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DEMOCRATISATION, DECENTRALIZATION, AND LOCAL PARTY POLITICS IN POST-SOEHARTO INDONESIA

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Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Philosophy in the Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian National University

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree in the same or other form to any other university.

Choi, Nankyung
19 September 2003

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to understand how the fall of an authoritarian regime and the following adoption of democratic reforms and the implementation of decentralization have affected the behaviour of political parties at the grassroots, with an emphasis on the day-to-day political practices of new political actors. Drawing on the recent political developments in Yogyakarta, Central Java, it scrutinizes, critiques, and further develops existing theories of democratisation and clarifies the uncertain relation between formal democratic institutions and local political practices in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

This study focuses on the interaction of formal political institutions and newly emerging patterns of political life at the local level. It identifies a large gulf in Indonesian society between formal democracy – i.e., the formal institution of the political system – and substantive democratisation – i.e., institutionalisation of democratic practices in the day-to-day political behaviour of political actors. It argues that though undoubtedly more democratic than under the New Order regime, post-Soeharto Yogyakarta has also shown indications of “undemocratic consolidation,” such as the reactivated, transformed, and decentralized political corruption and violence. It lays emphasis on the society’s authoritarian legacies and, in particular, the inclination of local politicians to abuse their new powers for their own benefit. It also analyses the growth of public disillusionment in Yogyakarta, as euphoric expectations of a democratic society gave way to the revived popular scepticism and even cynicism about multi-party parliamentary politics.

The overall argument of the thesis is that while changes in Indonesia’s formal institutional arrangements have democratised some spheres of political life, they have also fostered the institutionalisation of undemocratic practices within local political institutions. More broadly, it argues that the change in formal institutional arrangements is, in and of itself, not sufficient to ensure the consolidation of democratic values, attitudes, and behaviour at the grassroots, and thus emphasizes the significance of going beyond simplistic and teleological assumptions about the positive effects of formally democratic institutions to a more sober recognition that the consolidation of new democracies is not a preordained conclusion and that authoritarian practices are resistant to change.
GLOSSARY

anggaran
Anesor
APBD (Anggaran Pengelolaan Belanja Daerah)
Banser (Barisan Anesor Serbaguna)
BBI (Barisan Buruh Indonesia)
BPD (Badan Perwakilan Daerah Pengelolaan Keuangan)
BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia)
bupati
camat
desa
Dewan Pembina
DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang)
DPD (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah)
DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah)
DPF (Dewan Perwakilan Pusat)
DPRI (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah)
DPW (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah)
dinas
dusun
dwifungsi

fraksi
GePaKo (Gerakan Pasukan Anti Komunis)
Gerinda (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia)

budget or finance
a Muslim youth organization affiliated with the NU
Regional Budget
Anesor’s security task force
Indonesian Labour Front
Village Council
State Audit Board
Indonesian Farmers Front
regent
sub-district head
village
Board of Control
Sub-district Leadership Board of parties
(District Board in the case of the PDI-P)
District Leadership Board of parties
(Provincial Board in the case of the PDI-P)
Regional Representative Assembly
Central Leadership Board of parties
People’s Representative Assembly
Regional People’s Representative Assembly
Provincial Leadership Board of parties
government office
hamlets
‘dual function’, the formal ideology by which the armed forces claimed a socio-political role as well as a military role. It was abolished in 1999.
unit of representation of individual parties or party coalitions in the assemblies
Anti-Communist Movement Force
Indonesian People’s Movement, the Yogyakarta-based local political party of the 1950s

GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia)
Golkar (Golongan Karya)
golput (golongan putih)
GPK (Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah)
HIPMI (Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia)
HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam)
IPNU (Ikatan Pelajar NU, later changed as Ikatan Putra NU)
IWAPI (Ikatan Wanita Pengusaha Indonesia)
japrem (jatah preman)
kabupaten
Kadinda (Kamar Dagang dan Industri Daerah)
kanwil (kantor wilayah)
kecamatan
kepala daerah
kphp(
KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme)
Koramil (Komando Rayon Militer)
kabupaten
KORPRI (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia)
KPKPN (Komite Pemeriksa Kepuahan Pegawai Negeri)
laskar
Laskar Rakyat
Masjumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia)
MFR (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat)
Muhammadiah

Indonesian Students’ National Movement
Functional Group
mutual cooperation
‘white group’, non-cooperative groups in the elections. It also means “blank ballots”.
Ka’bah Youth Movement
Association of Indonesian Young Businessmen
Association for Muslim Students
NU’s Students Union
Association of Indonesian Business Women
preman’s allotment
district level of administration headed by a bupati
Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry
regional office
sub-district level of administration headed by a camat
regional head
decision
Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism
Commission in the legislature
Sub-district Military Headquarters
municipality
Indonesian Civil Servants Corps
Committee for Investigation of Officials’ Properties
youth paramilitary groups
People’s Militias
Modernist Islamic Party (banned in 1960)
People’s Consultative Assembly
Indonesia’s largest modernist Islamic organization
Murba
musyawarah
NU (Nahdatul Ulama)
onotomi daerah
rumah tangga
Pam Swakarsa (Pengamanan Swakarsa)

PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional)
Pancasila
Panitia
Pansus (Panitia Khusus)
ParWI (Parliament Watch Indonesia)
Pasanda (Pasukan Andalan)
Paskam (Pasukan Keamanan)
PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia)
PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan)
pegawai
pemerintah
pemuda
Pemuda Pancasila

pesangon
Perda (Peraturan Daerah)
Petrus (Penembakan misterius)
Pimpinan
PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
PKP (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan)
PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia)
Polri (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia)
PP (Peraturan Pemerintah)

PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik)
PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia)
pemenan
pemenisme
rakyat
reformasi
Ranting
Ratih (Pasukan Rakyat Terlatih)
sangg
satgas (satuan tugas)
sapam (satuan pengamanan)
sekor (sementara dewan)
SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia)
TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat)
TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia)
tunjangan
undang-undang
upeti
walikota
wewenang
yayasan
YCW (Yogyakarta Corruption Watch)
YLBHI (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia)

United Development Party
People’s Democratic Party
Indonesian Socialist Party
street hoodlums or criminals
vigilantism or gangsterism
people
blessing
Village-level board of party organization
Trained People’s Militia
the pro-democracy movements that eventually led to the fall of Soeharto in May 1998
respect money
security task forces or civilian militia
security guard
secretariat of the assembly
All-Indonesian Central Labour Organization
People’s Security Army
Indonesian National Army
bonus
law
tribute
mayor
authority
foundation
a corruption watchdog organization in Yogyakarta
Indonesian Institute of Legal Aid Foundation
Chap I. Introduction:
Democratisation, Decentralization, and Party Politics

Changes since 1998 have certainly transformed Indonesia’s political life at both national and local levels to be more democratic and dynamic. Four sets of constitutional amendments during the period 1999-2002 and the introduction of administrative decentralization measures in 2001 were particularly important. The latter substantially curtailed the previous dominance of the central government in local affairs, by devolving extensive powers to the local levels of governance. In June 1999, the Indonesian people succeeded in holding the country’s first relatively free and fair general elections since 1955 and, as a result, observed enthusiastically the formation of national and local assemblies in September. In January 2001, a wide range of powers began to be devolved to more than 360 district-level governments and assemblies, embracing the long-standing aspirations of local communities to exercise greater control over their own political and economic affairs. Taken as whole, the political developments since May 1998 have featured democratisation and decentralization of the political structure, which underpinned the reformasi (reform) movement that forced Soeharto to step down.

However, there are a number of reasons for questioning whether the country is indeed undergoing a process of democratic consolidation, a process by which democratic practices become the dominant institutionalised feature of the political system. Most efforts to evaluate the effects of Indonesia’s apparent transition to democracy have remained pitched at the national level and show a narrow concern with formal democratic institutions. These analyses offer limited insight for evaluating the
qualitative features of political practices in the country as a whole, particularly those occurring beyond Jakarta.

This dissertation investigates patterns of local political change in post-Soeharto Indonesia. More specifically, this study examines the practical effects of democratic institutions since 1998 on political behaviour in Yogyakarta, Central Java. The basic motivation of this study arises from the belief that an adequate assessment of the qualitative features of political change in a post-authoritarian society requires an analysis of post-transitional political processes at the local level. Accordingly, this dissertation asks: What, if any, is the relation between actual patterns of political practice and democratic consolidation of local political institutions? In another words, how has the advent of formal democracy and decentralization in Indonesia affected political institutions at the local level? This study investigates three interrelated features of political change in post-Soeharto Indonesia:

1) Given the significance of the roles and contributions of political parties in the post-transition political process, this study examines the main features of party institutionalisation in post-Soeharto Indonesia. In so doing, it focuses on emerging patterns of competition and representation in the democratic performance of re-empowered local political institutions.

2) With many third-wave cases, including post-Soeharto Indonesia, having gone through administrative decentralization combined with political democratisation, this study intends to probe the impact of devolution of power on the district-level governments and assemblies.

3) Related to the first and second patterns of political change, this study particularly investigates the uncertain relationship between formal democratisation and its practical effects on local political institutions through probing the parliamentary and party politics in Yogyakarta.

Drawing on theories of democracy and regime change and using the methods of political anthropology, this dissertation looks into the recent history of Yogyakarta to scrutinize the uncertain relation between formal democratic institutions and local political practices in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Correspondingly, this study focuses on the interaction between formal political institutions and the evolution of new patterns of political life at the local level. This study shows that, in Yogyakarta, it is undemocratic practices such as ‘money politics’ and political gangsterism (popularly known as *premanisme*) that have been among the reactivated, decentralized, and institutionalised outcomes of formal democratic transition and devolution of power to the regions.

Explaining the sources of undemocratic political practices at the new loci of power – political parties and legislative assemblies – in Yogyakarta is the focus of this dissertation.

The central claim of this dissertation is that despite all the remarkable changes in Indonesia’s political life since 1998, snapshots taken at the local level show a growing gap between expectation and reality. This shows that something important is missing from accounts of democratising and decentralizing post-Soeharto Indonesia: the persistent, reactivated, and even institutionalised undemocratic practices within local political institutions. From this angle, this dissertation argues that the change in institutional arrangements in and of itself does not consolidate democratic values, attitudes, and behaviours at the grassroots. This by no means undermines the significance of institutions in the post-authoritarian political process, but rather emphasizes that problematic patterns of political change at the local level require explanation that goes beyond a simplistic assumption about the positive impact of the formal political setting.
Democratisation and Decentralization

Two processes of political change, democratization and decentralization, provide the basic framework of this study. Democratization combined with decentralization, or ‘democratic decentralization,’ is generally expected to reduce the power of central state bureaucracies and to improve accountability of locally elected bodies. It is also assumed to stimulate the reconstitution of political relations in the regions in terms of political participation. In fact, however, such conducive conditions as enhanced popular participation and well-funded decentralization programs have been found to give no guarantee for good institutional performance (Crook & Manor 1995, 330). Although the deliberate designing of democratic institutional settings at the early stage of decentralization is important, it is quite unlikely that the designed rules and the enforcement mechanisms will fully determine the actual implementation of decentralization.¹

Therefore, a realistic perspective of assessing democratic decentralization requires going beyond the purview of formal rules and procedures that are often interpreted and applied in unintended ways. Formal rules and procedures are undoubtedly important in understanding the general idealized political mechanism of a society, regardless of issues and actors. Nonetheless, under peculiar circumstances such as the post-authoritarian context, informal, frequently undemocratic, practices tend to exert greater and more pervasive influence over political processes. Without underestimating formal rules and procedures, this study seeks to explain the practical impacts of democratization and decentralization on the changing nature and dynamics of local political life in post-Soeharto Indonesia. The features of political change in post-

¹ An example of overemphasis on the designing aspect as a determining factor of carrying out decentralization successfully is the World Bank’s program: See, for example, Litvack, Ahmad & Bird (1998).

Soeharto Indonesia that this study is mainly concerned with can be pictured as Figure I-1.

Figure I-1. The Puzzle of the Post-Authoritarian Political Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Transition &amp; Decentralisation</th>
<th>Undemocratic Consolidation: 'Money Politics' and Political Gangsterism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-party Parliamentary Democracy</td>
<td>'Money Politics' and Political Gangsterism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Formal changes in institutional arrangement, as a result of transition and decentralization, do not necessarily lead to the substantive democratization of local politics. There is no evidence that democratization combined with decentralization automatically encourages local politicians to be more responsive and accountable. Even after the successful democratic transition, “the worst types of vote buying and fraud, government corruption, and abuse of power may still occur in well-entrenched local and regional authoritarian enclaves” (Diamond 1997, 31-2). The experiences of many countries that underwent democratisation and decentralization simultaneously tell us that the positive impact of devolving power to local authorities in the process of democratisation will only be felt if the decentralized power is exercised democratically (Crook & Manor 1995; Kerkvliet & Mojares 1991; Trocki 1998; Arghiros 2001; and, Swianiewicz 2001). For instance, reforms in Thailand and the Philippines have revealed that competitive elections for local officials do not, in themselves, ensure that the devolved authority would be operated democratically (Kerkvliet 1996; Sidel 1999; and, McVey 2000).

This post-transitional syndrome necessitates close examination since it could mark the beginning of democratic erosion.² The public will be seriously disaffected from politics when they perceive political elites in elected bodies as corrupt, self-

² For a detailed description and analysis with regard to post-transitional syndromes, see Carothers (2002), pp. 10-14.
interested, and not serious about working for their constituents. The resulting
dissatisfaction of the public from the decision-making process can, in turn, provide
politicians with opportunities to reactivate and diffuse old undemocratic practices within
democratic political institutions. However, attempts to explain political change in post-
authoritarian societies have been principally concerned with the transition from
authoritarianism to consolidated democracy. Analysing politics in these terms poses
basic analytic problems. On the one hand, the concept of democratic transition
implicitly suggests that movement from authoritarianism to democracy is linear, and
somewhat pre-ordained. On the other, the concepts of “authoritarianism” and
“consolidated democracy” represent historically and theoretically derived ideal types of
political regime. In practice, as the contemporary democratisation literature commonly
notes, political processes in late-democratising societies remain between these ideal
types, somewhere between authoritarianism and consolidated democracy.

Observing the “third wave” of democratisation, in which many countries
returned to military or authoritarian regimes, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C.
Schmitter (1986, 6) emphasized that while a formal transition to democracy can happen
overnight, the consolidation of a democratic government is a much longer, uncertain
process (see also O’Donnell 1992). Along these lines, Samuel P. Huntington (1991, 290)
concludes that the causes of democratic breakdown, i.e. the shift from democratic to
authoritarian political systems, were remarkably similar to transition from authoritarian
to democratic regimes. The military coup in 1991 in Thailand, for instance, was justified,
and even supported by the politically alienated middle classes, as a necessary action to
put an end to the increasing vote-buying and violence in national/local elections since
the restoration of parliamentary and electoral politics in 1979. The military regime was

overturned 15 months later by a popular uprising, but the country’s democratisation was
trapped again by the rise of provincial godfathers (chao pho) as new local politicians. 3

In fact, this “exhaustion” of the third wave of democratic transition, which
essentially peaked in the mid-1990s, has been widely accepted (Hagopian 1993; Collier
& Levitsky 1997; Huber, Rueschemeyer, & Stephens 1997; Zakaria 1997; Munck 2001;
McFaul 2002; Carothers 2002; and Schedler 2002). Discussion of the “stalemate
transitions” 4 has revealed the necessity of developing new approaches to “what is
happening” rather than to “what should be happening” in the processes of regime change.
In another words, studies focused on whether democratic regimes will survive and how
to break the cycle of military intervention have failed to provide a convincing
explanation for why many new democracies barely manage to “limp along in
unconsolidated state” (Hagopian 1993, 465). They have instead established causal and
sequential explanations by linking the mode of transition and the path of democratic
consolidation. Then, different types of hybrid regime are placed on the continuum
between transition and democratic consolidation. 5 Despite the usefulness of the
subtypes, the sequential model is basically perched on expectations about the future,
blurring the issue of how to address the actual developments of the post-transitional
polities (Collier & Levitsky 1997, 450; Schedler 2002, 36). Few studies have identified
how the challenge of consolidation has been shaped and what that challenge indicates
for post-transitional political processes, which is fundamental to develop a “realistic
expectation about the likely patterns of political life” in post-authoritarian societies

3 For full-fledged discussions on the growth of chao pho and its impact on the political economy of
Thailand from the late 1980s on, see McVey (2000).

5 For example, Larry Diamond classifies 104 countries (54%) as liberal or electoral democracies by the
end of 2601, and 63 countries (32.8%) as hybrid regimes – ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarian,
and hegemonic electoral authoritarian (Diamond 2002, 25-7). Along the same lines, Michael McFaul
regards 10 of 28 post-communist countries as “partial democracies” (McFaul 2002, 227). Drawing on the
fact that authoritarianism has successfully managed to practise electoral politics, Andreas Schedler
proposes a model of “electoral authoritarianism” and estimates that this regime type makes up more than
two-thirds (69.9%) of all electoral autocracies (Schedler 2002, 48).
(Carothers 2002, 18). To understand post-authoritarian political life requires moving beyond categorizing regime types.6

Correspondingly, this study emphasizes political practices, and suggests distinguishing ‘substantive’ democratisation from ‘formal’ democracy in understanding the post-authoritarian political process. Whereas ‘formal’ democracy refers to the institutional aspect of the political system, ‘substantive’ democratisation emphasizes the institutionalisation of democratic practices in the day-to-day political behaviour of politicians. By drawing a distinction between the ‘substantive’ nature of democratisation, on the one hand, and the introduction of ‘formal’ rules and institutions of democracy, on the other, this framework rejects the tendency of the transition literature to focus heavily on the procedures and longevity of emerging democratic governments.

In contrast, this perspective gives more emphasis to the institutionalisation of undemocratic practices in political institutions, exemplified by the persistent and even increased influence of ‘money politics’ and political gangsterism (premanisme) in local politics. Such a process of dissociation of formal democracy and substantive democratisation is most likely to lead to ‘undemocratic consolidation’. The weakness of the substantive aspects of democratisation may be unnoticed in the formally democratic settings, but when informal political processes emerge as a defining feature of the post-authoritarian polity, it will become clear that “formal democracy may remain formal” (Huber, Rueschemeyer, & Stephens 1997, 324).7

Until the downfall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, the Indonesian political system was highly centralized and bureaucratised. This has changed with the transition to democratic rule and the implementation of regional autonomy that has devolved legislative, fiscal, and investigative authorities to the district level of governance. With the revitalized multi-party parliamentary politics and the substantially expanded power of the local assemblies as a result of decentralization, party representatives in local assemblies have emerged as the new local power-holders. It can be assumed that local political life might in fact be more dynamic and democratic. Local people may sense that they can influence the political process, while local mass media and intellectual groups can play a more active role in organizing and delivering public opinion.

Nonetheless, despite some meaningful achievements in introducing formal democracy, the unintended effects of democratisation combined with decentralization have become matters of concern. Many local party politicians have displayed political attitudes and engaged in behaviour, which are ultimately undemocratic. This is not to argue that they necessarily violate the newly applied formal rules and procedures, but they have not discarded old informal practices. Particularly, the abuse of the expanded authority by local assembly members has contradicted the expectations of many Indonesians about a more democratic and locally-grounded political life in the wake of the authoritarian regime. Such practices as ‘money politics’ and premanisme are undemocratic because they tend to make the formal institutions of democracy less representative, less responsive, and less accountable. The problem is “not that there are no government structures but that they do not work effectively (and democratically)” (Crouch 2003, 33). Ultimately they distort the preferences expressed by citizens through elections and by other democratic means. On the one hand, everyday political practices such as plenary sessions of the assembly or meetings of constituents with assembly members at Saturday ‘morning coffee’ have grown to be ‘democratic rituals’. On the other, local elections for local executive heads, in which only assembly members are

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6 See, for example, Table 2. Classification of Regimes at the End of 2001, Diamond (2002), pp. 30-31.

7 The idea of ‘social democracy’ suggested by Eva;nc Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John Stephens is more concerned with social dimensions such as “high levels of participation” and “increasing equality in social and economic outcomes”, while the ‘substantive’ democratisation in this study is more directed to the practical effects of the introduction of formally democratic settings on the daily practices and performances within political institutions: See Huber, Rueschemeyer, & Stephens (1997), pp. 323-5.
eligible to cast votes, have routinely involved 'money politics' and, in some cases, violence. This expanding gap between initial expectations and actual developments requires a historical understanding of the country's party politics as well as a general discussion of the role and contribution of political parties in the post-authoritarian political process.

**Post-authoritarian Party Politics**

Political parties have been credited with taking an important part in democratising formerly authoritarian politics. Many democratic systems are grounded on a party system in their actual operations, and thus, political parties should be placed at the centre of understanding how democracy works. In relation to democratisation, in particular, they have received special theoretical attention as ‘mediators’ in both installing and consolidating democracy (Huntington 1968; Dahl 1971; Sartori 1976; Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela 1992; Hagopian 1993; Linz 1994; Morlino 1995; Ware 1996; Sachsenroder 1998; Diamond 1999; Mainwaring 1999; Kitschelt et. al. 1999; Teorell 1999; Sejong Institute & NED 2000; Randall & Svasand 2001; Carothers 2002; and Wollack 2002). As an institution, political parties stand between the state and civil society. In democracies, they play a crucial role in elections. At the same time, they influence the agenda of public discourse by organizing, articulating, and aggregating societal demands and interests. They also function as a training ground for political elites who aim to assume governing roles.

Indonesia’s political change since the fall of Soeharto, the hallmark of which was the successful 1999 general elections based on a multi-party system, has interested many observers of the nature and actual patterns of party development (e.g., Liddle 1999 and Fealy 2001). However, political parties in “analytically slippery and volatile” developing polities have been largely unexplored, particularly in Southeast Asia (MacIntyre 2003, x). One of the reasons may be that analysis of party politics in post-authoritarian countries requires different perspectives and approaches. Drawing on case studies of several democratizing Asian countries, Robert W. Compton suggests examining party systems as part of political development, which in turn requires a historical perspective on cultural construction (Compton 2000, 17). He argues that democratic transitions and patterns of consolidation in Asia have generally involved weak party systems and low levels of responsiveness. Therefore, analysis of post-authoritarian party development needs to be grounded on understanding of the society's historical experiences and their remaining effects on people’s political attitudes and behaviours. Unlike the ideal trajectory of democratic consolidation, authoritarian legacies from former regimes often find ways to reassert themselves during the long and uncertain journey to consolidated democracy.

Here it is noteworthy that many political scientists have warned of an oligarchic tendency in party development. One of the significant issues in questioning democratic performance has been the representativeness and accountability of those elected through a competitive-elective mechanism. Drawing on his participant observation of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany in the early 20th century, Robert Michels (1962) diagnosed the oligarchic tendency of political parties as a disease inherent in democracy. Giovanni Sartori also notes that democracy tends to evolve into “a party tyranny in which the actual locus of power is shifted and concentrated from government and parliament to party directorates” (Sartori 1987, 148). However, drawing on a competitive-elective polyarchy model from J. A. Schumpeter’s and Robert A. Dahl’s theories of democracy, Sartori criticizes Michels for dismissing the existence and breadth of competition among organizations – and among elites who represent those

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1 Among Indonesian scholars who have given special attention to this, Riwandha Imawan points to "the expanding discrepancy between formal democracy and substantial democracy that the (Indonesian) society has sensed" (kerenjang yang makin meledak antara demokrasi formal dan demokrasi substantia yang dirasakan oleh masyarakat): See Imawan (2002), p. 47.
organizations. The realistic model of democracy suggested by Sartori has in fact been pursued by other political scientists, including Talcott Parsons (1959) and Seymour M. Lipset (1962), who emphasize the competitive struggle among the political elites as a way of understanding how democracy operates in the real world. Consequently, although it emphasizes the effects of competition among the elite in promoting responsiveness, the competitive-elective polyarchy model also presumes an inherently elitist—or oligarchic—tendency of democracy.

This realistic model of democracy seems to be quite helpful to our understanding of Indonesia’s post-authoritarian party politics, especially in terms of the competition among party representatives in local assemblies and its effect on their representativeness and accountability. Although the post-1998 changes in the political system have generally revitalized the democratic principle of "exchange of leadership for support" in the country’s party politics, the practical patterns of local politics make it premature to say that local party politicians are now more representative and accountable. From this viewpoint, it is worth remembering Samuel P. Huntington’s argument that a party is "strong to the extent to which political activists and power seekers identify with the party, or weak to the extent to that they view the party as simply a means to other ends" (Huntington 1968, 410). Henceforth, it is essential to estimate the significance of the way political parties operate and create linkages of accountability and responsiveness to the people in terms of their effect on the viability and quality of democracy (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 15).

In an analysis of political party development in democratising Brazil, Scott P. Mainwaring defines party institutionalisation in a narrower way, i.e., as "a process by

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1 More recently, S. N. Eisenstadt also notes that "the suspicion that the existing representative institutions serve only to uphold various concrete, diverse interests, and not some vision of common good" continues to arise even in contemporary democratic regimes: See Eisenstadt (1999), pp. 90-1. While Eisenstadt’s argument regarding the ‘deconsolidation’ of the institutional bases of democratic regimes mainly applies to consolidated democracies, I argue that in the post-authoritarian societies it is the lack of consolidation of democratic values and practices that is a significant factor in supporting the oligarchic tendency in new democracies.

which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted" (Mainwaring 1999, 25). He argues that through this process, actors develop expectations, orientations and behaviour that will prevail into the foreseeable future. However, many third-wave democratisation cases, including the Brazilian case, have proved that political parties in the post-authoritarian context can develop in either democratic or undemocratic ways.

The post-authoritarian circumstance usually does not support an ideal track of party institutionalisation, even though there may be a certain degree of institutionalisation of the party system and individual parties. Many third-wave cases have shown that stable electoral competition, strong party organization, and accountability of political actors are scarcely achievable, at least, in a short period. In turn, under a weakly institutionalised party system, public officials are less likely to subject themselves to effective accountability (Schedler 1999, 335). The formal democratic rules and procedures can be often disregarded as a result of politicians’ weak linkages of accountability and responsiveness to the people. Accordingly, analysis of political party development and party institutionalisation in post-authoritarian societies requires a thorough consideration of behavioural and attitudinal patterns as well as institutional and systemic change.

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Accounting for Undemocratic Practices within Democratic Political Institutions

In fact, the patterns of party development in post-Soeharto Indonesia have already alarmed many political analysts (Sarundajang 1999; Yudoyono 2001; Lema 2001; Imawan 2002; Ratnawati 2002; Aini 2002; Said 2003). Since their formation after the 1999 general election, both the national and local assemblies have been criticized as arenas for the ‘oligarchy of power,’ within which a few elite groups exercise power in
the name of the people, but in reality pursue individual interests. Rather than propagate alternative policies and build an opposition coalition aiming to win the next election, minority parties tend to seek the "blessing" (restu) of the major parties and a share in the spoils of office. This is certainly ironic if it is remembered that the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Assembly) and the MPR (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly) during the New Order was so impotent that they were no more than rubber stamps for Soeharto and his executive.

On the other hand, many ordinary Indonesians have grown to be dismayed by the weak coalition politics of the major parties and undemocratic practices of individual party representatives in both national and local assemblies. Public opinion, as expressed by civil society organizations and mass media, increasingly believes that most political parties have been indifferent to the societal interests of their constituents. For instance, the polling conducted by Center for the Study of Development and Democracy (CESDA) and the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES) in early 2002 shows that many party supporters have been disappointed by the parties that they supported in the 1999 general elections. Around two thirds of Golkar supporters (62%) believed that there was no party “fighting on behalf of the people” (memperjuangkan kepentingan rakyat), and similar proportions of the PPP (67%) and the PAN (57%) supporters expressed the same opinion (Media Indonesia, 21 February 2002). Another polling conducted by LP3ES in February 2002 shows that slightly more than half the respondents (51%) saw no political party “attending to the people” (memperhatikan rakyat) (Kompas, 20 February 2002). The public disillusionment about political parties seems to have continuously furthered, which is demonstrated by another CESDA-LP3ES survey conducted in May 2003. The polling results show that around two-thirds (64%) do not regard political parties as a media for people's aspirations and almost half the respondents (49%) do not trust political parties (Kompas, 13 June 2003).

There is little doubt that given the elitist decision-making mechanisms of most Indonesian political parties, broad mass participation will remain a minimal factor in local political life of the country and mostly restricted to the mass mobilization during the election time. On the other hand, the influence of formal democratic rules and procedures appears to be still limited in enforcing politicians to shape their practices. Although informal practices are not peculiar to post-authoritarian politics, they are more important in democratising societies because they tend to distract from the initial democratic commitment. Under the post-authoritarian circumstance, actual practices tend to have little to do with formal sets of rules, while informal practices tend to be persistent and often define the institution’s operating mechanism.

Reactivation and Decentralization of ‘Money Politics’ and Premanisme

Drawing on observations of party politics in post-Soeharto Yogyakarta, this study is especially concerned with essentially undemocratic practices such as ‘money politics’ and premanisme that have become a defining feature of the region’s party politics.10 Although these undemocratic practices are not new to Indonesian politics and were indeed deeply entrenched during the New Order period and earlier, they have been reactivated and diffused on a wider scale after the decline of the centralized control system.

‘Money politics’ has emerged as a key issue in local politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It involves both the manipulation of budgets by politicians in self-enriching

10 Golkar is the party that dominated national and local assemblies during the Soeharto regime. PPP (Partai Perjuangan Pembangunan, United Development Party) represented Muslim voters. PAN (Partai Amanah Nasional, National Mandate Party), although not explicitly a Muslim party, gets much of its support from modernist Muslims. In 1999, Golkar won 22.5 per cent of the national votes, PPP 11 per cent, and PAN 7 per cent.

11 The term preman used to refer to a policeman or a soldier who was not on duty or wearing civilian clothes, but the term now refers to hoodlums or criminals, replacing the traditionally used jago or goli, professional criminals or charismatic toughs. The concept of ‘premanisme’ is discussed in detail in Chapter V of this thesis.
ways and political decisions being taken not on the merits of the issues but as a result of
payments made by interested groups. For example, in many elections for governors or
regents/mayors (bupati/walikota) local assemblies “inexplicably” elected unexpected or
controversial figures. Assembly members frequently disregard their own parties’
candidates and vote for rivals who have won their support most likely through bribery
(Fealy 2001, 102). This frequent vote-selling by local assembly members has resulted in
growing disillusionment and cynicism as seen in the comment of a prominent regional
newspaper:

In a situation in which there is no political pressure and control, parliaments at
the moment appear to have such a high level of arrogance that they can decide
all the issues of the executive in the name of people (rakyat) who voted for them,
on the one hand, and they also can make use of the institution of parliament for
their political and economic well-being in the name of power that was delegated
by the people, on the other. ("Antara Meein Cuci dan Pesangan," Bernas, 3 July
2001)

Another example of the growing ‘money politics’ practices in local politics is
what can be called as ‘excessive perquisites’ for local assembly members in using funds
available to them as a result of the devolution of authority to the local levels. Most local
assemblies throughout the country are reported to have increased their operational
expenditures considerably since their installation in September 1999. Taken alone, the
increase in the funds made available to local assembly members is not surprising, when
it is considered that the regional autonomy scheme in Laws No. 22 and No. 25 of 1999
expanded local assemblies’ command over budgetary matters. What is significant,
however, is that through the substantial increase of their budgets, local assembly
members have sought extra financial and material benefits for themselves by
manipulating ambiguous regulations.

In response to this unintended effect of the expanded authority of local
assemblies, the central government issued two governmental regulations specifying
local assemblies’ operational expenditures (PP No. 110 of 2000) and also determining
the election process for local executive heads (PP No. 151 of 2000). Nonetheless, both
the manipulation of the budget and vote-selling in elections for local executive heads
have become deeply entrenched as informally institutionalised practices in many local
assemblies. There still is room for interpreting regulations in arbitrary ways while there
is scarcely any institutionalised channel for monitoring the daily activities of local
assemblies.

While the vote-selling by local assembly members in elections for local
executive heads is no doubt a case of corruption, the practices of seeking out excessive
perquisites for local assembly members may not be undemocratic in a formal sense.
However, such practices can be considered as undemocratic in that they do not reflect
the expectations of the voters who elected the assembly members. First, the substantial
increases in the expenditures for local assemblies have been at the expense of such
items as education and empowerment of minority sectors of society.13 Second, the perks
received by local assembly members have encouraged local politicians both inside and
outside the assemblies to regard a seat in an assembly as an opportunity to make their
fortune. In that case, it is not surprising to see local politicians pursuing political power
mainly to enrich themselves. Finally, the growing disillusionment of local communities
seems to have undermined people’s expectation and faith in democracy and rather
reactivated cynicism and scepticism towards political parties and their representatives in
local assemblies.

The other type of undemocratic practice that this study is concerned with is
related to the civilian security task forces, or satgas (satuan tugas), affiliated with
political parties and mass organizations. Their main formal task is to protect

13 An example can be taken from the 2001 provincial budget of Yogyakarta, in which 9 per cent of the
regional budget was allocated to development and 91 per cent to routine expenditures such as salaries and
general administration. The education sector received less than 1 per cent and allocation for empowering
women was removed (Kompas, 28 April 2001; Bernas, 1 May 2001).
organizations and cadres from possible threats from rival groups and to link grassroots supporters with the party leaderships. One of their main practical functions is to demonstrate their parent organizations' strength and popularity, especially in such activities as mobilizing support in street convey and election campaigns. In principle, the members are supposed to be trained and controlled by the organization's leadership. In reality, while some look like well-run organizations comprising committed party members, most appear to be ill-disciplined gangs dominated by local hoodlums and criminals (Fealy 2001, 103).

Most major parties have more than one satgas, and there appears to be no big difference between those located within and outside formal party structures in that both basically contribute to the parties' 'security-cum-mobilization' activities. The plethora of political parties seems to have provided for "shifting tactical alliances among gangs of predators at the national and local levels" (Hadiz 2003, 121). In fact, the presence of satgas both within and outside parties have raised similar issues with regard to how party leaderships reward their contributions during the 1999 elections. This issue has turned out to be quite difficult because satgas of parties and some mass organizations are usually based on various small preman groups. Especially, the parties' satgas have demanded a greater share of political influence within the party organization as well as more seats in local assemblies, but they have also frequently been accused of engaging in other activities unrelated to party politics, such as communal conflict and black-market operations.\(^\text{13}\)

Since the 1999 elections, many regions have been concerned with the expanding operations of the party-affiliated preman groups in criminal activities such as petty extortion, racketeering and debt collection to generate income for the party and their own members. As a response, political parties have tried to integrate, rather than eliminate, the satgas into party organizations in order to tighten their control over them but with little meaningful success. Although there are rumors that some preman group leaders have already taken seats at local assemblies through different party routes, it seems to be too risky for party leaderships to give official positions to those preman groups, some of which are reluctant to subordinate themselves to party leaderships.

With regard to this, many sources point out that preman groups affiliated with parties generally seek political protection for their illegal or criminal activities rather than political power itself.

As with 'money politics' practices, the existence and growing influence of the satgas both within and outside parties requires understanding of Indonesia's political history, at least, since Independence. The historical understanding reveals that gangs and criminals have been recruited by political elites throughout the country's political history (Cribb 1991; Robinson 1995; Lindsey 2001; and Collins 2002). Those gangs or criminal groups continued to carry out political functions, such as intimidating opponents on behalf of political groups including the state authorities during the New Order. Among such examples are People's Militias (Laskar Rakyat) during the revolutionary period, People's Youth (Pemuda Rakyat), the youth organization of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia: PKI) until 1965, Ansor, the youth section of the Muslim party, Nahdlatul Ulama, that actively participated in the mass murders on Java in 1965, and Pemuda Pancasila\(^\text{14}\) under the New Order.

The democratic transition in 1998 marked a turning point whereby preman groups became entrenched in local chapters of political parties that quickly surfaced as

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\(^{13}\) Parsudi Suwaran of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in the International Symposium on Globalisasi dan Kebudayaan Lokal: Suatu Dialektika Menuju Indonesia Baru, July 18-21, 2001, University of Andalan, Padang.

\(^{14}\) Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila) was originally formed to support President Soekarno's proclamation of a return to the 1945 Constitution in 1959. In the early years of the New Order, it developed into an organization of the "tough guys of the ruling Golkar party and the semi-official in-house gang of the presidential family" (Schulte Nordholt 2002, 48). See also Colombo & Lindblad (2002), p. 29, and Ryter (1998).
new loci of power. Although the parties' satgas had existed throughout the country's political history since Independence, their continuous presence and expanded roles run contrary to the efforts to democratise and de-militarise the society. Furthermore, the increasing political influence of preman within local party politics has contributed to the dissociation of 'formal' democracy and 'substantive' democratisation in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

Of course, other new democracies also have similar informal political practices that threaten their democratic character. What is especially problematic in the post-authoritarian context is that such informal and often undemocratic political practices as 'money politics' and premanisme have become deeply entrenched and circumscribe the nature and working mechanisms of democratic political institutions. Democratic rules and procedures become too weak and formalistic to counter undemocratic practices, in particular when political elites understand democracy only as an institutional and procedural matter (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 12; Rivera 2002, 472). Correspondingly, the dissociation of formal democracy and substantive democratisation in the post-authoritarian political process requires understanding of the general attitudinal and behavioural patterns of major political actors.

Authoritarian Legacy and Future Dependency

After a decade of neglect, studies of political institutions inspired by the school of institutionalism have appeared in the mainstream of political science (MacIntyre 2003, 14). This study applies a broad concept of institution that refers to patterns of repeatedly occurring attitudes and behaviours, as well as political organizations themselves. In addition to the conventional concept of institutions referring to organizational structures and formal rules, this neo-institutionalist conceptualisation also focuses on informal institutional practices and processes of decision-making, which are specific to a particular political setting. This perspective is essential for understanding a post-authoritarian polity which carries an authoritarian legacy because it emphasises the actual patterns of political change in addition to the formal introduction of democratic institutional setting.

With the focus on embedded values, rules, and practices rather than the institution itself, this study seeks to understand the historical roots of informal practices and their enduring effects on the contemporary post-authoritarian political process. This is not an argument, however, that the contemporary political developments of post-Soeharto Indonesia were already determined by its past authoritarian experiences. It rather calls attention to the fact that the contemporary informal, and often undemocratic, practices have existed throughout the country's political history, and more significantly, have recently been reactivated and institutionalised.

The 1999 general election campaigns indeed featured popular enthusiasm for the revitalized multi-party electoral politics in their political life. However, Indonesia's local party politics in many regions since 1999 have revealed an unintended and paradoxical effect of democratisation combined with decentralization as a result of the combination of the weak representative–constituent relationship and growing public disillusionment. That is, the revitalized multi-party parliamentary politics has enabled party representatives to engage in political behaviour that reactivates and deepens existing public cynicism and scepticism towards political parties. Correspondingly, this study argues that to analyse the contemporary political context of post-Soeharto Indonesia requires reflecting on the fact that the country's political journey has partially,

\[15\] This conceptualization of institution underlines "the way in which institutions embody values" and "the obstacles as well as the opportunities that confront institutional design": See Lowndes (2002), p. 91.

\[16\] David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz refer to an inefficient and often predatory civil and military bureaucracy, a systematically disorganized civil society, the constitutional framework, a lingering suspicion of liberalism and capitalism that derive ultimately from the influence of leftist ideas on Indonesian nationalism early in the 20th century, a preoccupation with unity as the legacies that "conditions" post-Soeharto Indonesia's politics and society. For detailed discussion, see Bourchier & Hadiz (2003), pp. 21-23.
if not wholly, shaped the political attitudes and behaviours of party politicians, as well as ordinary citizens.

Discussion of this attitudinal and behavioural issue requires considering the party-list proportional representation (PR) system as partly contributing to the weak attachment of the elected representatives to their electorates. Under the closed party-list PR system, central boards of parties are authorized to make the final decision as to who would be seated in both national and local assemblies. As a result, the linkages of party representatives in both national and local assemblies with their constituents are relatively weak. Additionally, the post-Suharto context necessitates recognition of the “delegitimizing” effect of the legacy of the negative image of parties that has remained prevalent among many Indonesians—not only ordinary Indonesians but also, not infrequently, party politicians—since the two former authoritarian regimes (Tan 2002, 485). Many party politicians themselves appear to have little faith in the parties they represent.

Political apathy itself may not be specific to Indonesia. Many Asian and Western societies also lack broad participation of ordinary citizens, especially among the younger generations, in political parties (Sachsenroder 1998, 25). Nonetheless, the increasingly pervasive public disillusionment with multi-party parliamentary politics in post-Suharto Indonesia needs to be traced back to the country’s post-Independence political life, the systematic emasculation of parties by the New Order regime, and the haphazard nature of political change in the wake of the authoritarian regime.

As will be discussed in Chapter II, the emergence of the authoritarian Guided Democracy in 1959 was justified by the argument that the polarization of ideologies among political parties was a major cause of the failure of multi-party parliamentary politics in the 1950s. The latter years of Parliamentary Democracy were described as

accompanied by an “increasingly widespread criticism of the party system” (Rocamora 1975, 166). The instability of multi-party politics was portrayed as being the main cause of the failure of Parliamentary Democracy by the two subsequent regimes led by Soekarno and Soeharto. Furthermore, party politicians themselves often invited negative and even cynical attitudes because they seemed more interested in securing positions for themselves under Guided Democracy than in defending democratic rule. For instance, the national leaders of the PNI in the late 1950s were described as reacting to the transition to Guided Democracy with “complacency,” which was most likely because they had secured their interests as an elite group with the most prestigious positions in national institutions remaining “in the hands of the PNI men” (Rocamora 1975, 189). Similar attitudes were found among the leaders of other parties who also secured positions for themselves in the Soekarno regime.

Observers have noted that, after spending more than three decades under another authoritarian regime, the Indonesian public now appears to have “absolute cynicism towards any form of (state) authority” (Lindsey 2001, 293). In turn, this public cynicism and scepticism towards democratic political institutions has created an atmosphere that allows local party politicians to take advantage of low public expectations of politicians who thus see little incentive for doing politics in democratic ways.

On the other hand, however, many Indonesians appear to expect something fundamentally different from what they had under the authoritarian regimes in terms of their political life. The gulf between expectations and reality has led to disillusionment. Many ordinary Indonesians and civil society activists that I met during field research expressed their dissatisfaction with the changes in the political system. In fact, the

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17 Juan J. Lina argues that the type of party system is related more to the electoral law than to whether the regime is parliamentary or presidential: See Lina (1994), p. 62.
formal changes in the political system since 1999 received generally positive assessment from many domestic and international observers. The gap of perceptions between ordinary Indonesians and these political observers needs to be resolved by looking beyond formal institutional arrangements. This study, therefore, attempts to examine how democratic transition and devolution of power to the regions have actually affected local politics.

Following the nearly four decades of political life under the two authoritarian regimes, it is important to recognize what many ordinary Indonesians expected from democracy. Their standards for democratic political life appear to be more or less the same as those of people in other democratic polities, but they seem to have different expectations. The ‘post-authoritarian’ context itself helps to explain the reason why people in democratising societies have in general high hopes following democratic transition. People in the post-authoritarian polities usually expect something ‘more’ democratic, which sounds very ambiguous but still means a lot to them.

While leaving detailed discussion of the practical effects of the introduction of formal democracy and decentralization to the latter parts of the dissertation, the growing disillusionment of the people can be described as emerging from the general ‘anti-politics’ atmosphere in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Such an ‘anti-politics’ attitude also can be found, but for different reasons, among party functionaries themselves. More often than not, party politicians tend to regard political parties as a means to serve their individual interests. In such a way, although changes in the political system following the downfall of the authoritarian regime strengthened the political parties’ position in the rearranged institutional design, substantive changes in the political attitudes and practices of party politicians have not yet occurred. The ultimate problem is that post-Soeharto political parties have embedded themselves “in an environment of strongly anti-party attitudes” (Tan 2002, 491). Furthermore, the political parties seem still to fall short on democratic behaviour, which will more likely slow down the institutionalisation of democratic practices in their daily activities (Mishra 2002, 14).

In turn, many Indonesian people appear to have reacted to the persistent undemocratic practices mostly in cynical and sceptical ways, given that the post-1998 political changes having so far failed to deliver socio-economic and political improvements. Some people even believe that many assembly members are only “making use of their posts to improve their earnings” (Chang, Jakarta Post, 21 May 2001). This sceptical perception of parties seems to be not restricted to ordinary Indonesians, but is also found among civil society activists and intellectuals who have expressed their strong cynicism and scepticism about political parties.

Methodology

This dissertation is based on data I collected during a year of fieldwork in Yogyakarta from March 2001 to February 2002. The Special Region (Daerah Istimewa) of Yogyakarta has a special place in the history of the Republic of Indonesia as the base for the fledgling nationalist government during much of the Revolution against the returning Dutch colonial forces. In the 1990s, Yogyakarta was often called a ‘city of learning’ (kota belajar) and a ‘city of culture’ (kota budaya), combining a patchwork of progressive-liberal intellectualism with a traditional-autocratic culture. In the turmoil of the last months of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the region became a stronghold for the reformasi movement calling for the overthrow of the authoritarian New Order. Many people of Yogyakarta take pride in the region’s social harmony that they attribute to the realm of culture, the character of the citizens, and the integrity of the Sultanate (Susanto 1993, 11-2). This study does not aim to generalize the case of Yogyakarta to other regions. Nonetheless, this small-scale study can be expected to link “the specifics of local changes to a larger concern for social pattern” (McVeY 1978, 8). I have little
doubt that similar stories can be found throughout the country. This locally grounded study can therefore contribute to discussion of the practical effects of democratization and decentralization on local party development in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

I first went to Yogyakarta in January 1997 and spent around three years there, doing a Master’s degree in Anthropology at Gadjah Mada University. During that time, luckily enough, I was able to observe first-hand the dramatic changes in local politics that preceded and followed the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. I returned to Yogyakarta in March 2001 to conduct field research specifically on party politics. I spent my time interviewing local assembly members, party functionaries, and the staff of the local assemblies, discussing political change with students, journalists, NGO activists, and ordinary people of Yogyakarta, and observing the day-to-day politics of the local assemblies, especially during the period of June-November of 2001.

This dissertation makes use of four types of data: 1) interviews; 2) official documents that I obtained from the secretariats of assemblies regarding day-to-day activities of local assembly members, and unofficial documents from local NGOs mainly regarding controversial issues including ‘money politics’ cases; 3) both national and local newspapers, magazines, and workshop papers; and 4) literature on Indonesia’s party politics since Independence up to the post-Soeharto period in both Indonesian and English.

The interviews that I had during the fieldwork can be categorized into three types: First, I had formal interviews with party functionaries, including a few national-level party cadres in Jakarta and local assembly members and the staff of assemblies in Yogyakarta. I usually focused on the organizational mechanism of parties, the impact of political changes since 1998 on local party developments, and the day-to-day activities of party representatives in local assemblies. In some cases, I interviewed the same people more than once. I also interviewed leaders of satgas affiliated with political parties or mass organizations, including some national-level leaders, with regard to the transformed relationship between political parties and local toughs. The second type of interviews that helped me a lot in understanding the actual patterns of political changes at the local level was discussion with students, journalists, NGOs activists, and ordinary people of Yogyakarta. Finally, I often visited the local assemblies to observe firsthand their day-to-day activities, including a number of demonstrations held by diverse interest groups and communities, and the election processes for local executive heads. Local assemblies were always the best place to meet party representatives, to get information from journalists of local newspapers, and to directly observe daily features of the new era of multi-party parliamentary politics.

In addition to interviews, I collected official documents concerning the organizational mechanisms of major parties in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, the working structure of local assemblies, and legislation adopted by the provincial and district assemblies of Yogyakarta during the period of 1999-2001. I also gained access to some unofficial documents that local NGOs had obtained on the basis of their own investigations with regard to controversial issues, including several ‘money politics’ cases, in the region. Another resource that I relied on was both national and local newspapers, magazines, and workshop papers, through which I could understand how local people perceived the activities, attitudes, and behaviour of their representatives in local assemblies. Local newspapers were a particularly important resource before, during, and after my fieldwork since I could follow up major political developments of the region, crosscheck my own interviews with the statements made by prominent

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19 Totally, I conducted formal in-depth interviews with 53 people. Among them are 11 provincial assembly members and party politicians, 8 municipal assembly member and party functionaries, 21 civil society agents, such as scholars, journalists, students/NGO activists, and ordinary citizens, 8 satgas leaders of both the national and regional levels, 3 national-level party functionaries, and 2 Jakarta-based scholars: See the list of interviewees attached to the end of this thesis.
assembly members, and observe the interaction between different interest groups and parties in the concerned region.

A final resource is the literature on democratisation, decentralization, and party politics in post-authoritarian societies, focusing on post-authoritarian party politics in countries where democratisation is combined with decentralization. Specifically concerned with the post-Soeharto context, this study seeks to understand the attitudinal and behavioural legacies of the country’s authoritarian experience. In the meantime, I also have tried to consider the tendency of many local scholars to compare post-Soeharto political parties with those of the 1950s. There seemed to be some interesting similarities as well as differences between the two periods. Therefore, although a historical comparison is not a major aim of this study, the post-1998 political developments are often compared to the parliamentary and party politics of the 1950s. More significantly, this study also argues that post-authoritarian politics cannot be understood without considering the legacies from the former authoritarian regimes.

However, a historical comparison itself does not fully answer why post-Soeharto local party politicians have reactivated and even institutionalised undemocratic practices in political institutions. From this viewpoint, it is necessary to address the specific context of the post-authoritarianism, including the concerns of ordinary people with democratic political life, better economic conditions, and the like, under a new democratic government.

**Structure of Thesis**

Following this introduction, Chapter II explores the political history of post-Independence Indonesia, seeking to trace the prevalent cynicism about politics, among both ordinary Indonesians and party politicians, back to the failure of democratic multi-party parliamentary politics in the 1950s followed by the authoritarian rule by Soekarno (1957-1965) and then Soeharto (1966-1998). The historical analysis aims to show the complicated nature of the post-authoritarian political process, shaped not only by the country’s authoritarian past but also by the popular expectations about a “more” democratic future. As another part of comprehending the country’s post-authoritarian context, it also probes the content, nature, and implications of the more recent changes in the political system, which can be summarized as the revitalization of multi-party parliamentary politics and devolution of authority to local political institutions.

Chapter III focuses on party and parliamentary politics in post-Soeharto Yogyakarta, beginning by examining the major political parties that ascended to power as a result of the 1999 general elections and also by comparing them with the major parties that emerged in the region through the 1955 general and 1957 provincial elections. Subsequently, it identifies party representatives in both provincial and district/municipal assemblies in terms of their social backgrounds and political attitudes. As a specific factor in Yogyakarta, the historical integrity and changed role of the Sultan in the region’s political history are analysed. The following section analyses the structure and functions of local assemblies, and the changed executive-legislature relationship, shaped by the implementation of regional autonomy since January 2001. The latter part of the chapter probes the daily activities of local political institutions, public perceptions of the performance of party representatives in local assemblies, and the apparently growing popular disillusionment about democratisation and decentralization. The final section describes the activities of several local civil society organizations that have focused on linking local assembly members with their constituents, emphasizing the significance of civil society in democratising the daily political life at the grassroots.

Chapters IV and V are grounded on empirical case studies and deliver concrete pictures of undemocratic practices within local political institutions. Chapter IV focuses
on the practices of ‘money politics’, from excessive perquisites for self-interested assembly members to corruption in local elections for local executive heads, while chapter V elucidates the background and processes by which civilian security forces have grown to influence local political developments through their ‘security-cum-mobilization’ activities for local chapters of parties. Each pattern of undemocratic practice is related to the practical effects of changes in the political framework as well as historical roots, and then with implications for general party development in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

The concluding chapter reflects on what has been achieved by this locally grounded study with regard to post-authoritarian party politics in Indonesia. It also considers the desirability of broadening theoretical discussion on party politics in the post-authoritarian context so that it covers practical patterns of political change at the grassroots.

Chapter II.
The Political System and Political Parties in Indonesia

The dynamics of political change during the post-transitional period continues to be influenced by the enduring attitudinal and behavioural legacies of the former regimes. This continuity challenges our attempt to make a decisive analytical distinction between the dissolution of the old order and the creation of the new. Nonetheless, the past presents a departure point from which we can understand the interaction between the legacies of the past and the mode of transition, as well as the expectation about the more democratic future and actual post-transitional developments. The post-authoritarian context can be seen as “a degenerative product” of authoritarian legacies (Burawoy 2001, 1108). This is not to say that the democratic future of a formerly authoritarian society is predetermined by the past, but it rather points out that democratisation cannot be recognised as an uninterrupted evolutionary process.

The fact that many cases of third-wave democratisation have either moved back to authoritarianism or remained in an unconsolidated state demonstrates how easily the past finds a way to reassert itself. Some post-communist countries have also proven that “the efficacy of institutions and new political and economic relations can be expected to assert itself (only) from a long-term perspective” (Kitschelt et. al. 1999, 60). Accordingly, a comprehension of the remaining influence of historical factors on the post-transitional political process is necessary to understand actual patterns of political change beyond formal changes in institutional design.

This chapter aims to understand party developments in post-Soeharto Indonesia in the context of the country’s authoritarian legacies that can be traced back to the period of Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957), Guided Democracy (1957-1965), and
New Order (1965-1998), which are the subject of the first two sections. The ceaseless conflicts between parties and the consequent failure of democratic experiments during the first years of the post-Independence period were used to justify the emergence of Soekarno’s authoritarian Guided Democracy. The sections show how the public disappointment with the performance of political parties in multi-party parliamentary politics provided the opportunity for President Soekarno and the military to discredit the parties and eventually paved the way to the establishment of the New Order regime. Under Guided Democracy and then the military-dominated New Order, authoritarian governments systematically enfeebled political parties. The sections also show that corruption and political gangsterism were prominent features of politics throughout the three regimes.

The last two sections focus on the processes and implications of two significant transformations in the post-Soeharto political system: the revitalization of multi-party parliamentary politics and the devolution of authority to local political institutions. Following an analysis of the changes in institutional arrangement resulting from the revitalized multi-party parliamentary politics and decentralization in the regions, the two sections show the gap between the substantive effect of those post-authoritarian political developments and the intended democratic ideals.

The overall argument of this chapter is twofold. First, it is that the experience of unsuccessful multi-party parliamentary politics of the 1950s was used by the following authoritarian regimes led by Soekarno and Soeharto to legitimate their rule and also repress political parties, and that these legitimising and repressing practices have retained a lingering influence on the post-Soeharto party development. Second, this chapter also argues that the political attitudes and behaviour of local party politicians have frustrated popular democratic aspirations following the post-1998 resurrection of multi-party parliamentary politics and the significantly expanded power of local political institutions. Despite their substantially enhanced political power in the decision-making process, local party politicians generally appear to have a weak commitment to their own parties, and still rely on long-standing but transformed undemocratic practices such as ‘money politics’ and *premanisme* in their everyday political activities. This transformation and decentralization of undemocratic practices has in turn disillusioned many ordinary Indonesians, and further enhanced the destructive and disintegrative image of political parties that had taken shape in earlier stages of post-Independence political history.

Although apathy towards political parties cannot be seen as an unusual phenomenon, it is important to understand that many Indonesians tend to see the post-Soeharto political developments from the perspective of their promised democratic future. After living under authoritarian rule for nearly four decades, they appear to expect the application of textbook-style principles in their political life. The gap between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ democracy of itself may be inevitable, but what it specifically indicates can be different depending on the specific context. In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the public disillusionment about multi-party parliamentary democracy seems to have grown quickly due to the expanding gap between the people’s ambiguous expectations about “something more democratic” and the rampant ‘money politics’ practised by party representatives in local assemblies and the prominence of criminal groups within the parties’ *satgas*. From this viewpoint, the popular scepticism towards multi-party parliamentary politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia is not just an authoritarian legacy but more importantly, has been reactivated by the unfulfilled expectation about a “more” democratic future.
The Failure of Parliamentary Democracy and the Prelude to Authoritarianism

Indonesia’s post-Independence politics was marked by a multiparty system that sprung up based on modern ideologies, religions, and regional, ethnic, or simply personalistic loyalties. Parties often created their own trade unions, scout movements, women’s organizations, newspapers, and even armed militias (Sundhausen 1989, 464). Political parties were regarded as the main political institution for ideological struggle and played a leading role in the nation-building process, which despite various distortions, was perceived as “essentially democratic” in that all the major ideological streams in society were able to participate (Max Lane, Jakarta Post, 13 Aug 2002).

The origins of Indonesia’s political parties can be traced back to the pre-Independence period in which various politically motivated organizations emerged with mainly Western-educated indigenous leaderships that led the struggle for independence from the Dutch colonial regime. At that time, political parties were “loosely-knit organizations which centred around charismatic leaders” such as Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia and the founder of the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia: PNI) (Juoro 1998, 203). During the Revolution, the common goal of independence allowed competing parties to overcome ideological or philosophical differences and thus avoid self-defeating conflicts that continually threatened to emerge. After Independence, the process of nation building was characterized by struggle between the ideological perspectives that had developed during the previous decades. Post-Independence politics witnessed ceaseless conflicts between parties in the context of a wavering economy, weakening central authority, and regional rebellion.

Parliamentary Democracy

The first years of Parliamentary Democracy saw a vigorous and open debate over competing political ideas. However, the parliamentary system was also characterized by the weakness of organizational links between the national party leaders and parliamentary delegations on the one hand and the masses they claimed to represent on the other” (Liddle 1974, 3-4). One of the main features of Parliamentary Democracy was a constant change of cabinets and government coalitions, while the unending partisan conflict and jockeying for power led to poor performance and the decline of the legitimacy of the parliamentary system. An early sign was an unsuccessful army attempt to pressure President Soekarno to dissolve Parliament in October 1952, known as the ‘17 October affair’ (Ricklefs 2001, 299; Feith 1962; and Rocamora 1975). In seven years of Parliamentary Democracy between 1950 and 1957, no less than seven separate coalition governments rose and then fell. This political instability pushed the politicians in the parliament to pass an election law in April 1953, and later to set September 1955 for parliamentary elections and December 1955 for elections for a Constituent Assembly (Konsultasi) to draft a permanent constitution.

The first democratic general election, in which 172 political parties and quasi-political groups competed for 257 seats, marked “the end rather than the beginning of parliamentary life in Indonesia” (Dahm 1971, 173). The election had been seen as a panacea but it could not produce a majority party, and it soon became clear that parliamentary political manoeuvring would continue as before. Meanwhile, the regional crises grew more serious, symbolized most dramatically by the rebellions in Sumatra and North Sulawesi (Imawan 1989, 153; Ricklefs 2001, 310). Together with President Soekarno, the armed forces, led by General Nasution, initiated the end of Parliamentary Democracy and imposed martial law in March 1957, which gave the military the means to deal with the challenges posed by regional military coups.

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1 The Nasir cabinet based on Masyumi with PSI support (September 1950 – March 1951); the Sukiman Wirjosandjojo cabinet based on the Masyumi-PNI coalition (April 1951 – February 1952); the Wilopo cabinet based on PNI-Masyumi coalition (April 1952 – June 1953); the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet based on the PNI with the support of NU and minor parties (July 1953 – July 1955); the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet based on Masyumi with PSI and NU support (August 1955 – March 1956); and the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet based on a PNI-Masyumi-NU coalition (March 1956 – March 1957).
Why did democratic multiparty politics fail? Basically, it should be pointed out that the political system during the period of Parliamentary Democracy was unstable as a result of the intricate combination of waning economic conditions, frequent regional rebellions, massive corruption, and the rivalries of multi-party politics. No single factor is sufficient to explain the termination of the multi-party parliamentary politics at that time. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that there was "widespread and intense" general political dissatisfaction during the last several years of Parliamentary Democracy (Feith 1962, 597). As Herbert Feith concludes, although the governments during the period cannot be said to have failed in an absolute sense, "their performance was in some objective sense poor with regard to the creation of wealth, the distribution of prestige, or the provision of meaningful images of leadership" (Feith 1962, 597-9). Although he recognizes some positive aspects of the political system at that time, Daniel S. Lev also points out that party leaders lacked enough courage to "put up a determined defence of the parliamentary system" (Lev 1994, 41). In any case, there was "too much fragmentation of power" that should be attributed to the unwillingness of elites to cooperate during the latter years of Parliamentary Democracy (Imawan 1989, 125).

Such fragmentation was not surprising given that parties at the time frequently lacked coherent party programmes, stable memberships, and working organizational structures (Rocamora 1975, 5; Frings 1998, 79).2

Guided Democracy

Authoritarian Guided Democracy followed democratic rule.3 The retreat from liberal democracy was completed by the presidential decree dissolving the constituent assembly and restoring the 1945 constitution on 5 July 1959. Many ordinary Indonesians who had become uneasy about the democratic failure accepted this action taken by Soekarno and the armed forces. There was a growing awareness that political parties were unable to express and aggregate the conflicting demands of various ethnic, religious, and cultural groups (Imawan 1989, 21-2). Party representation was partly replaced by functional representation in the state institutions under Guided Democracy. The parliamentary system was abolished and the government became in practice only accountable to the president. The general election scheduled for 1960 was postponed indefinitely. In the absence of other institutions, President Soekarno and the army occupied the decision-making centres toward which all other would-be political actors were drawn (Feith 1994, 19-20; Liddle 1974, 14). Guided Democracy was also marked by rising conflict between the centre and the regions, to which the government responded not with the devolution of authority but increasing centralization that exacerbated regional frustration. Local interests thus became more self-conscious and demanding (McVey 1978, 26-7).

On the other hand, the party system was drastically revised. Soekarno's Guided Democracy regime promoted a negative image of the multi-party parliamentary system as a means of strengthening its own legitimacy. President Soekarno and the armed force seemed to intentionally exaggerate the instability of the multi-party system for this purpose. Political discourses continued to emphasize that party politicians were incapable of building workable coalitions due to political cleavages between different ideological streams. The image of multi-party politics has since been characterized as a fierce struggle on the basis of mutually exclusive ideological claims and differences in personal experience. A multi-party system in a society with multifaceted social cleavages was described as one with insurmountable ideological differences among the

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1 In addition to the multi-party instability, many former revolutionary activists attribute cultural factors, such as "the negative influence of Javanese culture on the political process", to the failure of Parliamentary Democracy: See Lucas (1994), pp. 101-8.

2 This pattern - independence, a short period of experiment with democratic governance, and the emergence of an authoritarian regime - was common in many newly independent countries during the 1950s. For a comparative historical analysis of post-independence democratic attempts in Southeast Asia, see Frings (1998).

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major political parties and, as a result, inefficient governance caused by constantly changing cabinets.

As a result, the “simplification” of the party system in 1960 reduced the number of political parties from around 100 to a mere ten (PKI, PNI, Murba, Partindo, IP-KI, NU, PSI, Parti, Parkindo, & Partai Katolik) (Imawan 1989, 165-6; Soebiantoro 1996, 139-40). In September 1958, the Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia: PSI) were outlawed, ostensibly because they had backed the regional rebellions known as Permesta (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam, Universal Struggle Charter) and PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in Sumatra and North Sulawesi. Political parties were denied the monopoly of political representation with half of the seats in the new Gotong Royong parliament (DPRGR) being allocated to so-called functional groups formed on the basis of occupation and special status. Military officers were appointed to the legislative assemblies as one such functional group. The armed forces began to practise what was later known as its ‘dual function’, or dwifungsi, doctrine, which allowed it to have both a defence and security function as an instrument of the state, and a political function as a guardian of the state and a participant in the political process (Lowry 1996, xxi).

Corruption and Political Militia

The practices of ‘money politics’, or more classical types of corruption, were one of the defining features of the multi-party politics during this period. During Parliamentary Democracy, the Ali Sastromadjojo cabinet from August 1953 to November 1954 was particularly notorious for its corruptive practices. Herbert Feith notes, “The volume of corruption among civilian politicians and bureaucrats had grown markedly in the two years of this cabinet, as inflation had reduced civil servants’ real income and as the government parties’ machine politics practices had undermined civil service norms and morale” (Feith 1962, 406). This led to both “spectacular corruption” at the highest levels in the government and “petty corruption” in the low ranks of the bureaucracy.

An important case was the ‘Benteng program’, which was originally intended “to secure indigenous dominance in the import sector,” but actually distributed privileges to the “individuals associated with powerful figures in the bureaucracy or the parties who controlled allocation of licences and credit” and sold licences to genuine importers, mostly Chinese (Feith 1962, 423; Robison 1986, 44). Richard Robison concludes that, “What was being consolidated was not an indigenous merchant bourgeoisie but a group of licence brokers and political fixers” (Robison 1986, 45). The failure of such policies as the Benteng program convinced economic nationalists, prominently members of the left wing of the PNI and the PKI, as well as Soekarno, to argue that, “the state itself must assume the burden of creating a national economy” (Robison 1986, 46).

The most prominent examples of the corruption by political parties during the 1950s involved the PNI. Rocamora notes, “In order to secure money to finance the party’s election campaign, the PNI corrupted the implementation of the government’s economic nationalization program which it controlled and brought business elements right into the party leadership” (Rocamora 1975, 363). It should be noted that Iaka Tjokrohadisoeiro, the Minister of Economic Affairs under the Ali cabinet who implemented enthusiastically the Benteng program, was also a PNI politician. In fact, he had been a member of the PNI’s Funds Committee from early 1950. The main source of funds for the PNI was “contributions from businessmen, both PNI-affiliated and not, given to the party in exchange for licences, loans, and other special favours from PNI
ministers in the Ali cabinet" (Rocamora 1975, 123). As a result, the latter days of Parliamentary Democracy saw a great number of demands, many of them coming significantly from particular army commanders, for a tougher policy against corruption" (Feith 1962, 510).

However, corruption was common during Guided Democracy, too. One case was the 'Operasi Karya' program, which was articulated in Presidential Decree No. 371 of 1962 and permitted the armed forces to use government development projects in production and distribution at all levels down to village rehabilitation and development. As the program was carried out, it became clear that it was “initiated by incompetence, corruption, and lack of enthusiasm” (Reeve 1985, 190). President Soekarno, who was in a diplomatic position between the armed forces and political parties – particularly the PNI and the PKI – attacked the armed forces which he blamed for the corruption that occurred during the implementation of the program. At the same time, the President made use of the corruption charges to attack party politicians. For instance, in December 1963, he blamed politicians in the ‘Generation of 1945 (Angkatan 45)’ for enriching themselves (Reeve 1985, 214). The President’s corruption charge against this group was in fact a response to their attack on the situation in the state enterprises, including the military mismanagement and corruption. In such a way, in the context of a severe power struggle, criticisms of corruption involved political calculations and were often aimed less at eradicating corruption and more at attacking political opponents, regardless of whether based on evidence or not.

Another feature defining the politics of the post-Independence period was the continuing and ubiquitous presence of political militias. Many of them were mobilized into regional rebellions. One example was the first regional rebellion by Darul Islam (dar al-Islam in Arabic meaning territory or house of Islam) against the Indonesian Republic in West Java in May 1948, which eventually developed to become no more than “simple banditry, extortion and terrorism on a grand scale” (Ricklefs 2001, 279). Another example was the 1950 rebellion in South Sulawesi, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Kahar Muzakkar, a leading Republican commander in the Revolution, joined some 20,000 troops who refused to be demobilised (Ricklefs 2001, 297).

On the other hand, political parties developed close ties with local youth militia groups and semi-official security organizations as a way of mobilizing support at the grassroots. Among them were NU’s youth wing Ansor (al-ansar, “the helpers who supported the Prophet in Medina), the PKI’s Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth), and the PNI and Masyumi youth groups (Ricklefs 2001, 315). Particularly, Pemuda Rakyat reported in the party congress of April 1962 that a quarter of a million among its members had registered for military training and in August 1965 it claimed a membership of 3 million (Mortimer 1974, 117 & 366). Some of its members were later arrested for their involvement in the attempted September 1965 coup (Mortimer 1974, 424; Ricklefs 2001, 339-40). In line with the nation-wide trend, local political elites also relied on local gangs and provided them with a degree of impunity to maintain their political and economic goals, thus enabling local gangs and criminals to participate in local political developments (Siegel 1999, 212). The last days of Guided Democracy saw the re-mobilization of youth militia groups of the revolutionary period to contribute to power struggles that culminated in their deployment in the 1965-66 massacres, in which youth militias, such as the NU-affiliated Ansor in East Java and anti-communist thugs backed by the PNI in Bali, played a major part.

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5 The generation of 1945, or Angkatan 45, was a group made up mainly of young nationalists of 1945 who in January 1955, just before the 1955 general election initiated a grouping that would override party divisions and alliances. The group had a wide range of representation from the major parties. See Reeve (1985), p. 113.
The Emasculation of Parties and the Hegemonic Party System

The New Order regime continuously reminded the people of the failure of multi-party parliamentary democracy. Its indoctrination resulted in many young Indonesians growing up with an image of political parties as collectively narrow-minded and self-interested (Bourchier 1994, 51-7). From its beginning, the New Order regime systematically emasculated political parties to prevent them from being a threat to military domination and gave priority to political stability and rapid economic development (Rocamora 1973, 172; Vatikiotis 1994, 236-7; Liddle 1996, 198-200; and Subiantoro 1996, 165). In the meantime, the military became entrenched as a dominant political force in the New Order political structure. The authoritarian-military regime blamed excessive ideological dispute and the absence of a dominant party for the political instability of the previous regimes. Furthermore, the regime propagated the view that the parliamentary system of the first decade of Independence had obstructed the emergence and development of a strong state, which it argued was necessary in achieving economic development and suppressing regional rebellions. Consequently, an ‘anti-politics’ atmosphere emerged as a key feature of Soeharto’s Pancasila Democracy. As Hans Antlov argues, this ‘anti-politics’ legacy of the Soeharto era casts a long shadow on the country’s political developments even after his departure. Political parties continue to be widely viewed as tainted, and politics (politik) is “something of a dirty word, used to describe the motivations behind unwanted and unpopular decisions” (Antlov 2003, 74-5).

‘Depoliticisation’

In anticipating its first general election in 1971, the New Order prevented government employees from joining any political party and imposed the principle of “monoloyalty” to the government. “Monoloyalty” meant that bureaucrats and soldiers were forced to support Golkar, a functional group that had been established by the army to coordinate army-civilian cooperative bodies in 1964. Golkar was originally formed as the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya: Sekber Golkar), a coalition of 97 social and political groups – representing peasants, workers, veterans, women, artists, youth, etc., and claiming to embody the aspirations of all elements of society, thereby reducing the need for political parties. By 1967, some 262 bodies had joined Golkar and one of the biggest was KORPRI (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Civil Servants Corps) (Reeve 1985, 293; Suryadinata 1989, 23). Civil servants were compelled to leave political parties and trade unions and to join KORPRI instead. Besides civil servants, employees of state-owned enterprises also came under a similar ruling that required more than 50 percent of all employees to be registered as members. Since all district and village heads were government officials, Golkar was present down to the village level (Suryadinata 1989, 10-14 & 19-28).

8 For example, in 1992, Interior Minister Rudini was reported to have told members of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (Ikatan Cendekiaan Muslim Indonesia: ICMU) that any move to turn the organization into a political party would “revive the turmoil of the liberal 1950s” (The Straits Times, 9 December 1992: quoted from Bourchier 1994, 59).
9 Muhammad Rynas Rasyid argues that the formation of a strong state underlay the emasculation of political parties during the first years of the New Order regime and the development of a hegemonic party system later on: See Rasyid (1994), Chap III & IV.

Pancasila refers to five principles in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution which guided its drafting and were intended to guide its application: belief in God; a just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy led by the wisdom of deliberation among representatives; and, social justice for all Indonesians. These principles formed the basis of New Order political discourse and purportedly served as a guiding force in Indonesian governance until the fall of Soeharto in 1998. In particular, since the so-called Ommar (organisasi massa, mass organizations) Law of 1985, all interest associations in the community, including the various religious groups, were required to acknowledge Pancasila as their ajaran tungsul (sole ideological foundation): For Soeharto’s conceptualisation of Pancasila Democracy, see his address delivered on 16 August 1967 in Bourchier & Hadiz (2003), pp. 37-41.
Meanwhile, the leftist PKI and the PSI remained banned, and the Masyumi also remained unacceptable because of its involvement in the regional rebellion of 1958. A new party was formed to cater for the former Masyumi electorate, especially the modernizing _santren_ community of West Java and the Outer Islands. In the mean time, the ‘floating mass’ concept was introduced to “immunize the villagers from political activities,” particularly aiming to “cut the mass support of the Islamic parties... which had strong bases at the village level” (Imawan 1989, 290). Whether articulated or not, the underlying assumption of this concept was that the ‘people’ (rakyat) were _bodoh_ (uneducated, unenlightened, stupid, and the like) and therefore should not be involved in political activity (Reeve 1985, 357). With the ‘monoloyalty’ policy imposed on bureaucrats and soldiers, the ‘floating mass’ concept was used to justify the prohibition of parties from organizing at the village level, and as a consequence, “the government actively and directly steered the people to affiliate only with the government’s own party, Golkar” (Imawan 1989, 34).

In January 1973, following the unexpected scale of Golkar’s victory (62.8% of the votes) in the 1971 election, the Soeharto government took another step to emaculate political parties. Four Islamic parties were fused into the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: PPP) and five non-Islamic parties into the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia: PDI). Except at election time, these parties were not to have organizations below district level, but the same restriction did not apply to Golkar since it was considered not as a political party but as a functional group representing mainly the bureaucracy. Even during election campaigns, in contrast to Golkar that had clear programs that were usually formulated and fulfilled with the support of the bureaucracy, the PPP and the PDI could not develop clear platforms due to their lack of adequate resources and instruments to implement them. On the other hand, the independence of the two parties was curtailed by government intervention in the selection processes of party leaderships. Additionally, financial support from the government was often used to facilitate such intervention in their internal affairs. As a result, neither the PPP nor the PDI had the opportunity to develop as credible opposition parties (Juoro 1998, 199).

Therefore, since the 1971 election, the party system in Indonesia resembled a hegemonic party system, in which the government ensured support for its own party (Imawan 1989, 39). Meaningful competition for power was restricted to the military circle and the patronial base of the regime flourished on the basis of the distribution of patronage. Meanwhile, in the arena of dealing with the masses, the New Order regime imposed the ‘depoliticisation’ policy on the general public, on the one hand, and relied on the state’s repressive apparatus to deal with civilian dissidents, on the other (Crouch 1984, 82).

Accordingly, political power was gradually and decisively concentrated in the person of the president rather than in political institutions. As president, Soeharto was granted the right to appoint unelected assembly members, including military representatives, in addition to those elected through general elections (Ward 1974, 7).

At the same time, he was the supreme commander of the military and also chairman of the Board of Control (Dewan Pembina) of Golkar, a position that allowed him to select

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10 Some prominent Masyumi politicians, such as Sjafuddin, Natir, and Buhmaduddin Harahap were involved in the PRRI (Pemerenatah Reperatur Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) rebellion of February 1938 in Sumatra: See, Ricklefs (2001), pp. 318-21.

11 Ali Moertopo crafted this ‘floating mass’ policy as an effort to establish “a healthy political life that carries on development”: See the extract of his article, originally published in 1972, in Bourchier & Hadiz (2003), pp. 45-49.

12 Riwandha Imawan, drawing on various reports published by the Indonesian Election Institute, notes that Golkar gained 65.56 per cent of the votes in the 1971 election (1989, 28), but other sources, such as Rasjid (1994), Ricklefs (2001) and Elson (2001), commonly record that the official result was 62.8 per cent.


14 From this viewpoint, Riwandha Imawan drew on the Bureaucratic Authoritarian model, introduced by Guillermo O’Donnell and applied to Indonesia by Dwight King, which characterized the New Order regime as “limited pluralism” and “state corporatism”; See O’Donnell (1973), King (1982), and Imawan (1989).
the candidates for the MPR and DPR. He was also chairman of various foundations (yayasan) that allowed him to finance political and social activities without relying solely on the government budget (Juoro 1998, 195). The parliament remained a mere formality, mostly echoing the government’s policies. As a result of the persistent process of emasculation, the party system under the New Order regime did not act as a locus through which the people could convey their demands to policy-makers. Instead, the military dominated politics, hampering any development toward a genuine democracy. The coercive power of the military lay in its security apparatus, which extended from the national level down to the villages. In short, throughout its reign, the authoritarian regime exerted rigid control over electoral competition and political parties, while using parliamentary institutions as a façade for military rule (Diamond 1989, 2; Schwarz 1997, 123-4). The systematic emasculation of parties did not only enable the regime to consolidate the foundation for authoritarian rule, but also enhanced the negative perception of parties – political parties were generally described as impotent, corrupt, and submissive – among many Indonesians and not infrequently among the circle of party politicians as well.16

Centralized Corruption and State Premanisme

Under authoritarian rule, corruption continued as an essential factor defining the nature of the regime. There were many cases that revealed massive corruption of the administrative apparatus17 and, as Richard Robison notes, “corruption was not only conspicuous in material terms, but symbolized a separation of the state from the people”

16 Michael R. J. Valtikis points out that “Soeharto has used Goelar as an incubator for fresh political blood, but at the same time he has restrained the party from developing any degree of independence from the executive” through, for instance, controlling party funds: See Valtikis (1994), p. 240.
17 Hans Antlov also points out that, ‘depoliticisation” has had the effect of depriving ordinary citizens and prospective leaders alike of critical knowledge about how to engage in politics’: See Antlov (2003), p. 75.
18 Examples can be taken from such cases as that of Pertamina in March 1975, in which the state corporation could not meet the short-term debts of US$ 10.5 billion, and the Bank Bumi Days case of 1978, in which US$ 84 million of credits were overdue: See Robison (1986), pp. 153-4 & 228.

and “the appropriation and abuse of power” (Robison 1986, 160).18 The government responded to blatant corruption cases by taking some legal action, for example during the 1975-76 economic crisis, but usually as “a short-term response to a situation which temporarily posed a major threat to the Indonesian economy” (Robison 1986, 244).

Hans Antlov also notes that the inclination of the New Order elites to look at “what could be gained rather than taking a dogmatic or ideological standpoint” led to a view of politics in which “people do not hold strong values and where short-term returns are more important than ideological principles” (Antlov 2003, 76).

A noteworthy feature of corruption during the New Order was the state authorities’ tight control of extensive undemocratic political practices among political elites, which are now popularly named as ‘KKN’ (corruption, collusion, and nepotism). People at least could comfort themselves by the fact that there was a centralized control over those practices (Aspinall & Fealy 2003, 5). Since then, democracy has altered the political dynamics of corruption “by greatly increasing competition between political parties and rival candidates” (Dick 2001, 35). As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV, the downfall of Soeharto has been marked by the fragmentation of this centralized system and its reconstitution in decentralised and more competitive networks of contesting power at the local level.

In parallel with the centralized pattern of corruption, the New Order regime from its early days monopolized violence of not only the state’s official security forces but also gangsters or criminals, which Timothy Lindsey later identified as “state premanisme” (Lindsey 2001, 289-90). The domination of the military in politics was accompanied by its practice of making use of gangs and youth organizations such as Pemuda Pancasila, in addition to its own forces, to terrorise specific communities for
political and commercial ends (Wessel 2001, 71). Under the protection of the state, “Leaders of paramilitary youth organizations played the role of political enforcers during the New Order period, providing an unofficial service of intimidation for the regime and its officials in concert with the security apparatus proper” (Hadiz 2003, 127).

The political developments since 1998, especially the expansion of local power and local interests, were also distinguished by the transformation of state *premanisme* with the penetration of gangs or criminal groups into local political institutions and thus the decision-making process. Drawing on his observations in North Sunantra and Central Java, Vedi R. Hadiz points out that the New Order *premanisme* has found “new opportunities to enhance their wealth, power and social status by ensconcing themselves as direct holders of political power” (Hadiz 2003, 127). The persistent involvement of political gangsters and criminal groups in politics-through mobilization and protection by political elites since Independence and the transformed features of political *premanisme* since 1998 will be discussed in detail in Chapter V.

**Multi-party Politics in the Post-Soeharto Era**

The previous two sections have revisited the history of unsuccessful multi-party parliamentary politics during the 1950s and the emasculated political parties under the following Guided Democracy and the New Order. The following two sections examine the political developments since Soeharto’s fall in May 1998. This section analyses the electoral and party politics during the transitional period and the following changes in the political system, the hallmark of which may be the four sets of constitutional amendments during the period of 1999-2002. It shows that the revitalized multi-party parliamentary politics contains some constraints in that the party and electoral system, which is based on proportional representativeness, has shown its relative weakness in creating and strengthening linkages of responsiveness and accountability by party representatives in the local assemblies to their constituents.

**Lifting of the Ban on the Formation of New Parties and the New Election Law**

Following the resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998, his successor, former Vice President, B. J. Habibie, found that he lacked the authority of his predecessor and was forced to seek broader public support. He quickly revoked the licensing of the press and the restrictions on forming political parties, unions and professional bodies, and announced that a general election would be held. Under the old law, the number of legal political parties had been restricted to two – the PDI and the PPP – in addition to Golkar, but the law was soon ignored as dozens of new parties formed since May 1998. New electoral laws were eventually passed and enabled 48 parties among more than 150 new parties to contest the promised election, which was held on 7 June 1999. The relatively free and fair elections in June 1999, which in turn led to a new democratic government under the Abdurrahman Wahid – Megawati Soekarnoputri leadership, were probably the most remarkable achievement of Habibie’s interregnum government.

As a result of the 1999 general elections six of the old and new parties obtained more than two per cent of the votes. The PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*, Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri emerged as the largest party with almost 34 per cent of the vote. Since Megawati was removed from the chairpersonship of the PDI in 1996, the party has been identified as a

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19 Besides the 1945 constitution, President Habibie seemed to be able to legitimate his succession only by meeting popular aspirations for political freedom and representation, and the restoration of some semblance of economic stability. In addition, since he had a strong ambition to be elected in the coming presidential election, he tried to create a grassroots support base by initiating reforms: See Christopher (2001) and Aspinall (2002).

20 The PDI-P has *de facto* existed since Megawati Soekarnoputri was ousted from her chairpersonship in 1996 by the faction of Suryadi, the former chairman of the PDI, with the support from the Soeharto government. However, the PDI continued as two factions: a remnant of the government-sponsored PDI and the PDI-P led by Megawati until 10 October 1998, when the establishment of the PDI-P was officially declared and Megawati Soekarnoputri was elected head of the party at a large convention in Bali.
reformist-nationalist party attracting not only much of the PDI’s mass base but also economically and culturally marginalized groups of society. Golkar, which quickly removed Soeharto as head of the party’s advisory board in the party’s extraordinary congress of July 1998, secured second position with 22.5 per cent, mainly drawing support from the non-Java population. The survival of Golkar, despite its huge decline from 74.5 per cent in the 1997 election, can be attributed partially to its ideological-religious middle position between the nationalist PDI-P and four Islamic parties among the six major parties.

The PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), founded by Abdurrahman Wahid, took third place with 13 per cent with its strong support base among traditionalist Muslim organizations and communities, especially the 30 million members of the NU community. The PPP, led by Hamzah Haz, took fourth position with 11 per cent. Since its emergence as a result of the merger of four Islamic parties in 1973, the party has remained as a fusion of diverse Islamic streams and thus, has support in both the traditionalist and modernist Muslim communities. The PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party), led by Amien Rais, came fifth with 7 per cent. Although there is no official relationship with the modernist Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic social organization with about 28 million members, the party appeals to modernist Muslim circles in urban areas. The PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Moon and Star Party), another modernist Islamic party led by Yusri Izha Mahendra, took sixth position with around 2 per cent (Evans 2003, 29-31).

Two consequences of the election results deserve special consideration in terms of the political structure of the post-Soeharto period. First, the fragmentation of the party system emerged as a significant factor influencing the stability of the new government. On the other hand, despite the fragmented party system, both national and local assemblies have been substantially strengthened at the expense of the previously dominant executive. The fragmentation of the power structure within the assemblies and the accompanying reduction of the power of the executive demonstrated its potentially disastrous effect during the 2001 impeachment process. The impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth President of Indonesia, has been usually understood as a case demonstrating the lack of cohesion of the coalition-based government and substantial expansion of power of the national assembly that, very unlikely under the previous regime, could initiate an impeachment process against the president. While his party (PKB) took just around 11 per cent of the seats in the national assembly, he had aroused general concern about his erratic and unpredictable statements and behaviour.

Since early 2000, he had faced the corruption accusations, popularly known as “Buloggate” and “Bruneiigate”.

Despite some theatrical moments, including his failed attempt to issue an emergency decree and suspend the national assembly, he was eventually impeached and succeeded by Megawati Soekarnoputri in the July 2001 MPR special session.

Second, related to the first aspect, the election results confirmed the conventional groupings of political parties into nationalist parties on one side, and Islamic parties on the other (Sulistyo 2002, 82). There appear to be some similarities to the political structure of the 1950s. It is perhaps because most parties still rely on the charismatic personalities of party leaders, while many ordinary Indonesians retain the ailean-pattern voting behaviour. If seen from this perspective, PDI-Perjuangan appears to have a similar support base as the old PNI, the PKB seems to share the old NU’s

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21 In January 2000, a special committee of the national assembly (DPR) released its report on cases involving the President’s mishandling of funds from the rice-trading agency, Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik, Logistics Affairs Board) (Rp. 35 billions) and the donation from the Sultan of Brunei (US$ 2 millions). The report stated that President Wahid was in violation of anti-corruption laws.

22 In addition to the nationalist vs. Islamic dimension, Kevin R. Evans also distinguishes dividing lines between the six major parties according to several different dimensions, such as elitist vs. populist, pro-New Order vs. anti-New Order, and Java vs. non-Java: For further detailed analysis, see Evans (2003), pp. 31-7.

23 Ailean was recognized as one of key factors in voting behaviour of the electorate as “a comprehensive pattern of social integration” in Indonesia: See Geertz (1959), p. 37.
support base, and several Islamic parties seem to have inherited the base of support of the old Masyumi. A deeper examination would result in an interesting picture, but would also require a longer period of observation to identify the remaining effects of the aliran-style of political groupings.

Nonetheless, at least two points can be made here. One is that aliran is a socio-cultural, rather than a political, concept that reveals the ethnic, religious, and social cleavages in society. Thus, this concept is an explanatory variable for examining the electorate’s voting pattern, rather than a variable in explicating political-ideological orientations of parties. As an extreme argument, Al Chaidar defines it as a “primordial attachment” (ikatan primordial) based on idealism, emotion, and even romanticism (Chaidar 1999, 18-9). As some foreign scholars might have become aware, however, Indonesians themselves have scarcely tried to articulate the concept of aliran to explain their political alignments with certain political parties. Many Indonesians may retain their attachment to the aliran-pattern by supporting certain political parties, but the factors lying beneath this attachment have changed with the economic and political changes of the past four decades. For example, the division between abangan and santri suggested by Clifford Geertz (1960, 4-6) in his original understanding of aliran now appears to say very little about the society. Now, it is necessary to consider capitalist development and the consequent growth of the middle class and expansion of the urban working class during the last two decades of the New Order period in order to understand the changed political-ideological structure of Indonesian society (Bourchier & Hadiz 2003, 16). The other point is that the groupings of parties into the abangan-nationalists vs. santri-Muslims scheme in the 1950s may be insufficient to explain voting behaviour today, considering that the dividing line between political forces now must take account of the status quo vs. pro-reform scheme.

The election results determined the membership of the legislatures of all levels, from the national and provincial to district. Among 500 members of the DPR, 462 were elected as a result of the general election, while 38 were appointed representatives of the armed forces (TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army) and the police (Polri: Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Indonesian National Police). In addition to the DPR members, the 700-member MPR consisted of 135 regional representatives to which each of 27 provincial assemblies elected five and 65 functional representatives appointed by the president. Provincial and district assemblies were formed in the same way as the DPR, including the representatives from the TNI/Polri. Since then, Indonesia’s political system has gone through further substantial changes, so that it is necessary to briefly examine the changes introduced by four sets of constitutional amendments during the period of 1999-2002.

Political Reform and the Constitutional Amendments

Despite a high degree of continuity of personnel from the Soeharto era, some basic political reforms, including reforms of the electoral and party system, and two regional autonomy laws were adopted under Habibie’s interregnum government. Among other noteworthy reforms were the abolition of the ‘dual function’ (dawi fungsi) doctrine of the armed forces, the separation of the police from the defence force, the reduction of military representation in the elected bodies, the ratification of the core conventions of the ILO, and the abolition of the press licensing system (Mishra 2002, 11; Anwar 2001; and Aspinall 2002). The Habibie government also paved the way toward constitutional reform that was implemented under the Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri governments.

As a matter of fact, the 1945 Constitution was a temporary one adopted in the context of preparing for independence from the Dutch colonial regime. It did not even
affirm the principles under which the nation should be run, but instead only prescribed its underlying ‘spirit’. Two former presidents, Soekarno and Soeharto, emphasized its “spiritual” quality as an embodiment of the national ideology with the result that its amendment became unimaginable and illegitimate during their rule. In Soeharto’s wake, there have been different interpretations of the constitution. Some argued that the president and parliament had equal powers and positions in the original 1945 constitution (e.g., Ignas Kleden, Jakarta Post, 9 Aug 2001). According to this argument, the president was in no position to dissolve the parliament while the latter had no political capability and legal right to impeach the president. In fact, the case of the July 2001 MPR special session, in which the then President Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached, demonstrated that the parliament could initiate the impeachment process by issuing its memorandum and summoning a special session of the MPR to consider and decide actions. However, the whole process was characterised by ambiguity and confusion caused by contending interpretations of the constitution. In the meantime, other analyses argued that Indonesia’s political system stipulated by the constitution was something much closer to a parliamentary one, with the MPR being established as the highest institution of state (NDI 2002b).

Some further significant changes to democratise the country’s political system proceeded at the consecutive annual sessions of the MPR during 1999-2002, which produced four amendment packages of the 1945 Constitution. As a consequence, Indonesia “has been changed from an integralistic state with an all-powerful highest institution of state (MPR) to a state with constitutional checks and balances and with separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary” (NDI 2002c). More specifically, the constitutional amendments “have placed limits on the power of the president and strengthened the capacity of the parliament (DPR) to check president power” (Crouch 2003, 16). With the president and vice-president being directly elected by the voters from 2004, it could be cautiously predicted that the equally democratic legitimacy of both a directly elected president and the legislature established as a result of general elections, which is unlikely to produce a absolute majority party, might bring about a face-off between the two institutions.24

In contrast to the old system under which the president and vice-president were elected in separate votes by the MPR, from 2004 the president and vice-president will be elected as a single team directly in a nation-wide presidential election. To be elected, a team of candidates should win an absolute majority of the votes in the nation as a whole (50 per cent plus one) and 20 per cent or more in at least half the provinces. If no team meets the criteria, a second round of popular balloting will be held between the top two pairs of candidates.25 A directly elected president and vice-president can be expected to attract greater legitimacy from their popular mandate than if elected by the legislature alone. At the same time, the constitutional amendments limited the president and vice-president to two five-year terms, and also restricted the authority of president.

The dismissal process of the president and/or vice-president has been made clearer. The president and vice-president can only be removed from office for breach of the constitution or moral turpitude, and not on policy grounds. The MPR is authorized to dismiss the president and/or vice-president on the proposal of the DPR if he/she is proved to have breached laws in regard to treason, corruption, bribery, or other behaviour unsuitable as a state leader. Before initiating the dismissal process, the DPR must request the new Constitutional Court to investigate the case, and its proposal to recommend dismissal should be adopted by at least 2/3 of those in attendance, who should make up at least 2/3 of the members. The president and/or vice-president have the right to provide a defence to the MPR, which has to meet within 30 days after

24 For further discussion of the complicated effects of the combination of presidential and multi-party system, see Mainwaring (1993).
25 For a further detailed explanation of the electoral system for the president and vice-president from 2004, see NDI (2003c).
receiving the proposal from the DPR. The MPR session should be attended by at least three quarters of its members, and its decision has to be supported by at least 2/3 of those present.

On the other hand, the DPR recovers its dominant role in the legislative process, and the position of the legislature has been enhanced through the acknowledgement of its rights of interpellation, inquiry, and immunity, as well as the elimination of non-elected seats. In particular, the removal of the formerly non-elected military, regional and functional representatives from all the representative bodies enhanced the legitimacy of the legislature. From 2004, a separate Regional Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah: DPD) will replace the regional representatives in the MPR who were previously elected by the provincial assemblies, constituting a second chamber in a semi-bicameral system. Each province has the same number of representatives at the DPD, which is therefore most likely to “shift the weight of the MPR away from Java and towards the Outer Islands” (Crouch 2003, 18). Unlike the parliamentary election of both the national (DPR) and regional (DPRD) levels in which party competition will take place, individual candidates can run for the DPD. In the meantime, the authority of the MPR is restricted to consider constitutional amendments, to swear in the elected president and vice-president, to conduct elections in cases of casual vacancy for vice-president and double casual vacancies for president and vice-president, and to decide on the action to follow a ruling by the Constitutional Court that an impeachment charge is well grounded (NDI 2002a).

To summarize, the overall process of constitutional amendments during the period of 1999-2002 reflects the post-authoritarian context of post-Soharto Indonesia, breathing new enthusiasm for a democratic and decentralized state. However, the remaining tasks are no less important than the achievements so far. Therefore, despite a number of substantial achievements, Indonesia must wait at least until the 2004 general and presidential elections to see how those achievements practically will affect the country’s political life.

Electoral Reform

Since the fourth constitutional amendment in August 2002, the DPR has finalised the revision of laws on political parties, general elections, and the structure and composition of the MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD, as well as a new law on presidential election. The party-list proportional representation (PR) system remains as the basic framework of parliamentary elections. Under the party-list PR system, the central boards of parties have exerted “considerable discretion to form a post-election list of winning candidates” (IFES 2000, 6; Rasyid 2003, 65). In the June 1999 elections, parties were allowed to nominate up to twice as many candidates as there were seats apportioned to a province before the elections. Then, in the elections, voters balloted for the party list and not for a specific candidate, and the actual winning candidates were decided by the parties’ performance at the district level, so that those seats won with a full quota were supposed to go to the candidates who represented the party in that district. In practice, however, when the minimum quota of votes was not met, a party could change the name of its first candidate with the second name in line, or with another candidate from another district.

This practice, as Hermawan Sulistyö points out, “usually involves the practices of money politics” and also gives too much discretion to the central boards of parties “to decide which candidates become elected members of parliament, even after voting has

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26 The laws adopted by the DPR can come into effect after 30 days even without the president’s signature.

27 An electoral system has an effect on the nature and characteristics of a party system, especially with respect to the relative strength, structure or social base of parties: See Blondel (1995), pp. 188-194.

28 The quota for obtaining a full seat was calculated for each province by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats apportioned to that province. See NDI (1999a).
taken place" (Sulistyo 2002, 80). On the other hand, as Ichlasul Amal points out, it tends to raise issues concerning the distribution of “rewards” within parties, and also links dissatisfaction with the received reward to the internal fragmentation of parties. In addition, he also notes that local assembly members feel very “vulnerable” because they can be “kicked out” (dilempar) by the party leaderships in the next election. The vulnerability or insecurity, he explains, tends to give local assembly members incentives to rely on preman groups as their support base and makes them less concerned about the risk of involving themselves in the practices of ‘money politics’.  

Although there is broad support for the current electoral system on the grounds that it ensures representatives of diverse groups in the legislatures, the practical effect of the system during the past four years in Indonesia has often led to “low political accountability of representatives towards voters” (Sulistyo 2002, 89). Some local assembly members actually do not live in the sub-districts that they represent, and even after elected, direct communication and meeting between local assembly members and their constituents rarely occurs. Therefore, although many Indonesians have a great passion for their national-level party leaders, it is not infrequent that they do not even know who represents them in the district/municipal and provincial assemblies. However, reforming the electoral system to be more effective and accountable does not appear to be as easy as to maintain it, particularly considering the regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages of Indonesian society. Realistic alternatives are very limited.

Another debate with regard to the electoral reform has focussed on elections for the executive heads of the provincial and district governments, which were formerly in effect appointed by the central government – despite going through the form of an election. Under the New Order regime, the local assemblies usually proposed three people as candidates for the position of head of local government, with the final decision among those three lying in the hands of the central government. The president decided who were to become governors, while the Minister of Home Affairs chose the regents (bupati) and mayors (walkot). Neither the president nor the minister were bound to select the candidates who had gained the most votes in the local assemblies, and in some cases, the successful candidates were in fact those with the lowest level of support at the local levels (Rasyid 2003, 64-65).

Since the formation of new local assemblies in September 1999, local executive heads are now to be elected by local assembly members. However, as Ryaas Rasyid notes, few of the local government leaders elected since January 2000 have been free from public allegations of having tried to bribe local assembly members in order to secure their positions (Rasyid 2003, 66). With the increasingly blatant practices of ‘money politics’ in local politics, some civil society organizations have called for a direct election system, arguing that “high quality representatives who reflect the voters’ interests will only be elected as a result of an electoral system that makes those elected directly responsible to the voters” (Tempo, 4 June 2001; Koalisi ORNOP31, 2001; and Christopher 2001, 27). The party leaders of major parties tend to keep their strong preference for the current election system, which allows only party representatives in local assemblies to vote, so that fundamental changes, such as adoption of the proposal

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29 It was reported that 97 out of 462 elected DPR members (21%) as a result of the 1999 general elections represented districts other than those to which they had been originally assigned. In other words, after the elections parties moved these candidates from the districts to which they had been previously assigned. The consequence of these developments was to reduce the significance of the district element in the new representative system: See NDI (1999b), pp. 6-7.

30 Interview with Ichlasul Amal, political scientist and former Rector of the Gadjah Mada University, 18 January 2002, Yogyakarta. Similarly, Ryadi Gunawan, former member of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly (PDI-P), pointed out that there was a common concern in many regions with local assembly members’ commitment to not only their own parties but, more significantly, their tasks as legislators (Interview, 11 December 1999, Yogyakarta).

31 This NGO coalition initiated an embryonic movement for the overthrow of the 1945 Constitution since the time of the Habibie’s interregnum government, inspired by the successful movements in Thailand and the Philippines, which were also initiated by civil society organizations. Eleven NGOs comprise it: CISTRO, GSP, ICW, INSE, KIPP Indonesia, PBHI, PSHK, Solidaritas Perempuan, WALHI, YAPPiKA, and YLBHI.
for direct election, are hardly expected. However, the direct election of local executive heads may be worth considering and pursuing from the perspective that one of the main aims of decentralization is to deepen democracy “by bringing decision-making closer to the people and producing more ‘rooted’ public policies” (Antlov 2003, 84). Otherwise, some legal and institutional mechanisms for monitoring and punishing the “floating voters,” those local assembly members who are willing to sell their votes, can be developed and established as a way of lessening the chance for engaging in corrupt deals during the election process.32

The party system was hardly touched on during the discussion of the four packages of constitutional amendments. The amended 1945 Constitution specifies that the elections for the national and local assemblies, except for membership of the DPD, should be contested by political parties. The candidates for the president and vice-president are also to be nominated by political parties or party coalitions. As a consequence, the significance of political parties in the political process has been further enhanced, and Jakarta leaders of major political parties seemed mainly concerned with maintaining the central boards’ control over their representatives in both the national and local assemblies (Ellis 2002, 8; O’Rourke 2002, 199).

In fact, the revised party law (Law No. 31 of 2002) even enhanced the tight control of the parties’ central boards over the elected assembly members. For instance, Article 12 stipulates that elected members of the DPR and DPRD can be replaced midterm on the grounds of withdrawal of party membership by the party, or breach of the law causing removal from office (NDI 2003b; Kompas, 10 July 2003). This ‘recall’ system, which was the norm under the New Order, was not allowed under the former Law No. 4 of 1999 on the structure and composition of the national and local assemblies.

Decentralization and Local Politics

This section investigates the historical background of the idea of decentralization in Indonesia, and the content and effects of the implementation of regional autonomy from January 2001. The regional autonomy outlined by Law No. 22 and No. 25 of 1999 particularly has enhanced the position of the local assemblies by giving the power to elect and hold accountable local heads of governments, to initiate and promulgate statutes and regulations, and to approve budgets (Rasyid 2003, 64). After reviewing the historical background of the idea of decentralization in Indonesian history, this section will show that while regional autonomy has breathed dynamism into local politics, the substantially expanded authority of local assemblies has not always been accompanied by institutionalisation of democratic practices.

Historical Background

Historically, the idea of decentralization has existed on the top of Indonesia’s political agenda since its Independence. Law No. 1 of 1957 was designed to increase the power of elected legislative assemblies in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities and provided for the gradual elimination of the authority of the traditional aristocratic-

32 Amrith Widodo names wistily this type of local assembly members as “floating voters”—echoing the ‘floating mass’ under the New Order. For his observation of the electoral practices of local assembly members in the 2000 regent election of Blora, Central Java, see Widodo (2003), especially pp. 185-88.
bureaucratic class (pamong pradja) (Feith 1962, 552). According to this law, the regents/mayors (bupati/walikota) and governor, the executive heads in the district and provincial levels of governance, would be elected and thus be held by party politicians and no longer by the civil service corps (Amal 1994, 215). However, this devolution of power did not take place largely due to the regional rebellions in the late 1950s, which eventually paved the way to the development of a highly centralized government. In early 1959, Soekarno initiated moves to concentrate executive powers in the hands of the president and issued a decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly and reintroducing the 1945 constitution on July 5, 1959. The decree also revoked the provisions of Law No. 1 of 1957 allowing for the election of the governors, who now were to be again appointed by the central government (Kahin 1994, 207-8; Amal 1994).

The New Order regime, which succeeded in exerting political pressure at all levels of society through its hierarchical administrative system and the military’s territorial structure, also applied some limited decentralization measures. Law No. 5 of 1974, the foundation of the New Order’s regional government system, designated local legislative assemblies as a part of the provincial and district local government system. A local assembly, therefore, was chaired by a person elected from their own members, but indirectly under the supervision of the formally elected governor or regent/mayor. The central government dominated most local affairs ranging from the nomination of the local government heads to the budget, favouring the government bureaucracy in its power relations with local assemblies (Astuti 1994, 149). As a result, as administrative and fiscal centralization escalated, there was a growing resistance in several regions outside Java to the consequent inefficiency stifling regional economic development. Meanwhile, some elements in the central government began considering the need for some degree of decentralization (Kahin 1994, 211; Aini 2002, 129-136).

Institutional Rearrangements

Compared to the previous attempts at decentralization, the regional autonomy (otonomi daerah) scheme of 1999, outlined in Law No. 22 on Local Government and Law No. 25 on The Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and Regional Governments, were designated to devolve a substantial degree of authority to the regions. The main aim of regional autonomy is “to bring the governments closer to their constituents so that government services can be delivered more effectively and efficiently” (Usman 2002, 1). Law No. 22 of 1999 transfers functions, personnel and assets from the central government to provincial as well as district/municipal governments.\(^{33}\) While provincial governments have a dual status as autonomous regions and also as representatives of the central government, decentralization is focused on the district/municipal level. It assigns most functions to the district level, including the devolution of expenditure responsibilities, public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, communications, industry and trade, capital investment, environment, land, cooperative, and manpower affairs. The changed structure of governance reflecting regional autonomy can be sketched as Figure II-1.

Although it is premature to estimate, several points that have emerged during the early days of implementation of the devolution of power to local political institutions can be addressed. First, the Law No. 22 and No. 25 of 1999 contradict each other at least in spirit. Despite the substantial changes, funding for decentralized functions is still to be provided mainly through a general allocation from the central government.

Decentralization in budgetary matters is mainly limited to expenditure, with no new revenue-raising power transferred to local governments. Responding to this, local governments have tried to seek out new sources of revenue through increasing local

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33 Districts (kebupaten) and municipalities (kota/kabupaten) are technically the same level of government, but distinguished on the basis of whether the administration is located in a rural area (district) or an urban area (municipality). Both administrative territories are divided into sub-districts (kecamatan), which are further divided into villages (desa in rural areas and kelurahan in urban areas).
taxes and levies. At the same time, there has been growing concern among business groups and civil society organizations that the increased enthusiasm of local governments to raise revenue would divert the main aim of decentralization by promoting such old practices as corruption and favouritism in local political institutions.

Figure II-1. Changed Structure of Governance under Regional Autonomy Laws (1999) and Four Sets of Constitutional Amendments (1999-2002)

Central Government (President) elected directly in a presidential election from 2004

Provincial Government (Governor) elected indirectly by DPRD I

District Government (Bupati or Walikota) elected indirectly by DPRD II

Sub-district

Canal (appointed by Bupati)

Village Heads (appointed by Canal)

People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)

People's Representative Assembly (DPR) with Regional Representative Assembly (DPRD)

Provincial Assembly (DPRD I) approx. 40-50 members, 4-5 elected from each district (kebupatens or kotamadyas) on the basis of proportional representation

District Assembly (DPRD II) approx. 40 members, 2-3 elected from each sub-district (kecamatan) on the basis of proportional representation

Village Council (BPD)* approx. 10-15 members, elected by all residents for each 2-3 hamlets (desa)

* As a part of the regional autonomy scheme, the BPD (Badan Perwakilan Desa, Village Representative Body) has been established in four districts of Yogyakarta since early 2001, and each district government was responsible for legislating related regulations, consulting with village communities, and implementing the elections.

In addition to financing issues, the central government has shown its inconsistency in the implementation of related laws and regulations by revoking several powers originally granted to the regions, including the responsibility for land management. It is also pointed out that the central government has had to clarify ambiguity regarding the transition process and related supporting regulations (Ahmad & Hofman 2000, 6-7; Usman 2002, 5-6; and Rasyid 2003, 67). For example, the central government issued a regulation concerning "Supervision and Control of the Performance of Local Governments" after the implementation process revealed conflicts arising from ambivalence regarding the division of power between provincial and district/municipal administrations. In the regional autonomy scheme, the position of the provinces is not as fixed in relation to the districts/municipalities as under the former centralized regime. It designates the role of the provinces to be confined to mediating disputes between districts, facilitating cross-district development, and representing the central government within the region. However, the practical problem that has emerged since its application is that many district/municipal governments tend to see themselves as sub-ordinate to the central rather than the provincial government, so that it has been frequently observed that provincial and district/municipal levels of governance tend to ignore each other. From this viewpoint, Widjajanti I Suharyo points out that the inter-governmental arrangements in the division of authority and functions are still too vague and oversimplified in Law No. 22 and No. 25 (Suharyo 2002, 13). Additionally, although the focus of autonomy is the district level of governance, in reality its autonomous power is largely limited. The devolution of functions has been selectively based on regional preparedness, but the criteria for assessing preparedness are far from clear. As a result, many regional governments are reported to "have promulgated their own regulations, based largely on local interests or concerns rather than on national law or the broader public interest" (Rasyid 2003, 67).
Local Dynamics in the Decentralization Process

One underlying premise of regional autonomy is that district and municipal governments have a better understanding of the needs and aspirations of their communities than the central government. Also, in line with the "reformasi" effort to eradicate the practices of KKN within the bureaucracy, the scheme is based on "the need to strengthen local legislatures" in relation to their executive counterparts (Usman 2002, 1). Local governments are now authorized to implement public policies, while local assemblies are provided with the functions of legislation, budget, and supervision of local executive heads. More specifically, local assemblies are authorized to legislate local regulations (peraturan daerah: perda), to elect the governors or regents/mayors, to evaluate the responsibility report (laporan pertanggungjawaban) submitted by the governors or regents/mayors, and to supervise general administration of local governments, including the budget and the implementation of local regulations.

The new role of the local assemblies in electing and requiring accountability from the local government heads is "a dramatic change from the previous system" (Rasyid 2003, 64). Therefore, it can be expected that the strengthened local assemblies would revive and institutionalise responsive and efficient democratic institutions in the regions (Yudoyono 2001, 54; Aini 2002, 137). In fact, the revitalized multi-party parliamentary politics in the regions has transformed the image of local assemblies to be more open and responsive. Many local assemblies have affirmed their accessibility to the public through such institutions as open plenary sessions in which the public can observe the lively discussion among their representatives, regular meeting with representatives of different interest groups, and an "audience" system for ordinary citizens.37

However, the implementation of decentralization has revealed several problems. First, although there are some encouraging signs that "local assemblies are operating in a more accountable and more democratic fashion than ever before," the changing patterns have not always been supported by adequate technical skills and professionalism (Usman 2002, 12; Rasyid 2003, 65). Some sources point out that many members of local assemblies, especially at the district level, are lacking in formal education and general political experience. Although it may be problematic at the beginning of their service period, the lack of experience and skills can be improved by diverse training programs and the process of learning by doing. Nonetheless, the reported "money politics" in which local assembly members are frequently involved raises a very different issue. Here are disclosed some cases in which local politicians slipped through the strong grip of the central boards of political parties over their representatives in local assemblies. In fact, the post-authoritarian syndrome that has been revealed by the practices of local assembly members requires special investigation. For example, many local assemblies have sought out salaries and extra perquisites excessively while the allocation for such sectors as health and education has decreased.38 With the changed power relationship with local governments, some local assemblies also have taken advantage of the funds made available to local assembly members outside their own budget.

On the other hand, the position of local executive officials has weakened in relation to local assemblies. In some cases, local assemblies rejected the responsibility meeting. The record of the "audience" activity of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly from September 1999 to early 2002 showed a tendency of decrease in its frequency, which seemed to result in declining attention by the secretariat to the related issues. The district-level assemblies (e.g., the municipal and Sleman) make little or no effort to record that kind of activity.

37 For some cases of salary increase of local assembly members in selected regions, see Table 6 in Usman (2002), p. 14. It shows, for example, a 460 per cent increase in West Sumba Province and a 117 per cent increase in East Java province. On the other hand, the revised 2001 Yogyakarta provincial budget shows that while the expenditures for the provincial assembly has increased more than 160 per cent compared to the previous year (from Rp. 5.9 to 9.7 billion), the education sector receives less than 1 per cent of the provincial budget and the allocation for empowering women was removed. See Kompas (28 April 2001), Bernas (1 May 2001), and Chapter IV of this thesis for the budgetary issues.
reports submitted by governors or regents/mayors at the end of every fiscal year, which sometimes led to their dismissal (Imawan 2002). Marcus Mietzner also notes that, under the changed power relationship, it is now local executive officials who have often to use bribery or financial reward as “the only effective means of maintaining power” (Mietzner 2003, 245). Consequently, the initial popular expectation has quickly evaporated as democratic institutions such as the ‘audience’ with assembly members or Saturday ‘morning coffee’ at local assembly, as having become no more than ‘democratic rituals’. This ‘ritualization’ of political institutions can be understood from the perspective that John Pemberton develops in his interpretation of elections, wrapped up as “festivals of democracy” (pesta demokrasi) by the New Order regime from the early 1980s (Pemberton 1994, 5). The democratic procedures in post-Soeharto local assemblies still tend to be performed as ‘ritual events’ (upacara), leaving uncertain the question of whether they eventually lead to their intended outcomes. On the other hand, the ‘anti-politics’ atmosphere of society is still pervasive as shown by the growing public suspicion that the devolved authority has provided local party politicians with opportunities to gain or maintain power only through deals with other local elites as well as those in Jakarta (Ratnawati 2002, 93).

The Intersection between the Authoritarian Past and the Democratic Future

A continuously recurring question since the devolution of power to the regions is whether it would eventually broaden and institutionalize mass participation in local decision-making, or will only facilitate the growth of ‘little kings’ (raja-raja kecil) in the regions. It is still premature to answer the question. Nonetheless, many domestic and international observers, as well as local media and civil society activists, have already pointed out that new party representatives in local assemblies have imported the previous bureaucratic practices and cultures into their newly empowered institutions.

The apparently undemocratic practices of the post-Soeharto era, such as seeking out excessive perquisites, vote-selling in elections for local executive heads, and relying on gangs or criminal groups in mass mobilization and other political activities, are not unknown to Indonesian politics. Nonetheless, the exact patterns seemed to be quite different under the authoritarian and centralized New Order regime. For example, there might be very little chance for either national or local assembly members to sell their votes in the elections for local executive heads, since it was the Minister of Home Affairs or President Soeharto who made the final decisions. The use of violence through gangs or criminal groups was also mostly contained and monopolized by the state’s authority during the New Order period.

The political structure has dramatically changed, and political parties, which were systematically emasculated by the former authoritarian regimes, have re-emerged as a foundation of Indonesia’s more democratic and decentralized political life. However, the long-standing undemocratic practices of the past have not disappeared but diffused into local political institutions. Local assembly members now tend to translate their expanded power simply into more money for him/herself. On the other hand, building and consolidating close relationships with constituents seems to be less significant to be (re-) elected as local assembly members, given that the central boards of parties will eventually make final decisions in distributing seats among potential candidates. In the meanwhile, gangs or criminal groups have quickly localized themselves in the wake of the centralized control system over violence and successfully become entrenched in local politics. They are now in charge of the ‘security-cum-mobilization’ market that has been substantially expanded as a result of the revitalized multi-party politics, and exercise their influence over the decision-making process.
through their connections with party politicians and sometimes their own leaders in local assemblies.

These observations of the transformation and decentralization of old undemocratic practices in local politics do not mean that Indonesia is confined by what the country inherited from its authoritarian past. Rather, what should be emphasized is that the country is still in the intersection between its authoritarian past and its democratic future, and that it is crucial to recognize what has been happening on the intersection in order to bridge the gap between formal institutional changes and substantive democratisation of political attitudes and practices in the day-to-day political process.

Chap III.
Party and Parliamentary Politics in Post-Soeharto Yogyakarta

The collapse of an authoritarian regime generally entails profound transformations in the society’s political institutions. This certainly occurred in Indonesia, where the end of the 32-year reign of the Soeharto regime was followed by fundamental changes in the country’s politics. Among such changes, the 1999 general elections and the implementation of regional autonomy since 2001 have received special attention, as they were widely seen to signal democratisation of the country’s politics, in particular at the local level. Importantly, the regional autonomy scheme has conferred on local governments an unprecedented degree of autonomy in the country’s post-Independence history. At the core of this transformation was the overhaul and revitalization of local parliamentary politics. This chapter examines the institutionalised outcomes of formal democratisation and decentralization in one particular region of Indonesia, that of Yogyakarta, Central Java.

In September 1999, a provincial assembly and five district assemblies were formed in Yogyakarta as a result of the June general elections. Many people of the region seemed to expect that the emergence of local assemblies as new loci of power would create and institutionalise more responsive and effectively representative political institutions in the region. However, as this chapter explains, political developments in the region during the past four years have diverged from the popular expectations about more democratic – transparent, accountable, responsive, etc. – political processes. Instead, the regime change at the national level, the following overhaul of the political
The overall argument of this chapter is that the resurrection of multi-party parliamentary politics in Yogyakarta has allowed local political institutions, represented by local chapters of major political parties and local assemblies, to assume the tasks of democratising and decentralizing local politics. However, the substantive patterns of party and parliamentary politics of the region since 1999 have shown that the nationwide democratisation combined with decentralization has failed, at least so far, to match their initial promise in practice. What is more remarkable is the ubiquitous presence of undemocratic practices in the activities of local assemblies, increased conflicts resulting from the changed executive-legislature relationship, and consequent disappointment and cynicism of the local public towards party representatives in local assemblies. This viewpoint necessitates giving attention to the activities of some local civil society organizations that have attempted to monitor and control the devolved power of local political institutions.

The Resurrection of Multi-Party Parliamentary Politics in Yogyakarta

The changed relationships between the executive and the legislature, as well as between the centre and the regions, have allowed local assemblies to emerge as new loci of local power in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Post-authoritarian political developments in Yogyakarta also show a similar pattern of political change to that at the national level, i.e., the resurrection of multi-party parliamentary politics. This section analyses the institutional settings of the region, starting from major political parties that emerged as a result of the 1999 general election and have dominated the region’s post-authoritarian political process. Party representatives in local assemblies are subsequently analysed in terms of their social and political backgrounds. Finally, the Sultan of Yogyakarta’s role is examined as another significant political actor of the region.
The Ascendant Political Parties

In the last New Order election in 1997, Golkar as usual obtained an overwhelming victory but the most noteworthy aspect was the emergence of PPP as a significant rival. In contrast to the third party, the PDI, which obtained only 3 per cent, PPP won 34 per cent of votes at the provincial level in 1997, the best performance of any Islamic party in the region since Independence and far ahead of the 21 per cent that it had obtained in 1992. The boost in votes for the Muslim-based PPP had come at the expense of the PDI which had been discredited following the government-backed removal of Megawati Soekarnoputri from the party leadership in 1996 and the new leadership’s co-operation with an army-backed attack on the party’s Jakarta headquarters in what became known as the ‘27 July Affair’. In 1997, young PPP and PDI activists had joined together in the unofficial ‘Mega-Bintang’ movement, named after the deposed PDI leader and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, a PPP politician who had been expelled from the national parliament and was jailed on subversion charges for founding a reformist political party. Although the central board of the PPP had not endorsed this alliance and even denied its existence, the ‘from-below-to-above’ movement during the 1997 election showed rising opposition to the New Order regime in Yogyakarta.

In contrast to the 1997 election, which was contested only by Golkar and the two legal political parties, voting in the 1999 election followed a vigorous campaign in which dozens of parties competed. The major parties held big rallies and apparently generated much public enthusiasm. The PDI-P emerged as the largest party with 35.5 per cent of the votes in the province - slightly more than its overall national votes - and 42 per cent in the municipality. PAN came second in Yogyakarta, winning 16.8 per cent of the votes in the province and 26 per cent in the municipality - percentages that were far higher than the 7 per cent that it won in the nation as a whole. PKB came third in the province with 14.5 per cent, slightly more than its national vote, while Golkar’s 14.3 per cent was well below the 23 per cent that it won in the national election. The 5 per cent won by PPP also fell far below its national vote of 11 per cent, let alone the 34 per cent that it had won in the province in the 1997 election. Smaller Islamic parties, including PK, PBB and PKP, together won around 5 per cent.

Table III-1 shows the composition of the provincial and municipal assemblies in Yogyakarta as a result of the 1999 general election, including the 10 per cent of seats in both assemblies that were allocated to appointed members of the military and police (TNI/Polri).

Table III-1. Composition of Parties at Yogyakarta Provincial and Municipal Assemblies for the Period of 1999-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>The number of seats in the provincial assembly</th>
<th>The number of seats in the municipal assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-Pejuangan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDKB</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai KAMPI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNI PM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Sri Bintang Pamungkas had been sentenced to 34 months in jail on 8 May 1996 for "insulting the president" in a speech given in Berlin. In March 1997, having been released pending appeal, he was arrested again on subversion charges for founding a reformist political party, the United Democratic Party of Indonesia (Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia: PUDI). He was eventually released on 25 May 1998 just after Soeharto’s resignation.

2 Another indication of the increased opposition against the New Order regime and Golkar during the 1997 election was the frequent confrontation between Golkar and PPP in many regions. A confrontation between Golkar and PPP supporters erupted into violence in Yogyakarta in April 1997, when some Golkar supporters attacked the PPP office. Clashes between PPP and Golkar occurred in other cities in Central Java, including Pekalongan, Temasgung and Banyumas, among others. Several PPP and Golkar campaign rallies in Jakarta were reported to have erupted into violence as well. See NDI (1997), pp. 12-13.

3 The votes for the provincial assembly were slightly different from the votes in Yogyakarta for the national assembly, in which the PDI-P gained 35.65%, PAN 17.27%, Golkar 14.34%, PKB 14.26%, and PPP 4.87% (Bersand, 20 June 1999). For the outcomes of the 1999 general elections at the national level, see Chapter II.
The party composition resulting from the 1999 general election appears to be similar to the one that emerged through the 1955 general election, where the main political forces in the region were the four major nation-wide parties (PNI, PKI, Masjumi, and NU) and the locally organized Indonesian People’s Movement (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia: Gerinda). Table III-2 shows similarities in patterns of support as well as significant differences. Several of the leading parties in the 1999 general election surfaced as ‘descendants’ of the major parties in the 1950s. The PDI-P clearly inherited the mantle of the PNI, while PKB traced its ancestry to the NU which had gained considerably higher support in 1955 at the national level. The Masjumi had no single major descendant but several. PAN, PPP and some of the small Islamic parties in varying degrees appealed to voters whose parents and grandparents most likely would have supported Masjumi in 1955. The combined votes for the Masjumi’s ‘descendants’ was much higher that the votes won by Masjumi in 1955.

Table III-2. Comparison of the 1955 General and 1957 Provincial Election Results with the 1999 General Election Results in Yogyakarta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>NU</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Masjumi</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gerinda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* In the 1955 election, Yogyakarta was part of the electoral territory of Central Java.

But two significant parties from 1955 - the PKI and Gerinda - were missing in 1999 while Golkar was present. Of course a full explanation of similarities and especially...
differences would require consideration of the impact of economic development during the New Order, expanded educational opportunities, and heightened social mobility. It would also require consideration of recent political history including the destruction of the PKI and the military-backed electoral ascendency of Golkar during the New Order period. It is likely that part of the PKI’s social base has shifted to the PDI-P while the children and grandchildren of supporters of the Gerinda, which mainly represented the interests of Javanese aristocrats in the 1940s and 1950s, possibly transferred their loyalties to Golkar. The parallels, therefore, are by no means exact.

Local Assembly Members: New wine in New Bottles?

During the New Order, most members of the Yogyakarta provincial and municipal assemblies were Golkar representatives with backgrounds in the civil service or the military. The composition of the assemblies changed drastically after the 1999 election, not only in terms of party affiliation but also in terms of social and professional backgrounds. Most party representatives in local assemblies now can be regarded as ‘newcomers’, or pendatang baru, in terms of both party and parliamentary politics (PerWl 2001; Widodo 2003, 185). Most of them had not been active in political parties until the revitalization of multi-party politics following the fall of Soeharto.

Relatively educated and moneyminded males compose around half of the membership in the provincial and municipal/district assemblies in Yogyakarta. Men make up most of the membership in both the provincial and municipal assemblies. The

level of education is higher in the provincial, than in the municipal, assembly, three-quarters of provincial assembly members having degrees from tertiary educational institutes, while half of municipal assembly members have degrees. In terms of occupation, only a few – mainly from Golkar – had bureaucratic or military backgrounds. The majority of members are involved in the private sector or education. The largest category consists of those engaged in the private sector as businesspeople – 54.9 per cent of the provincial and 67.5 per cent of the municipal assembly – reflecting, even if indirectly, the expansion of business interests in local politics. The proportion of members with backgrounds in education was 12.7 per cent in the provincial, and 12.5 per cent in the municipal, assembly. Although the majority of the national-level DPR members also have occupational backgrounds as entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and teachers, the distribution was different to that found in Yogyakarta. More than half (57.4%) of Golkar representatives in the DPR are bureaucrats and 21.7 per cent are entrepreneurs. On the other hand, almost half of the PDI-P representatives are entrepreneurs, while more than half of the PKB representatives are teachers, mainly in higher institutions of learning. The proportion of entrepreneurs reaches one-third (31.3%) of the DPR members, while that of teachers is around a quarter (23%) (Suryadinata 2002, 120-1).

Because many were new to politics and their parties had been newly formed, most assembly members lacked long-term commitment to their parties. Only a few assembly members in both the provincial and municipal assemblies expressed their ambitions to become professional politicians. This has given rise to negative

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4 Among 55 provincial assembly members, only 6 members had served previously as assembly members at the same level or moved from the district level, while 5 among 40 municipal assembly members had experience of assembly membership. Most of the political ‘freshmen’ were in the PDI-P in many regions. For instance, Anini Widodo observes in Blora, Central Java, that only one PDI-P member had previous experience as a legislator, and almost all the others were relative newcomers to the party itself: See, Widodo (2003), p. 185.

5 Female members make up around 10 per cent in the provincial assembly and less than 5 per cent in the municipal assembly. The composition of female members is expected to increase from the 2004 general election as the new party law requires political parties to distribute at least 30 per cent of their obtained assembly seats to female members.

6 For example, the Sleman district, another rapidly growing business area, also shows a high proportion of assembly members (67%) in the private sector.

7 Although it was often unclear whether they just dealt modestly with my question as to their ambition for the next period, many assembly members that I interviewed during the field research in Yogyakarta expressed, even emphasized, their lack of interest in becoming assembly members for the next period. One possible explanation might be that at the time of interview, they actually had no knowledge about whether they would be really listed by the party in the next election or not. Another persuasive explanation is that they still tended to regard politics as “something risky and undesirable.”
assessments of the new generation of post-Soeharto politicians. Some political analysts believe that politicians tend to regard political parties as “political instruments” to further other, more private, objectives and that this is a source of unresponsiveness and unaccountability on the part of many party politicians. For example, R. Gonang Djuliastono, acting chairman of Yogyakarta’s provincial board of the Association of Indonesian Young Businessmen (Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia: HIPMI), commented that “(when) those who have not yet succeeded in being established (dewangan) in terms of business ascend to power as local assembly members, they usually tend to take advantage of the facilities there, not only salary but also a house and a car, etc.”

Along similar lines, Halida R. Kusumaharta, chairwoman of the provincial branch of the Association of Indonesian Business Women (Ikatan Wanita Penguasa Indonesia: IWAPI), compared what she has observed of local assembly members to what she called the Javanese attitude of “grasping what they can when they can (aji mumpung).”

In general the new politicians seem to lack strong ideological commitments to their parties so that “the essence of everyday local politics has been the fight for strategic positions and resources” (Widodo 2003, 192). Representatives of the PDI-P in particular, as the majority party in both the national and many provincial and district legislative assemblies, have been the target of accusations of “economic opportunism.” It is also claimed that the PDI-P has appointed so-called “jumping fleas” (kutu loncat) cadres with little experience in the party to strategic positions without a proper selection process (Kompas, 31 March 2000). The PDI-P seems to have acknowledged that these

claims are not without foundation when its central board responded to the increased disappointment of its supporters by carrying out several “caderization” (training) programs before and after the party congress of March 2001. However, the party’s attempts to improve the quality of its members appear to have been far from successful. Unhappy local cadres point out that recruitment and promotion to the commonly perceived “wet” (basah) positions in the central leadership is still dominated by favouritism or patronage linkages. Thus, as long as the centre does not reform itself as an exemplary model, local cadres can easily excuse their undisciplined and even corrupt practices. The declining public reputation of the political parties and their representatives in the assemblies has been exacerbated by two phenomena – ‘money politics’ and premanisme – which are the themes of chapters IV and V of this thesis.

The Significance of the Sultan

At this point it is necessary to give some consideration to a special feature of the politics of Yogyakarta: the role of the Sultan. Sultan Hamengku Buwono X succeeded his father, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, in March 1989 (Kleden 1990, 351-5). Unlike other sultans and aristocratic rulers, Hamengku Buwono IX had sided with the nationalists against the Dutch during the revolution that broke out at the end of the Second World War and Yogyakarta had become the capital of the nationalist forces for the duration of the revolution. In recognition of the Sultan’s support, Yogyakarta was granted special status as a separate province and not merged with the surrounding province, Central Java, after Independence. As a result, the Sultan of Yogyakarta enjoyed wide respect throughout Indonesia and near-mythical status in Yogyakarta itself.

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8 Among these analysts are Kusuma Anggoro (interview, 18 April 2001, Jakarta) and T.A. Legowo (interview, 26 June 2001, Yogyakarta) of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta.

9 Interview, 8 January 2002, Yogyakarta.

10 To quote directly from the interview, “selama saya ada di sini, saya bisa gunakan fasilitas yang ada di sini” (Interview, 11 January 2002, Yogyakarta).

11 According to the internal regulation of the PDI-P, to become a cadre of the party requires submitting a written application to a village board of the party (Ranting) first (Article 4). Then, to become a candidate for the party’s leadership, it is required to show capacity in implementing the party’s activities and also ideologicaL, political, and organizational stability (Article 5). However, it is the central board that determines the criteria and manner of selecting cadres (Article 6, Clause 3): “Peraturan Perluangan Anggaran Usaha, Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Demokrat Indonesia Perjuangan” Republik Indonesia 1 PDI Perjuangan, Semarang, 27 March - 1 April 2000.

12 Interview with Aria Bima, head of secretariat of the PDI-P, 17 April 2001, Jakarta.

13 The term “basah” (wet) refers to positions which provide ample opportunities for obtaining financial benefits in contrast to “dry” positions.
The political culture of Yogyakarta is centred on the Kraton (palace) and has often been seen as enabling the emergence of effective leadership in a time of crisis (Skinner 1959; Mas’oed, Panggabean, and Azca 2001). Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was an intellectual, educated in the Netherlands, and later became one of the influential political figures in the early post-Independence period. During the Japanese occupation, he took the administration of the territory into his own hands, which resulted in considerable loss of power for the court. On 5 September 1945, just after the Declaration of Independence, he affirmed his support for the country’s independence and declared that Yogyakarta would retain its regional autonomy in the Republic of Indonesia. In contrast, the neighbouring city Solo, headed by Sunan Paku Buwono XII who had just succeeded to the throne in 1944, was still under the leadership of Pupeth Dalem (court aristocrats) and expected the Dutch colonial government to return. As a result, the Kraton of Solo had strained relations with the pro-Independence groups, which eventually weakened the Sunan’s legitimacy in the eyes of both the Solo general public and the nation-building fathers in Jakarta (Suwarno 1994, 173). In contrast to Yogyakarta, Solo was absorbed into the province of Central Java after Independence.

Later, although there were several occasions when popular belief in the Sultan’s traditional power was tested, he generally managed to stand above the conflicting interests of party politics and administrative decentralization during the 1950s. The political position of the Sultan was not specified in constitutional terms, but his authority was hardly challenged. During the Guided Democracy period he served as Minister and Chairman of the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan: BPK) in the Working Cabinet (Kabinet Kerja) formed in July 1959 by Sukarno as Prime Minister and Djuanda as ‘First Minister’. He was also appointed as one of three deputy prime ministers in charge of economic, financial, and development affairs after the fall of Sukarno in 1966, and was elected by the MPR as Vice President when President Soeharto was re-elected for his second term in March 1973.

Sultan Hamengku Buwono X emerged as a national figure just after the New Order regime had begun to crumble, playing a similar role to his father during the revolution by standing above the conflicting interests surrounding the impending and possibly drastic changes in the political arena. Although he was the chairman of the provincial board of Golkar, he made clear his sympathy for the reformasi movement by calling for the end of the authoritarian regime during the last weeks leading to Soeharto’s resignation on 21 May 1998, while at the same time showing his concern to prevent violence breaking out in Yogyakarta. On 15 May when student demonstrations against Soeharto ignited riots, for example, the Sultan mediated between police and students and succeeded in defusing the situation by persuading students to march back to Gadjah Mada University. On 20 May 1998, when hundreds of thousands of people from Yogyakarta marched to the town square located in front of Sultan’s palace (alun-alun), the Sultan opened it to demonstrators and declared with Paku Alam VIII that the Yogyakarta Kraton supported the reformasi movement and asked the military to avoid confrontation with demonstrators. Although he appeared hesitant to take a firm position, the Sultan gradually emerged as an alternative leader on the national stage in...
the post-reformasi era, in particular by joining the ‘Ciganjur Four Meeting’ on 10 November 1998 with the three other major pro-reform figures, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and Amien Ra’i. In contrast, during the same period, Solo experienced several severe riots, which were partly attributed to a lack of leadership by local elites. The riot of 14 May 1998, for example, resulted in extensive damage to its commercial areas where buildings were destroyed or burnt and widespread looting of mostly Chinese-owned buildings, shopping malls, shops, and houses took place. Among the houses looted and destroyed was that of Harmoko, the then chairman of Golkar’s central board (Rozi 2000, 43).  

In early August 1998, many people in Yogyakarta began organizing a movement to elevate the Sultan to the governorship, which the provincial assembly also ultimately supported. Immediately after Independence, the central government adopted Law No. 3 of 1950 that appointed the Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and Paku Alam VIII respectively as Governor and Deputy Governor of Yogyakarta for the rest of their lives. However, the governorship was not inherited by Hamengku Buwono X when his father died in 1989. In 1998, the movement gained broad popular support, including from the so-called “little people” (wong cilik) — petty traders, manual workers, and becak drivers, for example. On 26 August 1998, those who supported the Sultan’s nomination for governor demonstrated in front of the provincial assembly. Considering that the Kraton is entrenched in many aspects of Yogyakarta’s political, economic, and socio-cultural life, it can be assumed that the Sultan’s nomination for the governorship was supported by other elements of local society.

However, this popular movement received a negative reaction from Jakarta. The central government was anxious to avoid a precedent in Yogyakarta in which a ‘hereditary’ leader would be appointed as governor. The government may have also been concerned that the legitimacy given from below would limit the degree of control exercised by the central government over the provincial government. It is also possible that President Habibie saw in the Sultan a potential rival for the presidency. Nonetheless, a Presidential Decree (Kepres 268/1998) was eventually issued on 24 September 1998 and the Sultan was inaugurated as Governor of Special Region of Yogyakarta for the period of 1998-2003 on 3 October 1998.

In early 2002, responding to the central government’s decentralization program, the Sultan proposed a draft law on autonomy of Yogyakarta (Rancangan Undang-Undang Keistimewaan Yogyakarta). With the period of his governorship finishing in 2003, he had been attempting to secure his position and also to move the weight of regional governance back to the provincial level. The draft aims to relocate local autonomy at the provincial, rather than the district level (Article 4, Clause (1)), and thus contradicts the central government’s basic scheme of regional autonomy that devolved administrative, fiscal, and legislative authority to district governments and assemblies. Also, the historical status of the Kraton in regional governance in Yogyakarta appears to be in conflict with the national Law No. 22 of 1999, which limits a governor’s term to two terms (a total of 10 years). Referring to the Law No. 3 of 1950 that assigned the Sultan and the Paku Alam as Governor and Deputy Governor of Yogyakarta for life, the draft of 2002 also provides for the Sultan to retain the position...
of the region’s head (kepala daerah) or governor as long as he is qualified and willing to serve (Article 10).\(^{21}\) Although the draft acknowledges the authority of the provincial assembly to elect a governor every five years on the basis of Law No. 22 of 1999, its spirit seems intended to limit the election process to a formalistic procedure (Article 10, Clause (4) & (5)).

The Yogyakarta provincial assembly passed the draft on 5 June 2003, and sent it to the national assembly to be ratified as a law. However, there still remains some controversy in the region. First, some civil society groups, such as the umbrella organization of diverse local NGOs, the Social Coalition for Autonomy (Koalisi Masyarakat Untuk Keistimewaan), have tried to push the provincial assembly members to insert articles that guarantee direct election for the governor and deputy governor, no matter how ritualistic it might be. Second, even in 1998, not all Yogyakarta residents supported the Sultan’s governorship. According to a 1999 survey conducted by the Yogyakarta branch of the Association for Muslim Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam: HMI), most respondents (80%) supported the Sultan becoming governor, but more than half of them (54.80%) wanted to limit the period of the Sultan’s governorship (Arinobimo Nusantara 1999, 61).

The Yogyakarta public has responded in a more or less similar way to the draft of a special law on the region. Local mass media and my own observations suggest that some people in Yogyakarta are concerned about whether the new law will allow them to cast their votes in the coming gubernatorial elections. Although many people of Yogyakarta support the general idea of legislating a special law on Yogyakarta’s autonomy, the Sultan’s privileged approach to governance seems to have drawn less support. As an alternative, the separation of the position of the region’s head (kepala

derah) from governorship has been proposed by some people, so that the Sultan’s inherited right as the region’s head does not contradict their wish to directly elect a governor through election (Bernas, 14 July 2003). At the same time, some other people of Yogyakarta, especially in rural areas, have also expressed their support for the acclamation of the Sultan and Paku Alam IX as governor and deputy governor without an election process (Bernas, 20 June 2003; 8 July 2003).

Public reaction to the proposed shift of power from district to provincial level is more ambivalent. While the general public has paid less attention to it, NGO circles have been criticizing it for overturning the basic idea of the decentralization package of 1999. Some groups, however, support the proposal, including a group of local academics who submitted a memorandum to the provincial government.\(^{22}\) Local unease with the dominance of district-level assemblies has also been expressed in the press. For instance, Tugyo, a Yogyakarta citizen living in Bantul district, sent a letter to the special committee on the special law, which in turn appeared in a local newspaper. In the letter, he agreed with the basic idea of the law to give regional autonomy to the provincial level, not the district level. His reason was that district or municipal assemblies have only “burdened” (membebani) the people by regarding regional autonomy as no more than an expanded “field” (lahan atau ajang) for ‘money politics’. He argued that the abolition of district-level assemblies would in fact mean that funds from the regional budget could be used for public services such as free education from primary to middle school (Bernas, 26 December 2002).\(^{23}\)

The institution most displeased by the Sultan’s moves might be the provincial assembly, which will be deprived of its authority to elect the governor and deputy

\(^{21}\) Article 10, Clause (6) specifies “the provincial assembly may consider the re-election of the head of the region who has already served for the position twice (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Propinsi dapat mempertimbangkan penetapan kembali Kepala Daerah yang telah dua kali menduduki masa jabatan).”

\(^{22}\) “Naskah Akademik Rancangan Undang-undang tentang Keistimewaan Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta,” p. 32: downloaded from http://www.appda-ids.go.id

\(^{23}\) An example supporting his argument can be taken from the revised 2001 provincial budget, which allocated less than 1 per cent of the expenditures to the education sector and removed the allocation for empowering women: Kompas (28 April 2001) and Bernas (1 May 2001).
governor of the region if the national assembly ratifies the draft as a law. Under the proposed law, the authority of the provincial assembly will be limited to a formalistic procedure to authorize further terms for the Sultan as governor and to elect the Paku Alam as deputy governor of the region. On the other hand, the assembly will gain additional power if the focus of decentralization is transferred from the districts to the province.

This discussion has shown that the Sultan of Yogyakarta continues to occupy a special position in provincial politics – that has no parallel in other regions. Building on the charismatic aura of his father, the current Sultan has succeeded in restoring some of the royal powers that had been in abeyance during the 1990s, but his authority is by no means unquestioned. His close identification with Golkar might be an obstacle among the overwhelming majority of Yogyakarta residents who voted for other parties in the 1999 general election. In any discussion of Yogyakarta politics, however, the role played by the Sultan cannot be overlooked.

The Dynamics of Local Multi-Party Parliamentary Politics

It is quite ironic to see that the strengthening of political parties as a crucial political institution has been accompanied by the cynical and sceptical attitudes among the general public and many party functionaries themselves. Observers have commonly pointed out that most major parties were not well prepared when the new national and local assemblies were elected due to their limited pool of educated and skilled cadres.

It is not difficult to observe some degree of negative perceptions of political parties in almost every society on the world. However, what is specific about the post-

Soeharto context is that many people have expected something fundamentally different from what they had experienced under authoritarian rule. For example, they have believed that the political system should be “democratic”, political elites should be “responsible”, local politicians should be “responsive” to their constituents, and the like. Such expectations, or illusions, about post-Soeharto Indonesia, can be understood as having motivated many people to engage themselves to the reformasi movements of early 1998. In fact, the political system is now “more” democratic, political elites are “more” responsible, local assembly members are “more” responsive to the local public, “compared to the situation under the former authoritarian regimes.” But, they have been disappointed because their higher aspirations have not been met.

From this perspective, popular faith in democratic institutions is in danger of being undermined if the political attitudes and behaviour of politicians, especially at the local levels, fail to meet the popular expectation of the early years of democratisation and de-legalization. Here is found an irony that post-Soeharto Indonesia has to deal with: Many local party politicians seem to have assumed their seats in the local assemblies without any commitment to carrying out the responsibilities as assembly members in a democratic manner. Members of the public have been alienated by the spectacle of local politicians attacking each other, even colleagues of the same party. There have also been a range of cases in which politicians violate internal party regulations that they themselves agreed on in the party congresses beforehand. In cases concerning local elections for executive positions, party representatives in the provincial or district/municipal assemblies have deviated from the official instructions issued by their central leaderships and sold their votes to whichever candidates were willing to pay for them.

The democratic and decentralized local political institutions of Yogyakarta have been accompanied by the growth of informal, and often undemocratic, political
practices. Although there have been a number of substantial changes in institutional arrangements, the patterns of political change in the regions in practice can be understood as undemocratic, even oligarchic, rather than democratic. Therefore, the emerging puzzle asks how wide the gap between democratic expectation and actual development is. It has been observed that many post-Soeharto party politicians have shown persistent patterns of undemocratic political behaviour and attitudes within political parties and parliaments. Its explication is the aim of this part, and it begins by analysing the operational mechanisms and daily performance of the assemblies in post-Soeharto Yogyakarta.

The Organization and Operation of Local Assemblies

The revitalization of political parties has been accompanied by noticeable changes in the nature and patterns of parliamentary politics at the regional level. Here it is essential to understand first the organizational structure and working mechanism of local assemblies of the post-Soeharto period. There may be some small differences between the regions, but a general picture of local assemblies is shown in Figure III-1.

Figure III-1. Organizational Structure of Local Legislative Assembly

In general, local assemblies, whether provincial or district/municipal, officially contain three main bodies: The Leadership (Pimpinan), Commissions (Komisi), and Committees (Panitia). The leadership of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly consists of a chairman and three deputy chairmen who were elected directly by assembly members shortly after their installation following the 1999 general election. The leadership body is generally responsible for arranging working programs, dividing duties among the chairman and deputy chairmen, and coordinating with the other two main bodies of the assembly. It is also in charge of implementing decisions made in the plenary sessions, and works with the executive officials by informing them of, and consulting with them about, the decisions reached by the assembly members. The Commissions are standing bodies composed of assembly members usually in such a way to ensure that each party or party coalition is proportionally represented. In Yogyakarta, there are commissions responsible for different areas: governance, economy, finance, development, and public welfare. Each commission works with and supervises its counterparts in the local governments.

Committees are composed of assembly members in the same way as commissions but are mainly responsible for internal management of the assembly. There are usually three permanent committees with their own spheres of responsibility: deliberation (musyawarath), budget (anggaran), and internal administration (rumah tangga). The deliberation committee advises the leadership with regard to the working programs and schedules activities of the assembly, including meetings and plenary sessions, and also consults with the executive officials in the government in regard to issues being decided by the assembly. The budget committee is responsible for preparing for the draft of the local budget in consultation with appropriate officials in the executive. After the draft is submitted to the assembly, the committee can give advice before the assembly takes its official stand over budgetary matters. The budget committee is also in charge of drafting,
and implementing after its ratification, the expenditure for assembly members and the assembly secretariat. Not all the local assemblies have the committee for internal administration – the Yogyakarta municipal assembly being an example, and its main tasks also can vary. The leadership of the assembly is also authorized to establish temporary special committees (panitia khusus: pansus) for special purposes, like reviewing drafts of regulations or by-laws under consideration of the assembly.

Three main functions that party representatives perform in the assemblies are officially described as: aspiration (aspirasi), legislation (legislati), and supervision (pengawasan). The first function mostly refers to the interaction between assembly members and local people in order to allow members to know, discuss, and understand the wishes of the people. This function may be regarded as normal in many societies, but in the post-Soeharto context, training and education programs have been provided for both assembly members and ordinary citizens so that their interaction is more active and effective. If the function of aspiration is directed to the people, the function of supervision is more related to the changed legislature-executive relationship resulting from the implementation of regional autonomy since 2001. With the bureaucracy having been regarded as a source of the chronic ‘KKN’ during the New Order, it might be hoped that the enhanced supervisory activities of assembly members would reduce corruption among the bureaucrats and also increase the transparency and efficiency of administrative processes.

Legislation is another important function of the assembly, given that local assemblies were previously regarded just as ‘rubber stamps’ legitimating the decisions made by the executives. Legislation usually begins with the drafting of regulations or by-laws, followed by such procedures as deliberation, amendment, and final decision through plenary sessions. The processes of deliberation and amendment are particularly significant and sometimes take a long time, especially when the issues under consideration are politically sensitive and thus each party or party coalition sticks to its own stance. This function is also closely related to the function of aspiration in that its outcomes frequently affect the people’s life and welfare.

All the functions reflect the increased challenges that local assembly members have faced as a result of changes in institutional arrangement of the past five years. For instance, the task of aggregating and articulating aspirations has increased the expectations of local populations with regard to their interaction between party representatives in local assemblies as well as their broadened participation in the decision-making process. Accordingly, local people have tried to gain increased access to local assembly members by sending letters or petitions, or visiting individually, or even organizing demonstrations to show their strength as pressure groups. Another important part of the working mechanism of assemblies is the party fraction (fraksi). The fractions can be described as “clusters of members from a single big party or coalitions of small parties” (Sulistyo 2002, 85). The large parties have their own fraksi in the legislature but the smaller parties often form coalitions with like-minded groups to enhance their influence in the assembly’s proceedings. Although the fraksi are not part of the assembly’s official structure, they play a crucial role in the day-to-day politics of local assemblies, from selecting the assembly leadership to determining the membership of different commissions and committees.

Table III-3 shows the party fractions in the provincial and municipal assemblies of Yogyakarta for the period of 1999-2004. The table shows that the larger parties – the PDI-P, PAN and Golkar - tend to form their own single-party fractions while smaller parties form coalitions with partners according to particular circumstances. Thus, for example, PKB heads a fraction that includes PKP and Partai KAMI in the provincial assembly but has joined together with PDKB and PKP in a differently named fraction in the municipal assembly. In another case three small Islamic parties (PPP, PBB, and PK)
have joined together with two small nationalist parties (PNI-FM and Partai IPKI) in the Unity Fraction (Fraksi Persatuan: FP) in the provincial assembly but have formed their own Islamic Unity Fraction (Fraksi Persatuan Islam: FPI) in the municipal assembly.

The unelected military and police members have their own fractions in both assemblies.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Assembly</th>
<th>Municipal Assembly</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Fraction</td>
<td>Composition (Seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDI-P</td>
<td>FPDI-P (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>PKB, PKP, &amp; Partai KAMI (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>FAN (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Golkar (7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>PPP, PKB, PK, PNI-FM, &amp; Partai IPKI (7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTNI/Polri</td>
<td>TNI &amp; Polri (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Notes: FPDI-P (Fraksi Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Pertiwara, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle Fraction); PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, the National Awakening Party Fraction); FAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, the National Mandate Party Fraction); PKD (Partai Kebangkitan Demokrasi & Keadilan, the Democracy and Justice Awakening Fraction); FPI (Fraksi Persatuan Islam, the Islamic Unity Fraction); and FTNI/Polri (Fraksi TNI & Polri, the Military and Police Fraction).

The party fraction is at the core of political negotiation between different groups within the assembly. The decision-making process of the assembly, which usually gives each fraction a chance to comment on, or criticize, the issues under consideration, demonstrates this. The political lines of party fractions are supposed to be determined by each party or party coalition outside the assembly. The central boards of parties usually give broad guidelines, while at least in principle, the provincial and district boards can decide the stance of their representatives in assemblies at each level in dealing with specific issues. However, in practice, without a majority party in most local assemblies, the final decisions often reflect negotiation between the ideas and interests of the different party fractions. On the other hand, the parties' central boards have been usually late to give guidelines to their provincial or district/municipal boards with regard to specific issues in the concerned regions.

Local Political Institutions in the Regional Autonomy Era

It is the argument of this thesis that, despite democratisation, party politicians have failed to discard old patterns of undemocratic political practices in their daily parliamentary and party activities. On the other hand, more and more ordinary people have realized that their expectations about 'post-authoritarian' politics have not been fulfilled. Here it may be useful to analyse the daily activities of local assembly members related to the three main functions of local assemblies, noted above, and also the general perception of local people of their performance.

First, in terms of the function of aspiration, most local assemblies in Yogyakarta were generally assessed by NGOs to have been ineffective because of their failure to work together with diverse elements of local society, such as intellectuals and NGOs (ParWl 2001). In addition to the limited scope of cooperation with local society in absorbing diverse aspirations, local assembly members also have been seen to be poorly motivated to interact with their constituents. Some observers argue that the proportional representation system is part of a systematic setting that tends not to encourage local party politicians to entrench themselves into the grassroots support base. It also needs to be pointed out that the local mass media and civil society organizations have commonly criticized many local assembly members for their incompetence in fulfilling their duties as legislators.

Second, with regard to the function of legislation, my fieldwork found that the provincial and municipal assemblies of Yogyakarta had been far from optimal. Most legislation in both assemblies during the period of 1999-2001 was limited to budgetary issues, including their own expenditure arrangements. Many decisions made by the assemblies were concerned with the financial issues of the assembly, while the decisions by the leadership dealt mostly with such issues as the establishment of special committees, or changes in the internal regulations, or the replacement of the military
and police members who were assigned to the assembly on the basis of a rotation system. Additionally, the party factions were often observed to consume their opportunities to comment on, or give alternative ideas about, the issues under consideration by simply making minor corrections of words or grammar (ParWI 2001). It is also well known that most local assembly members prefer to be assigned to the so-called "wet" (basoh) budget commission, while members of the other commissions have shown their lack of enthusiasm for their commission activities. There has been a remarkable tendency to prioritise formal procedure rather than contents, which seems to have become entrenched in the local assemblies of post-Soeharto Yogyakarta.

Finally, concerning the function of supervision, the local assemblies are no longer submissive bodies, but partners (mitra kerja), of local governments, which now have to get agreement from the assemblies with regard to their administrative activities. In fact, with their substantially expanded authority, local assembly members have the opportunity to initiate legislation with regard to the governance of the region. In practice, the local governments still frequently take the initiative in drafting regional regulations (perda) and ask assemblies to review the drafts. In that case, the assembly may not need to establish a special committee (pansus) and instead asks each party fraction to prepare their comments and criticisms in order to be considered in a plenary session.

However, local assemblies usually rely on the special committee system, regardless of its efficiency. For example, the Yogyakarta municipal assembly established 12 special committees in 2000, and 8 special committees in 2001. I found that one special committee worked just for 3 days from 20 to 22 May 2000, and another special committee for a week from 17 to 24 March 2001 in the Yogyakarta municipal assembly. In addition, the tasks assigned to the special committees often looked formalistic, and sometimes even 'cosmetic'. For example, the special committee established on 20 May 2000 was assigned to consider the drafts of several regional regulations and dissolved by the plenary session that passed the drafts on 22 May 2000. The committee established on 17 March 2001 was assigned to consider the mechanism and internal regulations of the assembly.

There is of course no necessary ground for suspicion if a special committee can finish its work in three days or a week, but suspicions arose because of payments made to committee members. Critics claimed that financial incentives were the main reason for establishing many short-term special committees. A special committee in the provincial assembly is usually composed of 17 members, including at least one from each party fraction. In 2001, once a special committee was established, its chairman and deputy chairman were paid Rp. 300,000, while ordinary members received Rp. 250,000, regardless of how long the committee lasted. The amount of money itself may not be problematic. However, it certainly becomes controversial if non-members are also paid for participating in the special committees by simply sitting and listening. In 2001, a sum of Rp. 150,000 was paid to inactive listeners as a 'listening fee' (uang dengar) for each special committee. Moreover, the fund made available for the special committees did not come from their own operation expenditures. Instead, the local government paid for special committee activities and it was reported that around Rp. 70 million was paid for 7 different special committees during the year of 2000 (Republika, 9 April 2001). Such payments could even be seen by critics as incentives to pass government legislation.

According to Yogyakarta Corruption Watch (YCW), the provincial government of Yogyakarta could have saved more than Rp. 39 million, if non-members had not been paid for their auditing (Radar Yogyo, 9 April 2001). However, the provincial

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35 Tatiang Setiawan, chairman of the FPDI-P in Yogyakarta Provincial Assembly for the period of 2002-2004, acknowledged that the local executive drafted most regional regulations ("Hak inisiatif kita munang rendah") (Interview, 14 & 21 August 2001, Yogyakarta).

36 Assembly decision No. 10 of 2000.

37 Assembly decisions No. 3 and No. 7 of 2001.
government appeared to be more concerned with smooth relations with the assembly.

This changed legislature-executive relationship was clearly demonstrated when the Sultan as Governor of Yogyakarta made it clear that money was given to assembly members for helping the smooth running of special committee activities (Solo Pos, 10 April 2001). He argued that the expenditure for the special committees was unimportant as long as their activities supported the basic policy of the government (Radar Yogya, 10 April 2001).

Seen from the quantity aspect of legislative activities, local assemblies may look productive enough, at least compared to their predecessors. The Yogyakarta provincial assembly, for instance, produced 8 regional regulations (perda), 31 assembly decisions (keputusan) and 116 leadership decisions (keputusan pimpinan) during the period from September 1999 to the end of 2000. However, a close look reveals that most legislative products during that period were about organizational restructuring and the budget. For instance, 4 out of 8 regional regulations related to the regional budget, including its own expenditures. All the 15 assembly decisions made in 1999 were to assign new assembly members and draft internal regulations of the assembly, while 11 out of 16 made in 2000 were to consider and finalize the regional budget. Most leadership decisions during the same period also were about assigning assembly members to different committees and commissions on the basis of the distribution of seats resulting from the general election. The emphasis on procedural and financial issues in the legislative activities of local assemblies seems not to be limited to the Yogyakarta provincial assembly. As a comparable case, more than half of leadership decisions (36 out of 60) made by the Yogyakarta municipal assembly in 2000 were to allocate bonuses (nusijangan) to the members who were assigned to special committees or to raise other bonus items. The ratio of the percentage of financial issues in the assembly’s leadership meetings grew to more than two thirds (22 out of 30) in 2001.

Public Perceptions

With increased reporting of the daily activities of local assemblies in the local media, the public has often shown cynical or indifferent attitudes towards their representatives (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 18 January 2001; Bernas, 29 March 2001). There is little doubt that many local people have been disappointed as they found that the devolution of power to local authorities has not made the decision-making process more transparent and accountable. For example, issues with regard to the local budget, from drafting to final decision, are still relatively closed to the local public. A public survey conducted just after the provincial budget of Yogyakarta (APBD DIY) was passed on 27 April 2001 shows that most local people did not know about (58%) or disagreed with the new budget (32%) (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 2 May 2001). The polling results may be interpreted as indifference of the majority of the local public, but it is necessary to consider that on that night when the budget was finalized, some NGO groups demonstrated, asking the assembly to postpone the final decision for a week and to inform local populations by publishing the contents of the budget in three local newspapers. The request was rejected, and the demonstrators were dissolved by the intimidating presence of members of GePaKo, a local preman organization unofficially affiliated with Golkar (Radar Yogya, 3 May 2001).

The generally downbeat public assessment of the performance of local assemblies is reinforced by a ParWI survey that was conducted in 8 different districts in Central Java, including the province and five districts of Yogyakarta, during the period of August 2000-August 2001. Most people of Yogyakarta considered the regulations

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28 Regional regulations No. 9 of 1999 and No. 1, 2 & 6 of 2000.
29 For the purpose of comparison, the provincial assembly of East Java produced 20 regional regulations, 22 assembly decisions, and 6 leadership decisions during the year of 2001. Similar to the case of Yogyakarta provincial assembly, budget and taxation consisted of almost half the regional regulations (9 out of 20): See Soid (2003).
produced during that period as hardly or not at all reflective of their aspirations (77% for the provincial and 73% for the municipal assembly). The majority of the local population felt that their assemblies had only occasionally or never implemented their aspirations (67% for the provincial and 81% for the municipal assembly). Especially, the local assemblies’ supervision of general administration of local governments, which can be regarded as one of the highlights of the decentralization packages, has also received an overwhelmingly negative assessment from the local public. The majority in Yogyakarta assessed that both the provincial and municipal assemblies had not supervised their counterparts in efficient and effective ways (82% and 92% respectively) (ParWI 2001).

In short, the initial enthusiasm shown by local people for a new era of multiparty parliamentary politics has been replaced with growing political indifference and cynicism. Local elections for executive officials have also exacerbated this attitude. The public survey conducted by ParWI just before the 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election shows that around two thirds (64%) of the respondents expressed their indifference concerning the coming mayoral election (Berner, 11 June 2001). Furthermore, another poll, also conducted by ParWI, reveals that the absolute majority of the respondents (90%) saw no need for the mayoral candidates to represent parties (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 29 June 2001). Although this demand is unrealistic since the mayoral election is the right of the municipal assembly, the results of the poll demonstrate how deeply local people have become disappointed by their representatives in the assembly.

The survey conducted by ParWI during the period of 2001-2002 also shows that local people have been disappointed by the rigid procedures to meet and consult with assembly members. Consequently, they have shown a tendency to use such collective actions as demonstrations to deliver their opinions (ParWI 2001). There has also been a growing popular perception that local assembly members have become less attentive to their constituents. Many Indonesians complain that their representatives are indifferent about the general interests of those whom they represent, or even that some members lack appropriate capabilities to perform their tasks (Yodoyono 2001, 57). Further, local parliament-watch groups claim that many local assembly members do not fully understand or care about the working mechanism and procedures of their institution.

In short, the impact of devolution of power to the regions is debatable, especially with regard to whether it has institutionalised more democratic decision-making processes in the regions. It seems, at least so far, that the resurrection of electoral and party politics in the regions, at least in Yogyakarta, has been limited to the institutional arrangements. The above-described aspects of the political developments in post-Suharto Yogyakarta make it possible to argue that although there have been substantial changes in institutional arrangements, the attitudinal and behavioural aspects of political actors have been overlooked. New party representatives in local assemblies have shown either their unwillingness or inability, or both, to carry out their responsibilities arising from the changes in institutional setting. Therefore, the primary question has been whether local assemblies use their substantially expanded authority in the way that they are supposed to. Another question is how far the conflict between local governments and assemblies could develop under the reformed institutional relationship, which is clearly in favour of the latter.

The Legacy of History

In the 1950s, unlike the political parties at the national level of that period which engaged in vigorous debates over ideological differences, the political parties of Yogyakarta appeared to be more like “a sleeping head without a body,” except for the PKI with its vigorous mass organizations (Selosomerdjan 1962, 178). Selosomerdjan notes that political parties in Yogyakarta were usually dependent on personal contacts
rather than strong commitments to ideology. Under the proportional representation system that post-Independence Indonesia had taken from the Dutch model, the party leaderships selected party candidates for seats in the local assemblies. Although rank-and-file members of subdistrict chapters were encouraged to choose and recommend their own candidates at district-level meetings, provincial leaders, who were keen to balance conflicting interests between factions, often influenced the final decision. Accordingly, the political relationship between the party leaders and the rank-and-file supporters was often superficial. On the other hand, parties tended to obtain grassroots support through mass mobilization by both formal and informal leaders of village communities (Selosoemardjan 1962, 205).

Until the emergence of Guided Democracy, the three main nation-wide parties relied largely on their ‘traditional’ bases of support. The PNI drew support from the local intelligentsia and civil servants who were also able to mobilise voters in the villages, while the Masyumi and the NU were supported by urban-modernist and rural-traditionalist Muslim groups of the region respectively (Selosoemardjan 1962, 171-2). On the other hand, the PKI, which emerged as the strongest party through the 1955 general election and the 1957 provincial election in the region, was very active in mobilising new supporters both in urban and rural areas. Rather than trying to recruit individuals as members, the party concentrated on organizing peasants into the Indonesian Peasants’ Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia: BTI) and the labourers into the Indonesian Labour Front (Barisan Buruh Indonesia: BBI), which later changed into the All-Indonesian Central Labour Organization (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia: SOBSI) (Selosoemardjan 1962, 175-6). If the PKI applied organizational techniques and political tactics derived from the international communist movement,

Gerinda could be seen as a “product of the specific culture of the Javanese society in Yogyakarta” (Selosoemardjan 1962, 193). The party basically relied on its charismatic leader, Prince Surjudiningrat, and mainly represented the old upper class and the leading nobility that had been embedded in the local society of the pre-war period.

For those seeking a party’s official candidacy, personal connections played an important part in winning the support at the provincial-level selection meetings, compared to personal popularity at the grassroots. The provincial or upper-level boards of parties usually made the final decisions. As a result, district and sub-district chapters of political parties at that time were generally inactive, and political parties were regarded as “an important avenue for social mobility within the officialdom” (Selosoemardjan 1962, 113). While many local party politicians tended to use every opportunity to get their members placed as officials in the administration, the public life at the village level was still far away from party politics. This was frequently demonstrated in the elections for the Village Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat desa: DPR desa), the membership of which was not attractive to party functionaries in terms of social prestige and financial rewards (Selosoemardjan 1962, 208).

The weak condition of local party politics was reinforced by the effects of the national-level political changes following the emergence of Guided Democracy. The limited potential for party development at the local levels was blocked by Soekarno and the armed forces, and the subsequent and far more systematic emasculation of parties under the New Order. As a consequence, the distance of the people from political parties was lengthened, while most local political actors were deprived of opportunities to further their political careers.

31 The political career of Prince Surjudiningrat began when he established the Association of the Subjects of Yogyakarta (Pakempalan Kavula Nagayogyakarta: PKN) in June 1930, attracting many peasants who believed that he was the messianic Raja Adil (just king). The association claimed nearly 260,000 members in Yogyakarta in 1939. In 1951, the PKN was revived as a local political party under the name of Gerinda, still under the absolute authority of Surjudiningrat: See Ruckel (2001), p. 237.
Indonesia in the early 1990s saw the sprouting of political activities at the local level, mostly organized and supported by local intellectuals, students, and NGO activists. There are a number of factors to be considered in understanding and explaining these political developments. Among them are such international factors as the collapse of the communist governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as such domestic factors as the ‘openness’ policy of the regime, and the growth of the middle class owing to the rapid economic development of the previous two decades. One thing to be noted with relation to local party politics here is that many local party politicians were far less active compared to local intellectuals and religious leaders in the gradually expanding pro-democracy circles. Despite several incidents in which popular enthusiasm for particular party leaders was demonstrated, the image of local party politicians among many ordinary Indonesians was that of ‘political opportunists’ until the last moment before the downfall of Soeharto. As Edward Aspinall notes, throughout the New Order, “the majority simply became politically passive and withdrew from active political life (even if many were cynical about official politics)” (Aspinall 1998, 142).

Nevertheless, popular cynicism about party politicians did not mean political passivity for everyone. Especially among educated youth in Yogyakarta’s universities and other educational institutions, opposition to the Soeharto regime was growing. One example was the so-called ‘1992 Yogyakarta Incident’, which involved a ‘campaign boycott’ (masyarakat kampanye) at the time of the 1992 general election when the then Governor Paku Alam VIII banned the use of motorcycles and party emblems in the election campaign rallies (arak-arakan). Immediately, young PDI and PPP supporters spontaneously boycotted campaigns and supported the ‘white group’ (golongan putih).

golput), which refers to those who opted not to take part in the election. The growing anti-authoritarian attitudes of the late Soeharto period were transformed into enthusiastic support for democracy after Soeharto’s resignation.

Now, with much of the initial democratic expectation about democratisation and decentralization of the early years of the post-Soeharto politics having almost vanished, cynicism about party politics has become widespread. The following comments illustrate common attitudes. Purwo Santoso, a scholar of the Gadjah Mada University, expressed his strong scepticism toward political parties, saying “political parties do not exist in our everyday political life. It is unnecessary to talk about their roles in aggregating and articulating public opinion because they are simply not doing it.”

Similarly, Sujarwo, a citizen of Yogyakarta city, told me that he saw the political change since May 1998 as just a “shift of power” (pergeseran kekuasaan) and denied that post-Soeharto politics could be seen as a process of democratisation. More provocatively, he concluded that Indonesia’s democracy “does not have its feet” (perkembangan itu tidak punya kaki).

To summarize, the intensified undemocratic practices of local party politicians have ironically curtailed the institutionally strengthened position of political parties in the changed political system. In the mean time, the regional autonomy scheme has made the undemocratic political attitudes and practices of local party politicians more visible, and further de-legitimated them in the eyes of the local public. As a result, although political parties have taken the most prominent political role in the process of

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33 The first “golput” had appeared at the time of the 1971 general election. Golput was reactivated in the early 1990s as a ‘protest’ against the monopoly of Golkar in the electoral process: See Sanit (1992), pp. 14-18 and Witoelar (2001), p. 292; An NDI report also notes that in April 1997, Megawati Soekarnoputri, the ousted chairperson of the PDI in the previous year, publicly urged her supporters not to participate in the 1997 campaign and on 23 May announced that she herself would not vote. Certain leaders of the PPP and some mass organizations, including the NU, also publicly called for a boycott of the campaign: See, NDI (1997), p. 10.

34 Notes from a public discussion that was organized by P2R and I happened to attend (4 July 2001, Yogyakarta).

democratisation and decentralization in post-Soeharto Indonesia, cynicism and scepticism about their role has been enhanced among local populations.

The Contribution of Civil Society Organizations

Observing the prevalence of undemocratic practices among local assembly members, many people in Yogyakarta have become aware that regional autonomy does not necessarily consolidate local democracy. Ironically enough, as Ryaas Rasyid observes, “public trust in regional governments and legislatures has declined since the implementation of the regional autonomy laws” (Rasyid 2003, 66). This growing public awareness has been followed by some civil society organizations attempting to expand the local public sphere through which local people can articulate and deliver their opinions. For example, civil society organizations have pointed out that the public does not have proper access to information on the wealth of their representatives and its growth. The regional branch office of the Body for Financial Investigation (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan: BPK) has never issued public reports on local budget management, while the Committee for Investigation of Properties of Officials (Komite Pemeriksa Kepuahan Pegawai Negeri: KPKPN) has no local branch office in Yogyakarta. As a result, there is a vacuum in which civil society activists can attempt to mediate between local populations and their representatives.36

My observations during field research, such as participation in public forums, private discussions, workshops, as well as frequent interaction with local journalists and students show that in Yogyakarta, university students and intellectuals in particular have taken initiatives to encourage local communities to realize their potential power and confidence to enforce their representatives to listen to their voices. Among those local

36 One of those who have encouraged local civil society organizations to initiate parliament watch activities is Ichialul Amal, active political analyst and former Rector of UGM (Interview, 18 January 2002, Yogyakarta); Hans Antlov also emphasizes the significance of civil society and the pro-democracy movement in deepening democracy “by challenging existing power relations”: See Antlov (2003), p. 76.

groups that have surfaced as ‘parliament watchdogs’ in Yogyakarta are ParWI (Parliament Watch Indonesia), Lapera Indonesia, and YCW (Yogyakarta Corruption Watch). All three organizations have focused on mediating between local politicians and constituents and also advocating people’s opinions and criticisms through diverse channels. In spite of similar purposes, each organization has different programs and working styles. Activists of ParWI and Lapera Indonesia are mainly university students and academics, while those of YCW are journalists and former student activists. The first two organizations have received sponsorship from international NGOs, while YCW is an independent advocacy group with its main focus on ‘money politics’ in local assemblies and governments. Among the three, ParWI has working programs as a parliament watchdog, while Lapera Indonesia and YCW are more like advocacy groups channelling local people’s opinions and criticisms. The three groups have grown as ‘models’ for local civil society organizations so that they now provide activists in nearby areas with some training programs based on their own experience during the past several years.

Since its establishment in September of 1999, ParWI has been the most remarkable parliament watchdog in Yogyakarta with strong organizational identity and working programs. It has received sponsorship from the Asia Foundation since 2000 just after local assemblies of the post-Soeharto period began forming as the result of the 1999 general elections. The group has carried out diverse and energetic programs demonstrating its leading role in the region’s newly expanded public sphere. First, it has organized workshops for local assembly members to help to improve their required knowledge, skills, and professional attitudes as legislators (e.g., budget, legislation, and supervision). In November 2000, it successfully held its first workshop in which local assembly members were given intensive training programs related to their tasks arising
from the coming implementation of the regional autonomy scheme in January 2001. In August 2001, I took the chance to participate in its second workshop for local assembly members. The workshop discussed a public survey that ParWI had conducted with regard to the performance of local assemblies and also held some training programs similar to the one of the previous year in legislation and the budget. The workshop demonstrated the big gap between how the public perceived their representatives in local assemblies and how local assembly members evaluated themselves. For example, many assembly members appeared to be unwilling to accept what the activists of ParWI delivered on the basis of their survey. Some members even looked unconcerned with how ordinary people perceived their performance.

In addition to the programs for local assembly members, ParWI also conducted a public survey to show how different sectors of society—bureaucracy, legislators, and ordinary citizens—perceived and evaluated the performance of local assemblies. It has also developed diverse programs to encourage local people to communicate with their representatives. For instance, it has organized a regular radio talk show in which local assembly members receive and answer questions from citizens on the phone. The Q&A section that has appeared in a local newspaper every Tuesday aims to perform a bridging role between provincial assembly members and citizens. It has also frequently held public forums to allow local activists and intellectuals to meet with politicians.

In contrast to ParWI, Lapera Indonesia has been more focused on educating and raising the political awareness of rural communities. The group’s special concern with the grassroots was in fact crafted even before the fall of the Soeharto regime when it worked as a advocacy organization for rural labourers’ rights and welfare. With the regime change in 1998, the main purpose of its working programs has shifted toward political education of rural communities about the importance and ways of achieving democracy in their own villages. It began receiving sponsorship from the Ford Foundation for those programs. Its main activities are political education and publication to spread the idea of grassroots democracy. Accordingly, since 2001, its main concern has been about the ongoing elections for the village council (Badan Perwakilan Desa: BPD) in hundreds of villages of Yogyakarta’s four districts. It has also published books on its basic idea of grassroots democracy. Lapera Indonesia also sometimes organizes public forums in rural areas, which have however been less successful with many assembly members being reluctant to spend too much time on visiting those remote areas.

Compared to ParWI and Lapera Indonesia, YCW has a distinct focus and working style. The group mainly aims to provoke public criticism with regard to ‘money politics’ practices of local assemblies and governments. Journalists of several local media usually provide information and a couple of activists hold press conferences to release their findings on the basis of their own investigation. In addition to the group’s limited funding, the fact that the main activists are journalists and former student activists explains this working style.

Despite the remarkable contribution of such local civil society organizations as these three groups to the expansion of the local public sphere and the growing public awareness about their potential power to control their representatives, it seems that the general public has lost much of the initial expectations and enthusiasm that they showed in the 1999 general elections. Activists often express their antagonism against political
parties and their representatives at local assemblies. They argue that although there are some prominent and capable assembly members, the problem is that those few members are unable to deal with all the challenging tasks of local assemblies. They also argue that a few morally clean politicians cannot change the general patterns of political attitudes and practices of other members. Those activists appear to be unexceptional in showing their cynicism and scepticism towards political parties and their representatives in local assemblies.

The Uncertain Relation between Institutions and Practices

The introduction of formal democratic institutions should be seen as providing a foundation for substantive democratisation. However, institutional arrangements do not by and of themselves bring about the institutionalisation of democratic attitudes and behaviour among major political actors in the formally democratised polity. Therefore, it is necessary to point out that as long as informal and often undemocratic political practices in democratic political institutions are prevalent, the presumed ideal track of post-authoritarian political developments towards democratic consolidation will take a much longer time, and possibly will never happen.

The revitalized multi-party parliamentary politics in post-Soeharto Yogyakarta of the past four years demonstrates that the formal changes in the institutional arrangements have not yet been accompanied by the consolidation of democratic values, attitudes, and behaviours within local political institutions. Party representatives in local assemblies have rather transformed and decentralized long-standing undemocratic political practices inherited the former regimes, such as ‘money politics’ and political gangsterism, which are the main subjects of the following two chapters of this thesis. In the meantime, the popular enthusiasm for democracy demonstrated by many Indonesians’ broad involvement in the reformasi movement in early 1998 and their successful holding of relatively fair and clean general elections in 1999 seems to have evaporated as they have become disillusioned by the daily performance of their representatives in local assemblies. What they have generally found since the transition to democratic rule and the devolution of power to the regions is the abuse of the expanded authority by local assembly members, which basically contradicts popular expectations about more democratic, responsive, and accountable representation.

In fact, it is not difficult to understand that ordinary citizens of a post-authoritarian society are less concerned with formally democratic institutional settings than substantive results – demonstrated by representativeness, responsiveness, accountability, transparency, etc. – of a more democratised political life. My observations in post-Soeharto Yogyakarta show that although the political system in Indonesia has generally revitalized the democratic principle of ‘exchange of leadership for support’, the practical patterns of local politics make it premature to say that local party politicians are now more representative and accountable. The problem is that local political actors and power seekers still tend to regard political parties simply as means to pursue individual interests. It is therefore necessary to assess how party representatives in local assemblies operate and create linkages of accountability and responsiveness to the local public.
Chapter IV.
The Reactivation and Decentralization of ‘Money Politics’

Institutional reform brought by democratic transition and decentralization is not of itself a sufficient condition for significant attitudinal and behavioural changes among those who operate the institutions. In another words, formal democratic reforms and decentralized political decision-making do not by themselves ensure the institutionalisation of democratic practices. The political developments in post-Soeharto Indonesia have shown that the practical effects of the revitalization of multi-party parliamentary politics in many regions have not always led to transparent and accountable decision-making. More specifically, the recent history of Yogyakarta has shown a persistence of undemocratic practices in the region’s post-authoritarian party and parliamentary politics. Although undemocratic practices are not new to Indonesian politics, they have been reactivated and institutionalised within local political institutions that have claimed dramatically expanded influence over the decision-making processes since 1998.

Among such practices that have grown to be a defining feature of local political institutions, this chapter focuses on ‘money politics’, which refers to the local assembly’s excessive pursuit of perquisites in drafting and implementing its own budget as well as local assembly members’ vote-selling to candidates in elections for local executive heads often ignoring the official line of their own parties. The experience of the post-communist countries such as Russia and Poland have shown that it is important to grasp that widespread self-enrichment while in office can be a major source of
political arbitrariness in the early days of transition. This 'self-dealing' has only recently attracted scholarly attention with regard to its negative impact on transparency and accountability of the post-transitional political process (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 136-7).

This chapter advances in four sections. The first clarifies the meaning of 'money politics' in its post-authoritarian context in which the modes of behaviour and practices embedded in the past have been adjusted to the sudden formal transformation. The section also probes the changed nation-wide pattern of 'money politics' since the fall of Soeharito and explains the reasons why the term of 'money politics' is preferred to corruption. The subsequent section examines what can be appropriately recognized as 'excessive perquisites' by which self-interested local assembly members have translated their expanded power in budgetary matters into substantially increased financial rewards for themselves. Although many practices of this type of 'money politics' are not always illegal, they can be understood as abuse of the devolved power to the local assemblies given the frequent manipulation of the regulations related to their budgetary autonomy. A detailed analysis of the practices of Yogyakarta provincial and municipal assembly members will show that, although local party politicians of the post-Soeharito era enjoy stronger legitimacy compared to their predecessors, they also have used their increased political power to get richer.

The third section analyses the parties' internal politics in local elections for governors or regents/mayors, followed by two cases showing the practical effects of the election of local executive heads by assembly members. Analysis of the 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election will illustrate how the local assembly members' right to elect local executive heads has transformed electoral practices, whereas the 'JBC' case will show that the changed executive-legislature relationship has often been exploited by local assembly members in pursuing 'kickbacks' in return for their legislative activities. The section argues that the cases of 'money politics' in local elections demonstrate how such practices that were usually linked to the judiciary and the bureaucracy under the New Order regime have been reactivated by and within local chapters of parties and the local assemblies. The final section draws a tentative conclusion that the persistent and more robustly reactivated 'money politics' practices have become entrenched in the regions as unintended consequences of the devolution of power to local political institutions.

Understanding 'Money Politics' in Post-Soeharito Indonesia

Both theoretical and empirical analyses of corruption have in general focused on two types. The first type concerns corrupt deals in the private sector usually involving payments to government officials. This type of corruption is often measured from the viewpoint of foreign investors. The other type focuses on such corrupt practices as vote-buying and illicit financing of campaigns during elections. In contrast to these two classic types of corruption, this study is more concerned with broadly defined 'political corruption'. If narrowly defined, 'political corruption' refers to "a deal of a private-sector actor pursuing the purchase of a decision from a public-sector actor." However, if applied to (post-) transitional societies, it inevitably embraces some other types of corrupt practices that emerge as pathological side-effects of transition. The democratization experiences in Latin America and in Eastern Europe have proved that

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1 See, for example, the articles on "Crime and Corruption after Communism" that appeared in East European Constitutional Review (Fall 1997).

2 In terms of Transparency International's corruption perception index, for example, Indonesia ranked 41st among 41 countries in 1995, 80th among 85 in 1996, and 88th among 91 in 2001: See Table 2 in Lim & Stern (2002), p. 21.

3 Buying votes has a long history, going back to Great Britain and the United States in the 19th century, and has remained a feature of electoral politics in many countries: See Rose-Ackerman (1999), pp. 137-8. Although it was generally assessed as relatively clean and fair, both domestic and international election watchdogs reported that there had been nonetheless pervasive vote-buying throughout the country, irrespective of political parties during the 1999 general election in Indonesia (YIFIK & ACILS 2000).

4 Claus Offe, in a talk at the Australian National University on 12 March 2003. See also Offe (1997) and Dick (2001), p. 26. With regard to the conceptualization of political corruption, see also Heywood (1997), especially on its definitional dilemma, pp. 5-10.
democratic institutions such as elections, multi-party systems, parliaments have provided more opportunities for corruption. The incentives supporting newly introduced democratic norms and practices are still so weak that many new actors tend to avoid adopting them until other actors do. The society's political culture might be seen as a major factor.

An understanding of political corruption in the post-authoritarian context requires looking beyond the motivations and opportunities that generally exist in most societies. The problem is that democratic institutions can provide new incentives for corruption, and "the relationship between democratic institutions and corruption depends on a broad range of political dynamics" in many new democracies (Hutchcroft 1997, 655). Howard Dick also points out that "democracy is likely to limit some forms of corruption but to make others more prevalent" (Dick 2001, 26). The modes of behaviour and practices that have been embedded in the whole society cannot be easily adjusted to a sudden formal transformation. From this viewpoint, it is important to explain why formal political changes have often failed to bring about substantive changes in the pattern of political attitudes and practices.

Soeharto's New Order was always identified with corruption (Hendardi 2000, 217-8), and Indonesia's political history since Independence until 1998 has been seen as the process of the "normalization of corruption" (Rafael 1999, 18-9). Hence, it is not surprising if a five-year transformation has not yet curtailed the country's epidemic of corruption. For example, although the 1999 general election, the first since the fall of Soeharto, was relatively free of charges of corrupt practices, it was widely known that the significance of money in politics dramatically rose during the distribution of seats in the national and local assemblies just after the completion of vote counting. In principle, the party lists should have been determined before the general election, but it turned out to be still possible for different levels of party leadership to change their lists in such a way that those listed on the top or in the middle were replaced by those listed nearer the bottom. Existing patronage networks and contributions during the campaigns seemed to have been primary considerations. Also, it was an open secret that those who wanted seats in either the national or local assemblies were usually asked to make financial contributions to their party's central board, which made the final decision regarding the distribution of seats.

The uncertainty of political power under the post-transitional circumstances seems to have pushed political actors to become more demanding than before -- a contradiction that have been often found in post-authoritarian politics. Although the popular demand for action to combat corruption is strong, "the institutions are still weak and the incentives (for corruption) perverse" (Dick 2001, 39). In post-Soeharto Indonesia, corruption is no longer hidden and more actors are involved, while democratization and decentralization have not succeeded in stopping it (Rodan, Hewison, & Robison 2001, 26-7).

The pattern of corruption also appears to have changed. During the New Order, the central authority usually controlled corruption through its hierarchically established patronage systems down to the lower layers of the bureaucracy. Now, the locus of corruption appears to have moved from the bureaucracy to the legislative assemblies, not only at the national level but also in the regions throughout the country. The political dynamics resulting from changes in the political system and the devolution of authority to the local level have strengthened the position of local assembly members in making decisions with relation to a range of local issues, such as development projects.

\[5\] Drawing on four cases from East Asia, Lucian W. Pye also points out that "the lingering uncertainty" during the transition to democracy has caused "a rising tide of corruption." However, I doubt his assumption that "money politics" can operate in a manner that actually advances democracy. The underlying problem seems to lie in his emphasis on the significance of the political leaders' willingness "to elevate their network relationships into responsible ties appropriate for a democratic civic culture"; see, Pye (1997), pp. 214 & 228. However, many post-authoritarian politics, even in East Asia, have shown that democratization of political practices in democratic political institutions cannot be achieved by a few clear politicians' good intentions. From his point, it becomes more important to study the various successful forms of anti-corruption efforts in post-authoritarian societies.
and taxation. In practice, however, the devolved power has often been interpreted and exercised in self-serving ways. This is partly because of the widespread attitude among local assembly members who tend to equate power with wealth. This is neither to argue that the executive officials are no longer involved in corruption nor to ignore the gravity of the same issue in the national assembly (DPR). Nonetheless, this study focuses on the malpractices of local assembly members in exercising their expanded power. Such practices in local political institutions are scarcely likely to meet the initial public expectations about democratic decentralization.

For two reasons, this study uses the term 'money politics' rather than corruption in describing and analysing the frequently corrupt practices of local assembly members. First, the relevant laws and regulations are often ambiguous so that some of the practices described in this study are not straightforwardly categorized as corruption in a legal sense. For instance, the practice of seeking out excessive perquisites, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section, is often blurred by frequent manipulation to conceal the exact amount of expenditures made available to assembly members. Second, in contrast to the Soeharto period when the term of "corruption" (korupsi) dominated discourse on the topic, many Indonesians, including scholars, journalists, activists, and even ordinary citizens, now prefer to use the term 'money politics', often in English and occasionally translated into Indonesian (politik uang). It appears that there has been a common view that the corruption of the post-Soeharto era should be differentiated from the previous one.

Two major types of 'money politics' are examined in the following two sections. The first is the practice of seeking out excessive perquisites in the local assemblies. This mainly refers to the practice of local assembly members in drafting and implementing the budgets. It is hard to judge whether the practices in this category are illegal or not given the ambiguity of the related laws and regulations. In any case, such practices demonstrate how local assembly members have translated their substantially expanded power into correspondingly increased financial rewards. On the other hand, the other type of 'money politics', represented by vote-selling by local assembly members in local elections for governors or regents/mayors, is more clearly political corruption. Local executive officials are elected by local assembly members, and this provides those who are willing to pay for with opportunities to win the election by buying dozens of votes from local assembly members. In this way, the term, 'money politics', has become closely attached to almost all gubernatorial as well as regent/mayoral elections since 1999, but ironically, none of these allegations has ever been proven, and no alleged corruptor has yet resigned or been forced from office (Rasyid 2003, 66). In short, the rampant 'money politics' allegations surrounding local elections in many regions have revealed that the changed legislature-executive relationship in favour of the former has not conformed to the expectations of democratic theory.

Excessive Perquisites for Local Assembly Members

This section focuses on two examples of the methods that local assembly members have adopted to gain excessive perquisites. The first is suggested by the substantial increase of expenditures for the local assemblies, the extent of which has run far beyond the rate of inflation. For example, the Yogyakarta provincial assembly raised its budget by around 250 per cent during the period of 1999-2001, while the Yogyakarta municipal assembly's budget was increased by more than 1000 per cent during the same period.

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6 Raymond Fisman and Roberta Gati find that there is no proven strong association between decentralization and decrease of corruption, although there remains a further question as to whether a particular type of decentralization can be more effective in combating corruption: See Fisman & Gati (2000), pp. 3 & 15.

7 For instance, Syukri Fadholi, deputy mayor of Yogyakarta municipality, acknowledges that corruption in the executive is still very possible, emphasizing the significance of the political commitment of individual senior officials (Interview, 3 January 2002, Yogyakarta). With regard to 'money politics' issues at the national assembly, see Adijono & Anggoro (2000), "Bagian IV. Korupsi Menjalak: Dari Diskusi," pp. 197-202.
Related to this substantial increase in the budgets for the local assemblies, the first sub-section shows how local assembly members in Yogyakarta have manipulated laws and regulations in drafting and implementing their own budgets. A second example shows that local assemblies have utilized money made available, usually by the local executives, to them outside their own budgets. The underlying argument of this section is that the excessive perquisites of local assembly members have shown their self-interested exploitation of the ongoing process of democratization combined with decentralization.

As explained in the last section of Chapter II, Law No. 22 and No. 25 of 1999 on regional autonomy authorize local assemblies to determine the budget for local governments, including the expenditures for their own operations, with the agreement of the executive heads. The main purpose of giving the local assemblies a more independent position in budgetary matters is to enable them to effectively supervise and control the general administration of their executive counterparts. From this perspective, the increased expenditures for local assembly members can be understood as intended to reduce the possibility of ‘money politics’ in the local assemblies and at the same time, to increase their supervisory efficiency over other political institutions. However, in practice, the devolution of the authority concerning budgetary matters to the local assemblies has only brought about a huge gap between “what should be achieved” and “what has been really achieved” by the local assemblies (Yudoyono 2001, 105). In another words, as the following examples grounded on empirical studies show, the increased expenditures have been mostly used for individual financial rewards and welfare than for activities related to their public service.

In fact, there have been warnings of the probable ‘decentralization of corruption’ as an unintended effect of devolution because the central government still retains its control over major financial resources while passing down expenditure responsibilities (Hill 2002, 32; Aditijendro & Anggoro 2000, 201; Hendardi 2000, 223; and Schulte Nordholt 2002, 52). In November 2000, as a response to the substantial increase of the budget for the local assemblies in most regions, the central government issued a governmental regulation (PP No. 110 of 2000) to restrict the expenditures for local assemblies to a certain ratio of the local revenue of the region. Nonetheless, as shown by recent research, in 2001, the expenditure of many provincial assemblies on their own activities was still far in excess of the limit imposed by the regulation. The regulation appears to have not had much effect on the patterns of budgetary management of the local assemblies.

Abuse of Budgetary Autonomy

Taken alone, the substantially increased funds made available to local assembly members is not surprising, when it is considered that the regional autonomy scheme in Law No. 22 and No. 25 of 1999 expanded local assemblies’ command over budgetary matters. What is significant, however, is that through the substantial increase of the budget, local assembly members have sought extra financial benefits by manipulating the ambiguous regulations on related issues. Both provincial and municipal/district assemblies of Yogyakarta have raised their operational expenditures and boosted other financial benefits for their members since they started their term in September 1999.

Table IV-1 and Figure IV-1 show the increase in the expenditures for the Yogyakarta provincial assembly during the period of 1999-2001. They show a gradual and substantial increase of the expenditures for the assembly and its secretariat.

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1 The ratio is to be determined according to the locally derived revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah: PAD) of the region. While expenditures for the provincial assemblies cannot be more than 1.5% of the PAD of the province, those of the district/municipal assemblies cannot be more than 5% of the PAD of the district/municipality. If the PAD is higher, the smaller ratio should be applied (Article 14, PP No. 110 of 2000).

2 See the Table 3 in Said (2003), which compares several provincial assemblies’ actual budgets for 2001 with the limits provided by the PP No. 110 of 2000. The table shows that the real budgets for those provincial assemblies are all larger - from 1.1 times in the case of Central Sulawesi to 3 times in Jakarta.
(Sekretariat Dewan: Sekwan). The expenditures for the assembly began being separated from the local government budget from 2000, and the budget for the secretariat was merged with the assembly's from 2001. Even before 2001, however, the provincial assembly appeared to manipulate the budget for the secretariat in order to obscure the actual increase in its expenditures. One example is the post for ‘others’ in the 2000 budget for the secretariat. More than 97 per cent (Rp. 1,504,315,000) was allocated for ‘support for civil servants’ welfare’ (kesejahteraan pegawai), to just 55 people, the number of which implies that the expenditure was for assembly members, and not the 16 members of the secretariat staff.

Table IV-1. Expenditures for Yogyakarta Provincial Assembly (1999-2001) (rupiah)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPDP</td>
<td>3,579,418,000</td>
<td>3,579,460,000</td>
<td>1,885,790,000</td>
<td>1,999,900,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money for Representation</td>
<td>961,200,000</td>
<td>1,490,880,000</td>
<td>304,560,000</td>
<td>459,920,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Package Money</td>
<td>240,300,000</td>
<td>240,300,000</td>
<td>123,750,000</td>
<td>166,230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Welfare</td>
<td>321,750,000</td>
<td>199,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honour Money **</td>
<td>173,880,000</td>
<td>173,880,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure for Health Care</td>
<td>134,500,000</td>
<td>134,500,000</td>
<td>66,000,000</td>
<td>95,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for Official Costumes</td>
<td>55,000,000</td>
<td>55,000,000</td>
<td>71,500,000</td>
<td>109,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for Official Visits and Movement</td>
<td>927,900,000</td>
<td>927,900,000</td>
<td>694,525,000</td>
<td>589,699,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure for Activities’ Support</td>
<td>557,000,000</td>
<td>557,000,000</td>
<td>250,000,000</td>
<td>347,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Improving Income</td>
<td>332,238,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Family, Children, and Rice</td>
<td>197,400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>51,705,000</td>
<td>81,990,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>6,145,805,550</td>
<td>5,820,523,050</td>
<td>4,037,036,300</td>
<td>2,257,496,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for Civil Servants</td>
<td>4,948,531,420</td>
<td>4,670,339,420</td>
<td>681,938,300</td>
<td>695,021,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for Goods</td>
<td>795,216,950</td>
<td>810,920,950</td>
<td>1,490,547,800</td>
<td>1,208,114,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for Official Visits</td>
<td>80,918,580</td>
<td>80,918,580</td>
<td>77,315,000</td>
<td>92,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for Maintenance</td>
<td>321,138,600</td>
<td>249,720,000</td>
<td>232,360,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>258,344,100</td>
<td>1,437,337,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPDP &amp; Secretariat</td>
<td>9,725,265,550</td>
<td>9,399,938,050</td>
<td>5,920,826,300</td>
<td>4,257,405,960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The same trick was used in the revised 2001 budget. For instance, more than 82 per cent (Rp. 4,074,260,000) of the ‘expenses for civil servants’ was allocated for just 55, not 79 (if the secretariat staffs had been included). Similarly, ‘expenditure for meetings’ (biaya sidang/rapat) for which Rp. 1,229,660,000 was allocated and ‘support for civil servants’ welfare’ (kesejahteraan pegawai) that amounted to Rp. 2,844,600,000 were intended for just 55 members but still inserted into the budget for the secretariat.

Therefore, the actual increase for the assembly members is greater if it is assumed that there was a negligible increase in the expenditures for the secretariat during the same period.

In addition to the considerable increase of the absolute amount, there are some controversial items such as ‘expenses for absorbing people’s aspirations’ (biaya penyeraapan aspirasi masyarakat) and ‘expenses for improving quality’ (biaya peningkatan kualitas) which, if combined, allocates Rp. 3.15 million per month to each member. In fact, these items violate central government policy, as provided by the PP No. 110/2000, and even the region’s own regulation No. 6 passed by the assembly itself in 2000 (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 21 April 2001). These budgetary issues seemed to pass unnoticed by most ordinary citizens, although local media and civil society
organizations, particularly activists of the YCW (Yogyakarta Corruption Watch), tried to draw public attention to those issues. A common defence put by assembly members is to argue that the allocation was based on relevant laws and procedures. For example, Surasmo Priandono, chairman of the provincial assembly from the PDI-P, and George BL Panggabean, three-time elected representative for Golkar, insisted that the budget for the assembly was "responsibly" adopted on the basis of Law No. 22 of 1999 and the assembly’s own regulations (Bernas, 11 April 2001). But the problem was that these regulations were so ambiguous that any interpretation and application was possible. It is reported that the expenditures for the Yogyakarta provincial assembly have continued to increase to Rp. 12.94 billion in 2002 and Rp. 16.19 billion in 2003 (Bernas, 11 January 2003).

Table IV-2 and Figure IV-2 show the expenditures of the Yogyakarta municipal assembly for the period of 1999-2001, which indicates a much more dramatic increase.

Although district-level assemblies may argue that it is understandable given that more authority was devolved to the district-level, the reality is that increased authority meant a bigger budget for "governance". As an example, the assembly allocated Rp. 279 million to 'honour money' (uang kehormatan) in 2000, which had increased from Rp. 47 million in 1999. In the municipality of Yogyakarta, the budget for the secretariat also began to be integrated into the one for the municipal assembly from 2001. Subsequently, the distinction between the budget for the municipal assembly and the secretariat looked very blurred in the revised 2001 budget. For example, the item, 'expenditure for meetings' (biaya rapat or biaya persidangan), was put in the secretariat’s expenditures. Also, the item, 'expenditure for education' (biaya pendidikan), for which Rp. 163 million was allocated was placed under the secretariat’s ‘expenditure for goods’

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12 Without established mechanisms for dealing with those issues, local activists usually make use of local media by holding press conferences and giving local journalists information that they obtained from their own investigations. In particular, YCW has focused on ‘money politics’ in the local assemblies and reused public criticism by frequently holding press conferences on related issues.
In particular, the ‘expenditure for meetings’ item invited cynical criticism from the local media and civil society organizations because of its unusual scale (Rp. 0.2 billion) that took almost a third of its revised 2001 budget. The amount of allocated money was about double that of the provincial assembly (Rp. 0.12 billion), while the number of members in the provincial assembly was 55 compared to 40 in the municipal assembly. Compared to other district-level assemblies of the region – for example, the Sleman and Bantul assemblies which allocated Rp. 92 million and Rp. 108 million respectively, the amount of money allocated for meetings appeared to be too much.

Responding to the criticism from local media and civil society organizations, Bahruniyyar Basrur, chairman of the municipal assembly, made clear the logic by which the district assembly members justified their budgetary management, saying that “Don’t compare us with the provincial assembly. The responsibility of public service is placed on the municipal/district level so that it is natural (wajar) that municipal assembly members are much busier and the budgets for them are also correspondingly bigger than the provincial assemblies” (Kompas, 8 September 2001).

Extra Perks

In addition to the manipulation of the official budget, local assembly members have obtained extra perks from other sources. One example is the ‘separation bonus’ (pesangon), which was conventionally given to the assembly members when their period in office finished. The separation bonus is not specified in any official regulations but has been usually provided at the end of the service period. However, in 2001, the Yogyakarta provincial assembly decided to give each of its members Rp.10 million as pesangon every year instead of once at the end of their 5-year term, which would be in 2004.13 Responding to the criticism by local media and civil society organizations, George BL Panggabean defended it as “less burdensome” for the assembly’s budget in the last year of the period (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 21 April 2001). In the hail of public criticism, Syukri Fadholi, then provincial assembly member and now Deputy Mayor of Yogyakarta, confessed that he had received 10 million from the finance bureau of the provincial government through his account at the Bank of Regional Development (BPD DIY) (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 23 June 2001). However, this admission evoked cynical criticism from his colleagues because he had participated in making the decision concerning pesangon beforehand (Radar Jogja, 26 June 2001).

There are also some other routes that are not directly covered by the regulations with regard to the funds made available to the local assembly members. An example is the money transferred from the previous year’s budget for the region. Before giving examples, it is necessary to recall what I discussed in Chapter III concerning the continuities and changes in the executive-legislature relationship at the local levels. In general, despite some fundamental transformation through the regional autonomy scheme, the local executives appear to have retained much of their control over their counterparts in local assemblies. The local executives still appear to take the initiative in most areas of administration, from budgeting to drafting regional regulations. However, the fact that the final decisions are made by the assemblies has made the local executives more attentive to the ‘needs’ of assembly members. Some cases show that local assembly members have obtained financial supplements by taking advantage of this transformed executive-legislature relationship.

One instance is the taxation of transportation in the region. Regional Regulation No. 2 of 1996 allows seven per cent of the revenue from this scheme to be distributed to civil servants who are involved in the taxation when the amount goes beyond Rp. 50

13 For comparison, the district assembly of Sragen, Central Java, also allocated Rp. 50 million to each of its 45 members as pesangon in its 2003 budget (Tempo, 14 August 2003).
money would be used for “capturing” (menjaring) people’s aspirations at the grassroots, consulting activities of each fraction and committee, and communicating several issues related to the new institutions of the municipal government. He further argued that those activities were very challenging and important in relation to producing new development strategies for the next year. He also pointed out that the future capability of the assembly members should be comparable with that of their executive counterparts (“kita tak boleh kalah dengan mereka”) (Radar Jogja, 1 September 2001). If so, the remaining question is how much the assembly’s performance has improved compared to their predecessors.

Local media and civil society organizations generally show their doubts about whether the substantially improved financial rewards of local assembly members will lead to better representation and the elimination of corruption from the institution. They point out the continuing difficulty in meeting their representatives in local assemblies and the insufficient information about the activities of assembly members. It is also necessary to point out that the regional budget for the public service has decreased during the same period when the budgets for the local assemblies have substantially increased. For example, the allocated money for development in the revised 2001 municipal budget was less than half the amount before the revision (from Rp. 42 to 19 billions), while the budget for the municipal assembly increased by more than 20 per cent (from Rp. 4.5 to 5.5 billions). Additionally, as a result of the devolution of public services, the district government also had to deal with the considerable increase in expenditures for transferred civil servants, mostly schoolteachers, from the central government. Furthermore, as the following section shows, the excessive perquisites

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14 Sixty five percent to field workers, a quarter to the department of general administration, the department of accounting, the department of law, and the local assembly, and the rest (10%) to representatives from the central government.

15 In November 2001, the YCW held a press conference and announced that it had asked the Supreme Court for a judicial review of the Regional Regulation No. 2 of 1996.
seem to have not contributed to the elimination of the practices of 'money politics' in the local assemblies.

'Money Politics' in Local Elections

This section examines party politics in elections of regional heads (kepala daerah) of government – governors at the provincial level and regents/mayors (bupati/walikota) at the district/municipal level. Regional heads are elected by the relevant legislative assembly in a process that is quite complicated. An examination of the selection process to determine the official candidates requires understanding of the relationship between party representatives in the local assemblies and party functionaries on the local boards of parties and also the power structure among parties within the assembly. The general organizational structure and working mechanism of parties are first explained, followed by two case studies. The first, the case of the 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election, is investigated from the perspective of why and how 'money politics' affected the election process. Then, the ‘JEC’ (Jogja Export Center) case is examined as an example of local assembly members taking advantage of the transformed executive-legislature relationship to obtain 'kickbacks' in return for their legislative activities.

The underlying assumption is that local elections can be analysed as litmus tests to see the practical effects of the power devolved to local political institutions on the practices of local politicians. From this perspective, the fact that many post-Suharto local elections have been tarnished with 'money politics' underscores the significance of consolidating democratic practices at the local level. Here two factors can be considered. First, multi-party parliamentary politics without an absolute-majority party seems to have made politicians keep their options open for possible coalitions.

88 H. Khairuddin, member of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly (Golkar), admits the rampant 'vote-selling' practices in many elections for regional heads of government but he attributes the major responsibility to the district-level assemblies for having raised 'money politics' issues in almost every single case of local elections for regents or mayors (Interview, 22 August 2001, Yogyakarta).

practice, stable and long-term coalitions can hardly be expected. Second, given that the elections for local executive heads are restricted to a limited number of people – mostly less than a hundred and only 40 in the case of the Yogyakarta municipal assembly – it is quite possible for candidates from minority parties to be elected through such illegal practices as vote-buying.

Local elections since 1999 have shown that in many cases, even candidates of the largest party – in most cases the PDI-P – have failed to win elections. This was often because representatives of the party failed to follow the official line of their party and presumably sold their votes to rival candidates. In other cases, elections were lost because of bitter internal fragmentation following rumours or suspicions about 'money politics' involving some members. The 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election is a case in which the majority party's candidate failed to be elected for a combination of the abovementioned reasons. More broadly, the case demonstrates the widespread impact of enduring undemocratic practices on democratic political institutions and thus local political developments.

Party Politics in Local Elections

For three reasons, it is important to understand the organizational structure and working mechanism of parties before examining how local elections proceed. First, it is members of party factions (fraksi), i.e., representatives of parties or party coalitions, who dominate the election process as only they have the right to nominate candidates who are selected through a process of political bargaining or “horse-trading”. Second, most political parties try to control their representatives in the local assemblies through a mechanism in which provincial or district boards are supposed to instruct their assembly members at each level. Third, in practice, members of the factions have often deviated from the official line of their parties, especially when the political and economic stakes
are high as in elections for the heads of local governments. Figure IV-3 shows the organizational structure of political parties. This figure is based on the model of the PDI-P, but most political parties share the same basic structure with slight differences in terms of the labels for each level.

Figure IV-3. Organizational Structure of Political Parties

In relation to party politics in local elections, two points are to be made clear. The first one is a frequently found contradiction in the organizational management of parties. In principle, the provincial (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah: DPD) and district boards (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang: DPC) make decisions with regard to the political position of the party factions at each level of government, and then obtain approval from their central boards (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat: DPP) in Jakarta. However, in reality, it is sub-district boards (Pengurus Anak Cabang: PAC) that take a strategically important position as a basic unit of party organization for at least two reasons. One is that current party representation in both national and local assemblies is based on the votes gained at this level in the 1999 general elections. Party cadres and ordinary members at this level often claim that they deserve a bigger voice in return for their contribution during the previous general election. Therefore, top-down organizational management of political parties often leads to the alienation of party cadres at this level. The other is that, in the cases of local elections, most parties' selection of candidates usually begins from the sub-district level. On the basis of the nominations suggested by sub-district boards, the district or provincial boards suggest the names of candidates to the central board for final nomination.

A second point is that although party factions play a key role in decision-making in local assemblies, they are supposed to follow the official line decided through the party's structure, both bottom-up and top-down, even though the latter is generally the normal mechanism. In practice, however, party representatives in the local assemblies usually resist, as far as possible, intervention by the party organization. They often argue that the party cadres in the local chapters do not have sufficient experience and knowledge to instruct the assembly members. The dilemma stemming from this uneasy relationship between party functionaries on the local boards and those seated in the local assemblies is that the former, especially those in the sub-district levels (PAC), have felt that they have not been rewarded enough for their contribution during the 1999 general election. On the other hand, party representatives in the local assemblies also argue that their daily tasks are heavy enough and that they have not received enough support from their own parties in carrying out their tasks.

Therefore, at least two different levels of conflict within political parties can be identified. One is the conflict between upper levels and the sub-district level within the party structure, and the other is between members of the party fraction in the local assemblies and party leaderships of the provincial and district boards. While the central boards of parties try to retain control over their local cadres, party representatives in the local assemblies seek to strengthen their political influence and access to economic

19 Interviews with many local assembly members, including TH Sunardjono and Turino Junaidy, members of FPDIP in the Yogyakarta municipal assembly (Interviews, 30 August 2001 & 31 August 2001, Yogyakarta), and Cindo Lesan Yulianto, chairman of the FPDIP in the Yogyakarta municipal assembly (Interview, 31 August 2001, Yogyakarta).
20 Many assembly members in Yogyakarta mentioned this unspoken conflict between the party organization and party representatives at local assemblies. Among them is Rahajeng Arhaun Adininggar, member of FPDIP in the Yogyakarta municipal assembly (Interview, 30 August 2001, Yogyakarta).
benefits. In the middle, party functionaries of the provincial and district level have not been able to exert their authority over party representatives in the local assemblies, while lower rank-and-file members of parties have been disappointed by the failure of the party functionaries to appreciate their contribution during the 1999 elections.

The 2001 Yogyakarta Mayoral Election

The Yogyakarta mayoral election process began with the establishment of a special committee in the municipal assembly to draft electoral rules and then an election committee in May 2001 (Table IV-3). The election committee consisted of four sub-committees – registration, selection, implementation, and inauguration - each of which was composed of nine assembly members. The chairman and three deputy chairmen of the assembly were in charge of supervising all four sections. Unusually, the election committee was composed of all 40 members, compared to other district assemblies that generally formed much smaller election committees. 21

Table IV-3. Timetable of the 2001 Yogyakarta Mayoral Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8-28, 2001</td>
<td>Registration (Pendaftaran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 21-28, 2001</td>
<td>Compilation of dossiers (Pendataan Berkas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2001</td>
<td>Transfer of documents to the fraksi leaderships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Pernyataan Dokumen kepada Pinjaman Fraksi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28 – July 11, 2001</td>
<td>First phase of screening (Pengadilan Tahap I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16-28, 2001</td>
<td>Second phase of screening (Pengadilan Tahap II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30-Aug 4, 2001</td>
<td>The last phase of determining a pair of candidates:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30, 2001</td>
<td>- Coordinating meeting of fraksi leaderships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31-Aug 4, 2001</td>
<td>- Presentation of vision and mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 4, 2001</td>
<td>- Coordinating meeting of fraksi leaderships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 4, 2001</td>
<td>- Determination of a pair of candidates by each party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Rakoordinas Piangan Fraksi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Penyimpanan Visti dan Mitri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Rakoordinas Pimpiian Fraksi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 Some local civil society organizations suspected that the assembly members joined the committee simply to get some more financial rewards (Bersatu, 18 May 2001). In fact, by joining the election committee, ordinary assembly members were paid Rp. 550,000, which was much higher than other special committees where they could be paid on average Rp. 175,000 (Leadership Decision No. 16 & 16a/K/PIMP/DPRD/2001, 18 May 2001).

1) Selection of Candidates

As shown in Table IV-3, there are two phases of the selection of candidates for mayor and deputy mayor. Only parties in the assembly can nominate candidates. Anyone who wants to become a candidate for either of the two positions can apply to one or more political parties. This phase can be defined as 'pre-screening' for nomination.

Individuals seeking to get a nomination from a certain party may have a strong connection with that party, but the final decision for official candidacy is in the hands of the party representatives in the assembly – in principle, with the agreement of the party’s district board. After considering the applicants through several internal tests, each political party usually nominates two pairs of candidates. This is for tactical reasons. In a context where no single party has a majority of seats, the nomination of two sets of candidates provides room for bargaining with other parties in order to form a winning coalition. Then, the election committee of the assembly, consisting, in the case of the Yogyakarta municipal assembly, of the entire membership of the assembly, selects a short list among the nominated pairs of candidates. Normally the pairs are made up of a mayoral candidate from one party and a deputy from another allied party.

From 8 to 28 June 2001, 49 candidates for mayor and deputy mayor registered. There were no restrictions on eligibility, although candidates who were still active military officers or civil servants, including parliamentarians, are required to resign in the event that they are later elected as mayor or deputy mayor. Thus, in principle,
anyone could register as a potential candidate (bakal calon). However, applicants must then get official endorsement by at least one party fraction. After registering, the potential candidates had to undergo psychological and other tests conducted by parties.22 In terms of party organization, the party’s district leadership, not its representatives within the assembly, hold the decision-making authority on the selection of final candidates. That is why parties, not fractions, implement the tests. Those who succeed in being selected then become official candidates of party fractions. Candidates were to be nominated as pairs for the positions of mayor and deputy mayor, and there were six fractions in the Yogyakarta municipal assembly: Fraksi PDI-P (FPDI-P, 15 seats), Fraksi PAN (PAN, 9), and Fraksi Golkar (FP/G, 4), two coalition-blocs consisting of several small parties (FPI (4) consisting of PPP, PBB and PK, and FKDK (4) consisting of PKB, PDKB and PKP), and the military-police fraction (FTNI/Polri, 4). Each party fraction was eligible to nominate two pairs of candidates in the first phase of the process, so that in principle, there could be twelve different pairs of candidates.

However, as a result of separate screening and very likely through bargaining between parties, five party fractions nominated seven pairs of mayoral and deputy mayoral candidates on 30 July 2001. The sixth fraction, the military/police fraction, declared itself neutral during the election process. Every other fraction nominated two pairs of candidates, but three pairs were supported by more than one fraction resulting in seven pairs (Table IV-4). With no party fraction holding an absolute majority in the assembly, this strategy opened the possibility for negotiating or bargaining with other fractions. For example, the PPDI-P nominated Endang Dharmawan (PDI-P) and Haryo Sasonko (Golkar) for the mayoral position and M. Wahid (FKDK) for the deputy mayoral position. On the other hand, the PAN nominated Henry Zudianto (PAN) as

22 The psychological and other tests conducted by most parties in fact did not look fundamental to the eventual official nomination of the parties. Since many candidates applied to more than one political party, each party fraction seemed to need time to find out those who were emerging as outstanding candidates with support from other parties as well.

Table IV-4. Candidates Nominated by Party Fractions in the 2001 Yogyakarta Mayoral Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fraksi</th>
<th>Component party or parties (seats)</th>
<th>Candidates for Mayor</th>
<th>Candidates for Deputy Mayor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPDI-P</td>
<td>PDI-P (15)</td>
<td>H. Endang Dharmawan</td>
<td>H. Muh Wahid MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ir. Haryo Sasonko</td>
<td>H. Muh Wahid MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>PAN (9)</td>
<td>H. Henry Zudianto</td>
<td>H. Syukri Fadhholi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Henry Zudianto</td>
<td>Bambang Purwoatmojo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPG</td>
<td>Golkar (4)</td>
<td>Ir. Haryo Sasonko</td>
<td>Bambang Dwi Pribadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Henry Zudianto</td>
<td>Bambang Purwoatmojo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>PPP, PBB, &amp; PK (4)</td>
<td>H. Henry Zudianto</td>
<td>H. Syukri Fadhholi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B. Soepijanto</td>
<td>H. Suwandi, BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKDK</td>
<td>PKB, PDKB, &amp; PKP (4)</td>
<td>H. Endang Dharmawan</td>
<td>H. Muh Wahid MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Henry Zudianto</td>
<td>Bambang Subandang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Secretariat of municipal assembly and Bernas (31 July 2001).

During the five days from July 31 to August 4, each pair of candidates presented their programs for the development of the Municipality of Yogyakarta in the form of statements of their vision and mission (penyampaian visi dan misi) in front of all 40 assembly members and a public audience. The political parties tried to find a common platform with other parties on which to build a coalition and win the election. Finally, the election committee selected three pairs on 4 August 2001 for the final round (Table IV-5).

Table IV-5. Candidates Selected by the Election Committee in the 2001 Yogyakarta Mayoral Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fraksi</th>
<th>Names of Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPDI-P</td>
<td>H. Endang Dharmawan/IM Wahid MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKDK</td>
<td>H. Endang Dharmawan/IM Wahid MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>H. Henry Zudianto/H. Syukri Fadhholi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>H. Henry Zudianto/ H. Syukri Fadhholi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPG</td>
<td>Ir. Haryo Sasonko/Bambang Dwi Pribadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTNI/Polri</td>
<td>No nomination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Secretariat of municipal assembly and Bernas (5 August 2001).
2) Campaigning for 21 Votes

As the election took place in the assembly, the candidates did not need to campaign for the support of a broad range of constituents. They focussed their energy on winning over votes from party members whose parties were committed to other candidates. This included political horse-trading and offers of various incentives. Even before the campaign period, the election had already begun to be tarnished by issues of ‘money politics’ and questions about the qualifications of certain candidates.

First, several controversial issues surfaced during the presentation of statements about vision and mission, mostly related to the eligibility of particular candidates and suggestions of money politics, particularly involving the PDI-P members. One of the controversies surrounded the background of Endang Dharmawan, the PDI-P’s mayoral candidate. PDI-P supporters were divided into several groups because it was the party organization through the district board (DPC) that selected Endang Dharmawan as the party’s official candidate, while many of the party’s fraction members (FPDI-P) did not agree with his candidacy. The FPDI-P was reluctant to support Endang Dharmawan as the party’s official candidate for several reasons. First of all, he had never been active in the party before, and it was claimed that he was hardly known to the people of Yogyakarta. The FPDI-P’s members argued that the party should be able to find a more promising candidate among well-known party cadres. Secondly, there was an inherent potential conflict between the DPC and the FPDI-P in that FPDI-P members had to be more attentive to the general opinions and emotions of their supporters at the grassroots — that is, PAC. However, in terms of the party’s organizational structure, it was the DPC, not the party fraction at the assembly, which had the final word on the party’s preferred candidate.23

Meanwhile, local journalists who covered the election process questioned Endang Dharmawan’s background as a retired military officer and the basis of his wealth. According to his curriculum vitae, Endang Dharmawan had worked at the Planning Centre for Administrative Development of the Army (Perencanaan Pusat Pengembangan Administrasi Angkatan Darat) as a bureau head (Kabiro) from December 1979 until he retired in April 1989. At the time he ran for the Yogyakarta mayorship, he introduced himself as a businessman having companies in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta. The regional office of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (Kamar Dagang Indonesia Daerah: Kadinde), however, doubted this, pointing out that he had no track record in business.24 Thus, his selection as the party’s official candidate raised suspicions.

He was a newcomer (pendatang) to the city. Many people believed that he could not have made it without bribing some, if not all, the PDI-P’s sub-district level cadres as well as some members of the FPDI-P in the assembly, who could influence the party’s official candidacy for the election. According to local media, such as Bernas and Kedaulatan Rakyat, and civil society activists, represented by ParWI, eleven chairmen of the party’s sub-district boards were suspected of receiving bribes in the form of motorbikes from Endang Dharmawan before they attended the district board’s ‘working session’ (Rapat Kerja Cabang: Rakercab). It was alleged that the motorbikes were only partly paid for and the rest would be paid when he got elected. The same trick was used to bribe some functionaries among district level cadres. The working session eventually decided on Endang Dharmawan and HM Wahid as the party’s official candidates from the 11 candidates who had applied.

In fact, there were some prominent party cadres, including Cinde Laras Yullianto, chairman of the party fraction (FPDI-P) in the municipal assembly, and Andrie

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23 Statutes and Rules (Angaran Dasar & Rumah Tangga) of the PDI-P, in particular Article 37 in Chapter XVI.

24 Pamphlets handed over by the candidates to the election committee and the assembly secretariat of Yogyakarta Municipality; Bernas, 2, 3 & 15 August 2001.
Subiyantoro, chairman of the district board (DPC), who were defeated in the party’s selection process by Endang Dharmawan. This outcome deepened internal conflict and mutual mistrust. Cinde Laras Yulianto took pride in having been involved in the PDI-P since his student days as a member of the Indonesian Students’ National Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia: GMNI) and some other sub-organizations of the PDI until 27 July 1996. However, he failed to get a recommendation from his own political base, the sub-district board of Gondonanan. After the selection, he complained that it did not make sense that the PDI-P as the majority party could not find any cadres among its own members to nominate from within the party. Neither could Andrie Subiyantoro get support from the district board cadres. The PDI-P of Yogyakarta Municipality fragmented into several factions: Endang’s supporters, Cinde Laras’ faction, and some other sub-district level cadres represented by TH. Sunaradjono, one of the party’s experienced politicians.

In this circumstance, Endang Dharmawan made a critical mistake by stating that he could afford to buy Yogyakarta if the city could be bought (“seandainya Yogyakarta hendak dijual, saya mampu membeli kok”), giving rise to criticism from the grassroots as well as many respected local figures (Bernas, 2 August 2001). The statement was unacceptable to most “original” Yogyakarta people and Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, governor of Special Region of Yogyakarta, dismissed Endang’s attitude as “unsuitable” (tidak pas) (Bernas, 3 August 2001). As the public criticism mounted, members of the party fraction of the PDI-P (FPDI-P) claimed that the party had to reconsider his candidacy and replace him.

On August 8, hundreds of local people demonstrated in front of the City Hall demanding more transparent electoral processes. This could be interpreted in diverse ways. It is possible that some local people who were concerned about the electoral process initiated the demonstration. Another possibility is that some party functionaries who were worried about the negative image caused by Endang Dharmawan might have mobilized it. In any case, responding to the demonstration, the chairman of the party fraction in the municipal assembly, Cinde Laras Yulianto, announced that the PDI-P’s district board (DPC) had cancelled Endang Dharmawan’s candidacy (Bernas, 8 August 2001), but it later turned out that the meeting of the district board had not formed a quorum, demonstrating deep fragmentation within the leadership on the district board.

Another problem was that the party could not cancel Endang Dharmawan’s candidacy without holding a plenary session of the assembly (Kompas, 8 August 2001). To withdraw its candidate the PDI-P would need the support of at least another party fraction in the assembly. Meanwhile, time was short with the voting day just a week away. Therefore, both the party fraction in the assembly and the district board of the party tried to find possible ways out of the deadlock and the most acceptable solution was to get a recommendation or instruction from the party’s central board (DPP) in Jakarta.

The timing was not helpful to the district board because at that moment the central board of the party was busy constructing the cabinet for Megawati Soekarnoputri who had just taken over as President. Some members of the party fraction in the assembly said that the central board did not want to back any of the candidates suggested by the district board. Endang Dharmawan was not familiar to PDI-P cadres, let alone to the Yogyakarta public, while Haryo Sasengko, the party’s other candidate, had previously been active in Golkarn, one of the PDI-P’s rivals, despite his good

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25 Cinde Laras Yulianto had supported Megawati’s faction of the PDI which, after the Soeharto government’s attack on the party headquarters in Jakarta on 27 July 1996, had split from the PDI and eventually formed the PDI-P after the fall of Soeharto. See Lea & Milward (2001), pp. 58-80.
26 Interview with Ir. Cinde Laras Yulianto, 31 August 2001, Yogyakarta.
reputation as an academic and a lawyer. From this viewpoint, it is noteworthy that as a provincial assembly member representing the PDI-P bitterly pointed out, the ultimate problem of the PDI-P before and during the election was that the party had no qualified cadres for the mayoral position.

According to Tatang Setiawan, secretary of the party’s provincial board (DPD) and also a provincial assembly member, the recommendation letter finally arrived and was delivered by Gunawan Wirosaroyo from Jakarta the night before voting day. However, it was too late to change the situation, not just to win the election but also to resolve internal conflicts with the municipal chapter of the PDI-P. Nobody was reported to have met the Jakarta representative to learn whom the central board recommended.

According to some other sources, the candidate recommended for mayor by the party’s central board was Haryo Sasongko, but this information was a little dubious, considering that he had been active in Golkar and apparently made no effort to build a coalition with the PDI-P.

On 13 August 2001, two days before the election, the party fraction in the assembly announced the decision of the district board to boycott the election and asked its members not to attend the plenary session on August 15. It also warned its members that it would apply sanctions if they did not follow the instruction. The decision was made by the district board, but again the meeting did not have the required quorum, so it left a question as to whether the decision was legitimate or not. The next day, 14 August 2001, however, 11 among 14 sub-district branches in Yogyakarta municipality stated that party fraction members had to attend the plenary session, and even warned that they would pick each one up from their houses and take them to the City Hall on voting day (Bernas, 15 August 2001). This action suggested that despite the disappointing performance of Endang Dharmawan during the campaign, the sub-district cadres still wanted him to win and were ready to compel the party representatives to attend the final voting.

3) Voting

Eventually, on 15 August 2001, 11 of 15 FPDI-P members attended the voting, but they came to the City Hall on their own, without the assistance of the sub-district branches. Bachtiarisya Basir, chairman of the municipal assembly and member of FPDI-P, justified his attendance at the voting by pointing to that it was what his constituents wanted him to do (Kompas, 18 August 2001). In the first round of voting no pair won the required absolute majority. The Endang Wahid pair nominated by the PDI-P ranked second with 13 votes, while the Herry-Syukri pair nominated by the PAN and the FPI coalition (including PPP) received 16 votes. After intensive political lobbying and bargaining, the Herry-Syukri pair eventually won 21 votes in the second round against the Endang Wahid pair with just 14 votes (Table IV-6). The final deal indicated that assembly members had kept open their options for negotiation until the last moment. On the other hand, it seemed that ‘money politics’ practices had blurred all the possible predictions about who would eventually win the election.

| Table IV-6. The Result of Voting in the 2001 Yogyakarta Mayoral Election |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Pair of candidates          | 1st Round | 2nd Round  |
| H. Endang Darmawan          | 13        | 14       |
| HM. Wahid MM                |            |          |
| H. Herry Zudianto           | 16        | 21       |
| H. Syukri Fadhil            |            |          |
| Ir. Haryo Sasongko          | 7          | -        |
| Bambang Dwi Aprilhadi       |            |          |
| **Total**                   | **36**    | **35**   |
On August 16, the day after voting, cadres from the Forum for Communication of PDI-P's Sub-district Boards (Forum Komunikasi PAC PDI-P Kota) asked the leadership of the district board to take responsibility for the defeat and to hold a special meeting (konferensi cabang khusus). The special meeting was not convened, signalling that the PDI-P in Yogyakarta municipality still could not resolve its internal conflicts. In an interview soon after the voting, Cinde Laras Yulianto said that the FPDI-P was considering bringing the 'money politics' cases to court. However, it was mainly local civil society organizations that led the public movement to take legal action. During the period of public test (pengujian publik), ParWI and the regional branch of the Legal Aid Foundation of Indonesia (YLBHI) provided some evidence of 'money politics' on Endang Dharmawan's part. They claimed that he bought his candidacy by bribe some of PDI-P cadres before the district board's working session. Triyandi Mulkan, one of the defeated party candidates and director of the Institute for Legal Protection (Lembaga Pembela Hukum: LPH), brought this case to the court and claimed that Endang Dharmawan's candidacy was illegitimate. Meanwhile, HM Wahid, Endang's partner as the candidate for deputy mayor, admitted that he and Endang had given money to the fraction of the armed forces and the police (FTNI/Polri). The two persons who acted as brokers and the chairman of FTNI/Polri confirmed HM Wahid's confession. ParWI claimed that it was Endang Dharmawan himself who disclosed to the local media that he had given Rp. 100 million to each FTNI/Polri member (400 million among the four members in the FTNI/Polri). ParWI also claimed it had evidence that Rp. 200 million

26 Interview with Triyandi Mulkan, 31 August 2001, Yogyakarta
27 This is based on the copy of the written confession by FTNI that the faction received money from M. Wahid (PKDK) and Endang Dharmawan (FPDI-P) twice before the election, signed on 20 August 2001. The reason why Wahid made this admission was not clear.
28 "Chronology of HM Wahid's candidacy by FKDK" (Kronologi Pencalonan Wahid Wallil Kota dari Praktik KDK atas nama Bpk. HM Wahid, MM) signed by FTNI/Polri of the Yogyakarta municipality assembly on 20 August 2001, and "Letter of Declaration" (Surat Pernyataan) made and signed by Supardi Antonio and Zulkarnaen in August 2001. These documents have not been publicized and I obtained the copies from ParWI. These documents did not mention the amount of money that FTNI/Polri had received.

4) Public Test and Inauguration

Based on the governmental regulation No. 151 of 2000 (Article 25 & 29), the local public can complain against the election of the mayor or deputy mayor by filing a challenge through a registered organization within three days of the voting. However, to prove 'money politics' is quite difficult because complaints about 'money politics' should be supported by the written testimony of more than two assembly members. The final decision whether the case should be pursued or not is decided by the assembly, not by the judiciary.

31 Interview with Heru Purwadi, secretary on the PAN's district board of Yogyakarta municipality, 16 August 2001, Yogyakarta. He referred to the new regulation of central government on the composition of the assembly chairmanship (Komposisi Pimpinan Dewan) specified by Governmental Regulation No. 21 of 2001. Heru Zudianto, the elected Yogyakarta Mayor for the period of 2001-2006, later acknowledged this (Interview, 9 January 2002, Yogyakarta).
was passed over to Col. Soroso S., chairman of the FTNI/Polri. Despite all the effort
made by local media and civil society activists, the municipal assembly declined to
investigate the cases. In any case, even if the allegations were true, it seems that the four
FTNI/Polri members did not vote for the PDI-P candidates.

The case of the Yogyakarta mayoral elections revealed that the public test in fact
hardly worked at all as it was limited to three working days and, moreover, people had
to be members of an officially registered organization to be eligible to submit a
complaint. Even then, the final decision of whether to investigate or not is still in the
hands of assembly members. Only if the election committee decides to hold a plenary
session, do they discuss the case.36 In this instance, it was not surprising that the election
committee composed of all the 40 assembly members did not bring the money politics
cases into a plenary session. In fact, if the guidelines specified in the governmental
regulation No. 151 of 2000 on local elections were followed, the municipal assembly
should have held a second plenary session to examine the issue. The elected mayor and
deputy mayor took their oaths on 17 September 2001.

5) Postscript

There are several different interpretations of the PDI-P’s loss and the PAN-PPP
calendar’s win in this election. First, the PDI-P was badly factionalised due to Endang
Dharmawan’s suspicious background and his controversial statements, lack of mutual
trust and the breakdown in coordination between the district board and the party’s
fraction, and the poor communication between the central board and sub-national
branches within the party.37 On the other hand, other political parties, including the
PAN, were compelled to spend much more energy and use more resources to win the
election as the PDI-P had won elections for the regional heads in four other districts in
Yogyakarta province. People in Yogyakarta and some party cadres also talked of a
conspiracy in which Golkar had manipulated the fragmentation of the PDI-P by
encouraging Endang Dharmawan to apply for the party’s candidacy. This suspicion
cannot be proved. However, Endang Dharmawan’s dubious history and his
controversial statements during the election are not inconsistent with this theory.

Many other rumours regarding money politics in this election circulated in
Yogyakarta, but it was almost impossible to get a clear picture of events due to the lack
of transparency of the electoral system itself. As a matter of fact, most politicians I met
were not hesitant to define politics of the reformasi era as politics of UUD, “ujung-
ujungnya uang,” which means that the main purpose of politics is money. Uang is a
Javanese word for money, while UUD are the initials for the 1945 Constitution
(Undang-Undang Dasar), widely acknowledged as the philosophical foundation of
Indonesian politics since Independence. This cynical and self-scrimming joke on post-
authoritarian politics reflects the emergence of local assemblies as a new locus for
‘money politics’.

Meanwhile, the internal conflict within the PDI-P of Yogyakarta municipality
seemed to continue to worsen.38 In responding to public criticism, the PDI-P faction in
the Yogyakarta municipality assembly made several gestures, including an attempt to
lobby the Minister of the Interior not to recognise the results of the mayoral election.

36‘Assembly decision of the Yogyakarta municipality assembly No. 10 of 2001 about the regulations on
the election for Yogyakarta mayor and deputy mayor for the period of 2001-2006’ (Kumpulan DPRD
Yogyakarta Nomor: 10/K/DPRD/2001 Tentang Peraturan Toin Terlakhir Pemilihan Walikota dan
37Rahajeng Achuna Adiuninggar, member of the Yogyakarta municipal assembly (PDI-P), particularly
pointed out the communication problems between different levels of the party structure. As one of the
four PDI-P members who had not attended the final voting, she said that while the PAC was too strong in
the party structure, the DPC made the situation more complicated by taking its own line and putting
fraction members in the assembly into a difficult situation (Interview, 30 August 2001, Yogyakarta).
38Bahtaniyus Basyir, chairman of the Yogyakarta municipal assembly (PDI-P), openly blamed Clinto
Larus Yullanto for his role in the internal fragmentation within the party fraction as well as the conflict
between the DPC and PAC (Interview, 12 November 2001, Yogyakarta).
However, they learnt that the Minister had already signed the necessary document when the delegates of the party fraction were still in Yogyakarta before leaving for Jakarta. In another attempt, some of the fraction members tried to boycott the inauguration ceremony of the elected mayor and deputy mayor, but the deputy secretary-general of the party’s central board, Pramono Agung, asked the party representatives to attend the ceremony, pointing out that the remaining task was to consolidate the party organization, implement cadresiation, and prepare for the 2004 general elections (Bernas, 17 September 2001). Eventually, 11 among 15 members of the party fraction of the PDI-P attended the inauguration ceremony. As a consequence, the party fraction only invited more cynical gossip among members of different party factions and grassroots supporters (Bernas, 3 October 2001).

On the other hand, a year after the Yogyakarta mayoral election, Endang Dharmawan reappeared in several national mass media covering the 2002 Jakarta gubernatorial election. This time he sought the nomination of the PDI-P against the favourite, Sutiyoso, the incumbent governor, and, unsurprisingly, was reported to have given 10 separate checks worth Rp. 450 million to members of the PAN fraction. However, as one of seven gubernatorial candidates, Endang Dharmawan received just one vote in the final selection by the election committee (Tempo Interaktif, 2 August 2002; Kompas, 30 August 2002; Kompas Cyber Media, 11 September 2002; and Jakarta Post, 24 September 2002). It was not clear why, despite his ‘money politics’ record during the 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election, he could run again for the Jakarta gubernatorial candidacy. Both national and local media suspected that he had never meant to pursue an official position such as mayor or governor, and he rather appeared to have been encouraged, or hired, for the purpose of concealing real political transactions behind the scene in both the 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election and the 2002 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

The ‘JEC’ Case
Unlike the Soeharto period, most authority to make decisions, including the expenditures for governor or regent/mayor, are in the hands of local assembly members. Local executive heads have to submit their “responsibility report” (laporan pertangungjawaban) to the legislatures every year just before seeking approval of the budget for the new fiscal year. There are at least two practical effects of this devolution process on the changing executive-legislature relationship in the regions. On the one hand, many regions have seen increasing conflict between the executive and the legislature, especially when the legislature was discontented with the responsibility report by the executive head and moved toward removing him/her from office (Rauf 2002, 150). Additionally, local assemblies are in a stronger position in deciding the local budget and supervising general administration of local governments. As argued by Herman Abdurrahman, the deputy chairman of the budget committee in the Yogyakarta provincial assembly, “in principle, the executive has no right and authority to reject the budget suggested by the assembly” (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 22 March 2000). On the other hand, the substantially expanded authority of local assemblies seems to have pushed local governments to provide financial rewards for assembly members in an attempt to build up a cooperative relationship between the two institutions. Although this practice of compensating assembly members by local governments for cooperating in local governance is hardly new, the amount of money available seems to have considerably increased. The local governments in Yogyakarta also have allowed their counterparts to make use of the unspent funds transferred from the previous year’s budget to buy new

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39 Many assembly members representing the PDI-P in both the provincial and municipal assemblies commonly point out the random mechanism of recruiting new cadres and the absence of proper cadresiation programs. Among them are Tatang Setiawan and Agus Sobayyo, members of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly (PDI-P) (Interviews, 14 August 2001, Yogyakarta), and Bahansiyar Basrif, chairman of the Yogyakarta municipal assembly (PDI-P) (Interview, 12 November 2001, Yogyakarta).
40 The same number those who had attended the voting on 15 August 2001, suggesting that the conflicting blocs stayed the same as during the election process.
official cars or just to divide between the party fractions. There is little doubt that other financial sources have also been sought by local assembly members.

The so-called ‘JEC’ case is an exemplary story showing the extent of ‘money politics’ in local assemblies, as well as the changed executive-legislature relationship in the regions. In January 2002, the provincial government of Yogyakarta held an international export exhibition (AFTA) at the newly opened Jogja Expo Center (JEC). In the following month, the regional prosecutors’ office (Kejati DIY) announced that it had received information about alleged bribery by the construction company to some provincial assembly members in an attempt to “smooth” the approval of the provincial assembly with regard to additional expenditures on the project. On 27 February 2002, the regional prosecutor decided to investigate the case, and named two suspects, a provincial assembly member and a worker of PT Adhi Karya, the construction company.

Considered that the JEC was a Rp. 42.5 billion project and the amount of the alleged bribery was Rp. 150 millions, the case could have massively affected local political developments, particularly in terms of the executive-legislature relationship. At a time when suspicion regarding the JEC case was already widespread in the previous month, Herman Abdurrahman, the suspected provincial assembly member (PPP), claimed that bribery payments of Rp. 1 billion had been made during the election of the Paku Alam as deputy governor (Beras, 30 January 2002). In fact, the ‘money politics’ during the deputy gubernatorial election was an open secret in Yogyakarta society, and Boedi Dewiantoro, another provincial assembly member (PK), publicly acknowledged that he had been given Rp. 35 million a week before the election but had returned it two days later (Beras, 19 February 2002). Herman Abdurrahman intentionally raised this issue because the deputy governor was in a position to decide whether the local government would begin investigations or not. If the deputy governor was also implicated in ‘money politics’, there could be a possibility for negotiation. Another plausible scenario was that the revelation of Herman Abdurrahman’s bribe-taking was a counterattack from the Golkar and PDI-P fractions against the PPP fraction for its attempt to leak the ‘money politics’ scandal behind the deputy gubernatorial election (Jakarta Post, 14 March 2002). On the same day when the regional prosecutor announced its investigation plan, it mentioned that there was another allegation with regard to ‘money politics’ during the 2001 deputy gubernatorial election.

At the beginning, there was some impressive progress in the investigation. Herman Abdurrahman publicly admitted that he had received Rp. 150 millions from Dulijman, director of the local office of PT Adhi Karya, but more interestingly, he also admitted that he had distributed the money to some 20 provincial assembly members. Following his announcement, Khaeruddin, the chairman of Golkar fraction in the provincial assembly, publicly admitted he had been given an envelope containing Rp. 5 millions by a fellow legislator. He said other legislators had also received similar amounts of money in return for their approval of the most recent disbursement (anggaran belanja tambahan) of Rp. 9.5 billion from state funds to the state-owned construction company PT Adhi Karya to finance the JEC project.41 Subsequently, the PPP’s investigation team led by Syukri Fadholi discovered a bank transfer slip that disclosed a transfer of Rp. 150 million from PT Adhi Karya’s bank account at Bank Mandiri to Herman Abdurrahman’s private account at Bank Bali (Jakarta Post, 14 March 2002).

Despite the impressive start, however, the scope of investigation continued to be restricted to the two suspects, while the deputy gubernatorial election case was neglected. From the beginning of this year-long investigation, many local civil society activists had already pointed out that Herman Abdurrahman was being sacrificed to save other assembly members. It is commonly assumed that the ‘money politics’ at local

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41 PT Adhi Karya was later included on a list for privatisation which is scheduled to begin in late 2003.
assemblies tends to be collective (Bernas, 28 February 2002). From this perspective, the investigation should have been extended to other assembly members.

Additionally, it was unclear why the local government was not investigated, although the JEC was a provincial government project with state funds. From the perspective of the local government, the timing of the investigation coincided with the scheduled meeting with the assembly to discuss the draft of the 2002 budget (RAPBD DIY 2002). An extended investigation to other members would bring to a standstill the local governance. Governor Sultan Hamengku Buwono X simply made clear that he had no specific opinion with relation to the case, and cautiously criticized the accused assembly members individually rather than the provincial assembly as a whole (Bernas, 4 March 2002). The unsolved allegation of ‘money politics’ in the 2001 deputy gubernatorial election might be also considered. On the other hand, Hantoro Soemaryo, the chief public prosecutor of the region who was in charge of the investigation, was criticized for having allegedly received bribes (upeti) from illegal gambling operators. He was also expected to retire from 1 April 2002 (Bernas, 1 March 2002).

After more than a year of investigation and public controversy, the regional court led by Judge Syahlan Said SH eventually sentenced Herman Abdurrahman to be jailed for 2 years and to pay a fine of Rp.10 million on 17 March 2003. There was no further indictment of the other 25 provincial assembly members who had been investigated. Since they argued that they had thought the money was a gift from the executive and had returned it later, the court concluded that there was no evidence that those other assembly members had violated Article 12 in Law No. 20 of 2001 on corruption (Bernas, 18 March 2003; 19 March 2003). It seemed that Herman Abdurrahman was indeed sacrificed to save his colleagues.

The region has recently seen another ‘money politics’ issue, in which all the assembly members received Rp. 2.5 millions from the budget for health insurance. This latest issue of ‘money politics’ was uncovered during the investigation into the ‘JEC’ case. Again, just 6 assembly members, mostly from the assembly leadership, were named as suspects of corruption (Kompas Cyber Media, 10 May 2003; Jakarta Post, 10 May 2003; 24 May 2003).

Money and Local Politics in the Post-Soeharto Era

From the cases observed at the provincial and municipal assemblies of post-Soeharto Yogyakarta, it can be concluded that the fall of the authoritarian regime and the following dissolution of Soeharto’s hierarchical patronage system have reactivated and dispersed ‘money politics’ into the regions. While local assemblies have grown as new loci of power, there has been much less effort to monitor and control the actual use of the devolved power. Legal restraints regarding the practices of ‘money politics’ still play a negligible role and, more significantly, many local party politicians have shown an inclination to equate their expanded power with correspondingly increased financial rewards.

Many local assembly members that I talked to and interviewed in Yogyakarta often criticized without any hesitation the institutions that they were representing. For instance, Krisnam, chairman of the Commission of Governance in the provincial assembly, criticized local assemblies for becoming “the main source of corruption” (blang korupsi) (Bernas, 25 February 2002). On the other hand, local assembly members also frequently appeared to take for granted receiving money made available from outside their official budget as a result of their far strengthened bargaining position vis-à-vis their executive counterparts. As an example, Agus Sunarto, a provincial assembly member, argued that “receiving gifts from the executive is just natural (wajar saja) because we are working partners” (Bernas, 26 November 2002).
Meanwhile, strong commitment to their parties or their grassroots supporters seems rare. Instead, an unspoken argument seems accepted that political parties are just instruments for obtaining political influence and accompanying economic benefits. While political parties have grown as major political institutions through which those who are politically ambitious compete for political power, party politicians have not overcome their common suspicion that the outcome of competition for political power is still determined by something else, rather than by fair democratic assessments of their performance. From this perspective, recent political developments draw our attention back to the puzzling relation between institutional democratisation and its substantive consequences for actual practice in local political institutions. Although it seems reasonable to assume that the realization of the initial intention of political change would take longer compared to formal changes in terms of institutional arrangements, the cases discussed in this chapter show that as long as political institutions are seen as no more than a means for getting rich, the intended effects of democratisation combined with decentralization will require a much longer time.

Chapter V.
Satgas and ‘Preman-ization’ of Political Parties

One of the pervasive features of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime was political violence that was usually perpetuated by unidentified thugs and apparently sponsored and utilized for the political purposes of the political elite. Such political violence was so prevalent that it conventionally attributed to the culture of Indonesian society.

Soeharto’s departure was marked by the fragmentation of systems of political control and the intensification of power struggles at the local level, transforming patterns of political violence rather than eliminating it. In contrast to the New Order period when the violence perpetrated by Pemuda Pancasila enjoyed semi-official endorsement with the backing of Golkar and the armed forces, control over political gangsterism has been largely dispersed into the hands of local chapters of parties. During and after the 1999 general election, a range of youth groups — many of which can be identified as semi-criminal gangs — have surfaced in both Jakarta and the regions as affiliates of political parties. Usually found in urban kampung areas, they now appear to take a more direct part in local political developments with the increased political influence that they obtained through their contribution to mass mobilization during election campaigns in 1999.

The main concern of this chapter is ‘civilian’ security “task forces,” or satgas (satuan tugas), of parties, which are distinguished from the state’s security forces. They usually exist as sub-organizations of parties or mass organizations and their major overt task is to protect members of the mother organizations from possible physical clashes with members of other organizations during political campaigning, such as rallies or street convoys. This study uses the Indonesian term in order to avoid confusion that the
English translation is likely to cause. It is also necessary to point out that there are two types of satgas, those officially recognized by the mother organizations and those unofficially but practically affiliated with parties. This study concerns both groups.

The overall argument of this chapter is that although satgas of political parties already existed in the 1950s when Indonesia practised a multi-party democratic system just after Independence, the continuing presence of such organizations within formal political institutions runs contrary to the effort to democratise and de-militarise the society. Furthermore, the increasing recruitment of local gangsters and criminals into parties’ satgas has raised the spectre of uncontrolled civilian violence as a paradoxical consequence of democratisation and decentralization.

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section starts by examining historical roots of contemporary political violence during the period of the Revolution when the anti-colonial nationalist forces sometimes mobilised gangsters in the fight against the Dutch. Gangsters were also used by younger nationalists to demonstrate their grassroots strength vis-à-vis the older Republican generation. Subsequently, the section examines the symbiotic relationship between the state authorities and criminal groups, and its impact on the growth of the parties’ satgas during the New Order period. The last part of the first section focuses on the post-authoritarian political process in which the state’s loss of its ubiquitous control over political violence and the intensified competition for political power in the regions seem to have motivated local gangs, including criminal groups, to affiliate with political parties. The 1999 general election provided those local gangs with critical momentum by contributing to mass mobilization on behalf of local chapters of parties which also allowed them to obtain some degree of political influence afterwards. The second section is dedicated to analysing one official satgas of a mass organization and four affiliates – two official and two unofficial – of political parties in post-Soeharto Yogyakarta. The final section draws some implications of the continuing presence and even expansion of satgas within party organizations for local political developments in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

State Premanisme and Satgas of Parties

Observing the riots in big cities in 1998, some people might have regarded Indonesia as a violent society. Yet, political violence in Indonesia, like in many other societies, is not inherent but often cultivated by authorities, for example by the armed forces during the New Order (Zinoman & Peluso 2002). This section argues that political violence in Indonesia took root in the country’s political history when semi-criminal gangs were ‘backed’ by political elites during the revolutionary period and then by the state, especially under the New Order regime. In particular, the events of the early 1980s, when the New Order state tightened its control over criminals and the major concern of criminals therefore became to gain political protection for their illegal activities, help to explain the development of party satgas. In the post-Soeharto period, political parties emerged as significant bases of political power, and provided a new source of political protection and even access to the formal political process. This section therefore will analyse the history of the development of state premanisme since the Revolution and its transformation and decentralization during the post-authoritarian political process.

Political Violence as a Historical Legacy

Some analysts find the historical roots of contemporary political violence back in the People’s Militias (Laskar Rayat) during the revolutionary period (Collins 2002; Lindsey 2001). The People’s Militias consisted of spontaneous armed groups that emerged to support the official People’s Security Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat). These militias were composed of nationalist youths together with jago (charismatic toughs), who lived on the edge of the law and were often engaged in semi-criminal
activities. The People’s Militia in Jakarta, for example, has been described as an “association of the young nationalists with the gangsters” (Cribb 1991, 190). Unlike the top Republican leaders who mostly preferred to pursue independence via negotiation, younger nationalists (pemuda) were much more radical despite their lack of national organization and ideological coherence and often resorted to violence with the help of criminal gangs in launching attacks on Dutch interests. The nationalist-criminal gangs, however, clashed not only with the Dutch but also the Republican government, which wanted to keep control of the nationalist forces. With regard to the militias in Bali of that period, Geoffrey Robinson notes that the increasing conflict between the Republican politicians and spontaneous militias led to widespread political violence (Robinson 1995, 220).

With the attainment of Independence, the spirit (semangat) and enthusiasm of the militant youth and their criminal allies, who stood at the vanguard of the revolution, were channelled into a new arena in the ensuing Parliamentary Democracy period. Although there were some efforts to de-mobilize youth militias and guerrilla groups in the early years of the post-Independence period, party politicians continued to turn to existing militia groups to further their political and economic goals (Schulte Nordholt 2002, 47). At that time, the military still lacked internal unity and had to encourage civilian security organizations to cooperate in the task of maintaining order.

As a result, the use of thugs by politicians in Indonesian politics became a long-standing practice (Colombijn & Lindblad 2002, 19). This tendency was more noticeable in the regions. It is said that many local leaders of youth militia groups filled the lower echelons of the civil administration and political parties. With the introduction of a multi-party system, political parties were particularly keen to develop close ties with local youth militia groups and semi-official security task forces for the purpose of mobilizing support at the grassroots. The so-called “military wings” (sayap militer) of parties are reported to have played an effective role in mobilizing support at the grassroots at that time (Kompas, 13 May 2000). Until the declaration of martial law in 1957, political competition between parties frequently involved violent activities, sometimes sponsored by political leaders with links to the police and the military (Robinson 1995, 234; King 2000).

The emergence of authoritarian rule with President Soekarno’s proclamation of a return to the 1945 Constitution seems to have rather enhanced the relationship between the political elites and criminals, but in a changed pattern. From the Guided Democracy period on, political leaders made more sophisticated efforts to bring the remaining militias or criminal groups under the control of the state authorities. For instance, in 1959, Pemuda Pancasila was formed “to back up the presidential move” (Colombijn & Lindblad 2002, 20). Other groups also enjoyed a degree of impunity as a result of their links with political parties and military officers. Later, such youth militias as the NU-affiliated Ansor in East Java and anti-communist thugs backed by the PNI played a major part in the massacres of PKI supporters following the attempted PKI-backed coup on 30 September 1965. The PKI also had a similar youth organization, Pemuda Rakjat (People’s Youth). At that time, in Medan and Aceh, Pemuda Pancasila appeared to take an active role in “slaughtering suspected communists” (Ryter 1998, 55).

Petrus, State Premanisme, and Satgas of Parties under the New Order

The turmoil of the massacres through which the New Order regime emerged seems to have enhanced the position of preman groups that continued to operate in the grey areas

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1 Lorr Ryter notes that pemuda refers to “members of an entire generation that has not yet come of age or into official position” (Ryter 1998, 47-8). In reference to the young nationalists during the early post-Independence period, however, the term is more likely to connote those who were involved in the revolutionary movement and tried to build their own political support base among the grassroots. See also Ryter (1998), pp. 57-8 and Cribb (1991).

2 However, it is necessary to note that some younger nationalist politicians had some “nobler ends” and “their own reasons” to achieve via their recruitment of rural gangsters: See Ryter (1998), p. 52.
under the context of economic boom, as there were more opportunities for illegal rents (Lindsey 2001, 289). In the context of the rapid economic growth backed by oil exports and low-wage industries, premanisme was a rational way to get access to the wealth that trickled down from above. At the same time, preman were often coopted by the state as enforcers, “a necessary component in the maintenance of state power and the collection of taxes” and their control of territory for rent extraction received “bekking” (backing) from the state or armed forces (Barker 1999, 122). The wave of industrialization and commercial growth was also accompanied by a remarkable expansion in private security services, which caused the central government some concern. In addition, the state authority became aware of the widening disparities in material conditions between classes and the resulting increase in crime by the people who were linked to the state authorities (van der Kroef 1985, 746-7).

In March 1983, the central military authorities launched a special operation, known as Petrus (penembakan misterius, mysterious shootings), and killed thousands of alleged criminals without trial, especially in big cities in Java, such as Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta. The officially claimed purpose of the operation was “to combat crime and to flush out criminals” (Tempo, 27 June 1983; Tapol Bulletin, July 1983). In addition to this official purpose, as David Bouchier points out, the central authority seemed to be also concerned with the increase in localized linkages between local authorities and gangsters. The collusion between local authorities and gangsters was said to have become “so engrained and pervasive that it was hampering the implementation of government policies and frustrating the control of the central authorities over urban kampung communities” (Bouchier 1990, 19). Political elites and military officials in the regions had continued to mobilize urban gangsters for political and economic purposes. Local private or government enterprises also

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1 Preman used to refer to a policeman or a soldier who was not on duty and not wearing his uniform. The term was also used to refer to civilian dress like pakai or baju preman before the 1990s, but the term now refers to hoodlums or criminals, replacing the traditionally used jago or gabi, professional criminals or charismatic toughs. The term originated from a Dutch word meaning ‘a free man’, who could be categorized as neither Dutch, native, slave, nor foreigner. The newly popularized meaning of preman refers to “borderline-criminal marginal youths” in gangs modelled on those operating in post-colonial Medan. For more detailed discussion on the socio-historical context of the emergence of these groups, see Rytter (1998) and Barker (1998).

2 As examples, Timothy Lindsey points out the Timor national car fiasco and the Busang/Bro-X goldmine scandal of the late 1990s. He further argues that from this perspective, the New Order’s state premanisme is quite different from other authoritarian state capitalism that can be found in some East Asian countries: See Lindsey (2001), p. 289.

3 Joshua Barker notes that “In public consciousness, at least, the late 1970s and early 1980s are remembered as the peak of preman power”: See Barker (1999), Footnote 53, p. 123.
employed some goli (young urban criminals) as bodyguards and security personnel (satpam). Some of them were used for more explicitly political purposes in collaboration with military officials, senior political figures or local governments and shared the loot from their illicit activities. From this perspective, the Petrus operation can be interpreted as 'shock therapy' aiming to break the linkages between local authorities and criminals, which had become entrenched around local governments and military businesses in many urban areas of Indonesia, and therefore to re-centralize and strengthen the links between the state and criminals. Along these lines, Henk Schulte Nordholt also points out that the Petrus was "an attempt to break the intimate relations between criminals and local authorities and to recentralize state power" (Schulte Nordholt 2002, 48).

As a consequence, the operation contributed to consolidating the linkages between central state authorities and criminal elements of society. The symbiotic relationship between political elites and preman groups, in which the latter sought protection from the former in return for their service, became increasingly common at higher levels of the state authorities. In his early analysis of Petrus, van der Kroef concludes, "criminal gang influence was quickly seen to extend to higher echelons of the business, political, and military strata of society. And these remained inviolate" (van der Kroef 1985, 758). Similarly, Loren Ryder notes that the "re-emergence of Pemuda Pancasila under the leadership of Yapto Soerjoosmano beginning in 1980 took place in an environment where sporadic efforts to organize the urban 'underworld' were being met with limited success" (Ryder 1998, 63). On the other hand, the state authorities also made efforts to prevent the growth of non-state security services by imposing state control over local security practices (Barker 1999, 123). As a result, as Daniel S. Lev also points out, "at various levels of the regime, from the top political circle to the administrative base, there were alliances with organized street gangs that generated financial returns – from protection rackets in the markets to cuts for local officials – and provided strong arms for political action" (Lev 1999, 189). At the bottom of that 'backing' network, ordinary Indonesians had to keep up good relations with their self-claimed protectors by paying out 'safety' fees (janguran or upeti).

Under this circumstance, satgas of parties emerged as a place where the distinction between formal political institutions and criminal activities was blurred. This is not to say that all the satgas members were criminals or gangsters. Some of them were trained, disciplined and controlled as party cadres. However, many were believed to be preman, local toughs and members of criminal gangs, who were involved in illegal activities outside the parties but, at the same time, pursued protection from the parties in return for mobilizing people in their territories (Van Dijk 2001, 159). In the mean time, the military intensified its practice of using gangs and youth organizations such as Pemuda Pancasila, in addition to its own forces, to terrorise specific communities for political and commercial ends (Wessel 2001, 71). The militarization of society was reflected in the militaristic features of the satgas, from their organizational structure to army-style uniforms. The satgas has been prominent since the 1982 elections, and gained strength in the latter days of the New Order when preman were more pervasively used to bring in votes in elections. The satgas of the parties became a convenient means

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4 For example, Yapto Suryosmano, who had run a personal security-services and debt-collecting business, was appointed as chairman of the pro-government Pemuda Pancasila after the Petrus operation. He later assumed responsibility for the personal security of President Soeharto's family: See Bouchier (1994), p. 195.

7 At about the same time of the Petrus operation, the New Order regime introduced the siskamling (struktur keamanan lingkungan, environment security system) as a new way of organizing local security apparatus within the confines of the state: For further discussion on Petrus and siskamling as attempts of the New Order regime to appropriate local, territorial power under the state's control, see Barker (1998 & 1999).
for party leaders to mobilize street hoodlums for political purposes without running the risk of being identified themselves.8

An obvious example of state premanisme of the New Order was the July 1996 incident ignited by the government’s manoeuvring to dislodge Megawati Soekarnoputri from her position as leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). After taking over as party leader in 1994, Megawati had quickly become a popular figure as her calls for more government accountability and political pluralism gained a wide following among the young. In response to this, in June 1996, the Soeharto government encouraged a rival faction of the party to hold a congress to elect Suryadi, the former party chairman, in place of Megawati. Discontented Megawati supporters resisted the government’s intervention by camping in the party’s headquarters, holding free-speech forums, and demanding their leader’s reinstatement. On 27 July 1996 after a month of daily gatherings by hundreds of supporters, preman groups, who appeared to be backed by the armed forces, burst into the party headquarters and expelled Megawati’s supporters (Barker 1998, 68; Bourchier & Hadiz 2003, 18).9 This action led to the worst rioting in Jakarta since the Malari incident of 1974,10 leaving five people killed, 149 injured, and 23 listed as missing (Schwarz 1997, 122-3). Ironically, this incident can be regarded as the beginning of the reformasi movement that eventually succeeded in bringing an end to Soeharto’s authoritarian regime and its state premanisme.

Decentralization of Premanisme in the Post-Soeharto Period

The presence of thugs and toughs in the political scene continued in Soeharto’s wake. Two examples were the establishment of Voluntary Militia (Pam Swakarsa) in November 1998 for the purpose of protecting the MPR special session against protesting students who demanded President Habibie to step down, and the Trained People’s Troops (Pasukan Rakyat Terlatih: Ratih) in early December 1998. Both militia groups were recruited by the armed forces, but Pam Swakarsa did not have a clear position within the state’s defence and security structure. Many of its thousands of “volunteers” were said to be brought from Tanjung Priok, Banten, and elsewhere, and were promised payment of around Rp. 10,000 – 20,000 per day.11 The Pam Swakarsa eventually withdrew or was evacuated by the armed forces after numerous brawls with student demonstrators during the MPR special session (Ryter 1998, 72). Meanwhile, the formation of Ratih was intended to assist the state’s security forces in maintaining order in the country, on the basis of the idea that the armed forces and ordinary people are equally responsible for security and order.12 Since there was no law that regulated Ratih, the People’s Defence Force (Keamanan Rakyat: Kamra) was formed to assist police personnel, and in February 1999, the armed forces began training 40,000 unemployed youths as members of Kamra.13

However, despite its continuous presence in politics, the premanisme of the post-Soeharto period saw some fundamental changes in the patterns of preman involvement. The fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime and the consequent deteriorating legitimacy of the state’s security forces led to the expansion of the civilian security forces of parties and social organizations rather than their elimination in

8 According to Carl A. Trocki’s observation, gangsters were relatively “well-positioned to advance within democratic, or at least electoral systems” where they could mobilize support for politicians in most Southeast Asian countries. Along similar lines, Wolfgang Sachsroder also points out that the ‘rent-a-mob’ method to demonstrate popular support or protect has been often used by ruling parties or governments in Southeast Asia: See, Trocki (1998), p. 12 and Sachsroder (1998), p. 18.
9 Loren Ryter assumes that Pemuda Pancasila was involved in the incident: see Ryter (1998), p. 46.
10 The Malari (Melahapeta Januari, January Disaster) Incident happened when the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited Jakarta in January 1974. There had been growing public unease about the increasing role of Japan in Indonesia’s exports and imports (71% of its oil exports and 29% of its imports by 1973). Students and poor urban youths burnt about 800 cars and 100 buildings, and looted many shops selling Japanese goods: See, Richler (2001), p. 362.
11 Loren Ryter quotes an internet source informing that many of them were in fact never paid: See, Ryter (1998), Footnote 79, p. 72.
12 Some argued that Ratih was an obligation of all the citizens as stipulated by the 1945 Constitution, supporting the viewpoint of General Wiranto in his proposal of the formation of Ratih (Kompas, 21 August 1999).
13 According to Joshua Barker, Kamra was a type of local security force under the sistem keamanan lingkungan, environmental security system: See, Barker (1999), p. 95.
accordance with democratic ideals. In particular, political parties continued to use preman groups affiliated with their satgas for political purposes. Its ironic and serious consequence is that it is now much more difficult for the state authorities to control preman groups following the emergence of local bosses in the regions.

Two factors need to be considered as background the presence of preman groups in local party politics. First, as Timothy Lindsay points out, the restricted access to wealth caused by the economic crisis has brought with it the weakening of state protection for preman (Lindsay 2001, 292; Schulte Nordholt 2002, 49). As a response to severe economic conditions and weakened protection linkages with high-level political circles, the preman groups pushed out of the state’s protection have quickly dispersed to the regions. In that process, the large pool of unemployed young men as a result of the long-term economic crisis provided a supply of new members in the regions. Second, the resurrection of electoral and party politics in the regions and the devolved authority to local political institutions seem to have facilitated the decentralization of preman groups. The 1999 general elections in particular provided opportunities for expanding linkages with local politicians, given that political parties turned the election campaigns into an arena for preman via their recruitment into party satgas. For many preman groups the revitalized multiparty politics has meant new opportunities. Philip King argues, “reforhasi was a liberalization of both party politics and underworld criminal activities” (King 2003, 19). Drawing on his observations in Lombok, John MacDougall also argues, “Indonesia’s young men have begun to play a crucial role in (local party) politics as Soeharto’s authoritarianism has been transformed into multi-party parliamentary politics” (MacDougall 2003, 18). For example, many Pesnada Pancasila members are said to have “traded in their orange and black camouflage for the basic black and red trim of PDI Perjuangan’s satgas, helping to boost the impressive turnouts for the party’s campaign rallies” (Ryter 2001, 154).

Concerning this phenomenon, one local party politician pointed out that post-Soearto political parties had many supporters (masa) but few ‘skilled and educated’ cadres to fill seats in the assemblies. This argument sounds plausible if it is considered that political parties were prohibited from having district or sub-district branches in the regions as a result of the systematic emasculation of parties during the New Order. In turn, the lack of disciplined party cadres seems to have boosted premanisme at the “juncture of the loyalty of the leader’s supporters and the unaccountability of the leaders for their actions” (Ryter 2001, 155). As a fast and easy way of obtaining mass support, many local chapters of parties commonly opted to engage local community leaders, including leaders of preman groups, in the 1999 general elections and thus, parliamentary politics afterwards. Drawing on his observations in North Sumatra and Central Java, Vedi R. Hadiz concludes that with their muscle and money, preman leaders are now “potentially capable of influencing policy decisions and debate in the local parliament, including those regarding the allocation of contracts and other resources.” He further argues that preman groups are “an integral part of the workings of Indonesia’s new democracy” (Hadiz 2003, 128). Along similar lines, Henk Schulte Nordholt also warns that “large parts of a decentralized Indonesia will eventually be ruled by political preman” (Schulte Nordholt 2002, 52).

In fact, the dissolution of the satgas of parties was discussed as one of several important agenda for political reform in early 1999. However, the initial seriousness to terminate the tradition of paramilitarism within Indonesian political parties soon

14 Here it is worthwhile to note the “relationship between violence and youth” not only in Indonesia but also in many other countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Rwanda, which show that young people in particular play a crucial role in carrying out violent acts. See, Schulte Nordholt (2002), p. 50.


16 A series of analytical articles on the issue of dissolving satgas of parties appeared in the daily Kompas in April of 1999; See, in particular, “Parat Politik Tinggaldan Serangam Milliter” (Kompas, 26 April 1999). However, the follow-up articles that appeared in 2000 and 2001 in the same newspaper show that there was little improvement regarding the same issue (compare with “Bendera dan PDI-P akan Hilangkan Sifat Milliteris,” 11 July 2000 and “Sudah Tiba Masanya Bepolitik Tanpa Fisik,” 4 December 2001).
mass organizations have obtained some degree of political influence over local party and parliamentary politics through their expanded role in ‘security-cum-mobilization’, which tends to jeopardize the nation-wide processes of democratization and decentralization. Before looking at the post-Suharto developments, it is necessary to look briefly at the historical development of the region’s major preman groups from the early 1980s.

The Petrus operation was launched in March 1983 in Yogyakarta under the code name of Operation Combat Crime (Operasi Pemberantasan Kejahatan) (Bourchier 1990, 185). More than 250, and possibly up to 600, local gangsters were killed during the first months of the operation in Yogyakarta. In addition to its success in underlining the presence of the government, the campaign also forced criminals to seek protection from influential political elites, especially local party leaderships and military officials. After the Petrus operation, there remained two big preman groups backed by local figures in Yogyakarta: Jozxin which controlled most of the southern part of Yogyakarta and was supported by the PPP and Qeruh which seized the northern part of the municipality assisted by the PDI, Golkar and the military. Besides their territorial identification, theses two gang groups were also distinguished in terms of their religious alignments: Islamic Jozxin versus Christian (or non-Islamic) Qeruh. In line with their territorial and religious affiliations, both groups contributed to political parties in mass mobilization during election campaigns in return for protection. Besides Jozxin and Qeruh, some other preman groups operated in Yogyakarta with the ‘backing’ of political parties and military officers during the New Order period – Pemuda Pancasila


This section focuses on the specific context of Yogyakarta. More specifically, it analyses five major satgas affiliated with the parties and mass organizations in post-Suharto Yogyakarta. The overall argument is that the satgas of political parties and

17 Yoris Th. Raweyal, ex-chairman of Pemuda Pancasila and a member of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and Tatang Setiawan, ex-chairman of the PDI-P’s satgas in Yogyakarta and a member of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly, are among them. Widodo’s recent research in Biers, Central Java, also shows that several local assembly members “came from or were sponsored by the party militia (Satgas PDI-P), and some were suspected of having semi-criminal (preman) backgrounds”: See Widodo (2000), p. 183.

18 For example, a district-level satgas commander of the PDI-P in Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta, was killed in March 2001. The incident is believed to be linked to factional rivalries between satgas leaders and the party’s district board over funding sources: See King (2003), p. 20.

19 It has remained unclear why Yogyakarta was chosen as the first major operational site given that the area was “not any the more crime ridden than other areas in Java”: See van der Kroef (1985), p. 748.


21 The Islam vis-a-vis non-Islam scheme seemed to be one of the most plausible reasons why Qeruh could obtain ‘backing’ from PDI, Golkar, and the military factions.
Especially, with the number of youth *laskar* groups having dramatically increased and become more engaged in informal political activities since the 1997 economic crisis, the distinction between *laskar* and *preman* groups have been further blurred. In fact, gang-style fights between high school students have long been common in big cities even during the New Order period. However, the post-Suharto *laskar* groups, mostly from the lower classes, have been identified as more daring and self-reliant with more partisan loyalties (King 2000). More interestingly, like the post-Independence period, the emergence of *laskar* groups of the post-Suharto period can be partly understood as a response to a situation in which the political future and boundaries of the state are decidedly uncertain.

During the 1999 election campaign, local chapters of parties in Yogyakarta recruited these youth *laskar* groups to fill the gap caused by their lack of grassroots organization. In addition, the devolution of administrative and political power to local political institutions seems to have provided a big opportunity for the expansion of the party-affiliated *laskar* or *preman* groups. Many local people expressed to me the view that the *preman* groups have developed their political-economic interests in the regions by using their connections with parties. The PDI-P’s *satgas*, for example, was strongly believed to collect ‘safety money’ from stores, kiosks, restaurants, cafes and discotheques in the areas near Malioboro St. and also at several bus terminals, while the GPK (*Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah*, Ka’bah Youth Movement), unofficial *satgas* of the PPP, was said to have many small illegal businesses, mainly gambling and play stations.

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24 The distinction between *laskar* groups and *preman* groups has become blurred with many of both groups having commonly become involved in local political and economic activities since the fall of Soeharto’s regime. The *laskar* that I found in Yogyakarta can be categorized into three types: while a first type may be a classic style of *laskar* like a ‘club’ where young people get together for undefined purposes, the other two types, such as *preman*-style and Islam-branded, have especially flourished since the fall of Soeharto’s regime and are involved in local politics and economic developments.

25 Agus Subagyo, Yogyakarta provincial assembly member (PDI-P), explains that members of *satgas* are recruited because they have their own people, or *masar*, and they were often integrated into the sub-district boards (PAC) even before the 1999 election (Interview, 14 August 2001, Yogyakarta).
in the southern area of the Yogyakarta municipality. The fact that the satgas have openly carried out illegal economic activities in such profitable areas demonstrates the ‘backing’ they have received from those who are politically influential such as local assembly members with access to the policy-making process. Local party politicians, therefore, have had to take some responsibility for illegal activities of the preman groups affiliated with their parties.

Although local preman groups have mobilized support for parties, the extent to which they have been actively engaged in local electoral and party politics is hard to estimate. Some observers argue that most preman groups in fact function in non-political arenas and that their ultimate purpose is to tap economic opportunities rather than seek political power or influence. That kind of argument sounds reasonable given that the main activities of preman involve raising ‘safety money’ in commercial areas, debt collecting, racketeering, gambling, and the like, and the connections with local politicians or government officials are usually pursued for the purpose of ‘backing’.

A specific aspect about the post-Suharto context is that local politicians have been seeking to expand their support base by encouraging some preman groups to be organized and to exchange their mobilizing power for political protection. For instance, the GPK, most of whose members are believed to have been involved in Jozzin and some PPP-oriented laskar before the 1999 general elections, has declared its ideological

and religious affiliation with the PPP. It officially claims that the main motivation of the establishment of the organization was its moral responsibility to eliminate religiously wrong behaviour in the society, but many people of Yogyakarta seem to believe that many GPK members are preman involved in illegal activities. The PDI-P has a satgas organization named Pasanda in Yogyakarta, comprised of 50 or more laskar at the subdistrict level. Pasanda is also believed to include many preman. Some of its members are identified as ex-members of Qeruh or Pemuda Pancasila. Both the GPK and Pasanda claim to have up to 6,000 members each. GePaKo (Gerakan Pasukan Anti Komunis, Anti-Communist Movement Force), affiliated with Golkar, claims about 2,600 members. Most of them are also suspected of being preman paid by the party. GePaKo’s official purpose is, according to its chairman, to warn society of the danger of ideologically left-leaning groups or movements.

The five major satgas of political parties and mass organizations in post-Suharto Yogyakarta commonly show quasi-military structures, and are organized in ‘battalions’ and given military-style training programs. (For comparison of general characteristics see Table V-1).

Table V-1. Five Major Satgas of Parties and Mass Organizations in Yogyakarta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliated Party or Mass Organization</th>
<th>Pasanda</th>
<th>GPK</th>
<th>Paskam</th>
<th>Banser</th>
<th>GePaKo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Members*</td>
<td>6,000-7,000</td>
<td>7,000 - 8,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Background</td>
<td>Qeruh</td>
<td>Jozzin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Nationalist-Secular</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 Some sources point out that most conflicts between PPP and PDI-P supporters tend to be caused by the scramble of preman networks in such profitable areas as Maliboro. The spontaneous mobilization of the GPK, affiliated with the PPP, during the 1999 election campaign is a representative case in which PPP politicians could take advantage of the organization’s vigorous mobilization against the PDI-P; Discussion with Husan Bactiar, a student activist and reporter of Balairung (UD \Muda University’s student magazine), and Adjanto Dwi Negrobo, a student activist and journalist of PANATAI, 14 January 2002, Yogyakarta.
27 In 2001, for example, the Yogyakarta municipal assembly passed two local regulations (perda) on fees for licenses to operate public transportation routes and on taxation of parking fees within the municipality. Collecting ‘safety fees’ from public transportation operators and raising parking fees are among the most profitable businesses of preman groups. The number of public bus routes in early 2002 was more than 30, up from 17 of 2001, while the official parking fee for a motorbike is now Rp 300, up from Rp. 100.
28 Interview with Antari, journalist Latitudes and Kunci, 4 Sept ember 2001, Yogyakarta.
29 H. Khairuddin, member of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly (Golkar), argues that the main intention of most preman groups affiliated with satgas is protection (“kini sang di bawah payung partai”) (Interview, 22 August 2001, Yogyakarta).
30 Interview with Muhamad Lutfi, chairman of the GPK of Yogyakarta, 13 August 2001, Yogyakarta.
31 Interview with Tatang Setiawan, ex-chairman of the PDI-P’s satgas of Yogyakarta and a member of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly, 14 August 2001, Yogyakarta.
32 Interview with Antari, 4 September 2001, Yogyakarta. However, Gendang Pardiman, chairman of Gerakan of Yogyakarta, argues that Gepeko does not have any official or structural relation with Golkar and that its members join the organization spontaneously without being paid (Interview, 8 August 2001, Yogyakarta).
Three are officially affiliates of parties or mass organizations, while two are only unofficially connected to their parent organizations. They usually have independent mechanisms to run the organizations, irrespective of whether they are within or outside parties. Since the 1999 general elections, parties have introduced programs to reduce the militaristic image of their satgas. These programs aim to "civilize" their preman elements, mostly focusing on restructuring the organization and additional training for satgas leaders to discipline them as party cadres, but they have met with no great success. On the contrary, as Bambang Arief, a sub-district commander of the PPP's satgas in Yogyakarta municipality, admitted, satgas of major parties have received training from the armed forces. He admitted that his group had received training conducted by the military at the sub-district level (Koramil) (Kompas, 13 May 2000). Even though it could be argued that the special program aimed at coordination between the official security authority and the parties' satgas, the military training of the parties' satgas seems to have continued. The members of the PDI-P satgas were also reported to have been trained by the military in May 2000 (Kompas, 13 May 2000).23

An ironic effect of the expanded role of preman groups in local party politics is that they have exacerbated internal conflicts within parties. The internal conflicts within the PDI-P during the 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election provide an example. Journalists and NGO activists often pointed out to me that one of the main factors causing the party's fragmentation was the gap between district-level party cadres and subdistrict-level 'field coordinators' (koordinator lapangan), mostly preman with direct access to the grassroots through their connections with youth laskar groups. It is also said that

23 Even after the downfall of the New Order regime, satgas of diverse parties in Jakarta were reported to have gone through some militaristic training implemented by the provincial police (Kompas, 26 April 1999).

many subdistrict-level rank-and-file activists had felt that their contributions to the party's success in the general elections had not been properly rewarded compared to party members who took seats in the assemblies. As a response, they might have tried to acquire some financial benefits by supporting a rival candidate while ignoring the PDI-P's official candidate. They even threatened assembly members to vote for the rival candidates. As a consequence of the chaos caused by increasing internal fragmentation, the party eventually failed to win the mayoral election.

As will be discussed in more detail in the following subsection on the GPK, the ambiguous status of the organization in the intra-party agenda of the PPP provides another example of the aggravation of internal conflicts. The organization, unofficially affiliated with the PPP, showed the largest increase in the number and size of satgas of parties in Yogyakarta after the 1999 general elections. The PPP politicians whom I interviewed did not deny that the Islam-oriented youth laskar groups supported them but were reluctant to take the risk of being responsible for the groups' violent activities. The dilemma that the PPP politicians faced was, as shown in the 1999 general election result, that the party's support in Yogyakarta was very weak with just half of the votes of national average. From that perspective, local branches of the party clearly needed support from the youth groups like the GPK. During the 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election, the GPK supported the candidate from the PPP who won the deputy mayoralship. In any case, many people of Yogyakarta believed that the elected deputy mayor had a suspicious background and was still very influential among the preman of Yogyakarta.24

**Banser** of NU

Among the satgas listed in Table V-1, Banser is the only one affiliated with a mass organization, Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization with 35 million

24 Among them was Herry Zudianio, Mayor of the Yogyakarta municipality for the period of 2001-2006 (Interview, 9 January 2002, Yogyakarta).
followers across the country. NU has a strong base in Yogyakarta with many affiliated *pesantren* in rural areas such as Bantul and Gunungkidul. *Banser* is the security task force of the NU’s youth group, *Ansor*, which was established in 1934 and named after *ai-ansor* (‘helpers’) who supported the Prophet in Medina. *Ansor* has around 5,000 members in Yogyakarta, while *Banser* (*Barisan Ansor Serbaguna*), which was founded in April 1964, has around 3,000 under its command in Yogyakarta.

Nurdin Amin, chairman of the Yogyakarta provincial board of *Ansor* and commander of the Yogyakarta provincial board of *Banser*, has a strong background in the NU. His grandfather, Saleh Amin, was one of the founders of the NU, and his father is chairman of the provincial board of NU in Central Java. Nurdin Amin began his career in the IPNU (*Ikatan Pelajar NU*, later changed into *Ikatan Putra NU*, both meaning Association of NU Students) while in middle school, and then moved into *Ansor* while in high school. He joined PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, Movement of Indonesian Muslim Students) while doing a degree at the IAIN (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*, Institute for Islamic Studies) of Yogyakarta and became chairman of *Ansor* of Yogyakarta in August 2000.

Although he leads NU’s *satgas*, he criticizes the militarization of Indonesian civil society during the New Order. He points out that the legacy from the New Order period is evident in the military-style uniforms and training programs of his organization. The same view was confirmed in an earlier interview with a national newspaper by H Masduki Thoha, chairman of the Surabaya branch of *Ansor*, which acknowledged that *Banser* members had received several levels of military training from basic training (*Latihan Dasar: Diklatas*), advanced training (*Kursus Banser Lanjutan: Susbalan*), to leadership training (*Kursus Banser Pimpinan: Susbanpin*) (*Kompas*, 13 May 2000).

Nurdin Amin points out that since the regime change in May 1998, some leaders in *Ansor* and *Banser* have pursued “de-militarisation” but with little success. The main obstacle, he said, was the presence in the existing leadership of *Ansor* of some who had cultivated a good relationship with the military. They did not want to give up the privileges accompanying their political and economic relationship with the military. *Banser* was also reluctant to abandon its militaristic style when other groups were becoming more militaristic. The strengthening of political Islam and the radicalization of Muslim youth groups, such as *Laskar Jihad*, seemed to have discouraged the attempt to reform the organization. Some of the leadership argued that the rank-and-file members would react to the weakening of *Banser*’s militaristic character by leaving the organization and joining other groups. In fact, some leading members of the *Banser* are said to have moved to other *satgas*, such as *Pasanda* of the PDI-P, which indicates that the attraction of practical benefits was sometimes more powerful than commitment to the organization.

I got the clear impressions during my interview with Nurdin Amin that he was not a militaristic or *preman* type. He rather appeared to be an intellectual (who might eventually become a *kyai*) rather than a person who would prefer to use his muscles. Like the dilemma facing many post-Suharto local party politicians, he seemed uneasy about the ‘*preman*-ization’ of his organization. Although such organizations as political parties and mass organizations have relied on the ‘security-cum-mobilization’ service provided by *preman* groups, there was always some tension between cadres of the organizations and *satgas* members. Although the militaristic style and accompanying violence resulting from the recruitment of *preman* and other young toughs were not acceptable to some members of the leadership, it was not easy to kick these elements out. They were already embedded in the power structure of the organization and their removal would possibly be fatal to future mass mobilization. It is also plausible to
believe that those leaders who have strong relationships with the local military officials would obstruct a de-militarisation program in order not to lose their privileged position in relation to security force officials.

**Pasanda of the PDI-P**

One of the biggest satgas in Yogyakarta is that of the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle). The organization expanded rapidly at the time of the party's congress in December 1993, when the party was sharply divided and turned to Megawati Soekarnoputri as its new leader (Kompas, 13 May 2000). The official security task force of the PDI-P in Yogyakarta is known as Pasanda (Pasukan Andalan, Security Troops) and consists of five ‘battalions’ in the municipality and four districts (Figure V-1). Each battalion is based on dozens of laskar groups in the villages or subdistricts. There are at least nine laskar groups in the municipality and a few more in each of the four other districts.

**Figure V-1. Structure of Satgas of the PDI-P in Yogyakarta**

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Pasanda of Yogyakarta
   
   Banteng Mataram (Municipality)  Rambusuro (Bantul)  Banteng Bukit (Gunungkidul)  Banteng Merapi (Slawan)  Kenceng (Kurowagung)
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* Each district-level branch of Pasanda in Yogyakarta has its own name. For example, the branch in the municipality is called 'Banteng Mataram', in Bantul district it is 'Rambusuro', and so on.

Since the 1999 election campaign, many new laskar groups have surfaced in the urban (kampung) areas of Yogyakarta, mostly joining the PDI-P. Sometimes party cadres encouraged young thugs to organize a laskar by finding and supporting a leader amongst them. Each laskar group is independent from the party and even from the satgas itself, but party functionaries distinguish laskar that are loyal to party instructions from those just seeking economic opportunities. According to Tatang Setiawan, ex-chairman of Pasanda of Yogyakarta and now a member of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly, there were increasing conflicts between different laskar groups over the issue of who deserved more ‘reward’, for example, by being seated in the local assemblies. The fundamental point of dispute seemed to be over how to distribute local assembly seats among formal cadres and informal laskar or preman members. Tatang Setiawan commented that laskar or preman leaders on the subdistrict boards took it for granted they would get a “ticket” to the district assemblies or at least to take up a position as an official cadre in the party structure. His statement seems to indirectly acknowledge that those who had a broad support base among different laskar groups were often seated in the district/municipal assemblies, given the lack of experienced cadres within the party.

Frankly speaking, we have never had cadres and thus never implemented cadreisation programs, so that if someone becomes a chairman of the subdistrict board, he must feel “more than anyone else” and then hope to get a seat in the district assembly. However, it is not yet certain whether the person is qualified to become a legislator. (Tatang Setiawan, 14 August 2001)

This practice of “serve oneself” (melayankan diri) seems to have tainted intra-party politics since the 1999 election. As a consequence, rivalries over positions have led to an agenda to restructure the party’s satgas.

In early 2001, the central board decided to integrate its satgas into the party organization. The integration was, however, limited to leaders of laskar groups, based

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36 At that time, the party’s official name was still the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party), and the party was split into at least two factions when Megawati Soekarnoputri was elected as the chairperson of the party in 1994. The PDI-P acquired its official status as a result of the new party law of 1999 following the fall of Soeharto in May 1998.

37 Interview with Tatang Setiawan, 14 & 25 August 2001, Yogyakarta. He openly admits that he is a preman and still controls many followers involved in debt collecting and other financial businesses.

38 Interview with Aria Bima, head of secretariat on the central board of the PDI-P, 17 April 2001, Jakarta.
on the assumption that ordinary members were not directly engaged in political activities. Yet up until early 2002, the Pasmanda of Yogyakarta had not been integrated into the party organization of the region. It was obvious that many laskar group leaders still stayed outside the party organization, preferring to concentrate on their illegal activities. The increasing bureaucratization of party management, especially up-down decision-making, of the past several years also seemed to have discouraged the groups from giving up their independence. In fact, the underlying aim of the restructuring was to distinguish potential cadres from canvassers, which could be a sensitive issue when provincial or district boards were deciding final choices. Therefore, as a solution, the provincial board of the PDI-P gave each subdistrict board the authority to appoint its own cadres. The only requirement was that those who wished to take official positions in the satgas department should not hold another position on the district or subdistrict board. However, it seemed that neither party functionaries nor laskar leaders in Yogyakarta were enthusiastic. Up until early 2002 not a single subdistrict board had convened a conference to select members for the new department.

The satgas of the PDI-P still kept both its formal and informal channels to the party, while the main purpose of individual preman groups within the satgas in keeping their linkages with the party was to participate in party affairs mainly in order to cover their illicit economic activities and to compete with other preman groups. Tatang Setiawan confirmed that party functionaries could not ignore preman and also were reluctant to jeopardize their grassroots support, although they could not give them any official positions within the party organization. Furthermore, the increase of Islam-oriented preman groups in the region forced party functionaries to rely on nationalistic-secular preman groups to “scoop” (menggali) support from local communities.

From this perspective, the risky cohabitation with laskar and preman groups through the satgas can be mostly attributed to the party’s lack of direct linkage with the grassroots support base, despite its claim as a mass party, and ineffective cadreisation (training) programs. However, the cohabitation with preman groups exacted a price. First of all, the party functionaries have not been able to control the activities of individual preman. Second, depending on the existing preman networks has obstructed the party from recruiting new cadres and developing effective training programs for existing cadres. As Tatang argued, as long as the party kept “accommodating” preman groups, there was no point in building up networks with other mass organizations or civil society groups. In fact, many party functionaries showed their readiness to cooperate with the preman groups as ”stakeholders” (pemegang polisi) as long as they stayed outside the party organization.

However, the more powerful the preman elements become, the more challenging it is for the party functionaries to keep them away from internal affairs. Thus, the PDI-P of Yogyakarta municipality was trying to build up networks of “big bosses” by giving them a certain degree of authority in order to make sure that the official line of the party was understood and implemented. If successful, the party would need to deal with around 50 to 100 bosses, who controlled their own men in different fields. The underlying argument of this idea is that preman have to remain in street politics. However, the changes in the political environment, especially resulting from decentralization, has actually encouraged the preman groups to be more ambitious than before. As local governments have gained control over far larger resources, compared to previously, they naturally have attracted the interest of preman.

GPK and Paskam of the PPP
Both the GPK and Paskam are satgas of the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party). Paskam (Pasukan Keamanan, Security Guards) is recognized as the party’s official satgas and its leaders take official positions on the
provincial or district boards, but the main satgas activities have been performed by the unofficial GPK since the 1999 general elections. The party officially denies any linkage with the GPK, but interviews with leaders of the two groups show that the GPK has been practically identified as the party’s major satgas group.

The GPK (Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah, Ka’bah Youth Movement) is an Islam-oriented security guard organization unofficially affiliated with the PPP and reflects the strengthening of political Islam in post-New Order politics. It consists of relatively young thugs and its chairman, Muhammad Lutfie, is a 23-year-old man. His father is a retired low-ranking military officer. Lutfie took a degree in hotel management for two years at an institute in Yogyakarta, and led a laskar from 1997 until he took over the chairmanship of the GPK in 2000. His official business is running a small wortel (phone kiosk) in Sosrowijaya area, a Yogyakarta trading and tourist centre. In several interviews that I conducted in 2001, he emphasized his devotion to Islamic teachings, but other sources, such as journalists, student activists, and some ordinary citizens, alleged that he was one of the most notorious preman in Yogyakarta, having committed many crimes but never brought to justice.

The GPK was established as a regional organization on 20 July 2000 and from the very beginning was openly associated with the PPP. In early 2002, there were more than 20 branches of the GPK throughout Indonesia under the leadership of the central board in Jakarta, but it was in Yogyakarta that the organization surfaced for the first time. F. Chairul Hadi M. Anik, chairman of the central board in Jakarta, confirmed that there was “daily communication” between the GPK and the PPP, even though there were no organizational linkages. He said that there had been another GPK, which was established in 1982 and soon outlawed by the Soeharto government because, according to him, it was too “radical.” He added that the preparations for its re-establishment began in 1998, but the establishment of the national board was only announced at the end of 2000. Since the central board was established on the foundation of existing independent local branches, it does not intervene in the latter’s affairs, especially in terms of their funding activities.

The GPK of Yogyakarta boasts around 7,000 to 8,000 members, but other sources estimate the real figure to be as low as 3,000. It is based on 57 or more laskar, most of which already existed before joining the organization. Each laskar operates separately without much cooperation with the others. Some belong to Paskam, the official satgas of the PPP, which is under consideration for dissolution before the 2004 general elections. Most laskar operate under the leadership of the GPK, but there are still some independent ones, working for both.

Lutfie defined the official purpose of the organization as “encouraging good deeds” (mengajak kebaikan) so that its main activity was to settle social problems and implement Islamic teaching in the region’s community life. Although he admitted that the activities of the organization were somewhat violent and fanatical, he blamed some “rogues” (oknum-oknum) for that kind of behaviour. He said that the organization conducted “sweepings” of corrupt places such as pubs and nightclubs when “requested”. He emphasized that the GPK was a mass, not criminal, organization, even though there could be some preman amongst them. Concerning the possible existence of preman among the members, he argued, it was a moral responsibility to “guide” (membinat) criminals so that they could become ordinary citizens through the

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39 Interview with F. Chairul Hadi M. Anik, chairman of central board of the GPK, 13 November 2001, Yogyakarta.

40 According to Philip King, GPK went into hibernation in 1987 and the PPP entered a prolonged period of internal duality: See King (2000), especially the section on the satgas of the PPP.

41 According to Loren Ryter, oknum, which literally means an ‘element’ or an ‘individual’ within a group, has come to mean any member of a group who acts outside of the mandate of the group. For further discussion of the concept and its use, see Ryter (1998), p. 47.

42 The action of ‘sweeping’ mainly refers to an attack by not only the state’s security forces but, more often in the post-Soeharto period, by civilian security forces or extreme Islamic organizations, to socially or culturally harmful or illegal things and places. The frequent attacks by the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) to the pubs and nightclubs in Jakarta are among the cases.
organization’s activities. To underline the mass organizational nature of the GPK, he pointed to its social-religious activities (kebaktian sosial) such as distributing rice and other necessities to the poor, making donations for roads repairs, and funding other community facilities. He admitted that all its activities aimed to “seek out its mass base” (mencari massa) in support of the PPP in the coming 2004 general elections.

On the other hand, despite his loyalty to the Islamic party, he expressed his disappointment with party cadres, especially those who took seats in the local assemblies, who have failed to reward laskar youths.

If some of us are unemployed, there must be some projects in the local governments. Although we are aware that they (i.e., assembly members and government officials) have their own rules, they should consider us. (Because) it is ultimately us that have the grassroots supporters (simpatikan). At least, there should be no street hoodlums (pemuda jalan) among us. (Muhammad Lutfie, 13 August 2001)

Frustration with those elected seemed to have made him more politically ambitious. He made clear that the GPK intended to have its own representatives in the local assemblies in the next elections. He even implied that satgas leaders could control those elected by complaining to the party boards and reminding them that they could cause or worsen conflict between different factions within the party.

The PPP also has its official satgas, Paskam, which was established in 1982 and now has around 3,000 members in Yogyakarta. Bambang Aris Sujoko, its head of staff, has been active in the PPP since it was established in 1973 as a result of the forced merging of four different Islamic parties by the Soeharto government. He admitted that around 10 to 15 per cent of Paskam members were also active in the GPK, and the relationship with the GPK was less formal than political. He explained that their cooperative relationship was limited to the context of mass mobilization, which meant that the PPP had to assume the responsibility for the violent activities of the latter.

Bambang said that whenever there was a mass activity of the party, Paskam made sure that the members of the GPK brought no weapons to the streets. Responding to the question as to whether political parties need such groups as satgas, Bambang made the same point that I often heard from other group leaders: the state’s security apparatus was unreliable. He admitted the presence of preman even within the Paskam but he also pointed to the moral responsibility to “cultivate” them.

Bambang confirmed that the party was planning to dissolve Paskam in the near future and thus the organization was not recruiting any new members while many members had already entered the party organization. The party appeared to intend to rely on GPK for mobilization. There seem at least two underlying reasons for the decision. First, the PPP was known for its frequent conflict, mostly involving self-mobilized satgas members or ordinary supporters, with the military during the New Order period, and from that point of view, the connections of the GPK seemed to help the party to improve its relationship with the military.43 Additionally, the party’s weak performance in the 1999 general elections with its vote at the provincial level (5%) reaching less than half its national percentage of votes (10.7%) seemed to have pushed party functionaries to take seriously the GPK’s willingness to fulfill the party’s need for ‘security-cum-mobilization’. Second, the PPP has another youth wing organization called Hanakah (Himpunan Angkatan Mudah Ka’bah, Association of Ka’bah Young Generation), which was established in 1982 and integrated into the party structure as a part of the youth department. Hanakah also has boards in each subdistrict but most of them practically operate under the GPK. Accordingly, given the strong support from the GPK, party functionaries, especially those who were seated at the assemblies, appeared to see no need for keeping Paskam within the party organization.

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43 Some journalists and student activists suspected that in addition to his father’s background in the military, Muhammad Lutfie himself had close connections with local military officers.
The dilemma that Paskam leaders had faced after the 1999 elections was that they did not have anywhere to transfer their members while GPK members took over the main tasks for the party’s security and mobilization. Bambang admitted that some members opposed the party’s decision to dissolve Paskam. The official announcement of the dissolution of Paskam was never made and it seems to have become more difficult if the party anticipates better performance in the coming general elections.

GePaKo of Golkar

GePaKo (Gerakan Pasukan Anti Komunis, Anti-Communist Movement Force) was formed in 1999 but officially established in January 2001. It does not have any formal relationship with Golkar, but its headquarters are located in the same building as Golkar’s provincial offices. Furthermore, as a provincial assembly member from Golkar confirms, the fact that its chairman is also the general secretary on the party’s provincial board demonstrates the actual “relationship” (hubungan) between GePaKo and Golkar.44 A major issue connecting the two organizations – or an “emotional link” (kaitan emocional) in his expression – was their common concern with such leftist groups as the People’s Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokrasi: PRD).45

Gandung Pardiman, commander of GePaKo and chairman of the Yogyakarta branch of the JPKPG (Jaringan Pembela Kehormatan Partai Golkar, Network of Defenders of Golkar’s Honour), admitted that most of its around 2,600 registered members were Golkar cadres.46 The commander explained that it recruited members on the recommendation of a reliable person and the members had to go through 8 months of internship without being paid. He boasted that there were university students, bureaucrats, artists, and businessmen among its members, and the main funding resources were membership fees and spontaneous donations. However, it was widely perceived that a much smaller number of members are active and most of them were premans paid to conduct “sweeping” or street campaigns. Moreover, internship of more than half a year without payment sounds very unrealistic given that satgas usually attract local youths with regular payment combined with some extra economic benefits, in addition to the appeal of militaristic uniforms and training programs – which are also usually expected to be given for free. GePaKo also has a militaristic structure, from “battalions” at the top to teams of 10 persons at the bottom.

The official purpose of the organization is said to be to alert society on the danger of communist-anarchist movements and extremist-fundamentalist Islam. One controversial activity was the organization’s “sweeping” of books, destroying material that the organization judged as ideologically leftist. In July 2001, there were several reports in local media that the members of GePaKo “swept” and burnt “leftist” books in public. At the time of my interview, GePaKo was a member organization of FMDAKI (Forum Masyarakat Dakwah Anti Komunis Indonesia, Indonesia’s Social Forum for Anti-Communist Mission) and Faksi (Front Anti Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Anti-Communist Front), and was preparing to convene a national congress in Yogyakarta to announce a national organization called Kerak (Komite Rakyat Anti Komunis, People’s Anti-Communist Committee) and Gepcrak (Gerakan Persamaan Anti Komunis, Anti-Communist Agreement Movement).

Gandung blamed democratization for allowing society, especially leftists and extremists, too much freedom:

44 Interview with H. Khairuddin, member of the Yogyakarta provincial assembly (Golkar), 22 August 2001, Yogyakarta.
45 Established in Yogyakarta in early 1996, the PRD was a small opposition party under the New Order regime. Many activists, including the chairman, Budiman Sojaiziko, were accused for being involved in the Jakarta riots following the attack on Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI headquarters in July 1996. The armed forces denounced the party as attempting to revive Communism in the country: Ricklefs (2001), p. 403.
46 Interview with Gandung Pardiman, 8 August 2001, Yogyakarta.
The pattern of democracy, communication, and interaction between citizens during the New Order was not like this. There was never ‘uprisings’ (lonjakan-lonjakan) of ordinary people like now. That is one thing that we have to learn now and (the same thing) ought not to happen again. (Gandung Pardiman, 8 August 2001)

Gandung had been active in the GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Students’ National Movement) from 1977 and has been involved in Golkar since the early 1980s. He did not hide his negative impression of reformasi and even said that ordinary Indonesians should be divided into two categories, some who were “developing” and others who were still “underdeveloped”. In such a way, he argued, the latter could be protected from the temporary interests of certain groups, which echoed the underlying argument of the ‘floating mass’ policy of the New Order regime.

In the post-Soeharto context, Golkar appears to be uneasy to have its own security task force, like Pemuda Pancasila during the New Order that enjoyed a semi-monopolistic status in the ‘security-cum-mobilization’ market under the protection of Golkar and the armed forces. The semi-official status of Pemuda Pancasila broke down with the downfall of the centralized control system and the following emergence of other ‘civilian’ security task forces, especially party-affiliated ones such as the Pasanda and the GPK. Besides Pemuda Pancasila, Golkar has had its own official satgas organizations, including Pasukan Cabra, but the party has hardly made use of them since the downfall of Soeharto because of its concern to adopt a “new paradigm” as a pro-reformasi party, through which it intended to create a new image. Unofficially affiliated groups like GePaKo have delivered the party’s basic ideological and political line without contaminating the party’s public face.

Transformed Symbiotic Relationship: Political Parties and Preman

Among the many workshops on the agenda of democracy and reform, a closed one was held at a hotel in Yogyakarta on the theme of “Dialogue between Parties II: Political Participation Without Violence”, 12-13 November 2001. The attendees were delegates from 6 major parties (PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN and PBB), 2 mass organizations (NU and Muhamadiyah), and 3 satgas (Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah, Garda Bangsa, and Pemuda Pancasila). The main purpose of the workshop was to identify political violence in Indonesia in terms of its context, features and sources, and also to formulate strategies that political parties and mass organizations could adopt to prevent further violence. However, neither leaders of political parties and mass organizations nor satgas leaders seemed to be prepared to take responsibility for the political intimidation of the post-Soeharto era. Instead they commonly blamed the weak rule of law. In a press conference, they concluded that political violence of the post-Suharto period should be attributed to the political system, including the weakness of the constitution and legal system, and the lack of professionalism and integrity of the state apparatus. Additionally, they also mentioned the common feeling of injustice, the increasing apathy of society as to legal and political problems, and the country’s lack of clear vision for its future. Subsequently, they suggested such solutions as amendment of the 1945 Constitution, fundamental reform of the legal system, changes in the economic development strategy as a way of empowering “the people’s economy” (ekonomi rakyat), and education of the state apparatus – including party cadres and mass organization activists – to understand and develop political participation without any violence.

In short, they showed no intention of giving up their lucrative ‘security-cum-mobilization’ activities. The delegates of Pemuda Pancasila, for example, claimed that the organization was open to any political parties as long as they “understood”

47 Garda Bangsa is an official satgas of PKB and much smaller compared to other major parties’ satgas.
(memahami) the people’s aspirations. They claim can be translated as a desperate attempt to get accustomed to the changed political circumstance. They pointed out that the problem is not in the existence of those satgas but, more fundamentally, in the Indonesian society’s violent culture and the weakness of the state apparatus. Weak rule of the law and consequent lack of faith in the legal system, they argued, were the important factors justifying the need for satgas. In other words, they argued that political violence and protection rackets were inevitable and even necessary for self-defence under a weak state authority and legal system.

In a way, their argument makes a point with regard to the lack of effective political or legal institutions for the resolution of conflicts in post-Soharto Indonesia. However, the remaining question is why the political changes resulting from the democratic transition and devolution of power have allowed the increased political influence of the parties’ satgas over political decision-making process in the regions. One of the possible answers is the unintended effect of the political changes of the past five years, which have not strengthened institutional mechanisms of checks and balance and instead created a situation in which local politicians act irresponsibly and unrepresentatively. Most local chapters of parties in Yogyakarta have shown their strong reliance on their satgas in mobilizing their grassroots supporters that has ironically perpetuated, transformed, and decentralized violence, which was state-sponsored, justified, and normalized under the former authoritarian regimes (Collins 2002, 602). One of the differences between today’s political violence and that of the Soeharto period is that it is now controlled by decentralized local elites and thus, the violence is no longer primarily sponsored by the state. An ironic consequence is that preman groups have filled the gaps left by the disintegration of the monopolistic control of the state authorities by reorganising themselves into the satgas groups of political parties and mass organizations and thus, getting access to formal political institutions and decision-making in the regions.

An episode revealing how local politicians use satgas occurred when the Yogyakarta provincial assembly was about to make a final decision on the revision of the 2001 provincial budget at its plenary session on 27 April 2001. Outside the provincial assembly building an umbrella NGO called Kamata (Kesatuan Akai Masyarakat Untuk Transparansi Anggaran, Social Action Group for Budgetary Transparency) was demonstrating against the way the budget was discussed and decided by assembly members. The demonstrators were calling on the assembly to postpone the final budget decision for a week and to inform local populations by publishing the contents of the budget in three local newspapers. The plenary session was postponed due to protests and the leadership of the assembly met representatives of the demonstrators. As negotiations continued, some GePaKo members turned up to the assembly and entered the meeting room. They held steel pipes and claimed to be “sweeping” members of the People’s Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik: PRD), a leftist party. Under the physical threat of the GePaKo members, demonstrators caved in and allowed the plenary session to resume. An anonymous witness reported that the police had come before the GePaKo but did not stop them from entering the meeting room and interrupting negotiations (Radar Yogyakarta, 3 May 2001). The session eventually resumed at 9.30 that evening and passed the budget.

29 Kamata was comprised by dozens of local NGOs such as Public Network for Analysis and Advocacy (Jaringan Bajian dan Advokasi Publik, Jangkep), ParWI, Yasanti, Rifa Anissa, Mitra Tam, Indonesia Women’s Coalition (Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia), Pawarta, Pusam UI, LKIH UI, and Yayasan Tjoe Nyak Diei.
30 The budget had been controversial because it allocated just 9 percent (Rp. 32.48 billions) to development while 91 percent (Rp. 323.34 billions) went to routine expenditures. Also, more than 93 percent of the locally derived revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah: PAD) was to be raised through taxation and fees from the local population. The education sector received less than 1 percent (Rp. 289.96 millions) and the allocation for empowering women was removed (Kompas, 28 April 2001; Bernas, 1 May 2001).

48 Interviews with Thomas Taka, Gunum R. Hutapen, and Uook who are on the central board of Pemuda Pancasila, 12 November 2001, Yogyakarta.
49 See also Van Dijk (2001), p. 160.
To summarize, although it is premature to draw a conclusion as to how the formal political changes of the past five years have affected political violence and its influence on local party and parliamentary politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia, the persistent but transformed – decentralized and more competitive – presence of satgas within parties and mass organizations and its consequent ‘preman-ization’ of local political institutions conflicts with democratic aspirations. Moreover, unlike the centralized and controlled state *premanisme* under the New Order, the post-Soeharto period has seen localized and “wild” *premanisme* in many regions. Interviews with the leaders of such groups and other secondary sources obtained during the fieldwork support the underlying argument of this chapter that the expanded and more competitive ‘security-cum-mobilization’ activities resulting from the revitalization of multi-party parliamentary politics in the regions have provided local *preman* groups with direct access to the power-holders in local governments and assemblies in the era of democratic decentralization.

Chapter VI. Conclusion: Post-Authoritarian Party Politics in Theory and Practice

The collapse of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of formal democratic institutions do not ensure the institutionalisation of democratic practices. This study has shown that, although the changes in institutional structures following the fall of the Soeharto regime have generally revitalised the democratic principle of ‘exchange of leadership for support’, the reality of local party politics makes it premature to conclude that local politicians are now more representative and accountable to the electorate than their predecessors. Thomas Carothers has recently pointed out that electoral competition in the post-authoritarian context often “does little to stimulate the renovation or development of political parties” (Carothers 2002, 15). In fact, the post-1998 political developments in Indonesia have shown many of the features of what he describes as a ‘post-transitional syndrome’—i.e., a kind of “feckless pluralism” in which:

> [the public is seriously disaffected from politics, and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country. Overall politics is widely seen as a state, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and commands equally little respect. And the state remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad or even calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous, and successive governments are unable to make headway on most of the major problems facing the country, from crime and corruption to health, education, and public welfare generally (Carothers 2002, 10-11).

This study has particularly emphasized that, despite all the meaningful achievements in reforming Indonesia’s political system since 1998, there has been a number of serious obstacles to the processes of democratic decentralization which are currently underway. These are the reactivation and spread of such undemocratic
practices as 'money politics' and premanisme into local chapters of parties and regional legislatures which have emerged as the most important determinants of political power. The point here is that the formal democratic rules and mechanisms seem not to have determined the actual process of political change at the grassroots. The political developments in the post-Soeharto context have, rather, proved that institutional changes in the political system resulting from democratic transition and decentralization do not automatically encourage local politicians to be more responsive and accountable. This gulf between formal democracy (i.e., institutional aspect of the political system) and substantive democratisation (i.e., institutionalisation of democratic practices in the day-to-day political behaviour of political actors) warrants close examination because it could mark the beginning of 'undemocratic consolidation'. Formal rules and institutions manage to look as if they were the main guides of political behaviour, but the actual rules of the game that are being consolidated inside the democratic institutions can be far from democratic ideals. Formal democracy as set out in the amended 1945 Constitution and various recent statutes is frequently breached both in the letter and spirit of the law. By contrast, much of the political culture inherited from the former authoritarian regimes remains intact, even though the institutions have been formally democratised.

In concluding this study, I would emphasise the following points:

1) In the post-authoritarian context, informal, frequently undemocratic, practices tend to exert greater and more pervasive influence over political processes.

2) To understand the substantive nature of democratisation, which is more than just the introduction of formal rules and institutions of democracy, requires an evaluation of the qualitative features of political practices on the ground.

3) Among the factors influencing the uncertain relationship between formal democratisation and its practical effects on political institutions is the inclination of local politicians to abuse their new powers for their own benefit.

4) As a result, the public’s political faith in such democratic institutions as parties and parliaments tend to be a far less than the euphoric and optimistic ones that prevailed immediately after the regime change.

My overall argument is that post-authoritarian party politics in Yogyakarta shows that the advent of formal democracy and decentralization has not, at least so far, reached the point of consolidation of democratic practices in the daily operation of local political institutions, and that this raises a number of important questions, not only about the future of democracy in Yogyakarta and Indonesia, but also, more generally, for theories of democratic transition and consolidation.

Formal Changes and Informal Practices
Since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia’s political system has substantially changed. The dramatic transition to democratic rule was followed by the first free and fair general elections in 1999 after more than four decades. The four sets of constitutional amendments during the period of 1999-2002 and the implementation of regional autonomy since 2001 have allowed party representatives at local assemblies to emerge as the new local power-holders. From the perspective of institutional settings, local political life appears to be more dynamic and democratic.

Nonetheless, snapshots taken of local political institutions show a growing gap between expectation and reality. As the previous chapters have shown, many local politicians have displayed political attitudes and engaged in behaviour which are ultimately undemocratic. This study has focused on such undemocratic practices as
"money politics" and political *premanisme* in local party and parliamentary politics. This study approached the two undemocratic practices from two dimensions – i.e., from a historical perspective and then viewing the contemporary transformation of political corruption and intimidation as a result of the democratic transition and decentralization. While a comparative historical study shows that corruption and political violence took hold in Indonesia’s post-Independence politics, and especially during the authoritarian regimes led by Soekarno and Soeharto, my findings show that they are now deeply entrenched and define the nature and working mechanisms of the country’s post-authoritarian local political institutions.

As many Yogyakarta party politicians acknowledged, the problem is not the wide-ranging authority (*wewenang*) that has been devolved to them but rather the abuse of this authority. Chapter IV especially focuses on the cases in which local assembly members seek excessive perquisites in drafting and implementing their budgets and more problematically, the way in which they use their power to elect local executive heads through bribery often ignoring the central party boards’ instructions. Chapter V shows that the increased significance of parties in local politics has not cultivated a closer relationship and active interaction between politicians and their constituents. It has instead enhanced a symbiotic relationship between local party politicians and semi-criminal gangs who have played a key role in ‘security-cum-mobilization’ as components of the *sargus* of parties. Similarly, drawing on his observations in North Sumatra and Central Java, Vedi R. Hadi also concludes that “there is no inevitable (and certainly no frictionless) march towards idealised forms of liberal democratic governance in the wake of authoritarianism, and that a very different kind of regime – one driven by the logic of money politics and violence – may instead become entrenched due to the specific constellation of social power and interest” (Hadiz 2003, 130). Some may attribute informal, and often undemocratic, practices to the lack of

knowledge and experience of many local party politicians, but the embedded undemocratic practices should be seen as an organizational problem rather than as individual choices. In turn, as long as actual practices have little to do with formal sets of rules, informal practices tend to remain as a persistent and often defining mechanism in the operation of the democratic institutions.

**Public Disillusionment**

Many ordinary Indonesians have become increasingly disaffected with their new democratic political life as they perceive that post-Soeharto politicians are just as corrupt and self-interested as those of the New Order period. Furthermore, they appear to be no more serious about working for their constituents. Although apathy towards political parties is not confined to post-Soeharto Indonesia and often found in other democratic countries, it is important to understand that many Indonesians tend to see their recently revitalized multi-party politics from the perspective of their promised democratic future. After living under authoritarian rule for nearly four decades, they have expected something fundamentally different from what they had under the authoritarian regimes in terms of their political life. Many of them may agree that the gap between formal democracy and substantive democratisation is inevitable, but what is particularly significant for them is the need for “more” responsive and representative local assembly members who decide and implement policies in “more” transparent and accountable ways. However, the gap between many people’s expectations about their “more democratic” political life and the ubiquitous ‘money politics’ and political *premanisme* in local politics has disillusioned many ordinary Indonesians. Therefore, this study argues that the growing public disenchantment about the current multi-party parliamentary politics is a product of their unfulfilled high hopes about a “more”
democratic future, which has in turn reactivated the 'anti-politics' atmosphere that was implanted by the former authoritarian regimes.

**Undemocratic Consolidation?**

Drawing on my observations in Yogyakarta, this study argues that the region has seen a reactivation and decentralization of political corruption and violence in the wake of Soeharto’s highly centralized control system over them. One of the main problems is that while local assemblies have grown as new loci of power, there has not been a corresponding effort to monitor and control the use of the new powers. Legal restraints regarding the practices of 'money politics' still have minimum effect. More significantly, while many local party politicians seem to lack a strong commitment to their parties or grassroots supporters, they also have shown an inclination to equate their expanded power with increased financial rewards. It seems that the greater power of parties and local assemblies has encouraged many local politicians to regard party and parliamentary service as a means to acquire economic benefits. One of the reasons seems to lie in the fact that many local party politicians believe that representing and being accountable to their constituents are not primary determinants of their re-election prospects.

On the other hand, in terms of political premanisme, this study argues that the fall of Soeharto was marked by the fragmentation of systems of political control and the intensification of power struggles at the local level, decentralizing rather than eliminating political violence in the country’s political life. What is remarkable now is the dispersion of political thuggery among the regional satgas of the major parties, which had once been largely monopolized by New Order-linked groups such as Pemuda Pancasila. Although party satgas have existed since Indonesia’s first years of Independence, the increasing recruitment of local gangsters and criminals into parties’ satgas since the 1999 general elections has raised the spectre of substantially expanded civilian violence as a paradoxical consequence of democratisation and decentralization. Therefore, the continuing presence of such organizations within formal political institutions runs contrary to the effort to democratise and de-militarise the society.

To summarize, recent political developments in post-Soeharto Indonesia draw our attention back to the relationship between institutional democratisation and its substantive consequences for actual practices in local political institutions. Although it may be inevitable to expect that the realization of the initial intention of political change would take longer compared to a simple change of formal institutional arrangements, the cases investigated in this study show that as long as political institutions are seen as a means for narrowly defined political and economic purposes, the intended effects of democratisation and decentralization on daily decision-making and implementation in local political institutions will require a long time. Similarly, the persistent but transformed – in a decentralized and more competitive way – presence of semi-criminal gangs within the satgas and its consequent ‘preman-ization’ of local party and parliamentary politics runs contrary to popular democratic aspirations. Through the expanded and more competitive ‘security-cum-mobilization’ activities following the resurrection of multi-party parliamentary politics in the regions, local semi-criminal gangs now have more direct access to decision-making processes through their closer relationships with power-holders in local governments and assemblies. The only distinction of the post-Soeharto period from the centralized and controlled state premanisme under the New Order seems to be localized and undomesticated premanisme in the regions.

In broader theoretical terms, this study argues that political parties in the post-authoritarian context do not always develop in democratic ways. Under the remaining authoritarian legacy and unsettled post-authoritarian environment, strong party
organization and high representativeness and accountability of party politicians are unlikely to be achieved, at least in a short period. Without underestimating their fundamental importance, formal rules and procedures do not of themselves ensure the creation and institutionalisation of more responsive and effectively representative political institutions, especially at the local levels of governance. The problem inherent in the post-authoritarian context is that formal rules and procedures are frequently interpreted and applied in unintended, and even self-interested, ways. Therefore, a study of post-authoritarian party politics should thoroughly examine what is happening politically, in terms not only of formal institutional changes but, more importantly, of their practical effect on daily politics. By so doing, an analysis of post-authoritarian party politics can show how the challenges of democratic consolidation are shaped and what those challenges indicate for the post-authoritarian political developments. In short, this study emphasizes the necessity of investigating actual patterns of political change at the grassroots in order to understand the gap between formal institutional change and its unintended effect on the post-transitional political processes. As many other scholars have observed, post-authoritarian politics can easily be stuck somewhere on their long journey to a consolidated democracy, with no guarantee that they will reach their destinations.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H. Surasmo Priyandono</td>
<td>Chairman (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Dec 9, 1999/Aug 10, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budi Dewantoro</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (PK)</td>
<td>Dec 9, 1999/Aug 18, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nur Ahmad Affandi</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (PKB)</td>
<td>Dec 9, 1999/Aug 10, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Khairuddin, SS, Msi</td>
<td>Member (Golkar)</td>
<td>Dec 22, 1999/Aug 22, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyadi Gunawan*</td>
<td>Chairman of the PDI-P Fraction</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatang Setiawan</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P) &amp; Ex-chairman of Pemuda of PDI-P</td>
<td>Aug 14, 2001/Aug 21, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agus Subagyo</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Aug 14, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imnawan Wahyudi</td>
<td>Member (PAN)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ida Fitimah ZA</td>
<td>Member (PKB)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJ. Zunatul Mafuchah</td>
<td>Member (PKB)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drs. MM. Umar</td>
<td>Member (PKB)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahtaniyar Basyir, SE</td>
<td>Chairman (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Nov 12, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinde Laras Yulianto</td>
<td>Chairman of the PDI-P Faction</td>
<td>Aug 31, 2001/Dec 3, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turino Junaidy</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Aug 30, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>TH Sunardi Jono</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Aug 31, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rahajeng Arhuna Adaninggar</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Aug 30, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Zubianto</td>
<td>Mayor of Yogyakarta (PAN)</td>
<td>Jan 9, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syukri Fudholi</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor of Yogyakarta (PPP) &amp; Former member of the provincial assembly</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999/Jan 9, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heru Pruwadi</td>
<td>Secretary of PAN’s district board in the municipality</td>
<td>Aug 16, 2001</td>
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### Civil Society Agents of Yogyakarta

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<th>Position or Role</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ichasul Amal</td>
<td>Rector of Gadjah Mada University</td>
<td>Jan 18, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohtar Mas’oed</td>
<td>Fisipol, Gadjah Mada University</td>
<td>Several times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratikno</td>
<td>Fisipol, Gadjah Mada University</td>
<td>May 22, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudarjo</td>
<td>Kadinda DIY</td>
<td>Jan 9, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halida R. Kasumaharta</td>
<td>Chairwoman of IWAPI</td>
<td>Jan 11, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonang Djuliatono</td>
<td>Chairman of HIPMI</td>
<td>Jan 8, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yaury</td>
<td>ParWI</td>
<td>Several times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budi Santoso</td>
<td>LBH Yogyakarta</td>
<td>May 9, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himawan S. Pambudi</td>
<td>Lapera Indonesia</td>
<td>May 8, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agung Wibawanto</td>
<td>Lapera Indonesia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christina</td>
<td>Lapera Indonesia</td>
<td>May 18, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Aman Sragih</td>
<td>Yogyakarta Corruption Watch</td>
<td>Several times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajianto Dwi Nugroho</td>
<td>Reporter of PANTAU &amp; Student of UGM</td>
<td>Jan 14, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Bachtar</td>
<td>Reporter of Balairung &amp; Student of UGM</td>
<td>Jan 14, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antariksya</td>
<td>Journalist of Latitudes &amp; Kunci</td>
<td>Sep 4, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triyandi Mulkan</td>
<td>Lembaga Pembantuan Hukum</td>
<td>Aug 31, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budi Susanto</td>
<td>Sanata Darma University (Realino)</td>
<td>Dcc 28, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danyar</td>
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<td>Wisnu</td>
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<td>Agus</td>
<td>Radio Unisi</td>
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<td>Suwarjo</td>
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### Civilian Security Forces (Yogyakarta and National)

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Muhammad Latifie</td>
<td>Chairman of GPK (Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Aug 13, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairul Hadi M. Anik, MBA</td>
<td>Chairman of GPK (National)</td>
<td>Nov 13, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambang Ari Sujioko</td>
<td>Head of Staff of Paskam of the PPP (Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Aug 9, 2001</td>
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### Other Agents

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<tr>
<td>Nurdin Amin</td>
<td>Chairman of Ansor and Commander of Banser (Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Aug 7, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gandung Pardiman, MM</td>
<td>Commander of GePuko &amp; Secretary of General of Golkar (Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Aug 8, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Taka</td>
<td>Pemuda Pancasila (National)</td>
<td>Nov 13, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung R. Husapea</td>
<td>Pemuda Pancasila (National)</td>
<td>Nov 13, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uco</td>
<td>Pemuda Pancasila (National)</td>
<td>Nov 13, 2001</td>
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### Jakarta

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<tr>
<td>T.A. Legowo</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Several times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusnanto Anggoro</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>April 18, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aria Bina</td>
<td>Head of secretariat on the central board of the PDIP</td>
<td>April 17, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Alimardwan Hanan</td>
<td>Secretary of General (PPP)</td>
<td>April 11, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. tuswandi, SIP, SH</td>
<td>Secretary of General (Golkar)</td>
<td>April 10, 2001</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* Passed away in 2001
REFERENCES

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ParWI DIY
Sekretariat Dewan Kotamadya (DPRD Kotamadya) Yogyakarta
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YLBHI (Yogyakarta Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia)
YCW (Yogyakarta Corruption Watch)

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H. Suraesmo Priyandono</td>
<td>Chairman (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Dec 9, 1999/ Aug 10, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budi Dewantoro</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (PK)</td>
<td>Dec 9, 1999/ Aug 18, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nur Achmad Affandi</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (PKB)</td>
<td>Dec 9, 1999/ Aug 10, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Khairuddin, SS, Msii</td>
<td>Member (Golkar)</td>
<td>Dec 22, 1999/ Aug 22, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyadi Gunawan*</td>
<td>Chairman of the PDI-P Fraction</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatang Setiawan</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P) &amp; e-chairman of Pasanda of PDI-P</td>
<td>Aug 14, 2001/ Aug 21, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agus Subagyo</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Aug 14, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immuwan Wahyudi</td>
<td>Member (PAN)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ida FitimahZA</td>
<td>Member (PKB)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJ. Zanatul Mafruchah</td>
<td>Member (PKB)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drs. MM. Umar</td>
<td>Member (PKB)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999</td>
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The Provincial Assembly and Government

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Bahtaniyyar Basir, SE</td>
<td>Chairman (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Nov 12, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cinde Laras Yulianto</td>
<td>Chairman of the PDI-P Fraction</td>
<td>Aug 31, 2001/ Dec 3, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turino Junaidy</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Aug 30, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH Sumardjono</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Aug 31, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rahujeng Arhuna Adaninggar</td>
<td>Member (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Aug 30, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herry Zadianto</td>
<td>Mayor of Yogyskarta (PAN)</td>
<td>Jan 9, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syurik Padholi</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor of Yogyskarta (PPP) &amp; Former member of the provincial assembly</td>
<td>Dec 11, 1999/ Jan 9, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heru Pruwadi</td>
<td>Secretary of PAN’s district board in the municipality</td>
<td>Aug 16, 2001</td>
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### Civil Society Agents of Yogyakarta

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ichasul Amal</td>
<td>Rector of Gadjah Mada University</td>
<td>Jan 18, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohtar Mas’ood</td>
<td>Fisipol, Gadjah Mada University</td>
<td>Several times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratikno</td>
<td>Fisipol, Gadjah Mada University</td>
<td>May 22, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudarjo</td>
<td>Kadinda DIY</td>
<td>Jan 9, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halida R. Kusumaharta</td>
<td>Chairwoman of IWAPI</td>
<td>Jan 11, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goniang Djuliatono</td>
<td>Chairman of HIPMI</td>
<td>Jan 8, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yaury</td>
<td>ParWI</td>
<td>Several times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budi Santoso</td>
<td>LBH Yogyakarta</td>
<td>May 9, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himawan S. Pambudi</td>
<td>Lapera Indonesia</td>
<td>May 8, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agung Wibawanto</td>
<td>Lapera Indonesia</td>
<td>Several times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christina</td>
<td>Lapera Indonesia</td>
<td>May 18, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Aman Sragih</td>
<td>Yogyakarta Corruption Watch</td>
<td>Several times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ajianto Dwi Nugroho</td>
<td>Reporter of PANTAU &amp; Student of UGM</td>
<td>Jan 14, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hassan Bachtiar</td>
<td>Reporter of Balairung &amp; Student of UGM</td>
<td>Jan 14, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antarika</td>
<td>Journalist of Latitudes &amp; Kunci</td>
<td>Sep 4, 2001</td>
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<td>Triyandi Mulkan</td>
<td>Lembaga Pembantuan Hukum</td>
<td>Aug 31, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budi Susanto</td>
<td>Sunata Darma University (Realino)</td>
<td>Dec 28, 1999</td>
</tr>
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<td>Danur</td>
<td>Forum-LSM Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Jan 4, 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisnu</td>
<td>KIPP-DIY</td>
<td>Jan 4, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agus</td>
<td>Radio Unist</td>
<td>July 10, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sojarwo</td>
<td>Independent activist</td>
<td>Nov 18, 2001</td>
</tr>
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### Civilian Security Forces (Yogyakarta and National)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhamad Lutfie</td>
<td>Chairman of GPK (Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Aug 13, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairul Hadi M. Anik, MBA</td>
<td>Chairman of GPK (National)</td>
<td>Nov 13, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambang Aris Sujoko</td>
<td>Head of Staff of Paskam of the PPP (Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Aug 9, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nurlin Amin</td>
<td>Chairman of Ansor and Commander of BanSer (Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Aug 7, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gandung Pardiman, MM</td>
<td>Commander of GoPaKo &amp; Secretary of General of Golkar (Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Aug 8, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Taka</td>
<td>Pemuda Pancasila (National)</td>
<td>Nov 13, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung R. Hutapea</td>
<td>Pemuda Pancasila (National)</td>
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<td>Ucok</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.A. Legowo</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Several times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kusnanto Anggoro</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>April 18, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aria Bima</td>
<td>Head of secretariat on the central board of the PDIP</td>
<td>April 17, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Alimarwan Hanan</td>
<td>Secretary of General (PPP)</td>
<td>April 11, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. tuswandi, SIP, SH</td>
<td>Secretary of General (Golkar)</td>
<td>April 10, 2001</td>
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