USE OF THESES

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Hollow Words: Guomindang Propaganda and the Formation of Popular Attitudes toward the National Revolution in Guangdong Province, 1919 to 1926.

by

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Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is entirely my own work.

1 March 1983
ABSTRACT

The idea that political education can alert people to some common good is by no means unique to early twentieth century China, but events there around the time of the New Culture and May Fourth Movements did conspire to give it a particular prominence. The success of publicity campaigns and popular protests in 1919 seems to have confirmed for radical intellectuals a long-held assumption that political education, or propaganda, could, if conducted on a sufficiently massive scale, influence the entire people's thinking and behaviour and perhaps even prompt a popular national revolution. It appeared to these activists that the indifference and ignorance of the common people were partly responsible for the continued presence of foreign gunboats and local despots, and hence that only when popular ignorance had been dispelled could there by any hope of a reprieve. Yet by 1926, after an interval of only seven years, this idea had lost much of its earlier credibility: experience had shown that peoples' attitudes were linked very closely to their regional interests and social and economic status, and were all but impervious to change through political education. In this thesis, I have tried to explain how one contemporary political party, the Guomindang, came to think of itself as capable of launching a popular national revolution with the assistance of mass political education, and why it failed in the actual attempt.

In the first chapter, I have examined the premise from which the party derived its optimistic view of propaganda, viz. that the people could be 'awoken' to their plight by political education. This examination follows two lines of inquiry, the first outlining the premise itself and tracing the source of its appeal, and the second contrasting the party's pronouncements on propaganda against its behaviour. From this base, I have, in the second and third chapters, attempted to measure the gap between the party's professed commitment to 'awakening' the people and its preference in fact for political negotiation and mercenary military activity. The fourth and fifth chapters take the form of an inquiry into the organization and nature of Guomindang propaganda in the period following the party's First National Congress of 1924. Two major developments are identified between 1924 and 1926: the centralization and coordination of propaganda, and the transformation of propaganda from a medium of instruction by outsiders to a medium for articulating local concerns and so bringing them to the attention of those outsiders. This section concludes with
a discussion of an emerging materialist view of popular consciousness among party propagandists, and an assessment of the place of Mao Zedong in Guomindang history. In the sixth and seventh chapters, the party's expansion throughout Guangdong is traced along the trail of the Eastern and Southern Expeditions, and an assessment of civilian responses to the national revolution is made in terms of regional and class differences, with particular reference to the party's taxation policies at the time of the Northern Expedition.
I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to the many people without whose help I would never have been able to complete this thesis. First and foremost I wish, like each and every graduate student who has come under his wing, to thank Professor Wang Gungwu for his great personal generosity and highly professional supervision. I wish also to thank Dr. Helen Dunstan, Dr. John Fincher, Ms. Antonia Finnane, Dr. Steven FitzGerald, Dr. Andrew Fraser, Dr. Anne McLaren, Mr. Ken Wells and Dr. Tim Wright for their assistance and encouragement, and indeed to thank all other staff and students of the Department of Far Eastern History, past and present, who have together contributed to making my stay in the department most enjoyable, instructive and memorable. I would also like to express heartfelt appreciation to the Director and staff of the Archives Commission of the Kuomintang for granting me access to its most valuable collection, and to pass on a special note of thanks to Mr. Lü Fangshang. My research in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou was made possible only by the good graces of Nanjing University, in whose praise I am joined, I am sure, by the many researchers who have enjoyed its hospitality over recent years. In particular I wish to thank Professor Zhang Xianwen of the History Department, and the staff of the library and External Affairs Section of the university. My research in Australia has been greatly facilitated by the Australian National University Library and the Oriental Collection of the Australian National Library, for which I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr. Y.S. Chen and Mr. Sydney Wang. For help with typing I wish to thank Ms. Denise Anning, Mrs. Joyce Barrett and Mrs. Linda Pellerin, and, for smoothing many paths, Mrs. Marian Saville.
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBGB</td>
<td>Zhongguo guomindang benbu gongbao (Guomindang Party Centre Gazette), 10 January to 20 November 1923.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cent. DNYB</td>
<td>Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui dangwu yuebao (Party Affairs Monthly of the Guomindang CEC), May 1926-.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFQJ</td>
<td>Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui dangshi weiyuan hui (ed.). Guofu quanjii (Complete works of Sun Yatsen) (Taipei, 1973, 6 vols.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSZZ</td>
<td>Junshi zhengzhi yuekan (Political and Military Affairs Monthly), January 1926-.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov. DNYB</td>
<td>Zhongguo guomindang guangdong sheng dangbu dangwu yuekan (Party Affairs Monthly of the Guomindang Guangdong Provincial Branch), February 1926-.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZGNM</td>
<td>Zhongguo nongmin (Chinese Peasant), January 1926-.</td>
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<td>ZGZK</td>
<td>Zhongguo guomindang zhoukan (Guomindang Weekly), 24 February 1924-.</td>
</tr>
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<td>ZZGZ</td>
<td>Zhengzhi gongzuo (Political Work [Daily]), late December 1925-.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZZB</td>
<td>Zhengzhi zhoubao (Political Weekly), 5 December 1925-.</td>
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GUANGDONG PROVINCE in the 1920's

Key:

Route of the Southern Expedition:
- 1st stage
- 2nd
- 3rd

Route of the Eastern Expedition:
- 1st
- 2nd

Counties lacking party branches, Feb., 1926.

Railway

GUANGXI

SOUTH CHINA SEA

FUJIAN

GUANGDONG

GULF OF TONG KING

HAINAN

GUANGDONG PROVINCE in the 1920's

Key:

Route of the Southern Expedition:
- 1st stage
- 2nd
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Counties lacking party branches, Feb., 1926.

Railway
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Since the appearance of Max Weber's pioneering works on the social and economic framework of popular consciousness, the issue of social consciousness has been at the forefront of historical and sociological inquiry. In the case of China in the 1920's and 1930's, it takes on an added significance by virtue of the interest shown in the subject by contemporary political activists themselves, who were drawn to the subject less by its intellectual attractions than by its immediate practical relevance. By the 1920's, China had endured almost a century of Western military and economic penetration and associated political disintegration, and had seen successive generations of reformers fail in their attempts to restore some vestige of national integrity and internal cohesion. Now, it was to be the turn of a new generation to take up the challenge where these others had left off. This latter generation of reformers, for the most part students and graduates of new Western-style schools and colleges, was initiated into political activity through the popular protests of May and June, 1919, which were directed against the transfer by the Versailles Treaty of former German concessions in Shandong Province to the Japanese. Earlier generations had tried to meet the threat from abroad by borrowing the foreigners' superior techniques while rejecting their ethics. It was a characteristic of this later generation, by contrast, to believe that the root of China's problems lay deeply embedded in the national psyche. In keeping with this diagnosis, the cure which they prescribed was a thorough-going transformation of the consciousness of the Chinese people. Questions of the nature and origins of social consciousness were thus mooted with a vigour born of wounded national pride.

Their overriding concern to alter popular consciousness led activists to neglect, momentarily, the question of whether social consciousness was at all open to alteration, and to assume that the albeit untried powers of mass political indoctrination, or propaganda, were capable of moulding it into the required shape. Propaganda was a good word, unencumbered by the negative connotations which have accrued to it, in China as elsewhere, in more recent
decades. The radicals' faith in revolutionary propaganda was shaped by a variety of personal, social and cultural influences. In the first place, their propaganda activities were conducted in a competitive environment far different from that of later totalitarian states, in which propaganda is reinforced by coercive arms of the state apparatus and is for that reason difficult to distinguish from them. For the early radicals, propaganda was an enemy of the state, and an alternative to force of arms; it was the pen confronting the sword. Against the chaotic background of early twentieth century China, propaganda appeared the more endearing by virtue of its contrast with the human and economic cost of armies and militarism. In the second place, radical intellectuals had themselves undergone a political education in new schools and study societies at home and abroad, and attributed their own enlightenment to their exposure to revolutionary ideas. It was natural for them to suppose, as they did, that exposing everyone else - peasants, workers, merchants, and gentry - to such ideas would produce similar results. This projection of personal student experience was in fact invalid, but until it was shown to be so through later experience of grassroots politics, it continued to make the idea of propaganda seem attractive.

In the third place, mass propaganda represented a progressive commitment to popular political participation in an age trying to shrug off its imperial past. In the fourth place, and quite paradoxically, in an age still bound up with the past the term propaganda carried an inherited wealth of traditional expectations about the obligation upon scholars to withdraw from corrupt officialdom, preach the Way of salvation, and rescue China from danger. These simultaneously progressive and traditional aspects of propaganda as viewed by early radicals are best illustrated by Sun Yatsen's favourite simile, that propagandists were appointed to teach the people just as imperial tutors had once instructed the emperor.³ A political revolution may have transferred sovereignty from the emperor to the people, but the role of the concerned scholar remained unaltered. Such notions of propaganda reinforced the radical intellectuals' sense of propriety while reassuring them that they were indeed revolutionary. In the fifth place, propaganda was believed to be used in western liberal democracies for educating 'public opinion', and in Russia, for carrying a popular revolutionary movement to victory. Hence for the earliest generation of republican revolutionaries and for the
later generation of communist revolutionaries, propaganda earned respect through association with emulated foreign models.

Above all else, what lent propaganda a good name was the trust placed by a broad spectrum of reformers and revolutionaries in the power of reason to prevail over ignorance and selfishness, to sway minds and to stimulate action. Modern intellectuals were heirs to a tradition which counselled that human consciousness took precedence over material factors in shaping events. Political differences were seen as hinging not on conflicts of interest, but upon varying levels of knowledge and ignorance. Over the first quarter of the twentieth century, this view took the form of an assumption on the part of radical activists that those who favoured revolution did so by virtue of their wisdom and alertness, while those who failed to respond to the call for revolution did so only through ignorance or insensitivity. It appeared to be the breadth of their knowledge which separated revolutionaries from the 'slumbering' masses. The motif of a sleeping creature -- a dragon, a lion or even a mouse -- being aroused to action through exposure to some startling insight is the single most pervasive image in all early revolutionary literature, and the word 'awakened' (juewu, juezhe) the term most commonly employed to distinguish the revolutionaries from the common people. Propaganda was the tool for linking the awakened few to the sleeping many, the instrument for awakening the masses from their torpor. The first step toward political regeneration appeared, to those already 'awakened', to involve awakening everybody else through propaganda.

The importance attached to mass political indoctrination by the political activists themselves has obliged historians of modern China to pay the matter due attention. Propaganda occupied much of the time and resources of all leading personalities and political organizations over the decade from the beginning of the New Culture Movement in 1917 to the onset of the Northern Expedition. Somewhere in the manifesto of virtually every magazine and intellectual society of the period is to be found a reference to the common aim of 'awakening' the people. The Guomindang and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and most of the prominent individuals associated with the two of them, devoted a great deal of attention to propaganda. Propagandists were also conspicuous throughout the major public incidents of the period, most notably
the May Fourth and May Thirtieth Incidents. Hence in broaching any aspect of the political or intellectual history of the period, the issues of propaganda and popular consciousness invite comment by virtue of their prominence.

Comment on the early Chinese preoccupation with propaganda and popular awakening has taken several forms. Relatively few works explicitly classify as elitist the model put forward by the modern Chinese radicals, wherein "dissident intellectuals ... take off the cognitive social blinders(sic) of the masses and provide them with a new ideology which 'broadens their horizons'." It is not, of course, necessary to make value judgements of this kind concerning the radicals' commitment to altering popular consciousness in order to describe and to explain the phenomenon. Some of the best work on the subject does little more than identify a "cultural-iconoclastic approach" among early revolutionaries, and trace its origins to "Confucian modes of thinking".

Elsewhere, however, is to be found a broad acceptance of the definition, drawn by the propagandists themselves, of the role of the propagandist as the enlightened intellectual duty bound to awaken the unenlightened masses. Some seem to have conceived of propaganda in terms similar to those in currency in China in the 20's, as the "re-education of a people"; others, to have accepted uncritically the activists' diagnosis that "what China needed was a reconstruction of the minds of men", and yet others, to argue that the increasing mass mobilization of the 20's and 30's was consequent on "evangelical efforts" by radical intellectuals, who managed to "reach and enlighten the people." This line of commentary is not identical on every count with the self-conceptualization of the radical intellectuals. It concedes, for example, that intellectuals possibly went a little far in claiming for propaganda the power to mould popular consciousness at will. Historians have, on the whole, been rather more circumspect in their estimates of what propaganda may or may not have been able to achieve, and have placed it in a wider context of social, economic and political factors which are thought to have played some part as well. Reservations of this kind may serve to qualify the assumption that political propaganda was a more or less successful form of mass evangelism, but the assumption itself remains intact. Propaganda is considered one measure of revolutionary achievement, and to
the extent that it generates any controversy at all, the arguments run along lines of which revolutionary creed happened to be best suited for mass political education. The importance of mass political education per se remains, albeit somewhat qualified, beyond dispute.

A more sceptical approach has emerged recently among historians who have been probing the inner workings of provincial peasant movements and examining popular responses to the Northern Expedition. These studies attribute little practical significance to mass propaganda, and hence decline to comment on the radicals' model of popular awakening on the ground that it is largely irrelevant. The data which they present on actual propaganda efforts by political parties in the 1920's suggest that political education was far less influential in summoning popular support than its practitioners had at first believed. The facts do not, however, justify the final conclusion drawn in one of these studies that the "bullhorns of propagandists" were largely irrelevant in mass politics as a whole. While it is true that political indoctrination was to prove useless as an agent of mass mobilization, it will here be shown that propagandists responded to this alarming discovery by abandoning political indoctrination and replacing it with a new type of propaganda which gave voice to local grievances and articulated sectional interests. Over the period in question, party propaganda underwent a transformation from a medium of political instruction by outsiders into a channel for bringing local concerns to the attention of those outsiders. Ideological disputes within and between political parties then came to represent social and economic conflicts in real life, and the "bullhorns of propagandists" were saved from the fate of irrelevance which otherwise awaited them.

Clearly, none of the works here referred to is likely to stand or fall on the basis of its comments on the place of propaganda in the mass movements of the 20's and 30's. The issue is peripheral to their various central themes, and is treated accordingly. By the same token, it may be said that despite the frequent appearance of comments about Chinese revolutionary propaganda, it has remained the poor relative of modern Chinese history, often asked to tea but never invited to stay. In this thesis, I hope to give the problem some of the attention which it deserves.
The Guomindang of the 1920's is an ideal subject for testing claims about the value of political indoctrination, the malleability of popular consciousness, and the place of propaganda in mass movements. This party was as anxious as any to awaken the 'slumbering' masses with propaganda. In the case of Guomindang leaders, however, no matter how strong their faith in the power of words to sway the multitudes, they possessed an even stronger impulse to see results for their efforts. For the Guomindang, political propaganda was but one tactic among many for bringing the party to power, so its worth was to be measured by its utility. This pragmatic streak distinguished the Guomindang from political education societies of other times and places, like the workers educational societies of nineteenth century England and Germany or Jiang Kanghu's Socialist Party of 1911, for which political education was an end in itself. While these organizations could not abandon such education without losing their raison d'être, the Guomindang could experiment with it at will, and even abandon it in favour of other stratagems. The Guomindang's concern with results thus made it something of a test-bed for political education as a catalyst for mass revolution.

Given that the Guomindang was keen to achieve results, it is not surprising that the spectre of kongyan (hollow words) should have haunted the party from the time of the founding of its China chapter in 1920 to the onset of the Northern Expedition in 1926. No sooner had the national organization been launched than Sun Yatsen delivered a speech on the need to substitute action for 'hollow words'; in January 1926, some time after Sun's death, Wang Jingwei revealed to the Second Party Congress that senior party members had all along been afraid of the gap between the claims the party made for itself, and what was to be seen for its efforts. In the space between 1920 and 1926, the phrase kongyan was never far from the lips of those involved in party propaganda activities, and it spurred them on to experiment with political education, popular entertainment and pork-barrel politics in the hope of finding a combination which would indeed mobilize the people.

The spectre of kongyan was double-headed: it was the hollow ring of party propaganda echoing back unheeded from a sceptical community, and it was the hollow chasm between what the party said and what it did. It was ideally possible to confront both at once, for keeping faith is a precondition of
trust. But in confronting the first, in trying to make people sit up and listen to its propaganda, the party also ran the risk of provoking the second, of making promises which it lacked the political will to keep. The spectre of kongyan thus pursued the Guomindang to the cross-roads of revolution, and there left it with a choice of two alternatives: either to withdraw promises made to disadvantaged sectional interests, or find the political will to carry them through. As it was fear of kongyan which drove the party to this extremity, kongyan sets the terms on which the party should finally be judged.
8.

Chapter One

THE MYTH OF POPULAR 'AWAKENING'

The propaganda of Sun Yatsen's political parties may have taken many forms and served many functions, but it was conceived fairly consistently as a teaching process in which 'those first enlightened' (xian juezhe) passed on their wisdom to the unenlightened. Regardless of whether their audience was a highly literate coterie or a group of illiterates, or of whether the actual function of propaganda was to raise funds among overseas Chinese communities, to solicit help from foreign powers, to sow subversion among enemy armed forces, to press for representation on elected assemblies, to recruit new party members, or simply to laud themselves and attack their foes, these party propagandists thought of themselves as teaching their audience. By extension, if the audience showed any signs of being persuaded it was because they had been swayed by reason. It is at this point that the motif of a somnambulent people being aroused by a novel and startling insight enters the vocabulary of early revolutionary propaganda, reducing even the most verbose and complex arguments to the universal slogan: 'Wake up!' (juewu, xing).

Belief in the power of reasoned argument to mould political attitudes derived from an idealist view of social consciousness as something shaped from within by sensibility and from without by education. This idealist view had indigenous intellectual roots in the Mencian vision of an intrinsic human good which may be uncovered and refined through instruction by a learned teacher. Within this tradition, self-interest was thought to play little part in human motivation, and awareness of the truth considered to be a sufficient inducement to good conduct. In everyday terms, such a view of human motivation was reinforced by the standard justification for gentry-scholar rule, that it was their levels of education and enlightenment which entitled the gentry to govern. For political parties working within this tradition early in the Twentieth Century, such as the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeng hui), the parliamentary Guomindang, the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua gemingdang, henceforth CRP) and the reorganized Guomindang of 1919, it meant that party members thought of themselves as revolutionary
by virtue of their enlightenment and believed the rest of society to be reactionary simply for want of instruction. From this perspective, formation of a popular revolutionary consciousness in any form appeared to be a matter of enlightening people through political indoctrination.

In the West, the Enlightenment had left in its wake a similar heritage of faith in reason. Belief in the power of reason to mould consciousness was built upon Rousseau's affirmation of fundamental human good, and around Locke's vision of human consciousness as a blank sheet open to any number and variety of impressions. The idea gained a specifically political application in late eighteenth century France, with an attempt by the Jacobins to replace one world view with another through mass political instruction. Over the space of a few years, the press, the arts, the schools and indeed "every available instrument for impressing ideas on the minds of men" was appropriated by the state to shape the consciousness of the people of France into conformity with the ideals and goals of the republicans. Over the following century in Europe, at a time of collapse of the old social order and emergence of new social forces, an alternative view of the nature of human consciousness was put forward by Marx and Engels. In its crudest and most explicit form, their materialist conception of history asserts that it is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence, but rather their social existence which determines their consciousness. Without wishing to place an overly deterministic interpretation on the words of Marx, we may nevertheless infer as a corollary that education, political or otherwise, must run a poor third to social structures and economic relations in shaping people's minds.

The materialist conception of history made its way into China on the coat-tails of the 1917 revolution in Russia, which, to the eyes of young Chinese intellectuals, appeared to vindicate Marxism by its very success. Historical materialism then gained some credit by association with the Russian Revolution. At the same time, as Joseph Levenson has argued most cogently, the Marxist historical framework acted as a restorative for Chinese national pride, for it enabled young nationalists to reduce Western values to mere functions of time and place. With the benefit of Levenson's insight, it is perhaps not surprising that the first people to apply the principles of historical materialism to the Chinese situation should have been neither
historians nor Marxists, but the Guomindang intellectuals Hu Hanmin and Dai Jitao. While applying dialectical materialism to the course of Chinese history, however, Dai and Hu balked at applying the class-struggle component of Marx's theory to the contemporary Chinese situation. Each circumvented the problem by positing an alternative historical dynamic at work in China, in the form of economic and social co-operation. For a later generation of radicals, it would be the very "social dimensions of contemporary revolutionary change" which would make historical materialism attractive; for Dai Jitao and Hu Hanmin, the class dimensions of historical materialism were best confined to history. For the present, it appeared sufficient that an enlightened minority should teach the ignorant majority the rudiments of a national revolution.

The traditional, idealist view of political motivation gained something of a populist flavour once the shortcomings of the 1911 Revolution had been exposed by the ease with which Yuan Shikai assumed autocratic powers. The new populist notion of republican revolution which then emerged was characterized less by its political, social or economic reform programs than by the gross number of people, the entire Chinese nation, which it sought to enlighten. One strain of populist thinking found its way into the CRP via Dai Jitao, at that time a young recruit from the educationally-oriented Freedom Party (Ziyou dang), who brought with him into the CRP seminal notions of popular 'awakening' as a precondition for successful national revolution. In the magazine which he edited in 1914 and 1915, The Republic (Minguo zashi), Dai developed his populist convictions to the point of advocating the use of colloquial language, pictures and ballad forms in party propaganda in order to make it accessible to a wider section of the population. Propaganda needed to address the common people for, in Dai's view, it was ultimately they who would make or break a republican revolution. Another young theorist in the CRP, Zhu Zhixin, found time to ponder over mass "psychology" and "popular will" between his forays into the Chinese hinterland in search of disaffected militia. Blood need not be shed, he argued, to create a true republic; popular understanding of republicanism alone would suffice, and such understanding could come about through mass political education by "those first enlightened" in the CRP.
In the event, nothing came of Dai's and Zhu's proposals for reorienting the CRP towards popular political education for quite some time. Following the CRP's return to China from exile in 1912, Dai tried on several occasions to initiate a party reorganization to facilitate mass propaganda activities on a systematic basis, but other party members vetoed his proposal as often as it was put forward. Zhu Zhixin, meanwhile, was to die before any semblance of his ideas found expression in a party platform. Leaving aside for the moment the immediate application or otherwise of Dai's and Zhu's populist ideas it seems that in conceiving of mass political participation they simply extended classical traditions of the role of scholars and the primacy of moral enlightenment to a wider political constituency. Mass politics was thought to mean enlightening masses of people. The perceived importance of mass political instruction grew, therefore, with the increasingly apparent need for some form of popular revolution.

In fact, however, if propaganda was important to the early revolutionary movement, it was not for its educative function. Its significance both in China and abroad lay in its immediate pragmatic rather than in its long-term ideological effects. Abroad, Sun's parties promoted or suppressed their propaganda activities in accordance with their need for finance. When party coffers were full or money would have served little purpose, then interest in enlightening the Overseas Chinese declined; when there was a need for money and propaganda was in full swing, 'enlightenment' alone was not considered a sufficiently effective tool of persuasion. In addition to appeals to reason and encomiums to patriotism, the Overseas Chinese were offered special citizenship status and substantial returns for their investments in the event of a party victory.

When it came to persuading foreign powers to lend their support to the parties, propaganda was even less concerned with enlightening its audience. Relations with foreign powers were so integral to Sun Yatsen's thinking and behaviour that some biographers have approached his life-story as a form of diplomatic history, in which Sun's negotiations with foreign powers overshadow his relations with his party and with China proper. Propaganda attuned to the ears of foreign leaders was in fact Sun's speciality, and one which earned him credit among fellow revolutionaries. In 1897, he published
Kidnapped in London to win the sympathy of the British public, and over the following years he cultivated the friendship of foreign journalists and frequently took advantage of the access they provided to the foreign public. Twenty years after the appearance of Kidnapped in London, Sun still addressed many of his major works first and foremost to foreign governments, promising them the rewards of joint participation in reconstruction programs should he be elevated to power with their assistance. A synopsis of The International Development of China was sent to all members of the British cabinet in March, 1919, even before it began to filter through to the Chinese-reading public in the Guomindang publications Construction (Jianshe) and the Shanghai Republican Daily (Minguo ribao).

The most celebrated example of party propaganda over the CRP period is also the most revealing in its exposure of the opportunism of party propaganda abroad. In 1915, at the time of Japan's presentation of the Twenty-One Demands to Yuan Shikai, the editors of the party's Tokyo-based magazine consciously ignored the pressure of patriotic opinion within China to close ranks behind Yuan in resisting this Japanese infringement of China's sovereignty. The Republic persisted in voicing harsh criticism of Yuan Shikai, in part to curry favour with its Japanese hosts in the hope of receiving Japanese aid. Propaganda was tied inseparably to party interests, even when party and national interests happened to clash. The keynote of party propaganda abroad, whether toward Chinese communities abroad or toward foreign governments, was thus its malleability in the service of the party. Failing to convert the Japanese government alone, the party was prepared to convert itself into a creature of that government's desires.

Propaganda within China itself was also important, but again not for the reason put forward by the propagandists themselves. Its importance derived essentially from two peculiarities quite divorced from its reputed capacity to enlighten people: these were the institutions set up to handle it, and the political environment within which it circulated.

The rise and fall of propaganda institutions and in levels of propaganda output from one year to the next give a clear indication of how propaganda's importance varied with circumstances. Party leaders had little time for
propaganda once their immediate political goals were attained, but would return to it with a vengeance if they happened to slip from power. In the period from 1916 up to the great party reorganizations of 1923-24, Sun Yatsen's own attempts to win a popular following in China through his writings were largely confined to the years 1916-17 and 1918-20, when he was denied access to any position of real authority. The lifespan of the two most prestigious intellectual journals published by Sun's parties, Weekly Review (Xingqi pinglun) and Construction, stretched no further than 1920, when Sun and his entourage returned to office in Guangdong and proclaimed an end to mere "hollow words". What requires explanation is not Sun's contempt for "hollow words" once immediate goals were at hand, which is perhaps understandable, but rather the habit of reverting to propaganda once power had slipped from the party's grasp. Does this reversion to propaganda in times of trouble indicate that Sun and his party could pull themselves up by the bootstraps through awakening people to their plight? This was partly true in respect of propaganda among the Overseas Chinese, whose support could be converted into hard currency, but it was less true of party propaganda within China. Whatever the rhetoric of propaganda, the party's turning to propaganda in defeat owed more to the political function of propaganda institutions than to the power of propaganda to sway people.

The institutional reasons underlying propaganda's elevation in times of crisis show up clearly in a brief letter drafted by Ju Zheng and Dai Jitao in 1918, shortly after Sun Yatsen's demotion in the Guangdong coalition government. In the course of seeking assistance for the party's Shanghai newspaper Republican Daily, they argued that "as our recent promotion of the Constitution-Protecting Government has met with defeat, publicity truly becomes of the utmost importance for our future undertakings." Sun's misfortunes proved a blessing for the ailing Republican Daily, for only after he had fallen from grace did its financial problems receive due attention. Yet central to the revival of interest in the newspaper was the fear that should this lone institutional survivor of the party's recent misfortunes itself go under, so too would the party flag. Regardless of what the paper published and whether or not it enlightened a single soul, its institutional presence was required simply to show that the party had some fight left in it yet. A newspaper house also provided the focus for meetings of like minds,
and an institutional setting for establishing and maintaining contact with fraternal organizations. Hence the survival and revival of the Republican Daily assumed importance for the continuing viability of the party itself.

The performance of these institutional functions shows that party propaganda organs within China primarily served the party's territorial and parliamentary ambitions, and derived little importance from their vaunted power to awaken the people. From as early as 1915, when Chen Qimei gathered the capital to launch Republican Daily and Ye Chucang assumed its general editorship, the paper had begun to establish links with the propaganda arms of other political factions. Its relationship with China News (Zhonghua xinbao), an organ of the Political Study Group (Zhengxue hui) whose members came to participate in the Constitution-Protecting Parliament set up under the titular leadership of Sun Yat-sen in August 1917, was cemented informally in its early years through contact with staff of China News and was finally institutionalized in 1917 through the formation of the Shanghai Journalists Club (Shanghai jizhe julebu). Founded jointly by Cheng Shewo, an editor of Republican Daily, and Wang Dungen, the editor of a supplement to The New Explicator (Xin shenbao), the club served to divide the Shanghai newspaper world into political camps. The New Explicator's involvement precluded that of The Explicator (Shen Bao), The News (Xinwen Bao) and The Times (Shibao), all of which resented The New Explicator's recent and most determined intrusion into their established markets. The rationale for the joint participation of Republican Daily and China News, expressed in their opposition to the Duan Qirui cabinet and joint involvement in the Guangdong parliament, itself ruled out the inclusion of Current Affairs News (Shishi Xinbao), a propaganda arm of the rival Research Clique (Yanjiao xi) and the most tireless supporter of Duan Qirui's Beijing government in Shanghai newspaper circles.

The problematic relationship between Sun's group and the Political Study Group in the Guangzhou parliament was in part concealed from public gaze because of the friendly relations maintained in Shanghai through the Journalists Club, which helped to sustain a united publicity front in defiance of attempts by hostile political factions to take advantage of their real differences. In his capacity as editor of the Political Study Group's China News, Wu Zhihui proved an indefatigable champion of Sun Yat-sen in
responding to the polemic of the Research Clique's *Current Affairs News*, thereby creating the appearance of unity between the Political Study Group and Sun's followers at a time when the course of their relationship was in fact far from smooth. When in 1918 relations between these two factions in the Guangdong parliament deteriorated beyond repair, bonds between journalists of their respective newspapers proved sufficiently strong to lead Chen Baixu, then associated with *China News*, and a number of non-party employees of that newspaper to dissociate themselves from their masters in the Political Study Group.

Over the first quarter of 1919, Ye Chucang took the initiative in expanding the *Republican Daily* 's links with other newspapers beyond the Journalists Club, which had been confined to Shanghai. The creation of a national newspaper association was mooted in discussion with sympathetic journalists and newspapers throughout the country, and positive responses from Guangzhou, Changsha, Hankou, Kunming and Tianjin encouraged the editors of *Republican Daily* to muster the Shanghai representatives of over fifty provincial newspapers into the National Newspaper Union (*Quanguo baojie lianhe hui*), which was inaugurated on 15 April 1919, some fortnight before the occurrence of the May Fourth Incident. The Union expanded the scope of liaison between *Republican Daily* and other newspapers both geographically and numerically, growing in time to include eighty newspapers from all parts of the country.

The significance of *Republican Daily* as a political institution over the period 1917 to 1919 cannot be overestimated. There was no formal party structure to speak of at this time, the CRP having disappeared in all but name after Yuan Shikai's death. But for *Republican Daily* and its National Newspaper Union, which was described by one contemporary observer as "the centre of Guomindang activities in Shanghai over the year of the May Fourth Movement", Sun's followers and allies would have lacked an institutional focus for any attempted comeback into national politics.

*Republican Daily* 's claim to the title of emergency power-base did not rest solely on its organizational initiatives in cementing relations with political allies. A party newspaper was also well-placed to take advantage
of the political environment of early Republican China in order to inflict damage upon its political rivals. Political legitimacy appears to have required a show of uniform popular support, no matter how genuine or contrived, for the government of the day. The effort expended by governments on alternately orchestrating and suppressing expressions of 'public opinion' certainly indicates that they were very sensitive to any sign of open criticism. Mark Elvin has documented the operation of contrived consensus politics in the decision-making processes of 'proto-democratic' local administration in Shanghai. Much the same process applied at the national level, where Yuan Shikai selectively imposed or relaxed press restrictions in order to suppress or rally 'public opinion' to his advantage. Later administrations also recognized that hostile publicity challenged their grip on the reins of power, as shown by the Beijing government's response to the protests of May Fourth, 1919. An edict issued by President Xu Shicheng on 6 May demanded the arrest and punishment of people "disturbing order", since "as Beijing is our capital, upon which Chinese and foreigners alike cast their eyes, the preservation of order and peace therein is of paramount importance". The appearance of "order and peace", essential for the projection of an image of good government, could be threatened by nothing quite so readily as by a hostile press.

The CRP shared this understanding of legitimacy by popular consensus. In 1914, Zhu Zhixin himself believed the "preservation of order and peace" to be the key to the stability of Yuan Shikai's rule. Yuan remained in power, according to Zhu, only because latent public hostility had "not yet surfaced". Should it have surfaced and thereby have threatened Yuan's claim to legitimacy, then he would have "fallen long ago". Zhu's prescription for toppling Yuan thus amounted, quite simply, to making loud noises critical of him. Yuan's response, in his turn, was to bludgeon hostile newspapers into silence. It was within this framework of contrived consensus politics that propaganda organs came to feature so strongly in early Republican politics, and it was a function they could perform without awakening anybody to anything.

Sun Yatsen's group was not alone among political factions in recognizing the value of a partisan propaganda network, nor was the world of journalism slow to take advantage of the interest shown by politicians. In fact journalism flourished in the new political environment. By 1921 there were
about one hundred daily newspapers published in Beijing, and over thirty both in Shanghai and in Guangdong. Very few of them managed to subsist on revenue from sales and advertisements alone. Some newspaper proprietors acted as freelance spokespersons in the service of the highest bidder, while others employed staff without paying salaries, rather in the manner of restaurants which expect their waiters to be tipped by patrons for special services rendered. The survival of so many, to all appearances insolvent, newspapers, is evidence in hard currency of the value placed on orchestrating 'public opinion' to give the appearance of a popular mandate by those laying any claim to rule.

Every military syndicate and political faction worth its salt operated a publicity arm to give the appearance of favourable 'public opinion'. The minimum requirement of a partisan newspaper was that it should not be critical of its patron, the next requirement was that it attack the patron's enemies, and the least important requirement that it actively support its patron. In 1919, the Political Study Group's Yang Yongtai manipulated some sixteen newspapers in Guangzhou, not so much to enlist their support as to ensure that they would raise no public objections to the political conduct of Yang and the Group. Yang Yongtai's skills in handling newspaper proprietors won him national prominence, and in 1925 he was appointed to the Beijing Financial Reconciliation Committee, where he took charge of newspaper bribery in the capital on behalf of Duan Qirui. Similarly, the Anfu Club (Anfu julebu) subsidized Public Commentary (Gongyan bao), Feng Yuxiang took control of the Sino-American Newsagency (Zhongmei tongxun she) and the Zhili Clique funded the establishment of the Beijing Eastern Times (Dongfang shibao), a paper which bore the distinction of never once having criticized its patrons Cao Kun and Wu Peifu. On Sun Yatsen's side of the fence, his allies in the southern government tried to win over the ten newspapers in Guangzhou not bought out by Yang Yongtai and the Political Study Group, but were hampered by lack of funds. Meanwhile, Sun's ally in Hunan, the Military Governor Tan Yankai, took advantage of a subordinate's connection with the Changsha Republican Daily to convert it into a client newspaper, and then dismissed its editor after it published an article containing criticism of himself.

Herein lay the second part of the "utmost importance" attributed by Zu Zheng and Dai Jitao to the survival of the Republican Daily, at a time when
their party was on the defensive. In addition to providing an institutional focus for party alliances, a partisan newspaper also enabled vanquished politicians to challenge the legitimacy of their political rivals. In trying to suppress critical commentary, whether by carrot or stick, the political victors inadvertently acknowledged their vulnerability to such attacks.

May Fourth and the New Rhetoric of Popular 'Awakening'

The idea of using propaganda to incite a popular 'awakening' received a great boost with the events of May Fourth, 1919. As it happens, the May Fourth Incident illustrates quite clearly the force of dissident publicity in the face of contrived consensus, with student protestors disturbing "order and peace" and exposing the government to more damaging attacks upon the real foundations of its power. This is not, however, how it was seen at the time. To the contrary, the May Fourth Incident appeared to be the first large-scale test of popular awakening as a political force, and to vindicate by its results the propaganda of those who, like the New Youth (Xin qingnian) circle, had long been working toward a popular awakening. Even the conservative Liang Qichao interpreted it in this fashion, defining political activity after May Fourth as properly consisting of "continual and united propaganda and activities joined by a mass of people in a public manner". The May Fourth Incident and Movement seemed to show that propaganda could lead to popular awakening, and that popular awakening could in turn yield political results more cheaply and effectively than the customary wheelings and dealings of politicians and militarists.

Much the same interpretation was placed upon the events of May by those in Sun Yatsen's camp. Sun himself was impressed by the results of May Fourth, and attributed its success to the prompting of "one or two enlightened publishers". Ever willing to emulate success, Sun and a few comrades embarked on similar publishing ventures. Sun's relatively late conversion to the "New Culture faith in social transformation through general public enlightenment", as it has been aptly described, may be traced to the conspicuous success of the May Fourth Movement in achieving its immediate political goals. The Movement appeared to vindicate, as nothing had before it, belief in the political potential of a popular awakening.
The May Fourth publications of Sun's circle accordingly reflected a belief in popular awakening as a precondition for national revolution, and exuded confidence in the potential of propaganda to awaken the people and so to catalyze national revolution. The first issue of Weekly Review, which appeared under the editorship of Dai Jitao, Sun Disan and Shen Dingyi just one month after the May Fourth Incident, presented its raison d'être in the words: "the entire world is but the creation of thoughts in the mind ... Uniting the thought and consciousness of our corporate mind is thus the basis of all creation and reform of the world." The magazine's self-appointed task was to awaken the "corporate mind." Publication some two months later of the party journal Construction was premised on the kindred assumption that the failure of a bona fide republic to emerge from the revolution of 1911 was attributable to "ignorance of the Way" of reconstruction on the part of people in general; the magazine was to salvage hopes for a republican restoration by enlightening all people in the Way of Sun's party. The declaration of purpose of the third party-related journal published in Shanghai in the year of the May Fourth Incident is unfortunately unavailable, but its title, Awaken (Juewu), is sufficiently indicative of the faith its editors placed in popular awakening.

Over the few years following the May Fourth Incident, the belief that propaganda activity could incite a popular awakening was put to the test and found to be quite unjustified. As early as 1920, those genuinely trying to carry out the May Fourth injunction to 'go among the people' came to see flaws in the May Fourth model of popular mobilization, wherein enlightened intellectuals pass on their learning to the ignorant masses and thereby arouse them to action. It simply failed to work.

The process of discovering the fallacy of popular awakening unfolds quite clearly from one issue to the next of the party's Shanghai newspaper supplement, Awaken, between the summer vacations of 1920 and 1921. The editors of Awaken played a very active part in encouraging and organizing Shanghai students to 'go among the people', and converted their magazine into a forum - for discussing the successes and failures of student propaganda activities in the workplace. These propaganda activities were to foster a popular awakening in the May Fourth tradition, illustrated in Awaken's call in June
1920 for the creation of popular book clubs throughout the length and breadth of China; the aim of these was to "open the doors of knowledge and change people's way of thinking". Clearly the underlying assumption of such propaganda was that knowledge moulded political consciousness. In the same month, the editor Shao Lizi called upon students to take their novel ideas back with them to their home counties over the summer vacation, to spread them among village people and win converts for the New Culture Movement.

By August, progress reports from students in the field had begun to filter back to the editorial offices. All claimed considerable success in propaganda, although the standard measure of success they employed was the amount of effort they had put into propaganda rather than the number of converts they had won. Even so, some ended on the cautionary note that propagandists must resolve to remain extremely dedicated and persistent. This warning found sternest expression in an editorial published in September 1920, which berated students for abandoning new principles and reverting to heinous traditional customs upon returning to their villages. It was the students, not the villagers, who were undergoing conversion when they went 'among the people'.

The reason for the students' loss of heart was in fact their failure to make people sit up and take notice of their message. The editor Shao Lizi returned to this problem in December, six months after first telling the students to 'go among the people' in their summer vacations. In the later editorial he wrote specifically about the failure of student propaganda in the factories of Shanghai, but the same lesson applied in the surrounding villages: students grew disheartened and quit the workplace after finding that workers took little heed of their well-intentioned efforts to 'go among' them. Shao's advice, similar to that given by concerned rural propagandists, was that the students should strengthen their resolve and show greater persistence.

By the following summer vacation, blame for the failure of student propagandists to awaken the people was no longer being laid at the door of youthful impatience or lack of resolve. Awaken's columnists had by then come
to accept that certain classes of people were not simply failing to awaken, but were in fact refusing to awaken, and that all the persistence in the world would not prevail against them. Experience was showing that sectional interests were determining political consciousness, regardless of students' appeals to knowledge and reason. Hence one commentator pointed out, even while urging students to 'go among the people' over the coming vacation, that propaganda activity in cities and towns was pointless "because the audience consists of merchants, whose interests conflict with our proposals." People in the countryside, by contrast, might possibly be stirred by propaganda if problems which preoccupied them, such as taxation, were identified and specifically addressed. Drawing upon the experience of student propagandists over the previous year or two, this new recipe for populist politics presumed that class and occupation played some part in shaping political consciousness, and that if student propagandists selected which classes to address, and addressed them on their own terms, then their propaganda might incite people to action. They had come a long way since investing their faith in the power of reasoned argument to persuade all people to join their movement. Through personal experience and observation, May Fourth leaders and student propagandists were beginning to discover a materialist conception of history for themselves.

There was an alternative lesson to be drawn from the patent ineffectuality of popular awakening, and it was drawn by members of the Guomindang. Tales of the students' experience in going among the people found their way into the Guomindang by way of party members in Shanghai closely associated with May Fourth activists. Awaken was published by Republican Daily, the semi-official party newspaper of Ye Chucang, and so enjoyed close relations with another daily product of Ye Chucang's presses, an official organ of Shanghai Party Centre entitled The People's Trust (Minzui rikan). In January 1923, Shao Yuanchong wrote a piece for The People's Trust summarizing, in the logic of the Guomindang, the reasons for the past failure by intellectuals to awaken the masses: it was not the fault of the intellectuals, whose planning and reasoning were beyond reproach, but the fault of the masses themselves, who were conservative, indolent, shortsighted, indecisive, unreliable, and unable to tell right from wrong. It was, in Shao's view, up to the Guomindang to consider these aspects of mass psychology when "planning for the happiness of
the great majority of the masses"; the best way to circumvent the masses' shortcomings was not through propaganda, but through closely knit organization. In light of the failure of efforts to awaken the people through propaganda, non-Marxist theorists in the Guomindang then came to advocate mass organization over mass propaganda. Manipulating people through organizations seemed preferable to adapting propaganda to the sectional demands of the "shortsighted" classes. Yet though this prescription of Shao Yuanchong differed from that of others who were turning toward Marxism, each stemmed from the same diagnosis of the problem: their faith in popular awakening had been shattered by experience.

It would seem that in time Sun Yatsen came to think of the May Fourth Incident as merely a flash in the pan, and that he too lost faith in the immediate political potential of popular awakening. Perhaps more significant than the much acclaimed opening of Weekly Review and Construction at the height of the Movement was their unheralded closure after only one year of publication. They ceased publication not because they were any less successful than their rivals in the enlightenment industry, nor because the party could no longer afford to maintain them: the circulation of Construction had grown from three to thirteen thousand copies per issue, while Weekly Review claimed to have won "the greatest number of readers" of all May Fourth publications, and was published for next to no cost by Ye Chucang's Republican Daily. The real reasons lay in disillusion as to the political feasibility and utility of popular awakening, and in the rekindling of hopes for a return to political power in Guangdong. Hence one leading light of the New Youth circle, Chen Duxiu, openly pleaded with the Guomindang to place higher priority on awakening the masses, while a contributing editor to Awaken blamed the magazines' closure upon the shortsighted ambitions of career politicians in the Guomindang.

Sun Yatsen's only concession to these criticisms was to try to explain his party's behaviour in terms of the May Fourth Movement. After returning to Guangdong in November 1920, he claimed that propaganda in the form of "hollow words" in fact "lacked real force". His new provincial administration was to substitute "concrete reconstruction" for "hollow words", and so provide "cultural propaganda" for the party. Sun felt obliged to employ the rhetoric of New Culture popular awakening to justify behaviour proscribed by May Fourth
activists. While the reality of May Fourth had been superseded, its vocabulary of popular awakening survived - as indeed it survives to this very day.

A similar process of granting token recognition to a presumed need for popular awakening occurred within central and regional offices of the Guomindang. At the central level, provision was made in November 1920 for the creation of a new Propaganda Bureau (xuanchuan bu) within the Shanghai national headquarters. Two methods of propaganda closely associated with the style of May Fourth political activity, education and public speaking, were listed as functions of the proposed bureau. Yet the bureau was never to operate as an agent of popular political education on the May Fourth model, because its opening was delayed until the Movement had fallen into decline late in 1921, and also because once it did open for business it came, as we shall see, under the sway of the Guomindang parliamentary faction.

At the regional level, the Guomindang made use of May Fourth student organizations and propaganda organs only as a front for clandestine activities in areas where it was prevented from operating under its own name. Talk of popular awakening was therefore incidental to its organizational goals. In North China, clandestine Guomindang activities were co-ordinated from Beijing University and the Beijing Public High School, and in the period preceding 1924 were confined to intellectual circles. Ma Xulun, who headed the party's Beijing Propaganda Bureau in 1924, was in 1919 Secretary of the Beijing University Staff Association and shortly afterward Chairman of that body, as well as Chairman of the Staff Union of Beijing Institutes of Higher Learning. From such vantage points, Ma could straddle intellectual and political circles on behalf of the Guomindang. In Shandong and Shanxi, party members ran party affairs behind the facade of student organizations, and managed to recruit a good many students into the party ranks.

Party affairs in central China followed a similar pattern. In Anhui Province from 1920 to 1923, the outlawed party organization continued to operate through two fronts, these being the magazines The Democrat (Minzhi bao) and the provincial student union. So dependent was the Anhui party branch upon the presence of these two cover organizations that the forced closure of The Democrat and disbandment of the student union brought party
activities in Anhui to an abrupt halt. Over the same period in Jiangxi Province, party activities were conducted in secret through student organizations.

The corollary to the present argument that Guomindang involvement with May Fourth student circles was simply a front for clandestine organizational activities, is that where the party was free to act openly and at will it would ignore the Movement and its style of propaganda. This was in fact the case. The party's continuing attempts to foster a popular 'awakening' in Shanghai defies simple classification, for while the party's national headquarters remained fairly aloof from the Movement, a number of party members in Shanghai maintained close personal contact with it. Party activity in Guangdong, on the other hand, offers a clear illustration of the maxim that where the party was free to act at will, it would ignore the May Fourth Movement and its call for intellectuals to awaken the people.

Between 1920 and 1922, the Guomindang made little effort to activate and recruit students for propaganda work in Guangdong, while its relations with the common people were characterised by organizational work geared to special interest groups, rather than to propaganda. Although ignoring students, the party courted the Southern Mechanics' and Seamen's Unions, and earned for its pains an increase in party membership of around forty thousand unionists.

The student movement in Guangdong could not compare in size or momentum with those of Shanghai or Beijing, but its relative insignificance was not the reason for the party's ignoring it. The small size of the Movement in Guangdong did not deter those who believed in the potential of the movement, like the local militarist Chen Jiongming, from giving it active encouragement. In December 1920, Chen Jiongming appointed the doyen of the May Fourth Movement, Chen Duxiu, to the position of Commissioner of Education for Guangdong Province, in which capacity Chen Duxiu founded the Guangzhou Citizens' University, set up a propagandist training institute, seconded members of the Socialist Youth League to conduct political education within the public schools system, and published a magazine, The Masses (Qunbao), on Chen Jiongming's behalf. So influential was Chen Jiongming's propaganda work among the students of Guangdong between 1920 and 1922, that until at least 1924 the major ideological quarrel among students was not between supporters of Communism and of Sun's
Three Principles, but between advocates of Sun's Three Principles and of 'Huizhouism', a term referring to the provincialism of Chen Jiongming. 73

Chen Jiongming's involvement with the May Fourth style of propaganda in Guangdong was greater than that of the Guomindang because the uses to which each put their propaganda varied considerably. Chen Jiongming differed from Sun Yatsen not only in encouraging May Fourth propaganda in Guangdong, but in shying away from the usual newspaper manipulations at which the Guomindang was quite adept. Late in 1919, members of Sun's party complained to Sun that Chen Jiongming was extremely reluctant to pressure unaffiliated Guangzhou newspaper houses into opposing the sixteen newspapers bought out by the Political Study Group. Chen was himself pressured into exerting his influence over the remaining newspapers, but only after some delay did he finally agree to do so. Chen Jiongming could afford to try to awaken the people, while ignoring political manipulation of newspapers, because propaganda was incidental to his power and authority. As a militarist, he could call upon his own army; as a local boy with provincial interests at heart, he could count on some support among the merchants and gentry of Guangdong. The Guomindang, by contrast, lacked even an army to call its own, and so was obliged to make use of propaganda to gain and consolidate power. Propaganda was a necessity, not a luxury, and the forms propaganda assumed came to reflect the party's pragmatic interest in it. Should attempts to awaken the people appear unlikely to carry the party to power, as they appeared to Sun Yatsen when he closed down the party's May Fourth style magazines in 1920, then propaganda designed to awaken people might quite reasonably be dismissed by Sun as mere "hollow words". 74

The history of the Popular Wisdom Press (Minzhi shuju; self-styled English title: 'The Intelligence Press') demonstrates more clearly than any other Guomindang enterprise of the early twenties the practical uses to which the party turned the rhetoric of May Fourth propaganda. If the name of the press is anything to go by, it was ostensibly set up to tap and to augment the wisdom of the people; in fact, however, the press was designed to convert general interest in popular awakening into a handsome profit for the party. The fate of Popular Wisdom Press shows how deftly Sun Yatsen could adapt the rhetoric of May Fourth populism to the demands of mercenary military activities.
One letter of January 1920 presents in microcosm Sun's attitudes toward popular awakening and mercenary armed force respectively. It begins, rather ominously in retrospect, with an account of the difficulty of financing the guest armies with which Sun hoped to recapture Guangdong province. It then lauds the New Culture Movement in its political aspect as "a great movement indeed, unprecedented in intellectual circles in our time." It moves on to extol the place of publishing in the promotion of revolution, on the understanding that the Movement's "origins can be traced to the exhortations of but one or two enlightened publishers." The letter finally draws the conclusion begged by this preamble, that the party should set up its own publishing house. It ends, however, as ominously as it began, with a comment on how the party might benefit financially through venturing into the publishing business. The provisioning of armies was not to be forgotten in Sun's apparent enthusiasm for awakening the masses.  

The financial incentive for establishing a party press was by no means the only reason explicitly proffered for its creation. Sun argued that a press would afford the party greater liberty in publication, and enable it to participate more fully in the promotion of popular education and the New Culture Movement. Although not without merit, this argument underrated the achievements of Sun and his colleagues in winning access to established publishing houses. Of itself, it was insufficient motive for investing precious party resources in the publishing business.  

The party had, to date, managed quite well without its own press. Throughout the early years of the Republic, Shanghai remained the publishing centre of the country, and its two largest Chinese publishers, Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan) and the Chung Hwa Book Company (Zhonghua shuju) have been estimated as accounting between them for some 50 percent of the total market in the period.  

Given their financial resources and the extent of their distribution network, their selection as prospective publishers of Sun's work would appear quite reasonable; whether, on the other hand, it was business sense or patronage which prompted them to accept his work for publication is rather less apparent. Having assumed the national presidency for a brief period in 1912, Sun was nothing if not a prominent figure when, in the same year, Commercial Press published a Chinese translation of his Kidnapped in London.  

A continuing disposition on the part of the larger houses to publish Sun's
occasional writings of book length can in fact be understood in such commercial terms. Chung Hwa's publication of Sun's *Parliamentary Procedure* (Huiyi tongze) in 1917 and again in 1919, and the publication by Commercial in 1920 of Sun's English language work *The International Development of China*, were each addressed to a market which was keen for new political ideas. This trade in political ideas attracted even umbrella manufacturers, one of whom selected the brand-name 'People's Livelihood' for his product in the hope of cashing in on the boom. 'People's Livelihood' umbrellas were widely advertised under the caption "Patriotic citizens forcefully advocate People's Livelihood..." -- and buy 'People's Livelihood' umbrellas. Although Sun Yatsen held no monopoly on the slogan of People's Livelihood, which was one of his Three Principles, it may be assumed that his publishers were no less confident of finding a ready market for their product than were hawkers of umbrellas.*78*

Should the major publishers reject his manuscripts on commercial or political grounds, Sun could go elsewhere. In 1918 or perhaps 1919, Commercial Press turned down his *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (Sun Wen xuezhuo) because it failed to meet with the approval, claimed Sun, of his political enemies within the company.*79* Sun was not without political friends. Lin Huanting, a relative of Sun's close aide Hu Hanmin, established the Huaqiang Publishing Company (Huaqiang shuju) in Shanghai around the time of this rejection.*80* It was ultimately through Huaqiang that *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* saw print.*81*

Among the host of smaller publishing companies in Shanghai, Sun and his associates found political sympathies operating in their favour. The Taidong Publishing Company (Taidong tushu ju), publishers in 1917 of Sun's *Question of China's Survival* (Zhongguo cunwang wenti), was founded in 1915 as the publishing arm of the Political Study Group.*82* At the time of publication, the Shanghai newspapers of this society had already forged close links with the associates of Sun Yatsen through the Shanghai Journalists Club, and they were joined, in however fragile an alliance, with parliamentary representatives still loyal to Sun in the Guangdong rump-parliament.*83* Although tensions between the Political Study Group and Sun's coterie developed to the point of rupture in the following year, the Taidong Publishing Company retained its links with Sun's group through an extensive network of personal contacts. Wang Xinming, a founding member of the 1920 offshoot of Taidong, the New Individual Society (Xinrenshe), had himself been a colleague of the editors
of Republican Daily, Ye Chucang and Shao Lizi, while a teacher at the Jing Xiong Girls' School (Jingxiong nuxiao) and was a member of their National Newspaper Union. Another member of this society, Chen Baixu, could claim a long history of association with Sun and his allies when he was appointed as a propaganda officer of the party's Guangdong Special Office, and also, in 1922, as a member of the Propaganda Committee of Party Centre in Shanghai. It was the maintenance of such links over the period 1917 to 1922 which made possible the selection in 1919 of Taidong as the sole independent distributor for the first issue of the party journal Weekly Review, and as one of the three official distributors for the magazine's sister publication, Construction. Should Sun and his colleagues be turned down by the larger publishing companies, they could always make use of their connections with the smaller publishers in order to have their works set to type.

It was not, therefore, solely to gain access to printers, publishers and distributors that Sun chose to venture into the business side of publishing. He was conscious witness to a rapidly expanding market for publications and determined to challenge the market-leader, Commercial Press, perhaps to expand the reach of his propaganda but most certainly to earn the cash needed for his military adventures. Some advantages of scale were to be won through establishing a party press more substantial than the smaller publishers through which the party had hitherto been operating. Popular Wisdom Press was not, however, destined to become one of the giants of publishing in Sun's lifetime. It was undermined from the outset by the primary incentive for its creation: a desire for funds to finance drives on Guangdong and Beijing.

Further light is thrown upon the financial aspirations of the publishing venture in an unidentified document held by the party's Historical Archives Commission in Taipei. Although undated and written in an anonymous hand, it does appear to have pre-dated the founding of Popular Wisdom Press, and to be born of the same considerations outlined by Sun in his letter of January 1920: to compete with Commercial Press, to "foster culture," to provide textbooks for the school market, and, finally, to make a lot of money. It may thus be safely assumed that this document was as closely related as Sun's own letter to the later establishment of Popular Wisdom Press. Perhaps the strongest point of similarity between the two documents is one which also serves to highlight their differences: while both proposed that an initial
subscribed capital of 500,000 yuan be invested in the project, the unsigned document further proceeded to estimate a profit potential of ¥200,000 to ¥300,000 annually. 90

A publisher capitalized at ¥500,000 would have been more than a serious competitor for the major publishers in 1921. In the early years of the republic, the greatest rival to Commercial Press in the field of textbook publishing had been the Zhongguo Publishing Company (Zhongguo tushu gongsi) which had begun operation in 1908 with an issued capital of just that amount. 91 This was, admittedly, some thirteen years prior to the establishment of Popular Wisdom Press, years in which Commercial had continued to grow in a market which has been estimated at expanding threefold over the period from 1911 to 1930. 92 Yet even in this inflated market, by 1930 only a handful of publishing companies could claim a capital value approximately or exceeding ¥500,000, while the vast majority were worth ¥100,000 to ¥200,000. 93 If the requested amount of ¥500,000 would have sufficed to mount a serious challenge to Commercial, it was certainly equal to the task of taking a controlling interest in the second largest of the Chinese publishers. The Chung Hwa Publishing Company had fallen on hard times in 1917, and was only just beginning to recover by 1921. Nine years of subsequent development saw it valued in 1930 at just four times the sum proposed for investment in a party press in 1920. 94

It was with such prospects of profit and power in mind that Sun penned a more specific letter to the Chief Officer of the American party headquarters in San Francisco, Lin Zhimian, later in 1920. His earlier approach had met with general approval, but had fallen short of generating the requested capital. Through this additional reminder, Sun set in train a series of practical measures designed to rally comrades in the United States. 95 By the end of 1920, Lin was able to report back that funds for the proposed press were beginning to flow in following a program of lecture tours and general liaison with party branches throughout the country. 96 The total sum remitted from the US for the specific purpose of establishing the press came to approximately US$100,000, or roughly ¥180,000, over the period 1920 to 1922, thereby providing a little over one third of the total amount sought from all overseas sources. 97
30.

In January 1921, the head of the party Central Affairs Bureau, Ju Zheng, reiterated Sun's appeal in correspondence with branches elsewhere. No record has been located regarding the sums remitted from these other branches abroad, but if it be assumed that they provided amounts proportional to their general contributions, then a rough estimate may be drawn of their respective donations earmarked for the party press. The one contemporary period for which records of receipts are most complete is that between July and December 1922. Total party income for the six months was a little over ¥1,000,000, of which about ¥670,000 was contributed by overseas branches, while the remainder came from within China itself. Branches in the US accounted for approximately ¥400,000, or 60 percent of the sum remitted from overseas. If indeed the US contribution of ¥180,000 also comprised 60 percent of funds received for the establishment of the party press, then receipts from other sources should have totalled about ¥120,000, giving a sum on hand of approximately ¥300,000 expressly for its creation. This speculative figure of ¥300,000, though considerably short of the target figure of ¥500,000, was nevertheless some ten years later still considered a sizeable amount in relation to the capital assets of the major publishers. The US contribution alone would have enabled the establishment of a viable and profitable enterprise, built upon a financial base more solid than its average rival in the competitive market of 1921.

The party did not, however, seize this opportunity to make a truly decisive move into the field of publishing. As the press was sired by military ambition, so was it endangered at birth by pressing military problems. The arrival of the American and other funds coincided with the party's involvement in the invasion of Guangxi, in a prelude to more grandiose plan for an expedition northward into Jiangxi and southern Hunan. Sun had, as noted, lamented the paucity of funds available for the maintenance of allied forces in his first letter on the subject of the party press dating from January 1920. It is unclear whether the bulk of the special press donation by overseas party members contributed to their support, but it does appear that only a fraction of it actually went toward the foundation of Popular Wisdom Press.

Popular Wisdom Press was founded with an initial outlay of ¥16,000 in June 1921, and was fed a further ¥21,500 over the subsequent six months. A sum of ¥18,250 was then sunk into the venture over the following year, giving a total investment of just under ¥56,000 for the two year period, 1921.
to 1922. 104 This sum does not, however, represent capital investment alone, for the appearance of the phrase "running costs" alongside items of expenditure in the records of 1922 indicates that some portion of this sum was diverted to cover the cost of paper, ink, salaries and rent, in a business incapable of supporting itself. 105 Yet even had it all been converted into capital assets, the investment would still have amounted to less than one third of the sum collected by Sun's American adherents, less than one fifth of the ¥500,000 calculated to have been the proceeds of the worldwide fund-raising drive, and only marginally more than one tenth of the sum of ¥500,000 at first requested.

The profitability of the new company was hampered not simply by the size of the sum ultimately invested in it, but also by the poor judgement exercised in the initial purchase of equipment. The establishment of the press happened to coincide with the appointment in April 1921 of Lin Huanting, proprietor of the aforementioned Huaqiang Publishing Company, to the position of Acting Head of the Finance Bureau of Shanghai Party Centre. 106 He used the funds available for the purpose to purchase "inadequate and faulty" equipment from an "established business." 107 The business taken over appears to have been none other than his own small Huaqiang Publishing Company, for the address ascribed to Popular Wisdom Press in advertisements of 1923 was formerly the location of the premises of Huaqiang. 108 The sums not siphoned off by Sun were pressed into re-equipment rather than expanding the business. The poor equipment initially purchased was replaced by new machinery in the company's second year of operation. 109 Some three years later, after Sun's death, the company was still appealing abroad for the funds required to give it a solid commercial foundation. 110 Plans for a party press to rival Commercial and Chung-Hwa were in fact reduced to the scale of those smaller publishers to which the party had already enjoyed access, prior to the establishment of Popular Wisdom Press.

In throttling the press at birth, Sun prevented it from realising the profit potential which was supposed to sustain his armies over the long term. Hence while party publishing did benefit through the creation of the press, the company could do little to offset military expenditure. Such mismanagement has been turned to Sun's credit by insisting that the sole purpose of the press was to publish party publications, and that in doing so it achieved its
The press was in fact set up to serve two purposes at once: to publish books on a grand scale and to make sufficient profit to subsidise other party expenditures. Rather than succeed in killing two birds with the one stone, however, Sun lost even the bird which was within his grasp: the establishment of a truly major publishing house.

The pattern traced by the history of Popular Wisdom Press highlights not only Sun's tactical priorities, but also his political style. While for all practical purposes he may have placed greater faith in the gun than in the pen, he was still inclined to play public deference to the political potential of a popular awakening. This contrast between talking of popular awakening but ignoring it in practice was to become such a mark of his style as to suggest not so much equivocation or uncertainty, as an underlying consistency of purpose. Following the incidents of May Fourth, the language of mass politics had become the medium of discourse among radical intellectuals. Should Sun wish to retain his credentials among local revolutionaries, he could ill afford to ignore the new vocabulary of mass nationalism. What appears, in retrospect, to have been a series of broken promises was, at the time, an attempt to explain familiar conspiratorial stratagems in the less familiar terms of May Fourth activists. The true measure of Sun's achievement is, therefore, not the size of the gap between what he said and what he did, but how successfully he managed to conceal that gap from the gaze of his contemporaries.

When, in 1922, the momentum of the May Fourth Movement had all but dissipated, the rhetoric of mass politics received a boost with the arrival of Soviet emissaries bearing promises of gifts. In addition to its local appeal, the new vocabulary was seen to enjoy some popularity internationally. Any candidate for Russian patronage was expected to become fluent in the language of populism and of nationalism, and Sun proved quite adept at mastering both.

Sun had given popular awakening short shrift in 1920 once it had become apparent that the Guomindang stood to gain little by it; yet by the end of 1922 he was talking louder than ever of the need to 'awaken' the people through propaganda. Both the earlier rejection and later resurrection of popular awakening occurred while Sun was trying to shrug off the spectre of
"hollow words": in the first instance, the "hollow words" of May Fourth propaganda, and in the later case the "hollow words" of the past twenty months in Guangdong, which had been brought to a close by Chen Jiongming's chasing him from the province.\(^{112}\) On both occasions, Sun was keen to find some new strategem which would bring results. Why, then, did he turn to a model of propaganda already discredited? One explanation may be that, having abandoned the May Fourth style of popular propaganda even before the student readership of *Awaken* had 'gone among the people', he was not fully aware of its failings. Another, and more important, reason is that Sun spoke of mass propaganda in order to impress the Russians, from whom he expected something much more tangible than "hollow words."

Following his eviction from Guangdong by Chen Jiongming in mid-1922, Sun Yatsen was desperate for money, arms and military allies. In October 1922, he ordered the creation of a special party agency in Hong Kong specifically for raising money among Chinese communities abroad and for liaising with militarists in Guangxi and elsewhere, in preparation for a counter-attack against Chen Jiongming.\(^{113}\) Financial and military assistance was also a major focus of Sun's concern in contacts with Soviet and Comintern representatives around this time, both personally with Dalin and Sneevliet, and by way of Liao Zhongkai with Joffe in Japan and Jiang Kaishek with the Soviet military establishment in Russia itself.\(^{114}\) It was, in the end, the Russians' willingness to finance his projects in Guangdong, when other countries consistently declined to do so, which decided Sun to throw in his lot with the Russians.\(^{115}\)

Sun's old habit of singing the praises of foreign political systems and cultures in the hope of winning the assistance of their respective governments had not waned with the years. In January 1923, the month in which he was to issue the famous joint manifesto with Adolf Joffe, Sun declared his admiration for the techniques and achievements of the Russian revolution. In February, passing through Hong Kong, he was hopeful of establishing good relations with the British and obtaining some portion of the customs revenue in their care, and so spoke of "taking England as our model, and spreading the English style of good government throughout the length and breadth of China."\(^{116}\) Similarly in May, Sun hoped to win from the Americans an assurance of help in withholding customs revenue from the northern government, and appealed accordingly to American partiality for liberal democracy by professing dismay
that a government espousing liberal principles dear to his own heart should
treat him with derision. In the same vein, Sun's references to Russia
over the period in which he most keenly sought its assistance, notably the
first and last month of 1923, almost always bore upon reputed Soviet
achievements with mass propaganda. Sun had heard time and again from the
Comintern agents Voitinsky and Sneevliet that it was popular support fanned
by mass propaganda which had carried the revolutionaries to power in Russia.
He may well have believed them, just as he believed in English 'good
government' and American liberal democracy, but he also learnt from their
persistance that mass mobilization was the Russians' soft-spot. His vaunted
conversion to the idea of a mass awakening was, therefore, more properly a
gauge of his eagerness for Russian assistance than a true measure of his
tactical priorities.

While mass propaganda may have been less attractive a tactical option
to Sun than he made it out to be, still he took it sufficiently seriously to
distinguish his version of it from that of the Russians. In coming to terms
with what he understood to be the Russians' use of mass propaganda, he
separated their propaganda method from their propaganda message, in a manner
reminiscent of the Qing reformers' attempts to borrow techniques (yon) from
abroad while leaving their own essence (ti) intact. Sun dismissed Marxism,
or the particular class flavour of Communism, as having played any significant
part in Lenin's initial success and subsequent achievements: mass propaganda
was but a "weapon", which could be primed with a variety of ideological
cartridges. His own writings and principles were equal to any theories of
Lenin, and hence equally suited for mass propaganda on the Russian model.
Sun was able to draw this distinction between essence and technique only by
conceiving of mass propaganda as an instrument for political indoctrination.
Through propaganda, the ignorant masses were to be swayed by reason to follow
their teachers, in this case "those first enlightened" in the Guomindang.
Lenin was only the latest in a line which had included Confucius, Buddha
and Christian missionaries, and which would now also include Sun himself.

In thus defining mass propaganda, on the eve of the great party
reorganizations of 1923 and 1924, as a form of political education, Sun
placed himself squarely within the tradition of popular awakening which he himself had earlier rejected and which others had found wanting when they attempted to 'go among the people'. But before moving on to see what became of mass propaganda after the party reorganizations, I should like first to place the question in proper perspective by examining two other matters which preoccupied the Guomindang from 1919 to 1926: constitutionalism and militarism. Constitutional politics and the cementing of military alliances each took up a great deal of the time and resources of the party over this period, and each made its own particular demands upon the propaganda of the party.
When in January 1923 Sun Yat-sen announced his preference for following what he took to be the Russian model and awakening the Chinese people through propaganda, he was comparing propaganda favourably with two more-familiar avenues for seeking power, parliamentary politics and the exercise of military force. Propaganda as such was not unknown to parliamentarians or militarists, and over the years the party itself had geared its publicity to the demands of parliamentary politics and military alliances. The propaganda which Sun now contrasted against them was, however, of another kind, designed to win territory by winning hearts, and to win support for party policy as surely as any duly elected assembly. Popular 'awakening' thus merited mention alongside armies and houses of parliament, as a third route to power.

This chapter, and the following one, will trace the party's journey down each of these two familiar paths, and establish whether Sun's propaganda did indeed strike out in new directions or continued to trail along behind constitutionalism and militarism. In this chapter, I shall outline the degree and nature of party involvement in the republican political process, and assess the role and value assigned to propaganda as a function of such involvement. This in turn will provide a framework for discussing the underlying Sun's declared intention to divert the party from the constitutional course, and for judging whether he and his party were genuinely committed to the suggested alternative of a popular awakening.

Drafting a New Party Constitution, 1920

Though in some circles it may have done so, contrary to general belief May Fourth did not signify the 'death rattle of liberalism' within the Guomindang. The politics of liberal democracy featured highly among the priorities of the party. Sun Yat-sen and senior party cadres shared, for different and sometimes conflicting reasons, an abiding interest in the resolution of conflict through the constitutional process. As far as Sun was concerned, all else being equal it was less demanding to maintain a presence at the negotiation table than on the battlefield. Should he choose
to resort to arms, propaganda associated with constitutional politics might help paint a glaze of legitimacy over less attractive military stratagems. Parliamentary aspirants within the party, on the other hand, were more concerned with pressing their particular claims to political representation. Having been promoted to parliamentary office with a variety of political affiliations, through several elections, and for a number of representative assemblies, Guomindang parliamentarians by no means constituted an homogeneous group. For some, sub-group and extra-party linkages might at times have outweighed their nominal allegiance to Sun Yatsen; for others, Sun's fortunes were inextricably entwined with their own. They were brought together by the party's provision of an historical focus, and immediate resources, for opposition to a government in Beijing from which they were excluded. The structure and propaganda of the party were both tailored to suit this common interest, although not without the occasional conflict arising from the different motives which underlay it.

Sun's parliamentary associates were in part responsible for the timing and shape of the formal party structure established to operate within China proper. The party organization unveiled in Shanghai on 10 October 1919 applied only to the overseas chapters of the defunct Chinese Revolutionary Party, and its form revealed a paramount regard for refilling the depleted party coffers which were to finance military activities on the continent. It ignored party organization and propaganda within China except for such rudimentary organs as were required to co-ordinate the operation of the overseas network. The creation of a continental party structure was delayed for some thirteen months after the establishment of the overseas party organization, until Sun's departure for Guangdong became imminent in November 1920.

In the three years prior to 1920, Sun had tried on several occasions to reorganize the moribund CRP, but had been foiled at each attempt by resistance from former comrades. The body of parliamentarians who had gathered in Guangzhou to "Protect the Constitution" (hufa) from 1917 to 1920 lacked a party structure to their liking. The majority had refused to join the CRP; it appears that they also objected to the form of a new party proposed by Sun Yatsen during the period of their residence in Guangzhou.
Encouraging news from the front lines in Guangdong, and the dawning realization of his imminent departure from Shanghai, prompted Sun to launch another attempt at party reorganization. On 9 November 1920, he issued a general party declaration designed to institutionalize that network of personal relations which revolved about him into a formal party structure. A body of parliamentarians from the Guangzhou "Constitution Protecting" Parliament had, by this time, made their way to Shanghai, and appeared to have brought with them a critical sense of their own best interests. In such circumstances, Sun's proclamation proved somewhat premature. At the heart of a controversy which preceded the publication of a second version ten days later, on 19 November, lay problems which had plagued Sun Yatsen over the past fifteen years: the nature of his party and the quality of his leadership were both brought into question. In the absence of voluminous documentary and published evidence on the period, the declarations of 9 and 19 November offer a rare glimpse into the matrix of tensions which underlay the establishment of a new political party intended to operate under Sun's direction within China proper. The interests of the parliamentary wing found expression in certain slight but significant alterations in the phrasing of the two documents.

Sun's monopoly of power within the CRP had been formalised through a ceremony involving an oath of personal allegiance to Sun himself, taken by all initiates upon entering the party. The CRP had been established specifically to compensate for the lack of central authority which had characterized the parliamentary parties which preceded it, the reorganized Revolutionary Alliance and the Nationalist Party. The oath of loyalty was a mark of Sun's distaste for the liberties taken by parliamentary representatives. The ceremony thus alienated the bulk of members of the parliamentary parties. By 1918 Sun had made concessions on this point, the oath-taking ceremony being abandoned for all new party recruits who were henceforth entitled to join Sun's group in Guangzhou, as elsewhere, under the old title of the parliamentary Nationalist Party. The presence of parliamentarians was felt once again at the launching of the continental Guomindang in November of 1920. Lest any doubt remained that the sixth clause of the 9 November document abolished the ceremony, the third clause of the revised 19 November text altered the wording from an enigmatic "must take an oath of loyalty, to the more precise "must swear to the party."
A second point of the old CRP platform associated with attempts to downgrade the interests of parliamentary representatives had been its reference to a period of state tutelage which would precede the establishment of a republic. Tutelage was to be the second of three proposed stages in a revolutionary process beginning with military victory and ending in the proclamation of representative government. In the interim, the Chinese people were to be tutored in the operation of republican government. The three-stage proposal was not to the liking of the parliamentarians. It had found mention, in slightly different form, in a manifesto of the Revolutionary Alliance published in 1905. Proposals for the postponement of representative government were not then considered appropriate for inclusion in the platform of a parliamentary party. When the Revolutionary Alliance was reconstituted as a parliamentary party in March 1912, reference to the three stages was duly deleted. The Nationalist Party, founded later in the same year to provide an umbrella organization for parliamentarians loosely affiliated with the Alliance, also dissociated itself from the three-stage proposal. The CRP, by contrast, prided itself on being anything but a parliamentary party. The three stages were thought to befit a revolutionary party, and were resurrected in 1914 in the platform of the CRP. Once victory had been won on the field of battle, tutelage was to be substituted for representative government for an unspecified period of time. Critics of the CRP then suggested that government by tutelage was but an excuse for Sun's ruling without reference to due process. Due process held promises of power and of livelihood to parliamentarians.

The fate of tutelage in the drafting of the Guomindang constitution in November 1920 indicates that the shape of the new party was being moulded by parliamentary loyalties. On the day of proclamation of the first draft, Sun lectured his comrades on the necessity for inclusion of the principle of tutelage as one phase in the three-stage periodization of the revolutionary process. Hu Hanmin anticipated others' objections by presenting a compromise proposal which, while agreeable to Sun, effectively removed tutelage from practical consideration. Hu's suggestion, incorporated into the third clause of the first declaration, was that tutelage be undertaken during the period of military offensive. Victory on the field of battle would then immediately herald a period of constitutional republican government. Even this diluted version of Sun's concept of
tutelage was, however, deleted from the final version of the text published ten days later, which neglected to mention tutelage at all. Sun's views on the issue, expressed forcefully in his speech of 9 November, carried little weight against the concerted opposition of those most likely to benefit through the introduction of national representative government.

A reference to Sun's leadership found in the ninth and tenth clauses of the first draft was also watered down in the twelfth clause of the final proclamation. In defence of the first draft Sun lectured his comrades on the requirement for strong personal leadership within the party. He argued that while the state might be based upon law, a party must be founded upon an individual. Party politicians found such sentiments no more palatable in 1920 than they had in 1914. The respective bargaining positions were rather different in 1920 from those which had pertained in 1914: they were so weighted in 1920 as to force concessions from Sun Yatsen. He planned to legitimize his rule through a new session of the Extraordinary Parliament upon his return to Guangzhou, and so was obliged to work together with its representatives. It might have seemed unfortunate that parliamentarians should invariably come in train with republican politics, but such being the case their interests had to be acknowledged. The first draft was subsequently amended. The initial reading: "Party Centre comprises one president... who holds absolute power to direct all party affairs," was changed in the later document to: "The party has one president who, as representative of the party, directs party affairs." Sun was thus held accountable to his fellows, within an organization shaped rather more like a parliamentary party than he appears to have intended.

Propaganda Institutions and Personnel, 1920-1922

Circumstances surrounding the creation and operation of propaganda institutions within the new party suggest that they too were sired by parliamentary politics. Propaganda had played an integral part in the political strategy of parliamentary parties since the establishment of the Republic. Political tacticians of various persuasions understood 'public opinion' to be the arbiter of political disputes within a liberal republic. One spokesman for the Republican Party (Gonghedang), a major rival to the Nationalist Party in the first years of the Republic, asserted that the
strength of democratic countries was directly proportional to the degree of respect for public opinion shown by their governments. Representatives of the Nationalist Party concurred that public opinion, articulated in open debate, was the very foundation of the democratic state. Informing and articulating such public opinion was thus considered a legitimate and necessary party activity. Since political parties conceived of themselves simply as the "representatives of public opinion," their activities could be justified only by presenting their own views as those of the public at large. Party publicity was designed to give just such an impression. The parties simulated 'public opinion' in their journals in order to press their particular views on the appropriate form for a new republican political structure, to win electoral support for parliamentary representation, and to support legislative proposals in the face of parliamentary opposition or executive intransigence.

The parliamentary antecedents of the Guomindang had been engaging in propaganda activity up to the time of the party reforms of November 1920. Within the province of Guangdong, for example, the Revolutionary Alliance had in 1912 managed some ten newspapers and organized a club for sympathetic journalists. The Guangdong provincial branch of the Alliance had also maintained close links with more than twenty newspapers in other parts of the country. Once Sun Yatsen had led a body of parliamentarians south and established the "Constitution Protecting" government in Guangzhou, rival factions within the Extraordinary Parliament competed for control of local newspapers. As noted previously, Sun's allies in the southern government tried to match the Political Study Group's success in winning the favours of local newspapers. Like the Revolutionary Alliance before them, they established a club for journalists, and arranged amusements in their honour. In the following year, propaganda retained its fascination for politicians in Guangzhou. Parliamentarians who were to preserve their links with the Guomindang over subsequent years combined forces to publish a new magazine, Popular Awakening (Minjue), in February 1920. In content the magazine differed little from the publications issued by parliamentary parties at the dawn of the Republic. Contributors to Popular Awakening asserted the sovereignty of the people in the Chinese Republic, stressed the role of parliamentarians in representing the people's will, and extolled the credentials of their own faction for representing the popular will.
legitimately and forcefully. From 1912 to 1920, parliamentarians allied with Sun Yatsen had shown a perennial commitment to propaganda activity, in a form geared to their specific interests.

Another quite independent stream of propaganda activity had developed over the eighteen months preceding the reforms of November 1920, through party involvement in the popular 'awakening' aspect of the May Fourth Movement. This involvement has since been interpreted as the major incentive for the creation of a Propaganda Bureau in the revised party structure.

In fact, however, the bureau's opening was delayed, and its attention diverted from whatever populist purpose it may have been designed to serve, by the demands of constitutional politics. The delay in the actual establishment of the Propaganda Bureau within the national headquarters in Shanghai was due to the role in constitutional politics which propaganda was expected to perform. Party cadres and parliamentarians departed for Guangzhou shortly after the November 1920 reorganization. Fund-raising propaganda abroad was covered quite adequately by other bureaux in Shanghai; constitutionally oriented propaganda was more appropriate to party offices in Guangzhou.

A distinct propaganda structure was indeed set up in Guangzhou once parliamentarians and others of the senior party cadre took up residence. The province of Guangdong presented a blank sheet to proponents of a new formal party structure when they descended upon it in November and December 1920. Little time was wasted in establishing a Special Guangdong Office of Party Centre (benbu dao yue teshe banshichu) on 3 January 1921. The Special Office was heavily weighted in favour of propaganda activities, being designed, in Sun's words, to operate as "the general headquarters for the marshalling of propaganda." It was to disseminate ideological propaganda to complement the concrete propaganda of successfully administering the province. The staff ratio of its four departments reflected this emphasis upon propaganda, for thirty-eight of its total complement of eighty-four staff members were employed in the Propaganda Division of the Special Office.

Within the province of Guangdong, propaganda emanating from the Special Office was geared to the party's goal of achieving reform within a republican setting. The population of the province was to be educated towards the limited goal of qualifying for participation in local elections.
The stated purpose of its propaganda hinted at the primary function of the office, which was to legitimize the power exercised by Sun through the reconstituted Extraordinary Parliament. Publications issued by the office were thus limited to didactic explications of the Five Power Constitution and Three Principles of the People proposed by Sun Yatsen.

The appointment of senior staff to the Propaganda Division of the Special Office confirmed the party's intention of framing its propaganda activities within a context of constitutional politicking. Deng Jiyan, only recently returned from Beijing where he had been conducting negotiations with the Beijing government on Sun's behalf, was appointed Director of the Propaganda Division. Deng shared with his deputy in the Division, Wang Hongtu, and with the Chief Officer of the Special Office, Zhang Ji, the distinction of having served as elected delegate to the Extraordinary Parliament of 1917.

The activities of the thirty-eight propagandists were not confined to the province of Guangdong alone, as the office came to serve as propaganda co-ordination centre for the party at the national level. The proposed Propaganda Bureau of Shanghai Party Centre was thus rendered all but redundant. Nine of the office's propagandists were eventually despatched to Guangxi, three to Hubei, and one to Hunan. Even Shanghai itself was favoured with an appointment by the Guangzhou office, the veteran Shanghai publicist Ye Chucang being honoured with the title of Shanghai Propagandist.

The shape assumed by propaganda was ultimately subject to other considerations, however, for military rather than political developments were setting the pace. The Special Office had continued to operate throughout 1921, its former Chief Officer, Zhang Ji, being replaced by another parliamentarian, Tian Tong, in October. The life of the Special Office was then cut short by concurrent events on the field of battle. At Sun's bidding, Chen Jiongming had routed Lu Rongting from the neighbouring province of Guangxi in July of 1921, after which Sun proceeded to Guilin to establish an advance headquarters for a proposed military expedition into southern Hunan in December. Sun's polemicists accompanied him to Guilin where a Propaganda Office was set up within the advance headquarters on 16 January 1922. Tian Tong was transferred from the Special Office to take command of
the new Propaganda Office, whereupon plans for the ongoing activities of the Guangzhou bureau fell into abeyance.\textsuperscript{46}

Authority over the operations of the Guilin Propaganda Office was vested in Sun himself, who defined its function as consisting of the "propagation of the Three Principles of the People and Outlines for National Reconstruction both to the troops and to the people."\textsuperscript{47} It was in fact the troops who formed the subject of, and audience for, Sun's most memorable speech over the period of his stay in Guilin, the oft-reprinted "Spiritual Education of Soldiers" (junren jinggokan jiaoyu).\textsuperscript{48} A preoccupation with military affairs then came to determine both the location and the priorities of party propaganda, at the expense of its initial goal of encouraging popular participation in local republican politics.

The pendulum of propaganda did nevertheless continue to swing between the poles of constitutional and military affairs. The site of constitutionally oriented propaganda switched to Shanghai once the propaganda structure in the south began to focus more on military matters. Zhang Ji left Guangzhou for Shanghai in September or October of 1921, to assume his seat as inaugural head of the party's central Propaganda Bureau.\textsuperscript{49} There is a hint in a second role assigned to Zhang Ji of the function which the Propaganda Bureau was expected to perform. On 4 October, he was appointed head of the Beijing party branch, a post he was curiously expected to hold concurrently with that of head of the Propaganda Bureau, situated in Shanghai.\textsuperscript{50} The purpose appears to have been to attune the publicity machinery of Shanghai to the demands of the Beijing party organization, in order to make a concerted effort to contest the constitutional legitimacy of the Beijing government. The Shanghai Party Centre had long been concerned with propaganda among expatriate Chinese communities for the purpose of financing military campaigns. If the new Propaganda Bureau were to direct propaganda to the local market, it should then be in the complementary form of servicing party investments in the electoral and parliamentary process.

With Zhang Ji's return to Shanghai, the Party Centre began to assert its autonomy over the Guangzhou and Guangxi party apparatus in the selection of propaganda personnel. Three propagandists had been appointed by February 1922, by which time plans were afoot to create a Propaganda Committee within
the Propaganda Bureau. On 11 April, regulations governing the conduct of the committee were ratified at a joint meeting of Party Centre bureaux, and two days later prospective committee members were notified by mail of their selection.

This selection of personnel gives some indication of the role and scope of the Propaganda Committee. The choice of its twenty-seven members reveals an overriding concern, apparent earlier in Zhang Ji's assumption of posts concurrently in the Shanghai Propaganda Bureau and in the Beijing party organization, to gear the party's Shanghai propaganda machinery to questions of the competing claims to constitutional legitimacy put forward by the Northern and Southern governments. At least fifteen of its number had in fact served as representatives in one or more of the provincial and "national" parliaments constituted since 1913. Two others had held formal office in the Southern administration. It was not their political experience alone which had recommended these seventeen for positions on the committee. Many could also claim a measure of propaganda experience. Almost half their number had shown their hand previously as publicists in newspapers and magazines throughout the country, or had been involved in the propaganda activities of the Guangdong Special Office. A further three committee members were drawn from among the staff of the Shanghai Republican Daily.

The range of the committee's contacts with newspaper circles was not confined to Shanghai and Guangzhou alone. Hang Xinzhai had founded newspapers in Beijing and in his native Zhejiang before joining the committee, and following his appointment contributed to the Beijing National Currents (Guofeng ribao). Tan Zhen had managed a daily paper in Changsha, Hunan, Wang Leping had worked as a journalist in Shandong, and Guan Peng was to establish The Democrat in Anhui Province shortly after his selection. The nature of propaganda orchestrated by the committee was most palpably revealed in the arrest of Guan Peng's brother, Guan Shudong, for his part in The Democrat's relentless criticism of the Cao Kun government in Beijing. The career profiles of committee members thus reflect a discernable pattern of propaganda activity: the committee renewed contacts with established publications throughout the country, and created new publicity organs where required, in order to launch attacks upon the "unconstitutional" Beijing government and hence promote the parliamentary aspirations of Guomindang.
politicians.

The propaganda of the Shanghai Propaganda Committee and Guangzhou and Guilin propaganda offices was less than helpful in the face of a military insurrection staged by Sun's erstwhile ally, Chen Jiongming, in June of 1922. Chen's rebellion offers an ironic demonstration of the effectiveness of party propaganda on constitutional issues. The motif of "Constitution Protection" had been used after the political break with Beijing in 1917 to justify the expense and suffering entailed in the conquest, consolidation and expansion of Sun's territorial base in the south. By mid-1922, the motif had so penetrated military, political and intellectual circles that it could be turned most effectively against Sun Yatsen himself. The party propaganda organs in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Guilin had in fact established the conditions whereby Sun could be hoisted on the petard of his own propaganda.

When, toward the end of 1921, Sun set out on his last military expedition under the standard of 'Constitution Protection', the flag was already somewhat tattered. Events in North China had contrived to rob the motto of its eloquence and distinctiveness. By mid-1922 it had managed to lose most of its credibility as well. In October and November of 1921, both the Beijing Prime Minister Jin Yunpeng and Wu Peifu found cause to revitalize their own claims to constitutional legitimacy. The politics of 'Constitution Protection' were further complicated when Zhang Zuolin of the Fengtian Clique took issue with Wu Peifu, and declared his support for Sun's alternative proposals after cementing a military alliance with Sun Yatsen in February of 1922. 'Constitution Protection' no longer served to identify the southern from the northern governments, but became an issue within the internecine disputes of the Beijing government.

The most telling blow to the credibility of Guomindang propaganda came in mid-1922, when Chen Jiongming challenged Sun's nominal authority and managed to bring his expeditionary army to an abrupt halt. Loss of identity in the world of publicity was then compounded by loss of face on the field of battle. Sun could earlier afford to ignore rival claims to constitutional legitimacy when ensconced as titular head of a southern government, but he was at something of a disadvantage when his lack of authority lay conspicuously exposed.
Even before his defeat had been conceded, Sun's enemies were spotlighting him in the beam of his own propaganda. Sun Chuanfang, commander-in-chief of one contingent of the victorious Zhili forces, issued a telegram on 15 May 1922 which confidently addressed Sun Yatsen on the latter's own terms. He proposed a restoration of the original constitution along lines similar to the constitutional formula championed by the southern government from the date of its establishment in 1917. Wu Peifu had intimated on the previous day that the interests of the Zhili Clique would not be damaged through such a restoration. The more positive advantages of the policy were apparent in the conclusion drawn in Sun Chuanfang's telegram, that there could now "be no reason for the southern government to continue in existence."61

Before newspaper approval for this proposal had subsided, Sun Chuanfang followed his first telegram with another which extended the logic of the Zhili argument. The presidents of north and south were now called upon to resign. President Xu Shichang was in no position to object and on 31 May vacated his palace in Beijing.62 Sun Yatsen was less inclined to concede defeat. He turned to propaganda at a press conference called on 8 June, in a desperate attempt to entice from his erstwhile ally Chen Jiongming the allegiance which his arms could not compel. The appeal fell upon deaf ears. A subordinate of Chen Jiongming, Ye Ju, then placed Sun and his retinue under siege before presenting him with a 'request', on 15 June, to follow the example of President Xu Shichang in Beijing and resign from office. His ultimatum was couched in terms of the necessity to attempt national reunification through a return to constitutional legitimacy.63 Ye Ju's telegram thus played upon those popular sympathies which had continued to find expression in public telegrams and declarations since the publication of Sun Chuanfang's pledge some months before, and which had been nurtured by Sun Yatsen's own publicity on 'Constitution Protection' over the preceding five years. Sun's refusal to comply was then treated as a laudable pretext for the launching of an attack upon his headquarters on 16 June. Sun Yatsen was thus caught on the wrong foot when he stepped onto the Shanghai docks after a furtive escape from Guangzhou in August of 1922. Propaganda on constitutional issues designed to legitimize his military activities had backfired.
The New Mass Stratagem: Positive and Negative Implications for Party Parliamentarians

Sun's misfortune made him more receptive to advice about exchanging his customary dependence upon militarists and career politicians for reliance upon a truly popular revolutionary movement. Some months before Chen Jiongming had turned against him, at a time when Sun was still confident of attaining power through a national military expedition, he had rejected advice to this effect from the Comintern agent Sneevliet (Maring). After Chen's rebellion, Sun was more inclined to take note of Sneevliet's words. Sun was, of course, sufficiently destitute to feel a genuine respect for the techniques which, he believed, had won for Lenin the success which had so long eluded himself. Sneevliet's advice concerning mass propaganda was, nonetheless, made the more convincing by the offers of Soviet material assistance which accompanied them. Offers of Soviet material assistance appeared to be conditional in turn upon Sun's displaying an interest in co-operating with Sneevliet's waif, the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP was itself committed to tactics of mass propaganda and subsequently assigned itself the responsibility for ensuring that Sun and the Guomindang did not waver from the true path. Sun was then encouraged to wax eloquent on the virtues of mass propaganda in order to convince his Russian benefactors of his conversion, and to practice what he preached at the prompting of the CCP. The subsequent preaching and practice of mass propaganda thus point as clearly to Sun's need for military and financial assistance as to any change of heart.

Events over the following months seemed to presage a fundamental shift in the party's propaganda stratagem, from involvement in constitutional politics to an attempt at popular 'awakening'. The interests of party parliamentarians appeared to be placed at risk, while the status of non-parliamentary cadres seemed poised to rise in proportion to their advocacy of a mass propaganda program. For the immediate present, however, the reverse was the case. The wider context of discussions on the new mass propaganda policy excited Guomindang parliamentarians and alienated its own mass propaganda advocates. Dai Jitao, for example, the party's foremost proponent of the mass propaganda stratagem, declined to take an active part in those reorganizations which were designed to implement this very stratagem. He felt it an affront
49.

that the shift to mass propaganda should have been catalyzed by "outside forces" rather than by his own tireless advocacy. The policy of admitting members of the Chinese Communist Party into the Guomindang, which was mooted in conjunction with this new emphasis upon mass propaganda, met with initial approval from other senior party personnel for reasons which had very little to do with the mass movement. Party politicians who endorsed the policy of admission were moved less by concern for mass propaganda than by a proprietary interest in parliamentary politics.

Recognition of the major interest group comprising the Guomindang leadership in August and September 1922 explains in part the early general acquiescence in the admission of members of the CCP. On 4 September, a body of fifty-three Guomindang members, under the informal leadership of Zhang Ji, gathered in Shanghai to discuss the new turn in party affairs. One result of their deliberations was a vote of "unanimous approval" for a party reorganization along the lines proposed by Sun Yat-sen. The presence of CCP members among these fifty-three indicated that Sun's proposals included acknowledgment of the admission of Communists into the party. The largest group of party members attending this Reorganization Conference may be said to have been politicians, whose experience and aspirations qualified them for participation in representative politics and government administration. At least twenty-five of the forty-six delegates whose affiliations could be identified had at some time held seats in one of the chambers of national parliament, either in Beijing, Guangzhou, or both. A further three had been very closely associated with the constitutional aspects of party activity over the previous five years.

This group merits attention by virtue of its size alone. Had it opposed the parcel of new policies presented for discussion at the conference, it would not simply have tarnished the appearance of unanimity, but would have overwhelmed the combined vote of all other delegates. Its significance, however, goes beyond the bounds of size. The group's indirect support for a style of political activity potentially antagonistic to its own was to have ramifications for party cohesion and party policy long after the closure of the conference. In ensuing years, some of the most outspoken critics of Communist activity within the Guomindang were to be drawn from its ranks. Their place
The Reorganization Conference did not win the undivided attention of Guomindang parliamentarians in the autumn of 1922. A committee of nine party members charged with drafting a platform for the reorganization lost almost half its number to the political charms of Beijing shortly after its creation. "Commitments" in Beijing compelled the parliamentarians Ding Weifen, Lu Zhiyi, Tan Zhen and Tian Tong to depart for the capital\(^2\). There they were joined by Zou Lu, Xie Chi and others in pressing the claims of party parliamentarians for full representation in a reconvened national parliament\(^3\). The priorities of these four committee members reflected the interests of the largest group in attendance at the party Reorganization Conference. They took their seats in the midst of an ongoing controversy concerning the reconvening of parliament. Parliamentary factions in the national capital had divided into pressure groups delineated by the different circumstances under which their members had won office, and the hundred or so parliamentarians of the Guangzhou 'Constitution Protecting' parliament who accompanied Sun to Shanghai in mid-1922 were represented in the debate by, among others, Zou Lu and Xie Chi. They argued against recognition of the 1917 Parliament, which had been elected after the onset of their campaign to protect the constitution\(^4\). Consideration of their career prospects in this wider field appears to have influenced the attitude of parliamentarians toward party reorganization and admission of Communists into the Guomindang.

In the early phases of the reorganization, the interests of Guomindang parliamentarians and of the CCP membership happened to merge in the promotion of an entente between Sun and Wu Peifu. As the new parliament was to be convened under the aegis of Wu Peifu, parliamentarians involved in the reorganization saw in the prospect of rapprochement between Sun and Wu the possibility of advancing their claims to representation. The Communists' public endorsement of the entente was very highly qualified, but in terms which Guomindang parliamentarians could appreciate. It was conditional upon Wu's showing sufficient respect for the Guomindang argument that "a genuine restoration of the national parliament is a necessary prerequisite for political reunification." Though the author of this particular article displayed less hope than Zhang Ji that Wu Peifu would in fact abide by this condition,
he was nevertheless articulating the very concern which motivated Zhang Ji and his associates to seek accommodation with Wu. 75

The interests of Guomindang parliamentarians and of the CCP also merged on the issue of parliamentary representation itself. In the months prior to the Reorganization Conference, the CCP had declared its intention to operate through the established parliamentary system in pursuit of its goal of proletarian revolution. At its Second National Congress in July 1922, the CCP had decided to seek some form of representation in parliament. Its decision was prompted by a declaration of the Third International, which stated that working through legally constituted assemblies was justified if by doing so the goal of revolution could be attained. To this end, the CCP decided to organize sympathetic members of parliament into a "democratic alliance," by which to press its claims and disseminate its propaganda. 76

Through its policy of operating within the parliamentary system, the CCP appears to have earned the respect of the parliamentary wing of the Guomindang. The most prominent member of the CCP in North China, Li Dazhao, personified the policy most clearly and was in return held in the highest regard. As early as June 1922, Li had made public his approval of a proposed government of "able men." 77 Wu Peifu's political associates were, at the same time, in the process of selecting four persons previously connected with the Guomindang for inclusion in a new interim cabinet. 78 In late July and August, two other sympathisers were given posts in the cabinet. 79 By September, Xu Qian had also been offered a place in the "able men" cabinet as a token of Wu's sincerity in seeking rapprochement with Sun. 80 Li Dazhao's early remarks were open to interpretation at the time of the Reorganization Conference as part of the stage setting which was thought to hold such promise for party politicians. Once Sun had put forward, for his own reasons, the proposition that individual Communists be admitted into the Guomindang, Li Dazhao was an obvious choice for induction by Guomindang parliamentarians. Li had not abandoned his friendship with the prominent representative Sun Hongyi, and had retained his long association with Zhang Ji, who was ultimately to sponsor him as the first member of the CCP to gain entry into the Guomindang. 81
In the light of Zhang Ji's subsequent attempts to rid the Guomindang of Communist influence, his initial support for their admission has been thought "ironic." In the context of negotiations to restore the privileges of party parliamentarians, however, his attitude was by no means inexplicable. The motives of parliamentarians in extending a welcoming hand to members of the CCP were no different from those which persuaded them to withdraw that hand shortly afterwards. Their approval, such as it was, was conditional upon continuing support for their claims on the part of the CCP. In the event, the Communists proved fickle partners.

Even as Li Dazhao's membership was being endorsed, he was obliged, under pressure from his Communist colleagues, to withdraw his support for the "able men" cabinet. The CCP as a whole was becoming increasingly sceptical of Wu Peifu. In October, Wu's bloody suppression of a miners' strike in Tangshan attracted vitriolic criticism from the CCP, which by the end of 1922 was in the process of sealing off those channels to Wu Peifu and the Beijing political elites which had seemed to offer such promise to Guomindang politicians.

Of perhaps even greater concern to Guomindang parliamentarians than the CCP's failure to support their claims was its increasingly apparent inclination to launch public attacks upon them. The Comintern agent Sneevliet marked out the targets for these attacks in November 1922, in an article critical of the Guomindang's emphasis upon purely political and military solutions to the national crisis. The promotion of policies through established political institutions was not, to his mind, an adequate formula for success. Zhang Guotao resumed the assault in a December issue of the CCP weekly periodical, Guide (Xiangdao). By December, the parliamentarians elected in 1917 had all but eliminated Guomindang representatives from contention in the battle for control of parliament. Zhang then poured salt upon their wounds by advocating de facto recognition of the "1917" elements. Denying them recognition, he argued, robbed the revolutionaries of a tangible enemy. They might be ignored if they did not wield power, "but before the successful completion of the revolution, we must acknowledge the existence of warlords and bureaucrats." Six weeks later, Chen Duxiu joined the fray. In keeping with the decision of the second CCP congress, he refrained from attacking
representative assemblies per se: he objected specifically, however, to the professional character of representatives under the existing parliamentary system. Guomindang claimants were not excluded from his criticism. Within the Chinese parliamentary system, he asserted, "of all political organizations there is not one which is not comprised of classless, displaced persons who have gathered together purely for the pursuit of personal advantage." Chen's remedy envisaged a completely new panel of representatives, appointed through selection procedures more responsive to social demands.

Sneevliet, appropriately, rounded off the attack in July of 1923 by once again berating Sun's dependence upon "shiftless politicians and parliamentarians." In each instance, the parliamentarians' Communist critics put forward mass propaganda as an alternative to constitutional means. The composite parcel of mass propaganda and of Communist admission into the Guomindang was rapidly losing its appeal for parliamentarians.

To complicate matters, Sun Yatsen appeared to agree with the Communists. The unhappy outcome of his party's constitutional manoeuvres in the latter half of 1922 brought Sun into alignment with the view of Sneevliet and the CCP by January of the following year. His premises did not match those of the Communists. He was not, at this stage, particularly concerned about the moral character of party politicians, nor convinced of the absolute irrelevance of parliamentary politics. It was the practical obstacles placed along the path of the constitutional route to power that led Sun to concur with the Communists' conclusions. In the four months which had elapsed since the convening of the Reorganization Conference his hopes of a political settlement had yielded to despair.

In sharing the Communists' conclusions Sun also endorsed the remedy which they prescribed, the blockage along the parliamentary route to power giving him good cause to adopt a new mass propaganda policy. Sun offered a glimpse of this motive for turning to mass propaganda in a speech delivered to mark the launching of the reorganized Guomindang in January, 1923. Referring to involvement in national and local assemblies, he remarked that "Political activity is unreliable... only party activity promises certain returns." He outlined a restructuring of general priorities, with a change of emphasis from the constitutional issues which occupied the "many persons
in Beijing" to emphasis upon party work as such. He defined party activity as propaganda. Propaganda he defined in turn as "assaulting the heart ... in order to entice the hearts of China's four hundred million people into favouring our party."91 Propaganda on a mass scale was thus posited as an alternative to constitutional channels. Although Sun failed to specify how popular approval was to be translated into institutionalized political power, the general drift of his argument was inescapable: it was not to be through the pursuit of seats in existing parliamentary institutions.

The Ultimate Vindication of Party Parliamentarians

Whether by default or by design, the year 1923 yielded little concrete evidence of serious commitment to the purported goal of preferring mass propaganda to parliamentary activity. Central party institutions were to remain primarily concerned with parliamentary politics, at the expense of mass activism. As if to compensate for their political misfortunes, in January 1923 Sun transferred a considerable measure of authority within the reconstituted Shanghai Party Centre to parliamentarians.92 A new panel of twenty-one advisers attached to Party Centre included fifteen members who might, in better times, have claimed seats in the national parliament.93 Parliamentarians were less well represented within the working bureaux as such, although one of their number was appointed to the influential post of Deputy Head of the Propaganda Bureau.94 Both advisers and senior bureaux officers were entitled to sit on the Central Cadre Council, the highest policy-formulating body of the party under the revised party constitution, while parliamentarians appear to have made up an absolute majority on the Council.95

By ensuring that his parliamentary allies would not simply disappear, Sun Yatsen also ensured the continuation of constitutional issues which he had avowed to have cast aside. The entrenched position of parliamentarians within Party Centre effectively guaranteed that as constitutional issues arose, they would continue to be considered at the highest level. At its first session on 12 February 1923 the Central Cadre Council decided to expand party activity in Beijing, and discussed problems of organization among parliamentarians in the capital.96 At its second meeting on 26 March, the Council's preoccupation with political activity in Beijing took the form of
discussing propaganda work in North China. Its fourth meeting was called on 27 June, shortly after President Li Yuanhong had been dismissed and in the midst of attempts by Cao Kun to seek the presidency for himself.

After attending the third Council meeting in May, the party adviser Sun Hongyi began to rally his own parliamentary faction around the slogan of 'Peaceful Reunification' to justify his attempt to gain representation under Cao's auspices. Sun Yat-sen himself then made a contribution to the constitutional debate. At the fourth session, the Council's attention was directed to a telegram from Sun Yat-sen in which he called for the immediate recall of all affiliated members of parliament. The party leader also telegraphed "Little Sun" personally, commanding his allegiance.

For the remainder of the year, the deliberations of the Central Cadre Council centred upon the constitutional issues thrown up by Cao's manipulation of parliament in quest of the presidency. At its fifth session on 7 July, the Council decided to press Sun Yat-sen for a definitive statement in reply to Sun Hongyi's publicity concerning an alleged entente between Sun Yat-sen and Cao Kun. Four days later, the problem was again pursued at a hastily convened provisional meeting. Li Yuanhong's counter-stratagem of establishing an alternative national parliament in Shanghai brought the issue closer to home in August and September. In its four sessions during this latter period, the Council reiterated its opposition to Cao Kun, reaffirmed its decision to recall all parliamentarians from Beijing, and accepted Sun's instruction to dissociate the party from Li Yuanhong's machinations in Shanghai.

The Council deliberated on constitutional questions to the exclusion of issues of perhaps greater mass propaganda value. It overlooked events of national significance which happened to fall outside the parliamentary arena. In mid-1923, for example, a bloody incident in Changsha incited popular indignation against its Japanese perpetrators. Other political organizations in Beijing and Shanghai recognized the propaganda value of the incident, and gave it appropriate publicity: not so the Guomindang. The sights of Shanghai Party Centre were set elsewhere.

Shanghai Party Centre committed its limited resources to the implementation of the constitutionally oriented decisions of the Council. In September,
it undertook to host the return of all Guomindang parliamentarians from Beijing, on the pretext of participating in a Constitutional Conference. In October, it created a Cautionary Committee which was charged with punishing parliamentarians who succumbed to the lures of Cao Kun. The Propaganda Bureau of Party Centre also tried to keep the constitutional issues alive. In November its Deputy Head, the parliamentarian Mao Zuquan, summoned some 150 parliamentarians temporarily resident in Shanghai to join the Reconstruction Discussion Society. With a fellow parliamentarian and former party propaganda officer, Chen Baixu, Mao also drafted a general platform for the Society. Provision was made within the Society for a propaganda section, on the staff of which were Zhang Ji and Chen Baixu. The creation of such informal propaganda offices for the benefit of parliamentarians was not without precedent. Mao's organization was in fact no more than a reconstituted version of a parliamentary liaison office established by Guomindang members in Beijing in the final months of 1922. In December of that year, Zhang Ji had been assigned to assist in the propaganda activities of the Beijing liaison office. Through the good graces of their colleague within the Propaganda Bureau, Mao Zuquan, parliamentarians then continued to exert influence over party propaganda throughout 1923.

Conflict was inherent in the attempt to juggle the two modes of propaganda. There was, on the one hand, tension within the constitutional orientation of Party Centre: its propaganda organs were diverted to take issue with Sun Hongyi's capitulationist faction. On the other, public wrangling also emerged over the contrast between Party Centre's designated role in mass propaganda and its actual participation in parliamentary politics.

It was his Communist allies, rather than Sun himself, who took pains to point out the contrast. From the sanctuary of their own propaganda organs, they fired volleys against particularly wayward parliamentarians. It was, perhaps predictably, Sneevliet who presented the Communist case against Guomindang practice with the greatest precision. In May 1923, he returned to the theme which had become his signature tune: only through mass propaganda could the Guomindang aspire to leadership of the national revolution. The attention of the party was focused too narrowly upon "the secret schemes of politicians and parliamentarians." It should be re-focused,
he maintained, on a "forceful and systematic propaganda venture." The parliamentarians were indeed undertaking propaganda, but it was neither forceful nor systematic. It was simply a function of their attempts to wield parliamentary authority, and for the CCP that was not sufficient.

Although he may not have admitted so to Sneevliet, Sun was perhaps not quite so perturbed. He was concerned less with ethics of popular revolution than with the contingencies of power. The conciliatory political route which came in for such derisive comment in 1923 had been conceived at the time in terms of existing parliamentary institutions. Sun generalized from the specific difficulties encountered by his parliamentary associates in the last months of 1922, to make bold statements about the inadequacy of strictly political activity as a whole. Events were to demonstrate that Sun's generalization was not entirely valid.

Sun's attitude toward the constitutional route to power had become increasingly caustic over the course of the year 1923. When he spoke of dumping the parliamentary wing in January, he had at least graced the contemporary political process with a mention, even if only to condemn it. At that time, he had envisaged three possible routes to power: by way of parliament, by armed force and by mass propaganda. The parliamentary route had fared rather poorly. Some twelve months later, it suffered the indignity of being ignored entirely. In December, Sun stipulated that there were in fact two methods for realising the party's goals, armed force and propaganda. His failure to mention the parliamentary route confirmed its low place in his esteem.

Yet in 1924, Sun was reminded that there was indeed a third, constitutional, route to power. The activities of Party Centre in 1923 had contrasted starkly with Sun's pronouncements of January; in 1924, Sun reserved for himself the privilege of contradicting these words of December 1923. The final reorganization conducted under Sun's leadership, which was ratified by the First Party Congress in January 1924, had given some substance to proposals for redirecting the party from its customary reliance upon militarists and politicians, to a mass base among the workers and peasants of Guangdong. Even then, Sun had not limited his strategic options. Sustained activity on the part of party politicians had preserved the party's stake in the political gamesmanship played in Beijing. In November 1924, Sun was presented
with an opportunity to participate in a 'Central Revolution' in the national capital. For all his rhetoric on the relative merits of grass-roots propaganda and elitist political revolution, Sun was now confronted with a purely tactical choice. The perceived difference between a coup engineered from above and a mass movement incited from below was one of expediency. Sun decided to embark on his Northern Visit (beishang) without hesitation and the lights were seen to shine once again along the constitutional path to Beijing.

This apparent slighting of mass propaganda in favour of more conventional political tactics was not without immediate precedent. In September 1924, Sun had diverted the resources of party and state to sustain an expansionist military campaign. On 1 September, a local war of national import had broken out in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Sun saw an opportunity to damage Wu Peifu through a tripartite alliance with the military governor of Zhejiang, Lu Yongxiang and the Fengtian militarist Zhang Zuolin. On 5 September, he announced that his troops were compelled to take up arms against Wu Peifu. The pretext for mobilization was as familiar as Sun's military behaviour itself: Sun pointed out that Wu's Zhili associate, Cao Kun, had undermined the Republican constitution through the bribery of parliamentary representatives. His crime was having placed obstacles along the political route to power.

In October and November 1924, it appeared that these obstacles were being removed. Under the leadership of Feng Yuxiang, a number of commanders within the Zhili ranks staged a coup against their commander-in-chief Wu Peifu in October. The avowed enemy of Sun and loyal party parliamentarians, President Cao Kun, was forced to resign from office on 2 November. Once this political impasse was overcome, the traffic began to flow again. Even before Cao Kun's resignation Sun had announced his plans to undertake a Northern Visit and partake in negotiations preliminary to establishing a new national government in Beijing. The negotiations which ensued assumed that the former constitution was defective in regard to its provisions concerning the houses of parliament. Discussion revolved around the question of an appropriate alternative to the old system of parliamentary representation. The distinction then apparent between a parliamentary system from which his party was excluded, and the constitutional route to power per se, proved Sun's
earlier generalization invalid. He could take the constitutional path without paying deference to the former parliamentary process.

The nexus of interests shared by Sun and Guomindang parliamentarians was to prove as vital in 1924 as it had at the time of the party's founding in 1920. Party parliamentarians paved the way for Sun's return to the national forum, emerging to lead negotiations with the northern militarists. In the first week of November, Zhang Ji, Ding Weifen, Xu Qian, Jiao Yitang, Wang Faqin and Wang Yongbin haggled with Feng Yuxiang and others over the place of Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang in a reconstituted national government. It was through the eyes of seasoned politicians that Sun assessed the significance and likely success of his Northern Visit. He admitted that he had underestimated their political potency over the preceding few years. Their influence was now thought apparent in the success of Feng's coup, which Sun attributed to the effort of "those few comrades who have gone on conducting their business in Beijing with untiring persistence." While he had omitted mention of the political route in his speeches, they had continued to advocate a 'Central Revolution'. Their persistence was rewarded. In acknowledging their achievements, Sun inadvertently acknowledged his own reason for turning to populist politics: he simply "lacked faith in [party politicians'] ability to achieve such good results." It was a case of nothing quite succeeding like success. Once "good results" had become evident, Sun dropped everything and headed for Beijing.

Sun's volte-face did not meet with unanimous approval within the party. He was particularly adept at overlooking, or glossing over, conflicting tendencies in his own behaviour. These different tendencies were personified within the party, however, by distinct interest groups. It was considerably easier to explain away ideas than to resolve a conflict of interests. Opposition to the Northern Visit was voiced most strongly by the Communist element within the party. Having sensed a convergence of interests, the CCP was critical of Sun Yatsen, but more scathing of the party's parliamentary wing. The military expedition which had preceded the Northern Visit had itself attracted criticism, on the grounds that it represented a departure from the mass propaganda and mass organization policies pursued by the CCP in Guangdong. Negotiations between the Guomindang and northern militarists were at first also dismissed as doomed, for want of a mass propaganda
program. These military and political exercises of Sun Yatsen were thought to compromise the stance adopted in party propaganda of concerted opposition to militarists and imperialists.\(^{123}\)

Such fears of compromise were heightened by the return to prominence of the party's parliamentary wing. Over the previous year, the CCP had been conducting a vitriolic campaign against party politicians on the issue of their inclination to compromise party principles. The Northern Visit appeared to confirm the Communists' suspicions. Party politicians were now ridiculed for promoting negotiations between Sun, Feng Yuxiang and Duan Qirui. For his part in the negotiations, Xu Qian was said to be "propagandizing on behalf of the imperialists"; for their part, politicians of the Society for the Promotion of Lawful Government (fazhi xiejin hui) were denigrated as lackeys of the militarists and imperialists.\(^{124}\) Zhang Ji and "others" shared in the opprobrium for having promoted the Northern Visit for personal gain. For party politicians, the party's return to Beijing was depicted as a return to lucrative government office.\(^{125}\) The Communists saw Sun's acceptance of Feng's invitation as a reversion to a model of revolution which they had thought abandoned. In the resurrection of this type of political activity, they correctly perceived the interests of party politicians to be diametrically opposed to their own.

Sun Yatsen approached this problem of internal dissension through a deft adaptation of rhetoric. His experience in 1922 and 1923 appears to have impressed upon him the value of talking about mass propaganda. In 1922, he had succeeded in winning the assistance of Sneevliet and the CCP while waxing eloquent on this very subject, but doing very little in the way of practising it. It was concern for the preservation of party unity which prompted him to do likewise in the last months of 1924.\(^{126}\) A fortnight after despatching his telegrams of acceptance to Feng Yuxiang and Duan Qirui, Sun declared himself innocent of plotting to seize power in Beijing. To those who thought this the object of his visit, he replied that "in fact I have not even considered seizing ... political power."\(^{127}\) The purpose of his Northern Visit, he insisted, was to "propagate principles" and to "expand party activity."\(^{128}\) In fact, however, it was negotiations over the form and diplomatic status of a new political structure in Beijing that set the pace for Sun's
Northern Visit.\textsuperscript{129} Similarly, his talk of mass propaganda served a purpose quite distinct from the role of mass propaganda as such. His artful use of the term served a propaganda purpose in itself: it was to convince his Communist critics of the consistency of his intentions.

Faced with a situation over which they could now exert little influence, the Communists seized upon Sun's words as a pretext for pardoning his Northern Visit. "To undertake revolutionary work - propaganda and organization - throughout the whole country is something we have long proposed to Sun Yatsen," wrote former propaganda chief, Cai Hesen. Accepting that Sun's departure from Guangdong was prompted by a perceived need for propaganda and mass organization, the CCP reversed its hostile attitude into an expression of warm approval of the Northern Visit.\textsuperscript{130} Sun's rhetorical twist was neither the only nor the greatest factor influencing the change of attitude within the CCP. The Communists had themselves been divided on the issue of the Northern Visit, and, according to Zhang Guotao, the question was ultimately resolved in Sun's favour by the intervention of the Soviet Union. The knowledge that their Russian mentors approved of Sun's plans, for reasons of their own, effected a swift change of heart within the CCP.\textsuperscript{131} Sun's assertion of the propaganda value of his journey served the secondary purpose of providing an outlet for the Communists to save face. The appearance of consistency was no less important to the CCP than to Sun himself.

It would be incorrect to imply that Sun's words on the propaganda function of his Northern Visit were entirely without substance. Communist Party members were gratified to note that he did not swerve from the basic tenets of anti-militarism and anti-imperialism in the course of his journey.\textsuperscript{132} The formal declaration heralding Sun's departure from Guangdong reiterated the party's position on these issues.\textsuperscript{133} Propagandists were appointed to explain the significance of the declaration to the citizens of North China; only a small fraction of these propaganda personnel were parliamentarians who might have been tempted to sacrifice the purity of the propaganda message for political gain.\textsuperscript{134} Indeed, so uncompromising were Sun's attacks upon the Unequal Treaties, which formed the legal foundation for extraterritorial privileges, that they prompted veiled threats from the imperialist powers.\textsuperscript{135}
The function of mass propaganda on the Northern Visit nevertheless differed significantly from that of the mass propaganda depicted in 1923 as wholly distinct from the parliamentary route to power. The mass propaganda of the Northern Visit was but a vehicle for pursuing this political path. Party propaganda was diverted to the specific task of drumming up popular support for a change in the structure of political authority in the national capital which would, it was hoped, bring about Sun's aspirations for a successful 'Central Revolution'.

As it differed in function, so did the nature of the propaganda on the Northern Visit contrast with the mass propaganda program outlined in Guangdong. Shanghai newspapers were exhorted to "guide the masses" toward an understanding of the party's position regarding a new political structure. For the limited purposes of establishing an approved National Citizens Conference (guominhuiyi), however, Sun thought it sufficient to define the masses in the context of mass propaganda as those comprising the literate community alone. The rest of the population might be overlooked for the time being, for a National Citizens' Conference would draw its delegates from "various large organizations of educated [people]." The structure of power rendered the illiterate masses superfluous.

Sun's decision to defend his Northern Visit in terms of its mass propaganda function may have owed its inspiration to the advocates of mass activity among his political associates. Indeed the party's achievement in capitalizing on his death, in the course of the Northern Visit, to enrol a great number of recruits, may be taken as tangible evidence of the force of such propaganda in North China. Yet neither Sun's words nor the rapid expansion of the party could conceal his attempt to win an acceptable measure of power in the national capital. Should party parliamentarians have proved suitable allies in this quest, then they might have been accorded the same recognition in 1924 that they had enjoyed at the time of the founding of the national party structure in 1920. The interest in constitutional politics shared by Sun and the parliamentary wing of the party antecedent talk of adopting new propaganda techniques to incite a popular 'awakening', and ultimately managed to redirect such propaganda to its own ends.
Chapter Three

MILITARY POLITICS

Like parliamentarians, militarist armies came in for heavy use by the Guomindang after 1923 despite Sun Yatsen's stated preference for mass propaganda as the ideal tactical option. Total disregard for militarist armies would of course have been unrealistic. The relationship between armies and politicians was clearly silhouetted against the chaotic political background of early Republican China as one of mutual dependence, wherein neither militarists who failed to don the mantle of constitutional republicanism nor politicians who declined to sport with militarists were able to survive for long. The reasons behind the evolution of this relationship are many and complex, but for the Guomindang the consequences were simple enough. As one of many rival bureaucratic factions competing for power within a militarist system, the Guomindang was obliged to consort with local militarists and purchase their loyalties in order to lay any claim to rule. In the process, the party found its military patrons expensive and unreliable. The most humiliating reminder of the basic impotence of the party came with the rebellion by Chen Jiongming in mid-1922, when, to the applause of the tax-paying gentry and merchants of Guangdong, Chen objected to the demands made by Sun to finance the first of his expeditions for national reunification. What the Guomindang needed, as it came in time to appreciate, was an army which would identify with the nation as a whole rather than with a particular province, which owed its loyalty to an organization rather than to an individual, and which was motivated by political principle rather than by greed: in short, a revolutionary party-army. The place of propaganda in attempts to create such a party-army forms the subject of this chapter.

Sun Yatsen and the party-army

The need for a party-army was felt, initially at least, less keenly by Sun Yatsen than by other members of his party. As early as 1920, the young party theorists Dai Jitao and Zhu Zhixin had put forward proposals to this effect, Zhu publishing a seminal work on the organization and training of armies around a nucleus of party doctrine, and Dai suggesting that political
indoctrination be undertaken among the fickle armies upon which the party customarily depended. Yet no structural change within the armed forces flowed from their initiatives. Before the arrival of Soviet representatives, the occasional lecture delivered to a hastily assembled body of troops marked the limits of Sun's commitment to the idea of forging a party-army.

Even the rebellion in 1922 of his erstwhile ally, Chen Jiongming, did not prompt Sun to give serious consideration to the creation of a party-army. Sun's immediate practical reaction to the rebellion was to raise funds abroad to sustain a military campaign in Guangdong, and to plot Chen's downfall with less savoury militarists who were, in time, to rebel in much the same way as Chen had done. Concrete responses aside, when it came to expounding publicly upon long-term policy and strategy, Sun was less inclined to talk of establishing a party-army than to urge the abandonment of military solutions entirely. The concept of a party-army appears to have entered his vocabulary rather late in the day.

The time-honoured strategic question of 水 and 兵, of the relative merits of the pen and the sword, was complicated after Chen's rebellion by the presence of Soviet and Comintern envoys. As noted above, in the latter half of 1922 Sun was keen to establish friendly relations with the USSR and with its Comintern representative, Sneevliet. At the time, in response to an apparently exclusive reliance upon militarists and politicians on Sun's part, Sneevliet and leaders of the CCP had promoted a policy of dependence on workers and peasants in their place. Sun absorbed and reproduced Sneevliet's comments with astonishing ease. Yet the intensity of Sun's publicly avowed conversion to mass propaganda over the following months appeared, on the surface at least, to rule out any continuing involvement in military matters. In Sun's conceptualization of events, though perhaps not in his concrete response to them, propaganda began to assume an almost magical potency. The defeat of Chen Jiongming in January of 1923, for example, was attributed not to the skills of Sun's mercenary allies, but to the wit of propagandists operating from Hong Kong. In the early months of 1923, Sun himself turned to propaganda to promote national disarmament. In January, he issued a Declaration on Peaceful Reunification, and held a reception for Shanghai journalists to enlist their support in the propaganda campaign. “The force of the pen is very great indeed,” Sun informed them. "Simply printing the word,
'disarmament' all over the page will suffice. If we start in Shanghai, and make all citizens of Shanghai understand and promote [disarmament], then we can extend [the campaign] throughout the whole country. Nothing could be easier." Sun promised militarists elsewhere a period of three months grace in which they could lay down their arms. Should they fail to take advantage of his offer, he himself would reluctantly resort to arms.

In urging dissociation from warfare as well as from warlords, Sun seemed to be throwing the baby out with the bath water. The Communists and Sneevliet then found themselves in the curious position of tempering Sun's conspicuous zeal for mass activities. In the first months of the alliance between the Guomindang and CCP, the CCP Secretary-General, Chen Duxiu, and its prolific propagandist Cai Hesen both issued public warnings of the dangers associated with total disarmament as proposed by Sun Yat-sen. Mass activities could not afford the luxury of proceeding unarmed. Sneevliet, too, advised that mass and military activities could and should be undertaken simultaneously. The two were not to be thought incompatible. The Communists had, of course, mistaken Sun's propaganda for his true intentions. For provincial leaders in a divided China, as for more recent national leaders in a divided world, the promotion of disarmament outside their domain complemented the consolidation of military power within it. Propaganda on the subject of disarmament played a leading role in the diplomacy of militarism. Sun, for one, often talked about disarmament, but never found himself in a position to do anything about it.

Whoever they were whom Sun hoped to impress by talking of disarmament, no Soviet representative would count himself among them. In response to comments by such representatives, Sun came in the course of the year 1923 to qualify his earlier remarks about the unrivalled supremacy of mass propaganda in order to make some allowance for the use of arms. In so doing, he was in fact bridging the gap between what he had been saying about mass propaganda but neglecting to do, and doing with his mercenary armies but declining to say. Sun's professed understanding of the Russian revolution and civil war was a touchstone of his attitude toward the effectiveness of mass propaganda and military activities respectively. In January, the Bolsheviks were said to have defeated their well-armed opponents through propaganda alone. Sun's comrades were urged to convert the Chinese masses in like manner. By October, after the Soviet advisor Mikhail Borodin had arrived in Guangdong to reiterate Sneevliet's advice on
merging arms and propaganda, Sun's perception of events in Russia had changed quite markedly. The achievements of the Bolsheviks were now attributed to the quality and discipline of their armed forces. By extension, Guomindang propaganda efforts were henceforth to be concentrated not upon the masses, but upon the troops stationed in Guangdong. In November, Sun publicly acknowledged Borodin's role in further clarifying his understanding of the key to the Russians' success. The party and army of the Russian Communists came to be apportioned an equal share of credit for that country's achievements. If there was a lesson to be drawn for the Guomindang, it was that the party and army should march in step, through the creation of a party-army.

When Soviet advisers broached the subject of a party-army in conversation, their words happened to convey greater authority, to Sun's ears, than the words of Zhu Zhixin and Dai Jitao of some years previously. As Bolsheviks, they seemed tangible proof of the effectiveness of such a force; as Soviet emissaries, they brought promises of generous assistance for its creation. Sun's appreciation of the Red Army's role in consolidating the Soviet state was, as already noted, reflected in the increasing emphasis placed upon armed force in his speeches over the course of the year 1923. The importance of the second consideration, of Russian material assistance, was apparent in the confinement of institutional initiatives in his lifetime to the one organ which the Russian chose to fund, the Army Officer School at Huangpu (Whampoa). Henceforth Huangpu Academy

Yet Sun knew full well that the creation of a reliable and viable party-army would require much more than the establishment of a single party military academy. It has been reported in major recent studies of the Huangpu Academy that in January, 1924, Sun presented to the First Congress of the Guomindang a motion that the party establish its own military academy. While this may be so (I have been unable to find any first hand corroboration), it is beyond dispute that on the penultimate day of the Congress Sun introduced, through Dai Jitao, an unscheduled motion to the effect that existing militarist armies should be converted into a revolutionary army by means of a party propaganda program. Something had to be done with those armies which stood to gain little from the establishment of the Huangpu Academy.
Sun Yatsen was not blind to the shortcomings of these allied armies. While the Huangpu Academy was still in the early stages of planning, he berated allied commanders for taking a despotic hold upon regions under their control. In January 1924, and again at the opening of the Academy five months later, he was equally reluctant to concede that any one of the armies in their present form was worthy of the title "revolutionary army". He understood that change was required at all levels within the armed forces: at the top, the structure of command needed to be reformed in order to eradicate local despotism, and at the bottom, the rank and file should undergo several months of intensive political indoctrination and training.

Sun came to attach great importance to propaganda as a substitute for difficult and time-consuming structural reform in the allied armies. He was, over the final year of his life, a man in a hurry, and the creation of a party-army was neither the only nor the most pressing claim upon his attention. In March, 1924, he noted that military and intellectual circles in North China were pressing him to unify the country militarily, and were becoming increasingly impatient at his hesitation. "If after occupying Guangdong for over a year we fail to launch an expedition northward," Sun told an army gathering, "then the people of North China will lose heart and criticise us unmercifully." As if to forestall such complaints, he proposed that a northern expedition set out shortly after the pacification of the East River region, which he thought to be imminent. Over the same month, Sun was also hoping against hope that after listening to a single speech from his lips the allied provincial armies would "turn into revolutionary armies". He was, in effect, proposing to resume his military reunification campaign just where he had been forced to leave off by the rebellion of Chen Jiongming almost two years previously, and using propaganda as a talisman to ward off the threat of another such rebellion. Apart from this desperate commitment to propaganda, little had really changed as far as Sun himself was concerned.

By way of contrast to this desperate faith in the power of propaganda to convert reactionary allies into revolutionary armies, Sun appears, over the last few months of his life, to have begun to harbour doubts about the likely success of attempts to create a party-army at the Huangpu Academy. By mid-October, 1924, his resuscitated Northern Expedition had come to nought,
but he managed nonetheless to arrange a departure from Guangdong by another, more peaceful route, for his Northern Visit. In a valedictory speech to students and staff of the Huangpu Academy on 3 November, he passed up a golden opportunity to insist once again upon the value of establishing a party-army, choosing to speak instead on the need for dedication and obedience among members of a revolutionary party. Sun might have found sufficient cause for selecting such a topic in the squabbles which were beginning to emerge among party and student circles in Guangzhou, but the context of his speech suggests a target closer to the party-army itself. The target was quite possibly Chiang Kaishek, who had recently refused to comply with two orders from Sun despite their being issued repeatedly. The first, to close down the Huangpu Academy and transfer its cadets and equipment to the forward base of Sun's Northern Expedition, brought forth the reply that Sun should abandon his expedition; the second, that Chiang distribute armaments seized while on consignment to the Merchant Militia, met with endless procrastination. Time was to prove Chiang's decision correct in strategic terms, for his control of the cadets and possession of the merchants' arms were to prove the key to quelling a merchant rebellion in mid-October. Chiang's personal vindication was, however, no consolation for Sun, who saw in Chiang's behaviour another example of the habitual disobedience of his military subordinates, and a final reminder of the party's impotence vis-a-vis the military.

Army Training Institutions

Much valuable research has been conducted into the history of the organization, staff and alumni of the Huangpu Academy by scholars wishing to trace the emergence of politically committed armies in modern China. I have no wish to take issue with the basic findings of these various scholars, nor any intention of repeating them here, but plan instead to look at the Huangpu Academy from a perspective which has hitherto been ignored, and which leads one to question its significance in terms of the overall attempt to create a party-army out of whatever scraps of military material happened to be on hand in Guangdong Province in the 1920s: a perspective on the place of the Huangpu Academy alongside that of other military academies in Guangdong Province.
The Huangpu Academy was by no means the only military training institution operating in Guangdong in the period 1924 to 1926. In speaking of others, I refer not to the oft-mentioned branch-schools of the Huangpu Academy but to the various military schools operating independently of it, and to an extent in competition with it. In some respects, these others complemented the Huangpu Academy within the overall stratagem of creating a disciplined and loyal party-army. The aim of the Huangpu Academy was to create a new army where none had been before -- The New Army (xinjun) as Sun Yatsen was inclined to call it; the other academies, dealing as they did with provincial armies already in existence, could help convert "reactionary military forces" into "revolutionary military forces." The Huangpu Academy offered few benefits for the "reactionary" armies which predated the New Army. By the Summer of 1925, the Academy had passed out 1052 cadets, all of whom were assigned to a new Huangpu Corps which was expanded in turn into the Party Army, and was eventually accorded the title of First Army of the NRA. This new unit doubtless benefited from the concentration of relatively disciplined officers within its ranks, yet it was but one of many which made up the array of forces in the Province. In February 1925, the Huangpu Corps totalled no more than 3,500 men; by July, it had grown to about 10,000, or approximately 15% of the estimated allied strength of 65,000 men. (The loss of the rebellious contingents of the Yunnan and Guangxi armies, under Generals Yang Xinmin and Liu Zhenhuan, had pared the allied force down considerably from the number accredited to the Guomindang in 1924.) At this time, the Guangdong Army comprised 30,000 troops, the Hunan Army 12,000, the loyal Yunnan Army 10,000, and the remnants of the second Northern Expeditionary Army some 3,000 men. By the time of launching the third Northern Expedition in mid-1926, the proportion of First Army to allied army soldiers of the NRA was to shrink much further, with the addition of the Fujian Army, Cheng Qian's Sixth Army, Tang Shengzhi's Hunan Army, and the Guangxi Army of Li Zongren. These others were not to be converted into a model party-army simply by virtue of the moral example emanating from Huangpu. The presence of separate military schools which catered for the allied armies offered some scope for converting the old armies into "revolutionary military forces", through structural co-ordination and political indoctrination.

In other respects, the independent academies competed with Huangpu. If we leave aside the question of the relative merit of forging a new army or
of revamping an old one, then it appears that within the limited terms of converting armies already in existence the establishment of the Huangpu Academy did more harm than good. It made inroads into the others' domain, stole their most promising recruits, hogged provincial resources, and in every respect was seen to receive favoured treatment from party authorities.

Cheng Qian's military school is a case in point. In 1923, as Head of the Army Political Department of Sun's Administrative Headquarters (dabenyang junshebu), Cheng recognized the need to train "genuinely revolutionary" officers for the various armies then nominally under the direction of his office. In October, he enlisted a small number of potential officers from a large body of candidates put forward by the Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong and Hunan Armies into a Central Army Instruction Brigade (zhongyang jujun jiaodaotuan). The Brigade was allotted a monthly sum of ¥9,000 from the Provincial Treasury, and was allocated the strategic site of Huangpu, on the Pearl River. In 1924, however, it ran into "numerous difficulties" once Chiang Kaishek's embryonic Academy was granted priority over that particular site. In April, Cheng announced that the Brigade was to be reduced in size to 300 cadets (200 of the "best" of the old Brigade and 100 troops drawn from the four aforementioned armies), was to be renamed the Army Military School (jujun jiangwu xuexiao) and was to be transferred to another site. Cheng's new Army Military School conducted courses in politics, economics and social science, in addition to martial arts, and was staffed by teachers who "followed completely and understood implicitly" the Three Principles of Sun Yatsen. The Army Military School thus held some slight promise of drawing the allied armies a little closer to the ideal of a party-army, which was rather more than the Huangpu Academy planned to do for them.34

Before long the allied armies were to be deprived even of this small token. In April 1924, when Sun decided to extend the former Brigade's monthly allowance to the Army Military School, he gave notice of intention to incorporate the School into the new Huangpu Academy.35 In October, at the height of the Merchant Rebellion, Sun transferred authority over the School to Huangpu's Principal, Chiang Kaishek, in the hope that he might be able to co-ordinate cadets of all military training institutions for the defence of Guangzhou city.36 In November of the same year, the CEC still found it
necessary, nonetheless, to invoke the pretext of internal strife within the Army Military School to justify a final decision to incorporate the School into Chiang's Huangpu Academy. It appears that the Military School opposed this decision, else in the light of Sun's earlier foreknowledge of closure there would have been little reason for the CEC to resort to lame excuses. Certainly if the CEC genuinely wished to remove cadets of the Army Military School from the scene of strife, then the Huangpu Academy was hardly the place to send them.

The amalgamation proceeded forthwith, the site then occupied by the Army Military School being subsequently converted into a Branch School of the Huangpu Academy, and turned over to the use of the Academy's Engineering Corps. Students of the Military School returned to the original site of their Training Brigade at Huangpu, but changed their caps in the process: henceforth they were to be known as the Sixth Team of the Huangpu Academy. Upon graduating with the First Intake of Huangpu cadets, they were assigned not back to their units of origin in the allied armies, but to Chiang Kaishek's new School Army, later the core of the First Army of the NRA. The Huangpu Academy eliminated other military schools in Guangdong without replacing them. Chiang Kaishek's dealings with rival military schools thus did little to convert the allied armies; to the contrary, it embittered some of the party's most loyal commanders, among them being Cheng Qian, who was to become an implacable enemy of Chiang over this critical period.

The absorption of their schools may have been a blow to the allied armies, but it was doubtless of great benefit to Chiang Kaishek in his bid to build an army answerable to himself. Pupils of Cheng Qian's defunct Army Military School, for example, were reckoned more skilful soldiers than their peers from the Huangpu Academy by those who fought alongside them in the Eastern Expeditions of 1925.

Allied armies objected to the favoured treatment accorded to the Huangpu Academy and School Corps. Their resentment came to a head in the Autumn of 1924, when Chiang Kaishek refused to share with them a valuable cargo of modern weapons seized while on consignment to the Guangzhou Merchant Militia. Chiang was cabled by Sun Yatsen, from the forward base of his 1924 Northern Expedition
in Shaoguan, to distribute the weapons equitably among the allied armies, but declined to do so. From late August through to October, Sun urged that the weapons be distributed to his own expeditionary armies, to one section of the Yunnan Army, to the Guangxi Army, and to the Honan Army and the airforce, as well as to two independent military schools, the Yunnan Army Officer School (tianjun ganbu xuexiao) and Cheng Qian's Army Military School. By the end of October, Chiang's defiance had reduced Sun to pleading that only those arms surplus to Huangpu's requirements be sent to Shaoguan. The response of the allied commanders was rather less polite: if the Huangpu contingent was in fact the only 'party-army', and uniquely fit to be entrusted with the weapons, then let it go off and fight all of the party's wars unaided. Its *prima donna* conduct won for the Academy army the title of "Dolls' Army", and earned for Chiang the sobriquet "Dolls' Chief", in the jargon of envious commanders. The staff and cadets of Huangpu, in turn, returned such contempt by refusing to acknowledge or to salute the officers of the allied armies.

Animosity between the curious assortment of armies parading around Guangdong was not a new phenomenon, nor was it all directed toward the Huangpu Academy. In May 1924, quarrelling between the Yunnan, Guangdong and Guangxi Armies was held responsible for their resounding defeat at the hands of Chen Jiongming's numerically inferior army. In September 1925, Xu Chongzhi's section of the Guangdong Army was called to account for squandering resources while other armies were going hungry. Such grievances, and the divided loyalties which they engendered, were in fact symptoms of that malaise which a party-army was supposed to cure. The redirection of such animosity toward the Huangpu Party Army shows that the Academy was, in this respect at least, aggravating the problem.

The response of the various allied armies to the establishment of the Huangpu Academy was to institutionalize their differences in ever increasing numbers of separate military training schools. The Yunnan Army was already operating an Officers School at the time of Huangpu's founding, and less than a week after Huangpu's official opening, the Guangdong Army decided to establish an academy of its own. By February 1925, another academy servicing the Guangxi Army had come to cater for a cadet population roughly comparable to
the concurrent student body at Huangpu, and by April 1925, the Hunan Army was also running an Academy.\textsuperscript{52} As the Huangpu Academy came to service the First Army of the NRA, so the Hunan, Yunnan and Guangdong army-schools came in time to cater for the Second, Third and Fourth Armies respectively. Lest the others be left behind, the Fifth Army was operating an academy by the end of the year, and by February 1926 Cheng Qian had returned to the charge of a military school once his Sixth Army had established an academy of its own.\textsuperscript{53} Some of the smaller allied forces, like the Attack Hubei Army, also set up academies on their own initiative.\textsuperscript{54}

While furnishing a new framework for political indoctrination within the allied forces, the rise of the separate military academies also posed new problems for the co-ordination of political work throughout the NRA. Each academy emulated the Huangpu model, of a client academy attached to a patron army, and hence authority over the content and the relative weight of political courses was divided between the various commanders and their subordinates. During Sun's lifetime, plans for establishing agencies to co-ordinate political training never left the drawing-board.\textsuperscript{55} The Huangpu Academy, for its part, tried to cope by providing in-course political education classes for a small number of officers from the other academies, but reports of high absenteeism cast some doubt upon their efficacy, even for the few who were enrolled.\textsuperscript{56} The creation of such \textit{ad hoc} classes was more a sign of concern over the state of political education generally, than a significant measure of reform in itself.

In the event, little advantage was taken of the opportunity offered by the military training institutes to convert the allied armies into "revolutionary armies". The military hierarchy of the independent academies, like that of the Huangpu Academy, handicapped political workers from the outset by ranking political training low on their list of priorities. In consequence, an examination of graduates of the various military schools conducted in February 1926 showed that the schools \textit{per se} were of little use in cultivating appreciation for the party's goals.\textsuperscript{57} Results from the field were hardly more encouraging. In September and October 1925, propaganda teams for the Second Eastern Expedition had to be drawn from a mixed bag of institutions when it was found that the military schools could not supply trained personnel
in sufficient numbers. The Huangpu Academy fielded eighteen students and the Attack Hubei Army’s military school twenty-five students, for a total of forty-three of the two-hundred and forty-nine propagandists employed on the expedition. Not only were they few in number, but those deployed from the military schools were also short on skill. It was found that propagandists from the Political Training Class of the Political Training Department, and from the Propagandist Training School of the Central Propaganda Bureau, outshone all other Team members on the expedition. The rest, including the cadets from the Huangpu Academy, were considered more of a hindrance than a help.

In about December of 1925, the head of the government’s Political Training Bureau, Chen Gongbo, observed that the political education provided by the army schools as a whole was very poor. Richard Landis has pointed out that at the Huangpu Academy political education declined in importance, relative to military training, over the course of the year 1925. Chen Gongbo is hardly likely to have disagreed, but as the one responsible for political education in all military schools he was also concerned with the sorry state of political education elsewhere. He traced the source of the problem to the party’s failure to centralize and police the propaganda issued by the various armies, to poor selection of personnel, and to the general neglect of political training on the part of school staff. Chiang Kaishek, who was chiefly responsible for the relative decline in political training at the Huangpu Academy, was as concerned about the standard of military training as Chen Gongbo was about that of political training in the allied schools. Each for his own reason then proposed abandoning the client-school system pioneered by the Huangpu Academy, in favour of creating a central academy which would cater for every contingent in the NRA.

In keeping with this advice, on 12 January 1926 the National Government Military Affairs Committee decided to dissolve all existing schools and to reconstitute them in a central institution located on the site of the Huangpu Academy. In deference to the shared emphasis which was to be placed upon military and political education, the new school was named the Central Military and Political Academy (zhongyang junshi zhengzhi xueyuan). The third and final class to pass through Chiang Kaishek’s Huangpu Academy graduated in the same month of January, whereupon other military schools also gave notice of their intention to close once current classes had been completed. The Central
Military and Political Academy opened its doors on 1 March, to welcome as its first intake of students a class which has come to be known as the Fourth Class of the Huangpu Academy, and which was, like the three preceding it, under the personal command of Chiang Kaishek. By the time this Central First Class was to graduate, on 5 October 1926, Chiang had already launched the third and final Northern Expedition, and was on the verge of capturing all three cities which comprised the strategic canal of Wuhan. Hence the potential impact of the new Central Academy upon the allied armies in Guangdong was muted by, if nothing else, the belated hour of its creation.

It was not without some justification that the Central First Class adopted the serial number of Fourth Class of the Huangpu Academy. Despite the obligation incumbent upon it to replace and to substitute for the disbanded allied military schools, the Central Academy recruited its students primarily from among young intellectuals sent South from the provinces, in the manner of the former Huangpu Academy, rather than from among the soldiers of the allied armies. The entrance examinations were rigorous, and prospective candidates from among the cadets of the other military schools did not acquit themselves well; very few in fact found their way into the new Central Academy. The 'amalgamation' of the allied army military schools with the Central Academy did about as much for the military schools of the allied armies as the merger of Cheng Qian's Army Military School and of the Guards' Academy with the Huangpu Academy in 1924: it eliminated them without replacing them. The shortcomings of the Huangpu Academy, most particularly as they bore upon the politicization of the NRA as a whole, were overlooked once accolades had begun accruing to Chiang Kaishek in the wake of the Northern Expedition, and once it had emerged that the historic function of the Huangpu Academy was in fact to create an army loyal to his person.

The Political Infrastructure of the NRA

If officers and men of every unit in the allied forces were to be converted into soldiers of a party-army, then it was not to be through the military-school system. By default of the army schools, the extension of party authority over political education in the armed forces was left to a system of external political agencies attached to the military structure as it stood.
The major contribution of the Huangpu Academy to the 'conversion' of the NRA was not, then, to be the training which it offered within its walls, but its pioneering of extra-mural political organizations and methods of political indoctrination. Political staff of Huangpu created political structures which were ultimately to find their way into armed units which never came within earshot of the Academy itself.

In association with the NRA, there evolved three permanent and co-existing political structures: the Commissariat, or system of party representatives (dang daibiao), political bureaux (shengshi bu) and party branches (dangzhubu). Another type of structure, the propaganda team (xuanhua duwei), was also associated with the NRA but was set up on a temporary and ad hoc basis to service particular military expeditions. Although there was some overlap of function between the three permanent structures, each came, in time, to cater for different aspects of party activity in the armed forces. Party representatives were entrusted primarily with overseeing the compliance of military officers with party directives; political bureaux were expected to train troops to behave like a party-army, and to convince civilians of the advantages of co-operating with the NRA; party branches were established to foster understanding and co-operation between officers and men. The difficulties encountered in introducing and developing each system throughout the NRA gives some indication of how little some contingents conformed with party goals and ideals, even as it shows the extent, and limitations, of the party's determination to force their compliance.

Although not personally responsible for introducing the political infrastructure into the NRA, Chiang Kaishek was accountable for the final form in which it accompanied the NRA on the Northern Expedition. Chiang showed in his dealings with the political infrastructure the same determination to downgrade legitimate party concerns in the interests of the military hierarchy, and especially that of his own command, as he was to display in dealing with the military training institutes. After Chiang had finished tampering with the infrastructure, the only legitimate role left for political workers was political instruction of the rank and file, and even that role was rendered impracticable by the low status to which political workers were reduced by systematic undermining of their status and authority.
Chiang Kaishek had witnessed the operation of a party representative system in the Soviet Red Army during a visit to the Soviet Union in September 1923, as an emissary of Sun Yatsen. Chiang came to understand from his observations that the chief function of party representatives was to keep military officers in line. Hence, when they were introduced into Chiang's Huangpu brigades, party representatives were given power of veto over military orders issued by military officers of equivalent rank. Chiang was also led to believe, while in Russia, that party representatives would be required only as long as the military structure remained aloof from the party hierarchy. His support for the introduction of the system was thus conditional upon its being withdrawn as soon as the commanders of the provincial guest armies were prepared to submit to some higher authority without direct prompting; precisely which authority this referred to was to be revealed only in the fulness of time. In addition to this supervisory function, a number of other tasks came to be ascribed to party representatives at one time or another, ranging from indoctrinating foot-soldiers to keeping the rolls. Such duties were shared with other political structures in the forces, and were neither essential to the operation of the party representative system, nor sufficient cause to prevent its disbandment should party control over the armed forces no longer appear necessary, or indeed desirable.

In April 1926, just a fortnight after adding another militarist army to the growing list of NRA armies, Chiang Kaishek decided that military commanders were now sufficiently 'converted' to warrant the abolition of the party representative system. Chiang was upset not simply by the Communists' domination of the system, which gave him cause enough to complain, but by the very existence of party watchdogs in the NRA. The Communists were a particular annoyance, but, as Richard Landis had pointed out, Chiang showed admirable impartiality in sacking party representatives of every persuasion after the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident of 20 March. Chiang then suggested that ruling the Communists ineligible for appointment as party representatives might partially redeem the system, but "whether or not party representatives are to be done away with entirely must itself await further consideration." In the course of the Northern Expedition some months later, Chiang did reintroduce the system, but his purpose was less to re-establish party control over the armed forces than to assert his own waning authority over a number of militarist
armies in the NRA which were beginning to show the limits of their allegiance to anything other than the recapture of the provincial capitals of their home provinces. 79

Like the party representative system, political bureaux were introduced into Guangdong by way of the Huangpu Academy, but there the resemblance ends. A political bureau was one of six bureaux set up in the Huangpu Academy at the time of its creation in mid-1924. 80 The bureau's function was prescribed within the limited aims of an army teaching institution: to provide cadets with a political education, to oversee military training, and to monitor, publish and distribute reading material within the Academy. 81 The term, political bureau, made its way from the Academy to a field unit in the Spring of 1925, after the Academy had suspended the operation of its political bureau and another was created in the Academy's Party Army. 82 Once transferred from school grounds to the battlefield, the political bureau underwent a transformation. While retaining its general brief for political instruction, it was stripped of the limitations imposed by the Academy, and in addition to soldiers of the Party Army began to cater for enemy troops and for residents of the areas traversed by the army. It evolved into a political Jack-of-all-trades, employed to bridge the gap between the Party Army and the enemy, and between the Party Army and local civilian population, by whatever means should prove most effective. By 1926, after two Eastern Expeditions and a Southern Expedition, this had come to mean subverting the enemy and indoctrinating captured enemy soldiers; trying to win the co-operation of peasants and merchants in obtaining provisions, transporting goods, offering financial credit, spying, scouting and sundry other practical tasks; securing conquered territories by establishing local party branches, and worker, peasant and merchant associations, as well as provisional police forces and administrative committees; and, for the allied soldiers themselves, arranging rest and recreation, caring for the wounded, offering political and literacy education, and establishing party branches within the forces. Despite such differences, there was a considerable degree of continuity between the Academy's political bureau and subsequent army political bureaux. Zhou Enlai, Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CCP while concurrently a member of the Guomindang, was at once effective head of the Academy's political bureau, official head of the Party Army Political Bureau, and in due course commanded
the political bureau of the First Army and of the entire Eastern Expeditionary Army. The development of political bureaux proceeded under his general supervision.

Political bureaux were affixed at the level of army and division, with the chain of command running from the National Government Military Affairs Committee's Political Training Committee at the very top, to each of the separate army political bureaux, and thence to each of the three division-level political bureaux comprising an army. The archetypal bureau consisted of perhaps a dozen personnel divided between a propaganda section, an organization section, general officers, a secretary, and a bureau head. It was a small unit, ideally capable of undertaking political work within the forces in peacetime, and yet sufficiently flexible to allow for expansion into a substantial propaganda team in time of war. There was some variation in the speed and form in which the political bureau system was adopted by each unit of the NRA, but less than a year after the initial appearance of a political bureau in the Huangpu Party Army, no army was left without one. However perfect the internal structure of political bureaux, they remained for all that quite alien to the military hierarchy, and lacked authority in their dealings with it. Military officers could scorn them with impunity, and political officers were not loathe in turn to withhold their co-operation. In addition to the difficulties it encountered with the military structure, a political bureau also had to put up with occasional obstruction from their supposed colleagues in the Commissariat. In February 1926, an attempt was made to defuse these several sources of conflict within the political infrastructure, and between it and the military hierarchy, by creating a new post of assistant party representative (fu dang daibiao) at the head of the political bureau of each army, in place of the former bureau head. Through this decision, political bureaux were effectively incorporated into the party representative system, and the potential for conflict between the two agencies was accordingly reduced. As, by this time, the authority of party representative was clearly defined in new regulations governing party representatives, the change also lent officers of political bureaux more authority in their dealings with military officers. The switch from bureau head to assistant party representative does not appear to have been a coup for either agency, or a victory for the CCP over the Guomindang, but rather
a rationalization of an intolerable situation which involved little more than a change in name and status. In those armies for which I have been able to identify both the retiring bureau head and his replacement assistant party representative, they turn out in any case to have been one and the same person: Zhou Enlai in the First Army, Zhu Kejing in the Third and Lin Zuhan in the Sixth.\textsuperscript{92} Hence, although having little to do with party affiliations, the change did give the political structure greater authority \textit{vis-à-vis} the military hierarchy; this, even more than their association with the CCP, was to be the crime of the assistant party representatives.

Political bureaux fared rather better than party representatives in the wake of the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident of 20 March 1926. On 3 April Chiang requested that the CEC withdraw all party representatives from service, but at the same time he spared the system of political bureaux from censure, suggesting that the latter, unlike the hapless party representatives, should remain in the forces to undertake general political work and "propagandize the Three Principles of the People".\textsuperscript{93} While the political bureau system itself was left intact, its staff underwent a significant reshuffle. Zhou Enlai was relieved of command of the First Army Political Bureau, and was replaced on 11 April by Deng Yanda.\textsuperscript{94} In May, new appointments were made at intermediate levels in the First Army, with Feng Ti and Zhou Shimian replacing the Communists Liu Kanghou and Jiang Xianyun as heads of the political bureaux of the First and Third Divisions respectively.\textsuperscript{95}

The different treatment which Chiang meted out to party representatives and political bureaux, abolishing the former while simply restaffing the latter, suggests that he was concerned with more than simply circumventing CCP domination of political work in the armed forces. He could, had he so wished, have replaced CCP party representatives with men of his own choice, as he did in fact replace Communists in the political bureaux of his First Army. In choosing to spare political bureaux \textit{per se} while emasculating the party representative system, Chiang showed that he was in sympathy with political work so long as it remained limited to propaganda activity among servicemen, but that, by April 1926, he would no longer tolerate political workers of any persuasion dictating policy to the military hierarchy. In the light of Chiang's tolerance of political workers provided they confined them-
selves to propaganda work among the rank and file, it is worth noting the qualitative change which came over political staff around the time of the Second Eastern Expedition. It is known that Chiang began to appoint military officers to political posts previously filled by civilian party staff; there appears to have been a related trend toward choosing wounded troops to fill these posts. To my certain knowledge, at least two military officers of the First Army who were wounded in the course of the Second Eastern Expedition were, shortly thereafter, appointed to the post of party representative without undergoing further training. Political bureaux, likewise, assembled wartime propaganda teams from troops fresh out of hospital. Doubtless a manpower shortage encouraged such practices. They do, nonetheless, strike an interesting contrast between the lofty ideals and sharp conflicts which characterized political work at the very highest levels, and the considerably lower expectations of propaganda work among the rank and file.

Party branches formed a third tier of political organization in the NRA. One crude measure of a party-army is the proportion of party members in its ranks, a measure employed by Chiang Kaishek himself when he pronounced his Instruction Brigades a party-army on the slim grounds that the entire contingent had already signed the party register. Other military officers worked on the same premise when they protested that their membership of the Guomindang should excuse them from being scrutinized by party political officers. Expanding party membership was not, however, the only proper goal of the Guomindang in dealing with the armies. There was also an urgently felt need to organize party members and to disseminate propaganda within existing armies.

It was the Huangpu Academy, yet again, which led the way in establishing party branches within the armed forces. On 30 June, 1924, just a fortnight after the Academy had been formally opened, the CEC ratified the charter of a special district party branch (tebie chu dangbu) which was to service the Academy. On 3 July, five sub-branches (fenbu) were set up within the special district branch, and on 1 August these sub-branches were further divided into cells (xiaozu).
In its earliest form, the branch system of party organization in the army performed a variety of functions later reserved for army political bureaus and their subsidiary propaganda teams. The cell-leader was expected to monitor the cadets' thinking and behaviour, and to censor their reading material. The special district party branch as a whole was entrusted with responsibility for the army's "propaganda to the outside world", a task subsequently performed by the propaganda teams. This same branch accompanied the Instruction Brigades on the First Eastern Expedition, and adapted to the contingencies of war in a manner very similar to Zhou Enlai's political bureau: it conducted propaganda work among residents of the East River region, assisted in the establishment of local party branches, and investigated local administrative practices - most notably in the field of education - in addition to its work among soldiers of the expeditionary army.

The unique position of an independent party structure within a military organisation was to give the party branch another, and very distinctive, function which in time over-shadowed those functions it happened to share with political bureaux. The most conspicuous thing about a party branch in an army unit was not its propaganda, its monitoring of cadets or its administrative work among local people, but rather its provision of a setting wherein all party members were nominally equal and the military hierarchy was left momentarily in abeyance. Party egalitarianism provided relief from hierarchical military authority. In so doing, it also subverted military authority, and military officers found plenty of cause to warn that military discipline would suffer should party branches be set up for the rank and file.

The distinctive role into which party branches found themselves cast by this tension with the intermediate military hierarchy was that of champion of the little man against the overwhelming authority of his immediate superiors. Common soldiers had much cause for complaint, and found in the party branches a channel through which to seek redress. The appeal which branches held for common soldiers made them attractive to senior commanders as well, for in circumventing officers of intermediate rank the branch system provided a direct link between command headquarters and the lowest ranks.
The primary function which befell party branches was then to oil the wheels of the military hierarchy; they had little to do with party affairs as conducted by the party at large.

Party branches were to remain a sanctuary for the victims of military oppression only so long as they enjoyed the patronage of highly placed commanders. Chiang Kaishek, who deserves credit for democratizing albeit not politicizing the NRA, staunchly defended the branch system and encouraged the troops to take advantage of its prestige in order to expose officers who mistreated them. Chiang was angered by what he saw to be corruption and sadism on the part of "most military officers", and gradually came to the realization that as one officer would never inform against another, the only sure way to bring malpractices to the attention of commanding officers was through the party-branch system. His own exhortations to middle-order officers that they treat subordinates more leniently had met with very little response. In November 1925, he noted that despite his instructions, officers were still syphoning off pay earmarked for their men, and "stuffing soldiers' mouths with shit, dealing out painful lashings, and cursing them mercilessly. One finds", he continued, "even more frequently that they couldn't care whether their troops are starving or freezing." He then initiated a reorganization of party branches within his First Army, to create a more effective instrument for alleviating the plight of common soldiers and exposing the corruption of their superiors. Henceforth, he asserted, party branches were to provide an outlet for the troops to "express their opinions and report their hardships with absolute freedom, without [fear of] resentment or reprisals from their superiors." Chiang's active support for the party-branch system in the forces owed little to respect for the party or to faith in political indoctrination as such. To the contrary, in as much as it arose out of concern for the well-being of his troops, it tacitly acknowledged the supreme importance of the material preconditions of loyalty; to the extent that it tried to break down the authority of middle-order officers, it shows to whom this loyalty was to be directed - toward general Chiang himself.

As was the case with the political bureaus and party representatives, the spread of party branches from the First Army to the many other units of the NRA was quite slow and uneven. There appears to have been a spurt in the creation of party branches in July 1925, yet by October even the most
rudimentary form of party organization was still lacking in all but the First, Second, Third and Henan Armies. Even where these four were concerned, it is doubtful whether brigade-level branches and the smaller party cells had spread beyond the First and perhaps Second Divisions of the First Army; it is certain that the party-branch system had not reached brigade-level in the First Army's Third Division until January of 1926. The creation of lower level branches in the Third Division coincided with a second spurt of party-branch activities which occurred in December 1925 and January 1926, around the time when the Second Party Congress was convened. This Congress was informed that in the three months since October, special district party branches had been established in the Fourth, Fifth, Hubei and Attack Henan Armies, as well as in the navy and the police force. The haste with which higher army-level party branches were constructed on the advent of the Second Congress suggests that there may have been some motive in addition to concern for his troops' well-being behind Chiang Kaishek's enthusiasm for party-branch activity at this time; it may also help to explain the acquiescence of the commanders of other armies to the establishment of party branches in their domains. In the wake of this spurt, the armed forces between them managed to muster some seventy delegates for the Second Congress, and thereby to occupy more than a quarter of all congressional seats. Henceforth, the power of the NRA would rest not only on its grasp of the weapons, but also upon its status within the Guomindang itself.

Propaganda and Military Discipline on the Provincial Military Expeditions

The provincial military campaigns of 1925-6 confronted propagandists with the first significant test of propaganda work in the ranks of the NRA. The two Eastern Expeditions and the Southern Expedition each posed in concrete terms the question of whether propaganda work could be conducted in the course of a military campaign, and whether it could enhance the loyalty and improve the conduct of soldiers under battle conditions. In the process, the expeditions revealed the limitations under which propagandists laboured and the shortcomings of propaganda work in itself, and showed that the NRA was not all that it was cracked up to be.

On the First Eastern Expedition, which was conducted over the two months from 31 January to 23 March, 1925, the political bureau, special party-branch
and party representatives of the Huangpu Academy all took to the field, in addition to a political propaganda team (zhengshi zhuanghuan dui) made up of several units (zu). The units drew upon the resources of central party apparatus, including ten East River dialect speakers from the third class of the Peasant Movement Training Institute and a number of staff members from the Central Peasant Bureau itself. Two informal party political organizations, the left-wing Young Soldiers Association and the right-wing Society for the Study of Sun-Wenism, took their place alongside the official political structure. Ultimate responsibility for just about every aspect of political work on the First Eastern Expedition was vested in Zhou Enlai, in his numerous capacities as Director of the Political Bureau, Chief of the Court Martial, and Director of Party Organization for All Areas of the East River Region.

Propaganda organization assumed a variety of forms during the Second Eastern Expedition which took place between 28 September and 7 November, 1925. In its early stages, propaganda teams followed the pattern of military organization. At the top of the political pyramid stood the General Political Bureau, within and corresponding to the general command HQ: Zhou Enlai was in charge of the one, and Chiang Kai-shek the other. At the next level, it divided into three political columns, corresponding to the three military columns making up the expeditionary force. At first, these were in fact termed columns (songdui) and were built around the permanent political structures already in operation within each unit, via the political bureaux, party representatives, and assorted political committees. In units where no such propaganda structures were to be found, new propaganda appointees were assigned to work directly alongside military officers.

In time, the propaganda structure moved away from reliance upon the established political infrastructure, toward an integrated and independent system of propaganda teams. It seems that at the outset of the expedition only the First Column, comprising the First Army, in fact managed to field a systematic propaganda structure, as it alone carried an extensive network of political bureaux and party representatives. In this First Column, the political bureaux at division-level formed the tier of propaganda organization immediately below the level of column, and were known as section teams (zhidui). Each of the three section teams in the First Column divided into
three sub-section teams (*fendui*) corresponding to the three brigades in each division. Altogether there were ten brigades in the First Column, and hence ten sub-section teams. Each sub-section team consisted of four cells, the cell forming the lowest tier of political organization. In the First Column, the propaganda structure thus fanned out from a political column at the top, headed by Zhou Enlai concurrently with his post of head of the General Political Bureau, to forty cells at the bottom. This system employed one hundred and sixty-three propagandists: nineteen at column-level, twenty-four at section-level, and one hundred and twenty at cell-level. The system was not, however, appropriate for all columns.

Shortly after the expedition had been mobilized, the system of propaganda teams was extended from the First Column to the Second and Third, with some notable changes. The same set of terms was employed, but it referred to a political structure which no longer paralleled the military structure quite so closely. The political column was henceforth known as the section team, and the old section team at division-level was abolished. The purpose of the exercise was to spread limited staff over a greater number of military units, the First Column, re-entitled the First Section Team, apparently donating some fifty-eight staff members to other units as a result of the reorganization. At the very lowest level, there was some variation in the number of cells per sub-section: in the First Section Team, there were three cells per sub-section, while in the Second, there were no more than two per sub-section. The number of political staff employed in the reorganized propaganda teams was two hundred and thirty-seven; ninety-one in the general political HQ, one hundred and five in the First Section, sixty-one in the Second, and forty in the Third. This amounted to about one political worker for every one hundred military personnel engaged in the expedition.

The staff of propaganda teams included personnel from some existing political bureaux, plus fifty-five recruits from the Political Training Class of the government's Political Training Bureau, forty from the Central Propaganda Bureau's Propagandist Training Institute, ten from the Central Peasant Bureau's Peasant Movement Training Institute, twenty-five from the military school of the Attack Hubei Army, eighteen from the Huangpu Academy, and hundreds from local civilian organisations sympathetic to the aims of the
Language difficulties were to pose serious problems throughout the expedition, and even after the inclusion of local citizens in propaganda teams, the proportion of dialect speakers rose to no more than eighteen percent of team members. The general deployment of propagandists and dialect speakers as they came to hand inevitably influenced the quality and the effectiveness of propaganda on the expedition. Students of only three of the five training institutes were commended for their levels of military and political education, and even they were thought ill-prepared for wartime conditions or for working with local dialects. The local dialect speakers who were employed to help out lacked, in their turn, any military or political training. The general political headquarters had no choice but to take whoever happened to be available, and while these included a number of capable propagandists, they also included some who set regrettable examples for soldiers of the expedition. It became known, for example, that certain propagandists preferred to remain at the rear of a column than to advance at its force, and that others were frequenting brothels with the familiarity of seasoned mercenaries.

The Southern Expedition was conducted over six months, from September 1925 to February 1926. Documentary records of its first stage are too slight to permit accurate reconstruction of its propaganda organization, but it is sufficiently plentiful for the second and third stages to allow a clear picture to emerge. Propaganda activities over the second stage were co-ordinated through the Southern Route General Political Bureau, under the direction of the Communist head of the Third Army Political Bureau, Zhu Kejing. At the next tier of organization, political work in the Second and Third Armies was supervised by their own political bureaux, while the political bureau of the Tenth Division took care of Chen Mingshu's Fourth Army contingent and two brigades of the Guangxi Army. Yu Zuobai's Guangxi Army unit appears to have been left out of the political arrangements entirely. Zhu Kejing's co-ordination was not very effective, if the occurrence of avoidable problems and proliferation of a wide variety of propaganda structures can serve as any guide. In its selection of staff, for example, Zhu's Third Army Political Bureau showed admirable foresight in selecting a large number of dialect speakers, but it failed to communicate the necessity for employing dialect
speakers to the Second Army Political Bureau, none of whose propagandists could speak the southern tongue. 132

Of all three stages of the Southern Expedition, the third stage came closest to realising the ideal of political co-ordination by reducing the problem to one of intra-army co-ordination. This came about through the elimination of all but the Fourth Army from the campaign, thereby leaving the Fourth Army Political Bureau to act as de facto political headquarters for the last stage of the expedition. 133 Yet even in these circumstances, the Tenth Division remained outside the orbit of the Fourth Army Political Bureau as it was located in Qinzhou, some distance from the scene of Fourth Army political activities on Hainan Island. Hence the Tenth Division managed to retain its operational independence, and the Fourth Army Political Bureau contented itself with supervising the two Divisions which accompanied it south from the eastern battlefields, the Eleventh and Twelfth. Communists and their sympathisers appear to have dominated political work in the Fourth Army and Twelfth Division Bureaux. 134

Political bureaux of the Fourth Army did not enjoy access to the pool of trained propaganda staff upon which Zhou Enlai had drawn for the Eastern Expedition, and so improvised in the creation of propaganda teams. They called upon local communities to staff provisional propaganda teams, of which about fifty were set up and disbanded along the route from Jiangmen to Hainan. Some of the teams were composed entirely of political personnel from the various political bureaux, but others included sympathetic activists from local party branches, peasant associations, labour unions and student groups, whose addition brought the number of propagandists to about one hundred in all. 135 When the Fourth Army Political Bureau was not co-ordinating other political bureaux directly through staff-sharing or joint engagement in provisional propaganda teams, it did continue to provide some direction by issuing propaganda outlines for the guidance of subordinate units. 136

Propaganda organization on the Eastern and Southern Expeditions was serviceable, but offered little scope for complacency or self-congratulation. Its inadequacies were keenly felt by those involved, who complained of the shortage and poor quality of staff, of the lack of appropriate materials,
and most especially of poor relations with the military hierarchy. No provision was made for military units to supply provisions to, or provide transport for, attached propaganda teams, and propaganda staff carried no authority in dealing with military officers. As military officers were loathe to volunteer their services, share their resources or pay deference to non-military personnel unless strictly required to do so, the theoretical division of functions within the political hierarchy whereby particular members of staff were assigned to handle transportation, finance and the supervision of military orderlies, was robbed of any meaning whatsoever; morale among political workers declined; and, as we shall see, even attempts to "propagandize the Three Principles of the People" within the armed forces came to very little.

The content of propaganda for troop consumption was simple and pragmatic. The general framework for internal propaganda on all three expeditions was laid down on the First Eastern Expedition, with the promulgation of 'three do's' and 'three don'ts': the former, to be obedient, disciplined, and protect the common people, and the latter, not to occupy private dwellings, seize provisions or conscript labour. After a period of gross indiscipline following the first expedition, Zhou Enlai's General Political Bureau paid greater attention to the problem of discipline in its propaganda outline for the Second Eastern and Southern Expeditions. Its propaganda program covered two aspects of military discipline, one regarding behaviour within the ranks, and the other dealing with conduct toward civilians. The program listed seven points for the first of these aspects, five for the second, and a further five on topics of general political interest, covering imperialism, militarism, and provincial and national reunification. The seven points on discipline in the ranks struck at the causes of the problem rather than at its many symptoms, avoiding all mention of punishment. Some aimed at relieving the troops' concern for their own safety, one of the causes of insubordination, by insisting that supply lines and communications between the front and rear lines could never be cut, that the NRA was better equipped than the enemy, that civilians favoured their cause, and that wounded troops would receive the best of medical attention and the finest of food. Other points were directed at the troops' natural inclinations for ease and comfort, ordering political workers to make arrangements for recreation and amusement, and to smooth relations between officers and men. The premise underlying this...
program was that a soldier, once convinced of his personal safety and satisfied with his position, might then begin to heed other propaganda about imperialism and militarism and become "brave and loyal, and care nothing for death, injury or danger." In a program concerned essentially with military discipline, political instruction yielded pride of place to promises of material security for the troops.

It was one thing to draw up propaganda guidelines, but quite another to implement them. Many practical difficulties beset political workers while on campaign, among them being poor organization, inadequate materials and a lack of trained staff, but the problem which loomed largest on each expedition and throughout every unit was the obstruction presented by military officers. In consequence, propaganda work among soldiers was in general very poor, varying only according to the marginal differences in intolerance for political work shown by one officer over another.

Levels of propaganda work among troops engaged in the Second Eastern Expedition varied between the three columns of the expeditionary army, and between the divisions comprising each column. Hence in the First Column it varied between the First and Third Divisions of the First Army, while both divisions differed from the armies comprising the Second and Third Columns. The First Division, formed from the original three instruction brigades of the Huangpu Academy, had undergone by far the most prolonged political training program of all contingents on the expedition and was equipped with its most extensive political infrastructure, yet as far as internal propaganda on campaign was concerned this experience appears to have made its military officers even more intolerant than might otherwise have been the case, and to have left even its party representatives contemptuous of political indoctrination. The record of propaganda sub-sections gives fair indication of the level of internal propaganda in the First Division. The mean number of political meetings convened for troops in all three brigades of the First Division was three per sub-section, and no one sub-section held in excess of five over the entire expedition. The insignificance of these numbers is apparent when they are compared with an average of sixty political meetings for civilians convened by each sub-section over the same period. In the face of substantial obstruction from military officers, propaganda
team members in the First Division could do little other than engage individual soldiers in casual conversation. The Third Division was an incongruous partner for the First Division within Chiang Kaishek's First Army. It was possibly the least trained and most undisciplined of all in the NRA, having been formed in the brief interval between the two Eastern Expeditions from a former command of an ally of Chen Jiongming. Its military officers and enlisted men all despised political work; the officers obstructed propagandists, and the men ignored them. Propaganda team members had therefore to content themselves with trying to correct improper behaviour after it had come to their attention.

Propaganda teams confronted yet another set of circumstances in the Second Column, which consisted for the most part of Li Jishen's Guangdong Army, recently titled the Fourth Army. They did encounter difficulties familiar to political workers in the First Column, such as the reluctance of military officers to assemble their men for political sessions, but ran into others as well. They could not, for example, settle for correcting improper conduct as even their reprimands passed unnoticed. Their words were outweighed by an attitude among officers that it was a soldier's natural right to steal food and clothing in time of war, and that it was not their business to stop them.

The position of the Third Section Team, attached to the Third Column, was quite unique. The propaganda team itself included military officers from the Third Column, as well as cadets from the military school of the largest army in the Third Column, the Attack Hubei Army. There was little room for friction or misunderstanding, as the propaganda team shared its staff with the officer corps, and shared language and loyalties with the rank and file. It is difficult to gauge whether the price paid for eliminating sources of friction was the emasculation of the political apparatus in favour of the military, because the Third Section Team appears to have failed to report in detail about its work. Perhaps its silence speaks more eloquently than any report might have done about the subservience of the political to military hierarchies in the Third Column.

On the Southern Expedition, propaganda activities also ran afoul of highly sensitive relations between political staff and military officers.
Political staff trod very warily in their dealings with military officers, and even in their reports to base were reluctant to appear to be at variance with them. In summarising political work on the expedition, the Fourth Army Political Bureau noted that: "...political workers rarely submit reports, and if they do so, it is generally to say that all is well; they dare not risk offence by speaking honestly." Their fear of speaking out hints at other areas of sensitivity governing relations between military and political officers and between officers and men. It was primarily military officers who risked being offended by honest reports from political staff, and the fact that there appears to be no mention whatever of obstruction or intimidation by military officers, either of political staff or of enlisted men, cannot then be taken to mean that such conduct passed unnoticed. In fact, the dearth of information on such matters, relative to the substantial information which came out of the Eastern Expeditions, may itself be a result of intimidation.

Another and related explanation for the lack of comment on political work within the Southern Expeditionary armies is that, while on the campaign trail itself, political workers were reluctant to do anything which might raise the hackles of military staff. On the Second Eastern Expedition, political personnel had complained that military officers obstructed their attempts to conduct internal political activities en route; there is evidence to suggest that, on the Southern Expedition, these same political workers had less cause for complaint because they had stopped trying to undertake internal political activity during the course of the campaign. The Fourth Army Political Bureau reported that "as for talking and lecturing to the common soldiers, it was generally very difficult to appoint a definite time, and then to keep to any schedule." The bureau of the Tenth and Eleventh Divisions reported similar difficulty in carrying out programs for internal propaganda. The impression gleaned from reports of all bureaux is that very little propaganda activity took place within the ranks: "there was no system [of internal propaganda] to speak of", wrote one; "we undertook political education only in the odd spare moment", wrote another. Political workers managed to avoid implicating themselves or the military hierarchy in their failure to carry out political work on campaign by blaming it on the lack of time at their disposal. In this they differed
from their colleagues on the Second Eastern Expedition who saw shortage of time not as an ultimate cause of failure, but as itself a result of more fundamental problems in their relations with the military hierarchy. Appeals to time, or the lack of it, to explain away the shortcomings in internal political activity can only mean that by the time of the Southern Expedition political workers had already grown tired of confronting military officers, and had stopped trying to undertake propaganda work with troops while on campaign.

The one exception to this rule appears only to confirm its general validity. The political bureau of the Twelfth Division did, unlike the others, manage to convene a few major lecture sessions for troops while on the march. On these occasions, the second-in-command of the Division, Zhang Fakui, himself helped to assemble troops and even addressed them personally on the subject of the importance of political work in the armed forces. Zhang and the Twelfth Division went on to become the "Ironsides" of the Northern Expedition, famous for their fighting skills and high level of politicization. Zhang's attitude illustrates by positive example, as other military officers illustrate by negative example, that levels of internal political activity were at the mercy of the whims of military officers.  

As, by report, "military officers in every unit" forcibly obstructed political work, the level of internal propaganda activity on all three provincial expeditions was very low.

When internal propaganda was indeed undertaken, as it was on occasion between campaigns though not during them, its effectiveness was hampered by social, financial and administrative obstacles which no amount of ideological training could overcome. One section of the NRA consisted of local peasants who were forced to don uniforms in order to make a living for themselves and their families after losing their traditional livelihood in the countryside. They soon found, however, that army life did little to improve their material circumstances. In October 1924, Chiang Kai-shek recognized that political work alone was unlikely to convert peasant breadwinners into disciplined revolutionary soldiers, and in order to slow their rate of desertion proposed that the salaries of common soldiers in his Huangpu units be increased, and forwarded to the families of soldiers rather
than to the men themselves. There was a second category of soldiers, drawn from outside the province, who were disillusioned by their failure to win promotions or secure places in the local military academies, disappointed by the small financial return for their services, and alienated by the generally foreign environment of Guangdong. In February 1926, the NRA's own propaganda publications acknowledged that political indoctrination was of limited value in converting foreign-province soldiers into revolutionaries, and advocated instead that responsible commanders remove the basic causes underlying troop indiscipline and desertion.59 A third section of the NRA consisted of soldiers who had at some stage fought against the NRA, but had since been captured, indoctrinated, and finally incorporated into the ranks. Such soldiers were found to be wedded to whoring, drinking, gambling, opium smoking and pillaging to an even greater extent than the professional soldiers of the assorted 'guest armies', and to be impervious to political indoctrination.60

Financial and administrative problems also militated against the success of political indoctrination. On their account, life was made all but intolerable for every kind of soldier in the NRA. The soldiers' monthly allowance, which at the best of times was barely sufficient for the needs of the individual, let alone for those of his family, often went unpaid due to corrupt administrative practices.61 Morale was further undermined by a dearth of medical supplies, and by the ravages of diseases which ran rampant in unsanitary camp conditions.62 A man injured while on the march or wounded in battle might reasonably expect to die for want of medical treatment, and his chance of survival would but little improve should he be brought to a field hospital, where lack of medication was compounded by poor sanitation and the incompetence of medical staff.63 Should he indeed survive but remain physically incapacitated, then in the absence of a systematic rehabilitation program he could look forward only to a life of begging for alms in the streets.64 Under such circumstances, few soldiers were willing to risk their lives for the revolution.

In addition to material deprivations, common soldiers endured harsh treatment at the hands of their officers. Public spokesmen for the NRA denied that corporal punishment was practised widely in the forces; good conduct was
reputedly the outcome of political indoctrination. Private diaries and contemporary internal publications tell quite a different tale of daily whippings, beatings and sometimes more imaginative forms of physical humiliation, imposed even for the most trivial of offences. The egalitarian slogans of political propagandists rang hollow in the chasm which loomed between the system of discipline to which common soldiers were subjected, on the one hand, and official disregard for more serious breaches by officers, on the other. Political workers were also at pains to explain the conspicuous difference in lifestyle enjoyed by officers and men. Officers from the rank of major received between ¥160 and ¥450 per month, to the foot soldiers' ¥6 to ¥11. This income differential was further widened by the practice of graft, whereby the "general run of officers" kept money earmarked for troops and labourers, for their own private use. Their absolute authority and relative wealth enabled officers to enjoy standards of luxury well beyond the reach of common soldiers, who were then motivated to break regulations and pillage civilian homes in order to make up the difference.

Discipline was thus a significant problem in the NRA. There are two basic yardsticks against which to measure the discipline of soldiers on the provincial campaigns: their loyalty toward the NRA high-command, and their treatment of the civilian populations of eastern and southern Guangdong. On both counts, the NRA's record is rather less flattering than as presented in the official histories. There has been a bipartisan agreement between Guomindang and Communist assessments of the conduct and achievements of the NRA on the provincial military expeditions. On the battlefield, by all accounts, the NRA was a loyal friend and mighty foe, and in the towns and hamlets of Guangdong was a welcome guest in every house. Having characterized the NRA as highly disciplined, this assessment retains a bipartisan approach in attributing NRA discipline to propaganda work in the armies, but diverges in crediting Guomindang or Communist propagandists for the achievement. The truth was in fact far more complex, involving the social and regional origins of soldiers, the conditions of service, and the ingrained attitudes of the military hierarchy and having very little to do with propaganda work at all.
The question of loyalty to the high-command was one which arose only under stress, as for example a threat to the lucrative territorial base of an army corps, a conflict between the provincial allegiance of a corps and the national aspirations of the Guomindang, or the prospect of defeat in battle, each of which tested the loyalty of the party's allies. With respect to the first, the loyalty of the commanders of the allied Yunnan and Guangxi armies which were stationed around Guangzhou was tested when Sun Yatsen tried to recover control of tax collection in their base areas; they showed the limits of their loyalty by refusing to mobilise for the First Eastern Expedition, and then launching an outright rebellion in concert with Chen Jiongming. The second type of crisis was to occur on the Northern Expedition when provincial corps of the NRA, in the manner of Chen Jiongming's rebellion of 1922, abandoned the campaign for national reunification as soon as it had begun to conflict with their provincial goals. The third type of crisis, wherein loyalty was tested by imminent defeat, confronted one section of the Fourth Army's Twelfth Division during the Southern Expedition. The main body of the Southern Expeditionary Army had been routed south-west and the Twelfth Division south-east, when the latter was attacked on an unprotected flank by an enemy column and driven back to within seventy-five kilometres of Guangzhou. The main body of the expeditionary army then turned east to assist the beleaguered unit of the Twelfth Division, only to find upon arrival that the unit had deserted to the enemy. It appears that as long as the high-command did not demand any significant gestures of fealty from the corps of the NRA, and so long as the corps evaded critical encounters, their loyalty was not brought into question; in crisis, their loyalty was by no means assured. Hence the proper lesson concerning the loyalty of the NRA which may be drawn from the history of the provincial military expeditions is not that the NRA was winning because it was loyal, but that it was loyal because it was winning.

The second aspect of military discipline, conduct toward civilians, lends itself to generalization more than to quantification, but generalizations about misconduct by the NRA may still serve as a corrective for overriding generalizations about its good behaviour. Rosy impressions of NRA behaviour are well justified, for example, by the soldiers' conduct over the early phase of the First Eastern Expedition, in February 1925, when the
expeditionary force adhered to the 'three don'ts' quite strictly. By March, however, order had broken down to the point where "every brigade and platoon" was breaking the 'three don'ts' consistently. It would seem that the success of propaganda units in enticing villagers back to their homes in fact facilitated the army's exploitation of them, and that this did not endear propagandists to civilians.

A subsequent overview of the expeditionary army's response to the prohibitions against billetting in private homes, seizing provisions and pressing labour presented a very damning indictment of the armies' treatment of civilians on the First Eastern Expedition as a whole. As their officers failed to arrange accommodation in public places, troops vied at each camp-site for the privilege of occupying private dwellings. They had few inhibitions about looting, and grabbed and ate whatever food they could lay their hands on. On the matter of labour conscription, the new system adopted on the expedition proved even more oppressive than the old. Ideally, the new system employed porters for a relatively short journey from point A to point B, whereupon new porters were enlisted and the earlier ones were sent back to point A; the old system, by contrast, forcibly inducted porters for the duration of an expedition. The new system relied heavily on the assumption that local people would willingly volunteer their services, but as the army came to lose civilian confidence over the course of the campaign, so that assumption grew patently absurd. In practice, if no volunteers came forward in point B then anyone at hand was pressed into service, regardless of age, sex or physical stamina. On the First Eastern Expedition the old and infirm were indeed pressed into labour gangs, and women were conscripted by the hundreds; any who happened to fall by the wayside were whipped back into line. It was to the credit of the old system that it had at least excluded such people from labour gangs, even if for the cynical reason that they could not be expected to last the entire distance. In practice, although they might be all but incapable of lasting the distance, the new system forced them to do so.

Army conduct on the Second Eastern Expedition mirrored that on the First with regard to general intimidation of civilians, forcible occupation of dwellings, and despoliation of property, but differed significantly with
respect to labour conscription. The labour problem was circumvented in part on the second expedition by the employment of three to four thousand striking workers from among the forty thousand or so who had flocked to Guangzhou in the course of the Guangdong - Hong Kong Strike. Improvements in the employment and treatment of porters on the second expedition also owed a great deal to political workers demonstrating to military officers that respect for porters would be rewarded by a swift and successful conclusion to the campaign. The conscription problem was the only area in which propagandists reported success in their dealings with generally sceptical military officers, who were impressed by the practical application of the principle rather than by its place in party doctrine. Indeed, in time to come even the Northern militarist Zhang Zuolin was to see the advantage of treating his porters fairly, and to introduce reforms into his army to ensure that they were recruited on a voluntary basis. Hence, on the Second Eastern Expedition, although military officers ceased pressing labour they continued nonetheless to tolerate looting and other misconduct, oblivious of the welfare of the civilian population per se.

The behaviour of troops on the Southern Expedition is difficult to assess because, in the words of the Political Bureau itself, political workers were reluctant to report on conduct except to say that all was well. Beneath the whitewash there linger, nonetheless, one or two signs of conduct harmful to civilians. Troops were responsible for a fire which gutted a small village in the vicinity of their camp at Chegang, after which civilians began systematically killing unwary soldiers whenever they strayed from the beaten track. Elsewhere, in the country of Suixi, one unit of the Tenth Division raped, kidnapped, murdered and plundered its way through the district on an early phase of the expedition. These two cases found their way into official reports as illustrations of the maxim that all was well, for in each instance some form of compensation was ultimately rendered to the victims. The cases which failed to earn mention in reports, those that is which lacked a happy ending, are lost to history.

It remains to ask whether the level of indiscipline displayed by the NRA on the provincial campaigns is attributable to the lack of internal propaganda work on campaign, or to the basic limitations of propaganda itself.
The question cannot be approached directly, for in showing how little propaganda work actually took place I have effectively severed all possible connection between internal propaganda and military discipline. The very irrelevance of internal propaganda does, nonetheless, indirectly supply one part of the answer, by demonstrating that the high hopes which Sun Yatsen held for propaganda as an agent for converting "reactionary military forces into revolutionary military forces" was essentially misplaced: social, administrative, financial and structural obstacles pushed such a goal beyond reach.

The other part of the answer may be found in the reversion to methods of punishment to reassert control in the most heavily indoctrinated of all units which went to make up the NRA, the Huangpu corps. The indiscipline and corruption of the first expeditionary force did not abate in the interval between the armies' withdrawal from the East River and their return on the Second Eastern Expedition. In mid-May, 1925, six weeks after Chiang Kaishek had returned to Guangzhou from the East River, an increase in the incidence of payroll-padding, misuse of funds, dereliction of duty and desertion forced him to take a stand. His first injunction reminding everyone of their duties was ignored, and some days later he referred to "a kind of arrogance" which had crept in among officers and men since the East River campaign and which, he said, was sure to lead to "dreadful results" if allowed to pass unchecked. He then issued another order which packed more punch in its list of punishments to be meted out to offenders. By way of a preamble to the order, he noted that "over the period in which we have been encamped instances of crime have been piling up one on top of the other, to the point where even the pure [name] of the Party Army has been dragged in the mud." The number sentenced in accordance with the order gives some idea of the extent of the problem, while the severity of the sentences shows the degree of reliance upon physical deterrents. From the Huangpu Army and Academy alone, about seventy men were allotted sentences of hard labour, imprisonment, and execution. Harsh punishment was accompanied by greater restrictions on liberty. On 29 May Chiang cancelled all sick leave, and on the following day abolished old procedures for seeking leave in any form on the grounds that many of those taking leave were failing to return. In combination, evidence of minimal propaganda work in most units, and of reliance upon
physical deterrents in those few units which did undergo heavy indoctrination, suggests that internal propaganda had little influence upon discipline within the NRA.

The indiscipline of the NRA had great bearing, in turn, upon the impact of external propaganda work among the citizens of eastern and southern Guangdong. Misconduct was thought sufficiently widespread on the First Expedition to have nullified whatever goodwill may have been won through propaganda. "The People", reflected Chiang Kaishek, "would not tolerate such harrassment, and were pressed to the point of hating us, though they dared not say so". In his summation of troop indiscipline Chiang showed that he shared with Sun and senior party officials in Guangzhou the fear that failing to practice what was preached made a mockery of the Guomindang, by reducing its propaganda as a whole to mere "hollow words". 189
Chapter Four

THE PROCESS OF CENTRALIZATION, 1924-1926

Over the twenty months between the First National Congress of the Guomindang in January 1924, and the assassination of the party-leader Liao Zhongkai in August of the following year, party propaganda was lacking in co-ordination and centralization. Yet just five months later, at the second National Congress of the Guomindang in January 1926, disharmony seemed to have given way to a harmonious party voice issuing from Guangdong. In this chapter I will trace how, and at what cost, this unity was achieved at the central and provincial levels in Guangdong Province.

At the time of the First National Congress, Sun Yatsen placed propaganda at the top of the list of priorities for his party, investing great faith in its power to win for the party a popular constituency in Guangdong. There is a striking number of references to propaganda in the speeches which Sun delivered in the two months leading up to the First Congress, a fact of which he himself was well aware. In November 1923, he rather self-consciously contrasted his current enthusiasm for propaganda with his neglect of it over previous years, attributing this neglect to failure on his part to recognise the true importance of propaganda, and ignorance of the best methods for pursuing it. He was not at all reluctant to identify the Soviet advisor Borodin as the inspiration for his new-found enthusiasm for propaganda. Sun learnt from Borodin, as he had earlier from the Comintern agent Sneevliet, of the need to link his flimsy party structure to a firm base in mass society in order to ensure the survival of his party and the stability of his administration, and he interpreted this advice on both occasions as an encomium to mass propaganda. Propaganda, as a form of mass political instruction, then assumed an importance relative to the importance of creating a new mass base for the party.

In fact, it will be recalled, Sun had been moved to make equally extravagant claims for propaganda some twelve months earlier at the prompting of Sneevliet. Earlier still, in 1920, a number of Sun's colleagues, among them Dai Jitao and Zhu Zhixin, had suggested that propaganda be given high priority in party work. Neither his colleagues nor his Soviet advisers appear to have
convincing Sun that practical benefits were likely to accrue from attempting a popular 'awakening'; he continued to seek power primarily through constitutional and militarist channels. This early scepticism about popular 'awakening' was disguised, in 1924, by tracing past propaganda failures to neglect, or to technical shortcomings such as bad methods and poor organization, and hence diverting attention from the limitations of popular 'awakening' per se. Sun was, in effect, offering the lame excuse for propaganda which Chesterton had once proffered in defence of Christianity: it was not that it had been tried and found wanting, but that it had never really been tried at all.

Mass propaganda came to be idolized as the supreme method for creating a mass base for the Guomindang because, as Sun understood it, propaganda promised to convert the people to the party's way of thinking, and so could spare the party the frustration of having to convert itself into an agent of any of the major social classes which comprised the people. Sun did not want his party to be the agent of any one person or class, likening the pursuit of personal or sectional interests to counter-revolutionary behaviour; his party, in its own estimation, pursued the interests of "every single person". The whole point of propaganda, therefore, was to convert people away from the narrow pursuit of their own sectional interests. Indeed, the two major synonyms for propaganda which pepper Sun's speeches of November and December 1923 are 'conversion' (ganhua) and 'education' (jiaoyu), and the main historical parallels drawn in illustration of mass propaganda are, apart from the Russian Revolution, the work of Confucius, Buddha, and latterday Christian missionaries. Mass propaganda meant preaching principles on a mass scale, to change people's fundamental nature and bring them to a secular salvation. Mass propaganda was entrusted with the monumental task of altering the minds of the masses "by throwing out old ways of thinking and substituting a brand new mode of thought".

By the time of the opening of the First National Congress in January, 1924, the issue of mass propaganda had been reduced to a technical question of how best to orchestrate mass instruction in party principles. Method was in fact the keynote of the First Congress, and the restructured Guomindang which emerged from it was the most tangible product of the congress. Structural
innovations appeared to lend substance to Sun's claim that he was about to launch a systematic, organized and disciplined propaganda machine. Operational bureaux were reorganized on a pattern which followed, to some extent, the structure of society itself, with bureaux for workers, peasants, women, students, and subsequently merchants, all of them entrusted with propaganda responsibilities toward their own particular sections of the community. Each bureau was linked horizontally and vertically within a chain of command which stretched, in theory, from the annual National Congress to the Central Executive Committee (CEC), and thence to central, provincial, city, town and county operational bureaux, each situated within the party branch at the appropriate level. Horizontally, the propaganda bureau at each level was responsible for supervising the propaganda activities of the relevant labour, peasant, merchant, youth and women's bureaux.

To work as well in practice as it appeared on paper, the reorganization required more than tenuous lines of nominal authority running up and down between desks all over the country. Even assuming that the role in which propaganda was cast was in fact a viable one, the new propaganda network still demanded mutual respect for the rights and duties of bureaux at every level, a consistency of leadership, and a consensus among staff on the goals and guiding principles of the party. None of these conditions was ever satisfied. Sun himself short-circuited the mechanism by continuing to act after the reorganization as if the party were still the instrument of his personal will, and this was nowhere more apparent than in respect of propaganda. If it was good enough for Sun, thought a number of old party hands, then it was alright for them to ignore properly constituted authority as well. Sun did exercise continuous leadership over his lifetime, but his strong personal style had the effect of reducing his party to chaos when death put an end to his leadership in March, 1925. The third requirement, consensus on goals and guiding principles, stood little chance of fulfilment once card-carrying Communists were allowed entry into the Guomindang.

There was almost an inevitability about the processes which prevented the new propaganda system from operating as set out on paper. The admission of CCP members into the Guomindang was in part premised upon a need for fresh blood to liven up the new mass propaganda program. The Guomindang had long
suffered from a shortage of dedicated party cadres, as Sun himself pointed out to a representative of Soviet youth organisations, Serge Dalin, in June of 1922.\(^9\) Shortly afterward, the Comintern agent Sneevliet helped Sun to relate his staff problems to the issue of recruiting Communists into the Guomindang, indicating how much greater was the staff problem if he truly contemplated conducting a mass propaganda program. In an article published in November, 1922, Sneevliet broached the issue, as he had doubtless already done in conversation with Sun, with the argument that the Guomindang needed both mass propaganda and the staff to see it through. The requisite talent could be drawn, he argued, from "outstanding elements" in "nationalist revolutionary groups" among whom would be counted the Communists.\(^{10}\) Sun himself returned to this theme early in 1923, before a meeting of party notables called in honour of the 1923 party reorganization. It was one thing to pass a new general platform, he averred, "but to implement it we need to get hold of people, ... must seek out personnel to shoulder the responsibility of carrying on party work." In this context, he cited the Russian propaganda precedent as he understood it, and claimed for propaganda the capacity to "enlist many good people" for party work. Propaganda on the Russian scale required, and was to help in acquiring, competent staff.\(^{11}\) The CCP appeared to offer a ready supply of party cadres who were committed to mass political activity. Sun then welcomed CCP members into the party as individuals, after which some concluded, and not without justification, that Sun wanted from them a level of commitment which his own party members had failed to provide.\(^{12}\) Such commitment came at a price, the Communists being determined to be more than merely tools of Sun Yatsen, and deciding in May of 1924 to "strive to become actual leaders of the propaganda departments of the Guomindang."\(^{13}\) Thus it was that if the Guomindang could not launch a mass propaganda enterprise without the help of the Communists, then it was to be penalised by a lack of consensus after recruiting them. The party could not have it both ways. This lack of consensus, in turn, made it incumbent upon Sun to provide strong personal leadership, and so to harness with his charisma an organization which could not be kept in check by structure and regulation alone.

**Decentralization**

In spite of the detailed structural guidelines laid down in the reorganization of 1924, the new party propaganda machine was characterized
by fragmentation rather than by "organized, systematic and disciplined" control. Central control of party propaganda had begun to deteriorate in 1923, as Ye Chucang pointed out to the party's First National Congress in January of 1924, but its fragmentation had posed little threat to party cohesion or credibility before the First Congress. It was the party reorganization ratified by that congress which made an issue of decentralization, by scattering responsibility for propaganda over a number of central bureaux and provincial, city and county branches, and at the same time adopting a policy on Communist admission which was of itself potentially divisive, and by no means endorsed at every level. Hence after the First National Congress, the need for co-ordination of propaganda was more pressing, and the consequences of failing to provide it more alarming, than had been the case in previous years.

The Outlines of Responsibility for each central bureau, promulgated by the CEC on 20 February 1924, empowered four bureaux in addition to the Central Propaganda Bureau (CPB) to undertake propaganda activities appropriate to each. These four, the Central Labour, Peasant, Military and Women's Bureaux, took advantage of this opportunity to pronounce, publish and perform propaganda at will, as did the Youth and Merchant Bureaux, which came in due course to join these others at central party headquarters. At the central level, and indeed at every other level of party organization, the Propaganda Bureau ran far behind the combined and even individual output of these other bureaux.

In 1925 and 1926, the propaganda of army units was far and away the most voluminous, most enterprising, and most far reaching form of propaganda carried out by any agency associated with the Guomindang. Military propaganda thus represented a considerable problem for central co-ordination agencies. It is not in fact clear whether Sun or party headquarters actually wanted to exert central control over military propaganda. In January and February 1924, plans were announced for setting up a Central Military Affairs Bureau to take charge of party propaganda in the armed forces, but not until November was any attempt made to carry them through, and even then only in a perfunctory way. Early in November, Sun Yatsen was keen to set his house in order before leaving Guangzhou on the fateful Northern Visit, and made
a few staff appointments to the military bureau as part of a more general reorganization. Once Sun had left for Beijing, central party headquarters failed to follow through his initiative and plans for the Central Military Affairs Bureau once again fell into abeyance. The CPB, itself empowered to direct propaganda work in the armed forces, declined to fill the gap left by the defunct Military Affairs Bureau, and responsibility for military propaganda drifted elsewhere.

It was the National Government's Political Training Bureau which, in 1925, finally took up the challenge of co-ordinating propaganda work in the National Revolutionary Army. By its own default, therefore, central party headquarters yielded jurisdiction over military propaganda to any agency outside the party. Moreover, in yielding jurisdiction to the Political Training Bureau, party headquarters effectively handed it to Soviet advisors attached to the military arms of the National Government. The Political Training Bureau was answerable to the government Military Affairs Committee, over which presided the chief Soviet military advisor to the NRA, V.K. Blyukher, a man of considerable experience in both party and army affairs in the Soviet Union. Another Russian, I.K. Mamaev, headed the editorial committee which prepared propaganda materials for the Political Training Bureau; while under Mamaev's direction, this editorial committee consisted for the most part of Chinese Communists. Under the Soviet advisors' guidance, the bureau took its responsibilities seriously, and initiated its own propagandist training program, issued the mass-circulation daily newspaper Political Work (zhengzhi gongzuo) and the monthly magazine Military and Political Affairs (Junshi zhengzhi yuekan), printed hundreds of thousands of lesser items and supervised the composition and distribution of the materials of subsidiary army agencies to virtually every hamlet in eastern and southern Guangdong.

Following the completion of the Eastern and Southern Expeditions in February 1926, the Political Training Bureau found itself caught up in the vortex of the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident, which took place on 20 March. The details of this incident, in which Chiang Kaishek ordered the detention of the gunboat commander Li Zhilong and placed all Soviet advisors and Communist military personnel under guard, remain hazy to this day, but its ramifications
Chiang's complaint heralded a reorganization of the bureau which technically transferred responsibility for army propaganda from a government to a party agency. At the heart of the reorganization was the opening of a new central party bureau entitled the Central Soldiers' Bureau, over which Chiang Kaishek himself presided. The Soldiers' Bureau appropriated from the Political Training Bureau two important prerogatives: the right to appoint commissars for propaganda work, and the right to publish propaganda materials for the edification of rank and file soldiers. Having assumed these prerogatives, the Soldiers' Bureau set up a propaganda section and editorial offices, which handled publication of a new journal, Soldiers' Weekly (Junren zhourbao) and drew up plans for a daily newspaper, Soldiers' Daily (Junren ribao). The establishment of the Soldiers' Bureau thus brought military propaganda activities as close as they were to come to the jurisdiction of central party headquarters, but only after those headquarters had themselves come under the patronage of the 'military man', Chiang Kaishek.

Like its military equivalent, the Women's Bureau operated essentially as a propaganda agency for the party's women's movement. Women's movement activists in the Guomindang argued that their propaganda required staff and techniques different from those employed by the CPB: male staff were unsuitable, while their standard techniques of public assembly, pamphleteering and magazine publication failed to reach the "mass of women". Hence staff of the Women's Bureau thought themselves the proper architects of party propaganda addressed to women, and believed such propaganda to be their raison d'etre.

In keeping with this perception of its role, the Women's Bureau employed its own team of propagandists in addition to general bureau officers. From 1924 to 1926, bureau propagandists instructed women in party doctrine and women's issues on site in hospitals, nursing colleges and factories; they also convened special gathering specifically for women, and orchestrated...
publicity campaigns for festive and commemorative occasions. Instruction also took other forms, concerned less with doctrine than with skills. The bureau ran schools for working women, and set up a Women's Movement Training Institute to acquaint women with the propaganda and organizational techniques considered appropriate for the party women's movement. Despite experimentation with appropriate techniques, the standard male propaganda medium of the printed word thrived within the Women's Bureau, which produced its own monthly magazine, Women's Voice (Fumzi shi sheng) and a variety of leaflets, and helped in the publication of magazines put out by affiliated organizations, such as that of the Guangzhou Women's Association, Woman (Funu xunkan).

Below the Central Women's Bureau there were many provincial, city and county branch women's bureaux, each with its own propaganda network, and all requiring central direction and co-ordination. In 1924 and 1925, the powers of co-ordination vested in the Central Women's Bureau were seldom exercised, but following the second National Congress held in January 1926, the central bureau began to convene joint conferences of provincial and city branch propagandists, and set up a permanent propaganda committee to work in conjunction with a similar committee in the Guangdong Provincial Women's Bureau. The bare bones of Central Women's Bureau propaganda, and of those subsidiary bureaux which complied with its instructions, amounted to an insistence upon equality of the sexes, promotion of the rights of women workers, diatribes against traditional customs of marriage and divorce, and, last but by no means least in the eyes of the party hierarchy, a call to join the mainstream of the anti-imperialist and anti-militarist national revolution under the banner of the Guomindang.

The Youth Bureau found itself submerged in educational propaganda activity by virtue of the highly intellectual traditions of the national youth movement. Before the bureau's founding, this youth movement had consisted in essence of a publicity drive for popular 'awakening' conducted by contending political factions through publications, demonstrations, public speaking and popular-education classes. The Youth Bureau inherited this tradition and, perhaps inevitably, all of the strife that came with it. Zou Lu, head of the Central Youth Bureau for its first eighteen months, was
concurrently Dean of Guangdong University, and predisposed to thinking of youth propaganda within the framework of political instruction. Instruction was indeed the norm for Youth Bureau propaganda, especially in the period immediately following Sun's death when the university began to offer accredited courses on 'Sun Yatsenism' within the university curriculum, and the Youth Bureau launched a propaganda campaign throughout the state and private school systems in Guangdong. The bureau was also concerned with the goals and structure of the school system as a whole; it drew up an education program on behalf of the CEC and opened a number of commoners' schools in Guangzhou. The school system in turn contributed to bureau propaganda by providing a pool of young intellectuals to assist in those propaganda campaigns too large for bureau staff to handle unaided. In the following year, 1926, the Youth Bureau took to publishing as well, issuing the two weekly magazines Scouts (Tongzi jun) and Youth Work (Qingnian gongzuo), in addition to dramatic scripts and a variety of leaflets. As in the case of the Women's Bureau, the Youth Bureau also kept an eye on affiliated organizations with propaganda organs of their own, most notably the All China General Union of Students and the Young Soldiers' Association.

Taking as it did the form of political instruction, Youth Bureau propaganda encountered problems on two counts. In the first place, didactic propaganda gave rise to squabbles over what were in fact the true lessons to be inferred from Sun Yatsen's writings and speeches. In the second place, the bureau's early orientation toward intellectuals prompted questions about the general direction of Guomindang mass activity. If the masses were to be awakened through political instruction, then the party could never find enough young students to send out onto the streets; if, however, the people were allowed, and indeed encouraged, to pursue those sectional interests of which they were already quite well aware, then there would be far less need for them to be awakened through the political instruction of young intellectuals. Youth Bureau propaganda was caught in an ideological and strategic dilemma, which, as will be seen shortly, was ultimately resolved only by fundamentally altering its direction.

While other central party bureaux could trace their origins to the First National Congress and the party's own initiatives in mass movements, the
Merchant Bureau came along as something of an after-thought in response to pressures from outside the party. The Guomindang founded a party Merchant Bureau on 20 October 1924, just five days after quelling a merchant rebellion which had almost brought the provincial government to its knees. The Guangzhou Merchant Rebellion, which involved the closure of shops and markets and culminated in armed insurrection, appears to have taught the Guomindang that it could ignore the economic, political and military muscle of the merchant community only at great risk to itself.

The real social and economic conflicts which gave rise to the Merchant Bureau were also responsible for moulding its propaganda into a form attuned to merchant sectional interests. The didacticism of general party propaganda was particularly unsuited to a section of society which, to the eyes of a party now awakened by merchant rebellion, appeared to be motivated solely by self-interest. The twin pillars of Guomindang propaganda, anti-militarism and anti-imperialism, were therefore presented in such a way as to appeal to merchant self-interest. The merchant communities of Guangdong were not homogeneous, and their members' interests not always compatible. The Merchant Bureau alerted its propaganda arms to distinctions within the merchant community, and most particularly to that between compradore and national capitalists, and instructed them to take advantage of their differences. Compradores were vilified, and the national capitalists brought under the wing of anti-imperialism by publicising the particular advantages for native industry of suppressing imperialist competition. A 'national goods' promotion drive had previously paid-off handsomely in Guangdong, and from the Merchant Bureau's perspective there was every reason to suppose that a 'national goods' movement might, in 1926, be converted into hostility toward the imperialist powers.

The Merchant Bureau also tailored the anti-militarist slogan to merchant interests, although not with unalloyed success. For all practical purposes, anti-militarism meant opposition to the local champion of merchant and land-owner interests, Chen Jiongming. Chen was a natural ally of Guangzhou businessmen in their campaign against Guomindang taxation policy, and the Merchant Rebellion of 1924 which engendered the Merchant Bureau seems to have been co-ordinated with Chen's troop movements along the East River. Hence
in Guangzhou, Chen Jiongming's slogan of "Canton for the Cantonese" held more appeal for merchants than the Guomindang's "down with militarists". By the same token, in places outside of Guangzhou where Chen Jiongming was himself the tax-collector and it was the Guomindang which appeared to offer welcome relief, the anti-militarist slogan found a warmer response among merchants. The Merchant Bureau thus explained Guomindang policy in terms of merchant interests and, depending upon compatibility of interests, won merchant acclaim for its opposition to militarism and imperialism.

Propaganda techniques employed by the Merchant Bureau were similar to those used by other bureaux, encompassing the publication of books, leaflets, documents and a monthly magazine, and their distribution through an independent propaganda network of provincial and county Merchant Bureaux. The bureau also founded a Merchant Movement Training Institute for specialist staff-training, and equipped all affiliated party merchant associations (shangmin xiehui) with their very own publishing sections.

The policy of attuning propaganda to the sectional interests of the merchant community, a policy forced upon the Guomindang by the political realities of Guangdong, had far-reaching implications for party propaganda which came to be realized more fully in the propaganda of the Peasant and Labour Bureaux. One outcome which did emerge clearly in the work of the Merchant Bureau, however, was the downgrading of propaganda activity relative to organizational work. The major resolutions on the party merchant movement drawn up by the second National Congress were concerned less with propaganda than with organization. The Merchant Bureau was instructed to organize small merchants into local merchant associations, both to combat the organized power of larger merchants making up the chambers of commerce, and to co-ordinate the merchant movement with the organized labour and peasant movements. Propaganda was henceforth to complement these organizational initiatives, by promising communities of small merchants a stronger voice in their own affairs should they join a party-sponsored merchant association. Whether or not they 'awakened' to a wider, altruistic vision of social and political harmony under Guomindang rule was becoming increasingly irrelevant.
The Peasant Bureau was also a propaganda agency in its own right, after the fashion of the other central bureaux, but it was much more than that as well. While a number of the other bureaux were moving toward organizational goals at the time of the second National Congress in 1926, from its inception in 1924 the Peasant Bureau had concentrated its attention upon peasant organization. Such early initiative was due in part to domination of the bureau by its Communist Secretary Peng Pai, who as a Marxist was predisposed to think along lines of class differences and less inclined than others to hope for some form of classless popular awakening. Peng's initiatives, and indeed the strength of his Marxist convictions, may be traced further to his previous experience of rural class politics in the Hailufeng areas east of Guangzhou, which taught him, more than any textbook, the value of peasant organization and the subsidiary role of propaganda.

The relationship between mass organization and propaganda in Peasant Bureau activity is clearly illustrated in the role of its special envoys (tepaiyuan), who performed the bulk of bureau work. With the help of special envoys, the Peasant Bureau put its publications to a use quite different from those of other bureaux. Its publishing record was, if anything, the most impressive of all central bureaux, encompassing the weekly magazine Peasant Movement (Nongmin yundong), the monthly Chinese Peasant (Zhongguo nongmin), a monograph series and propaganda guidelines. Yet these publications were not, like those of other bureaux, addressed to the people at large but designed for the use of the bureau's special envoys and for staff of its affiliated organizations. Peasants absorbed Peasant Bureau propaganda through the special envoys only after it had been reconstituted in a form suited to local conditions. As a result the bureau had to employ a great many special envoys to cope with the demands of a personalized local propaganda service, and in fact over the two years 1924 and 1925 employed several hundred in Guangdong alone.

For all their propaganda activity, special envoys were organizers before they were propagandists, their propaganda being but an aspect of their organizational work. No sooner had the first group of special envoys graduated from the Peasant Movement Training Institute than they were sent out to convince peasants of the advantages of organizing themselves into peasant associations. Yet being both organizers and propagandists, the special
envoys broke down the functional barriers set up between the 'propagandists' (xuanohuan yuan) and 'organizers' (suzhi yuan) who staffed, for example the Women's Bureau. The linking of propaganda and mass organization in the dual role of the special envos made propaganda responsive to the local environment, and provided it with a simple test of verification: propaganda which failed to muster peasants into peasant associations was demonstrably unsuitable. No such test was available for propaganda in the Youth, Women's or Merchant Bureaux until they too had geared propaganda to the progress of mass organization.

The Labour Bureau, under its Communist Secretary Feng Jupo, followed the pattern of the Peasant Bureau in linking propaganda with organizational activity. The scale of its operations was far smaller than that of the Peasant Bureau, because the CCP had established or penetrated a number of other agencies for labour organization, including the Chinese Labour Union Secretariat (Zhongguo laodong zuhe shuji bu), the All-China general Union (Zhonghua quanguo zong gonghui) and the Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike Committee (Shenggang bagong weiyuanhui), which in some respects rendered the Guomindang Labour Bureau redundant. The weight of publications issued by these other labour agencies contrasted markedly with the poor publishing record of the Central Labour Bureau, which was the only one of the six community-oriented Guomindang bureaux without a serial publication to its name. To the limited extent that the Labour Bureau did engage in labour organization, it showed even less interest in propaganda. Every one of nineteen separate items of bureau work listed for the months of February and March, 1926, involved organization, but only one involved propaganda at all.

Centralization

From its founding in February 1924 until Sun's death in March of the following year the Central Propaganda Bureau did very little to justify its title, neither centralizing party propaganda nor disseminating much propaganda on its own account. Some credit is due to the bureau for a number of endeavours, among them being the publication of Guomindang Weekly (Zhongguo guomindang zhoukan), the creation of the Central Newsagency (Zhongyang tongxun she) and the opening of a Propaganda Training Institute (xuanohuan jiangxi so), but
these were strictly limited achievements. The weekly magazine, for example, was not a brainchild of the bureau but a fully-grown offspring of the 1923 Provisional CEC which had been adopted by the CPB. Had it shown greater initiative, the CPB might also have taken charge of a second product of the Provisional CEC, the 'central' party newspaper *Guangzhou Republican Daily*, but the daily remained outside the jurisdiction of the CPB for the better part of 1924. The Propaganda Training Institute, moreover, conducted only one brief class of four weeks before closing down, and fell so far short of meeting the demand for trained propagandists that other central bureaux and indeed provincial and even county branch bureaux were obliged to set up institutes of their own.

Blame for the CPB's poor showing in 1924 may be levelled fairly squarely at Dai Jitao, whose casual and intermittent directorship of the bureau robbed it of direction and initiative. The petty level of CPB involvement in party propaganda as a whole is illustrated by Dai Jitao's suggestion, and apparently his only contribution to central propaganda work at this time, to enforce the use of traditional punctuation in all party publications. The CEC obliged his pedantry.

Sun Yatsen himself was also partly responsible for the listlessness of the CPB. Sun's personal involvement in central propaganda went beyond his most valuable lectures and writings, to include the organization and policing of propaganda in general. Sun bypassed the CPB with that same self-assurance which was to turn the CEC into a "minor administrative device" and make a mockery of the system of committee rule laid down by the First National Congress. Shortly after the Congress, responsibility for inspecting and correcting party newspapers was vested in the CPB by order of the CEC. Sun, however, took upon himself the burden of keeping central publications in line, and in August and September alone, personally reprimanded the *Guangzhou Republican Daily* on three separate occasion. On 1 August, he quite reasonably took objection to the insensitive placement of an article entitled "Let's talk less of -isms" (*Shaotan zhuyi*) directly above the transcript of his first lecture on "Democratism" (*Minquan zhuyi*), and sacked its author, the experienced party journalist Sun Jingya. A week later, on 9 August, he instructed the paper to cease publication of a serialised story entitled...
"The Suicide Club" (Zisha gonghui), and in the following month called upon the CEC to rebuke the paper for misnaming his administration the "military government" (jun zhengfu). At the time of this last correction, Sun was already preparing to leave Guangdong on his second northern expedition, and was consequently keen to set things in order before leaving his Guangzhou headquarters to its own devices. Hence, while stationed at his forward military base in Shaoguan in mid-September, he initiated a reorganization of central propaganda organs at a meeting of his Political Committee. The CPB's Guomindang Weekly was abolished, a few of its regular columns were transferred to the Guangzhou Republican Daily, which was transferred to the CPB, and Wang Jingwei, who had recently come to replace Dai Jitao as CPB Head, was appointed its General Editor. From the time of the party reorganization up until his final departure from Guangdong, it was largely Sun who decided what was to be published in central party organs, and what form these organs should take.

As long as Sun was around to give the final word on party policy, organization and propaganda, the CPB was distinguished from other party agencies less by its propaganda initiatives than by its lack of them. When Sun and the head of bureau Wang Jingwei departed for Beijing in November 1924, they left the CPB directionless and becalmed at the centre of a storm brewing in ever widening arcs around Guangzhou, as articulation of sectional interests began to replace political instruction in the propaganda of Zhou Enlai's General Political Bureau, Peng Pai's Peasant Bureau and Feng Jupu's Labour Bureau. By the time of the third CEC plenum, called in May 1925 to define Sun Yatsen's political legacy, there was plenty of party propaganda in circulation but very little of it emanating from the CPB.

Only after Sun's guiding hand had been permanently withdrawn did the CPB begin to feel the full weight of its responsibilities. A month after Sun's death, the CPB's sole serial publication, the Guangzhou Republican Daily, carried a two-part editorial calling for centralization of party propaganda. It pointed in alarm at the proliferation of Guomindang propaganda agencies and at the abundant variety of their products, and took issue with the standard excuse for tolerating such volume and variety, namely that "the more there are to urge on the revolution, the better". To the contrary, it argued, the more
there were the greater was the likelihood of anarchy and open conflict, and even should conflict be averted then the principle of 'the more the merrier' remained inapplicable because the audience was more likely to be distracted than attracted by ever greater volumes of repetitive propaganda. The editorialist cited the countless declarations and obituaries prompted by Sun's death as one instance of over-exposure being counter-productive, for they had led to popular indifference; a few months later, Wang Jingwei pointed to the chaotic mass of leaflets and posters concerning the Shamian Incident, Guangzhou's own equivalent to the Shanghai May Thirtieth Incident in which foreign militia opened fire on Chinese demonstrators, as an example of abundant propaganda being marred by serious inconsistencies. In each case the guiding principle of 'the more the merrier' was clearly at fault, and were it left to govern party policy in future then propaganda would either erupt into public debate or descend into repetitive banalities, neither outcome being desirable. Hence, according to the editorialist, the party needed a single, definitive, large-circulation journal like the CCP's New Youth (Xin gingnian), and nothing else at all. In a revealing aside, the editor commented that this role was beyond the scope of any existing party publication, for even the CPB's own Guangzhou Republican Daily "dares not claim to represent the party". The problem of lack of coordination in propaganda lay in the CPB's reluctance to "represent the party" at a time when plenty of other party agencies were obliged to do so by their very presence in the armies, towns and villages scattered throughout Guangdong. With this editorial in the wake of Sun's death, the CPB began to show signs of recognition of the problem, and of the obligation upon itself to resolve it.

With responsibility for propaganda dispersed through a number of bureaux, branches and political agencies, there was little option for those seeking control of the party after Sun's death but to cut their losses and co-ordinate current production. This they set out to do through the CPB, in a process which began in earnest after the May Third Plenum and reached its apogee under Mao Zedong's directorship from late 1925 to 1926. Mao was promoted to head the CPB in one of four basic measures for co-ordinating party propaganda; his appointment, along with those of several other Communist members of the Guomindang, was aimed at bringing the CPB into line with the radical opinion dominant in the governing Political Committee.
The second of the four measures was structural co-ordination, frequently taking the form of joint committees which brought together the staff of several bureaux. A few such committees had been set up before Sun's death, the most notable being the Peasant Movement Committee of May 1924 which had drawn upon senior staff of the Central Peasant, Labour, Organization and Propaganda Bureaux to co-ordinate peasant movement activities, but these earlier committees, the Peasant Movement Committee notwithstanding, were of little practical use in forestalling the anarchic proliferation of propaganda which was to become so apparent at the time of Sun's death. The later joint committees were more effective because, in the first place, there was a wider network of them, and secondly, their activities were reinforced by other co-ordination measures.

The first of the joint committees to appear after Sun's death was set up in mid-April 1925, around the time of the aforementioned Republican Daily editorial, to rationalize propaganda concerning his death and to salvage such public sympathy as remained for the purpose of channelling it into a party-recruitment campaign. The Committee for Recruiting New Party Members consisted of representatives from the CPB and every other central bureau, from among whom it selected its own propaganda committee. Other joint committees set up for propaganda co-ordination during the following year included a Provisional Political Propaganda Committee, which in June brought together the CPB, the Central Organization Bureau and propagandists from Shanghai and Beijing; a party history Editorial Committee which in October 1925 concentrated the talents of the CPB and the Guangdong Provincial Branch Propaganda Bureau; and two specific-purpose propaganda committees of February and March 1926, which were organized to co-ordinate publicity drives concerning a National Citizens' Conference and the first anniversary of Sun's death. The most important of all such joint committees was the Peasant Movement Committee, reconstituted in March 1926, which brought staff of the Central Peasant Bureau into formal contact with Mao Zedong of the CPB and Gan Naiguang of the Guangdong Provincial Propaganda Bureau. Creation of the Peasant Movement Committee followed two important resolutions of the Second National Congress, each of which posited a crucial role for the peasantry in the revolutionary movement and made party propaganda subordinate to the interests of the peasant movement. The first, carried among congress resolutions on
propaganda, ordered the CPB to help make the peasantry the party's centre of gravity; the second, listed among resolutions concerning the peasant movement, called for closer linkage between propaganda bureaux of provincial, district and town levels on the one hand and the Central Peasant Bureau on the other, in order to co-ordinate party propaganda from the desks of the Peasant Bureau. The Peasant Movement Committee was thus concerned less with ensuring Central Peasant Bureau compliance with CPB guidelines than with keeping the various propaganda bureaux abreast of developments in the Peasant Bureau's own propaganda activity. The Peasant Bureau was at the forefront of advances in a type of propaganda geared to mass organization, and the Peasant Movement Committee provided the machinery for familiarizing the rest of the party with these advances, through the joint participation of the CPB.

A third measure for co-ordinating propaganda involved improving internal communication. Until the latter half of 1925, the customary practice for keeping bureaux and branches in touch with central policy had been the issuing of Declarations (xuanyan) on subjects of current interest. Later in 1925 and in 1926, Declarations were still issued whenever a definitive policy statement was required, but with Sun dead and the locus of central power not clearly defined, they no longer carried the authority of earlier Declarations at all levels of the party. Hence in the period after Sun's death the shortcomings of Declarations became more glaring. The most obvious of these shortcomings was the lack of detail in the Declaration; this had the effect of allowing great scope for variations and contradictions within its general parameters.

Another more detailed form of policy guide, the Propaganda Outline (xuanhuan dagang) came into circulation in the last months of 1925 to compensate for this lack of specific guidance, by offering ready-made analyses and prescribed slogans covering a specific range of issues. The Outline appears to have been first devised by Zhou Enlai's General Political Bureau for use on the Second Eastern Expedition, undertaken from September to November, and to have made its way thence to the CPB, where Mao Zedong drew one up for presentation to the CEC in November. By 1926, the various joint committees which were set up to co-ordinate specific publicity campaigns had also begun to convert their decisions into Propaganda Outlines, and to communicate them
in that form to subsidiary bureaux and branches. The technique was adopted by political agencies with propaganda responsibilities of their own, for use within their organizations. The Political Training Bureau of the government Military Affairs Committee, for example, devised long-term Propaganda Outlines which were specific not only in prescribing themes but even in appointing times for their discussion within the armed forces. In March 1926, it issued the first of a series of monthly Outlines detailing precisely what was to be discussed from one week to the next. Ideally, every soldier or civilian with whom military propagandists came into contact was to be told the same thing at the same time.

Apart from compiling Propaganda Outlines, the CPB also upgraded internal communications by issuing the long-awaited definitive central party magazine, Political Weekly (Zhengzhi zhoubao). In October, Mao approached the CEC with plans for a new central publication to be called Guangdong Weekly (Guangdong zazhi), but the CEC reserved judgement and referred the matter to the Political Committee, which was coming to assume much of the responsibility for decisions relating to propaganda. The Political Committee seems to have approved publication of a CPB magazine, but with one or two qualifications: that its title be altered to Political Weekly, and that it be published by the CPB on behalf of the Political Committee rather than of the CEC. With the publication of Political Weekly, the Political Committee became formal patron of the CPB, and joined with the Central Peasant Bureau in taking advantage of the party's improved internal communications network.

The fourth measure for propaganda co-ordination was regulation. Declarations, Propaganda Outlines and joint committee pronouncements were not worth the paper they were written on unless they were accompanied by close supervision and forceful regulation. Many a stern warning to conform with central directives had been issued in 1924, and not least by Sun Yatsen himself, but so long as Sun continued to insist that disparate elements within the Guomindang made up one happy family, such regulations were enforced only under extreme provocation. In the face of increased public wrangling after Sun's death, this reluctance to prosecute offenders soon yielded to determination to enforce obedience. As far as propaganda was concerned, the
first victim of the change was the party's Hong Kong daily, *Xiangjiang Morning Post* (*Xiangjiang chenbao*), which found its editor sacked and its financial subsidy withdrawn in March 1925 on account of its open criticism of the work of CCP members in the Guomindang. By the year's end, bankruptcy had forced the paper's closure. The CPB also pressed the prosecution before the CEC of two anti-Communist pamphleteers, Ma Su and Jiang Weifan, as a result of which both were expelled from the party. Under Mao Zedong's direction early in 1926, the CPB began systematically scouring all party publications in order to identify those out of tune with policies laid down by the Second National Congress, and passing irregular cases on to the CEC for prosecution. In February alone, it pointed the bone at the Beijing Society for the study of Sun Wenism, the fourth sub-branch of the Shenzhen County Branch in Guangdong, the Shanghai party magazine *Revolutionary Guide* (*Geming daoobao*) and the long-standing daily of the U.S. party headquarters, *The Young China Morning Post* (*Shaonian zhongguo chenbao*).

The uncompromising insistence of the Political Committee and Peasant Bureau upon uniform support for their policies, communicated and policed through the CPB, so alienated anti-Communist elements within the party that they moved beyond the pale of central party authority and ceased to respond to its discipline. Thus while the four listed measures brought some semblance of uniformity into party propaganda, this uniformity was achieved at the expense of squeezing variant elements into a rival claimant to the party title, the Western Hills Guomindang; if the 'party' came to speak with a uniform voice, it was by creating two parties where once there was one. Centralization was, therefore, not simply a technical achievement, but indeed a political coup in which one political faction, and one vision of national revolution, gained ascendancy over another.

**Centralization at the Provincial Level**

The CPB was already well on the way to setting its house in order by the time a provincial propaganda bureau was established in Guangdong Province. Indeed, the very act of establishing a provincial branch in Guangdong was itself a measure of how far the CCP and Guomindang Left had succeeded in centralising party authority in their own hands. Establishment of the prov-
The initial branch had long been delayed by political squabbling between the anti-Communist party officials who had staffed the branch before the 1924 reorganization and the Communists who were beginning to dominate political work in Guangdong through central party agencies. Many staff members of the 1923 provincial branch were concurrently members of a right-wing organization, the Society for Commemorating the Revolution (Geming jinian hui) which was bent on stemming Communist Party infiltration in the Guomindang, while the Branch Head at the time, Deng Zeru, is now remembered as the first party member with the foresight to impeach the Communists for their activities in the Guomindang. In October 1925, none of these earlier anti-Communist officials was reselected for inclusion in the reformed provincial branch. Hence the problem of ensuring the conformity of provincial branch propaganda with the wishes of central party headquarters was essentially reduced to a technical one.

By its original charter, the CPB was empowered to "Guide the propaganda bureaux of all [regional] executive committees and provincial branches for the purpose of attaining unity in propaganda and opinion." This general brief was interpreted to mean guiding, correcting, and providing material for all papers, magazines, schools, film production units and performing art groups set up by the party or by any of its members at the provincial level. By the same charter, it was encumbent upon all propaganda bureaux of regional executive committees and provincial branches to report to the CPB at least once each month.

Although obliged to report regularly to the CPB and accept its guidance, provincial propaganda bureaux were also granted considerable liberty to prepare propaganda materials for the town and county branches in their care. The charter of the Propaganda Bureau of the Guangdong Provincial Executive Committee (henceforth Guangdong Propaganda Bureau, or GPB) empowered it to provide propaganda materials to party newspapers, to print and distribute materials in its own right, and to examine and authorize materials prepared by its subordinate town and county branches.

Some provincial branch propaganda bureaux exercised their liberties without acknowledging their obligations toward the CPB. The Shanghai Executive
Committee, which was responsible for organization and propaganda in all provinces of central China, failed to forward a single report to Guangzhou headquarters from the time of the First National Congress to the date, almost two years later, when it transferred its loyalty to the Western Hills faction. The Guangdong Provincial Branch, for reasons of geography as well as of political affiliation, was much closer to the CPB. It opened for business in the very month that Mao Zedong came to the chair in the CPB, and it appointed as head of its own propaganda bureau the Guomindang Leftist Gan Naiguang, who joined Mao in the self-styled revolutionary faction of the Guomindang. Hence on matters of general policy, the GPB and CPB were similarly inclined.

On most practical matters as well, there existed good co-operation and communication between the GPB and CPB. Indeed, relations between the central and Guangdong provincial party headquarters as a whole were quite unexceptionable. The Guangdong Provincial Executive Committee dutifully passed on instructions regarding propaganda from the CEC to its subsidiary town and county branches. The GPB complied with the letter and spirit of CEC instructions by publishing monthly reports of the activities of the executive committee and all bureaux at provincial level, as well as summaries of local branch activities as reports came to hand. Before issuing major propaganda guidelines, it sought the approval of the CPB, and when confronted by difficult cases of propaganda investigation, passed them up to the CPB for prosecution. Propaganda materials prepared by the CPB were passed down, in turn, through the Guangdong Provincial Branch to town and county branches, and the GPB accepted CPB propaganda guidelines for implementation. There appear to have been few constraints upon the frequency and variety of co-operation in propaganda ventures between the CPB and GPB. Many propaganda campaigns drew upon the joint resources of the two, and some invited the co-operation of other bureaux as well. By the party's own account, the success of co-operative propaganda ventures in Guangdong merited applause.

As with the CPB in central Party headquarters, the GPB was but one of many bureaux in the provincial Party headquarters engaged in propaganda activities. This situation appears to have arisen through a gradual process of attrition and accumulation in which other bureaux came
to assume responsibility for propaganda activities in their particular domains, and then, in time, to produce the great bulk of propaganda issued by the Guangdong branch. The GPB itself ran a large number of propaganda instrumentalities and turned out a prodigious volume of propaganda material. In November 1925, it took over management of a major daily newspaper in Guangzhou and began fostering a series of local newspapers throughout Guangdong, and in April of the following year started issuing an official monthly magazine. It set up a training institute for propagandists, dispatched student propaganda teams to far-flung corners of the province over school vacations, opened libraries and reading rooms, promoted the establishment of party bookshops, inspected schools and pressed for their introduction of courses on Sun's Three Principles, and in virtually every month of its operation printed and distributed thousands upon thousands of copies of leaflets, books and photographs.

The GPB was also the technical centre of propaganda operations within the provincial party headquarters. Just as the CPB specialised in the production of political cartoons for general use, so the GPB set up a Committee for Artistic Propaganda which utilized the talents of the Guangzhou School of Fine Arts to upgrade the quality of propaganda productions at provincial level. The GPB also monitored feedback from other propaganda agencies, and then drew upon relevant aspects of their experience to heighten the impact of provincial branch propaganda. In November 1925, for example, the GPB took note of reports from political bureaux of the Second Eastern Expedition that pictures were proving far more popular and effective among the illiterate rural folk than printed leaflets, and adjusted its own propaganda accordingly. In preparing materials for its expansion into distant rural communities, the GPB then deliberately reversed the earlier propaganda ratio of written to pictorial material from about three-to-one in favour of written material, to more than three-to-one in favour of pictorial.

Another function of the GPB was to train propagandists for local party work. The GPB drew up plans for a propagandist training school in March 1926, to supply the demand for trained staff at town and county level. So great was this demand that many local branches were moving to set up propaganda institutes on their own initiative, in for example Zijin, Yingde, Nanxiong
and Xijiang. The GPB grew alarmed at the prospect of losing the power
to co-ordinate propaganda effectively should such local institutes proliferate,
and in February issued an order that no institute be established without its
prior approval and joint participation. Before February, the bureau had
consistently answered demands for trained propagandists at the local level
by calling on town and county branches to put forward candidates for
the Central Propaganda Bureau's Propagandist Training Institute, but by March
it had become clear that the CPB Institute was not interested in training
propagandists for local party work in Guangdong. The GPB then decided to
set up a Propaganda Training Institute exclusively for provincial use.

The demand for trained propagandists at the local level was still far
from satisfied by the GPB institute. In March, town and county branches
and other party agencies put forward the names of eight hundred applicants
for entry, although initial plans had envisaged a first intake of only twenty
students. In view of the large number of applicants, the size of the first
class was in fact doubled, to forty. These forty were to attend classes for
thirty hours each week, in politics, economics, social psychology and the
martial arts, and their eighteen part-time teachers were to be drawn from
the GPB, the Central Youth Bureau and a number of universities in Guangzhou.
While not knowing the names or political affiliations of these teachers,
it is safe to assume that they reflected the commitment to radical labour and
peasant policies of the institute's founder, Gan Naiguang.

Practical difficulties beset the institute from the outset. It opened
on 3 April 1926, but without quarters suited for study purposes, and without
books or study materials. Once underway, its teachers often failed to show
up, and student morale suffered in consequence. As the institute opened in
the midst of confusion surrounding the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident of
20 March, some of the teachers were possibly reluctant to commit themselves
one way or another until it was clear which way the wind was blowing. This
may account for the poor performance credited to the institute in contemporary
reports.

The extra-curricula activities of students compensated to some extent
for the failure of their formal courses. Informal activities included prepar-
ation of propaganda materials, participation in public propaganda activities, on-the-job training in five work-units (news agency, peasant and labour, education, newspaper, and political training) and involvement in the activities of three voluntary societies (student, debating and lecture societies). Extra-curricula activities not only gave the students something to do in lieu of their formal classes, but also extended the reach of the institute to far more than the forty students initially enrolled. The extramural Education Unit, which was staffed by students of the institute, conducted separate propaganda courses for upwards of fifty other party members not directly affiliated with the institute. 

The impact of the institute upon party work in rural Guangdong was, in the event, quite minimal. Students were on occasion sent around the province to conduct single-issue campaigns, as on the anniversary of the Shamian Incident in June 1926, but they had not yet been stationed at town and county level when the Northern Expeditionary Armies marched out of Guangdong. The demand for trained propagandists at the local level, which was felt and articulated from November 1925 through to June 1926, was in the event met neither by the central nor by the provincial training institutes of the two propaganda bureaux.

The other major function of the GPB within the provincial branch was to co-ordinate and to police all propaganda emanating from its companion bureaux in the branch. To appreciate the scope and importance of this work, it is necessary to know something of the propaganda disseminated by these other bureaux.

The Guangdong Provincial Peasant, Labour, Merchant, Youth and Women's Bureaux were not charged specifically in the branch charter with responsibility for propaganda in their respective domains. Perhaps out of deference to the Propaganda Bureau, the use of the word 'propaganda' was avoided in the definition of responsibilities of the other bureaux, and the word 'education' seems to have been inserted in its place. The Peasant Bureau, for example, was entrusted with the task of "rural education", the Labour Bureau with the task of "workers' education", and the Women's Bureau with that of "women's education". The Youth Bureau was exhorted, again without recourse to the word 'propaganda', to "guide the political views" of students in provincial
Although the word 'propaganda' was nowhere to be found, it was thus everywhere inferred. Most bureaux interpreted the charter, in practice, to mean that they were entitled and perhaps obliged to turn out their own propaganda.

The Provincial Youth Bureau, for example, ran a staff-training institute similar to that run by the GPB in order to prepare youth movement staff for propaganda work. Like the GPB training institute, the Youth Bureau institute had not yet graduated its first class when the Northern Expedition was launched. It opened in April 1926, in the same week as the GPB institute, and its classes were scheduled to run for three months, through to July.

Again like the GPB institute, the Youth Bureau institute was weighted heavily in favour of aggressive peasant, labour and anti-imperialist policies. Courses covered histories of socialism and imperialism, and admission was by way of an entrance examination which tested candidates' familiarity with, among other things, the materialist conception of history. On the faculty itself, Communist Party members were clearly in evidence. They occupied almost half of teaching positions forshadowed in initial plans for the institute, and although there was some diminution in their influence between the time of the institute's inception and the date of its opening, that is, before and after the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident, their influence remained considerable. Once the institute opened, Communists made up about one-third of staff and accounted for roughly one-third of classroom hours. Mao Zedong's class on the provincial peasant movement, doubtless similar to the one he was conducting simultaneously at the Central Peasant Movement Training Institute, was the longest of all, equalled only by that of the old colleague of Peng Pai who directed the institute, Li Yueting.

Provincial bureaux other than the GPB also engaged widely in general propaganda activities. The Women's Bureau is a case in point. It employed five full-time propagandists, a greater number than the GPB itself; it organized and funded a theatrical society, known as the Popular Drama Society, to perform works charged with "revolutionary significance" in Guangzhou and throughout the countryside; it set up a Propaganda Section for the
purpose of encouraging women to join the Guomindang; it composed, printed and distributed leaflets; and it sent propagandists out to schools and public places to lecture on issues of concern to women.\textsuperscript{118}

The provincial Women's Bureau sat neatly within the total propaganda network of the party's various women's bureaux, from the central bureau at the top, to the provincial, city and town and county branch women's bureaux. The provincial Women's Bureau co-edited and distributed the magazine of the Central Women's Bureau, \textit{Women's Voice}, and distributed that of the Guangzhou City Branch Women's Bureau, \textit{New Woman} (\textit{Xin funu}).\textsuperscript{119} It co-operated with the central and Guangzhou City bureaux in planning propaganda activities for the celebration of International Women's Day on 8 March, 1926.\textsuperscript{120} At the town and county level, the provincial Women's Bureau promoted the establishment of a Women's Propaganda Training Institute in Luoding County, and, through its appointment of propagandists to four regional Special Committees, expanded the reach of its propaganda to the southernmost and easternmost points of the province.\textsuperscript{121} Similar outlines of propaganda activity could be drawn up for the provincial Youth and Merchant Bureaux, each of which matched the Women's Bureau in the variety and volume of its output.\textsuperscript{122}

The Guangdong Peasant and Labour Bureaux were, like their central equivalents, less committed than the Women's and Youth Bureaux to propaganda activity. In the case of the provincial Peasant Bureau, this was partly a function of that bureau's role in the overall party peasant movement: it was primarily a cipher for the Central Peasant Bureau, and barely existed in its own right. The initial head of the Guangdong Peasant Bureau, the Communist peasant activist Peng Pai, also master-minded the Central Peasant Bureau from his position as Secretary of that bureau.\textsuperscript{123} Peng ceded the position of Central Peasant Bureau Secretary in November, 1925, to his Communist colleague Luo Qiyuan, but Luo managed to retain the close identification between central and provincial Peasant Bureaux by coming to replace Peng as Head of the Guangdong Peasant Bureau, as well, in January 1926.\textsuperscript{124} In effect, Peng Pai transferred his twin posts to Luo Qiyuan. On top of sharing its senior staff with the Central Peasant Bureau, the Guangdong Peasant Bureau also borrowed low-level cadres from its central counterpart.\textsuperscript{125} Hence from top to bottom, the Guangdong Peasant Bureau had few staff to call its own. Its lack of staff was reflected
in a minimum output of propaganda.\textsuperscript{126} Peasant movement materials distributed at town and county level appear, in fact, to have been produced by the Central Peasant Bureau and its affiliated, Communist dominated, organizations.\textsuperscript{127}

Another reason for low levels of propaganda activity in the provincial Peasant and Labour bureaux was propaganda's relegation to the back seat, in the peasant and labour movements, behind organizational activities. Party activists in the two movements were essentially organizers who could turn their hands to propaganda, rather than propagandists who could dabble in organization as activists in the women's and youth movements tended to be. The monthly reports of the Guangdong Peasant and Labour Bureaux, like those of central headquarters, were laden with accounts of their organizational activities in the town and county branches of Guangdong, while the reports of the Women's and Youth Bureaux brimmed with accounts of propaganda activities.\textsuperscript{128} In the former, propaganda was but an aspect of organization, while in the latter organization was a byproduct of propaganda, and this difference in the functions of propaganda came to be reflected in different levels of propaganda activity in the two groups of bureaux.

The propaganda activities of its five companion bureaux taxed to the limit the GPB's capacity to supervise them. Although no mean publisher itself, the GPB's production was far outstripped by the combined tally of its partners, and the more they produced, the greater was its own burden. It was empowered by the charter of the Provincial Executive Committee to examine and correct all party publications issued at provincial level, and to guide all propaganda activities directed toward the town and county levels, with the aim of "ensuring the uniformity" of party propaganda. The GPB was to vet everything put out by the Guangdong provincial branch.\textsuperscript{129}

If the experience of the Guangdong Merchant Bureau is any guide, then it appears that attempts were made to follow the charter in practice. On 16 December 1925, the Merchant Bureau petitioned to set up a monthly magazine to cater exclusively for the merchant movement. The Provincial Executive Committee approved the plan, and assigned responsibility for preparing the magazine to the Merchant Bureau, while insisting that a draft of each issue should gain Executive Committee approval before publication.\textsuperscript{130}
The Merchant Bureau submitted an outline of contents in the following week, which was duly passed on the GPB for examination.\(^{131}\) In February, however, when perhaps half of the regular staff of each bureau had left town to take up positions on the four regional Special Committees, the Executive Committee appears to have bypassed the GPB in granting approval for other propaganda material prepared by the Merchant Bureau.\(^{132}\) New steps were then taken to restore the GPB to its rightful place in the process of propaganda production. In March, the Merchant Bureau invited the GPB Head and Secretary, Gan Naiguang and Chen Kewen respectively, to accept positions on an editorial committee within the Merchant Bureau itself, and so to participate at the creative end of the propaganda production line.\(^{133}\) By such methods, the GPB kept in touch with the propaganda activities of the Merchant Bureau and, it may be assumed, of its other partners in the Guangdong provincial party headquarters. Two years after the closure of the First National Congress, central and provincial propaganda organs in Guangdong Province were thus attuned in as fine a harmony as could be expected of any revolutionary party. But to what purpose?
Chapter Five

THE QUALITY OF CENTRALIZATION

Anti-imperialism and anti-militarism were the twin pillars of Guomindang propaganda from the First National Congress in January 1924, through to the Northern Expedition. These two political principles had been adopted by the CCP at its Second Congress in 1922, when, under orders from the Third International to form a united front with the Guomindang, it had seized upon militarism and imperialism as the common enemies of the two parties and hence as the most appropriate targets for emblazoning the pennant of their united front. In the interim, the Guomindang was not quite so sure that the two were in fact its enemies, and in the sequel to its First National Congress, it found them a little less straightforward than they had at first appeared.

Sun Yatsen certainly had few qualms about stating his opposition to militarism. Anti-militarism could be accommodated very easily into that grand tradition of party propaganda which reviled military rulers who had overthrown legitimately constituted party authority, from the time of Yuan Shikai to the rebellion of Chen Jiongming. Sun's sympathy for the anti-militarist slogan was grounded in the past experience of his parties and governments in dealing with military power-brokers, upon whom they were forced to rely but could never depend. Militarism was thus conceived simply in terms of maverick mercenary armies which had no real basis in local society and economy and could consequently be eliminated without in any way touching the fabric of society.

The slogan of anti-imperialism made its way into formal Guomindang propaganda by a more circuitous route. Although some in Sun's circle had long been critical of Great Power intrusion into China's domestic affairs and treatment of China in international forums, Sun himself was not among them. Dai Jitao was willing to sound a note of welcome for any new public display of righteous patriotic indignation, but Sun, who was ever trying to win some form of assistance or concession from these very Powers, professed distaste for 'anti-foreignism' with equal consistency. The issue was complicated in 1923 by Sun's turning to the USSR for financial, military and technical assistance while at the same time keeping open his options for help from
Britain, Germany and the US. The evidence suggests that only after the Soviets had delivered the goods, and the others had affronted Sun by turning him down, did Sun begin to adopt an anti-imperialist posture, which in this latest manifestation meant opposition to all the Great Powers with the exception of the USSR.\(^3\)

Communist members of the Guomindang were advertising the twin slogans through the Guomindang even while Sun was still questioning the suitability of 'anti-imperialism'. Their differences emerged most clearly in August, 1923, when Sun and Communist members of his own Military Headquarters Propaganda Committee clashed, indirectly, on the problem of the Great Powers. In a speech to delegates of the National Students' Union, Sun took umbrage with a phrase which appeared in the union's Declaration: "Resist the Great Powers abroad, and overthrow the militarists at home!". "In my view, these two problems cannot be discussed in the same breath", insisted Sun, "... for if the home government is good then foreign relations present no problem."\(^4\) To Sun's mind, the two issues were clearly quite distinct and only one of them, militarism, was worthy of immediate attention. Sun's misgivings notwithstanding, the two issues were raised together in a booklet by the Communist Feng Jupo, published by Sun's Propaganda Committee, and entitled National Revolution and the Workers, the theme of which was the role of organized labour in "resisting the Great Powers" and "overthrowing militarists".\(^5\) The Communists' use of the twin slogan in the name of the Guomindang was, as things turned out, premature rather than improper, and so escaped censure; the Communists were gratified to find that Sun was not going to lecture them, as he had the student union, but chose instead to come around to their way of thinking. In the Declaration of the First National Congress of the Guomindang, drafted by Borodin in November 1923, the twin slogan made its appearance with Sun's consent.\(^6\)

By the opening of the First National Congress, the CCP and Guomindang were in agreement not only on the importance of opposing imperialists and militarists, but also on the nature of the anti-imperialist and anti-militarist national revolution. The united front was premised on the shared assumption that a national revolution was, and should remain, distinct from class politics. Like Sun, the CCP saw militarism as having no significant
foundation in Chinese society; its view deviated from Sun's not in its level of class analysis but in its long standing recognition that militarism and imperialism were inter-related phenomena, the militarists being sustained by imperialism and bargaining away China's sovereignty in return. The two are presented in CCP writings from 1922 to 1924 as inter-twining strands of an oppressive superstructure which weighs down Chinese people of every class, except perhaps the class of compradore merchants which, it is suggested, barely merits the designation Chinese and is itself but a by-product of imperialism. Hence the CCP appears to have harboured few doubts that a national revolution could proceed independently of class struggle, and indeed should precede it. This assumption was never called into doubt in the interminable quarrels within the CCP over the form of its co-operation with the Guomindang; the point at issue in 1922-23 was not whether an all-class national revolution against imperialists and militarists was possible, but whether in fact it was desirable.7

With some prompting from Sneevliet, who believed a supra-class national revolution to be both possible and desirable, the Communists joined the Guomindang as individuals and defended this shared definition of national revolution within the other party. In April 1924, the CCP Secretary-General Chen Duxiu tried to distinguish radical and conservative factions within the Guomindang by classifying them simply in terms of their attitudes toward militarism and imperialism, irrespective of their attitudes toward class politics, which he declared irrelevant.8 This limited definition of radicals and conservatives was, nonetheless, highly applicable, for within the parameters of the proposed all-class national revolution there were still plenty of Guomindang members who objected to anti-militarism for fear that it would alienate the party's allies in militarist circles, and many others who objected to anti-imperialism because it was bound to make life difficult for them in the foreign concessions or on foreign shores.9 For this early phase of the national revolutionary movement, before the party had actually tried to foster popular opposition to militarists and imperialists in the towns and villages of Guangdong, the definition shared by Chen and Sun sufficed.

Once the revolutionaries had taken their twin slogan into the field, it soon became apparent that there was indeed a social dimension to militarism
at the local level, and hence that national revolution and class politics were not quite as easily segregated as at first appeared. The process of discovering this social dimension unfolds most clearly in the pages of the CCP weekly magazine, Guide, over the second half of 1924. The standard CCP belief in undifferentiated popular opposition to militarism was presented early in June, as in previous months, in one article which queried the truth of reports that a local militarist received widespread popular acclaim as he passed through his territories in Anhui, and in another article which applauded signs of local resistance to a Shaanxi militarist in Hunan. The latter placed particular stress on the role of landlord Popular Militia in leading resistance to the Shaanxi army units, concluding that "we should recognise the importance of Popular Militia in the movement to overthrow the militarists". The CCP was clearly prepared to work alongside the most reactionary of social classes in the interests of a united front for national revolution.

In the following issue of the magazine, faith in the strength of landlord sympathy for the anti-militarist movement was subverted by a letter from the Communists' resident peasant movement activist in Guangdong, Peng Pai. In this letter, written a month or more before publication, Peng detailed a simple story of collusion between the landlord gentry of Hailufeng and the local militarist, Chen Jiongming, in the politics of East Guangdong. Peng capped his tale with a candid comment from Chen's own lips: "The gentry and I still depend on one another for our survival." Peng had in fact been overstepping the bounds of the all-class national revolution by organizing the peasants of Hailufeng and pressing their demands for rent reductions, and in so doing had not unnaturally incited social reaction. Yet the point of Peng's letter was not the nature or violence of that social reaction, which was in any event expected, but rather the fundamental relationship between the local gentry and their local militarist which his activities had exposed.

In fact, Chen Jiongming was quite a popular figure among the landlords and merchants of Guangdong, being in some cases preferred to the Guomindang, as that party was to discover to its cost on the Eastern Expeditions of 1925. Chen's popularity among the property owning classes of Guangdong had shown up in a number of ways prior to the Guomindang reorganization: in the obvious
inclination of Guangzhou newspaper proprietors to value his word over that of Sun Yatsen, when the latter was trying to win support for his Constitution Protection campaign in 1919; in the support from merchants and gentry for Chen's rebellion against Sun in 1922; and in the popularity of 'Huizhouism' among tertiary students studying in Guangzhou, 'Huizhouism' being a political philosophy which espoused rule by the benevolent militarist, Chen Jiongming. When Peng Pai wrote of the symbiotic relationship between the gentry of Hailufeng and the militarist Chen Jiongming, he was therefore pointing to but the tip of an iceberg, the bulk of which was to be uncovered piece by piece as the national revolutionaries of the Guomindang tried to extend and exercise party authority throughout Guangdong.

The next lesson for the CCP in the collusive alliance between local militarism and vested interests came with the Guangzhou Merchant Rebellion, which was staged in unison with troop movements by Chen Jiongming along the East River. Chen Duxiu was prompted by this incident, which he read in conjunction with the quote attributed to Chen Jiongming on the mutual reliance of gentry and militarists, to expand his definition of the national revolution with the comment that "the imperialists, militarists, rural gentry and traitor merchants are in fact all just peas in a pod". It was thus the nature of local militarism itself, and the turn of events in Guangdong, which introduced an element of class politics into the national revolution of 1924-6. Under pressure from the Comintern, the CCP as a body initially rejected proletarian revolution in favour of an all-class alliance for national revolution. Only after learning that the premise upon which the united front was based, viz that national revolution could be undertaken with a minimum of class friction, was false, did it encourage the national revolution to develop its class aspect. 'Aspect' is indeed the appropriate word, for the national revolution in Guangdong was not, even in its most controversial moments, a movement for peasant or proletarian dictatorship. The Guomindang welcomed all classes and groups other than those which showed by their actions that they would help the militarists or imperialists, and indeed some of the most successful propaganda and liaison work undertaken by Communists within the Guomindang was among the merchants of Shantou and Huizhou.
This class aspect of the national revolution was to have profound repercussions upon the Guomindang as a party. The twin themes of anti-militarism and anti-imperialism had already, even in its most elementary form, alienated one group of party members who were fearful of offending allied militarists and hospitable imperialists. The emerging class implications of the national revolutionary movement in Guangdong spawned another splinter group which, though itself strongly anti-militarist and anti-imperialist, still hoped to keep the national revolution above class politics. This group, as we shall see, was compelled to place enormous faith in the power of propaganda to persuade people of every class and every place to shelve their differences and come out fighting against the militarists and imperialists.

To complicate matters, class politics threatened to enter the national revolution from another front as well, from the direction of the nascent mass movements of workers and peasants. Expansion of the peasant and labour movements was the second major task assigned to propaganda after the First National Congress of the Guomindang, with workers and peasants, and indeed merchants and landlords, being asked to pool their strength in the party's support. In this respect, propaganda was expected both to catalyse a mass movement and at the same time to keep it within bounds. Speaking of labour movement propaganda on the eve of the First National Congress, Sun said the party should attract workers to the movement without conceding their demands for higher wages or shorter hours; propaganda was to teach them to look beyond their immediate interests for the sake of national revolution.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, peasant movement activists were told to rely heavily on propaganda precisely in order to prevent peasants making excessive demands upon their landlords.\textsuperscript{19} Sun's expectations of mass movement propaganda were thus quite ambivalent: on the one hand it should mobilise particular classes and herd them into class-specific mass organizations, and on the other should prevent their developing class solidarity or class consciousness. What lent this ambivalence some credibility at the time was an unbounded faith in the power of propaganda to sway the minds and expand the horizons of workers and peasants.

Should political instruction not live up to the first of these expectations, failing to stimulate worker or peasant involvement in national
revolution, then the masses would have to be left out of the anti-imperialist and anti-militarist movement altogether, or else be enticed into it by other methods, such as those perfected by Peng Pai in Hailufeng. Should it succeed, then the local gentry would in all probability take exception to the mere presence of peasant associations in their vicinity, regardless of whether or not the associations pressed concrete demands upon them. If propaganda did not live up to the second of these expectations, failing to keep the peasant and labour movements within bounds, then each of the mass movements would indeed press demands particular to its class. Sun was thus tempting fate by proposing the organization of class-specific mass movements for an all-class national revolution, and pinning his hopes for containing the mass movements upon propaganda.

CPB Staff Appointments, 1924-6

A rudimentary outline of the type of uniformity which, by 1926, had come to prevail in Guomindang propaganda in Guangdong may be traced through staff appointments to the CPB, from Dai Jitao to Mao Zedong. Although propaganda developments over this period can hardly be put down to personal or ideological differences alone, these differences certainly mark its phases of development. As Dai differed from Mao, so did the nature of party propaganda in 1924 and in 1926.

Dai, Sun's initial choice for bureau head, remained aloof from the reorganization of 1923-4 and effectively declined the position. He was offended that Sun had looked to the "outside forces" of the USSR and CCP for inspiration, after having ignored his own mass propaganda proposals for a number of years. Dai had in fact never felt at home in Guangdong, and found the relatively sophisticated atmosphere of Shanghai more congenial for the type of 'mass propaganda' he had in mind. He thus retired to Shanghai to "manage a publishing house or a newspaper." Between Dai's unpredictable visits to Guangzhou, and before his formal replacement by Wang Jingwei in August, 1924, management of the CPB fell into the hands of the acting head Peng Sumin and the Bureau Secretary Liu Luyin, who himself later served as acting head.

Peng Sumin was an old hand at party propaganda, having edited and contributed to official party journals since the founding of the Guomindang
A memorandum from Peng to Sun Yatsen, published in January 1923 under Sun's marginal comment that it was "most accurate and should be publicised to all party members," gives some indication of those ideas on propaganda which led to Peng's elevation to CPB chief in Dai Jitao's absence. To Peng's mind, propaganda consisted first and foremost of instruction in party principles. The party's past misfortunes could be attributed to its members' failure to implement such basic party doctrines as the Five Power Constitution of Sun Yatsen, a failure which was attributed in turn to members' lack of understanding of party principles. Peng thought the same faults apparent among students, workers and the general population, all of whom would benefit from instruction in party principles were it conducted through educational, labour and community organizations. He then proposed that such instruction commence forthwith. Given the similarities between Peng's views and Sun's own, Peng must have seemed just the man for the job. His tenure was, however, fairly brief, for Dai Jitao returned to Guangzhou in April and occupied his chair at the CPB until June. Peng, meanwhile, moved on to become head of the Central Peasant Bureau, where he was to remain until his untimely death just five months later.

Such continuity as the CPB achieved in the first year came through Liu Luyin, initially in his capacity as Bureau Secretary from February to June, and later as acting head from June to August, 1924. Liu was a friend and colleague of Dai Jitao; he shared the latter's distaste for Marxism and mistrust of the CCP, and moved on to become Dai's personal assistant after both had left the CPB. Dai Jitao considered awareness of Sun's principles to be the hallmark of a revolutionary, and enlightening the people to be the role of propaganda; Liu Luyin understood party propaganda to mean instructing citizens of all classes in the principles of Sun Yatsen and in the workings of republican democracy. Liu was thus admirably suited to hold the torch in Dai's absence.

By the time Liu joined the CPB he was a highly qualified lawyer and sociologist, with many years experience in the USA and Canada behind him. He took his first degree at Fudan University in Shanghai, where he came into contact with the Shanghai circle of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, and his second in the law school of the University of California. Once in San Francisco, be became a leading contributor to the newspaper of the US
party headquarters, The Young China Morning Post (Shaonian zhongguo chenbao) and in 1920 took charge of the entire party network in the U.S. In mid-1923 he moved north to Vancouver to assume command of Canadian party headquarters, and in the last months of 1923 was chosen to act as U.S. delegate to the First National Congress of the Guomindang, scheduled to be held in Guangzhou in January 1924. Thus he found his way back to China, and into the CPB.

Liu's professional training and experience abroad shaped his understanding of the Guomindang and of the function of its propaganda. In the first place, his years in party branches abroad had made him an ardent spokesman for Sun's Three Principles. In the American setting, he had traced Sun's inspiration to the traditional Chinese virtues of Universal Love (boai) and Mutual Aid (huzhu) and to the cherished American principles of Liberty and Equality, portraying the Three Principles as a unique and systematic "reform program" which drew upon the best of East and West and which pre-empted violent social revolution. In the second place, like Dai Jitao, Liu entrusted responsibility for restoring China's glorious heritage to intellectuals. He developed the idea to new heights by trying to shift the attention of the Canadian Party Headquarters from the commercial hub of Vancouver's Chinese community to a small circle of local intellectuals. Liu's elevated notions of the political function of intellectuals was out of touch with the historic role of Overseas Chinese business communities in keeping the party solvent. Thirdly, and once again like Dai Jitao, Liu believed education and training to be the key to revolution in China: education of the public in political issues, and training of party members for participation in republican administration. In 1921, he defined the Guomindang as a "political school for training the citizens of a republic".

Liu Luyin showed by his behaviour at the time of appointment to the CPB that his ideas had changed little over the intervening years. At the First National Congress in January 1924, he came out in support of a motion proposing the use of an American electoral system within the Guomindang, after the motion had been introduced by Huang Jilu with the words: "this system can be adopted as a form of training, in preparation for that time in the future when it might be put into universal practice in the administration of the nation as a whole". Liu Luyin could hardly afford to let slip such
an opportunity for creating a "political school for training the citizens of a republic", and rose to defend the motion against opposition voiced by the Communist delegate Mao Zedong. Mao argued that the Guomindang was essentially a revolutionary party, and that techniques of party organization suited to a post-revolutionary situation might divert the party from its immediate goal of revolution. This providential encounter between Liu and Mao, each of whom was to head the CPB in the period between the First and Second Congress of the Guomindang, foreshadowed one of the major developments in Guomindang propaganda over the intervening two years. While Liu took propaganda to mean educating people to play their part in national revolution, Mao understood propaganda to mean stimulating them to action by articulating their own demands.

Under Liu Luyin in the CPB at this time were two other staff members of like mind, Lang Xingshi and Zhou Fohai. Lang was a friend and colleague of Liu Luyin, having worked alongside him in party offices in San Francisco and Vancouver. Zhou Fohai made his way into the Bureau at the invitation of Dai Jitao in April 1924, after returning to China from an extended period of study in Japan. Zhou was at the time undergoing an intellectual transition from infatuation with Marxism to repudiation of it, and from early association with the CCP to total dissociation from it. His familiarity with Marxism left him with an understanding of historical materialism and of the class roots of social consciousness, but rather than make a Communist revolutionary of him, this understanding only strengthened his resolve to try to ameliorate class differences through mass political instruction in the principles of Sun's national revolution. Indeed, not only Zhou Fohai but the three other senior staff of the CPB who survived 1924, that is Dai Jitao, Liu Luyin and Lang Xingshi, all wanted to keep class politics out of the national revolution and blamed its introduction upon the CCP. It was their shared distaste for class politics which brought them together again late in 1925, through direct and indirect association with the anti-Communist Guomindang splinter group, the Western Hills Faction. Staffed during its first phase of operation by men such as these, the CPB was bound to look askance at any vision of propaganda other than as educating people to look beyond their sectional interests, toward the universal principles of Sun Yatsen.
Wang Jingwei's appointment as Bureau Head on 14 August ushered in the second phase of CPB operation, which corresponded with the period of Sun Yat-sen's second Northern Expedition, Northern visit and death, the Guangzhou merchant rebellion, and Chiang Kaishek's First Eastern Expedition; it drew to a close with the Third Plenary Session of the CEC in May, 1925. CPB staff of this phase showed as little inclination to take advantage of class and sectional interests in the community as their predecessors in the bureau. Dai Jitao, Liu Luyin and Zhou Fohai all withdrew from the CPB, but their replacements Wang Jingwei, Chen Fumu and Chen Yangxuan did little to divert the CPB from its earlier course.

Wang Jingwei directed the bureau for only the first three of the nine months in question, before joining the entourage of Sun's Northern Visit in November and accompanying him to Beijing. Over those three early months, Wang was neither the creature of the Soviet advisor Borodin that he appears later to have become, nor had he yet been tempted to abandon his early misgivings about granting Communists entry into the Guomindang. Hence Wang's brief directorship in 1924 occasioned none of the developments which were to take place after his return from Beijing, when he played the Communist card to win titular control of the party, government and army in Guangdong.

Chen Fumu joined the CPB by way of its one and only serial publication in its second phase, the Guangzhou Republican Daily. Chen began his career in the Guomindang while working for the Hong Kong News (Xinwen bao) in mid 1924, at which time it had switched from being the mouth-piece of Chen Jiongming into a formal subsidised propaganda organ of the Guomindang. Following his volte-face, one of the co-owners of the News, Huang Jusu, sided with anti-communist elements in the Guomindang, rising to the position of Head of the Central Peasant Bureau in October and then trying to rid that bureau of Communist Party influence. His master-stroke was an attempt to replace the Peasant Bureau's dynamic Communist Secretary, Peng Pai, with his old colleague from the Hong Kong News, Chen Fumu. The attempt failed, Huang Jusu lost his seat in the Peasant Bureau and the Communists strengthened their hold upon it. The upshot of all this was that, having failed to gain entry to the Peasant Bureau through this abortive right-wing coup, Chen Fumu joined the
CPB as editor of the central Guomindang newspaper, the Guangzhou Republican Daily, and prevented that paper from developing into an organ for promoting the sectional interests of those masses it was attempting to arouse.48

Chen Yangxuan, the man who came to deputise for Wang Jingwei as head of the CPB from November, was an enigmatic figure. He was appointed secretary of the CPB around the time of Wang Jingwei's promotion to the CPB in August, 1924, and attended Guomindang Central Executive Committee meetings in Wang's place from November to May of 1925.49 Chen was not himself a Communist, and seems to have shown little partiality toward the CCP.50 Indeed, if he favoured any group within the Guomindang it was perhaps the right-wing Old Guard of the party, for under Chen's direction in March, 1925, the CPB co-operated in a propaganda program with the stridently anti-Communist Society for Commemorating the Revolution (Geming jinian hui) which was headed by the Communists' arch-enemy in Guangzhou, Deng Zeru.51 Yet whatever the personal political inclinations of these little known officers, Chen Fumu and Chen Yangxuan, their low standing within the party gave the CPB an equally low profile in its second phase of operation, with the result that it played an insignificant part in the rebellions, strikes and military campaigns taking place around it.

A major power struggle heralded the start of the third phase of CPB operation, which occupied the year from May 1925 to May 1926. In April and May 1925, members of the entourage of Sun Yatsen's Northern Visit made their way back to Guangzhou, in dribs and drabs, from the scene of Sun's recent death in Beijing. Before leaving Beijing, they had convened the Third Plenary Session of the First CEC, but faced with the increasing opposition of the northern government without, and mounting turmoil within, had decided to dissolve the Third Plenum and to reconstitute it in Guangzhou, where it resumed on 18 May.52 Over the following months the party was preoccupied with conflicts between personalities, strategies and ideologies which inevitably found expression in the CPB.

The two most senior party officials to have headed the CPB, Dai Jitao and Wang Jingwei, both attended the Third Plenum, and in terms of policy making Dai clearly carried the day. Dai penned the formal Declaration
and Instructions issued at the close of the plenum, which bore his unmistakable stamp in their insistant and repetitive references to mass awakening as the foundation of popular revolution. The documents attributed success in recent party mass movements to propaganda, in the form of instruction in the principles and platform of the Guomindang, and on the basis of this explanation called for continued political indoctrination of the masses. The tenets comprising party doctrine were defined in the "Instructions on Accepting the President's Will" as an integral corpus of eight works composed or authorised by Sun Yat-sen. As there was no call to promote the interests of one sectional group against another in any of these eight works, so the plenum effectively banned the promotion of class struggle in the name of the Guomindang. At the same time, the Plenum reaffirmed the policy of admitting Communists into the Guomindang, while reiterating the condition Sun ostensibly placed upon their entry, of disciplining them should they step out of line. As Dai Jitao defined it in the Instructions, the core of party discipline lay in "respect for Sun's character and acceptance of the works he has bequeathed us." This definition of the essence of the Guomindang was to make interesting reading once Mao Zedong took charge of the CPB, just four months after its promulgation at the Third Plenum.

There was no mistaking the import of the plenum declarations, and they were immediately pressed into service in the propaganda programs of provincial branches hostile to the presence of the Communists. As is the nature of peripheral organizations, provincial branches were keen to state in no uncertain terms things which the centre dared only hint. The Zhejiang Provincial Branch accepted the plenum documents enthusiastically, and then issued an "Instruction on the attitude toward class struggle which should be adopted in propaganda work", in which it developed the theme of the plenum documents into the argument that the proper function of propaganda was to smooth over, rather than to take advantage of, differences between classes. From the perspective of the Zhejiang branch, the different interests of different classes had little bearing upon social consciousness: "the distinction between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries lies not in their class background, but in their levels of understanding and awakening." Hence propaganda, being vested with powers to mould consciousness and shape attitudes toward the Guomindang, assumed paramount importance. Party propaganda was in fact assigned responsib-
ility for extracting social consciousness from the depths of local ignorance, and recasting it into an homogeneous popular awakening. Dai Jitao himself could not have put it better.

Dai Jitao may have won the contest of words at the May Plenum, but when it came to staffing the CPB and responding to the pattern of events unfolding in Guangdong, it was the Communists on the spot who carried the day. In mid-June, at the eighty-second session of the CEC, members of the CCP gained entry to the upper echelons of the CPB for the first time, when Yu Shude, Zhang Guotao and Tan Pingshan were appointed to a Provisional Political Propaganda Committee (Zinshi zhengzhi xuanzhu weiyuan hui). The committee also included three Guomindang members who were by this time hostile toward the CCP, Dai Jitao, Shao Yuanchong and Shen Dingyi, and of course Wang Jingwei, who was left to straddle both sides as chairman of the committee and head of the CPB. Of the seven members only Wang Jingwei and the Communist Tan Pingshan remained stationed at the CPB offices in Guangzhou. The two other Communists, Zhang Guotao and Yu Shude, resumed their positions in Shanghai and Beijing respectively, while the three non-Communists all returned to Shanghai after the May Plenum.

Tan Pingshan was, at the time of his appointment to the propaganda committee, the architect of Guomindang branch organization in Guangdong Province. His dual role as party organizer and propagandist in Guangdong came to be reflected in the first plan drawn up by the propaganda committee, which dealt almost exclusively with that province in outlining a propaganda program for countering the damage caused by the rebellion of the Yunnan and Guangxi armies, by Tang Jiayao's threatening gestures in Guangxi, and by the opposition to Guomindang rule presented by landlord militia in the numerous counties of Guangdong. Through entry into the CPB, Tan Pingshan thus gave the CCP command of the heights as well as the valleys of Guomindang propaganda activities in Guangdong.

The selection of committee members from Shanghai and Beijing was designed to bring the nationwide propaganda network into line with the CPB, but in fact it exacerbated existing tensions to the point of rupture. In Guangzhou, Tan Pingshan lent his newly acquired authority to the publication
of an unofficial party journal, *The Revolution* (*Geming*), and contributed to it articles which riled Dai Jitao by referring to some aspects of the Guomindang as counter-revolutionary. In response, the three anti-Communist committee members in Shanghai, Dai, Shen and Shao, joined forces to edit a new magazine outside of the formal party structure, *The Independent* (*Buli*), which emanated from Dai Jitao's personal address in Shanghai and listed as its aim the "explanation and research of the Three Principles of the People". The magazine's title suggested that its editor wished to remain aloof from the politics of sectional interest, be they vested interests or the interests of the dispossessed. At the same time, Dai wrote and published his two influential tracts *The Philosophical Foundations of Sun Yat-sen-ism* and *The National Revolution and the Guomindang*, in which he forcefully reiterated his ideas concerning a popular awakening independent of class and sectional interests, and through which he inevitably, albeit perhaps inadvertently, fanned anti-Communist feeling in all three centres of Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong. With its seats parcelled out equally among Communists and non-Communists, and similarly divided between Shanghai and Guangdong, the Provisional Political Propaganda Committee thus formalized a defacto tendency within the party for political cleavages to take on a geographical aspect, in the shape of conflict between the Shanghai and Guangzhou offices of the party.

From September of 1925, Mao Zedong was to strengthen CCP representation in the CPB. Mao had come to Guangzhou on the run, after raising the ire of the Military Governor of Hunan, Zhao Hengti, through his activities with peasant associations in Hunan. On 29 September, shortly after reaching Guangzhou, Mao was selected to work with Wang Jingwei and the Republican Daily editor, Chen Fumu, in preparing the propaganda brief for the Second National Congress of the Guomindang, and in the first week of October was given charge of the CPB itself, at Wang's request. Mao served as acting head of the CPB through to the convening of the Second Congress in January 1926, and on 5 February won Wang Jingwei's approval to continue working in that capacity indefinitely. In 1926, Mao's deputy in the CPB was another Communist, the renowned novelist Shen Yanbing, who was himself to replace Mao as acting-head for a brief spell in February, ostensibly on account of Mao's ill-health but quite possibly as the result of a quarrel between Mao and the Guomindang CEC.
Mao's period of tenure in the CPB was significant not only in terms of the opportunities it afforded the CCP to define and redefine the national revolution from one day to the next, but also in terms of general continuity and stability within the CPB. Mao held the top job in the CPB job for eight months, from the first week of October 1925 to the last week of May 1926, when he resigned in compliance with a decision of the Second Plenary Session of the Second CEC to remove Communists from senior positions in central party bureaux. Prior to Mao's appointment the CPB had never known such continuity, and, as we have seen, its major achievements in co-ordination and discipline all fell within the period of Mao Zedong's directorship.

On Practice

In a second providential encounter at the First National Congress, Mao Zedong took the floor to oppose a motion for establishing a Guomindang Research Association, on the grounds that the proposal presupposed an erroneous separation of theory and practice. The mover of the motion, Tan Xihong, upheld it with the argument that the party should formulate its policies and postures around scholarly research by acknowledged experts, an argument which Mao characterized as "separating practice from research", and hence inappropriate for a revolutionary party. By the time Mao Zedong took charge of the CPB in October of the following year, his position had been vindicated by a disregard for intellectual experts and high regard for practical research in party propaganda. Mao was not personally responsible for these developments, and even his outburst at the First National Congress can be traced to the teachings of his mentor, Li Dazhao, on the subject of combining study with action. Mao's words do, nonetheless, set the tone for a turbulent period in which social and political realities forced themselves upon the Guomindang and demanded to be met with a response in kind, as the party moved from county to county and village to village in Guangdong trying to replace local militarist authority with its own.

Scholarly research had long enjoyed popularity in dissident intellectual circles, and came to assume the proportions of a movement itself over the period of the New Culture Movement, when research associations and study societies proliferated in major cities throughout China. At that time the
Guomindang had played an active role in fostering such research through a number of affiliated study societies, and in later years leading members like Dai Jitao, who withdrew from the CPB to his Shanghai studio in order to "research" Sun Yatsen's works, remained wedded to it. In this context, research meant submersion in history and political thought in the hope of finding or clarifying ideas applicable to China, and propaganda meant their transmission to the slumbering masses in the hope that one of them might arouse the people to action.

As it evolved in the propaganda work of the Peasant Bureau, and of army political bureaux in the field, research came to mean something else again. The linking of propaganda with mass organization in the case of the Peasant Bureau, and with mobilization for logistical tasks in the case of army agencies, placed propaganda at the heart of a process which began with on-the-spot research into local conditions and ended with organization or mobilization for specific purposes. Propaganda was squeezed in the middle, as a method for turning local social, economic or political conditions to the party's advantage. Agents in the field thus carved a role for propaganda quite distinct from the political instruction of earlier years, and still practised in later years by other bureaux. In the Peasant Bureau and General Political Bureau, propaganda began not with teaching people, but with learning from them. Drawing upon the experience and technical advances of the Peasant Bureau in 1924 and 1925, the Bureau Secretary Luo Qiyuan drew a moral for general party propaganda in January 1925: "Through rural investigation we can find out exactly what the difficulties and needs of the masses happen to be. We can then propagate methods for resolving their difficulties and satisfying their needs, and so bring them closer to us." In this context, research meant indentifying the grievances and aspirations of people in a specific community, and propaganda meant promising to do something about them.

Applied research went hand in hand with propaganda in the two bureaux most closely involved with mass organization, the Peasant and Labour Bureaux. Students of the Peasant Movement Training Institute were taught to conduct investigation whenever planning propaganda programs; once in the field as special envoys, they translated general policies of anti-militarism and
anti-imperialism into slogans suited to particular times and places. Slogans were thus formulated around local grievances against the landlord gentry, around the perceived need for protection against the landlord Popular Militia, and occasionally around demands for rent reductions. Propaganda work under the Labour Bureau followed a similar pattern of local research followed by an appropriate campaign of slogans. In October 1925, the Labour Bureau set up labour movement propaganda teams to follow the trail of the Eastern Expeditionary forces and establish labour unions along the way. The teams were furnished with two key propaganda themes, namely the Eastern Expedition's attack upon militarism and the devastating effect upon British imperialism of the Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike, but they were also instructed to conduct local investigations before launching into their propaganda and organizational activity. Propagandists were to take advantage of local labour demands and, while not ignoring the themes of anti-militarism and anti-imperialism, to convert these demands into promises of redress and thereby to recruit members for the new labour unions. In order to give some substance to the specific promises it was making at one point and another, the Labour Bureau resolved in January 1926 to focus in future upon issues of immediate interest to workers, such as pay and conditions, in addition to the more general themes of opposition to militarism and imperialism.

As other party bureaux also began moving toward organizational goals in 1926, they too started to carry out applied research and to mould their propaganda into promises based upon their findings. Once the Merchant Bureau had settled into creating merchant associations, it undertook research into merchant organization, self-protection and hardships, and into the commercial and industrial climate in which merchants were operating in order to formulate and articulate policies geared to their special interests. The same applied in the Women's Bureau, which in 1926 began concentrating upon women's labour organization and modelling its propaganda around the demands of female workers for equal pay and better conditions.

The closer propaganda came to being tied to organizational goals, the further it was removed from simple political instruction. Faith in a popular awakening through instruction then yielded, for all practical purposes, to recognition of an innate awareness on the part of whole classes of people to their sectional interests. If there was a place for policial instructi...
under this new regime, it was to come after organization had already been achieved, and was to take the form of pointing out how the sectional interests of a few poor peasants in a given locality in fact amounted to the class interests of all poor peasants in the county, the province and the country as a whole. Such an education in the class nature of peasant demands did not require instruction in political principles, whether those of Marx, Lenin or Sun Yat-sen. Peasants who found their own demands articulated in local party propaganda needed only to hear of similar demands put forward by peasants in other peasant associations for the lesson to be complete.  

The demise of universal political education as the method and short-term aim of propaganda was accompanied by a decline in the status of those intellectual experts and academic institutions to whom the task of enlightening the people had customarily fallen. In 1925, the image of intellectuals as torch-bearers of enlightenment yielded to one of intellectuals as parasites drawing upon the life-blood of the toiling masses, for whom the only redemption was to labour in the service of the workers and peasants under the blue and white flag of the Guomindang.

Anti-intellectual rhetoric emanated most clearly from Communist staff of the Guomindang branch attached to the Huangpu Military Academy, and it honed in most particularly on staff and students of Zou Lu's Guangdong University. The academy branch rather brazenly instructed the university's faculty and student bodies to abandon elitist studies of science and the humanities and to work directly for the worker and peasant masses who were maintaining their idleness with "sweat and blood". Zou Lu had, as noted above, spread party doctrine throughout the state education system and the university, but his critics would not be satisfied until the university had abandoned the teaching of "philosophy, literature and science" entirely, and had become a "training ground for nurturing staff of the revolutionary government". In fact, the University Regulations promulgated by Grand Marshall Sun Yat-sen in August, 1924, had defined the responsibility of the university as the pursuit in every field of the most modern theories and techniques in the world. The change in expectations of the university came only after Sun's death, when the CEC brought down a verdict on the role of Guangdong University which favoured its anti-intellectual critics; henceforth its role was "to
offer training in [party] principles." Zou Lu's university was to be the party-school (dangxiao) turning out cadres indoctrinated in the principles of serving the workers and peasants, much as the Huangpu Academy was a military school (junxiao) for turning out loyal soldiers. In the case of the university, those who were henceforth to undergo doctrinal training were those who had previously undertaken it.

As the year progressed, the party began to interfere in the financing and administration of Guangdong University, and finally sacked Zou Lu from the position of dean. Forty-two staff members immediately resigned in protest, thirty-eight of them making their way to Shanghai where they swelled the ranks of the breakaway Western Hills Faction.

One of their number was Dai Jitao's appointee to the CPB, Zhou Fohai, who proceeded to publicise the dispute within and beyond the party. In the Shanghai party magazine Awaken he took issue with the patently anti-intellectual slogan then current in the south, "Down with the intellectual class", and in the non-affiliated magazine Solitary Army (Guojun) justified his stand with the argument that intellectuals enlightened in the Way of national revolution were needed to instruct the workers and peasants, who might otherwise go the wrong Way. Zhou's advocacy of mass political instruction by enlightened intellectuals constituted an attempt to prevent the national revolution from spilling over into a social one. At the root of his understanding of the obligation upon intellectuals to enlighten the masses lay a desire to dissipate class struggle. Hence the option of enticing genuine popular support for opposition to militarism and imperialism by articulating and satisfying sectional interests appeared less palatable than the well-established revolutionary tradition of trying to awaken people through political education. Political education in this context meant teaching people to be a little less revolutionary than their own demands would make them.

Meanwhile, back in Guangdong, propaganda activities were moving away from the dizzy heights of a universal popular awakening to a more plausible role in the building up of mass organization, and at the same time away from a reliance upon enlightened intellectuals toward the use of workers and peasants who were themselves trained in the skills of propaganda. The most striking
sign of the shift away from intellectuals in Guangdong was the development in 1926 of a new stage in the process from research, to propaganda, to mass organization, when, having been organised into peasant association, peasants were encouraged to conduct their own propaganda activity toward students and the petite bourgeoisie. Peasant movement propaganda then ceased to mean propaganda by intellectuals to peasants, and came to mean propaganda by peasants toward other social classes.87

A Vindication of the Materialist View of Consciousness

The discovery that sectional interests moulded popular consciousness in Guangdong, and the realization that this discovery could be put to good use in mobilizing social groups, was the major breakthrough in party propaganda over the period 1924-6. At the start of this period, the retiring Propaganda Bureau chief Ye Chucang had addressed the First National Congress on the desirability of making propaganda "relevant" to the common people by conducting classes at the village level in party principles and policies.88 From this perspective, differences between social groups and classes were meaningful only in deciding technical questions, such as whether party principles should be taught in oral form to illiterate peasants, or through written texts, to the literate classes. By mid 1924, Sun Yatsen had moved some distance toward the view that differences between classes might perform a second function, insofar as differences in class interests could be used as leverage by propagandists when trying to win the attention of their audience. Unlike Ye Chucang, Sun had by 1924 personally witnessed a successful attempt to rally popular support in defence of Guangzhou through appeals to the class interests of peasants and workers. In November 1923, the Soviet adviser Borodin had issued promises of land-rent reductions and labour reforms at the height of the battle against Chen Jiongming and in so doing had mobilised workers and peasants in defence of the city.89 Sun showed his appreciation for Borodin's assistance by citing his name and his advice, several times in the course of a major speech delivered just a matter of days after the relief of Guangzhou.90 The whole episode was echoed in another of Sun's speeches in August 1924, when he lectured students of the Peasant Movement Training Institute on the advantages of attuning propaganda to sectional interests. He did not go quite as far as Borodin in promising immediate satisfaction of peasant
grievances, preferring to conceive of interest articulation as a technique for winning the attention of an audience, which, once engrossed, could then be instructed in the dangers for society as a whole of one group pursuing its sectional interests at the expense of another. Sun's position, in sum, was that the sectional interests of workers and peasants should be discovered and articulated, but that their satisfaction should be postponed indefinitely.

The practice of attuning propaganda to sectional interests, despite the barriers Sun set up to contain it, eventually verified the thesis of the indivisibility of class interests and popular rational revolution. The method by which Sun hoped to contain the impact of interest-based propaganda, via the separation of the propaganda and the actual behaviour of the party, tempted the familiar spectre of kongyan to leap out at the Guomindang and to bring it down. It had long been a maxim even of the most conservative of party propagandists that it was impossible to summon support by saying one thing and doing another, a maxim reiterated by Ye Chunyang in his propaganda report to the First National Congress, and restated by the similarly conservative Guangdong provincial government in September of 1925. Needless to say, the CCP was equally damning of a "propaganda of principles" which remained aloof from reality and unrelated to action. Wang Jingwei gave vent to the same sentiment, although some in the Western Hills Faction may have objected to his particular application of it, in a comment to the Second National Congress that at long last the gap between the party's propaganda and its behaviour appeared to be shrinking. The Second National Congress indeed formally removed the barriers between articulating and satisfying the sectional interests of workers and peasants, and in so doing rationalised Sun Yatsen's position in the light of party experience of kongyan. Propaganda to workers and peasants was henceforth to be absorbed into a process of researching, articulating and as far as possible satisfying their demands, as the propagandists understood them.

Recognizing, as Sun had done, the potentially antagonistic nature of class interests, the Congress also decided to resort to political education in order to soften the blow of satisfying one set of demands at the expense of another. In the view of the Congress, however, it was the large landowners and bourgeoisie rather than the workers and peasants who
should undergo instruction. They were to be taught that yielding to peasant demands for tax and rent reductions, and to labour demands for increased wages and improved conditions, would also benefit themselves in the long term. Should such instruction fail to convince the gentry and bourgeoisie, as instruction on the need to shelve their demands had in fact failed to impress workers and peasants, then the gentry and bourgeoisie would mark themselves out as counter-revolutionaries, and furnish further proof of the indivisibility of national revolution and class interests.96

Having established that it was sectional interests, sometimes in the form of antagonistic class interests, which were moulding popular attitudes toward the Guomindang, it remained only to classify sectional interests in terms of attitudes toward the two main pillars of Guomindang national revolution, opposition to militarism and imperialism. This Mao Zedong attempted to do in the three major writings of his term as head of the CPB, "The reasons underlying the secession of the Guomindang rightist faction and its ramifications for the future of the revolution" (December, 1925), "An analysis of the various classes of the Chinese peasantry and their attitudes toward revolution" (January, 1926) and "Analysis of all the classes in Chinese society" (February, 1926).97 In each of these articles, Mao related class interests to those of militarists and imperialists, and so defined, with ranging degrees of precision, the attitude of each class to national revolution. He divided the field of national policy into three camps: the counter-revolutionary, revolutionary, and vacillating intermediate camps. Within the first camp he placed the compradore capitalists and great landlords, classifying them as natural allies of the militarists and imperialists by virtue of their common interests. In the revolutionary camp, he listed a "petite bourgeoisie" made up of owner-cultivators, handicraft proprietors, small merchant and lower intellectuals; a "semi-proletariat" of part-owner cultivators, tenant farmers, handicraft workers, shop assistants and small pedlars; and a "proletariat" comprised of industrial workers, urban coolies, farm labourers and éléments déclassés. Even the vacillation of the intermediate camp, via the national capitalists and small landlords making up the "bourgeoisie", was traced to the self-contradictory nature of its class interests, which on the one hand led the bourgeoisie to aspire to the status of the great capitalists, and on the other made it chafe at the bridle with which the great capitalists, militarists and imperialists were trying to
Mao's crude application of the materialist conception of history to the role of classes in the Chinese national revolution was, to all appearances, highly deterministic, but it was in fact a perfectly reasonable response to his own experience in Hunan and that of the Guomindang in Guangdong, and was a logical progression from earlier responses of Sun Yatsen and Dai Jitao to these same experiences. Sun's position in August 1924, as noted, was that the consciousness of the peasantry was tied to "its own interests", and hence that peasant support for the Guomindang was best mobilized by addressing their interests through propaganda, even if only to attract attention before moving on to other things. In August of the following year, the earliest and most consistent party exponent of popular awakening, Dai Jitao, was similarly moved by events in Guangdong to remark that "the consciousness (liangxin) of the Chinese people is, after all, determined by immediate interests, just as the historical materialists would have it." The major distinction between Dai Jitao's appreciation of historical materialism and that of Mao Zedong lay not in one being more or less deterministic than the other, but in Dai's deriving from the discovery a profound disgust with the Chinese people for their "inability to be swayed by reason", and Mao's using the discovery as a starting point for a revolution in which appeals to "reason" played far less a part. Either way, the discovery of historical materialism at work in Guangdong, by keen observers from both left and right, meant that propaganda designed to awaken the whole nation to the need for national revolution was no longer a credible option, and that its ghost would henceforth be invoked only by a ruling elite trying to exercise dominion over its subjects.

Mao on Sun, 1925-6

The CPB had never been the pacemaker in Guomindang propaganda, for that was a role assumed by Sun himself, during his lifetime, and by other bureaux more intimately involved with the citizens of Guangdong. The Propaganda Bureau did, nonetheless, carve out a niche for itself in the co-ordination of party propaganda over the period following Sun's death and, as we have seen, succeeded admirably in the attempt. One responsibility of the CPB in
co-ordinating propaganda was to define the line which separated true and false interpretations of party policy, and which distinguished revolutionaries from counter-revolutionaries. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the CPB in late 1925 and 1926 to relate current party policy to the political legacy of Sun Yatsen, in order to delineate who were the true, and who the false, followers of Sun Yatsen within the Guomindang. The task was complicated, of course, by the contradiction between the current policy of articulating and satisfying worker and peasant demands and thus inviting social reaction, and the premise of social appeasement which lay at the heart of Sun's political philosophy.

The very assumption that there were in fact revolutionary and counter-revolutionary factions within the Guomindang was in itself a reversal of the attitude adopted by the party during Sun's lifetime. At the time of the First Congress, Borodin told Hu Hanmin that he believed the GMD harboured left and right factions, which Hu fiercely denied. The contending views of Borodin and Hu were then formally adopted by the CCP and Guomindang respectively, the CCP resolving in May 1924 to advertise, aggravate and take advantage of factionalism within the Guomindang, and the latter issuing repeated denials that there was any division within the party. The matter came to a head in October 1924 when, at the insistence of Zou Lu, the CEC publicly rebuked the CCP's Guide magazine for writing of left, right and centre factions within the Guomindang, and characterising one faction as less revolutionary than the other. Shortly after Sun's death, during Chen Yangxuan's tenure of office, another case of CCP publicity on factionalism within the Guomindang came to light and was criticised with equal severity. The controversy centred on an article in the May 1925 issue of the new magazine, The Revolution, in which appeared the comment:

"At this moment we can see once again that right-wing elements in the party, representing the interests of the compradore class and working in league with militarists and imperialists, are plotting to destroy the party, and that only the worker and peasant masses led by left-wing elements are inclined to protect the party day in and day out."
The CPB promptly addressed a letter to the editors of *The Revolution*, which upheld the position maintained in party propaganda during Sun's lifetime by disclaiming the existence of factions within the Guomindang.¹⁰⁵

Just four months later, in the third phase of CPB operation, this long standing policy was reversed by the CPB. Shortly after the assassination of Liao Zhongkai on 20 August, 1925, the CPB Head Wang Jingwei addressed a commemorative meeting with the words:

"Those of our comrades who wish to oppose imperialism, step to the left; those who want to live under the unequal treaties, to allow China to remain a semi-colonial country in perpetuity and to help imperialism last forever as a force in the world, step right." ¹⁰⁶

The choice of Liao's memorial ceremony as the moment for breaking CPB policy on party factionalism was particularly appropriate, as Liao himself had brought the issue into the open with an article on revolutionary and counter-revolutionary cliques in the Guomindang.¹⁰⁷ Wang was to find support for his views after the event, as well, from the military commander of the Eastern Expedition, Chiang Kaishek. In a formal letter to all party members issued in December, 1925, Chiang defended Wang from the charge of splitting the party and further ventured the opinion that Wang's use of left-right terminology was "most penetrating and discerning".¹⁰⁸ The Communists, whose penetration and discernment on this issue were apparent almost two years earlier than in the case of Wang, made a further contribution to this debate with the addition of Mao Zedong to the CPB. Discussion of friction between left and right then became standard fare in CPB propaganda, with Mao himself penning several articles on the theme, and introducing to it a dimension of class struggle by ascribing to each of the factions a particular and inalienable class character.¹⁰⁹

Having established that there were left and right factions within the Guomindang, it was then up to Mao to prove that the left faction was the legitimate one by showing that current policy was in keeping with Sun's wishes. This he endeavoured to demonstrate by means of bold assertions, making no attempt to substantiate his claims with quotations from Sun himself other than
citing Sun's initial approval for admission of Communists into the Guomindang which was, as any rate, beyond dispute. On the more sensitive issue of class aspects of national revolution, Mao was obliged to ignore the letter of Sun's law and invoke what he took to be the spirit of it instead. In the name of Sun's spirit, he went so far as to rebuke those who, like Dai Jitao and his followers associated with the magazine The Independent, accurately quoted the letter of Sun's law in support of their own argument that class politics bore no necessary relation to the national revolution at hand:

"Members of this bourgeois 'independent' revolutionary faction (most of them children of small landlords) are still masquerading in Sun Yatsen's name, claiming that his 'principles' and 'doctrines' do in fact represent themselves. Was Sun Yatsen really like this? Sun's principles and doctrines are definitely for 'relieving distress', and certainly not for 'growing rich', definitively for liberating people from oppressive classes, and certainly not for preparing the way for a new oppressive class. No matter how Sun's principles and doctrines may be misconstrued, this point will never change".110

Unfortunately for Mao, one other point which would never change was the intractibility of Sun's recorded legacy on the subject of keeping national revolution distinct from class politics. This intractibility was of little consequence for the future of the revolution as such, but it was indeed damaging to the credibility of a party which was now pursuing a class-based national revolution in his name.

Mao's next step was to try to alter the twin criteria by which the true party member was recognised. These criteria, drawn up by Dai Jitao and officially endorsed by the Third Plenum in May, 1925, consisted of "respect for Sun's character and acceptance of the works he has bequeathed us".111 Precisely what was meant by "respect for Sun's character" was outlined by the plenum itself, in the form of a resolution to hold a brief ceremony in Sun's honour before every meeting of party bureaux, branches and agencies.112 Before Mao's arrival in Guangdong, the CPB accordingly compiled 'Regulations for the Weekly Commemoration', which were promulgated by the CEC on 8 August. As prescribed, a ceremony was to be held each Monday by all party, government
and army agencies, and was to consist of bowing thrice before a portrait of Sun, reading his will, observing three minutes silence, and finally presenting a report on the political work of the unit in question. The Regulations also prescribed disciplinary action to be taken against those who regularly failed to attend, or who did not practice the rites in the spirit in which they were intended. Not all units did in fact treat Sun with due respect, and while "to all appearances" observing the ritual, "ignored it in secret." Mao himself tried to rationalize the situation in November 1925, soon after joining the CPB, by moving that the CEC allow the ritual to be held less frequently, to which the CEC consented. Mao was clearly impatient with the ritualistic constraints of the cult of Sun Yatsen.

In defiance of the second stipulated characteristic of the model party member, "acceptance of the works [Sun] has bequeathed us", Mao did his best to relegate Sun's writings to the background after the Second National Congress. His most brazen attempt at downgrading Sun's works came with the grand occasion of the first anniversary of Sun's death in March, 1926, which presented an ideal opportunity for public adulation of his character and works. The CPB was charged with responsibility for preparing the Propaganda Outline for the guidance of all party, army and government propaganda agencies, and on 16 February presented its Outline to the Standing Committee of the CEC. This committee, and indeed many another branch executive committee, was puzzled to find that Mao's "Propaganda Outline for Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Death of the President" in fact omitted all mention of Sun's life and works, failing to mention even his Three Principles of the People. It consisted simply of repetitive, bland assertions about Sun's support for the policies of alliance with the USSR, admission of Communists into the Guomindang, and advancing the interests of the workers and peasants. The Standing Committee charged Wang Jingwei with making up the Outline's deficiencies by penning an addendum on the Three Principles and at the same time gave Mao two weeks' leave of absence from the CPB, ostensibly on account of illness but quite possibly in response to a fit of pique on Mao's part.

Other Propaganda Bureaux, in the meantime, took upon themselves the responsibility for venerating Sun's life and works which the CPB had so
clearly failed to discharge. The Guangdong Provincial Branch Propaganda Bureau, under the left-wing Guomindang official Gan Naiguang, issued its own addenda in conscious competition with the CPB. As if to demonstrate that even the left-wing of the Guomindang would not allow Sun's life and works to disappear without trace, the Guangdong bureau's addenda included a "General Outline of the Life of the President", and an "Outline of the President's Principles." The life and works of Sun must then have appeared as obstacles to the progress of the revolution in Mao's eyes, preventing his explaining the class nature of national revolution in terms of Guomindang traditions, yet refusing to go away.
Chapter Six

THE CONSOLIDATION OF PARTY AUTHORITY AT THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS IN GUANGDONG PROVINCE

As used herein, the word 'regional' refers to a geographical and administrative unit of indeterminate limit situated between the provincial and county levels. It consists of more than one county, and may be defined by any one or a number of geographical, commercial, and administrative features which happen to set any particular group of counties apart from another. For the purposes of the following discussion, the defining features may be historical links of some vintage, as in the case of the "Huizhou Eight Counties" (Huizhou ba shu) or "South Route Eight Counties" (nanlu ba shu); or simply the temporary gathering of a group of counties under the jurisdiction of a particular garrison or military commander in a given year. The word 'local' is used to refer to the level of, and below, the county.

The Regional Level

Once the military phase of the Southern and Eastern Expeditions had drawn to a close, political bureaus of the victorious armies began to transfer responsibility for civilian propaganda work to local party branches. Where local branches were already well established, political bureaus investigated and reorganized them; where none existed, they set about creating them. The expansion of the party structure into the countryside then followed the direction of military expansion toward the east and south of the province, in a patch-work pattern corresponding to the regions occupied by different units of the NRA.

The provincial military expeditions prompted a great spurt in the creation of town and county branches. Over the twenty months between the First National Congress and the onset of the Second Eastern Expedition, a total of forty-six town and county party branches were in the process of being formed or were already in operation. By contrast, during the relatively
brief period of five months in which the Second Eastern and Southern Expeditions were launched and completed, that is from October 1925 to February 1926, an additional forty were opened. Subsequently, over the five months from January to May 1926, party membership in Guangdong Province more than doubled. This accelerated rate of growth applied largely to those eastern and southern areas of Guangdong conquered by the expeditionary armies. The size of party membership in Guangzhou city remained more or less static over the same period, and the only other regions in Guangdong which failed to register significant growth lay to the far north and west, where the expeditionary armies had failed to penetrate.

In addition to influencing the rate of party expansion, the expeditionary armies exerted considerable influence, for better or worse, over the quality of that expansion. In the first place, in the interval following military victory but preceding the establishment of formal local party networks, army political bureaux carried on their civilian propaganda activities quite unabated. Following the cessation of hostilities along the southern route, for example, the expeditionary armies found the local people woefully ignorant of the Guomindang and so convened numerous public assemblies to publicize party policy on provincial and national reunification, the pending Japanese menace in North China, the Guangdong-Hong Kong strike, the liberation of women, and the principles of Sun Yatsen. The various Fourth Army political bureaux in South Guangdong also set up a theatre troupe, the People's Star Dramatic Society (min xing juanhe) to facilitate post-war propaganda activity. The Society held its inaugural performance on 7 February 1926, before an audience of four to five thousand citizens of Haikou, Hainan, with a program of two plays. The first of these, a serious drama entitled "People's Star", was written by the Fourth Army Political Bureau for the occasion - doubtless with the help of its Soviet advisor Gorev - and portrayed a curious collection of imperialists, local militarists, corrupt local officials and gentry bullies conspiring to harrass and oppress the common people, but being foiled in the end by the arrival of the NRA. According to eyewitness reports, the audience readily identified with the oppressed victims of the play, grew very excited when the NRA came to the rescue, and finally "applauded without end" when the arch-villain Deng Benying got his come-uppance. A one-act comedy then rounded off the evening's entertainment. The political message of Fourth
army occupation also made its way from urban centres such as Haikou to the rural communities of Hainan, through a provisional propaganda team of local youths, who were issued by the Fourth Army Political Bureau with a set of propaganda guidelines and then sent "from village to village" to spread the news. Such propaganda activities as these had little to do with the military expeditions as such, but built up local preconceptions of what the party was all about in the post-war period.

A second means whereby the armies affected the nature of local party activity following the military expeditions was through their placement as defensive garrisons at town and county level. The NRA was a force to be reckoned with in local politics, and managed to influence the quality and impact of party propaganda even when not engaged directly in its manufacture. It controlled access to official war booty and to recovered bandit treasure, and disbursed money according to the priorities of its political bureaux. In April 1926, for example, the First Army was responsible for underwriting the propaganda expenses of the Chaomei-Hailufeng Party Congress, and so could expect some assurance of the Congress' fealty. The way the armies distributed funds affected the type of political activity conducted in a given area. Around Huizhou, for example, the spoils from bandit clearance were divided between the peasant, labour and popular education movements to the exclusion of a party-sponsored merchant movement, and merchant movement activists were forced to appeal to the provincial executive committee for redress. To the south as well, the Fourth Army showed a certain bias in its promotion of other popular movements at the expense of the merchant movement.

As local garrison, the army was obliged to arbitrate in local disputes, and was thus prone to find itself entangled in propaganda battles not of its own creation. Once the Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike Committee came south to Haikou, for example, it became embroiled in a dispute with the American-owned Asia Oil Depot, and activated its own propaganda machinery to wage a war of words with the oil company and with the local merchant community, which was inclined to sympathize with the oil company. The Fourth Army Political Bureau was asked to lend its weight to the strike committee's
side in the dispute, and in so doing it brought the dispute to an end.\textsuperscript{11}
Some time later in Haikou, a merchant strike took place as a result of the Strike Committee's arrest of a local merchant, and a team of party propagandists sent to dissuade the merchants from continuing their strike was surrounded and beaten up. The party's Hainan Special Committee called out the local garrison to protect the propagandists. The propaganda team then ventured into the market place for a second time, in the company of a cohort of seasoned soldiers, and found that its message was far more readily appreciated. Merchant resistance folded, and commercial life in Haikou soon returned to normal. The medium, in the form of the local garrison, was the message.\textsuperscript{12}

Illustrations of the army's role in post-war civilian propaganda activity would be misleading if they gave the impression that all local garrisons happened to side with the party's labour and peasant movements in their locality. Some adopted the opposite position, either by lending their approval to a conservative county branch or by trying to suppress propaganda activities which placed a radical interpretation upon the party's peasant and labour policies.\textsuperscript{13} In either case, the nature and impact of propaganda at town and county levels was heavily influenced by the local garrison.

A third way in which army political agencies directed the course of party expansion in Guangdong Province was through their prescribed authority to investigate, organize and reorganize local party branches. On the First Eastern Expedition, Zhou Enlai was empowered to organize local branches in his capacity as Director of Party Affairs and Party Organization for the East River Region.\textsuperscript{14} Things were arranged differently for the Second Eastern Expedition, but not to the disadvantage of Zhou's General Political Bureau. Before the second campaign had begun, civilian Party Affairs Directors were named for every relevant town and county along the route of the expedition, and these accompanied the army to their appointed destination, where they set up office. They remained very closely associated with the General Political Bureau, some of them remaining located within it when their destinations happened to coincide.\textsuperscript{15} On the southern route, political bureaux of the various armies which took part were empowered to organize local party
affairs. The political bureau of the Tenth Division on the first stage, of the Third Army on the second stage and of the Fourth Army on the third stage each bore responsibility for local party affairs over their respective stages of the campaign.16

The local party branches established with NRA assistance took up propaganda activities where the NRA agencies left off. Their propaganda methods bore the marks of their parent army agencies, the Qingxian (Hainan) branch, for example, setting up propaganda teams and holding candle-light processions in the manner of the Fourth Army Political Bureau which sired it.17 The content of local branch propaganda was equally beholden to the army agency responsible for its creation, as the army political bureau's political complexion tended to rub off onto the local branch. Over the final stage of the Southern Expedition, for example, the Fourth Army Political Bureau decided the political tone of branches on Hainan Island by declining to enlist "self seeking" gentry notables who volunteered for party work, and refusing to accredit the many "Guomindang branches" and "Guomindang branch preparatory offices" which sprang up at the initiative of these same notables, who hoped to turn the NRA's victory to their advantage.18 The local gentry found Li Linong's Tenth Division Political Bureau more amenable, and branches set up in the trail of the Tenth Division tended to be coloured a conservative complexion. Li aroused Zhou Enlai's ire on the First Eastern Expedition, and that of the Guangdong Provincial Executive Committee on the Southern Expedition, for his "many errors" in local party organization.19

Whatever the nitty-gritty details of local branch relations with the NRA, the significance of the correlation between the political disposition of local party branches and the political leanings of the particular military units with which they came into contact is clear. The geographical reach, style and content of propaganda, and the class background and political sympathies of local party propagandists, were all profoundly influenced by the political agencies of the NRA involved in the Eastern and Southern Expeditions:

Once the NRA had consolidated its hold over eastern and southern
Guangdong, the party itself began to intervene in regional political affairs. Communication between the Guangdong Propaganda Bureau and town and county branches followed several channels, some more direct than others. The CPB could communicate directly with branches close to the provincial capital, and in the reverse direction local branches were obliged to report back directly to the provincial headquarters on a regular basis. As the pace of party expansion accelerated following the Southern and Eastern Expeditions, a system of intermediary regional Special Committees was developed to facilitate communication between the provincial and town and county levels. A total of four Special Committees were set up between November 1925 and February 1926, two each for the areas cleared on the Southern and Eastern Expeditions. For the southern region, the Southern Route Special Committee was established on 21 December, and the Hainan Special Committee on 6 February; for the east, the Chaomei Special Committee and Huizhou Area Special Committee were both set up on 5 December. The GPB came to communicate with local branches in these newly conquered areas through the Special Committee in their vicinity.

The four Special Committees carried with them from Guangzhou the authority of the provincial branch to "promote party affairs" in their respective regions through "organizational and propaganda work." The committees' staff and resources were commensurate with their heavy obligations. As far as its staff was concerned, the Special Committee was basically a sub-division of the provincial party headquarters, drawing one staff member from each of the seven bureaux in the provincial branch who was as often as not a head of Bureau. Gan Naiguang, for example, the head of the GPB, was absent from Guangzhou from late November 1925 until mid-February 1926 on duty with the Southern Route Special Committee, while Peng Pai and Fan Qiuwu, Heads of the Provincial Peasant and Merchant Bureaux respectively, were both appointed to the Chaomei Special Committee. Financial allowances for the Special Committees likewise attested to their importance. The Chaomei and Southern Route Committees each received ¥600 per month, excluding salaries, and the Hainan Special Committee was given ¥1090 per month, excluding salaries and additional establishment costs.
Propaganda received favoured treatment in the structure and operation of the committees. The propaganda bureau of the Hainan Special Committee, for example, received twice the sum allocated to the Organization, Peasant, Labour, Youth and Merchant Bureaux. The propaganda bureau representative on the Southern Route Special Committee, Gan Naiguang, won an additional sum from the provincial party headquarters, equal to more than half of the monthly allowance for that committee as a whole, in order to fund a Special Propaganda Committee within the Special Committee.

The Special Committees supervised propaganda activities at the town and county level with an eye to details beyond the visual range of the provincial party headquarters in Guangzhou. They petitioned bookshops to stock Guomindang publications, investigated newspapers not affiliated with the party, set up party newspapers, founded dramatic societies, organized rural propaganda teams, distributed materials on behalf of the provincial headquarters, and prepared, overhauled and launched numerous town and county party branches.

Aside from regional Special Committees, a second channel for communicating policy and co-ordinating propaganda between provincial and regional levels was offered by party newspapers. The CPB, it will be recalled, operated a daily newspaper, the Guangzhou Republican Daily, and a weekly magazine, Political Weekly; at the provincial level, from November 1925 the CPB operated a daily newspaper, the Republican News (Guomin xinwen). Up until the GPB's acquisition of the Republican News, the paper had been a source of some embarrassment to the CPB, as it had been managed by an informal right-wing faction in the Guomindang which passed under the title of Hall of Literary Splendour (wenhua tang) and which persisted in publishing veiled attacks upon the Communists and their sympathizers within the party. Once the paper had come under the direct control of the GPB and Gan Naiguang assumed its editorship, it changed course to become a vehicle for these very Communist sympathizers, and so won the approval and financial support of central party headquarters. The provincial branch complemented its daily paper with a monthly gazette of party affairs, the Guomindang Guangdong Branch Party Affairs Monthly (Zhongguo guomindang guangdongsheng dangbu dangwu yuekan).
Below provincial level, a host of official party serial publications was issued at the regional and local levels. The GPB was empowered, by section six of the branch charter, to correct, inspect and guide all such publications at town and county level. To discharge its responsibility for the first two of these tasks, the GPB commanded all local branches to submit their publications for inspection immediately upon issue. In any one month, the GPB then examined and corrected about thirty titles. The performance of its third function, of guiding serial publications, was to be most clearly apparent in the expansion throughout Guangdong of the Republican Daily newspaper chain.

The expansion of the Republican Daily network took place within guidelines set by the GPB in its Regulations on Establishing Party Newspapers, promulgated on 18 November, 1925. The Regulations specified conditions to be met before any existing or proposed local newspaper could profess to be an official organ of the Guomindang. In sum, they invested the provincial branch with absolute discretion over which papers were to be accredited, and absolute control over those which in fact gained accreditation. The Regulations were vigorously effected. Papers which laid claim to the title of Republican Daily without fulfilling the prescribed conditions, like the Qinlian Republican Daily, were refused accreditation, while others whose titles were approved but which subsequently failed to abide by the conditions of accreditation, as in the case of the Jiangmen Republican Daily, were severely reprimanded.

Although placed under the authority of a single town or county branch, as a general rule each Republican Daily was set up to cater for the population of the wider region for which that town or county happened to form the natural commercial focus. By June 1926, at least eight Republican Dailies had been developed to the point of seeking accreditation, and at least three others were being mooted. The East River Republican Daily, centred in Huizhou, was to circulate in the wider Huizhou region. The Qinlian Republican Daily hoped to cater, as its name would suggest, for the area around Qinzhou in Guangxi and Lianzhou in Guangdong, to the very south of the two provinces; the Liangyang Republican Daily was to provide for the area between
Yangjiang and Yangchun, in central-southern Guangdong, the Qiongyai Republican Daily was set up to serve all of Hainan Island; the Lingdong Republican Daily, headquartered in Shantou, was for circulation throughout the north-east; and three other Republican Dailies, located in Zhongshan, Jiangmen and Dongwan, catered for other areas not covered by the above.

Between planning and execution, the local Republican Daily network encountered two major problems, one being internal strife in the Guomindang, and the other a drain on provincial funds to cover military expenditures. Political infighting played havoc with the Lingdong, Jiangmen and Qiongyai papers. The Communist-appointed editor of the Lingdong Republican Daily, Li Chuntao, was obstructed by a right-wing party figure who came to wield considerable authority in Shantou, Fan Qiwu. Difficulties with the Jiangmen and Qiongyai Republican Dailies can be traced to the involvement of another party activist who was a constant thorn in the side of Communist propagandists in the Guomindang, Luo Han. Luo appears to have worked on the First Eastern Expedition as a propagandist, and to have been reprimanded on that occasion by the Special Party Branch of the Huangpu Academy. Around the time of the Second Eastern Expedition, he made his way to Jiangmen and there set up the Jiangmen Republican Daily. Within a short while, however, the paper's Director Chen Riguang was arrested, and local branch affairs fell into turmoil. Details of the affair are difficult to assemble, but it appears to have revolved around a labour dispute. Jiangmen had a record of labour disputes, ranging from strikes in support of wage claims at the time of the Southern Expeditionary Armies' arrival, to a conflict between the local General Labour Union and the municipal government in February 1926. In the midst of these disputes, Chen Riguang and an official of the local Restaurant and Tea-House Workers Union fell to blows, and Chen was "arrested" by the union. A couple of other disputants were subsequently "arrested" by the party's Jiangmen Town Branch Preparatory Committee, and several sub-branches petitioned the provincial branch to condemn the actions of the town branch. The matter was finally handed to the head of the provincial branch Labour Bureau, the Communist Liu Ersong, for resolution. The outcome is unclear, except insofar as it
affected the *Jiangmen Republican Daily*, which paper appears to have ceased
publication.49

Leaving Jiangmen, Luo Han made his way south to Hainan Island, on
the trail of the Fourth Army. In Hainan, he took part in preparations for
establishing the *Qiongyai Republican Daily*, and became embroiled in a dispute
which ultimately put an end to plans for the paper. The *Qiongyai Republican
Daily* was formally the responsibility of the Hainan Special Committee,
one of the four Special Committees set up by the Guangdong Provincial
Branch to conduct local party affairs on its behalf. The Hainan Special
Committee appointed an editor and manager for the paper, and arranged for
its establishment costs to be met by the headquarters of the Fourth Army,
which was then in occupation of Hainan. In February or March, 1926, Luo
interceded and persuaded the editor and manager to reject the army's money,
which would presumably have made the paper beholden to the left-wing
political bureau of the Fourth Army. Luo managed to find ¥3,000 from other
sources, and planned to use this to acquire the former *Hainan Island Daily*
and convert it into an official party *Republican Daily*. The Hainan Special
Committee raised objections, and stalemate ensued. In consequence, by June
of 1926 nothing had yet come of plans for a party newspaper on Hainan Island.50

Financial constraints imposed by attempts to build up and equip a national
expeditionary army also took their toll of the regional *Republican Daily*
network. The income of the provincial government rose markedly with the
conquest of the south and east, but the increases were absorbed by expansion
of the military budget.51 Hence the party found itself in no better position
to fund local party activities after the Eastern and Southern Expeditions
than before them.

The financial pressures at work are nowhere more clearly illustrated
than in the buck-passing which preceded the establishment of the *Lingdong
Republican Daily*. The hefty establishment cost of the paper, estimated
at ¥10,000, was ordered to be drawn from opium-prohibition levies and from the
NRA's collection of bandit booty, but neither source came good. With the
approval of the CEC, the minimal running costs of the paper, ¥30 per month,
were to be met by the party's Central Finance Bureau, but the bureau informed
the CEC that it could not afford the expense. The CEC passed the matter on
to the Guangdong Provincial Executive Committee, which was patently incapable of meeting the establishment and running costs of the paper unaided, and which passed responsibility in turn on to the Shantou party branch. Fortunately for the Lingdong Republican Daily, Shantou was a large town with a healthy merchant community and a well-funded party branch. The paper did eventually go to press, and its problems were henceforth political rather than financial.

Faced with similar financial problems, other regional party papers were less fortunate. The Huizhou County Branch, located in Huizhou, could not afford the upkeep of its East River Republican Daily beyond July of 1926. Similarly, publication of the Dongwan Republican Daily was delayed indefinitely by the financial problems of the Dongwan County Branch. Once the various dailies ran into financial problems such as these, neither provincial nor central party agencies could step into the breach to ensure the survival of the newspaper network. On account of the enormous financial demands of the imminent Northern Expedition, the party was forced to run Guangdong Party affairs on a shoe-string in 1926, and party propaganda at the regional level in Guangdong inevitably suffered.

The Local Level

In the period immediately following the provincial military campaigns, local party branches were to consolidate politically the territories recently won militarily. This task they shared with the local administrative system of the provincial government. The nature and consequences of the relationship between the local party and local government systems will be ignored for the present; suffice it to say that local party branches had no rightful business participating in district administration, nor in policing the neighbourhood. The local branch was, strictly speaking, a "propaganda agency", whose legitimate function lay in the transmission and implementation of party policy.

The structure of town and county party branches was standardized in April 1925, at the seventy-first session of the CEC. The seven working bureaux to be found at central and provincial levels were reduced to three composite bureaux at the local level: a propaganda-organization bureau,
a peasant-labour bureau, and a youth-women's-merchant bureau. Each town and county branch was assigned five members of staff, one for each of the three composite bureaux, plus a secretary and a general hand. The monthly allowance for a local branch was set at ¥270, of which one half was for running costs (¥30 for each of the three composite bureaux and for the branch secretariat, and ¥15 for miscellaneous expenses) and the other half for salaries (¥30 for each of the three bureau staff and for the secretary, and ¥15 for the general hand). The allowance was to be drawn from local revenue, with the compliance of the County Magistrate. In practice, of course, there was considerable variation between one local branch and another, and much room for controversy over the payment of the prescribed monthly allowance. In recognition of mounting difficulties for local government agencies, in June 1926 the Central Organization Bureau reduced the prescribed monthly allowance for each bureau from ¥30 to ¥20.

In relative terms, the income of the propaganda-organization bureau at town and county level was the same as that of other bureaux in the branch, both before and after the changes of June 1926. It was sufficient to buy ink and brushes, paint, paper, and the paraphernalia of a small printing workshop, but inadequate for anything of the order of a daily newspaper or large weekly magazine. To fund large-scale projects such as these, other non-government sources had to be found in the local community. Propaganda staff, both for the local propaganda-organization bureau and for the other bureaux engaged in propaganda activity, were appointed from among executive committee members of the branch, elected by the local Party Member Congress which was convened at the launching of each branch.

In practice, the importance of propaganda to the functioning of local party branches extended well beyond their role as passive "propaganda agencies" for the transmission of policies determined at higher levels elsewhere. In towns and counties far from the provincial capital, few people had heard of what the party planned to do for them or expected of them, and the local party branch was as capable of misinforming as of correctly informing them. The local branch was able to exercise liberal discretion in choosing which bits and pieces from the great body of rumoured and endorsed policy it would pass on to the local community. In effect, through propaganda
the local branch defined policy at the local level.

The power to define policy at the local level placed town and county branches in an important position within the abiding system of local authority. To command official party propaganda organs at the local level was to confer legitimacy upon policies which profited the sectional interests represented by the propagandist. Hence whether for a party trying to extend its authority over newly conquered territories, or for scattered community groups hoping to protect their interests in the face of Guomindang expansion at the local level, it was foolish to ignore the propaganda potential of the town or county branch -- and few in fact did so.

It was in the interests of local elites, whether rural gentry or urban merchants, to gain and to hold control over any Guomindang branch set up in their vicinity. The spontaneous or 'natural' shape which a new town or county branch tended to assume was, therefore, that of an extension of the existing local power structure. Where that structure took the form of agnatic kinship groups, as was frequently the case in South China, the party branch was incorporated into the local kinship system. One of the strife-ridd county branches along the route of the Third Column of the Second Eastern Expedition, at Longchuan, fell into this pattern. Without exception, every one of the nineteen office-bearers in the First, Second, Third and Fourth sub-branches of the Longchuan County Branch bore the surname of Zhang, and the formal opening ceremony of the county branch was conducted in the Zhang family ancestral temple, thus cementing symbolically the real identification of clan and party authority.62

Where clan authority was less in evidence, local gentry set up Guomindang branches on their own initiative. Branches which had been established in the East River region before the arrival of the NRA were all, according to reports of the expedition's General Political Bureau, created by "bad gentry" for their own purposes. Such local 'branches' were set up without the authority, and often with the knowledge, of party headquarters in Guangzhou. They usually amounted to little more than hollow hierarchical organizations, devoid of sub-structure and lacking officially registered
membership, which tried to lord over the county in the name of that distant higher authority, the Guomindang. In such cases, the local party branch presented its gentry membership with a platform from which to berate provincial government administrative officers in the area, to press for local government positions for themselves, and to determine the course of party activity in their domain. Needless to say, these 'branches' declined to promote radical peasant and labour policies in their areas. "Given the sorry state of party branch organization and in view of party members' lack of political training," reported the General Political Bureau, "there has of course been no achievement of any note in party propaganda."

Where branches arose spontaneously at the initiative of local elites, party propaganda reflected exclusively the interests of the local gentry, and radical policy found no voice.

The corollary to the law of natural elite control over local party branches was that peasants and organized labour would only come to exercise authority in local branches through positive intervention on their behalf by an outside party agency. Central peasant and labour policy could not even be enunciated at town and county level unless the Guomindang devoted considerable resources to reorganizing and policing local party branches. The higher agencies in place, most notably certain political bureaux of the NRA, were not always willing to undertake such affirmative action. Even when they were in fact willing, there was a limit to what they could achieve. Much could be done on a miniature scale, but within the limited time available and over the province as a whole, the problem was all but insurmountable.

The first major handicap under which the provincial branch laboured in attempting to transmit its policies through local branches out into the countryside at large was its own ignorance of what exactly was going on. It lacked information about where outside intervention was most immediately required. Over the three months from November 1925 to January 1926, very few of the eighty-odd branches which had been prepared or established in Guangdong bothered to send in even one of the monthly reports which they were technically obliged to deliver. Of those which did report, even fewer recorded their activities in such detail as to enable the provincial
headquarters to know precisely what the branch was saying and doing in its area.64

In such cases, ignorance could hardly be said to have been bliss. In counties where the party's peasant and labour movements were encouraged with some success, there was a tendency to boast of this success in official reports.65 Local branches which neglected to note the details of their activities, or which failed to report at all, can only have aroused the suspicions of provincial headquarters. According to the pro-forma leaflet distributed to branches, provincial headquarters wanted to know how each local branch was organized, how it operated, what had transpired at its meetings, whether it had guided and participated in local mass movement activities, the state of current organization and membership, and the activities of its various bureaux. Judging from the few reports which were published in the provincial branch's monthly journal, it rarely received anything other than cryptic notes to the effect that a number of leaflets had been distributed in a particular locality on a given market day. Hence while the provincial headquarters may have had little inkling of how urgently intervention might be required, it can have been left in little doubt that the difference between what it wanted to know and what it was in fact told was due to branches withholding incriminating information.

As sources for Guangdong provincial party affairs are limited to what the provincial headquarters knew and published in its monthly gazette, it is no easier for the observer today than for the party official at the time to assess the political leanings of all town and county branches throughout Guangdong. It is possible, nonetheless, to plot the political spectrum across which they ranged by comparing one branch with another. Few and cryptic though reports of local branches may have been, their accounts of their propaganda activities give some insight into their attitudes toward the peasant and labour movements in their vicinity.

To the right of the spectrum would lie Pingyuan County, on the north-eastern border of the province. The propaganda of the Pingyuan County Branch followed a very cautious line, never varying from the
unimpeachable documents of Sun's Three Principles, the First Congress Declaration, and the Platform and Constitution of the Guomindang. When it addressed peasants and workers specifically, it did so not on topics of immediate concern to them, but rather on general issues like the Five Power Constitution proposed by Sun Yatsen. In order to keep more radical interpretations of Sun's works at bay, it set up a local chapter of the anti-communist Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, through which to sift and discard any unpalatable variations of Sun's words.66

Around the middle would lie the Zijin County Branch, along the route of the Second Column of the Second Eastern Expedition, where party propaganda appears to have been rather equivocal. Judging from its reports to the provincial headquarters, the Zijin Branch spent most of its time on propaganda activities and most of its energy and resources devising new ways to attract the attention of the local market crowds. The purpose of this considerable propaganda effort was to allay the fears of those who came to market that the Guomindang was communist and was dedicated to turning the district 'red'. In these efforts, they reported some success. The branch failed to send propagandists into the countryside and so to address the peasants on their home ground; its equivocation lay in its wishing in retrospect that it had in fact done so. As it happens, the policies of the Zijin branch were as equivocal as its propaganda activities. At the Zijin County Party Congress, one member moved that the gentry Popular Militia be abolished forthwith, but as carried, the motion read that Popular Militia forces be abolished only in those villages where peasant associations had already been established; for the rest, the militia should be left in peace. To all appearances, the Zijin County Branch intended neither to smother nor to promote the peasant movement.67

Marking the left of the political spectrum would be the Humen County Branch, situated about forty kilometres downstream from Guangzhou on the eastern bank of the Pearl River. Humen had been a centre of Guomindang peasant and labour organization for some time, and the report of the county branch bore all the marks of a radical peasant and labour orientation. The Humen report appears to bear out the observation that when a branch had much to boast of in its promotion of the labour and peasant movements,
it did not hesitate to detail every aspect of its activities in its reports to party headquarters. The Humen branch report went far beyond the cryptic propaganda summaries of some other branches, offering accounts of the branch peasant, labour, youth and women's organizations as well as of its propaganda-organization bureau. The Humen report thus offers a rare opportunity to cross-reference propaganda messages and methods against the promotion of peasant and worker organization. Unlike Zijin, the Humen Branch Propaganda Bureau did send propagandists into the countryside, where they fearlessly urged peasants to take an active part in "political struggle". Again, unlike Zijin, the Humen branch did not bother to dissociate itself from communism, but consciously interpreted the third of Sun's Three People's Principles, 'People's Livelihood', to mean "workers arise and fight back against the capitalists! peasants arise and fight back against the big landlords!" The branch's organizational activities were as aggressive as its propaganda. By November 1925, it was supervising several peasant self-defence armies, ten village peasant associations and a regional general labour union made up of over ten individual unions. In radical Humen, as in equivocal Zijin and conservative Pingyuan, propaganda clearly defined policy and practice at the local level according to the whim of the branch itself. This, at least, the provincial party headquarters could deduce from the reports which landed on its desk.

Given the dearth of quantitative information at its disposal about local branch activities, the provincial headquarters chose to concentrate its resources upon some of the major urban centres outside of Guangzhou, and upon those rural branches about which information came to hand. At this point, positive intervention ran afoul of two limitations in addition to ignorance: shortages of staff and of time.

One of the urban centres which drew the attention of provincial headquarters was the city of Huizhou. The experience of the Huizhou Area Party Organization Committee highlighted the importance and limitations of positive intervention in local branches. The Huizhou Organization Committee was a nominally independent party body situated within the General Political Bureau of the Second Eastern Expeditionary Army before the formation of the regional-level Huizhou Area Special Committee. The Huizhou Organization
Committee was charged with responsibility for party organization in the eight counties of Boluo, Heyuan, Zijin, Longchuan, Lianping, Heping, Xinfeng, and Huiyang, and on 8 December it delivered an interim report to the provincial headquarters detailing its activities in these areas. Much of the following account is drawn from this report, whose compilers showed unequivocal support for the policies of anti-imperialism and anti-militarism and for the promotion of the peasant and labour movements.

Of the eight counties in the care of the Huizhou Organization Committee, only one was subjected to thorough investigation and intervention. Three of them, Heping, Lianping and Xinfeng, were situated too far from Huizhou to make intervention practicable, and were consciously ignored by the Committee from the outset. In two others, Longchuan and Heyuan, attempts had been made to establish contact, but many weeks had elapsed without any reply forthcoming. In the case of Heyuan this was a cause for some alarm, as a local branch had assumed the Committee's compliance and proceeded with its elections and formal opening ceremony without informing the Committee or inviting its scrutiny. The Committee had, therefore, no idea of what had transpired. Not much was known about the sixth county, Zijin, except that its branch organization appeared to be hampered by the local government office's reluctance to cover its running costs. Only in the case of the seventh county branch, at Boluo, did the Committee show any sign of satisfaction with the progress of local branch affairs. The Committee decided to cut its losses and to concentrate upon reorganizing the eighth county branch of Huiyang, within which the city of Huizhou was situated. The Huiyang County Party Branch was in fact located in Huizhou, a city whose mighty walls had been breached for the first time since the Song Dynasty by the armies of the Second Eastern Expedition.

A county branch had been set up in Huizhou in July 1925, shortly after the Yang and Liu rebellion had been quelled, and had then attracted a large number of "one-time soldiers and gentry layabouts" who could by that time see that the writing was on the wall for Chen Jiongming and his Huizhou ally, Yang Kunru. Once Huizhou fell to the NRA in mid-October, then those "gentry layabouts" who had not already foreseen the likely advantages of joining the Guomindang rushed to take shelter within it. The NRA anti-communist
garrison commander, Hu Shusen, assumed the title of Director of the Huiyang Party Branch as soon as he took command, and under his patronage the branch swelled to around two thousand party members, ninety percent of whom were soldiers or gentry. The branch and its sub-branches reputedly tried to exclude peasant and worker membership by introducing excessive entry fees, and they promoted policies resisting the spread of peasant and labour organization.

With respect to propaganda, Hu Shusen forbade the circulation of some tracts, as far as it was in his power to do so, and encouraged the reading of others. Prohibited were the CCP magazines *Guide* and *Chinese Youth (Zhongguo qingnian)*, Tan Pingshan's *Why Must We Overthrow Chen Jiongming?*, Wang Jingwei's *The Sense of Determination Appropriate to the People of Guangdong Today*, and anything else that happened to come by way of the General Political Bureau. Promoted were Dai Jitao's *The National Revolution and the Guomindang* and all literature of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. Hu's choice of materials for prohibition and dissemination shows that those highly theoretical debates which were splitting the party asunder at the national level were also finding a resounding echo at a more mundane level in the class politics of Guangdong Province.

Such, then, was the state of the Huiyang County Branch when the Huizhou Area Party Organization Committee resolved to reconstitute it in mid-November 1925. The Committee placed its own appointees within the county branch secretariat, and then proceeded to reorganize the seven sub-branches under the county branch. It vetted the credentials of the listed party members, recalling the party-tickets of all "one-time soldiers, gentry layabouts and traitor merchants". All in all, it proved a very difficult and laborious task, as at no stage did the Committee meet with anything other than outraged opposition from incumbent branch officials.

The reorganized branch's attempts to promote a more radical policy through propaganda were limited by practical problems and community obstruction. It established a daily newspaper in Huizhou, the *East River Republican Daily*, but as noted previously the paper collapsed within a month of
publication for want of funds. The reorganized branch was eager to distribute the mountain of propaganda material built up by various party agencies, but the local bookshops refused to stock or to sell them. The regional Financial Reform Office hindered the promotion of the peasant and labour movements, and obstructed branch activities in general, by ignoring orders to allocate ¥20,000 in war booty to the former, and ¥300 monthly to the latter.

Despite such setbacks, youth, women, merchants, peasants and workers all came in for specialist attention in the propaganda activities of the reformed branch and sub-branches themselves. A club was set up for local youth, through which they were trained as propagandists and sent out into the countryside on propaganda missions. Girls in Christian schools were instructed in the evils of imperialist "intellectual aggression". Workers were rallied into six new labour unions, and considerable numbers of merchants were persuaded, "through the influence of revolutionary propaganda", to join the party-sponsored Merchant Association movement.

At the close of this enormous effort at reorganization, which was marked as much by its limitations as by its achievements, the Huizhou Organization Committee was moved to comment that although thorough investigation and reform was required almost universally in Guangdong, it took a very heavy toll of staff and of time. Huiyang County alone had stretched the capacity of the eight-county Committee to the limit. Its experience in Huiyang would have to serve as a model for its successors to emulate, rather than stand as a first concrete step along a well ordered path leading to wholesale investigation and reorganization of all eight county branches in the Huizhou area, or for that matter, of all town and county branches in the province.

One other major urban centre which attracted provincial branch intervention was the city of Shantou (Swatow). In the case of Shantou, government and party agencies worked together in their attempts to win local approval. Shantou occupied an important position in the provincial economy, and was accorded equal importance in party and government affairs. It was,
after Guangzhou, the second largest port in Guangdong, as well as being a major centre of native industry in its own right. For the party, the capture of Shantou in the first week of November, 1925, presented the greatest test of its relations with the provincial bourgeoisie since the Guangzhou Merchant Rebellion of the previous year. One measure of the branch's importance in the party's eyes lay in its more than quadrupling the standard town and county branch allowance from ¥270 to ¥1200 per month. The Shantou Party Branch was to be a big operation.

The first hint of the line to be adopted by the party in dealing with the merchants of Shantou came with a speech by Chiang Kaishek to the Shantou Chamber of Commerce on 16 November, just a fortnight after the expeditionary armies had taken the city. Chiang had but one simple message to convey: the Shantou merchants should set aside their fears, as the Guomindang did not espouse communism. "Is the Guomindang a communist party? Is the NRA a communist army?" he asked rhetorically, "I have come here today specifically to correct all misunderstanding and to make the answers clear to everybody." The answers so clearly enunciated were all in the negative, and Chiang went on to defend the role of the native bourgeoisie and to promise that they would prosper under a party administration which would reserve its sting for use against foreign capitalists alone.

The second indication of the party's conciliatory attitude toward the Shantou merchants came with the inclusion of the highest ranking officer in the provincial Merchant Bureau, the conservative bureau head Fan Qiwi, as Merchant Bureau representative on the Chaomei Special Committee. Fan was a Cantonese revolutionary of the old school who had attended military college, taken part in the Hankou uprising of 1911, studied in Japan, and then assumed a number of government posts in the various Guangdong administrations of Sun Yatsen, from 1920-1923. He was a friend and colleague of Zou Lu, who at the time of the capture of Shantou on the Second Eastern Expedition was occupied in organizing the Western Hills Faction of dissident party conservatives. Fan did not join the Western Hills Faction, but remained in Guangzhou to accept the post of head of the party's Guangdong Merchant Bureau. He was, nonetheless, just as happy as Zou Lu to see the Communists
purged from the party in 1927. After reaching Shantou as Merchant Bureau representative in December 1925, Fan diversified his options by assuming a post as departmental head in the city's municipal administration. With one foot in local government and the other in local party affairs, Fan left a mark upon Shantou politics which was to be remembered long after he had moved on.79

A third sign of the conciliatory attitude toward the merchants of Shantou came with the convening of the East River Region Administrative Conference in the city, from 22 February to 3 March, 1926. Zhou Enlai, then wearing the many caps of Administrative Committee member, Shantou Party Branch Reorganization Committee member and Head of the General Political Bureau, acted as co-convenor of the Conference with the commander of the First Army, He Yingqin. The Conference drew one hundred and twenty-four representatives from local government bodies and community associations, including merchant groups. A number of its resolutions indicate that merchant interests were given clear voice at the Conference, and were carried thence to the provincial government in Guangzhou.80

The fate of the formal party branch in Shantou is rather obscure, and for that reason, not very illuminating. A branch had been opened in Shantou less than one month after the Huiyang County Branch, in that same quietus between the Yang-Liu Rebellion and the Second Eastern Expedition.81 Four months later, in December 1925, the Chaomei Special Committee set up office in Shantou, and after a period of dealing with this established branch, opted in mid-February to abolish it entirely.82 The Special Committee impeached the old branch before the Provincial Executive Committee, and asked that its executive officers be punished for exceeding their authority. The provincial branch reply to this latter request took the form of a motion by Chen Gongbo to the executive committee to investigate and punish all branch officers who "conduct themselves unlawfully, or break party regulations." That, presumably, is what the Shantou branch had done to deserve demotion. What it meant in substance is difficult to ascertain, but in all likelihood it included the expression of opinions on party policy and practice similar to those put forward by the former Huiyang County Branch 'Director', Hu Shusen.
Shortly after the Shantou branch had been abolished, certain "erroneous" views still found expression on the occasion of ceremonies held in commemoration of Sun's death in March 1926. The Chaomei Special Committee spoke out against these deviations with as much vigour as it had condemned the old branch for exceeding its authority. Things were put right, to the Special Committee's way of thinking, by the creation of a five-person Reorganization Committee, which included the Communists Zhou Enlai and Liu Ersong.

In addition to the two major urban centres of Huizhou and Shantou, and those rural communities of the eastern and southern regions which came under the authority of the regional Special Committees, there were four rural counties in which the provincial branch of the party intervened directly: Dongwan, Zhongshan, Shunde and Gaoyao. All fell within a seventy-five kilometre radius of Guangzhou, all underwent reorganization in the month of November, 1925, and all appear to have been brought to the attention of the provincial branch as suitable cases for intervention by the party's Central Organization Bureau, which was under the direction of the Communist, Tan Pingshan. Perhaps the most notable feature shared by all four counties, however, was the presence of violent struggle between gentry forces and local peasant associations. In some, notably Dongwan and Shunde, the peasant associations had themselves been responsible for deaths; in others, in for example Zhongshan and again in Shunde, the gentry militia had killed a number of peasants. In all four, the county peasant associations had complained to central and provincial officials that they were threatened by the militia. Needless to say, the propaganda of the four county branches had a significant part to play in defining and legitimizing these struggles, and the local branches came in for their share of attention as a result.

As the roots of the disputes within the four county branches lay deep in social conflict, provincial branch intervention was not entirely successful in resolving them. In January, the reorganization committee which had been appointed to Dongwan was accused of having rigged the local branch elections; the Zhongshan branch, even after reorganization, was ordered to sack one of its investigation committee members; and as late as February 1926, the Shunde County Branch was still said to be locked in "internecine
conflict. Yet for all the accusations and counter-accusations surrounding intervention and reorganization in those four branches, they were in fact brought more closely into line with central and provincial party policy in consequence.

The effect of reorganization is perhaps best illustrated by its pronounced impact upon the propaganda activities of the county branches. The reorganized Zhongshan County Branch, inaugurated on 17 December 1925, became one of the few town and county branches to launch a local Republican daily. This, along with its propaganda bureau and merchant-workers' bureaux, ran very lively propaganda programs consonant with the basic principles of the radical central party headquarters. Little information is available on Shunde and Gaoyao, but much can be said of the Dongwan branch after intervention. Following the recall of its original preparatory committee and the substitution of a reorganization committee, the Dongwan County Branch was finally opened on 15 December, 1925. After reorganization, the Dongwan branch became perhaps the most prolific propagandist of all the eighty-odd town and county branches in the province. It issued three regular serial publications (Dongwan Republican Daily, Dongwan Party Branch Weekly Pictorial, and Dongwan Party Branch Ten-Daily Magazine); several monographs (Special Issue of the Second County Congress of Dongwan County, Special Issue on the May Thirtieth Incident, and Mass Movement of the Dongwan County Branch over the Past Half-Year); and a variety of leaflets of its own design (including Declaration in Commemoration of February Seventh and Letter to Peasants). From the type and quantity of these materials, it appears that the Dongwan County Branch, after intervention, was a branch sure of its own place in the party, and confident of the party's place in the countryside of Guangdong.

Provincial party headquarters was genuinely concerned with publicizing party policy through the town and county branch system in Guangdong, and it constructed a formidable propaganda apparatus for the purpose. When required to do so, the provincial branch was more than willing to intervene in local party affairs in order to shape local branches into instruments of its will. Although hampered in this task by the 'natural' tendency of local branches to fall into the hands of local elites, by its own ignorance of local branch affairs, and by shortages of qualified staff and lack of time, it did manage
nevertheless to pull off a number of notable successes. In such cases, current central policy came to be articulated loudly and clearly at the village level. But was articulation sufficient to win the support of even those classes of people whom the party promised to help? It was to be shown that, to be successful, propaganda had to be made of more than 'hollow words' alone.
Chapter Seven

SOCIETY, ECONOMY AND POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GUOMINDANG
NATIONAL REVOLUTION IN GUANGDONG PROVINCE

Propagandists marched out of Guangzhou with the Eastern and Southern Expeditionary Armies, fully prepared to educate and awaken the citizens of eastern and southern Guangdong to the need for an anti-militarist and anti-imperialist national revolution. Once in the field, however, they found that they were ill-prepared for the three major lessons which lay in store for them: the first, that the residents of the battle-zone preferred entertainment to edification; the second, that civilian attitudes toward the goals of the national revolution were largely predetermined according to class interests and local social and economic conditions; and thirdly, that the actions of the NRA, the party, and the provincial government spoke far louder than the words of a few well-meaning pamphleteers. Political workers absorbed these lessons, drawing upon them in preparing propaganda as the expeditions progressed, and trying to implement them in the administration of captured territories in the post-campaign period.

Edification and Entertainment

Didactic propaganda made little impression upon the citizens of eastern and southern Guangdong. Merchants were notoriously difficult to attract to political gatherings, and peasants either failed to comprehend the language of the million and more posters and pamphlets pressed into their hands, or else listened in bewilderment to phrases which made little sense to them; these included such simple exclamations as "the spirit of Mr. Liao lives on!"1 The messages of these pamphlets were hardly inflammatory, promising good conduct on the part of the NRA in return for civilian assistance with reconnaissance and transportation, and limiting the aims of peasant involvement in the expeditions to self-organization and the elimination of militarism and imperialism, in short, to the rudiments of Sun Yatsen's all-class national revolution.2 If Sun's formula for national revolution were to be given any chance of succeeding through political education of the masses, as he himself suggested, then clearly more appropriate techniques had to be devised in order to attract the attention of the citizens of eastern and southern Guangdong.
It appears that the public preferred entertainment to edification, a fact of which political workers showed themselves fully aware in the comment that political tracts and sermons were "comparitively less effective" than crude amusements. The same political workers were ill-prepared to take advantage of this observation. On the Second Eastern Expedition, there were three written pieces for every one pictorial piece prepared in advance by the General Political Bureau. The Second Section Team, finding itself undersupplied with pictorial propaganda, then set its propagandists to work painting pictures by hand. It was generally agreed, in post-mortems on the campaign, that on future expeditions the ratio of written to pictorial items should be the reverse of that supplied for the Second Eastern Expedition. On the South Expeditions, propagandists similarly bemoaned the oversupply of books, leaflets and printed matter, and the undersupply of musical instruments, photographs, paintings, "artful" posters and other eye-catching devices for which there was considerably greater demand and appreciably greater response.

For all their lack of preparation, propagandists were prepared nonetheless to merge political education with popular entertainment in the hope of preserving and communicating part of their message intact. Pictures, songs, public gatherings and general amusements came to replace pamphlets and posters in the armory of propagandists, and their reception far exceeded that of the written word. Peasants learned to repeat slogans recited by propagandists, and to sing revolutionary songs under their tuition. The Song of the National Revolution, being the only form of propaganda with any appeal to youth, became something of a hit tune in the East River region. Public singing and performances also served to announce the advent of political meetings, of which many were conducted in those villages and towns at which the armies stayed for a reasonable length of time. On the Second Eastern Expedition, the First Section Team alone convened sixty-one such public gatherings, and the Second and Third Sections were said to have held similar numbers. As a general rule, the more spectacular the meeting, the greater the approval it generated. Hence a few extraordinary meetings, like the Li Village Double-Tenth Candle Procession and the Victory Meeting at Maxi, merited special mention in reports for having prompted the "ten-thousand-strong multitude to burst out in thunderous applause". As merchants were reluctant to show their faces even at such gatherings, theatrical performances were devised for their particular benefit.
Technical adaptation could, however, compensate for the shortcomings of didactic propaganda only to a limited degree, beyond which popular attitudes toward the goals of national revolution remained impervious to the technical mastery of propagandists. As has been shown with respect to the party's mass movement in general, any further enlistment of merchant, peasant and worker support on the expeditions required a reorientation of propaganda itself, away from political indoctrination toward the articulation of local interests. In response to this demand, the various Fourth Army political bureaux which were engaged in the Southern Expedition undertook research into local social organization and local conditions the better to adapt their propaganda to the environment. Propagandists identified and located the headquarters of local civic organizations such as merchant associations, benevolent societies, and labour unions, to use their facilities and activate their social networks in support of propaganda work.¹² The Twelfth Division Political Bureau also rounded up local youth from schools in its vicinity and quizzed them about local circumstances and problems, before compiling propaganda guidelines based on the answers supplied.¹³ These innovations were in fact technical adaptations designed to revive the flagging attention of civilians in the war-zones, but were adaptations of a kind which helped propaganda to make the transition from political indoctrination to articulation of those regional and class interests which preoccupied the citizens of eastern and southern Guangdong.

Regional and class differences

There was considerable correlation between regional and class differences in popular attitudes toward Sun Yatsen's national revolution, that is, toward anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, and the promotion of mass organizations in Guangdong Province. Diverging responses toward the slogan of anti-militarism for example, in Huiyang county and Shantou in eastern Guangdong, reflected class as greatly as regional differences, the gentry of Huiyang and the merchants of Shantou having their own reasons for favouring or disapproving of local militarism. By the same token, points of similarity in attitudes toward imperialism may hide the actual regional and class differences which underlie the similarities, as for example between the national bourgeoisie of Shantou and the peasants of southern Guangdong, the livelihood of each of these groups being threatened, albeit for different reasons, by competition
from imperialist traders. Despite occasional overlapping, the drawing of distinctions between classes and regions helps to explain variations in civilian responses to the arrival of the NRA and Guomindang on the Eastern and Southern Expeditions.

Popular attitudes toward militarism, or more specifically toward Chen Jiongming in the east and Deng Benying in the south, varied between regions within eastern Guangdong, and between the eastern and southern regions as a whole. As I have already indicated, within eastern Guangdong Chen Jiongming was popular among the gentry and tertiary students of the East River and Huizhou (Huiyang) regions. In the areas to the east bordering Guangzhou, notably Huiyang, Heyuan, Zijin and Boiuo counties, he appears to have been more popular than the Guomindang among the merchants and peasants as well, since the Guomindang had reported to using despised Yunnan and Guangxi militarists to expel Chen Jiongming and occupy the region in his place. When, in mid 1925, the Yunnan and Guangxi allies of the Guomindang were themselves put to flight, the peasants took after them with hoes and sticks. As a result of their experience under Guomindang rule, the common people of these counties were reluctant to concede that any advantages would arise from an anti-militarist campaign directed by the Guomindang against Chen Jiongming. This attitude was simply a statement of general preference for local over foreign militarists, and had little bearing upon popular attitudes toward militarism per se. It did, nonetheless, constitute a challenge to the Guomindang's credentials for espousing the slogan of anti-militarism. The Guomindang, in turn, showed itself to be sensitive to the regional aspect of militarism. After breaching the walls of Chen Jiongming's bastion on the East River, Huizhou City, it tore them down stone by stone so that never again would Huizhou act as an alternative centre of authority within the wider hinterland of Guangzhou city. Further east from Guangzhou, variations in levels of support for militarism corresponded primarily with class differences, and will therefore be discussed under that category. Suffice it to say, for the purpose of drawing meaningful contrasts between civilian attitudes in eastern and southern Guangdong, that the eastern gentry showed little partiality for the NRA and Guomindang, while peasants and merchants were far more sympathetic toward them.

Social and economic conditions in Southern Guangdong were much worse than those in the east, and this difference appears to account for a far higher
level of undifferentiated popular support for the NRA in the south. In contrast to most of the eastern region, southern Guangdong was already all but totally devastated by bandits and roving armies when the expeditionary armies set off in pursuit of Deng Benying. The further south the armies went, the more tragic was the scene which confronted them. From Enping to Suixi, the situation was rather patchy. At some points, like Heshan just south of Enping, the markets were already bare and the wealthy had long fled, while at others, such as Meilu, merchants still remained in a position to direct local braves against bandit strongholds. Over this area, most villages and towns were operating at about twenty percent of capacity. From Suixi to Leizhou, the situation was more desperate. Here, the roads traversed flat wasteland and passed through the remains of villages long razed to the ground. Further south again, from Leizhou to Xuwen, things grew more desperate still. Three-quarters of the population of Xuwen, estimated at about 300,000 people, had either perished, or sold off their children and fled. Food stocks were exhausted, and no water fit for human consumption remained. Those so unfortunate as to have been left behind turned to banditry themselves, or fell to eating the pulp of banana skins and to sitting about, wretched and emaciated, awaiting death. Over the final stage of the expedition, as the armies drew closer and closer to the southernmost tip of the Chinese mainland, the roads became almost impassable, overgrown with bamboo and littered with skeletons.

The most immediate cause of devastation in the south was banditry. Bandits impeded agricultural production by stealing farm implements and oxen, kidnapping peasants to enslave or ransom them, burning whole villages, and seizing for their own consumption such few crops as could be raised under the circumstances. They also interfered with commerce by lying in wait along roads and waterways to pounce upon commercial traffic. The more bandits disrupted local production and commerce, the more plentiful they became, as early groups of disbanded soldiers began to swell and multiply with the addition of peasants whom they had helped to impoverish. By the third stage of the Southern Expedition, bandit numbers, and their impact on the surrounding countryside, had increased to the point where the rural economy could no longer sustain them. Raids on bandit lairs by the NRA revealed that even the bandits were living on nothing but rice gruel, prepared in humble bamboo pots. The outlook for bandits and law-abiding folk alike was one of imminent
starvation. Deng Benying had presided over this social and economic collapse, and had himself contributed to the general chaos by allowing his troops to run amuck during the few fruitless 'anti-bandit' campaigns conducted under his administration. It appears that blame for the bandit situation was popularly attributed to him.

Yet banditry was as much a symptom as a cause of impoverishment in the south. The local economy was under threat from other quarters, which exacerbated the bandit problem. Cash-crop production and the regional cottage industry, reed-mat manufacture, were both collapsing under the weight of competition from abroad. While household cash surpluses were contracting under this pressure, Deng Benying introduced a new range of taxes and increased the levies on existing taxes. Rich and poor shared the burden, but it appears that the Popular Militia of the landowning gentry began to step up its harassment of the peasantry while the merchant Militia began to hound small debtors, in order to help make up the landlord and merchant quotas of the taxes. Hence while the rich may have grown poorer, the poor were totally impoverished. Despite the complexity of the situation, much of the responsibility for the havoc wrought in the south could be laid at the door of Deng Benying, and so long as his removal remained the paramount objective of the expeditionary army, the Southern Expedition appears to have won the undivided sympathy of the local community.

The upshot of all this was that direct participation in the military campaign by merchant, gentry and peasant groups was in many cases spontaneous, owing more to their unbridled hatred of Deng Benying than to any active solicitation on the part of propagandists. Merchant leaders in Meilu, for example, came in person to meet the Eleventh Division and to beg its assistance in ridding the area of bandits. Elsewhere, they risked punishment by refusing to pay Deng's taxes in the expectation of the imminent arrival of the NRA. Gentry Popular Militia, which had made life difficult for the NRA to the east of the province, came to its assistance on the Southern Expedition. During its second stage, Popular Militia in the region of Tiantang harassed the enemy from the rear while the Second Army advanced from Xinxing. Over the third stage, Popular Militia frequently joined the Fourth Army in chasing the remnants of Deng's army across Hainan Island. Peasants generally volunteered their services in other capacities, to provide food, clothing and shelter,
but they too occasionally took up sticks and hoes to follow the army into the marshland in pursuit of bandits. 32 Even to the partial eyes of propagandists on the expedition, such direct participation in the campaign across so wide a social spectrum did not appear to be the outcome of their propaganda activity. As the General Report on propaganda activity on the Southern Expedition itself concluded, "Although political propaganda work by our armies was not without some influence in this regard, it was in the main a response to several years of tyranny and extortion at the hands of the outlaw Deng." 33

Differences in the state of local society from one region to another also accounted in part for varying levels of practical assistance rendered to the NRA by the peasants of eastern and southern Guangdong. Drought and flood were to play a part in encouraging peasants to earn a wage as porters in southern Hunan, as Donald Jordan has shown in his work on the Northern Expedition. 34 Conditions in southern Guangdong had deteriorated much further, to the point where peasant coolies were no longer to be found. Even when all was going well for the propaganda teams, in terms of appropriate materials, entertaining methods and well behaved soldiers, civilian assistance was not always forthcoming. In fact whatever cap they happened to don in their anxiety to please the civilian population, whether that of entertainer, ombudsman or disciplinarian, propagandists were rather less successful in eliciting assistance from the citizens of the south than from those to the east. 35 As the same military and political units, the Eleventh and Twelfth Divisions, were involved in both expeditions, it might readily be supposed that the different levels of response to the Fourth Army from one campaign to the next were due to social and economic conditions peculiar to each region.

This does appear to have been the case. There was a compelling need for porters throughout the southern campaign, but the regional economy and society had been so devastated in the years of Deng Benying's occupation that few able-bodied men remained. Those who had survived all else had found themselves pressed into service by Deng Benying, so that no matter how generous the wages and how lenient the conditions of service offered by the NRA, and regardless of how widely it publicised its porter program, volunteers were few and far between. 36 Low levels of pre-existing peasant and labour organization, in contrast to levels in the east, also lessened the likelihood and frequency of popular assistance. 37
Propaganda on the subject of militarism came to reflect the different concerns of various localities. In the Huizhou region of eastern Guangdong, where the NRA had met with a cool reception, NRA propaganda dwelt upon the relative discipline of the NRA in contrast to the heinous conduct of the Guomindang's Guangxi and Yunnan allies who had previously occupied the area; in those parts of the East River region from which the first expeditionary armies had withdrawn, and in so doing had carelessly abandoned newly founded mass organisations to the knives of the gentry Popular Militia working in concert with Chen Jiongming, propaganda emphasised the NRA's determination to provide long-term protection in the future; in cities and market centres, the party promised in its propaganda to abolish the likin and other miscellaneous taxes; throughout southern Guangdong, NRA propaganda repeatedly enumerated the hideous crimes of Deng Benying, and contrasted the potential relief offered by the NRA.

Similarly, on the subject of imperialism, propagandists allowed themselves considerable latitude in interpreting party policy to suit local conditions. Sun Yatsen had himself sanctioned the use of local idiom in December 1923, with the words: "If we choose phrases dear to the hearts of the people in our speeches, then we can move a good many people, and see great results for a minimum of effort"; the Tenth Division Political Bureau took him at his word. The citizens of southern Guangdong had, as noted earlier, genuine cause for resenting foreign intrusions into local markets and industry, and they appear to have been receptive to anti-foreign propaganda as a result. Deng Benying certainly thought so, and in his own propaganda attacking the Guomindang he stressed its links with Russia. Deng's propaganda contrasted his own parochial loyalties against the foreign associations of the Guomindang, and did so in the rhetoric of local xenophobia. The messages of his posters ranged from "Let the people of Guangdong govern Guangdong", to "Russian devils are directing Chiang Kaishek to destroy the Guangdong Army." Both sides could play at that game. The Tenth Division bureau showed itself equally sensitive to anti-foreign sentiment in the south, and pointed to Deng's own alleged role in mortgaging Hainan Island as collateral for foreign aid. It was also adept at grasping anti-foreign idiom, and translated the politically-oriented motif of anti-imperialism into the ethno-centric language of anti-barbarism: "In Guangdong, let us achieve peaceful reunion, and in our foreign relations, let us defeat the English. All
will then share in the benefits of peace and prosperity, and avoid being swallowed up by the barbarian race. Just such 'anti-imperialism' had heralded the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty as many as thirty years before.

In preparing their materials, propagandists worked on the understanding that no matter how finely they attuned their organization or perfected their techniques, their work was, in the last analysis, successful only to the extent that it reflected the immediate concerns of civilians in a given locality. In reflecting local concerns it ceased to be uniformly didactic, and took on many of the tensions already present in the social, political and economic life of Guangdong Province from one region to another.

Class attitudes toward the goals of national revolution may have varied in line with regional circumstances, but they retained their class character nonetheless. The landowning gentry of eastern Guangdong relied as heavily upon the local militarist Chen Jiongming for maintaining its regional autonomy as he depended upon them for his survival. Not once, to my knowledge, did the gentry Popular Militia come to the assistance of the NRA on the eastern campaigns as they did in the south. To the contrary, they moved in concert with Chen Jiongming to reassert gentry local authority in the hiatus between the two eastern expeditions. Once NRA victory appeared imminent, the gentry attempted to retain local autonomy under the guise of nominal Guomindang rule by flooding established party branches, as in Huiyang county, by setting up new and unauthorised Guomindang branches throughout the East River region, by seeking party sponsorship for their own 'peasant associations', by converting Popular Militia into 'peasant self-defence armies', and by seeking senior positions in the revamped provincial administrative system. In this respect they displayed a marked similarity to the gentry of southern Guangdong who, although mobilizing their Popular Militia in support of the NRA to defeat the common enemy Deng Benying, turned around and resisted the imposition of a Guomindang government administration once the common enemy had been eliminated.

In many places to the south and to the east, the gentry succeeded in converting the party and provincial administration into its own creature, and in so doing made a mockery of Sun Yatsen's all-class national revolution by maintaining local gentry autocracy. The Guomindang could not possibly
remain an impartial administration concerned with the interests of "every single person" and at the same time lay claim to the support of the gentry, for the only condition under which the gentry would accept party authority was if they themselves constituted it. The question of rural class dictatorship aside, the Guomindang, by virtue of using regional authority as merely a springboard to provincial and ultimately national power, effectively alienated the gentry of eastern and southern Guangdong whose loyalties lay first and foremost with their own locality and only marginally with the nation as a whole. The gentry resented national political actors along with their national revolutions, especially when the obligation befell them to foot part of the bill. Hence the Guangdong gentry wanted neither an all-class, nor a national, revolution, and remained totally unmoved by propaganda which promoted it. Propagandists, try as they would to reassure the gentry that the Guomindang harboured no plans for social revolution, failed to win their support for even a national revolution.

It would be incorrect to assume that any class of people came running at the sound of the approaching footsteps of the NRA, least of all the peasants of eastern and southern Guangdong. Not unnaturally, in view of their past experience of roving armies, peasants usually saluted its approach by fleeing. In addition to the taint which clung to the NRA by indirect association with the poor reputation of armies in general, the revolutionary army laboured under another burden which is perhaps best conveyed in the warning with which mothers are said to have scolded naughty children: "behave or the revolutionary party will come and get you!" The revolutionary sense of mission which the NRA put forward as the feature distinguishing itself from all others was as much a handicap as a help, in a society which, however desperate it may have been, was terrified by the prospect of further deterioration coming in train of that unknown quantity, revolution.

The peasants of Guangdong had little time for armies, politicians or preachers visiting from afar, unless those visitors showed by patient example that they were working with the peasants' interests at heart, and were capable of defending their interests in the long term. In consequence, at the time of arrival of the NRA in the hamlets of Guangdong, peasant sympathy for the NRA was slight and peasant assistance negligible. There are in currency a number of apocryphal stories about peasants lining the roads with tea and
cakes in hand, in expectation of the armies' arrival. Such stories do have some basis in reality, but they are highly atypical. As we have noted, on the First Eastern Expedition the peasants "were pressed to the point of hating us, though they dared not say so;" on the second expedition, peasants were relieved to find that less of their number were being conscripted for baggage service, but found no cause to rejoice in the continued tolerance of looting and occupation of their dwellings; political reports are ominously silent on the subject of troop behaviour on the Southern Expedition, but at all events, able-bodied peasants were not to be found when labour recruiters went knocking door-to-door. The mythology of peasant support for the three provincial expeditions thus rests entirely on the exceptional assistance offered by the organized peasants of Haifeng, Lufeng, and Wuhua counties in eastern Guangdong. The assistance of these few localized peasant associations, while not negligible, may have made little difference to the outcome of the campaign at hand, but it did demonstrate that the popular image which the NRA claimed for itself only happened to conform with reality when and where party activists had carried out painstaking organizational work at its fore.

While, as a general rule, peasants showed little active interest in the progress of the 'anti-militarist' military campaigns, their curiosity was aroused in the post-war period upon learning that the NRA and Guomindang were on occasion aggravating the local gentry by their attempts to impose an alien administration in the wake of the expedition. Hence, after the battles had been won, peasants flocked in greater numbers and with far greater consistency than any other class of people to the Welcome Gatherings staged by NRA political workers in liberated market-towns. They came in their thousands specifically to find out what the Guomindang would do for them in terms of gaining political redress and economic concessions from the class of landowning gentry, which was already showing by its behaviour an hostility not only to social but to national revolution. With the establishment of new peasant associations along the trail of the expeditions, for the purpose of counter-balancing the weight of gentry influence in local affairs, the class aspect of the national revolution then took on a second dimension.

The attitude of merchants toward the expansion of Guomindang rule in Guangdong was, like that of the gentry and peasantry, shaped by their
immediate interests, and hence subject to variations in their means of livelihood and to fluctuations in their local environment. On the one hand, sympathy for the anti-imperialist position of the Guomindang proved to be quite strong among the national capitalists of Shantou once it had been pointed out that anti-imperialism meant promotion of native goods at the expense of imported products. By the time of Shantou's capture in November 1925, the Guangdong-Hong Kong strike and trade embargo, which had earlier harmed traffic in native and imported goods alike, had come to favour native industry by a selective relaxation of trade restrictions. Anti-imperialism thus benefited a certain section of the Shantou merchant community, which is reported to have responded to the arrival of the NRA with considerable enthusiasm. To the south of the province in Haikou, on the other hand, all merchants, whether national or compradore, large or small, came to adopt a common position in opposition to the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Guomindang by virtue of their shared reliance upon the oil and kerosene stores of an American subsidiary in their locality, the Asia Oil Depot. A blockade of the Depot by the Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike Committee prompted retaliations by the Depot itself, which led in turn to the total cessation of commercial life in Haikou. The merchant community, holding the Guomindang to blame for their predicament, refused as a body to co-operate with the new administration. The Fourth Army Political Bureau, which was responsible for civil administration in Haikou, was left to draw different conclusions about the revolutionary potential of the bourgeoisie from those being drawn by the First Army Political Bureau in Shantou: in the south, not only imperialist and compradore merchants but indeed "the better part" of the Chinese merchant body appeared to oppose the national revolution.

Merchant attitudes toward the Guomindang's position on anti-militarism hinged on the issue of taxation. Variations in levels of support for the Guomindang and for Chen Jiongming corresponded with degrees of exposure to each as a tax collector, the general rule being that exposure to one engendered sympathy for the other. In the Guangzhou area, the Guomindang accumulated an appalling record of tax abuse and currency manipulation which alarmed the local merchant community and contributed in no small part to the great strike and armed insurrection of 1924. At the same time, Chen Jiongming earned for himself an equally poor reputation among the merchants
of those areas of eastern Guangdong over which he retained authority. NRA political workers took advantage of merchant discontent in eastern Guangdong by promising tax relief under the Guomindang, and in the three prosperous regions of Chao'an, Meixian and Shantou won merchant acclaim on that account. The gentry of these three regions, incidentally, contrasted markedly with their merchant neighbours by remaining impervious to Guomindang efforts to woo them away from Chen Jiongming.

Granted that sections of the merchant community were predisposed to sympathise with the Guomindang in opposing militarism and imperialism, their sympathy was nonetheless conditional on the Guomindang practising what it preached. For small merchants along the route of the provincial military expeditions, this meant in effect that the Three Don't's (san bu zhuyi) were more important than the Three Principles of the People (san min zhuyi). In the case of the powerful merchants and greater business houses of the major cities, it meant that merchant support was conditional upon the local party, army and government agencies fulfilling the specific promises outlined in their advance publicity. Hence even among merchants who were predisposed to be anti-militaristic and anti-imperialistic, levels of support for the Guomindang varied with the behaviour of the party and its agencies from one locality to another.

The observation that merchant responses varied according to the shape of local party representation is not quite the same as saying that merchants favoured the right-wing of the Guomindang over the left. If there was, in fact, any consistent correlation between party factions and that section of the merchant community which was predisposed against militarism and imperialism, it was more probably the reverse: the left-wing was in many respects an ally of the merchants of eastern Guangdong, as is apparent in the experience of the two major cities to the east, Huizhou and Shantou.

At the time of the Second Eastern Expedition, the Huizhou branch of the Guomindang was occupied and staffed by ex-soldiers and scions of the local gentry who consciously aligned themselves with the right-wing party faction then centred in Shanghai. Merchants enjoyed little representation in the branch, and were alienated from the Guomindang as a whole by its behaviour. In collusion with local government and military agencies, the branch ran a
profitable commercial protection racket, in which, for a fee of ¥50 to ¥200 per boat, the Huizhou garrison would contract to guard merchant vessels against bandit harassment on the journey down river. The bandits in fact rarely attacked commercial traffic, preferring instead to levy charges on its passage through their territory. As these charges tended to be lower than the fees charged for protection, the merchants appear to have preferred the threat of bandits to the exorbitant cost of protection. Following a left-wing reorganization of the branch, Huizhou merchants voiced their support for the new party organization in the expectation that it would put an end to the protection racket and tackle the bandit problem at its source. 68

In Shantou, similarly, it was the Communist and Guomindang official Zhou Enlai who spearheaded attempts to win the support of the merchant community. In co-operation with the First Army Commander, He Yingqin, Zhou convened the East River Region Administrative Conference in Shantou from 22 February to 3 March 1926, at which a number of proposals were formulated for promoting native industry and for linking party and merchant interests. 69 In its opening declaration, the Conference published an apology to all merchants in the East River region who had been forced to offer "loans" to the expeditionary armies over previous months, and promised, like army political bureaux before it, to repay all loans in full by exempting merchants from current and future taxes to the equivalent amount. The Conference voted to expand the telephone grid in Guangdong and to build a sizable radio transmitter in order to facilitate intra-provincial, inter-provincial and international business communications. For the particular benefit of native industry, it voted to lower export taxes and to increase import tariffs. 70 An important adjunct to capital construction and fiscal measures for promoting native industry was another proposal to orchestrate a propaganda campaign to prompt the citizens of Guangdong to buy local, in preference to foreign, goods. The party did in fact help to promote native goods through a propaganda campaign centring on the slogan of 'economic independence for Guangdong', and stressing the extent to which imperialist economic oppression hindered the development of native industry. Merchant demands were thus neatly incorporated into its more general propaganda barrage against foreign imperialism. 71

A final motion which appears to have been of interest to Shantou merchants was one proposing the establishment of local representative government. The
A vexatious issue of phasing out party government and introducing representative government was to plague Guomindang administrations for years to come, and was to underlie many of the factional disputes which rocked the Nanjing government in the 1930s. As a rule, pressure for representative government came from outside the party, while determination to maintain party rule came from within it. This appears to have been the case in Shantou in 1926. The motion proposing the establishment of representative government came from the floor of the Conference, in the form of a motion without notice. It requested that the provincial government formulate the organizational charter of the Guangdong Citizens Conference, and suggested that representative government be introduced first of all at town and country level, and then extended to provincial and national levels; in short, to introduce it as soon as possible in Shantou.

The simplest way to accommodate such a far-reaching request was to incorporate it into an ongoing propaganda campaign. Late in November, some three months before the opening of the East River Region Administrative Conference, the CPB had considered resuscitating the old National Citizens Conference campaign of 1924, which had been organized to bolster Sun Yatsen on his ill-fated Northern Visit of 1924. In November 1925, its slogans had taken on new relevance in the light of the Guo Songling revolt in North China, as they did again in February 1926, when Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian armies appeared poised to demolish the party's ally in North China, Feng Yuxiang. A massive publicity campaign was unleashed in February, drawing into its service central and provincial party agencies as well as community groups affiliated with the Guomindang. It was within this context that, on 20 March 1926, Shantou city launched its very own Association for the Promotion of a National Citizens Conference, under the watchful eye of the city's Party Reorganization Committee.

Attempts to muster merchant support for the national revolution ultimately floundered, but not for want of trying on the part of Communists and left-wingers to attune party propaganda to their sectional interests. The Guomindang lost the support of merchants, and indeed of the peasantry as well, through the manner in which Chiang Kaishek, conservative military officers and the right-wing provincial government forced them to shoulder the enormous financial burden of the Northern Expedition. The Northern
Expedition was launched in mid-1926 before the party's hold on the newly incorporated regions of Guangdong had been fully consolidated, and so the party was forced to rely upon the old taxation network of local militarists in order to finance the expedition. It was the taxation policy pursued in eastern and southern Guangdong which made "hollow words" of the party's advance propaganda.

**Taxation and party propaganda**

As things were set up in Guangdong, the functions of party and government were quite distinct. The government's job was, basically, to keep law and order and to collect and redistribute taxes, while that of the party was to formulate policy and oversee its implementation. Hence while the party dealt with ideological and political questions with scant regard for their impact on social cohesion or upon the province's capacity to generate finance, the government concerned itself with social cohesion and financial considerations with little regard for ideology or policy. Government propaganda was thus turned to purposes quite alien to party propaganda.

The propaganda activities of the provincial government reflect this distinctive emphasis upon administration. In the field of education, government propaganda took the form of introducing courses on Sun's Three Principles into the provincial education system; in communications, it involved restricting the entry and circulation of propaganda hostile to the party in Guangdong; in the area of health administration, a propaganda office was set up to promote public hygiene; in local police matters, propaganda was used widely to urge citizens to assist in the elimination of bandits; in the matter of public records and tax collection, an enormous propaganda campaign was launched to induce people to welcome and assist census-takers in a forthcoming provincial census. The propaganda activities of party and of government were geared to such different purposes that there was very little scope for coordination of their propaganda.

In concert with this functional differentiation, provincial government personnel appear on the whole to have been politically more conservative than staff of the provincial party branch. The proportion of radicals to conservatives at the highest levels of the provincial government was the
reverse of that in the provincial party headquarters. As Fan Qiwu was the conservative exception in an otherwise radical party headquarters, Chen Gongbo was the one radical exception in an otherwise conservative provincial government. From the founding of the National Government and Guangdong Provincial Government in July 1925 until the launching of the Northern Expedition one year later, the pivotal figures in the provincial government, aside from Chen Gongbo, were the hardened conservatives Sun Fo (Reconstruction Dept.), Gu Yingfen (Civil Government Dept.), Song Ziwen (Commerce Dept.) and Xu Chongqing (Education Dept.). Their political sympathies predisposed them to place administrative considerations before any radical policy initiatives.

At the intermediate level of provincial government, more or less at a level equivalent to the party's regional Special Committees, government staff and policies were rather more radical. Following the Second Eastern Expedition, government administration in the East River region was placed in the hands of Zhou Enlai and the First Army Commander, He Yingqin, and the policies espoused at that level were far from conservative. The regional government agency resolved to disarm and disband gentry militia, to introduce free compulsory education, to establish free child-care centres, to organize genuinely independent labour unions, and to capture and punish all who threatened or harmed the peasants. For the southern area, it was the left-wing party propagandist Gan Naiguang who drew up regional government policy. With the assistance of selected local representatives, Gan formulated specific policies around the general goal of transferring power from the "gentry class" to the "people". Hence all gentry organizations were to be reformed or disbanded; local authority was to be vested in a County People's Representative Assembly, for which representatives would be drawn from peasant associations, labour unions, merchant associations, local party branches, student associations and "reformed" gentry organizations; the tax burden was to be lifted from the "masses" and shifted to the "powerful families"; and education was to be popularized. For Hainan Island, intermediate government policy was defined by yet another assembly of local representatives, this time under the supervision of the Fourth Army Political Bureau. The thrust of policies for Hainan was much the same as for the eastern and southern regions, aiming to rid Hainan of all "despotic gentry".
Staff at the lower levels of provincial government administration, in the towns, counties and sub-counties, were more in sympathy with Sun Fo and his colleagues at the highest levels than with Zhou Enlai and Gan Naiguang at the intermediate level. It was precisely at this lowest level of government administration, staffed in the main by officials hostile to the party's peasant and labour movements, that party propaganda was measured most acutely against its actual performance.

Once again, it was not for want of trying that radical party leaders failed to dislodge conservative local government officials. Indeed, the appointment of County Magistrates followed much the same pattern of selection as heads of local party branches, with military and political commanders of the Eastern and Southern Expeditions leaving distinctive trails of political sympathisers occupying civilian posts in their wake. On the Second Eastern Expedition, Zhou Enlai's General Political Bureau replaced "gentry bullies" occupying county magistracies with magistrates more to its liking. Not many could have been replaced in this way, however, as discretionary power rested solely with the General Political Bureau, whose activities were confined to the southern flank. In the south of the province, Chen Mingshu's Tenth Division was initially vested with authority to appoint County Magistrates, but as in the case of this Division's appointment of party branch staff on the southern route, it selected conservative local figures unsympathetic to the peasant and labour movements. Once Gan Naiguang and his intermediate administrative agency had taken from Chen Mingshu the authority to appoint County Magistrates in the south, the political complexion of the appointees changed from conservative opponents to radical supporters of the peasant and labour movements. Yet it seems that in the south, as with Zhou Enlai to the east, Gan's committee made very little impression on the overall quality of staffing of local administration. A report on provincial administration issued in December 1926 pointed out that throughout the province, in every single county and sub-county, there remained government officials "who conspire with reactionary forces to crush the mass movement". This was indeed the case on the southern peninsula, in Hainan, and in the Huizhou, Hailufeng and Chaomei areas of eastern Guangdong.
In consequence, at county level the proposals for change formulated by Gan Naiguang and Zhou Enlai were all but totally ignored. Extant government and party records list not a single instance of successful disarmament of gentry Popular Militia. In more cases than not, it seems that the Popular Militia retained and even expanded their authority, and carried out attacks upon peasant associations with the connivance of local government officials. Certainly in those cases where hostility between peasant and gentry forces erupted into violence, the local arms of provincial government failed to come to the aid of the peasants. It may well have been beyond the power of County Magistrates to intervene on behalf of the peasant movement even had they chosen to do so, but neither impotence nor intransigence could excuse the failure of the party to carry out the promises made in its propaganda, at least as far as peasants were concerned.

It was in respect of taxation that the gap between the party's promises and the government's performance loomed widest, and proved most damaging to party propaganda. One theme which had run constantly throughout NRA propaganda on the Southern and Eastern Expeditions was the promise to deliver local citizens from hardship by reducing or eliminating the heavy taxes imposed by Deng Benying and Chen Jiongming. For townsfolk, and most especially merchants, this presumably meant that the provincial government would rationalize and reduce sales taxes, and do away with the imposts levied arbitrarily upon goods in transit throughout Guangdong. For rural folk, and not least the peasants, it amounted to a promise to ease the burden of land tax and other taxes which fell upon rich and poor alike.

The propaganda theme of lowering taxation had met with an enthusiastic response from citizens of the eastern and southern regions, both before and immediately after their liberation. News of the NRA's attitude toward Deng Benying's taxes ran ahead of the army itself, whereupon merchants withheld payment of taxes in defiance of Deng Benying, pending the arrival of the NRA. The NRA was then welcomed on this very account. The NRA won similar acclaim on the Second Eastern Expedition by declining to accept levies which had been raised at the behest of Chen Jiongming. Such munificence was all very well for the military phase of the expeditions, but in the administrative aftermath,
the provincial government showed itself rather less generous in its
determination to gather enough funds to finance a national military
expedition.

Expanding the provincial government's financial base was by no means
the immediate motive for embarking on the Eastern and Southern Expeditions,
nor for the brief campaign against Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan. As far as
the military campaigns were concerned, it is difficult to ascribe any motive
to the Guomindang other than that of self-defence. The First Eastern
Expedition was simply a response to military initiatives taken by the enemy,
Chen Jiongming, and the Second, no more than a return to that campaign after
putting down the Yang-Liu rebellion. The Southern Expedition was little other
than a flank engagement of the Eastern Expeditions, until the imminent defeat
of Chen Mingshu's Tenth Division called for the launching of a full-scale
campaign to unseat Deng Benying. In none of these cases did the party,
government or army initiate military confrontation as the preferred option
for dealing with enemies within the provincial borders.

Yet in the longer term, the issue of control of all economic resources
in the province was central to each of these armed conflicts. Access to
provincial financial resources was the very issue over which Chen Jiongming
had first broken with Sun Yatsen in mid-1922, in the midst of preparations
on Sun's part for a national military expedition which would have placed great
strains upon the treasury, and citizens, of Guangdong. In the name of Guangdong
provincialism, Chen denied Sun the sums he wanted.93 The alienation of
Generals Yang and Liu from Guomindang authority stemmed from attempts by
the provincial government in 1924 to recover tax revenue collected and
retained by Yang and Liu from areas in and around Guangzhou subject to their
control.94 When the two generals threw in their lot with Chen Jiongming in
mid-1925, they were motivated by the vain hope of maintaining their financial
independence in the face of party intrusions into their tax-base. Hence it is
clear that in the battle for control of economic resources which underlay the
various intra-provincial military campaigns of 1925 and 1926, the Guomindang
was in fact the aggressor; it was ultimately in defence of their economic
privileges that the enemy first resorted to arms.
The allure, for the Guomindang, of access to all of Guangdong's bountiful economic resources survived these military campaigns intact, to become one of the driving forces behind the expansion of the provincial administration into every corner of the recently acquired territories. The possible financial yield of the disputed southern and eastern regions was being confidently estimated even before they had been incorporated into the provincial administrative system. In drawing up these estimates, there appears to have been no suggestion that demands made on the eastern and southern regions to finance a proposed national military expedition should be limited by the local citizens' willingness or capacity to pay. In fact, a greater tax burden came to mark the transition of power from Chen Jiongming in the east and Deng Benying in the south to the new provincial administration, and this was naturally of some consequences for citizens of these regions as well as for propagandists trying to win their sympathy and support.

Propagandists on the provincial military expeditions were rather out of touch with the economic history and short-term financial incentives which underlay the progress of their expeditions. Propagandists of the Fourth Army Political Bureau, for example, were astonished to find during the third stage of the expedition that areas on the southern peninsula which had come under government control on the second stage were already being subjected to harsh taxation akin to that previously imposed by Deng Benying. Official notice of these taxes and of the penalties imposed for avoiding them were said, in rather ironic tones, to have been "pasted all over the walls, so that there was barely any room for the political bureau to stick up its own posters." The political bureau, as it happens, was making political capital of promises to release people from the enemy's "harsh levies and miscellaneous taxes", even as the new administration was collecting them with renewed vigour.

If Fourth Army propagandists thought that the administrative sequel to their own stage of the Southern Expedition, which centred about Hainan Island, would differ much from what they had witnessed of its second stage, then they were sadly mistaken. Before departing Hainan, the military commander of the Fourth Army's Eleventh Division, Chen Jitang, imposed upon all districts within his administration a military levy, collected by the forced sale of 'tax-exemption' notes. As with similar notes issued earlier in the area
by Deng Benying, there was no guarantee that they would be accepted at some future date in lieu of taxes. On the whole, the new administration on Hainan differed from the old not in its abolition of harsh taxation, but in the increased severity of its tax-collection procedures. The numerous old levies and miscellaneous taxes were retained, increased, and collected with renewed vigour. Despite the proliferation of 'tax-exemption' notes, and even without increasing rates of taxation, the regional Public Finance Office set an annual quota for 1926 which was over thirty percent in excess of that previously set by Deng Benying. This thirty percent quota-increase was to be achieved by improving tax collection procedures alone; there was an additional tax-hike in store for the citizens of Hainan once the Public Finance Office could get around to introducing tax-rate increases already approved by the provincial Finance Department, but held in abeyance on Hainan until things had been set in order. 97 (See Table overleaf).

For Guomindang propaganda on Hainan Island, as earlier on the southern peninsula, this taxation policy was disastrous. Army political bureaux had won support among merchants and villagers alike on the strength of their promises to reduce taxation, and now the extent of their unwitting deception was becoming apparent to all. According to propagandists working in rural Hainan, when local people found themselves burdened with increased taxes they became suspicious of other party propaganda and erupted in fury at the deception which had been played upon them. The currency of propaganda slogans became debased, and propaganda was useless in dealing with the citizens of Hainan henceforth. As the propagandists concluded in their own report, "whenever we went among the masses on propaganda work, [it was we who] always received the blame. It was really difficult to find anything to say in reply". 98

It was not only in southern Guangdong and on Hainan Island that the government arm of the Guomindang bred disillusion among local citizens through its taxation policy. The administrative sequel to the Second Eastern Expedition was almost identical. In the wake of that expedition, party propaganda and organizational work had flourished under the regional Special Committees, which helped local party branches, peasant associations, labour unions, and merchant associations to multiply and flourish throughout the region. With the advent
Comparative table of annual tax quotas for Hainan Island set by the Hainan Finance Office under Deng Benying (1925) and under the Guomindang (1926).1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under Deng Benying</th>
<th>Under Guomindang</th>
<th>Difference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>160 (in ¥1,000)</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butchery</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative²</td>
<td>15.75</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>-1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirits</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>10.992</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>5.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feast</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinglan Land Tax³</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltpeter and Gravel</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puqian Land Tax³</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amusement</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>292.762</td>
<td>400.700</td>
<td>107.938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Only those taxes for which comparable figures are available have been chosen for inclusion. The table is compiled from two sources published in 1926: Miao, "Nanzheng", 5, pp. 16-18 and "Ge xianshi dangbu", Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 17. After comparing the figures presented in these two sources and cross-referencing them against contemporary taxation receipts for Guangdong Province as a whole (see Guangdong caizheng ting (ed.), Guangdong caizheng jishi (n.p., 1933), 1, pp. 49-50), I have taken the final three zero's in each of Miao's figures to refer to parts of one yuan.

2. Quota said to have been reduced to take into account the effects of the blockade of Hong Kong, 1925-6.

3. Qinglan and Puqian are the names of villages in north-eastern Hainan.
of the third Northern Expedition, it was to be shown to what purpose all this activity had, in effect, been directed. In order to finance the Northern Expedition, local administration in east Guangdong was mobilized to raise additional sums by levying taxes for a year in advance and compelling the purchase of National Treasury notes (guoku quan) and Government bonds (gongshai piao). The tax-raising methods adopted harmed, most of all, the poorer citizens of the East River region whom the Guomindang professed to champion, and benefited those wealthy local notables who had been the object of ridicule in its propaganda.

The counties of the Chaomei and Hailufeng areas of East Guangdong were set a quota of two million yuan, to be raised through the sale of Government bonds. The method of sale employed by the local administration was the same as that used by the displaced administration of Chen Jiongming. Under this system, each County Magistrate was assigned a certain quota of sales, which he was at liberty to divide among the sub-counties as he saw fit. At sub-county level, responsibility for bond sales rested with the sub-county Popular Militia Office (mintuan ju), or with a prominent local landowner, at whose discretion lay the choice of method for bond sales within the sub-county. Some assigned bond-sale quotas to each village, others to each household, and yet others again, to each individual. Whatever the case, little differentiation was made between one unit and another, whether village, household or individual, on the basis of its capacity to pay. There was however an inverse differentiation made on the basis of political affiliation, such that the poorest members of the community who happened to belong to party-sponsored peasant associations were singled out for particularly heavy quotas. Peasants, therefore, found themselves paying far higher proportions of their income than their wealthier neighbours, and indeed paying very dearly for their affiliation with the Guomindang. The local notables who administered the system, by contrast, profited by forcing sales in excess of quotas and pocketing the difference, or by accepting small tributes in return for reducing the quotas of their friends.

The consequences for party propaganda activity of tax collection procedures in the Chaomei and Hailufeng areas of eastern Guangdong were as momentous as in the south. It had been in these very areas of eastern Guangdong that the Guomindang had used anti-tax slogans to such great effect; now disillusion
rebounded with all the force of that earlier success. Peasants sought redress through their peasant associations and local party branches, and failing to find satisfaction turned in rebellion against party authority. The terms of reference in local party propaganda then came to be reversed, with peasants who refused to pay their tax quotas being labelled 'anti-revolutionary' for allegedly hindering the Northern Expedition, and those gentry notables who administered the system with such commendable vigour winning for themselves the designation 'revolutionary'. Finally, as Guomindang propaganda came to lose all credibility there came a resurgence of propaganda by disciples of Chen Jiongming, and a widespread revival of sympathy for his less ambitious programs. 101

Once the Guomindang had by its actions in Guangdong belied its own words, propaganda could not redeem the party's reputation. Faced with the prospect of failure in their attempts to summon popular support through mass political education, propagandists had been compelled to research and articulate local grievances and aspirations insofar as they were compatible with the aims of the national revolution. In retreating from one form of hollow words, however, they confronted another, for in aligning themselves with the local interests of various social classes, they laid themselves open to a public backlash if they failed to satisfy the grievances which they brought to light. The precipitate launching of the Northern Expedition, and the manner in which the provincial government and vestigial infrastructure of gentry-militarist local administration were mobilized in support of the expedition, unleashed just such as backlash by showing party propaganda to have been nothing but hollow words. In subsequent years, the Guomindang reverted to the model of political indoctrination for an all-class popular 'awakening'. 102 This was, in retrospect, an admission of its failure to align itself with the forces of national revolution, and at the same time a perverse manifestation of its desire to return to those golden days when it was possible both to promote popular 'awakening' through political education, and still to be counted revolutionary.
CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, I should like to draw upon a few of the findings presented in the body of this thesis to correct one or two misconceptions about the nature of propaganda and ideological conflict over the period of the First United Front. Credit is due to Donald Jordan for his observation that political propaganda was one of the more serious casualties of the Northern Expedition. Education in political principles failed to impress the "acquisitive" and "pragmatic" people encountered along the route of the expedition, who showed interest only in demonstrations of good will and promises of tangible rewards. Through detailed research into the impact of troop behaviour and local conditions upon popular attitudes toward the NRA, Dr. Jordan has effectively denied political propaganda the credit previously thought to have been its due. Yet he is, I believe, in error in assuming that the Communists relied heavily on political indoctrination to muster a popular following, and hence also in error in believing that his arguments, by dispensing with the idealist view of peasant consciousness and substituting for it a materialistic one, somehow discredit the Communist role in the First United Front. In fact, as my research has shown, it is the enemies of the Communists within the Guomindang who must bear the brunt of Dr. Jordan's findings. Well before the launching of the Northern Expedition, Communists within the Guomindang had come to terms with the material foundations of popular consciousness. They recognized them from one day to the next in the effect upon popular attitudes of undisciplined soldiers, banditry and harsh taxation, and learned to make use of them in building up popular support in the towns and villages of Guangdong. Their enemies within the Guomindang, by contrast, continued to cling dearly to the belief that political indoctrination could sway minds and could hence overcome "the acquisitive nature of the Chinese peasantry." Donald Jordan has in fact inadvertently chronicled the demise of political indoctrination as a workable conservative stratagem for national revolution.

Conservative party members in Shanghai continued to call for a universal popular 'awakening' even as the party organization in Guangdong was discarding
political indoctrination in favour of researching and expressing local grievances. Some party intellectuals in Shanghai, like Dai Jitao, had declined to take up responsible positions in Guangdong, and so saved themselves the trouble of having to put their theories of popular 'awakening' to the test. Others, like Zhou Fohai and his colleagues who had resigned from Guangdong University, were professional teachers who saw in mass propaganda a natural extension of their professional duties into the community at large. Whatever their choice of profession and whatever the conceptualization of their roles, all shared a desire to keep class politics out of the national revolution lest the country fall into blood-letting on the scale of the French and Russian revolutions. In the face of mounting evidence that a revolution against militarists and imperialists involved, of itself, a modicum of class politics, the conservatives were left hoping against hope that mass political instruction would keep class politics at bay. Mass political indoctrination then assumed enormous importance for Dai Jitao, Zhou Fohai and the Western Hills Faction as a whole.

Since the start of the New Culture Movement, popular 'awakening' had meant many things to many people, but by 1926 it had come to mean something very specific to Guomindang conservatives. Party conservatives were working from the premise that the common people were "blockheaded" since, if left to their own devices, they would remain oblivious to any goal other than to the pursuit of their own personal welfare. As the pursuit of personal gain or sectional interest was thought antithetical to the revolution at hand, the alleged blockheadedness of the masses appeared to be an obstacle to the revolution. The purpose of 'awakening' the people was to remove this obstacle, by eliminating that selfishness with which nature had endowed them. The possibility that the masses were capable of undergoing such an 'awakening' was made to appear plausible by a particular interpretation of China's past which depicted a state of harmony and co-operation as having governed relations between the four occupational categories making up the people: scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants. By presenting harmony and co-operation as the natural order of things, the pursuit of personal or sectional interests was made to appear an unnatural and temporary aberration. It was the duty of the scholar, among the four categories, to restore the natural state of harmony by instructing the country's rulers and enlightening its people, and scholars such as Dai Jitao drew some comfort from this idealized vision of the past,
which stood in such contrast to the picture of unrelieved selfishness confronting them in the present. The masses were to be 'awoken' to this vision of their natural state by the injection, in effect, of an ideological sedative. Hence, although at the time of the New Culture Movement the term popular 'awakening' had meant broadening and expanding the revolution by enlisting the support of the common people, by 1926 it had come to mean narrowing and containing the revolution by keeping the common people, as far as possible, out of the revolution.

This transformation of the meaning of the word 'awakening' was catalyzed by the party's experiences in Guangdong from 1924 to 1926. It was not simply an intellectual exercise prompted by differences of opinion, but primarily a political response to tangible developments in the province. In 1924 the Guomindang had set out, in Sun Yatsen's words, to "convert" the people of Guangdong into loyal followers of the party, in the manner of Confucius, Buddha and Christian missionaries converting their congregations. In practice, party propagandists found that political sermons won few converts, and so they turned to music, drama, pictures and other innovative techniques in order to make some impression upon their audience. In time, even these technical adaptations were found to be of little use for winning a genuine popular following. Propagandists then came to appreciate that people were not to be swayed by gimmicks and artistry alone, and that they needed to repeat what the people themselves were saying in the rice fields and market places of eastern and southern Guangdong in order to earn their respect. At this point of realization propagandists faced a dilemma, insofar as there was a limit to how far they could learn about and adapt to popular demands without ceasing to be missionaries and becoming, instead, the converts. Those Christian missionaries whose record of conversions had made such an impression upon Sun Yatsen had themselves faced a similar dilemma at the Beijing court in the seventeenth century. At that time, Jesuit priests had adapted Catholic rites to the religious and intellectual customs of their hosts in order to advance the Propaganda of the Faith, but out of concern that inviolable principles might be sacrificed to convenience, the Vatican ordered a return to the rites. The Guomindang's position was roughly analogous. It was torn between a commitment to Sun Yatsen's Way of national salvation and its belief that unless it won a popular following then the revolutionary movement was bound to fail. In adapting itself to the demands of the people, it compromised the Way
prescribed by Sun Yatsen. Propagandists who shaped their words to suit the local peculiarities of rural Guangdong were obliged to voice the demands of the rural gentry or of tenant farmers, and in either case compromised Sun's most treasured principles of keeping the party above sectional interests. In addition, their experience confirmed for some propagandists a suspicion that people were not to be swayed by reason alone, for their attitudes appeared to be predetermined according to the ways in which they made their living. All knew that Marx had said something of this sort, and so many found in Marxism a creed to rival that of Sun Yatsen. Such compromise, and even abandonment, of the principles espoused by Sun Yatsen then offered ample justification for his most loyal followers to call a halt to experimentation and adaptation, and to demand a return to the rites. As Sun's 'rites' had been contravened in the first place only in order to come to terms with the complexities of local politics in Guangdong, it was by this time impossible to return to them without that return constituting a political act in itself. Henceforth, to talk of eliminating class politics in Guangdong in the name of Sun Yatsen was in effect to demand that local power be delivered back into the hands of the gentry-militarist coalition.

The conflict over ideology and policy which beset the Guomindang as a result of developments in Guangdong was far more, therefore, than simply "the result...of competing ideologies among intellectuals". Once party propaganda had become a channel for expressing local grievances, it became highly sensitive to the contours of local society in Guangdong, and it gave voice to problems which lay at the heart of social and economic dislocation in the province. Problems in society at large then came to be reflected in disputes within the Guomindang. The thesis that there was a social basis to policy formulation and ideological conflict within the party has been challenged on the ground that the class backgrounds of individual party members bore no necessary relation to their political behaviour. This does not amount to an adequate refutation, for it may be restated as the proposition that party members need not have belonged to a particular class in order for them to act on its behalf. Dai Jitao, for example, although born into a family of pottery traders in Sichuan, found a warm reception among the gentry of Guangdong. As we have seen, sub-branches of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, which claimed Dai as its mentor, sprang up in county branches of the Guomindang under gentry control. Dai's call for a revolution which looked
beyond class differences struck a sympathetic chord in that class which stood
to profit most through retention of the status quo; Dai's propaganda model of
enlightened intellectuals instructing ignorant commoners also accorded with
the gentry's preconception of its own customary role in rural society.

At the local level, political and ideological differences were clearly
grounded in local society. Intra-party conflict in Guangdong arose from the
opposition of gentry groups to outside intervention in local branches, which
in the absence of intervention would have been absorbed into the traditional
system of gentry-dominated local authority. The Guangdong gentry showed both
resilience and initiative in establishing unaccredited party 'branches' when-
ever it became apparent that the NRA or Guomindang was heading in their
direction. Rural England had earlier witnessed a similar phenomenon. The
English liberal democratic parties which preceded the mass parties of the late
nineteenth century were, in the main, run by local notables from prominent
county families who set up ad hoc committees without authorization from any
central headquarters. It has never been pretended that the early English
parties succeeded in representing 'every class'; nor, under similar
circumstances in Guangdong, could the same be said of the Guomindang. Intra-
party conflict was the inevitable outcome of attempts to achieve balanced class
representation at the lowest levels of Guomindang organization.

Conflict within the party also stretched to disagreement over the lessons
to be drawn from the party's experience in Guangdong. We have noted that
Communists in the Guomindang thought historical materialism vindicated by
the noticeable variations between classes in their responses to the two major
tenets of the national revolution, anti-militarism and anti-imperialism. Mao
Zedong, for example, summarized his experience of politics to 1926 with a
classification of various attitudes toward the national revolution according
to class interests. Other Guomindang members, however, came away from
Guangdong demanding that people of every class should be persuaded to join
the revolution. It was not, as has been suggested elsewhere, ignorance of the
implications of historical materialism which enabled Guomindang intellectuals
to go on believing that "consciousness is amenable to alteration" through
judicious use of propaganda; not only Dai Jitao, but other leading party
intellectuals such as Hu Hanmin and Zhou Fohai were familiar with the
materialist conception of history, although they denied it any application
Indeed materialist philosophies of any kind, whether 'bourgeois' or Marxist, were all considered inappropriate to a society which, in contrast to the Western tradition of pursuit of personal gain, was thought to have derived its strength and character from the tradition of helping others. Dai, Hu, Zhou and many another Guomindang intellectual thus left Guangdong insisting more firmly than ever upon the need to indoctrinate everybody everywhere in the one doctrine suited to all, Sun Yatsen's Three Principles of the People. Such a conclusion did not, however, invalidate the alternative conclusions drawn by Mao Zedong about the class aspects of the national revolution or about the limitations of Sunism. It indirectly confirmed them, for henceforth continued insistence upon a universal political education which overlooked social and economic differences itself amounted to an ideological posture, identified with particular interest groups opposed to social and political change of any substance.
APPENDIX

* Běn bù tōng xìn (本部通信 "The Weekly of the Chinese Nationalist Party" [sic]),
  weekly, around Oct. 1919 to 1922, publ. by Guomindang central head­
  quarters, ed. by Luo Mai and occasionally by Peng Sumin, forerunner of
  Zhōng guó guomindang tōng xìn (q.v.).

Cái zhèng bu gōng bāo (財政部公報 Finance Bureau Gazette), daily, Guangzhou,
  March 1926-, publ. by Guangdong Provincial Government Finance Bureau,
  forerunner of Guangdong cái zhèng gōng bāo (q.v.).

Chāo chāo (潮潮 The Chaozhou Tide), weekly, Chaozhou (Guangdong), July 1926-,
  publ. by the Political Bureau of the Chaozhou Branch – School of the
  Central Military and Political Academy.

Chóng qìng zhǔ diào Sun Zhōng shān xiān shēng dà huì te kān (重慶追悼 孫中山先生
  大會特刊 Special Issue of the Congress Held in Honour of the Death of Sun
  Yatsen), Chóng qìng, 1925, publ. by the congress.

Chū guāng rī bāo (楚光日報 The Hubei Daily Beacon), daily, 24 March 1926-,
  publ. by the Guomindang Hubei Provincial Branch.

Dā hàn bāo (大漢報 Greater China), daily, Hankou, 1912-, publ. by Hu Shiyan;
  received Guomindang subsidies 1923-4.

Dāng shèng (i) (黨聲 Party Voice), Beijing, 1 January 1926-, publ. by the
  Guomindang Beijing City Branch.

Dāng shèng (ii) (黨聲 Party Voice), weekly, Guangzhou, around February 1924-.

Dāolù yuè kān (道路月刊 The Roadway Monthly), monthly, Guangzhou, around 1923-,
  publ. by Guangdong Provincial Government (Public Works Department?).

Dì kāi (敵敵 Loathe Your Enemy), irregular, Guangzhou, around 1925-, publ.
  unknown.

Dōng jiāng xīn chāo (東江新潮 New Tide on the East River), Guangzhou, around
  Sept. 1924-, publ. by the Propaganda Office of the Guangzhou East River
  Bandit [i.e. Chen Jiongming] Suppression Agency.

Duān bīng xūn kān (段兵旬刊 The Troop Reduction Ten-daily), every ten days,
  Chengdu, December 1926-, publ. by the Guomindang Chengdu Provisional
  Branch.

* See Bibliography, p.297
Duli xunkan (独立旬刊 The Independent Ten Daily), every ten days, Shanghai, 1 November 1925-, ed. by Dai Jitao, with articles by Shao Yuanchong and Shen Dingyi.

Fan jidu jiao zhoukan (反基督教周刊 Anti-Christian Weekly), weekly, around 1925-, publ. as a supplement to Guangzhou minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the Guangdong Great Anti-Christian Alliance.

* Fei jidu jiao tekan (非基督教周刊 Non-Christian Special Issue), weekly to no. 20, after which fortnightly, Shanghai 19 Aug. 1924-25 March 1925 (no.25), publ. as a supplement to Juewu (q.v.), ed by the Great Non-Christian Alliance.

* Funu pinglun (妇女评论 Women's Review), weekly, Shanghai, Aug. 1921 - Aug. 1923, publ. as a supplement to (Shanghai) Minguo ribao, ed by Chen Wangdao, forerunner to Funu zhoubao (q.v.).

Funu zhi sheng (妇女之声 Women's Voice), every ten days, Guangzhou, December 1925-, publ. by the Guomindang Central Women's Bureau.

* Funu zhoubao (妇女周报 Women's Weekly), weekly, Shanghai, August 1923-, publ. as a supplement to (Shanghai) Minguo ribao, ed. to Nov. 1924 by Women's Review Society/Women's Problems Research Association, from Nov. 1924 to Aug. 1925 by Guomindang Shanghai Executive Branch Women's Bureau/Women's Problems Research Association, and thereafter by the Women's Weekly Society.

Geming zhoukan (革命周刊 The Revolution Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, 1 May 1925-, ed. by Tan Zhitang, Gan Naiguang, Chen Yannian, Guo Shouzhen.

Geming chao (革命潮 Revolutionary Tide), ten daily, Chengdu, Nov. 1926-, publ. by the Guomindang Chengdu Provisional Branch.

Geming daobao (革命导报 Revolutionary Guide), weekly, Shanghai, Dec. 1925-, publ. by the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, ed. by Deng Gongxuan, successor to Guomin daobao (q.v.).

Geming funu (革命妇女 Revolutionary Women), Nanning (Guangxi), 1926, publ. by Guomindang Guangxi Provincial Executive Committee.
Geming haijun (革命海军  Revolutionary Navy), Guangzhou, Feb. 1926- , publ. by the National Government Military Affairs Committee Navy Political Bureau.

*Geming jun (革命军  Revolutionary Army), irregular, Guangzhou, 1925-7, publ. by the Special Party Branch of the Huangpu (later Central Military and Political) Academy.

Geming junren (革命军人  Revolutionary Soldier), fortnightly, Guangzhou, around Aug. 1926- , publ. by The NRA Seventh Army Special Party Branch.

Geming pinglun (革命评论  Revolutionary Review), (Guangzhou?), around 1925.

Geming qingnian (革命青年  Revolutionary Youth), weekly, Guangzhou, around Sept. 1926- , publ. by the Guomindang Central Youth Bureau.

Geming shenghuo (革命生活  Revolutionary Life), every ten days, Guangzhou, around March 1926- , publ. by the Guongdong University Guomindang Special Party Branch.


Gexin pinglun (革新评论  The Reformist Review), Shanghai, 1922- , sought Guomindang financial assistance in Dec. 1923.

Gu xing (孤星  The Lone Star), every ten days, Shanghai, Feb. 1924- , publ. by the Guomindang's Shanghai University.


Guangdong caizheng ting yuekan (广东财政厅月刊  Guangdong Finance Section Monthly), monthly, Guangzhou, 1922- (1923 dropped 'ting' from title), publ. by the Section.

Guangda xuesheng hui zhoukan (广东学生会周刊  Weekly of the Student Union of Guangdong University), weekly, Aug-Dec. 1925, publ. by the Union.
Guoli guangdong daxue fake xueyuan jikan (国立广东大学法科学院季刊 National Guangdong University Law Faculty Quarterly), quarterly, Guangzhou, Jan. 1925- , publ. by the university's Publications Bureau.

Guoli guangdong daxue nongke xueyuan fushe guance so (国立广东大学农科附设观测所 Annual of the Planning Institute Attached to the Agricultural Science Faculty of National Guangdong University) Guangzhou, 1922-.

Guoli guangdong daxue wenke xueyuan jikan (国立广东大学文学科学院旬刊 National Guangdong University Arts Faculty Quarterly), quarterly, Guangzhou, Autumn 1925- , publ. by the university's Publications Bureau.

Guoli guangdong daxue zhoukan (国立广东大学周刊 National Guangdong University Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, 1924- , publ. by the university's Publications Bureau.


Guangdong funu jiefang xiehui huikan (广东妇女解放协会会刊 Guangdong Women's Liberation Association Journal), Guangzhou, June or July 1925- , publ. by the Association.

Guangdong gongren zhi lu (广东工人之路 Guangdong Workers' Road), Guangzhou, 1925- , publ. by the Guangdong - Hong Kong Strike Committee.


Guangdong qingnian (广东青年 Guangdong Youth), at first monthly, but fortnightly after no.2, Guangzhou, Aug. 1926- , publ. by the Guomindang Guangdong Provincial Branch Youth Bureau.

*Guangdong sheng zhengfu gongbao (广东省政府公报 Guangdong Provincial Government Gazette), weekly, Guangzhou, 11 July 1925- , publ. by the Guangdong Provincial Government Secretariat.
Guangdong shiye ting gongbao (广东事业厅公报 Guangdong Enterprise Section Gazette), monthly, Guangzhou, around 1925–, publ. by the editorial office of the Section.

Guang guo bao (光明报 The Bright Nation), Hankou, around 1924.

Guangxi geming jun ban yue kan (广西革命军半月刊 Guangxi Revolutionary Army semi-monthly), fortnightly, around Aug. 1926–, publ. by the Propaganda Office of the Guomindang Guangxi National Revolutionary Army Special Party Branch.

Guangzhou minguo ribao – see Minguo ribao: Guangzhou.

Guangzhou pinglun (广州评论 Guangzhou Review), Guangzhou, 1926, publ. by the Guomindang Guangzhou City Branch Propaganda Bureau.

Guangzhou shi shizheng gongbao (广州市政公报 Guangzhou City Municipal Gazette), weekly, Guangzhou, Feb. 1921–, publ. by the Guangzhou Municipal Government.


Guoli Zhongshan daxue xiaobao (国立中山大学校报 School Journal of the National Zhongshan University), Fortnightly, Guangzhou, Nov. 1926–, publ. by the University.

Guomin daobao (国民导报 The National Guide), Shanghai, around Aug. 1925–, publ. by the National Committee (later Society for the Study of Sun Wenism) of the Guomindang Shanghai Executive Committee, ed. by Deng Gongxuan, predecessor to Geming daobao (q.v.).

Guomin geming jun (国民革命军 National Revolutionary Army), 1926, publ. by the NRA Third Army Political Bureau.

Guomin geming jun zong siling gongbao (国民革命军总司令公报 NRA General Headquarters Gazette), Guangzhou, around Nov. 1926–, publ. by the Secretariat of the Headquarters.

Guomin ribao (国民日报 National Daily), Guangzhou, around 1926; mentioned in secondary sources, but perhaps a misreading of Guomin xinwen (q.v.) or Minguo ribao (q.v.).

Guomin wanbao (国民晚报 National Evening Post), daily, Beijing, around April 1925, publ. by Luo Dunwei on behalf of the Guomindang, established following the closure of the party's (Beijing) Minguo ribao (q.v.) and, like its predecessor, forced to close after only a few days' publication.

Guomin xinwen (国民新闻 Republican News), daily, Guangzhou, 1925 (at least)-, prior to Nov. 1925 publ. by the right-wing party group, 'The Hall of Literary Splendour', and apparently edited by Chen Qiulin until his death in Aug. 1925; after Nov 1925, publ. by the Guangdong Provincial Branch Propaganda Bureau and edited by Gan Naiguang.

Guomin xunkan (国民旬刊 National Ten-daily), every ten days, Nanjing, around Dec. 1925-, publ. at Dongnan University by associates of the Western Hills Clique.

Guomin zhengfu gongbao (国民政府公报 National Government Gazette, also written Zhonghua minguo zhongbao 中华民国公报), weekly, Guangzhou, July 1925- (later issued in Nanjing), publ. by the National Government Secretariat.

Guomin zhengfu jiancha yuan gongbao (国民政府监察院公报 National Government Investigation Department Gazette), Guangzhou, Sept. 1925-.

Guomin zhoukan (i) (国民周刊 National Weekly), irregular, Shanghai, March 1923 - late 1923, publ. by Shanghai Party Centre Propaganda Bureau, ed. by Di Dishan, apparently only a few issues published, successor to Minxin rikan (q.v.) and predecessor to Guomindang zhoukan (q.v.).

Guomin zhoukan (ii), Hankou, 1924, publ. by the party's Hankou Executive Committee, ed. by Zeng Boxing.
* Guomindang zhoukan (国民党周刊 Guomindang Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, 25 Nov. 1923 - 13 Jan. 1924 (issue no.8; from issue no.9 title changed to Zhongguo guomindang zhoukan (q.v.), publ. by the party's Provisional CEC, ed. by Xie Yingbo and Xu Suzhong, circulation of 50,000 copies to issue no.5, subsequently 30,000.

Guoxue zhoukan (国学周刊 National Learning Weekly), weekly, Shanghai, around May 1923-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the National Learning Research Society.

* Hawai zhoukan (海外周刊 Overseas Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, Feb. 1926-, publ. by the party's Central Overseas Bureau.

* Hangkong yuekan (航空月刊 Aviation Monthly), monthly, Guangzhou, Nov. 1925-, variously publ. by (nos.1-2) the Propaganda Division of the Guangzhou Aviator - Comrades Association, (nos.3-4) the Propaganda Division of the National Government Military Affairs Committee Aviation Department, (nos. 6-7) the Aviation Office of the NRA General Headquarters, (nos.8-10) the Aviator - Comrades Association, etc. (no.20 is dated Nov. 1929).

Han sheng zhoubao (汉声周报 Voice of China Weekly), weekly, Hankou, Dec. 1926-, publ. by the party's Hankou City Special Party Branch.

Huang hua gang (黄花岗 The Huang Hua Gang [Martyrs]), fortnightly, Guangzhou, around Dec. 1925-, publ. by the Chinese Young Comrades Association.

* Huangpu chao (i) (黄埔潮 Huangpu Tide), twice weekly, Guangzhou, 1925-, publ. by the Political Bureau of the Huangpu Academy.

Huangpu chao (ii), weekly, Guangzhou, 24 July 1926-, publ. by the Propaganda Division of the Huangpu Alumni Association.

Hubei nongmin (湖北农民 Hubei Peasant), Hankou, 4 issues produced by July 1926, publ. by the Hubei Provincial Peasant Association.

Hunan minbao (湖南民报 Hunan People's Daily), daily, (Changsha?), 1926, funded through party sources in Hong Kong.

Huo xian (火线 Fire-Front), Nanning (Guangxi), 1926, publ. by the Propaganda Training Institute of the party's Guangxi Provincial Branch.
Jiangnan wanbao (江南晚报 Jiangnan Evening Post), daily, Shanghai, publ. by the party's Western Hills Faction, around 1926-.

Jiang sheng bao (江声报 Voice of the Yangtze), Hankou, 1924 at least, publ. by party associates.

* Jianshe (i) (建设 Construction), monthly, Shanghai, Aug. 1919 - Aug. 1920, publ. by the party's Jianshe Society, ed. by Zhu Zhixin, Dai Jitao, Hu Hanmin, initial circulation 3,000, later 13,000.

* Jianshe (ii), weekly, Shanghai, March - April 1926, publ. by the party's Western Hills Faction.

Jiaoyu zhoubao (教周报 Education Weekly), weekly, Shanghai, 20 March 1924-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the Educational Reform Society of Beijing Normal University.

Jingji zhoukan (经济周刊 Economy Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, 1925, publ. as a supplement to the party's Guangzhou minguo ribao.

Jue bao (觉报 Consciousness), Hankou, 1924 at least, publ. by party associates.

* Juewu (觉悟 Awaken), daily, Shanghai, 16 June 1919 at least - 1928 at least, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by Shao Lizi, itself published several supplements, including Fei jidu jiao tekan (q.v.) and Shehui kexue tekan (q.v.).

* Junren zhoubao (军周报 Soldiers Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, Sept. 1926-, publ. by the Propaganda Division of the party's Central Soldiers Bureau.

Jun sheng (军声 Army Voice), weekly, Guangzhou, around Nov. 1925-, publ. by the NRA Fourth Army Political (later Political Training) Bureau.

* Junshi weiyuan hui bing gong chang yuekan (军事委员会兵工厂月刊 Monthly of the Military Affairs Committee's Soldier - Worker Factory), monthly, Guangzhou, around Jan. 1926-, publ. and ed. by the Editorial Committee of same.
* Junshi zhengzhi yuekan (军事政治月刊 Military and Political Affairs Monthly), monthly, Guangzhou, Jan. 1926- (no. 8 dated Oct. 1926, but in fact publ. in Jan. 1927), publ. by the Military Affairs Committee, ed. by Chen Gongbo.

Kexue zhoubao (科学周报 Science Weekly), weekly, Shanghai, 6 April 1924-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by Wu Zhihui.

Lao dong yu funu (劳动与妇女 Women and Labour), weekly, Guangzhou and Shanghai, 13 Feb. 1921-, distributed by the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by Shen Dingyi, Ye Chucang, et al.

* Li Ming (黎明 "The Aurora" [sic]), weekly, Shanghai, 4 Oct. 1925-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. at Fudan University.

* Litou zhouban (铁头周刊 Ploughshare Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, around May 1926-, publ. by the Guangdong Provincial Peasant Association.

Liu ershisan jinian hao (六二三纪念号 Issue Commemorating 23 June), Guangzhou, June 1926, publ. by the Publications Bureau of the Guangdong University Preparatory Committee for Commemorating the Shaji Massacre.

* Lu hai jun da yuanshai da benying gongbao (陆海君大元帅大本营公报 Gazette of the Headquarters of the Generalissimo of Land and Sea Forces), fortnightly (1922), weekly (1923), every ten days (1924-5), 1922-5, Guilin (1922) and Guangzhou, publ. by the Headquarters, ed. by Lian Shenghai.

Man di hong (满地红 The Whole Earth is Red), Chaozhou (Guangdong), Aug. 1926-, publ. by the Special Party Branch of the Chaozhou Branch School of the Huangpu Academy.

Mei zhou tongxun (每周通讯 Weekly Newsletter), weekly, Kaifeng, around March 1925-, publ. by the Kaifeng City Party Branch.

Min chao zhoubao (民潮周报 Popular Wave Weekly), weekly, Beijing, mid 1923- (5 issues only), publ. by a party student organization in Beijing, the Democratic Comrades Association.
Minguo ribao (Republican Daily), official title of party newspapers in China prior to the establishment of the Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily). Between 1919 and 1926, these included:

Beijing: around Feb-March 1925, closed down by Beijing authorities after twenty-eight days of publication, chief ed. Luo Dunwei, general ed. Shao Yuanchong.

Dongjiang: Huizhou, 1926
Dongwan: Dongwan, 1926

* Guangzhou: founded late 1923 or early 1924 by the Provisional CEC, editors unclear but included Wang Jingwei (Sep. 1924-), Chen Fumu (Nov. 1924-) and Chen Qixiu (Jul. 1926-), from Sept. 1924 incorporated Zhongguo guomindang zhoukan (q.v.) and came under the Central Propaganda Bureau.

Jiangmen: Jiangmen, 1926
Liangyang: Yangjiang, 1926
Lingdong: Shantou, 1926
Qinlian: Qinzhou.
Qiongyai: Hainan, 1926

* Shanghai: the original Minguo ribao, founded 1916 by Chen Qimei and Ye Chucang, general editor Ye Chucang, Dec. 1923 became a formal party organ under the nominal management of an editorial committee consisting of Ye Chucang, Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Qu Qiubai and Shao Lizi, but in fact remained under Ye's control. Late in 1925 began to side with the Western Hills Faction, but shortly afterward adopted a 'neutral' position. Published numerous weekly supplements, including Fan jidu jiaozhankan, Funu pinglun, Funu zhoubao, Guoxue zhoukan, Jiaoyu zhoubao, Kexue zhoubao, Laodong yu funu, Li ming, Pinglun zhi pinglun, Pingmin, Pingmin zhi you, Pipeng, Shehui kexue tekan, Wenyi zhoukan, Wuhu, Yishu pinglun, Yishu zhoukan, Zhengzhi pinglun and Zhengzhi zhoubao (all q.v.)

Wuzhou: Wuzhou (Guangxi), 1925
Zhongshan: Zhongshan, 1926

* Minjue (Popular Awakening), monthly, Guangzhou, Feb. 1920- , published by an organization comprising many party members, the Popular Awakening Society, ed. by Jing Haoru.

* Minquan ("The People's Right Semi-monthly" [sic]), fortnightly, Guangzhou,
16 Sep. 1923- (5 issues only), published by a right-wing party group, the People's Rights Society.

* Minsheng zhoukan (民生周刊 "The Min Hseng Weekly" [sic]), weekly, Beijing, 7 Apr. 1923- (no. 87 dated 5 Apr. 1925), publ. by a right-wing party youth organization at Beijing University, the Centre (later People's Livelihood) Society.

* Minxin rikan (民信日报 People's Trust Daily), daily, Shanghai, around Feb. 1920 - Jan. 1923, publ. by the party's national headquarters, ed. by Zhao Pixie and Chen Anren, forerunner to Guomin zhoukan (q.v.).

Mingyi bao (民意报 People's Will), Beijing, re-established Oct. 1924- , publ. in association with party members in Beijing.

Minzhi bao (民主报 Democrat), daily, Anqing (Anhui), around 1922 - Nov. 1923, publ. by Anhui Provincial Branch of the party, founded by Guan Peng, possibly ed. by his brother, Guan Shudong.

Nong gong (农工 Peasant and Worker), weekly, Changsha, around Aug. 1926- , publ. by the Propaganda Bureau of the Re-organization Committee of the party's Hunan Provincial Branch.

Nong gong huibao (农工汇报 Peasant and Worker News), Guangzhou, Sep. 1926- , publ. by the Guangdong Provincial Government Peasant and Worker Section.

* Nongmin yundong (农民运动 Peasant Movement), weekly, Guangzhou and later Hankou, Aug. 1926- , publ. by the party's Central Peasant Bureau, 10,000 copies per issue.

Nongmin zhoukan (农民周刊 Peasant Weekly), weekly, Hankou, around April 1927- , publ. by the party's Central Peasant Bureau.

Pinglun zhi pinglun (评论之评论 Review of Reviews), weekly, Shanghai, April 1924- , publ. by the Shanghai Minguo ribao Society and issued with that newspaper as a supplement, a magazine of general political commentary by party members.

Pingmin (平民 Common People), weekly, Shanghai, 1 May 1920- , publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), stresses co-operatives.
pingmin zhi you (平民之友 Common People's Friend), weekly, Shanghai, 13 June 1924-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the Common People's Guide Society, stresses popular education, labour and women's affairs.

Piping (批评 Critic), weekly, Shanghai, 20 Oct. 1920- (no.7 dated 23 Jan. 1921, from no.8 publ. by Commercial Press), initially publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by Beijing University students, managed by Beijing party publicist Luo Dunwei.

Qiandi (前线 Front Line), weekly, Hankou, Dec. 1926-, publ. by the Political Bureau of the Front Line General Command Headquarters of the NRA.

Qianjin (前进 Advance), weekly, Guangzhou, Oct. 1926-, publ. by the Navy Office of the NRA General Headquarters.

Qingnian gongzuo (青年工作 Youth Work), weekly, Guangzhou, 1 March 1926-, publ. by the party's Central Youth Bureau, first issue 10,000 copies printed, subsequent issues 5,000.

Qingnian junren (青年军人 Young Soldier), Guangzhou, around Feb. 1925-, publ. by the Special Party Branch of the Huangpu Academy.

Qingnian yuekan (青年月刊 Youth Monthly), monthly, Guangzhou, March 1926-, publ. by the right-wing Guangzhou City Special Party Branch, ed. by Shen Tequn.

Sanmin xunkan (三民旬刊 The Three Principles Ten-Daily), every ten days, Beijing, Sep. 1925-, publ. by the Friendly Society of Sichuanese Comrades in Beijing.

Sanmin zhoukan (三民周刊 The Three Principles Weekly), weekly, Hangzhou, around May 1925-, publ. by the Joint Conference of all County and Town Party Branches in Zhejiang Province.

Shangda wusa tekan (上大五卅)，Shanghai University May. Thirtieth Special Issues), irregular, Shanghai, May - at least July, 1925, publ. by the Propaganda Division of the Student Union of the party's Shanghai University.
Shanghai daxue zhoukan (上海大学周刊 Shanghai University Weekly), weekly, Shanghai, around Apr. 1924-, publ. by the party's Shanghai University.

Shangmin yundong (商民运动 Merchant Movement), weekly, Hankou, Sep. 1926-, publ. by the party's Central Merchant Bureau.

Shehui kexue tekan (社会科学特刊 Social Science Special Issues), irregular, Shanghai, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.).

Shehui pinglun (社会评论 Social Review), every 10 days, Guangzhou, Jan. 1925-, publ. by a right-wing organization consisting of party members on the faculty of Guangdong University: the Shehui Pinglun Society.

Sheng gang gongyun daibiao lianhuan dahui tekan (香港工运代表团联欢大会特刊 Special Issues on the Welcome Conference of Delegates from the Labour Movements in Guangdong and Hong Kong), Guangzhou, 1925.

Shishi baihua bao (时事白话报 Current Affairs Colloquial Paper), Daily, Hankou, 1924 at least, published in association with the party.

Si jun zhoukan (四军周刊 Fourth Army Weekly), irregular, perhaps Guangzhou, around Nov. 1926-, publ. by the Political Bureau of the NRA Fourth Army.

Songjiang pinglun (松江评论 Songjiang Review), every 10 days, Shanghai, 1924-, publ. by a group of CCP-Guomindang members associated with the party's Jiangsu Provincial Branch.

Sun Wen zhuyi zhi yanjiu (孙文主义之研究 Research into Sun Wenism), Guangzhou, 20 Feb. 1925-, publ. as a supplement to the party's (Guangzhou) Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the Central Executive Committee's Sun Wenism Research Society.

Sun Wen zhuyi zhoukan (孙文主义周刊 Sun Wenism Weekly), weekly, Hangzhou, 1926.

Tangshan chao sheng (唐山潮声 Sound of the Tangshan Waves), irregular, Shanghai, 9 Nov. 1922-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the Tangshan News Agency, dealt with the 1922 strike at the Tangshan collieries.
Communicator), Hankou, 1924 at least, publ. in association with the party.

Iangingji huikan niankan (Statistics Annual), annual, Guangzhou, Jan. 1926-, publ. by the Statistics Division of the Guangdong Provincial Government Peasant and Worker Section.

Iangingji huibao (Statistics), probably monthly, Guangzhou, 1926-, publ. by the Statistics Division of the Guangdong Provincial Government Peasant and Worker Section.

Tongzi jun (Scouts), weekly, Guangzhou, around Mar. 1926-, publ. by the party's Central Youth Bureau.

Tuji zhoukan (Blitzkrieg Weekly), weekly, Chaoan (Guangdong), May 1926-, publ. by the Political Bureau of the First Army of the NRA.

Wenxue (Literature), fortnightly, Shanghai, Apr. 1925- publ. by the Chinese Literature Society of the party's Shanghai University.

Wenxue zhoukan (Literature Weekly), irreg., Guangzhou, 16 Feb. 1925-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Guangzhou minguo ribao (q.v.).

Wenyi zhoukan (Arts Weekly), weekly, Shanghai, 5 Jul. 1923-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the Qiancao Society.

Wuhu (Wuhu), irregular, Shanghai, 15 May 1921-, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the Wuhu (Anhui) Study Society.

Wujun xunkan (Fifth Army Ten-Daily), every ten days, Guangzhou, 21 Dec. 1926-, publ. by the Political Bureau of the NRA Fifth Army.

Xiandai pinglun (Contemporary Review), weekly, Beijing (after 1927, Shanghai), 3 Dec. 1924-, edited by staff of Beijing University but apparently funded by the party.

Xianfeng (Front Ranks), fortnightly, probably Guangzhou, 1926, publ. by the Political Bureau of the NRA Second Army Military Academy.
* Xiangjiang chenbao (香港晨报 Hong Kong Morning Post), daily, Hong Kong, 1919-, publ. initially by the CRP and subsequently by the Guomindang, had its subsidy withdrawn early in 1925 after it attacked the CCP. It was declared bankrupt later in that year.

Xiao bao (晓报 Daylight), daily, Taiyuan (Shanxi), 1923 at least, publ. jointly by the party's Shanghai national headquarters and the head of the party's Shanxi Provincial Branch, Wang Yongbao.

Xin anhui (皖报 New Anhui), weekly, Shanghai, 25 June 1923-, publ. by Anhui party members in Shanghai.

Xin funu (新妇女 New Woman), monthly, Guangzhou, 1925-, publ. by the Women's Bureau of the party's Guangzhou City Special Party Branch.

Xin jiangxi (新江西 New Jiangsi), fortnightly, Nanchang (1921-3) and Shanghai (1923-4), May 1921-, publ. in association with the party.

* Xin jianshe (新建设 New Construction), monthly, Shanghai, 20 Nov. 1923-, publ. in association with the Shanghai party branch by CCP and left-wing Guomindang members.

Xin junren (新军人 New Soldier), Guangzhou, no.3 dated May 1925, publ. by the Special Party Branch of the allied Yunnan Army's officer training school.

* Xin minguo (新民国 New Republic), monthly, Beijing, Nov. 1923-, publ. in association with the Beijing party branch of CCP and left-wing Guomindang members.

Xin shangmin (新商民 New Merchant), monthly, Guangzhou, Jan. 1926-, publ. by the party's Guangdong Provincial Branch Merchant Bureau.

Xin sheng (新生 New Life), Guangzhou, mid 1926-, publ. by the Society for the Study of Sun Yat-senism at Guangdong (later Zhongshan) University.

Xin xuesheng (新学生 New Student), fortnightly, July 1923-, publ. by the New Student Society, subsidised by the party, managed by Guo Yuzhen.

Xin zhongguo (新中国 New China), monthly, Beijing, around 1923-25, from
contents appears to be a party journal.

* Xingqi pinglun (星期评论 Weekly Review), weekly, Shanghai, 8 June 1919 - 6 June 1920, publ. by the Weekly Review Society, ed. by Dai Jitao, Shen Dingyi and Sun Disan, managed through the party's national headquarters in Shanghai, set, printed and distributed by the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), claimed the "largest number of readers" of any May Fourth publication.

* Xinwen bao (新闻报 News), daily, Hong Kong, around 1920-, publ. by Chen Qiulin and Huang Jusu initially on behalf of Chen Jiongming, but from July 1924 on behalf of the Guomindang, closed down by British authorities during the Guangdong-Hong Strike of 1925-6.

Yingwen ribao (英文日报 English Language Daily - title possibly incorrect), daily, Guangzhou, from July 1925 publ. by the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the National Government.

Yishu pinglun (艺术评论 Arts Review), weekly, Shanghai, 23 April 1923- , publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.).

Yishu zhouban (艺术周刊 Arts Weekly), weekly, Shanghai, 1923, publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (perhaps the same as the preceding entry).

Zhanshi xinwen beifa tikan (战事新闻北伐特刊 Special Issue of Warfare News for the Northern Expedition), probably 1926, publ. by the General Political Bureau of the NRA.

Zhanshi xinwen huabao (战事新闻汇报 Warfare News Pictorial), weekly, probably 1926, publ. by the General Political Bureau of the NRA.

Zhanshi zhoubao (战士周报 Fighters' Weekly), weekly, probably Changsha, 1926.

Zhejiang (浙江 Zhejiang), irregular, Hangzhou, Nov. 1925- , publ. by the party's Zhejiang Provincial Branch, successor to Zhejiang zhouban (q.v.) and forerunner of Zhejiang chao (q.v.).

Zhejiang chao (浙江潮 Zhejiang Tide), weekly, Hangzhou, 1 June 1926-, publ.
by the party's Zhejiang Provincial Branch, successor to Zhejiang (q.v.).

* Zhejiang zhoubao (i) (政治周报 Political Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, 5 Dec. 1925- , publ. jointly by the party's Central Propaganda Bureau and its Political Committee, ed. by Mao Zedong and Zhang Qiuren, over 30,000 copies per issue.

* Zhengzhi gongzuo (政治工作 Political Work), daily, Guangzhou, late Dec. 1925- , publ. by the Political Training Bureau of the National Government Military Affairs Committee, 18,000 copies per issue.

Zhengzhi zhoubao (ii), weekly, Shanghai, around March 1924- , publ. as a supplement to the party's Minguo ribao (q.v.), ed. by the Beijing University Political Research Association, successor to Zhengzhi zhoubao (ii) (q.v.).

Zhengzhi zhoubao (iii), weekly, Changsha, Aug. 1926- , publ. by the Northern Expedition Front Line General Command Headquarters of the NRA.

Zhongguo guomindang chengdu dankan (中國國民黨成都黨刊), weekly, Chengdu, Sep. 1925- .
Zhongguo guomindang di er ci guanguo daibiao dahui rikan (中国国民党第二次全国代表大会 日报 Daily of the Guomindang Second National Congress), daily, Guangzhou, Jan. 1926, publ. by the Congress Secretariat.


Zhongguo guomindang guomin gemen jun di qi jun tebie dangbu banyuekan (中国国民党革命军第七军特别支部半月刊 Semi-monthly of the Special Party Branch of the Guomindang NRA Seventh Army), fortnightly, Nanning (Guangxi) around Jul. 1926- , publ. by the Branch.


Zhongguo guomindang guanqu diaibiao dahui tehao (中国国民党全国代表大会特号 Special Issues on the Guomindang [First] National Congress), Guangzhou, Jan. 1924, publ. by the Congress Secretariat.

* Zhongguo guomindang tongxin (中国国民党通信 Guomindang Newsletter), daily, Shanghai, publ. by the party's Shanghai national headquarters, 1922, successor to Benbu tongxin (q.v.) and forerunner to Zhongguo guomindang benbu gongbao (q.v.).

Zhongguo guomindang zhejiang sheng dangbu zhoukan (中国国民党浙江省委部周刊 Weekly of the Guomindang Zhejiang Provincial Branch), weekly, Hangzhou, publ. by the Branch, its position vis-a-vis Zhejiang (q.v.), Zhejiang chao (q.v.) and Zhejiang zhoukan (q.v.) is unclear.

* Zhongguo guomindang zhili sheng dangbu dangwu yuebao (中国国民党直隶省委部 务月报 Party Affairs Monthly of the Guomindang Zhejiang Provincial Branch), monthly, probably Beijing, June 1926- , publ. by the Branch.

* Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui dangwu yuebao (中国国民党 中央执行委员会务月报 Party Affairs Monthly of the Guomindang CEC), monthly, Guangzhou, May 1926- , publ. by the CEC Secretariat.
* **Zhongguo guomindang zhoukan** (中国国民党周报 | Guomindang Weekly), weekly, Guangzhou, following on from **Guomindang zhoukan** (q.v.), began with no. 9 (24 Feb. 1924), ended with no. 42 (26 Oct. 1924), after which it merged with **(Guangzhou) Minguo ribao** (q.v.), publ. by the party’s Central Propaganda Bureau, chief ed. Liu Chengyu.

* **Zhongguo junren** (中国军人 | Chinese Soldier), Guangzhou, around Feb. 1925–, publ. by the left-wing Young Soldiers Association, ed. by Wang Yifei, 5,000 copies issued of no. 1 & 2, 10,000 of no. 3, 5,000 of no. 6.

* **Zhongguo nongmin** (中国农民 | Chinese Peasant), monthly, Guangzhou, Jan. 1926–June 1927 (no. 2: 1), publ. by the party’s Central Peasant Bureau, 5,000 per issue.

**Zhongguo xinwen bao** (中国新闻报 | China News), see **Xinwen bao** (q.v.).

* **Zhonghua minguo guomin zhengfu gongbao** (中华民国国民政府公报 | Chinese National Government Gazette), see **Guomin zhengfu gongbao** (q.v.).

**Zhongshan zhuyi** (中山主义 | Zhongshan-ism), weekly, Shanghai, 20 Dec. 1925–, publ. by the left-wing Zhongshan-ism Research Association of the party’s Shanghai University.

**Zuo xiang** (左 | Left Tendency), irregular, Guangzhou, around Feb. 1926–, publ. by the Fifth Sub-Branch of the Eleventh District of the Guangzhou City Party Branch (probably based at Lingnan University).
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


13. Sun, "We must rely upon propagandizing culture in order to unify China" (1921), GFQJ, 2, p. 402; "Dahui shimo jiyao" (Outline of the Congress from beginning to end), Zhengzhi zhoubao (Political Weekly, henceforth ZZZB), 6/7 (10 April 1926), pp. 32-3.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Yusheng Lin, "Radical Iconoclasm".
6. Mast, ibid., pp. 246-7; Dirlik, ibid., p. 18.
8. Zhu Zhixin, "Geming yu xinli" (Revolution and psychology), in Zhu Zhixin Ji (Collected works of Zhu Zhixin), (Shanghai, 1921, 2 Vols.), 1, pp. 119-20. Zou Lu, Zhongguo guomindang shigao (Draft history of the Guomindang), (Shanghai, 1929, 4 Vols). Reprinted in Zou Lu Quanjil (Complete works of Zou Lu), (Taipei, 1976, Vols. 4-6; henceforth, references are to shigao vol. nos.), 2, pp. 540-1.
9. Only in the party reorganizations of 1923 and 1924 was any stress laid upon popular political education. Below pp. 102 ff.


15. Wilbur, Sun Yatsen, pp. 15-16.

16. Sun Yatsen, "Letter to Lady James Cantlie" (20 Mar. 1919), GFQJ, 5, pp. 418-9; Jianshe, 1:1-6 (August 1919 - January 1920); Mingwu Ribao, 2, 3, 4 October 1919; Wilbur points out that the synopsis was published in English in March 1919 in Far Eastern Review, ibid., p. 98.


18. Sun, "We must rely", p. 402.


20. Since its founding in 1915 the paper had suffered chronic financial problems, to the point of being unable to pay staff or to purchase newsprint. See "Ye Chucang", in Huang Jilu (chief ed.), Geming renwu zhi (Records of revolutionary personalities) (Taipei, 1969-(76), 15 vols. to date), 7, pp. 101-2. Henceforth GMRW.

21. ibid.

22. Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923 (Berkeley, 1976) p. 131. Chen Baixu, for example, was both the editor of a supplement to China News and a member of the CRP. Wang Ximing, Xinwen guan li sishi nian (Forty years in the world of journalism) (Taipei, 1957), p.131.


Notes to pp. 14-17

27. ibid., p. 140.
28. ibid., p. 163.
29. ibid., pp. 164-6; one instance of a joint pronouncement by members of the national union was its response to news of the Karakhan Declaration in April, 1920. See Juewu, 14 April 1920.
31. Wang, Xinwen, p. 163.
34. Chow, ibid., p. 133.
36. "Tao Yuan zhi yulun ji xuanchuan" (Public opinion and propaganda in the struggle against Yuan [Shikai]), in GMWX, 46, pp. 491-543.
38. ibid., 1925-6, p. 1058.
40. "Deng Muhan chenshu lianluo baoguan ji guangdong zhengqing shang zongli han" (Letter from Deng Muhan to the President detailing his liaison with newspaper houses, and the political situation in Guangdong), (26 Apr. 1919), GMWX, 48, pp. 291-2.
42. Wang, ibid, pp. 251-3; Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 110.
Notes to pp. 17-23

44. Wang, Xinwen, pp. 180-5.
47. Dirlik, Revolution and History, p. 35.
50. Awaken was edited by Shao Lizi, and was first published as a supplement to the Shanghai Republican Daily sometime before 16 June 1919. See Wusi shiqi gikan jieshao (Introduction to periodicals of the May Fourth period), (Beijing, 1958-9, 3 Vols.), 1, pp. 182-5.
57. Juewu, 1 July 1921.
58. Minxin rikan was edited by Zhao Pixie, and published daily from February 1920 until January 1923.
60. Lu, Zhu Zhixin, p. 238; "Xingqi pinglun bannian lai de nuli" (our effort on Weekly Review over the past half year), Xingqi pinglun, 26 (30 November 1919), p. 4.
61. Chen Duxiu, "Zhongguo Guomindang yinggai buxi de gongke" (Some homework which should be done by the Guomindang), Xingqi pinglun, 31 (New Year Issue, 1920), p. 14; Juewu, 2 July 1920.
62. Sun, "We must rely upon propagandizing culture", GFQJ, 2, pp. 401-2.
63. Zou Lu, Shigao, 1, p. 301.
Notes to pp. 23-26

64. See below, pp. 42-4.

65. "Bendang benbu dangwu baogao" (Report on party affairs under the Guomindang party centre), in Zhongguo guomindang zhoukan (Guomindang Weekly), 9 (24 February 1924), pp. 6-7, (henceforth ZGZK). Li Yunhan, Cong rong gong dao qing dang (From the Communist admission to the party purification) (Taipei, 1966, 2 Vols.), 1, pp. 253-4.

66. Ma Xulun, Wo zai liushi sui yigian (Before my sixtieth year) (Shanghai, 1947), pp. 67-72; Li, ibid., 1, p. 279.


70. The editors of Republican Daily and of its daily supplement Awaken retained close ties with the Movement: above, pp. 19-22.


72. Qing Xiao, "Guangzhou shimin daxue piping" (Criticisms of Guangzhou Citizens University), Juewu, 9 September 1921; Minxin Rikan, 15 January 1923; Zhang Guotao Wo de huiyi (My Recollections), (Hong Kong, 1971), p. 128; Zhou Fohai, "Wo taochu le chidu wuhan" (I fled the red capital of Wuhan), in Zhou Fohai and Chen Gongbo, Huiyu lu hebian (Joint reminiscences), (Hong Kong, 1967) p. 145; Chen Gongbo, "Wo ya gongchandang" (The CCP and I), ibid., pp. 12-13; Li, Cong rong gong, 1, pp. 64-5.

73. Fang Gang, "Guomindang gaizu hou zhi guangdong" (Guomindang after the Guomindang reorganization), Xin minguo (The New Republic), 1:5 (30 March 1924).

74. "Deng Muhan baoqiao zai yue lianluo qingxing yimou zai wo zhengquan shang zongli han" (Letter from Deng Muhan to the president reporting on liaison work undertaken to plot a return to power in Guangdong), (13 May 1919), GMWX, 48, pp. 293-4; Deng Muhan, letter of 26 April 1919, ibid., p. 292; Sun, "We must rely on propagandizing culture", pp. 401-2.

Notes to pp. 26-28

76. Zhang Jinglu, Zhongguo chuban shiliao bubian (Documents on the history of Chinese publishing; Supplementary volume), (Shanghai, 1957), p. 279.

77. The English language original was first published in Bristol by J.W. Arrowsmith in 1897: Editor's note, GFQJ, 2, pp. 38-9. The Chinese version, entitled Lundun Beinan Ji was translated by Gan Zuolin, ibid.

78. Advertisement in Juewu, 3 January 1920; other titles under which Parliamentary Procedure later appeared include Shehui jianshe (Social Reconstruction) and Mingquan chubu (First Step Toward People's Rights); a chinese version of International Development was published serially in Jianshe under the title Shiye jihua (Plans for Enterprises); the work also appeared in Chinese at a later date under the title Wuzhi jianshe (Material Reconstruction).


82. Taidong was founded by Zhao Nangong. Zhang Jinglu (ed), Zhongguo xiandai chuban shiliao (Documents on the history of contemporary Chinese publishing), (Shanghai, 1954-1956, 5 vols.), 1, p. 66.


84. Wang, Xinwen, pp. 159 and 165.

85. ibid., p. 140; Archives Commission of the Kuomintang (Zhongguo guomindang dangshi weiyuan hui, henceforth Archives), 415/28(i), "Zhongguo guomindang benbu teshe banshi zhiyuan biao" (List of personnel of the Special Office of Guomindang party centre) (1921-2); "Xuanchuan bu gongwen digao" (Drafts of documents of the propaganda bureau) (1922-3), Archives 415/91, p. 20.

86. See cover of Xingqi pinglun, 1 (8 June 1919). The only other listed distributor was the party's own unofficial mouth-piece, the Shanghai Minguo ribao. See advertisement in Minguo ribao, 1 October 1919.


88. "Zuzhi tushu yinshua youxian gongsi" (On organizing a limited book-printing company), (n.d.) Archives 446/8.

89. In addition to the similarities between the content of Sun's letter and that of this document, their relationship seems to be confirmed by the document's failure to mention Popular Wisdom Press at all. It is highly unlikely that it should make pointed reference to other publishing companies, and indeed proceed upon the assumption that the party lacks its own press, and yet have been written after the founding of Popular Wisdom Press.
Notes to pp. 29-30


92. ibid., p. 279.

93. The value of assets of the larger companies were estimated as Commercial ¥5,000,000, Chung Hwa ¥2,000,000, Shijie Book Company (shijie shuju) ¥700,000, Dadong Book Co. (dadong shuju) ¥300,000, ibid., p. 278.

94. ibid., p. 277.


96. Benbu tongxin (Party Centre Mail), 60 (31 January 1921), p. 73.

97. "Sanfanshi zong zhibu dangwu baogao" (Report on party affairs of the San Francisco general branch headquarters), ZGZK, 12 (16 March 1924) p. 7; the average rate of exchange over the year 1921 was one tael (liang): US$76¢. The tael was equivalent to (dayang) ¥1.39. One yuan was thus equivalent to US55¢. US$100,000 would, at this rate, have yielded about 180,000 yuan in exchange. See Woodhead, The China Yearbook, 1923, p. 699; 1926/7, p. 52.

98. See, e.g., "Haiwai gongwen gaoben" (Drafts of correspondence abroad) (1920-1921), Archives 413/45, p. 25.

99. Prior to July, incoming funds were shared between the separate party centres located in Shanghai and Guangzhou, according to the whim of the overseas branch addressing the remittance. Records extant in Taiwan report only those sums received by Shanghai Party Centre. When Sun's party fled Guangzhou in June, that city ceased to operate as a point for receipt of party funds and all sums came to be channelled through Shanghai Party Centre. Thus a fairly comprehensive table of party finances over the period July to December, 1922, is preserved in extant records of the Shanghai Office. Records for the periods 18 April to 31 December 1921, and 1 January to 31 December 1922, are contained in two consecutive issues of Zhongguo guomindang benbu caizhen bu tonggao (Report of the Finance Bureau of Guomindang Party Centre), Archives 415/25.

100. Excluding sums whose overseas source I cannot identify, which are listed below as "other", the national contributions totalled (in yuan):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (yuan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>405,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia &amp; New Zealand</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>81,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ibid., July to December 1922.
Notes to pp. 31-32.

101. The fourth largest of the Shanghai publishers was valued at ¥300 in 1930, above, Chap. 1, no. 93.

102. Most respectable publishers were valued at between ¥100,000 and ¥200,000 in 1930, when the market was about double that of 1921. Zhang, Zhongguo chuban, pp. 278-9.

103. Archives 415/25, June to December, 1921; this document does not state that the sum of ¥16,000 was the first sum invested in the press. Two pieces of internal evidence suggest, nevertheless, that it was so:

(i) Although Party Centre's records do not list expenditures prior to April 1921, the fact that no payment was made to Popular Wisdom Press in April or in May suggests that none was made before that time. Over the nineteen months (June 1921 to December 1922) there is no one instance of Party Centre failing to transfer money to the press for two consecutive months.

(ii) The sum expended in June 1921 is by far the largest single amount listed against the account of the Party Centre. Party Centre expenditure on Popular Wisdom Press, April 1921 to December 1922, in yuan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>(not available)</td>
<td>1,900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>(not available)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>(not available)</td>
<td>3,780.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>631.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>16,000.00</td>
<td>2,050.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>360.00</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>7,332.37</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>5,210.00</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>4,117.92</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>4,500.00</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One other item which appears to support this internal evidence was the Press' failure to publish the one major publication issued by the party in 1921, Zhu Zhixin Ji (Collected Works of Zhu Zhixin), which was published by Jianshe she in July of that year. Had Popular Wisdom Press been established before April 1921, it might reasonably be expected to have put its presses to good use by July.

104. ibid.

105. ibid., March to December, 1922.


Notes to pp. 32-34

108. Compare ibid. and Xingqi pinglun, 5 (6 July 1919), p. 3. The address listed in each case was 140 Dongxingqiao, French Concession, Shanghai.


110. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 17 July 1925.

111. Zou Lu states that the purpose of the press was to "strengthen propaganda", and that this purpose was achieved. Shigao, 2, pp. 572-3.

112. Sun, "We must rely upon propagandizing culture," p. 402, and "Smash military autocracy and quell internal rebellion" (12 June 1922), GFQJ, 2, pp. 851-3.

113. GFNP, 1, pp. 919-23, 928-30; Zou Lu, Huigu lu (Recollections), in Zou Lu guanji, vols. 1-2, 1, p. 130.


116. ibid.; Sun, "The birth of revolutionary thinking", (20 February 1923), GFQJ, 2, pp. 514-7.


118. Sun, "We should stress propaganda in the conduct of party affairs" (2 January 1923), GFQJ, 2, pp. 509-11; "The reasons for past failures in party affairs" (11 October 1923), ibid, pp. 534-6; "For success, we must rely on party members and not just on armies", ibid., pp. 558-67; "To smash old ways of thinking we must use the Three Principles of the People", ibid., pp. 567-77.


120. Sun, "We should stress propaganda", GFQJ, 2, p. 510; Zou Lu recalls Sun making a clear distinction between method and principle, Shigao, 1, p. 391, n. 4.
Notes to pp. 34-38


NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Su, "We should stress propaganda", passim.


3. The state of relations between Sun and various parliamentarians may be explained by reference to differences which emerged in the 1913 and 1916 National Parliaments. Tian Tong, Ju Zheng and Lin Sen, for example, had been leaders of the Chinese Revolutionary Party delegation within the 1916 Parliament, and faced subsequent turns in Sun's political fortunes with faithful equanimity. Sun Hongyi, on the other hand, had been associated with the rival Tao Garden group in the 1916 Parliament, and was to break with Sun in 1923. See below, p. 55; also Yu, Party Politics, p. 144.


6. By 1917, "party affairs had drawn to a halt": "Ben dang ben bu dangwu baogao", p. 6.

7. Of his former associates, it was the parliamentarians who were in closest contact with Sun over the years 1917-18. It was at this time that such associates objected to the form of a proposed new party structure. See Dai Jitao, "Zhi Jiang Jieshi", p. 980.

8. Sun had been closely involved with the campaign of Chen Jiongming since Chen's departure from Zhangzhou in August. A succession of military victories culminated in the fall of Guangzhou on 29 October, just eleven days before the first of the party declarations was issued. GFNP, 2, pp. 795 and 807.
9. They had returned to Shanghai by April 1920: "Hufa zhi yi dashi nianbiao" (Chronology of major events in the battle to protect the constitution), GMWX, 7, p. 148. See also GFNP, 2, pp. 787-9. A number of parliamentarians took part in discussions regarding the new party platform in November. Of the five or six party members whose motions were listed in the minutes of the discussions, four were parliamentarians: Tian Tong, Lu Zhiyi (alias Lu Tianmin), Tan Zhen and Ju Zheng. Benbu tongxin, 60, pp. 22-3.

10. Sun’s problems as party leader in the Revolutionary Alliance period are noted in Yu, Party Politics, p. 56, and Hsueh, Huang Hsing, pp. 52-4; for the CRP period, see Friedman, Backward toward Revolution, Chap. 4, passim.

11. The texts of both documents are presented in Zou, Shigao, 1, pp. 298-302.


15. Zou, Shigao, 1, pp. 299-300 (my emphasis).


17. The Declaration of Military Government issued by the Revolutionary Alliance in 1905 foretold a three-stage revolutionary program: military government, government by treaty (yuefa), and constitutional government. The intermediate stage, of government by treaty, was limited to a maximum period of six years. Text in ibid., pp. 53-55, esp. p. 54.


19. The debate between Sun and former members of the Revolutionary Alliance on the issue of tutelage is outlined, albeit with a particular bias, by Ju Zheng in his “Zhonghua Gemingdang” pp. 84-6.


21. Benbu tongxin, 60, p. 22. Yu’s suggestion that Sun "disguised" his three-stage proposal in the form of two stages appears misplaced; the three-stage principle was mutilated in what was but a face-saving gesture. Party Politics, p. 156.

Notes to pp. 40-42

23. Sun, "Explanation on revising the constitution" (4 November 1920), GFQJ, 2, pp. 395 and 297.

24. Zou Lu, Shigao, 1, pp. 299-300 (my emphasis).

25. Peng Xian, "Yu lun yu zhengzhi" (Public opinion and politics), Dang bao ("The Tang Pou" [sic]), 2 (20 May 1913).

26. Minguo zhuren, "Fakan ci" (Forward to first edition), Minyi (People's Justice), 1 (15 November 1912).

27. Ze, "Zhengdang zhi guannian" (One view of political parties), Minyi, 1.


29. "Cieshao hainei zui you jiazhi baozhi" (Introducing the most valuable newspapers in the country), Minyi, 1.


31. ibid., and "Deng Muhan baogao", pp. 293-4.

32. Minjue was edited by Jing Haoru and published by the Minjue Magazine Society. Among the members of the Society were listed a number of parliamentarians associated with Sun Yatsen, including Li Xilian, Jiao Yitang, Zhang Qiubai, Hang Xinzhai, Liu Jixue, Xu Qinghe and Wang Yongbin. See List of Members of the Minjue Magazine Society, Minjue, 1 (10 February 1920).

33. Xie Yingbo, "Demokelasi zhi shensui" (The essence of democracy), ibid.; Tong Hangshi, "Wo de zhixian guan" (My views on establishing a constitution) ibid.; Tai Rui, "Zhengzhi quanli debenyuan shi shenma" (What is the root of political power?) ibid.; Ding Xiangqian, "Yu zhi nanbei heyi guan" (My views on the north-south peace dialogue), ibid.

34. Lu Fangshang, "Zhongguo guomindang gaizu qianhou de xuanchuan kanwu" (Propaganda publications of the Guomindang at the time of the reorganization), Lishi xuebao (History Journal [of Taiwan Normal University]), 2 (February 1974), p. 416.

35. GFNP, 2, pp. 817-8.


37. Staff numbers in other Divisions were: General Affairs, 17; Party Affairs, 26; Financial Affairs, 3. Archives 415/28.

Notes to pp. 43-45


41. "Liu hu quohui yiyuan Lin Sen deng zhu feichang guohui yanqi gaizu dian" (Telegram from Lin Sen and other parliamentarians in Shanghai proposing that the extraordinary parliament be postponed and reorganized) (7 May 1918), GMMX, 7, p. 91.

42. Archives 415/28.

43. The signature of "Chief Officer Tian Tong" appears alongside a document dated 24 October 1921, in "Zhongguo guomindang benbu zhuyue teshe banshichu wenjian" (Documents of Guangdong special branch of party centre), (1921-2), Archives 415/6.


45. GFNP, 2, p. 858; Sun, "Regulations for the headquarters of the grand marshall of land and naval forces" (16 January 1922), GFQJ, 2, pp. 961-4.


47. Sun, "Regulations for the headquarters", pp. 963-4.

48. GFNP, 2, pp. 850-1; GFQJ, 2, pp. 477-506.

49. As early as 28 September, Zhang Ji signed a document in his capacity as head of the Party Centre Propaganda Bureau, in Shanghai: "Ren Chen Dongping wei yangguang zhibu buzhang zhuang" (Notice of appointment of Ren Dongping as head of the Yangguang party branch), GFQJ, 4, p. 399; yet Guangdong records indicate that he left Guangdong in October. Archives 415/28.

50. GFNP, 2, p. 839.

51. "Zhongguo guomindang gesheng zhiyuan biao xiuzheng gao" (Revised draft of party staff members in all provinces), (1922), Archives 415/29; Archives 415/28.

52. "Xuanchuan bu gongwen digao" (Draft correspondence of the Propaganda Bureau) (1922-23), Archives 415/91.

53. The names of the following parliamentarians on the committee are listed in Archives 415/91: Chen Baixu, Ding Weifen, Fang Qian, Guan Peng, Hang Xinzhai, He Leshan, Li Xieyang, Ling Yi, Liu Rongtang, Mao Zuquan, Peng Jieshi, Tan Zhen, Wan Hongtu, Wang Leping and Zhang Ji.
Notes to pp. 45-49

54. Xu Ruilin and Huang Zhanyun. "Mingguo liu zhi qi nian dayuanshuai fu jianren renyuan zhiwu xingming lu" (List of names of staff appointed by the grand-marshall's office, and of the nature of their appointments, from 1917 to 1918) (1917-18), GFQJ, 4, p. 286.

55. Chen Baixu, Guan Peng, Hang Xinzhai, Mao Zuquan, Tan Zhen, Wang Leping and Zhang Ji could claim experience as journalists; Wan Hongtu had worked in the Propaganda Division of the Special Office.

56. Ye Chucang, Shao Lizi and Sun Jingya.


60. ibid., pp. 413 and 420.

61. ibid., p. 421.


63. GFNP, 2, 877.

64. Isaacs, "Notes", pp. 104 and 107; Sneevliet himself wrote several articles in this vein for publication in CCP magazines in 1922 and 1923: below, pp. 52-3.


68. Ju Zheng "Bendang gaijin dafan" (Outline of the party reforms), GMWX, 8, p. 32.

Notes to pp. 49-52

70. Huang Zhanyun had served on Zhang Ji's constitution-oriented Propaganda Committee in 1922: Archives 415/91; Yang Bojun had served on the Treaties Council (yuefa huiyi) prior to the establishment of the Constitution-Protecting Parliament in Guangzhou in 1917, whereupon he followed Sun to Guangdong: "Yang Bojun", GMRW, 3, pp. 11-13; Guan Peng was a member of the Anhui Provincial Assembly (ibid., 5, pp. 250-3).

71. Parliamentarians from this 1922 reorganization conference who joined - and indeed led - the Western Hills Faction in 1925 and 1926 included Guan Peng, Huang Fusheng, Liu Jixue, Mao Zuquan, Tan Zhen, Tian Tong, Xie Chi and Zhang Ji. Their positions on the central organs of the Western Hills organization are listed in Li, Cong rong gong, pp. 448-9.


73. Zou, Huigu lu, 1, pp. 121-7.


75. [Cai] Hesen "Tongyi, jiezai yu guomin dang" (Unification, loans and the Guomindang), Xiangdao (The Guide), 1 (13 September 1922), pp. 4-6; Zhang Ji, "Geming da shiji" (Record of great events of the revolution), Zhang Puquan xiansheng guanji, p. 49.

76. Wang, Zhongguo gongchandang, 1, pp. 60-1.


78. The four were Huang Yanpei, Li Dingxin, Tan Yankai and Yan Huiqing. Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 190-1.

79. These two, Luo Wengan and Wang Chonghui, were both described by Zou Lu as "extremely friendly toward our party": Huigu lu, 1, pp. 129 and 194.

80. [Cai] Hesen, "Sun Wu ke zai yizhong shenma jichu shang lianhe ne?" (And upon what basis can Sun Yatsen and Wu Peifu come together?), Xiangdao, 4 (4 October 1922), pp. 4-5; on the term, "able men cabinet", see Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 195.


Notes to pp. 52-54


85. Sneevliet wrote under the Chinese pseudonym of Sun Duo: Bing, "Ma-lin's Activities", p. 30, n. 15; Sun Duo "Guomin yundong geming jun he geming xuanchuan" (The Nationalist movement, revolutionary armies and revolutionary propaganda), Xiangdao, 9 (9 November 1922), pp. 4-6.


88. Sun Duo, "Zhongguo guomin yundong de guoqu ji jianglai" (The past and future of the Chinese national revolutionary movement), Qianfeng (Vanguard), 1 (1 July 1923), p. 7.

89. Sun's criticism of the "political" route to power was simply that it was "unreliable": "We should stress propaganda", p. 509.

90. The 'able men' cabinet was brought down in late November by an enemy of Sun's party, Wu Jinglian; Li, The Political History p. 430; Sun, "Letter in reply to Jiao Yitang outlining a method for resolving the dispute in the national assembly" (14 September 1922), GFQJ, 3, p. 813; "Letter in reply to parliamentarians in Beijing who protect the constitution, discussing the protection of the constitution" (December 1922), ibid. p. 863.

91. Sun, "We should stress propaganda", pp. 509-10.

92. It was in fact Sun Yatsen's responsibility to appoint all cadres, ibid.; Zou, Shigao, 1, pp. 309-11.

93. Ding Weifen, Hang Xinzhai, Huang Fusheng, Ju Zheng, Liu Jixue, Lu Zhiyi, Sun Hongyi, Tan Zhen, Tian Yong, Wang Yongbin, Xie Chi, Yang Shukan, Zhan Dabe, Zhang Ji, and Zhou Zhenlin: "Zhongguo guomindang benbu xian ren zhiyuan yil biao" (A table of current personnel of party centre of the Guomindang), Zhongguo guomindang benbu gongbao (Guomindang Party Centre Gazette), 14 (20 May 1923), pp. 8-9. Henceforth BBGB. The advisors were appointed on 23 January 1923: ibid, 3 (30 January 1923). Ding Weifen is not listed on the table, but he is listed in ibid., 4 (10 February 1923). See also the appointments listed in GFQJ, 4, pp. 450-1.

94. Mao Zuquan, a representative from Jiangsu Province on the National Assembly, was appointed deputy head of the Party Centre Propaganda Bureau on 26 January 1923. BBGB, 3, p. 51.
95. In addition to advisers, heads of committees and of bureaux were entitled to vote at sessions of Council. Zou, Shigao, 1, p. 311. Had they all attended, 31 seats would have been occupied (21 advisers, 5 bureau heads, 5 committee heads). Ibid., p. 310. A search of documents, has, however, yielded no
evidence to suggest that any of the committees were in fact established. In all likelihood, then, it was only advisers
and bureau heads who were eligible to attend. The 15
parliamentarians formed an absolute majority of this body
of 26 eligible councillors.

96. GFNP, 2, pp. 954-5.
97. ibid., p. 964.
99. GFNP, 3, p. 988.
100. ibid., pp. 986-8.
101. ibid., pp. 989-90.
103. Chun Mu, "Guomindang muqian zhi liangzhong zeren" (Two responsibilities currently facing the Guomindang), Xiangdao, 30 (20 June 1923), pp. 2-3.
104. GFNP, 2, p. 995.
105. ibid., p. 1013.
107. ibid., 20 November 1923.
108. ibid., 18 November 1923.
109. GFNP, 2, p. 931; Sun, "Letter in reply to Jiao Yitang informing him that Zhang Ji was coming north immediately" (28 December 1922), GFQJ, 3, p. 856. The Beijing liaison office itself published a book on Sun's Three Principles, entitled Sun Zhongshan xiansheng sanmin zhuyi yanshuo (Speeches by Sun Yatsen on the Three Principles of the People) (n.d.), Archives 046/34.
110. [Chen] Duxiu, "Dui deng huiyi yu Sun Cao xieshou" (The meeting of equals and the Sun-Cao alliance), Xiangdao, 22 (25 April 1923), pp. 1-2; [Chen] Duxiu, "Guomindang yu Jiaotong anfu" (The Guomindang and the Communications and Anfu Cliques), ibid., 25 (16 May 1923), pp. 2-3; Chun Mu, "Xiu jian guomin de zhongguo guomin dang" (The Guomindang: a party which slighted the people), ibid., 29 (13 June 1923), pp. 1-2; [Cai] Hesen "Beijing zhengbian yu ge zhengxii" (The Beijing coup and various political factions), ibid., 31/32 (11 July 1923), pp. 8-9.
Notes to pp. 56-61

111. Sun Duo, "Wu Peifu yu guomindang" (Wu Peifu and the Guomindang), ibid., 24 (9 May 1923), pp. 5-6. Note also the similar argument presented by Sun Duo (Sneevliet) in "Zhongguo guomin", pp. 2-9.

112. Sun, "We should stress propaganda", p. 509.


114. Sun, "The significance and prospects of the Northern Visit", (11 November 1924), GFQJ, 2, pp. 135-8.


116. Sun, "Text addressed to the soldiers and the people on launching an attack against Cao and Wu" (5 September 1924), GFQJ, 1, p. 907.


118. Sun, "Telegram to Duan Qirui announcing the imminent Northern Visit" (27 October 1924), GFQJ, 3, p. 978.


120. Sun, "the significance and prospects", pp. 735-8.

121. Opposition also surfaced from other quarters. Zou Lu does not, however, provide the names of those non-Communist party members whose objections Sun refuted: Shigao, 3, p. 1161

122. [Peng] Shuzhi, "Women wei shenma fandui guomindang zhi junshi xingdong" (Why do we oppose the military activities of the Guomindang?), Xiangdao, 85 (1 October 1924), pp. 7-9.

123. [Cai] Hesen, "Beijing zhengbian yu guomindang" (The Beijing coup and the Guomindang), ibid., 89 (29 October 1924), pp. 4-5.

124. [Peng] Shuzhi, "Beijing zhengbian yu touji wuchi de gongtuan zhi qingqiu" (The Beijing coup and the requests of the opportunistic and shameless public associations), ibid., pp. 5-7.

125. Jizhe, "Da guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui" (Reply to the CEC of the Guomindang), ibid., 92 (19 November 1924), pp. 5-7.

126. Sun, "For success in revolution, individuals cannot act at liberty but organizations must have freedom of action", GFQJ, 2, pp. 727-35.


128. ibid., p. 737.

129. GFNP, 2, pp. 1145 and 1149.
Notes to pp. 61-64

130. [Cai] Hesen, "Huanying Sun Zhongshan xiansheng li yue lai hu" (Let us welcome Sun Yatsen on his journey from Guangdong to Shanghai), Xiangdao, 91 (12 November 1924), p. 1.


132. [Peng] Shuzhi, "Sun Zhongshan xiansheng lai hu yu diguo zhuyi" (Sun Yatsen's visit to Shanghai, and imperialism), Xiangdao, 92, pp. 3-5; "Duan Qirui zhi zheng yu bu pingdeng tiaoyue" (Duan Qirui's administration and the unequal treaties), ibid., 94 (10 December 1924) pp. 2-4; [Chen] Duxiu, "Sun Duan hezuo yu guomindang zhi yunmeng" The Sun-Duan co-operation and the fate of the Guomindang), ibid., pp. 1-2.

133. Sun, "Declaration on the Northern Visit" (10 November 1924), GFQJ, 1, pp. 919-22.

134. The thirty two propagandists included only three parliamentarians: Wang Leping, Zhang Shanyu and Jiang Hao. GFNP, 2, pp. 1169-70.

135. Li, The Political History, p. 476; Sun, "A national citizens conference is the way to resolve internal disorder in China", (19 November 1924), GFQJ, 2, p. 743.


138. Party membership in Beijing was said to have grown by 16,000 in the month following Sun's death. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 15 April 1925.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. The terms 'party army' and 'revolutionary army' were interchangeable in Guomindang usage. The various qualities expected of a party army are noted in Mao Sicheng (ed) Shiwu nian yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng (Chiang Kai-shek before 1926) (n.d., H.K. reprint, 1965) pp. D481: 46a and 0489: 61-2; Wilbur and How, Documents, p. 203; Sun, "The foundation of a revolutionary army lies in profound learning" (16 June 1924), GFQJ, 2, p. 694.


3. See, for example, Sun's "Spiritual education of soldiers".
Two militarists who were funded following Chen's rebellion were Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan, who rebelled in turn in 1925. Zou, Huigu lu, 1, p. 130; GFNP, 2, pp. 919-21, 923, 928-30, 944. On the Yang/Liu rebellion, see below, p. 203.

5. Isaacs, "Notes", p. 107; Sun, "We should stress propaganda", passim. This speech by Sun bears a fairly close resemblance to an article published by Sneevliet two months beforehand, in November 1922: Sun Duo (Sneevliet), "Guomin yundong", passim.

6. Sun, "Develop the power of the pen to wage war upon militarists" (26 January 1923), GFQJ, 2, p. 512.

7. ibid., pp. 512-4.

8. [Cai] Hesen, "Zhongshan xiansheng de binggong zhengce shi junfa shuofa de ma?" (is Sun Yatsen's soldier-worker policy spoken on behalf of the militarists?), Xiangdao, 7, pp. 1-2; [Chen] Duxiu, "Zema dadao junfa" (How are we to overthrow the militarists?), ibid., 21 (18 April 1924), pp. 4-6.

9. Sun Duo (Sneevliet), "Guomin yundong".

10. When Sun turned to implementing his disarmament policy in Guangdong, he rationalized rather than reduced the effective strength of forces under his command. In a rather gratuitous gesture, only troops who were old, infirm, or lacked rifles were in fact dismissed. GFNP, 2, p. 961.

11. Sun, "We should stress propaganda", p. 510.


18. Sun, "One member of the revolutionary army must be a match for one hundred ordinary soldiers", 1 January 1924), GFQJ, 2, p. 605; "The foundation of a revolutionary army", p. 693.
Notes to pp. 67-70


20. Sun, "The people will first taste prosperity when the revolution succeeds" (24 March 1924), GFQJ, 2, pp. 658-9.

21. Sun, "One should not think of winning wealth and promotions in the revolutionary army" (10 March 1924), GFQJ, 2, p. 641.


25. below, p. 72.


27. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0326: 34 and 0334: 49; on the Chaozhou branch-school, see Li, Cong rong gong, 2, p. 481; on the Guangxi branch-school, see Vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova-Akimova, Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927 (Steven I. Levine trans.), (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 162.


31. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, p. 0459: 2; the Party Army may have made up an even smaller proportion of total allied strength if, as reported, Chiang exaggerated the strength of forces under his personal command. Akimova, Two Years, p. 167.

32. below, p. 203.


34. Official order of 24 April 1924, GFQJ, 4, pp. 1118-9; official order of 21 October 1923, ibid., p. 865; fewer students are listed in Deng Wenyi, Huangpu jingshen (The spirit of Huangpu) (Taipei, 1976) p. 145.

35. Official order of 24 April 1924, ibid.
257.

Notes to pp. 70-73

37. ibid., p. 0335: 52.
38. Gillespie, "Whampo", ch. 3, passim.; informal cadet organizations began to appear in October 1924, and became increasingly divisive over the following year: "Guangdong geming shili de tuanjie" (The unity of revolutionary forces in Guangdong), ZZZB, 10 (3 May 1926), pp. 10-14.
40. ibid.; Akimova, Two Years, pp. 161-2.
41. The Guards Military Academy (Jingwei jun jiangwu tang) was also amalgamated with Huangpu, in October 1924: Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0320: 22 and 0330-1. Graduates of yet other military schools were transferred to serve at the Huangpu Academy: ibid., p. 0246: 34.
42. Akimova, Two Years, p. 185.
43. Du, Huangpu junxiao, p. 57.
45. ibid., p. 0327: 35-6.
46. ibid., p. 0347: 74.
47. Du, Huangpu junxiao, p. 44.
49. ibid., pp. 0260-1.
50. ibid., p. 0506: 19-20.
51. ibid., pp. 0276: 8 and 0302: 60.
52. There were about 1,000 cadets at the Guangxi Army School. Guangzhou min guo ribao, 19 February 1925; "Guangdong geming shili", p. 10; Mao, ibid., p. 0449: 84; on the Hunan Army School, see Guangzhou min guo ribao, 15 July 1925; "Qingnian junren lianhe hui di si ci daibiao dahui huiyu lu" (Minutes of the fourth congress of the Young Soldiers Association), in Zhongguo Junren (Chinese Soldier), 5 (30 April 1925), pp. 40-4.
53. "Junshi weiyuan hui junshi zhengzhi yuekan jianzheng" (Constitution of the Military and Political Affairs Monthly of the Military Affairs Committee), in Junshi zhengzhi yuekan (henceforth JSZZ), 1 (January 1926), pp. 9-12; Zhongzhi gongzuo rikan Political Work Daily, henceforth ZZGZ), 26 February 1926.
Notes to pp. 73-77.

54. Zhang Qixiong, "Dongzheng shiqi zhi zhengzhi gongzu gailue" (General outline of political work during the Eastern Expedition), JSZZ, 2 (February 1926), p. 25. A general report by the Russian military advisor, Kisanko, on the state of army military schools in late 1925 is presented in Wilbur and How, Documents, pp. 194-6.

In July 1924, Sun set up a political-training co-ordination committee but in August created a co-ordination office which superseded the committee; after only one week, this office was also abolished. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, p. 0286: 27; GFNP, 2, pp. 1110 and 1114.

55. Mao, ibid., pp. 0305: 66 and 0455: 96; Fang Dingying, Fang jiaoyu zhang Dingying yanlun ji (Collected speeches of the officer in charge of education, Fang Dingying), (Guangzhou, 1927), Section 2, p. 6.

56. ZGZ, 16 February 1926.


58. ibid., p. 35.


60. Chen Gongbo, "Dang daibiao tiaoli he zhengzhi xunlian bu de jieshi" (Explanation of regulations concerning party representatives and the Political Training Bureau), JSZZ, 2, pp. 4-5.

61. ibid.; Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0559-60.

62. Li, Cong rong gong; Fang, Fang jiaoyu zhang, Section 1, p. 60.

63. Fang, ibid., ZZGZ, 26 February 1926.

64. ibid., ZZGZ, 26 February 1926.

65. ibid., Section 1, p. 60 and Section 2, p. 58.

66. Fang, ibid.; Dangshi shiliao bianzuan weiyuan hui (ed), Huangpu jianjun sanshi nian gaishu (General outline of the creation of the army at Huangpu over thirty years) (Taipei, 1954) p. 15.

67. Landis, "Institutional Trends", pp. 39-40; Chen Guofu, "Jianjun zhi yi ye" (One page in the history of creating the army), GMWX, 10, pp. 27-36; Wilbur and How, Documents, pp. 203-4.

68. ZGZ, 16 and 26 February 1926.

69. above, p. 71 and Chap. 3, n.4.

70. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, p. 0206: 52.


72. Chen Xunzheng, "Dangjun zhi zhaofu" (Laying the foundations of the party-army), GMWX, 10, p.7; "Guoming geming jun dang daibiao tiaoli" (Regulations concerning NRA party representatives), JSZZ, 1, p. 8.
Notes to pp. 77-79

73. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0643-4.

74. ibid., pp. 0343-4; Chen, "Dangjun", pp. 6-8; "Guoming geming jun dang daibiao tiaoli", p. 7.

75. Mao, ibid., pp. 0642-5; The system was shelved immediately after the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident of 20 March 1926, but reinstated in the course of the Northern Expedition. Akimova, Two Years, pp. 240-1.

76. Li Zongren's Guangxi Army contingent was incorporated into the NRA on 24 March 1926. Mao, ibid, p. 0631: 88; on 8 April, Chiang stated his reasons for abolishing the system; ibid., pp. 0642-5.

77. Landis, "Institutional Trends", p. 112.


79. Akimova, Two Years, pp. 240-1.

80. Qian Dajun, "Huangpu junxiao kaichuang shiqi zhi zuzhi" (The organization of the Huangpu Academy at the time of its founding), GMWX, 10, pp. 37-8.


82. Li Linong, "Guomin geming jun di shi shuai zhengzhi bu nanlu zhanshi zhengzhi xuanchuan gongzuo" (Political propaganda work of the NRA 10th Division Political Bureau in the war on the southern route), JSZZ, 6 (August 1926), p. 33. The Huangpu Political Bureau was placed in the care of a skeleton staff and transferred to a branch-school on 4 January 1925, in preparation for the First Eastern Expedition. Mao, ibid., p. 0363: 3-4.

83. ibid., p. 0508: 23; Chien, "Huangpu junxiao", p. 42; Li, Cong rong gong, 1, p. 390; Xie Cilin, "Dongzheng jingguo qingxing" (The passage of the Eastern Expedition), JSZZ, 2 (February 1926), p. 55; Chun Tao, "Dong zheng ji lue" (Outline of the Eastern Expedition), ZZZB, 3 (20 December 1925), p. 14.


85. ZZZZ, 4 February 1926.

86. "Guangdong geming shili", p.11; Jordan points out that the creation of a political bureau in the Fifth Army was postponed by its commender, Li Fulin. Northern Expedition, p. 24.


88. ZZZZ, 23 February 1926; Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0414: 14 and 0428: 41.
Until the creation of the post of assistant party representative, the political bureau head was placed under the relevant party representative, and on the Second Eastern Expedition, this occasionally led to conflict: "Guomin geming jun dang daibiao tiaoli", p. 7; ZZGZ, 26 February 1926; Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 30.

The significance of the revised regulations governing party representatives is discussed in Chen, "Dang daibiao tiaoli", pp. 6-7.

Li Yunhan argues that through the creation of the position of assistant party representative and the appointment of Communists to such positions, the CCP came to dominate political work in the armed forces. While there can be little doubt that the Communists did dominate political work in the NRA, their dominance predates their appointments as assistant party representatives, Cong rong gong, 2, p. 475.


ibid., p. 0645: 21.

ibid., p. 0663: 58; ZZGZ, 4 February 1926.


Du Congrong and Leng Xin were both wounded shortly before being appointed party representatives: compare Du, Huangpu junxiao, pp. 60-1, and Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0548: 6 and 0574: 57.

Mao, ibid., p. 0447: 79.

ibid., p. 0432: 49.

ibid., p. 0644: 19.

"Zhongyang zhiwei hui di sanshijiu ci huiyi lu" (Minutes of the 39th CEC session), ZGZK, 29 (13 July 1924), p. 4.

Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0281: 18 and 0290: 36.

ibid., pp. 0291: 2.

Mao, ibid., p. 0370: 18.

"Ben dang bu dongzheng riji zheyao" (A summary diary of the Huangpu Special Party Branch on the Eastern Expedition), Geming jun (Revolutionary Army), 6/7 (30 May 1925), pp. 5-21.

Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0287-8.

Notes to pp. 83-86

108. ibid., p. 0531:70.


110. See Guangzhou minguo ribao, month of July, 1925; Tan Pingshan, "Zhongguo guomindang quanguo dangwu gaikuang" (The general situation regarding Guomindang party work throughout the country), ZZZB, 3, p. 6.


112. The Second Congress was held between 1 and 19 January 1926. Li, Cong rong gong, 2, p. 462.

113. Tan Pingshan, "Tan Pingshan xiansheng dangwu zong baogoa" (Tan Pingshan's general report on party affairs), ZZZB 6/7 (10 April 1926), p. 46.


115. above, pp. 78&82; Mao, Shiwu nian yi qian, p. 0371:19.

116. Ruan Xiaoxian, "Huiyang xian nongmin xiehui chengli zhi jingguo" (The process of establishing the Huiyang County Peasant Association), Zhongguo nongmin (The Chinese Peasant), 3 (March 1926), p. 1.


118. Qian, "Huangpu junxiao", pp. 41-2; Mao, Shiwu nian yi qian, p. 0403:84; Guangzhou minguo ribao, 21 February 1925.


120. Zhang, "Dongzheng" p. 22.

121. The political bureau system and commissariat had their beginnings in the First Army, and spread fairly slowly to other units. above, p. 78.

122. The 10 staff at sub-section level are not included in this tally as each was concurrently a cell-head, and is thus counted among staff at the cell level. Zhang, "Dongzheng", pp. 22-3; Xie, "Dongzheng jingguo", p. 55; Chun, "Dongzheng jilue", p. 14.
123. Yun Changhon, "Di si jun zhengzhi bu dongzheng xuanchuan zhi jingguo" (Fourth Army Political Bureau propaganda on the Eastern Expedition), JSZZ, 1, p. 6.


125. ibid., p. 24; the organization of 3 cells per sub-section in the first column called for nine staff members in each sub-section; the presence of only five staff members per sub-section in the second column meant that a maximum of two cells could be formed. ibid., pp. 24-6; "Dongzheng jun xuanchuan dui zhi di er zhidui zhiyuan" (Staff of the Second Column of the Eastern Expedition Propaganda Team), Archives 461/2.11.

126. As, for example, the Society of Comrades for Reorganizing Huizhou (Gaizao huizhou tongzhi hui). Zhang, ibid. p. 25.

127. ibid., pp. 25-6.

128. The three institutions commended were the Political Training class of the Political Training Bureau, the Propagandist Training Institute, and the military school of the Attack-Hubei Army. ibid., pp. 25 and 35.


130. The Southern Expedition took place in three stages: the first, under the command of Chen Mingshu, ending in defeat in mid-October 1925; the second, under Zhu Peide, forcing the enemy forces to flee to Hainan Island in December 1925; and the third, under Li Jishen, routing the enemy on Hainan Island in February 1926. See Chen Xunzhang, "Pingting nanbei lu" (Pacifying the northern and southern routes), GMWX, 10, pp. 325-7; Li, "Guomin geming jun", passim; Huang Ao, "Nanzheng de jingguo he ganyi" (Experience and impressions of the Southern Expedition), JSZZ, 4 (April 1926), pp. 6-9; Miao Xiangchu, "Nanzheng zhengzhi xuanchuan gongzuo zong baogao" (General report of political propaganda work on the Southern Expedition), JSZZ, 4, pp. 1-2.

131. Miao, ibid., 4, p. 3; Li, ibid., p. 20.

132. Huang, "Nanzheng de jingguo", p. 12; "Guomin geming jun di san jun zhengzhi xunlian zhi xian zhuang" (The political training situation in the NRA Third Army), JSZZ, 1, p. 5.

133. The Fourth Army's Tenth Division was already in the south after having engaged in early stages of the expedition, while its Eleventh and Twelfth Divisions moved south, for the third stage, from the eastern battlefields. Li, "Guomin geming jun", p. 26; Lin Yizhong, "Nanzheng ji" (Record of the Southern Expedition), JSZZ, 5 (July 1926); Chen, "Pingding", p. 327.
Notes to pp. 88-91

134. Miao, "Nanzheng", 4, p. 4; Luo Yangqing "Di si jun shengzhi bu nanzheng gongzuo jingguo gailue" (General outline of the work of the Fourth Army Political Bureau on the Southern Expedition), JSZZ, 6, p. 1. The Twelfth Division Political Bureau was headed by the Communist Liao Qianwu, and that of the Fourth Army by the Communist Zhang Shanming. Luo, ibid., p. 5; ZZGZ, 4 February 1926.

135. Miao, ibid., 4, pp. 4-6; Luo, ibid., pp. 2 and 11.

136. Miao, ibid., 4, pp. 7-9. The Eleventh Division Political Bureau followed the pattern of Fourth Army Political Bureau organization, setting up brigade-level teams each comprising two or three staff from the divisional bureau. The Twelfth Division Political Bureau, by contrast, remained intact throughout the expedition, utilizing an independent system of political workers at brigade level. ibid., p. 4; Luo, ibid., p. 2.


140. On the problem of indiscipline after the first expedition, see below, p. 97; the propaganda outline drawn up for the second expedition was also used on the Southern Expedition: Li, "Guomin geming jun", p. 21.


142. ibid., p. 30.

143. ibid., p. 28.

144. ibid., p. 30.

145. viz. Mou Xiong; Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, p. 0527:61. Mou Xiong's place in Chen Qiongming's camp is indicated in Chen Xunzheng, "Di er ci dongzheng", p. 308.


147. ibid.

148. The work of the First and Second Columns was reported in detail in Zhang Qixiong's synopsis of the General Political Bureau report on political work during the Second Eastern Expedition; that of the Third Column barely rates mention. ibid., passim.
Notes to pp. 92-94

149. Luo, "Di si jun", p. 10.

150. Perhaps significantly the single reference to internal political work on the Southern Expedition which I have come across outside of official reports in JSZZ deals with the very issue omitted from such reports: that of intimidation of enlisted men by officers. See ZZGZ, 9 February 1926.

151. Luo, "Di si jun", p. 4.

152. ibid.; Miao, "Nanzheng", 4, pp. 10-11.


156. Although performing little internal propaganda work on campaign, the political bureaus of the Third Army, Fourth Army and Eleventh Division all began fairly intensive political indoctrination courses after the Southern Expedition had been completed. "Guomin geming jun disan jun", p. 5; Miao, "Nanzheng", 4, pp. 7 and 11-13, Lin, "Nanzheng ji", pp. 18-19.

157. Soldiers' salaries varied from one army to another, being highest in Chiang Kaishek's First Army (¥10 per month) and as low as ¥6 per month in the Third Army. ZZGZ, 9 and 10 February 1926; Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0324-5 and 0599-23; Akimova, Two Years, p. 167.

158. Mao, ibid., pp. 0324:5.

159. ZZGZ, 10 February 1926.

160. ibid., the Military Affairs Committee outlawed the practice of absorbing enemy deserters, but it appears to have continued unabated. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, p. 0561:31; Huang, "Nanzheng de jingguo", p. 7; Lin, "Nanzheng ji", pp. 17-18.


162. In October 1924, the First Student Brigade from the Huangpu Academy was sent back to the Academy from Shaoguan after almost one third had taken seriously ill; in 1926, in the Second Army alone over one thousand troops died of Cholera. Mao, ibid., pp. 0310:2 and 0342:66; Akimova, Two Years, p. 238.

163. Luo, "Di si jun", p. 12; ZZGZ, 9 and 18 February 1926; Mao, ibid., p. 0542:92; Akimova, ibid.; Wilbur and How, Documents, p. 193.
Notes to pp. 94-98

164. It was the effect upon morale of the dismal prospects facing wounded soldiers which prompted the government to publicise its establishment of a token rehabilitation centre in 1926. "Luhai jun jiaoyang yuan gaikuang" (The general situation of the joint-forces education and rehabilitation institute), JSZZ, 6, pp. 10-22.

165. Du, Huangpu junxiao, pp. 25-6 and 33.

166. ZZGZ, 10, 20 and 23 February 1926; Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0514-5 and 0541:89.

167. ZZGZ, 20 February 1926; Mao, ibid., p. 0531:70.


170. Chiang Kaishek himself traced troop misbehaviour to the poor example set by their superiors, Mao, ibid., p. 0514:36.

171. Compare, for example, Du, Huangpu junxiao, pp. 43-5, and Akimova, Two Years, pp. 162-3.

172. Chen Xunzheng, "Guangdong jing luan" (Quelling the rebellion in Guangdong), GMWX, 11, pp. 276-8.


176. ibid., pp. 0390-1.

177. ibid., pp. 0513-4.

178. ibid., pp. 0530-2.

179. [Zhang] Qiuren, "Shenggang bagong de guoqu he xianzai" (The past and present of the Guangdong - Hong Kong Strike), ZZSB, 9 (26 April 1926), p. 17: The circumvention of the porterage problem on the Second Eastern Expedition is apparent in a comparison between Chiang Kaishek's list of faults for each of the two expeditions: while the first dwells on the porter problem, the second overlooks it. Compare Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0513-4 and 0530-2.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. See for example, Sun, "For success", pp. 558-67; "To smash old ways", pp. 567-77; "Party members should struggle alongside the army" (9 December 1923), GFQJ, 2, pp. 577-83; "The method of struggle", pp. 593-604.


3. ibid., pp. 563-5. Sun, "We should stress propaganda", p. 510.


8. Ye Chucang, and other party veterans in charge of party affairs in Shanghai, ignored the reorganized party headquarters in Guangdong as best they could; below, pp. 121-2.
Notes to pp. 104-107

11. Sun, "We should stress propaganda", pp. 509-10.
16. "Zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui ge bu zhiwu gaiyao" (Outline of responsibilities of each bureau under the CEC), ZGZK, 11 (9 March 1924), p.6.
17. ibid.; GFNP, 2, p. 1070. On 11 November 1924, Xu Chongzhi was appointed head of the Military Affairs Bureau and Chiang Kaishek appointed bureau secretary; two days later, on 13 November, Sun left Guangzhou on his northern visit. GFNP, 2, p. 1152.
18. "Zhongyang guomindang zhixing weiyuan hui xuanchuan bu banshi zhangcheng" (Regulations governing the operation of the Guomindang CEC Propaganda Bureau), ZGZK, 22, p. 4; Tan Pingshan, "Tan Pingshan xiansheng", p. 45.
19. The Military Affairs Committee consisted of four civilian party officials (Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, Liao Zhongkai and Wu Chaoshu), four military commanders (Chiang Kaishek, Zhu Peide, Tan Yankai and Xu Chongzhi) and Blyukher. The Committee lost three members following Liao Zhongkai's assassination: Liao himself and Hu Hanmin and Xu Chongzhi by implication in the crime. Li, Cong rong gong, 1, p. 374; Akimova, Two Years, pp. 173 and 223-5; Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao (July to December 1925), p. 26.
20. The editorial committee consisted of Mamaev, the four Communists Li Fuchun, Zhu Keqing, Lin Zuhan and Li Zhilong, and two members whom I cannot identify, Xiong Xiong and Wu Hing. ZZGZ, 6 February 1925.
21. On the training program, see Chen "Dang daibiao tiaoli", p. 5; 16,000 copies of Political Work were published each issue; on pamphlet publication and distribution, see Miao, "Nanzheng", 5, pp. 1-3.
Notes to pp. 107-109

24. "Ben bao qishi, l" (Announcement by this paper, no. 1), ibid., back cover. The editorial office was opened on 25 July 1926: "Ben chu choubai junren ribao zhi jingguo" (The process of preparation of Soldiers Daily by this office), ibid., p. 18.

25. He Xiangning, "Funu yundong baogao" (Report on the women's movement), ZZZB, 6/7, p. 69; Yihong, "Zhide zhuyi de ji jian guomindang gongzuo" (Some Guomindang work worthy of attention), Xin minguo (New Republic), 1:5 (30 March 1924).

26. He, ibid.

27. Women's Bureau propagandists were Feng Mingguang, Wang Guoying, and Li Shangqin; other bureau officers who engaged in propaganda work included Wu Xiaoli, Zhao Xuru, Feng Jingyun and Gao Tianpo. "Funu bu gongzuo baogao" (Report on the work of the Women's Bureau), Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui dangou yuebao (Party Affairs' Monthly of the Guomindang CEC), 1 (May 1926), pp. 22-4, henceforth Cent. DWYB.

28. ibid.; "Zhongyang dangbu funu bu minguo shisan nian san yue zhi shiwu nian san yue gongzuo zheyao" (Outline of the work of the Central Women's Bureau from March 1924 to March 1926), Funu zhi sheng huikan (Collection from Women's Voice), 31 May 1926, pp. 24-7; "Funu ri da yundong jingguo gongxing" (Events surrounding the great movement on women's day), ZGZK, 12 (16 March 1924), p. 5; He, "Funu yundong baogao".

29. He, ibid., p. 70; "Zhongyang dangbu funu bu", p. 26; "Funu bu gongzuo baogao", p. 23.

30. Women's Voice was co-edited by the Central and the Guangdong Provincial Women's Bureaux - see Appendix. Over 10,000 leaflets were distributed at International Women's Day celebrations in Guangzhou in 1924. "Funu ri", p. 5; on Woman, see Zhang, Zhongguo xiandai chuban shiliao, 1, pp. 90 and 105, n. 38.

31. Criticism of the poor co-ordination of women's movement propaganda was aired at the second party congress. He, "Funu yundong baogao", p. 69; "Funu bu gongzuo baogao", p. 22; "Funu bu xuanchuan huiyi an" (Documents on the propaganda meetings of the [Central] Women's Bureau) (September 1926), Archives 436/302.

32. "Funu yundong jueyi an" (Decisions on the women's movement"), ZZZB, 6/7, p. 70.

33. Qishi'er hang bao (Journal of the Seventy-Two Hongs), 24 April 1925; Guangzhou minguo ribao, 22 April 1925.

34. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 15 July 1925; Chart of the structure of the popular education movement, Guangdong qingnian, 3 (not dated: June, 1926), p. 14; "Zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui di sanshisan ci huiyi lu" (Minutes of the 33rd CEC session), ZGZK, 26 (22 June 1924), p. 4.
Notes to pp. 109-111

35. Larger propaganda exercises involving students included the Eastern and Southern Expeditions and the Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike. Chen Gongbo, "Qingnian yundong baogao" (Report on the Youth Movement), ZZZB, 6/7, p. 63.


37. The student union published Zhongguo xuesheng (The Chinese Student) and a series of monographs opposed to Christianity, Juewu, 22 December 1925; "Quanguo xuesheng zonghui zhi xuanchuan jihua" (Propaganda plan of the All China General Union of Students), ZGZK, 13 (23 March 1924), pp. 5-6. The Young Soldiers Association published Zhongguo jamien (The Chinese Soldier) - see appendix. The Association ultimately passed from the jurisdiction of the Youth Bureau to that of the Political Training Bureau. Chen, "Qingnian yundong baogao", p. 61.

38. GFNP, 2, pp. 1140-1.

39. Significant differences of interest marked relations between large and small merchants, compradores and national capitalists, and merchants of one region and another. See Gan Naiguang, "Shangmin yundong zhi jingguo" (An account of the merchant movement), ZZZB, 6/7, pp. 65-6, and below, pp. 194-5.


42. Huang, "Nanzheng de jingguo", p. 10. A campaign against non-Cantonese in Guangzhou was also conducted by a volatile ally of the Guomindang, Wei Bangping, following the suppression of the Yang-Liu rebellion in June 1926. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0451:88 and 0453:92.

43. As, for example, in the Meixian-Chaoan-Shantou region of eastern Guangdong. Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 29; below, pp. 195-6.

44. "Shangmin bu gongzuo baogao" (Report on the work of the [Central] Merchant Bureau) Cent. DWYB, 1, p. 19. Publication of the Merchant Bureau's monthly magazine, Shangmin yundong (The Merchant Movement) was delayed until party headquarters had moved to Wuhan, see appendix.
The Institute commenced classes on 1 October 1925 and was in operation for three months. Gan, "Shangmin yundong", pp. 66-7.


Peng was founding secretary of the Peasant Bureau, but was replaced in November 1924 by fellow-Communist Luo Qiyuan. GFNP, 2, pp. 1149-50; Peng remained a Peasant Bureau organizer, and went on to head the Guangdong Provincial Branch Peasant Bureau. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 5 November 1925.

Peng's experience in Haifeng is retold in Hofheinz, Broken Wave, pp. 139-78.

For the magazines, see appendix; regarding the monographs, in May 1924 the bureau was asked to edit a series on rural reform, and by October 1926 had published thirty-one titles over three monograph series. Luo Qiyuan, "Ben bu yinian lai gongzuo baogao gaiyao" (Outline of the report on Peasant Bureau work over the past year), ZGNM, 2 (1 February 1926), p. 3; "Benbu gongzuo baogao" (Report on the work of the [Central Peasant] Bureau), ZGNM, 9 (1 November 1926), pp. 3-4; one Propaganda Outline was drawn up by the Bureau on the first anniversary of Liao Zhongkai's assassination. "Ben bu gongzuo baogao", ibid.

"Benbu tepai yuan dahui zhi jueyi an" (Resolutions of the [Peasant] Bureau special envoy conference), ZGNM, 1 (1 January 1926), p.2.

Chen Gongbo, "Nongmin yundong baogao" (Report on the peasant movement), ZZZB 6/7, p. 59.

Luo, "Ben bu yi nian lai", 2, p. 5.

Feng Jupo, although only bureau secretary, dominated the work of the Labour Bureau. Zou, Shigao, 1, p. 356.

Zou, ibid., pp. 391-2; Chesnaux, Labour Movement, pp. 178-80 and 292; Zhang, Zhongguo xiandai chuban shiliao, 1, p. 19; Li, Cong rong gong, 1, pp. 101 and 362-3.

Serial publications by the non-Guomindang labour agencies included Gongren zhoukan (the Workers' Weekly, Beijing CCP Branch), Zhongguo gongren, (The Chinese Worker, Labour Movement Secretariat), Guangdong gongren zhi lu (The Guangdong Workers' Road, Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike Committee), Laodong zhoubao (Labour Weekly, Labour Movement Secretariat).

"Gongren bu gongzuo baogao" (Report on the work of the [Central] Labour Bureau), Cent. DWYB, 1, pp. 24-5.
57. On the magazine, see appendix; on the newsagency, see Zeng Xubai, Zhongguo xinwen shi (History of Chinese journalism) (Taipei, 1966, 2 vols), 2, p. 575; the Institute was first mooted in October 1923, and finally opened on 29 June 1924 with three hundred and sixty students. GFNP, 3, pp. 1032 and 1100; "Zhongguo guomin dang jiangxi su zuzhi jueyi " (Resolution on the organization of the Guomindang propaganda training Institute), ZGZK, 13, p. 4; "Zhongguo guomindang jiangxi so kai xue ji" (Record of the opening of the Guomindang propaganda training Institute), ZGZK, 28 (6 July 1924), p. 6.

58. See Guomindang zhongkan and 7th guomindang zhongkan entries in Appendix.

59. The Daily appears to have been managed until 19 September 1924 by the right-wing Guangzhou City Party Branch. Interview with Huang Jilu, Taipei, 27 August 1979. See also below, p. 115.

60. Provincial and county-level propaganda training schools are discussed below, pp. 123-6.

61. "Zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui di ershiyi ci huiyi lu" (Minutes of the 21st CEC session) ZGZK, 20 (11 May 1924), p. 5.


63. "Zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui di qi ci huiyi lu" (Minutes of the 7th CEC session), ZGZK, 11, p. 6.

64. GFNP, 2, p. 1108; Huang Jilu identified the journalist "Lan" as Sun Jingya. Interview with Huang Jilu, Taipei, 27 August 1979.

65. "Zhongyang zhi guangzhou minguo ribao jin kan zisha gonghui xiao shuo han" (Letter from [party] centre to the Guangzhou Republican Daily prohibiting publication of "The Suicide Club"), (9 August 1924), Archives 436/182; "Zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui di sanshijiu ci huiyi lu" (Minutes of the 39th CEC session), ZGZK, 39 (21 September 1924), p. 4.

66. On the subject of Sun's demotion of the Political Committee, see Shirley, "Control of the Kuomintang", p. 73.

67. GFNP, 2, p. 1133.

68. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 21 July 1925.

69. Editorial by Shu Feng, ibid, 18 and 24 April 1925.

70. Staff appointments to the CPB, 1924-6, are discussed in detail below, pp. 136-45.
Notes to pp. 117-119

71. "Zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui di ershiliu ci huiyi lu" (Minutes of the 26th CEC session) ZGZK, 22 (25 May 1924), p.5.

72. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 15, 16, 17, 22 and 25 April 1925.

73. ibid., 31 October 1925; "Guomin huiyi shijian ziliao jiabao tiecun pu" (Collection of newspaper clippings of materials on the National Citizens Conference), (March-April 1926), Archives 472/9; "Xuanchuan bu gongzuo baogao" (Report on work of the [Central] Propaganda Bureau), Cent. DWYB, 1, p. 11. The Provisional Political Propaganda Committee is discussed below, pp. 143-4.


75. "Guanyu xuanchuan jueyi an" (Resolutions on propaganda), ZZZB 6/7 p. 77; "Nongmin yundong jueyi an" (Resolutions on the peasant movement), ibid., pp. 60-1.

76. For Zhou's outline, see Li, "Guoming gemen jun", p. 21; for Mao's, "Zhongguo guomindang zhi fan feng zhanzheng xuanchuan dagang" (Guomindang Propaganda Outline on the war against the Fengtian clique), ZZZB, 1, pp. 8-11.

77. As, for example, the Outline published by the February Seventh co-ordination agency, ZGZK, 1 February 1926; on co-ordination of February Seventh activities: "Eri jinian yundong" (February Seventh commemorative movement), Cent. DWYB, 1, pp. 63-5.

78. "Zhengzhi xunlian bu shishi xuanchuan dagang huibian" (Collection of topical Propaganda Outlines of the Political Training Bureau), JSZZ, 2, pp. 38-52.

79. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 3 November 1925. Another propaganda decision taken at this time by the Political Committee concerned the Guangzhou newspaper Republican News (Guomin xinwen), ibid., 20 November 1925.

80. Details of the founding of Political Weekly remain secret among the classified minutes of Political Committee meetings stored at the KMT Archives. Hence I have been forced to resort to an unreliable source: Wang Zhong, "Di yi ci guonei gemen zhanzheng shiqi zhongyao de gemen baozhi yu qikan" (Important revolutionary papers and periodicals of the first revolutionary civil war period), in Lai Xinxia and Wei Hongyun (eds) Di yi ci guonei gemen zhanzheng shi lun ji (Collected essays on the history of the first revolutionary civil war), (Wuhan, 1957), pp. 50-1. Wang is most unreliable on any point which bears on Mao Zedong's role in Guomindang propaganda work. As, however, Mao's stature is neither enchanced nor damaged by Wang's proposed connection between Political Weekly and the Political Committee, it may well be correct.
Notes to pp. 119-122

81. See, for example, the case of the Shanghai Minguo Ribao in September 1924: Li, Cong rong gong, 1, pp. 334-6.

82. The paper had been subsidized by ¥2000 per month. Zou, Shigao, 1, p. 399; Guangzhou minguo ribao, 11 April 1925.

83. ibid., 26 November 1925.

84. ibid., 7 and 9 April 1925.


86. Between January 1924 and November 1925, party organization in Guangdong was managed by the Communist Tan Pingshan through the Central Organization Bureau. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 20 Nov., 1925.

87. 1923 branch staff who belonged to the Society included Huang Longsheng, Deng Muhan, Zhao Shijin and Deng Zeru. GFNP, 2, p. 964; Li, ibid, 1, p. 383; Official order of 19 October 1923, GFQJ, 4, p. 865; "Guangdong zhibu tanhe gongchandang wen" (Letter from the Guangdong branch impeaching the CCP) (29 November 1923), GFQJ, 4, pp. 916-9.

88. Bureaux heads of the reformed 1925 branch were Gan Naiguang (Propaganda), Fan Qiwu (Merchant), Chen Fumu (Youth), He Xiangning (Women) and the Communists Yang Pao'an (Organization), Peng Pai (Peasant) and Liu Ersong (Labour). "Zhixing Weiyuan hui jiancha weiyuan hui huiyilu" (Minutes of [Provincial] Executive and Investigation Committee meetings, henceforth "Huiyi lu"), Zhongguo guomindang guangdong sheng dangbu dangwu yuekan (Party Affairs Monthly of the Guomindang Guangdong Provincial Branch), 1 (February 1926), pp. 1-2. Henceforth Prov. DWYB.

89. "Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui xuanchuan bu banshi zhangcheng", p. 4, clauses 1 and 3.

90. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 5 November 1925.

91. As it had severed relations with Guangdong, the established Shanghai branch was omitted from the list of branches presented to the second party congress. Tan Pingshan, "Tan Pingshan xiansheng", p.46; Li, Cong rong gong, 1, p. 434.

92. Staff of central and provincial bureaux in part overlapped: Yang Pao'an (Organization Bureaux), Peng Pai (Peasant Bureaux), Gan Naiguang (Provincial Propaganda and Central Merchant Bureaux), He Xiangning (formerly Central Women's and later Provincial Women's Bureaux).

Notes to pp. 122-124

94. Such reports were published regularly in Prov. DWYB, passim.


96. "Gongzuo baogao" (Work reports [of local party branches]) ibid, 4 (June 1926), pp. 30-2; "Zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui shunling ji zhongyao tonggao" (Orders and important notices from the CEC), ibid., 1, p. 4.


98. Provincial branch publications are discussed in detail below, pp. 165-9.


100. ibid., 4, pp. 5-6.


102. Compare ibid. and Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 27. Output of the Provincial Propaganda Bureau in November 1925 totalled 70,000 photographs, and 20,000 books and leaflets. "Xuanchuan bu gongzuo baogao", Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 9.

103. "Ge xian shi dangbu ji choubei chu gongzuo baogao" (Report on the work of all party branches and preparatory offices at the county and town levels), Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 23, "Huiyi lu", ibid., pp. 13, 30 and 42.

104. "Guangdong sheng zhixing weiyuan hui xuanyan ji tonggao" (Declarations and announcements of the Guangdong Provincial Executive Committee), ibid., 1, p. 8.


106. "Xuanchuan bu gongzuo baogao", ibid, 2, p.10.

107. ibid.

Notes to pp. 124-127

109. ibid.

110. ibid.

111. "Xuanchuan bu gongzuo baogao", ibid., 4, pp. 5-6.

112. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 5 November 1925.

113. "Zhixing weiyuan hui ge bu gongzuo gaiyao" (Outlines of work of each bureau under the [Provincial] Executive Committee), Prov. DWYB, 1, pp. 8-9; "Huiyi lu", 1, p. 42, and 4, pp. 64-74.

114. One question, for example, read "Try to analyse the relationship between the economic foundations of youths and their revolutionary spirit", "Zhixing", ibid.

115. The 15 staff listed in early plans included the Communists Yun Daiying, Shen Yanbing, Xiao Chun, Zhang Tailai, Deng Zhongxia, Huang Ping and Mao Zedong; Yun, Mao and Guo Moro were among the ten staff who ultimately taught at the institute, Mao taking 61 hours of classes, Yun 16 and Guo 13, of a total of 291 classroom hours. "Zhixing", ibid., and "Huiyi lu", 4, pp. 66-7. On Li Yueting's early association with Peng Pai, see Peng Pai, "Guanyu Haifeng nongmin yundong de yi feng xin" (A letter on the Haifeng peasant movement), Xiangdao, 70 (18 June 1924), p. 5.


119. ibid., 1, pp. 19-20.

120. "Funu bu", Cent DWYB, 1, p. 22.

121. "Funu bu", Prov. DWYB, 4, p. 14; the regional Special Committees are discussed in greater detail below, pp.

122. The Provisional Youth and Merchant Bureaux each published its own magazine. (Guangdong qingnian, and Xin shangmin; see Appendix), ran its own staff propaganda school, sent propagandists throughout the province and co-operated with its central and local equivalent bureaux in general propaganda campaigns. "Zhixing weiyuan hui ge bu gongzuo gaiyao", 1, pp. 3-13; "Qingnian bu gongzuo baogao", Prov DWYB, 1, pp. 20-3; 3, pp. 21-30; 4, pp. 15-16; "Shangmin bu gongzuo baogao", ibid, 1, pp. 23-6; 3, pp. 31-6; 4, p. 17; "Huiyi lu", ibid, 1, pp. 20, 21, 24, 27, 41, 44 and 3, p. 89.
Notes to pp. 127-131

123. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 5 November 1925; Li, Cong rong gong, 1, pp. 270- and 275.

124. GFNP, 2, pp. 1149-50; "Huiyi lu", Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 36.

125. "Huiyi lu", ibid, p. 6.

126. Provincial Peasant Bureau reports carry little evidence of propaganda activity relative to the Youth, Women's or Merchant Bureaux reports. See, eg, "Nongmin bu gongzu baogao", ibid, 1, pp. 15-8; 2, p. 12; 3, pp. 17-8; 4, pp. 9-10.

127. The Zhongshan County Branch, for example, reported receiving copies of the Central Peasant Bureau's Chinese Peasant and the Provincial Peasant Association's Ploughshare (Litou zhoukan). "Zhongshan xian dangbu" (The Zhongshan County Party Branch), Prov. DWYB, 4, pp. 30-2.

128. Compare sources listed above, Chap. 4, n. 117, 118 and 122.

129. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 5 November 1925.

130. "Huiyi lu", Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 27.

131. ibid, p. 30.

132. ibid., p. 41. The Special Committees are discussed below, pp. 164-5.

133. ibid., 2, pp. 36-9; "Shangmin bu gongzu baogao", ibid., 3, p. 32.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5


2. Mast, "Tai Chi-tao, Sunism and Marxism", pp. 235-42. The long party tradition of opposition to "anti-foreignism" was upheld as late as 1924: "Zhongyang zhxing weiyuan hui di sishiwu ci huiyi lu" (45th CEC Session minutes), ZGZK, 32 (3 August 1924), p. 7.


4. Sun, "Students must work hard at propaganda and shoulder the burden of the revolution" (19 August 1923), GFQJ, 2, p. 526.

5. Guomin geming yu gongren (The national revolution and the workers), (Guangzhou: Dabenying xuanchuan weiyuan hui, August 1923), Archives 416/2, p. 7.
Text in Zou, Shigao, 1, pp. 331-41. On Borodin's role in its drafting, see "Guangdong zhibu tanhe gongchandang wen", p. 917, and Sun, "Comment on the letter from the Guangdong Branch impeaching the CCP" (29 November 1923), GFQJ, 4, p. 915.

See, for example, Zhang Guotao's account of his dispute with Sneevliet: Wo de huiyi, pp. 288-9.

[Chen] Duxiu, "Guomindang zuyou pai zhi zhen yiyi" (The true significance of left and right factions in the Guomindang), Xiangdao, 62 (23 April 1924), pp. 3-4.


Yiping, "Chongbai junfa de zuize" (Worshipping the Crimes of a warlord), Xiangdao, 68 (4 June 1924), p. 7; [Liu] Renjing "Henan lushi xian renmin dui junfa zhi fankang" (Resistance against a warlord by the people of Lushi County in Henan), ibid., 69 (11 June 1924), pp. 3-5.

[Liu] Renjing, ibid., p. 5.

Peng, "Guanyu haijue", p. 5.

Deng, "Deng Muhan baogao" and "Deng Muhan chenshu".

Jean Chesnaux, "The Federalist Movement in China, 1920-3", in Gray, Modern China's Search, pp. 113-4.

above, p. 25.

[Chen] Duxiu "Fan geming de guangdong shangtuan jun" (the anti-revolutionary Guangdong Merchant Militia), Xiangdao, 79 (20 August 1924), pp. 1-2.

below, pp. 196-8.


Sun, "Land to the tiller!", (21 August 1924), GFQJ, 2, pp. 719-23.

Roy Hofheinz has perceptively noted that peasant associations only occasionally pressed radical demands for rent reductions or for other immediate benefits, being more concerned with protecting themselves against attacks from landlord militia forces. He declines however, to draw the conclusion warranted by this observation, viz. that landlords stood firmly opposed to the very existence of any form of peasant organization which lay beyond their control, regardless of whether or not it pressed a single concrete demand upon them. Peasant organizations as conceived by Sun Yatsen or by the CCP were equally anathematic. Broken Wave, p. 21.
Notes to pp. 136-139


22. On Peng, see Fang Gang, "Guomindang gaizu hou de guangdong" (Guangdong after the Guomindang reorganization), Xin Min Guo, 1:5 (30 March 1924); on Wang, GFNP, 2, p. 1115; on Liu, GFNP, 2, p. 1101 and Li, Cong rong gong, 1, p. 270.

23. Peng edited the self-styled "Weekly of the Chinese Nationalist Party" (Benbu tongxin) in 1921, and contributed regularly to the party's Peoples' Trust in 1922. Editorial note, Benbu Tongxin, 60 (31 January 1921), back cover; Minxin rikan, daily issues of May, 1922.

24. "Peng Sumin guanyu dangwu tiaochen" (Memorandum from Peng Sumin on party affairs), BBGB, 3 (30 January 1923), pp. 5-7.

25. (Shanghai) Minguo ribao, 24 June 1924; Herman Mast 111, "An Intellectual Biography of Tai Chi-t'ao from 1891 to 1928" (Unpublished dissertation), Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois, Ph.D., 1970, p. 228.

26. GFNP, 1, pp. 1085 and 1113.

27. Liu was transferred from secretary to editor on 6 June, but appointed acting-head on 30 June. ibid., pp. 1092 and 1101.


29. Woodhead, China Yearbook, 1929/30, Vol. 2, p. 964; Dai Jitao, "Zhi Liu Luyin xiansheng shu" (Letter to Mr. Liu Luyin), (22 August 1925), Dai Jitao xiansheng wencun, 3, p. 971; Cheng Tianfang "Li gongci sinian" (Four years in the Li Temple), Zhuanji wenxue, 1:7 (December 1962), p. 25; "Sun Jingya", GMRW, 10, p. 263;

30. Interview with Mr. Huang Jilu, 27 August 1979; GFNP, 2, p. 813; "Cheng wen" (Petitions) BBGB, 3, p. 4.

31. ibid., 19 (10 July 1923), p. 7; Zou, Shigao, 1, p. 318.


34. Zhongguo guomindang quan meizhou, Preface.


36. Interview with Huang Jilu, 27 August 1979; Lang is pictured in a photograph, alongside Liu Luyin, taken at the Canadian head- quarters in 1923: Qingshidun zhongguo guomindang jiu nian jingguo dangwu (Nine years of party affairs in the Kingston Branch) (n.p.) 1925; GFNP, 2, p. 1092; "Zhongguo guomindang jiangxi so kaixue ji", p. 6.
Notes to p. 139-141


39. Zhou Fohai, "Guomin geming zhong zhi jieji wenti"; (The class problem in the national revolution), Gujun (Solitary Army) 3:2 (July 1925).

40. Li, Cong rong gong, 1, pp. 438-9.

41. Dai and Liu moved to Shanghai, while Zhou remained in Guangzhou until late 1925 as a member of the faculty of Guangdong University. I have not been able to identify Lang Xingshi's movements.

42. GFNP, 2, p. 1154.

43. On Wang's misgivings, see Wang Jianmin, Zhongguo gongchandang shigao, p. 108.

44. One of Chen's editorials for the News was reprinted in ZGZK, 33 (10 August 1924), p. 7; the News's declaration of support for the Guomindang was also published in ZGZK, 31 (27 July 1924), p. 4; the subsidy for the paper is mentioned in a letter from the party secretariat, published in ZGZK, 34 (17 August 1924), p. 6.

45. ibid, 34, p. 6; Zhang, Zhongguo chuban shiliao bubian, p. 179; Chen Qiulin's anti-Communist views found expression in his newspaper articles: Xinwen bao, 1 and 3 April, 14 and 16 May, 1925.

46. GFNP, 2, pp. 1149-50.

47. Li, Cong rong gong, 1, p. 275.

48. It is difficult to date Chen Fumu's appointment as editor of the Guangzhou Republican Daily. His editorials were appearing in the paper by (and perhaps before) February 1925, and he was referred to as 'General Editor' in one source dated July 1925: Guangzhou mingguo ribao, 13 July 1925.

49. Chen was listed as CPB secretary in "Ben kan caiche qishi" (Notification of closure of this magazine), ZGZK, 42 (26 October 1924), p. 1. He deputed for Wang at CEC sessions from at least 27 November to mid May 1925, and is referred to as "acting head" in a document dated 6 April 1925: Guangzhou mingguo ribao, 1 December 1924, 9 April and 16 May 1925.
Notes to pp. 141-144

50. In a discussion of CCP infiltration of central party bureaux, Zou Lu lists Chen among the non-Communists. Zhigao, 1, p. 358.

51. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 11 April 1925. On the society, see official order of 19 October 1923, GFQJ, 4, p. 865, and Li, Cong rong gong, 1, p. 383.

52. Li, ibid., p. 364. At the time of the Beijing plenum, the Beijing government ordered the closure of the Guomindang newspaper, the Beijing Republican Daily, and threatened to arrest party staff. Luo Dunwei "Laoyu zhi zai" (An unfortunate gaoling), Zhuanji wenxue, 2:3 (March 1963), p. 19; the exchange of views among Beijing plenum delegates is noted in Dai, "Zhi Jiang Jieshi", (13 December 1925), p. 983.


54. viz. the Strategy for National Construction (Jianguo fangjue), Outlines for National Construction (Jianguo dagang), the Three Principles of the People (Sanmin zhuyi), the Declaration and the Platform of the First National Congress, the Declarations of 13 September and 10 November 1924, and, by association with the other declarations of this Third Plenum, Sun's will. Ibid., 79, p. 23.

55. ibid.

56. cited in Li, Cong rong gong, 1, pp. 411-2.

57. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 21 June and 2 July 1925. Somewhat later in July, the Provisional Committee was transformed into a Propaganda Committee at Wang Jingwei's request, and placed in the charge of the CPB. Ibid, 18 July 1925.

58. Tan was appointed head of the Central Organization Bureau after both the first and second congresses, but was replaced for a spell in the interim by his CCP protege, Yang Paoan. Li, Cong rong gong, 1, pp. 270-1; GFNP, 2, p. 1149; Zou, Shigao, 1, pp. 355-6.

59. "Linshi zhengzhi xuanchuan weiyuan hui di yi qi xuanchuan jihuagao" (Draft of the propaganda program for the first period of Provisional Political Propaganda Committee [Operations]), (18 May 1925), Archives 436/2.

60. The first issue of Revolution was dated 1 May 1925. On Dai's response, see his forward to Guomin geming yu zhongguo guomindang (The national revolution and the Guomindang) (Shanghai, 1925).

61. The first issue of the Independent was dated 1 November 1925. Advertisement in Guomin geming zhoukan (National Revolution Weekly), 4 (27 October 1925).
Notes to pp. 144-147

62. Dai, Sunwen zhuyi zhi zhexue de jichu (Shanghai, 1925); on The National Revolution and the Guomindang, above, chap. 5, n. 60. Dai's fellow committee member Shao Yuanchong lent his public support to Dai's controversial writings: See Shao, Xuanpu yishu (The Works of Xuanpu [Shao Yuanchong]), (Taipei, 1954, 2 Vols), 2, pp. 919-30.

63. Mao was appointed acting-head of the CPB at Wang's request at the 11th CEC session, dated on or about 2 October 1925. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 9 and 14 October 1925. Stuart Schram covers Mao's arrival and his activities in Mao Tse-tung, (Harmondsworth, 1966), pp. 81-97.

64. Li, Cong rong gong, 2, p. 474.

65. ZZGZ, 22 February 1926. Shen wrote under the name of Mao Dun. The possibility of a dispute between Mao and the CEC is raised below, p.157.

66. The Second Plenum formalized Chiang Kaishek's hold on the party following the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident of 20 March 1926. "Di er ci quanti huiyi zhongyao jueyian" (Important resolutions of the Second Plenum), GMWX, 79, pp. 46-53, esp. p. 49. Mao was replaced by Gu Mengyu: Li, Cong rong gong, 2, pp. 507, 512-3.


69. Such societies with party links included the Construction Society (Jianshe she) qnd the Shanghai Association for Researching Problems (Shanghai wenti yanjiu hui): Juewu, 7 June, 28 and 30 September, and 1 October, 1919. Dai's quotation comes from (Shanghai) Minguo ribao, 24 June 1924.

70. Luo Qiyuan, "Guomin geming yu nongmin yundong zhi quanxi" (The relationship between the national revolution and the peasant movement), ZGNM, 1, pp. 26-7.


73. See, e.g. Zhou Qijian, "Xijiang banshichu huiwu baogao" (Report on [peasant] association affairs by the West River Office), ZGNM, 617 (July 1926), pp. 1-11; Hofheinz, ibid. p. 21.

74. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 19 October 1925.
Notes to pp. 147-51

75. "Congren yundong jueyi an" (Resolutions on the Labour Movement), ZZZB, 6/7, p. 57.

76. "Zhixing wei yuan hui gebu gongzu gaiyao", Prov. CWYB, 1, p. 4.

77. "Funu bu gongzu baogao", Cent. DWYB, 1, pp. 23-4; "Funu yundong jueyi an" (Resolutions on the women's movement), ZZZB, 6/7, pp. 70-71.


79. Hu Chenghan "Bu geming de guangdong daxue" (un-revolutionary Guangdong University), Geming jun, 6/7 (30 May 1925). Guangzhou minguo ribao, 30 June 1925.

80. Hu, ibid.

81. "Daxue tiaoli" (University regulations), (20 August 1924), GFQJ, 2, p. 986.

82. The Academy Party Branch, which favoured the "partification" (danghua) of education, had sought a definitive statement on party education policy from the CEC, while Zou Lu asked for a clarification of the role of Guangdong University. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 15 and 28 July 1925.

83. Si Dun, "Jiaoshou cizhi" (Professors resign), Guangda xuesheng hui zhoukan (Weekly of the Student Union of Guangdong University), 5 (9 December 1925), pp. 2-3; Li, Cong rong gong, 1, pp. 434-5.

84. In 1925 Zhou Fohai headed the university's Department of Economics, and taught its course in Sun Yatsen-ism, and was at the same time secretary of the Central Youth Bureau. Interview with Mr. Huang Jilu, Taipei, 27 August 1979; Guangzhou minguo ribao, 15 July 1925; Qishier hang bao, 24 April 1925.

85. Juewu, 16 December 1925; Zhou, "Guomin geming zhong zhi jieji wenti".

86. Zhou "Guomin geming", ibid.

87. "Guangdong nongmin yi nian lai fendou jingguo baogao jueyi an" (Resolutions on the report of the struggle of Guangdong peasants over the past year), ZGNM, 6/7, p. 5.


90. Sun, "For success", pp. 564-5.

91. Sun, "Land to the tillers", passim; note also the similar advice given by Sun to labour movement workers, "The method of struggle", p. 602.
Notes to pp. 151-155


93. [Cai] Hesen, "Yihetuan yu guomin geming" (The Boxers and the national revolution), Xiangdao, 81 (3 September 1924), p. 10.


96. ibid., p. 77.


98. Sun, "Land to the tiller!", passim.


100. ibid.

101. Hu Hanmin, "Zhongguo guomindang piping zhi piping" (Criticism of criticisms of the Guomindang), GMWX, 9, pp. 59-60.


103. The Guide article appears to have been Cai Hesen's "Jinggao guomindang zhong pai zhu lingxiu" (A respectful message to leaders of the centre faction of the Guomindang), in issue 85 (1 October 1924), pp. 6-7. The CEC replied at its 57th session, on 23 October 1924: GFNP, 2, p. 1143. This reply was discussed, in turn, in a November issue of Guide. Jizhe "Da guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui" (Reply to the Guomindang CEC), 92 (19 November 1924), pp. 5-8. According to a letter from the CEC published in May 1925, the point at issue in this exchange was whether in fact the Guomindang harboured left, right and centre factions: Guangzhou minguo ribao, 13 May 1925.

104. Chen Dong, "Minzu geming you nonggong wenti" (National revolution and the worker-peasant problem), Gemin, 1 (1 May 1925); Guangzhou minguo ribao, ibid.

105. Guangzhou minguo ribao, ibid.
Notes to pp. 155-160

106. Wang Jingwei, "Dai Liao Zhongkai tongzhi shu zhu tongzhi" (Advice to all comrades on mourning Comrade Liao Zhongkai), in Liao Zhongkai xiansheng aisi lu (Record of eulogies for Mr. Liao Zhongkai), (n.p.: Zhongkai xiansheng jinian choubei weiyuan hui, n.d. (1925?).

107. Li, Cong rong gong, 1, p. 381.


109. See the three articles by Mao discussed above, pp. 152-3.


112. ibid.

113. "Zhongyang zhixing weiyuan hui wei wei banfa jinian zhou tiaoli tonggao di erbai shiliu" (Notice No. 216: proclamation by the CEC of the regulations for the weekly commemoration) (8 August 1925). Archives 458/25.

114. "Zhongyang dangbu zhongyao wenjian", Cent. DWYB, 1, p. 4.

115. Guangzhou min guo ribao, 26 November 1925.

116. The text of the Propaganda Outline is published in ZZGZ, 18 and 19 February 1926.

117. Wang Jingwei's addendum was published on 24 February: ZZGZ, 22 and 24 February 1926. The complete text, with addendum, appears in Cent. DWYB, 1, pp. 51–5. At this stage of his career, it was no+ unknown for Mao to excuse himself from duties which he found irksome, on the pretext of illness: he withdrew from the Fifth CCP Congress in April 1927 on such a pretext: Schram, Mao, p. 110.

118. "Xuanchuan bu gongzuo gaiyao", Prov. DWYB, 2, pp. 9-10.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Tan, "Zhongguo guomindang quanguo dangwu gaikuang", p. 5.


4. Guangzhou membership grew by only 2,086 to 14,569, a rise of about 15%, compared to a 125% increase for the province as a whole. Counties without branches as of February 1926 are marked on my map with a star; ibid.; "Zhixing weiyuan hui gebu gongzuo gaiyao", p. 3.


6. ibid, 4, p. 16 and 5, p. 4; Luo, "Di si jun", p. 7; ZZGZ, 19 February 1926.

7. ZZGZ, 26 February 1926.

8. "Huiyi lu", Prov. DWYB, 3, p. 84.

9. ibid, 2, p. 39.

10. Political bureaux in the Fourth Army launched a number of peasant associations and labour unions during the Southern Expedition, but failed to set up any merchant associations. Miao, "Nanzheng", 5, pp. 5-7.


12. "Qiongyai tebie weiyuan hui gongzuo gaishu" (General report on the work of the Hainan Special Committee), Prov. DWYB, 3, p. 37.

13. As, for example, in Huiyang County (Huizhou): below, pp. 176-7.


15. The Party Affairs Directors for Huiyang and surrounding counties were stationed in the General Political Bureau. "Ge xian shi dangbu ji choubei chu gongzuo baogao" (Reports on the work of all county and city branches and preparatory offices), Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 1.


21. "Ge tebie weiyuan hui gongzuo gaiyao" (Outlines of the work of each Special Committee), Prov. DWYB, 1, pp. 1-2.

22. ibid.; "Huiyi lu", ibid, 1, p. 14.

23. As committee members' salaries were included in the provincial branch budget, Special Committee funds excluded staff salaries. "Huiyi lu", ibid, 1, p. 38, and 3, p. 82.
Notes to pp. 165-167

24. The Women's Bureau received ¥240 per month, the Propaganda Bureau ¥120, and other bureaux ¥60. ibid., 3, p. 82.

25. Gan received an extra ¥335. ibid., 1, p. 14.

26. "Ge tebie weiyuan hui gongzuo gaiyao", ibid., 1, pp. 1-2; "Qiongyai tebie weiyuan lui, 2, pp. 25-6, and 3, pp. 37-8; "Nanlu tebie weiyuan hui gongzuo zhuangkuang gaishu" (General report on the work situation of the Southern Route Special Committee), ibid., 4, p. 26.

27. "Xuanchuan bu gongzuo baogao", ibid., 1, p. 8.

28. Li, Cong rong gong, 1, p. 384.

29. In Gan's absence from Guangzhou from November 1925 to February 1926, the paper was edited by Chen Fumu; the Political Committee allocated ¥1000 per month for the paper from November 1925. "Huiyi lu", Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 14; Guangzhou minguo ribao, 20 November 1925.

30. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 5 November 1925.


32. Republican Daily was the uniform title of official Guomindang newspapers before the advent of the Central Daily (Zhongyang ribao) in 1928. The only two Republican Dailies in publication at the time of the Guangdong branch's expansion of the network were the Shanghai and Guangzhou editions. On the short-lived Beijing edition, see above, Chap. 5, n.52.


34. The Qinlian paper was refused accreditation on the grounds that it was financed by an individual rather than by a recognized organization, while the Jiangmen paper was reprimanded for failing to send copies to provincial headquarters for inspection. ibid., 1, p. 28; "Guangdong gedi dangbao xiaoxi huizhi" (Sundry news of party papers in Guangdong), ibid., 4, p. 41.

35. "Guangdong gedi dangbao".

36. ibid.

37. "Yangjiang xian dangbu" (Yangjiang County Party Branch), Prov. DWYB, 3, p. 49 and 4, pp. 32-5.


40. "Guangdong gedi dangbao"; "Qiongyai tebie weiyuan hui gongzuo baogao", Prov. DWYB, 2, pp. 25-6; "Zhongshan xian dangbu xuanchuan bu gongzuo jingguo qingxing" (The work situation in the Zhongshan County Branch Propaganda Bureau), ibid., 3, p. 39.
Notes to pp. 167-170

41. Li was appointed by the CPB, then under Mao Zedong's direction: "Huiyi lu", ibid., 3, pp. 77 and 84.


44. "Huiyi lu", ibid., 1, p. 34.


46. "Gongren bu gongzuo baogao", ibid.


48. ibid., 1, pp. 23 and 34-5.

49. The Jiangmen daily was not listed among current publications in June, 1926: "Guangdong gedi dangbao".

50. ibid.; "Qiongyai tebie weiyuan hui gongzuo baogao", Prov. DWYB, 2, pp. 25-6.

51. The place of the Eastern and Southern Expeditions in the expanding military budget is discussed below, pp. 203-4 and 294 n. 95.


53. ibid., 3, p. 84 and 4, p.56.

54. "Guangdong gedi dangbao".

55. ibid.


58. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 24 April 1925.

59. As, for example, in Zijin County, where the local government office refused to pay party expenses. "Ge xianshi dangbu ji choubei chu", Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 2.

60. "Huiyi lu", Prov. DWYB, 4, p. 56.

61. Branches such as those in Zijin and Shixing Counties could afford to publish neither papers nor magazines; others managed to do so only by resorting to a system of shareholders, "Ge xianshi dangbu ji choubei gongzuo baogao", ibid., 1, p. 20 and 4, pp. 39-40; "Zhongshan xian dangbu xuanchuan bu", ibid., 3, p. 39.
Notes to pp. 171-180


63. Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 32.

64. The provincial branch itself acknowledged this problem in "Ge xianshi dangbu ji choubei chu gongzuo baogao", Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 1.

65. See, for example, the Humen County Branch Report, in ibid., 1, pp. 7-16, and below, p. 174. Samples of the pro-forma sheet distributed to town and county branches are published in Cent. DWYB, 1, pp. 79-80.


67. ibid., 1, pp. 20-3.

68. ibid., 1, pp. 7-16.

69. ibid., 1, pp. 1-7.

70. On the capture of Huizhou, see Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0515-23.

71. Zhongguo qingnian; Wei shenma yao dadao Chen Jiongming; Guandong renmin jinri yingyou zhi juexin: "Ge xianshi dangbu", Prov. DWYB, 7, p. 6.

72. Note also the account of gentry control of the Society in Puning County, in Robert Marks, "The World Can Change", Modern China, 3:1 (January 1977), p. 94.

73. "Huishu tebie weiyuan hui gongzuo baogao" (Report on the work of the Special Committee for the Huizhou Region), Prov. DWYB, 2, pp. 26-7.

74. "Ge xianshi dangbu", ibid., 1, p. 18. With regard to the difficulties of local branch organization, it is worth noting that the Huizhou Area Special Committee, which superseded the Huizhou Organization Committee, also failed to establish branches in the three counties of Lianping, Heping and Xinfeng, see map.

75. Shantou's national industrial enterprises included electric power generation, oil mills, canneries, breweries and distilleries. Chesnaux, Chinese Labour Movement, pp. 415-9.

76. "Huiyi lu", Prov. DWYB, 1, pp. 34 and 38; Guangdong sheng zhengfu gongbao, 30 (31 December 1925), p. 21.

77. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0539-40.

78. "Huiyi lu", Prov. DWYB, 1, p. 1; "Fan Qiwu", GMRW, 4, pp. 30-5.

80. "Dongjiang geshu xingzheng huiyi jilue" (General account of the East River Region Administrative Conference), ZZZB, 9 (26 April 1926), pp. 17-20.
Notes to pp. 180-185

82. "Huiyi lu", ibid, 1, p. 42.
83. ibid., 3, p. 77.
84. ibid., 1, p. 42.
85. ibid., 1, p. 5, 10, 14 and 22.
86. ibid., 1, pp. 9, 11 and 16; "Nongmin bu gongzuo baogao", Prov. DWYB, 1, pp. 16 and 18.
87. "Huiyi lu", ibid., 1, p. 35; "Zhixing weiyuan hui gebu gongzuo gaiyao", ibid., 1, p. 3.
89. Dongwan minguo ribao; Dongwan tuhua zhoukan; Dongwan xian dangbu xunkan; Dongwan xian di er ci quan xian daibiao da hui tekan; Wu sa tehao; Dongwan xian dangbu ban nian lai zhi minzhong yundong; erqi jinian xuanyan; gao nongmin shu. "Ge xianshi dangbu", ibid., 2, p. 28 and "Ge di gerning chubanwu jieshao" (Introducing revolutionary publications from a variety of places), ibid., 4, pp. 52-3.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. Titles and quantities of propaganda materials distributed on the expeditions are listed in Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 27, and Miao, "Nanzheng", 4, pp. 17-8, and 5, pp. 1-3; on the reluctance of merchants to make an appearance, Miao, ibid., 4, p. 13 and ZZGZ, 19 February 1926; on peasant bewilderment, Yun, "Di si jun", pp. 6-7 and Zhang, ibid., pp. 27 and 37.

2. Titles and texts in Chun, "Dongzheng jilue", p. 14; Li, "Guomin geming jun", pp. 27-32 (based upon the Eastern Expedition Propaganda Outline, ibid, p. 21); Yun, "Di si jun", p. 6; Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 27.


4. There were about 400,000 pictorial to 1,330,000 printed pieces. Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 27.


Notes to pp. 185-189

8. Yun, "Di si jun", p. 7; Xie, "Dongzheng jingguo", p. 56.
9. Yun, ibid., p. 8; Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 34.
10. Yun, ibid., p. 7; Luo, "Di si jun", p. 4; Miao, "Nanzheng", 4, p. 10.
13. ibid., p. 6; Miao, "Nanzheng", 4, p. 11.
14. above, pp. 24-5 & 134.
18. below, pp. 192-6.
27. The landlord militia in Leizhou resorted to kidnapping and ransoming peasants in order to extract payments from them, while the merchant militia in Yangjiang, Dianbai and Shuidong were reported to have turned into debt-collection agencies. Miao, ibid, 5, p. 14. Once the common enemy (Deng) had been defeated, the local consensus broke down. below, p. 192
Notes to pp. 190-193

32. Luo, ibid., p. 6.
36. Li, "Guomin geming jun", p. 23.
41. Li, ibid., pp. 27-32.
43. Huang, "Nanzheng de jingguo", p. 10.
44. Li, "Guomin geming jun", pp. 30-1.
45. ibid.
46. Chen himself acknowledged his dependence on the East River gentry. above, p. 133.
52. Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 29.
53. Gu Yiquan, "Geming de liliang yu minzhong de roudian" (Revolutionary strength and the masses' weak spot), *Geming jun*, 9 (25 December 1925), p. 36.
Notes to pp. 193-197


55. Akimova, Two Years, pp. 162-3. This version of events is accepted, in less apocryphal form, by historians of varying persuasion: contrast Hofheinz, Broken Wave, p. 14 and Marks, "The World can Change", pp. 78 and 81.


57. above, p. 97-8.

58. above, p. 190.


62. Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 34.


64. On party taxation policy to 1924, see Chan, "An Alternative", pp. 135-7.

65. Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 18; one text containing promises of tax relief was reprinted in Chun, "Dongzheng jilue", pp. 13-14.

66. Zhang, ibid.

67. ibid., p. 33; on the Three Don't's, see above, p. 89.

68. "Ge xianshi dangbu", Prov DNYB, 1, p. 5.

69. above, p. 180; an outline of the conference is published in ZZZB, 9, pp. 17-20.

70. As control over customs was vested in foreign hands, it was far simpler for local governments to increase tariffs by way of surcharges collected by themselves, than for them to press for changes in customs rates. The Guangdong government took the former course in October 1926. C. Martin Wilbur, "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the Nationalist Regime, 1922-1937", Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds) China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System (Vol one Book one) (Chicago, 1968), p. 211.
Notes to pp. 197-201


74. Materials on the Conference campaign abound in party sources. See, for example, "Guomin huiyi yundong zhi fuxing" (The revival of the National Citizens Conference Movement), Cent. DWYB, 1, pp. 34-50; "Ben dang zhidaoxia zhi quansheng minzhong yundong", Prov DWYB, 1, pp. 4-5; "Guomin huiyi shijian ziliao jianbao tiecun pu" (Scrapbook of newspaper clippings on the National Citizens Conference) (n.d.) Archives 472/9; Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, p. 0653:38; ZZGZ, 18, 19 and 22-6 February, 1926. Shantou's part in the movement is outlined in Archives 472/9.


76. ibid., 23 (20 October 1925), p. 56.

77. ibid., 27 (30 November 1925), pp. 44-9.

78. ibid., 8 (29 August 1925), pp. 59-60.

79. ibid., 4 (1 August 1925), pp. 9-11; 6 (15 August 1925), pp. 1-2; 8, pp. 29-32; 16 (17 September 1925), pp. 24-9.

80. Liao Zhongkai would have taken his place alongside Chen Gongbo on the more radical side of provincial government, but that he was assassinated in the month following the government's establishment. Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao, (July-December 1925), pp. 15-16.

81. "Dongjiang geshu xingzheng huiyi jilue", passim.

82. "Nanlu geshu xianzhang huiyi yijue an" (Resolutions of the county magistrates conference for the Southern Route Region), ZZB, 11 (10 May 1926), pp. 13-18.

83. ZZGZ, 20 February 1926.

84. He Chi, "Dongzheng zhan shi" (History of the Eastern Expeditionary war), JSZZ, 4, p. 3; Zhang, "Dongzheng", p. 31.

85. All three county magistrates appointed by Chen Mingshu, for the counties of YangJiang, Lianjiang and Suixi, were found most unsatisfactory by contemporary observers sympathetic to the mass movements. Miao, "Nanzheng", 5, pp. 12-13.
Notes to pp. 201-204

86. Of the eight magistrates appointed by Gan's committee on whom some information is available, only two (for Wenchang and Leshan) were considered in the least unsatisfactory by contemporary observers sympathetic to the mass movements: ibid.; the Southern Route Region Administrative Committee consisted of Gan, the Fourth Army Commander Li Jishen and a Fourth Army Political Bureau representative (Zhang Shanming). Luo, "Di si jun", p. 17.

87. "Guangdong di er ci quansheng daibiao dahui xuanyan" (Declaration of the Second Guangdong Provincial Assembly), JSZZ, 8 (October 1926), p. 5.

88. The extant records to which I refer are those available to me in party archives and in contemporary party, government and independent publications.

89. There was in fact frequent connivance between county magistrates and landlord militia forces, as for example in Baoc and Nanxiong Counties in December 1925: "Huiyi lu", Prov. DMYB, 1, pp. 18 and 24-5. In his account of violent struggles in Guangning and Hua Counties, Roy Hofheinz brings to light similar intrigue and connivance on the part of local magistrates: Broken Wave, pp. 186-7, 194, 196, 199-200.


92. ZZGZ, 16 February 1926.


94. GFNP, 2, pp. 1078 and 1092-3.

95. In July 1925, before the Second Eastern or Southern Expeditions had been launched, Chiang Kaishek predicted that treasury receipts would grow by ¥10 million, or over half of the current income of ¥18 million, once the eastern and southern regions had come under provincial government control. His estimates of potential income varied, however, with his estimates of how much he would need to launch a northern expedition. In July, he had thought ¥18 to ¥20 million would suffice for military expenses, and accordingly set a total potential annual income of ¥35 to ¥40 million. In December, he revised his estimate of likely military expenditure, in light of the pending Northern Expedition, from the July estimate of ¥18 to ¥20 million, to a new figure of between ¥28 and ¥35 million; as the treasury would have to find such an amount, he recalculated its potential annual receipts at ¥50 million. Chiang's December revision of his earlier estimates was made with an eye to two criteria: how much treasury could afford, and how much a Northern expedition would cost. The first criterion was not, however, meant to refer directly to income, but rather to the financial demands upon treasury of other government agencies and projects which would compete with the NRA for
funds. Chiang's twin criteria did not, therefore, represent a balance between income and expenditure, but rather two different kinds of expenditure which made no reference to actual or possible treasury income other than that required to meet these various expenditures. The ¥10 million difference between Chiang's July and December estimates was to be met, in the last analysis, by making people pay more in taxes than they had ever done in the past. Mao, Shiwu nian yiqian, pp. 0459:1, 0478:38 and 0558:25-6.

96. Luo, "Di si jun", pp. 15-16.

97. On Chen Jitang's levies: "Ge xianshi dangbu", Prov DWYB, 1, p. 17. The doubling of night-soil taxes in Haikou similarly affected the livelihoods of its poorest inhabitants following Guomindang occupation: ibid.

98. Ibid.


100. Ibid., pp. 14-15. In a note attached to Luo's article, Peng Pai is at pains to point out that it is not taxation as such, levied to support the Northern Expedition, to which the peasants object, but rather the excessive and disproportionate share of the burden placed upon them. Ibid, pp. 16-19.

101. Ibid., p. 15.

FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. Jordan, Northern Expedition, pp. 234, 243-6 and 278.


4. The term "blockheaded" (manzi) appears several times in "zhongyang xuanchuan bu zuo jin bannian jihua dagang caoan digao" (original copy of a draft outline of the current six-month plan of the Central Propaganda Bureau [of the Western Hills Faction]) (17 May 1926), Archives 436/200. Dai Jitao comments on the innate selfishness of the people in "Zhi Liu Luyin" (22 August, 1925), p. 971.
Notes to pp. 210-214

5. See Dai, Sun Wen zhubi zhi zhexue de jichu; Zhou, "Guomin geming zhong zhi jieji wenti"; Te Cai, "Geming jiaoyu yu zhonghua minguo" (Revolutionary education and the Chinese Republic), in Minguan (People's Rights), 1 (16 September 1923), pp. 6-7.


8. ibid.; Hofheinz, Broken Wave, p. 294.

9. Robert E. Bedeski, "The Tutelary State and National Revolution in Kuomintang Ideology, 1928-1931", in The China Quarterly, 46 (April/June 1971) pp. 325-6; Dai Jitao, "Zhi Liu Luyin" (22 August 1925), p. 971; Hu Hanmin, "Weiwu shiguan piping zhi piping" (Criticism of criticisms of the materialist conception of history), in Jianshe, 1:5 (December, 1919); Zhou Fohai underwent a thorough education in Marxism in Japan. The strictly ethical implications of historical materialism to which Dr. Bedeski refers are also discussed in Jianshe: see Hu Hanmin, "Jieji yu daode xueshu" (class and ethical theory), 1:6 (January 1920) and Li Hanjun (transl.) "Daode di jingji de jichu" (The economic foundations of ethics), 2:4-5 (May-June 1920).
This bibliography includes only materials which have been cited in the text or in notes to the text, with the additional qualification that specific articles from primary source magazines need to have been cited more than once to qualify for inclusion. The titles of contemporary magazines and newspapers which were consulted in the course of preparation of the thesis have been omitted, as they have been listed in the appendix, where they are indicated by asterisks. Internally, the bibliography has been organized according to the nature of the sources, primary and secondary, irrespective of the original language of each source. Within each of the primary and secondary sections a further distinction has been made between published and unpublished materials. With respect to Sun Yatsen's works, I have throughout the thesis been compelled by the lack of commonly accepted titles for many of his speeches and writings to list each according to an English title which gives some idea of the content of the piece. Hence the itemized list of Sun's works presented in the bibliography is arranged according to English language titles, with appropriate Chinese titles drawn from the 1973 Taipei edition of his works.
1. PRIMARY SOURCES

(i) published

Akimova: see Vishnyakova - Akimova

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"Bendang benbu dangwu baogao" (中央本部黨務報告 Report on party affairs under the Guomindang party centre). ZGZK, 9 (24 February 1924), pp. 6-7.


"Wo yu gongchandang" (我和共產黨 The CCP and I), in Zhou and Chen, Huiyi lu hebian, pp. 1-88.

Chen Guofu 陳果夫. "Jianjun shi zhi yi ye" (建军史之一页 One page in the history of creating the army). GMWX, 10, pp. 27-36.


Cheng Tianfang 陈天放. "Li gongci sinian" (李公祠四十年 Four years in the Li temple). Zhanzhan wenxue, 1:7 (December 1962).


Sunwen zhuyi zhi zhexue de jichu (孫文主義之哲學的基礎 The philosophical foundations of Sun Wen-ism). Shanghai: Minzhi shuju, 1925.
"Zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng shu" (致蒋介石先生书 Letter to Mr. Chiang Kaishek) (13 December 1925), in Chen (ed.), Dai Jitao xiansheng wencun, 3, pp. 979-86.


"Daxue tiaoli" (大学条例 University regulations) (20 August 1924). GFQJ, 2, p. 986.

"Deng Muhan baogao zai yue lianluo qingxing yimou zai wo zhengguan shang zongli han" (邓穆汉赴英国考察事情一目在吾政务上总览 Letter from Deng Muhan to the president reporting on liaison work undertaken to plot a return to power in Guangdong) (13 May 1919). GMWX, 48, pp. 293-4.

"Deng Muhan chenshu lianluo baoguan ji guangdong zhengqing shang zongli han" (邓穆汉陈述联络报告及广东政情上总览 Letter from Deng Muhan to the President detailing his liaison with newspaper houses, and the political situation in Guangdong) (26 April 1919). GMWX, 48, pp. 291-2.

"Di san ci quanti huiyi zhongyao jueyi an" (第三次全体会议重要决议案 Important resolutions of the Third Plenum). GMWX, 79, pp. 21-32.


"Dongjiang geshu xingzheng huiyi jilue" (东江各属行政会议纪略 General account of the East River Region Administrative Conference), ZZZB, 9 (26 April 1926), pp. 17-20.


"Funu ri da yundong jingguo qingxing" (妇女大运动经过情形 Events surrounding the great movement on women's day). ZGZK, 12 (16 March 1924), p. 5.

"Funu yundong jueyi an" (妇女运动决议案 Decisions on the women's movement). ZZZB, 6/7 (10 April 1926), pp. 70-1.


"Ge di geming chubanwu jieshao" (各地革命出版物介绍 Introducing revolutionary publications from a variety of places). Prov. DWYB, 4 (June 1926), pp. 52-3.

"Ge tebie weiyuan hui gongzuo gaiyao" (各特别委员会工作概要 Outlines of the work of each Special Committee). Prov. DWYB, 1 (February 1926), pp. 1-2.

"Ge xian shi dangbu ji choubei chu gongzuo baogao" (各县市委及筹备处工作报告 Reports on the work of all county and city branches and preparatory offices). Prov. DWYB, 1 (February 1926) to 4 (June 1926).


"Gongren yundong jueyi an" (工人运动决议案 Resolutions on the labour movement). ZZZB, 6/7 (10 April 1926), pp. 55-7.

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"Guangdong zhibu tanhe gongchandong wen" (广东支部检讨共产文 Letter from the Guangdong Branch impeaching the CCP) (29 November 1923), GFQJ, 4, pp. 916-9.
"Guanyu xuanchuan jueyi an" (关于宣传决议案: Resolutions on propaganda). ZZZB, 6/7 (10 April 1926), pp. 76-8.

"Guoming geming jun dang daibiao tiaoli" (国民革命军党代表条例: Regulations concerning NRA party representatives). JSZZ, 1 (January 1926), pp. 7-10.

"Guomin geming jun disan jun zhengzh'ai a..." (国民党第三军政治训练之现状: The political training situation in the NRA Third Army). JSZZ, 1 (January 1926), p. 5.


"Hufa zhi yi dashi nianbiao" (护法之役大事年表: Chronology of the major events in the battle to protect the constitution). GMWX, 7, pp. 139-154.


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Glossary

Anfu Julebu 安福俱乐部
Anhui 安徽
Beijing 北京
Benbu Zhuyue teshe banshichu 本部驻衙特设办事处
boai 博爱
Boluo 博罗
Cai Hesen 曹积森
Cao Kun 曹昆
Changsha 长沙
Chaoan 潮安
Chaomei-Hailufeng 潮梅海丰
Chegang 切岗
Chen Baixu 陈白书
Chen Duxiu 陈独秀
Chen Fumu 陈公博
Chen Gongbo 陈公博
Chen Jiongming 陈炯明
Chen Jitang 陈其唐
Chen Kewen 陈克文
Chen Mingshu 陈铭枢
Chen Qimei 陈其美
Chen Riguang 陈铁冈
Chen Yangxuan 陈阳先
Cheng Qian 程潜
Cheng Shewo 程步渊
Dabenying Junzhengbu 大本营政部
Dai Jitao 戴季陶
dang daibiao 党代表
dangxiao 党校
Deng Benying 邓本颖
Deng Jiayan 邓家彦
Deng Muhan 邓慕韩
Deng Yanda 邓亚达
Deng Zeru 邓泽如
Deng Zhongxia 邓中夏
Ding Wiefen 定惟芬
Dongfang Shibao 东方时报
Dongwan 东莞
Du Congrong 杜从戎
Duan Qirui 段祺瑞
Duli 独立
Enping 恩平
Fan Qiwu 范其武
Fang Qian 方潜
Fazhi xiejin hui 法治协进会
fen cao 分草
fenbu 分部
fendui 分队
Feng Jingyun 冯景云
Feng Jupo 冯菊坡
Feng Mingguang 冯明光
Feng Ti 冯梯
Feng Yuxiang 冯玉祥
Fengtian 奋天
fu dang daibiao 副党代表
Funu xunkan 女司机
Funu zhi sheng 女士之声
Gaizao huizhou tongzhi hui 改造惠州
同志会
Gan Nai guang 甘乃光
ganhua 感化
Gao Tianpo 高天波
Gaoyao 高要
Geming 革命
Geming daobao 革命日报
Geming jinian hui 革命纪念会
Gonghe dang 共和党
Gonghe dang tongzhihui 共和党同志会
Gonghe dang tongzhihui 共和党同志会
Gonghe dang 共和党
Gonghe dang tongzhihui 共和党同志会
Gonghe dang tongzhihui 共和党同志会
Gonghe dang tongzhihui 共和党同志会
Gonghe dang 共和党
Gonghe dang tongzhihui 共和党同志会
Gu Mengyu 郭孟余
Gu Yingfen 郭英芬
Guan Ji'an 韓介安
Guan Peng 韓鹏
Guan Shudong 韓樹東
Shangwu yinshuguan 商务印书馆
Shantou 汕头
Shanxi 山西
Shao Lizi 邵力子
Shao Yuanchong 邵元冲
Shaoguan 韶关
Shaonian zhongguo chenbao 少年中国晨报
Shaozhan zhuyi 少谈主义
Shen bao 申报
Shen Dingyi 沈定一
Shen Yanbing 沈雁冰
Shenggang bagong weiyuan huì 青工委
Shenzhen 深圳
Shibao 时报
Shishi xinbao 时事新报
Shu Feng 王凡
Shunde 顺德
Song Yuanyuan 宋渊源
Song Ziw en 宋子文
Suixi 顺溪
Sun Chuanfang 孙传芳
Sun Disan 孙涤三
Sun Duo (Sneevliet) 孙铎
Sun Fo 孙佛
Sun Hongyi 孙洪伊
Sun Jingya 孙镜亚
Sun wen xueshuo 孙文学校
Sun Yatsen (Zhongshan) 孙中山
Tiadong tushuju 滕东图书馆
Tan Pingshan 谭平山
Tan Yankai 田汉
Tan Zhen 邓振
Tang Jiyou 唐纪尧
Tang Shengzhi 唐生智
tebie qu dangbu 特别区党委
Tepaiyuan 特派员
Tian Tong 天桐
Tianjin 天津
Tianjun ganbu xuexiao 滩军干部学校
Tiantang 天堂
Tongmeng hui 同盟会
Tongzi jun 童子军
Wan Hongtu 万鸿图
Wang Boqun 王伯群
Wang Chonghui 王宠惠
Wang Dungen 王钝根
Wang Faqin 王法勤
Wang Guoying 王国荣
Wang Jingwei 王静徽
Wang Leping 王乐平
Wang Ximin 王性民
Wang Yongbin 王永宾
Wei Bangping 魏邦平
Wenhua tang 文化堂
Wu Chaoshu 吴朝枢
Wu Jinglian 吴 Jinglian
Wu Ming 吴明
Wu Peifu 吴佩孚
Wu Xiali 吴稚晖
Wu Zhihui 吴稚晖
Xi an juezhe 先觉者
Xiangjiang chenbao 汐江晨报
Xiangdao zhoubao 响导周报
Xiao zuo 小组
Xie Chi 徐志
Xiji ang 新安
Xin funu 新军
Xin jian 新军
Xin qingnian 新青年
Xin ren she 新人社