USE OF THESES

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A U.S. Territory in Japan’s South Sea Islands: The Japanese Navy Administration of Guam

Wakako Higuchi

20 August 2006

A Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University
Declaration

This thesis is totally my original work.

Wakako Higuchi
20 August 2006
Canberra, Australia
Acknowledgement

I could not have completed this work without the invaluable help of staff of the Australian National University, especially Professors Donald Denoon and Hank Nelson, Divisional Administrator Ms. Dorothy McIntosh, and Administrators Ms. Marion Weeks and Maxine McArthur of the Division of Pacific and Asian History. I am grateful to the Australian government and The Australian National University for their generous scholarship assistance.

My study of the Guam Minseibu began when Mr. Yamaguchi Yoji of the Japan Institute for Pacific Studies, Tokyo, showed me a Japanese Army manuscript on Guam under Japanese rule. His Micronesian collection and his enthusiasm gave me the idea to conduct a comparative study of a U.S. territory and Japan’s South Seas mandate.

Ms. Rose Manibusan, Chief of Interpretation, War in the Pacific, National Historical Park, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, found a government grant for my initial research, especially interviews with former military and South Seas Bureau officers in Japan. The product of this research, “Remembering the War Years on Guam: A Japanese Perspective” established a basis for my thinking.

In spite of their age and physical condition, often unknown to me, a hundred Japanese informants took me into their confidence and told me what they could remember in response to my many questions. Of these informants, I especially express my gratitude to the late Mr. Kosuge Teruo of the South Sea Islands Association, the late Mr. Niino Michio, a former Guam Minseibu officer, and the late Mr. Yamashita Yasuhiro, First Lieutenant of the Japanese Army, who served on Guam.

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Lastly, Mr. Nakahashi Kiyoshi passed away as I completed this thesis. Without his personal letters, I could not have written Chapter Six with confidence.
Abstract

This thesis examines the Japanese Imperial Navy’s administrative policy for Guam, implemented from December 1941 until July 1944, when U.S. forces retook the island. Guam was invaded by Japan simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbour. This southernmost island of the Mariana Islands chain in Micronesia had been under U.S. Naval administration since 1898, when it was taken from Spain at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. This thesis examines Guam under Japanese naval rule in relation to the navy’s policies for Japan’s South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Gunto). The South Sea Islands were the Micronesian islands occupied by Japan in 1914, and mandated to Japan by the League of Nations in 1919.

With its own notion of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideology, the Navy occupied Guam and other southern areas, and attempted to establish political and economic relationships with territories and peoples under its rule. On Guam, the navy’s civil administration organization, the Minseibu, was responsible for this task. The navy’s goal was “organic integration” between Japan and Guam. However, the navy did not explain the measures that would provide direction and substance to “organic,” although it was the navy’s favourite term. To understand the terminology and actual policies, this thesis examines two major issues: the navy’s pre-war policies for the South Sea Islands and its governing plans for the South Seas; and the Guam Minseibu’s policy for political, economic, and cultural affairs for ruling the Chamorro people.

I argue that the navy’s concept of “organic” was prepared as a guiding idea for peaceful economic expansion to the south. However, it evolved according to Japan’s urgent need for natural resources and became a plan for the military defence of the Pacific. With Japan’s move toward aggression and shortage of defence resources, the navy’s ideal of “organic” was transformed. The “organic” policy that aimed at mutual cooperation was turned into ethnic rule. This was expressed in the Guam Minseibu’s rule over the Chamorros. As a result, Guam and its people were thrown into a centripetal movement toward Japan’s military, society, state, and Emperor system. The navy’s unique ideal was finally exposed for what it was, concentric circles of the Japanese government’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideology.
This is the first study to reconstruct Japanese naval administration on Guam based on government and naval documents, private records, and oral testimony, while taking into consideration the relationship between two different colonial entities, Guam, a U.S. territory, and the South Sea Islands, Japan’s strategic area.
[Map 2] The South Sea Islands and Guam (April 1938)
[Photo 1] The Guam Minseibu Staff at the Ōmiya Shintō Shrine (January 1944)

Wakako Higuchi Personal Collection
Front row: Minseibu Chief Homura Teiichi (centre), Takenaka Kisaku (teacher, first right of Homura), Fr. Komatsu Shigeru (second right of Homura), Police Officer Hirata Saiki (fourth right of Homura). Second row: Chamorro women (assistant teachers), Chamorro man (third from right), Saipan-Chamorro (second from right). Third row: Head of Chamorro patrolman on Saipan Juan Castro (sixth from right, with sunglasses).

[Photo 2] Chamorro-Japanese Students at Azotea (Old Spanish Structure Connected and Perpendicular to the Governor’s Palace) at the Plaza de Espanã, Agana (1942)

Wakako Higuchi Personal Collection
Front row from left: Sawada Haruko, Chong Villati, Ruth Birathi Fujihara, Shinohara Shizuko
Second row: Elizabeth Flores, Sayama Masuko, Chong Yamanaka, Rafael Villati, Fujikawa Kimiko. Third row: --- Conception, Fujikawa Fumiko
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Introduction

Background

This thesis examines the Imperial Japanese Navy’s occupation and administration of Guam during the Pacific War. Guam was the only U.S. territory where a Minseibu, the navy’s civil administration department, carried out civil affairs under a military administration.¹ As the title of this thesis indicates, Guam was not only geographically encircled but politically and strategically surrounded by the South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Guntō), a mandated territory of the League of Nations and later considered Japan’s territory by the navy. The thesis examines occupied Guam in the context of the navy’s policy for the region. In order to clarify the pre-war status of Guam and the South Sea Islands, I sketch the historical and political background of these two jurisdictions.

Guam is the southernmost island in the Mariana Islands archipelago and with 500 square kilometres is the largest island in Micronesia. The earliest settlers to Guam and the northern Mariana Islands were Austronesian speakers, most likely from the Philippines.

First European contact with the Chamorros, the indigenes of Guam, was made by Captain General Ferdinand Magellan in 1521. When Miguel López de Legazpi from Mexico stopped on Guam 1565 on the way to the Philippines, he claimed the islands in the name of Philip II of Spain. For over 200 years, Guam was a supply port for the galleons that sailed 3,000 miles between Acapulco and Manila — the “Spanish lake”.

After Father San Vitores and seven missionaries arrived in 1662, Spanish religious conquest and Chamorro resistance began. This resulted in the killing of San Vitores in 1672 and the reduction of the Chamorro population from an estimated 12,000 on Guam to less than 2,000 by 1690.² When the last organised resistance ended in 1698, Chamorro women began marrying Spanish, Mexican, and Filipino soldiers, the ancestors of the present Chamorro people.

Concerning the Micronesian islands beyond Guam, the Vatican recognised the Caroline and Palau Islands as Spanish possessions in 1885, and the Marshall Islands

¹ Since 1899, except during the Japanese occupation, the political status of Guam has been “... an unincorporated territory ... Guam, like Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, is appurtenant to the United States and belongs to the United States, but is not a part of the United States. Unincorporated areas are not integral parts of the United States and no promise of statehood or a status approaching statehood is held out to them.” Robert F. Rogers, Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), p. 222.
were incorporated into a German protectorate by agreements between Germany and France in 1885, and with Britain in 1886. After the Spanish-American War of 1898, Germany purchased all the Micronesian groups, except Guam, and remained in control from 1899 to 1914. Also in 1898, the United States gained Guam as a spoil of war. This event divided the Chamorros. From 1899 to 1941, the Chamorros of Guam were ruled by U.S. naval captains who served as governors. Essentially, Guam was a U.S. naval station administered by a series of autocrats for 40 years.

Japan’s participation in World War I provided her official entry into Micronesia. In 1914, the main islands of the German-held South Sea Islands north of the equator were taken by Japan and ruled by the navy until 1922. During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, these islands were designated as “C” Class mandated territory of the League of Nations with Japan as a mandatory. With this change, the navy departed and the South Seas Bureau (Nan’yōchō), a civilian agency, took over administration until the military resumed full control late in the Pacific War.

In June 1941, the population of Guam consisted of 23,394 people, mainly Chamorros.\(^3\) In contrast, the Japanese population in the South Sea Islands was some 90,000 out of a total 141,000 in 1942.\(^4\) From the Japanese viewpoint, this U.S. territory stood in Japan’s ocean as a “cancer disturbing the peace of the South Sea Islands.”\(^5\) In December 1941, Guam was attacked simultaneously with Pearl Harbour and Guam was occupied. As a consequence, the island became part of Japan’s South Sea Islands.

**Purpose of the Study**

Japan entered the Pacific War (the Greater East Asia War) by declaring the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and using two key terms, hakkō ichiu (universal concord) and onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru (to enable all nations to find their proper place in the world).\(^6\) The sphere manifested an ideology of the extreme Tenno

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\(^3\) *The Annual Report of the Governor of Guam*, 1941, p. 78.


\(^6\) One of the few official translations for hakkō ichiu appeared in a draft of a diplomatic memorandum to the United States dated 12 May 1941. The draft translated hakkō ichiu as: “Both Governments declare that it is their traditional concept and conviction that nations and races are composed, as members of a family are composed, of one household under the idea of universal concord based on justice and equity, each [government] equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interest regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves [as they are bound not to defend for themselves] as they are bound not to destroy for others. There should be, of course, neither oppression nor exploitation of the backward
system that attempted to justify and beautify Japan’s expansion. The navy also attempted to formulate a plan for realising these slogans in the southern areas where it was responsible for administration (See Table 1, p. 12).

First, this study clarifies the Japanese Navy’s occupation of Guam and the Minseibu’s (Civil Administration’s) rule of the Chamorro people during the War. Taking into account the navy’s South Sea Islands administration, I examine Guam for aspects of the navy’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideology.

There are several studies of Japanese military administration in areas that were important to Japan because of their natural resources and labour. The navy was responsible for the Dutch Indies, New Guinea, New Britain, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Guam. Except for the Dutch Indies (Indonesia), these ocean territories have scarcely been touched by researchers beyond reconstructions based on oral accounts. But these areas were also important defence outposts for Japan. Guam was the only former U.S. territory where the Japanese Navy established a Minseibu. The Guam Minseibu was placed directly under the base force and the naval commander enforced civil administration. In contrast, a high-ranking civilian governor supervised civil administration in the Dutch Indies. Guam was surrounded by the South Sea Islands and by 1935 was regarded as Japan’s territory, no longer a mandate. The South Sea Islands became the navy’s advance post where twenty-seven air bases were built before the outbreak of war (see Appendixes 1 and 2). Guam was part of the Marianas where Saipan and Tinian, two of Japan’s most important defence posts, were located. Through the occupation, Guam became one of the supply islands in the chain linking Japan to the occupied southern areas.

To understand the ephemeral nature of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere doctrine, it is necessary to observe military administration in places with a limited land and a small population. In the examination of directly ruled small areas, we have an opportunity to understand Japan’s real intentions in the context of its co-prosperity sphere ideology.

peoples.” The government’s last memorandum to President Roosevelt on 6 December 1941 translated “onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru” as “It is the immutable policy of the Japanese government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby enable all nations to find each their proper place in the world.” Government of Japan confidential memorandum in English to the United States drafted on 12 May 1941; and Memorandum from the Japanese government to the United States sent on 6 December 1941, in Kase Toshikazu, Nihon gaikōshi 20: Nichibei kōshō (Tokyo: Kajima Heiwa Kenkyūjo, 1980), p. 108 and p. 302. Also see Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke’s statement of 1 August 1940, and the formal announcement of the Tripartite Alliance. U.S. Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, p. 573.
The second purpose is, more importantly, the study of the meaning of the navy’s goal of “organic integration” and its intention through the practical administrative policies the Minseibu pushed forward.

Soon after the first military operation in the Greater East Asia War, the navy decided its policies for civil administration in the Outline for the Conduct of Military Administration in Occupied Area, in March 1942. The navy’s goal was “organic integration,” officially supported by Japan’s principle for military administration in occupied areas, namely: “Administrative and other policies shall be so devised as to facilitate the organic integration of the entire region into the Japanese Empire.”

Six months before this outline, the navy’s Research Section, the navy’s policymaking unit, prepared Nanpō kokudo keikaku (the Plan for Southern National Lands, September 1941). The terms “organic new order,” “organic links” (ketsugō), “organic existence” and “organic organisation” were used to explain the ideal unified relationship between Japan and the southern areas. After a year, the section stipulated the foundation of these concepts in Daitōa Kyōeiken ron (The Study of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, September 1942). This document deserves attention because it was written when the navy began full-scale administration, and included serious study of material prepared prior to the war. Instead of the government’s slogans, hakkō ichiu and onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru, the navy used “organic coexistence and co-prosperity,” “organic links,” “organic relationship,” and “organic unification” to describe the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, or “unification sharing a common destiny for Asia’s coexistence and co-prosperity.” Figure 1 shows the navy’s ideal formulation.

Why did the navy retain this conceptual and ideological expression without concreteness and persuasiveness? Did they intend to give a pregnant meaning to the term? I take particular interest in the navy’s concept, but the term was not used systematically, nor did the navy define “organic.” The dictionary meaning suggests the navy’s fundamental principle for administering foreign people as: “a situation where many parts gather to make one, in which close unification exists between each part, and

7 “Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 1942).
9 Kaigun Chōsaka, “Daitōa Kyōeiken ron” (1 September 1942), in Shōwa shakai keizaishi shiryō shūsei dai jūdana-kan: Kaigunshō shiryō (17), pp. 19 and 44.
where there are logical relationships between each part and the total.”10 The establishment of an “organic” connection according to “logical relationships” between Japan and other races would be a key concept in the navy’s administrative work.

This “logical relationship” would be based on “organic difference”, which was not arbitrary or discriminatory, but derived from the undeniable characteristics of each race — history, traditions, customs, social structure, and especially ability, value, and cultural level.11 Notably, this rationale was made by Japan, the liberator of Asian peoples. The “organic difference” would be consistent with “onoono sono tokoro o esesimuru” concept.12 The navy wanted to establish several relationships with the occupied areas, to break the status quo of Asia and develop positive connections. The navy also expected Asian peoples to accomplish their roles according to their own initiative. I believe that the navy would call such a productive atmosphere “organic integration” of the whole.

Originally the navy was reluctant to use the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere slogans which were directed by the government under the army’s leadership. It pointed out that the slogan of hakko ichiu, as well as New Order, were too simple and vague to serve as national policy for organising and unifying culturally, economically, and politically diverse areas and peoples making up Greater East Asia.13 Because these terms became clichés, the navy emphasised “what import these slogans would imply.”14 I interpret this to mean that the navy believed that “organic integration” under Japan’s leadership would be accomplished according to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere policy, onoono sono tokoro o esesimuru.

The reason why the affirmative term came to the forefront of the navy’s thinking is related to the navy’s “traditional policy” which was southward advance through economic expansion, in a phrase, “peaceful method.” The navy entered the war and began its military administration in the occupied south in a dilemma between (on one hand) military responsibilities, and (on the other hand) “organic relationship” with regard to diverse ethnic groups. The result of the navy’s efforts is an indelible stain on Asia and the Pacific. However, future studies will examine how the navy attempted to implement its concepts, how it did not confront its limitations, and how the navy’s activities contradicted its promises.

12 Ibid., p. 19.
13 “Shisō kondankai (hyōgo no kenkyū)” (30 September 1941), in Shōwa shakai keizaishi shiryō shūsei dai jūyon-kan: Kaigunshō shiryō (14), pp. 264 and 268.
I argue that the navy was inspired by “organic” – an insubstantial term with a vaguely peaceful meaning just as it was struggling to conciliate the southern resource areas. Although the navy optimistically proposed the ideal of military administration after occupation of the southern areas, it shifted its motives and the meaning of “organic” during Japan’s expansion and total defeat. During these dramatic events, the term for interdependent relations came to be thought of as concentric circles of subordination within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideology.

Literature Review and Approach

Three main approaches have been used in the study of the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The first is through an examination of the military administration as political and diplomatic history. The main work in this approach is M.A. Aziz’ *Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia* (1955), and F.C. Jones’ *Japan’s New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945* (1954). Aziz claimed that Japanese occupation and administrative policies toward Indonesia were patterned by her colonial experience in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria. Focusing on Japan’s conflicting political aims and methods in Indonesians, Aziz described how serious mistakes and misunderstanding turned its rule into a version of European colonialism and provoked Indonesian nationalism. Jones described Japanese military attempts and failures in Southeast Asia as a part of the study of Japanese hegemony in these areas and its catastrophic end.

The second main approach consists of studies of army and navy regimes in the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and other South East Asian states. Large populations and land size, and a strong sense of national and racial independence resulted in strong anti-Japanese movements. For these reasons, the study of Japanese military administration has focused on how Japanese intervention set the stage for the transition to independence. Willard Elsbree argued that Japanese rule served as “catalytic agents in the dissolution of the old order.”†† Alfred W. McCoy studied Japanese wartime administration through the sociological and cultural/anthropological examination of local politics and society. He took up subjects such as anti-Japanese movements, collaboration in politics and society and the collaboration of elites.‡‡

‡‡ McCoy, Alfred W., “Politics by Other Means: World War II in the Western Visayas, Philippines,” in *Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation*, ed. McCoy, Alfred W.,
The third approach is typical of wartime studies of the Pacific Islands. These are based on personal accounts and oral testimony. The major publications which refer to the Japanese period on Guam rely on this method: Pedro Sanchez’s *Guam 1941-1945: Wartime Occupation and Liberation* (1983); Tony Palomo’s *An Island in Agony* (1984); and Chris Perez Howard’s *Mariguita: A Guam History* (1982). In recent years, two scholars have analysed the wartime experiences of Islanders, going beyond simple oral historiography. These are Geoffrey M. White’s *The Pacific Theater: Island Representations of World War II* (1989), and Lin Poyer’s *The Typhoon of War: Micronesia Experience of the Pacific War* (2001).

Oral history is often based on fragmentary episodes from individual memories. Such accounts do not discuss, analyse or complement other studies, or examine and re-examine issues. Nor are such studies normally placed in a larger context. Hence, the Pacific Islands during the Japanese occupation have not yet been fully examined to explain Japanese rule; for example, when, where, and under what circumstances did shortages of the necessities of life, forced labour, physical torture, rape, plunder, speech control, and other restrictions take place? The major reason for limited studies has been the insufficiency of original material, particularly documents about the Japanese administration. In some areas there is sufficient material, but bridging material is often missing. McCoy has commented on the lack of parallel studies that would require study of Japanese material:

Unlike the large number of “impact” and “response” studies done to date, parallel examination of most military aspects of Japanese policy — economic management, special policy, civil-military relations, etc. — has yet to be undertaken for what it tells us about the Japanese war efforts and the society behind that effort. Once completed, such work will give us a far clearer perspective of Japanese operations, and will allow the study of the war’s impact on Southeast Asia to proceed at a much higher level of analysis.

McCoy called for parallel studies in 1980 but very few such studies have been published. Ōta Kōki, of Tōhoku Joshi University, is the only scholar who has tried to clarify the entire phenomenon of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in a series

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19 McCoy, Alfred W., ed., ibid., p. 9.
of studies using military and administrative documents from various areas. This method can generate valuable findings. Stimulated by Ōta’s careful work, the primary approach of this thesis is to reconstruct a history of the Japanese military administration of Guam based on oblique and peripheral, but reliable, evidence. This evidence consists of many Japanese government documents as well as personal records that provide context and substance for “historical facts” in oral testimonies. In other words, I attempt to write a Guam history during the Japanese occupation beyond established history based mainly on oral accounts.

With this methodology, I interpret each feature of the military administration of Guam from the viewpoint of the navy’s management of the South Sea Islands. I examine non-militarisation in these Islands and how it related to Guam’s occupation by Japan. The thesis considers efforts to bring about economic development; and analyses the application of Japanisation to Guam’s Chamorros. Although I can present more evidence from the South Sea Islands than from the Guam Minseibu, I demonstrate a mutual and consistent administrative relation. This thesis is the first attempt to study Guam and the South Sea Islands in the same framework. Previous studies examine Guam or Micronesia but not both, or emphasize oral testimony with no wider framework.

I focus on the navy’s notion of “organic relationship” and its connection to “organic integration” policies in the context of military administration for Guam. I have not found any definition or explanation of “organic” in navy documents. However, understanding the meaning of “organic” in Japanese dictionaries, I dare to take this approach because the navy’s effort and goal can be clarified when I examine fragmentary historical facts within the general notions of “organic relationship” and “organic integration.”

**Thesis Structure**

Between the introduction and conclusion, this thesis has six chapters. Chapter One reviews the navy’s interest in Western Pacific defence in relation to the occupation of Guam. Chapter Two is an overview of the navy’s South Sea Islands and southward advance policy. Chapters Three through Six review the Guam Minseibu policies and explain the navy’s effort and failure to realise “organic integration.”

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20 Ōta Kōki’s publications are listed in the Bibliography.
Chapter One defines the navy’s interest in the South Sea Islands by examining its attitude while negotiating international treaties. This reveals that the navy’s original policy for the Pacific was self-defence. However, this changed in the late 1930s from preparations for peace to armed expansion for war. The etymology of the term “organic” is related to this turning point.

As background to how the navy got its idea of “organic relations” with the southern areas, Chapter Two explains the navy’s involvement in the South Sea Islands administration in the late 1930s. According to the navy’s southward plan based on the South Sea Islands, and movements to seek southern resources, it drew up blueprints for the South Sea Islands including further southern areas, using the term “organic.” The “organic relations” plan was later applied to the occupied areas of the south and even to Guam’s military administration.

Chapter Three describes the Minseibu’s structure, organization, personnel and dissolution. Scarcely any documents exist, but this chapter reveals the navy’s purposes, aims, and goal. These were all related to basic policies to support the military presence and war preparedness. The first effort at integration was into navy rule.

Chapter Four examines Navy Commander Homura Teiichi’s administration as head of the Minseibu. Homura rigidly followed navy policy, an aggressive approach that stressed Chamorro unification into the Japanese social-political movement. In contrast stands the work of a South Seas Bureau administrator, Yamano Yūkichi. His work reveals the navy’s intention in its civil administration, i.e., the effort to integrate the Chamorros into Japan’s military rule.

One of the direct causes of Japan’s war and two of its three administrative purposes was the dire need for natural resources. Chapter Five examines the Guam Minseibu’s economic policy. The first part reviews Guam’s industrial role and plans to establish a baseline for developing Guam as a food supply base. The second part of the chapter describes the Minseibu’s plan, its enforcement, and the result of industrial activities. The navy’s management of Chamorro labour was a key method for absorbing the people into Japan’s war effort. Therefore, the chapter’s third part explains what physical methods and policies the Minseibu applied for achieving its the final goal. My analysis of economic integration clarifies a basic deception in the navy’s “organic” notion. Its success depended on the Chamorro’s attitude that was formed or manipulated as part of the effort at ideological Japanisation.

The last chapter is “Cultural Integration into the Imperial Way.” Japan’s fundamental method for governing other races was Japanisation. First, this chapter
examines the Minseibu’s initial step in Japanisation — to discourage the Chamorros’ pro-American Catholicism. The second part examines efforts to instil the Japanese language — Japanese spiritual blood — into the Chamorros to assimilate them. The third part examines the Minseibu’s plan to elevate Japanisation toward kōminka or kōminisation, to mould the people into loyal subjects of the Emperor. According to this ideology, becoming the Emperor’s subjects would complete the “integration” of the Chamorro people into Japan’s national body.

I conclude that the navy’s idea for “organic relations” before the war became “organic integration” in terms of administration policy. The Guam Minseibu’s work was not to establish an equal relation but an integration of the occupied peoples into Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The navy’s ideology of “organic” completely replaced hakkō ichiu, Japan’s slogan for the war.

*Note, my software does not allow me to use the macron. I use the circumflex instead in this thesis.
[Figure 1]
The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere
Minister of the Navy, Research Section (1942)

*These territories were added by author.
* Dotted line means diplomatic relationship.
* Solid line means control relationship
### Table 1: The Japanese Navy's Administrations for Civil Affairs in Occupied Areas (As of 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Authorized Area</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Abolition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borneo Civil Administration Department (Minselbu)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dutch Borneo Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebes Civil Administration Department (Minselbu)</td>
<td>Makassar, Menado Branch and Singaradja Branch</td>
<td>Celebes Islands</td>
<td>Mar. 10, 1942</td>
<td>Menado Branch (Jan. 31, 1944), Singaradja Branch (Dec. 24, 1942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Britain Civil Administration Department (Minselbu)</td>
<td>Rabaul</td>
<td>Bismarck Islands</td>
<td>Mar. 10, 1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andaman Civil Administration Department (Minselbu)</td>
<td>Port Blair</td>
<td>Andaman and Nicobar Islands</td>
<td>Oct. 13, 1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam Civil Administration Department (Minselbu)</td>
<td>Apra</td>
<td>Guam Island</td>
<td>Jan. 1, 1942</td>
<td>March 1, 1944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter One

The Navy’s South Sea Islands Between the Wars

On 8 December (7 December in Hawaii) 1941, Japan began its air attack on U.S. military facilities on Guam. At dawn on 10 December, 130 sailors and 2,743 soldiers of the Army’s South Seas Detachment landed. Six hours later, Captain G. J. McMillin, Governor of Guam, signed a letter of surrender.¹ The Japanese proclaimed:

“that our Japanese Army has occupied this island of Guam by order of the Great Emperor of Japan. It is for the purpose of restoring liberty and rescuing the whole Asiatic people and creating the permanent peace in Asia. Thus our intention is to establish the New Order of the World.”²

Guam was renamed Ōmiyajima (Ōmiyatō), “the island of the Imperial Court.” Next day, the Imperial General Headquarters’ Navy and Army Sections announced the completion of the Guam operation. On 11 December the War Guidance Office in the Imperial Headquarters Army Department noted: “U.S. bases in the Pacific were gradually wiped out. President Roosevelt looks distressed. The U.S. and British sense of defeat cannot be hidden.”³

Guam, the most westerly, smallest U.S. Pacific possession, was vulnerable because it was isolated, 3,315 miles west of Pearl Harbour, 1,504 miles east of Subic Bay and only 1,347 miles south of Yokosuka, Japan. Guam was surrounded by a “veritable shoal” of Japanese-held islands, one of which was Truk, 584 miles to the south, home port of the 4th Feet. Saipan, from where the Japanese initial land and air assault took place, was just 100 miles north. Japan’s attack proposed to “suppress the enemy menace in the South Sea Islands.”⁴ But this was the navy’s tactics, not strategy. Broadly, strategy is the preparation, planning, and pursuit of war over a long period. The occupation of Guam was part of the navy’s strategy for the South Sea Islands.

¹ The deceased: six American and 30 Chamorro soldiers; the injured: 30 American and 50 Chamorro soldiers. 230 military personnel were taken prisoner. The Japanese casualties were one death and six injured. Five Saipan Chamorro scouts were missing. Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu, Senshi sōsho: Chūbu Taiheiyo hōmen kaigun sakusen (1), Shōwa jūnana-ten go-gatsu made (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbonsha, 1970), pp. 266 and 268.
⁴ Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu, Senshi sōsho: Chūbu Taiheiyo hōmen kaigun sakusen (1), Shōwa jūnana-ten go-gatsu made, p. 236.
So, what strategy did the Japanese Navy have for the South Sea Islands? Under what circumstances was Guam taken? This chapter examines the phased change of the navy’s posture from defensive to aggressive. The occupation of Guam was not simply planned according to Japan’s territorial ambitions. It was unnecessary for the Japanese Navy to introduce the “organic” ideology to justify its occupation of Guam. This study clarifies the navy’s Pacific policy between the wars and suggests some gaps between the escalation of its militarisation and the purpose for taking Guam.

Although there are many other approaches to the study of the development of Japanese Navy’s attitude, this chapter analyses navy policy and strategy through Japan’s international negotiations of agreements and treaties which limited her militarisation efforts in the South Sea Islands. Together with Chapter 2, this chapter clarifies the background of the occupation of Guam in comparison with the South Sea Islands.

**Naval Limitations and the Pacific Status Quo**

Japan’s first naval action in the Western Pacific came when she joined World War I in 1914. Japan’s involvement was a sensitive issue for the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, and, of course, the U.S., all of whom had Pacific territories. Great Britain tried to restrict Japan’s activities to the western and southern China Seas and north of the equator. Nevertheless the Japanese Navy occupied the main centres of German Micronesia, later referred to as the South Sea Islands. Leaving the U.S. behind, Japan concluded a secret agreement with Britain in February 1917, to support each other’s territorial interests in the Pacific. Japan concluded similar agreements with France, Russia, and Italy. When Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Mandate for the German Possessions in the Pacific Ocean Lying North of the Equator (the Mandate Agreement) were approved by the Council of the League of Nations in December 1920, Japan gained a Class “C” mandate over the South Sea Islands. Japan therefore seemed provocative and therefore suspect.

**Article 22 of the Covenant**

Clause 5 of Article 22 of the Covenant and Article 4 of the Mandate Agreement prohibited the establishment of military and naval bases and fortifications in areas held under mandate. It also prohibited military training of natives except as police and local defence forces. Mark Peattie wrote that the principal issue for naval advisers to the
American delegation was Japan’s demilitarisation of the islands that began in 1914.\textsuperscript{5} Yazaki Yukio likewise argued that the most important decision at Versailles was to distribute the South Sea Islands to Japan on condition of their non-militarisation.\textsuperscript{6} However, a review of the origins of the demilitarisation clause reveals a contradictory U.S. attitude, and consequently some influence on the Japanese Navy’s view of Pacific defence.

According to The Drafting of the Covenant by David H. Miller, President Wilson’s legal adviser, Wilson prepared the first draft from a text written by Colonel Edward M. House, his chief military adviser. In January 1919, Wilson prepared the second draft (the First Paris Draft), recognising General Jan C. Smuts’s famous pamphlet, League of Nations – A Practical Suggestion. Wilson’s First Paris Draft stated, “the mandatory States or agency shall in no case form or maintain any military or naval force, native or other”, but the draft did not prohibit fortifications.\textsuperscript{7}

General Tasker H. Bliss, U.S. Army representative to the Allied Supreme War Council, remarked on Wilson’s First Paris Draft that it should be made clear that the mandatory is not to maintain a military force of native troops.\textsuperscript{8} But Bliss did not mention a ban on fortifications. Wilson’s Second Paris Draft was not amended and nearly the same plan was presented on 20 January 1919 as the third plan.

On 24 January, all Council of Ten members, including Japan, agreed to confiscate all German colonies. A Draft Convention regarding Mandates (Revised January 24, 1919) insisted on annexing these territories and was submitted by Britain. The British Draft stated that there were no “vested territories” where the following practices would be permitted: the establishment and maintenance of fortifications or fortified bases or native armed forces, except to the extent necessary for guarding or policing the territory.\textsuperscript{9} Finally, the non-militarisation provision was clarified, but for non-specified areas.

The British accepted all, including Wilson’s suggestions regarding the mandate system. So the Council discussed Smuts’ resolution and called for a prohibition of the


\textsuperscript{6} Yazaki Yukio, Mikronesia shintaku tōchi no kenkyū (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1999), p. 74.

\textsuperscript{7} ”Wilson’s Second Draft or First Paris Draft, 10 January 1919 with Comments and Suggestions by D.H.M.,” in Miller, David, H., The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume Two (N.Y. and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928), p. 89.

\textsuperscript{8} ”Suggestion of General Tasker H. Bliss, 14 January 1919, Regarding Wilson’s First Paris Draft,” in Ibid., p. 97.

\textsuperscript{9} Miller, David, H., The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume One, p. 106.
military fortification and naval bases in Central Africa (a “B” mandate). For the first
time, this restriction also was applied to the north Pacific, or the South Sea Islands.
This provision was revised to read “the prevention of the establishment of fortifications
or military and naval bases and of the military training of the natives for other than
policing and the defence of the territory.”10 With a “minor amendment”, the provision
became Article 22 of the Covenant on 28 April 1920.

To sum up, the non-militarisation clause applied to all countries holding
mandates. Because of the involvement of many delegates, it cannot be determined who
suggested the clause and why it was agreed, but it was not a major point of contention.
There is no evidence that the U.S. delegation had a great concern to prevent Japan’s
possession and militarisation of the South Sea Islands.

The lack of concern by the U.S. delegation was because U.S. naval policy for
Guam was still a matter of debate. Although David Miller, Wilson’s legal adviser,
wrote, “The remaining islands should not become naval bases”, the matter was left
ambiguous.11 In 1906, William Taft, Secretary of War under President Theodore
Roosevelt, endorsed recommendations to fortify Subic Bay and Manila Bay in the
Philippines, Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, Puget Sound in Washington State, and Guam.
But in November 1909, the Army and Navy Board decided that no major bases should
be established farther west than Pearl Harbour. In 1910, the Naval War College studied
the suitability of Guam as a major naval base. To recognise the navy’s compromise and
enhance security at minimal cost, President Taft issued an order in 1912 that Guam be
closed to all “foreign vessels of commerce … except by special authority”, along with
Guantanamo Bay, Pearl Harbour, and Subic Bay.12 When Japan occupied the German
Micronesian islands in 1914, Commander Edward S. Kellogg of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet
wrote, “The recent acquisition of the Marshall and Caroline Islands by Orange [Japan]
is an advance beyond the natural frontier, which temporarily isolates Guam but does not
detract from its natural strategic advantages.”13 Then in March 1916, the plan of the
U.S. Navy’s General Board to develop home and outlying bases oddly ignored Guam.
Captain H.E. Yarnell, who had helped argue the navy’s program at the Peace
Conference, indicated that the principal obstacle to the development of Guam as a first-

10 Miller, David, H., ibid., p. 110.
11 Miller, David, H., ibid., p. 110.
13 Pomeroy, Earl S., Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia (California:
class naval base was “still in the realm of national policy making”. As late as 1919, U.S. strategic planners considered logistical support in any future campaign against Japan to be secure only as far west as Pearl Harbour.

As the U.S. was still in the early stages of debate about the Western Pacific, Japan’s planning and preparation lagged behind. Japan’s defence policy, revised in 1918, listed Russia, the U.S. and China, in that order, as hypothetical future enemies. Japan’s listing the U.S. as an enemy called for gathering all its fleets near Amami Ōshima (see Map 2). Strikes could be made against U.S. forces from patrols along the line of the Ogasawara Islands. The navy planned to capture Manila and Subic Bay swiftly so that they could be turned into Japanese bases. However, Japan’s war plans did not include Guam and the South Sea Islands, 2,000 km to 9,000 km away, scattered over an area as large as the U.S. mainland.

During the Paris Peace Conference, Japan had to pay at least equal attention to the Shantung issue. Japan also wanted a provision to prohibit racial discrimination. Other simmering issues were Japanese troops in Siberia, and the formation of a new international consortium (proposed by the U.S.) to provide loans to China. With regard to former German territories in the Pacific, Japan’s initial aim was not military, but to exploit phosphate ore and copra without paying compensation to Germany. While the Mandate Agreement was being drafted, France demanded the exclusion of Clause 5 of Article 22, prohibiting the military training of native people. Although Japan complained about commercial and trade inequities in the definition of a “C” mandate, she made no argument about military restrictions. Rather, she recognised the non-militarisation provision in Article 22 as an “impolitic policy” that was an “ordinal and general restriction which did not provide special consideration” for Japan.

In the early 1920s, it was unnecessary for the Japanese Navy to keep strict watch on U.S. strategy, so the navy had no plans to use the South Sea Islands or Guam. Although it had vague oceanic ambitions, it was too early to shape future plans.

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The Yap Controversy

With the Yap controversy, the Japanese Navy found new strategic significance in Yap. Yap is a 216 km² island, 850 km south of Guam. In 1903, the U.S. Commercial Pacific Cable Company finished laying an undersea cable from San Francisco via Honolulu and Guam to Tokyo, Manila, and Shanghai. Since the U.S. had no direct cable connections to China, it used the German cable station on Yap, which was connected to Guam, Menado in the Dutch East Indies, and Shanghai. The Guam-Yap-Shanghai link was important for the U.S. as it was more reliable than the Guam-Philippines-China link. The latter was problematic because of deep and rough waters west of Guam. \(^{17}\) After the Japanese occupied Yap in 1914, the three German cables were disconnected and towed to Naha, Okinawa, indiscreetly breaking the Guam-Yap-Shanghai link.

In August 1919, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Henry Lodge accused President Wilson of poor judgement for not acquiring the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands. Wilson admitted that the General Board of the Navy Department and Chief of Operations had recommended “to have a footing there … in order to secure cable communication.” He emphasized that he had hoped to reserve Yap in a meeting of the Supreme Council on 7 May 1919, but not the entire South Sea Islands, for cable communications. The Yap issue sat idle in Congress for more than a year. Meanwhile, the Covenant was rejected by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in November 1919. The issue was revived at the Preliminary International Conference on Communications in October 1920, when the U.S. decided to take diplomatic action against Japan.

Correspondence between the U.S. and Japan made the differences in recognition of the Pacific strategy clear. A U.S. memorandum to Japan of 12 November 1920 claimed that Wilson had on 7 May 1919 reserved Yap for future consideration, separate from the issue of Japan’s Mandate. \(^{18}\) The U.S. argued that Yap should be administered by international control under an agreement between the Allied and Associated governments. Japan disagreed, stating that the Supreme Council came to a final decision on 7 May 1919 to place the whole of the former German islands north of the equator under mandate to Japan, with no reservations. Moreover, on 17 December 1920 the Supreme Council defined Japan’s “C” Mandate as “all the former German islands


\(^{18}\) Henry Miller wrote, “this matter (the distribution of the Mandates) was passed on by the Supreme Council on May 7, except as to Turkish territories.” See, Miller, David H., *ibid.*, p. 114.
situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying north of the Equator.” Although the U.S. complained to the Supreme Council, pointing out that the decision of 17 December was “not an accurate recital of the facts,” the Supreme Council on 1 March 1921 again supported Japan, stating that the U.S. had abstained from ratifying the Peace Treaty and had not taken her seat on the Council of the League. Further, the U.S. complaint was not against the Council of the League but against the Principal Allied Powers. On 5 April Secretary of State Hughes noted that neither the other Principal Powers nor the League of Nations had the right to award or define a mandate without the consent of the U.S. But he compromised on 15 September by requesting a share of rights to former German possessions with respect to Yap that were agreed upon in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated powers. Finally, on 11 February 1922 the Yap Treaty between the U.S. and Japan was signed during the Washington Disarmament Conference, resolving all disputes.

However, during these negotiations the U.S. requested first, recognition of its ownership of the Yap-Shanghai cable; second, internationalisation of the cable station; and third ownership of the cable between Yap and Guam. Finally, the U.S. expanded its demands in an attempt to void Japan’s mandate. Its real intention seemed to be the denial of Japan’s legal foothold in the islands. Contrary to the U.S. attitude, Japan’s position proved that Japan was willing to grant all rights and privileges to the U.S. that were granted to members of the League of Nations, and would adopt a policy regarding equality of commerce and trade with the U.S., and that an agreement on cable operations would be concluded between Japan, the U.S., and Holland. Although it was a technical communication issue, the U.S., via public opinion and protests from Congress, eventually won rights and privileges equivalent to that of a League member in Japan’s Mandate. To be specific, Article 2 of the Yap Treaty refers to non-militarisation of the South Sea Islands, allowing free travel and residence to American missionaries who could report on the military situation, and requiring an annual report “containing full information with regard to the territory and indicating the measures taken to carry out Japan’s obligations assumed under Article 4 and Article 6.” The Yap Treaty was not a treaty strictly for cable telecommunication but also allowed the U.S. to acquire the right to speak out, even if that act interfered with Japan’s rule of the South Sea Islands.

These rights soon impacted on Japan’s administration. As early as 1921, America accused Japan of violating the non-militarisation clause, the Mandate

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Agreement, and the draft Yap Treaty. The U.S. motive for harping on Yap is explained by U.S. Navy Secretary Daniels: If the Japanese should obtain the Yap-Guam cable, they would insist on going to Guam, an American strategic point now closed to outsiders. Senator Lodge’s words are more revealing: “The Japanese could not be trusted in diplomatic negotiations and it is impossible to deal with them through the ordinary method of diplomacy.”

Japan, too late, recognised that it had given great advantage to the U.S. A member of the Imperial Diet who observed the conference stated, “Our diplomacy failed.” The Yap controversy taught the navy how strongly the U.S. valued its strategic interests in the Western Pacific. But this did not drive the Japanese Navy into militarisation because Japan’s policy for the Pacific was still self-defence and the status quo: the First National Defence Policy (1918 - 1923) still defined Japan’s potential enemies as Russia, U.S., and China in that order.

In this period, the navy had no idea about expanding to Guam and the south, much less preparing for “organic relations” with such areas.

**The Washington Disarmament Treaty**

Japan made good use of the Yap controversy experience during the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921-22. Realising that “a serious crisis would eventuate if she left things untouched”, she agreed to join a naval disarmament conference that the U.S. proposed. What became a series of conferences allowed the Japanese Navy to recognise that her military planning lagged behind that of the U.S. It also underlined the importance of the South Sea Islands for national defence.

Japan’s first priority at the conference was to maintain its defensive position in the Pacific at least at the status quo. Recognising that the U.S. would never give up the militarisation of Hawaii, Japan offered several proposals. First, it offered status quo

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20 Some of these accusations claimed that Japan secretly fortified the islands, and that she had established a submarine base in the Marshalls and built a reserve supply of fuel there.
23 “Inin tôchi ni kansuru kenri to beikoku” (January 1933), in *Manshū Jihen hōritsu mondai ni kansuru gaichō ikeshū 1: Renmei Kiyaku kankei* (Ajiakyoku Daiikka, 1933).
25 “Washinton Kaigi kaisai ni kanshi hōkoku no ken, Nichi-ei-bei kyōtei no kyūmu” (Gaimushō Ōbeikyoku sakusei), in ibid., p. 251.
regarding the Philippines and Guam, without mentioning Japan’s island territories. Second, if the U.S. refused this proposal, or Great Britain and France insisted on the status quo of Taiwan, the Ogasawara Islands, and Amami Ōshima, then Japan would continue to insist on the status quo in the Philippines and Guam, on the condition that she be allowed to add Kirun, the Pescadores Islands, the Ogawarawas, and, if necessary, Amami Ōshima to the status quo. Third, Japan planned to ask Britain and France to preserve the status quo in Hong Kong, Singapore and the French territories. Japan’s strategy was to hold on to her north-to-south South Sea Islands line, and, if possible, to sever the U.S. line between Guam and the Philippines.

The conference included in Article XIX of the Washington Disarmament Treaty a provision that accepted the status quo with regard to fortifications and naval bases in Japan’s Kurile Islands, the Ogasawaras, Amami Ōshima, the Ryūkyū Islands, Taiwan, the P’enghu Ch’untao, and “any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire”, including the South Sea Islands. In turn, the U.S. agreed to maintain the status quo in its insular possessions, excluding those near the coast of the U.S., Alaska, the Panama Canal Zone, the Aleutian Islands, and Hawaii. It seems that Japan gained the parity it wanted with the U.S. territories near Japan, by getting the U.S. to agree to demilitarise the Philippines and Guam, but on condition that Japan accepted Secretary Hughes’ surprising proposal of a ship ratio that disadvantaged Japan – five to three – of main fleet war ships, instead of Japan’s intended ten to seven.

The reasons for Japan’s acceptance are given by Captain Yamanashi Katsunoshin, a supporter of Navy Minister Katō, a plenipotentiary to the Washington Conference: (1) Japan could attack the enemy in the open ocean, making up for its shortage of battleships and subsidiary vessels; (2) Japan was better placed strategically and defensively than the U.S.; (3) The South Sea Islands had good natural ports for naval bases; (4) Japan could reduce the enemy by submarine attacks using the advantages the South Sea Islands offered; and (5) The enemy could be forced into decisive battles in waters close to Japan. Japan’s consistent Pacific policy was

26 The treaty does not specify the South Sea Islands as a status quo area, but the treaty of four powers regarding the Pacific of 13 December 1921 confirmed that the South Sea Islands belonged to “Japan’s insular possessions.” “Taishō hōmen ni okeru tōsho taru zokuchi oyobi tōsho taru ryōchi ni kansuru yonkokoku yōyaku shozoku seimei” (13 December 1921); and “Yonkokoku yōyaku tsuika kyōtei” (25 February 1922), in Gaimushō ed., Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabini shuyō bunsho, pp. 537-538.

27 Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyūjo Senshishitsu, Senshi sōsho 38: Chōbu Taiheiyō hōmen kaigun sakusen 1: Shōwa jūnana-nen go-gatsu made, p. 44.
defensive. Therefore, so long as the U.S. Pacific Fleet did not take any military actions Japan did not need to demonstrate any offensive attitudes.

In 1922, the same year as the Washington Conference, the Japanese Navy transferred all administrative authority for the South Sea Islands to civilian South Seas Bureau. From the basic viewpoint that all economic facilities and resources including industries, immigrant labour, transportation, and communication would satisfy the military needs in case of emergency, the navy’s plan was to have the civilian administration prepare all the basic facilities and resources prior to any military tension with the U.S. Total disarmament was a convenient restriction for Japan.

Japan was obliged to abandon the new 32,000-ton battleship, Mutsu and dismantle the nearly completed fortresses in Chichijima in the Ogasawara, Amami Ōshima, and the Ryūkyū Islands. However, the U.S. strengthened bases in Hawaii and improved its facilities in Manila Bay and Subic Bay. Also, the American war planners had given up Guam at the outset of an Orange [Japan] war. So the treaty allowed the U.S. Navy to come closer to Japan’s territorial waters by strengthening existing facilities, and did not consider the small island of Guam. Moreover, the U.S. Navy was allowed to build 102 auxiliary vessels, up to the amount allowed by the London Naval Treaty. This was a result, in part, of the fact that Roosevelt signed the Vinson bill of 1934, which provided money to build new ships for the first time since World War I. Japan’s position in the Pacific rapidly weakened.

Japan’s psychological crisis regarding national defence had incited its highest leaders to be suspicious of the U.S. This unease was expressed in Japan’s second national defence policy of February 1923, in which the U.S. was designated as Japan’s first potential enemy. War would trigger decisive battles between the U.S. and Japanese fleets, ideally west of the line between the Izu and the Marianas. Logically, Guam came to the forefront of the navy officers’ thinking as well as Luzon, both U.S. bases.

**Militarisation of the South Sea Islands**

Regarding strategic diplomacy during the Washington Conference, the U.S. offended Japan by limiting her armaments, and, in turn, Japan defended her interests by arguing for the Pacific status quo. Given this ‘cold war’ with the U.S., Japan’s anxieties mounted, and its leaders impatiently encouraged militarism.

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Japan’s first attempt to overtake the U.S. started with the building of cruisers and auxiliary vessels, whose gross tonnage and numbers were not restricted by the Washington Treaty. But the rapid naval armaments expansion caused financial burdens that in turn led to serious domestic issues such as the settlement of the Washington restrictions and recovery from the Great Kantō Earthquake (1923). Japan also suffered a financial crisis (1927), the first Shantung expeditions (1927), the Showa Depression (1930-1935), and the Manchurian Incident (1931-1933). During the disarmament conference in Geneva in 1927, the U.S. insisted that the ratio of auxiliary fleets be five to three, while Japan insisted on ten to seven. At the 1930 London Naval Conference, a follow-up to the Washington Disarmament Conference, the U.S. got Japan’s back against the wall by insisting on an overall ratio of 0.697 that would include large and small cruisers and destroyers. To compensate for the lack of capital ships, the Japanese planned to establish submarine bases in the South Sea Islands. Submarines were the only vessels that Japan was allowed to construct, up to 52,700-ton, equal to the U.S. quota. Compared to the Washington limitations, the London restrictions stirred up Japan’s ill will toward the U.S. Such pressures increased compared to the results from former meetings. With the rapid development of airplane technologies and weaponry in the 1920s, the Japanese Navy’s traditional and stereotyped strategy that depended on decisive fleet battles had to be revised to include air forces. Japan concluded that it was time to build military infrastructure, especially ground bases such as airfields, artillery batteries, fuel depots, and communication facilities. Surveys were carried out on Saipan and Truk in 1930, and on Palau in 1931. The navy recognised that the South Sea Islands would become a major target.

After rejection of its proposal to gain parity with U.S. and British fleets, Japan abrogated the Washington Treaty in December 1934 (effective in 1937), and withdrew from the Second London Conference in January 1936. By 1934 Japan’s aviation technology “had nearly established its foundation” and reached the level of technological innovation that enabled aviation tactics and aircraft to be independent of British assistance.31 There were other reasons for the navy to welcome a so-called new Pacific period without disarmament treaties. For the first time, in 1932, the South Seas Bureau’s local revenue exceeded the financial support from the National Treasury. This allowed the navy to carry out military projects in the South Sea Islands with the South Seas Bureau budget. Second, the number of the Japanese migrants to the mandate

increased to 32,000 by 1933, which totalled 80,000 people, including the islanders. The islands could provide labour for industrial development to support navy projects. Third, Japan announced her withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 (effective in 1935) on the occasion of international criticism over the Manchurian Incident. Withdrawal from the League released Japan from Article 22 of the Covenant, as well as the Washington Treaty.

Japan had two great concerns when she withdrew from the League. First, could she legally continue to rule the South Sea Islands under the mandate? Second, how could the navy proceed with its plans without criticism from the League and the U.S.? Regarding the first issue, Japan made no statement to the League regarding its mandatory status, but the government was confident in March 1933 that withdrawal from the League should not affect this status.\footnote{32 “Teikoku no Kokusai Renmei dattaigo no Nan’yō Inin Tōchi no kusū ni kansuru Teikoku Seifū no hōshin kettei kata ni kansuru ken” (16 March 1933).} Japan’s most acute interest was “how would the U.S. respond?” Japan was convinced that the U.S. had provided favourable evidence for Japan. During negotiations over Yap, the U.S. representative to the League wrote to the Council (11 February 1921) that the effectiveness of the Mandate Agreement needed the consent of the U.S. The Council replied that the issue should be addressed to the Supreme Council, not the League. As a result, the U.S. had \textit{de facto} accepted Japan as the mandatory with its agreement to the Yap Treaty of 1922. Japan also judged that the U.S. argument, in effect, recognised the allocation of former German territories to Japan, and the Mandate Agreement could not be considered legal unless the U.S. agreed to it, which it did. Japan understood that the matter should be handled in the Supreme Council. The U.S., a non-member of the League, agreed with the Yap Treaty outside the League.

Another encouraging indicator was the fact that in April 1920, the Council of the League and the Supreme Council suggested that the U.S. also serve as a mandatory power, although Congress declined.\footnote{33 Pauwels, Peter Carel, \textit{The Japanese Mandate Islands}, p. 136.} This implied that mandatories need not be members of the League. Japan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry concluded that the U.S. opinion encroached on the League’s sovereignty described in Article 22 of the Covenant, while expressing “powerful support” of Japan as mandatory for the Pacific
Islands even after Japan’s withdrawal.34 Without further discussion, Japan continued to administer the Mandate as if it were Japan’s own territory.35

On the other hand, between 1933 and 1935 there were heated debates among League members as to the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the mandated territories. The majority opinion was, as the British Foreign Affairs Ministry stated, that it was difficult to question Japan’s mandatory role as long as Japan continued to satisfy the conditions of a mandatory power, even though she had withdrawn from the League.36 The State Department chose to ignore this issue until the League brought it up. In short, no country sought a return of the mandate. The mood was wait-and-see as League members observed how Japan performed, and what attitude the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the League might take.37 The League’s Council was inclined to deny the qualification of a mandatory from late 1934 to early 1935, if that nation was not a member of the League. However, it did not examine Japan’s qualification in the meeting of 11 January 1935, two months before Japan’s withdrawal was complete. Likewise, there is no League view on record concerning the sovereignty of a mandate and the qualifications of a nation to function as a mandatory.38 As Prentiss Gilbert stated, “the matter would be allowed to drift as if nothing had happened.”39

No matter who a mandate belonged to, the non-fortification provision applied. Also, for trans-Pacific aircraft, the U.S. chose to assist PanAm with a million dollar loan.

34 “Inin Tōchi ni kansuru kenri to Beikoku” (January 1933).
35 Japan’s mandatory status officially ended when the U.S. Trust Territory Agreement was approved by the Security Council of the UN in agreement with the U.S. government in 1947.
37 Tohmatsu Haruo, “Nan’yō Guntō inin tōchi keizoku o meguru kokusai kankyō, 1931-35: Senkanki shokuminchi shihai taisei no ichi-danmen,” Kokusai Seiji 122: Ryōtaisenkanki no kokusai kankeishi, ed. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (September 1999), pp. 105-108. E.G. Fitzmaurice, a legal advisor for British Foreign Affairs stated that the political subject called Principal Allied and Associated Powers had disappeared though it was uncertain when, and there was no guarantee the PAAP would take joint activities for the future. Pauwels also wrote, “If the Mandatory withdraws from the League, he is no longer bound by the Covenant, in which the fundamental principles of the mandates system are laid down. This will, however, not make any difference in the rights and duties of the Mandatory, since all stipulations of Article 22 of the Covenant are embodied in the text of the mandate. Hence he continues to be bound solely by the mandate, and has no longer to take account of the Covenant of the League, but in fact remains in the same position.” Pauwels, Peter Carel, The Japanese Mandate Islands, p. 144.
38 Margalith wrote, “It is thus not likely that in any of the above ways, the issue as to the location of sovereignty under the mandate system will be raised in such an acute manner that a definite decision will be compelled.” See, Margalith, Aaron, M., The International Mandate, p. 200.
in 1935, and a second loan of $1.85 million in 1936. The U.S. Navy “was not uncooperative” in allowing PanAm to use naval facilities on Midway, Wake, and Guam for refuelling. Regular postal flights from San Francisco to Manila via Guam began in November 1935. Because U.S. military and civil aviation developed in parallel, this was, for Japan, “a matter needing profound consideration.”40 The early completion of aviation bases and facilities in the South Sea Islands became absolutely necessary.

Two government publications claimed that the navy did not consider preparing any collective view regarding militarisation in the Mandate. A Defence Agency publication prepared by former navy officers claimed that Japan was not restricted by the non-militarisation clauses in the Covenant after 1935, or by the Washington Treaty after 1937. The Defence Agency argued: “since this restriction had its origin in the Covenant of the League of Nations, it affected only the members of the League.”41 In contrast, a naval document of 1939 stated, “naval authorities secretly began several construction projects, but they are restricted by the Covenant at present.”42 Both naval authors ignored the relevant clauses in the Mandate Agreement and the Yap Treaty. The navy recognised that the issue was how to reduce international criticism, particularly from the U.S., rather than how to legalise militarisation. The navy realised it should not step back or to be irresolute.

The navy took two steps. The first was to continue to submit annual reports to the Mandates Commission. They believed that if they stopped reporting, that would be seen as an attempt to ignore the ban on fortifications. In fact, when the Foreign Affairs Ministry had proposed terminating submission of the 1937 annual report in 1938, the navy argued for continuing, in order to fulfil its mandatory duty, but without the government representatives who, in past years, explained the reports.43 The navy knew it was vital always to state in “simple sentences” that there were no fortifications. This was thought to be the best way to avoid criticism or suspicion such as arose at most Mandate Commission meetings. No matter how the navy interpreted the Mandate requirement to promote the “well-being and development” of the islanders, the annual report had much more persuasive power than a violation of any of the mandate.

41 Boeiho Boei Keshuyo Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho 38: Chubu Taiheiyou Honmen Kaigun sakusen 1: Shouwa Fushichi nen go-gatsu made, pp. 41-42, and p. 46.
43 “Ju-gatsu Nanoka Zuke Gozo Daihyosha Uchiawasekai Hôkoku.”
provisions. Therefore, Pauwels wrote, “It is only when Japan failed to fulfil these obligations that any question can arise as to her legal disqualification as a mandatory.”

The second step was to pretend that all navy projects were part of the South Seas Bureau’s “cultural and industrial development work” until the projects were turned to military use. There were no clear definitions of military or naval bases or fortifications in the Covenant, the Mandate Agreement, the Yap Treaty, or the Washington Treaty. Also, there was no reference to “facilities used for peaceful purposes” and “facilities changeable to military purposes in case of emergency.” Through a lack of technical definition and a conciliatory approach, the navy began its first comprehensive military project in 1936, stating, “preparations for naval armaments had the merit of suiting our national condition and nation” in the South Seas. The projects emphasized harbour construction, communication facilities, air routes, aviation beacons, and weather stations and were carried out by the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, the South Seas Bureau’s supervisory body, as a part of the bureau’s ten-year development plan under the Bureau’s account. Construction was done by the Nan’yō Kōhatsu Kabushiki Kaisha, a sugar company, with funding from the South Seas Bureau. The navy was convinced that the Mandates Commission would not send a survey group, even though suspicions persisted. The Commission stated that it had no authority to organise a survey group without approval from the Council. When the 29th International Union met in Madrid in October 1933, discussion of a survey visit was scheduled, but Japan successfully opposed it, claiming that if the Council gave authority to the Mandate Commission to send a survey, it would place the mandatory in the position of an

45 “Nan’yōchō sōтоку (kashō) nī kaigun shōkan o motte mitsuru o yōsu,” in _Shōwa shakai keizai shiryō shūsei dai hachi-kan: Kaigunshō shiryō_ 8, p. 226. The issue of the prohibition had never been discussed. Burns wrote, “Such a distinction was severely complicated by the vague, loosely-worded restrictions which only forbade the construction or improvement of naval bases and fortification.” Burns, Richard Dean, “Inspection of the Mandates, 1919-1941,” _Pacific Historical Review_ 37, no 4 (1968): 461. During the International Military Tribunal (Far East), Yoshida Eizō, member of the Armaments Section, Bureau of Naval affairs, stated that the navy did not build any facilities used purely for military purposes until November 1941, so that Japan did not violate the Covenant and the Mandate Agreement. Admiral Richardson stated that the Japanese Navy used two words, _konkyōchi_ (fleet base for staging, repair, supply and other special facilities) and _kichi_ (base). He said that the Japanese facilities on eight islands in the South Seas were not _konkyōchi_ but “available spots” possible sites for military purposes. He described Japanese Navy fortifications as military facilities and fixed defence facilities which could be defended from enemy ground, sea or air attacks. Asahi Shinbun Hōtei Kishadan, _Tokyo saiban: chū-kan_ (Tokyo: Tokyo Saiban Kankōkai, 1962), pp. 167-168.
The Council was convinced that Japan recognised that the non-militarisation provisions were made under a gentlemen’s agreement and, therefore, not legally binding, let alone binding on national honour and prestige.

After the Naval General Staff began to accelerate construction on airfields on Saipan, Pagan and Truk, and seaplane ramps in Palau, Yap and Saipan in 1937, the navy’s work was finally assigned to the Naval Civil Engineering Department in Yokosuka (See Appendix 1). Again, the question was how to hide its construction facilities from foreigners, especially American journalists such as Willard Price, who would report to the U.S. government, possibly threatening Japan’s position. The navy saw three possible solutions: First, after declaring the territorialisation of the South Sea Islands, Japan could prohibit the entry of foreigners. Second, Japan would allow only so many foreign visitors per year, excluding military officers, and only under supervision. The third solution would allow free visits under the supervision of a South Seas Bureau police officer. Before the navy made any decision, Japan ended its relations with the League when the 102nd Council of the League approved sanctions against Japan because of her application to the Mandate of the nation’s National Mobilisation Laws, mobilising human and material resources for national defence. The 1937 report, the last one submitted, was reviewed without Japanese representatives. Also, the 1938 report, in which Japan ignored the non-militarisation issue, did not arrive due to the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

In step with the impotence of the League and the worsening situation in Europe, Japan discontinued being submissive to international moods, and tried to establish a more independent administration with which to strengthen its presence in the islands. By 1939, Japan had no reason to delay fortification. U.S. Secretary of State Hull declared that any investigation would be “untimely and would likely serve no useful purpose.” There was no doubt among U.S. officials and public opinion that Japan was violating its non-fortification pledge, because “it was common practice to refer to fortifications as fact,” according to Burns. The U.S. Navy was thinking along similar

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50 “Josetsu Inin Tōchi linkai gawa yori sōfu sōseru honpō Inin Tōchi kankei shinbunkiji sōfu no ken, besshi honpō Inin Tōchi kankei shinbunkiji (bassui),” “Jō san futsu gō dai 3213-go, Gaimu Jikan Shingemitsu Aoi, Kaigun Jikan Hasegawa Kiyoshi dono” (8 August 1935), in Shōwa shakai keizai shiryō shūsei dai i-kan: Kaigunshō shiryō 1, p. 348.
lines. Rear Admiral A.J. Hepburn, U.S. Pacific Fleet, strongly recommended to Congress in December 1938, that Guam be developed as a major air base for large, long-range seaworthy patrol planes, and a submarine base, with a garrison sufficient to make its reduction or occupation a major effort on the part of any enemy. The U.S. Navy General Board rejected construction of large-scale fortifications, but approved repairs to Guam’s harbour and the construction of a fortified air and submarine base. Congress authorised money for a breakwater, dredging to improve the seaplane take-off area, and minor preparations for handling planes. The Rainbow War Plans, U.S. global strategic plans of late 1939 and early 1940 reclassified Guam as Category F, the lowest possible rating. But Japan took these preparations seriously and referred to Guam from then on as the “Gibraltar of the Pacific.” Soon after their forces landed on Hainan Tao in February 1939, Chiang Kai-shek predicted that Japan’s next targets would include Guam. Guam was now recognised as an island on Japan’s lifeline to the South Sea Islands. Guam, near bustling Saipan and the Japanese homeland, was an obvious target.

Japan changed her military stance from a defensive one to an offensive one in the late 1930s, as if on the rebound from frustrations at U.S. demands. It is also a fact that Guam was occupied as a firm foothold for homeland defence. But this is not all.

Under the surface, Japan had an inconsistent policy regarding militarism. The 1936 national policy (actually the navy’s policy) was gradual and peaceful, to avoid political conflict and criticism from foreign countries. When the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government finally opted for southward advance using military power, the navy still favoured peaceful or diplomatic expansion. After the occupation of Guam, the navy did not begin the fortifications including air base constructions for nearly two years. Rather, the navy emphasized natural resource development. Japan announced the purpose of the war as the establishment of the Greater East Asia economic sphere. In a word, military force ought to be a means subordinate to the principal purpose of peaceful cooperation with the southern areas. The navy’s “organic” policy was prepared independent of Japan’s militarism.

For the navy, the South Sea Islands was not only a base for homeland defence, but also a base to support military and economic expansion. For this goal, the South Sea Islands needed to establish “organic relationships” with the homeland. Similarly,

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Guam needed to be organically bound, first, with the South Sea Islands. In the next chapter, I survey the South Sea Islands as a southward advance base, and as a way of clarifying the navy's attitude toward Guam.
Chapter Two

The Navy’s South Seas:
Development of New Sphere Plans

After the occupation of Guam and other southern areas, the navy began to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The Central Agreement between the Army and Navy (November 1941) specified that Guam, as well as the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea and the Bismarck Islands would come under naval administration.1 The government also decided that the areas under the navy’s jurisdiction should be “retained in the future for the benefit of the Empire.”2 The Draft Plan on the Future Status of Occupied Territories (January 1943) confirmed that “areas of strategic importance” were to be secured for the defence of Greater East Asia. “Sparsely populated areas and regions lacking the capacity for independence” should be incorporated into the Empire.3 For permanent domains, the “organic integration” of the navy’s occupied areas was indispensable.

In order to give shape to its authority in the occupied lands, the Outline on the Conduct of Military Administration in the Occupied Areas (March 1942), the navy’s basic policy, stated that civil administration should be conducted in keeping with the new situation, without regard to past territorial divisions.4 This shows that the navy had a policy for the administrative reorganisation of these lands. The Navy Research Section’s 1942 study explained the plan for these territories as “important strategic points and areas in the rear”: if necessary, the navy could shift one or more areas into other administrative districts, each with a governor-general or director.5

The details of the navy’s regional organization plan are unknown because of the navy’s brief rule. However, the pre-war policy for the South Sea Islands, the structure of military administration for the occupied areas, and other fragmentary descriptions in naval documents provide some evidence. In all, the navy’s areas comprised three major groups, Japan, the South Sea Islands, and the Dutch Indies - New Guinea areas. The South Sea Islands was regarded as a relay base between Japan and the Dutch Indies –

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1 The Army was assigned densely populated areas that would demand complex administration such as Hong Kong, Philippines, British Malaya, Sumatra, Java, British Borneo, and Burma.
2 “Senryōchi gunsei jisshi ni kansuru riku-kaigun chūō kyōtei” (26 November 1941); and “Senryōchi gunsei jisshi ni kansuru riku-kaigun chūō kyōtei, setsumei” (26 November 1941).
3 “Senryōchi kizoku fukuan” (14 January 1943).
4 “Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 1942).
5 Kaigunshō Chōsaka, “Daitōa Kyōteiken ron” (September 1942), in Shōwa shakai keizai shiryō shūsei dai jūnana-kan: Kaigunshō shiryō 17, p. 22.
New Guinea areas. Each area should establish a strong defence and economic base and be bound by an “organic relationship”.

In the South Sea Islands, the navy had the civilian South Seas Bureau establish the foundation of the general affairs and industries, centred in Palau, since 1922. In the late 1930s after a solid administrative foundation had been built, the navy returned and gave full scope to its plan based on the civilian build-up.

In the Dutch Indies, the navy did not have enough time to enforce its gradual method, so it established the Southwest Fleet Civil Administration District (minseifu) with Borneo, Celebes, and Ceram (later Lesser Sundas) civil administration departments (minseibu). Although a civilian governor-general was appointed, the administration was totally military. The New Guinea Civil Administration (minseifu) was established in Manokwari. Two departments were planned: Western New Guinea (Manokwari) and Eastern New Guinea (Port Moresby), but this was impossible to achieve. The navy despatched South Seas Bureau officers to these areas to build an administrative foundation for the new “South Sea Islands” area.

For economic development, the Tropical Industrial Research Institute, the model for which was in Taiwan, was built in Palau in 1937. Similarly, the Makassar Kenkyūjo, a comprehensive research and technical institute, was established in the Celebes. For undeveloped New Guinea, a hundred scholars and technicians were sent to conduct resource surveys. The Nan’yō Kōhatsu and the Nan’yō Takushoku, both development companies tasked to carry out national policies, were assigned to development work. The navy planned to achieve economic results from such “organic relationships.”

Returning to the South Sea Islands, the navy set up six administrative districts at Saipan, Yap, Palau, Truk, Ponape and the Marshalls after which the administration was transferred to the South Seas Bureau in 1922. In addition to administrative reasons, the navy intended to establish self-sufficiency in each district, and this policy was strongly enforced after the late 1930s. After Japan occupied the southern areas, the navy planned to bring Halmahera (Djilolo) Island, a rice-growing district in the Moluccas, into the Palau district for self-sufficiency. It was planned that Guam would be integrated into the South Seas Bureau, Saipan District (Saipan, Tinian, and Rota) to be a supply base. The navy wanted to reinforce each self-sufficient unit of the national

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6 Ibid., p. 258.
defence and southward expansion line from the homeland to the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Dutch Indies and New Guinea. Conversely, it had to secure the supply route of resources for Japan’s defence industries and the transport route to Japan. Local self-sufficiency and the acquisition of defence resource in the tropics were two fundamental goals in all areas. Besides its strategic location, Guam was in an extremely important position on Japan’s ocean line, so the navy applied unique and comprehensive administrative goals of the South Sea Islands to the former U.S. territory.

As mentioned above, the construction of the South Seas sphere had begun in the 1930s in the South Sea Islands, realising the southward advance policy. To clarify the background of the navy administration of Guam, this chapter examines development of the navy’s southward advance plan and its actual reorganisation work for the South Seas Bureau. These clarify the “organic relationship and integration.” This idea had to be combined with military power, and with the unification and rule of the occupied southern areas.

The Southward Advance and the South Sea Islands

Parallel with militarisation, the South Seas sphere for southward advance policy began, following the Ten-year Development Plan of 1935 that started in 1936.

The 1935 plan prepared by the Ministry of Overseas Affairs’ investigative committee was a general economic development plan for infrastructure. The plan called for experiments in tropical industries, particularly fisheries, agriculture and mining. The obvious purpose was to promote the export of products to the homeland and to extend Japan’s air transport route to the South Sea Islands. The plan was to be the first step in the militarisation of the mandate. However, it was not confined to civilian development nor limited to the South Sea Islands (see Chapter 1). For the first time, the plan defined the South Sea Islands as bases for southward advance and national defence.

Significantly, this ten-year plan had a counterpart in Taiwan. While the investigative committee was discussing the South Sea Islands, the Investigation Board for Tropical Industries (Nettai sangyō chōsakai) convened in Taiwan. The Board originated with Overseas Affairs Minister Kodama Hideo, who was head of the South Sea Islands’ investigative committee. The Board decided to establish the Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha (Taiwan Colonisation Company) under government supervision in 1936. Nan’yō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Colonisation Company) was established in Palau in the same year under the Overseas Affairs
Ministry. Minister Kodama was head of the committee for establishing Nan’yō Takushoku. While the Taiwan Takushoku planned economic expansion into South China and British Borneo, Nan’yō Takushoku in the South Sea Islands proposed the same for Dutch New Guinea, the Celebes, and Timor. Modelled after Taiwan’s research institute, the Tropical Industrial Research Institute of the South Seas Bureau was established to support the research called for in the ten-year plan. In order to carry out large-scale projects in Taiwan, the navy had Admiral Kobayashi Teizō take over as Governor-General in September 1936. At this time, the South Seas Bureau took responsibility for development, but through the navy’s “internal instructions”. The navy apparently attempted to build comprehensive advance bases in Taiwan and the South Sea Islands in order to secure two expansion routes to the south.

The ten-year plan was prepared at the navy’s urgent request to the Overseas Affairs Ministry, involving the high-ranking naval officers. Out of the 27 members of the committee, three were senior sailors: Vice Admiral Yoshida Zengo (chief of the Naval General Staff Bureau and later Navy Minister), Rear Admiral Koga Mineichi (head of the Naval General Staff Bureau, Second Department, and later Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet), and Captain Tsukahara Nishizō (head of the Naval Air Headquarters, General Naval Affairs Department, and later Chief of Naval Air Headquarters). Besides these three, Captain Fujimori Seiichirō (Yokosuka Naval Civil Engineering Department, later commander of the Seventh Base Force, Chichijima, the Ogasawaras), made an on-site inspection of the South Sea Islands between June and August 1935 and reported to the investigative committee. Other members were: Captain Abe Katsuo (head of the Naval Affairs Bureau, First Section), Captain Ōta Taiji (head of the bureau’s Second Section, later commander of the Fourth Base Force, Truk, in 1939), and Captain Nakahara Yoshimasa (the Naval General Staff Bureau, First Department member) shared in the committee work. They all met in the investigation committee to advise not only for development of the air route, but also to determine the detailed policies for southward advance, including the islanders, colonisation, industries, transport and finance.

When the ten-year plan was prepared, Japan’s ocean defence perimeter was considered to be the area between the homeland and the South Sea Islands; the direction of southward advance was in and around the Dutch Indies. A few years later the perimeter included the whole of the South Sea Islands and further south as backup for Japan’s future expansion. The naval officers who shaped this plan also participated in a

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8 "Chōsa iinkai Nan’yō Guntō Kaihatsu iinkai kankei (1), (1935)."
naval program for southward expansion. In July 1935, the navy’s Policy Study Committee for the South Seas Areas was established to conduct “the first research study concerning the Omote Nan’yō (Outer South Seas) from the perspective of national defence and related national policies and to establish authoritative naval measures.” So the policy study committee focused on a plan to extend to Omote Nan’yō, particularly into the Dutch East Indies under the navy’s defence of the oceans.10 Yoshida, the chair of the Policy Study Committee, Abe, and Ōta were well-known advocates of the navy’s southward advance policy as well as members of the committee. Abe was in charge of “manoeuvring for preparedness” in the South Sea Islands. Captain Nakahara, the “South Seas King”, took responsibility for military operations, preparedness and enforcement.11 He and Commander Chûdō Kan’ei (the Naval General Staff member) recommended the Research Section Head Oka Takazumi (later head of the Naval Affairs Bureau) establish the policy study committee. Another member, Captain Kusaka Ryûnosuke (head of the Naval Air Headquarters, First Section head under Tsukahara), was an advocate for enlarging the naval air forces in the South Sea Islands.12 The Naval General Staff members and Captain Fujimori’s Yokosuka Naval Civil Engineering Department pushed construction of air bases in the South Sea Islands.

Oka and Nakahara became principal members of the Navy General Staff’s First Committee for the Study and Research of Naval Policy and Systems established in March 1936. In opposition to the army plan, the First Committee drafted the navy’s General Plan for National Policy about April 1936. Their plan assumed that the Empire would set policy, strengthen the administrations of Taiwan and the Mandate, and expand colonisation and economic development. In common with the navy’s Policy Study Committee’s proposals, the plan stressed the role of Taiwan and the South Sea Islands as advanced bases for expansion.13

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After the army and navy agreed on basic policies, the General Plan was revised as the Fundamental Principles of National Policy (30 June 1936). A key point was the navy’s *hokushu nanshin* policy (defend the north and expand to the south), rather than expand north and south concurrently. These fundamental principles finally became the Fundamentals of National Policy, decided at the Five Ministers’ Conference in August 1936. The final policy embodied the navy’s idea of “preparing military forces to secure mastery of the Western Pacific” and “to plan for Japanese economic expansion toward the South Seas, especially the *Soto Nan’yō* ... by progressive and peaceful measures.”

Being beyond the province of the Foreign Affairs and Overseas Affairs Ministries, the navy took the initiative in promoting this idea. The contradiction between military ideas and “peaceful” expansion was not discussed. Rather military force, as a national instrument became an important method for expansion.

The peaceful measures began to collapse after 1937 when Japan urgently needed resources to fight in China. First of all, the war rapidly consumed precious resources such as oil, steel, tin, gum, bauxite and hemp. To obtain these resources to continue the war, Japan confronted the western imperial powers, Britain, the U.S., and Holland, over the reorganisation of colonies in South East Asia. Accordingly, the navy began rapid expansion to the south, by force. In February 1939, the navy leaders strengthened their footing in Southern China by occupying Hainan Tao. Japanese aggression prompted anti-Japanese feelings in the West and parts of Asia. To complicate matters, in July 1939 U.S. President Roosevelt notified Japan of the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. commerce treaty with six-months’ notice. Imports of oil from the U.S. (67% in 1935, 74% in 1937, and 90% in 1939 of imported oil) stopped and the navy approached the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina for oil.

The South Sea Islands’ development plan originally envisioned expansion by providing investment capital and technical training to Japanese investors to exploit natural resources, particularly in the Dutch East Indies. However, with worsening international relations, the ten-year plan proved too modest and too slow in the face of a national emergency. It had to be revised to a five-year plan in May 1940 to meet the government’s needs. The revision emphasised the need for resources from the Dutch Indies “without a moment’s delay.” The policy of “peaceful expansion” became “to the

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14 “Kokusaku no kijun” (August 1936), in *Gendaishi shiryō* 8, p. 361.
utmost” in the revised plan. In the same month, Vice Admiral Katagiri Eikichi’s Fourth Fleet gathered in Palau. This was the first time the navy took military action in the South Sea Islands waters, and anti-U.S. war games were carried out by the Naval General Staff. The South Sea Islands were made ready for war.

With the Outline of Basic National Policy and the Outline for Dealing with the Situation, both concluded in July 1940, Prime Minister Konoe’s cabinet and the military recognised that control and use of natural resources in the south might need force. In the Tripartite Alliance of September 1940, Germany agreed to Japan’s definitive possession of the South Sea Islands, former German territory, provided some compensation was made. Although this was recognised only by Axis powers, it allowed Japan to enlarge its territory and promote southward advance.

Japan’s concerns for self-sufficiency included rice from French Indochina and Thailand, fuel from the Dutch Indies, nickel from Celebes, crude rubber from French Indochina, Thailand and the Dutch Indies, and tin from Thailand and French Indochina. By January 1941, the Imperial Headquarters was ready for armed expansion. Meanwhile, the U.S. bought up other raw materials that Japan depended on. French Indochina reduced rice exports to Japan. New Caledonia, Australia and Hong Kong stopped or restricted the export of nickel, chrome and scrap iron. Japan requested Holland in the Dutch Indies to export more oil, rubber, tin and other materials. But these requests were denied in June 1941. In retaliation for Japan’s expansion into French Indochina, the U.S. froze all Japanese assets and prohibited the export of oil in August 1941. U.S. hostility exceeded Japan’s expectations and that affected negotiations between the governments.

When southward expansionists such as Captain Ishikawa Shingo, a member of the First Committee which had authority to decide the navy’s policies, wrote, “Imperial Navy’s Attitude should be taken under the Present Condition” (Genjōseika ni oite Teikoku Kaigun no torubeki taido) in June 1941, the navy’s armed expansion to southern French Indochina, Thailand and the Dutch Indies became “unavoidable.” The decision was a corollary of Japan’s armed southward advance. Finally, war broke out and the navy took by force of arms the long-desired resource areas, the Dutch East Indies. French Indochina and Thailand were also placed under army administration.

Just before the war, a cadre of navy officers constructed Japan’s southward advance policy securing a foothold in the South Sea Islands. The policy for peaceful

16 Nan’yōchō, “Nan’yō Guntō kaihatsu chōsa iinkai saikai ni kansuru kenan” (9 May 1940), p. 4.
expansion changed to armed expansion. Moreover, armed aggression created an escalating demand for resources to fuel the wartime economy. Military food self-sufficiency and defence resources were essential. This required total local cooperation. The navy apparently thought that a governor-general system by mainly civilian officers with careful and gradual methods (rather than military methods) would be ideal. However, this was no more than the navy’s plan.\(^{17}\) In reality, when the Foreign Affairs Ministry argued to “unite, adjust, or transfer the military administration” to a new (civilian) administration “one after another” just before the war, the navy insisted on full military administration in the occupied areas.\(^{18}\) The navy’s intervention in South Sea Islands activities provides evidence of what the navy wanted for its own policy.

**Naval Government-General Plans for the South Seas**

As the prime policy-maker and mover in southward expansion, the navy became involved in the South Seas Bureau administration in the mid-1930s. This was not only to enforce the ten-year plan but also to make the civilian South Seas Bureau work more effectively with naval plans. The navy tried to get complete control of civil administration, including political, economic and social affairs, although navy policy was to keep some distance from political affairs.\(^{19}\) When Japan went to war, the navy wanted to share in civil administrations in all its occupied areas. One reason was that the navy considered the areas as extensions of the South Sea Islands.

Intervention in the South Sea Bureau was step by step. For the first step, the navy joined the army to prepare the Outline for Improvement of the Political and Administrative Structure (September 1936).\(^{20}\) The outline suggested the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Affairs be combined into one office with cabinet rank. This change proposed the reduction of these ministries’ authorities. The new ministry would handle economic expansion with emigration of Japanese labour to the south at the combined office. The military wanted to influence diplomatic activity outside the scope of civilian officers. This bold idea was rejected by government agencies, but

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\(^{17}\) The Imperial Conference decided in May 1943 that Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Celebes should be imperial territories. In reality, the government in September 1944 agreed in principle with political independence for the Dutch East Indies as Indonesia, in response to local racial movements, although a date was not declared.


\(^{19}\) The navy decided this policy after young naval officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi during the May 15\(^{19}\) Incident of 1932.

\(^{20}\) "Seiji gyōsei kikō kaizen yōkō, kai rikugun shumusha kyōtei" (17 September 1936), in *Shōwa shakai keizai shiryō shūsei dai ni-kan*, Kaigunshō shiryō 2, p. 423.
structural streamlining did take place in 1942 when the government established the Greater East Asia Ministry to unify all political, economic, and cultural affairs in the Greater East Asia regions, under the military.

Next, the navy directed the Bureau to enlarge its organisation. When the ten-year development plan was launched in 1936, the Bureau was small, with only nine sections under a director (see Figure 2). In December 1936 the Interior Department (local, finance, police affairs, and engineering works) and the Colonisation Department (agriculture, commerce, fishery and transport) were set up to support the navy’s public works, industrial development and labour migrants. The Colonisation Department was the section to carry out the navy’s programs.

In February 1937, two months before the navy began flying long-range seaplanes from Yokosuka to Saipan and Palau, Lieutenant Commander Watanabe Kenjirō took office as head of the Transport Section. This first posting of a naval officer to the South Seas Bureau was explained by the need for a military officer to take charge of “Air routes, harbours, roads, aviation, and communications infrastructure on the basis of confidential research and plans.”21 Because the test flights to Palau, Truk, and Ponape were completed by March 1937 and seaplane flights to Kosrae, Eniwetak, Wotje, and Jaluit were planned in 1938, Watanabe was to supervise the next stage of the plan. In order to secure more money from the Bureau as well as state land, the Tax Section in the Interior Department was established in June 1938. The Communications Section in the Colonisation Department was also opened to “handle rapidly increasing airmail, telecommunication, and telephone services.”22 Regular flights from Japan began in April 1939, with Dai Nihon Kōkū Kabushiki Kaisha, or Great Japan Airways.

While the navy was reorganising the civilian government, it was elaborating a scheme for all the territories of Japan’s South Seas. In September 1938, the Governor-General of Taiwan proposed a centralised administration, a “government-general of the southern areas” (Nh’pô Sōtokufu) in a report titled, Measures for Enlargement and Reinforcement of Administrative Structure in the Southern Areas. The naval governor-general would be responsible for unifying the administrations of Taiwan, the southern islands off the Chinese coast and Southern China. The planned Hainan Bureau in Hainan Tao would administer the Pratas Islands (occupied in September 1937), the

21 “Nh’yōhō jumukan no tokubetsu nin’yō ni kansuru ken, shinsa hōkoku, Sūmitsuin shinsa hōkoku” (13 January 1937).
22 “Takumu Daiji seigi Nh’yōchō kanseichū kaisei no ken” (14 July 1937), P. 93.
Paracels (held by Vichy France in July 1938), and the Spratly Islands. In fact, Hainan Tao (34,000-km² island with iron and rubber) was occupied in February 1939, and the Spratlys (rich in guano and phosphate) in March 1939. They were integrated into the Government-General of Taiwan. The navy’s idea for a “government-general of the southern areas” was realistic, as the occupation of the islands in the East China Sea was expected. Under this plan, the navy wanted to place the South Sea Islands under the Taiwan Governor-General, but there was no administrative or geographic relationship between the two areas, nor was there established transport. Predictably, this ambitious plan met strong opposition from the South Seas Bureau, and was never put into practice.

The navy’s willingness to compromise with the Bureau suggests that its concept of expansion to the south had not yet matured. After the proposed linkage of the South Sea Islands to Taiwan and Hainan Tao was rejected, the navy proposed to promote the South Seas Bureau to a “government-general of the south seas” (Nan’yōdo Sōtokufu). The navy’s efforts in implementing its development plans were at the zenith at that time. Completion of airfield construction in the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands had become critical. For this purpose, strengthening the South Seas Bureau’s work and cooperation in military projects, food production and recruitment of local labour were essential. Further, because Japan’s needs for resources were acute, the South Seas Bureau’s territory naturally included productive efforts as far south as New Guinea, Timor, and the Arafura Sea, where enterprises such as fishing had become important to the Japanese economy. As a result, the navy felt it must enlarge the South Seas Bureau to include a high-ranking naval officer as governor-general, with “abundant knowledge of naval operations”, who could make decisions on both economic necessity and military preparedness. The navy was eager to absorb the civilian administration into a military regime. While the first government-general plan centring on Taiwan envisioned an area stretching from the coast of Asia to the South Sea Islands, the new plan called for a status separate from Taiwan, and anticipated the area stretching south from Japan to the Marianas, Palau, Dutch East Indies and New Guinea. This bolder plan would enlarge Japan’s resource areas. This “government-general of the south

24 “Nan’yōchō kikō kudai mondai ni kansuru saiki no kei,” in Shōwa shakai keizai shiryo shūsei dai hachi-kan: Kaigunshō shiryo 8, pp. 13-14; and “Nanpō ryōdo tōchi kikō ichigenka an ni kansuru shoken” (15 July 1939), in ibid., p. 53.
seas” idea had a place in the navy’s thinking about 1942, as mentioned above. However, it did not evolve further.

Practically, the navy needed to counter the bureaucratic system because it prevented the appointment of a naval officer to head the South Seas Bureau. In response, the navy planned to set up one overall structure within the bureau, including a transport department and a planning section with an admiral and other active duty naval officers in charge, to control all the Bureau’s projects. In 1940, at the highest pace of military construction, the navy had to obtain the Bureau’s quick decisions and consent for naval projects. Instead of a high-ranking naval officer who would concurrently hold the post of South Seas Bureau deputy director, the navy requested the government to upgrade the Interior Department Head Dōmoto Teiichi’s position of sōninkan-rank to the highest position of chokinunkan (see Glossary). The position was equivalent to a South Seas Bureau district chief, and this would enable the officer to make timely decisions under the navy’s influence at the highest level when the director was absent for several months each year to attend Diet sessions.

To further strengthen war readiness, the navy established the Office of the Resident Naval Officer with the Naval Communication Unit, the Yokosuka Naval Stores Department branch, and the Naval Construction and Service Department on Palau in April 1940 (just as the navy did in Taiwan two years earlier). The Naval General Staff moved the Fourth Fleet in Truk to Palau as a route of possible advance to the Dutch Indies in the next month. However, the navy trod carefully in establishing the naval base in Palau because it was cautious about conflict with British, Dutch, and particularly the U.S.26 It did not push for the reorganisation on the eve of war.

After the Dutch surrendered in March 1942, the navy resumed its reform of the South Seas Bureau. As seen in Figure 2, the South Seas Bureau structure as of April 1942 was divided into civil affairs departments (Secretariat, Interior and Colonisation) and naval department (Transport). The Colonisation Department was a civilian officers’ executive organ for military planning but the director’s secretariat and the Interior Department each had naval officers as advisors to civilian heads. A structure of three civil affairs departments of the South Seas Bureau resembled the Guam Minseibu, the navy’s department for civil affairs. The Guam Minseibu consisted of three units:

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26 The navy wrote in June 1940 that the creation of a naval station or base force should be “restrained” because of the Yap Treaty. “Dai Yon Kantai no seido ni kansuru ken, Chōsa kachō” (20 June 1940), in Shōwa shakai keizai shiryō shūsei dai jū-kkan, Kaigunshō shiryō 10, p. 52.
general affairs, political affairs, and economic affairs, which corresponded to the South Seas Bureau’s units.

With the shrinking of Japan’s defence line toward the Marianas, which would allow U.S. B-29s to bomb the homeland and where over 10,000 military personnel and civilians lived, the navy had to establish its superiority to newly landed army forces. The navy’s real motive was evident in the quick appointment of Hosogaya Bōshirō, a retired vice admiral, as the South Seas Bureau director in November 1943. Hosogaya was also the Interior Department head, responsible for all civilian affairs. Finally, the South Seas Bureau that existed “as idle resistance (to the navy)” was replaced.\(^{27}\) The offices of the bureau director and the Interior and Transport Department heads were all taken over by naval officers. The post of Economic Department head was taken by a South Seas Bureau officer, but the department’s work was limited to implementing navy plans. In addition, the six district branches of the Bureau were consolidated into three: Rear Admiral Aihara Aritaka’s Eastern District Office (Truk), Rear Admiral Takeoka Kenji’s Western District Office (Palau), and Captain Tsuji Masayasu’s Northern District Office (Saipan, and eventually Guam). Although the “South Seas Bureau” name remained, civil government functions became a dead letter, and it became like the navy’s civil administration department, if compared to the Guam Minseibū. Consequently, the navy called this function *Uchi Nan’yō gunsei* (military administration of the South Sea Islands).\(^{28}\) However, in June 1944 when most aircraft carriers were lost in the battle of the Marianas and U.S. troops landed on Saipan to annihilate Japanese troops, the navy reduced the Bureau to a skeleton with three departments and four sections: it needed labour only for food production and combat.

In summary, the South Sea Islands was the navy’s laboratory for economic benefit. While the navy prepared two government-general plans, including the South Sea Islands, in peace time, it changed its basic method to armed expansion. This required a rapid change of the South Seas Bureau organisation. After the outbreak of war, the government-general idea lingered among navy planners but it was not a realistic method in war time. As the navy refused the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s argument to “unite, adjust, or transfer the military administration” to a new (civilian) regime “one after another,” and the South Seas Islands became subordinate to a military

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\(^{27}\) “Uchi Nan’yō guntō ni okeru kaigun no shidō teki chii meijī ni kansuru iken, Nan’yō Guntō Zaikin kaigun bukan” (1 July 1943), in *Shōwa shakai keizai shiryo shūsei dai nijū-ikkan, Kaigunshō shiryō* 20, p. 161.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., p. 161.
administration, the method was absolutely necessary. Guam was totally absorbed in the navy’s administration.

[Figure 2] The South Seas Bureau Structure

(1) April 1922
- Secretariat
  - Interior Dept.
    - Local Section
    - Police Section
  - Financial Dept.
    - Budget Section
    - Accounting Section
    - Engineering Section
  - Colonisation Dept.
    - Industrial Section
    - Communication Sect.

(2) June 1935
- Secretariat
  - Document Section
  - Local Affairs Section
  - Financial Affairs Sect.
  - Police Affairs Section
  - Colonisation Section
  - Fishery Section
  - Engineering Section
  - Transportation Section

(3) December 1936
- Secretariat
  - Document Section
  - Local Affairs Section
  - Financial Affairs Sect.
  - Police Affairs Section
  - Engineering Section
- Colonisation Dept.
  - Agricultural/Forestry Sect.
  - Commerce/Industrial Sect.
  - Fishery Section
  - Transportation Section

(4) June 1938
- Secretariat
  - Document Section
  - Research Section
- Interior Dept.
  - Local Affairs Section
  - Financial Affairs Section
  - Police Affairs Section
  - Engineering Section
  - Taxation Section
- Colonisation Dept.
  - Agricultural/Forestry Sect.
  - Commerce/Industrial Sect.
  - Fishery Section
  - Transportation Section
  - Communication Sect.

(5) April 1942
- Secretariat
  - Document Section
  - Research Section
- Interior Dept.
  - Local Affairs Sect.
  - Financial Affairs Sect.
  - Police Affairs Sect.
  - Engineering Sect.
  - Planning Section
- Colonisation Dept.
  - Agricultural/Forestry S.
  - Commerce/Industrial S.
  - Fishery Section
- Transportation Dep.
  - Engineering Section
  - Transportation Section
  - Communication Sect.

(6) November 1943
- Secretariat
  - General Affairs Section
  - Examination Section
- Interior Department
  - Administration Section
  - Financial Affairs Sect.
  - Police Affairs Section
- Economic Dept.
  - Agricultural/Forestry S.
  - Planning Section
  - Commerce/Industry/
  - Fishery Section
- Transportation Dept.
  - Engineering Section
  - Transportation Section
  - Communication Sect.

(7) June 1944
- Secretariat
  - Secretarial Section
- Interior Dept.
  - Internal Affairs Section
- Economic Dept.
  - Industry Section
  - Economic Section
- Transportation Dept.
  - Transportation Section

Chapter Three

The Guam Minseibu: The Navy’s Civil Administration Department

On 20 December 1941, ten days into Japan’s occupation of Guam, the 5th Base Force on Saipan designated 269 members of the 54th Naval Guard to be responsible for guard duty on the island.

Imperial Headquarters insisted that “civil administration can not have even one idle day.” But military operations were still in progress, and the 2,700 troops on Guam were waiting to depart for the Bismarck Archipelago. Moreover, the navy’s order to establish civil administration had not been promulgated, so the 5th Base Force opened the Guam Minseisho (civil administrative station) on 21 December as a temporary regime. The office consisted of twenty people from the South Seas Bureau, Saipan District, including the Tinian Office chief, the Saipan mail office, police chief and a group of Chamorro patrolmen (also known as interpreters) from Saipan and Rota. Then on 20 January 1942, after the troops left and 483 U.S. POWs and nationals were sent to the Zentsūji camp in Japan, the Guam Minseibu office began civil administration of the 22,000 Chamorro people (see Table 2) at St. Vicente de Paul building attached to the Cathedral of Dulce Nombre de Maria in Agana.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Population on Guam (30 June 30 1941)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Identiity</td>
<td>Race</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Population</td>
<td>Chamorro and Carolinian</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Naval Establishment</td>
<td>Including 54 families of Enlisted Personnel (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Foreign Population</td>
<td>Americans</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Filipino</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Danish</td>
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<td></td>
<td>German</td>
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<td>Japanese</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chinese</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Japanese military administration for ruling ordinary inhabitants in an occupied area was called “gunsei” (military administration).³ While the army used this term in official documents, the navy used the term “minsei” (literally, civil administration). According to Hata Ikuhiko, a military historian, there were no substantial differences between these terms.⁴

The Outline on the Conduct of Military Administration in Occupied Areas (March 1942), the basic principles of military administration, defined a naval department of civil administration (kaigun minseibu) as an organization to carry out “civil administration in occupied areas” under a special base force.⁵ This suggests that civil administration was not synonymous with military administration, and the navy’s civil administration or “minsei” was a part of the base force’s military administration.

Before the war, the navy’s only experience with military administration was in the South Sea Islands. The Regulations for the Defence Corps (1914) promulgated in the South Sea Islands used two terms, military administration and civil administration. In July 1918, the Civil Administration Department (minseibu), with a civilian chief and 111 civil officials, was created under the control of the Commander of Defence Corps for “general administrative work.” This was called the “origin of civil administration”, and was succeeded by a full contingent of South Seas Bureau civilian officers.⁶ Again, civil administration was part of a military regime. Also, it was a civilian officers’ organization, as a Japanese dictionary defines civil administration as an administration carried by civilian officers.⁷

Civil administration means apparently a part of the whole administration in the occupied areas carried out by the navy, and the intrinsic purposes of civil administration seemed to differ from those of military affairs. Still: how did the navy use these terms? Okada Fumihide, a civilian superintendent of the Southeast District Fleet Government-

³ “Gunsei” (military administration) has two meanings. One is to establish, maintain and control military forces. The army and navy ministries were the coordinating bodies for each military administration. The second meaning is a limited and temporary administration in an occupied area by the occupying force. Because the Navy Ministry had jurisdiction over this military administration of the occupied area, the navy termed this “minsei” or civil administration.


⁵ “Senryōchi Gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 1942).


General (civil administration headquarters in the Dutch Indies), wrote that the navy planned that a base force should support peace and order, and on the other hand, the navy intended to leave the civilian administrators in a minseibu entirely to administer the inhabitants in the occupied areas.\textsuperscript{8} However, this was impossible in Guam.

The central military administration policies decided by the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Japanese Government (November 1941) were: 1) restoring public order; 2) expediting the acquisition of resources vital to defence; and 3) ensuring the economic self-sufficiency of military personnel.\textsuperscript{9} Although the base force would be in charge of the first policy, the second would depend on civil administration. The third supply plan would be the responsibility of military affairs similar to base force construction projects. Construction was, for the navy, the first priority and required the mobilisation of a large labour force.\textsuperscript{10} The navy had to place a great deal of weight on civil administration, which would be a prime mover. Naturally, the navy’s administration must have integrated civil with military administration. According to the navy’s outline of military administration, the goal was “organic integration”. So the characteristics of the Guam Minseibu organization must be attended to. At least, the Minseibu did not protect the inhabitants as the 1907 Hague Convention required.\textsuperscript{11}

This chapter characterises the navy’s civil administration through the study of the Guam Minseibu organization, personnel and dissolution. This reveals that the Guam Minseibu was not simply the navy’s department for civil affairs: it was united with the navy’s military administration and its purpose in close cooperation.

Military Machinery for Civil Affairs

The Navy Research Section’s preliminary administrative plan (September 1941), before the creation of the Guam Minseibu, made three points: 1) avoid unnecessary and drastic changes to the existing regime; 2) adapt Japan’s administrative style to comply


\textsuperscript{9} “Nanpō senryōchi gyōsei jisshi yōryō” (20 November 1941).

\textsuperscript{10} “Daita senso senryōchi gunsei kankei tsuzuri, senryōchi gunsei jisshi ni kansuru ruku kaigun chūō kyōtei, setsuimei” (11 November 1941).

\textsuperscript{11} Section III Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State in \textit{Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV)} of October 18, 1907 forbids compelling inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power (Article 45), and protects family honour and rights, the lives of persons, private property, and religious convictions and practice (Article 46). The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, \textit{Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV)} at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm#art42.
with abilities of the races being governed; and 3) consider a formula to ensure a smooth transition from military to a future administration. Although these basic points were considered in the Dutch East Indies because of the large territory and population, complexity of races and culture, and their movement toward political independence, it does not seem that these points were applied on Guam.

First, Internal Directive 1538 (26 November 1941) stated that the commander-in-chief of fleets and the special district commandant should take charge of the administration of occupied areas by order of the Navy Ministry. Second, Internal Directive 1 (January 1942) stated that a special base force should administer the areas under the direction of their commanders, and take charge of administrative affairs under the supervision of their superior officers. Third, Regulations concerning Navy Civil Affairs Departments (1 January 1942) stated, the navy shall establish minseibu offices in occupied areas “as the need arises.” Accordingly, The Guam Minseibu was established directly under the 5th Base Force on Saipan, not under the 54th Naval Guard on Guam that was responsible for military defence. The Commander-in-chief of the 4th Fleet at Truk commanded the Saipan Base Force. The 4th Fleet’s upper organization was the navy in Tokyo. There is a great distance between Truk in the Caroline Islands and Saipan in the Marianas. It was a one-day voyage from Saipan to Guam. The 4th Fleet therefore could not supervise details of the 5th Base Force’s civil administration on Guam, so the Guam Minseibu was relatively independent. However, that would not be important because the administrative purposes and goals were already clarified, simple and absolute.

By March 1942, with the occupation of the Dutch East Indies and other areas in the Pacific, five civil administration departments were established: Borneo, Celebes, and Serum (later Lesser Sunda), New Britain and Guam. The navy gave these areas two levels of importance: natural resource areas (the first three) and defence base areas (the last two). Accordingly, the three naval chiefs of the civil administration departments in the Dutch East Indies were united under the experienced civilian superintendent-general of the Southwest District Fleet Civil Government in May 1942. On Guam and New Britain “the navy had to be involved in the area’s political and economic affairs” for

12 Kaigunsho Chōsaka, “Nanpō kokudo keikaku” (1 September 1941), Shōwa shakai keizai shiryo shūsei dai jūyon-kan: Kaigunsho shiryo 14, p. 84.
13 “Kantai shiri chōkan oyobi tokusetsu keibifu shirei chōkan senryōchi gyōsei shori no ken, Nairei dai 1538-gō” (26 November 1941).
14 “Tokusetsu konkyochitai oyobi kaigun tokusetsu konkyochitai senryōchi kanri to no ken, Nairei dai ichi-gō” (1 January 1942).
15 “Kaigun minseibu kitei, Nairei dai ni-gō” (1 January 1942).
“the efficient management” and construction of naval-air bases, transport and communications “for future operations.” Civil administration of Guam and New Britain (and later the Andaman and Nicobar districts) remained under direct control of naval base forces. The Guam Minseibu was small but held an important portion of the naval administration in the Marianas under direct naval base force supervision on Saipan.

Another view of the Guam Minseibu reveals the navy’s expectations. The Regulations concerning Navy Civil Administration Departments (1 January 1942) directed the establishment of a political affairs section, an economic affairs section, and “another necessary section” in civil administration departments. It added that the Guam Minseibu could not establish an administrative “section (ka).” This means the navy planned to keep the Guam Minseibu as a small organization. After the Minseibu was established, three “sub-sections (ka)” were set up for convenience: political affairs, economic affairs, and general affairs. The regulation of 9 January 1942 emphasised that the economic sub-section should be responsible for food production, agriculture and forestry. But there was no specification regarding the political affairs sub-section.

In short, the Guam Minseibu was a plain and simple organization in the naval structure. This does not mean that the navy intended to give it easy work. Rather, its simple organization meant that it would concentrate on a single purpose, in light of the three basic administrative purposes. Of these, political affairs for the peace and order of the local people did not present difficulties. All civil administration effort could focus on defence resources and food self-sufficiency. Economic purposes should be handled by the economic sub-section. The actual work was done by Nan’yō Kōhatsu and the Chamorro people (see Chapter Five). The Minseibu’s entire agenda focused on this supervision: the Minseibu was tasked to support military purposes and goals.

Civilian Personnel for Military Affairs

Another peculiarity of the Guam Minseibu was the relationship between the naval chief and civilian officers. Because the Minseibu chief was to “perform his functions under orders from fleet commanders, special naval defence district heads,
special base unit commanders, or from special naval base unit commanders,” a naval officer was appointed as Minseibu chief, while other officers were civilian from the South Seas Bureau. The Minseibu was structurally a naval administration within the navy’s command system. Although the civil administration departments of Borneo, Celebes, and Serum (later Lesser Sunda) were placed under a civilian superintendent of the Southeast Fleet, there was no intervention by civilians in the Guam Minseibu or in the New Britain Minseibu in Rabaul since that position did not exist.

Because there is confusion about the names of the Guam Minseibu chiefs in publications, we need to clarify names and terms. According to naval orders, the “Disposition of Personnel” (30 December 1941) and the “Civil Affairs Department Structure” (9 January 1942), the Minseibu chief should be a naval officer with the rank of captain or commander, sent from headquarters. The headquarters, for Guam, was the 5th Base Force on Saipan. When the Guam Minseibu opened in January 1942, Commander Hayashi Hiromu of the 54th Naval Guard Unit under the 5th Base Force was its first chief. Because of his heavy workload, Political Affairs Sub-section head Yamano Yūkichi, a South Seas Bureau officer, acted on his behalf. Confirming this arrangement, the “Staff of the Guam Minseibu” (10 March 1942) specified that the head of the Minseibu be a captain, commander, or civilian officer of kōtōkan rank or higher (see Glossary).

In June 1942, when wartime travel restrictions eased, Homura Teiichi, a commander in the reserves, arrived to replace Hayashi and Yamano (although one document shows that he was appointed in January 1942). The navy’s intention was to have a naval chief as Minseibu head. With Homura’s arrival, full-scale administration began. For a year and nine months he could, and did, “offer his opinion concerning general administrative problems” to the base force, and “supervised the management of navy contractors, and took necessary measures regarding their work, and informed each department concerned.” Although he was supposed to be replaced in April 1943 by Captain Sugimoto Yutaka, commander of the 54th Naval Guard Unit, he remained as chief until March 1944, when the Minseibu was dissolved.

Heads of the Minseibu’s three sub-sections were selected according to Imperial Order 1204 (26 December 1941) stating that civilian administrators assigned to the

20 “Nan’yō senryōchi minseibu kikō ni kansuru ken geisai” (9 January 1942), in Shōwa shakai keizai shiryō shūsei: Kaigunshō shiryō 15, pp. 18-19.
21 “Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 14, 1942).
Minseibu would come from the central government and be “hired in a prescribed number without official title.” A civilian position without title denied the officer any voice with the Minseibu chief, in spite of the civilians’ rank and experience. The Minseibu was Homura’s one-man organization.

The “Table of Civil Affairs Department Staff Positions” (30 December 1941) stated that the Guam Minseibu should have one officer from the South Seas Bureau under the Overseas Affairs Ministry, and one from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The 9 January 1942 decision spelt out that the staff transferred to Guam from the South Seas Bureau should be at the fourth or fifth kōtōkan rank (i.e. appointed on the prime minister’s nomination and with the Emperor’s approval), or a high-ranking naval officer; and that the person from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry should be from fifth or sixth kōtōkan rank. Accordingly, the first heads of sub-sections were Yamano Yūkichi (head of the South Seas Bureau, Local Section) for political affairs, and Kataoka Kuichirō (technician of the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry) for economic affairs. Note that a naval officer could be the head of the political affairs sub-section that handled native matters.

The decision also called for a non-government employee of sōninkan rank (lower kōtōkan rank) as interpreter. The navy already had Ogawa Kan’ichi who owned the Ogawa Store in Tokyo and the Mariana Maru, the only Japanese merchant ship allowed to enter Guam between 1914 and 1939. Ogawa exported merchandise to his relative’s store, the J.K. Shimizu store, on Guam, so Ogawa had Chamorro relatives and was familiar with their culture, which the Minseibu wanted to know.

The selection of Minseibu personnel suggested that the navy paid close and equal attention to political and economic matters. However, the real nature of the organisation became clear after Homura became chief officer. First, because of his opposition to Homura’s policy for the people and a military style for Minseibu staff, the first head, Ogawa, resigned in March 1943. Homura transferred his political opponent, Yamano, from Political Affairs to General Affairs and relieved him from the position

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23 “Tokusetsu kaigun buti rinji shokui secchi rei, Nairei No. 1204” (26 December 1941).
responsible for the Chamorro people: little more than a “messenger between the navy and the Minseibu.”

In opposition to Homura regarding policies for Chamorros, Yamano resigned and returned to the South Seas Bureau in July 1943. This move shocked the Minseibu employees from the Bureau who had come to Guam out of respect for Yamano’s abilities. Homura dominated both political and general affairs. Although Kanai Shinkichi (chief of the South Seas Bureau, Saipan Branch) took over as general affairs head in October 1943, he was not allowed to use his experience. It was not a time for a civilian to demonstrate ability. Instead, he had to work between the Minseibu and the naval guard on fortification projects that involved over 1,500 members of the Naval Construction Battalion.

Meanwhile the navy tried to enlarge the Minseibu’s work. Imperial Order 478 (4 May 1942) elaborated the navy’s plan, calling for four civil administrative directors, seven secretaries, two translators and three technical assistants — the same number of officials as in the New Britain Minseibu. Imperial Order 641 designated four kōtōkan administrators, one technician, seven secretaries, two translators and three assistant technicians by February 1943. At that time the navy planned to hire 200 teachers and 1,500 police for all areas under their administration. Between the promulgation of this order and February 1943, ten teachers, police officers and assistants were in fact sent from the South Seas Bureau to Guam. To create an “appropriate civil administration”, Imperial Order 50 (January 1943) approved that the Guam Minseibu increase its staff to 55: seven kōtōkan rank administrators, one councillor, four technicians, 28 secretaries/ translators/ assistant technicians, and 15 police inspectors. Nakahashi Kiyoshi, a Minseibu teacher, claimed that it was important for civil administrators with kōtōkan rank to express their opinions if progress was to be made. Therefore, it is interesting that the navy planned to assign seven high-ranking officers of kōtōkan rank, but I cannot explain why the Minseibu needed so many (see Table 3).

Order 50 could not be implemented because of the tide of war. The South Seas Bureau had already sent more than 21 administrators (excluding police and teachers)

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28 “Tokusetsu kaigun butai rinji shokuin secchi sei chū kaisei no ken, Chokurei dai 478-gō” (4 May 1942).
29 “Tokusetsu kaigun butai rinji shokuin no zōin ni kansuru ken seigi, Kanbō dai 4975-gō” (17 August 1942).
31 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, fall 1943.
and technicians to the southern occupied areas (Philippines, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Macassar and New Guinea). Both the Bureau and the central government faced staff shortages and transport was difficult.

Additional evidence is available in a personal note of Morita Ryûzô, a Guam Minseibu member. He recorded that besides two kôtôkan rank officers (heads of subsections: general affairs and economic affairs), there were 24 teachers, 13 police, 25 assistants and 17 other officers of hanninkan rank in July 1944. There should have been no change of numbers after the dissolution of the Minseibu in March 1944, so the Guam Minseibu administration consisted of 79 civilian staff before closing. These consisted of two groups — police and teachers responsible for civilian residents, and other lower ranking officers to assist the Minseibu office work or with supply matters under the economic sub-section. Apart for individuals from the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry, most civilian officials had worked in the South Seas Bureau and its branch offices. Also, more than 30% of the employees were former Bureau teachers, and 50% of the total were teachers and police for political affairs. They had more experience in the administration of Pacific Islanders than did the naval personnel.

The Minseibu was small, but a strong organization with the base force directly behind it. The navy would have been wise to use the experience of civilian officers, but this was not what they wanted. The civilian officers proposed relieving the navy of complicated civilian matters. The Minseibu focused on public peace, education, and economic control. It enforced the navy’s orders and goals, not for the better civil administration for the indigenous people.

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32 "Daitoashô narabini shozoku kansho shokuin gunsei yôin shirabê" (15 September 1943).
33 Morita Ryûzô, personal note. These numbers do not include Chamorro patrolmen and translators, mainly from Saipan and Rota, or Guam-Chamorro teacher assistants.
34 "Daitoa sensô senryôchi gunsei kankei tsuzuri, senryôchi gunsei jisshi ni kansuru ruku kaigun chûô kyôtei, setsumei" (11 Noevmeber 1941).
Table 3] Imperial Orders and Guam Minseibu Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imperial Order</th>
<th>Order 478 4 May 1942</th>
<th>Order 641 8 Sep. 1942</th>
<th>Order 50 29 Jan. 1943</th>
<th>Morita Ryōzō Note</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Kōtōkan rank administrator</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers (han’hinkan): 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technician</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Translator</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Technician</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Inspector</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Teacher</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant (rijisai)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>79 (As of July 1944)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accomplished Date | Feb. 19, 1943 | April 19, 1944


Dissolution - Absorption - Extinction

From the early stages, the navy had a clear vision of what it wanted the Guam Minseibu to be. Realisation of its vision was urgent because it expected the Allied Forces to stage a counterblow. In September 1943, the Imperial Headquarters decided to reduce the defence sphere Japan absolutely needed (Zettai kokubōken) to a line from the Kuriles, the Central Pacific (the Marshall, the Caroline, and the Mariana Islands), to northern Australia, and to southwest Asia. But U.S. units wiped out Japanese defences in the Marshalls. By early February 1944, all main facilities in Kwajeline, Ruot, Jaluit, Taroa, Woje and Makin were lost. The U.S. assaulted Truk, the base of the 4th Fleet, the major ocean units, and air operations. This attack on 17 and 18 February 1944 left 52 sunk and damaged ships and 180 planes lost. Although the navy had accelerated the construction of airfields and other defences in the Marianas, the last line of defence for the homeland, U.S. air attacks on 23 February 1944 destroyed much of Japan’s essential defences on Saipan, Tinian, Rota and Guam. In response, the army’s 29th Division from Manchuria began to reinforce the Marianas. The 54th Defence Guard Unit on Guam was unified under the command of the 31st Army’s Mariana District Group. The army was also placed under Rear Admiral Nagumo Chūichi, Commander in Chief of the Central Pacific Fleet on Saipan. Because the fleet was between the 4th Fleet and the Combined Fleet, the 5th Base Force on Saipan came under the Central Pacific Fleet. In July 1944 there were 20,810 military personnel on Guam: 12,815 army and 7,995 navy.35

The navy and the army central agreement of February 1944 stated that the army was to be absorbed into the navy. Although the army had to transport war supplies equivalent to at least three months’ demand, the navy should take responsibility for transport, maintenance and supply of munitions after three months.\textsuperscript{36} The navy also agreed to assume responsibility for landing and transporting the supplies on land. In addition to the rapid and unreasonable increase of military men on Guam to over twenty thousand, and the impossibility of self-sufficiency, the 18\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment’s \textit{Sakito Maru} (9,247 tons) was sunk by two torpedo attacks in February 1944. This resulted in the loss of 2,200 soldiers and all their war supplies. The navy was forced to command civilians more directly and aggressively. According to the Regulations of the Navy Civil Administration Department, civil administration could be conducted in an occupied area “as the need arises.”\textsuperscript{37} The Guam Minseibu was dissolved on 1 March 1944.

When the Ōmiya (Guam) Sub-branch of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Naval Construction and Service Department was established on 25 March 1944, the former Minseibu staff members and workers, including Chamorro, were absorbed into this department. Article 2 of the Order of the Specially Established Naval Construction and Service Department stated that the department was responsible for supporting military operations such as “matters relating to construction, transportation, war supplies and production, storage, supply, research, and development of self-sufficiency for Japan’s fleets and forces.”\textsuperscript{38} All civilians became a tool of the military for this purpose. Nearly 80 Minseibu staff were divided into four groups: General Affairs under Lieutenant Commander Fujii of navy headquarters; Agriculture Cultivation under Accounting Lieutenant Ishii, whose main members were from the Navy Crop Cultivation Unit; Civil Administration under former Minseibu General Affairs Sub-section Head Kanai; and a group of teachers and police. Kanai’s civil administration was arranged for 150 Japanese civilians (including 50 females).\textsuperscript{39}

The teachers and police officers in each village supervised the Chamorros. This could not be called civil administration because as of March 1944, there were only 24 teachers and 13 police on Guam, compared to 23,000 Chamorros. The main duty of these officials was to supply hundreds of men for work battalions, and women and

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{36}] Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyūjo Senshishitsu, \textit{Senshi sōsho: Chūbu Taiheiyō rikugun sakusen 1, Mariana gyokusai made}, p. 291.
\item[\textsuperscript{37}] “Kaigun minseibu kitei, Nairei dai ni-gō” (1 January 1942).
\item[\textsuperscript{38}] “Tokusetsu kaigun kensetsubu rei, Nairei dai 2180-gō” (24 November 1942).
\item[\textsuperscript{39}] Morita Ryūzō, personal note, 1982.
\end{itemize}
children to food production units. If there was something called civil administration, it was only when former Minseibu teachers could tell the military about the possibilities of a breakdown of control of Chamorros.40

By 11 July 1944, ten days before a massive U.S. invasion, any semblance of civil affairs had ended. About 15,000 Chamorro elders, women and children were forcibly evacuated to coconut groves near the upper reaches of the Ylig River (now the Manengon area) “for safety (sokai).” They were transferred to the authority of the army military police.41 Soon after that, U.S. Marines began to take control of the island, and former Minseibu staff were ordered by the 5th Naval Construction and Service Department to serve as guards for Japanese civilians, to set up encampments, transport food and perform other duties. On 5 August, many Minseibu staff took on full-fledged military duties.42 Japanese resistance officially ended on 10 August, when Commander of the 31st Army, Obata Hideyoshi, killed himself in Yigo. Of 79 former Minseibu staff on the island, 59 were killed in the war.43 All control was taken by the U.S. Navy one year before Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration on 14 August 1945.

According to the Chamorros’ war claims under the Guam Meritorious Claims Act (November 1945), 795 claims by over 4,000 claimants were submitted by 1 December 1946. 320 claims were for deaths and 258 for injuries. There were 217 claims for property damage.44 On Guam, 19,135 Japanese military personnel out of 20,810 were killed.45 The U.S. deployed 600 ships, 2,000 planes and 300,000 soldiers for the Mariana operation. In 21 days of battle, the U.S. Marines lost 1,190 killed and 377 died of wounds, and 5,308 were wounded. The 77th Infantry Division casualties were 177 killed and 662 wounded.46

40 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, diary, 1944.
43 According to Morita Ryuzō’s note, 14 junior officers (hanninkan), 20 teachers, 11 police and 14 assistants (rijisei), totalling 59 out of 79 were killed.
The Guam Minseibu regime was brief. The navy did not have time to establish a more substantial administration due to dramatic changes in the war. However, the decision concerning the Minseibu's structure, personnel and dissolution reveals its basic role. It was to control and absorb civilians under the auspices and functions of the military for war preparation and operations. The navy intended to establish a hierarchical civil administering structure, not a horizontal one, because the whole island of Guam was a naval base. So it was not "organic relations" but "organic integration" of civil administration into the military from top to bottom.
Chapter Four
The Minseibu:
Political Integration into Japan

The Guam Minseibu began its work in January 1942. In it, the 5th Base Force on Saipan had civilian administrators and staff to carry out civil affairs as part of military administration. Their purpose was to achieve military goals.

For “sparsely populated and primitive” places like Guam, the navy decided the policies for civil administration by means of the Outline for the Conduct of Military Administration in Occupied Areas of March 14, 1942. The outline declared that “the native inhabitants of the southern areas shall be guided to assume their proper places and cooperate in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere under the leadership of the Empire.” “Proper places” was a slogan of the Greater East Asia War as well as hakkō ichiu.1 Further, the administration should be “devised to facilitate the organic integration of the entire region into the Japanese Empire.”2 So the Minseibu should assign Chamorros their “proper place” and “organically” integrate them into Japan.

Although we can see the basic policy, purposes and goal of the military administration in the 1942 outline, the navy did not describe concrete measures. The outline, prepared soon after the surrender of the Dutch on 9 March 1942, focused on the Dutch Indies, politically and socially the most complex area under naval jurisdiction. The title “datsu” (native chief), and terms “nationalist movements”, “local Chinese”, “Dutch rule” and “Moslems” in the outline related to these areas only. In fact, the navy prepared a separate system for New Guinea, which had “promising natural resources” and the main focus was on resource development.3 For the New Britain (Rabaul) Minseibu, the 8th Base Force promulgated the Outline for Administration in the Occupied Areas.4 Former Minseibu staff claimed that the policy required respect for the local governing system and customs, communication with residents, and consideration of local religions. These points were based on the navy’s outline of March 14, 1942. The Minseibu also emphasised labour management, and called its

1 See the Introduction of this thesis.
2 “Shinrōchi gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 1942).
3 “Nyūginia gunsei jisshi yōkō” (1942).
work civil affairs and "the execution of naval operations," because the regime was directly under a naval base force, as was the case with the Guam Minseibu.⁵

On Guam, Ogawa Kan’ichi, head of the General Affairs Sub-section, recalled that he received the navy’s outline (March 14, 1942), but the Minseibu did not prepare its own written policy.⁶ It comes as no surprise that the Guam Minseibu did not have its own outline. As well as the small size of the organisation, the Chamorros, subject of civil administration, had kinship links with the people of Saipan and Rota. Japan had twenty five years' experiences in the Mariana Islands. For civil peace and order, Guam was comparatively safe, and the navy had experienced South Seas Bureau officers, particularly police, and even Chamorro interpreters from Saipan. For economic purposes, there was Nan’yō Kōhatsu, a successful company. In short, all preparations for civil administration were complete by the early 1942.

This chapter examines civil affairs of the Guam Minseibu’s administrators, a South Seas Bureau officer, Yamano Yûkichi (January 1942 – October 1943), and a naval commander, Homura Teiichi (June 1942 - March 1944). Their different approaches exhibit features of the navy’s policy for integration of the Chamorros.

Civil Administrator Yamano’s Policy

Upon direct appointment by Captain Ogata Tsutomu, a naval attaché in Palau, and at the request of the first Minseibu Chief Hayashi (54th Naval Guard Commander), Yamano Yûkichi, South Seas Bureau, Local Section Head, became the first responsible administrator of the Guam Minseibu.⁷ As an experienced civilian, the 34-year-old high-spirited Yamano assumed responsibility for civil administration, including police, agriculture and forestry, religion and the judiciary, from February 1942 to June 1942.⁸ He supervised teachers, police and others from the South Seas Bureau. He established the Minseibu, which looked like a “branch office of the South Seas Bureau”.⁹

At the beginning of the Minseibu rule, Naval Staff Officer Inoue of the 5th Base Force warned Yamano that “South Seas Bureau approaches” were not appropriate for an occupied island.¹⁰ “South Seas Bureau approaches” for Yamano meant a regime to put the Mandate principles into practice and recognise that the people were “not yet able

⁵ Rabauru Minsei Kurabu, Rabauru Minsei no kaiko (1989).
⁶ Ogawa Kan’ichi, interviewed by author, Tokyo, 10 October 1997.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Ogawa Kan’ichi, interviewed by author, Tokyo, 7 September 1999.
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.” The navy’s Research Section wrote that the Mandate principle was in conflict with the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideology. The navy’s purpose was not tolerance and sympathy but “onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru” or to have them work. Second, the “South Seas Bureau approach” was gradual, and the navy termed it a “corrupt practice.” The 1935 ten-year development plan was implemented, and made more aggressive, but that was not enough. After the outbreak of war, the navy still criticised South Seas Bureau officers as “ignorant of the tense atmosphere of wartime” and failing to “manifest zeal for cooperative attitudes toward the navy.”

On Guam, the navy ignored U.S. legislation, administration and judicial work. Legally Japan could not apply its laws and regulations because Guam was an occupied territory, and the navy did not prepare judicial rules during the Minseibu regime. As a result, Yamano referred to the South Seas Bureau’s laws, orders and regulations. The following descriptions of the village chief system, public order, and taxation are examples of Yamano’s administration. Although there was a false rumour of attacks by pro-American Chamorros in January 1942, Guam was comparatively safe, particularly after the Japanese Army and U.S POWs left the island. According to Japanese military personnel, relations between the military and the Chamorros in early 1942 were not bad, although that judgement may be superficial. Yamano’s term was too short to be judged. His work as a mediator between Chamorro leaders and the naval guard, was useful to recover the islanders’ stability. The first goal of the military administration — recovery of peace and order — was achieved by June 1942, when the 5th Base Force decided to allow Japanese civilians to enter Guam for the next step.

Commander Homura operated a civilian office in a military style. Although Yamano, as head of political affairs and later, general affairs worked with and between Homura, the Minseibu officers, and the Chamorros for a year, he resigned in July 1943

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13 “Nan’yō sōtoku (kashō) ni kangun shōkan o motte mitsuru o yōsu” in Shōwa shakai keizai shiryō shūsei dai hakkan: Kaigunshō shiryō 8, p. 27.
15 Though Yoshinaga Hiroe, a South Seas Bureau High Court Judge, was sent to Guam after the Minseibu opened, he could not achieve his purpose of preparing laws because “the army was still stationed on the island.” Yoshinaga Hiroe, interviewed by author, 12 October 1986.
16 Ogawa Kan’ichi, interviewed by author, Tokyo, 7 September 1999.
and returned to the South Seas Bureau in Palau. Against a backdrop of the South Seas Bureau and 24,000 Japanese civilians (in December 1940) in Palau, Yamano displayed his skills in the Economic Department under the military until the end of the war.\(^\text{17}\)

Although I emphasise discord between naval officers and South Seas Bureau officers in the Minseibu, a more important point is their striking similarity and their shared goal. Dōmoto Teiichi, South Seas Bureau Interior Department head (1937-1943) made public the South Seas Bureau’s principles. He was a competent and close adviser of Bureau directors and also to Yamano, his superior.

For the islanders who recently rose from their primitive world, rapid improvement to the standard of modern culture, a hasty assimilation policy, and aggressive peddling of good administration would upset them. It will never have them be willingly obedient to our administration. It is important for us to avoid any sudden change as much as possible. Then we can gradually have them feel their happiness under the imperial favour, and firmly have them absorb the spirit of the imperial way. We have to lead them to harden their thought of being members of the Emperor’s administration permanently.\(^\text{18}\)

Dōmoto also wrote that the South Seas Bureau’s purpose was to train islanders to be decent people under the Emperor. The people would then be able to work for the country, and finally for the Emperor with gratitude.\(^\text{19}\)

In short, the Bureau believed it was responsible for the “tutelage of such peoples” based on the mandate principle (Article 22 of the Covenant). This view was common in Japan as the leading nation in the co-prosperity sphere ideology, and bound by sharing the idea of Great Asianism, a basic concept of state construction in the Meiji period (1868-1912). For example, Yamano interpreted an English language letter from a Chamorro young man in July 1943, as “We, the islanders, are deeply indebted that you took care of the people of Guam with affection.”\(^\text{20}\) The nuance of Yamano’s translation into Japanese reveals the Bureau’s goal as rooted in the soil of Japanese thinking, “take good care of” Asian people. Therefore, the people under the mandate should be released from their uncivilised situation, as Asian people should be liberated from European colonialism via the co-prosperity sphere. The South Seas Bureau’s work was to have the islanders recognise Japan’s imperial favour under the eternal rule of the Emperor. Success would mean the reign of hakkō ichiu, or universal concord.

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\(^\text{17}\) 4,920 Japanese in Palau were repatriated to Japan before December 1944. Ajia-kyoku Dai go-ka, “Nan’yō Guntō ni okeru shūsenji no jōkyō oyobi jimu shori tenennatsu” (July 1954), p.


\(^\text{19}\) Dōmoto Teiichi, ibid., p. 93.

\(^\text{20}\) Yamano Yūkichi, “Guamutō no omoide,” p. 2. The original text reads as “Guam no tōmin wa minna anatani kawagarare, osewani narimashita.”
centred on the Emperor. Both ideas were grounded on the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 (see Appendix 3). These ideas concluded that people had to work hard in return for the Emperor’s favour. The Bureau’s goal was “alteration of the islanders to be able to work (for the country).”\footnote{Nan’yō Guntō Kyōikukai, ed., Nan’yō Guntō kyōikushiki (1938), pp. 113 and 712.} The slogan of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was onono sono tokoro o eseshimuru (to enable all nations to find their proper place), or to do work given by the leader nation, Japan.

So, what did administrators have to do to integrate foreign races? First, the South Seas Bureau officers on Guam worked to rebuild peace and order, and second, they attempted to introduce Japanese thought through education. This was the approach in the South Sea Islands (see Chapter Six). For the navy, the Minseibu had to achieve its goals as soon as possible, given Japan’s two-front war. Then, if this could be done, the final ambition would become possible. The navy had a major challenge as to how to integrate the islanders into Japanese society and how to have them absorb Japanese thought through the military administration. Another challenge was the difference between civilian and military personnel in the comprehension of “organic”.

**The Village Chief System**

During the Minseibu period, Guam was divided into 16 districts; one city (Akashi, formerly Agana, now Hagåtña), one town (Suma, formerly Sumay), and 14 villages.\footnote{There were 15 municipalities during the U.S. naval administration. Thompson, Laura, Guam and its People: A Study of Cultural Change and Colonial Education (N.Y.: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 41-43.} Akashi was the site of the Minseibu headquarters, where more than 45% of the population lived before the occupation. The city was divided into seven towns. Suma, five kilometres south of Akashi, was the site of the 54th Naval Guard Unit Headquarters. Other villages followed former district borders and consisted of 600 to 3,000 people, each village having a Japanese name as an expression of the Japanisation policy.

To control and gain information about Chamorros, the Minseibu appointed district chiefs (kuchō) and deputy chiefs (joyaku) in Agana from among the municipal commissioners who served the U.S. administration. In villages with small populations and where Chamorro traditions and customs were regularly practiced, municipal commissioners were appointed as village headmen (sonchō).\footnote{During Spanish rule a “municipal commissioner” was a “governadorcillo” (mayor or justice of the peace), appointed from the Chamorro principalia (higher class). During U.S. rule, the...} Along with these titled
positions, Yamano unofficially introduced the South Seas Bureau’s Rules for Native Officials of 1922. According to the rules, the reason for varying titles depended on the levels of racial development in a village, such as the mix of Spanish-Chamorro heritage, the extent of diffusion of American material culture, and English language education.\textsuperscript{24} Therefore, the Minseibu gave priority to the governance of Chamorros in Agana rather than to villagers. The Minseibu employed Ben Sablan, a former chief commissioner, as a secretary and a key intermediary.

The main duty of chiefs and headmen was originally to organise the Chamorros and facilitate communication with the Minseibu, informing villagers of orders and rules, reporting on sanitation, health conditions, and births, deaths and marriages. To improve communication, the General Affairs Sub-section distributed the Guam News (or Ryōmin no shintoku or the Rules for Good People), with notices and directives in the Chamorro language.\textsuperscript{25} The people could express opinions and make requests of the Minseibu, but whether or not the Minseibu listened is another issue. The officials were compensated. Although the rules of the Bureau called for loyalty and obedience to Japan, this was not stressed. The adoption of these rules and regulations, originally for civilians, revealed Yamano’s confidence in the Bureau’s system of civilian government.

But Yamano’s practices were not always effective. Under U.S. administration, the Office of Chief Commissioner executed judgements of the Courts in special and civil cases, and issued decisions made by the Small Claims Court under supervision of the Naval Executive Department. Chamorro commissioners were a “vital link in the liaison between the naval government and the rural population of Guam.”\textsuperscript{26} But the Minseibu’s village officials, as in the South Seas Bureau, were not decision-makers and did not carry out court business. They merely transmitted orders. Further, the district chief in Agana was directly under the Minseibu, but village headmen were supervised by low-ranking Minseibu police officers and Saipanese Chamorro patrolmen, all of whom displayed a “strong sense of superiority.”\textsuperscript{27} These patrolmen were clear examples to Guam Chamorros of kinsmen who had become acculturated, well trained, and proficient in the Japanese language. They were disliked and sometimes hated.

\textsuperscript{24} Gaumushō Jōyakukyoku, \textit{Inin Tōchiryō Nan’yō Guntō: Gaichi hōseishi dai go-bu, zenpen}, p. 274.
\textsuperscript{25} Ogawa Kan’ichi, interviewed by author, Tokyo, 7 September 1999.
\textsuperscript{26} The Annual Report of the Governor of Guam, 1940, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{27} Arahara Yasuke, “Amerika Nihonjin horyo shūyōjo, sono ichi” \textit{Gekkan Dōhoku} (July 1976), p. 10.
Their attitude and practices had a negative impact on Guam Chamorros who had been under less oppressive American rule. Some Chamorro headmen in southern villages refused the mediation of Saipanese Chamorros and complained in English to the Minseibu, where an English-speaking officer of high rank considered such issues.  

When rice paddy work and other agricultural development began in the southern part of the island in mid-1942, Japanese and Saipanese officers and employees of Nan’yō Kōhatsu exercised wide authority over village chiefs who were responsible for supplying labour. The village chief system became an empty shell, especially under the navy’s demands for food production.

**Stabilising Public Order**

Stabilisation of public order and recovery from the armed take-over were important issues for Yamano. Before the war, the Code of Guam of 1937, a mixture of U.S. Navy and California procedures and laws, called for four courts: the Court of Appeals, the Justice Court, the Island Court and the Police Court. There were only two Chamorro judges, and individual rights were not protected by a grand jury. Appeals to federal courts on the mainland were not possible. All judges and attorneys served at the will of the governor. Yamano criticised this simple system: “There were no grounds for maintaining Chamorro public peace by impartial strict measures.”  

The Bureau’s Order regarding Court Management allowed the district branch chief of the Bureau to sentence islanders to less than a year in prison, or detention. He could also convert prison time to service time. Based on this order, Yamano released 42 prisoners who had been under the supervision of the U.S. Insular Patrol, except those convicted of murder. The 282 Chamorro Insular Patrolmen, then POWs, were also released to work at the Minseibu’s manganese project.

Yamano’s leniency was based on the Japanese understanding of Chamorros. A military report stated that they “did not have their own characteristic culture and were deficient in the concept of truthfulness, although they were obedient.” Their crimes, mainly theft, led the Japanese to conclude that they lacked social awareness and needed a sense of morality. This notion is similar to concepts in the mandate system, and the Bureau decided that islanders should be protected by not applying general criminal and

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28 Ogawa Kan’ichi, interviewed by author, Tokyo, 7 September 1999.
29 Yamano Yūkichi, ibid., p. 2.
other laws that applied to Japanese nationals. Yamano regarded Chamorros as requiring the same protection as the islanders in the Mandate.\(^{32}\) He respected their customs and lifted the ban on dancing, singing, parties, picnics and other celebrations in spite of the tensions of the military occupation. This generous treatment should work to the navy’s advantage in the recovery and retention of peace and order.\(^{33}\)

The Guam Minseibu was not independent of the military: the naval guard unit was responsible for all public order. These facts limited Yamano’s effort at protection and complicated his attempts to separate civil affairs from the military regime.\(^{34}\) The navy ordered that Chamorro women be “protected” from Japanese soldiers’ sexual exploitation. Yamano realised that a compromise was needed and opened four \textit{ianjo} (brothels for military personnel) in Agana and Sumay. In addition to Japanese and Korean women, Chamorro women of “ill fame” or “Monday Ladies”, “girl friends” of American sailors, were called to work at the brothels.\(^{35}\) Though local women were protected by navy order, the \textit{ianjo} had a negative impact on Chamorro society because it was seen as an “evil practice” in the eyes of devout Catholics. During Homura’s period, these ladies were used as informants by the Minseibu police.

While Yamano tried to manage civil affairs separately from the naval administration, the navy considered the Minseibu part of the military administration. Yamano’s policy was diametrically opposed to Homura’s complete military approach.

\textbf{Taxation}

The primary aim of the navy’s military administration was to acquire resources. To accomplish this goal, Japan had first to establish self-sufficiency in each area. To obtain local financial support, Regulations for the Navy’s Accounts for Civil Affairs called for taxes, service fees and transfers on the occupied people.\(^{36}\) But how to obtain tax revenue and how to establish independent accounts for civil affairs were not small matters, especially as this was required immediately.

Yamano called on Hirata Genjirō, tax officer of the South Seas Bureau, Tinian Office, to draft tax laws conforming to the Rule on Taxes for Local Expenditures in the


\(^{34}\) See Owings, Cathleen R.W., “The War Years on Guam: Narratives of the Chamorro Experience” (Guam: Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1981).


South Seas Islands. Though the rule levied income tax, poll tax, recreation and other taxes, the only tax that applied to islanders was a poll tax, levied on males between 18 and 60, excluding those who supported more than five children, or who were disabled (Article 45 and 48). In consultation with traditional chiefs, the tax rate was decided by the chief of each district. The tax applied only to islanders and did not consider the payer’s ability to pay. However, the Bureau gave consideration to the islanders’ living off the land and sea. It allowed Marshallese to pay tax in copra and encouraged other islanders to make handicrafts for income. Collection of button shells was allowed only to islanders as a way for them to earn cash.\(^{37}\) The tax in the South Sea Islands corresponded to the Mandate principle — it was used for the islanders’ welfare and improvement.

Although details of Hirata’s draft tax regulations cannot be found, he made decisions with consideration for the Chamorro family system, life conditions and income sources as well as the Bureau’s existing tax laws, because “When the social order is fully recovered, regular taxation could be promulgated under the South Seas Bureau jurisdiction.”\(^{38}\) However, his draft with Yamano’s approval was rejected by the chief supply officer of the naval guard unit. On the basis of U.S. tax regulations, the chief supply officer insisted on applying several taxes including taxes on business income, houses, cars, bicycles, refrigerators, electric fans, all of which were luxury goods.\(^{39}\) The supply officer’s intention was not merely to obtain revenue from the Chamorros who could not afford to pay. Before the war, the main income for Chamorros came from employment with U.S. Naval agencies and at military facilities, and remittances from overseas Chamorros, mainly in the U.S. military. After Japan’s occupation, inflation placed them in great difficulty. The chief supply officer announced his plans: the collection of all U.S. dollars held by Chamorros at a low rate of exchange, one dollar to two yen, instead of one dollar to 4.37 yen (December 1941), and further acquisition of U.S. dollars through taxation. These were pressing “indolent Chamorros” to work, and thereby helping the Japanese.\(^{40}\)

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38 Hirata Genjirō, diary (5 February 1942).
39 In 1939, the U.S. poll tax was $2.00 a year. In 1941, additional taxes were levied on water, liquor, domestic liquor (tuba from coconut trees), vehicles, firearms, soft drinks, tobacco, fuel oil, cosmetics and perfume, dogs and others. *Government of Guam Civil Regulations, 1936*, pp. 37, 47, 53, and 93; and The Annual Report of the Governor of Guam, 1941, pp. 32-33.
40 Hirata Genjirō, *ibid.*
Hirata asked, “Are we Japanese providing government services sufficient for sustaining Chamorro life? How much power does the navy give the Minseibu to administer the Chamorro?” He criticised the navy’s attitude to civil affairs including its lack of support for Chamorro livelihood.

Although the levy of taxes was suspended as unrealistic, Homura reintroduced them in early 1943. The tax was three sen per coconut tree (there were an estimated 655,000 trees), and two sen per banana tree planted on 210 cho (514.5 acres). In addition to runaway inflation, the purchase price of copra paid by the Minseibu fell and bananas became a basic food. With opposition from Yamano, village chiefs, and even the 5th Naval Guard Unit Commander Sugimoto who was worried about public order, Homura finally withdrew his tax plan.

In general Yamano’s purpose was to protect Chamorros from the military.

**Naval Commander Homura’s Policy**

The 5th Base Force on Saipan had no intention of leaving the Guam Minseibu in the hands of civilians. The navy appointed Commander Homura Teiichi, in the reserve, as Minseibu chief in January 1942 as Minseibu work began.

Homura, an elite graduate of the Naval Academy, was a former torpedo officer of the battleship *Haruna*. He went into the reserve due to a “failure during a naval review in front of the Emperor.” He was a Doctor of Laws and a former member of prefectural and city assemblies in Yamaguchi.2 The Guam Minseibu, like the New Britain Minseibu, was established directly under a naval base force. In New Britain, all chiefs were captain-rank staff officers of the 8th Special Base Force because it was in the forefront of Japan’s advance and established to “form solid ground for the future deployment and operation in New Guinea, Australia, and the South Pacific Islands.” In comparison with Rabaul, Guam was far from the front line no matter how important strategically. Although the navy’s reason for appointing Homura is not known, the Navy Ministry thought this 54-year-old reserve officer was appropriate.

At the time of Homura’s arrival in June 1942, the government decided on the Basic Principles for the Establishment of Greater East Asia (Daitoa kensetsu no kihon kōyōro) following suggestions of the Council for Greater East Asia Construction (Daitoa

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41 Hirata Genjirō, ibid.
42 Homura Yasue, interviewed by author, Kōbe, 7 May 2000.
The first unified principles for military administration in occupied areas included guidelines for using existing administrative machinery and religion, employing natives, and spreading the Japanese language. One guideline stated, “Kind but stern justice shall be administered and narrow-minded kindness shall be avoided.” The cabinet’s Planning Board expounded this policy, to concentrate forces for a robust defence in Asia. This defence was more important than any concern for native people.44

The remainder of this chapter considers Homura’s policies on pacification and the judiciary, mainly between mid-1942 and October 1943, when the Minseibu could manage civil administration without heavy military influence. According to a Minseibu report, Homura focused on: 1) general administration — public order, pacification, intelligence activities, appointment of village officials, news and propaganda, Japanese language education, instruction for food production and farming, repair of roads, instruction for employment, search for escapees; 2) economic development — distribution of subsistence provisions, price control, official prices, inventory of food in stock, and the census; and 3) judiciary — law enforcement and the prosecution of criminals.45 Because of poor records, the discussion here is limited to Homura’s administration of pacification and judicial matters. His method as military and civilian officer is clear — propaganda or punishment. He strictly followed guidelines and this immediately changed Yamano’s policy and the attitudes of civilian Minseibu officers.

The Minseibu administration for Homura was not one of an occupied area or of the South Sea Bureau but of Japan. The focus was not the Chamorros or the South Sea Islanders, but the Japanese. He brought Japanese experience to his administration. One was the National Spiritual Mobilisation movement (1937), which aimed to reinforce national mobilisation from the spiritual side. The spiritual movement aimed to have them understand the significance of the war, promise positive participation and loyalty, and willingly endure hardships. Another motivational effort was the Imperial Rule Assistance movement (1940) to unify nations under one-political party in a unified-state, or a “new order” for “a little more reasonable wartime national system.”46 Each prefectural governor was head of the local movement. The navy encouraged retired and reserve officers to join the movement. As a politician and naval officer, Homura was definitely one of the community leaders for the movements in Japan.

According to Minseibu staff, Homura behaved like a local assemblyman. But, as civil administrator in an occupied area and a naval officer in active service, he eagerly tried to rebuild Guam according to Japan’s statism, rather than absorb Chamorros into the Japanese community. He saw his duty as the navy’s, “to facilitate the organic integration of the entire region into the Japanese Empire.”

Pacification

The navy’s Outline on the Conduct of Military Administration in Occupied Areas provided two policies for native peoples: no interference with local customs, practices, and religious “for the time being,” and no measures for the “sole purpose” of placating natives. With a policy of non-intervention and pacification, the navy tried to minimise the psychological impact of the presence of Japanese troops. However, this policy was not enforced, at least on Guam.

In the Minseibu report to the army, Homura’s pacification measures carried out by Minseibu officers were:

- carrying out visits to each village area to clarify the significance of the war, and to instruct [Chamorro] to rid their consciousness of dependence on the U.S. and Britain, and to be obedient to the imperial government through every possible means.

Homura’s characteristic method was pacification by “every possible means,” such as events, speeches, and gatherings. These were frequent from late 1942 to mid-1943 during the most stable period of the Minseibu.

Special events included deer hunting, a sports day, sukiyaki party, Chamorro dance party, picnic, baseball, and sumo tournaments, and variety shows to dispel fear of the occupation and promote pro-Japanese feelings. Naval propaganda films were shown regularly. On the first anniversary of Japan’s occupation, a troop inspection and ceremony were held to dedicate the Ōmiya Jinja, a Shinto shrine, in Agana. The celebration included a parade with the Japan Club president’s son who was dressed as a soldier, pointing his gun at a man wrapped in a U.S. flag. The point was to show Japan’s dignity, strength and justice, protecting Chamorros from American colonialism.

Homura’s enthusiastic speeches and lectures were given at village officials’ and district chiefs’ meetings, during tours of villages and schools, and at any other

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47 “Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 1942).
48 Ibid.
50 Okada Shōnosuke, interview by author, Tokyo, 4 August 1997.
opportunity. His speeches covered the excellence of the navy, especially the sinking of H.M.S. Prince of Wales and H.M.S. Repulse and the capture of Singapore, one of the greatest moments in Japan’s Pacific war. During his impassioned speeches, “Japan’s number one propagandist on the island” explained the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity ideology in order to make the Chamorros accept the Imperial Way spirit, namely hakkô ichiu (universal concord). His regular finale was bowing in the direction of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo and shouting “banzai.”

Under his direction, Minseibu officials and Nan’yô Kôhatsu employees lectured on a unified Asia as a key to hakkô ichiu, Japan as a liberator, and the purpose of world peace.

It was important for Homura to organise civilians, including Japanese, into groups and give them instructions. Beside the Japanese Club of Guam, the “Greater Japan Ladies’ Patriotic Society Ômiyajima Branch” (Ômiyajima Dainihon Fujinkai) was organised. In the homeland all women’s associations were unified in October 1940 under the Imperial Rule Assistance Association with slogans of the whole nation’s support and faithful public duty. Japanese wives in the Guam branch carried out memorial services for the war dead, supported naval guard members, gave donations to the troops and volunteer airfield construction workers. President Sawada Nao, a patriotic storeowner who migrated to Guam before the war, gave instructions to new Japanese residents regarding daily behaviour so as to gain respect. Homura’s policy required that everyone leading an ordinary life would match their homeland compatriots in nationwide fascist movements and in supporting militarism.

For Guam’s 214 children of Japanese fathers and Chamorro mothers, Homura organised the Second Generation Society (Dai Niseikai). Because of the infrequency of transport and communication from Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, these children were assimilated into Chamorro society in language, culture, customs, and thought. They did not share the new patriotic sentiment for Japan. Dealing with mixed blood youth was an important issue in parallel with the Council for Greater East Asia Construction’s discussion of the “blood morality of the Yamato race”. The council recognised the need for unification of all Japanese nationals and decided to train these youngsters to imbibe Japanese spirit “until they could fully understand they were members of an Asian race and thereby become indoctrinated with Japanese racial consciousness.”

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52 Okada Shônosuke, interview by author, Tokyo, 4 August 1997.
53 Koshimuta Yoriko, interview by author, Kagoshima, 23 September 1999; and Takano Naoe, interview by author, Guam, 29 September 1997.
54 Kikakuin Kenkyûkai, Daito a kensetsu no kihon kôryô, p. 107.
second-generation society was a site of re-education and training in Japanese language, Japanese style, and building a Japanese spiritual foundation. The goal was to have them be imperial subjects and to mobilise them for Japan’s purposes.55

The Chamorro leaders’ Concord Society (kyōwakai) is, perhaps, the best example of Homura’s ideological approach. He explained its purpose as “to cooperate with Japan in winning the war,” and “in making Guam a part of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.”56 This society was established by consultation between the Ministries of Home Affairs, Overseas Affairs and the Government-General of Chosen in 1934. Its hypocritical ideology was one of racial harmony through the assimilation of Koreans in Japan’s homeland and having them work as the Emperor’s subjects. In order to accelerate assimilation with government sponsorship, the society in Japan defined seven slogans and associated ceremonies:

1) understanding Japan’s national body,
2) respect for the Yamato spirit,
3) demonstrating loyalty and filial piety,
4) demonstrating Japanese spirit,
5) mastery of the Japanese language,
6) a national flag-raising ceremony, and
7) pride in personal appearance.57

The idea of the society spread to the South Sea Islands, where groups were drafted into a society of that name under the supervision of each district office. Everyone was directed to strive to improve their lifestyle and society, build cooperative neighbourhoods, and cultivate a spirit of hard work.58 Similarly, assimilation would be the motive for establishing a new Guam society. The volunteer members worked at airfield construction to propagate the model of “good Chamorros.”

By contrast to an ideological approach, the most effective system for building loyalty was the Chamorro Young Men’s Association (Seinendan), which consisted of Chamorros between 15 and 30. It was the lowest level of the nationwide Imperial Rule Assistance Association. The goals of morality, discipline, improvement of the will to work, physical training, and Japanese language instruction were to make Chamorro youth “splendid Japanese” who would dedicate themselves to the construction of

55 “The Judge Advocate’s Brief in Reply to Plea in Bar, 1400-50 (610)-wka, Legal Office, Island Command, Guam” (4 June 1945), T(6) and T(9).
Greater East Asia (a theme in Chapter Six). The navy had great expectations for the young men’s associations in occupied areas. Lieutenant Commander Horii from the Ministry’s Department of Southern Government Affairs (Nan’pō Seinumu) stated the aim of the association was to prepare local youth to supplement military forces in emergencies.\(^{59}\) An association in Java, called Penudas, consisted of a reservoir of young people for military purposes, and the seinendan members from Palau and Ponape (now Pohnpei) supported military operations in Indonesia, New Guinea and Rabaul.\(^{60}\) On Guam — a likely scene of a U.S. counterattack — the association could provide military labour, and even combatants.

With systematic organisation of Japanese nationals, Japanese women, second-generation youth, Chamorro leaders and Chamorro youths, Homura tried to develop elements of the Imperial Rule Assistance movement for psychological and patriotic inspiration. His final effort was to propagandise the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere slogan. His effort failed mainly because of a lack of leadership and manpower, the small size of the groups and impractical instruction. Japan’s abstract thoughts had no appeal for Chamorros under Japanese rule.

By early 1943 when defence became critical, Homura had to give up attempts at ideological change due to shortages, lack of shipping, and erratic transport because of U.S. submarine attacks. This forced him to change his speeches into all-out support of each nation and race in Asia. This also did not last long. Homura could not present his patriotic ideology in the face of defeat. Some Chamorros observed him, and a teacher commented, “Toward the end of the occupation period, Homura was more helpful than he intended to be in raising the hopes of Chamorros for a return of the Americans.”\(^{61}\)

Homura’s aggressive propaganda to immediately “Japanise” Chamorros to be included in Greater East Asia was not accepted.

**Judiciary and Police Affairs**

Because Japan could not apply the Imperial Constitution to occupied areas, the general laws and regulations for the homeland also could not be applied. The navy’s Outline of the Conduct of Military Administration required the Military Offences Tribunal to have jurisdiction over native residents and foreign nationals who violated military ordinances and regulations, or who committed criminal and civil offences

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\(^{59}\) “Nanpō kaigun senryōchiku shisatsu hōkoku sho hoka ronaihšu” (April 1944).


outside the jurisdiction of the Military Offences tribunal. Such offences were judged in terms of customary law and the colonial judicial system. Necessary revisions would be made as soon as possible and steps would be taken in the judicial field for natives to exercise self-government as much as possible. 62 The Provisional Order for Judiciary of Civil Administration, the fundamental law for a criminal court, was promulgated by the Southwest District Fleet Civil Government in Indonesia under the navy’s jurisdiction. 63

There was no equivalent order for the Guam Minseibu, directly under 5th Base Force. Treason and spying were punishable by death, imprisonment, expulsion, fine or confiscation of property. While Yamano cited the liberal measures in South Seas Bureau orders, Homura treated all cases under the Military Offences Tribunal. An example is the case of sexual assault on the wife of a Japanese teacher by a Chamorro man. At the summary trial, the defendant was not given the right to a lawyer. Though Captain Harada Ryūichirō, a prosecutor and supply officer from the 54th Naval Guard Unit, proposed life imprisonment, Homura, the presiding judge, sentenced the man to death. It was unusual for the naval prosecutor’s ruling to be overturned by the judge. A factor was that Homura outranked Harada. 64 Judicial power for civil affairs was in the hands of the Minseibu chief and not with the commander of the naval base. As in this trial, Homura tried to keep the Minseibu administration under military rule.

Another example of Homura’s interpretation of policy was the capture of U.S. escapees. An army report on behalf of the Minseibu stated, “(the Minseibu) was making all possible effort to capture escapees by mobilising the police officers and village chiefs to cooperate with the navy.” 65 This search left a stain on the Minseibu administration. On 10 December 1941, believing all American soldiers had been captured, the 5th Base Force on Saipan informed Headquarters, Tokyo, that Guam had been secured. However, six Americans with Chamorro assistance had eluded capture and this was not discovered until early 1942. 66 With its honour in question, the base force had the 54th Naval Guard Unit organise a search party of five military guard groups. Soon after Homura arrived, he organised a Minseibu search party of his own headed by Police Inspector Shimada and five Saipanese patrolmen. 67 After a large-scale

62 “Senryōchi gunsei shoriyōkō” (14 March 1942).
63 “Zantei minsei saiiban rei” (1 November 1943).
64 Niino Michio, interview by author, Kumamoto, September 22, 1999. The victim’s husband, a Japanese teacher, was sentenced to six years in prison for “slapping a Chamorro student.” Case no. 16 of “Final Report of Navy War Crimes Program” (1 December 1949).
66 Ogawa Kan’ichi, interview by author, Tokyo, 27 September 1999.
67 Hirose Hisashi, interview by author, Tokyo, 24 February 1999.
search, three escapees were found and executed in September 1942 by the guard unit and Shimada. Two others were found and shot by a naval search party in October. The last was a U.S. Navy radioman first class, George Tweed. He was finally rescued by a U.S. ship ten days before the 21 July 1944 landing.  

Because the escapees were U.S. military, the search should have been the responsibility of the 5th Naval Guam Unit, but Homura had the Minseibu police involved, competing with the Naval Guard Unit groups. During the search, the police detained more than 110 Chamorros and conducted abusive investigations to find the escapees, especially Tweed, who supposedly had a radio. Chamorros came to believe that the Minseibu was the “headquarters of the military police” or “minseibu binta” (The Minseibu where one got a double slap in the face).  

Homura’s aggressive pursuit of Tweed went so far as attempting to manipulate the Japanese priest Komatsu Shigeru and Father Duenas, an influential Chamorro priest, to persuade Tweed to surrender. Because of the cooperation by some Chamorros with the Minseibu police, Chamorro society split into pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese groups. Because the Saipanese Chamorro patrolmen and interpreters were abusive during the investigations, the Chamorros on Guam detested them. All investigations failed and their brutality caused great psychological damage.  

The best evidence of Homura’s policy is buried in the case files of the Saipanese Chamorros who were tried at the U.S. Navy War Crimes Program, Guam, 1945-1949. After exhaustive investigations, the Navy War Crimes Office determined that 23 out of 51 cases were directly related to the Guam Minseibu. The individuals prosecuted for crimes outside Guam and found guilty were all navy and army officers and officials,

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71 “Sworn Statement of Luis Furtado concerning Residents of the Island of Guam as observed by him during the occupation of that island by the Japanese,” 29 September 1944, a part of c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif., From the Island Commander to District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, 20 November 1944, Office.
72 “Memorandum from Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer to the Island Commander” (16 November 1944), Headquarters, Island Command, Navy Number 926, c/o FPO San Francisco, California.
73 Cases concerning Guam, Rota, Palau, Truk, Chichijima (the Ogasawara Islands), and Wake were examined on Guam. Cases concerning Mili, Jaluit, and one case concerning Wake were separately examined on Kwajalein, in the Marshall Islands.
except one high-ranking interpreter. But 21 individuals out of 24 accused of crimes on Guam were connected to or worked for the Minseibu. The charges against many Saipanese Chamorros and Japanese police were assault, battery and murder. These offences, which applied to more than 80% of the accused, took place mainly in relation to the American military escapees, especially Tweed.\textsuperscript{74}

The details are:\textsuperscript{75}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Accused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saipanese-Chamorro patrolmen (cases 2-5, 7-9, 12, 17, 19-23)</td>
<td>15 persons\textsuperscript{76}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese police officers (cases 14-15, 18, and 27)</td>
<td>4 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army and navy personnel (case 13)</td>
<td>1 person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamorro district officer serving the Japanese (case 4)</td>
<td>1 person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese military policeman (case 6)</td>
<td>1 person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese schoolteacher (case 16)</td>
<td>1 person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese resident on Guam (case 11)</td>
<td>1 person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To recap, the Guam Minseibu was small, but well equipped with personnel, organization, administrative ability and other conditions, compared with the New Britain Minseibu. The goal made little difference between the civilian officers and naval officers. However, the navy that was alienated from civilian administration trusted a naval-civilian officer who had no experiences in governing foreigners, and had no “organic” administrative skills. Japanese society swept into Guam all at once, like a mud flow. There was no serious effort to integrate the Chamorros. The U.S. Navy war crimes trials revealed the impact of the Minseibu’s integration work.

\textsuperscript{74} These experiences shaped their later views. Leibowitz wrote, “Utilizing in many cases as intermediates Chamorros from Saipan, resulting in resentments among some Guamanians.” This resentment partly explains Guam’s rejection, in a 1969 referendum, of the Northern Mariana Islands petition for unification. Leibowitz, Arnold, H., \textit{Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations} (Dordrecht, Boston, London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), pp. 323-324.

\textsuperscript{75} “Final Report of Navy War Crimes Program” (1 December 1949).

\textsuperscript{76} The 15 persons includes one Chamorro from Palau and two from Rota.
Chapter Five

The Minseibu:
Integration into the War Economy

Japan's war required the acquisition and centralisation of natural resources in the southern areas. In order to secure these resources, Japan enlarged the war: armed expansion needed additional resources, regardless of quality. Instead of plundering supplies, the government demanded local food self-sufficiency for overseas garrisons and native peoples. As well as the outlines of the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government (November 1941) and the army (November 1941), two of three navy's basic administration policies (March 1942) stressed expedited acquisition of vital resources self-sufficiency of military personnel.¹ No matter what was possible or reasonable, these policies were pushed ahead, so industrial development was the first and last goal of the Guam Minseibu.

As the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere plan tried to absorb far-flung areas, the navy did not develop Guam in isolation. The navy already had a self-sufficiency plan during its military administration of the South Sea Islands (1914-1922): the Marianas (Saipan, Tinian, and Rota), Palau (using Babeldaob Island), Yap, Truk, Ponape, and the Marshalls (supported by Kosrae), which coincided with the South Seas Bureau administrative district (see Chapter Two). Possession of the Marianas would allow U.S. aerial bombing of Japan's homeland. Therefore, the 5th Defence Unit, the converted gunboat Shōei Maru, the 18 Air Group, the 7th and the 8th Gunboat Divisions, the 7th Air Group, and the 58th, 59th and 60th Sub-chaser Divisions were deployed in December 1941.

As well as a supply base, Guam would serve as an air base. However, by 1941 the navy had not begun construction on Mili, Kwajalein, Brown, Nauru, Tarawa, or other eastern islands, although Allied Forces were expected from that direction (see Appendix 1). While the navy focused on airfield construction, the Minseibu had to establish self-sufficiency on Guam, which would also be a supply base for Saipan and Tinian. This was the first task given to Guam, to be achieved as soon as possible, according to the navy's onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru (to enable each to find their

proper place) policy for establishing “organic” industrial relations and permanent integration of Guam into the Mariana Islands and Japan.

To describe Guam’s economic integration into the Mariana Islands, the first and second portions of this chapter examine the contrasting pre-war conditions on Guam and in the other Mariana Islands. This provides background to the development that the navy expected on Guam, to reinforce the Marianas in military and industrial terms. The third part examines the plan, method and results of the Guam Minseibu projects. The conflict between the navy’s development plan and the realities of war raised serious questions, particularly about labour. Therefore, the fourth part of the chapter examines the Minseibu’s treatment of Chamorro labourers.

American Development of Guam

In 1945 the United Kingdom Naval Intelligence Division reported on Guam’s pre-war agricultural development. It described Guam as a raised coral limestone island with irregular volcanic formations, possessing no known mineral deposits. Coconut plantations yielded copra, but the world price varied dramatically; rice, a staple food for the Chamorro people, was imported from Japan because it was cheaper than locally grown rice; corn was grown twice per year, but was hampered by lack of storage, equipment and an adequate water supply. Typhoons hit Guam and their ravages were a major obstacle for agriculture; and deep-sea fishing was hardly practised.²

From the beginning of U.S. naval rule, the government gradually absorbed Chamorro land by enforcing a high land tax. By 1941, federal and naval government-owned land amounted to 19,431 ha, a 30% increase in 40 years. The navy held one-third of the island. The absence of an island-wide cadastral land survey, short-term land leases, high freight rates, high prices for labour, scarcity of land transport and the proximity of the Philippines and China as sources of cheap agricultural products discouraged development.³ For many years, the Agriculture Department of the U.S. naval government ran an agricultural school and school farms, sponsored boys’ and girls’ agricultural clubs and public markets to stress self-sufficiency.⁴ But according to

² Naval Intelligence Division, Pacific Islands Vol. IV: Western Pacific (New Guinea and Islands Northward), B.R.519C (Restricted), (Geographical Handbook Series, UK, 1945), pp. 476-479.
a Japanese agronomist, the department’s experimentation and improvement had not reached the level of “expert research.”

The federal and naval governments’ employment of Chamorros slowly shifted the island economy from agricultural self-sufficiency to cash. In early 1941 the naval government employed 1,200 Chamorro men in infrastructure projects, so most farm work was done by women and children. As agriculture became a minor matter for home-consumption, the distribution of produce was not systematised and agriculture languished. After PanAm began service from San Francisco in 1935, American thinking and material culture gradually intruded into the “bull-cart economy”.

Copra, Guam’s only export commodity, scarcely increased during the thirty-year U.S. era (see Graph 1). The trade gap was conspicuous in 1940 and 1941, imports were 6.3 times higher in 1940 and 11.8 times higher in 1941 than exports. The importation of rice, wheat, dairy products, sugar, matches, tobacco and other daily necessities occupied more than 37% of imports. The U.S. Office of Strategic Services admitted that Guam’s pre-war economy was “thrown seriously out of gear by the presence of the U.S. naval station work projects.”

![Graph 1. Import and Export of Guam (S)](source: The Annual Report of the Governor of Guam, 1909-1940.

The acreage under cultivation was 1,540 chô out of 54,900 chô, only 2.8%, according to an early 1942 study by Japan’s Asia Development Board. Another

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6 Rogers, Robert F., ibid., p. 158.
Japanese evaluation defined the 23,000 Chamorros' self-sufficiency rates in terms of output as: rice, less than 10%; corn, 30%; sweet potatoes, 4%; others 8%; and vegetables, 4% (see Table 4). Through America's economic strength, the U.S. naval administration unwittingly fostered Guam's overwhelming dependence on imports. During the same period, Japan became a major military power at the expense of economic diversity, and had to institute a policy the reverse of America's. Moreover, a distinctive feature of wartime self-sufficiency was Japanisation, which was not for the benefit of Chamorro but local Japanese military and for the military industry at home. For Japan to achieve its economic goals, the Guam Minseibu had to begin development practically from scratch, namely deforestation, soil preparation, irrigation and a "back-to-the-land" campaign.

![Table 4](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amount Required Per Day (g)</th>
<th>Amount Required Per Year (kg)</th>
<th>Yield (kg)</th>
<th>Shortage (kg)</th>
<th>Rate of Self-Sufficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,511,100</td>
<td>457,365</td>
<td>1,053,735</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>1,511,100</td>
<td>69,135</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,441,965</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1,846,900</td>
<td>159,555</td>
<td>1,687,345</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,511,100</td>
<td>59,610</td>
<td>1,451,490</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sanbō Honbu, "Ōmiyatō heiyō chishi shiryō" (1944), p. 47.
* Calculations were made based on a total population of 23,000.
* Original miscalculations were corrected by the author.

Japanese Development of the South Sea Islands

As a matter of course, the navy's plan for Guam was directly linked to the economic situation in the South Sea Islands. Because Japan's business activity in the South Sea Islands was praised after the war by scholars in both English and Japanese, I need to address this issue first.

David Purcell evaluated the Japanese development of phosphate, sugar, copra and the exploitation of ocean resources and commercial operations, and determined that high levels of production were achieved. Mark Peattie and Matsushima Yasukatsu, who paid special attention to the Nan’yō Kōhatsu (South Seas Development Company) in the Mariana Islands, concluded that Japan established an "independent economy" in

9 Sanbō Honbu, "Ōmiyatō heiyō chishi shiryō" (1944), p. 47; and Miyasaka Gorō, "Guamutō shokuryō no jukyū kōzō," *Shokuryō Keizai* 8, No. 10 (October 1942): p. 54. The island's output in 1941 was 839 koku but 8,039 koku were imported. The daily requirements per person were: 180g of potatoes, 220g of other potatoes, and 180g of vegetables. The two sources noted above were based on the same source: figures on need and shortages differ slightly, but rates of self-sufficiency are approximately the same.

the mandate.\textsuperscript{11} The basis for their opinion is seen in Graphs 2-7. Copra (mainly in the Marshall Islands), phosphate (Peleliu), dried bonito (Palau and Truk) and sugar (Marianas) were flourishing in the South Sea Islands. Saipan and Tinian were the most developed, mainly by Nan’yō Kōhatsu Kibushiki Kaisha (South Seas Development Company). This company monopolised the sugar industry through access to land, immigrant labour, and exclusive control of commerce. Their taxes ended the South Seas Bureau’s fiscal dependency in 1932; ten years after civilian government was instituted.

These favourable descriptions have an element of truth, but development in the South Sea Islands cannot be accurately assessed without consideration of the context. If these optimistic evaluations were accurate, the navy’s policy for the islands in mid-1930s and even Guam would have been very different.

The apparently successful economic development was not realised by private businesses without the support of the government. The South Sea Bureau was able to carry out its work only because of its budgetary support from the homeland. The national treasury subsidy between 1922 and 1931 reached 20,990,000 yen.\textsuperscript{12} This was nearly triple the amount (7,850,000 yen), which was transferred from the South Seas Bureau Special Account to the general account of the government between 1936 and 1943. Therefore we cannot say that the Bureau created an “independent economy” as the result of Nan’yō Kōhatsu’s enterprises. The interesting question is why the government invested such large amounts to support costly industrial experiments in the South Sea Islands.

One answer is that the navy’s voice was extremely weighty in the management of the mandate, more than equal to the South Seas Bureau. It was the navy that occupied the South Sea Islands in 1914 and controlled the ocean, which could not be compared to the small area managed by the Bureau. A key element in the navy’s plan was to relocate Japanese nationals to the Islands as a step to eventual territorialisation. For this purpose, industries were necessary. A review of development under the navy is critical for understanding the navy’s vision of the economic integration of Guam.

After having the South Seas Bureau achieve “financial independence”, the navy began its second stage through the 1935 ten-year development plan. Fortunately for the


navy, Japan withdrew from the League: and the navy saw this as release from the League’s non-fortification restriction. The 1935 plan was originally for engineering projects: roads, communications, airfields, sea transport and weather observatories so that the South Sea Islands could serve as southward advance and defence bases.¹³ To secure the budget for these projects, the navy had the Bureau emphasise diverse industries, particularly tropical agriculture, forestry and fishery which could increase government revenue. This new phase of development and the navy’s construction projects were all carried out by Nan’yô Kôhatsu and Nan’yô Bôeki (South Sea Trading Company) through the Nan’yô Takushoku (South Seas Colonisation Company), a company fully supported and supervised by the Bureau. The exponential increases of business activity seen in Graphs 2-7 were the result of the 1935 plan, a joint effort between the navy and the Overseas Affairs Ministry.

The morass of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) deepened the need for war supplies and created tension within the emerging war economy. The five-year plan of 1940, a revision of the 1935 plan, called for further strengthening of agriculture (pineapples and cassava), fishery (dried bonito), and forestry products to support military industries at home.¹⁴ To ease a serious deficit in Japan’s balance of payments caused by the war industries, the Outline for Enlargement of Production Capacity (December 1938) controlled all productive activities in every corner. The South Seas Islands were allotted shipping of bauxite (for aircraft) and phosphate (for fertilizer), and any other minerals. The 99% alcohol (for fuel and medicines) manufactured from sugarcane was required to meet fuel shortages.

As of July 1940, the navy’s policy was to expand southward, “seizing opportunities” and “with use of arms, if necessary.” If expansion was achieved, self-sustenance of agricultural and forestry could be realised. Desperate efforts for local self-sufficiency were taken, particularly in the Mariana Islands where 45,922 Japanese out of a population of 85,000 lived, until the outbreak of the war. This took place with product exports to Japan and fortification work. In late 1942, the Bureau under the navy ended sugar plantation work and changed land usage in order to achieve food self-sufficiency. Besides shortages of labour and food from Japan, the reason was the

¹³ Ibid., pp. 31-34
¹⁴ These were mainly military supplies, including sugarcane (alcohol, not sugar), cassava (starch, alcohol and gunpowder), derris (pesticide), cacao (confectionery), balsa (insulator, life preservers), mangrove (tannin and charcoal), aconitum (paint), coconut (copra), Manilkara udoido Kanehira (paint), sandalwood (for gonorrhoea), and rubber.
limited land space in the Marianas.\textsuperscript{15} Above all, Saipan (185 km\textsuperscript{2}) and Tinian (98 km\textsuperscript{2}) had no excess arable land because more than 90\% of that had been developed mainly for sugar.\textsuperscript{16} Repeated planting of sugar caused soil exhaustion.\textsuperscript{17} The Bureau, Saipan Branch and Nan'yō Kōhatsu repeatedly tried to lease southern Guam from the U.S. naval governors during a brief honeymoon period in 1930s, but were refused.\textsuperscript{18} Rota's (40 miles north of Guam) sugar plantations failed and the manufacturing facility was closed in 1939 due to low soil quality. In place of cane, vegetables and lumber were planted for Saipan and Tinian, and castor-oil plants (medicine), sisal hemp (fibre), derris and cotton. But Rota with 125 km\textsuperscript{2} was too small to support even local military needs. Accordingly, development of Pagan Island (48.3 km\textsuperscript{2}), Auijan (7 km\textsuperscript{2}), Anatahan (3 km\textsuperscript{2}), and Agrihan (47 km\textsuperscript{2}), all north of Saipan, was commenced.

In these circumstances, Guam was the object of envy by administrators and businessmen in the Marianas. Before the war, an agricultural technician of Nan'yō Kōhatsu provided a positive estimate to an American journalist:

Guam could produce more and better sugar than Saipan and is also well suited to growing coffee, cacao, tobacco, cotton, pineapple, and, in the rich lowlands, maize and rice. There is fine timber in the hills of the south. The northern plateau, or those parts of it not needed for airfields, could readily be laid out for sugarcane or coconut plantations. There are no better fishing-grounds in the Pacific than the waters around Guam.\textsuperscript{19}

In the context of the Marianas, the navy's expectations of Guam were high, due to its size (514 km\textsuperscript{2} — 2.7 times larger than Saipan), arable soil, flatlands and irrigation. Military and civilian self-sufficiency including the Japanese staple, rice, could reinforce the navy's plan to use the Marianas as supply bases. A tiny quantity of some minerals could be helpful in light of unlimited demand. 5,000 Chamorro labourers were already under the navy's control and could be made to work for the navy's purposes. Guam, it was assumed, could be integrated into the Marianas to achieve Japan's war purposes.

\textsuperscript{15} The Japanese population (including Koreans and Taiwaneses) was 77,257 (43,860 in Saipan) in December 1939 and 90,072 (48,923 in Saipan) in December 1941. Nan'yōchō, Shōwa jūnana-nenbun: Nan'yō Guntō yōran (1942), p. 37; and Nan'yōchō Naimubu Kikakuka, Daidō kyūkai Nan'yōchō tōkei nenkan Shōwa jūyō-nen (August 1941), pp. 12-13.
\textsuperscript{16} "Takuku Dairin sei Nan'yōchō bunai rinji shokuin sechī sechī kaisei no ken" (14 June 1941 and 11 April 1942).
\textsuperscript{18} Kasahara Yasumasa, interview by author, Shizuoka, Japan (14 April 2006).
\textsuperscript{19} Price, Willard, Japan's Islands of Mystery (NY: John Day, 1944), p. 49.
[Graphs 2-7]
Main Products in the South Sea Islands

Copa Shipment to Japan (ton)

Phosphate Shipment to Japan (ton)

Sugar Output (picul)

Output of Mining Industries (1,000 tons) and Revenue from Mining Industries (yen)

Dried Bonito Shipment to Japan (kan)

Export of Alcohol to Japan (Yen)


Revenue from Mining Industries includes mining area tax, mining production tax, and mining industry service tax.

"Takumu Dajin seigi Nan'yōchō kansei chū kaisei no ken" (5 February 1942).

1 kan = 3.75kg

The Minseibu’s Development of Guam

According to the navy’s Outline on the Conduct of Military Administration in the Occupied Areas of 1942, the Guam Minseibu was responsible not only for the acquisition and development of natural resources, but for the acquisition, distribution, trade, interchange of commodities, finance, currency, price control, self-sufficiency of local military forces, and the use of enemy property.\(^{20}\) Because the 80 staff of the Minseibu could not handle all these tasks, the 5th Base Force, the Minseibu’s superior on Saipan, contracted Nan’yō Kōhatsu to carry out all economic work on Guam as a “true, comprehensive government agency that would play an active patriotic role.”\(^{21}\)

Within a week of Guam’s occupation, the Nan’yō Kōhatsu research group (Sangyō Chōsadan) of 25 specialists in agriculture, construction and labour explored the island in a two-week feasibility study. A second group of 25 rushed to open the Guam business branch office in Agana in February 1942. The Guam office had two sections: general affairs (accounts, canteen, transport, and medical) and business affairs (rice cultivation, special crops, industrial products, minerals and civil engineering). The swift establishment of the office showed that the navy had a blueprint ready. Rather than products suited to Guam’s conditions, development was for defence resources and food self-sufficiency. Both appeared in the navy’s outline of military administration.

Commercial Control

The Liaison Conference’s Basic Policy for Currency and Banking Systems in the Southern Areas (February 1942) defined two policies for currency: all American and British currency or gold would be exchanged for yen; and the exchange rate would depend on the economic relations between Japan and other nations in the co-prosperity sphere.\(^{22}\) This policy aimed at creating a yen bloc profitable to Japan, and to make the yen the single currency for all transactions in the sphere.\(^{23}\)

Soon after the occupation, the use and distribution of the U.S. dollar were banned. The Minseibu ordered Chamorros to exchange their dollars for yen in order to

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\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 612.
begin economic relations with Saipan. While the official exchange rate was one U.S. dollar to 4.37 yen at the start of the war, a rate of one dollar for two yen was imposed, so that Chamorros immediately lost half the value of their money. U.S. $88,793 was converted. In order to consolidate Japan’s financial dominance, the assets of the Bank of Guam, formerly controlled by the U.S. Naval government, were seized. The Bank of Guam was replaced by the South Seas Bureau Saipan Post Office, Guam Sub-branch office, which handled savings, remittances and tax payments, as well as a postal service. Though the sub-branch had only 100 Japanese customers, it established a banking and postal function in common with the South Sea Islands.

The Minseibu purchased goods in U.S. Navy warehouses on the basis of parity between the yen and the dollar to avoid “a negative impact on prices.” The Nan’yō Köhatsu’s camp canteen, on behalf of the Minseibu, distributed these commodities to Japanese civilians, and later to Chamorros through six Japanese merchants and 26 commissioners and approved Chamorro-owned stores. The distribution of necessities (rice, miso, soy sauce, sugar, salt, pickled radish, matches, oil, tobacco, canned and other foods, beer, liquor, and cloth) were prioritised for sale to nationals only, at one dollar for one yen, with ration tickets. Other items were sold to Chamorros, but at one item per person and they had to endure inflation caused by the unfair exchange rates and prices — at least eight times higher — and shortages. The Minseibu responded that the Chamorros should awaken from their colonized mentality, dependence on imports, and work to achieve food self-sufficiency (through corn instead of rice) and other local food. Tobacco, matches, oil, baby milk and common imported goods, including food, became scarce in early 1942. The rationing stations were open three times a week in early 1942, but gradually this was reduced to once per month till early 1943. This naturally weakened the authority of the Minseibu over the people.

According to U.S. Naval government and Minseibu statistics in Table 5, the number of births on Guam was 908 per year on average between 1935 and 1941. This

24 “Guamutō ni okeru tsūka kōsaku ni kansuru ken” (22 December 1941); and “Guamutō ni okeru tsūka kōsaku ni kansuru geisai” (6 January 1942).
27 Ibid., p. 73.
28 Okada Shōnosuke, interview by author, Tokyo, August 4, 1998.
rate fell to 694 in June 1943. The increase in population for 1935 to 1941 was 528 on average, but only 385 in 1943. This fall may reflect the impact of food shortages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Table 5] The Chamorro Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1936</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1937</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1938</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1939</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1940</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1941</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1942</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1943</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sanbō Honbu, "Ômiyatô heiyō chishi shiryō" (1944); and The Annual Report of the Governor of Guam, 1934-1941. *The number of birth and death do not include people whose parents are not Chamorro and Kanaka natives.

After the Wartime Food Self-Sufficiency Plan was decided in May 1943, the frequency of transport ships from Japan fell dramatically because of U.S. submarines. In August 1943 when the Outlines of Reorganization of Industries were announced in the South Sea Islands, the food self-sufficiency policy on Guam was entrenched. Material shortages became serious on Guam earlier than in the South Sea Islands. On Guam, distribution to the people at large was limited because of Guam’s lower food self-sufficiency. Further, the majority of the population on Guam was Chamorro, not Japanese. The ratio of Japanese to the islanders was 12 to 1 on Saipan, Tinian, and Rota but 1 to 50 on Guam. Although basic necessities were shipped to the Marianas from Japan, limited supplies were sent to Guam for Japanese residents: it was claimed that Saipan, Tinian and Rota were Japan’s territories, while Guam was only an occupied territory. The outline for military administration of 1942 stated that the impact of the war on native livelihood should be alleviated where possible. It also ordered that commodities be secured for the general public through the interchange of goods in occupied areas. While the unilateral introduction of a Japanese command system had Guam integrated into the Marianas, no measures for this sudden change were taken by the Minseibu.

30 The Annual Report of the Governor of Guam, 1934-1941; and Sanbō Honbu, “Ômiyatô heiyō chishi shiryō,” Table 1.
Agricultural Production

In September 1941, cabinet adopted emergency measures to increase rice production and storage, anticipating a wider war. However, expansion was impossible in the South Sea Islands because of limited and steep land, lack of irrigation, the lack of protection from diseases and insects, and the ease of importing rice. Although the Bureau’s Tropical Industries Research Institute, Ponape Branch, finally developed a new rice strain in 1941 after more than fifteen years of experiment, rice output was only 43,266 kg, equivalent to 10,487 yen, or 0.2% of rice imports from Japan.\(^\text{32}\) Successful rice production on Guam was the Minseibu’s most urgent priority, but the reality on Guam was the same as in the South Sea Islands.

To obtain land suitable for rice paddy, the Minseibu did not recognise private land ownership. As seen in Table 6, it estimated that land on Guam for food production could be increased from 1,540 ちょう (1 ちょう = 2.45 acres) to 12,000 ちょう for agriculture (7.8 times larger): Of this amount, 60 ちょう to 800 ちょう for rice paddy (13 times larger), and 1,440 ちょう to 11,200 ちょう for farms (7.8 times larger).\(^\text{33}\) The land condition for rice paddy was “good” and “fair” only, while “good” land was only 7% of all farms. In 1941 the Bureau planned to assign Japanese farmers on Saipan, Tinian and Rota to plant rice in dry fields. On Saipan, 83.02 ちょう of rice fields in 1941 increased to 207.55 ちょう: on Tinian, 82.10 ちょう increased to 205.23 ちょう: on Rota, 0.16 ちょう increased to 0.40 ちょう. All islands in the Marianas planned to increase by 2.5 times.\(^\text{34}\) Compared to the northern Marianas, the expectation of Guam’s rice was extremely high and this effort took precedence.

\[\text{Table 6] Agricultural Land on Guam (Early 1942)}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soil Fertility</th>
<th>Developed Land Area in Pre-occupation Period</th>
<th>Area Possible to Develop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Land (a+b)</td>
<td>Paddy (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>390 ちょう</td>
<td>50 ちょう</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>850 ちょう</td>
<td>10 ちょう</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>300 ちょう</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,540 ちょう</td>
<td>60 ちょう</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversion Formula: 1 ちょう = 2.45 acres. Gross Area: 54,903 ちょう (g)
Developed Land Area: 18,611 ちょう (a+b+c+d).
Developed Rate (a+b+c+d)/(g) = 33.9%: Paddy and farm areas, (a+b)/g: 1,540 ちょう (2.8%); Pasture and coconut farm areas, (c+d)/(g): 17,071 ちょう (31.1%).
Area Possible to Develop for Agricultural Purposes (e+f)/(g): 21.9%.


\(^{33}\) Miyasaka Gorō, “Guamutō shokuryō no jukyū kōzō” Shokuryō Keizai 8, no.10: 50.

\(^{34}\) “Takumu Daijin seigi Nan’yo chō bunai rinji shokuin sechisei chū kaisei no ken” (8 May 1941).
To prepare paddy, the Minseibu began using local labour for reclamation, cultivation and irrigation in February 1942. Soon after that they opened rice farms in Asai Shōten, Suma, Inada (Inarajan), Naka (Agat), Umata (Umatac) and Matsuyama (Merizo), all southern villages that had water resources. Farms were also established in the central part of the island, and extended to the northern limestone areas. By 1942, the 76.82 chō (or 60 chō in Table 6) of rice paddy in the pre-occupation years was increased to 216 chō (2.8 times larger). According to Table 7, an additional 73.35 chō was developed by January 1944, totalling 289.35 chō (3.8 times larger). The farming area increased from 1,463.18 chō (or 1,440 chō in Table 6) to 3,900 chō (2.7 times larger). Then land for agriculture had increased from 1,540 to 4,189.35 chō. Since the total area of Guam was 54,903 chō, the pre-war land use rate of 2.8% rose to 7.6% out of a planned 21.9% in just two years (see Table 7). Therefore, 35% of the potential development area was brought under cultivation, a good effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Farm</th>
<th>Paddy</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Farm</th>
<th>Paddy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asai (Asan)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Naka (Agat)</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>196.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shōten (Piti)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>65.55</td>
<td>165.55</td>
<td>Umata (Umatac)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suma (Sumay)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td>Matsuyama (Merizo)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inada (Inarajan)</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>Haruta (Barrigada)</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tesaki (Talofono)</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>Takahara (Yigo)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakawa (Yona)</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>Kita (Dededo – Ritidian)</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinagawa (Sinajana)</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>Hiratsuka (Tumon- Dededo)</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawahara (Mangilao)</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>289.35</td>
<td>4,189.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sanbō Honbu, “Ômiyatō heiyō chishi shiryō” (1944), pp. 48-49.
Conversion Formula: 1 chō = 2.45 acres.

In February 1942 there were 3,799 Chamorro families: 523 in central Guam (5.7 persons per household) and north, and 3,278 in the south (5.1 per household). For “immediate achievement of self-sufficiency in staple foods and/or the islanders’ life security,” one chō two tan (2.95 acres) of cultivated land was assigned to each family in the south. Relative to the average area cultivated by a Japanese farmer, one chō two tan seemed reasonable (see Table 8). Besides Chamorro farms, a nine-chō naval guard

36 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
37 Calculated from Miyasaka Gorō, “Guamtō shokuryō no jukyū kōzō,” Shokuryō Kenzai 8, no. 10, p. 50; and Sanbō Honbu, “Ômiyatō heiyō chishi shiryō,” pp. 47-51. Each Chamorro family had five to six persons. This was similar to the situation in Japan: of 4,881 farming families in
unit farm and a 160-čō Nan‘yō Kōhatsu vegetable garden were developed. This means that most farmland was allocated to Chamorro families. The Minseibū reported that it made a sincere effort to stabilise Chamorro life after the rapid achievement of staple food self-sufficiency. At first, the land policy was welcomed by landless Chamorros. However, the Minseibū system distributed food to the military first, then to Japanese civilians, and only then to the Chamorros. The distribution of provisions to Chamorros was always dependent on the number of Japanese military personnel on island.

[Table 8] Chamorro Families and Size of Farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Farmer Families</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Farmers</th>
<th>Farmers Per Family</th>
<th>Land Able to be Cultivated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per Family</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shōten</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Piti)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asal (Asan)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inada</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Inarajan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsuyama</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Merizo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umata</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Umatac)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>4,087</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* “Land able to be cultivated” is based on a trial calculation.

Because of the rapid reclamation of land in the first half of 1942, rice planting was ready for Guam’s rainy season (June – December). Paddy areas were worked by villagers, organised by Chamorro leaders under some Nan‘yō Kōhatsu and Minseibū staff. Guam-grown seed rice and a new improved strain, “158-123-gō,” was planted. If it had been planted in the best paddy of 300 čō of land in Ponape, then 9,000 koku (one koku = 3.78 litres) could be harvested twice per year. This could support a Japanese population of 3,000. If Guam’s 800 čō were similar to Ponape’s, 24,040 koku, or enough for 8,010 people could be expected, by my calculation. Although distribution to Chamorros was not considered, the amounts were decidedly inadequate to supply the 46,000 Japanese in the Marianas. However, this amount could support the 5th Base Force needs in the Mariana Islands, including Guam.

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four prefectures between April 1939 and April 1940, 46% operated farms of one čō to two čō. See, Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai, Taiheiyō Sensōshi III: Taiheiyō Sensō zenki (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1953), p. 92.
40 300 čō: 9,000 koku: 3,000 people = 800 čō : 24,040 koku: 8,010 people.
In Financial Year 1942 (April 1942 – March 1943), 216 chô of paddy farms were established, rice seedlings were planted between May and September. About 1.37 koku per tan was harvested. Because the average yield per tan was three koku in Ponape, or two koku in the homeland, Guam’s yield was quite low. Paddy areas of 73.35 chô were added and planting areas increased by 289.35 chô in 1943. However, damage by insects in the second year was worse than the first. Table 9 shows the paddy without harvest increased to 138.59 chô and 50% reduction of unhulled rice per tan. In reality, rice growing on Guam was a failure. This was documented by the Nan’yô Kôhatsu Business Section Head Koshimuta Takeshi in his diary:

We burned the entire crop except three tan of paddy of the fifth plantation area in Naka (Agat) because of damage by leafhoppers. The three tan of paddy was sprayed with insecticide. I ordered the farmers to plant maizu (corn) and cowpea (December 13, 1942). Damage from the leafhoppers was immense. Plants in seven tan of paddy died within two days. Examination was carried out. Rice planting in Matsuyama was also hopeless (October 9, 1943).41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Paddy Completed (chô)</th>
<th>Planted Area (chô)</th>
<th>Non-Harvested Area (chô)</th>
<th>Harvested Area (chô)</th>
<th>Unhulled Rice (koku)</th>
<th>Unhulled Rice/ tan (koku)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>216.00</td>
<td>216.00</td>
<td>59.50</td>
<td>156.50</td>
<td>2,146.5</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>73.35</td>
<td>289.35</td>
<td>138.50</td>
<td>150.85</td>
<td>966.9</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversion Formula: 1 chô = 2.45 acres, 1 koku = 180.39 dl, 1 tan = 10 a.

The Minseibu bought all unhulled rice from village headmen and distributed it to Japanese civilians, one gô (0.18 litres) per person, compared to 2.5 gô for average Japanese daily consumption.42 The local rice was too small even to satisfy the navy.

The crucial reason for the failure was time. Attempts were made to develop a new strain from Ponape, which was never tested on Guam. Supplies of fertiliser, insecticide and equipment could not be shipped from Japan, and labour was limited. In August 1943, the Outline of Food Policies for the South Sea Islands emphasised that Saipan would reach food self-sufficiency.43 To support this program, in December 1943, the Greater East Asia Ministry allotted over 1.3 million yen from the Bureau to boost production of rice, but desperate efforts failed on both Saipan and Guam.44

42 “Kaigun Chôsaka, Tôa shokuryô taisaku ron” (4 August 1942), in Shôwa shakai keizai shiro jûrokkan: Kaigun shiryô 16, p. 400.
43 “Nan’yô Guntô sokuryô taisaku yôkô,” in Nan’yô Guntô sangyô seibi keikaku yôkô ni kansuru ken (10 August 1943).
44 “Daitoashô shokan shokuryô taisaku ôkyûshisetsu hoka san-ken: Nan’yôchô tokubetsu kaikai yaôkîn o motte yosangai shishutsu no ken” (21 December 1943).
Minseibu concluded that it could not achieve the goals of the central government. Since late 1943, all cultivated lands were transferred in great haste to potatoes, bananas and other crops; all more easily grown than rice.

In 1941, 24% of all imported food to Guam was rice and Chamorros consumed 4,500 kg per day. But the occupation and failure of rice production forced Chamorros to live without rice. Corn, banana, breadfruit, sweet potatoes, cassava and dogdog (A. incisa L,f.) became their principal foods. By January 1944, corn was harvested from 2,400 cho, 62% of the farm area. The rest of the farmland was under sweet potato (8%), cassava (7%), taro (6%), vegetables (4%), bananas (5%) and others (8%). The Nan’yô Kôhatsu kitchen garden of 160 cho produced vegetables: 60% for the military and 40% for Japanese civilians. According to Table 10, the production of every crop except rice increased because the farming areas were enlarged. The Minseibu concluded that the needs of 23,000 Chamorros could be met by local corn, sweet potatoes and other potatoes. Vegetable production lagged but coconut and fruit would provide their needed vitamins. The Minseibu reported sufficient vegetable production to support 500 naval personnel and 455 Japanese civilians in October 1943.

### Table 10 Farming Land Use and Products (January 1944)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Planting Area (cho)</th>
<th>Crop per cho (kg)</th>
<th>Yield (kg)</th>
<th>Yield (kg) in FY1941 (b)</th>
<th>Compared with Yield in FY 1941 (kg) (a)-(b)</th>
<th>(a) – (Islanders' consumption per year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,680,000</td>
<td>457,365</td>
<td>+1,222,635</td>
<td>+168,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet Potato</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>5,630</td>
<td>1,745,300</td>
<td>69,135</td>
<td>+1,287,935</td>
<td>+234,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>9,370</td>
<td>2,529,900</td>
<td>Potatoes 159,555</td>
<td>Potatoes +3,777,845</td>
<td>Potatoes +2,090,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taro</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5,630</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable (Nan’yô Kôhaysu)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>1,182,300</td>
<td>Navy 360 tons, Civilian 240 tons</td>
<td>59,610</td>
<td>+540,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>5,630</td>
<td>1,125,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>8,590,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,270,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversion Formula: 1 cho = 2.45 acres.

Nevertheless, Guam’s tenuous food supply was ruptured, first when 1,500 men of the 218th Naval Construction Battalion landed for airfield construction in October 1943. The supply of vegetables was exhausted. When the rice they brought ran out,

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46 Ibid., pp. 52-54.
47 Ibid., p. 53.
Chamorros were obliged to provide corn, cassava, and sweet potatoes. In a short time, Japanese consumption made inroads into the Chamorro food supply. When the 48th Naval Store Department on Saipan ordered Nan'yō Kōhatsu to make basic food such as miso, soy sauce, and tōfu using beans, this work also began on Guam. 48 Koshimuta Takeshi of Nan'yō Kōhatsu wrote, “We made tōfu, but failed because we used salt instead of bittern” (September 5 1943), and “A meeting was held to discuss how to make miso, soy sauce, oil, sake, and tōfu” (December 10, 1943). At this meeting, it was planned to make 360 koku of soy sauce, 1,500 kan of miso, 24,000 chō of tōfu per year from soybean, rice and salt. 49 This plan failed due to shortages of ingredients.

The second event was a large number of soldiers from Manchuria arriving in the South Sea Islands and Guam, from February 1944. In the South Sea Islands, the Plan for Urgent Countermeasures for Supplementing Food (February 1944) was announced. This imposed self-sufficiency on civilians, to provide food for the military. Although there was no announcement, the situation on Guam was the same or worse. On 15 February 1944, shortly before the arrival of more soldiers, food stocks were sufficient to feed 2,129 persons for 233 days on Guam. However this was not enough. 50 The number of the 29th Division soldiers increased on Guam to 20,810 by mid-July. They sometimes landed without rations because their supply ships had been sunk. 51 In addition to 500 naval guards, naval air groups, anti-aircraft defence units, naval communications unit, weather unit, naval air depot, naval construction and service department, naval construction battalion and naval groups totalled 7,995. 52 With this huge increase, hunger was inevitable. Doubling the population in eight months without an increase in labour, tools, seed or fertilizer triggered the plunder of Chamorro supplies.

While the Minseibu prepared a list of edible grasses, it planned further expansion of farmland to 11,500 chō (2.8 times larger than in January 1944) with the help of the Naval Crop Cultivation Unit (Kaikontai). After these experts’ arrival from Shizuoka on May 8, 1944, five headquarters at Shirahama (Ritidian Point), Rikyū (Tarague Beach), Orita (Ordot), Shinagawa (Sinajana), and sixteen farm sites were established on central and northern Guam where agricultural conditions were poor. Of the 50 tractors shipped from Japan, 30 were lost in submarine attacks and only 20 were

50 Sanbō Honbu, “Ômiyatō heiyō chishi shiryō,” p. 77.
52 Ibid., p. 534.
distributed to 16 farms. Food production, mainly by Chamorros’ labour, was made compulsory in these areas. For example, four members of Kaikontai unit planned cultivation of 20-chô of rice paddy and a 300-chô farm in Harakawa (Inarajan) near the Ylig River. But the plan was soon revised to shift to vegetables and corn in order to avoid waiting for the rice harvest and to make up for shortages of equipment and food.\(^{53}\) However, within two months, regular agriculture ended because of large-scale air attacks and ship bombardments beginning on 4 July 1944.

The Minseibu planned agricultural development according to trial calculations but these were unachievable because of constant increase of military personnel. The central government’s economic policy was “to force industry, agriculture, and land use according to economic needs for national defence, rather than considering local conditions.”\(^{54}\) Disregarding local conditions was inconsistent with production, and the Minseibu failed in the most important area of agriculture, rice.

**Manganese**

The Pacific War required Japan to obtain metals to modernise, expand and mechanise the military, particularly the air force. The Outline for Economic Policies for the Southern Areas stated, “Existing mining facilities shall be exploited as rapidly as possible, after which the development of new mines… shall be promoted.”\(^{55}\) Specialists prospected for minerals, particularly nickel, mica, bauxite, copper, phosphate and manganese. Of the metals required, manganese was “to be developed to the maximum, without consideration of quantities.”\(^{56}\)

Soon after occupation, the Nan’yô Kôhatsu group looked for minerals and found “good quality” manganese in Lubugon, Shôten (Piti) village, in southern Guam, and began a promising project in January 1942. Mining was first opencast, then it changed to excavation in caves. All the ore was exported to Japan along with manganese from Saipan. However, before Nan’yô Kôhatsu received orders from the Navy Ministry to begin mining on Guam in June 1942, mining had already declined from its peak. After August 1942, crude manganese (more than 25% concentrates) suddenly decreased,

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\(^{53}\) The *Kaikontai* consisted of 130 students of the Takunan Renseijo (Training Centre for Developing the Southern Areas), Shizuoka, under the leadership of the Nôchi Kôhatsu Eidan (Agricultural Land Development Corporation). See Kuromusha Fujio, “Takunan Renseijo shuppatsu,” in *Takukai banri hatô*, ed., Takunankai (Shizuoka: Takunan Renseijo Jimukyoku, 1988), pp. 235-236.

\(^{54}\) “Nanpô keizai taisaku yôkô” (12 December 1941).

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) “Nanpô sakusen ni tomonau senryôchi tôchi yôkô” (25 November 1941).
which affected total output (see Graph 8). A Chamorro worker testified, “Every time we dug about seven or eight feet and found no manganese, we had to go to another site and start digging again.” Also, after mid-1943, shipping became difficult:

The ships were bombed or torpedoed and if not sunk, limped back to Guam with no manganese abroad. The ships were repaired and again loaded, and every time these ships departed Guam’s harbour, they returned in about two or three days, without any manganese, which made us think that the ships were damaged by torpedoes.  

![Graph 8. Manganese Mining on Guam (ton)](image)

Source: Sanbō Honbu, “Ōmiyatō heiyō chishi shiryo” (1944), pp. 64-65.

So grave was the metal situation that the government agreed to investigate mineral resources in which civilian companies were not interested, or which were reported as uneconomic. Nan’yō Kōhatsu surveyed for copper in Umata (Umatac) and Shōwa-machi (Piti), and manganese in the Matsuayama (Merizo) and Umata. For all its attempts, Nan’yō Kōhatsu’s efforts ended in December 1943 when all deposits were mined as planned. The acquisition of ore was typical of Japan’s exploitation.

Tropical Agriculture and Forestry

After the occupation, 655,000 coconut trees on 9,500 chō were put under the control of the Guam Minseibu and managed by the Copra Trade Confederation (Kopura Dōgyōsha Rengōkai) of Saipan. Copra production in the South Sea Islands accounted for 60% of Japan’s demand in 1939, and Japan began to obtain “heavily over-produced”

58 “Nan’yō Guntō sangyō seibi keikaku yōkō an” (August 1943), in “Nan’yō Guntō sangyō seibi keikaku yōkō ni kansuru ken” (August 10, 1943).
coconut oil and palm oil from the occupied southern areas after February 1942. The Minseibu had to take “emergency measures” although the trees had not fully recovered from typhoon damage of 1940. In order to protect “the Chamorro’s sole industry,” the government did not order a reduction in plantation production, but took action to consume copra to “give support to the islanders’ economy as well as establish price controls.” Small amounts of copra were used to support a soap industry on Guam.

The purchase price, distribution of copra for livestock feed, and soap making were negotiated by a Japanese confederation and village headmen. Nan’yō Kōhatsu made soap from copra, caustic soda, and salt at the requisitioned Johnson factory and the Chamorro-owned Ada’s factory. In 1943, 80,000 cakes of laundry soap and 40,000 cakes of toilet soap were made and exported to Saipan for the military, but there were no items coming back from Saipan. Guam’s small-scale soap operation was the only successful industrial achievement of the Minseibu. Soap manufacture then declined and ended about June 1944 due to the loss of caustic soda shipments from Japan.

Nan’yō Kōhatsu’s “special crops” group, Sasaki-gumi (Saipan), and Chūgai Sangyō (Rotai) tried to plant cassava (for starch, soy sauce colouring, alcohol), and castor-oil plants (for lubricants), tuba (derris for pest control), lemon (oil), cacao (for chocolate, suppository) and cotton trees. But no results were reported from Guam because food production had priority.

The Minseibu had to supply wood for military construction, firewood and charcoal although Guam depended on imported wood in the pre-war period. For construction materials, the Nan’yō Kōhatsu operated a lumber mill (40 koku of trees per day) to saw ifil (ifit or Intisia bijuga, rectangular timber), pengua (Macaranga carolinensis, bottom of ships), rokrok (bread fruit tree, A. communis Forst, rectangular timber), and Ahgao (P. Gaidocjaaidoo Schauer, log), all from 4,400 ha of the north.

Because land clearing for agriculture and roads generated a supply of native trees, there was “extremely abundant” wood for fire-making and charcoal. About 450 bales of charcoal were made per month from panau (D. D. Hasseltii Bl.), A’abang (Eugenia reinwardtiana, D.C.), pengua (Macaranga carolinensis Volkens), fago (O. parviflora [Forst.]), Ahgao, pai-pai (Guamia marianae), ifill, laalahang (Sideroxylon glomeratum), nunu (Ficus prolixia), and budo (Tahitaian chestnut) and 30 cubic tubo

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62 “Yushi kankei shiryō” (February 1942), in Shōwa shakai keizai shiro shūsei dai jūgo-kan: Kaigunshō shiryō 15, pp. 346-347.
64 Ibid.,
were exported to Saipan and Tinian. The more the island was developed the more the Nan’yō Kōhatsu mill could satisfy military demand. However, by January 1944, more shortages were expected through army construction and the reckless destruction of the jungle began to cause deforestation.\(^5\) In response, the Minseibu recommended a reaforestation effort, but of course it could not afford labourers to do this.

**Fishing**

The navy gave priority to fishing, especially for the garrison.\(^6\) The pre-war fishing industry was underdeveloped and reef fishing was carried out by 35 local men using licensed fish weirs, for family consumption.\(^7\) Because the Minseibu could not depend Chamorro small scale reef fishing, the navy ordered Nankō Suisan (Nankō Marine Products Company), a Nan’yō Kōhatsu’s subsidiary, to begin fisheries.

The 30 Okinawans from Saipan began tuna fishing with two 21-ton ships southwest of Matsuyama (Merizo), and between Guam and Rota. A small dried bonito factory was built to process 60 kan (1 kan = 3.75kg) per month for military food. The result was poor, with “no hope of increasing production” because bonito was seasonal and migratory and there were fewer schools of tuna near Guam than in waters around Palau, Truk, Ponape, Saipan and the Marshalls. In addition to seasonal winds and rough waters, large catches were not expected because of the limited number of Okinawan fishermen who were the only ones that could catch bait fish.\(^8\) Guam’s fishing areas were also limited and surrounded by South Sea Islands’ fishing grounds. The catches from Guam waters in 1942 were: 82,170 kg of bonito and 7,230 kg of others, totalling 89,400 kg, compared to 1,297,000 kg (1942) of bonito from Saipan.\(^9\) After the *Daini Tōkai Maru* (a cargo-passenger ship and later commercial cruiser) was sunk in Apra Harbour in January 1943, fisheries suddenly declined. An 8-ton ship, newly hired for reef fishing, tried to make up for the poor catches of bonitos. Still, the total catch fell to 52,805 kg in 1943 (see Graph 9).\(^\) The fresh fish were distributed to the military and Japanese civilians. The Minseibu’s deep-sea fishery did not benefit the Chamorros.

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\(^5\) Ibid., p. 63.

\(^6\) “Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 1942).

\(^7\) *The Annual Report of the Governor of Guam*, 1940, p. 92.

\(^8\) Wakako Higuchi, “Pre-war Japanese Fisheries in Micronesia — Focusing on Bonito and Tuna Fishing in the Northern Mariana Islands,” *Migration Studies*, No. 3 (March 2007), pp. 4-5.


\(^\) Ibid., pp. 60-62.
Stock Farming

Before the war, cows, pigs, water buffalo, horses, goats and chickens were raised on Guam. This was small-scale breeding for family consumption. There were only 15 cattle ranches in the central part of the island: seven farms with 10 to 15 head; six with 50-100 head, and two with 300-400 head, covering 7,570 chô. In 1941, a large amount of livestock was consumed by U.S. Navy public works labourers. Typhoon damage in November 1940 and August 1941 caused a shortage of coconuts (livestock feed) and resulted in cattle being slaughtered. After the occupation, the meat supply fell again when many animals were butchered to feed army and naval personnel.

The Minseibu’s first task was to recover. Nan’yô Kôhatsu cooperated with the Bureau, Saipan Branch to support stock farming through bonuses, sale of bloodstock, and health checks for cattle to emphasise selective breeding. Between August 1942 and January 1944, cattle increased by 130%, pigs by 170% and chickens by 170% (see Table 11). It was reported that Guam could achieve “almost self-sufficiency” in these products even after 1,500 Naval Construction Battalion members landed in October 1943. But the Chamorros were not considered: priority for meat consumption was the military, with Japanese residents next.

In January 1944, a month before the landing of a thousand soldiers, there were 720 cattle and 1,440 pigs on the island. The Minseibu estimated that this could feed 30,000 persons at 180g per day, but for one month. Predicting shortages, the Minseibu restricted the slaughter of domestic animals and ordered islanders to increase herd

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numbers. But troops pouring in made orderly husbandry impossible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11</th>
<th>Stock Farming on Guam: Number of Head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Farm Animal</strong></td>
<td><strong>August 1941</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>5,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalos</td>
<td>1,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>8,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chickens</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sanbō Honbu, "ōmiyatō heiyō chishi shiryō" (1944), pp. 57-58.

In summary, all industrial activities were for the benefit of the military and Japan. No “organic” principal was respected in supply and demand. The Minseibu could not establish goals, so two modes emerged, “as soon as possible” and “as much as possible.”

**Labour Management and Exploitation**

These reviews expose the Minseibu’s attitude as inseparable from its mission. Time was too short to evaluate these efforts fairly, but the Nan’yō Kōhatsu Guam accountant Okada Shōnosuke stated that Guam’s development would have achieved some success in peacetime much as his company had realised in the Marianas. In other words, development would have been possible given Guam’s climate and soil, with the same financial and administrative support that Nan’yō Kōhatsu received from the South Seas Bureau. However, Nan’yō Kōhatsu’s most decisive factor was the large number of labourers, particularly from Okinawa, who understood tropical agriculture. Matsue Haruji, a founder of the company, wrote that labour, with capital, were the key elements. On Guam, it was impossible to employ Japanese or Koreans from Japan. This shortage was caused by military service and labour mobilisation programs. On the other hand all industrial developments involved economic Japanisation.

All shortages had to be met by Chamorro labour. In reality, the critical task for the Guam Minseibu was to plan and mobilise labour, but no official documents address the question of methods for obtaining and managing this labour. Even the Ministers, the Liaison Conference, and Cabinet’s Outline of Economic Policies for the Southern Areas (December 1941) ducked this issue. The Planning Board’s statements clearly represented official thought.

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72 Ibid., p. 59.
73 Okada Shōnosuke, interview by author, Tokyo, 4 August 1998.
The reinforcement of the economy in Greater East Asia has an immediate bearing on individual benefits in each area. Therefore, the local people ought to obey Japan’s instructions and accept Japanese control [and] Japan should have the local people assume an appropriate [work] load as a general policy.75

The military’s expectations of the people were simply “obey,” “accept,” and “pull your weight”, which was the precondition for “organic relationships” with Japan, and was to be a response to Japan’s slogan of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (to enable all nations to find their proper place). Whereas Japan had grounds for expecting people to obey, their duty was an “appropriate” workload.

Labour management on Guam can be divided into three periods: 1) January 1942 – October 1943 (land reclamation and agriculture); 2) November 1943 – March 1944 (agriculture mainly for navy needs and airfield construction); and 3) March 1944 – July 1944 (agriculture for the navy and the army needs only, fortification, and preparing for combat).

Before the first period, the Guam Minseisho (the predecessor of the Minseibu, December 1941–January 1942) registered all Chamorros, issued identity papers and ordered headmen to report villagers’ movements. This survey was not for the convenience of the administering authority. The navy, later the Minseibu, apparently planned for labour control, and registration was regarded as the navy’s first step to apply wartime labour mobilisation measures. In Japan, the government’s labour management gradually switched to labour control after the National Mobilisation Laws were enforced in 1938 (they took effect in the South Sea Islands in the same year). The cabinet decided on the Outline of Urgent Measures for Labour (August 1941) to obtain labour for industries that the government had to expand. It stated:

... to whip up the nation’s patriotic spirit of hard-work and to swiftly organise and strengthen the labour mobilisation system. The government requires (the nation) to be a nation at work, not a leisureed nation, and not a nation with unemployed people.76

The registration of Chamorros equated to the “lабourer’s notebook”. According to the Labourer’s Notebook Law in the South Sea Islands (May 1942), workers of more than 14 years and less than 60 were involved in industries designated by the government, and were required to carry a notebook. Although there are no records of Minseisho registration, the basic policies were applied to the Chamorros because

75 Kikakuin Kenkyūkai, Daitoa kensetsu no kihon kōyō, p. 27.
activities were carried out under Minseibu control and Chamorro labourers were members of Japan’s permanent territory, analogous to Japan’s South Sea Islands.

Table 12 below shows the results of the Minseibu occupation survey. The data are undated, but the population of 23,374 in June 1943 increased slightly to 23,460 in this survey. Other data was collected in October 1943, so the native data in Table 12 were compiled in October 1943 and I put it together in one table. Both surveys probably needed up-dating. Of the Japanese population of 455, about 104 were categorised as “others,” probably including 80 Minseibu administrators. The 256 “unemployed” would have been family members of Japanese workers.

Meanwhile the Chamorro work force in 1943 consisted of: 123 fishermen; 187 manganese miners: 118 in the navy guard unit, industrial yard and soap factories; 58 in commerce and distribution; 37 bus drivers for Nan’yō Kōhatsu and the naval guard unit; and 8,756 agricultural workers on their farms and Nan’yō Kōhatsu vegetable gardens. “Others” would have been workers employed by the 54th Defence Guard Unit and the Minseibu. The 611 women in “others” were quite high. These included Chamorro housemaids for Japanese civilians and soldiers. They responded to the policy as a way to establish “identity” or “individual security” under Japanese military rule.77

Chamorro workers totalled 10,328 (5,408 male and 4,920 female).78 The Chamorro employment rate was as high as 47% for men and 41% for women in 1943. More than 50% of the population, and as much as 80% of male workers and 90% of female workers were engaged in manual agriculture. There are no available data on Guam’s working population on the eve of the U.S. invasion, but the Chamorro population in agriculture was probably limited because its production was mainly for consumption. However, in 1943, the Minseibu’s full-labour policy was in effect.

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77 Tanaka Toraji, interview by author, Guam, June 30, 1998.
78 Sanbō Honbu, “Ômiyatō heiyō chishi shiryō,” Tables 2 and Table 3.
### Table 12: Occupations of Chamorros and Japanese Civilians (c. 1943)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9 (11)</td>
<td>9 (11)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23 (15)</td>
<td>2 (13)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>8,756</td>
<td>4,353</td>
<td>4,403</td>
<td>21 (9)</td>
<td>15 (9)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>104 (2)</td>
<td>91 (2)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>13,132</td>
<td>6,147</td>
<td>6,985</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,460</td>
<td>11,555</td>
<td>11,905</td>
<td>455 (37)</td>
<td>270 (35)</td>
<td>185 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sanbô Honbu, "Ōmiyato heiyō chishi shiriyō" (Tokyo: 1944), Table 2 and Table 3.

* Numbers in parentheses show the Japanese residents who immigrated to Guam before 1941.
* People who were more than 60 years old and less than 18 years old were considered unemployed if he/she did not have an independent occupation.

In contrast, in December 1941, the total population in the South Sea Islands was 141,259 (90,072 Japanese, including Koreans and Taiwanese and 51,089 Chamorros). In September 1941, there were 28,070 labourers registered according to the Labour Coordination Law and the Labourer’s Notebook Law. They worked at mining, manufacturing and processing, civil engineering and construction, freight traffic, communications, agriculture, forestry and fishery, all related to military plans. Of the total population, 53,753 people (48,923 Japanese; 4,808 Chamorros and Carolinians) lived on Saipan, Tinian, and Rota. The number of register labourers in the Marianas was only 8,042. In FY 1941, the South Seas Bureau needed more 34,521 labourers, including 23,380 military workers, particularly in Palau and Saipan, it could arrange for 30,063 new labourers (4,780 from Japan; 23,550 Koreans; and 1,933 residents), totalling 58,133. Still, 4,458 labourers were not available. Naturally no labourers were sent to Guam from the South Sea Islands, except about 50 Japanese “industrial leaders” and 30 fishermen from the Saipan district. Thus, all new intensive development including land reclamation was done by the Chamorro workers because of the application of the independent industrial development policy for the occupied areas. Although the navy deemed Guam a supply base for the Marianas, nothing was provided to Guam.

Despite this full-labour operation policy, compulsory work (kyōsei rōdō) was not the Minseibu’s normal policy, at least during the first period, namely before October 1944.

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80 “Takumu Daijin seigi Nan’yōchō bunai rinji shokuin sechisei chū kaisei no ken” (11 April 1942).
82 “Takumu Daijin seigi Nan’yōchō bunai rinji shokuin sechisei chū kaisei no ken” (11 April 1942).
1943. During the time Table 12 data was gathered, the Minseibu targeted a labour force aged 18 to 60 years old. There were 13,132 “unemployed.” Because there existed a labour pool of the people between 16 and less than 18 years old, it was unnecessary to enforce compulsory work at this stage. *Kyôsei rôdô* is a general term in Japanese meaning forced labour in disregard for the worker’s will. Speaking correctly, the Minseibu’s view was that of *chôyô* (drafting) by which the government under the occupation coerced the “nationals” to work for certain industries except military service. Guam was regarded as a Japanese territory. The Japanese language schools for Chamorros were called “*kokumin gakkô*” (national school), Chamorros, as Japanese nationals, were regarded as *chôyô*, meaning Imperial nationals.\(^8^3\) Unlike the situation of people in the Philippines, Burma, and later Indonesia where Japan promised independent political statuses, the Chamorros as *chôyô* had a national duty for realising the Japanese nationals’ common goal of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

Still, it was expected that Japan’s oppressive rule over the Chamorros would generate people’s antagonism. The cabinet Planning Board admonished administrators in the occupied areas and, therefore, the Minseibu, to adopt the employment of the Chamorros under apparent “good guidance” to avoid unnecessary anti-Japanese feeling.\(^8^4\) Nan’yô Kôhatsu employees were instructed to pay “extreme attention” to Chamorro labour treatment.\(^8^5\) During the period of 1942 and 1943 when a U.S. attack was not an imminent danger, Nan’yô Kôhatsu’s Chamorro workers were employed in a proper but conciliatory way through recruitment with payment by Chamorro village headmen through the Minseibu.

Furthermore, the nature of the navy’s employment can be conjectured from the navy’s outline of military administration that directed wages be held down as much as possible.\(^8^6\) Nan’yô Kôhatsu’s Shimano Kenji in charge of wages testified that the company’s wage level was applied to Chamorros.\(^8^7\) As of 1939, the Nan’yô Kôhatsu Sugar Manufacturing Office on Saipan paid a Japanese labourer 0.90 yen to 1.20 yen per day. But the majority of the Japanese labourers were Okinawans who were paid lower wages than Japanese from the mainland. Also, a Japanese day labourer on Saipan

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\(^{8^4}\) Kikakuin Kenkyûkai, *Daitoa kensetsu no kihon kôryô*, p. 27.

\(^{8^5}\) Okada Shônosuke, interview by author, Tokyo, 4 April 1997; and Tanaka Toraji, interview by author, Guam, 20 July 1998.

\(^{8^6}\) “Senryôchi gyôsei shori yôkô” (14 March 1942).

\(^{8^7}\) Shimano Kenji, interview by author, Guam, November 19, 1998.
was paid 1.40 yen in 1939 while the islanders (mainly Chamorros) received one yen.  
Chamorros on Guam who were also “the islanders,” although they were regarded as Japanese nationals for convenience’ sake, ought to be paid lower than the Japanese for the same work. Wage differentials between the Japanese and Chamorros were explained by lack of Japanese language ability and education, and skill level. The hourly wages of Chamorros in the soap factory were much higher than a Japanese factory chief’s monthly salary of 80 yen, but this is simply evidence indicating overtime work done by Chamorros.

In 1943, airfield construction workers were paid 1.20 to 1.25 yen daily, but the yen had no value because money was not in circulation at the time. Chamorro workers welcomed payment in rice because the food distribution system had collapsed. The navy outline emphasized giving the occupied people technical education. But this was not applied on Guam. To sustain the military presence, the navy certainly needed as many low wage physical labourers and farmers as possible.

Rice production work shows another aspect of the navy’s policy for mobilizing Chamorro laborers. The labour of Chamorro men, women and children on land projects in early to late 1942 was described as “never follow the European style of eight hours work per day, (everybody works) from early morning to evening.” Basically the ten-hour workday, common in Japan, was adopted. This was called “kinrō hōshi” (voluntary labour service) or “mura sōdetō kyōdō sagyō” (village cooperative work) without pay because it was for community and national benefit. Both types of volunteerism spread to all villages in Japan after 1937. The background of voluntary service was the Japanese concept of moral education, of faithful devotion to the nation that was defined in the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890). It was assumed that all Guam land belonged to Japan; Chamorros were new nationals of Japan. Procurement of the indispensable staple food (rice) for the Japanese was not only a pillar of self-sufficiency but also was viewed as strengthening the co-prosperity sphere. Rice production ought to be typically done by “kinrō hōshi.” The Minseibu employed women, school children and unskilled residents for airfield construction. This was also kinrō hōshi because it was preparation for “national” defence.

On 20 September 1943, Imperial Headquarters and the Government established a new defence sphere in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, including the Western Carolines.

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89 Tanaka Toraji, interview by author, Guam, 30 June 1998.
and the Mariana Islands for Japan that had to be held unconditionally. The Greater Asia Ministry decreed the mobilisation of all human and physical resources to strengthen the fighting force within the defined perimeter. Mobilisation or chōyō became more general in the occupied areas after October 1943, when the Chief Conference on Labour in the Southern Area was held in Singapore. This was also a turning point for the South Sea Islands. The National Mobilisation Laws (1938), the Order for Labour Coordination (1941), the Order for National Labour Services Cooperation (1941), and the Order for Labourer’s Notebook (1942) were called into force in the South Sea Islands. The first order targeted skilled labourers, and the second applied to Japanese males between 14 and 40 and females between 14 and 25. The third order included those who could be recruited and was applied to all Japanese nationals between 14 and 60 years.\(^{91}\) In August 1943, the cabinet’s Outline of Industrial Reorganisation Plan ordered the closure of small businesses in the South Sea Islands so that their workers could contribute additional labour power to the war effort. Unlike the South Sea Islands, a characteristic of the military administration of Guam was that these orders were promulgated without official announcement.

Table 13 below in the original source does not include the date of the survey. It was undoubtedly compiled by the Minseibu as directed the army advance troop between January and February 1944, anticipating the arrival of a new group of army forces. The total Guam population of 23,915 in Table 13 was made up of 23,460 Chamorros and 455 Japanese in Table 12. One note for Table 13 identified “special workers” as those “employed by the navy and primary civilian enterprise(s) or who are disabled.” These were 138 workers in the Navy Civil Engineering Department who carried out ship repair, water supply and power plant work; 205 employees in the Minseibu; 466 workers for airfield construction; 332 workers for Nan’yō Kōhatsu; 780 workers for rice production; 215 disabled; 126 others, totalling 2,262 (2,200 in the table).\(^{92}\)

In Table 13, the potential labourers were regarded as all those civilian residents between 16 years old and 60 years old to increase the number, no longer the number between 18 and 60 seen in Table 12. The total number of employed labourers in Table 12 was 10,507: 5,408 Chamorro men, 4,920 Chamorro women, and 179 Japanese men. In Table 13, the potential labourers increased by 12,194. Except for “special workers” or the military labourers, the Minseibu had a work force of 7,794 for food production.

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\(^{91}\) “Nan’yō Guntō sangyō seibi keikaku yōkō” (August 1943), in “Nan’yō Guntō sangyō seibi keikaku yōkō ni kansuru ken” (10 August 1943).

\(^{92}\) Sanbō Honbu, “Ōmiyatō heiyō chishi shirō,” Table 4.
The 7,794 projected agricultural labourers in Table 13 were 983 less than the 8,777 appearing in Table 12. Although the arrival of some ten thousand military forces was expected, the number of agricultural labourers decreased. Furthermore, about 180 Japanese women and children were repatriated to Japan in March 1944. The labour capacity had been already exhausted before the new stage of labour demand began.

In February 1944 the cabinet decided to implement a similar policy for the South Sea Islands. The Outline of Urgent Countermeasures for Supplementing Munitions Provisions in the South Sea Islands required all residents, except workers needed for military construction and mining of natural resources, to concentrate on rice, potatoes, fish, and vegetable production only for military purposes.93 The Chamorros’ right to work for their livelihood was completely ignored.

[Table 13] Total Population and Labourers (Late 1943 or Early 1944)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Number of Families</th>
<th>More than 16 and Less than 60 Years Old</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Special Workers*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akashi (Agana)</td>
<td>4,770</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asal (Asan)</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shōten (Piti)</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suma (Sumay)</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naka (Agat)</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umita (Umatec)</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsuyma (Merizo)</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inada (Inaraian)</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasaki (Talofofo)</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakawa (Yona)</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinagawa</td>
<td>3,039</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawahara (Manglao)</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haruta (Barrigada)</td>
<td>2,421</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takahara (Ylo)</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kita (Dedido – Ritidian)</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiratsuka (Tumondededo)</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,915</td>
<td>4,032</td>
<td>5,305</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>3,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sanbō Honbu, “Ōmiyato heiyō chishi shiryō” (1944), Table 4.
*“Special workers” were those “employed by the navy and primary civilian enterprise(s) or who are disabled.”

The most important problem to be solved by the Minseibusu was how to stimulate the Chamorro’s productive attitude. For the Japanese, the Chamorros were “idle in common with the other natives in the South Sea Islands” and could not bear heavy work due to “hedonistic customs learned during the years of American rule.”94 For example, an Okinawan tenant family of four to five working for the Nan’yō Kōhatsu sugar farms

93 “Nan’yō Guntō gunjo shokuryō hokyū kinkyū taisaku yōkō” (February 1944).
94 Sanbō Honbu, “Ōmiyatō heiyō chishi shiryō,” Table 4.
on Saipan and Tinian was allotted five to six chō of land. This group did all the work from land clearing to planting, weeding, and harvesting. In the homeland, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry considered the appropriate size of a family farm to be three chō. Instead of Japanese efficiency, the Nan’yō Kōhatsu vegetable garden had to have five Chamorro males and four females per chō, which meant an efficiency of one-third or a half of a Japanese worker. However, in a sense, this would be an unfair evaluation considering the tools and animals used (see Table 14). The average number of farm animals and tools per farming family in southern Guam (Shōten, Asai, Inada, Matsuyama, and Umata) was 0.63 water buffalos, 1.04 machetes, and 0.90 fusinos (long handled hoe with a straight blade). Because of a shortage of tools, working cattle and fertilizer, and absent support from the homeland, agricultural output was poor. All agricultural labour by Chamorros, inexperienced in Japanese methods, was manual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 14</th>
<th>The Numbers of Agricultural Implements and Draft Animals on Guam (1944)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cow</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoes</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusinos</td>
<td>4,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machete</td>
<td>5,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shovels</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickles</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weed Killers</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshing Machine</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forks</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprayer</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>1,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Buffalos</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sanbō Honbu, "Ômiyatō hei'yō chishi shiryō" (1944), pp. 51-52.
* *Fushinos* is a long handled hoe with a straight blade.

The Greater East Asia Construction Council cautioned Japanese managers not to attempt rapid change of islanders’ customs. Technical and economic measures were to be decided according to actual conditions, especially the cultural level of each race. The council advised that local farmers be motivated to improve their working spirit. This policy was adapted to conceal Japan’s inability to send material or technical advice to the occupied areas. Of course, Chamorros had no reason to demonstrate the work spirit that the Japanese wanted. It was reported later that Chamorro work skill and efficiency had improved to 70% to 90% of workers “owing to good supervision” during the construction of an airfield. According to a Naval Construction Battalion member, two bulldozers, one crane, two dump trucks and a fire truck were available to build a runway of 200 m by 2,000 m in Suma. Some Chamorros operated American

95 Higuchi Wakako, ibid., p. 42.
97 Sanbō Honbu, "Ômiyatō hei'yō chishi shiryō," Table 4.
99 Kikakuin Kenyūkai, Daitō kensetsu no kihon kōryō, p. 302.
100 Sanbō Honbu, "Ômiyatō hei'yō chishi shiryō" (1944), Table 5, and p. 51.
machinery, but the majority worked with shovels and picks. Their Japanese co-workers were strong men who had been discharged from military service, or had been racketeers and prisoners.\textsuperscript{101} It is easy to imagine their work conditions and “good supervision” from the testimony of a Korean labourer who was killed at work. The work situation included forced labourers from Japan’s colonies, lack of mechanical and technical expertise and equipment, mass mobilisation for physical labour, and near absence of a spirit to work hard. These factors created tension and were potentially explosive.

In early 1944, the Minseibu’s plan was to assign Chamorro women to work to meet their food needs, and men to work for the military. However, the Japanese military miscalculated regarding the timing of two devastating raids: a U.S. air attack on Truk, the navy’s home port, and the air attack on the Marianas in February 1944. The unpredictably fast enemy advance to the west and the Japanese Army’s huge losses of war supplies, including food, drove Guam’s labour conditions into a frenzy. The Minseibu and all residents were absorbed into the 5\textsuperscript{th} Naval Construction and Service Department and came under direct army control. The identical policy, Outline of Emergency Countermeasures for Wartime, was issued in the South Sea Islands in April 1944. It directed all residents to work for “direct war production.” All civilians were enlisted as “civilian workers.” All war production efforts would be “decentralised and mobilised” under the “principle of having the workers in combat readiness.”\textsuperscript{102}

In a state of confusion before the U.S. landing, the navy’s seaplane field in Finegayan, Hiratsuka, was built using Chamorro labourers between April and mid-July 1944. With the continual arrival of war and supply ships, the army required Chamorro men for unloading and loading. Both the army and the navy needed labour to build defensive positions.\textsuperscript{103} The drafting of Chamorro men, originally between 16 and 60 years of age, was accelerated. In May 1944, when the Crop Cultivation Unit landed to expand farming areas to feed troops, Chamorro females and children over 12 years old were also mobilised. Under the Yano-Obara Agreement of April 1944, all Nan’yō Kōhatsu employees in the Marianas came under the navy’s authority, and the navy was granted the use of all company assets on Saipan, Tinian and Rota, including farmland, equipment, housing, medical facilities, employees, and farmers. A similar agreement between Captain Sugimoto Yutaka, Guam Branch head of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Naval Construction and Service Department, and Fujiwara Masato, Nan’yō Kōhatsu director, was signed in

\textsuperscript{101} Yamamoto Satomi, interview by author, Hiroshima, September 24, 1999.
\textsuperscript{102} "Nan’yō Guntō senji hijō sochi yōkō ni kansuru ken” (April 14, 1944).
\textsuperscript{103} Daini Fukui kiyoku Guamutō Kaigun Butai Sentō Butai Zanmu Seirihan, “Guamutō kaku kaigun butai sentō jōkyō” (15 January 1947).
May 1944. Thus, Nan’yō Kōhatsu’s employees including Chamorros became navy employees. The chaotic labour situation under military order during U.S. air raids was nothing but psychological and physical forced labour.

As the Minseibu did not set an upper limit for outputs during the build-up of military forces, it enforced its will thorough labour mobilisation and always required more than what was reasonable. It did not take any measures to increase productivity and did not create that which would be a minimum requirement of an “organic relationship” with Chamorros. As the last stage of labour mobilisation proved, economic activities had a direct bearing on the war effort. Chamorros’ industry was collaboration with war preparation and finally part of battle efforts. Therefore, for the Minseibu directly under the 5th Base Force, its goal was to make Chamorros combatants, like Japanese nationals. This would be a condition of Chamorro “organic integration” into Japan’s rule.

It was not easy to inculcate in Chamorros a sense of loyalty and sacrifice as the navy and the Bureau had taken more than 20 years to realise change in the islanders. In particular, Chamorros had been “bathing their feelings” in American water for forty years, and the Minseibu had other political and economic issues to deal with.

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Chapter Six

The Minseibu:
Cultural Integration into the Imperial Way

The Japanese Navy took the southern resource areas to shield the land forces. As a consequence, the navy had to organise and control the people under its authority. The navy’s measures amount to a feigned peace and order. This was the first step toward an “organic” situation. The navy also needed the military administration to attain Japan’s war aims. As they had to depend on local labourers, they needed to gain their active cooperation. If the Chamorros fulfilled their labour function, the situation could be the second step towards an “organic” situation.

However, the navy needed more than passive cooperation because the enemy’s counterattack was much stronger than expected. With a formidable enemy, the navy could not afford to antagonise the people. It needed to use some measures to tie the navy and the people into a mutual, reliable, and dependent relationship so as to have at the least a superficial “organic” situation which might mature into an authentic one.

In order to establish an authentic “organic” relationship, peaceful interactions (cultural events, ceremonies and schooling) were necessary. The navy chose to employ civilians to govern through a civil administration. In short, the Guam Minseibu’s work was to supervise a private company’s industrial development and to supply labourers whose efficiency would be improved by cultural measures.

This indirect administration was supposed to “facilitate the organic integration of the entire region into the Japanese Empire.”1 The Navy Research Section’s 1942 study insisted that any administration take into account the characteristics of each race’s history, traditions and customs in order to define policies to encourage, guide and foster desirable social and economic development.2 In order to “encourage, guide, and foster”, the Guam Minseibu focused on three policies: abolishing the U.S. legacy including religious influences; language training for Japanisation; and propaganda to make the Chamorros the Emperor’s subjects, that is kōminisation.3

1 “Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 1942).
3 I use “kōmin” (the Imperial subject) plus “-isation” to avoid repeated explanation.
Two questions are posed by these approaches: why was language and cultural diffusion not sufficient to establish "organic relations" with Japan?; and what feature was common to the navy's "organic" ideology and to kōminisation?

This chapter argues that the navy hoped to focus Chamorro consciousness and labour in order to strengthen Japan militarily, spiritually, physically and psychologically. Japan's final aim was to cultivate and inculcate the Imperial Way mentality, the core of "organic integration", and to gain the people's obedience to Japan's national policy.

Abolition of Colonial Legacy

Imperial Headquarters and Government policy (November 1941) stated that American, British and Dutch nationals should be required to cooperate with the various military administrations. Appropriate measures, such as deportation, should be taken against recalcitrants. After the first stage of military operations, the army and government attitude changed and emphasis was placed on more direct measures. The army's Military Affairs Bureau Head, Major Katō Chô, wrote in April 1942, "A ruthless attitude shall be taken toward enemy nationals." The Council for Greater East Asia Construction, a body developing policies for Greater East Asia, also recommended the exclusion of ideas, customs and practices based on U.S. and British colonial heritage; and decisive measures to exclude the enemy, especially from areas needed for defence.

Japan's unexpected victories induced more aggressive attitudes toward enemy countries. Prime Minister Tojô Hideki, an army general who in early 1942 defended the modest doctrine of racial cooperation so as not to force cultural change, later directed that any American and British power in Greater East Asia be removed by force.

On the other hand, the navy followed the original policy. The navy's outline of March 1942 stated: "Deportation and other appropriate measures shall be taken against American, British, Dutch citizens ... excluding those who sincerely cooperate with military policies." However, Guam had been a U.S. Naval station for 40 years and the naval governor held complete executive, judicial, and legislative power. More than anything else, the island was an isolated "area the Empire needed for defence", in

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4 "Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas" (20 November 1941).
7 Ibid., p. 27.
8 "Senryôchi gunsei shori yôkô" (14 March 1942).
Japan’s South Sea Islands “lake.” To establish a strong base, it was necessary to abolish any American influence from the island and people.

The 5th Base Force first removed 368 U.S. military personnel and 115 nationals to a POW camp in Japan on 10 January 1942. About 100 POW family members were allowed to stay on Guam because they were children of Chamorro mothers. This was naively believed to be a step to abolishing the U.S. legacy and remodelling the character of the people, toward the Emperor’s court (Ômiyajima). Although six American military escapees were found and five executed by September 1942, only George Tweed remained on the island during the whole occupation. Juaquin Limtiaco, a Chamorro supporter of Tweed, testified, “Tweed was a symbol of the United States which was fighting the war for a great cause.” For the 54th Naval Guard Unit and the Minseibu, Tweed was a source of trouble: a soldier who had a radio for communications with U.S. forces. The Minseibu, or actually Chief Homura, took excessive steps to erase American features on account of the American escapee.

Americanism and Catholicism

The first American influences that the Japanese recognised in the Chamorros were the good living standard and material culture seen in some of the people’s homes in Agana, where half the Chamorro population lived. These stood out in comparison with Japanese standards, and included pianos, cars, refrigerators, typewriters, beds, and even personal appearance, water and sewer systems, and flush toilets. Many Chamorros whose skin colour was relatively light also impressed the Japanese. Ueno Fukuo, an agricultural geographer who visited Guam between August and September 1942, wrote: “the (Chamorro) women wear attractive American dresses and some of them are coquettish (like European),” “the Chamorros want brilliantine and tobacco rather than food (like them),” and “even the low-prestige people in Agana adopted American life styles and have household effects which only Japanese upper classes have in Japan.”

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9 See footnote 2 of the Chapter Three.
11 See Chapter Four.
Minseibu teacher Nakahashi Kiyoshi described the Chamorros’ life style.\textsuperscript{14} They “did not study their own language but rather English..., acceptance of American liberalism was rapid, especially among 20 to 30 year-old youths.” Nakahashi concluded that this material culture and associated behaviour represented European liberalism: egoistic, individualistic and hedonistic behaviour.\textsuperscript{15} This enviable material culture was completely opposite to Japan’s wartime slogans of simplicity, frugality and devotion to the state. Awakening their racial identity as Asian constituents of Japan was the mission of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideology. It was also expected that Chamorros’ life style would change in the absence of the U.S. and the presence of military rule. Still, besides superficial American influences, the cultural goal was to extirpate the Chamorro’s disgusting Americanism.\textsuperscript{16}

What did “Americanisation” mean for Japanese writers? J. Higham traced its origin to the U.S. in the first quarter of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, as migrants being “assimilated via absorption of American speech, ideals, traditions, and ways of life.”\textsuperscript{17} In Guam, most Americans lived in Sumay (the site of the naval station) and Agana (the location of the Governor’s Palace). The American population was only 778, or 3.6\% of the total population of 21,502 in June 1940.\textsuperscript{18} The Chamorros’ daily contact with English speaking people was limited. Guam’s school system was patterned after California’s and used English language textbooks in classes taught by Chamorro teachers. The native children were segregated from Americans. The majority of Chamorros between 10 and 20 years and 40\% of Chamorros over 20 “understood” English in 1940.\textsuperscript{19} Another source stated that nearly 75\% of all Chamorros over age ten spoke English in

\textsuperscript{14} Nakahashi Kiyoshi, letter, 10 December 1942. Nakahashi Kiyoshi (1913 - 2007), a teacher at the South Seas Bureau National Elementary School on Palau from 1938, was a teacher with the Minseibu on Guam. He arrived in September 1942 and taught at the Junior National School for Chamorros in Agana (Akashi), Tiyan (Tomioaka), and Umatac (Umata). After the dissolution of the Minseibu in March 1944, he was responsible for Chamorros in Barrigada (Haruta) village until the U.S. landing. He was detained by the U.S. military. Nakahashi saved over 40 letters written between May 1942 and early 1944 on Palau and Guam. Most were addressed to his wife and some to relatives. Since many were sent after military censorship began, dates were not included, but dates can often be inferred. Nakahashi also wrote a diary and notes while he was detained.
\textsuperscript{15} Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, December 1942, January 1943, and June 1943.
\textsuperscript{16} Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, 19 May 1942.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{The Annual Report of the Governor of Guam}, 1940, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 37.
Ueno Fukuo concluded that English was widely used, but it was mainly conversational, and the vocabulary was limited. The use of English was banned, but this was not expected to cause much inconvenience. The Minseibu did not take the Chamorros' English language ability seriously.

Chamorros sought U.S. citizenship as early as 1904. This request was repeated to visiting congressmen in 1927 and 1928. In 1936, the second Guam Congress requested the U.S. Congress to grant American citizenship. This was done in person when B.J. Bordallo and F.B. Leon Guerrero, two Guam congressmen, lobbied for a citizenship bill with President Roosevelt. As a result, Senate Bill 1450 and House Bill HR 4747 were introduced into the 75th Congress in 1937 and again in 1939, but failed due to navy opposition. According to Robert Rogers, a University of Guam professor, the reason for the effort was to be free of the racism and political frustration Chamorros experienced under the naval government: they were less motivated by a sense of U.S. patriotism. The Minseibu did not consider this movement important on the grounds that they were a minority who had never had their own nation and identity or even a sense of racial independence.

When the Minseibu looked for cultural damage by Americanisation, the Chamorros' Catholicism was the obvious area in which to try to uproot American influence. After Spanish priests began baptising Chamorros in 1668, the church's roots were planted firmly in fertile soil. During U.S. rule, church and politics were separated, but six Catholic societies strengthened the hold of Catholicism through American-style social and charitable activities. For Chamorros, these activities enlivened the monotony of daily life, especially for women, in rites and ceremonies such as baptism, confirmation, marriage, confinement after childbirth, and funerals. These activities moderated Spanish Catholicism to be more like liberal American Catholicism. The implanting of American ideals, traditions, and ways of life through Catholic groups reinforced both Catholic and American sentiments. In December 1941, 98% of the

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23 Daughters of Mary (345 members); the Sacred Heart of Jesus (1,000 members); Saint Vincent de Paul (380 members); Third Order of St. Francis of Assisi ("a large membership"); the Pontifical Association of the Holy Childhood (700 children), and the Knights of Columbus.
people were devout Catholic, attending 19 churches where they were looked after by ten American, two Chamorro, and two Spanish priests.

Teacher Nakahashi Kiyoshi, who criticised American influence, concluded that the Chamorros’ religious belief did not endanger the occupying authority, because their “blind religious mind does not have any definite view toward their religion and does not fully understand the moral justice implicit in their beliefs.”25 He suggested that the authorities respect Chamorro religion because the islanders did not have their own nation and history, and found spiritual and social peace only in religion.26 Ogawa Kan’ichi, the Minseibu’s general affairs head, who was Christian and spoke English, suggested a policy of non-interference in religion.27 However, Miyasaka Gorō from the cabinet’s Asian Development Board reported: “After a 40-year administration, western cultural influence on the Chamorro mind was considerably American and it seemed American religious influence had been successful everywhere for the time being.”28 The Guam Minseibu accepted Miyasaka’s view that Catholicism and Americanism were a united problem that caused Chamorro indolence.

For the Japanese at war, Catholic missions in many southern areas were small, but worrisome because of the nature of “Western cultural compounds.”29 The white man’s or the “enemy’s religion” contained European and American concepts of “egoistic motivation for oppressing and exploiting other races.”30 Army Minister Araki Sadao, an Imperial Way Sect member, criticised all Christianity as incompatible with Japan’s national body. Christian practices therefore were anti-nationalistic and inconsistent with the policy of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.31 Japan therefore urged that individualism, strong self-identification, and hedonism be denounced and erased in order to liberate Asian people from western religion.

However, Japan could not ignore the history lesson that religious oppression generated animosity. In fact, how to deal with the islanders’ religion in the South Sea Islands was an important issue. Because the islanders’ mental situation became unstable after foreign missionaries were removed, the navy had to request the Vatican to

25 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, April or May 1943.
26 Ibid., April or May 1943.
27 Ogawa Kan’ichi, interview by author, Tokyo, 27 September 1999.
30 Kikakuin Kenkyūkai, Daiiwa kensetsu no kihon kōryō, pp. 58-59.
send missionaries. The supervision of these foreign missionaries was difficult. The priests exhibited an air of racial superiority and this stimulated notions of Japanese inferiority. The largest problem was the missionaries’ non-cooperative attitude toward the administration, especially the use of islander labour. The priests criticised Japan’s basic virtues. The navy concluded that religious influence was responsible for the natives disliking labour and lapsing into irrational thinking.

Initially, the Imperial Headquarters and the Government took a position of non-interference to avoid opposition from the people, but the policy had to be changed. The new policies of the Planning Board for Greater East Asia Construction were: 1) use of the native’s religion; 2) no attempt to correct any religious practice or to force some other religion on the people; and 3) for the most part, toleration of the existing religion as far as it did not conflict with policy.32 The authorities recognised that the solution would be replacing American with Japanese Catholicism through Japanese priests.

Religion for Pacification

In April 1942, through the Education Ministry, the navy requested Monsignor Ideguchi Miyoichi, an administrator apostolic of the Yokohama Diocese and the South Seas Diocese of the Nippon Tenshu Kōkyō Kyōdan (Nippon Katorikku Kyōdan or the Japanese Catholic Religious Body) to send priests to Guam. Although it is unknown what Ideguchi, Bishop of Laguna, and Bishop Miguel Angel de Olano (Vicar Apostolic of Guam in the POW camp in Japan) did about canon law and the replacement of clergy on Guam, it was not important for the navy because the employment of Japanese priests was not truly for religious activities. In October 1942, Monsignor Dominico Fukahori Sen’emon, ordinary of the Fukuoka Diocese, and Father Pedro Komatsu Shigeru of the Chiba Church, Catholic Archdiocese of Tokyo, left for Guam. As Minseibu members in charge of religion, they joined two Chamorro priests — Father Jesus Baza Duenas and Father Oscar Lujan Calvo. Duenas who was named by Bishop Olano as pro-vicar apostolic and priest in charge in the Bishop’s absence: he ministered to the southern areas with headquarters at St. Joseph Church in Inarajan. Calvo served the villages north of Chalan Pago and east of Pitt.33 The populated central areas including Agana, location of Dulce Nombre de Maria Cathedral-Basilica, were under Fukahori. Both he and Komatsu travelled to all churches on the island within six months.

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32 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
Returning to Japan in May 1943, Fukahori reported in the *Nippon Katorikku Shinbun* (Japan’s Catholic Newspaper) that the islanders felt relieved and obeyed government orders after the priests arrived.\(^{34}\) With appreciation for the help of the “authorities concerned”, he emphasised, “Owing to the navy’s understanding and cooperation, we could work without inconvenience and do well, better than we expected.”\(^ {35}\) But he confessed to Olano his disappointment in his role under Homura: the cathedral was almost empty even on First Friday’s exposition of the Blessed Sacrament, Holy Thursday and Good Friday. The Chamorros regarded Japanese priests as spies who asked the Lord for Japanese victories.\(^ {36}\)

As a 32-year-old priest, Komatsu’s essay on Guam was published in a Christian journal, *Koe*, in November 1942:

> How distantly related is the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and my homeland’s work of this century with gorgeously reported dramatic moments. This holy work beyond description has been done by the people who devote their ordinary daily life through actual sweat and tears. … They really have a life of great precious sacrifice. At any rate, the machine began to rotate with awful noise. A gear bit another gear and is moving. The humans must only watch it with oily cloths.\(^ {37}\)

Fukahori’s anguish and Komatsu’s metaphors were those of the Catholic Church in wartime Japan in general.

Among the many religious groups that were oppressed during the 1930s and 1940s, the Catholic Church announced its cooperation with the war effort. In 1935 when Sophia University students refused to offer reverence at Yasukuni Shrine, the Japanese Hierarchy decided that Christians “might” show reverence at Shinto shrines. Some churches introduced the doctrine of Japanese Catholicism (*Nipponteki kirisutokyō*) aiming to combine Christianity and Japanese spirit in order to express cooperation with national policy. In 1937, the Vatican also supported the faithful worshipping at Shinto shrines, describing this as an expression of patriotism, not

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\(^{34}\) Msgr. Fukahori, a graduate of the Montreal Divinity University, ordinary of the Fukuoka Diocese between January 1941 and December 1969. He was ordained bishop in May 1944. Fr. Komatsu (1911–1989) studied in Paris and the *Angelicum* in Rome, and was a lecturer at Thomas Gakuin, Kyoto, and the Nanzan University, Nagoya, after he was repatriated from Guam in 1946.


religion. The Pope ordered all churches to support Japan’s aggression in China and reject Chinese communism. Therefore, in 1940, the government recognised the Catholic Church as a religious body. On a “suggestion” from Archbishop Marela in Tokyo, the Vatican in 1940 ordered the replacement of all foreign priests who headed dioceses, by Japanese priests. (The appointments of Monsignors Ideguchi in December 1940 and Fukahori in January 1941 were examples.) In August 1941 the Catholic Church along with Shinto and Buddhist leaders proclaimed a joint resolution on full-scale cooperation with the war. Finally, in September 1943 the Catholic Church announced the “Wartime Policy on Activity”, directing full cooperation with the Greater East Asia War by using the total power of the church. It also called for friendly relations with believers in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere urging them to contribute their efforts for sphere construction.  

With this background, the Catholic paper reported on the Japanese priests’ role on Guam in trying to secure the religious life for Chamorro Catholics under military rule and having the people understand the Empire’s noble spirit and the significance of building Greater East Asia. It was expected that Japanese priests would participate in pacification and, “if necessary,” work to dispel illusions of the old America, to have the Chamorros grasp the lofty spirit of the Imperial country and the necessity of the co-prosperity sphere. Father Duenas criticised the Monsignor’s effort, saying that it was not proper for a priest in a foreign county to preach about his own county’s greatness. There is no record of Fukahori’s reply.

Komatsu, who had worked on Saipan (1937-1939) as the first Japanese Catholic missionary, was the real writer of a book by Joseph Herreros of the South Seas Diocese. The book was published under censorship and argued that the missionaries’ role was to teach islanders to obey Japanese authority and have them work in support of it. Komatsu himself obeyed navy authority, but Homura tried to take advantage of Father Duenas, a graduate of San Jose Seminary in the Philippines. Duenas repeatedly refused the Minseibu’s request for assistance in the search for Tweed or in spreading propaganda about him. For fear of Duenas’ influence, Homura intended to exile him to

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Rota Island in early 1943, but did not do so because of opposition from Fukahori and the Minseibu civilian officers. Homura next ordered Komatsu to write to Tweed on September 1, 1943 to offer a “proposal of his surrender.” However, the attempt failed. As can be seen in Table 15, church buildings were planned for conversion into military storage and barracks after Japanese forces landed in 1944.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Present Use</th>
<th>Possible Military Use</th>
<th>Capacity (Person)</th>
<th>Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suma (Sumay)</td>
<td>Wooden</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asai (Asan)</td>
<td>Reinforced -concrete</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Barracks</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Enemy Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shōen (Pill)</td>
<td>Reinforced -concrete</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Barracks</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Enemy Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naka (Agat)</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Warehouse Barracks</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umata (Umatoc)</td>
<td>Reinforced -concrete</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Enemy Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsuyama (Merizo)</td>
<td>Wooden</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Provisions &amp; Fodder</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Minseibu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inada (Inarajan)</td>
<td>Reinforced -concrete</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Barracks</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inada (Inarajan)</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasaki (Taloff)</td>
<td>Wooden</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakawa (Yona)</td>
<td>Reinforced -concrete</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haruta (Barrigada)</td>
<td>Wooden</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiratsuka (Tumonde)</td>
<td>Reinforced -concrete</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Barracks</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sano Honbu, "Omiyato Heyo Chiushi Shiryō" (1944), pp. 39-45.
* Buildings in Agana and enemy properties controlled by the Naval Guard Unit are not listed.

Because the Imperial Headquarters and the government’s policy on religion was supposedly non-interference, it has been said that the essential features of Japan’s religious measures were not active. However, “non-interference” or “non-active” policy on Guam was eventually equated to “disregard” of the importance of religion to the Chamorros. Instead, the Minseibu attempted to involve itself in the Chamorros’ religion and take advantage of Japanese priests for the purpose for pacification. So the Minseibu’s policy for religion was a device for pacification, not “organic integration.” The Japanese priests were, essentially, pacification officers.

In the Philippines, with much the same colonial and religious history as Guam, the Japanese Army knew that it would have trouble if it could not obtain the cooperation of the Catholic Church. Therefore, it took an indirect approach. First, church leaders were issued certificates of release for missionaries including the Americans. All the

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army’s affairs that could be related to the Vatican, such as rice production, taxation of church property, adjustment between canon law and civil law, were to be defined in an “agreement” with the local church.\textsuperscript{45}

In all cases, the military’s bold policy for delicate issues was that they hardly recognised the global Catholic system under the Pope and ecclesiastical authorities. The cross in Guam’s Cathedral was removed by the army in January 1942 and was not replaced during the occupation. The navy did not understand the reality of larger problems caused by opposition to Catholic authorities as the result of administrative measures. Further, the Guam Minseibu did not recognise the roots of Chamorro Americanisation, such as American style tolerance, a vibrant culture based on Christianity, and a common religious tradition. The reason for this was the navy’s great ambition to Japanise the Chamorros.

**Language as Japan’s Spiritual Blood**

Japanese language training began with the object of increasing understanding. Language education in all the occupied areas was the most concrete and common method for “organic integration” of the occupied people in the long term.

In the Planning Board’s Instructional Policy for Occupied Areas, language training was regarded as the key to foster consciousness among the natives as “People of Asia,” shaking themselves free from European and American colonial exploitation; and having them acquire Japanese spirit and culture.\textsuperscript{46} Transplanting the Japanese way of thinking, culture, tradition, and life style through a common language among the Asian races was assimilation into Japan’s Greater East Asia. Assimilation via language was Japan’s consistent policy for unifying races, since colonisation of the Okinawans, the Ainu and other minorities in southern Sakhalin. Because Japan’s overseas colonies, Taiwan and Korea, shared similar cultural traits with the Japanese such as writing based on Chinese characters, language education became an immutable colonial policy.

In June 1939 when Education Minister and General Araki Sadao endorsed language scholar Ueda Mannen’s theory, language as Japan’s “spiritual blood” at the National Language Council, language education became the policy of the Greater East Asia ideology. Araki expanded Ueda’s idea that “blood” would trickle down among the Asian races to establish the New Order and world peace by forming concentric circles.


\textsuperscript{46} Kikakuin Kenkyūkai, *Daito kensetsu no kihon kōryō* (Tokyo: Dōmei Tsūshinsha, 1943), pp. 48-49.
around the core of Japan’s ideology. Accordingly, the unified language policy applied not only to Japan’s colonies, but also to Manchukuo, Japan’s puppet government. These thinkers did not discuss the application of the policy in the southern areas whose people did not share the common root of Chinese characters and ideology. However, the grounds for doing so were the results the South Seas Bureau achieved in the mandate. So the policy was naively applied to southern people and to non-Asians.

The navy’s 1942 outline of military administration stated: “the European-type education previously provided to the inhabitants shall be revised, and the dissemination of Japanese language and culture shall be undertaken.” In August 1942, cabinet made the Education Ministry responsible for editing textbooks and training teachers, but language diffusion was to be handed over to the army and navy. In short, military administration in each area was given authority to carry out the language education policy for different races with different cultures.

The navy assumed responsibility for language policy in the Dutch East Indies and Guam. Compared to the army’s policy in Java, Nishiyma Shigeta and Kishi Kōichi, Waseda University professors, concluded that the navy’s language education was an “extremely strong policy for Japanisation, and kōminisation, (so called) “eternal possessions and colonisation” in Borneo, Celebes, and Seram. Although the navy intended to proceed with this policy, such language education required long-term training, step by step, and could not yield prompt results. Also, it was hard to inspire nationally conscious people with Japanese thoughts by means of a language so very unlike their own. Vigorous language education did not always produce the Japanisation of the Asian people. This was a dilemma for the Guam Minseibu.

On Guam, Japanese language training began at 15 former elementary schools in January 1942. One school in Agana for Chamorro children held classes between 7:30 A.M. and 11:30 A.M. and taught simple vocabulary, reading and writing of katakana characters, arithmetic, children’s plays and songs, as well as flag-raising, moral discourse and etiquette. For young adults, language and patriotic songs were taught for an hour and a half, twice a week. Because civilian entry to Guam was not officially permitted, the instructors came from the 54th Naval Guard Unit and the Minseibu staff.

47 Nan’yō Dantai Rengōkai, Dainan’yō nenkan 2, p. 919.
48 “Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō” (14 March 1942).
50 Jesus Sablan Leon Guerrero, Jesus in Little America: An Autobiographical Account of the Founding of the Bank of Guam and History in the Making (Guam: LIG Publishing House, 1987), p. 37; Sanchez, Pedro, C., Guahan: Guam: The History of Our Island, p. 196; Carter,
In a church building in a village, a petty officer wrote and read the Japanese expressions for “Go and pick up a coconut” and “Go and get five shells,” and made Chamorros practice. A selected student went outside and brought the item ordered. The goal was to teach Chamorros to revere and obey the military.

The Minseibu’s official schooling began after the teachers arrived from Saipan and Palau in September 1942. Unlike the 100 teachers sent to the southern areas after makeshift training in Tokyo, these teachers had experience in islander education. Besides the Ōmiyatō National School (Ōmiyatō Kokumin Gakkō) for Japanese children, three kinds of school opened for Chamorro children: a school for second generation children of Japanese residents (nisei gakkō or nisei school, see Photo 2), Junior National Schools (Shokyū Kokumin Gakkō) in the 19 villages, and a Provisional Assistant Teacher’s Training School (Rinji Kyōinho Yōseijo) in Agana. Japanese-Chamorro children were separated from Chamorro students and studied at the same campus as Japanese students, in the belief that limited mingling might benefit them. Importantly, schools for Chamorro children were not called public schools (kōgakko) which was the term originally used for non-Japanese speaking islanders’ schools in the Mandate. Instead, they were called national schools (kokumin gakkō) based on the naigai ichinyo policy. According to the National School Order in Japan (1941), a national school should provide “regular elementary education” in line with the benevolent Imperial Way (Kōdō), which eternally supported the prosperity of the Emperor’s rule.

In the junior national schools for seven-to-fifteen-year-olds, “orthodox and beautiful Japanese expressions” for conversation were taught, including reading and writing for ten hours per week using a “smattering of phrases with gestures.” Because the Education Minister’s textbook were not ready, teachers prepared handouts based on the beginners’ textbooks, Hanashi Kotoba (Speaking Language, three volumes). The textbooks were originally edited for students in China and were also used by Japanese


52 During the military administration, elementary schools were called “kokumin gakkō” (national school) in Java, “kōgakko” (public school) in Celebes, and “kōritsu shōgakko” (public elementary school) in the Philippines.

53 Head Attorney Kiyose Ichirō explained in the Tokyo war crimes tribunal that the Imperial Way implied benevolence, impartiality, moral courage, courtesy and honour. It was expected to unite the ruler and the ruled. Kiyose Ichirō, Hiroku: Tokyo Saiban (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1986), pp. 81-82 and p. 228.

54 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, December 1942.
military administrations in Thailand and Burma. In the Philippines, the textbooks were used as an introduction and later Nippongo Dokuhon (Japanese Reader, three volumes), newly edited six-volume textbooks for Greater East Asia were used. Guam Minseibu teachers preferred the new textbook because of the language unification policy. The “Nippongo” (Japanese Language), the first volume of the Nippongo Dokuhon introduced 300 simple Japanese words (person, days of the week, number, time, place, direction, nature, transportation, society, military terms, adjectives, verbs, greetings). Specifically these included:

Japan, Japanese people, friend, rice, vegetables, sake, tobacco, matches, the army, the navy, the headquarters, commander, commissioned officer, non-commissioned officer, soldier, military police, warship, airplane, tank, artillery gun, rifle, fight, enemy, ally, order, win, rescue, and banzai.55

These books used katakana orthography for pronunciation. Kanji was not used because the purpose of training was speaking, not writing. This was only the first step toward having the Japanese language become an official language in Asia. The results of language training were demonstrated to parents through plays and songs. In late 1942 when instruction began, Chamorro children “were listening with vacant looks,” but after some months they could understand general conversation.56

The condition of school education reveals the Minseibu’s effort at language diffusion. In early 1944, 3,805 students attended 19 junior national schools and 41 attended the assistant teachers’ training school. (During American rule there were 5,500 students in 28 public schools and one high school.) Given these numbers, as many as 70% of students from the American period attended Japanese language school.57 There were only 23 Japanese teachers which meant that only one or two were assigned to each school. Each Chamorro teacher had 32 students during American rule, but one Japanese teacher taught at least 169 students. Nakahashi Kiyoshi, at the Umatac Junior National School, had 120 first-graders, 84 second-graders and 120 third-graders, a total of 320. He was also school principal, caretaker and leader of the Young Men’s Association. Classes on Guam were twice as large as those in the South Sea Islands (50 to 60 students). The navy had to disseminate practical Japanese phrases and expressions with as many young people, as fast as possible.58

56 Ibid., January 1943.
58 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, December 1942.
To supplement the few Japanese teachers, Chamorro students were trained at the Provisional Assistant Teachers' Training School. As envisioned by the Minseibü, they would become language-culture interpreters, at ease in both language and culture. Those were relatively good students who initially understood Japanese and were selected by village officials. Their first two months' training aimed at mastery of vocabulary equivalent to Japanese seven to eight years olds. Next, they had to master reading and writing of 46 Hiragana characters and Chinese characters equivalent to a fourth grader in the South Seas Bureau school. Their textbook, probably an advanced edition of *Nippongo Dokuhon*, contained about 370 Chinese characters and introduced the importance of New Year, Japanese language, the spring season and Mt. Fuji. Topics relevant to national ideology such as the Emperor, the Rising Sun flag and the national anthem were rarely included. The use of Chamorro language was prohibited at school, and self-study using a dictionary in the dormitory was required. Moral education, physical exercise and Japanese songs were introduced as well as recitation of an oath.  

During the occupation, the assistant teachers training centre began with 26 students for six months from October 1942, and a second batch of 24 for eight months, in April 1943. Fifty graduates were assigned to village schools as assistant teachers. They also served as models of education. Although 41 students were recruited in November 1943, the training school closed in March 1944. The Minseibü was able to train Chamorro interpreters in six months. During New Year celebration of 1944, these young people joined worship ceremonies at the Ōmiya Shinto Shrine with other Minseibü employees (see Photo 1). In this way, the teachers took a leading role to "implant Japanese thought" by means of "fresh words" of the "Japanese blood" which was the "best method of ideological communication to replace American influence."  

The Minseibü's real target was members of the Young Men's Association, an organization of several hundred villagers aged fifteen to thirty. At nights, they were taught Japanese language for two hours, three times per week. Every Sunday instruction on Japanese spirit, rules and prevention of espionage was given by teachers and other Minseibü staff. Speeches during national ceremonies supplemented the limited content for Japanisation in the language textbook by demonstrating Japanese thought, culture and traditions. In particular, the three great national holidays — Imperial Day (*Kigensetsu*), the Emperor's Birthday (*Tenchōsetsu*) and New Year —

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60 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, 19 May 1942 and December 1942.
involved a full schedule of worship toward the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, flag raising, singing the national anthem, reading the Imperial Rescript on Education, attending instruction on moral issues and singing. On the anniversary of Guam’s occupation (10 December), when the Imperial Rescript announced the Great East Asia War, and Naval Memorial Day, the national anthem and moral discourse were featured. However the Chamorros understood these ceremonies, the message in each was that Chamorros must accept and respond to Japanese rule.

The Minseibu’s language training tried to make Chamorros into “reserve” Japanese-speaking people familiar with Japanese culture and rule. But the “organic” effort for construction of the Greater East Asia had already begun. Besides school education, the Minseibu’s target was the Chamorro working generation who could provide labour power. Subtly embedded in the messages were two hidden concepts — the Imperial Way and loyalty to the Emperor. On Guam, language training was seen as necessary for industrial development and the coming battle.

**Kôminsation: Being the Emperor’s Subjects**

The role of language teachers was to impart not only a thorough knowledge of language and culture, but also Japanese spirit.\(^{61}\) Their mission was to have the occupied people assimilate Japanese culture and values to achieve collaboration with the military administration and Japan’s war efforts. The process of spiritual integration or adopting Japanese spirit was described as the assimilation of foreign peoples into Japan’s rule.

Varied efforts at assimilation of foreign races — the Ryukyan, Taiwanese, Korean, Cantonese, South Sea Islanders, Ainu and other minority aborigines in South Sakhalin — were made in the pre-war years. Certain terms were used that were similar in meaning to “dôka” (assimilation), “Nihonteki narumono e no sekkī” (approaching or being like Japanese), “Nihonka” (Japanisation), and “Nihonjinka” (make other races like Japanese). These terms had shades of meaning depending on when they were used or how the policy was managed and to what race the term applied. There are no specific definitions. “Dôka” seems to have been a generic term indicating a tendency of people to accept being connected to Japanese society. “Nihonka” or “Nihonjinka” was a more positive term. The highest educational outcome of language and cultural assimilation was kôminka (kôminsation).\(^{62}\) “Kôminsation” is making the people devoted subjects

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of the Emperor, and placing them under all the obligations described in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 and in national policy.  

There are many studies of this policy. Nishiyama Shigetada and Kishi Kōichi’s *Indoneshia ni okeru Nihon gunsei kenkyû* (Study of Japanese Military Administration in *Indonesia*) conclude that the navy vigorously pushed Japanese policy, and even the kōminisation policy on Indonesians to colonise them as Japan’s permanent possession. Miyawaki Hiroyuki, who studied Malaya and Singapore, states that the administration compelled people to accept the Tenno ideology and its nationalist culture. He concluded that this approach was taken in all southern areas: that the Japanese began kōminising, or forcing the people to be the Emperor’s subjects. Kimishima Kazuhiko supports Miyawaki’s conclusion that Japan, in the Emperor’s name, enforced kōminisation as a way to eliminate each race’s unique culture in all colonies, including areas occupied during the War. Meanwhile, Ishii Hitoshi states that Japanisation measures in education were, in aggregate, weak. Tani Yasuyo, through her study of language teaching methods, emphasises that there were different applications of policy because, for example, education for people to become the Emperor’s subjects in the Philippines was not connected with language instruction, and education did not necessarily become kōminisation.  

These studies conclude that Japanisation and kōmi-isation could be strongly or weakly introduced. Yamada Shōji’s explanation of the term is consistent with various authors: “to deprive an oppressed race of its right in order to gain obedience from them.”  

When we see the results of policies and measures enforced during military rule, this definition is too general and too simple from the viewpoint of the oppressed people. To understand the navy’s kōminisation policy, a different angle is needed. For

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63 I use “kōmin” (the Imperial subject) plus “-isation” to avoid repeated explanation.  
the purpose of this research, I need to establish how the navy’s kōminisation policy was related to its fundamental policy of “organic” association.

The navy’s policy for governing foreign peoples can be seen in the South Sea Islands during military administration. The basic policy for schools was defined by the Regulations for Elementary Schools in the South Sea Islands of 1915. Under these regulations, islanders were obliged to learn the “national language”, to know about Japanese daily life and understand Japanese moral education sufficient to become Imperial subjects (the terminology of the Imperial Constitution of 1889) who would recognise their national duty. These expectations were obviously based on the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, the basic policy for education. The goal was for islanders to be Japanese-speaking nationals who would accept the responsibilities defined by the Imperial Constitution.

When the navy’s civil administration was established in 1918, recognition of “Imperial favour” was removed as an educational goal, but language instruction and moral education remained. Ordinary knowledge and skills were to be taught so that islanders could serve under Japanese rule. The navy’s motive for this change was to eliminate a blunt policy that might create a negative impression at Versailles. But the aim was to have the islanders contribute their labour to the Emperor’s reign.

During the period of civilian Mandate authority (1922-1935), the South Seas Bureau introduced a moderate policy of “moral education” to replace “achieving Imperial favour (Kōdon).” But the goal implied a re-shaping of islanders to “become earnest people able to work” which was much the same as the navy’s idea.

After a 15-year interval, the navy returned to manage the 1935 ten-year plan. The Lukow-kia Incident of 1937, the outset of the long Japan-China War, signalled the turning point in the navy’s policy for the South Sea Islands and the islanders. As part of the plan, the navy insisted on using islander labourers after giving them the status of Japanese nationals. The final goal was clarified as kōminisation, a term used for the islanders for the first time. This was explained as “being honoured to be the Emperor’s subjects.” To strengthen its role, the navy’s Government-General of Taiwan pushed three objectives in the latter 1930s: industrialisation, kōminisation and southward

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66 Nan’yō Guntō Kyōiku kai, Nan’yō Guntō kyōiku shi, p. 630.
67 See Appendix 1 of Chapter Six.
69 Ibid., p. 113.
70 Nan’yō Guntō Guntō kaihatsu chōsa iinkai tōshin” (10 October 1935), in Takumu daijin seigi Nan’yō Guntō kaihatsu chōsa iinkai haishi no ken (17 December 1935).
advance. The navy applied these aims to the South Sea Islands although “development” was used instead of “industrialisation”. The islanders’ kōminisation, particularly on Palau and Saipan, was more actively pursued along with the Imperial Rule Assistance movement, or Japanese national’s kōminisation activities, under the joint work of the navy and the South Seas Bureau until opening of hostilities.

Particularly in wartime, the fundamental point of these stages (Japanese speaking, earnest in work, and kōminisation) was the application of isshi dōjin — universal benevolence, impartiality and equal favour, or the Emperor’s equal love for everyone. In addition, the duties of the Japanese people were shared by colonised people. The isshi dōjin policy was a slogan to strengthen foreigners’ consciousness of being the Emperor’s subjects or servants. Further, the regular use of the Japanese language, which had been the general language in the major population areas of the South Sea Islands, the kōminisation movement supported by Japan’s generous policy of isshi dōjin was widely known during war preparations.

Three points defined the navy’s policy for the islanders in pre-war years. First, the navy’s educational goal was to create the Emperor’s subjects loyal enough to serve him. Second, how strongly kōminisation was to be enforced depended on how strongly the government or the military needed islanders’ labour. Third, kōminisation was a corollary of the isshi dōjin policy, not to refuse the impartial love of the Emperor but to be obligated to Japan. This would apply equally to all Japanese nationals. This basic thought also applied to the people of Guam, because they had to be integrated with the South Sea islanders. Discipline, group activities, hardship training; and all islanders together with Japanese. Everyone was to be tightly absorbed.

However, the isshi dōjin policy distinguished other races from Japanese. Although the policy regarded them as equal, they were given different “duties” or a greater labour burden than the Yamato race. Work was not allocated with respect for cultural or racial diversities, but according to the state’s needs and the thought of centralising the Emperor system and Japanese worldview. The people’s stage of kōminisation was first explained by their limited language ability and cultural adaptation, and finally evaluated to be assigned duties. The navy’s justification of this discrimination was the term “organic difference.” This idea denied the “mechanical application” of equality to anybody and meant that Japan would assign an appropriate position to each person, according to their “original racial ability and particularities.”

This notion of “organic difference” was equivalent to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere slogan, “onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru” (to enable all nations to find their proper place – assigned by Japan). Some assignments were determined by the educational policy. When the navy and the South Seas Bureau began islanders’ kōminisation, they planned more public schools and decided that islander education would be complete at the elementary level to create “simple and honest Imperial subjects who loved hard work.”72 Japan recognised that higher education would place new obstacles on the road to future plans. Only “excellent islanders” would be trained in agriculture, education, carpentry and leadership. The “excellent” naturally meant sufficiently kōminising, not kōminised, islanders.

The “organic difference” of the races is seen in the oaths prepared according to the government’s National Spiritual Mobilisation Plan of 1939 for students. Comparing oaths reveals the inconsistency of the isshi dōjin policy and the navy’s intentions.

The Oath of Allegiance to the Emperor (Chikai no kotoba) was recited by assistant teacher training centre students on Guam every morning. This oath was prepared by Principal Takenaka Kisaku.

1. On my oath, we shall be good Japanese.
2. On my oath, we shall study hard.
3. On my oath, we shall work hard.73

The oath was recited to promote consciousness of and loyalty to Japan. It is unknown when daily recitation began. The model for this was probably the one written for islander students in the public schools in the South Sea Islands because Takenaka was originally from a Bureau school in Palau. This oath was used in 1939 or 1940 after Japan stopped reporting to the League of Nations.

First, we shall be splendid Japanese nationals.
Second, we shall be His Majesty’s children.
Third, we shall be faithful to our Emperor.74

The origin of both oaths was likely the Oath of Subjects in the Emperor’s State (Kōkoku shinmin no seishi) used by the Government-General of Korea. Japan’s rule in Korea was regarded as a model especially of education policies and it was where the oaths for elementary students, higher education students and adults were written. The

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72 Nan’yōchō, “Nan’yō Guntō kaihatsu chōsa iinkai saikai ni kansuru ken’an” (9 May 1940), pp. 64-65.
oath for elementary students was composed in advanced Japanese language compared with the two noted above.\(^{75}\)

1. We shall be the subjects of the great Emperor of Japan.
2. We shall be whole-heartedly faithful to His Majesty.
3. We shall become a splendid and strong nation with endurance and training.

The contents of these oaths are vertically and horizontally related and a longer colonial influence is reflected in the quality of language used. Table 16 shows the key phrases in each. These cardinal words and phrases provide some sense of how Japan would phase in Japanisation in each territory. The arrows show the first, second and final steps of education — Study the Japanese language, values and morality with enthusiasm, so Chamorros could be good Japanese and the Emperor’s children. The ultimate goal was to be splendid Japanese nationals. Finally, Chamorro children could be subjects of the great Emperor as specified in the Greater Japan Constitution. Also, they should single-mindedly devote themselves to work, which meant to be faithful to the Emperor. They had to be strong to work with endurance and training. Chamorro children must learn to become “good Japanese” and prove themselves as the Emperor’s subjects. This was the only way to support national prosperity, which would bring about the nation’s happiness. Although the Chamorro’s oath was simple, it contained profound and noble messages from the Emperor via the Imperial Rescript of Education.

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<th>[Table 16] The Oaths of the Emperor’s Subjects</th>
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<td><strong>Guam Minselbu</strong> (1942)</td>
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The Koreans, annexed in 1910, were granted an option of Japanese nationality from the beginning of colonisation: they were confirmed as being among the “Great Emperor’s subjects.” When Japanese aggression in China began in 1937, Korea’s colonial agrarian economy was reorganised for producing food, manufacturing, and to serve as a military base for Japan’s armed expansion. This decision escalated the need for Korean kôminisation to supply labour for the military. For improved effectiveness

of work and responsibility, the Koreans had been united with Japan, and made spiritually and physically strong with endurance and training. They had to share all duties and responsibilities with Japanese (naisen ittai or Japan and Korea as a single body) and were therefore the highest colonised people under Japan’s rule.

The South Sea Islands had 27 years of Japanese administration and Japanese language was the general means of communication. Already removed from Mandate status, the islanders who studied at public school (three-year regular and two-year supplemental) were now the “His Majesty’s children.” Japan changed its policy that the islanders held a different status from Japanese, and planned to grant them Japanese nationality to unite them with Japan’s work. So the islanders swore to improve their spiritual development to become “splendid Japanese nationals”. Finally, as they completed their duties, they could be called “faithful to the Emperor.” Since these oaths were said repetitively and in unison, this was a centripetal force pulling the children’s hearts and minds to Japan’s work for the Greater East Asia. Next, the navy applied its policy for imperialising the Chamorros. “Chamorros were a population too small in size to be called one race; they were too devastated to be called one tribe; they did not have a world outlook or concept of being a nation until Japan’s occupation,” according to Teacher Nakahashi Kiyoshi.76 Therefore, they were “destined for inclusion into Japan’s one hundred million people nation like the Ainu.”77

However, assimilation did not promise that Chamorros would gain equal “organic” status and be harmonized into a relationship with Japan as symbolised by the differences between these oaths. Generally, Japanese disliked the Koreans; being still feudalistic, the Japanese formed racial class distinctions in the small island societies, especially on Saipan where a majority of the Japanese population lived. The hierarchy was Japanese on top, and Okinawan, Korean, Chamorro, and Carolinian in descending order. Some imperialised Saipanese Chamorros were selected in 1941 for the landing on Guam, and other Saipanese worked as patrolmen and interpreters over the occupied Chamorros. Under navy authority, the Minseibu and Nan’yô Kôhatsu employees led other civilian Japanese, and Okinawan fishermen from the Nan’kô Suisan. Korean military labourers worked with Chamorro men in airfield construction. Chamorros were treated as “tômin” (islanders) or assigned a lower status of “domin” (uncivilised people or aborigines). They needed to be educated as the Emperor’s subjects.

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76 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, “rainy season,” 1943.
77 Ibid., 10 December 1942.
Although they were kōminised, their social status and role were already determined in Japan’s “stratified order”, as the navy called it.78

In any case, the Minseibu teachers’ spiritual education of the Chamorros began in September 1942. Teacher Nakahashi articulated the Minseibu policy in his letters.

Despite the navy’s demand for speed, the Minseibu’s schooling began at a slow pace under South Seas Bureau teachers. Recognising the difficulties in achieving their goal, the teachers set their expectations as Japanisation, an approximation — “bringing Chamorros closer to being something like the Japanese.”79 They attempted “not to tenaciously teach the Chamorros the essence of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” but “to promote the islanders’ proper understanding of Japan and increase their affection for Japan.” They sought a “natural, sensible and subjective … awakening” to be “something Asian-like” through instruction in Japanese language. Finally, “to have the Chamorro people recognise their duty as one of the races in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” the teachers projected 20-to-30- years.80 The teachers always concentrated on persuading students during school garden work to understand the “necessity of gratification from work.”81 However, despite the worsening war situation, the Chamorros seemed to be different from the Japanese. A popular satirical song among Chamorros used a melody from a Japanese song that revealed their reaction to Japanese enthusiasm. There were different versions. The last part of one version ended with “Taimanu ti un chatpa’go” (no wonder you are ugly).82

“Sensei na sensei hafa nanamu? kechapha’ yan misu Kalang of yamu.”
(Teacher, teacher, what do you eat? Soysauce and soybean soup. Seems that you like it very much).

On December 31, 1942, Imperial Headquarters decided to withdraw from Guadalcanal. This shocked the Japanese on Guam. With the pressure of war, the Minseibu’s gradualism changed according to navy orders. After early 1943, teacher Nakahashi began to say “Japanese spirit” in his writing, symbolising the Emperor’s message to his subjects in the Imperial Rescript of Education. Nakahashi expressed this spirit with his motto of “having firm determination to fight until the last person dies.”83 The more the situation deteriorated, the more the teachers reflected on Japanese spirit and the need to be ready for the worst. Further, after the U.S. counterattack began in the

78 See Introduction of this thesis.
79 Ibid., 12 January 1943 and July 1943.
80 Ibid., January 1943.
81 Ibid., January 1943.
82 Sanchez, Pedro C., Guahan Guam: The History of our Island, p. 197.
83 Ibid., 12 January 1943.
Solomon Islands, the navy finally decided in March 1943 that each island should
prepare for an unaided, drawn-out struggle until reinforcements arrived. The Minseibu
chief demanded that the teachers enforce preparedness, so the gradual policy changed to
a policy for immediately making Chamorros loyal subjects — kōminisation.

Such changes in policy would allow the authorities easily to apply national
policy to the ruled and thereby unite all people under a single military authority at any
time and in any shape before all out war reached the islands. Therefore, kōminisation
could be called a comprehensive slogan for mobilising foreign peoples.

The explanations of two Japanese historians of Taiwan are pertinent. Ihara
Kachinosuke wrote that although the assimilation policy in peaceful times was Japan’s
professed position of isshi dōjīn, “impartiality and equal favour,” the Taiwanese were
not allowed a middle position between the Japanese and the enemy (Chinese) after the
beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. Ihara asserted that the elimination of the middle
position was called kōminisation. Takeuchi Kiyoshi argues that because Taiwanese
had already been granted Japanese nationality, the idea of Ordering them to be Japanese
was meaningless. If they were required to be loyal Japanese, this assignment also had
to be given to all Japanese whose kōminisation was incomplete.

Minseibu teachers emphasised Japan’s lofty ideals, to encourage the Chamorros
to work. Hard work and its fruits represented loyalty to the Emperor. Also, the teachers
worked as “pacification officers who complemented the greater wishes of the Emperor”
to teach the language and give instruction on food production so people would work
“Spartan-like and with hardships.” Also, they popularised the slogan “Chamorro
damashii” (Chamorro spirit), corresponding to “Yamato damashii” (Japanese spirit).

After a few months, references to the kōminisation effort disappeared from
Nakahashi’s letters. In mid-September 1943, Imperial Headquarters directed a major
change in military operations. National defence areas to be maintained at any cost
(Zettai kokubōken) were reduced to a front from the Banda Sea to the Eastern and
Western Caroline Islands (Truk-Palau-Yap line) and the Marianas (Saipan-Tinian-
Guam). The Marshall Islands were left out. The air force would strengthen the rest of
the South Sea Islands. In addition to food production, Chamorro labourers were
mobilised for airfield and other fortifications beginning in November 1943. The

84 Ihara Kachinosuke, “Taiwan no kōminka undo: Shōwa jū-nendai no Tiawan (2),” in Nihon no
285-286.
86 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, personal letter, 12 January 1943 and June 1943.

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teachers’ duty changed from re-educating Chamorros to having them do more labour on military construction. The pacification activities also ended after ten thousand soldiers landed on Guam in late February 1944.

When Guam was declared a potential combat arena in 1944, an army report urged “good instruction” for Chamorros because they could not be fully trusted, and because much time would be needed to Japanise them.\(^{87}\) Under total military rule, “instruction” was replaced by authoritarian rule and the demand for obedience “by fair means or foul for winning the war”.\(^{88}\) This helped the Chamorros recognise their position, which was not on the side of the Japanese. After May 1944 when there were signs of a U.S. landing, Chamorro spy activities with U.S. submarines were frequently reported. In the mid-June, when the U.S. bombardments of Saipan became severe, Chamorro anti-Japanese activities became conspicuous.\(^{89}\)

The navy’s Chamorro spiritual conversion using anti-Americanisation, Japanisation and kōminisation failed. The Minseibu did not respect the people and did not try to establish equal and mutual relationship to create “a situation where many parts gather to make one.” While Japan aimed at absorbing all resources from the southern area, it could not provide any material and monetary return. Instead, it attempted to integrate the people’s mind with psychological centripetal force of the Japanese spirit — an abstraction. Japanese who believed the teaching of the Imperial Rescript on Education as the nation’s common and greatest asset thought that kōminisation of the people could unite them. However, during the war, kōminisation was a Japanese slogan, not a Chamorro one. The war was Japan’s, not theirs.

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88 Nakahashi Kiyoshi, private diary, 1945.
Conclusion

This thesis has examined the Japanese Navy’s administration of Guam during the Pacific War. Guam is significant because it was the only occupied U.S. territory where a civil administration department (minseibu) ordered civil affairs.

Guam was geographically encircled and strategically surrounded by the South Sea Islands (Nan'yō Guntō) mandated territory, which the navy treated as Japan’s permanent territory. From Tokyo’s viewpoint, this United States territory was a dangerous anomaly in Japan’s ocean. Guam was therefore attacked at the same time as Pearl Harbour, and de facto became become part of Japan’s South Sea Islands. That context affected the navy’s policy for Guam and her 22,000 people.

The Guam Minseibu was a government operation that carried out the navy’s directives. Its functions (labour stability, mobilisation and management) were directly controlled by the navy. For this reason I refer to the Guam Minseibu as a “navy administration”, not a “civil administration”. To be exact, the Guam Minseibu should be translated as a “civil affairs department for military administrative purposes.”

This Minseibu was directly under the naval commander, whereas, for example, a civilian governor supervised civil administration in the Dutch Indies. By examining directly ruled small areas, we can perhaps grasp Japan’s intentions in the co-prosperity sphere. It was envisioned as the navy’s ideal regime because it was simple, not a burden for the navy’s core work, and it was easy to enforce the achievement of the navy’s goals. It was an administration “devised to facilitate organic integration” because of Guam’s peculiar geographical, military, political, and even social situation.

Japan began the Pacific War by declaring the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, using two key terms, hakkō ichiu (universal concord) and onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru (to enable all nations to find their proper place in the world). The navy therefore tried to formulate a plan to realise these slogans in the southern areas where it was responsible for administration.

The navy’s goal of “organic integration” was adopted in the Outline for the Conduct of Military Administration in Occupied Areas in March 1942. Japan’s purpose for military administration was “to facilitate the organic integration of the entire region into the Japanese Empire.” The Plan for Southern National Lands, of September 1941 had already referred to “organic new order”, “organic links”, “organic existence” and “organic organisation” to describe an ideal unity between Japan and the southern areas.
The navy’s concept of “organic” was not systematic, nor was it ever defined, but it was related to “logical relationships” between Japan and other races, and was a key concept in the navy’s administration. This “logical relationship” was supposed to be based on “organic difference”, which derived from each race’s history, traditions, customs, social structure, ability, value, and cultural level. The navy expected Asian peoples to cooperate freely to bring about “organic integration” of the whole region.

At first the navy resisted Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere slogans which came from army thinking and became clichés. The navy nevertheless believed that “organic integration” would be accomplished according to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere policy, onoono sono tokoro o eseshimu.

The reason why this term came to the forefront relates to the navy’s long-standing policy of southward advance through economic expansion. I have argued that the navy was inspired by the vague term “organic” as it struggled to administer the southern resource areas. During the war, the term for interdependent relations shifted, to be thought of as circles of subordination.

To understand these shifts, the thesis has reconstructed the navy’s pre-war strategic interest in the Pacific, and its policies towards the South Sea Islands and southward advance. Against that background I have reviewed the Guam Minseibu’s political, economic and cultural policies and explained the navy’s failure to realise “organic integration”, either under Navy Commander Homura Teiichi or the civilian Yamano Yûkichi. I conclude that the navy’s policy idea for “organic relations” before the war became “organic integration” in wartime. The Guam Minseibu’s work was not therefore to establish equal relationships but to integrate the occupied peoples into Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

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The navy never presented an agreed definition of “organic”, but it used the term largely as in the dictionary sense: “a situation where many parts gather to make one, in which close unification exists between each part, and where there are logical relationships between each part and the total”. However vague, it was a key concept in the navy’s thinking — “to make one,” “close unification” and “logical relationships.” This broad meaning remained, although the context changed radically.

The South Sea Islands played two roles: first as a military base and second as a southward advanced base. When the navy abandoned its disarmament efforts in 1934, it speeded up the militarisation of the South Sea Islands. However, if Japan’s war purpose had been limited to becoming the new imperial power in Asia, it would have been
unnecessary for the navy to build “organic” relations with the occupied areas. Japan could have governed the southern peoples as she did in Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and her other territories. But Japan’s military inferiority to the U.S. was evident and war with the U.S. was inevitable. The “organic” concept would be a message to Britain and the U.S. to respect Japan’s intentions in Asia.

“Organic” was the term used by the southward advance advocates, members of the navy’s Policy Study Committee, who took the lead in finding a method to expand to the south. The issue became “how to establish organic economic relations with the south without conflict with the resident colonial countries”. But during the search for a method, the “organic” situation was partly achieved, so it gradually changed.

When Japan quit the League of Nations in 1935, the navy began to draft plans for advance: on one hand, pursuing the development of Taiwan and the South Sea Islands as advanced bases; on the other hand, the Policy Study Committee searched for practical measures. The earliest method for achieving “organic” relations was to pursue political linkages using Japanese enterprises and migrants.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1937 was the acceleration point for the advanced policy and military base construction in the South Sea Islands. Acquiring raw materials for military industries was first targeted in Manchukuo and the homeland, then spread to Korea and Taiwan. The major expansion route was through Taiwan, according to the navy’s 1938 plan for a government-general of the Southern Areas.

In 1939 the navy increased its efforts because of the quagmire Sino-Japanese War and impending economic sanctions by Britain and the U.S. The Production Capacity Enlargement Plan (January 1939) finally included the South Sea Islands in order to meet the government’s resource demands. But resources in the South Sea Islands were limited. The wider southern areas, particularly the Dutch Indies, were seen as much more important. The navy’s draft plan for upgrading the South Seas Bureau to a government-general of the South Seas (not of the South Sea Islands) acknowledged this. The difficult negotiations with the Dutch East Indies government gradually convinced Japan to use aggressive diplomacy backed by military power.

The 1940 abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the war in Europe set the stage for the army’s decision on military expansion to the south. The Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy followed Japan’s failure in negotiations with the Dutch Indies. The U.S. and Britain froze Japan’s overseas assets, and Holland and the U.S. ended their oil exports to Japan. In this crisis, the navy finally established its position: “If we are resisted, we will use arms”. The use of arms meant occupation,
and eventual territorial integration into Japan’s rule. Germany’s acceptance of Japan’s possession of the South Sea Islands supported the navy’s final decision. The frustration of its southward advocates was relieved with a single blow. However, the background idea – that the navy should establish “organic relationships” with the south — remained in the 1942 outline of military administration, which was to involve “organic integration”.

In response to the navy’s change of approach from peaceful to armed methods, the concept “organic” changed from “organic relationships” to “close unification” (only with Japan, not between Asian peoples) and “integration” — or even “permanent retention” as the purpose of the war. The navy finally defined the way to make the region “one” — the Greater East Asia co-prosperity Sphere — to obtain resources. However, the key term “organic” was never discussed.

Two reasons have been suggested. First, in the construction of a co-prosperity sphere, the regional “one” was subordinate to Japan’s real intention: the rapid acquisition of natural resources. The Imperial Council defined two fundamental purposes of the war: self-existence and self-defence; and the construction of a new order called the co-prosperity sphere. Hattori Takushirô, the Imperial Headquarters Army Department Operation Head, stated that the former purpose was fundamental, and the latter issue was merely incidental. “Permanent retention” was necessary, but the political effort, excluding labour management, would depend on the navy’s ability.

Second, the navy’s notion of “organic” was still implied in the government’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideology that Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yôsuke proclaimed in September 1940. The slogan hakkô ichiâ, literally “the whole world spreading toward eight directions under one roof”, exactly described, it was believed, the Asian race’s worldview that the navy should achieve by “organic integration”. Another slogan, “onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru” (to enable all nations to find their proper place in the world) also characterised the navy’s idea of “logical relationship” with the southern people, based on the notion of “organic difference.”

When the force of arms was added to national ideology, everything changed. The original idea of “organic” had imagined a space where each race’s kinetic energy could generate motion, and each relationship would freely evolve into unity. Instead of that rather mystical process, the navy’s new “organic situation” imagined Japan as the focal point of a circle: at the centre of this circle was statism, with other peoples gathered into their proper place by the navy’s force. How to maximise this centripetal force in the occupied areas depended on the skill of each minseibu.
As may be recalled, the strategy first excluded the U.S. military and absorbed the Chamorros, with the Guam Minseibu navy chief interpreting navy orders for the civilians. Next, the Minseibu sorted out the diverse peoples according to their status to serve as a reserve army of labour. Third, with Nan'yō Kōhatsu’s help, the Minseibu mobilised the people to economic activities for military self-sufficiency. Fourth, teachers taught Japanese language and culture, to confirm Chamorros psychologically in their new condition. The Minseibu policies pulled them into the orbit of the Japanese military, nation and state, in the direction of the core. Contrary to this movement, Japan’s national sphere was understood as having an unlimited capacity for expansion, after absorbing the people’s energy. This systematic and skilful method was successful to a degree, but the navy ultimately could not accommodate the Chamorro mentality to its core — Japan’s national body, with the Emperor as its centre.

Unlike navy officers, the Chamorros saw no reason to accept the Imperial Way, however “logical” or “organic”. Guam was declared to be part of Japan’s permanent territory, but the Imperial Constitution was not applied and the laws did not protect the Chamorros. They were called new Japanese nationals, but they were not treated as Japanese. Rather their duties were heavier than those of real Japanese. Equality under the Emperor (isshi dōjin) was, in reality, unequal exploitation. The navy failed to transform its idealism into policies even through it had what it believed was an ideal instrument, the Minseibu.

Whether or not the navy recognised this, the “one” of the navy’s worldview based on “organic integration” was really the concentric circle of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. “Hakkō ichiu” would spread the Imperial favour to Asian peoples while the navy’s “one” expected their service in return. Balanced unification was the navy’s ultimate idea. The navy originally used the biological term, “organic”, as a political term. Once it used military power, however, this was replaced by the dynamic principle — the logic of rule. The meaning of terms shifted, subtly but significantly, to “organic coexistence and co-prosperity”, “organic links”, “organic relationship” and “organic unification”.
Glossary

1. Basic Principles for the Establishment of the Greater East Asia (Daitōa kensetsu no kihon kōryō), 1943.
2. Central Agreement between Army and Navy on the Military Administration of Occupied Areas (Senryōchi gunsei jisshi ni kansuru riku-kaigun chūō kyōtei), 26 November 1941.
4. Civil Administration Department (Minseibu).
5. Civil Administrator (Shiseikan).
6. Concord Society (Kyōwakai).
7. Copra Trade Confederation (Kopura Dōgyōsha Rengōkai).
10. Defend the north and expand to the south (Hokushu nanshin).
12. Deputy District Chief (Joyaku).
13. Director of Civil Administration (Shisei chōkan).
14. District Chief (Kuchō).
17. 5th Base Force (Dai-go Konkyōchitai), Saipan.
18. 5th Naval Construction and Service Department Ōmiya (Guam) Sub-branch (Daigo Kensetsubu Ōmiya shibu).
19. 54th Naval Guard Unit (Dai-gojūyō Neibū), Guam.
20. First Committee for the Study and Research of Naval Policy and Systems (Kaigun Seisaku Oyobi Seido Kenkyū Chōsa linkai).
22. Fundamentals of National Policy (Kokusaku no kijun), Five Ministers’ Conference, August 1936.
23. General Plan for National Policy (Kokusaku yōkō), around April 1936.
26. Governor-General of Taiwan (Taiwan Sōtoku).
27. Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (Daitōa Kyōeihen).
28. Greater East Asia Ministry (Daitōashō).
29. Greater Japan Ladies’ Patriotic Society Ōmiyajima (Guam) Branch (Ōmiyajima Dainihon Fujinkai).
30. Guiding Principle in Wartime Activities (Senji katsudō hōshin), 1943.
31. Hainan Bureau (Kainanchō).
32. Hakkō ichiu (Universal concord)
33. Hamrinkan (appointed by government ministers or governors).
34. Imperial Council (Gozen Kaigi).
35. Imperial Rescript of War Proclamation (Kaisen chokuyu), 8 December 1941.
36. Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai).
37. Imperial Way (Kōdō).
38. Inner South Seas of Japan (Uchi Nan’yō).
39. Inspectorate of Military Administrations (Gunsei Kanbu).
40. Instructional Policy for Occupied Area in Greater East Asia (Daito senryō chitai no shidō hōshin). 1943.
42. Investigation Board for Tropical Industries (Nettai sangyō chōsakai).
43. Investigative Committee for Development of the South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Guntó kaihatsu chōsa iinkai).
45. Kōtōkan (senior officers above hanninkan rank. Kōtōkan rank consists of shinminkan [the Emperor’s direct appointment], chokuninkan [1st to 2nd classes of Kōtōkan, appointed by the Emperor’s order], and sōninkan [nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the Emperor’s decision]).
46. Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government (Daihō’ei seifu renraku kaigō).
47. Mariana District Group (Mariana Shūdan).
50. Nan’yō Kōhatsu Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Development Company).
51. Nan’yō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Colonisation Company).
52. National defence sphere absolutely to be kept (Zettai kokuboken).
53. National Language Council (Kokugo Taisaku Kyōgikai).
55. Naval Civil Engineering Department (Kaigun Shisetsubu).
56. Naval Construction and Service Department (Kaigun Kensetsubu).
57. Naval Construction Battalion (Setsueitai).
58. Navy Crop Cultivation Unit (Kaikontai).
59. Naval General Staff (Gunreibu).
60. New Guinea Civil Government (Nyūginia Minsei).n
61. Onoono sono tokoro o eseshimuru (To enable all nations to find each their proper place in the world).
62. Order for Guaranty of Civil Services (Bunkan mibun hoshō rei).
63. Order for Labour Coordination (Rōmu chōsei rei), 1941.
64. Order for Labour Notebook (Rōmu techō rei), 1942.
65. Order for National Labour Services Cooperation (Kokumin kinrō hōkoku kyōryoku rei), 1941.
66. Order of Specially Established Naval Construction and Service Department (Tokusetsu kaigun kensetsubu rei), Navy Internal Order No. 2180, 25 November 1942.
67. Organic Integration (Yūkiteki ketsugō).
68. Outer South Seas (Omote Nan’yō or Soto Nan’yō).
69. Outline for Administration in the Occupied Areas (Daihachi konkyo-chitai senryō-cho gyōsei jisshi yōkō), 10 March 1942.
70. Outline for Economic Policies for the Southern Areas (Nanpō keizai taisaku yōkō), 12 December 1941.
71. Outline for Enlargement of Production Capacity (Seisanryoku kakuju keikaku yōkō), December 1938.
72. Outline for dealing with the situation according to transition of the world condition (Sekai jōsei no suī ni tomonau jikyoku shori yōkō), Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government, July 1940.
73. Outline for Improvement of the Political and Administrative Structure (Seiji gyōsei kikō kaizen yōkō), 17 September 1936.
74. Outline for the Conduct of Military Administration in Occupied Areas (Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō), 14 March 1942.
75. Outline of Basic National Policy" (Kihon kokusaku yōkō), July 1940.
76. Outline of Emergency Countermeasures for Wartime (Nan'yō Guntō senji hijō sochi yōkō), April 1944.
77. Outline of Food Policies for the South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Guntō shokuryō taisaku yōkō), 10 August 1943.
78. Outline of Industrial Reorganisation Plan (Nan’yō Guntō sangyō seibi keikaku yōkō), August 1943.
79. Outline of Urgent Countermeasures for Supplementing Munitions Provisions in the South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Guntō gunju shokuryō kinkyū taisaku yōkō), February 1944.
80. Outline on the Conduct of Military Administration (Senryōchi gunsei shori yōkō), Confidential Secretariat paper No. 3167, Ministry of the Navy, 14 March 1942.
81. Planning Board (Kikakuin).
82. Policy Study Committee for the South Seas Area (Tai nan’yō hōsaku kenkyū iinkai or Tainankan).
83. Principles Accomplishing Imperial Policy (Teikoku kokusaku suikō yōryō), 5 November 1941.
84. Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas (Nanpō senryōchi gyōsei jisshi yōryō), adopted at the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government, 20 November 1941.
85. Proposal to the Emperor for Structure of Navy Civil Administration Departments in the Southern Occupied Areas (Nanpō senryōchi minseibu kikō ni kansuru ken geisai), 9 January 1942.
86. Rear of Japan’s South Seas (Ura Nan’yō).
87. Regulations Concerning Navy Civil Administration Department (Kaigun minseibu kitei), 1 January 1942. Ministry of the Navy.
88. Regulations for Elementary Schools in the South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Guntō shōgakkō kisoku), 1915.
89. Rules for Native Officials in the South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Guntō tōmin sonri kitei), 1922.
90. Rules on Taxes for Local Expenditures in the South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Guntō tōmin jintōzei kisoku), 18 July 1922.
91. Second Generations Society (Dai Niseikai).
92. Section (Ka 課).
93. Secretariat of the South (Nanpō jimukyoku), the Greater East Asia Ministry.
94. Sōnin kan (3rd to 9th classes of kōtōkan rank officer in the Japanese government)
95. South Sea Islands (Nan’yō Guntō).
96. South Seas Bureau (Nan’yōchō).
98. South Seas Development Company (Nan’yō Kōhatsu Kabushiki Kaisha).
100. South Seas Trading Company (Nan’yō Bōeki Kabushiki Kaisha).
101. Southwest District Fleet Civil Government (Nansei hōmen kantai kaigun minseifu).
102. Staff of the Guam Minseibu (*Guamu minseibu shokuinhyō*), 10 March 1942, the Navy Ministry.
103. Stratified Order (*Kaisōteki chitsujo*).
104. Sub-section (*Ka* 科).
105. Table of Civil Administration Department Staff Positions (*Senryōchi minseibu yōin haichihyō*), 30 December 1941, Ministry of the Navy.
106. Taiwan Colonisation Company (*Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha*).
108. Village Headman (*Sonchō*).
109. War Guidance Office in the Imperial Headquarters Army Department (*Daihon'ei rikugun sensō shidō han*).
110. Young Men’s Association (*Seinendan*).
Appendix
### [Appendix 1] Engineering Works in the South Sea Islands

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- **DP** = Drying Place for Agriculture and Fisheries (South Seas Bureau)
- **EL** = Emergency Landing Place for Seaplane (South Seas Bureau)
- **S** = Storage for Coal, Lubricating Oil or Other Kind of Oil (South Seas Bureau)
- **WT** = Wireless Telecommunication (South Seas Bureau)
- **DA** = Dredging for Anchorage (Japanese Navy)
- **OT** = Oil Tank (Japanese Navy)
- **SP** = Seaplane Base (Japanese Navy)
- **LP** = Land Plane Base (Japanese Navy)
- **AA** = Anti-Aircraft Battery (Japanese Navy)
- **FTG** = Flat Trajectory Gun (Japanese Navy)
- **RDF** = RDF Station (Japanese Navy)
- **Date** = Construction began.
## [Appendix 2] Air Bases in the South Sea Islands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Base</th>
<th>Land Plane or Seaplane</th>
<th>Construction Completed before 8 Dec. 1941</th>
<th>Under Construction on 8 Dec. 1941</th>
<th>Length of Runway</th>
<th>Type of Plane</th>
<th>Other Data</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pagan</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1933-1933</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000 m</td>
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<td>Expanded in 1937, Completed in 1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aslito (Salpan)</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1933-1933</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000 m</td>
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<td>Expanded in 1937, Completed in 1940</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saduk Tashi (Salpan)</td>
<td>EL</td>
<td>1934-1935</td>
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<td>LAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hagoi (Tinian)</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>1938-1940</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peleliu</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>June 1937 - Fall 1939</td>
<td></td>
<td>1200 m</td>
<td>LAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arakabesang (Palau)</td>
<td>EL</td>
<td>1934-1935</td>
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<td>Meyuns (Palau)</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1941-1942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LAP</td>
<td>Expanded in 1927, Completed in 1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yap</td>
<td>EL</td>
<td>1934-1935</td>
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<td>LAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takeshima (Truk)</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1934 - Spring 1937 (Fighter)</td>
<td>Jan. 1940 (LAP)</td>
<td>1,200 m</td>
<td>LA, LAP</td>
<td>Expanded in 1927, Completed in 1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harushima (Truk)</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Oct. 1931 - Jan. 1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harushima (Moen, Truk)</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Spring 1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natsujima (Dubson, Truk)</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>? - Oct. 1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nanpohnmai (Ponape)</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Oct. 1938 - Jan. 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td>700 m</td>
<td>LA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Langar (Ponape)</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1938-1942</td>
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<td>Mortolock</td>
<td>SP</td>
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<td>Namorick</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>? - 1939</td>
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<td>Kosrae</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>1939 Discontinued</td>
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<td>Dec. 1942 Resumed</td>
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<td>Kosrae</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1939 Discontinued</td>
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<td>Dec. 1942 Resumed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ruot (Kwajalein)</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Fall 1939 - April 1941</td>
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<td>Ebeye (Kwajalein)</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1939? - 1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maloelap (Taros)</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Fall 1939 - March 1941</td>
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<td>1,500 m 1,300 m</td>
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<td>Wotje</td>
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<td>Wotje</td>
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<td>May 1939 - Sep. 1941</td>
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<td>Imidji (Jaluit)</td>
<td>SP</td>
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<td>Mill</td>
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<td>Spring 1941 - Aug. 1942</td>
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<td>LAP</td>
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<td>Eniwetok</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1941? - 1942</td>
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<td>Majuro</td>
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Based on Bōeichō Bōei Keshūjō Senshish histósu, Senshishósō: Chûō Taihei yó hömen kaigun sakusen
DP = Drying Place for Agriculture and Fisheries
EL = Emergency Landing Place for Seaplane
LAP = Land Attack Plane

SP = Seaplane Base
LP = Land Plane Base
LA = Light Airplane
[Appendix 3] The Imperial Rescript on Education

“Know ye, our subjects; Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. His is the glory of the fundamental character of our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, to be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coequal with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.” (October 30, 1890).

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