USE OF THESES

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AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES AND POLICIES TOWARDS THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE, 1942-1949

BY

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University

September 1973
This thesis is my own original work

Margaret L. George
This thesis is an historical analysis of Australian attitudes and policies towards the Netherlands East Indies (N.E.I.) and Indonesian independence during the Pacific War and, more particularly, during the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, 1945-1949. It traces the assertion by the Curtin Labor government, and especially by Evatt, of an aspiration for Australia to have a close post-war relationship with the N.E.I., particularly in matters relating to security. The thesis shows how this aspiration was both modified and diplomatically complicated by the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. An examination of Australia's policies towards the Indonesian Republic reveals that Australia's response to post-war developments in Indonesia was cautious and ambivalent. The thesis shows that, although in 1947 Australia assumed the role of diplomatic protagonist of the Republic, its support for the Republic was at all times qualified. The constant objective of Australian diplomacy was a compromise settlement between the Dutch and the Indonesians in which the Dutch conceded self-government to the Indonesians who in turn voluntarily accepted Dutch cooperation, especially in defence and economic matters. Such a settlement was considered to be in Australia's best security interest. While the Australian government recognised the desirability of "legitimate" Indonesian nationalist demands being met, it clearly retained reservations about Australia's relationship to an autonomous Indonesia.
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<td>A.C.T.U.</td>
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<td>A.F.N.E.I.</td>
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<td>P.K.I.</td>
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<td>P.N.I.</td>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia</td>
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<td>R.T.C.</td>
<td>Round Table Conference</td>
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<td>R.V.D.</td>
<td>Regeerings Voorlichtings Dienst</td>
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<td>S.A.C.S.E.A.</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia</td>
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<td>SCOR</td>
<td>Security Council Official Records</td>
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<td>S.E.A.C.</td>
<td>South East Asia Command</td>
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<td>S.I.C.</td>
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S.W.P.A.  South West Pacific Area
T.L.C.  Trades and Labour Council
U.N.  United Nations
U.N.C.I.  United Nations Commission on Indonesia
U.S.  United States
U.S.I.  United States of Indonesia
USFR  United States Foreign Relations
U.S.: OSS:R&A  United States, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch
W.W.F.  Waterside Workers' Federation
A NOTE ON SOURCES

Footnotes with the suffix "X" refer to confidential public material and those with the suffix "Z" to confidential private material. Full details of these sources have been provided in a separate and confidential Examiners' Appendix.
NOTE ON DUTCH SOURCES

The location (i.e. archives collection and file number) and description of documents cited from the Netherlands' archives are given in Dutch. However, for the convenience of readers, details of the authors/senders of communications and their recipients are given in English.
A NOTE ON THE SPELLING OF INDONESIAN NAMES AND PLACES

Throughout this thesis Dutch spellings of Indonesian names and Dutch names of Indonesian places have been used, these being the ones that were used by the Australian government at that time. viz., Soekarno, Oesman, Batavia, Djocjakarta.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an historical analysis of the development of Australia's diplomatic interest in the Netherlands East Indies (N.E.I.), subsequently Indonesia under the Curtin and Chifley Labor governments, 1942-1949. It begins with a brief look at Australia's relations with the N.E.I. before the Pacific phase of World War II. It then traverses the Pacific war years, 1942-1945, when an N.E.I. administration was in exile in Australia during the Japanese occupation of the Indonesian islands. But the primary focus is directed to an examination of Australia's policies towards Indonesia during the period of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, 1945-1949.

This is a study of the attitudes and policies of two successive Australian Labor governments. As originally conceived, this thesis was to have been a study of non-governmental, as well as of governmental, attitudes and policies. However, since it was possible to obtain access to considerable new primary material relating to governmental policies, it seemed, given the wordage restrictions of a doctoral thesis, that this would be a more valuable study if its focus was narrowed accordingly.

The structure of the thesis is chronological rather than thematic. Once substantial documentation for a diplomatic history such as this is available, it is clear that considerable distortion occurs if an action or a policy is removed from the historical sequence and context within which it occurred or was formulated. In particular, it is possible through a chronological study to convey an understanding and assessment of the decision-maker, diplomat, politician, and individual in a particular situation and at different points in time. Thus, an appreciation of governmental policies can include an indication of how policy or its presentation may have been influenced by the subjective perceptions and by
the temperaments of individual decision-makers and governmental representatives. Of course, a chronological approach does not disregard themes. Rather it allows them to emerge naturally from the narrative.

There are historic, as well as historical, reasons for presenting this subject contextually. The Curtin Ministry which assumed office in October 1941 was inexperienced in government, Labor having been in opposition for some ten years. More particularly, however, in Australia in the 1940's both the concept and the machinery of independent foreign policy making were comparatively new. The Department of External Affairs had been separated from the Prime Minister's Department as recently as 1935. Until 1940, when an Australian Minister was sent to Washington, Australia had no full diplomatic mission in a foreign country. Thus the Department which Dr H.V. Evatt, as Labor's Minister for External Affairs, inherited in 1941 was still comparatively new and small, and its manpower remained low until after World War II. At Evatt's initiative, the Department began its own diplomatic training scheme in 1943, primarily to build up Australia's overseas representation. Compounded with Evatt's highly personal style as Minister for External Affairs, this tended to limit the role of the Department in Canberra. The functioning of the Department in Canberra in turn reflected Evatt's relationship to its successive Permanent Heads. Colonel W.R. Hodgson (1935–1945) impinged little on Evatt's dominance of decision-making at the Departmental level, and even less so his successor, Mr W.E. Dunk, a skilled administrator whom Evatt appointed to reorganise the post-war Department and who made no claims to diplomatic experience or expertise in foreign policy making. However, this pattern changed in 1947 when Evatt appointed his young and inexperienced Private Secretary (Departmental), Dr J.W. Burton, to the position of Secretary of the Department. Not only did Burton's appointment and his personal style cause considerable resentment among senior career diplomats within the Department, but his foreign policy ideology,¹ which was

considered radical at the time, contributed to his becoming a figure of some controversy. Thus, the total circumstances in which Australia's foreign policy was created under the Curtin and Chifley Labor governments has contributed to there being as much interest in the process by which it was formulated and presented, as in its substance. This interest is, of course, more readily fulfilled by a chronological narrative.

Since Australia's policies towards Indonesia are here examined primarily in the context of intergovernmental diplomacy, internal and non-governmental influences such as Australian party politics, the activities of pressure groups, and the attitudes of the press and public opinion, receive attention only insofar as they appeared directly to affect government policy.

There was a degree of bipartisanship in Australia's policies towards the Dutch-Indonesian dispute insofar as both the Labor government and the Opposition (Liberal and Country) parties envisaged a compromise settlement between the Dutch and the Indonesians. However, to the extent that the Labor government emphasised the need for the Dutch to be both liberal and realistic in accommodating the legitimate demands of the Indonesian peoples, and the Opposition parties defended and supported the Dutch presence in Indonesia, there was a lack of unanimity about the Australian government's Indonesia policy.

This divergence from bipartisanship reflected the parties' differing approaches to Australia's post-war security situation. In principle the Labor government did not want to be party either to supporting colonialism which had become oppressive, or to suppressing communism in South East Asia. By accepting, befriending and supporting moderate nationalism in Indonesia (and generally in South East Asia), the Labor government believed it could protect Australia's security and assist regional stability in South East Asia.
As a supplementary policy, Labor advocated regional defence cooperation with the major Western powers interested in the Pacific area.

For Australia this represented a radical departure from its previous foreign policy tradition. The non-Labor parties reacted strongly against the prospect of the protective presence of European colonial powers in South East Asia being substantially reduced. They believed firmly that Australia should have supported and defended its white and Western counterparts in South East Asia, whom they regarded as the stabilising forces within the region. As described by a Liberal Party Senator in March 1949, the Dutch in Indonesia were "the one white hope standing between us and the hundreds of millions of coloured peoples to our north".\(^1\) Similar fears were shared by the majority of the Australian press\(^2\) and large sections of the public.

As post-war nationalist and communist movements in South East Asia caused increasing colonial dislocation, and as the Cold War between U.S. and the U.S.S.R. developed, the non-Labor parties felt Labor's policies were hostile to Western democracy and were likely to expose Australia to attack from the north.

Perceiving communism in Australia in the 1940's to be both strong and pervasive, the non-Labor parties linked the 'threats' of internal and external communism, not least in relation to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. For some four years, with only a couple of brief interruptions, Communist-led waterside unions maintained a boycott against Dutch shipping in Australia. The Labor government sympathised with the unions' support for the Indonesian Republic. At the same time it admitted the boycott constituted interference in Australia's relations with the N.E.I. However,

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\(^1\) *CPD*, Vol.201, p.826 (2 March 1949), Senator Neil O'Sullivan.

\(^2\) See cartoons included in thesis.
it was not prepared to provoke the unions by its counteracting of the boycott. In Australian history, this union boycott against Dutch shipping in Australia during the Dutch-Indonesian dispute stands as one of the most important cases in the linking of the 'threats' of internal and external communism. The Opposition parties, the press¹ and large sections of the public perceived a connection between the communist leadership of the main boycotting unions, the Labor government's support for the Indonesian Republic, and, in the context of the Cold War, its intermittent dissociation of Australia from the Western bloc.

In both Australia and Indonesia a mythology² exists about the sympathy and friendship Australia extended to the Republic during the Indonesian nationalist struggle for independence from the Dutch. The Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.) has regarded Indonesia "as almost its own creation"³ and an Indonesian Foreign Minister has described Evatt as "the midwife of Indonesian independence".⁴ There is no doubt that Australia's governmental and non-governmental sympathy and support for the Indonesian Republic during the Dutch-Indonesian dispute were, at the least, a source of Republican morale. For almost thirty years since then, in spite of considerable differences with Indonesia, Australia has constantly sought to maintain close and cordial relations with it. Largely for diplomatic reasons, there has been considerable bipartisan consensus for keeping alive memories of this 'honeymoon' period in Australian-Indonesian relations.

The image at the time that the policy of the Australian government was 'pro-Indonesian', together with the continuing mythology, has

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¹ See cartoons included in thesis.

² J.A.C. Mackie, "Australia and the Indonesian Revolution; the symbol and the record". Address. Weekend Seminar, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, 10 November 1972.


⁴ Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs (CNI/A), Vol. XXX, No.2 (February 1959), p.86. The Prime Minister, Mr R.G. Menzies, quoting Dr Subandrio.
tended to reinforce an historical fallacy, namely, that Australia gave unqualified support to the Indonesian struggle for independence. As a full-length study, based on official documentation, of Australian attitudes and policies towards the N.E.I. and Indonesian independence, 1942-1949, this thesis examines the nature and extent of Australian governmental support to the Indonesian Republic, and official attitudes towards the Dutch presence in the N.E.I.

Australia's support for the Indonesian Republic has been described variously – as realistic, idealistic, successful, independent. This thesis inquires how the objectives of the Australian government's policies were formulated, how the policies were instrumented, and explores the extent to which they were effective, at what cost, and with what benefits. Primarily the thesis seeks to provide an answer (or several answers) to the general question: why did the Australian Labor government develop its particular approach to the Indonesian question? There are as well some wider questions. Was Labor's policy towards the Dutch-Indonesian dispute a turning-point in Australian foreign policy? Through its response to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute as a post-war foreign policy crisis in its region, did the Australian government establish Australia's national identity more firmly in the external world? To what extent did Australia's confidence in its national independence in the 1940's result in its reconciling its Western heritage with its geographical environment? If Labor had remained in power, after 1949, would Australia have had a foreign policy which fulfilled the promise of Labor's policy towards Indonesia in the 1940's?
Map 1: Australia and Indonesia
Chapter One

AUSTRALIA AND THE N.E.I. BEFORE THE PACIFIC WAR

As an island continent situated between the Indian and Pacific oceans, with the Antarctic to its south and the South East Asian archipelago to its north-west, Australia stands in a geographically isolated position. Historically this has been to Australia's strategic advantage, in so far as contiguity with foreign countries is strategically disadvantageous.

Australia's nearest foreign neighbour since 1949 has been Indonesia, which, prior to this, was the Netherlands East Indies (N.E.I.), a colony of the Netherlands.¹ Close political relations between Australia and the N.E.I. have, however, been a relatively late derivative of their geographical propinquity to each other. Before the Second World War Australia had little interest in and little contact with the N.E.I.² For one thing its colonial status meant that the Netherlands controlled its foreign relations. This state of affairs precluded direct diplomatic relations between Australia and the N.E.I., but in any case, Australia's diplomatic independence from Britain was so recent that it had not established diplomatic relations with the Netherlands. As a British dominion, Australia relied on the direct diplomatic relations between Britain³ and the Netherlands. Given that relations between Britain and the Netherlands were stable and friendly, Australia and the N.E.I. tended to be both complacent and apathetic towards each other.

In broader terms Australia's indifference towards the N.E.I. was part of its general lack of attention to South East Asia. With the

¹ See Appendix I: Dutch administration of the N.E.I. and the development of the Indonesian nationalist movement before the Pacific war.
³ Britain maintained a Consul-General in the N.E.I.
Map 2: The Netherlands East Indies

exception of Thailand, South East Asia was under the effective control of European colonial powers. Although historically there had been some rivalry between the colonial powers in South East Asia as well as some local conflicts, the overwhelming impression in the outside world was that the colonial powers were firmly entrenched. Thus, to the extent that Australia consciously perceived itself in relation to South East Asia, it visualised itself as a small, white, Western state encompassed by stable and secure major Western powers.

It derived additional confidence in strategic matters from the 'guarantee' to its security afforded by the British and Dutch presence in Malaya and the N.E.I. respectively. The British were blood-brothers and the Dutch were traditionally neutral in their foreign policy. On this latter point, Mr R.G. Casey, a prominent Australian politician and foreign affairs observer, wrote in 1931:

We are separated from the continent of Asia by that great neutral umbrella of islands, the Netherlands East Indies, colonised from and controlled by Holland, and which we can reasonably safely assume will be permanently neutral in any future recurrence of war...

Casey's statement also reflected Australia's lack of political perception of the indigenous peoples within this colonial 'barrier' and emphasised Australia's illusion that the Australian continent was widely separated from Asian politics, namely China and Japan. Thus, Australia's perception of threat related to the autonomous, as distinct from the colonised, Asian countries. This provided independent grounds for its accepting the European geographical reference to Asia as the "Far East".

Australia's interest in the Far East during the 1920s and 1930s did, nevertheless, stimulate Australia's consciousness of the Pacific region.

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With regard to the N.E.I., fears of a southward expansion by China and/or Japan produced subordinate and marginal attention to its security as a strategic barrier to Australia. Expressions of scepticism were mild and few. For example, Stephen Roberts (Professor of History, University of Sydney) suggested in 1925 that Australia should have

a very live anxiety regarding the future of the Dutch East Indies, which are known as the portals of the Pacific, and which are huge and (save Java) comparatively empty islands, very rich and right athwart the southern move of any Asiatic population.¹

Such strategic perceptions took no account of the subjugated and 'sub-Asiatic' population of the N.E.I. A revolutionary national movement, which had begun early in the twentieth century², in conjunction with the Indonesian communist party (PKI), posed a significant challenge to the Dutch administration in the N.E.I. during the 1920s. However, Dutch suppression of an attempted communist coup in 1926-1927, plus the lack of external publicity which the Dutch gave to revolutionary Indonesian nationalism, effectively cushioned Australia's unquestioned assumption of Dutch internal control of the N.E.I. Ill-informed about subsequent Dutch suppression of revolutionary and non-cooperative Indonesian nationalism, Australia also barely noticed Dutch concessions to cooperative nationalism. In describing some of the evolutionary, constitutional and controlled concessions which the Dutch were making to Indonesian demands for self-government, Casey commented in 1931:

The swing over to native control is of decided interest to us in Australia. We are but little conscious of this teeming native population in the Dutch Indies, which is only a day's aeroplane flight from the north of Australia.³

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¹ "Australian View of Pacific Relations", Paper No.4, Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, Honolulu Session, June 30-July 14, 1925 (Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, 1925), pp.63-64.

² See Appendix I.

³ Casey, op.cit., p.49.
Small-scale private commerce formed the basis of Australia's main contact with the N.E.I. In 1933 this culminated in a visit to the "East" (including the N.E.I.) of a non-official Australian Trade and Goodwill Delegation sponsored by the Manufacturers' Association of Australia. This commercial contact between Australian businessmen and traders only served to perpetuate static, simplistic and stereotyped impressions about the inhabitants of the "Spice Islands". A journalist who accompanied the Delegation described the Indonesian peoples as "obedient, tractable little brown men" leading a happy life in a fortunate world "made for them by Nature, assisted ably by the methodical and omniscient Dutch Administration" which provided a "firm but benevolent rule".\(^1\) The 1933 Trade and Goodwill Delegation thereby confirmed Australian assumptions of internal harmony in the N.E.I.

However, the Delegation stimulated Australian commercial interest in the Indonesian peoples. The Delegation had directed its preparations almost exclusively towards the Dutch "master merchant class". It "discovered", however, that there were millions of Indonesian "potential purchasers of Australian goods", and so it recommended that Australia befriend "the sun-browned races of the East Indies".\(^2\)

This commercial discovery of the Indonesian peoples challenged Australia's strategic misperception of its propinquity to Asia, and stimulated interest in the development of regional relations between Australia and the N.E.I. Dutch. The view of the Delegation was that

> Close neighbours in contact with the vast and restive populations of Asia, the Dutch East Indies and Australia have common interests of the most vital importance to their own well-being and the security of civilisation...\(^3\)


\(^2\) Moorehead, *op. cit.*, pp.133, 135.

\(^3\) *Ibid.*
...In the East, which is geographically Australia's north, the British at Singapore and the Dutch in the East Indies, for the past four hundred years, have individually set the seal of Western control upon Asiatic and sub-Asiatic races and established the standard of European culture and law. Holding vast populations there to their ideals of order and progress, they need every available ally.\textsuperscript{1}

The 1933 Delegation resulted in government interest in promoting trade with the 'near East'. In 1934 the Australian government assigned Sir John Latham (the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for External Affairs and Minister for Industry) to lead an officially-sponsored Australian Eastern Mission. In his official report Latham endorsed the view of the 1933 Delegation that Australia should take a regional interest in the N.E.I. Moreover, he indicated that there was a reciprocal feeling in the N.E.I.

I was deeply conscious of a prevailing belief in the Netherlands East Indies that those islands and Australia have, and will continue to have, a very great deal in common in facing the problems of the Pacific.\textsuperscript{2}

On Latham's recommendation,\textsuperscript{3} the Australian government appointed a Trade Commissioner to the N.E.I. in 1935. Australia's trade with the N.E.I. increased marginally, but not in the proportions or in the directions that had been envisaged. The economic disparity between the Dutch and the Indonesians made the N.E.I. a "bad customer"\textsuperscript{4} for Australian manufactured goods. This considerably reduced the possibilities of complementarity\textsuperscript{5} in trade between Australia and the N.E.I., both of which were substantially primary producers.

As an initiative towards developing contact with neighbouring countries, the 1934 Australian Eastern Mission remained an "isolated gesture".\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.54-55.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Latham Report: The Australian Eastern Mission 1934}, p.3.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, p.8.
\textsuperscript{4} Sir Robert Carran, "Australia and the Pacific. The Need to Know Our Neighbours", \textit{Australian National Review} (Canberra), Vol. 6, No.31, p.4.
\textsuperscript{5} See J.G. Crawford, "Australia as a Pacific Power", in W.G.K. Duncan (ed.), \textit{Australia's Foreign Policy} (Sydney, 1938).
\textsuperscript{6} Carran, \textit{op.cit.}, p.4.
Only when Japan's threat to Australia's regional security was quite advanced did Australia in 1939 focus its attention on its immediate strategic environment. On 26 April 1939 the Prime Minister, Mr R.G. Menzies, stated:

What Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the near north... I have become convinced that in the Pacific Australia must regard herself as a principal... maintaining her own diplomatic contacts with foreign powers...[I] look forward to...increased diplomatic contact between ourselves and the United States, China and Japan, to say nothing of the Netherlands East Indies and the other countries which fringe the Pacific.¹

The N.E.I. was important to Japan as a geographically-convenient source of strategic raw materials, in particular oil.

Following the outbreak of the European war in September 1939, the United States (U.S.) indicated its concern that Japan might challenge the status of the N.E.I. if the Netherlands became involved in the European war.² Australia shared the U.S.'s concern but there were few public statements to this effect before April 1940, when it seemed that a German challenge to Dutch neutrality in Europe was imminent. By this time the anti-fascist Allies envisaged two possible scenarios. Either Germany would claim the N.E.I. as an integral part of the Netherlands, or Japan would attack and occupy the N.E.I. The U.S. Secretary of State declared that intervention in the domestic affairs of the N.E.I. or alteration of its status quo by other than peaceful means would be prejudicial to peace in the Pacific.³ The Netherlands, for its part, claimed it could protect the N.E.I. Neither statement was particularly reassuring to Australia, which had been reluctant to admit publicly that there was any lack of official confidence about the Dutch 'presence' in the N.E.I. However, Australia's Minister for External Affairs, Mr J. McEwen, stated on 19 April 1940:

¹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 April 1939.
Any large-scale invasion of the Netherlands would inevitably affect the status of the Netherlands East Indies, a territory at our back door and our closest neighbour, the fate of which is of immediate and vital concern to Australia... Should hostilities be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, they would cause an undesirable situation from the aspect of the peace and stability of East Asia...\(^1\)

Australia thereby recognised the N.E.I. as an object of considerable strategic vulnerability. This recognition implicitly undermined Australia's long-standing confidence in Dutch neutrality.

On 10 May 1940 Germany invaded the Netherlands. Fearing that Japan would seize any excuse for intervention in the N.E.I., the U.S. had already urged Britain and Australia not to send troops to the N.E.I. On 10 May the U.S. government told the Australian Minister in Washington, Mr R.G. Casey, that the U.S. was opposed to Allied troops entering the N.E.I. unless they were requested by Dutch authorities and were under Dutch command.\(^2\)

Publicly the Australian government accepted the U.S. advice. On 15 May McEwen stated:

> ...I wish to stress that nothing has taken place to provide any strong reason for apprehension that there will be interference with the present position of the Netherlands East Indies. Australia, as a Pacific nation, is naturally anxious that there should be no alteration of the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies and the Commonwealth Government will play its part in avoiding any action that might affect the present position.\(^3\)

Whereas the Australian government had hitherto directed public attention solely to the potential external threat to the N.E.I., McEwen in this same statement - without explicitly referring to the possible reaction of the Indonesian peoples to an invasion by Japan or a Japanese threat of invasion - raised the subject of the "internal security" of the N.E.I.

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The Government's information is that the Netherlands authorities are fully competent to deal with any potential risk to the internal security of the colony ... a communication received by the Commonwealth Government from the Government of the Netherlands on 13th May stated, inter alia, that whatever might be the fate of the Netherlands in Europe, the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies is fully competent and able to continue the administration of those territories and to maintain public order externally and internally; consequently all outside intervention would be rejected by the Netherlands Government.\(^1\)

This appears to have been the first public attention paid by the Australian government to Dutch internal control in the N.E.I. as a strategic consideration. At the time an Australian state politician made the following assessment of indigenous commitment to defending the N.E.I.

It is difficult to obtain reliable information about the attitude of the natives of N.E.I. to a change of masters. There is widespread nationalist feeling, but in virulent form it is restricted to a small group.... The better educated natives are bitter at Holland's plain exploitation of the Indies.... But on the whole the Indonesians are passive in their attitude, and would be likely neither to assist the Japanese, nor to fight very vigorously against them. There is no conscription for military service on N.E.I. and the Dutch have not been able to turn the natives into formidable soldiers....

Thus the internal conditions are not conducive to a vigorous defence, even if they do not point to a revolt. The actual defences are also small in relation to the size of the islands. The Army numbers only 50,000 with a ratio of four Indonesians to one European (including half-castes)....\(^2\)

The Australian government, being itself afraid of provoking Japan, asked the U.S. on 16 May to make a firm commitment to defend the status quo of the N.E.I. This the U.S. was unwilling to do.\(^3\) In his statement on 15 May McEwen did not indicate whether the Australian government accepted the assurance of the Netherlands government that the Dutch could defend the N.E.I.

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1. Ibid., pp.205-206.
2. E.S.B. Stevens, The Next Year in the Pacific. Problems of Australian Overseas Policy today: Facts and Figures (Sydney, 1940), p.10. [Published October 1940]. The author was Premier of New South Wales, 1932-1939 and a Member of the N.S.W. Legislative Assembly, 1927-1940.
without assistance. However, in Cabinet on 17 May the Prime Minister (Menzies), for his part, indicated that he did not think that the Dutch would defend the N.E.I.\textsuperscript{1} The same day McEwen admitted in parliament that the security of the N.E.I. from external attack was "a matter upon which only an opinion can be formed".\textsuperscript{2} Having advised parliament on 24 May that he and the Japanese Consul-General in Australia had exchanged assurances that neither government "would take any action likely to affect the present position in regard to the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies",\textsuperscript{3} McEwen refused to participate in further parliamentary discussion of the subject.\textsuperscript{4} The 'issue' itself receded as it became apparent that Japan did not intend an immediate invasion of the N.E.I.\textsuperscript{5}

Hitherto the passive role of the Australian government in relation to the defence of the N.E.I. had been founded firstly on its acceptance of U.S. advice on how to avoid provoking Japan; and secondly on the absolute rejection of outside assistance by the Netherlands. By July 1940 this second condition was no longer absolute. The N.E.I. Army proposed that it send a military mission to Australia to purchase arms supplies.\textsuperscript{6} The Australian government obstructed the N.E.I. Army proposal, it would seem in deference to the U.S.

All the while Australia had no guarantee that the U.S. would intervene if Japan attacked the N.E.I. When in July 1940 the U.S. placed an embargo on the export of certain strategic raw materials to Japan,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] Paul Hasluck, *The Government and the People 1939-1941* (Canberra 1965), pp.212-213. Menzies expressed his view that Australia could not depend on receiving defence assistance from Britain in the current situation; and that Australia could no longer be assured that the Dutch and the French would come to the aid of their Pacific colonies.
\item[5] Esthus, *op.cit.*, p.73.
\item[6] This and information following in this paragraph based on Nederlands Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken [Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (M.B.Z.): *Londens Archief* (L.A.)F2(3).
\end{footnotes}
Australia shared the alarm of both Britain and the Netherlands\(^1\) that the U.S. embargo would incite Japan to attack the N.E.I.\(^2,3\)

It also seems that the Australian government chose to coordinate its policy with that of Britain when it decided in August 1940 not to guarantee support to the N.E.I. in the event of its being attacked by Japan. Knowing that the British government had made a decision to this effect, the Australian government advised the British that it is the opinion of the War Cabinet that we should not enter into a binding unilateral obligation to go to the assistance of the Dutch if Japan attacks the Netherlands East Indies. It is considered that the Empire’s policy should be to take a realistic view of such an act of aggression in the light of our military position at the time.\(^4\)

No doubt the continuing absence of any U.S. guarantee of support contributed to Britain and Australia reaching this common decision.

At the same time Australia urged Britain to keep its policy flexible. In August/September 1940 it cautioned Britain against jeopardising U.S. diplomatic cooperation in the Far East by pursuing its policy of appeasement towards Japan too rigorously.\(^5\) Thus, following the imposition by the U.S. in September 1940 of a complete embargo on steel to Japan, Australia reversed an earlier decision regarding the supply of arms to the N.E.I. On 23 October 1940 the first of a number of N.E.I. military missions arrived in Australia to purchase arms.\(^6\) The N.E.I. government consolidated

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\(^1\) Following the German occupation of the Netherlands, a Netherlands government-in-exile operated from London.

\(^2\) Esthus, *op.cit.*, p.76.

\(^3\) Such alarm was premature. In July 1940 Japan sent an Economic Mission to the N.E.I. to negotiate a more favourable trade agreement; and it also renewed its Tripartite Alliance with Germany and Italy.


\(^5\) Esthus, *op.cit.*, p.78.

this initial form of Australia-N.E.I. military cooperation when, following
the visit to Australia in February 1941 of an N.E.I. Economic Mission, it
established a permanent purchasing office in Australia, primarily to
facilitate the purchase of armaments.1 N.E.I. initiatives for military
cooperation with Australia reflected a degree of autonomy which the N.E.I.
Dutch asserted after the German occupation of the Netherlands and the
transfer of a Netherlands government-in-exile to London.

In the meantime, following reports of Japanese preparations for
a southward offensive, there had been a "serious war scare"2 in Canberra
in January 1941. On 28 January Menzies visited Batavia to confer with the
Governor-General of the N.E.I. regarding the worsening position of the
N.E.I. vis-a-vis Japan. Menzies promised full Australian support by way of
arms supplies; discussed the possible landing of an Australian division
on Java in the event of an attack by Japan; and obtained N.E.I. agreement
to Australia's participation in Anglo-Dutch staff conversations in Singapore.3

In January 1941, following a request from the N.E.I., the Australian War
Cabinet approved the use of facilities in Australia and its Mandated
Territories (specifically New Guinea) by Dutch tankers and warships.4 Also
at the suggestion of the N.E.I., the Australian government agreed to send a
military mission to the N.E.I. for "exploratory" conversations.5 Australia
insisted, however, that cooperation and assistance did not imply commitment
to defend the N.E.I.6 At the same time Australia sought to impress on the

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1 Ibid., F2(3), op.cit.
2 Esthus, op.cit., p.98.
3 Londene Archief, D.33. Bezoek Australische Min.-President aan Batavia en
verslag besprekingen met G.C. over samenwerking in geval van Japanse
agressie em besprekingen Australische Hoge Commissaris met H.M.'s Gezant
to Londen overtoestanden in de Pacific. 1941. Paraphrase of telegram from
Batavia, 29 January from Starkenburgh, the Governor-General.
4 Evatt Collection (Flinders University, Adelaide): the private papers of
Dr H.V. Evatt, War Cabinet Minute, Melbourne, 4th February 1941, Agenda
40/1941, N.E.I.
5 Ibid., R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister to J. van Holst Pellekaan, Consul
6 Ibid.
Dutch that it was taking a keener interest in the "Pacific problem" than the British, whose approach it considered to be half-hearted.¹

Among the decisions taken at the resultant Anglo-Dutch-Australian [Staff] Conference at Singapore 22-25 February 1941, it was agreed that, in the case of an outbreak of war in the Pacific, Australian troops would be sent to reinforce N.E.I. defence - subject to the approval of the Netherlands government that such action was desirable in terms of the political and military situation pertaining at the time.² This latter qualification emphasised the continued importance attached to maintaining the status quo (i.e. both the external Dutch sovereignty and the neutrality) of the N.E.I. However, this emphasis on the external threat to the N.E.I. tended to distract attention from whatever importance such external policies were to the Dutch maintaining full internal sovereignty in the N.E.I. This became apparent when, in November 1941, the Netherlands government refused a British recommendation (based on the Singapore decision) that Australian forces be sent to reinforce Ambon, Koepang and nearby areas. By way of explanation the Netherlands government, which had constantly recommended postponing as long as possible the introduction of foreign troops into the N.E.I., indicated its fear that the premature arrival of foreign troops, particularly in Ambon, might have a disruptive effect on the local population.³ This meant that Australian troops did not leave for the N.E.I. until 11 December 1941. Moreover, they went at the request of the N.E.I., and after the mutual declaration of war against Japan on 8 December.⁴

Even then, Dutch sensitivity to the internal political effects in the N.E.I. pertained. On 9 December the N.E.I. discouraged Australia from publicising its strategic support to the N.E.I., on the grounds that statements about Australian 'protection' of the N.E.I. were having a deplorable effect on public opinion in the N.E.I.¹

Netherlands' concern about maintaining its metropolitan power over the N.E.I. during the war conflicted with Australia's desire to facilitate its own strategic cooperation with the N.E.I. - through the appointment of a political representative to the N.E.I. Following the German occupation of the Netherlands, the Netherlands government-in-exile in London took steps to counteract circumstantial pressure from N.E.I. Dutch separatists. In 1940 the Netherlands government-in-exile in London appointed a Consul-General to Australia, who acted as the intermediary in Australia-N.E.I. relations. However, whereas the Netherlands government-in-exile welcomed and pressed for a reciprocal Australian appointment of a political representative to London, the Australian government was adamant that the need was rather to have such a representative in Batavia - which, by Netherlands constitutional law, was impossible. The impasse continued through 1941. Eventually, on 31 January 1942, the Australian Labor government, which had come into office in October 1941, announced that it had concluded a diplomatic agreement with the Netherlands. The appointment of an Australian Consul-General to the N.E.I. (in conjunction with an exchange of Ministers between Australia and the Netherlands) involved a private agreement between Australia and the Netherlands that the Australian Consul-General in Batavia would function as a direct political representative.² In his official announcement of the diplomatic exchange, the Minister for External Affairs,

¹ Archief B.Z., 912.30 Politiek T.18 Militaire Samenwerking (Groote Oost) Statement.
Dr H.V. Evatt, underlined the importance that the Australian government attached to this mutual understanding.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gorman [the appointee as Australian Consul-General] is assuming a highly responsible post. His status will be practically equivalent to that of a Minister....It is a matter of great satisfaction to the Commonwealth Government that the diplomatic exchange with the Netherlands has been concluded in a form which enables Australia to have a direct representative of high status in the Netherlands East Indies....¹

However, given that countries such as Britain and the U.S. had had Consul-Generals in the N.E.I. for some time, Australia's claim to having established such a distinctive relationship would seem questionable.

Summary and Conclusion

By the time that Australia and the N.E.I. were thrown together in December 1941 as allies in the war against Japan, many of the historical assumptions on which their mutual lack of attention to each other had been based were eroding. The concurrence of war in Europe with a threat of Japanese aggression in the Pacific fractured the working assumption that the interests and priorities of Britain and the Netherlands in Europe were identical with those of Australia and the N.E.I. in the Pacific. Australia and the N.E.I. faced the mutual prospect of not being able to rely for defence on their respective European imperial protectors.

The German occupation of the Netherlands in May 1940 removed the principal bases on which Australia's assumption of strategic security in relation to the N.E.I. had been based, namely, Dutch neutrality and the metropolitan 'presence' in the N.E.I. In the immediate threat of Japanese aggression towards the N.E.I., Australia sought to coordinate its policy towards the N.E.I., with those of the U.S. and Britain. Australia adopted this approach, conscious of its own limitations for independent self-defence. However, the strategic priorities by which both the U.S. and

¹ Department of External Affairs, Canberra: Current Notes on International Affairs [CNIA], Vol. XII, No.3 (February 1942), p.57.
Britain limited their respective commitments to the defence of the N.E.I., further reduced Australia's extra-regional sources of security.

Faced by their mutual vulnerability in relation to Japan, Australia and the N.E.I. sought to establish bilateral defence collaboration. In this attempt Australia experienced further disquieting strategic restraints. The foreign relations of the N.E.I. remained strictly controlled by the remote Netherlands government; and, as the strategic unity of the Netherlands and the N.E.I. diminished, the Netherlands government's dogmatic insistence on its diplomatic autonomy over the N.E.I. inhibited regional collaboration. As distinct from this aspect of Dutch external sovereignty over the N.E.I., the apprehension of the N.E.I. administration that Dutch internal sovereignty would be threatened by the introduction of either friendly or hostile foreign troops was disconcerting from Australia's point of view.

The impact of four centuries of Dutch commerce in the East Indian archipelago, with the addition of a substantial Dutch colonial administration, resulted in Australians having had only a rudimentary, remote and neutral appreciation of the Indonesian peoples. A nascent commercial awareness in the 1930s subsided when the notion of Australia-N.E.I. trade complementarity proved to be a miscalculation. By December 1941 Australians were therefore still barely conscious of the Indonesian peoples as their nearest foreign neighbours.

With the common declaration of war against Japan by the Australian and Netherlands governments in December 1941, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and the Netherlands in January 1942, Australia entered into wartime cooperation with the N.E.I., conscious that strategic compulsion would not necessarily ensure an easy political relation—
ship. Whereas Australia had without qualification traditionally valued the colonial relationship between the N.E.I. and the Netherlands, the recent development of bilateral relations between Australia and the N.E.I. had provided challenge to most of Australia's traditional assumptions.
Chapter Two

AUSTRALIA'S POLICIES IN RELATION TO THE N.E.I.,
1942-1945

Within weeks of Evatt's announcement that Australia was establishing consular relationships with the N.E.I., the political relationship between Australia and the N.E.I. changed dramatically. In February 1942 Japan invaded the N.E.I.; on 8 March all organised Dutch resistance ceased; and on 10 March a nucleus of the N.E.I. administration evacuated to Australia. On 10 April the Australian Consul-General to the N.E.I. resigned the post which he had never taken up.

Just as Britain had become host to the Netherlands government-in-exile in May 1940, so Australia in March 1942 became host to the N.E.I. administration-in-exile. In the first instance, the Netherlands government-in-exile appointed Dr J.E. van Hoogstraten as "Netherlands Indies Commissioner for External and Maritime Affairs in Australia and New Zealand"; and in April 1942 a four-man "Netherlands Indies Commission for Australia and New Zealand" was formed.¹ The Australian government extended full cooperation to the N.E.I. officials who came to Australia, and was apparently² confident that,

¹ Knickerbocker Weekly (Netherlands Publishing Corporation, New York), 20 April 1944, pp.4-5.

² In reserved style, the Prime Minister, Mr J. Curtin, described Australia's relation to the N.E.I. officials in the following terms: "After the fall of Java early in March some important questions arose affecting Australian-Dutch relations. We were happy to welcome here for the relevant discussions, Dr van Nook, Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, and other members of that administration. The Commonwealth Government will do all it can to help the Netherlands Administration in reorganising such forces as have reached Australia, or may do so in the future from Java." CFJ, Vol. 170, pp.366-367 (25 March 1942).
from its enhanced bargaining position, Australia would obtain the kind of political relationship with the N.E.I. administration for which it had unsuccessfully negotiated in 1940-1941.¹

However, such expectations conflicted sharply with official Netherlands' policies aimed at counteracting long-feared separatist tendencies on the part of the N.E.I.² In November 1941 the Netherlands government-in-exile appointed Dr H.J. van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of the N.E.I. as Netherlands Minister for Colonies. Then, after leading the nucleus of N.E.I. officials to Australia, he was relieved of the former post on 25 March 1942 and transferred to London to assume the Colonial Ministry. The dissolution of van Mook's N.E.I. position emphasised the continuing imperial subordination of the N.E.I. to the Netherlands. This reduction in the autonomous power of the N.E.I. administration-in-exile thus conflicted with Australia's expectation of having a more direct political relationship with it.

From at least June 1942 the Netherlands government viewed Australia's interest in closer political relations with the N.E.I. administration-in-exile as support for the separation of the N.E.I. from the Netherlands and with what it saw as an aspiration for Australian jurisdiction over the post-war N.E.I. The Netherlands Minister to Australia, Baron F.C. van Aerssen Beyeren van Voshol, reported that, at a heated meeting of the Allied Political Warfare Committee in Canberra on 30 June 1942, Evatt had suggested that the people of the N.E.I. should not be told that the war was being fought to regain the N.E.I. for the Dutch. The Dutch, Evatt argued, had given up their territories without resistance; it was unlikely that

¹ See Supra, Chapter 1, pp. 21-22.
² The separatist lobby in the Indies had since the early 1930s been identified with a small group (in which van Mook was a leading identity) which published a journal, De Stuw, from which the group derived its name, the "De Stuw group". See U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS): R & A 209: Recent Political Developments in Netherlands Indies, 8 January 1942.
they would govern the N.E.I. after the war and Australia should govern the Dutch islands or they should at least be a condominium. Assuming that Evatt was accurately reported, it is doubtful that his reference to Australia governing the N.E.I. represented Australian government policy, although Netherlands and N.E.I. officials in Australia certainly paid serious attention to it.

However, on 3 September 1942 Evatt did state publicly that the Australian Labor government shared the anti-colonial viewpoint that the British and U.S. governments had enunciated in the Atlantic Charter? The "broad principles" of the Charter, he declared, would govern the future of the Pacific and South East Asian regions. In particular he specifically stated that Australia would be interested in expanding its economic relations with its near neighbours in the South-West Pacific in order to prevent the formation of another Japanese co-prosperity sphere and to forestall the re-establishment of colonial monopolistic economies in the Pacific.

From the time the Atlantic Charter was proclaimed on 12 August 1941 the Netherlands government identified its policies towards the N.E.I. with the Atlantic principles. On 26 August 1941 Soetardjo, an Indonesian member of the Netherlands Indies Volkeraad, had asked the Netherlands government-in-exile in London whether the Atlantic Charter would apply to the N.E.I. On 13 November the Netherlands government replied evasively:

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3 See below, Appendix III, Document 1.

...As the principles of the Charter were already adopted long ago by the Netherlands government... and executed within the kingdom, adherence to the Charter does not represent a special reason for new consideration regarding the aims of its policy, more especially as far as the Indonesian population is concerned.\(^1\)

Thereafter the Dutch Royal family, which resided in Washington during the German wartime occupation of the Netherlands, came under increasing pressure from President Roosevelt to make a firm commitment to change the post-war status of the N.E.I. In an address to the U.S. Congress on 6 August 1942, Queen Wilhelmina described political changes that had already occurred in the N.E.I., reiterated the Netherlands' support for the Atlantic Charter, but said nothing of the future. Apparently to allay U.S. pressure, the Queen made a radio broadcast on 6 December 1942 in which she expressed confidence that the Netherlands Kingdom would be reconstituted after the war on the basis of a "voluntary" and "complete partnership" which was fully consistent with the purpose of the Atlantic Charter.\(^2\) Implicit in the Queen's statement was both a rejection by the Netherlands of foreign interference in its domestic jurisdiction in the N.E.I., and a view of the Atlantic Charter which diverged from that of the U.S.

An unofficial conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in December 1942 served to emphasise that the current divergence between the Netherlands' approach to the post-war N.E.I. and that of the U.S. and of Australia also reflected itself in non-governmental opinion in the respective countries. A U.S. paper proposed that the colonies of South East Asia should either be internationalised or converted to trusteeships


\(^{2}\) See below, Appendix III, Document 2.
after the war. Likewise, an Australian paper by Mr W.D. Forsyth\(^1\) of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, suggested that Australia's contribution to the defence of the N.E.I. "might be important enough to give her some influence on Dutch policy". In any case, Forsyth thought Australia would be bound to press for...an international mandate system over colonial territories in this region, or the rapid construction of an Indonesian Union as a new composite state under the tutelage of the powers, or the covering of this area along with the rest of the Pacific or a large part of it by an international police system, or...imperial cooperation turning the whole of Malaya into a fortress and on an alliance with the Dutch with mutual use of Indonesian and Australian bases....\(^2\)

Not surprisingly, the Dutch rejected such ideas about an international colonial mandate system; and tended to equate its advocacy in the U.S., Britain and Australia with neo-colonialism. In December 1942 the Netherlands Indies Chief Commissioner in Australia, Dr Ch. O. van der Plas,\(^3\) considered Australia's aspirations for post-war political and economic dominance in the Pacific as particularly threatening to the N.E.I. He reported talk of an Australian mandate over the N.E.I. based on assumptions that Australia would take responsibility for allied recovery of the outer N.E.I. islands - at the least, the Soembas, Timor, and New Guinea.\(^4\)

The idea that Australia should participate in allied reoccupation of the N.E.I. apparently developed during 1942-1943 as a challenge to assumptions by the U.S. that its wartime command of the South West Pacific Area (S.W.P.A.), including the N.E.I. (with the exception of Sumatra)

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\(^1\) In 1942 Forsyth joined the Department of External Affairs in which he assumed the position of Head of the Pacific Division.


\(^3\) In order to emphasise the unity between the Netherlands and the N.E.I. and also to weaken the separatist inclinations of the N.E.I. administrators, the Netherlands government-in-exile regularly rotated the chief N.E.I. officials between London, Washington, and Melbourne.

\(^4\) *Collectie van Kleffens* (Algemeen Rijksarchief [A.R.A.]). Note for the Minister for Foreign Affairs. From Ch. O. van der Plas, Melbourne, 29 December 1942.
also conferred on it sole rights to political influence in the post-war N.E.I. On a visit to Washington during April-May 1943 Evatt is reported to have submitted a memorandum to the U.S. State Department asking that the U.S. make some concession to Australia. Evatt is understood to have proposed that Australia assume post-war control of Dutch Timor, Dutch New Guinea, and the Kei, Aru and Tanimbar islands.

While Evatt subsequently denied the report of his discussions at the U.S. State Department, there is no disputing that one of the objectives of his 1943 visit to the U.S. was to establish Australia's claim to a 'foothold' in the post-war Pacific. On 19 April he told a press conference in New York:

As against Japan this is not merely a war to retain or regain territory....Australia, as a leading nation of the south-west Pacific zone, will have a very special concern in economic, as well as strategic arrangements in that zone...any post-war order in the Pacific cannot be for the sole benefit of one power or group of powers. Its dominant purpose must be that of benefitting the peoples everywhere. If "freedom from want" means anything, it means that the age of unfair exploitation is over. The attainment of a higher and better standard of life for all the Pacific peoples involves the assumption of specific duties or obligations towards the peoples concerned. In short, we must found future Pacific policy on the doctrine of trusteeship for the benefit of all the Pacific peoples....

In a press statement issued in the U.S. on 28 April 1943, Evatt emphasised and expanded the regional and international perspectives which Australia's postwar foreign policy would include.


2 In the Dutch newspaper, Java Bode (Batavia) on 14 November 1949, a journalist, Hubert Goupillon, claimed knowledge of the contents of confidential notes of Evatt's conversations at the State Department in April-May 1943, including the contents of the memorandum cited. Copy. Hubert Goupillon, "Australië's mentaliteit onthuld", Java Bode, 14 November 1949. Archief DIRVO (Directie Verre Oosten). L. Australië. Under cover of the Chief of DIRVO (Dr J.G. de Beus) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 18 November 1949. 13265/801

3 See Map 5.

4 The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 1949, which reported the Java Bode article, also carried Dr Evatt's denial that any such discussion had taken place.

5 UNIA, Vol. XIV, No.6 (June 1943), pp.214-215.
Australia will naturally regard as of crucial importance to its security the arc of islands lying to the north and north-east of our continent...it will...be vitally concerned as to who shall live in, develop, and control these areas....The history of the period...preceding the present war made it clear that the lust for colonial areas is a constant threat to the security of the world and will no longer be tolerated by the public opinion of enlightened peoples.... The major attention has up to the present been placed upon the political aspects of development....

Australia feels that emphasis should also be placed upon the economic factor. In short the principle of trusteeship also implies that the trustee power will ensure that the economic development of colonial areas is conducted in a way which is not opposed to the interests of the peoples of the world....

...If the general principles of the Atlantic Charter are carried out by the countries adhering to it, it may become necessary for their Governments to accept obligations of an international character affecting matters which, in the past, have normally been regarded as matters of domestic concern only, and to accept responsibility for standards of living and for economic development in countries beyond their own borders.¹

Evatt's emphasis on international economic integration implied a flexible approach to both internal and external sovereignty. As such, it conflicted sharply with the Netherlands' attitude towards the post-war reconstruction of the N.E.I., which was based on a strict concept of sovereignty, both internal and external.

This conflict of approach between Australia and the Netherlands became overt as a result of Evatt's statements in the U.S. in April 1943. The Netherlands government-in-exile in London took particular exception to an address which Evatt made at Holland House in New York on 26 April. Possibly intent on impressing the U.S. with Australia's claim to a post-war foothold in the N.E.I., Evatt spoke expansively of Australian-Dutch wartime cooperation. However, he also declared:

Australia regards Australian-Dutch relations as being vital....The Netherlands East Indies and Australia can become great partners in developing and bringing a

¹ Evatt, op.cit., pp.116-118.
better way of life to the peoples of Indonesia.¹

In a joint interview on 14 May with the Prime Minister, Mr J. Curtin, van Aerssen and van der Plas handed Curtin an Aide-Memoire in which the Netherlands government stated emphatically that, while interested in mutual defence cooperation with Australia, it could not agree to any power, however friendly, becoming a "partner" in improving the lot of the Indonesian peoples.²

Curtin had his own conception of Australia as a principal power in the postwar Pacific. He therefore fully supported Evatt's proposition that Australia and the N.E.I. should cooperate closely regarding territories in which they had a mutual interest and towards which, he maintained, they would both have definite postwar obligations. He told van Aerssen and van der Plas that by "partnership" Evatt would only have meant a relationship such as existed between members of the British Commonwealth.³ However, both Curtin's and Evatt's conception of an Australia-N.E.I. regional relationship implicitly circumvented the Netherlands as the metropolitan and sovereign power. Curtin did not succeed, therefore, in placating Dutch apprehension about Australian aspirations.

The domestic political desirability of maintaining Australia's confidence in its wartime allies possibly influenced the Australian government to clarify its policy on colonial sovereignty at the time of the federal elections in September 1943. In a pre-election speech on 28 July 1943 Curtin declared:

To the north is Dutch New Guinea, and the other large N.E.I. Islands, and as we look forward to a restored Holland, it is therefore our Government's duty to respect the sovereignty of the territory of Queen Wilhelmina....Australia's fate is bound up with that of the Netherlands East Indies and of the French and

³ Ibid.
Portuguese Governments. Australia is almost surrounded by island possessions of these Governments...Australia certainly will play a major part in carrying out the restoration to their proper owners of the colonies lying off our coast which have been temporarily lost to them...1

Curtin's statement underlined the short-term incompatibility of promulgating an anti-colonial policy at the same time as sustaining wartime cooperation with colonial powers.

In the long-term there was also tension between the Australian government's anti-colonial policy and its defence interests in combining with Holland, France, Portugal, as well as Britain and the U.S., to form a post-war "Southwest Pacific zone of security against aggression".2 In a pre-election newspaper article Evatt enumerated some of the diverse policies which the government was trying to coordinate.

Of course we have no desire of aggrandizement or prejudicing the sovereignty of the Netherlands, France, or Portugal....But we cannot again afford to have defence areas of such weakness to attract the unwelcome attention of an aggressor.... We will be trustees...for a decent world order in the Pacific sphere of influence....There is an opportunity of great industrial expansion for Australia in those undeveloped markets of the north. Never was a good neighbour policy more desirable in the interest of all concerned.3

Such statements, which tended to confirm the apprehension of Netherlands' officials that the Australian army would be used to achieve post-war political and economic expansion, militated against Australia's desire for defence cooperation with the Netherlands.

In any case the Netherlands government proceeded in August 1943 to make its own plans for ensuring that a Dutch army reoccupied the N.E.I. It advised the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) that immediately after the liberation of the Netherlands it would raise an army to assist the U.S.-led

2 Evatt, pre-election speech, 4 August 1943 in Australia and the Pacific, op.cit., p.33 Footnote.
3 Evatt, op.cit., pp.132-133.
S.W.P.A. Command in the war against Japan. \(^{1}\) Then, on 4 October 1943, without advising the Australian government, \(^{2}\) it appointed Lieutenant-General L.H. van Oyen to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Land Forces in the South-West Pacific, in which capacity he transferred to Australia.

In a ministerial statement of 14 October 1943, Evatt reiterated Australia's claim to recognition as a party to the Allies' reoccupying the N.E.I.

As a result of the war Australia must show a particular interest in the welfare and system of control of those islands and territories which lie close to our shores. From the point of view of defence, of trade and of transport most of them can fairly be described as coming within an extended Australian zone... Australia has become the base from which the Dutch colonies will finally be regained.

All these adjacent islands, together with Australia and New Zealand, form a great zone of mutual interest. It would be blindness not to recognize their complementarity. \(^{3}\)

Evatt's concern to press Australia's case had involved some retraction from his emphasis in April 1943 that the war against Japan could "not merely regain [colonial] territory". \(^{4}\) He revealed his priority to security in November 1943 by instructing the Australian High Commissioner in London, Mr S.M. Bruce, to propose to the Netherlands government-in-exile that, without impairing its sovereignty, it accord Australia a long lease over Dutch Timor and Dutch New Guinea. Evatt made the point to Bruce that these islands had in 1941-1942 been left practically defenceless by the Dutch, which had been highly undesirable from Australia's point of view. \(^{5}\)

Australia's cooperation with the N.E.I. became open to question after the Netherlands Minister to Australia (van Aerssen) informed Curtin on 12 November 1943 that van Mook would soon arrive in Australia to resume

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\(^{2}\) X

\(^{3}\) Evatt, op.cit., pp.142-144.

\(^{4}\) See Supra, this chapter, p.30.

\(^{5}\) X
the position of Lieutenant Governor-General of the N.E.I.; and that the N.E.I. administration in Australia would be reorganised.\textsuperscript{1} Viewed in conjunction with the recent appointment of van Oyen, these plans implied that the Netherlands would itself take military and civil responsibility for the recovery of the N.E.I. The independence (vis-à-vis Australia) with which the Dutch were apparently proceeding to re-establish the \textit{status quo ante bellum} conflicted with Australia's expectation that, as the territorial base of the N.E.I. administration, Australia could expect the Netherlands to recognise certain Australian interests in relation to the post-war N.E.I.

Moreover, it appears that Australia was sensitive about the presence in Australia of a fully-fledged N.E.I. colonial administration. On 9 December 1943 the Department of External Affairs instructed Bruce in London to strongly discourage van Mook's appointment to Australia as Lieutenant Governor-General; also to advise the Netherlands Foreign Minister that the time was most inopportune for a formal reorganisation of the N.E.I. administration in Australia.\textsuperscript{2} Bruce urged Canberra not to obstruct the Dutch plans\textsuperscript{3}, but in overruling Bruce's objection the Department of External Affairs explained that it wanted to avoid the impression that an N.E.I. gubernatorial regime was operating in Australia and to discourage complacency by the Dutch about an imminent reoccupation of the N.E.I.\textsuperscript{4}

The Netherlands government proceeded without the cooperation of the Australian government. A Royal Netherlands decree of 23 December 1943 established a Netherlands Indies government and vested the full constitutional powers of the Governor-General in the Lieutenant Governor-General for as long


\textsuperscript{2} X

\textsuperscript{3} X

\textsuperscript{4} X
as the government was not resident in the N.E.I.\(^1\) On 24 December, in
affirmation of earlier advice, van Aerssen informed Curtin that van Mook
would be coming to Australia shortly and would discuss with the Australian
government the plans of the Netherlands government to establish the
Netherlands Indies government in Australia.\(^2\) In reply Evatt indicated that
the Australian government would be anxious to see van Mook as soon as
possible after his arrival and would reserve its attitude towards the
establishment of an N.E.I. government in Australia until that time.\(^3\)

Possibly domestic political considerations caused Evatt to insist
in December 1943 that it would be inopportune for an N.E.I. administration
to formalise its extra-territorial status in Australia. As a result of
considerable pressure from within the Australian labour movement, Evatt as
Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs had that month been
responsible for releasing from Australian military detention some 300
Indonesian political detainees. The Dutch had transferred them from Dutch
New Guinea in June 1943 and had them imprisoned in Australia under an extra-
territorial arrangement they had with the Australian government.\(^4\) Dutch
policy towards the Indonesian political detainees, many of whom had been
held at the Tanah Merah camp at Boven Digoel in Dutch New Guinea since the
abortive Indonesian communist coup in 1926–1927, had caused enough offence


\(^2\) *Londens Archief*. Australië politiek G.B. 428/44. Under cover of van
Aerssen to Mr J. Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, Melbourne, 24
December 1943. To avoid direct confrontation with Evatt, the Netherlands
Foreign Minister, Mr E. van Kleffens, advised van Aerssen to address all
communications regarding van Mook’s appointment to Curtin. Nevertheless,
most of the replies came from Evatt.

\(^3\) *Ibid.*, H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs to Baron van Aerssen, Canberra
Sydney, 31 December 1943. Under cover of letter for Foreign Affairs,
London. W.8/77.

Australië. Arrestanten Casino. This arrangement appears only to have been
formalised on 24 November 1943 when Australia’s Minister for the Army, Mr
F.M. Forde, authorised the detention in Australian prisons or military
barracks of members of the Netherlands Forces and presumably persons under
their jurisdiction guilty of infringing Netherlands civil or military law.
(especially in the light of Labor's doctrine of anticolonialism) for Evatt to defer, at least temporarily, to this sectional public reaction.

Evatt may also have regarded van Mook's arrival in Australia at the end of 1943 as particularly untimely in relation to the forthcoming Australia-New Zealand Conference in January 1944. The object of the Conference was for Australia and New Zealand jointly to formulate a policy towards post-war security in the Pacific.

Foreshadowing the Australia-New Zealand Conference, Curtin explained his conception of Australia as a principal postwar Pacific power.

... The smaller Powers have their parts to play and their contributions to make. Where, as in the case of Australia and New Zealand, they are autonomous nations in close proximity to the colonies of Powers whose seats of Government are located in other continents, they are in a pre-eminent position to speak with authority on the problems of the Pacific and have a primary part in their solution.

The geographical position of Australia has determined her destiny to be that of a Pacific power...¹

Curtin maintained this emphasis throughout the Australia-New Zealand Conference, which was geared to impressing on the U.S., and to a lesser extent on Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal that Australia (and New Zealand) had a claim to regional leadership. The anti-colonial element in Australia's foreign and defence policy tended to become muted vis-à-vis its preoccupation with asserting its right to a regional 'foothold'.

As a part of this, Curtin explained Australia's interest to have a 'forward defence' position within the so-called "arc of islands".²

In our hands or those of friendly powers and adequately defended they are a bulwark in the defence of the two dominions and points of offensive action against the enemy... It is vital that forward bases be located where maintenance can be assured. They should not be capable of being by-passed, neutralized and ultimately occupied.³

¹ Address to the Triennial Conference of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in Australia Looks to the Future (Australian News and Information Bureau, New York, 1944), p.5. December 1943
² See Supra, this chapter, p.31, quotation.
³ ANETA, Canberra, 18 January 1944.
As enunciated by Curtin, the task of the Conference was for Australia and New Zealand to allocate to themselves their "proper" regional responsibilities after which it was hoped that neighbouring countries would voluntarily support the Australia-New Zealand 'terms' as a basis for regional collaboration. Evatt's description of the resultant Australia-New Zealand Agreement as a "Pacific Charter" gave the impression of its emulating the Anglo-American Atlantic Charter. Anticipating the dubbing of Australia's policy as "jingoism" or "imperialism," Evatt offered his own interpretation by describing it as "expansion...in accordance with our rapidly increasing responsibilities."

The Australia-New Zealand Agreement (ANZAC Pact) did not receive the international recognition for which Australia had hoped. The U.S. in particular rejected the idea of a South West Pacific regional conference as premature in relation to an international declaration of post-war principles. Publicly and privately Evatt appealed to the Dutch to support the Australian-New Zealand principles, but the Netherlands Foreign Minister (van Kleffens)

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1 CNIA, Vol. XV, No.1 (January 1944), pp.12-14 [Curtin's address at the opening of the Conference, 17 January 1944].
2 Ibid., p.19 [Curtin's address at the signing of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement, 21 January 1944].
3 For text, see Appendix III, Document 3.
5 Evatt, op.cit., p.178.
curtailed discussion of the Agreement outside the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, which itself made no official comment.¹

From January 1944 there was particular reason for Australia to press its claims in relation to the N.E.I. on both the U.S. and the Netherlands. At their Cairo Conference in December 1943 the CCS had decided that the course of the offensive against Japan would be through the N.E.I. Accordingly, in January 1944 the U.S. and the Netherlands were negotiating reoccupation policies. From late 1943 increasingly liberal statements by the Dutch about post-war policies in the N.E.I. appeared to reflect increasing Dutch apprehension about Japanese encouragement of Indonesian nationalism.² However, Dutch statements of intent appeared to mollify distrust of Dutch colonial policy by the U.S. and Britain who became less dubious of restoring Dutch sovereignty in the N.E.I. As a result the U.S. announced in February 1944 that the U.S. operational command (S.W.P.A.) would restore Dutch sovereignty in the liberated N.E.I., although the U.S. government would reserve the right to confer with the Netherlands government on post-war policies of mutual interest.³ The U.S. thereby agreed to restore the *status quo ante bellum* in the N.E.I.

This U.S.-Netherlands understanding conflicted with Australia's desire that the restoration of colonial sovereignty be subject to the Netherlands' prior commitment to make changes in post-war colonial welfare policies. However, in so far as the U.S. was in operational command of the S.W.P.A. and Australia wanted to persuade the U.S. to its participating in the reoccupation of the N.E.I., Australia apparently deferred to the U.S. Moreover, since the U.S. was concerned to influence post-war Dutch policy in the N.E.I., it was in Australia's interest to cooperate with the U.S.

² See Appendix II.
Such was the situation when van Mook arrived in Australia to assume his position as Lieutenant Governor-General of the N.E.I. at the end of February 1944. Van Aerssen and van Mook immediately conferred with Curtin and Evatt on plans for an expanded N.E.I. governmental apparatus in Australia. Neither Curtin\(^1\) nor Evatt\(^2\) took exception to the proposals as set forth in a Netherlands Aide-Memoire which emphasised both the temporary domicile of the N.E.I. administration in Australia and de-emphasised its status as a 'government'. Australia's sensitivity to this latter point continued. When, on 5 March 1944, van Mook publicly referred to the nucleus of an N.E.I. "government" in Australia, Curtin replied to press inquiries in the following way.

The office of the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies and the Executive Council for the administration of the Netherlands East Indies will be domiciled temporarily in Australia as the Commonwealth is a convenient location for carrying on their administration, but they are not going to establish a Government in Australia.\(^3\)

The contrast between Curtin's statement, which gave the public impression that Australia's political relationship to the N.E.I. administration was solely a pragmatic and geographically-determined wartime obligation, and Evatt's official letter to van Aerssen in which he welcomed the N.E.I. governmental changes, revealed the ambiguous elements in Australia's attitude to the N.E.I. In the latter Evatt pronounced Australia's desire for close cooperation not only with the N.E.I. administration domiciled in Australia, but also between Australia and the N.E.I. on postwar questions of security and welfare which involved their mutual interests and responsibilities.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 March 1944.

\(^4\) *Londen Archief*, A I 43, op.cit., H.V. Evatt to Baron van Aerssen, Netherlands Minister, Canberra. Canberra, 5 April 1944.
As distinct from Evatt's advocacy of bilateral cooperation between Australia and the N.E.I., Curtin emphasised that it was important for the security of Australia that weak metropolitan powers should not retain exclusive responsibility over colonial territories. Reiterating Australia's interest to include the U.S. and Britain in postwar security arrangements for the region, he announced at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London in April 1944 that, in addition to a regional colonial commission for the South West Pacific, as outlined in the Australia-New Zealand Agreement, Australia envisaged another for South East Asia and the N.E.I. Recalling the assistance the Japanese had received from the peoples of the region, Curtin stated that Australia would welcome the post-war "intrusion of American influence", even if at the expense of the Dutch and the French.¹ If Curtin had been hoping for an expression of British support for Australia's regional proposal, this was not forthcoming. The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, stated a preference for post-war international control of occupied colonial territories by the United Nations, though possibly including U.S. trusteeship.²

Moreover, in the immediate instance, Australia's proposal for an increase of U.S. influence in the post-war N.E.I. conflicted with British strategic policy. Britain was planning a major offensive within its South East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.) area to regain Singapore and the Malay peninsula. For that reason it was keen that the N.E.I., currently divided between the British-controlled S.E.A.C. and the U.S.-controlled S.W.P.A. operational areas, should be unified under S.E.A.C.³ Many U.S. strategists including General Douglas MacArthur, then Supreme Allied Commander of the South West Pacific (S.W.P.A.), distrusted British political motives in relation to the N.E.I.⁴ In June 1944 MacArthur advised van der Plas, second to van Mook's deputy

² Ibid.
⁴ Sullivan, op.cit., p.112.
in the N.E.I. administration in Australia), that he would resist any attempt to remove the N.E.I. from his S.W.P.A. command.\textsuperscript{1}

At the same time MacArthur told van der Plas that the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces, General Thomas Blamey, objected to the present division of Australian troops between the British and U.S. commands in the Pacific; and that he (Blamey) had proposed their unification under a separate Australian command in the N.E.I.\textsuperscript{2} Van der Plas in turn strongly cautioned against this proposal, contending that there was an 'annexationist' group within the Australian army which had links with Blamey.\textsuperscript{3} Van der Plas's description of this annexation group strongly suggests he was referring to persons within the Post-war Planning Section of the Far Eastern Liaison Office (F.E.L.O.),\textsuperscript{4} which was a branch of the Allied Intelligence Bureau.

Given van der Plas's distrust of Australia's intentions towards the N.E.I., Evatt's effusive description of Australia-N.E.I. relations in July 1944 would not have allayed such suspicions. In a ministerial statement he declared:

Our relations with the Netherlands East Indies are of the most intimate character....There is in Australia today the nucleus of the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, which will resume occupation of its territory after the war. But we do not talk about these things every day because the relations between Australia and the Netherlands East Indies are so close, so friendly, and so accepted....Australia's participation in the recovery of their territories from the enemy will lead to even closer relations in peacetime.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Londen Archieven} Brandkast I\textsuperscript{a} 13, Open telegram to Washington from van Aerssen, Melbourne, 12 June 1944. No.9 367-374.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Van Mook Papers}, Doos 3,Folder 7. Open telegram to Washington from van Aerssen, Melbourne, 12 June 1944. Personal message from van der Plas to the Ambassador.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Archief Algemeene Secretarie} 2/678. Letter to N.S. Blom from J.E. van Hoogstraten, Melbourne 19 July 1944; \textit{Ibid}. Letter N.S. Blom from J.E. van Hoogstraten, Melbourne 1944. Information from Mr van der Plas about F.E.L.O.

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{CPD}, Vol. 179, p.236.
The contrast with Curtin's blunt denial four months previously that there was an N.E.I. government in Australia,¹ and the combination of Evatt's evasion of the question of Dutch sovereignty and his implicit satisfaction with Australia's strategic relationship to the N.E.I., all suggested Australia was more confident about realising its interests in relation to the N.E.I.

Very much the junior partner, Australia accepted American strategic leadership and planning with the S.W.P.A., although not to the exclusion of Australian interests. Australia also seemed confident of its participation in the recovery of the N.E.I. under the U.S. command. Nevertheless, it appears that Australia became a pawn in the U.S.-British rivalry to acquire complete strategic jurisdiction over the N.E.I. In a meeting with van der Plas on 14 August 1944,² MacArthur reportedly spoke of the insistence with which the Australian military command had pressed him to use Australian ground and naval forces for the campaign in the N.E.I. MacArthur shared van der Plas's belief that the Australian attempt to remove the N.E.I. from his command had been engineered by an annexationist group linked with Blamey. He told van der Plas that he had made a stern complaint to Curtin, in which he had indicated that he discerned sinister intentions in the attempt. MacArthur promised to assist van der Plas to counter Australian political meddling. He also suggested that Dutch interests would be better served by U.S. control of Australian ground troops within the S.W.P.A. command rather than their transfer to a British command.³

At Joint Staff conversations in Honolulu during August 1944,⁴ the British again pressed their claim for the transfer of the N.E.I. from

¹ See Supra, this chapter, p.40.
² All information following in this paragraph is based on Enquête Commissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945 ('s-Gravenhage, 1956) Deel 8C-II: Militair Beleid 1940-1945, pp.487-488.
⁴ Londens Archief Brandkast 13. Notes by Ch. O. van der Plas on conversation with General Pellers and General MacArthur, Brisbane, 19 August 1944.
the S.W.P.A. command to S.E.A.C. MacArthur advised Roosevelt\(^1\) of his profound distrust of British economic-political motives in relation to the N.E.I. Whatever the case, Roosevelt assured MacArthur he had no intention of conceding the N.E.I. to the British command. Though Roosevelt had not succeeded in extracting from the Dutch a commitment to post-war changes in the N.E.I., it seems he shared MacArthur's view that a U.S. command would enable the U.S. to continue to press its views on the Dutch. On the other hand, the transfer of the N.E.I. to a British command would reinforce mutual British-Dutch colonial interests.

Dutch officialdom was divided between support for the British and U.S. claims to strategic jurisdiction over the N.E.I. The Prime Minister, Mr P.S. Gerbrandy, and several members of his Cabinet, distrusted Roosevelt's attitude towards the restoration of Dutch sovereignty in the N.E.I. They therefore regarded British jurisdiction as the more politically advantageous arrangement. On the other hand van Kleffens and van Mook favoured continuing the U.S. command.\(^2\) Later in 1944, when Britain gave strong support in Washington to Dutch and French representations to the C.C.S. to grant a role to Dutch and French troops in the Pacific war, Dutch opinion shifted in favour of British jurisdiction over the N.E.I.\(^3\) However, no immediate change occurred in the division of the N.E.I. between the two commands.

It was within this context that the Netherlands government formally asked the Australian government on 16 August 1944 if it would agree "in principle" to the arrival, accommodation, training and maintenance in Australia of 30,000 Dutch troops. There had been informal discussion between the Australian and Netherlands governments of such an arrangement after

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\(^1\) All information following in this paragraph based on Enquête Commissie, *op.cit.*, Deel 8C-II, pp.

\(^2\) All information above in this paragraph is based on Enquête Commissie, *op.cit.*, Deels A en B, pp.

\(^3\) Sullivan, *op.cit.*, p.151.
the arrival of Lieutenant-General van Oyen in Australia at the end of 1943. Following the arrival of van Mook in Australia in February 1944, the Australian government had again informally indicated a favourable attitude to the proposal. On 21 September the Australian War Cabinet accepted the proposal "in principle", with the proviso that Australian assistance would be conditional on Australia's own commitments.¹

It was amidst this profusion of uncertainties about Allied strategic jurisdiction over the N.E.I., and about Australia's own participation in recovery operations, that Evatt attempted to conclude an agreement with the Dutch for present and future civil and military coordination between Australia and the N.E.I. In conjunction with the formal establishment in Australia of a provisional government for the Netherlands East Indies on 14 September 1944, Evatt proposed a series of informal and confidential conversations between the Department of External Affairs and representatives of the Netherlands and N.E.I. governments. The Department of External Affairs indicated vaguely that the aim of the conversations was to establish closer relations and to discuss conditions for a general understanding and means of contact between Australia and the new N.E.I. government.²

The continuing difference between Australia's and the Netherlands' concept of sovereignty in the N.E.I. made van Kleffens instinctively suspicious that the Australian proposal concealed ulterior motives.³ Nevertheless, persuaded that informal conversations on definite subjects might be useful, he condoned Dutch participation, provided that Australia accepted specific preconditions.

¹ Archief Genantschap Canberra 921.12. Training 27,000 Netherlands Troops in Australia. Statement made by Mr Chifley, 8 August 1945.
Australia agreed

(i) to acknowledge the territorial integrity of the N.E.I.;
(ii) that all discussion or agreement would be on a completely reciprocal basis; and
(iii) that the full Netherlands sovereignty over the N.E.I. precluded acceptance of responsibilities for internal changes in the N.E.I. from other than an international authority of which the Netherlands was a member.¹

On this basis Mr J.D.L. Hood² and Mr D.P. McGuire³ (Australia); Mr W.E. van Panhuys⁴ (Netherlands government); and Dr J.E. van Hoogstraten⁵ and Mr N.S. Blom⁶ (N.E.I. government) began discussions on 19 September 1944. The non-ministerial level of the conversations was a deliberate Australian attempt to counteract Dutch distrust of Australia to which Evatt had personally given rise.⁷

Discussion at the meetings soon revealed Australia's aim to conclude a formal agreement (along the lines of the Anzac Pact) covering the return to the N.E.I. of the N.E.I. government in Australia. Implicitly such an agreement would supplement McArthur's informal agreement to restore Dutch civil government in the liberated N.E.I. However, the Dutch participants were under instruction to curtail discussion of military and defence matters which might jeopardise the Netherlands' favourable understanding with MacArthur; and generally to discourage Australia for anticipating any Dutch commitment on large political questions.⁸ Therefore, Australia's attempt to

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² First Secretary, Counsellor, Department of External Affairs.
³ Far Eastern Liaison Office (F.E.L.O.), Melbourne.
⁴ Counsellor, Netherlands Legation, Melbourne.
⁵ N.E.I. Director of Economic Affairs.
⁶ N.E.I. Director of Justice.
⁸ Aanteekening over 7713 G.A. [van Kleffens], op.cit., n.d.
obtain Dutch commitment on precisely those subjects which the Dutch participants were bound to avoid, meant the conversations were frustrated in so far as this Australian objective was concerned. Discussion was thereby reduced to inconsequential subjects on which cooperation of immediate practical convenience to both parties could be achieved.1 Nevertheless, during October/November, Evatt2 and van Aerssen3 approved the continuation of informal exploratory conversations.

When the conversations resumed in November 1944 Australia again attempted to introduce a number of large regional political questions,4 which the Dutch, on advice from van Kleffens, declined to discuss.5 In further conversations in January 1945 a similar confrontation occurred. On this occasion Australia urged the desirability of issuing a public statement about the informal conversations between the Australian and N.E.I. governments. Clearly Australia attached public importance to an impression of intergovernmental cooperation.

Australia's insistence produced a draft statement which Evatt was to submit to van Kleffens. The draft statement indicated that consultation would continue in regard to specific areas of cooperation for relief and rehabilitation in the N.E.I.; that close commercial and economic relations between Australia and the N.E.I. would be advantageous; and that officials would jointly consider the possibilities of economic cooperation.6

2 Ibid., H.V. Evatt to Baron van Aerssen, Canberra, 10 November 1944. T.3/4135.
3 Ibid., Brandkast II B6 van Aerssen, Melbourne, 24 October 1944, T 3/3913 to H.V. Evatt.
In the draft of a letter to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs,¹ Australia would have offered its full assistance to the N.E.I. government to provide post-war relief and rehabilitation for the peoples of the N.E.I. The draft letter mentioned that for this purpose and also in relation to the basing of Netherlands forces in Australia, Australia and the N.E.I. were negotiating a financial agreement. It also expressed the hope that such current collaboration would establish the basis for a close continuing relationship between the Australian and N.E.I. governments. Furthermore it indicated Australia's readiness to enter high-level discussion on major subjects of mutual interest, especially with regard to future economic and commercial relations between Australia and the N.E.I.

Australia's desire for a cooperative and direct relationship with the N.E.I. government, as enunciated here, reflected an attempt to reconcile Labor's anti-colonialism and Australia's defence interests in an approach which gave priority to a good neighbour policy² with the N.E.I. By indicating its interest in a greater N.E.I. autonomy which would facilitate bilateral regional relations between the N.E.I. and its neighbours (primarily Australia), and its interest in the improved colonial welfare of the peoples of the N.E.I., Australia expressed no challenge to Dutch sovereignty per se and implicitly supported its restoration.

Evatt was to have submitted the draft letter and the draft public statement to van Kleffens in London in March 1945, but it appears that he did not do so. It is conceivable that Evatt received advice of, and took into account, an impending change in S.W.P.A. strategy. In March 1945

¹ All information following in this paragraph is based on Ibid. Draft letter to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, 26 February 1945.
MacArthur announced that instead of conducting its offensive against Japan by reoccupying the N.E.I., the S.W.P.A. command would direct its offensive through the Philippines.¹

This strategic change involved a conflict in Australia's overall priorities. For the recognition of Australia's claim to a post-war role as a principal Pacific power — in particular, its inclusion by the major Allied powers in the post-war settlement with Japan — it was important to Australia that its forces play a significant part in the Allied offensive against Japan. However, whereas the U.S. was not averse to using Australian ground forces in the S.W.P.A. command's superseded plans to reoccupy the N.E.I., for reasons of U.S. prestige it was important that U.S. forces liberate the Philippines. Australian forces were thereby allocated the marginal task of reoccupying the outer north-eastern N.E.I. islands. However, in the changed strategical situation, these operations (which began late in April 1945) were of considerably less military or political significance.²

In the meantime, with the opening of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation in San Francisco on 25 April 1945, Australia's attention had shifted to the international arena. In Wellington 1 - 6 November 1944 Australia and New Zealand had formulated their joint proposals for general international organisation including the principle that "powers responsible for dependent territories should accept the principle of trusteeship".³ And at the British Commonwealth Conference in London 4 - 13 April 1945 Australia enunciated its concept of "the duty of the more advanced countries towards the native peoples of dependent territories".⁴ As well,

² John Hetherington, Blamey (Melbourne, 1954), p.218: "...with the knowledge that MacArthur had no intention of using Australian land forces on any other front...Blamey had to accept what was offered, or see the Australian Military Forces fade out of the Pacific picture."
Evatt advanced Australia's claim to international recognition as a "middle power" and as a "security power" (along with the great powers). In these terms Evatt wanted Australia to be identified with the middle powers which included France and the Netherlands.

By contrast, there was a marked lack of identity of interest and lack of cooperation between Australia and the Netherlands at the San Francisco Conference. In relation to the N.E.I., it seemed that what Australia had failed to achieve trilaterally, it was bent on achieving internationally. Australia's determination that trusteeship for colonial territories be accepted as a universal principle, together with the reinvolve-ment of Evatt in Australia-Dutch relations, contributed to a deterioration in those relations. At San Francisco the Netherlands delegation proscribed trusteeship as inapplicable to the N.E.I., and rejected any notion of outside interference with internal political developments. The Australian Delegation did not discuss its draft proposals on trusteeship with the Netherlands Delegation and in the Trusteeship debates Evatt antagonised the Dutch delegates by successively ignoring, intimidating or being openly hostile towards them.

As distinct from the Netherlands' insistence on domestic jurisdiction and self-reliance in colonial administration, Australia's proposals for trusteeship emphasised the need to interpose 'security powers' between metropolitan powers and their colonial subjects, both to exercise international

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2 Ibid., p.763.
5 For detailed discussion, see W.J. Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations (Sydney, 1970).
control over the development of dependent peoples and to fill the post-war "strategic vacuum" in colonial territories. With regard to the "strategic vacuum", Australia envisaged the colonial peoples in occupied territories as having an ambivalent attitude towards their returning metropolitan powers, unless 'security powers' were interposed to appease and protect them. These were some of the main points in Evatt's Trusteeship Statement at San Francisco on 10 May 1945. Although regarded as the highpoint of Australia's achievement at the San Francisco Conference, the trusteeship provisions included in the United Nations Charter, which was agreed on at the San Francisco Conference, were not made compulsory, as Australia had hoped. International authority was limited, and the voluntary nature of the system protected the sovereignty of metropolitan powers.

Meanwhile Australia's uncertainty about its participation in the recovery of the N.E.I. from the Japanese had been an element in the deterioration of Australia-Dutch relations during the San Francisco Conference. Following the S.W.P.A. command's decision not to reoccupy Java immediately and to concentrate on the direct offensive against Japan, the C.C.S. approved on 16 April the sending to Australia of an initial Dutch force of only 5,600 troops. The British government subsequently advised the Netherlands government that it could not transport 30,000 Dutch troops to Australia as requested. Then on 31 May, the Australian War Cabinet decided that it would need to give early reconsideration to Australia's capacity to fulfil its agreement "in principle" with the Netherlands government. Chifley's announcement on 1 June of Australia's limited capacity to accept such commitments was, from the Dutch point of view,

1 See Appendix III, Document 4.
2 See below, Appendix III, Document 5.
3 X
5 X
6 CPD, Vol. 182, p.2427.
not encouraging. Finally, on 28 June the Advisory War Cabinet proscribed Australia's acceptance of the initially-proposed 30,000 Dutch troops and reserved its decision with regard to the force of 5,600.¹

Given what had previously seemed Australian preparedness to accept the Dutch force² and van Aerssen's testimony that Australia political and military leaders appeared to regret their official decision,³ it is possible that the policy of the C.C.S. influenced Australia's decision. In any case, it seems that Dutch dissatisfaction with U.S. strategic priorities affected Australia-U.S. relations within the S.W.P.A. command. Blamey's agreement to Australia's 7th Division being used on Balikpapan in late June 1945 had been reluctant. He believed the assault on Balikpapan was intended primarily to strengthen Dutch goodwill,⁴ and so he objected to MacArthur's use of Australian forces for secondary political rather than pragmatic military reasons.

In July 1945 the conflict between C.C.S. strategic priorities and Dutch political considerations became overt. In a policy statement on 10 July the C.C.S. announced:

No [French or] Netherlands Forces will be accepted for operations unless it has been previously agreed that complete control of such forces will be vested in the commander in chief concerned and their actual employment will be determined by him solely on military grounds. The actual use of any force must depend solely on military considerations.⁵

On 13 July, acting on his own initiative, Dr A. Loudon, the Netherlands Minister to Washington, in the course of complaining to the U.S. government that no arrangements for the transport of Dutch troops to Australia were

¹ Archief Geszantschap Canberra 921-12. Statement by Mr Chifley, 8 August 1945, op. cit.
² e.g. Supra, this chapter, p.45.
³ Enquête Commissie, op.cit., Deel 8C-II, pp.459-460.
⁴ Wetherington, op.cit., pp.223-224.
being made, accentuated the basis of Dutch anxiety.

If the eventual invasion, occupation and mopping up of the Netherlands East Indies should be undertaken by American and Australian forces with no Dutch forces present the loss of face which Holland would undergo in the opinion of the natives would never be overcome. ¹

Subsequently the Netherlands government advised the U.S. and Britain that the Netherlands Prime Minister (Professor W. Schermerhorn) and the former Prime Minister (Gerbrandy) wanted to go to the meeting of the C.C.S. at Potsdam to ask Truman and Churchill to agree

(i) to send to Australia for training, a Dutch army of 27,000 in preparation for the liberation of the N.E.I. ² and

(ii) to provide shipping to transport the Dutch military force to the Far East. ³

The U.S. rejected the proposed Netherlands' action and at Potsdam on 24 July the C.C.S. agreed "in principle" to transfer complete jurisdiction over the N.E.I. from U.S. control under the S.W.P.A. command to British control under S.E.A.C. The C.C.S. also reaffirmed their decision that the use of French or Dutch forces in the Pacific was for the present logistically impractical. ⁴

A week after the Potsdam decisions the question of Australia's policy towards the training of Dutch troops in Australia became the subject of heated domestic political controversy and of confrontation between the Australian government and the Netherlands Minister in Australia. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr R.G. Menzies, charged that the Australian government had broken an "agreement". ⁵ The controversial implications of the issue

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¹ Ibid., p.940.
⁴ Ibid., p.1465.
⁵ CPD, Vol. 184, p.483 (1 August 1945).
became compounded when, on 3 August, a Melbourne newspaper, the *Herald*, published extracts from the government file on the subject. In a comprehensive public statement issued on 8 August the Prime Minister, Mr J.B. Chifley, vehemently defended the Australian government's decision as having been determined by domestic questions of manpower.

Despite domestic political pressure 'to bring the boys home', this explanation seemed inadequate. Australia had its own military force in the N.E.I., which had substantially completed its task of liberating the outer islands, and was on location. Moreover, in order to substantiate its claim to participate in the peace settlement with Japan, Australia had an interest to maintain a military role in the South-West Pacific until Japan was defeated. It also had an interest in enhancing its post-surrender status as a security power in the Pacific and a particular interest in enlarging the N.E.I.'s wartime indebtedness to Australia, so as to enhance its claim to post-war security bases in the N.E.I.

Australia's decision on the training of Dutch troops in Australia had been taken before the transfer of the N.E.I. to S.E.A.C. at Potsdam; but that transfer provided Australia with the chance to reassert its regional status. In statements on 18 and 29 August (following Japan's surrender) Chifley reiterated Australia's claim to be recognised as a "principal Pacific

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1 The incident took on the aspects of collaboration and an anti-government conspiracy by reason of the close personal relationships and sympathy which both Menzies and the proprietor of the Melbourne *Herald*, Sir Keith Murdoch, had developed with Dutch officialdom in Australia during the war, and in particular with the Netherlands Minister, van Aerssen.

2 Archief Gesantschap Canberra 912.12. Statement made by Mr Chifley, 8 August 1945, *op.cit.*

3 Chifley became Prime Minister in July 1945, following the death of Curtin.

4 See U.S. Department of State: Office of Strategic Services: Research and Analysis Branch No.3238: "Australian-Netherlands Controversy over training of Dutch troops" (24 August 1945).

power" and stated its desire for responsibility in the South-West Pacific area to be divided between the British S.E.A.C. command and a 'separate' Australian command. At the same time Australia understood, he said, that S.E.A.C. would assume full civilian control for the areas in which Australia assumed initial military responsibility and to which Australia also understood the respective sovereign powers would, in due course, be restored.¹

As presented by Chifley, Australia's wartime foreign policy aspirations in relation to the N.E.I. conflicted with its actual post-surrender military policies. The former sought an enlarged regional role which the latter denied. In the immediate post-surrender period Australia thus failed to substantiate its claim to an influential role in the post-war N.E.I.

**Summary and conclusion**

The strategic imperative which had shaped Australia's interest in the N.E.I. remained the foremost consideration in Australia's attitudes towards the N.E.I. during the Pacific war. The reality of a Japanese-occupied N.E.I.; the constraints which derived from U.S. and British operational jurisdiction over the N.E.I. area; the presence in Australia of an emigré Dutch regime from the N.E.I. and wartime planning for post-war security in the Pacific, all contributed to Australia's continuing strategic consciousness of the N.E.I.

However, within the context of Australia's general wartime strategic policies, the N.E.I. was a subordinate and subsidiary consideration. During the Pacific war Australia attached a constant priority to asserting its claim to an independent status within the S.W.P.A., and subsequently the S.E.A.C., operational command; also to obtaining both international recognition as a principal Pacific power together with great power cooperation in post-war regional security arrangements. Thus, Australia's enthusiasm to participate

¹ Ibid.
in the military reoccupation of the N.E.I. changed once Allied priority was transferred to a direct offensive against Japan. Australia's interest to participate in the post-surrender settlement with Japan, and to ensure post-war regional involvement in the South West Pacific by the U.S. and Britain also took precedence over continuity in policy towards the N.E.I.

Australia's wartime policies towards the N.E.I. reflected substantially Australia's broad approach to post-war regional and international security. With conscious reference to Japan's pre-war policies towards Australia's Pacific colonial neighbours, Australia envisaged a system of post-war control of colonial territories in which the monopoly of political, economic, social and defence responsibility by the administering metropolitan power would be substituted by a system of plural control. Australia placed special emphasis on the defence and economic aspects of such a framework, namely, the formation of regional security pacts, and plural participation in the economic development of dependent territories.

These dual emphases can be detected in Australia's support for the principle of trusteeship. Australia projected trusteeship as a means of reducing the vulnerability of colonies as objects of aggression by a system which distributed the benefits of economic development between the metropolitan powers, the subject peoples, and extra-administering powers. In so far as this Australian conception of trusteeship challenged traditional notions of colonial sovereignty, it is important to recognise that Australia's emphasis was on the sharing of colonial responsibility between metropolitan powers and other administering powers, as distinct from the extension of self-government to the colonial peoples by the metropolitan powers. Thus, while Australia emphasised the advantage to its security of improving the welfare of colonial peoples, it did not question the continuance of colonial authority over them.

For reasons of contiguity Australia was particularly vehement in applying this general approach to post-war regional security to its
immediate northern foreign neighbour, the N.E.I. In pressing the Dutch to accept the trusteeship principle for the N.E.I. and in attempting both to secure a military foothold in the N.E.I. and to commit the Dutch to an agreement for post-war defence and economic cooperation between Australia and the N.E.I., Australia was interested in establishing itself ahead of any other nation (and in particular the U.S.) as the extra-administrative power in the post-war N.E.I. In so doing, Australia antagonised the Netherlands with what the latter regarded as an apparent desire both to change the nature of Dutch sovereignty in the N.E.I., and to interpose Australia in the sovereign relationship between the Netherlands and the N.E.I.

For its own part, Australia found it difficult to pursue at the same time its cross-purpose objectives in relation to the N.E.I. On the one hand, it oscillated between attempting to translate a cooperative wartime relationship with the N.E.I. administration in Australia into a post-war bilateral relationship between Australia and the N.E.I. which admitted Australia to the N.E.I. as a trustee power. On the other hand, it attempted to advocate post-war changes in the colonial control of the N.E.I. while trying to obtain the cooperation of the Netherlands in a regional security pact. The incompatibility and instability of these objectives, inter alia, produced a deterioration of both Australian-Netherlands and Australia-N.E.I. relations during the Pacific war.
Chapter Three

1945: AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE TO POST-SURRENDER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE N.E.I.

During the Pacific war Australia, together with other Allied powers, recognised that when the European colonial powers re-entered the territories of South-East Asia from which they had been evicted by the Japanese, the local peoples might resent their return.\(^1\) The failure of the metropolitan powers to successfully defend their colonial territories against Japanese aggression; the effectiveness of Japanese propaganda designed to alienate colonial peoples from their pre-war colonial rulers; and Japanese encouragement to indigenous nationalist movements\(^2\) were some of the factors on which this calculation was based.

However, Allied expectations of indigenous resistance by no means extended to projections of colonial warfare. Allied intelligence estimated that indigenous nationalist movements in South-East Asia continued to lack both sufficient popular support and administrative competence to demand independence. It also put forward the view that the reaction of the colonial peoples would be mollified by their recognising the short-term benefits to defence and rehabilitation of readmitting the metropolitan powers.\(^3\) Often statements to this effect directly reflected the rationalisations of the colonial powers themselves.

In the N.E.I. the challenge to such assumptions was immediate. On 17 August 1945 two long-standing Indonesian nationalist leaders, who had risen to prominence during the Japanese occupation period, Drs Soekarno and Hatta,

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\(^1\) See Evatt's Territorial Trusteeship statement, San Francisco Conference, Appendix III.

\(^2\) See Appendix II

\(^3\) e.g. US/OSS/R & A, No.3229: "Problems Arising from a Sudden Liberation of the N.E.I." (13 August 1945).
proclaimed the Indonesian Republic, of which they became President and Vice-President respectively. From the Indonesian nationalist viewpoint, the timing of the proclamation was deliberate and symbolic. It coincided with the end of Japanese control of the N.E.I. and it asserted the Indonesian claim to independence prior to Allied reoccupation.

Within the context of Allied expectations, the proclaiming of the Indonesian Republic caused little concern in the outside world. Aware that the Japanese were fostering the Indonesian nationalist movement and preparing to grant Indonesian independence, the Allies anticipated that the Japanese might establish a puppet government in this crucial period. Accordingly, the Western world viewed the emergence of the Republic on the one hand as the culmination of Japanese anti-colonial policies in the N.E.I. On the other hand, it recognised Indonesian 'collaboration' as the opportunistic gambit by a nationalist minority to enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis the returning Dutch.

Soekarno and Hatta had proclaimed the Republic under pressure from revolutionary Indonesian nationalists. However, the Allies paid only slight attention to the actual circumstances in which the Republic was proclaimed, coinciding as it did with the ending of the war. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August respectively is said to have led to the early surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945. Naturally, after six years of world war, Allied preoccupation with the advent of peace was virtually exclusive.

Moreover, because the Japanese surrender took place so quickly, the possibility of the Allies being able to assess the credibility and popular

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1 US OSS/R & A 3229, op.cit.
2 Ibid.
Map 3: South East Asia Command Area

from Vice Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of Burma: *Post Surrender Tasks. Section E of The Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff* by the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Area 1943-1945 (London 1969).
support for the Indonesian Republic was limited. The Japanese were still occupying the N.E.I., and the Allies were not able to re-enter occupied areas immediately. The N.E.I. had been effectively transferred from MacArthur's S.W.P.A. command to Mountbatten's S.E.A.C. only on 15 August 1945. Also, plans to send a landing party into Java had to be delayed until after the formal surrender of Japan on 2 September.

Consequently, it was not until 8 September that an advance Allied Mission landed at Batavia by parachute, followed by an Allied Mission which arrived by ship on 15 September. Finally S.E.A.C. troops (one Indian battalion) under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Christison entered Java on 29 September.\(^1\) Thus it was not until mid-September that the Allies had their own sources of direct information about the Indonesian Republic.

Reports from Batavia immediately emphasised that the situation was considerably more adverse vis-à-vis both S.E.A.C. and Dutch plans than had been suspected. Although the Allies had instructed the Japanese in the N.E.I. to maintain responsibility for law and order until an Allied reoccupation force arrived, considerable Japanese armaments had been turned over to the Indonesians. Japanese administration had been effectively superseded by the Republican government, which was in charge of all public facilities. Popular support for both the nationalist movement and the Republican government was stronger than suspected, as was the liability of nationalist extremists to resist with violence the re-establishment of Dutch authority.\(^2\)

In response to the situation in Java, S.E.A.C. immediately amended its policy for the reoccupation of the N.E.I. Initially, the British and Netherlands governments had, on 24 August 1945, signed a Civil Affairs

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\(^2\) For elaboration of the above, see Donnison, *op.cit.*, p.424.
Map 4: Java and Borneo

Agreement which had been drafted with a view to S.E.A.C. reoccupation of Sumatra. Then, on 4 September (following the complete transfer of the N.E.I. to S.E.A.C.), Mountbatten and van Mook agreed to apply the principles of the Agreement$^1$ to the whole of the N.E.I. However, given the quasi-political nature of the Civil Affairs Agreement, Mountbatten requested guidance from the British Chiefs of Staff on policy towards the Indonesian Republic.

Having merely been instructed not to take any action implying recognition of it, on 28 September he limited the tasks of S.E.A.C. to those which were militarily expedient.$^2$ Moreover, he restricted S.E.A.C. operations in Java to the key areas of Batavia and Sourabaya. Once these areas were secure, S.E.A.C. would relinquish responsibility to the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (N.I.C.A.) which would be responsible for the re-establishment of civil administration.

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$^1$ The agreement provided for a two-stage reoccupation of the N.E.I.: (a) S.E.A.C. would have absolute control to effect the Japanese surrender; (b) S.E.A.C. would transfer civil jurisdiction and authority to the N.E.I. government. Within this plan S.E.A.C. had five tasks:

(i) to accept the surrender of Japanese forces and enforce the terms of the surrender;
(ii) to release and aid Allied P.O.W.s and internees;
(iii) to disarm the Japanese and assemble them for repatriation;
(iv) to establish and maintain order preparatory to the re-establishment of the N.I.C.A.; and
(v) to investigate war crimes.

$^2$ Tasks (i) - (iii) as stated in footnote 1.
Map 5: The Outer Islands of the Netherlands East Indies.

from Vice Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of Burma: Post-Surrender Tasks. Section E of The Report To The Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia 1943-1945 (London 1969).
All of the above transpired without Australia appearing to pay much immediate attention to or reveal serious concern about developments in Java following the Japanese surrender. The Department of External Affairs heard news of the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic in a shortwave radio broadcast from Batavia on 19 August.\(^1\) Through its monitoring of Indonesian radio broadcasts it was aware of the Indonesian version of post-surrender developments. As additional sources of information it had access to S.E.A.C. intelligence, together with Netherlands and N.E.I. officialdom in Australia. Yet there is no available evidence of Australian and Dutch officials having discussed developments in Java in this initial period.

With Australian forces still engaged in reoccupying the outer N.E.I. islands, the post-surrender situation in Java was not without interest to Australia. However, Australia's defence policy appeared to take small account of foreign policy. In contrast to earlier expressions of diplomatic interest in a post-war (i.e. peacetime) role as a 'security power' within the N.E.I., Australia emphatically declined to assume any additional post-surrender responsibility for civil affairs within the N.E.I. area under its military command. On 29 August Chifley had announced:

\[\ldots\text{The general principle adopted by the Government in regard to civil affairs is that...Australia shall refrain from any extension of its present responsibilities for civil affairs in re-occupied territories. Such responsibilities as is accepted initially during the military phase will pass to the South-East Asia Command simultaneously with the relief of the Australian command in the respective areas. We look to governments having sovereign rights in these areas to take over full responsibility for them after the initial period.}\]^2

Defence priorities to military withdrawal, isolationism and non-involvement in civilian affairs were, however, not without political


repercussions. In accepting the Japanese surrender at Koepang (Dutch Timor) on 2 September, Blamey made no mention of the restoration of Dutch sovereignty. This omission, which conflicted with Chifley's statement of 29 August, was the subject of an official Netherlands' protest to the Australian government.¹

As distinct from the situation in the N.E.I., there was at the same time a conflict between Dutch and Indonesians in Australia and this impelled Australia to adopt an attitude towards the Indonesian Republic. During 1944 Indonesians in Australia (primarily the political exiles from Dutch New Guinea)² had begun to form Indonesian Independence Committees in various centres.³ Following the establishment of the Indonesian Republic, the Central Committee for Indonesian Independence (CENKIM) in Brisbane, issued a manifesto on 1 September calling on all Indonesians in Australia to mutiny. It also requested support for the Indonesian rebellion in Australia.⁴ Subsequently Indonesian members of the Netherlands Indies armed forces in Australia, merchant seamen, and civilians employed by the provisional N.E.I. government in Australia mutinied or went on strike. Dutch authorities placed mutinous servicemen under military detention. And, under extraterritorial powers, they arranged for striking seamen to be charged as "prohibited immigrants" and imprisoned in Australian gaols. The situation culminated on the weekend of 22-23 September when Indonesian merchant seamen in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne 'walked off' Dutch ships which were being loaded with supplies for the Dutch reoccupation of the N.E.I. The Indonesian seamen made it clear that their action was taken to prevent the N.E.I. provisional government in Australia returning to the N.E.I. and interfering with the

² See Supra, Chapter 2, p.36.
⁴ Manifesto [roneoed], Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia (WWF), Indonesia File Jan. 1945-June 1949.
YES—they decided they could run the department better than Dix. Watt!
with the Indonesian Republican government.\(^1\)

With considerable initiative coming from the Australian Communist Party (A.C.P.)\(^2\) and the Communist leadership of the major Australian waterfront unions,\(^3\) Australian waterfront workers on 24 September imposed a black ban on the loading in all Australian ports of Dutch ships destined for the N.E.I. The W.W.F. also made clear the political nature of its action. For example, a resolution passed by the Sydney Branch on 20 September stated:

That this meeting protest against the British using the Japanese forces to suppress the Republican Government of Indonesia, and call upon all members to place an embargo on all ships carrying munitions or any war materials to be used against the Indonesian Government. Further, we call upon the Labour Council to support the struggle by deputation to the Dutch Consul, demanding that the Indonesian peoples should be given the right to elect their own Government.\(^4\)

Similarly, a circular produced by the W.W.F. Branch of the A.C.P. which was distributed on Sydney wharves on 24 September stated:

Four ships, the *Japara*, *El Libertador*, *General Verstijck* and *Patras*, are being loaded with supplies for the Dutch Army that is being brought from England for the purpose of waging war against the independence of the Indonesian people and to convey the Dutch East Indies puppet government to Indonesia....The loading of these ships is a definite challenge to the democratic ideals of the Australian Labor Movement. To assist the Dutch in any way is to assist avaricious Dutch imperialism against Indonesian democracy.\(^5\)

The striking Indonesian seamen made demands relating to wages and working conditions on their Dutch employers. Although Indonesian seamen in

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1 *W.W.F., Indonesia File, op.cit.* Meeting to discuss the Waterside Workers' and Indonesian Seamen's disputes. Trades Hall, Brisbane, 23 September 1945.


3 Mr J. Healy, General Secretary, W.W.F.; Mr E. Roach, Assistant General Secretary, W.W.F.; Mr E.V. Elliott, Federal Secretary, Seamen's Union of Australia.

4 *Merdeka* (Central Committee of Indonesian Independence, Brisbane), 17 August 1946.

5 *W.W.F., Indonesia File, op.cit.*
Australia during the war had previously made similar demands, the "emphasis on the wages issue" in September 1945, Rupert Lockwood, then Editor of the Tribune (the official organ of the A.C.P.), has written, was a deliberate Communist tactic to gain wide support within the Australian trade union movement for a political strike which large sections would otherwise have "shied" away from. Similarly, Lockwood has pointed out that the presentation of "legitimate trade union grievances" complicated the handling by the Australian Labor government (which relied substantially on trade union support) of what might otherwise have been treated as "straight-out intervention in Australian-Netherlands relations".

In Parliament on 25 September the Opposition strongly denounced the waterside workers' ban and demanded prompt government counteraction. In reply Chifley avoided dealing with the foreign political implications of the Australian ban. Rather he indicated sympathy with Australian-Indonesian 'worker solidarity':

The hold-up of ships bound for Javanese ports is a matter between the Dutch authorities and their own subjects. Indonesians refuse to work those ships. If the Dutch authorities cannot make their own subjects do the job, I can easily imagine that the subjects of another country are not likely to take action which might be regarded as "scabbing".

1 e.g. On 1 April 1942, some 2,000 Indonesian seamen on Dutch ships in Australian ports went on strike in demand for wages and conditions approximate to those of Australian seamen. See Maritime Worker (organ of the W.W.F.), Vol.8, No.8 (November 1945), p.2. See also CPD, Vol. 182, p.1901 (18 May 1945). Mr Allan Fraser (A.L.F. and Vice-President, Australian Council for Civil Liberties) asked the Curtin Labor government to intervene on behalf of Indonesian seamen in Australia who feared that the Dutch would reduce their economic conditions when they returned to the N.E.I. and also politically suppress them.

2 "Black Armada", op.cit., Part III, Chapter 13, p.10.

3 Ibid., p.9.

4 CPD, Vol. 185, p.5833.
Occurring five weeks after the cessation of hostilities, the Dutch shipping strike coincided with a period when the Australian government was concerned with the civilian economy. This effort was already being antagonised by general industrial unrest, in particular on the waterfront. Thus, the Minister for Supply and Shipping, Senator W. Ashley, suggested on 25 September that his policy towards the unions would take into account the possible effects on general industrial stability.

...I, personally, am of the opinion that no action should be taken which would have the effect of embroiling the whole waterfront of Australia in a dispute arising out of trouble which has occurred in another country.¹

However, contrary to Ashley's assertion, the Stevedoring Industry Commission (S.I.C.), the official body controlling waterfront labour, had taken action in Brisbane on 24 September to ensure that, unless labour was supplied to the Dutch, labour would not be called for other ship-loading.²

More directly, the Australian government took "the necessary steps to ensure that the ships [were] loaded".³ Chifley, Ashley and the Minister for Immigration, Mr A.A. Calwell, jointly conferred with Dutch officials,⁴ as a result of which Chifley announced that there will be no interruption of the loading of vessels that are to transport only foodstuffs and medical supplies. Any ship that is to carry munitions and, I presume, military personnel, will be loaded by Dutch labour.⁵

The Australian government thereby adopted a position which did not wholly support either the Dutch or the Australian waterside workers.

¹ Ibid., Vol. 185, p.5865.
³ CPD, Vol. 185, p.5865, Ashley (25 September 1945).
⁵ CPD., Vol. 185, p.6128 (28 September 1945).
As a related problem, the Australian government had also to take action with regard to the striking Indonesian seamen. In the first instance a number had been charged as prohibited immigrants and gaol. The vast majority were free, but were repudiating Dutch citizenship. In turn Dutch authorities denied responsibility for their welfare and wanted the Australian government to deport them to the N.E.I. Although the W.W.F. threatened a general strike if the government applied the Immigration Act rigidly against the Indonesian seamen,¹ Chifley was adamant that "there [would] be no waiving of the requirements of the Immigration Act in favour of Indonesian seamen".² The government was unable to obtain assurances from the Dutch that the seamen would not be penalised if they were returned to the N.E.I. It therefore proposed to temporarily remove the striking Indonesian seamen from the Australian "mainland",³ preferably to Nauru, until the situation in the N.E.I. stabilised.⁴ This proposal reflected official recognition that the Indonesian seamen identified strongly with the Indonesian nationalist movement. It also reflected the official view that the Dutch should grant the Indonesian seamen political amnesty.⁵

The Indonesian community, Australian unions and the Australian Council for Civil Liberties all pressed for the return of the 500 Indonesian seamen involved to Republican territory on a non-Dutch ship.⁶ In deciding to voluntarily repatriate the Indonesians to Republican areas, the government adopted a decision along these lines.

As distinct from Australia's initial official approach to the problem as an immigration one, this decision tended to de-emphasise

¹ e.g. Telegram to the Minister for Immigration, Mr A. I. Calwell from the Brisbane Branch, W.W.F., 25 September 1945. W.W.F., Indonesian File.
² CPF, Vol. 185, p.6211 (2 October 1945).
³ Ibid.
⁵ X
⁶ See Civil Liberty (organ of the Australian Council for Civil Liberties), Vol. 8, No.2 (October 1945), p.3.
concern to maintain the White Australia policy. Moreover, Australia's initial position could easily have been inferred to have been anti-Indonesian. This conflicted with the pro-Indonesian sentiments of considerable and vocal sections of the Australian public (predominantly within the labour movement) who demonstrated support for the Indonesian Republic during the first week of October. It antagonised the waterside unions which the government was trying to persuade to load civilian supplies for the N.E.I. As well, it was not consistent with the government's awareness that the situation in the N.E.I. was delicate with regard to the re-establishment of Dutch authority.

In cooperation with S.E.A.C. which provided a British ship, the Esperance Bay for the purpose, the Australian government arranged for some 1,400 Indonesians (merchant seamen, ex-servicemen and civilians) to leave Australia in mid-October. To supervise the repatriation and then to remain in Batavia as a politico-military representative, the government appointed Lieutenant K.C. Plumb\(^2\) as Australian Political Liaison Officer attached to S.E.A.C.

In so far as the decision to repatriate the Indonesians suggested Australia's readiness to sympathise with the Indonesian nationalist position, the government subsequently increased its partisanship by questioning Dutch credibility. While the Esperance Bay was en route to the N.E.I., Christison, after consulting Dutch officials in Batavia, advised Mountbatten (SACSEA), that the position of the Indonesian revolutionary extremists might be strengthened if the militant group from Australia landed in Java or Sumatra.\(^3\) In any case Mountbatten thought it likely that civil war would break out in the N.E.I. He therefore requested Australia to temporarily divert the

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\(^2\) For the last two years Plumb had been a Liaison Officer between the Australian Security Service and the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS), stationed at Camp Columbia, Brisbane, which was the headquarters of the N.E.I. provisional government in Australia. In this capacity he would have become well-acquainted with the official Dutch attitude towards the politically-active Indonesian community in Australia.

\(^3\) X
Indonesians to Timor and other small neighbouring islands.\textsuperscript{1} Australia replied that any such change of plans would be embarrassing to it.\textsuperscript{2} When Mountbatten subsequently referred the difference of opinion to the British government, Chifley defended Australia's attitude. He argued firstly that Dutch officials in Australia had acquiesced in arrangements for the repatriation of the Indonesians; secondly that the Dutch tended to overreact against Indonesians who were not in sympathy with them; thirdly that, with the knowledge of Dutch officials in Australia, the Minister of Immigration had pledged to return the Indonesians to the N.E.I. Finally, in the interests of Australia's future influence in the Pacific, the government did not consider a veto by Dutch officials in Batavia as sufficient basis on which to breach its promises to the Indonesians.\textsuperscript{3}

In pressing for Australia's cooperation, the British Prime Minister, Mr C.R. Attlee, asked Australia to consider the delicate internal situation in the N.E.I. and Britain's related difficulties with the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{4} At this point Australia relaxed its initially inflexible stance and agreed to a compromise. It agreed to land temporarily at Timor those Indonesians on the Esperance Bay who Australian and Dutch authorities in Australia mutually agreed were potentially dangerous extremists.\textsuperscript{5} However, Australia made it clear that its cooperation was prompted by its recognising that Britain's ability to produce a peaceful and permanent solution in the N.E.I. depended on its (Britain's) capacity to influence the Dutch to accept either a modified system of colonial administration or an approved temporary trusteeship.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2} X
\textsuperscript{3} X
\textsuperscript{4} X
\textsuperscript{5} Australia-Indonesia Association [records], [Untitled] Report by Jim Lumanauw on the repatriation on the Esperance Bay.
If, by this latter suggestion, Australia had in mind an international trusteeship, it would gain certain prestige through Evatt's recent appointment as Chairman of the U.N. Trusteeship Commission. Alternatively, if viewed in conjunction with Australia's linking of its credibility vis-à-vis the repatriate Indonesians with its continuing aspirations for influence in the Pacific, Australia was possibly reasserting its interest in a post-military political role in the N.E.I.

At the same time as Australia was, through the Esperance Bay episode, taking pro-Indonesian and anti-Dutch positions, its diplomatic activities elsewhere were eroding what might have been initially regarded as Australia's diplomatic indifference to, or isolationism from, post-surrender developments in the N.E.I. Whenever the government's failure to counter the waterside workers' ban on Dutch shipping was equated with official partisanship in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, the government was prompt in declaring its neutrality. Such was its response to a Washington Post editorial which the Australian press reported on 10 October. It immediately advised the Australian Legation in Washington that the official attitude to date had been to regard the Dutch-Indonesian dispute as a domestic matter to be settled without outside interference. It added, however, that if the situation deteriorated, Australia's vital interest in the future of the area might prompt it to offer its good offices to both sides to facilitate an early compromise.¹

No doubt with a view to fostering a joint Australian-New Zealand policy towards the N.E.I., the Department of External Affairs in mid-October also put a number of informal proposals to New Zealand. Australia suggested that, in the interests of order and stability, it was necessary for the Dutch, who were skilled and experienced administrators, to return to the N.E.I.

¹ X
For this to occur, the Department reckoned that the Dutch would be dependent on British military support and possibly also on Australia's assistance with supplies. As a *quid pro quo*, External Affairs suggested that it should be possible to press the Dutch to publicly acknowledge their obligations under Article 731 of the U.N. Charter as well as pledge to place the N.E.I. under the U.N. Trusteeship System.2 In the mutual security interests of Australia and New Zealand, the Departmental proposals also emphasised the need for a liberal compromise settlement between the Dutch and Indonesians. While New Zealand had no dispute with Australia's assessment of the situation in the N.E.I., for extraneous reasons it was not at that stage prepared to commit itself on the question of extending the trusteeship principle to the N.E.I.3

At the same time, an exchange of views between Australia and Britain, on Australia's interest in establishing a consulate-general in Batavia, revealed that the Department of External Affairs was not hesitant about recognising the authority of the N.E.I. government. When, in mid-October, Australia had first mooted its proposal to establish a consulate-general in Batavia,4 Britain suggested that it temporarily defer such plans. It suggested instead that Australia attach a Political Representative to the S.E.A.C. commander in the N.E.I.5 Acting on this advice, the Department of External Affairs informed Britain on 19 October that it would be sending Mr W. Macmahon Ball6 to Batavia in this latter capacity.7

However, no sooner had this decision been taken than British policy in the N.E.I. shifted to one of firmer support for the Dutch. Britain

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1 i.e. Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories.
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3 X
4 X
5 X
6 In October 1945 the Australian Broadcasting Commission (A.B.C.) asked Macmahon Ball of the Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne, to go to Batavia on its behalf as a correspondent. When Macmahon Ball applied to the Department of External Affairs for a visa, it asked him to go on its behalf instead.
7 X
recognised the strength of Indonesian support for the Republic and the severity of the conflict between the Dutch and the Republic. In the interests of British military disengagement from the N.E.I., it therefore decided to transfer responsibility to the Dutch as speedily as possible. To this end Mr Maberly Dening, whom the British government had recently sent to Batavia as a Political Adviser to Mountbatten, informed Soekarno on 23 October that the Allied Command recognised the Netherlands Indies government as the legitimate authority in the N.E.I.¹

Subsequent to this, Britain proposed that Australia reconsider appointing a consular representative to Batavia,² the implication being that Australia also recognise the N.E.I. government as the legitimate authority. In its reply of 29 October, Australia expressed its surprise at Britain's changed attitude. Moreover, it declared that Australia now considered it undesirable to make an appointment which the Indonesians might interpret as an absolute decision to support the restoration of Dutch administration throughout the N.E.I.³ Australia thereby appeared to acknowledge the position which the Indonesian Republic had won by popular support and by resistance to the reimposition of Dutch authority in Java. It also implied its having given thought to the possibility of a Dutch-Indonesian compromise on territorial lines.

Prompted by what it described at the end of October as an imminently critical situation in the N.E.I., Australia gave Britain for the first time, a comprehensive statement of its official attitude towards the N.E.I.⁴ Indicating its regard to the future military security of the Pacific, Australia stressed the need for a liberal settlement between the Dutch and

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¹ See Djadjadiningrat, op. cit., p.31.
² X
³ Ibid.
⁴ X All information following in this paragraph.
Indonesians which would satisfy the legitimate demands of the various groups in the N.E.I. It opposed the current British standpoint that the terms and conditions for the return of the Dutch administration to the N.E.I. should be settled bilaterally by the Dutch and Indonesians. Implying that such an abnegation of responsibility would have amounted to the Dutch imposing a unilateral solution, Australia declared that its own and New Zealand's security interests depended on a satisfactory settlement in the N.E.I. Accordingly it indicated the importance which Australia attached to due consideration being given to the strength of the Indonesian nationalist movement and the credibility of the Republican administration. It also advocated a continuing ban on the arrival of Dutch troops in the N.E.I.; and of pressing the Dutch to specify reforms, especially with regard to nationalist autonomy. As well as advocating that international responsibility for the resolution of the conflict be established, Australia urged the necessity of consulting with all powers directly interested in the Pacific and ensuring their support of any settlement.

At this stage it was evident that Australia's desire to obtain British support, if not sponsorship, for its involvement in the political solution of the Dutch-Indonesian situation conflicted with Britain's priority to its own disengagement from the N.E.I. At the same time Britain's own sovereign position in neighbouring Malaya and Borneo, its promises of self-government to India, together with its interest in maintaining good relations with the Netherlands as a neighbour in Europe, meant that Britain's view of a satisfactory settlement in the N.E.I. did not necessarily coincide with Australia's. Britain's reply to Australia in early November,¹ when its firmer military policy in the N.E.I. was still operating, therefore expressed faith in Dutch political prudence. The reply also made it clear that Britain

¹ X All information following in this paragraph.
had no intention of taking advantage of its temporary and accidental military control of the N.E.I. to interfere with the domestic jurisdiction of the Dutch whose sovereignty Britain recognised and of which it regarded itself as a temporary 'trustee'.

At Batavia British officials resented Australia's assertiveness vis-à-vis the N.E.I. When Macmahon Ball arrived on 7 November he received a cool reception from Christison. Also, British political representatives at Batavia tried to circumscribe his status as an independent political representative.

With its power to influence Britain thus limited, Australia considered the alternative of appealing to the U.S. to sponsor a solution of the N.E.I. conflict. When Evatt was in Washington in November 1945 the Department of External Affairs in Canberra suggested that he make such a proposal. Thus far the U.S. had been cautiously non-committal towards the N.E.I. situation. With regard to Australia, it was apprehensive about the possible international implications of the continuing ban against Dutch shipping. In any case, Evatt was aware of considerable U.S. internal opposition to the restoring of the status quo ante bellum in the N.E.I. and he surmised that the U.S. would incur external opposition (presumably from the Netherlands) if it advocated a U.N. trusteeship. He did not, therefore, expect a positive response.

Meanwhile Australia-Netherlands relations had steadily deteriorated, primarily on account of the continuing waterside workers' ban on Dutch shipping in Australia. Apparently official Dutch as well as domestic

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1 W. Macmahon Ball, "Diary Batavia" Ms, p.7.
2 Ibid.
3 X
4 Sullivan, op.cit., pp.218-219. However, following a decision announced on 11 November to ship 5,000 Dutch marines from the U.S. to Java, the U.S. moved towards support of the Dutch. Ibid., pp.237-241.
5 US/OSS/R & A, No.3271: "Australian Shipping Strike has international implications" (5 October 1945).
6 X
"OH, THERE YOU HAVE ME!"

by Armstrong

BY THE WAY, ARTHUR, WHAT IS OUR POLICY ON INDONESIA?

P.M. REPudiATES BROADCASTS ON INDONESIA

KEON-SAWER BROADCASTS

Argus (Melbourne)
17 November 1945
criticism of Australia's implicit hostility to the Dutch was conflicting with Australia's diplomatic activities in relation to the N.E.I. Thus, in November, Australia sought to reassure the Netherlands that, while its policy was one of non-involvement in the N.E.I. conflict, it favoured maintaining the Dutch 'presence'.¹ This represented something less than support for the restoration of complete Dutch sovereignty.

Australia was similarly cautious of committing itself to the Indonesian Republic. In Batavia Soekarno indicated to Macmahon Ball his confidence in both Evatt's policies and Australian support for the Indonesian nationalist movement.² Soekarno had been appealing unsuccessfully to Britain and the U.S. to seek a U.N. enquiry into the N.E.I. situation. When in mid-November his hopes of their intervening were diminishing, he appealed through Macmahon Ball for Australia to take such an initiative.³ On his own part Macmahon Ball thought that it would be appropriate for the U.N. to conclude an agreement with the Indonesians which recognised the principle of Indonesian self-government.⁴

At this stage Australia's policy towards the N.E.I. became a subject of public official questioning. Hitherto the Government had steadfastly claimed to be impartial towards the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. However, on 5 and 8 November 1945, two shortwave broadcasts by Messrs G. Sawyer and M. Keon of the Department of Information were strongly critical of the Dutch and accused Britain and the U.S. of hypocrisy towards the conflict. While not uncritical of the Indonesians, the former broadcast declared:

² "Diary Batavia", op.cit., 9 November 1945.
³ Loc.cit.
⁴ Loc.cit.
Mr Chifley, apologising to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten for a Department of Information broadcast on Indonesian affairs, said it was done without the knowledge of the Government or the Department of External Affairs.

"I didn't say it, Lord Louis, and Makin didn't say it, and he won't say it again, I hope."

Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)
23 November 1945
...Australia cannot be blind to the fact that 40 million Indonesians [on Java] in our near north may well, in the long run, be more important to our security, not to mention our trade and commerce, than the few thousand Dutch who have hitherto controlled that area and whose control is now being disputed....

The Prime Minister, the Minister for Information (Calwell), and the Acting Minister for External Affairs, Mr N.J.O. Makin all disclaimed having authorised the broadcasts. The publicising of the texts of the broadcasts was, nevertheless, an untimely embarrassment to the government's private diplomacy.

At Batavia Macmahon Ball was still trying to establish Australia's claim to an interest in the settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. On 14 November a new Republican government headed by Sutan Sjahrir, the leader of the Indonesian nationalist underground during the Japanese occupation, replaced the original cabinet which had been directly responsible to Soekarno. By transferring government leadership to a 'non-collaborationist', the Republic calculated on enhancing its acceptability to the Dutch and the outside world. When, in response to the new situation, the British announced they were convening a conference on 17 November to try to negotiate a Dutch-Indonesian settlement, Macmahon Ball asked if he could attend as a silent observer. Van Mook objected and was supported by Christison and Dening.

British sensitivity to Australia's assertiveness in the N.E.I. reflected, in part, U.S.-British concern lest their major power counterparts, the U.S.S.R. and China, be drawn into taking partisan positions in the N.E.I. conflict. In this respect Macmahon Ball was conscious of the delicacy of his independent status in Batavia. Therefore, he cautioned Canberra against Australia distinguishing its viewpoint from that of the British.

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1 Text quoted, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 November 1945.
2 "Diary Batavia", *op.cit.*, p.7.
3 X
Meanwhile the British military command was having little success in achieving its objectives in the N.E.I. Moreover, its new pro-Dutch emphasis received unexpected and dramatic challenge at Sourabaya in November 1945. Despite British air and naval bombardment on 10 November, Indonesian guerrilla warfare persisted. The strength of Indonesian resistance which the British encountered there demonstrated that an early British disengagement would only be possible by introducing a much larger British occupation force.

Prompted both by the "battle of Sourabaya" and by the failure of the political conference convened by the British on 17 November, Evatt, for his part, decided Australia was bound by its own interest to take an independent initiative. Having ascertained that the U.S. would not intervene and knowing that Britain had hoped for an early solution without further military commitment,¹ he proposed from London that Australia intervene in Java. He envisaged the calling of a truce; the opening of political negotiations involving the Netherlands, the Indonesian nationalist movement, S.E.A.C. and Australia; and the landing of an Australian force under S.E.A.C. to complete the Allied military tasks.²

As part of his proposal, Evatt drafted what he intended would be a public statement announcing Australia's intervention. Setting out Australia's interest in the N.E.I. dispute, the draft reiterated Australia's wartime contribution alternatively to the defence of the N.E.I. and to its liberation, and emphasised Australia's security interest in a stable, progressive and self-reliant N.E.I. With reference to international recognition of Netherlands' sovereignty in the N.E.I., the draft stated Australia's disinterest in the internal politics of the N.E.I. Yet it suggested that the political forms through which Dutch sovereignty was exercised should be flexible so as to

¹ X Above information in this paragraph.
progressively accommodate peoples' aspirations for self-government. Finally, it declared the direct military interest of the Allied belligerents in removing the Japanese completely from the N.E.I. as justifying intervening within the sovereign domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands.¹

Evatt's proposal for Australia's intervention in Java appears as a timely attempt to obtain a number of diplomatic advantages. It represented an opportunity for Australia to take over British Commonwealth military responsibility in Java from a weary and disenchanted Britain. It was an opportunity to enhance Australia's claim to be an independent party to the post-war settlement with Japan. More specifically, it offered Australia the necessary source of authority through which it could press the Dutch (in the interests of regional security), to yield to legitimate Indonesian political aspirations.

However, Evatt appeared to overlook the military implications of his proposal. British difficulties in Java were already prolonging the occupation of the outer N.E.I. islands by war-weary Australian soldiers. Chifley told Evatt "it would be difficult enough to keep Australians in Borneo for an extended period", and he was sure Cabinet would not agree to a future commitment of forces to Java.² In the politico-military situation, any offer of mediation by a third party was, in Chifley's view, impracticable without military support. In any case Chifley told Evatt he was against an initiative by Australia at that stage.³

Following his return to Australia in December, Macmahon Ball reported that his impression from visiting Australian forces in Morotai and Borneo was that "any Australian government which sought to transfer our troops to Java instead of bringing them home would be faced with a major domestic crisis".⁴ War Cabinet concluded similarly when it reaffirmed on

¹ X
² Hasluck, op.cit., Vol. II, p.605 [Hasluck's words].
³ Loc.cit.
⁴ Ibid., p. 606, quoted.
18 December that

on the basis of the present position the Government
is opposed, in principle, to the acceptance of any
additional commitments for the use of Australian forces
in the Netherlands East Indies.¹

Not surprisingly, therefore, support for military non-intervention prevailed
over Evatt's evaluation of Australia's foreign policy interest to intervene
in the N.E.I.²

As distinct from an independent diplomatic initiative, Macmahon
Ball recommended that "if Australia [were] to participate directly in the
Java crisis [it] should do so...as a member of the United Nations".³ While
Britain and the U.S. continued to oppose the dispute becoming international,
any such attempt by Australia would, however, be abortive. On 19 December the
Department of State broke the U.S.'s public silence on its attitude towards
the N.E.I. by calling for a speedy resumption of bilateral talks between the
Dutch and Indonesians.⁴ Then, as a result of joint consultations on 27
December, Britain and the Netherlands announced they had agreed to promote an
agreement between the Netherlands and the Indonesian nationalist movement as
a part of British responsibility under S.E.A.C. For this purpose Britain on
19 January 1946 appointed its Ambassador-elect to the U.S., Sir Archibald Clark
Kerr (subsequently known as Lord Inverchapel), as a Special Commissioner

¹ _Ibid._, quoted.
² Hasluck, _op. cit._, II, p.607 has written: "Australian post-war diplomatic
activity in the islands to the north might have begun at that point but
in fact it did not do so. The old gap between defence and foreign policy
started to open again. The pull of the old isolationism and of keeping out
of other people's troubles was for the time being stronger than the
ambitions to shine in world councils." On this subject, see also E.M.
Andrews, _Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the
³ _Ibid._, quoted.
⁴ U.S. Department of State: _Bulletin_, 23 December 1945, p.1021. The U.S.
announced its interest to see a "peaceful settlement achieved as will best
promote world stability...recognizing alike the natural aspirations of
the Indonesian peoples and the legitimate rights and interests of the
to assist a Dutch-Indonesian settlement.¹

Meanwhile Australia's efforts to improve relations with the Dutch had not been successful. Government attempts to obtain union cooperation for shipping non-military supplies to the N.E.I. had failed. However, in November, with Australia exploring the possibilities of diplomatic intervention in the N.E.I., a demonstration of Australian goodwill seemed mandatory if Australia was to be acceptable to the Dutch as a mediator. Australia agreed to place under government charter the five Dutch ships still in Australian ports and to supply in their place five Australian ships under government charter to transport Dutch-owned relief supplies to the N.E.I.² The moderate trade union majority, as represented by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (A.C.T.U.) also decided to cooperate in loading non-military supplies to the N.E.I., provided Christison in Batavia took responsibility for their being fairly distributed.³ However, early in January the Dutch rejected Australia's proposal as unacceptable.⁴ Moreover, they rejected the proposal for the free distribution of relief supplies. Having hitherto gained considerable Australian public sympathy by emphasising the humanitarian purposes for which the supplies were urgently required, they now insisted that supplies must be sold as consumer goods in order to promote a speedy return to normal economic conditions in the N.E.I.⁵ Needless to say, this obstruction by the Dutch would have only confirmed Australia's conviction

¹ See Djajadiningrat, *op.cit.*, p.50.
² X
⁵ *Indones Archief: Archief Gesamtschop Canberra* 712.1. Relief and Supply.
Various correspondence: Australian Red Cross/ N.E.I. Red Cross, Australian Red Cross/Chifley.
that the Dutch could not be solely entrusted to arrive at a liberal solution to the N.E.I. conflict.¹

Summary and Conclusion

Australia's policy towards post-surrender developments in the N.E.I. was characteristically inconsistent. In the first instance this was the result of treating decisions about Australia's responsibilities in the outer N.E.I. islands as military policy, secondly, of regarding the waterside workers' ban on Dutch shipping as a domestic industrial question and, thirdly, of viewing the repatriation of Indonesians in Australia as an immigration matter. The government apparently sought to disconnect the latter issues from foreign policy, which claimed Australia's non-partisanship in the N.E.I. dispute. However, the anti-Dutch posture of the waterside workers prevailed over such domestically-cautious steps which the Labor government took to counteract the ban. More directly the government appeared to adopt a partisan position by self-consciously avoiding discriminating against the Indonesians whom it repatriated from Australia, and by rebutting Dutch objections to repatriation arrangements.

Within the Australian Labor government there was apparently a range of attitudes towards the Indonesian Republic. In dealing with the waterside workers, Chifley reflected the pro-Indonesian, if not the pro-Republican, attitude of a significant section of the Australian Labor Party

¹ L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley (London, 1960), pp.292-293: "A number of Australian Ministers, Chifley included, had gained not altogether favourable impressions of some of the Dutch of all classes and ranks who were evacuated to Australia when the Japanese overran the Indies in 1942. They were still less happy about Dutch policy, in what they conceded were difficult circumstances, when the Indies were regained from Japan in 1945. While neither approving nor condoning the Communist-inspired embargoes placed on Dutch shipping in Australian ports by the Waterside Workers' Federation - a challenge, indeed, to the authority of the Government over Australian foreign policy - Chifley held most critical views of Dutch Eastern policy."
and the trade union movement. Moreover, by supporting a policy of military non-intervention in Java, Chifley and the majority of the Labor Cabinet implied a political reluctance to assist restoring Dutch sovereignty by force. Yet foreign policy as directed by Evatt reflected a due regard for the legal sovereignty of the Dutch position in the N.E.I., and for Australia's security interest in maintaining the Dutch presence in the N.E.I. As distinct from sympathy towards the particular claims of the Indonesian Republic, which Australia's industrial and immigration policies implicitly enkindled, Evatt's foreign policy implicitly denied the radical claim to independence of the Indonesian Republic by emphasising that Australia supported legitimate demands by the Indonesian nationalist movement for an extension of political autonomy.

This distinction emerged in Australia's advocacy of a compromise settlement between the Dutch and Indonesians, and its particular enthusiasm for trusteeship in the N.E.I. Australian foreign policy envisaged Dutch sovereignty continuing, together with a progressive and graduated extension of self-government to the Indonesian peoples, commensurate with their political aspirations and capacity for autonomy. Within this context, however, Australia did go so far as to infer that the Republic might be capable of assuming a large measure of self-government as distinct from sovereign independence.

The fluctuations in Australian-British relations with regard to the N.E.I. reflected Australia's ambivalence in its regional foreign policy. In so far as Australia's attitude towards the N.E.I. situation differed from that of Britain, Australia emphasised its national independence and de-emphasised its dominion status as a member of the British Commonwealth. Alternately, Australia claimed equal status as a member of the British Commonwealth in seeking prestige and recognition as the principal Commonwealth power in the Pacific. Yet in the N.E.I., Australia was at this stage not prepared to take independent action, although it insisted on Australia's interests being taken into account by Britain. The combined
effect was that Australia progressively antagonised Britain.

Australia's direct regional concern with the N.E.I. dispute also conflicted with its interest to encourage Britain and the U.S. to participate in post-war regional security arrangements. Australia appeared conscious of needing to show due consideration to the major power considerations, primarily British and U.S. concern that the resolution of the dispute remain localised. Yet Australia was uneasy about the Dutch having full responsibility for concluding an agreement with the Indonesians. To this extent its attitude conflicted with the major power priorities of Britain and the U.S., which, as colonial powers, also sympathised with the predicament of the Dutch. Australia's contiguity to the N.E.I. thus contributed to the Australian government being ambivalent about acquiescing in the policies of its traditional major-power allies.
Chapter Four

AUSTRALIA'S POLICIES TOWARDS THE N.E.I. PRIOR TO THE CHERIBON AGREEMENT (NOVEMBER 1946)

In January 1946 Evatt returned to Australia after an absence of some five months. During this time, in which the N.E.I. dispute had emerged as a major foreign policy issue, the Minister for the Navy, Mr N.J.O. Makin, had been Acting Minister for External Affairs. Generally, post-war developments had placed a considerable burden on the small and undermanned Department of External Affairs which was hastily recruiting staff, largely demobilised servicemen. Continuity in the Department had also been affected by the absence from Australia of its newly-appointed Permanent Secretary, Mr W. Dunk, during November-December 1945. In this period Dr J.W. Burton, Dr Evatt's Departmental Secretary, had acted as Secretary of the Department. Burton, who was young and inexperienced to have been in such a position, had taken a leading part in coordinating Australia's diplomacy towards the N.E.I. during this crucial period. When, in November 1945, Makin sought to resolve with van Aerssen a number of "misunderstandings" in Australian-Netherlands relations, he had partly explained some of these in terms of the understaffing of the Department and its temporary control by Burton.  

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1 van der Wal, II, op. cit., document 3, op. cit., p.7. When van Aerssen visited the Department in Canberra in November 1945 there were six members of the professional staff, namely, Messrs B.C. Ballard, W.E. Dunk, W.D. Forsyth, W.R. Hodgson, J.D.L. Hood, and a Mrs Hodges.  

2 In July 1945 Evatt appointed Dunk as Permanent Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, apparently for his recognised administrative expertise, for Dunk had no claim to experience in foreign policy. See Alan Watt, Australia Diplomat. Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt (Sydney, 1972) p.74. Dunk's appointment was widely regarded as suiting Evatt's egotistical desire to run his Department as a "one man band".  

3 van der Wal, II, op. cit., document 3, op. cit., p.7
TRIAL RUN

by Jack Lusby

WE RUN THIS COUNTRY, SEE,
BUT YOUSE CAN 'AVE
ONE SHIP

AUSTRALIA

Courier-Mail (Brisbane)
1 February 1946
Not only administrative consistency in the Department of External Affairs had been wanting in the later months of 1945. In Evatt's absence from Australia, coordination of Australia's foreign policy by the Department had apparently also been lacking, especially with regard to policy towards the N.E.I. Immediately following his return, Evatt seemingly set out to reassert personal ascendancy over the Department and to create a public impression of the government's firm control of foreign policy. This applied especially to Australian-Dutch relations.

The continuing waterside workers' ban on Dutch shipping was publicly embarrassing to the government. Bad Australian-Dutch relations were also inhibiting Australia's diplomatic flexibility in the N.E.I.

On 22 and 23 January Evatt conferred with van Aerssen. The unions had already accepted Christison's proposal that a trial shipment be sent to the N.E.I. Evatt and van Aerssen then agreed to Christison assuming responsibility for the distribution of the relief supplies to former internees, prisoners of war and those in the greatest need, without regard to nationality or political persuasion.¹ After months of tripartite negotiations between the Australian government, the Dutch, and the unions on the shipping of relief supplies to the N.E.I., Evatt was seemingly responsible for the fait accompli.

In their broader consultation about the deterioration in Australian-Dutch relations, Evatt is reported to have assailed van Aerssen with angry accusations of Dutch hostility towards Australia.² He referred, in turn, to the Netherlands' objectionable attitude at the San Francisco conference;³ to its having voted against Australia's nomination to a non-permanent seat

¹ Archief B.Z. 912.1 Australië. Verhouding tijdens de Indonesische questie. Deel II jan. t/m mei 1946. Telegram to MBZ from Melbourne, 23 January 1946.
³ See Supra, Chapter 2, p.50.
on the Security Council; and to its lack of appreciation of the part played by Australian troops in reoccupying the N.E.I. Evatt then suggested that irresponsible Dutch spokesmen in Australia were conducting a press campaign against the Labor government. He implied, moreover, that contact between Dutch officials, including van Aerssen, and the Opposition parties lay at the root of 'leak's' to the press,¹ such as had occurred in connection with the training of Dutch troops in Australia.² Finally, Evatt attributed the government's difficulties with the unions to agitation caused by Dutch statements. He then intimated that a Dutch request for Australia's assistance to resolve the political conflict in the N.E.I. would contribute to an improvement in Australian-Dutch relations.

Evatt apparently also suggested that, were van Aerssen to make a friendly public statement, that would improve Australian-Dutch relations a great deal. With advice on content from Evatt,³ van Aerssen issued a press statement announcing that

the conversations [with Evatt] had been held in a frank and cordial atmosphere with a background of mutual regard for the part which the respective countries had played in the war. The Netherlands Government appreciated the vital interest which Australia had in Pacific affairs. Under the United Nations Charter, both countries had assumed as a sacred trust the obligation to provide to

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¹ Evatt did not substantiate this accusation. However, in November 1945, the Leader of the Opposition Mr R.G. Menzies and his Press Secretary, Mr Charles Meeking discussed with the Netherlands Consul in Melbourne, Colonel F.H. Wright, unfavourable press publicity which the Dutch were receiving in Australia. Following their discussion, Meeking proposed to van Aerssen that leading newspapers be approached to cooperate in a counter-publicity campaign. Van Aerssen agreed. In January 1946 Brigadier E.G. Knox, Editor-in-Chief and Managing Director of the Argus, Melbourne, and Mr T. Gurr, Editor-in-Chief of the Sunday Sun, Sydney, visited Java on a fact-finding mission so that their newspapers would be able to present the Dutch viewpoint to the Australian public. (Archief Gesamtschap Canberra 912.1.C. Charles Meeking to Baron van Aerssen. Melbourne 27 November 1945; van Aerssen to Charles Meeking, Melbourne, 4 December 1945. J27c/3444; van Aerssen to the Minister B.Z. The Hague. Melbourne 5 March 1946. J27c/932/79.) In a joint interview with van Aerssen in March 1946, Chifley and Evatt complained about the special treatment which the N.E.I. government had extended to Knox and Gurr in Batavia. (Archief DIRVO. PA (Box 211) Graaf van Bylandt, DIRVO, to Baron van Aerssen, Canberra. Batavia, 29 March 1946.)

² See Supra, Chapter 2, p.54.

the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of
dependent territories and to develop self-government,
taking due account of the political aspirations of
the peoples concerned. No question outstanding
between the two governments could not be settled in
the cordial atmosphere of the present conversations,
and which had in fact been the case through the
difficult war years.¹

Evatt was obviously intent both on counteracting adverse publicity
about Australian-Dutch relations and on advancing Australia's claim to a
third-party role in the N.E.I. No doubt he calculated that the success of
this latter objective would be enhanced by Australia's expected military
withdrawal from the N.E.I. outer islands in February 1946.

Australia appeared to hold the 'tactical advantage' when Evatt
utilised van Aerssen's statement to issue a reply, saying that

the Australian Government appreciated the cordial
statement by the Netherlands Minister to Australia.
It showed that there was no clash of interest between
Australia and the Netherlands in the Netherlands East
Indies. The Australian Government had fully and
consistently recognized the rights and interests of
the Netherlands in the South-west Pacific and had fully
co-operated with the Netherlands Government in all
wartime and post-armistice agencies of an international
character. Throughout the Pacific war Australia had
shown how directly interested she was in the Netherlands
East Indies and had made a large military contribution
towards their military recovery from the Japanese.
Baron van Aerssen's statement showed that he fully
understood and sympathized with Australia's interest in
the future security and the economic and social
development of all Australia's neighbours in the South-
west Pacific area.²

Despite prompting by Evatt during their discussions, van Aerssen
had declined to give his opinion about Australia participating in political
negotiations in the N.E.I.³ However, their respective press statements may

¹ Digest of Decisions and Announcements, 1946 (Canberra), No.110, p.53,
footnote.
² Ibid., p.53.
³ Archief B.Z. 912.1,Deel II. Van Aerssen to van Royen [Minister without
portfolio; became Foreign Minister, March 1946], The Hague,
Melbourne, 25 January 1946, p.11.
have given the impression that their interests and viewpoints were mutual to the extent that the Dutch would welcome Australia's diplomatic assistance in the N.E.I. If the statements implicitly compromised Australia's position as a mediator acceptable to the Indonesians, they made clear Australia's acceptance of Dutch sovereignty in the N.E.I. They thereby had the desired domestic effect of mollifying the press.1

Meanwhile Australia's Political Representative attached to the SACSEA at Singapore, Mr J.C.R. Proud, had assumed responsibility for the N.E.I. following Macmahon Ball's return to Australia in December 1945. He informed Dutch officials in Batavia that Australia intended to appoint a high-ranking representative to assist the British mediator in Java, Lord Inverchapel.2,3 From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at The Hague this proposal was firmly discouraged as extraneous, unnecessary and without military authorisation (such as Britain had).4

In any case, Australia's move had been pre-empted. On 21 January the Ukraine applied - successfully - for the "Indonesian question" to be raised in the U.N. Security Council. Hitherto Britain and the U.S. had been endeavouring to forestall an initiative of this kind by the U.S.S.R.5 In February the Ukraine introduced a motion in the Security Council charging that British suppression of the Indonesian nationalist movement constituted a threat to international peace, and calling for the Indonesian situation to be investigated by the U.N.

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1 e.g. The Canberra Times, 23 January 1946. Editorial headline: "Talks clear air on Australian stand to N.E.I."


3 See Supra, Chapter 3, p. 85.

4 Archief DIRVO PA Australië tot 31 december 1947. Telegram to Batavia from The Hague, 23 January 1946. From van Royen to van Bylandt.

5 See Supra, Chapter 3, p. 82.
For Australia, which was one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the Ukraine action created a policy dilemma. Support for U.N. investigation and resolution of international disputes was a basic tenet in the foreign policy of the Labor government. Moreover, there had already in 1945 been some official enthusiasm for Australia's sponsoring a U.N. enquiry in the N.E.I.\(^1\) However, Australian troops in the N.E.I. outer islands, due to disengage at the end of February, were still cooperating with the British S.E.A.C. command. Also, Australia's current diplomatic aspirations in the N.E.I. implied political cooperation with the British. In a broader context, Australia's international alignment with the major Western powers, together with its interest in ensuring British and U.S. cooperation in regional security arrangements, were factors to be considered.

Regarded in this total context, it is not surprising that Australia's stance at the Security Council was cautious and somewhat conservative. It is significant, however, that Australia opposed the terms of the Ukrainian motion as distinct from its charges against the partisanship of British troops in the N.E.I. Makin denied a threat to international peace, and supported the application of Article 2(7)\(^2\) of the U.N. Charter relating to domestic jurisdiction.\(^3\) At the same time Makin emphasised Australia's support "in principle" for committees of enquiry and its claim to participate in these whenever Australia's interests were "especially affected".\(^4\) In relation to the N.E.I. he declared:

If the parties concerned had wished to adopt the suggestion that a committee of enquiry should be set up, the Australian Government, of course, would not have felt obliged to object. I should only add that in that event, since Indonesia is in a geographical area which the Japanese

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\(^3\) At the San Francisco conference Australia had been responsible, in large part, for the framing of this Article which protected Australia's policies towards the Australian aboriginal population, as well as its administration of New Guinea.

\(^4\) *SCOR*, *op.cit.*, p.232.
war has shown to be of vital importance to Australia, my country would have asked to be associated with the work of any such committee.  

Evatt subsequently reaffirmed Australia's support for the case in favour of the U.N. investigating disputes and assisting in conciliation. On the same occasion he referred to the "temporary failure" of the U.N. to solve the Indonesian question. He also indicated Australia's frustration that "other and deeper questions", such as "a just Indonesian settlement", had been "deemed outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council".

At the same time as the Security Council in London was debating the Indonesian question, new discussions between the Dutch and the Republic had begun in Batavia on 10 February under the chairmanship of Inverchapel. Van Mook, representing the Dutch, was keen to conclude an agreement with the moderate and cooperative Republican government led by Sjahrir.

Coincidentally a second group of Indonesians repatriated from Australia were due to arrive in the N.E.I. on 20 February. Van Mook believed that the Indonesian repatriates were largely supporters of Tan Malakka, a veteran Indonesian communist leader who was a Trotskyite and was currently leading Republican opposition to negotiations with the Dutch. At van Mook's request, Inverchapel asked Australia to delay the arrival of the repatriates, a recommendation which Australia's representatives at Singapore had already made.

Australia had arranged the repatriation in cooperation with S.E.A.C. As in the case of the Esperance Bay, Chifley resented British political

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1 SCOR, op.cit., p.234.  
3 See Djajadiningrat, op.cit., pp.51-52 and 56.  
4 Above information in this paragraph from van Mook Papers [ARTA] Doos 5, Folder 6. Unaddressed message dated 14 February 1946.  
5 X  
6 See Supra, Chapter 3, p.73.
News Item: The unions refuse to permit the loading of relief ships for Java unless a union observer travels in them.

Mr Chifley: "They want an observer, Bert. We've been observing the stuff so long, I almost forget what it's wanted for!"

Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)
2 March 1946
intervention at the instance of the Dutch. Again, Calwell's promises to the repatriated Indonesians were the reason given for Australia's refusal to comply with the request from Batavia. Outraged by Australia's failure to give priority to the Batavia negotiations which were being conducted under the auspices of S.E.A.C. and by the harm done to Australia's official relations with the Dutch, Proud resigned his Singapore post. Whether or not he was influenced by Proud's reaction, Chifley sent a message to Inverchapel on 18 February stating that Australia would endeavour unobtrusively to delay the arrival of the Indonesian repatriates until about 12 March. Although Chifley subsequently denied having caused friction with the British and the Dutch, the strength of his anti-Dutch sentiment clearly conflicted with Evatt's policy.

Evatt's efforts to conciliate the Dutch were equally damaged by the government's inability to obtain union cooperation for the trial shipment of relief supplies to the N.E.I. The W.W.F. was insisting on an assurance from Sjahrrir to the Indonesian Seamen's Union in Australia and on government agreement to a trade union observer accompanying the trial shipment. In fact, the W.W.F. stated:

...we desire to make it quite clear that under no circumstances are we prepared to aid the Dutch directly or through any intermediary against the just fight of the Indonesians for freedom, but will do all possible to aid the Indonesians.

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1 *CPD*, Vol. 186, p.18 (6 March 1946), Chifley: "...when I sent a cable about this matter to Lord Louis Mountbatten, he intimated to me that he was referring it to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr [Inverchapel] in order that he might deal with it... The return of the Indonesians to Java was a matter for the Supreme Commander, not the Dutch, to determine...."

2 X

3 X

4 X


6 Telegram from E. Roach, Assistant General Secretary, WWF, Sydney to A. Monk, Secretary, ACTU, Melbourne. WWF Indonesian File, op.cit.


8 *Maritime Worker* [Official organ of the WWF], Vol. 8, No.11 (23 February 1946), p.1.
"COMRADES, COMRADES!"

(But not exactly "ever since they were born.")

"There is a great deal of feeling in Australia that there is room for reform in the administration of the Netherlands East Indies.... The old order in Indonesia will not continue after the final settlement in May." - Mr Chifley.

Bulletin (Sydney)
13 March 1946
The government's irritation with the boycott reflected in the Commonwealth Arbitration Court convening a compulsory conference on 26 February of the unions involved in an attempt to break the deadlock over the continuing ban on Dutch shipping in Australia. In an authoritative gesture on 5 March Conciliation Commissioner Morrison directed "all unions concerned to see that any relief goods or medical supplies are shipped without further delay".  

Meanwhile, in a timely move, which again mollified domestic criticism of government policies towards the N.E.I., Evatt announced the appointment of Mr F.K. Officer, a senior diplomat, as Australian Political Representative in South East Asia (with the rank of Minister). Officer was appointed primarily to represent Australia in post-hostilities negotiations in Siam, but Evatt announced that, before and after visiting Siam, Officer

[would] be in charge of the Australian Mission in the Netherlands East Indies, and [would] report urgently to the Australian Government on the present situation in the Netherlands East Indies and the progress of current negotiations.  

The terms of Evatt's announcement seemed a direct rebuttal of Australia's disregard of the Batavia negotiations which Chifley had implied by his recent actions.

However, ambiguity in the government's attitude towards the N.E.I. Dutch continued. In replying to an Opposition motion of censure against the government's N.E.I. policy, Chifley told parliament on 6 March 1946:

...In this country there is a considerable body of opinion that the set of circumstances which originally existed with respect to the Administration of the Netherlands East Indies required a good deal of reformation...

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2 e.g. Press release by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr R.G. Menzies. Officer Papers, Ms 2629 (National Library, Canberra), Diary (1946), Vol. 13, p.5.

3 Ibid., pp.1-4. Text.
the feeling which I have indicated runs very deeply through the whole trade union movement in this country.... It runs wider than the trade union movement....

I agree to a considerable extent with what the Leader of the Opposition has said. There is a very strong movement in Indonesia for freedom for the Indonesians. The Leader of the Opposition has said that he does not believe the Indonesians have had sufficient administrative training to take upon themselves the responsibility of self-government. I think there is a good deal of truth in that. It is also completely true, I think, that the old order in Indonesia will not go on, after the final settlement has been made.1

Chifley's sympathy with the anti-Dutch standpoint of the boycotting unions again conflicted with Australia's foreign policy as announced by Evatt a week later. In this first comprehensive statement of policy towards the N.E.I. dispute, Evatt expressed Australia's "vital interest in the preservation of the wartime friendship with the Dutch in relation to the Netherlands East Indies" and indicated satisfaction with recent Dutch proposals for a settlement with the Indonesians "expressly based on Article 73 of the Charter".2

Evatt thereby appeared to have re-emphasised Australia's partisan position. British and Dutch officials in Batavia were pleased with his statement. However, Sjahrir was disappointed in its tone. In his view, Australia was aligning with the European powers against its geographical and sentimental interests to support the peoples of the East who were struggling for independence.3

Evatt also announced that Australia's policy was "to assist in [the] settlement of the dispute". He stated further that "our special representative in the Netherlands East Indies [Officer] is doing what is possible to assist the special British political representative [Inverchapel] mediating between the parties with a view to a just settlement."4 When Officer returned to Batavia from Bangkok at the end of March to act as an official Australian observer at ongoing Dutch-Indonesian talks, the Dutch

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2 For full text of statement relating to the N.E.I., see Appendix III, Document 7.
3 X
in Batavia learned for the first time that Officer was on a special mission.\textsuperscript{1} For his part, Inverchapel was reported to have been affronted by Evatt's assertion that Officer was assisting him.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, Evatt's own brashness compromised his efforts in other ways to obtain influence for Australia with the British and the Dutch in the N.E.I.

Meanwhile, the government had been unsuccessful in attempting to implement the arbitration directive that the boycotting unions load relief supplies for the N.E.I. The unions continued to demand that a trade union observer accompany a trial shipment. They refused an alternate government proposal that it appoint observers. In any case, the Dutch would not countenance observers, be they trade union or governmental, sailing on Dutch ships. In turn, the government did not implement an official proposal that Australian naval vessels, rather than the boycotted Dutch ships, be used,\textsuperscript{3} because this would have involved using naval personnel to 'scab' against the unions.\textsuperscript{4} Naturally, this was a step which a Labor government felt constrained to avoid.

In March S.E.A.C. was beginning to introduce Dutch troops into the N.E.I. to enable the British to withdraw. In this connection it was interested in substituting the Dutch ships in Australia for the British ships which were being used to transport Dutch troops. To explore this possibility, which would also enable the impasse regarding the loading of relief supplies to be overcome, Mountbatten came to Australia for discussions at the end of March.\textsuperscript{5} By acceding to the unions' request that he cable

\textsuperscript{1} Archief DIRVO PA (Box 211) van Bylandt to van Aerssen. Batavia, 29 March 1946.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{3} CPD, Vol. 186, p.464 (20 March 1946), Chifley.
\textsuperscript{4} CPD, Vol. 186, p.470 (21 March 1946), Evatt.
\textsuperscript{5} WWF Indonesia File. Record of proceedings of meeting between representatives, Sydney, 29 March 1946.
News Item: The Prime Minister, Mr Chifley, said that, after the departure of Lord Louis Mountbatten, "something had gone wrong with the negotiations" for the despatch of Dutch ships.

Mr Forde: "Just hide your pipe, Ben, and they won't know you from the Supremo."

Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)
6 April 1946

* Mr F.M. Forde, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Army.
Batavia to obtain assurances from Sjahir, Mountbatten reached 'agreement' with the unions. The unions wanted to know

(i) if Sjahir had any objections to Dutch ships being used in N.E.I. waters; and

(ii) if he would agree to the Dutch ships bringing stores to Java.¹

Sjahir's reply,² which Mountbatten requested be sent to Chifley and to the unions through the Australian Political Representative in Batavia, created a further impasse. However, Dutch-Indonesian negotiations were at a delicate stage in Batavia. Sjahir was not prepared to become a party to the shipping dispute in Australia. Moreover, he believed that because the supplies in Australia were Dutch-owned, the Dutch would claim the right to dispose of them; and, also if the goods were sold, they would only bolster the Dutch currency.

As Chifley subsequently told parliament, the reply received from "the self-styled Premier of Indonesia" indicated that he "did not favour the release of the Dutch ships".³ Moreover, it implicitly endorsed the attitude of the militant Australian unions towards the shipping of 'mercy' supplies. It would also have placed the government in an awkward position in the event of its implementing the proposal, which it was reconsidering, to forward relief supplies to Java on Australian naval vessels - in the name of non-partisanship. Overt government opposition to the ban therefore subsided early in April.

Talks between the Dutch and the Republic in Batavia transferred to The Hague in April to enable direct consultations with the Netherlands

¹ Copy. Cablegram from Australian Political Representative, Batavia, 3 April 1946. WWF Indonesia File.
² Ibid. All information following in this paragraph.
government. Officer therefore concluded his mission at Batavia and reported to the Australian government.¹ He predicted that the N.E.I. was only at the beginning of a long period of unrest. He regarded the Sjahrir government favourably, but anticipated that it would continue to be harassed by more radical nationalists opposed to cooperation with the Dutch. In turn he found that few Dutch officials in Batavia favoured the idea of an agreement with the Indonesians and most favoured repressing the Republic by force. Also in April a Netherlands Parliamentary Commission visited the N.E.I. and it recommended this latter course. Officer reported there to be a strong feeling in Batavia that Australia had supported the Indonesians and let the Dutch down. He suggested Australia might implement a cautious and constant policy towards the N.E.I. with a view to restoring a balance in good relations with both the Dutch and the Indonesians.

On 8 May Officer took up his new post in The Hague as Australian Minister to the Netherlands. The government's appointment of one of its most senior and distinguished diplomats to this post appeared as a gesture of goodwill towards the Dutch. As such, it received favourable publicity in Australia.²

By early May Dutch-Indonesian talks in Holland had failed to produce any tangible results, coinciding as they did with Holland's first post-war general elections which were scheduled for 17 May. The post-war provisional government, which had been appointed after the return of the wartime government-in-exile from London, was naturally reluctant to commit Holland to any definite agreement with the Indonesians without an electoral mandate. The Indonesian delegation regarded this reluctance somewhat as a breach of faith. In Batavia it had concluded with van Mook what it assumed

¹ X All information following in this paragraph.
² Officer, Diary, op.cit., Vol. 13, p. 20.
was a definite basis for negotiations with the Netherlands government.¹

During the Dutch-Indonesian talks in Holland, Mr A.D. Brookes, who had been Assistant Australian Political Representative at Singapore (and Batavia) since Macmahon Ball's return to Australia in December 1945, suggested to the Department of External Affairs that it would be opportune for Australia to establish informal relations with the Indonesian Republic. Brookes argued that if negotiations in Holland succeeded, the future status of the Republic would be assured. Alternatively, if they failed, it would be in Australia's interest to advocate U.N. intervention and Australia taking a more prominent part.² After the talks in Holland foundered, Brookes suggested to Canberra that the Dutch were unfit to govern in the N.E.I. and he recommended Australia adopt a policy of support for the Sjahrir government. This, he argued, would strengthen Sjahrir's position vis-à-vis both the Dutch and Indonesian extremists. Furthermore Brookes thought that, if Australia adopted such a policy, it could well lead to Sjahrir's desire to integrate the defence of Java and Sumatra with that of Australia.³

Brookes's role in the N.E.I. exposed a difference in approach to the Sjahrir regime between Evatt and the Department of External Affairs as well as tension over the whole question of control of foreign policy by Evatt and the Department respectively. As Secretary of the Department, Dunk apparently resented the lack of protocol with which Evatt and various of his appointees treated the Department. Brookes's relationship to the

¹ See Djajadiningrat, *op.cit.*, p.60.
² X
³ X
Department in Canberra was an instance of this.\(^1\) Moreover, Dunk was not persuaded that Australia should support the Sjahrir regime.\(^2\) However, Chifley and Evatt called at Sourabaya in April en route to the Commonwealth Ministers' Conference in London. Brookes recalls Evatt having told him that Australia's policy was to support the Indonesian moderates. Evatt also instructed Brookes to communicate directly with him in London, rather than with the Department in Canberra.\(^3\)

At the Commonwealth Ministers' Conference in London (23 April-23 May), Australia pressed for a Commonwealth system of regional security in the Pacific.\(^4\) In obtaining British cooperation for the immediate establishment of a South Seas Regional Commission to advance the standards

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1 Watt, *op. cit.*, pp.79-80. Watt, who was Assistant Secretary (Political) in the Department described Brookes as "a young man without governmental training or international expertise, suddenly launched with Dr Evatt's approval into an extremely delicate international situation of special importance to Australia". He has elaborated: "On 17 April 1946 Dr Evatt and his Private Secretary, Dr John Burton, left Australia for London, arriving there on 19 April. During their absence overseas a telegram was received in Canberra from Brookes. It was despatched from Batavia, addressed to Burton and 'repeated' to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs. The telegram dealt with matters of high policy in which Brookes was involving himself with Indonesian Republican leaders. Dunk was annoyed that Brookes seemed to regard a junior officer, Burton, as the person to whom he had primary responsibility for reporting. But even if the message had been intended for Dr Evatt, Dunk was deeply concerned that a person of such limited experience was involving himself in difficult and delicate political problems without effective departmental control, and without his reports being submitted to the Minister together with departmental comments.... Dunk gave me to understand at the time that he had taken up directly with Evatt the question of Brookes' activities in Indonesia and control over them by the Department of External Affairs. In reply, Evatt, while not specifically endorsing what Brookes had been doing, minimised their significance and ascribed them to excess of zeal."

2 According to Brookes, Dunk's line was that "we can't be St George to every maiden". Interview with Brookes, Canberra, 1 November 1967.

3 Interview with Brookes, Canberra, 1 November 1967.

of living of the Pacific peoples, Australia reaffirmed its support for
continuing control of non-self-governing territories by the colonial powers.¹

Discussion of defence cooperation centred on the future use and
administration of bases in the Pacific. It will be recalled that during the
war Evatt had envisaged Australia would establish such bases in the post-
war N.E.I.² On their way to London, Chifley and Evatt discussed the Dutch-
Indonesian dispute at Singapore with Officer, Mountbatten, and Lord Killearn,
British Special Commissioner in South East Asia.³ After conferring with
Mountbatten, Evatt cabled the Australian Minister in London saying it would
be important to clarify British use of bases such as Sourabaya (Java) and
Koepang (Dutch Timor) before any Dutch-Indonesian agreement was finalised.⁴
Evatt was possibly concerned that Australia, as the principal Commonwealth
power in the Pacific, have access to these N.E.I. bases.

Meanwhile the Dutch elections, in which the Indonesian dispute
had figured prominently, had produced a Catholic-Labour left-wing coalition
government of substantially the same party composition as the provisional
government which it replaced. This meant that a diplomatic settlement in
the N.E.I. was unlikely.⁵ In Batavia talks between van Mook and Sjahrir
resumed on 20 May on the basis of new and more unyielding Dutch proposals.
The latter were not as acceptable to Sjahrir as the draft 'agreement' he
had concluded with van Mook under the chairmanship of Inverchapel.⁶ Sjahrir,
who was under considerable internal political pressure, asked Brookes⁷ what
he thought world reaction would be to his resigning as Premier of the
Republic and allowing Sjarifuddin, a left-wing nationalist leader and

¹ Ibid.
² See Supra, Chapter 2.
³ Officer, Diary, op.cit., Vol. 13, p.21.
⁴ X
⁵ See Anderson, op.cit., p.370.
⁶ See Djajadiningrat, op.cit., p.112.
⁷ X Information following in this paragraph.
currently Minister for Defence and for Information in the Republican
government, to assume office. Brookes advised Sjahrir against this course.
On the same occasion Sjahrir intimated to Brookes that the Republican
cabinet was considering appealing to the U.N. through Australia. When, in
early June, ill-health compelled Brookes to return to Australia he brought
with him "a formal letter from Prime Minister Sjahrir requesting that the
Australian government raise the Indonesian question before the United Nations
on certain terms".\textsuperscript{1} The terms were those of the draft 'agreement' between
van Mook and Sjahrir which provided for Dutch recognition of the Indonesian
Republic.\textsuperscript{2}

Sjahrir survived the current political crisis within the Republic,
with considerable assistance from Indonesian political exiles repatriated
from Australia. In April 1946, one of their number, Sardjono, became
Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, (P.K.I.) which took up a position
in support of the Sjahrir government.\textsuperscript{3}

Meanwhile, Sjahrir had submitted a set of Indonesian counter-
proposals to van Mook. The Department of External Affairs therefore regarded
Sjahrir's letter as an informal sounding out of the possibility of an
Australian initiative in the Security Council, should the Dutch-Indonesian
talks again break down.\textsuperscript{4}

Following Brookes' return to Australia, Judge (now Sir Richard)
Kirby, who was in Java to investigate the murder of three Australian war
crimes' investigators, acted as Australian Political Representative at
Batavia. The Department of External Affairs was sensitive, lest Sjahrir
had been led to expect Australia's diplomatic support.\textsuperscript{5} It therefore asked
Kirby to discreetly convey to him that Australia would be unlikely to find

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Watt, \textit{op.cit.}, p.80.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Letter to Brookes from Sjahrir, 5 June 1946. Brookes, private papers.
\item \textsuperscript{3} See Anderson, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.345-347.
\item \textsuperscript{4} X
\item \textsuperscript{5} X Information following in this paragraph.
\end{itemize}
The Prime Minister, Mr Chifley, says it was "most inappropriate" to send the Netherlands warship Piet Hein to Australia for repairs in view of existing trouble in Australia with Dutch ships.

Mr Chifley: "You should be ashamed, Piet Hein, coming here worrying this gentleman after all the trouble he's had keeping your friends out!"

*Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney)
22 June 1946
his proposal feasible, adding that there was no lack of sympathy in
Australia for Indonesian aspirations to self-government, but that Australia
favoured the Dutch and Indonesians reaching a bilateral settlement.

At this juncture the union ban against Dutch shipping in Australia
came into public prominence again. A Dutch destroyer, Piet Hein, visited
several Australian ports and was successively refused repairs. The
Melbourne Herald published correspondence on the subject between the
Australian government and Dutch authorities. The Netherlands protested
officially to Australia; and van Aerssen issued a press statement claiming
that the Dutch people would fail to understand Australia's treatment of its
wartime ally. When the Opposition raised the subject in parliament, Chifley
accused Dutch officials in Australia of engaging in newspaper controversy
against the Australian government.1 Whether or not Chifley's specific
accusation was true, it seems that for some months prior to the federal
elections in September 1946, certain metropolitan newspapers in Sydney and
Melbourne were conducting a concerted campaign to overthrow the Labor govern-
ment on the issue of domestic communism. In any case, personal contact
between Chifley and van Aerssen broke down for several months as a result
of Chifley's statement.2

At the same time, Officer in The Hague was being apologetic to
the Dutch about the continuing ban on Dutch shipping in Australia. In mid-
June he issued a statement emphasising that only a very small minority of
unions were maintaining the ban against Dutch ships; that the government
was inhibited in counteracting it for fear of a general shipping strike;
and that the Netherlands had the sympathy of the whole Australian nation.3

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2 Archief B.Z. 912.1 Australië. Verhoudingen Dipl. met Nederland,
Deel 1, 1946-1949. Van Aerssen to van Boetzelaer. Melbourne,
3 Officer, Diary, op.cit., Vol. 13, p.26; Sydney Morning Herald, 13 June
1946.
Officer, who privately admitted his sympathy with Dutch hostility to the ban, regarded its continuance as the main obstacle to his diplomatic capacity in the Hague.\textsuperscript{1}

Australia's refusal to service the Piet Hein in June 1946 did not mean that in other circumstances Australia would refuse military assistance to the Dutch in the N.E.I. Probably because Australia had not been able to release the Dutch ships in Australia to S.E.A.C., the Australian Army and Navy cooperated June-August in the transporting of Dutch personnel and military supplies to Biak and Macassar. The Department of External Affairs advised Kirby in Batavia that Australia's recognition of Dutch sovereignty made it difficult to object to the removal of Dutch forces and stores from Australia. At the same time it admitted that the decision to assist the Dutch militarily had been particularly difficult, given Australia's constant policy of encouraging a peaceful Dutch-Indonesian settlement.\textsuperscript{2} Australia's partisan action did not pass unnoticed by the Republic. Sjahrir told Australian journalist, Mr Graham Jenkins, who was in close contact with the Republican leaders,\textsuperscript{3} that he was most upset about Dutch reinforcements being landed by Australian naval vessels.\textsuperscript{4}

Australia's 'interventionary action' coincided with an internal crisis in the Republic. At the end of June social revolutionary forces had impelled Soekarno to declare a State of Emergency and to impose presidential government. As well, it seems that Soekarno's action was taken "to create an atmosphere of national crisis that would rally public support to the government" in renewed negotiations with the Dutch.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1} Officer Papers, \textit{op.cit.}, Box 8, Folder: P.R. Heydon. Letter to Heydon [Department of External Affairs, Canberra], from Officer, 24 June 1946.

\textsuperscript{2} X


\textsuperscript{4} X

\textsuperscript{5} Anderson, \textit{op.cit.}, p.380.
the Dutch had meanwhile convened a conference of Indonesians to rally support for independent Dutch plans to form an Indonesian confederation. Militarily and politically the Republic was therefore under pressure.

In August 1946 Evatt went to Paris to represent Australia at the Peace Conference. Here, with a common interest in advancing the rights of small/middle powers, Australia and the Netherlands worked in close cooperation. Evatt apparently established particularly cordial relations with the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Baron C.G.W.H. van Boetzelera van Oosterhout, who was especially pleased with Evatt's assurances that he wanted a resumption of Dutch administration in the N.E.I.¹

Meanwhile the government in Canberra was limiting its military support to the Dutch. When the Netherlands Navy in August asked Australia for munition supplies and base facilities, Cabinet decided that neither of these requests would be encouraged. It also decided that it did not favour munitions being transported from Australia, although it would not prevent the Dutch from loading on their own ships with their own labour and removing from Australia their own stores.²

In communicating these decisions to Evatt in Paris, Chifley indicated that Cabinet had taken into account the impression that the Dutch were not making a bona fide effort to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the N.E.I. If Australia facilitated the building up of Dutch military strength under these conditions, Chifley stated, it might well stimulate lasting resentment by the Indonesians.³

In any case Chifley described the current lack of progress in negotiations as disturbing. In a recent speech by Queen Wilhelmina, the Netherlands had evinced a most uncompromising attitude towards negotiating

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¹ Archief B.Z. 912.1 Australië. Verhoudingen tijdens..., op.cit., Deel IV, van Boetzelera van Aerssen, The Hague, 1 October 1946.
² X All information above in this paragraph.
³ X
with the Republic. Chifley suggested that the Dutch were stalling negotiations in the hope either that the Indonesian nationalist movement would disintegrate into different factions or that Dutch forces could be sufficiently built up to re-impose Dutch authority. Chifley emphasised the necessity of persuading the Dutch that their policy in the N.E.I. was misguided. He also reflected apprehension within the government that instability would continue after the military withdrawal of the British (which had begun in July) and the assumption of full Dutch control.¹

The ambivalence in government attitudes towards the Dutch remained clear. Foreign policy was not an election issue in September 1946, but the election campaign revealed the lack of unanimity between government ministers on policy towards the Dutch. While Evatt spoke of recent Australian-Dutch cooperation in Paris,² Calwell stated emphatically that the days of the Dutch in the Indies were over. Dutch officials in Australia reacted angrily to Calwell's assertion.³

Ministerial dissidence aside, Evatt's interest to cultivate Dutch goodwill continued. On 26 September he announced Australia's intention to convene a conference early in 1947 for the purpose of creating a South Pacific Commission. At the Paris Peace Conference, Evatt had already indicated to Dutch officials that he envisaged the Netherlands participating so that Dutch New Guinea would be included in the Commission's area.⁴ Dutch officialdom was not entirely persuaded, the most vocal opposition apparently coming from van Mook. He regarded the conception of the conference as another opportunity by which Evatt would seek the limelight. More particularly, he did not accept that Dutch New Guinea logically belonged to the

¹ Ibid.
⁴ Archief DIRVO. MA: South Pacific Commission (Box 161) van Boetzelaer to van Aerssen. Untitled document dated 9 September 1946.
proposed area of the Commission. While he thought that Dutch New Guinea and Australian New Guinea had some common interests, he was more persuaded that Dutch New Guinea would depend on the rest of the N.E.I. rather than on the South Pacific for assistance in economic, social, cultural and medical matters. In any case, van Mook questioned the current political wisdom of the Dutch acknowledging that Dutch New Guinea was in any way separate from the rest of the N.E.I. He therefore recommended that the Netherlands attend the Conference as an observer, but in no way commit itself to cooperation until the results were known.¹

On 28 September, not unexpectedly the Chifley Labor government was returned to office. Already Australia had taken new steps to intensify its diplomacy in the N.E.I. British military withdrawal (July–November 1946) gave greater urgency to Australia's claim to participate in political discussions in Batavia. Coinciding with the appointment of Killearn² as a new British mediator, Australia appointed a senior diplomat, Mr B.C. Ballard, as Australian Political Representative at Batavia. Australia had not had a permanent representative in Batavia since Macmahon Ball's return to Australia in November 1945.

Evatt had been aware for some considerable time that both Killearn and the previous British mediator (Inverchapel) had been dissatisfied with the Dutch attitude to negotiations.³ Evatt made it clear to Killearn that Australian and British views were parallel. He stressed that Australia was anxious for Dutch sovereignty and interests to be preserved in the N.E.I.

² See Supra, this chapter, p.109.
³ X Following information in this paragraph.
At the same time he indicated Australia's dissatisfaction with promises of self-government constantly being made to the Indonesians without being fulfilled.

In September Evatt proposed to Killearn that Australia's interests in a settlement of the N.E.I. dispute were greater than Britain's. He advised Killearn of his strong feelings about Australia being represented at tripartite talks at Cheribon (Java) on 7 October in which British, Dutch and Republican representatives would discuss a political settlement.¹ Evatt made a similar appeal directly to the British government but the Dominions Office recommended it be refused by Attlee.² Through Officer in The Hague, Evatt likewise appealed to the Netherlands government, offering every assistance to uphold the 'guiding hand' of the Netherlands in the N.E.I.³ Again the response was negative.⁴

Nevertheless, Ballard attended the opening session of the Cheribon Conference as an "adviser",⁵ and according to Killearn, as a member of his staff.⁶ Van Mook objected to Ballard's presence as he had done to Macmahon Ball's participation in November 1945.⁷,⁸ In any case, Attlee refused Australia's request in mid-October.⁹

² Ibid., Memo from van Boetzelaer to Chief, Political Affairs, MBZ, The Hague, 7 October 1946.
³ Ibid., Codetelegram for (1) London (2) Melbourne (3) van Bylandt, Batavia. From van Boetzelaer, The Hague, 11 October 1946.
⁴ Van Mook Papers, op.cit., Doos 7 (1 okt. t/m 20 okt 1946), Folder 1. Record of proceedings.
⁵ Archief B.Z., 912.10. Telegram to MBZ from van Bylandt, Batavia, n.d. nr. 88.
⁶ See Supra, Chapter 3, p.82.
⁷ Archief B.Z., 912.10. Telegram to MBZ, The Hague from van Bylandt, Batavia, 14 October 1946. 92.
Officer told van Boetzelaer that Evatt regarded Holland's failure to accept Australia's offer of assistance as entirely unsatisfactory. At the same time Burton conferred with van Aerssen in Canberra and reiterated Evatt's suggestion of January— for Australian participation in N.E.I. negotiations as a means of improving Australian-Dutch relations. Apparently with Killearn's approval, Ballard attended subsequent sessions of the Cheribon Conference as an observer.

Thus, Evatt failed to have Australia admitted as a 'party principal' to the negotiations for resolving this major post-war Pacific problem within Australia's self-defined area of interest. With the prospect of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations concluding successfully, it seemed, however, that Australia attached some importance to at least appearing to be a participant at Cheribon. Evatt told parliament on 15 November:

We have not said very much about the part which we are playing in the negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians....Australia's representatives are sitting side by side with the representatives of Great Britain in attempting to settle the dispute.

In the ensuing debate Chifley contributed to the government's misrepresentation of its position at Cheribon.

The representative of the Commonwealth Government not only accompanied the British Special Commissioner in South-East Asia, Lord Killearn, when the matter [a Dutch-Indonesian settlement] was being dealt with, but also acted, at times, as chairman.

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2 See Supra, this chapter, p.93.
4 *Ibid*.
5 van Mook papers, op.cit., Doos 7 Folder 1. Transcript of proceedings.
The inaccuracy of both statements attracted the attention of Dutch officials in Batavia, and the Netherlands Legation in Australia promptly sent rebuttals to the Australian government.

No doubt also prompted by the expectation that negotiations at Cheribon would be successful, the Department of External Affairs tried more urgently to resolve outstanding issues with the Dutch. Following the breakdown in relations between van Aerssen and Chifley, van Aerssen had returned to Holland for consultations. Then, on 30 October, Mr P.R. Heydon, Head of the Pacific Division in the Department, conferred with the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires, Mr J.A. de Ranitz. In particular Heydon pressed for the Dutch to evacuate Camp Casino.

As a continuation of wartime arrangements the N.E.I. army had had the use of former Australian Army camps, including Victory Camp at Casino in northern New South Wales. Since September 1945 mutinous Indonesian members of the N.E.I. armed forces in Australia had been held at Camp Casino by the Dutch. For more than a year publicity and pressure by pro-Indonesian groups had accentuated the government's own embarrassment at the continued operation of the camp. Previous official requests to the Dutch to close the camp had been constrained. However, once a truce had been called in the N.E.I. in mid-October, Australia suggested to the Dutch that the detention of Indonesians as political prisoners was no longer viable. Heydon proposed

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1 Archief DIRVO FA Australië. RVD [Regerings Voorlichtings Dienst (Government Information Service)], Batavia, 17 November 1946; Memo to Head of RVD, n.d. Uitingen Chifley in kamerdebat 20 november 1946.


3 This and following information from Archief Geszantschap Canberra, 912.1 C J.A. de Ranitz to P.R. Heydon, Department of External Affairs, Canberra. Netherlands Legation, Canberra, 30 October 1946. [Record of conversations]; also Ibid., 912.1 Deel IV, op.cit., van Aerssen to van Boetzelaer, The Hague. Melbourne, 4 November 1946. J27c/4724/347 Besprekingen...

4 For further discussion, see Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi Di Luar Negeri (Djakarta, 1971) pp.29-36.
the Indonesians at Casino be repatriated on the same basis as other
Indonesians still in Australia. Camp Casino closed in December 1946;
and the Indonesians detained there were finally repatriated by Australia
eyearly in 1947.\footnote{1}

For his part, de Ranitz mainly complained about the continuing
boycott against Dutch shipping between Australia and the N.E.I. Apparently
Heydon indicated that the government was embarrassed by the boycott, but
that it also was not in a position to obtain union cooperation.\footnote{2}

On 8 November, in his first post-election statement on international
affairs, Evatt made no mention of the N.E.I. When pressed to do so in
subsequent debate, he said that the Dutch-Indonesian dispute appeared to be
settled, and added:

\begin{quote}
Our idea is that Dutch sovereignty should not be
terminated, but that the peoples of Indonesia should
obtain a substantial measure of self-government. In
one sense, this problem is outside our province, but
we have adopted that attitude, and I contend that it
is right.\footnote{3}
\end{quote}

On 15 November representatives of the Netherlands government and
of the Indonesian Republic initialled the so-called Cheribon Draft Agree-
ment by which the Netherlands was to recognise the \textit{de facto} authority of
the Republic on Java, Sumatra and Madura. However, the Netherlands and the
Republic were to cooperate in the formation of a federal United States of
Indonesia (U.S.I.), comprising the Republic and non-Republican areas of the
N.E.I. The U.S.I. in turn would remain linked with the Netherlands.

In so far as mediation had contributed to this result, Britain
thereby achieved a speedy compromise settlement prior to S.E.A.C.'s military

\footnote{1} Statement by the Minister for Immigration, Mr A.A. Calwell, 16 December
1946. \textit{ANEP-ANETA Bulletin}, 17 December 1946 \textit{Archief B.Z.} 912.1 Deel IV.
\textit{op.cit.}

\footnote{2} \textit{Archief B.Z.} Gezantschap Canberra 912.1 C, \textit{op.cit.}, J.A. de Ranitz to
P.R. Heydon, 30 October 1946, \textit{op.cit.}

\footnote{3} \textit{CPD}, Vol. 189, p.339 (15 November 1946).

Summary and Conclusion

During 1946 Australian-British relations with regard to the N.E.I. had not been entirely satisfactory. Australia's military cooperation had at times been reluctant. Alternatively Australia had actively sought political cooperation with British efforts to mediate the dispute between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic. Britain did not accept Australia's claim to a more direct geographical interest in the N.E.I. dispute. For its part, Australia rejected Britain's rebuffs. In various ways, ranging from Chifley's confrontation with S.E.A.C. over the Indonesian repatriations to Evatt's verbal effusiveness and diplomatic assertiveness in relation to negotiations between the Dutch and the Republicans, Australia managed to agitate rather than to conciliate British officialdom.

More generally Australia's policy towards the N.E.I. during 1946 was fulfilled only so far as the Dutch and the Republicans produced the Cheribon draft agreement. This accorded with Australia's desire for a peaceful compromise settlement in which Dutch sovereignty was retained. However, as indicated above, Australia's particular hope to assist that settlement failed.

Australia's wider interest in developing Dutch goodwill, which would rebound in a cooperative regional relationship, also failed. Australia's inconsistency contributed to this. In particular, Evatt's oscillation between friendliness and hostility to the Dutch militated against any sense of trust in Australian-Dutch relations. Many of the Australian government's friendly gestures towards the Dutch were, of course, made to appease a hostile opposition and a hostile press in Australia.

The lack of unanimity in government policy towards the N.E.I. also contributed to inconsistency. The division of attitude within the Labor
Cabinet, most pronouncedly between Evatt and Chifley, was transmuted into a conflict between foreign policy and other relevant government policies. There was, as well, a lack of unanimity between Evatt and the Department of External Affairs, within the Department of External Affairs, and between the Department and its overseas diplomats.

The pro-Indonesian and pro-Republican policies of the militant Australian unions created the impression within Australia and overseas that Australia officially favoured Indonesian independence. The government's failure, under industrial pressure, to circumvent union intervention in Australia's foreign relations tended to substantiate this impression.

Officially, Australia's foreign policy towards the dispute between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic supported the Dutch throughout 1946. It seems, nevertheless, that the Labor government maintained its 'pro-Dutch' position somewhat uneasily. Australia's support for Dutch sovereignty in the N.E.I. appeared as a pragmatic choice which conflicted sharply with anti-Dutch sentiments within the Labor government.

Pragmatic priorities both related to the N.E.I. and extended beyond it. With regard to the former, Australia evinced a legalistic regard to Dutch sovereignty. Moreover, by its 'progressive' attitude towards the peoples of non-self-governing territories Australia envisaged advocating neither the termination of colonial sovereignty nor the assumption of national independence by the colonial peoples. Instead it favoured colonial welfare and a liberal and gradual extension of local autonomy to the colonial peoples by the colonial powers.

Pragmatic priorities extending beyond the N.E.I. were integral to Australia's approach to the N.E.I. dispute. Australia's plans for post-war regional security involved cooperation with the colonial powers in the Pacific, which were by coincidence the major or middle international security powers. In particular, Australia sought the Netherlands' regional cooperation
in the South Pacific Commission. Internationally, Australia, as an aspiring middle power, identified with the Netherlands.

As distinct from these foreign policy considerations, Australia-Dutch relations were not smooth during 1946. The Labor government resented what it regarded as collusion between Dutch officials in Australia, the press and the opposition parties. It considered that Dutch verbal provocation of the boycotting unions was aggravating the government's difficulties with the unions. Together, these issues culminated in Chifley disparaging van Aerssen. Given Labor's support for a peaceful settlement in the N.E.I., Chifley and the majority of his Cabinet were uneasy about Australia's continuing military relationship with the Dutch, the more so as the Dutch appeared disposed to suppress the Indonesian Republic by military force.

As distinct from the boycotting unions, the Labor government did little to cultivate the friendship of the Indonesian peoples during 1946. Chifley's attitude towards the Indonesians being repatriated from Australia was a marginal case.

In contrast to its widely-proclaimed sympathy for the aspirations of the Indonesian peoples, the Labor government was at times distinctly unfriendly towards the aspirations of the Indonesian Republic. Australia's constant reiteration of its support for Dutch sovereignty in the N.E.I. implied rejection of the Republic's claim to merdeka - freedom from the Dutch. In the repatriation incident, Chifley appeared unconcerned as to whether the repatriates supported or opposed the Republic. And he was clearly annoyed at Sjahrir's obstructionist role vis-à-vis the lifting of the shipping ban in Australia.

In other respects, Australia's attitude towards the Sjahrir government appeared disingenuous. In so far as Australia claimed to support moderate and reasonable Indonesian aspirations for self-government,
the Sjahrir government, in the situation of 1946, occupied a moderate position. Its willingness to negotiate a compromise settlement with the Dutch distinguished its policy of *dipomasi* (diplomacy) from the radical alternative of *perdjuangan* (struggle).\(^1\) However, as was shown by the 'Brookes incident', Australia recoiled from encouraging the Republican government.

\(^1\) For the conflict between these Republican policies, see Anderson, *op.cit.*; also J.D. Legge, *Soekarno. A Political Biography* (London, 1972), p.206.
Chapter Five
AFTER CHERIBON: AUSTRALIA'S INTEREST TO
RESTORE TRADE WITH INDONESIA

In the time between the return of the Labor government to office in September 1946 and the Cheribon draft agreement of November, there was speculation in various quarters that Australia would seek to establish relations with the Indonesian Republic immediately a Dutch-Republican settlement was concluded. Dutch officialdom noted the prediction by Graham Jenkins,\(^1\) a prominent Australian journalist close to Republican sources in the N.E.I., that the re-elected Labor government would pursue a more vigorous good-neighbour policy towards Java, aimed at strengthening Australia's influence with the Republicans.\(^2\) They also noted Jenkins' report of an interview with Soekarno in mid-November\(^3\) in which Soekarno stated his intention, following a settlement with the Dutch, to pursue a good-neighbour policy towards Australia.\(^4\) In mid-October van Aerssen voiced his suspicion that, in seeking to become a party to negotiations in the N.E.I., Australia had an eye to an Australian-Indonesian trade pact.\(^5\) Finally, in November, van Mook added his voice to the mounting speculation. He thought more was 'brewing' in Canberra than the Dutch knew about. He suggested that Australia would exploit the new truce situation in Java and Sumatra by developing an active policy towards the emergent U.S.I.\(^6\)

Once A.F.N.E.I. withdrew from the N.E.I. the accreditation of the Australian Political Representative at Batavia effectively dissolved. Possibly to clarify doubts about Australia's diplomatic relations with the

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\(^1\) *Argus* (Melbourne), 1 October 1946.


\(^3\) *Argus* (Melbourne), 15 November 1946.


\(^5\) *Archief B.Z.* 912.10, J27c/4486/330, 18 October 1946, *op.cit.*

\(^6\) *Archief DIRVO*, PA Australië. 3. Van Mook to van Bylandt, 1 November 1946.
N.E.I., van Mook immediately sent a message to the Australian government indicating that an Australian consular representative would be welcome in Batavia.¹

In contrast with its hitherto legalistic attitude towards Dutch sovereignty in the N.E.I., Australia was apparently uncertain about political accreditation during the period of transition from the N.E.I. to the U.S.I. In December Dunk told de Rantz in Canberra that so long as Killearn² remained in Singapore, there should be no objection to the Australian Political Representative remaining a member of his staff.³ When de Rantz pointed out to Dunk that, as a part of the future U.S.I., the Republic would have no independent control over its foreign relations, Dunk replied that Australia understood it would be possible to have direct relations with the Republic in the interim period. Moreover, Dunk indicated Australia's intention to establish contact with the Sjahrir government immediately to discuss Australia-Indonesia trade.

Clearly Australia considered the Cheribon draft agreement enabled it to recognise the Indonesian Republic as a part of the proposed U.S.I. It also appeared to have resented the attempt by the Dutch to prevent Australia from establishing informal contact with the Republic. On 7 December the Department of External Affairs instructed the Australian Political Representative at Batavia to enlarge his direct informal contacts and strengthen Australian influence with the Republican government.⁴

For some months prior to this the Indonesian Republic had itself been making preparations for opening trade with Australia. Since mid-1946

¹ Archief B.Z. 912.1, Deel IV, op.cit., de Rantz to van Boetzelaer. Melbourne, 12 December 1946. J27c/5325/394ᵃ. Australisch politiek waarnemer bij APNEI.
² British Special Commissioner in South East Asia.
³ J27c/5325/394ᵃ, op.cit. This and information following in this paragraph.
⁴ X
the Republic had generally sought international economic aid or trade as a means of enhancing its position vis-à-vis the Dutch. In mid-July CENKIM proposed to Sjahrrir that it establish a Republican import and export organisation in Australia. In reply, the Republic indicated it was already making plans along these lines and requested CENKIM to collect relevant information and prepare reports to assist its planning.

At the same time there was in Australia private commercial interest in renewing pre-war trade relations with the Indonesian area. For this purpose Mr C.H. Campbell, Managing Director of United Lubricants Pty Ltd (Sydney), who in 1945 had been Vice-President of the politically-active Australia-Indonesian Association, in August 1946 contacted Mr A. Maramis, an Indonesian repatriate from Australia, who was operating a Republican trade agency in Singapore. Also in August the Secretary of CENKIM, Mr Mohamad Bondan, asked Campbell for assistance in establishing an import and export organisation in Australia. Bondan subsequently indicated that the Indonesians in Australia were not experienced in business or commerce and were therefore seeking help from their friends, the people of the Australian labour movement. Campbell, who was also a leading member of the A.C.P,

1 Central Komite Indonesia Merdeka (Brisbane) - Central Committee for Indonesian Independence.

2 C.H. Campbell Collection (Deposit P81/1, ANU Archives, Canberra) CENKIM to Premier Sjahrrir, Indonesian Republican Government. Brisbane, 15 July 1946.


5 Ibid., Deposit P81/1. M. Bondan, Secretary, CENKIM, Brisbane to C.H. Campbell. 18 August 1946.

6 Ibid., Deposit P81/1. Bondan to Campbell, 10 October 1946.

agreed to assist.\(^1\)

With a recommendation from CENKIM,\(^2\) Campbell wrote to Sjahri\(r\) on 15 October and proposed that official trade between Australia and the Republic should be opened. He also offered his honorary services as a temporary trade representative for the Republic in Australia.\(^3\) Campbell wrote:

\[ \ldots \text{Some efforts have been made to develop trade through some "back-door" method. We believe the time has arrived to sponsor trade through official channels: to this end I have approached the appropriate Minister\(^4\) of our Government for official recognition, and the reaction appears favourable.} \]

To help us in getting this recognition it would be valuable if you could give approval to some person in Australia to act temporarily as your trade agent or commissioner. This person could either be one of our Indonesian friends still in Australia, or I would be prepared to undertake the task in an honorary capacity until full Australian recognition is granted....

Australia is undertaking an intense home-building programme, if you have timber, both soft and hard, which would come in the form of logs for preference, sisal fibre, or any other materials that can be used for building purposes, sheer necessity would force trade relations....

Already an "Indonesian Import and Export Agency"\(^5\) has been registered in Sydney... but your official [imprimatur] is necessary to avoid it drifting into private hands.....\(^6\)

CENKIM did not agree with the Republic's policy of *diplomasi*. It believed trade would pave the way for recognition of the Republic, would obviate the need for coming to any agreement with the Dutch, and would force

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1. C.H. Campbell Collection, *op.cit.*, Deposit P81/1 Campbell to Bondan, 1 October 1946.
4. The Minister for Trade and Customs was Senator B. Courtice; and the Minister for Commerce and Agriculture, Mr R. Pollard. Campbell may, however, have been referring to Evatt.
5. Maramis and Mr Bob Menot, another Indonesian repatriate had re-entered Australia as representatives of Chinese firms at Singapore. Although Australia was in the process of repatriating all Indonesians out of Australia, the Australian Commissioner at Singapore did not question their credentials which were clearly marked "Republic of Indonesia". C.H. Campbell Collection, *op.cit.*, Deposit P81/2. Molly Warners, Secretary to Bondan, CENKIM, Brisbane to Campbell, 15 December 1946.
their downfall.\footnote{Ibid., Deposit P81/2. Molly Warners to Bondan, 15 December 1946, op.cit.} CENKIM asked Sjarhri to reply to Campbell's letter immediately by radio. Because it viewed the trade question with such urgency, CENKIM was therefore angered and frustrated that Sjarhri deferred to diplomasi.\footnote{C.H. Campbell Collection, op.cit., Deposit P81/2. Molly Warners to Bondan, 15 December 1946, op.cit.} A month after the Cheribon draft agreement was initialled Sjarhri wrote to Campbell appointing him Temporary Trade Commissioner for the Republic of Indonesia in Australia.\footnote{Bondan, op.cit., p. 127. Also Free Indonesia (issued by the Central Committee of Indonesian Independence, Brisbane, Australia), 6 January 1947.}

CENKIM was also disappointed in the Republic's approach to economic questions, as evinced by the Cheribon draft agreement. It felt that the Republic had won a sufficiently strong international position to have enabled it to bargain harder on Article 14\footnote{See below, Appendix III, Document 10.} of the draft agreement in which it agreed to restore Dutch economic interests in Republican territory.\footnote{C.H. Campbell Collection, op.cit., Deposit P81/2. Molly Warners to Campbell, 15 December 1946, op.cit.}

For their part, the Dutch objected that the Cheribon draft agreement did not give the Republic the right to establish independent foreign relations or to conduct its own external trade. Because of this, van Aerssen protested to the Australian government in Canberra about Campbell's appointment. Dunk in turn disclaimed Australia's having any official knowledge or connection with the matter.\footnote{Archief B.Z. 912.1 Deel IV, op.cit., van Aerssen to van Boetzelaer, Melbourne, 9 January 1947 C/15/148/15. [Report of interview with Dunk, 8 January 1947].}

Campbell's appointment was undoubtedly an untimely embarrassment to the Australian government. As the South Seas Conference was scheduled for the end of January 1947, Australia was mindful of the need to maintain Dutch goodwill. It advised the Netherlands on 22 January that it intended appointing an exequatur consular representative to Batavia.\footnote{Archief DIRVO. FA. Telegram from The Hague, 25 January 1947. From van Boetzelaer to Boon, Batavia.}
Meanwhile, Dutch officials in Australia approached the unions directly about lifting the ban on Dutch shipping. On 7 January the General Secretary of the W.W.F., Mr J. Healy, advised the Dutch to obtain a request from Indonesia, presumably from Sjahrr. Roach maintained that the original reasons for imposing the ban no longer existed and he suggested the Indonesian peoples would benefit from receiving N.E.I. goods in Australia. Moreover, he indicated that as soon as he had any sort of official Indonesian request, he would be pleased to lift the union ban in the interest of good commercial relations between Australia and Indonesia.

However, the Dutch apparently had other things in mind. In Batavia, Dutch officials dom was giving thought to a swift military action against the Indonesian Republic as an alternative to signing the Cheribon draft agreement. At the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Officer entered into a full discussion of problems in Australian-Dutch relations in The Hague on 25 January. The Netherlands proposed that Australia and the Netherlands had a mutual interest to cooperate in economic and security matters with regard to the future U.S.I. In particular, the Netherlands raised the question of present shipping difficulties inhibiting Australia-N.E.I. trade and its desire to remove military stores from Australia.

Thus, the Dutch approach to the Australian unions appeared as part of a wider Dutch plan to eliminate the Indonesian Republic. On 28 January 1947 van Mook authorised regulations by which the Dutch imposed a naval blockade on Republican ports. The regulations were aimed at preventing

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2 Above information in this paragraph from Archief B.Z. 912.1, Deel IV, op.cit. Report of private interview on 7 January 1947 between Mr J. Healy and Mr N.C. van Riemedijck Kool.


4 This and following information in this paragraph from Archief Minog. Verbaal 31 december 1947. J78. For the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Subject: Account of difficulties with Australia. 27 January 1947.
the export of 'non-native products' and the import of military goods. In effect the blockade imposed an economic stranglehold on the Republic.

Meanwhile, in his capacity as Indonesian Trade Commissioner in Australia, Campbell asked Evatt if the Republic of Indonesia could be given delegate or observer status at the forthcoming South Seas Conference. When Campbell had originally written to Sjahrr in October 1946 he had included a message from the Minister for External Territories, Mr E.J. Ward, asking Sjahrr if the Republic wished to participate in the Conference. Apparently Sjahrr did not reply to this query. Although the Conference area did not include the territory over which the Indonesian Republic had de facto authority, Evatt agreed to "official observers" attending on behalf of the Republic. It is possible that Evatt's responsiveness related to Australia's hope for the establishment of a further regional commission which included the rest of the N.E.I. area. CENKIM regarded this "political gesture" as a step towards official recognition of Campbell's position.

The South Seas Conference opened in Canberra on 28 January. The Conference dealt with the area of the South Pacific which was "wholly or partly south of the equator and east from and including Netherlands New Guinea." Australia and New Zealand had invited the other four administering powers in the region, namely, Britain, the U.S., France and the Netherlands.

For whatever reasons the Netherlands was persuaded to participate, it was clear that it regarded West New Guinea as somewhat separate from post-

1 C.H. Campbell Collection, op.cit., Deposit P81/1. Instruction of the Head of the Export Bureau of the Department of Economic Affairs for the Custom and Excise Service, in regard to...the Decree of the Lieutenant Governor-General of 28 January 1947, No.21.
2 Ibid., Deposit P81/1. Campbell to Sjahrr, 15 December 1946, op.cit.
3 Ibid., Bondan, Secretary, CENKIM, Brisbane, to Mr A.R. Taysom, 54 Vine Street, Windsor, Victoria. 7 February 1947.
4 See Supra, Chapter 2; also below, this chapter, p.137.
5 C.H. Campbell Collection, op.cit., P81/1, Bondan to Taysom, 7 February 1947, op.cit.
war developments in the N.E.I. At a conference convened by van Mook at Den Pasar in December 1946 the Dutch excluded West New Guinea when they created the State of East Indonesia.\(^1\)

Campbell and Bondan attended the open sessions of the South Pacific Conference "to watch Indonesian interest in Dutch New Guinea".\(^2\) Campbell had made no prior mention of this to Evatt.\(^3\) However, at the Conference Bondan lobbied for the granting to the Republic of the Boven Digoel/Tanah Merah area of Dutch New Guinea where he and other Indonesian political exiles had been held by the Dutch before the war.\(^4\) In a letter to the Australian delegation Bondan urged that the Conference discuss the Dutch use of West New Guinea for detaining political prisoners. He claimed that the areas specified were of symbolic value to the Indonesians struggling for independence.\(^5\) Bondan also urged that the Commission pay attention to the level of political development of the peoples of all territories and their readiness for self-government.\(^6\)

Campbell and Bondan felt that their lobbying was sympathetically received by the Australian delegation, especially by Evatt and Ward. In particular they felt that they may have influenced the liberal statement\(^7\) on the rights of dependent peoples to self-government which Ward made at the conclusion of the Conference.\(^8\)

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2 ANEP-ANETA, Canberra, 30 January 1947.
5 Bondan, *op.cit.*, p.41.
6 Central Committee for Indonesian Independence Information Service, Brisbane, Australia, 12 February 1947, pp.1-2.
7 See below, Appendix III, Document 9.
8 *C.H. Campbell Collection, op.cit.*, Deposit 81/24-27, Campbell to Miss D. Seeby, 13 February 1947.
Aside from this, however, the Indonesian Republic had little reason to regard Australia's approach as favourable to its particular aspirations for merdeka. By its sympathetic support for an extension of Indonesian internal sovereignty in the N.E.I., Australia in no way compromised its support for Dutch external sovereignty. The Conference created the South Pacific Commission:

a consultative and advisory body to the participating Governments in matters affecting the economic and social development of the non-self-governing territories... and the welfare and advancement of their peoples....

Although the intent of the Commission represented a progressive position by the colonial powers participating, it was, in terms of the dispute between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic, a formal 'alliance' between Australia and the Netherlands. As regional, metropolitan and 'trustee' powers, they agreed to cooperate in matters of colonial welfare. Although Australia ascribed a different 'status' to West New Guinea this related to its own geographical approach to regional security, rather than to any distinction with regard to the continuance of Dutch external sovereignty over the whole of the N.E.I. The post-war demand for independence in the N.E.I. had, fortuitously from Australia's point of view, received only marginal support in West New Guinea. This enabled Australia to continue regarding West New Guinea as geographically and strategically separate from the rest of the Indonesian archipelago, and to link it rather with the contiguous and stable Australian New Guinea. West New Guinea was thereby part of the strategic 'umbrella' of islands which Australia regarded as vital to its security. As such, Australia envisaged it as part of its strategic sphere of influence, as distinct from its wider sphere of interest, which included the Indonesian islands.

During the South Pacific Conference Australia clarified its formal relations with the N.E.I. Apparently influenced by the Dutch

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1 Article VI of the Agreement, CNIA, Vol. XVIII, No.2, p.97, op.cit.
2 See Supra, Chapter 2.
explanation of their continuing external sovereignty under the provisions of
the Cheribon agreement, 1 Australia asked the Netherlands to accept Ballard
as Australian Consul-General to the N.E.I. 2, 3 Consequently, Campbell had
long but unsuccessful discussions with the Department of External Affairs
about Australia recognising his position. 4

At the same time, Campbell encountered considerable official
sympathy for the Republic's economic position. Evatt disapproved the Dutch
blockade of the Republic and, according to Campbell, his "greatest fear" was
that the Dutch would seize any imports into the Republic. 5 Nevertheless
Campbell thought that it was "reasonably clear that for some time to come,
trading with Indonesia [would] have to be carried on through private trading
channels". 6 With a view to developing these, he proposed to Sjahrir that he
visit the Republic for "on the spot" discussions. 7

At this stage, the former President of the Indonesian Seamen's
Union in Australia, Soekamto, who was then at the Indonesian Import and
Export Agency in Singapore, advised Campbell that the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce there was considering imposing a complete boycott on Dutch shipping
in the Pacific as a counter-move to the Dutch blockade of the Indonesian
Republic. 8 Alternatively, Campbell suggested imposing a world-wide ban on

1 C.H. Campbell Collection, op. cit., Deposit P81/11. Campbell to Sjahrir,
6 February 1947. According to Campbell, the Department of External Affairs
saw "international legal difficulties" in Australia recognising his position
as Temporary Trade Commissioner for the Republic in Australia.
2 Archief DIRVO. FA. Telegram from The Hague, 3 February 1947. From van
Boezelaer. To Canberra (11); to Boon, Batavia (18).
3 c.f. as an exequatur consular representative, See Supra, this Chapter, p.129.
4 C.H. Campbell Collection, op. cit., Deposit P81/11. Campbell to Sjahrir,
6 February 1947, op. cit.
5 Ibid., Deposit P81/1. Campbell to CENKIM, Brisbane, Sydney, 8 February 1947.
6 Ibid., Deposit P81/8. Campbell to Mr Herbert C. Griffin, Perth, Sydney,
11 February 1946.
7 Ibid., Deposit P81/11. Campbell to Sjahrir, 6 February 1947, op. cit.
8 Ibid., Deposit P81/44 Mas. Soekamto NESIA [Indonesian Import and Export
Agency], Singapore to Campbell. 10 February 1947.
Dutch shipping "until they [the Dutch] sign the [Cherbon] agreement or something better".¹

Following a meeting with Dutch officials on 17 February, Campbell wrote to CENKIM:

The plan was to drive a bargain with the Dutch to lift the blockade on trade, or face a world-wide campaign against all Dutch ships, and they were to provide me with an air passage to take it up with the Republican Gov[ernmen]t. In return for them lifting the blockade, we would consider lifting the ban on their ships. They are now very busy making up their minds....²

Meanwhile Bondan ascertained that the W.W.F. would cooperate in a world-wide ban.³

Having been advised by Ward that it would be appropriate "to crash Canberra" when parliament was in session,⁴ Campbell went to Canberra at the end of February "to get something tangible" from the government.⁵

In his statement on international affairs on 26 February 1947 Evatt said much which pleased Campbell.⁶ Evatt gave prominence to the recent South Pacific Conference, but also referred to the changing situation in South-East Asia, particularly in relation to India and Indonesia, our trade relations with those and other countries, and the possibility of regional cooperation within that area.⁷

Evatt spoke more expansively than he had previously done of the need to respond to the initiatives which the peoples of South East Asia were taking on their own behalf.

¹ Ibid., Deposit P81/1 Campbell to CENKIM. Sydney, 15 February 1947.
³ Ibid., Deposit P81/1 Bondan, CENKIM, Brisbane to Campbell. 20 February 1947.
⁴ Ibid., Deposit P81/1 Campbell to CENKIM. 16 January 1947.
⁵ Ibid., Deposit P81/1 Campbell to CENKIM, 15 February 1947, op.cit.
⁶ Ibid., Deposit P81/20 Campbell to Evatt, 4 March 1947.
The recent war gave to the peoples of the whole of this area an opportunity of political development at a rate previously unprecedented...the people of Indonesia have achieved a far greater degree of political autonomy...

This general trend,...is, in fact, in accord with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter, and, in particular, with the obligations of colony-possessing powers to promote the political development of non-self-governing or politically under-developed countries.¹

Emphasising Australia's gradualist approach to expanding relations with the politically-emergent peoples of South East Asia, Evatt added:

Australia is directly concerned with these political developments and their consequences. Just so far as the peoples of South-East Asia cease to be dependent upon the decisions of European Governments, so far do Australia's interests in the councils of South-East Asia increase. We must work for a harmonious association of democratic states in the South-East Asia area, and see in the development of their political maturity opportunity for greatly increased political, cultural and economic cooperation.²

Referring to the Republic's uncertainties regarding its position in international law, and Dutch restrictions on trade with Java and Sumatra, Evatt noted that neither the Netherlands nor the Republic had ratified the Cheribon draft agreement. He also emphasised the "grave responsibility" of both parties to reach "an early accord".³

Assuming Australian manufacturing and industrial expansion, Evatt predicted "a spectacular growth in the exchange of Australian processed products for the raw materials of the intensely-rich areas of South-East Asia".⁴ Therefore it was, he added, in Australia's "interests as an exporting country to ensure improved living standards throughout the area."⁵ This latter argument was no doubt for the benefit of the vocal opposition trade lobby.

² Loc.cit.
³ Loc.cit.
⁴ Loc.cit.
⁵ Loc.cit.
As a means of facilitating indigenous development, Evatt proposed "a regional instrumentality" for South East Asia, similar to the South Pacific Commission, but, one which was "appropriate" to the greater "political maturity" of the inhabitants of the area, and in which both "the peoples and governments" would be included.¹

On 4 March Campbell wrote to Evatt to congratulate him on his ministerial statement. He also advised Evatt of his proposed visit to Indonesia as an intermediary between the Dutch in Australia and the Republic government. Campbell had received no invitation from Sjahrrir to go to the Republic for trade discussions.² However he now wrote to Evatt:

The Netherlands Government representatives in Australia had their nominee, a Mr van Koole³ seek me out with the object of adjusting their problems with the Indonesian Government. With the very express intention of seeing that the Republic of Indonesia survives, I have offered to state their case to the Government, and endeavour to find a common basis that may bring an end to the present stalemate.⁴

Anticipating that van Mook in Batavia would not issue him with a visa to enter the N.E.I., Campbell added:

I feel that the position is such that something positive⁵ should be done, to this end, I would be grateful if you would give consideration to the possibility of me being permitted to travel with the anticipated repatriation ship that will be leaving Australia in the near future with the last of the Indonesian Nationals now in Australia.⁶

Whatever attitude the government may have taken to Campbell's diplomatic assertiveness, his request conflicted with current official efforts

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¹ Ibid., pp.118-119.
² Bondan, op.cit., p.130.
³ See Supra, this chapter, p.130, footnote 2.
⁵ See Supra, this chapter, p.135, paragraph 2.
to influence the Dutch. On 5 March, Burton, the newly-appointed Secretary of the Department of External Affairs,¹ conferred with de Ranitz in Canberra.² Burton spoke strongly in favour of Evatt’s proposal for a regional commission in South-East Asia. Having reaffirmed Australia’s support for Dutch–Indonesian cooperation, he then referred to Dutch delay in signing the Cheribon draft agreement. Perhaps reflecting Australia’s apprehension that the Dutch would resort to military measures rather than conclude an agreement with the Republic, Burton intimated that U.N. intervention in the N.E.I. was inevitable. Moreover, he hinted that Australia might take an initiative in this direction.

At this stage the U.S. broke its long silence towards the N.E.I. following the so-called Martin Behrmann incident in which, contrary to a U.S.–Netherlands informal agreement, the Dutch confiscated the cargo of this U.S. commercial vessel which was trading in the N.E.I.³ Australia possibly sought to take advantage of the U.S. reaction to this incident. On 11 March it approached the U.S. State Department with a proposal to raise the Indonesian question at the Security Council.⁴ However, the Indonesian Republic had just ratified the Cheribon agreement and it seemed the Dutch would soon follow suit. The U.S. therefore politely declined to support Australia’s proposal.⁵

¹ Having originally been Evatt’s Private Secretary (Departmental), Burton was appointed Head of the United Nations Division of the Department of External Affairs in January 1947. Then, on 26 February, Evatt announced his appointment as Secretary of the Department. Burton replaced Dunk whose unsatisfactory working relationship with Evatt, it seems, may have influenced his decision to seek another position. Watt, op. cit., p.80.

² Information following in this paragraph based on Archief B.Z. 912.1 Deel IV, op. cit., De Ranitz to van Boetzelaer. Canberra, 6 March 1947. C.2/1096.82. Dr J.W. Burton.


⁵ Ibid.
There was also evidence of a more aggressive Australian policy in other quarters. On 21 March Messrs W.J. Davidson and I.H. Blanchfield of Australian Enterprises (W.A.) visited Evatt in Canberra. Davidson had letters of introduction from the Republican Minister for Economic Affairs, Dr A.K. Gani, and from Campbell, from which Evatt apparently inferred that Gani had appointed Davidson as the agent for conducting trade between the Republic and Australia.\(^1\) Gani had a proposal for challenging the Dutch blockade and for opening trade between Australia and the Republic, which Davidson conveyed to Evatt. Campbell subsequently wrote to CENKIM:

> Evatt's Department has promised to try to provide a ship on Charter to him [Davidson] to challenge the Blockade.\(^2\) They were also surprised and disappointed that Indonesia has not asked for official recognition.\(^3\)

Bondan surmised that Evatt may have had in mind to create another Martin Behrmann incident.\(^4\)

Any such immediate action was, however, forestalled by the signing of the Cheribon draft agreement at Linggadjati (Java) on 25 March. Representatives of the Netherlands and of the Republic signed the renamed Linggadjati Agreement\(^5\) on the basis of conflicting interpretations, and immediately entered negotiations to attempt to implement the Agreement. The achievement was therefore somewhat superficial. Nevertheless, Australia welcomed the Agreement,\(^6\) and Evatt expressed the hope that the signing would result in the Dutch lifting their blockade against the Republic.\(^7\)

Immediately the agreement was signed, the Australian government, the unions engaged in the boycott, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, individually and collectively redirected their attention to economic and

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1 Bondan, *op.cit.*, pp.146-147.
2 Confirmed by Bondan, *op.cit.*, p.150.
3 All of the above information in this paragraph from C.H. Campbell Collection, *op.cit.*, Deposit P81/1. Campbell to CENKIM. 21 March 1947. See also Bondan, *op.cit.*, p.131, pp.147-150.
SLAVE OF THE LAMP

AUSTRALIAN WHARFIES WILL OBEY
THE WORD OF INDONESIAN SLAVES.

MASTER!

Courier-Mail (Brisbane)
1 April 1947
trade questions. For its part, the Netherlands, strained by its wartime loss, and the post-war economic dislocation, of the N.E.I., was anxious to re-establish its economic position in Indonesia. On 26 March van Boetzelaer proposed to the U.S. that the U.S., Britain, France and the Netherlands "get together" and cooperate closely on economic, financial and other problems in the Far East.¹ At the Council of Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Moscow in April, the Dutch Ambassador, Dr A.H.J. Lovink, proposed to the U.S. Secretary of State, General G. Marshall, that the Western powers adopt a mutual policy of economic protection in the Far East.² In Australia Dutch officials approached the unions to lift their ban on Dutch shipping. According to Campbell:

> The Dutch were told that the "Ban" would only be lifted when personal instructions were received from the Republican Government, for that reason, the Dutch were asked to provide me with a visa to see the Government for that purpose.³

In fact, the W.W.F. initially stated it would lift the ban once the Linggadjati Agreement was ratified.⁴ However, a subsequent press item from Batavia reported Sjahrir as having stated he would not ask the Australian waterside workers to lift the ban until the Dutch removed their blockade against the Republic.⁵ The W.W.F. then indicated it would not lift the ban until it received advice from the Republican government that full independence had been granted and was in operation.⁶ This incident revealed the lack of coordination of the unions and the Republic on the one hand, and of the unions with Campbell and CENKIM on the other.⁷

² Ibid., p.915.
⁴ Brisbane Telegraph, 26 March 1947.
⁵ Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 31 March 1947. (AAP, Batavia).
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ C.H. Campbell Collection, op.cit., Deposit P81/1. Bondan to Campbell, 26 March 1947: "if they [WWF] would please study the bulletin [i.e. CENKIM] we send them religiously every issue, they might better understand how things are going, and just what is the attitude of the Republic towards the Australian black ban, the Dutch bloc[k]ade and the signing of this Agreement".
On 26 March Campbell reapplied to Evatt for official recognition of his position in Australia.\(^1\) However, on receipt of his letter, the Department of External Affairs cabled to the Australian Representative in Batavia suggesting that he indicate to the Republican government that Australia would much prefer an Indonesian appointee.\(^2\) In an interview in Batavia which the Australian press reported on 31 March, Sjahrir said he proposed to send an Indonesian "special commissioner" to Australia as soon as the Australian government was prepared to accredit such an appointee. Furthermore, he indicated that he was personally anxious to visit Australia to discuss the boycott "and other important means of putting into effect immediately (the) economic cooperation between the two countries".\(^3\) At the same time, the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to Campbell on 29 March asking him to go to Djakarta (Batavia) as soon as possible.\(^4\)

By the end of March an official proposal had been mooted that Australia send a delegation to Batavia to discuss trade and economic questions with both Sjahrir and van Mook.\(^5\) Apparently Australia regarded the Liagjadji Agreement as a firm basis on which to begin negotiations with both the Dutch and the Republic. When the proposal was put to the Dutch in The Hague and in Batavia, it met with objections. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that it would be inappropriate to send such a mission before the Dutch concluded an economic agreement with the Republic.\(^6\) On the other hand, van Mook considered as unfriendly the proposal to send such a mission while the shipping ban continued.\(^7\) In Canberra Burton assured de Ranitz that Australia had...
talks in Batavia would only be exploratory.\textsuperscript{1} Moreover, Burton told de Ranitz, the government was endeavouring to establish trade relations ahead of Campbell and the Indonesian Import and Export Agency who were possibly cooperating with the unions to lift the shipping ban. In any case, Burton added, Chifley regarded it as useless to approach the unions unless the government had new proposals. Australia, therefore thought the mission to Batavia should obtain concrete proposals for the exporting of sisal to Australia.\textsuperscript{2} Then Evatt would be able to suggest to Chifley that he reapproach the unions.

At this juncture the government's apprehension of union complicity multiplied. The Secretary of the Queensland Trades' and Labor Council (T.L.C.) Mr M. Healy, and the Assistant Secretary of the W.W.F., Mr E. Roach, applied to Chifley and Evatt for the government to sponsor their participation at a forthcoming Indonesian trade union conference at Malang (Java).\textsuperscript{3} SOBSI (the Central Organisation of All-Indonesian Trade Unions) had originally sent an invitation to the A.C.T.U. in mid-February.\textsuperscript{4} When, in deference to the delicate political situation, the A.C.T.U. declined to accept the invitation, the Queensland T.L.C. and the W.W.F. respectively decided to send Healy and Roach.\textsuperscript{5}

Both in Canberra\textsuperscript{6} and in The Hague,\textsuperscript{7} Australia pressed the Dutch to issue visas for the Australian mission, but van Boetzelaer remained obstinate.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{1} Information following in this paragraph based on \textit{Ibid.}, de Ranitz to van Boetzelaer, The Hague. Canberra, 14 April 1947. E.2/1762/127. Uitzending Australische handelmissie naar Nederlandsch-Indië.

\textsuperscript{2} See Supra, this chapter, p.128 (quotation).

\textsuperscript{3} See \textit{CPD}, Vol. 192, p.2774 (22 May 1947). Evatt.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{C.H. Campbell Collection, op. cit.}, Deposit P81/1. Bondan to Secretary, ACTU Melbourne. Brisbane, 14 February 1947.


\textsuperscript{6} e.g. \textit{Archief DIRVO}. FA. I. Australische handelmissie. Telegram from Canberra, 14 April 1947. From de Ranitz for van Boetzelaer.

\textsuperscript{7} e.g. \textit{Archief B.2.}, 912.1 Australische handelmissie, Memorandum by van Boetzelaer, The Hague, 14 April 1947. 34722-26396S.

\textsuperscript{8} e.g. \textit{Archief Minog}. Under cover of Letter V24. Telegram from The Hague, 13 April 1947. From van Boetzelaer to Canberra.
A more displeasing revelation, from the government’s standpoint, was contained in a telegram it received from the Dutch and Republican economic delegations at Batavia stating their intention to appeal directly to the Australian waterside unions to lift the shipping ban in Australia.\(^1\) Implicitly the Dutch and the Republic by-passed the Australian government as an intermediary between themselves and the Australian unions.

Finally, on 15 April the Netherlands agreed to an amended Australian proposal to temporarily strengthen the staff of the Australian Consulate-General at Batavia, provided Australia made no attempt to establish direct contact with the Indonesian Republic.\(^2\) The additional members of staff were to be Mr C.J. Carne (Department of Commerce), Mr R.A. Hetherington (Director of Shipping), Mr E.B. Richardson (Treasury) and Mr W.D. Forsyth (Department of External Affairs).\(^3\) Australia then made clear that the 'mission' would make interim arrangements for importing urgently-needed raw materials to Australia, which in turn would enable the shipping ban to be terminated.\(^4\) It also indicated that it objected to an Australian acting as the agent of the Indonesian Republic in Australia and would welcome the attachment of an Indonesian to the Netherlands Legation in Canberra.\(^5\)

One of the economic questions which Australia hoped to settle with the Dutch was an N.E.I. war debt to Australia amounting to some £7\(^3\) million. However, Australia envisaged a settlement in kind. Before the Australian mission left for Batavia, Evatt apparently emphasised to its members that Australia wanted Dutch sovereignty maintained in the N.E.I., in conjunction

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\(^1\) Van Mook Papers, Doos 10, Folder. Werkgadering No.4, 14 April 1947.


\(^3\) Ibid., Statement, The Hague, 22 April 1947; Archief DIRVO. FA. I Telegram from The Hague, 18 April 1947. From van Boetzelaer for Boon.

\(^4\) X

with an extension of self-government to the Indonesian peoples. However, he also apparently indicated that, should the Dutch and the Republicans not be able to come to an agreement by which Dutch sovereignty continued, then it would be necessary for Australia to obtain defence bases within the N.E.I.¹

In Canberra Burton subsequently told de Ranitz that Australia had in mind a political solution. Already, on the day the Lingaadjati Agreement was signed, Burton had intimated to de Ranitz that, if the Dutch complied with certain Australian political wishes in Dutch New Guinea, then this would be an acceptable solution to the N.E.I. war debt.² Subsequently, during official negotiations in Batavia to resolve the war debt, Australia made similar suggestions for Dutch political concessions to Australia in Dutch New Guinea.³ In response to de Ranitz's probing, Burton now suggested the Dutch might give Australia a base, or allow it to administer Timor.⁴ The Netherlands government promptly instructed its representatives in Canberra and Batavia to curtail any further discussion of this subject with Australian officials.⁵ Thus, when Carne and Hetherington discussed the war debt with van Hoogstraten⁶ in Batavia and suggested Dutch political concessions to Australia, such as the administration of Dutch Timor, they were promptly rebuffed.⁷,⁸

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¹ Above information in this paragraph from Archief B.Z., 912.1 Australië tijdens, op.cit., Deel V. Note, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 25 April 1947. [Record of interview with Officer.]

² Archief B.Z., 912.1 Deel V. Note for the Chief, Political Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 16 April 1947.


⁵ Ibid., PA Telegram from The Hague, 26 April 1947. From van Boetzelker to DIRVO.

⁶ NEI Director of Economic Affairs, see Supra, Chapter 2.


⁸ Australia's security in Dutch Timor at this stage complemented a similar interest being taken in Portuguese Timor. On 16 May Evatt told parliament that Australia was negotiating with Portugal regarding trade, air facilities, and common defence with Portuguese Timor. CPD, Vol. 192, p.2518.
Surprising though Australia's approach to the N.E.I. war debt may have seemed, it revealed that security considerations were paramount in Australia's support for a conservative solution of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. Australia regarded the satisfaction of 'reasonable' Indonesian demands as important to Australia's security. However, in so far as Indonesian demands for merdeka threatened the Dutch presence in the N.E.I., Australia considered that its security would be compromised. The imperialistic undertones in Australia's proposals for resolving the question of the N.E.I. war debt therefore appeared as a move to forestall Australia's security being reduced by an unsatisfactory Dutch-Indonesian settlement.

In Batavia the Australian mission was concentrating on negotiations to end the shipping ban in Australia. The Dutch were opposed to the ban being lifted at the request of the Indonesian Republic.\(^1\) The Australian mission therefore proposed to the Republic that the N.E.I. and Republican governments should jointly request the Australian government to mediate with the unions for a lifting of the ban.\(^2\)

From Australia's point of view, the Republic's attitude was not helpful. Sjahrrir maintained that lifting the Australian shipping ban was a matter for SOBSI, and otherwise for the Australians themselves, presumably the unions, to decide.\(^3\) Apprehensive that Healy and Roach, who were both attending the SOBSI Congress at Malang (East Java) might prejudice the Australian government's current negotiations, the Australian Political Representative at Batavia obtained an assurance from Sjahrrir that he would ask Healy and Roach not to make any provocative statements. Prior to this, the Australian government had also intimated to Sjahrrir that he should not

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\(^1\) *Archief* DIRVO. Fa. I. Telegram from The Hague, 28 April 1947. From van Boetzelaer, to Boon, Batavia (135).


jeopardise relations with the Australian government by transactions with other persons, namely Campbell, who might be using the Indonesian nationalist movement for their own objectives.\textsuperscript{1,2}

For its part, however, the SOBSI Congress passed a resolution on 15 May, recommending that the ban in Australia continue until the last Dutch soldier left Indonesia.\textsuperscript{3} SOBSI, which formed part of a left-wing party grouping in the Republican government, was currently opposing Sjahrir's conciliatory approach to negotiations with the Dutch.

Apparently, the news of the SOBSI resolution caused Evatt to panic. Determined to pre-empt any act of sabotage by Healy and Roach when they returned to Australia, Evatt told de Ranitz in Canberra on 16 May that a joint request for mediation from the N.E.I. and Republican governments must be in his hands by 19 May. Emphasising how seriously he regarded the union threat, Evatt suggested van Mook and Sjahrir personally deliver their request to him in Canberra so as to 'take the wind out of the sails' of the 'Australian communists' at Malang.\textsuperscript{4}

However, with Republican cooperation still unassured, Australia also encountered difficulties with the Dutch at Batavia. The Dutch initially obstructed Australia's attempts to mediate with regard to the shipping ban because of an official misunderstanding of the capacity in which Healy and Roach were attending the SOBSI Congress.\textsuperscript{5} In any case, they were sceptical of the Australian government's ability to persuade the unions to lift the ban.\textsuperscript{6} Only after reassurances and strenuous diplomacy by the Australian mission on both these counts\textsuperscript{7} did the Dutch agree to cooperate with Australia.

\textsuperscript{1} X
\textsuperscript{2} Before Healy and Roach arrived at the SOBSI Congress, Campbell, acting (without authority) as a spokesman of the Australian trade union movement, challenged SOBSI to call a world-wide ban on Dutch shipping. Campbell's intervention was sternly disapproved by the ACTU, the WWF, GENKIM, and also by the Australian Communist Party. See Bondan, \textit{op.cit.}, p.167.
\textsuperscript{3} X
\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Ibid.}, Memorandum from Boon, Batavia, 20 May 1947.PA32577. Australische boycot.
At the same time the Dutch possibly had wider considerations in mind. During May the Netherlands Prime Minister, Mr L.J.M. Beel, and the Minister for Overseas Territories, Mr J.A. Jonkman, were visiting the N.E.I. The Netherlands government had been unable to reach agreement with the Indonesian Republic for the implementing of the Linggadjati Agreement. It therefore regarded Beel and Jonkman's visit to Indonesia as crucial to its deciding whether or not to implement a proposal for military action against the Republic.\(^1\) It was in this context that Beel and Jonkman, together with the Netherlands Commission-General (the official agent of the Netherlands government in negotiations with the Indonesian Republic) and representatives of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 23 May formulated a proposal for a joint N.E.I.-Republican appeal to the Australian government to mediate on lifting the shipping ban in Australia.\(^2\)

In accepting the proposal, the Republican government probably also had wider considerations in mind. Fearing Dutch military action, and at the same time facing serious domestic political opposition to its policy of *diplomasi*, the Sjahriir government probably considered a demonstration of its international diplomatic status and acceptability as internally and externally desirable.

On 24 May the N.E.I. Director of Economic Affairs, Dr J.E. van Hoogstraten, and the Republican Minister for Economic Affairs, Dr A.K. Gani, signed the so-called Gani-Hoogstraten agreement by which the N.E.I. and Republican governments jointly appealed to the Australian government to exercise its good offices to achieve an end to the ban on Dutch shipping in Australia. They also requested Dutch-owned goods be shipped from Australia on Dutch ships. The goods would then be distributed on the basis of an


The Dutch and Indonesian Republican Governments have jointly asked the Australian Government to "use its good offices" to end the ban imposed on Dutch shipping by the Waterside Workers' Federation. The general secretary of the federation says the matter will probably be discussed when the assistant secretary returns from Java.

"The boss is away. He didn't leave you any orders."

*Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)*

27 May 1947
agreement to be concluded between the N.E.I. and Republican governments.¹

Whatever domestic political purpose the Gani-Woogstraten Agreement may have served in Australia, it appeared of little immediate value in the N.E.I. On 27 May the Netherlands Commission-General presented the Indonesian Republic with a new set of proposals for implementing the Linggadjati Agreement. The Netherlands insisted the Republic accept the proposals completely and unconditionally within 14 days. It proposed, among other things, that Dutch de jure authority operate throughout the N.E.I. until 1 January 1949.

Presumably before he knew of the new Dutch proposals, Burton intimated to de Ranitz in Canberra that the deteriorating political situation in the N.E.I. pointed to a need for third-party mediation.² It is not inconceivable that he had in mind an extension of Australia's recently-acquired third-party role. However, within a matter of days, even the latter was under threat. On 2 June, Burton warned de Ranitz that the changed situation in the N.E.I. might affect union cooperation in lifting the shipping ban in Australia.³

However, in discussions with Chifley, Evatt and Ashley in Canberra on 6 June, the General Secretary of the W.W.F., Mr J. Healy, agreed to modify the ban to allow the shipment of 40,000 tons of non-military supplies to Java. Thus, on the same day, in a ministerial statement on international affairs, Evatt was able to tell parliament Australia's negotiations at Batavia had been successful in restoring trade with Indonesia.⁴

¹ Van Mook papers, Doos 11, Folder 1. Agreement signed at Jacarta on 24 May 1947 between the Minister for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the Director of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies Government.


³ Archief BZ. 912.1 Deel VI, op.cit., Telegram from Canberra 2 June 1947. From de Ranitz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. 45.

⁴ See below, Appendix III, Document 11.
Evatt understated the government's difficulties with the unions in proportion as he stressed its assistance in resolving economic difficulties between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic. Balanced against the evidence here presented, Evatt's statement thus appeared as an idealisation of the influential diplomatic role which he wanted to suggest Australia had taken in the N.E.I. Australia's pressure on the Dutch and on the Republic to accept it as the mediator with the Australian unions certainly had the "happy effect", from the government's point of view, of re-establishing it, as distinct from extra-governmental agencies, as the principal co-ordinator of Australia's foreign relations. Contrary to Evatt's claim, however, as immediate events demonstrated, the visit of the Australian mission did not have the "happy effect of bringing together Dutch and Indonesian representatives in a way which helped to lessen the feeling of suspicion and hostility between them". ¹

Summary and Conclusion

After the Cheribon agreement was initialled in November 1946 Australia appeared to have been genuinely interested in restoring trade with the Indonesian area. In so far as this involved opening trade with the Indonesian Republic, Australia encountered a number of obstacles. Firstly, the Dutch cast uncertainty on the international legal status of the Republic which in turn affected its authority to conduct foreign trade. This Australia was reluctant to challenge. Delays in the ratification of the Cheribon draft agreement accentuated this state of affairs. The imposition by the Dutch of a naval blockade against the Republic represented a more substantial obstacle. Finally, Australia's recognition of the de facto authority of the Republic once the Linggadjati Agreement was signed, was undoubtedly withheld because of reluctance to also recognise Campbell as Temporary Trade Commissioner for the Republic of Indonesia in Australia.

Initially Australia was prepared informally to acknowledge Campbell's position. Not surprisingly, however, the government came to resent Campbell's increasing influence and assertiveness as the principal mediator between the Dutch in Australia, the unions engaged in the boycott, and the Indonesian Republic. Moreover, the tendency of both the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic to by-pass the Australian government and negotiate directly with the unions and/or Campbell to lift the shipping ban in Australia threatened the government's position as the primary authority for Australia's foreign relations. In the six months following the Cheribon agreement, Australia's diplomatic role in relation to the N.E.I. dispute appeared more vulnerable than it had been at any time previously. Australia's determination following the Linggadjati agreement to obtain a formal request from the Dutch and the Republic to officially mediate in lifting the shipping ban, therefore, appeared primarily as an attempt by the government to regain its proper diplomatic position.

Australia's preoccupation with this objective caused tension in its relations with both the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic. Alternately, once the Cheribon Agreement was initialled, Australia's approach to future Dutch-Indonesian relations shifted. Whereas Australia had hitherto emphasised the continuance of Dutch external sovereignty as paramount to Australia's security, it shifted to stressing the paramount need for the Dutch to adopt a liberal policy towards extending Indonesian internal sovereignty. Thus Australia was sympathetic to Bondan's representations at the South Pacific Conference. It sympathised with the Republic's reservations about ratifying the Linggadjati Agreement, namely, uncertainty regarding the Republic's de facto status in international law and its right to conduct foreign trade. It also took objection to the Dutch naval blockade against the Republic.
The shift in Australia's policy was influenced primarily by security considerations. Australia's concern that the Dutch be compelled to ratify the Cheribon draft agreement and subsequently to implement the Linggadjati Agreement reflected its apprehension that the Dutch were more disposed to suppressing the Indonesian Republic militarily than coming to a peaceful agreement to cooperate with it. Alternatively, Australia's renewed expressions of interest in obtaining defence bases in the N.E.I. or extending its influence to Dutch New Guinea and/or Dutch Timor seemed to reflect its uneasiness about either the effectiveness of Dutch external sovereignty or the adequacy of Indonesian defence in Australia's immediate strategic zone.
Chapter Six

AUSTRALIA'S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER
THE FIRST DUTCH 'POLICE ACTION' AGAINST
THE INDONESIAN REPUBLIC (JULY 1947)

The political crisis in the N.E.I. during May-June 1947 refocussed attention by Britain and the U.S. on the failure of the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic to reach a peaceful compromise settlement. Both powers had foreign capital investments in the N.E.I. Thus they shared the Netherlands' impatience for economic normalisation and the restoration of N.E.I. external trade.\(^1\) However, should the Republic not accept the Dutch proposals of 27 May,\(^2\) they both feared the Dutch would take military action against the Republic. In turn, they strongly urged the Netherlands to seek a negotiated settlement with the Republic,\(^3\) and the Republic to accept the Dutch proposals.\(^4\)

On 8 June the Republic presented the Dutch with a set of counter-proposals in which it agreed to an interim government, but insisted, among other things, that the Republic comprise one-half the membership, and East Indonesia and West Borneo the other half (with the Netherlands excluded). On 11 June the Dutch again intimated to the U.S. that it might take military action.\(^5\) For its part, the U.S. on 17 June informally declined Britain's suggestions that their two governments jointly offer their "good offices" to the Dutch and to the Republic.\(^6\) Instead the U.S. independently appealed to

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2 See Supra, Chapter 5, p.150.
the two parties to seek peaceful cooperation.\footnote{USFR, Vol. VI (1947), p.950 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in The Hague. Washington, 17 June 1947; The Secretary of State to the Consulate-General at Batavia. Washington, 17 June 1947.} Faced with the alternatives of concessions to the Dutch or military action, on 20 June Sjahrrir conceded to the Dutch proposal for Dutch de jure control of the interim government.\footnote{George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1952), pp.207-208.}

Australia took no part in these negotiations. For some three weeks after the Dutch ultimatum, however, it continued trilateral negotiations with the Dutch and the Republic in an effort to implement the Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement.\footnote{e.g. See Archief B.Z. 912.1, Deel VI. De Ranitz to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. Canberra, 28 June 1947. H.2/3186/209. Boycot op Nederlandse schepen en goederen.} On 30 May Sjahrrir had written to Chifley advising that Campbell, at his own request, had resigned his position as Temporary Trade Commissioner for the Republic of Indonesia in Australia.\footnote{X} In relation to this and other matters outstanding between Australia and the Republic,\footnote{i.e. funds [the Panitia fund, Queensland Trades and Labour Council] accumulated by Indonesians repatriated from Australia, also the welfare of Australian wives of repatriated Indonesians.} Dr Oesman Sastroamidjojo, the Acting Head of the Consular Section of the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Australia on 10 June for informal discussions with the Australian government.\footnote{Archief DIRVO PA. Secretary, [Republican] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta (Soerjotjondro) to the Head of the Far Eastern Office of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs [DIRVO] (Elink Schuurman). 6 June 1947. 863/K1/47-s; De Ranitz to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. Canberra, 17 June 1947. C.15/2967/29 i.z. Mr Oesman.}

It is inconceivable that Oesman did not convey the seriousness of the political situation in the N.E.I. to the Australian government. However, ten days elapsed before the government hinted at Australia's intervening as a mediator. In their first interview with the new Netherlands Minister to Australia,\footnote{Van Aerssen had been appointed as Netherlands Minister to China in March 1947.} Mr P.E. Teppema, on 20 June, Evatt and Burton spoke about the
'unsettled' situation in the N.E.I. Evatt expressed the hope that there would be no fighting but only received an evasive reply that the Dutch would be able to cope with the situation.\(^1\) Possibly as a result of this discussion, Australia cabled to Britain that day requesting that Britain and the U.S. include Australia in any 'friendly intervention' they might decide to take in the N.E.I.\(^2\)

Australia's request to Britain was somewhat inopportune. In his ministerial statement on 6 June, Evatt had spoken of the need confronting Australia as the principal British Commonwealth power in the Pacific and South East Asia "to play our due part, for which our experience equips us, in helping the peoples of these areas achieve their legitimate aspirations".\(^3\) As well Evatt had been critical of a "lessening of British interest, evidenced by failure to give to South-East Asia and the Pacific their rightful place in British political thinking."\(^4\) It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Britain curtly refused Australia's request and pointed out Australia's failure, prior to this, to consult with Britain on the current political crisis in the N.E.I.\(^5\)

Clearly Evatt and Burton were not prepared to accept Australia's exclusion as a mediator in the N.E.I. Teppema was to be officially accredited as the Netherlands Minister to Australia on 25 June. Evatt and Burton called on him on 24 June. They asked to see the draft of the speech he intended to make the following day, and tried to persuade him to make minor changes which

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\(^2\) X

\(^3\) CPD, Vol. 192, p.3687.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) X
would enhance the impression that Australian-Dutch relations were currently cordial. Teppema accepted none of the changes to his speech which, in fact, reflected the strain in current Dutch-Australian relations.¹

Nevertheless, following a U.S. press release on 25 June urging the Dutch and the Republicans to cooperate immediately in forming an interim government,² Australia on 26 June offered its "good offices" to the two parties to assist their forming such a government.³ The Australian offer was preceded by similar ones by Britain and the U.S.⁴,⁵ Moreover, the U.S. offered to give financial aid to an interim government to assist economic rehabilitation in Indonesia.⁶ Not surprisingly, van Boetzelaer in The Hague regarded Australia's offer as reflecting Evatt's desire to intervene in the N.E.I. dispute, and as a deliberate attempt by Australia to compete with the British and U.S. offers.⁷

All the while, the prospects of the Dutch and the Republic cooperating in an interim government were diminishing. Within the Republic Sjahirr was facing serious opposition from the major parties for having

³ Archief B.Z. 912.10 Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. From Elink Schuurman, Batavia, 26 June 1947. Ref. no.4274.
⁵ cf Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia (London, 1959), pp.98-99: "Dr van Mook has given me the startling information that the police action commenced and was temporarily stopped in June...on June 26, when troops were already in motion and ships had been loaded for an expedition against Madura - United States Consul William Foote volunteered to mediate the dispute...."
yielded to the Dutch demands on 20 June. As a result, he resigned his premiership of the Republic on 27 June.

For its part, Australia appeared increasingly concerned that, if there was to be third-party intervention in the N.E.I., Australia should be that party. When it received news of the U.S. offer of financial assistance to an interim Indonesian government, the Department of External Affairs proposed to the Treasury that Australia consider offering a loan or some form of credit to an interim government. Apparently Chifley objected to Australia assuming the role of a creditor. Following discussions with Oesman, the Department of External Affairs put forward a modified proposal that Australia offer material assistance for the rehabilitation of Indonesia. The result was a public statement by Evatt on 9 July in which he announced Australia's recognition of the de facto status of the Indonesian Republic, renewed Australia's offer of "good offices" to both the Dutch and the Republic, and offered Australia's advice and assistance to the proposed interim federal government in matters relating to economic rehabilitation and development. At the same time, Evatt emphasised Australia's concern that the Republic co-operate in the formation of the interim federal government. Presumably he was concerned that the Republic was resisting Dutch interim de jure authority.

The Netherlands government regarded Australia's offer as a "source of annoyance" and advised Australia that it did not consider its offer either opportune or helpful. In Canberra, however, Burton sought to persuade

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1 See Supra, this Chapter, p.155.
2 X
3 X
4 Archief DIRVO LA (Box 121) Teppema to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hague. Canberra, 10 July 1947. Persverklaring Dr Evatt dd.9 juli 1947.
5 X
6 See below, Appendix III, Document 12.
de Ranitz that Australia's offer of material assistance to Indonesia was preferable to the U.S. offer of a financial loan. Burton suggested a joint Dutch-Indonesian delegation come to Australia for discussions as soon as possible. As well he indicated Australia's preparedness to charter ships and to airlift emergency relief supplies to Indonesia.1

Meanwhile, Amir Sjarifuddin, the Minister for Defence in the Sjahrrir government, had formed a new Republican government on 3 July. The non-cooperation of the major Masjumi party augmented left-wing representation in the Republican cabinet. Ironically, Sjarifuddin, for his own part, agreed, like Sjahrrir, to enter an interim government in which the Dutch had de jure authority. However, when the Dutch put forward revised terms for the formation of an interim government on 15 July, the Republican government as a whole was again reluctant to concede de jure authority to the Dutch.2

At this stage, its own offer of mediation having been rebuffed by the Dutch, Australia tried to prompt Britain to action. On 16 July it informed London that, if the Dutch and the Republic could not come to an agreement, Australia would have no alternative but to raise the dispute in the Security Council or in the General Assembly.3 As an explanation of its 'ultimatum', Australia advised its High Commissioner in London that Australia would welcome British mediation in the N.E.I. As well it intimated that it favoured the British appointing Lord Killearn, who it considered was aware of Australia's interests in the Indonesian dispute.4 When it replied on 18 July, Britain urged Australia to consider carefully the likely international consequences of referring the dispute to the U.N. In particular, it cautioned against providing an opportunity for the Soviet Union to champion the

1 Archief B.Z. 912.10 Telegram from Teppema, Canberra, 11 July 1947. 55. To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, Via Elink Schuurman, Latvia.
2 Kahin, op.cit., pp.209-212.
3 X
4 X
NON-INTERVENTION!

AUSTRALIA HAS NOT BEEN ASKED TO INTERVENE IN THE INDONESIAN DISPUTE

by Jack Lusby

Courier-Mail (Brisbane)
24 July 1947
Republican cause and attempt to discredit the Western powers.¹

Further preventive diplomacy vis-à-vis the N.E.I. was however, pre-empted by the Netherlands announcing on 20 July that it would begin "police measures of a strictly limited character" against the Republic the following day.²

Australia had then to decide on its next diplomatic course. There was, as well, the specific problem of how to handle its commitment under the Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement to ship supplies to Indonesia. On 20 July the Dutch in Batavia had handed a memorandum to the Australian Consul-General at Batavia stating that impending military operations against the Republic would not affect Dutch implementation of the Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement.³ This presented Australia with a conflict between cooperating with the Dutch and avoiding a Dutch charge that Australia had failed to implement the Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement.⁴ However, the Republic subsequently announced it did not wish shipment of supplies from Australia to continue. Australia used this declaration to discontinue the agreement, on the grounds that Dutch-Indonesian cooperation had broken down.⁵ In any case, Australian waterside unions had on 22 July reimposed their ban on Dutch shipping in Australia.

Meanwhile Australia was apparently heeding Britain's advice against referring the Indonesian dispute to the U.N. On 21 July Australia advised the Republic that it could itself appeal directly to the U.N. Secretary-General or through India.⁶ By proposing self-reliance or an appeal to another

¹ X
³ *Archief DIRVO*, PA Australische boycot. Memorandum to the Australian Consul-General, Batavia from the Far Eastern Office of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Batavia, 20 July 1947.
⁶ X
emergent Asian state, Australia implicitly sought to obviate international complications. At the same time it warned Britain it could not remain inactive while military operations were being conducted in Indonesia.¹ In fact, with U.S. approval, Britain offered its good offices to both parties on 21 July.²

The Republic, however, pressed Australia to take the initiative. On 22 July Sjarifuddin appealed publicly to Evatt to intervene in the dispute; and in Canberra on 24 July Oesman appealed to Chifley.³

Britain's restraint on Australia dissipated following the Netherlands' rejection of Britain's offer of "good offices". On 23 July Britain informed Australia it would not wish to interfere with whatever action Australia might decide to take with a view to ending the military action in Indonesia and achieving a settlement.⁴ The following day Chifley received a message from Evatt (who was in Japan) recommending that Australia refer the dispute to the Security Council.⁵ The Australian government however, took no action at this stage.

As against its apparent carte blanche to Australia, Britain continued to advocate third-party rather than U.N. intervention in Indonesia. On Britain's advice, India on 22 July urged the U.S. to take action to curtail military operations in Indonesia.⁶ Britain itself proposed to the U.S. on 24 July that they jointly offer to arbitrate the dispute in order to pre-empt its possible referral to the U.N. by some other power.⁷

¹ X
³ X
⁴ X
⁵ X
For its part, New Zealand advised Australia on 25 July that it favoured the British proposal to arbitrate the dispute, and it urged Australia not to allow its deliberations to be swayed by considerations of national prestige.¹ New Zealand received a curt reply from Australia that the major question was security, not prestige.²

However, the Australian government showed no sense of urgency about protecting either its own, or the Republic's, security. Chifley considered Australia was 'disposed' to refer the Indonesian dispute to the Security Council, provided Britain had no strong objection.³ From Tokyo Evatt suggested such an approach was tantamount to inviting Britain to object. He reassured that the Security Council was the proper constitutional tribunal to resolve the dispute.⁴ For its part, the U.S. warned Australia on 24 July of the delays and frustrations which Security Council intervention would involve and expressed the hope that Australia would not refer the Indonesian dispute to the Council.⁵ Notwithstanding, Australia advised Britain on 25 July that, for reasons of regional security, Australia felt impelled to respond to the Republic's appeals. It suggested, moreover, that such an action would have a salutary effect on the Asian view of the Western powers.⁶ By its continuing deferral of action, it appeared that Australia was experiencing an internal policy crisis.

By 25 July the Republic had militarily been cut off from diplomatic contact with the outside world. Sjarifuddin broadcast a special message over Radio Djocjakarta to the Australian Consul-General at Batavia asking him to take

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¹ X
² X
³ X
⁴ X
⁵ X
⁶ X
Map 6: The results of the first Dutch 'police action'

over representing the Republic diplomatically.\(^1\) Australia politely declined
to do so.\(^2\) Perhaps it wished to avoid prejudicing any diplomatic initiative
it might take at the U.N.

This exchange between Australia and the Republic demonstrated that
Australia's reaction to the Dutch 'police action' was cautious and calculating
rather than emotional, and procrastinating rather than impulsive. With
unusual reserve, Australia gave full measure to other powers to take the
initiative. The effect of this approach, like that of the U.S. 'soft'
diplomacy towards the Dutch, was to enable the Dutch to achieve the objectives
of their military operations. Soon after commencing their 'police action'
the Dutch controlled most of the major towns and cities in East and West Java;
they had occupied all the major Republican ports in Java; and had secured
some areas of Sumatra.\(^3\) In contrast to their prior vociferousness, the U.S.,
Britain, Australia and India had all been indecisive in their reactions to
the ultimate military conflict.

Apparently Australia had discounted the possibility of India's
referring the Indonesian dispute to the Security Council. Its information
was that India had deferred to Britain's reservations about U.N. intervention.
Thus, when on 29 July India announced its intention to refer the dispute to
the Council, Australia regarded this unexpected announcement as 'slightly
embarrassing'.\(^4\)

Nevertheless, Australia advised Britain it intended taking no
immediate action. But it suggested the Western powers could procedurally
minimise the Indian initiative being regarded as an Asia-versus-the West

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1 *Archief B.Z.912.2 Australië* (voor S.O.) verzoek van Indonesische zijde aan
Aust. Consul-Gen. vertegenwoordig tijdens de 1e politionele actie op ziek te
nemen. juli 1947. Telegram from Elink Schuurman to the Minister for Foreign

2 X

3 Kahin, *op.cit.*, p.213.

4 X
confrontation by voting in favour of the Indonesian question being admitted to the Security Council agenda.\(^1\) Within a matter of hours, however, Australia took steps, by which, simultaneously with India, but in terms which took precedence over India's referral, Australia also referred the Indonesian question to the Security Council.

On 30 July Chifley announced\(^2\) Australia was referring the Indonesian question to the Security Council under Article 39\(^3\) of the U.N. Charter. By thus claiming that a breach of the peace had occurred, Australia's referral took precedence over India's which, under Article 34, made the lesser claim that the maintenance of international peace and security was endangered. Whereas India's referral under Article 34 would have entailed a full investigation of the dispute with all the attendant delays, Australia calculated that the Security Council could make a speedy and purely "constitutional" decision in the terms of Article 39.\(^4\) When the Indonesian question was admitted to the agenda of the Security Council on 30 July, Australia submitted a draft resolution calling for an immediate end to hostilities and for the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration in the terms of Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement.\(^5\)

However, the following day, the U.S. offered its "good offices" to the Netherlands government and to the Indonesian Republic as a counter-move to Security Council intervention.\(^6\) At the same time it argued against the

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\(^1\) *Ibid.*


terms of the Australian referral of the Indonesian question to the Security Council. Primarily it challenged Australia's assumption that the Republic was a state in international law, which formed the basis of Australia's claim that hostilities existed between two states. On 1 August the Security Council adopted a U.S. resolution which was more loosely- phrased than the Australian draft resolution. The U.S. resolution called upon the parties "to cease hostilities forthwith" but deleted reference to Article 39 of the Charter, and in calling for arbitration of the dispute or settlement "by any other peaceful means", did not stipulate that this should be in accordance with the Linggadjati Agreement.¹

Having asserted its claim to a direct interest in the Indonesian dispute, Australia was apparently concerned that it should not forfeit the initiative to the U.S. On 5 August, after the Netherlands had accepted the U.S. offer of "good offices", Australia proposed to the U.S. that together they offer to assist the settlement of the dispute between the Dutch and the Republic. Australia's suggestion was not favourably received.² Nevertheless, on 7 August Chifley publicly stated Australia's preparedness "to act jointly with the United States Government in a capacity of mediator and arbitrator". In so doing, he intimated that "any offer merely of good offices" did not adequately meet the situation.³ Australia had offered and supported proposals for mediation of the dispute prior to the 'police action'. Its insistence on arbitration implied that it now thought it essential for the third party to have greater power to reconcile the parties.

¹ Text : Taylor, op.cit., p.449.
Some confusion followed when the Republic accepted the U.S. offer of "good offices" on 7 August, and then accepted Australia's offer as well on 10 August. Moreover, in accepting the U.S. offer, the Republic suggested the U.S. use its "good offices" to establish an international commission to arbitrate the dispute. The Republic indicated further that it would soon announce the countries with which it wished to arbitrate. Subsequently Soekarno told the U.S. Consul General at Batavia that the Republic would prefer to accept the U.S. offer of "good offices", but that it would want countries like Australia and India to be included in arbitration of the dispute.

The Republic recognised the U.S. as the most important power in the Security Council, and was presumably reluctant to directly reject the U.S. offer. For its part, the U.S. recognised that the Republic was politely refusing its offer of "good offices".

Australia then tried to press the Netherlands to accept trilateral mediation of the dispute as an alternative to a Security Council arbitration commission, which Australia was intending to propose to the Council on 12 August. In an official note of 11 August Australia pointed out to the Netherlands that the Republic's reply to the U.S. had rendered the U.S. offer of "good offices" ineffective. On the other hand, Australia argued, the Republic's acceptance of the Australian offer afforded a means of agreeing on a compromise. In addition to the U.S. (which was acceptable to the Netherlands)

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2 Ibid., pp.1017-1018. The Consul-General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State, Batavia, 8 August 1947.

3 Ibid., p.1018.

4 Ibid., p.1025. The Consul-General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State. Batavia, 12 August 1947.

5 Ibid., pp.1037-1039. Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon). Washington, 20 August 1947. [Conversation with Sjahmir, Salim and C.T. Lamboe, representing the Republic of Indonesia.]

6 Ibid., p.1029. The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the Consul-General at Batavia (Foote). Washington, 14 August 1947.
and Australia (which was acceptable to the Republic), Australia proposed that the Netherlands nominate a third mediator acceptable to it.\(^1\) The Netherlands apparently did not accept Australia's proposal.

On 12 August Australia duly submitted to the Security Council a proposal for establishing a commission to "report directly to the Council on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947".\(^2\) In putting forward a proposal favoured by the Republic, it was possible that Australia also calculated on enhancing its standing with the Republic. However, the Council considered the situation did not require the intervention of an arbitration commission,\(^3\) and therefore rejected Australia's draft resolution.

Within the Security Council Australia continued to advance the interests of the Republic. On 12 August the Council accepted a proposal, which Australia had first mooted on 31 July, that representatives of the Republic be allowed to participate in the Council's debates on the Indonesian question. Australia argued persuasively that, although the Council did not recognise the Republic as a state in international law, it did recognise it as a party to the dispute under consideration.\(^4\)

Outside the Security Council Australia continued to press the Dutch to agree to multilateral arbitration. In Canberra on 18 August Evatt told Teppema that the Netherlands' refusal to accept arbitration in Indonesia was at the root of bad relations between Australia and the Netherlands. Warning that it was in the Netherlands' interest to accept Security Council, as against General Assembly, intervention in the dispute, Evatt suggested that arbitration

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\(^1\) *Archief B.Z.* 912.10. Note handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Australian Minister, 11 August 1947.


\(^3\) e.g. U.S. objections. See *USFR* Vol. VI (1947), p.1027. The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson). Washington, 13 August 1947.

\(^4\) *SCOR*, Second Year, 181st Meeting, 12 August 1947, p.1940.
by Britain, the U.S., Australia and, if necessary, a fourth power, would be appropriate. As to the ultimate political settlement in Indonesia, Evatt reiterated Australia's interest to see Dutch influence and prestige retained. Drawing a distinction between sovereignty and dominion status, he advocated a cooperative relationship between the Dutch and the Indonesians, and referred to the British settlement with India by which India would remain in the British Commonwealth.¹

Evatt's view of the division of sovereignty between the Netherlands and Indonesia had clearly shifted. Hitherto he had advocated that the Dutch extend internal sovereignty to the Indonesian peoples but retain external sovereignty. Although dominion status implied a close cooperative relationship, formally it meant virtually total sovereignty under a common constitutional monarchy.

Subsequently Australia renewed its efforts in the Security Council to persuade the Council to take a more active role in Indonesia. On 22 August Australia and China jointly submitted a resolution proposing that the Council request the representatives in Batavia of its member governments to report to the Council on the observance of the cease-fire which it had ordered on 1 August. The Council accepted this resolution ² on 25 August.

On 22 August Australia also submitted another draft resolution proposing that the Security Council request the Netherlands and the Republic to accept arbitration by a tripartite commission comprising one nominee of the Netherlands, one of the Republic, and one of the Security Council.³ The Council rejected this proposal.


AUSTRALIA EXPECTED TO REPRESENT
INDONESIANS IN JAVA SETTLEMENT
DISCUSSION —— NEWS ITEM.

YES SIR!
YES SIR!
YES SIR!

AUSTRALIAN REP.

Courier-Mail (Brisbane)
28 August 1947
Instead the Council accepted on 25 August a U.S. draft resolution in which the Security Council tendered its "good offices" to both parties. As well it offered, if requested, to assist a settlement through a committee of the Council, consisting of three members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third to be designated by the two so selected.¹

The U.S. thus achieved its objective of limiting intervention in Indonesia to mediation. Thereby it also effectively overruled Australia's persistent efforts to enforce greater intervention by way of arbitration.

With this policy substantially defeated, Evatt became conciliatory towards the Dutch. In Canberra Evatt told Teppema he realised the Dutch had to remain in control in Indonesia. He reaffirmed that Australia only wanted to stop the fighting; and said he wanted to keep the Indonesian question out of the General Assembly.² The Dutch took little heed of what Evatt said at this stage, believing that his friendly gestures merely reflected his ambition to be elected President of the General Assembly in September 1947.³

Whether or not this was the case, other Australian officials remained abrasive towards the Dutch. Australia's representative on the Security Council's Consular Commission at Batavia, Mr Charles Eaton,⁴ agitated Dutch officials

² Archief B.Z.912.1 Deel VII, september t/m december 1947. Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. From Teppema, Canberra, 1 September 1947. 78.
³ Ibid., Telegram for Canberra from van Boetzelaer, The Hague, 3 September 1947. Ref. no.6820.
⁴ Eaton, who had been Australian Consul-General in Dili, Portuguese Timor, arrived in Batavia to become Deputy Consul-General on 30 August 1947. As Eaton was to become Acting Consul-General on 8 September, when Ballard left on leave, Australia nominated him as Australia's representative on the Consular Commission. Van Mook papers Doos 13. Folder 3. Telegram from Elink Schuurman, Batavia, 31 August 1947. 389.
by his impatience to visit the Republican capital, Djocjakarta, before the Consular Commission convened on 1 September.\(^1\) And in Canberra, when Teppema complained to Burton about the impetuosity of Australia's representative at the Security Council, Mr W.R. Hodgson, and of Eaton's impropriety in Batavia, he received the curt reply that such accusations by the Dutch did not improve Australian-Dutch relations. Burton also indicated that neither Hodgson nor Eaton had acted without instructions.\(^2\)

Cooperation between Australia and the Netherlands seemed less likely when, on 8 September, Australia accepted the invitation of the Republic to become its nominee on the "good offices" committee.\(^3\) Sjahri, who had been representing the Republic in the Security Council debates, recommended to the Republic that it select Australia.\(^4\) Presumably Australia's support of the Republic in the Council influenced him to do so.

On 10 September Belgium accepted its nomination by the Netherlands. Then the U.S. accepted a joint request by Australia and Belgium to become the third member of what became known as the U.N. Good Offices Committee (G.O.C.).\(^5\) the U.S. did so somewhat reluctantly. It was affronted that the Republic had earlier 'rejected' its independent offer of "good offices". Yet it felt constrained to cooperate, seeing that the Security Council had accepted its resolution proposing such a committee.\(^6\)

At this stage Australia took steps independently to advance particular proposals for a Dutch-Indonesian settlement. In Canberra on 22

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\(^1\) Ibid., also Telegram to van Boetzelaer, The Hague from Elink Schuurman, Batavia, 3 September 1947. 401. Also Archief DIRVO PA. Telegram from van Boetzelaer, The Hague to DIRVO. 1 September 1947. 387.

\(^2\) Archief B.Z. 912.1 Deel VII. Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. From Teppema, Canberra, 10 September 1947. 83.

\(^3\) SCOR, Second Year, No.88, 201st Meeting, 10 September 1947, p.2365.

\(^4\) X


September Burton told de Rantiz that the G.O.C. would only become involved in protracted and fruitless discussions unless the Dutch and the Republicans were agreed on the future structure of Indonesia. He pointed out that the Republic no longer regarded the Linggadjati Agreement as acceptable. As a concrete plan for the future, Burton suggested that the relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines was a suitable model for Indonesia. In 1946 the U.S. had granted independence to the Philippines with certain provisions which protected U.S. economic interests. Burton argued that such an arrangement would guarantee the Netherlands' economic interests, which, he maintained were its prime concern in Indonesia.

On 22 September the Consular Commission in Batavia submitted an interim report to the Security Council which indicated a far from satisfactory state of military affairs in Indonesia, the cease-fire order notwithstanding. On that day Burton had told Teppema it was Eaton's impression that greater culpability for cease-fire violations lay with the Dutch than with the Republic, which appeared to be maintaining peace and order in its area. In a subsequent

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1 Cf. *Ibid.*, p.1038. Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon), Washington, 20 August 1947. Republican representatives indicated that the Republic had signed the Linggadjati Agreement as "an easy way to end the *de jure* sovereignty of the Netherlands Government over Indonesia; that they expected that by means of the Linggadjati Agreement the various states to be set up aside from the Republic of Indonesia would be established in consultation with the Republic and would accordingly form one sovereign state which would really be an enlarged Republic of Indonesia; that they intended to achieve their independence immediately and not eventually..."


discussion with Teppema on 24 September Burton suggested that the Consular Commission report was added reason why the Netherlands should adopt the U.S.-Philippines formula in Indonesia. Moreover, he intimated that the Republic had deputed Australia to try to make such an arrangement on its behalf.\footnote{Archief Minog, C.9/C.21/4829/330, op.cit.} If this were so, Australia, as a member of the G.O.C., was effectively exercising its independent "good offices" and was acting as the nominee of the Republic rather than a representative of the U.N.

It seemed the government's support for the U.S.-Philippines formula may have emanated from the Labor Party. In parliament on 25 September Mr K.E. Beazley, a Labor backbencher who was emerging as a party spokesman on foreign policy, suggested the U.S.-Philippines formula was "ideal" for Indonesia.\footnote{CPD, Vol. 193, pp.415-416. See below, Appendix III, Document 23.} However, in the absence of Evatt overseas, Chifley, who was Acting Minister for External Affairs, suggested to parliament that his view of the kind of Dutch-Indonesian settlement that was desirable had not changed.\footnote{Ibid., p.242 (25 September 1947). Chifley: "no one can deny that there is a strong upsurge of nationalism in that country [Indonesia] also. When the trouble first started in Indonesia I expressed the opinion that an arrangement should be worked out between the Dutch and the Indonesian people whereby the Indonesians, while continuing to enjoy the advantage of the administrative ability of the Dutch, should be given an increasing part in the government of their own country. Ultimately, something of that kind must be done. That is why we referred the matter to the Security Council."} This suggests that the different views of a Dutch-Indonesian settlement of Chifley and Evatt on the one hand, and Burton and Beazley on the other, may have reflected a difference of opinion within both the Labor government and the Labor party at that time.

In Batavia, meanwhile, Eaton had proposed that representatives of the Netherlands Indies and Republican governments go to Canberra for discussions with the Australian government about the aims and objectives of renewed
negotiations under the G.O.C.\(^1\) Clearly, Australia was keen to promote its proposal for a Dutch-Indonesian settlement. As well, Eaton suggested to the Dutch that Australia appoint a representative to the Republican government at Djocjakarta and the Republic send a representative to Canberra to facilitate Australia's role on the G.O.C.\(^2\) Implicitly Australia saw itself as the representative of the Republic on the G.O.C. and not merely of the Security Council.

On 26 September Evatt assumed the position of Australian representative on the Security Council. He informed the Council that Australia had appointed Judge R.C. Kirby\(^3\) as its representative on the G.O.C.\(^4\) On 26 September the Council agreed, at Evatt's request, to include the Indonesian question on the agenda for its next meeting so as to allow discussion of both the Consular Commission's interim report and the establishment of the G.O.C.\(^5\)

Then, on 3 October, Evatt spoke about the Consular Commission's report. He told the Council that its cease-fire order was still not being implemented. He implied the Dutch were primarily responsible for violating the order and he criticised the Consular Commission for its tardiness in reporting. For these reasons he thought the G.O.C. should begin functioning immediately.\(^6\) The Council adopted an Australian draft resolution requesting the U.N. Secretary-General to accept responsibility for organising the G.O.C. to convene "with the utmost dispatch".\(^7\)

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\(^1\) *Van Mook papers*, Doos 13, Folder 3. Telegram to van Boetzelaer, The Hague, from Elink Schuurman, Batavia, 22 September 1947. 447.


\(^3\) Formerly Acting Australian Political Representative, Batavia, 1946. See Supra, Chapter 4.


Map 7: The 'Van Mook' line.

Division of Java under the Renville Agreement (17 January 1948). White (unshaded) areas were those which the Republic retained. Shaded areas were those which the Netherlands occupied. The heavy dotted lines represent the Renville truce line, which approximated to the Van Mook line.

While Australia received support for this proposal to expedite a political settlement in Indonesia, the Council did not display any sense of urgency to respond to its protests about military violations. On the contrary, the U.S. advised its Consul-General at Batavia on 27 September that the Consular Commission should not feel impelled to submit its final report by its 30 September deadline.\(^1\) It was not improbable that the U.S. was yielding to Dutch representations that the cease-fire order was inhibiting its military measures which, the Netherlands claimed, were aimed at restoring "law and order" in Indonesia.\(^2\) However, as distinct from the Security Council directive that Dutch and Republican forces hold their military position as of 4 August, the Dutch had on 29 August unilaterally declared their own cease-fire line, the so-called "van Mook line",\(^3\) representing the position they had won by "mopping-up operations" since 4 August. This unilateral military demarcation limited the Republic to about one-third of the island of Java and brought the most fertile agricultural areas under Dutch control.\(^4\)

On the basis of this conflict between the Security Council's cease-fire line and the van Mook line, Australia on 11 October put to the Council a draft resolution calling upon Dutch and Republican forces to withdraw at least five kilometres behind the positions they held on 1 August.\(^5\) Australia put this proposal forward in opposition to another by the U.S.S.R. that Dutch forces should be required to withdraw completely to their ante bellum (i.e. 20 July) lines, which the Republic was itself demanding.\(^6\)

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\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 1048-1051. Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, Washington, 8 September 1947.

\(^3\) See map opposite.


\(^6\) USFR, Vol. VI (1947), p.1059. Document left at the Department of State by the Netherlands Minister (Keuchlin) on October 16, 1947. Conversely both the U.S. and Britain favoured the GOC establishing a military demarcation line.
Australia had already, on 31 July, rejected the idea of complete withdrawal of Dutch troops. By way of explanation, Hodgson told the Council on 11 October:

What is the object? The object is to restore law and order and civil administration - to what end? In order to look after human lives and property, and to see that reasonable conditions are restored so that rehabilitation and reconstruction have a chance.

We have doubts as to whether the Indonesian Government, shut off from the outside world, has the physical and material resources to restore communications, roads, bridges and so on, and to restore law and order. We think they must have the assistance and co-operation of the Netherlands authorities in order to do all that. Therefore, we rule the USSR proposal out as being impracticable and unreal...."1

Australia thereby revealed that it 'accepted' the declared civil objectives of the Dutch 'police action'. It recognised the declared intentions of the Dutch as justifiable, given the current instability in Indonesia. Indirectly, it implied it considered these served Australia's security interests. This perhaps further explains why Australia delayed taking diplomatic action for ten days after the Dutch initiated their 'police action' against the Republic. It regretted, but acquiesced in, the 'police action', although it deplored its military excessiveness.

The Security Council's debate on the cease-fire question was protracted. The Council rejected Australia's draft resolution and on 1 November finally settled on a U.S. draft resolution by which the Council transferred responsibility for the cease-fire to the parties, the G.O.C. and the Consular Commission.2

Meanwhile, en route to Indonesia, the G.O.C. had had its first formal meeting in Australia.3 There the three members resolved that it was

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1 Ibid., p.2554.
3 At Lapstone, New South Wales.
their duty to act as representatives of the Security Council rather than as representatives of their nominees.\(^1\) For their part, the Dutch ascertained that Kirby supported full independence for the Republic and they regarded adversely his efforts to have Oesman\(^2\) admitted to the G.O.C. meeting as a spokesman for the Republic.\(^3\) Alternatively, after the G.O.C. arrived in Batavia on 29 October and consulted the Republic, the U.S. member of the G.O.C., Dr Frank Graham, reported favourably on Kirby's having been able to clarify a misunderstanding by the Republic that the G.O.C. would perform an arbitral function.\(^4\)

Other difficulties which the G.O.C. encountered were not as easily resolved. The Netherlands and Republican delegations could not agree on a mutually-acceptable site to hold negotiations, the Dutch insisting that they be held in Indonesia, which the Republic would not accept. So the Australian and Belgian members of the G.O.C. requested the U.S. to provide a ship for the negotiations.\(^5\) On 14 November formal discussions began on board the U.S.S. *Renville*. Meanwhile informal discussions between the members of the G.O.C. had produced no decision regarding a cease-fire line and troop withdrawals.\(^6\)

In Canberra Burton was impatient with these delays and the G.O.C.'s lack of progress. On 14 November he warned de Ranitz that, unless the G.O.C. soon reported something favourable to the Security Council, then the Council

\(^1\) *Van Mook papers*, Doos 14, Folder 3. Telegram to DIRVO from Teppema, Sydney, 22 October 1947. Unnumbered.; Telegram to Elink Schuurman, Batavia (87) and to van Boetzelaer, The Hague (106) from Teppema, Canberra, 28 October 1947.

\(^2\) Representative of the Republic of Indonesia in Australia. See Supra, this chapter, p.155.

\(^3\) *Van Mook papers*, Telegram, 28 October 1947, *op.cit.*


would be impelled to intervene more incisively. This, Burton argued, would
be adverse to Dutch interests.¹

On 15 November Burton spoke more sternly when he conferred with
de Ranitz on another matter. At Sourabaya on 21 October Dutch officials had
intercepted Australian officials supervising the return to the Republic of the
last two Indonesian repatriates from Australia, namely Bondan and Slamet of
CENKIM, Brisbane. As Australia had arranged their repatriation in full
consultation with the Dutch, Burton protested to de Ranitz on 15 November about
their luggage being seized at Sourabaya and correspondence and propaganda
therein confiscated. Burton referred again to Dutch obstruction of G.O.C.
negotiations. If Australia did not receive a full and satisfactory explanation
of the Sourabaya incident, he warned, government officials would probably fly
straight to Djocjakarta for discussions with the Republic, after which inter-
national recognition of the Republic (presumably, by Australia) could be
expected.² In Batavia the leader of the Netherlands delegation, Mr H.F.L.K.
van Vredenburg, protested to Kirby that Burton's remarks implied Australia's
disavowal of its "good offices" role on the G.O.C.³

At the same time the U.S. was critical of the way in which both the
Australian and the Belgian members of the G.O.C. were acting as protagonists
for their nominees in the G.O.C. negotiations.⁴ It viewed unfavourably Kirby's

¹ Archief Minog Australië 1947 Verbaal 31 december 1947. J78. Teppema to
C.15/H.2/5803/411. [The Netherlands Minister reported de Ranitz's interview
with Burton.]

from Teppema to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. Canberra, 15
November 1947. 112 [The Netherlands Minister reporting de Ranitz's interview
with Burton.]

³ Archief B.Z. 912.1 Deel VII. Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

⁴ USFR, Vol. VI (1947), p.1079. The Consul-General at Batavia (Livengood) to
the Secretary of State. Batavia, 6 December 1947. [From Graham]: "Apart US
Del, GOC in no sense Good Offices Committee...Austr[al]ian delegation and
Belgian delegation are protagonist Republic and Netherlands point of view
respectively and on crucial points are proving almost as uncompromising as
parties themselves. Such partisanship openly acknowledged by Kirby who has
several times stated that unless decisions GOC can be reached majority vote,
GOC may as well go home...."
proposal that the G.O.C. impose a cease-fire demarcation line on the Dutch and Republicans as a form of arbitral intervention, as distinct from "good offices". Moreover, in Kirby's emphasis on the Netherlands' rejection of this proposal, the U.S. discerned a desire by Australia to put an "anti-Dutch case" to the Security Council as soon as possible. In proferring this explanation the U.S. G.O.C. representative suggested Australia was mindful both that its two-year membership of the Security Council was due to expire at the end of 1947 and that it might thereby be required to forfeit its membership of the G.O.C.2

On 8 December the G.O.C. moved on to discussions about a political settlement. It became apparent very early that the Linggadjati Agreement would provide cause for contention rather than a basis for agreement. Australia therefore suggested that the G.O.C. itself formulate new proposals. Australia put forward a draft plan for the immediate granting of sovereignty to the Republic and provision for the Netherlands retaining by protocol certain rights in economic and defence matters. The Australian draft plan was modelled on the U.S.-Philippines Agreement.3

It will be recalled that Burton had mooted this formula three months previously. In December 1947, however, it was unacceptable to the Dutch who were continuing both to sponsor the formation of non-Republican states (e.g. West Java in mid-December) and to advocate the early formation of the U.S.I. In connection with the latter, Beel, (the Netherlands Prime Minister) was planning to visit Indonesia in December 1947. The Netherlands government in

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1 Ibid., p.1079.
3 Taylor, op.cit., p.79.
The Hague felt that, unless the U.S.I. were formed without further delay, the Netherlands would need to engage in further military action in Indonesia.\(^1\) With this knowledge, Evatt, who had recently returned to Australia, on 16 December invited Beel to visit Australia as well to discuss the Indonesian situation.\(^2\)

Meanwhile, on 12 December, Sjahrrir had arrived in Australia on a goodwill visit in his capacity as "Ambassador-at-large" for the Republic of Indonesia. He had hoped to see Evatt and other federal ministers but apparently did not receive the attention from the Australian government which he expected. The government's coolness to him possibly reflected its concern not to adversely prejudice its invitation to Beel. Not surprisingly, however, it resulted in Sjahrrir becoming openly critical of Australia's sincerity towards the Republic.\(^3\)

Australia appeared intent on inducing the Dutch to make large concessions in the Renville negotiations. On 19 December Burton urged the U.S. without delay to get the Security Council "to prod" the Dutch. The U.S. was generally "unfavourably impressed" by Australia's "tactics", both as a member of the Security Council and as a member of the G.O.C. In the U.S. view, Australia seemed primarily concerned to embarrass the Netherlands, rather than to assist the functioning of the G.O.C. from a basis of "reasonable neutrality". The U.S. claimed it considered it essential to maintain its

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\(^1\) Taylor, *op.cit.*, p.79.


\(^3\) *Archief* B.Z. 912.1 Deel VII. Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague from Eltink Schuurman, Batavia, 29 December 1947. 726. For van Boetzelae. Also to Teppema, Canberra. 111. In Singapore on 25 December, Sjahrrir told the press that India was the Republic's best friend and that, although Australia had referred the Indonesian question to the Security Council, it had failed to defend the Republic.
neutrality as a member of the G.O.C. and it could not, therefore, engage in such an "unneutral" act as getting the Security Council to "prod" the Dutch.\footnote{All the information in above paragraph from USFR, Vol. VI (1947), p.1099. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia. Washington, 31 December 1947.}

Kirby had meanwhile returned to Australia to discuss with Chifley his responsibilities in Australia as a member of the Arbitration Court and as Chairman of the Stevedoring Commission. The U.S. then complained to Australia about Kirby's absence from the Renville negotiations. According to Dutch sources, the Department of External Affairs curtly replied that Kirby's return to Batavia depended on the progress of the G.O.C. negotiations. It indicated, moreover, that progress was minimal because of the non-cooperation of the Dutch.\footnote{Van Mook papers, Doos 15, Folder 3. Telegram to van Boetzelaer, The Hague (126) and to Elink Schuurman, Batavia (117) from Teppema, Canberra, 27 December 1947.}

Apart from the U.S.'s particular complaints against Australia, its outspokenness reflected a new decisiveness in its approach to the G.O.C. negotiations. By 19 December the Department of State had considered that the time had probably come for the U.S. to take a "strong position" to produce a "positive" effect in discussions between the Netherlands and the Republic.\footnote{USFR, Vol. VI (1947), p.1085. The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the Consulate General at Batavia. Washington, 19 December 1947.}

For its part, Australia protested directly to the Netherlands government about delays in G.O.C. discussions for implementing the cease-fire in Indonesia. In The Hague on 24 December Officer delivered a verbal protest to van Boetzelaer, which van Boetzelaer thought Officer may have delivered in more moderate tone than intended. Officer indicated Australia's concern that some Dutch officials appeared to welcome delays in the G.O.C. negotiations. He said Kirby and his colleagues on the G.O.C. were depressed at the current stagnation in negotiations. Finally, he showed van Boetzelaer a copy of a telegram instructing Australia's representative on the Security Council to
draw the Council's attention to the delays in the Renville negotiations.\(^1\) Simultaneously Australia appealed to Britain to exert pressure on the Dutch so as to prevent either a breakdown in negotiations or the imposition on the Republic of an unfavourable settlement.\(^2\)

Australia made these multilateral appeals at a time when the G.O.C. as a whole considered the Renville negotiations were at a critical stage. On 25 December the G.O.C. sent a special Christmas message to the two parties reminding them of their responsibilities to implement the Security Council resolutions without further delay. Because the U.S. was prepared to take a stronger position, the G.O.C. was also able to make a number of proposals for an immediate truce. As well, it put forward a list of proposals, derived from the Linggadjati principles,\(^3\) for a political settlement.\(^4\) Neither party responded favourably to the proposals. The Netherlands delegation in fact demanded their withdrawal on the grounds that, in proferring proposals, the G.O.C. was exceeding its "good offices" role.\(^5\) Meanwhile the Dutch were proceeding with their unilateral plans to establish a cooperative federation. On 29 December van Mook announced the establishment of the state of East Sumatra.\(^6\)

\(^1\) *Van Mook papers*, Doos 15, Folder 3. Telegram to Teppema, Canberra (80) and to Elink Schuurman, Batavia (637) from van Boetzelaer, The Hague, 24 December 1947.

\(^2\) X

\(^3\) The Linggadjati principles were:

1. independence of the Indonesian peoples;
2. a sovereign state on a federal basis, possessing a constitution to be arrived at by democratic processes; and
3. a union between the U.S.I. and other parts of the Netherlands Kingdom under the Netherlands crown.


All the while the acting Australian representative on the G.O.C., Mr T.K. Critchley, continued, apparently under government instructions, to urge the G.O.C. to submit a full report to the Security Council before 30 December. Presumably Australia was still seeking a tangible result before its membership of the Council expired. This impending reduction in Australia’s diplomatic capacity notwithstanding, the Security Council had decided on 19 December that Australia should continue as a member of the G.O.C. and should retain speaking rights in the Council debates on the Indonesian question.

At the beginning of January 1948 the Renville negotiations were still in a hiatus. On 2 January, under pressure from the G.O.C., the Netherlands submitted to it a set of 'final' counter-proposals to the G.O.C.'s Christmas suggestions. The Netherlands draft included no reference to the Republic. In Canberra Teppema urged Evatt and Burton to recognise the necessity of the Republic's being incorporated in a federal Indonesia, arguing that it was in Australia's political and economic interest to support the proposed U.S.I. Evatt and Burton in turn emphasised Australia's primary concern with an end to bloodshed in Indonesia. They also regarded the opening of trade as essential to Indonesia's being sufficiently economically viable to assume autonomy.

On 5 January Beel advised that he would be unable to accept Evatt's invitation to visit Australia for discussions about the Indonesian situation.

1 Kirby was still in Australia.
3 Taylor, op. cit., p.86.
4 Above information in this paragraph from Archief DIRVO. PA. 3. Teppema to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hague. Canberra, 3 January 1948. C.21/H.2/38/8 Australische-Nederlandse Betrekkingen. Teppema had been instructed to tell the Australian government that time would not allow Beel to visit Australia. Archief ARTA Telegram van Elink Schuurman, Batavia to van Boetzelaer, The Hague (2); to Teppema (1), 3 January 1948.
From the first, both Dutch officials at Batavia and Teppema in Canberra had regarded Evatt's invitation with suspicion and had advised Beel not to accept it.\(^1\) On 5 January Burton suggested to Teppema that Beel reverse his decision. Burton intimated that Beel had originally favoured the idea but had been influenced by misguided Dutch officials at The Hague and Batavia.\(^2\) Given that a month had elapsed since Australia originally issued its invitation, it is not improbable that Burton's assessment was correct. At the same time there was little reason for the Netherlands to regard discussions with Australia as impelling or attractive.

At Batavia on 8 January the Netherlands delegation informed the G.O.C. that unless the Republic accepted unconditionally its counter-proposals within a 48-hour period beginning on 11 January, then the Netherlands would be bound to resume its "freedom of action".\(^3\) In response to this crisis the G.O.C. on 11 January presented the Dutch with a set of additional principles which both strengthened the Republic's position but also made concessions to the Dutch standpoint.\(^4\) Graham, the U.S. representative on the G.O.C., urged the U.S. government independently to impress on the Netherlands the necessity of accepting the G.O.C. principles. It appears that such third-party pressure by the U.S. was decisive\(^5\) in persuading the Netherlands to make what was in


\(^2\) Teppema, 8 January 1948, C.21/108/15, *op.cit.*

\(^3\) Taylor, *op.cit.*, p.88.

\(^4\) The GOC designated the Republic as one of the States in the USI. It proposed to ensure fair representation to any interim government by requiring the continued presence of the UN during the transitional period and by providing for proportional representation to the constitutional convention. At the same time the GOC suggested the Republic recognise Dutch interim sovereignty prior to the formation of the USI; that it reaffirm its acceptance of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union; and that it accept a special relationship between the USI and the Netherlands. *Ibid.*, p.89.

effect a "complete volte-face from a consistently maintained position".\(^1\) On 12 January the Netherlands accepted the G.O.C. principles. Subsequently it placed a new time limit - 15 January - on the Republic's reply to its proposals. It also renewed its threat of "freedom of action".\(^2\)

After Kirby returned to Batavia in December he received instructions to do his utmost to protect the position of the Republic and thereby offset Republican disillusionment with both the U.N. and Australia.\(^3\) Kirby felt that the G.O.C. truce plan\(^4\) was most unjust to the Republic. However, in view of the strong State Department support to the U.S. within the G.O.C., Kirby did not feel that he could advise the Republic to reject the G.O.C. proposals. He did indicate to the Republic, however, that, whether it accepted or rejected the current terms, Australia would continue to support it.\(^5\) On 14 January the Republic accepted the G.O.C. Christmas truce proposals, the twelve Dutch political principles (hitherto referred to as the counter-proposals) and the G.O.C.'s six additional principles. Together these formed the Renville Agreements which the parties and the G.O.C. officially signed on 17 January.\(^5\)

The Renville Agreements provided certain relief to Australia in so far as they obviated a unilateral, and perhaps military, solution of the conflict between the Netherlands and the Republic. They protected the status of the Republic as well as guaranteeing the continuing role of the U.N. and the G.O.C. On the debit side, however, there was no common interpretation of the agreements by the Netherlands and the Republic nor a resolution of the basic issues in dispute between them. The Renville Agreements represented an exercise in preventive diplomacy. As such they did not provide a positive basis for a *modus vivendi* between the parties.

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2 *Loc.cit.*
3 X
4 The "van Mook line" was accepted as the military boundary between the two parties.
5 X
Summary and Conclusion

From mid-1947 until the Renville agreements were concluded in January 1948, Australia's policies towards the dispute between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic underwent a radical change. A gradual reassessment of Australia's security interest in relation to Indonesia was fundamental to its progressive shift in attitude. Notwithstanding its dislike of repressive colonialism, Australia had a limited tolerance of protracted Republican rebelliousness, which conflicted with Australia's expressed security interest to see a Dutch-Indonesian compromise settlement, and, more immediately, cooperation between the Dutch and the Republic in an interim federal government. Australia therefore postponed taking diplomatic action to counteract the Dutch police action in July 1947. Yet, it regarded intensive Dutch military action as equally, if not more so, prejudicial to Australia's security interests. Gradually these two attitudes were transmuted into policy decisions which increasingly suggested Australia was coming to regard an autonomous Indonesia as potentially more stable and more peaceful, and as such, preferable to continuous unrest generated by gradualist Dutch colonial policies. In various instances Australia's impulsive diplomatic behaviour and abrasive policies reflected as well its growing fear that its security would be adversely affected, should the Indonesian Republic become alienated by Western diplomatic handling of its dispute with the Netherlands.

At the same time Australia's mounting opposition to the Netherlands' approach to Indonesian policy hardened once it decided that the Dutch 'police action' was exceeding reasonable bounds. Following the 'police action' its change of attitude towards the Netherlands was reflected in its shift to supporting arbitration rather than mediation of the dispute. As a form of third party intervention, mediation allows greater autonomy to the disputants whereas arbitration allows the third party a more active role.
The Australian government constantly asserted its interest in, and claim to, a third party role in Indonesia. In late June its offer of material assistance to an interim Indonesian government implied its aspiration for a distinctive role as a regional, Western, prosperous, middle power in relation to its small, Asian, economically-needy and politically-frustrated neighbour, Indonesia. The presumptuousness with which Australia in this way sought to project itself in relation to U.S. and British attempts to mediate in the Indonesian dispute adversely affected the diplomatic advantage it sought from being able to coordinate its Indonesia policy with those of the U.S. and Britain. The state of Australian-Dutch relations notwithstanding, Australia, as an aspiring middle power, did not have the same diplomatic capacity to wield international influence as the U.S. and Britain had, as major powers. Yet it was reluctant to yield the initiative to the major powers who effectively controlled the Security Council. Its attempt to receive diplomatic acknowledgement from the U.S. and Britain by invoking its ability to take action at the U.N., therefore, appeared to be a desperate tactic. Similarly, in other circumstances, Australia displayed its frustration with its diplomatic limitations. These instances included the attempt to 'censure' the speech by the new Netherlands Minister to Australia in June, threatening the Dutch with Australian recognition of the Republic, and posing obstruction to the G.O.C.

Chifley's, and more particularly Burton's, approach to U.N. intervention in the Indonesian dispute was in many ways inconsistent with Australia's general policy of giving staunch support to the U.N. as the proper international diplomatic agent. Although Australia, in accordance with Evatt's wishes, was ultimately responsible for the U.N. intervening in the Indonesian dispute, it soon found that the lines of action adopted in turn by the Security Council, the Consular Commission and the G.O.C. conflicted in important respects with Australia's individual policies. More than not, Australia was in the position of antagonist to rather than protagonist of, the U.N. and its agencies.
Granted that both the G.O.C. and its individual members at one time or another infringed the neutral and/or the "good offices" role of the G.O.C., the degree and kind of liberty Australia exercised in these respects revealed its ambiguous attitude towards the U.N. In large measure, of course, this reflected its frustration as a small/middle power with the major power control of the Security Council.

Australia's attitude towards the Indonesian Republic added to this ambiguity. As a member of the Security Council and as a member of the G.O.C. Australia, to a large extent, cast itself into the role of the protagonist of the Republic. This reflected its growing sensitivity to, and sympathy with, the Republic as the underdog in a dispute in which Australia considered the respective cases should at least be equally regarded. Australia's alignment with the Republic was, however, not absolute. In various instances following the Dutch 'police action' it withheld support and assistance which the Republic fervently requested.

Nevertheless, an increasingly anti-Dutch and pro-Republican emphasis emerged in Australia's policies towards both the resolution of the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic on the one hand, and an ultimate Dutch-Indonesian settlement on the other. From late June Australia moved from supporting the establishment of an interim Indonesian government with de jure Dutch sovereignty to advocating in September that the Dutch immediately and almost absolutely grant independence, presumably to Indonesia as a whole. If this were so, it had departed radically from prior support for the formation of a federal Indonesia in which self-government was extended according to the different levels of political capability of the Indonesian peoples. Australia implicitly advocated the 'extension' of the Republic into a unitary state.

Between June 1947 and the signing of the Renville Agreements, Australia's policies towards the Indonesian question had been considerably
transformed. However, in as much as Australia had become at once more independent, outspoken and incisive about the kind of Indonesian polity it supported, its diplomatic position as a 'Western' power had become a non-conformist one.
Chapter Seven

SHIFTS IN AUSTRALIA'S POLICIES:
FROM THE RENVILLE AGREEMENT TO THE COMMUNIST REBELLION
WITHIN THE REPUBLIC, SEPTEMBER 1948

Once the Renville Agreement of 17 January 1948 had averted the immediate Dutch military threat to the Indonesian Republic, it was hardly surprising that the Australian government should have regarded the Agreement with some diffidence. Although the Agreement committed the Netherlands to negotiate a final settlement with the Republic, it considerably weakened the absolute, as well as the negotiating, position of the Republic.

Alternately, with the Renville Agreement in hand, the Netherlands evinced new confidence. Presumably because the Agreement provided for a Dutch-Indonesian compromise settlement, Dutch officials at Batavia and at Canberra assumed it would be possible to establish a cooperative relationship with Australia.¹ To this end, Teppema wrote immediately to Evatt suggesting Australia take action to terminate the union boycott on Dutch shipping in Australia.² Teppema regarded his appeal as especially opportune since Australia was currently experiencing a dollar shortage. As well, there were benzine restrictions in Australia which he calculated could be eased or overcome by oil imports from Indonesia.³ In his reply of 23 January Evatt completely ignored Teppema's proposal. Instead he charged the Netherlands with having at no time shown its appreciation of, or even given recognition to, the part played by Australia in assisting a settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.⁴

³ Ibid., Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague from Teppema, Canberra, 17 January 1948. 6.
⁴ X
If Evatt resented this attempt by the Netherlands to enhance the advantageous position it had won by the Renville Agreement, his feelings would not have been subdued by subsequent developments within the Indonesian Republic. The signing of the Renville Agreement by the Sjarifuddin government did not have the support of the major parties within the Republican cabinet, namely the Masjumi and the P.N.I. (Nationalist Party). Immediately the Agreement was signed, they withdrew their support from the Sjarifuddin government, which was thereby forced to resign on 23 January. Soekarno then appointed Hatta to form a presidential cabinet. The replacement of Sjarifuddin by Hatta represented a return to moderate leadership of the Republic, and the Hatta government, based on Masjumi and P.N.I. support, assumed office on 29 January.¹

This change within the Republican government was bound to disorientate the Australian government. On the one hand, it had constantly supported a peaceful, negotiated settlement in Indonesia. But, in so far as the fall of the Sjarifuddin government represented the Republic's rejection of the Renville terms as the basis for such a settlement, Australia was faced with the dilemma of its own attitude towards the agreement to which it, as a member of the G.O.C., had been a party. The Republic's defiance of the Renville Agreement would in turn provoke the Netherlands. Yet, in so far as the Australian government favoured Republican moderation, it would presumably want to support the new Hatta government.

The Australian government did in fact rally to the side of the Republic. According to Teppema's information, Evatt declared that the Republic had made maximum concessions, and it was time for the Dutch to concede. Evatt also indicated he distrusted the Dutch and feared they would attempt to wreck the Renville Agreement (by which he presumably meant he feared they would take action against the Republic). Evatt claimed he was

sending Kirby to The Hague to persuade the Netherlands government that it
was necessary to recognise the Indonesian Republic as a state in order that
it could conduct its own affairs and make its own trade arrangements. If
correctly reported, Evatt was clearly challenging the provision in the
Renville Agreement for Dutch de jure sovereignty in Indonesia in the interim
period before the formation of the U.S.I. In a complementary manner, Chifley
inferred to Teppema on 6 February that he did not accept absolute
Dutch interim sovereignty in Indonesia. In reply to Teppema's urging him to
take action to lift the shipping ban, Chifley said he was not prepared to
exert pressure on the unions until it was clear that the political and
economic situation in Indonesia was settled. A couple of days later Burton
intimated to de Ranitz that he, for his part, distrusted Dutch military
intentions in Indonesia. He protested that the Commander of the Netherlands
Indies Army, General S.H. Spoor, was obstructing the entry into Indonesia of
Australian G.O.C. military observers. Burton told de Ranitz he believed
Spoor was planning to advance to Djocjakarta to annihilate the Republic.
Besides Burton's specific complaint about the attitude of the Dutch military
command in Indonesia, there were grounds for the Australian government's
apprehension about Dutch political policy in Indonesia. On 21 January - four
days after the Renville Agreement had been signed - Dutch civil authorities
unilaterally created a new federal state on Madura, one of the islands over
which the Republic had exercised de facto authority prior to the 'police
action'.

1 Van Mook papers, Doos 16, Folder 3. Telegram from Teppema to van Boetzelaer,
The Hague (9); to Elink Schuurman, Batavia (9). Canberra, 30 January
1948. See also Archief B.Z. Geheime Stukken. Ms. Ambassade te Londen (1945-
1954). B42/2 Boycott van Nederlandse schepen in Australië, Nieuw Zeeland
en Singapore. De Ranitz for Teppema to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
The Hague. Canberra, 2 February 1948. C.21/528/62 Houding Australië i.v.m.
Indonesische conflict.

2 Archief B.Z. B42/2, op.cit., Teppema to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,

3 Ibid., Under cover of Teppema, C.21/528/62, op.cit., Note for the Ambassador,
n.d. [Transcript of de Ranitz's conversation with Burton, following Teppema's
interview with Chifley.]

4 Kahin, op.cit., pp.234-238.
In this situation, the Australian government sought to assist the Republic economically. In February Australia's representatives in Canberra, Batavia and The Hague proposed to the Dutch that another agreement be concluded along the lines of the Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement.¹ For this purpose, Eaton suggested to van Mook that a Dutch and an Indonesian representative go to Canberra to confer with an Australian interdepartmental committee.²

Van Mook emphatically rejected Eaton's proposal.³ At that time, possibly influenced by Australia's earlier rebuffs of Teppema's appeals, the Netherlands Indies government was considering placing a counter-boycott on the export of petroleum products to Australia.⁴ This idea was, however, overruled by the Netherlands government in The Hague, which decided to leave the question of the Australian boycott in abeyance until certain political questions in Indonesia had been resolved.⁵ Also, it wanted first to have discussions with the Australian government about the reopening of air traffic between Australia and Indonesia, which had not been restored since the war.⁶ On 19 February van Boetzelrae instructed Teppema not to pursue the question of the boycott with the Australian government for the present.⁷

At this stage the Security Council was considering the First Interim Report of the G.O.C., which dealt with the Renville Agreement. Prior to the Council meeting, Australia learned that the U.S. State Department favoured an early settlement of the Indonesian dispute on the basis of the Renville

¹ See Supra, Chapter 5, p.148.
² Archief B.Z. 912.1 Deel VIII. Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague from DIRVO, Batavia, 18 February 1948. 134.
³ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., Telegram, from van Boetzelrae, The Hague, 4 March 1948 to DIRVO, Batavia (126); to Canberra (7).
⁶ Telegram to Teppema, Canberra, from van Boetzelrae, The Hague, 19 February 1948. 5.
⁷ Ibid.
Agreement. The U.S. indicated it would urge the Dutch to cooperate to this end; also that it would offer them financial assistance for economic reconstruction in Indonesia.¹ Tactically, it was clear that Australia and the U.S. were working at cross purposes.

This tactical divergence reflected itself in the approaches of the Australian and U.S. members of the G.O.C. Along with his U.S. and Belgian counterparts on the G.O.C., Kirby addressed the Security Council on 9 February. Kirby spoke of the informal initiatives the G.O.C. had taken to obtain the Renville Agreement. He pressed the Security Council to give the G.O.C. a 'mandate' to maintain an active role in negotiations, arguing that a "speedy and permanent settlement" depended on the G.O.C. being "in a proper position in the future to render useful assistance to the parties".² He also mentioned the importance the Republic attached to the role of the G.O.C.³ Kirby thereby reflected Australia's belief that, without the G.O.C., the Dutch would proceed slowly in the hope that the Republic would wither away, also that, without the G.O.C., the Dutch would dominate negotiations and force an unsatisfactory agreement on the Republic.

In pressing for the formal jurisdiction of the G.O.C. to be extended, Kirby conflicted with U.S. policy. Notwithstanding its firmer attitude towards the negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic, the U.S. was opposed to the G.O.C. intervening more than was absolutely necessary.⁴

Kirby's attitude towards the Renville Agreement also differed from that of the U.S. Whereas the U.S. supported the Agreement as a basis for a settlement, Kirby impressed on the Security Council that the truce and the accepted political principles were only "provisional measures".⁵

¹ X
² SCOR, Third Year, No. 20, 247th Meeting (17 February 1948), p. 146.
³ Ibid., p. 147. See below, Appendix III, Document 27.
⁴ Taylor, op. cit., p. 394.
⁵ See below, Appendix III, Document 27.
Kirby declared that the G.O.C., and he in particular, had persuaded the Republic to accept a temporary "disadvantage and loss, which, if allowed to become permanent, would cause it irreparable damage, and perhaps make its continued existence as an entity and as a party to the dispute impossible".\(^1\) However expedient the Republic Truce Agreement had been in the short-term, Kirby, in particular, now obviously felt obligated to reverse its effect.

In the Security Council on the same day, Mr W.D. Forsyth (Australia) was unequivocal about the integrity of the Republic. He described it as a "symbol of the aspirations of vast number of peoples in the Indies" and suggested the "rights and interests" of the Republic were amongst the "most important" involved.\(^2\) Forsyth argued that the formation of new states within the area of de facto Republican authority was inconsistent with the Renville principles. He urged a restoration of internal and external trade. He also argued that the Republic should be permitted to retain its de facto foreign representatives for the present, namely that Dutch interim sovereignty be modified. As well, he asked that the position of the G.O.C. be strengthened. In a Council session on 21 February Australia again proposed, unsuccessfully, that the role of the G.O.C. be formally extended to deal with difficulties in Indonesia, such as Dutch exclusion of the Republic from an interim Indonesian federal government.\(^3\) The Australian government was clearly intent on protecting the position of the moderate Republic.

Not surprisingly, the Security Council supported the Renville Agreement, which had been concluded under its own auspices, and rejected Australia's proposals. On 28 February the Council adopted a Canadian resolution which merely noted "with satisfaction" the Renville Truce Agreement and

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\(^1\) Ibid.

\(^2\) See below, Appendix III, Document 28.

\(^3\) Ibid., No.33, 252nd Meeting (21 February 1948), pp.247-248.
However, the Dutch continued to insist on Indonesia's being regarded as a single economic unit.\(^1\)

Although the Security Council had not extended the power of the G.O.C.,\(^2\) the Department of External Affairs in Canberra believed that the G.O.C. had a sufficient mandate to pursue an active role in negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic. At the end of February Kirby had returned to Australia to assume his judicial duties and Critchley, his deputy, became Australia's representative on the G.O.C. In mid-March the Department of External Affairs told Critchley it could see no advantage to the Republic's rushing to join the interim government created by the Dutch. Instead it suggested the G.O.C. strive for an early agreement incorporating all the Renville principles. The Department recommended that the Dutch be restrained from forming new states until G.O.C.-supervised plebiscites were held. It also considered it urgent to conclude a firm arrangement for a resumption of trade between Australia, the N.E.I. Dutch and the Republic. Finally, it advised Critchley that it was far from pessimistic about the Republic's being beyond help.\(^3\)

This swift volte-face with regard to the Renville Agreement and the Department's urgent concern for a final settlement between the Dutch and the Republic possibly reflected its uneasiness about the internal stability of the Republic. It perhaps sought to forestall Republican extremists rejecting the idea of negotiating a compromise settlement with the Dutch. At the same time, the Australian government's repeated concern to restore trade with Indonesia presumably reflected its belief that trade would assist the Republican government to withstand both internal and external pressure.

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1 Archief DIRWO, PA. De Ranitz to H.F. Eschauzier, First Secretary, DIRWO, Batavia. Canberra, 3 March 1948.
2 See Supra, pp.6-7.
3 X
At this stage Evatt appeared more concerned about the internal complexion of the Republic than its viability within Indonesia. In an article in the *New York Times* of 4 April he argued strongly for continuing Dutch political guidance and economic assistance to the dependent peoples of Indonesia. Indicating a degree of apprehension about the political complexion of both the Indonesian and Indochinese politics, he proclaimed the value of European colonial powers "instilling the conception of [the] individual rights", pointed out that independence and democracy were "not always the same thing" and observed that "a nationalist movement sometimes contains fascist totalitarian elements".\(^1\)

The case which Evatt here made for the continuation of Western political influence in the N.E.I. clearly conflicted with his earlier advocacy of self-government for non-self-governing peoples.\(^2\) Evatt's ambivalent attitude affirmed that, at least for his part, support for the Republic was qualified.

The Australian government continued to obstruct the Dutch from obtaining a unilateral advantage over the Republic. This was clear when, in April, Teppema again raised the question of the shipping boycott. In a letter to Chifley on 1 April, Teppema intimated that Kirby, who had resumed his position as Chairman of the Stevedoring Commission, shared his view that the time was right for the lifting of the ban.\(^3\) Chifley replied on 5 April that, as a result of discussions with Kirby, he, for his part, was persuaded present circumstances did not favour the recommencement of unilateral trade with Indonesia. Instead he reiterated the government's proposal\(^4\) for another Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) See below, Appendix III, Document 29.

\(^2\) This and other ambiguities in Evatt's colonial policies are explored more fully by W.J. Hudson, *Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations* (Sydney, 1970).

\(^3\) *Archief B.Z. B.42/2, op.cit.*, P.E. Teppema to J.B. Chifley. Canberra, 1 April 1948. H.2/1661.

\(^4\) See Supra, this chapter, p.198.

There appeared, however, to be some inconsistency between Chifley and Kirby. After Teppema conferred again with Kirby, on 7 April, he reported to The Hague Kirby's having told him that the current basis for the unions' non-cooperation was their objection to the Dutch creating 'puppet states' (i.e. unilaterally-created federal states) in Indonesia. Kirby apparently also told Teppema that he and Evatt and Burton shared the view that the Dutch had won both the question of sovereignty (presumably, interim) and the federal question while the Republic had been reduced to a small state, somewhat akin to Tasmania in relation to the Commonwealth of Australia. Kirby suggested a gradual lifting of the shipping ban might be possible if the Dutch were to revise their policy of forming new states in Indonesia. By its very nature, Kirby's proposal seemed more likely to have come from within the government than from the boycotting unions, which were primarily concerned about the Dutch blockade against the Republic. Kirby also suggested that an Australian (at Teppema's prompting, he nominated Burton) go to Batavia for discussions. Teppema firmly discouraged the idea of a mission led by Burton. The former proposal for a kind of quid pro quo was naturally unacceptable to the Dutch. The question as a whole was left in abeyance when van Boetzelaer in The Hague again curtailed Teppema's initiatives.

In a Statement on International Affairs on 8 April, Evatt made only passing reference to Indonesia. He obviously sought to please his domestic political audience, but chose not to define the outstanding issues between the Netherlands and the Republic, or Australia's official attitudes to them.

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1 See pp.108-109 below.

2 Information above in this paragraph is from Archief B.Z. 912.1 Deel VIII. Note regarding discussion with Mr Justice Kirby on 7 April 1948. Teppema, Canberra, 10 April 1948.

The fighting in Indonesia has ceased and the final settlement there is being negotiated. I claim that the saving of many lives in Indonesia was due to the initiative taken in the Security Council by Australia which led to the final settlement after fighting had commenced.\(^1\)

On the same occasion, Evatt outlined seven principles by which Australian foreign policy had been and would continue to be conducted.\(^2\) The fifth principle, Evatt stated, was:

> To strengthen Pacific security by appropriate regional arrangements in co-operation with the United States of America and other Pacific nations.\(^3\)

With reference to this principle, Burton again broached with de Ranitz on 13 April the question of a regional commission in South-East Asia.\(^4\)

He is reported to have claimed the Indonesian situation was the only obstacle to the commission being formed immediately, given that it must be based on the greatest possible political and economic cooperation. If Burton was accurately reported, it would seem he had overstated his case. Nationalist and communist movements were creating widespread colonial dislocation in South East Asia at that time.

Burton is also understood to have related the Indonesian situation to wider issues of security. In April 1948 confrontation and tension between the Soviet Union and the West were mounting in Europe, primarily in Berlin. Burton suggested to de Ranitz that, if a conflict broke out in Europe, the presence of Dutch troops in Indonesia would be sufficient to produce repercussions in Asia. As in Indonesia, he argued, the peoples of India, Burma, China and the Malay states would immediately seize the opportunity to expel the white metropolitan powers.

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Burton indicated that the Australian government was concerned about the possibility of conflict in Asia. Only if European influence in Asia was removed or was minimal, he argued, could the threat of conflict be avoided or temporarily averted. On this point he recommended Holland adopt a long-term policy towards Indonesia rather than continue its current short-term attempt to restore colonial power, which, he said, would make it a prime target in the current situation. If Holland did as he commended, Burton believed it would win Indonesian goodwill and cooperation. Burton urged de Ranitz to convey to The Hague and Batavia Australia's desire to promote cooperation in the South-East Asia area. If Australia and Holland could achieve a solid basis for regional cooperation, Burton told de Ranitz, then minor problems, such as the boycott, would immediately disappear. Essentially Burton seemed to be saying that the repressive basis on which the Dutch were currently maintaining their position in Indonesia threatened their continued presence there on a basis of friendly cooperation, which Australia favoured.

The boycott situation could not be expected to improve, Burton said, unless the Netherlands Indies government changed its attitude to the Indonesian Republic. He intimated that the Republic considered it unnecessary for him to visit Djocjakarta.1 Alternatively, he suggested the Netherlands send someone to Australia for discussions. Burton believed the Netherlands government was basing its Indonesia policy solely on reports from 'colonial die-hards' at Batavia and this displeased him. Finally, Burton suggested to de Ranitz that the outcome in Indonesia would be more vital to Australia than it would be to Holland. Australia's very existence was at stake, he argued, whereas Holland had only to lose a colonial empire which ultimately it would lose anyway.2

1 See Supra, this chapter, p.204.
2 All of the above from Archief B.Z. 912.1. C.2/1849/222, op.cit.
In forwarding de Ranitz's report to The Hague, Teppema entirely disparaged what Burton had said. He suggested Burton usually expressed his own, as distinct from the government's, views. While it seems Burton often did take considerable individual initiative, the views he expressed on this occasion appeared to reflect the genuine ambivalence in the government's attitude to the Dutch position in Indonesia.

In April 1948 the Department of External Affairs in Canberra made an appreciation of Australian policy towards Indonesia. The Departmental paper was pessimistic as to whether the federation proposed by the Dutch would guarantee order and stability throughout the archipelago. It posed the question whether, from a hard-headed point of view, Australia's security might not be better served by the Dutch giving way to local nationalist movements as they coalesced, while remaining in full control in outlying and more backward areas indefinitely. Yet the paper recognised Australia was bound to assist the Dutch commitment to establish a sovereign federation. It surmised that the Republic would dominate the federation, and therefore considered Australia justified in maintaining a sympathetic and helpful attitude towards the Republic. Such a policy, the Paper said, need not imply antagonising the Dutch, although Australia had a legitimate interest in seeing that the Dutch did not prolong unrest and disorganisation in the area. Although ambivalent towards the Dutch in Indonesia, the Departmental paper implied a reluctant recognition of the Republic which was obviously in conflict with the government's more generous attitude. Similarly, Departmental resistance towards Indonesian internal autonomy appeared to be less generous than the government's attitude.

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2 X. All information about this appreciation,
The Departmental paper suggested a number of steps by which Australia could use its influence directly with the parties and through the G.O.C. to persuade both the Dutch and the Republicans to concentrate on the larger issues in dispute between them. Firstly it proposed that the Security Council increase the powers of the G.O.C. to promote a settlement. Secondly, it recommended resolving the immediate, as distinct from the substantial, issues between the Dutch and the Republicans. Thirdly, it favoured the lifting of the Australian boycott on Dutch shipping as soon as an agreement was concluded. Finally, it recommended the holding of a plebiscite in Indonesia as soon as possible.

On the question of the boycott, Chifley, on 13 April, repeated the suggestion he made to Teppema on 5 April that Australia would welcome a joint announcement by Dutch representatives and 'interested Indonesian parties' along the lines of the Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement. Subsequently, however, three British oil companies approached both the Australian government and the W.W.F. requesting that the shipping boycott be modified to allow them to take cargoes to Dutch New Guinea and to bring back to Australia oil produced by the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company. The Minister for Shipping, Senator Ashley, conferred with the General Secretary of the W.W.F., Mr J. Healy, on 5 May. Healy agreed to lift the ban as it related to the specific request of the oil companies. Although this move would involve certain economic gain to the Dutch, Healy presumably felt he could defer to Australia's current need for oil, seeing that British, and not Dutch, shipping was involved. He reaffirmed, however, that the general ban would not be lifted until the Dutch

1 Chifley avoided nominating the Indonesian interim federal government or the Indonesian Republic.

2 Archief ARTA. 1070. Buitenlandse Betrekkingen van de Republiek. Telegram to Eschauzier, DIRVO, Batavia (40) and to van Boetzelaer, The Hague (19) from Teppema, Canberra, 19 April 1948.

removed their blockade on Indonesian ports. At this juncture Healy is reported to have conferred with Chifley about the need to take action to have the Dutch blockade on Indonesian ports abolished.

On advice from van Boetzelaer at The Hague, Teppema delivered an *Aide-Memoire* to Chifley on 11 May stating that Chifley's proposal for a joint Dutch-Republican statement was out of the question. The *Aide-Memoire* pointed out that, until the U.S.I. were formed, the Netherlands Indies government, in consultation with the provisional Indonesian federal government, was the only authority which could speak for Indonesia. This exchange made clear that, whereas the Netherlands regarded the Renville Agreement as having nullified the *de facto* status of the Republic, Australia did not accept this.

When Teppema handed the *Aide-Memoire* to Chifley on 11 May, Chifley retracted his suggestion of a joint Dutch-Indonesian statement, claiming he had had advice from Officer in The Hague that such a statement would be 'impolitic' for the present.

Whether or not this was the case, it seemed Chifley's recent consultation with Healy may have provided a more immediate incentive to his change of tactics. Chifley told Teppema that the unions favoured lifting the ban and he was optimistic that they would do so at a forthcoming A.C.T.U. Congress. At this stage Chifley obtained from Teppema full details about the operation of the Dutch naval blockade of Indonesian ports and passed these on to Healy. It appears, however, that Chifley and the unions were both

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1 *Ibid.*, Notes of Discussion at Conference between Senator Ashley (Minister for Shipping), Mr G.G. Sutcliffe (Secretary, Department of Shipping) and Mr J. Healy (General Secretary, WWF), 5 May 1948.
3 *Archief B.Z. 912.1 Deel VIII. Telegram for Canberra (16) and for DIRVO, Batavia (218) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 1 May 1948; Ibid., Deel IX. Aide-Memoire, Canberra, 11 May 1948.
4 Van Mook papers, Doos 18, Folder 3. Telegram to van Boetzelaer, The Hague (23) and to Elink Schuurman, Batavia (52) from Teppema, Canberra, 11 May 1948.
confused about the relationship of the Indonesian Republican government and the provisional federal government (which excluded the Republic). In any case Chifley told Teppema on 21 May that the rationale for the ban in Australia had long since ceased to exist.

While this may have been the case, the Australian government was at this time planning to extend economic assistance to the countries of South East Asia, including Indonesia. Evatt announced on 16 May that Mr W. Macmahon Ball was about to visit the countries of South East Asia to make arrangements for educational assistance to them, and in some instances for the sending of relief supplies. Evatt claimed Macmahon Ball's mission was a positive step to "strengthen the ties of friendship between Australia and the peoples of South East Asia".

On arrival in Batavia Macmahon Ball handed van Mook a letter from Evatt which stated that the purpose of the goodwill mission was to assist post-war reconstruction in the Netherlands East Indies. However, in regard to relief supplies, the Department of External Affairs indicated to the Australian Legation at The Hague that it was anxious for supplies to reach

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1 A report to a meeting of the ACTU Emergency Committee on 18 April 1948 stated: "Mr Clarey [President, ACTU] had discussed with Mr Healy, Secretary of the Waterside Workers' Federation, and the Prime Minister [Chifley], the matter of the continued ban on shipping to Indonesia. There had been no fighting in Indonesia in the past two months, and the great bulk of the country was now under the control of the Indonesian Government itself. If the ban were lifted it would assist the present shortages of sisal hemp, which would be most helpful to the building industry, and in addition would relieve the petrol situation.

Mr Healy indicated that his organisation would discuss the matter and it was expected that Mr Healy, Senator Ashley [the Minister for Shipping], and Judge Kirby of the Stevedoring Commission, would shortly explore the possibilities of lifting the ban." Minutes of ACTU Emergency Committee, 18 April 1948. ACTU Emergency Committee 1936-1948 (Queensland Trades and Labor Council).


3 Formerly Australian Political Representative at Batavia, November 1945. See Supra, Chapter 3, p.75.


the Republic. Post-Renville negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic were, in the Department's view, dragging on with little prospect of a settlement. In such circumstances, the Department was concerned that the economic position of the Republic was deteriorating.¹

During May Critchley had meanwhile been trying to vitalise the G.O.C. as a third party in negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic. His efforts were resisted by the Dutch, who for some time had been endeavouring to by-pass the G.O.C. and deal directly with the Republic.²

General elections were due to take place in Holland in July. In order to create the U.S.I. the Netherlands needed to make certain constitutional changes. This contributed to the government's Indonesia policy being a prominent election issue. By May, however, it was apparent that the internal political balance of power in Holland would shift to the right - in favour of those who advocated a tougher policy in negotiations with the Republic.³

It was within this context that the Department of External Affairs in Canberra advised Critchley on 20 May that it was necessary to make the Dutch and the Republicans concentrate on the objective of establishing the U.S.I. as soon as possible⁴ - presumably before the Dutch general elections. However, it was apparent that the Dutch delegation would be reluctant to take new initiatives in negotiations before the elections. On 21 May negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic came to a standstill.

It was not surprising that the Australian government should regard the hiatus in negotiations as most detrimental to the Republic's chances for political and economic survival. The Department of External Affairs advised Britain on 25 May that Australia's vital interest in the future prosperity

¹ X
² Taylor, op.cit., p.125.
³ Ibid., p.127, footnote.
⁴ X
and orderly progress of Indonesia meant that it could not continue indefinitely to tolerate Dutch tactics which were calculated to reduce the Republic to a 'rump state'. It informed Britain that the Macmahon Ball mission would be visiting Djocjakarta to discuss plans for making relief supplies available to Republican areas.¹

At this stage Chifley was also attempting to lift the shipping boycott in Australia and, at the same time, open trade with the Republic. On 24 May Burton told Teppema that he and Chifley had discussed Chifley's recent meeting with Teppema.² Burton told Teppema the Prime Minister had been mistaken in thinking it would be possible to trade with the whole of Indonesia once the shipping ban was lifted. He impressed on Teppema that current steps to lift the ban would only succeed if Republican territory benefited in some way. Burton gave no indication that he was speaking on authority from Chifley. Presumably he was speaking on his own initiative. Teppema made it clear that the Dutch regarded the Netherlands Indies as one customs territory with one foreign exchange and that under no circumstances would they permit independent trade and foreign exchange between the Republic and foreign countries.

Burton in turn argued that, as long as the Republic was excluded from the federation, Australia recognised its de facto status and could, in his view, trade directly with it. On the question of relief supplies arranged by the Macmahon Ball mission, Teppema indicated that, provided an agreement was made beforehand, the Republic would be guaranteed a percentage of the supplies. However, in reply to Teppema's hinting that the Netherlands Indies government would probably refuse supplies unless the shipping ban in Australia was removed, Burton suggested Australia would not tolerate the Dutch preventing its assisting the Indonesians, and especially the Republic. If

¹ X
Federal transport and waterside unions have decided to lift the ban on Dutch shipping imposed in September 1945, while Sydney seamen have imposed a ban on Greek ships.

"Yeah, it looks beaut, and wot's more it doesn't affect the steering."

*Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney)

28 May 1948
what Teppema said eventuated, Burton predicted the Australian unions would renew their ban.\(^1\) This whole exchange appeared as an attempt at bluff on Burton's part.

In The Hague Officer handed two formal notes to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 May. In the first note the Australian government is understood to have complained about the lack of progress in G.O.C. negotiations in Indonesia due to the Dutch not recognising the status of the Republic in the forthcoming U.S.I. In the second note Australia protested about Dutch obstructions to Australia's trading with, and sending relief supplies to, the Indonesian peoples.\(^2\)

The following day an A.C.T.U. Conference of Federal Transport and Waterside Unions in Melbourne - on Healy's recommendation - lifted the ban on Dutch shipping in Australia, with the provisions that the Australian government continue to prohibit the export of weapons and that Australian and British vessels be accorded the same rights of freedom of trade in Indonesian ports as would be accorded Dutch vessels in Australian ports.\(^3\) It was clear from these provisions that this was a calculated attempt to challenge the Dutch blockade of the Republic. A subsequent circular to W.W.F. branches explained that the conference had been convened to consider a request by the federal government for "some easement of the ban" to allow "a resumption of trade".\(^4\)

Burton was apparently not prepared to defer to Chifley's course of action. Immediately the A.C.T.U. conference decision was known, he telephoned de Ranitz at the Netherlands Legation in Canberra and told him that the unions

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\(^2\) Archief B.Z. 912.1. Deel IX. Memorandum to the Chief, Political Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 25 May 1948.

\(^3\) WWF Indonesia File, op.cit., Minutes of Conference of Unions held at Melbourne Trades Hall, Wednesday, 26 May 1948. Associated with the Loading, Unloading and repair of Dutch ships.

\(^4\) Ibid., Circular to all WWF branches, 4 June 1948.
were under the impression that trade with the Republic would be possible. Burton suggested that, if the Republic could ship urgently-needed imports to Australia, then the unions would probably be satisfied for the time being.\(^1\) However, the Department of External Affairs cabled Eaton at Batavia on 1 June, saying it hoped the union decision would result in the Dutch taking a more liberal and generous attitude towards the needs of the Republic.\(^2\)

Meanwhile, the representative of the Indonesian Republic in Australia, Dr Oesman,\(^3\) issued a press statement saying the lifting of the ban would only benefit the Dutch so long as they maintained their blockade of the Republic.\(^4\) Chifley is reported to have expressed surprise that Oesman was still in Australia when Teppema, on 1 June, complained to him about Oesman's statement.

Only after the union decision had been taken, Chifley told Teppema, did he learn that the lifting of the boycott would be of no avail to the 'Indonesians' — by which he apparently meant the Republicans. He impressed on Teppema the need for some of the Australian relief supplies to reach them. Chifley is reported to have told Teppema he was not apprised of the present stage of negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic but he did emphasise his concern for the Republic benefiting from a resumption of trade.\(^5\) Notwithstanding Chifley's eventual endorsement of Burton's argument, this episode was surely a clear example of intra-governmental incoordination.

The Macmahon Ball mission arrived at Batavia on 29 May and proceeded to Djocjakarta on 1 June. This was the first such official foreign mission to visit the Republic. Subsequently Australia came to an agreement with Dutch authorities that any assistance to the Republic would be arranged through the

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2 X
3 See Supra, Chapter 6, p.155.
Netherlands Indies government, which would act as an intermediary in distributing supplies equitably throughout Indonesia.¹

While the Macmahon Ball mission was visiting the Republic, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was meeting at Ootacamund, India. Australia instructed its delegate, Dr H.C. Coombs, to propose that the Republic be admitted to ECAFE as an associate member.² Pending a settlement between the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia, the ECAFE meeting was not prepared to do this and it did not accept Australia's counter-argument that, by excluding the Republic, which Australia described as the most important part of Indonesia, it would prejudice negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic.³ The admission of the Republic to ECAFE would clearly have afforded a means of direct economic assistance to the Republic.

In Batavia Critchley was concerned about the Republic's diminishing prospects of obtaining an equitable settlement from the Dutch. He was also concerned that the G.O.C. was becoming defunct.⁴ As distinct from any vested interest in the G.O.C., Critchley's concern here seemed to reflect his, and Australia's, distrust of the Dutch. A personal invitation from van Mook to Hatta in early June suggesting they hold direct conversations accentuated the by-passing of the G.O.C. Critchley was also convinced that the Republic needed to obtain a final settlement urgently. The U.S. representative on the G.O.C., Mr Coert Dubois,⁵ shared Critchley's concern. However, whereas Critchley had from Canberra a 'mandate' to press for an early settlement,⁶

² X
³ Var. Mook papers, Doos 19, Folder 3. Telegram from van Gelissen [Netherlands delegate to ECAFE], Ootacamund to Elink Schuurman, DIRVO, Batavia (7); to van Boetzelaer, The Hague (4); to van Kleffens (Unnumbered). 8 June 1948.
⁴ X
⁵ In February 1948 Dubois, a US Foreign Service Officer, had replaced Graham as the US representative on the GOC.
⁶ See Supra, this chapter, p.211.
Dubois did not have sympathetic backing from Washington. On 28 May the State Department had cabled Batavia expressing doubts whether the Republic sincerely wanted to effect the Renville principles since the Renville Agreement had immobilised the Republican army. It linked this view with Dutch reports of the increasing strength of the P.K.I. within the Republic. For his part, the Belgian representative, Mr R. Herremans, insisted it would be improper for the G.O.C. to take any action until the conversations between van Mook and Hatta concluded. Critchley and Dubois were not persuaded of this and decided to take action as individual members of the G.O.C.

On 10 June they submitted to the Dutch and Republican delegations an informal and confidential working paper, which Critchley primarily had drafted. The paper, subsequently referred to as the Critchley-Dubois Proposals, outlined a basis for a political settlement. Its authors said they would submit their Working Paper to the Security Council if the parties failed to accept it, or any alternate basis for agreement. In justifying their 'ultimatum' to the parties, Critchley and Dubois considered there was an urgent need to protect the Republic from being coerced by the Dutch into relinquishing its status and participating in a Dutch-dominated interim Indonesian federal government. Furthermore, Critchley and Dubois indicated their concern to ensure that the moderate Hatta government survived the internal challenge it was encountering from the P.K.I. which, they believed, was a direct result of the Dutch and Republic's inability to reach a political settlement.  

The Critchley-Dubois Proposals comprised a set of principles, in accordance with the Renville political principles, by which the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia could agree to form a sovereign U.S.I., which

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1 Z
2 Herremans had replaced van Zeeland as the Belgian representative on the GOC.
would enter into equal partnership with the Netherlands Kingdom. Critchley and Dubois accorded priority to the formation of a representative Provisional Federal government and they suggested the bases on which this could be done. They proposed elections be held under G.O.C. surveillance and that representation be in proportion to population. (The Republican area contained two-fifths of the Indonesian population.) The representatives elected would in turn elect delegates to a Constituent Assembly which would firstly delineate the states of the future U.S.I. and then act as a constitutional convention. By giving delegations the option of voting to combine their states into a single Republic of Indonesia, Critchley and Dubois thought, the concepts of an Indonesian Republic and of the U.S.I. could be emerged. In any case, Critchley and Dubois believed that, once a constitutional convention existed which was qualified to speak for all the Indonesian peoples, then it would be possible to achieve the unification of Indonesia in a broad and stable U.S.I.¹

With their emphasis on Indonesian self-determination, the Critchley-Dubois Proposals were clearly far removed from the paternalistic solution that the Department of External Affairs had in April 1948 regarded as appropriate.² Similarly, they reflected a greater acceptance of Indonesian self-expression than Evatt had in April seemed prepared to accept.³

The Proposals offered a solution for the main immediate obstacle in the negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic - the question of governmental authority prior to the formation of the U.S.I.⁴ Instead of interim Netherlands de jure sovereignty, Critchley and Dubois proposed the formation of an interim body, representative of the Indonesian peoples, both Republican and non-Republican. From this initial act of self determination,

¹ Ibid., Working Paper on an Outline of a Political Settlement.
² See Supra, this chapter, p.207.
³ Ibid., p.203.
they proposed a fully self-determined U.S.I. could devolve.

On 16 June the Netherlands government issued a statement rejecting the Critchley-Dubojs Proposals as procedurally inadmissible. It objected to their having come from two individual members of the G.O.C., and without being requested by the parties to the dispute. The statement also drew attention to van Mook's having requested the G.O.C. to refrain from action pending his conversations with Hatta. For his part, van Mook regarded the Working Paper as a 'stab in the back'. He advised Critchley and Dubois that he did not share their views that the Paper might be of use in his conversations with Hatta.

On 17 June the Security Council discussed the Critchley-Dubojs Working Paper in connection with the impasse in negotiations at Batavia. However, the U.S. State Department instructed its delegation that the Working Paper was not to be submitted to the Council. There was heavy Dutch criticism of Dubois but he himself recommended that the State Department accept the Working Paper as an index of its support for Indonesian self-government. If the Working Paper were not supported, Dubois argued, U.S. prestige in South East Asia would decline, the U.N. position would be further damaged, and his own usefulness (presumably as a member of the G.O.C.) would be defunct.

The Critchley-Dubojs Proposals were indicative of the impasse the G.O.C. had reached as a mediatory party in negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic. The drawing up and presentation of the Proposals reflected their sponsors' apprehension about the internal politics of the Republic, specifically about the rise of the P.K.I. U.S. and Australian sensitivity

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1 Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.135: "The GOC was in a precarious position, caught as it was in a vicious circle. Forced by the rules of procedure to remain passive while one party strengthened its policy of attrition against the other, the Committee found itself unable to discharge its continuing responsibilities to both parties as well as to the Security Council. There came a point where these responsibilities required the GOC to initiate remedial action only to be frustrated in turn by the same rules".
to the handling of the Indonesian question in the Security Council was yet another consideration. The U.S.S.R.'s attempt to establish consular relations with the Indonesian Republic in late May presumably heightened this sensitivity. News of an initial agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic became known in mid-June.¹

This perhaps helps explain why the Department of External Affairs in Canberra did not give immediate support to Critchley. Only on 25 June did it instruct its delegation at the Security Council to ensure that there was a full discussion of the Critchley-Dubois Working Paper in the Council and that the Council adopted the Paper as a basis for a political agreement.²

On 1 July a Chinese motion calling for the Council to study the Critchley-Dubois Proposals failed by one vote.³ The Council also rejected a proposal put forward by the Indonesian Republic and supported by Australia that the Council encourage the G.O.C. to take any action which the majority in the G.O.C. considered likely to produce a settlement.⁴

Independently, however, the U.S. is understood to have redrafted the Critchley-Dubois Working Paper in early July with a view to using it in renewed G.O.C. negotiations. At the same time the U.S. apparently advised the Netherlands that no proposal for an agreement would succeed unless it originated in the G.O.C.; that the G.O.C. could not be a mere advocate of Dutch ideas; and that the U.S. intended to give the Netherlands advice as it saw fit, even though this might involve the G.O.C. assuming added responsibility.⁵ For its part, the Netherlands assured the U.S. it would resume

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³ SCOR, Third Year, No.91, 328th Meeting (1 July 1948), p.34. The six votes in favour were cast by Canada, China, Colombia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR. Argentina, Belgium, France, United Kingdom and the US all abstained from voting.
⁴ Ibid., p.25.
⁵ Z
negotiations with the Republic as soon as the new U.S. member of the G.O.C., Mr Merle Cochran, arrived at Batavia.\(^1\) By this time, the Netherlands pointed out, it would have been able to form a new government and to enact constitutional changes which would allow the formation of the U.S.I.\(^2\) The general elections in Holland on 7 July had meanwhile produced the expected swing to the right.

The U.S. government was apparently pleased with the attitude of the Dutch.\(^3\) When the Security Council resumed debate on the Indonesian Question on 27 July, the U.S. confidentially urged the Republic to support further G.O.C. negotiations. However, the Republic had interpreted prior U.S. reluctance to use the Security Council as U.S. support for the Dutch. It therefore insisted that the U.S. itself, rather than the G.O.C., take the initiative.\(^4\) As the third member of the G.O.C., the U.S. claimed it was anxious to maintain a neutral position in relation to the parties.\(^5\) Within the Council, the U.S. did not call for renewed G.O.C. negotiations, possibly because of its misunderstanding with the Republic. On 29 July the Council adopted a Chinese resolution merely calling on the parties to strictly observe the military and economic articles of the Renville Truce Agreement and to implement the Renville political principles "early and fully".\(^6\)

As distinct from Critchley's activities at this time, the Australian government maintained a relatively low posture on the Indonesian question. It was not improbable that the government was in conflict about the policy it should adopt towards communism within the Republic. Critchley was also concerned about growing support for the P.K.I. within the Republic. He

\(^1\) Dubois is reported to have returned to the US because of ill-health. (Taylor, *op.cit.*, p.131, footnote.)
\(^2\) Z
\(^3\) Z
\(^4\) Z
\(^5\) Z
\(^6\) SCOR, Third Year, 342nd Meeting (29 July 1948), p.38.
remained convinced that, so long as there was no final settlement between the Dutch and the Republic, the Hatta government would be subject to mounting internal opposition.\textsuperscript{1} The internal fragility of the Republic was also reason for apprehension that the Dutch might renew military action against it.

Both before and after the Critchley-Duboys Proposals, the Netherlands government had intermittently considered the desirability of, at least, the Australian member of the G.O.C. being changed. At one stage it proposed to Australia that Kirby be recalled to the G.O.C. in place of Critchley, but had dropped this idea at the end of June. The Netherlands Prime Minister (Beel), Minister for Foreign Affairs (van Boetzelaer) and Minister for Overseas Territories (Jonkman) all believed any Australian delegate would be a 'puppet' of Evatt's.\textsuperscript{2} The basis of this assumption was obviously superficial.

In late July, at the request of the Netherlands, the U.S. asked Australia to reappoint Kirby to the G.O.C. in place of Critchley.\textsuperscript{3} The Netherlands thereby hoped to have closer contact with Chifley. It believed this was being obstructed by a small group led by Burton, and it was intensely suspicious of Burton because of his close contact with Oesman, the Republican representative in Australia.\textsuperscript{4} The Australian government did not accept the Netherlands proposal. However it subsequently agreed to make Kirby available for a short time for vital work, if the occasion arose.\textsuperscript{5}

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\textsuperscript{2} Van Mook papers, Doos 19, Folder 3. Telegram to Elink Schuurman, Batavia from van Boetzelaer, The Hague, 29 June 1948.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4} Archief B.Z. 912.1. Deel IX. Telegram to Canberra from Political Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 24 July 1948. 34.

\textsuperscript{5} Van Mook papers, Doos 21, Folder 3. Telegram to Elink Schuurman, Batavia (450); to Teppema, Canberra (393); to van Kleffens (562) from Stikker, The Hague, 18 August 1948.
Late in July 1948 Australia responded to a communist emergency in Malaya by lifting its general export embargo on small arms and ammunition and indicating its preparedness to extend this to heavier weapons and military equipment, if so requested.¹ In Canberra on 1 August Teppema sought the views of the Department of External Affairs towards the Malayan emergency. He pointed out there were links between the Malayan Communist Party and the P.K.I. and suggested fighting might spread to Indonesia.²

In reply, Burton told Teppema that, by their failure to reach an accord with moderate Indonesian groups, the Dutch themselves were to blame for any difficulties they were encountering with extremist elements in Indonesia. Unless an agreement were reached within a month or so, Burton asserted, there would be serious confrontation between moderates and extremists within the Republic, and political action would be of no avail.³ Through Teppema, the Netherlands government was presumably sounding out Australia's likely reaction to its renewing military action against the Republic. The following day it made a similar approach to the U.S. government.⁴

At the same time the Dutch position in non-Republic areas of Indonesia was under threat. Mounting dissatisfaction with van Mook's administration through the provisional Indonesian federal government culminated in non-Republic Indonesian leaders convening a Federal Consultative Assembly (F.C.A.) at Bandung on 8 July. This meeting resolved to demand that the Netherlands accept the immediate formation of an all-Indonesian (but not including the Republic) interim federal government. On 16 August the Netherlands government at The Hague accepted the F.C.A. plan. This involved

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⁴ *Z*
replacing the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies by a High Representative of the Netherlands Crown.\textsuperscript{1} For three years van Mook had been under constant criticism by the metropolitan Dutch for what was considered excessive accommodation of the Republic in his attitude towards the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. He had an even greater lack of rapport with the new Netherlands government. Van Mook was therefore asked to resign by 15 November 1948.\textsuperscript{2}

At the same time, on instructions from the new Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr Dirk U. Stikker, Teppema made repeated representations to the Australian government in Canberra to send Oesman back to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{3} However, it was soon clear that the Department of External Affairs had reservations about Oesman's position in Australia. On 17 August 1948 - the third anniversary of the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic - Oesman held a much-publicised reception in Canberra and it was well attended by officers of the Department, including Burton.\textsuperscript{4}

This was at a time when the Republic was under serious internal pressure. The P.K.I. had created a critical division within the Republic which the Hatta government was barely managing to stay. On 11 August, veteran P.K.I. leader, Musso, returned to the Republic after several years in Moscow. Opposition groups from the F.D.R.\textsuperscript{5} joined a new, enlarged "P.K.I.-Musso", which was demanding that the Hatta government surrender key ministerial posts to it.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1} Taylor, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.138-139.


\textsuperscript{3} e.g. \textit{Archief ARTA}. 876. Subcommittee 2: Buitenlands betrekkingen Republiek 1948 begin 1949. Telegram to Stikker (4) and to Elink Schuurman (74) from Teppema, Canberra, 12 August 1948. \textit{Ibid.}, Telegram to Teppema (37) and to Elink Schuurman (438) from Stikker, The Hague, 13 August 1948.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Van Mook papers}, Doos 21 Folder 3. Telegram to Stikker (41) and Elink Schuurman (75) from Teppema, Canberra, 16 August 1948. [Teppema's telegram details the questioning of protocol which had ensued within diplomatic circles after Oesman issued invitations on 9 August.]

\textsuperscript{5} See Supra, this chapter, p.201.

\textsuperscript{6} McVey, \textit{op.cit.}, p.58ff.
By the end of August Critchley was agitating for the Indonesian Question to be referred back to the Security Council. Meanwhile Evatt indicated he intended visiting Holland in mid-September. Notwithstanding the critical situation in Indonesia, there was no doubt in Stikker's mind that Evatt wanted primarily to win support for his candidature for the Presidency of the U.N. General Assembly later that month. At the same time Stikker sought to forestall any new Australian intervention. He instructed Teppema to make it clear that, if Australia took any new initiative in the Security Council in relation to the Indonesian question, the Netherlands would oppose Evatt's candidature and use its influence to persuade other members of the General Assembly to do likewise.

For whatever reason, Evatt was willing at this stage to soft-pedal Australia's support for the Republic. Whereas Australia had advocated the admission of the Republic to ECAFE in June, in late August Evatt acceded to a Netherlands' request to oppose any attempt to have the Republic admitted at a meeting of ECAFE in September.

On the G.O.C. at Batavia and in Canberra the mood of Australia's representatives was otherwise. Convinced that the P.K.I. could only be checked if the Dutch and the Republic achieved a speedy and satisfactory settlement Critchley pressed the G.O.C. throughout the first week in September to report the deterioration of negotiations to the Security Council. In an

1 Archief DIRVO, PA 11. Bezoek Dr Evatt aan Nederland. Telegram to Teppema (43) and to Elink Schuurman (475) from Stikker, The Hague, 28 August 1948.
2 Van Mook papers, Doos 21, Folder 3. Telegram to Elink Schuurman (450); to Teppema (393) and to van Kleffens (562) from Stikker, The Hague, 18 August 1948.
4 See Supra, this chapter, p. 216.
5 Archief DIRVO, PA 11. Note for the Lieutenant Governor-General and for the Chief, DIRVO. Batavia, 1 September 1948. The Netherlands representative on the UN Economic and Social Council which met at Geneva in August 1948, Professor Gelissen, obtained this verbal assurance from Evatt. Gelissen suggested that Evatt may have been calculating on Australia's deriving greater prestige from having the Republic admitted to ECAFE at the following meeting which was to be held in Sydney in November 1948.
6 X
interview with de Ranitz in Canberra on 1 September, Burton and Mr L.R. McIntyre, Head of the Pacific Division in the Department of External Affairs, discussed this proposal and other contents of a letter recently received from Critchley. The G.O.C. could see no way out of the current deadlock in negotiations, according to Critchley. He was very critical of the Dutch, in particular, of new police measures announced on 25 August by which all Republican personnel were to be removed from Dutch-controlled territory.¹

De Ranitz suggested to Burton and McIntyre that the Australian government wanted to see the Dutch removed from their present position in Indonesia. Burton replied that the Australian government would not seek to weaken the Dutch position if the Dutch endeavoured to achieve a final and reasonable settlement with the Republic. At the same time Burton made it clear that Australia would deliberately oppose the Dutch so long as they exerted military pressure against the Indonesians. Burton said he considered military pressure included starving and blockading as well as killing. The Australian government would do its best, Burton said, to ensure the Republic a fair chance, and to make sure it was not forced into a position of having no alternative but to accept Dutch proposals.

Burton claimed Australia, together with the rest of the world, regarded the creation of federal states purely as a counter-move by the Dutch. Referring to the recent Federalist Conference at Bandung,² he argued that the Indonesians in Dutch-controlled areas had not been allowed free expression or self-determination. Burton did not accept de Ranitz’s objection that the Republic would dominate Indonesia if the idea of the U.S.I. were rejected. Because the 'other Indonesians' (by which he presumably meant the non-Republicans) had not been allowed free expression, Burton postulated, there was no evidence to indicate whether or not they wanted the U.S.I. Finally

² See Supra, this chapter, p.223.
Burton is reported as having claimed it was too late for action through the G.O.C. He maintained the Dutch should take responsibility for making new proposals to the Republic through a mediator of the calibre of Graaf Bernadotte. On whatever authority Burton spoke, his approach at this time clearly diverged from Evatt's.

Not surprisingly, when Teppema suggested subtly to Burton on 6 September that Australia assist the Dutch to quell communist unrest in Indonesia, Burton replied that little assistance would be forthcoming from the Australian government until the Dutch themselves made some attempt to retrieve the current situation, other than by force of arms. Given current Soviet criticisms that delays in the G.O.C. were favouring the imperialist powers, Burton indicated the Australian government would be reluctant to take any action which implied that it was letting the Indonesians down.

To Evatt, however, Burton admitted a more equivocal attitude. At this stage Burton regarded Australia's Indonesia policy as more risky than it had ever been. The ineffectiveness of the G.O.C. having been amply demonstrated, Burton intimated to Evatt that it might be appropriate for Australia to seek a rapprochement with the Dutch. On the basis of recent events in the Republic, Burton suggested, Australia could show it shared with the Dutch an interest in the continuation of Western influence in Indonesia and more generally in South East Asia. Burton thought Australia should then try to persuade the Dutch to accept an Australian offer of "good offices" to mediate with the moderates in the Republic with a view to concluding a reasonable settlement immediately.

1 Count Graaf Bernadotte (Netherlands) was negotiating at Jerusalem for Arab recognition of the State of Israel. He was assassinated there on 17 September 1948.
2 Archief DIRVO. L. Note by de Ranitz, Canberra, 1 September 1948., op.cit.
3 X
5 X
Before Evatt visited The Hague and was able to put any such proposals to the Netherlands government, Cochran, the U.S. representative on the G.O.C., with the approval of the U.S. State Department,\(^1\) presented to the Dutch and Republican delegations on 10 September an informal and confidential Draft Agreement for an Over-All Political Settlement. The so-called Cochran Plan was similar to the Critchley-Dubois Proposals in its emphasis on the structure and powers of the interim government as well as in the steps by which it proposed sovereignty be transferred to the U.S.I. It differed, however, by reinforcing the federal structure of the interim government. By suggesting the formation of a Federal Council in which the Republic would have comprised one-third of the total membership, it also conceded to Federalist fears of domination by the Republic.\(^2\)

Possibly unaware of the confidential Cochran proposals, Evatt arrived at The Hague on 14 September for a three-day visit. The following day he presumably kept his long-standing appointment with Stikker.\(^3\) It is clear, however, that if Evatt had hoped to bring Australia's influence to bear, his visit was ill-timed. The same day as Evatt's scheduled interview with him, Stikker left for Washington for discussions with the U.S. Secretary of State.\(^4\) Also on 15 September, the Netherlands government announced it had decided to outlaw and oppose communism in Indonesia "with all the legal means" at its disposal.\(^5\) From The Hague, Evatt proceeded to Paris to attend the Third Annual Session of the U.N. General Assembly, of which he was duly elected President on 21 September.

\(^{1}\) Z

\(^{2}\) Taylor, op. cit., p.142 ff.

\(^{3}\) Officer Papers, op. cit., Diary, Vol. 14, p.46. The Australian Minister at The Hague has only recorded that Evatt made a number of official calls.

\(^{4}\) Z

\(^{5}\) New York Times, 16 September 1948.
Summary and Conclusion

Following the signing of the Renville Agreement the constant objective in Australia's Indonesia policy was to support a speedy and liberal settlement between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic. While ever there was no final political settlement, Australia was concerned about the deteriorating political and economic condition of the Republic. It became increasingly intolerant of all Dutch policies which threatened the Republic or its de facto authority, especially after the moderate Hatta government was reinstalled in the Republic. Australia argued that the Republic's resilience justified its claim to special political recognition, during the interim period before the formation of the U.S.I. It therefore recognised and sought to protect the political "trust" of the Republic, and virtually disregarded the Indonesian states which were cooperating in the provisional federal government. The conviction with which it did so was reinforced by its assumption that the Republic would be dominant in the future U.S.I.

In the international context, Australia's support for the Indonesian Republic was largely unsuccessful, as it did not, in the short term, receive major-power support. For effectiveness in the Security Council or within the G.O.C., Australia particularly needed U.S. support. However, Australia's strongly-committed attitude to protecting the position of the Republic as the disadvantaged party to the Renville Agreement conflicted with the standpoint of the U.S. The U.S.'s claim to a policy of maximum neutrality within the G.O.C., the constraints which the Cold War placed on its approach to Security Council intervention in the Indonesian dispute, and possibly also its concern not to alienate the Netherlands as a party to Western cooperation in Europe, all distinguished U.S. interests and perspectives from those of Australia. It was significant, however, that the relative position of the U.S.
representatives on the G.O.C. Dubois and Cochran, were more akin to those of their Australian counterparts on the G.O.C. than to the prevailing viewpoint in the State Department in Washington.

Notwithstanding considerable interaction between the Australian government and the Australian members of the G.O.C., there was clearly a degree of consensus between the government on the one hand, and Kirby and Critchley on the other. Both attached importance to the Republic's interests being properly included in a Dutch-Indonesian settlement which gave priority to long-term political stability in Indonesia. To this end, both the Australian government and the Australian representatives on the G.O.C. regarded the achievement of a final political settlement as more important than adherence to procedural constraints, such as a formal regard to the function of the G.O.C. would have placed on their respective activities. This particularly applied to Burton on the one hand, and to Critchley on the other. By the convergence of their individual standpoints, they were clearly most influential in shaping Australia's Indonesia policy during this period.

Yet it is doubtful that consensus and coordination characterised Australia's policies towards Indonesia at this time. Clearly there was much working at cross-purposes as regards assisting the Republic economically. At the same time as Kirby was telling the Dutch the boycott might be able to be lifted if they ceased unilaterally creating federal states in Indonesia, Chifley was telling them the boycott could be tackled if another Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement were concluded; and Burton was claiming the ban would only be lifted if Australia could aid and trade with the Republic. Possibly for a combination of political and personal reasons, Evatt in September did not advocate Australia's supporting the Republic's admission to ECAFE as it had done in June.

There were also differences between the approaches of Evatt, Burton and Critchley to the political aspects of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.
Having stated reservations about the ideological complexion of Indonesia, Evatt appeared to retreat from publicly supporting the Republic. Critchley's comparatively bold scheme for Indonesian self-determination, as put forward in the Critchley-Dubois Proposals, appeared to be in advance of Australian governmental thinking at the time, although Burton, for his part, continued to press for greater Dutch concessions to the Indonesians. Australia supported the Proposals at the Security Council, but in the succeeding months its support for Critchley's insisting on the urgent need for a settlement between the Dutch and the Republic wained. Disillusioned with the Security Council, Australia seemed also to have abandoned trying to make the G.O.C. effective.

Concerned about the stability of Republic, which was faced with the possibility of communist take-over, the Australian government moved from confrontation with the Dutch to exploring a more conciliatory relationship with them. Primarily, the Australian government feared any sort of extreme outcome in Indonesia - be it Dutch suppression of the Republic or communist ascendancy within the Republic. Yet it was unable to reconcile its stern disapproval of Dutch policies in Indonesia with its constant aspiration for a continuing Dutch presence and influence after the formation of the U.S.I., or its fear of Indonesian communism with its support for Indonesian self-government. In this situation, it continued to support a compromise settlement between the Dutch and the Republic, presumably with doubts about its feasibility or viability.
Chapter Eight
AUSTRALIA'S POLICIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE SECOND
DUTCH 'POLICE ACTION' (DECEMBER 1948)

In September 1948 the communist threat to the Hatta Republican
government reached crisis point with pro-P.K.I. military groups initiating a
revolt against the central government. At Madiun on 18 September they
declared a National Front government.\(^1\) Stikker, who was in Washington at
the time, could not rally support for the Dutch proposal for intervening
militarily to combat communism in the Republic. On the contrary, when the
Republic on 20 September accepted the Cochran plan as a basis for resuming
negotiations with the Dutch, the U.S. supported the Hatta government. At
Batavia Cochran received instructions to inform Hatta that the U.S. would
give economic aid to the Republic to assist its suppressing the communist
revolt, provided the Republic agreed to adopt a reasonable position in
negotiations with the Dutch.\(^2\) Apparently, however, the Republic did not
need outside assistance. On 30 September loyal Republican troops entered
Madiun, quelled the uprising, killed Musso, and arrested other National Front
leaders, including Sjarifuddin.\(^3\) The position of the Hatta government was
strengthened further during early October when it regained the support of
three major parties, the Masjumi, the Nationalist and the Proletarian parties.

On 14 October the Netherlands put forward a set of additional
proposals which it was prepared to discuss in conjunction with the Cochran
Plan. The next day Stikker advised Teppema in Canberra that he expected a
resumption of negotiations.\(^4\)

Prior to this the Netherlands had made representations to Evatt and
Officer, and also to the British Foreign Secretary (Bevin), for Australia to
reappoint Kirby to the G.O.C. in place of Critchley. Stikker now instructed

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\(^1\) McVey, op.cit., p.70.
\(^2\) Z
\(^3\) McVey, op.cit., p.70.
\(^4\) Van Mook papers, Doos 23, Folder 3. Telegram to Teppema (520) and to Elink
Teppema not to press for this.\textsuperscript{1} This decision probably related to the wider one taken by the Netherlands, namely, to seek a solution by direct negotiation with the Republic, rather than through the G.O.C. or U.S. mediation. The Netherlands had been aware for some time that the G.O.C. majority, namely the U.S. and Australia, had not been sympathetic to its point of view. In particular, the U.S. government had not taken a sympathetic attitude towards the communist issue.

There were deep divisions within the Netherlands government itself concerning Indonesia policy.\textsuperscript{2} Nevertheless, on 24 October the Netherlands Parliament enacted an Emergency Act for Indonesia by which the F.C.A. plan\textsuperscript{3} was adopted. On 29 October, following van Mook's resignation from the position of Lieutenant Governor-General a fortnight earlier, the Netherlands government announced the appointment of the former Prime Minister, Dr L.J.M. Beel, as the Representative of the Netherlands Crown in Indonesia. These unilateral actions did not augur well for the Republic's position within Indonesia or in direct negotiations with the Dutch.

Meanwhile, Stikker went to Paris to discuss the Netherlands' policy with Evatt as President of the U.N. General Assembly, and with other foreign ministers attending the Assembly meeting. He received little sympathy, even from expected supporters such as France and Belgium.\textsuperscript{4} Belgium, as a member of the G.O.C., possibly took offence at this body being by-passed. On 31 October Stikker arrived at Batavia to open direct negotiations with the Republic.\textsuperscript{5}

In messages to both Beel\textsuperscript{6} and Stikker,\textsuperscript{7} Australia on 1 November expressed its concern for, and interest in, a fair and final settlement in

\textsuperscript{1} Van Mook papers, Doos 23, Folder 3. Telegram to Teppema (520) and to Elink Schuurman (567) from Stikker, The Hague, 15 October 1948.
\textsuperscript{2} See Stikker, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.108-152.
\textsuperscript{3} See Supra, Chapter 7, p.223.
\textsuperscript{4} Stikker, \textit{op.cit.}, p.120.
\textsuperscript{5} Kahin, \textit{op.cit.}, p.333
\textsuperscript{6} X
\textsuperscript{7} X
Indonesia. Chifley made it clear to Stikker that Australia was still willing to assist any settlement which seemed likely to be permanent and also acceptable to the Indonesian peoples. On 9 November Chifley told parliament he had "studied the Indonesian problem very deeply". He continued to believe, he said, that the "so-called Indonesian Republican party" and the Dutch would come to "a joint arrangement for the administration of Indonesia".1

The following day Burton discussed Chifley's attitude with Teppema. Burton said that Chifley was deeply concerned that Australia's foreign policy should accord with the U.N. Charter. Because of this, Burton said, Chifley was irritated by a report of van Mook's having told the press at Singapore that Australia had no Indonesia policy, save personal ambitions and ideas.2

On 10 November Burton told Teppema he himself was concerned that the Dutch would renew military action against the Indonesian Republic once the Security Council had concluded its current session in December. Burton based his prognosis on a number of factors. Firstly, negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic had not resumed following Stikker's arrival at Batavia. Secondly, there were serious differences between Stikker's and Beel's approach to the solution of the Indonesian dispute.3 Thirdly, Cochran had conveyed to the Republic Stikker's proposals for a resumption of negotiations, but Beel had regarded the Republic's reply as unacceptable.4

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1 CPD, Vol. 199, p.2635 (9 November 1948).

2 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 5 November 1948. Van Mook is reported to have added that Australia apparently had the idea that if it identified with Asian movements it would win Asian friendship and safeguard its security. Indonesia was a rich country with plenty of land and would never be an aggressor, he said. On the other hand, he added, a disorganised Indonesia might be a stepping stone for other aggressors.

3 Beel represented a more 'hard-line' approach to Indonesian policy than Stikker. See Stikker, op.cit., pp.108-152.

Burton warned Teppema that, if Holland was condemned in the Security Council, this would seriously affect the Western European Union. Burton's criticism of Britain's Eurocentric foreign policy\(^1\) and of the U.S.'s China policy\(^2\) during the same discussion implied it would be Australia, rather than the U.S. or Britain, which might feel impelled to take this action.\(^3\) Notwithstanding Burton's disparagement of the U.S. and Britain, Critchley reported from Batavia on 15 November that the U.S. expected the Nanking regime would soon fall and this appeared to have greatly strengthened the U.S.'s desire for an early and peaceful settlement in Indonesia.\(^4\)

Meanwhile Stikker held direct conversations with Hatta between 4 and 11 November. He obtained what he believed was a basis for a resumption of direct negotiations with the Republic and left for Holland to confer with the Netherlands government.\(^5\) On 27 November he returned to Batavia, accompanied by the Minister for Overseas Territories, Dr E.M.J. Sassen, and resumed discussions with the Republic.

On 29 November the Fourth Annual Session of ECAFE opened at Lapstone, New South Wales, Australia.\(^6\) The Indonesian Republic applied for associate membership, but the majority agreed to Australia's recommendation that consideration of the Republic's application be postponed on the grounds that

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\(^1\) Burton was reported to have criticised Britain for overconcentrating on Western Europe to the exclusion of concern for Australia's position in the Pacific, especially in relation to the Indonesian question.

\(^2\) Burton was reported to have criticised U.S. support for the Nanking regime in China over which the communists were gaining the ascendancy.


\(^4\) X

\(^5\) Stikker (op. cit., p.128) has written that he was acutely aware of the importance of achieving a non-violent solution before the monsoon season, which would inhibit military action, began on 1 December.

\(^6\) Eight days before the ECAFE meeting opened in Australia, Chifley broadcast a statement in which, among other things, he stated that "economic development" was the "key" to solving the problem of the "continuous state of social and political unrest" in "the great populous nations in our north". C/IA, Vol. XIX, No.11 (November-December 1948), p.722. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Broadcast by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. J.B. Chifley, on 21 November 1948.
Despite American opposition, Australia voted with Russia to admit the Indonesian Republic to ECAFE.

"I'll play ball with you when it suite ME, Sam."

Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)
10 December 1948
ECAFE should not take any action which might prejudice current discussions in Indonesia. Within a few days however, news was received that the discussions between the Dutch and the Republic had broken down. On 8 December the ECAFE meeting adopted a motion (originally put forward by New Zealand1 but amended by Pakistan2) proposing the separate admission of the Republic of Indonesia and "the rest of Indonesia" as associate members. Australia argued that, if ECAFE further postponed the Republic's application, this would amount to rejection of it. If a settlement were reached between the Netherlands and the Republic, Australia added, then the present separate admission of the two Indonesian parties would automatically be corrected. Finally, Australia considered a decision needed to be made in terms of ECAFE's responsibilities.3 Cabinet instructed the Australian delegate to support the ECAFE motion.4

Prior to this decision the Netherlands had represented the Netherlands Indies on ECAFE. In December 1948 the Netherlands opposed the motion before ECAFE on the grounds that Indonesia formed one economic unit. When ECAFE decided to admit the two Indonesian parties, the Netherlands delegate left the meeting and refused to participate further in the current session.5

The U.S. also opposed the ECAFE motion, on the grounds that it was a political decision which would not serve the long-term interests of either the Netherlands or the Republic of Indonesia.6 The concurrent attempt by the U.S. to encourage the Netherlands to seek a peaceful solution in Indonesia may have influenced its adoption of this position.

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1 New Zealand proposed the admission, as associate members, of the Republic of Indonesia and Indonesia (Netherlands East Indies).
2 Pakistan amended the proposal to the admission of the Republic of Indonesia and of "the rest of Indonesia".
3 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 December 1948.
5 Ibid., 9 December 1948.
6 Ibid.
On 7 December the U.S. delivered an Aide-Memoire to the Netherlands in which it stated that a resumption of *bona fide* negotiations was imperative. The U.S. expressed considerable hope that the Netherlands could achieve a reasonable political settlement with the moderate Hatta government. It said it viewed the Republic not merely as a geographical concept but as a political force, namely, as the chief expression of the preponderant desire of the Indonesian peoples for self-government. Here the U.S. was virtually echoing the viewpoint Australia had expressed in the Security Council in February 1948.¹ At the same time, the U.S. reaffirmed its belief that the welfare of Indonesia would continue to depend on the technical and administrative experience of the Dutch.

The U.S. recommended the Cochran plan as providing an appropriate *quid pro quo* as between economic concessions by the Republic to the Dutch and Dutch political concessions to the Indonesian nationalists. The U.S. admitted it was likely that a swift Dutch military action against the Republic would be successful, but denied that this would be an acceptable solution. It warned that if the Netherlands did not take the present opportunity to achieve a fair settlement in Indonesia, it would present the Cochran Plan to the Security Council. As well, the U.S. warned that, if its ability to contribute to a settlement were exhausted, it would be forced to withdraw from the G.O.C., which in turn would restore its freedom of action.²

Three days later, on 10 December, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr Ernest Bevin, proposed to the Netherlands that he "use his influence in Washington and Canberra" to resolve "the problems that were of critical importance" to the Dutch.³ Bevin possibly believed both the U.S. and Australia were pressing the Netherlands too hard. However, all efforts to influence

¹ See Supra, Chapter 7, p.200.
³ Stikker, *op.cit.*, p.139.
A Dutch spokesman says Dutch forces have taken "police action" for the purpose of "liberating" Indonesian Republican territory.

"Are you coming in, or have I got to rescue you?"

*Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney)

21 December 1948
the Netherlands were to no avail. On 11 December, the Netherlands\textsuperscript{1} advised the G.O.C. that there was no basis for agreement between itself and the Republic and that further negotiations under the auspices of the G.O.C. would be futile. In a special report to the Security Council on 12 December, the G.O.C. warned of the possibility of renewed hostilities in Indonesia. Australia and the Republic of Indonesia pressed for the Security Council to meet in emergency session on 16 December, but failed. Cochran for his part, tried to effect a reconciliation between the Dutch and the Hatta government. The Netherlands resisted all mediation efforts. On 11 December the Dutch Cabinet had decided to resume military operations against the Indonesian Republic.\textsuperscript{2} Eight days later, on 19 December, the Netherlands officially announced that it had begun a second 'police action'.\textsuperscript{3}

To the extent that Australia had, in the last resort, been relying on the U.S. to exert sufficient influence on the Dutch to prevent their taking military action against the Republic, the second Dutch 'police action' demonstrated the futility of this policy. Australian representatives at the U.N. are reported to have indicated their disappointment with the U.S.,\textsuperscript{4} and in Canberra Burton suggested to the U.S. Embassy that, if the U.S. had threatened to stop Marshall aid to Indonesia, it could have prevented the Dutch taking military action.\textsuperscript{5} In an interview with the Australian Ambassador in Washington on 20 December, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State repudiated Australia's suggestion that the U.S. was culpable for failing to forestall the Dutch action.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1} Stikker, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.139-140 maintains that Sassen, the Minister for Overseas Territories, issued this directive without consulting his ministerial colleagues.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, p.140.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.140-142. Stikker details the sequence of events 13-18 December 1948 as they were known to him.

\textsuperscript{4} X


\textsuperscript{6} Z
Despite Australia's disappointment with the U.S. attitude, this did not in any way diminish its desire to continue to work in close concert with the U.S.\(^1\) On 19 December, at Washington's request, the U.S. representatives at the U.N. sought and received Australia's agreement to their jointly requesting the President of the Security Council to call a meeting "at the earliest possible moment" to discuss the outbreak of hostilities in Indonesia.\(^2\)

Both in Canberra\(^3\) and in Washington\(^4\), Australia urged the U.S. to take decisive action against the Dutch. In particular, Australia advocated that the Security Council apply economic sanctions against Holland. It also pressed the U.S. to suspend aid to Holland for Indonesia under the European Recovery Programme (E.R.P.) This it did on 22 December 1948, but probably of its own accord.\(^5\)

The U.S. regarded Australia's representations as assertive rather than helpful. It appealed to Britain to try to restrain Australia.\(^6\) Presumably the U.S. wanted to ensure Australia acted in concert with the West and its handling of the Indonesian question. At the same time the U.S. suggested to Britain and France, the other major Western powers on the Security Council, that they should all three coordinate their handling of the Dutch action.\(^7\)

Whether on its own count or in response to the U.S. request, Britain advised Australia on 20 December that it favoured an immediate Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of Dutch troops, and a resumption of work by the G.O.C.\(^8\) For its part, Australia, on the same day,

\(^1\) X
\(^4\) Z
\(^5\) Usha Mahajani, Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia 1949-1968 (Athens, Ohio, 1970), p.5. At this stage $US11.2m of the $US72.2m ERP aid to the Netherlands for Indonesia was outstanding.
\(^6\) Z
\(^7\) Z
\(^8\) X
ONE-ARMED STRONG MAN  

THE DUTCH MUST BE STOPPED!

Australia will call for a cease-fire in Indonesia and demand that the Dutch forces retreat to the lines held before their latest attack.

*Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney)

22 December 1948
sent equivalent proposals to its representative at the Security Council, explaining that, while Dutch domination of Indonesia might be inevitable, there were strong political reasons for resisting a Dutch fait accompli. Australia presumably had its security in mind in the event of an Indonesian 'backlash' against suppression by the Dutch.

In addition to his instructions from Canberra, the Australian representative at the Security Council, Colonel W.R. Hodgson ¹ received a special message from Evatt, who was in London. Evatt considered the Dutch military action a direct challenge to the U.N. and the Security Council. He told Hodgson Australia should act resolutely and without bias, and solely with a view to preventing loss of life and insisting on adherence to the authority of the U.N. Evatt thought it necessary for the issue to be forced to a vote so that the Security Council took action ahead of the debate being adjourned. For this to happen, Evatt suggested to Hodgson that it might be necessary to say some harsh things to restore the Dutch to a sense of responsibility to the U.N.² Being at that time President of the U.N. General Assembly, Evatt seemed particularly agitated about the Dutch flouting the authority of the U.N.

Whereas Australia's reaction to the Dutch military action had, in some quarters, been angry, in others it was restrained. In contrast to the hostile reaction from the Department of External Affairs, Teppema reported having had a more congenial meeting with Chifley on 20 December. Chifley deplored the renewal of hostilities in Indonesia but assured Teppema he would do everything he could to discourage the waterfront unions from reimposing a boycott on Dutch shipping to Indonesia.³ Chifley's assurances were, however, to no avail. The W.W.F. reimposed the ban on 22 December.⁴

¹ Australian Ambassador to France. The Security Council's current venue was Paris.
² X
³ Archief DIRVO, NG 4, op. cit., Telegram to Stikker, The Hague (62) and to DIRVO, Batavia (100), from Teppema, Canberra, 20 December 1948.
RIGHT ON OUR DOORSTEP

by Ian Gall

Courier-Mail (Brisbane)

22 December 1948
On 21 December Cabinet endorsed both Australia's action in referring the hostilities to the Security Council in conjunction with the U.S. and the instructions given to Australia's representative at the Security Council to call for an immediate cease-fire. Announcing this the same day, Chifley pointed out that the Security Council had non-violent means, such as the power to impose economic sanctions, to give effect to its decisions. He also indicated various proposals for a permanent solution of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute which Australia would be discussing with other members of the Security Council. These were

whether the Security Council should order an immediate election with a view to establishing a legislature along the lines proposed by members of the Committee of Good Offices; whether the full sovereignty ultimately envisaged by the Dutch should not be granted with much less delay than the Dutch contemplate; whether in the event of continuous disputes the United Nations should not consider a trusteeship arrangement.¹

Hitherto, the Australian government had firmly supported the right of the Indonesian peoples to self-government. That it was prepared at this stage to countenance such a range of solutions indicated its pessimistic attitude towards the dispute being resolved peacefully and satisfactorily. To propose a trusteeship seemed especially retrogressive on Australia's part. The Department of External Affairs informed the Australian representative at the Security Council that this particular idea had not been seriously examined. Rather, it had been mooted as an alternative which would have to be negotiated in consultation with the Republic. The Republic would thereby be afforded protection against an imposed settlement.²

Australia was at this time also lobbying among the Western members of the Security Council to encourage them to consider the adverse effect on relations between Asia and the West which would occur, should the outcome of

² X
the Dutch-Indonesian dispute adversely affect the Indonesian Republic.¹

Chifley's statement on 21 December resulted in Teppema conferring with him again on 22 December. Teppema rejected each of the proposals Chifley had put forward for resolving the Indonesian dispute. He argued it would be impossible to hold elections in Indonesia, given the current disorder and he maintained that, if full sovereignty were transferred to an administratively-unequipped regime, it would be terrorised by irresponsible elements. Finally, he dismissed Australia's suggestion of a trusteeship as 'plain silly'. On this occasion Chifley is reported to have been more curt. He described the Dutch military action as a 'colossal mistake' and said it could only be compared to British policy in Egypt.²

On 22 December the Security Council assembled in emergency session to consider the Indonesian Question. The U.S., Colombia and Syria jointly submitted a draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, troop withdrawals, and the G.O.C. to be instructed to assess responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities.³ The meeting on 22 December adjourned without a vote having been taken. It will be recalled that Evatt had instructed the Australian representative to force the issue to a vote before adjournment.⁴ Accordingly, Canberra instructed him to insist that there be an immediate vote on the question of a cease-fire.⁵ When this failed, Canberra instructed its representative on 23 December to call for an immediate vote on the operative parts of the U.S.-Colombia-Syria resolution, without further debate or adjournment.⁶

The sense of urgency with which Australia acted in the Security Council possibly reflected its concern to counteract Dutch military successes

¹ X
² Archief DIRVO, NG 4. Telegram to Stikker, The Hague (65) and to Elink Schuurman, Batavia (103) from Teppema, Canberra, 22 December 1948.
³ SCOR, Third Year, Document S/1142.
⁴ See Supra, this chapter, p.243.
⁵ X
⁶ X
against the Republic. Since 19 December the Dutch had occupied the Republican capital of Djocjakarta and had captured various Republican leaders including Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, the Foreign Minister, Hadji Aogoes Salim, and other Cabinet members. Moreover, the Netherlands parliament in The Hague had endorsed the decision of the Netherlands government to renew 'police action' against the Republic. As a result of both these developments it seemed possible that the Dutch would completely overrun the Republic within a few days.

In the Security Council on 23 December, Hodgson (Australia) charged that the Netherlands had deliberately violated the U.N. Charter. "The consequences must be - if the Council faces up to the matter - expulsion from the United Nations", Hodgson declared. Having outlined how the Netherlands had by-passed the G.O.C. since the Renville Agreement, he said of Dutch dealings with the Republic prior to the second 'police action': "That was even worse than what Hitler did to the Netherlands in 1940". He then went on to question both the purpose and motivation of Dutch military measures:

Is armed force to be used for the subjection of a people whose right to independence has again and again been recognised? was it in order to exploit Indonesia's economic resources for itself and not for the benefit of the native population? was it to restore the old colonial system which the United Kingdom has demonstrated is dead and outmoded? was it to create, as we have been told, a federal United States of Indonesia on democratic principles?

We may never know the true motives, but we can assess the possible consequences. The action will certainly result in a loss of goodwill, tolerance and co-operation. It will certainly cause unrest throughout South East Asia. It will involve the Netherlands in a constant drain on resources and manpower to keep the people of the Netherlands East Indies in subjection. It does not even follow that current operations will result in immediate success....

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1 SCOR, Third Year, No.133, 390th Meeting, 23 December 1948, p.7.
2 Ibid., p.10.
3 Ibid., p.11.
4 Ibid., p.12.
It seemed probable that, in tone, if not also in substance, Hodgson's speech exceeded the instructions he had received from Evatt.

In contradiction to his instructions from the Department of External Affairs, but apparently under direct instructions from Evatt, Hodgson then said that Australia regarded the U.S.-Colombia-Syria draft resolution as inadequate. Firstly, Hodgson argued, the draft resolution did not specifically call on the Dutch as the aggressor to cease hostilities. Secondly, it called on the G.O.C. to assess responsibility for the hostilities whereas the G.O.C. had already reported to the Security Council. Hodgson suggested that the G.O.C. might need to be reconstituted to enable it to assist "the long-term problem", namely, the resumption of negotiations, the calling of elections and the formation of an interim government. Finally, Hodgson justified Australia's grounds for adopting a vehement standpoint:

My Government is concerned about this question and the question of competence....This is not merely a question of international interest; it is not merely a question of international concern. It is a question which directly affects the whole of South East Asia, and it affects my country. It causes strife and strikes and turmoil; it causes a loss of vital raw materials which are essential for world rehabilitation; it causes the loss of trade and commerce; it gives cause for the growth of extremist forces to take charge in areas vital to our well-being....

Australia's speaking rights in the Security Council did not enable it to propose its own resolutions. However, Hodgson commended for sponsorship Australia's suggestions for amendments to the U.S.-Colombia-Syria draft resolution under discussion. Australia accepted the call for an immediate cease-fire and for a withdrawal of troops behind the previous demarcation lines.

1 See Supra, this chapter, p.246.
2 According to Mr Sam Atyeo, who was acting as Hodgson's assistant at this time, Hodgson had received further instructions from Evatt by telephone on the evening of 22 December. Interview with Mr Atyeo, France, 20 December 1971.
3 SCOR, Third Year, No.133, 390th Meeting, op.cit., p.13.
4 Loc.cit.
5 Ibid., p.14.
In addition it proposed the Dutch be called on to release the Republican President and other Republican political prisoners they had arrested since 19 December. As well, Australia proposed that the Council instruct the G.O.C. to observe and report on compliance with its first two requests and also to ensure there were no reprisals or punitive actions taken against individuals.\(^\text{1}\)

At this stage Cold War confrontation and tactics between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council were conflicting with the proper consideration of the issues under discussion. After a tortuous debate the Council on 24 December adopted a revised U.S.-Colombia-Syria resolution, which was substantially as recommended by Hodgson, except that it omitted "the most important thing", namely, any demand for troop withdrawals.\(^\text{2}\) Hodgson said the Australian government was "surprised" the Security Council would pass such a "weak and ineffective" resolution.

After the action taken by the Council last year, my Government felt that the Council would have the courage to uphold its authority and prestige, which, in our opinion, were deliberately flouted.\(^\text{3}\)

Australia appreciated the U.S. concern to prevent the U.S.S.R. from appearing to champion the Republican cause in the Council. At the same time it sought to impress on the U.S. the need to take positive initiatives to guarantee the continuing influence of the Western democracies in South East Asia.\(^\text{4}\)

On 27 December the Security Council debate centred on Dutch non-compliance with the resolution adopted on 24 December. Hodgson told the Council on 27 December that, in Australia's view, "each day which passes without effective action being taken by the Security Council leads to a further prejudicing of the position of the Republic - if not to a practical elimination

\(^\text{1}\) *SCOR*, Third Year, No.133, *op. cit.*, pp.15-16.
\(^\text{4}\) X
of it." Afterwards he advised Canberra that he did not think the Council would take the necessary steps to preserve the Republic as a negotiating unit.  

However, on 28 December the Council adopted a Chinese resolution which noted the Netherlands had not released the Republican political prisoners as required by the resolution of 24 December, called on it to do so immediately, and to report to the Council within 24 hours of the present resolution being adopted. The Council also adopted a Colombian resolution requesting the Consular Commission to supply a complete report on the cease-fire.

On 29 December the Netherlands advised the Council that hostilities were "in the course of being terminated" and would cease in Java on 31 December and subsequently in Sumatra, although it would still be necessary "to act against disturbing elements". Clearly, the Netherlands was not complying with the Council resolutions. The Council made no proposals for counteraction. Again, Hodgson protested on behalf of Australia:

> It is clearly the presentation, so far as military action is concerned, of a fait accompli. It may be that we shall be able to return to the question with fresh minds - as we are told - with certain constructive views, but my delegation fears that, by that time, we shall be presented not only [with] a fait accompli but a complete liquidation of the Republic.

At this stage Australia was disillusioned with the Council, and clearly felt itself to be the chief Western supporter of the Republic.

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1 SCOR, 393rd Meeting, op.cit., p.17.
2 X
3 SCOR, Third Year, Document S/1162.
5 Ibid., 396th Meeting, 29 December 1948, pp.26-27.
6 Ibid., p.42.
7 Ibid., Third Year, No.137, 396th Meeting, 29 December 1948, p.44. Hodgson told the Council: "My Government and delegation feel that the Security Council has failed in this particular case. Here was a case which, before all others, required quick, decisive and effective action a year ago..."
Australia also felt that the U.S., as the major Western power in the Security Council on which Australia had placed its hopes, had failed to take a decisive initiative and exercise effective influence on the Dutch. Again Australia conveyed to the State Department its bitter disappointment in the U.S. tactical response to the second Dutch 'police action'.

Despite Australia's hostile reaction to the second Dutch 'police action', Chifley, for his part at least, held to the ideal of Dutch-Indonesian cooperation. In an interview on 30 December he is reported to have told Teppema that the upsurge of nationalism in South East Asia represented a grave danger to Australia. He also felt the Dutch must remain in control in Indonesia for some years, but he was equally emphatic that the Dutch should seek to cooperate with genuine nationalist elements, as distinct from the 'yes-men'.

Meanwhile the Indonesian Republic had decided to take an initiative on its own behalf. The Republican representative in India, Dr Soedarsono, advised Oesman in Canberra on 30 December that the Republic was seeking joint third-party mediation by a number of interested neighbouring countries with a view to persuading the Dutch to come to an immediate agreement or to submit to arbitration.

As a result, on 3 January, India invited Australia to attend a conference in New Delhi later that month to discuss the Indonesian question. Given Australia's current hiatus in policy towards Indonesia, as well as its concern to lessen the gap between Asia and itself as a contiguous, white, Western country, the timing and nature of India's proposal were fitting.
On 4 January Burton accepted India's invitation on behalf of Australia.\(^1\) The following day, the Minister for Defence, Mr J.J. Dedman, announced, on behalf of the Prime Minister, that Burton would be representing Australia at the Conference, together with Mr C.T. Moodie (who was currently the Political Counsellor at the Australian High Commission in New Delhi). Dedman made it clear that Australia might alter its decision to attend the New Delhi Conference in the event of the Security Council taking action to make regional consultation superfluous. In any case Dedman inferred that the Australian participants would not have authority to make any commitment on behalf of the government.\(^2\)

Likewise, in a message to the Australian High Commission in New Delhi on 5 January, the Department of External Affairs reflected official reservations about Australian attendance at the New Delhi Conference. The message stated that, under present circumstances, the government felt unable to send a Minister of Cabinet rank.\(^3\) Possibly Evatt, who was overseas when the government decision was taken, was opposed to Australia's participating in the Delhi Conference. Presumably it would have been 'inappropriate' to send a Minister, other than the Minister of External Affairs. Moreover, in so far as the Delhi Conference implied that the Security Council had been ineffective, no doubt Evatt, as President of the U.N. General Assembly, would have been reluctant to identify so directly with that view.

Possibly Australia was also reluctant to be identified with a radical and nationalist Asian viewpoint, which might demand the complete withdrawal of the Dutch from Indonesia. As well, it would probably have been reluctant to appear itself to be challenging the authority of the U.N. At the same time,

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\(^1\) *Ibid.*


\(^3\) X
Burton was mindful that Australia had to weigh its participation in this Asian conference against the reaction of the Western powers. He still wanted to be able to maintain pressure on the U.S. and Britain to support a settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute by the Security Council.\(^1\)

On 7 January Australia appealed to the Security Council not to adjourn that day "without taking at least the immediate steps which the situation in Indonesia urgently require[d]."\(^2\) Speaking for Australia, Mr N.J. O. Makin said:

> The action of the Netherlands cannot be condoned. To ignore is to condone; to delay is to condone. The Council...should immediately consider measures it can take within its authority to bring peace to Indonesia and assurances to South East Asia.\(^3\)

Makin recommended that the G.O.C. be revived, and its role enlarged.\(^4\) Given Australia's legal regard for the authority of the U.N., it seemed Australia was attempting to expedite Security Council action so as to forestall the New Delhi Conference.\(^5\)

Four days later, the U.S. made its first condemnatory statements against the Dutch within the Council.\(^6\) It accused them of having "violated" the U.N. Charter, of failing to cooperate with the G.O.C., and of having deliberately weakened the Republic. It also condemned the Dutch for having attempted to militarily eliminate the Republic as a political entity, which represented the essence of Indonesian nationalism. Clearly the U.S. was moving closer to Australia's standpoint. Finally, it called for a resumption of negotiations on the basis of the Cochran Plan.\(^7\)

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\(^1\) X

\(^2\) SCOR, Fourth Year, No.1, 397th Meeting, 7 January 1949, p.25.

\(^3\) Ibid., p.28.

\(^4\) Ibid., p.27.

\(^5\) See Supra, this chapter, p.252. Dedman's statement.

\(^6\) Taylor, op.cit., p.178.

\(^7\) SCOR, Fourth Year, No.3, 398th Meeting, 11 January 1949, pp.5-8.
At this time the Netherlands was claiming to have gained military control of all Republican territory. It also claimed it no longer recognised the Republic as a "political organisation". For its part, Australia pointed out to the Security Council on 14 January that its recognition of the Republic as a party to the Indonesian dispute pertained. Speaking for Australia, Mr J.D.L. Hood said:

...is it not evident that it is the clear intention of the Netherlands Government to present the Security Council with a picture of what is taking place in Indonesia in which the Republic does not figure at all? ...What had become of the Republic of Indonesia? In the protracted discussions which the Council has had for eighteen months in this Council chamber, the Council has taken all cognizance of, and given full recognition to, the status and existence of the Republic of Indonesia as an equal partner in what has been happening in Indonesia. ...By all its actions since 1947, the Council is committed irrevocably to the recognition of the Republic as an equal partner in all the processes leading to the final settlement of the Indonesian question....I am very happy to note that the representative of the United Kingdom stated earlier this afternoon that the restoration of the Republic to a position in which it could function and could be recognized as an equal partner in negotiations is a primary, indeed the primary, objective immediately before the Security Council.

At this point, if not earlier, the value to the Republic of Australia's initial diplomacy on its behalf was apparent. By having the Security Council recognise the Republic as a party to the dispute under consideration in July 1947, Australia had guaranteed the Republic continued recognition by the Council while ever the Indonesian dispute remained unresolved.

Hood (Australia) also argued that the Council was bound to demand the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Republican territory.

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1 Taylor, op.cit., p.181.

2 Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia* (London, 1959), p.121 states that on 8 January 1949 "the High Commissioners in London of Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon interviewed Foreign Secretary Bevin and told him that a British hands-off policy on Indonesia would cause infinite harm in Asia and lower British world prestige".

3 SCOR, Fourth Year, No.4, 400th Meeting, 14 January, p.28.
What is really the use of restoring the political freedom of the Indonesian leaders, and even restoring the status of the Republic as a political entity free to participate on an equal basis as a political entity with the Netherlands authorities? What is the use merely of doing that? The Republic must be restored not only in the political sense, not only on paper, but also in a territorial sense so far as that proves to be necessary. The inference is, therefore, that withdrawal [of Dutch troops] must be both early and effective.  

The Security Council could not, Hood argued, "escape the responsibility" of being in some way "associated" with the "basic character" of the "final settlement". If the Council allowed the Netherlands to try to impose a unilateral settlement on the Indonesian peoples, he added, this would "lead to the worst consequences both in Indonesia and throughout the whole of South East Asia".

In the Security Council on 17 January, three days before the New Delhi Conference was due to begin, India itself called for the G.O.C. to be reconstituted as a full commission to enable the Council's resolutions to be implemented. At the same time it impressed on the Council that the primary purpose of the New Delhi Conference would be to "explore the possibilities of a peaceful solution, and to strengthen the hand of the Security Council". The Council was to have met next on 19 January but this meeting was postponed until 21 January to enable China, Cuba, Norway and the U.S. jointly to draft a new resolution. For its part, the U.S. at this stage apparently regarded the resolution of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute as a question of timing, and it was therefore not pressing for an immediate solution.

The Security Council having failed to act, Australia took its place

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1 SCOR, Fourth Year, No.4, 400th Meeting, op. cit., pp.28-29.
2 Ibid., p.29.
3 Loc. cit.
5 The question of timing may have related in part to U.S. negotiations with Holland for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which were in progress at this stage.
6 Z
I don't look too bad
as an Asian
myself—come
to think of it.
at the opening of the New Delhi Conference\(^1\) on 20 January. If the government shared any of the apprehensions of its domestic critics who were outraged by Australia's acceptance of an invitation to what they presumed would be a radical, anti-colonial, anti-European gathering, such qualms should have been allayed by the opening address to the Conference by the Indian Chairman (Prime Minister Nehru). Nehru stressed that the Conference was meeting within the framework of the U.N. and in order to "supplement", rather than "supplant", the efforts of the Security Council.\(^2\) In an address to the Conference on the same day, Burton, for Australia expressed similar sentiments.\(^3\)

On 20 January Evatt returned to Australia from overseas. Presumably to counter domestic criticism, he issued a statement to the press, justifying Australia's stance. Evatt stressed that the Conference did not "conflict in any way with the powers or the jurisdiction of the Security Council"; also that Australia's policy was not "directed against Dutch interests". On the question of the Conference's jurisdiction, Evatt said it "would be perfectly entitled to make suggestions and recommendations". Because Australia wanted

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\(^1\) The Countries participating in the New Delhi Conference were Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. In addition China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam sent observers.

\(^2\) Nehru defined the tasks of the Conference as threefold: "(1) to frame and submit to the Security Council proposals which would, if accepted, by both parties concerned, restore peace immediately to Indonesia and permit the early realisation of freedom by the Indonesian people; (2) to suggest to the Security Council what action it should take if either party to the dispute fails to act according to its recommendations; and (3) to devise machinery and procedures by which the Governments represented here today can keep in touch with one another for purposes of mutual consultation and concerted action for the achievement of the purposes for which this conference has met."


to live in closest harmony with its newly-emerging neighbours in South East Asia, Evatt conceded, the "New Delhi meeting may [therefore] be of crucial significance".\(^1\) Teppema reported a subsequent discussion in which Evatt admitted having been apprehensive about the role Burton would play at the Conference. Evatt told Teppema he had made sure Burton received explicit instructions.\(^2\)

Burton, in fact, participated in the Conference committee which drafted the three resolutions\(^3\) that the Conference (including Australia) adopted on 22 January. Resolution I made several recommendations to the Security Council. These included requiring the Dutch to free Republican prisoners; to allow the re-establishment of the Republican government and to restore to the Republic territory under its control on 18 December 1948. The Resolution also recommended that the Council demand the withdrawal of Dutch forces; the removal of Dutch restrictions on Republican trade; the free formation of an Interim Indonesian government; the holding of elections for the Constituent Assembly of Indonesia by 1 October 1949; and the transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I. by 1 January 1950. Resolution II provided for cooperative consultation between the participating countries with regard to Resolution I. Resolution III advocated continuing general cooperation between the participating governments.

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2 *Archief DIRVO*, AC-3a - Mrs O'Keefe 49/50. Telegram to Stikker, The Hague and to Elink Schuurman, Batavia. From Teppema, Canberra, 10 February 1949. Ref. no.1152.

There is a widespread conviction that Australia can have no possible place at the New Delhi conference on Indonesia.

*Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney)

24 January 1949
By becoming signatories to the Conference resolutions it seemed the Australian representatives had exceeded their mandate.\(^1\) When Burton returned to Canberra on 26 January Evatt issued a statement commending Burton's role at the New Delhi Conference and stating that the decisions of the Conference accorded "in principle" with Australia's general policy of support for the U.N. and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.\(^2\) Clearly, however, there had been a lack of unanimity within the government and Burton, for his part, had overstepped governmental, and possibly also, ministerial, instructions.

Aside from personal motives, policy priorities were obviously involved in Burton's commitment of Australia at the Conference. In his opening address to the Conference Nehru had indicated the importance he attached to the presence of Australia and New Zealand as white, non-Asian powers.\(^3\) Burton was apparently responsive to the idea of Australia participating fully so as to prevent the Conference taking on a racialist and Asian complexion.\(^4\) The moderation and stability of the Conference itself, and the sense of a joint regional leadership which Australia and India developed during the Conference, and the desirability of there being a Western protagonist of Indonesian freedom were apparently additional factors which contributed to Australia's approach at the Delhi Conference.

Before the Conference, the Australian government felt concerned to avoid any impression that Australia was abandoning the Western bloc and

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1 See Supra, 252. At the same time it would seem consistent for a participant in the Conference, as distinct from an observer, to be a signatory to the Conference resolutions.


3 *Eggleston Papers*, op.cit.

4 X. This and information following in this paragraph.
aligning itself with Asian countries which were identified with the Communist bloc.\(^1\) However, during the Security Council debates which immediately preceded the Conference, India had adopted a firmly anti-communist line. Presumably this allayed any official reservations of this kind. The prospect that the Delhi Conference might "strengthen the anti-communist outlook of the participating governments" complemented, rather than conflicted with, U.S. and British policy.\(^2\)

In the Security Council on 25 and 27 January, Australia, together with India and the Republic, pressed for the Council to incorporate the provisions of Resolution I from New Delhi in the China-Cuba-Norway-U.S. draft resolution before it. Certain of these were included in the amended resolution which the Security Council adopted on 28 January.\(^3\) The Council called upon both parties to discontinue military operations and on the Netherlands to release all Republican political prisoners.

More particularly, the Council's resolution of 28 January recommended a resumption of negotiations, for which purpose it reconstituted the G.O.C. and renamed it the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (U.N.C.I.). Amongst its enlarged powers U.N.C.I. had "authority to consult with representatives of areas in Indonesia other than the Republic."\(^4\) For the first time, the Security Council thereby took cognisance of the Indonesian federal states as a third party to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. U.N.C.I. was also empowered to act by majority vote; to make recommendations to the parties and/or to the Security Council; to supervise elections throughout Indonesia; and

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\(^1\) X


\(^3\) SCOR, Fourth Year, 406th Meeting, Document s/1230. See below, Appendix III, Document 39.

\(^4\) Ibid.
to assist and protect the restoration to the Republic of areas which were under its control at the time of the Renville Agreement.\textsuperscript{1} Clearly this resolution went a considerable way towards meeting many of the demands Australia had been pressing for in the Council over a long period of time.

However, when Evatt delivered a statement on International Affairs to the House of Representatives on 9 February,\textsuperscript{2} domestic political opposition required him to take a defensive approach to Australia's Indonesia policy. Large sections of the Australian public had been becoming progressively disillusioned with the U.N. as an effective international body. More particularly, Australia's participation in the New Delhi Conference had brought Labor's approach to the White Australia policy into public question. Whereas Labor regarded befriending Australia's Asian neighbours as the best means of providing Australia with racial security, the prevailing view was that, if Australia's white neighbours were driven out of the region, Australia would be racially isolated and \textit{ipsa facto} vulnerable to attack from the north. In his initial statement Evatt possibly thought he could obtain domestic political mileage out of his Presidency of the U.N. General Assembly. He tried to neutralize and objectify Australia's Indonesia policy by treating it "purely from the point of view of the United Nations". In these terms he also denied charges of Australian "hostility" to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{3}

Evatt's evasiveness was unacceptable to the Opposition which initiated a stringent attack on government policy, charging that Australia had been "assisting to put the Dutch out of the East Indies".\textsuperscript{4} Not only did Evatt vehemently deny this charge but he asserted the Labor government had "always"

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{CPD}, Vol. 201, pp.80-82. Section dealing with Indonesia. See below, Appendix III, Document 40.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}, p.369 (15 February 1949), Mr R.G. Menzies, Leader of the Opposition.
thought the Dutch should "remain" in Indonesia "on a basis of cooperation" which was "freely sought by Indonesia". ¹ However, by February 1949, the realisation of Evatt's idealised 'double insurance policy' was becoming an increasingly unlikely possibility, given the embittered nature of the Indonesian dispute. Although Evatt tried to appease the Australian electorate, he also reflected his continuing equivocal attitude towards a Dutch-Indonesian settlement. While he regarded the second Dutch 'police action' as having "upset" the "stability" of the area, he reaffirmed he was "convinced" that the "safety of South-East Asia and the Indonesians themselves" required Dutch cooperation.²

In so far as Australia's participation in the New Delhi Conference focussed domestic political attention on the White Australia policy, this was again in February a primary consideration in parliamentary debate on the O'Keefe case. Apparently supported by both the Labor Caucus and Cabinet,³ the Minister for Immigration, Mr A. Calwell, had issued a deportation order against Mrs O'Keefe, an Indonesian (Ambonese)⁴ and her eight children.⁵ The Opposition charged Calwell with inhumanity and maladministration of Australia's restrictive immigration policy. Calwell claimed that Mrs O'Keefe was still a Dutch subject and by her marriage to an Australian had not acquired the right to remain in Australia. This conflicted with Dutch law, according to which Mrs O'Keefe was a British subject by marriage, and would require a Netherlands visa to re-enter Indonesia. Calwell duly charged the Netherlands with failing to fulfill the

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² Ibid.
³ Ibid., p.60 (9 February 1949), Holt.
⁴ Ambon was not part of the de facto Indonesian Republic, and during the Dutch-Indonesian dispute the Ambonese people remained loyal to the Dutch.
⁵ As presented by the Liberal member, Mr H. Holt, the facts of the O'Keefe case were briefly as follows. Mrs O'Keefe was formerly Mrs Jacob and an Ambonese citizen. Mr and Mrs Jacob and their seven children were evacuated to Australia by the Dutch in 1942, and their eighth child was born in Australia. Mr Jacob was killed in war service in 1944. In 1947 Mrs Jacob married Mr O'Keefe, an Australian. Subsequently Mrs O'Keefe had been ordered to leave Australia, under the requirements of the Immigration Act. CPD, Vol. 201, p.57 (9 February 1949).
obligations of the N.E.I. government to reaccept responsibility for those persons who had been allowed into Australia temporarily during the Pacific war. However, Calwell did not restrict his remarks to the domain of immigration policy. As well as accusing the Dutch of supplying the Opposition with its "propaganda", Calwell added:

... the O'Keefe family... has been asked to leave Australia just as have all other persons who came to Australia in similar circumstances. The family was wished on to Australia by the Dutch Government. The motion that is before the House today is part of a Dutch plan to embarrass the Australian Government because we sent representatives to the Asian Conference at New Delhi. It is part of a plan to get even with the Australian Government because of our interest in Indonesia... The Republican representatives of Indonesia have never protested against what the Australian Government has done in regard to its nationals... All the trouble that I have experienced has been made by colonial Dutchmen and colonial Englishmen...  

In so far as Australia's participation in the New Delhi Conference was an index of Australia's desire to extend its goodwill towards, and cooperation with, Asian countries and, given that Evatt was concurrently attempting to reduce the anti-Dutch image of Australia's foreign policy, Calwell's handling of the O'Keefe case exposed dramatically the high degree of ambiguity between Australia's foreign and immigration policies. Moreover, whereas Australia's sympathy and support for the Indonesian Republic had appeared probably to be anti-racialist, Calwell's blunt interpretation of immigration policy was grossly offensive in racial terms. He made it quite clear that the decision to deport the O'Keefe family was taken primarily in the interests of a White Australia.

... if I allow Mrs O'Keefe to stay I have perforce to let back into this country those Indonesian husbands of Australian women whom I have already repatriated... the hard core of resisters cannot defeat our laws. Mrs O'Keefe and her children are not important; it is the precedent that is important. If we allow these people to stay we

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1 CPD, Vol. 201, pp.60-61.
2 These numbered about 40.
"Even if he is your pet there's no sense in letting him annoy the neighbours."

Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)
31 May 1949
shall open the flood gates to any Asiatics who want to come here....We can have a white Australia, we can have a black Australia, but a mongrel Australia is impossible, and I shall not take the first steps to establish the precedents which will allow the flood gates to be opened. I respect Asiatic people. I do not regard them as inferiors, but they have a different culture and history, different living standards, and different religions from our own. They can live, and, I hope, enjoy whatever they can get from the earth's bounty in their own countries....

In the House of Representatives on 11 February an embarrassed Evatt evaded questions as to whether Calwell's recent statements represented government policy. When Chifley was questioned similarly on 23 February, he replied: "I enunciate the Government's policy, which usually is formulated in conformity with Cabinet decisions".

When, on 10 February, Teppema protested to Evatt about Calwell's statements in the House, Evatt was duly apologetic. However, he implicitly supported Calwell's accusation about Dutch collusion in the O'Keefe case by telling Teppema there were grounds for believing that Dutch officials in Australia were party to a political campaign against the Labor government. In a letter dated 16 February Evatt charged Teppema with having induced a new attack on the government in parliament by his issuing of a press statement on 10 February protesting about Calwell's speech. Moreover, Evatt charged that Dutch propaganda and press agencies were continuously interfering with the Australian government's performance of its 'supreme executive functions' and he demanded that this cease immediately.

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4 *Archief DIRVO*, AC-3a-Mrs O'Keefe 49/50. Telegram to Stikker and to Elink Schuurman from Teppema, Canberra, 10 February 1949.
substantiate his charges, Evatt refused\(^1\) and on 18 February he suggested to Teppema that they forget all about their recent correspondence.\(^2\) Presumably the government had over-reacted to domestic criticism of its policies towards Indonesia.

**Summary and Conclusion**

Throughout the Dutch-Indonesian dispute a racial element had been constantly, if for the most part implicitly rather than explicitly, present in the policies of the Australian Labor government towards Indonesia. It had consciously sought to accept, support and befriend the Indonesian Republic. It had also repeatedly revealed its sensitivity to Dutch policies and actions which were abrasive or repressive towards Indonesian nationalism. At the same time, there was a broad consensus among all the political parties that Australia's security would be best served by a continuing Dutch presence and influence in Indonesia. There can be little doubt that a factor in this attitude was apprehension about Australia's racial isolation.

The second Dutch 'police action' and its aftermath brought to the surface this racial factor in Australia's policies towards Indonesia. At a time when nationalist and communist unrest was widespread in South East Asia, Australia regarded the assault by the Netherlands as a white, non-resident, Western power, on the Indonesian Republic as the ultimate in Western exploitation of Asian instability. The seriousness with which the Australian government regarded the Dutch action can be gauged by its pressing the Security Council to take decisive retaliatory action against the Netherlands. Likewise its particular demands that the Security Council obtain Dutch troop withdrawals,


the release of Republican political prisoners, the territorial restoration of the Republic and its preservation as a negotiating unit, reflected Australian concern that the Council reverse the effects of the Dutch military action.

Following the second Dutch military action, the tactical priorities of the U.S., as a major power in a situation of bipolar confrontation with the U.S.S.R. conflicted with the regional interests of Australia as a small/middle power. Disappointed by the tactical responses of the Security Council, and particularly that of the U.S., to the second Dutch 'police action', Australia partly dissociated itself from the policies of the major Western powers. Whereas the U.S. presumably regarded Australia's policies and actions as reflecting, in Cold War terms, disloyalty to the Western bloc, Australia itself saw the need for the West to play a constructive role in relation to emergent Asian nationalism. The Australian government considered its own security dictated its supporting the Republic rather than complementing the Republic's alienation by the Western powers as the non-white, non-Western, anti-colonial party to the dispute. Such a sense of racialist conviction was reflected in Australia's participation in the New Delhi Conference.

At the domestic level, the New Delhi Conference and the O'Keefe case combined to demonstrate the conflict for Australia between its Western identity, its fundamental racialism (as reflected in the bipartisan White Australia policy), and its attempt to reconcile itself with a geographically contiguous Asia. Both Evatt's attitude towards the New Delhi Conference and Calwell's handling of the O'Keefe case indicated that the conflict was present within the Labor government, as well as between government policy and attitudes in the wider community. Given that Evatt's position as President of the U.N. General Assembly in this period tended to inhibit his responses as Australia's Minister for External Affairs, it still seemed that he was particularly cautious with regard to both Australia's participation in the New Delhi Conference and its adoption of too distinctive a position.
Fundamentally, the second Dutch 'police action' and its aftermath accentuated the need for the Labor government to re-examine its basic approach to a Dutch-Indonesian settlement. Whereas Australia had thought to ensure its own racial security by advocating a continuing Dutch presence in Indonesia, successive Dutch policies and actions which Australia considered were creating racial and political instability in Indonesia clearly challenged Australia's idealisation of a cooperative Dutch-Indonesian relationship. Likewise it brought into question Australia's idea of regional security arrangements founded on cooperative relations with the Western colonial powers in Asia.
Chapter Nine

AUSTRALIA'S PART IN FINAL DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE NETHERLANDS' TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THE U.S.I.

At the beginning of February 1949 the Netherlands government was undecided about whether or not it would comply with the Security Council's resolution of 28 January.\(^1\) There were external as well as internal considerations involved. The former included the Brewster Resolution, which had been introduced into the U.S. Senate. This called for the termination of all U.S. financial aid to the Netherlands\(^2\) until it complied with the Security Council directives. The Netherlands was also sensitive to U.S. opinion, in relation to N.A.T.O. negotiations, which were well under way at this stage. Stikker told the Netherlands Parliament on 4 February that cooperation with the U.S. was crucial both to the Netherlands and to Western Europe.\(^3\) It is not inconceivable that the Netherlands' economy had been strained by the military outlay in Indonesia, to the extent that there was not adequate finance to provide independently for the Netherlands' own European defence.

The Netherlands Cabinet crisis culminated on 11 February when the Minister for Overseas Territories, Sassen, who had been largely responsible for the decision to initiate the second 'police action', resigned. He was succeeded by Dr J.H. van Maarseveen,\(^4\) who, on 18 February, announced Cabinet's decision to adopt the Beel Plan. As distinct from complying fully with the Security

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\(^2\) The Netherlands had received $US400m under the Marshall Plan. When the *New York Times* revealed on 13 January 1949 that it had cost the Netherlands $US436,297,874 to maintain the Dutch army and air force in Indonesia during 1948, US public opinion was outraged by the suggestion that Marshall aid funds had been diverted to such use. See Kahin, *op.cit.*, p.403.

\(^3\) *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal*, II, pp.1186-1187.

\(^4\) Van Maarseveen was a liberal member of the Catholic Party.
Council resolution, Beel, the High Representative of the Netherlands Crown in Indonesia, proposed that the Netherlands itself take the initiative to effect an accelerated transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I. Accordingly, the Netherlands decided to convene a Round Table Conference (R.T.C.) at The Hague on 12 March 1949 to discuss arrangements for creating an interim Indonesian federal government, the transfer of sovereignty, and the establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.¹

Meanwhile U.N.C.I. had reacted to the Netherlands' failure to implement, or even respond to, the Council's resolution of 28 January. On 2 February U.N.C.I. reminded the Netherlands of its obligation to make recommendations to the Council if the parties had not agreed on an interim government by 15 February. Australia fully supported this position.² When no agreement had been reached by 15 February, Cochran suggested U.N.C.I. postpone its report to the Council, on the grounds that the Beel Plan might contribute to the Netherlands changing its attitude to the Council's resolution. Critchley disagreed, and was ready to send a 'hot' report to the Security Council. Apparently Cochran restrained him,³ and the U.N.C.I. majority agreed to postpone reporting to the Council until 1 March.⁴

In a joint interview with Teppema in Canberra on 22 February, Evatt and Burton expressed different views about the prospects of a Dutch-Indonesian settlement. While Evatt was apparently optimistic about a speedy settlement being achieved, Burton spoke of serious and strong guerilla activities, also his impression from military reports that the military situation in East and West Java⁵ was very serious.⁶ Underlying this difference of view there was

¹ Taylor, op.cit., p.199.
² X
³ Z
⁴ Taylor, op.cit., p.201.
⁵ See Kahin, op.cit., p.409.
perhaps a significant difference in the attitude to the Indonesian Republic of Evatt, on the one hand, and Burton and Critchley, on the other. It appeared that Evatt was content that the Dutch should peacefully transfer sovereignty to the U.S.I., without necessarily restoring or recognising the Republic, while Burton and Critchley were adamant that the Dutch restore the Republic, release Republican prisoners, and recognise the de facto status of the Republic prior to the transfer of sovereignty, as the Security Council resolution demanded. This would seem inconsistent with Evatt's legalistic attitude towards the authority of the U.N. However he had always emphasised the imperative of Dutch-Indonesian cooperation, as distinct from the particular concern Burton and Critchley had evinced for the Republic's being satisfactorily accommodated in a Dutch-Indonesian settlement.

Whatever the case, when the Security Council discussed the U.N.C.I. report in March, Australia's attitude to the authority of the U.N. was unequivocal. On 11 March, Hood (Australia) insisted:

the Council has before it a most clear and explicit judgement of the Commission for Indonesia [U.N.C.I.] to the effect that the Netherlands Government has not complied with the terms of the Council's resolution.\textsuperscript{1}

He rejected the idea that the Council should agree to the Netherlands' proposal for a R.T.C. This, he said, would circumvent "the most essential point" in the Council's resolution, namely, the political and territorial restoration of the Republic. Nor could the Council accept the exclusion of U.N.C.I., he added.\textsuperscript{2}

On 16 March, Hood (Australia) charged that the second Dutch 'police action' had been designed "to give the Netherlands a free hand in framing the kind of settlement in Indonesia best suited to itself".\textsuperscript{3} To support his argument, he cited the Netherlands' admission to the Council that the outcome of

\textsuperscript{1} SCOR, Fourth Year, No.20, 417th Meeting, 11 March 1949, p.14.
\textsuperscript{2} Loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., No.22, 419th Meeting, 16 March 1949, p.9.
the R.T.C. would have to be compatible with Dutch "responsibilities". In any case, Hood pointed out, there was no prospect of the proposed R.T.C. taking place. Because the Netherlands had not complied with the Council's resolution, Republican leaders were refusing to attend; and the Federalists were demanding the restoration of the Republic as a precondition for their participation.¹ Similar indices of Federalist dissatisfaction with the Dutch and of solidarity with the Republic were frequent following the second 'police action', and profoundly influenced Security Council and world opinion during 1949.

On 23 March Canada introduced a draft resolution directing U.N.C.I. to assist the parties to reach agreement

(i) for implementing the Council's resolution of 28 January; and

(ii) on arrangements for the R.T.C.

Hood protested strongly, on the grounds that the Council would thereby accept an alternative course of negotiations to that outlined in its resolution of 28 January.² He took the same standpoint as the Republic and the Federalists:

There are no negotiating parties at the present time in Indonesia except the Netherlands authorities. There is no organized party, in the negotiating sense, on the Republican side....³

Australia objected that the Canadian draft resolution went "too far" and "prejudiced" the position of the Republic, but this did not receive the necessary Council support. The Council adopted the so-called McNaughton resolution⁴ the same day.

Within a week India⁵ and Australia⁶ (separately) asked the U.N. Secretary-General to place the Indonesian question on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly.⁷ They argued that inclusion of the question on the

¹ SCOR, Fourth Year, No.22, 419th Meeting, 16 March 1949, p.7.
² Ibid., No.24, 421st Meeting, 23 March 1949, p.16.
³ Loc.cit.
⁴ See below, Appendix III, Document 42.
⁵ On 30 March 1949.
⁶ On 31 March 1949
agenda of the General Assembly

would not prejudice the talks about to begin in Batavia, and that it would be unwise to pin hopes on the Batavia discussions and allow the fact that they were being held to be used as an argument against full discussion in the Assembly.¹

Clearly Australia and India were not prepared to accept the Security Council's willingness to compromise the authority of the U.N. They also apparently acted without giving any advance warning, much to the annoyance of the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands.²

Meanwhile, on 8 March the U.S. Senate had defeated the Brewster resolution. However, U.S. pressure on the Dutch of another kind came into operation. In March the U.S. State Department advised Stikker that he should clearly understand that the United States, while prepared to create NATO and to give military aid to its future allies, would not be willing to give such aid to allies like the Netherlands so long as they had not solved their colonial difficulties.³

However, Stikker having first obtained an assurance from the U.S. that proposed amendments to the E.C.A.* Bill would not affect aid to the Netherlands (as distinct from Indonesia), the Netherlands signed the N.A.T.O. agreement on 4 April 1949.⁴

Two days later, the U.S. Senate adopted the Vandenberg amendment to the E.C.A. Bill. This stipulated that, in the event of the Security Council voting sanctions against the Netherlands, U.S. Marshall aid to the Netherlands would cease.⁵ However, the improbability of this happening⁶ meant that U.S. pressure on the Netherlands was only nominal.

¹ CHIA, Vol. XX, No.5 (May 1949), p.569.
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³ Stikker, op.cit., pp.145-146.
⁴ Ibid., p.146.
⁵ Fischer, op.cit., pp.126-127.
⁶ Kahin, op.cit., p.419.
*Economic Cooperation Act.
In his Presidential Address at the opening of the U.N. General Assembly on 5 April, Evatt recommended that the Assembly admit the Indonesian question to its agenda.

The Security Council is at present seized of the problem, but the proposed inclusion of this subject on the Agenda of the Assembly may enable all members of the organisation to express their views and add to the moral weight being exerted upon the parties to the dispute to settle the dispute in accordance with justice and the principles of the Charter.  

On 12 April the Indonesian question was admitted to the agenda of the current General Assembly session, and specifically to the agenda of the First Committee. Evatt told the Netherlands representative at the Assembly that, if current negotiations at Batavia (to arrange the R.T.C.) lasted longer than the Assembly session, then the First Committee would certainly debate the item. Alternatively, if the conversations at Batavia failed to arrive at a speedy and satisfactory conclusion, then he was prepared to introduce the Indonesian question in plenary session. In any case, Evatt indicated that he was pessimistic about the Batavia conversations.

Clearly Australia's reservations about the Batavia conversations reflected its belief that the Dutch had no intention of restoring the Republican government to Djocjakarta. Yet Australia's case had lost an important part of its strength by the Council's directives to U.N.C.I. on 23 March.

Four days before the Dutch-Indonesian conversations were due to begin in Batavia, General S.H. Spoor, the Commander of the Netherlands Armed Forces in Indonesia, warned of a possible Australian attempt at their sabotage. Spoor charged that Critchley had been interfering in delicate matters in West Java,

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2 *GAOR*, Third Session, Part II, 190th Plenary Meeting, 12 April 1949, p.36.
3 *Ibid*.
where the Dutch had been meeting strong military resistance from the Republic. He predicted Critchley would encourage the Republicans to frustrate the Batavia conversations, and suggested that Critchley's activities be publicised and discouraged.\(^1\) Apparently, Spoor's report reflected, at least in part, Dutch sensitivity to recent Republican military gains in Java.\(^2\)

The day before the Batavia conversations were scheduled to open, Australian representatives in New Delhi attended a meeting of the Heads of Missions of the countries that had attended the Delhi Conference in January 1949. The Indian government informed the Australian High Commission beforehand that the meeting would discuss whether the Dutch should be denounced in the General Assembly in the event of the Assembly's handling the Indonesian question unsatisfactorily, also whether the governments assembled should press the Security Council to impose economic sanctions against the Netherlands. When the participants assembled under Nehru's chairmanship on 13 April, they were presented with a joint draft resolution, of which they had been given no prior notice. The draft resolution recommended to the participating governments that, in the event of no agreement being reached at Batavia, the Dutch should be condemned in the Security Council for failing to give effect to the Council's resolution of 28 January. It also recommended that the individual governments impose economic sanctions against the Dutch and deny them transit facilities. A telegram from the Indian Consul-General at Batavia was also read to the meeting. This gave as Critchley's opinion that a settlement must be achieved in Indonesia within a month to forestall complete disruption of the Republic by communists.\(^3\)

\(^1\) *Collectie S.H. Spoor* (ARTA) No.46. Kab. 1016. Onderwerp: Goede diensten van het UNCI - led T. Critchley. To the acting Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation at Batavia from S.H. Spoor, Lieutenant-General, Commander of the Army in Indonesia. 10 April 1949.

\(^2\) Kahin, *op. cit.*, p.419.

\(^3\) X. All information above and in following paragraph.
Australia had expected that the meeting would involve only an informal exchange of views. As well as the presentation of the draft resolution suggesting an element of coercion, the publicising of Critchley's opinion was undoubtedly embarrassing to the Australian representatives. Having no specific governmental authority, they did not support the resolution.\(^1\)

Given that India and Australia had separately referred the Indonesian question to the General Assembly, it is not inconceivable that India sought to assert its own, over Australia's, claim to regional leadership on the Indonesian question. Having irritated the U.S. and Britain by referring the Indonesian question to the General Assembly, Australia now became dissociated from the Asian bloc as well.

On their way to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in mid-April, Chifley and Burton conferred with Critchley at Singapore about recent developments in Indonesia.\(^2\) Critchley agreed with Burton that it would be best to delay debate of the Indonesian question in the General Assembly until the Batavia conversations had been given a fair chance to succeed,\(^3\) although he admitted being pessimistic about the likelihood of this.\(^4\) Critchley also recommended that Australia urge both the U.S. State Department and the U.S. delegation at the General Assembly to bring pressure to bear on the Batavia conversations. Critchley suggested the U.S. could be charged as responsible for the lack of progress in Dutch-Indonesian negotiations and for encouraging Dutch intransigence. According to Critchley, Cochran was

\(^1\) Cf. Taylor, op.cit., p.212; "...meeting at Delhi, a number of Afro-Asian countries, together with Australia, declared that any settlement in Indonesia must be reached in the spirit of the resolution of January 28", from Chronologisch Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling van het Indoneesche Vraagstuk in de Nationale en Internationale Politieke Verhoudingen (14 August 1945 - 27 December 1949), p.47.

\(^2\) Archief DIRVO, NG 4, op.cit., Telegram to Stikker, The Hague (5) and to Elink Schuurman, Batavia (5) from Teppema. Canberra, 13 April 1949.

\(^3\) cf. Supra, p.276.

\(^4\) X. This and information following in this paragraph.
encouraging the Republicans to accept the R.T.C. at The Hague once the Dutch agreed to release the Republican leaders and to restore the Republican government to Djocjakarta.

The Department of External Affairs adopted Critchley's proposal, in modified form. On 20 April it suggested to Evatt that he indicate to U.S. representatives at the General Assembly that, should the Batavia conversations fail to make real progress, then Australia, together with India and other countries, would publicly question the U.S.'s official attitude.¹

Friction was clearly developing between Australia and the U.S., and between Critchley and Cochran on U.N.C.I. Herremans, the Belgian member of U.N.C.I., was reported to have said Cochran was 'fed up' with Critchley's attempts to dissuade the Republicans from cooperating, especially after he had conferred with Burton at Singapore.²

Burton apparently told the British Foreign Office that, in the event of the Batavia conversations failing, (and it was his information from Critchley that they had been most unsatisfactory so far), Australia would raise a 'hullabaloo' in the General Assembly.³ The British Secretary for Commonwealth Relations is understood to have suggested that Britain raise the Indonesian question at the Commonwealth Conference.⁴ However, with India's membership of the British Commonwealth as the controversial issue on the Conference⁵ agenda, the inclusion of the Indonesian question would almost

¹ X
⁴ Loc. cit.
certainly have aroused Indian emotions unduly. It was therefore not surprising that this suggestion was unacceptable. However, at the request of the Netherlands government, the British government agreed to tell Chifley at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference that it was imperative for the Batavia conversations to succeed.

At Batavia on 21 April, the Netherlands delegation announced it was agreeable to re-establishing the Indonesian Republic at Djocjakarta and to releasing the Republican leaders, on condition that guerilla warfare stop and the Republican government agree to attend the R.T.C. at The Hague. This offer went a considerable way towards meeting Australia's objections to the Batavia conversations.

U.N.C.I. as a whole obviously regarded the Netherlands' proposal as affording a good chance for Dutch-Indonesian reconciliation. Critchley spent much time during the following couple of weeks conferring with the Republican delegation, likewise Herremans with the Netherlands, and Cochran acted in the capacity of a coordinator.

At this stage Evatt probably thought it best not to interfere with the chances of a Dutch-Indonesian compromise being reached at Batavia. On 2 May he asked the Assembly to decide on a date of adjournment of the current session, and on the reallocation of agenda items. The Indonesian question was referred to the Ad Hoc Committee. Burton apparently remained hostile towards

1 Archief DIRVO. NG.4. Telegram to Elink Schuurman from Stikker, 26 April 1949, op.cit.
2 Ibid., Telegram 36 from van Royen, op.cit.
4 Taylor, op.cit., p.214.
5 See Supra, this chapter, p.273.
7 It was the impression of the Netherlands delegate, Snouck Hurgronje, that Evatt was anxious that the Assembly session finish by 14 May, to enable him to visit London before returning to Australia for the federal election campaign; also that Evatt would give priority to the Assembly's dealing with the Spanish and Israel questions over the Indonesian question.
8 GAOE, Third Session, Part II, 205th Plenary Meeting (2 May 1949), p.293.
the Batavia conversations. In Canberra on 5 May he told Teppema they were 'window dressing' and a Dutch tactic to keep the Indonesian question out of the General Assembly.¹

It seems largely as a result of Cochran's mediation,² on 7 May the Netherlands and Republican delegations at Batavia agreed on the so-called Roem-Van Royen³ Statements. The Republic thereby accepted the Netherlands proposal to restore the Republican government to Djocjakarta, and release Republican prisoners in return for its agreeing to participate in an R.T.C.⁴

On 9 May the Department of External Affairs in Canberra advised Critchley it regarded the Roem-Van Royen Statements as most satisfactory. They provided a basis for a Dutch-Indonesian agreement, and represented a firm commitment to negotiate to that end. The Department was also pleased that U.N.C.I. retained responsibility in negotiations for a final settlement. It advised Critchley that it wanted him to attend the R.T.C. at The Hague.⁵ Presumably there had been some question of Critchley's continuing on U.N.C.I.⁶

On his way to The Hague, the Head of the Far Eastern Office (Batavia) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr T. Elink Schuurman, visited Canberra on 9 and 10 May. Burton told Elink Schuurman he thought great difficulties lay ahead, and he cherished little hope that the R.T.C. would be successful.⁷ Although this might have been the tactical line for Burton to

³ Roem was the leader of the Republican Delegation, van Royen the leader of the Netherlands'.
⁴ See below, Appendix III, Document 43.
⁵ X
⁶ See p.281 below.
take, it was more likely that Burton in fact disagreed with Australia's appearing to support the Dutch initiative. Yet Australia did not completely remove pressure from the Dutch through the U.N. On 11 May the General Assembly adopted an Australia-Indian resolution by which the Indonesian question remained on its agenda for the next session.¹

In London at the end of May, Evatt inquired whether the Netherlands government would be agreeable to his visiting The Hague for discussions on 7 June. The Netherlands government had been annoyed by Australia's recent initiatives in the U.N. General Assembly. Stikker was therefore reluctant to issue a direct invitation to Evatt. While the Netherlands government was deciding how it should answer Evatt's enquiry, Stikker suggested to the Netherlands Ambassador in London, Mr E.F.M. Michiels van Verduynen, that he suggest to Evatt that the R.T.C. would be more likely to succeed if Australia replaced Critchley with Kirby on U.N.C.I.²

When Michiels broached this question with Evatt in London on 30 May, Evatt said he thought the chance for a final Dutch-Indonesian settlement had never been as good as it was at present. He told Michiels it would be difficult to replace Critchley at that stage. To do so, Evatt said, would be to disavow Critchley's policy. Moreover, Evatt maintained it would be important for Critchley to take part in the final result to deter Cochran from claiming complete credit. Evatt told Michiels Australia wanted the Dutch-Indonesian dispute settled quickly, sovereignty to be transferred, but Dutch interests retained. He promised to instruct Critchley to be fair, impartial and fully cooperative so that the settlement, which was in sight, could be achieved as quickly as possible. The inference was, if Evatt was correctly reported, that he accepted that Critchley had not hitherto been fully cooperative within

² All information in this paragraph from Archief B.Z. 912.1. Telegram to London (41) also to Washington, Paris and Brussels, from Stikker, The Hague, 27 May 1949.
U.N.C.I. Evatt dissociated himself more directly from Hodgson's anti-Dutch outburst in the Security Council on 27 December 1948. He told Michiels that Hodgson had not had his approval for what he said, but that it would have been difficult for him to have disavowed Hodgson's statement. As regards his own role at the General Assembly, Evatt maintained no harm had been done to the Dutch. In fact, the British Foreign Minister had congratulated him on his moderation. As distinct from clarifying Australia's official attitude towards the Dutch, Evatt was clearly engaged in re-establishing his own personal goodwill.

Finally, Evatt told Michiels, once a Dutch-Indonesian agreement was concluded, Australia, the U.S., France and the Netherlands should confer about future cooperation in South East Asia.\(^1\) Clearly, for external purposes, Evatt did not envisage such a Dutch transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia as would affect Australia's regional defence cooperation with the Netherlands. Presumably, recent instability in South East Asia had increased Australia's concern to conclude regional defence arrangements with Western powers in the Pacific area. Referring to the recent conclusion of the N.A.T.O. Pact in Europe, Chifley had on 15 May issued a statement on defence and regional security. Here Australia reaffirmed that

defence for the Pacific area should be by agreement between Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and thereafter with the United States, and later with other nations with possessions in this area.\(^2\)

The Netherlands government postponed making a decision about whether or not to invite Evatt to Holland until it had word from Michiels as to whether Evatt was agreeable to removing Critchley from U.N.C.I. before the R.T.C. It was also apprehensive as to how the Dutch people would react when it advised them shortly that the Netherlands would be expected to make a substantial

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contribution to meeting the costs of U.N.C.I. However, in a preliminary
discussion on 30 May, the Netherlands Cabinet decided that it did not favour
inviting Evatt to Holland. The majority view was that the primary purpose of
Evatt's visit would have been to advance his own interests in the forthcoming
Australian federal elections.¹ The Hague apparently issued no invitation, and
Evatt did not pursue the matter further.

In a Statement on International Affairs on 21 June, Evatt told the
House of Representatives:

The Assembly supported the action of the Security
Council which had initiated a conciliation group
[U.N.C.I.] in connection with Indonesia to try and
settle the matter finally as between the Republic
of Indonesia and the Netherlands Government. The
action of Australia and India in advocating conciliation
in that way won the approval of the enormous majority
of the General Assembly.²

Although it is questionable whether Australia's initiative at the General
Assembly was as influential as Evatt made out, he clearly regarded Australia's
role at the General Assembly as of domestic political value.³ Nevertheless,
Australia's Indonesia policy was coming increasingly into question within
Australia on the grounds that it ignored the threat to Australia's security of
communism in South East Asia. The rising problem of domestic communism within
Australia in mid-1949 probably made the Labor government reluctant to draw
undue attention to the question of external communism.

Nevertheless, on this same occasion, and with special reference to
Indonesia, Evatt gave the government's first comprehensive public interpreta-
tion of communism in South East Asia.

¹ All information in this paragraph from Archief B.Z. 912.1 Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, The Hague. Bureau S.G. to Division of Political Affairs,
8 June 1949.
² CNIA, Vol. XX, No.6 (June 1949), p.752.
³ In the ensuing debate Evatt said of the Opposition: "They do not talk about
Indonesia any more because the Indonesian solution advocated by Australia
and India, namely, conciliation, was accepted by the General Assembly".
CNIA, Vol. XX, No.6 (June 1949), p.757.
The general picture [in the Far East] is one of unrest and instability, and as such is most disturbing to Australia. There has been a growing influence of Communism throughout the area, [but]... the majority of genuine nationalists in most countries in South East Asia are not communists.... These genuine nationalists know well enough that they must look to established democracies in this part of the world, including Australia, for help in developing their industry and agriculture and improving the lot of their people1 and I think that in the great majority of cases they are trying to the best of their ability to see that no Communist movement takes control of the nationalist movement.

I think one of the best illustrations of that is Indonesia. It has been repeatedly said in the press and suggested by certain persons that the Republican movement in Indonesia is most probably Communist. That is clearly not so. All the factual reports [negate] that....2

Here Evatt pointed out that Australia's support for the Indonesian Republic, as well as against the external threat posed by the Dutch, was also against the internal threat of communism to Indonesia. Evatt made it clear that, in supporting non-communist nationalism in South East Asia, the Australian government was attempting to promote moderation and stability.

At the same time Evatt reaffirmed that, in assisting economic and political development in the Pacific and South East Asia, Australia would be seeking the "active cooperation" of governments in the region, and especially the U.S.3 From this it could be deduced that Australia would want to cooperate as closely as possible with the U.S. in the achievement of the final settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. Australia's increasing emphasis on regional

1 Cf. In an address to the ALP Federal Executive at Canberra on 11 May 1949, the Prime Minister (Chifley) said: "It cannot be overlooked that the only way to win the support of the East for the democracies is to improve the economic welfare of the Asian peoples - to win their spirit and so defeat any spread of Communism. It cannot be done with armies and navies.... It is desirable that the Asian people should have a decent way of life and so see that democracy, liberty and freedom don't mean freedom to starve.... This is Australia's great opportunity.... If we do not grasp it, then Asian countries will undoubtedly be looking at us and there will be increasing pressure for an outlet for their populations...." ALP Federal Executive Minutes.

2 CNIA, Vol. XX, No.6 (June 1949), p.759.

3 Ibid., p.763.
cooperation with the U.S. no doubt also reflected growing polarisation in the Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Increased instability in South East Asia during 1949 was presumably also causing Australia to feel that U.S. commitment would be necessary for Australia's regional security, namely, as a replacement to the decreased influence of European colonial powers.

It was precisely at this point, mid-1949, that Australia's policy of support for the Republic came into question, in terms of Australia's security interests. On 22 June representatives of the Netherlands, the Republic, the F.C.A. and U.N.C.I. concluded informal discussions in Indonesia about implementing the Roem-Van Royen Statements. The Republican government was to be restored to Djocjakarta by 6 July. The future status of West New Guinea\(^1\) was to be on the agenda of the R.T.C., and at this stage, surprisingly, all three delegations made it clear this would be a major issue. The Netherlands delegation claimed the Netherlands should retain this territory, while the Republican and Federalist delegations considered West New Guinea should be part of the U.S.I.\(^2\)

Australia had obviously not forseen West New Guinea being a major issue. An official Working Paper dated 15 July, which made detailed recommendations for the Australia representative on U.N.C.I., made no mention of West New Guinea.\(^3\) However by the end of July the Department of External Affairs had formulated its attitude towards the future status of West New Guinea. On 28 July the Department advised Batavia that it considered West New Guinea occupied a special position geographically, ethnologically and politically.\(^4\)

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1 A comprehensive account of this issue is given by Robert C. Bone, *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1958).

2 Taylor, *op.cit.*, p.222.

3 *Evatt Collection*. The Private Papers of Dr H.V. Evatt. (Flinders University Library, Adelaide, South Australia). Typescript. Indonesia, 15 July 1949. (Internal evidence strongly suggests that this paper was prepared in the Department of External Affairs.)

4 X. All information in this, and following, paragraph.
It was the only foreign territory with which Australia shared a land frontier (Papua-New Guinea). Australia also considered West New Guinea occupied a strategic position in relation to Torres Strait and the northern Australian coastline. Moreover, the welfare of the inhabitants of West New Guinea, would be best served, in Australia's view, by their eventually being integrated with the peoples of Papua-New Guinea\(^1\) and the rest of Melanesia, rather than with those of the Indonesian and Asian area.\(^2\) For one thing, the Department argued, Indonesian control of West New Guinea might result in a large influx of Asian peoples whose influence on the Melanesian inhabitants of West New Guinea and Australian New Guinea would be undesirable. Furthermore, Australia was pleased with the cooperation between Netherlands officials responsible for West New Guinea and the Australian Administration in New Guinea, as well as with other governments in the South Pacific Commission.

For all these reasons, the Department stated its preference for the substantive issues between the Dutch and the Indonesians being settled independently of, and prior to, any discussion of the future control of West New Guinea. It suggested that the status of West New Guinea be treated as presenting problems which were essentially not connected with the transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I., presumably developmental problems.\(^3\) The Department pointed out that such an approach would also obviate the need for Australia publicly to express a policy on this issue.

West New Guinea had been a constant, if latent, source of ambiguity in Australia's policy towards the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. Australia had supported the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements, both of which stipulated that the Netherlands' transfer of sovereignty would encompass the whole of the

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\(^1\) In July 1949 Australia combined the administration of the dependent Territory of Papua and the UN Trust Territory of New Guinea.

\(^2\) This was presumably the assumption on which Australia had included West New Guinea in the area over which the South Pacific Commission operated.

\(^3\) See pp.291-292 below.
former N.E.I. However, in formulating its policy towards the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, Australia had concentrated on the Indonesian Republic, paid less attention to the non-Republican areas of Indonesia, and virtually excluded West New Guinea from its conception of the area over which Dutch control was being disputed. Similarly, various Australian proposals for an extension of self-government to the Indonesian peoples had contained a notion of Dutch control in Indonesia which differentiated the political maturity and demands of the Indonesian peoples. Thus Dutch control would be minimal in relation to the Republic, greater in the non-Republic areas, and possibly absolute in the most outlying, and coincidentally the most 'backward', areas.\(^1\) West New Guinea belonged logically to this latter category.

As well, there had been various Australian proposals for converting Indonesia as a whole to a trusteeship, the latest one being in December 1948.\(^2\) These might be seen as complementing Australia's conversion of the mandated territory of New Guinea to a U.N. trusteeship. Moreover, by inviting the Netherlands to participate in the South Pacific Commission on behalf of West New Guinea alone, Australia had recognised Netherlands' control of West New Guinea specifically, and recognised its relationship to Australian New Guinea, rather than to the rest of Indonesia.

In mid-1949 Australia was suddenly faced with a situation in which it needed to give more specific attention to coordinating its foreign policy towards Indonesia with consideration of its own administration of Papua-New Guinea. Hitherto colonial relationships in Melanesia, including both the Dutch\(^3\) and Australian sections of New Guinea, had been relatively undisturbed. In its own interest, Australia was clearly concerned to obstruct any change-over to indigenous administration in West New Guinea. This, it felt, might enable revolutionary nationalism

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1. See Supra, Chapter 7, p.207.
2. Ibid., Chapter 8, p.245.
and/or Asian communism to penetrate New Guinea, which Australia regarded as part of its strategic zone of influence.\(^1\) Quite apart from these considerations, it was in the interests of the Australian Labor government to prevent this potentially-embarrassing issue from jeopardising the substantial settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute before the Australian federal elections.

The R.T.C. was scheduled to begin in The Hague on 23 August. After his arrival there on 15 August, Critchley advised Canberra that the West New Guinea question would be the most contentious issue to be settled. West New Guinea was the largest part of the Federal State of East Indonesia,\(^2\) and Anak Agung Gde Agung, the Premier of East Indonesia, was the person who had first raised the question of West New Guinea in relation to the R.T.C. Critchley felt that pressure for West New Guinea being included in the U.S.I. was coming from the East Indonesians, and in the interests of Indonesian unity, he had no doubt that the Republic would fully support their claim.\(^3\) This reflected the spirit of solidarity between the Federalists and the Republicans which had emerged from their Inter-Indonesian Conference (19 July – 2 August), convened to discuss strategy at the R.T.C. and the desired structure of the U.S.I.\(^4\)

After the R.T.C. began, one of the first decisions of the Conference Steering Committee was to delay discussion of the West New Guinea issue until a number of other issues had been resolved.\(^5\) Australia availed itself of the opportunity to convey its views to the Dutch, and also to the U.S. In an interview in Canberra on or about 1 September, Burton is reported to have told Teppema that both he and Critchley were astonished the Netherlands had

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1 See Supra, Chapter 5, p.133.
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5 Taylor, *op.cit.*, p.236.
not already made it clear to the R.T.C. that West New Guinea was not part of Indonesia. He pointed out that, along with Australia, other countries participating in the South Pacific Commission, namely, the U.S., Britain and France, assumed West New Guinea would be excluded from the transfer of sovereignty. Burton is reported to have jokingly dismissed press reports that Australia wanted trusteeship over West New Guinea. But he told Teppema that, after the R.T.C. had been concluded and, assuming the Dutch retained West New Guinea, Australia and the Netherlands should establish a cooperative arrangement for territorial defence in New Guinea. On 9 September Burton suggested to the U.S. Embassy in Canberra that it would be appropriate for the Netherlands itself to convert West New Guinea into a trusteeship. Burton said it would be difficult for Australia itself to make this suggestion to the Netherlands, the inference being that the U.S. might do so.

In the House of Representatives on 7 October, Evatt was asked whether "some kind of condominium" was envisaged between Australian New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea, and if this was the case, "how is it to be reconciled with the support that the Government has given to the claims of Indonesia to independence". In the first instance Evatt replied:

The Government has not favoured any particular solution of the Indonesian problem. Its desire has been merely that the parties concerned, the Indonesian Republic, the other Indonesian governments formed since the armistice, and the Netherlands should consult together, and reach agreement in order to prevent fighting and bloodshed. At the present time, at The Hague, there is in progress a round-table conference....A final agreement has not been reached, but everything points towards an agreement on terms mutually acceptable to the Netherlands and to the Indonesian countries. As far as I know, the position of Dutch New Guinea has not been brought into the deliberations. Sovereignty of Dutch New Guinea is in the Netherlands and it is for the Netherlands to say whether Dutch New Guinea shall come into the agreement. From our

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1 Archief B.Z. 912.1 Deel IX. Telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hague (33) from Teppema, Canberra, 1 September 1949.

2 X

3 CPD, Vol. 204, p.1120 (7 October 1949). Question asked by Mr Falkinder.
point of view the relationship of Dutch New Guinea with the Indonesian Republic and the future government of the territories concerned are matters primarily for the Dutch and Indonesian governments. I repeat that our interest is that there should be a peaceful settlement of that question. I understand that the honorable member's reference to a condominium was in relation to Dutch New Guinea.  

Evatt's reference to "the other Indonesian governments" was the first official recognition of the autonomous identity of the federal states. Moreover, his reference to "the Indonesian countries" suggested he regarded Indonesia as a collection of unitary states. Evatt thus accentuated the distinction he made with regard to Netherlands' sovereignty over West New Guinea. Implicitly he denied Australia's special strategic interest in West New Guinea, such as he himself had claimed during the Pacific war, and such as had been formalised by the inclusion of West New Guinea in the South Pacific Commission. He also quite clearly contradicted Australia's, and his own, insistence hitherto that Australia's direct interest in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute gave it the right to a 'say' in its settlement.

When the questioner pointed out Evatt's misinterpretation, deliberate or otherwise, of his probing the prospect of a condominium of Australia and Dutch New Guinea, Evatt replied:

"...Such an idea is quite out of the question. Australian New Guinea consists partly of the Territory of New Guinea and partly of Papua each of which adjoins Dutch New Guinea. No proposal for a condominium in the sense of joint sovereignty has ever been suggested; but that does not mean that there will not be [a] close relationship between Dutch New Guinea and Australian New Guinea. Already  

1 Ibid., [My emphasis].
the relationship between those territories is particularly close. No question of a condominium in respect of Australian New Guinea has ever been raised and, so far as I know, such a proposal would not be favourably considered by the Australian Government. However, close cooperation with the Netherlands, or whatever authority operates in Dutch New Guinea, will be strongly favoured by this Government.1

It will be recalled that during the Pacific war, Evatt was in fact reported to have mooted the idea of an Australian-Dutch condominium over West New Guinea, (as distinct from the present suggestion of a condominium over the whole of New Guinea), also of an Australian trusteeship.2 Evatt's denial, therefore, did not rule out the possibility of Australia's interest in joint administration of West New Guinea per se.

In The Hague on 13 October Critchley suggested in a Working Paper addressed to his U.S. and Belgian colleagues on U.N.C.I. that U.N.C.I. offer two suggestions to the parties for the resolution of the West New Guinea question. Critchley's first suggestion was that West New Guinea be placed under international trusteeship, with the Netherlands, Indonesia3 or the U.N. as the administering authority. Alternatively Critchley proposed the issue be postponed and West New Guinea be specifically excluded from the transfer of sovereignty "with the proviso that its status would be the subject of further negotiations within a specified time".4

Critchley did not himself believe trusteeship was the most practicable approach.5 He therefore advocated his second proposal, arguing that if discussions about West New Guinea were held some time after the transfer of sovereignty they would be 'depoliticised' and allow concentration on "the real

1 CPD, Vol. 204, p.1120 (7 October 1949).
2 See Supra, Chapter 2.
3 Since the UN did not recognise Indonesia as a state under international law, it does not seem viable that it could have nominated Indonesia as a trust authority before the transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I.
5 Taylor, op.cit., p.238. Also see p.297 below.
problems of administration and development'). Critchley suggested ten to fifteen years as an 'appropriate' time. Without knowing whether Critchley received any advice from the Department of External Affairs, it is to be noted that during September Burton had advanced both proposals which Critchley here put forward.

Critchley's proposals regarding West New Guinea were contained in a Working Paper in which he suggested to his colleagues on U.N.C.I. that it should take the initiative at the R.T.C. Critchley suggested U.N.C.I. should call a conference under its own auspices or make direct recommendations either to the parties or to the Conference Steering Committee, so as to forestall a full debate of the Indonesian question in the U.N. General Assembly. It is not inconceivable that Critchley was prompted by Canberra to make both these proposals. Australia had resented the Security Council's allowing the Netherlands, by initiating the R.T.C., to usurp the Council's, and more particularly U.N.C.I.'s prerogative. Similarly, the General Assembly's option to take up the Indonesian question represented an opportunity for Australia to reassert the authority of the U.N. Critchley may also have calculated that U.N.C.I. could prevent the West New Guinea issue from interfering with the conclusion of a settlement for the transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I. More particularly, Critchley would have been aware that, despite the cease-fire in Indonesia on 1 August, the military situation remained brittle. Should the R.T.C. not conclude on 2 November as scheduled, civil order in Indonesia would inevitably be disrupted again.

In Canberra on 18 October, under instructions from Stikker, Teppema handed Evatt two personal and informal notes, the first relating to the West

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2 See Supra, this chapter, pp.288-289.
New Guinea question at the R.T.C., and the second to defence arrangements for the U.S.I. (to be agreed on by the Netherlands and the Indonesian parties at the R.T.C.). The Netherlands submitted identical notes to the U.S. and Britain.\(^1\)

In the first note the Netherlands asked the U.S., Britain\(^2\) and Australia to support its efforts to exclude West New Guinea from the transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I. and to postpone making a decision about the future status of West New Guinea until after the R.T.C. Rather than itself place West New Guinea under trusteeship or postpone taking a decision for some ten to fifteen years (as Australia suggested), the Netherlands said, for reasons of expediency and practicability, it intended consulting with Indonesia to create a trusteeship in West New Guinea, in which responsibilities would be shared with the U.S.I. In putting this proposal forward, the Netherlands claimed the structure and degree of development of West New Guinea was similar to that of Papua–New Guinea. (Given Australia's considerable post-war attention to Papua–New Guinea,\(^3\) one cannot imagine Australia would have been flattered by this unqualified comparison.) Finally, in so far as West New Guinea was of strategic importance to the defence of the Pacific, the Netherlands considered that both the U.S. and Australia would be interested in its future status.\(^4\)

In the second note the Netherlands asked whether the U.S. and Australia were prepared, in the interests of Western defence of the Pacific,


\(^2\) As members of UNCI, the US and Australia were in a position to support the Netherlands. However, without denying Britain's regional defence interest in the West New Guinea question, it is difficult to know how Britain could have brought any influence to bear on this issue.

\(^3\) e.g. See L.R. Mair, Australia in New Guinea (Sydney, 1948).

\(^4\) Archief Minog, C.5/4613/570, op.cit., Enclosure "A".
to press the Indonesian Republic to compromise its demands that Netherlands naval bases be closed and Netherlands naval forces be withdrawn from Indonesia within a few months of the transfer of sovereignty. The Netherlands pointed out that the defence position of the U.S.I. would be weakened, and a defence vacuum would exist after the transfer of sovereignty. Moreover, it argued, the U.S.I. would be under no obligation to cooperate with the Western powers in regional defence arrangements.¹

Evatt's reply to the Netherlands' notes on 20 October was noticeably off-handed. The subjects of the Netherlands' notes were, Evatt asserted, but two of a number of questions to be settled at the R.T.C., and he thought the question of the N.E.I. public debt might yet prove to be the most important. He also repudiated the Netherlands' claim that it would be too protracted a process for the Netherlands to place West New Guinea under U.N. trusteeship.² A statement of intent by the Netherlands would, Evatt maintained, be tantamount to doing so. As a member of the Trusteeship Council, he added, Australia would be glad to accept a proposal by the Netherlands to place West New Guinea under trusteeship.³ In conformity with his statement to the House of Representatives on 7 October,⁴ Evatt denied that Australia was vitally interested in the future status of West New Guinea and reaffirmed this was a proper subject for discussion between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia.⁵

¹ Archief Minog., Enclosure "B" (Ad. C.5/4613/570), Canberra, 18 October 1949. Under cover of Teppema, Canberra, 14 October 1949, op.cit.
² See Supra, this chapter, p.295.
³ Cf. Undocumented statement by Margaret Haupt, "Australian Policy towards the West New Guinea Dispute, 1945-1962" (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1970), p.94: "During the month of October interested governments, including Australia, were privately approached regarding their possible reactions to a proposal that the Netherlands place West New Guinea under a United Nations trusteeship. Netherlands officials were informed by Dr Evatt in a confidential, informal exchange of views that Australia would find trusteeship an acceptable solution".
⁴ See Supra, this chapter, pp.289-290.
⁵ All above information about Evatt's reply from Archief Minog., C.5/4613/570, op.cit., Enclosure "C".
With regard to the Netherlands' second note, Evatt asserted the question of over-all defence of Indonesia should be easy for the Netherlands and Republican authorities to resolve, and could be postponed until after the transfer of sovereignty. Thereby Evatt appeared to underwrite the standpoint Australia had constantly espoused throughout the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, namely, that Australia favoured a Dutch-Indonesian compromise settlement by which the Netherlands would maintain primary responsibility for the defence of Indonesia.

How does one account for this denial of interest in West New Guinea when Evatt had formerly and vehemently proclaimed Australia's "vital" interest as to "who shall live in, develop and control" the arc of islands to Australia's north?¹ More immediately, Evatt's denials contradicted his own Department.²

With federal elections pending in Australia, domestic political considerations were likely contributants. Evatt's vanity would perhaps not allow him to admit an 'oversight' in Australia's Indonesia policy. Also, the Australian Labor Cabinet was apparently not agreed that West New Guinea should be excluded from the Netherlands transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I.³ Aside from avoiding intra-governmental controversy, the Department of External Affairs had already indicated the government's concern to avoid the controversy which would inevitably arise from publicising the West New Guinea dispute and Australia's policy towards it.⁴ Presumably Evatt was also keen to be able to present Labor's Indonesia policy to the Australian electorate as an incontrovertible success.

¹ See Supra, Chapter 3.
² Ibid., this chapter, p.285.
³ Haupt thesis, op.cit., p.101 Footnote: "Mr J.J. Dedman [Minister for Defence] stated in an interview that he did not regard West New Guinea as being separate from Indonesia. He added that it was his recollection that other Labor members shared his view that West New Guinea would inevitably become a part of Indonesia. Had Cabinet discussed the issue, he would not have advised Australia to oppose the transfer to Indonesia".
⁴ See Supra, p.22.
As distinct from Australia, how did the U.S. and Britain regard the Netherlands' proposals for resolving the West New Guinea issue? The U.S. State Department supported both the idea of excluding West New Guinea from the transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I., and the Netherlands' proposal for converting West New Guinea to a trusteeship in which responsibility for development were shared by the Netherlands and the U.S.I.¹ Evatt's initial information was that Britain was not in favour of a U.N. trusteeship, which he proposed.² At a meeting in Canberra in November, however, Britain and Australia agreed to support the Netherlands' proposal that West New Guinea become a trust territory.³ It was not clear whether or not this agreement extended to the idea of Netherlands-U.S.I. joint responsibility but, given the standpoint Australia expressed elsewhere, this would seem unlikely.

During the last week of October, the fourth session of the South Pacific Commission convened at Noumea, New Caledonia. The Netherlands delegation was under strict instructions not to discuss the future status of West New Guinea. However, it reported members of the Australian delegation as having repeatedly spoken out against Indonesian administration of West New Guinea. The Australians are understood to have argued that the Indonesians were unfit to administer West New Guinea and to have asserted that an Indonesian administration there would be disastrous for the Papuan population. Members

¹ Archief B.Z. 912.10 Nederland–Indonesie R.T.C. Houding v.d. Amerikaanse regering. Telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hague (368) from van Kleffens, Washington, 24 October 1949. With regard to future defence, the US thought the Republic should be told immediately that the US wanted the Netherlands to retain Sourabaya as a naval base.
of the Australian delegation apparently intimated to the Netherlands representatives that Australia had instructed Critchley to support the Netherlands' approach to the West New Guinea question at the R.T.C.¹

At the end of October the Netherlands and Indonesian parties to the R.T.C. specifically asked U.N.C.I. to assist it resolve the West New Guinea question so that the R.T.C. could conclude as scheduled on 2 November.² In mid-October Critchley had deemed trusteeship an impracticable solution.³ On 30 October he told Canberra that he thought Netherlands' trusteeship of West New Guinea would be the preferable solution, but that this would be politically unacceptable to the Indonesians.⁴ For its part, U.N.C.I. recommended that the West New Guinea question be postponed until after the transfer of sovereignty. The parties accepted U.N.C.I.'s recommendation. However, whereas the relevant Article of the Conference Resolution, as originally drafted, had recognised the Netherlands' authority to control the status quo in West New Guinea, the Indonesian Federalist delegation succeeded in having this amended. The Article as adopted by the R.T.C. noted that the views of the parties regarding West New Guinea remained "in dispute",⁵ although the parties agreed in an exchange of letters to describe West New Guinea as "continuing under the Government of the Netherlands".⁶

From the short-term point of view of the Australian government, this was a satisfactory outcome, but in the long-term view it was less satisfactory. Despite its 'low posture' publicly, on the West New Guinea question, Australia

² Taylor, op.cit., p.238.
³ See Supra, this chapter, p.291.
⁴ X
⁶ Stikker, op.cit., p.149.
Map 8: The Republic of the United States of Indonesia
(as shown by boundary lines)

clearly favoured Netherlands' or U.N. control. Yet the R.T.C. agreements provided no assurance that either would be the case. It also seemed likely that, when Australia was eventually impelled to publicly state its attitude towards the ultimate resolution of the West New Guinea dispute, the Labor party would espouse a policy which contradicted many of the principles on which it had so vehemently supported the Indonesian Republic during the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.

The R.T.C. concluded as scheduled on 2 November with an agreement by which the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to the Republic of the U.S.I., and the U.S.I. became an equal and independent member of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. By the time of the R.T.C., the prevailing view in the Netherlands was that Holland did not have the military capacity to enforce a political settlement in Indonesia and that it should therefore transfer complete sovereignty to the U.S.I. The U.S. apparently also recognised the resilience and resistance of the Republic, as well as the radical alternative, should the outcome of the R.T.C. not satisfy the Indonesian parties. Thus, the Netherlands' resolve was reinforced by U.S. insistence that the U.S.I. be granted full independence.¹ The U.S.I. government became responsible for defence and foreign relations, as well as for economic and financial policies. Prior to the R.T.C., sovereignty in each of these areas had been in dispute. Under the R.T.C. agreements, however, cooperation within the Netherlands-Indonesian Union would depend on the willingness of the Netherlands and the U.S.I. This accorded with Australia's constant insistence that the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia should be one of voluntary cooperation. But, in so far as cooperation to the extent envisaged by Australia was unlikely, the loose structure of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union would appear to have fallen short of Australia's hopes.

¹ See Kahin, op.cit., pp.431-432.
Apart from the West New Guinea question, Australia appeared to have played a relatively subdued role at the R.T.C. In regard to another major issue, the N.E.I. debts, Critchley resisted Cochran's attempt to assert himself individually as the representative of U.N.C.I. in relation to the Debt Commission.¹ But Australia apparently did not particularly assume the role of protector of Indonesia by vehemently opposing the transfer of these debts to the U.S.I.² This was perhaps a concession to the U.S., which wanted a strong Netherlands in Europe. Most surprisingly, Australia appeared not to have clashed with the Netherlands to any great extent. In fact Stikker conveyed to Evatt the Netherlands' appreciation of the contribution Critchley made to the successful outcome of the R.T.C.³ Since the U.S. was keen for a prompt settlement and as Indonesian stability also required this, Australia's role was not incongruous. It was itself also concerned that the dispute be settled quickly and peacefully.

With Australian federal elections scheduled for December, it is not inconceivable that the Labor government felt it needed, after the R.T.C., to reassure the public of the wisdom of its policies for protecting Australia's security in relation to an independent Indonesia and an inevitably decolonised South East Asia. In Canberra on 10 and 11 November, Evatt convened a meeting of British, New Zealand, and Australia officials to discuss matters of mutual concern in South East Asia. An official press release declared that Australia's long-term policy would be to encourage

maximum economic development, higher living standards, and the orderly growth of political autonomy and democratic institutions throughout the area. This is

¹ Kahin, op.cit., p.441.
NEWS ITEM: The Waterside Workers' Federation will consult other unions with a view to lifting the ban on shipping to the Netherlands East Indies.

Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)
30 November 1949
regarded as the best means of establishing a firm basis for lasting friendly relations....Australian commercial and strategic interests depend on the maintenance and extension of such friendly relations. Such relations are regarded as the best bulwark against any extremist or disruptive developments.¹

Items on the agenda for the meeting included both the R.T.C. Agreements and the future status of West New Guinea. According to a paper prepared for the meeting, Australia intended to make it clear that it fully expected the U.S.I. government would confront internal instability caused by both guerillas and communists. With regard to the future status of West New Guinea, Australia proposed to tell Britain that it firmly favoured a trusteeship.² Australia apparently also told Britain it considered it would be desirable for the West New Guinea issue to be resolved within a couple of months of the Netherlands transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I.³ In turn, it advised the U.S. on 24 November that, while it considered the West New Guinea question was essentially a matter to be resolved between the Netherlands and the U.S.I., Australia's preference was for a U.N. trusteeship.⁴ The fickleness in Australia's attitude towards the West New Guinea issue during 1949 presumably reflected internal indecisiveness as to the correct Australian policy.

Australia's foreign policy towards Indonesia figured only marginally in Labor's election campaign, but the Liberal and Country parties paid considerable attention to the Australian union ban on Dutch shipping in Australia which was only lifted on 1 December.⁵ This attack complemented the Opposition's campaign focus on the threat of domestic communism to industry

² Evatt Collection, op.cit., Topics for Discussion, op.cit.
³ Archief DIRVO. LA, op.cit., Telegram to Stikker, The Hague and to Teppema, Canberra from de Beus, Batavia, 16 November 1949.
⁴ X
⁵ WWF Federal Council Circular 49/56 - Goods to and from Indonesia. Signed by J. Heely, General Secretary, 2 December 1949 (ANU Archives, Deposit T62/56 Volume 8).
and more generally to the Australian economy. In its election campaign, the Opposition parties were also able to successfully link the "threat" of internal communism with popular fears of external communism in Asia.

The Liberal and Country parties won the election of 10 December. Seventeen days later the new government formally accorded full recognition to the U.S.I. and to the government headed by President Soekarno and Prime Minister Hatta.

Summary and Conclusion

Between February 1949 and the R.T.C. agreements in November 1949, Australia's policy towards the Dutch-Indonesian dispute shifted considerably from issue to issue.

In the first instance Australia continued to give vehement support to the Indonesian Republic. Such was the case when Australia insisted that the Netherlands be compelled to comply with the Security Council's resolution of 28 January, which among other things, called on the Dutch to release Republican political prisoners, and thereby restore the Republic as a negotiating party. Similarly, it showed its hostility to the Council's directive of 23 March by which U.N.C.I. was to assist the Dutch initiative to confer an R.T.C. Likewise Australia was reluctant to accept the Batavia (pre-R.T.C.) conversations until the Dutch had released Republican political prisoners and restored the Republican government to Djocjakarta. Australia's referral of the Indonesian question to the U.N. General Assembly was in turn a form of insurance for the Republic, should either the Batavia conversations or the R.T.C. conclude unsatisfactorily.

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1 In July 1949 the Labor government had been impelled to intervene in communist-controlled unions during the Coal Strike.

However, when the West New Guinea question emerged as a major issue at the R.T.C., Australia found itself opposed to the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea to be included in the transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I. Although overt conflict was averted by the agreement to exclude West New Guinea from the transfer, and to make a separate decision as to its status at a later date, it was clear that there were large inconsistencies between Australia's policies towards the Dutch-Indonesian dispute and its attitude towards the West New Guinea question.

Australia's attitudes towards the Netherlands between February and November 1949, not surprisingly, formed a converse pattern. Australia's initiatives at the U.N. General Assembly reflected its fundamental distrust of the Netherlands. More particularly as a member of U.N.C.I., and in the Security Council prior to the Batavia conversations, Australia made clear its hostility to the Netherlands' proposing the R.T.C. without first restoring the Republic as a negotiating party.

Yet the Australian government's strong disapproval of Dutch policies towards Indonesia was not equivalent to an objection to the Dutch presence in Indonesia. Even before the West New Guinea question arose, instability in South East Asia prompted Australia to reiterate its idea of defence cooperation with the Netherlands in the Pacific, and still more particularly with the U.S. as the European colonial presence diminished. When the West New Guinea issue arose, not only did Australia support the Netherlands position, but both Evatt and Burton spoke unequivocably about present and future close cooperation between Australia and the Netherlands in New Guinea. Both also indicated that they were particularly concerned about defence cooperation.

Throughout 1949 Australia's support for the U.N. clearly came into conflict with its attitude towards the part played by the Security Council in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. Australia was hostile towards the Council's continually 'soft' attitude towards Netherlands' non-compliance with its
directives. When the Security Council compromised its position by the directive of 23 March, Australia demonstrated its unwillingness to rely on the Security Council by referring the Indonesian question to the U.N. General Assembly. As a member of U.N.C.I., Australia was particularly concerned that the Council would fail to insist on this newly-empowered conciliatory authority participating in the final Dutch-Indonesian settlement. Obviously, as a member of U.N.C.I., Australia found it difficult to reconcile its responsibility to comply with the Council's directive of 23 March with its reservations about the Batavia conversations. Critchley's proposal in mid-October that U.N.C.I. seize the initiative at the R.T.C. possibly reflected Australia's continuing regret that the U.N. was not playing a more prominent part in the final Dutch-Indonesian settlement.

Within the Australian government there were often inconsistencies in policy. Evatt appeared to give priority to a peaceful settlement and possibly also to cooperation with the U.S., which was pressing for the resolution of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute by the R.T.C. For their part, Burton and Critchley both appeared concerned that the Republic should receive a fair settlement. Only on the West New Guinea question did a clear consensus emerge.

Throughout 1949 Australia continued to envisage a Dutch-Indonesian settlement in which continuing Dutch political influence would be ensured by a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, Dutch economic interests would be protected, and the Netherlands maintained primary responsibility for the external defence of the U.S.I. When the West New Guinea issue arose, Australia also revealed that it envisaged a territorial compromise in the Netherlands' favour. Once the Republican and Federalist Indonesian parties became unified and more diplomatically-confident, however, Australia's aspiration that they would voluntarily concede to the Dutch in such areas was suddenly overtaken.
This disorientation in Australia's constant policy of support for a Dutch-Indonesian compromise settlement was reflected, in part, in its heightened concern with increased instability in South East Asia generally during 1949. In reaction to this, Australia gave increased priority to its ties with the West. It appealed for Western democratic assistance to support the forces of moderation and stability in South East Asia, as well as for the cooperation of the major Western powers in defence in the Pacific. Its uneasiness about the stability of the U.S.I. was revealed at the Canberra Conference in November 1949. Clearly, the terms of the Netherlands' transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I. did not fulfil the security interests which had been a foremost consideration in Australia's policies throughout the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.
CONCLUSION

Australian foreign policy first paid serious attention to the N.E.I. when it failed to provide a bulwark to Australia's security in the war against Japan. Faced for the first time with protecting its own territory from an Asian imperial power, Australia was shocked at the ease with which Japan occupied the European colonies to its north. The wartime Labor government became persuaded that the remote European metropolitan powers had afforded inadequate protection to their colonies in the Pacific. It also recognised the economic deficiencies of colonialism which had enabled Japan to establish its co-prosperity sphere. To forestall a similar situation in the post-war period, the Labor government argued that the monopolistic control of colonies by their metropolitan powers, particularly in defence and economic matters, should be divided among a number of advanced Western powers. It claimed that Australia, in order to become more self-reliant and independent, must assume equal status in sharing these post-war responsibilities. The wartime government thus envisaged order in the Pacific being maintained by a concert of Western 'security powers', which included Australia.

Mindful of the possibilities of an economically-resurgent and/or remilitarised Japan, the government specifically advocated the application of the principle of trusteeship in the Pacific area. In so doing, it emphasised the desirable effect such as sharing of power responsibilities would have in strengthening external colonial security. While Evatt in particular also stressed that trusteeship would give the local peoples themselves a greater interest in resisting future external attack, the Labor government's anti-colonialism was primarily one of opposition to colonial monopolisation by the metropolitan powers, rather than support for the nationalist claimants. It was also an assertion of Australia's interest and power. Australia's aspiration to become a "Pacific power" reflected its
strategic consciousness of the "Pacific war". It also implied a continuing inability to perceive Australia's relationship to the peoples of its region. The government began to formalise its claim to a distinctive regional role in the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of January 1944. However, by unilaterally claiming certain responsibilities in the post-war Pacific, it at once acknowledged Australia's inability as a small power to compete on an equal basis with the major and secondary Western powers.

In any case, Labor's 'blueprint' did not fit post-war realities. While the idea of Australia's assuming post-colonial regional responsibilities had appealed as an ideal solution to the situation of strategic vulnerability in which Australia had found itself in 1942, it was quite inappropriate to meet the regional crisis of internal colonial dislocation which emerged in post-war South East Asia. The Australian government had been confident about Australia's assuming a passive post-colonial position alongside the colonial powers in the region. But it had not contemplated Australia's intervening actively in a threateningly hostile relationship between the metropolitan powers and the indigenous peoples. This was implicit in the Labor government's reaction to post-war developments in the N.E.I. in particular.

During the Pacific war Evatt had foreshadowed Australia's assuming a 'special' position as a 'security' and 'trustee' power in the N.E.I. His allusions to the desirability of Australia's obtaining some kind of post-war territorial foothold in the N.E.I., at least in the islands closest to Australia, where Dutch defence had been minimal in 1941-1942, implied a particular lack of confidence in the security the Dutch had afforded against Japanese aggression in the N.E.I. Notwithstanding Australia's own failure to secure Australian New Guinea and Papua against Japanese invasion, such notions assumed Australia's defence capability was superior to that of the Dutch in the N.E.I. In any case, Evatt considered that Australia's wartime 'status' as the territorial base of the N.E.I. administration-in-exile,
together with its participation in the recovery of the N.E.I. from Japanese occupation, would confer on it the right to obtain a special post-war security role in the N.E.I., or at least considerable influence. This was the assumption on which the informal Australian-Dutch conversations of 1944-1945 were held.

Not only did the Dutch have fundamental objections to Evatt's assumptions based on their orthodox concept of colonial sovereignty but the expansionist element in his perception of Australia's post-war security role in the N.E.I. militated against either the metropolitan or the N.E.I. Dutch being responsive to it. Evatt's claim that Australia would be "vitally concerned as to who shall live in, develop and control" the arc of islands to Australia's north implied that the occupying power would in some way be accountable to Australia in order to retain its right of occupancy. The Dutch, as the sovereign power in the N.E.I., viewed this as dangerous presumption.

Yet the diplomatic position Australia adopted towards the post-war N.E.I. contrasted sharply with the rhetorical projections Evatt had made during the Pacific war. The Australian government was initially hesitant about claiming a special role, even a special interest, in the solution of the post-war Dutch-Indonesian dispute. Despite Evatt's wartime protestations against the post-war restoration of colonial rule, the military policy of the Chifley government required a full resumption of responsibility by the Dutch as the sovereign power in the N.E.I. outer islands where Australia had responsibility for Allied reoccupation. Subsequently, when the unitary Indonesian Republic (as proclaimed on 17 August 1945) adopted a policy of diplomasi - and thereby modified its outright demand for merdeka (freedom) from the Dutch to a claim for national autonomy - this presumably facilitated the Australian government's adoption of a sympathetic attitude towards the nationalist position. The anti-colonial disposition of the Labor government and anti-Dutch sentiments which had germinated in the
Australian-N.E.I. wartime relationship provided foundation for this sympathy. Nevertheless, the Australian government maintained a conservative and low-key position for some time. Australia's wartime policies towards the N.E.I. had not questioned the principle that non-self-governing territories should continue to be controlled by external powers. This principle remained the assumption in the post-war period.

When Evatt first proposed Australian intervention in Java in November 1945 to resolve the confused post-hostilities military situation, his primary regard was to the security situation. The Australian government's advocacy of a peaceful, liberal compromise settlement between the Dutch and the Indonesians was a cautious advance on its wartime policies and was a safe and impartial attitude to adopt. But it was also necessarily a denial of the fundamental Republican challenge to the Dutch position in Indonesia. Evatt's subsequent attempts during 1946 to interpose Australia as a participant in British mediation in the N.E.I. appeared more as diplomatic posturing to gain personal prestige and recognition of Australia's claim to a special regional role than as constructive proposals to resolve the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. The Australian government in 1946 asserted no claim to a special security interest in the N.E.I. Despite domestic opposition pressures and external considerations, Evatt was clearly disposed to establishing an identity of interest between Australia and the Dutch and he offered no official diplomatic encouragement to the Republic. His public statements showed no particular sensitivity to the Republican viewpoint. Evatt perhaps continued to dissociate the "domestic dispute" between the Dutch and the Republic from the projected partnership between Australia and the Netherlands as the continuing external power in the N.E.I., which the Australian government did not question. In March 1946 Evatt for the first time affirmed publicly the government's post-war support for an extension of self-government to the Indonesian peoples. His official advocacy on 9 November, six days before the Cheribon Agreement was initialled, of the extension of "a
substantial measure of self-government" to the Indonesian peoples, if bold in terms of traditional Australian foreign policies, was hardly so in relation to post-war developments in the N.E.I. Beyond such generalisations, the Australian government during 1946 offered no specific suggestions for the internal political structure of Indonesia.

Only after the Cheribon Agreement accorded the Republic de facto status did the Department of External Affairs encourage the development of informal relations between the Australian and Republican governments. However, within the government there were apparently different views as to how fast and to what extent Australia should support the Republic. In early 1947 Ward's ministerial adventurousness\(^1\) distinguished his position from that of Evatt and of the government in general. As both official distrust of Dutch intentions to concede Indonesian self-government and hostility to Dutch tactics increased, a desire by the government to assist the Republic emerged. Thus, in March 1947 Australia advocated U.N. intervention to the U.S., and made preparations to assist attempts to challenge the Dutch blockade of the Republic. Yet Evatt's proposal of a regional commission for South East Asia and his idea of Australia's assuming a special responsibility for the formation of a 'harmonious association of democratic states' in the area underlined his continuing identification of stability with Western influence and values. Clearly, the idea of Australia finding a regional role as a result of the colonial demise was re-emerging.

However, only after the Linggadjati Agreement had been signed in March 1947 did the Australian government itself move to actively sponsor Dutch-Republican cooperation. As distinct from non-governmental efforts to establish trade between Australia and the Republic, the Australian government, as the recipient of the Gani-Hoogstraten Agreement, emphasised its third-

\(^1\) His invitation to the Republic to attend the South Seas Conference, and his assistance to Campbell as the Temporary Trade Commissioner for the Republic in Australia.
party responsibility to Dutch-Republican cooperation. Yet, the concurrent attempts by Evatt, Burton and the Australian mission to Indonesia to obtain a substitute settlement of the N.E.I. war debt to Australia indicated an official lack of confidence in the Linggadjati formula. The attempt to persuade the Dutch to grant Australia political or territorial concessions in Dutch New Guinea or Dutch Timor suggested an interest to obtain a 'forward defence' position in advance of a self-governing U.S.I. There was a similar conservative element in Australia's urging the Republic to join an interim Indonesian government under Dutch de jure control in June-July 1947. Notwithstanding the Australian government's recognition of the de facto status of the Republic at this stage, its offer of economic assistance to an interim Indonesian government reflected a higher priority to Dutch-Indonesian cooperation than to Indonesian autonomy.

When Dutch-Republican cooperation broke down in July 1947 and the Dutch launched their first 'police action' against the Republic, the Australian government was somewhat more diffident about assuming independent or special responsibility for intervening to restore peaceful cooperation. However, when, in due course, Australia referred the hostilities in Indonesia to the Security Council, its various proposals for arbitration, rather than mediation, of the dispute reaffirmed its support for external intervention in the dispute. Yet, such a conviction constituted recognition that a peaceful compromise settlement between the Dutch and the Republic would have to be imposed from without, rather than independently concluded by the disputants. Evatt's subsequent proposal for a "commonwealth" relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia was an advance on his previous advocacy of Indonesian internal autonomy, and was perhaps an attempt to shift to a more realistic formula for Dutch-Indonesian cooperation. Burton's proposal in September 1947 for the adoption of the U.S.-Philippines formula was a more liberal model. Implicitly, excessive suppression by the Dutch in
Indonesia resulted in an official re-evaluation of the degree of Dutch control in Indonesia that was desirable, in terms of internal stability and external security.

The Republic's nomination of Australia to the G.O.C. no doubt contributed to official confidence in the Republic and in Australia's ability to influence it. The government's concern to encourage the left-wing Sjarifuddin government to adhere to a policy of diplomasi implicitly provided additional motive for Australia's staunch support of the Republic both inside and outside the G.O.C. in 1947, and to its intermittently unorthodox diplomatic efforts to obtain an early negotiated settlement. In this context the Renville Agreement was a crisis in Australia's position as the Republic's nominee to the G.O.C.

In the immediate post-Renville months Australia fought for a restoration of the Republic's de facto status. As instability within the Republic re-emerged, however, Evatt reverted to a more conservative position by emphasising the necessity for continuing Dutch influence, and the Department of External Affairs favoured a more gradualist solution than the proposed U.S.I. This contrasted with the liberal lines for a settlement which Critchley formulated in the Critchley-Dubois Proposals. Although the government supported the Critchley-Dubois Proposals in the Security Council, its attitude towards the solution of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute for the rest of 1948 can be seen to have been more conservative and lacking in confidence. As revolutionary forces gained ascendancy within the Republic, the Australian government reverted to a low-key relationship with the Republic. At the time of the Madiun rebellion both Evatt and Burtor favoured a reidentification of Australian and Dutch interests, although the government's continuing advocacy of an early settlement between the Netherlands and the Republic may be seen as an attempt to forestall the assumption of revolutionary control within the Republic. Basically the Australian govern-
ment opposed violence which created instability in Indonesia, be it Republican revolutionary tactics or Dutch military measures.

The Australian government's equivocation of 1948 dissolved when the Dutch launched a second 'police action' against the Republic in December 1948. Australia opposed the Dutch attempt to militarily destroy the Republic, which the Security Council recognised as an equal party to the Indonesian dispute. Its participation in the New Delhi Conference affirmed this official conviction, similarly its referral of the Indonesian question to the General Assembly, and its fear that the Batavia conversations would deal the final political blow to the Republic as a party to the final settlement. All the while Burton and Critchley in particular were concerned that, unless there was a quick settlement, revolutionary forces would take over the Republic. Evatt saw it as Australia's role, politically, to support and influence and, economically, to assist the Republican government as the non-communist nationalist party in Indonesia. At this stage, with the Cold War well-defined and its focus shifting to Asia, there was clearly an ideological element in Australia's policy.

The attitude the Australian government took to the West New Guinea question in 1949 indicated a basic and general reservation about the effect on Australia's security of its being contiguous to an autonomous Indonesia. The government's policy contradicted its approach to the resolution of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, based as it was on the premise that satisfaction of the moderate demands of the Republic afforded the best guarantee to Australia's security. At the same time, whereas the Australian government had come to regard the Dutch as contributing to instability in Indonesia, their continuing control of West New Guinea was welcomed as a guarantee to stability within New Guinea and as a bulwark to Australia's external security. Whereas the Australian government had in 1947 sought an advance foothold for Australia in Dutch New Guinea or Dutch Timor, it now reverted to firmly supporting Dutch sovereignty, and hence the 'barrier' concept. The priority
which the Australian government had latterly appeared to give to Australian cooperation with the Indonesian peoples dissolved in relation to West New Guinea.

Generally, the Round Table Conference did not produce the kind of binding cooperative relationship between the Dutch and the Indonesians for which Australia had hoped. The Australian government acquiesced in Indonesian independence as the most expedient solution albeit at some defence, economic and political cost, from Australia's point of view. Evatt's announcement in November 1949 that Australia would seek to encourage democracy in South East Asia did not indicate a confident acceptance of ideologically, as well as a culturally, dissimilar neighbours.

The Netherlands' transfer of sovereignty to the U.S.I. clearly limited Evatt's idea of incorporating the Dutch in regional defence arrangements covering Indonesia. The Australian government's approach to the West New Guinea question in 1949 suggested a hastily-conceived notion of a narrower Australian zone of strategic influence involving close Australian-Dutch defence cooperation in New Guinea. With regard to Indonesia, the government accordingly upgraded the diplomatic components in its concept of regional security. Goodwill towards Indonesia was regarded as affording Australia a means of exercising Western democratic influence. Similarly, Australia's extension of economic and developmental assistance to Indonesia was seen as a means of reducing Australia's environmental, political and diplomatic disadvantages in relation to Indonesia. Implicitly the Australian government would be satisfied with Indonesia's position in its scheme for regional security only so long as an independent Indonesia adhered to the ideological standards required of it by Australia. At the same time, the exclusion of Indonesia from the Australian government's projections of future defence arrangements during 1948-1949 carried an assumption that the Netherlands would continue as an external security power in the Indonesian
area. It possibly reflected as well a lack of perception of Australian-Indonesian common defence interests. Together with the restoration of the New Guinea 'barrier' concept, this substantiated the impression that the Australian government regarded Indonesia as potentially threatening to Australia. There was an assumption that, should the Dutch presence be completely removed, then the Indonesian peoples might well transfer their aggressive feelings from the Dutch as their white oppressors to Australia as their contiguous white, Western neighbour. Such an assumption underlay the Labor government's efforts to create a regional identity which distinguished Australia from the European colonial powers of South East Asia.

The lack of confidence of the Curtin and Chifley governments in Australia's direct relationship to Indonesia contributed to their having a vacillating attitude towards cooperation with the major Western powers. Throughout this period Australia's policies were in basic accord with those of Britain and the U.S. For the greater part of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, all three advocated a peaceful and liberal compromise settlement between the Dutch and the Republic. However, whenever the Australian government was seeking a special role for itself in Indonesia, or alternatively whenever it perceived Britain or the U.S. to be showing sympathy for the Netherlands as a fellow colonial power, it deliberately dissociated Australia from the major Western bloc. On the other hand, when it perceived the need for a major Western power to take a diplomatic initiative or when it recognised its own incapacity or unwillingness to take the lead, it sought to identify, and be associated with, its major Western counterparts. In the post-war years this ambivalence was complicated by the emergent Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Although allied to the Western democratic tradition, the Australian government wished neither to align itself with the U.S.S.R. nor to recognise the Cold War as a constant restraint on its independent policies.
It will be recalled that in 1940-1941 a non-Labor Australian government deferred to the U.S. in deciding its defence policy towards the N.E.I. During the Pacific war, the Labor government's desire to involve other Western 'security powers' in the post-war N.E.I. conflicted also with its perception of national interests. As a junior partner in the S.W.P.A. command and in S.E.A.C., Australia was dependent on the U.S. and subsequently on Britain to recognise its claim to participate in the reoccupation of the N.E.I. Yet it asserted that its claim as a contiguous Western power was greater than that of the U.S. or Britain. Alternately, in the post-war situation of internal colonial conflict in the N.E.I., Evatt in November 1945 proposed Australian intervention in Java only after the Department of External Affairs had fully explored the possibilities of British, U.S. or U.N. sponsorship of external intervention. Throughout 1945-1946 the Australian government deferred to British and U.S. wishes to avoid external intervention in the dispute being widened by its being referred to the U.N. But, throughout 1946, Evatt's aspirations for Australia to be recognised as the principal British Commonwealth power in the Pacific were out of touch with the realities in the N.E.I., in view of the Australian government's inability and unwillingness to accept the military and political tasks Britain undertook as part of its S.E.A.C. responsibilities. Given the national limitations on the government's independent third-party intervention, Australia's dominion status was a diplomatic advantage. Despite Chifley's antagonism towards British military policy in Java and the Labor government's general reluctance to be a party to the British military task in the N.E.I., if Evatt had throughout 1946 been less diplomatically assertive for the sake of assertiveness, the Australian government may have had a better chance of obtaining a voice, or having its regional political aspirations accommodated, in British mediation in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.

1 See Supra, Chapter 1, pp.15-17.
For almost two years the Australian government evinced no impelling security interest to warrant its taking independent action in relation to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. Only after the first Dutch 'police action' was initiated, and then only after due deference to the U.S. and more particularly to Britain, did it feel so impelled. Australia's proposal that the dispute be submitted to third-party arbitration in accordance with Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement not only suited Australia's interest to keep the dispute out of the direct control of the Security Council but also complemented the interest of the Western bloc to limit external intervention in the dispute. Evatt's subsequent proposal for multilateral arbitration of the dispute by Britain, the U.S. and Australia indicated his desire for Australia to cooperate with the major Western powers, albeit perhaps also an attempt to elevate Australia's power status.

Once the Security Council had assumed responsibility for the resolution of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, the Australian government recognised the importance of winning U.S. endorsement of its viewpoint, and of seeking U.S. cooperation. Yet its coordination and cooperation with the U.S. throughout 1947-1949 was extremely brittle. There was considerable conflict between Australia and the U.S. during their first year of association on the G.O.C. Aside from Australia's nomination to the G.O.C. by the Republic, its support for the Republic was in this initial period more resolute than that of the U.S. Particularly within the Security Council, Australia attached a higher priority to protecting the Republic's position than to acquiescing in the major-power constraints to which the U.S. gave deference. Generally the U.S. regarded Australia's diplomatic independence and assertiveness as antagonistic. For this reason it is unlikely that the more progressive position Australia adopted in the Security Council and on the G.O.C. acted as a direct catalyst on the U.S. change of policy, 1948-1949.
The New Delhi Conference stands out as an instance in which Australia constructively assumed an independent role at small international, if at domestic political, cost. The situation was very much changed later in 1949 when an independent Indonesia was inevitable, with full U.S. support. The low posture Australia assumed towards the final settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute presumably reflected in part the government's desire to encourage U.S. interest in Indonesia, given what it regarded as somewhat of a defence 'vacuum'.

Throughout the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, the Australian government had an ambiguous attitude not only towards the major Western powers but also towards the U.N. The U.N. Charter provided the framework for its approach to the resolution of the dispute, and it claimed absolute support for the U.N. as the basic tenet of its post-war foreign policy. However, its enthusiasm for the U.N. intervening in Indonesia was qualified. Australia being a small power and wanting to assert its own interests in the resolution of the dispute, the government was reluctant to place the Indonesian question within the jurisdiction of the major powers on the Security Council. Australia was itself a temporary member of the Council 1946-1947; it regarded itself as a regional representative; and it took the opportunity to enhance its international status from that position. Yet its introduction of the Indonesian question to the Council was delayed and cautious. Evatt's role at the San Francisco Conference and his subsequent Presidency of the General Assembly gave him a vested interest in proclaiming Australia's loyalty and support for the U.N. but this was not necessarily reflected in the government's diplomatic activities. By discouraging a U.N. enquiry into the merits of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, the Australian government recognised the limitations of U.N. machinery. If Australia's initially fervent activity within the Security Council otherwise suggested that it regarded the Indonesian question as a test case for the U.N., such an impression was short-lived.
Australia's tactics within the Security Council and as a member of the G.O.C. constantly reflected the government's frustration with the limited roles both these bodies had. At no time was the Australian government satisfied with the intervention of the Security Council. From the first it also regarded the mediatory function of the G.O.C. as inadequate and so independently took upon itself a third party role as an arbitrator. Thus it only paid lip-service to the constraints which membership of the G.O.C. in principle imposed on its diplomatic activities and its neutrality. In December 1947 the Australian representative told the Security Council it had failed in relation to the Indonesian question. Throughout 1948 the Australian government became progressively disillusioned about the possibility of the G.O.C. playing a constructive role. The Critchley-Dubois Proposals of June 1948 reflected the individual frustration of the Australian member with the G.O.C.'s operational limitations.

The second 'police action', some three months after Evatt's election to the Presidency of the General Assembly, produced a reversal in this trend. Australia's proposal that the U.N. impose economic sanctions against the Netherlands, together with Hodgson's suggestion of the possibility of the Netherlands being expelled from the U.N., was an attempt to revive and reassert the U.N.'s authority. Australia's participation in the New Delhi Conference in January 1949 can be regarded as its recognition of the failure of this attempt. The reconstitution of the G.O.C. as U.N.C.I. was a belated development of a kind favoured by Australia, but the Security Council's adoption of the McNaughton resolution in March effectively transferred the initiative for the final Dutch-Indonesian settlement from U.N.C.I. to the Netherlands.

Although U.N.C.I. remained a party to the final settlement, the Australian government withheld support from the preliminary conversations at
Batavia in May 1949 until the Dutch had restored the Republican government to Djocjakarta. Its referral of the Indonesian question to the General Assembly affirmed its continuing distrust of the Security Council's having transferred the initiative to the Netherlands. This action also reflected Australia's inherent inability as a small power to carry weight in the Security Council.

The ambiguity in Australia's official attitude towards the U.N. was accentuated by the role of its representatives on the G.O.C. and U.N.C.I. Although neither the Belgian nor the U.S. members maintained impartiality, the particularly resolute position the Australian representatives took by functioning as protagonists of the Republic, however justifiable in other terms, contradicted in principle Australia's professed regard to the international credibility of the U.N. The Australian government clearly attached a higher priority to protecting the Republic than it did to ensuring the neutral functioning of U.N. machinery. During 1947 official attempts to use Australia's membership of the G.O.C. as an instrument of pressure for advancing Australian foreign policy interests for the Dutch-Indonesian dispute to be speedily resolved only served to accentuate the selectivity with which the Australian government took indignation at abuse of the U.N.'s authority.

The inconsistencies in Australia's policies and diplomatic activities in relation to the N.E.I. and Indonesian independence reflected a lack of unanimity within the government. Evatt, as Minister for External Affairs 1942-1949, was the one person with a continuing influence on Australia's Indonesia policy. However, despite his reputation for being the 'one man band' of Australian foreign policy, it is clear that his approach to Australia's Indonesia policy did not always prevail. For the greater part of the Pacific war period, Evatt's proposal that Australia should assume a special post-war regional role in the Pacific received considerable support from Curtin as
Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Coordination. Not only did Chifley appear not to share the same enthusiasm for Australia's obtaining such post-war status but, with the transition from wartime planning to post-war realities, a gap emerged between Australia's foreign and defence policies. Australia's defence forces were neither able nor willing to assume responsibilities for policing an extended Australian zone of influence. This was revealed by the government's attitude towards the Australian forces in the outer N.E.I. islands, 1945-1946. Similarly, throughout the S.E.A.C. occupation of the N.E.I. this lack of support in defence policy continued to frustrate Evatt's aspirations for Australia's assuming a special role as a mediator. So long as the post-war military situation in the N.E.I. was unresolved, any third-party political mediator was also potentially involved in a military commitment.

In any case, there were contradictions and a lack of concord in Australia's civil policies towards the N.E.I. In 1945 Chifley told parliament the Dutch-Republican dispute was a domestic matter in which Australia favoured no particular party. Yet his handling of both the union ban against Dutch shipping and the repatriation of Indonesians on the Esperance Bay implied an anti-Dutch bias and a pro-Indonesian sympathy. Evatt's suggestion in November 1945 of a limited Australian intervention in Java was overruled by Chifley and opposed by the government as a whole. The Department of External Affairs maintained a low public posture but privately advocated a liberal compromise settlement between the Dutch and the Republic. Clearly Chifley's official influence prevailed over that of Evatt, who was absent from Australia during the last four months of 1945.

In 1946 there was unanimity in government policy only to the extent that there was support for a peaceful, compromise settlement between the Dutch and the Indonesians. In particular, Chifley and Evatt worked in antithesis to each other. Chifley's anti-Dutch attitude continued and became
more pronounced in his approach to the second Indonesian repatriation, his confrontation with van Aerssen over the *Piet Hein* incident, and by the part he played in Cabinet's decision in August to withhold all military assistance from the Dutch. By contrast, Evatt clearly sought to reconcile Australian and Dutch regional interests and thereby to place Australia in a special position as a mediator in the N.E.I. Although the government proclaimed a general sympathy for the moderate demands of the Indonesian nationalist movement, it made few official gestures towards the Republic prior to the initialling of the Cheribon Agreement in November 1946.

Brookes's individual initiatives with the Sjahrir government were not acceptable to the government in Canberra. For his part, Chifley was annoyed by Sjahrir's non-cooperation in official moves to lift the shipping ban in Australia, and Evatt's continual identification of Australian and Dutch interests were regarded as particularly unfriendly and partisan by the Sjahrir government.

The Australian government was divided about referring the Indonesian question to the Security Council at the time of the first Dutch 'police action' in July 1947. Chifley's unwillingness to diverge too sharply from U.S. and British policies prevailed over Evatt's insistence that Australia should refer the dispute to the U.N. immediately. In 1948 a difference emerged on the one hand between Burton and Critchley and the more reserved position taken by Evatt, and on the other between these officials and the Department of External Affairs which revealed even less confidence in the emergent Indonesian polity. At the same time Chifley, Kirby and Burton all worked at odds in relation to the lifting of the union shipping ban. Following the second Dutch 'police action' there was a lack of coordination between Evatt, the Department of External Affairs and Hodgson as Australia's representative on the Security Council. Nor did Evatt, Burton and the government present a unified view of Australia's participation
in the New Delhi Conference. In this instance it was Burton's view, rather than Evatt's or the government's, that prevailed. The government's attitude towards the Batavia conversations in May 1949 varied as between Evatt, Burton, the Department of External Affairs and Critchley. Burton and Critchley retained reservations about the R.T.C. while Evatt appeared to acquiesce in it.

These differences appeared to reflect both fundamental differences in principles and values and a conflict of foreign policy objectives which were not readily compatible. Primarily, Evatt remained wedded to the idea of an Australian system of defence based on cooperation with Western powers and interests in the Pacific region. More particularly, he believed that Australia's continental security depended on its Asian neighbours accepting Western political and economic 'standards'. His view of Australia's relations with its neighbours in South East Asia was not one of national equality, based as it was on intolerance and fear of dissimilarity. By contrast, Burton and Critchley favoured the principle of national self-determination and were convinced that Australia's demonstration of confidence in the Indonesian peoples was the way to establish the basis for a mutual relationship of acceptance and 'peaceful co-existence'. Burton's contribution to the New Delhi Conference, which reflected this latter spirit, also demonstrated a more egalitarian method of achieving regional influence. The greater national confidence implicit in this latter approach obviously enabled a greater abrasiveness towards the Dutch, which conflicted with Evatt's sense of Australia's continuing defence cooperation, if not also ideological identity, with the Dutch.

As well as policy differences within the Australian government, official strategy lacked both consistency and coordination. Evatt's schizophrenic volte-faces between spreading disaffection and displaying effusive goodwill adversely affected his diplomatic credibility, particularly
with the Dutch, and hence limited his diplomatic effectiveness. This was compounded by his personal ambition usually being blatant. Similarly, Burton's fusion of governmental policy with his own individual assertiveness impaired his official persuasiveness. At the governmental level, there were contradictions between official foreign policy as presented by Evatt and governmental decisions taken by Chifley as Prime Minister or by Cabinet. In addition, priorities given to policies emanating from other portfolios, Shipping and Immigration in particular, modified Australia's foreign policy as presented by Evatt as Minister for External Affairs. At the Departmental level, Evatt's lack of a sense of operational responsibility in his relationship to the Department of External Affairs meant that the presentation of official policy was diffuse, and at times contradictory. A combination of historical circumstances, a lack of official direction and of operational constraints also meant that individual diplomats, notably Brookes and Eaton in Batavia, were able individually to affect the shape of Australia's policies.

Outside the government, the Australian waterside unions which maintained a boycott against Dutch shipping in Australia for some four years were the major domestic influence on Australia's official external relations with Indonesia in the post-war period. The ban compromised the government's claim to Australia's national neutrality and impartiality in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, and its failure to counteract this non-governmental intervention in Australia's foreign policy adversely affected its own claim to even-handedness towards the disputants. At the same time there was obviously considerable sympathy within the Labor government towards the political stance adopted by the boycotting unions, which culminated in Chifley's coordination of governmental and union tactics to challenge the Dutch blockade against the Republic in 1948. On the other hand, during 1946 and 1947, when the gap between government and union policies was
considerable, the boycotting unions acquired the status of an independent party to relations between Australia, the Netherlands Indies and the Indonesian Republic. The political imperative which the unions thereby created for the government to reassert its primary authority for Australia's external relations may be seen to have influenced official policy, at least in so far as it provided the motive for the government's becoming actively involved in the N.E.I. situation.

In so far as the Australian government became the most prominent diplomatic protagonist of the Indonesian Republic during 1947-1949, its prima facie record of support for the Republic is indisputable. If with some procrastination, the Australian government did refer the Indonesian question to the Security Council following the first Dutch 'police action' in July 1947. Subsequently it obtained the Security Council's recognition of the Republic as a party to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, a recognition which was of considerable diplomatic significance after the second Dutch 'police action', when the Dutch claimed to have eliminated the Republic. Within the Security Council Australia gave strong support to the Republic, and generally helped to maintain international attention on the unresolved dispute. As the Republic's nominee to the G.O.C., Australia gave staunch protection to the Republic both on the G.O.C. and on U.N.C.I. Particularly on Critchley's part, much of this support was conveyed through informal advice and diplomatic guidance. Such informal assistance may be seen to have contributed to the internally-and externally-beleaguered Republic adhering to the course of diplomaei.

However, in so far as the Australian government officially prized itself as the articulator and protector of the Republic, its support was qualified and its diplomatic record not one of dependability or effectiveness. It did not always respond to the Republic's requests for support or assistance, nor did it always give the Republic the kind of support it most needed, or at the times when needed. The Australian government supported the Republic
substantially as the disadvantaged, 'underdog' and *de facto* party, able to be oppressed by the *de jure* sovereign power. Yet its constant purpose was more to moderate, restrain and control the Dutch as the dominant and domineering party than to advance the particular claims of the Indonesian Republic. The Australian government disputed not so much the political attitude of the Dutch towards Indonesian self-government so much as the military, economic and other tactics they employed in order to enhance their negotiating position, and retrieve their lost authority. To this extent there was a constant tension and ambiguity in Australia's diplomatic alignment with the Republic.

Although the Labor government's approach to the post-war Dutch-Indonesian dispute was bold and radical as an Australian foreign policy, clearly it was not uniformly or consistently progressive, nor did it constitute a successful adjustment to the changes in Australia's regional, strategic and foreign policy environment. Australia assumed a diplomatic posture towards Indonesia which contained at once realism and idealism, acceptance and intolerance, optimism and insecurity. Historically Australia had achieved a special relationship with Indonesia, but Australia's ideological isolation continued to inhibit Labor's visualization of the shape and substance of its bilateral relationship with a sovereign Indonesia.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I


Except for one brief period of British rule (1811-1816) the East Indian archipelago had been subject to Dutch rule since the arrival in 1602 of the Dutch trading organisation, the United East Indian Company. In 1796 the operations of the Company were taken over by the Netherlands Government, which continued the development of the archipelago, primarily as a commercial colony.

The N.E.I. became recognised as one of the wealthiest and most lucrative colonies in the world, but the Dutch were considered to lack a "national philosophy of empire". The highly efficient system of colonial administration which they developed in the N.E.I. was substantially the product of economic pragmatism - likewise their concentration on the rich Java and their extension of effective jurisdiction over the entire archipelago only by World War I. Although the system of indirect rule through local courts and indigenous rulers interfered less with the indigenous pattern of society than forms of direct colonial rule, excessive paternalism in the Dutch system of administration in fact inhibited Indonesian initiative and militated against any sense of self-government.

Following the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 a small minority of educated Indonesians in 1908 evinced the first signs of modern nationalist sentiments. However the racial and religious heterogeneity of Indonesian society, compounded by the geographical dispersion of the Indonesian peoples throughout the archipelago, historically has been a natural impediment to the development of a sense of Indonesian unity. The appeal of

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2 See Appendix B, p.1.
modern Indonesian nationalism which emerged as a Java-dominated and urban phenomenon, was also limited in an Indonesian society in which 95% of the peoples lived in villages. The formation in 1917 of Partai Sarakat Islam, a Marxist, anti-capitalistic and left-wing party, represented the first significant attempt at nationalist organisation.

Simultaneously with the emergence of Indonesian nationalist movements, there were appeals by the European residents of the N.E.I. (mainly of Dutch origin) for greater autonomy from Holland. The dual pressures of the Indonesian nationalists and the local colonial population contributed to the establishment in 1918 of the Volkeraad (People's Chamber). One third of the members of the Volkeraad were appointed by the Governor-General, and the remainder elected by a system of proportional representation through Dutch-controlled local councils. The majority of Indonesians, if not disenfranchised by the system itself, were ineligible by reason of their illiteracy, the Dutch having extended education to only a minority of Indonesians. The Volkeraad, which had only advisory functions, was nevertheless the first major institution in the N.E.I. which conceded the possibility of future self-government.

Power was, and remained, vested in the Governor-General, who was appointed by the Netherlands Government for a term of five years. The Governor-General was responsible to, and governed in association with, a five-man Council of the Indies. Primarily, however, the Governor-General represented the Netherlands States-General (parliament) and the Netherlands Government through the Minister for Colonies. As the chief executive of the N.E.I., the Governor-General was indisputably the most powerful political figure in the N.E.I. before the Pacific war.

Throughout the 1920s the Netherlands Government made piecemeal concessions to N.E.I. self-government as the changing political climate demanded. In 1922 by a revision of the Colonial Articles of the Netherlands Constitution the status of the N.E.I. was redefined to be an overseas territory, as distinct from a colony. In 1925 the East Indian Government Act was revised
to give greater freedom from direct Netherlands Government control to the Governor-General, and to grant limited legislative power to the Volksraad.

The creation of the Volksraad and gradualist concessions to autonomy within the Kingdom of the Netherlands only absorbed and accommodated moderate Indonesian nationalists who were prepared to cooperate with the Dutch. In the 1920s the Indonesian nationalist movement moved steadily to the left, a change punctuated by mass violence and the development of non-cooperation with the Dutch. Communist-led riots in Java in 1926 and 1927 involving radical nationalists confronted the Dutch with an Indonesian nationalistic self-consciousness, albeit sectional, which was prepared to espouse militancy. For the Dutch, this crisis dramatised the changing nature of their colonial rule in the N.E.I. Their response was a dual policy: repression (13,000 Indonesians were arrested and 1,300 extremists exiled to a camp at Boven Digoel in Dutch New Guinea) and encouragement to cooperative nationalists (whose number of seats in the Volksraad was increased in 1927). However, in 1927 Soekarno formed a new revolutionary party, Partai Nasional Indonesia, to bring together the general populace and the intellectual nationalist core into a movement dedicated to non-cooperation with the government and aiming for complete independence.

The world depression beginning in 1929, which greatly affected Dutch economic interests in the N.E.I., highlighted the tardy and inadequate attention that the export-oriented Dutch economic policy had given to developing internal economic resilience and promoting native economic welfare. This provided the Indonesian nationalist movement with a heightened sense of class-consciousness. The Japanese, whose economic and political penetration of the N.E.I. began during the depression, were welcomed by many nationalists as potential allies against Dutch colonialism.

The Dutch response to nationalist unrest in the N.E.I. during the 1930s was to curtail political and civil freedoms. In 1933 Soekarno was imprisoned; and in 1934 Sjahrr was sent to Boven Digoel. By 1938 a French historian of colonial systems described the Dutch "preventive policy, involving such
measures as a penal code which inhibited strikes, and press censorship" as a "police state".¹ On a visit to the N.E.I. in 1938 the same French historian considered that the state of mind of the Dutch in the Indies betrayed a "lack of confidence" which found expression in an "unhealthy hypersensitiveness which afflicts the treatment of every colonial question".²

In the late 1930s the N.E.I. recovered from the depression comparatively well. There was also a more peaceful relationship between Dutch and Indonesians, which was attributable, in part, to the appointment of a more liberal Governor-General, Jonkheer A.W.L. van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, in part to the continued fragmentation of the Indonesian nationalist movement, which was still confined to a minority of the Indonesian people. In response to pressure from Indonesian moderates in the Volksraad, the Netherlands Government in 1939, the year in which the European war began, established a commission led by Dr. Franz Visman to determine the views of articulate Indonesians about post-war changes in the N.E.I. government. The conservative conclusions of the Visman Report recommended that the Netherlands make no specific commitment to change. In May 1940 Holland was occupied by Germany, and although the Governor-General was granted emergency powers enabling greater N.E.I. autonomy this did not result in any substantial change in the political relationship between the Dutch and Indonesians within the N.E.I.

¹ F.H. Eousquet, A French View of the Netherlands Indies, pp.33-35.
² Ibid., pp.41-44.
APPENDIX II

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE N.E.I. AND THE
INDONESIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

When the Japanese invaded the N.E.I. in 1942 one of their aims was to
eliminate as quickly and as thoroughly as possible all Dutch influence so
that Indonesia could become an integral part of the Japanese Empire. The
welcome which most Indonesians gave to the invading Japanese and their co-
operation with Japanese purposes had historical links with the Japanese
victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 by which Japan symbolically demon-
strated that Asians could effectively challenge colonial powers.

This victory inspired the first efforts to organise a modern Indonesian
nationalist movement. It also caused Japan to become identified with a
Javanese prophecy by which the people of a yellow race from the north would
one day drive out the white overlords and rule for a short duration before
the reign of the Ratu Adil (Just Saviour).

Most Javanese believed so strongly in Japan's prophetic role that they
did not question Japanese intentions when in 1929 (as the Dutch economic
position in the N.E.I. eroded in the depression), Japan began her commercial
invasion of the N.E.I. It was primarily left-wing intellectuals of the
nationalist movement who questioned Japan's imperialistic designs. Many
Indonesians also reacted against Japanese appeals to Pan-Asianism and Asian
solidarity, which began in 1932. Throughout the 1930s such anti-Japanese
sentiments that had been entertained by cooperative Indonesian nationalists,
faded as their disillusionment increased with Dutch constriction of their
demands for self-determination.

Following the completion of their military invasion of the N.E.I. in
March 1942, the Japanese established three separate military administrations
in Java, Sumatra, and the outer islands. The entity created by the N.E.I.
colonial administration was thereby fragmented. Java, which contained two-
thirds of the population of the N.E.I., had traditionally been dominant in the archipelago; and similarly, under the Japanese occupation, it was Java where the pattern and pace of important political developments was set.

Japanese policy towards the Indonesian nationalist movement was fundamentally repressive. One of the first actions of the military administrators on Java - on 20 March 1942 - was to decree the dissolution of all political parties and an end to all political activity. At the same time, as a means of winning and holding popular support, the Japanese military administration sought nationalist collaboration. Indonesian nationalists who had been imprisoned or exiled by the Dutch were released. The most significant instance was the release of Soekarno in Sumatra and his return to Java where he was promptly installed as a popular leader. Soekarno's decision to collaborate gave him three years of public exposure as an Indonesian nationalist leader. More generally, the Japanese military administration in the N.E.I. used Indonesian nationalists both for public relations and as a practical necessity. The undermanned Japanese military administration employed Indonesians as civil servants, and in press, radio and propaganda work.

Programmes by the Japanese administration to organise popular support implicitly assisted the nationalist movement. In August 1942 Indonesian became the official national language. In October 1942 a preliminary attempt was made to organise an Indonesian cultural movement. Then, on 9 March 1943 the all-Indonesian Putera was formally established, with Soekarno as Chairman and Hatta as one of the Vice-Chairmen. Its aims included "to assist and support Japan in achieving final victory"; "to eliminate American, English and Dutch influence"; and "to cooperate and participate in the defense of Greater East Asia".¹

Japanese encouragement of such organisations increased as the need to amass Indonesian support for the war effort also increased. Nationalist symbols were often invoked in the attempt to emotionally involve Indonesians in the war effort. One historian of the Japanese occupation of the N.E.I. maintains that through the various popular organisations set up by the Japanese "the whole of Indonesian society came as close to being uniformly regimented under one ruling authority as at any other time".

Indonesian nationalist pressure on the Japanese military administration to grant political concessions developed following the Japanese decision in January 1943 to grant independence to Burma and the Philippines. Although the Japanese Government favoured independence for Indonesia also, this course was resisted by the military and naval commanders of the Japanese administration in the N.E.I. Accordingly, Premier Tojo of Japan on 16 June 1943 made only vague promises of Indonesian "political participation".

From mid-1943 Japan began to be on the defensive in the Pacific war. At the same time the framework of Japanese-Indonesian collaboration was breaking down. In August 1943 Premier Koiso announced provisions for "political participation". These provided the establishment of advisory councils coordinated by a Central Advisory Council, of which Soekarno was appointed Chairman. Political influence through this system was nominal, but the system itself "served to institutionalise Indonesian cooperation".

The Japanese military administration in the N.E.I. also attempted to involve Indonesians physically in the war effort - through the formation of para-military and regular military forces in Java and Sumatra. Peta, the

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1 Kinahele, op. cit., p.80.
2 Ibid., p.88.
3 Kinahele's emphasis is on Indonesian pressures for political concessions, whereas Elsbree (Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements 1940 to 1945, IRP, Harvard UP, Cambridge, Massa., 1952) maintains that Japanese concessions to Indonesian nationalism were made in response to outside events than to internal pressures.
4 Kinahele, op. cit., p.104.
first Indonesian volunteers corps which was formed on 3 October 1943 on the basis of youth groups, was, General Harada, Japanese Supreme Commander in the N.E.I., proclaimed, the embodiment of "the intense desire of fifty million Indonesians to defend their Fatherland".\(^1\) The promotion of this image was an important contribution to Indonesian patriotism, nationalism and militarism. According to Aziz,\(^2\) by 1945 the Japanese military administration in the N.E.I. was experiencing difficulty in restraining the revolutionary spirit of Peta.

In 1944 economic conditions in Indonesia worsened, Indonesian resentment against the Japanese administration grew, and the defeat of Japan in the Pacific war became more certain. In August 1944 the Japanese Army came out in favour of Indonesian independence; and on 7 September Premier Koiso actually promised independence. Nationalist leaders immediately undertook speaking tours throughout Java to "enlighten" the people. The Japanese fully exploited the propaganda value of the promise of future independence, which was given wide publicity. Although no substantial political concessions were granted, the promise of independence had a psychological impact. It strengthened the resolve of nationalists and generally contributed to the Indonesian populace becoming enthusiastic for a free Indonesia.

Eventually on 1 March 1945 a Committee to Investigate Preparation for Independence was formed, along with Kenkoku Gakuin, an organisation to train leaders for the independent state. The first meeting of the Committee at the end of May 1945 (the Allies had already invaded Morotai, Tarakan and Papua) denounced both the return of Dutch colonialism symbolised by N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) and the classification of Indonesia at the San Francisco conference as having "mandate status".\(^3\) At the second meeting of the Committee on 10 July 1945, which drafted a Constitution, Soekarno demanded immediate independence.

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1 Kinahele, *op.cit.*, p.123.
At this point external military pressure on the Japanese became critical. On 2 August Marshall Terauchi indicated that the scheduled date for Indonesian independence was early September 1945, probably 7 September.

... ... ...

The Japanese occupation of the N.E.I., which claimed to have liberated Indonesia from Dutch rule, implicitly contributed to the development of Indonesian nationalism by its various policies designed to win popular support for the Japanese Empire and its war effort. The use of Indonesian nationalist leaders to invoke popular support, the employment of Indonesians in civil and administrative capacities, programmes geared to cultural unification of the Indonesian peoples, the provision of military training for Indonesians, propaganda against the former colonial ruler, and the psychological (if not the substantial) build-up for the assumption of independence (albeit within the Japanese Empire) prepared the basis for a militant claim to self-determination by the Indonesian nationalist movement.

If the actual circumstances of the proclamation constituted an opportunistic severing of the relationship between Indonesia and the Japanese Empire, its implicit disassociation from the former Dutch rulers was considerably pre-determined by the three and a half years' experience of Japanese occupation. The Indonesian nationalists also derived confidence from the anti-colonial wartime proclamations of the major Western powers. Indonesians initially welcomed S.E.A.C. forces in Java as the trustees who would safeguard Indonesia's status until its future was considered by the forthcoming Peace Conference.
APPENDIX III

DOCUMENTS
The spelling and grammar in the appendices are as in the original text.
1. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

12 August 1941

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, representing H.M. Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

1. Their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.
2. They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.
3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
4. They will endeavour with due respect for their existing obligations, to further enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.
5. They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security.
6. After the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.
7. Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.
8. They believe all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments
continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament.¹

"At this moment my thoughts are more than ever with my country and my compatriots in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies. After an age-old historical solidarity in which had long since passed the era of colonial relationship, we stood on the eve of a collaboration on a basis of equality, when suddenly we were both confronted by the present ordeal. In previous addresses I announced that it is my intention after the liberation to create the occasion for a joint consultation about the structure of the Kingdom and its parts, in order to adapt it to the changed circumstances. The conference of the entire Kingdom, which will be convoked for this purpose, has been further outlined in a Government declaration of January 27th, 1942. The preparation of this conference, in which prominent representatives of the three overseas parts of the Kingdom will be united with those of the Netherlands at a round table, had already begun in the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao, the parts of the Kingdom which then still enjoyed their freedom. Especially in the Netherlands Indies, detailed material had been collected for this purpose, and it was transmitted to me in December, 1941, by the Governor-General. The battle of the Netherlands Indies disrupted these promising preparations. We can only resume these preparations when everyone will be able to speak his mind freely.

"Although it is beyond doubt that a political reconstruction of the Kingdom as a whole, and of the Netherlands and the overseas territories and its parts is a natural evolution, it would be neither right nor possible to define its precise form at this moment. I realize that much which is great and good is growing in the Netherlands despite the pressure of the occupation. I know that this is the case in the Indies, where our unity is fortified by common offering. These developing ideas can only be shaped in free consultation in which both parts of the Kingdom will want to take cognizance of each other's opinions. Moreover, the population of the
Netherlands and of the Netherlands Indies has confirmed, through its suffering and its resistance, its right to participate in the decision regarding the form of our responsibility as a nation towards the world, and of the various groups of the population towards themselves and one another. By working out these matters now, that right would be neglected, and the insight which my people have obtained through bitter experience would be disregarded.

I am convinced, and history as well as reports from the occupied territories confirm me in this, that after the war it will be possible to reconstruct the Kingdom on the solid foundation of complete partnership, which will mean the consummation of all that has been developed in the past. I know that no political unity nor national cohesion can continue to exist which is not supported by the voluntary acceptance and the faith of the great majority of the citizens. I know that the Netherlands, more than ever, feel their responsibility for the vigorous growth of the overseas territories, and that the Indonesians recognize in the ever increasing collaboration, the best guarantee for the recovery of their peace and happiness. The war years have proved that both peoples possess the will and the ability for harmonious and voluntary co-operation. A political unity which rests on this foundation, moves far towards a realization of the purpose for which the United Nations are fighting, as it has been embodied, for instance, in the Atlantic Charter, and with which we could instantly agree, because it contains our own conception of freedom and justice, for which we have sacrificed blood and possessions in the course of our history.

"I visualize, without anticipating the recommendations of the future conference, that they will be directed towards a Commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao will participate, with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance. It is my opinion that such a combination of independence and collaboration can give the Kingdom and its parts the strength to carry fully their responsibility, both internally and externally. This would leave no room for discrimination,
according to race and nationality. Only the ability of the population will determine the policy of the Government."\(^1\)

3. THE AUSTRALIAN–NEW ZEALAND AGREEMENT,
SIGNED ON 21 JANUARY 1944

HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and HIS MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT IN THE DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND HAVING met in Conference at
Canberra from the 17th to the 21st January, 1944, AND DESIRING to maintain
and strengthen the close and cordial relations between the two Governments
DO HEREBY ENTER into this Agreement.

DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES OF AUSTRALIAN – NEW ZEALAND
CO-OPERATION

1. The two Governments agree that, as a preliminary, provision shall be
made for fuller exchange of information regarding both the views of each
Government and the facts in the possession of either bearing on matters of
common interest.

2. The two Governments give mutual assurances that, on matters which appear
to be of common concern, each Government will, so far as possible, be made
acquainted with the mind of the other before views are expressed elsewhere
by either.

3. In furtherance of the above provisions with respect to exchange of views
and information, the two Governments agree that there shall be the maximum
degree of unity in the presentation, elsewhere, of the views of the two
countries.

4. The two Governments agree to adopt an expeditious and continuous means
of consultation by which each party will obtain directly the opinions of the
other.

5. The two Governments agree to act together in matters of common concern
in the South West and South Pacific areas.

6. So far as compatible with the existence of separate military commands,
the two Governments agree to co-ordinate their efforts for the purpose of
prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion.
ARMISTICE AND SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS

7. The two Governments declare that they have vital interests in all preparations for any armistice ending the present hostilities or any part thereof and also in arrangements subsequent to any such armistice, and agree that their interests should be protected by representation at the highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies.

8. The two Governments are in agreement that the final peace settlement should be made in respect of all our enemies after hostilities with all of them are concluded.

9. Subject to the last two preceding clauses, the two Governments will seek agreement with each other on the terms of any armistice to be concluded.

10. The two Governments declare that they should actively participate in any Armistice Commission to be set up.

11. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia shall set up in Australia, and His Majesty's Government in the Dominion of New Zealand shall set up in New Zealand, Armistice and Post Hostilities Planning Committees, and shall arrange for the work of those Committees to be co-ordinated in order to give effect to the views of the respective governments.

12. The two Governments will collaborate generally with regard to the location of machinery set up under international organisations, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and, in particular, with regard to the location of the Far Eastern Committee of that administration.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE

13. The two Governments agree that, within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence comprising the South West and South Pacific areas shall be established and that this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand, stretching through the arc of islands North and North East of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.

14. The two Governments regard it as a matter of cardinal importance that they should both be associated, not only in the membership, but also in the planning and establishment, of the general international organisation referred
to in the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, which organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States and open to membership by all such States, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

15. Pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, the two Governments hereby declare their vital interest in the action on behalf of the community of Nations contemplated in Article V of the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943.¹ For that purpose it is agreed that it would be proper for Australia and New Zealand to assume full responsibility for policing or sharing in policing such areas in the South West and South Pacific as may from time to time be agreed upon.

16. The two Governments accept as a recognised principle of international practice that the construction and use, in time of war, by any Power, of naval, military or air installations, in any territory under the sovereignty or control of another Power, does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities.

CIVIL AVIATION

17. The two Governments agree that the regulation of all air transport services should be subject to the terms of a convention which will supersede the Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation.

18. The two Governments declare that the air services using the international air trunk routes should be operated by an International Air Transport Authority.

¹ Articles 4 and 5 of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security made at Moscow on 30 October 1943:

"4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations."
19. The two Governments support the principles that -

(a) full control of the International air trunk routes and the ownership of all aircraft and ancillary equipment should be vested in the International Air Transport Authority; and

(b) the international air trunk routes should themselves be specified in the international agreement referred to in the next succeeding clause.

20. The two Governments agree that the creation of the International Air Transport Authority should be effected by an international agreement.

21. Within the framework of the system set up under any such international agreement the two Governments support -

(a) the right of each country to conduct all air transport services within its own national jurisdiction, including its own contiguous territories, subject only to agreed international requirements regarding safety, facilities, landing and transit rights for international services and exchange of mails;

(b) the right of Australia and New Zealand to utilise to the fullest extent their productive capacity in respect of aircraft and raw materials for the production of aircraft; and

(c) the right of Australia and New Zealand to use a fair proportion of their own personnel, agencies and materials in operating and maintaining international air trunk routes.

22. In the event of failure to obtain a satisfactory international agreement to establish and govern the use of international air trunk routes, the two Governments will support a system of air trunk routes controlled and operated by Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations under Government ownership.

23. The two Governments will act jointly in support of the abovementioned principles with respect to civil aviation, and each will inform the other of its existing interests and commitments as a basis of advancing the policy herein agreed upon.
24. Following the procedure adopted at the Conference which has just concluded, the two Governments will regularly exchange information and views in regard to all developments in or affecting the islands of the Pacific. 

25. The two Governments take note of the intention of the Australian Government to resume administration at the earliest possible moment of those parts of its territories which have not yet been re-occupied.

26. The two Governments declare that the interim administration and ultimate disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific is of vital importance to Australia and New Zealand and that any such disposal should be effected only with their agreement and as part of a general Pacific settlement.

27. The two Governments declare that no change in the sovereignty or system of control of any of the islands of the Pacific should be effected except as a result of an agreement to which they are parties or in the terms of which they have both concurred.

WELFARE AND ADVANCEMENT OF NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE PACIFIC

28. The two Governments declare that, in applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Pacific, the doctrine of "trusteeship" (already applicable in the case of the mandated territories of which the two Governments are mandatory powers) is applicable in broad principle to all colonial territories in the Pacific and elsewhere, and that the main purpose of the trust is the welfare of the native peoples and their social, economic and political development.

29. The two Governments agree that the future of the various territories of the Pacific and the welfare of their inhabitants cannot be successfully promoted without a greater measure of collaboration between the numerous authorities concerned in their control, and that such collaboration is particularly desirable in regard to health services and communications, matters of native education, anthropological investigation, assistance in native production and material development generally.
30. The two Governments agree to promote the establishment, at the earliest possible date, of a regional organisation with advisory powers, which could be called the South Seas Regional Commission, and on which, in addition to representatives of Australia and New Zealand, there might be accredited representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and of the French Committee of National Liberation.

31. The two Governments agree that it shall be the function of such South Seas Regional Commission as may be established to secure a common policy on social, economic and political development directed towards the advancement and well-being of the native peoples themselves, and that in particular the Commission shall -

(a) recommend arrangements for the participation of natives in administration in increasing measure with a view to promoting the ultimate attainment of self-government in the form most suited to the circumstances of the native peoples concerned;

(b) recommend arrangements for material development including production, finance, communications and marketing;

(c) recommend arrangements for co-ordination of health and medical services and education;

(d) recommend arrangements for maintenance and improvement of standards of native welfare in regard to labour conditions and social services;

(e) recommend arrangements for collaboration in economic, social, medical and anthropological research; and

(f) make and publish periodical reviews of progress towards the development of self-governing institutions in the islands of the Pacific and in the improvement of standards of living, conditions of work, education, health and general welfare.

**MIGRATION**

32. In the peace settlement or other negotiations the two Governments will accord one another full support in maintaining the accepted principle that every government has the right to control immigration and emigration in regard to all territories within its jurisdiction.
33. The two Governments will collaborate, exchange full information and render full assistance to one another in all matters concerning migration to their respective territories.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE RELATING TO THE SOUTH WEST AND SOUTH PACIFIC

34. The two Governments agree that, as soon as practicable, there should be a frank exchange of views on the problems of security, post-war development and native welfare between properly accredited representatives of the governments with existing territorial interests in the South West Pacific area or in the South Pacific area, or in both, namely, in addition to the two Governments, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Netherlands, the French Committee of National Liberation and the Government of Portugal, and His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia should take the necessary steps to call a conference of the governments concerned.

PERMANENT MACHINERY FOR COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

35. The two Governments agree that—

(a) their co-operation for defence should be developed by:

(i) continuous consultation in all defence matters of mutual interest;

(ii) the organisation, equipment, training and exercising of the armed forces under a common doctrine;

(iii) joint planning;

(iv) interchange of staff; and

(v) the co-ordination of policy for the production of munitions, aircraft and supply items, and for shipping, to ensure the greatest possible degree of mutual aid consistent with the maintenance of the policy of self-sufficiency in local production;

(b) collaboration in external policy on all matters affecting the peace, welfare and good government of the Pacific should be secured through
the exchange of information and frequent ministerial consultation;
(c) the development of commerce between Australia and New Zealand and their industrial development should be pursued by consultation and, in agreed cases, by joint planning;
(d) there should be co-operation in achieving full employment in Australia and New Zealand and the highest standards of social security both within their borders and throughout the islands of the Pacific and other territories for which they may jointly or severally be wholly or partly responsible; and
(e) there should be co-operation in encouraging missionary work and all other activities directed towards the improvement of the welfare of the native peoples in the islands and territories of the Pacific.

36. The two Governments declare their desire to have the adherence to the objectives set out in the last preceding clause of any other government having or controlling territories in the Pacific.

37. The two Governments agree that the methods to be used for carrying out the provisions of clause 35 of this Agreement and of other provisions of this Agreement shall be consultation, exchange of information, and, where applicable, joint planning. They further agree that such methods shall include -

(a) conferences of Ministers of State to be held alternately in Canberra and Wellington, it being the aim of the two Governments that these conferences be held at least twice a year;
(b) conferences of departmental officers and technical experts;
(c) meetings of standing inter-governmental committees on such subjects as are agreed to by the two Governments;
(d) the fullest use of the status and functions of the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Australia in New Zealand and of the High Commissioner of the Dominion of New Zealand in Australia;
(e) regular exchange of information;
(f) exchange of officers; and
(g) the development of institutions in either country serving the common purposes of both.

PERMANENT SECRETARIAT

38. In order to ensure continuous collaboration on the lines set out in this Agreement and to facilitate the carrying out of the duties and functions involved, the two Governments agree that a Permanent Secretariat shall be established in Australia and New Zealand.

39. The Secretariat shall be known as the Australia-New Zealand Affairs Secretariat and shall consist of a Secretariat of the like name to be set up in Australia and a Secretariat of the like name to be set up in New Zealand, each under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs in the country concerned.¹

40. The functions of the Secretariat shall be:

(a) to take the initiative in ensuring that effect is given to the provisions of this Agreement;

(b) to make arrangements as the occasion arises for the holding of conferences or meetings;

(c) to carry out the directions of those conferences in regard to further consultation, exchange of information or the examination of particular questions;

(d) to co-ordinate all forms of collaboration between the two Governments;

(e) to raise for joint discussion and action such other matters as may seem from day-to-day to require attention by the two Governments;

¹ On 12 February the Minister of External Affairs in Wellington advised the High Commissioner for New Zealand in Canberra that R.T.G. Patrick had been appointed the New Zealand representative of the Secretariat under the Ministry of External Affairs. Daily contact would be maintained with the Australian liaison officer and regular conferences would be held between the Australian High Commissioner, the Minister (if necessary) and the Secretary of External Affairs. An officer of the High Commissioner's Office in Canberra would act as the New Zealand liaison officer with the Australian Secretariat.
(f) generally to provide for more frequent and regular exchanges of
information and views, those exchanges, between the two Governments
to take place normally through the respective High Commissioners.

41. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and His
Majesty's Government in the Dominion of New Zealand each shall nominate an
officer or officers from the staff of their respective High Commissioners
to act in closest collaboration with the Secretariat in which they shall be
accorded full access to all relevant sources of information.

42. In each country the Minister of State for External Affairs and the
resident High Commissioner shall have joint responsibility for the effective
functioning of the Secretariat.

RATIFICATION AND TITLE OF AGREEMENT

43. This agreement is subject to ratification by the respective Governments
and shall come into force as soon as both Governments have ratified the
Agreement and have notified each other accordingly. It is intended that
such notification will take place as soon as possible after the signing of
this Agreement.

44. This Agreement shall be known as the Australian-New Zealand Agreement
1944.2

DATED this twenty-first day of January, One thousand nine hundred and
forty-four.3

1 The Agreement was ratified by the Australian Government on 24 January and
by the New Zealand Government on 1 February 1944.

2 The title of Agreement for Mutual Collaboration Between Australia and New
Zealand, dated Canberra, 21st January 1944 is given by Hasluck in The
Government and the People, 1942-1945, in a footnote on p.480.

3 The Agreement was signed by all the representatives of the two governments.
4. EXTRACT FROM TRUSTEESHIP STATEMENT BY
DR H.V. EVATT, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, SAN FRANCISCO,
10 MAY 1945.

For more than three years the peoples of south-eastern Asia and
Indonesia have been under Japanese military overlordship. Their political
structures have been subjected to shock and strain...they will remember
that their former rulers were overcome. They will be uncertain and perhaps
suspicious of the motives of some at least of the returning powers. It is
vitally important that these uncertainties be removed and that the peoples
of this region be given a solemn pledge that the purpose of administration
will be their welfare and advancement. Their goodwill must be fostered,
not only because their cooperation is essential to good administration in
their own interests, but because they inhabit a vital strategic area....It
is necessary that powers capable of playing an effective part in maintaining
security should be present in this region until the indigenous peoples can
stand on their own feet...the overriding interests of security forbid that
there should meanwhile be a strategic vacuum in this vital zone. But the
conditions of security in this area will not exist unless the peoples are
prepared to cooperate with stronger states....A solemn declaration in this
Charter would give meaning to cooperation between East and West in this
region. The principle of trusteeship would thus contribute to security.¹

5. RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS


Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Chapter XI
DECLARATION REGARDING
NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end;

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.

e. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.
Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

Chapter XII
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;

b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nations, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.
Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements;

   a. territories now held under mandate;

   b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

   c. territories, voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79 and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.
6. Extracts from
JAPANESE SURRENDER: STATEMENT BY THE
PRIME MINISTER (THE RT HON J.B. CHIFLEY)
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON
29TH AUGUST 1945.

...On 18th August, 1945, when I announced the details of Australia's share
in post-surrender arrangements, I stated the feeling of War Cabinet that
Australia was acting as a principal Pacific Power and that the Australian
war effort, though inadequately recognized in the armistice negotiations,
etitled us to a status in regard to the peace settlement commensurate with
our substantial contribution to victory. We are hopeful that this will be
fully recognized and given effect to in all steps leading to the peace
settlement, especially in the Pacific.

The Government has taken decisions with the object of ensuring that
Australia plays its proper part in the tasks arising from the Japanese
capitulation and contributes to the execution of the surrender terms against
Japan....

...It has been made clear to the British Government that this contribution
is being made by Australia as a separate belligerent of Japan and that our
force will operate under an Australian Commander, who will be responsible
only to the Supreme Allied Commander. In this respect the composite
Australian force will, therefore, have the same status as the occupation
forces being supplied by the United States, Britain, China and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics....

...As soon as the Instrument of Surrender is signed by Japan, the South-
West Pacific Area, south of the Philippines, will pass to the South-East
Asia and Australian commands.

The division of responsibility for this area between the British and
Commonwealth Governments is still the subject of discussion. We have,
however, agreed to accept initial responsibility for Borneo, where Australian
forces are now located, and for certain Japanese-occupied territories to
the east thereof, including Timor and Ambon where Australian forces operated
in the early stages of the war against Japan. The re-occupation of these territories will be undertaken in stages, details of which are now being worked out. Considerable additional shipping will be necessary and the British Government has been informed of the requirements. The precise extent of our responsibilities will be announced upon completion of the present discussions with the British authorities.

There are limits to our capacity to accept additional responsibilities, and it is the Government's aim to ensure that releases of long-service personnel already directed shall be effected and that demobilization of the forces shall proceed in accordance with the approved plan as rapidly as personnel can be absorbed into civil life.

It is the intention of the British Government to make available, as soon as possible, British and Dutch forces from the South-East Asia Command to relieve Australian forces in the territories for which we assume initial responsibility. The general principle adopted by the Government in regard to civil affairs is that, except in Papua and Australian mandated territories, Australia shall refrain from any extension of its present responsibilities for civil affairs in re-occupied territories. Such responsibility as is accepted initially during the military phase will pass to the South-East Asia Command simultaneously with the relief of the Australian command in the respective areas. We look to governments having sovereign rights in these areas to take over full responsibility for them after the initial period....

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Netherlands East Indies and Indonesian Disputes. - Australia's policy in relation to the dispute caused by the Indonesian demands for self-government is to assist in settlement of the dispute and to discourage acts of provocation and violence which, by accentuating bitterness, are calculated to prevent a just settlement. We have had special representatives in the Netherlands East Indies since V-J Day, including first Mr Macmahon Ball and at present Mr Keith Officer. Both representatives have kept in close consultation with the British Military Command, the function of which is solely to carry out the armistice arrangements. The lines of a possible settlement of the dispute are indicated in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, by which each member has undertaken to assist its dependent peoples to increase their rights of self-government. Under Article 73 everything depends on the stage of political development which has been and can be reached by the peoples concerned. What is appropriate to one territory may be entirely inappropriate to another.

The most recent proposals of the Netherlands East Indies Government seem to me to mark a great advance towards a satisfactory settlement. While Dutch sovereignty is retained, provision is made for a great increase in local self-government and the proposals also envisage the ultimate admission of an Indonesian Commonwealth into the United Nations. The Dutch proposals are expressly based on Article 73 of the Charter and our special representative in the Netherlands East Indies is doing what is possible to assist the special British political representative mediating between the parties with a view to a just settlement.

Australia has a vital interest in the preservation of the war-time friendship with the Dutch in relation to the Netherlands East Indies. At the same time it is important to do everything possible to establish good
relations with the Indonesian and other dependent peoples of the world who are advancing towards a far greater degree of self-government. These have been actively encouraged by the declaration in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 to which all the United Nations subsequently subscribed. France has succeeded in making satisfactory settlements in relation to some of the peoples of Indo-China and it is to be hoped that a settlement will soon be reached in relation to the Netherlands East Indies.¹

...I shall have something very much more to say at a later stage if those who claim to represent the Dutch Government persist in making statements of the character that were made quite recently....I consider that it was most inappropriate, in view of the knowledge that there was trouble already with Dutch commercial vessels in Sydney, to send the Piet Hein to that port, because it was evident that unless the existing dispute could be overcome the warship also would be involved....On the first occasion when I had some discussion with the Dutch Minister on a question asked by the Leader of the Opposition, about certain correspondence, all that correspondence appeared in the Melbourne press on the following day [1]. The Dutch Minister has assured me, and I accept his word, that he was not responsible for the publication of that correspondence between the Government and the Dutch authorities. Still it was rather a strange thing that correspondence of that character between officers of the Department of External Affairs and the Dutch authorities should appear in the Melbourne daily press. I must confess that I was not at all pleased by the statement that was made the other day....I consider that diplomatic relations are not improved when diplomatic representatives of other governments engage in newspaper controversy which can easily be taken as intended to damage a government then in power. I am always prepared to take a most generous view of these things, and accept the view that no such intention was held by the Dutch Minister in connexion with the statement that was made to the press....The dispute has travelled, and the repercussions have become very much wider now than the matter of Dutch ships in this country. I would have thought that diplomats would have been serving their country much better by trying to settle the differences that exist between the Dutch Government and their own subjects than by engaging in newspaper controversy in another country.1


Mr E.J. Ward, co-delegate for Australia, seconded the motion and said -

"We have not overlooked the necessity to recognize that the ultimate objective of all the participating Governments is that the dependent peoples shall obtain the rights of self-government. Therefore, in the agreement itself, provision is made whereby at the outset opportunity will be afforded to them to have their say as to how they believe the Commission should shape the affairs of the dependent territories in the South Pacific Area.

"The agreement which we are now asked to adopt is not to be added to the long list of unfulfilled international agreements that have preceded it. There have been many international agreements that have not, in the final analysis, meant very much to the people to whom they were directed; but this agreement, I feel, will mean something to the people of the dependent territories in the South Pacific, and I hope that in the not far distant future the Commission will be able so to extend its activities and obtain the co-operation of the dependent peoples that, within a reasonably short space of time, we shall reach that objective at which we are aiming.

"In addition, it ought to serve the native peoples as evidence of the goodwill of the nations participating in this Conference, and as an indication to them that, when the Atlantic Charter was laid down, its provisions were not meant to apply only to the nationals of the great nations and the great powers, but were meant to extend to the peoples of the world generally, no matter in what quarter they may live or what colour they may be."1

10. TEXT OF THE LINGGADJATI AGREEMENT

[Signed on March 25, 1947, between the Netherlands Commission-General and the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia]

Preamble - The Netherlands Government, represented by the Commission-General for the Netherlands Indies, and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, represented by the Indonesian delegation, moved by a sincere desire to ensure good relations between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia in new forms of voluntary co-operation which offer the best guarantee for sound and strong development of both countries in the future and which make it possible to give a new foundation to the relationship between the two peoples; agree as follows and will submit this agreement at the shortest possible notice for the approval of the respective parliaments:

Article 1 - The Netherlands Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. The areas occupied by Allied or Netherlands forces shall be included gradually, through mutual co-operation, in Republican territory. To this end, the necessary measures shall at once be taken in order that this inclusion shall be completed at the latest on the date mentioned in Article 12.

Article 2 - The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic shall co-operate in the rapid formation of a sovereign democratic State on a federal basis to be called the United States of Indonesia.

Article 3 - The United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies with the provision, however, that in case the population of any territory, after due consultation with the other territories, should decide by democratic process that they are not, or not yet, willing to join the United States of Indonesia, they can establish a special relationship for such a territory to the United States of Indonesia and to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Article 4 - The component parts of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo, and the Great East without prejudice to the right of the population of any territory to decide by democratic process that its position in the United States of Indonesia shall be arranged otherwise.

Without derogation of the provisions of Article 3 and of the first paragraph of this Article, the United States of Indonesia may make special arrangements concerning the territory of its capital.

Article 5 - The constitution of the United States of Indonesia shall be determined by a constituent assembly composed of the democratically nominated representatives of the Republic and of the other future partners of the United States of Indonesia to which the following paragraph of this Article shall apply.

Both parties shall consult each other on the method of participation in this constituent assembly by the Republic of Indonesia, by the territories not under the authority of the Republic and by the groups of the population not, or insufficiently, represented with due observance of the responsibility of the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic respectively.

Article 6 - To promote the joint interests of the Netherlands and Indonesia, the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall co-operate in the establishment of a Netherlands Indonesian Union by which the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands, the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao, shall be converted into the said Union consisting on the one hand of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands, Surinam and Curacao, and on the other hand the United States of Indonesia.

The foregoing paragraph does not exclude the possibility of a further arrangement of the relations between the Netherlands, Surinam and Curacao.

Article 7 - A. The Netherlands Indonesian Union shall have its own organs to promote the joint interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia.
E. These organs shall be formed by the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia and, if necessary, by the parliaments of those countries.

C. The joint interests shall be considered to be co-operation on foreign relations, defence and, as far as necessary, finance as well as subjects of an economic or cultural nature.

Article 8 - The King (Queen) of the Netherlands shall be at the head of the Netherlands Indonesian Union. Decrees and resolutions concerning the joint interests shall be issued by the organs of the Union in the King's (Queen's) name.

Article 9 - In order to promote the interests of the United States of Indonesia in the Netherlands and of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Indonesia, a High Commissioner shall be appointed by the respective Governments.

Article 10 - Statutes of the Netherlands Indonesian Union shall, furthermore, contain provisions regarding:

A. Safeguarding of the rights of both parties towards one another and guarantees for the fulfilment of their mutual obligations.

B. Mutual exercise of civil rights by Netherlands and Indonesian citizens.

C. Regulations containing provisions in case no agreement can be reached by the organs of the Union.

D. Regulation of the manner and conditions of the assistance to be given by the services of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia as long as the services of the latter are not, or are insufficiently, organized; and

E. Safeguarding in both parts of the Union of the fundamental human rights and liberties referred to in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.
Article 11 - A. The Statutes of the Netherlands Indonesian Union shall be drafted by a conference of representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the future United States of Indonesia.

B. The statutes shall come into effect after approval by the respective parliaments.


Article 13 - The Netherlands Government shall forthwith take the necessary steps in order to obtain the admission of the United States of Indonesia as a Member of the United Nations Organization immediately after the formation of the Netherlands Indonesian Union.

Article 14 - The Government of the Republic of Indonesia recognizes the claims of all non-Indonesians to the restoration of their rights and the restitution of their goods as far as they are exercised or to be found in the territory over which it exercises de facto authority. A joint commission will be set up to effect this restoration and restitution.

Article 15 - In order to reform the Government of the Indies in such a way that its composition and procedure shall conform as closely as possible to the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia and to its projected constitutional structure, the Netherlands Government, pending the realization of the United States of Indonesia and of the Netherlands Indonesian Union, shall forthwith initiate the necessary legal measures to adjust the constitutional and international position of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the new situation.

Article 16 - Directly after the conclusion of this agreement, both parties shall proceed to reduce their armed forces. They will consult together concerning the extent and rate of this reduction and their cooperation in military matters.
Article 17 - A. For the co-operation between the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic contemplated in this agreement, an organization shall be called into existence of delegations to be appointed by each of the two Governments with a joint secretariat.

B. The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall settle by arbitration any dispute which might arise from this agreement and which cannot be solved by joint consultation in conference between those delegations. In that case a chairman of another nationality with a deciding vote shall be appointed by agreement between the delegations or, if such agreement cannot be reached, by the President of the International Court of Justice.

Article 18 - This agreement shall be drawn up in the Netherlands and Indonesian languages. Both texts shall have equal authority.¹

11. Extract from
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, RT. HON. H.V. EVATT,
TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 6TH JUNE 1947.

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

On 28th January last, the Dutch authorities at Batavia issued regulations
prohibiting the export by the Republic of all goods produced on Dutch-owned
estates, and the import into Republican territory of goods which could be
used for military purposes. These regulations have been enforced by the
Dutch Navy, and as a consequence all foreign trade with Republican-controlled
areas has stopped.

While this is not a matter which affects Australia only - British,
United States and Chinese ships having been held up by the Dutch Navy - it
was considered that Australia had suggestions to offer to both the Dutch and
Indonesian authorities, which might overcome the problem and assist in their
negotiations. Australia wishes to import goods, such as sisal, from Indonesia,
so we had a very considerable interest in helping to promote a solution.

A second and related problem, in the solution of which it was considered
assistance could be given, was the problem of shipping goods from Australia.

These goods have been held up in Australia for some considerable time,
partly because there was no agreement between Dutch and Indonesian author-
ities as to their proportionate distribution when once they had arrived at
Indonesia.

Towards the end of April, four Australian representatives were sent to
Batavia to assist the Consul-General in his discussions with Dutch and
Indonesians. These officials represented the Departments of External Affairs,
the Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture, and Supply and Shipping.

On the first problem, officials suggested that trade should be resumed
without restriction, and that, pending the conclusion of current negotiations
between Dutch and Indonesian representatives, the trade should be financed
by frozen accounts so that when the title of goods shipped was determined
payment could be made to the owners.
On the second problem, as a result of discussions by our officials with both Dutch and Indonesian representatives, both these parties made an arrangement governing the distribution of goods when delivered, and the payment by the Indonesians to the Dutch for these goods allocated to Republican areas.

On 25th May, the Australian Consul-General at Batavia received a letter signed jointly by Dr van Mook, representing the Netherlands East Indies Government, and by Sutan Sjahrir, representing the Indonesian Republican Government, stating that an agreed arrangement was being made between Dutch and Indonesian authorities for the distribution in Indonesia as a whole of Dutch-owned goods in Australia and that, therefore, both parties desired the shipment of the goods from Australia.

It is to be observed that the receipt of this letter followed upon the lengthy negotiations which the Australian Government had initiated. The agreement between Dutch and Indonesians made possible the joint message to the Australian Government through the Australian Consul-General stating that both parties now wish the goods to be shipped.

Meanwhile, negotiations continue on the problem of a general resumption of trade. At present only native-owned goods - particularly kapok and some rubber - can be shipped out of Indonesian-controlled ports. Only goods not on the Dutch contraband list can be sent to Indonesian ports.

While, therefore, the ships carrying goods to Indonesia may, under present circumstances, return with only limited quantities of goods, it is hoped by the time they arrive Dutch-Indonesian negotiations will have progressed sufficiently for a general restoration of trade.

The visit of Australian officials, which has resulted in agreement between Dutch and Indonesians on the question of distribution of goods in Indonesia, has also contributed to the solution of the general problem of future relationships. In this respect Australia will continue to help in any way possible. The visit also had the happy effect of bringing together Dutch and Indonesian representatives in a way which helped to lessen the
feeling of suspicion and hostility between them. This, in the opinion of the Australian officials, is the main real factor preventing general and unrestricted agreement between the two parties.

The Dutch and Indonesian authorities have yet to reach agreement on ways and means of implementing a number of the more important provisions of the Cheribon (or Linggardjati) Agreement of 25th March last. The Netherlands Prime Minister, Dr Beel, and the Minister for Overseas Territories, Dr Jonkman, have recently visited Indonesia, and have examined the situation at first-hand. Apart from the general question of the control of foreign trade of Indonesia, there remain to be resolved significant differences of opinion concerning, for example, the restoration by the Republic of estates owned by the Netherlands East Indies Government and Dutch interests, not to mention foreign interests; the international status of the Republic of Indonesia and the mode by which its representation in foreign countries is to be effected; and the vexed question of currency and financial policy generally.\(^1\)

\(^1\) CPD, Vol. 192, pp.3691-3692; also CNIA, Vol. XVIII, No.6, (June/July 1947), pp.102-103.

The Australian Government welcomes reports that further progress has now been made towards a permanent settlement in Indonesia.

The de facto authority of the Republic, on the basis of the Linggadjati Agreement, which has been recognized by several Governments, including the United Kingdom and United States Governments, and which the Government of Australia also recognizes, implies the acceptance by the Republican Government of very great responsibility; and the Republican Government, as one of the negotiating parties and as a future essential element in the Interim Federal State, has in fact accepted this responsibility.

The Australian Government, because it believes that the revival of production and trade is vital to the welfare not only of the Indonesian area, but of the world as a whole, sent representatives to Indonesia recently to assist in solving problems related to the recommencement of trade. The Australian Government wishes both parties to understand that, if in the interests of agreement between Dutch and Republican authorities on economic and political matters, the good offices of the Australian Government would at any stage be helpful, Australia will continue to do anything in its power to afford both the Netherlands and Indonesian authorities its assistance.

Furthermore, the Australian Government would be happy to give to the Interim Federal Government of Indonesia, when it is established, advice and assistance in such matters as trade, finance, communications, and economic rehabilitation and development.¹


The Australian Government has instructed its representative on the Security Council to draw the attention of the Security Council to the situation in Indonesia under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter.

Australia takes this action ten days after hostilities commenced in Indonesia, because, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, the parties to any dispute are obliged first of all to seek a solution by negotiation or mediation. Strenuous attempts have been made, in consultation with other Governments, particularly the United Kingdom, United States, and India, to bring about a solution in this way. However, it is felt that further delay is not justified because of the loss of life being sustained.

The policy Australia has adopted in the past disputes has been to urge an investigation under Article 34 of the Charter before any decisions are reached. However, the situation in Indonesia differs from any previously brought before the Security Council. Hostilities are being carried on. Investigation is not required to establish the crucial fact, and, before the Security Council determines further action, it is essential that hostilities cease.

For this reason, Australia has drawn the attention of the Security Council to the situation under Article 39 of the Charter and thereby gives power to the Security Council immediately to order the cessation of hostilities, and subsequently to take such further steps as are necessary to restore peace.

This is the first time in the history of the Security Council that this article has been invoked, and it is the hope of the Government in taking this action that, not only will hostilities cease, but that the Security Council will prove its worth in dealing quickly and effectively with a situation of this kind.

In making this move, Australia still maintains the judicial attitude which it has always maintained in considering any situation before the
Security Council. No attempt will be made to pre-judge the issue, and
discussion of merits of the case will be avoided. The Australian represent-
ative will ask first that the necessary steps be taken to terminate hostilities,
and second, without discussing the merits of the situation, that both parties
act upon Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement, which specifically
provides that, in the event of disagreement between the two parties arising
out of the Linggadjati Agreement, a third party will be asked to arbitrate,
or, failing that, the matter should be referred to the Chief Justice of the
International Court.

It will be seen, therefore, that, if the Australian proposal is given
effect to without delay or debate on procedural issues, and, if it is
readily admitted by the Security Council that the situation is one within
its jurisdiction, there should be good prospect of an immediate cessation
of hostilities, and an immediate negotiation between the two parties with
the assistance of a third party of their own choosing. Members of the
Security Council should not therefore have to arbitrate or to pass judgment
on the merits of the case.

Action along these lines can only be taken by the Security Council if
the Republican Government, not being a member of the United Nations, under-
takes to observe the obligations and duties of the United Nations Charter,
and in particular undertakes to observe Article 25, which obliges members
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.

This action by Australia has been taken after close consultations
between the Minister for External Affairs and myself, and after the closest
consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and
India.¹

¹ CNIA, Vol. XVIII, pp.411-412.
14. LETTER DATED 30 JULY 1947 FROM THE ACTING REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (DOCUMENT S/449)

[Original text: English]

30 July 1947

I have the honour to advise that I have today addressed the following communication to the President of the Security Council:

"Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to the attention of the Security Council the hostilities which are at present in progress in Java and Sumatra between armed forces of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia, and which have been the subject of communiqués by their respective army commanders during the past ten days.

"The Australian Government considers that these hostilities constitute a breach of the peace under Article 39 and urges that the Council should take immediate action to restore international peace and security.

"In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Australian Government proposes that the Security Council, as a provisional measure and without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned, should call upon the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cease hostilities forthwith and to commence arbitration in accordance with article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement between the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia signed at Batavia on 25 March 1947. (See the letter, dated 26 March 1947, from the representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, document S/311.)

"In view of the urgent circumstances, I am instructed to request you to call immediately a meeting of the Security Council for the consideration of this communication and to ask that the provisional agenda, including this item, should be communicated to the representatives on the Security Council simultaneously with the notice of the meeting."
I would be grateful if you could immediately bring this communication to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council.¹

(Signed) W. R. HODGSON,
Minister

¹ SCOR, Second Year [1947] Supplement No.16, pp.149-150.
15. DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL BY AUSTRALIA,
31 JULY 1947.

"The Security Council,

"Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed
forces of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia, and

"Having determined that such hostilities constitute a breach of the
peace under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Calls upon the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of
Indonesia, under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to comply
with the following measures, such measures to be without prejudice to the
rights, claims, or position of either party:

"(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and

"(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration in accordance with
article XVII of the Linggadjati Agreement, signed at Batavia on 25 March
1947."¹

¹ SCOR, Second Year, No.67, 171st Meeting, 31 July 1947, p.1626.
16. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Lovett)

(Washington), August 5, 1947.

Subject: Proposed Australian-United States Joint Mediation on Indonesia.

Participants: Mr Lovett, Under Secretary; Mr Makin, Australian Ambassador;
Mr Stirling, Australian Minister; Mr Bohlen; Mr Rusk;
Mr Matthews.

Mr Makin called this afternoon at his request to discuss the Indonesian problem. At considerable length and without understatement Mr Makin dwelt upon the important role of Australia in that area, and in the world, its keen interest in seeing peace in Indonesia, and its fears that continuance of strife would result in a threat to Australia. (He did not explain the nature of the threat.) With this background the Australian Government had welcomed American initiative before the Security Council and the American offer of good offices. His Government had, however, considerable qualms as to the possibility that the "cease fire" orders would not continue to be respected in view of the strong feelings on both sides in Indonesia. He referred to some radio charges by the Indonesian "Government" that the Dutch are violating the truce. I asked whether he really believed these charges. With some embarrassment he replied that he did not know whether they were true and that he had cited them merely to show continuance of uncertainty. His Government, he continued, had excellent relations with the Indonesians, with the Netherlands East Indies authorities and with the Dutch Government and was more familiar with the real situation in Indonesia than any other Government. Therefore, in the interests of peace he had been instructed formally to state that the Australian Government would welcome the opportunity to mediate jointly with the United States.

Upon conclusion of his lengthy buildup I asked why, if his Government felt so keenly about the matter, it waited five days to make the offer. Mr Makin replied that he did not know but that Mr Evatt was somewhere at sea and perhaps it had been difficult to communicate with him.
I asked further whether his Government had any reason to believe that such an offer of joint mediation would be acceptable to the Dutch. He replied that during the war Australia had rendered great service to the Dutch in the East Indies and had taken care of Dutch wounded and refugees. In view of the closeness of their wartime alliance he felt sure that the Dutch through gratitude would welcome such an offer. I said that the experience of the United States has been that gratitude was a rare and short-lived emotion.

I told Mr Makin that as he knew, the Dutch had accepted our offer of good offices. A similar offer had been extended to the Indonesians but no reply had yet been received. Thus we did not know whether our offer of good offices would be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile I could only say that we would study the suggestions of his Government. Mr Makin remarked that perhaps India might make some similar offer and if so he wanted us to know that Australia because of her geographic situation and her important role in world affairs was a much more logical partner in mediation than India or for that matter any other country. I asked if this latter included the Philippines and he said yes. I said that our reply at this time to any similar approach by the Government of India would naturally be the same.

After the departure of Mr Makin and Mr Stirling there was some discussion of the Australian proposal and the following general conclusions were reached:

(1) That Australia was motivated largely by Mr Evatt's desire to play a leading world role and to take the limelight wherever possible.

(2) That it was probable that the Australians have already been in touch with the Indonesians with regard to the American offer of good offices;

(3) That if the Indonesians should decline our offer of good offices or attach unacceptable conditions the United States should permit its offer to lapse;

(4) That the United States should not mediate jointly with any other power or powers;

(5) That unless hostilities were resumed we would favor giving opportunity to both parties to settle their differences through direct negotiations;
(6) That if an attempt were made by some other country (probably Australia or India) to force further action by the Security Council we should take the position that as long as there were no hostilities the matter was not one for Security Council action. (Mr Rusk thought that this position would receive good support in the Security Council.)¹

17. **INDONESIA: The Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. J.B. Chifley, 7th August, 1947.**

(Commenting on reports of an American offer to mediate in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, the Prime Minister said that the decision of the Security Council was that the two parties should cease hostilities and then submit to arbitration or other peaceful means of settling the dispute. When that decision was taken by the Security Council, it was interpreted by the Australian Government as meaning that the two parties would submit their case to an arbitrator who would give a decision which would be binding on the two parties, the arbitrator acting as an agent for the Security Council. Consequently, any offer merely of good offices did not adequately meet the situation.)

Reports are current that Republican authorities do not find mediation acceptable, nor do they find the good offices of only one country acceptable. While it is understood that the Netherlands Government has accepted the American offer, it must be accepted by both parties before negotiations can commence. It might be recalled that previously the Indonesians accepted the good offices of the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, which were put forward separately, but these, at that time, were not acceptable to the Netherlands authorities.

The present situation is full of dangers as, while there is a truce, there is no negotiation or contact between the two parties, and incidents are likely to occur each day which might make negotiations more difficult. The period between the cessation of hostilities and the commencement of negotiations should be as short as possible.

**Offer of Joint United States of America-Australian Arbitration.**

If both parties consider it would help to terminate this interim period and to commence negotiations immediately, the Australian Government, for its part, would be prepared to act jointly with the United States Government in a capacity of mediator and arbitrator.
This offer is made in the spirit in which the Australian Government raised the matter in the Security Council, that is in a spirit of impartiality and with one desire only, to see, as soon as possible, a peaceful settlement of the prolonged dispute in the Netherlands East Indies.¹

Whereas the Security Council, on 1 August 1947, called upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia:

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and

(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means, and to keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement;

And whereas communications have been received from the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia advising that orders have been given for the cessation of hostilities.

And whereas it is desirable that negotiations should commence as soon as possible with a view to a just and lasting settlement, and that steps should be taken to avoid disputes and friction relating to the observance of the cease fire orders and to create conditions which will facilitate agreement between the parties.

The Security Council

1. Notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the parties to comply with the resolution of 1 August 1947;

2. Notes the action taken by the Government of the United States in making available its good offices to the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia and the offer by the Government of Australia to act jointly with the United States Government in the capacity of mediator and arbitrator;

3. Resolves to establish a commission consisting of representatives of.........................................................*

who will report directly to the Security Council on the situation
in the Republic of Indonesia following the resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947.¹

* Hodgson proposed that the membership of the commission should be by the appointment of the Council, after negotiations between the parties had started.

¹  SCOR, Second Year [1947], 181st Meeting, 12 August 1947. [Document S/488].
Whereas the Security Council on 1 August 1947 called upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cease hostilities forthwith, and

Whereas communications have been received from the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia advising that orders have been given for the cessation of hostilities, and

Whereas it is desirable that steps should be taken to avoid disputes and friction relating to the observance of the cease fire orders, and to create conditions which will facilitate agreement between the parties.

The Security Council

1. Notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the parties to comply with the resolution of 1 August 1947;

2. Notes with satisfaction the statement issued by the Netherlands Government on 11 August, in which it affirms its intention to organise a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia in accordance with the purposes of the Linggadjati Agreement.

3. Notes that the Netherlands Government intends immediately to request the career consuls stationed in Batavia jointly to report on the present situation in the Republic of Indonesia;

4. Notes that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has requested appointment by the Security Council of a commission of observers;

5. Requests the Governments members of the Council which have career consular representatives in Batavia to instruct them to prepare jointly for the information and guidance of the Security Council reports on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the resolution of the Council on
1 August 1947, such reports to cover the observance of the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties;

6. Requests the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia to grant to the representatives referred to in paragraph 5 all facilities necessary for the effective fulfilment of their mission.

7. Resolves to consider the matter further should the situation require.¹

¹ SCOR, Second Year [1947] No.82, 193 Meeting, 22 August 1947, pp.2173–2174.
Whereas the Security Council on 1 August 1947, called upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means, and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement; and

Whereas it is desirable that negotiations should commence as soon as possible with a view to a just and lasting settlement;

The Security Council

Requests the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia to submit all matters in dispute between them to arbitration by a commission consisting of one arbitrator selected by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, one by the Government of the Netherlands, and one by the Security Council.¹

¹ SCOR, Second Year [1947], No.82, 193rd Meeting, 22 August 1947, p.2174.
"Whereas the United States of America by the treaty of Japan with Spain of Dec. 10, 1898, and by the Treaty with Spain of Nov. 7, 1900, did acquire sovereignty over the Philippines;

Whereas the U.S.A. has consistently and faithfully during the past 48 years exercised jurisdiction and control over the Philippines and its people;

Whereas it has been the repeated declaration of the U.S. Government that full independence would be granted to the Philippines as soon as the Philippine people were prepared to assume this obligation;

Whereas the Act of Congress of March 24, 1934, known as the Philippine Independence Act, directed that, on July 4 immediately following a 10-year transitional period leading to the independence of the Philippines, the President of the U.S.A. should by proclamation withdraw and surrender all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty of the U.S.A. in and over the territory and people of the Philippines, except certain reservations therein or thereafter authorised to be made, and, on behalf of the U.S.A., should recognise the independence of the Philippines:

Now, therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do proclaim:

The United States of America hereby withdraws and surrenders all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty now existing and exercised in and over the territory and people of the Philippines; and,

On behalf of the U.S.A., I do hereby recognise the independence of the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the Government instituted by the people thereof, under the Constitution now in force."

1 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1946-1948, p.8029.
Interim report from the Consular Commission at Batavia:

"1. Although investigations cannot be regarded as complete until reports can be received from all military observers, the Commission has unanimously reached certain definite and inevitable conclusions after visits by members to eleven different Netherlands and Indonesian-controlled areas in Java and Sumatra since the Commission began its work on 1 September. In view of the urgency of the problem we think these should be transmitted to you without delay and very concisely for your advance information.

"2. Advances by Netherlands troops between 20 July and 4 August were in the nature of spearheads and some fighting occurred. While the main bodies of Republican troops in most areas retreated, considerable numbers of Republican troops remained between the spearheads in some areas and guerrillas remained in all areas. The Indonesian scorched-earth policy and other disturbances, including looting and heavy loss of life, especially of Chinese, were intensified between and behind the spearheads during and after the Netherlands advance. On 29 August the Netherlands East Indies Government declared its intention to complete 'complete restoration of law and order and the complete disarmament and winding up of all armed organizations' opposing the Netherlands East Indies authority within a demarcation line covering Netherlands advanced positions. The Indonesians did not accept the Netherlands demarcation line. The Netherlands line entailed patrol and other activities which were regarded by the Indonesians as hostile movement. Patrol clashes and sniping result without diminution, notwithstanding the cease-fire order.

"3. We find that the cease-fire order is not fully effective, and that casualties and damage continue and that this state of affairs is due in the main to the situation described above. So long as this situation continues,
it will be impossible to secure anything like complete observance of the cease-fire order.

"4. We have so far been unable to discover any practical interim measures which would secure a more effective observance of the cease-fire order or reduce casualties.

"5. As the work of the Commission is not yet completed, it is requested that these advance conclusions may be regarded as confidential.

"6. The Consular Commission hopes to complete a written report on or about 30 September."

September 22, 1947.¹


I believe that the political situation at present existing in the Philippines is the ideal one for the islands to the north of Australia. The western power, in that case the United States of America, has the right to maintain fortified positions. On the other hand, it has given complete independence to the native peoples. The result is that the fortified positions, which are really maintained in our interests as well as those of America, are not surrounded by a hostile population. If Dutch sovereignty is restored in Indonesia by military action, which would involve the complete suppression of the Indonesian revolution, we should not imagine - whatever we may think of that possibility - that it is an acceptable solution. Our experience of fortified positions which are surrounded by a hostile population, teaches us that those fortifications will last only about as long as they did in the Netherlands East Indies in 1941, when they lasted about five days. Therefore, when Australian foreign policy was directed towards the consummation of the Cheribon Agreement it was directed towards leaving Europeans in certain fortified positions, conserving certain economic rights, and yet, at the same time, conferring on the native peoples democratic rights. That is a policy which afforded a reasonable prospect that the native peoples would not become hostile to the European force maintained in their country....

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24. AUSTRALIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION, SECURITY COUNCIL
3 OCTOBER 1947.

(Document S/574)

"The Security Council resolves:

"That the Secretary-General be requested to act as convenor of the Committee of Three and arrange for the organization of its work; and

"That the Committee of Three be requested to proceed to exercise its functions with the utmost dispatch."1

1 SCOR, Second Year [1947], No. 93, 207th Meeting, 3 October 1947, p.2503
"The Security Council,

"In order to ensure the observance of its cease-fire order,

"Calls upon the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to withdraw their respective forces at least five kilometres behind the positions held at date of cease-fire order of 1 August."¹

¹ SCOR, Second Year [1947], No. 96, 210th Meeting, p.2555, 11 October 1947.
A. The Principles Proposed by the Netherlands and accepted by the Parties on January 17, 1948:

1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement.

2. It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that this guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.

3. It is understood that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only with the full and free consent of the populations of those territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such populations will have been ensured.

4. That on the signing of the political agreement provision be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties.

5. That as soon as practicable after the signing of the truce agreement, economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be restored through the co-operation of both parties, taking into consideration the interests of all the constituent parts of Indonesia.

6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than six months nor more than one year after the signing of the agreement during which time uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed; at the end of this period free elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the United States of Indonesia.
7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to democratic procedure to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia.

8. It is understood that if, after signing the agreement referred to in item 1, either party should ask the United Nations to provide an agency to observe conditions at any time up to the point at which sovereignty is transferred from the Government of the Netherlands to the Government of the United States of Indonesia, the other party will take this request in serious consideration. The following four principles are taken from the Linggadjati Agreement:

9. Independence for the Indonesian peoples.

10. Co-operation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia.

11. A sovereign State on a federal basis under a constitution which will be arrived at by democratic processes.

12. A union between the United States of Indonesia and other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the King of the Netherlands.

B. Six Additional Principles Submitted by the Committee of Good Offices and accepted by the Parties on January 19, 1948:

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such stated interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a provisional federal Government of the territories of the future United States of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent State in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands Indonesian Union, at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a State within the United States of Indonesia.
2. In any provisional federal Government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all States will be offered fair representation.

3. Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request. This request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.

4. Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or another State within the United States of Indonesia, such plebiscite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices, should either party in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 3 above request the services of the Committee in this capacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebiscite.

5. Following the delineation of the States in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened through democratic procedures to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various States in the convention will be in proportion to their populations.

6. Should any State decide not to ratify the constitution and desire, in accordance with the principles of Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.¹

27. EXTRACT FROM
ADDRESS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON 17 FEBRUARY 1948 BY MR JUSTICE KIRBY (AUSTRALIA)
MEMBER, COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION

...My knowledge of the situation, gained on the spot and by constant and close relationship with the parties, is that the Republic of Indonesia has been willing to place, and has actually placed, the utmost reliance and faith for the future in the continued interest of the Security Council and of the Committee of Good Offices in the Indonesian Question. It was this reliance and faith that led the Republic to accept, as far as a truce plan was concerned, a disadvantage and loss, which, if allowed to become permanent, would cause it irreparable damage, and perhaps make its continued existence as an entity and as a party to the dispute impossible. I refer to the fact that the Republic accepted a truce plan which not only allowed to remain under control of the Netherlands large territories which it gained by "military or police action", in part since 20 July 1947, and in part since 4 August 1947, but, more importantly, which allowed the Netherlands to have, for the time being, the political administration of the lives of some 25 million people in those territories.

My knowledge is that the representatives of the Republic were repeatedly and correctly told by me, as well as by other members of the Committee, that the truce was a provisional measure only; and that, as a provisional measure, it was "without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned". These words, of course, are the words of Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, and justice demands that these words shall not be dead but shall live. I, as a member of the Committee of Good Offices, feel entitled to say that it is the responsibility not only of the Committee of Good Offices but of this Security Council to see that
those words do live. By their continued and active interest in the Indonesian question, the Security Council and the Committee of Good Offices can help both parties to ensure that a speedy, permanent and just settlement removes any temporary disadvantage to either or both of the parties.

It is my belief and hope that the Netherlands Government has shown, by its acceptance of fundamental political principles, that it, for its part, recognizes the necessity for a speedy and permanent political settlement in place of the provisional measures so far agreed upon.

The accepted political principles contain a provision for the holding of plebiscites not less than six months nor more than one year after the signing of the political agreement. This provision for plebiscites, important in itself, becomes doubly important when it is realized that each party has undertaken that it will guarantee at all times freedom of assembly, speech and publication. Moreover, the parties can take immediate advantage of the Committee's offer, made at the very meeting at which the truce agreement was signed and the political principles accepted, to inform and to keep informed all the Indonesian peoples on all matters relating to a favourable settlement of the Indonesian question. This offer was so to inform the peoples of Indonesia by all available means, such as radio, newspapers and speeches, whether the people were in Republican-controlled or Netherlands-controlled territories, or in the demilitarized zones. Thus, neither party will, I hope, delay until the six-month period has elapsed, or until the political agreement is signed, the taking of steps to create a properly informed public for the proper holding of the ultimate plebiscites.

The political principles also contain a recognition by the parties of the past assistance of the Committee of Good Offices, a recognition expressed in the provisions which make available a continuation of the assistance of the Committee, not only until a political agreement has been
reached, but until the United States of Indonesia has come into being. I hope that the Security Council will play its part in making the assistance of the Committee thus available to the parties, the assistance, I hope, of a Committee which can act formally rather than informally, and with greater initiative than the past has allowed.¹

¹ SCOR Third Year, No. 20, 247 mtg., pp.148-149.
28. EXTRACT FROM
AN ADDRESS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON 17 FEBRUARY 1948 BY MR W.D. FORSYTH,
REPRESENTING AUSTRALIA

...The great importance of putting the Renville principles into the earliest possible effect is felt keenly by Australia, which is geographically so close to the scene of the Indonesian dispute and which first brought the question before the Security Council. Australia fully appreciates and shares the concern of those who desire the speediest possible return to stability and peaceful development in Indonesia.

The truce is the first and fundamental achievement. The fighting has stopped.

The second great achievement is that the bases on which a settlement can be negotiated have been agreed upon unconditionally.

The third achievement is still to come. There must be a political agreement covering all matters in dispute in the territories over which the Republic has exercised de facto authority: Java, Sumatra and Madura.

Fourthly, the new independent federal State has to be set up and its sovereign status established in fact. An immediate beginning with the task of putting the Renville terms into effect is clearly desirable so that a permanent settlement may be reached without delay. Great tasks of economic reconstruction and development, and of promoting the welfare of the peoples of the area, are waiting to be done. Nevertheless, the desire for speed should not be permitted to obscure or prejudice in any way the rights and the legitimate interests and aspirations of the parties and peoples concerned. A settlement that is not based on justice cannot long endure; a speedy settlement, in which these rights, interests and aspirations were not reconciled, would not last.

The Renville political principles wisely provide for a period of some months during which there will be completely free discussion of the issues involved in the settlement. During this period, the Committee's function of
keeping the people informed would be of particular importance.

Amongst the most important of the rights and interests involved are those of the Republic. It is a signatory to the truce and to the principles on which a settlement will be negotiated. It would be unjust and inconsistent with the Renville Agreement if the status of the Republic were not fully preserved during the negotiations.

The political principles accepted by the two parties recognized that the peoples of Indonesia are entitled to self-government, independence, and self-determination; and it is essential that the elections, the plebiscites, and the constitutional convention provided for should be conducted on completely fair and democratic lines. Since the peoples concerned, through their representatives, have placed their reliance on the Committee of Good Offices and the United Nations, it is the duty of the United Nations, through the Committee, to assure itself that fair and democratic processes are in fact followed in these elections and these plebiscites. Both parties will be able to avail themselves of the assistance of the Committee in making it clear beyond all doubt that the will of the peoples concerned is being expressed. The political principles provide the means by which the United Nations may so assure itself.

The rights of the Republic are of special importance because the Republic has been and remains a symbol of the aspirations of vast numbers of people in the Indies. In a sense, the Republic exercises a trust on behalf of those people. It is important that its position should not be subject to attrition; that its influence should not be whittled away during the period of negotiations, and that its place in the political settlement, and in the eventual United States of Indonesia, should be determined by the democratic processes and principles prescribed in the Renville terms.

The question of the formation of new States in the Indonesian area is of special importance in this connexion. The political principles provide that after six months, and within twelve months, there shall be a plebiscite
to determine whether the people of the various parts of Java, Sumatra and Madura wish to belong to the Republic or to another State.

It is also provided that changes in administration shall not be made without the consent of the population, given under conditions of freedom from coercion. It would clearly be inconsistent with these provisions, and with the spirit of the principles as a whole, if new States were to be set up during the period when a political agreement covering the three islands mentioned was being negotiated.

.....The setting up of such new States would obviously affect the position of the Republic of Indonesia, and would also affect in advance the very substance of the political agreement contemplated. In the interests of steady progress towards settlement, the position obtaining at the time of the Renville truce should be maintained until there is further agreement.

Similar consideration, as well as others, apply to the very difficult question of trade. It is well known that control of trade was one of the most contentious issues between the parties before the outbreak of hostilities, now happily ended by the truce.....The truce agreement provides for trade and intercourse between all areas, with necessary restrictions to be agreed upon with the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices. The political principles provide for the restoration of trade and economic activity through co-operation between the parties, the interests of all parts of Indonesia to be considered.

It is obviously desirable that trade, economic activity, transportation and communications, both internal and external, should be restored as soon as practicable. But here, again, the rights and interests of the parties must not be prejudiced. The Committee of Good Offices and the parties will have a difficult task in reaching arrangements that will take care of practical necessities without sacrificing interests the parties are entitled to preserve throughout the negotiations.
Related to some extent to this question is the question of foreign representation. The Republic has de facto established representatives of its Government abroad in some countries. At some stage, the de facto foreign representation of the Republic must necessarily be adjusted to the principle of its future status as a state within the United States of Indonesia. Meanwhile, whatever the grounds on which it established its foreign representation, it would seem that those grounds would remain inviolate and effective.

The truce and the political principles have been accepted as a result of a process initiated by the Security Council. One of the parties has made it clear that its acceptance was given in complete reliance on the Security Council. This party now finds itself in a less advantageous position than it was in at the time when it accepted the Security Council's offer of good offices. Its position is less advantageous in two main respects. First the territory under its control is much less than it was at the time when the cease-fire decision was proclaimed on 4 August, since the Renville line deprives it of areas which it occupied at that earlier date; and, secondly, it has given up a claim to separate statehood and independence which it was maintaining at that earlier date. It now accepts the principle that it will be one State in a federal structure, the whole of which will be a sovereign entity. This party has accepted the truce and the principles containing these provisions in the faith that its rights will be respected, and that the principles will be honestly and justly implemented and a solution arrived at which will reconcile the interests of the parties and provide for the satisfaction of the needs and aspirations of the peoples concerned. In so doing, it has cast a tremendous responsibility on the Security Council, and, indeed, on the United Nations as a whole....

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SCOR, Third Year, No.21, 248th Meeting, pp.162-165.
In the Netherlands East Indies and Indo-China considerable bloodshed and bitterness have occurred in clashes between the governing power and the native inhabitants. The best solution for the time being at least would be some arrangement, which would give a complete or considerable self-government to the native populations, while permitting a continued Dutch and French participation in the political and economic development of these regions. Complete severance of relations is to the interest of no one, depriving this region of the capital, investment, experience and backing of the advanced European State, and drastically changing the economic and political relations of the governing power. But it requires a real statesmanship for a governing power, willing to make concessions, and for dependent peoples to moderate the absoluteness of demands to accord with realities of their present stage of development.

We should not allow our sympathy for dependent peoples blinding [sic] us from the real achievements of the colonial powers in material development, bringing peace to [the] region and instilling the conception of the individual rights. In very many cases the present freedom desire is itself a product of western tradition, thought and teaching.

Furthermore independence and democracy are not always the same thing. The removal of the western domination not necessarily eliminate[s] the power struggles between the various nations interested in and situated in this area. Moreover, a nationalist movement sometimes contains fascist totalitarian elements whose attainment of power would endanger a sound political development and even peace. Independence does not remove all Asia and Pacific problems; in some cases merely gives them a new shape.¹

(1) To support at all times, and faithfully, the principles expressed in the United Nations Charter;
(2) In international disputes, to insist on independent investigation of all the facts with a view to a settlement based upon right and justice, and not upon mere expediency or mere strategical preparation for another war;
(3) To give every possible assistance to the peoples of the world by way of relief and rehabilitation required because of World War II;
(4) To maintain and strengthen our ties of kinship with Britain and the other Dominions through co-operation in defence and welfare matters;
(5) To strengthen Pacific security by appropriate regional arrangements in co-operation with the United States of America and other Pacific nations.
(6) To support democratic principles both in the United Nations and particularly, in the making of peace settlements.
(7) To emphasize the duty of contributing towards preventing war, by actively supporting all welfare organizations such as United Nations organizations and agencies, including the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Labour Office and all important international bodies concerned with the welfare of peoples, especially those in the Pacific and South East Asia region, such as the South Pacific Commission.¹

MISSION TO SOUTH-EAST ASIA:

Statement by the Minister for External Affairs,
Right Honorable H.V. Evatt, 18th May, 1948

The Minister for External Affairs (Dr Evatt) said to-day that, as a consequence of the decisions of the Government made known some time ago to offer scholarships and relief supplies to countries in the South East Asia area, he was arranging for Mr W. Macmahon Ball, accompanied by an educational and supply officer and an officer of the Department of External Affairs, to visit the countries concerned to arrange for the selection of scholars to come to Australia and, in some cases to arrange for the sending of relief supplies.

Australia is carrying out the recommendations of the United Nations and its agencies. In the case of the scholarships, the scheme was being set in motion as part of the world-wide programme of UNESCO designed to bring about greater understanding between nations. On relief matters the United Nations has decided that countries should make their contributions direct by agreement with the recipient countries where the need is greatest.

Dr Evatt emphasized that he attached a great importance to these positive steps to promote international understanding, and hoped that Mr Ball's visit would strengthen the ties of friendship between Australians and the peoples of South-East Asia.¹

¹ CWIA, Vol. XIV, No.6 (June 1948), p.354.

Note. The following is the text of the letter addressed to the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies. A similar letter, mutatis mutandis, was addressed to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia.

Kaliurang, 10 June 1948

The Committee of Good Offices' third interim report to the Security Council, now nearing completion, will show that, in the five months that have passed since the signing of the Renville Agreement, no significant progress has been made towards a political settlement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. We have, indeed, for some time had the impression that negotiations towards such a settlement have been approaching a standstill. Your Excellency's letter of 4 June to the Prime Minister of the Republic, expressing the view that the bridging of the gap between the points of view of the two delegations along the lines followed so far would be difficult, and inviting the Prime Minister and his principal advisers to discuss outstanding problems with you and the Royal Commissioners, indicates that we are not alone in fearing that a protraction of the procedures so far followed in the discussions (in which, it must be added, the Committee's role has been largely passive) will prove barren. Furthermore, you evident belief that direct conversations between the most highly placed officials of both Governments might accomplish what negotiations between the delegations of the two Governments, under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices, have so far failed to achieve raises the question whether the Committee's effort can be of value unless the Committee can make a positive contribution to an agreement, which it has in the past refrained from attempting.

Before receiving a copy of Your Excellency's letter of 4 June, we had discussed among ourselves the difficulties that appear to stand in the way of a successful conclusion of the negotiations and the manner in which
the Committee might be of assistance.

The enclosed working paper, which has taken shape from these discussions, is tentative and subject to reconsideration in the light of the discussions, questions, or objections which it may provoke. We believe that only by coming forward with such a suggestion now that the delegations of the parties appear unable to make further progress towards an agreement can we acquit ourselves of our obligations and justify the seven and a half months the Committee has spent in Indonesia endeavouring to assist the parties.

Our Belgian colleague is reserving his position with respect to the working paper.

We are offering this working paper informally to Your Excellency and to Mr Hatta in the sincere hope that it may prove useful in any conversations that may take place between you and to the delegations of your respective Governments should negotiations continue between them. It is not our intention to refer to the substance of the paper in any public statement or in any report to the Security Council, unless, of course, we are forced to the conclusion that the parties are unable to reach a political agreement on the basis of our proposals or on any other basis. In this case we should feel obliged to include the working paper, with such revisions as are called for in the light of the comments of the parties, and to set forth the circumstances of the parties' inability to come to an agreement in a report to the Security Council.

(Signed) T.K. CRITCHLEY
Representative of Australia on the Committee of Good Offices

(Signed) Coert du BOIS
Representative of the United States of America on the Committee of Good Offices
WORKING PAPER ON AN OUTLINE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

This paper offers suggestions for the principles of a political agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia which would provide the basis for the formation of a sovereign United States of Indonesia in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. We believe that the principles as set forth below will safeguard and reconcile the proper and essential interests of the two parties as these have been clarified in the current negotiations between their delegations.

We have come to the conclusion that the main issues between the parties involve the following:

1. The extent of the Republic's representation in the Provisional Federal Government, which will constitute the Government of Indonesia prior to the transfer of sovereignty by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

2. The powers to be transferred to the Provisional Federal Government (in the sense that this will be a government by Indonesian representatives) by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

3. The powers to be transferred to the Provisional Federal Government by the Republic of Indonesia.

4. The powers and functions to be reserved to the Netherlands-Indonesian Union in the Statute of the Union as against those to be exercised by the United States of Indonesia as a member nation.

We believe that the parties' differing positions on these issues may be resolved in accordance with the letter and spirit of the principles accepted by the parties on board the USS Renville.
OVER-ALL POLITICAL AGREEMENT

With regard to the problems pertaining to the interim period (the period prior to the transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands), we are of the view that the key to a solution may be found in the second of the six additional principles of the Renville Agreement, which states that "in any provisional federal government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all States will be offered fair representation". This principle may be taken as grounds for maintaining that a provisional federal government cannot be created until the States have been delineated and formed.

We believe, however, that this principle need not be interpreted so as to delay the creation of a provisional federal government until the final delineation and formation of the component States of the United States of Indonesia. At the same time, it is clear that the representation of the Republic, as one of the States in the future United States of Indonesia, must be based upon the extent of the Republic if such representation is to be fair; that is, proportional to the representation accorded the other areas. The present geographical extent of the Republic is defined solely by the location of the demilitarized zones, which were established purely as a means of making possible a military truce between the parties. The establishment of these zones, according to Article 3 of the Truce Agreement, "in no way prejudices the rights, claims or positions of the parties under the resolutions of the Security Council of 1, 25 and 26 August and 1 November 1947". In short, the area which the Republic properly represents is yet to be determined. The area at present under the control of the Republic contains, according to the Committee's information, about two-fifths of the population of Indonesia. The islands of Java, Madura and Sumatra contain about four-fifths of the population of Indonesia. According to the fourth of the six additional principles which, "among others, form a basis for the negotiations toward a political settlement", accepted by the parties
on board the USS *Renville*, the States in Java, Madura and Sumatra will be
delineated in accordance with a plebiscite or with another method for
ascertaining the will of the populations upon which the parties may agree.
Should the populations of these islands so elect, all may be incorporated
in the Republic. (In this connexion, the Committee should point out that
in its view nothing in the *Renville* principles precludes the Republic from
subdividing into a number of States in the interests of a balanced Indonesian
federation, and that this sub-division could be effected either on the basis
of the territories it now controls or of the territories that it may come to
control when the populations have had an opportunity to express their will
in accordance with the fourth of the six additional principles. In so far
as an agreement with the Netherlands is concerned, we consider that the
Government of the Republic represents all the territories of Java, Madura
and Sumatra the populations of which may, when the time comes, demonstrate
through democratic procedure their desire to be incorporated in the Republic
irrespective of whether these territories be ultimately included in a single
Republican State or be divided with the consent of the Republic into a
number of States).

The fundamental question is whether it is possible to create a
provisional federal government in which all the States, including those
which at the time of the formation of this government have not yet come
into existence, may be fairly represented. We believe that there is a
solution to this problem and propose that the following principles, which
we believe contain such a solution, be accepted by the parties:

1. Upon the agreement of the parties to the following principles, the
Netherlands to undertake as soon as possible to obtain the agreement of the
representatives of the areas outside Java, Madura and Sumatra to the procedure
envisaged in these principles in order that it may apply to the entire
territory of the future United States of Indonesia.
2. Immediately upon the signing of the political agreement, the parties to set up a joint commission of technical experts which would have the task of studying the problem of the future administration of Indonesia from an objective, non-political point of view and of proposing the delineation of the future States, taking account of all relevant consideration but particularly the necessity for an efficient system of administration.

3. The Constituent Assembly (see below) to be empowered to delineate the States of the United States of Indonesia but to be bound to accept as States area delineated as such by the joint commission of technical experts, unless a proposal for a change in any of the boundaries delineated by the Commission should receive the support of the majority of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly and of the majority of the delegates elected from the areas within the proposed States directly affected by the proposed change.

4. Elections to the Constituent Assembly to be held as soon as practicable after the signing of the political agreement, but the Assembly not to be convened before the joint commission of technical experts has reported on the provisional delineation of States.

5. The provisions for free and uncoerced discussion of vital issues accepted by the parties on board the USS Renville to apply in the period preceding the election, and persons charged with abusing the freedom of speech, assembly and publication as assured under the Renville principles to be tried without delay.

6. The regencies in Java and the equivalent administrative areas in other parts of Indonesia to constitute electoral districts for the Constituent Assembly. Where a regency or equivalent area is divided by the status quo line, the two portions to constitute separate electoral districts.

7. The number of delegates to the Constituent Assembly from each electoral district to be in proportion to the population of the district (perhaps one delegate for each 500,000 inhabitants).
8. An elector (or electors) to be selected by each desa and by the lowest administrative subdivision of each municipality within the regency or equivalent administrative area. The electors so elected to convene at the seat of the regency (or other area) government and there elect delegates to the Constituent Assembly...

9. Secrecy of the ballot to be assured at both stages, at the primary level by a method of voting suitable to a partially illiterate electorate.

10. The Committee of Good Offices to place itself at the disposal of the parties for observation of the election in accordance with the fourth of the six additional principles.

11. The Constituent Assembly to convene and to have the status both of a Constituent Assembly and of a Provisional Parliament.

12. The Provisional Parliament to form the Provisional Federal Government by electing a President, the President in turn to appoint a Prime Minister who will select a cabinet (the Parliament, however, to be free to form the Provisional Federal Government in any other democratic manner should it desire). The Prime Minister and the Cabinet to be collectively responsible to the Provisional Parliament and to cease to hold office in the event of a vote of no confidence.

13. The Constituent Assembly to approve the delineation of States recommended by the joint commission of technical experts subject to any changes made in accordance with paragraph 3 above, the delegates in the Constituent Assembly from the electoral districts included within the boundaries of the States as delineated to be considered thereafter as the representatives of these States in the Constituent Assembly Provisional Parliament. (The question arises as to what would take place should a number of States be represented in the Assembly by delegations of which the majority of members are adherents of the Republic. Obviously the delegations would have the option of voting to combine their States in a single Republic of Indonesia which, subject to the approval of the majority of the Assembly as a whole, would as such become one of the
component States of the United States of Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia in these circumstances could be so enormous in population by comparison with the other States as to throw the federation out of balance and render it virtually unworkable and meaningless. Since the Government of the Republic has, however, subscribed to the principle of a federated Indonesia, we assume that it would not wish to vitiate, in this manner, the planning of the joint commission of technical experts and that, instead of combining, the States which have elected Republican adherents to represent them in the Constituent Assembly would choose to consider themselves "Republican" States. However, with the progress towards a sovereign Indonesia as far advanced as it will be at this stage, we anticipate that the concept of the Republic will have become merged with the concept of the United States of Indonesia.)

14. The representatives of each State in the Provisional Parliament to elect provisional State government to prepare for the election of duly constituted State governments.

We have the following observations to make in connexion with these principles:

Time of elections for the Constituent Assembly. The sixth of the twelve principles "forming an agreed basis for the political discussions" accepted by the parties on board the Renville states that after a period of not less than six months or more than one year after the signing of the agreement, free elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the United States of Indonesia. There is a difference of opinion as to whether "the agreement" referred to is the political agreement or the Truce Agreement. Irrespective of which agreement was referred to, we believe that no obstacle exists in the Renville principles to the parties agreeing to shorten the interval between the political agreement and the holding of the elections. It was not anticipated by the Committee, which originally suggested the limitation on the time of holding the election, that such a long period would elapse between the signing of
the Truce Agreement and the signing of the political agreement as has been the case. Since full political and economic stability in Indonesia cannot be achieved until the process of transition now in progress is completed, we suggest that the elections be held no later than three months after the signing of the political agreement and that the Assembly be convened as shortly thereafter as possible, subject to the report of the joint commission of technical experts on the delineation of States having been made.

Feasibility of elections. We are aware that the present division of Indonesia by the demilitarized zones, creating areas under separate authorities, civil and military, imposes certain obstacles to the smooth operation of election machinery. We regard these obstacles as by no means insuperable, however, and consider that between the present time and the time of the elections the parties should devote their major effort towards the working out of an electoral procedure. This procedure should, in the first instance, give the candidates for election and the political parties in all areas full opportunity to present their programmes and make their appeal for popular support without jeopardizing the maintenance of law and order and, in the second instance, assure the absolute secrecy of the ballot. By these and other means the effect of possible unwarrantable influences over the electorate could be reduced to a minimum. We believe that no more constructive step towards the creation of a stable United States of Indonesia could be taken by the parties than the acceptance of the principle of a representative provisional federal government.

We do not see how the unification of Indonesia can now feasibly be accomplished except under such a government or how such a government can be created except through an Indonesia-wide election, whatever difficulties this may present. During our stay in Indonesia, we have come increasingly to believe that the outstanding obstacle to a settlement between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia has been the disagreement between them as to who, in fact, is qualified to speak for the Indonesian people.
Until this question is settled and a representative body assembled — and we know of no means of reaching this goal except by an election — there would seem to be little hope of building the foundations of the future United States of Indonesia on a broad and stable basis. We should be glad of offer suggestions on the subject of an electoral procedure, making use of the research at present being conducted in the United Nations.

The pre-election period. After the signing of a political agreement looking towards the early creation of a representative provisional federal government of all Indonesia, we conceive that the parties will have every incentive to closer cooperation. We therefore believe that in addition to preparing for the election the parties will also wish to proceed as far as possible, in the interval between the agreement and the election, with the economic rehabilitation of Indonesia as a whole and with preparations for the integration, administratively, of the territories now under the control of the Republic with the territories now under the control of the Netherlands, so far as this will be necessary upon the transfer of powers to the Provisional Federal Government. We foresee the desirability of creating a number of joint commissions to work on the problems of the pre-election period and suggest the following:

1. Joint commission of technical experts to delineate the future States of Indonesia, as previously set forth.

2. Joint electoral commission to institute an electoral procedure and to control the conduct of electioneering and of the elections themselves.

3. Joint reconstruction board to expedite the restoration of non-Indonesian private properties in Republican-controlled territories to their owners and the resumption of trade and commerce with the Republican-controlled territories.

4. Joint preparatory commission to plan the integration of the Republican fiscal and monetary systems and the administrative system of the territories at present controlled by the Republic (in so far as it includes federal functions) into the provisional federal system.
5. Joint defence commission, including a joint staff, to carry out the progressive reduction of the armed forces of the parties as contemplated in the fourth of the twelve principles and to plan the integration of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia into the army of the Provisional Federal Government.

6. Joint evacuee commission to facilitate the return to their home of personnel displaced since 1942, including demobilized soldiers and their families, and to make possible greater freedom of movement by persons across the status quo lines.

We believe that as soon as the parties have agreed upon the broad terms of the political agreement it would be highly desirable to form the commissions suggested above in order that study and planning in connexion with the problems to be dealt with by the commissions may proceed without awaiting the formal signing of the political agreement. In particular, the period intervening before the elections might be appreciably shortened by progress in planning by the joint electoral commission before the signing of the political agreement and in preparing the country for the election. During the pre-election period the Republic would remain responsible for the security of areas under its control and retain command of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia. With regard to the Republic's foreign relations, the Republic would be expected to give assurances that these relations would not be expanded during the pre-election period.

Division of powers in the pre-federal period: We visualize a division of powers in the pre-federal period between the Lieutenant Governor-General, as the representative of the Crown, and the Provisional Federal Government, as an organization of Indonesian representatives. We assume that in order to complete the transitional process and to create the United States of Indonesia as soon as practicable, the actual government and administration of Indonesia would be progressively turned over to Indonesian officials as
rapidly as the development of an Indonesian organizational structure would permit. In the first instance, we believe that a delegation of powers on the highest level should take place and that apart from certain specified powers reserved to the Lieutenant Governor-General, the full powers of internal government should be vested in the Provisional Federal Government. The Provisional Federal Government would then itself determine how rapidly the governmental and administrative functions could be transferred on progressively lower levels from the present governmental and administrative organization to the developing Indonesia organization. We consider that key officials of the present Netherlands Indies Government should by all means be asked to remain in an advisory capacity even when, in the course of time, their responsibilities have been taken over by officials designated by the newly elected Provisional Federal Government. Sovereignty in the interim period would rest with the Netherlands, but it is suggested that the Crown issue a certificate of instruction to the Lieutenant Governor-General that the exercise of his power be limited: (1) to a veto over acts of the Provisional Federal Government which are in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations or of the Union Statute; and (2) to the direction, after consultation with the Provisional Federal Government, of the employment of the federal armed forces and other federal agencies in cases of civil conflict with the Provisional Federal Government proves unable to control.

Coincidentally with the transfer of full powers of internal government to the Provisional Federal Government by the Netherlands, the Republic would transfer to the Provisional Federal Government all federal functions which it now exercises, including control of its armed forces, foreign relations, foreign trade and currency.

With regard to the external affairs and relationships of Indonesia, ultimate authority would remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, but in practice the actual conduct of such affairs and relationships would be taken
over by the Provisional Federal Government step by step with the organization
and staffing of a Ministry for Foreign Affairs (the Minister to be a member
of the initial Provisional Federal Government) and of an Indonesian
diplomatic and consular service. It is proposed that such Indonesian over-
seas offices as already exist or may be established in this period should
operate in conjunction with the diplomatic and consular posts of the
Netherlands.

All armed forces in Indonesia in the pre-federal period should, it is
considered, be under the control of the Provisional Federal Government with
the following exceptions: (1) the Netherlands Command to operate such
bases as may be set aside for the use of the Netherlands in an agreement
between the Netherlands and the Provisional Federal Government of Indonesia;
and (2) components of the Netherlands Army to be free to engage in non-
tactical movements from one base to another or in preparation for evacuation
under the sole authority of the Netherlands Command.

Apart from its duties as a provisional Parliament, the Constituent
Assembly should have the duties of formalizing the delineation of the States,
drafting and ratifying a constitution for the United States of Indonesia and
submitting it for ratification by the representatives of the States, and of
ratifying the Union Statute. These tasks complete, the United States of
Indonesia could, in our view, be considered formed and to be eligible to
receive the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands and to seek recogni-
tion as a sovereign State by other States and membership in the United
Nations and other international bodies.

The Committee offers the following comments on the foregoing procedures:

Drafting of the Union Statute. It is our understanding that the Union
Statute, out of which the Union of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
United States of Indonesia is to arise, will provide the basis for the
co-operation and consultation between the member nations on all matters of
common interest and will contain basic guarantees of the legitimate economic
cultural and military interests of the one nation in the other, together with provisions for a judicial body to interpret the Statute. Principles which both parties might find acceptable as the basis of the Statute are suggested below in the section headed The Union Statute. In any case, we feel strongly that in order to bring definitive Netherlands-Indonesian negotiations to as prompt a conclusion as possible, the complete and final text of the Union Statute should be incorporated in the political agreement between the Netherlands and the Republic, the Netherlands delegation in this connexion to represent the interest of Indonesian groups outside Java, Madura and Sumatra as well as of its own Government. The Statute as drafted in the political agreement would be submitted to the Constituent Assembly for ratification when the Assembly had completed its other tasks. Ratification and the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia would be simultaneous events. Should the Assembly fail to ratify and express a desire to renegotiate the Statute in whole or in part, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would reserve all rights respecting the relinquishment of sovereignty.

*Ratification of the Constitution.* In accordance with the fifth of the six additional principles, approval of the draft constitution by a majority of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly will register the Assembly's ratification of the constitution. Since the representation of the states in the Assembly will be in accordance with their populations, such ratification may be taken as an expression of the will of the Indonesian people as a whole. With regard to obtaining ratification by the States, we suggest that the constitution be submitted to the representatives of each state in the Assembly. In accordance with the sixth of the six additional principles, any State failing to ratify the constitution may negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Scope of the political agreement. Matters that fall entirely within the competence of the future United States of Indonesia, such as the federal constitution and federal defence forces, are, in our view, outside the scope of the political agreement and are subjects for consideration and decision by the Constituent Assembly.

THE STATUTE OF THE UNION

Upon the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia in accordance with the terms of the political agreement, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia will associate themselves together in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

In our view, the character of the Union must be based upon:

1. The sovereignty of the member nations.

2. The common interests of the member nations and the proper and legitimate interests of the one in the other arising from many years of close association and inter-dependence.

In our opinion, the aim of the Statute of the Union, out of which the Netherlands-Indonesian Union will arise, should be to give maximum assurance consonant with the full sovereignty of the member nations that the member nations will consult and co-operate and to the fullest extent possible follow a concerted policy in all fields of common interest and that the interests of one member nation in the other, which we construed to be primarily cultural, economic, and military, will be safeguarded.

The powers; functions, and responsibilities of the Union will be enunciated in a Statute of the Union annexed to and incorporated in the political agreement.

We offer the following tentative suggestions for the principal provisions of the Statute of the Union:
A. General provisions

1. The members of the Union will be the United States of Indonesia, on the one hand, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on the other hand.

2. Each member will be a sovereign, independent state, united in partnership on a footing of equality. (Immediately after the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands will take the required steps to obtain the admission of the United States of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations, the International Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and other appropriate international bodies).

3. The Union will be established when on the one hand the Constituent Assembly of the United States of Indonesia has taken the steps under the political agreement precedent to the transfer of sovereignty, and when on the other hand the Kingdom of the Netherlands has: (1) transferred sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia in accordance with the terms of the political agreement; and (2) ratified the Statute of the Union.

4. Any state in Indonesia that decides by failing to ratify the Constitution not to join the United States of Indonesia may have a special relationship both to the Kingdom of the Netherlands and to the United States of Indonesia.

5. The Union will ensure: (a) lasting co-operation between the members; (b) the mutual rights of the members and the fulfilment of their mutual obligations; (c) provision for mutual assistance; (d) mutual exercise of rights of citizenship by Netherlands and Indonesian citizens; (e) maintenance in both parts of the Union of fundamental human rights and freedoms in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

6. The Union will promote the common interests of the members through co-operation with regard to foreign relations, defence, finance and economic and cultural matters.
7. These common interests will be ensured by co-operation and consultation in the Union organs.

8. Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina and her legitimate successors to the Crown of the Netherlands shall be the Head of the Union.

9. The executive organ of the Union will be the Council of Union Ministers composed of an equal number of ministers of the United States of Indonesia and of the Kingdom of the Netherlands entrusted by their respective Governments with the direction of Union affairs.

10. The members of the Council of Union Ministers are responsible only to their respective Governments according to the constitutions of the members.

11. The members of the Union will consult in the Council of Union Ministers with respect to legislation on Union affairs. Such legislation will be enacted by the Parliament of each member in conformity with the constitution of each member.

12. In their inception the Constitution of the United States of Indonesia and the Statute of the Union will not conflict. Thereafter the Constitution of the United States of Indonesia will be the supreme law of the United States of Indonesia and the constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will be the supreme law of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Statute of the Union will have all the force of a solemn treaty obligation entered into by sovereign States.

13. The members of the Union may conduct their own foreign relations subject to the provision of the Statute of the Union for co-operation and consultation. By the agreement of the members of the Union in each case, the Union itself may take part in international affairs and maintain diplomatic representation on behalf of the members.

14. A Union Court of Justice composed of an equal number of judges of the highest court of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and of the highest court of the United States of Indonesia will be instituted. The jurisdiction of
the Union Court of Justice will be limited to cases brought by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands or the Government of the United States of Indonesia arising under the Union Statute, provided that in all cases arising within the exclusive jurisdiction of the members, the highest courts of the members may request the Union Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.

15. In cases where the judges of the Union Court of Justice are equally divided, the court itself may designate an additional judge to cast the deciding vote; in the event of the Court's being unable to agree upon an additional judge, provision shall be made for reference of the case to the International Court of Justice or another international legal tribunal.

B. Economic and financial provisions

1. Non-discrimination. The principle of non-discrimination to apply in all economic relations between the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

2. Equality of import duties. Articles or products of one member imported into the territory of the other member to be subject to no import duty in excess of the duty imposed with respect to like products or articles which are imported from any other country, or to no import duty at all if such duty is not imposed with respect to all such articles and products.

3. Equality in internal taxes. Products of one member imported into the territory of the other member, or articles manufactured wholly or in part from such products, to be subject to no internal tax in excess of the internal taxes imposed with respect to like products or articles from any source; and to be subject to no internal tax at all if an internal tax is not imposed with respect to such like products and articles.

4. Non-discriminatory import and export controls. To the extent that selective or quantitative import or export controls are applied by either member, these to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner as regards the
products or articles originating in or destined for the territories of the other member.

5. *Equality of export taxes.* To the extent that either member levies export taxes or duties on articles or products destined for the territory of the other, such taxes or duties not to exceed those levied on like articles or products destined for the territory of another country.

6. *National treatment.* National treatment to be accorded the citizens and enterprises of one member resident in, conducting commercial, agricultural, mining, industrial, or other business activities in, or seeking to conduct such activities in, the territory of the other. National treatment to be taken to mean that the legal status, rights and obligations under legislative acts and administrative regulations, and liability to taxation of citizens and enterprises of one member in the territory of the other member to be not less favourable than is accorded to the citizens and enterprises of the other member. The right to require ownership of land not, however, to be granted under this article.

7. *Supplementary agreements.* Agreements elaborated under the foregoing clauses of this section to extend for a period of, say, twenty years and to be renewable by mutual agreement thereafter.

8. *Exemption from tax of articles for official use.* No tax to be imposed or collected in the territories of either member with respect to articles or products imported for the official use of any department or agency of the other member.

9. *Currency and exchange agreements.* The value of the currency of one member in relation to the currency of the other member not to be altered, the convertibility of the currency of one member into the currency of the other not to be suspended, and restrictions not to be imposed upon the transfer of funds from the territory of one member to the territory of the other, except after consultation between the Governments of the United States of
Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

10. *Guarantees of property rights.* Contractual rights and physical properties held or owned by the nationals, business enterprises, corporate bodies, or Governments of one member in the territory of the other to be guaranteed. The Government of the United States of Indonesia to honour for their full terms contracts and agreements entered into with non-Indonesians by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies prior to March 1942 and to restore to non-Indonesian owners physical assets located within the territory of the United States of Indonesia but not yet returned to them. In those cases in which contracts and agreements entered into by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies for any reason cannot be honoured or in which physical assets owned by non-Indonesians are taken over by the Government of the United States of Indonesia, full indemnification to be made. Nothing in the foregoing to protect the property rights of ex-enemy nationals.

11. *Assumption of obligations.* The Government of the United States of Indonesia to assume all debts, internal and external, incurred by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies prior to 1 March 1942, subject, however, to the qualification that adjustments may be made to take account of territories previously under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Netherlands East Indies that may not join the United States of Indonesia. The proportion of debts later incurred by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies to be assumed by the Government of the United States of Indonesia to be negotiated.

12. *Transfer of rights and properties.* The Government of the United States of Indonesia to enjoy the privileges and rights previously enjoyed by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies within the territories coming under the jurisdiction of the United States of Indonesia; and to assume full title to the property owned by the Netherlands East Indies Government within these territories and, subject to the terms of peace settlements, to the properties of ex-enemy countries and of the nationals of ex-enemy
13. Reciprocity. All rights, obligations, and duties conferred or assumed under the economic and financial agreement elaborated in accordance with these provisions to be reciprocal.

C. Military provisions

1. A combined Netherlands-United States of Indonesia staff to be instituted to exchange information, to consult and to make recommendations to the Government of the members on all matters relating to the defence of the Union with the object of achieving a co-ordinated defence policy and system.

2. Each member to be granted base-rights in the territory of the other on a basis of long-term leases.

3. The military education and training, equipment, organization and doctrine of the armed services to be standardized as far as may be allowed by: (a) the nature of the theatres of operation in which the members' forces may be engaged; (b) the sources of supply of equipment available to the members; (c) the possibility of a severance of the lines of communication between the members in the event of large-scale conflict; and (d) the requirements of such regional defence arrangements as the members may enter.

4. Military personnel to be exchanged between the members for the purpose of assisting in the attainment of the foregoing ends, particularly for purposes of giving and receiving instruction. Military personnel assigned by one member for duty with the armed services of the other to be eligible to serve in any capacity other than in a command capacity, which would require special agreement.

It is suggested that provision be made in the Statute of the Union for supplementary agreements to be entered into by the members elucidating and providing for the implementation of the principles contained in the Statute which relate to economic, military, and other special relations between the members.
To recapitulate, the following schedule is offered as an outline of the steps to be taken toward the creation of a sovereign United States of Indonesia:

1. The delegations of the parties to initial the terms of the political agreement, including the text of the Statute of the Union.

2. Joint commissions to be formed as soon as possible to delineate provisionally the future states of the United States of Indonesia; to prepare for the elections to the Constituent Assembly; to prepare for the integration on a federal level of the government of territories under the control of the Republic with the governments of other areas; to plan the economic rehabilitation of Indonesia as a whole; to carry out the reduction of the armed forces of the parties and to plan the integration of the residual Republican armed forces with those of the Provisional Federal Government; and to remove barriers to the free movement of persons across the status quo line.

3. The political agreement including the text of the Statute of the Union, to be submitted to the Governments of the parties for approval and signature.

4. The elections for delegates to the Constituent Assembly to be held throughout Indonesia as soon as practicable after the signing of the political agreement, and preferably within at most three months.

5. The Constituent Assembly to be convened as soon as possible after the elections and after the joint commission of technical experts has reported on the delineation of the future States.

6. The Constituent Assembly acting as the provisional Parliament to form a Provisional Federal Government.

7. The Provisional Federal Government to receive simultaneously:

   (a) Full powers of internal self-government from the Netherlands with the provision that the Lieutenant Governor-General may exercise certain rights within specified limits.
(b) All powers now exercised by the Republic of Indonesia properly pertaining to the Federal Government.

8. The Constituent Assembly to draft and ratify a constitution of the United States of Indonesia.

9. The constitution to be submitted to the representatives of the States in the Assembly for ratification and to be considered in effect for all Indonesia with the exception of States failing to ratify.

10. The Constituent Assembly to ratify the Statute of the Union, and simultaneously:

   (a) The United States of Indonesia to be considered formed and to receive the transfer of sovereignty from the Kingdom of the Netherlands;

   (b) The United States of Indonesia to be considered eligible to seek recognition as a sovereign State by other sovereign States and membership in the United Nations and other international bodies;

   (a) The Kingdom of the Netherlands having ratified the Statute of the Union, the Netherlands-Indonesian Union to come into being.

SCOR, Third Year, Supplement to December 1948, pp. 194 – 209.
Cabinet discussed today the Indonesian situation. It will be recalled that Australia raised the question in the Security Council originally in July, 1947, under Chapter 7 of the Charter under which the Security Council has power not only to order cessation of hostilities but to enforce that order by means not involving force, for example, economic or other sanctions.

The Good Offices Committee has reported to the Security Council that the Netherlands have violated both the order to cease fire and the order to negotiate. The Security Council must now therefore decide what action it should take to ensure its instructions are carried out.

Cabinet endorsed action taken associating Australia with the United States in raising the matter at an urgent meeting of the Security Council at Paris. Australia will call for an immediate cease fire, the return of Dutch forces to previous demarcation lines, and action by the military observers on the Committee of Good Offices to prevent reprisals or executions. Meanwhile, the Australian representatives at Paris are instructed to discuss with other members of the Security Council, particularly Britain and the United States, what further steps should be taken to bring about a permanent solution of the dispute, for example, whether the Security Council should order an immediate election with a view to establishing a legislature along the lines proposed by members of the Committee of Good Offices; whether the full sovereignty ultimately envisaged by the Dutch should not be granted with much less delay than the Dutch contemplate; whether in the event of continuous disputes the United Nations should not consider a trusteeship arrangement.¹

34. AUSTRALIAN ACCEPTANCE OF INVITATION TO NEW DELHI CONFERENCE

The Minister for Defence, the Hon. J.J. Dedman, after consultation with, and at the request of the Prime Minister, issued the following statement on 5th January, 1949:

"The Australian Government has decided to send to the Conference proposed by the Government of India to discuss the Indonesian situation two senior officers of the Department of External Affairs, the Secretary, Dr. J. W. Burton, and a Political Counsellor, Mr. C.T. Moodie, who was previously attached to the Australian High Commissioner's Office at New Delhi.

"Their main objective will be to explore means by which the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, can assist in bringing about in Indonesia a speedy, just and lasting settlement of the present dispute. These officers will report back to the Government the views of the Conference.

"If, before the Conference is convened, the Security Council acts in such a way as to make unnecessary this regional consultation, the decision of the Government may be changed."1

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"The Australian Government, whose policy it is to carry out its obligations to the United Nations with sincerity and earnestness, will give immediate and earnest consideration to the reports and observations which will be taken back to it at the conclusion of this Conference by its officials attending it."

This was stated by the Australian representative, Dr J.W. Burton, in the course of his speech to the plenary session of the Conference today.

Dr Burton began by saying that the thoughts already expressed by the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in his opening address were so much in accord with those of Australia that he felt there was little he need say in addition.

"We are convened here today by the Prime Minister of India", continued Dr Burton, "to discuss the problem which has been presented to the United Nations and in particular to the peoples of the United Nations of this area, by the failure so far of the Security Council effectively to deal with the situation which has been brought about in Indonesia. We are all agreed on the general principles involved, that is the principles of the United Nations, including the stated principle of self-government. We are concerned with detailed suggestion for the consideration of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations as to how these principles might be implemented in this case of Indonesia, and in this case only.

"We do not meet in any vindictive spirit; we do not contemplate reprisals or restraints as an objective. Our attitude is rather that a mistake has been made which has cost lives and has brought about suffering not only to the people of Indonesia but also to the people of the Netherlands.
who have themselves already suffered too much at the hands of an aggressor. A mistake has been made from the point of view of the future of the United Nations. A mistake has been made from the point of view of world peace and the development of independent political institutions which alone can withstand the infiltration of undemocratic influences.

"We have only one objective at this Conference and that is to try to off-set or remedy these grave mistakes: to find a way in which peace can be restored in Indonesia, a peace which is just and which, therefore, can be lasting; to endeavour to remedy the damage already done to the prestige and standing of the United Nations and the Security Council without which we can have no security.

"We can make a real contribution to the solution of this problem as a regional conference assisting the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. Wisdom does not reside only in countries having great economic or military power. We assembled here, therefore, with our special knowledge of the area, have a duty to advise, and if our deliberations are characterised by objective thinking, persistent support for the principles, purposes and procedures of the United Nations, and by positive constructive planning, then our advice must ultimately be accepted by the peoples of the United Nations.

"As is well known, Australia as the member of the Security Council, representing this area at the time of Dutch military action, has from the first made every endeavour to obtain a settlement to this dispute. We will not rest content until peace is restored.

"The Australian Minister for External Affairs and President of the United Nations General Assembly, Dr H.V. Evatt, just a few days ago observed that not a single member of the Security Council has justified the aggressive action of the Dutch and added "I sincerely hope that in view of the Security Council's discussions and the general feeling, the Dutch will recede as far as possible from the action taken and release the Indonesian
leaders from captivity with a view to a quick settlement of the new constitutional set-up for the United States of Indonesia".

"That I am sure is the hope of all of us at this Conference.

"We are meeting, therefore, with a specific purpose - that of assisting the United Nations in settling finally and justly the problem of Indonesia. The countries represented here are in general agreement on the question, and it is for the Conference in its later session to clarify in greater detail our thoughts so that we can make positive and helpful suggestions, and even at this last moment endeavour to retrieve the position so that not only will the peoples of Indonesia look forward to an era of freedom, peace and increasing prosperity but also so that the prestige and standing of the United Nations, which is so vital to all of us, shall be maintained".

In conclusion, Dr Burton expressed gratitude for the consideration and hospitality which had been shown by the Government of India, by the Prime Minister in particular, and by his very able officers who by careful preparation had already ensured the success of the deliberations.


Offered with the compliments of the Public Relations Officer, Office of the High Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Australia in India, Connaught Place, New Delhi.¹

¹ Eggleston Papers, op. cit., Folder 8, New Delhi Conference.
On his arrival at Sydney today Dr Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, who is also President of the United Nations General Assembly, referred to the Conference on Indonesia which opens in New Delhi today. He said –

The important conference on the Indonesian question which opens in New Delhi today at the invitation of India, is being attended by Australian representatives and will serve to emphasise the deep concern felt in many countries at the recent resort to force and the failure of the Dutch to carry out the Security Council's direction.

Conference does not Conflict with U.N. Charter

This conference does not conflict in any way with the powers or the jurisdiction of the Security Council. On the contrary it should bring home to all concerned the general opinion of the countries participating that United Nations principles should always be observed.

In accordance with Australia's adherence to these principles, when bitter fighting broke out in Indonesia in July, 1947 Australia immediately brought the dispute before the Security Council. As a result a halt to the fighting was called. Many thousands of lives were saved, further resort to force was banned and conciliation was substituted through the Good Offices Committee of which Australia has been a most active member. Further, a complete settlement seemed within sight until recently when force was again resorted to.

Action not Directed against Dutch Interests

Australia's intervention and the Security Council's action were not directed against Dutch interests, our one object was to assist in a freely negotiated settlement on United Nations principles to the advantage of the Netherlands was well as all the peoples of Indonesia. The unjustified use of force in such circumstances may well imperil European interests and prestige.
throughout the whole area.

For Australia has consistently regarded the Indonesian question not in isolation but as an integral part of the Governments established policy of adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

**Importance of Indonesia to Australia**

The application of these principles to South-East Asia is a matter of special importance to the security of Australia.

The factual background in the area must be clearly understood. It is one of great and dynamic change throughout the entire region of South-East Asia. Until the second World War the affairs of South-East Asian countries were often regarded as of only passing interest. Australia's direct trade and contacts with them were comparatively limited.

All this is rapidly changing partly as a result of the struggle against Japan and partly because the peoples of the region, moved by the solemn declarations of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, becoming conscious of their desperate need for economic, social and political advancement and rightly proud of their ancient cultural traditions and affinities, are showing a determination to take charge of their own affairs, to improve their living standards and to take their place on an equal footing with other nations of the world.

It is obvious that, if the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter is to be observed, these progressive trends cannot be arrested. Indeed history shows that attempts at forcible repression lead almost inevitably to the wildest and most dangerous forms of political and social extremism.

**Links between Australia and South-East Asia**

Geographically, Australia is closely linked with South-East Asia. Those who are devoted to Australia's welfare will desire to live in the closest harmony with these new neighbour nations three of which, India, Pakistan and
Ceylon, are new and very important members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In other parts of South-East Asia, such as Indonesia, newer nations are coming into existence and the transition should be smooth and orderly.

The New Delhi meeting may therefore be of crucial significance. Its purposes are fully in accord with the Charter of the United Nations and it is comparable to the regional meetings held in western Europe, in Latin America and elsewhere. Such a conference would be perfectly entitled to make suggestions and recommendations. Always remembering that the Security Council is still seized of the dispute and that, especially if the Security Council is unable to recommend a definitive solution, the matter can always be brought before the General Assembly.

There is a great need for close and continuing cooperation in the future between Australia on the one hand and the Netherlands and Indonesia on the other. Such cooperation will be facilitated and indeed guaranteed, if a just settlement is peacefully worked out in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and through its appropriate organs.

From the very first that has been Australia's sole objective and because of the contribution of its servicemen to the liberation of this area, no country has a greater right to speak.¹

¹ Eggleston Papers, Ms 423, Folder 8 (National Library, Canberra).
RESOLUTION 1: ADOPTED ON JANUARY 22, 1949

THIS CONFERENCE of representatives of the Governments of AFGHANISTAN, AUSTRALIA, BURMA, CEYLON, EGYPT, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, IRAN, IRAQ, LEBANON, PAKISTAN, PHILIPPINES, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA and YEMEN,

Affirming their support of the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the obligation of all member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter;

Having considered the situation in Indonesia in the light of all available data and, in particular, the reports submitted by the Good Offices Committee of the Security Council;

Being of the opinion that the Dutch military action launched on the 18th December, 1948, constitutes a flagrant breach of the Charter of the United Nations and defiance of the efforts of the Security Council and its Good Offices Committee to bring about a peaceful settlement;

Noting that the Netherlands authorities have failed to give full effect to the resolutions of the Security Council adopted after that date;

Finding that this action is directed against the very existence of the Republican Government which the Security Council and several member Governments of the United Nations, including the Netherlands Government itself, have recognised;

Conscious of the danger to the peace of South-East Asia and of the world through the continuance of hostilities in Indonesia;

Recognising that the people of Indonesia are entitled, according to the principles of the Charter, to independence and the exercise of full sovereign rights;

Recognising further that the maintenance of international peace and security and the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, constitute the high and steadfast purpose of the United Nations;
(v) Pending the formation of the interim Government referred to in (3), the Republican Government be afforded all facilities for communication with the outside world.

(3) THAT an Interim Government composed of representatives of the Republic, and representatives of territories in Indonesia other than those under the authority of the Republic commanding the confidence of the Indonesian people, be formed not later than 15th March, 1949, with the approval and assistance of the Good Offices Committee, or any other body that may be appointed by the Security Council. Pending the result of the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly referred to in paragraph (6) below, no new regional governments shall be formed or recognised.

(4) THAT, subject to the provisions of paragraph (5), such interim Government shall enjoy full powers of government including control over its armed forces. To ensure this, all Dutch troops shall be withdrawn from the whole of Indonesia on a date to be determined by the Good Offices Committee, or any other body appointed by the Security Council. Pending such withdrawal, Dutch forces shall not be used for the maintenance of law and order except at the request of the Interim Government and with the approval of the Good Offices Committee or any other body that may be appointed by the Security Council.

(5) THAT the Interim Government shall have such freedom in external affairs as may be determined, in consultation with the Interim Government and the Netherlands authorities, by the Good Offices Committee or any other body that may be appointed by the Security Council.

(6) THAT elections for the Constituent Assembly of Indonesia be completed by 1st October, 1949.
Firmly convinced that the Security Council is properly seized of the Indonesian question, as a breach of the peace and an act of aggression, under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter;

RECOMMENDS to the Security Council of the United Nations:

A. (1) THAT members of the Republican Government, other Republican leaders and all political prisoners in Indonesia, be immediately restored to complete freedom.

(2) THAT the Republican Government be enabled to function freely and, to this end,

(i) the Residency of Djokjakarta be handed back immediately to the Republic and the Netherlands authorities refrain from taking any action that may interfere with the effective functioning of the Government of the Republic. That Government should also have facilities for communication and freedom of consultation throughout Indonesia;

(ii) such areas of the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura as were held by the Government of the Republic on the 18th December, 1948, be restored to the Republic not later than the 15th March, 1949;

(iii) Dutch forces be withdrawn (a) immediately from the Residency of Djokjakarta, and (b) progressively from the rest of the Republican territory mentioned in (ii), such withdrawal to be effected in stages and under conditions to be prescribed by the Good Offices Committee or any other body to be appointed by the Security Council and to be completed not later than the 15th March, 1949;

(iv) All restrictions imposed by the Netherlands authorities on the trade of the Republic be immediately removed;
(7) THAT power over the whole of Indonesia be completely transferred, 
by the 1st January, 1950, to the United States of Indonesia whose 
relationship with the Netherlands shall be settled by negotiation 
between the Governments of the United States of Indonesia and of the 
Netherlands.

(8) THAT the Good Offices Committee, or any other body appointed by the 
Security Council, be given authority to secure the application of the 
foregoing recommendations under the supervision of the Security Council 
to whom it shall report as frequently as may be necessary.

B. THAT, in the event of either party to the dispute not complying with the 
recommendations of the Security Council, the Council shall take effective 
action under the wide powers conferred upon it by the Charter, to enforce 
the said recommendations. Member States of the United Nations represented 
at this Conference pledge their full support to the Council in the 
application of any of these measures.

C. THAT the Security Council be pleased to report, for consideration by the 
United Nations General Assembly at its adjourned session commencing in 
April, 1949, the measures taken or recommended by the Council for a 
solution of the Indonesian problem and the action taken by the parties 
concerned to give effect to these measures.

RESOLUTION II: ADOPTED ON JANUARY 22, 1949

In order to ensure close co-operation among themselves on matters dealt 
with in the Resolution I, this Conference recommends to the participating 
Governments, whether member States of the United Nations or not:

(a) That they should keep in touch with one another through normal 
diplomatic channels;

(b) That they should instruct their representatives at the Headquarters 
of the United Nations or their diplomatic representatives to 
consult among themselves.
RESOLUTION III: ADOPTED ON JANUARY 22, 1949

The Conference expresses the opinion that participating Governments should consult among themselves in order to explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery, having regard to the areas concerned, for promoting consultation and co-operation within the framework of the United Nations.¹

Dr J.W. Burton returned to Canberra this morning from his mission and immediately went into conference with the Minister for External Affairs, Dr H. V. Evatt. Dr Evatt subsequently said: "Dr Burton has reported to me about the proceedings of the conference at New Delhi. He has done an excellent job for Australia.

"In principle the conference decisions are in line with Security Council discussions although some additional recommendations have been made. The attitude of Australia has been strictly in accordance with its general policy of unwavering support for United Nations principles and purposes, including the settlement of all international disputes by conciliation and not by the use of force. In addition, the conference has undoubtedly strengthened the practical co-operation between five member nations - Australia, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and Ceylon. I believe that the security and welfare of all the peoples of South-East Asia will be advanced as a result of the conference - a belief that is fully shared by the leading newspapers of both Britain and the United States of America."1

1 CHIA, Vol. 20, No.1 (January 1949), p.113
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING its resolutions of 1st August, 1947, 25th August, 1947, and 1st November, 1947, with respect to the Indonesian question:

TAking NOTE with approval of the reports submitted to the Security Council by its Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia;

CONSIDERING that its resolutions of 24th December, 1948, and 28th December, 1948, have not been fully carried out;

CONSIDERING that continued occupation of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia by the armed forces of the Netherlands is incompatible with the restoration of good relations between the parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute;

CONSIDERING that the establishment and maintenance of law and order throughout Indonesia is a necessary condition to the achievement of the expressed objectives and desires of both parties.

NOTING with satisfaction that the parties continue to adhere to the principles of the Renville Agreement and agree that free and democratic elections should be held throughout Indonesia for the purpose of establishing a constituent assembly at the earliest practicable date, and further agree that the Security Council should arrange for the observation of such elections by an appropriate agency of the United Nations; and that the representative of the Netherlands has expressed his Government's desire to have such elections held not later than October 1, 1949;

NOTING also with satisfaction that the Government of the Netherlands plans to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia by January 1, 1950, if possible, and, in any case, during the year 1950.

CONSCIOUS of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in order that the rights, claims and
positions of the parties may not be prejudiced by the use of force;

(1) CALLS UPON the Government of the Netherlands to insure the immediate discontinuance of all military operations, calls upon the Government of the Republic simultaneously to order its armed adherents to cease guerilla warfare, and calls upon both parties to co-operate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order throughout the area affected.

(2) CALLS UPON the Government of the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since 17th December 1948, in the Republic of Indonesia, and to facilitate the immediate return of officials of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to Djokjakarta in order that they may discharge their responsibilities under paragraph 1 above and in order to exercise their appropriate functions in full freedom including administration of the Djokjakarta area, which shall include the city of Djokjakarta and its immediate environs. The Netherlands authorities shall afford to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may reasonably be required by that Government for its effective functioning in the Djokjakarta area and for communication and consultation with all persons in Indonesia.

(3) RECOMMENDS that in the interest of carrying out the expressed objectives and desires of both parties to establish a Federal, Independent, and Sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest possible date, negotiations be undertaken as soon as possible by representatives of the Government of the Netherlands and the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia with the assistance of the Commission referred to in paragraph (4) below on the basis of the principles set forth in the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements, and taking advantage of the extent of Agreement reached between the parties regarding the proposals
the proposals submitted to them by the United States representative
on the Committee of Good Offices on September 10, 1948, and in
particular on the basis that
(a) the establishment of the Interim Federal Government which is to
be granted the powers of internal government in Indonesia during
the Interim period before the transfer of sovereignty shall be
the result of the above negotiations and shall take place not
later than March 15, 1949.
(b) the elections which are to be held for the purpose of choosing
representatives to an Indonesian Constituent Assembly should be
completed by October 1, 1949; and
(c) the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Government of
the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia should take
place at the earliest possible date and in any case not later
than July 1, 1950;
Provided that if no agreement is reached by one month prior to the
respective dates referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c)
above, the Commission referred to in paragraph 4 (a) below or such
other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance
with paragraph 4 (c) below, shall immediately report to the Security
Council with its recommendations for a solution of the difficulties.

(4) (a) The Committee of Good Offices shall henceforth be known as the
act as the representative of the Security Council in Indonesia
and shall have all of the functions assigned to the Committee
of Good Offices by the Security Council since December 18, and
the functions conferred on it by the terms of this resolution.
The Commission shall act by majority vote but its reports and
recommendations to the Security Council shall present both
majority and minority views if there is a difference of opinion
among the members of the Commission.
(b) The Consular Commission is requested to facilitate the work of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia by providing military observers and other staff and facilities to enable the Commission to carry out its duties under the Council's resolutions of 24th and 28th December, 1948, as well as under the present resolution and shall temporarily suspend other activities.

(c) The Commission shall assist the parties in the implementation of this resolution, and shall assist the parties in the negotiations to be undertaken under paragraph (3) above and is authorised to make recommendations to them or to the Security Council on matters within its competence. Upon agreement being reached in such negotiations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Security Council as to the nature, powers, and functions of the United Nations agency which should remain in Indonesia to assist in the implementation of the provisions of such agreement until sovereignty is transferred by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia.

(d) The Commission shall have authority to consult with representatives of areas in Indonesia other than the Republic, and to invite representatives of such areas to participate in the negotiations referred to in paragraph 3 above.

(e) The Commission of such other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance with its recommendation under paragraph 4 (c) above is authorised to observe on behalf of the United Nations the elections to be held throughout Indonesia and is further authorised, in respect of the territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra, to make recommendations regarding the conditions necessary (a) to ensure that the elections are free and democratic, and (b) to guarantee freedom of assembly, speech and publication, at all times, provided that such guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.
(f) The Commission should assist in achieving the earliest possible restoration of the civil administration of the Republic. To this end it shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend the extent to which, consistent with reasonable requirements of public security and the protection of life and property, areas controlled by the Republic under the Renville Agreement (outside the Djokjakarta area) should be progressively returned to the administration of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, and shall supervise such transfers. The recommendations of the Commission may include provision for such economic measures as are required for the proper functioning of the administration and for the economic well being of the population of the areas involved in such transfers. The Commission shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend which, if any, Netherlands forces shall be retained temporarily in any area (outside of the Djokjakarta area) in order to assist in the maintenance of law and order. If either of the parties fails to accept the recommendations of the Commission mentioned in this paragraph, the Commission shall report immediately to the Security Council with its further recommendations for a solution of the difficulties.

(g) The Commission shall render periodic reports to the Council and special reports whenever the Commission deems necessary.

(h) The Commission shall employ such observers, officers and other persons as it deems necessary.

(5) REQUESTS the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission such staff funds and other facilities as are required by the Commission for the discharge of its functions.
(6) CALLS UPON the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to co-operate fully in giving effect to the provisions of this resolution.¹

¹ CHIA, Vol. XX, No.2 (February 1949), pp.283-285.
40. Extract from
A STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON 9 FEBRUARY 1949 BY THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
DR H.V. EVATT

I hope to make it perfectly clear to the House that this is a question
not of the particular merits of the dispute but of the purposes and principles
of the United Nations and of the necessity for loyalty to its decisions....
I am not regarding this matter from the point of view of what one would do
if one had a free hand or of what would be the expedient or even what would
be the just thing to do. This situation has developed, the United Nations
has intervened, and its decision should be loyally observed.

I entirely repudiate any intention, on behalf of this Government, at
any time, of any hostility to the Netherlands....

My instructions to delegations have always been to seek conciliation
by the Security Council and to adhere to the Council's decisions. There is
an attempt in some circles to sow distrust between Australia on the one hand
and the Netherlands on the other....I repeat that in every case where we have
had dealings with the Netherlands Government...we have acted for the sole
purpose of carrying out the principles of the United Nations and in an
attempt to settle this dispute in accordance with conciliation and arbitration
instead of by the arbitrament of force....1

1 CPD, Vol.201, pp.80-82.
41. Extract from
SPEECH BY THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, DR H.V. EVATT,
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON 17 FEBRUARY 1949

...I submit to the House that, from the beginning to the end, our
action was correct and in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations....Broadly speaking, the Australian Government's attitude towards
Indonesia was compelled by our membership of the United Nations....All I
want to do is to destroy, once and for all I hope, the ridiculous canard
that the proposals of the United Nations which were made through the Security
Council are aimed at excluding the Dutch from South-East Asia. Nothing could
be further from the truth....The agreements [Linggaadjati and Renville] were
freely made by conciliators representing the United Nations. That does not
tend to show the exclusion of Dutch influence from Indonesia. On the
contrary, it shows the integration of Netherlands self-governing Indonesia
[sic] with the Kingdom of the Netherlands....In other words, the agreement
constitutes an arrangement under which cooperation between the two countries
will continue and the enormous proprietary and economic interests of the
Dutch in that part of the world will not be prejudicially affected. To say
that this is an attempt by Australia to throw the Dutch out of Indonesia
is quite false. This agreement, which was made by the Dutch on the one hand,
and by the Indonesian Republic on the other [sic] provided for the future
government of the Indonesian territory under a system very analogous to,
but different in some respects from, the system of dominion self-government
which was enjoyed by many countries in the British Commonwealth....In other
words, the agreement tended to perpetuate the influence of the Netherlands
in this part of the world. Far from being a United Nations decision to
throw the Dutch out of this part of the world, it had quite the contrary
intention....We are convinced, and always have been, that for the safety of
South-East Asia and the Indonesians themselves, cooperation by the Dutch in
the establishment of the new self-governing unit is necessary. But that view
is shared by the republican leaders. They have never hesitated to admit
their need for assistance in the development of their territory, including the provision of capital. Their attitude is similar to that of other peoples who have obtained self-government, or a measure of self-government, within the British Commonwealth under the Crown - in this instance the Crown being the Crown of the Netherlands - and Indonesia will remain portion of the territory over which the Queen of the Netherlands has jurisdiction as queen. Far from wishing to oust the Dutch from Indonesia, it has always been our thought, although it has not been a matter for our decision, or for the decision of the Security Council, that they should remain on a basis of cooperation, of mutual help, which was freely sought by Indonesia rather than on the earlier basis of mere power exercised in relation to the Indonesians, that is, Government exercised without the consent of the governed....It was impossible to disguise the fact that action of that kind [the second Dutch 'police action'] was calculated to upset the whole balance and stability of the area from Australia right up to Pakistan. I entirely repudiate the idea that this Government has any thought whatever that Australia should interfere with the interests of European countries such as those of Great Britain in Malaya or of the French, our close allies in the two wars, in relation to New Caledonia and other possessions in the Pacific....

1 CPD, Vol.201, pp.473-475.
42. McNAUGHTON (CANADIAN) RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY
THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 23 MARCH 1949.

It is the sense of the Security Council that the U.N.C.I., in
accordance with the Council's resolution of January 28, 1949, and without
prejudicing the rights, claims and positions of the parties, should assist
the parties in reaching agreement as to

(a) the implementation of the Council's resolution of January 28, and
in particular paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part thereof;
and

(b) the time and conditions for holding the proposed conference at The
Hague, to the end that the negotiations contemplated by the
resolution of January 28 may be held as soon as possible. It is
further the sense of the Council that, if such an agreement is
reached, the holding of such a conference and the participation by
the U.N.C.I. in accordance with its terms of reference would be
consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Council's
resolution of January 28, 1949.¹

¹ SCOF, Fourth Year, No. 24, 421st Meeting, 23 March 1949, p. 5.

(i) Statement by Dr Roem Leader of Republican Delegation

"As Chairman of the Republican Delegation, I am authorised by President Soekarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta to give their personal assurance that they favour, in conformity with the Security Council's resolution of 28th January, 1949, and its directive of 23rd March:-

(i) The issuance of an order to the Republican armed adherents to cease guerilla warfare;

(ii) Co-operation in the restoration of peace, and the maintenance of law and order; and

(iii) Participation in a round table conference at The Hague with a view to accelerating the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.

President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta undertake that they will urge the adoption of such a policy by the Government of the Republic as soon as possible after its restoration at Djokjakarta."

(ii) Statement by Dr Van Royen, Leader of Netherlands Delegation

(1) "The Netherlands Delegation is authorised to state, in view of the undertaking just announced by Dr Mohammad Roem, it agrees to the return of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta.

The Netherlands Delegation agrees further to the setting up of one or more joint committees, under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, for such purposes as:-

(a) To make the necessary investigations and preparations preliminary to the return of the Government to Djokjakarta;

(b) To study and advise on measures to be taken in order to effectuate the cessation of guerilla warfare and co-operation in the restoration of peace and in the maintenance of law and order.
(2) The Netherlands Government agrees that the Republican Government shall be free and facilitated to exercise its appropriate functions in an area consisting of the Residency of Djokjakarta, and that is a step taken in the light of the Security Council's directive of 23rd March, 1949.

(3) The Netherlands Government reaffirms its willingness to ensure the immediate discontinuance of all military operations and to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since 17th December, 1948, in the Republic of Indonesia.

(4) Without prejudice to the right of self-determination of the Indonesian peoples as recognised by the Linggadjati and 'Renville' principles, the Netherlands Government will refrain from the establishment or recognition of Negaras and Daerahs on territory under Republican control prior to 19th December, 1948, and from the expansion of Negaras and Daerahs affecting the said territory.

(5) The Netherlands Government favours the existence of the Republic as a State to take its place in the United States of Indonesia. When a provisional representative body for the whole of Indonesia is to be established and it consequently becomes necessary to determine the number of representatives from the Republic to the said body, this number will be one half of the total membership exclusive of Republican membership.

(6) Consonant with the intent of the Security Council's ruling of 23rd March, 1949, on the subject of the 'proposed Round Table Conference at The Hague to the end that the negotiations contemplated by the resolution of 28th January, 1949, may be held as soon as possible,' the Netherlands Government is fully prepared to do its utmost that this conference take place immediately after the return of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta. At this conference, discussions will take place as to the way in which to accelerate the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia in accordance with the 'Renville' principles.
(7) In the light of the necessity for co-operation in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order, the Netherlands Government agrees that, in all those areas outside the Residency of Djokjakarta where the civil police and other officials of the Government of Indonesia are not operating at present, the Republican civil police and other officials where still operating will remain in function. It is understood that the Netherlands authorities shall afford to the Republican Government such facilities as may reasonably be required by that Government for communication and consultation with all persons in Indonesia, including those serving in the civil and military services of the Republic, and that the technical details will have to be worked out by the parties under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia."\(^1\)

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\(^1\) *CNIA*, Vol. XX, No.6 (June 1949), p.661-662.
Draft covering Resolution of the Round Table Conference on Indonesia at The Hague.

The Delegations of:

1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands.
3. The Federal Consultative Assembly,

CONSIDERING that they have assembled at the Round Table Conference to achieve at the earliest possible time, an appropriate and lasting solution of the Indonesian conflict, by reaching agreement between the participants on the way of transferring real, complete and unconditional sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, in accordance with the Renville-principles;

CONSIDERING that this aim has been achieved in good co-operation,

CONSIDERING that the U.N.C.I. has given valuable assistance,

I  The results of the Round Table Conference are embodied in draft-agreements and in letters, which documents are attached to this resolution;

II  A. The draft-agreements are the following:
1. the draft-charter of transfer of sovereignty.
2. the draft-Union-Statute including appendices and special agreements on the principal subjects of future co-operation.
3. the draft-agreement on the transition-period including special agreements on the settlement of those subjects, which require provision as a result of the transfer of sovereignty.

3. The delegations have expressed their respective points of view on a number of separate issues in an exchange of letters.

III  The documents enumerated under A and B are drawn up in the Netherlands and in the Indonesian languages. Both texts have equal value.

The official English text will prevail in case of divergent interpretation of the Netherlands and Indonesian texts.
IV The acceptance of this resolution by the Kingdom of The Netherlands on the one side and the territories acceding to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia on the other side will be considered the ratification of the documents attached to this resolution. The ratification by party will lose validity, if any other party does not ratify this resolution.

V The agreements referred to under II will come into force at the moment of the transfer of sovereignty which will take place at a formal ceremony at Amsterdam, to be held not later than 30th December 1949.

VI The U.N.C.I. and another United Nations agency shall observe in Indonesia the implementation of the agreements reached at the Round Table Conference.¹

Article 1

(1) The Kingdom of the Netherlands unconditionally and irrevocably transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and thereby recognises said Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign State.

(2) The Republic of the United States of Indonesia accepts said sovereignty on the basis of the provisions of its constitution which has been brought to the knowledge of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

(3) The transfer of sovereignty shall take place at the latest on 30th December, 1949.

Article 2

With regard to the residency of New Guinea it is decided:

(a) In view of the fact that it has not yet been possible to reconcile the views of the parties over New Guinea, which remains, therefore, in dispute.

(b) In view of the desirability of the RTC concluding successfully on November 2, 1949.

(c) In view of the important factors which should be taken into account in settling the question of New Guinea.

(d) In view of the limited research that has been undertaken and completed with respect to the problems involved in the question of New Guinea.

(e) In view of the heavy tasks with which the Union partners will initially be confronted, and

(f) In view of the dedication of the parties to the principle of resolving through peaceful and reasonable means any
differences that may hereafter exist or arise between them.

that the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained
with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of
sovereignty to the R.I.S. the question of the political status of New
Guinea be determined through negotiations between the R.I.S. and the
Netherlands.

DRAFT STATUTE OF INDONESIAN UNION

The Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of the United States
of Indonesia.

Having decided on a basis of voluntariness, equality and complete
independence to call into being a friendly co-operation with each
other and in order to effectuate the future co-operation to create the
Netherlands Indonesian Union.

Having agreed to lay down in this Statute of the Union the basis
of their mutual relationship as independent and sovereign States.

Thereby considering that nothing in this Statute shall be interpreted
as excluding any form of co-operation not mentioned therein or co-operation
in any field not mentioned therein, the needs of which may be felt in
the future by both partners.

CHARACTER OF THE UNION

Article 1

(1) The Netherlands Indonesian Union effectuates the organised
co-operation between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of
the United States of Indonesia on the basis of voluntariness and equal
status with equal rights.

(2) The Union does not prejudice the status of either of the two
partners as an independent and sovereign State.
PURPOSE OF THE UNION

Article 2

(1) The Union aims at co-operation of the partners for the promotion of their common interests.

(2) This co-operation shall take place with respect to matters lying primarily in the field of foreign relations and defence and as far as necessary finance and also as regards matters of an economic and a cultural nature.

Article 3

(1) The two partners undertake to base their form of government on the principles of democracy and to aim at an independent judiciary.

(2) The two partners shall recognise the fundamental human rights and freedom enumerated in the Appendix to this Statute.¹

FUNCTIONING OF THE UNION

Article 4

All decisions in the Union shall be taken in agreement between the two partners.

HEAD OF THE UNION

Article 5

(1) At the head of the Union shall be her Majesty Queen Juliana, Princess of Orange Nassau, and in case of succession, her lawful successors to the Crown of the Netherlands.

(2) In case of minority of the Head of the Union or in case the Head of the Union becomes unable to perform his office and further in case the Head of the Union temporarily ceases to perform his office, both partners shall make the necessary provisions in common agreement.
Such common agreements may be reached in advance.

Article 6

The Head of the Union embodies the concept of voluntary and lasting co-operation between the partners.

THE ORGANS OF THE UNION

Article 7

For the implementation of the purposes of the Union, conferences shall be held twice each year and further as often as the partners shall deem necessary, between the Ministers thereto assigned by the partners or between persons who, according to the respective constitutions of the partners are vested with equal or similar responsibilities. Unless otherwise agreed, three Ministers of each partner will participate in these conferences.

Article 8

The Ministers participating in the conference remain responsible to the respective organs of the partners on the basis of the respective constitutions of the partners.

Article 9

The Conference of Ministers shall (as circumstances may require) institute Committees in which each of the two partners shall appoint members on a basis of parity.

Article 10

(1) The two partners shall establish a good contact and a regular co-operation between the respective Parliaments of the partners.

(2) The first discussion between the representatives of the Parliaments shall take place within eight months after the coming into

Article 11

(1) The Union is served by a permanent secretariat. Each of the partners appoints a Secretary-General, each of whom takes charge of the Secretariat by yearly rotation.

(2) The other personnel is appointed in agreement between the two Secretaries-General in accordance with an instruction drawn up jointly by the two partners.

DECISIONS AND JOINT REGULATIONS

Article 12

(1) Decisions of the conference of Ministers are taken by common consent of the representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the one hand and those of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia on the other hand.

(2) Decisions of the conference can be dealt with in the following way.

(3) Decisions taken by the conference of Ministers for the enactment of joint regulations require ratification by the respective Parliaments of the partners. After ratification by the two Parliaments, the Head of the Union shall state that agreement exists between the two partners and the joint regulation shall thereupon be promulgated in the official Statute Books of each partner. This promulgation confers force of law upon the joint regulation. The joint regulations are inviolable.

(4) In respect of the other decisions of the conference the Head of the Union, upon a request of the conference, may equally state that agreement exists between the two partners.
UNION COURT OF ARBITRATION

Article 13

(1) There shall be a Union Court of Arbitration for the settlement of matters of law and justice in the name of the Head of the Union.

(2) The Court shall take cognisance of legal disputes arising out of joint regulations, and brought before the Court by one of the partners against the other or jointly by both partners.

Article 14

(1) The Union Court of Arbitration consists of three members appointed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and three members appointed by the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.

(2) The members of the Court are appointed for a period of ten years. They shall resign in any case once they reach the age of sixty-five years.

(3) A Netherlander and an Indonesian shall be elected in turn as Chairman by yearly rotation.

(4) Prior to taking up their office the members of the Court shall take the oath or make the promise in accordance with their religious faith before the Head of the Union that they shall fulfil their office honestly, scrupulously and impartially and shall comport themselves in the exercise of their duties as befits a good member of the Union Court of Arbitration.

Article 15

(1) The Union Court of Arbitration decides by majority of votes.

(2) In case votes are equally divided the Court shall, unless the two partners otherwise request, call upon the President of the International Court of Justice or upon another international authority, to be designated by majority of votes, with the request to appoint a person of another nationality as extraordinary member of the Union Court of Arbitration, who, having the
rights of an ordinary member, shall take part in a renewed consideration of the dispute and in the decision thereon.

Article 16

Further provisions concerning the rules of procedure, the organisation and regulation of the activities of the Union Court of Arbitration shall be established in a joint regulation. As long as such a joint regulation does not exist, the Court itself shall determine its rules of procedure and the organisation and regulation of its activities, paragraph 2 of the preceding Article being applicable if no agreement can be reached in this matter.

Article 17

The two partners undertake to comply with the decisions of the Union Court of Arbitration and to implement such decisions under their own authority and responsibility each within his own territory.

Article 18

In case of conflict between provisions of the law of the partners and of the public corporations within their jurisdiction on the one side and the Union Statute or any agreement between the partners or a joint regulation on the other, the latter category of provisions shall prevail.

Article 19

The two partners reserve all their rights under international law or otherwise to solicit the decision of an international judge or arbitrator in cases where both partners consider that the Union Court of Arbitration lacks competence or in cases where the Court declares itself incompetent.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Article 20

Provisions concerning the co-operation between the partners in the field of foreign relations are set forth in the agreement attached to the
present Statute.1

DEFENCE

Article 21

Provisions concerning the co-operation between the partners in the field of defence are set forth in the agreement attached to the present Statute.2

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Article 22

Provisions concerning the co-operation between the partners in the field of financial and economic relations are set forth in the agreement attached to the present Statute.3

CULTURAL RELATIONS

Article 23

Provisions concerning the co-operation between the partners in the cultural field are set forth in the agreement attached to the present Statute.4

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1 This agreement provides for closest co-operation between the parties in the field of foreign relations. Such co-operation will be achieved by regular consultation and in some cases by joint representation of the interests of both parties.

2 While each of the partners bears the full responsibility for the defence of its own territory, each agrees so far as possible to assist in the defence of the other. This aid may inter alia consist of training of personnel, supply of personnel and material. The partners will exchange military missions and consult freely on all points of mutual interest.

Sourabaya Naval Base will belong to the R.I.S. which will have political, military and territorial responsibility as well as property rights in the base. A Netherlands naval officer, chosen by the R.I.S. from a panel of names, will undertake the technical management with direct responsibility to the U.S.I. Minister of Defence.

3 In general the R.I.S. takes over a large portion of the external and the whole internal debt of the Government of Indonesia and undertakes to consult with the Netherlands Government before taking action in matters affecting the economic and financial interests of the Netherlands in the U.S.I.

4 This agreement provides for the establishment of a joint committee to promote maximum co-operation between the partners in the whole field of cultural matters.
CITIZENSHIP

Article 24

(1) Without prejudice to the arrangements made or still to be made in special arrangements between the partners, with regard to the exercise of political and other rights of citizens of one partner within the jurisdiction of the other partner, parties have agreed as follows:

(a) the nationality of citizens of one partner shall not constitute an objection with regard to holding offices within the jurisdiction of the other partner except for:
   1a. offices, the holder of which is responsible to a representative assembly, unless the law should provide otherwise;
   2a. those political authoritative, judicial and leading offices which are specified as such by law;

(b) with regard to the exercise of civil rights and social activities, either party shall always fully appreciate the special interests of the citizens and corporate bodies of the other party within its own jurisdiction, and therefore no appreciable discrimination will be made with respect to each other's subjects and corporate bodies, it being understood that this provision is made without prejudice to the power of either party to establish regulations required either for the protection of national interests of the respective participants or for the protection of groups of economically weak people.

(2) On no account shall the citizens and corporate bodies of either of the partners receive within the jurisdiction of the other partner a treatment less favourable than citizens and corporate bodies of a third State.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS

Article 25

To further the interests of the partners within each other's territory the Governments of the partners shall appoint High Commissioners. These shall have the status of diplomatic representatives with the rank of Ambassador.

Article 26

(1) Unless otherwise agreed each partner shall bear one half of the expenses of the Union.

(2) Further provisions in respect of the expenses of the Union shall be established in common agreement. Until the establishment of such common agreement the conference of Ministers shall make the necessary provisions.

Article 27

(1) All official documents, issued by the conference of Ministers or by other Union organs shall be in the Netherlands and Indonesian languages.

(2) Both texts shall be equally authentic.

Article 28

The Union Statute and the agreements pertaining thereto as well as the joint regulation and future agreements may be presented to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is further agreed that two matters shall be settled by an exchange of letters as follows:

1. The Netherlands may act as partner in the Union on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in case the issue of continued consultations with Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles give cause therefore.

The status of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a partner in the Union shall remain unaffected thereby.
2. Each of the partners shall provide in his own legislation on nationality that service with one of the partners or with a public corporation within that partner's territory by nationals of the other partner shall not entail loss or limitation of nationality.

Summary of the Draft Agreement on Transitional Measures.

Article 7 of this agreement concerns the withdrawal of the Netherlands Armed Forces from Indonesia and the re-organisation of the armed forces in Indonesia organised and equipped by or on the authority of the Netherlands-Indonesia Government. Main points in the regulations agreed to in this connection are -

WITHDRAWAL OF NETHERLANDS FORCES

(i) Netherlands troops will be withdrawn from Indonesia within as short time as possible after the transfer of sovereignty and advantage will be taken of all means available.

(ii) Should it become evident, as the Netherlands Government regretfully foresees, that lack of shipping or other technical difficulties will prevent completion of the withdrawal within six months after the transfer of sovereignty, the Netherlands Government will gladly give the R.I.S. authorities free access to details of the arrangements and endeavours of the Netherlands Government for repatriation of the troops.

(iii) A Joint Technical Committee might be established to study the technical possibilities of repatriating the Netherlands Forces and ways and means of overcoming the difficulties.

(iv) Under its terms of reference the U.N.C.I. or its successor should be in a position to assist.
REORGANISATION AND FINANCING OF K.N.I.L. (ROYAL NETHERLANDS INDIES ARMY)

The Military Committee has agreed that K.L. (Royal Army) and K.N.I.L. troops should be concentrated in certain areas and that this should begin during the transitional period immediately after the termination of the Round Table Conference. The Netherlands Delegation has, however, pointed out that decisions on measures to be taken prior to the transfer of sovereignty are not the concern of the Round Table Conference. It has, therefore, been agreed that the leaders of the Delegations will discuss the matter outside the conference in the near future. The Commission is maintaining pressure to have this issue settled as quickly as possible.

Outline of the Provisional Constitution of the R.I.S.

Prior to the termination of the conference, agreement was reached between the two Indonesian delegations on a draft provisional constitution for the R.I.S. Though outside the formal scope of the conference this was an essential prerequisite to a final agreement for a transfer of sovereignty.

The provisional constitution follows the federal pattern, extensive powers residing with the government of the component States. Among the matters of national interest, reserved to the federal government, are defence, foreign relations, and economic and financial policies.

The constitution provides for a president, the procedure for whose election has not yet been determined, ministers, a bi-cameral legislature, and a Supreme Court of Indonesia. The President will name three ministers (one of them the premier), who will form the cabinet. Other ministers will be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of these three. Ministers will be responsible to Parliament.

The lower house will consist of 150 seats, of which 50 will be allotted to the present Republic and the remainder to the other component States in proportion to population. The Senate will consist of an equal number of representatives from each State.
The Provisional Constitution will remain in force until the Constituent Assembly, to be convened as soon as possible, drafts the final constitution of the R.I.S.

45. AUSTRALIAN RECOGNITION OF INDONESIA: ANNOUNCEMENT
BY THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE HON. P.C. SPENDER,
27TH DECEMBER, 1949

The Minister for External Affairs, the Honourable P.C. Spender, made the following statement today:

"With the completion of the transfer of sovereignty to the new government of Indonesia, the Australian government has decided to accord full recognition to the United States of Indonesia, and to the government of President Soekarno and Prime Minister Hatta."

Mr Spender recorded his gratification that the Indonesian leaders and the Netherlands Government had been able to reach agreement on the establishment of a sovereign United States of Indonesia, and said that the Australian Government looked forward to close and friendly association with both countries in the future.

The following message was sent from the Australian Prime Minister Mr Menzies, to the Prime Minister of the United States of Indonesia, Dr Hatta -

"The Australian Government and people sent to the Government and people of the United States of Indonesia warmest congratulations and best wishes on the occasion of the inauguration of the Republic. As a near neighbour Australia has deep and constant interest in the well-being and prosperity of Indonesia, and we look forward to the most intimate and friendly relations with you."

A message was also conveyed to Dr Hatta as Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing Mr Spender's sincere congratulations on the establishment of the United States of Indonesia and informing him, that, as Minister for External Affairs of Australia, it would be Mr Spender's earnest endeavour to ensure the closest co-operation at all times between Australia and Indonesia. He regretted that he could not be present in Batavia on this happy occasion, but Mr L.R. McIntyre, Counsellor of the Department of External Affairs, would be representing Australia, and Mr Spender looked forward to having an opportunity to convey greetings in person in the near future.
The following message has also been sent from the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr Menzies, to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Dr Drees:-

"The Australian Government is gratified at the successful outcome of recent negotiations at the Round Table Conference and notes with satisfaction that the agreements reached at The Hague are now culminating in the establishment of a sovereign United States of Indonesia. We congratulate you upon this landmark in the development of relations between yourself and Indonesia and trust that the firm basis now being established for co-operation within the Netherlands-Indonesian Union will ensure the well-being and prosperity of both the Netherlands and Indonesian peoples. We look forward to close and friendly relations with the Kingdom of the Netherlands as well as the United States of Indonesia in the future."\(^1\)

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\(^1\) *CNIL*, Vol. XX, No.12 (December 1949), pp.1248-1249.
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