Chapter 5. The Maricopa and Hua desiderative morphemes are each subject to various syntactic and other constraints, as outlined above.

If it is generally true that morphological desideratives are subject to more constraints on their use than independent lexemes are, this would not be unexpected. In general, bound morphemes are more tightly constrained, both syntactically and semantically, than free morphemes. Crosslinguistic typological studies of causative constructions, for example, have found that the more morphologically bonded a causative morpheme is to the verb, the tighter are the semantic constraints on the construction. Bound morphemes are the most tightly constrained, verbal auxiliaries less so, and serial verb constructions have the fewest constraints. A similar pattern may be found in the case of desiderative constructions.

The operation of constraints like these probably originates from at least two sources. The first is syntactic. Where a desiderative morpheme is tightly bound to the verb denoting the desired action or outcome, the argument structure of that verb dominates the construction, and determines to some extent the interpretation of the desiderative. For example, in examples like the ones above from Hua and Kayardild, the agent of the desiderative-marked verb is also the person to whom the desire is attributed. The argument structure of the main verbs 'eat', 'dance' in these constructions has a strong influence in determining to whom the desiderative refers.

However, in the Maricopa example (11), the agent of the main verb 'help' is not the same as the person who wants this action. The 'wanter' in this case is the speaker. This provides an illustration of the interaction between syntactic structure and a second factor, pragmatics. A desiderative morpheme bound to a verb cannot have a separate syntactic argument structure of its own; but the extralinguistic reality is that human beings have more direct access to their own desires than to those of other people. Therefore, from the standpoint of pragmatics, the speaker is in many cases just as likely, if not more so, to be the one who wants the action named by the desiderative-marked verb to be performed.

Even on the basis of such a small number of morphological desideratives, a possible hierarchy of grammaticalisation may be observable. Desideratives that are bound morphemes may be viewed as more grammaticalised than those that are free morphemes. In languages where morphological desideratives are used in some but not all types of desiderative situation, then some types of desiderative may be considered
'privileged' in the sense of being more grammaticalised than others. If any type of desiderative is morphologically privileged over others, the bases of such privilege are likely to be (a) directness of experience (speaking of one's own desires vs. those of other people), and (b) directness of relationship between desire and outcome (desiring actions by oneself vs. actions by others). Such a hierarchy could explain the restrictions on the Hua desiderative verbal forms, and the need for a different construction type (e.g. the quotation-like constructions mentioned above) to speak of wanting by other persons in Hua and Maricopa; this question is pursued in 6.5 below.

A discussion of morphological desideratives should take into account other morphemes that are involved in the expression of desiderative meanings. For example, verbal complements of the Arrernte verb *ahentyeneme* 'want' are marked with the purposive inflection *-tyeke*. Sometimes this morpheme is used on its own with a desiderative meaning. Indeed, the purposive-marked verb form in (16a) effectively means the same as the longer version (16b), and is probably more common in everyday speech:

(16) a. *Ayenge lheteyeke*.  
1s go-PURP

b. *Ayenge ahentyeneme lheteyeke*.  
1s want go-PURP

'I want to go.'

The dative case inflection *-ke* marks a noun in the construction with *ahentyeneme*, as in (5) above, but even in the absence of the desiderative verb, *-ke* can still indicate that someone wants the thing it marks:

(17) *Ampe yanhe merneke artneme*.  
child that food-DAT cry

'That child is crying for food.' [i.e. because she wants food]

To give a rather different example, the Spanish verb *querer* 'want' can be followed by an infinitive or a subjunctive verb form, as in (2) above. However, subjunctive forms occasionally occur by themselves, conveying a desiderative meaning. In the following example there is no desiderative
verb, but it is still clear that the speaker is expressing a desire for the event to take place:

(18) ¡Mueran los traídores!
die-3psJV the traitors
‘Death to the traitors!’

If the corresponding indicative form (mueren ‘die-3p’) were substituted for the subjunctive in this example, the meaning would be ‘the traitors die/are dying’, with no reference to whether anyone wants them to. Therefore the desiderative element in the meaning of (18) is contributed by the subjunctive form itself. Infinitive forms can also be used by themselves with desiderative implications: in sentences like To open the door, pull the handle the English infinitive form to open implies ‘if you want to open ...’. The Spanish equivalent para abrir la puerta ‘to open the door’ also has the infinitive form of abrir ‘to open’, preceded by the preposition para ‘for’.

A number of other morphological devices found in various languages have meanings related to wanting. For example, many Australian languages have an aversive suffix, like the Arrernte -ketye, marking things that are not wanted or that someone wants to avoid:

steady-RDP-INCH-PURP fall-AVER / hole-AVER
‘Go carefully so as not to fall/to avoid the potholes.’

Optatives, hortatives and jussives are also used in situations that involve wanting, in combination with other elements of meaning such as saying something to someone.

From this brief survey of morphological desideratives, two general observations may be made. One is that, while most languages have independent lexical desideratives, some languages have morphological desideratives in addition to these, and a few languages may have morphological markers rather than independent words as their principal means of expressing desiderative meanings. The second is that, even in languages that do not have desiderative morphemes as such, an examination of desiderative expressions may need to include some consideration of other morphological markers that are involved in
expressing desiderative meanings. Clearly, desiderative notions are grammaticalised to different degrees and in different ways by individual languages; the extent and nature of such grammaticalisation is considered further in subsequent chapters.

2.3 Desideratives and lexical relations

Every language investigated in the course of this study was found to have more than one desiderative term. Even in cases like those mentioned above, where a desiderative morphological marker is strictly limited in its range of use, there are other terms that can also be used in referring to wanting, as for example a construction involving the verb 'say' in Hua can be used to refer to wanting by a third person or in the past, where the morphological desideratives are not used.

In examining the sets of desiderative terms in different languages, it quickly becomes apparent that each language has its own way of dividing up the semantic field of desiderative notions. Even between very closely related languages, the correspondences among desiderative terms are not one-to-one equivalents. The contrast in English between the everyday verb want and the somewhat more formal-sounding verb desire seems to have parallels in several languages, for example Spanish querer and desear, or French vouloir and désirer. But language learners soon discover that these are not exact equivalents, and that to be a competent speaker of Spanish or French one must master the subtle distinctions of each language; that for example, the distinction in Spanish between Quiero ir al centro 'I want to go downtown' and the less specific Deseo viajar mucho 'I want to travel a lot' does not have exact parallels in English or French (I desire to travel a lot and Je désire voyager beaucoup both sound awkward).

A closer look at the relationships between the meanings of desiderative terms in languages reveals a variety of patterns. These patterns are interesting for the light they can shed on the nature of lexical relations and the division of semantic space, and on the different patterns of usage found in different languages. They also have implications for the understanding of sources and directions of semantic change, and the search for common, possibly universal, patterns of meaning among
languages. The rest of this chapter outlines some of the patterns of lexical relations that were found in this study.

In this discussion, morphological desiderative markers as well as independent words are treated as having specifiable semantic content; both the semantic content and the grammatical properties of such morphemes are examined in some depth. If languages can have desiderative expressions based on independent words (like Spanish querer), on morphological markers (like Maricopa -lya), or on both (like Japanese hoshii and -tai), then the morphological markers can be viewed as having meanings similar in many ways to the meanings of the lexical items. In the English expression I want to go, the desiderative meaning is contributed by the lexeme want, while in the Japanese translation waalshi wa iki-tai a very similar meaning is contributed by the suffix -tai. For this reason, bound morphemes like -tai are treated here as meaning-bearing units of language, while of course their grammatical status must be considered as well. Each desiderative element, whether morphologically independent or not, has particular grammatical properties and participates in construction types according to the grammar of the language in which it occurs.

2.4 Body part desideratives: metaphor or polysemy?

Desiderative expressions in Arrernte, involving ahentye(neme) 'want' and purposive constructions, were shown in (16)-(17) above. Arrernte is one of several languages whose desiderative terms are closely linked, etymologically at least, with a body part term: in Arrernte, ahentye also means 'throat'. Cases like this raise an important question about the lexical relations of these words: does a word like ahentye really have two meanings, 'throat' and 'want', or is one a metaphorical extension of the other? In other words, does Arrernte really have a word for 'want', or just a metaphorical expression based on 'throat'?

There are plausible associations between wanting and various parts of the body, that seem to support the view that metaphor is operating here. Arrernte speakers have traditionally viewed the throat as to some extent the seat of desire, associating the experience of wanting with a physical sensation in the throat (perhaps a little like the 'lump in the throat' associated in English with longing for home and loved ones). Some
languages have desiderative words that can also mean ‘eye’, suggesting desire based on visual attraction, or words that can also mean ‘insides’ or ‘guts’, suggesting links with hunger or ‘gut feelings’ of desire.

However, there is other evidence suggesting that these cases may involve more than metaphor, and that separate meanings may be distinguishable on formal criteria. This is an issue of theoretical importance, bearing both upon whether it is possible to draw a formal distinction between metaphor and polysemy, and whether in such a case the concept of wanting is represented lexically, or only metaphorically. A close examination of the Arrernte case will demonstrate principles and methods that can be applied to similar questions in other languages.

*Ahentye* is a nominal. Depending on the context in which it occurs, it is usually translated into English as either (a) ‘throat’ or (b) ‘want’ or ‘desire’. In the first instance it is used like other body part nominals:

(20) *Ampe kweke ahentye-ke-arle merne mwene-lhe-ke.*
    chiiJ small throat-DAT-FOC food stick-REFL-PC
    ‘The child has some food stuck in her throat.’

When referring to wanting, *ahentye* can occur with or without the verbal elements *-irre-* ‘inchoative’ or *ne-* ‘be/sit’ (existential-positional verb). The complement, the object of desire, is marked dative if a noun, and purposive if a verb, for example:

(21) a. *Re kere-ke ahentye-ne-me.*
    3sNOM meat-DAT want-be-NPP
    ‘She wants meat.’

b. *Re lhe-tyeke ahentye-ne-ke.*
    3sNOM go-PURP want-be-PC
    ‘She wanted to go.’

c. *Re ahentye-ne-ke Kwementyaye lhe-tyeke.*
    3sNOM want-be-PC K(NOM) go-PURP
    ‘She wanted Kwementyaye to go.’

The complement can occur before or after *ahentye*; the alternative orderings are equivalent to the above examples: *Re ahentyeneme kereke*
is equivalent to (21a), and so on. The only real ordering constraint is that a
dependent subject must occur after the main clause subject, as in (21c).
Since both re and Kwementyaye are grammatically in intransitive subject
(or nominative) form, ordering is the only way of distinguishing the main
from the dependent subject.

There are several ways in which the body part and the desiderative
senses of ahentye display different syntactic behaviour. Ahentye ‘want’
must have a dative or purposive complement, as in the above examples,
while ahentye ‘throat’ cannot occur in such a construction. In the
following example, ahentye can only mean ‘want’ and not ‘throat’:

(22) Re ahentye-kwene ye arikwe-tyeke.
3sNOM want-NomNEG eat-PURP
‘She doesn’t want to eat.’ (‘She doesn’t have a throat to eat with.’)

Where no complement is present, ahentye must mean ‘throat’.

(23) Re ahentye-kwene ye.
3sNOM throat-NomNEG
‘She doesn’t have a throat.’ (‘She doesn’t have a want/desire.’)

If the object of desire is unknown, a grammatical complement must still be
present:

(24) a. Ampe iwenhe-ke-pe ke ahentye-ne-me.
child what-DAT-maybe want-be-NPP
‘The child wants something.’

b. *Ampe (ø) ahentye-ne-me.
child want-be-NPP
‘The child wants (something).’

The only exception to this would be in rare cases where a dative or
purposive complement could be understood from the context. For
example, if a child refuses a proffered morsel of food, one could say the
following, with or without the complement NP:
(25) \textit{Re} (\textit{nhenhe ikwere}) \textit{ahentye-kwenye}.
\begin{flushright}
3sNOM (this 3sDAT) want-NomNEG
\end{flushright}
‘She doesn’t want it.’

\textit{Ahentye} ‘throat’, like other body part terms, can occur in the part-whole (inalienable possession) construction as in (26a), or with a possessive (genitive) marked owner, as in (26b):

(26) a. \textit{Ampe ahentye kwarme-me}.
\begin{flushright}
child throat ache-NPP
\end{flushright}

b. \textit{Ampe-kenhe ahentye kwarme-me}.
\begin{flushright}
child-POSS throat ache-NPP
\end{flushright}
‘The child’s throat is aching.’

\textit{Ahentye} cannot mean ‘want’ here because there is no dative or purposive complement. \textit{Ahentye} ‘want’ seems also to require a preceding NP, while \textit{ahentye} ‘throat’ does not. Where there is no mention of a ‘wanter’, the interpretation can only be ‘throat’.

(27) \textit{Ahentye re kngerre nthurre}.
\begin{flushright}
throat 3sNOM big very
\end{flushright}
‘The throat/*desire is very big.’

\textit{Ahentye} ‘throat’ behaves like other body part nominals, but \textit{ahentye} ‘want’ behaves more like a predicate nominal. In part-whole constructions like (26a), the whole and the part can be separated by modifiers, as in the following example where ‘child’ and ‘throat’ are separately modified, by ‘small’ and by a definitising resumptive pronoun respectively:

(28) \textit{Arelhe-le ampe kweke ahentye renhe are-ke}.
\begin{flushright}
woman-ERG child small throat 3sACC see-PC
\end{flushright}
‘The woman looked at the small child’s throat.’

The whole and part can be separated by other constituents, but they cannot be separated by a verb of which they are the subject:
(29) *Ampe kweke arelhe-le are-ke ahentye renhe.
  child small woman-ERG see-PC throat 3sACC
  ‘The woman looked at the small child’s throat.’

(30) Ampe ahentye kwarne-me. / *Ampe kwarne-me ahentye.
  child throat ache-NPP / child ache-NPP throat
  ‘The child’s throat is aching.’

The same applies to other body part nominals, such as kaperte ‘head’ or ingke ‘foot’.

On the other hand, ahentye ‘want’ can be quite freely separated from the ‘wanter’ NP, as in several of the above examples as well as the following:

(31) Ampe unte ikwere merne nthetye ahentye.
  child 2sNOM 3sDAT food give-?URP want
  ‘The child wants you to give her some food.’

In this respect ahentye ‘want’ behaves like other predicate nominals, such as ‘thirsty’ or ‘afraid’, which can be freely separated from their subject NP:

(32) Ampe kwatyke-ke ngkethekwe.
  child water-DAT thirsty
  ‘The child is thirsty for water.’

(33) Ampe kngwelye-le (renhe) uthne-ketye ater-irre-me.
  child dog-ERG 3sACC bite-AVER afraid-INCH-NPP
  ‘The child is afraid the dog will bite her.’

Like other predicate nominals, ahentye ‘want’ can take the inchoative derivational affix -irre-, while ahentye ‘throat’ cannot. The following example, with -irre-, is very similar in meaning to (21a) above:

(34) Re kere-ke ahentye-irre-me.
  3sNOM meat-DAT want-INCH-NPP
  ‘She wants meat.’
The -irre- affix often occurs with nominals that denote some quality or characteristic, like akngerre 'big', akngerre-irre-me 'getting big, growing'; ankwe 'sleep', ankwe-irre-me 'getting sleepy'. It can sometimes occur with other nominal types; for example the process of becoming a man (artwe) through initiation is termed artwe-irre-me 'becoming a man'. However, ahentye 'throat' is not used in this way: though perhaps marginally possible grammatically, it is hard to imagine a context in which people would speak of something 'becoming a throat' (ahentye-irre-me); and even then, such a construction would probably be blocked by the existence of the desiderative ahentyireme. Thus, only ahentye 'want' occurs with -irre-, and then only with a dative or purposive complement, as in (34) above.

The affix -irre- is seen in other emotion terms, for example ahelhe-irre- 'angry' and ingkerte-irre- 'jealous'. Although 'inchoative' is the accepted grammatical label for this affix and its equivalents in many other Australian Aboriginal languages, its meaning is not always equivalent to 'become', and this is particular'y evident in emotion contexts. In the case of ahelhe 'angry', the verbal element -irre- is obligatory in the predicative construction, but a 'become' reading is not obligatory. Thus, the following example is ambiguous:

(35) Artwe ahelhe-irre-ke.
    man angry-INCH-PC
    a. 'The man got angry.'
    b. 'The man was angry.'

In the case of ahentye 'want', then, it should not be assumed that -irre- contributes an inchoative meaning, and that example (34) above really means something like 'she is becoming desirous for meat'. The usual interpretation of (34) is simply 'she wants meat', and the optional -irre- provides a verbal stem to which tense marking can be attached.

The other verbal element often found with ahentye is ne-, as seen in examples (21) and (24). As a free verb, ne- usually means 'sit', but it can also serve as a copula, meaning 'be somewhere', for example:

(36) Ampe ulpaye-le ne-ke.
    child creekbed-LOC sit-PC
    'The child sat in the creekbed.'
(37) Yaye Alkwerte-le ne-ke.
   e.sister Alcoota-LOC be-PC
   'My elder sister was at Alcoota.'

As a copula, ne- can also occur without a locative marker, though in Arrernte a copula is not obligatory; for example:

(38) a. Arne untyeye nhenhe.
    tree corkwood this

b. Arne nhenhe untyeye ne-me.
    tree this corkwood be-NPP
    'This is a corkwood tree.'

Ne- can occur with either ahentye 'throat' or ahentye 'want'. But in such constructions, 'throat' can still be distinguished from 'want' by the presence of a complement with the latter, as in the following examples (according to Arrernte writing conventions ne- is shown as separate from ahentye in the former case and connected to it in the latter):

(39) Arle akweke nhenhe ahentye ne-me.
    hole small this throat be-NPP
    'This little hole is the throat (*desire).'

(40) Ampe akweke nhenhe ahentye -ne-me kere-ke.
    child small this want be-NPP meat-DAT
    'This little child wants (*is throat for) meat.'

Like -irre-, ne- takes a tense marker. A sentence like (38a), without a copula, contains no reference to time. Tenseless clauses like this are usually interpreted as referring to the present for pragmatic reasons, but there is no linguistic indicator of present tense; in narratives, the time reference of tenseless clauses is dictated by the discourse context. Thus (38a) and (38b) are not fully synonymous, as (38b) contains a reference to present time that is absent from (38a). Similarly, ahentye-ne- 'want' contains a reference to some time, which is absent from unsuffixed ahentye. As ahentye 'want' is a nominal, the only way it can be specifically located in time is by adding one or the other of these verbal elements.
It is possible, then, to distinguish between ahentye ‘throat’ and ahentye ‘want’ on the basis of the differences in syntactic behaviour outlined above. No contexts were found in which it would be ambiguous, or difficult to tell whether ahentye referred to the body part or to wanting. To maintain that ahentye ‘want’ is still a metaphorical extension of ‘throat’, one would have to say that ahentye in a dative or purposive construction means something like ‘X’s throat is for Y’; that is, that examples (21a) and (21b) mean ‘Her throat is for meat’, and ‘Her throat was to go’. Such an interpretation may appear plausible, and somewhat analogous to English sentences like those below, where the body part term ‘eye’ is used metaphorically in referring to something that someone wants or would like:

(41) a. The Devil already controls Chicago, and ... has his eye on New York.

b. I only have eyes for you.

Definitions of the English expressions have eyes for and have an eye on would probably include some reference to wanting. This poses no problem in English, where the verb want is available along with other elements that can be used in defining more complex words and expressions. But the Arrernte desiderative constructions with ahentye could not be similarly defined (in Arrernte) unless there were some other more basic, non-metaphorical desiderative expression to use in defining the supposedly metaphorical use of ahentye.

One possibility would be to try to define ahentye in terms of the purposive marker -tyeke since the constructions X ahentye V-tyeke and X V-tyeke can mean the same, as in example (16) above. However, -tyeke has a wider range of meaning, and does not refer as unambiguously to wanting as ahentye does. A definition of -tyeke would be incomplete without some reference to wanting (ahentye), but the reverse is not the case: -tyeke is not a part of the meaning of ahentye.

Another view would be that one should recognise both the formal distinction and the metaphorical or conceptual link between ahentye ‘throat’ and ahentye ‘want’. On this view, a definition of ahentye ‘throat’ should include some mention of the fact that the throat can be seen as the seat of desire (ahentye: a part of a person’s body ... when a person wants
something, this person feels something in this part of the body). This may be correct, although it would have to be confirmed that this concept is still associated with *ahentye* ‘throat’ for present-day Arrernte speakers. However, the reverse would not work; a definition of *ahentye* ‘want’ that included a reference to feeling something in the throat would be far too restricted, since the great majority of desiderative uses of *ahentye* do not imply feelings in the throat.

The Arrernte case discussed here raises wider issues about polysemy, definitions, linguistic and cultural associations like those between desire and parts of the body, and their synchronic and diachronic status; these questions are further explored in the light of data from other languages. The important observations to be made from this particular case are two: the usefulness of syntactic evidence in establishing formal criteria for distinguishing between lexical meanings; and the need to be specific in formulating hypotheses about lexical relations. To establish whether or not a metaphorical relation obtains between two meanings, it is necessary to state the form of the hypothesised relation: whether one sense can be defined in terms of the other, or both can be defined in terms of something else.

Another situation that raises similar questions is found in the Austronesian language Mangap-Mbula, where one of the most common desiderative expressions involves the body part term *lele-* ‘insides’. *Lele-* is an inalienable body part noun referring to a person’s or an animal’s insides in general, rather than to specific body parts such as stomach, intestines and so on, for which there are more specific terms. It is frequently used in referring to emotions:

(42) *Nio lele-ng ambai.*

1s insides-1sPOSS good

‘I am happy/contented.’

Some other inalienable body part nouns are also found in emotion expressions, for instance *kete-mmal* ‘angry’, literally ‘liver-fight’, but *lele-* is more productive than the others. Although used for emotional feelings, *lele-* is not used with reference to physical feelings like hunger or tiredness.

When *lele-* is used in reference to wanting, it must obligatorily be followed by either *be* or *pa*. *Be* is the nonfactual complementiser, and
must be used where lele- is followed by a sentential complement, as in (45) below. In cases where the object of wanting is a thing rather than a state of affairs, lele- must be followed by the ‘referent’ preposition pa:

(43) Nio lele-ng pa korong tana.
1s insides-1sPOSS REF thing that
'I want that (thing).'

Pa is one of only two prepositions in Mbula (the other being ki), and it is used with almost all peripheral arguments.

There is thus a clear syntactic difference between lele- meaning ‘inside’ and lele- meaning ‘want’. The ‘want’ use is limited to constructions with be or pa with the appropriate complement. This leads to two possible interpretations of the meaning of the word lele-. Either it has two distinct meanings, ‘inside’ and ‘want’ (and perhaps a third one in ‘emotion’ constructions), or the meaning ‘inside’ must be seen as somehow extended to cover wanting. It should be noted that lele- does not mean simply ‘feel’, as the verb yamaana does:

(44) a. Nio ang-yamaana itu-ng kembele lele-ng
1s 1s-feel REFL-1SPOSS like insides-1sPOSS
ambai som.
good NEG
'I feel that I am unhappy.'

b. Nio ang-yamaana itu-ng kembele mete i-kam yo.
1s 1s-feel REFL-1SPOSS like illness 3s-do/get 1sACC
'I feel that I am sick.'

Many uses of lele- ‘inside’ have nothing to do with wanting; even the emotion expressions with lele- mentioned above do not necessarily involve desire as part of the emotional state. Only the lele-...be/pa constructions denote wanting.

If ‘inside’ do not necessarily involve ‘wanting’, does ‘wanting’ in Mbula necessarily involve one’s inside? Could wanting be viewed as a special feeling in or condition of one’s inside, reflected in the special be/pa constructions, interpreted as something like ‘inside for’?
The situation in Mbula is a little more complex than in Arrernte, because there is another important desiderative construction involving the polysemous verb -so, which can mean ‘say’, ‘want’, or ‘if’. (These meanings can also be distinguished on formal criteria, as shown in 6.5 below.) In its desiderative use, -so is followed by a sentential complement; the nonfactual complementiser be (-mbe) is optional. The two desiderative constructions can be used interchangeably in contexts like the following example, where the (a) and (b) versions mean the same:

(45) a. Nio lele-ng be ang-la ang-re Atai kar ki-ni.
   1s want-1sPOSS NF 1s-go 1s-see Atai village POSS-3s

   1s 1s-want(-NF) 1s-go 1s-see Atai village POSS-3s

‘I want to go see Atai’s village.’

If these two are fully synonymous, then the state of one’s insides is no more a part of the meaning of lele- ‘want’ than of -so ‘want’. There may still be a cultural perception that when one experiences desire, and certain other emotions, one feels something in one’s insides, and this could then be one element in the definition of lele-1 ‘insides’, but it has no part in the meaning of lele-2 ‘want’.

There can be little doubt that in Arrernte and Mbula, the desideratives ahentye and lele- are etymologically related to ahentye ‘throat’ and lele- ‘insides’. Etymology can provide some clues to meaning relationships, but to identify a word’s history with its synchronic lexical meaning is to ignore the constant and living process of language change. There can also be little doubt that metaphor plays an important role in the processes of historical semantic shift that produce etymological relations like these. The human cognitive capacity for metaphor allows people to associate desire with parts of the body, and to lexicalise these associations.

However, in order to have an orderly account of lexical relations within semantic theory, it is necessary to distinguish between metaphor and polysemy; or at least to see if it is possible to develop sound criteria on which such a distinction can be based. The cases discussed in this section provide an illustration of the kinds of empirical evidence that can be used to determine whether it is valid to assign a separate desiderative meaning (synchronously) to a lexeme that also functions as a body part term, rather
than simply assuming that it is being used metaphorically. Some more examples of lexical relations that may be based fully or partially on metaphor are observed in the following section, and the role of metaphor in language change is considered in the final chapter.

2.5 Wanting, feeling, saying and thinking

There is great variety in the semantic scope, the range of meanings encompassed by desiderative terms in different languages. Not only are there lexical relationships linking desideratives with body parts, but also with positive emotions or good feelings; with negative states such as lack and need; with other human activities such as saying and thinking; and with temporal and modal concepts such as futurity and possibility. Examples of these kinds of desiderative expressions illustrate common patterns of lexical relations, and highlight the need for a principled approach to the analysis of meaning in such cases.

A close association between concepts of wanting and liking is seen in many Austronesian languages, as well as in other languages such as Albanian. In Bahasa Indonesia, the verb mau ‘want’ can be followed either by predicatives (46a,b) or nominals (46c):

Ali want work
‘Ali wants to work.’

b. Ali mau tinggi.
Ali want tall
‘Ali wants to be tall.’

c. Ali mau kopi.
Ali want coffee
‘Ali wants coffee.’

However, verbal complements (as in 46a) are far more usual with mau than nominal or adjectival complements. Many speakers view nominal complements like (46c) as infelicitous with mau, and avoid this
construction by replacing mau with suka, a verb whose primary meaning is 'like':

(47) Ali suka kopi.
    Ali like coffee
    'Ali likes/wants coffee.'

A sentence like this can be used in contexts that involve liking but exclude wanting (as in ‘Ali likes coffee but doesn’t want anything to drink right now’); but it can also be used in contexts that clearly refer to wanting rather than liking. For example, (47) would be a normal response to a host asking what the guests want to drink. In this context it clearly indicates what Ali wants on this occasion, not just his general attitude to coffee.

This is a case of lexical association, but it does not mean that in Bahasa Indonesia the concepts ‘want’ and ‘like’ are somehow merged. When suka is used in its desiderative sense, mau ‘want’ can be substituted for it; and when suka refers to liking, mau cannot be substituted for it. This is reflected in dictionary definitions that recognise mau as a second meaning of suka, while defining the principal meaning of suka in terms of perasaan senang hati, essentially ‘good feelings’. Perasaan is a noun derived from rasa ‘feel’, and senang hati is a pleasant state that involves feeling good (baik) because of the absence of anything unpleasant. The meaning of suka, then, shares with the English verb like a core element of meaning referring to feeling, and specifically to feeling something good.

In addition to being a good feeling, suka is a feeling about something specific; it is a verb that takes either a nominal object (as in example 47), or a verbal complement (e.g. Ali suka minum kopi ‘Ali likes to drink coffee’). So its meaning must include, along with feeling something good, some reference to the focus of the good feeling. As with English like, one can suka coffee whether or not one has any right now, but the feeling of liking must be based either on some past experience of or knowledge about coffee, that when called to mind evokes this positive feeling. Hence the representation of meaning for suka is very similar to that proposed in the previous chapter for like:

\[
X \text{suka} \ Y
\]

when X thinks about Y, X feels something good
sometimes X wants to do something because of this
This definition provides a basis for understanding the nature of the lexical relationship between *suka* and *mau*: one is needed to define the other, but not vice versa. The explication of *suka* above suggests that wanting is 'sometimes' but not always involved. The relationship of liking to wanting in human experience is such that, when we like something, we often want it; and when we get what we want, we often feel something good. But these experiential associations do not constitute a basis for suggesting that the meanings of liking and wanting are merged; the two are still quite distinguishable. We may like coffee but not want any just now; or we may find that when we get something we want, we don't like it after all. Such distinctions can be maintained if it is recognised that *mau* plays a part in the definition of *suka*, but not the reverse.

However, it has been argued above that *suka* has another, desiderative sense, apparently synonymous with *mau* and distinguishable from the primary meaning of *suka* both on this basis and on the basis of usage. This use of *suka* may well have arisen partly through its compositional relationship with wanting, as some though not all instances of *suka* include wanting. However, the evidence suggests that the desiderative sense should be recognised as a second meaning, *suka*₂, related to but distinguishable from *suka*₁ defined above:

\[ X \text{ suka}_2 Y = X \text{ mau } Y \]

Additional linguistic evidence supporting such a distinction between *suka*₁ and *suka*₂ includes the fact that the derived form *menyukai* is substitutable for *suka*₁ but not *suka*₂, and the prepositions *(ke)pada and akan* can be used with *suka*₁ but are less acceptable with *suka*₂.

The English verb *like* cannot be used as a synonym of *want*; it is equivalent only to *suka*₁. But it is interesting that the phrase *would like* is often used as a polite or softened way of expressing what one wants in English:

(48)  
a. *Do you* want tea or coffee? -*I want* coffee, please.  
b. *Would you* like tea or coffee? -*I'd like* coffee, please.

In this case it would be quite incorrect to posit a second meaning for *like*, equivalent to *want*; the *would like* construction is considerably more
complex than *suka*₂, as the modal *would* introduces a hypothetical or conditional element. The politeness effect relies precisely upon this element of meaning. In *I'd like coffee*, the modal implies that the evocation of a good feeling (i.e. liking) is dependent upon some other conditions. *Like* retains its primary reference to feeling something good, while the modal *would* makes reference to the conditions evoking this good feeling: in this case a hypothetical event (e.g. ‘if you give me some coffee’) rather than a thought (‘when X thinks of Y’). The effect of this is to shift the emphasis of this utterance away from what the speaker wants, conveying in effect, ‘if you give me some coffee, I’ll feel something good’. The polite effect of an implied conditional (‘if’) is also seen in the use of *please*, derived historically from *if you please* / *if it please you*.

The English *would like* construction is an example of how norms of politeness, and the cultural values underlying them, operate to modify the ways in which people express what they want; this process is explored more thoroughly in Chapter 6. What is important to note at this point is that this is a different type of lexical relation from that of *suka* and *mau*. The desiderative use of *suka* in Bahasa Indonesia is a case of polysemy: in addition to its primary meaning, *suka* has a second meaning, synonymous with *mau*. But the English verb *like* does not have a second meaning in which it is synonymous with *want*. In the *would like* construction, the verb *like* is modified by the modal *would*, but does not become equivalent to *want*. There are desiderative uses of *suka* that exclude reference to liking, as explained above, but there is no use of *would like* that would exclude reference to good feelings arising from a hypothetical event.

Another kind of lexical relation is seen in the desiderative use of *maith* (~*mhaith*) ‘good’ in contemporary Irish. The usual way of expressing wanting in Irish uses *maith* with the conditional form of the copula (the complementiser *a* occurs where the wanted action is by someone other than the wanter):

(49) a. *Ba mhaith liom theacht.*
    be(COND) good with-me come(NZN)
    ‘I want to come.’

    b. *Ba mhaith liom i a theacht.*
    be(COND) good with-me her CZR come(NZN)
    ‘I want her to come.’
The evaluative use of *maith* can be distinguished from the desiderative use on syntactic grounds, in two ways. These are illustrated in the following example, where the copula verb is in the indicative rather than the conditional form, and *maith* is followed by the preposition *do* ‘to’ instead of *le* ‘with’:

(50) *Is maith dhó i a theacht.*
    
be good to-him her CZR come(NZN)

‘It’s good for him that she came.’

The connection between the two concepts is of course intuitively clear, but here again it is important to consider the nature of the lexical relation. Is the desiderative use of *maith* some kind of figurative use of ‘good’; or are concepts of goodness and desire somehow merged in the meaning of *maith*; or does *maith* have two distinct meanings? Questions like these are by no means easy to resolve, as some of the detailed case studies in this work illustrate. In this Irish example, the syntactic evidence weighs heavily in favour of distinguishing two separate meanings. The desiderative use of *maith* is characterised syntactically by the conditional copula (*ba*) and the preposition *le* ‘with’ introducing the pronoun or NP indicating the person who wants something. This can be expressed in terms of a syntactic formula that specifically identifies the desiderative construction: *ba mhaith le X Z ‘X wants Z’.*

The English verb *desire* is often used as a near synonym of *want*, and ‘want’ must certainly be a major element in its definition, but its meaning is more complex than just ‘want’, and probably includes a component having to do with ‘good’. There is more to desiring something than just wanting it; there must also be some basis for considering it desirable. That is, when we desire something, we think something good about it, and feel something because of this. We can desire something that we think of as bad, and something we don’t even want, as someone who has given up smoking still feels the occasional desire for a cigarette. But even in such a case, for the verb *desire* to be used, there must be some positive thought, such as how good it would taste or feel to have just one puff. This thought can cause one to experience at least a momentary wanting, though at the same time one may have other, stronger reasons for not wanting a cigarette.
2.5 Wanting, feeling, saying, thinking

These basic components of the meaning of *desire* can be represented more formally in a definition as follows:

\[ X \text{ desires } Y \]  
X thinks something good about Y  
X feels something towards Y because of this  
because of this X wants to do something to Y

The verb *desire* usually takes a direct object (Y) rather than a verbal complement: *I desire to have a cigarette* sounds awkward or affected if not completely ungrammatical. *Desire* is more commonly used as a noun than as a verb, and in this construction it can take either a nominal complement with the preposition *for*, or a verbal complement: *I had a sudden desire for a cigarette/to have a cigarette.*

Whether in the verb or noun form, *desire* involves thinking as well as wanting; thinking of an evaluative kind. This suggestion is compatible with the register difference between *desire* and *want*. *Desire* is suitable for more formal use because it sounds less emotive, more elevated and cerebral than *want* or *wanting*. These connotations arise not just because of the word’s Latinate origin, but because *desire* really is more thoughtful, less immediate than wanting, and it is based on a kind of reasoning process: wanting something because of thinking something good about it. This is another case of a lexical relation that is compositional in nature. *Desire* can be defined in terms of *want* plus some other elements; but *want* cannot be defined in terms of *desire*.

A circumstantial association of wanting with positive feelings or value judgements may be reflected in a variety of other lexical relations. For example, the Samoan emotion term *fiafia* ‘happy’ obviously has some etymological relation to the desiderative verbal modifier *fia* ‘want’. However, *fiafia* is an independent lexeme that does not have any specifically desiderative use or connotations, and wanting is not a necessary element in its definition. It can be defined in terms of ‘feeling something good’, without reference to *fia* ‘want’; in this case the lexical relation of *fiafia* ‘happy’ and *fia* ‘want’ is not a compositional one. In examining lexical relations it is important to determine whether an apparent association of concepts is purely circumstantial or historical, or whether it plays a part in the synchronic meaning of a lexeme, and if so, how.
2.5 Wanting, feeling, saying, thinking

Similar patterns of lexical relations can be observed in the links between some desiderative expressions and concepts of need or lack. Notions like these are included in the scope of use of desiderative terms in many languages. To give just one example, the Samoan desiderative *fia* 'want' can also be used in contexts where it is probably best translated as 'need':

\[(51)\] \[E \text{ fia } fa'asavili lavalava nei.\]

\[\text{TAM want air clothes these}\]

'These clothes need airing.'

In some varieties of English, it is possible to use the verb *want* in a similar way, particularly with an inanimate subject, as in *His coat wants mending*, or *It wants ten minutes to nine*. These uses of *want* in English (*want*₁, unlike *want*₂, as argued below) can be paraphrased in terms of the verb *need*: 'His coat needs to be mended', or 'Ten more minutes need to go by before it will be nine o'clock'. But in many other languages it is not possible to use desiderative terms at all in this way, and one could only use a term referring specifically to need. In French, for example, it would be nonsensical to use *vouloir* 'want' in contexts like these; instead the *il faut* construction is used with to reference to something that needs to be done (e.g. *il faut aérer le lit* 'The bed needs airing').

If in some languages one word (like *want* or *fia*) can encompass both want and need, does this mean that these languages don't differentiate between the two ideas in the same way as other languages (for example French) do? Are the concepts of wanting and needing somehow merged in the Samoan word *fia* and the English word *want*, so that when one says in English *I want to go*, or the Samoan equivalent *'Ou te fia alu*, there is some overtone or implication of a need to go, that isn't present in the French equivalent *Je veux aller*?

To give this question the attention it deserves, let us take a closer look at the English verb *want*, before returning to the Samoan *fia*. The noun *want* is sometimes used in relation to need or poverty, as in the annual fundraising *Walk Against Want*. The verb *want* is less often used in relation to need or lack, but is still occasionally used in this sense, as in the well-known King James version of Psalm 23: 'The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not *want*'. The more recent NEB retains this use of *want* but uses the noun *nothing* as its direct object: 'The Lord is my shepherd; I
shall want nothing’. Other modern translations and commentaries use the word need instead: the GNB says ‘The Lord is my shepherd; I have everything I need’, and the Lion handbook explains the phrase as meaning that God ‘provides all that his people need’.

Earlier in the history of English, want could refer simply to not having something, as in an example from 1787 cited in OED: ‘We wanted the plague in Scotland, when they had it in England’. In modern English want could not be used in this way; or if this sentence were said today, it would be interpreted as referring to some twisted or masochistic desire for the plague. In the now rare instances where want refers to need or lack, there is usually some syntactic feature distinguishing it from the desiderative use: an inanimate subject (e.g. His coat wants mending; What you said wanted saying; I never saw a place that wanted so much improvement), a dummy subject (It wants ten minutes to nine), the preposition for (He did not want for abilities), no direct object (I shall not want), or a predicative construction (He is wanting in discretion).

If none of these syntactic clues is present, there may be some ambiguity. Consider the following:

(52) I want ten cents for the phone.

The desiderative interpretation is the most likely one, i.e. ‘I want to get ten cents’ or ‘I want someone to give me ten cents’. However, a non-desiderative interpretation is also possible: that I’m ten cents short of what is necessary to make a forty-cent phone call. For this sense, but not for the desiderative one, the be wanting construction could be substituted: I’m wanting ten cents for the phone. (Cf. also Jespersen’s ambiguous examples I wanted a woman to save me; She wants someone to love.)

Does this rather marginal kind of non-desiderative use of want arise simply because of the circumstantial association between needing and wanting? When we need something we often, though not always, experience a desire for it; and when we want something, we sometimes feel that we need it. This can lead to much personal difficulty, and a major focus in psychological counselling is to help people to distinguish between needing and wanting. Semantically, ‘need’ is a fairly complex, conditional concept: a state of affairs in which, if some condition (the need) is not satisfied, something else cannot happen, often with further undesirable consequences. For example, humans need water; if we don’t get it we
cannot stay alive for very long. This kind of conditional structure is thus quite different in nature from the characterisation of desiderative situations developed above.

All of the non-desiderative examples of want mentioned above can be explained in terms of this analysis of the necessitative sense: if I don’t get ten cents, then I can’t make my phone call; if his coat doesn’t get mended, then he can’t keep warm (or look nice); if ten minutes haven’t gone by, then it can’t be six o’clock yet. The first two imply some further bad consequences, but the last does not, so the semantic formula proposed below does not include a component such as ‘this is bad for X’; in this respect it may not be perfectly synonymous with need. This sense of want can be termed want\textsubscript{2} to distinguish it from the desiderative sense, want\textsubscript{1}. The meaning of want\textsubscript{2} can be represented more formally as follows, with CPLT standing for a complement, discussed further in the next chapter:

\[
X \text{want}_{2} \text{ CPLT}
\]

if this [i.e. the CPLT\textsubscript{1} doesn’t happen]
something else can’t happen

Want\textsubscript{1}, the desiderative sense, can be distinguished from this necessitative sense, though there is a strong circumstantial association between the two. If I say I want coffee, or I want you to make me a cup of coffee, it may or may not be that I actually ‘need’ this. It may be that without a cup of coffee I can’t stay awake, or that I need you to make it because I can’t do it myself; but it is equally possible that I simply feel a desire for coffee, without any need whatsoever. In the latter case, it wouldn’t be true to say that ‘if this doesn’t happen, something else can’t happen’.

Thus, it seems possible to identify two distinct senses of want on semantic grounds. This tentative distinction is supported by syntactic evidence: the non-desiderative want\textsubscript{2} is either characterised by or substitutable with the distinctive syntactic patterns described above, while the desiderative want\textsubscript{1} occurs always and only in the syntactic frame X want\textsubscript{1} CPLT, where X is usually animate, and CPLT is either a noun phrase or a to complement.

We are now in a position to observe some similarities and some differences between the English want\textsubscript{2} and the use of the Samoan desiderative fia in examples like (51). In this example, the NP ħāvalava nei
‘these clothes’ is inanimate; and it seems that a conditional notion might be involved (e.g. if these clothes don’t get aired they can’t dry properly, smell nice or some such). But there is a crucial grammatical difference between the English *want* constructions and this *fia* construction in Samoan.

The Samoan construction can be interpreted as having not an inanimate subject, but rather an absent or unspecified one. The NP *lävalava nei* ‘these clothes’, in absolutive case, is the object of *fa’asavili* ‘air’. If an agent NP is inserted, there is no change in the status of *lävalava nei* with respect to the verb phrase. Inserting an agent, *le teine* ‘the girl’, into the original example (53a) produces (53b), in which *fia* cannot be interpreted in any necessitative sense, but only as a desiderative:

(53) a. *E fia fa’asavili lävalava nei.*
    TAM want air clothes these
    ‘These clothes need airing.’

    b. *E fia fa’asavili e le teine lävalava nei.*
    TAM want air ERG the girl clothes these
    ‘The girl wants/*needs to air these clothes.’

In neither (53a) nor (53b) does *fia* refer to the clothes as wanting or needing airing. In both examples it functions as a desiderative, referring to the wishes of the girl in (53b), and to the wishes of an unspecified person in (53a). This fact of Samoan grammar and its implications for the analysis of the meaning of *fia* are explored in detail in the next chapter, on the grammar of desiderative constructions. The point to be noted here is that lexical relations must be analysed on the basis of the structure of each language.

The English *want* and the Samoan *fia* both seem to include a necessitative sense as well as a desiderative sense within their scope of use. However, this similarity in semantic scope is not a basis for assuming that the lexical relations are the same in English and Samoan. An analysis of *want* within the structure of English reveals evidence for two distinct meanings, but when *fia* is analysed within the structure of Samoan, this yields a different result. Similarities in patterns of lexical relations may be observed across languages, but the exact nature of these relations must be analysed on a language-specific basis.
Two other types of lexical association found in a very wide variety of languages are those that link desiderative expressions with the speech act of saying what one wants, and with the concept of future time. Both of these patterns of association can be seen in the semantic scope of the Mandarin Chinese verb yào ‘want’. The primary use of yào is in desiderative expressions like the following:

(54) Wǒ yào hé nǐ yǐqiǐ qù.
     1s want with 2s together go
     ‘I want to go with you.’

However, yào can be interpreted as a speech act verb, leading to an apparent ambiguity in some contexts:

(55) Nǐ yào wǒmen bāng nǐ?
     2s want 1p help 2s
     a. ‘Do you want us to help you?’
     b. ‘Are you asking us to help you?’

This speech act interpretation of yào is limited to interpersonal contexts, that is where someone wants (or requests) someone else to do something. This kind of semantic association is by no means limited to Mandarin; indeed, the OED gives it as a secondary meaning of the English verb desire, citing an example from Sir Walter Scott, ‘He alighted at the ... Convent, and desired to see the Duke’, meaning not that he wanted to see the Duke, but that he said he wanted to see the Duke. In English, too, the speech act use of desire (unfamiliar to many contemporary speakers) is limited to interpersonal contexts. It is not difficult to see how these ideas are associated. If I want to do something myself, usually I just do it; but if I want another person to do something, usually I have to say something to let the other person know what I want. Moreover, it is difficult to know what someone wants someone else to do, unless the desire is expressed in some outward way.

In both the Mandarin and the English examples, some ambiguity is present. Although the speech act interpretation applies only to interpersonal uses of the desiderative, the reverse is not true: an interpersonal use of yào or desire (i.e. X yào Y V or X desires Y to V) may convey either ‘X wants Y to do V’ or ‘X says X wants Y to do V’ (basically,
though desire is more complex than just 'want', as discussed above). In both languages, the ambiguity could be resolved by introducing an overt speech act verb. Thus, if the meaning is 'X says X wants Y to do V', this could be expressed specifically in Mandarin by including the verb shuō 'say': X shuō X yào Y V, or in the case of English desire, X says X desires Y to V. The desiderative use of yào and desire can thus be regarded as basic, and the speech act use as a case of semantic extension.

A different situation is seen in languages where the verb 'say' seems to be an obligatory part of one or more kinds of desiderative construction. This is the situation in Hua, mentioned in 2.1 above, where a third person desiderative (e.g. 'he wants to eat') is usually expressed via a construction with 'say' ('I will eat, he says'). A somewhat similar pattern applies in Maricopa, where either 'say' or 'think' is used when wanting is attributed to someone other than the speaker (example 12 above). Especially in languages with morphological desideratives, 'say' or 'think' may be required as a main verb in some constructions, in order to specify who is the person who wants the desired event to happen. In these cases, the association of ideas may be similar to that underlying the extension of the Mandarin and English desideratives, but the grammatical and semantic consequences are different. The nature of the lexical relation between the desiderative and the speech act expression is not one of optional semantic extension, but in some cases, an obligatory grammatical requirement.

Yet another kind of link between wanting and saying is exemplified by the verb -so in Mangap-Mbula. The desiderative use of this verb was shown in example (45b) above, but there are other contexts in which it means 'say', and still others in which it means 'if'. Here again the lexical relation is not one of semantic extension, because each of these three senses is associated with a distinctive set of syntactic characteristics explained in section 6.4 below. In this case, and in the case of the morphological desideratives, the nature of the lexical relations cannot be determined without a detailed examination of language-specific grammatical constraints. The important issues raised by these constructions, including to what extent they may be regarded as truly desiderative in meaning, are discussed in Chapter 6.

The Mandarin verb yào can also be used in a modal sense, referring to the immediate future, in contexts like the following:
This is one of the most widespread types of lexical association found in this study: in a great many languages, desiderative terms can be used in some contexts to refer to future time; and the future tense markers of many languages have developed historically from desiderative expressions. In some instances, the temporal or modal interpretation of a desiderative term is limited to inanimate subject contexts, as appears to be the case in Mandarin: if yào has a human subject, it refers to what this person wants. But since an inanimate thing is not capable of the human experience of wanting, the way is open for yào to undergo a semantic shift from desiderative to future.

If this temporal use of yào is limited to the inanimate-subject construction, there is no possibility of ambiguity, and yào can be considered to have a second meaning limited to this particular construction type. But many cases are more complex and ambiguous. For example, the English auxiliary will is usually used nowadays with reference to future time, but it has some clearly desiderative uses (e.g. *Come with me, if you will*; or Jespersen’s *You will smoke all day long - and then complain of a sore throat*, and some examples are ambiguous between the two (e.g. *Will you do me a favour?*). Pragmatics plays a part in this; a second-person question like this seeks an answer based on the addressee’s own intentions, while a similar question about a third person (*Will she do me a favour?*) carries no expectation that the addressee has any inside knowledge of the third person’s desires. Intonation can play a major role in distinguishing the desiderative from the temporal use: when will is stressed it is usually desiderative, unless used in a contrastive temporal sense (e.g. *She isn’t here yet, but I think she will come*).

The lexical association between desiderative expressions and markers of future or immediate future time is often a circumstantial one. When someone wants to do something, they quite often do it shortly thereafter; and if we know or see that someone is about to do something, it is often reasonable to assume that they want to do it. Of course this is not always the case, since sometimes we can’t do what we want, and sometimes we do things we don’t want to do. In the case of an inanimate subject it seems reasonable to assume that future time rather than wanting
is relevant (as with _utf in example 56). But it may be necessary to
distinguish between a temporal or other secondary meaning and a
personification.

While an inanimate subject is characteristic of want$_2$ in English (as
in His coat wants mending), it is also true that want$_1$ can be used with an
inanimate subject, for example This drawer doesn't want to open. This is
not the necessitative meaning but a genuinely metaphorical use of want$_1$,
personifying the sticking drawer as wilfully reluctant to open. Will in the
same context (This drawer won't open) is open to a purely temporal
interpretation (...) until you fix the handle), though it can also be a
personification of the drawer as stubbornly refusing to open (...no matter
what I do). While syntactic information is important in analysing lexical
relations, it may not be conclusive in itself.

Desiderative expressions may be associated not only with future
time, but also with modal meanings such as irrealis, possibility or
potential. The 'potential' inflection in Kayardild can be used to refer to
ability or possibility, as well as to wanting or future time (as in example 15
above); it can also be used in a modal sense akin to 'should'. The particle
_la in Buru marks irrealis mood, an event that hasn't happened but has the
potential to happen, as well as being used in desiderative expressions. In
these cases, too, the lexical associations are plausible but not obligatory.
Events that people want are often possible, or as yet unrealised; but these
conditions are not a necessary part of every desiderative situation. The
examples of Kayardild and Buru are explored in the following chapters as
case studies of the complex relationships of desideratives with these other
temporal and modal concepts.

Finally, mention should be made of the lexical associations found in
some languages between desiderative expressions an l thinking. Example
(12) above showed the use of the verb 'think' in Maricopa to attribute
wanting to another person; and the role of thinking in addition to
wanting as a component of the meaning of desire was discussed above.

In quite a few languages, verbs of thinking can themselves be used
in a desiderative sense. For example, the Mandarin verb xiàng 'think' can
be used to refer to wanting, or perhaps more accurately, intention:

(57) Wō xiàng qù kàn wō nāinai.
    1s    think    go    see    1s    grandma
    'I want to go and see my grandma.'
Somewhat similar usages can be observed in many other, unrelated languages. In the following example, the Arrernte verb *itirre-* ‘think’, like the English *think of* construction used in the gloss, may refer to anything from idle contemplation to a firm intention to act:

(58)  *Re akwele itirre-me impe-rlalhe-tyeke.*
     3s INDIR think-NPP leave-GO&DO-PURP
     ‘He’s thinking of leaving.’

Because thinking of doing something often leads to wanting to do it, the interpretation of ‘think’ in these contexts may be extended almost to the point of wanting, as the Mandarin *xiāng* in (57) seems almost synonymous with *yào* ‘want’ in (54). However, any true synonymy between words for wanting and thinking is highly improbable. It would be a complete nonsense to suggest that, in Mandarin, *xiāng* always implies *yào*. Rather, this should probably be analysed as a special construction consisting of *xiāng* plus an action complement, meaning something similar to the English *intend*.

*Intend* is a word that specifically combines elements of thinking and wanting. The definition sketched below reflects the fact that *intend* usually applies to one’s own actions (*X intends to V*); the construction *X intends for Y to V* should be defined separately, though along similar lines. Intending implies some degree of belief in the achievability of the intention, that is, thinking that one can do it. It also implies having thought about it for some time, having some basis for wanting to do it, and having some expectation of carrying out the intention. ‘Will’ is shown in brackets to emphasise that its only function here is as an obligatory signal of tense agreement of ‘do’ with ‘after now’:

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \textit{intends to V} \\
X & \text{thinks: I can do V} \\
X & \text{has thought about doing it for some time before now} \\
X & \text{thinks something good about doing it} \\
& \text{because of this X wants: I [will] do it after now} \\
& \text{because of this X thinks: I [will] do it after now}
\end{align*}
\]

Here, thinking and wanting are both a part of the meaning of *intend*, but there is no overlap in meaning between *think* and *want* themselves, nor
is there any reason to suppose that want is a component of the meaning of think, or vice versa.

These sketches of different patterns of lexical relations found across languages are by no means exhaustive, but they cover the most common patterns observed in the course of this study, and they serve to illustrate several points that are crucial to the discussion in the following chapters. Perhaps foremost among these is the fact that variations in semantic scope, from minor semantic extensions up to and including multiple polysemy, are not at all unusual in desiderative expressions across languages. Desiderative expressions may be associated with a variety of other lexical categories, from body parts to temporal/modal markers, and very similar patterns of association may be found in completely unrelated languages.

Most of these patterns of association make sense in terms of circumstantial associations in human experience, from the bodily sensations associated with wanting food, to the association of wanting something with the possibility of its future attainment. But the questions they raise for linguistics and cognitive science have to do with how much and in what ways these extralinguistic associations find expression in the structure of languages, and what this can tell us about how such links may be represented in people’s minds.

To address these questions requires a thorough and principled approach to the analysis of linguistic data, in which the observation of patterns like the ones described in this chapter is only the first step. There are no quick and easy solutions here. It is not enough to assign the variations in semantic scope of desiderative words and constructions to extralinguistic factors, because this would not say anything about their expression in linguistic structure. It would say nothing about how, for example, a word like ahentye or lele- in one grammatical environment denotes a body part, and in another denotes wanting; or about how an inflection like the Kayardild ‘potential’ and an auxiliary like English will can refer in some contexts to wanting and in other contexts to future time; or what is the status of these associations in the lexical and grammatical structures of these completely unrelated languages.

It is also not enough to suggest, on the basis of the high degree of semantic overlap between desiderative expressions and a range of other notions, and the variety of grammatical structures and constraints associated with desiderative expressions in different languages, that desideratives are too amorphous and should be abandoned as a category
for cross-linguistic investigation. This would be to ignore the similarities in lexical and grammatical patterns that can be observed across languages. It would say nothing about why, although different languages divide up the range of desiderative situations in different ways, there are many cases of unrelated languages each using one desiderative expression to cover two or more types of situation; or about why morphological desideratives in unrelated languages display similar semantic and grammatical constraints; or why similar patterns of polysemy and other lexical relations are observable in unrelated languages.

This preliminary typological sketch has outlined a number of patterns and tendencies that can be observed among desiderative constructions in a wide range of languages, in both grammatical and lexical structures. It has provided several illustrations of the complex interplay of semantic and grammatical factors that must be taken into account in the analysis of these constructions. And it has yielded some tentative cross-linguistic generalisations for further exploration in subsequent chapters, with a view to assessing whether any central, universal elements of desiderative meaning or structure can be identified across languages.
Chapter 3

Grammar of desiderative constructions

While a very high proportion of the world’s languages encode wanting and related notions by means of constructions based on verbs, there is considerable variation in the structure of these verbal desiderative constructions in different languages. Moreover, as already noted, some languages use words and morphemes other than verbs to denote wanting. The great diversity of grammatical constructions involved in desiderative expressions has been a major obstacle to crosslinguistic study and comparison of these expressions, and to the recognition of semantic correspondences between them. Very few grammars of languages discuss desiderative constructions as a category, unless the language being described has some corresponding morphosyntactic category such as a desiderative affix or particle.

However, a noticeable tendency across languages is that desiderative expressions usually involve some of the most elaborate grammatical apparatus in a language: complex verbal or other constructions, complementation devices, interclausal dependency relations, and so on. Because of this, desiderative constructions can usually be found in descriptive grammars even though they are not grouped together as such; and the effort of locating and examining them is usually rewarding because of their interesting syntactic properties.

A study of desiderative expressions yields many examples of the interplay of semantics and syntax. The focus of analysis in the NSM approach is not the individual lexeme but rather the utterance, because lexemes always occur in a context. While each word or morpheme has a discrete meaning, it does not appear in isolation but in one or more constructions: configurations in which the meanings of the individual lexical items interact both with each other and with the meaning of the construction as a whole. And the meaning of a construction is linked with the meanings of other, related constructions in the same language: neither the individual lexeme nor the individual construction can be understood properly in isolation.

This principle is crucial to the assessment of semantic correspondences across languages, and hence to the question of linguistic universals. It is necessary to be able to say, for example, to what extent a
noun like Kiwai *ubi* or an adjective like Japanese *hoshii* can be considered equivalent to a verb like English *want* or Spanish *querer*; or to what extent a reflexive construction like the Russian *Mne xočetsja X* 'I want X' (where *mne* is dative and the verb is reflexive) can be equated with constructions that cannot be reflexive (like Spanish *Quiero X*, *'A mí se quiere X* 'I want X'; *'X wants itself to me'); or how *querer* with a subjunctive complement or *hoshii* with a 'gerundive' (-te) complement corresponds to *want* with an infinitive complement. To be able to talk about these questions we need to be able to identify and describe the meanings of these various construction types in each language, as well as the individual words that denote something like wanting.

This chapter examines some of the grammatical patterns found in desiderative constructions across languages, showing how the semantics and grammar of different construction types interact with the meanings of individual lexemes to encode various desiderative meanings, and how the similarities and differences between these meanings across languages can be specified.

### 3.1 Parts of speech and grammatical roles

Parts of speech such as verbs, nouns, adjectives and so on have some distinctive semantic properties in addition to the syntactic properties on which their wordclass identification is based. The English nouns *desire*, *wish* and *hope*, for example, have a somewhat different flavour from the corresponding verbs in the following examples:

(1)  
   a. *Our desire is to please the customer.*  
   b. *We desire to please the customer.*

(2)  
   a. *The wish of the majority will prevail.*  
   b. *What the majority wish (/want) will prevail.*

(3)  
   a. *My hope is that we can resolve these problems.*  
   b. *I hope that we can resolve these problems.*
English *want* is rarely used as a noun, but the fact that it can be so used in psychological jargon illustrates the same kind of contrast between noun and verb:

(4) a. *Try to understand your partner’s wants and needs.*
   b. *Try to understand what your partner wants and needs.*

The nominal constructions, the (a) versions of (1-4), convey a sense of being slightly more abstract and less direct than the verbal (b) constructions. One can talk about *wants, hopes* and *wishes* in general and abstract terms, and about these nouns as if they ‘belong’ to a person (*X’s wants,* etc.), without mentioning any specific instance where *X wants to do Z,* or *X wants Y to do Z.*

These differences in ‘feel’ between nouns and verbs arise from the semantic structure of nouns as a class, discussed in detail by Wierzbicka in her work on the semantic basis of wordclasses. The most prototypical nouns are names of concrete objects, but there are other important classes of nouns such as the ones mentioned above. The English nouns *wish, want* and so on are de-verbal nouns, a class of nouns referring to actions, processes, events and sometimes states; but as nouns they also have a more ‘thing-like’, reified flavour than verbs referring to the same actions, processes, events or states. This quality of nouns may be what underlies an observable preference in English for nouns rather than verbs when referring to emotions, for example (as well as a general preference for nominalisations in formal styles). Using *resentment* or *fear* as nouns, one can speak of doing something with or about these emotions: expressing or overcoming one’s resentment, ignoring or mastering one’s fear. Being able to speak of emotions as if they are ‘things’ allows people to feel as if they have some power over these emotional states, a power not suggested by the verbal constructions *I resent this, I fear this.*

The syntactic properties of nouns contribute to this effect. Noun constructions can relegate the human experiencer of wanting to a background role by allowing the formal subject of the sentence to be inanimate or abstract. The semantic effect of such a syntactic backgrounding device can be seen by comparing the following:

(5) a. *Her hope for a better life was sadly disappointed.*
   b. *She hoped for a better life, but was sadly disappointed.*
Not only does (5a) have a non-human subject noun, but the link between
the emotion words and the experiencer is attenuated. The possessive (her
hopes) of course implies that 'she hoped', but this is not indicated directly;
the nature of the connection between the emotion and the experiencer in
(5a) is more vague than in (5b). Pluralising the noun (Her hopes for a
better life) makes the effect even vaguer, by removing any suggestion of a
single identifiable act of hoping. And of course the second emotion
mentioned, disappointment, is formally attributed in (5a) to the abstract
'hope' rather than to the human experiencer as in (5b) (her hope was
disappointed cf. she was disappointed).

These semantic and syntactic effects explain why it does not seem
fully accurate to equate a nominal 'want' construction in one language
with a verbal 'want' construction in another. This is particularly so when
comparing a language that contrasts nominal and verbal desiderative
constructions, as English does in the examples above, with a language that
has only a nominal construction. In the Papuan language Kiwi, for
example, 'ne normal way of saying 'X wants Z' is by means of a
construction with the desiderative noun ubi:

(6) Mo ubi aireera uwo gido.
1s want 3s-be sleep(INF) for
'I want to sleep.'

(7) Ro ubi ebeta?
2s want what
'What do you want?'

The verb erea seen in (6) is optional in this construction; it is a positional
verb that can function as a copula. This ubi construction is the main
desiderative construction in Kiwi; it does not contrast with any verbal
'want' construction. But because English does have a contrast between
nominal and verbal desiderative constructions, it seems intuitively more
accurate to reflect this somehow in the English gloss, for example by saying
that the Kiwi mo ubi aireera 'literally' means 'My wish (it) remains'.

But is this really more accurate? The English sentence My wish is
to/for sleep sounds unusual, archaic; while the Kiwi nominal
construction is the ordinary, everyday way of saying 'I want to sleep'.
There is no other, more usual construction with which it contrasts, in the
way that English *My wish is to sleep* contrasts with *I want to sleep*. Of course one can argue the pros and cons of particular glosses on many grounds, but I am suggesting that it is misleading to assume that two grammatically parallel constructions, such as the Kiwai and the English nominal desiderative constructions, are any more equivalent than the Kiwai nominal and the English verbal construction are.

English has a basic desiderative construction, *X wants CPLT* (where CPLT stands for a complement; complements of desideratives are discussed in the next section). Other English constructions that contrast with this construction do so because they contain elements of meaning other than or additional to those contained in the basic construction. So the English nominal construction *X's wish is CPLT* would have to be defined in terms of the basic *X wants CPLT* plus some other elements involved in the lexical meaning of *wish*.

Kiwai, on the other hand, has as its basic desiderative construction *X ubi CPLT*, and this construction does not contrast with any more basic Kiwai construction. There is no evidence that *X ubi CPLT* involves any elements of meaning additional to or other than 'X wants CPLT'. In this sense, therefore, the Kiwai nominal construction *X ubi CPLT* should be regarded as semantically equivalent to the English verbal construction *X wants CPLT*: semantically equivalent in the sense that it contains exactly the same elements of meaning, no more elements and no fewer elements.

The English nominal construction *X's wish is CPLT* is not fully equivalent to *X wants CPLT* or *X ubi CPLT* because it contains more elements of meaning. Even apart from the lexical difference between English *wish* and *want*, English nominal desiderative constructions have a special, marked quality because they contrast with the more ordinary, unmarked verbal desideratives; and the nature of this contrast can also be identified by comparing the semantics of the two construction types.

Consider for a moment a rather marginal English construction, *X's want is CPLT*, for the purpose of comparing it with the verbal construction *X wants CPLT*. Although the nominal construction is unusual in English, it is possible to think of a context in which it could be said. For example, after reading one of those books that urge one to be aware of one's partner's wants and needs, I might conceivably initiate a late-night discussion aimed at finding out more about those of my partner; and my partner might well protest, saying something like: 'I'll tell you about my
wants and needs! Right now I've only got one want and one need: *my want is to go to sleep*, and my need is to do it now!*

Fanciful though this example may seem, it allows us to observe the central semantic difference between *my want is to sleep* and *I want to sleep*. The difference is one of presupposition. The nominal, possessive *my want is* contrasts with *I want in that the former presumes the latter: if I refer to *my want or my wish* it is presupposed that I want or wish for something. This presupposition effect can be spelt out in a statement of the meaning of the construction, as follows:

\[
X's \text{ want is CPLT (e.g. My want is to sleep)} \\
\text{people can know: X wants something} \\
\text{this something is CPLT}
\]

That is, it is assumed (people can know) that I want something; what I say about this something is that it is 'CPLT', in this case 'to sleep'. In English this construction contrasts with the verbal construction that has no such presupposition:

\[
X \text{ wants CPLT (e.g. I want to sleep)} \\
X \text{ wants CPLT}
\]

That is, the verbal construction is indefinable in that it cannot be reduced to any more or any smaller elements of meaning; whereas the nominal construction has more elements of meaning.

In Kiwai, however, *X ubi CPLT* is apparently the unmarked way of referring to wanting, and it does not seem to make reference to any additional presupposition. The English nominal construction is able to encode the additional presuppositional meaning because of the availability of two constructions in English; when two alternative constructions are available in a language, one of them often acquires additional semantic content. The meanings of construction types in each language must be identified by investigation and comparison of the range of constructions available in the language in question, and it cannot be assumed that grammatically similar construction types in two languages are semantically equivalent.

So, although *ubi* is a noun, the meaning of the Kiwai construction is still identifiable as follows:
3.1 Parts of speech and grammatical roles

\[ X \text{ ubi (erea) CPLT} \text{ (e.g. 6, 7)} = \]
\[ X \text{ wants CPLT} \]

Of course these definitions are framed in the English version of NSM, but exactly the same equivalence would apply if the definitions were framed in a Kiwai metalanguage:

\[ X \text{ wants CPLT} = \]
\[ X \text{ ubi CPLT} \]

\[ X \text{ ubi (erea) CPLT} = \]
\[ X \text{ ubi CPLT} \]

While some languages do have nouns as their primary desiderative lexemes, nominal desiderative constructions are not nearly as common as verbal ones, and there is an observable trend across languages for desiderative nouns to show verbal tendencies of one kind or another. They may be accompanied by optional verbal elements like *erea* in Kiwai, or *-irre-* and *ne-* which often accompany the nominal *ahentye* ‘want’ in Arrernte as described in the previous chapter. In Buru, *suka* ‘like, want’ has some nominal and some verbal properties, and is termed a ‘nominal verb’ (see 4.4 below). This accords with the theory that as a semantic prime, WANT is of the nature of a predicate, rather than, say, a substantive, and may thus be expected to display some verb-like characteristics in most languages; but it is not the case that all equivalents of WANT must be verbs.

The proposal that a nominal construction like Kiwai *X ubi CPLT*, Arrernte *X ahentye CPLT* or Mangap-Mbula *X lele-ng CPLT* can be deemed semantically equivalent to English *X wants CPLT* or Spanish *X quiere CPLT* does not necessarily conflict with the idea that nouns as a class have different semantic properties from verbs. The semantic properties of different wordclasses can contribute to the semantic associations or the semantic ‘resonance’ of a word or a construction, without necessarily affecting the elements contained in its lexical meaning. The term ‘resonance’ has been introduced very recently in NSM semantic theory, to describe non-compositional, non-paraphrasable effects resulting from the association between separate meanings of a single lexical form, or from
other formal associations such as morphological or wordclass relationships. Several types of resonance are examined in the present study, and the nature of this theoretical construct and some constraints upon it are discussed in section 6.3 below. The case of nominal desideratives is a useful first example of how this kind of resonance effect works.

The most prototypical, concrete-object nouns in all languages probably share the same kind of semantic structure: they may be defined in terms of, first of all, 'a kind of thing', followed by details of what kind of thing and the nature of the specific thing being defined, as demonstrated in Wierzbicka's work on concrete objects. Internal-experience nouns certainly do not have the same semantic structure as concrete-object nouns, but they acquire their 'thing-like' quality by association with more prototypical nouns: a want or a wish, an ubi or an ahentye would not actually be definable as 'a kind of thing that people feel' (cf. the previous chapter), but they can readily be thought of and spoken of in such terms.

The effect is more pronounced when there is a contrast between a nominal and a verbal expression (as in the case of English wish, want etc.), but the 'thing-like' resonance of nouns is an effect of the semantics of the wordclass itself. However, the semantic character of a wordclass derives from its most prototypical members, and does not dictate nor form a part of the lexical meaning of all members of the set: not all nouns are defined via 'thing' nor as 'a kind of thing'. In particular, desiderative nouns are not 'a kind of thing', though some of their resonance is derived from their wordclass association with other nouns that are words for 'a kind of thing'.

Another wordclass in which desiderative words are sometimes found is the adjective class. In Japanese, for example, the most frequently used desiderative term is the adjective hoshii, as in the following:

(8) (Watashi wa) okane ga hoshii.
    1s TOP money NOM want
    'I want money.'

(9) (Watashi wa) kare ni hayaku ki-te hoshii.
    1s TOP 3s DAT soon come-SER want
    'I want him to come soon.'
Japanese also has a desiderative verbal suffix, -tai, which marks a verb as 'wanted':

(10) *(Watashi wa) (mizu o) nomi-tai.*

1s TOP water ACC drink-DES

'I want (some water) to drink.'

The derived form (e.g. nomi-tai) is treated grammatically as an adjective, taking the same suffixes to derive negative, conditional and other forms as hoshii and other 'true adjectives' do. In the above examples the reference to the 'wanter' is in brackets because in Japanese any reference to internal states (physical or emotional, e.g. samui '(feel) cold', ureshii '(feel) happy'), is assumed to be in the first person, except in special circumstances (see 6.4 below); and because of this the reference to 'I' seems to Japanese speakers somewhat redundant.

The relationships between hoshii, -tai and their complements will be explored further, but for the present let us note that like the desiderative nouns considered above, desiderative adjectives have a somewhat different flavour from desiderative verbs. In translating from Japanese to English, people often feel it is more accurate or more literal to translate a sentence like (8) as 'Money is desirable to me' rather than the verbal construction 'I want money'.

The contrast between the English adjective desirable and the verb desire allows us to observe some of the semantic and syntactic properties of desiderative adjectives, though English has no adjective corresponding to the verb want, as Japanese has no verb corresponding to the adjective hoshii in current use (the archaic verb hossuru is discussed in 6.4 below). An English sentence like Money is desirable to me sounds much milder than the verbal construction I desire money. Both sentences are a little unusual in English, but the 'mildness' of the adjectival construction is due not to its peculiarity but to its syntax and its semantics.

The English desirable is of course morphologically complex, and it is also semantically complex. Z is desirable (to X) means not just 'X desires Z' but 'X can/could desire Z': Z is 'able' to be desired, but is not necessarily the object of anyone's desire. Hoshii has no such 'potential' (can/could) component in its meaning: (X wa) Z hoshii means 'X wants Z', not 'X can/could want Z'. In addition to this semantic difference, the syntactic
properties of the adjectival construction contribute to the ‘milder’ effect in important ways.

The English adjectival construction *Money is desirable to me* syntactically ‘backgrounds’ the human participant, by having the object of desire, *money*, in the subject slot and relegating the desirer (*me*) to a prepositional phrase. And because of the weakness of the syntactic link between the desire and the desirer, this construction opens up the possibility of removing reference to a desirer altogether, as in *Money is desirable*. Of course this still implies that someone can/could desire money, but the omission of any specific reference to a desirer leaves this construction vague as to whether the ‘someone’ who can/could desire money is the speaker, someone else, or just people in general.

Does this mean that two adjectival constructions would have to be recognised, one with and one without reference to a ‘desirer’? These could be represented as *Z is desirable to X* (implying ‘X can/could desire Z’) and *Z is desirable* (implying ‘someone can/could desire Z’). But this formulation is not fully explanatory, because the contrast between the verbal construction *X desires Z* and the adjectival *Z is desirable (to X)* is based on more than just a semantic difference between the lexemes *desire* and *desirable* (= ‘desire’ + ‘can/could’). The two English construction types differ primarily in that *X desires Z* is an assertion about X, while *Z is desirable (to X)* is an assertion about Z, and the role of X is peripheral to this assertion about Z.

As shown in the preceding chapter, *X desires Z* predicates (about X) that X wants Z because of thinking something good about it. But *Z is desirable (to X)* is a construction that predicates something about Z (not about X). And what is predicated about Z is not that some specific person wants it, but that it can or could be desired. Mention of a specific desirer (X) is optional, appearing if at all in a prepositional phrase. The meaning of the construction could be sketched more formally as follows:

*Z is desirable*

- people can think something good about Z
- people could feel something toward Z because of this
- because of this people could want to do something with Z

If the prepositional phrase *to X* is added, this could be represented in a formula for *Z is desirable to X* by an additional component along the lines
of 'X feels something like this toward Z'. Compare this with the somewhat more straightforward verbal construction sketched in the previous chapter:

\[
X \text{ desires } Z
\]

\[
X \text{ thinks something good about } Z
\]

\[
X \text{ feels something towards } Z \text{ because of this}
\]

\[
because \text{ of this } X \text{ wants to do something with } Z
\]

Comparing the two construction types in this way allows us to identify the specific semantic content of each, and to observe clearly the nature of the differences between them. The two formulae above show how the English adjectival and verbal constructions differ in meaning, and how the semantic components of the adjectival construction operate to produce the 'milder' effect.

But does the Japanese adjectival construction with *hoshii* have the same semantic content as the English construction with *desirable*? Almost certainly not: there is much evidence to the contrary. First, as noted above, there is no evidence for any 'potential' component in the meaning of *hoshii*, so 'can'/'could' should be excluded. Second, *hoshii* is not derived from a synchronic verb in quite the same way that *desirable* is, so it does not imply that 'Z is such that someone does V (where V='desire')'. Third, the *hoshii* construction does not contrast with any verbal desiderative construction in the way that the English *desirable* and *desire* constructions contrast. There is no simpler or more basic desiderative in Japanese than the adjectival *hoshii* and -*tai* ones, so the meaning of (*X wa*) *Z hoshii* cannot be assumed to contain any additional components in contrast with some semantically simpler construction that means just 'X wants Z'. *X wa Z hoshii* can therefore be deemed semantically equivalent to *X wants Z*, in that there is no evidence that the *hoshii* construction has either any more or any fewer components in its meaning.

Perhaps the strongest evidence comes from the ways in which *hoshii* and *V-tai* differ from more typical Japanese adjectives. They are so strongly linked with a specific experiencer that they are hardly ever used attributively, unlike other adjectives that are often found in attributive use (e.g. *warui hito* 'bad person'). In instances where *hoshii* can be used attributively, it presupposes the existence of someone in particular who wants the noun, for example:
(11) (Watashi ga) hoshii tabemono wa sashimi desu.
   1s    NOM    want food    TOP raw.fish COP
   'A desired food (of mine) is sashimi.'

This sentence does not convey that sashimi is desirable in general, but that someone in particular desires it. In this construction the wanter is not limited to first person, as in the predicative constructions (8-10) above: anata 'you' or ano hito 'that person' could be substituted here for watashi 'I'; but if no wanter is specified it is assumed to be the speaker, not just people in general. No such presupposition applies to other adjectives: warui tabemono 'bad food' carries no implication that the food is bad to or for anyone in particular; it is simply bad.

Just as in the predicative constructions (8-10) above, hoshii carries an inbuilt assumption that there is some particular 'wanter', namely the speaker unless otherwise indicated. Okane ga hoshii doesn't mean just that money is generally desirable; it means the speaker wants money, hence the redundant effect of watashi 'I' in (8). In this feature, hoshii is different from other adjectives such as daiji 'important': Okane ga daiji means 'money is important', but carries no implication that it is important to anyone in particular, only that it is important in general.

This evidence suggests that the meaning of hoshii constructions is different from the meaning of ordinary Japanese adjectival constructions. The nature of adjectival constructions in general deserves a fuller discussion than is possible here, but on the basis of what is known about adjectives as a class it is reasonable to suppose that typical adjectives in most languages have a basic semantic structure involving something that is asserted 'about Z' (as suggested for desirable above). So, for Japanese, the meaning of an ordinary adjectival construction could be represented along the following lines:

\[
\text{Okane ga daiji ('money is important')}
\]

people think this about money:
   it is like something big
   it is good if a person thinks about it

If a similar adjectival semantic structure were assigned to a hoshii construction, the resulting explication would be phrased in terms of something knowable 'about money', namely that it is wanted:
Okane ga hoshii ('money is wanted/desirable')

people can know this about money:
people want it

But this explication is not adequate for the hoshii construction, because it does not take into account the evidence that okane ga hoshii presupposes that someone in particular wants money, that this someone is the speaker, and this presupposition is so clear that the actual reference to this 'wanter' (watashi 'I') can be omitted without altering the meaning that the speaker is the wanter. Therefore an adequate representation of the hoshii construction would have to be more specific than the general adjectival construction:

Okane ga hoshii

someone wants money
people can know: I am this someone

While different from the general adjectival construction, this implied first-person construction is also different from hoshii constructions in which the wanter is overtly mentioned:

Watashi wa okane ga hoshii

I want money

Such an analysis of hoshii constructions has the power to explain not only how hoshii can function as a semantic equivalent of WANT, but also how its adjectival properties affect both its semantic resonance and its syntactic behaviour. The most prototypical members of the adjective class, in Japanese as in other languages, are words that describe things or people: words that tell what someone or something is like, and so the semantic structure of many adjectives involves a component that something is known or thought 'about' the thing or person. But not all adjectives have this kind of semantic structure; it is associated with, but not dictated by membership of this particular wordclass. So, while hoshii constructions can be understood as having their own semantic structure as analysed above, the wordclass membership of hoshii contributes a resonance effect whereby, while a sentence like (8) actually means 'I want money', it has a
flavour similar to other adjectival constructions that tell us 'people think/can know this about money:...’

Moreover, the syntactic properties of *hoshii* as an adjective allow the human participant, the wanter, to be backgrounded or even omitted grammatically from a *hoshii* construction (e.g. *Okane ga hoshii*), while as seen above, a wanter is still present both in the semantic structure ('someone wants money') and the pragmatic implicature ('people can know: I am this someone') of this construction.

The (*X wa*) *V-tai* constructions (e.g. 10 above) are slightly different both from the typical adjectival constructions and from the *hoshii* constructions. *V-tai* is even less likely to be used attributively than *hoshii* is. Because it is derived from a verb, it is both syntactically and semantically linked with a performer of that particular verb. With *V-tai* the wanter must be coreferential with the performer of the verb, unlike *hoshii* where a verbal complement has a performer other than the wanter (e.g. 9 above).

Although the wanter can be omitted grammatically from a *V-tai* construction, it remains part of the semantic structure. The sentence (*Mizu o*) *nomi-tai* cannot be interpreted as meaning that drinking (water) is desirable in a general sense, but only that someone in particular, namely the speaker, wants to drink (water). The strength of the semantic link of -tai with a wanter is also reflected in comments by Japanese informants that -tai constructions seem to imply more about the experiencer’s emotional state than *hoshii* constructions do; for example, that (*Watashi wa*) *iki-tai* conveys something more like 'I am anxious to go', in comparison with (*Watashi wa*) *kimi ni iki-te hoshii* 'I want you to go'. This comparison will be discussed further in the next section.

The *V-tai* constructions with and without overt wanter may be represented as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
X \text{ wa (o) } V-tai \text{ (e.g. 10)} \\
X \text{ wants to do } V \text{ (to } Y) \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(Y \text{ o) } V-tai \text{ (e.g. 10)} \\
\text{someone wants to do } V \text{ (to } Y) \\
\text{people can know: I am this someone} \\
\end{align*}
\]

In the fairly rare cases where *V-tai* can be used attributively, wanter and performer are clearly coreferential, for example *shini-tai hito* 'person who
3.1 Parts of speech and grammatical roles

wants to die'. In this attributive use, V-tai conforms more to the typical
adjectival meaning of something knowable about the modified noun:

\[ V\text{-}tai \text{ } N \text{ (e.g. } shini\text{-}tai hito) \]

people can know this about N:
this person wants to do V

The same is probably true of the attributive use of hoshii mentioned
above:

\[ hoshii \text{ } N \text{ (e.g. } hoshii \text{ } tabemono) \]

people can know this about N:
someone wants this

The Japanese adjectival desideratives, then, can be seen to have a
semantic resonance arising from their wordclass association with other
adjectives that tell what something is like; but the predicative hoshii and
V-tai constructions are different from these more typical adjectival
constructions in that their semantic content is not ‘people think this about
Z’ but rather ‘someone (X) wants Z’. The adjectival syntactic properties of
hoshii and V-tai contribute to the resonance effect by permitting the
wanter to be omitted grammatically from (X wa) Z hoshii and (X wa) V-tai
constructions; but a wanter (‘someone’) is still present in the semantics of
these constructions. Thus the Japanese adjectival desiderative construc-
tions can be deemed semantically equivalent to the verbal desiderative
constructions of other languages (e.g. English X wants Z) rather than to
adjectival constructions derived from them but containing additional
elements of meaning (e.g. English Z is desirable (to X)). The wordclass
does not dictate the semantic content.

Another example of the relationship of wordclass properties and
semantic content comes from languages that have various classes of verbs,
where the resonance of desiderative verbs may be influenced by the
semantics of their verbclass. This is the case in Acehnese, an Austronesian
language that distinguishes actor-oriented from undergoer-oriented verbs.
Acehnese has a variety of verbs with desiderative meanings, some
belonging to the actor-taking (A) class and some to the undergoer-taking
(U) class. The grammar distinguishes between these two classes of
predicates in that A predicates have proclitics controlled by the actor
argument, while U predicates have none. These proclitics are seen in (12) and (13) below, where both tém ‘want’ and jak ‘go’ are A verbs:

(12) Ka i-tém jak.
    already 3-want go
    ‘Now he wants to go.’

(13) Meunyō gata h’an ta-tém jak di lôn pih h’an.
    if 2s NEG 2-want go FOC 1s too NEG
    ‘If you don’t want to go, then I too don’t [want to go].’

While tém is a satisfactory equivalent of ‘want’ in examples like these, there are two grammatical constraints on its use: the complement verb (e.g. jak ‘go’) must be an A verb, and its actor must be coreferential with the A of tém.

Another desiderative verb, meuh’eut ‘want’, belongs to the U class, so it takes no proclitic. The complement verb can be either an A or a U verb:

(14) Lôn meuh’eut lôn-jak u Makah.
    1s want 1s-go to Mecca
    ‘I want to go to Mecca.’

(15) Di jih meuh’eut-jih that keu maté.
    FOC 3s want-3 very to death
    ‘She wants to die (but cannot).’

Meuh’eut, unlike tém, also allows a clausal complement with a non-coreferential actor or undergoer:

(16) Di gopnyan meuh’eut-geuh that aneuk-geuh ji-jak sikula.
    FOC 3s want-3 very child-3 3-go school
    ‘They very much want(ed) their children to go to school.’

Meuh’eut also allows an NP complement; complements of this kind are discussed in the following section.
Another common desiderative construction in Acehnese uses the verb *galak* '(be) happy' with a complement sometimes but not always introduced by the desiderative particle *beu*:

(17) *Lon galak beu-neu-woe laju.*
1s happy DES-2-return immediately
'I want you to return immediately.'

(18) *Lon galak droeneuh neu-pubuet lageè nyoe.*
1s happy you 2-do way this
'I want/am happy for you to do this.'

The particle *beu* (like its negative counterpart *bèk*) is frequently used to introduce what the speaker wants:

(19) *Beu-that neu-peh tambô.*
DES-very 2-hit drum
'Hit the drum hard.'

(20) *Bu-mudah raseuki.*
DES-easy fortune
'May fortune smile upon (you).'

(21) *Beu-geu-riwang lom Teungku Jôhan u Acèh.*
DES-3-return again title Johan to Aceh
'I want Johan to come back to Aceh again.'

In addition to *têm, meuh'eut, galak* and *beu*, there are several other Acehnese verbs with desiderative meanings. *Keumeung, meu* and *(keu)neuk*, all glossed as 'will, want', are A verbs like *têm*. *Teugiyan* 'desire', *ék* 'like' and *seugen* 'not want to' are U verbs; while *galak* '(be) happy' is one of a very few verbs that can take either an A or a U argument. As noted in the previous chapter, these verbs are all more semantically complex than *meuh'eut* or *têm*. A more detailed look at the desiderative construction types involving *beu, galak, têm* and *meuh'eut* can serve to illustrate how the semantics of the word and the construction type interact.
3.1 Parts of speech and grammatical roles

A beu construction (e.g. 19-21 above) is often the closest translation equivalent for 'I want', but it is limited to first-person use. In addition it seems to carry an illocutionary message, signalling not just 'I want' but 'I say: I want'. So, the meaning of a beu construction would have to be defined via a desiderative verb (probably meu'h'eu't in Acehnese because of its freedom from coreferentiality constraints), for example:

**Beu Y V** (e.g. 21)
I say: I want: Y [will] do V

In all the explanations that follow, 'will' is used in the same way as an obligatory agreement marker; the bracketing device is usually omitted for ease of reading.

The galak constructions (17-18 above) are often used in desiderative contexts, but authorities on the language regard galak as conveying something like 'be happy/pleased (that...)' rather than indicating actual wanting. Example (17) is a direct statement of what the speaker wants, but here galak is accompanied by beu, which contributes the specifically desiderative meaning; compare this with (18) where galak by itself does not convey wanting unambiguously. This is consistent with the meaning of galak when it occurs without a clausal complement. The meaning of X galak is probably as simple as 'X feels something good'. The complement construction involves some relationship between galak and the complement, along the following lines:

**X galak Y V** (e.g. 18)
if Y does V, X will feel something good because of this

The inclusion of beu introducing the complement may then involve a combination of the two meanings. Because beu can refer only to the speaker's wishes, not anyone else's, X in this case is 'I'. Here 'I say' is bracketed because beu as a complementiser may not have quite the same illocutionary force as when it is used as an illocutionary particle:

**Lon galak beu Y V** (e.g. 17)
[I say:] I want: Y will do V
if Y does it, I will feel something good because of this