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Reconfiguring Boundaries:

Japanese Women in Shanghai

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Social Sciences, the Australian National University

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I certify that this thesis is my own work and all sources used have been acknowledged. The substance of the thesis has not already been submitted for any degree and is not currently submitted for any other degree or qualification.

Signature: Eiko Hasegawa

Date: 8/6/2010
Since the early 2000s, despite the continued and relentless illustrations of celebrated accounts of the "borderless" world in the media, academic books and discourses, the security regimes that control the movement of people have been reinforced to a considerable degree. Recent technological developments such as the emergence of biometric passports to identify individuals bear testimony to this process. Increasingly, rather than removing boundaries, we are living in a world where the acts of creating, demarcating and ascertaining boundaries between "us" and "them" have become part of our every day social practices. Indeed they have become so commonplace that we often do not pay attention to their meanings and operations at all, recreating the image of the world of nation-states: each separated by our mindset to reaffirm such image as well as by fences, wires and border patrols.

This thesis is the product of several years of thinking about culture, mobility and boundaries in our everyday lives. In this intellectual journey, I have encountered a number of interesting people who crossed boundaries on many different levels: as immigrants, as academics and as travellers. These encounters have often led me to travel further to different sites, ideas, practices and new theoretical insights, giving me the opportunities to get a glimpse into the pictures of the world of mobility that are predicated on both the acts of crossing and of redefining boundaries on different levels. Their trajectories of crossing boundaries, including those of my interviewees, reveal
the permeability of boundaries: that they are open to the acts of reconfiguration and contestation, although the lines of demarcation continue to exert critical influence on our modes of thinking and on our everyday lives.

First of all, I am grateful to my interviewees in Shanghai and Singapore for taking part in this research and for taking me to interesting places in these cities. Equally important, I would like to thank those Chinese diasporas in Australia who have provided me with valuable insights into Sino-Japanese ties. My conversations with them form a vital part of this thesis.

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Abstract

This thesis explores migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai since the early 2000s. It sheds light on the shifting meaning of boundaries between Japan and other Asian countries, particularly China, through these migratory processes. I argue that urbanization and opportunities associated with rapid economic growth in China, as well as growing economic ties between China and Japan, are central to their migration processes. Their acts of migration are part of the processes of redefining and renegotiating boundaries between Japan and other parts of Asia. In this regard, I stress that they are not passive recipients of transnational processes. Rather, I suggest that they are active participants in the dynamic processes of place making and negotiating borders as well as countering, questioning and re-imagining the state practices of demarcating boundaries. Transnational migration is a vital part of enacting such processes as it enables individual migrants to relate to the place, culture and/or people beyond “our” territory: an imagined community that is sustained through the acts of forgetting and remembering and of securitizing border-crossings as a threat to the secure and bounded community. By drawing attention to the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai, I suggest that the global cities in the Asia-Pacific region may provide a significant space for critically interrogating the questions of boundaries, mobility and territoriality. I thus argue that the movement of people is vital to the reconfiguration of boundaries.
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Notes on Japanese Names

This thesis follows the Japanese convention that family names precede personal names. However, the names of the authors of English language works (except translations) follow the English convention of the personal name preceding the family name. Macrons are put on long Japanese vowels except in the case of place names (e.g., Tokyo), words commonly used in English and authors' names which usually appear without a macron in their English language works.
Introduction
The city is a place where new ideas, encounters and stories are constantly experienced, made and narrated in motion, where the mobility of people intersects with diverse flows of commodities, cultures, ideas and architectural practices. Cities in China also share such characteristics: places in motion.

My first encounter with Chinese cities dates back to 1995 when I visited Hong Kong on my way to India. Although it was just meant to be a short stopover to a trip to another place, I was deeply enchanted by its street life and the cosmopolitan ambience of the city as a meeting place between the East and the West. And I encountered a number of tourists and sojourners who were on a transit to/from mainland China. The urban landscape of Hong Kong reflected the mixture of Chinese and other cultural dimensions: the city as the product of its interconnectedness and interrelationships with other cultures and places shaped my subsequent encounters with, and understandings of, cities in Asia.

A decade later, I revisited the city again. And this time I was on my way to Shanghai. The major difference between the 1995 trip and this one was that the territorial sovereignty of Hong Kong had shifted from Britain to the People's Republic of China. Despite the change in its nationality, the city remained as the place of mixing and transit, with increasing influence from mainland China. And the territory was now directly connected to the mainland by railways. Rather than taking a flight directly to Shanghai, I chose the train journey from Hong Kong to experience what it was like to move between the two cities overland and to directly experience the border-crossing between Hong Kong and mainland China.

As with other long-distance train journeys in mainland China, the train was filled with the sound of Chinese pop music, the sight of people eating,
drinking and engaging in conversations. To put it another way, the dynamism of a busy street life as seen in many parts of Chinese cities was now transposed in the carriages of the train. Such a train journey seemed to be sharply in contrast with those train trips in Japan: quiet, ordered as it basically existed as a vehicle of transporting people from place A to B.

As I made several trips between Hong Kong and Shanghai during my fieldwork, I have come to appreciate the interconnectedness of the two cities and the importance of such connections to people who move between them as part of their everyday social practices. In particular, the cityscape of Hong Kong, as a meeting place of East and Southeast Asia, as a transit place between East and West, and as a contact zone between China and the global, has influenced the ways in which I think about the relationship between places, mobility and cultures. Although this thesis largely relates to one Chinese city, Shanghai, Hong Kong, as a place of transit, has thus provided me with a variety of important insights into the social, political and cultural dimensions of cities as bridges between different communities, cultural practices and as a place of transit where diverse people, commodities and ideas meet to create a new landscape and stories about diverse encounters and movements in multiple contexts. As such, the city informs both theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the chapters that follow.

This thesis aims to contribute to contemporary debates about population mobility to cities in East Asia in relation to larger questions of borders and boundaries in the contemporary world. It is thus dedicated to cities and places where different cultures meld, mingle and intersect, and particularly to those people who embody such mixing and encounters through their acts of border-crossings in their everyday lives and practices.
Borders and Boundaries: Mapping Transnational Migration in East Asia

Borders and boundaries are significant components of contemporary social processes. Despite the putative free movement of transnational capital, the mobility of people across state borders continues to be framed and informed by a number of restrictions, social control and political practices by the state. From the acts of asylum seekers and refugees risking their lives to cross state borders to those of immigration officers suspecting and trying to deter such acts of border-crossings to protect and secure the territorial integrity and borders of the nation-state, issues pertaining to borders and boundaries have become one of the most central social and political agendas in the early twenty-first century. At the same time, a range of social, political, economic and cultural dynamics all across our interconnected world are forcing us to rethink the meanings and operations of boundaries in our everyday lives.

Situating boundaries at multiple scales and analysing their implications for social, economic and political practices have thus become central to our understanding of contemporary social processes today. Despite the increasing flows of people, goods, ideas and capital, we continue to construct and ascertain boundaries to make sense of our place in the world. These borders and boundaries, as social constructs, in turn, shape and structure our everyday lives in a variety of ways. Since they are very much part of our everyday lives, we seldom question their assumptions and implications.

1 As Wastl-Walter and Staeheli point out, political geographers use the term “borders” to talk about the delimitation of the territory of the nation-state (2004: 151). In this thesis, I make a conceptual distinction between “borders” and “boundaries”. While I use the term “borders” to mark this legally accepted delimitation of the state’s territory, I refer to the term “boundaries” to draw attention to the socially constructed dimensions of boundaries at a variety of scales. In doing so, I highlight that boundaries may be contested by non-state actors and are thus open to the acts of constant renegotiation and reconfiguration.
Instead, we tend to presuppose the practice of demarcating boundaries as “natural” and “inevitable”, leaving them unquestioned as social constructs. As a result, we seldom ask such questions: Why do we have borders and boundaries that divide people and places apart?: What are the meanings of boundaries in this seemingly “globalized” world?: What is the social, political and historical basis on which we differentiate “us” from “them” and “our” territory from other places?: What is the role of the nation-state in the creation and demarcation of boundaries?: And how do people act upon such state practices in an age when the movement of people, cultures and information increasingly connect us to different places, people and ideas?²

The chapters that follow are concerned with these questions about boundaries, their meanings and operation in this seemingly “borderless” world. It aims to place the acts of demarcating, or contesting boundaries in a social, political and cultural context. For boundaries, as social constructs, have huge impacts on how we perceive “us” and “them” and how we narrate the nation, territories, identities as well as memories of “our” past. Our social interactions with others are thus deeply embedded in this “bordering” process: we determine who is included as part of “us” and who is excluded from this process through the assumed boundaries and differences. In this respect, it can be argued that one of the central functions of borders and boundaries is to separate and divide “us” from “them”: that is, to mark the difference between “us” from “them”. These social practices of demarcating between “us” and “them” and ideas that inform such a practice have sustained the basis of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991). Such a way of thinking has permeated into an assumed association between boundaries and the territory of the nation-state (Newman and Paasi 1998: 3). In this context, the nation-state continues to operate and reinforce these practices of

² There is an enormous and burgeoning literature on globalization. For representative entry points into this vast literature, see Held, MacGrew, Goldbratt, and Perraton (1999); Shoelte (2000).
“bordering” in the face of the growing impacts of transnational processes on their economic, political and social structures. As Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan point out, the control of borders becomes critically significant to states because borders are first lines of defense, institutions of social coercion, and symbols of a variety of state powers (1998: 10).

Most importantly, these “bordering” processes have brought to light the centrality of the state’s practices to demarcate boundaries in order to keep its territorial and national integrity pure and intact while selectively erasing the continued presence, memories and traces of its irrevocable ties and interactions with, “others”. In this regard, I aim to demonstrate how the mobility of people — the migration of Japanese women to Shanghai — may impact on, contest, and/or interact with, the state’s practices of boundary-making.

The aims of this thesis are twofold. The first is to examine the acts of reconfiguring of boundaries between China and Japan through the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai, the largest and an aspiring global city of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). More specifically, I focus on expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai, in China whose economic growth and rapid urban development have attracted a growing number of Japanese women to work there. I explore their migratory processes in the context of increasing flows of population mobility both within and across the borders of the nation-states in the Asia-Pacific region. I also aim to shed light on how Japanese women engage with new conceptions of “Asia” since the 1990s. Against the backdrop of Japan’s past atrocities against other Asian countries,

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3 It should be acknowledged that the “Asia-Pacific” is a contested idea (Dirlik 1993: Kelly and Olds 1999). Although there are different interpretations in regard to this concept, I use this term to signify the regions or areas which are conventionally referred to as East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia and Oceania. Among these different areas that constitute the “Asia-Pacific” regions, I focus on countries of East and Southeast Asia as the central scope of analysing and explaining transnational social processes.
in particular China and the two Koreas, its relationships with these countries have always been fraught with complexities, ambiguities and political tensions. Recent years, however, have seen the significant rise in transnational connections and relations between Japan and other Asian countries, in particular, in social, economic and cultural spheres. Non-state actors, such as individual migrants, NGOs and a variety of industries, have been central in these processes. Thus, exploring the movements of people, ideas and cultural products is of vital importance for mapping the socio-political practices and processes of “re-bordering” in East Asia.

The second is to understand the migratory process of Japanese women to Shanghai as part of the larger process of reconfiguring boundaries in global cities in the context of global population movements that have accelerated and intensified in scale and volume since the late twentieth century. As I shall discuss in the following chapters, the processes of demarcating, contesting and renegotiating boundaries constitute the vital dimensions of social, political and cultural practices as a variety of scales in the present historical moment. These processes and practices are central to understanding and addressing the issues in regard to national identity, regionalism as well as the relationship between the construction of community, culture, citizenship practices and a sense of belonging. I thus place the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai in the context of the growing mobility of people, goods and ideas across borders and stress their agency in their active roles as transnational migrants in Asia. In

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4 Risse-Kappen defines transnational relations as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization” (1995: 3).

5 Pempel suggests that a host of overlapping and reinforcing regional ties are being built in East Asia — not only through formal, governmentally constituted bodies but also, and more pervasively, by cross-border investment and trade flows, increasingly common cultural experiences, and unofficial links among NGOs. Such cross-border linkages, he argues, have far more reaching influences on developing the basis for regional cooperation and interdependence in the region (Pempel 2005: 5-6).
particular, I draw attention to one dimension of migratory processes — that “displacement may enable a different and sometimes subversive of reshuffling of national verities” (Malkki 1995: 15).

What grounds this thesis is the embodied experience of places by expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai, the largest city of the most populated country, China, as well as in other Asian cities such as Singapore. The changing political economy in East and Southeast Asia, which is represented by the rapid economic development in China, as well as the increase in media and cultural interactions between Japan and other Asian countries, has provided an important basis on which Japanese women perceive other parts of “Asia”. In addition, the growth of job opportunities in other Asian countries that reflects the intensification of regionalisation of economic activities between Japan and other Asian countries has contributed to the migration of Japanese women who are disappointed with the gendered domestic job market in Japan or who are in search of new challenges and opportunities in urban centres of countries such as China and Singapore. This thesis thus also draws attention to the contemporary social processes in which Asian women may also occupy professional spaces, although their economic or social status may differ from the pre-existing image of expatriate males who dominate the imagined landscape of the global city.

Research on transnational migration, as it is a multi-dimensional process, requires multiple perspectives from different academic disciplines. This thesis aims to bring multidisciplinary approaches and methodologies to bear upon the migratory processes of Japanese women to other parts of Asia, in particular to Shanghai: it draws on approaches associated with sociology, cultural studies, politics, history, geography and anthropology and seeks to bring them together in the studies of transnational migration. By transcending disciplinary boundaries such as anthropology, geography,
sociology, I thus aim to open up dialogues between different disciplines and to situate the migratory processes of Japanese women within the scholarship on transnational feminist studies, cultural studies, political geography and urban studies that take account of the increasing flows and circulations of people, goods, information and knowledge across the borders of nation-states.

Drawing on recent theoretical developments on migration and transnationalism, I aim to demonstrate the complexity of their migration trajectories to highlight that their acts of migration are a central part of the ongoing processes of reconfiguring boundaries between Japan and other parts of Asia, in particular, between China and Japan. These women, as I shall demonstrate in subsequent chapters, are not passive agents in the constructions of territoriality and boundaries. Rather, I argue that they are central to the processes of the reconfiguration of boundaries between Japan and "Asia" through their acts of border crossings.

**Territory and Territoriality as the Site and Strategies of Constructing Boundaries**

In explaining and understanding migratory processes, the concepts of territory and territoriality are crucially important as they chart the map in which we frequently demarcate the boundaries. The power of a nation-state is often conceived as inseparable from its exercise and maintenance of sovereignty in its territory — the space controlled by the nation-state. Disputes regarding the demarcation of territory often mark central frictions in bilateral or multilateral relations. We need valid passports and/or visas to enter the territory of the place which we do not belong to. If we do not have these documents, we then run the risk of becoming "illegal migrants": objects
to be deported or removed by the authorities. Territory signifies a place that is invested with political meanings. The territorial integrity of a nation-state, thus, is conceived as one of the most critical dimensions of the project of statehood, to be maintained or protected by its politicians and citizens alike. As territory is an important concept in discussing the relationship between place, boundaries and identity, we need to give definitions of this term and territoriality — its interrelated concept. Wastl-Walter and Staeheli define territory and territoriality as:

_Territory_ is an area claimed by a single person or a group of people; it therefore is a concept that operates at a variety of scales, from the personal space of an individual to the space controlled by a street gang to the space claimed by a transnational corporation. The spaces are usually marked by boundaries, which may be visible or symbolic and which may be more or less impervious to other claims on the same space. Functionally, the idea of territory works to provide a space for social action of various sorts and for various social actors. In providing such a space, territory is constructed through acts of inclusion and exclusion. _Territoriality_ refers to the strategies by which control is asserted over territory. These strategies may rely on several “technologies,” such as legal structures ensuring property ownership, social norms and sanctions that mark people and acts as being “in place” and “out of place,” and state-sponsored violence to enforce borders and sovereignty. Critically, territoriality relies on notions of identity and difference — of belonging to a territory or of being different from those who do not belong (2004: 142-143; _italics_ original).

Thus, territoriality shapes our understandings of boundaries and highlights the ways in which marking a particular territory as “ours” has always been an exclusionary practice in its meanings and operation. The nation-state has invested enormous efforts in, and relied on, the strategies to assert control over its territory to define its nation and people and to exclude “others” from these processes of imagining “our” nation and territory. Moreover, the concept of territoriality may be extended to people
and phenomena. As Sack identifies in his definition of territorality, it refers to "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" (1986: 19). As such, the notion of territorality points to the centrality of power and control in understanding the ways in which the nation-state articulates its identity politics in relation to its citizens. It also indicates that the acts of demarcating boundaries are inseparable from the politics of territorality and thus constitute the crucial dimension of the political processes in which state power is exercised to map and demarcate its territory and people by articulating their differences from other places and to put them in place.

Connecting the Past with the Present: Exploring the multiple trajectories of women between Asian countries

The acts of migration take on different meanings to different individuals under a diverse range of circumstances and contexts. For some, migration represents a route to better opportunities as well as liberation from the social constraints of being rooted in one place; for others, it signifies exploitation, oppression, pain and sufferings. The movement of women between Asian countries has sometimes been a contested and, all too often, politicized issue in the region. During the Second World War, a large number of women from both other Asian countries and Japan, the majority of whom were Korean, were forced to become sex slaves for the Japanese army. It was not until the

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Sjoberg argues that women's marginality in just war narratived is reinforced through the gendered categorization/construction of men as viril warriors and of women as the feminized other and that these narratives obscures women's actual suffering in war (2009: 152-153). She also illustrates that violence against women in war must be understood in a larger context of gender symbolism in global politics (2009: 173).
1990s that the sufferings of “comfort women” were brought to light in Japan. In order to raise the morale of soldiers in various war zones, these women were often sent to the frontlines in the Asia-Pacific region and suffered considerable pains both physically and psychologically during and after the war. Even after they managed to return from the battlefield to their homeland, which remained an unfulfilled dream for a large number of those women who were left deserted or died in places where they were forced to accompany soldiers, most of them had to keep their voices silenced for fear of being ostracized by their families and communities that valorize the “purity” of women’s bodies. And in Japan, the official discourse on history, which viewed its selective reinterpretation of history as a necessary act in order to represent the nation as a historical continuity in its own right, has left the history and memory of “comfort women” largely unexamined until the early 1990s when the testimonies by the former comfort women, as well as the international revelation of related historical events, exerted considerable pressure on the nation to admit the existence of these women. Indeed, far from being marginal, these women are viewed as an integral part of the gendered and racialized practices of the Japanese imperial army during the Second World War. The acts of silencing of the voices of these women at home, as well as the erasure of their existence from the “official” version of Japan’s modern history, have been a marker of how the politics of memory, history and trauma is closely tied to larger questions of gender and race as well as the nation-centered political practices of both their home countries and Japan.

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7 The term “comfort women” is a euphemism referring to sex slaves for the Japanese military during the Second World War. In recent years, in order to reflect the realitieves of the pains that these women suffered, the term “sex slaves” is preferred when referring to these women.

8 It should be acknowledged that there has been a continuing contention over the war within Japanese society. Here I mainly refer to official discourse on history as sanctioned by the Ministry of Education and Sciences in Japan.
I was an undergraduate student in Tokyo when the stories of these women were brought to light in Japan in the early 1990s. It was a time when, through the broadcasting of entertainment TV programs such as Asia Baguus!, popular cultures from other parts of Asia appeared to begin permeating into the everyday lives of Japanese. From this development, it appeared very natural to assume that Japan and "Asia" were finally becoming closer not only geographically but also socially and culturally after several decades of assumed separation in social, political and cultural terms. But the revelation of the painful historical facts of "comfort women" sparked national and international controversies over the ways in which Japan had faced, or, to put it more precisely, erased certain parts of its wartime history from its official discourses and history textbooks. More specifically, this representation of history resulted in the questioning of Japan's asymmetrical engagement with Asia, which was mirrored in the continuing sexual exploitation of migrant women from Southeast Asian countries in its burgeoning sex industry, while the country promoted the idea of a closer economic cooperation with other Asian countries through its economic development assistance programs and investment to these countries. Since the late nineteenth century, Japan's relationship with other parts of Asia has always been fraught with the selective acts of remembering and forgetting, raising questions about its presence in, and ties with, Asia even several decades after the end of the Second World War. Such selective acts of invoking and mobilizing historical memory for political purposes have strained its relations with its neighbors. As Jager and Mitter point out, "Korean and Chinese memories of the Pacific War, and continuing tensions over Japan's 'amnesia' about its wartime past, have led to a marked increase in anti-Japanese sentiments in these countries" (2007: 4). At the same time, these processes drew my attention to a number of contradictions that exist within me: a part of me, as a Japanese citizen, belonged to "the race of the accused": I was a part of the nation which institutionalized the system of the
"comfort women", inflicting enormous pains and sufferings on these women while completely erasing their existence from “public memory” for almost half a century. Yet another part of me, as a woman, belonged to the same sex as the victims. And as a woman it was not difficult for me to imagine how acutely painful it had been to be forced into sexual slavery in distant places, far away from home, without any knowledge of the local language, without any emotional or psychological support from the beloved family or friends and with the idea of relinquishing any hope of return to their homeland. These thoughts tormented me as I read and watched the testimonies of former “comfort women” in books and on TV documentaries in those times.

Whenever I have had a chance to talk about this thesis topic, some people have asked me why I had chosen this particular topic. I could mention several reasons for this choice: my academic background in Gender Studies and Sociology, my personal and academic interest in China’s social transformations as well as global cities in East Asia; and my social and cultural capital as a Japanese woman to explore the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai. But one of the most important of all is that the personal contradictions that I felt in the 1990s are still alive inside me: whenever I have to face the history of Japan’s wartime atrocities as narrated through the films, media and, sometimes, through the voices of my friends from other Asian countries, the sense of contradictions inevitably come back to me as a recurring theme and it makes me realize that, although I belong to a relatively less privileged group as a woman in contemporary Japanese society, I still belong to the “race of the accused” on the part of those people who originate in countries that experienced Japan’s imperial expansion during the Second World War. These processes of contemplating the relationship between the politically and historically charged population movements between Japan and Asia and the construction and (re)-negotiation and questioning of my social identity as a Japanese woman at a
particular historical moment, in turn, have stimulated my academic interests: to explore and illuminate the shifting trajectories of population movement of women between Japan and other Asian countries at a time when China’s rise as a resurgent regional and global power signals a new stage of population mobility across borders in which the changing balance of power is intimately tied to the emergence of multifaceted and diversified forms of population movements in East Asia since the early twenty-first century. And, in particular, I became interested in exploring how these movements and their actors as transnational migrants may contest, re-imagine or inform the state’s practices of demarcating social and political boundaries with other parts of Asia in the present historical moment.

My Positionality as a Researcher: Doing interdisciplinary research on the migration of Japanese women to Shanghai

My interest in, and fascination with, studying the construction and reconfiguration of boundaries began in Britain where I was living and studying as an MA student in the late 1990s. At that time, the social and political map of Europe was being significantly redrawn with the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU). This process entailed a reconfiguration of boundaries among sovereign European states in social, political and economic terms. Moreover, as I observed from students from European countries, there was an emerging sense of European identity that marked a sharp contrast to a conventional understanding of identity as being based firmly on the nation-centred perspectives of citizenship. At the same time, these processes of boundary reconfiguration were being contested by “Euro-sceptics”— those politicians who regarded deepening political and economic integration in the EU as a threat to the national sovereignty, power
and identity of Britain. Furthermore, a critical question has emerged as to the geographical boundaries of Europe — as the EU enlargement process began including former central and eastern European countries, the definition of boundaries between Europe and "non-Europe" has increasingly become a highly contested and politicized issue. Moreover, the social and cultural landscape of major cities was, contrary to my imagination of Europe prior to my departure to Britain, increasingly marked by the blurring of boundaries between "the East" and "the West". Over the past decades, increased migration has altered the landscapes of cities in many parts of Europe. Birmingham, for instance, is a city with a large number of South Asian and Middle-Eastern populations living in the city. Walking on the streets of Birmingham, I often had a sense of doubt about the location in which I was situated: the racial and ethnic heterogeneity and diversity of streets in the city made me wonder whether I was in Europe or in another region in the world, blurring the sense of boundaries between Europe and "non-Europe".

These dynamic processes of constructing, contesting and reconfiguring boundaries have vital repercussions for economic, social and political contexts in which our everyday lives are embedded. Moreover, though conversation with some local people in Europe, I found that they do not necessarily share the same securitized concept of boundaries as articulated by politicians or bureaucrats of the EU and its member states. These encounters made me reconsider the nature of boundaries and identities as arbitrary, contextual and contingent.

* In particular, the issue of whether to include Turkey as member states of the EU has remained unresolved for more than a few decades. As a country with the majority of its population comprised of muslims, Turkey has applied for an EU membership since the 1980s. But the accession processes have been delayed due to its human rights records, the issues of Cyprus and, most importantly, its huge muslim population to which some European politicians referred as threats to the basic identity and stability of Europe if Turkey is included as part of the EU.
This study relates to the reconfiguration of boundaries between China and Japan through the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai. As in Europe, the processes of “bordering” between Japan and other Asian countries, and particularly between China and Japan, have often been marked by conflict and contestation in social and political terms. Japan's geographical proximity to China has meant that centuries of its relations with China—a powerful and giant neighbour with which Japan has had ambiguous relations that have been fraught with both xenophobic protectionism and yearning—had a critical influence on shaping its national identity in relation to its development as a “modern” nation in East Asia.

As I shall demonstrate in Chapter 1, China, in Japanese representational practices since its modernization in the late nineteenth century, has often been associated with the pre-modern, the uncivilized and the underdeveloped. It has thus represented spatial formations which were unambiguously opposed to the progress and modernity of the Japanese nation. Such a social imagination, as represented by the constructed dichotomy between Japan as a modern and developed nation and China as the opposite, has functioned to sustain ideas about China as a distant country in social and cultural terms and to keep peoples apart between the two countries even several decades after the end of the Second World War. Since the early 2000s, however, with China’s integration into the world economy and the deepening of social and economic ties between China and Japan, boundaries between the two countries are being reconfigured. Within such a context of China's transformations and closer ties between China and Japan, I argue that expatriate Japanese women play a central role in this process of reconfiguring the boundaries through their migratory processes to Shanghai.

This research has required me to cross boundaries on multiple levels. First, I
crossed different boundaries on a geographical level. During this process, I came to discover that there are multi-layered boundaries within the Chinese speaking world itself. As I made several fieldwork trips between Singapore and Shanghai using Hong Kong and Macau as a transit point, I found that the mobility of the Chinese from the mainland China often constitutes a contested social presence in both Singapore and Hong Kong. The term “China girl” in Singapore, for instance, refers to a single woman from mainland China who, according to the local social imagination, comes to Singapore for prostitution purposes. In this context, women from the mainland China are imagined and construed as immoral and sexualized females who could possibly pose a threat to the “secure” Singaporean family though their acts of seducing local men. In Hong Kong, too, women from the mainland China represent a site of contestations, and this is evident in a number of Hong Kong films that deal with the movement of women from the mainland China. For instance, film such as Durian Durian (Liulian Piaopiao: directed by Fruit Chan, Hong Kong 2000) is a sensitive portrait of a young woman from mainland China who works in Hong Kong as a prostitute.10 These representational practices suggest that the construction of boundaries often includes a gendered and racialized process in its production and circulation. Moreover, the imagined “others” may well be at home instead of some anonymous places on the other side of the border. To illustrate this further, Yeh and Ng suggest that the boundary between Hong Kong and China may not be as distinct as perceived when one looks at the economy of sex and menial labor. Films such as Durian, Durian and Hollywood Hong Kong

10 As Gan points out, although mainland Chinese women have had a presence on Hong Kong cinema, the representations of these women have often been restricted to those of “the mainland other”, against whom a boundary between a local Hong Kong identity and that of mainland China is created. Despite such traditions of representing mainland women as “the other”, recent geopolitical and social developments on Hong Kong after 1997, which is highlighted by the intense cross-border relations between Hong Kong and mainland China, have produced more accurate and realistic portrayals of these women. (Gan 2005: 43-45). For more detailed analyses of the representations of mainland women in Hong Kong, see Shih (1999) and Gan (2005).
(directed by Fruit Chan, Hong Kong 2001), for instance, present the narratives of the mobility of confident and assertive sex workers from the mainland and their penetration of borders deep inside Hong Kong locality (Yeh and Ng 2009: 147-148). Their acts of travelling across a various borders of neighbourhoods, cities and further illustrate the increasingly permeable nature of the border between Hong Kong and the mainland: the border that sustained the lines of demarcation between the city and its "motherland" for 150 years has now been transformed into a busy crossroad which is marked by the intense cross-border mobility of people, capital and cultures.

Such processes of the changes and/or (re)production of boundaries also made me realize the socially constructed nature of the nation-state: that the nation-state needs to be considered not in absolute but in relative terms. As Jens Bartleson points out, we tend to presuppose "some primordial differentiation of humanity into territorially bounded communities" in order to understand processes of homogenization that we consider as precedent to the formation of the nation-states (2006: 33). During my fieldwork, as I crossed different boundaries on a geographical level, I found that what is of paramount significance in the Australian media, for instance, does not assume as much importance in the Singaporean media. This dimension points to the significance of the (national) media in revealing to its citizens what is important to the nation. By doing so, it also conveys that it must be also of vital significance to its citizens' lives. By constructing the matters of significance to the nation and closely tying it to its people, the media strengthens the socially constructed ties between the nation-state and its citizens and make them natural and unproblematic to their everyday lives. Our daily exposure to newspaper, TV news programs or radio news is a constant reminder of this process to inform the centrality of the nation to our everyday lives (Billig 1995). In this respect, the media plays a critical role in
sustaining the narrative of nation-states as a paramount and primordial entity in its own right, thus prompting us to consider and theorize social processes in terms of territorially bounded communities.

Also, my academic location as a PhD student in Australia at the time of writing this thesis — being geographically and intellectually detached from the territorial spaces of both China and Japan — has enabled me to reconsider the questions of the politics of selective memory in (re)imagining the nation, as well as to interrogate critically the relationship between the nation, memory and territoriality that continue to be operative in both countries.

The second and third dimensions of border-crossings relate to theoretical levels. Second, as mentioned above, I found it important to cross disciplinary boundaries within the academic disciplines of social sciences since this research addresses issues of migration and the “bordering” processes between China and Japan in the larger context of East Asia. Third, I also felt it vital to move the scope of my analytical framework from a nation-stated based one to a transnational one. More specifically, the growing flows of people who move in and across borders of nation-states in East Asia are indicative of the need for shifting our imagination from the one that is based on the nation-state to a much larger or different framework to better understand the mobility of people and the reconfiguring of borders that it brings with it. I thus stress a transnational approach because an exploration of contemporary East Asian migration necessitates the recognition of multifaceted flows and influences between the place of origin and the new living space. I take this approach as the notion of the transnational contests static binary of centre/periphery and self/the other (Low and Lawrence Zuniga 2004: 27).

My own social location as a Japanese woman who is doing a doctoral research
at one of the universities in Australia provided me with a number of entry points to study their migratory processes in a variety of ways. First, as a Japanese woman who lives overseas, I share an understanding of both liberating and difficult aspects of crossing boundaries and of living as a minority as well as a perspective of reflecting upon Japan from the outside. Second, the conversations and interactions with my interviewees were facilitated due largely to the fact that I belonged to the same generation as the majority of them. Third, as I am a female researcher, some of my interviewees seemed to have felt it relatively unrestrained to talk about their personal lives more intimately than being interviewed by a male researcher. In this respect, the sex of the researcher, I believe, may be considered to be a significant factor in shaping the outcome of research, in particular, one that is based on in-depth interviews. Finally, the fact that I was not from a local educational institution worked to an advantage, as it made my interviewees feel less restricted about what they talked about in interviews. Overall, I view the process of this research as one that has been based on ongoing dialogues between my interviewees and me, and between different disciplines in the social sciences.

Methodology: Applying feminist perspectives as a way to understand embodied experiences of migration

This thesis is based on my fieldwork research in Shanghai between 2004 and 2005, as well as on my fieldwork research in Singapore between 2004 and 2006. I conducted in-depth interviews with 25 expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai and 15 women in Singapore, with 5 additional specific interviews with Japanese men who were working in China or had specific contacts with the Chinese in Japan. Interviews with these Japanese men were conducted to
ask their personal opinion about China and the Chinese, as well as any
gender specific differences between Japanese men and women in Shanghai.
Three of them were recruited through local Japanese magazines published in
Shanghai and two of them were through personal contacts.

One of the central reasons why I choose to focus on expatriate Japanese
women in Shanghai rather than males is that the flows of migration take
different forms between men and women: men are more likely to be in a more
privileged position since the majority of them are transferred from their
companies in Japan, whereas most of Japanese women in Shanghai are more
likely to migrate on their own accord. The majority of expatriate males, as
some of my interviewees put it, live and experience the city as if they are
living in Japan: they live inside the Japanese community in Shanghai and
thus it is often possible to live their daily lives without having any
interactions, or taking any interest in the locals. By contrast, the majority of
Japanese women come to Shanghai with different expectations, motivations
and perceptions with regard to their move. In light of these differences, I was
interested in why women, who are conventionally perceived to be closely tied
to the private spheres of home and often conceptualized as the boundary
marker of the nation, choose to migrate to different countries. In particular,
female migration to China — a country with which Japan has had
complicated relationships both in historical and contemporary terms — draws
attention to the increasingly multifaceted aspects of contemporary migration
in the Asia-Pacific region. In light of this, I argue that those Japanese

11 Since the late nineteenth century, the project of modern nation-building in Japan
rendered China and other Asian countries insignificant in comparison with the West as
the cradle of “modern” civilization and technological innovation. The defeat in the
Second World War realigned Japan as one of the closest allies of the Unites States. As a
result, relations with other Asian countries have been less prioritized than that with the
United States in political, diplomatic and security terms for several decades after the
end of the Second World War. Yet in recent years the rise of other Asian economies,
particularly that of China’s economy, has contributed significantly to a different
understanding of other parts of Asia in Japan. The detailed accounts of Japan’s ties with
other parts of Asia, particularly China, will be provided in subsequent chapters.
women who migrate to Shanghai have been central to the process of reconfiguring the migratory processes between China and Japan, which was previously characterized by one-sided movement: Chinese economic migrants going to Japan for better opportunities. But the recent migratory processes of the Japanese to China suggest that the population mobility between the two countries is increasingly marked by the interdependent relationship of China and Japan in economic and social terms. Furthermore, these processes are part of the growing global migratory flows of people, information, goods and ideas, which are multidirectional and multifaceted.

Most migration theorists have largely concentrated upon the study of migrants from less developed countries to more developed regions, searching for an improvement in their social and economic situation. Yet this focus neglects the other dimension of migratory process: that is, the movements of people in which citizens of more developed economies choose to migrate to other areas for non-economic reasons. There are a few studies of this form of mobility in the West. But little research has been done in regard to the investigation of these reverse population movements in the Asia-Pacific region. This study aims to bridge this gap in migration studies by bringing to light an emerging form of the population movement that is grounded in an increasing web of ties and interdependencies across the barriers of nation-states in an East Asian context.

In order to approach potential interviewees, I attended the regular meetings of the Association of Japanese Women in Shanghai in July 2004, January 2005 and April 2005. By attending these meetings, I was able to introduce

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12 See, for example, O'Reilly (2000).
13 The Association of Japanese Women in Shanghai was established in the mid-1990s to foster exchanges and interactions among Japanese women who are working in Shanghai. Approximately 250 Japanese women were members of this association as of 2005. They hold three to four regular events a year, such as a lunch party, a seminar, or a music concert, to facilitate these interactions. Presenters of their seminars include
myself as a researcher and to obtain contact information from those Japanese women who attended these meetings. Subsequent to these meetings, I contacted them individually to ask about the possibility of interviews based on questions I had prepared in advance. Depending on the availability of the interviews as well as on the different experiences of migratory patterns of my interviewees, I asked additional questions which I thought to be relevant to each interviewee's specific situation. As for the place of interviews, I left it entirely to my interviewees. As a result, these meetings often took place in fashionable cafés or local restaurants chosen by the interviewees. These restaurants included Taiwanese, Cantonese, French-Vietnamese, Japanese, Indian and others, testifying to the fact that the growing presence of expatriates in the city has transformed its dining culture to a considerable degree. In short, these meetings provided me with critical insights into migratory processes of Japanese women and into the impacts of the global flows of people on the increasingly diversified food-scenes in Shanghai.

The interviewees include locally-hired Japanese women as well as those who were transferred from their companies in Japan, Hong Kong or Europe. The age of my interviewees is quite diverse: it ranges from early twenties to late sixties. Nevertheless, reflecting the basic pattern of Japanese women's migrations to Shanghai in which they study Mandarin in China after several years' work experience in Japan and seek employment in Shanghai thereafter, most of them are in their thirties or late twenties. In regard to their marital status, the majority of them are single, with four of my interviewees being married to local Chinese men and one to a Japanese man who also works in Shanghai as an expatriate. Their educational levels also vary, but the majority of them are university graduates and have attended some forms of language courses in mainland China. Reflecting the growing expatriate Japanese women and men as well as local Chinese business people.
Japanese presence in the city as well as the importance of Chinese manufacturing and markets to Japanese firms, most of my interviewees work in Japanese-related business in Shanghai, whether they belong to Chinese or Japanese organizations.

Fieldwork research in Singapore was conducted to contextualize the analyses of expatriate Japanese women within the wider framework of population movements within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to deepen my understanding of the multiple processes of Japanese women migrating to other Asian countries. As a city-state that relies on knowledge-based labour and thus relatively welcomes skilled (temporary) migrants\textsuperscript{14} who possess adequate skills and educational qualifications, Singapore preceded Shanghai in terms of these processes. Moreover, it has a long and established history of Japanese presence within Southeast Asia. Geographically, it is situated in Southeast Asia. Yet it is one of the highly Westernized and modernized cities in the region and English is its official language. The positioning of Singapore as a travel hub in Southeast Asia may prove it to be a convenient location for these Japanese women to travel and explore tourist places in Southeast Asia and beyond. Together, these dimensions have contributed to attracting a number of Japanese women who have aspirations to live and work overseas. Since there is no association specific to expatriate Japanese women in Singapore, I relied on the use of a snowball sampling technique for my initial approach to potential interviewees in Singapore. After this process, I made appointments with interviewees who agreed to be interviewed by me. These interviews in Singapore also took place in fashionable cafés or local restaurants chosen by the interviewees.

\textsuperscript{14} It should be acknowledged that labour migration is regarded as a temporary migratory process and thus not viewed as a permanent settlement in most of the countries in East and Southeast Asia (Castles 2003: 5). In the case of Singapore, however, it is possible for individuals with accepted skills and educational qualifications to apply for a permanent residency in Singapore, although certain groups of people are excluded from this process.
In addition to asking expatriate Japanese about their perceptions of China and their migratory processes, I also asked Chinese students and academics in Shanghai, Singapore and Australia (3 individuals in Shanghai, 2 in Singapore and 12 in Australia respectively) about their perceptions of Japan to better understand multiple dimensions of bilateral ties from different perspectives.

My fieldwork did not end with my return to Australia. Rather, it has continued throughout the processes of writing the chapters of this thesis. To put it differently, everyday interactions with both Chinese and Japanese in Australia, as well as people of other ethnicities, have also provided significant insights into rethinking questions of boundaries, identity and place. For me, fieldwork and writing have always been inseparable research processes and they have been reconstitutive of each other. I, therefore, included these insights as parts of my analyses in conceptualizing Japanese women's migration to Shanghai and their reconfiguration of boundaries between China and Japan through their migratory process.

**Questioning Methodological Nationalisms: Situating new theoretical Paradigms in the Social Sciences within the study of transnational migration**

The nation-state is a highly specific historical form as it developed between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe. The development of the nation-state has led to the identification of political territory with social space (Hirst 2005: 26-27). This vision of social space has been conducive to the "territorialization" of the social sciences; that is, their theoretical and empirical foundations have largely been informed by our imaginative
landscapes where politics, society and culture are to be understood within the containers of the nation-state. As Malkki asserts, "the national order of things" — a system of ordering and sorting people into national kinds and types is a powerful regime of classification that is based on a continual and taken-for-granted exercise of power (1995: 6). Such a categorical order of nation states has been seen as natural and therefore, inherently legitimate (1995: 8). As a consequence, the state-centred system of territories and boundaries defines not only how we understand and represent the world but also how knowledge of the geography of the world is created and reproduced (Paasi 1999: 69). Such thinking has further reinforced the view that all individuals should belong to a nation-state and, thus, moving across state borders should be seen as anomalous acts rather than as an integrated part of social and economic processes of individuals' lives.

Tim Cresswell succinctly points out that the metaphysics of sedentarism continues to pervade modern social thought (2006: 32). He illustrates that one of the principal ways of thinking about mobility in the modern Western world is "to see it as a threat, a disorder in the system, a thing to control" (2006: 26). Such a strand of thinking about mobility has permeated the theoretical orientations of many studies in the social sciences. Sheller and Urry similarly point to the internalization of sedentarist theories in the social sciences (2006: 208). Sedentarism is influenced by the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger, for whom dwelling (or wohnen) means to reside or to stay, to dwell at peace, to be content or at home in a place (1971). Sheller and Urry thus argue that sedentarism has defined the scope of the designs and methodologies of the social sciences by locating bounded and authentic places or nations as the basic units of analyses (2006: 208).

In much of the twentieth-century, much of the scholarship on sociology was primarily based on the study of occupational, income, educational and social
mobility and viewed mobility as a threat to society. Such literature, as Urry criticizes, regarded society as "a uniform surface and failed to register the geographical intersections of region, city and place, with the social categories of class, gender and ethnicity" (2000b: 186). Billig also illustrates that the "society which lies at the centre of sociology's self-definition is created in the image of the nation-state" (1995: 53). Gupta and Ferguson demonstrate that "the representation of the world as a collection of 'countries,' as on most world maps, sees it as an inherently divided space"; and, as a result, the terms "society" and "culture" are routinely rendered synonymous with nation-states (1997b: 34). This representation, as they point out, has led to two strands of nationalisms on which the association between society and culture is based: the first is the association between a culturally unitary group and "their" territory as natural; and the second is the naturalized acts of associating citizens of states with their territories. More importantly, they stress that both nationalisms present "associations of people and place as solid, commonsensical, and agreed on, when they are in fact contested, uncertain, and in flux" and that states play a central role in this process: constructing and maintaining naturalized links between places and peoples (Gupta and Ferguson 1997b: 40-41). In such theorization of place and people, mobility is considered as the phenomenon that presents problems and threat to the stability, rootedness and continuity of culture and society (Cresswell 2006: 32-33).

The focus on the nation-state as the unit of sociological analyses was suitable as long as social mobility of various forms takes place only within the territorially defined and bounded spaces of the particular nation-state. Yet this perspective on "society", which relies on the assumption that "society" and "culture" are "rooted" in a particular place, is simply not tenable for

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15 See, for example, the work of Burgess (1925) and Park (1925) who belonged to the Chicago School of sociology and were concerned with social disorder produced by mobility.
explaining and understanding contemporary social processes that are increasingly stretched across borders. More specifically, it does not fully account for the social and cultural practices of a growing number of those people who live a life of border-crossings — transnational professional elites, migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers whose social relations and itineraries criss-cross boundaries as demarcated and defined on conventional world maps of nation-states. Featherstone thus points out that the challenge for sociology is to develop modes of systematic investigation which identify global social processes "which render problematic what has long been regarded as the basic matter for sociology: society, conceived almost exclusively as the bounded nation-states" (1990: 2).

The increased flows of people, goods, cultural products, information and capital across national boundaries have posed significant questions about the traditional theoretical foundations and perspectives of disciplines within the social sciences, as outlined above, and urged these disciplines to shift their attention and to shed more light on the shifting relationship between people and place. More specifically, mobilities of diverse forms on an enormous scale and at a variety of spatial scales problematize the definition of "society" as the unit of analysis that has been based upon nation-states. As such, these mobilities "hold out the possibilities of a major new agenda for sociology" (Urry 2000a: 2). In light of these global processes, Urry (2000a) thus argues for "sociology of mobilities": sociology that examines the diverse mobilities and travels of people, ideas, images and objects across international borders, and the implications these mobilities have for the reconstitution of social life.

Such an act of reconfiguring of sociology and social sciences in general is useful in that it enables to shift our imagination from the nation-state to a much larger or different framework to better understand the mobility of people in transnational contexts and processes and to chart the ways social
ties are shaped (and shape) networks which transmit flows of goods, people, ideas and capital. In aligning myself with such a perspective, I argue for the importance of theoretical approaches that take into account the increasing mobility of people, culture and ideas across the borders of states while taking into consideration the continued salience of nation-states in defining and controlling their borders. The "sociology of mobilities", therefore, needs to de-centre the nation-states as the unit of sociological analyses while remaining sensitive to the power of the nation-states to demarcate borders and, by doing so, to control and regulate population movements across their borders.

Border-Crossing, Immigrant Bodies and National Security: Questioning the meaning of Security in the post-Cold War era

As Fierke points out, security studies emerged as an academic subfield of international relations after the end of the Second World War and the development of this sub-discipline was supported by an antagonistic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union (2006: 17-18). Since then, the fears of the nuclear war and the need to deter such warfare have dominated the field. As a result, this discipline was largely concerned with the threat and use of force by states (Fierke 2007: 21-23).

The end of the Cold War, however, has changed the terms of security studies: the series of events that took place in Central and Eastern Europe suggested the insufficiency of conventional explanations provided by the discipline and stimulated reflections, discussions and critical evaluation within the academy on the meaning of security (Fierke 2007: 23). In particular, the political climate of the post 9/11 in many parts of the globe indicates a further shift on the meaning of security: increased control over the bodies of
"securitized" others who may pose a threat to the social, economic, political and military frameworks within which the Western democracies are located.

By taking such concerns into consideration, this study also aims to contribute to ongoing discussions about the relationship between security, migration and community in an age when borders are transgressed by a number of non-state actors.

**Shifting the Axis: Questioning the dichotomy of the “centre” and the “periphery”**  

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has often been regarded as the world’s sole superpower and, in this context, globalization has often been considered as synonymous with Americanization. Although it can be argued that the United States still dominates important security and political issues in global affairs, the world today is much more complicated and diverse than the proponents of viewing globalization as the process of “Americanization” or homogenization may indicate. It is thus critical to be sensitive to the limitations of the extraordinary preponderance of the United States (Kirshner 2006: 5). In particular, we need to take into account a significant restructuring of the political economy and strategic relationships in East Asia that has taken place as integral part of the geopolitical changes in post-Cold War Asia. The rapid economic rise of China in the region is particularly important in this context (Jager and Mitter 2007: 2-3).

Previous ideas about the world are thus becoming increasingly inadequate to represent the present geopolitical situation in which the existence of multiple

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16 The term “Shifting the Axis” was borrowed from Mackie (2004).
centres, as well as multiple forces to counter the single dominant structure in global affairs, informs how the state defines its place and relates to other parts of the world. China and Russia, for instance, actively pursue and propagate the idea of a "multipolar" world and omnidirectional diplomacy instead of the prevailing concept of the unipolar world as determined solely by political and strategic interests of the United States. In economic terms, since the late 1960s, there has been a shift of the centre of gravity of the world economy toward the Asia-Pacific region (Yeung 2000: 13). As Dirlik points out, the new global configuration calls into question the distinctions between the First and Third Worlds as parts of the earlier Third World are today on the pathways of transnational capital and thus belong in the "developed" sector of the world economy (1996: 31). In particular, the rise of China, with its huge population and manufacturing power as well as its increasing political influence over world affairs, is creating a perception that the image of the unipolar world dominated by a country such as the United States is shifting in the Asia-Pacific region in light of new geopolitical and economic developments that shape the region today. Therefore, an increasing sensitivity to particularities and localities is required to capture the shifting and diversified global circumstances in which multiple actors shape social and geopolitical realities.

In her article "Shifting the axis: feminism and the transnational imaginary", Mackie (2004: 240) argues that "we need to be sensitive to the multiple dimensions of power in specific, local situations." Citing the examples of multiple dimensions of power and privilege that operate in the Asia-Pacific region, she points out that we need "to shift the axis of our comparisons away from the USA and Europe" in order to understand different strands of power and privilege in a way that is different from Euro-American context (Mackie 2004: 240). Similarly, Jager and Mitter contend that Asian nations are beginning to turn away from "the geopolitical West centered on the United
States toward the geopolitical East centred on China due to its economic and geopolitical rise in the region (2007: 4-5).

In this respect, this thesis is part of an ongoing process of knowledge making practices that attempt to be sensitive to locally and historically specific social processes in East Asia, while taking into account emerging geopolitical and economic developments that shape the region today.

**Conceptualizing Gender as a Process**

In this thesis, I do not use the term “gender” synonymously with “sex”. The term “sex” is used to distinguish biological categories between men and women. While the term “sex” is regarded as a biological construct as such, “gender” is a social construct and “involves the ways in which cultures imbue this biological difference with meaning such as demarcating between male and female domains in activities, tasks, spaces, time, dress and so on” (Pessar and Mahler 2003: 813). Although people are socialized to regard these distinctions as natural and stable, “gender” needs to be viewed “as a process, as one of several ways humans create and perpetuate social differences” (Pessar and Mahler 2003: 813).

“Social Location” of Japanese Women within Migratory Flows in the Asia Pacific Region

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As I shall explore in Chapter Three, migratory processes are intimately tied to states’ policies and differences such as gender, race and citizenship inform the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the context of transnational migration. In this regard, the “social location” of an individual is central to the shaping of their transnational mobility. Pessar and Mahler (2003: 816) define “social location” as “persons’ positions within interconnected power hierarchies created through historical, political, economic, geographic, kinship-based and other socially stratifying factors”.

Although there are a number of differences among Japanese women based on class and educational background, their Japanese citizenship allows them to travel with ease to most of the Asian countries. Moreover, gender ideologies in contemporary Japan, which tend to view men as breadwinners of the family and thus to regard women’s labour as supplementary to men’s, restrict women’s employment opportunities on the one hand, but provide women with more freedom to chart their life plans according to their interests and preferences on the other. This social location of Japanese women, although it must be viewed as fluid constructs, affects their migration to other parts of Asia to a considerable extent. The migratory processes of Japanese women, therefore, need to be situated and contextualized within various forms of hierarchies and boundaries that have been socially constructed.
Chapter Outlines of the Thesis

In Chapter 1, I provide the background for conceptualizing the emigration of Japanese women in Asian context. In particular, I contextualize their migratory processes within the social and political contexts in which Japan has interacted with Asia since the late nineteenth century to the present. I show that ideas about modernity and progress in modern Japan were closely intertwined with its dissociation from other parts of Asia, in particular, China. Since the early 2000s, this de-centring of China from the narrative of Japan as a modern nation-state has significantly been challenged and transformed by the growing mobility of people, goods, ideas and information that characterize contemporary East Asia as well as by the shifting geopolitics in the region.

In chapter 2 and chapter 3, I provide my theoretical orientations as well as literature reviews of the literature on transnationalism, migration and boundaries. In chapter 2, I provide an overview of the literature on gender and migration. Over the past three decades, feminist geographers have contributed both to the scholarship of geography and to feminist migration studies by pointing to the gendered social constructions of spatiality and to the roles that gender and other differences play in shaping migratory processes. In this chapter, thus, I demonstrate that feminist migration studies have been concerned with understanding the social and spatial dimensions of mobility associated with gender, citizenship, race, class, nation and sexuality.

The migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai are inseparable from the larger international contexts in which people, goods, information and ideas about other places circulate around the globe and impact-upon the everyday lives of people who cross borders as well as those who do not
physically cross borders but nonetheless engage in acts of boundary crossings. To put it another way, it is difficult to understand and explicate their migratory processes without references to larger international forces associated with transnational population movements. In chapter 3, therefore, I discuss the meanings of place, boundaries and identities in an age when transnational connections and ties criss-cross the established boundaries of nation-states. I shall detail the recent development of the study of transnationalism and migration and point to the importance of boundaries in considering issues of migration and transnationalism. The discussion of Chapter 3 centres on situating boundaries within the studies of migration and transnationalism as they are an integral part to shaping migratory processes in the present contexts. I conclude this chapter by suggesting that a new form of urban citizenship is emerging in East Asia and that this may have the potential to reconfigure the identities of people through their active participation in urban life. The emergence of this urban citizenship also leads us to the reconsideration of the politics of belonging, boundaries and territoriality.

In Chapter 4, I illustrate the practices of place-making in global cities in East Asia, particularly in Shanghai. First, I discuss Japanese conceptions of China in the 1930s. Second, I provide an overview of urban development in Shanghai. Third, I draw attention to the increasing presence of expatriate Japanese in Shanghai, which is followed by an examination of gendered differences between Japanese women and men in terms of their employment conditions, lifestyles and social relationships. I point to a growing significance of Shanghai among expatriate Japanese communities by showing the shifting boundaries and meanings of place and identity. By situating Shanghai at the centre of social and economic dimensions of China-Japan interactions, I place Shanghai as a "contact zone" between the Chinese and the Japanese.
In Chapter 5, I discuss my empirical findings in Shanghai. I place the narratives of Japanese women's migratory processes to the city in relation to China's urban development, economic growth, and, more importantly, to shifting Japanese women's perceptions of the boundaries between China and Japan as well as of China based on their migratory processes to Shanghai. Drawing on the interviews with expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai, as well as on relevant literature, I trace the connections between the migratory flows of Japanese women to Shanghai within the larger context of Sino-Japanese ties as well as social transitions that were taking place in Japan in the 1990s and the early 2000s.

In Chapter 6, I demonstrate that East Asia represents a contested site of political differences over memory, history, identities and territoriality. Specifically, I discuss the political and economic dimensions of the relationship between China and Japan in relation to the expatriate Japanese community in Shanghai. In particular, I identify my respondents' views about the Sino-Japanese relationship in light of the prevailing political tensions between China and Japan. It shows that, despite the official conceptions of China as a potential threat to the security of Japan, expatriate Japanese women have voiced different and diversified views about the position of China vis-à-vis Japan. Drawing upon Enloe's conceptions of the significant roles of international political economy in shaping the everyday lives of women and men (1989), I consider the implications of Sino-Japanese political relations for everyday lives and mobility of expatriate Japanese women as well as for their perceptions of China.

In Chapter 7, I discuss the cultural dimensions of boundary reconfiguration. I identify the ways in which processes and practices of cultural interaction and exchanges reconfigure the boundaries between the countries of East Asia. More specifically, I draw attention to the cultural dimensions of mobility: the
circulation of cultural products across the borders of the nation-states. I then discuss how this process in intimately tied to the movement of people to produce further "re-bordering" of East Asia. I begin with a discussion about how gendered representations about "Asia" have shaped and informed Japan's gendered relations with other Asian countries. Second, I examine the emergence and development of the processes of cultural integration in Asia and tie these processes to the growing significance of cross-border population mobility in connecting people and places across traditional conceptions of boundaries. Moreover, I contextualize this cultural interconnectedness within the shifting Japanese women's perceptions of other Asian countries; in particular, I stress that their (re)imagination of "Asia" is itself the product of images and representations that circulate across the boundaries of countries in East and Southeast Asia. These images and representations have gendered effects: they are mainly produced for, and consumed by, women. I argue, therefore, that both cultural and migratory flows between Japan and other Asian countries are shaped by transnational processes that are gendered and that the cultural flows across borders of states play an important role in mediating and reconstituting these processes.

In Chapter 8, I discuss the social processes of re-bordering of East Asia through the movements of people, ideas, goods and cultural products in cities. I thus place the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai within the larger framework of growing flows of people and cultural interactions across countries in East Asia. I also point to the possibility of re-imagining East Asia through the filmic imagination of Hong Kong Cinema to illuminate how boundaries are reconfigured in our everyday life through various forms of border-crossings in cities. By doing so, I then draw attention to the issue of urban citizenship that provides the possibilities for reconfiguring the boundaries of identity and territoriality in the region. I argue that the emergence of such urban citizenship leads us to the reconsideration of
belonging and territoriality — concepts that highlight the divisions between people in East Asia.

In Chapter 9, I aim to reconsider East Asia as a site of interconnectedness, mutual engagement and exchanges rather than as one marked by tensions and demarcated boundaries. In this chapter, the central theme of the thesis is reintroduced in the context of such critiques.

Throughout the chapters, I highlight the shifting boundaries between Japan and other parts of Asia, as exemplified by the acts of migration of Japanese women to Shanghai. In doing so, I show that the migration of Japanese women to other Asian countries is significantly tied to economic, social and urban transformations in these places and that the flows reflect deepening economic and cultural integration within the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, I argue that the current political friction between China and Japan, which have caused concerns within the region and beyond, can be contested and renegotiated through the growing exchanges and interactions between the Chinese and the Japanese at an individual level. Japanese women's migration to Shanghai illustrates one of such potentials for opening up spaces for interactions and for improving bilateral ties between the two countries. This, I believe, has significant dimensions considering the fact that the two countries play central roles in shaping the region's geopolitics and economy. In order to sustain the prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, I suggest that the process of reconciliation between the two countries needs to go beyond the level of political dialogue. In order to achieve this aim, it will inevitably encompass the acts of contesting and questioning the meanings of boundaries in our everyday lives and these acts are central to contravene and subvert the singular narrative of boundaries, the nation and security discourse that continues to be informed by the political and social imperatives of the nation-states. Thus, the central argument of this thesis is that the
movement of people across boundaries of the nations-states — be it in the form of migration, sojourn or travel — plays a vital role in the acts of reconfiguring and questioning of the boundaries that are demarcated and inflected by the state-centric discourses on politics and security. These analyses of population movements across boundaries, I believe, will help move us beyond the geopolitics of fear, suspicion and threat and towards hopeful, constructive engagement with, and understandings of, our interconnected world.
Chapter 1:

Emigration of Japanese Women in an Asian Context
Contrary to the popular perception that Japan is, and has been, an ethnically homogeneous nation, Japanese history has actually been shaped by diverse flows and cultural interactions across boundaries. From the beginning of Japanese history, when mass migration from the south and west brought new and different people to these islands, through to the present time when more than two million foreign nationals reside as registered immigrants, Japan has always been a multicultural nation (Willis and Murphy Shigematsu 2008: 9-11). Yet this diversity and connections with other parts of Asia had long been neglected and forgotten due to the state ideology of demarcating boundaries between Japan and other parts of Asia, which had been propagated as part of Japan’s modernization project in the late nineteenth century (Gann 1984: 514-515). It was only since the early 1990s when cultural flows with other parts of Asia increased significantly and when elites in Japan called for internationalization of Japan that such demarcation of boundaries has undergone transformations and taken on different meanings.

Any understanding of the migratory process of Japanese women to other parts of Asia requires discussion about social, political and historical contexts in which such movements take place and about the meanings of their migrations in light of Japan’s relationship with other parts of Asia, both in the past and in the present. In this chapter, therefore, I aim to provide the social and historical background for conceptualizing the emigration of Japanese women in an Asian context. In particular, I contextualize their migratory processes within the social, historical and political contexts in which Japan has interacted with Asia since the late nineteenth century to the present. I show that ideas about modernity and progress in modern Japan were closely tied to its disassociation from other parts of Asia, in particular, China.
Japanese Emigration in Social and Historical Context

Conventionally, Japan is considered as a country that mainly imports labour from other countries. Reflecting this assumption, the majority of migration research on Japan has tended to focus on labour immigration from neighbouring countries to Japan, whereas little research has been done with regard to the phenomenon of emigration of Japanese citizens to other countries. In terms of emigration, Befu points out that there are three phases of the Japanese "diaspora" (2000: 17-40). The first wave of its human dispersal is said to have begun toward the end of the fifteenth century. By the sixteenth century, Japanese trade ships were frequenting China and Southeast Asia. This trend was accompanied by the emergence of Japanese communities, or "Japan towns", across Southeast Asia.

The second phase began in the late nineteenth century, when Japan was in the process of advancing its territorial ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as of enhancing its political influence abroad. Japanese emigrants from the Meiji period (1868-1912) to the end of the Second World War migrated not only to the continents of North and South America, but also to Southeast Asia, China, Taiwan, Sakhalin and Micronesia. These migrations were part of state policies to alleviate the domestic population problem and to establish ethnic Japanese institutions in its colonies and occupied territories. Those who emigrated during this period were usually of poor economic background and tried to find economic opportunities not available in Japan. In particular, female migrants to other Asian countries such as China or Southeast Asia in early modern Japan were called Karayuki-san (literally, karayuki means going to Kara, that is, China, or abroad). Karayuki-san refers primarily to
those impoverished women who sought work in China or Southeast Asia during the Meiji and Taisho (1912-1926) periods. It has been pointed out that most of these women were sold into prostitution in these places. The amount of money they sent back home contributed to Japan's economic modernization and laid the foundations for its expansion as a colonial empire (Befu 2001: 23). Their stories of displacement and sufferings indicate that women's bodies were appropriated for the strengthening of the nation in early modern Japan.\(^{17}\) In this regard, their economic contributions to the homeland, as well as their presence in places where Japan had strategic interests, were closely interconnected to Japan's emergence as an imperialist power. It was also during this period that Asia, as part of the Japanese empire, became "the object of Japanese colonization and subjugation" with colonial policies as well as a variety of social, cultural and ideological practices. In this respect, other parts of Asia came to represent "an integral site of articulation for the Japanese empire's self-identification" (Ching 2007: 411).

This period is also significant in that the national project of modernization involved a reinterpretation of boundaries between Japan and the rest of Asia. In 1885, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), a leading political thinker of the Meiji period, stated that Japan could not wait for its neighbouring countries to modernize; Japan must cut itself free from its "bad companions" in Asia, and align itself with the civilized nations of the West. Japan should deal with China and Korea, Fukuzawa advocated, in the same way that Westerners did (cited in Colligan-Taylor 1999: xxii; Ching 2007: 409). Fukuzawa's argument on leaving Asia, thus, advocated shedding any resemblance to China and Korea in the eyes of "the civilized West" (Ching 2007: 409). In terms of this point, this textual envisioning of Fukuzawa's approach to Asia, known as Datsu-ron, or "Abandoning Asia", illustrates the extent to which the

\(^{17}\) For detailed analyses about the history of "Karayuki-san", see Yamazaki (1999); Masanao, (1989); Warren (1993: 2008).
reification and renegotiation of boundaries between Japan and other parts of Asia — the construction of binary distinctions between Japan as “us” and Asia as “others” — was integral to Japan’s modernization project. I provide a more detailed account of Japan’s dissociation from other parts of Asia, in particular, from China in the subsequent sections.

The third phase of emigration unfolds in post-war Japan. After the Second World War, Japan recovered from its devastating effects on the country and saw major economic growth between the late 1950s and early 1990s. The economic recovery and growth were thereby accompanied by growing economic presence of Japanese firms and Japanese citizens overseas, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Most significantly, the rapid growth in other Asian economies, in particular, China’s integration into the world economy, has affected the population movement of the Japanese to a considerable extent, bringing about the increase in the number of Japanese in major cities in Asia.¹⁸ To illustrate this point, table 1 provides data on the number of Japanese residents in other countries in recent years.

¹⁸ According to the Reports on the Statistics of Overseas Japanese, which was provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), the number of Japanese who reside overseas (the number of Japanese citizens who live in other countries more than three months) as of 2005 was 1,012,547. Of these, 351,668 Japanese citizens reside in the United States, 114,899 in China, 65,942 in Brazil, 54,982 in Britain, and 52,970 in Australia. The number of Japanese residents, as classified in terms of cities in which they live, is: 59,285 Japanese residents in New York, 50,535 in Los Angeles, 40,264 in Shanghai, 26,991 in Bangkok, and 25,961 in Hong Kong. It should be acknowledged, however, that these figures do not include those who do not register with the Japanese consulates overseas. Therefore, the actual number of overseas Japanese residents is estimated to be much higher than these official statistics indicate.
Table 1: The number of Japanese residents in other countries from 2005 to 2007:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>386,328</td>
<td>373,732</td>
<td>351,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (PRC)</td>
<td>125,928</td>
<td>127,905</td>
<td>114,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>60,578</td>
<td>61,527</td>
<td>65,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>63,017</td>
<td>63,526</td>
<td>54,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>66,371</td>
<td>63,459</td>
<td>52,970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008)

As this table indicates, there is a rapid increase in the number of Japanese residents in China in recent years, reflecting growing Japanese corporate activities and their presence in China since the early 2000s (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). I shall provide a more detailed account of Japanese emigration to Shanghai in Chapter 5.

**Forgetting China: Rearticulating the question of Japan and Asia in the modern moment**

As an essentialized and imaginary geography as well as an existing entity, “Asia” has played a central part in Japan’s construction of national identity, which has often involved the acts of imagining and representing “Asia” as the image of Japan’s past (Iwabuchi 2002b: 7-8). In the context of its modernization, in particular, such past was imagined as the one which needs to be forgotten, erased or negated in order to achieve progress and modernity, as symbolized by the West. In this respect, Ching points out that the “self-
knowledge of Japan is predicated on the complex and contradictory processes of differentiation, identification, and subjugation of Asia" (2007: 407). As such, Japan’s national project of modernization involved a reinterpretation of boundaries between Japan and the rest of Asia and, in particular, de-linking and separating Japan from China and Korea. A completion of such a project would come with the annexation of Korea to Japan in 1910, which would demonstrate the status of Japan as colonial power in East Asia (Kimitada 2007: 25). As such, the creation of a modern Japanese identity as crafted through this project involved, above all, “an internalization of a Eurocentric model of the world where the West is represented as modern, progressive, and therefore superior whereas Asia is represented as pre-modern, stagnant, and therefore inferior (Ching 2007: 407-408).

Any consideration of the relationship between China and Japan would be insufficient if it does not take into account the dynamics of the centre-periphery relationship in East Asia. As the map 1.1 shows, Japan’s geography has placed it in close proximity to China and this geographical location has exerted a critical influence on how it has viewed the world outside its borders and how it has represented the nation according to such views of the world as it continuously (re)-negotiated its place in Asia in relation to its fraught relationship with China — a historically powerful and giant neighbour which faced the increasing threat of semi-colonization from Western powers in the late nineteenth century. Through centuries of cultural exchanges and interactions, China has had enormous influence on Japan. Indeed our understanding of modern history and cultures of Japan is not sufficient without paying serious attention to the things Chinese in Japan (Fogel 2007: 6). At the same time, China’s huge social, political and cultural influence on the countries of East Asia — along with its political view which has placed China at the centre of the region — have also produced various forces to resist it and to reinstate national identities in the region.
To understand Japanese modernization and nationalism from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, it is critically important to comprehend its political project of “forgetting China” that has marked its dispositions towards China during this period. In this respect, Joos (2004) points out that Japan's modernization signified to a considerable extent a “desinification”, which represents its political project of separation from China.
This project involved, above all, various practices of "dissociation" from China in terms not only of intellectual production but also of an entire world view. Despite the incoming wave of Western civilization, China, in the eyes of a political thinker such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, represented a country that stubbornly continued to cling to its ancient and stagnant ways (Ching 2007: 409). As Fukuzawa put forward his opinion in an editorial published by *Jiji Shimpo*:

Japan cannot wait for its neighbouring countries to modernize and further association with its neighbours of Asia would only impede Japan's own reputation and efforts to secure equality with the West; Japan must cut itself free from its "bad companions" in Asia, and align itself with the civilized nations of the West. Japan should deal with China and Korea, in a same way that Westerners do. (cited in Jansen 1984: 71; also cited in Colligan-Taylor 1999: xxii)

Fukuzawa's argument, known as *Datsua-ron*, or "Parting with Asia," demonstrates the extent to which the renegotiation of boundaries between Japan and Asia — the construction of binary distinctions between Japan as "us" and other parts of Asia as "others"— was integral to Japan's modernization project. In this context, Asia was reconstructed as a place from which Japan needed to escape, for Japan's association with backward China and Korea only gave the world a bad impression of the Japanese people (Fogel 1984: 9-10). Young (1997: 158) also points out that the emergence of a Japanese discourse on race in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represented one of the most important consequences of Japan's integration into the world. Young further explains that Japan's empire-building in this period created a particular context in which Japanese interacted with foreigners:

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Within their growing empire in East Asia, and domestically, with immigration of Chinese and Koreans into Japan, Japanese began to draw racial boundaries between Japan and other Asians. Here the Asian Other was socially encountered and culturally constructed within the contexts of institutionalized violence, economic exploitation, and Japanese monopolies of political power and social privilege (Young 1997: 158).

Moreover, events such as the victory over China during the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 and the establishment of “Manchukuo” as a new independent state in the provinces of Northeast China reinforced and justified these processes of “de-sinification” to a significant degree (Joos 2004: 1). In this respect, Carol Gluck points out that the victory over China in a war that was cast as a “conflict between civilization and barbarism”, enhanced national confidence and pride of empire at the expense of an age-old cultural respect for China (1985: 135-136). These processes illustrate the extent to which that state efforts to delineate borders operate not only at the political level of regulating population flows but also at the level of meaning construction (Wilson and Donnan 1998: 23).

Paradoxically, it was within this context of drawing boundaries between Japan and other Asian peoples that the idea of “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” was introduced in Japan in 1940. This idea, signifying interracial harmony among the nations and peoples, proposed a future Asian community founded on the notions of cooperation and interdependence.²⁰

²⁰ Yet these processes did not lead to the total erasure of Chinese culture from Japan. As Young points out, although Japan’s victory over China during the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 stirred up much contempt and derision against the Chinese, these emotions did not completely erase Japanese reverence for China. Young asserts it remained to be practiced in a variety of “sinified” artistic, philosophical, scholarly and other cultural expressions and representations (Young 1997: 162). Centuries of cultural interactions with China continued to leave a deep imprint on the cultural lives of the Japanese even after the war, albeit in a different tone and scale.

²⁰ Cultural products such as cinema played an integral part in the propagation of the idea of “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” as the idea internalized the
Shelly Stephenson illustrates that “Japan was, in the basis of its presumed superiority to other Asian nations, to have a leading role in such a community, and it is in this capacity that Sphere Ideology provided the motivation and eventual goal behind Japan’s militarism toward its Asian neighbours” (1999: 225). The construction of boundaries between Japan and people from other parts of Asia, thus, went hand in hand with the presumed racial harmony and solidarity in East Asia, which was indeed masked by the idea of racial superiority of the Japanese in relation to other races.

**An Ambivalent Disjuncture with the Past: The perceptions and representations of China in the context of Japan’s modernization**

In examining the relationship between Japan and other parts of Asia, particularly in terms of the population movements between Japan and these places, Shanghai has occupied a central place both in historical and contemporary terms. The Japanese connections or ties with Shanghai stretch back to the late nineteenth century. As a cosmopolitan city of East Asia, Shanghai attracted a large number of immigrants, sojourners and travellers, in particular, in the 1920s and 1930s. Such flows of population movements into Shanghai involved a huge population of Japanese as well. Since the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century, a number of Japanese writers, intellectuals and journalists travelled to Shanghai and other parts of China and they documented their impressions about the places they visited either in the form of travel diaries or as part of journalistic writings. In view of the social and political climate during that period in Japan, these writers

presumption that: Japan was the leader of Asia made it necessary to learn about “others” and to project the county as a modern and superior nation. Modern Japan was thus actively involved in film production in Korea, China and throughout Southeast Asia from early 1920s to the first half of the 1940s (Stephenson 1999: 225-226).
documented their ambiguous feelings about China. These writings provide important materials in demonstrating the contrasts between the modernist Japanese configurations of China and the current ones, as well as the continuities between them.

As indicated above, Japan's modernization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries signified to a considerable extent a "de-sinification". This shift marked a significant rupture from the past: as Japan's project of empire building in the Asia-Pacific region intensified, China as an object of awe and reverence for Japan was increasingly replaced by a new conceptualization of the country with negative connotations. As Young illustrates:

Since the period of intense cultural borrowing from the continent in the sixth and seventh centuries, China had represented a standard of high civilization to which the Japanese aspired. The awareness that China was the source of Japan's writing system, the philosophical traditions of Buddhism and Confucianism, and a host of other institutions and ideas nurtured a sense of cultural debt. ...But when war broke out in 1894, victory for the Japanese side inspired contempt and derision for the vanquished, shattering the image of China as a model of civilization (1997: 162).

The shift, in particular, is epitomised in Datsua-ron, or "Abandoning Asia," as advanced by Fukuzawa Yukichi, the prominent politician during the Meiji period. The Datsua-ron succeeded in gaining support from intellectuals and politicians as they regarded China's inability to prevent Western imperialist penetration stemmed from its backwardness (Fogel 1984: 1-2). To become the first imperial power in Asia, Japan was to replace China, "asserting its desire to be a worthy counterpart of the West in the Orient" (Liao 2007: 288).

It was in this context that derogatory expressions for the Chinese were popularized in the media in the early Meiji period. These expressions reflected an emerging sense of superiority among the Japanese as they
reconfigured the representation of the “modern” Japanese nation in relation to China: Japan’s ability to modernize in the face of Western imperialist project and China’s apparent inability to do so stirred up many Japanese people’s sense of superiority over the Chinese (Fogel 1984: 10).

It was in this context of “de-sinification” that shina, rather than chūgoku, was commonly used to refer to China after the Meiji restoration in 1868. Although both terms signified China in Japanese, various groups in Japan preferred to use shina as the term chūgoku implied that China is the centre of the world. Nativist (kokugaku) scholars in Japan, for instance, used shina “to separate Japan from the barbarian/civilized or outer/inner implication of the term chūgoku” (Stefan Tanaka 1993: 3-6). By disassociating China as the centre of the world and calling it as shina, these groups aimed at representing China as “a troubled place mired in its past, in contract to Japan, a modern Asian nation” (Tanaka 1993: 4).

Amidst these shifting representations and configurations of China as a place in question, a number of intellectuals, novelists and politicians visited China from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century. The list of such intellectuals includes prominent writers such as Yokomitsu Riichi (1898-1947). Lee points out that Shanghai provided special meaning for Japanese intellectuals, in particular, during the period from the late 1920s to the late 1930s when most of these intellectuals went through an ideological conversion from aestheticism and proletarianism to Japanese imperial nationalism. In this context, Shanghai provided “both a real and a fictional setting for them to negotiate their own mental ambivalences between nationalism and internationalism” (1999: 316). For instance, Yokomitsu, one of the prominent writers in modern Japan, visited Shanghai in 1928. After his visit to Shanghai, he produced a novel which was entitled Shanghai. In contrast to the emerging metropolis as portrayed by his Chinese followers,
Shanghai, as represented by Yokomitsu, was a dark and poverty stricken place (1999: 317).

A neighbourhood of crumbling brick. In the narrow byways, crowds of Chinese wearing black garments with long sleeves filled the area quite spiffily, like seaweed sedimented on the bottom of the sea. The beggars squatted on the road paved with pebbles. In the storefronts above their heads, fish bladders, hacked sections of carp dripping with blood, things like that were hanging. In the fruit stand to the side mangos and bananas were piled up flowing over even to the pavement. Then there was the character to the side to the fruit store where endless numbers of skinned pigs, with hoofs hanging down, were hollowed out into dark flesh-colored caves (Yokomitsu 2001: 7).

Leo Ou-fan Lee points out that Yokomitsu’s depictions of Shanghai as a place of chaos and darkness illustrates his wish to define a world totally different from modern Japan. More importantly, China signified an Oriental “other” to Japan for intellectuals like Yokomitsu, as suggested by the use of the term shina to refer to China rather than chūgoku in his novel (1999: 317-318). His portrayal of Shanghai suggests how modern Japanese intellectuals placed the city within their assumptions about China — that is, China as a “place of backwardness” and, thus, as a site that was redefined as antithetical to modernity. Writers such as Yokomitsu have thus disseminated unfavourable images of China among Japan’s common readers (Liao 2007: 288-289). More importantly, such writings are indicative of the significance of China as the “other” in relation to which the “modernity” of the Japanese nation was assessed, proved and sustained within the realm of the representational practices among Japanese intellectuals in the early twentieth century. Thus, the writings of these intellectuals such as Yokomitsu suggest that these representational practices were part of the state’s political project of “forgetting China” and their active participation in such a project of demarcating Japan’s boundaries with other parts of Asia.
Racialized Nationalism: Women and their bodies as the symbol of "home" and the national

Nationalisms often take on many different forms and meanings: in particular, defining territoriality and boundaries with other countries have been an integral part of shaping central discourses on nation-states. Women's bodies, in this context, have often been appropriated as the markers of racial or national identity. "Contaminating" women's bodies, for instance, through rape or sexual torture, has often been deployed as one of the strategies to colonize and gain control over other countries or ethnic communities.  

In the context of the imperial Japanese state, the conceptualization of the Japanese nation as one “family” was promoted to stress the assumed gender and racial harmony. Under this notion of a nation as one family, Japanese women were expected to serve as the “mother of the nation” according to the ideology of a good wife and wise mother. This ideology played a central role in defining and stressing the ideal type of Japanese femininity and was actively promoted by the state: state-oriented feminists and the media during the Meiji period actively took part in the country's political campaign to strengthen the nation through the creation of dutiful and obedient citizens to serve the modern Japanese state. In this context, the central duty of Japanese women lay in ’begetting the nation through having as many children as possible to increase the number of Japanese imperial subjects

21 The ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, for instance is a testament to the interplay of nation, gender and sexuality in armed conflicts. Mass rapes such as Bosnia, Mostov claims, are about the invasion of other's symbolic space, property and territory. She asserts that rape of women in such a context becomes an attack on the nation, figuring as a violation of national boundaries, a violiation of national autonomy and national sovereignty (Mostov 2000: 96).
who are willing to sacrifice their bodies and/or lives to the nation. Their bodies thus became a symbol of “home” which needed to be kept pure and uncontaminated for the nation.

On the other hand, women in the colonies were often viewed as being outside the good wife and wise mother category since they were not considered as part of those Japanese women who assumed social, cultural and biological responsibilities to the integrity of the Japanese state and thus to maintain “pure” Japanese blood. Obviously, this distinction acted as a vital tool for justifying the actions of the imperial government and army to force a large number of women from Korea and other Asian countries into the sexual slavery for the soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army across Asia in the early twentieth century.

Ueno points out that postwar historians’ efforts to reconstruct the history of women during wartime have exposed how the memory of war is reinterpreted according to the official discourse on history in Japan: very few women recognize themselves as those responsible for cooperating with the state during war times since the reconstructed past memory and the official versions of history encourage these women to view themselves as those who suffered from hardships rather than as an integral part of the members of colonizers (1998: 61). In analyzing the Japanese women’s living experiences of Korea during wartime, Tabata (1995: cited in Ueno 1998: 61-62) shows that the memories of these women who had lived in Korea in the early twentieth century, which were reconstituted in postwar Japan, were filled with the feelings of nostalgia for they, as Japanese citizens, had possessed a number of privileges in Korea as part of Japan’s colonial empire. Despite the fact that these privileges had been derived from their social position as women of colonizers during that period, they were quite indifferent to the systems of inequalities as the product of the colonization. These systems of inequalities
operated differently along the lines of gender and ethnicity, marking the
treatment of women in colonies — who, as women of the colonized, faced
multiple forms of gender and racial oppressions — as irrelevant to the lives of
the majority of Japanese women both at home and in the colonies as these
women were assumed to belong to the category of “other” women.

**Gender, Nation and Identity Politics in Post-war Japan**

In postwar Japan, a series of strategies have been devised to avoid
“contaminating” its population with foreigners (Goodman, Peach, Takenaka
and White 2003: 1). In order to maintain the imagined “pureness” of the
nation without sacrificing the country’s economic growth, it has been
assumed that the flexibility of women’s labour is central to achieving this
goal. Women’s work, thus, has been undervalued and under-used within the
employment structure in much of the postwar period.

Yet despite this undervaluation of women’s labour, the phenomenon of the
decreasing number of children born in Japan has ignited a new debate about
the urgent need for incorporating more “women and the elderly” into the
workforce. The debate, it seems, is still based firmly on the assumed
importance of maintaining the imagined pureness of the Japanese nation
against the perceived “contaminating” forces of the foreign in Japan.

Women have been central to this discourse about imagining and maintaining
the purity of the nation. In their analyses of the intersections of gender,
immigration and nation, Sidonie Smith and Giselda Brinker-Gabler point out
that various forms of nationalism secure and in turn depend upon specific
constructions of femininity, masculinity and normative sexuality, indicating
that conceptions of femininity and masculinity are socially constructed and may be appropriated for specific purposes of the nation-state (1997: 11).

Although the current situation of Japanese women differs considerably from those in pre-war times in terms of the fact that diverse range of employment and different types of lifestyle options are much more readily accessible to them than in the past, there are some important continuities between the lives of Japanese women in contemporary Japan and those of women in the pre-war period. These continuities can also be observed between the prewar and postwar representations of "others" in Japan, which are in the process of transformations. These interrelated processes point to both domestic and international factors in shaping the situation of Japanese women and to the increasingly multifaceted ways in which Japanese women engage with other parts of Asia.

Nation and Motherhood in the Context of Postwar Japan

With the end of the Second World War, Japan went through considerable transformations in terms of its national identity, social organization and politics. In particular, official ideologies of womanhood in relation to women's rights were renegotiated to suit the postwar political climate that surrounded Japan under the US occupation period. To demonstrate this, Article 14 of the 1947 constitution stipulates that "All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin". It was a significant change given the fact that women were not regarded as individuals, but as dependents of patrilineal households under the prewar constitution. Despite this radical redefinition of women's rights in legal
terms, however, gender-based discrimination and the ideology of “a good wife and wise mother” persisted in postwar Japan, though in a different scale and manner from the prewar period.

The social climate that stresses women’s nurturing role as mothers has continued to affect women’s choices in their lifetime in postwar Japan. The state and media’s assumption that women’s primary role should be that of a mother or of a caretaker of the aged has led many married women to take up part-time jobs rather than full-time jobs. Part-time women workers have thus functioned as a cheap and deskilled source of labor force whose temporary commitment to work allows them to look after children and the aged while enabling their husbands to commit most of their time and energy to their work (Mackie 1988: 221).

As Nancy Rosenberger points out, another reason that the part-time work of married women has been promoted in Japan was based on the following assumption: rather than bringing cheap foreign workers into Japan, Japanese companies appealed to women to fill low-level jobs. In particular, they assumed that modesty and a nurturing role that they consider epitomize the basic nature of femininity would not upset the assumed harmony of the Japanese workplace or nation (2001: 71). To put it another way, women in postwar Japan have provided flexible labor, their skills remained largely unrecognized and under-used due to patriarchal attitudes within the employment structure (Lam 1992).

This tendency of placing women at the bottom of the workplace has been intertwined with Japan’s reluctance to accept foreign workers into its soil for fear of contaminating the “pure” nation.\textsuperscript{22} In this way, through repetition of

\textsuperscript{22} Despite the existence of such a reluctance of accepting foreign workers, a number of such workers have entered Japan since the late 1980s. And they have played an important part in Japanese economy since then.
accepted norms and behaviors — as mothers and deskilléd part-time workers— many married women have helped to "construct the privileged nation" in which men can devote most of their time to work and contribute to national economic growth (Mayer 2000: 5). In this context, a mother is required to play a central role in raising children in a prescribed way and sending them to good schools. To illustrate this point further, a mother is expected to spend a considerable time in preparing a lunchbox for her children, demonstrating the fact that being a mother in Japan requires fulfilling a number of demanding and often time-consuming roles (Allison 1996). The basic assumptions of a "good wife and wise mother" have thus continued to define and inform the ideal conceptions of femininity in postwar Japan.

Gender and Demographic Transformations in Contemporary Japan

The role of women as mothers has been important in linking the nation with women both in prewar and postwar Japan. Yuval-Davis and Anthias, for instance, point out that, as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities, women have participated in ethnic and national processes and in relation to state practices. Through their role as reproducers, women have played a central role in maintaining the population and ensuring that "our" community is reproduced both biologically and ideologically (1989: 7). Women's labour at home, which enabled men to work for long hours, was an integral part of Japan's high economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s. Having thus been viewed as performing natural duties, their "unpaid" contributions to Japanese society and economy — as mothers, housewives or caretakers in the name of familial affection and responsibilities — have
largely been made invisible and rendered less significant compared with the male devotion to their "productive" work in the public realm.

Yet the high economic growth in the late 1980s contributed to produce a new group of young single women who preferred to postpone their marriage and reconsidered the merit of having children at all. The passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1986 and the economic prosperity the nation enjoyed provided these women with more choices than their mothers' generation had enjoyed. In particular, urban educated working women, although their opportunities for employment and promotion were still restricted compared to their male colleagues with similar qualifications, have begun to have a number of opportunities to pursue their careers or higher education at home and overseas. Contrary to the expectations of politicians and bureaucrats who hope the problem of Japan's declining birthrate might be resolved soon, this group of women, in particular, those who have had higher education in urban areas, do not intend to follow the paths of women of former generations who voluntarily or involuntarily shouldered multiple burdens at home and work without enjoying full autonomy and due attention from society. Rather than sacrificing "self" for the sake of the nation and the family, they prefer to enjoy their lives as independent individuals and to reap the benefits of their careers as full citizens in society.23

23 This tendency can also be observed among some young Japanese males in contemporary Japan. These young males, who have seen their fathers devoting most of their lives and aspirations to their work in companies, are questioning their fathers' generation's lifestyles and prefer to pursue their personal interests and goals rather than a high social status and/or financial benefits that full-time employment in (prestigious) companies have conventionally provided to Japanese males as signs of achieving daikokubashira (breadwinners) status in society. This daikokubashira ideology has, like their counterpart of the ideology of "a good wife and wise mother", played a central part in defining and shaping the pillar of gender relations, as well as conceptions of hegemonic masculinities in a Japanese society (Gill 2003: 144-158).
In July 2003, the former Prime Minister Mori sparked a controversy over his statement about the phenomenon of the decreasing birthrate in relation to the state pension crisis. While he was appearing in a TV program, he stated that those single women who enjoy their lives but do not contribute to the state by having children should be excluded from receiving the state pension when they get old. His view on women, which regards them as the child bearing machines to reproduce the future subjects of the Japanese nation, outraged many women. They express that the current birthrate is not the sole responsibility of women opting for staying single. Rather, they argue that it is the result of the maltreatment of women at workplace, the social pressure that urges women to give up their careers when they have children, the lack of childcare facilities and of husbands' support in housework and child-rearing.

Since the second baby boom of the early 1970s, Japan's birthrate has gradually fallen and has hovered around 1.35 children per woman for the past several years. It stood at 1.34 in 1999, 1.36 in 2000 and 1.33 in 2001, well below the 2.08, which is needed to sustain the population at its current level. Some social critics argue that women do not have as many children as before because they are unconsciously and silently revolting against the traditional gender roles that continue to operate in Japan. According to an estimate by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, an affiliate of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan's population is expected to decline by 30 per cent over the next fifty years. A dwindling birth rate and a rapidly aging society have ignited disputes among policy makers and politicians over the future of its economy and the maintenance of social security services and pensions.

This trend of a decreasing birthrate is a phenomenon common to many developed countries where women pursue higher education and careers. It
can be seen as a global phenomenon in which young single women prefer the life of consumption, travel and financial independence over that of motherhood. What makes this phenomenon complicated in Japan is the reluctance of the government to accept immigrants as workers in spite of the fact that the nation's population is ageing very rapidly. Since the late 1980s, the government and local authorities alike have had a number of campaigns to encourage women to have children. Despite their efforts, however, the birthrate has continued to decline. The government and media have held a common view that women are largely to blame for the phenomenon of the decreasing number of children: their tendencies to get married later or stay single in favor of personal freedom to enjoy their lives as individuals. Very few people address other important factors: for instance, the lack of childcare facilities, expensive educational costs and long working hours of male workers that make it extremely difficult to help their spouses at home. Such difficulties of balancing home and work have partly contributed to the social processes in which a large number of women may choose to pursue their own life choices rather than to follow the traditional path of articulating womanhood in contemporary Japan.

Reconfiguring Japanese Migratory Processes: Exploring New Migration Paradigms and Geographical Shifts in Re-imagining Places and Boundaries

Since 1945, Japan has been under the influence of the United States, particularly in terms of its formations of military and foreign policies. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War and the increasing sense of interconnectedness across national borders among growing numbers of people have led to the recognition that it is important to address issues of redefining
and maintaining a sense of national identity in this changing world order. In response to the assumed crisis in maintaining a “pure” national identity, some politicians and academics in Japan have begun to form some nationalist groups whose aim is to restore a “true” Japanese, or as some prefer, a “Japanese subjectivity”, to the centre of the Japanese state (McCormack 2002: 145). Its claim for increasing national assertiveness centers around an interpretation of history that is based on nationalistic or Japan-centred view of the world: that Japan’s colonial domination of Korea and Taiwan can be justified under the international relations at that time; that its acts of aggression were unavoidable act of self-defense; and that “comfort women” (sexual slaves for the Japanese imperial army) were not forced to work as sex slaves.

“Japan’s historical ambivalence towards both Asia and its own identity as an Asian state” has had a profound impact upon the configuration of national identity vis-à-vis other Asian countries (Weiner 2000: 63). Buckley (1997: 283) points out that Japan has been marked as not Asian, in favor of a closer affiliation — political, economic, and cultural — with Europe and North America within the framework of Japan’s positioning of itself in relation to Asia in much of the postwar period. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Westernization, in terms of new ideas and technologies, has been regarded as synonymous with the ideas of modernity and progress in Japan. On the other hand, other Asian countries were largely regarded as backward and uncivilized states until the late 1990s when economic growth of these countries gained momentum and thus helped to shift the previous perceptions. Here it is important to note that in what Iwabuchi Kōichi (2002: 5) describes as Japan’s “return to Asia” project, it was not only such economic impacts but also the cultural sphere, that is, intra-Asian popular cultural flows, which played an important role in giving rise to the shift in the previous perceptions of “Asia”.

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In particular, recent transnational social processes, which are marked by a significant improvement in media and communication technologies across the borders of nation-states and an easier availability of transportation to other countries, as I discussed in the introductory chapter, make it increasingly difficult for any nation to maintain the concept of a pure and homogeneous nation. In this context of growing transnational social processes and ties, a number of women in Japan have begun searching for new opportunities overseas in search of a better life. In considering the trajectories of migration of Japanese women from Japan to Shanghai, I aim to open up an alternative mode of thinking about mobility in such processes: I will discuss how these women enact imaginative geographies, in which they define alternative maps to the Euro-American centric maps of previous women migrants/travelers from Japan. Conventional accounts of Japanese women who explore alternative life choices overseas have tended to draw attention to their migration to the West. Kelsky (2001), for instance, explores how Japanese women construct the West as the site of rescue and liberation from the sexual and social constraints of Japanese society. She points out that Japanese women “defect” from expected life courses in Japan to pursue the idea of West by exploring the spaces of the foreign (mostly spaces that are associated with the West) as sites of professional opportunity, personal liberation and romantic expression. In placing the West as the dominant spaces of liberation for Japanese women, she stresses its importance, both geographical and conceptual, for their self-definitions and realizations. While such observations may portray some realities of Japanese women, her argument — Japanese women’s narratives of internationalism depend largely on the idea of a progressive West and a backward Japan — needs to be reconsidered in light of recent developments in their engagement with the “foreign”, particularly their shifting and multi-faceted relationships with places that are categorized as the “non”-West.
In particular, economic and social processes that are taking place between Japan and other Asian countries urges us to shift our perspective on population movements from the previously Western centric to a more multi-directional one. As I shall argue in Chapter Three, migratory processes have often been considered as those that are linear and motivated primarily by economic factors. In such configuration of migration, it has been assumed that “poor” migrants from the Third World countries head for the West to seek material wealth and social security. Likewise, the West has often been represented as a site of an ideal refuge for “social” migrants from some developed countries in Asia, such as Japanese women in Kelsky’s accounts (1999; 2001).

Yet the current picture of their migratory processes in the Asia-Pacific region needs remapping and reformations in light of the contemporary social processes that are taking place in the region. More specifically, the growing contacts and ties between Japan and other Asian countries in economic and social terms, as I shall illustrate in detail in subsequent chapters, have brought about geographical shifts in regard to how Japanese women construct, desire and relate to “the foreign” to a significant degree. Some, for instance, have migrated to other Asian countries such as China, Singapore, or Hong Kong, to find better employment opportunities. Such process demonstrate the extent to which boundaries between Japan and Asia — which was demarcated in the process of Japan’s modernization in the late nineteenth century — is being reconfigured and contested in the context of the increased border-crossings of people, information and ideas in East Asia in recent years. In this respect, this thesis explores the aspects of the migration of Japanese women to other parts of Asia that is still under-theorized, as well as their engagement with “the foreign” outside of Euro-American contexts.
Chapter 2:

Gender and Migration

Feminist perspectives on place and mobility
The movement of people has taken on an increasing importance as it has considerably affected the ways in which we theorize the nation, boundaries and citizenship in a shifting global order. In particular, issues of gender and other differences are central to the analyses of population movements that are increasingly stratified along the lines of gender, race, religion, nationality and citizenship.

In this chapter, I provide a review of literature on gender and migration studies, which form the theoretical background of this study. First, I discuss recent developments of feminist geography on both empirical and theoretical dimensions to explore feminist contributions to the theorizing of space and place. Second, I discuss the gendered conceptualization of home and cities as a dichotomy, rendering the former as a feminine and the latter as the masculine space to interrogate the conventional ideas about the relationship between women and place. Third, I conceptualize gendered perspectives on the urban space as well as the constructed dichotomies between the urban and the suburb/rural, which have often been invested with gendered meanings. To conclude, I discuss the importance of feminist epistemological practices in relation to the research on transnational migration and its theoretical relevance to this thesis.

**Feminization of Transnational Migration**

Since the 1980s, scholars on international migration research have acknowledged that one of the key features of contemporary migration patterns is its feminization (King 1995: 23): increasing numbers of women are playing a leading role in many migration streams which contrasts sharply with male-dominated labor migrations in the past. The data on the
percentage of female migrants in global migration streams shows that the share of female migrants among all international migrants have risen steadily since 1960, as shown in Table 2. In particular, these scholars indicate new developments in transnational migration in terms of the scale of cross-border mobility and entry of women as independent migrants into migration streams (Piper 2006: 140-141). These developments, therefore, show that female migration is a key constituent of global migration (Zlotnik 2003). Concomitantly, the prominence of women as independent migrants has led to a shift in focus of migration research from a traditional family migration to the migration of individuals. This shift has enabled scholars of migration to shed more light on the phenomenon of female migration as previous studies on migration which placed family as analytical framework on migration often resulted in overlooking the role that women play in international migration by treating women solely as dependants of their male family members.

Table 2: Percentage of female migrants among the total number of international migrants, 1960-2000

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
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The rise in educational levels as well as increasing labour force participation among women in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in East and South East Asia, have given rise to the emergence of women as important social actors: increasing numbers of women across the region have migrated to other countries within the region or to Europe and North America for better life opportunities. As the number of female migrants is increasingly on the rise in many parts of this region, such a trend has had considerable impacts on the gendered assumptions about mobility, belonging and place. Yet despite their increasing significance in migratory processes in the Asia-Pacific region, research on Asian migrations has not paid sufficient attention to the gendered dimensions of migratory processes (Hugo 2004: 92). It is in this context that feminist geographers argue for the need to pay more attention to the gendered dimension of the transnational flows into global cities (Yeoh et al. 2000).

Zlotnik (2003) points out that 48.8 percent of the total number of female migrants in the world in 2000 were female. If we restrict the scope to East and Southeast Asia, the figure in 2000 was 50.1 percent, demonstrating that female migrants constitute half of the total migrants in the region. This increasing feminization of migration raises a number of significant questions in regard to the relationship between the social and spatial dimensions of mobility: gendered expectations and experiences of migrations; how gendered assumptions are appropriated to encourage certain forms of emigrations; how receiving countries differentiate migrants along gender, race and class differences.

In particular, little attention has been paid to the skilled migration of women. Research on gender and migration has not paid sufficient attention to gendered patterns of skilled migration, whereas much of the literature on
skilled migration has ignored gendered dimensions of the process. Particularly, in regard to Asian women, most of the studies on transnational migration have focused on the migration of domestic workers (e.g. see Momsen 1999; Phizacklea and Wolkovitz 1995) or sex workers (Kempadoo 1998). The lack of research on skilled migration of Asian women has resulted in the perpetuation of the stereotypical images of Asian women as domestic, subservient and/or seductive who migrate solely for economic purposes. As Ramji puts it:

Much academic work on South Asian women and work views them as being consigned either to low status employment or to their reproductive roles. This literature perpetuates their status as victims, concentrating on the negative experiences of low-status employment and ‘homework’. There is little recognition that Asian women may also occupy professional spaces. (Ramji 2003: 228)

Her statement not only describes the dominant representations of South Asian women in the migration literature but also applies to the depictions of Asian women as a whole. In this respect, Nagel points out that feminists’ accounts of skilled migration have presented a sustained critique of the mainstream literature, which, they argue, typically has ignored the role of gender in structuring high-end labour markets and labour mobility (2005: 199).

Conventional approaches to migration research have thus tended to focus on pull and push factors of migration, and, in particular, to place emphasis on economic factors as one of the central motivations for migrants to move across the borders. Based firmly on neo-liberal economic theory, this “push-pull model” was employed as the classic explanation for migration and reinforced the view that individuals migrate primarily for economic purposes or reasons (Anthias 2000: 18). A number of assumptions about population
movement informed such a theory: for instance, that it is a product of rationality and that it can be described in universal terms that negate difference (Cresswell 2006: 29-30). Studies based on such a model, thus, presupposed that migration was a product of rational decisions made predominantly by male migrants who seek to maximize profit through migration. As such, the social and political dimensions of migration have largely been ignored by such studies (Tyner 2004: 8).

Yet in recent years, gender-sensitive, or feminist, perspectives of migration have begun to contribute new insights by pointing to the need to recognize non-economic incentives to migration (Piper and Roces 2003: 2-3; Raguram 2004: 194), thereby indicating the diversity of migratory patterns, which requires integrating the analyses of differences such as gender, class, nationality, race and age into the scope of migration research.

As a result, there is an increased awareness of the important role that gender plays in international migration and of the gendered nature of migration experience by scholars and policymakers alike. This recognition of the gendered dimension of migration reflects the increased proportion of migrant women in all categories of population mobility. A number of scholarly works done by feminist geographers and sociologists to focus on this neglected area of migration has shed light on diverse categories of female migration in the past two decades (Piper 2004: 45).

Much of the literature that incorporates the perspective of gender and feminist perspectives into the study of transnational migration has illuminated the gendered nature of migratory processes. As Piper (2005: 20) points out, “men and women circulate differently in the new global economy, with men occupying an elite space of flows in a masculine high-tech world of the knowledge economy”, whereas migrant women are perceived to be
engaged in job categories such as domestic work which requires lesser skill, and therefore, whose contributions to the economy of the sending countries are viewed as less significant compared to those by expatriate males who occupy the spaces of a privileged world on their own. Moreover, feminist migration studies have shed light on the importance of borders and boundaries by making themselves the focus of investigation and examining the socially specific processes tied to their development (Rachel Silvey 2006: 72).

**Gendered Space and Place**

Geographers have significantly contributed to the theorization of cross-border movements with particular emphasis on their spatial processes. They argue that spatial processes may become significant object of geographical research in so far as they are embedded in social contextuality. McDowell, for instance, contends that “space is relational and constitutive of social processes and that space is not just a set of flows, but also a set of places with associations and meanings for individuals and groups” (1996: 29-32). In particular, feminist geographers have provided critical insights into the meanings of spatiality that is embedded in social relations.

Before discussing feminist geographers' understandings of space and place, it is essential to make a distinction between the two terms. Domosh and Joni Seager point out that when geographers use the word “space,” what they mean is that all of our actions take place in particular locations. In this sense, therefore, “space” refers to the three-dimensionality of life— to its material form: the patterning and organization, as well as the relative locations of material forms, are central to our understanding of the role of
spatial organization in social life. While "space" often refers to material aspects of patterning, organization and locations, "place" signifies locations that have been invested with particular meanings and power (Domosh and Seager 2001: xxi; Cresswell 2006: 3). Harvey thus asserts that "the assignment of a place within a socio-spatial structure indicates distinctive roles, capacities for action, and access to power within the social order (1990: 419).

Over the past three decades, feminist geographers have contributed to the analyses of the relationship between women, place and space. In the 1970s, they began to point to a neglect of women and to the perpetuation of gendered stereotypes and assumptions about masculinity and femininity in much of human geography research (Heyford 1974; Tivers 1978, Monk & Hanson 1982). Rose maintains that when such geographical practices made references to the feminine it was to reaffirm the superiority of masculine knowledge in the discipline (1993: 10). Much of the scholarship on feminist geographical practices since this introduction of feminist perspective in geography has explored the relationship between space and gender and has made the following assumptions as their starting points of geographical inquiry through the lens of gender. First, it is often women who have been obliged to have the most spatially restricted lives. Second, "design and use of our build environment is determined in part by our assumptions about gender roles and relations" (Domosh and Seager 2001: xxi). To paraphrase it in a more concise way, space is gendered.

These scholars have thus shown that women and men are differentially located in space and that spatial configuration is a product of power relations which are inflected by assumptions about gender. The issue of mobility/stasis, for instance, is often marked by gendered assumptions. In many societies, being feminine has often been associated with the stasis,
while the masculine has been linked to various forms of dynamism and
global mobility such as the traveller, international business elites or
diplomats (Enloe 1989: 21).

Such gendered assumptions about mobility have played an integral part in
demarcating and ensuring spatial boundaries between men and women.
Certain spatial configurations, for instance, have acted as mechanisms to
keep many women from entering or crossing into the perceived masculine
territories or domains. Those who crossed these boundaries have often been
labelled as women “out of place” and deviated from their prescribed everyday
lives of the feminine sphere, thus inviting unwanted attention or ridicule.
Indeed, the “street” has often been associated with the dangerous place
where “proper” women should avoid walking or spending their time across
many cultures. “Woman in the street” has often been associated with “fallen
woman”, suggesting that their sexuality is not moralistically right and thus
literally falls out of the socially accepted category of “proper” women. In her
book entitled The Sphinx in the City, Wilson points to the construction of the
presence of women in the city as the moral danger and threat to the
Victorian Britain as follows:

Woman is present in cities as temptress, as whore, as fallen woman, as
lesbian, but also as virtuous womanhood in danger, as heroic
womanhood who triumphs over temptation and tribulation. Writers
such as Benjamin concentrated upon their own experience of
strangeness in the city, on their own longings and desires, but many
writers more definitely and clearly posed the presence of women as a
problem of order, partly because their presence symbolized the promise
of sexual adventure. This promise was converted into a general moral
and political threat. (Wilson 1991: 5-6; italics original)

Indeed, the “feminine” has always been conceptualised as the “other” in
relation to the “masculine” within the gendered discourses about spatial configurations of power. In this context, the “masculine” is assumed to be more privileged than the “feminine”; positive meanings are ascribed to the former while negative meanings are associated with the latter. As Rendell (2000: 107) points out, “the femininity is connected with chaotic and disorderly space, while logo-centric space remains masculine”. Although this binary does not reflect the full range of individuals’ lived experiences, she argues, gendered assumptions about spaces contained within this binary hierarchy are continually reproduced (Rendell 2000: 103). Thus, gendered assumptions about space have been emphasized by constructing assumed dichotomies about different spaces in which woman and man might inhabit, as well as about the different roles they play in everyday lives. These assumptions can be summarized as follows: that man builds and woman inhabits; that man is outside and woman is inside; that man is public and woman is private; that man moves freely inside the city and woman is restricted to home. As such, these assumptions are reproduced through representation of space in gendered terms. As Rendell points out, “descriptions of gendered space make use of words and images which have cultural associations with particular genders to invoke comparisons to the biological body — for example, soft, curvaceous interiors are connected with women and phallic towers with men” (Rendell 2000: 103). Much of the literature pertaining to feminist geographers and philosophers has focused on questioning these long sustained assumptions about gendered roles, space and representational practices by presenting these assumptions as socially constructed and thus contextual.

As I have already indicated, the earlier feminist geographers’ scholarship was initially concerned with “making women visible” and revealing gendered practice in geographic research. Subsequently, their perspectives have been enriched and sophisticated by the influence of post-structuralist thought on
that they are, has played an important role in restricting their mobility (1993: 22). These restrictions on women’s freedom of movement, both physically and ideologically, suggests that restricting their mobility has been an important strategy for putting women in “place,” or, to put another way, it has been essential to appropriate these social practices in order to contain women’s bodies in a place called “home.” “Place” and “home” in this context are often used as terms that are interchangeable in their meanings. As Massey suggests:

integral to the ideas of places as stable and settled is often —explicitly or implicitly— a notion of place as “home,” as a haven of peace and quiet and of retreat. ...There are two elements to this way of thinking: first, there is the explicit analogy between the concepts of place and of home; second, there is the assumption that both are places of rest. Yet, as feminists have often pointed out, for many women home may be the place, not of rest, but of work. Neither is home necessarily a haven of peace and quiet: intra-family relations may be the source of just as much conflict as external social relations. (1995: 64)

Raghram also points out that “patriarchy within the household is related to, and interact with, patriarchy in other sites” as the household is the site that reflects and mediates gendered and other hierarchies within society as a whole (2004: 196). It is in this context that many migration theorists argue that migration may provide a route and opportunities for women to escape gendered social constraints and expectations at home to gain independence for themselves (Phizacklea 1998: 28; Rose 1995: 89-90; Willis and Yeoh 2003: 106).

At the same time, the idea of “home” has often been closely associated and tied with the idea of a secure domestic place in which an attentive mother or wife awaits the return of displaced migrants who are presumably male. Massey points out that “thoughts of home frequently centre on ‘mother’, seen
as an unchanging fixity" (1995: 65). In this configuration of “home", the image of attentive and caring mother is inextricably linked to the concept of the “homeland” or nation to which the migrant is always aspiring to return. In this regard, many politicians have turned to the word “motherland” to stress the importance of protecting the “vulnerable motherland” from any enemies on the one hand and the unreplaceable and, therefore, absolute nature of this territory on the other. In this discourse of comparing a nation to a “motherland", emigrants are conceived of as the “displaced” people who are separated from their homeland geographically, socially and culturally. A number of politicians in “sending” countries of labour migrants have deployed this imagery of a “motherland” to present an image of nation as the sole most significant place to which migrants should return eventually. Furthermore, this imagery has aimed to appeal to the minds of migrants to emphasize their contribution to the nation, in particular, through such means as remittances.

Home as the Site of Resistance

In Western discourses on modernity, woman’s freedom is often interpreted and represented in spatial terms. As Grewal points out, freedom of women, in English colonial discourses in the nineteenth century, was defined in terms of their liberations from the restrictions and “degraded” traditions of home space to emphasize the binary distinctions between British and Indian women and thereby the superiority of Britain over India: Britiish women were defined as “free because they were not in Purdah, could associate with men and women outside their kin, and could move about in the streets,” while Indian women are confined to, or ‘caged’ in, their homes (Grewal 1996: 167). Such binary distinctions underline deep-rooted ideas in the West about mobility as “a progressive force, as a form of relative freedom, as a break from
the discipline.

Feminist geographers who draw on such perspectives maintain that concern with gender relations and gendered inequalities has been transformed by questions about identities, subjectivities and performances, which may be gendered but which are also marked by other differences. Moreover, they claim that issues of identity such as those of race, class, sexuality, age and gender never operate outside of spatial configurations but are inextricably connected with the particular space and place within which, and in relation to which, people live (Bondi and Rose 2003: 231-232). These scholars thus point out the need for identifying the differences that exist among female migrants; namely, the differences between skilled migrant women and the unskilled, refugee women and migrating wives. Furthermore, given the fact that the high proportion of female migrants are undocumented, and therefore, more vulnerable to exploitation and discrimination in the countries of destination, there is a growing recognition that gendered assumptions about men's and women's roles, as well as gender-segregated labor markets, affect men and women differently. These processes shape migratory flows in a significantly gendered manner.

Recreating of Domesticity and Femininity in a Familiar Space:
“Home” as Woman’s Place

In recent years, reflecting the significant contributions by feminist scholars' work on the relationship between women, space and identity, there has been a major shift in the conventional conceptualization of woman as a “place,” as the “pure” place of home in which tradition of a particular group, community or nation is preserved from outside contamination (Rose 1993; Yuval-Davis
These scholars have demonstrated that the conventional conceptualization of woman as a pure "place" is often political in its intentions and implications: they aim at producing gendered conceptions of mobility between women and men by defining female as an immobile "place" and male as an active and mobile agent.

Conventional conceptions of women's place have often situated them in the private spheres of home. Inderpal Grewal states that, by the end of the nineteenth century, campaigns for sexual purity and a greater surveillance of sexual practices occurred in Britain and that these campaigns involved putting greater emphasis on distinguishing home/domestic space from public arenas (1996: 91). A variety of gendering practices have helped to define and interpret women's place solely in terms of home/domestic spaces. In this respect, I examine the conceptions of home/space for women and look at the intersections of the ideology of domesticity, power relations and the idea of "proper" womanhood as they enter into the discourses of "home", delimiting the spaces for women in the private sphere. The "private sphere" in this respect is a product of hierarchical thoughts inherent in modernity: The "private", being defined as "woman's domain", has always been considered as periphery to the "public" realm of men's lives. These conceptions and practices have been integral and conducive to the domestication of femininity and feminization of home space, which has served to justify masculine/public hegemony over the feminine/private.

Anthropologists and sociologists have revealed that there have been a number of social practices which have contributed to a greater restriction of spatial mobility of women. For instance, Ardener points out that social practices such as foot-binding, tight corsetting, hobble skirts, high heels, all effectively impede women's freedom of movement (1993: 21-22). Moreover, she adds, an ideology which encourages women to be physically frail, or to think
earlier, more confined, spaces and times" (Cresswell 2006: 56).

While Western discourses on modernity and enlightenment have defined woman in South Asia as victims of their “local” patriarchy because they are confined to their homes, by doing so, these discourses have defined “home” as a site in which “unliberated” women in the places of periphery are placed and controlled by “uncivilized” and barbaric local men (Grewal 1996: 167). These discourses, in turn, have impacted upon modernist Western feminist theorization of “third world women”, producing the dichotomy between “liberated” Western women and “controlled” third world women.24 By representing “other” women as such, this way of thinking has justified both hierarchical relations between the West and the “third world” and has imposed particular ideologies and practices upon their “sisters”.25

In contrast to certain Western feminists’ theorization of “home” as the site of control and restrictions by patriarchy as mentioned above, African-American women have situated home differently in the processes of their encounters with multiple forms of oppressions which they have faced in their everyday lives: African-American women have made their “homes” as the site of resistance to racism (hooks 1990: 41-55). hooks argues that “home” has had a radical political dimension for African-American people, and, in particular, African-American have contributed significantly to the task of making home “a site of resistance” to the domination and control by white men and women.

Black women resisted by making homes where all black people could

24 For critical analyses of the ways in which Western feminists have theorized “third world women”, see, for example, Mohanty (1998) and hooks (1990).
25 The veils of Muslim women, for instance, have often been considered to be a symbol of the oppression of Muslim women by their communities and religion. Yet it should be acknowledged that these discussions surrounding the veils of Muslim women often take place without sufficient attention given to the particular socio-cultural meanings of the different Muslim communities and the actual voices of these women. For further discussions of these issues, see Mohanty (1998) and Moore (2008).
strive to be subjects, not objects... where we could restore to ourselves the dignity denied to us in the outside world. This task of making homeplace was not simply a matter of black women providing service; it was about the construction of a safe place where black people could affirm one another and by doing so heal many of the wounds inflicted by racist domination. We could not learn to love or respect ourselves in the culture of white supremacy, on the outside; it was there on the inside, in that “homeplace,” most often created and kept by black women, that we had the opportunity to grow and develop, to nurture our spirits. (hooks 1990: 42)

Similarly, Grewal argues that “home” is a political site of resistance in which women attempt to break down “the binary of private/public” which is a primary source of nationalist articulations in India. Resistance in this regard is articulated by showing that the public and the private are interconnected spheres rather than separate ones (1996: 230-231). She stresses that “home” is “the domestic space that is also a political entity invested with history and tradition represented through the female bodies located within it” (1996: 230).

Both Grewal and hooks thus suggest that “home” is a political concept in which the meanings of femininity and domesticity are embedded within the structures of power and resistance. Central to these theorizations is the significance of resistance in a place called “home” which is conventionally considered as a site far removed from the political. Female bodies are crucial to the configurations of power and resistance tied to the “home” as they are considered to symbolize and represent “home”. This means that those women who try to escape or move from this familiar sphere have often been labelled as “outsiders” or outcasts who could potentially destabilize the established social order. Thus, it can be argued that “proper” womanhood has been interpreted in terms of the immobility of women’s bodies and of the restriction of these bodies to the “home” sphere.
As I have shown, the meanings of "home" have always been contingent upon different interpretations and explanations. In other words, the different meanings of "home" constitute a contested site in which its multiple meanings and definitions are constantly in the process of being negotiated, contextualized and reinterpreted by individuals across different social positions.

The gendered concept of "home" as a signifier of femininity and domesticity has influenced the delimitation of the place as the ideal site for "proper" woman. At the same time, the idea of "home" in the context of emigrations has often been tied to the idea of a secure domestic place in which a mother or wife awaits the return of displaced migrants. By suggesting the link between the mother and the "homeland", this gendered configuration of "home" has helped to emphasize and reaffirm migrants' continuing ties with the "homeland" which is embedded in a gendered imagery as well as in "imagined communities" (Anderson 1991). The city, too, is a repository of such practices of constructing and reinforcing gendered imageries and representation as I shall explore below.

**Cities as Gendered Space: Discussions of urban space in feminist urban studies**

As mentioned previously, space is gendered and this gendered space has been sustained by gendered assumptions about femininity and masculinity. City space has also been construed, imagined and represented with particular gendered associations and meanings. To examine the extent to which urban spaces are implicated with gendered assumptions in their planning and
spatial-structuring, contemporary feminist urban research has drawn upon post-structuralist ideas and theories of subjectivity, identity and meanings to link spatial configurations with power and difference (Watson 2000: 101). To illustrate, feminist urban studies suggest that the colonial project in most parts of South Asia, the Middle East and Africa was about seizing control of geographical areas to produce new spatial relations of boundaries and hierarchies (Asdar and Rieker 2008: 4).

The gendered conceptions of production and reproduction, which are informed by the binary hierarchies of the public and the private, the masculine and the feminine, have played significant roles in how space is constructed, differentiated and interpreted. As Rendell (2000: 103) points out, "the most pervasive representation of gendered space is the paradigm of the 'separate spheres,' an oppositional and hierarchical system consisting of a dominant public male realm of production (the city) and a subordinate private female one of reproduction (the home)". Saeggert similarly asserts that whereas urban life and men tend to be thought of as more aggressive, assertive, definers of important world events, intellectual, powerful and active, women and suburbs are perceived to share such characteristics as domesticity, repose, closeness to nature and passivity (1980: 96-97).

In particular, the architectural practices of capital cities around the globe have significantly demonstrated masculine constructions of the city space by encouraging the associations of its architecture and space formations with the power of the nation. As Henri Lefebvre points out, "the arrogant verticality of skyscraper, and especially of public and state buildings, introduces a phallic or precisely a phallicentric element into the visual realm; the purpose of this display, of this need to impress, is to convey an impression of authority to each". In particular, he adds that verticality and great height have been the locus of the spatial expression of power (1991: 98).
Thus, emphasis on masculine virility which is articulated through the construction of what Lefevre terms "the space of phallic verticality" (1991: 36) has been an integral element of spatial practices in urban spaces, in particular, in capital cities of nation-states. One can easily conjure up the images of urban landscape in cities such as Beijing, Tokyo and Singapore to elaborate on what is symbolized and, more importantly, the ideological meanings and practices that are implicitly expressed through these spatial practices. In this respect, Petra Weyland suggests that the built environment of global space in the city is deeply engraved with male and female symbolism: while male spatial metaphors and symbolism mark skyscrapers such as office towers and five star hotels in global cities, privacy and domesticity shape the protected nature of female global space which is "not accessible from, nor even seen by, the outside world" (1997: 86-87). Here, on the one hand, "the space of phallic verticality" is invested with crucial importance to convey the penetrating power of transnational capital in financial "hub cities" or to demonstrate the unambiguous authority and power of nation-states in capital cities. On the other, femininity and domesticity are the aspects of city that need to be suppressed or hidden to stress the virility of phallocentric built environment which is assumed to be of central strategic importance to the formation and functioning of city space.

Wilson (2001) points out that there is an analytical divide in feminist urban studies. On the one hand, there are those for whom "urban space is so fundamentally constructed by gender difference that women are not simply disadvantaged but representationally excluded or even extirpated"; on the other hand, there are those who "see the city as a contradictory and shifting space which can be appropriated by women" (Wilson 2001: 83). This analytical divide indicates the contradictory nature of the city in terms of how the feminine is interpreted or situated within its space, thereby
elucidating the contested realities and discursive practices inherent in the urban space. These contradictions are indicative of the construction of the city—as embodied and environmental concept—as "multiple contrasts: natural, unnatural; monolithic, fragmented; secret, public; pitiless, enveloping; rich, poor; sublime, beautiful" (Wilson 1991: 8).

Yet despite these contradictory aspects of the city space, the city is a site where people of different cultures and backgrounds may have the opportunity to interact with one another, where new experiments in architecture, art and other cultural and social practices may take place. In view of these points, I suggest that the city may open up a space whereby women can explore opportunities or possibilities that may be barred from them in the countryside or in the suburbs. The city, with the coexistence of diversity and anonymity, thus allows women much more freedom and room for exploring their own interests in comparison to other spaces.

**Gendered Flows of Transnational Migration: Migrant Women as Transnational Social Actors**

Conventionally, the scholarship on migration has been influenced by the basic assumptions pertinent to Western enlightenment theory. As McDowell (2003:12) points out, "many of the assumptions of Western enlightenment theory, which dominated the development of the social sciences in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rely on essentialist and binary distinctions that map on to gender divisions. Whereas men were viewed as the idealized rational, civilized Enlightenment subjects, full participants as workers and citizens in the public arena of the economy and politics, women were dependants, to be protected and kept close". These binary gender
constructions have shaped the foundations of traditional migration research, resulting in "the pervasive image of the international migrant as a male worker in much of the scholarship on international migration" (DeLaet 1999: 3). Similarly, Pratt and Yeoh point out the neglect of gender in much of the literature on transnationalism:

There is, then, some suspicion that the neglect of gender reflects the fact that much scholarly work on transnationalism is implicitly gendered— as masculinist. In traversing transnational space, men often feature as entrepreneurs, career-builders, adventurers and breadwinners who navigate transnational circuits with fluidity and ease, while women are alternatively taken to be truants from globalised economic webs, stereotyped as exotic, subservient or victimised, or relegated to playing supporting roles, usually in the domestic sphere. (Pratt and Yeoh 2003: 159)

Thus, scholars of migration studies and transnationalism have pointed out that the existing literature on migration, as well as the popular image of a migrant, has placed too much emphasis on men as international migrants, neglecting the roles of women in migration (Basch, Schiller and Blanc 1994; DeLaet 1999; Hugo 2000: 289; Lazaridis 2000; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Zlotnik 2003).

The disproportionate focus on male migrants which had dominated research in migration, however, has been transformed by a theoretical shift in gender and migration research. Reflecting the theoretical and empirical developments in social sciences such as feminist theory, geography, anthropology and sociology, the neglect of gendered dimensions in migratory processes has gradually been replaced by increasing attention to gender as one of the key concepts in analysing and explaining transnational processes. This attempt to integrate gender into the focus of migration research,
however, had to follow the same path as in other related fields of academic disciplines: scholars of migration research were initially concerned with drawing attention to the roles that women have played in migratory processes rather than providing analyses of gender in these processes. Thus, scholars began to pay more attention to the phenomenon of female migration during the 1970s and 1980s. The research produced during this period was primarily concerned with "adding women" to existing migration research (Willis and Yeoh 2000: xi).

This approach, despite its contribution to "making women visible" in migration research, lacked theoretical strength in that it did not integrate the concept of gender as socially constructed and relational into its theoretical approach. As Hondagneu-Sotelo argues, "gender is not simply a variable to be measured, but a set of social relations that organize immigration patterns" (1994: 3). Therefore, subsequent research has shifted its attention to acknowledge and examine the gendered dimensions of migratory processes and other issues of differences rather than simply adding women to existing empirical and theoretical framework in migration research. It thus covers issues of identity and agency to examine the relationship between place and self and puts emphasis on a multiplicity of factors that shape the processes of migration and accounts for the agency of migrants. As Silvey explains:

Migration research that revolves around the questions of gendered places and identities views the migrant as produced through a range of intersecting forces and processes, and emphasizes the human agency migrants have in the production of places and identities. Feminist geography aims to take seriously migrants' own interpretations of place and self as lenses which, albeit partial and interpretively complex, can reveal important aspects of the ways that broader structures are mediated into particular distillations of place and self. (Silvey 2006: 71)
Over the past three decades, feminist geographers have contributed both to the scholarship of geography and to feminist migration studies by pointing to the spatial configurations of gender and to the roles that gender and other differences play in shaping migratory processes. These feminist accounts of migratory processes have challenged dominant accounts of transnational migration by illuminating the gendered assumptions and effects that are generally invisible in mainstream theories and by identifying the sometimes contradictory relationships among state power, agency, mobility and differences. More specifically, scholars in the field of feminist migration studies have been concerned with understanding the social and spatial dimensions of mobility associated with gender, citizenship, race, class, nation, sexuality, caste, religion, and disability (Silvey 2006: 65). They thus approach spatial mobility “as interconnected in its meaning and processes to changes in economic and cultural landscapes of which mobility is understood to be a constitutive part” (2006: 65).

Knowledge-Making as a Political Practice: Contextualizing feminist epistemological practices within research on transnational migration

As indicated above, the perspective of gender is central to understanding contemporary migratory processes. For the growing numbers of female migrants indicate that a feminization of migration alters the terms in which social, economic and political processes that underlie current population movements are addressed, discussed and questioned. This is particularly relevant in the Asia-Pacific region where the feminization of migration has been one of the central dimensions of shaping the current migratory
processes.

This thesis is thus informed by feminist epistemology and methodology in a number of ways as these approaches shed light on the importance of taking into account the issues of boundaries, of gendered dimension of migrations and the differences and diversity of migratory processes. Moreover, feminist epistemology is, I believe, intimately relevant to this thesis as it questions the assumed unity, neutrality and universality of knowledge and reason, which has helped to privilege certain forms of knowledge over others and to belie multiple forms of differences and subjectivities that shape the individual experience in social processes today. As Lloyd maintains in her article on rationality, the alleged sexlessness of reason, in particular, its transcendence of all bodily difference, has masked differences under "an idealized sameness" to the disadvantage of women (1998: 169). Lloyd further adds that this putative gender neutrality of reason signifies "a covert privileging of maleness" (1998: 169). Thus, the privileging of the masculine over the feminine has been a significant dimension of epistemological tradition. By assuming the universality of reason and by connecting it with male power, the notions of rationality have sustained a conventional approach to social science in which white affluent males are regarded as the primary and sole producers of the knowledge and wisdom, giving them the sole authority and legitimacy over determining what counts as "knowledge" and excluding the voices of others as trivial. Knowledge and meaning, thus, are not individual inventions but social products (Smith 2001: 130). As a result, "the knowledge and wisdom made in places and by knowers other than those legitimated by the current, authoritative knowledge makers" have been discredited and discounted (Code 1998: 174). Thus, the processes of knowledge making that reflect the supposed neutrality and objectivity of reason have not only informed the basis of a discipline such as philosophy in which the unity of reason plays an essential part (Lloyde 1998: 169), but also

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been pervasive in most other academic disciplines in humanities and social sciences (Code 1998: 174). Feminist engagements with difference and diversity have translated these processes of knowledge making into critiques of universalism and the unified subject, the destabilization of the category "woman" and the ideal of situated and partial knowledges. In this respect, Haraway's concept of "situated knowledges" is particularly instructive and relevant. She defines situated and partial knowledges as "politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situating where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims on people's lives" (Haraway 1992: 195). She further adds that we seek partiality for the sake of "the connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible" (1992: 196).

Research on transnational migration, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, has also been influenced by the conventional practices of privileging maleness and power in the making of knowledge as social construction: that is, the conventional approach to study migratory processes has largely focused on male migrants while disregarding the cause and nature of gendered migration which shape the migratory processes of women differently from those of men. Feminist epistemology, I believe, is a useful approach to researching transnational migration for the reason that I specify below and it applies well to exploring transnational social processes which affect individuals differently and unevenly. Contrary to the popular imagination that capital and multinational corporations dominate the contemporary global processes with the effect that the agency of individuals and local specificities lose their meaning in the face of the absolute power of economic globalization, individuals, as agents of transnational processes in their own right, negotiate the multiple and fluid meanings of place and identity in their social practices and everyday life. These negotiations may lead to a variety of transnational social processes including transnational migration,
transnational social movements and circulation of ideas and theories across the globe. To capture and comprehend the contemporary social processes without privileging "meta-narratives" that tend to ignore the social impacts of agency upon these processes, we need an epistemology that transcends the traditional boundary, that is, the binaries between reason/affect, public/private, modernity/tradition, agency/victim, of producing and illuminating knowledge. It is in this context that I stress the importance of situated knowledges that are derived from the lives and experience of women as they contest, reconfigure and struggle over the social practices and meanings of boundaries.

By arguing for particularity and context instead of privileging the unitary "reason" as the authoritative voice in epistemology (Lloyd 1998: 169), feminist epistemology has charted a new terrain in which not only analyses of gender count as a "knowledge", but also analyses that integrate the issues of race, class and citizenship with the questions of gender contribute significantly to the making of "knowledge" in the social sciences. In other words, feminist epistemology opens up spaces for different voices and forms of knowledge which have hitherto been marginalized in conventional approach to knowledge-making practices. This position "to include the voices and experiences of those silenced by dominant forms of representation" is central to much feminist methodology (Sharpe: 2004: 91). In drawing in the views and concerns of expatriate Japanese women in other Asian countries, this thesis stresses the importance of listening to the voices of others and the collaborative nature of research processes rather than the reproduction of an authoritative reading of the world. In doing so, it attempts to represent "the voices of being studied as knowing subjects rather than as objects of research" (Sharpe: 2004: 92) and to contribute to analyses of social processes that are not dependent on the reproduction of binaries.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that gender provides an important analytical framework to examine transnational processes in relation to issues of boundaries, mobility and place. Feminist geographers have contributed significantly to the theorizing of the relationship between gender, space and power. By doing so, they have reconceptualized and enriched the scope of migration studies. They have thus shown that women and men are differentially located in space and that spatial configuration is a product of power relations which are inflected by assumptions about gender.

Gendered understandings of place and space have produced assumptions about women's and men's place in society. Conventional conceptions of women's place have often situated them in the private spheres of home as women's bodies have often been considered as symbols of purity and domesticity. Feminist scholars have demonstrated that such conventional conceptualizations of woman as a pure "place" are often political in their intentions and implications. They have illustrated that these conceptualizations aim at producing gendered conceptions of mobility between women and men by defining female as an immobile "place" and male as an active and mobile agent. These conceptions often produced the associations between men and the city, and between women and the home, reiterating the social and physical immobility of women. In this context, women migrants received little scholarly attention until the 1970s and 1980s when feminist scholars began addressing the importance of taking into account women's experiences of migration.
As evidenced by the growing number of women in many migration streams, the feminization of migration is one of the key processes to shape transnational migrations today. Feminist scholars have demonstrated the important role that gender and other differences play in international migration. In particular, they have paid sufficient attention to non-economic incentives to migration. More importantly, they have addressed the significance of borders by making them the focus of their investigation.

Feminist mappings of transnational migration have thus provided new ways of exploring transnational processes and practices. In particular, they have elucidated the conventional practices of privileging maleness and power in the making of knowledge as social construction. This thesis draws on such an understanding of knowledge as social construction and it is in this context that I stress the importance of situated knowledges that are derived from the embodied experiences of women as the agents of transnational migration.

This thesis thus aims to bring the centrality of boundaries to the study of the migratory processes of Japanese women to other parts of Asia. As such, it is informed by feminist understandings of boundaries as socially contingent and contextual. By seeing boundaries as social constructs, I demonstrate that they are open to the acts of negotiation, reconfiguration and contestation over their meanings and operations.
Chapter 3

Transnationalism, Place and Migration: 
Situating borders and boundaries within 
the studies of migration

People are mobile. (Personal conversation with a Thai PhD student, 5 April 2008)

A place is a centre of meaning — we become attached to it, we fight over it and exclude from it — we experience it. (Cresswell 2006: 3)
The landscape of global migration has undergone significant changes over the past decades. In 2000, among the world population of 6.057 billion, migrants represent some 2.9 per cent. This percentage has been rising steadily over the past 15 years. Although representing a relatively small percentage of the world's total population, if all international migrants lived in the same place, it would be the world's fifth biggest country (IOM 2003: 4-5).

The growing intensity in global interconnectedness and interdependencies, in particular, the rising tide of population movement across borders, is increasingly reshaping the theoretical landscape of social sciences as well. As I have discussed in the introductory chapter, a “new mobility paradigm” in sociology has significantly called into question the conventional understanding of the relationship between society, culture and place: an imaginary which regards territories or identities as spatially fixed and bounded. Instead, such a turn in sociology has highlighted the need for integrating the diverse forms of mobilities into thinking about society and place. In light of such theoretical transformations in theorizing mobility as an integral part of explaining society, Smith points out that “transnational flows of migration and cultural practices are inexorably enmeshing the everyday activities of many residents of both sending and receiving localities in dense and resilient migrant networks that some researchers are now calling transnational social formations” (2001: 1). Similarly, Riemenshinitter and Madsen reminds us that as “the categories of East and West, Mainland China and Taiwan/Hong Kong, centre and periphery, nation and diaspora, power and knowledge, are joined in increasingly contingent relationships, our ideological, geopolitical, and metaphysical borders are blurring” (2009: 1).
In this chapter, then, I provide a review of literature on migration studies and transnationalism, which form the theoretical background of this study. In particular, I explore the questions of how boundaries operate across state borders and how the concept of transnationalism sheds light on the processes of demarcating and reconfiguring boundaries. Moreover, the rising flows of population movements across national borders have called into question the following assumptions pertaining to place-making: 1) place as a “pure” construct; 2) conceptions of identity and “home” that construct them as stable; and 3) borders and boundaries as fixed markers of differentiating one place from another. In considering such questions and the relationship between boundaries and transnationalism, I place global cities as an important site that provides critical insights into the acts of remapping boundaries across the borders of nation-states.

In this chapter, I thus discuss the meanings of place, territory and boundaries in an age when transnational connections and ties criss-cross the established boundaries of nation-states, which has led some critics to assert that the power of nation-states in sustaining boundaries has diminished to a considerable degree. Yet boundaries do continue to exist and they exert critical influences in our conceptions of place, identity and belonging. Thus, instead of seeing globalization as an overarching process to dominate the conceptions of place and to remove the boundaries altogether, I aim to situate transnational processes — the growing mobility of capital, information, goods, people — as embedded firmly in specific places and borders and to consider these processes as contingent on locality and the politics of place-making by nation-states.

First, I discuss the relationship between place and globalization and provide a critique of globalization as it relates to notions of place, boundaries and identity. Second, I discuss recent developments of the studies on
transnationalism and boundaries and on both empirical and theoretical dimensions. As I demonstrate in this chapter, borders and boundaries do not disappear because of the social and economic processes that are associated with globalization. Rather, they continue to inform significant dimensions of contemporary social processes to differentiate "us" from "other" and "our place" from "other places". Boundaries thus form the basis of our understandings of territorality — a concept that underlies the current transnational processes. Third, I suggest that places are the product of connections with other places and, more importantly, they are socially constructed and can thus be contested and negotiated over their meanings and symbolisms by individuals, institutions or states. Cities, and population movements that are associated with cities, play a critical role in this respect. Fourth, I thus point out that a new form of urban citizenship is reconfiguring the ways in which we think about the relationship between place, territory and boundaries that have been based firmly on the idea of imagining citizens as those who place their loyalty and belonging to the country of their origin.

Rethinking Conceptions of Place: From deterritorialized space of flows toward the "grounded reality"²⁵

Globalization generally refers to a phenomenon which is marked by the broadening, deepening and acceleration of global interconnections in all aspects of life (Held et al., 1999). Like other flows, whether financial or commercial, flows of ideas or information, the rising tide of people crossing borders is considered as the most reliable indicator of globalization (IOM 2003: 4). In light of the increasingly intense relationship between globalization and population mobility, social critics argue that the increasing

²⁵ The term "grounded reality" was borrowed from Guarnizo and Smith (1998).
tide of globalization has not only affected the flows of migration, but also impacted on the ways in which we conceive of place as secure and settled (Harvey 1989). In other words, the processes of globalization, or to put it more precisely, discourses on the globalized world, have unsettled the meaning of place to a significant degree. In this respect, Massey explains this process as a product of the changes in the world itself as well as of the shifts in the way that different groups in society think about and/or represent place (1995: 50). Smith states that the combined effects of several transnational processes and practices have impacted significantly on people's experience of place. These include:

the trans-territorialization of production; the global extension, speed, and simultaneity of new communication technologies; the end of the Cold War and attendant geopolitical restructuring; the rapid acceleration of transnational migration, and the consequent ethnic reconstitution of localities and regions now taking place on a global scale. These dramatic sociospatial changes have affected prevailing structures of work, residence, and social intercourse, in many localities, great and small, throughout the world, significantly impinging on people's everyday experience of place. (Smith 2001: 133-134)

In major cities across the globe, one is always tempted to find what is considered to be symbolic of processes of globalization: McDonald's, large shopping malls as well as office buildings of multinational companies. The acts of imagining these landscapes, which are perceived to have permeated many parts of urban centres in the world, are creating a perception that globalization is synonymous with the processes of the homogenization of cities and places in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, technological developments in air transport have led to the significant increase in air travel, enabling those people who have the money and means to explore even the remote parts of the world. In light of these trends and processes, globalization, has emerged as one of the most prominent academic and
political discourses to explain and think about social processes today.

Some have taken globalization as a triumph of the free market and competition over national regulation and protected economies, while stressing the weakening power of the authority of the state to determine its fiscal and monetary policies. Others have contended that national boundaries are losing their significance because of the increased movement of people (Shin and Timberlake 2000: 2262). This raises an important question: has "globalization" altered the significance of place to the extent that the meaning of place is rendered irrelevant and insignificant to our lives?

To address such a question, first, we need to turn our attention away from the seemingly familiar landscapes of "globalization" toward unequal processes of social and economic development in the world. Most importantly, "globalization", as imagined through skyscrapers of multinational companies, global information flows and increased flexibility of people's mobility across national boundaries, has never been an equal process as international flows of capital tend to be extremely concentrated within specific regions such as Europe, East Asia and North America (Hirst and Thompson 1996). Rather, it has been a partial and contingent process privileging those people who hold certain citizenship in developed countries, passports or capital while excluding the majority of people who do not own the means to cross national or regional borders that continue to affect these people's mobility and the construction and perpetuation of such borders are intimately connected to the perceptions of people on the other side of the border, who regard them as the "threat" to maintaining the integrity and security of their society. In this regard, Dirlik points out this partial nature of "the global":

The term *global* used as a signifier for certain processes (economic, political, social, and cultural) obviously does not refer to the globe as a
representation of the whole world geometrically. Not only are large parts of the world left out of these processes, but even in those parts of the world that are included in the processes, the processes appear as pathways in networks of one kind or another that leave untouched or even reduce to marginality significant surfaces of what is implied by a term such as global. (Dirlik 2001: 16; italics original)

Second, if we think about the increasing number of people on the move across national boundaries, be they political, economic migrants, or skilled migrants, to say that place has lost is meaning and significance belies existing social realities that shape the lives of the growing numbers of transnational migrants who move from their "homeland" to different locations across the globe. On the contrary, conceptions of place and their implications for transnational migration are crucially important to shape transnational social processes and practices in the present. I argue, thus, that rather than seeing the global as homogeneous place directed by flows of transnational capital, conceptions of place, which are structured by the agency and imagination of individual migrants, as well as by the larger economic, social and political forces that mediate individual migrants' choices of migration, are key elements to understanding transnational migration.

It has often been pointed out that globalization, in particular, an inexorable, accelerating and homogenizing tide of economic globalization, has transformed the world to the extent that nation-states have become insignificant actors in the face of powerful flows of transnational capital which are perceived to move freely across national boundaries. In particular, the transfer of power away from states toward corporations has meant that the idea of territorial borders has become meaningless (Ohmae 1991; 1995). Moreover, economic globalization, as some studies contend, may also create a tendency towards cultural homogeneity across the globe (Castells 1998). As such, these theorists highlight the deterritorializing nature of contemporary
global processes highlighted by the ease of movement of capital, goods, and ideas, as well as of people across borders.

In particular, triumphant accounts that celebrate the victory of the capitalist and market forces over all of the economic, political and cultural processes claim and emphasize the efficiency, stability and equity of the new world order, leaving little room for imagining agency or practices of resistance outside the logic of the power of global capitalist expansion (Bergeron 2001: 983-986; Williams, 2006: 3). Similarly, Hay and Marsh indicate that an account that privileges a singular account of globalization is insufficient “to capture the complexity and contingency of contemporary change” (2000: 3).

As suggested above, the economic-centered discourse on globalization stresses the view that economic processes of globalization, which are reinforced by capitalist notions of modernization and development, prevail and dominate the world irrespective of national borders and boundaries. In particular, corporate discourses of globalization offer the promise of a unified humanity and “set in motion the belief that separate histories, geographies, and cultures that have divided humanity are now being brought together by the warm embrace of globalization, understood as a progressive process of planetary integration” (Coronil 2000: 352). Thus, the corporate discourses of globalization see the local as “a site the inhabitants of which must be liberated from themselves to be homogenized into the global culture of capital” (Dirlik 1996: 35).

Cartier also points out that new Western-centric perspectives on society and economy, which are particularly prevalent in the United States, have made normative ideas about globalization an arena for the reemergence of Western political economic hegemonies and a promotional base for the neo-liberal regime and financial globalization (2002: 1517). In this respect, “the global” is
privileged as "a new kind of universalism, rendering it into a point of departure for all other spatializations" (Dirlik 2001: 17).²⁷

In this context, the feminist project of deconstructing global capital and of challenging conventional discourses of globalization has significant reverberations for considering globalization as a contingent and mediated process. As Bergeron points out, a challenge to the hegemonic discourses of globalization begins by "rethinking the nature of global capital itself, by challenging the presentation of economic mechanisms of globalization as governed by a unified, intentional, and noncontradictory economic logic, as the more or less inevitable outcome of a drive to accumulate on a worldwide basis, or even as an outcome determined solely by powerful international institutions" (2001: 996).

By making the role of capital and economics central to the analyses of globalization and marginalizing the alternative accounts of global processes, dominant accounts of globalization that view the flows of capital, people, goods and ideas as a universal, timeless and spaceless operation tend to dismiss the local specificity and the social and cultural contexts in which diverse forms of transnational social processes take place. As Dirlik points out, "the teleology of modernity", which identifies civilization and progress with political, social, and cultural homogenization, justifies the suppression of the local in the name of the general and the universal, thus representing the local as the realm of backwardness (1996: 23).

Furthermore, this view does not take the agency of individuals into sufficient consideration. In other words, theories that stress the putative free movement of capital across borders and its absolute power over the agency of

²⁷ For other critical scholarship on the celebratory discourses on globalization, see Appadurai 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Massey 1999; Robertson 1992; Saskia Sassen 1998; Smith 2001; and Weiss 1998.
individuals have failed to recognize the multi-faceted and "grounded" nature of transnational social processes, be they transnational migration, transnational flows of capital, or transnational social movements. In this respect, it is critically important to note that transnational processes do not take place in a vacuum outside of any social relations and contexts. Rather, they do take place with a multitude of meanings attached to place and boundaries that are socially constructed and impact on individuals in diverse ways. In this regard, Guarnizo and Smith caution against the dangers of regarding transnational processes as something which is totally free from the constraints and restrictions arising from territorial boundedness of the nation-states concerned and urge us to pay more attention to the "grounded reality" that constitutes transnational processes:

Thus, the image of transnational migrants as deterritorialized, free-floating people represented by the now popular academic adage "neither here nor there" deserves closer scrutiny. Intermittent spatial mobility, dense social ties, and intense exchanges fostered by transmigrants across national borders have indeed reached unprecedented levels. This has fed the formulation of metaphors of transnationalism as a "boundless" and therefore liberatory process. However, transnational practices cannot be construed as if they were free from the constraints and opportunities that contextuality imposes. Transnational practices, while connecting collectivities located in more than one national territory, are embodied in specific social relations established between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities, at historically determined times. The "locality" thus needs to be further conceptualized. (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 11)

As I have illustrated, discourses on economic-centred view of globalization have produced the particular assumption that place has become insignificant or lost its meanings in the face of the overarching and "deterritorialized" forces of transnational capital. Yet despite this dominant discourse on the erasure of boundaries between different places and their homogenization, the
concept of place and boundaries continue to occupy a central place in the acts of migratory processes.

Transnationalism, Borders and Nation-States

Over the past five decades, the growing volume of international population mobility has been central to the shaping of the major economic, political and cultural transformations that are taking place in many countries across the globe (Castles and Davidson 2000: 59-60). In this context, both emigration and immigration have affected the nation-state to a considerable extent: they have raised important questions regarding the configuration or reconfiguration of borders to protect it from undesirable "others", the protection and redefinition of national identity, as well as the regulation and integration of migrants within its borders.

Despite the increasing "securitization" of borders in many parts of the developed countries, characterized by the presence of more border patrols, fences and military personnel, growing numbers of people in developing countries have attempted to cross these borders into the developed countries to secure a more stable and prosperous future for themselves. The growing interdependence of countries in the world economy, as well as the increasing economic disparities that exist between the so-called developing and developed countries, have been conducive to the intensification of the population movements from developing to developed countries on a massive scale. Upon arrival in the destination countries, those who originate from developing countries are often categorized as migrants whose work is defined as "unskilled" or "femininised" such as domestic work. At the same time, a

20 Tyner (2004) points out that the definition of who is considered to be a "migrant",

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number of developed countries, due to their declining birthrate and ageing population, are facing the shortage of skilled workers and revising their immigration policies to attract more skilled workers in order to maintain and raise the competitiveness of their country.

These dimensions of migratory processes demonstrate the enormous importance of examining the implications of population mobility across national borders, which impacts upon not only individual migrants but also on the economic, political and social structures of nation-states.

Although migrations across state borders have existed for centuries, the current patterns of population mobility require special attention since such patterns are unparalleled in their diversity and magnitude. In this respect, Alejandro Portes points out that the density and complexity of the current phenomenon of transnationalism has been facilitated by the advent of new technologies in transportation and telecommunications which greatly enable immigrants to communicate and sustain ties across national borders (2003: 875).

The social and economic transformations that are taking place in terms of these population movements have been discussed and theorized by a broad range of scholars, encompassing a number of academic disciplines in social sciences such as sociology, geography, anthropology, political science and economics. The growing interest in transnationalism, as exemplified in a
proliferation of academic journals, seminars and conferences related to this topic, can be regarded as part of the continuing academic efforts to explain and theorize these social processes. Indeed, much of the literature on transnationalism has sought to identify the implications of the emergence of transnational networks that migrants maintain in their migratory processes for social, economic and political situation in their host countries as well as in their countries of origin. As Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 3) point out, the concept of transnationalism, or “transnational social formations”, has been rapidly appropriated and consumed by anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and geographers, generating its theoretical circulation and analyses across disciplinary boundaries. Schiller, for instance, defines “transnational” as articulating “political, economic, social and cultural processes that (1) cross the borders of one or more states; (2) include actors that are not states; but (3) are shaped by the policies and institutional practices of particular states” (1999: 203). Similarly, Vertovec points out that “transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of the nation-state” (1999: 447). In this regard, Yang maintains that the media are crucial components of transnationalism, since they “provide ways for audiences to traverse great distances without physically moving from local sites” (1997: 288).  

As indicated above, theoretical developments in transnational social processes have demonstrated that the conventional view of the dichotomy between the local and global is problematic as it does not sufficiently capture the multiple ties and interactions that these processes entail. As Smith succinctly points out, the global-local duality in social theory is based on a binary construction: “the local with a cultural space of stasis, ontological

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29 As Yang points out, the mass media are important vehicles for imagining the outside world. Thus, it should be stressed that the role of the media in transnational processes forms significant part of the studies of transnationalism, as it is predicated upon interactions with places that spread beyond national boundaries (1998: 287-288). I shall discuss this aspect of transnationalism in detail in Chapter 7.
meaning, and personal identity and the *global* as the site of dynamic change, the de-centering of meaning and the fragmentation/homogenization of culture" (Smith 2001: 157; *italics* original). This sort of binary thinking, he adds, has set cognitive limits in theorizing transnational migration because it conceives "immigration" as "a linear process moving from an 'old,' presumably coherent traditional culture, through a transitional period of delocalization, followed by a period of adaptation and relocalization to the 'new' and presumably more 'modern' cultural context and way of life" (2001: 157). Moreover, it has virtually become impossible to think of local identities and perspectives today as being constituted and maintained without any reference to the seemingly boundless travel of commodities, ideas and populations that mark our current condition (Schindler and Koenick 2007:12). Thus, recent research on transnationalism has arisen from the need to explain and understand "the ways in which migrants are both 'here' and 'there' —transcending the scales to which they have been analytically assigned" (Kelly and Lusis 2006: 832).

In analyzing transnational social processes such as transnational flows of migration and cultural practices, it is essential to make a conceptual distinction between "globalization" and "transnationalism". The theories of globalization as developed in the West often rely on the assumption that some master processes of globalization, characterized by the power of the flows of finance and commodities, make the world more unified and homogenous (Featherstone 1996: 46). Indeed, some scholars (Albrow 1996; Ohmae 1996) point out that the nation-state has ceased to be a dominant force and has thus become incompetent in the face of globalization, suggesting that sovereignty and power are increasingly challenged by this phenomenon. This perspective thus stresses an erosion of borders and territorial controls. Yet despite such an attempt to stress the undermining of state sovereignty and power, which is a dominant theme in the globalization literature (see Castles
critics point to more complex and multifaceted accounts of transnational processes that take the issues of borders and boundaries into account. In this respect, Smith, for instance, maintains that while globalization discourses often explicitly assume the growing insignificance of national borders, boundaries, and identities, the discourses on transnationalism are based on the continuing significance of borders, state policies, and national identities even as these are often transgressed by transnational social practices (2001: 3). Pratt and Yeoh suggest that "one of the distinctions of transnationalism as a concept, compared to globalization, is that it signals specific locations, and the continuing, if evolving, importance of borders and the nation state" (2003: 161). Similarly, Willis et al. (2004) point out that although transnationalism is often conceptualized as a challenge to the continued existence of the nation-state, it does not necessarily signify the disintegration of the nation-state in its exercise of power, but rather a reconfiguration of the nation-state within the context of greater global migration flows. In aligning myself with these discourses on transnationalism, I identify transnational social processes as embedded in the existence of borders and boundaries that continue to inform the movements of people and, in connection with this point, assert that the nation-states, rather than losing its significance to control such movements, are being reconstituted by the transnational mobility of people, goods, information and capital.

Contemporary states’ ability to control movements across borders is often underestimated. As indicated above, nation-states continue to play a crucial role in economic, social, cultural and political processes in the context of transnationalism. In particular, nation-states are central to the shaping of the policies of immigration and emigration. As Piper (2005: 17-18) points out, the importance of government policy in shaping the conditions for the processes of emigration and immigration should not be underestimated.
because the increasing number of migrants, or people on the move, does not signify that national borders and policies are becoming meaningless in an age of globalization and mobility. Rather, state boundaries have been strengthened. Indeed, as the tightening of immigration control and regulations in the United States since the attacks of the 11 September 2001 indicates, possible migrants from certain developing countries are finding it more difficult to cross the borders into the developed countries in the West and to obtain a ticket for a new life. This trend shows the extent to which the nation-state continues to serve as “the critical institution that divides and disciplines global labour” (Bauder 2006: 1002) and to continue the flows of labour into its territory through various mechanisms of control. As Raghuram points out, “the state’s territorial boundaries are regulated and have become sites of inspections and restrictions as the state determines the general conditions of entry, work, and residence of the people who live within its borders” (2004: 185). Borders, as continuing agents of a state’s security and sovereignty, are “the political membranes through which people, goods, wealth and information must pass in order to be deemed acceptable or unacceptable by the state (Wilson and Donnan 1998: 9).

These processes have resulted in the stratification and differentiation of migrants between those privileged groups who are able to traverse borders relatively easily and those less privileged groups who are positioned under strict conditions and surveillance in securing even the temporary residency or work permits in their destination countries. In order to ensure the separateness of separate places, nation-states have invested enormous energy and resources in the tightening of their border control. Such attempts to reinforce the border control activities are most visibly and powerfully inscribed on the landscape of the border. In May 2006, for instance, George W. Bush, the President of the United States, announced publicly that the United States was going to deploy up to 6000 troops to its border with Mexico to
deter undocumented migrants from crossing the border into the United States, while suggesting that this move would not amount to the militarization of its borders because Mexico is “our friendly neighbor” (Canberra Times 2006 May 17). As these strict measures toward tightening its borders by the United States suggest, the move to tighten its border controls as well as to reassert the (in)security of the “homeland” has become a common feature of immigration and security policies in many developed countries today. It also suggests that under this political framework the security of states is often given priority over the security of persons in social, economic, and political terms. Indeed refugees, illegal migrants and asylum seekers are often seen as posing threats to “national security” since their very existence elides the categorical order of nation states and thus blurs national boundaries (Malkki 1995: 7-8). To cite another example, the Australian Government, in its report entitled Managing the Border: Immigration Compliance, describes the entry of unauthorized arrivals as “a threat to the Australian community” (DIMIA 2005: iii). In this regard, this “securitization” of border control suggests that controlling the flows of “illegal migrants” has indeed become one of the most central security concerns of the nation-states in the present. Also, these processes do indicate that borders and territorial control have not become irrelevant to state practices. Rather, they are being recrafted through state efforts to territorially exclude non-state actors who cross national borders in violation of state laws while assuring territorial access for “desirable” migrants (Andreas 2003: 79-80). Thus, transnational flows of migration need to be considered as a phenomenon inseparable from state practices of regulating who should be allowed to enter and remain in the territorialized spaces of the nation-state and who should not be allowed to do so.

Border control regimes are thus a vital part of the state’s policies and practices in exercising its power over the selection of who is allowed to gain
entry to the country and who is excluded from this process. As Mahler and Pessar point out, there is a gendered dimension to the state's border policies and practices: on the one hand, women and girls are more often targets of gender-based violence, in particular, sexual assault, and of suspicions of border crossing for the purposes of prostitution; on the other hand, border concerns characterized in national security terms disproportionately affect males, as gendered assumptions about who is a terrorist inform a significant part of border control practices and thus often result in singling out males as possible terrorist suspects in the Middle East as well as in other regions (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 39). In particular, since the attacks of the 11 September 2001 and, more recently, a similar attempt to carry out acts of terrorism on a number of transatlantic airplanes from Britain in August 2006, Muslim men of South Asian or Middle Eastern origin have been subject to more strict scrutiny by security authorities than others, causing concerns among Muslims that they may be singled out as the target of increasing racial discrimination and stereotyping after the September 11. In his book entitled On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World, Cresswell highlights the social and political roles played by mobility and relative immobility in people's geographical imaginations and shows how these ways of thinking have permeated the world we live in to influence all manners of beliefs and practices in regard to people's mobility and immobility. As Cresswell argues, these imaginations are not simply mental maps confined to the world of ideas. Rather, "they are active participants in the world of action. They inform judges, doctors, factory managers, photographers, government officials, lawyers, airport planners, and all manner of other people who have the ability to mold the world we live in" (2006: 22). As such, gendered and racialized practices of exercising power over the mobility of individuals on the basis of differences suggest that "the structures of gender, race and class play into determining whose bodies belong where, how different social groups subjectively experience various environments, and what sorts of exclusionary
and disciplinary techniques are applied to specific bodies" (Silvey 2006: 70). In this respect, the social and political practices of demarcating boundaries are closely intertwined with the exercise of power over individuals by a variety of actors who take part in such processes.

Transnationalism as a Grassroots Phenomenon

Another important dimension that needs to be considered in theorizing a conceptual distinction between transnationalism and globalization is the way in which we identify actors in regard to interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of the nation-state. Portes points out that the concept of transnationalism, as used in much of the literature, refers primarily to the cross-border activities of private grassroots actors, including immigrants rather than to these activities from those belonging to large bureaucracies and other institutions. In doing so, much of the literature focuses on the initiatives of "common people" to sustain a variety of ties across national borders (Portes 2003: 875-876).

The concept of transnationalism, then, draws our attention to the issue of transnational migrants' agency in relation to states and of the possibility that these migrants may impact upon prevailing national politics. For instance, on 1 May 2006, millions of legal and illegal migrant workers in the United States, predominantly from Latin America, actively took part in street protests in various cities in the United States in favour of less restrictive immigration policies, as well as of the greater recognition of their contributions to the domestic economy in the United States. Because of their actions, many shops and businesses in the United States were affected on the day and obliged to close their operations for that day, showing effectively that
U.S society would grind to a halt without the labour of the immigrant population (Pederson 2007: 9-10). This event illustrates the extent to which transnational migrants actively shape and take part in the negotiations of the meanings attached to the politics of migration and immigrant labor on which countries such as the United States are dependant to sustain their economy. As Appadurai indicates by referring to his definition of the term "ethnoscape", "the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree" (1996: 33). To understand such a shifting landscape of the globe, then, it is essential that we introduce agency into migration theory to enable us to take "a more multifaceted approach that can pay attention to the lived experiences" of migrants" (Anthias and Lazardis 2000: 6).

In this thesis, I follow the conceptual distinction between "globalization" and "transnationalism" as articulated by Smith (2001). As indicated above, he stresses the continuing significance of borders, state policies, and national identities in theorizing transnational social practices. In doing so, I seek to identify the transnational flows of migration between Japan and other Asian countries as embedded in national borders, politics and identities that impacts on these flows. Rather than merely celebrating the emancipatory aspects of transnational practices and flows as ushering in the age of societies without any significance attached to nation-states and their borders, I seek to provide more balanced and complicated views of transnationalism: I aim to point to the multifaceted ways in which transnational processes are embedded as well as the significance of individuals as agents and subjects in maintaining, promoting, and sometimes contesting, the forces of the transnationalism that affect their everyday lives in various ways. In particular, I stress that borders, state policies, and national or ethnic
identities are significant elements in shaping these transnational processes and that these dimensions thus form the basis on which we discuss transnational mobility today.

**Borders and Boundaries within the Context of Transnationalism**

Borders and Boundaries are significant components of contemporary social processes. Despite the putative free movement of capital, the movement of people is subject to a number of restrictions and social control. In particular, growing disparities in economic and social securities between developed countries and developing countries have produced a large number of refugees and asylum seekers, in economic, social and political terms.

For these people, borders represent significant obstacles to their attempts or plans to start new lives in their countries of destination. In recent years, in particular, there have been a number of cases in which a large number of "illegal" migrants from African countries have risked their lives to cross the borders between Europe and Africa. Their attempts to reach the shores of wealthy and prosperous Europe demonstrate the importance of Europe as a place for these migrants: in the minds of these migrants, Europe is a desirable destination that is imbued with considerable economic opportunities and social securities for themselves and their family.

Europe, as a geographical concept, provides important implications for exploring the questions of borders in social and political terms. Since its inception, the European Union (EU) has placed the right to mobility at the heart of its constitution (Cresswell 2006: 233). Europe has thus been marked by the blurring of boundaries within the member states of the EU on the one
hand and by the strengthening of border demarcations with other places on the other. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has embarked on the enlargement of its organization to include former socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Moreover, it has deepened the processes of political, economic and social integrations within certain EU countries through the proposal of a common foreign and security policy, the adoption of a single currency, Euro, and the Schengen Treaty, which allows for the free movement of people and labour within designated countries.\(^{30}\) Immigration, as it has been affected by the accelerating processes of regional integration, has changed the face of Europe to a significant degree. At the same time, the EU countries, in particular, such countries as Britain, France and Spain, have made it more difficult for migrants from other regions, in particular, from African countries, to reach the shores of Europe through increased and intense border controls and patrols to police and prevent the flows of illegal migrants into the territory of Europe. It has been argued that the “fortress Europe” is becoming a dominant reality for those who wish to cross the borders of developed countries. For instance, Jess and Massey argue that the phrase “fortress Europe” is used to express a new boundedness of place that rest firmly on issues of who belongs and who does not and that they are strongly exclusionary, creating barriers against immigrants (1995: 162). Such manifestation of Europe as a bounded place highlights that boundaries between “us” and “others” are critical elements in establishing “us” at the expense of excluding “others” (Paasi 1999: 75).

Within the EU countries, in particular, in Britain, France, Germany, there are large numbers of Muslim citizens because of their colonial and postcolonial ties with these countries. Incidents such as the racial riots in the

\(^{30}\) The Schengen Agreement, which was signed in 1985 and implemented in most states of the EU a decade later, was also underlined by ideological commitment to a sense of European “community” that would transcend national allegiances and reduce the chance of conflict between member states (Cresswell 2006: 233).
suburbs of Paris and the London underground bombings in 2005 have exposed how complicated the processes of assimilation and integration in Europe are. Also, these events revealed the extent to which the idea of "a harmonious multicultural society" in the enlarged Europe is a contested one within the context of an increasing sense of alienation and segregation that Muslim people experience in Europe because of the association of Muslims with Islamic extremists since the attack on 11 September 2001.

One British film *Love + Hate* (Directed by Dominic Savage; 2005) provides an interesting example of how people construct boundaries on the basis of racial and ethnic differences in a contemporary Europe that has increasingly become ethnically diverse and multicultural. The protagonist of the film, Naseema, is a Pakistani British girl who lives in a small town in Lancashire. Naseema is caught between the dictates of her Muslim family's traditions and her personal desire as an individual to take control of her life. Working in a wallpaper shop, she begins to have a feeling for Adam, a local young man steeped with racial hatred. Yet their relationship meets strong resistance and disapproval from their families, particularly from Yousif, Naseema's brother, who expects her to conform to the "good Muslim girl" stereotype and despises his sister's relationship with a White man.

Despite such difficult circumstances, Adam and Naseema decide to leave the past behind and to depart from their lives in Lancashire for a new future. Rather than conforming to her family's pressure to live within her own "community", Naseema chooses to take control of her life, to live her life as an individual with personal aspirations and the will to achieve it against the backdrop of an increasingly multicultural landscape of contemporary Britain.

**Theorizing Place: Place as a social and historical process**
The significance of situating place in conceptualizing transnational population movements, as mentioned above, has urged us to rethink questions of boundaries, identities and mobility. More specifically, the growing centrality of transnational contacts across borders has altered the notions of place as “pure” and “authentic” and, thus, uncontaminated from external influences. Central to these discussions are: 1) all places are interconnected and; 2) any insistence on a “pure” place is thus artificial and socially constructed. Place, for those scholars who identify the connections between its meanings and transnational processes, is not taken to be a backdrop on which to explore other migration dynamics. Silvey, for instance, points to the significance of place in migration and asserts that “place is not taken to be a backdrop on which to explore other migration dynamics. Rather, place itself is a process that makes and is made by migration” (2006: 71). Thus, place remains fundamental to the problem of membership in society, and, thus, it is one of the most theoretically and politically pressing issues facing us today (Holston and Appadurai 1996: 188; Rose 1995: 88).

In their discussions of place, geographers have emphasized that place is something created by people, both as individuals and groups (Rose 1995: 88). In doing so, they convincingly point out that all associations between places, people and culture are social and historical processes to be explained (Gupta and Ferguson 1997a: 4; Massey 1995: 50; Dirlik 2001: 15).

Massey (1995) points out that place, as an unchanging stability to be looked back on, has often been considered as an important part of identity and territory to be defended from acts of transgression by outsiders. Place, as discussed in these terms, is viewed as authentic and free from influences from “others” who are often considered as security threats to the putative territorial integrity of “our” nation or “our” community. That is to say, those
who cross boundaries in these terms are viewed with suspicion — that they might contaminate the putative authenticity of a particular place or territory and, they are thus assumed to constitute major security threats to a particular community or state. The tightening of immigration policies and, particularly, the “securitization” of border control regimes in a number of developing countries testify to this process.

Yet despite the continued political projects of tightening borders by nation-states, individuals, information and ideas continue to cross borders, facilitating a multitude of contestation and interpretations of boundaries. In this respect, Massey stresses that the “identities of places which people campaign to defend are themselves the product, in part, of a long history of connections with the beyond, with other places”, demonstrating that it is important to consider place as a meeting-place, the location of connections and interrelations, and of influences and movements (1995: 64). In highlighting places as the product of social and historical processes, I contend that their meanings and symbolism can be contested and negotiated by individuals, institutions or states. As growing numbers of expatriates, migrants, travellers and refugees reshape the social and cultural landscape of cities from those of a nation-centred place to sites that indicate potentials for connections and intercultural exchanges across boundaries, cities are increasingly becoming an important site to re-imagine and contest the politics of place, identity, territories and boundary-making. Before turning to the discussions about cities as the site of reframing ideas about boundaries, I illustrate how cities have been conceptualized in economic globalization discourses to assess how such economic-centred analyses of cities have limited the contingent, mediated and nuanced understanding of cities as possible zones of contact between people from different social and cultural backgrounds as they are implicated in transnational processes.
Cities as Sites of Capital Power: Economic globalization discourses on cities

Research on global cities has often been invested with lines of argument to stress the power of capital to define the hierarchies of cities across the globe. Friedmann (1986), for instance, adopted such a theoretical framework and identified a hierarchy of cities, headed by London, New York and Tokyo. Subsequently, urban theorists have developed this theory to suggest that global cities need to be considered in the context of corporate power and its presence. As Sassen points out, global cities such as New York, London and Tokyo are best understood as strategic nodes in a transnational urban network. These global cities, she asserts, are the source of corporate power and knowledge that are to be disseminated to "second-tier" cities such as Shanghai (1998: xx-xxviii).

Against this backdrop of prioritizing the power of capital to determine the hierarchies of cities, Smith indicates that when the level of transnational analysis and social practice was incorporated into the studies of cities, "it was conflated with economic globalization and was generally represented one-dimensionally as an overarching driving force for social transformation that introduced new modes of domination into urban life wherever it became localized" (2001: 145-146). Similarly, in critiquing the economic-centric discourses that underlie such studies of global cities, Olds points to the significance of human agency in cities: that the global flows of capital, people, images, ideas and commodities are intimately tied to human-directed action within cities (1999: 10).

Thus, while the argument to stress the power of capital and multinational
corporations seem persuasive to explain the growing importance of cities in the contemporary world, the disproportionate focus on global capital in the analyses of cities needs to be questioned in order to open up spaces for considering social and cultural processes that shape the dynamism of the global city.

Furthermore, conventional approaches to the study of the city tended to highlight the division/dichotomy between accounts of cities in countries which have been labeled “developing world” and those in the “West”. As a result, “urban theory” is based primarily on the experiences of Western cities, imposing substantial limitations on imagining cities around the globe (Robinson 2002: 531-532). Such an approach does not produce sufficient accounts of the situation of urban transformations that are taking place in a number of cities across the globe, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

Thus, the view that particular forms of urbanity precede and dominate “other” cities offers only a partial perspective on exploring the dynamism of the local, social and cultural practices in particular sites at a specific time. Rather than imposing one form of globalization as a dominant pattern that guides the meanings, connectivity and characteristics of cities, we need to pay attention to the ways in which the “historically specific patterns of politics, culture, economic life found in particular locales significantly mediate the transnational flows of people, resources, ideas, and information” (Smith 2001: 168).
Pacific Region: The importance of taking urban citizenship into account

Migratory processes shape both the places of origin and the places of destination of the migrants. In particular, migrants have reshaped the nature of urban space in the cities in which they have settled (King 1995: 32). In this respect, LiPuma and Koelble draw attention to the need to explore the social implications of the presence of those who are “always transient and oscillating figure of persons circulating at different speeds and with different degrees of rootedness or attachment through the urban space” for conceptualizing global space (2005: 156). To put it another way, a better understanding of the city with significant flows and circulations of people, goods and information is not complete without taking into account patterns and practices of the mobility of people who do not necessarily settle permanently in the city. In this context, cities can be best understood as important sites for border-crossings. This shifts our understanding of migration as settled and permanent relocation from one place to another: rather, migration is better conceived as a transitory, multi-faceted and ongoing process. Moreover, it also challenges our conventional view of the centrality of the nation-states in shaping the cityscape.

Yeoh (1999) points out that the recent analyses on global cities have moved from purely economic analyses to include the social and cultural dimensions of globalizing processes. In doing so, they consider global cities “as places themselves, where the social, cultural and economic fabric is not only out woven out of local actors but clearly involve a high density of transnational relationships” (Yeoh et al. 2000: 149). This analytical shift in global city research draws attention to the significance of the presence of expatriates, migrants and sojourners in the global city spaces. In particular, global cities
have become important sites for attracting skilled migrants as many countries now face the issues of an increasingly ageing population at home and of increasing the competitiveness of their labour force in the context of the globalized economy. As I shall indicate in one of the sections of chapter 4 that examined the practices of place-making in Singapore, attracting skilled migrants has become a central dimension of redefining the nation, suggesting the important implications of growing intra-Asian migratory processes for the local practices of place making in the Asia-Pacific region.

Most importantly, transnational processes — the intensification of the transnational flow of ideas, good, images and people — have sometimes resulted in the production of places where the ideology of nation-states does not permeate into the landscape of diversity and coexistence of different identities in growing numbers of urban centres. In this regard, Holston and Appadurai maintain that “there are a growing number of societies in which cities have a different relationship to global processes than visions and policies of their nation-states may admit or endorse”. Cities, they point out, are thus challenging and diverging from nations as the important site of citizenship (1996: 189). Similarly, Sassen points out that the global city may become a new political space within which the meaning of citizenship can be fundamentally redefined (Sassen 1998). In terms of these points, cities, as places of the crossroads and intersections of different cultures and peoples, may have the potential for remapping the boundaries between “us” and “other” — a central concept that underlies the boundary and territoriality of nation-states in determining and shaping their policies of citizenship and its membership. This does not mean that national citizenship loses its significance. Rather, I argue that the broader meaning of citizenship as including forms of belonging may be contested, reinterpreted or renegotiated in the urban landscape where diversity and coexistence of different identities are highlighted and tolerated. In this respect, the idea of “soft borders” as
advanced by Mostov is quite relevant here. As Mostov explains, "softening borders means facilitating legal movement and political, economic, and cultural activity across existing nation-state borders (2008: 56).

Such acts of rethinking borders in a new light challenge conventional concepts of citizenship practices, territoriality and forms of belonging. In particular, it questions "the linkage between membership in a particular national community and the rights and responsibilities typically associated with citizenship, thus disturbing the power to exclude individuals and groups from the enjoyment of resources and opportunities in a particular territory or space" (Mostov 2008: 3).

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have pointed out that economic-centered views of globalization are insufficient to understand transnational migration in the present historical moment. By undermining the local specificity and agency of individual migrants, these views do not account for the significance of nation-states and belie the political aims of globalization discourse by certain agencies to further their cause for "de-territorialization". Yet as I have indicated in this chapter and in the previous chapter, mobility has always been infused with notions of power and thus structured by such differences as citizenship, gender and race. Thus nation-states continue to exert a critical influence on the mobility of capital, information and, most importantly, of people. In this context, nation-states form an essential part of shaping migratory processes. The economic-centered view of globalization, by prioritizing the power of capital in discussing the issues of territories and boundaries, has not taken into account the continued salience of the nation-
state as it impacts on the processes of demarcating borders and boundaries — both existing and new ones — against the securitized threats of its “others”.

Place is a central component of examining migratory processes. I align myself with those social critics who view place as the product of social and historical processes. By doing so, I stress that the meanings of place can be contested and negotiated by individuals, institutions or states.

The interconnected nature of place as a social process is most evident in global cities in recent years. As migratory flows centre on cities, these processes have drawn attention to cities as the site of remapping the boundaries between “us” and “others”. In this respect, cities may provide the potential for rethinking the previous ideas about citizenship — ideas that were primarily nation-centred in their meanings and operation. Such practices may enable us to re-imagine ideas about territoriality, place and boundaries. In this regard, the concept of “soft borders” is particularly relevant and global cities are important sites for such acts of rethinking citizenship and boundaries. Cities thus play a critical role in showing us a way to rethink these ideas and practices within the context of the increased mobility of people, commodities and ideas across state borders.
Chapter 4:

The Rise of Shanghai as a Global City:
Re-imagining the city as the site of transnational connections
Cities are not only the places of diverse social practices such as work, consumption and play but also products of social imaginaries that are highly selective. As Amin and Thrift point out, the place called London, for example, has been fashioned and re-imagined through various commentaries, recollections, memories and erasures and in a variety of media, including newspapers, magazines, guides and maps, photographs, films, novels and street-level tales (Amin and Thrift 2002: 2).

Likewise, the tale of Shanghai, a port city located on the eastern coast of mainland China, has been told and re-imagined through selective memories of the city as a cosmopolitan city which was known as the Paris of the East and associated with the emergence of modernity in East Asia in the 1920s and 1930s. For instance, Yamaguchi Yoshiko, a Japanese woman who starred in a number of Manchukuo-Japanese films as a Chinese actress under the Chinese name Li Xianglan, recollects the cityscape of Shanghai in the 1930s in her autobiography:

Shanghai. Which adjective should I use to best describe this city, one of the largest metropolises not only in China but also in the world? A number of words come to my mind: international city, modern city, stateless city, economic city, and music city. But the most appropriate terms for conveying the atmosphere of the city during that time would be the "lurid" and the "modern".31 (Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Fujiwara Sakuya 1987: 276)

Even today, the term Shanghai evokes images of China that may be distinctively different from other parts of the country which are still largely

31 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
rural: the city that has embraced the open economic policy of China most ardently in mainland China; the place that is most open to influences from other parts of the world; and the urban spaces that attract people from diverse backgrounds, both from other parts of China and beyond its territories. Indeed the act of uttering its name has conjured up a host of powerful images associated with danger and decadence, cosmopolitanism and excitement (Wasserstrom 2009: 4). As Zhen illustrates, the term yangpai (foreign style) became interchangeable with haipai (Shanghai style). Similarly, the name of Shanghai itself is almost synonymous with “going to sea” (shanghai) or “on the sea” (haishang) due to its proximity to the China Sea and the Pacific Ocean (2005: 47).

The story of Shanghai thus unveils the political, economic, social and cultural dynamics that have connections to its hinterlands and, across the seas, to other parts of the world. These connections reveal the fluidity and flexibility of boundaries, both in time and space, and help us creatively imagine spaces that connected in variegated ways between the East and the West, and between China and other parts of East Asia. The city is therefore inherently a place where people and culture intermingle.

In recent years, anthropologists, geographers and urban theorists have called for a new way of conceptualizing cities. In particular, they have stressed the need to understand cities as open to influences from other places and as the products of diverse kinds of mobilities, including flows of people, commodities and information (Appadurai 1996; Smith 2001; Urry 2000). To illustrate such mobilities that are increasingly shaping cities as sites of diverse transnational social processes in the present historical moment, Smith, for instance, use the term “transnational urbanism” as “a marker of the criss-crossing transnational circuits of communication and cross-cutting local, translocal, and transnational social practices” that come together in cities.
(2001: 5). Smith thus advances the idea of transnational urbanism because the social constructions and maintenance of transnational social ties generally require the connections between transnational social actors and socioeconomic opportunities, political structures, or cultural practices found in cities, as well as advanced means of communication and travel, which has been predominantly associated with the cultures of cities (2001: 5).

Lau asserts that the urban, as a universal symbol of modernization, constitutes a prime site for the investigation of the current culture in China. Such modernity and culture is accompanied by the movement of people, the drastic rearrangement of the cityscape and, most importantly, linkage to the outside world (Lau 2009: 231). In this regard, there is a close link between processes of modernity in China, as embodied by the urban spatial changes in Shanghai, and flows of people, commodities and information that constitute such urban landscapes.

The conceptualization of such modenity, however, does not signify that modernity in an East Asian context is simply synonymous with the introduction of Western ideas and materials upon Asian soils. In China, urbanization and modernization have been accomplished at the expense of widespread destruction of “old” areas of the city. Such demolition process caused much anxiety to the residents as they were caught in a struggle to come to terms with the new faces of the city: a city of modernization and materialism rather than its conventional role of preserving traditional Chinese culture and history.

As I have previously noted, conventional approaches to the studies of the city tended to highlight the divisions/dichotomy between accounts of cities in countries which have been labeled “developing world” and those in the “West”. As a result, dominant theories of “the urban” have been based
primarily on the experiences of Western cities (Robinson 2002). Such an approach of applying modern/Western universalism in theorizing cities does not sufficiently address the complex and multilayered situations of urban transformations that are taking place in a number of cities in East Asia. In other words, conventional understandings of modernization/urbanization as westernization need to be reconsidered in light of contemporary urban developments and processes in the Asia-Pacific region.

A thorough examination of cities in the region, therefore, entails a critique of the presupposition of binaries that underlies conventional ideas about modernization and urbanity: modern versus premodern, Asia versus Western, and the desirable versus the undesirable. Such critique would prompt us to re-imagine the modern city in capturing contemporary urbanism in an East Asian context. I thus suggest that the acts of transcending those binaries are critical to reconceptualizing the urban in relation to the larger questions of modernity. Cities in China are in need of reflecting on such questions as they grapple with the new realities of the changes that are associated with rapid urbanization and modernization.

Shanghai provides an interesting framework within which to conceptualize transnational urbanism in an East Asian context. As an emerging global city that plays a central role in the social and economic development of China — a nation redefining itself as the rising power of the Asia-Pacific region — Shanghai has had a number of privileges to develop its infrastructure, to receive a great amount of investment and to attract a huge number of people, ranging from less skilled workers to skilled professionals, both from within China and on a global scale. As China seeks to project its rising economic power onto the world at large, the practices and processes of place-making in Shanghai as a city that symbolizes such a new configuration of power have a critical repercussion on how "transnational urbanism" is envisioned,
practiced and re-imagined by a variety of actors, including not only government officials, urban planners and investors who are conventionally perceived to be the main actors of place-making, but also local residents, immigrants and expatriates who may have much more direct connections and relationships to the city.

The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the processes of place-making in Shanghai — both as a part of the Chinese state’s practices to open up China to the larger international community and of the city’s ongoing project of reconstructing and re-imagining itself as a cosmopolitan city reminiscent of its status as one of the most international cities in East Asia in the 1920s and 1930s — to illustrate the significance of the city as the site of connections between China and Japan as well as between China and the outside world. By interpreting Shanghai's landscape as a reflection of China's global integration to the world economy, I suggest that the patterns of change seen in the streets of Shanghai embody key political, economic and social processes and transformations and that these processes not only impact on the people of China but also on the production of transnational connections beyond the borders of the Chinese state.

I begin this chapter by illustrating practices of place-making in two global cities in Asia: Hong Kong and Singapore. I selected these two cities because both cities have similar characteristics with Shanghai in that although they are actively promoted as global cities, "Chineseness", that is, the local cultural elements in defining the city are still regarded as the central part of defining the cityscapes. The practices of place-making in these cities thus suggest that integrating indigenous elements with the global has constituted an important strategy in place-making in the Asia-Pacific region. Second, I provide a brief history of Shanghai. Third, I discuss the processes of place-making in Shanghai in relation to China's urban development and economic
growth, particularly the reverberations of such processes in linking China to the outside world. Fourth, I discuss the centrality of China to Japan's economic ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region and link this to the growing importance of Shanghai to Sino-Japanese ties. Fifth, I place Shanghai as a "contact zone" between the Chinese and the Japanese and point to the significance of Shanghai in considering Sino-Japanese ties. I argue that the act of placing Shanghai as the site of transnational connections in East Asia and beyond has been an integral part of China's ongoing project of reintegrating the country with the outside world and of highlighting the country's rising status as a powerful actor in regional and global affairs.

**Authenticating Places: Place-making Practices in the Asia-Pacific Region**

Our understandings of place are products of the society in which we live. Our conceptions of place thus reflect the shifts in the way which different groups in society think about place — how the idea of place is represented (Massey 1995: 50). In this regard, place as social construct brings into focus the social practices of place-making in cities as the locus of national, regional and transnational processes since all representations of cities and urbanization processes are social constructs (Smith 2001: 165). To put it another way, cities are created and re-imagined as various actors involved in these processes reconfigure and reposition cities in relation to the larger regional and transnational settings. In the following sections, I consider the practices of place-making in Hong Kong and Singapore: two global cities in the Asia-Pacific region that articulate their connections with global flows of people, goods, capital as central to their urban identity. I shall discuss practices of
place-making in Shanghai in subsequent sections in this chapter.

Asia's World City: Place-making Practices in Hong Kong

Among the East Asian regional centres, Hong Kong, as the most centrally located city relative to other capitals in East and Southeast Asia, enjoys the locational benefits that derive from its being at the intersections of Chinese and foreign social networks mediating flows of capital (Yusuf and Wu 2002: 1215). These geographically favorable conditions have been central to the practices of place-making in Hong Kong. Since its handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong has stressed its advantage of being part of China. At the same time, it has faced the need to claim that it retains its central function as a trade and commercial hub linking East and Southeast Asia and to promote its place according to the new political and economic imperatives in order to remain competitive as a world city. In 2000, the Commission on Strategic Development, a body of public and private representatives advising the Chief Executive on Hong Kong’s long-term development needs and goals, called for the promotion of a positive image of Hong Kong to external audiences:

Hong Kong needs to promote its unique position as one of the most cosmopolitan and vibrant cities in Asia to a wide range of international audiences. A successful external promotion programme can have a significant positive impact on Hong Kong’s ability to achieve a number of key economic, social and cultural objectives. (The Commission on Strategic Development; cited in the Government of Hong Kong 2004)

Promoting Hong Kong as one of the most cosmopolitan and vibrant cities in
Asia has been considered as an essential part of achieving and addressing its economic, social and cultural development. One advertisement titled “Your bridge to China”, which appeared on the Financial Times, November 8, 2005, captures how Hong Kong represents itself to the outside world: “No other city beats Hong Kong as a bridge to the mainland China market”. And it makes a list of advantages, such as gateway to China, world-class infrastructure, world’s freest economy, free flow of information, political stability, international lifestyle, skilled workforce and unrivalled location. These advantages, it claims, “make us the best base for regional operations. Add China’s first free trade pact — exclusive to Hong Kong goods and services— and the choice is yours”.

As this advertisement illustrates, the practices of place-making in Hong Kong are firmly based on the advantage of its location and, in particular, its proximity to the mainland China. Cartier argues that Hong Kong is at the heart of a “trans-boundary cultural economy”. Cartier notes that the concept a “trans-boundary cultural economy” encourages treating the regional edconomy as a coastal economy, in the Zhujiang delta, as a region of linkages and networks to other cities and regions in China, Asia and Chinese overseas communities (Cartier 2001). Indeed the brand name of Hong Kong — “Asia’s World City”— was chosen by the Government of Hong Kong as it captures Hong Kong’s role “as a natural gateway to new economic opportunities in mainland China and the rest of Asia” (The Government of Hong Kong 2004).

Thus, practices of place-making in Hong Kong have relied on its geographical location and on its image as one of the most cosmopolitan and vibrant cities in East Asia. The rise of China in economic terms has had significant implications for the social practices of place-making in Hong Kong and this is reflected in its emphasis on its geographical proximity to mainland China. As China’s economic growth gains momentum, economic, social and geographical
connections with China play an increasingly significant role in the practices of place-making in Asia. Place-making in Singapore, too, is contextualized within this shift in China's position in the Asia-Pacific region, which has contributed to Singapore's emphasis on "Asian heritage and values" in sustaining its unique cosmopolitanism.

*Singapore as a Global City: The city-state built on a discourse on "East Asian modernity"

Some Asian countries have appropriated the socially constructed ideas about, and practices of, "the local" to contest and challenge the Western conceptions of individualist modernity as well as to stress the uniqueness of their state-building project. Instead of relying on the hegemonic forces of modernity that originate in the West as the basis of state-building processes, these countries have pointed to a discourse on "East Asian modernity" in which "traditional" Asian values of family-centredness, self-control, frugality, and corporate identity are seen as the foundations for Asian success (Wee 1996: 490). Singapore has appropriated these values as the foundations of the state-building and development processes and, accordingly, its practices of place-making are built on these principles. To put it another way, the city-state is one of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region that has successfully blended the disciplines of "East Asian modernity" with the conventional landscape of the global city — the cityscape full of skyscrapers and shopping centres.

The deployment of Asian values into the core of state-building processes has been central to the government's efforts to achieve two interrelated purposes: first, to maintain discipline and efficiency in the area of its citizen's economic activities; and, second, to integrate Singapore with the larger Asian setting.

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32 For an overview of Singapore's economic and political development in terms of its regional and global networks, see Preston (2007).
In particular, “incorporating Chineseness into its conceptualization of Asian values means that a re-imagined regional community with China — one in which trade and investment are important — can be encouraged” (Wee 1996: 508). It is in this context that Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stresses that “our economy depends on the region and on external factors. We don’t prosper ourselves. We prosper in Asia” (August 20, 2006).

Moreover, attracting skilled immigrants is also an important aspect of place-making in Singapore. In his national day rally speech in 2006, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong pointed out:

we must continue to promote immigration into Singapore because just as we accept that Singaporeans have the world as their oyster, so too we must promote immigration here and let this be one of the options which talent from around the world will look for when they are considering where to go and live. Many countries are doing this. The Australians are working hard at it, the Canadians are working hard at it. And even China is scouting for talent. China with 1,300 million people looking for talent. ...We must do the same. (Lee Hsien Loong, August 20, 2006)

In short, the practices of place-making in Singapore are guided by the following principles: a discourse on “East Asian modernity” and the active promotion of the immigration of talented people who would contribute to the social and economic development of Singapore. Both factors are considered as significant in maintaining the competitiveness and “uniqueness” of Singapore. As Lee (2006) explains in his national day speech, “Singapore offers something unique. We are an Asian society, with an Asian heritage,

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33 Since the 1980s on, the use of Mandarin was promoted as a public and rational language by the People’s Action Party (PAP) government. The opening up of economic opportunities in China was one major reason for the elevation of Mandarin. Wee points out that while this is indicative of the processes of Chinese identity-formation in Singapore (1996: 502).
culture and roots, and yet we are an open and a cosmopolitan society”. Such constructions of Singapore thus provide the basis of the discourse of Singapore as a global city. Within this context, the territory’s links with the surrounding region become critical (Preston 2007). In particular, the connections with China are regarded as one of the most important and strategic dimensions of defining Singapore as an “Asian” nation and play a central role in tying its social and economic prosperity to China’s development as a leading economic actor in the Asia-Pacific region.

These practices of place-making lead us to turn our attention towards social and political processes of place-making rather than seeing “the local” as a simply given or unproblematic place (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 6). Conceiving place-making as an embodied practice with particular social, cultural and political meanings has critical implications for rethinking the relationship between place, politics of representation and power. In this respect, Dirlik suggests that “it may be best to conceive of places as a project that is devoted to the creation and construction of new contexts for thinking about politics and the production of knowledge” (2001: 16).

The Making of a Global City in a Chinese Context: The practices of place-making in Shanghai

The economic strengths of cities are critically important for the development of national economies as a whole (Jacobs 1984). In the context of China, cities have often been central vehicles for accelerating social and economic processes of integrating the country into world economy since the “opening up” of its economy in 1978. In particular, the city of Shanghai has played a significant role in China’s economic and social development from the late
1970s to the present. Since 1984, Shanghai has been designated as one of the fourteen open coastal cities and, accordingly, special development zones have been established in the peripheral areas of the city (Wu 2002: 1368).

Under China’s open economic policy, Shanghai has thus become a symbol of achieving capitalist modernity in a socialist state. Most importantly, the prosperity and attractiveness of Shanghai are regarded as a product of its contacts with other cultures, which is expressed in its built landscapes. Historic buildings in the Bund, for instance, are famous for their European architectural styles and continue to attract a large number of tourists. These buildings constitute a significant part of the cityscape in conveying and representing a symbol of historical and cosmopolitan Shanghai. Moreover, they elucidate the processes of place-making in Shanghai: the city as a product of the intersection of different cultural practices. In this respect, place, as theorized by Massey, needs to be considered as a long history of connections with other places (1995: 64). Therefore, I argue that the acts of place-making in Shanghai need to be considered as the product of such a long history and these connections with other places have helped to establish the status of Shanghai as an international city in East Asia. Before discussing the practice of place-making in Shanghai, I provide a brief outline of the history of the city.

The Modern History of Shanghai: Tracing the trajectories of the cosmopolitan city in China

The place name “Shanghai” was first used in 1291 in official documents to refer to an administrative center that stood by the Huangpu River and this year is marked and endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party as the year
when Shanghai first became a city (Wasserstrom 2009: 2). But the main alternative approach to trace the origin of Shanghai is to place it in 1843. According to this vision of Shanghai's origin, the history of Shanghai as a modern capitalist city began in 1843 when the Qing dynasty was defeated in the Opium War and was forced to open Shanghai to Western trade and residence as a result of the implementation of the Treaty of Nanjing (Fu 2002: 108-109). By 1853, it surpassed Guangzhou as one of China’s principal trading cities, ushering in the period of modern industrial development in the city in the late nineteenth century (Wu 1999: 207). As Wasserstrom points out, the simple act of placing the start of Shanghai in the 1840s when Westerners first began to live in the port city encourages us to think of the foreign presence as a natural and decisive part of the local past (2009: 3).

The process of the industrialization of Shanghai was accelerated by the growth in the investment of transnational capital together with rapidly growing local capital after China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan in 1895, which first granted foreigners the right to establish factories in the treaty ports of China (Fu 2002: 109-110).

In the 1920s and 1930s, before the dual devastating effects of Japanese imperialist invasion in 1937 and the Chinese civil war, Shanghai was the most urban, industrial, and cosmopolitan city of all of Asia (Yang 1997: 289). In this respect, as Lee, points out, Shanghai reached a new height of urban development in the 1930s, with the construction of skyscrapers, department stores and movie theatres (1999: 312).34 These developments, as he emphasizes, enriched not only the wealth of Shanghai as an international port city but also the cultural dimensions of the city, producing a number of

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34 The 1930s also saw a rapid rise in the number of foreigners in Shanghai. By the end of 1930s, for instance, the Japanese counted among the largest foreign community in Shanghai. In 1942, the number of Japanese residents was approximately 100,000 (Yang 2010).
films, literature and artworks (1999: 82-307).

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in mainland China in 1949, Shanghai was placed under the direct control of the central government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Beijing. Furthermore, transnational capital, which had been so critical to the development of cosmopolitan Shanghai, fled to Taiwan, Hong Kong and overseas (Fu 2002: 112). As such, it took three decades before Shanghai regained the reputation as a cosmopolitan city that it enjoyed during the 1920s and 1930s, since the Communist party emphasized the rural as the fundamental expression of the indigenous and the authentic characteristics of Chinese culture. During this period, “Chinese cities functioned less as centres of a market economy and more as political and social centres for the state to exercise its power” (Lin 2007: 9). As a result, urban space under Mao's regime was arranged according to the principles of uniformity, standardization and classlessness (Lin 2007: 15).

In this context, the Communist Party seized the opportunity to rebuild China’s cities as models of socialist organization and ideology (Gaubatz 1999: 1497). Under the new Communist government, the urban cosmopolitan cultural life of Shanghai, which had prospered in these earlier periods, was now regarded as a decadent “bourgeois culture” and hence as the relics of the past to be discarded and replaced by a new form of governmentality, that is, socialism. Moreover, the city of Shanghai was placed under tight fiscal and political control by the centre, Beijing, which resulted in more than thirty years of neglect of, and disinvestment in, urban development (Yang 1997: 290; Wu 1999: 208; Lee 1999: 323). In particular, during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, a large number of youths and intellectuals in big cities in China were sent to the countryside as part of their “spiritual re-education” (Skeldon 1997: 206-207) and of CCP’s emphasis on the countryside.
as the centre of Chinese revolutionary and developmental practices. In addition, China’s previous encounter with global forces in modern times had rather negative connotations and meanings: the unequal relationship with the Western powers that was marked by the Opium Wars and Treaty Port systems in the mid-nineteenth century; the Japanese seizure of province in 1914, the annexation of Manchuria by Japanese colonial empire as Manchukuo and invasion of East China in 1937. These disastrous encounters with the outside world propelled the Communist state to close its doors for the first three decades after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. During these times, contact with the outside world was mainly limited to government exchanges with the Soviet bloc and the non-aligned third world (Yang 1997: 291-292). Since the establishment of the PRC, it took a few decades before big cities such as Shanghai became a focus of attention in Chinese development discourses. The anti-urban bias of the new Communist government thus resulted in a limited investment in housing, transport and other urban infrastructure. As a result, by the 1970s and 1980s, the urban infrastructure of Shanghai lagged significantly behind that of Beijing (Wu 1999: 208).

Since the late 1970s, China has pursued its path for economic liberalization and implemented an open economic policy. With China’s opening up to the world economy, transnational capital came back to Shanghai again. This move was preceded by Chinese normalization of relationships with such countries as the United States and Japan in the early 1970s.

Since the early 1990s, in particular, big cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and Guanzhou have experienced a series of major transformations and renovations in terms of their urban landscapes. These transformations took place within the context of the growing influx of foreign investment into, and global influences on, these cities.
These social processes have taken place in the context of China's integration into global economy as well as of growing migratory flows within the Asia-Pacific region, reflecting increasing prominence of cities as the site of transnational economic and social practices. The processes of urbanization in Shanghai thus need to be situated within the intersections of the influences of both local and global factors.

Towards a Global City in East Asia: Urban Transformations in Shanghai since the late 1970s

Rapid urbanization is a central feature of social and economic transformations in the Asia-Pacific region. As more cosmopolitan, innovative and diverse urban forms are emerging in cities such as Bangkok, Beijing, Mumbai, Osaka, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo, these new emerging urban contexts are altering the way we think about cities. Moreover, the processes of urbanization are gaining momentum in the countries of East and South East Asia. It is predicted that by 2020 half of the population in the region will be living in cities and that by 2025 the urban population is expected to soar to 2.5 billion people (Marshall 2004: 195-201). These aspects of urbanization point to the enormous significance of cities in social and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region.

China's new role in the Asia-Pacific region differs qualitatively from its past one of exporting the Communist ideology and practice to other Asian countries, which continued until the early 1970s (Taylor 1996: 6). Rather, China has increasingly paid attention to economic development along its coastal cities in the east and on maximizing economic cooperation with the
dynamic economies of countries in East and Southeast Asia (Chen 1993: 89). China's increasing focus on economic stability, which was initiated under Deng Xiaoping, is part of the country's political priorities to try and reintegrate China into the Asian region (Shambaugh 2005b: 1).

In this context, particularly since market-oriented reform policies were initiated in 1978, cities in China have been in the process of rapid transformations at an unprecedented scale and play pivotal roles in China's economic development as an emerging superpower in the region (Ma and Wu 2000: 8). Cities are central components of "the rise of China" both in economic and social terms. These changes illustrate and point to China's shifting economic and social conditions. In particular, internationally linked cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guanzhou, epitomize these processes of rapid urbanization. As a result, the distinctive patterns of China's cities, which was previously characterized by socialist and Maoist ideals, are being replaced by new forms that reflect, and contribute to, the country's changing socioeconomic dynamics. The new urban forms are evident in certain aspects of urban life such as changing city skylines and the emergence of new urban districts (Gaubatz 1999: 1495-1496). As Goh points out, there is an intimate link between the state's aspirations for modernity and cityscape changes in contemporary urban formations in the rapidly developing Asian economies (1998: 193). The built forms of China's emerging global cities attest to the productions of spaces "where the state and local elites are inscribing new cultural forms in the landscape of the reform-era city, interpreted through particular kinds of transnational social and economic transactions, and in architectural forms of international (post)-modernity" (Cartier 2002: 1518). Thus, these new urban spaces represent the embodiment of the new

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35 As Skeldon (1997: 207) points out, since the economic reforms initiated, China has entered an era of massive population mobility from the countryside toward the largest cities in China; in particular, Shanghai, Beijing and Guanzhou figure prominently in these population movements.
interactions between China and the world in the reform era (Gaubatz 2005: 98).

Much of the influential literature on global cities, such as the one advanced by Sassen, presents a particular vision of these places. According to this view, global cities follow a same trajectory: moving from being nested within a local economy, to being a centre of a nation or empire, to being a key node in transnational economic, financial and cultural flows. Indeed such a vision of global cities works well with the analysis of cities like New York, London or Tokyo. Yet it becomes problematic to explore the dynamism of urban centres such as Shanghai: a city that has followed different trajectories from cities in other capitalism economies due to its turbulent history as the treaty-port (1843-1943), the years of partial or full Japanese occupation (1937-1945) and the Maoist era (1949-1976) when the city was remade into a place representing socialist ideals. Any sufficient understanding of current urban restructuring in China thus needs to be approached in a much broader geographical context and framework as contemporary urban transformations are the outcome of a dynamic interplay of forces at work on regional, national and global scales (Fu 2002: 108). In this respect, Smith stresses the significance of looking at the urban processes as the interaction of diverse forces:

Since human agency operates at many spatial scales, and is not restricted to "local" territorial or sociocultural formations, the very concept of the "urban" thus requires reconceptualization as a social space that is a crossroads or meeting ground for the interplay of diverse localizing practices of national, transnational, and even global-scale actors, as these wider networks of meaning, power, and social practice come into contact with more locally configured networks, practices, and identities. (2001: 127)
In this respect, cities in contemporary China need to be regarded as the product of the interplay of both domestic and global forces and to be situated within this context (Ma and Wu 2005: 14). In other words, we need to pay attention to both local and global factors in understanding processes and implications of urbanization in China since the late 1970s: changes in domestic policies in regard to urban governance facilitated urban transformations on the one hand and the growth in the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) into such cities as Shanghai on the other (Fu 2002: 106-107). More importantly, the city is a social construct created by the acts of place-making by the state, urban planners, and citizens. It is also the site of multiple articulations and aspirations: from local, national to global scales. As Evers and Körff demonstrate:

The primate cities are the places of articulation of globalization, national integration and localization. ... The cities are neither global nor local or national. They are a combination of all these, and although they are regarded as foci of alienation and of corrupted ways of life, in contrast and even contradiction to genuine Thai, Indonesian and other cultures, they are equally much developing into showcases of global modernity and expressions of national self-consciousness. (2000: 2)

Indeed, since the 1990s, Shanghai has developed itself into a showcase of Chinese modernity which symbolizes China’s integration into the global economy. It is in this context that we find the link between the built environment and the expression of modernity. In his study of colonial modernism in Morocco under French colonial rule, Rainbow (1989) indicates that elites expressed their modernist aspirations through architecture and city planning in order to show a position of cultural superiority and a particular vision of development that is associated with such notion of superiority/difference. Likewise, a rapidly growing number of skyscrapers
that house headquarters or divisions of global multinational companies testify that the country is part of global economic processes and that Shanghai is prepared to play a role of hub for transnational flows of people, goods and information in East Asia. In this regard, we need to take into account that Shanghai’s history as a cosmopolitan city in the 1920s and the 1930s has facilitated its openness to transnational flows in the present even after a few decades’ rupture due to domestic political processes. Indeed the nostalgia for Shanghai’s past as a cosmopolitan city has been actively promoted by the city’s social and economic elites as well as government officials. The “Shanghai nostalgia”, being a nostalgia that is based on the selective processes of remembering and re-imagining its pre-Communist past, serves the social and political agenda for Shanghai’s transition toward a global city (Pan 2005: 122-123). It is also important to note that the city has had a crucial impact on transforming the image of China as a predominantly rural and pre-modern nation to that of the modern nation with huge potential for economic growth, success and opportunities in the outside world. Shanghai has not only enabled the state to appropriate its urban development for the economic growth of the nation as a whole but also facilitated the socio-economic processes in which China, as an aspiring regional and global power, becomes a member of nations embracing global modernity.

**Urban Development of Shanghai in the Context of Economic Growth in China**

The rapid economic growth in China has captured the attention of neighbouring countries as well as across the globe. China has established itself as the fastest-growing economy in the world, and has strengthened its
links with the global economy through trade and direct investment since the 1978. Moreover, in the past 26 years, China has achieved a high annual rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging almost 9.3 per cent and its GDP size is 10.3 times higher than it was in 1978 (Lin 2006: 57-58).

It is in this context of rapid economic growth and the policies that sustained it that the city of Shanghai has received extensive support and incentives for its development. Designated as one of the Coastal Open Cities in 1984, it was chosen in 1990 as a central city to integrate the Yangtze River region with the global market (Wu and Radbone 2005: 275). This meant that further state support would be provided to Shanghai to accelerate the process of its urban development. In 1990, for instance, Deng Xiaoping offered extensive support to the city calling for rapid development of the Pudong New Area project36 in the eastern part of the city, which was followed by a number of preferential measures in terms of urban planning and development. In 1992, he declared that Shanghai would be "the head of the dragon" pulling the country into the future (Business Week 2007: 52). In this context, the local government has paid more attention to the image of urban landscape than ever, as this improves the prospects for investment in the city. Therefore, great efforts have been directed towards creating symbolic urban landscapes to present Shanghai as a "booming" city. (Wu 2002: 1087). In particular, Pudong's Liujiadui finance and trade zone has created a new signature skyline immediately opposite the early twentieth century European bank structures of Shanghai's pre-1949 financial district that is seen as a symbol of its cosmopolitan history. Liujiadui's cluster of high-rises creates a spectacular

36 Based on the model of China's Special Economic Zones, Pudong is designed to relieve the spatial pressure on the old centre of Shanghai and become a new centre of industrial and commercial activities of the city (Fulong Wu 1999: 210). As the city's focal point for its links with global economic activities, it is oriented toward production for the foreign market and the utilization of foreign investment funds (Gaubatz 1999: 1505: 2005: 116). Most importantly, the development of Pudong was part of the state's project to revitalize Shanghai into a world class city as it was in the 1920s and 1930s (Fu 2002: 113).
profile of "new" Shanghai defined by skyscrapers, among them the 88-story Jinmao Tower and the 468m Oriental Tower, the new icon and symbol of Shanghai (Gaubatz 2005: 110-112). Here it is important to note that these urban built forms are more than a physical and spatial form. Rather, they are imbued with specific social and cultural meanings. As King illustrates:

physical and spatial form actually constitute as well as represent social and cultural existence: society is to a very large extent constituted through the buildings and spaces it creates. (King 1991: 151)

Today, with a population of more than 18.4 million, Shanghai is viewed as an economic centre of China and competes with Hong Kong for its future role as a financial hub in East Asia. 37 To illustrate its growing status in the global economic order, it is home to the headquarters of more than 150 global corporations (Business Week 2007: 53). Moreover, as the most internationalized city of mainland China in the context of China's rising market economy, Shanghai embraces the best prospect of becoming a global city in East Asia (Yusuf and Wu 2002). The city thus seeks to become ever more tightly enmeshed in transnational flows (Wasserstrom 2009: 134).

Since economic reform has begun in 1978, the focus of CCP policy has shifted from class struggle to economic development (Wu 2002: 1074). This economic reform was the direct outcome of domestic factors and, in particular, "the overcoming of the constraints of state socialism", while also admitting the role of direct foreign investment in accelerating the process of reform (Wu 2003: 1674).

Economic development in China since 1978 has been closely tied with urban

37 The source of this population figure comes from People's Daily Online (2007).
development in cities in its coastal areas. In this regard, Zhou points out that the central government’s willingness to promote urban development to achieve a world city status in its major cities reflects their understandings that the creation of the “international city” is key to realize and sustain its rapid economic development (2002: 60). At the same time, such an international city may enable China to represent and project its growing economic power to the world at large (2002: 60). In this context, cities such as Shanghai have played important roles in transforming China’s domestic economy as well as in linking China to the outside world.

Japanese Expatriates in Shanghai: Reflecting the growing Japanese ties with the Asia-Pacific region

To date, the growth in East Asian economic interdependence has been achieved mainly through intra-regional trade, commerce and investment linkages that have expanded significantly since the mid-1980s. As Kim points out, the economic realm marks the central framework of regionalism in East Asia (2004: 40). Shambaugh also asserts that China’s growing engagement with the Asian region is most evident in the economic domain, which is shown in its trade data — today nearly 50 percent of China’s trade volume is intraregional (2005: 83). Asia, in general, has emerged as an important production centre for Japanese firms, in particular after currency re-evaluation following the Plaza accord of September 1995. In 1990, East Asian economies accounted for less than 30 per cent of all Japanese exports but by 1995 their share had increased to 42 per cent (Maswood 2001: 7-13).

In economic terms, trade between China and the rest of Asia is playing a vital role in economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region, and, in particular, this has
invigorated several economies in the region, including Japan (Shambaugh 2005: 83-85). Abe Shinzo, the former Japanese Prime Minister, also acknowledges that the continued economic growth of Japan is closely tied with the economic growth in China (2006: 152). In this regard, trade with other Asian countries, in particular, China, is increasingly playing a pivotal role for Japan, thus marking the increasing economic interdependency between China and Japan. Since the 1990s, the economic and trade relationship between the two countries has become closer and more intense than ever before. In 2001, the volume of trade between the two countries stood at $US85.7 billion; in 2006 it reached $US250 billion (Alford 2007). China became Japan's biggest trading partner in 2004, replacing the United States for the first time (Japan Times 2005a). Japan is China's second largest trading partner, its biggest foreign investor and its most important source of technology (Alford 2007).

The growing economic ties between China and Japan and the accompanying increase in job opportunities in China have contributed to the growth in the numbers of Japanese students studying in China. In addition, Beijing's growing appreciation of "soft power diplomacy" has impacted upon the migratory processes of the Japanese to China. As Shambaugh points outs, China increasingly regards higher education as an important means of achieving its aim of popularizing Chinese culture throughout the Asia-Pacific region. During the 2003 academic year, 77,628 foreign students were studying in China's universities — of whom 35,363 students came from South Korea, with Japan second in the ranking of the number of foreign students enrolled in China; the number was 12,765 students in the same year. Although the influence of the academic training on future generations of these students will be difficult to assess with any precision, as Shambaugh

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38 Nye Jr. (2004) defines "soft power" as the ability to produce outcomes through attraction instead of coercion.
illustrates, it will certainly sensitize them to Chinese viewpoints and interests (Shambaugh 2005a: 77-78). China’s active involvement in opening up its education to the outside world has thus contributed significantly to the growing numbers of those Japanese who study in China’s universities, and, eventually, impacted on their future career options as these students consider seeking employment in China after their studies to take advantage of the knowledge and experience which they obtained while in China.

**Shanghai as a “Contact Zone”: The city as a meeting place between the Chinese and the Japanese**

As I have already discussed, Shanghai, both in the past and in the present, has played a central role in facilitating cultural and economic interactions between China and Japan. This is partly due to such factors as the history of the city as a cosmopolitan city in East Asia in the 1920s and 1930s and its geographical proximity to Japan. Most importantly, the urban development of the city as an aspiring global city symbolizing the economic successes of China as a powerful country in the Asia-Pacific region, has been crucial in producing the social and cultural contexts for exchanges and interactions between the two countries.

In particular, Shanghai’s growing connections with Japan in economic and social terms, as illustrated by increasing numbers of Japanese expatriates, tourists and students, as well as the presence of Japanese establishments, have crucial implications for shaping the flows of the Japanese to China. For instance, in her novel about a Shanghainese woman seeking romance and adventure in contemporary Shanghai, Zhou Weihui illustrates the close cultural connections with Japan that are found in the streets of Shanghai:
The city has a strong preference for Japanese. Songs by Amuro Namie, books by Murakami Haruki, TV show by Kimura Takuya, and countless Japanese style comics and Japanese-made electrical appliances have won the hearts of the Shanghainese. And I love Japanese cuisine and cosmetics, which I find refreshing and refined. (Zhou Wei-hui 1999: 115)

Moreover, in comparison to other cities in China, there are many residents who have the experience of living in or travelling to Japan in Shanghai. In this respect, Shanghai is a “contact zone” between China and Japan, enabling and impacting on the transnational mobility of people, goods and ideas between the two countries. Mary Louise Pratt defines “contact zone” as the space of encounters, “the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations” (1992: 6). She further points out that a “contact” perspective emphasizes how subjects are constituted in, and by, their relations to each other and that relations between subjects, viewed from this perspective, are conceived in terms of “copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices” (1992: 7). I argue that Pratt’s concept of “contact zone” is a useful tool in reflecting on the role of Shanghai in a more nuanced understanding of the multilayered relationship between the Chinese and the Japanese and in seeking for the possibility of building bridges between China and Japan — the historical, economic, social and political ties between the two countries in East Asia that have often been marked by conflict, tensions and mistrust both in the past and in the present historical moment. In view of this point, it can be argued that the Japanese presence in China, if it is seen and analyzed only in terms of the official Beijing-Tokyo relationship, provides only an insufficient and partial view of the multiple interactions, ties and exchanges that have taken place between the Chinese.

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26 This information comes from a personal conversation with a Professor in Engineering from Beijing University in Canberra on May 3, 2006.
and the Japanese. Rather, the Japanese "transnationalism from below" in China, as marked by the closely intertwined relationship and interdependence between the two countries, needs to be considered and contextualized in terms of the role that the city of Shanghai has played in China-Japan interactions and border-crossings. In this regard, Shanghai mediates the official Beijing-Tokyo relationship and provides critical terrains on which to reflect on the relationship in terms of population movements between the two countries. The city thus draws attention to the relationship between the city, the mobility of people across borders and the practices of place-making as they shape and mediate the transnational flows of people into cities.

**Conclusion: The city on the move**

In this chapter, I have discussed the processes of place-making in Shanghai. Economic development in China since 1978 has been closely tied with urban development in cities in its coastal areas. Cities such as Shanghai have become a central vehicle for representing China as a modern and powerful country in East Asia. Since China opened up its economy, the processes of place-making have had two critical dimensions: the importance of Shanghai in the PRC's strategy to open up China to the larger international community and the city's ongoing project of reconstructing and re-imagining itself as a cosmopolitan city reminiscent of its status as one of the most international cities in East Asia in the 1920s and 1930s. These processes have been an integral part of China's ongoing project of reintegrating the country with the outside world.

40 The term “transnationalism from below” was borrowed from the title of book *Transnationalism from Below*, Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo (eds) New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998.
These processes mark the city as the product of social imaginaries, as they are selective in their deployment of memories of the city. As such, the narrative of Shanghai has been told and re-imagined through selective memories of the city as a cosmopolitan city. This dimension of the city has recently been highlighted further as part of the accelerating processes of the transnational flows of people, capital and commodities in East Asia in response to the rise of China in social and economic terms. This draws our attention to the need for remapping the region and thus to the shifting conceptualization of boundaries and territoriality in an East Asian context.

In recent years, a number of factors have contributed to the growing number of expatriate communities in cities in China. In particular, the rising status of China as an economic power, accelerating economic interdependence in East Asia as well as Beijing's soft power diplomacy to increase its social and cultural influence outside its borders have all contributed to this phenomenon.

It is in this context that the act of re-imagining Shanghai as the site of transnational connections has become critically important as it has helped to establish the status of Shanghai as an international city in East Asia where transnational flows of people, ideas and commodities reshape not only ideas about China but also the understanding of East Asia as a site of interconnections. The growing intra-Asian migratory processes have further reinforced such a construction of Shanghai as the site of transnational connections.

In particular, Shanghai has played a vital role as a “contact zone” between China and Japan, both in the past and in the present. Shanghai thus provides critical insights into the bilateral relationship and its
reconsideration in terms of population movements between the two countries. I have thus illustrated the importance of conceiving the city as the site of connections between China and Japan as well as between China and the outside world.

Shanghai provides an interesting framework within which to rethink transnational urbanism in an East Asian context. It brings back into the focus the relationship between the city, the mobility of people across borders and the social and political practices of place-making as they shape and mediate the global flows of people into cities.

A variety of actors are involved in the processes of place-making in Shanghai. These actors, as active agents of place-making processes, may reconfigure, contest and/or question the meaning of place and boundaries as narrated in their conventional terms. Those Japanese women who have moved to the city are one of the actors who take part in such acts of re-imagining the city within the context of transnational processes in East Asia, which I will explore in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5:

Expatriate Japanese Women in Shanghai: Shifting meanings of place and boundaries in an East Asian context

I feel a plenty of energy when I am in China. This is because this country is experiencing a rapid social transformation which is similar to the Meiji reform or postwar democratization in Japan (Yamamoto Michiko 1989: 179).
Transnationalism has spawned new relations between capital and labour, people and the state, and belonging and territoriality, entailing complex and multi-layered movements of people, information, technologies, ideas and commodities. These processes have led to a rethinking of the ties between people and place and the politics of place-making and individual, national, local and transnational identities (Kearney 1995: Smith 2001). Such transnational practices have implications for the ways in which women's lives and their belonging to the nation-state are questioned and renegotiated.

The rise in educational levels as well as increasing labour force participation among women in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in East and South East Asia, have highlighted the increasingly important role played by women as active agents of transnational migration. Such population movements, as well as their diverse forms of mobility, have raised important questions about place, belonging and boundaries. In particular, the significance of transnational connections in migration studies has shifted the terms of our engagement with the world by enabling us to renegotiate and rethink our relationship with nation-states and boundaries that are created by them.

Transnational connections forged largely by international trade, global migration, and cultural interactions are by no means entirely new phenomena. Yet the scale and growing prevalence of transnational connections at the present historical moment suggest that they differ markedly from those in the past. In this regard, Smith illustrates four contemporary processes contributing to the formation of transnational social practices that appear to be new. They include:

1. The discursive repositioning of cities in relation to nation-states in the
ongoing debate on the meaning of globalization.

2 The emergence of cross-national political and institutional networks that deploy the discourses of decolonization, human rights, and other universalistic tropes to advance the interests of heretofore marginalized others.

3 The facilitation of transnational social ties by new technological transnational developments that have widened access to the means of transnational travel, communication, and ways of being in the world.

4 (Following from these) the spatial reconfiguration of social networks that facilitate the reproduction of migration, business practices, cultural beliefs, and political agency "from below." (Smith 2001: 165)

In this chapter, I consider the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai within the context of these transnational processes that redefine and shift the meanings of boundaries and place. I argue that the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai are part of the larger transnational processes that reconfigure the meanings of nation-states, boundaries and places on a global scale.

I discuss their motivations for moving to the city as well as their experience and interpretations of living and working there. In doing so, I stress that these women are not mere recipients of these transnational processes. Rather, they are social agents who actively take part in these processes through their practice of border-crossings.

In examining the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai, I suggest that urbanization and growing economic ties between China and Japan are central to migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai. This discussion is contextualized within the central arguments of this thesis: that the perceptions of boundaries between Japan and other parts of Asian countries are shifting and that these shifting perceptions are indicative, and a product of, the growing significance of transnational ties that are located in
global cities in the Asia-Pacific region. The intersections of the city and transnational ties have multiple dimensions and individuals experience the city in this setting differently based on their sex, race, citizenship and other differences. I thus situate the city of Shanghai as “local sites of cultural appropriation, accommodation, and resistance to ‘global conditions’ as experienced, interpreted, and understood in the everyday lives of ordinary men and women” (Smith 2001: 128). Before exploring the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai, I provide a brief overview of the studies on expatriate communities in contemporary China.

**Studies on Expatriate Communities in Contemporary China**

As China’s economy has shown rapid growth, its influence in the Asia-Pacific region has also steadily increased and its economy is now a major engine of regional growth (Shambaugh 2005c: 23). China’s regional rise has translated into the processes of increasingly closer economic cooperation between the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In light of this dynamic and of the significance of overseas Chinese in facilitating economic and cultural ties with China, recent studies on expatriate communities in China have largely centred on the experiences of Singapore and Taiwan, particularly as they constitute one of the biggest foreign investors in China since the 1990s.

In her study of Taiwanese business people in China, Shen (2005) examines how China imposes its nationalistic agenda of “one-China policy” on them and shows how these business people negotiate their political situation in China by “doing Chineseness”, that is, pretending to be mainland Chinese, as well as by refraining from any involvement with political discussions that might affect their social and economic positions in China. In particular, she
argues that "suspicion, hostility, deceit, resentment and insecurity dominate the relationship between Taiwanese business communities and their Chinese hosts. Boundaries and differences are constructed, reiterated and elaborated between them as cross-strait politics is continually shaped by both Chinese and Taiwanese nationalist politics" (Shen 2005: 38). In other words, Taiwanese business people in China, although they are engaged mainly in economic activities there, find it almost impossible to avoid facing the issues of politics and boundaries in their transnational lives across the borders between China and Taiwan.

Willis and Yeoh (2003) demonstrate the impacts of gendered norms and constraints in Singapore on the migratory processes of Singaporeans to China. Although improving their career prospects is one of the central motivations for both Singaporean men and women who migrate to China, there is a significant gender difference at work in their migratory processes: for men, career-dominated reasons shape their decisions to live and work in China, whereas for women, in particular, "migration was seen as an opportunity to experience the kind of independence and excitement unavailable at home in both the family context and within wider Singaporean society" (Willis and Yeoh 2003: 106).

Kong's study on Chinese Singaporean transmigrants in Beijing indicates that these transmigrants negotiate their conceptualization of "Chineseness" in various ways. She notes that Chinese Singaporeans have faced a number of discrepancies between the "quintessential" Chineseness that they conceived prior to their arrival in Beijing and the Chinese they encounter in their everyday settings in Beijing (Kong 1999: 226-230).

In short, the studies on the migratory processes of Chinese Singaporeans or Taiwanese to China demonstrate the extent to which "Chineseness" is a fluid
identity that can be contested and renegotiated at times. More importantly, this identity is a multi-faceted one that is inflected by differences over nationality, economic development, as well as a sense of what modernity and tradition represent among the Chinese. These differences point to the significance of placing and examining “Chineseness” within the localized and grounded framework: that is, to situate “Chineseness” within the context of a diversity and multiplicity of its meanings from a localized and historicized perspective. Moreover, they also indicate the extent to which Shanghai, like other places, offers “different, if not oppositional, spatial experiences who come to inhabit it” (Sun: 174). In other words, individuals, based on differences in sex, class, nationality and other dimensions, may experience the city differently.

Japanese Women in Shanghai: Shifting terms of engagement with “Asia”

Recent years have seen the increasing significance of transnational business activities and such activities have caused the emergence of highly mobile groups of entrepreneurs, executives and specialists (Castles 2003: 5). As discussed in the previous chapter, growing economic ties between Japan and other Asian countries, in particular, between China and Japan, have played a central role in the migratory processes of the Japanese to cities in other Asian countries. The growing presence of expatriate Japanese in Shanghai since the early 2000s is illustrative of such processes of growing economic interdependencies between Japan and other parts of Asia. As of 2004, there were as many as 4500 Japanese companies that had their operations or branches in China (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2005). In accordance with this increasing Japanese corporate presence in China, the number of Japanese
residents in China, in particular, in Shanghai, has also soared in recent years. In relation to this point, the table 3 provides data on cities in the world as ranked in order of the number of Japanese residents in recent years.

Table 3: Cities as ranked in order of the number of Japanese residents from 2005 to 2007

<table>
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<th>2007</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Los Angeles 64,734</td>
<td>Los Angeles 61,336</td>
<td>New York 59,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>New York 49,659</td>
<td>New York 51,750</td>
<td>Los Angeles 50,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shanghai 48,179</td>
<td>Shanghai 47,794</td>
<td>Shanghai 40,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bangkok 32,283</td>
<td>Bangkok 31,616</td>
<td>Bangkok 26,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>London 27,072</td>
<td>London 28,787</td>
<td>Hong Kong 25,961</td>
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As the table 3 demonstrates, the number of Japanese residents in Shanghai has shown remarkable growth over the recent years. In particular, the table indicates that there is a growing shift toward cities in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of the number of Japanese residents. It represents a sharp contrast with the statistics on cities as ranked in order of the number of Japanese residents in 1999, which showed that New York, London and Los Angeles comprised the cities with the largest number of Japanese population overseas (The Japan Times 2000).

In accordance with Japan's growing social and economic ties with other Asian

\[41\] According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statistics in 2006, the number of Japanese male residents in Shanghai as of 2005 was 35,439, while that of female was 16,306 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006: 22).
countries, Japanese women's perceptions of other Asian countries have also changed significantly over the past decade. In this respect, the media and popular culture have played significant roles in this shift in the perceptions of other Asian countries. As Asuna points out, since the 1990s, women's magazines, such as special issues of Crea on Taiwan, Vietnam and South Korea, have played central roles in constructing the positive image of tourist locations of other Asian countries as the accessible "paradise" among Japanese women (2004: 93-94). In this respect, Iwabuchi indicates that since the 1990s, media interactions among East Asian countries have surged considerably and the flow of popular culture from other parts of Asia into Japan has also increased (2002: 555). Buckly also points out that both in the media and official rhetoric, the "Asianization" of Japan has gained tremendous significance in the 1990s (1997: 284). The 1990s thus represents a critical period in reshaping the process of re-bordering Japan's relationship with other parts of Asia. It was a time when "Japan began actively reasserting its own identity as an Asian country, in response to the rising economic power of other Asian states as well as to the changing post-Cold War geopolitical landscape" (Iwabuchi 2004: 151).

To illustrate one example of the growing interest in the cultural products from other Asian countries, the popularity of a music group called Joshi Jūnigakubō, a group comprised of young and beautiful women from China, is a case in point. The music that these women play — contemporary improvisations of various tunes using classical Chinese instruments — proved so popular in Japan that over 2 million copies of their CDs were sold as of 2004 (Asuna 2004: 77-78). These media and cultural interactions with other Asian countries, as well as the changing perceptions of Japan as an Asian nation, have contributed, to a significant degree, to alter the previous assumptions about "Asia" as a stagnant and undesirable place. Instead, they have opened up a discursive space in which more positive and vibrant images
of Asia are recreated and renegotiated.

It is in this context of shifting terms of engaging with Asia that those Japanese women who regard working abroad as positive options in their life paths have started moving to Shanghai in search of new opportunities. The majority of these women, as I have already indicated, are in their twenties or thirties. Although women in Japan have a multitude of differences based on class, educational background and ethnicity, Japanese women who belong to this generation share an enthusiasm for travelling and living abroad as well as great interest in higher education in order to achieve a further advancement in their careers. To illustrate this point, in 1999, the number of Japanese women living abroad exceeded the corresponding number for Japanese men for the first time since the Japanese Foreign Ministry started its annual survey of Japanese expatriates in 1976. As an official of the ministry’s Consular and Migration affairs department points out that, in the past, most Japanese women who live abroad tended to accompany their husbands on overseas assignment, but in recent years there is a growing number of women who choose to go overseas alone for work (The Japan Times 2000). In this respect, the migratory processes of Japanese women are situated within the larger patterns of female migration in recent years—in particular, “the expansion of education and shifts in women’s roles and status in origin countries has seen more women engage in autonomous migration that in the past” (Hugo 2000: 294). Since 1999, the trend in which growing numbers of Japanese women seek to go overseas by themselves has continued into the twenty-first century, as shown in table 4.

Table 4: The number of Japanese men and women living abroad from 2000 to 2005

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42 In 1999, the number of Japanese women living overseas was 402,500, whereas that of Japanese men was 393,200 (The Japan Times 2000).
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<th>2000</th>
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<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>397,297</td>
<td>409,106</td>
<td>420,381</td>
<td>443,878</td>
<td>467,627</td>
<td>490,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>414,415</td>
<td>428,638</td>
<td>451,370</td>
<td>467,184</td>
<td>493,680</td>
<td>522,317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006: 5)

In 2005, the number of Japanese women living abroad exceeded 500,000, accounting for 51.58 percent of the total Japanese population abroad. As part of this trend of the growing number of Japanese women living abroad, Ono and Piper, in their analyses of Japanese women's migration to the United States as MBA students, point out that women contribute significantly to the rise of the number of Japanese students opting for studying abroad in recent years. They suggest that this phenomenon is closely tied to persisting gender inequalities within the Japanese employment system, as well as the social conventions and traditional lifestyles prevailing in Japan.\(^{43}\) Thus, they argue that these women choose to invest in higher education overseas as a strategy to overcome their disadvantages or to resist conforming to a more conventional life path (Ono and Piper 2004: 102).

These findings suggest that the contemporary patterns of Japanese women's migrations are different from those of Japanese men: Japanese women tend to migrate on their own accord or independently; whereas men, if they go overseas, tend to go there on their overseas transfers from the companies to which they belong. I suggest that this difference contributes to the formations of the gendered experiences of migrations between Japanese women and men and has implications for the sense of belonging to the place(s) to which they

\(^{43}\) In comparison to other developed countries, Japan ranks low in terms of the numbers of women workers in management positions, with only 9.9 percent of women workers in management positions compared with 45.9 percent in the US and 34.5 percent in Germany (Nakamoto 2006: 3).
migrate, for their societal and economic status in their particular destinations and for their future prospects.

The contemporary gendered flows of emigration from Japan suggest that the analysis of contemporary migratory patterns of the Japanese needs to take account of gender as its starting point. It also indicates that traditional conceptions about migration and mobility which view men as the agent of migration and women as their dependants who follow the male head of the family are not sufficient to explore the growing cases of female emigration from Japan. In this respect, this thesis has drawn on the studies of feminist migration studies which I discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Little research has been done on the case of Japanese women who emigrate out of Japan. There are a few studies on the social position and experiences of single female Japanese expatriates in Singapore (Ben-Ari and Yong 2000; Thang, MacLachlan and Goda 2002), as well as the situation of Japanese women in places such as Hong Kong or the United States. Sakai (2003) points out that those Japanese women who work in Hong Kong regard the city as the place where they can gain more independence in the workplace and that they appropriate their Japanese traits and working experience in Japan for employment and business purposes in Hong Kong. Ono and Piper (2004) examine the dynamics of Japanese women's migration to the United States as MBA students. These findings indicate that the marginalization of Japanese women within the Japanese employment system is the driving force for them to pursue careers or studying overseas. According to an article which appeared in The Japan Times, an increasing number of women in Japan believe that working abroad, especially in China and elsewhere in Asia, could

It should be acknowledged that the contemporary migratory patterns of Japanese women to other Asian countries need to be understood as the migratory flows of skilled workers, which contrast sharply with the dominant patterns of migratory movements from other Asian countries such as the Philippines or Indonesia whose female citizens are predominantly employed as domestic workers in other countries.
be the solution for the problems they face in male-dominated Japanese companies bound by the seniority system (The Japan Times 2003).

Going overseas, however, does not necessarily mean that they become free from marginalization. As Ben-Ari and Yong point out, for example, Japanese women are “twice marginalized” in Singapore (2000: 82, 110). They are marginalized in relation to both the host country and to the expatriate Japanese community represented by the privileged position of Japanese males and their accompanied families. This could equally be applied to the situation of Japanese women in Shanghai. Expatriate Japanese women occupy a marginal position in Shanghai: they do not belong to the mainstream of Chinese society; nor do they identify themselves with the world of Japanese expatriate males who generally enjoy higher privileges and status within the Japanese community.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, we need to take fully into consideration gender differences between Japanese women and men as expatriates, as well as their position as a minority of Chinese society in order to better understand and illuminate their migratory processes.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} It should be acknowledged that those Japanese women who are married to local men in Shanghai appear to be more integrated with, and accepted by, local people there due to their familial ties with Chinese men through marriage. In this sense, it becomes significant to make a distinction between single expatriate Japanese women and those married to locals in Shanghai in terms of their different perspectives concerning their migration experiences. Moreover, there is an increasing number of Japanese women who enjoy the same privileges and status as Japanese men in China, though the majority of Japanese women are still locally hired on a contract basis, which means their salaries and associated benefits are much lower compared with the majority of expatriate Japanese males who are transferred from their companies in Japan to work in one of the branches of their companies in China.

\textsuperscript{46} One of the members of the Association of Japanese Women in Shanghai mentioned that many Japanese women work in a isolated situation in Shanghai: on the one hand, their superiors, usually expatriate Japanese males, live in a different social world in terms of salaries, social position and other numerous benefits that are attached to their position; on the other, their Chinese colleagues are often employed on conditions and salaries that are different from these Japanese women. These factors, she told us in one of the events of the association in June 2005, may create barriers between these Japanese women and other employees, making these women feel isolated in the workplace at times. Therefore, one of the central aims of the association, she added, is to facilitate the interactions of these Japanese women who may face problems with having social contacts in Shanghai.
The Rise of Shanghai as a Global City: Re-imagining Shanghai as a desirable place

Thang, MacLachlan and Goda point out that the “Japanese women work in Asia” boom first started with Hong Kong, after the autumn 1993 career seminar on Hong Kong conducted in Tokyo and Osaka by a recruitment agency (2002: 541-542). In the early 1990s, Hong Kong was viewed as a vibrant Asian city and as a good place for Japanese women who felt constrained by the traditional roles assigned to them in the workplace and wanted to fulfill their aspirations as career women. Yet after the handover of Hong Kong to mainland China in 1997, the demand for Japanese office staff has substantially decreased partly due to the rise in local unemployment, which affected the prospect of Japanese women finding employment opportunities there. In addition, obtaining working visas in Hong Kong has become increasingly difficult since the mid-1990s (2002: 541-542). Since then, cities such as Shanghai and Singapore have become popular destinations among Japanese women who seek employment overseas and regard Asian cities as a site of opportunities that they find hard to obtain in

47 In postwar Japan, Hong Kong has long been Japan’s gateway and entry point to China. As a cosmopolitan city bridging the East and the West, it has attracted a large number of the Japanese, both as expatriates and as tourists. Many people in Hong Kong, too, have become interested in Japanese cultural products, including comics, TV dramas as well as food. As a result, a number of social and cultural exchanges between Hong Kong and Japan have taken place. Yet the recent rise of Shanghai as a potential travel hub in East Asia, coupled with the increased numbers of flights between Shanghai and major cities in Japan, the position of Hong Kong as Japan’s gateway to China has shifted. Yet cultural products from Hong Kong have played a central role in providing ideas about Chinese modernity, both to the Chinese diaspora and the Japanese. As such, Hong Kong’s cultural status as representative of Chinese culture when China was relatively close to the outside world from the 1950s to the 1980s remains critical as an area of inquiry into the cultural interactions between the Chinese speaking world and Japan (Sinn 2006: 107).
Japan due to the economic recession since the early 1990s and limited career prospects in the workplace.

In particular, reflecting the image of rapid economic growth in China that circulated in the Japanese media and growing economic ties between China and Japan, the city of Shanghai captured the attention of some Japanese women interested in taking up new employment opportunities as well as living abroad. In this regard, the shift in the dominant image of China in Japan, as well as regional economic dimensions within the Asia-Pacific region, appears to have had considerable impact upon women's decisions to seek employment opportunities in Shanghai or other cities in China which was almost inconceivable a decade ago. In line with this growing popularity of Shanghai as one of the places in which to seek employment opportunities, a number of books that contain information on living and working in the city has been published in Japan. One of such books, for instance, *Shanghai de hataraku* (Working in Shanghai) provides basic information on visas, housing, lists of employment agencies as well as universities that offer courses in Mandarin for foreigners (Sudo 2003). Furthermore, there are numerous Japanese magazines that are published locally to cater to the growing social needs of Japanese and other expatriate communities in Shanghai.49

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48 For Japanese citizens who are interested in working in mainland China, the majority of employment opportunities are concentrated in Shanghai and its surrounding regions, as well as in South China where China's open economic policy first took its shape. According to Sudo, the author of *Shanghai de hataraku*, the majority of Japanese women who study Mandarin in Beijing or Shanghai tend to prefer finding employment in Shanghai or northern China, rather than heading for the South where there is a great demand for personnel who have both Japanese and Chinese language skills (a personal conversation with Sudo Mika, Shanghai, April 17, 2005).

49 Examples of these magazines include: *Shanghai Walker* (in Japanese), *Super City Shanghai* (in Japanese), *That's Shanghai* (in English). For expatriates, these magazines provide valuable information on Chinese culture, local social activities (such as dining and entertainment) as well as social networking of expatriates in the city.
As indicated above, the shifting images of other Asian countries in Japan appear to have had considerable impacts on individual decisions to seek and take up employment opportunities in Shanghai. Since the early 2000s, there are frequent references about how fashionable Shanghai has become in Japanese women’s magazines, as well as in television programs on rapid urban and economic development in Shanghai. In the Japanese media, the development of Shanghai towards a global city has often been emphasized through the image of the urban built environment in Shanghai. It is characterised by the dominant attention paid to, and frequent representations of, the growing presence of skyscrapers.

In view of the positive representations and reinterpretation of Shanghai as a cosmopolitan and fashionable city, a number of Japanese women, who are interested in Chinese or Asian cultures and economies, have undertaken studies in Mandarin and have sought employment opportunities in China. Therefore, as far as Shanghai is concerned, it has replaced previous Japanese views about China as “backward and pre-modernized” country.

The rapid urban development in Shanghai appears to be one of the central motivations for moving there among those Japanese women who work in the city. One of my interviewees, Sara, who is in her early forties and works as a

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50 For instance, Le Figaro Japan, a Japanese women’s magazine which usually covers and emphasize Western cities as fashionable places, published a special issue on Beijing and Shanghai in 2002 and introduced a number of cafés, restaurants and shops in these cities to its readers.

51 One of my interviewees, who works as a manager for a Japanese recruitment agency in Shanghai, points out that the majority of Japanese women migrate to the city because they are interested in business opportunities in China. Yet she expressed some concerns about the motivations of some persons who come to Shanghai for different purposes: she notes that “I am concerned that some people come to Shanghai thinking that it is fashionable to live and work here. Apparently, this group of people are affected very much by some articles that appeared in Japanese women’s magazines. As a result, they tend to expect only fashionable aspects of Shanghai in their lives here and are more interested in living and working in central parts of Shanghai rather than in developing or enhancing their careers” (Interview, July 12, 2004).

52 To protect the privacy of my interviewees, all of their names that appear in this thesis
general secretary at an accounting consulting firm in Shanghai, explained her decision to come to Shanghai from Kobe (a port city close to Osaka):

My decision to work in Shanghai had been prompted by my short visit to the city in December 2001 when I was very much impressed by the rapid urban transformations of the city. Nine months after this visit, I began studying Mandarin at a local university in Shanghai. And as for my motivation to study Mandarin, it was driven primarily by my personal desire to advance my career. I had been working as a dispatch employee in Japan and knew that I needed extra knowledge or skill in order to remain competitive in the job market. In particular, in light of the unfavorable employment situation surrounding women above the age of 35 in Japan, I thought that acquiring additional skill, such as the ability to speak Mandarin, would be an advantage in the job market. Another important factor for my move was my own conviction that China would become the centre of Asia, which would certainly add to the significance of my knowledge of Mandarin as well as of my business experience in China (Interview with Sara, April 9, 2005).

Sara’s narrative of migration resonates with that of Sachie, who is in her early thirties and works in the accounting section of a Chinese company in Shanghai. Sachie is married to a Chinese man from Beijing whom she met as a tour guide when she went to China on a holiday from Japan. Sachie’s husband, who works for a Japanese company, also works in Shanghai as an expatriate of the Japanese firm. Sachie tells me how she had come to learn Chinese and eventually came to China with her Chinese husband:

When I graduated from university in Japan in 1995, it was very difficult to find an employment in a company that I had hoped to work. So I thought of going to Los Angeles to study English or something. But one of my Chinese friends in Japan told me that China would become the centre of the world in the twenty-first century. So I decided to go to Taiwan because I had a friend there. At that time, it was very easy to

are pseudonyms.
find a job as a Japanese teacher there because Japanese culture and TV
oramas were very popular among Taiwanese youths and they wanted to
learn the language too. I studied Mandarin during my first year in
Taiwan and taught Japanese during my second year. ..I started
working in Shanghai to accompany my husband who was transferred to
Shanghai. This city has a huge potential for development. Here I can
find people from diverse backgrounds and goods from different places.
In this sense, Shanghai is a crossroad of different people and goods. In
such an environment, there is an intense competition among business
people in particular. I met many Japanese who started business here.
And most of the people I meet in this city are always eager to learn
something new and the encounters with them give me much energy to
improve myself. So my home is in Shanghai at present. (Interview with
Sachie, October 21, 2005)

Shanghai's rising status as an emerging global city is reflected by the
growing population of expatriates in the city: it is a city increasingly shaped
and extended in space by many different kinds of mobilities, from cross-
border flows of people to global flows of commodities and information.
Transnational population movements to the city, in particular, have
transformed the landscape of the city to a considerable extent in recent years.
With a growing population of expatriates in the city, as well as the increase in
the number of shopping malls, restaurants and office buildings to cater to the
cosmopolitan needs of these expatriates, the city of Shanghai has regained its
status as a cosmopolitan city: it is attracting a greater number of migrants,
sojourners and tourists for its trans-boundary ambience and characteristics.
One of my interviewees, Miwa, who is in her early thirties and teaches
Japanese at one of the language schools in Shanghai, emphasizes that one of
the positive aspects of Shanghai is that there are many opportunities to meet
various people from different cultural backgrounds.53 In this regard, Ang

53 The recent flows of global labor and capital have been an important part of defining
Shanghai as an emerging global city in East Asia. In this respect, Huang points out that
the term "new Shanghaiese" (xin shang hai ren) best captures the collective identity of
the large number of business people who moved to the city because of recent global
capital flows. She adds that the underlying appeal of the term "new Shanghaiese" lies
in the open and flexible image of people who live and work in a global city which enables
points to the way in which "the transnationality of the global city is characterized by intense simultaneity and coexistence, by territorial togetherness in difference" (2004: 190-191). Miwa adds that having this sort of transnational experience is very difficult in Japan (Interview with Miwa, October 22, 2005).

**Gender Relations across Boundaries: Being Japanese women in Shanghai**

The majority of my interviewees in Shanghai share the view that what makes Shanghai a good place to work is that the city provides a suitable environment for working women, particularly working mothers. They take note of the fact that the modest cost of living expenses and hiring domestic workers in Shanghai help them to focus on their work as well as to enjoy their lives at a reasonable cost. Along with these advantages, they mention that higher expectations attached to women in the workplace contribute to a better sense of fulfillment in their job responsibilities. One of my interviewees points out that the political system of China, having been a socialist state for more than half a century, have been conducive to putting emphasis on the importance of gender equality in the workplace.

In this respect, my interviewees have also made a positive evaluation of local Chinese men in Shanghai. Sara, for instance, contends that Chinese men, as opposed to Japanese men who have a tendency to judge women on the basis of their age, have the capacity to treat women as their equal colleagues or as friends (Interview with Sara, April 9, 2005).
Some of my interviewees point out gender differences between expatriate Japanese women and men in terms of their engagement with China and the Chinese. Tomomi, who is in her late twenties and works as a senior associate at a British accounting firm in Shanghai, points out that expatriate Japanese women are more energetic and fluent in Chinese than the majority of expatriate Japanese men who do not seem to be at home in China. (Interview with Tomomi, April 18, 2005). Given the fact that the majority of these Japanese women in Shanghai find employment locally as opposed to most of the Japanese men there who are transferred from their companies in Japan and thus are in a more privileged position, their engagement with the local community is different from those of Japanese men: they negotiate such engagement with the local in their own terms. Such acts mark the gendered differences in negotiating the boundaries between China and Japan. For these Japanese women the boundaries between “our” culture and “their” culture, between home and away and between “here” and “there” are being blurred, enabling them to have more active engagement with the cultural and social dimensions of China and Shanghai in particular.

Reflecting the broadening social ties between the Chinese and Japanese, there are increasing cases of intermarriages between them. In Shanghai, there is an association of wife (laopo) and it is an association for those Japanese women who are married to local Chinese. 64 Taeko, who is the Vice President of the association, points out that the number of Japanese women who have Chinese husbands or relationships with Chinese men are on the increase in recent years. She further adds that she attaches a lot of importance to communication with her husband as they do not share a same culture. “In this way, I think we understand each other better than ordinarily Japanese couples” (Interview with Taeko; 17 April 2005).

64 Approximately more than 100 Japanese women were members of this association as of 2005.

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Marika, who is in her mid-twenties, works at one of the hotels in Shanghai. Before coming to China, her image of the country was that of communism and poverty. Upon her arrival in China, however, her image of the country has completely transformed. She tells me that when she first came to Shanghai, she used to miss the Hainan island, a southern island located between China and Southeast Asia, where she worked for one year prior to coming to Shanghai. She notes that island is similar to Southeast Asia in its climate and food cultures. After six months working in Shanghai, however, she has finally begun to feel as home as she has a Chinese boyfriend and finds that the Chinese are much friendlier than the Japanese at an individual level in her everyday interactions with the locals (Interview with Marika: 17 April 2005).

Mia, who is in her thirties and works for a recruitment agency, stresses that the majority of Japanese women are finding it difficult to balance their professional and married life, particularly if they have children. And she says that if she were to marry someone, she would prefer those individuals who are from outside Japan. The reason for this is that: “if I am married to a Japanese guy, then my life will be based in Japan and that means narrowing down the options and perspectives in my life”. Mia, as she frequently makes a trip to overseas to study language or culture even while she is in Shanghai adds that she wants to broaden her horizon as much as possible for her own personal development (Interview with Mia: 22 April 2005). Mia’s case illustrates that to pursue personal development constitutes one of the most critical dimensions of living and working in Shanghai.

The City of Dynamism and Transnational Connections: Shanghai as a desirable place
Along with the rapid urban development and the advantages of living and working in Shanghai as I described above, the role that the city plays in the economic development as an economic centre of China captures the attention of Japanese women and affects their migration choices to the city. Tomomi points out that Shanghai's status as an economic centre of China means that working there enables her to take part in big projects, giving her broader scope and horizons in her career development as a professional accountant. Tomomi had lived in Hong Kong for nine years because of her father's overseas assignments and obtained her university degree (BA in accounting) in Britain. After that, she worked in London for three years before coming to China. Yet she notes her preference to Asian cities: London has already developed enough as a city and suggests that a city like Shanghai, which is going through rapid transformations as the Chinese economy grows, attracts her much more than major cities in the West. To Tomomi, the West appears to have reached the saturation point in its urban development in comparison to cities in Asia. After she came to China, she first studied Mandarin in Dalian, a northeastern city in China and then moved to Shanghai to work. She adds that Shanghai, compared to a more regional city such as Dalian, offers much more in terms of work prospects, activities and entertainment because it is an economic centre of China (Interview with Tomomi, April 18, 2005).

In addition to increasing Japanese corporate interest and investment in China, the rapid urban development and Shanghai's central role in Chinese economy means that there are diverse opportunities available in Shanghai compared with the already developed and ageing economy of Japan. As one of my respondents, Tomoyo, who is in her late twenties and works for a Shanghai branch of a Japanese textile company, reflects, since everything has
come to a complete stage and more growth opportunities seem unlikely to emerge in Japan, it is difficult for someone like her to embark on a new challenge there. She adds:

The enormous power of organizations over individuals in Japan is one of the main reasons why young people find it difficult to envision new hopes for the future and that many firms in Japan tend to regard female labour solely as disposable. By contrast, there are a variety of new opportunities available in China and the sheer possibility of taking up these opportunities makes a city like Shanghai attractive to me. (Interview with Tomoyo, April 24, 2005)

Mamoru, an expatriate Japanese man in Shanghai who is in his mid-forties and works for a Japanese public organization, identifies that one of the advantages of being in China as:

Because China is still in the process of developing its country on various fronts, the society is very flexible in accepting new ideas, projects and new ways of doing business: it is thus relatively easy to put into practice a new and innovative enterprise in this country. (Interview with Mamoru, October 20, 2000)

Marie, who is in her early forties and works as a manager at a recruitment agency, also points out the difficulty of envisioning hopes for the future in Japan:

Twenty years from now, I hope that I will still be able to continue to live and work somewhere in other Asian countries. Although I hope to settle in Japan upon my retirement, I do not want to live in Japan as it is now; for the current social structure in Japan leaves little room for creating dreams, opportunities and energy. (Interview with Marie, July 12, 2004)
Their contrasting observations about Japan and other Asian cities such as Shanghai — Japan as stagnant place and other Asian cities as more dynamic — is also echoed by Hoshino Hiromi, a female photographer who stayed in Hong Kong first in the late 1980s and again in the late 1990s. She recalls her first “encounter” with Hong Kong:

When I first landed in the Kaitak airport in Hong Kong, it was in August, 1986. I was just twenty years old and an exchange student from Japan with nothing to worry about in particular. The processes of landing in Hong Kong — overlooking its streets and billboards just below my eyes while the plane buzzing the surface of buildings in the city centre— shaped my first impressions of the city to a significant degree. To me, Hong Kong was, and has always been, a very exciting place. The rich and the poor, and the good and the evil — all coexist in that place called Hong Kong. Moreover, people in Hong Kong always question their relationship to the place or country in which they are located, and they do not hesitate to cross boundaries: they decide to move to different places with ease if they think that the move might provide them with more opportunities or choices in life. They thus always aim for an upward mobility in social and economic terms. I, who had complained that going to schools was boring and that it was difficult for me to find what I would like to do in Japan, was very much influenced by the dynamism of the city as well as the way in which people lived their everyday lives in Hong Kong. (1996: 3)

Experience of migration not only reshapes our understandings of different people and places but also provides us with comparative insights into “our” society from a different perspective. In other words, being “away from home” often urges us to rethink and to question what we thought as natural and given and provides us opportunities for posing questions in regard to what constitutes “our” society. Sudo Mika, who is the author of Shanghai de hataraku and has studied and worked in China, identifies how the Japanese in Shanghai may feel liberated from “doing Japanese-ness” through their interactions with the Chinese.
In recent years, Shanghai, with its rapidly changing cityscape, has attracted growing numbers of people and capital across the globe. People living in this city, be they Chinese or expatriates, are often eager to talk about their dreams and to make strenuous efforts to realize them. Although it is indeed exciting to live in such a city amidst these energetic people, we need to realize that there are many risks involved in living and working in this city whose social system is totally different from ours. ...Even though the Chinese and the Japanese do look similar in appearance, we sometimes feel perplexed by those behaviors and words of the Chinese that are rather incomprehensible to us in terms of our common sense. Therefore, it is inevitable that we occasionally feel puzzled or get angry in our interactions with them. At the same time, we may also become liberated in these processes by freeing ourselves from the constraints of what we usually conceive of as "our common sense" in Japan. (Sudo 2003: 151)

Hoshino Hiromi, a female photographer I mentioned earlier, makes a comparison between the Hong Kong society and the Japanese one in terms of the manifestation of tolerance or intolerance for differences in these societies:

In Hong Kong, it is very hard to imagine who constitutes a typical Hong Kong citizen since each person living in the city has a variety of social and cultural backgrounds. Thus there is little societal pressure to make people imagine the same "us" as Hong Kong citizen. This city, with its history of the place of immigrants, has long had the capacity for tolerating individuals from different backgrounds. The strength of the city is that Hong Kong belongs to everyone who needs it. ...I sometimes feel more alienated in Japan where I am expected to belong as a Japanese citizen than Hong Kong where I just stayed as a temporary resident: in Japan I have observed a social and political dynamics in which they exclude the minorities to preserve the interests of the dominant groups in its society at large. The reason for this is that this place belongs only to the Japanese and those coming from outside are intruders. Japan is thus a place that is intolerant for those individuals who cross boundaries. (1996: 619-620)

Similarly, Miwa, the interviewee whom I mentioned earlier, renegotiates the meanings of being "away from home" in Shanghai. She tells me her narrative
of migration from Japan to the city:

Since I was in my early twenties, I have always been interested in going abroad. ...I have already lived in Shanghai for five years now. I had studied Mandarin for the first two and a half years, and then I audited art lectures in one of the local art schools while teaching Japanese in this city. I came to Shanghai because I felt some kind of yearning for something, though it is rather vague to describe it in concrete terms. ... In Shanghai I feel myself liberated from a number of uncertainties, constraints and ambiguities that I used to feel in Japan. To put it another way, I have a clearer view of myself in Shanghai. I do have my family and friends in Japan and I think it is indeed a convenient place to live. But it is difficult to experience and feel intense emotions — feeling extremely joyful or sad about something — in Japan these days. Japan is a country full of consumer goods and products, at least in material terms. But I am not sure how many people in that country have some core values or paths in which they can believe. Indeed I met many people who were at a loss as to what to do in their lives in Japan. ...I have become a Christian since I came to Shanghai in 2000. Being in Shanghai by myself has enabled me to face myself and reflect upon my life. I had a time of darkness and emptiness for some time until I discovered something precious to light up my life.... In Shanghai, I am able to feel intense joy and sadness. This is a place where people, things and events respond to you in direct and certain ways and with a variety of meanings. (Interview with Miwa, October 22, 2005)

In 2002, Murakami Ryū, a contemporary Japanese writer, published a novel entitled “The Exodus from the Hopeful Country”. The book narrates the social rebellion of Japanese junior high school students on a massive scale through their acts of refusing to go to school altogether and demonstrates Japan’s inability to cope with, and adapt to, new realities of the world and its limited capacity to create new hopes for its younger generation. Namamugi, one of the protagonists of the novel expresses his severe criticism of Japan as: “This country has everything. Indeed a variety of goods abound in this society. But there is one thing there is lacking here. It is hope.” (Murakami 2002: 12).
As Miwa’s narrative suggests, the materialistic society of Japan is placed in sharp contrast to the straightforwardness and directness of Shanghai. She represents Shanghai as the space for liberation from uncertainties and ambiguities that she felt in Japan. In other words, Shanghai, in her narrative, is portrayed as the place characterized by dynamic openness: it is open to the articulation of intense feelings and emotions; it is open to attract various people from different cultural backgrounds; and it is a place where a variety of interactions with those people are made possible because of the city’s openness to other cultures and influences that has increasingly accelerated since the early 2000s since when the central government of the PRC and the city of Shanghai have made joint efforts to promote the city as a global city in East Asia and to reintegrate the city into the global flows of people and goods. Miwa thus reinterprets her life and connects it with Shanghai — a city marked by increasing transnational connections and flows. By doing so, she blurs the boundaries between being “away from home” and being “at home”: she reconstitutes her home in Shanghai and thus questions the assumed connection between citizenship, territory and identity as rooted in one’s place of origin.

Most importantly, the majority of my interviewees indicate that Shanghai is a city that provides them a variety of opportunities. Their representation of urban space in Shanghai suggests that urbanization and its association with opportunities are central in their decisions for moving to work in China. In her account of the relationship between women and the city, Wilson argues that the city might be a place for freedom and liberation for women (1991: 7-8). One of my respondents in Singapore, Tami, who is in her early thirties and has the experience of working in a small provincial town in Hunan Province in China before coming to Singapore to work in marketing, recalls that her
experience in a small size city in China was very "frustrating".\textsuperscript{55} She further adds that "honestly speaking, I do not want to live in China again". By contrast, when she came to Singapore after finishing her term as a Japanese teacher in Hunan province, she found Singapore to be a "sophisticated version of China" and decided to come back to the city-state for work next time when she leaves Japan (Interview with Tami, February 21, 2005). Her contrasting remarks about China and Singapore suggest that it is not just China itself that motivates Japanese women to move to the country and stay there. Rather, the growth of Shanghai towards a global city, which includes diverse forms of entertainment, the increasing availability of Japanese goods and food at shops, the improvement in infrastructure, and the safe environment for women at night, proves to be a significant aspect of Japanese women's choice to migrate to China. In this regard, one of my interviewees, Sachie, who is in her early fifties and work for a Japanese school in Shanghai as an administrator, points out that there is a need to "differentiate Shanghai from the rest of China" and suggests that "compared with other places in China, foreigners tend to feel more comfortable living in Shanghai because of its vibrant history as a cosmopolitan city" (Interview with Sachie, July 3, 2004). Satomi, who is in her late twenties and an employee at a recruitment agency, also points out the significance of the intersections of the urban and the global in shaping her life in Shanghai:

I think that I can live and work in Shanghai because it is a big city, which enables me to go to Japanese restaurant sometimes and to buy Japanese food and goods at shops whenever I want them. I simply cannot imagine myself living in other places, for instance, in the countryside in China where I do not think that I will be able to

\textsuperscript{55} Interviews with expatriate Japanese women in Singapore were conducted in the period between 2004 and 2006. I added my interviews in Singapore in this thesis because they are relevant to experiences of my respondents in Shanghai.
maintain the same lifestyle as I am enjoying in Shanghai. (Interview with Satomi, April 20, 2005)

It has been often pointed out in Japan that rural areas or regional small and medium sized cities have been sacrificed in terms of its urban development and human capital capacities for the development of major cities such as Tokyo or Osaka. Due to the scarcity of good employment opportunities in these areas, many young people in these areas have moved to big cities; others have chosen moving overseas. Teruyo, who is in her late thirties and works for a Japanese publishing firm in Singapore, points out that her move from Niigata Prefecture in Japan to Singapore was "just like moving to Osaka from Tokyo" (Interview with Teruyo, December 20, 2004). In other words, for individuals like Teruyo, migration from Japan to other Asian countries today is construed as a similar process to moving domestically. Similarly, Tomoyo, the interviewee whom I mentioned earlier, originally comes from a city in Hiroshima. She told me that her place of birth did not offer good employment opportunities.

Their response to the urban-regional dichotomy in Japan reveals the importance of placing global cities in transnational context, as well as the regionalization of economic processes in East and Southeast Asia in migratory processes. Most importantly, the growth of Shanghai as a global city, as well as opportunities associated with this urban development, has been crucial to the shaping of their migratory processes. These factors also point to the significance of taking account of non-economic incentives for these processes.

56 This information comes from a personal conversation with a Japanese postgraduate student studying in Australia, on February 3, 2006. Coming from Okayama prefecture in Japan, he told me that there were growing tendencies among young people in his region to prefer to move to big cities, which has social and economic impacts on regional development in a place like Okayama Prefecture.
My interviewees' positive evaluation of Shanghai as a city of opportunities suggests that a variety of opportunities, which are made available in a global city, are crucial to the understanding of women's migratory processes. The term 'opportunities', in this regard, implies a multiplicity of meanings: they might indicate opportunities to experience changing urban landscape in China as the country goes through rapid social changes; opportunities to interact and/or socialize with people of different cultural and ethnic origins; opportunities to undertake exciting projects in the workplace; opportunities to travel safely to work and play; opportunities to move from a country with rigid organizational structures; and opportunities to explore the possibilities of a different setting. Their choices to migrate to China are therefore not driven solely by economic or business opportunities associated with the rise of China. Rather, non-economic factors — including, for instance, the opportunity to experience the dynamism of an emerging global city in East Asia — play central roles in their migratory processes.

As my interviewees' accounts of migration and border-crossings suggest, the boundaries between Japan and other Asian countries are given different meanings and interpretation: their conceptions of boundaries are in sharp contrast to the conventional approach to the construction of boundaries between China and Japan that have marked the separation between the two countries in social, political and economic terms since Japan's modernization. Rather, the availability of a variety of opportunities is central to their migratory processes. In this regard, they reconfigure the borders in accordance with the current regional processes of economic interdependency and with social and cultural connections between the countries of East Asia. This suggests that they are never merely passive instruments of narratives of nations-states. Rather, as social beings, with capacities for interaction, communication and interpretation, they are social and political actors
engaged in the contestation and reconfiguration of boundaries created, demarcated and drawn by nation-states. By doing so, they make their own mapping of East Asia against the backdrop of states' practices to demarcate boundaries. Shanghai constitutes a critical site in this process.

In contrast to the divisions based on national politics and security agenda, this process of reconfiguring boundaries has the potential for transforming boundaries between nation-states and reconstituting them as more porous and flexible than those that are visible on a map. Such a process points to the importance of reconsidering borders or boundaries as sociopolitical constructions in terms of their meanings and operations. In particular, it intersects with the idea that what a boundary is, what it represents and what it does are inseparable from what we think about these questions and that there exists a complex relationship between ideas about territorial borders and social action (Williams 2006: 6). As David Newman points out, "borders are as much perceived in our mental maps and images as they are visible manifestations of concrete walls and barbed-wire fences" (2006: 146). Similarly, Paasi asserts that boundaries are manifestations of social practice and discourse (1999: 75).

Wastl-Walter and Staeheli thus draw attention to the significance of multifaceted dimension of boundaries: they maintain that boundaries are conceptualized as "social constructions: the ways in which they are constructed, performed, and perceived depends on the cultural, religious, social, and economic contexts in which they are located. They are symbolic lines of division and separation, enforcing ideas of difference, but this also means they are contact zones of different social and cultural groups. In this sense, boundaries are constantly negotiated and redefined, as are the social categories in which people are placed." Transnational migrants, in particular, engage in a continuous struggle and renegotiation over the redrawing of
political boundaries through the acts of border crossings (2004: 144-145).

Thus the boundary, far from being a self-evident, analytical given, which can be applied regardless of context, must be interrogated for its subtle and substantial shifts in meaning and form according to setting (Wilson and Donnan 1998: 12). The boundaries between Japan and other parts of Asia, reestablished and strengthened since Japan's modernization, have gone through significant transformations in their meanings and operation in the early twenty-first century, paving the way for shifting perceptions and representations of "other" places. Expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai take part in such a process of reconfiguration of boundaries though their trajectories of migration from Japan to Shanghai: these women reconceptualize the concept of China from a chaotic, uncivilized and underdeveloped place to a site of opportunities, urban dynamism and transnational connections. These transnational processes urge us to shift our understanding of borders and boundaries as embedded in state-centric definitions of security and an "us" "other" dichotomy toward more inclusive and broader understandings of the reconstruction and reinterpretation of boundaries as social processes.

Conclusion

The state continues to play a significant role in the popular politics of place-making and in the creation and perpetuation of naturalized links between places and people (Gupta and Ferguson 1997b: 40-41). In the case of Japan, such politics of place-making has largely been achieved through the construction and reification of binary distinctions between Japan as "us" and Asia as "others" as well as through the securitization of "others" as potential
threats to "us". Despite such politics of place-making and imaginative geographies of other parts of Asia which have been an integral part of articulating and representing Japan's modernity, the shifting social, cultural and economic ties between Japan and China, along with the economic rise of China and increased openness of its cities to transnational influences and connections since the 1990s, have opened up spaces for rethinking boundaries between the two countries.

In particular, my interviewees' identification of Shanghai as a place of opportunities and their positive views of the city suggest the potential for reconfiguring the established political map and narratives of divisions between China and Japan that place the rivalry between the two nations and different interpretations of historical events at the centre of bilateral relations. The phenomenon of migration from Japan to China thus draws our attention to the need for re integrating the social, political, economic and cultural processes into analyses of border-crossings and to the "transnationalism from below" which is not bound by the state security agendas and practices. Furthermore, this phenomenon sheds light on the growing significance of Asian women as skilled migrants, as well as of female autonomous migration, in theorising international population movements within the Asia-Pacific region.
Chapter 6:

Security, Transgressions and the Politics of Memories in Sino-Japanese Ties: Communities of forgetting and remembering in East Asia

The two countries have had some tensions over each other's interpretations of history — how can they harmonize their relations? (Personal conversation with a Chinese PhD student, 6 April 2007)

If something bad happened between two countries in the past, both people tend to have certain preconceptions about each other. These assumptions, then, prompt them to suspect that those people belonging to the other side of the border might still have bad intentions towards us. (Personal conversation with a Thai PhD student, 17 April 2007)

In this chapter, I discuss the political and historical dimensions of the relationship between China and Japan. These aspects of the relationship will be brought to light in relation to the representations of the Chinese
in Japan and the transnational practices of expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai. In particularly, I draw attention to the social practices of expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai to engage both with China and Japan despite the prevailing political tensions and differences that continue to exist and to shape the overall relations at an official level between the two countries. I therefore explore my interviewees' views of political dimensions of the Sino-Japanese ties to elucidate the importance of everyday interactions between the Chinese and the Japanese in bringing the two countries closer and, possibly, in finding ways to address issues in the past as well as in the present. I demonstrate that, despite some Japanese politicians' conceptions of China as a potential threat to the security of Japan, expatriate Japanese women have different and diversified views about the position of China vis-à-vis Japan. Drawing on Enloe's theorization of the significant role of international political economy in shaping the everyday lives of women and men, as well as of their active participation as individual actors in constructing the basis of international politics in various ways (Enloe 1989), I aim to consider the political dimension of Sino-Japanese relations as expressed by expatriate Japanese women in relation to their embodied experiences and lives in Shanghai.

As growing numbers of people are living outside of their countries of origin, the lives of these migrants, expatriates or sojourners are affected considerably by the political, social and economic ties between the countries of their origin and destination, as well as by the political and social climate of the country to which they migrate. In particular, political tensions and issues between the two countries tend to have significant impacts upon the lives of migrant and expatriate communities concerned, as evidenced by a number of cases that involve international conflicts both regionally and globally. It is therefore vital to take the Sino-Japanese relationship into consideration as it
impacts upon individual experiences of migration. Moreover, it is also important to recognize migrants' own perspectives on, and their engagement with, China in reaffirming or reconfiguring their perception of the country and in reviewing their migratory processes within the wider framework of the social and political ties between Japan and other parts of Asia.

Both academic and popular writings such as international relations and journalism have generated a range of insights into, and analyses of, contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. In particular, the discipline of international relations, as well as its sub-discipline of international political economy, has contributed to provide vital insights into the relations between the two countries. Despite these rich contributions to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, however, everyday lived experiences of the Chinese and the Japanese in relation to the social, political and economic developments in bilateral relations have largely been neglected or under-theorized in much of the literature of international relations and commentaries: individuals' responses to, and perceptions of, Sino-Japanese relations are not considered to be of significance within this discipline. This is because the academic discipline of international politics has narrated the story "of the spectacular confrontation of mighty states led by powerful statesmen, of the speeches and heroic acts of the elite, and of the specialist knowledge of the intellectuals" (Sharpe 2004: 96). That is to say, conventional international politics has largely been concerned with the state and other actors who have political power. As a consequence, "the experiences and perspectives of marginalized groups seemed absent from the study of political processes" (Staehali and

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57 In particular, realism emerged as the dominant framework for understanding international relations since the end of the Second World War. Based on a pessimistic view of human nature and assumptions about the prevalence of the pursuit of power, this theoretical tradition has largely defined the terms in which international relations, and security studies, its sub-discipline, are conceptualized and discussed (Fierke 2007: 23). Nonetheless, a number of feminist and critical International Relations studies have criticized such dominance of realism in the realm of international relations: and they have called for a broader definition of power and security.
Kofman 2004: 1). Indeed, since the seventeenth century when the nation-state began to develop in Europe, we have come to view political power as inherently territorial (Hirst 2005: 26-27). Such a view of political power has also tended to marginalize the stories about those people whose lives were characterized by border-crossings on a variety of scales from the grand narratives of the nation-state.

Reflecting this process of knowledge production, scholars of this discipline have largely tended to restrict their attention to the state and politicians who they think have the power to determine the course of the diplomatic policies of their country rather than the everyday lives of ordinary people who, despite their assumed powerlessness to engage with, and determine, the "high politics of diplomacy and foreign policy making", may constitute the significant elements of international political economy in a variety of ways. In this respect, Enloe’s work (1989) is quite instructive and relevant. In her book *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, she provides accounts of international politics that differs considerably from its conventional narratives and perspectives: rather she focuses on the role of international labour migration, the appropriation of cheap female labour by transnational corporations, and the role of sex workers in the tourist industry in Southeast Asia. Through the analyses of these phenomena which were left relatively unexplored in the traditional narrative of international politics, she demonstrates that what we conceive of as “the international” is intimately tied to everyday constructions of femininity and masculinity as well as to the grand narratives of diplomacy, war and trade. These elements that she explores in this book mark a sharp contrast to the conventional understanding of international politics; yet they

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58 There are exceptions to this. In particular, feminist approaches to IR have contributed to the broadening and enriching of the discipline through their thorough critiques and reconsideration of IR from the perspective of gender that incorporates power as a central concept in conceptualizing global political processes. Furthermore, feminists have critiqued the state centrism of IR theory generally, arguing that the very notion of the unitary state is gendered.
are essential components of understanding the workings of the contemporary transnational processes.69

In this chapter, thus, I focus on processes that this story has marginalized, silenced and excluded rather than merely reproducing the dominant narrative of international politics as the power struggle between states; and, in doing so, I suggest that the everyday lives of ordinary men and women are just as significant as statements made by prominent politicians or diplomats in maintaining, justifying and reinforcing patterns of global political economy and international relations. More specifically, I contextualize the migratory processes of Japanese women within the political and economic processes of the rise of China and the political tensions and rivalries between China and Japan that result from these processes as well as from the contrasting narratives of history, nation and memory that divide these countries.

In exploring the politics of memory in shaping China-Japan ties, I examine the implications of such politics for the bilateral relations through a Chinese cinema that narrates the migration of a Japanese woman to China and her troubled relationship with China that is fraught with the politics of the past memory in shaping the present and the future. In doing so, I point out that cultural products such as a film provide a useful framework through which to identify the interrelated relationship between cultural politics and political economy. As Aihwa Ong elaborates on the importance of taking into account such a relationship in exploring transnational social processes:

Only by weaving the analysis of cultural politics and political economy into a single framework can we hope to provide a nuanced delineation of

69 There is an enormous and burgeoning literature on Gender and International Relations. For representative entry points into this vast literature, see Enloe(1989) Peterson and Runyan (1999), Tickner (2001) and Staehali and Kofman (2004).
the complex relations between transnational phenomena, national regimes, and cultural practices in late modernity. (Ong 1999: 16)

Individuals take part in the configuration of how a nation relates to the outside world by accepting, mediating, contesting or disobeying official discourses on “other” countries. Furthermore, citizens’ participation in these processes is closely echoed and reflected in their engagement with the nation-state: the effective operation of nationalism is predicated upon the cooperation of its citizens. Although the diplomatic and foreign policies may largely be framed by the political and economic elites of a nation-state, the successful implementations of these policies or orientations are dependent on the integrity of the nation-state and its citizens, which is achieved through familiarizing its citizens with the assumptions of national security agendas as well as through re-imagining the unity of the nation-state and its people.

The media has played a central role in achieving and imagining the assumed integrity and unity of the nation-states. Anderson (1991) has theorized that a nation, as a unit of identification, could be conceptualized only through the medium of mass print such as newspapers and novels. Billig (1996) also points out that these aims of propagating notions of nationalism and national identity are achieved through social and cultural practices in our everyday lives: such as acts of reading a newspaper which is exclusively aimed at tying domestic readers to “the national”, of supporting a national football team or of listening to the statement of influential politicians on the television. He termed nationalism that is acquired and reified through these everyday practices as “banal nationalism” to stress that nationalisms are to be understood not as something that belongs to developing countries in a war zone or places that are remote from the site of our everyday lives; rather, he convincingly asserts, these nationalisms are deeply rooted and to be found in
our everyday lives and practices in a large number of nations, including those nations that position themselves as “democratic” or “modern”.

Moreover, these nationalisms are continuously reproduced as natural, and as part of our identities and selves, through diverse social and political mechanisms and they penetrate into our everyday social and cultural practices. To put it another way, the meaning and operation of nationalisms are to be understood not only as visible forces in the times of conflicts between nation-states but also as critical dimensions that interact with the everyday lives of individuals. In this respect, therefore, everyday social practices of ordinary men and women are as important as the “high politics of diplomacy and foreign policy making” as sites where the politics of national identity is played out against the backdrop of larger structural forces of the patterns of international political economy.

The experiences and perspectives of marginalized groups have often been absent from the studies of political processes. Shen, for instance, points out that scholarly and popular discourses about cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan have tended to limit the scope of their analyses to macro-political issues and the opinion of high-ranking government officials (2005: 4-5). As a result, she argues, little research has been done “to document the actual lived experiences of Taiwanese business people residing and working between Taiwan and China within the current context of cross-strait nationalist disputes” (Shen 2005: 5). In light of this point, this chapter represents an effort to bridge the gap to document the actual lived experiences of expatriates in relation to political processes. By doing so, I aim to shed light on the interconnected relationships between macro-politics and migratory processes as experienced and narrated through the multiple voices of expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai.
In this chapter, therefore, I aim to make visible the everyday implications and impacts of prevailing geopolitics and security agendas in East Asia and, more specifically, to examine the ways in which members of the expatriate Japanese community interpret the bilateral relations between China and Japan and the shift in geopolitics in East Asia from their perspectives. Their interpretations and negotiations of the meanings of the relations are both the product of their exposure to the discourses about China that have circulated in Japan before their arrival, as well as of their actual lived experiences in Shanghai. Before considering their views on the Sino-Japanese relationship, I provide a detailed overview of shifting international relations in East Asia, as well as illustrations of Japan's postwar relations with China.

Situating the Rise of China: The shifting regional order in East Asia

Since the 1990s, international relations in East Asia have been undergoing profound transformations. The most potent drivers of such change in the region are the "rise of China" and the "normalization of Japan" — Japan's search for a mature sense of national identity and statehood (Ikenberry 2008: 218). In particular, the "rise of China", which is marked by its growing economic and military power, expanding political influence and active involvement in regional diplomacy, is one of the most significant dimensions in regional affairs in the Asia-Pacific region, and it is thus altering regional dynamics and giving shape to a new Asian order (Shambaugh 2005a: 64; 2005c: 24). China has thus actively engaged in reshaping the geopolitical order in East Asia, particularly in the realm of its foreign policy. Since the introduction of open door policy in 1978, and particularly since the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese foreign policy has underscored the importance of
multilateral diplomacy designed to establish and improve relations with both developed and developing countries (Taylor 1996: 6).

The "rise of China", as a political and economic phenomenon, has had considerable impacts on reshaping the balance of power in East Asia. Most importantly, it has shifted the terms of the relationship between China and Japan, the two giants in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, such shifts in Sino-Japanese relations as well as post-Cold War geopolitical arrangements have also unleashed nationalist passions and rivalries: the end of the Cold War has allowed East Asian countries to reassess the U.S. presence and role in the region and the understanding of historical memory. It is in this context that, Japan's program of incremental rearmament, Prime Minister's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and textbook debates have led to rising anti-Japanese sentiments in its neighbouring countries (Jager and Mitter 2007: 3-5).

Given the significance of the ties between the two countries in the larger contexts of regional and global affairs, this shift in the terms of their relationship has critical reverberations for the operation of geopolitics in East Asia and beyond.

Post-war Sino-Japanese Relations in the Context of the Rise of China and the

Re-emergence of Japan as a "normal" country: An Overview

60 The Yasukuni shrine was built in 1869 to honour victims of the Boshin Civil War. It honours the souls of 2.5 million of Japan's war dead, including 14 class A war criminals. Both China and South Korea protested strongly against Japanese Prime Minister's visits to the shrine, saying the shrine glorified Japan's past militarism (BBC 2006c). The former Japanese Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichiro, made six visits to the Yasukuni shrine during his premiership and posed obstacles to improve relations between the two countries. As such, the Prime Minister's repeated visits to the shrine constitute one of the most contentious issues between China and Japan. Yasukuni also houses a museum that depicts Japan's invasions in Asia as justified acts of self-defence (Talmage 2006: 11).
Since the early 2000s, it has become a cliché to describe the Sino-Japanese relationship in the following phrase: that "economics are red hot, while politics are frigidly cold (David Pilling 2006: 3). Indeed a Japanese translation of the phrase "Seirei Keinetsu" is often considered to be an appropriate representation of the essence of Sino-Japanese relations in the Japanese media in recent years.\(^6\)

The year 2005 turned out to be a very eventful year in terms of the development of the Sino-Japanese relationship. As demonstrated by a number of anti-Japanese public demonstrations in major cities in China in April 2005, the two nations in East Asia face numerous issues yet to be resolved in order to improve the bilateral relationship. Moreover, there are existing issues such as the controversy over Japanese interpretations of history, Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine, territorial disputes over a chain of islands between Taiwan and Okinawa, called Diaoyu in Chinese and Senkaku in Japanese, and the contested ownership of gas fields located in East China Sea. These issues have substantially soured the official relationship between China and Japan, which is also complicated by China’s rising status in international affairs. The rise of China in economic and political terms in particular has intensified the political rivalry between the two nations in the Asia-Pacific region. In

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\(^6\) In comparison to the Sino-Japanese relationship, the ties between China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) have shown positive developments since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries in 1992. The burgeoning relationship, which is marked by a large volume of trade and growing flows of people (approximately 60,000 long-term South Korean residents; of these 36,000 are students in 2003) in recent years, has become a central element in understanding and explaining the evolving balance of power in East Asia (Shambaugh 2005: 79-80). Yet the relationship is not without problems: one of those is a disagreement over a recent historical interpretation of the ancient Kingdom of Koguryo (37 B.C. to A.D.668). Assertions in 2003 by Chinese historians that the ancient Kingdom was part of Chinese territory have deeply angered South Koreans and raised suspicions about China’s long-term intentions in bilateral ties (Shambaugh 2005a: 80).
particular, Japan is anxious about China’s military modernization; and China is concerned about Japan’s increasingly close military ties with the United States (BBC 2006c). Despite all these political developments in the bilateral relationship, the deepening and widening of the economic and cultural ties between the two countries, which has been accompanied by China’s rapid economic growth and its integration to the world economy, have resulted in the significant increase in the number of Japanese residents in China, in particular in Shanghai in recent years, as I have discussed in previous chapters.

Bilateral economic relations have been a driving force for improving Sino-Japanese ties since the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1972. Since then, bilateral trade between China and Japan expanded dramatically and became the most positive foundations for the Japanese-Chinese relationship. This was facilitated by the development of domestic and foreign policies in China, which shifted from an ideological focus on spreading communist ideology to other Asian countries to economic modernization and pragmatism (Drifte 2003: 23; Taylor 1996: 6).

Despite these developments in bilateral economic relations, the political relationship between the two countries has been under strain for years, in particular, since Koizumi Junichirō, the former prime minister, took office in 2001. His repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine angered China and neighbouring countries, making them suspicious of the Japanese government’s attitude toward its past.

Indeed, these visits to the Yasukuni shrine were closely tied to Japan’s new political project of becoming a “normal” country: its quest to become a normal member of the international community. In other words, turning Japan into a “normal” country suggests the increasingly predominant political discourse in
Japan that the country should not continue to be bound by certain versions of history narrated in other countries in strengthening its international influence. Instead, it is claimed that citizens of the country, particularly children who will shape the future of Japan, should be taught and encouraged to learn historical events and figures that will make them take pride in their own country.

In line with such a political move, Machimura Nobutaka, former foreign minister, defended Koizumi's controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine in October 2005 saying these visits were to show that he would not succumb to the foreign pressure: "Until now, we have often, not always, tended to think it is best for Japan to follow everything China says, not insist on our claims, and keep a rather low-profile posture. But I think we should be able to say what we believe is right, and also listen to the other side sincerely" (cited in *South China Morning Post* 2005 October 24).

Such a political trend persisted under the administration of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, which lasted from September 2006 to August 2007. On 3 May 2007, when the Japanese government held the sixtieth anniversary of Japan's constitution, Abe spoke of the need for a "new era" to allow Japan to take on a larger role in global security issues while working "towards a Japan that instills confidence and pride among its children". Abe thus used the anniversary to emphasize the need for rewriting Japan's pacifist constitution as part of an in-depth discussion of the construction of a "new Japan" (*BBC* 2007b). Such construction of the nation has required the selective narration

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62 The Article IX of Japan's constitution, which prohibits the use of military force in settling disputes as well as the maintenance of a military for warfare, has not been altered since 1947. Mainstream politicians in Japan's LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), including former prime ministers such as Abe Shinzo and Koizumi Junichiro, have regarded a review of the pacifist constitution central to their political agendas to make Japan play a more assertive role on the world stage. China and South Korea oppose such a move (*BBC* 2007c).
of the memories of the past as well as the reworking of its imaginative geographies of threat and security. Since the interpretations of historical events and the memories of the past are closely tied to the narration of the nation as a secure and bounded community, selective narration of history plays a vital role in boundary-making processes in its meaning and operation, ensuring the perpetuation of the boundaries though the acts of “forgetting” and of “remembering”.

The Role of “Memory” in China-Japanese Relationship

As Jager and Mitter illustrate, “the breaks, as well as continuities with the past, are now an inescapable part of what shapes the societies of East Asia” (2007: 1). This statement is particularly relevant to the depictions of contemporary Sino-Japanese relationship. As illustrated in a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China’s major cities in 2005 and in other political disputes between the two countries, the controversies over interpretation and representation of modern history between the two countries are a significant dimension of the relationship.

Bartleson suggests that the relationship between collective memory and identity is always a two-way process: the collective identity of a community is a product of its collective memories, and the collective memories are constructed by the acts of the community to make its identity in the present integral to its past (2006: 37). Similarly, Malkki illustrates that the construction of a national past is a construction of history “that claims moral attachments to specific territories, motherlands, homelands, and posits time-honoured links between people, polity and territory” (1995: 1).
In Japan, the victimization narrative, which focuses on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been predominant in remembering its prewar past. The perpetuation of such a narrative in contemporary Japan has encouraged Japan’s forgetfulness about its war crimes such as the 1937 Nanjing Massacre and the forced prostitution of Asian women (Jager and Mitter 2007: 9). To illustrate such historical amnesia about the past further, the Yasukuni shrine, for instance, continues to be visited and worshipped by many politicians in Japan as the shrine is regarded as an important site of preserving certain narratives about history of the nation: honouring the souls of the Japanese war dead who fought for the country and sacrificed their lives during the Second World War. In this respect, Selden identifies Yasukuni as “the central symbol linking emperor, war, and empire” and points out that it represents the alchemy of forgetting: “forgetting atrocities and war crimes, forgetting the treatment of the military comfort women, of forced laborers, of those whose lands were invaded” (2006).

To illustrate another example, in March 2007, Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō questioned whether the so-called “comfort women”, were forced to become sex slaves for the Japanese military during the Second World War (BBC 2007a). Abe’s remark illustrates how it is difficult for Japan to trace its memories during the Second World War — to face squarely its past atrocities — in a country that seeks increasing presence and voices in both regional and world affairs. To achieve such aims, the constitution of its history is an important part of redefining the future of the nation-state as a dynamic and rejuvenated community. The remarks by politicians such as Abe illustrate how the politics of memory operates in Japan: to enable this vision of the nation as a dynamic and rejuvenated “community” to operate, it first needs to liberate itself from the constraints of the memories of past atrocities. Such processes thus indicate how the institutionalization of “collective memory” through the selective acts of forgetting and remembering the past is closely
tied to the state's project of shaping the present and the future according to its narrative of the nation as a secure and bounded community.

In China, too, the acts of narrating the official version of history constitute one of the most significant dimensions of state's projects to construct the notion of the centrality of the nation among its citizens. Therefore, any acts of disputing or contesting this version of history may lead to possible offences or persecutions by the state. In January 2006, for instance, Li Datong, the editor of *Freezing Point* (*Bing Dian*), the weekly supplement of the national newspaper *China Youth Daily* (*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*) was severely criticized by the Communist Party for publishing a scholarly article, which, written by Guangzhou Professor Yuan Weishi, challenged the orthodox version of Chinese history taught in junior-high school textbooks (Shirk 2007: 79).^{63}

The construction of the meanings of communities and their boundaries occurs through narratives: "stories' that provide people with common experiences, history and memories, and thereby bind these people together" (Paasi 1999: 75). In this respect, it is crucial to note the strong connection between history and culture since crucial elements in the culture of a given community, such as symbols, language, sacred places, heroes, anthems, and legends and traditions are inextricably bound up with the community's history (A.D. Smith 1991). In most Asian countries, cinema is used strategically to reinforce the myth of the unitary nation and to interpret the textual subjects as willing members of the nation (Dissanayake 1994: xvi). Thus, in considering the issues of the relationship between memory and the official version of history in narrating the nation and its past to bind people together,

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^{63} In this article, Professor Yuan compared the accounts in PRC and Hong Kong textbooks with regard to the descriptions of major conflicts with foreign powers in China's nineteenth century history and pointed out that the PRC textbooks describe its history to "inflame nationalistic passions" (Shirk 2007: 79).
cinema, in particular, national cinema which is aimed mainly for domestic circulation and consumption, provides some useful frameworks to rethink the acts of narrating history as the product of the social and political project of the nations-states to position itself as the centre, thus incessantly necessitating the production of the other on which to project itself as well as to reify its image as the central force across time and space. In this respect, as Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu convincingly points out, national cinema attempts to write and rewrite “national” histories (1997: 17).

In discussing the role of memory and national identity in the shaping of China-Japan relations, *Autumn Rain* (*Qiuyu*: Directed by Sun Tie: 2004 China) provides an interesting insight into how the memory shapes the relations between people with different understandings of history. Adapted from a best-selling novel *A Japanese Soldier*, this film illustrates how the memories of war and, in particular, the acts of atrocities committed by the Japanese army in China, continue to shape and cast a dark shadow over the relationship between the Chinese and the Japanese.

The narrative of the film begins with the scene of the arrival of a Japanese woman in China. In January 2004, a Japanese woman, Hashimoto Kiko, who is fascinated with, and interested in, exploring traditional Chinese culture, arrives in Beijing to learn the Chinese opera. One early morning when she sees He Ming practicing and singing the songs of a Peking Opera, she begins to develop a special feeling for him. Eventually she falls in love with him when they are practicing *Silang visits His Mother*, a Peking Opera, together. He Ming also comes to develop a feeling of intimacy for her and they thus begin to form a close friendship. But when Kiko discloses her personal feelings to her grandfather, Hashimoto Sebun, he tells her about the

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64 This film was shown in Hong Kong on October 29, 2005 as part of the Chinese Film Panorama 2005.
incidents that happened sixty years ago: he participated in the Japanese invasion of China as a soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army. Moreover, he tortured and killed He Ming's grandfather, a Chinese soldier who chose the death of dignity over the humiliating act of surrender to the Japanese. These facts are revealed when Kiko, He Ming and his father are eating dumplings on the eve of the Chinese New Year. As a result, their friendship falls apart and Kiko, disappointed and broken-hearted, returns to Japan.

Several months later, she comes back to China again to play a role in Silang visits His Mother. Her role is that of the wife of a protagonist, played by He Ming in this Peking Opera classic. They manage to play their individual roles up until a certain moment when He Ming has to call Kiko “my wife” in his role on the stage. Yet he has a great difficulty of uttering this very word because the sheer thought of calling a Japanese woman “my wife”, even in a play, instantly reminds him of the brutal acts of Japanese soldiers that brought his grandfather to death and enormous shame to his motherland. After several minutes of hesitation and agony over his “memory” and a sense of patriotism and belonging to his nation, He Ming eventually manages to call her “my wife”. But it is only on a stage that they can be united as a couple. Although Kiko longs for China and its culture and wishes to become a part of the continuing traditions of that culture and history that she ardently admires, her affection for the country, as well as for He Ming, a Chinese man who embodies the continuity of that Chinese cultural tradition, remains entirely shattered by the revelation of her grandfather's involvement in past atrocities against the Chinese and, by extension, by the dark history of the relationship between the two countries. The ending of the film suggests that the “memories” of war, even after the passage of sixty years, keeps Chinese and Japanese people apart.

This film thus indicates that social, political and historical boundaries
between China and Japan continue to operate as the central marker of dividing people apart and that it is thus difficult to transcend these boundaries, particularly in light of what the Japanese did against China during the Second World War. As the film demonstrates, for the Chinese nation and its people, as represented through and embodied by He Ming, coherent images of the memories of the nation’s past invaded and humiliated by the Japanese are a central part of being Chinese — part of the social, historical and politicized practices of constructing a cultural and ethnic identity as Chinese that is defined and continuously re-imagined in relation to its memories of the tragic interactions with its other: the Japanese. In this respect, the film points to the cinematic practice of the acts of imagining

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65 It should be acknowledged that the interpretations of the past under the communist government shifted before and after the Cold War. As Jager and Mitter point out, the uncertainties of the post-Cold war era, as symbolized by the fall of the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s, were an integral part of reshaping public memory in China. In this context, China’s experience of the Second World War, particularly, the memory of Japanese war atrocities has become a central part of narrating a history of the “new” China. The revival of, and greater emphasis on, the memory of the atrocities and Chinese collective suffering were thus intimately caught up in the political process of creating an undivided loyalty and patriotism to the state in the context of post-Cold War geopolitical realignment and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance that might impact on China’s regional power (2007: 12-13).

66 Here I focus mainly on the representation of a shared collective memory and the associated construction of a modern Chinese history in relation to its Japanese "other" as narrated through the Mainland Chinese cinema. Given the discrepancies and complexities in explaining and understanding the modern history of China among diverse Chinese communities across borders, such interpretation of history as discussed above represents only part of the Chinese historiography in narrating its past. Lu, for instance, points out that more attention should be given to the tensions and relations among distinct Chinese communities: the Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and overseas Chinese communities. As he suggests, films produced by mainland directors tend to rely on the assumed "grand-narrative" of China's modern history, such as the Japanese occupation, the Communist victory and the Cultural Revolution. By claiming a unitary authentic voice of the Chinese people and its history, such mainland-centered narration of Chinese history elides and erases different versions of “China” outside the geography and imagination of the mainland (Lu 1997: 15-18). In this respect, we need to be sensitive to the differences and diversity among distinct Chinese communities in exploring the question of how each community describes and recreates its past as parts of China’s modern history. In particular, the assumed dichotomy between the "centre" and the "periphery" in narrating the community’s past and the present raises a significant question in regard to the construction of history as an ongoing process and as inseparable from the power of the nation-state to justify or sanction particular versions of history as part of their nation-building process.
of Chinese as a single and united community and to the representation of such a community as fixed and stable across time and space.67 Anderson suggests that “communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (1991: 6). Such acts of imagining community also highlight the importance of the construction of a national past as part and parcel of the grand narratives of a nation. In this respect, Lu points out the role of Chinese national cinema in reproducing the nation as a community:

Like other national cinemas, Chinese cinema is the “mobiliser of the nation’s myths and the myth of the nation.” Through the creation of a coherent set of images and meanings, the narration of a collective history, and the enactment of the dramas and lives of ordinary people, cinema gives a symbolic unity to what would be otherwise appear to be a quite heterogeneous entity: “modern China.” (Lu 1997: 5)

The film also indicates that a bitter memory about the wartime atrocities committed by Japan not only describes the feelings of the wartime generation of Chinese vis-à-vis Japan, but also penetrates deep into the minds of the successive generations in regard to their perceptions of Japan. Such a construction of Japan through its acts of aggression against China has been partly achieved “through adroit and repeated representations of these atrocities in the media and school textbooks” (Shambaugh 1996: 90). Furthermore, the changing power relationships in the Asia-Pacific region in which Japan is eclipsed by China’s rise have created the conditions for changes in the way in which the wartime past is being reevaluated. Such acts of reworking the memory of war shape the nation’s self-images, not only about its past but about its future as well (Jager and Mitter 2007: 5-6).

67 Shih suggests that the so-called Chinese language cinema in general has been largely a story of a story of standard Mandarin spoken with “perfect” pronunciation and enunciation. Actors who speak with accents are therefore usually dubbed over so that the illusion of a unified and coherent “Chinese” community is invented and sustained (2008: 9).
Similarly, as Gao succinctly claims, history is not simply a picture of what happened in the past: "it is our present construction of the past. The way we construct the past depends on how we conceptualize our world and ourselves in the present" (2008: 3).

In considering the narration and representations of historical memory, it is significant to examine the interrelationship between the reproduction and display of historical events in texts, films, monuments and museums and the larger social and cultural forces that shape such representations as part of "our" history: "Analysis of representations of the past requires simultaneous considerations of the actual historical event represented and of the social context in which these representations are made" (McGregor 2007: 10). Most importantly, such considerations constitute one of the central dimensions of understanding the variegated constructions, demarcation and expressions of boundaries. As Paasi maintains:

A boundary does not only exist in the border area, but it manifests itself in many institutions such as education, the media, novels, memorials, ceremonies and spectacles, etc. These are effective expressions of narratives linked with boundaries and border conflicts and serve as references to the Other. (Paasi 1999: 76)

Both China and Japan's treatment of history — the former stressing the past atrocities of the Japanese in constituting its past and recreating the idea of the collective memory of the Chinese as a cohesive community sharing its past ordeals and sufferings, while the latter erasing "undesirable" part of its history from its official discourses and history textbooks — does suggest that the construction of "our" memory is contingent upon social and political contexts at a particular historical moment. Both China's resurgence as a
regional and global power and Japan's re-emergence as a "normal" country provides such contexts and they are thus integral part of the different narrations and representations of history, collective memory and the past between the two countries.⁶⁸

The construction of "our" memory is thus narrated through the selection, erasure, and/or recreation of certain memories or events for the construction of a "community", united by coherent memories of the past to share an identical vision for the past, the present and the future. As Jager and Mitter indicate, the acts of remembering and forgetting the past play an important part in the story of Asia's post-Cold War transformations. In particular, such transformations have given rise to new forms of nationalism that have politicized official public discourse about the wartime past (2007: 5). Furthermore, such politics of memory impacts upon the definition of "our" identity as a territorially bounded community, connecting "us" in a singular narrative of time and space while disconnecting "us" from "others". The presence of different communities, both within and outside "our" territory, is given insufficient attention, and often conceived of as a "threat" to the stability and unity of "our" society in such a narrative. As such, this process is intimately tied to the political project of nationalism since it "signifies a close and emotional identification with the nation and the construction of legitimating and unified narratives linking past, present, and future" (Dissanayake 1994: ix).

Ambiguities about the Rise of China: Real and imagined China in

⁶⁸ In recent years, there have been some ambitious attempts to reconcile different interpretations of history between the countries of East Asia. Since 2006, for instance, groups of historians from China and Japan have undertaken a project to try to find a common ground for interpreting the history of the two countries from ancient to modern times (BBC 2006d). The favorable influences of domestic and international political developments in both countries are critical to achieve success in such a project.
Japan

To date, there have been a number of discussions and analyses about the rise of China in Japan, which range from newspaper articles, TV documentaries to scholarly debates. The rise of China, as a politico-economic phenomenon, has spurred a variety of controversies, discussion and questions as to the new but uncertain directions of Japan’s engagement with the country that attracts a lot of attention globally as sites of production, investment and as providers of huge market opportunities. At the same time, a number of popular media in Japan have focused on the potential risks of the rise of China. These contradictory views about China represent the multifaceted nature of Japan’s perceptions of China.

Despite all the discussions about the rise of China and its rapid economic growth that continue to circulate in the media and academic discourses around the globe, negative perceptions about, or stereotypical representations of, China and the Chinese, are still prevalent in Japan. One Japanese public prosecutor, Morio, who is in his early thirties, comments on his perceptions of the Chinese:

To be frank, I dislike Chinese people. As a public prosecutor, I have been involved in a number of criminal cases that were committed by the Chinese in Japan. From my personal viewpoint, it can be said that the majority of crimes in Japan in the present are committed by them. They first make a list of rich people, and then they go to their houses, harm their bodies and rob them of money and any expensive stuff. ... In this sense, the rise of China in economic terms might turn out to be beneficial for the security of the Japanese as it may eventually lead to the reduction of the number of the influx of Chinese people who come to Japan with the aim of committing crimes in our country. The Chinese claim huge numbers of casualties for the Nanjing Massacre. But the Japanese estimate of the number is totally different from theirs.... I simply do not know what the “true history” is, or where to find the
truths behind these historical events. In comparison to the relationship with China, I think that the one with South Korea is more manageable. Although I am living in a middle-sized town in Kyūshū (Southern part of Japan), I can find a plenty of Korean TV and film products whenever I go to local rental video shops in recent years. This, I think, represents that Korean cultural products have permeated into the everyday lives of Japanese, even in such a place where it is substantially distant from the cultures of big cities such as Tokyo. (Interview with Morio, 24 October 2006)

In a similar vein, Kōta, a Japanese man in his early fifties who has previously worked in Vietnam both as an expatriate for a branch of a Japanese airline company and as a Japanese language teacher, articulates his disaffection towards the Chinese:

The Chinese tend to view China as the centre of the world (Chūkashisō) and I do not like that way of thinking. So when I had an opportunity to be transferred to one of the overseas branches of the company I was working for, I asked them not to transfer me to the one in China. I think that people in Southeast Asia are much friendlier to Japanese. (Personal conversation with Kōta, 26 March 2008)

Both Morio and Kōta's remarks about China and the Chinese represent the persistent insecurity of the Japanese over China as well as their uneasiness to try to find a way to relate to the giant neighbour and its people — their acts of transgression of the territorial boundaries to come to Japan, the domestic economic inequalities that are increasingly prevalent in China, their sense of hatred toward Japan and the Japanese because of its past aggressions against China — these real and imagined China and the Chinese, then, make it plausible to articulate a statement such as “China, in particular, the presence of “illegal” Chinese migrants⁶⁹, is a security threat of

⁶⁹ For instance, Ishihara Shintarō, the governor of Tokyo Metropolitan Government, is well known for making such a statement, inciting a feeling of fear against the Chinese and Koreans among Japanese citizens. The association of the immigration of Chinese to
Japan and the lives of the Japanese among the Japanese who have no or limited contacts or interactions with the Chinese. In particular, these security concerns exploded to a significant degree after the revelation of cases of anti-Japanese protests in China in 2005. They were particularly reiterated and stressed by prominent politicians in Japan. Significantly, some of the leading politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as well as officials working in the area of defense in Japan, have repeatedly pointed out that China is a potential security threat to Japan. In December 2005, for instance, foreign minister Aso Taro made a remark that “China's robust military buildup is posing a threat to Japan's security” (Japan Times 2005b). His remark testifies Japan's dominant security framework in which China, as a rising country not only in economic but also in military terms, constitutes major security challenges and threats to Japan.

Meinhof and Triandafyllidou point out that threat and the control of threat, the reestablishment of security and order are powerful sources of cohesion within society (2006: 12). In such a securitized context of Japan as indicated above, the rise of China, both real and imagined, can stir up feelings of fear and insecurity in its domestic milieu, which can act in the interest of politicians whose main political ambitions include achieving a cohesive unity of the nation as a bounded community and making such unity unquestionable to its citizens. Most importantly, ideas about security in this context are not only tied to its conventional concept of security in political and military terms but also to broader understandings of security for the country — which

Japan with their "illegal" status has been particularly prevalent in the popular Japanese media. For instance, when Faye Wong, a prominent actor and singer across PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan, appeared in a Japanese TV drama in the late 1990s, she played a role of a female illegal immigrant from mainland China. Another example, a documentary on an illegal Chinese migrant in Japan, which was broadcast in November, 2006, showed how this migrant struggled in Japan to send remittances to his family in China. In these representations, economic disparities between China and Japan are highlighted and the Chinese are rendered as “the economically less privileged” who come to Japan solely for economic purposes.
portray the (illegal) movements of the Chinese to Japan as potential sources of organized crime and thus linking their migratory processes to the increased insecurity of "our" territory as a settled and cohesive place. Such understandings of security, which link the flow of people and commodities between the two countries to fears of "contamination" from China, may mark the division between "us" (Japanese) and "them" (illegal Chinese migrants), recreating and reiterating narratives of tensions, fear and disengagement rather than those of dialogues, engagement and interactions.

Anti-Japanese Protests in China: Views and representations of the protests in the Japanese media

In this section, I examine how the Japanese media has represented and interpreted Sino-Japanese relations; in particular, I focus on their representations of anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place in several major cities in China in April 2005. I thus review how Asahi Shimbun and Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Financial Times) — the two newspapers that are widely circulated and read in Japan — reported and/or reinterpreted these anti-Japanese demonstrations. I examine their reports on these protests because it is often in such times when a particular nation is supposedly under attack by another country that its views of that country are brought to light, in particular, in the media.

In Shanghai alone, some 20,000 Shanghai residents are reported to have taken part in anti-Japanese demonstrations across the city on April 16, 2005.\(^7^0\) Citing the comment by a Shanghai government spokeswoman Jiao

\(^{70}\) This figure is based on a report by Shanghai Daily (April 26, 2005).
Yang, one of the local newspapers described the event in Shanghai:

Dissatisfied with Japan’s wrong attitudes and actions on a series of issues such as its history of aggression, the students and citizens spontaneously took to the streets to demonstrate and protest, expressing their discontent with the right-wing forces in Japan. (cited in Yang Lifei 2005: 1)

The demonstrations, which, according to one student activist, are “to spread the message that Japan must properly handle its wartime past” (South China Morning Post 2005 April 10), included some violent activities against the Japanese embassy, restaurants and shops. The media in Japan, including television, magazines and newspapers, provided massive coverage of these events. Furthermore, a variety of popular publications that are critical of China have appeared in the Japanese media since these protests.⁷¹

The protests and a series of events in China have urged analysts and commentators to examine in detail both their cause and implications for Sino-Japanese relations in Japan. In regard to the cause of the protests, the media in Japan suggested there is a deep-rooted mutual distrust between China and Japan which, in turn, motivates these demonstrations (Asahi Shimbun 2005 April 7). Also, it was argued that at the root of tensions between China and Japan lay some issues of complex rivalries between China, which aims to obtain a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region, on the one hand, and the United States and Japan, which attempt to deter China’s ambitions in Asia, on the other (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2005 April 20).

⁷¹ Manga Chūgoku Nyūmon: Yakkaina Rinjin no Kenkyū (An introduction to China: Research on a troublesome neighbour), for instance, portrays China as a country full of problems — such as prostitution, AIDS and political corruption. Published in 2005 in the aftermath of anti-Japanese protests in China, this book has obviously served as a negative introduction to China among its readers in Japan. Also, it should be acknowledged that this sort of publication usually targets at male readers rather than females in Japan.
Both newspapers as well as other Japanese media criticized the Chinese government intensely for its response to, and handling of, anti-Japanese protests in China. First, these media pointed out the fact that the police did not stop vandalism and violent activities against Japanese facilities, in particular, Japanese diplomatic establishments (*Asahi Shimbun* 2005 April 10). In relation to the vandalism, an article in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (2005 April 18) even questions Beijing’s eligibility to hold such international events as the Olympics in 2008 and World Exposition in Shanghai in 2010. Furthermore, it was argued that acts such as the boycotting of Japanese goods and vandalism against Japanese facilities damage not only Sino-Japanese relationship *per se* but also the overall image of China to the outside world, in particular that of China’s reform-driven open-door economic policy (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun* 2005, April 10: 2005, April 14).

Second, as illustrated in an editorial section of *Asahi Shimbun* on April 13, 2005, the Japanese media criticize the Chinese media as well as the government for circulating distorted views about Japan in China. The editorial indicates that although there is a growing interest in such Japanese cultural products as cartoons, literature and music among people in China, the Chinese media and the government tend to perpetuate distorted views about Japan through patriotic education that emphasizes the memory of Japan’s wartime invasion of China as well as the prime minister’s repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine and textbooks issues.

Anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005 took place in various cities. Among these demonstrations, the Japanese media drew particular attention to protests in Shanghai as the city has the largest number of Japanese residents and firms in China and represents the “opening up” of China to the outside world. In other words, Shanghai symbolizes the “rise of China” in Japan and plays an important role in the economic and cultural
relations between China and Japan as “the city has closest ties with Japan among cities in China” (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun* 2005 April 17). In an article that reports anti-Japanese demonstration in Shanghai on April 16, 2005, the significance of the fact that the demonstration took place in the city is reiterated:

Shanghai has been one of the most important symbols of the deepening economic interdependence between the two countries. The fact that anti-Japanese demonstration took place in this city suggests that a further deterioration in Sino-Japanese relationship is unavoidable. (*Asahi Shimbun* 2005, April 17)

In regard to Shanghai, an article in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (2005 April 14) illustrates that the city places an emphasis on its image as a global city as it is expected to hold a World Exposition in 2010 there. Moreover, it notes that many Chinese citizens regard it as a city that is representative of China. Added to the fact that the city has the largest number of Japanese residents and firms in China, these reports confirm the significance of Shanghai in the coverage of news related with China in the Japanese media as well as the serious implications of the anti-Japanese demonstration in Shanghai for Sino-Japanese ties. In this context, the editorial of *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (2005 April 18), stresses that the acts of vandalism had seriously damaged the image of Shanghai as a global economic city.

In their reports and analyses on anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, the Japanese media stressed that youths played important roles in these protests as active participants. Although Chinese youths never experienced Japan’s wartime atrocities themselves, they are known to be well informed about these historical events. An article in *Asahi Shimbun* (2005 April 9) provides
an analysis of the reasons why many youths and students took part in anti-Japanese demonstrations and concludes that these protests are reflecting Chinese youth's dissatisfactions with the society. It indicates that while the Communist government since the 1980s has inculcated patriotism and a sense of national pride in their youths, youths in China face many difficulties such as increasing unemployment. It concludes that since the Communist government does not allow its citizens to criticize the current government, Chinese youths tend to find anti-Japanese protests as the only legitimate outlet for expressing their dissatisfaction with the administration.

Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, when he was still occupying a position within the Japanese government as chief Cabinet secretary in 2005, shared the Japanese media's dominant view that the anti-Japanese demonstrations had resulted from the people's dissatisfaction with the society where there is no other means of expressing discontent. In an interview with British correspondents in Tokyo, Abe expressed his views about the anti-Japanese protests:

The Communist party is on the verge of losing its legitimacy, and playing the anti-Japanese card was a useful way of shoring up its support. The gap between rich and poor is opening up and there is a tremendous dissatisfaction (with the current regime's management of economic disparities) among the Chinese people. For these reasons, Beijing will continue to portray Japan as a bad guy. (cited in David Pillin and John Ridding 2005: 2)

As the above comments and articles do suggest, there is a widespread view in Japan that China, as a communist state, does not allow alternative voices to be heard in politics and society. This sort of argument is often contrasted with
the different political system in Japan: that Japan is a country of democracy as opposed to its "un-democratic" giant neighbour which suppresses any behaviour or political actions that can be regarded or interpreted as subversive to the current rule of the Communist Party. Yet despite these assertions to praise the success in achieving full-fledged democracy in post-war Japan, there are other dimensions that draw our attention. As Maki Yoichi points out, given the situation of contemporary Japanese art in which certain representations, such as paintings that depict emperor or wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese imperial army in the earlier part of the twentieth century, are seldom seen in public museums or their exhibitions in Japan, it is simply not just to claim China solely as an "un-democratic" nation and its form of government as antithetical to that of Japan. Rather, he claims, these restrictions that are in place in regard to the freedom of artistic expression in Japan urge us to question the meanings and operation of "democracy" in Japan (Maki 2000: 9-11). In this context, "democracy", as part of the ongoing social and political processes, is a contested and contingent term in both China and Japan. More importantly, the act of positioning China as the undemocratic nation to mark a contrast between the political systems between the two countries — to implicitly privilege Japan as a democratic country by emphasizing the dominance of the Communist Party in the PRC — may be considered as part of the social and political practices of "banal nationalism" (Billig 1996).

An article that appeared in Nihon Keizai Shimbun (April 13 2005) also emphasizes that the growing disparities between the rich and poor as one of the major factors in anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. It suggests that the economic disparities in China, which were previously recognized as those that exist between coastal areas and inland areas, currently prevail in cities such as Shanghai. It further indicates that those people who are discontented
with the economic disparities tend to resort to anti-Japanese protests as they find it relatively easy to obtain a widespread domestic support if these protests take the form of anti-Japanese demonstrations. Ian Buruma, a professor of Democracy, Human Rights and Journalism in the United States, expresses similar views in one of the newspapers in Britain: that the Chinese authorities deliberately inflame anti-Japanese passions in order to turn attention away from contradictions that have arisen in recent years in China, in particular, those contradictions that exist between the current system of governance and capitalist development against the background of growing economic disparities among citizens in China. He adds that since Deng Xiaoping began adopting its open door policy, “patriotic museums” — most of them dedicated to past Japanese atrocities — have been built all over China (Buruma 2005: 13).72

Moreover, as illustrated in one of the articles which appeared in Asahi Shim bun, what is most significant about these protests is that they addressed not only past war issues and history, such as the treatment of school history textbooks in Japan, but also the future orientation of Sino-Japanese relationship against the backdrop of the rise of China in political and economic terms (Asahi Shim bun 2005 April 11). China’s persistent opposition to the aspiration of Japan becoming one of the member states of the U.N. Security Council, which was one of the major causes of the anti-Japanese demonstrations, is a case in point. It suggests that the Chinese, who feel increasingly confident in the status of their country as an economic power, do not necessarily view Japan’s attempt to gain a leadership role in international affairs as a desirable component to chart the future of Sino-Japan relations. In this context, Taylor points out that the two countries will

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72 According to Yanshan Fu, attaché of the Chinese embassy in Canberra, Australia, there are approximately 2400 museums in the PRC, 75 of which are devoted to collections and exhibitions of materials relating to Chinese history (This information comes from a talk given by Mr Fu on the museums in China, 25 October 2008, Canberra, Australia).
continue to vie for influence and resources in the Asia-Pacific region (1996: 188). The prevailing political tensions between China and Japan, therefore, need to be situated in the context of "structural changes in international relations in East Asia which are characterized by the rise of China" (Asahi Shimbun 2005 April 21).

In short, the anti-Japanese protests in China in 2005 demonstrated the extent to which the political relationship between China and Japan was a contested one, which, when combined with certain events and political developments both domestically and internationally, can be inflamed to an extreme level without effective political interventions from Beijing. In particular, given a variety of popular publications critical of China which have appeared since these protests, it can be argued that Japan still has uneasy relations with its neighbor and, thus, the terms of its political engagement with China are marked by ambivalences and anxieties. These protests also revealed that, given the extensive coverage of the events by the Japanese media, the Sino-Japanese relationship forms an essential part of thinking about the "security" of the country and that the media plays a critical part in this process.

"Yasukuni" as the Central Issue: Chinese perceptions of bilateral ties between China and Japan

About two thousand years ago, a king in China had sent some of his subjects to the East. These people subsequently settled in that place and they became the origin of the Japanese. The king, who got angry at them for not coming back from the East, punished the relatives of those people who did not return by sending them to the peripheral location of the kingdom. These people became the ancestors of the people living in
Yunnan Province. That is why some Japanese people think that their racial roots can be traced back to the people in Yunnan province.

One male Chinese PhD student from Shanghai told me such a narrative about the origin of the Japanese and, by extension, their similarity with the ethnic people in Yunnan province at a small gathering of students in Canberra on December 25, 2006. Interestingly, I had heard a similar story about the origins of the Japanese from Chinese Singaporeans as well. These stories tell us that it is believed by some people that the Japanese and the Chinese may be of same origin and blood, and the Japanese are the descendents of those Chinese who had failed to return to the “centre” of Chinese society. These stories are the ones which I have never heard of in Japan, illustrating that different versions of narrating ethnicity and race continue to exist between the Chinese speaking world and Japan.

In addition to asking expatriate Japanese about their perceptions of China and their migratory processes, I have also asked Chinese students and academics in Shanghai, Singapore and Australia about their perceptions of the China-Japan relationship to better understand the major issues in bilateral ties that are complex and multifaceted as well as to identify their perspectives on these issues as Chinese. For instance, a Chinese professor in Shanghai, in the aftermath of anti-Japanese protests there, pointed to the Japanese government attitudes in dealing with its past as the principal cause for the deterioration in the bilateral ties between the two countries:

We do dislike not only crimes committed by the Japanese in the past, but also the current attitudes of the government in dealing with the past. Currently, both Chinese and Japanese are losing trust with each other. The distance between these people is getting wider and wider. (Interview with Tam, April 20, 2005)
One male PhD student from Beijing, who studies geography in Singapore, also expresses a similar opinion about the Japanese government. Yet he stresses that “we make distinctions between Japanese people and its government” (Interview with Ben, February 26, 2005). For him and many other Chinese whom I have met during the research process, it seems that it is not the Japanese but the Japanese government that becomes their object of deep concerns in both political and historical terms. In this regard, Dr Yang Jian, a Chinese lecturer in international relations in New Zealand, points out that Japan needs to take an initiative to intensify its efforts to mend the bilateral ties. More specifically, he mentions that Japan needs to satisfy three basic conditions to make a substantial improvement in bilateral ties between the two countries. He maintains, in particular, that it is imperative for the Japanese Government to take the following steps in order to start improving bilateral ties. These are: 1) make an apology to China for its wartime past in the form of parliamentary resolutions; 2) resolve the distorted descriptions of its wartime acts in history textbooks that circulate in schools in Japan; 3) the Prime Minister should stop visiting the Yasukuni shrine at any level (Personal conversation with Dr Yang, Brisbane, November 25, 2005).

Some Chinese, especially those from Hong Kong, take account of the connections between domestic politics in the PRC and anti-Japanese sentiments in thinking about the China-Japan relationship. For instance, Tom, a PhD student from Hong Kong, draws attention to the deployment of anti-Japanese sentiments to shore up support for the communist regime in China:

Given the fact that anti-Japanese sentiments are used in China as a unifying force of the Chinese state, the Japanese Government should stop playing the game with China: they had better apologize to China and should avoid stirring up the sentiments of the Chinese about its
wartime pasts. (Personal Conversation with Tom, 26 September 2006)

One male PhD student from Guanzhou, Todd, who used to work for a newspaper company in Southern China and whose research relates to the Chinese media in Australia, provides a rather different perspective on bilateral ties and he stresses the need for dialogues at an individual level rather than those at a governmental level:

The Chinese and the Japanese need dialogues at an individual level. It is only through individual interactions that we will be able to understand each other better. (Personal Conversation with Todd, 2006, June 21)

In this respect, David, a Chinese student from eastern part of China, indicates that there are a number of cultural gaps to be filled among the Chinese in relation to enhancing their knowledge about Japan and that the Japanese side needs to make more efforts in promoting the country in China:

China and Japan are getting closer. But the knowledge that the Chinese have about Japan is still limited to certain dimensions such as historical events that took place during the Second World War. I think Japan should promote more about its country so that the Chinese can understand Japan better. If people's understanding of one another will deepen and both people feel at ease with one another, there will be a further improvement in Sino-Japanese ties. (Personal Conversation with David, 3 October 2007)

Another Chinese PhD student, who is female and also studies in Australia, points out that history, and the Japanese attitudes toward it, play a crucial
part in the shaping of the Sino-Japanese relationship:

Q: What do you think about China-Japan relations?

A: It is a sort of funny relationship. ...Both countries regard each other as an enemy. In particular, the memories of the war between China and Japan during the World War II are still vivid among the Chinese. In particular, the repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japan's Prime Minister are totally unacceptable to us as the shrine honours class-A war criminals. These people are the ones who initiated the acts of invasions against neighboring countries including China. Japanese politicians should understand how people in China and Korea feel when they visit the Yasukuni shrine. ...Even if Japanese politicians apologize to China for its wartime acts, their apologies do not mean anything to us if they are not accompanied by thorough action and sincere attitudes toward that country's past acts of atrocities. Paying visits to the shrine vividly shows Japan's attitudes toward its past and its neighboring countries. How can we accept these visits to the shrine when it is a symbol of Japan's acts of aggression toward its neighbors? The memory of the wartime period is as important as the present for the Chinese; it is kept alive in a number of contemporary literary works in China as they have been influenced significantly by the literature produced during the wartime period. Indeed the memory of that period have been recounted and retold countless times from one generation to another. Unless the Japanese government and conservative politicians change their current attitudes towards history, the China-Japan relationship will continue to remain like what it is.

Q: Apart from official bilateral relations, don't you think the interactions between the Chinese and the Japanese are growing at an individual level?

A: Yes. I think that the relationship at that level is getting better. But the Japanese business community in China should think about China from a long-term perspective: they should neither just focus on immediate gains nor view China simply as a huge market for them. For instance, some Japanese products sold in China are said to be of lower quality in comparison with those sold in other countries. To illustrate, one of the Japanese cosmetic products was banned in China for sale for allegedly containing a prohibited toxic substance. Subsequently, this allegation turned out to be just a rumour. A similar problem in

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accumulation of problems like this that leads to occasional protests against the Japanese establishments in China, such as the protests that took place in 2005. Before giving priority to gaining better access to the Chinese market, therefore, they should first think thoroughly about how to build a sense of trust among the Chinese about the quality of their products, and, about Japan as a whole. (Interview with Terry, October 11, 2006)

She further adds that there are some difficult issues between China and Korea in regard to the interpretation of history. The origin of Dragon Boat Festival, which constitutes one of the important festive traditions in a Chinese culture and is assumed to be of Chinese origin, is disputed between the two countries. Summing up all those conflicts and tensions in East Asia, she says: “if they happen between China and remote places such as Africa, it might not have mattered as much. Things that happen between neighbouring countries are sometimes much more difficult to handle”.

To summarize, the Yasukuni shrine is the symbol of Japanese past atrocities against China and the Chinese. For many Chinese, therefore, the acts of visiting the shrine by leading Japanese politicians are synonymous with justifying its wartime past by the Japanese government. In this respect, one Japanese male PhD student, who had worked in Beijing in the 1980s as a Japanese teacher and studies linguistics in Australia, points out how the visits to the shrine by the former prime minister have been detrimental to Japan’s diplomacy in relation to other Asian countries:

relation to Japanese firms’ operations in China came to the surface in April 2005 when one of the top executives of Japanese beer companies was reportedly having significant influence on Japanese politics as one of the members of associations in Japan that justifies its wartime atrocities against neighbouring countries. In China, there was a considerable move to boycott products made by this company. As a consequence, their products were removed from shops in Shanghai then. These allegations against Japanese firms, both real and imagined, illustrate how delicate the issues of “trust” between the two countries are.
Mr Koizumi sacrificed Asian diplomacy to a significant degree; and instead he gave preference to achieving domestic reforms both politically and economically. He will realize how significant it is to maintain good relations with other Asian countries if he lives in one of those countries as an ordinary citizen from Japan. (Interview with Kenta, April 26, 2006)

His comment draws our attention to expatriate Japanese in Shanghai, in particular, their views on the bilateral ties. In the next section, therefore, I shall examine how they conceive of the ties as Japanese citizens who may directly experience or feel local feelings about the Japanese government.

**China and Japan: Expatriate Japanese views of the bilateral relationship**

In this section, I demonstrate how expatriate Japanese in Shanghai perceive the political dimensions of the relations between China and Japan, in particular, in light of anti-Japanese protests that took place in cities across China in 2005.²⁴

The anti-Japanese protests in Japan sparked controversy not only in Japan but also in other countries, in particular, the demonstrations had serious reverberations in the Japanese community in China as these events had

²⁴ It should be acknowledged that individual views about the political dimension of the relationship between China and Japan, as discussed in this chapter, do not necessarily represent the whole of Japanese views about the issue. Nor do they represent the opinion of the expatriate Japanese community as a whole. They are personal and subjective opinions that were expressed by some of my interviewees at a time when social and political tensions between China and Japan were highlighted to a significant degree.
direct impacts on their lives. As Tomomi critically observes:

It is Japanese like us (living in China) who are affected considerably by the apparent inability of the Japanese government to settle the issues of the past with neighbouring countries. So I do sincerely hope that the Japanese government will start addressing this problem as soon as possible by making a sincere apology for its past deeds to China. At the same time, I think that the continued opposition against Japanese history textbooks by the Chinese government seems to have gone too far. In addition, it seems unreasonable that China continues to oppose Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. (Interview with Tomomi, April 18, 2005)

Her remarks about the current relations between China and Japan epitomize the sense of frustration felt by those who belong to the expatriate Japanese community in times of heightened political tensions between the two countries: it is extremely difficult for them to avoid the negative influences of historical and political issues between the two countries as they live and interact with the local people in China. Furthermore, her view reflects an opinion about Japanese politics and diplomacy that is also shared by some of my other interviewees — a view that Japan should adopt more aggressive diplomatic policies that are commensurate with Japan’s status as an economic power in the Asia-Pacific region. In regard to this point, Tomoyo expresses her sense of irritation about Japan’s ambiguous political position in East Asia:

I think that Japan is a very exceptional country in an East Asian context. In particular, in diplomatic terms, it has not been able to maintain or assert its own position to other neighbouring countries. It would be better if Japan was able to articulate its position on diplomatic and political issues to the outside world. (Regarding anti-Japanese demonstrations in China), I think that the Chinese should calm down themselves. Rather than devoting their precious energy to criticize the politics of another country, they might as well think more about the future of their own country. The demonstrations in China
made me acutely think about many issues in regard to the relationship between Japan and other Asian countries. Personally, I felt like returning home a bit after these series of events (Interview with Tomoyo, April 24, 2005).

As Tomoyo’s remarks suggest, the demonstrations in China in April, 2005, have led many Japanese expatriates to analyse their causes and future implications for Sino-Japanese ties. In this regard, Sachie attributes the causes of demonstrations in China to unresolved domestic problems in that country:

I think the Chinese took part in the demonstrations not because they really hated us (Japanese). Rather, they resorted to such activities because it was only through anti-Japanese demonstrations that they were able to express their protest against the government. Young people in China are facing a lot of difficulties in finding employment these days and there are numerous domestic problems that have been left unresolved in this country. Yet it is extremely difficult to make any protest against the government. So they probably found it easier to join the anti-Japanese demonstrations rather than making a direct protest against the government. (Interview with Sachie, October 21, 2005)

Despite the existence of deep tensions that underlie the political dimensions of the relationship between China and Japan, however, the majority of my interviewees are looking positively towards the future-oriented ties or optimistic about the prospects for improving the relationship between the two countries. Sara’s personal opinion was about the desirable future of Sino-Japanese ties:

It was not until I came to Shanghai that I began to realize how Chinese
people dislike the Japanese (government). As a Japanese woman who currently lives and works in China, I sincerely hope that more Chinese people will come to understand and appreciate some positive dimensions of both the Japanese and Japanese culture. To achieve this aim, I would like to make my personal efforts to act as a bridge between China and Japan to overcome the differences between the two countries. I would not mind if Japan is overtaken by China in economic terms in the future; I do sincerely hope that we will be able to understand each other better rather than merely intensifying and stressing the rivalry between the two countries. (Interview with Sara, 9 April 2005)

Sata, who is in her early thirties and works as a secretary, also points to positive and constructive directions of the Sino-Japanese ties as follows:

Although there are a number of unresolved political issues between the two countries, I do think that China and Japan are getting closer if we turn our attention to the bilateral ties at an individual and grassroots level. It seems that the political problems between the two countries are deep-rooted and may take some time to resolve. Despite these issues, Japanese residents in China should take the initiative in making efforts to improve the relationship between the two countries. I think this kind of approach will eventually pave the way for alleviating the political tensions and deepening the relations toward a more positive direction in the future. (Interview with Sata, 20 April 2005)

Her opinion clearly resonates with the view as expressed by Todd, one of my Chinese respondents whose view on China-Japan relations I introduced in the previous section: that the interactions between the Chinese and the Japanese at the grassroots level have the potentials for opening up spaces where both people exchange dialogues and for finding the basis for building up mutual trust between the two countries.

As individuals who have direct contact with the Chinese society and economy, the majority of my interviewees have different perspectives from the
mainstream views of Sino-Japanese relations as circulated in the domestic media in Japan. They, in particular, realize that the rise of China and the shifting dynamic of the relationship are ushering the beginning of a new age in the Sino-Japanese relations. Sachie, for instance, observes that there is a possibility that China will become the leader in the Asia-Pacific region and Japan one of the peripheral countries surrounding China (Interview with Sachie, July 3, 2004). Fumi, one of my interviewees who is in her late thirties and works for a Chinese trading company, argues that the Japanese should recognize that they cannot always take their perspectives for granted. Japan needs to change (Interview with Fumi, July 9, 2004). Marie suggests that Japan's power to shape international relations in the Asia-Pacific is declining in view of the shifting balance of power in the region:

I have lived and worked in both China and Hong Kong since 1999. In recent years, I have observed that Japan's influence over other Asian countries has been beginning to show signs of decline. As a Japanese citizen, it is rather disappointing to see Japan's position within the region being shifted to a less influential one. In particular, I think that China contributes considerably to this process as the political and economic map of the global power is being redrawn and transformed enormously by the rise of China as an emerging global and regional power in the Asia-Pacific region. From now on, one of the most central issues in addressing Japan's diplomatic priorities is apparent in this context: to find an effective way to co-exist and co-prosper with China, its giant neighbour. Equally important, countries in East and Southeast Asia, including Japan, need to consider building on the relationships of interdependency and cooperation to produce more positive outcomes in regional affairs. (Interview with Marie, July 12, 2004)

Their remarks about Sino-Japanese relationships as well as the shifting axis of power in East Asia mark a sharp contrast to the dominant discourses on the bilateral ties in Japan. Rather than simply envisioning and problematizing China as the threat to the security of Japan and tying it to its dwindling influences over other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, they
provide a critical insight into the shifting axis of power in the region. By doing so, they also chart a new political map in East Asia in which Japan would be able to find a way to coexist and co-prosper with China as the more powerful and influential country in reshaping the dynamism of East Asia in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the political dimension of the relationship between China and Japan in relation to the transnational practices of expatriate Japanese women in Shanghai. In discussing the China-Japan relationship in a shifting geopolitical context in East Asia which is marked by the rise of China in economic and military terms, I have stressed the importance of taking into consideration everyday lived experiences of the Chinese and the Japanese. In doing so, I have demonstrated that individuals are important actors in the operation of international political economy in that they actively shape and take part in the configuration of how a nation relates to the outside world by accepting, mediating, contesting or disobeying official discourses on “other” countries. Such processes are dynamic and contingent upon social and political contexts.

Also, I have highlighted the role of memory in shaping China-Japan relations. I have argued that the narrative of the nation as a secure and bounded community rests on selective representations of historical events. These processes point to the importance of giving due considerations to the social contexts in which certain historical events are represented, remembered or forgotten in the official narration of history and memories. In particular, the construction of “our” memory is integral to the shaping of a
bounded community in defense of our heritage, culture and territory against any acts of invasions to threaten such continuity, integrity and stability. It is in this context that imaginative geographies of threat and security are reworked to represent "other" place, people or culture as the threat to "our" nation and/or community.

Both China's resurgence as a regional and global power and Japan's re-emergence as a "normal" country have actively contributed to the perpetuation of different interpretations and representations of history and memories of the past between the two countries. Such different narratives of the historical events have further reinforced the boundaries between China and Japan. Yet, as my findings have shown, individuals are not passive recipients of such official historiographies and imaginative geographies that are sustained by the state. Rather, they are active agents in the processes of countering, questioning and re-imagining such state discourses on and practices of demarcating boundaries. Transnational migration is a vital part of enacting such processes as it enables individual migrants to relate to the place, culture and/or people beyond "our" territory: an imagined community that is sustained through the acts of forgetting and remembering and of securitizing border-crossings as a threat to the security and boundedness of the community.
Chapter 7:

Reading the Processes of Cultural Reconfigurations across Boundaries: Transnational Cultural Connections in East Asia

Indonesia is like a sponge: it has absorbed diverse cultures, such as Chinese, Indian, and Arabic, into its own culture. (Personal conversation with an Indonesia PhD student, 23 August 2008)

It is very likely that most of us Asians, be it Thai, Chinese, Korean or Japanese, inherit diverse cultural and ethnic heritages within us as we are the products of countless mixtures and interactions with people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds unless our ancestors have continued to reside in a secluded area for centuries. In this sense, we can say that no person is really "pure" in both cultural and ethnic terms. (Personal conversation with a Thai PhD student, 16 April 2008)
"Coffee" is pronounced as "kopi" in Korean.

'So it is very similar to the Japanese pronunciation of that word.'

'But you need to be careful. If you pronounce the o sound of the word using the same o sound as the Japanese vowel "o", it is not the correct pronunciation of the word "coffee" in Korean. To pronounce "kopi" correctly, you need to pronounce the vowel "o" with your mouth vertically wide open.'

This is part of the conversation among a group of Japanese female tourists in Sydney on 2 July, 2007. I overheard this conversation since I shared a table with them when I was having breakfast at a hotel. Their conversation about Korean vocabularies intrigued me in that Japanese women visiting Australia on a holiday were talking eagerly about Korean language as part of their everyday conversation topic. It illustrated the extent to which cultures of other parts of Asia were increasingly becoming an integral part of everyday life conversation topics for Japanese women at the present historical moment.

As I have indicated in previous chapters, the construction of boundaries between "us" and "others" is a social process. As these boundaries are socially constructed, reconfigured and re-imagined by individuals, states and institutions, it is a process in which there is always a potential for modifying, or even dissolving, boundaries between one's own group and another.

And yet "the national order of things" — a system of categorizing people into national kinds and types has led to a particular imagination and representation of the world in which society and culture are rendered synonymous with the nation-state (Malkki 1995; Gupta and Ferguson 1997b).
As such, this representation has produced a vision of the incommensurability of different cultures based on the demarcation of clear boundaries and territories that the nation-state draws on as its important component of establishing its political identity. In this respect, Samuel T. Huntington's highly influential "clash of civilizations" thesis represents such a way of drawing boundaries based on cultural differences. Huntington identifies the seven civilizations — Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox and Latin American — and asserts that the clash between these different civilizations are inevitable and predict that such clash will dominate the future of global politics (1996). In doing so, Huntington has constituted cultural differences as insurmountable and therefore, as possible sources of conflict.

In this context, Paul Gilroy's concept of "ethnic absolutism" is profoundly relevant. As Gilroy points out, ethnic absolutism is "a reductive, essentialist understanding of ethnic and national difference which operates through an absolute sense of culture so powerful that it is capable of separating people off from each other and diverting them into social and historical locations that are understood to be mutually impermeable and incommensurable" (1990: 115).

As Castles demonstrates, one of the important principles in dealing with migration and ethnic diversity in the Asia-Pacific region is that national culture and identity should not be modified in response to external influences (2003: 6). Seen in this light, migration policies since the emergence of nation-states have been devised and implemented according to the state's economic needs and the process of labour migration was thus perceived as temporary and supplementary to the existing local labour force. Contrary to such

There are exceptions to this. The assisted migration programs of the Australian Government, for instance, were seen as solving labour shortages, but were also based upon an assumption of permanent settlement. I am grateful for Professor Vera Mackie
assumptions, some migrants have settled and their migrations took on the character of diasporas. For such migrants, the “homeland” often became a distant place of their origin and adjusting to a new homeland has taken on a greater significance. In this process, cultural interactions between the different cultures of immigrants and the culture of the receiving country have sometimes been in conflict with each other. Yet at the same time, such interactions have also created new space for imagining community, culture and nation by blending different cultures into producing a new social and cultural landscape as well as different ways of interacting with the “other”. Indeed it is important to acknowledge one of the central dimensions of migration in relation to the undoing of cultural boundaries: that it is gradually eroding the traditional boundaries between languages, cultures, ethnic groups and nation-states (IOM 2003: 4).

Yet despite the increasing significance of the process of reconfiguring cultural boundaries across borders in relation to growing population movements, sufficient consideration has not been given to the social and cultural changes that may accompany population mobility in the Asia-Pacific region.

Population movements between areas and countries in the Asia-Pacific region have existed for centuries. Of these movements, Chinese and Indians have played prominent roles in bringing their cultures, ideas and goods to other regions while gaining an understanding of local cultures in their migratory processes.

One of the examples of such blending of cultures through migration is the social and cultural practices of the Peranakan Chinese in Southeast Asia. The word “Peranakan”, which originally comes from the Malay word anak (child), contains a suggestion of mixed racial origin and refer to creolized ethnic

for alerting me to this point.
Chinese population in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia (Heidhues 2006: 153; Wickberg 2006: 116). As Wickberg suggests, members of these groups generally acquired the languages and cultural skills of their country of residence and created new versions of transcultural Chineseness through intermarriages and cultural mixing (2006: 116). In particular, in the nineteenth century, Peranakan women adopted a special form of Malay dress, using colours and patterns influenced by Chinese taste. They also borrowed food and table customs from local life. As a result, a distinctive culture emerged, blending Chinese cultures with those of local society (Heidhues 2006: 153).

The examples of the Peranakan Chinese in Southeast Asia — acting as cultural intermediaries between the Chinese and indigenous societies — bring to light the diversity of articulating Chineseness in a local context. As such, the Peranakan culture illuminates the extent to which the process of defining a cultural or ethnic identity is a socially constructed process: it is always subject to new reinterpretations and renegotiations.⁷⁶

Such practices of border-crossing and cultural interactions raise significant questions in regard to the conventional assumption about cultural authenticity and local continuity in a bounded territory and space. In particular, they lead us to criticize the often taken-for-granted idea that "culture is a profoundly territorialized concept" (Malkki 1995: 15). What is central to such an assumption is that those who stress the idea of cultural

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⁷⁶ In the early twentieth century, for instance, the various local versions of Chineseness that had existed among Chinese overseas (huaqiao) became subject to a reinterpretation: they were encouraged to familiarize themselves with unifying "national" version of Chineseness. They thus were urged to look up to mainland China as their original "homeland" and to subordinate regional and local cultures of the countries of residence to the "true" Chinese culture, of which mainland China was seen as the only legitimate source for identification. Overseas Chinese schools played important roles in this process of preparing the overseas Chinese, whose wealth and skills China needed for its modernization, to be citizens of a new and modern China (Wickberg 2006: 117).
authenticity within a bounded territory view the "local" as pure, and thus stabilize it as the product of an uncontaminated place, which, in turn, defies any connections with other people and places. Yet the movements of people, ideas, goods and cultural products across borders of nation-states over the last decades have had critical ramifications for the ways in which we re-imagine, experience and represent boundaries in our everyday lives. This process has thus raised vital questions in regard to the centrality of the idea of rootedness in thinking about culture as well as to the assumed association between nation, territory and culture. In other words, "mobility has changed both the world and our ways of knowing the world" (Cresswell 2006: 45).

In particular, transnational production, consumption and circulation of cultural products have led to new ways of imagining and reconfiguring the relationship between "us" and "them", "here" and "there", and "our culture" and "their culture". It is in this context that the production, circulation and reception of culture become critically important. As Lowe identifies,

Because culture is the contemporary repository of memory, history, it is through culture, rather than government, that alternative forms of subjectivity, collectivity, and public life are imagined. (Lowe 1998: 22)

Over the last decades, the media has played dynamic and important roles in shaping migratory processes. Appadurai (1996), for instance, identifies imagination and media literacy as central to the shaping of migration and the formation of new "ethnoscapes" as people renegotiate the terms of uneven social conditions created by global economic processes through images and representations that are already in circulation. Yang also indicates that "the mass media are vehicles for imagining not only the nation but also the larger space beyond the national borders — that is, the wider world" (1997: 288-289). In the context of the Asia-Pacific region, the development of transnational
media technologies and the resurgent economic power of East and Southeast Asian countries have given rise to the intensification of media and cultural flows between these countries (Iwabuchi 2002: 3). Thus, in imagining place(s) beyond national borders as defined by the political narrative of the nation-states, these growing cultural flows within East and Southeast Asia are producing effects to transform the flows of population movements and to bring significant changes to the perceptions of other Asian countries/regions.

Thinking about cultures is multi-relational rather than one-dimensional (Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu 2008: 9). The images and representations that circulate across the boundaries of countries in East and Southeast Asia have effects and implications which are differentiated by ethnicity, gender, class and age. Cultural products from East Asia, for example, are mainly produced for, and consumed by, women in both East and Southeast Asia; and these women, who are predominantly in their twenties and thirties, actively take part in, and express, their transnational desire for encountering other cultures and people in both East and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, as I demonstrated in Chapter five, positive media representations of other parts of Asia have contributed partly to the significant rise in the number of Japanese residents and tourists in places such as Shanghai and Seoul. In this respect, the circulation of popular culture, as well as images and representations of other Asian countries constructed by the media, plays an important role in intra-Asian flows of people, be they in the form of migration or that of tourism.

Tourism and migration are regarded as interrelated social processes in East and Southeast Asia as each process impacts upon one another to produce exchanges and different perceptions of other Asian countries/places on the part of individuals who go through these processes. These processes are mediated by differences such as race, class, citizenship and gender that have
produced divisions among people in the region and thus impacted on the formation of their subject positions. I argue, therefore, that both cultural and migratory flows between Japan and other Asian countries have been, and will continue to be, shaped by transnational processes that are both gendered and racialized. More importantly, I stress that the circulation and consumption of cultural products across the borders of the countries in East Asia, which are closely tied to the acts of imagining and reinforcing the representations of modernity and urbanization in the region, play central roles in mediating and reconstituting these transnational social processes.

In this chapter, I explore the cultural dimension of the processes of demarcating and reconstituting of boundaries in East Asia. More specifically, I discuss the processes of cultural flows and interactions across countries in East Asia as they relate to population movements in the region. By doing so, I stress that migratory movements in the region also give rise to, and are impacted on by, the process of cultural flows. Furthermore, such flows play significant roles in reconfiguring the boundaries created by the securitized narratives of the nation-state, and, in so doing, these flows may create a sense of interconnectedness through the circulation of images and representations. Such a sense of interconnectedness, as generated by the consumption and circulation of cultural products across state borders, illustrates the potential for re-bordering East Asia — a region that has long been divided by memories of different versions of histories of nation-states as well as by securitized discourses about boundaries.

I begin this chapter with a discussion about how gendered representations about "Asia" have shaped and informed Japan's imaginative geography in respect to other parts of Asia. Second, I examine the emergence and development of the processes of cultural integration in Asia and tie these processes to the growing mobility of people across state borders. Third, I
contextualize this emerging sense of cultural interconnectedness in an East Asian context and its implications for the national narratives about culture, communities and boundaries in the region where the politics of memory divides the peoples apart. By doing so, I argue for the importance of thinking about cultural interconnectedness as an integral part of the process of re-bordering East Asia.

Gendered Border-Crossings between Japan and "Asia"

Li Xianglan: Crossing and reconstructing imagined boundaries between China and Japan as the embodiment of Chinese femininity

Born in China of Japanese parents in 1920, Yamaguchi Yoshiko represents one of the Japanese women who crossed the boundaries between China and Japan, albeit in a way that was marked by Japan's imperialist policy toward China and other Asian countries. Her father, Yamaguchi Fumio, was a person who yearned for Chinese culture and studied Mandarin at a time when the study of European languages was preferred over Asian languages as a way to gain the knowledge from the West and to modernize the nation in Meiji Japan. He worked in Manchuria Railway Company in China as a Chinese teacher for Japanese workers in the company and educated Yoshiko to be fluent in Mandarin. Subsequent to her education in China, Yamaguchi Yoshiko became a actor of Manei (Manchuria Cinema Company) and starred in a number of Manchukuo-Japanese films as a Chinese actress under the Chinese name Li Xianglan. In her autobiography, Li Koran — Watashi no

77 Her autobiography, Li Koran — Watakushi no hansei [My life as Li Xianglan], (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1987), was translated into Chinese by Jin Ruojing under the title Zai Zgongguo de rizi — Li Xianglan: Wode bansheng [My days in China — Li Xianglan: my
hanset [My life as Li Xianglan], Yamaguchi Yoshiko recalls her life in China:

I was born and raised in Manchuria in China. It was not until I was eighteen years old that I visited Japan for the first time in my life. Although I communicated in Japanese within a Japanese community in China, I played a totally different role in films — as a Chinese actress under the Chinese name Li Xianglan. In this respect, my identity was an ambiguous one. Under the prevailing influence of the prewar ideology in Japan, I was called upon to act as a Chinese actress in a number of films produced during that period. I loved both countries — Japan as the motherland of my blood and China as another motherland. But the two countries were in conflict with each other. (Yamaguchi and Fujiwara 1987: 24)

Li Xianglan played a significant role in propagating the idea of "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in the 1930s and the 1940s as an actor "representative of a unified Asia" (Stephenson 1999: 243). The three most well-known of Li's earliest films — Song of the White Orchid (1939), Night in China (1940), Vow in the Desert (1940) — were shown both in Japan and China and known collectively as the "continental series" in Japan. Each film narrates a love story between a Japanese man and Chinese woman in China: Beijing in the first film, Shanghai in the second, and Manchuria in the third. These films, by depicting such love stories of surmounting obstacles including anti-Japanese feelings in China, symbolize "Chinese collaboration with Japanese interests as well as peaceful collaboration guided by a paternalistic Japan" (Stephenson 1999: 227). Thus, these films were scripted to facilitate Japanese cultural propaganda in both China and other Asian countries and, in particular, to confirm the idea that "the Chinese not only need but also desire a Japanese presence in the mainland" (1999: 236).

Because of her fluency in Chinese, most of the Chinese audiences assumed

half life] (Hong Kong: Baixing Wenhua shiye youxian gongsi, 1989).
that she must be of Chinese origin. This treachery with which she went about posing as a Chinese actress collaborating with imperial Japan tormented Yamaguchi to a significant degree. In 1943, after being critically questioned by a Chinese journalist about her motives in playing a role in such films as *Night in China* that portrayed a humiliating picture of a Chinese woman surrendering to a Japanese man in the form of a romantic relationship, she decided to quit performing Li Xianglan in her stage as well as in her real life:

Who is Li Xianglan? I wondered what her identity was as I was walking along one of my familiar paths in Beijing, close to my most favourite park in the city. When I was eighteen and went to Japan for the first time, I was verbally abused by a Japanese policeman at Shimonoseki port for wearing a *qipao* (traditional Chinese dress). In Beijing, I have been criticised by Chinese for not being patriotic to China. ... I have decided that I should relinquish performing the role of Li Xianglan. (Yamaguchi and Fujiwara 1987: 273)

In relation to the guilt and anguish which Yamaguchi suffered as Li Xianglan, Stephenson asserts that Yamaguchi crossed boundaries between Japan and other parts of Asia in her performance of the role of Li Xianglan but did not succeed in blurring them. Indeed they were invariably confirmed, demonstrating "the impossibility of superseding 'natural' boundaries", as implied by her films in which the love affairs between Chinese woman and Japanese man always fail to be consummated (Stephenson 1999: 243-245).

The propaganda that appeared in these films aimed to stress and reaffirm the racial assimilation of other Asian peoples to the Japanese on unequal terms. In this regard, as Ching points out, in an attempt to legitimize

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78 In her autobiography, Yamaguchi recollects this incident and describes it as a shocking experience particularly as it was her first real encounter with her native homeland. "When I showed my passport, the policeman pointed his finger at my China dress and said in a very provoking way: 'We Japanese are the first-class people. Aren't you ashamed of yourself for wearing such clothes worn by the third-class Chankoro (a term that was used to denigrate the Chinese then) people and for speaking their language?'" (Yamaguchi and Fujiwara 1987: 117-118).
Japanese colonial rule and practices and to differentiate it from the Western imperialist powers as benevolent and liberating for the peoples of Asia, ideas such as “common script, common race” and “universal brotherhood” were propagated as a means to assimilate and subjugate all its subjects under imperial benevolence (2007: 412).

Representing “Asia”: From feminized “other” to the Korean Wave

As indicated above, since the late nineteenth century, portraying other Asian countries as “feminine” has been a central way of representing these countries and peoples in Japan. Moreover, it has been an integral part of the imagining of unequal relationship between Japan and other Asian countries. Mackie points out that “Asia” has often been aligned with the “feminine” in academic, popular and activist literature in Japan (2002: 187). Japan’s cultural encounters with the rest of Asia since the country’s modernization have thus been characterized by the ambivalent feelings of privileging Japan as the site of modernity and progress. As such, the narrative of the nation in modern Japan has stressed the dichotomy between Japan and other parts of Asia: Japan was regarded as the centre and the site of progress while other parts of Asia were represented as its peripheries, mired in stagnation and stasis. During the colonial period of Korea (1910-1945), for instance, postcards of Korea were produced by various Japanese organizations and these postcards helped reinforce the image of Korea as “traditional” and "backward" through the representations of Korean customs, villages and Kisaeng (female entertainers) in “traditional” dress (Hyung Gu Lynn 2007: 8-9). Such representations were suggestive of reinforcement of the boundaries within the Japanese colonial empire and it was within this imaginative frame that the dynamic movement of Japan into progress and modernity was
accentuated in contrast with the relative stasis of Korean society (Lynn 2007: 9).

Gender became a central trope in this context, and, accordingly, Japan was regarded as a masculine nation which was able to achieve progress and civilization through colonizing and feminizing the places which it defined as peripheral to the center of East Asia. In order to achieve this aim, the country not only colonized Korea and Taiwan but also femininized these places through various representational practices as a means of justifying its colonial policies to become a strong nation in East Asia. In this respect, Ikeda (2005) points out that imperial Japan appropriated the Orientalizing gaze of the modern West through these images of feminizing “other” places. The acquisition of this gaze confirmed Japan’s ascent to the subject position of the “modern” by its ability to visualize its difference from the rest of “backward” Asia. Within this discourse of modernization, there appeared a dichotomy in the way that Japanese views the West and the East: the West symbolized the superior and enlightenment while the East tended to represent backwardness and the barbaric. In this context, Asia represented a place that Japan had to take control of in order to become a privileged nation alongside the “Western” nations.

In the realm of popular culture, in particular, sexual and romantic encounters between the Japanese and other Asians have often served as allegories for representing and justifying the unequal relationships between Japan as a modern and masculine nation and Asia as a feminine and vulnerable place. As indicated above, Yamaguchi Yoshiko, a Japanese actress, under the Chinese name of Li Xianglan, played a central role in propagating the ideology of the imperial Japan as a Chinese woman who fell in love with a Japanese man in a number of Manchukuo-Japanese films in the 1930s and the 1940s. The central narratives of these films were suggestive of a racial
harmony between the Chinese and the Japanese and, more importantly, portrayed an ideal relationship between China and Japan — that of feminine China longing for masculine Japan to help its modernization and development.79

Yet since the late 1990s, these feminine representations of “other” Asians have been shifted considerably to those images and representations that are not necessarily restricted to the feminine. Rather than the continued circulation of Asia as feminine and as such, as place to be controlled and appropriated by the economic modernity of Japan as a superior Asian nation, the emergence of more dynamic and multiple images of other parts of Asia began to take root in the Japanese media. This process was facilitated by the increased cultural and tourism traffic within the Asia-Pacific region.

In view of the recent popularity of cultural products from other parts of Asia, Iwabuchi explains that Japan’s desire for connecting with Asia has resurfaced with the rise of Asian economies and the transnational impacts of Japanese popular culture on the region since the 1990s and that these processes have impacted on Japan to reassert its identity as an Asian country (2004: 15). In this respect, the rise of China in economic terms has had a significant impact

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79 In 2000 and 2001, when Japan was preparing for the World Cup football events that were to be co-sponsored with South Korea, narratives of romantic encounters between the Japanese and Koreans were visualized and retold in TV dramas in Japan, albeit in a different manner and context from the 1930s and the 1940s. These TV dramas largely centered on portraying the romantic relationships between the Japanese and the Koreans and highlighted such a relationship: both between a Japanese man and a Korean woman and between a Korean man and a Japanese woman. These dramas were broadcast in both Japan and Korea. The central narratives of these dramas had something similar in common: the couple faces numerous obstacles due to the ethnic stereotypes and a sense of hatred held by both communities and to the national and linguistic barriers. In the end, however, they succeed in reconciling their differences and reunited, which can be seen as a social and political allegory for the possibility of improving the relationship between Korea and Japan, as well as of the success of the World Cup football event in the two countries.
on their perceptions of other countries in East Asia and their national identity. These socio-economic processes have resulted in a call to bring the country closer to its neighbours. At the same time, media globalization has given rise to the shift in Western cultural hegemony in East Asia, challenging its continued dominance and accelerating the process of intensifying intra-regional cultural flows and connections in the region (Iwabuchi 2004: 152).

It is within such wider socio-economic transformations in both Japan and other parts of Asia that a growing interest in cultural products from other Asian countries has begun to take root in Japan since the mid-1990s. To illustrate this point further, since the mid-1990s, a number of recently produced Chinese films, such as Chen Kaige’s Farewell, My Concubine, have captured the heart of a large audience in Japan, demonstrating a refuelled interest in Chinese cultural products. With the success of this film, a range of Chinese films that centre on the similar theme — social and cultural conflicts in the midst of historic moments of turbulence when the Cultural Revolution transformed the destiny and lives of numerous individuals and their personal relationships in China in the 1960s and 1970s — have subsequently been shown in cinemas in cities in Japan. More recently, the films of sixth-generation directors in China have also been shown in Japan. Unlike the fifth-generation directors, such as Chen Kaige, these directors

80 The film represents one of the emerging trends in cinematic practices in East Asia — transnational coproduction of films across state borders. Chu points out that a trans-regional imaginary as exemplified by such films poses new challenge to the notion of Chininess and, by extention, of the nation-state as the primary site of filmic imaginations (Chu 2004: 117-118). Also, in considering the reception of the film in Japan, we need to pay attention to the orientalized dimension of the Japanese consuming practice of cultural products from China: the ways in which “Chinese” or “oriental” flavor of such cultural products is closely tied to their circulation and popularity among Japanese audiences.
focus more on contemporary problems and their impact upon people's lives in China in the present. Their films, too, have gained relative popularity in urban centres in Japan. Moreover, the renewed interest in Chinese culture is not restricted to the domain of the cinema. In 2005, Mori Art Museum, which is situated in central Tokyo, held a major art exhibition on contemporary Chinese art. The exhibits included paintings, video installations and photographs produced by Chinese artists. These artists attempt to capture the new social realities of contemporary China — a country whose citizens are in the processes of contesting, questioning and renegotiating the implications and meanings of China's social and economic transformations in recent years for their lives as individuals and for the future of their society at large. Again, this exhibition proved to be popular as well and, accordingly, the catalogues of this exhibition were sold out by the end of the exhibition. Such recent popularity of Chinese culture in Japan demonstrates that, despite a series of anti-Japanese protests in China and an extensive media coverage of such events in Japan, there is a growing Japanese population who continue to show respect for, and interest in Chinese culture, history and society. Moreover, as the popularity of the art exhibition illustrates, social changes that are taking place at an unprecedented scale and temporality in contemporary China do attract a lot of attention in contemporary Japan.

In this context, unlike in the past, other Asian countries are often spoken of and represented as "something different and exciting", particularly in relation to the current social and economic situation in Japan. More importantly, in contrast to the colonial period, the cultural interaction between the countries of East Asia in the early twenty-century takes place not as a one-way traffic but as part of larger and multi-directional flows of
people, information, ideas and commodities across borders.

In thinking about such cultural interaction, the concept of cultural translation becomes quite relevant. As Bery points out, cultural translation is a process that takes place on both sides of the boundaries, as people attempt to make sense of other ways of life (2007: 2). In particular, “any attempt to understand the conceptual schemes of another culture — even when the cultures in question are more or less equal in terms of cultural, political and economic power — involves translation” (Bery 2007: 6). In this process of cultural translation, the cultures that are being translated modify and adapt the versions of “their translated selves” that are offered to them, extending the intellectual, spiritual, emotional and linguistic resources available to the society which is doing the act of translation. In this way, translation enables the society to find new and imaginative ways of dealing with or representing their own and other cultures (Bery 2007: 18-20).

The representations of other parts of Asia, as circulated in the Japanese media and consumed among the Japanese public, have thus become much more multifaceted and diverse in recent years. This trend closely resonates with the growing circulation of popular culture across Asia, as represented by the “Korean Wave” (the popularity of the Korean cultural products in East and Southeast Asia) as well as with the rapid economic growth of China. These social, cultural and economic processes have considerably shifted the axis of dominant images and perceptions of “Asia” in Japan.

To illustrate, since the early 2000s, Korean TV dramas, films and actors who appeared in these cultural productions have gained a wide audience and popularity in Japan as well as across the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
As one of its neighbouring countries with a large number of Korean residents with significant social, historical and geographical connections, the media in Japan has invested a great deal of energy in the circulation of cultural products from South Korea. As a result, NHK (one of the major TV stations in Japan), for instance, has achieved a great success in broadcasting *Winter Sonata* in 2003 and 2004 to its audiences.\(^{81}\) Furthermore, the popularity of Bae Yongjun, an actor who played one of the protagonists in this TV drama, among the Japanese public, has led to an increasing media coverage of, and attention to, Korean popular culture in Japan. To put it differently, Korean visual culture — TV dramas and films — has become part of everyday practices of consuming popular culture in the country, in particular, among women.

Japanese women have played a central role in the phenomenon of the Korean Wave in Japan as well as in other cultural interactions with other Asian countries.\(^{82}\) As Iwabuchi points out, the “gendered transnational desire” is apparent in the intra-Asian cultural flows (2002: 571). Whereas the representation of other Asian countries as “feminine” penetrated into the core of the Japanese imagination of these places in modern Japan, the current cultural interactions take place in ways that differ significantly from the past. Other parts of Asia are no longer represented as feminine and as objects of domination and control; rather, these places are re-imagined as the places of excitement, development and dynamism. It is in this context that the masculinity of Korean male actors — the conceptions of the masculinity which is conceived as capable of achieving economic growth and development — have gained enormous popularity in Japan.

\(^{81}\) NHK is the national broadcaster.

\(^{82}\) During the 1990s, Hong Kong pop stars such as Andy Lau and Jacky Cheung became popular among some Japanese women who were interested in popular cultures in China, Hong Kong as well as in other Asian countries. Although the scale of the popularity of these Chinese stars was much more limited compared to the “Korean Wave”, it became the foundations for the subsequent “Korean Wave” which took place in Japan in the early 2000s.
As Gupta and Ferguson demonstrate, "the transnational public sphere", which is produced by the circulation of cultural products across state borders, has rendered any strictly bounded community or pure culture obsolete and led to "the invention of new forms of imagining community", forcing us to reconceptualize the political production of culture, community and difference (1997b: 37). As such, "Asia" has recurred to the Japanese imagination as a new social, cultural and geographical concept: instead of previously circulated images and representations of a place mired in its past and traditions, "Asia", as a metaphor for dynamism and progress for the future, has come to represent and symbolize the opportunities to reinvigorate Japan as a member of the East Asian community. The consumption of popular culture has thus become one of the critical sites where we can possibly observe the social and cultural processes of rearticulations and ruptures of "Asia" in the making in Japan.

Morio, a public prosecutor in Japan, suggests that there are better prospects for Korea-Japan relations in light of the growing circulation of Korean popular culture in Japan in recent years and the solutions for political issues can possibly be sought in the realm of the everyday interaction between Koreans and Japanese:

When I look at the bilateral relationship between Korea and Japan, I have observed that the growth in tourism between the two countries and the popularity of Korean culture in Japan have led to mutual interaction and exchanges on a deeper level. Although there are some political issues between the two countries that are yet to be resolved, they are not as serious as the ones that exist between China and Japan. The best way to deal with these issues and to improve the relationship between Korea and Japan is, I think, is to influence politics through social and cultural interaction at a grassroots level. (Interview with Morio, 24 October 2006)
When East Asian culture is seen as a phenomenon larger than the individual national cultures, a variety of new possibilities unfold (Fogel 2007: 9). Mike Featherstone, for instance, identifies two effects which are produced by the processes of cultural interaction and exchange: first, linking together different cultures which in turn produces more complex images of the other as well as generating identity-reinforcing reaction; and second, the emergence of "transnational cultures" which are oriented beyond national boundaries (1990: 6). Similarly, Lim stresses that East Asian popular cultural products that transcend national boundaries not only enhance the regional flows of cultural products, but also generates the intersection of cultural identities (2008: 45). Seen in this light, the "Korean Wave" can be viewed as a cultural phenomenon which, being a part of "transnational and intra-Asian flows of popular cultures, produces different ways of imagining the community, cultures and the region.

Critiquing Notions of Cultural Authenticity, Territory and Boundaries: Reframing China-Japan Relations from Migratory Flows of People

In the 1930s and 1940s when Yamaguchi Yoshiko attained stardom as Li Xianglan in a number of Manchukuo and Japanese films, the relationship between China and Japan was informed and marked by ideas and processes about the presence of Japanese imperialist power in Asia, and, thus, by the practices of inequality and assumed racial purity and hierarchy in East Asia. As a number of these films demonstrate, the ideas about racial harmony during that time were firmly based on the conviction that the Japanese are modern and superior to other peoples in Asia. Accordingly, cultural flows, as
well as the mode of population movements between Japan and China, and between Japan and other Asian countries, were quite asymmetrical and imbued with notions of power.

As the recent migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai suggest, the contemporary flows of people between China and Japan, although still marked by asymmetrical inequality of immigration control between the Chinese and the Japanese, points to a different picture from the past. These migratory processes demonstrate that the representation of China as an undesirable place has shifted in its meaning and operation. This shift in the meaning of China takes place in a city such as Shanghai, where increasing flows of peoples across the globe enable Japanese women to experience transnational processes and to reconfigure and contest the meanings of boundaries that have been placed as the narratives of nation-states. In this respect, the current population movements between the two countries draw out attention to the contested relationships between the transnational, the national and growing mobility of individuals. These migrants, by taking part in migration, redraw the political map of nation-states as their migratory processes reveal the arbitrary and socially constructed nature of boundaries.

Nation-states are based on exclusionary gendered, classed and racialized meanings and practices (Bergeron 2001: 994). As such, one of the central projects of the modern nation-state has been the binary construction of “us” and “them”. This has been largely achieved through the “nationalization” of its citizens and through the “othering” of its enemies or rivals: various strategies have been used to achieve this aim, which include the construction and propagation of national cinema, the media as the central means of conveying the continuity and significance of the nation in our everyday lives (Billig 1995), the selection of popular memory in its museums, and ritual ceremonies to remember the important milestones in the nation’s past and
the present. These practices point to the process of "authorization" of "our" authentic culture and past by the hegemonic power of the nation-states. Yet the growing population movements across the boundaries contest these practices of stressing the national imagination as the unitary mode of imagining the relationship between individuals and place. In this regard, Gupta and Ferguson assert that there is a need to question the seemingly taken-for-granted distinction between "ourselves" and "others" in thinking about cultural practices across borders (1997b: 45).

Moreover, the emergence of the transnational public sphere, that is, the processes of the production and circulation of cultures across state borders, has pointed to the political and constructed nature of the practices of the nation-states to authenticate their culture as uncontaminated and pure, separated from interactions with other cultures by their demarcated boundaries with "others". Increasingly, individual migrants are questioning their relationship to the nation-state and the artificial borders it has created. It can be argued that Japanese women's migration to Shanghai is part of these processes to question the political narratives of nation-states as grounded in a dichotomy between "us" and "others", to reconstitute the relationship between the national and the transnational and to renegotiate boundaries at multiple scales. In this regard, the interrogation of boundaries as conducted by Anzaldúa, a Chicano feminist, is quite relevant and suggestive here. Her work entitled Borderlands/ La Frontera (1999) points to the importance of the experience of those people who, living in sites of intersections between multiple cultures, renegotiate and struggle over the nature and meanings of boundaries, and to their potential power to generate new understandings of culture that encompass the acts of contesting and questioning the myth of a "pure" culture of "our" society. This conceptualization of boundaries and practices of those who are engaged in border-crossing draws our attention to a need for a critical interrogation and
reconsideration of states' practice of demarcating boundaries between "us" and "others" through the acts of forgetting parts of its history that are selective in their operation and meanings. By critically interrogating such state practice, we can identify the process in which it has continuously sought to erase and mask the ties and interactions with "others" across its borders, the relationships that have shaped its past as well as its present historical moment. Such an endeavor will thus illuminate the political nature of defining what "our culture" is as well as the meanings and operation of constructing cultural authenticity in an age when social and cultural boundaries are redrawn and crossed more easily.

Cultural Interaction as a Bridge: Border crossings in cultural spheres in East Asia

Since the 1990s, countries in the Asia-Pacific region have gone through major social, economic and political transformations. One of the major changes in the region is the rise of China in economic terms and it has significantly increased the prospect of regional cooperation in other areas as well. Also, efforts have been made to build regional cooperation mechanisms in East Asia such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) +3 (South Korea, China and Japan) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), which includes Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific regions.

Despite such positive outlook and development, there is much less cooperation within East Asia compared to other regions due to the existence of distrust and the history of confrontations: the political dimension of the relationship between countries in East Asia has been fraught with territorial disputes, differences over the interpretation of history, as well as increasing
regional rivalry between these countries. In this respect, boundaries have been recreated and strengthened along the lines of political and security narratives of nation-states in East Asia. In view of these obstacles, Kim and Lee support the idea that “cultural alternatives” such as exchanges and cooperation in education, culture, history, arts, tourism, and sports play a greater role in building the basis of regional cooperation and identity (2006: 91-95). In his analysis of East Asian popular culture, Chua (2004) convincingly argued that everyday lives of Asians are increasingly shaped by the consumption of an “East Asian popular culture” where East Asian popular music, television, film, fiction, stars, new media and fashion circulate regionally and globally against the backdrop of media globalization. Similarly, Jinsung, a Korean who works for a branch of an international organization in Seoul, identifies the need for improved communications between the countries of Asia:

States in Asia can learn a lot from the experience of Europe over the past fifty years in terms of regional integration and overcoming the past. I think that communication is critical for the processes of integration in East Asia. (Personal conversation with Jinsung, 12 February 2008)

Individuals can create an imagery and flexible East Asian identity through the consumption of recent cultural products such as films, TV dramas and music as these circulate across national and regional boundaries (Lim 2008:

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83 In recent years, efforts have been made to create common East Asian history textbooks as part of the larger projects to rewrite and share different versions of histories in the region to create a common regional identity as the one that is being forged in Europe. The Korean government, for instance, created the Northeast Asian History foundation in 2006 and introduced East Asian history into the school curriculum as a separate course. As Roh Moo-hyun, former President of the Republic of Korea, points out, such an initiative will “help transform parochial nationalism into an open nationalism which enables mutual trust and understanding” (Roh 2007).
51). In this context, the transnational consumption and circulation of cultural products across East Asia have raised significant questions about the intersections between the intra-Asian cultural flows and about the growing sense of regional identity in East and Southeast Asia. In particular, in view of the processes of growing cultural integration that are taking place in this region, scholars of cultural studies or anthropology have called for the need to take the circulation of cultural flows into account as a starting point for discussing any move for regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. Kim and Lee for instance, insist that the “Korean wave, that spread through borders of East Asia since the early 2000s, is an important cultural resource that has the potential for providing a new popular culture of the Northeast Asian region (2006: 93). For instance, the 2003 South Korean drama Dae Jang Geum (Jewel in the Palace) gained a wide popularity in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The popularity of the drama, which traces the rise and struggle of the first female physician in sixteenth-century Chosun Dynasty, was partly due to the close cultural affinity between the Chosun Dynasty and Chinese history (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008: 5-6). Such cultural affinity helped the success of this drama series in the Chinese speaking territories.

Similarly, Cho suggests that the circulation of popular culture across the region is narrowing “the geographical, social and psychological distance between Asians” and that flows of popular culture, such as the Korean wave, provide us with “new contact zones”, enabling us to take interest in the cultures of people in different countries who have been “othered” for long time in modern history (2005: 177-179).

Indeed, Korea has historically played an important role as a cultural intermediary in the East Asian context. As Shultz points out:
Korea is the real middle kingdom. Geographically in East Asia, Korea is situated in the middle, between China and Japan. ...Because of its middle location, Korea played an important role in the transfer of continental culture to Japan. ...The transmission of Buddhism to Japan is one of the best examples of this role of Korea as the “middle man”.

(Shultz 2006)

In the National Museum of Korea, Seoul, South Korea, a Buddhist sculpture, entitled “Pensive Bodhisattva” (early seventh century) is exhibited as one of its national treasures. The statue has remarkable similarities with the Buddhist statue in Kōryū-ji, one of the temples in Kyoto, Japan, illustrating the role of Korea as the “middle man” since ancient times.

Seen in this light, the Korean wave can be considered as part of such cultural tradition of Korea acting as an intermediary in East Asia to enact social and cultural change in the region through the circulation of its cultural products for transnational consumption, creating the sense of cultural interconnectedness across boundaries.

**Conclusion**

The sense of cultural interconnectedness, as developed and nurtured through the growing circulation and consumption of shared cultural products between countries in East Asia, plays a central role in reconfiguring the boundaries created by the narratives of security/insecurity within the political frameworks of the nation-states. As such, the circulation of images and representations promotes a sense of interconnectedness among Asians who are divided by social, political and economic. The process of cultural interaction across borders is closely intertwined with the migratory processes
of people in the region since it is largely through the intra-Asian cultural products that they re-imagine and reconfigure the boundaries of nation-state. Such sense of interconnectedness, as generated by the consumption and circulation of cultural products across state borders, illustrates the potential for re-bordering East Asia — a region that has long been divided by different narratives about the memories of the past.
Chapter 8:

Re-bordering East Asia:
Trans-Asian flows of peoples and cultures in cities

Things foreign have always been part of this city. ...We do not ghettoise immigrants into Chinatown or Little India as we see it in other large cities in the world. Those people who have historically been considered as enemies — such as Chinese and Indians, and Russians and Afghans — they cease to fight with each other when they come to Rome; instead, they coexist in this city as Romans. (From the 2003 Italian film People of Rome)
The circulation of cultures across boundaries has been theorized in a number of academic disciplines; including sociology, anthropology, geography and cultural studies. Such a phenomenon, along with the rising tide of global population movements, defies the nation-centred narratives about culture as pure, authentic and single, as well as reshaping our understanding about interconnections between places, cities and the territories of different nation-states. On 2 July 2006, I heard an interesting story about one dimension of travelling culture at a conference dinner in Canberra. Shekhar, an Indian student in architecture from Mumbai told me the story about these photographs that his family found after his grandfather passed away: there were a number of nude photographs portraying East Asian women from Shanghai in one of the boxes he left. Given the fact that his grandfather had worked as a public servant in one of the post offices in Bombay (former name of the city Mumbai) in the early twentieth century when it was under British colonial rule, Shekhar and his family eventually came to the conclusion that his job in the post office may have enabled him to access such photographs as they circulated between cities across national and regional divides: from Shanghai to Hong Kong and then from Hong Kong to Bombay.

Indeed it is interesting to think about how his grandfather had come to gain access to these photographs and about what motivated him to keep them for so many years. And where did these women in the photographs come from? Were they Chinese or women from other parts of Asia who were residing in Shanghai at the time when it thrived as a cosmopolitan city of East Asia? What is important about this story, however, is that cities have played a vital role in the circulation of diverse forms of mobilities in the Asian context: they thus provide critical insights into the practices and processes of re-bordering across boundaries.
In this chapter, I thus discuss the social processes of re-bordering of East Asia through the movements of people, ideas, goods and cultural products, particularly in global cities. I thus place the migratory processes of Japanese women to Shanghai within the larger framework of growing flows of people and cultural interactions across countries in East Asia. In particular, I draw attention to the issue of urban citizenship that provides the possibilities for reconfiguring the boundaries of identity and the territoriality in the region. First, I explore contemporary migratory processes in the Asia-Pacific region. I stress that intra-regional migration and feminization are crucial to understand such processes and that gendered and racialized dimensions of migratory processes are important part of re-bordering East Asia. Second, I discuss that terms such as "home" and "culture" are increasingly taking on multiple meanings in light of increased mobility of people across borders. I then examine how conceptions of home are inflected by the processes of migration. Third, I place the city as one of the central sites of transnational connections in East Asia. Fourth, I draw attention to the issues of boundaries, identity and territoriality in an East Asian context. I use conceptions of national/transnational cinema in an Asian context, particularly, the filmic imaginations that are articulated in Hong Kong cinema, to critically rethink and interrogate the nature of the knowledge and imagination that have informed our theorizations about the connections between the nation-states in East Asia as well as the questions of territoriality and the politics of inclusion and exclusion within this framework. Moreover, Hong Kong's role as a continuing centre of population movement between China and other parts of the world (Skeldon 2006: 67), as well as its ambiguous relationship with the mainland China, gives it a unique place in the larger framework of theorizing migration in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. I conclude this chapter by suggesting that the concept of urban citizenship is increasingly playing an important role in remapping East Asia as the site of interconnections and that this remapping may have the potential for
reconfiguring the boundaries as demarcated by the state's political and security practices. The significance of such urban citizenship in rethinking social and cultural dynamics in East Asia also leads us to the reconsideration of belonging and territoriality — concepts that highlight the differences, divisions and boundaries between people in the region.

**Contemporary Migratory Processes in Asia: Toward feminized and diversified forms of migrations**

Home to the world’s biggest population, the Asia-Pacific region has also become an important site for international migration research as growing numbers of people within the region move from their homeland for better lives across national or regional boundaries. As Yamashita points out, “Asians are now emerging as among the most active migrants in the contemporary world. It has become part of everyday reality for contemporary Asians to leave their places of origin for urban centers or to move on further across national boundaries in order to be able to pursue better lives” (2003: 3-4). In particular, since the 1990s, there has been an upsurge in migration within Asia. The recovery from the economic crisis of the late 1990s, for instance, saw the resumption of large foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Asia, (particularly to East and Southeast Asia) that, in turn, led to higher flows of skilled, professional and managerial workers within the region. Despite traditionally tight controls on the entry of foreign workers, the year of 2003, for instance, saw increased numbers of business professionals move to Hong Kong and Singapore — notably from Malaysia, Japan and Australia (IOM 2005: 106). This suggests the growing trend for intra-regional population movements in the Asia-Pacific region.
Scholars of international migration in the Asia-Pacific region point out that there are some characteristics that are central to understanding and explaining recent migratory processes in the region since the 1990s: (1) an increasing feminization of migration (Chow 2002: 20); (2) a shift from a traditional family migration to the migration of individuals (Chow 2002: 20); (3) a growing flexibility and diversity of Asian migrants, with much of these flows occurring in an unauthorized manner or of being of short-term nature (Chow 2002: 20; Piper 2003: 22); (4) the existence of large outflows to other migratory regimes — notably to North America, the Middle East, and Western Europe (Hugo 2004: 77); (5) the emergence of smaller but still significant inflows into the regions of highly skilled professionals from developed nations (Hugo 2004: 77); and (6) a rapid increase in intra-regional migratory flows between East, Southeast and South Asia (Piper 2003: 22; Hugo 2004: 77). In particular, the rapid growth in intra-Asian population movements is central to understand the processes of contemporary migratory flows in the Asia-Pacific region (Piper 2003: 22).

Taken together, these features point to an important trend in migratory processes in the Asia-Pacific region: a diversification of the types of international migration (Hugo 2004: 78-90) as well as increased feminization of these processes. That is to say, population movements in the region are not just from developing to developed countries as conventional accounts of migration may suggest. The contemporary migratory processes in the Asia-Pacific region are becoming more complex and the basic nature and meanings of migration have shifted from one-directional move, which often means settling permanently in another country, to multi-sited and temporary migrations, as indicated by the so-called astronaut migrants or circular migrants who move back and forth between their origin countries and host countries. Indeed these migrants who try to maintain homes and businesses in multi-sited locations have become significant actors in highlighting the
momentum of transnationalism in contemporary social processes. Cities, as one of the central sites of transnational migration, are increasingly playing important roles in these processes.

Global cities and Migrations in the Asia-Pacific Region

One of the characteristics of international migration today is the growing circulation of skilled migrants centred upon the world’s largest cities or the so-called global cities (Skeldon 2006: 59). In this respect, the global cities in the Asia-Pacific region have attracted a lot of academic attention over the past decade as these cities have a number of migrant communities to meet the demands of different and diverse functions of global cities. In particular, recent studies on migration in relation to global cities in the Asia-Pacific region have connected the presence of skilled migrants in those cities with particular functions and facilities that are available in global (world) cities. The Government of Hong Kong (2006) thus defines them as “very cosmopolitan and this enables them to attract the international capital, business and skilled individuals that make them centres for global commerce”. In particular, the presence of skilled individuals is regarded as critical to the definition of cities as global (world) cities.

As Yeoh and Khoo point out, “world cities, characterized by the concentration of corporate activities and cluster of producer services, are important locations for highly skilled international migrants. The availability of social and cultural facilities also render cities particularly attractive to those professionals as places in which to work and live” (1998: 160). Taylor also stresses that “it is cities not countries that are becoming the prime migration goal” (1995: 57). In this respect, Holston and Appadurai argue that “cities are
challenging, diverging from, and even replacing nations as the important space of citizenship — as the lived space not only of its uncertainties but also of its emergent forms" (1996: 188). Moreover, the rapid economic growth and increasingly growing regional ties within the region have accelerated the trend in intra-Asian migration, with major cities as the central site of migratory processes. The scale of this intra-regional migration in East and Southeast Asia is indicated in table 5.

Table 5

Approximate stock of Migrants/Migrant Workers in Major Countries/Regions in East and Southeast Asia, 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrant Numbers (000)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Main countries of Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,300-1,500</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1.2 Korea, China, Philippines, Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>240-250</td>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>5.7 Philippines, Indonesia, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25.27 Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.2 Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>90-100</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1 China, Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Global cities in the Asia-Pacific region show clear parallels with other global cities such as New York or London in that these cities have a polarized distribution of migrants: there is immigration and emigration of highly skilled migrants on the one hand and there is immigration of the so-called low-skilled migrants on the other. Moreover, there is a continuous flow of population within the transnational networks established and extended by the migrants (Skeldon 2006: 69). What characterize the intra-regional migrations in East Asian countries in contrast to other regions such as European countries is that migration to Asian countries is viewed by Asian policy makers as a means of resolving temporary shortage of labour supply. Therefore, migration to these countries is perceived as the migration for satisfying temporary labour shortage supply and is not envisaged as leading to permanent settlement eventually (Castels 2004: 18). In this context, an increasing number of migrants in the Asia-Pacific region are experiencing cross-border movements as temporary workers, sojourners or students and their trajectories of migrations are more likely to show patterns of multiple destinations or circular migrations between one location and other places. These processes demonstrate that migratory processes in the region are characterized by flows of multiplicity and diversity.

84 Each member states of European Union have different policy in regard to the acceptance of labour migrants from other EU member states. But in principle, citizens of the EU member states today have relative freedom in migrating to, and working in, other EU countries, due to agreements based on the Schengen Treaty.
Reconfiguring the Relationship between the Centre and the Periphery: Border-crossings in East Asia

As the population movement across borders intensifies into the twenty-first century in the Asia-Pacific region, the assumed relationship between the centre and the periphery has undergone major transformation. Such transformation has been brought about by the major shift in the meanings of borders. As such, it affects not only those who live close to border areas but also the larger social, political, economic and cultural landscape of East Asia.

One major example of such shifts relates to the increasing numbers of people crossing borders between Hong Kong and mainland China. The economic resurgence of mainland China has been central to this process. As Skeldon points out, increasing numbers of Hong Kongers are moving to, or working in mainland China. Furthermore, border-crossings have become a part of every day lives for a large number of Hong Kongers: some 333,000 cross-border trips took place in 2001, indicating Hong Kong's closer integration with the mainland China (Skeldon 2006: 70).

More importantly, Chinese migration from the mainland has always been an integral part of the history of Hong Kong. As I have indicated in the introductory chapter, the mobility of the Chinese from the mainland China has often constituted a contested social presence in Hong Kong. With the economic resurgence of China and its increasing importance in both regional and global processes, however, such a perception of the mainland is being shifted to more positive and diverse representations of the territory and its people. A recent Hong Kong cinema *Butterfly (Hūdié)*, Directed by Yan Yan
Mak: 2004), for instance, illustrates such a shift in depicting the mainland China in post-1997 Hong Kong. The protagonist of the film, Flavia, is a high school teacher in her thirties. Being married with a child and a stable job, her life fulfils criteria for being a successful woman in Hong Kong. Yet she feels something is missing in her life. Then she meets Yip, a young aspiring singer from the mainland. She falls in love with her and decides to leave the stability of her married life, an act suggested by the title Butterfly — liberation from social constraints and expectations and articulating her desire as an individual who takes charge of her life.

In this film, the portrayal of Flavia as a mature woman living a stable life is in sharp contrast with the depiction of Yip: although Yip is still poor by a Hong Kong standard and her future is still uncertain, she has plenty of hopes for her future and thus her dynamic and energetic characteristics are viewed as the embodiment of contemporary China as it undergoes rapid social transformations. The film also draws attention to the way in which the object of desire is being reconfigured in East Asia with the rise of China. In Hong Kong, as a former British colony, the mainland China has often been seen as an underdeveloped and uncivilized place. Such a construction of China as an undesirable place has undergone changes in recent years. As this film shows, the mainland China is constituted as a site of attraction and desirability, which is reflected in increased population movement between Hong Kong and the mainland after 1997. The film also point to the potential of Hong Kong's coming to terms with the idea of "returning" to and re-encountering the increasingly more confident and powerful "motherland" and thus suggests its changing relations with the mainland.

Yeh and Ng indicate that the boundary between Hong Kong and China may not be as distinct as perceived when one looks at the economy of sex and menial labor. Films such as Durian, Durian (2000) and Hollywood Hong Kong
(2001), for instance, present confident and assertive Chinese sex workers travelling across a range of boundaries between Hong Kong and the mainland (Yeh and Ng 2009: 147-148).

Such a shift in representations of the mainland China resonates with major changes in cultural traffic between Hong Kong and the mainland in recent years. In the past, Hong Kong’s cultural products, such as movies and pop music, travelled readily to the mainland and there was little flow the other way. Since the early 2000s, however, cultural products from the mainland have permeated into the cultural landscape of Hong Kong (Mitchell 2007: 1).

As suggested in such increased population and cultural flows between Hong Kong and the mainland China, the relationship between the centre and the periphery is in the process of being reconfigured in East Asia. The rise of China is central to this process of reconfiguration. Moreover, it suggests the construction of the centre and the periphery is a socially constructed one: such a relationship is always contingent on social, political and economic transformation and the margin, as defined and interpreted within such contextual perspectives, may be seen as the centre in specific contexts and circumstances.

**Gendered and Racialized Dimensions of Re-bordering East Asia**

As I have pointed out in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the movement of women between Asian countries has often been a contested and politicized issue in the region. More importantly, the movement of women across borders in East Asia is an important part of understanding the processes of re-bordering East Asia through the flows of people, ideas and information. Their
mobility is often closely tied to the gendered and racialized assumptions about mobility as well as the shift in such assumptions in light of social, political economic and cultural transformations in the region.

These assumptions are often highlighted by the media representations of "others" in "our" territory. For instance, the representations of mainland Chinese women in Hong Kong have tended to be stereotyped, often suspecting their motives for border-crossing. As a consequence such representations have made these women marginal to the social processes in Hong Kong while problematizing their immigration to Hong Kong as a threat to the stability of the "local". As Gan illustrates:

Seen from the perspective of the media and the authorities, the Mainland prostitute is a vice and immigration problem, a matter of statistics and logistics, an unruly body that need to be policed, controlled and eventually removed. (Gan 2005: 49)

It is in this context of gendered and racilized mobility and representational practices in East Asia that issues of citizenship need to be discussed. In terms of transnational mobility, for instance, Japanese women do not face difficulties in going through borders between Japan and other Asian countries, including China, due to their status as Japanese citizens. In contrast, narratives of border crossings by women from other Asian countries (such as the Philippines or Thailand) to Japan suggest that asymmetrical processes of border control regimes, as well as differentiated levels of economic development in countries of the Asia-Pacific region, affect individuals differently based on their citizenship status, facilitating and privileging the mobility of certain nationalities over others.65 Boundaries have different meanings for women from these Asian countries. In this

65 See, for instance, David (1991) on the migration of Filipino women to Japan.
regard, Japanese women are located in a relatively privileged position in so far as their citizenship enables them to travel to most other Asian countries without severe restrictions. It also demonstrates that the act of simply being born into one country rather than another shapes and determines one's migration options, in particular, in regard to where and how one can move across international borders, to a significant degree. Moreover, the differentiation of migrants based on skilled/unskilled workers tend to confine the majority of migrants from certain nationalities to the category of the unskilled, which impacts on discriminatory practices in their destination countries. These asymmetrical dimensions in the implementation of immigration policy structures need to be taken into account to further understand the diversified flows and nature of migration in the Asia-Pacific region.

To summarize, contemporary migratory processes in the Asia-Pacific region are becoming more diversified and, thus, conventional perspectives on migration as unidirectional (from developing to developed countries) and permanent rupture from one's country of origin need to be reconsidered and redefined accordingly.

**Transnationalism and the “New” Diaspora**

As indicated above, the growing interest in transnational social processes reflects a shift in the patterns of migration as well as in the basic assumptions about migratory processes today. Conventionally, transnational migration was regarded as a one-way process: a rupture with the past and a permanent change in the place of residence from one country to another. This view has sustained the idea that migrants would disconnect any ties which
they had with their homeland and eventually become assimilated into the host society. Yet the recent trends in population movements across borders indicate that the basic nature of migratory patterns is shifting from the traditional pattern of permanent settlement to a much more temporary and fluid population movement, thus problematizing the conventional view of migration as a linear and settled process.

In recent decades, the development of the global aviation industry as well as the Internet and modern technology in communications has meant that migration takes on significantly different forms and meanings from the past. Because of these developments, migrants can now incorporate their deterritorialised memories of, and ties with, their homelands into the borders of different nations-states where they migrated. Smith describes the recent development of these processes as "the rise of translocalities" (2001: 169). He defines "translocal" as "the specific social space in which transnational actions take place" and illustrates that translocal relations connect transnational actors, the localities to which they migrated, and their points of origin in localized and historicized contexts (2001: 169).

The concept of translocalities, as put forward by Smith, requires us to transcend the dichotomy between "here" and "there" in analyzing the experiences of migrants and in explaining the practices of transnational migrants sustaining ties with multiple places. It also raises the critical question as to the shifting meanings of "home" in an age when there are increasingly multiple points of departures and arrivals that are increasingly fractured, temporary and, most importantly, diversified based on gender, race, class, nationality and other social identities of each migrant.
Diasporas in the Making: Overseas Chinese and their search for identity

For migrants, the acts of identifying with their "homeland", be it real or imagined, are intimately tied with the search for their roots, identity and cultural and ethnic heritage. In particular, living in a country where they are regarded as an ethnic minority, these acts become critical in maintaining social and cultural ties with their real or imagined homeland and, more importantly, in coming to terms with the social, cultural and geographical disjuncture between their place of origin and their place of living. These processes, in turn, are translated into a variety of social and cultural practices, crossing boundaries across space and time. And these practices are often informed by each migrant's ideas about "the homeland". For some, it may be the culture of a place from which his/her ancestors left almost hundreds of years ago; for others, it may be inextricably tied with the assumed connections between their homeland and another territory or place. Also, "the homeland" can be found inside the territory of the country where they live as members of a diaspora. These processes illustrate that the acts of identifying with their "homeland" are multidimensional and elide no simple categorization.

Yet it is important to uncover these processes because they provide a useful analytical framework to rethink the relationship between place, mobility and identity in an age when the transnational movement of people, goods, culture and information across state borders considerably impacts on such a relationship and produces effects that reconstitute conceptions of place as stable and territorially fixed and as those based on a singular narrative of nation and belonging. As Duiya, a lawyer who immigrated to Australia from
former Yugoslavia explains: “At first we came here in 1993 in order to broaden our options in life. But then the ethnic conflict broke out in my home country and we decided to stay here” (Personal conversation with Dijia; 19 September 2009). After her decision to stay in Australia, she has worked as a lawyer by upgrading her knowledge of law she studied in former Yugoslavia and by continually striving to acquire Australian English accent for her job. Her life story exemplifies the multifaceted nature of “finding home” in an age of migration: she lost her original home (former Yugoslavia) to return to amidst the war and the disintegration of her motherland. Yet she has found her new “home” in Australia. In this sense, the experience of “losing home” has provided her and her family with an opportunity to “finding a new home”.

Individuals have narrated complicated experiences of migration and displacement across different places. Particularly, Chinese diasporas, whose imagining of the spaces of their homeland may differ significantly across political, ethnic and cultural divides, attest to the multiplicity and complexity of the processes in which “homelands” are re-imagined as they are integrated into their ongoing narratives of departures and arrivals across borders.

Michael, who migrated from Singapore to Australia when he was two years old, says that he has found ways to reconnect with his Chinese identity through his improvisation of Chinese music:

My ancestors had migrated from China to Southeast Asia more than a century ago. As for myself, my parents migrated to Sydney when I was just two years old. It was through my personal encounters with the Chinese traditional music, particularly, playing erhu (a Chinese harp) that I began to experience the process of rediscovering my cultural heritage and identity as a Chinese. (Personal conversation with Michael; 2 September 2006)
For Michael, his close engagement with the world of traditional Chinese music has provided him with a sense of being "rooted", or of being reconnected with his own cultural heritage and "homeland", in a place far away from China. For him, China constitutes a cultural site that is re-imagined and recreated by the beautiful melodies of a Chinese harp which he plays.

Julia, whose parents are of Chinese origin, works as an administrator in a university in the suburb of Sydney. She told me about her motivation for, and experiences of, living and working in Japan as an English teacher there:

Many young Australians prefer to go to London if they go overseas for work. But I, as one of the Australians of a Chinese descent, went to Japan instead because I felt much more affinity with Asia than with the West and wanted to explore the region myself. I chose Japan rather than China because I believed that Japan was much more similar to Australia in terms of economic development and the degree of modernization. I taught English in two different places in Japan: Chiba and Osaka. I found people in Osaka friendlier. Whereas the landscape of the Kanto region was filled with houses and buildings, making it somewhat monotonous, the Kansai region seemed to have had a different landscape. Its diversity in landscape, such as Kyoto and Kobe, affects people, how they think and how they react to one another. Next time I go to Japan, I hope to work in rural areas, then, I will be able to experience another side of Japan. (Personal conversation with Julia, 20 April 2007)

In her narrative of living in Japan, she recreates China and Japan as interconnected places — the two countries are connected as integrated parts of Asia, enabling her to feel a sense of affinity toward Japan in her imagination of the region as a Chinese Australian. Some Chinese art posters that were hung in her office seemed to have been indicative of such imagination: she told me that she bought them in a China town in Kobe.
They suggest that she has identified more interconnections and intersections rather than separation and boundaries between China and Japan in her sojourns in Japan.

Chen Tien-shi, a Chinese woman born and raised in Yokohama, Japan, illustrates how the culture of intersections that has characterized the China town in Yokohama has had a significant impact on identifying the place as the home.\footnote{Yokohama’s Chinatown, founded in 1873, remains the largest of Chinatowns in Japan (Kobe and Nagasaki are other China towns), with 260 restaurants attracting some 12 million visitors a year (Kyo 2006: 334). Also, the Chinese are the second largest foreign population in Japan after the Koreans. In 2004, they numbered 485,700, accounting for 0.38 per cent of a total population of Japan. Of these, 99,953 have gained permanent resident status. More than 100,000 are students. Kyo points out that this relatively small number of Chinese, despite the geographical proximity and sustained cultural relationships between the two countries, is largely due to the strict enforcement of regulations governing the residence and employment of foreigners in Japan (2006: 332). In recent years, however, there is an increasing trend of international students taking up employment after their studies in Japan. In 2006, for instance, the number of international students who remained in Japan after graduation reached the highest figure in the postwar period, which was 8272. Of these, 6000 were Chinese (43.3% increase from the previous year), followed by 944 Koreans (26.4% rise from the previous year). Such increase is largely explained by the globalization of Japanese corporate activities (Yomiuri Online 14 August 2007).}

The landscape dominated by the sea. And the wind that blows from the harbor. The predominant image of Yokohama, in my mind, is that of the city full of watercolors. Whenever I return to this place, I feel very comfortable walking on its streets, in particular, those of Chinatown. As soon as I set my foot on this place, the first things that I identify are: a number of signboards written in Chinese characters in gold or red colors and the vapor coming from steaming baskets which contains dumplings. I then draw in scents that are distinct and unique in this China town. I hear Japanese and different Chinese dialects spoken interchangeably on the streets. It is a space where things Chinese blend into those of a Japanese society; a place where Chinese and Japanese can coexist with each other. ...As such, it is a place where different cultures, ethnicity and nationalities intersect and mingle together. Indeed diverse histories and human processes have converged in this China town. (Chen Tien-shi 2005: 250)
As indicated above, the practices and narratives of (re)imagining East Asia among overseas Chinese suggests that there are multiple ways of imagining the nation, community, the homeland and place(s) and that such embodied experiences of diasporic Chinese suggest the multiple and complicated relationship between place, identity and mobility. In particular, their engagement with the concepts of home defies simplified identification of the relationship between place and “culture” as stable and pure and bounded in a single place or territory.

Rethinking of the Practices of “Othering” through Experience of Border-Crossing

Conventionally, the social practices of “othering” are based primarily on information from the media that tells us about how “others” are different from “us” and how our “secure” lives are threatened by the undesired border-crossings from “others”. In this respect, the media shapes both positive and negative understandings of “others” in our everyday lives. This draws our attention to the significance of actual interactions in reconfiguring and undoing the processes of “othering” and to the experiences of border-crossings as they open up spaces for these interactions.

Shintarō, an expatriate Japanese man in Shanghai who is in his mid-thirties and works for a Japanese public organization, observes that one of the advantages of being in Shanghai is that he is able to experience and identify what is happening in China without being too dependent on the information from the Japanese media. He says: “Not all the information on China as reported by the Japanese media conveys the reality of the country. Some
reports on China in Japan are often too exaggerated or narrate only part of the story. By living in this country as an expatriate, I can discern what is true and what is not" (Interview with Shintarō, 20 October 2005).

A female Japanese student, Yukie, who studies at a university in Australia as an exchange student, expresses her perception of China and the Chinese has shifted after having interactions with Chinese friends there:

I remember that there were some violent protests against Japan in China last year. But since I came to Australia, I have met a number of Chinese students here and came to realize that they are ordinary human beings just like us. In fact, one of my best friends here is a Chinese. (Personal Conversation with Yukie; December 8, 2006)

Similarly, Yumi, a visiting scholar from a Japanese organization, suggests that coming to a multicultural country like Australia has altered her perceptions of the Chinese:

In Japan there are many reports about anti-Japanese sentiments in neighbouring countries. So I have never been to China because I do not want to travel to a country where (I think) people are anti-Japanese. But since I came to Australia earlier this year I have found out that the Chinese are quite friendly to me. (Personal Conversation with Yumi; September 10, 2008)

As these statements demonstrate, experiences of border-crossings not only open up spaces for interaction with “others” who are often identified as the “object of fear” at home but also bring about the potential for contesting and questioning the social practices of “othering”. Rose points to this process:

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67 It should be acknowledged that a series of anti-Japanese protests which took place in a number of cities in China in April 2005, including Shanghai and Beijing, considerably tarnished the general image of China as these protests were widely reported in the Japanese media. The number of Japanese tourists to China in 2005, as a result, showed considerable decline after these protests.
Increasing flows of ideas, commodities, information and people are constantly challenging senses of place and identity which perceive them as stable and fixed. The increasing interdependence between places mean that, for many academics at least, places must be seen as having permeable boundaries across which things are always moving. Identities, too, more and more involve experiences of migration and cultural changing and mixing. This means that process of Othering — of defining where you belong through a contrast with other places, or who you are through a contrast with Other people — is more and more difficult to sustain. (1995: 116)

As population movements across borders accelerate and more and more people experience border-crossings as part of their lives, the identities that have been sustained by the narratives of a nation as well as by the dichotomy between “us” and “others” are contested, interrogated and renegotiated. In these processes, the assumed unity between place and people is questioned by increased flows of ideas, goods and people. In this respect, the relationship between people and places is not a static but a dynamic one and such a relationship is contingent on certain spatial contexts.

**Multiple faces of home and belonging: Reconceptualizing the concept of “home” in the context of transnational migration**

Since experiences of migration involve a departure from “the home”, migrant’s ideas about home are central to understanding the social dimensions of migration. Yet “the home” or “homeland” is not exclusive to the place where one is born or raised. In a time of increasing transnational flows of people, culture and capital across borders, “home” has become “a borderland where cultural traditions, values, and ways of life come together, clash, meld, and are transfigured” (Elliott, Payne and Ploesch 2007: 2).
A number of studies on transnationalism and migrations have demonstrated that migrants maintain transnational ties between the place where they settled in and the one where they originally came from. Thus, the growing significance of transnational connections have raised a number of questions in regard to traditional ideas about the home that have defined and emphasized it as the site of a fixed, unitary and bounded place. To put it differently, the idea about a home as closely tied to a particular place, nation or territory is open for incessant processes of contestation and renegotiation as we redraw the social, cultural and political map of boundaries in our everyday social practices.

In this respect, my research participants, as they negotiate the boundaries between China and Japan, have articulated the contingent and multiple concepts of home and belonging in their migratory processes.

Kazumi, who worked in Shanghai for three years in the mid-1990s at a hotel and works on her PhD dissertation about overseas Chinese in a border region between Malaysia and Thailand, puts her concept of home as multi-sited and plural:

For me, home does not exist in a single place: it is multi-sited. At present, I find my home in the border place between Malaysia and Thailand where I am currently conducting my fieldwork. I think that it is crucially important to be able to find places you feel at home in various locations. (Interview with Kazumi, 10 March 2005)

In questioning the concept of the home as rooted in a bounded territory or nation, one German film *Neither Fish nor fowl* (Directed by Matthias Keilich; 2002) points to multiple faces of “home” as well as the complex and
contingent relationship between conceptions of home, belonging and identity as an ongoing process that is informed by processes of migration, displacement and one's incessant quest for a place called "home". The protagonist of the film, Michael, is an ethnic Korean who was adopted by a German couple when he was a baby. His German parents pay little attention to him and this leads him to leave his parental home upon his graduation from high school. Although his German friends accept him, his physical appearance keeps reminding him of his background as an ethnic Korean in a country where "European" appearance is perceived to constitute a majority. His relationship with a Korean girl, Jin-hi, whose family run a Korean restaurant and maintain a Korean lifestyle and social norms in Berlin, confuses him further about his identity, for even in Berlin's Korean community he is "neither fish, nor fowl"; for instance, he does not know how to behave properly in front of elder Koreans when he has meals with them; and yet his appearance visibly differentiates him from the conventional concept of being a German. Based on the experiences of not being able to act out "Koreanness" as implicitly required in the Korean community in Berlin, he strongly feels that he is disconnected from Korea — a country where he was born and from which his original "ethnicity" derives. With no knowledge of Korean language or tradition, he comes to realize that he is destined to live between two cultures and to accept that the concept of "home" can have multiple faces and dimensions. The film ends with Michael's departure to South Korea — he goes there in search of Jin-hi who has already returned to her native country with her family. Although Michael does not know what future awaits him in Korea, he is now ready to accept his sense of in-betweenness and to venture into a new place whose landscape, to which he is assumed to belong in terms of his ethnicity, is totally unfamiliar to him.68

68 In recent years, a number of films produced in European countries have dealt with the questions of "otherness" as well as the crossings and marking of boundaries in contemporary Europe. These films reflect increasingly diversified "ethnoscapes" in Europe, as well as growing tensions and conflicts in European societies that are produced from such diversification.
Based on the real story of ethnic Koreans living in Berlin and on the interactions that the director had with them, this film represents the fluidity of the notion of home and identity and demonstrates that identity, although it is often regarded as being rooted in, and inseparable from, one's ethnic origin, is indeed a product of continual processes of questioning and of redefining the place or site where one can call “home”. Therefore, the processes of forming an identity constitute the sites where one negotiates, interprets and reconfigures conceptions of the home in relation to social contexts in which one is currently located. As such, these processes need to be situated as part of the dynamic processes of interactions between individuals, groups and the social. Indeed, the fluidity, diversity, subjectivity, vagueness and potentially paradoxical nature of notions of identity as narrated in this film reveal that questions such as who is a “true” Korean? and what does it mean to be a Korean? are all open issues that are still debated and struggled over.

In her study of the meanings of home to ethnic Chinese migrants in Germany, Maggie Leung points out the significance of paying attention to “the home” in the context of migration and identity, as well as to the multiplicity of meanings attached to “the home” as follows:

Home can be a place (a country, a village or a house), a social unit (family, extended family or community), or a perception (a feeling of belonging or being sheltered); home can acquire different meanings for an individual with changing times/space. Where precisely migrants feel at home (or not) informs their identities, their perceptions of life’s quality and chances, as well as their further mobility plans. Hence in migration research an understanding of migrants’ ideas of home and the processes involved in their making a home is at least as important as charting their movements across space. (Leung 2004: 9)
Over the past few decades, the migratory flows of people in the Asia-Pacific region have increased significantly. In relation to this trend, the notion of "the home", which is conventionally considered in relation to the sense of attachment to a single and fixed place of one's origin, has also shifted to a new direction. As Leung (2004) demonstrates, it is currently considered to be more fluid, open, temporary and often subject to various forms of negotiations depending on the migrants' diverse backgrounds and their situation in the country of their residence. Therefore, it can be argued that the conceptions of "home" as a single and static process are being contested, signifying that the increase in transnational migratory flows that may unsettle the conceptualization of "the home" for people on the move. Far from being rooted in one definition or interpretation, the concept of "home" is a contested terrain where its meanings are embedded within the experience of migration and structures of power and contestation that shape migratory processes. At the same time, the city, as a destination for most of the migrants who seek for a better life, provides locations for creating new "home" as it is a space that opens up various kinds of possibilities and interactions across a range of social divides such as gender, class and ethnicity.

Cities as the Site of Transnational Connections: The importance of cities in creating and maintaining transnational social practices

The 100 million airborne arrivals who descend on London each year are equal to almost twice the population of Britain. Travel on this scale now makes it impossible to characterise cities as stable entities. They're no longer simply geographical locations but urban contexts adapting themselves to a constant flux. (Barley 2000: 13; cited in Amin and Thrift 2002: 14)
As the above observation on London by Barley suggests, cities are increasingly connected and shaped by transnational population movements across borders. As such, cross-border flows of people and global flows of commodities and ideas are increasingly becoming synonymous with cities — cities as the site of connectivity between places and peoples. Such flows have inevitably necessitated the emergence of social and cultural practices that are articulated and sustained through transnational ties. Yet cities as the site of such transnational social and cultural practices have largely been overlooked by the dominant “global cities” discourses, which centre on the strategic operation and hierarchies of cities according to the economic order created by global capitalism, as I have discussed in Chapter 3. Rather than assuming cities as the product of global capitalism, we need to provide more nuanced and balanced perspectives on cities: cities as nodes of transnational social relations and practices that are articulated, created and sustained in particular places at particular times.

Such an idea of cities as sites of transnational connections forces us to rethink the concept of citizenship and to raise critical questions in regard to belonging, mobility and community, as well as the politics of inclusion and exclusion that the conventional understanding of citizenship has entailed. As O’Brien pontes out, citizenship is a specific form of belonging to, and membership of, a community or a nation and it has conventionally been assumed that such belonging means the relationship between an individual and the state, which is dependent upon certain rights and duties (2003: 2-3).

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89 It should be acknowledged that citizenship is a contested concept. It has to be seen as a kind of socially constructed identity which relies on a variety of influences and definitions (O’Brien 2003: 11). Here I refer to a broader definition of citizenship — citizenship as the social and political practices of articulating a sense of belonging to a community and membership to such a community.

90 There are alternative citizenships that transcend national boundaries. Such citizenships include: EU citizenship; flexible citizenship — citizenship practices of those people who cross national borders according to their strategic needs of adapting to global capitalism (Ong 1999); diaspora citizenship (Lagueur 1997); global citizenship (Dower and Williams 2002) and urban citizenship (Holston and Appadurai 1999).
Yet the increasing flows of people as expatriates, immigrants and sojourners into cities suggest that the conventional ideas about citizenship as those that are closely tied to the nation-state and its bounded territory needs to be reconsidered in light of the new realities of contemporary cities — cities increasingly characterized by a mobile population and their transnational connections. As Amin and Thrift point out:

Historically, rights of citizenship have been tied to territory, usually the nation. But, now a significant proportion of the temporary and permanent residents of cities consists of non-citizens (including stateless persons, asylum seekers), illegal migrants, citizens of other nations who carry limited rights of residence, and people with ties of loyalty and belonging to transnational communities and global movements. (Amin and Thrift 2002: 155)

As such, social critics who view cities as the site of rethinking citizenship in terms of population movements across borders have argued for the importance of cities in such practices. By doing so, they have pointed to the concept of citizenship that takes into consideration the global flows of people in cities in multiple directions and terms rather than its affiliation with the nation-state — citizenship as the repository of the state, as it has been conventionally envisioned in state controlled institutions and practices. Taylor, for example, claims that cities, as a crossroad in the flow of people, goods, ideas, are replacing states in the construction of social identities (1995: 58). Aksoy observes that cities, as spaces increasingly shaped by transnational mobility of people, commodities and ideas, are no longer the repository of exclusive citizenship practices as commonly understood within the terms of the national project (2006: 86).91 In relation to this point, Holston

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91 The points made by these social critics resonate closely with the idea of global citizenship as put forward by Williams (2006). As Williams points out, "global citizens are seen as possessing a political and ethical concerns that is global in its extent and concerns. This means not necessarily and automatically privileging the needs, interests or desires of a geographically specific and bordered group of people with whom one
and Appadurai argue that cities are the privileged sites for the reconsideration of the current renegotiation of citizenship:

Although one of the essential projects of nation-building has been to dismantle the historical primacy of urban citizenship and to replace it with the national, cities remain the strategic arena for the development of citizenship. They are not the only arena... But with their concentrations of the nonlocal, the strange, the mixed, and the public, cities engage most palpably the tumult of citizenship. Their crowds catalyze processes which decisively expand and erode the rules, meanings, and practice of citizenship. Their streets conflate identities of territory and contact with those of race, religion, class, culture, and gender to produce the reactive ingredients of both progressive and reactionary political movements. (1996: 188)

Their points illustrate that cities are central to the processes of rethinking people's belonging and identities as opposed to the nation-centered idea of citizenship, territoriality and place. As Thomas puts it, the states' practice of citizenship often relies upon the politics of exclusion: she maintains that policies which define entitlement to citizenship are based on the idea that "the territorial boundaries of the country are defended against intrusion by those not accepted" (Thomas 1999: 89).

In contrast to such state-centric practices of citizenship, cities may provide alternative sites for re-imagining the notion of citizenship and belonging and facilitate processes of dialogues, interaction and engagement with people from different social and cultural backgrounds. These acts of engaging with differences may also offer spaces to contest and re-imagine the assumed integrity of territory and people sharing the past, the present and the future. Particularly global cities have become nodes in transnational flows of people,

shares a membership of a state. It means recognizing and accepting the moral standing of all human beings, or, potentially, all living things, and that their sharing or not sharing the membership of a state is morally arbitrary" (2006: 2). The idea of global citizenship thus provides the possibilities for new types of politics in the context of the creation of new transnational spaces (2006: 2-3).
capital and cultures. Bauböck states that an urban citizenship that has been emancipated from the imperatives of national and state-centred conceptions of political community may transform national identities and nationalist ideologies from below and from within, providing an alternative model of membership that could eventually help to overcome some of the exclusionary features of national citizenship (2003: 157). Such processes of critically interrogating the relationship between the nation, the city, comminity and belonging and extraterritoriality draw our attention to the assumptions that underlie the practices of territoriality and identity as the strategies of exclusion and erasure. Nation-states have deployed these strategies in order to "territorialize" their citizens within the bounded and imagined spaces of a particular nation-state.

Questioning Territoriality and the Nation-states in East Asia:
Territoriality as the strategies of exclusion and erasure

Ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct places inform the social and political practices of mapping territory as a central component of a nation-state. Indeed, territorial disputes have marked one of the most important dimensions in the narratives of the nation-states to assert its continuity and separation from other peoples and places.

It is in this context that the concept of territoriality becomes important. As I indicated in the introductory chapter, territoriality refers to the strategies by which control is asserted over territory and it relies on notions of identity and difference. It signifies the social practices of categorizing and demarcating people into those who belong to "our" territory and those who are "out of place". We often consider that these notions of identity and difference as
natural and part of the cognitive map of the nation-states. Seldom do we question its assumptions and the strategies that underlie these processes. Instead we construct boundaries as described in the political narratives of the nation-states, leaving the questions of their origins and operation unscrutinized.

But territories, as we have seen in the redrawning of the map of former central and eastern European countries in the 1990s, are not fixed. Rather, as Passi succinctly asserts, territories are “made, given meanings, and destroyed in social and individual action”, thus making them open to the acts of active contestation and renegotiation (2003: 110). In particular, the socially constructed nature of territories, identities, cultural authenticity and traditions are brought to light by those migrants and diasporas who continually contest and renegotiate the meanings of these terms in their everyday lives. As Said puts it:

No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are no more than starting points, which if followed into actual experience for only a moment are quickly left behind ... No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness. (Said 1994: 407-408)

National or Transnational?: Remapping East Asia through cinematic practices

The region of East Asia, in political terms, is often told as the site of conflict and of nationalisms that divide the countries and peoples apart. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the contested interpretations of history and the ideology of territoriality ensure that boundaries are kept in order and
that "others" are imagined as a threat to "our" security within the putative bounded-ness and the purity of a particular community or of a nation. Imagining and representing East Asia in such terms has served to prevent us from mapping or reimagining an alternative vision for the region: as places that are interrelated and interdependent with one another.

But the recent increase in the mobility of people, commodities and culture across state borders in the region indicates that we need alternative visions and imagination for remapping the transformative processes that are taking place vis-à-vis these diverse forms of mobility. In order to delineate the alternative vision for conceiving the region, the ideas and imagination that inform the study of transnational cinema, in particular, the filmic imaginations of the contemporary Hong Kong cinema as they are inflected by the mobile characteristics of the city — a regular movement of people, goods and culture in and out of the territory — provide some important points to consider. As Yeh and Ng contend, identity politics in regard to the interpellation of China as the "motherland", as well as resistance and ambivalence toward a new "Chinese" identity are a vital part of Hong Kong's cultural production before and after 1997 when Hong Kong's sovereignty returned to China (2009: 146-147). I take up the filmic imaginations in Hong Kong cinema for three reasons: first, these imaginations are quite relevant to the central theme of my thesis to interrogate the issues of boundaries, identity and territoriality on a theoretical level; second, Hong Kong and its cinematic productions have had close interconnections with Shanghai and such relationships have often been marked by the movement of key actors and filmmakers between the two cities since the 1930s, illustrating that the histories of these two cities are predicated upon the movement of people; third, Hong Kong's ambiguous and complicated ties with the mainland China resonates with those between China and Japan. And filmmakers in Hong Kong recreated and envisioned such relationships with the mainland through
cinematic practices. In this respect, the filmic imaginations in Hong Kong cinema enable us to reflect critically on the representational practices vis-à-vis PRC in an East Asian context.

Hong Kong has long been labelled as a "place of transit" since it became a British colony in 1941. Since then, a diverse range of both emigration from, and immigration to Hong Kong, has been an integral part of social and political forces that has shaped Hong Kong as a place of mobility. As a result, the history of diasporic imaginations is inherent to, and almost synonymous with, the history of Hong Kong itself (Yiu-Wai Chu 2004: 112-116).

As such, one of the basic considerations in Hong Kong cinema is that the "films articulate a Hong Kong identity that is connected with and detached from both the Western world and the Chinese world, and they often refute the 'official' success story" (Esther C.M. Yau 2004: 21-22). More importantly, as Abbas succinctly points out, Hong Kong culture, as "a culture that interrogates the very nature of Hong Kong and explores the possibility of its redefinition, does not express the hopes and aspirations of a people or a nation. In a society of migrants and immigrants, 'the people' is hardly a unified concept" (Abbas 1997: 303-304). This skepticism about the notions of "the people" united by a singular narrative of the nation foregrounds the city culture of Hong Kong and informs its social and cultural practices in a

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92 In 2007, there was a special cinema program, which was entitled "Hong Kong, Shanghai: Cinema Cities". Screening more than sixty Chinese films, the program provided a unique opportunity to demonstrate the interconnected histories of the two cities in their cinematic practices. The program, held from 2 March – 27 May 2007, was presented as part of the 5th Asia-Pacific Triennial of Contemporary Art, Brisbane, Australia.

98 Shih (2008) argues that most of the so-called Chinese language cinemas have largely been produced in Mandarin. Nevertheless, Hong Kong films, which were predominantly produced in Cantonese, have had critically significant impacts on the development of Chinese cinemas, particularly in Shanghai in the early twentieth century. See Fu (2003) for the detailed examination of such cultural interactions that had taken place between Hong Kong and the mainland.
number of ways that are distinct from the mainland even after its handover in 1997. Each year, July 1, for instance, is the date of an anniversary to commemorate Hong Kong's "return" to the mainland. But when I visited Hong Kong on July 1, 2005, I found tens of thousands of people demonstrating against the possible suppression of democracy and human rights in Hong Kong by the policies formulated by the mainland China. At the same time, cinemas in the local Arts Centre showed some documentaries and films that dealt with the Tiananmen incident in 1989, official screening of which would be inconceivable in the cinemas in the mainland. These processes illustrate that both social movements and cultural practices in Hong Kong remain independent of the orthodox and singular narrative of the nation in the mainland, thus defying the passive acceptance of the singular narration of Chineseness even after it officially became "part" of the PRC.

In light of this social and political climate in its streets and cinemas, filmic imaginations as articulated in Hong Kong cinema differ significantly from the narratives of conventional national cinema in East Asia. Such relationship with the national in imagining and representing the shifting and often contested relationship between people and the homeland provides us with a new mode of thinking about East Asia. By pointing to the socially constructed nature of the national and its boundaries, the filmic imaginations of Hong Kong cinema enable its viewers to question and reimagine the relationship between the nation, territory and people. Such imaginations may also enable us to interrogate the ways in which we make sense of the "homeland" and to question any strictly bounded sense of "community" as commensurate with the particular territories of nation-states. In other words, they uncover the myths of the assumed integrity of one people/nation sharing the past, the present and the future in a bounded territory as demarcated decisively from other places. In this respect, diasporic Hong Kong films, as Chu asserts, provides us with "a new conception of homeland as ungrounded, hybridized
and flexible", thus transgressing the boundary of "the stable signified of authentic Chineseness" (2004: 125-126). They thus offer us vital theoretical insights into our social and cultural practices of identifying with the nation in imagining and conceptualizing the relationship between place and identity and allow us to critically examine it in light of the movements of people and cultures across borders. In this respect, Hong Kong cinema — its detachment from the national as the most salient analytical category to imagine and describe the relationship between people and places as well as its sensitivity to the issues of both boundaries and connections with the mainland China — provides an important basis on which to remap East Asia as the site of connections, interdependency and porosity rather than that of territorial disputes, security concerns and political divisions as marked by the single and linear narrative of the nations-state to unite and mark certain people as "us", while recreating "others" to strengthen such an idea of unity in harmony in a world that is increasingly characterized by border-crossings, heterogeneity and mixtures. Moreover, cinematic practices of Hong Kong cinema also enable us to have a more nuanced understanding of boundaries in East Asia: they provide us with a sensitive lens to look at the issues of contestation, demarcation and reconfiguration of boundaries that are created by new social and geopolitical realities of China as it undergoes rapid transformation. They also enable us to envision "soft borders" (Mostov 2008) in remapping East Asia, a region increasingly marked by the ambiguous and shifting relationship with China in social, economic and cultural terms. To summarize, the coming together of cinematic practices and urban experience as mirrored in Hong Kong cinema offers both theoretical and empirical insights into the ways in which cinema enables us to envision the urban and its relationship with boundaries, belonging and the community through the acts of transcending the imaginative limits imposed by nation-centred narratives on boundaries, identity and territoriality.
Peoples and Cultures on the Move: The implications of increased mobility for the Asia-Pacific region

In recent years, growing numbers of people have been on the move across the Asia-Pacific region. As the regionalization of social and economic processes intensify, the contemporary migratory processes in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more complex and the basic nature and meanings of migration have shifted from one-directional move, which often means settling permanently in another country, to multi-sited and temporary migrations.

The countries of East Asia have often been marked by highly differentiated economic development among countries as well as by differences in conceptualizing and representing their national history and memories. Because of these differences, particularly, economic ones, the population movements between the state borders are processes that are also highly unequal in their operation and meanings. Yet the growing mobility of people, which is unparalleled in its scale and diversity, has significant implications for the region.

Such trans-border movements may constitute a threat to states' efforts to define their identities and territoriality in relation to their borders. To ensure that borders are kept intact from the acts of transgression from unwanted "others", states have endeavored to stress the integrity of their national identities with the bounds of their territories through the acts of demarcating borders. Yet the increasing mobility of peoples, ideas and cultures across the region do indicate that these processes may eventually lead to the creation of social spaces in which the affiliation with a single identity and/or sense of belonging may be contested and questioned in favour of the articulation of
multiple identities and of attachments to multiple cultures and places — a process that is conducive to the narration of the city in terms of its intimate connection with diverse cultures and places rather than that of its secluded containment within a single, unitary and authenticated culture.

It is in this context that non-state actors and processes are increasingly playing pivotal roles in creating and sustaining social networks and ties that transcend ethnic and national boundaries. Shambaugh (2005a: 97) points out that the core actor in creating a dense web of economic, social and other ties in the Asian region is not a nation-state. Rather, it is a variety of non-state actors and processes that operate at the societal level, thus bringing societies together in complex and interdependent ways. Shambaugh further insists that this dynamic is "a powerful deterrent to conflict and is conducive to peace and stability, as all nations and people become tied together in one large interdependent web" (2005b: 16).

In view of the importance of such processes, I suggest that an emerging sense of urban citizenship, which has been produced by growing population movements and cultural interactions across the region of East Asia, is bringing about significant transformations on the ways in which people, as agents of transnational processes, take part in these processes of reconfiguring and remapping the boundaries in the region to a significant degree. As the circulation of people, commodities, ideas center on cities, such urban citizenship is global in its meanings and operations — reflecting and responding to the growing consciousness of the interconnected nature of the world.

84 In this thesis, I refer to urban citizenship not as an alternative to other kinds of citizenship, such as a national and local citizenship. Instead I conceive it as an additional dimension of citizenship that has come into existence today along with the growing importance of cities in transnational social, economic and cultural processes.
These processes lead us to consider the need for taking into account the practice of "re-bordering" at multiple scales and for rethinking the seemingly "naturalized" association between citizenship, culture, nation-states and territoriality and for situating it within the wider flows of culture and population movements. Yet the process of "re-bordering" has often been rendered insignificant in comparison to the "fixed" territorial borders of nation-states. In this respect, Williams claims that the possibility of a new form of bordering emerging from transnational processes tend to be underplayed "because they do not create the kind of social practices we tend to assume are emblematic of territorial borders — the division of zones of authority and ownership symbolized by claims to sovereignty" (2006: 6). Such privileging of territorial borders in thinking about the question of borders and boundaries has, in turn, been central to the production of security discourses that stresses the exclusionary practices of defending and protecting "our" borders against "them".

Most importantly, the social and cultural dynamics in global cities in East Asia challenge such practices and a way of thinking about boundaries. As Mostov points out, cities are sites in which we can recognize the need for rethinking borders as they are the product of ongoing renegotiations of territoriality (2008: 141-142). By bringing into question the assumed connections between citizenship, culture, nation-states and territoriality, it becomes possible to gain significant insights into the relationship between boundaries, community, nation and territory: that these concepts are dependent on narratives of identity politics which are socially and politically constructed and, thus, are subject to the acts of reconsideration, contestation and reconfiguration by individuals as agents who may question and reinterpret the assumed binary between "us" and "them". Transnational processes, as produced by the mobility of people and cultures in global cities, play a central role in remapping such boundaries as conventionally narrated
by the security imperatives of the state.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have mapped the social processes of re-bordering East Asia. In explicating such processes, I have demonstrated several important dimensions: feminization of migration, the increased trend for intra-regional migration, the diversification of migratory patterns and the growth of cities. I have stressed the centrality of these dimensions to the theorizing of transnational migration in the Asia-Pacific region.

Trans-border migration is a basis upon which to redraw our conceptual framework of the borders and boundaries in relation to nation-states. Global cities in East Asia play a central part in such a reconsideration of borders and boundaries. The increasing movements of people to cities such as Shanghai, both at the regional and global levels, may illustrate the potential for the emergence of transnational social processes in which boundaries are contested and (re)negotiated through migratory processes. Such processes also suggest that the conventional conception of citizenship as closely tied to a single nation-state needs to be reconsidered as transnational migrants simultaneously are anchored in and cross one or more nation-states. They cut across the boundaries of the nation-state and are inclined to identify themselves as members of global community spanning national boundaries (Brah 1996; Williams 2006). It is in this context that the issue of urban and global citizenship is brought to light in East Asia in which the transnational movements of people raise critical questions about the naturalized association between the nation-state, citizenship, identity and its territorial borders.
In discussing the issues of re-bordering East Asia, China occupies a central space. In particular, the rise of China as a growing economic and political actor in reshaping regional affairs contributes significantly to the ongoing discussion about the practices and processes of re-bordering East Asia. As has been suggested in the media and academic discourses, the directions of the country play a critically important role in social, political and economic processes in the region and beyond. In this regard, any analysis of the process of re-bordering East Asia would be insufficient without addressing how China is implicated in such practices and process in the region.

I have also suggested that the growing centrality of the city in the everyday lives of East Asians, along with an emerging sense of urban citizenship, which has been produced by growing population movements and cultural interactions across the region of East Asia, is bringing about a vital transformation on how people, as agents of transnational processes, reconfigure and re-imagine the boundaries in the region. Such urban citizenship is not dependent on the conventional definition and understanding of the relationship between the community and sense of belonging as singular and static: rather, it opens up the potential for reconfiguring the idea of citizenship as it shifts its meanings and operations within a context of transnational population movements. As a consequence, the concept of home also becomes multi-dimensional, enabling us to contextualize and rethink multiple meanings of home in relation to mobility. This is particularly evident in East Asia where increasing numbers of people are beginning to embrace the multi-sited notions of home because of their population movements across borders. In this respect, I stress that non-state actors are increasing playing a vital role in creating a dense web of economic, social and cultural ties in the region. In doing so, I suggest that the re-bordering of East Asia is taking place through the movements of people,
ideas, goods and cultural products to cities and that the global city such as Shanghai is central to this process.
Chapter 9:

Contesting and Reconfiguring Boundaries: Remapping Boundaries and Territoriality in East Asia

Hay tantísimas fronteras
que dividen a la gente,
pero por cada frontera
existe también un puente.

Gina Valdés

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This poem was quoted in Anzaldúa (1999: 107). I translate this poem, written in Spanish as: "There are so many boundaries that divide people apart. But for each boundary, there is also a bridge that connects it with other boundaries".

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Transnational migrants in East Asia are active participants in their acts of border-crossings. Through this process, their acts may also reconfigure the political and securitized map of East Asia. As such, they urge us to rethink issues of boundaries, territoriality and citizenship in relation to the social, political and cultural transformations they bring about through their transnational practices and processes.

As I have explored in previous chapters, transnational population movements raise critical questions about the meanings, nature and operation of boundaries as constructed through the selective narratives and memories of the nation-states.

This thesis is a contribution to our thinking about boundaries, particularly in an East Asian context. Throughout, I have argued for the importance of considering the meaning and operation of boundaries as socially constructed: that the nature of boundaries and identities is arbitrary, contextual and contingent.

Since the twentieth century, nation-state ideology has dominated spatial imaginaries in social, political and cultural terms. This ideology, as it has attached importance to the nation-state in our thinking about boundaries, place and mobility, has acted to obscure social and cultural practices of border-crossings across territorial borders of the nation-state.

In such configurations of spatial imaginaries, the acts of migrations have often been considered as those of deviation from the assumed sense of loyalty and attachment to a place of one's birth or origin. Despite such configurations of migratory processes, the social, political, economic and cultural landscape
of East Asia has always been, and will continue to be, shaped by population movements across borders. Such population movements, in turn, are inseparable from the politics of boundary demarcation, social and geopolitical reconfiguration of boundaries between the nation-states, as well as the production, circulation and consumption of transnational cultural influences. In this respect, migration in the region needs to be considered as a part of diverse expressions of the local, regional, and global developments in transnationalism. And it forces us to reconsider the relationship between nation-state, citizenship and cultural practices that transcend state borders. In order to critically interrogate such a relationship, it becomes crucially important to reconsider and redefine the relationship between the centre and the periphery in an East Asian context and to resituate it in the shifting terms of geopolitical, socio-cultural and economic realities in the region.

As I have discussed in previous chapters, the political relationship between China and Japan since the late nineteenth century has always been a contested one, fraught with ambiguities, difficulties and tensions. In particular, a growing sense of insecurity over Japan's place in a new regional order created by the rise of China or, to put it another way, a new geopolitical climate in East Asia in which China figures as a central feature of a regional dynamics in the early twentieth century, has increasingly highlighted the significance of major differences in constructing the politics of memory in both China and Japan. Such politics of memory, as well as Japan's increasingly dominant security framework in which China constitutes major security challenges and threats to the country, in turn, have significantly contributed to the reinforcement of the construction of boundaries between the two countries in political and historical terms.

Yet despite such underlying political tensions and the reworking of the imaginative geographies of threat and security, both sides of the borders have
always been marked by multiple border-crossings which include population movements, cultural traffic as well as the mobility of capital and goods. These border-crossings have always affected both countries to a considerable degree; these flows of population movements, along with other flows of commodities and ideas, have always enriched and replenished social and cultural formations in East Asia. In this respect, such social and cultural traffic has contributed to the development of social and cultural life in both China and Japan, though such interaction has often entailed tensions, complexities, misunderstandings as well as a sense of ambiguities, distrust and fear on both sides of the borders.

In this thesis, I have explored the border-crossings of Japanese women from a multiplicity of perspectives: the social, the cultural and the political. Throughout the chapters, I have pointed out that nation-states use various mechanisms to ensure that boundaries are kept in place and that the identities of people are defined, framed and maintained within the prescribed definition of a particular territory marked by the nation-states. Such acts of boundary-making constitute one of the central dimensions of ensuring national security and territoriality in its place. Yet individuals, as active agents of social and political change, transgress and renegotiate the boundaries as defined and imagined by such securitized narratives of the nation-state. Migration is an integral part of this process. In this context, the identities of individuals who cross national boundaries need to be examined and reframed in accordance with the transnational webs of connectedness that they form, articulate and sustain through their border-crossings.

**The City as a Crossroad: Towards Transnational Urban Studies of East Asia**

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The places called "Japan" or "China" have constantly been remade and traversed by multiple influences beyond their borders. Yet attention to the transnational practices of cooperation, interaction and exchanges across borders has often been subsumed into the central and singular narrative of the nation-state, its society and culture as a singular and linear entity across time and space. As a consequence, such assumed construction of authentic culture and society, which views these categories as distinct from the influences beyond the borders of the nation-state, has dominated our practice of thinking about the relationship between nation, territory and individuals.

In this regard, Gupta and Ferguson points out that the representations of space in the social sciences are dependent on "images of break, rupture, and disjunction" and that these images shape a seemingly unproblematic division of space. The promise of discontinuity, they stress, "forms the starting point from which to theorize contact, conflict, and contradiction between cultures and societies" (Gupta and Ferguson 1997b: 33-34).

Conventional understandings of East Asia as a region have primarily been based on this assumption of discontinuity: that the understandings of the region are to be predicated upon seemingly uncontested territorial boundaries between states in the region as we see them on a world map. The divisions between China, Japan and Korea have thus been theorized as stable and fixed markers of separation, making it unproblematic to stress rivalries and conflicts instead of exploring the social and cultural interconnectedness between these countries. As a result, little attention has been given to social and cultural processes that transcends the political boundaries between these countries and area studies about the region has been divided into three different fields of studies: China studies, Japan studies and Korea studies respectively.
Yet a strikingly different view of East Asia emerges when one looks at transnational webs and linkages beneath the level of state actions (T. J. Pempel 2005). In recent years, social scientists have questioned the usefulness of the traditional area-studies paradigm. They argue that the arbitrary demarcation of boundaries between countries, geographical areas, and civilizations limits our understanding of the subtle and complex connections and cross-cultural contacts. New scholarship therefore devotes greater attention to the movement of people, commodities and ideas across the rigid geographical divisions of East Asia. Such an understanding of the region challenges conventional approaches to, and perceptions of, East Asia as a place or region marked by fixed and stable boundaries. Despite the continued salience of the state as a dominant actor in shaping social and political boundaries, transnational movements of population, ideas and cultures are highlighting emerging social dynamics in which boundaries are contested and reconfigured by non-state actors. Transnational migration, particularly, intra-regional migration between countries in East Asia, as well as cultural exchanges in the region, are vital to these processes.

In particular, cities in East Asia offer a critical site in which to explore such process in social, political, economic and cultural terms. Considering the fact that global cities in the region are, and will continue to be, occupying a central place in the acts of reconfiguration and re-imagining boundaries, it becomes vital to tie urban studies to the larger issues of borders and boundaries in cities in East Asia. One can hope that more research in this

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95 For comprehensive accounts of emerging trends in regionalism in East Asia, see Pempel (2005).
97 In June 2008, Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister of Australia, suggested that there is a need to have a vision for an Asia-Pacific community, a vision that embraces a regional institution, which spans the entire Asia-Pacific region — including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and other states of the region to be able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, co-operation and action in economic and political matters and future challenges related to security (Franklin 2008: 1).
direction will be conducted in the coming years, as well as comparative studies of global cities in East Asia such as Shanghai, Hong Kong and Beijing and Sinagapore, where multicultural, or cosmopolitan, communities reveal transnational connections in these cities. Such scholarship will enable the more nuanced studies of, and approaches to, the social, political and cultural processes of re-bordering East Asia through the movements of people, commodities, ideas and diverse cultural practices.

**Boundaries as Social Constructs: Reconfiguring and renegotiating boundaries through migratory practices and processes**

In discussing the issue of boundaries in relation to controversies over public memory and historical narratives of the past, *Walk on Water* (Directed by Eytan Fox; 2004 Israel) provides an interesting insight into how different people, who are divided over the meanings and interpretations of the traumatic events in the past, may overcome the boundaries demarcated by different communities and contest their practices regarding historiography and its acts of reconstructing and remembering the past to shape its present and future of the community.

Eyal, whose parents were of Jewish origin in Germany, works as an agent in the Israel security service. His job is to target the enemies of Israel, particularly of the Jewish people. When he was given an assignment to track down an aging Nazi war criminal, he approaches his grandchildren, Axel and Pia, pretending that he is a tour guide in Israel. Pia lives in a Kibbutz, an Israeli commune. Although she has spent many years living in Israel, she still feels insecure and unsettled in respect to her identity as a German woman in Israel. Her brother, Axel, visits her in Israel to convince her to
return to Germany for their father’s seventieth birthday. But Pia is reluctant to do so due to her estrangement with her parents since she discovered that they were hiding her grandfather from prosecution.

Although he does not reveal his identity as an agent, Eyal befriends Axel and Pia and finds that they are individuals who are open to other cultures and people and thus do not identify with the racial hatred that led to the Holocaust and Jewish persecution in the early twentieth-century.

After a series of twists and turns, the film shows the life of Eyal and Pia two years after they first met, married with a baby, suggesting that they have found a way to harmonize the differences that exist between their communities in relation to history, memory and a sense of belonging to such communities in their own ways. The film ends with the scene of Eyal and Axel walking on water, conveying the main theme of the film — there are no boundaries based on race, ethnicity or one’s sense of belonging to a certain community as long as one has the courage to face such boundaries and to take a step forward, toward a future that is full of uncertainties but one that may make a great difference to the creation of the bonds between people across racial, national and other social and cultural divides. The film thus indicates the possibility of reconstituting communities — the ones that enable the dialogues between different cultures and people and thus initiate and enact social change which would be beneficial to overcoming boundaries.

Mobility and migration raise critical questions about assumed boundaries and traditions and demand new ways of thinking about the relationship between boundaries, culture and tradition. This thesis has thus sought to expand current conversations about our understandings of boundaries, security, nation, communities and culture in the study of transnational migration. Theorists of globalization have shown that states are increasingly
becoming powerless in the face of the power of transnational capital. They argue that boundaries are becoming meaningless and porous in the process of economic globalization. These theories, as I have argued in previous chapters, do not take into account the continuing centrality of boundaries in our everyday lives, in particular, the ways in which the state continues to possess exclusive power over the definition and control of its borders, and over who should be included into, or excluded from, its territory, both real and imagined. As such, the social and political practices of demarcating boundaries have been integral to nation-state's practices to sustain its identity in a shifting global order and to place and police the movements of people within its borders in relation to its ideals of the nation as a contained, demarcated and exclusive place which necessitates constant protection from undesirable transgression by “others”.

Yet despite the state's efforts to maintain its territorial and national integrity, boundaries are reconfigured and transgressed by a variety of non-state actors and processes in a variety of ways. Central to this process is the movements of people across state borders. Such mobility is not only aided and sustained by new technological developments in transport and travel but also by other movements: the mobility of culture, ideas and information about “other” places and people. The locations in which these movements and travel take place are highly concentrated in cities where new ideas and conceptions about belonging, citizenship boundaries, communities and traditions are constantly being created, negotiated, reconsidered and contested.

In this thesis, I have discussed the migratory processes of Japanese women in Shanghai since the early 2000s — their negotiation over the meanings and operation of boundaries between China and Japan as well as a number of factors and reasons why they find it attractive to live and work in Shanghai in terms of their shifting perceptions of urban China. The growth of Shanghai
as a global city, as well as opportunities associated with this urban development, has been central to the shaping of their migratory processes. I have also considered the importance of non-economic incentives for these processes.

Their identification of Shanghai as a place of opportunities suggests the possibility of redrawing the established political map of divisions between China and Japan that places the rivalry between the two nations and different interpretations of historical events at the centre of bilateral relations. The importance of non-economic factors in their migratory processes draws our attention to multiple dimensions of migration.

As I have discussed in previous chapters, Shanghai, as an emerging global city in East Asia, provides a site of contact zones between China and Japan. This mapping of the city urges us to shift our understanding of the boundary between the two countries: the boundary can be seen not only as a site of separation and division, but also as a site of dialogues and encounters. The migration of Japanese women to Shanghai highlights the role of the city in such a process. Furthermore, understanding Shanghai in such terms would enable us to see the city as the product and site of connections between different places and cultures, thus challenging and defying the concept of place as the repository of pure, single and unitary culture per se.

The circulation of people across national borders, as well as flows of ideas and cultural products that are associated with this process, is reshaping East Asia in the twenty-first century. The rise of China, the emergence of a multi-polar regional order as well as the centrality of the city in social, political economic and cultural aspects of transnational processes, constitute integral part of such circulations and flows in the region.
The significance of the availability of opportunities in my interviewees’ accounts of their motivations for moving to Shanghai highlights that their migratory processes are inextricably interconnected to changes in the economic and urban landscapes of China of which their spatial mobility is understood to be a constitutive part. Yet these women are not simply patterned outcomes of macro-political and economic processes but geographically and socially constituted subjects in their own right.

Most importantly, their acts of migration draw our attention to the potential for, and the importance of, overcoming the constructed binaries between “us” and “them” in rethinking East Asia as the site of interdependency, connectedness and cohesiveness. By crossing boundaries between China and Japan, they negotiate the multiple meanings of boundaries between the two countries: the boundaries as inclusion and exclusion; and the boundaries as sites of negotiations between the national, the local, the regional and the global. They are transnational actors who question state-centered definitions of boundaries and give them new meanings. Rather than conforming to the increasingly dominant Japanese political view that China poses a threat to Japan’s national security — or to the previous assumptions about China as underdeveloped and undesirable, these women, being active participants of the dynamic processes of contesting and negotiating boundaries, reconfigure the socially constructed boundaries between China and Japan: they reconfigure such boundaries though their identification of Shanghai as a place of urban dynamism and of transnational connections. By doing so, they seek to create a different mapping of East Asia through multiple attachments to places, exchanges and interactions with the people they encounter across

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These assumptions reflect only part of Japanese views about China. As I have already pointed out, the construction of binary distinctions between Japan as ‘us’ and Asia as ‘others’ was integral to the modernization process of Japan. Yet centuries of exchanges and cultural interactions with China highlight the ambivalent and multifaceted perceptions about China, which are still relevant today.
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