USE OF THESSES

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When Clio Meets the Titans: Rethinking State-Historian Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines

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A Thesis Submitted in fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Asian Studies
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ABSTRACT

Riding the waves of decolonisation characteristic of postcolonial decades, the governments in Indonesia and the Philippines sponsored in the 1970s their respective history-writing projects: *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (SNI) and the *Tadhana* Project. One of the purported aims was to produce a ‘truly’ nationalist history that could help ‘repair the damage’ wrought by colonial experience. While nationalism provided a broad template within which the scholars and the state forged a partnership, the haunting problem of political legitimacy provided the two regimes strong reason to initiate collaboration and to see it through to a fruitful conclusion, if at all possible.

The formation, contexts and contents of the *Tadhana* and the SNI projects are utilised in this study as areas for exploring the complex and varied manners by which embodiments of knowledge and power interact. What makes the two projects very fertile as exploratory grounds is the differentiated dynamics—sometimes obvious, at other times subtle—between or among the scholars, state actors, knowledge itself and all other factors. There are, of course, notable similarities as well, and these sharpen the backdrop against which the search for a nuanced characterisation of the knowledge-power nexus has been pursued in this study.

The primary questions that this study addresses are: (1) “Whose and/or what powers determine the shape of historical knowledge, and how?” and, (2) “Whose and/or what knowledge frames whose exercise of power, and how?” The overall arguments may be summarised as follows: First, there is no inherently oppositional relationship between good scholarship and political interests. They could go together. Whether the relationship would be antithetical or complementary depends on many factors including the intention of an actor and the meaning or value attached to a knowledge claim.
Second, the scholars and scholarship are in themselves a power to reckon with; they are not mere puppets at the mercy of the manipulative control or influence of the state. They should, therefore, be factored into the analysis of the knowledge-power nexus.

The third main argument addresses the question, if scholarship and politics are not necessarily opposites, why are they often framed as if they are? What role do moral judgments play in formulating such dichotomies? It appears that, aside from genuine moral outrage, the moral framing of the criticisms against the Tadhana scholars and Nugroho was not just a rhetorical device to strengthen the position of the critics but this also served to divert the attention of the people away from the apparently inherent ties between the scholarly and the political, between knowledge and power.

Fourth, the relationship between knowledge and power seems to be captured by the mathematical metaphor of the calculus, that is, they are formed at the confluence of criss-crossing factors whose possible combinations are infinite and the process of their formation dynamic.

Fifth, knowledge is possibly an autonomous site of power; that is, knowledge is not just dependent on the power of a particular agent, as imbedded in the popular notion of 'knowledge is power.' This autonomy possibly emanates from the fact that meaning, which is constitutive of knowledge, is continually being shaped by the interaction between the individual knower and the social forces with which he or she has to contend with. These forces are beyond an individual's control though he or she has the capability to influence the outcome of such interaction.

Sixth, a similar logic underpinned the knowledge-power relation as manifested in the SNI and the Tadhana. It is in the logistics of power that they differed. This means that both projects suggest that knowledge is a function of
power and it is in the distribution, combinations, sources, and types of power where the differences between them lie.

This study concludes with a call for an ethics of accountability. This is occasioned by the serious ethical problem that accompanies the notion of knowledge as a function of reality (rather than as a function of power). By claiming to be neutral or objective, scholars can and often do remove themselves from the responsibility for whatever consequences the knowledge they produce might have. Unwittingly, they become accomplices in causing, maintaining or justifying social injustice, inequality and violence, both physical and symbolic. These are precisely the conditions that, ironically, they often claim to remedy. One way to neutralise the problem is to expose the sources of the insidious powers that prop up knowledge and these include the power of the scholars and that of scholarship itself. It is by being transparent about such power that the scholars can help address the problem.

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STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This thesis is an original work of the author, except where acknowledged in the text. It has not been submitted for any other degree.

ROMMEL CURAMING

Date 26 July 2006
GLOSSARY

Abangan  Nominal Muslims, follow a form of Islam that that is mixed with Hindu-Buddhist and animistic influences

Asal bapak senang  Indonesian for ‘so long as the boss is happy;’ attitude or mentality that predisposes an individual to do everything to please the superior

Bagong Kasaysaysan  Tagalog term for ‘New History’

Barangay  Tagalog word which means a village or a settlement consisting of 30-100 families; social, economic and political unit during the pre-hispanic and Spanish periods.

Biro Khusus  Indonesian for ‘special bureau;’ a clandestine group tasked to infiltrate the military and propagate communist teachings

Buku babon  Indonesian for ‘standard text;’ a book that serves as the basis of another books or whose importance makes it a fundamental reference.

Caciquism  Spanish-derived term for the rule of the local chiefs or bosses

doktorandus  Dutch-influenced post-bachelor’s degree in the old educational system in Indonesia.

connaissance  Developed knowledge, as opposed to day-to-day knowledge, French.

EDSA Revolution  The uprising that toppled Marcos in 1986

Ethical Policy  An ambitious program promulgated by the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia starting early 1900s

Filipino Heritage  An encyclopedia of the Philippines, a project that was contemporary with the Tadhana

Frailocracy  A term often used to refer to the rule of the friars in the Philippines during the Spanish period; another term is friarocracy.

Hamlyn Group  An Australian publishing company that financed the Filipino Heritage Project

Ilustrados  Educated Filipinos during the Spanish period in Philippine history.

Indonesia sentrisme  Indonesian for Indonesia-centric perspective in historiography

Istruktural  In Indonesian historiography, it refers to the structural or multi-dimensional approach

Katipunan  Secret revolutionary society founded in 1892 in Manila which led the revolution in 1896

Kumpare  In the Philippines, it refers to the person (male) who served as the sponsor in the baptism of one’s child

La Liga Filipina  Spanish term which meant ‘The Philippine League,’ a short-lived organisation founded by Rizal in 1892.
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<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<td><strong>Lubang Buaya</strong></td>
<td>Indonesian for ‘crocodile hole.’ It is a village south of Halim Airbase in Jakarta; it became famous being the place where the bodies of abducted generals’ were dumped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malacanang</strong></td>
<td>The President’s official residence in the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Manila Times</strong></td>
<td>One of the national daily newspapers in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Martial Law</strong></td>
<td>Marcos proclaimed martial law in September 1972 to prolong his stay in power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pancasila</strong></td>
<td>State ideology in Indonesia, literally Five Principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pantayong Pananaw</strong></td>
<td>Tagalog term for ‘We/Us Perspective,’ one of the dominant schools of Philippine historiography.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pemuda Rakyat</strong></td>
<td>People’s Youth, one of organisations affiliated with the Communist Party of Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-hispanic period</strong></td>
<td>In Philippine history, it refers to the time before the Spaniards arrived in 1521 or 1565.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Propagandists</strong></td>
<td>Group of young educated Filipinos in Spain who campaigned starting in the 1880s for reforms in the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Prosesuil</strong></td>
<td>In Indonesian historiography, it refers to the narrative, processual or chronological approach to writing history.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reform Movement</strong></td>
<td>Another term for the movement created by the Propagandists (see above)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Santri</strong></td>
<td>Devout Muslims, following forms of Islam that are fairly strictly based on the Koran</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>savoir</strong></td>
<td>French, day-to-day knowledge, as opposed to developed knowledge</td>
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<td><strong>Sejarah</strong></td>
<td>Indonesian word for history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sejarawan murni</strong></td>
<td>Indonesian for “pure historian,” a rhetorical term that sets a marker of qualitative difference between historians who were well trained in methods and those who were not</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sikolohiyang Pilipino</strong></td>
<td>Tagalog for ‘Filipino Psychology,’ a school of thoughts in Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Statism</strong></td>
<td>An approach to knowledge/power analytics that focuses on the heavy role or influence of the state on knowledge production</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sumpah Pemuda</strong></td>
<td>Youth Oath, pledge made by the participants in the youth congress in Indonesia in 1928</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tadhana</strong></td>
<td>Tagalog word which means fate or destiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tripartite view</strong></td>
<td>In Philippine historiography, it refers to the condition during and division between the period before, during and after colonization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1898 Revolution</strong></td>
<td>A landmark event in Philippine history; the revolution against Spain</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ABRI</strong></td>
<td><em>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</em>, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADHIKA</strong></td>
<td>Abbreviation for <em>Asosasyon ng mga Dalubhasa at may Hilig sa Kasaysayan</em>, ‘Association of Scholars and History Enthusiasts’; one of the major history associations in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BTI</strong></td>
<td><em>Barisan Tani Indonesia</em>, Indonesia’s Farmers’ Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDSA</strong></td>
<td>Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, one of the major avenues in Metro Manila, well-known as the place were the 1986 uprising took place</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FH</strong></td>
<td><em>Filipino Heritage</em>, the multi-volume history writing project funded by the Hamlyn Group</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gerwani</strong></td>
<td><em>Gerakan Wanita Indonesia</em>, Movement of Indonesian Women</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gestapu/G30S</strong></td>
<td><em>Gerakan 30 September</em>, The 30th September Movement, group of military personnel that launched an aborted coup on 30 September-1 October 1965</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IAHA</strong></td>
<td>International Association of Historians of Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lekra</strong></td>
<td>Abbreviation for <em>Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat</em>, Institute for Peoples’ Culture; an association of leftist artists in Indonesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LEKNAS</strong></td>
<td>National Institute of Economic and Social Research</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LIPI</strong></td>
<td><em>Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia</em>, Indonesian Institute of Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LRKN</strong></td>
<td>National Institute of Cultural Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MPRS</strong></td>
<td><em>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara</em>, Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MSI</strong></td>
<td><em>Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia</em>, Association of Historians of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NHC</strong></td>
<td>National Historical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NHI</strong></td>
<td>National Historical Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NMPC</strong></td>
<td>National Media Production Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHA</strong></td>
<td>Philippine Historical Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHC</strong></td>
<td>Philippine Historical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHRMC</strong></td>
<td>Philippine Historical Research and Markers Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKI</strong></td>
<td><em>Partai Komunis Indonesia</em>, Communist Party of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PNHS</strong></td>
<td>Philippine National Historical Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PMP</strong></td>
<td><em>Pendidikan Moral Pancasila</em> (Pancasila Moral Education)</td>
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Pusjarah

Serangan Umum

Indonesian for ‘General Offensive;' this is a landmark event in the struggle against the Dutch (1 March 1949). The Republican forces conducted a concerted attack on Yogyakarta and held it for six hours.

SNI

Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, title of the 6-Volume history of Indonesia

SNI-SMP

Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk Sekolah Menengah Pertama, ‘National History of Indonesia for the Junior High School’

SNI-SMA

Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk Sekolah Menengah Atas, ‘National History of Indonesia for the Senior High School’

SOAS

School of Oriental and African Studies

SSK

Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, one of the branches of sociology of knowledge

SSN2

Seminar Sejarah Nasional II, the Second National History Seminar held in Yogyakarta in 1970.

Supersemar

Abbreviation for Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, ‘Instruction Letter of 11 March;' this letter authorised Suharto to undertake several measures to restore order and enabled Suharto to wrest control of the government.

Tritura

Abbreviation for Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, ‘Three Demands of the People;' after the Gestapu coup, demonstrators had demanded the government three things: (1) dissolution of the PKI; (2) changes in the Dwikora Cabinet; and (3) proper handling of the economic crisis.

TRD

Today’s Revolution: Democracy, a book that served as the blue-print for Marcos’s plan to establish Martial Law.

UC

University of California

UI

Universitas Indonesia, University of Indonesia

UGM

Universtitas Gadjah Mada, Gadjah Mada University

UP

University of the Philippines

VOC

Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or Dutch East-India Company
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

A work of this magnitude can only be a product of multiple efforts. The greatest debt I owe is to God who, despite my still unresolved struggle with agnosticism, has bestowed upon me an unending stream of blessings all through these years. Without God's mercy, generosity and guidance, and without the strength He constantly lent me at many times I felt so down, this thesis would have not been completed.

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To Dr. Craig Reynolds, God knows I cannot be thankful enough. His genuine interest in the topic right from the beginning, and his faith in my capability inspired me to rise above mediocrity that otherwise I would have easily settled in. One of my pillars of strength all through the years, he made me believe that I could do things. Through the right combination of exacting scholarship, gentle encouragement, exemplary work ethic, huge reservoir of patience, emotional sensitivity and adept administrative skills, he nurtures in a way that only a great supervisor can. By allowing himself to be persuaded to stay in the panel, and by doing much more than what was called-for by his duty, I have earned a lifetime debt to him that can be repaid adequately only by doing the same thing to my future students. Together, my three supervisors have provided a composite of an exemplary definition of what a scholarly community is. Whatever good things in the field of scholarship that I might achieve in the future, they certainly would be a huge part of it.

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The same indebtedness I have incurred in the Philippines. I am grateful, first, to the Centre for International Studies under the leadership of Dr. Cynthia Zayas and the History Department of the De La Salle University under Dr. Ronaldo Mactal. These institutions kindly accommodated me as a visiting fellow during my fieldwork in Manila. Among many people who helped me in Manila, I should particularly mention Dr. Zeus Salazar, Dr. Samuel Tan, Dr. Serafin Quiason, Prof. Fe Mangahas, Mr. Adrian Cristobal, Dr. Rod Paras-Peres, Dr. Antonio Hila, and Dr. Luis Dery for their kind assistance in my effort to gather data. To the helpful staff at the libraries of the Asian Center-UP, Main Library-UP, Ateneo de Manila, De La Salle University, Lopez Museum, Ayala Museum and National Library, I am also very thankful.

Finally, I like to acknowledge that part of me that persevered no matter what to complete this thesis. The temptations to give-up during the most trying and discouraging moments had been strong such that to reach this point could only be attributed to a part of myself that refused to say ‘I have had enough.’ I have never been prouder of that part of myself.

All these go without saying that for all errors and shortcomings, the responsibility is solely mine.
INTRODUCTION

KNOWLEDGE-POWER: APPROACHES AND THEORIES

The past is never dead. In fact, it is not even past.

-William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun* (1953)

We live in a time of 'history wars'. In the past few decades in many parts of the world, historical interpretations have been an object of intense public contestations (McIntyre and Clark 2003; Linenthal and Engelhardt 1996; Nash, Crabtree and Dunn 1998; Saaler 2005; Reedy 1999; Suny 2005; Art 2006; Niven 2002; Berger 1995; Falola 2005; Humblebok 2005; Aguilar 2002; Basu and Das 2005; Hite 2005; Hein and Selden 2000). While history’s potential and actual ability to generate controversy, not to mention its intimate relationship with politics, has long been recognised (Laquer and Mosse 1974; Unger 1993; Ferro 2003), at least two things are new in the recent phenomenon: the extent of involvement of the public and the level of passion it generates. This phenomenon seems paradoxical. While many academic historians lament what they perceive to be a growing marginalisation of history and the historical profession, observers have noted an increase of public interest in history¹ (Rozensweig and Thelen 1998; Tyrell 2005, 11-24). It seems that history has seldom figured more prominently in the public consciousness than it has in the recent past.

Corollary to the increased public interest in history is a growing number of important studies scrutinising the historians (Brock and Wroebel 2006; Gorman 2003; Naimark and Case 2003) and history itself, both as a form of analysis or

¹ The marginal position of history and historians is a common complaint among Filipino and Indonesian historians. This is not confined to historians in the developed world such as the US, as Tyrell (2005) and Rozensweig and Thelen (1998) noted.
narrative (Fasolt 2004; Martin 2004; White 1973, 1987; Foucault 1967, 1976, 1979) and as a profession (Novick 1989; Tyrell 2005). While self-reflexive, self-critical examination into the practice of historiography and the character of historical profession have some bitter critics, sometimes even claiming that history has been (or is being) ‘murdered’ (Windschuttle 1994; Himmelfarb 2004), one can argue that it (self-critical examination) is an indication of the discipline’s increasing level of maturity or sophistication. They who recognise their limits understand themselves well.

The multi-front war over history is a complex phenomenon. It may be a part of a larger, ambiguous process that on the one hand accompanies the growing scepticism or disenchantment towards many things that represent modernity, including modern scholarship and the forms of rationality that underpin it. On the other hand, it may also have been occasioned by the empowerment of groups or individuals that modernity and democratisation has made possible. The on-going alignment or re-alignment of power relations within many countries as well as at transnational or global level may also have a part in it. The dialectics of contending forces or conflicting interests specific to a given society possibly make each ‘war-front’ quite distinct from another. There are at least two common features, however, that may be discernible. The first is the presence of the elements of the past that, owing to the present condition and/or the aspirations for the

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2 For a highly recommended, deeply penetrating and crisply written treatise on the limits of historical analysis, see Fasolt (2004). Also useful, but not as compelling as Fasolt’s is Martin (2004).

3 See also Weiner (2005) for an insightful look at how different configurations of power within the society condition contrasting reactions to and consequences of offences (plagiarism, fraud, harassments, etc.) committed by historians in the United States.


5 Philosophers associated with poststructuralism such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Heidegger and de Man are notable examples. For critics of this attitude, see Wolin (2004); Ferry and Renaut (1990); and Pels (1991)

6 Examples include the break-up of Yugoslavia and the collapse of the former Soviet Union that gave rise to a number of independent states in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Baltic. Change of regime in Spain, Indonesia and Chile and the reunification of Germany are also notable examples.

7 The Chinese and Korean reactions to textbook issues in Japan may be a case in point.

8 The on-going process of globalisation, for example, and the war on terrorism, or the ‘clash of civilisations’ may have an impact. See for example Hein and Selden (1998).
future, may be forgotten, distorted, resurrected and kept alive for various reasons. As Faulkner said, "The past is never dead. It is not even past" (Faulkner 1953, 83).

The other is the change (or the perception thereof) in the structure of power relations in a society, sometimes induced or influenced by forces beyond its borders. In short, at the bottom line rests the question of the relationship between the structure of power and the shape of knowledge.

The objects of analysis in this study are two history-writing projects which to an extent reflected a small-scale 'history wars' in Indonesia and the Philippines in the 1970s. These are Marcos's project, the *Tadhana: A History of the Filipino People* (hereafter Tadhana), and the Suharto regime's official history, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (hereafter SNI). Because of the context in which they were made, however, these projects are perceived more as tools for political supremacy rather than as expression of a battle for history. Undertaken at a crucial juncture of the two authoritarian regimes' political consolidation, suspicions mounted that these projects were none other than vehicles for regime-justification or self-glorification. While it cannot be denied that these projects had features that validate such suspicion, this study will demonstrate that their greater importance lies in analysing the aspects or the extent to which they were not. Considering the physical proximity and the intimacy of the interaction between the embodiments of knowledge (scholars) and power (political leaders or their representatives), these projects offer quite a rare glimpse of the intersection where knowledge and power clash, fuse, restrict, reinforce or constitute each other.

9 The haunting memories of past violence such as the Holocaust in Germany (Art 2006), the 1965-66 mass killings in Indonesia (Budiawan 2004; Zurbuchen 2005; Cribb 1989), and the Nanjing massacre and human experimentation of the Chinese by the Japanese (Fogel 2000) are examples.

10 The demise of authoritarian regimes, for instance, that altered the structure of power relations paved the way for the interrogation of the past misdeeds. See Aguilar (2002) for the case of Spain, Budiawan (2004) for the case of Indonesia, among many others. The case of Japan does not involve a change of regime, but the perception by certain groups of the threat of the alleged remilitarisation by the government heightens the tensions.

11 For Korea's involvement in textbook controversies in Japan, see Dudden (2005).
In contemporary academic culture, reference to the knowledge-power nexus may be met with a polite but jaded response. Many have moved on, or stayed away, perhaps thinking that this (the idea that knowledge is a function of power) is counter-productive or, in a theoretical and analytic sense, is already exhausted (Nola 1994; Roberts 2005; Jones 2000; various articles in Jenkins 1997). Others who opt to move along this analytic flow have adopted different approaches or vocabularies perhaps to reflect conceptual refinement, or to cross new intellectual frontiers or just to keep up with intellectual fashion. Another possibility is that some may think that the idea is a self-evident truth and that there is no need to problematis it anymore. Whatever the reason, or whatever attitude others have towards this idea, I believe that taking another look at knowledge-power nexus is of fundamental importance because, among other things, there are certain aspects of the relationship that have yet to be fully explored.

This study starts with the assumption that knowledge and power are closely intertwined and that, following Foucault, they presuppose each other. In his words, “Knowledge and power are integrated with one another.... It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power” (Foucault 1980, 52). At the outset, however, I emphasise that this study is not another application of Foucault’s knowledge/power analytics. The nature of my data does not warrant such a move and while I start with Foucault, the questions I raise in this study are different from those addressed by him.

The main aim of this study is to identify areas that may be utilised in formulating a more nuanced, differentiated and yet inclusive definition of the relationship between knowledge and power. As I will try to demonstrate in the following review of the relevant literature, while the approaches that have so far been tried have their own notable contributions, they tend to be either too inclusive and lacking in differentiation, or too generalized or too specific and short on inclusivity and/or nuances. Another approach, I believe, is necessary—an approach that in its most ideal formulation has the capacity to identify all possible
types of power; all possible subjects or agents who may be powerful; and all types of knowledge that may be produced by, and in turn frames, the configuration of power relations. In short, the general questions this study aims to address are the following:

a.) Whose or what power/s shape/s whose or what knowledge, and how?

b.) Whose or what knowledge sets the frame for the exercise of whose or what power, and how?

The origin of problematic issues surrounding knowledge-power nexus may be coeval with the birth of authoritative knowledge itself (Bauman 1987). The Greek philosophers early on thought of related issues (Remmling 1967; Shapin 1991) as did philosophers in other parts of the world (Hansen 1981; Matilal and Evans 1986). Central to these issues are the questions of whether or not, and if it does, to what extent, the non-rational elements such as social, cultural and political factors affect knowledge production. Bacon’s Theory of the Idols and Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* were pivotal (Levine 1950a, 195b) but it was

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12 The first chapter of Bauman’s book *Legislators and Interpreters* (1987) provides a penetrating look into the evolutionary process that might have taken place in primitive societies leading to the fusion between knowledge and power. Such an approach was particularly important in that it demonstrates the deep roots—both social and historical—of the knowledge-power nexus.

13 According to Shapin (1991) from the early Greek philosophical tradition through early Christianity all the way to 17th century empiricism and beyond, knowledge was considered as appropriate to the extent that its formulation was achieved out of the context of the practical and the political. Remmling (1967, 53-55) notes that the early systems of modern philosophy (referring to the European tradition) had been dominated by rationalist epistemology. Early forms of empiricism were discernible in Aristotle and Epicurus, among others, but it would take Locke and Hume to launch vigorous challenges to rationalism.

14 I agree with Longino (2002) when she argues that the sharp dichotomy between the social and the rational hampers rather than facilitates understanding of knowledge. However, I use the dichotomy between rational and non-rational here just for convenience.

15 Larrain (1979) traces to Machiavelli the early recognition of the environmental influence on cognition. Francis Bacon in the 17th century was also notable in his idea of the Idols of the Tribe referring to the distorting effects of individual perceptions. He said that it is wrong to regard the human as the measure of everything (cited in Dant 1991, 56).

16 In Levine’s comprehensive and incisive survey of historical development of philosophical views on knowledge as interpretation, she traced the ‘modern’ roots of interpretationism upon which sociology of knowledge was based from Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. Then she proceeded to Hegel and Marx down to pragmatism of Dewey and Lewis and eventually to Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge.
Foucault who nailed the point when he argued that knowledge and power presuppose each other.

Between Kant (or even earlier) and Foucault is a long tradition of serious efforts to understand the power-knowledge interface. This tradition is exemplified, for instance, in the importance of the notion of ideology in Marxist scholarship.\(^\text{17}\) Durkheim provided early impetus too with his idea of social \textit{a priorism}, which suggests that forms of knowledge such as religion and sciences all emerged from the confluence of social forces and one is thus not necessarily superior to the other (Law 1986; Bloor 1982).\(^\text{18}\) Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was perhaps the earliest, most developed attempt to make sense of the relationship between knowledge and its social context.\(^\text{19}\) According to Remmling, writing in the 1960s, Mannheim provided "the most resolutely developed sociology of knowledge" (1967, 62). What was of particular importance in Mannheim lay in his emphasis on the understanding of the social context of knowledge production in favour of its supposed contaminating influences. He put the question of veracity of a knowledge claim (epistemology) at the backseat of understanding the social context in which the knowledge claim was made (sociology) (Dant 1991, 34-40; Pels 1993). It was a sort of a revolution that saw social epistemology challenging the monopoly of philosophy as the sole arbiter of knowledge claims (Ben-David 1978, 1981 as cited in Shapin 1995, 296).\(^\text{20}\) Seminal though his ideas may have been, Mannheim nonetheless lost much of his appeal as reflected in the development in the 1960s-1980s of the sociology of knowledge,\(^\text{21}\) especially in the sociology of

\(^{17}\) For a concise overview of the Marxist tradition in the sociology of knowledge, see McCarthy (1996, 27-46)

\(^{18}\) As noted by Law (1986), while Marx's views on knowledge-society relations was prominently picked up by the sociologists of knowledge, Durkheim's ideas did not receive as much attention, until recently with the rise of groups of scholars who developed what is known as sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) or social studies of science. Bloor, one of the prominent SSK scholars, is among those who 'resurrected' Durkheim's ideas for appropriation in the SSK. See Bloor (1982).

\(^{19}\) For a book-length reconstruction and analysis of the early development of sociology of knowledge in Germany, where Mannheim was one of the key figures, see Frisby (1992).

\(^{20}\) The very notion of 'sociology of knowledge' was met by strong opposition from the philosophers. (See Dant (1991, 34-40) for a discussion of the hostile responses from philosophers to Mannheim's project. For a book-length attempt at refuting relativism, see Norris (1997).

\(^{21}\) Its 'obituary,' as Coser (1987, 218) has noted, has been announced a couple of times already.
scientific knowledge, purportedly the most prominent sub-branch of sociology of knowledge in the past two decades. Through the efforts of some scholars, however, Mannheim's influence lingers and, lately, it seems being revived or revitalised (Coser 1987; Pels 1993, 1996; Kim 1994; Vandenberghe 1999).

Between Bacon's 'knowledge is power' and Foucault's power/knowledge is not just a wide temporal gap. It also signifies a revolutionary transformation in the ways knowledge and power have been conceived and how the relationship between them is analysed. The transformation has a complex history that witnessed both subdued and agonistic debates among different theorists from the days of the Greek classical philosophers through the time of Descartes, Kant and Hume, Marx and Durkheim, Mannheim and Berger/Luckman, all the way to the present.

One notable feature of this debate points to the changing conception of the relationship between knowledge and reality. Initially knowledge was thought to be an uncontaminated reflection of reality (rationalism), then as sense-experience (empiricism). Kant played a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the two. From that point on, the notion of knowledge as interpretation provided a common thread that links Kantian epistemology to certain ideas of Hegel and Marx and to the various schools of thoughts or methods such as historicism, pragmatism and sociology of knowledge (Levine 1950a, 1950b; Remmling 1967) all the way to poststucturalism (McCarthy 1995) and Latour's actor-network theory (Latour 1986).

22 Mannheim has been the favourite 'whipping boy' of the sociologists of science. He is often cited in contemporary sociological discourse as the one who attempted to rationalise the irrational (see Stehr 1997, 773). That he is not mentioned even once in Shapin's (1995) comprehensive review of the state-of-the-field is symptomatic of the continuing disregard of his legacy. This may be because of Mannheim's categorical declaration that 'hard' sciences were not a proper domain of sociological examination. However, some scholars have noted, even argued, for the centrality of Mannheim's ideas and that these ideas could even provide a solution for some of the problems the field faces. (See Pels 1996; Kim 1994; Vandenberghe, 1999).

23 Francis Bacon, a 17th century philosopher, is the originator of the adage 'knowledge is power.' By this he meant that by acquiring knowledge about nature—science—human beings can empower themselves by gaining the mastery over nature.
Beyond theoretical or philosophical debates, on the ground in scholarly practice, the two areas where the knowledge-power question often figures are in the analysis of the relationship between schooling and politics and between politics and writing history. Initially, both schooling and history writing were thought to be out of the domains of politics. There remain those who still insist this is so and de-emphasise whatever political linkage schools and historiography may have (Himmelfarb 2004; Windschuttle 1994), but this view seems to have long been superseded. In both cases in the earlier stage, it is usually the interests of the visibly power, the political power holders (or economic elites) that determine or influence the character or features of educational or scholarly output. In other words, they are contaminants to the otherwise pure knowledge. In the Marxist parlance this corresponds to the dominant ideology thesis. I call this approach statism-elitism and this will be the first approach to be discussed here.

In Asia, Japan’s case stands for decades as exemplary. The issues around textbook censorship, which arose in the 1960s, have refused to die down (Ienaga 1970, 1992; Nozaki 2001; Nozaki and Inokuchi 1998; Nakamura 1998). They have in fact intensified since the mid-1990s when a ‘movement’ to revise history along “neonationalist and conservative lines” was formally launched (McCormack 1998; Gerow 1998; Saaler 2005). The battle lines between the ‘liberal’ critics of textbook censorship and the ‘conservative’ proponents of nationalist history have been drawn, and the confrontation has often been public. Likewise the contested sphere that used to be focused on educational settings—the textbooks—has been expanded to the writing of Japanese history in general. One notable feature of the many studies (Reedy 1999; Hein and Selden 2000) on Japan’s case, in so far as the

24 The concept of false consciousness highlights the oppositional relationship between knowledge and power. The underlying premise is that power distorts knowledge—that is, interests distort the truth in the direction set forth by a dominant group. This formulation presupposes the opposite: knowledge is free from power; it is objective or neutral and capable of adjudicating between competing interests. See Haagard (1997, 16-17) and Lukes (1974).

25 The textbook issue has always presupposed the broader historiographic questions and in that sense it was not just an educational question. However, when the conservatives (see definition or elaboration below, footnote number 27) such as Fujioka fought back and established the Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks, the debates while remaining concerned with the textbook issue have also become largely historiographic.
knowledge-power interface is concerned, is the emphasis on the strength of, in Althusser’s terms, the ideological state apparatus. That is, the focus of analysis is on the state’s control of knowledge transmission channels and the responses of the foreign governments as well as domestic civil society groups to this control. There are of course exceptions and Morris-Suzuki’s *The Past Within Us* (2005), which ‘goes beyond the textbook,’ is a fine example. Unfortunately, there are not yet many work similar to Morris-Suzuki’s. Another prominent feature is the fairly defined demarcation line between the contending parties within civil society, the ‘liberal’ and the ‘conservative.’ In other words, Japan’s case is noteworthy for the clarity of the sources of power (that is, the state and to a lesser extent civil society groups) that contest and define the contours of historical knowledge.

To an extent, Japan’s case is paradigmatic. Studies focusing on the state (or the elite that it often embodies) as the dominant player are very common. In the case of the Philippines, the writings of Constantino such as ‘Miseducation of the Filipinos’ (1966) and the two-volume synthesis of the Philippine history, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (1975) and *The Philippines: The Continuing Past* (1978) represent a clearly Marxist line of analysis that sees the state and the elites as the locus of the dominant influence on the mentality of the people. The highly regarded *Limits of Educational Change* by Doronila (1989) follows the same line of analysis. Doronila was able to rule out pedagogical (teaching-related) factors after finding that teachers hardly deviate from the prescribed textbooks and other curricular requirements. She concluded that despite the government rhetoric pointing to national identity formation as one of the most important goals of public

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Morris-Suzuki rightly pointed out that the problem with the many studies that have so far been published was that they focused too much on the textbook censorship. What she did was to expand the focus to include popular media such as manga, short stories, films among others.

In Japan’s context ‘liberal’ refers to those who follow or are sympathetic to lenaga Saburo’s crusade dating back to the 1960s against state censorship. They are also keen to protest against any signs of remilitarisation of Japan and they complain about the denial of atrocities during the Second World War. The group of ‘conservative,’ on the other hand, is perhaps best represented by the Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks, founded in 1996. They pushed for an ‘ultranationalist’ history that absolves Japan of many wrong-doings associated with World War II and, conversely, they want to promote pride and a good image of Japan. For an example of how the latter depict history, see the John Nelson’s content analysis of the textbook issued by the Society, “Tempest in a Textbook: A Report on the New Middle-School Textbooks in Japan” (Nelson 2002).
education, the goal is not achieved and the problems appear to lie in the less than nationalistic contents of the textbooks. Such a lack of nationalism she attributed to the economic and political interest of the dominant class in collusion with international agencies such as the World Bank. The textbooks she analysed were products of the project funded by the World Bank, an institution, according to Constantino that "we can hardly expect to be interested in helping Filipinos acquire education relevant to their own needs" (1982, 21). The importance of Doronila’s book, as far as this study is concerned, lies in demonstrating how the public school system reproduces the interests of the dominant class.

Studies of Indonesia likewise offer notable examples of the similar approach. Elder's study, *Ideologies, Aims and Content in Indonesian Education* (1987), argues that even during the period of transition from Sukarno to Suharto, 1965-1969, contents and aims of education reflected largely the interest of the state. Parker's 'The Creation of Indonesian Citizens in Balinese Primary School' (1992) is noteworthy for providing empirical evidence of the success of the state educational apparatus in creating citizens according to the definition set by the state. Leigh's two articles 'Making the Indonesian State' (1991) and 'Learning and Knowing Boundaries' (1999) reinforce Elder's and Parker's arguments. By looking into the contents of the textbooks and how questions in the national examinations are formulated, she shows not only how the school system transmits knowledge that is favourable for justifying the regime, but also how education practice creates among the students a mindset amenable to ideological conditioning. This approach is particularly useful for its attempt to provide a theoretical and, to a degree, generalisable basis for the link between educational practice and the formation of certain types of mentality.

The centrality of the state also informs the analysis in Bourchier's 'The 1950s in New Order ideology and Politics' (1994) as well as in van de Kok, Cribb and Heins's '1965 and all That: History and Politics in the New Order' (1991). More recent studies by Wood, *Official History of Modern Indonesia* (2005), and by
McGregor, 'Claiming History' (2002), continue more or less the same line of analysis. The latter is particularly notable for focusing on visual representations such as monuments and museums. Along with Schreiner's "History in the Showcase" (1997), it provides a welcome balance to the heavy emphasis of other scholars on written representations. Considering the dominant presence of the New Order regime, a state-focused approach is neither surprising nor unwarranted.

The similarity of examples from Indonesia and the Philippines lies in the extensive role of the state, not in the emphasis on class. While class analysis has a long, deep and continuing tradition in and on the Philippines, the same is not the case for Indonesia. In the case of the Philippines, the state is more clearly seen (especially by Marxist-inspired scholars) as subservient or subsumed to the interests of the dominant class. In the case of Indonesia, on the other hand, there is not as much emphasis, implicit or explicit, on the connection between the two. The works of scholars, such as those I mentioned above, do not tend to conflate the two, as usually done by many Filipino scholars.

State-heavy, if not state-centric, analysis is also discernible in Gorman's Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt (2003). This emphasises the primary role of the state in influencing the shape of historical knowledge but also provides analysis of the non-state historiographies. The volume edited by Hadiz and Dhakidae, Social Science and Power in Indonesia, contains a number of articles that follow a similar line of analysis. In their introduction, they claim that "...the development of Indonesian social science—its very nature and character—is inextricably linked to the shifting requirements of (state) power over time" (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005, 2).

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28 Class analysis is widely and often employed by both foreign and local scholars who deal with the Philippines. In Indonesia, class analysis by Indonesian scholars is almost non-existent during the New Order period. Even in the post-Suharto period, many scholars maintain a suspicious attitude towards it. See Farid (2005). Among the foreign Indonesianists, class analysis is also not as a popular as in the case of the Philippinists. A notable exception is Robison (1978).

29 For specific examples of state-heavy analysis in this volume, see Laksono (2005) and Adam (2005).
The second approach, which I call *pluralism* for want of a better term, gives more emphasis to the conflicting roles or interests of various players, the state or the elite being just one of them. Rather than seeing the school system and historical knowledge as a mere reproducer of or a vehicle to advance the interests of the dominant class, they are seen in this approach as a battlefield where power is contested and power relations constituted. Thaveeporn Vasavakul’s *Schools and Politics in South and North Viet Nam: A Comparative Study of State Apparatus, State Policy and State Power (1945-1965)* (1994) is a very good example of this approach. By looking into the ‘processes by which the two school apparatuses were formed and expanded in order to ascertain how they reflected and effected ideological and economic changes’ (1994, 1) it demonstrates a textured relationship between politics and schooling in the former North and South Vietnam. The author addresses the main problem with the state-focused approach exemplified above when she forcefully argues that it cannot be assumed *a priori* that all “school apparatuses are state apparatuses – a premise that precludes any systematic discussion of the process by which statism took over the school system and of how the degree and form of statism changed over time” (Ibid., 9-10).

Lee Kam Hing’s book, *Education and Politics in Indonesia* (1995), dovetails well with Thaveeporn’s. Devoid of reference to theories, it is a historical study that plainly describes the contested character of education in Indonesia during the formative period from 1945 up to 1965. Clear from the author’s exposition is a picture of several competing forces—state, communists, nationalists, teachers’ union, and several Islamic groups—struggling to influence the shape of educational policies.

notable examples. All these articles discuss the dynamic interface either between the interests of the state and those of the non-state actors or between different groups of non-state players.

Of equal significance are the books of Phillips (1998), Nash et al (1997) and Boyd (1997), which, respectively, deal with the battles for history in the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain. They, especially Boyd, all discuss in fine detail, the different interests and strategies adopted by different stakeholders in the debates to influence the shape of the national curricula. Echoing the view of the other two, Boyd argues that rather than a clear mirror of a dominant ideology in the society, schooling is a battleground for competing forces.

What differentiates the first (statism) from the second approach (pluralism) is the extent to which it recognises the influence of the state and the non-state groups in shaping educational policies or historical knowledge. Statism emphasizes more heavily the role of the state whereas the latter focuses on the multiple sources of influences. In both approaches, the roles of individuals seem ignored. What is emphasised is the process of knowledge production at the top or middle level and there seems to be an underlying assumption that what gets transmitted to or consumed by the general public is largely similar to what was produced at the upper-middle level. These approaches have their own usefulness. No doubt there are many cases when the role of the state and groups in civil society is paramount. However, these could also be problematic for downplaying the power of individuals to make a difference. The third approach aims to address precisely the problem.

The third approach, which I call personalism, pays particular attention to how knowledge is actually consumed in public. This approach recognises the important roles of individuals in the analysis of knowledge production. One good example of this is Parker's (2002) ‘The Subjectification of Citizenship: Student Interpretations of School Teachings in Bali.’ By using various anthropological
techniques, Parker was able to demonstrate that "the process of creating national citizens in schools was, despite the homogeneous and authoritarian nature of the school system, an open-ended and potentially transforming one" (2002, 3). This study is particularly important as a corrective to the common tendency to deny individual students agency in the face of the seemingly monolithic school system in an authoritarian state such as Indonesia. That it is possible, even likely, to 'subjectify' citizenship in a fairly controlled environment indicates that individuals should not be neglected in the analysis of knowledge production.

Certain types of memory studies that have become very popular in the past two decades also exemplify the third approach. The idea of memory as a counterweight to history is underpinned by the recognition of the importance of the actual consumption of knowledge in the analysis of knowledge production. It also allows the shifting of the locus of power from the visibly powerful—such as the state, the elite, or various interest groups—to the individual knower. The notion of collective memory, while problematic, is also often invoked and in effect it expands the utility of the concept beyond individuals. In this case, however, I think this should be classified under the second approach which is better equipped to address the question, "Whose collective memory?"

There is extensive literature on the memory-history interface. This cannot be said however of the case of Indonesia and the Philippines where, as far as I am aware, there are only a handful of studies. One good example for the case of Indonesia is the volume edited by Zurbuchen, *Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present* (2005), a collection of essays on various facets of the subject. One thing that is noteworthy in the volume is the simmering tensions between the

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30 By consumption, it refers to actual use of knowledge as may be manifested in one's beliefs or behaviours which are in accord to what one knows. Mere possession or acquisition of knowledge is not enough. It is just the initial stage.

31 For a survey of the place of memory in historiography, see Chapter 1 of Patrick Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (1993, 1-25).

32 For a comprehensive review, see Jeffrey Olick and Joyce Robbins (1998).

33 That is if we exclude the enormous quantity of personal recollections, autobiographical and biographical accounts published in both countries.
contributors who are dubious of and those who are amenable to the idea of elevating memory to a position side-by-side with history. Another is the uneasy relationship between individual and collective memory.34

Another notable work that falls under this category is Budiawan’s *Mematahkan Pewarisan Ingatan* (Breaking the Legacies of Remembrance)35 (2004). It addresses the difficult question of how reconciliation between the perpetrators and the victims of the mid-60s mass killings in Indonesia might be achieved within the context where different groups or individuals are consuming competing or contradictory memories of the events.

The first three approaches identified above are notable for addressing the question of who has the power to determine or influence the shape of knowledge. Equally noteworthy is that in these approaches it is taken for granted that knowledge is a handmaiden of power—something that the powerful uses to advance their own interest and something whose shape or character reflects those interest. In these approaches, the possible autonomy of knowledge as itself having power is not recognised and this lack of recognition necessarily limits the range of knowledge-power interaction that may be scrutinised. Another approach is, therefore, necessary.

Aiming to address the limitations noted above, the fourth approach has been formulated. This approach may be called *mutualism* and it draws primarily from Foucault, in whose formulation, power and knowledge are reciprocal constructs whose relationship is that they presuppose and constitute each other. (Foucault 1980) In *Discipline and Punish* he declared: ‘Power and knowledge directly imply one another...there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ (cited in Simon 1995, 27). The reciprocal notion of power/knowledge presupposes a conception of power that is

34 For a review of this book, see Curaming (2005c).
35 The original title of the PhD thesis on which this book was based was ‘Breaking the Immortalised Past.’
different from what we conventionally know (Pels 1995b, 1020). That is, the notion of power as coercive, negative and limiting, is common in the first, and to an extent in the second, approach discussed above. What Foucault was more interested in was the type of power that is creative, positive and liberating, which is often invoked in the third and also to an extent in the second approach. As a theoretical construct, Foucault’s idea of power/knowledge exist on a conceptual plane and is useful in explaining how the things or the situations that we take for granted as given or natural—such as sexuality, madness, human nature, knowledge, power, body—are in fact historically contingent and are products of the complex interaction among various social forces. These insights provide the initial starting point for this study.

What sets the Foucauldian approach apart from the three others is the conception of the role of the agents or subjects in the knowing process. The first three approaches are clear about this. The state or elite, the various interest groups, and the individuals are the agents or the subjects who use and produce knowledge. Foucault’s concepts of power and knowledge, on the other hand, are non-subject, or non-actor based. As he told us, the subject is not the one who has power; it is power that makes the subject (Foucault 1980, 98). This anti-humanist stance tends to make Foucault’s power-knowledge analytics self-refuting, which has serious epistemological implications. Once ‘applied’ in analysing empirical data, what we shall have is an untenable situation where power is exercised without an exerciser, or a knowing process (or knowledge) without a knower.36 Since this study deals with specific subjects such as scholars and political power holders—subjects who appear to ‘have’ power and to know willfully—Foucault’s notion of subject-power relations can only be of limited use.

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36 For instance, he described genealogy as “a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledge...without having to make reference to a subject...” Foucault (1980, 117).
Another problem springs from Foucault's idea of knowledge as *savoir* (day-to-day knowledge) as opposed to *connaissance* (developed knowledge)\(^3^7\) which sets the limits to the types of knowledge to which his power analytics may be applicable. I believe that a truly serious effort to explore fully the knowledge-power interface requires that no type of knowledge or power should be exempted at the outset. It cannot be *a priori* assumed that one type of knowledge is power driven and others are not.\(^3^8\)

Many criticisms of Foucault emanated from the misunderstanding and/or misappropriation of his knowledge/power analytics (Prado 1995, 71).\(^3^9\) As ably demonstrated by Dyrberg (1997, 85-115), Foucault’s power analytics is more applicable to a higher-order type of analysis.\(^4^0\) How power is actually exercised on the ground or how it is acquired or distributed can be better dealt with by other theories or approaches (Ibid.) In this regard, the Foucauldian approach is closely allied to the whole poststructuralist, postmodernist project on at least two points: (1) through theoretical fiat they invariably tend to politicise all knowledge and knowledge production; and (2) they are more applicable to a higher-order type of

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\(^3^7\) Foucault regards psychiatry as a *savoir* because, he claims, of its 'dubious' scientific credentials. Organic chemistry and physics he considered as *connaissance* (Foucault 1980, 109). This suggests that just like Mannheim, he upholds asymmetry between 'soft' (social) sciences and 'hard' (natural) sciences in so far as the question of the influence of power is concerned. Such an asymmetrical approach is bound to meet epistemological problems that Mannheim himself was confronted with (See Dant 1991).

\(^3^8\) This is the essence of symmetry. This term refers to the injunction to analyse all sciences, hard and social sciences (or all knowledge claims by implication) be they successful or not, good or bad, using the same yardstick. That means, avoiding the treatment of successful science by using the rational standpoint and explain away 'unsuccessful' science as being influenced by social forces. On the part of the analyst it entails suspending a value-ridden evaluation of knowledge claims and instead focus on understanding the context in which a knowledge claim is made and used. Such a view is an extension of Mannheim’s relationism (Kim 1994, 391), but this time it is closely identified with Bloor (1991).

\(^3^9\) Prado notes that the notion of power/knowledge is often misunderstood as conflated or as identities. As he quotes Foucault: "The very fact that I pose the question of their relation proves clearly that I do not identify them." [italics original] (Foucault 1988, 43, as cited in Prado 1995, 71). See Nola (1994) as an example of one who misunderstood Foucault.

\(^4^0\) By higher order analysis, Dyrberg means that Foucault wanted to demonstrate how power, for instance, come to be seen as power, as we understand and exercise it now. Foucault’s denial of the subject is understandable in the light of his desire to eliminate all *a priori* assumptions about power (or anything). Making a knowing subject as a starting point will only favour one viewpoint over another (problem of relativism), thus precluding the possibility of knowing what forms of power enables 'objectivity' to be considered as preferable (See Appendix A for more details). As explained by Prado (1988), Foucault was not guilty of relativism, for it presupposed subject-object dichotomy, which Foucault rejected.
critique rather than for empirical analysis. Because of these reasons, my use of Foucault in this study is limited to three things: (1) as an inspirational starting point; (2) as a point of reference against which I consciously develop my own case; and (3) as a source of certain insights or ideas that are too useful to be ignored.

Vis-à-vis the three other approaches, the relative strength of the Foucauldian approach is the weakness of the others, and vice versa. Whereas the latter is inclusive in the sense that it focuses both on knowledge and power as equally important sites of analysis, the three others put a premium on power to the neglect of knowledge. Likewise whereas the sites of power that the Foucauldian approach aims to deal with are expansive, the three other approaches focus on their respective domains that are restricted. On the other hand, in its inclusivity the Foucauldian approach seems hard pressed in dealing with nuances and differentiation—differentiation that can only be achieved and accounted for if the subjects or agents are recognised, as the three approaches do. An attempt to synthesise the two—inclusivity and differentiation—gave rise to yet another approach.

The fifth approach that I will discuss here is best exemplified by Said in *Orientalism*. He drew inspiration from Foucault’s power analytic~ but rejected its anti-humanist tenets. Rather than rejecting agents and subjects, Said emphasised their essential role in a political act, including knowledge production. In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, the respective works of Philpott (2000) and Ileto (1999) are very important. Inspired by Said and Foucault, these studies recognise the broader political context in which knowledge production was undertaken. At the same time they focus on how knowledge itself, as autonomously powerful, influences the behaviour or perceptions of the people. In other words, knowledge

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41 For a more detailed explication of this point, see my article “Towards Poststructuralist Southeast Asian Studies?” in *Sojourn* (April/May 2006)
is shaped by, and at the same time shapes, power relations between subjects or agents.

This study builds on the foundation set earlier by the five approaches discussed above. Being a narrative and analysis of two state-sponsored history writing projects, it recognises at the outset the paramount power of the state (first approach, statism). However, in partnership with scholars who had different interests and as a controversial move that elicited discordant responses from the elements of the civil society, the two projects may also be considered as sites of power struggle (second approach, pluralism). Moreover, these projects having been done through a collective effort, under a varying degrees of restriction, the extent to which slippages—in the forms of fluid, inconsistent or even contradictory interpretations—are manifested in the final outputs may indicate the power of the individuals (third approach, personalism). On the other hand, the elements of the Foucauldian approach, the fourth approach, are best manifested in the mutuality of the relationship between knowledge and power that constitutes the fundamental starting point of this study. Finally, the fifth approach, the Saidian approach, will inform the analysis of how power relations between or among actors, groups, institutions and ideas get constituted.

This study also aims to go beyond the reach of the five approaches discussed above, both in terms of differentiation and inclusivity. Wide as the reach of the five approaches may be, they nevertheless seem to have not yet fully mapped out all important sites of power play. What they miss are the scholars and scholarship itself. Considering their central role in knowledge production and adjudication—being in Bauman’s (1987) words the “legislators” and “interpreters” of knowledge—any analysis would be incomplete without them in the equation. Ileto and Philpott came close with their emphasis on the political act that seems inherent in scholarly institutions and scholarly practice, but they prove not close enough. One proof of this is that while they expose and bewail the political nature, what they call Orientalism, of the American scholarships on Indonesia and the
Philippines, they seem oblivious to the political nature of their own critique. They seem to have been infected with the "all-other-scholarship-except-mine-is-political" syndrome.

Bourdieu's stance is perhaps even more instructive of this syndrome. His field theory of science provides an illuminating explanation for the behaviour of the scholars. As interpreted by Vandenberghe (2000, 58), Bourdieu's theory posits that,

The struggle that scientists wage within the field is always a struggle for the power to define the definition of science which is best suited to their specific interests which, if accepted as the legitimate definition would allow them to occupy with legitimacy the dominant position in the field. And given that there is no external and impartial arbiter, the scientific-cum-political legitimacy claims are always a function of the relative power of the competing groups.

Bourdieu did not operate on the idea of power/knowledge, neither was he fond of the use of the term power (in the way defined here) as a starting point for explaining the apparently self-serving behaviours of the scholars. But his idea of capital (cultural, social, intellectual) could be another term for power, as an ability to make a difference. If Bourdieu's views about the interests of intellectual are correct, then the persistence of the "other-scholarship-except-mine-is-political" syndrome along with the disavowal of relativism and, more so, its extreme form nihilism, can be explained with reference to the scholars' class interests. What they cannot reject on logical and epistemological grounds, they reject on the basis of veiled politics couched in moral and scholarly terms. As Bourdieu aptly puts it, it is in their interest to be seen as disinterested; it is in their politics to appear to be anti-political (Bourdieu 1976, 94 as paraphrased in Vandenberghe 1999, 57-58).

If Bourdieu's declaration has a very disturbing implication for scholars and scholarships, he is seemingly not disturbed enough. The reason is that he takes a

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42 The notion of class in Bourdieu is different from Marx's, but has similarities with that of Weber and Durkheim. In Bourdieu, a class is not economically based. Roughly, it refers to a loosely classified grouping that share common attributes owing to similarity in jobs, interests, or perhaps sharing the same geographic space.
direction opposite to his ideas' most logical conclusion. Rather than conceding the possibility that all scholarly acts, including his own and science itself, may be political acts, his call for a reflexive sociology\textsuperscript{43} signifies and entails the need for more science as an antidote to what Pels calls "knowledge-politics" (Pels 1995a). In Bourdieu's view, "science is one way of constructing alternative categories of being that can serve as an exemplar of transgressive practices both inside and outside academia."\textsuperscript{44} Such a position has some merit. If science (or knowledge in general) has been instrumental in setting restrictive and oppressive limits to the freedom of individuals (what Bourdieu call symbolic violence), then it is also the way to neutralise these restrictions and regain freedom. Ultimately, however, I think his proposal is misleading and unsatisfactory in that it re-inscribes through denial the power of the scholars and scholarship as the glue that creates the insidious partnership between knowledge and power. What makes the partnership between knowledge and power potentially dangerous is the aura of credibility that the unrecognised power of the scholars and scholarship lends to knowledge claims (Bauman 1987).\textsuperscript{45} Bauman further argues that the scholars and scholarship, as embodiments of objectivity or impartiality of knowledge, are often unwitting accomplices in reproducing and maintaining an unjust social order, which is constituted and justified through authoritative knowledge (1987, 13-20; 1992).\textsuperscript{46} The seductive appeal of history to leaders such as Marcos is rooted in this capacity of knowledge.

\textsuperscript{43} By reflexive sociology, he means "systematic objectivation of the field as the totality of the possible standpoints... and their corresponding viewpoints... which he opposes to the partial and interested objectivations of the agents involved in the field 'allows one to establish the truth of the different positions and the limits of validity of the different standpoints.'" (Bourdieu 1997, 38-39 as cited in Vandenberghe 1999, 60).

\textsuperscript{44} This is Schubert's interpretation of Bourdieu (1984, 1988) (Schubert 1995, 1010).

\textsuperscript{45} According to Zygmunt Bauman (1987, 17-18), the "asymmetry of power, as factor in the structure of domination... is served by concepts... coined, or refined, or logically polished, not by the dominating side of the structure as a whole, but by the intellectual part of it... Any claim to domination and superiority must... pay tribute to the very factors on which the intellectuals ground their power claims."

\textsuperscript{46} Schubert (1995, 1011), for his part, claims: "The emphasis on evidence in scientific research is inherently conservative, especially in the social sciences. By virtue of the fact that it is dependent upon the categories that allow for its existence, this emphasis tends to support and reaffirm the social and scientific status quo...(T)he dictum 'the data suggest' masks all the discursive activity and political contestation that go into constituting the 'data' as an agency of knowledge or insight...(I)t censures other ways of truth telling."
Bourdieu, however, seems to deny the potential danger that inheres in any authoritative knowledge, and such danger precisely lies in the power embodied in scholars and scholarship. Suggesting more science as antidote to the problem created by science in the first place puts Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology in a vicious circle. It might end up solving problems that it in itself creates, and so the process goes on and on. For that, I consider Bourdieu as a good example of a scholar who, by failing to admit and be willing to give up the symbolic power that inheres in any scholarly practice, evades reflexivity’s full requirement. He enjoins everyone but himself to fulfill this requirement, and he exonerates science and the attendant interests of the scholars as the primary source of the problem that in the first place gave rise to the need to be reflexive. Vandenberghe (2000, 60) aptly pointed out Bourdieu’s paradoxical position: “...if his move is not a polemic but a reflexive one...how can he have access to the position of ‘impartial spectator,’ observing his own observation and those of others, seeing what they don’t see and maybe even what he doesn’t see.” The key, it seems, is to bring the knowledge-power nexus to its ultimate conclusion by laying bare the nature of scholarship as an autonomous field of power. This is the direction to which this study points.

Let me give another illustrative example. Perhaps as effectively and painfully as Bourdieu, Pels (1996b) embodies what I call the ‘scholar’s primal fear’ that prevents the knowledge-power nexus to be taken to its full conclusion. Pel’s case is very instructive because his views reflect the anxiety that animates debates among scholars in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), the field that has been in the forefront of pushing the frontiers of the sociology of knowledge. In his article ‘Politics of Symmetry,’ (Pels 1996b) he castigates scholars who progressively radicalised the requirement of epistemological symmetry as applied in the SSK.47

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47By symmetry it refers to the injunction to analyse all sciences (or all knowledge claims by implication), be they successful or not, good or bad, using the same yardstick. That means avoiding the treatment of successful science by using a rational standpoint and explain away ‘unsuccessful’ science as being influenced by social forces. On the part of the analyst it entails suspending a value-ridden evaluation of knowledge claims and instead focusing on understanding the context in which it is made and used (See Pels 1996b). Such a view is an extension of Mannheim’s relationism (Kim 1994, 391), but this time it is closely
Convincingly, he exposes the pretensions to disinterestedness of these scholars and argues that the supposedly ‘value-free relativism’ they propound and their very act of pushing for it are intricately woven in the knowledge-political domain where they are located48 (Ibid., 284, 294-295). Latour, who blurs the boundary between human beings and things and between society and nature, and whose antipathy towards sociologism is well-known, is chided by Pels for collapsing politics and science together (Ibid., 293). Despite conceding that science (or knowledge in general) is a “form of politics ‘continued by other means,’” Pels nonetheless rescues knowledge from the inevitable clutches of power and provides an unwieldy justification at the bottom line of which he re-inscribed the authority and autonomy of the scholarly class along with the veiled power of the scholars. In his words (1996b, 292-293):

The abstract recognition that science is social, political and ‘interested’ through and through does not necessarily dictate a radical agnosticism concerning the boundaries of science and politics as a functionally-differentiated subsystems in the social division of labour...(T)he scientific field is a field similar to others, and similarly subject to laws of capital formation and competition, but it is simultaneously a ‘world apart’ which obeys its own specific logic of functioning.

Pel’s defence of scholarship is telling, and understandable if seen against the question of what may be at stake in the issue. This ambivalence dogs even the most famous among the poststructuralist scholars, such as Derrida and Foucault. They fully knew that knowledge and power are intimately linked but they seemed hesitant to reflect on, let alone accept, what it meant to their own position as scholars. In his review of Madness and Civilization, for instance, Derrida adroitly refuted Foucault’s attempt to exclude madness as a foundation for an attempt to form an alternative to Reason (Boyne 1990, 52-71). Many observers considered what Derrida did as a brilliant defense of philosophy against “unreason.”

Foucault’s apparent subsequent acquiescence to Derrida’s stinging rebuff

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48 Pels is obviously following Bourdieu on this point. For Pel’s discussion of Bourdieu, see Pels (1995a).
reinforced the point (Ibid.) The debate was of course highly philosophical in nature but, as explained in details in Appendix A, Derrida’s point cannot be upheld outside the confines of power relations that underpin the supposed neutrality and autonomy of the scholarly class.

Aside from the self-interests of the scholars, there are other possible reasons for the hesitance to bring the knowledge-power nexus to its full conclusion. One of these is methodological in nature—that is, the distance or indirectness of the interaction between the embodiments of knowledge and power that scholars have utilised as objects of their analysis. In Ileto’s and Philpott’s case for instance, as in the case of Said, they extrapolated knowledge-power relations from the supposedly perceptible discursive formation around what they consider as hegemonic texts. Such a discursive regime was thought to be an epiphenomenon of the complex, socially constituted power relations. At best under such conditions, the link between knowledge and power can only be established through inference and indirection. The same is the case with Foucault who studied psychiatry, medicine, penology and other fields. The ‘visibly’ powerful, such as political leaders, are not directly part of the equation. What they focused on, in other words, was how positive or creative power, in Foucault’s terms, operates. What seems necessary is to see a case where the actors involved include both the ‘visibly’ powerful, and the surreptitiously powerful such as the scholars. In other words, what happens when positive (restrictive, coercive, limiting) and negative (enabling, productive and liberating) powers meet and interact? This is what this study aims to explore.

The cases of Tadhana and SNI seem particularly instructive because of the proximity and intimacy of the interaction between embodiments of knowledge and power, both positive and negative, that can be glimpsed from these cases. In a laboratory of the knowledge-power interface, I doubt if there can be a better representative of power than a dictator such as Marcos; of knowledge than the independent-minded historians such as Sartono and Salazar; and of merger of
knowledge and power than a figure such as Nugroho Notosusanto. They are the main protagonists in the story and analysis that will unfold in the following chapters. The interactions among them are direct and quite intimate and their motivations were closely interlinked. Such a combination promises a clearer look into how knowledge and power actually interact. If the mechanism that allowed scholars and scholarship to hold their own in the face of politically motivated pressures can be explicated, if the actual manners by which the two sides clash, fuse, reinforce, restrict or constitute one another can be elucidated, it may generate insights that have far-reaching implications on how we theorise the knowledge-power relations. Since the question of the knowledge-power relations is central to the epistemological foundation of scholarship, what is at stake here is of considerable importance.

The two history-writing projects that are the primary focus of attention in this study took shape in two Southeast Asian countries that are comparable, Indonesia and the Philippines. The projects germinated at about the same time and under the auspices of two authoritarian regimes that shared some fundamental similarities. Despite similarities, however, there were also essential differences in the context within which the two projects emerged. These included the patterns of colonial experience that had a bearing on the character of the two countries' nationalism and the trajectory of state-formation vis-à-vis the development of the historical profession. As these are essential for understanding the features of the two projects, these will be discussed in the next chapter, Chapter 2.

The formation and the content of, and the responses to, the two projects will be the focus of the succeeding four chapters. Chapter 3 will narrate the story of how the Tadhana Project came into being. It will start by looking at the circumstances leading to the inception of the project. It then identifies the motivational forces for Marcos and the scholars to forge a partnership that produced it. Moreover, snapshots of how the project was carried out will be provided. The aim is to demonstrate the dynamics of the relationship among the
actors involved in the project. Being both a political and a historical project, the political and the historiographic context within which the project can best be analysed will be discussed in Chapter 4. The objective is to explain how the interests of the scholars and those of Marcos complemented or reinforced each other, and how they fitted into the broadly defined existing socio-political and academic order. The contents will be scrutinised to demonstrate the way how complementarity or congruence was achieved and the extent to which these reflected the interests of the state and/or the scholars.

The case of the SNI will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Paralleling Chapter 3, Chapter 5 will recount the process that gave birth to the SNI from the moment of its inception up to the reaction of the public to its publication. Chapter 6 will focus, just like chapter 4, on the political and historiographic context that makes the structure and the contents of the project intelligible.

A synthesis of Chapters 3 to 6 will be carried out in chapter 7, highlighting the similarities and the differences in the features and in ways various actors and factors interacted in two projects. The main idea is to help map out the range of possibilities by which knowledge and power, and their respective embodiments, interrelated. It is also important to identify particular combinations of factors that gave rise to different forms of interaction.

The concluding chapter will provide a summary of the main arguments. It will suggest some key ideas which may have important theoretical and ethical implications. It will also identify some areas for further research.
CHAPTER II

CONTEXTUAL COMPARISON

Indonesia and the Philippines are the same enough to be put together
but different enough to make comparison interesting.

-Robert Pringle (Indonesia and the Philippines, 1980)

For a Filipino like me, living in Indonesia for the first time could be a shock of recognition. Filipinos and Indonesians do not just look the same. They do not just speak languages that are related. They also laugh at the same jokes; enjoy the same tacky ghost stories and mushy melodramas; and share the same propensity for religiosity and fatalism. Laid back life they love to live; they both seem to have an amazing tolerance for time ‘wasted,’ poverty, injustice and inequality. Despite a long history of religious and colonial differentiation, there are uncanny similarities in how they view and enjoy life; how they relate to people; how they bear suffering. I did not really feel far from ‘home.’

There were also some impressions of difference. One that stood out was the sense of nationalism among the Indonesians. Growing up in an environment where nationalism was at best confused, I felt that Indonesians were at ease with their nationalist sentiments. It seemed as natural and clear cut to them as it was contrived and ambivalent in me. It appeared that the ‘nationalist project’ in Indonesia has been more successfully accomplished than in the Philippines.

1 The first time I had a chance to live in Indonesia was in 2001. I stayed in Yogyakarta for 10 months, with intermittent trips for days or few weeks to Jakarta.

2 There is a tendency to confuse the intense anti-colonial nationalist expression of the Filipino intelligentsia with the strength of Philippine nationalism itself. Wurfel’s observation as follows is typical: “The Philippines...has since independence enjoyed a national cohesion greater than that found in the most postcolonial states.” David Wurfel, The Filipino Politics (1988, 24). However, if we take a look at the Philippine nationalism as a whole, from the viewpoint of the common people, we may realize that what lies beneath the vocal and passionate anti-colonial, anti-American rhetoric is a reality that such rhetoric sought to efface. It may be an aspiration whose intense expression corresponds to the depth (and breadth) of the roots of its opposite.
notwithstanding the greater geographic and demographic challenges, and the
greater ethnic diversity in Indonesia than in the Philippines. If my impressions
were correct, I am sure there is a complex set of explanations for these. For
similarities, ecology may be one factor. For differences, the contrasting patterns of
their colonial experience that ultimately influenced the character of their
nationalisms may have played a role. Pringle's observation seems to be apt:
"Indonesia and the Philippines are the same enough to be put together, but
different enough to make comparison interesting" (1980, 1).

Given the wide array of pertinent comparative features of the two countries,
I will focus on only three points that I think are most relevant to the narrative and
analysis in the subsequent chapters. These are: (1) patterns of colonisation and the
responses to it; (2) state-formation and state-society relations; and (3) patterns of
development of nationalist historiography and the historical profession. A general
background will precede discussion of these points.

**Background**

Indonesia and the Philippines are two archipelagic countries in Southeast
Asia. Looking at the map, together they form a porous boundary separating the
region from the vast seas of the Indian and Pacific oceans. Along with Malaysia,
these countries constitute perhaps the most comparable subset in the region. They
comprise what is often called the Insular Southeast Asia. They share the same
geographical zone with a tropical climate that nurtures broadly similar vegetation,
topography and culture. People whose languages belong to the same Malayo-
Polynesian group and whose physical features are largely similar populate them.
Just by looking at them, one group could be mistaken for another. Were it not for
colonisation\(^3\) that saw the Philippines falling under the control of the Spaniards
and later the Americans, Indonesia under the Dutch and Malaysia the British, a
'pan-Malay' nation would have not been an impossibility. Alternatively, numerous

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\(^3\) As Elson (2004, 28) puts it: "The colonial period created, directly and indirectly, a fundamentally new
Southeast Asia, one with a fundamentally diminished sense of regional identity and belonging."

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nationalities with boundaries conforming more closely to the logic of geography would have taken shape. The fact that three different Euro-American countries—with contrasting policies, length presence and depth of impact—colonised them is a ground for a potentially fruitful comparison.

The trajectory of their more recent experience is also comparable. Both Indonesia and the Philippines fought anti-colonial revolutions that set the keystone for the master narrative of their nationalist imaginations. The Second World War played an important part in their nation- and state-building efforts. The experience under the Japanese occupation inflamed or radicalised the two countries’ nationalisms and cast a long shadow over the political developments in the succeeding decades. Of equal importance, both countries gave rise to communist movements that were among the most active in the Third World. Moreover, both have undergone ‘democratic experiments,’ dictatorial rule, expelled their dictators and had to negotiate a difficult democratic transition. There were differences of course in the timing, the extent, the modalities, the impact, and the dynamics of how these features or events actually played out. Such differences make comparison all the more potentially insightful.

One stark difference lies in religion. About 80-90% of the Filipinos are Christians (the great majority are Catholics) while about the same figures are Muslims in Indonesia. Just like the Muslims in Indonesia, the Christians in the Philippines are highly fragmented. Various Protestant and Filipino-church groups compete with Catholicism for constituencies. The fact, however, that the Catholics comprise a huge majority makes a difference. Unlike the Muslim majority who were divided along orientational, if not doctrinal, lines (abangan and santri, modernist and traditional) and were comparatively more loosely organised,

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4 That is, Sumatra and Malay Peninsula could go together, Kalimantan and Sulawesi could form another, and so forth.
6 Examples are Iglesia ni Kristo (or Church of Christ) and the Aglipayan Church. The latter is more Catholic and the earlier is more Protestant in orientation, but neither admit their affinities to either.

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the huge Catholic population stood under a unitary institutional presence of the Church. This is far from saying that the Catholics are a monolithic group, but their organisational oneness, backed by tradition, creates a reality-effect that further enhances the Church’s long-standing enormous power. While Islam had for a long time been largely marginalised in Indonesia’s political sphere, no aspiring head of state in the Philippines could take the Catholic Church for granted. Almost from the beginning, the tension continually brewed between the civil and the ecclesiastical representatives of the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines (De la Costa 1969). Such tension remains a fixture in the state-church relations to this day (Youngblood 1990; Steven 2004).

**Patterns of Colonisation and Nationalist Responses**

It used to be considered that both the Philippines and Indonesia had undergone three centuries of colonisation. While subsequent qualifications shortened the period for Indonesia (Resink 1968), the same was not the case for the Philippines. The first Spanish expedition reached the area in 1521 and in 1565 the Spanish presence gradually began to take root, wide and deep enough. The Dutch, on the other hand, established themselves in Indonesia more slowly, on a piecemeal basis, depending primarily on their economic interests: Maluku and Batavia (Jakarta) regions starting from the early 17th century, the whole of Java in the 18th, a large part of Sumatra in the 19th and the rest in the early 20th century. The sheer length of time of the Spanish presence in the Philippines almost ensured a more deep-seated impact than was the case of the Dutch on Indonesia.

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7 For a concise and useful analysis of the multi-faceted character of the Philippine Catholic Church, see Barry (1999).

8 This largely emanated from the structure of the colonial government. Unlike in other Spanish colonies where the Church was subordinated to the secular authorities, in the Philippines that was not the case. The Church representatives enjoyed paramount influence as partly consequent to the papal prerogatives agreed to by the king of Spain.

9 Actually, there were only a few Spaniards in the Philippines. By 1840s, the number hardly exceeded 5,000 out of the population of 5 million, and most of them were in Manila. However, the presence of only one Spanish missionary in a locality was sufficient to create a tremendous impact. See Corpuz (1957, 44 as cited in Sidel 1994, 27).
There were, of course, other factors. The geographical characteristics of Indonesia—its enormous size and its being spread out in three time zones—made it so much less manageable or penetrable than the Philippines, which was not just considerably smaller, with land area less than one-sixth of Indonesia’s, but was also more compact. Likewise, Dutch colonial activities being primarily focused on commerce, at least in the first two centuries, proved less intrusive to the culture of the indigenous population. It was not until the implementation of the Ethical Policy in the early 1900s that the socio-cultural life of a significant portion of the population was deeply affected. On the other hand, the missionary zeal of the Spaniards that resulted early on in the conversion of the majority of the natives ensured that the indigenous lowland cultures had been penetrated to their core. Many are convinced that what made indigenous culture vulnerable to the onslaught of Spanish influences was the lack of cultural, material and political development in the Philippines before the coming of the Westerners comparable to those stimulated by the Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic influences in the case of Indonesia. The brand of Christianity that developed in the Philippines may have been infused with indigenous elements, as captured by the term “folk Christianity” (Phelan 1959). The fact cannot be denied, however, that it was predominantly more Christian than folk.

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10 For a comprehensive analysis of the process of national integration in Indonesia, see Christine Drake’s book of the same title, published by the University of Hawaii Press (1989), specifically Chapter 2, pp. 16-59. See also Kahin’s Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (1952, 1-36).

11 The land-area of the Philippines is approximately 300,000 sq. km, compared with Indonesia’s 1.9 million sq. km (and about 3 million sq. km of seas). There are about 7,000 islands in the Philippines while in Indonesia about 13,000-17,000 islands.

12 The Ethical Policy was, in theory, an ambitious program in agriculture, education, infrastructure, health, and others areas undertaken by the Dutch starting in the early 1900s. One of the purported aims was to promote or improve the welfare of the colonised.

13 This is with the exception of the Muslim communities in Mindanao. For a standard work on the Muslims in the Philippines, see Majul’s book of the same title (1972). For the early process of hispanisation, see the classic, John Phelan, Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses (1959). As Rafael’s Contracting Colonialism has shown, however, such conversion cannot be assumed to be straightforward.

14 In areas, for example, where the Muslims were already established such as Mindanao, it took the Spaniards hundreds of years before they could be subdued, in military terms. From the viewpoint of culture, both Spain and the US never really succeeded in colonising the Muslims.
Another main difference lies in number. The Philippines shares with only a few countries the experience of being under two western colonisers. What made the case of the Philippines quite distinctive were the length of time, the depth, and the ambiguity or the contrasting impacts of the colonisers. African countries such as Tanzania may have changed hands from one colonizer (Germany) to another (Britain) but the impact was nowhere near as sharp or unsettling as in the case of the Philippines when it passed from Spanish to American control. Given the different experience under the two colonial masters many Filipinos harbour ambivalent attitudes towards colonialism in general. The term ‘binationalism’ coined by McCoy (1981) may be helpful in describing this attitude. While Dutch colonialism has been almost unequivocally perceived in Indonesia as negative, the same cannot be said of the Philippines where the American colonial period and its legacies continue to be viewed by many with nostalgia and fondness. The ambivalence of the Filipinos towards their colonial experience resonates in their nationalisms (McCoy 1981; Abinales 2002), in educational policies (Gaerlan 1998; Doronila 1989), in political structures and practices (Owen 1975; Paredes 1988), and even in personal views down to this day.

15 In 1971, for instance, a movement for “Philippine Statehood USA” easily gathered millions of members nationwide. (cited in Wurfel 1989, 26 and McCoy 1981, 61) For one of the reasons for the lingering positive reception among the Filipinos of American colonial project, see Patricio Abinales, “American Rule and the Formation of Filipino ‘Colonial Nationalism,’” Southeast Asian Studies, 39, 4 (March 2002).


17 The controversies on language policy, especially medium of instruction, are long-standing. For an incisive treatment of various related issues, see Gaerlan (1998).

18 The ambivalent character of Philippine democracy has been a topic of intense interest since the American period. See Hayden (1945) and see Abinales (2002) for an analysis of Hayden.

19 Earlier, I carried out a study of the patterns of nationalist discourses discernible in Philippine history textbooks in the period 1900 to 2000 (Curaming 2001). I have identified at least five streams of nationalisms: (1) mass nationalism; (2) colonial nationalism; (3) clerico-nationalism; (4) state nationalism and (5) indigenous nationalism. The term “mass nationalism” refers to the type of nationalism that champions the right of the common people for a fair share in the nation’s power and wealth. It starts from the proposition that the real makers of history are the common people, and thus history must be seen through their eyes and they should be the beneficiaries of the fruits of historical change. This is often directed against the elite and the elite-controlled state and it is heavily influenced by Marxist ideology. It is also closely allied with anti-colonial radical nationalism. “Colonial nationalism,” on the other hand, refers to a set of thoughts and practices that saw in the colonial experience – its legacies and consequences – sources of things advantageous for the whole nation. It is nationalist in the sense that the welfare of the whole nation takes precedence, and it is colonial, on the other hand, for its favourable recognition of the contribution of
The timing of the national revolution may have also contributed to such ambivalence. Whereas Indonesia saw independence after their revolution, the Philippines had to contend with the coopting and disarming policies of yet another coloniser soon after declaring independence from Spain in 1898. If after fifty years, an Indonesian scholar talked about the “heartbeat of Indonesian revolution” (Abdullah 1997), a Filipino counterpart grieved over an “aborted nation” (Quibuyen 1999).

One of the Americans’ disarming policies was the mass education program (May 1976, 1980). Figures put it that by 1920 nearly a million children received education in English and by 1938, it was twice as many (Steinberg 1987, 264-265). None among its contemporary Southeast Asian neighbors could surpass such figures. While such programs created generations of Filipinos forever grateful to the Americans in stark contrast with the painful memories of colonial experience under Spain, it also served as a breeding ground for nationalisms of varying shades. The emergence, for instance, of homegrown historians—educated during the American period—with very different nationalist temperaments as exemplified by Zaide and Zafra, on one hand, and Agoncillo and Constantino, on another, attested to the ambivalent impacts of American-sponsored education. The colonial experience. For a slightly different but related conception of ‘colonial nationalism’, see Anderson (1983) and Abinales (2002). “Clerico-nationalism,” on the other hand, refers to the brand of nationalism that emphasises the contribution of Catholicism in the development of the Filipino nation. This is closely allied to the colonial nationalism mentioned earlier and it has an uneasy relation with the radicalism of the Marxist-inspired mass nationalism. The state nationalism, on the other hand, refers to the type of nationalism espoused by the state for the purpose of justifying or strengthening its position of authority. In the case of the Philippines, it was most visible during the American period as well as during the Marcos years. And lastly is indigenous nationalism. It eschews colonial experience as pivotal to the development of Philippine nationalism. Instead, it tries to uncover or recover the ‘truly Filipino’ in the deepest past possible.

According to Reid (1981, 153): “The major achievement of the Indonesian revolution was the creation of a united nation with an assured sense of its own identity and significance. The national idea has by 1950 become an irresistible myth, sanctified by the blood sacrificed for it.”

The distinction between the two sets of historians will be discussed below.
American period, rather being a crucible of unity, produced still more potential for disputes over nationalism.22

Indonesian nationalism is by no means monolithic. Just as in the Philippines, competing ‘nations-of-intent’ existed then as now (Cribb 2004).23 The primary difference lies in the distribution of power among the promoters of the competing visions of the nation. While the coalescing of forces allowed one dominant vision to emerge in Indonesia, subordinating others, that was hardly the case in the Philippines. Up to now, there is no one unassailable ‘exemplary center’ of nationalism in the Philippines. It is continually being disputed. A complex of reasons explains this but one factor is the ambivalent character of the Filipinos’ colonial experience.

Whereas in the case of Indonesia’s nationalist movement, the “idea of unity has quickly acquired crucial symbolic value,” (Cribb 1999, 16) and “cultural, social and ideological differences” did not hinder “enthusiasm for national unity” (Cribb and Brown 1995, 9), conflict and discord rocked its Philippine counterpart since its beginnings in the 1880s. In both cases the necessity of unity was certainly recognised but such a recognition did not as easily translate into a unified front against colonialism in the Philippines as was the case in Indonesia.24 The disputes between Rizal and del Pilar,25 the groups of Bonifacio and Aguinaldo,26 Mabini and

22 Before the American period, sources of disunity—regionalism and socio-economic class differences, etc.—were already multi-layered. After the American period, another layer was added, and was more pernicious: the loyalty or fondness of many Filipinos towards their erstwhile colonisers.

23 According to this article, the competing nations-of-intent identified in this article are the Islamists, the communist, the developmental nationalist, the three strands that Sukarno wanted to synthesize into Nasakom, as well as that of the indigenous aristocracies and the mestizos (what he calls ‘multi-ethnic nation-of-intent’). The visions of the latter two, and why they failed and are almost forgotten, are the focus of the paper.

24 Indonesia may have been rocked by regional revolts in the 1950s but these revolts still mostly operated within the framework of the Indonesian nation, not as a subversion of it. For a pithy explanation of the sources of unity of the Indonesian nationalist movement, see Cribb and Brown, Modern Indonesia, pp. 9-12.

25 The dispute between the two reflected a division within the Filipino community in Spain during that time (late 1880s-early 1890s)

26 This had to do with the struggle for leadership positions within the revolutionary movement, the Katipunan. It ended in the death of Bonifacio on the order of Aguinaldo.
the oligarchs\textsuperscript{27} are but a few early examples that have foreshadowed the continued and the continuing disputatious character of Philippine nationalism to this day.\textsuperscript{28} No sooner had the Americans come to the Philippines, for instance, than a number of Filipino elites, erstwhile very high-ranking officials in the revolutionary government, switched sides. The questions of who should be the national hero, Rizal or Bonifacio; what should be the medium of instruction, Filipino or English; whether to require the reading of Rizal's writings in the schools, and a few others do not seem to have as sharp parallels as in the case of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{29} The division among the Islamists, the communists and other groups was of course serious and deeply rooted but time and again there emerged a locus of power capable of balancing, if not neutralising, such sharp divisions. Sukarno's adept, if ultimately fatal, attempt to synthesise the three competing ideologies of nationalism, religion and communism into \textit{Nasakom}; the Pancasila; and the military's decisive wiping out of the communists that smothered oppositions, did not have counterparts in the Philippines where competing interests co-existed, held only in tenuous equilibrium by a fragile balance of power. Despite the early beginning of Philippine nationalism, there was nothing comparable to \textit{Sumpah Pemuda}\textsuperscript{30} or \textit{Pancasila}, two important markers of Indonesian unity and nationalism. Marcos's (1979; 1980) was the first attempt to propose what amounted to a Filipino ideology, but due to his unpopularity, it was dismissed as nothing but a self-serving ploy.

\textsuperscript{27} Mabini was Aguinaldo's executive secretary, sometimes called the "Brain of the Revolution". In his apparently well-meaning effort to curtail the power of the oligarchs, he drafted a constitution wherein considerable power lay in the executive. This was vigorously opposed by a clique of landed elites who comprised the legislature. They were afraid that their interests might be jeopardised, and they looked down upon Aguinaldo as uneducated.

\textsuperscript{28} Conflicts and rivalries were, of course, hardly absent in the case of Indonesia. Examples include the tension between the advocates of \textit{perjuangan} (armed struggle) and \textit{diplomasi}, but they did not undermine unity in the face of the colonisers in the same way as, say, the killing of Bonifacio and Luna. Another was between the communists and their enemies and between what Feith called the "problem-solvers" (or "administrators") and "solidarity-makers." (See his \textit{The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia} (1959). But then again, in the face of the colonisers they were less disunited that their Philippine counterparts.

\textsuperscript{29} Feith's \textit{Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia} presents a picture of sharp division and acute dispersal of power among the military, Sukarno and numerous political parties during the period 1950-1957.

\textsuperscript{30} In 1928, in a congress attended by Indonesian students, a threefold declaration of one people, one motherland and one language. It became a landmark event in Indonesian history as one of the most important markers of unity and a symbol of Indonesian nationhood. See Foulcher (2000) for a fresh look at this event.
Thomas Megan in her PhD dissertation *Orientalist Enlightenment* (2002) has noted the 'peculiar' character of the earliest period in the development of Philippine nationalism. She argues that right at its very inception, Philippine nationalism was infused with a high level of cosmopolitanism that was difficult to find in many other colonial societies. According to her, whereas in many other colonial societies, the ‘middle class’ who led the nationalist movement were in between two poles, the colony and the metropole, Filipino nationalist leaders were in between multiple centers, which included Hong Kong, Japan, Germany, Belgium, France, etc. In her words: “They were not located between A (colony) and B (metropole), or even mediating between them, but instead travelling between multiple centers: not existing on the margins so much as existing in more than one place simultaneously” (2002, 4). This was made possible, according to her, by the fairly extensive travel experienced by these early nationalists (2000, 75-118). It exposed them to stimuli other than those in Spain and the colony and this afforded them multiple viewpoints that tamed the parochial tendencies of many anti-colonial nationalisms, including that of Indonesia.

The idea of cosmopolitan nationalism as an explanatory template for the development of Philippine nationalism is of course preposterous. Metanarrative is in the mind. Conceptual order is always retrospective whereas historical processes are open-ended. However, as the Philippines has emerged in the 20th century as a ‘truly’ global nation with more than 10 million (out of 85 million) of its people scattered in practically all corners of the world, this lends the idea of cosmopolitanism a heuristic value as an organising, as opposed to explanatory, principle.31 For the purpose of this study, it highlights the more than superficial roots of the fluid and multiple character of Philippine nationalisms.

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31 The process has accelerated since Marcos encouraged labour-export starting in the 1970s but it has been ongoing since the early 1900s when substantial numbers of Filipinos went to the US for various reasons. It could even be said to go back to the 1870s when many *ilustrados* went to Europe in the wake of the Spanish crackdown following the mutiny in Cavite in 1872.
Viewed from the perspective of the development of Philippine nationalism, the degree of unity evoked among early Indonesian nationalists by the notion of "Indonesia" was quite remarkable. As observers have noted, 'Indonesia,' at least to the educated, was to the modern and the future what regional ethnic groups were to the feudal and the past (McVey 1996, 14). Subsuming the regional into the national in the Indonesian nationalist imagination did not prove as challenging as it was in the Philippines where regional loyalties persistently dogged nationalist efforts. Likewise, while the project of modernity in the Philippines was initially identified with nationalism just as in Indonesia, the American colonisation provided a much clearer vision and more tangible fruits of the modern. Whatever strength the promise of modernity could lend to the nationalist project, as in Indonesia, was dashed by the American colonial project. This is yet another illustration of the impact of having two colonisers. The cosmopolitan, the national, and the regional elements competed or co-existed in shaping Philippine nationalisms.

**State-Formation and State-Society Relations**

As postcolonial states, the process of state formation in Indonesia and the Philippines was largely influenced by their colonial experience. It is unclear to what extent the Indonesian postcolonial state built upon its predecessor, but there is no doubt about it in the case of the Philippines where governmental and other political structures—constitution, party-system, system of checks and balances, etc.—were unabashedly patterned after those of the United States. The explicit 'training' in the 'art of democratic governance' that the Filipino leaders underwent within the colonial framework ensured this.

In a contrasting fashion, Indonesia and the Philippines were declared independent after the Second World War. Whereas Indonesian leaders hastily did

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32 This is a continuing problem. In Cebu, for instance, there were times in recent years when the national anthem was sung in Cebuano rather than in Filipino.
so amidst confusion in 1945, the Filipino leaders took the mantle of leadership in 1946 after being ‘prepared’ for it for decades. However, what happened to Indonesia in 1945 had a parallel in the Philippines. After declaring independence against Spain in 1898, also amidst uncertainties, Filipinos had to face the might of foreign conquerors. While the Filipinos fought against a new coloniser, their old colonisers confronted the Indonesians. Whereas the Indonesians held on to their independence after years of diplomatic and armed struggle against the Dutch, the Filipinos lost theirs (or they thought they had lost something they had yet to gain) and had to settle for decades of ‘democratic tutoring’ under the Americans. The repercussions of this difference were far-reaching on the trajectories of the two countries’ post-colonial political development, including nationalism, as pointed out above.

One fundamental difference lay in the decolonisation process. Whereas Indonesia succeeded in divesting itself of many legacies of the colonial era—Dutch property ownership, political use of the native aristocracies, the Dutch language, among others—the neo-colonial relationship between the US and the Philippines lingered. As aptly described by McCoy, it was an “independence without decolonisation” (1981). The Americans maintained control of the vast plantations, military bases, mines, and businesses while the Filipino elites enjoyed preferential access to the American market. This set the frame that shaped the Philippine government’s relationship with its American counterpart in the succeeding decades. Aside from the persistence of American popular culture and American-flavoured education, not to mention the control of resources and territories cited above, the continued close collaboration between the two governments served as

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33 In Ruth McVey’s (1996, 14) words: “Indonesia’s declaration of independence, instead of the high ceremony and ringing statement of goals that we might expect of a revolutionary state, was a bare announcement read before a few people, under the reluctant gaze of the Japanese.”

34 The promise of independence by the Americans was given early but was formalized in Jones Law of 1916. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 stipulated that in preparation for eventual independence in 1946, there would be a 10-year preparatory period. After presidential election in 1934, the Commonwealth government was inaugurated in 1935. Aside from certain areas such as foreign affairs, finance and others that remained other the control of the Americans, the Filipinos were given free rein.
one of the fulcrums of the anti-colonial nationalist backlash. To the consternation of his critics, Marcos was able to surf on the wave of such a backlash and use nationalist rhetoric to justify his authoritarian rule, one clear example being the Tadhana project that is one of the objects of this study.

The roads to authoritarianism were different in the two countries. While both underwent forms of 'democratic experimentation,' the crucial difference lay in the length of time they spent on it. Whereas parliamentary democracy was crushed just years after it was tried in Indonesia in the 1950s, the Philippines had more time to develop democratic practices and institutions. The establishment of the Philippine Assembly in 1907, the Filipinisation as an offshoot of the Jones Law of 1916, the electoral practices that started early on, and the establishment of the Commonwealth government in 1935 all marked a gradual and progressive pattern of increased Filipino participation in the experiment. Within the 25 years after independence in 1946, the experiment seemed to be working, notwithstanding the 'fiesta' character of the democracy that came out of such an experiment (Paredes and Cullinane, 1988; Anderson 1988; Golay 1998). In other words, by the time an authoritarian regime was installed with the declaration of Martial Law in 1972,

35 I specify that this nationalist sentiment is anti-colonial because in the Philippines, as explained in fn 16 in this chapter, there is a form of nationalism that is colonial.
36 This will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
37 It must be pointed out that the pre-war years were characterised by the entrenchment of a small group of bourgeoisie and oligarchs as political elites in the Philippines. More importantly, this period was dominated by only two persons, Osmena before the 1920s and Quezon afterwards. Quezon had in fact showed a high level of authoritarianism that only Marcos exceeded later on. See McCoy (1989). Nonetheless, at least the trappings of democracy were there and the foundation of (a nominal) democratic system was laid. Elections for example were held in 1901 (municipal), 1902 (provincial), 1907 (Philippine Assembly), 1916 (legislature) and in 1935 (presidential). Due to restrictive qualifications—literacy and property ownership—the electorate was approximately limited to 1.3% of the population in 1907, 10% in 1935 and 15.1% in 1946. See Jesus Manalili, "Historical Suffrage in the Philippines and Its Present Problems," PhD dissertation, University of Santo Tomas, 1966, as cited in Sidel 1995).
38 Fiesta means festivity or festival. Fiesta democracy refers to democratic practices that may be ephemeral, skin-deep, or just for a show, such as voting during election time. It also refers to the atmosphere of fun and conviviality that accompany the electoral exercise. One example of this is the EDSA Revolution in 1986. While it was punctuated by gripping fears and tensions, there were aspects that appeared like a spectacular fiesta. In Vincent Boudreau’s (1999, 11) words: "Filipinos moved from dictatorship to democracy with characteristic spectacle—color, music, emotion, and drama."
the Philippines had already undergone about six decades of (at least nominal) democratic practice. This makes it easy for the dictatorial period between 1972 and 1986 to appear an anomaly in the otherwise continuous evolution of the experiment.

The authoritarianism of the New Order regime, on the other hand, was hardly an anomaly. In many respects it was a continuation of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and retained the feudal character of the traditional political culture as well as the autocratic features of the Dutch colonial government (Anderson 1983). If anything, the brief parliamentary experiment in the 1950s was the one that appeared anomalous within the broader historical scheme.40 Such a view is reinforced by the tendency of many Indonesian politicians since the Guided Democracy period to use this period as a metaphor for political chaos and ineptitude (Bourchier 1994; 1996, 255-256).

Given the wider democratic latitude the Philippines had enjoyed for a longer period of time, it is not surprising that the state-civil society relations in the Philippines was more dynamic and confrontational, and the structure of power relations within the society more fluid and polyvalent (Headman 2001). Different interest groups such as labour unions, church organisations, political parties, professional associations and others had ample time to grow, acquire power and exert influence on the process, if not the outcome, of political struggles within the public sphere. Admittedly, Indonesia had similar experiences but its trajectory was arrested at a specific point.41 What happened in 1965-66 and the subsequent years proved to be pivotal. It installed the reign of terror that effectively put in place the resilient anti-communist “master narrative” that legitimated the use of

40 Benda’s thoughtful review of Feith’s book Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia and Feith’s intelligent response to it emphasise this point. (Benda, 1964/1982; Feith, 1965/1982) Anderson (1983, 482) for his part, suggested that the parliamentary form of government survived until 1957 because given the weakness of the civil bureaucracy and political parties, there was “no other form of regime (that) was possible” (emphasis original).

41 For analysis of the dynamic interpenetration between the ‘state’ and the ‘society’ in Indonesia between 1945 and 1965, see Anderson (1983, 480-486). This culminated in the ‘triumph’ of the state over the society as the New Order became entrenched (Ibid., 487-493).
“repressive measures geared to intimidate the citizenry” for an indefinite period of time (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005, 267, 270). This was followed by years of systematic mass indoctrination most clearly evident in programs such as *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila* (PMP, Pancasila Moral Education) and *Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa* (PSPB, History of National Struggle Education) (Bourchier 1996, 227-263). Dissent could hardly thrive in such an environment. The lasting and deep impact is manifest in the much more difficult democratic transition that Indonesia experienced in the post-Suharto period in comparison with the Philippines in the post-Marcos years (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005; Hedman 2002). 42

There is a prevailing perception that the New Order regime was more firmly grounded in authoritarian terms than the Marcos dictatorship (Boudreau 1999, 15; Abdullah 2005). That the Marcos regime tottered in early 1980s and eventually collapsed in 1986 whereas the New Order persisted until 1998 supports this view. On the whole, this is clearly the case. However, in the first five-seven years of the two regimes’ existence, the period particularly relevant to this study, this may not have been so. The considerable strength and durability of the New Order regime rested significantly on a sudden reversal of fortune (“luck?”) associated with the 1965-66 events. That the communists were decimated hardly demonstrated an enormous power of the military or the emerging New Order. Perhaps the reverse was truer: the military and the regime became dominant because the communists were wiped out. As Ariel Heryanto (2006) vividly shows in his book *State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia*, the strength of the New Order partly derived from the hyper-reality effect of its power, made possible by the overriding state of fear among the people—fear rooted in the events of 1965-66.

42 Heryanto and Hadiz’s article cited above provides an illuminating three-way comparison of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. In their view, the absence of events comparable to the 1965-66 events in the Philippines and Thailand makes democratisation less formidable. See also Hadiz (2003) for the case of Indonesia specifically.

41
Marcos, on the other hand, was able to install dictatorship on the basis of accumulated strength of will- and fire-power.\textsuperscript{43} Whereas the communists in Indonesia were disempowered by the sharp turn of public opinion in the days and months following 1 October 1965, which prevented them from putting up a strong opposition, Marcos faced throughout, from the 1960s to 1980s, a coalition of forces, including armed ones.\textsuperscript{44} This dictatorship was installed and maintained as a product of long, arduous, calculated and skilful manipulations of competing and complementary forces and interests. Hardly was there luck in it. If the New Order was empowered by the weakness of the opposition,\textsuperscript{45} the Marcos regime thrived despite strong and continued resistance. In other words, by the early-mid 1970s when the two history writing projects were carried out, the Marcos regime was more or less of equal strength as the New Order. As the 1970s wore on, however, Suharto’s formidable rise contrasted sharply with Marcos’s continuous descent.

\textbf{Historiography and History Profession}

The early development of nationalist historiography closely followed that of the nationalist movement in general. It is not surprising, therefore, that the nationalist historiography in the Philippines took shape earlier than in Indonesia considering that it was there where Southeast Asia saw the rise of the earliest anti-colonial nationalist movement. Nationalist historiography here refers to a set of ideas and practices adopted by historians or history enthusiasts in their efforts to write history with the result, intended or not, of recognising or justifying the existence of a nation-state as well as of defining and/or maintaining an identity deemed fitting for such a collectivity\textsuperscript{46} (Curaming 2005a, 62).

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\textsuperscript{43} For a comparison of the patterns of consolidation and resistance between the Marcos and Suharto regimes, see Boudreau (1999, 4-7).
\textsuperscript{44} The Marcos Diary contains passages that show how worried Marcos was about the coalition of these forces, specifically entries for early January 1970.
\textsuperscript{45} Sukarno and his hordes of loyal supporters, both civilian and military, were of course a formidable challenge. But the events of 1965-66 considerably disempowered Sukarno. With the communists neutralised, and Sukarno sidelined, the military and the regime did not have any effective opposition.
\textsuperscript{46} Klooster, for his part, defines it as: "... written for the purpose of cultivating love and esteem for the fatherland, by telling stories of common prosperity and adversity in the past from which the common fate of the nation through the ages must be evident. Once this common fate has been clearly demonstrated, the
As early as the 1880s, Propagandists like de los Santos,47 Paterno,48 Tavera,49 Palma,50 delos Reyes,51 and more notably, Rizal, 52 produced pioneering works which constituted the earliest formulation of the nationalist interpretation of Philippine history (Thomas 2002, 147-178; Schumacher 1979). Some of their works were notable for the fairly sophisticated methods (by the standard of the time) employed in the synthesis and/or analysis of data. Rizal's Annotations of Morga's Sucesos de Las Filipinas53 and Isabelo de los Reyes's El Folk-Lore Filipino54 are good examples. Palma's Historia de Filipinas (1935), which may be regarded as perhaps the best one-volume survey of history of the Philippines in the first five decades of the 20th century (Agoncillo 2003, 26), is another. While none was a trained historian, they laid the foundations upon which future efforts at 'modern' nationalist scholarship would be built.55

Indonesia would have to wait decades later for an at least nominally similar phenomena. Starting from the 1920s or 1930s, the germ of nationalist historiography was planted through the fictional writings or speeches of Yamin, Sukarno, Sanusi Pane and other nationalists (Klooster 1982, 54). The succeeding

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feeling of togetherness which emerges from it can be used also to safeguard unity in the future'(Klooster 1982, 48).

47 For an analysis of life and works of de los Santos see Agoncillo (2003).
48 For a rare scholarly analysis of Paterno's works, Reyes (2006).
49 For life and work of Tavera, see Ocampo, J. (1959).
50 For an appreciative assessment of the works of Palma, see Zaide (1974).
51 For a fascinating discussion of the career of Isabelo de los Reyes as a folklorist, see Anderson (2000).
52 There are perhaps hundreds of books and articles analysing Rizal and his works. For a one-volume comprehensive and yet penetrating treatment of Rizal's writings, see Quibuyen (1999). For article-length studies, see Ikehata (1968) and Quibuyen (1998). Anderson expressed astonishment with Rizal's writings, especially the two novels, Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo. In his view, Indonesia would have to wait more than half a century, with the advent of Pramoedya Ananta Toer on the literary scene, for a comparable example (Anderson 2004, 99).
53 For an in-depth analysis of this work, see Ocampo's "Rotten Beef and Stinking Fish: Rizal and the Writing of Philippine History" (1998).
54 See Anderson (2000) for an insightful analysis of this work.
55 One decided advantage of the Philippines was that, in the words of Anderson, it "was the only colony in the nineteenth-century Southeast Asia to have a real university..." (Anderson 2000, 61). This university was the University of Santo Tomas, run by the Dominicans, founded in 1611, starting conferring degrees in 1624 and became a university in 1645 ("History of the University of Santo Tomas," http://www.ust.edu.ph/sitelinks/insideust/geninfo/history.asp, accessed on 13 June 2006)
decades of the 1940s and 1950s saw the publication of historical works whose hagiographic, overly nationalistic character prompted some observers to regard these as pre-scientific in methods and in interpretations (Klooster 1982, 47; Notosusanto 1965, 2). Perhaps Djajadiningrat’s thesis in 1913 that critically re-assessed the sources pertaining to the history of Banten stands alone in the period prior to the Second World War for observing ‘modern’ historical methods. The theme of this thesis, however, was at best tangential to nationalist historiography. In other words, whereas Filipino historians as early as the pre-Second War War era already had a foundation to build upon, their Indonesian counterparts had almost nothing. They had to “start from scratch,” as Nugroho Notosusanto emphasized in 1965.

Historical studies following standard methods done by professionally trained Indonesian historians did not appear until after the establishment of history departments at the University of Indonesia (UI) and Gadjah Mada University (UGM) in 1950 and 1951, respectively (Sejarah FIB UI 2004; Kompas

56 See for example Yamin’s 6000 Tahun Sang Merah Putih (1951) [6000 Years of the Red-and-White], and Gadjah Mada: Pahlawan Persatuan Nusantara (1953) [Gadjah Mada: The Unifying Hero of the Nation].


58 He claims that whereas the fields of law, medicine and technology had already made progress in the earlier decades of the 20th century, history was different. “Our study of national history has never been running; it has just started to run” (Notosusanto 1965, 2). This observation is concurred with by Clifford Geertz’s report published in 1971 on the state of the social sciences in Indonesia. Geertz (1971, 2) noted that in the first twenty years of independence, the focus of skill-building efforts was economics. All other social sciences were neglected. The Dutch scholars, of course, had done a good deal of work on history (See Abdullah, 1975: 89-95) but the absence of institutional mechanism for transfer of knowledge, as in the case of the History Department in the University of the Philippines, left the pioneer Indonesian historians with not much to stand on.

2006) and after a number of Indonesians went abroad for graduate studies.\textsuperscript{60} In contrast, formal institutionalization of historical studies in the Philippines was accomplished much earlier, with the establishment of the Department of History at the University of the Philippines in 1910 (Apilado 1993, 90). Despite being the initial seat of colonial historiography, it was also there where nationalist historiography germinated, nurtured and bloomed fully later on.\textsuperscript{61}

Indonesia produced its first professional historian only in 1956, in the person of Sartono Kartodirdjo. He is widely believed to be the first to obtain a PhD in history;\textsuperscript{62} he received it in 1966 from the University of Amsterdam. By the time the history writing project, the SNI, was underway in the early 1970s, there were only four PhDs of history in Indonesia but only two were of consequence in so far as Indonesian history writing was concerned.\textsuperscript{63} Aside from Sartono, the other one was Taufik Abdullah who obtained his PhD from Cornell in 1970. The case of the Philippines was vastly different in that before the Second World War, several Filipinos had already obtained PhDs abroad and there were even a few who obtained theirs from a local university, the University of Santo Tomas (See Table 2.1).

\textsuperscript{60} Examples are Sartono Kartodirdjo who studied at Yale and Amsterdam, Taufik Abdullah at Cornell, Prof. Ongchokham also at Yale and the late Prof. Kuntowijoyo at Columbia.

\textsuperscript{61} Two of the most important products of UP History Department during the American period were Gregorio Zaide and Teodoro Agoncillo. The clerico-colonial-nationalist orientation of the former and the radical nationalist tendencies of the latter are symbolic of the range of ideological orientations Filipino historians of this period assumed. The presence in the department of an American historian who was sympathetic to the nationalist cause, Austin Craig, may have provided an impetus for the early growth of nationalist historiography within the strictures of the colonial framework.

\textsuperscript{62} It is a common knowledge among Indonesian historians that Sartono was the first to get a PhD in history. Lie Tek Tjeng, however, graduated from Harvard in 1962 with specialization in Japanese history. Perhaps because his area is not Indonesian history, he is often forgotten by other historians. In the list made by Sartono (1963) in 1963, Lie Tek Tjeng was not included.

\textsuperscript{63} The two others were Lie Tek Tjeng and Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro. The first finished his PhD (1962, Harvard) and wrote a dissertation about early modern Japanese history while the latter wrote about France-Poland relations in the 19th century (1968, Sorbonne). Abdullah (1975, 123, 156) These two are not particularly prominent within history, perhaps because their area of specialisation is not Indonesia. Lie Tek Tjeng did not take part in the SNI while M. D. Poesponegoro acted supposedly as one of the main editors. However, she served no more than a ceremonial function (to be discussed further in Chapter 5).
When the Department of History at the University of the Philippines opened in 1910, all members of the teaching staff were Americans. Two years later, the first Filipino historian, Conrado Benitez, was appointed. Progressively, more were appointed so that by 1920, all teachers in the Department were Filipinos, all with advanced degrees (or studying for them) from the Department or from abroad (Apilado 1993, 90-91).

Table 2.1
Filipino and Indonesian Historians

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<th>FILIPINO HISTORIANS</th>
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<td>PhD History (1933) - Stanford</td>
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<td>MA- Yale (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PhD History (1926) - Columbia U.</td>
<td></td>
<td>MA—Cornell (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benitez, Conrado (1889-1971)</td>
<td>MA Social Sciences (1911)</td>
<td>Ibrahim Alfian</td>
<td>BA- UGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ph D History (1951) - Harvard</td>
<td></td>
<td>MA- PhD - UGM (1980)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PhD Chicago (1915 or 1916)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Alzona, Encarnacion</td>
<td>MA History (1918) UP</td>
<td>Djoko Suryo (1939- )</td>
<td>BA (1965)- UGM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA History (1920) Harvard</td>
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<td>MA (1970)- UGM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PhD History (1922) Columbia</td>
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<td>PhD (1983)- Monash</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MA (1929) Uni. of Manila</td>
<td></td>
<td>MA (1974)- Hawaii</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PhD (UST)</td>
<td></td>
<td>PhD (1990)- UI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agoncillo, Teodoro</td>
<td>BA Philosophy (1934) UP</td>
<td>Nugroho Notoeustanto</td>
<td>BA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64 Initially, the Department of History was merged with Sociology and Economics. In 1917, they became autonomous units. (Churchill 1993, 11)
One indicator of the seriousness of the professionalisation effort was the opening of the MA in History program in 1916 (approved in 1915). By 1918, it had already produced graduates who would become important historians later on, such as Encarnacion Alzona and Nicolas Zafra (Apilado 1993). Teodoro Agoncillo and Gregorio Zaide, two of the biggest names in the Philippine history profession, were also products of the same program (See Table 2.1). Alzona went to the US to pursue PhD in Columbia University and she earned in 1922 the distinction for being the first Filipino woman with a PhD in history. She was well known for writing the critically acclaimed *History of Education in the Philippines* (1932) among other titles. She and Leandro Fernandez, who also did a PhD in Columbia and who wrote *The Philippine Republic* (1926), are considered to be the Filipino pioneers in employing ‘scientific’ history writing methods (Agoncillo 2003). The three others did not pursue further studies abroad but they nevertheless emerged among the

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81 According to Abdullah (1975, 123) the year he finished was 1961. I checked the Harvard library catalogue and it indicates 1962.
most prominent and important historians for the period 1940-1980s, overshadowing many of the foreign-trained historians. This seems to suggest the quality of training they received from the local institutions.

Again, the same thing cannot be said in the case of Indonesia. Most prominent Indonesian historians were trained abroad (at least partially), with the notable exception of Adrian Lapian\textsuperscript{82} (See Table 2.1). The local departments of history encountered difficulties in the professionalisation effort. A severe shortage of teachers plagued the two departments of history during the first decade of their existence; and the teachers were most mostly philologists and lawyers, not historians (Abdullah 1975, 123). According to Nugroho (1965, 3), both these departments were "on the brink of being closed (for) lack of teachers." Students complained about the lack of courses offered due to acute shortages of teachers. Some students who were initially interested in history moved to Archaeology and other courses because of the problem.\textsuperscript{83} While it was not as bad in the following decade, it was still bad enough to prompt Nugroho Notosusanto to complain in 1965 that the lack of professionally trained historians remained an acute and basic problem. He put the problem this way: "It has been a vicious circle: we want to train a great number of historians because we now have too few; and because we have too few at the present time, we cannot train new historians as quickly as we should like to do" (Notosusanto 1965, 2-3). In Sartono's (1963, 26) article surveying the state of history profession in Indonesia in the 1960s, he described it as "still in (its) infancy." The purge of leftist historians in the wake of 1965 events further shrank the pool of already limited intellectual resources (Djoko Suryo 2005). Local universities did not produce their first PhD in history until 1977, in the person of Nugroho Notosusanto himself. Progress was slow from that point on. By

\textsuperscript{82} Nugroho Notosusanto was also such an exce, but he studied for two years in SOAS, without getting a degree. Anhar Gonggong is another example. If his supervisor, Nugroho, had not died in 1985, he would have received the PhD then. He was instead conferred the degree in 1990.

\textsuperscript{83} That the history department at UI was struggling may be glimpsed from the account of Adrian Lapian (2005). He recalled that the department was almost non-existent then. Only through accident that he got to know of the 'existence' of the history program: when he read in a newspaper that Sartono Kartodirdjo would graduate as the first history major. See also Nugroho Notosusanto (1965, 3).
Nugroho’s count, by 1980 there were six PhDs in history in Indonesia (*Sinar Harapan* 1980c) while Abudullah put the number at ten84 (*Kompas* 1980b).

Professional organisations for historians were also established much earlier in the Philippines than in Indonesia. The Philippine National Historical Society (PNHS) was founded in 1941.85 A break-away group formed in 1955 another organization called the Philippine Historical Association (PHA). There has been both tacit and open competition between the two groups since then.86 Another group was formed in 1989 from among the members of the Department of History, University of the Philippines. It is called *Asosayson ng mga Dalubhasa at may Hilig sa Kasaysan* (ADHIKA) (Association of History Professionals and Enthusiasts). There were other small groups that were formed, but these three are the largest, the most active and/or the most established. In Indonesia, their lone counterpart, *Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia* (MSI) (Association of Historians of Indonesia), was founded in 1970.

A number of contrasts between these organizations should be noted. Whereas its Philippine counterparts were either less dependent on or practically independent of the government, the MSI relied on the government for its sustenance. The Philippine Historical Association may have had a fairly close relationship with the government. Since its inception in 1955, the President of the

84 It seems that Nugroho did not include Lie Tek Tjeng. The ones I can identify are only eight: Sartono Kartodirdjo (Amsterdam, 1966), Taufik Abdullah (Cornell 1970), Ongkhokham (Yale, 1975), Kuntowijoyo (Columbia, 1980), Nugroho (UI, 1977), Poesponegoro (Paris, 1968), Abraham Alfian (UGM, 1980) and Lie Tek Tjeng (Harvard, 1962).

85 Smaller, less known organisations preceded the PNHS such as the one founded by Felipe G. Calderon in 1905, the Asociación Histórica de Filipinas and the one established in 1916 or 1917 by Carlos Sobral and his group, the Sociedad Histórico-Geográfica de Filipinas (Bauzon 1993, 93).

86 For instance, when the Philippine Social Science Council initiated the Philippine Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Project, it was quite odd that history would be allotted two volumes, whereas other disciplines had one each. One version was done by members of the PHA (Volume 1) and the other, by PNHS (Volume 2).
Republic was invited as an honorary president of the organisation. However, the extent of its dependence on the state for sustenance was not as much as the MSI.

Whereas the MSI held national conferences, funded by the state, only occasionally (1957, 1970, 1981, 1985, 1991, 1996, and 2001) in the Philippines almost every year, the PNHS, PHA and ADHIKA hold their own national conferences aside from a number of regional ones. Most of these conferences were held with minimum financial support, if any, from the government. The bulk of the funding usually came from the registration and membership fees.

In both countries, the government established institutional infrastructures specifically for promoting historical consciousness. In the Philippines, the National Historical Institute (NHI) was founded in 1972. It traces its history, however, to the Philippine Historical Research and Markers Committee established in 1933, which in 1936 was superseded by the Philippine Historical Committee. The basic function of these committees focused on the identifying, marking and safe-keeping of historic sites and antiquities. In 1967 this committee was replaced by the National Historical Commission. Another re-organisation took place in 1972 to form the NHI whose function was not just the marking and preservation of historic sites but also the active promotion of history through education, public campaigns and research (Gealogo 1993, 95).

In Indonesia, there is the Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional (Directorate of History and Traditional Values) that is functionally similar to the NHI. Unlike in the Philippines, however, there are other government agencies that promote historical research and public awareness. These include the Armed Forces History

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88 Since 1978, PNHS has held a regular annual national conference, aside from regional conferences. Since 1958 when it held its first national conference, it held conferences regularly, not only national in scope but regional as well (De Ocampo 1975, 313). For instance, the five regional conferences in 1975 were held in Baguio, Cagayan de Oro, Tagloban and two in Manila (De Ocampo 1975, 324-330). In 1976, it was held in Dagupan, Lucena, Iloilo, Manila, Tuguegarao and Cebu (De Ocampo 1975, 317).
Centre, which does not have a parallel in the Philippines and a section of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences or LIPI (specifically the former National Institute of Economic and Social Research, LEKNAS, and National Institute of Cultural Studies, LRKN) (Abdullah 1975, 139). The Armed Forces History Centre, founded in 1964, is by far the most active and most productive history-related institution in Indonesia having published about 50 books by 1972 (Abdullah 1975, ibid.).

Conclusion

While the Philippines and Indonesia share some broad similarities, there have also been considerable differences. The differences are particularly pronounced in the impact of the colonial experience, state-civil society relations and the development of the historical profession. In preparation for the narrative and analysis in the succeeding chapters, a number of points ought to be highlighted. First, the contrasting patterns of colonial experience in the two countries prefigured forms of nationalism that were more fluid in the Philippines and hegemonic in Indonesia. Such forms of nationalisms simultaneously influenced and were reinforced or affected by the shapes of nationalist history writing in the two countries.

Second, the relationship between the state and civil society was far less constrained in the Philippines than in Indonesia. The polyvalent character of power relations in the former allowed a greater space for different interest groups to operate. While centralisation of power in an individual or an institution was the norm in postcolonial Indonesia, the reverse, to an extent, was the case in the Philippines. Marcos's dictatatorship appears anomalous within the Philippine political matrix. The longer tradition of political contestation made opposition easier to mobilise.

Third, the historical profession in the Philippines developed earlier and under a freer environment compared to that in Indonesia. By the time a strong, manipulative state emerged in the early 1970s with Marcos's declaration of martial law, the profession had already reached a relatively high level of advancement—
advancement that would be tested in the historians’ encounter with Marcos. Their Indonesian counterparts, on the other hand, had to develop under the aegis of a restrictive state from the Guided Democracy era up to the New Order. To this day, they struggle for professional respectability, something that its Philippine counterpart had already achieved decades back and which by the 1970s the historians already took for granted.

Finally, while the New Order was, on the whole, more authoritarian than the Marcos regime, and thus was in a stronger position to impose what it wanted, this seemed not to be the case in the early to mid 1970s when the two projects were undertaken. The two regimes were more or less on an equal footing.

The last two points are particularly salient. It is commonly assumed that there is an inverse relationship between the strength of the scholarship and the extent to which scholars may be influenced by political power. To the extent that scholarship is ‘scientific’ it is less manipulable. Observers of Indonesia, for instance, usually attribute the weaknesses of the historical profession to the strength of state manipulation. Historians were (and still are) seen as powerless in the face of societal and political pressures. As emphasised above, the strength of the two states was more or less comparable; it was in the level of advancement attained by the history profession that the two cases significantly differed. One may expect, therefore, that Filipino historians, given the level of their scholarly achievement, would fare significantly ‘better’ in their encounter with a political power holder. We shall see in the succeeding chapters if, or to what extent and in what ways, this view might be correct. Or, we shall find out if we need to rethink our assumptions and ask a more appropriate question.

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CHAPTER III

THE TADHANA PROJECT: THE MAKING

“Clio ... to thee, O Muse, has been vouchsafed the power to know the hearts of the gods and the ways by which things come to be.”

- Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica 3.15

When exactly the idea was conceived cannot be told for sure. But it was in an extemporaneous speech delivered in 1967 when Marcos declared in public perhaps for the first time his desire to write history (Marcos 1967). Before an audience of historians and history teachers, he articulated a wish to be able to do so once his stint in politics is over. It did not have to wait that long. Inspired by Churchill’s multi-volume A History of the English-Speaking Peoples (1956-58), he forged a partnership with a group of young Filipino scholars and embarked beginning in 1973-1974 on an ambitious project to write a multi-volume Philippine history. The purported aim was to write a ‘truly national’ and ‘genuinely Filipino’ history covering the earliest period (geologic times) up to the Martial Law years in the 1970s. In terms of scope, targeted output and financial and brainpower requirements, the project was as enormous as it was unprecedented. It stands out in the history of Philippine scholarship not only as the most ambitious, but easily the most controversial history-writing project ever undertaken.

1 By national, Marcos meant a history not just of the people in Luzon and Visayas who were under the sovereignty of the Spaniards but of all people in the archipelago. By genuinely Filipino, he meant “a history which is not distracted by the deluge of colonial intervention...” It is a “history concerned with the indigenous as a principle of assimilation and growth” (Marcos 1982a). (Note: It is relevant to mention that while this was published in 1982, it was originally a keynote address delivered at the Annual Seminar on History, sponsored by the Philippine Historical Association on 29 November 1976, just a few months after the first Tadhana volume was published).
In the context of post-colonial Southeast Asia, the Tadhana Project as a state-sponsored history-writing project is hardly unique. What lends it some distinction is the partnership between Marcos and the scholars that gave fruition to the project. The dynamics of their partnership, both the process and the output, provides an exemplary opportunity for exploring the intersection where politics and scholarship meet and constitute each other. Pertinent questions include: What was the condition—social, political, economic and intellectual—that made the partnership between Marcos and the scholars possible? How did the project take shape and unfold? How can we characterise the dynamics of the relationship between Marcos and the scholars? What insights can we derive from such characterisation? In addressing these questions, this chapter will, first, reconstruct the circumstances leading to the birth of the Tadhana Project. Second, it will identify and discuss the possible motivations that drove Marcos to initiate the project as well as the features of the project that enticed the scholars to participate in it. And finally, it will provide some snapshots of how the project actually ran with the aim of looking at the interaction between different actors.

**Genesis**

Amidst heightened awareness of the problems in Philippine historiography during Marcos's first term (1966-1969), an idea was floated among board members of the National Historical Commission to establish a commission to write Philippine history. This history was meant to correct 'errors' and expunge the existing narrative of its colonial hangover. Riding perhaps on the wave of reformist and progressive images he wanted to propagate, Marcos picked up the idea and initially sought the participation of the two biggest names in Philippine history then, Teodoro Agoncillo and Horacio de la Costa, to spearhead the project. The choice of these scholars with polar characteristics may be instructive of Marcos's evolving interest in history-writing. Agoncillo was a home-grown historian (read: did not study abroad) who gained fame through his books *Revolts of the Masses* (1956), *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (1960) and the very popular textbook *A
Short History of the Filipino People\textsuperscript{2} (1960) that had seen reprints and revisions (in the slightly different title of History of the Filipino People) even after he died in 1985. These books occupied a seminal position in promoting a radical anti-colonial form of nationalism that was brewing since the 1960s.\textsuperscript{3} He studied at public school through and through and dominated for decades, both by dint of personality and by strength of his scholarship, the country's most important department of History—that of University of the Philippines (UP) at Diliman. De la Costa, on the other hand, stood in stark contrast, ideologically and academically. He was a Jesuit who received a PhD from Harvard and he reigned over Ateneo's History Department for some time. He was well known for his book Jesuits in the Philippines, 1571-1768 (1961) as well as for the textbook popularly used in Catholic schools, Readings in Philippine History (1965). If Agoncillo was thoroughly secular, De la Costa was proudly sectarian. If Agoncillo promoted radical nationalist history, De la Costa championed what some would derisively call a 'clerical history'.

According to Agoncillo, Imelda Marcos approached him twice about joining the project. The first was in 1968 and the second was in 1971.\textsuperscript{4} He was reportedly offered generous financial support as well as freedom to decide the administration, structure and content of the project. On both occasions, he declined, mustering all the polite gestures and alibis he could think of.\textsuperscript{5} While he maintained a friendly

\textsuperscript{2} It had gone its 8\textsuperscript{th} revision in 1990, through the initiative of Agoncillo's family and through the combined effort of Agoncillo's former students and colleagues, Samuel Tan, Bernardita Churchill and Isagani Medina.

\textsuperscript{3} According to Ileto, the publication in 1956 of Agoncillo's Revolt of the Masses was a turning point in Bonifacio studies as well in the development of a discourse on "unfinished revolution." "...(I)t transgressed the proper meaning of the revolution at that time" and by doing so proved instrumental in altering the consciousness required for the student movement to take off. (Ileto 1998a, 185, 188-189).

\textsuperscript{4} Aside from Agoncillo's own testimony (See transcript of interview with Agoncillo published in Solidarity, March 1976 issue, and reprinted in Ocampo Talking History. Manila: DLSU Press,1995, hereafter referred to as Agoncillo 1976/1987), corroborating information was provided by Quiason who in my interview with him recalled that he was present (sometime in 1968) when Imelda Marcos was talking to Agoncillo and de la Costa about the President's desire to invite them to a history-writing project (Quiason 2004).

\textsuperscript{5} Agoncillo recalled of the first attempt, in 1968: "She (Imelda) told me that perhaps it was a good idea for me to write the history of the Philippines, from the Republic, July 4th 1946 when we became independent, to Marcos." Then Agoncillo replied, "...mahirap ito, Mam...(it's difficult, Ma'm) if I were to write, people will not believe me...because people will suspect that you paid me, and it will boomerang on you...And the President realized it was correct" (Agoncillo 1976/1987, 150-151). Regarding the second attempt, in 1971, Agoncillo quoted Imelda as saying that the Marcos Foundation has invested 10 million and "we don't know
stance towards the Marcoses, he seemed too conscious of the possible adverse consequences once he became an 'official historian' and this weighed heavy on his decision to turn down the overtures. In his words: "...the day I do that (write history for Marcos), finished, I am finished!" He said further that if he accepted the offer he would "not just be a fiction writer but a prostitute" (Agoncillo 1976/1987).

In the case of Horacio de la Costa, the number of times he was invited to the project cannot be established, but the earliest verifiable attempt was made in 1968. As late as June 1973, the Marcos couple was still trying to win his nod. Just as in the case of Agoncillo, however, they met no success. Their refusal to join the project was, among others, a testimony to the sharp political division in the Philippines during that time. On the other hand, that Marcos went a long way to convince the two to lead the project, offering generous support and promising unhampered movement, says a good deal about Marcos's evolving and complex motivations in pursuing a history-writing project. It cannot be easily assumed, as often is, that undiluted, naked politics was all there was. For if that was the case, why should he approach two people whose reputations make them difficult to influence or manipulate?

Not the type to give up easily, Marcos continued to seek people who could help him realise his dream history-writing project. Meanwhile, a project called the Filipino Heritage (FH) was underway. Under the stewardship of Alfredo Roces as the editor-in-chief, the Filipino Heritage (FH) was an initiative of the Hamlyn Group, an Australia-based publishing company. Conceived months before Martial Law was declared in September 1972, the Hamlyn Group entered into a partnership with the Manila Times, a leading daily newspaper. The original plan, according to

how to spend the interests. And so, perhaps a multi-volume history of the the Philippines could be financed out of the profits and we thought of you as the Editor-in-Chief. You can get the men you want and maybe there is money in this." In his attempt to get away, Agoncillo said that he was teaching at UP and was handling courses that no other professor could teach. Then, he said, Imelda realised that he didn't like the job and so she immediately changed the topic (Agoncillo 1976/1987, 149-150).

6 In the Marcos Diary, an entry on June 5, 1973 indicates that on that day Imelda and Ferdinand Marcos asked Fr. De la Costa to 'participate in a commission to write Philippine history'. As to his response, there was no mention.(see page 177, Volume 4).
Roces, was to produce 100 articles on Philippine history and culture. Well-known experts were to be commissioned to write these articles and these would be serialised in Manila Times for 100 weeks or two years. However, when almost all newspapers including the Manila Times were shut down in the wake of the declaration of Martial Law on 21 September 1972, the project was repackaged into a ten-volume opus with public schools as one of the projected markets. Given the altered political landscape, the FH team had to ask for an official approval from the Malacanang. As part of their effort, they sought an audience with the President to present the initial outputs of the on-going Project.7 Marcos was reported to have exploded in rage upon seeing someone surnamed Roces heading the list of editorial board members and advisers. Apparently, Marcos’s furious reaction relates well to his widely known loathing for his staunch critic Joaquin ‘Chino’ Roces, the owner-editor-in-chief of the Manila Times. He might have mistaken Alfredo Roces for Joaquin ‘Chino’ Roces who were in fact first cousins. Or Marcos simply could not trust any of the Roceses who just like the Lopezes he might have considered among his enemies. Not long after the incident, the head of the Hamlyn operation in the Philippines, Kevin Weldon, received a letter from the Malacanang Palace. Juan Tuvera, the Presidential Assistant, signed the letter which stated that Marcos would take over the position of editor-in-chief from Alfredo Roces. In addition, the FH manuscripts should be submitted to Malacanang for evaluation. Despite Roces’s offer to give way so as to keep the economic viability of the project, Weldon did not budge under pressure from Malacanang. The FH manuscripts were submitted as per Malacanang’s instruction but after the negative appraisal came out a few weeks later, Weldon instructed Roces to pack the FH-related materials. In due time Roces found himself and his family in migratory flight to Sydney where (alongside with Singapore) he worked for the completion of the

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7 Alfredo Roces (2001) admitted that he can not be sure of the date when it happened, but he said it should be about two years after the start of the FH so the most likely estimate is 1974.
project. It eventually saw publication in 1978 (Roces 2004). But that is shooting well ahead of the story.

For a few weeks upon submission of the FH manuscripts, a group of scholars had been busy poring through the pages and preparing critical reviews of FH's scholarly worth. To this group belonged young, scholars who were from the University of the Philippines and whose PhDs (or Masters) were from prestigious universities in Europe and the United States. Leading the group was Serafin Quiason. He obtained a PhD in history from the University of Pennsylvania and was the director of the National Library from 1966 to 1986. Before taking a post at the National Library, he was a lecturer at the Department of History of the University of the Philippines. His stint in academe before working as bureaucrat prepared him for the role of intermediary between Marcos and the group of scholars who took part in the Project. He acted as the Assistant Project Director. Upon his shoulder fell the task of recruiting participants—a task in which he happily noted, he was allowed free rein (Quiason 2004).

Initially, he gathered around him four other scholars, all young assistant or associate professors at the University of the Philippines—Samuel Tan, Zeus Salazar, Alex Hufana, and Cesar Hidalgo. Together they constituted the group whose initial task was to review the FH manuscripts. As later events would have it, they would form the core group of the Tadhana Project. Like Quiason, Tan and Salazar were historians by training. Hufana, on the other hand, was a writer and Hidalgo a linguist. By the time Tan was initiated into the group sometime in 1973-74, he had just returned from Syracuse University armed with the latest multi-disciplinary approach to historical analysis. Salazar, on the other hand, had completed few years earlier a PhD at the Sorbonne in Paris. He trained in anthropology and history and he gained fluency in a number of European and

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8 Unless otherwise stated, the data for this paragraph were culled from a series of author's email exchanges with Alfredo Roces dated 11-12, 22 March 2004 (Roces 2004) and Nov. 19, 2001 (Roces 2001).

9 According to Romeo Cruz, he was asked by Quiason to join the project as early as 1973-74 but he had to beg off because he became the dean of the UP Clark. He could have been a member of the core group had he opted to join then. He eventually joined the project in 1980 (Cruz 1989, 200).
Austronesian languages, a feat rare for a Filipino scholar then as now. Hufana for his part was an accomplished, multi-awarded writer in English. He undertook Masters degree at Columbia University while Hidalgo obtained a PhD in linguistics from Georgetown University. Hidalgo's early departure in 1976 from the group set the stage for the entry into the core group of another scholar, Rodolfo Paras-Perez. He was an established painter and a premier art historian who trained at Harvard University for a PhD in art history. Like the rest, he was a lecturer at the University of the Philippines. The choice of people whose academic expertise and background varied was no accident. The intention was to produce history that was multi-dimensional - a kind of history that transcends the traditional, politics-focussed narrative. Bonds of friendship and other personal ties, however, also informed the choice of people to be invited as it was thought to enhance the quality of working relations (Tan 1993, 85). Tan, Salazar and Hufana, for instance, were all Quiason’s close friends. Hidalgo was a friend of Hufana as Tan and Paras-Perez of Salazar. In addition, Quiason was Salazar’s kumpare.10

The task of reviewing the FH manuscripts came as annoying or a bothersome puzzle to the group. It seemed there was no adequate understanding as to why they were doing it. Tan (2004a) recalls:

... I was actually surprised, I was reacting, “Bakit naman (why) we have to review this? We don’t have time...ang dami-daming folders na babasahin ...(so many folders to read)

For Salazar, he recalled rather vaguely that Marcos had to decide whether FH should be given official endorsement for use in the public schools, ostensibly its main target market, and Marcos needed a group of scholars to help him reach a decision. Salazar also believed that the group was formed precisely as a counterweight to FH (Salazar 2004a). Quiason for his part claimed he did not recall a project called Filipino Heritage (Quiason 2004). None in the group apparently knew that Marcos had the intention to wrest the editorship of the FH from Roces

10 Quiason stood as sponsor, or as godfather in the baptism of Salazar's eldest child.
and that they were tasked to evaluate the FH in preparation for a possible take-over. Based on their understanding, they were recruited to write history, not just evaluate or review it.

The verdict was not long in coming. It was decidedly unfavourable. One complaint, as recounted by Salazar, was that the perspective adopted was inappropriate – that it was not Filipino enough. It seemed bent on ‘pleasing the foreigners’ rather than demonstrating the ‘internal dynamics’ within the Philippines or among the Filipinos. Another complaint was the absence of unifying framework to tie all the articles written by various contributors together. In his words (Salazar 2004a):

...What we can see is the point of view of the foreigners. It seems that the objective was to please the foreigners. It’s like the Wow Philippines\textsuperscript{11}-type of mentality that we did not like. In addition, it lacked coherence! Filipino heritage? What heritage?! Snakes, birds, languages...There was no direction from which you can show pride in the Philippines! To whom do you show that we have the most poisonous snakes in the Philippines? The deepest...That’s not the way, because Philippines is not a geography. It’s a people.\textsuperscript{12}

One may ask what would have happened afterwards had the outcome of the reviews been more favourable. It can be surmised that one of the following scenarios was possible: there would have been no Tadhana for there was no need for an entirely new project. As FH would fall under the editorship of Marcos, with its framework already set and substantial progress already made in writing manuscripts, it was likely that only fairly limited changes, or additions, would be

\textsuperscript{11} Wow Philippines refers to the tourism program of the Macapagal Administration whose aim has been to attract tourists to the Philippines by exhibiting the supposedly unique and endearing characteristics of Filipino culture.

\textsuperscript{12} Salazar’s critique was a logical consequence of the problem of perspective he saw in many attempts to write Philippine history, including FH. His Pantayo perspective (to be discussed in greater detail later) made him dismissive of FH notwithstanding the fact that it also tried to operate within what may be called Filipino perspective (the various types of this perspective will be discussed in Chapter 6). In this sense, Salazar, in stating that the point of view adopted by FH was that of foreigners, may have exaggerated FH’s weakness. In my own assessment, FH’s more serious weakness, which Salazar also pointed out, was its lack of coherent, organizing framework. As admitted by Roces himself, the editor-in-chief, the FH was “presented not as continuous story but (as) a mosaic of diverse topics” (Roces, 1977, Introduction to Volume 1)
made to accommodate Marcos's interest. Another possibility was that Tadhana would have pushed through just the same, as people behind FH were firm in their resolve not to allow Marcos to take over the FH.

In hindsight, however, it may have been naïve to expect that FH could ever receive sympathetic reviews from the group of scholars tasked by Marcos to undertake the evaluation. There was a generational gap in the scholarly orientations of the major members of this group and that of the scholars who worked with the FH. The historians for instance who worked for the FH such as de la Costa, Agoncillo, and Corpus represented various streams in what some would dismissively call the ‘old schools’ in Philippine nationalist historiography. On the other hand, Salazar and Tan seemed eager to assume the role of Young Turks, brewing with new ideas and keen to offer alternative historiographic views and approaches to address what they saw as problems that had long bedeviled Philippine historiography.13 The outlet for their pent-up intellectual energy precisely came when Marcos broached the idea of a history-writing project. Between acting as editors or evaluators for an on-going history-writing project, on the one hand, and as trailblazers of the still uncharted historical terrain, on the other, the choice was obvious.

It was also possible that at some point the group got a hint that the review of FH was somehow related to a possible take-over of the project. In which case, there was even less a chance for a favourable review of FH. Given the group’s

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13 It is noteworthy that some of those who worked for FH also worked for Tadhana (e.g. Paras-Perez, Tan, Dery, among others). There is therefore an overlap in the composition of the teams that worked on the two projects (One of my anonymous thesis examiners should be acknowledged for pointing this out) I should clarify, however, that those who made considerable difference in the designs of the two projects belonged to two significantly different groups, in generational (established versus ‘Young Turks’) and in historiographic terms. Tan and Salazar defined the shape of Tadhana and they had a very different view of Philippine history as to be spelled out in Chapter 4. Tan may have been a contributor to FH, thus, constituting one of the overlaps, but his historiographic agenda—what matters to the analysis here—hardly figures in the overall scheme of FH. Paras-Perez was an Associate Editor in FH, and thus, contributed significantly to the design of FH, but having joined Tadhana rather late, he did not have as much impact on the original, overall design of Tadhana. Dery served as contributor to FH and research assistant in Tadhana that afforded him a fairly limited role in the overall design of the projects. In short, notwithstanding the overlap in the composition of the members, such overlap hardly mattered in defining the distinguishing characteristics of the two projects, or in smoothing the differences between them.
(Tadhana's core) avowed rationale for taking part in the Tadhana Project (see discussion on possible motivations below), it would better serve their interest to start a clean-slate project, a project that would afford them maximum freedom, rather than take over one whose parameters had already been defined more or less. This is particularly clear in Tan's wonderment as to why they 'wasted' time reviewing FH while he, for one, already had a clear idea how to proceed with the writing project. Like Salazar, he had a well-defined historiographic agenda (Tan 1976; Salazar 1974). It was just the opportunity to write that he was waiting for. Giving FH a favourable review might have been interpreted to mean a lesser opportunity for them to accomplish their objectives as Marcos might be enticed all the more to take over FH.

As Marcos lost interest in FH owing perhaps to Weldon's obstinate stance as well as to the group's patently negative appraisal of it, the way was paved for the birth of an entirely new project. This time, he was not content to act as a patron or a sponsor of a commission. Neither was he interested in merely becoming the editor-in-chief, as was the case for FH. He wanted no less than authorship, in fact, the sole authorship of the books. What initially started as a modest desire to help advance scholarship on Philippine history by sponsoring a commission to write it ended in an ambitious, others may call it delusional, appropriation of the role and the power of the scholars. The attempt to fuse knowledge and power was unmistakable.

Motivations

Marcos's desire to embark on a history-writing project emerged from a confluence of several factors. In popular imagination, however, what easily dominates is the perception that the project was part of Marcos' grand design to perpetuate himself in power, made possible by his declaration of Martial Law in September 1972. The timing of the project -- having taken off in 1974, not far

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14 One of the many scholars who share this view is Veneracion. According to him, what motivated Marcos to sponsor the Tadhana Project was his anxiety about his mortality and growing vulnerability in the midst of
removed from the time other books with a clear propaganda purpose appeared—tended to reinforce this view. Moreover, the trajectory of Philippine historical development as outlined in the *Tadhana* (see discussion on this in the next chapter) coincided almost perfectly with Marcos' interest to present Martial Law and the New Society it spawned as a natural or a necessary part of the evolutionary process in the development of the Filipino nation. The choice of the title *Tadhana* which means "destiny" says it all: that the Philippines was destined to see the rise of a New Society characterised by peace, prosperity and national pride. Not only that, much of the reform package offered to justify the declaration and maintenance of Martial Law was anchored on 'history concerned with the indigenous as a principle of assimilation and growth”—exactly the kind of history that the Tadhana was designed (Marcos 1982a, 6).

Notwithstanding all these considerations, however, the situation appears to be more complex. For one, Marcos was already toying with the idea of a history-writing project years before Martial Law was declared or seriously thought about, or long before his regime was seriously challenged by the radicals. His extemporaneous speech in 1967 shows him rather ambivalent as to whether he would in fact write history, similar to what Churchill did, but he was categorical about his 'wish' to do so at some point in time (Marcos 1967). His offer in 1968 to Agoncillo and de la Costa to spearhead the commission to write history, promising the unrestricted movement, also points to his early desire for a history-writing project. For another, an elaborate network of excuses backed by well-oiled propaganda machinery had been in place to address the need to rationalise Martial Law. A 19-volume history seemed too difficult, too time-consuming, too

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16 There are of course some who believe that even during Marcos's first term (1966-1969), he was already planning something to stay in power for long as he could. See for example De Quiros (1997, 42)

unwieldy and perhaps because of all these reasons not too effective a medium if the sole or primary purpose is justification of his continued stay in power. A political agenda was certainly there but there must be other factors to consider as well.

One other factor to consider is Marcos's deep personal interest in history. Practically all informants who had had a chance to engage with Marcos at close range have attested in glowing terms the keenness of his knowledge of and interest in history. As Tan (2004a) recalls:

... he was a very fantastic reader of history. I noticed that for a president, mapapahiya kayo sa questions nya (trans: you might get embarrassed with his questions). Like details about Genghis Khan... he is somebody you cannot tinker with your expertise kasi mapapahiya ka doon (trans.: because you might be embarrassed). He reads a lot. There were incidents that some of us were medyo mayabang (a bit haughty) only to find out, to admit in the end...

Quiason (2004) for his part has this to say:

...you can feel that his sense of history is very pronounced...he has read a lot of books, biographies of leaders...Sometimes he would regale us with the lives of these guys I never read about....Bismarck, Napoleon....and then war...war...the Pacific War, Europe during the war. He knew a lot about the Third Reich...He was at heart and mind a scholar-historian...The study of history was what interested him most and this was the main motivation behind his writing of Tadhana in which he shared his views on Philippine history, destiny and all that. He is a voracious reader whose prodigious memory was indisputable.

They all remembered, some of them with fondness, their nocturnal discussions about wide-ranging historical topics with Marcos - discussions that sometimes lasted until early in the morning. They all said that Marcos had a developed sense of history and that he exuded a deep respect for historians and the historical profession. Cynics would be quick to wonder how they could have easily allowed themselves to be captivated, or conned, by Marcos. Coming however from professionally trained historians, with PhDs at that, there could be something more than superficial impression in such observations.
A corollary to this was his awareness or appreciation of the usefulness of history for administrative purpose and, of course, for personal aggrandisement. Typical in his speeches, for instance, is a declaration like: "I am interested in history not only for the wisdom and the book learning it conveys, but also for its value as a basis for actual decision, policy-making and implementation" (Marcos 1973b, 3). While one might say that such a statement is no more than empty rhetoric common among Filipino politicians, informants have confirmed his voracious appetite for historical researches as part of routine decision- or policy-making process. He rationalised his penchant for this type of research by saying that the best advisers inhabit the pages of history who, because they were long dead, had no interest to protect or advance (Marcos 1982a, 13-14). While one expects that he would be less than forthright about history’s self-aggrandising function, he was candid enough to admit on one occasion that “it is sometimes convenient to be able to write down your own side of history.” This was after quoting Winston Churchill as saying: "If they won’t write history the way it should be written after making history, I will write history" (Marcos 1982a, 5). At the very least, Marcos was well aware of what history can do. As he said, referring to history, "...no matter what others say, the written word is still a powerful instrument and the pen is still mightier than the sword. Words will always be able to achieve what the bullet cannot" (Marcos 1982a, 26).

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18 For instance, one informant relates that before Marcos undertook a state visit to China in mid-late 1970s, she was tasked to undertake research on the technological contributions of China to world history as well as Chinese influences on the Philippines (See Boquiren 2004). Another recalls that he/she worked on the historical basis of claims on Sabah and the US bases agreement (Mangahas 2004). General Ileto related that in 1969 when he was Pittsburg-bound, he received instruction purportedly from Marcos himself to do research on Martial Law. He thought ‘This guy must be up to something.’ But I dismissed it then” (cited in de Quiros 1997, 295). Still other examples: Blas Ople was told to go to Soviet Union and among other things, make notes on the Soviet experience with authoritarian government, specifically, how the single-party system worked. Jose Almonte, for his part, was told to study how martial law was implemented in Pakistan. (De Quiros 1997, 338)

19 Chapter 5 of McCoy's book Closer than Brothers: Manhood at Philippine Military Academy includes an interesting discussion of the central role of a military historian, Colonel Uldarico Baclagon, and his historical work in Marcos’s success in perpetuating himself in power through Martial Law. While it seems to me that McCoy has exaggerated Baclagon’s importance, I think he rightly identified Baclagon’s contribution in constructing the matrix within which Marcos’s claims to heroism would be propagated and defended. For McCoy, his writing was “no mere matter of ‘rectification’, but was in fact the warp in the regime’s ideological fabric” (1999, 167). “By placing the imprimatur of a historian’s authority on (Marcos’s) claims, he strengthened Marcos’s grips on power” (1999, 178).
Still another possible factor is the perceived prestige that goes with authorship of a scholarly work. It seemed that Marcos was very much interested in promoting himself as an intellectual or as a scholarly president. An informant claimed that of few thousand copies of the first published volume of Tadhana, only about 500 circulated in the Philippines (Tan 2004a). The rest had been earmarked for distribution abroad, to be given as personal gifts from Marcos to ambassadors, heads of state and other high-ranking officials, friends and acquaintances whom he met in his fairly extensive travels abroad. He also seemed desirous of immortalising himself through the Project. As Tan quoted Marcos as saying in one of their meetings: “You know, after the end of my term, the people will forget everything that I have done, my infrastructures, etc...but the only thing that will last is this (showing a copy of the first printed volume of Tadhana)” (Tan 2004a).

Perhaps another side to Marcos’s apparent genuine interest in history was his anxiety about it. Marcos’ diaries contain passages that indicate his nagging sense of unease as to how he and his regime would be judged in history. An entry dated Oct. 8, 1970, for example, states (Marcos Diary, n.d., entry for 8 October 1970):

I often wonder what I will be remembered in history for. Scholar? Military hero? Builder? The new constitution? Reorganization of (the) government? Uniter of the variant and antagonistic elements of our people? He brought light to a dark country? Strong rallying point or a weak tyrant?

The diary also indicates that Marcos was fearful and distrustful of historians. After reading Bailey’s book Presidential Greatness which Marcos notes “explains the bias of historians and how they get it,” he concluded that “history should not be left to the historians,” (Marcos Diary, entry for 19 December 1971). This was corroborated by what Marcos declared in the 1967 speech whereby he rationalised his desire to write history by citing the need to correct what he thought to be erroneous and overly negative picture of him in the media. Perhaps Marcos was thinking that through the Tadhana, he would be able to ‘straighten’ what he
believed to be a distorted history perpetrated by his detractors, including historians some of whom he described as 'contentious' (Marcos 1982a, 1).

According to Adrian Cristobal, one of Marcos's closest aides and the one whom Marcos asked to write a memo that served as the germ of the Tadhana Project, the project was undertaken primarily as Marcos's vehicle to explain himself and the declaration of Martial Law to the Filipino people, not of the contemporary period, but a century hence. Given the highly fractious political sphere in the 1970s, Marcos knew full well, Cristobal avers, that the public would not take the project seriously. In a hundred years, so Marcos believed, people would already be far removed from the political contentiousness of the 1970s and they would be in better position to judge without bias whether what he did was right or wrong (Cristobal 2005).

Still another possible factor is Marcos's sense of nationalism. Marcos routinely utilised nationalist tropes to serve his personal agenda and so cynics would be justified in doubting the sincerity of his nationalism. However, for many in his generation who grew up "in a period which took special delight in the culture and history of other country" and consequently developed a "sense of alienation from (their) country's past," at least some of them probably longed for redemption from such a "crisis of identity" (Marcos 1976b, ii). Marcos may be one of them. The truth is, even if we grant that Marcos was not one of them, succeeding generations were well aware of such a crisis of identity and their commanding presence called for a kind of history that would address such a crisis. In other words, there was a fairly broad constituency to whom the writing of a 'truly' nationalist history would appeal, and Marcos was quick to respond.

On the part of scholars who took part in the Project, their motivations varied depending on their academic standing and personal circumstances at that time. Tan and Salazar claimed that what attracted them to the project was the opportunity to do what they loved doing — scholarship — under an atmosphere
unhampered by day-to-day concerns. Both of them had a rather well-defined historiographic agenda the opportunity for realising these they saw in the Project. Tan, for instance, wanted to address the long-standing neglect of the Muslims and other cultural communities in a traditional historical narrative which, almost without exception, were badly skewed towards the numerically dominant Christian populace. He had particular interest in demonstrating the interaction between the ‘great’ traditions of Christianity and Islam, on the one hand, and the ‘small’ traditions of the tribal groups on the other. Furthermore, as a reaction to the predominance of descriptive political history, he wanted to inject into historical narrative a multi-disciplinary analytical approach whereby, as appropriate, the analytic tools of the social sciences were woven into historical narrative (Tan 2004a). This he believed would enable him to emphasise the dynamism of history as counterpoint to the rather static images that gathered around traditional historical approaches.

Salazar, on the other hand, wanted to develop a more holistic, or complete picture of the Philippine history. This was understandable in the context of seriously inadequate historical scholarship that ‘silenced’ various periods, notably the centuries spanning the pre-hispanic era and the first 200-250 years of Spain in the Philippines. Asked if it did not bother him to work for Marcos who was despised by many, he put it strongly in these words (Salazar 2004b):

If I’d be offered by anyone—even by a criminal—a whole institute to allow me to write my history [referring to complete Philippine history], I’d accept. I wouldn’t mind even if he’s a criminal. The important thing is that I be able to do it. After all this is more important than one single individual. So for me there’s no moral issues here because one of the attainments of historiography is that you no longer judge in moral terms.  

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[20] In his own words: “...kung bibigyan ako ng isang buong institute upang masulat ko ang aking kasaysayan, mamamatay tao man ang magbigay sa akin... wala akong pakialam sa kanya. Ang importante maisulat ko ito. After all, this is more important than one single individual. So wala akong moral issues involved dito because one of the attainments of historiography is hindi ka na naghahusga..."
Salazar also wished to employ and experiment with new perspectives aimed at correcting the long-standing approaches heavily tinged with a colonial hangover. That Salazar and Tan had in fact succeeded in pushing their agenda can be seen in the framework that underpins the whole project. Through their combined effort that the original outline of the Project was drawn (Tan 1993, 86). After the outline was drafted, it was discussed by the group and was presented to Marcos for discussion. As Quiason said, Marcos accepted it without asking for revision. In Quiason’s words, “Marcos swallowed it hook, line and sinker” (Quiason 2004). Not long after, in 1976, it was circulated in public as a 62-page pamphlet simply entitled *The Tadhana Outline* (Marcos 1976c).

The nationalist packaging of the project certainly made it attractive. It was in fact the upsurging of Filipino nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, with its meanings and defining parameters no doubt contested, that provided a pliable template upon which Marcos’s partnership with the scholars materialised. Marcos was bound to strike very sympathetic chords not only among increasing numbers of scholars but common people as well when, in justifying the Tadhana Project, he declared: “The need to refresh one’s perspectives on the past is particularly acute for a people whose written history is mainly the legacy of nation, or nations that once subjugated them” (Marcos 1982a, 3). Salazar recalled that when Quiason approached him and invited him to the project, the latter described it as a ‘very important, nationalist undertaking’.21 Cruz who joined the project much later in 1980 echoed the same words as Quiason’s time-tested bait to entice potential prospects. Cruz added that one thing that lured him to the Project was the impressive manner by which topics which were seemingly difficult to situate within a nationalistic framework (such as geological issues, pre-hispanic period) have in fact been successfully interpreted along this line. He cited as an example, the chapter on *Adam in the Philippines* (Cruz 1989). Paras-Perez, for his part, while

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21 As Quiason was quoted by Salazar as saying: “napakainportante nito...ang gagawin natin ay makabayang gawain. Bibirahin natin ang mga Australyano...” [trans.: “this is very important...what we shall do is a nationalist undertaking. We will hit back at the Australians...”, the latter refers to the Australian-funded *Filipino Heritage Project*. See Zeus Salazar (1989).
similarly attracted to the nationalist intent of the project, felt disturbed by the overly politico-economic conceptualisation of nationalism that informed much of the Philippine nationalist history. He bewailed the common practice of treating culture like an appendix to the politics-centred narrative, if included at all. In joining the project, he felt he was being given an opportunity to help correct the imbalance. Specifically, he was interested in showing the centrality of culture and in weaving into historical narrative the cultural, values-centred aspects of the development of Filipino nation (Paras-Perez 2004).

Another factor was compensation. Whether this carried heavy weight in their decision to participate, however, depended much on their personal circumstances during that time. For someone like Paras-Perez who already had a name as an established artist (painter) and thus had a reliable source of decent income, it was easy to be cavalier in attitude toward compensation.22 Others, however, were not as fortunate. Those who served auxiliary functions such as research assistants and part-timers, readily admitted that the compensation package was an attraction. Dery, for instance, claimed to have received from the Project a salary which was more than double of his salary as Instructor at the UP Baguio. He claimed to have received 2,500 pesos per month from the Project as a research assistant, compared with 900-1000 pesos as an Instructor at UP. Without his work at the Project, he claimed, it would have been much more difficult to accumulate savings that enabled him to pursue doctoral studies while at the same time providing for the needs of his family. He admitted he owed much to his participation in Tadhana (Dery 2004).

Another participant who worked briefly on the project attested that what he received from the Project as honorarium (around 600 pesos) for editing a ‘badly written chapter’ was a substantial addition to his salary of about 1,500 pesos per

22 Paras-Perez as-a-matter-of-factly stated that he already had a name, and a career as an artist and so he did not have a need for high salaries to be attracted to join the project. He related that in fact, when Salazar asked him how much salary he wanted just for him to accept the invitation, he casually asked his assistant how much should he charged and he said in jest that his assistant sold him cheaply (Paras-Perez 2004).
month as Asst. Professor at UP. He said he was very happy to have been paid well for that piece of work and he believed that “for most of those who took part in the project, the pay was the big attraction” (Ileto 2004).

In talking about salaries, core members such as Tan, Quiason and Salazar invariably took a different view from that of minor players. If the latter happily emphasised the substantial difference, the former tended to downplay the financial factor in the project, underscoring that the difference between UP pay and that of Tadhana hovered “only” at around 20-30% (Quiazon 2004; Tan 2004a; Salazar 2004a). In the absence of exact figures, which they refused to give, this is not easy to verify. It is very likely however that they were being modest about it. If Dery’s claim was true—that he was getting more than twice his UP salary—those who occupied more senior positions such as Salazar and Tan were probably getting at least proportionately as much. Given that a UP Asst. Professor was getting P1,500/month, and an Assoc. Professor about P2,000/month, it seems unlikely that the senior researchers were getting only P2,000 to P2,600 (following the 20-30% differential claimed by Tan, et al) while Dery who was only a research assistant received P2,500. On the other hand, even if what they claimed was accurate, the difference could still be substantial considering that they received fringe benefits such as travels abroad to gather materials to which they were the only ones entitled as members of the core group.

The attitude of Tan et al can best be understood in the context of widespread rumour that they had received handsome amounts of money just to join the project, a claim they all summarily rejected. In jest, laughing heartily, Tan said “How I wished I got that much!” Then rhetorically he asked, “If that was true, how come I was driving a car handed down to me by my brother?” (Tan 2004a). Salazar’s retort was more stinging. He said that those who were spreading the rumour, as well as those who believed in it, were perhaps thinking of themselves, “they are too inferior...they would accept it because of the money. (For) they would not be asked otherwise...” (Salazar 2004a).
Still another attraction was the opportunity provided by the project for professional or academic advancement specifically access to valuable historical documents. For young historians such as Rowena Boquiren, a fresh graduate in history, and Luis Dery, a PhD student, being able to gather data while having gainful employment was an opportunity one can hardly refuse (Boquiren 2004; Dery 2004).

Finally, a variety of pragmatic reasons also played a part. Salazar for example candidly admitted that Quiason convinced him to join the project by saying, among other things, that participating might pave the way for rescinding the travel ban imposed upon him by the Martial Law regime (Salazar 1989). This ban, alongside detention, Salazar claimed was a penalty for mocking or criticising Marcos’s book *Today's Revolution: Democracy* (Salazar 2004a). He was incarcerated for three months and was released through the help of a friend, Leticia Ramos Shahani who was Gen. Fidel Ramos’ sister. It was Ramos, one of the main implementers of Martial Law as the Philippine Constabulary Chief, who worked for his release. His release, however, carried a condition that he was not to leave the country, nor the vicinity of Metro Manila. This prevented him from accepting invitations for conferences or fellowships abroad, which irritated him considerably as he had, among others, a standing offer from the French government. His desire to regain his freedom of movement proved strong enough that any opportunity to restore it was enticing.

Fe Mangahas, for her part, was a breadwinner. She had a child to feed and a husband who, because of his painful experience in jail during Martial Law, could

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23 In a separate interview, Salazar offered a different story. According to this version, he was arrested not for mocking Marcos' book but as a consequence of widespread arrests by the military upon the implementation of Martial Law in September 1972. Gaerlan (1998, 255-6) citing the interview with Salazar by his students, Bernadette Abrera, Elena Gonzales and Suzette Lopez, the text is appended to their unpublished paper, *Ang Kasaysayan ng Departamento ng Kasaysayan ng Pamantasan ng Pilipinas, 1963-1986* (1988).[The History of Department of History of the University of the Philippines, 1963-1986]

24 Tatad's version as cited in De Quiros's *Dead Aim* (1997, 332) is quite different. According to this version, friends of Salazar approached Tatad and he briefly discussed with Marcos the circumstances surrounding Salazar’s arrest and detention. Upon being informed of the rather amusing grounds for Salazar’s arrest, Marcos ‘magnanimously’ ordered his release.
not work and had to be taken care of. She too was detained for involvement in political activism and her release carried the condition that she should work for a government agency (Mangahas 2004). For a lecturer in history whose chance of getting a teaching job anywhere was slim, a job with a history-writing project with a good salary proved irresistible.

In sum, the partnership between Marcos and the scholars was made possible and was sustained by mutual needs—economic, political, intellectual, even psychological—they had for each other. It was nurtured by the rising wave of nationalism that engulfed the atmosphere in 1960s and 70s. To understand this partnership, its products and its implications more deeply, we shall look into various aspects of the project as it unfolded.

**Dynamics**

After the outline has been completed and approved, the members of the core group divided the tasks. For practical reasons, the group initially focused their effort on Vol. II covering the periods from 1565 to 1896. They figured out that they had as yet insufficient resources to tackle Vol. I (Geologic times up to early 1500s) whereas they had enough for Volume II. So Salazar was assigned to Part I (Encounter) encompassing the period 1565-1663. Part II (Reaction) covering the period 1663-1765 was given to Hidalgo, whose early departure from the group in 1976 paved the way for the entry of Paras-Peres. Part III (Transition) which spans the period 1766-1815 was assigned to Hufana. Part IV (Transformation) was allotted to Quiason while Part V (1872-1896) was the responsibility of Tan. This will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.

Each of the core members was assisted by two or three research assistants—usually graduate students—whose tasks included scouring for books and documents in the archives as well as, in certain instances, writing manuscripts. There were also those who worked on a part-time, per project basis. They were hired on the basis of their specific expertise. It was on this account that the likes of Ben Austria who did a PhD in Geology at Harvard and Reynaldo Ileto, who
studied at Cornell, were invited. The composition of the group was fluid at most times wherein some people were hired, stayed for only few months and then disappeared, to be replaced by new hires or none at all.

From a formal administrative viewpoint, the Project was under the jurisdiction of the National Library, then under the directorship of Serafin Quiason. It was classified as a ‘Special Research Project.’ According to Tan, the Project was in effect a special research arm of Marcos, a description with which Quiason did not concur (Tan 2004a). The group was assigned the top floor, 5th floor, for their workplace where almost every working day for about 11-12 years (1974 to 1985), the Project gradually took shape. Every morning, there was a shuttle service that ferried the participants from their abode at UP-Diliman and elsewhere to the heart of Manila where the National Library was (and still is) located. At the end of the day, sometimes extending to the early hours of the morning, the same shuttle service brought them back to their residences.

The importance Marcos attached to the Project can be clearly seen in the quality and quantity of resources he made available to ‘his’ researchers. Informants described with nostalgia the working environment as ‘ideal’. The group was provided with efficient clerical and technical staff who allowed the group to concentrate on their scholarly pursuits. All the materials in the National Library were made available to the group and staff were specifically tasked to bring in whatever they needed from the collection. They also did not have to do typing, one thing very much appreciated by the participants. Once a handwritten manuscript was completed, they just gave it to the typists and on the following morning, or in the afternoon of the same day, it is on the desk ready for editing. Even when some required materials were found only in other libraries or institutions, and access to them was not normally easy, they said it took only one call from Malacanang (by Tuvera) to facilitate release and delivery of such materials to the workplace (Tan 2004).

25 Quiason did not concur with Tan on this point. For him, the Project was under the National Library and thus was not Marcos’s special research arm (Quiason 2004).
As echoed by one informant, there was nothing like that in his experience as a scholar in the Philippines. In his words (Salazar 2004a):

For the first time in my life, I could read the entire day, write the entire day and have one or two assistants and a typist. *Sino bang historiador sa Pilipinas ang mayroong ganyan. Sa Alemanya, kahit isang istupidong historiador na naging propesor sa isang unibersidad, merong ganyan. Sa Pilipinas (kahit magaling ka), wala.* (Who among historians in the Philippines have experienced that? In Germany, even a stupid historian who became a professor in a university enjoyed such amenities. In the Philippines, even if you're good, none!)

He added that he had a taste of such an ideal working environment only when he was invited as Visiting Researcher at the Australian National University way back in the 1980s.

Reinforcing the 'ideal' working environment was the almost unlimited financial support for expeditions to gather data abroad. This allowed the Project to amass an impressive collection of documents, pictures and other historical materials hitherto unavailable in the Philippines. Dery describes the collection in following terms (Dery 2004):

How impressive the Tadhana collections were!! Rare microfilms of William Howard Taft Papers, Alexander Robertson Papers!...It was really well-funded! 3-4 times they (members of the core group) went abroad...to gather materials. We had complete photocopies of dissertations about the Philippines that were not available in local libraries...everything was latest...Even before Gate's *Schoolbooks and Krags* and Lynn’s *US Army in the Philippines* were published, we had already used them! The documentation was massive...however, because they did not install an airconditioning system in the National Library, those microfilms ‘melted’ and were rendered useless! What a waste! It cost millions! Just imagine one set of William Howard Taft Papers, how many hundreds of reels were that? There were probably 600 reels...²⁶

²⁶ In Dery’s exact words: “...Ang ganda ng collection ng Tadhana, mga rare na mga microfilms, complete ng William Howard Taft Papers, Alexander Robertson Papers...Talagang ginastusan! 3-4 times...nag-a-abroad yong mga (members ng core group)...para kumuhang mga dokumento...Kompleto ang mga xerox ng dissertations about the Philippines na hindi available sa library (dito sa Pilipinas)...latest lahat ...Hindi pa napa-published ang *Schoolbooks and Krags* ni Gates, yong kay Lynn(?!) *US Army in the Philippines,* ginamit na namin yon...massive ang documentations...kaya lang hindi ipina-aircon ang National Library kaya hayon, nagkadikit dikit ang mga microfilms...sayang yon. Milyon ang halaga non! Isipin mo na lang...
Tan attested that Marcos did not seem to entertain second thoughts in approving their proposal to visit archives and libraries in Europe and the United States to collect relevant materials. The decision quickly came down only after a few days (Tan 2004a). Marcos’s full support was apparent not only in quick approval of the proposal but also in the fact that no limit was set on the amount of money that they could spend in buying these materials. As Tan happily recounted, so long as the materials were deemed useful, there was no question about the cost (Tan 2004a). Considering Marcos’s well-known tendency to be stingy, the generous provisions he allowed the scholars was a testament to the importance he attached to the Project. Perhaps, such amenities for historical research remain unequalled in the history of Philippine historical scholarship up to the present. It is no wonder then that Tan described the provisions as the “(t)he most rewarding part of the project” (Tan 2004a).

How much of the contents of Tadhana could be attributed to Marcos is not easy to determine. The problem is made even more daunting by the fact that someone did editing (some say ‘just’ style editing) for Marcos, Juan Tuvera, the Executive Secretary/Presidential Assistant.27 Tuvera stood as the overall Project Director. He was the only one trusted to edit, as he had a very intimate knowledge of Marcos’s writing style, among other things. Through his consummate hand passed all the manuscripts before they were given to Marcos for final scrutiny before publication. If asked, the four core members—Tan, Salazar, Quiason and Paras-Perez—unanimously declared in the strongest term that Marcos did not have anything to do with the substantive content of the Project. It was only on two occasions, so Salazar (1989, 199) claimed, that Marcos intervened and such intervention involved alteration or inclusion of very minor details. He accommodated Marcos’s request, Salazar recalled, just to humour him and also his own self. Tan for his part concurred with Salazar’s view. In his words: “Marcos

27 At a certain point in Tuvera’s service to Marcos, he was the Executive Secretary. At another time, the Presidential Assistant.
did not influence Tadhana, ideologically or theoretically. The only participation he had was when he read the manuscripts and ...had marginal notes... and questions asked. But more on factual parts of history...” (Tan 2004a). He even boldly claimed that “(i)n fact it was the other way around...the Tadhaha (was) the one that shaped Marcos views of history... and later on his perception of future itself...”28 (Tan 2004b).

Notwithstanding the strong protestations of Tan, Quiason, Salazar and Paras-Perez that Marcos did not intervene in the Project, there are indications to the contrary. Fe Mangahas, a research assistant who was asked to write about the Marcos’s years 1966-1972, attested that she was told to revise her manuscript, the contents of which apparently did not sit well with Marcos’s interest. As she recounted the incident (Mangahas 2004):

...one day, ... somebody from Malacanang and Dr. Quiason asked me to join them in a closed-door meeting. I saw the manuscript...somebody from Malacanang whose name I cannot recall but he came from the office of Tuvera, sabi niya (he said) the problem with my contribution was with perspective. According to him, Marcos did not like the idea of all voices speaking and one of these is his voice, and at the end somebody—the writer—makes conclusion he did not agree with. Sabi niya (He said) if I could revise and make it one voice and which the president speaks...I said ‘I cannot do that because that’s the way it happened! ...But sabi nya (he said), “But this is a history of Filipino people by Ferdinand Marcos, the author is Marcos!... I think what he (Marcos) didn’t like was, pag left ang nagsasalita, medyo sympathetic ako (if the one speaking is the left, I was a bit sympathetic)...pag siya, sini-center ko siya nang kaunti (if he, I put him towards the center) . Pag rightist naman, hindi naman ako sympathetic kasi nakikita ko naman talaga ang kanilang color. (if the rightists, I wasn’t sympathetic because I can easily their see true color) It wasn’t that bad dahil hindi ko naman siya completely in-identify here at lalo namang hindi dito. (It wasn’t that bad because I neither completely identified him here, nor there. [Hand gestures pointing to the left and the right, meaning the leftists and the rightists, respectively]).”

28 Such a confident declaration seems not totally unwarranted. The influence of the Tadhana framework is manifest for instance in Marcos’s book Introduction to the Politics of Transition (1978b). Compared with the framework of history laid out by Marcos in the diary (entry for 17 February 1973) before the Tadhana Project took shape, the difference was very clear in that this followed the traditional periodisation (pre-hispanic, Spanish-, American and independence period).
Dr. Quiason, relates Mangahas further, asked her if she was willing to revise and the latter’s response was “Sir, if you can get somebody to re-write it, please just have it re-written.” The impasse was resolved when Dr. Quiason said to the man from Malacanang not to worry, that he would fix the problem (Mangahas 2004).

There are a number of things worth noting in this incident. First, that despite maximum level of freedom Marcos allowed the scholars to do as they pleased, when it came to certain historical question or a period that was utmost in his political design, he would really insist to have his way. Second, that Mangahas could say no, at the risk of losing her job which was very dear to her considering that she was the breadwinner, bespoke array of possibilities but these certainly included her sense of responsibility to uphold measures of historical methodology. She in a sense “spoke truth to power.” Third, that Quiason did not pressure her, despite his avowed duty as the Deputy Director of the Project to uphold or represent Marcos’s interest, could also mean a lot of things but one possibility was that being a scholar himself, he shared with Mangahas an understanding of the historical context that served pretext for Mangahas’s defiance and he did not dare cross the line of such an understanding.

Even Salazar, who on several occasions strongly affirmed that Marcos did not have anything to do with the content of the Tadhana, did in fact admit that Marcos on at least one occasion explicitly showed desire to influence its shape. He claimed that they were given instruction to emphasize the negative images of the Catholic church and such an instruction was reversed when there was a thaw in

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29 Her exact words: “Sir, kung may makukuha kayong mag-rire-write, pa-rewrite nyo na lang.”

30 She related that her husband, like she, was an activist and they were both incarcerated in the wake of crackdowns on activism that accompanied declaration of Martial Law. Upon release, one of the conditions set by the government was that she should work for a government agency. Her husband, on the other hand, sustained injuries, both physical and psychological, as consequence of incarceration. He could not work upon release. Fe Mangahas, therefore, had to earn a living for the family (Mangahas 2004).
the icy relationship between Marcos and the then Cardinal Sin. In Salazar's words (Salazar 2004b):

He anticipated the church's resistance. He seemed bent on attacking the church during that time, and we too were recruited for that. For a while in the first volume that I and others were writing, the emphasis was on the abuses and irregularities of the friars. But after a while, Sin ___ (garbled) and showed friendly gestures towards Marcos. You will see that in the history between 1975 and 1979. When Sin mellowed, that was when we were advised to tone down...that's what's political, which I did.32

The overall progress of the Project turned out to be slow. By 1980 only four volumes had been published. These were Part I Vol. 1 (Archipelagic Genesis, 1980) and Part II Volume 1 ( Encounter, 1976), Volume 2 (Reaction, 1978) and Volume 3 (Transition, 1979). Cruz claimed that much progress had already been accomplished in the remaining volumes (Parts III and IV, books 11-19) and the manuscripts had been submitted to Tuvera for editing (Cruz 1980, 201). But it was Tuvera and Marcos, as Quiason (2004) attested, who proved to be the bottleneck.

Tuvera's duties as Executive Secretary/Presidential Assistant were simply too much, Quiason averred, that he hardly had time to devote for editing the manuscripts (Quiason 2004). Asked why Marcos did not employ somebody to help Tuvera, Quiason said he was the only one trusted by Marcos (Quiason 2004). To compound the problem, Marcos was already getting ill starting in the early 1980s and it could only mean further delays to the Project. That no more than four of the originally planned volumes saw print despite the fact that the drafts of most

31 Cardinal Sin occupied the highest position in the hierarchy of the Catholic church in the Philippines. He was well-known for, among other things, his active involvement in politics. He was a staunch critic of Marcos.
32 Salazar's exact words (2004a): "... Na-anticipate niya ang resistance ng simbahan. Medyo gusto niya na birahin ang simbahan at that time, and we were also recruited for that......for a while, yong first volume na sinulat ko at sinusulat ng iba, ang emphasis doon sa kabulastugan ng mga praile. Pero after a while, nag-____ (garbled) si Sin, eh. At medyo nakipag-kaibigan kay Macoy. You will see that in the history between 1975 and 1979. Noong umano na si Sin, eh di we were advised to tone down...yan ang may pulitika, which I did.
33 Cruz (1989) claims that the manuscripts for book numbers 11-19 have been completed and he contributed significantly to the writing of all these except books 14 & 18.
other books had already been written (Cruz 1989), indicated that Marcos would not allow publication without sufficient scrutiny by Tuvera and himself.

Realising the improbability of completing the 19 volumes, Marcos asked the group to produce a two-volume abridgement. The first volume covered the period up to 1896 and the other one spanned the period from 1897 to the Marcos years in the early 1980s. As Tan related, the team set aside their work on the still unfinished volumes and to concentrate on the abridgement. They merely summarised, he said, what was already written to come up with the abridged versions (Tan 2004a). The first volume was published in 1982 and the other one was almost ready for publication when the EDSA Revolution in 1986 swept the Project away. The second volume never saw print, and the loss of the manuscript has been a source of deep bewilderment and amusement among those who were involved in the Project. Piecemeal and sometimes contradictory accounts of the whereabouts of the manuscript in the last days of the Marcos regime circulate. According to Tan (2004a), the page proofs were given to Tuvera for Marcos' final approval. In turn, Tuvera turned it over to National Media Production Center (NMPC), the printing arm of the government. Quiason, for his part, claimed that it was in the office of Tuvera in Malacanang which was reported to have been ransacked by anti-Marcos elements in the dying days of the Marcos regime (Quiason 2004). Mangahas, on the other hand, claimed that she went to the NMPC office after the EDSA event and asked the clerical staff about whereabouts of the page or galley proof of the manuscript, but the staff said they did not have an idea (Mangahas 2004).

Questions arise as to the original agreement regarding the disclosure of the role of the scholars. According to Tan, there was in fact an intention to acknowledge and publicise the names of scholars, but it was to be done in the last volume completing the project. Since the events at EDSA took over and swept the still unfinished project away, there was simply no opportunity to do so (Tan 2004a; Quiason 2004). It raises another question, however, why wait until the project was
completed. Tan's explanation leaves one wondering if there was indeed such an intention. According to him, as the composition of the group was fluid, acknowledging the scholars before the project was finished might cause a problem of inaccuracy in acknowledging all the individual contributions. Why should that be the case is not clear, considering that the volumes appeared one after another and the group knew very well who and to what extent each participant had contributed to the work on each volume. If there was indeed an intention to reveal the identity of the researchers, it would better seem to do so as each volume appeared, for the problem of inaccuracy would loom much larger if they waited for the completion of the entire project. This is due to the difficulty of accurately keeping track of the contributions of various participants within the span of ten years or more.

The more intriguing question is why Marcos installed himself as the author while he could have opted to serve as the editor, or just a patron. It is a puzzle even to those who participated. If his primary intention was to provide a 'scholarly' justification for his hold on power, the project would have been more credible and effective had he stayed on the sidelines and let the scholars carry their by-lines. To recall, couched in the offer extended to Agoncillo and de la Costa was his apparent intent to act as mere patron or sponsor of the project. What caused the sudden shift in his mood can only be surmised. Perhaps, in the case of the offer to Agoncillo and de la Costa, he inferred that given their stature the chance that they would write for him (Marcos) as the declared author was minimal. Whereas asking them to lead a commission as editor-in-chief stood some chance. It seemed that he really liked the project to prosper so to avoid the danger of nipping the project in the bud he opted to take the safer route. Marcos's initial intention in pursuit of history writing appeared more scholarly or academic and if there was political intent in it, it was not paramount.

On the other hand, it is also possible that what he considered as success in his early foray into 'writing' thoroughly gratified him and consequently
emboldened him to do more daring things, as ‘authoring’ a 19-volume Philippine history. *Today’s Revolution: Democracy* (TRD) was the first major book-length work that was supposed to have been authored by Marcos and it appeared in September 1971.34 Entries in his diaries shortly thereafter showed him overjoyed with the alleged ripples ‘his book’ had made. He stated that there were many people, even those not given to reading books, who “insist(ed) on having my book and discussing it.” He relished that “(e)verybody (was) talking about the book” (Marcos Diary, entry for 11 September 1971). Other books followed the TRD such as *Notes on the New Society of the Philippines* (1973), *Introduction to Politics of Transition* (1978) and *Towards A Filipino Ideology* (1979), to mention but a few. All these were written for Marcos by a stable of intellectuals or in-house ideologues or propagandists, as critics were wont to call them. Against the backdrop of the wondrous things that Marcos had wanted the people to believe he was—the most bemedalled war hero, bar top-notcher, author of various books, saviour of the nation, the best president the country every had—authoring a 19-volume Philippine history seemed not unlikely for him to lay claim on too. More than anything else, perhaps it was his enormous capacity for self-deception, (de Quiros 1997, 331) or what Rempel calls as Marcos’s delusional tendencies (Rempel 1993), that enticed him to install himself as the author of Tadhana and believed that people would take him seriously for it.

At any rate, Tadhana was a scholarly undertaking. What prompted Marcos to opt for a partnership with professional historians, with impressive credentials at that, points to his desire to produce a scholarly history, presumably a history that carries authority—authority that emanates from its pursuit of objectivity or truth (Cristobal 2005). He could have resorted to ‘lesser academic mortals,’ like Baclagon who some people considered as Malacanang’s resident military historian, (McCoy 1999, Chapter 5). They would have not been credible or authoritative, however, for

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34 *Today’s Revolution: Democracy* was written for Marcos by Adrian Cristobal, one of young, brilliant intellectuals who worked intimately with/for Marcos. He admitted it to me during the interview on 23 February 2005.
they did not have the expertise and the imprimatur of PhDs or universities that certified and embodied human beings' capacity to know. Questions arise then, what need did Marcos perceive for a scholarly history? From what source did such a need arise? Who or what created the source, to begin with? Popular notions, as already noted, simply see Marcos's overriding concern to perpetuate himself in power and to find lofty justification for it. Marcos, so this notion goes, seemed too aware that 'power is empty without knowledge to back it up.' And what better way to buttress his claim to authority than by producing a history that could withstand critical scrutiny? It is however pertinent to ask, considering Marcos's apparent lack of intention to disclose the identities of his researchers, as he wanted this scholarly history to be presented as his own, who might be his target audience? For ordinary Filipinos who could barely negotiate day-to-difficulties, much less read English in which Tadhana was written, a 'comics history' presumably would do, or worse, any or no written history at all would. Many scholars and members of the educated elite and middle-class, both outside and inside the country, proved to be among his bitterest critics. Perhaps it was they whom Marcos had in mind. However, it is precisely these people who would not believe that Marcos actually wrote the work.

Perhaps Cristobal was right. Marcos wanted to use the Tadhana as a medium to convince future generations of Filipinos that what he did was right. A history that is necessary to serve the purpose—a history that could withstand time and critical scrutiny—could only be written by an army of brilliant scholars. What Marcos's case was and how he planned to explain himself will be the focus of the next chapter.

Finally, could it also be because of deep-seated anxiety, as noted by some observers. They said that Marcos was overly anxious about the ultimate judgment of history: the abstraction that acts like a secular god dispensing reward or punishment for a life lived well or ill. This does not seem farfetched. Fastidious as Marcos had shown to be in so many instances, it should not surprise that he would
seek no one but the best to help him argue, and win, his case before the judgment of Clio. If that was indeed the case, so be it. But what seems to have compelled Marcos to argue and try to win his case? Why was there a 'case', in the first place? And why should history be invoked? These are questions whose possible answers may bear pregnant implications on the over-all import on this study to which I shall return to in Chapter 7.

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CHAPTER IV

THE TADHANA: CONTENTS AND CONTEXT

History is past politics and politics present history.

–Sir John Robert Seely

As a partnership between scholars and a dictator, the Tadhana Project could be seen as fraught with ambiguities and contradictions. While some of the scholar-participants seemed to regret their participation, others insisted on domesticating the partnership, claiming that it was only natural for them to take part in it. Something in such insistence however betrays their conscious or unconscious grasp of the contentiousness of their position. Notwithstanding their pronouncements to the contrary, among their peers in the Filipino scholarly community the widely accepted definition of ‘true’ and ‘good’ scholarship requires success in insulating oneself from politics (Yabes 1965). Anyone thus who consorts with politicians may be seen with suspicion. The fact that Marcos has been very unpopular, even hated, provides a backdrop that makes such a partnership particularly distasteful in the eyes of many.

Tempting as it is for analysts to fall into Manichaean trap, this I will try to avoid in this Chapter. It is I think more productive to analyse the context that made such a partnership possible and, more importantly, to understand the driving forces that made it dynamic. Despite differences in motivations and interest, not to mention the disparate types or bases of powers that facilitated and rationalised the pursuit of those interests, they (both sponsor and scholars) nonetheless realised an

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2 Agoncillo’s studious refusal to write history under Marcos’s sponsorship, discussed in Chapter 3, can be fully appreciated against this background.
3 As I will explain in Chapter 7, the ethical dimension of scholar-politician relations is among the stumbling blocks to a thorough understanding of the knowledge-power nexus. That it is often invoked is precisely part of the effort to hide certain sources of power that prop up knowledge.
indubitable need for each other. The malleable nationalist template provided them the necessary ground that fused their powers and resources together so as to enhance their chance of winning the battle against their perceived contenders—contenders who, among other things, upheld competing versions of Philippine nationalisms. What was at stake, it seemed, was the support of the Filipino people without which their claim to power would not be validated.

In the first section of this chapter, I will examine the historiographic landscape within which the Tadhana Project tried to find a niche. I will try to demonstrate how, in their attempt to advance their historiographic agenda, the scholars were not just exercising their power but were at the same time in pursuit of a greater power. The second section, on the other hand, will focus on how Marcos appropriated the scholars’ output for his own political ends, with or without the awareness or concurrence of the scholars.

**Historiographic Context**

In the history of Philippine historiography, there are a number of areas that have traditionally been the focal points of contestation. These served as nodal points through which some of the most important defining characteristics of historical scholarship in the country took shape. As a project wanting to be recognised as important and scholarly, the Tadhana cannot but locate itself at the cutting edge of historiographic development. At the same time, however, it had to show engagement with the enduring traditions. There are many areas where the Tadhana engaged Philippine historiography. Due to space constraints, however, I will discuss only aspects that appear vital both to the historiographic agenda of the prime movers of the Tadhana and to the political interests of Marcos. The first is the prehistoric and pre-colonial origins of the peoples and cultures of the Philippines. This issue often relates to the supposed autonomy and strength of local culture vis-à-vis foreign elements as the engine of historical change. The second deals with perspective and the concomitant issues related to periodisation. And finally, the disputed character of Philippine nationalisms that is manifested in
different though related questions pertaining to the ensemble of events and ideas surrounding the 1896 Revolution. The aims of the whole exercise are: (1) to demonstrate the historiographic terrain within or beyond which the Tadhana as a scholarly project can best be understood; (2) to lay bare the procedures or approaches the scholars have adopted in their effort to secure a niche for the project and for themselves; and (3) to prepare the groundwork for analysing in the succeeding section how Marcos tried to appropriate the contents of Tadhana to advance his own political interests.

Prehistoric, Pre-colonial Origins

As planned, the Tadhana was remarkable for the depth and breadth of its scope and for the conceptual coherence through which it wanted to weave together the entire stretch of Philippine history. It may not be too much to say that to this day it remains unparalleled for aiming to cover the widest span of time and for trying to provide a more solid or more detailed treatment of each period. The approach was particularly noteworthy in its attempt to deal with the pre-Hispanic periods (pre-1500s) that for long had constituted a massive black hole in Philippine historiography. Hampered by the severe scarcity or almost total absence of extant pre-Hispanic written sources,4 as well as by the persistent belief that Philippine history began only with the arrival of the Spaniards, the little interest in pre-Hispanic periods can be gleaned from general surveys of Philippine history published up till the 1970s, even 1980s. As shown in Table 4. 1 the standard surveys of Philippine history allotted no more than a few pages, if any, to this period, and covered only a short stretch of a hundred years, or even less, before the coming of the Spaniards, or even shorter. Thus, the fact that Tadhana devotes over a quarter, or five of the projected 19 books, to these periods and that it goes to as far back as hundreds of thousands of years before Spain came, is by any measure

4 In Scott’s intimation, as of 1968 only “Philippine archaeology, two medieval Chinese accounts and a comparison of Philippine languages are...valid pre-Hispanic source materials available for the study of Philippine history” Scott (1968, 139). It is widely believed that the Spanish missionaries carried deliberate, if not systematic, efforts to destroy written document on account of their supposed un-Christian forms and contents.
noteworthy. Of course, one is justified in saying that the ten-volume Filipino Heritage (1978) with three of its volumes devoted to pre-hispanic period has preceded Tadhana in giving comparable emphasis to this period. A number of things, however, set the Tadhana apart. The projected contents of Tadhana's first five books were unprecedented for theoretical unity and sophistication; refreshing for the novelty of their approaches; and provocative for the implications they carried. They cohered in their paramount aim to demonstrate, on one hand, the participation of the ancestors of the Filipinos in a broader, universal process of evolutionary development and, on the other, the particularisation process that was supposed to lend deep roots to the identity of the Filipino nation. On the other hand, the FH remained stuck in the fairly conventional framework that did not pay explicit attention to the depth and continuity of the influences of the pre-hispanic period in the development of the Filipino nation.

Table 4.1
Coverage of Pre-Spanish Period in Some Textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE AND AUTHOR</th>
<th>YEAR OF PUBLICATION</th>
<th>NO. OF CHAPTER/PAGES/VOL. FOR PREHISPANIC PERIOD</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER OF CHAPTER/PAGES/VOLUMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zafra, <em>Readings in Philippine History</em> (Mimeograph)</td>
<td>1947 &amp; 1949</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>300 pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zafra, <em>Philippine History Through Selected Sources</em></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Less than a chapter (6 pages)</td>
<td>336 pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaide, <em>Philippine Political and Cultural History</em>, 2 vols.</td>
<td>1949, 1953</td>
<td>5 chapters (64 pages)</td>
<td>46 chapters (812 pages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benitez, <em>History of the Philippines: Economic, Social, Cultural, Political</em></td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Less than a chapter (less than 6 pages, mainly geographical and climatic)</td>
<td>24 chapters (533 pages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roces, ed., <em>The Filipino Heritage</em></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3 volumes</td>
<td>10 volumes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Two popular textbooks, Zafra's (1956a) *Readings in Philippine History* (1956a) and de la Costa's *Readings in Philippine History* (1965) started their coverage with the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521. One notable exception was the 10-volume *Filipino Heritage* (1978) which devotes 3 volumes to pre-hispanic period.
The first book, entitled Archipelagic Genesis, was the only one in Volume I (supposed to consist of five books) that saw actual publication. It covers the period from the Big Bang to ca. 250,000 BC. It deals with cosmological and geological processes that made possible the formation of the universe and the archipelago which in due time would be called the Philippines. The planned second book, provocatively entitled Adam in the Philippines, was supposed to cover the period 250,000 BC to 9,000 BC and it focused on hominisation—pertaining to the evolutionary process of becoming human—as it played out in Philippine territory. Not long before the Tadhana took off, artefacts were unearthed suggesting the existence of the yet-to-be-found remains of a *homo erectus*, comparable to the famed Java Man. For some reasons, Marcos readily shared the enthusiasm of archaeologists about the find (Marcos 1976c, 1.6). Salazar, who was responsible for conceptualising and outlining this portion of the project, admitted that these two earliest periods were no doubt too remote to have a direct impact on the formation of a historic community which later would serve as the foundation of Filipino nation (Salazar 1974, 189). The first volume was important nonetheless not just to set the physical stage wherein the Philippine drama would unfold later on but also to suggest that the elemental geologic, geographic and climatologic processes had conspired to produce a unique environment that would nurture the formation of a distinctly Filipino national identity (Marcos 1980b, 5). In other words, Filipino identity was thought not just as an outcome of historical imaginings; it was anchored on the land and this lent it a resilience that the appearance of primordiality can provide. The second, on the other hand, carries a subtle

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6 One may also find in Marcos Diary (entry for 24 April 1971) lengthy entries showing Marcos’s ecstatic reaction to archaeological finds in Cagayan Valley. Exaggerating the significance of the finds, he writes erroneously, “The discoveries proved the existence of man with a civilization long before the western world could boast of any culture.”

7 In the introduction of the Tadhana, Vol. I, Part I (Archipelagic Genesis), it is stated that the “peculiar location of the Philippines at the western edge of the Pacific and Australian landmass” is one of the primary sources of the unique characteristics of the Philippine archipelago (Marcos 1980b, 5).

8 Such a view of the deep roots of Filipino identity is a 180° turn away from previous articulation. Ileto notes, for instance, that in Today’s Revolution: Democracy (TRD), Marcos believed that “Filipino identity would be found, not in the recovery of an illusory precolonial past, but in the people’s struggle for liberation.” (Ileto 1998, 178). The Tadhana offered a different view.
message that being participants in the universal evolutionary process, the ancestors of the present day Filipinos share with the rest of humanity commonalities that should form the basis for racial equality (Salazar 1989, 188). Against the backdrop of the long drawn struggle against the inferiority complex wrought by colonialism, it is hard not to detect the subtle nationalist intent immanent in these formulations. Given likewise that a significant part of what had been paraded as glorious Philippine pre-history (or pre-Hispanic history) proved to be no more than romanticised myths and even hoaxes, one can appreciate the level of sophistication employed in this attempt to use available scholarly resources to ground the promotion of national pride and unity on a firmer foundation. The succeeding three books were supposed to pursue this effort to a fruitful end. But before we proceed to Books 3 to 5, let me clarify the context within which the first five books tried to locate themselves.

One major problematic in Philippine pre-Hispanic scholarship long revolved around the effort to portray Filipinos favourably vis-à-vis their ‘others’ (neighboring Asian countries and more significantly their Western colonisers, the Spaniards and the Americans). Having been colonised by two Western powers; having a culture considered perhaps ‘the most western’ in Asia; and having no ancient cities to show off, not a few Filipinos felt a sense of wholesale inferiority and insecurity. Efforts thus were focused on convincing Filipinos that they had a civilisation, a glorious past prior to the coming of the Spaniards, and that they were not inferior to their ‘others’ despite notable absence of urban centers like Funan, Champa, Angkor, Srivijaya and Pagan. Consequently, generations upon generations of Filipinos well into the 1980s, even up to 1990s, devoured a set of information about Philippine pre-Hispanic history that was meant to massage the

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9 Marcos, for example, in TRD (1971, 91) bewails the absence of ancient cities which could ‘remind the intruder of his insolence.’ Ileto (1998a) seems convinced of the deep seated impact on the psyche of Filipino intellectuals of this lack of a ‘great tradition.’

10 In explaining how a compilation of erroneous information could have been thoroughly accepted as ‘truths’ by generations of Filipinos. Scott opines that there seemed to be a ‘deep yearning’ for ideas that might fill a void in their psyche battered by colonial experience. Scott (1968, 130).
sense of their national self-worth.\textsuperscript{11} These include (1) Beyer's Wave Migration Theory which explains the peopling of the Philippines, the diversity of ethnic groups therein and the early cultural development allegedly brought long before the Spaniards came by various migrant groups -- Negrito, Malay, Indonesian;\textsuperscript{12} (2) the purported 'membership' of the Philippines to Srivijaya and Majapahit empires to show that Philippines was not a political and cultural blank slate before Spain came; (Hassel 1953) (3) the existence of the supposedly pre-Hispanic documents, the Codes of Kalantiao and Maragtas, which were supposed to prove the existence of written laws before the Spaniards came.\textsuperscript{13} All these were meant to dispel the notion that the ancestors of the Filipinos did not have a developed culture or that they were barbarians and therefore were inferior to other people, especially vis-à-vis their colonisers. As more and more researches since the 1950s and 1960s seriously questioned the bases for these suppositions, there arose a need for a new anchor to which pride in pre-Hispanic past could be tied. While not a few historian-textbook-writers ignored advances in research so that some textbooks as late as the 1990s still clung to the old, discredited lines, others rose to the occasion and suggested ways to at least alleviate the problem. Scott (1968), for his part, pointed to the existence of a wealth of evidences that were ignored. He also reminded us that despite the absence of documents written by early Filipinos there are 'cracks in the parchment curtains,' that allowed us to get a glimpse of the lives of the natives. Left with nothing but the writings of early missionaries who tended to be biased, Scott claimed that by reading intuitively between the lines of these Spanish documents one can gather some bits of information that can help reconstruct at least the broad outlines or trends about the early history of the natives (Scott 1982). Still another approach was to shift the focus away from the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Despite the fact that as early as 1968 (See Scott 1968), an authoritative study had debunked there myths, some textbooks in as late as the 1990s include them as though they were historical truths.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} For a refutation of this 'theory' see Jocano (1975).
  \item \textsuperscript{13} As succinctly and sardonically noted by one scholar, "The popular texts present a picture of law codes, membership in Asian empires, and political confederations projected against a background of 250,000 years of migrating waves of Filipino progenitors, almost complete with points of departure, sailing dates and baggage" Scott (1968, 139).
\end{itemize}
very distant past, towards the 'glorious revolution of 1896' which served as a wellspring of nationalist pride. While these were no doubt helpful in their own specific ways, they seem inadequate in comparison with the problem. By a stroke of brilliance, Tadhana offered arguably the most comprehensive and trenchant solution to the problem. The keys, as will be shown below, lie in the creative application of advanced research done abroad on the Austronesians and in interrogating and discarding the taken-for-granted adoption of the urban-centered setting as the measuring rod in comparative analysis of cultural development. The task was arguably executed in a magisterial fashion, if not a tour de force.

Whereas previously historians had relied heavily on Beyer's wave migration theory to explain the cultural development and peopling of the early Philippines, the scheme adopted by the Tadhana in Book 3 (Austronesian in the Philippines) interestingly reversed the positioning and put the Philippines in an enviable position as a possible intermediate staging point for the 'epic peopling' of the Austronesian world covering wide areas as far as Hawaii, New Zealand, Madagascar and of course the Indo-Malayan realm (Marcos 1976c, 1, 6-7). I should note that this was not a mindless, procrustean distortion of known facts to fit into nationalist mould, which has been quite common in nationalist writing almost everywhere. Rather, it was a creative application of researches done in Europe (where Salazar studied) and elsewhere - which for the most part had not yet been applied to the case of the Philippines. This resulted in a refreshing, hard to dismiss, effort to demonstrate the affinity and equality of the early Filipinos with the rest of the Austronesians, more specifically the Malayo-Polynesians. At the same time, it underscores the primacy of internal factors—the internal dynamics—in the development of culture within the area.

While the theme ‘universalisation,’ in the sense of primacy of universal history, runs through the heart of the first two books, it is with the particularisation process that the Books 3 to 5 were supposed to be preoccupied. This process is seen as a logical outgrowth of man’s interaction with the natural environment whose variety set the stage for the formation of cultural communities distinct from one another. Thus, Book 3 identifies the Austronesians as an entity distinctive from the other groups such as Indo-Europeans, Hamito-Semites and Sino-Tibetan while Book 4 (Southeast Asia: The World Between) intends to narrow further the particularisation process by showing the gradual formation of the “Indonesian world” distinct from that of Austronesian kin, the ‘Oceanic world’ (Micronesians, Melanesians and Polynesians), and even more so from that of non-kin, such as Indians and Chinese. Finally, in Book 5, the “Philippine Forms” gradually took shape roughly from AD 200 to AD 1565 as various differentiating factors came into play including intensification of inter-island (both intra-Philippines and intra-regional) trades and the centrifugal pull of the Sinic and Indic civilisations on parts of the Southeast Asian world that left the Philippines on trajectory different from that of the rest of the region (Marcos 1976c, 1, 6-12). It was during this period, so the Tadhana suggests, that the ‘proto-Filipino cultural identity’ began to crystallise and by the end of this period, “the Philippines was on the verge of transforming herself from an “ethnographic entity into an ‘historic’ polity...”(Marcos 1976c, 12). Implied in this formulation is the assertion of the primacy of internal factors and the rejection of the deeply entrenched views that cultural development in the early Philippines was brought about by foreign traders or waves of migrants. As a side note, this echoes the efforts of scholars such as van Leur, Smail and Benda who dealt primarily with the case of Indonesia.

Likewise, this period coincides with the emergence of ‘ethnic states’, which in Salazar’s view constituted one stream in the parallel development of comparable socio-cultural forces operative in different parts of Southeast Asia (Salazar 1974,

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15 This follows from the assumption that despite ecological and cultural differences in the global and local scale, peoples in different parts of the world are subject to more or less common set of historical forces.
Such a masterstroke in effect puts the pre-Hispanic baranganic\textsuperscript{16} communities, composed of roughly 30 to 100 families or sometimes more, in the same league, say, as the famed ancient states, or \textit{etnic states} as Salazar prefers to call them, such as Champa, Funan, Srivijaya and Angkor. The stark difference in the levels of their development and what such difference may signify had been de-emphasized as inconsequential. As the Tadhana framework asserts, comparative evaluation showing the superiority of Champa, Angkor and others and the backwardness of the \textit{barangays} is based on a dubious yardstick that derives from a flawed assumption. The difference, it claims, owes much to the variations in the outcome of the interplay among commercial, environmental and socio-cultural factors unique to each locality as it interacted with a broader regional forces (Marcos 1976c, 10-11). As a process of state formation, which seems to be of major importance to the makers of Tadhana, they (various ethnic states) were a parallel response to a more or less common set of factors. There is, by implication, no reason why should Filipinos feel less about the ability of their ancestors and of themselves vis-à-vis that of other Southeast Asians.

In short, while the absence of Angkor- or Borobudur-like monumental structures in the early Philippines pained many Filipino nationalist intellectuals, the framework adopted by the Tadhana rejected the basis of their worries.

One other contribution of Tadhana’s treatment of the pre-Hispanic period lies in its intent to find an acceptable basis for national unity that is rooted deeply in time long before the arrival of the Spanish. This attempt eschews the historical orthodoxy that regards the nation-formation as an offshoot of the Spanish colonial project. From the viewpoint of the Tadhana, this is tantamount to settling for a superficial basis of unity that, precisely because it is superficial, cannot adequately address the persistent problems of disunity. Parenthetically, secessionism in Mindanao began to brew heatedly at about the same time the Tadhana was being

\textsuperscript{16}This word is a derivation of the term \textit{barangay} and is possibly used only in academic discourse on the Philippines.
conceptualised. By insisting on affinity with the Austronesian, Malayo-Polynesian world, and by underlining the particularization process that set the Philippines apart from it, the Tadhana found in the supposedly common base culture a unifying thread among Christian, Muslim and tribal Filipinos. Their particularities, Tadhana insists, were no more than skin-deep primarily because these emerged only as consequences of more recent historical developments (Tan 1976). This coincides with the idea that by the time the Europeans came, the base culture was sufficiently developed such that foreign influences that henceforth flooded in could not but be assimilated into the indigenous cultural matrix. Alternatively, they formed layers of trapping on top of a resilient indigenous culture. The key, Tadhana implies, lies in re-discovering and recuperating the indigenous foundation of Filipino identity and unity upon which the future structures of the nation would be built.

**Perspectives and Periodisation**

The search for deep roots not only of Filipino identity but also of the Philippine nation-state had a concomitant result of de-centring the colonial experience that for so long has served in Philippine historiography as the fulcrum of historical development. For so long, historical writings on the Philippines took the colonial experience as pivotal in the unfolding of the nation’s history. This was the case of scholarship initially by Spanish scholars and chroniclers (from 1500s to early 1900s), then by the Propagandists and their immediate heirs (1880s-1920s), as well as by professionally trained historians from the generations of Fernandez and Benitez (1920s-1940s), to those of Zafra and Alip (1940s-1960s), and finally to the heyday of Zaide, Agoncillo and Constantino (1960s-1980s). There were major differences of course in the rationale, in focus as well as in tenor of evaluative

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17 The Tadhana declares: "When the Spaniards arrived...the process of state construction was already underway, and instinct of wisdom moved them to build the colonial state upon the beginnings of the native edifice...(T)he colonial state enlarged itself on the foundation of the barangay, promoting acculturation and pursuing trade and political expansion on the same principal route the native logic and tradition had established..." (Marcos, 1982b, iii).
assessments and interpretations, but they all agreed that the colonial period was the defining moment in Philippine history.

That was not the case with the Tadhana.\(^\text{18}\) Although it concedes that it was during the colonial period that the transformation to become a ‘political entity’ was achieved, the colonial impetus was by no means a necessary ingredient. Such transformation, Tadhana avers, could have been attained anyway without colonisation because the complex of forces operative within the broader regional context was sufficient to consummate the transformative process. Besides, the colonial experience, as far as Tadhana is concerned, was little more than a thin glaze on the indigenously defined core, as already noted. The singularly most important defining thread or pivotal hinge, in its view, was the development of a Filipino nation-state (actually, more skewed towards development of the Filipino state than of the Filipino nation) whose roots originated, the Tadhana makers insist, in the distant pre-Hispanic past and whose future headed towards full realisation of a New Society. The use of nation-formation as a pivotal point is not unique to Tadhana. Agoncillo, and a few others, also used that as the anchoring device. The main difference, however, was that Agoncillo and others traced the origin of the nation-state to the Spanish colonial period. As periodisation of the Tadhana shows, while the formation of national community (Vol. 2) corresponded neatly to the Spanish colonial period, the ‘Philippine Forms’ (Vol. 1, Part 5) had already taken shape by the time Spain came. Tadhana wants to show that colonial structures could not but build upon the template defined by indigenous elements. Toward this end they made a meticulous effort to maintain, among other things, the quantitative balance in the coverage between Spanish and pre-Hispanic periods. Both were allotted five books each. Seen from the vantage point of Zafra, Zaide, Alip and many others who devoted a disproportionately large space for the

\(^{18}\) Veneracion noted that Tadhana’s main difference from other histories previously written was its periodisation. In his words, “Whereas the thematic stress of previous historians was colonialism, Tadhana envisioned the emergence of the nation-state as a long process of development that went beyond 1565...” See Veneracion (1993).
Spanish period, on one side, and Agoncillo who deliberately allotted only three short chapters for this period, on another, Tadhana obviously represents the middle ground. One can also easily see the heavy emphasis on the nation-state formation that seems to be the paramount concern of Volumes 3 and 4. On this point, Tadhana seems unique. Its recognition of the tension between nation and state as well as its emphasis on the state-formation, as distinct from but closely related to nation-formation, is not found in other approaches hitherto attempted in Philippine historiography.

Periodisation is affected by the perspective or point of view adopted by the authors. Early on, spirited discussion focused on the dichotomy between colonial and Filipino viewpoints. At various times these terms assumed different meanings but they remain framed as might be expected within the us-versus-them matrix. The Propagandists led by Rizal, for instance, countered the Spaniards' pejorative bipartite view of history with a tripartite view. The bipartite view considered the time before Spain came as the 'age of darkness' that was superseded by the 'age of enlightenment' with the onset of Spanish period. The tripartite view on the other hand reversed the prism and viewed the time before Spain came as the 'golden' age; the Spanish colonial period, the 'age of darkness' and Spain's departure the redemption or the beginning of a new era. Just as the bipartite view informed the morally loaded evaluative framework adopted by Spanish scholars all through the centuries of colonial period, the tripartite view casts a very long shadow even up to some historical works by Filipino scholars up to this day. The good and the bad were clear-cut and were central to the analysis.

Table 4.2

19 Zaide, for example devotes 28 out of 53 chapters in his two-volume opus The Pageant of Philippine History (1979) whereas Zafra, 19 out of 29 in his Philippine History Through Selected Sources (1967) to the Spanish period. Zaide allots five chapters to the Pre-Hispanic periods, whereas Zafra has only a few scattered pages of reference to Pre-Hispanic era.

20 His celebrated textbook A Short History of the Filipino People, the first edition of which was co-authored with Oscar Alfonzo, created a stir when it first appeared in 1960 for compressing more than three centuries of Spanish period to only three chapters.

21 For a useful overview of explanations of the different logics behind the use of various periodisations of Philippine history, see Francis Gealogo, "Periodizations in Philippine History" (1993b).
Outline of Tadhana

**TITLE**

**Volume 1**
- The Roots of Filipino Heritage (Up to 1565 AD)
  - Part 1: Archipelagic Genesis (Pleistocene-Glacial Periods)
  - Part 2: Adam in the Philippines (ca. 250,000 BC-ca. 9000 BC)
  - Part 3: The Austronesians in the Phil. (ca.9000BC-1500 BC)
  - Part 4: The World Between (ca 1500 BC-200 AD)
  - Part 5: Philippine Forms (ca. 200AD-1565 AD)

**Volume 2**
- The Formation of a National Community (1565-1896)
  - Part 1: Encounter, 1565-1663
  - Part 2: Reactions, 1663-1765
  - Part 3: Transition, 1765-1815
  - Part 4: Transformation, 1816-1872
  - Part 5: Triumph, 1872-1896

**Volume 3**
- The Promised State: A Nation in Travail
  - Part 1: Birth of a Nation, 1896-1907
  - Part 2: Participation and Partnership, 1907-1921
  - Part 3: Crisis and Consolidation, 1921-1930
  - Part 4: Ferment and Control
  - Part 5: Conflict and Direction

**Volume 4**
- Search and Synthesis; Towards the New Society (1946-Present)
  - Part 1: Dilemmas of Nationhood, 1946-1951
  - Part 2: Nationalism and Reforms, 1951-1966
  - Part 3: Radical Alternatives, 1966-1972
  - Part 4: National Synthesis: The New Society, 1972-


Subsequent assessments of American as well as Spanish colonial projects proved to be ambiguous. For generations of scholars appreciative of the legacy of Spanish and American colonisers—e.g. Christianity, education, public health, science and technology, democratic institutions — the colonial experience cannot be an undiluted curse. While such scholars as Fernandez, Benitez and Zaide have been branded as advocates of colonial scholarship primarily for their sanguine views of American colonisation, one can also find an avid proponent of the Filipino viewpoint, no less than Agoncillo,22 who was as appreciative of American legacies. In the same vein, one can find in Zaide (1957; 1979) and Joaquin (1988), to mention but two, who were sympathetic to the Filipino viewpoint and at the same time

22 Cruz in his attempt to make typology of approaches to the study of Philippine history categorised Agoncillo’s as ‘pure nationalist history’. See Cruz (1982).
admiring and approving of the legacies of Spain. In other words, the terms *colonial* and *Filipino viewpoints* ceased to be a marker for a dichotomy between those who had respectively a favourable and unfavourable view of the colonial legacy. The issue on viewpoint became more about the question, who is at the centre-stage and who at the margin of the historical narrative? The earlier emphasis on moral judgment gave way to methodological issues. In this, Agoncillo’s very provocative pronouncement that there was no Philippine history before 1872 came to the fore.

In a lecture delivered by Agoncillo in 1958, he made public the idea that he said he had told his students since the 1940s (Agoncillo 1958). That is, that Philippine history must be rewritten because much of what claimed to be as history of the Philippines was in fact not a history of the Philippines, but a history of Spain in the Philippines. He boldly asserted that the history of the Philippines *proper* began only in 1872 with the martyrdom of Gom-Bur-Za²³, which also marked the beginning of Philippine nationalism. Before then it was the foreigners who wrote about the Filipinos and because of the writers’ skewed perspective, the Filipinos can hardly be seen in their own narratives. Agoncillo was of course reacting to the common tendency of his contemporaries to include much materials of tangential relevance to the Filipinos. In his words (Agoncillo 1958, 6):

> Filipino historians...discuss with alacrity such irrelevant subjects as Spanish expeditions to the Mollucas (or Moluccas), the Marianas, French Indo-China and other places, in which the Filipinos’ only role was that of rowers...(S)ubjects not related to the development of the Filipino nation, I dismiss in a few words...

Agoncillo has been recognized in standard, mainstream accounts for pioneering the push for and the introduction of the “Filipino viewpoint” in the writing of Philippine history. This brand of Filipino viewpoint while it can be subsumed under the tripartite view discussed earlier is in important ways different from it. Rather than being primarily concerned with the question of whether an

²³ This is shorthand for Gomez, Burgos and Zamora, the three priests who were garroted by Spanish authorities in 1872 on charge of complicity in the Cavite Mutiny.
event or a period was good or bad for Filipinos, it is more interested in whether it is relevant to the formation of the Filipino nation. Otherwise, it falls under the rubric of colonial historiography and it deserves to be relegated to the background, if not left out altogether. Efforts to demonstrate the internal dynamics among the Filipino people, and to foreground them as the prime movers of historical change were all offshoots of this type of Filipino viewpoint.

Zaide, complicating the picture, can be said to have his own version of the Filipino viewpoint. Despite being politely or bluntly dismissed by many historians for his ‘colonial’ and ‘clerical’ tendencies, his idea of what is a Filipino viewpoint could be resonant with the views of the silent public. The fact that his many textbooks were best sellers since the 1950s well up to years after he died in 1986, may indicate wide reception, or endorsement, of his approaches and ideas. In his revealing article “The Rewriting of Philippine History,” he explicitly rejects the anti-foreign element in the Filipino viewpoint. He writes: “One can really love his fatherland without hating other nations. One can glorify the achievements of his nation without denigrating the achievements of other nations. And one can praise his own people without slandering other peoples” (Zaide 1973, 174). He also warned historians not to be “embittered by anti-foreign bias” (Ibid.). This is an obvious reaction to what he perceived to xenophobic, anti-colonial proclivities that began to permeate historical scholarship since the 1950s. Having enjoyed the orthodox status since pre-war years, Zaide may have found the atmosphere in the post-war decades, which was fertile for promoting heterodox views, disconcerting. To note, aside from the attitude towards the foreigners, the demarcating line separating Zaide’s from Agoncillo’s brand of Filipino viewpoint lies in Zaide’s emphasis on what he thought was good for the Filipinos, not on

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24 In the history of Philippine historiography, Zaide’s books dominated the market before and after the Second World War. In that sense, he represented the ‘orthodoxy’

25 There is an extensive literature explaining the resurgence of Filipino nationalism since the 1950s. However, Agoncillo’s brief article “Postwar Filipino Nationalism and Its Anti-American Posture” stands out for vividly capturing the sentiments, not just the logic of the nationalist response. His very effective prose may have much to do with it.
whether the Filipinos were at the foreground of historical narrative as was the case of Agoncillo.

Meanwhile, the upsurge in influence of the radical, left-leaning groups coincided with the rise of yet another slant on the Filipino viewpoint. Cognisant of the widening gulf separating the small, highly westernised, rich and powerful elite from the vast majority of impoverished Filipinos, observers claimed there was a need to redefine relevance and perspective on the basis of social equity and social justice. Citizenship alone ceased to be the primary basis of the ‘Filipino’ in the Filipino viewpoint. The socio-economic class to which the majority belonged became the principal determinant. Believed to be the true makers and bearers of history, the ‘masses,’ however defined, became the proprietary claimant to Filipino viewpoint. Agoncillo’s revolt of the masses thesis helped pave the way for this, but it was Constantino’s articulate and forceful advocacy that pushed it towards the center of historical discourses. For Constantino, the measure of relevance rests on the extent that knowledge helps liberate the ‘masses’ from the shackles of poverty and oppression. As far as he is concerned, “Filipino resistance to colonial oppression is the unifying thread of Philippine history” (1975, 9).

The sharp elite-mass dichotomy in Constantino’s formulation found historiographic expression in the rejection of the great men’s style of history or ‘history from above’ in which the common people are hardly seen in traditional historical narratives, which is usually dominated by the stories about presidents, rich families, diplomatic policies, etc. Since the great majority of Filipinos were

26 Schumacher notes rightly that one of the problems that bedevil studies on the Philippine revolution is the imprecision and “looseness of class terminology.” Terms such as elites, ilustrados, caciques, principales, proletarian, middle class, upper-middle class, the people, and the masses are all problematic. For clear explication, see Schumacher (1991a) Earlier, Guerrero expressed similar observation (1977, 22-25).

27 Glenn May hit the mark when he described Constantino’s book as a ‘semi-sacred text’ among Filipino intellectuals. It was precisely its enormous popularity, despite what May saw as its gross transgression of every canon of historical methodology, that disturbed him. See his article “A Past Revisited, A Past Distorted,”(1983) a hard-hitting critique of Constantino’s The Philippines, A Past Revisited (1975).

28 In Constantino’s view, a relevant history is that which “can serve as guide to present and succeeding generations in the continuing struggle for change. Such a history must deal with the past with a view to explaining the present.” Constantino (1975, 9)
(and still are) poor peasants and workers, it seemed scandalous to many observers that they hardly figure in historical accounts. To rectify the situation, what is variously called 'people's history,' 'history from below' or 'history of the inarticulate' became the aim of a growing number of historians. In this quest, Constantino played an important role. By imputing to the collective mass of people the power to act as an engine of historical change, he in effect put them at the centre of the historical enterprise. Notwithstanding his contribution to historiography, the Marxist provenance of his formulation, with its accompanying analytical and political rigidity, laid him open to harsh criticisms. Among other things, he was castigated for glaring bias and for leaving out or distorting facts to sustain his Marxist framework. A critic also pointed out that for all of Constantino's zealous promotion of a people's history, the people in his history hardly think, feel, speak and decide for themselves. Someone, or certain groups such as the elites, have had to do these for them (Ileto 1979, 5). In spite of all the criticisms, Constantino's writings, notably his two-volume synthesis of the history of the Philippines, have been immensely popular. Perhaps they constituted the single most influential set of work among the Filipino young intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s.

Unhappy with a people's history where the 'real' people are almost muted or left out, historians devoted their efforts to allowing the masses to 'really speak for themselves.' Ileto's *Pasyon and Revolution* was a landmark product of this project. Among other achievements, it has demonstrated that despite the tyranny of the archives, so to speak, it was in fact possible to write history by using unusual texts -e.g. songs, folk tales, prayers, poems, *pasyon* - that were produced by the inarticulate masses. By allowing the 'masses' to speak, the *Pasyon* recognises the existence and autonomy of their worldview - a worldview that if seen from within its own logic is valid in its own right. Their perceptions and behavior can thus be

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29 For a brief overview of the concepts as applied in Philippine history, see Gealogo (1993c)
understood on their own terms, not as an irrational variant of or an aberration from
the elite-defined code of thoughts and conduct (Ileto 1979). Through Ileto’s rather
essentialist formulation (Hau 2002), the conceptual gap that divides the ‘elite’ and
the ‘mass’ was made virtually unbridgeable, a formulation that would be refined
almost to perfection and elevated almost to a dogmatic position by the Pantayong
Pananaw. (We/Us-Perspective) (thereafter referred to as Pantayo School) The
Pantayo School emerged from the sustained effort of a group of historians from the
University of the Philippines. It is a philosophically sophisticated project and its
methodological ramifications are in many ways path-breaking, within the context
of nationalist historiography in the Philippines. Among its manifold contributions
to historiography are the formulation and use of concepts and analytic categories
that are believed to be primal and indigenous and thus supposedly faithful to the
worldview and aspirations of the ‘true’ Filipino people. The purportedly
indigenous elements, of which the masses are thought to be the repository, proved
to be the most salient dimension in their formulation of a Filipino perspective.
Begun in the 1970s, the Pantayo School rose to a dominating position by the 1990s
in the country’s largest and most important history department, that of the
University of the Philippines. It does not mean that competing versions of Filipino
viewpoint were obliterated inside and outside of the University of the Philippines.
Like other elements of nationalist discourses in the country, they coexisted, albeit

31 Pantayong Pananaw: literally, ‘we/us-perspective.’ In Tagalog, the pronoun ‘we’ has two equivalents: tayo
and kami. The first is used when the speaker includes the addressee and all other members of a group, real
or imagined, to which both of them belong. The latter is used when the addressee is not included in the
group the speaker refers to in a certain discourse. This differentiation has far reaching implications when
applied to historiography. It identifies with whom the speaker (or the historical narrative) is engaged in a
discourse. In the pantayo perspective, the discourse is between or among members of a group who may
constitute a ‘nation.’ In the pang-kami perspective, on the other hand, the speaker (or the historical
narrative) is addressing people other than members of his/her own group. Corollary to the question with
whom one is engaged in a discourse is the question whom and what is historical knowledge for. From the
pantayo perspective, historical knowledge is for the consumption of the members of one group or nation
and it is for their better understanding of themselves. In the pang-kami perspective, on the other hand, the
knowledge is designed to enable one group to present itself to another, probably as their equal or their
superior. Knowledge, therefore, is for the consumption primarily of the one spoken to, and it is for the
addressee to understand the group being presented to him/her. The presenter (of knowledge) gains a sense
of fulfillment from having successfully presented oneself as either equal to or better than the addressee. (By
far the most comprehensive and serious attempt to map out the history of Pantayong Pananaw can be found
in Reyes (2002) For an accessible account, see Salazar (2000). For a well-thought out attempt to explain and
critique Pantayong Pananaw, see Guillermo (2003)
uneasily, with the concurrently dominant school of thought. Having laid down a broad historiographic map, we must then ask where does the Tadhana fit in?

The Tadhana to an extent constitutes a transition in the evolving quest for the definition of the Filipino-viewpoint. By pioneering the search for the deep, pre-Hispanic roots of the Philippine nation-state, it prefigured the emphasis on the indigenous that would find eloquent expression in the ‘80s and ‘90s in the Pantayo School and in Bagong Kasaysayan (New History). By de-centering the colonial experience as pivotal to the nation’s historical development, it foreshadowed what in due time would be recognised (at least in some quarters) as a landmark historiographic achievement: the cutting of the analytics of nation-formation from the hitherto colonial ties. Interestingly, it paralleled even anticipated certain important aspects of what has been trumpeted in the West as postcolonial theory.

At the University of the Philippines, however, it exemplified the indigenisation movement epitomised best by the Pantayo School and Sikolohiyang Pilipino32(Filipino Psychology). By eschewing Constantino’s and refining Agoncillo’s formulations, and by rejecting orthodoxies espoused by Alip, Zafra, Zaide and others, the Tadhana was searching for an alternative that its makers believed to be more appropriate to address the problems of the time. What these problems were will be explored further in the next section.

The transition role of the Tadhana can be partly explained by the fact that Salazar, one of the main players in it, was also the prime mover of the Pantayo School. The early formative period of the Pantayo coincided with the first five years of the Tadhana project, the same period when Salazar figured prominently in that Project.33 Upon leaving the Project towards the end of 1979, Salazar continued his historiographic crusade, gathering fellow travelers at the UP along the way until they established themselves by 1990s as the dominant faction within the

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32 Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino Psychology) is a parallel effort to indigenize the study of psychology. It rejects, among other things, western conceptualization of the self.

33 In Portia Reyes’s dissertation (2002), what may be regarded as an ‘official’ history of the Pantayo school, she points to 1974 as the starting point of the development of the Pantayo School.
country's most important history department (Gaerlan 255-260). Their dominance would not last as Salazar and practically all his very close associates were purged out of the department in the late 1990s-early 2000 in the wake of a very complex intra-departmental politics. But that is another story altogether. What is important is that despite the physical purge of the Pantayo group, their historiographic influence lingers, notwithstanding the avowal to the contrary by the now dominant group. Even more significant, however, is the fact that despite the downright rejection of the Tadhana Project, dubbed as undiluted propaganda, the early seeds of the Pantayo ideas which heavily informed Tadhana's framework have survived, and even risen to a prominent position.

Vis-à-vis the Marxist-inspired notion of a Filipino-viewpoint articulated most eloquently by Constantino, the Tadhana was explicitly reactive and dismissive. The reason was not just political, as will be discussed in the next section. It was historiographic as well. The long tradition of framing historical questions along a dichotomous Filipino/foreigner matrix provided an unfavourable context, which required more than subtle ideological conditioning for historians to transcend. The act of fragmenting the Filipino into various groups defined along social class, linguistic affiliation, and so forth was viewed as weakening its purportedly united front vis-à-vis the foreigners. Despite being more at home with Agoncillo’s version, the Tadhana group were not happy with this either. Though sympathetic to Muslims in his books, Agoncillo’s concept of the Filipino remained for the most part focused on the Christian majority. It was, in other words, not sufficiently inclusive to address the concerns or aspirations of cultural minorities. As a corrective to Agoncillo, Tadhana offered a conception of the Filipino nation wherein cultural diversity is constitutive of, rather than a problem in, the process of nation-formation. Tan’s idea of tri-sectoral communities - Christian, Muslims and tribal - walking side by side with one another comprises
one of the salient contributions of Tadhana in historiographic development. In Tan’s (2004) words:

Actually, the idea of the three sectoral community was inspired by Wolf, from my point of view lang. (only) Matagal na iyan...(That’s nothing new) (But) (a)ll previous history works (in the Philippines) did not look at that perspective laging (always) based on the treatment of the Muslims and the tribal as peripheral. That categorized almost all the historians, from Spanish to American. There was no balance given to the three communities...always dominantly Christian. Now, one idea of Marcos’ nationalist vision is precisely to correct that perspective. So I was very happy that (they) kept my view --- meaning to give equal treatment. The Tadhana was the first historical work that gave importance to these three – not in terms of one is superior to the other but one is distinct from the other. However small you are, you are important. The numerical existence was not the criterion for determining your importance.

On the issues of histories from above and from below, the Tadhana exhibits a seemingly unresolved tension of combining the two strands that in some ways are fundamentally conflicting. On one hand, Tadhana puts a premium on state formation as the crux of historical development, the process that is essentially ‘from above’ (Veneracion 1977). On the other, it traces the origin of national identity, even the state itself, to a past as distant as possible, calling the bedrock indigenous and taking the masses ‘from below’ as its true bearers. Tension such as this seems inherent in any effort to combine the nation and the state into the hyphenated nation-state. This is especially true in cases where geographic

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34 It is interesting to note that Tan’s views ran counter to Salazar’s on this point. The differences were clearly spelled out in Tan (1976). Despite non-reference to Salazar, Tan’s article is obviously reacting to Salazar’s conceptualisation of the pre-Hispanic periods in the Outline of the Tadhana. In Tan’s formulation, the unitary approach (apparently the one preferred by Salazar) is based on the assumption that there existed in the pre-Hispanic period a common cultural or historical unity. The bases for this unity are, in linguistic terms, Austronesian- Polynesian language, and, in cultural terms, the base-culture, which may be classified as Malay. The approach is to search for a “common thread in the maze of ethnic diversities and complexities...”[p. 5] The pluralist approach (Tan’s view), on the other hand, assumes that “there are indefinite numbers of events or circumstances in the historical process which do not necessarily form into an inter-related whole”. In the case of the Philippines, this means that before the coming of the Spaniards, communities in the islands were independent and isolated from one another and that the only kind of unity or cohesiveness was imposed from the outside. Unity was mainly political (ibid.).

35 In a rare independent review of the Tadhana, specifically Vol. 2 Part I (Encounters) Veneracion expresses dismay that the volume, and the whole project, is conceived from the viewpoint of the ‘big men,’ in other word, ‘from above’.
heterogeneity and cultural and socio-economic diversity are paramount, of which the Philippines is an example. What the Tadhana does is to recognise and confront the tension by attempting to synthesise the two strands with as one might expect uneasy and tenuous results.

By insisting on the ethnic, pre-colonial origins of the Philippine state, Tadhana posits that in the distant past, there existed an indigenous Philippine state - a state that was a product of the intimate relationship between indigenous Filipinos and their environment; a state that supposedly came from the bosom of the Filipino ‘nation.’ It is another way of saying that before, there was no hyphen, no tension, between the nation and the state. The wide gap between the two that characterised the colonial and the post-war periods emanated from the long and divisive colonial experience. The Tadhana recognized it as a problem that had long been ignored by scholars and all politicians alike, until Marcos came and decided to do something about it. This smells of politics, as will be discussed in the next section, but from a historiographic standpoint, it has its own pragmatic value. For one, the polarity between histories “from above” and “from below” drains itself of the seemingly intractable friction. The issue ceased to revolve around the questions whether it was deliberately written from the viewpoint of either pole or whether inconsistency has been committed in its attempt to combine the two. The most pertinent questions become: (1) Which aspect of the Tadhana framework adopts a top-down perspective and which employs bottom-up viewpoint? (2) Why should this be so? and (3), at what point, if ever, might they merge as one? In Tadhana’s formulation, the persistence of diverging perspectives is but a reflection of socio-economic, political and historical reality and this calls precisely for the realisation of the New Society that, among other things, would smooth away such divisiveness. Apparently, the New Society was not just the culminating point of Marcos’ effort to re-combine the nation (people) and the state (government) in a politically creative and harmonious synthesis. It also represents historiography’s Holy Grail. From this vantage point, the use of state formation as an overarching framework is not just consistent with the emphasis on the indigenous or on
people’s history; it is precisely the constitutive device for realising such a kind of history. As an initiative of the state, the Tadhana conjures up the future when a “true” people’s history shall finally write itself, at which point, there would be no more need for state sponsorship. Until then, however, the state is justified in taking the initiative.

1896 Revolution and Contested Nationalisms

Another important area, though not as passionately treated as the previous two, revolves around the 1896 Revolution and the accompanying questions about Philippine nationalisms. Ileto considers the events surrounding the 1896 revolution as a cornerstone of modern Philippine history and the founding myth of the Philippine nation-state (Ileto 1998b, 61). The centrality of the 1896 Revolution in historical discourses may be seen in the persistence since the 1950s of the discourses on the ‘unfinished revolution’ which various groups of opposing ideologies employ to make themselves seem relevant. As Ileto succinctly put it: “Without great monuments or a court culture to serve as an alternate focus or center of national aspirations the ensemble of events and ideas called ‘the revolution of 1896’ has had to serve as some sort of charter or as the legitimising principle for subsequent calls for unified action” (1998a, 195). Like many other events or ideas of monumental significance, its meanings are contested. It is problematic and ambiguous, as Mojares (1996, 263) observes, for it generates a surplus of meanings, which may be hostile, ambivalent and inassimilable.

The Tadhana’s treatment of the 1896 revolution is patently reactive to the sharply polarised debates about the 1896 Revolution and about the ‘true’ meaning of Filipino nationalism. As these debates are multi-layered and multifaceted36 we shall focus for the purpose of this study only on the overall attitude towards the Revolution (especially vis-à-vis the Reform Movement) as well as on the extent of

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36 The exceedingly complex debates on Philippine nationalism may be gleaned from the fact that just within the left-leaning sector, Abinales has identified at least four streams that bitterly contested the interpretation of the ‘national question.’ (See Abinales 1999; Churchill 2001; Guillermo 1994). For controversies on Bonifacio, see Glenn May (1991, 1997) In response, see Determining the Truth (1997) edited by Churchill.
the role of the elite and the ‘masses’ in this landmark set of events. The primary reason for this is that among the Revolution-related issues, these questions are of the greatest relevance to Marcos’s political blueprint.

Agoncillo’s assertion that it was a ‘revolt of the masses’ was a watershed in this debate. Spelled out in his controversial book of the same title, published in 1956, it transgressed the orthodox meanings ascribed to the revolution. At various times until then, the Revolution had been seen as a handiwork of the ilustrados or the elites. Observers also claimed that rather than a movement driven by nationalism, it was a reaction against the abuse of the friars and against the excesses of feudalism or caciquism (Le Roy 1906 cited in Veneracion 1971, 33-34). The unity among the Filipinos, masses and elites, in their struggle against the Spaniards was also commonly posited. For casting doubts on these beliefs about the Revolution, he earned the ire of the establishment scholars. As evidence of the paramount importance of this work, a number of succeeding works explicitly or implicitly reacted to Agoncillo’s thesis, either by further developing it, by refining it, or by rejecting it altogether. Constantino, for instance, took off from Agoncillo and elevated the masses not just as prime movers of the revolution but also as the

37 One characteristic of early studies (American period) on the Philippine revolution was to emphasize that it was a response to the oppression of the friars. Another was that it was a product of ‘international Masonic conspiracy.’ Nationalism hardly figured out as a cause. Another, as exemplified by Teodoro Kalaw’s The Philippine Revolution, is to overlook regional or class conflict within the ranks of Filipino revolutionaries. Cited in Schumacher (1991a 180, 252).

38 According to Schumacher (1991a) the Americanistas among Filipino ilustrados in the early 20th century tended to downplay the notion of nationalism and instead focused on anti-friar sentiments in explaining the Revolution. He gave as an example de Tavera (1906).

39 Zafra echoes a popular, monolithic view of the revolution when he asserted, in response to Agoncillo, that “the revolution was truly national in scope and in character. The persons who participated in it were moved and inspired by a genuine love of country. They came from all classes and elements of the population.” (1956b, 502). The tendency in the post-Agoncillo/Constantino era is to reiterate this monolithic view. See for example various articles compiled in Llanes (1998) especially the synthesizing chapter by Ambrosio (1998, 333-343).

40 The fact that the publication of the book was delayed by 8 years, and it required presidential intercession before it finally appeared, indicated the level of controversy it generated even before it was published. The controversy broke out on two levels. First, the perceived anti-Catholic stance of the book. For this, Agoncillo found himself in a running debate with the spokesperson of the Catholic Church and a scholar in his own right, Hernandez of the University of Santo Tomas (Agoncillo 1958). And second, concerning Agoncillo’s class bias and other methodological issues. This is exemplified by the interesting exchange he had with his colleagues at the University of the Philippines (See Zafra (1956b). For an overview and analysis of the debates and other controversies, see Hila (2003).
engine of historical change. In his view, the hinge on which history turns is the struggle of the masses for greater freedom from colonial bondage and from oppression by the elite. Guerrero, for her part, has assaulted Agoncillo’s revolt of the masses thesis by demonstrating that it was the provincial and municipal elites who led the revolution in northern Luzon while the masses, abused by the Filipino elites and burdened by the policies of the Aguinaldo government, had every incentive not to support the revolutionary struggle, and even rose against the elites and the elite-led Philippine republic (Guerrero 1977; 1982). Glenn May who conducted research on the Southern Tagalog province of Batangas concurred with Guerrero. He claimed that patron-client relationship accounted for the involvement of the ‘masses.’ That is, it was the elite who led the fight against the foreigners and the retinue of their underlings merely followed suit, either under duress or in deference to the wishes of their patron.41

Rather than pitting one against another, the Tadhana opted to combine the mass and the elitist elements as necessary ingredients of the revolution. It explicitly denied that it was a revolt of the masses. Rather than a manifestation of class struggle, it was presented as an “expression of the national community,” and as a “product both of ilustrado and mass ideologies” (Marcos 1976c, 38). Painstakingly, it provided a smooth transition from the elitist Propaganda movement to the founding of La Liga Filipina (hereafter Liga)42 to the formation of the Katipunan. Whereas Agoncillo and Constantino drew a sharp contrast between the intent and the methods preferred by the Propaganda Movement and the Katipunan, and saw Katipunan as a necessary offshoot of the failure of the Propaganda Movement, the Tadhana endeavored to blur the line separating the two. This was done by underscoring the mixed membership, meaning both elite and ‘mass,’ of the Liga as well as its transitory role in giving birth to the Katipunan. Short-lived as the Liga

41 For perhaps the most direct attempt to revise Agoncillo’s thesis, see May’s article “Agoncillo’s Bonifacio: The Revolt of the Masses Reconsidered” (1991). See also May’s various articles in the collection A Past Recovered (1987).

42 Rizal, realizing the futility of reformist efforts in Spain, returned to the Philippines and founded the La Liga Filipina on 3 July 1892. Three days later, he was deported to Dapitan and the Liga died a natural death shortly thereafter. On 7 July 1892, Bonifacio founded the Katipunan, in effect supplanting the Liga.
was, the Tadhana seems to overstate its importance by claiming that it was a "milestone in the effort of the reformers to link the ilustrados with the masses" and that it constituted the "marriage of strong social forces in a new dynamic ideology of national community" (Marcos 1982b, 432). In its effort to downplay the class element in the transition from Propaganda to Katipunan, the Tadhana declares: "The (Katipunan) movement was not so much a class takeover as an effort of the Filipino masses to take the leadership away from the ilustrados, who they felt, moved too slowly and too uncertainly" (Marcos 1982b, 431). With such a formulation whatever differences existed in their methods and objectives, and which to an extent reflected class differences, have been elided or effaced. This seems to pave the way for the view that partnership and complementarity, rather than contrast and oppositionality, should characterise the relationship between the Propaganda and Katipunan movements.

The Tadhana established a complementary relationship between the Propaganda Movement (elite) and the Katipunan (mass) by several means. First, it insisted that the ideology of the nascent national community drew both from the liberal ideas propounded by the Propagandists as well as from the 'populist-messianic sentiments of the masses,' an organized expression of which is the Katipunan, according to Tadhana (Marcos 1976c, 58). Second, it claims that the united front that made the Revolution possible was achieved when the ilustrado and mass elements were fused together and this was made possible through the combined efforts of the propagandists and the Katipunan. The Tadhana thus claims "Where Rizal and del Pilar represented the ilustrado reaching the masses in a common struggle against the frailocracy,43 Bonifacio stood for the masses struggling from below to reach the ear of the principalia-ilustrado" (emphasis original) (Marcos 1982b, 437). In other words, the "revolution represented the convergence of all the classes in Philippine society" (Marcos 1982b, 438).

43 Frailocracy or friarocracy refers to the rule of the Spanish friars. It seems it is used only in the Philippine academic discourse. A search on the web reveals that only sites related to the Philippines contains this word. Many dictionaries also do not recognise it.
This erasure of whatever class or regional differences or conflict that existed within the revolutionary movement seems deliberate. In the extended outline explaining the contents of Volume 3, Part (1896-1906), covering the Revolution up to early American period, no mention was made of the internal conflicts that dogged the revolutionary effort. The Outline focuses on the 'pragmatic and restrained' reaction of the Filipino nation toward the American incursion, stressing the cooperative stance of the Filipino leaders towards the Americans who promised them a 'Filipino State' (Marcos 1976c, 40-42). The silencing of the internal factional strife or class or regional contradictions in the analysis appeared to have been completed when the Tadhana blamed the 'feudal orientation of the Katipunan' for the downfall of Bonifacio and for jeopardising revolutionary efforts (Marcos 1982b, 438). The anti-foreign, anti-colonial aspects of the revolution are highlighted to the extent that internal or class-conflict elements are downplayed. Ironically, the Tadhana re-asserts some fundamental views on the Revolution propounded in earlier studies, considered as belonging to colonial historiography, such as Kalaw’s (1925) and Fernandez's (1926).

In fairness to the Tadhana, it was not alone in eschewing the Agoncillo-Constantino formulation. Trenchant, if sometimes only implied, criticisms came from a number of scholars such as Ileto (1979), Guererro (1977) and Schumacher (1975), but their views were easily engulfed by the overwhelming popularity of Agoncillo-Constantino views. More recently, Quibuyen (1998; 1999) offered a deeply penetrating analysis of the whole gamut of pertinent issues and conclusively demonstrated the continuity between and the complementarity of the Propaganda and the Katipunan, affirming to a certain extent Tadhana’s line of analysis.

44 Because the second volume of the abridgment that covers the period 1896 to 1970s has not been printed, in fact the manuscripts or galley proof are deemed to be lost, the only extant documentary basis are the extended outline, published as The Tadhana Outline plus a few other documents such as speeches and prefaces where brief references were made.

45 Interestingly and ironically, this echoes the view of some American colonial writers such as James Le Roy who emphasised the feudal character of the Katipunan.
The contentious character of the 1896 revolution is only a reflection of the multifarious nature of Philippine nationalisms on the whole. In earlier research carried out by the author, I examined the contents of 16 Philippine history textbooks published and/or used in public schools from the early 1900s up to 2000. I found out that it was only among textbooks used during the American period (Barrows 1907; Fernandez 1919/1932; and Benitez 1926) that fairly clear and consistent images of nationalism were discernible. That is, the parameters of a hegemonic nationalist discourse were rather well defined. In the post-war period, in contrast, clarity and consistency gave way to and was easily overwhelmed by ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion (Curaming 2001).

**Clio in the Hands of Power?**

That the Tadhana is a political project cannot be denied. Notwithstanding the scholars' strong protestation to the contrary, Marcos did in fact intend to use the project for his own political interest. Despite the maximum latitude he allowed the scholars in designing the project, Marcos seemed to have a fairly clear set of ideas as to how he might utilise its output. He was even said to be confident that the final shape of the project would coincide with his overall designs (Cristobal 2005). Most of the participant-scholars would vehemently deny this but the fact was Marcos had successfully, albeit partially, appropriated the “scholars' history” for his own political purpose, whether or not the scholars liked it or were aware of it. How and why it was achieved is a testament not only to knowledge's malleable character as a handmaiden of power but also, and of equal importance, to knowledge's ability to set the parameter for the exercise of power.

In Marcos's own intimation the problems of national identity, national unity, and national self-determination are among the 'principal national problems' that must be addressed in any governmental efforts and such efforts included the

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46 In Ileto’s article “History and Criticism: The Invention of Heroes,” a thoughtful response to May’s incendiary book *The Invention of Heroes*, there is a portion where he referred to the contested terrain of Philippine nationalisms. Interestingly, he challenged May to locate himself within it, rather than keep his (May’s) pretensions of being a disinterested outside observer. See Reynaldo Ileto (1998, 231-234).
writing of history (Marcos 1982a, 5). To most Filipinos in the 1970s, including the scholars who joined the project, these were reasonable, even desirable goals to pursue. It is no surprise then that the Tadhana as designed largely, and allegedly independently, by Salazar and Tan precisely fitted into this mould. Apparently there was a meeting of the minds between Marcos and the scholars, and that is probably one reason for Marcos’s full acceptance of the Outline when it was presented to him.

As noted in Chapter 3, the Tadhana is popularly perceived as a political project that forms part of Marcos’s effort to rationalise Martial Law. Despite reasons for believing that the truth is more complex, this perception has a prima facie validity to it. In declaring Martial Law and thereafter maintaining it for a decade, Marcos summoned a host of justifications foremost among which are (1) his alleged effort to ‘save’ the Republic from an impending take over by the leftist radicals and (2) his desire to reform the society and establish a new one where gross inequality is mitigated, oligarchic control neutralised and colonial legacies eased. That Marcos’s version of history as depicted in the Tadhana coincides considerably with these justifications lends credence to such popular perceptions. We should suspect, however, that we might be underestimating Marcos in supposing that that was in fact his only, or primary, purpose in mind. Considering Marcos’s track record of propensity for the impressive and the heroic, there may have been something grandiose in his overall plans.

As noted in the previous chapter, contrary to a commonly held belief, Marcos did not wish to appropriate the project as a medium to convince, to respond to or to argue with the people of his own time. He knew too well that there was no way his contemporaries would interpret the Tadhana other than as a self-serving political project. He pushed through with the project just the same because he had set his sights on the distant future. He wanted to address the

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47 Officially, the Martial Law did not last beyond a decade but Marcos’s grip on power did not ease even after it was formally lifted in 1981. So until Marcos was removed from power in the 1986, the Martial Law atmosphere reigned de facto.
people yet to be born, Filipinos and otherwise, who perhaps in a century hence, unencumbered by the bitter polarisation of contemporary politics, would judge fairly and would acquit his actions and appreciate the wisdom of his decisions (Cristobal 2005). In other words, he was setting an eye to arguing his case before the altar of history and he was staking a confident claim to a vindication.

Several factors are relevant in understanding the fit between Marcos's political interest and the design of the Tadhana. First is the radical politics, brewing since the 1950s, that saw the mounting effort to bring down the establishment. Second is the growing disenchantment with the liberal representative democracy that Marcos and others saw as having degenerated to become a rule by the oligarchs. Third is the upsurge in Filipino nationalism, and the escalating contestation for its definition. And lastly is Marcos's faith in the power of scholarship as a legitimating tool.

Politics of Indigenism

Earlier sections in this chapter have demonstrated that the Tadhana is particularly emphatic in its treatment of the pre-historic and pre-Hispanic periods. It proudly declares, not without justification, that it is the "first work on Philippine history that conceives prehistory as a necessary part of history." (italics mine) (Marcos 1980b, blurb) It also concedes, as already noted, that the indigenous principle permeates much of the framework of the project. From the point of view of scholars who participated, this is purely an act of filling a huge historiographic void. There is nothing political about it for, as they would rhetorically ask, "How can rock formation or human evolution or development of early settlements be political?" Salazar, for instance, adamantly declared that it was his personal policy to work only on topics as far removed from the Marcos years as possible. He believed that by focusing, say, on the prehistoric or pre-Hispanic period, he bore

48 In Marcos's words: Tadhana is a "history concerned with the indigenous as a principle of assimilation and growth...It became necessary for me to find out what were the native and indigenous structures that we could adopt for renewal in our New Society. How can we utilize the past in order to fortify the present and to assure the future" See Marcos (1982b, 6, 12).
no responsibility for whatever political intent ascribed to the Tadhana Project (Salazar 2004a; 1989, 198). Self-satisfied as Salazar was, he could not be more naïve in his supposition. It was precisely in the indigenous buried in the very distant past that the spectre of Marcos’s political project lurks.

The deeply political colour of the Tadhana’s emphasis on the indigenous can best be understood and appreciated by looking into the conditions that gave rise to the Project. Ileto convincingly demonstrates in one of his articles that the radical politics starting from the 1950s well up to the 1980s provides the ‘discursive frame’ through which Marcos’s effort at history writing could be understood. He argues that the challenge mounted by radical students not just against the Marcos regime but also against the entire ideological bedrock upon which it rested had prompted Marcos to wrest the revolutionary initiatives from the young radicals (Ileto 1998a, 177-201). The memory of the siege of Malacanang in January 1970 by the radical student activists seemed too frightening for Marcos to ignore (Rempel 1993). One prong in his multi-faceted response was to offer a supposedly revolutionary ideology designed to counter Marxism/Maoism/Leninism whose foreign provenance, among other things, purportedly made these ideologies inappropriate for the Philippines. At the same time, he could not hide his contempt for the liberal representative democracy, which like Marxism and its variants was of foreign origin (Marcos 1971, 64).

On this point, Larkin’s observation may be instructive. According to him the disenchantment with the failure of Western-inspired representative democracy as a means to improve the lot of the people may be one possible reason for the shift towards the search for the indigenous (Larkin 1979, 9-10). The problems began to appear not merely as systemic that may be remedied by changing one Western-inspired system (capitalism and liberal democracy) for another (socialism/communism). The critics grew more convinced that the roots of the problem went deeply back to Western mentality itself. More than systemic, the problem was
civilisational and the solution lay in recovering the indigenous elements to serve as the basis for creating a new system.

In Today's Revolution: Democracy (TRD, 1971) we can see Marcos's early effort to lay the groundwork for rejecting foreign models and finding a Filipino alternative. He offered the Filipino version of democracy, what he called the democratic revolution from the center, as this alternative. As though to implement this alternative immediately, soon after declaring Martial Law, he altered the political landscape in the local areas by making the barangay the basic political unit. This would serve, at the same time, as the socio-economic structure of the New Society. One of the purported aim of the New Society was “to strengthen the baranganic culture and retrieve its cultural elements...” (Marcos 1976b, vii). The New Society thus constitutes a return to or a re-recreation of the pre-Hispanic past where the barangay was thought to be the primeval core of nascent Filipino communities. Marcos rationalised this move by highlighting barangay's indigenous credentials: the barangay having emanated “from the traditions of our race (and) therefore it draws on spiritual strength” (Marcos Diary, entry for 9 January 1973). Hard to please as Marcos was known to be, it was likely that he felt less than satisfied; he needed a more compelling set of justifications. Enter the Tadhana. What the Tadhana does, with all its emphasis on the indigenous, is to formally encode in a historical, scholarly, and presumably authoritative template what otherwise would seem to be an obviously political move. By doing so, the act seems domesticated and naturalised and was made to appear truthful and more acceptable, or so Marcos hoped. At the same time, as Ileto noted (1998a) the position of history as a battlefield in his multi-cornered struggle against leftist and rightist adversaries has been highlighted.

There is something in history, and all other disciplines dealing with the past, that seems to makes it prone to contestation. Distance or remoteness is a fertile breeding ground for uncertainty that is one factor that fuels disagreement. In the absence of a broad platform upon which to base contrary or alternative views, the
few who have access to 'expert knowledge' tend to monopolise debates among themselves, to the effective exclusion of the general public. From this vantage point, the Tadhana's emphasis on the distant past, and the employment of highly-credentialed scholars to provide 'expert knowledge' about it, are, perhaps with or without meaning it, strategic. To the extent that the past is lost, it is manipulable.

The dexterity by which Tadhana knits the pre-Hispanic periods into a coherent whole, from the onset of the Big Bang, to the geologic formation of the archipelago and the evolution of Adam in the Philippines, all the way to the formation of Filipino identity with its deep roots in the Austronesian past; all these lend a patina of credence only serious scholarship can give to otherwise patently self-serving political motives. Besides, without such a master stroke, rejecting foreign models and talking about Filipino ideology seem hollow, for what was commonly thought of as Filipino was nothing more than a concoction of ‘three centuries in the convent and forty years under the spell of Hollywood.’ By anchoring the Filipino in a very distant past, it makes some sense to eschew foreign models and consider a ‘genuinely Filipino’ alternative.

One challenge, however, was how to present a consistent image of a ‘genuinely Filipino’ alternative, considering that the Philippine state itself, as almost everyone takes for granted, was a child of the Philippine Revolution which in turn was inalienably linked to Spanish colonisation. Tenuously, the Tadhana confronts the challenge by tracing the origin of the New Society government not to the Spanish colonial state but to the supposedly autochthonous ethnic states that emerged long before the Spaniards came. As earlier noted, the Tadhana asserts that the colonial state established by the Spaniards could not but build upon the existing framework defined by ethnic states (or the barangays), making it some kind of an indigenous state (Marcos 1976c, 10-11). By such a stroke, the continuity of the ethnic states with the contemporary government is thus forged and the genuineness of its claim to Filipino-ness is affirmed. It becomes seemingly easier, then, to present the New Society as an appropriate vehicle for searching the
"Filipino identity to solve the centuries of ambivalence in national attitudes, values and action..." (Marcos 1976b, vii). In the end, the Tadhana drove home the message that Marcos wanted every Filipino to imbibe: that the New Society is the tadhana, the destiny of the Filipino people. With the use of such a metaphysical idiom, Marcos seemed bent on strengthening his deposition before the judging eyes of Clio. Whether that would ultimately help, we have yet to see. But so far, he has not succeeded.

The choice of the title Tadhana was ominous. Tadhana is a Tagalog word, probably derived from Sanskrit, whose close equivalent in English is destiny or fate. It carries a connotation that things are beyond one’s control, as God or the celestial forces predetermine their course. As a nationalist project, Tadhana is expected to be teleological. It appears, however, to be more than that. By tying history to destiny, not just to the nation’s destiny but also to that of Marcos’s, the triumvirate—history, destiny and Marcos—became inextricably linked in the metaphysical transcendence of time and space. It was a combination that was potentially formidable, and it certainly was not lost on Marcos. In his own words, “History is destiny. For long before you and I were born, history dictated the future of our country” (Marcos 1982a, 12). By eliding the past and the future, the present—Marcos, New Society, constitutional authoritarianism, whatever it was—became a fait accompli, a fate every Filipino must enjoy or endure as a necessary bridge to the glorious future.

Known rightly or wrongly for fatalism, the Filipinos were the obvious and vulnerable targets of the rhetorical device that was tadhana. It was an index to Marcos’s political acumen to frame his life, his political career, and the life of the nation using a metaphor that was not unlikely to appeal to many Filipinos. Predating the Tadhana Project was a host of commissioned biographical works in which the foreboding of greatness and inevitability of Marcos’s achievements was encoded. As noted by Rafael (2000, 128), in reading or viewing Marcos’s biographies, one cannot fail to sense that “biography merely confirms destiny.”
The bio-film *Iginuhit ng Tadhana (Destined by Fate or Written in Stars)*, which he utilised as powerful campaign material in the 1965 presidential election, cannot be more transparent. What the Tadhana Project did was not just to cap all previous efforts but also to inscribe Marcos's personal ambitions in the supposedly foreordained historical trajectory.

**Homogenizing Politics**

As already noted, the Tadhana rejects the class-based perspective, best exemplified by Agoncillo-Constantino, as well as its concomitant analytic approach to the Revolution. Such a move fits very well within the ambit of Marcos's political interests. Marcos may have had an intense hatred for the oligarchs, but he refused to take the side of the 'people' by viewing things exclusively from their viewpoint. That would have been tantamount to upholding the views of his leftist adversaries. Instead, he saw the oligarchs as the rent-seeking intermediaries that set the masses apart from the state, thus hampering national unity (Marcos 1971). Just as the friars who mediated between the colonial state and the people had to be eliminated, so did the oligarchs. If and when that was accomplished, much progress towards national unity would have been achieved. This is another way of saying that the Tadhana favours the homogeneity of the nation—homogeneity that, the Tadhana was careful to emphasise, is deeply rooted in the pre-Hispanic past. Thus any divisive elements—class-based conflicts, regionalism, and secessionism—are seen to be anomalous and the state must deal with them by all means possible, including the use of force. In this, Marcos's multi-faceted and at times violent struggles against the leftist radicals, the oligarchs, the liberal politicians, the Church, the press, the Muslim separatists and others found justification. He seemed to say, it was not just called for by an instinct for self-preservation; it was necessary for the survival and security of the nation.

The effacing of any conflict or internal difference is best showcased by the Tadhana's treatment of the Katipunan and the Revolution. As already noted, the Tadhana excises or silences any conflict or differences between the 'masses' and the
elite, Bonifacio and Aguinaldo, Caviteño and the rest, to mention but a few. Considering Marcos’s desire to draw parallels between the 1896 revolution and his democratic revolution, this is not just understandable, but also expected. Faced with ever sharpening division on all fronts—social, political, ideological and cultural—the Tadhana in its articulation of Marcos’s definition of the usable past had to emphasise history’s homogenising, unifying function.

On a side note, in the context of the scholars’ strong protestation of their independence, the treatment of the Katipunan and the Revolution seems to be rather curious. Considering that the scholar-participants were invariably from the University of the Philippines, and that a good number of them were even jailed for their nationalism and anti-Marcos activism, it is rather unusual that the Tadhana was so clearly designed in stark contrast to Agoncillo-Constantino’s formulation. Not only that, it re-inscribes parts of ‘colonial historiography’ on the Revolution in a way long rejected by the scholars who wished to be identified with the ‘nationalists.’ It was the Agoncillo-Constantino line of nationalism, buttressed by Amado Guerrero, that informed significantly the whole anti-colonial, anti-state nationalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s in which the University of the Philippine was the undisputed centre.49 One can surmise that had the core scholars in fact had their way, the Revolution would have not been treated in a fashion that would make Agoncillo and Constantino turn over in their grave. While it is true that there are different shades of Philippine nationalisms, and that different stakeholders were scrambling to assert their own definitions, the Tadhana’s treatment of the revolution may be taken as indicator of the triumph of Marcos’s political interest over that of the scholars.

On the other hand, one cannot totally rule out the possibility that the Tadhana-makers were in fact consciously going against the tide of Agoncillo-

49 As observed by Ileto, the radicalisation of the youth followed and borrowed strength, at least in part, from the shift in historical consciousness marked by displacement of the reformist Rizal by the revolutionary Bonifacio. Such a shift, he further noted, owed much to the revisionist historical interpretations of the events of 1896 as proffered by Agoncillo and Constantino as well as by Amado Guerrero. See Reynaldo Ileto (1998a)
Constantino tradition. From the vantage point of the post-Tadhana historiographic landscape, it is clear that the Agoncillo-Constantino tradition had spent much of its force, at least from the viewpoint of certain groups, and has given way to a more indigenous version of nationalism, the version pioneered by the Tadhana. In a sense therefore, the Tadhana constitutes a transition in the development of indigenism in Philippine historiography.

Other Indicators

Aside from the emphasis on the indigenous and on the homogenizing aspects in the perspective and treatment of the Revolution, other clues about the political character of the Tadhana may be found in the presentation of the book as well as in the rhetorical styles employed. For instance, in the preface of the first volume of the abridgment, Marcos writes: "History is nothing if it is not an orderly account of events in chronological sequence...From (geologic past to) the barangay to the modern state runs the thread of a narrative that must be told in a comprehensible and orderly manner, if it is to be told at all" (Marcos 1982b, ii-iii). This passage forms a part of what was reproduced in the blurb usually reserved for the catchy and juicy tidbits to whet readers' interest. In the context of deeply entrenched tradition where lucid written expression and linear, orderly narrative are taken for granted, one can only wonder what was the need for being over-emphatic about it. Recalling, however, that clarity of message is an absolute requirement in any propaganda, lest the message gets distorted or lost, the emphasis becomes comprehensible.

Likewise, efforts have been made to domesticate the idea of a new society. While Marcos took pride in having a proprietary claim (through the TRD) to the idea, he nonetheless emphasizes in the Tadhana that the New Society he wanted to establish in the 1970s was just the most recent in the series of societal renewals that recurbed throughout Philippine history. In his words: "(M)ankind, not least of all Filipino, is continually reborn in an endless recurrence of creation that has set upon the planet a succession of new societies" (Marcos 1982b, iv). He also believes that
“(e)very distinct epoch...entailed a ‘new society,’ so that our history may be viewed as essentially a series of new societies, each bringing change, if only in texture, mood or pattern” (Marcos 1976b, viii). By locating the New Society within the familiar, he seems to encourage everyone to accept on-going changes and to participate in and share with the birth pangs of a supposedly ‘natural’ transformative process. Probably wanting to offer additional inducement, he dignifies such participation as “…perhaps the most historic act of all” (Ibid.).

Conclusion

To sum up, the Tadhana was both a reaction to and an accommodation of the rather fluid nationalist traditions in Philippine historiography. It was at the same time an attempt to push back the frontiers of these traditions. As a reaction, it was mindful of the problems that had long haunted Philippine historiography and it aimed to offer alternative solutions to these problems. As an accommodating move, it framed its narrative within the long-familiar nationalist, anti-colonial template but only occasionally carelessly fell into old clichés that had been quite common among nationalist writings in the Philippines. As indications of its conscious attempt to raise the historiographic benchmark, it offered among other things a framework that was refreshing for its scope and theoretical coherence and for the novelty and boldness of its approaches and interpretations. It was also remarkable for the richness of the historical databank it was able to set up—a databank that enabled it to fill in some important gaps that had long existed in the historical narrative. Though not without its shortcomings, the Tadhana Project arguably constitutes a quest for a higher degree of sophistication in Philippine historical scholarship. Its progenitors intended it to be so. While working on it, they were conscious of the increasing competition in the marketplace of historical ideas and approaches within and beyond Philippine historiography. They may not

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50 Marcos correctly noted that the unsatisfactory state of historical studies in the country owed much to the fact that ‘reconstruction of the past is still incomplete...We get by with certain romantic generalisation about the past and about its relevance to the contemporary times, but in fact whole scores and even centuries of our history have not merited enough study and analysis from our scholars in order to prove or disprove these conclusions’ (Marcos 1982a, 4).
have been forthright about what was at stake in the whole enterprise, but considering the ‘logistics and logic’\textsuperscript{51} of power relations within and beyond the scholarly community, the Tadhana and the scholars who took part in it, appear to be staking a claim to social acceptance, to academic accolade, perhaps to political patronage as well, but most importantly, to the symbolic power that goes with all of them. By striking a partnership with a powerful state, they probably thought it was strategic for gaining the broadest ‘market share’ for the version of history they propounded.

The fact, however, that the Tadhana was also a political project proved disastrous to such aspirations (both for the scholars and for the project as a whole). It seems precisely because of the Marcos signature that the Tadhana has been off-handedly dismissed as undiluted propaganda. Whatever scholarly value the scholar-participants may have invested in it hardly mattered in the face of the adverse political fall out. Then as now, only a handful of scholars out of the Tadhana circle realised and appreciated its scholarly value. Clio and her disciples’ quest for greater power appears to have backfired. Or perhaps, that is a premature judgment as only time can tell.

That Marcos sought the service of Clio’s disciples cannot be adequately explained by his desire for more power. The other side, points to its limits. Anyone it seems to whom history matters has not much choice but to play by its rules, which incidentally can be bent only so much.\textsuperscript{52} It is easy to see individual (or group) effort to sway history to their side as a sign of the absolute manipulability (or powerlessness) of knowledge. Easily overlooked is the more deep-seated issue of why the effort was made in the first place. Pointing to the quest for power is only half the equation. For one does not seek more power if he has enough. Who or

\textsuperscript{51} I borrow the phrase from Vicente Rafael’s engaging article, “Patronage, Pornography, and Youth.” (2000, 123).

\textsuperscript{52} The case of Suharto regime’s (specifically military’s) manipulation of history seems to pose a challenge to the line of thought I am trying to develop here. But as I hope to demonstrate in Chapters 5 & 6, Indonesia is interesting not because it negates the idea of dialectical relationship between power and knowledge but because it offers contrasting case that can illustrate the range of possibilities within the same frame.
what causes, then, the feeling of inadequacy that necessitates the quest for more? Anyone’s access to the real world is mediated by the knowledge he/she has about it. In the case of Marcos whose sense of history arguably finds not many peers among political leaders, the mediatory role of history can be easily posited. Against the risk of reifying history, however, it must be underscored that Marcos’ understanding of it, as anyone else’s, is highly personal. To the extent, however, that one wants to utilise history for the purpose of gaining more power, one cannot but contend with the sociality of historical understanding. At the heart of such sociality lies the ‘autonomy’ of knowledge vis-à-vis power of certain groups or individual. I hope that by comparing the case of the Tadhana with the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (SNI) we can gain deeper understanding of how knowledge and power interact.
CHAPTER V

THE SEJARAH NASIONAL INDONESIA

It has been said that although God cannot alter the past, historians can. It is perhaps because they can be useful to Him in this respect that He tolerates their existence.

- Samuel Butler, Erewhon Revisited (1949 [1901])

The idea of writing national history through a collective effort was conceived rather early in Indonesia. Barely had the ashes of the war for independence settled when a committee was appointed in 1951 to undertake a history-writing project (Sartono 1975; Surjomihardjo 1987b). The committee consisted of the most prestigious scholars of the time—Poerbatjaraka, Yamin, Djajadiningrat, Soekanto and Resink. For unknown reasons, however, the plan did not materialise (Abdullah 1994). Another proposal was put forward in 1957 during Prijono’s stint as Minister of Education and a committee was formed in 1963 (Sinar Harapan 1976). Perhaps due to the strained political atmosphere during that time, however, nothing came out of it too. Only in the wake of the Second National History Seminar (Seminar Sejarah Nasional, hereafter SSN2) held on 26-29 August 1970 that concrete results would eventuate. The product would be a six-

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1 Abdullah (1994) speculates on possible reasons: (1) they could not agree on the concept of national history; (2) they were too prominent to find time to write a textbook; or (3) academic or ideological incompatibilities. In the case of the second attempt in the 1960s Nugroho Notosusanto (1969, 4) claimed that the government during the Guided Democracy was not willing to entrust the writing of history to historians whom they thought were not “politically correct.”

2 The surat keputusan (letter of decision or instruction) dated 13 March 1957, issued by the then Minister of Education, Prijono, stipulates that one of the main objectives of the seminar was to collect materials that will be used to compile a national history, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia. See Laporan Seminar Sedjarah (1958, 8).

3 Taufik Abdullah succinctly captured the impact of Guided Democracy atmosphere on historical studies in Indonesia in these words: “The emergence of the Guided Democracy marked the waning of the pluralities of expressed ideas. The meaning and understanding of history was no longer to be continuously searched for, but rather something to be supplied the ‘revolutionary’ nationalist regime” (1975, 99.).
volume opus simply entitled *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (National History of Indonesia).

Like Tadhana, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (SNI) was a partnership between two forces that some people believed contain contradictory elements. While both projects were laboratories of tensions between politics and scholarship, they nonetheless offer illustrations, in different shades, of a symbiotic relationship or a creative fusion of powers emanating from each domain.

In the following section, I will attempt to narrate a story, or pockets of stories, about the inception of the SNI. The context and the driving forces for the Project will also be noted as a prelude to a more detailed discussion in the next chapter. To be provided likewise are snapshots of the implementation of the project with particular emphasis on the dynamics of the relationship among the protagonists. The last section will focus on responses to the Project which will lay the groundwork for an in-depth investigation of the context and the content of the SNI in the next chapter.

**Inception and Driving Forces**

While the *Seminar Sejarah Nasional II* (SSN2) is commonly perceived to have given birth to the Project, lending it an aura of a consensual decision, it was in fact conceived and was given official imprimatur several months before the national seminar. On 4 April 1970, more than four months before the SSN2, the Minister of Education and Culture, Mashuri, issued a decision letter (No. 0173/70) designating the Committee for the Writing of the Standard Book on the National

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4 Abdullah (1994) for instance noted that one of the resolutions emanating from the SSN2 was the decision to write a standard history book and that the government took over such decision and formed a committee to oversee its implementation. (p. 14-15). In contrast, an article in *Sinar Harapan* (1970b) published a few days after the Seminar noted that Professor Sartono in his closing remarks categorically stated that the just concluded national seminar opted not to identify specific resolutions. Surjomihardjo (1980) for his part, in rejecting Nugroho's claim that the government chose the people who would be involved in the project, declared that he had observed the process at close range, from the formation of the committee that would oversee the SSN 2 and thereafter the SNI and he could say that the decision on who to invite came from the historians themselves. Even Sartono, in my interview with him (22 June 2005 and 15 December 2005) insisted that it was a collegial decision of the community of historians that emerged as an offshoot of the SSN2 and the formation of *Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia* (MSI, Association of Historians of Indonesia) in August 1970.
History of Indonesia. Stipulations in the letter included the following: (1) that the book be based on Pancasila; (2) that it could be used in the universities; and (3) that it could be utilised as the basis for writing textbooks for elementary and high schools (Zain 1976). The appointment of the Committee was preceded by meetings among historians and between the historians and the Minister himself. In short, the idea was already being “cooked” by the time it was presented to the SSN2 in August 1970 for the acclamation of the whole community of historians. Only the details would have to be spelt out later. Unknown to the historians who took part in the seminal meetings, the germ of the controversies that were to haunt the Project once it saw print in 1975 and beyond had been planted at that very early stage.5

Sartono, who would spearhead the Project, admitted that he was “dubious” about the idea of writing a national history at that time. Asked about the reasons, he carefully couched his words in very polite terms saying to the effect that the experience or the abilities of the prospective members of the team in writing history were “so uneven” (Sartono 2005a). Underneath such polite words was the fact that by that time there were hardly sufficient intellectual resources to carry out the project successfully.6 By 1970, there were, for instance, only two scholars with a PhD in History (with Indonesia as their expertise) in Indonesia, both still fresh from overseas: Sartono who completed his PhD degree in 1966 in Amsterdam, and Taufik Abdullah who obtained his in 1970 from Cornell. The first homegrown PhD in History would not be produced until Nugroho Nodosusanto was conferred the degree by the University of Indonesia in 1977. According to Sartono, the same scepticism was shared by other scholars who attended the initial meeting, but

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5 The earliest documented effort of Nugroho to convince the Indonesian historians happened sometime in February 1969. On the occasion of “Scholarship, Reunion and Graduation Week” (Pekan Kegiatan Ilmiah, Reuni Sarjana dan Wisuda) of the Faculty of Arts and Culture of the UGM, Nugroho delivered a lecture entitled “Sedjarawan Indonesia dan Sedjarah Indonesia.” (Indonesia Historians and Indonesian History) In this lecture, he proposed that it was about time that the community of scholars undertook the writing of a “standard” Indonesian history. (Nodosusanto 1969).

6 In an article that appeared in Kompas the day before the start of the SSN 2, Sartono’s assessment was agreed with by an undisclosed observer who noted that with few exception, one cannot but admit the bitter fact that in terms of quality and quantity the output of the existing generation of Indonesian historians was still inadequate (belum memadai). See “Menjonsong seminar sedjarah nasional ke II,” Kompas (1970a).
Nugroho Notosusanto firmly believed otherwise (Sartono 2005a). He forcefully argued that one cannot say that they were not yet ready until they did it and saw the results. He said that for too long Indonesian historians had been engaged in discussing abstractions as how should history be written, it was thus about time that they focused on the concrete, and they could best learn and develop clear concepts and methods while in the process of writing history itself (Notosusanto 1969, 8-9). Steadfast in his conviction, he won the day, as he often would in the course of the Project. Well placed in the government, and a friend of the then Minister of Education, Mashuri, he facilitated the release of the decision letter and convinced fellow historians to undertake the Project.

Before we move on, let us take a look at the contrasting background of the two main protagonists of this story: Sartono Kartodirdjo and Nugroho Notosusanto. Sartono is a towering figure in Indonesian historiography. He holds the distinction of being Indonesia’s first professionally trained historian and his academic achievements were impressive. He graduated (doktorandus in History) from UI in 1956, took his MA at Yale under Harry Benda in 1963, and opted to do a PhD in Amsterdam, through the encouragement of Benda himself. He obtained the degree in 1966. He has a well-deserved international reputation for a number of his publications and he has dominated at least the “academic” history landscape in Indonesia for decades. Now in his 80s, almost blind but still sharp and lucid, his achievements, if not also influence, remain unsurpassed. To many among his peers in and outside of the country, he embodies ‘scientific history’ as opposed to ‘politicised history’ for which much of Indonesian contemporary history-writing is known.

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7 Sartono recalled that at the time there were exchanges between those who supported and those who opposed the idea, he received a small note (he did not specify from whom) indicating that the Ministry of Education had already agreed upon the plan and that the Ministry would fund the project. It was at that point that he acceded to the proposal (Sartono 2005a).

8 Patterned after the Dutch system, doktorandus in Indonesia in the 1950-1960s roughly corresponded to a Master’s degree. After about 3 years of Bachelor’s degree (Sarjana Muda), some students study for about 2 more years and write a thesis to get the doktorandus degree).

9 According to Sartono, it was Benda who suggested to him to do a PhD in Amsterdam for the simple reason that that archives were there (Sartono 2005a).
Nugroho stood in notable contrast to Sartono. He used to be a fairly well-known literary figure, an author of short stories, in the 1950s before he opted to become a historian. Academically his credentials as historian were not as impressive despite holding the distinction of perhaps being the first homegrown PhD. Some observers, friends and critics alike, would tend to harp back to his literary background, his not being a "pure historian" (sejarawan murni), for his putative "sins against history." By that, it refers to his well-known reputation as an apologist or an ideologue of the New Order regime. He went to SOAS in 1960 on a Rockefeller fellowship purportedly to do a Master's degree in philosophy of history but he left in 1962 before the degree was completed. While he went on to obtain his PhD in History from the University of Indonesia (UI) in 1977, the circumstances surrounding the conferment of the degree tends to cast doubt on its merit. He became the Department of History's first professor of history in 1980.

10 A running joke, for instance, between Taufik Abdullah and Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo was that Nugroho was like that because he was not from the Department of History but from General Studies (also in UI). That is, in the 50s and 60s, the Faculty of Arts allowed students who were still undecided to stay in the General Studies program and decide later on what specialisation to pursue. Nugroho was one of those students. He used to be much more interested in literature and only in later years he opted to move to history (Abdullah 2005). Adrian Lapian likewise expressed more or less similar view. In his words, "(Nugroho) started in literature and then majored in History. So he didn't have a full course of History. Only one year..." (Lapian 2005).

11 While informants from Indonesia all attested to this information, Wang Gungwu offered a different view. According to him, Nugroho and he were both Rockefeller grantees in SOAS in 1960-62, but not as degree students. Instead, they both were doing research. He said that if he remembered it right, Nugroho worked on the question of British involvement in the Indonesian revolution (Wang Gungwu 2005).

12 The reason for prematurely returning to Indonesia remains unclear. His wife, Irma Nutosusanto(2005), who joined him in London, related that at the height of the crisis on Irian in 1962 Nugroho all of a sudden told her that he wanted to go home saying that war was breaking and he didn't like to be overseas when there was war in Indonesia. So off they went. Later, however, she thought that the real reason could be related to the problem of severe lack of lecturers in the Faculty of Arts at UI as well as to the increasing polarization of campus politics that left no one interested in occupying the position of Dean of Student Affairs.

13 Sartono related that, sometime in 1977, Nugroho approached him after completing in Japan the draft of his PhD thesis. Nugroho asked Sartono to be promoted to PhD. Sartono found the draft inadequate and so he turned down the request for promotion. Revisions had to be made before he could approve the thesis. Apparently, Nugroho did not want to revise. After quite some time, Sartono was notified by UI that there would be a change in the composition of Nugroho’s thesis committee. That is, that Harsha Bachtiar would be willing to act as the promoter (main supervisor) and Sartono would become just a co-promoter. The promotion day was set but mysteriously, Sartono was not properly informed. He said that he asked the UI personnel where and when the promotion would be done, but he never got a clear response from them. Meanwhile, Sartono had to go to Istanbul for a conference and while he was away, Nugroho's promotion to PhD was done (Sartono 2005a). That a plot may have been hatched may be glimpsed from putting together Sartono’s story and some relevant information from an anonymous informant. This informant said that some people in the Faculty of Arts and the History Department had interpreted Sartono’s refusal to promote Nugroho as an indication of brewing professional jealousy on the part of Sartono. During that time, Sartono
He was a towering figure in the Department and his influences cast a long shadow over it, even after he died in 1985 (Irsyam 2005). His shadow actually extended beyond academe into the society at large as some would go as far as crediting him for enormous contribution in popularising history among the common people (Suryanegara 1985, 6). He was invited to join and lead the Armed Forces History Center (Pusat Sejarah ABRI, thereafter *Pusjarah*) in 1964 and began almost two decades of loyal service to the military. His military service formally ended only when he was installed as Rector of the University of Indonesia (UI) in 1983. While in the military, he maintained his ties with the UI as a lecturer/professor in, even at some point the Head of the Department of History. Many are convinced that his devoted and loyal service to the military earned him military commendations and

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14 Nugroho was appointed professor on 6 January 1980 (*Kompas* 1980, 1). That he was the first Professor of History at UI needs clarification. Only a professor can supervise and promote a PhD. In the 1970s, only Harsha Bachtiar held that rank in the History Department of UI. That explains why he was the one who promoted Nugroho to PhD, after Sartono who was the original supervisor appeared to have been unceremoniously sidelined (more on this later). Harsha Bachtiar’s PhD however was in Sociology, not in History, so he was often not considered a Professor of History. Nevertheless, since he taught Social History (*Sejarah Masyarakat*) he was with the Department of History. So strictly speaking, as Nugroho himself did declare publicly, (*Sinar Harapan* 1980c) there were only two professors of history in Indonesia up to the early 80s, that is, Sartono and himself.

15 Suryanegara notes that Nugroho’s controversial historical works may have contributed greatly to popularising (memasyarakatkan) history. The uproar, he further noted, over PSPB that ensued after the death of Nugroho in June 1985 indicated his success.

16 For details about Nugroho’s life and service to the military, see McGregor (2002, Chapter 4; 2005).
apparently political appointments in the government as well. On the other hand, these government appointments made many people doubtful of his integrity as an intellectual. He ranks perhaps among the most controversial personalities in Indonesia's postwar history as, some would say, an exemplar of the 'intellectual prostitute.' As far as orientation in writing history is concerned, he favoured a more conventional chronological-narrative approach with heavy emphasis on military and political aspects.

What gave rise to the Project was a confluence of factors. At the broadest and the most fundamental level, the nationalist atmosphere provided a template that brought all the participants together, as in the case of Tadhana. With the perception of the colonial orientation of existing history books, the scholar-participants shared a desire to contribute towards countering or neutralising the legacies of a 'colonised history.' They all believed they were doing something good, something they could be proud of, because it was a nationalistic undertaking. They believed that what they were doing was a historic act; they were not just writing history, they were at the same time making it (Sinar Harapan 1970a).

Beyond the limited circle of scholars, encouraging support for the Project came from various segments of the society. Press coverage of the SSN2, for instance, focused heavily on the supposed main objective of the conference. That is, to take stock of researches in history with the view of producing a national history. This level of interest was not surprising considering that the

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17 Many of my informants believe that Nugroho's appointments first as Rector of UI and later as Minister of Education were a sort of 'reward' for his loyal service to the military. Even one of his very close former adjutants in the Pusjarah believes so.

18 Saraswati Barkah, for instance, in his article in Sinar Harapan (1 October 1985, pp. 5,7) noted that now that Bung Karno was dead, he (Nugroho) attacks him whereas in 1966 Saraswati said she could attest to the fact that Nugroho wrote articles praising Bung Karno. She was implying that the change in Nugroho's tone may well indicate his doubtful integrity as intellectual.

19 Examples include Vlekke's Nusantara (1945, 1959).

decolonisation effort was mounting in Indonesia as elsewhere in Asia and Africa, and history was seen as among the most important areas that badly needed decolonisation. Even Sartono, who doubted the timing and the chance of success of the project, could not but be carried along the currents of the time. He was persuaded to lead the project. In his opening remarks in the SSN2, he justified the conference by stating that there had not yet been a coordinated effort to write a national (non-colonial) history and that the existing history textbooks he described as "chaotic" and afflicted by too much commercialism (*Sinar Harapan* 1970a; *Kompas* 1970b). He also noted that Indonesia was being left behind by neighbouring countries in its efforts to write national history. Apparently this realisation came from his participation in the International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA) conference, held in Kuala Lumpur in 1968 (*Sinar Harapan* 1970a).

From a political standpoint, the 1970s was auspicious for the Indonesian state to undertake a history writing project. It was going through a period of consolidation. Sponsoring a history-writing project, and installing the output as the 'standard history' to which all history textbook writings would refer, appeared to be a politically strategic act.

It was not clear whether it was Nugroho's original idea to undertake the project or it was an order that came from the higher authorities. What was certain was that he gathered and convinced a small group of historians/scholars who would eventually form the backbone of the project.21

Nugroho recalled that prior to the idea of forming a team to write national history, an idea was floated to have a nation-wide history-writing contest whereby worthy entries would form various chapters in the projected book. After due

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21 The earliest documented effort of Nugroho to persuade the scholars to undertake the project is clearly seen in a lecture he delivered in UGM in early 1969 on the occasion of the "Scholarship, Reunion and Graduation Week." His lecture is entitled "Sedjarawan Indonesia dan Sedjarah Indonesia" (Indonesian Historian and Indonesian History) Notosusanto (1969).
consideration, however, they realised that entries to the contest might not guarantee the quality of the prospective book. It was then that the option to form a team of writers was taken up instead (Zain 1976). The shape of the team readily followed the six panels in the conference: prehistory, ancient period (Hindu-Buddhist period), Islamic kingdoms (1500-1800 AD), colonial period, national awakening and the Japanese period up to New Order. The heads of the various panels became the respective editors of the six volumes (Lapian 2005). For details, see Table 5.1

Table 5.1

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<td>18th-19th century (Abad 18th-19th)</td>
<td>Sutjipto (Editor), Djoko Suryo, Sartono</td>
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<td>National Awakening</td>
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<td>Wiesmar, M. Marbun, Rochman Santoso, Saleh</td>
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22 "This was corroborated by a candid assessment of the SSN 2 published in Kompas, 16 September 1970, whereby the author observed that in general the papers presented at the conference fell short of expectations as only a handful were products of original, empirical research. Mostly, papers were summaries or synthesis of previously published works (Siswadhi 1970)."
The team was led by three main editors, Sartono Kartodirdjo, Merwati Djoenid Poesponegoro, and Nugroho Notosusanto. Sartono occupied the highest post being the Editor Umum (General or overall editor). This was in obvious recognition of Sartono’s leading position in the community of historians in Indonesia. Merwati Poesponegoro, on the other hand, was appointed to the core group primarily because of seniority. Her expertise was in European history, and she would play a mostly ceremonial role as one of the main editors. If Sartono earned his place in the leadership for his academic reputation and Merwati for seniority, it seemed that Nugroho was assigned to the core group because of the combination of the two reasons. He was among the most senior and he also had some standing in the academic community. Among historians interested in contemporary history at that time he was perhaps among the most productive, if not also the most senior. This put him in the editorship of Volume 6, which dealt with the contemporary period. Besides, the project seemed to be his personal initiative so it does not surprise that he occupied one of the key positions.

Implementation

The available details about the implementation of the project are at best fragmentary. Djoko Suryo had a vivid memory of the early stage when Sartono was conceptualising the project. Being Sartono’s protégé, Djoko had observed him at close range. He said he was the first to know the design because, being Sartono’s assistant, he typed the manuscript. He recalled the procedures by which Sartono meticulously drew up a grand plan, starting from identifying the general questions and specific themes, justifying the perspective, drawing up periodisation,

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23 Note: Sartono Kartodirdjo is more popularly known simply as Sartono, so he will be referred to here as Sartono, including in citing references. While Kartodirdjo is his family name and many libraries even in Indonesia would enter his works under this surname, reference to his name here would be under Sartono.

24 Note that by this time Poesponegoro was in her 60s, having been born in 1910 (Poesponegoro 1988, blurb). Taufik Abdullah recalled that when they were assigning specific tasks for the committee, they merely followed the hierarchy of officers in the MSI in determining the main editors. Since Sartono was the Chair, therefore, he was the General Editor, Merwati Poesponegoro was the First Vice Chair Nugroho was the Second Vice Chair thus they were assigned general editors as well (Abdullah 2005). Merwati Poesponegoro studied in Stanford and the Sorborne (Abdullah, 1975, 130; Poesponegoro 1988, blurb).

25 Merwati Poesponegoro was supposed to act as the style-editor but apparently she did not in fact do the job. In Adrian Lapian’s words, Merwati “didn’t contribute anything” (Lapian 2005).
identifying the methods of processing materials, up to projecting the substance of the written output. Djoko claimed that the “arguments, theories and perspectives, everything was there” and that he learned so much that he used the experience as a model for his own future research-design undertakings. Sartono also envisioned, so Djoko recalled, training the writers in theoretical and methodological approaches. The whole idea was “very, very idealistic,” according to him (Djoko Suryo 2005).

By November 1970, the conceptual framework worked out by Sartono was completed (Sartono 1972). A few meetings were then held among the members of core group (volume editors and main editors) as well as within each volume-team to formalise division of labor and discuss the suggested outline and the framework. The first task was to survey and gather available published materials for the respective periods (Surjomihardjo 1987a). Meanwhile, Soedjatmoko who was an enthusiastic supporter of the project suggested to Sartono that an intensive six-month preparation overseas be undertaken (Sartono 2005a; 2005b). Through the intercession of Soedjatmoko, then Indonesian ambassador to the United States (US), funding was secured from the Ford Foundation to allow Sartono and the six volume editors to go to the US and the Netherlands. The objectives were to undertake a ‘crash course’ on various aspects of social science theories and historical methodologies, as well as to gather materials. The trip materialised in November 1971. Sartono envisioned that after the intensive training overseas, they would revise or refine the framework that he had drawn up (Sartono 1972). He

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26 I was not able to find an extant copy of the detailed framework entitled “Kerangka Konseptual Sejarah Nasional Indonesia.”[Conceptual Framework of Indonesia’s National History] Sartono said it was published in an Indonesian journal but my search did not produce any result, even the indexes of journal articles published in Indonesia does not include such a title. However, one can get a glimpse of some of Sartono’s ideas and suggestion in a paper he presented in the workshop at Tugu, Bogor in June 1972. See Sartono (1972).

27 As noted for instance by Sagimun MD, one of the members of Vol. III team, their team met on 11-15 March 1971 in Tugu, Bogor and on 28 April 1972, to discuss plans of action of the team. See Sagimun MD (1972).

28 Soedjatmoko had a strong interest in the project. This was manifested by his encouragement and assistance in securing funds for the team to have an intensive training in historical methods overseas. This may be a reflection of his desire to ‘save’ history from the pervasive influence of the political environment, as he wrote in late 1950s to Kahin. See Kahin & Barnett (1990).
recounted that, prior to the group’s departure, he initially went to the US alone to look for an appropriate university with which they could affiliate. He visited Cornell, Wisconsin, Yale, Berkeley and another one which he could not recall. He finally decided to choose UC-Berkeley. He said that the primary reasons were that (1) the weather in Berkeley was appropriate to the tropical sensitivities of the member of the group, most of whom have not been overseas yet; and (2) that Berkeley’s Department of History, in Sartono’s assessment, was very strong in social history, the approach very much preferred by him (Sartono 2005a; Ford Foundation 2003, 123).

Almost every day from November 1971 up to March-April the following year they spent reading and discussing, among themselves and with historians from Berkeley. Mornings and afternoons were for reading and evenings usually for discussion. Things they read and discussed included the social science approach to history writing, social science theories and methods, recent research abroad about Indonesia and the experience of other nations in writing national history (for more details see Tjandrasasmita 1972). In Sartono’s count, they had 99 sessions in all (Sartono 2005a). Uka Tjandrasasmita, one of the volume editors, recalled the experience as pleasant and very intellectually productive and satisfying (Tjandrasasmita 2005). He was quoted by Sartono as saying that “I have) never read so many books in so short a time” (Sartono 2005a). Others, however, complained of being overwhelmed. Trying to know so much, they said, in so short a time could result in an overload (as recounted by Djoko Suryo 2005). They were also able to buy quite a lot of books, about 20-30 each per person, from the apparently generous per diem provided by the Ford. In April, they moved to the Netherlands primarily to gather materials. They stayed there for a month and in early May 1972, as Sartono recalled, they went back to Indonesia (Sartono 2005a; Ford Foundation 2003, 123).

Perhaps as a portent of what to come, this early part of the project encountered difficulties. The preparation in Berkeley did not go as smoothly as
Sartono hoped. Nugroho, for instance, could not complete the ‘program’ because, as the Head of the *Pusjarah*, he had other heavy responsibilities. He stayed for only two months (Ford Foundation 2003, 123). Buchori, the editor of Vol. 2, stayed in Cornell for unspecified reason rather than join the group in Berkeley, and only for two-three months (Sartono 2005a). Another one joined only in the Netherlands (Surjomihardjo 1987b).29 In the view of Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo this was a very early indication of the inability of the group to work together well (Ibid.).

About a month after returning from overseas, on 6-10 June 1972 they held a seminar-workshop in Tugu, Bogor where all the members of the team attended. At this meeting, each group reported on the progress of their work as well as on the problems so far encountered.30 Sartono also discussed the multi-dimensional approach to history and how this might be applied (Surjomihardho 1987a; Sartono 1972). The succeeding plenary meetings alternated among Bogor, Puncak and Jakarta and were held at least once every 6 months, coinciding with the semestral break from teaching in the university (Sartono 2005a). For each group, meetings were held more frequently, as needed (Sagimun 1972).31

Taufik Abdullah described plenary sessions as involving intense scrutiny of each team’s plans for their respective volumes. He recounted that having just returned with a PhD from Cornell (in his words “fresh from the oven”) he was eager to display what he knew. He earned the annoyance or fear (or both) of several in the group for his stinging criticisms. He particularly remembered his unforgiving critiques of Nugroho’s presentation, wherein the latter proposed what Taufik considered as an eschatological emplotment of Indonesian history. What was worse, according to Taufik, Nugroho proposed that the group should decide

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29 Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo’s version is slightly different from Sartono’s. He said that of the six volume editors, only three fully joined Sartono. One only stayed for a month (apparently Nugroho), the other one (apparently Buchori) joined only at the fourth month in the US, and the last one, only in Netherlands.

30 For details of what were discussed during the Workshop, see the three volumes of proceedings: *Lokakarya Buku Standard Sedjarah Indonesia*, Jilid I-III. (1972)

31 Sagimun M.D (1972), noted that they (the Volume 3 team) met a number of times before and after the volume editors went to Berkeley in Nov. 1971.
then on how to regard Sukarno, that is, whether he was a traitor or a hero. Taufik recalled that, admitting a lack of wisdom owing to youthful impudence, he lambasted Nugroho reminding him that in writing history, empirical data should decide the conclusion and not the other way around. Nugroho, Taufik surmised, was deeply hurt by having been humiliated in front of the whole team, which included his young associates in the *Pusjarah*. Taufik believes that Nugroho never forgave him for what he did (Abdullah 2005).

Djoko Suryo’s recollection was consistent with that of Taufik’s. He remembered that plenary discussions were an exhilarating experience, especially for someone as young and as eager to learn as he was. He recalled learning a lot from the sessions. He also could not forget memories of his contemporaries who were then working under Nugroho in *Pusjarah* and were assigned to Volume 6. These young protégés and protégées of Nugroho’s, so Djoko recalled, had to endure panic attacks whenever they had a presentation and Taufik Abdullah was there, always ready with loads of biting criticisms or difficult questions. While the rest of the team pitied them, they were also a constant source of amusement for the group (Djoko Suryo 2005).

The membership of each group was based mainly on the area of expertise. Each volume editor, however, seemed to have enjoyed de facto freedom to decide who to invite to become part of his team. Nugroho for instance chose to employ his protégés from *Pusjarah* who were all young and inexperienced, fresh from undergraduate (or doktorandus) studies at the UI Department of History. Against the backdrop of high hopes and expectations for the Project, at the early stage no one suspected, or no one voiced suspicion if there was any, that such a move was

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32 Yusmar Basri, one of Nugroho’s close aides in the *Pusjarah* who himself was present during the workshop said that although Nugroho was not the type of person who divulged what he felt, it was possible that Nugroho was indeed offended by Taufik’s broadside (Yusmar Basri 2005).
part of an undisclosed political motive behind the Project. Suspicion would arise only at a later stage (Djoko Suryo 2005; Sartono 2005a).33

Most members of the team shared Sartono’s avowal of the freedom they enjoyed while writing their respective assignments (Lapian 2005). Under no circumstances, Sartono strongly emphasized, were any government officials to watch over the proceedings, nor were there to be guidelines from the government as to what they could and could not write about or how specific events should be interpreted (Sartono 2005a).34 This freedom, however, seemed to apply only to volumes in which the government only had remote interest. As far as Volume 6 was concerned, that appeared not to be the case. As one of the members of Volume 6 team has confirmed, the way how they wrote the volume was in compliance with a “military mission.” That is, “to shear (the nation of) Sukarno” (Saleh As’ad Djamhari 2005a).35 As this will be discussed in depth in the next chapter, suffice it to state here that this statement refers to the effort to cleanse the collective national memory of anything good that Sukarno did or stood for. The regime seemed to believe that it was only by doing so that the nation could move on.

The framework drawn up by Sartono was based on a “multi-dimensional” approach to history. Sartono pioneered this approach in Indonesia and for decades it has been considered as sort of methodological ‘holy grail’ among many historians. The framework was discussed thoroughly during the plenary meetings but as actual outputs would show, it was not faithfully followed by the writers.

There may be three reasons why the framework was not satisfactorily followed. In terms of academic preparation, Sartono was well ahead of most of the other members of the team. Not only was the multi-dimensional approach

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33 Djoko Suryo (2005), for instance, said that other members of the team were too engrossed with their own tasks to be concerned about whatever political motive there might behind the composition of the Volume 6 team. Sartono concurred (2005a). He claimed at it was only much later when they began to sense that Nugroho was up to something.

34 It seems that Sartono did not consider Nugroho a government official.

35 While the interview was primarily in Bahasa Indonesia, it was sometimes interspersed with phrases in English. This was one of those English phrases he uttered. In his words “To shear Sukarno…”
demanding, it was also very unfamiliar to practically all other members who were either absolute neophytes or were reared in the conventional narrative approach to history. Likewise, by 1970, it was barely fifteen years since history departments in Indonesia had begun turning out graduates of history. In terms of actual experience, therefore, even in conventional narrative or antiquarian history-wi naging, the reservoir was insufficiently filled. The second possible reason was Sartono’s personal leadership style. Maybe because he was so gentle, soft-spoken, diffident and unassertive, he said he did not or could not bear to push hard enough for the implementation of the framework (Sartono 2005a). As already mentioned, right from the very start, he doubted the overall readiness or capability of the team to undertake such a project. Perhaps upon seeing his fears being realised, he felt helpless about it and just let things be. The third possible reason is political, and this especially applies to Volume 6. One of the members of the Volume 6 team, Saleh As’ad Djamhari, Nugroho’s very close adjutant, has admitted that since their primary purpose in writing volume 6 was to fulfill what he called a ‘military mission,’ the narrative approach would serve the job better than Sartono’s multidimensional or structural approach. With a narrative approach, the propagandistic messages, he hinted, would have a better chance of being understood by the target audience (Saleh As’ad Djamhari 2005). This view seems corroborated by the move to expunge the succeeding edition, starting with the 1984 edition, of the use of the structural approach in favour of the narrative approach.

Other problems plagued the project. One was leadership accountability. While Sartono was supposed to be the main editor, there were many indications that Nugroho was in fact running the project. In setting timetables, for instance, he earned the ire of some members, even eliciting mutinous reactions from them. This

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36 According to Sartono, one can have a glimpse of the framework he had drawn from the way how he wrote the two-volume *Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia Baru*. Jakarta: Gramedia. He said that had what he wished for SNI been followed by the writers, it would closely look like this book, and that thus there would have been no need to write it. For a favourable review of the book, see G. Moedjanto (1988).

37 Even by 1980s, the output of historical research still left much to be desired. This was the main conclusion of the survey undertaken by Adrian Lapian and Sedijono ‘Historical Studies in Indonesia in the 1980s’ (1992).
happened when he proceeded to print unfinished manuscripts. He justified his
decision by saying to the effect that the deadlines have been moved back twice or
thrice already and so those who remain unfinished had lost the moral authority to
complain (Irma Notosusanto 2005; Manus 2005; Zain 1976). He claimed that there
should be no problem as the books would undergo revisions later on. As far as he
was concerned the most important thing was that the project had to be completed
sooner than rather than later.

Some details of this incident deserve to be spelled out to allow us a glimpse
of the dynamics between Nugroho and the other members of the team. In an article
based on an interview with Nugroho in 1980, he claimed that the original deadline
for manuscripts was set for June 1973. Because a number of groups were still not
finished, it was decided in the last plenary meeting (possibly also in June 1973) to
move back the deadline to September 1973. He also claimed that in this meeting, it
was decided, among others that he would be the one to act as “Pelaksana
Penyiapan Penerbitan” (implementor of the preparation for publication) with the
duty of finalising the drafts which were supposed to have already been examined
by Sartono (for scholarly aspect) and Merwati (for writing style). By September,
however, so Nugroho continued, certain groups were still not finished and so the
deadline was moved back once again to April 1974. By then, however, there
remained an unfinished group (not clear in the article but possibly he was referring
to the Volume 5 group). Nugroho averred that on 8 July 1974, Sartono, being the
over-all editor, decided that printing should proceed after 31 July 1974. Any new
manuscript, or any revision in old manuscripts, submitted after that date would no
longer be accepted. That is, whatever was in Nugroho’s hand by 31 July, would be
printed (Sinar Harapan 1980b).

38 Apparently, such plan was not carried out. Sartono did not have a chance to examine the manuscripts and
Merwati Poerspoonegra did not style-edit them. (Sartono 2005a; Lapian 2005)
39 What is really very puzzling in these pronouncement was that why would Nugroho write a letter to the
Minister of Education, dated 17 May 1975 stating to the effect that by April 1974, all the manuscripts were
already polished and ready for printing whereas he himself attested that the ultimate deadline was reset for
31 July 1974 precisely because there was still a group that was not finished by April 1974. Abdurachman
Asked whether he in fact concurred in the publication of the still unpolished, even unfinished manuscripts, Sartono was embarrassed to admit that he could not prevent Nugroho from doing so. He quoted himself telling Nugroho “Well, according to you this should be, then go ahead.” What he wanted was that after finishing all the manuscripts, they would assign three persons or more to proof-read, edit and style-edit them before printing. He also thought that in cases of historically controversial questions, they had to offer “various conclusions.” On both counts Nugroho did not assent and did as he pleased (Sartono 2005a).

This incident was telling. It showed who was in control. Anyone who knows Sartono can infer that Sartono’s personality may have much to do with it. That is, if he had had a personality as forceful as Nugroho’s, he could have put up a stronger resistance. On the other hand, Nugroho’s standing or the position he occupied in the military-dominated scheme of things during the New Order, not to mention that the project was his initiative, exerted a strong influence on how others dealt with him. Sartono’s subservience boded ill for the stance of the scholarly community that he represented vis-à-vis the state power that Nugroho signified. This interpretation gains support if we look at how the tougher Taufik Abdullah and Abdurrahman Surjomihardjo would fare in their encounters with Nugroho.

Nugroho’s obstinacy and the hastiness of his decision to print the manuscripts puzzled many. He justified his decision by saying that the time and the money allotted by the sponsor of the project, the Ministry of Education, had already been well exceeded. He seemed to have felt embarrassed about the delays for he held himself personally responsible to the Minister, who was his personal friend (Lapian 2005; Manus 2005; Irma Notosusanto 2005). The truthfulness of this justification cannot be set aside. Those who knew him closely would attest as to how faithful he was to his promises. If he said such and such would be done by

Surjomihardjo thinks that it indicated Nugroho’s asal bapak senang mentality (so long as the boss is happy) See Abdurachman Surjomihardjo (1980).

40 My informants such as Taufik Abdullah, Adrian Lapian, Djoko Surjo, Sartono Kartodirdjo and others claimed they cannot comprehend such behavior of Nugroho.
this and this time, he really worked hard, or pushed his assistants to do so, to be able to deliver what he promised (Irseym 2005). Since he believed that the deadline had been moved back already for a number of times, it should not be transgressed once again.

The trouble was, Nugroho’s notion of a ‘deadline’ seemed not to have been shared by others in the group. Sartono claimed, for instance, that Nugroho’s timetable was not something agreed upon by the group (Sartono 2005a). He seemed to have imposed his own timetable and expected that others would follow. When Taufik Abdullah for instance failed to meet the ‘absolute’ deadline, Nugroho sent the manuscripts to the printer and Taufik was shocked upon hearing that the volume had already been printed. Abdurrachman Surjomiharjo, editor for Volume 5, joined Taufik in protesting at not being consulted in the publication of his own volume. What further enraged them was that the chapter written for Volume 5 by their colleague Deliar Noer was unceremoniously removed from the printed version. It turned out that this was due to Deliar Noer’s critical remarks about the New Order regime that incensed Suharto. As a consequence he earned for himself expulsion from the IKIP where he was serving as a professor, aside from being banished from the Project. Combining their sympathy for their friend with their resentment for Nugroho’s rash judgment, Taufik and Abdurachman both withdrew from the project and renounced any responsibility for Volume 5 (Abdullah 2005). Their contributions, however, were not taken out and the succeeding printing (the one that actually circulate widely in public) carried the name of Yusmar Basri giving the impression the he was the real editor as well as the writer. Yusmar Basri was one of Nugroho’s young protégés at the Pusjarah.

That Taufik and Abdurachman resigned in protest indicated they would not tolerate Nugroho’s transgression of their principles. They stood by their desire to protect their integrity as scholars and as individuals. That Nugroho however was undeterred, had his way, made use of their contributions under somebody else’s name, and got away with it (at least for a time) indicated the seemingly stronger
constellation of power within which he was inserted. The relatively weaker position of Abdurrachman could be seen for instance in that it would take another five years, in 1980, before he could get back at Nugroho in the open and gave a voice to a muted contempt he had for the latter (Surjomihardjo 1980). The details about this incident will be discussed below.

Nugroho’s impudence had yet to peak. When a later edition of the SNI appeared sometime in 1980-1983, the public was startled to see only two names of editors printed on the cover of the books. Sartono’s name no longer appeared. Rumours circulated that Sartono, following Taufik and Abdurrachman, had also withdrawn from the project. Both vocal and silent critics of the New Order history readily applauded his ‘withdrawal.’ They speculated that Sartono could no longer bear to feel responsible for the books that they felt in many ways did not uphold scholarly standards (Soeroto 1980; Atmakusumah 1992). That was a fairly logical explanation so it is no wonder it persisted as a widely upheld truth. Contemporary observers such as Syamdani (2001 xii-xiii), for instance, would refer back to that incident to emphasise the very problematic character of the SNI. Even historians who are still alive and closest to Sartono such as Djoko Suryo (2005), Adrian Lapian (2005) and Taufik Abdullah (2005) did not have an idea about what really happened.

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41 This was not the first time he wrote a critical piece about the SNI or Nugroho’s role in it. He wrote a politely critical and subdued short piece in *Kompas* on 17 November 1976. (“Penulisan Sejarah Mutakhir,” reprinted in Surjomihardjo (1978b: 98-100). However, the 1980 piece was decidedly fiery and was directed at Nugroho himself, although Nugroho was not named.

42 Designating the year each edition appeared is not straightforward. One reason is that as they appeared in the title page, edition and reprinting numbers are mixed up. The first edition clearly appeared in 1975, the second in 1977, the third in 1980 and the fourth in 1984. However, in between 1975 and 1984, and beyond 1984, reprints appeared that were indicated also as ‘edition’. Say, 1976 edition (which was just like 1975) and 1990 edition (just a reprint of 1984 edition). I didn’t see any 1981-1983 editions, but Klooster (1985) mentioned that they were very similar to the 1980 edition.

43 This is widely believed both in Indonesia and abroad. In a number of times when I gave presentation both in Indonesia and in Australia, in mentioning this incident there were always participants who asked for clarification of the matter because the common belief is that Sartono withdrew from the project. In a slightly different vein, Reid noted that the SNI “apparently went to print without the blessing of Professor Sartono” (2005, 88, fn 25).

44 See Syamdani’s introduction to *Kontroversi Sejarah di Indonesia* (2001, xii-xiii). A journalist from *Kompas* once asked Sartono, in May 1987, why did he withdraw from the SNI project. Sartono politely evaded the question. See *Kompas* (1987a)
Sartono categorically stated that he never withdrew, he was ejected (Sartono 2005a). He recounted that he found the idea of putting the names of the three main editors in front cover of all volumes of the SNI objectionable. He believed that ethics demanded that those who actually wrote the volume should be credited by printing their names in front and the names of the three main editors should be put somewhere inside. He told his misgivings to Nugroho but Nugroho did not agree. When Sartono opted to stand by his position, Nugroho removed his name without any explanation or warning whatsoever (Sartono 2005a). That Nugroho had the temerity to do such a thing could mean many things. But one thing was clear: he plainly showed who was the boss.

All these incidents, however, were far from being a crass display of power on the part of Nugroho. In the world where Nugroho, Sartono and other protagonists existed, there were subtle ways and means to smooth the rough edges of the power play. In fact, despite what he did, even his bitter critics such as Taufik Abdullah and the mildly critical Sartono described him as a likeable or a good person (Abdullah 2005; Sartono 2005a). It would thus be inaccurate to depict Nugroho as a power-wielding individual who would flaunt his power at every turn. Perhaps, his conduct, sometimes at the expense of ethical principles, may suggest that he felt lacking in power and that he was in pursuit of more of it. It is pertinent to address where Nugroho stood in the topologies of powers during that time.

45 As everybody believed that he withdrew, I initially thought that he might have just forgotten or made a mistake. I asked him again about this incident six months later (in December 2005) and he confirmed it. When I asked why he kept quiet about it for so long, he said that nobody asked him about it. Actually, sometime in 1987, a journalist from Kompas asked Sartono why did he withdraw from the SNI project. Sartono politely evaded the question. See Kompas (1987a). Perhaps, Sartono simply did not like to make an issue out of it or that he did not like to be pitied.

46 In an article in Sinar Harapan (1980b) ("Setuju konsep Sartono, Kecuali yang "Hahahaha"”), which was based on the interview with Nugroho, he confirmed that Sartono indeed expressed contrary view on where to put the names of the editors. However, he was silent on the 'ejection' of Sartono. Instead, he made an impression that Sartono indeed withdrew ("keluar") from the project by confirming the journalist's assumption that Sartono did so.
Taking the lead from a declaration of his adjutant, Nugroho had a military mission to accomplish. Instances cited above thus may be understood as suggestive of his determination to overcome all possible obstacles to accomplish the 'mission.' One can speculate that his effort to railroad the publication of the manuscripts, his refusal to subject them to thorough editing, could mean that not only was he concerned about the time (deadline) but also about more importantly about the content of the books. He seemed very careful not to subject especially Volume 6 to scrutiny by other members of the team. That could also be one important reason why he rejected Sartono's plan to assign three or more proofreaders and editors through whom all manuscripts should pass before printing. Other interpretations are of course possible.

Adrian Lapian, Nugroho's close friend, recalled that he asked Nugroho why he published Volume 5 ahead of the rest while it was still unfinished. Nugroho's reply was that it was okay. "It's alright! It's good!" Lapian quoted Nugroho as saying. Lapian said that Nugroho really seemed to think that the volume was good and he wanted to show the people, the Ministry of Education especially, that a good output was forthcoming from the Project. Considering that "accuracy was not one of (Nugroho's) strong points" such a judgment on Nugroho's part seemed not surprising, so Lapian (2005) averred.

Another possible reason lay in the dynamics between Nugroho on the one hand and the members of Volume 5 on the other. Taufik Abdullah was puzzled as to why Volume 5 was printed first whereas there was a prevailing perception among members of their team that by that time, if any volume was ready for publication, it was Volume 1 (Abdullah 2005). Lapian said that Nugroho might have suspected that Taufik and Abdurrachman were deliberately delaying the

\[47\] Another possible indication that Nugroho was really in a hurry may be glimpsed from a perceptive observation of an author of an article that appeared in *Kompas* (1970d). He noted that the Seminar Sejarah Nasional 2 appeared to be hastily organised. He attributed such haste to the fact that the seminar was moved four months earlier. He noted that it was originally planned for December 1970 and he wondered why it was moved to August 1970. The interesting thing was that he expressed a suspicion that political reasons ("alasan2 politis") might be behind it. I cannot of course prove that such a move was on the behest of Nugroho. But the relevant point is that there were people who might have carried such a suspicion.
project. Afraid, thus, of the impact of delays on the overall success of his brainchild, Nugroho launched what amounted to a preemptive strike by publishing the volume hastily. When the two were enraged and at once withdrew, Nugroho averted a potential crisis (of accountability for volume 5) by putting the name of Yusmar Basri as a replacement for the Abdurachman Surjomihardjo, the volume editor.

It is possible that a combination of these considerations prompted Nugroho to do what he did. However, once we examine in the next chapter the contents of the books, especially Volume 6, we would be in better position to decide. At this point, what is important is to underline that Nugroho, aside from being a historian, regarded himself as a soldier who seemed to aspire for recognition as a good, dutiful one.

**Reactions**

Despite the tumultuous episodes involving some members, the SNI had finally been published. It was officially launched on 15 December 1975, purportedly as a ‘New Year’s gift’ to the Indonesia people. Apparently elated at the completion of the project, Nugroho declared that it constituted a “national pride.” He also proudly claimed that the book proved beyond doubt that Indonesians could write their own history (Zain 1976). Moreover, he declared that SNI was the best Indonesian history yet written (*Kompas* 1976). And as if to sharpen further the significance of the occasion, he juxtaposed the publication of SNI with what he called the ‘failure’ of two previous attempts during the Sukarno period (Zain 1976). Nugroho’s self-congratulatory tone was unmistakable.

The importance accorded to the book may be glimpsed, among others, from the ceremony held on 18 March 1976 whereby the books were formally presented to President Suharto. The event hit the headlines of major dailies the following day (*Kompas* 1976; Zain 1976, in *Sinar Harapan*) and it was also televised nationwide on TVRI (cited in Surjomihardjo 1980). In attendance during the formal presentation were the Minister of Education (Sjarif Thayeb) and the three main editors along
with the each volume's respective editors. Suharto took the opportunity to emphasise his call for increased attention to the teaching of national history in schools. The books were heralded by Nugroho, the Minister and the President alike as the 'buku babon' (standard book) of Indonesian national history.

Notably absent in the immediate press coverage was Sartono's categorical pronouncement in his preface to the books that "none among the members of the team regards this book as a standard, far from it" (Sartono 1975, n.p.). Like a call in the wilderness, Sartono's voice dissipated amidst the noise of political power as the media and the public school system expectedly obeyed Suharto and regarded the SNI as the standard basis for writing history textbooks. The injunction lasted all throughout the New Order, even beyond. The SNI was officially withdrawn from circulation only in 2002 when the government could no longer resist the mounting public clamour (Kompas 2004).

That the government conferred on the SNI the status of being the "standard history book" and maintained it for decades notwithstanding its serious shortcomings may be considered as an act of political power trying to define historical knowledge. The crudity of it all did not escape some observers, but just like Sartono's pronouncement, theirs could only find muted concurrence among small segments of the population, if noticed at all. It would take a long time, and in gradual little steps, before sufficient pressures built up to undermine what

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48 Actually the picture in the headline of Kompas (1976) shows clearly only the three main editors, the Education Minister and Suharto. According to the Atmakusumah, however, the 5 other volume editors were also present. (see Footnote No. 1 of Siswadhi, Leirissa and Atmakusumah 1976, 87)

49 BM Diah (1976), however, in his passionate review in Merdeka (more on this later) repeatedly underscored, even praised, Sartono's declaration. About two months later, another observer, Atmakusumah (1976) would not leave Sartono's declaration uncited in his article "Mengamati ‘Sejarah Nasional Indonesia’.

50 The Minister of Education in 2002 took a decision to pull the books out of public circulation (cited in Kompas 2004), 6 September 2004, “Penulisan Sejarah Indonesia Masih Menunggu Berbagai Masukan Baru”

51 Actually, the question whether to consider the SNI as a standard work was raised at the early stage of the project. Uka Djandrasmita noted in his paper for the Tugu workshop the problematic character of the term ‘standard.’ He mentioned that in their discussion with foreign experts in Berkeley and the Netherlands, it was repeatedly raised and he urged for a reconsideration of the intention to consider it a standard work. See Tjandraasasmita (1972).
appeared to be a monolithic and overpowering presence of official history. Upon the collapse of the New Order, the lid was lifted and the pent-up doubts about official history exploded pushing the pendulum of scepticism to the opposite extreme. What stood for decades as almost a monolithic truth crumbled under the weight of public scrutiny. The public perception has considerably shifted away from credulity for any official pronouncement. Parts of the official narrative, however, still stand, especially that which deals with the communists. What used to be almost a monolithic history has been transformed to become a veritable theatre of conflict among competing powers in the post-Suharto period. Let us see what preceded this explosive reaction.

Hardly had the books entered public circulation, and barely three weeks after the presentation to Suharto, the SNI began its travails in the hands of critics. BM Diah, a well-known journalist and owner of Merdeka, one of the national dailies, launched the first major salvo. He wrote a passionate and lengthy critique of the books in his newspaper. Most of my informants readily remembered Diah's piece, at least vaguely, indicating the lasting impression it left on the reading public. In the article, Diah lambasted the SNI for many reasons. First, it was grossly biased against Sukarno. Second, he bewailed that contrary to its purported aim of writing a truly Indonesian history, significant parts of it remained largely dominated by "Western viewpoints" and filled up by Western sources. Third, historical methodology was inadequately employed (Diah 1976). He even went as far as calling for the withdrawal of the book from circulation (Ibid.). The reasons for these criticisms will be discussed further in the next chapter in conjunction with the overall historiographic and political terrain. At this point, however, it is important to note one thing. Diah keenly observed that the biased treatment of Sukarno in volume 6 cannot seem to be accounted for by a simple problem of innocent subjectivity on the part of the writers, Nugroho specifically. He suspected

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52 Actually, by that time the book was not yet widely circulated. It was still in the first printing, in special paper (kertas lux) and hardbound, appeared in late 1975. The books presented to Suharto in March 1976 and those reviewed by Diah were of this quality. The special edition set was not meant for public circulation. A plan was afoot to print in cheaper paper that was meant for public circulation (Sinar Harapan 1976).
that it emanated from a more deeply felt desire to assert one’s personal beliefs at the expense of methodological imperatives. He particularly hinted at the position of Nugroho in the scheme of things in Indonesia and he implied that there was nothing innocent or accidental in the treatment of Sukarno (Diah 1976/1987, 17-18). Diah would prove to be perceptive.

In June, Atmakusumah (1976) wrote for Kompas a mildly critical review of the SNI. This review prefigured an article which would appear in Prisma two months later. He identified the editorial weaknesses of the book. These included the notable absence of illustrations or photos in some parts, and inappropriate, misplaced or unlabelled photos in others; numerous typographical errors; inconsistent terminologies; and inappropriate lay-out. More important, however, was his observation that many of the SNI's controversial assertions were haphazardly formulated, without sufficient effort to provide evidence, much less critical evaluation of competing possibilities. Another one was that the authors of volume 6 wrote as if they were journalists, in a hurry to finish a deadline and delivering information that they subconsciously ‘knew’ to be good only for the day. Atmakusumah wondered what could be driving the authors to be in such a hurry. That the entire project was finished in 4 years was an extraordinary feat, he mused. He speculated that the authors (especially referring to the Vol. 6 team) perhaps wanted to reconstruct recent history while evidence, both written and oral, was still fresh but may soon be lost forever (Atmakusumah 1976). I am not sure if he was exceedingly perceptive and that, in the subtlest manner, he wanted to hint that something irregular was going on with the Project. It is also possible, however, that it was just a plain, guileless observation.

Two months later, a review appeared in Prisma written by the trio of Siswadhi, Leirissa and Atmakusumah (1976). It was subdued, and politely appreciative although forthright about some of its notable weaknesses. Corroborating many of Atmakusumah’s observations cited above, they pinpointed the weaknesses as follows: (1) editorial inconsistencies and other editorial
problems such as absence of or faults in documentation; (2) contradictory interpretations; (3) one-sided interpretation or interpretations based on highly selective treatment of evidence; (4) apparent absence of an overriding theoretical and unifying framework; (5) grossly inadequate research on some periods. The reviewers were invariably quick to forgive the authors for these lapses saying that this was a first time attempt and that revisions would follow as promised by the authors. The title of the review is quite interesting: "Buku Babon Sejarah nasional Indonesia: Objektivitas yang Ideal?" ("Standard Text of National History of Indonesia: Ideal Objectivity?") The question mark (for the word objectivity?) makes one wonder what lay beneath the circumspect and appreciative tone of the reviewers. It does not categorically uphold Diah's critique but it obviously made an impact on the reviewers, especially Atmakusumah who did the review of the controversial Volume 6.

Towards the end of 1976, on 17 November, Abdurachman Surjomihardjo published in *Kompas* what seems to be his first in the series of candid and sometimes fiery critiques of the SNI that would not abate until the late 1980s. This first statement was so much milder than what he wrote in the 1980s, but it gave a foretaste of what was to come. He noted, for instance, the irregular circumstances surrounding the 'birth' of the SNI and alluded vaguely to broken goodwill and ethical norms that were transgressed in the process. He also quoted an unnamed historian who was supposed to have used a metaphor of a "retarded or defective child" (*bayi yang cacat*) to refer to the SNI. What was more, he did not hold back saying that it was just a draft and that the word "standard" was a very smug way of describing it (Surjomihardjo 1978b).

In the succeeding two decades, from 1977 to 1997, the SNI only occasionally figured in the media. Some notable instances when the SNI was talked about

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53 Actually, it was Sartono who said that. Having said that, it would haunt him to this day as he wonders whether the words hurt Nugroho so much that he (Nugroho) expelled him from the project as a reprisal. In Sartono’s thinking, because Nugroho himself has a slightly “defective child,” Nugroho must have thought that Sartono meant to insult him. (Sartono 2005a)
coincided with the announcement of the plan to revise it or a new edition came out. 54 They also cropped up at around the same time the National History Seminars were held or when a government-initiated history-related idea project was being mulled over. 55

In 1980, for instance, an initial exchange between Sartono Kartodirdo and Taufik Abdullah, on the one hand, and Nugroho, on the other, ended up rousing an indignant rejoinder from Abdurachman Surjomihardjo. This encounter was set off by mischievous responses by Sartono and Taufik Abdullah to a journalist from Sinar Harapan who asked what they could say about the on-going efforts (in 1980) to revise or improve the SNI-6. Sartono responded: “I can only laugh. Hahahaha”. Taufik Abdullah, on the other hand, responded that if Prof. Sartono said that, then he might as well say, “Hihihihii” (Sinar Harapan 1980a). Nugroho appeared to have been offended as evident in an interview that appeared in the same newspaper eleven days later. The title of the interview was telling: “Setuju Konsep Sartono, Kecuali Yang ‘Hahahaha.’” This means: “Agree with Sartono’s concept, Except the ‘Hahaha’” (Sinar Harapan 1980b).

In this interview, Nugroho mentioned numerous things that impelled Abdurachman Surjomihardjo to respond. The response appeared in a feature article in the same newspaper fifteen days later. It was a scathing critique of an unnamed person but it was obvious that Abdurachman referred to Nugroho. His pent-up anger palpable, he lambasted Nugroho for his ‘asak bapak senang’ (so long as the boss is happy) mentality and for lying 56 (Surjomihardjo 1980). He described the history writing in Indonesia as being in ‘crisis’ (kemelut) and he categorically

54 For example, in 1992, the then outgoing Minister of Education announced that there would be a revision of the SNI. See Taufik Abdullah (1994, 203-204) for an overview of different views expressed in the media, seminars and private conversation about the plan to revise the SNI in 1992.

55 For instance, in 1987 Suharto declared the need for taking another look at the period 1950-65 and to come up with an ‘honest and objective’ re-assessment of the period. (Kompas 1987a; 1987b; Abdullah, H. 1987a)

56 As disclosed by Sudjomihardjo, Nugroho wrote a letter to the Minister of Education, dated 17 May 1975 stating to the effect that by April 1974, all the manuscripts were already polished and ready for printing whereas he himself attested the ultimate deadline was reset for 31 July 1974 precisely because there was still a group that was not finished by April 1974. Abdurachman Surjomihardjo thinks that it indicated Nugroho’s ‘asal bapak senang’ mentality (tendency to please the boss) See Surjomihardjo (1980).
stated that the Volume 6 did not satisfy the requirements of scholarship. It was, he claimed bitterly, a humiliating chapter in the history of history writing in Indonesia (Ibid.). What appeared to be an overheating altercation led to an editorial from the same newspaper, with a view to dousing the fiery exchange.

Not long after the 1984 edition came out, a front-page article in *Kompas* appeared, pointing to the persistent and new problems with the latest edition of the SNI. Due to the problems, observers expressed bemusement or doubt about the status of the SNI as “buku babon” (*Sinar Harapan* 1985).

Surjomihardjo proved to be a persistent and a hard-hitting critic. Joining the public discussion aroused by Suharto’s call in May 1987 to formulate an official, ‘objective’ history of the period 1950-65, Surjomihardjo rekindled the controversies surrounding the SNI. On 20 May, he published in *Kompas* a translation of selected parts of Klooster’s book *Indonesiers Schrijven Hun Geschiedenis* (*Indonesians Write Their History*) (Surjomihardjo 1987a). The book was published only two years earlier (1985) and it documented and analysed the process and the outputs of the efforts of Indonesians writing their own history covering the period 1900 to 1980. Taufik Abdullah, in a separate article, described it as the “most comprehensive and exhaustive study” of Indonesian historiography and despite some notable problems is a “real contribution to our knowledge” (Abdullah 1988, 334).

What Surjomihardjo opted to translate were portions detailing the process and the problems encountered in making the SNI. In his introduction, he noted that Klooster’s being a foreigner and an outsider (in the SNI) made him an objective observer and thus his analysis, despite some problems, should be paid due attention (Surjomihardjo 1987a). Considering some highly critical observations of Klooster, what Surjomihardjo in effect seemed to have in mind was to reaffirm, even intensify, his earlier critique by proxy. This becomes clear when he wrote a sequel to it a few weeks later whereby he used a number of Klooster’s observations

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57 An example of the new problems cited was the inclusion of index and bibliography that were replete with errors and of photos without appropriate annotation and sources.
as a springboard for furthering his critique (Sujomihardjo 1987b). These observations point to problems such as a lack of research, uneven writing abilities, failure to observe the prescribed approach, just to mention a few (Klooster 1985 as summarized in Surjomihardjo 1987b, 13).

In 1992 a number of more openly critical articles appeared. This was again in consonance with the reported plan to revise the SNI. In the two articles written by Masduki Baidlawi in the news magazine Editor, the more candidly critical tone was readily seen in the titles: ‘Looking at History that Smacks of Politics’ (1992a) (‘Meninjau Sejarah yang Berbau Kekuasaan’) and ‘Negligence that goes on and on’ (1992b) (Kealpaan yang Terus Berulang’). The third was even more direct: ‘SNI VI: A Political Book.’ (SNI VI: Buku Politik) It was written by Atmakusumah, whose articles in 1976 have been discussed above.

In the first article, Baidlawi cited the declaration of the then Minister of Education, Fuad Hassan, that the SNI-6 would be the primary focus of revision because it had numerous weaknesses and that it received considerable attention from the critics owing to its controversial character. It is significant that such declaration came from a high-ranking government official.

The second article, on the other hand, reiterated the problems—factual mistakes and skewed interpretations—that persisted in the SNI and the history books based on it, despite already having undergone several editions or revision. It calls for the books’ total overhaul (perombakan total). Significantly, it concluded by identifying one lesson, that is, “it is important to separate political interest from historical interpretation” (Baidlawi 1992b). Against the backdrop set by all previous articles that dealt with SNI, these two articles are notable for their candour, specifically in linking political interests with the shape of history. Even Diah and Surjomihardjo who were both strident critics of the SNI from the start were not as explicit in their reference to the political character of the SNI. That the time and the things may have indeed changed seems evident in the third article.
where the previously cautious Atmakusumah had shed much of the inhibitions evident in his 1976 critiques of the SNI. Without mincing words he declared that "the editor of Volume 6 no longer played the role of an observer of history but rather a politician" and that the SNI-6 gave the impression that it is not a historical but rather a political book (1992, 30). Perhaps these candid critiques may have been occasioned by the atmosphere of openness (‘keterbukaan’) that was seen in early 1990s, which proved to be shortlived.

As declared earlier by Nugroho, the SNI did undergo revisions to address the problems or weaknesses. However, the way revisions were undertaken left much to be desired and to be suspicious about, as will be discussed further in the next chapter. Out of the seven or eight editions, there were in fact only 2 major revisions, in 1984 and in 1993. Those that appeared in 1977 and 1980 were only very slightly different from the first edition (1975). These little differences consisted of improvement in language use, adding a glossary, index or bibliography, and correction of typographical errors. Editions that appeared between 1985 and 1991 are almost the same as the 1984 edition. The 1993 edition was also very similar to the 1984 edition. The primary difference lay in having an additional volume (Volume 7) that was specifically devoted to the New Order regime. Likewise, the chapter about the Japanese period which was originally part of Volume 6 was moved to Volume 5. Thus, the coverage of Volume 6 had been shortened to the period from the onset of independence in 1945 up to the end of Guided Democracy.

Another important thing to note about revisions is that, of the six volumes only Volume 6 underwent substantive changes. A few chapters of Volumes 2, 3 and 4 were also re-written and some materials were added but the changes did not

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58 A foreword of the Volume 7 indicates, the decision to form a separate volume specifically for the New Order period emanated from decision of the Minister of Education in 1992 upon the recommendation of a working committee tasked to take another look at history writing (Leirissa & Ghazali 1993, ix-xiii). This appears to have a link to the clamour raised sometime in 1987 for a new history book on the 1950-65 and New Order periods. See Kompas (1987), 27 May 1987, p. 16.
go anywhere near the scope of Volume 6’s. Changes in Volumes 1 and 5 were less consequential.\textsuperscript{59} (See Appendix E for the description of the changes.)

**Conclusion**

This chapter constitutes a counterpart of Chapter 3 where the making of the Tadhana was discussed. I should note that the structure of the two chapters are not strictly parallel. Because the public responses to the SNI have for three decades been sharp if not always spirited—in great contrast to that of Tadhana that seldom figured in public discussion—this chapter devotes a specific subsection to discussing these responses.

This chapter has tried to outline the processes that gave rise to the SNI. Particular emphasis has been laid on specific instances that can demonstrate the dynamics between or among key protagonists such as Nugroho NotoSusanto, Sartono Kartodirdjo and other scholars. Such emphasis was meant to find out what happens at the intersection where scholarship and politics meet.

To wrap up this chapter, let me note a number of observations about the critical responses to the SNI. First, the criticisms of the project were hardly muted, but their relatively small number, and the sporadic character of their criticisms ensured that their impact would be limited.

Second, the criticisms had been narrowly focused on the first edition (1975) of the SNI. The fact that the succeeding two editions, 1977 and 1980, were almost mere reprints may have misled critics into thinking that other editions were also not much different. Had they looked at the 1984 edition, they would have been startled at the considerable changes and wondered as to what those changes may signify. As a consequence, the general perceptions or images of the SNI as an official history crystallised from a highly skewed glance at the 1975 edition. That Diah decided to re-issue in 1985, in _Merdeka_, (and in 1987, reprinted as a chapter in

\textsuperscript{59} I have not found a copy of the 1993 edition of Volume 5. This state refers only to up to 1990 version.
a book) his 1976 review of the SNI without any change attests to this. Had he
looked at the 1984 edition, he would have been more infuriated.

Finally, perhaps partly as a consequence of the singular focus on the SNI,
other sources of more blatant propaganda escape the critics' notice. The most
notable of these were the versions of the SNI that Nugroho and his team wrote for
high schools. These were purportedly mere summaries of the original (SNI 1975
dition). The titles of the textbooks were *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk SMP*
(1976) (National History of Indonesia for Junior High School) and *Sejarah Nasional
Indonesia untuk SMA* (1979) (National History of Indonesia for Senior High School).

That no critical articles appeared in the media about the highly propagandistic
contents of these textbooks until the late 1980s may be partly attributable to the
critics' singular focus on the SNI. They, like the general public, seem to have
believed in Nugroho's pronouncement that these textbooks were just summaries of
the SNI, adapted to suit the pedagogical needs of the high school students. As will
be shown in the next chapter, this was not so.

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CHAPTER VI

SNI: CONTENTS AND CONTEXT

"Clio, the muse of history, is as thoroughly infected with lies as a street whore with syphilis."

– Arthur Schopenhauer

Just like in the case of the Tadhana, a complicated configuration of the social, historiographic and political forces influenced the shape of and the responses to the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (SNI). Unlike the Tadhana, however, that never for any extended period of time enjoyed the public appreciation that its makers had hoped for, the SNI experienced vicissitudes of fortune depending on the shifting public political climate. From the status of being the ‘standard text’ for more than two decades since the mid-70s, exalted by the government (Kompas 1976) and apparently trusted or believed in by many Indonesians, it became an object of almost thoroughgoing scepticism and fierce public criticism in the post-Suharto period. Eventually, as already noted in Chapter V, it was officially withdrawn from public circulation in 2002.

The volatile responses to the SNI were understandable against a backdrop of reversals in political alignments in the post-Suharto period. However, the fairly limited level of development that the scholarly community (especially that of the

1 From De Kunst van het Beledigen, translated by Cyril Lansink, as quoted in Hartman, J. (2005, 75)
2 There is admittedly no way of finding out how many Indonesians at any one time believed in or trusted the version of history propounded in the SNI. However, the reported uproar about historical issues immediately after the demise of the New Order—uproar that involved teachers, students and parts of the general public—could indicate that there were many people who might have believed in the ‘official’ version of history and perhaps felt cheated when reports about deliberate attempts to manipulate history began to circulate. Besides, for more than two decades, there was only one version of history taught in schools and while attempts to transmit and the actual absorption of knowledge should not be confused, the two could also coincide to a significant degree, especially under the fairly restricted atmosphere as that which prevailed in Indonesia under the New Order.
historians) in Indonesia has achieved so far may also have something to do with it. Their ability to withstand political pressures and to arbitrate in a number of contentious historical issues has been hamstrung by the relative weakness of the historical profession in general. If the Tadhana exemplifies a case of a relatively strong scholarship meeting strong politics head-on, the SNI, as shown in this and the previous chapter, represents a case of a relatively weak scholarship that had to contend with strong politics. In Vickers and McGregor’s words, “The dominant view of history...is that it is a raw tool of politics” (2005, 44). This is far from saying that the historians were powerless. There were notable instances when the extent of their power, as a generalised capacity to make a difference, was manifest. These instances may be few and not so obvious but these are no less important for the purpose of this study.

**Historiographic Mapping**

From the historiographic standpoint, there are at least two areas from which SNI drew its clearest defining characteristics. These are (1) the attempt to carry-out Indonesia-centric perspective (*Indonesiasentrisme*) and (2) the effort to implement the multi-dimensional, social science approach. The Indonesia-centric perspective, to note briefly, refers to the way of looking at history and the manner of writing it that foregrounds the native Indonesians in the historical narrative of their own country. This constituted an effort to correct the long-standing approach that presented Indonesia and its people merely as an appendage, if seen at all, to the history of the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies. It also sought to change the perspective: instead of foreign scholar looking in from the outside, the ‘native’ scholars could present a perspective from within.

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4 See for instance Volumes 2 & 3 of Stapel, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie* which Resink (1968a, 16-17) described, banking on van Leur’s review of Stapel, as “through-and-through Neerlandocentric.” See also Bernard Vlekke’s *Nusantara* that first appeared in 1943 and H. J. de Graaf’s *Geschiedenis van Indonesia* that came out in 1949. In Resink’s view, Vlekke’s *Nusantara* “had little of the Neerlandocentric left about it; it was only not yet Indocentric enough” (1968a, 19). Vlekke’s book underwent important changes from one edition to another. The 1959 edition for instance was marked by reversals of what used to be heavily Dutch-leaning interpretations. See Harry Benda’s review of the 1959 edition in the *Far Eastern Survey* (1960).
The multi-dimensional, social science approach, on the other hand, refers to a method that requires use of various social science analytic tools in an effort to understand events or actors involved in them. This shuns the traditional tendency to focus on the political dimensions and instead refracts attention to various aspects such as the social, economic and cultural, alongside the political. The ultimate aim is to capture the multiple dimensions of reality.

The multidimensional approach and the Indonesia-centric perspective actually go hand in hand. The effort to present the natives as *dramatis personae* and to foreground internal development within Indonesia lay at the heart of Indonesia-centric perspective. On the other hand, the use of various tools from the social sciences was the means to create a holistic picture of such internal development in Indonesia as corrective to the highly selective (skewed towards politics, the Dutch, the big-men and Java) accounts in colonial historiography. It was also meant to account for the integration of various groups within the archipelago—the elite and the common people, Javanese as well as other ethnic groups, Muslims and other religious groups. Such integration was not seen to be merely in terms of political integration, manifested in the formation of the Indonesian state, but also in cultural, social and economic terms (Kartodirdjo 2001a).

**Indonesia-Centrism**

Writing a history of Indonesia from the point of view of Indonesians is one of the most pressing objectives of the SNI. This was, however, not actually the first time that this perspective was employed. As noted by van der Kroef, it was actually pioneered by Dutch ‘colonial’ scholars or scholars of Dutch origin, such as van Leur, Berg and Resink. Van Leur, as early as 1930s for instance, bemoaned the tendency of colonial historiography to look at Indonesia from the “deck of the ship, the ramparts of the fortress, the high gallery of the trading house” (cited in Smail 1961, 76). Indonesian writers (Rangkuti 1951; Soetjipto Wirjosuparto 1957; Anwar Sanusi 1953) tried to do it but the early efforts were replete with problems. They

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5 See van der Kroef (1958) for a review of the contributions of van Leur, Berg and Resink.
merely inverted the positions of the coloniser-colonised so that the local actors described by the Dutch as rebels or insurgents were now called heroes. While such a tendency persisted, it was soon deemed to be grossly inadequate or inappropriate (Abdullah 1975, 121-122).6 Showing the natives as the real prime movers in their own history became the primary goal (Sartono 2001a).

One fundamental concept that underpins Indonesia-centrism was the process of integration. Sartono Kartodirdjo very well emphasised the need to demonstrate how various cultural, political, social and economic elements come together to form a unity that served as a bedrock of Indonesian identity and the nation-state. The overwhelming diversity of Indonesia—in ethnic, religious, economic and linguistic terms—poses a considerable challenge to the scholar who aims to present such a huge and diverse area as a unified entity. Integration as the unifying framework was a logical response to such a challenge (Sartono 1982; 1975; 1987; 1991; 2001a).

In Sartono’s framework, all the forces, processes, acts or tools that stimulated or facilitated interaction of the people, cultural diffusion and economic exchange all contribute to the process of integration and thus they deserve considerable attention in historical analysis, starting from the prehistoric period up to the present (Sartono 1975, xiii-xxiii). As noted in the previous chapter, Sartono’s framework was a tall order and we shall see how the SNI authors struggled to carry out such a prescription.

In the case of SNI-1975 Volume 1, the decision to do away with the technology-based traditional periodisation of Indonesian pre-history—Paleolithic, Mesolithic, Neolithic, etc.—was partly attributable to the imperative of setting a

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6Soeroto (1972), one of the respected Indonesian scholars in 1960s-1970s, claimed that when he was being asked by foreign friends for a ready reference about Indonesian history, he felt so embarrassed because he couldn’t mention a book that was written by an Indonesian. He said that the sad truth is that by that time (1972) what could be considered as the best history book was Vlekke’s Nusantara. He didn’t have the heart to recommend it, however, because its perspective is biased towards the Dutch and against the Indonesians. Taufik Abdullah admitted that notwithstanding colonial biases, “these books did provide enlightening reading materials for students of Indonesian history” (Abdullah 1994, 206).
framework more sensitive to the peculiarities of local conditions. One perceived problem with the use of the lithic-based periodisation was that it was disproportionately concerned about advances in technological development and it was primarily based on European cases, which needless to say emanated from conditions different from that in Indonesia (Soejono 1972). The writers of the volume endeavoured to plot Indonesia's pre-history using what they call a social-economic model whereby the basis of periodization was broadened to include economic and social problems alongside technological development. Thus, the periodisation was divided as follows: hunting and gathering stage; farming and domestication of animal-stage; and tool-using or technology-based specialisation stage (perundagian). The importance of technological development, as reflected in the lithic-based periodisation, was by no means set aside. It was incorporated into a model that reflects the socio-economic needs of the people at various stages of development (Soejono 1972; Moelyadi 1990).

As actually implemented, however, there was much to be desired. The absence of an explicit elaboration of the link between the socio-economic archaeological model and Indonesia-centric perspective seems to betray a lack of intention on the part of the authors to pursue seriously the Indonesia-centric perspective. One has to exert some effort to see the link between the two. While the things discussed are almost all about what was supposed to be going on in various parts of Indonesia during the pre-historic period, there seemed to be no discernible effort to connect them to the Sartono-defined framework that was anchored in the process of integration. Each chapter is a hodgepodge of accounts about prehistory, accounts whose internal logic seems only faintly linked to the over-all framework. Moreover, as Taufik Abdullah observed, the contents of Volume 1 were more like a "description of the history of prehistoric investigations rather than an attempt to describe life during the prehistoric era" (Abdullah 1994, 213). While such an observation may be hyperbolic, there was more than a kernel of truth in it.
It is understandable that the prehistoric period is hardly the time-frame one should look to for early signs of integration. At the very least, however, the authors could have pointed out explicitly that the enormous amount of diversity in the archipelago that was clearly demonstrated in each chapter set the backdrop against which later efforts at integration would be carried out. Or, they could have stressed that the more or less common set of climatic and environmental factors provided a frame that stimulated the formation of some fundamental similarities (ecological-cultural), amidst overwhelming differences occasioned by the archipelagic nature of the area. That was done in the Tadhana. Unfortunately, that was not the case here.\(^7\)

There was even an instance in Volume 1 when the Indonesia-centrism was violated. In the discussion on Chapter 5 (Agriculture-stage) about the Neolithic remains of humans, the authors noted that there was no study yet done on the case of Indonesia, unlike that of Thailand, Indo-China and Malaysia. Then they went on to describe the findings of these studies and moved to conclude that based on them, it can be expected (or hoped, bisa diharapkan) that during the same stage of development in west Indonesia, the case was the same (Sartono et al Vol. 1, 1975, 154-155, hereafter SNI-Volume Number and year edition). The authors might have meant well in doing this, that is, they did not want to leave that aspect totally uncovered despite the absence of study yet done. Ironically, however, this was an instance when Indonesia was seen through the eyes of other countries. In so far as Indonesia-centrism is concerned, it may have been better to keep silent about it.

Notwithstanding problems, the socio-economic model that the Volume 1 writers had adopted enabled them to include elements of Indonesian prehistory that did not fit well with the more conventional and Europe-based periodisation. That in itself constituted an attempt to assert Indonesia, rather than Europe, as the yardstick. More importantly, the socio-economic model gave space for

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\(^7\) In an article Soejono wrote for *Dynamics of Indonesian History* (1979) he did what he did not do in SNI-1. In his concluding paragraph, he stated that the material evidences about Indonesian pre-history point to the depth and richness of tradition upon which later Indonesia cultures would develop (1978, 1-29).
demonstrating the peculiarities of the Indonesian case as it underwent the successive stages of hunting and gathering, farming and animal domestication and technological specialisation. In the process, if only inadvertently, the Indonesia-centric perspective was affirmed.

In Volume 2, the attempt to adopt Indonesia-centrism was more explicit.\(^8\) This volume covers the period when Hindu-Buddhist influences arrived and were assimilated in the archipelago. In the discussion on the process of the coming of Indian influences, the supposed passivity of Indonesia as the recipient was summarily rejected. Emphasised was the supposed active role of 'Indonesians'\(^9\) in assimilating Indian influences. Citing scholars such as van Leur and Bosch, the authors argue that it was Indonesia that set the initiative and the manner by which the process went along.\(^10\) They further asserted, unfortunately without due substantiation or elaboration, that the push-factor did not just come from the Indian traders arriving in Indonesia but also the natives visiting India and seeing the condition there (SNI-2 1975, 23). The initiative by indigenous actors to 'invite' the Brahmans supposed to have emanated from having seen the situation in India and having a desire to develop culture as high as what they saw there.\(^11\) It is notable that the word invited (diundang) is repeatedly emphasised. Likewise the fact that many cultural features of India, such as the caste, cannot be found in the

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\(^8\) This drew praise from Siswadhi, one of the authors of the review of SNI that appeared in Prisma. (See Siswadhi, Leirissa and Atmakusuma 1976, 82)

\(^9\) The use by authors of the Volume 2 of the terms 'Indonesia' and 'Indonesian' is noteworthy. As if by that time, India was already India and Indonesia already Indonesia, and as if a small group of people in Sumatra, in Bali or Java could stand as a representative of the whole population of the archipelago.

\(^10\) Considering the contribution of other scholars such as Berg, Rassers, Stutterheim, in understanding the process of Indianisation, it is curious that the volume writers did not bother to include their works. For an overview of Rassers and Stutterheim's contributions see van de Kroe (1951). Others such as Goris, Damais and Moens were also not consulted. For a more comprehensive treatment that included Goris, Damais, Berg, Moens and many others, see Casparis (1961). It covers the development of historiography from 1770s to 1956. I should note that the works of most of these scholars were utilised in the succeeding chapters which described the Indianised states. It seems to indicate lack of coordination between the writer of the chapter or section on Indianisation and those of other chapters.

\(^11\) The efforts of the authors constituted an explicit attempt to give a 'nationalist' twist to a trend in the study of early Southeast Asia, whereby the region was no longer seen as a mere extension of India and China. For a comprehensive and useful review studies on early Southeast Asia, see Bentley (1986).
same form in Indonesia, if at all, was used as evidence that in the interaction between the two cultures, Indonesian culture was dominant (Ibid., 26-27).

It is striking that the straightforward manner by which the authors asserted the Indonesia-centric perspective was not accompanied by effort to demonstrate such a perspective. The thinness of evidence was arresting. In a few pages (six or seven pages) where the coming of Indian influences was discussed, they merely deliberated on the merits and demerits of selected views of different authors (Krom, van Leur, Bosch, Coedes) and concluded from there that the Indonesian-side was in fact active, not a passive recipient of Indian influences (SNI-2 1975, 20-27). It appeared that the views of these scholars were enough as evidence. Illustrative examples, save from mentioning the caste system, were not discussed, not even mentioned, and the process of differentiation or divergence from Indian cultural patterns was not even hinted at. The whole treatment was strikingly mechanical, and at best contrived. One can hardly see the native Indonesian as the *dramatis personae* (except as supposedly the one who “invited” the Brahmans) in their interaction with the Indian cultures. Moreover, there was no explicit effort to illustrate how this period relates to the process of gradual integration of the Indonesian nation. In the succeeding chapters, the authors were content in describing the contents of Chinese dynastic records and many inscription that pertain to various cities such as Kutai, Tarumanagara, Srivijaya, Majapahit and small kingdoms in Sunda and Bali. The Indonesia-centric perspective is easily lost in the preponderance of information borrowed from the eyes of Chinese travellers or chroniclers as well as in the attributions to the Indian influences. Here and there statements\(^\text{12}\) are found asserting Indonesia-centrism, but they are far too isolated to really sustain the perspective.

\(^\text{12}\) For instance, in the subsection about ‘Hinduisation’ ritual (*upacara penghinduan*), the text states that a certain Kundunga, described as possibly the first person to be ‘touched’ by Indian influence, was able to maintain his Indonesian character, but there are no reinforcing details, and the rest of the subsection is devoted to the images of how powerful and influential Indian cultural influences were (SNI-2, 1975: 34-35).
Multi-dimensional Approach

The main driving force behind the multi-dimensional approach is the need to formulate a multi-faceted explanation for a historical phenomenon. It posits that history covers much more than what is happening in the king's palace, in the courtrooms, in rich men's houses, in trading house. It is much more than about inter- or intra-elite rivalries, wars, laws, diplomatic manoeuvrings. History, in short, is about the totality of human experience.

The fundamental assumption that underpins the multi-dimensional, often also called structural (struktural), approach is that everything that happens occurs as it does because of multiple factors or multi-faceted context. Given a different context, or different combinations of factors, things would have unfolded differently. Full understanding of the whole context thus is the key to understanding an event or individual action. In academic discourse among Indonesian historians, the structural, multi-dimensional approach is often sharply differentiated from what they call processual (prosesuıl) or chronological approach. The latter being a straight-forward exposition of what supposed to have transpired. As far as this approach is concerned an event is important because it is a part of a story that needs to be told. Explaining why an event or an action occurred as it did is less important than formulating a clear, straightforward narrative. If the structural approach aims to explain, the processual approach seeks to narrate or describe. If the earlier requires use of different theoretical or analytic tools in the social sciences the latter dispenses with those tools. In institutional terms, the difference between the two approaches finds expression in that the History Department in the Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) has been well known for the structural approach whereas that in the Universitas Indonesia (UI) adheres to the processual-narrative approach. While the perception of difference remains to this day, it appears not as sharp in practice as it used to be.

Under ideal circumstances, the structural (synchronic) and the processual (diachronic) approaches complement each other to form a neat, lucid and
comprehensive account. Sartono showed how it might be done in his *Pengantar* (1987, 1992) and other critically acclaimed works such as *Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888.* (1966) In the case of the SNI, however, the lack of experience of the authors was clearly manifested in the often disjointed and strained relationship between the two approaches (Klooster 1985, 122-125, 127-128 as translated by Surjomihardjo 1987a).

Sartono's effort at formulating and employing the Indonesia-centric, multi-dimensional approach was a conscious attempt primarily to address a set of well identified historiographic problems. Such an effort went well with his reputation as an exemplar of a highly academic and an apolitical person. However, political elements seemed to have had an influence or a consequence, advertent or not, in his undertakings. One can say that the multidimensional approach was in a sense rooted in his personal effort to deal with certain shades of the political, and it carries within itself not only political elements but in itself may have a potential as a neutraliser of political interests. Just as most Indonesian observers of historiographic development are keen to emphasise, Sartono Kartodirdjo was aware that Indonesian historians are in a highly-charged political environment. No longer is it a question, he declared of whether, but to what extent, Indonesian historians would allow themselves to be affected by such an environment in their effort to dispense their role as a historian (Sartono 2005a).

As implied by Sartono, the multi-dimensional, social science approach (hereafter MDSSA) was a reaction to the political, in a double senses of the term. In the first sense, he claimed that he began the early stage of his effort to formulate the approach against a backdrop of a personal and intellectual struggle against the increasingly Marxist atmosphere in the mid-late 50s and early 60s in Indonesia (Sartono 2001b; 2005a; 2005b). For one, he claimed that he considered the economic determinism of the Marxist approach untenable. For another, the political pressures coming from leftist acquaintances who were wooing his cooperation or

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collaboration egged him to resist forms of ideological determinism and to uphold the multidimensionality of historical understanding (Sartono 2001b). In the second sense, and this is more historiographic but subtly political as well, he was aware of the need to unsettle the primacy of colonial historiography that put a premium on the political approach to history writing. He bemoaned the tyranny of the colonial archives that tended to reduce Indonesian history to a chronicle of the activities of Dutch colonial officials and the local big men such as political leaders, sultans, kings and religious leaders. One can neutralise the political, so he averred, by highlighting equally other aspects (Sartono 2005a; 2005b).

The way how the 1975 edition of the SNI is organised reveals the effort to conform to the structural approach. Every volume, in varying degrees, is framed whereby different aspects—social, cultural, economic and political—are discussed parallel or entwined with one another. For instance, Volume 4 discusses the geographic features, bureaucratic and political framework, trade and other economic activities, cultural development and social organisations. This has been done either by allotting a specific sub-section for each aspect or by weaving several aspects together in discussing each kingdom (Mataram, Banjar, Aceh and others), or period (that is, liberal period, 1870-1900) or a set of socio-economic practices (culture-system, social movements and revolts).

Another example is Volume 1 that deals with pre-history. Under each stage (hunting and gathering, agriculture and others) aspects such as geography, technology, social organisation and culture are given ample space. Even Volumes 5 and 6 that cover the most recent periods (1900-1942 and 1942 to 1965)—periods when there are preponderance of "exciting" political developments (nationalism, revolution, among others)—also follow, at least in general form, the same apportioning of space whereby the 'political' does not by any means disproportionately dominate or crowd out the rest. There is one exception here though. Volume 6 allots about a third (the first of the three chapters) of its space
explicitly to a narrative approach, emplotting chronologically events from 1942 to
1965. The two other chapters conform to the structural approach as other volumes.

One can raise a question to what extent the SNI-1975, as it was published, actually fulfilled the requirements of the Indonesia-centric perspective and the structural approach. Short of identifying all the deficiencies evident in the outputs, something that is at once tangential to my purpose and a formidable task for which I am not equipped, I shall note here a number of observations, culled from my own as well as those of other commentators. These can provide a glimpse of how adequately these approaches/perspectives were employed.

There is an impression that the SNI-1975 had fallen well short of what was expected or hoped for. Sartono (2005a), for one, frankly admitted that he was unhappy about the output as it was far from the Indonesia-centric and multi-dimensional approach that he envisioned—an approach that observers have agreed he employed well in his books such as the Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888 and Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia Baru (Introduction to New History of Indonesia) The reason, he said, for writing the two-volume Pengantar (1987 & 1992) precisely lay in his disappointment with the SNI-1975 (Sartono2005a). He wanted to produce an alternative to the SNI and he aimed at showing what SNI could have been, had the authors successfully followed his vision. That the problem had persisted was evident in the output of a seminar held in 1984 (to commemorate the 27th anniversary of the First National History Seminar in 1957) wherein speakers reached a sobering conclusion: that the community of Indonesian historian was still a long way off carrying out the multi-dimensional approach, which at least to

14 In Abdurachman Surjomihardjo's intimation, the SNI constituted a 'shameful chapter' in the history of Indonesian historiography. On another occasion he declared that only the Volume I (Pre-History) approaches the benchmark of scholarly standard. 1978b. Taufik Abdullah echoes the same view but he was quick to point out, followed by a hearty laugh, that it was probably because “we don't really understand it” (Abdullah 2005).


16 For a useful overview and favourable assessment of the first volume, see Moedjanto (1988)

17 The title of the news article was telling: 'Penulisan Sejarah Indonesia Belum Perhatikan Fakta dan Multi-dimensional,' (Writing of Indonesian History has yet to Pay Attention to Facts and the Multi-dimensional approach) Kompas (1984). It is noteworthy that not only historians closely identified with UGM, such as
certain groups, remains a 'methodological Holy Grail.' Recently, in a talk he delivered on the occasion to celebrate the UGM History Department's 55th Year Anniversary and Sartono's 85th birthday Bambang Purwanto argued that state of Indonesian historiography, in general, and Sartono's contributions in particular, have stagnated after a certain point. Up to now, he claimed, it remains not sufficiently understood, even misused by those who purported to apply it. (Setyadi and Saptono (2006) Things may not be as bad as Purwanto painted it, but such an observation suggests that the approach seems still far from being widely and adequately understood.

The first observation points to the inadequacy of basic research. A cursory glance at the lists of materials reveals that the authors relied on disproportionately huge number of secondary and foreign-authored sources, which were written with few exceptions by foreign scholars. As Diah observed, referring to specific volumes, one can count with one's fingers the sources written by Indonesian scholars (1976/1987: 9). This is understandable considering that no money was

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18 In the freer atmosphere of the post-Suharto period, it was not just the New Order 'official' historiography that came under scrutiny. Sartono's School has also been bitterly attacked for its being 'apolitical.' In Kuntowijoyo's view, the neutrality of the multi-dimensional approach is amenable to whoever is in power: "history contributed nothing and contradicted nobody, history was safe for everybody" (2000, 81). Bambang Purwanto (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2000c) has also criticised the Sartono approach and launched efforts to reform, not reject it. For an overview of this effort, see Curaming (2003). These criticisms notwithstanding, Sartono's approach remains the benchmark that many Indonesian historians who want to pursue 'scientific history.' Even activist-historians find use in at least name-dropping Sartono and his approach in support of their advocacy. See Syamdani (2001, ix-vx) for example.

19 Editorial introductions by Tjandrasasmita (Vol. 3) and Sutjipto (Vol. 4) are forthright and apologetic about this. The editorial introduction for Volumes 2 and 5 are silent about this while that of Volume 1 was written not by the volume editor (Soejono) but by the over-all editor (Sartono) whose concerns naturally covered the entire project, not just Vol. 1.

20 The reviews that appeared at Prisma (1976) and Sinar Harapan (Zain, 1976) were sensitive to these and were quick to forgive if not gloss over the resultant weaknesses. Others, however, such as B. M. Diah, were not as forgiving. BM Diah bewailed the fact the one can count with one's fingers the sources written by Indonesian scholars (1976/1987: 9) and this to him constituted a sufficient basis to conclude that "Western views" seemed still dominant. Diah's critique is a bit unfair as he tended to base such observations on a
allotted for 'real' research and that much of Indonesian social sciences were by then
still barely out of the infancy stage. The thinness of evidence, for instance, of the
supposed dominance of indigenous elements vis-à-vis foreign influences that I
referred to earlier in relation to the discussion about the coming of Indain
influences (in Volume 2) may be partly attributable to lack of research. The same is
the case, as earlier noted, of looking at the Agriculture Stage (Volume 1) from the
lenses of what happened in the neighbouring countries, thus violating the
Indonesia-centric perspective. These examples coincide with Leirissa’s observation
that due to a serious lack of research, the treatment of the 17th and 18th centuries in
Volumes 3 and 4 unduly gave a very lopsided focus on the activities of the VOC at
the expense of the more interesting and relevant things. (Siswadhi, Leirissa and
Atmakusumah, 1976, 86) Consequently, the primacy of internal dynamics, the
essence of Indonesia-centrism, gave way to Neerlando-centrism that, ironically,
the whole project was supposed to neutralise.

Another observation focuses on the unevenness of writing, that is, within
most of the volumes the quality of writing in one chapter is not sustained in
another. This situation, it seems to me, does not just reflect lack of actual writing
experience on the part of members of the team, as pointed out by Sartono, but also
lack of understanding of Indonesia-centrism and the multi-dimensional approach
and how these might be properly applied. Looking at an example, say in Pengantar
Sejarah, of how Sartono employed the multi-dimensional approach, this approach
entails an astute demonstration of how various aspects—social, economic, cultural,
political, institutional—interact and how such interaction helps clarify or explain a
phenomenon, say, uprisings or social movements. In the case of SNI, it is, in my
view, in parts of Volume 4 that the approach has been satisfied more satisfactorily,
compared with other Volumes. The chapters for instance on uprisings against
colonialism and social movements stand-out as good examples of this approach

fairly limited and selective reading of the voluminous work. However, he also has a point. There are indeed
parts of the 6 volumes that hardly qualify as having been written from an Indonesia-centric standpoint.
The same thing definitely cannot be said of Volume 2 where a significant part is littered with little more than epigraphic accounts based on numerous inscriptions or Chinese records or what scholars say or argue about those inscriptions/records. Grossly insufficient effort seems to have been expended to arrange or frame these accounts to clearly demonstrate how social, economic, political, religious and cultural factors interact to form a unified explication of the life in early Indianised states in Java, Bali, Kalimantan and Sumatra (SNI-2, 1975, 29-129). Even the chapter on Singhasari and Majapahit which is evidently much better written does not faithfully conform to the structural approach (SNI-2, 1975, 252-282). It is mostly a narrative of political developments—the rise and fall of Majapahit. It is only the chapters about Mataram and the kingdoms in Bali and in Sunda that an effort to follow the prescribed approach is discernible, but even in these cases, the writing style of the assigned authors, exacerbated by a lack of data, may have hamstrung their efforts (SNI-2, 1975, 75-252). Non-political aspects such as culture, religion and socio-economic dynamics are discussed along the political but the inter-connection among them never approached the clarity evident in parts of Volume 4.

Be that as it may, whether the SNI-1975 was successful or not was less important than the fact that this constituted the scholars’ concrete response to their perceived needs or problems of the time, both political and historiographic. As such, it was useful as a showcase of the manner in which they grappled with the challenges at hand; and it can provide a glimpse of the conditions that made such undertaking, and its success or failure, possible. The whole context and the entire process are much more relevant than the extent of success attained, although this is not to deny that the success-failure question carries its own significance. In particular, this question occupies a central position in efforts to address the often-

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21 In his review of the volume 4, Leirissa notes that in comparison with volume 3, which he also reviewed, volume 4 was much more integrated, in a sense that parts fit well into a discernible framework of analysis. He is not explicit about how well multi-dimensional approach has been employed but he is categorical in praising the analysis of social movement. He claims it is new and seldom found in other published works. He also said that the way how the author formulated the classification of these social movements is very interesting (Siswadi, Leirissa & Atmakusuma 1976, 84-86).
assumed inverse correlation between the level of scholarship and the extent of politics in the SNI.\textsuperscript{22}

The SNI project took off with the scholars harbouring good faith and high hopes in it (Surjomihardjo 1980; Abdullah 1994). Sartono and others claimed that in the beginning there was not an iota of suspicion about whatever political motive there might be behind the Project. It was only when the Project was well underway that, observing Nugroho’s behaviour, they began to be suspicious (Sartono 2005b). At the very beginning, as far as they were concerned the Project was purely a scholarly undertaking and that despite enormous challenges it entailed, they would do it because it was their patriotic duty to do so. Only to the extent thus that nationalism was considered political, were they willing to grant the Project’s political intent. In the context, however, of the independent Indonesia, to be nationalistic was hardly considered a political act. It assumed the status of being a moral responsibility and it was seemingly as natural as early morning air.

**Political Terrain**

Reading Nugroho’s foreword in SNI-6 (1975), one can readily sense that he anticipated readers would find a good deal of controversy in the volume. He emphasised, for one, what he readily and consistently declared in many of his writings (Notosusanto 1964; 1971b; 1978) and public declarations (Zain 1976; *Sinar Harapan* 1980a; 1980b; Sumantri 1982), that is, that contemporary history was by nature contentious because many people who were still alive had different experiences or perceptions from what the historian’s accounts presented. This seemed to be an invitation to regard ‘selectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ in historical work as natural. At best, one cannot but be subjective, he pointed out. One possible interpretation of this statement was that Nugroho seemed to be preparing the readers, conditioning their minds not only to regard contemporary history as

\textsuperscript{22} Taufik Abdullah, for instance, in an interview with *Sinar Harapan* (1980a) noted that aside from the moral or ethical stance of a historian, capability or skills also matter in resisting influences of prevailing politics. Edi Sedyawati (in Kompas 1996) express a similar view claiming that political pressure on scholarship can be parried by adept use of conceptual and analytic tools in history.
naturally controversial but also to accept the version he proposed as a product of his own selection and interpretation.\(^{23}\)

The main political factor that I think is very relevant in explaining the shape of and in stimulating the responses to the SNI is the effort to justify the regime. This factor rests on a number of pillars: demonising the communists; eulogising the military; discrediting Sukarno; and ‘Othering’ the Old Order. The following discussion will focus on volume 6 because these pillars are most relevant within the period covered by this volume.

The New Order regime emerged from a set of mysterious, irregular and bloody events in 1965-66. These were preceded by a sharply contested and protracted struggle for political supremacy among forces that included the Communist Party of Indonesia (\textit{Partai Komunis Indonesia}, PKI) and the military. Central to the story of the birth of the New Order was the gruesome events collectively associated with the September 30 Movement (\textit{Gerakan 30 September}, hereafter G30S). The importance of this event is gleaned not only from what happened immediately afterwards—collapse of the PKI, massacres of hundreds of thousands of people, the fall of Sukarno and the rise or Suharto, among others—but also from the lingering state of terror that followed in its wake, haunting Indonesian society up to this day.\(^{24}\) (Heryanto 2006; Budiawan 2004; Kasiando 2003; Goodfellow 1995; van der Kok et al 1991) There is a medium-sized and still growing corpus of published works discussing the controversial character of this

\(^{23}\) B. M. Diah, one who wrote the earliest and a damning critique of the SNI, had a different interpretation. He likened Nugroho to a sharp-eyed eagle that flies high in the sky and that despite keen eyesight was oblivious of a hunter who was about to shoot him. (Diah, 1975/1987, p. 18) In my view, the simile is inappropriate. I think Nugroho knew full well that he would be attacked for his interpretation and his invoking of the supposed inherence of selectivity and subjectivity in history was meant to provide some hedge. However, it could also be a plain expression of intellectual honesty.

\(^{24}\) Heryanto in his book \textit{State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia} (2006) and Budiawan’s \textit{Mematahkan Pewarisan Ingatan} (2004) clearly demonstrates the lingering impact on the life of the people of the anti-communist witch-hunts that followed the G30S. For a useful analysis of media coverage of highly contentious debates surrounding Gus Dur’s proposal to abrogate anti-communist laws, see Kasiando, \textit{Mendamaikan Sejarah} (2003). For earlier attempts at understanding the roots and/or the manifestations of anti-communist discourse, see Goodfellow (1995) and van der Kok et al (1991)
event so I would just focus first on how SNI-6 (1975) treats certain relevant persons or events. These include the supposed centrality of the role of the communists in the G30S and the corresponding minimal involvement of the military. Because of the fairly significant variations in the treatment offered in different editions, comparison will follow.

The SNI-6 (1975) starts its discussion of the G30S with emphasis on the alliance between Sukarno and the PKI. The two were blamed for the sharp polarisation of the political field between friends and enemies; the friends were nurtured and the others were set aside or neutralised. (SNI-6 1975, 119) The sins of the PKI since 1964 are enumerated: aggressive and vitriolic propaganda, wilful provocation, unlawful acts, infiltrating the military threatening national unity, fomenting social unrest, deception, and attempts at a power grab (Ibid., 119-121). It denounces the acts of seizing lands (aksi sepihak or unilateral act) in the name of land reform claiming that in Java there was no more land that should be subjected to a land reform program. Transmigration, it adds, is the only way to give poor peasants land (Ibid., 119). The PKI is also blamed for allegedly influencing Sukarno toward a wayward foreign policy, and it is castigated for belligerently imposing its politicised standards on arts and literature.

The volume describes the double-faced strategy of the PKI whereby its participation in the parliament is depicted as a deceptive front for legitimacy and

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25 For the reviews of historiography of G30S, see Hermawan Sulistiyo (2000, 46-89); Cribb (1990; 2002). For a much more comprehensive and very detailed review, specifically aiming to find out Soekarno’s involvement, see Beisi (2004). For a review strikingly favorable to Suharto’s position see Elson (2001, 99-119) For the earlier versions see Anderson & McVey (1971), Nugroho & Saleh (1968) Crouch (1978)


27 Unilateral action refers to efforts of PKI mass organization such as BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesia’s Farmers’ Front) to enforce land reform regulations (SNI-6 1975, 108).

28 See p. 108 (SNI, 1984). This relates to the attempt by the left-leaning artists and cultural workers to assert the primacy of the ‘political’ (captured in the slogan “Politics is in Command”) in all aspects of life, including art-related matters. It elicited a response from a group of artists who signed the Manifesto Kebudayaan (Cultural Manifesto) asserting freedom of artistic expression. For a perceptive, insider’s view of the issues, events and personalities surrounding this incident, see Goenawan Mohamad The ‘Cultural Manifesto’ Affair: Literature and Politics in Indonesia in the 1960s: A Signatory’s View (1988).
respectability, while they were allegedly preparing themselves for an opportune moment to seize power by forceful means such as a coup d'état (Ibid., 120). Infiltration of the military ranks through the efforts of the *Biro Khusus* (Special Bureau) is part of the grand strategy. It claims that the PKI had learned from the debacle in Madiun in 1948 that it was not enough to have their own troops but they also needed to neutralise the military leadership neutralised, and if needed liquidate it. It also claims that a PKI document was found in 1964, allegedly stating that the year 1966 would be the time when the condition was 'ripe' for a forceful take-over (Ibid., 120). Why 1966 and which particular document is neither specified nor the source of information about the presence of such document cited. It also notes that by August 1965 Sukarno had fallen ill and that this condition could result in paralysis if not death. This was supposed to be a pretext for Aidit to decide on the hastening the shift from peaceful parliamentary approach to a forceful tactic (Ibid., 121). The whole treatment seems to aim at laying the groundwork for presenting the G30S as the long-planned handiwork of the communists.

The names of the military personnel who were supposed to be agents of the *Biro Khusus* were identified—Untung, Sunardi, Atmodjo, Anwas—and they were also pinpointed as responsible for setting the targets for liquidation. They were among the members of the group, the *Gerakan Sepuluh September* (G30S), that kidnapped, supposedly tortured and killed the generals whose bodies were eventually thrown into a well in Lubang Buaya. The narrative then notes briefly that Suharto decisively acted to crush the coup. The whole coverage of the event, of the history of Indonesia in fact, ends simply by noting that Suharto sent troops to quell the rebels in Central Java (122-123). There was no mention whatsoever of the reaction of the people and the subsequent events that would lead to the rise of the New Order and the demise of the PKI.

That the SNI-6 (1975) authors were bent early on to present a negative view of the Old Order and Sukarno is evident in a paper by Ariwiadi, one of the
members of the team and a protégé of Nugroho’s in the Pusjarah. This paper was presented in the planning workshop in Tugu, Bogor in June 1972. In his paper, he strongly emphasises the need to differentiate clearly between the Old and the New Order. The ideas were obviously in an incipient stage but a persistent trope is quite discernible: that the Old Order represents the negative things—economic crisis, paralysing politics, whimsical rules, chaos, poverty—and the New Order was the opposite—economic development, orderly politics, systematic laws, etc (Ariwiadi 1972).29

One clear manifestation of the effort to paint a negative picture of Sukarno and the Old Order in the 1975 edition is the highly skewed treatment of Sukarno and his government. There is, for instance, only one sentence in the whole chapter on Guided Democracy that expresses a positive tone about Sukarno and there is another one about the government.30 In the sentence favourable to Sukarno, he was credited, alongside the TNI, for his decisive effort to break the supposedly paralysing political impasse that emanated from endless party-bickering during the period of parliamentary democracy (SNI-6, 1975, p. 103). For the government, on the other hand, the SNI-6 (1975) referred to its effort to increase exports. The sentence was quick to point out, however, that this effort did not succeed (1975:109). These sentences would have not stood out if most of the others were balanced descriptive statements, but they were not. Many were loaded with insinuations which even if true were nonetheless posed in a tendentious manner. They were made without supporting information or without citing the source of information. Examples of these statements are presented in Table 6.1.

29 It’s is notable that Ariwiadi’s colleague, Moela Marbun, who was assigned to the period of Guided Democracy wrote the paper apparently without much desire to paint an overly negative picture of the period. See Marbun (1972).

30 Sukarno was credited, alongside the TNI, for his decisive effort to break the supposedly paralyzing political impasse that emanated from endless party-bickering during the period of parliamentary democracy. See SNI-6, 1975, p. 103). The government’s effort to increase exports was noted, although the sentence was quick to point out this effort did not succeed. See SNI-6 (1975:109).
Table 6.1
Examples of Statements Unfavourable to Sukarno

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TRANSLATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Atas petunjuk President Sukarno, PKI dan ormasnya dapat dengan aman melakukan intimidasi dan teror politik terhadap pihak-pihak dan tokoh-tokoh yang dianggapnya lawan...” (108)</td>
<td>With the instruction of President Sukarno, the PKI and its mass organizations could intimidate or terrorise groups and personalities they considered as enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“...ternyata Presiden Sukarno menafsirkan terpimpin itu dengan pimpinan pribadinya selaku Pemipin Besar Revolusi, sehingga pengertianya menjadi demokrasi yang dipimpin oleh Sukarno.” (104)</td>
<td>...the fact is President Sukarno interpreted ‘Guided Leadership’ as his own leadership being the Great Leader of the Revolution. In his understanding, it became democracy guided by Sukarno.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalam prakteknya ekonomi terpimpin berubah menjadi sistim lisensi yang menguntungkan segilintir orang-orang yang dekat di istana (110)</td>
<td>In practice, the economy during Guided Democracy period came to operate as a system of licensing that benefitted only a small group of people close to the palace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sebagai presiden nampaknya tidak mau dijadikan symbol belaka...ia mau menganggap dirinya...pemimpin rakyat.” (101).</td>
<td>As the president, it seems he didn’t like to be just a symbol...He wanted to consider himself...as the leader of the people.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Efforts to demonise the PKI and to discredit Sukarno often go intricately together. The purportedly wayward behaviour of Sukarno, for instance, is often attributed to the influence of the PKI and the PKI’s supposed notoriety, its aggressive actions and posturing were all attributed to the protection of Sukarno. Such a rhetorical trick, it seems to me, is quite ingenious. On the one hand, efforts to demonise PKI can be reinforced by emphasis on Sukarno’s faults whereas efforts to tarnish Sukarno can easily be enhanced by associating whatever he did with the

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31 The Konfrontasi with Malaysia and the subsequent withdrawal from the UN, the dissolution of the Murba Party, Sukarno’s distrustful attitude towards the TNI, all these and more were blamed on the influence of the PKI on Sukarno (SNI-6, 1975, 110-111, 115).
influence of the PKI. Besides, to the many who were fanatical supporters of Sukarno, passing the blame to the PKI cannot but be a welcome move. On the other hand, the subliminal message that Sukarno was weak because he allowed himself to be influenced by the PKI can hardly escape the non-'Sukarnois.' Either way, it is beneficial to the interest of the regime.

There are a number of notable points about the treatment as summarised above. First, there is a deliberate effort to emphasise the partnership of Sukarno with the PKI and to blame the partnership for many problems. Second, the coverage may be described as relatively scanty, being just a little over four pages for the G30S, and nothing after that event. Third, the involvement of the military in the G30S as well as in kidnapping and killing of the generals is explicitly stated. Fourthly, there was no mention of the role of the Gerwani, Pemuda Rakyat and other PKI-affiliated groups in the killing. And finally, there is something puzzling about the hasty manner by which the coverage ended so abruptly. The last four points would have not been notable had the other versions of the SNI not offered sharply different renditions. Let me start with the version of the SNI for the high schools, the SNI-SMP. (Notosusanto and Yusmar Basri 1976; heafter SNI-SMP) This textbook is not, in the strictest sense, part of the SNI project. It was supposedly an offshoot of the project. However, the circumstances surrounding its writing can provide valuable insights into the dynamics within the SNI project itself.

Almost simultaneous with the official launching of the SNI in late 1975 the version for high schools came out in early 1976. The first set (three volumes) was entitled *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk SMP* (for junior high school, hereafter SNI-SMP) and the second set, published in 1979, was simply called *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk SMA* (for senior high school). It was prepared by a team led by Nugroho Notosusanto and Yusmar Basri. According to the preface, it was based on

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32 The foreword is explicit that as early as 28 October 1975, the textbook was already completed. The first printing was done in 1976. See SNI-SMP (1976, 2-6).

33 In Indonesia, high school is divided into two stages, three years each. Names changed through the time but in the 1970s, the first stage was called the SMP, or Sekolah Menengah Pertama. It corresponds to Junior High School. The next was SMA, or Sekolah Menengah Atas, what amounts to the Senior High School.
the newly published SNI, reworked supposedly to suit the pedagogical needs of high school students. Syaref Thayeb, the Minister of Education then, described the textbooks as “making use of scholarly, objective facts and is in agreement with the national interest” (Zain 1976).

Pertinent things about this textbook, in so far as this study is concerned, include the (1) timing and the context within which it was prepared and the (2) the contents which hardly qualify as mere summaries of the SNI.

That it was published just few months after the SNI and it was used in the public schools starting 1977 was a remarkable case of urgency. It means it was being prepared while work on the SNI was still underway. That it was done exclusively by a team led by Nugroho, with members he personally picked, seemed to be irregular. It was a violation of the previous understanding with Sartono and other historians which, broadly speaking, posited that the textbooks for high school that would emanate from the SNI would be prepared by a team of historians and history teachers appointed on the basis of merit and chosen following a set of more or less transparent criteria and procedures. At the very least, the composition of the team would be determined by a collegial body, not by a single individual such as Nugroho (Sartono 2001b; 2005a).

Contrary to Nugroho’s declaration, the SNI-SMP was not a mere a summary of the SNI, simplified or adjusted to suit the need of high school students. It was substantially different, both in form and in content. For one, the SNI-SMP followed a chronological, narrative approach while the SNI (1975) as, noted above, subscribed to a structural, multi-dimensional approach. This

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34 See Foreword, SNI-SMP, p. 5. That these textbooks were just summaries of the SNI has been widely believed. One indication of this was that while the SNI, as shown in Chapter 5, had been fiercely attacked since 1976, SNI-SMP would not be noticed by the critics until middle late 1980s. Klooster (1985, 212-213) and Kuntowijoyo (2003) are just among the better known observers who took Nugroho’s declaration at face value. Even a recognized expert in social studies education, Prof. Dr. Helius Syamsuddin, declared in his paper written in 1997 that SNI-SMP (and its sister SNI-SMA) was just based on the SNI. (Syamsuddin, 1998) One possible reason for this was that there were only few people who actually read SNI and SNI-SMP together. Textbook writers, in Indonesia and the Philippines as in many countries as well, tend to find the easy way out. They tended to merely paraphrase information from the most accessible source.
approach can be very well justified by pedagogical imperatives, as Nugroho in fact did (SNI-SMP 'Prakata,' 5). A structural approach, is no doubt much more difficult for high school students to understand. There is, however, evidence indicating that Nugroho preferred a narrative approach because of the greater ease by which it could convey the propaganda message (Saleh As‘ad Djamhari, 2005a).

A more important difference was that the SNI-6 (1975) paled in comparison with the SNI-SMP in the intensity and clarity of its propaganda messages. Why Nugroho and his team produced almost at the same time two versions of history with very different temperament? Let us look at the contents of the SNI-SMP and compare it with SNI-6 (1975) to find some clues.35

The Madiun Affair, for one, is categorically described as a betrayal (pengkhianatan) by the PKI, and it is emblazoned as the title of a sub-heading at that (SNI-SMP, 105). It plainly states that it was aimed at bringing down the Republic, at that time in the middle of its struggle against the Dutch. It continues, thus (SNI-SMP, 106):

The rebels controlled the whole residency of Madiun and parts of the neighboring areas, especially Pati. Government officials, military (TNI) officers and party leaders or groups they considered enemies they killed with impunity and the bodies of some them were put in wells. Such cruelty elicited anger from the people in general. That was the reason why they (PKI) did not get a widespread public support. Such gruesome or barbaric acts were remembered by the people especially those in East and Central Java 17 years later with the outbreak of the G30S. The ways of killings, including the act of putting the dead bodies inside the well, were the same.

In SNI-6 (1975), there is nothing like this. For one, it is plainly called an uprising in Madiun and the only mention of it in relation to the G30S is made in two plain sentences, stating that the PKI already tried in 1948 to seize the government but this attempt failed, and from that point on the PKI struggled underground (SNI-6 1975, 119-120). There is no feeling of bitterness in such a

35 The one I utilized is that published in 1985. It constituted the seventh printing, the first having been done in 1976. No revision was done, only reprinting. See SNI-SMP (1976, 2-6).
declaration that is common in other versions (1984 and 1993). The only other mention is made in two paragraphs describing the event in an unadorned way, summarised as follows: The rebels seized the city of Madiun and Djokosuyono who installed himself as the military governor made a speech on the radio whereby he called for the purge of colonial and reactionary elements from the TNI. It is followed by the enumeration of charges raised by Musso against the nationalist-leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta. After plainly stating that the government immediately crushed the rebellion, it closes with an expression of regret that those involved were not brought to trial because the Dutch were once again on the offensive. What stands out in this exposition was not the alleged betrayal by the PKI, as highlighted in the SNI-SMP and other versions of the SNI-6, but the justifications of the communists for launching the ill-prepared uprising (Ibid. 58-59).

On account of what happened at the Lubang Buaya, the SNI-SMP is different from SNI-6 (1975) in the mention of the doctors' supposed post mortem according to which the victims experienced heavy torture (siksaan berat) before they were killed. Mentioned likewise, a detail omitted by SNI-6 (1975), is that the bodies were already decomposing by the time they were taken out from the well (SNI-SMP 1975, 161). More striking, however, is the reference to the alleged reaction of the people to what happened in Lubang Buaya. Not only is SNI-SMP quite straightforward in mentioning the killings of many people that happened in the wake of the coup, something that the 1975 version totally omits, while others (1984 and 1993 editions) are visibly hesitant to do.36 It also avers that the killings of the PKI leaders (no mention of members, sympathisers and suspected affiliates) that ensued after the G30S in 1965 was the people's initiative, allegedly at least partially as a reprisal to what the PKI did in Madiun (SNI-SMP, 166).

36 Observers tend to be blinded by the reality-effect of the SNI being an official history. While it is true that it is to the regime's interest to gloss-over the mass-killings and SNI-1975 is in fact totally silent about it, the 1984 edition is hardly silent and the SNI-SMP is definitely far from being discreet about it. For an example of an observer I referred to above, see Nordholt (2004, 8)
President Sukarno’s indecisive attitude gave rise to the impatience of the people. In a lot of areas, especially those that have experienced mass killings by the PKI in September-October 1948 (Madiun Uprising), the people took the initiative against PKI leaders. Many leaders of the PKI were killed by the people in armed encounters in the villages.

The authors are silent who these people were. The generic and nebulous terms ‘rakyat’ and ‘masyarakat’ are always deployed to hide the real perpetrators. It does not surprise that there is not a iota of hint about the role of the military and some Islamic groups in these massacres.

Another aspect where SNI-SMP clearly exceeds SNI-6 (1975), in terms of propaganda intent is in the image of the military. The 1975 edition is also emphatic of the good image and the pivotal roles of the military but it does not go to the extent of obliterating the role of the military in the G30S, something the SNI-SMP does. After enumerating groups—PNI, Murba, trade unions and others—that the PKI allegedly infiltrated and eventually neutralised or won over, the SNI-SMP authors highlighted that it was the military that remained the only institution capable of withstanding the ‘PKI conquest.’ Perhaps it was in the spirit of this claim that the authors tried very hard to conceal the fact that the armed forces itself was infiltrated by the PKI, and they imply that no part of it became sympathetic, much less became close to it. The height of this effort can be seen in the depiction of G30S as a purely PKI-affair. Even Untung, the leader of the coup attempt, was not mentioned! As noted above, by contrast the SNI-6 (1975) is forthright about the involvement of the military. It is not a hyperbole to assert that only a very faint

37 For example, the TNI was emphasized as Sukarno’s partner in restoring order and in breaking political impasse caused by the supposedly unwieldy party-politics. P. 103. TNI is shown always to be in a rescue when something goes wrong. As p. 106 enumerates: enormous contribution to the Perang Kemerdekaan, the crushing rebellions, cleaning up the mess of the failure of Konstituante, freeing of the Irian Jaya.

38 There is in fact only one sentence that connects the PKI and the armed forces in terms other than one being the anti-thesis of the other. It reads: “It's because of such a reason that the PKI focused its attention on achieving control of the TNI from within by developing networks of cadres and sympathisers within its rank...” (SNI-SMP, 151). Note that the statement indicates merely the efforts or attempt of the PKI to win support from within the military. It occludes the fact that there were in fact a good number of military personnel who were at least sympathetic to the PKI, or at least to its cause. Comparing with Ichtisar Sejarah R.I., published in 1971, where Nugroho was very explicit about the role of some military men in the G30S, SNI-SMP's version is puzzling indeed. (Notosusanto, 1971, 108, 113-114)
trace of military involvement is hinted at in the SNI-SMP. This is found in a sentence whose function was merely to clarify what Biro Khusus was. It states: “Biro Khusus was a secret agency that was directly under the leader of the party (PKI) whose task is to infiltrate the military and to influence and create a group sympathetic to the PKI” (SNI-SMP, 160). Any student who had no prior knowledge and would read nothing other than the SNI-SMP would have no notion of military involvement in the coup.

The tendency to demonise the PKI also abounds in SNI-SMP, and in a more virulent manner. For instance, notwithstanding that in the parliament there were many supporter of Sukarno who were not communists, the writers of the SNI-SMP exclusively blamed the PKI for the failure of these two institutions to respond to the Tritura39 (SNI-SMP, 1966). In contrast, SNI-6 (1975) is silent about this point. The PKI was also depicted as the cause of the abrogation of Murba (p. 151), and the splitting into two factions of the PNI (p. 151), one side supposedly taking the PKI-line and the other opposing it. Likewise, the authors chided the PKI for forcefully taking land from legitimate owners (p. 152). Moreover, PKI’s influence was blamed for a good number of Sukarno’s wayward decisions,40 thus creating impressions that are mutually destructive to Sukarno’s and PKI’s images: that is, that Sukarno was bad because he was too close to the PKI and that Sukarno was a weakling because he allowed the PKI to influence him.

What can possibly explain these disparities? There are a number of possibilities depending on the kind of disparity. On the difference in the intensity of pro-regime interpretations, one possibility is that the two versions might have been written by different persons who despite being similarly employed by the

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39 Tritura was a shorthand for Tri Tuntutan Rakyat or Three Demands of the People. The political fall-out from the G30S, exacerbated by economic crisis, proved too much for Sukarno to handle. The three demands were: (1) dissolution of the PKI; (2) massive restructuring of the Dwikora Cabinet; and (3) proper handling of economic crisis.

40 The PKI was blamed for many things that Sukarno did or was: that is, anti-Western foreign policy (SNI-6 1975, 110), konfrontasi with Malaysia (SNI-6 1975, 115) and Sukarno’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies as well as for deviating from many long-standing socio-cultural, economic and political practices (SNI-6 1975, 344).
military and despite being supervised by Nugroho Noto Susanto simply had different views about historical events. Yusmar Basri admitted that he wrote volume 3 of SNI-SMP (the one under consideration here) under the close supervision of Nugroho (Yusmar Basri 2005). Yusmar Basri belonged to the team that wrote the SNI-5 (1975) whereas those who wrote SNI-6 were Yusmar’s colleagues at the Armed Forces History Centre such as Saleh As’ad Djamhadi, Rochmani Santoso, Ariwiadi, among others.

Individual writing style, or writing ability, may also have something to do with it. The SNI-6 (1975) and SNI-SMP, for instance, both wanted to emphasise the sins of Sukarno and the Guided Democracy regime. SNI-SMP, however, appears to be clearer in its message. For instance, in its attempt to discuss the sources and the gravity of economic problems during the Guided Democracy period, the SNI-6 (1975) merely cited the problems – hyperinflation, white elephant projects, corruption related to deferred payment – but there is no attempt to establish their causes and interconnections, nor even an explanation what those terms meant. Moreover, Sukarno’s culpability is hardly referred to (SNI-6, 195, 109-110). One gets the impression that it was haphazardly written. The SNI-SMP, on the other hand, is able to define and explain more clearly, within comparatively lesser space, the connections between the monetary crisis, corruption, inflation and the suffering of the people (SNI-SMP, 152-154).

The regime’s political interest is another possible reason, and this is the most popular way to explain the nature of the the SNI. That the SNI-SMP was indeed intended to be a political tool right from the start became clear in 1982. Nugroho in an interview with a journalist declared: “Yes, I know that (referring to SNI-SMP) was not perfect...but its contents were already okay (sudah baik) and it satisfies the requirements set forth by Pak Harto.”

Many scholars in Indonesia, and perhaps every foreign observer, suspected this

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41 Nugroho was quoted as saying: “Saya tahu itu (SNI-SMP) tidak sempurna karena saya bukan guru SMP, tapi bahan isinya sudah baik dan memenuhi syarat yang dikehendaki Pak Harto”
but Nugroho was usually adamant in rejecting any suggestion that he was a lackey of the regime. He insisted repeatedly and tried hard to convince the public that he was a scholar, and that he deserved to be treated as such. Indeed, what he said in that interview was a very rare explicit admission that he wrote history in conformity to the order or wish of the higher authorities.

The key question here is that if political interest is indeed a primary reason, why would SNI-6 (1975) be any less effective as a vehicle? The possible answer lies in the contrasting set of constraints within which the two projects developed. Whereas the SNI-SMP was written with Nugroho and his team enjoying almost full freedom, there are reasons to believe that they were hamstrung by at least three strictures in writing the SNI-6 (1975). The first emanates from the pressure to conform to the structural, multi-dimensional approach agreed to by the group. The second was the attitude held at least by some influential members of the team towards contemporary history. Such an attitude springs from what I call, for lack of better term, the “contemporary-history-as-not-yet-history” mentality. And finally, the presence and the towering stature of Sartono himself who, despite Nugroho’s audacity to overrule him several instances before, remained a ‘force’ to reckon with.

Reading various papers presented in the workshop in Tugu, Bogor in June 1972\(^{42}\), one is struck by the strong pressure for everyone to conform to the structural, multi-dimensional approach such that Nugroho who was known to be not a fan of the approach could only concur.\(^{43}\) In his paper “Periode Sedjak 1942: Pengantar” (Period Since 1942: An Introduction) he expresses agreement with the structural approach, but insists on the need for a chapter that adopts a chronological or narrative approach as an introductory but integral part of the

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\(^{42}\) See the three-volume proceedings *Lokakarya Buku Standard Sejarah Indonesia*, mimeograph, 1972.

\(^{43}\) Interviews with several people close to Nugroho confirmed his preference for the narrative-chronological approach. Saleh As’ad Djamhari (2005a) (Yusmar Basri (2005), Irsyam (2005a) Manus (2005). One reason for this was perhaps Nugroho’s literary background. For him history is a story. For another, if the objective is to convey a message (moral, exhortatory, propagandistic), it can be accomplished more effectively using a story-telling approach, rather than structural analytical approach.
whole effort. That is precisely what came out in the SNI-6 (1975) as described above. Nugroho’s insistence on chapter specifically containing a chronological narrative as a prelude to the structural discussion seems to represent a compromise.\textsuperscript{44} If he could not fully have his preferred way, a straight narrative approach, at least there is one chapter allotted for it.

This move had important consequences. Having confined the narrative approach to the introductory chapter one is left with little space for a detailed and passion-inciting narrative of what was supposed to have happened, especially in the crucial events of the G30S coup and after. This partly explains the rather weak character of the propaganda messages in the SNI 1975 edition. Likewise, being an overview chapter, it had to fit its time coverage and the intensity and density of narration to the level appropriate to the two succeeding chapters. Since the two succeeding chapters employed a structural approach to analyse the Japanese, Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy periods, it calls for an overview (in the previous chapter) that covers these periods. It becomes a little clearer then why details about important events after the 1965 coup, especially those associated with birth of the New Order, and beyond were not covered. Supersemar,\textsuperscript{45} Tritura and the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto are all left out. They might appear misplaced or awkward given the nature of the two main chapters. Perhaps, if the New Order period was included in the coverage of the two main chapters, mentioning those events was necessary. Even in such a case, however, the primacy of the structural approach would likely preclude the need for so much details that could crowd out non-political aspects — elements that the structural approach aims to equally highlight. So here we have a case whereby the structural framework of

\textsuperscript{44} In Nugroho’s foreword in the 1975 edition, he justifies such a move by implying to the effect that unlike other volumes that dealt with the periods long time past — periods when lack of data makes it difficult to present a clear and detailed narratives — the period from 1942 to 1960s is different. There are simply numerous events that are so immediately important, and with enormous amount of data, that it would be a pity not to plot them in clear narrative.

\textsuperscript{45} Supersemar is shorthand for \textit{Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret}, which means Letter of Authority 11\textsuperscript{th} March. This a controversial document in which Sukarno was supposed to have given Suharto the authority to restore peace and order. It eventually led to the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto.
the project seemed to have restricted the ability of Nugroho and his team to convey more effectively their propaganda messages.

That the birth and early years of the New Order were not covered in the 1975 edition is really puzzling. Their absence cannot be purely incidental as there was a clear plan to include the period 1965-1970s. It is evident in the plan laid out by the team in the planning workshop in 1972 (Ariwiadi 1972). My informants who were members of the Volume 6 team cannot remember what actually happened in the writing process in the early 1970s. So I can only speculate based on available pieces of evidence. I think one possible reason was Sartono’s (abetted by other historians’) sceptical attitude towards very contemporary history. According to him, writing about a period too close to the present carries considerable risks that emanate from the absence of a ‘historical perspective.’ By that he meant a sense of critical distance which historians need so they achieve an impartial assessment. There must have been pressure from Sartono backed by the group for Nugroho to back-track from his team’s original plan to include the New Order period. Otherwise, it would have been included, as SNI-SMP shows. That there was disagreement among historians about this issue might be glimpsed from Nugroho’s preface in the 1975 edition where he launched a broadside against undisclosed targets. He chided them for not being brave enough to face the responsibility of making people understand their most recent history (SNI-6, 1975, n.p). Such a thinly veiled innuendo is quite odd to anyone unfamiliar with the context. In fact when I first read it, it struck me as strange. It became quite clear to me only when I pieced it together with Sartono’s emphatic tone in talking about Nugroho in relation to the need for the passage of at least 15-20 years before a history could be written46 (Kartodirdjo 2001b).

46 Also mentioned in his collection of essays, *Indonesian Historiography*, thus: “...lack of distance that is needed for an objective historical investigation. Personal involvement is still strong, which means that many issues and personalities may still arouse partisanship on the part of the public. Foreign scholars are in a better position to deal with contemporary history since they need not take sides” (2001a:44).
Despite Nugroho’s repeated transgression of the authority of Sartono, as described in Chapter 5, he seemed also cautious not to go too far. This caution seems reflected in his guarded and grudging obeisance to the structural approach. That he would do otherwise and abandon all strictures given a choice is clearly seen in the structure and coverage of the SNI-SMP as discussed above.

Considering Sartono’s stature, it was not difficult to understand why Nugroho should be at least superficially deferential to him. It might not be only because Nugroho as a person was known to be very polite, or because Sartono’s personality was (still is) truly respectable. It may also not just because Sartono was the most highly regarded Indonesian historian. More importantly, it may also because, being the only Professor of History during that time, Nugroho, who himself aimed at getting a PhD could not afford to recklessly antagonise Sartono. He may have already contemplated that he might need to request Sartono to act as the promoter (supervisor) of his PhD. The rather unflattering details about Nugroho’s quest for a PhD can be found in footnote 13 in Chapter 5. We can thus say that the limitations to Nugroho may have arisen not only from the structural approach but also from the presence and stature of Sartono. By looking at the SNI-SMP, we saw what Nugroho would or could do outside of Sartono’s shadow.

The timing and the condition under which the SNI-SMP was produced, as well as its contents, suggest what the SNI-6 (1975) might have looked like had Nugroho and his team worked independently. I speculate that one possible reason for Nugroho’s hasty move to form his own team to write the textbooks for high schools, without conferring with Sartono and other historian as earlier agreed, was Nugroho’s realisation that with Sartono and his structural approach at the helm once again, the political objectives of writing history might again be difficult to meet, as happened with the SNI-6. The difference thus between the SNI-SMP and the SNI (1975) may be said to represent Nugroho’s frustration with the SNI-6 (1975). Such a disappointment might have driven him to produce the SNI-SMP and

47 For description of the character of Nugroho, see Hoerip (1985), Mahbub Djunaidi (1985).
by a sleight of hand declared that it was just a summary of the SNI (1975). The people, including the critics, seemed to have believed this. Their attention was focused on the latter without realizing it was SNI-SMP (and its partner SNI-SMA) that was blatant propaganda. Only in 1985 was it first brought up in the media, but hardly anyone noticed (Kompas 1985). Unlike SNI that was talked about decades, SNI-SMP was ignored by critics, until later.

This is evident in the fact that the editorial cited above (Kompas 1985) that contained information about the problem with the SNI-SMP did not generate as much debate as had SNI.

That Nugroho would have written the SNI-6 (1975) differently under unrestricted condition would become even clearer if we look at the 1984 edition of the SNI. By this time, Sartono was no longer involved because of his removal by Nugroho a few years back. It is striking that the 1984 edition is so much closer to the SNI-SMP than to SNI-6 (1975) in structure, tone and contents.

The first obvious difference between 1975 and 1984 editions of the SNI-6 was the structure that was consequent to the approach adopted. Just like the SNI-SMP, the SNI-6 (1984) had abandoned the multi-dimensional in favour of the straight narrative-chronological approach. The 1984 edition constituted a massive overhaul of the volume, in stark contrast to the other volumes that through the years barely changed. (For list of changes, see Appendix E) The little of what remained of the multi-dimensional approach had been confined to a sub-section in each chapter, often just as appendices to a lengthy account of political development. See Table 6.2 below.

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48 Possible reasons for these include: (1) there are not many people who actually read SNI and SNI-SMP together, so most people don’t know the difference. (2) textbook writers tend to find the easy way out. They tend to merely copy from sources that is popular and easily accessible. Rather than consulting the SNI, which is complicated and admittedly was badly written in many parts, it is much more convenient to just consult the SNI-SMP (and its sister-textbook SNI-SMA). A cursory look at wide varieties of textbooks in the 1990s confirm this observation.

49 I was looking for newspaper articles that might have picked up the issue raised in that editorial but nothing came. It was only in 1987 when the issue of revision of the SNI-SMP was mulled over by the Ministry of Education that the SNI-SMP became a topic of discussion.
Table 6.2
Comparison of Outlines (1975 and 1984 Editions)

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<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1: Overview</strong></td>
<td><strong>I. Japanese Period</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative of political history from Japanese period up to 1 October 1965. (124 pages)</td>
<td>Among seven sections, two are non-political: Section D (War Economy) and E (Education, Social Communication and Culture). A total of 19 out of 89 pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2: Japanese Period (50 pages)</strong></td>
<td><strong>II. War for Independence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among four sections, only one for politics: A. Social Change and Mobility B. War Economy C. Government Structure and Political Life (18 out of 50 pages) D. Education and Social Communication</td>
<td>Among nine sections, there are also two non-politics sections, Section H (Economic Blockade) and I (Education, Culture and Social Communication. A total of 33 out of 115 pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3: Republic of Indonesia (158 pages)</strong></td>
<td><strong>III. Liberal Democracy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among six sections, three for non-politics and three for political themes: A. Social Mobility and Social Stratification B. Economic Development C. Government Structure and Political Life (24 out of 158 pages) D. Education and Social Communication E. Foreign Relations (18 out of 158 pages) F. National Security and ABRI’s Dual-Function (8 out of 158 pages)</td>
<td>Among eight sections, only one is non-political: Section H (Education, Culture and Social Communication. A total of 26 out of 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> A total of 50 out of 158 pages is devoted to political matters.</td>
<td><strong>IV. Guided Democracy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One section among 6 is allotted for non-political matters, 11 pages out of 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. New Order</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three sections for non-political: D (Economic stabilisation), E (5-Year Development Plans) and H (Socio-cultural Development. [Note that discussion on economic stabilisation and 5-Yr Plans (22 pages) is heavily underlain by political tone and motive; it was meant to draw sharp dichotomy between the New and the Old order.] A total of 41 out of 133 pages.</td>
<td></td>
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Having been freed from the strictures of the multi-dimensional approach and Sartono’s ‘contemporary-history-as-not-yet-history’ stance, the 1984 edition pays huge attention to political themes and it pushes the logic of contemporaneity to its utmost, covering the years up to 1983. Out of 520 pages, only 130 (25%) were devoted to non-political matters whereas in the 1975 edition, 108 out of 158 pages (68%) were devoted for the same.
The free-flowing narrative-approach enables the 1984 edition to provide, in
general, more clear-cut images of events and personalities, including a more
sharply negative depiction of Sukarno, the PKI and the Old Order as well as a more
clearly positive appraisal of Suharto, the military and the New Order. For instance,
whereas the 1975 edition merely mentioned without elaboration the sources or
manifestations of economic problems during the Guided Democracy, the 1984 (and
1993) editions provide copious details about the economic crisis, specifically the
hyper-inflation, and its alleged relationship with Sukarno’s erratic and profligate
economic policies. More importantly, the effort to connect all these facts to the
suffering of the people succeeds in conjuring a highly unpleasant image of
Sukarno and the Old Order among the readers.

The failure of the 1975 edition to go beyond early October 1965 effectively
precluded the discussion of events important to the legitimation of the New Order
regime. These include the reaction of the people to G30S, the skillful transfer of
power from Sukarno to Suharto, the restoration of peace and order, and the early
achievements of the New Order. To an extent this was accomplished in SNI-SMP,
but the 1984 edition elevated the effort to a substantially higher level of clarity. The
exposition began with a decidedly negative picture of the period 1950-1965—
gloomy, chaotic, hopeless, unstable—and then the tone gradually changed as it
became more expectant and upbeat after Supersemar was secured in March 1966.
The positive tempo continued until unbridled optimism was unleashed in the
coverage of the post-1967 period when power was eventually transferred to
Suharto. Panegyric descriptions of the gains in stabilising the economy, putting
order in the society in general, and in strengthening the foundations of political
stability were profusely detailed in over 100 pages (SNI-6, 1984: 4004-519). The
1993 edition went even further when when a separate volume of almost 500 pages
has been earmarked to serve purposes that included extolling or highlighting the

Note that SNI-6 (1984) devotes 10-11 pages of compact and relatively well organized details about the
economic problem, its alleged caused and impact (321-331)
To be more specific, the sub-section on the period of consolidation (since 1968) in the 1984 edition starts with how conscientious the government was in partnership with the parliament in their effort to address law-related problems. Law, it states, is “an objective guarantee to normalize the situation necessary for development” SNI-6 (1984, 426). That was how such effort was justified. A few lines later, however, it becomes clear that this is aimed as a broadside against the supposed ‘lawlessness’ of the Old Order. It reports that many laws promulgated by the previous regime that were incompatible with UUD 1945 were repealed. It also claims that unlike the situation under the Old Order government officials and the people in general have now become more aware of and concerned about the laws (SNI-6 1984, 426-427). This clearly illustrates how the ‘othering’ of the Old Order was accomplished in the 1984 edition.

The succeeding pages parade the specific efforts of the new regime to “repair” (Ibid. 426) the damage or “save” (Ibid. 430) the country from the ravages wrought by the former government. Highlighted are campaigns to wipe out corruption and to curb inflation; the rehabilitation of export-oriented industries and tax collection infrastructure; the recovery of ‘ill-gotten’ wealth; debt-restructuring; the rationalised economic planning and the overhaul of foreign policy. Gains, big and small, in each of these areas contribute to creating a picture of progress, order and optimism that stood in stark contrast to the depressing portrait painted by the authors in the previous chapter. Suharto, without mentioning his name often, is cast as the hope for the future. And Sukarno represents the ghost of the past.

In relation to the PKI and the G30S, the 1984 edition also provides a more detailed and forceful rendition. The Madiun uprising, for instance, is more clearly linked up with the G30S, the latter being depicted as a continuation of the earlier attempt to wrest control of the government. The authors regret that G30S became
possible due to the failure of the government to capture and punish all the communist leaders in 1948.51

<table>
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<th>Table 6.3</th>
<th>Treatment of the Link Between Madiun Uprising and G30S</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1975 Edition</strong></td>
<td><strong>1984 Edition</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;It is a pity that perpetrators were not punished because the Dutch attacked once again and many of them got away.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;It is a pity the perpetrators were not punished because the Dutch attacked once again. As a consequence, many of them got away and 17 years later they tried again to stage a revolt against the Republic, that is, the G30S.&quot;</td>
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<td>(&quot;Sayang sekali belum sempat oknum-oknum yang terlibat diadili, Belanda sudah menyerang kembali sehingga banyak di antara mereka lolos.)</td>
<td>(&quot;Sayang sekali belum sempat oknum-oknum yang terlibat diadili, Belanda sudah menyerang sehingga banyak di antara mereka lolos dan 17 tahun kemudian mencoba kembali untuk mengadakan pemberontakan terhadap Republik Proklamasi yaitu (G30S/PKI). (italics supplied)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likewise, the 1984 edition is categorical about the role of Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat in the purported act of torturing and killing the generals. Both the SNI-6 (1975) and SNI-SMP were silent about their involvement.52 Moreover, whereas the 1975 edition is silent about the reaction of the people, the 1984 version is explicit about it, describing it as 'angry,' a reaction supposedly reflected in the burning of the PKI headquarters at Kramat Raya (SNI-6, 1984: 395-396). Moreover, a fairly detailed description of the alleged effort of the PKI to 'come back' was provided in the discussion about 'Operation Trisula' in East Java, near Blitar in early 1968 (Ibid., 402-403)—a move that seems to highlight the 'latent danger'

51 Actually, the only difference between 1975 and 1984 versions was the addition of the phrase: "and 17 years later they again rebelled or rose up again against the Republic, that is, through the G30S." (SNI-6 1984, 156). However, the addition of this phrase was significant enough to establish the link between the two—a link which was essential in the propaganda that would proliferate in the wake of G30S in 30 September 1965 onwards.

52 The SNI-SMP is totally silent but in the SNI-6 (1975), they are mentioned in the same sub-section but not in relation to the killings but as included among those arrested by the military in the wake of the G30S(SNI-6 1975, 123).
that communism perpetually posed to Indonesian society. This is something that both the SNI 1975 edition and the SNI-SMP do not carry.

While the 1984 edition is overall more systematic, detailed and forceful in rendering accounts favourable to the regime, it would be a mistake to assume that there is always a linear progression from the SNI 1975 to SNI-SMP to the 1984 editions, if one looks at the treatment of particular events or personalities.

In efforts to conceal or minimise the involvement of the military in the G30S, for example, the 1975 edition appears to serve the purpose better simply by saying so much less about it than the 1984 edition. Whereas the 1975 edition allotted no more than a total of two pages (SNI-6 1975, 120-122 passim), in the 1984 edition there is a detailed description of military involvement spread out over as many as 10-12 pages (SNI-6, 1984: 390-402). For another, while later editions pinpointed Untung as the leader of the movement, the 1975 edition named Syam Kamaruzaman, designated by the text as a PKI high ranking officer, as the leader (SNI-6 1975, 121). Untung was relegated to a minor position of being just one among military men involved.

To the extent that the SNI-6 openly recognises that some military personnel were involved in the G30S, all editions were invariably careful to emphasise that these military men were misled or brainwashed by the PKI through the persistent effort at infiltration (penggarapan) by its Biro Khusus (Special Bureau) (SNI-6 1975, 120; 1984, 399). Not an iota of space was allowed for the possibility that they (the military officers) may have subscribed to leftist ideas on their own volition. In comparative terms, the 1975 edition is more straightforward and emphatic about the alleged vulnerability of the military to PKI brainwashing than SNI-SMP and the 1984 edition (SNI-6 1975, 120-121). It provides, for instance, some details as to how the Biro Khusus infiltrated the military, even mentioning specific middle-ranking officers who were supposed to be channels for the spread of communist ideas. The

Heryanto (2006) shows that while the regime had a hand in keeping alive communism’s supposed ‘latent danger,’ it has nonetheless assumed a life of its own apart from state manipulation.
1984 editions, on the other hand, merely mentioned the function of the *Biro Khusus* (SNI-6 1984, 387) and cited a number of brigades or battalions in Central Java as targets of attempted penetration (SNI-6 1984, 397).

Likewise, despite the vehemence of the SNI-SMP, in general terms and in particular against the leftists, there are instances when it proves softer than the SNI-6, both 1975 and 1984 editions. The PKI, for example was not blamed for Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN and the confrontation with Malaysia, as was the case in the 1975 edition. Nor is there any mention of the pressures on the artists or literary figures to toe the “Politics is in Command” line favoured by the LEKRA and other leftist organisations.

The foregoing tries to show that despite efforts to provide accounts favourable to the regime, the variations between the different versions and the lack of consistent progression from the earlier to the later edition suggest a less than systematic and overriding effort along this line. The presence of important contradictions reinforces this point.

Before the 1975 edition closes, nestled in the middle of the last paragraph, far from the main narratives, the authors declare (SNI-6 1975, 345):

> With the coup attempt of the G30S/PKI that failed, the whole of ABRI opened their eyes about the consequence of inter- and intra-service (military) conflict due to the infiltration of ABRI by people who are agents of an outside political power.

That such a statement can be found in the SNI is very significant. While this statement reiterates the blame on an ‘outside political power’ (read: the communists) for the cause, it also implies not only the involvement of the military in the G30S but it also puts the intra- and inter-service rivalries among the causes of the G30S. By doing so it undercuts not only the whole effort expended in the earlier parts of the book (denying or minimising military involvement). It also tends subtly to subvert one of major ideas behind the official explanation of the event as painstakingly laid out by Nugroho Noto Santo and Ismael Saleh in their
book *The September 30 Movement Coup Attempt*. That is, that the G30S was not a product of internal dissension within the Army,\(^{54}\) as McVey and Anderson argued in a paper famously known as the “Cornell Paper,” but rather a coup masterminded by the communists to wrest control of the government. Nugroho, under whose editorship SNI-6 was written, must be turning over in his grave.

In the 1984 edition a similar passage is still there. In a re-phrased version the link between the intra-military rivalry and the G30S remains implicit but interestingly this version may even be downright more incriminating than the one above! Although no necessarily causal connection between the two is established, just like that in 1975 edition the phrasing sets the mood for interpreting the internal rivalries within the Army (or ABRI as a whole) as leading to the G30S. The authors declare: (SNI-6, 1984:456)

> Since 1962...the ‘divide and rule’ politics towards the ABRI reached climax such that the process of *disintegration, rivalries and controversies* between or within different branches or services of the ABRI accelerated until such point that the G-30-S/PKI broke out.\(^{55}\) (italics original)

These statements were made in the ‘periphery,’ far removed from the chapters that dealt with the ‘main’ events/periods such as the G30S, Guided Democracy or transition to the New Order. It is thus understandable that few seem to have noticed.\(^{56}\) Ironically enough, this passage is mentioned in connection with the discussion to explain or justify ABRI’s dual function in a separate section where the authors enumerate the achievements and explain the specific steps undertaken by the regime to strengthen the foundation of economic development, political stability and social order. The important thing to note is that the presence of such

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\(^{54}\) In Nugroho’s and Saleh’s exact words: “...the ‘September 30 Movement’ was not an internal Army Affair. The cases did not have the characteristics of internal Army squabbles. They were neither caused by difference between the Army and the Air Force, nor between any of the other within the Armed Forces.” (1967: 145)

\(^{55}\) Exact words: Sesudah tahun 1962...politik ‘divide et impera’ terhadap ABRI mencapai klimaksnya, sehingga terlihat adanya proses *disintegrasi, rivalitas, kontroversi* antar-Angkatan dan intra-angkatan yang berkembang dengan pesatnya sampai kepada saat meletusnya pemberontakan G-30-S/PKI.”

\(^{56}\) The 1993 edition was written by a different set of historians who, despite being in the same circle as Nugroho was (the UI-Pusjarah circle), worked in the post-Nugroho period. Nugroho died in 1985.
statements in an 'official history' indicates the fluidity within the otherwise monolithic perception of the SNI.\(^{57}\)

The foregoing has identified specific instances wherein the interests of the New Order regime have impinged on the shape of historical knowledge. Given the preponderance of close parallelism, one can hardly deny that regime justification was among the concerns of the authors. It is no wonder then that the epithet 'official history' as ascribed to the SNI carries, as almost always in similar instances, a pejorative connotation of being the 'official propaganda.'

The significance, however, of the disparity among different editions cannot be set aside. The following observations highlight the salience of such variations.

First, any variation points to the fluidity or multiplicity of powers that determine the shape of knowledge. It sends a stark reminder that these variations may have emanated perhaps from having been written by different persons, at different circumstances within differently nuanced power relations. The variations and inconsistencies could also arise simply as unintended products of negligence, accidental oversight or simply just pure luck. Such phenomena thus cast in doubt on the impression of singularity and monolithic power that the term "official history" carries. The fact that Nugroho and his team were on the payroll of the Armed Forces heightens the impression of "officiality" and solidity. Any evidence thus to the contrary could give us a glimpse of how various forces interact at the interstices between knowledge and power.

Second, the two major editions, 1975 and 1984, were written by exactly the same people.\(^{58}\) From this group also came the most important people responsible

\(^{57}\) To cite a number of examples of this monolithic view: Vickers and McGregor (2005, p. 44-45) declared, "New Order hegemony was supported not by a set of reasoned arguments, but rather by statements which were to be accepted, not believed. In the compiling of state-authorised facts, from trade statistics to text books, the dominant principle was one 'as long as the boss is happy.' While Wood (2005, 17) categorically stated that "(t)he Indonesian history industry as a whole cannot be dismissed as being merely a reflection of officially sanctioned views" and that "it could not be described as simply a source for regime propaganda" he did not, unfortunately, pay attention to his own declaration. His whole book presents a monolithic view of what he calls 'official history.'
for writing the SNI-SMP. Both teams were led by Nugroho and, as discussed in Chapter 5, we know who he was and what he represented. Thus, notable variations in the output calls for an investigation of their possible sources.

Third, among the four books—the 1975, 1984 and 1993 editions and the SNI-SMP (1976)—the 1975 edition stood out as the most awkward from the viewpoint of propaganda, although there are specific instances, as pointed out above, where it could be more forceful. Aside from being awkward, it contains a statement that ran counter to the New Order official narrative, albeit in way that may not be easily noticed. One may say that being the first to be written—the authors being inexperienced—caused such a 'deficiency.' As noted earlier, however, the SNI-SMP was written at the time that almost coincided with the writing of the 1975 edition, and it proved far more direct and forceful than the 1975 edition. It was much closer to the 1984 edition in terms of potency as propaganda, sometimes even surpassing it.

If that is the case, then what was the most salient difference between the 1975 edition, on the one hand, and the three other books? This brings us to the final consideration I should note here. The defining difference lay in the micro-context within which the three books were written. That is, whereas the 1975 edition was written within the strictures set by Sartono and by the broader community of historians who took for granted that they were producing a scholarly work, the SNI-SMP and the 1984 editions were produced under the atmosphere of almost total freedom for Nugroho and his team. It is, as I will try to demonstrate below, the power of scholarship that made the difference.

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58 The 1993 edition was prepared by a mixed-group of new-comers and former members of the old team. The editors of Vol. 6 are Richard Leirrissa and Zulfikar Ghazali while those of Vol. 7 are Richard Leirrissa and Salaeh As'ad Djamhari. Volume 6 has six contributing writers while volume 7 has seven. The common denominator among these and the members of the old SNI-6 [1977 & 1984 editions] was that all of them were close identified with Nugroho Noto susanto, either employed in Pusjarah or in UI.
In the Service of Two Gods?

To begin with, despite being employed or deployed by the military, Nugroho and his team at the Pusjarah were all professionally-trained historians. They were all reared in a high dose of historical philosophies and methodologies. Having been taught to pursue as much as possible “objectivity,” juggling possibly conflicting demands that sometimes required contradictory loyalties posed as a challenge. Nugroho and Saleh As’ad Djamhari I consider as good examples. Nugroho, for instance, was adamant that he was a scholar-historian. He took pains to convince the public that he deserved to be treated as such. In more than a few instances, he displayed a mastery of historical methods and utilised them as weapons in his contentious debates with his critics. He was not always convincing but one can grant that he carried himself quite well in various instances. On the other hand, Saleh, a very close aide to Nugroho and a member of the SNI-6 team, has been left feeling guilty for what they did. He described Sukarno as a “Grrreaaatttt leader!” and he felt bad that he (Saleh) had joined the endeavour to discredit him (Sukarno) and besmirch his memory (Saleh Djamhari 2005a). Perhaps as an attempt at self-redemption, after retiring from the Pusjarah in 1995 he pursued a PhD in history (with a thesis on Diponegoro) notwithstanding advanced age and vowed to do a ‘scientific history.’

The ambiguities of military-historians’ positions tended to pose certain limitations to what they could do or achieve. As historians they had to contend

59 I asked for instance Saleh As’ad Djamhari a hypothetical question: What do they do when they were faced with evidence which contradicted the avowed interest of the military? Did they deliberately ignore or neglect (meng-abaikan) the contrary evidence? He said, “Oh no, we don’t neglect them, we just select!” He implied that there was something in being a historian that held them back from deliberate manipulation of evidence (Saleh Djamhari 2005b).

60 This is clear in a number of newspaper articles written by Nugroho in defence of his work Proses Perumusan Pancasila Dasar Negara. In these articles, he exerted enormous efforts to parry criticisms and he relied on his command of historical methodology to refute the allegations and arguments of his critics. He was not always successful but, without prejudice to his reputation as a henchman of the military, he appeared persuasive in a number of crucial points being contested. See “Teori: Ajinomoto dan metode Sejarah,” Kompas, 30 August 1981, pp. 8, 12 (Notosusanto 1981a); “Metode Sejarah Prapanca dari abad ke-14 terlalu kuno untuk abad ke 20,” Kompas, 6 September 1981 (Notosusanto 1981b); “Tulisan Tangan Bung Karno Jadi Landasan Saya,” Kompas, 21 August 1981 (Kompas 1981); “Tulisan Tangan ‘Bung Karno’ Dasar Perumusan Nugroho Tentang Pancasila,” Sinar Minggu Pagi, 23 August 1981 (Sinar Minggu Pagi 1981) (The latter two were from Yayasan Idayu, 1981, pp. 80 & 87). For an overview of this debate, see Sutrisno (2003:1-12). For a compilation of articles about the debate, see Yayasan Idayu (1981).
with the rules or conventions or the prevailing discourses of the professional community where they also liked to be recognised.\textsuperscript{61} One arena where these conventions or discourses were embedded was in the overall historiographic terrain as it was developing then in Indonesia. This was one of those spheres where, despite being backed by the supremacy of the New Order regime, they did not readily have pre-eminent power or influence. They had to wrestle, among other things, with scholarship in the ‘purest’ form of which politics lies in the practitioners’ being avowedly non-political. The clash of the two domains of power was perhaps inevitable, and it is relevant to see how they negotiated their respective positions.

Aside from the limitation emanating from their ambiguous position, the nature of history-used-as-a-propaganda also tended to pose considerable challenges to Nugroho and his team, or to anyone assigned to do the same task for that matter. Even if they consciously aimed at promoting propaganda, there remain a need to maintain at least a semblance objectivity and historical methodology. The power of history as propaganda depends to a great extent on the appearance of credibility. They had to strike a delicate balance between forcefulness and subtlety, immediacy and restraint. An overkill could defeat the purpose. While it is true that most of Nugroho’s and his team’s published outputs betrayed their crudity and lack of skills along this line, there were also instances when restraints upon them, self-imposed or otherwise, were apparent. Let us take a look at some notable examples from the SNI-6 to illustrate the point.

\textsuperscript{61} Nugroho often emphasised that he was a ‘historian’ not a politician, and so insisted that criticisms of him should be at the academic level. Perhaps to make worthy of his desire to be treated as a historian he tried very hard to employ not just the rhetoric of history but standard historical methodologies to respond to his critics. See for instance “Tulisan Tangan Bung Kamo Jadi Landasan Saya” (1981). A similar effort may be glimpsed in Nugroho’s foreword in the Volume 6. He took pains to emphasize that because not all facts can be included in the narrative, they did the best they could to examine them carefully “based on the requirements of historical methods.” (See “Prakata” SNI, Jilid 6, n.p, 1975)
As already noted earlier the place called Lubang Buaya occupies a central position in the official narrative of the New Order. It eventually became a museum that served as a memorial to the alleged treachery, wickedness, and hunger for power of the PKI. Considering the pivotal position it occupies in the official narrative of the regime, it is surprising that all versions of the SNI, including SNI-SMP, treated it rather mildly, in comparison with what had been popularly known. For instance, none among various editions of the SNI-6 contain the grotesque lies that the members of Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat gouged out the eyes of the generals, mutilated their genitals or danced naked around, even ‘raped,’ them. It simply stated that the generals were tortured, a lie in itself, and how such a torture was inflicted. The extent of such torture, I should note, was treated differently in different editions. The first edition (1975) for instance merely states that they were tortured; it did not describe the torture as ‘berat’ (severe) or ‘kejam’ (cruel or gruesome), as was the case in 1984 edition (SNI-6 1976, 122; SNI-6 1984, 390). More surprisingly, the alleged culpability, even the mere presence, of the Gerwani and other PKI-affiliated groups in Halim or Lubang Buaya was not mentioned in the first edition. (see Table 6.1 for the comparison)

Table 6.4
What Happened in Lubang Buaya?

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<td>“In Lubang Buaya, the officers who were still alive were tortured using sharp weapons and rifle butts. They were then sprayed with bullets and finally were thrown in an old well…” p. 122</td>
<td>“In a gruesome or cruel (kejam) manner, they were tortured and finally killed by the members of the Pemuda Rakyat, Gerwani and other PKI-affiliated organizations. Satisfied with their cruelty, the bodies of dead officers were afterwards thrown in an</td>
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62 See Drakeley (2000) for a concise and highly perceptive interpretation of what purportedly transpired in Lubang Buaya and for the importance of the event in the subsequent response to the PKI and the birth of the New Order. This brief article anticipates significant parts of Weiringa’s important book Sexual Politics in Indonesia (2002)

63 A valuable and detailed treatment of this and other military-sponsored museums in Indonesia can be found in McGregor (2002)

64 Such gruesome details originated from news reports published by military-controlled newspapers such as BeritaYudha and Angkatan Bersendjata. The apparent intention of such reports were to incite the anger of the public towards the PKI. For a systematic and detailed account of the process by which the military deceived the public, see Saskia Wieringa, Sexual Politics in Indonesia. (2002, 310-317)
The reason for this could be a simple oversight or carelessness on the part of Nugroho and his team. This is plausible in the case of 1975 edition where as noted, Gerwani and other PKI groups were not even mentioned, let alone blamed for the gruesome event in Lubang Buaya. As noted in Chapter 5, the first edition was done rather hastily. That it was rectified in the 1984 and 1993 editions makes the point clear. The case, however, of the ghastly details allegedly done by the women—castration, forking out of eyes, dancing of naked women—is different. It cannot be an oversight. That such details remained unstated in the 1984 edition makes it obvious that there was really no intention to mention these in the 1975 edition. Asked why was the treatment of the event like that, one of the members of Nugroho’s team hinted that that they could not find defensible or credible evidence for such alleged wrongdoings and that for educational purposes, inclusion of such details they deemed not appropriate. Stating that the generals were tortured (dianiayai) was enough. (Saleh As’ad Djamhari, 2005a)

Another was the treatment of the Serangan Umum (General Attack) of 1 March 1949. All the three editions refrained from eulogising the role of Suharto in it. They uniformly stated simply that Suharto led the attack, which was in fact the case. There was no effort to exaggerate his role as the leader, much less as supposedly the initiator of the attack, unlike the role claimed for him elsewhere such as his autobiography (Soeharto 1989). This dubious claim was even popularized in the films Janur Kuning and Serangan Fajar. What is quite

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65 This refers to coordinated attack by Republican forces under the operational leadership of Suharto against the Dutch-controlled Yogyakarta which was held it for 6 hours. At the heart of controversy lay in Suharto’s claim that it was his brainchild, side-lining Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as the real initiator.

66 It was through these films that Suharto’s dubious claim of having initiated the attack had been popularized. The first was made in 1979 with a huge budget and the other one was in late 1980s. See Budi Irawanto’s Film, Ideologi dan Militi (1999) for a penetrating analysis of the pervasive military values reflected in the films. Aside from these two, another film was analysed, Enam Djam di Jogya. The sharp contrast in the ways how the roles of Suharto, Sudirman and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX were shown (or omitted) in
exaggerated is the treatment of the extent or the importance of the event. This is evident in all versions, to a slightly varying degree. The attack, for instance is described in all versions as 'extraordinarily intensive' ('paling hebat') It led, the text continues, to the demoralisation of the Dutch forces (SNI-SMP, 108)) or to the turning of the tide of war that saw the initiative shifted from the Dutch forces to the TNI. The Dutch who were hitherto the attackers became the ones attacked (SNI-6 1975, 63; SNI-6 1984, 162).

Still another example was the treatment of the Supersemar and the events leading to the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto. The first edition (1975) was totally silent about it. The narrative mysteriously stopped right after the G30S and the explanation for this was earlier discussed. The two later editions were notable for lack of any real effort to embellish the importance of the event, unlike the case in SNI-SMP. They simply stated that it was the beginning of the New Order. Compare the treatment below.

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<th>Table 6.5</th>
<th>Treatment of Supersemar</th>
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<td><strong>SNI-SMP</strong></td>
<td><strong>1975 Edition</strong></td>
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<td>&quot;Supersemar constitutes a turning point in the victory of the New Order and because it was newly acquired must be defended and protected.&quot; (p. 169)</td>
<td>Silent. Not covered.</td>
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the three films manifested interestingly the varying extent and styles of promoting military values, in general, and certain political interests, in particular. Many are convinced that *JanurKuning* was deliberately made to erase the lackluster image of Suharto as presented in *Enam Djam di Jogya* which was made in 1951. For such a perception, see for example Adam (2001, 18)
There are other instances when restraint on the part of the writers was apparent. However, I single out these three cases as exemplary because these were central to the interests of the regime, or of Suharto specifically. That the supposed “buku babon” would not go as far as other propagandistic tools could mean various things. However, these certainly include the conscious or unconscious ‘attempt’ of the historians who wrote it to uphold some measures of historical methodology. Despite being dubbed as a mouthpiece or an ‘icon’ of New Order propaganda, and for that bitterly criticised, the SNI (especially the 1975 edition) was at best of limited forcefulness or efficacy. Perhaps, Suharto’s call in early May 1987 to take another look at the history of 1950-1965 and to formulate anew an official, “objective and honest” history of the New Order was in belated recognition of the limitations of the SNI.67

Notwithstanding the preponderance of regime’s political motives in SNI-6, identifying the spaces where they do not dominate provides us a glimpse of the intersection where politics, scholarship and chance meet. The dialectic that ensues among the three posits that scholarship has its own set of powers that may or may not be compatible with those of political actors. The factor of chance or the unintended exercise of power does sometime play important role, too. The well-spring of the powers of scholarship needs to be discussed.

Roots of Scholarship-Politics Tension

The tension between the scholarly and the political runs quite long but not particularly deep in the field of history in Indonesia. The early roots may be

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67 The official reason given for Suharto’s call focused on the need of the younger generation to know more about the ‘truth’ about the periods 1950-1965 as well as the New Order. Considering the detailed treatment of the periods in the SNI 1984 edition, as well the long-standing presence of the SNI-SMP (and its accompanying texts for the SMA, SNI-SMA) the official reason given by Alamsjah, a high ranking minister, was unusual. Suharto’s call elicited spirited public discussion in the media. See ‘Pemerintah Perlu Menyusun Buku Acuan Sejarah Indonesia 1950-65’ (Kompas 1987b); ‘Sejarah Zaman Baru Indonesia Memang Perlu Ditulis Kembali’ (Kompas 1987a); ‘Beberapa Kendala Penulisan Sejarah’ (Abdullah H. 1987a); ‘Demitologisasi Sejarah’ (Moedjanto 1987); “Dilema Sejarawan Nasional” (Abdullah H. 1987b)
remotely traced to the spirited exchanges about, among other things, the question of objectivity and subjectivity within the 'club' of colonial historians, as Resink put it (Resink 1968c, 63). The Indonesian scholars did not participate; they were, as Resink noted in 1953, “totally ignorant of it” (Resink 1968c, 66). If the notion of 'subjective history' had to be fought for in Europe, in the context of a deeply entrenched tradition of positivism and empiricism, the reverse was true in the case of Indonesian scholars. The subjective notion of history seemed to have easily found a fertile niche in the emerging community of Indonesian historians. Among the reasons for these, Resink spelled out, were the “pluralistic and polyinterpretable” character of Indonesian culture and the ‘syncretistic traditions’ that altogether nurtured the spirit of tolerance among the people.68

In the earlier stage the question of subjectivity was not primarily linked to the influence of the ‘obviously’ political. It was rather tied to the impact of the Zeitgeist in general including the supposedly a-historical attitude emanating from traditional culture.69 The same culture had also nurtured and sanctioned the close ties between the rulers and the court poets/priests—a practice that, some would say, would be carried all throughout, perhaps in different forms, even up to the New Order period. In due time, coasting along the rise of nationalism, the notion of subjectivity would become decidedly political, both in tone and intent. The proliferation starting in the late colonial period of the purportedly historical works that were blatantly mythical, extolling the glories of the Indonesian past illustrated the extent to which intellectuals would allow themselves to be carried away by strongly nationalist atmosphere.70

68 The other reason Resink (1968c) pointed out lay in the backwardness of historical theory as it developed among colonial scholars in/of Indonesia. That is, colonial historiography of the earlier days did not pay particular attention to the question of historical objectivity, so it was relatively easy to plunge into the notion of historical subjectivity.

69 Soedjatmoko, among others, proved to be emphatic of the supposed adverse effects of traditional mindset on understanding history. See Soedjatmoko’s “Indonesian Historian and His Time” (1965). See also Oetomo (1961)

70 For a stand-out example of this, see Yamin 6000 Tahun Sang Merah Puti (1951) and Gadjah Mada: Pahlawan Persatuan Nusantara (1953). It is surprising that whereas Yamin had been constantly criticised by both Indonesian and foreign scholars for his glaring nationalist biases, Casparis (1961) proved to be an
Against such a backdrop we can appreciate the importance of what happened on the fateful day of 14 December 1957. In the opening day of the historic first National History Seminar, Soedjatmoko\textsuperscript{71} and Yamin were the two presenters tasked to articulate their proposed philosophy of national history.\textsuperscript{72} The two spelled out what proved to be classic articulations of the two contrasting views on the philosophy of national history of Indonesia. The primary bones of contention were the question, “History for what?” and “What history should be?” If Resink, only five years earlier, bewailed the absence of Indonesians’ participation in the debate, things would never be the same after the Soedjatmoko-Yamin encounter in December 1957. The friction between scientific and nationalist history was given eloquent expression, perhaps for the first time in Indonesia’s public sphere.

Muhammad Yamin argued passionately for the use of history to promote national unity and national pride.\textsuperscript{73} (Yamin 1958) Soedjatmoko, for his part, argued exactly the opposite. He warned against the use of history as a political tool and he called for a ‘scientific’ and open approach to the study of history, devoid of any preconceived political purposes. As far as he was concerned, talking about philosophy of history at a time when there was virtual absence of empirical research was premature and inappropriate. Let research be done, he urged, in an open space of scientific inquiry and the output would frame the shape philosophy would take afterwards (Soedjatmoko 1958). The whole idea of his paper revolved

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\textsuperscript{72} It may be by a stroke of fate that Soedjatmoko spoke at that conference. He was not originally the intended speaker. It was Hatta. For an undisclosed reason, Hatta could not come, so Soedjatmoko was asked to replace him. (See Laporan Seminar Sedjarah 1958, 12)

\textsuperscript{73} For a useful explication of the life and works of Yamin, see Gunawan (2005). See also Deliar Noer (1979).

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around the urgent need to protect history from the impatient demands of nationalism."74

Soedjatmoko’s eloquent articulation notwithstanding, the mantra of nationalism seemed overwhelming. For instance, among the seven reactors (pendebat) invited to comment on Yamin-Soedjatmoko exchange, hardly anyone expressed agreement with the points raised by Soedjatmoko. These were either politely rejected, angrily engaged or flatly ignored.75 Such reactions were a portent of how in the succeeding decades Soedjatmoko’s ideas would be received or treated by the history establishment in Indonesia in particular, and the public in general.76 Like many of his other brilliant ideas, his message cannot but be confined, during much of Guided Democracy and New Order periods, to the undercurrents – considered by many, to put it in the most polite terms, as well-ahead of its time.77 It would have to wait for the rise of Sartono and the multidimensional school (sometimes called the UGM School) he led before a sustained effort materialised to bring at least a little part of Soedjatmoko’s message to the

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74 Kahin recalled that Soedjatmoko wrote to him sometime in the late 1950s that the latter felt it was his personal responsibility to protect history from the impetuous dictates of the nationalist atmosphere. See “In Memoriam: Soedjatmoko, 1922-1989,” (1990)

75 Two flatly rejected Soedjatmoko’s proposal and one of them seemed to be deeply angered by it. See Kartawirana, (1958), Ave (1958). The others either implicitly denied Soedjatmoko’s views by agreeing with Yamin or they appeared to politely ignore him. In his response Soedjatmoko tried to mollify Ave by anchoring the roots of their oppositional views on the unclear nature of the theme of the panel saying that it should not be about philosophy of national history but about issues on the writing of history.

76 There seems to be tendency among Western scholars to exaggerate the impact or influence of Soedjatmoko’s 1957 piece. A good example of this is Kahin (1990) who gushed about its supposed being widely read and influential. Interviewing a good number of Indonesian historians who studied history in Indonesia in the 1960s up to 1980s, it surprised me that not many considered it a ‘hot’ topic in their historiography classes. They often noted that the fact the Soedjatmoko-edited book (Introduction to Indonesian Historiography) was translated in Bahasa and published in Indonesia only in 1995 could point to its limited readership and influence before mid 1990s. In Frederick and Soeroto’s introduction to the first set of papers in their book Pemahaman Sejarah Indonesia, noted that while perhaps Soedjatmoko’s views had some influence in the 1950s, by 1980s “it does not surprise that these were considered not apt” (28).

77 Soedjatmoko was aware that he was going against very strong currents of the time. In his acutely perceptive essay “The Indonesian Historian and His Time” (1965) he identified the currents as, first, the pervasive ahistorical attitude of the people that emanated from the feudal, agrarian setting of much of Indonesia. The second was the impatient demands of nationalism that tended to subordinate everything to the quest for national strength, pride and unity. So the lukewarm response must not have surprised Soedjatmoko. In an obituary for Soedjatmoko written by Hannah Papanek and Goenawan Mohammad (1990) they called him a “voice of reason... in a world too seldom has listened to such voices.” (p. 449) They also noted that “his influence at home remained muted” (450). In the review of “Transforming the Humanity: The Visionary Writings of Soedjatmoko,” Leslie Palmier (1996, 198) stated that “his country was too blinkered to appreciate him.”
surface, allowing it a chance of joining the mainstream of historiographic development.\footnote{However, it would be a mistake to regard the Sartono School, despite looming large in most major accounts of historiographic development in Indonesia, as central or dominant in terms of actual influence. The alleged dominance of the School may be a projection of a deep-seated desire rather than a representation of what was actually the case. If we take a look at the general map of historical outputs in Indonesia—be it in academic, popular or instructional terms—the quantity of those following the Sartono approach to historical writing occupy very little space. See Curaming (2003) for a more developed detailed argument along this line.}

The scientific and the nationalist history were not necessarily antithetical, as Soedjatmoko suggested. Klooster rightly pointed out that a nationalist historiography can also be scientific, although he conceded that it may seldom happen. The difference between the two, he claimed, lay in the purpose. That is, while nationalist historiography aims at “cultivation of love and esteem for the fatherland,” scientific historiography seeks to understand “the past in its own right.” (Klooster 1982, 48-49)

Parenthetically, I would like to note that while many foreign observers\footnote{For instance, see Vickers and McGregor (2005), Van Klinker (2002).} were openly dismissive or bitterly critical of the politicised, nationalist historiography that developed in the Old and New Order periods, there are also others who were sympathetic, or at least tolerant. Sue Nichterlein\footnote{In a characteristic historicist fashion, Nichterlein demonstrated that various ways or examples by which different Indonesian authors had given substance to the idea of history consistent with the demands of the time or their understanding of those demands. “Scientific” history, she claimed, was but one of the several possibilities by which history could be written. It was not necessarily the most applicable or acceptable.} (1974) and Frederick (with Soeroto) (1982), and even Resink\footnote{Resink declared: “Our national attitude has to an important extent been determined historically, and it will continue to develop as a response to the challenge of the extra-national, a-national, and in some case, anti-national historical attitudes of many...” (1968b) (“ Europocentric, Regiocentric, and Indocentric Historiography,” p. 12. His historicist views, however, are more clearly spelled out in his article “A Passe-Partout Round Indonesia’s Historians.” (1968d))} (1968b; 1968d) to an extent, agreed that such form of history was a product of its time and it was not necessarily antithetical or inferior to “scientific history.” Such a historicist assessment of nationalist historiography, while seemingly at home to most Indonesians, did not sit well with the views of the eloquent and the vocal few. The likes of Bambang Oetomo, Soedjatmoko and more recently Bambang Purwanto...
proved to be as harsh if not harsher than their foreign counterparts in castigating nationalist historiography. Mohammad Ali,82 Sartono Kartodirdjo,83 Abdurachman Surjomihardjo,84 Taufik Abdullah,85 Kuntowijoyo86 and Ong Hok Ham were also critical but their stance was somewhat tempered by their sympathies for or understanding of the inevitability of national (if not nationalist)87 aspirations. Altogether, however, they gave a clear, albeit muffled, voice in an atmosphere pervaded by the logic of nationalism. Their occasional articles, either or both in the press and/or more scholarly venues, kept the tension between the 'scientific' and the nationalist scholarship alive all throughout the extended period when the pressure was enormous for the former ('scientific') to bow down to the latter ('nationalist').

Where did Nugroho fit in all this? It is seductive to regard Nugroho as a carrier of the long tradition of the ruler-poet/chronicler relationship that dates back to the pujanggas in the courts of Mataram, Majapahit and other old kingdoms. Not a few observers considered him as the Prapanca88 of the New Order regime. Nugroho doggedly resisted the epithet as he insisted that he was a scholar, not an 'intellectual prostitute.' Whether he succeeded is highly doubted by

82 Mohammad Ali was emphatic about the need for a 'scientific history' but he was aware that such a kind of history can be realized only within the context of a "new culture suitable to life in the modern world." (See "Historiographical Problems," pp. 22-23.)
83 Sartono Kartodirdjo, despite being considered by many as a sort of an icon for 'scientific history' in Indonesia, never failed to at least mention in his writings that history writing can never be divorced from its Zeitgeist and since national unity and identity he deemed among those needs of the time, he had no qualms in aligning history to serve those needs. (1982; 1994; 2001a; 2001b)
84 Abdurachman Surjomihardjo proved to be the most vocal, and downright brutal, critic of the SNI and political influence on history writing, but it is also evident in his articles that he recognized the 'obligations' of the historians to contribute to nationalist undertakings. See his collection of essays, Pembinaan Bangsa dan Masa/ah Historiografi (1978a)
86 See the introductory chapter to Metodologi Sejarah (Kuntowijoyo 2003)
87 The debates surrounding the philosophy of national history in the 957 national seminar gave rise to sharp differentiation between the terms "national" and "nationalist," the latter being associated with 'chauvinistic' forms of nationalism. That Sartono's articles written as late as the 1990s, even teh early 2000s, contained referred to such a differentiation attests to the enduring tension between the two concepts. See for instance "Sekali Lagi Pemikiran Sekitar Sejarah Nasional" (1970 pp. 33-34).
88 Prapanca was supposed to be the author of Nagararaktagama. It purportedly contained historical accounts about Madjapahit. He was a pujangga, or a court poet/cleric-literati.
many but I would argue in the next chapter that more complex judgments are needed. What makes, for instance, an effort to understand Nugroho doubly complicated was that in the context of much of 20th century Indonesia, a Prapanca has been a contested signifier. While C. C. Berg dismissed Prapanca as a manipulator of history to serve a political interest of his ruler (and also questioned the historical value of Prapanca’s purported work Nagarakrtagama alongside the Babad Tanah Jawi, Pararaton, and others89), Sutjipto Wirjusuparyo90 exalted, even installed him as the father of Indonesian history. While there have been more than a few Bergs in the past 3-4 decades, there seem to be many more commentators who identified with Sutjipto’s ideas. 91 So any overly dismissive assessment of Nugroho as a modern day Prapanca, or as an intellectual prostitute, can only reflect one side in a highly contentious and continuing debate. In strict terms, it is just a case of asserting one’s politics against that of others. Such a debate is embedded in, though by no means confined to, the historiographic terrain.

Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was four-fold: (1) to demonstrate the political and the scholarly context within which the SNI developed; (2) to examine how political and scholarly factors interacted; (3) to identify the outcome of such interaction; and, finally, (4) to account for the ‘excess,’ those things outside of the obviously political and the scholarly that also contributed to the process of defining the shape of the SNI.

89 For an overview of the contrasting views on the historicity of these writings, see Hall (1965). See also van der Kroef (1958) for an overview and appreciative assessment of Berg’s ideas and approach. For a useful overview of how differently Majapahit was depicted in Nagarakrtagama, Pararaton and Babad Jawi and how such differences mattered in the Indonesian intellectual’s effort to grapple with the place of Majapahit in the overall nationalist eschatology, see S. Supomo (1979).

90 Sutjipto Wirjosuparto was one of the respected scholars in Indonesia. He wrote in “Prapanca sebagai Penulis Sedjarah,” (1960/1982) as a defense against Berg’s ideas that cast doubt on the historical value of Nagarakrtagama, among other babads.

91 Frederick and Soeroto (1982, 176-177), for instance, described Sutjipto’s piece as his ‘best’ as it offered a new perspective on the early history of Indonesia. Sutjipto, for instance, was said to have succeeded in demonstrating that contrary to what many foreign scholars believed, pre-modern Javanese had a historical consciousness and Prapanca was among the clearest proofs of that.

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It has been shown that the primacy of the political factors, manifested specifically in the bitterly fought ideological contests in the 1950s and 1960s, had a deep and wide impact on the writing of the SNI. As almost everyone suspected, the shape of the SNI, especially Volume 6, coincided to a very significant degree with the interests of the regime. The epitaph 'official propaganda' given by the critiques of the SNI was not unwarranted.

Notwithstanding the supremacy of political factors, however, they did not go unmolested. It has been demonstrated that contrary to the general perception that the scholars were almost totally helpless against the regime, the scholarly-related factors such as the use of multi-dimensional-structural approach, the pressure emanating from the community of scholars and the stature of Sartono have, taken together, made a dent in the political designs of Nugroho.

The dynamic interplay between the political and scholarly factors has resulted in equivocal, at times confused, sometimes even inconsistent, messages that tended to betray the ideas of singularity and solidity that are often associated with the concept of 'official history.' Historical knowledge, as presented in various editions of the SNI, is far more fluid than often assumed. This fluidity points to the fact that even under a fairly controlled conditions, the fluidity of knowledge tends to assert itself and one possible reason for this is the multi-dimensionality of forces or powers that define its shape.

To refine the previous point, it is too simplistic to assume that the shape of knowledge that came out of the SNI was determined only by the political interests of the state or state actors and that of the scholars. As shown, there were instances when neither of the two could adequately account for the shape of specific parts of the SNI. Factors such as haste, carelessness, the writing style of the writer, unintended omission, forgetfulness, personal idiosyncrasies of the authors and other factors did also contribute. There are two ways to interpret this. One is that knowledge is not really a function of power, and that highly refined scholarship is
precisely what is needed to minimise, if not totally eliminate, these non-scholarly factors in formulating knowledge. Another possibility on the other hand is that there is a multitude of possibly infinite and not always identifiable sources of power that shape knowledge, and scholarship is just one of them, albeit the least recognised yet one of the most potent. This study takes the latter path and the reasons for this will be explored in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII
CALCULUS OF KNOWLEDGE-POWER

Historical sense and poetic sense should not, in the end, be contradictory, for if poetry is the little myth we make, history is the big myth we live, and in our living, constantly remake.

-Robert Penn Warren (Brothers to Dragons)

It all started as a wish. In 1967, Marcos expressed in public perhaps for the first time his wish to write a history. I surmise that hardly anyone on that occasion took him seriously. As in many previous instances when he expressed wishes that appeared unlikely, if not impossible, to be fulfilled, Marcos endeavoured to prove his doubters wrong. He did not actually write history, as others did it for him, but he tried hard to make it appear as if he actually wrote it.

Two years later, in 1969, in the city of Yogyakarta in Java, Nugroho Notosusanto expressed a related, but different wish. To write history was not what he wanted; that the national history of Indonesia be written soon enough was what he desired. Nugroho was not a head of a state as Marcos was, but he was (still is) widely believed to have stood for the interests of one.

Both Marcos and Nugroho had some obstacles to overcome. Faced with fellow historians who were skeptical of the timing and the adequacy of available intellectual resources, Nugroho tried hard to persuade them. The time had come for the national history to be written, he claimed (Notosusanto 1969). Armed with the support of the state machinery and pressed by the perceived acute need of the time, he succeeded. Just over a year later in 1970, the SNI project was on its way.

The obstacles for Marcos proved more daunting. For about five years, he looked without success for historians who would spearhead the project. Despite a promise of full support and an unhampered movement, no one proved willing. It

1 From Foreword to Brothers to Dragon, as quoted in Dupuy, E. (2003)
would only be in 1973-1974 that Marcos succeeded in finding a group of scholars who enthusiastically agreed to realise his dream.

The stories of the two history-writing projects, the SNI and the Tadhana, have been told separately in the past four chapters. Now is the time to see one next to the other. The focus of this chapter will be on the features of the two projects that can demonstrate the intricate interrelationships between the embodiments of knowledge and power. What seems to make these projects very fertile as exploratory grounds are the directness or proximity and intimacy of interaction as well as the differentiated dynamics—sometimes obvious, at the other times subtle—between the scholars, knowledge and specific political actors. There are of course notable similarities as well, and these sharpen the backdrop against which the search for a nuanced characterisation of the knowledge-power nexus has been pursued in this study.

**Contexts and the Link Between Politics and Scholarship**

The contrasting manner by which Nugroho and Marcos overcame the initial impediments bespoke the different contexts in which they operated. Nugroho, for one, was himself a historian; thus talking about a history-writing project was not unnatural for him. Marcos, on the other hand, was a politician who aspired, among many other things, to be considered as a historian. In the eyes of many it was suspicious. Likewise, unlike in Indonesia of the 1970s where the relationship between the state and the scholars was fairly cooperative and amicable, that in the Philippines was not. The late 1960s and early 1970s were a time of ferment that saw segments of the intelligentsia, including historians, at the forefront of struggle against the government. Indonesia had its own share of political bickering, of course, and it was both sharper and bloodier, but that was a few years past. By the early 1970s, things had begun to stabilise.

Another pertinent consideration was the status of development attained by the historical professions in the two countries. By the 1970s, history in the Philippines had already undergone almost 70 years of professionalisation, whereas
in Indonesia it had barely passed its second decade. One consequence of this discrepancy was that the professionally well-trained Indonesian historians were still few in number at that time. The project in fact needed more than what the existing pool, more in qualitative than quantitative terms, could adequately provide. On the other hand, their counterparts in the Philippines were but a small portion of a bigger, and less homogeneous community of scholars. With a longer tradition of autonomy from state tutelage, the Filipino historians' direct partnership with the state tended to be viewed by fellow scholars and the public in general with lesser tolerance and greater suspicion than was the case in Indonesia. Such partnership in Indonesia had almost been 'naturalised' by necessity: the history profession had to grow since the 1950s side-by-side with the rise of an authoritarian state, so there was hardly room for a non-restrictive, less dependent development of the profession.

The set of factors that gave rise to the two projects were broadly similar. On the one hand were scholars who, imbued with nationalism, believed that participation in the project was a contribution towards decolonisation efforts. They were led by scholars whose nationalism and academic interests urged them to push historiographic agenda as conscious or unconscious responses either to foreign or domestic, scholarly or political stimuli, or both. On the other hand were the two authoritarian regimes. Suharto's New Order was emerging from the politically and economically turbulent decade of the 1960s. Rocked likewise by tumultuous political contestations in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Philippines suddenly found itself under Martial Law which Marcos justified as necessary to form a New Society. What accompanied these developments were the haunting problems of legitimacy for both regimes. The coup in 1965, the subsequent killings and the events leading to the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto were shrouded with layers of mystery that up to now have yet to be fully uncovered. Marcos's declaration of Martial Law, for his part, was a gross violation of the rules of the political game which Filipino elites were long accustomed to. There must be
ways to justify them, and history was deemed potentially helpful in this undertaking.

Nationalism in the Philippines, however, was less a unifying platform than it was in Indonesia. The Philippines underwent a pattern of colonial experience that was distinct for eliciting forms of nationalist responses that were ambivalent towards colonialism, among other things. The nationalist historiography that underpinned the Tadhana was clearly an assertion of an alternative to the existing well-developed nationalist historiographies. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the nationalist historiography Sartono aimed to develop through the SNI gained the support of other historians as most of them recognised the need to replace the colonial and the non-academic historiographies that they saw as problematic. In other words, the potential for divisiveness within the community of historians was simply much greater in the Philippines than it was in Indonesia. This set the tone for the more morally-loaded charges against those who took part in the Tadhana than was the case against those who participated in the SNI, with Nugroho, of course, being a notable exception.

The Filipino scholars entered into a partnership with Marcos seemingly aware of the political risks it entailed. The years leading up to and after the declaration of martial law in 1972 saw a sharp polarisation among the intellectual, political and economic elites in the Philippines between those supportive of and those opposed to Marcos. The battle line was clearly drawn and, in the eyes of many, these scholars had decided which side they took when they agreed to write history for Marcos.

The situation was vastly different in Indonesia. Early on, since the late 1950s, the trajectory of political developments in this country pointed towards the rise of authoritarianism. There were years, as noted above, when the political sphere was bitterly contested, but conflicts would be smoothed out almost completely by the cataclysmic events of 1965-1966. Among other things, these events effectively
weeded out scholars who held political views sharply divergent from that which the state promoted. These also set off an enduring atmosphere of fear that reduced considerably the possibility of developing any form of effective or strong opposition to the state. When the SNI was undertaken in the early 1970s, the scholars were one with the state. Their participation in state-sponsored writing project appeared to be a natural thing to do. There seemed to be no perception of irregularity in such a partnership, which was obviously in sharp contrast to the case of the Tadhana.

It is striking that right from the start, the core group of the Tadhana scholars evinced a sense of confidence in what they were about to do and about what they might get out of the project. Not only did they seem to have a definite personal and scholarly agenda which they liked to pursue. They also appeared convinced of their ability to withstand or neutralise the political risks that working for Marcos entailed. This confidence was best exemplified by Salazar and Tan. Salazar, for instance, was forthright about his willingness to accept the support of anyone, even a criminal, to realize the need for writing a complete and ‘truly’ nationalist history of the Philippines. He declared that producing a good history far exceeded in importance the question of who or what enabled it to happen. (Salazar 2004b) Tan for his part believed that it was not Marcos who influenced the shape of the Tadhana; it was the Tadhana that influenced Marcos’s views of history. (Tan 2004a)

The confidence of Salazar and other Tadhana scholars could only be matched by Sartono’s doubts and Nugroho’s proven misplaced self-assurance. The SNI may have been completed while the Tadhana was not, but the quality of the published outputs appeared to weigh more heavily towards Tadhana than to the SNI. The level of historiographic advancement, conceptual coherence, quality of writing and the depth of actual research that characterised Tadhana as demonstrated in Chapter 4 found no parallel in the SNI, as evident in the problems—unevenness in writing, weak conceptual framework, lack of research, editorial lapses—that were spelled out in Chapter 6. The decades of established
historical scholarship in the Philippines, strengthened by a longer period of autonomous or less politically restricted development put the Tadhana scholars in an apparently more favourable position than their Indonesian counterparts, not only in embarking on a history-writing project in general, but also in doing it in partnership with the state that had its own political interests to promote. Whereas the key players in the SNI constituted the first generation of professional Indonesian historians, young and generally inexperienced and thus still struggling to lay the foundation of the historical profession, the Tadhana scholars were heirs to a relatively established tradition not just of “pure” scholarship, if ever there was such a thing, but also of politically engaged scholarly undertaking. The presence in the Tadhana team of the anti-Marcos activists such as Boquiren, Mangahas and Salazar exemplified the political engagement of many Filipino scholars. Against this backdrop, one may argue that while both groups disavowed any foreknowledge of their project’s political intent, the Tadhana scholars seem to be more vulnerable to the suspicion of disingenuousness than their SNI counterparts, again, with a notable possible exception of Nugroho.

Contrary to a commonly held supposition, however, the apparent imbalance between the strength of the state on the one hand, and scholarship on the other, does not necessarily translate into a clear cut opposition between scholarship and politics. Notwithstanding the relative ‘strength’ of the Filipino scholars vis-à-vis their Indonesian counterparts, their outputs seemed to be no better shielded from political appropriation. The highly scientific exposition of the geological and geographic formation of the Philippine archipelago, for instance, assumed a political meaning, if seen against the totality of the Tadhana and against Marcos’s over-all interests. For the geologist, trained in Harvard, who wrote this, it was nothing more than an innocent, scientific rendition of the origin of the Philippines. For Marcos, however, it strengthened his eschatological claim of Philippines history which linked the New Society to the indigenous origins the search for the sources of which can be traced to the deepest possible roots—the geological process. If such a seemingly politically inert subject can be used for political
purposes, what else cannot? In the same way, whereas the Volumes 1-5 of the SNI had no clear political intent, they were ultimately implicated in the political design (or public perception thereof) of Volumes 6/7. That the entire 7-volume SNI had been officially withdrawn in 2002, points to this outcome. This happened despite the lack of a tightly integrated framework comparable to the Tadhana's. Sartono planned the SNI to be a well-integrated whole but the actual output turned out to be disparate. Only in a very limited sense one can say that the volumes are unified. Apparently, the presence of the first five volumes made Volumes 6/7 more publicly acceptable as a standard work. In both cases, the political and the scholarly are closely entwined, and this happened not because individual scholars wanted it, but because the knowledge they produced takes on a life of its own depending on how other people, such as Marcos and Nugroho, or the public in general, use and interpret it.

It is crucial that the scholarly quality of the content did not seem to matter as much as commonly assumed. That is, it did not follow that good scholarship neutralised politics. The case of Marcos is particularly instructive because rather than upholding the fairly common notion of the scholarly as antidote to the political, what he precisely wanted was for his political interest to be buttressed by the highest quality of scholarship possible. His ultimate interest, we may recall, lay in explaining or justifying himself to the people of the future. It could be served best if the history that would be written under his name was of high quality, presumably capable of withstanding critical scrutiny and the test of time (Cristobal 2005). That was the reason for seeking the services of, as far as possible, the best

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2 As noted in the previous chapter, what used to be 6 volumes had become 7 volumes in the 1994 edition. This is because a separate, additional volume had been added specifically for the New Order period. So what was withdrawn in 2002 were 7 volumes, not 6 volumes.

3 Borrowing from Maus ([1938]/1979, p. 22 cited in McCarthy, 1997, p. 49), knowledge is like "an invoked genie" that had the "life of its own; it in fact reproduces itself indefinitely." This is not the same as upholding the structuralist-poststructuralist dictum of the death of the author or the corollary view on the indeterminacy of meaning. It only says that the authorial intention is but one among array of possible determinants of meanings that can be ascribed to knowledge. This carries important implication on the process of legitimation. Bauman, for his part, declares: "Power/knowledge denotes self-perpetuating mechanism, which at a relatively early stage stops being dependent on the original imperus, as it creates conditions of its own continuous and ever more vigorous operation." (1987, 11)
credentialed Filipino scholars of the time. Good scholarship and politics, in short, are not necessarily antithetical. They could, and often do, go together. This idea corroborates one of Said’s main points in *Orientalism* (1978), that is, the quality of the Orientalist scholarship was one of the contributory factors that lent Orientalist discourses credibility and resilience.

Sartono’s Indonesia-centrism and multi-dimensional approach employed in the SNI are also a good case in point. At first glance, Sartono’s scholarship was simply a sophisticated attempt to provide an adequate reconstruction of the process of nation-formation. If seen, however, against the backdrop of a number of separatist efforts that punctuated Indonesia’s postcolonial history, it provided strong, scholarly justifications for state-sponsored nationalism, inadvertently de-legitimising the nationalist aspirations of certain groups such as those of the Acehnese and the Papuans. Historical efforts by the likes of Muhammad Yamin, of course, preceded Sartono’s and in fact laid the foundation. Considering the low level of scientific rigour put into earlier attempts, however, it is possible that these provided no more than tenuous groundwork. Sartono and his followers were those who provided a strong scholarly justification for state-centric nationalism, and the SNI constituted the official encoding of such a justification. Without consciously being political, the way Sartono’s approaches were appropriated or interpreted and the manner they became enmeshed within the nationalist discourses made them so. These examples do not intend to suggest that everything is political; it only points to the possibility that everything may be politicised. To politicise here refers to a conscious act (or an act perceived to be conscious) of empowering oneself, other group/s or institution/s that one represents.

The case of the SNI seems instructive of the other side of the issue. Since it appeared in 1976, it has endured stinging criticisms. Two things stood out in the critiques: (1) scholarly weakness and (2) politics. From the standpoint of scholarship, Sartono’s early doubts as to the readiness of the Indonesian scholars to undertake the project seems vindicated. The SNI, notably the 1975 edition, has been
viewed by many both in Indonesia and abroad as deficient in scholarly terms. Surjomihardjo’s (1980) categorical declaration in 1980 that the SNI did not satisfy scholarly standards seems warranted. Of importance for analytic purpose here is the tendency to link the elements of scholarly weakness to the SNI’s alleged susceptibility to political manipulation. The commonly assumed oppositional relationship between scholarship and politics was affirmed.

As demonstrated in Chapter 6, there is no doubt that the SNI-6 (1975) was an attempt to promote propaganda. Efforts are evident to “shear (the nation of) Sukarno,” to extol the military, and to vilify or discredit the Old Order, the communists and others opposed to the state. In comparison with other versions, however, it proved to be the least virulent as propaganda. What could account for this situation was, as argued in Chapter 6, the imposition of Sartono’s multi-dimensional approach which restricted the space for political topics. This restriction hampered efforts at promoting political propaganda by limiting time coverage (SNI-6 did not cover events beyond October 1965) and space allotted to each political topic, and more importantly, by eschewing the narrative approach to writing which seemed to be more effective in conveying emotive propaganda messages. The point is clear in the versions such as the SNI-SMP and the 1984 and 1993 edition of SNI-6 that abandoned the multi-dimensional approach.

The apparent irony here lies in the fact that despite the relative weakness of the overall scholarship that underpinned the SNI vis-a-avis the Tadhana, the SNI 1975 edition proved to be more resilient to political manipulation. This is in comparison both with the Tadhana and other versions of the SNI. The key role was played by the multi-dimensional approach and this, therefore, is an instance when the scholarly made a difference in restricting the exercise of the political. Unfortunately, this point seemed unrecognised by many, including those involved in the project themselves.

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When the SNI-6 1984 edition came out, for instance, nobody seemed to have complained about the abandonment of the multi-dimensional approach. The focus of the complaints remained the treatment of Sukarno and the exclusion or misinterpretations of certain personalities or events. That B. M. Diah (1987, 1) reprinted in 1985 the same review he did in 1976, claiming that the 1984 edition did not warrant revision of the said review, seemed to reflect a general perception that there was not much difference between the two editions. Even Surjomihardjo who was a student of Sartono, a frequent commentator in the newspaper, and who was a former member of the SNI team hardly noticed the change (Surjomihardjo 1984a; 1984b; 1985; 1987a; 1987b). Sartono himself has no idea what difference his preferred approach may have made. As discussed in Chapter 6, Sartono initially developed the approach as a conscious, negative reaction to the dominance of the political as manifested in colonial historiography as well as in the tendencies of the Marxist-inspired intellectuals of the 1950s and 1960s. He did not seem to have entertained the possibility, however, that the very nature of the approach itself, notwithstanding its inadequate implementation in the SNI 1975, proved quite effective as a neutraliser of Nugroho's political intent. What remains in his mind to this day, and he is quite regretful about this, are three things: (1) the inadequacy of the implementation of the approach, for which he holds himself responsible; (2) Nugroho's 'hijacking' of the otherwise purely scholarly project for political designs; and (3) his failure to do something to prevent what Nugroho did (Sartono 2005a; 2005b).

The foregoing discussion suggests that there is no inherent opposition between politics and scholarship. The character of the relationship is determined by the meaning or value attached by individuals to historical knowledge. The dynamic configuration of the individual, group, and institutional interests as they interacted with the broader social forces set a frame within which the relationship between the two is defined.
Responses and Dynamics of Power Relations

The contrasting characteristics of the two projects and the different contexts that gave rise to them set the frame for the dissimilar responses that the two projects elicited. The Tadhana was never completed and was never widely used. Out of the originally projected nineteen volumes only four were published and out of the two volumes of abridgement, only one saw print. The SNI, on the other hand, was not only completed but even underwent revisions and reprints. It was also used widely either as reference texts in the university, or as a basis for writing textbooks for high school and elementary school, at in official sense. Likewise, while the Tadhana project operated under a shroud of mystery, the SNI took shape under the watchful eyes of the media. Because of this the controversial character of the SNI had been publicly known whereas that of the Tadhana has been confined largely to the community of scholars.

The more widespread utilisation and the sporadic but intense media coverage of the SNI that now spans three decades set the frame within which its controversial character has been constituted. This situation has resulted in a multi-faceted, more fluid and more ambiguous picture of power relations which may be discernible in the SNI vis-à-vis the case of the Tadhana. Whereas the scholars who participated in the Tadhana were almost universally depicted in a negative light by those who know about the project, a perception that has barely changed, only a few members of the SNI team have been vilified. Moreover, the SNI has seen vicissitudes of fortune depending of a number of factors including the altered power structure wrought by the fall of the New Order regime in 1998.

The official (and symbolic) withdrawal of the SNI in 2002 exemplifies this point. It was a government’s response to the mounting public clamour occasioned by the proliferation since 1998 of stories of deliberate distortions of history that the media profusely covered. After enjoying for more than two decades the status of being the official, standard history text—apparently believed in by a large segment of the population—the SNI has been denigrated as a testament to the New Order
government's unscrupulous behaviour. Right from the very start, there were of course people who have always believed that the SNI (specifically Volume 6) was no more than government propaganda, but they were a small minority. For many others, especially the younger generation, there was no other history apart from what was inscribed in the SNI. With the demise of the regime, the situation has been reversed. The majority seem convinced of the 'engineered' character of the SNI, but there are those who remain steadfast in their belief in the truthfulness of at least parts of it.

The case of Nugroho is another good example. The image of Nugroho varied through time depending largely on the prevailing political atmosphere. During the New Order, while he had his own share of bitter critics, he too had many admirers. His power and influence was largely due to his being a well-known historian and a high-ranking government official. But side by side with Sartono, his standing in the community of historians paled in comparison. Because of his ties with the government, however, he seemed to occupy a more prominent position in the society in general than any other historians of the time. Such appraisal might not hold on the individual level, as certain individuals such as Abdurrahman Surjomihardjo and Taufik Abdullah certainly had a different valuation of Nugroho. One thing seems certain, though. After the demise of the New Order, even if there remained people who were appreciative of Nugroho's legacy, it looks like there have been far more who viewed him and his legacy in a negative light. The power that he enjoyed while he was still alive—power that was reduced, but what remained of it nonetheless lingered through his influences after his death—has been considerably diminished due to the re-alignment of power relations in the post-Suharto period.

In the case of the Tadhana, notwithstanding the scholarly value of the output and the impressive credentials of those who made it, Marcos's claimed authorship has, from the very beginning, overshadowed whatever scholarly merit it might have. This is easily explained by the unpopularity of Marcos among the
intellectuals, a situation that has diminished only a little, if at all, by now. In other words, it is possible that so long as anti-Marcos sentiments remain rife, the Tadhana would not be received favourably. Probably, as Marcos hoped, things would be different a hundred years hence, but it all depends on the confluence of factors that only time will determine.

As suggested earlier, scholarship and politics are not necessarily oppositional. They could go together. Why is it, however, that the intimate relationship between scholars and the state, such as exemplified by the Tadhana and, to a lesser extent, the SNI, is often unfavourably perceived? Such framing has a fairly long history (Shapin 1991). Scholarship is equated to the pursuit of truth, neutral and liberating whereas politics is deemed as self-serving, constricting and inherently biased. This was clearly expressed by Soedjatmoko (1960, 18) in these words:

...we should realize that history as a scholarly discipline is not and cannot be made the handmaiden of a particular ideology – can not that is, as long as it is true to its scholarly character ...

The critics of both the SNI and the Tadhana operated to a varying extent within this premise. The different context and the varied features of the two projects, however, resulted in the different ways by which this dichotomy was deployed. In the case of the Tadhana, critics chided the participant-scholars for allowing themselves to be ‘co-opted’ by Marcos. Their criticisms carry a subtext of moral weakness, as if saying, had they been resilient enough as, one may add, any scholar worthy of the name should be, they could have resisted the temptation of ‘selling’ their service to Marcos, in exchange for some rewards.

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4 This has a parallel in the dichotomies between nature and society, human and non-human, objective and subjective, the rational and the social, etc. that bedevils analysis of the relationship between knowledge and societal forces. For a pointed critique of the first two see Latour; for the third, see Bourdieu, (1989) and Brubaker (1985, 749-754) and for the last, see Longino (2002, 77-96). According to Karabel (1996, 208-214) a state-intellectual partnership is actually the norm and the prototype of intellectuals-as-rebels are the exceptions that require explanation.
This also applies to the SNI but only to a more limited extent. Among over 30 scholars who took part in the project, only Nugroho (and to a lesser degree members of his team) had been targeted by such criticism. Most other participants were faulted for other reasons, that is, the relatively weaker foundation of their academic training and lack of experience.

The critics of the likes of Nugroho and Salazar are often scholars themselves who assume a moral high-ground in their avowed duty to preserve the integrity of the scholarly community. Their battle cry is that scholarship should be able to rise above partisan politics. In the words of Julien Benda, one should not commit "treason of the intellectuals."\(^5\) (cited in Pels 1990; Jennings and Kemp-Welch 1997) Such a line of thought has a long lineage\(^6\) and is well-intentioned. It is meant to protect the individuals and the society in general from the danger which might ensue from the collusion between the politicians and the scholars. By occupying a position above politics, the scholars are supposed to act as guardians of conscience, as critics of abusive power and as protector of the common good.

In the scheme of things, however, the scholars' claimed impartiality or objectivity is hardly an innocent position. According to Bourdieu, the scholars' symbolic power allows them to consecrate a perspective and lends it "an absolute, universal value, thus snatching it from a relativity that is by definition inherent in every point of view..." (Bourdieu 1989, 22). Objectivity is at once a weapon and a repository of the scholars' enormous investment from which they expect to reap both intellectual capital and symbolic power (Scott 1997, 55). It is the anchor to which the whole institution of scholarship is tied and it is a 'corporate' responsibility of each member of the intellectual class to contribute towards the

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\(^5\) His pamphlet *La Trahison des Clercs* (1927) (translated in English with title *The Betrayal of Intellectuals*, 1955) is often considered as classic statement of the supposed above-politics position of the intellectuals. See Pels (1990) and Jennings and Kemp-Welch (1997)

\(^6\) One of the landmark moments in the development of the idea of the intellectuals as a moral-political conscience of the nation was the Dreyfus Affair in France in late 1800s up to early 1900s. For an overview, see Jennings and Kemp-Welch (1997)
protection and growth of their investment. It is to their advantage as a class to maintain their autonomy as the gatekeepers of knowledge, and the notion of objectivity or impartiality is the key (Vandenberghe 2000; Scott 1997). Any challenge to their status, and this includes strong relativism and its proponents, would be met by symbolic violence, perhaps in the form of marginalisation if not expulsion. As Schubert (1995, 1009) aptly puts it:

Transgression is violent. It can hurt. While it is dangerous for the transgressor, it is potentially dangerous to those who occupy privileged position as well. The legitimacy of privilege is placed in question by transgression. For that reason the transgressor can expect reactionary condemnation, in any of its various guises, of his acts. Privilege is not likely to be abandoned without a fight.

In the case of Indonesia, it was not easy to identify the transgressor and the occupants of the privileged historiographic position. When Abdurachman Surjomihardjo on various occasions since the mid-1970s castigated Nugroho for relativism, along with its moral implications, he did so against a strong current of a long-standing tradition of historicist or relativist history writing in Indonesia (or elsewhere). Surjomihardjo’s critique presupposed the ascendancy of an established set of standard or scientific historical methodology as the basis for assessing knowledge claims. His confidence in rebuking Nugroho rested, among other things, on his belief that the methodology he invoked was the right one and thus every historian worthy of this name should abide by it. The problem, however, was that it was a minority view in Indonesia at the time. His position was made more difficult by the fact that he represented a small group of people. Among the historians, he was almost alone in his public crusade against Nugroho and his relativism. By positing his preferred historical methods as given, Surjomihardjo

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7 Bourdieu is fond of using economic-business metaphors to describe the dynamics both of competition and cooperation within the intellectual community. In Pels’s article *Mixing Metaphors: Politics or Economics of Knowledge* (1997), he exemplifies Bourdieu, along with Latour and others, as among those theorists who made use of economistic model in their analysis of power and knowledge.

8 Bourdieu’s concept of ‘class’ is not, as in Marxist sense, defined in largely economic terms. This refers to a loosely bounded grouping defined by certain commonality: common interests, jobs, shared geographic space. (Wacquant 1989)

9 He of course had allies in the likes of Sartono and Taufik and some journalists but based on published materials, newspaper and journal articles between 1975 and late 1980s, Abdurrachman seemed to have
has put under erasure the long history of the continuing struggle to install it (his preferred methodology) as the 'standard' historical methodology. I refer to such struggle not only in the development of Western historiography from Herodutus and Thucydides all the way to Ranke, Carr, Collingwood, Braudel, White and beyond, but also in the context of Indonesian historiography from the days of Prapanca and Muhammad Yamin to the time of Resink, Soedjatmoko, Nichterlien, Frederick-Soeroto, and Sartono. By doing so, he in effect was trying to offset what he lacked in number by invoking the convincing power of a modern, established scholarly tradition in which objectivity was one of the keystones. It should be noted that Surjomihardjo’s use of objective scholarship as basis of his public critique of Nugroho should not obscure the fact that Nugroho’s defence of subjectivity was often interpreted by historians, including Surjomihardjo, as a hollow justification for Nugroho’s close and suspicious ties with the government.

Against the backdrop of these insights one can argue that upholding objectivity is the basis of the scholars’ politics.\(^\text{10}\) When the likes of Nugroho and Salazar made explicit the side they were on, making clear the kind of politics they professed, they in effect transgressed their supposed responsibility as members of the scholarly community. They defied the injunction against partiality. The various names they were called—‘intellectual prostitutes,’ ‘sell-outs,’ ‘mercenaries’—can only reveal the moral subtext of other scholars’ reactions. That the critics’ moral outrage is genuine I do not deny. What is significant is that such moral outrage tends to conceal the possibly more fundamental reason for the critics’ furious reactions, that is, the self-interest of the scholarly class.

For every critic of Nugroho during the New Order period, it may be safe to suppose that there may be more who either defended him, silently concurred with

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\(^{10}\) According to Bourdieu, intellectuals have an ‘anti-political’ calling. Their ‘anti-political politics’ is constituted in the paradoxical need to guard their own autonomous interest and at the same time maintain a semblance of neutrality. See Pels, (1995, 92-93). See also Bauman (1987, 13-14).
him or just stayed neutral. In the case of Salazar et al, the ratio may not be as favourable for them as it was for Nugroho. The point here, though, is not the number, but that the terrain within which such criticisms and counter-criticisms were launched was highly contested. The moral framing of criticisms appears to be a rhetorical and strategic device employed by the critics. By invoking moral absolutes, the critics were trying to take the issue outside purely academic and social politics, the domains of which were both highly disputed, into the moral sphere where they might have believed they were ascendant. Who can argue against morality or ethics, they might have thought? Besides, allowing it to be seen as 'merely' an academic and social political conflict contravenes the image of the scholarship as above politics. Of course, there may be other fundamental reasons, but this could be a possibility.

I should quickly add that this tendency is not always a conscious or a calculating move on the part of the scholar-critics. There are cases when the scholars and the society at large have long imbibed the moral imperatives attributed to scholarship as a supposedly neutral instrument. The moralist rhetoric, therefore, could be a naturalised response by scholars against those who violate the established norms of conduct.

It is not just how the public (including fellow scholars) reacted to the projects that was instructive of the dynamics of power relations. The interaction between the scholars and the political sponsor (or a representative) as well as between members of the team can likewise offer important insights. The members of the Tadhana team were treated very well by Marcos. Not only were they given ample provisions—good pay, access to scholarly materials, clerical assistance—but

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11 The idea of intellectuals as above politics is hardly a generally accepted notion. Pels (1990) and Jennings and Kemp-Welch (1997) discuss in their article the highly contested notion of what an intellectual is or should be. As Pels puts it: "Treason of the intellectuals is by no means a singular or transparent thing, but takes multiple forms according to competing conceptions about the content and solidity of particular claims of knowledge and morality." (1990, 23) Jennings and Kemp-Welch for their part contrasted the widespread anti-intellectualism in Britain with the very different situation in France.

12 By social politics, this refers to the competition for power and resources among groups in the society. Academic politics, on the other hand, refers to the same competition but specifically restricted within the scholarly and what is at stake for the scholars—academic rank, higher degrees, prestige, etc.
also were shown the utmost respect. Whether or not such an expression of respect was genuine is beside the point. What seems to weigh heavier was that Marcos could not afford to be less than respectful to the scholars. Considering that it took him a long time to persuade historians to enter into partnership with him, he seemed to have understood well that the slightest offence, or sign of manipulation, could lead the scholars to resign, and thus jeopardize the continuance and success of the project.

Nugroho's attitude towards at least some members of the team stood in stark contrast. Nugroho's treatment of Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo and Taufik Abdullah—printing their volume without allowing them to finish it—was bad enough. It was, however, his expulsion of Sartono from the project on account of Sartono's ethically valid request—to have their (main editors') names printed on an inner page rather than on the cover of the books—that was downright cruel. Sartono, who kept quiet about it for so long, endured in silence the ignominy of being treated so badly. That Nugroho never explained, much less apologised, is something that Sartono carries to this day. (Sartono 2005a; 2005b) These cases drove forcefully the point of how much more restricted, in comparison with the case of Tadhana, was the space the Indonesian scholars had occupied in the face of the representative of the regime.

Nugroho's power or influence, however, cannot be exaggerated. As emphasised earlier, the way the SNI-6's first edition (1975) was written reflected the extent to which Nugroho and his team were restricted by Sartono's multidimensional approach. The approach being backed by the group's consensus, Nugroho and his team could not but abide by it, albeit half-heartedly. The contents of the history textbook, the SNI-SMP that appeared a few months later, stood as a testament to the kind of history Nugroho would have written without the constraints set by Sartono and other scholars. It seems possible that Sartono was

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13 Since Suharto appeared to be not directly involved in the project, Nugroho who seemed to have represented the interests of the state will be utilised for comparison here.
removed precisely because his presence made it difficult for Nugroho to have his way. Sartono might be more respected and influential than Nugroho within the scholarly sphere, and Nugroho seemed to recognise that, but the fact that the Nugroho could unseat Sartono in such a blatant manner indicated a different type of power play in which Nugroho proved more dominant. The foregoing emphasises the contextual and dispositional nature of power. In short, power as a generalised capacity or ability to make a difference partly depends on the configuration of contending or mutually reinforcing forces (both social and individual), interests and beliefs at a particular context and time.

**Contents and the Power of Scholarship**

The original designs of the two projects were drawn apparently without pressure or influence from the state authorities. Historians, following largely what they thought to be the best historiographic considerations, designed both projects. In the case of the Tadhana, Tan and Salazar produced a framework that was supposed to present a coherent picture of the complex process that led to the contemporary Philippines. This they did by combining their complementary interests on the integration of the minorities in the national narrative and the indigenous roots of the process of nation-formation. Sartono, who designed the framework of the SNI was also concerned about how the Indonesian nation was formed. Unlike Salazar, however, he did not have as much interest in the indigenous origins of the nation. In Sartono’s design, the colonial experience provided much greater impact on the formation of the nation than Salazar was willing to concede.

The Tadhana and the SNI (1975) shunned the approach to history writing that focused primarily on politics. Both have adopted a multi-dimensional approach in the sense that all aspects—social, economic, cultural and political—were given due consideration in narrative and analysis. Both were also organised chronologically wherein different aspects were discussed under each period. There is an important difference, though, in the way the multi-dimensional approach was
deployed in the two projects. Whereas the above-cited aspects were often explicitly used in the SNI as basis for organising a chapter or a section/subsection—that is, a particular section is allotted to the economy, another to culture, and so on—the Tadhana had tried to weave various aspects within a section or a chapter. The approach in the Tadhana, in other words, was not just multi-dimensional; it may also be called inter-disciplinary.

One important question is that if the multi-dimensional approach as utilised in the SNI was able to restrain the politicisation of the project, why it was not the case for the Tadhana? The reason for this was that the Tadhana was designed as an integrated whole and that Marcos’s political interest lay, among others, precisely in the coherence of such a design. On the other hand, Nugroho’s political intent focused on a specific personality (Sukarno), groups (PKI, military) periods (Old and New Order) and events (G30S, Sepersemar), the piecemeal nature of which made Nugroho’s and his team’s effort susceptible to the injunctions that accompanied the multi-dimensional approach. In order to enhance the efficacy of the propaganda message for instance, the SNI-6 writers needed a less restricted space to characterise in greater detail, and in an emotive and evocative manner, their target personalities, events and groups. Towards this purpose, the narrative, story-telling approach to writing was deemed more appropriate than the analytic-style that went with the multidimensional approach as originally employed in the SNI. The nature of the propaganda intent and rhetorical devices it required had a bearing on whether the approach would make an impact or not.

The contents of the two projects, notably the SNI-6, earned different characterisation depending on who looked at it. For Nugroho, Salazar, Tan and others, the projects were scholarly. For Surjomihardjo and a few other critics, the SNI hardly met an adequate standard of scholarship. For the New Order regime, the SNI was the official or the standard history, but for other groups it was propaganda, in the same way that many in the Philippines have regarded the Tadhana. More discerning observers were able to identify which parts qualified as
state propaganda and which did not, but as they were a minority, their perception seems to carry less weight. The perceptions of the public had much to do with how the contents would be classified.

The official withdrawal of the SNI in 2002 was a good case in point. Despite the lack of an integrated framework that effectively linked the political intent of Volumes 6/7 to the other volumes, the very unfavourable public perceptions of Volumes 6/7 eventually implicated, by association, Volumes 1-5 which were previously thought to be innocent. In case of the Tadhana, its coherent design apparently makes each part liable to a suspicion of political intention, notwithstanding the protestations of those who wrote it. This is because each part, being part of an integrated whole, had a potential contribution to Marcos's political design. In both instances, what appeared to be the real intentions of the authors (in Tadhana and SNI 1-5) ran counter to public perception and the clash exemplified a constituting process of power relations between the public and the scholars involved and between the public and the knowledge these scholars produced. For a public imbued with politically induced scepticism, the quality of scholarship or the truthfulness of a knowledge claim did not seem to matter. As far as they were concerned, it was propaganda.

It seems that one fundamental way in which power relations are constituted lies in the formation of 'coalition of forces' and in the act of definition. One's definition of things might not coincide with that of coalesced forces but the difference, in so far as this study is concerned, is merely a reflection of the source/s of power that produce the disjunction between the two. When Salazar, for instance, implied that the task of a 'good' Filipino historian is to contribute towards the efforts at writing a 'truly' nationalist history, and his participation in the Tadhana exemplified such an effort, his definition of a Filipino historian's task and the meaning he attached to his participation in the Tadhana could be an attempt to cushion the impact of unfavourable social perception. This proposition might hold provided of course that there were enough people who agreed with such a
formulation. Apparently, however, not enough people have concurred with Salazar. Practically all Filipino historians would readily agree that it is their task to help develop nationalist historiography, but only a few would concede that doing it in partnership with Marcos, or any politician for that matter, was a legitimate way of doing so. It was the contrasting definition of how things should be done—the unwritten code of ethics that forbids consorting with politicians, for one—that put Salazar and other members of the Tadhana team in unfavourable power relations vis-à-vis their critics as well as other observers.

Likewise, it was the definition of a ‘standard’ history text that put the SNI in a privileged position during the New Order. Being officially proclaimed as the standard, it readily assumed authority manifested in the fact that the history textbooks used in public and even private schools, not to mention the examination questions given at the national level, were based on the SNI, at least in theory if not exactly in practice. So long as the New Order regime was in power, its power managed to form a ‘coalition of forces’ that made the SNI seemingly generally acceptable. With the sharp turn of events in 1998, what used to be a minority definition of what SNI was, gained more and more adherents raising public clamour for the withdrawal of the SNI. The battle for the definition of what standard history is, or what history should be, has been a primary fixture in public discourse in the post-Suharto Indonesia.

Considering the centrality of definition in scholarly practice—defining the terms and concepts, the relationship between variables, the mode of analysis, the standard of scholarship itself—does this mean that scholarship is an essential constituting device of power relations? And considering that history is the record of what happened in the past, does it mean that among the branches of human knowledge, history contributes perhaps potentially the most in the act of definition, and therefore in constituting power relations?
Marcos’s intended use for scholarly history points to this possibility. It seemed that he believed in the power of a scholarly history to define what is at least perceptibly true, if not the truth itself. This was a history that could presumably withstand time and critical scrutiny. Through this kind of history he hoped he would be able to convince the posterity of the rightfulness of his decision to declare martial law, to extend his rule and to build the ‘new society.’ In other words, the rightfulness of his own definition of the trajectory of Philippine history. Apparently he hoped not only that he would be vindicated but perhaps even venerated for such decisions. Many of his contemporaries being bitterly critical of him, he seemed deeply worried that his dream definition of his position in history was being jeopardised by the hostile responses to his initiatives. Through the Tadhana, he cast his hope that the unfavourable power relations he had with his contemporaries would be reversed in the future. This exemplified how historical knowledge’s power to define things or events may serve as a constituting device of a power relation. Whether the power relation would indeed be reversed in favour of Marcos would depend entirely on the fit between his and the future generation’s definition of what history was and what history should be.

Another possible example is the relationship between the authors and the commentators of the SNI. When many critics or ordinary observers saw the SNI-6 as a self-serving ‘official history,’ they did so on the basis of a presupposition (for most of them did not read it) that it contained numerous one-sided interpretations. Their suspicious attitude tended to be reinforced by the fact that the SNI-6 was written by a team of historians under the employ of the military. The SNI’s status of being an ‘official history’ created a reality-effect which set the dominant image, both among many Indonesian and foreign observers, that the SNI-6 is no more than undiluted propaganda. One consequence was (and still is) that their attitude towards the volume tended (and tends) to be dismissive, and to those who wrote it, a mixture of disrespect, disdain, grudging understanding, pity perhaps, or anything that reflects their morally or scholarly ascendant position. To be honest, I
was one of those observers and I was a witness to how seductive it was to see the project through the eyes of a judgmental public.

A close reading of the SNI-6, however, affords a chance to see it in its complexity. Chapter 6 shows the fluidity, ambiguity, inconsistencies, even some measures of scholarly integrity in the interpretations. It is important to note that there is a paragraph in both the 1976 and 1984 editions that contradicts one of the main pillars of the regime's propaganda. Suharto and the military would have not been happy to read such a paragraph, and Nugroho might have found it difficult to believe that it was there. A number of interpretations are of course possible but one possibility is that such fluidity or contradiction indicates either a deliberate or accidental assertion of the writers' individuality. Others of course would dismiss those paragraphs as a slippage that in no way alters the overall one-sided character of the SNI-6, and I agree with this. But in so far as the point being raised here is concerned, it is of significance. Seeing the individuality of the members of the SNI-6 team, recognising that they were not mere puppets constantly being manipulated, this alters somewhat the critic-observers' definition both of what SNI-6 is and what the individual author's power relations was vis-à-vis Nugroho and the regime.

The power to define is, given the existing context, largely within the domain of scholarship. Notwithstanding the scholars' common protestation of their powerlessness or lack of influence, even the most powerful nations or corporations in the world cannot dispense with the services of the scholars or experts trained by scholars, or think-thanks run by people who were given an imprimatur by the academic establishment. This does not mean that the scholars' definition of things, concepts and phenomena always take precedent over other definitions. No one has the monopoly of definition but given the scholars' grasp of the scholarly methods, their access to empirical data and their social standing, they have the advantage over non-scholars. Definition will often be contested for definition reflects its very nature as a locus of power and as a constituting device of power relations. That the
Tadhana was dismissed as propaganda despite its scholarly contents and that the SNI elicited conflicting evaluations from different groups at different times, exemplified the contestation for definition.

What is being suggested here is that at the core of the scholarly act is an act of definition and that one of the elementary sources of the power of the scholars and scholarships lies in the presupposition that things can be defined or known. The very presence of the scholarly class, its scholarship and the universities serve as potent signifiers of the 'knowability' or 'definability' of things. Their presence is enough to make the act of definition, regardless of who performs it, whether it be Marcos or the scholars, potent as a device for constituting power relations. The potency of such a device, however, depends on many factors. As the cases of Tadhana and the SNI show, the power relations that underpin knowledge production are a complex combination of powers emanating from different sources at a specific place and time. To define is to know and the knowledge that we have about the real is no less than the definition of such reality. The definition of reality lends knowledge (especially history) enormous power and this makes the contest for definition among competing interests expected and understandable. The essential point here is, that the scholars have their own wellsprings of power and the power to define is one of them. This concurs with the classic formulation by Francis Bacon that 'knowledge is power.' Considering the enormous popularity of this dictum, it is puzzling that there has been a persistent urge to regard the mechanism—scholarship and scholars—that produces knowledge as anything but powerful.

Many cases show that when the power-knowledge interface is broached, knowledge is considered the passive partner. The common perception that the Tadhana and the SNI are legitimating tools is a good illustration of this. The idea that memory is a counterpoint to history also points to the same direction. In both cases historical knowledge is the mediating device between two or more sets of actors. By asking "Why must legitimation or counter-legitimation has be to be
framed within history?" we open the backdoor and see that the use of knowledge (such as in legitimation) goes not just forward to a target audience, but it also goes back to prior presuppositions that are constitutive of the need for such a use.

Let me illustrate this by recalling the case of Marcos. In Chapter 3, I pointed out that Marcos seemed to have a well-developed sense of history. In his diaries he mused and worried as to how history would ultimately judge him. It seemed he did not like to be 'weighed and found wanting' and this was the primary reason why he embarked on the Tadhana Project. We can only speculate about the possible sources of his sense of history. Being intelligent and widely-read, he may have developed his sense of history from his readings as well as from his understanding of events in his immediate environment and beyond. As Barnes aptly said, we can perceive the world only through the knowledge that we have. (1988, 49) Marcos’s desire to legitimise his political move (Martial Law) and his decision to utilise history (among other means) to serve such a purpose had been prompted by what he knew, and by what he felt, which to an extent was conditioned by what he knew. Whereas in the cases above, knowledge sways along with the interests or power of the actors (both ruled and ruler), in this instance, it seemed that knowledge, in a sense of what one knows, served as the driving force. There could have been no Tadhana Project had Marcos not considered the judgment of history as important and such perception might have been instilled in him by what he knew about history. Rather than seeing, therefore, the Tadhana, or the SNI for that matter, as unequivocal indication of the ruler’s superior power, we might better be reminded that it also manifests the recognition of the limits of such power. It was the sense of inadequacy of Marcos and the New Order regime—inadequacy that partly emanated from an awareness of history—that gave rise to the two projects. In other words, the two projects suggest the ascendancy of history over Marcos and the New Order regime. By history here, I do not mean the knowledge processed by historians, but the knowledge about the past as understood by individuals or a collectivity. Scholarly history might form a large part of that understanding, but it depends on many factors, including the
individual's interests and cognitive ability and the standing of the history profession within the society.

The extent that historical knowledge may have power over an individual depends partly on how an individual, reacting or negotiating with various forces in a specific environment, deals with it. There are those to whom history and historical judgment matters because, of their own volition, they believe in it. There are others, however, who were forced to believe by pressures from the society. To both groups, historical knowledge would indeed exert power. Marcos, as mentioned earlier, was a good example of the first; those who were associated with the PKI and their families, marginalised and ostracised during the New Order, exemplify the second. However, even among the PKI-associated groups or individuals there are those who by sheer force of their personal convictions refused to be cowed down. What they knew what had happened they believed was the truth, notwithstanding the publicly accepted history. In other words, the power of knowledge depends, on the one hand, on the constellation of social forces that come together to empower it and, on the other, the individual knower's position in the power-differential scale. An individual who agrees with socially defined knowledge in effect further empowers it, while those who refuse in an act of asserting their own personal power end up offering what may be to them was the truth (their knowledge), but this truth is easily dismissed by the rest of society and is called by various names: propaganda, apostasy, personal memory, and even gossip, idle talk, lies, etc. It is the lack of power of the individual or small group that earned for their 'truth' these various derogatory terms. Once the structure of power changes, however, as what in fact happened with the demise of the New Order regime, we began seeing what used to be branded as lies, propaganda, gossip, personal memories suddenly assuming certain level or respectability. It has come to be known as pelurusan sejarah (straightening of history), a 'movement' whose proponents think they are out to uncover the truth that was obscured or distorted by the government.

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While the flight of public trust away from New Order history has indeed taken place, there are those who remain faithful at least to portions of it. The strong public resistance against changing the long-held interpretation of PKI-related historical events attests to this faithfulness. For some people who have, for one reason or another, deeply internalised demonic images of the PKI, neither heightened conditioning by the media nor legislation by the parliament, not even refined historical methodology, can shake their faith in the New Order version of PKI history. Perhaps in the future, or it has been happening already, the 'truth' they hold would be dubbed as hearsay, lies, gossip, propaganda. But there is no certainty about it, as the battle rages on and the future alignment of power cannot be predicted. One thing seems certain, however. It is a complex of power relations that defines the contours of knowledge. This does not mean that good scholarship does not matter. It only means that good scholarship and the scholars themselves have their own power that is usually left out of the equation and should thus be factored in.

Let me take a look at the scholars' relationship with the regime. Often enough, it is through the prism of powerless-powerful dichotomies that such a relationship is framed, the scholars being the powerless and the regime the powerful. This is misleading. Such a partnership is in fact at once a recognition of the limits of the power of the regime and the recognition of the power of the scholar. Marcos sought the service of brilliant scholars precisely because he could not do something that the scholars could. He entered into a partnership with them precisely because he recognized that the scholars had power that he lacked. That he wanted a scholarly history for his purpose indicated his recognition of the power of scholarship.

The power of scholars, in a sense of their ability to make a difference, comes from two primary sources: their expertise and their standing in the society. The first emanates from the power that the entire scholarly community has accumulated through the ages and whoever becomes a scholar partakes in that. In
Bourdieu's parlance, it is the symbolic power emanating from cultural capital such as intellectual expertise or academic credentials (Brubaker 1985, 755-758). The second is derived from the alignment of social powers, one indicator of which is the level of esteem received from the people. In the case of Marcos, it was largely on account of the first that he sought the service of the scholars. The New Order on the other hand seemed interested in both. What Marcos seemed to have missed, and the Tadhana authors as well, was that for the power of scholars to be maximised, the powers from the two sources of power must be combined. Expertise was not enough; favourable social perception of such expertise was also required. That Tadhana was rejected offhand despite its scholarly contents suggests that there are instances when favourable perception takes precedent over expertise in constituting the powers of the scholars. Favourable perception is an outcome of social alignment that enjoins the scholars to fit into socially defined expectations, which include upholding objectivity or impartiality. Whenever scholars are seen violating this injunction—by consorting, for instance, with the politically powerful—negative perceptions may be generated and the power of the scholars is diminished. The extent of the diminution of power depends on the depth of the first wellspring of power (expertise) as well as on the perception of the gravity of social offence committed. The contrasting fate of Salazar, Sartono and Nugroho illustrate this point.

Salazar's involvement in the Tadhana Project hurt his reputation within the community of Filipino scholars.\footnote{When I presented a paper on Tadhana in the 2004 Philippine Studies Conference in Baguio, Philippines, there were those in the audience who bitterly denounced Salazar and other Tadhana participants.} Despite his creditable contribution to Tadhana which makes it a notable contribution to Philippine historiography, his ideas rang hollow within the community so long as these ideas were within Tadhana's confine. As mentioned already, the Marcos signature ensured that the Tadhana would be dismissed by many as mere propaganda. Upon leaving the Project, however, and having returned full time to the university, he developed similar ideas and approaches. In due time, not only did he emerge as a powerful figure in
the historians' community but his ideas and approach eventually became the bedrock of *Pantayong Pananaw*, (The Us-Perspective) arguably the most dominant school in Philippine historiography in the 1990s. (Gaerlan 1998, 255-267) His impeccable academic credentials, his remarkable intelligence that even his enemies acknowledged, if grudgingly, coupled with very strong personality enabled him to rise above the political fall-out from his participation in the Tadhana. He remained bitterly criticized by some, but he exemplified nonetheless the case of a scholar who had a huge reservoir of power accruing from expertise (intellectual capital, in Bourdieu’s term), huge enough to offset the unfavourable social alignment.

Sartono seems to share with Salazar a deep wellspring of power that derives from expertise. In terms of personality, however, they are very different. Sartono is well-respected, well-liked by fellow Indonesian historians and this contributes enormously to his favourable social standing. His involvement in the SNI hardly affected his standing and one reason was that he was perceived to have withdrawn from the project. Even if he did not withdraw, however, his stature in the community seemed secured not just because of his academic credentials but also because of his personality and integrity that perhaps almost everyone recognised. His power as a scholar, in short, was strengthened both by expertise and favourable social perception.

Nugroho’s was, again, a different story. He was as complex as perception of him has been. Critics always tend to point to the mediocrity of his scholarly outputs but for many of his former students and colleagues he was a scholar of respectable standing. (Irzyam 2005; Manus 2005; Santoso 2005; Yusmar Basri 2005; Zuhdi 2005) For them, he was perceived to be decent as well as intelligent. In the wider society during the New Order, it is difficult to approximate his over-all social standing but admirers seemed to have outnumbered the critics by a perceptible margin. In the post-Suharto period, with the changed political atmosphere, critics significantly increased but admirers by no means disappeared. The contrasting social alignment for and against him, as well as the temporariness
and temporality of such alignments, renders it difficult to pin down the configuration of his power as a scholar.

In sum, Nugroho stands as a metaphor for the apparent complexity, mutuality or inseparability and inscrutability of knowledge-power relations. In him, the boundary between scholarship and politics is dissolved, so as between self- and national interest; between the credible and the suspicious; between the moral and the immoral; between gossip and knowledge. He defies clear cut characterisation. Any effort to paint him in black or white, in the same way as to define exactly what constitutes knowledge-power nexus, is bound to meet difficulties. He personified the calculus of knowledge-power relations.

Conclusion

The term calculus is used as the title of this chapter because it seems apt for describing the nature of power relations that are imbedded in knowledge production as well as those which informed the interaction among actors and factors involved. As a branch of mathematics, calculus refers to the study of continuously changing quantities (or combinations thereof) and it is characterised by infinite processes, in the same way that the power-knowledge nexus seems to operate. By that, I mean knowledge and power seem to be formed at the confluence of criss-crossing factors whose possible combinations are infinite and the process continuous. Any effort to present power as power, and a knowledge claim as authoritative knowledge (regardless of whether it is in fact truthful or not) cannot but be an act of 'freezing' an otherwise dynamic process. As such it is definitely propped up by powers that need to be uncovered.

What are the criss-crossing factors evident in this study that play significant roles in the calculus of knowledge-power relations? The first, of course, are the political power holders who by virtue of their position had enormous power or influence to pursue their interests. These include Marcos, the New Order regime and Nugroho who, aside from being a historian, seemed to have represented the interest of the regime. In so far as a calculus of power is concerned, it is important
to underscore that the configuration of power of these actors or institutions changed depending at least partly on how the society in general viewed or regarded their position. Once the overall power structure was reconfigured, such as with the fall of Suharto, it also altered significantly the mechanism by which the existing power-structure influenced the shape of knowledge. What used to be official history or standard history, as SNI was, became political propaganda, as the power relations had been altered.

The next factor is the scholar. The scholars' sources of power stemmed from their expertise as well as from the social esteem that they had earned through the years. To a great extent, the shape of the Tadhana and the SNI ensued from the power of the scholars to employ historiographic methods in analysing the data. Their expertise, however, was not enough in itself as shown by the case of the Tadhana scholars. A favourable social perception was also required. That Salazar's ideas became accepted, even became popular, outside of the contaminating image of the Tadhana signified the changing calculus of knowledge-power relations depending on the social, intellectual and political context.

The third factor is perhaps the most fluid. It is a set of socially constituted powers, the configuration of which cannot be easily pinpointed. The complexity of the configuration of such powers emanates from the inherent fluidity of meaning. A particular event or personality may have been depicted in the SNI to serve the political interests of the New Order regime, but how individual consumers of knowledge interpret such a depiction could vary depending on the cognitive ability, value system, and many other factors that are both internal and external to the person concerned. Despite having been discredited in the post-Suharto era, parts of official history that were encoded in the SNI, especially about the 'sins' of the PKI, remain widely believed by the people. It seems that certain individuals, for one reason or another, would stick to this old version, notwithstanding contrary declarations by the scholars or by the new regime. There are aspects of meaning-formation that seems to be highly personal.
The idea of calculus as a metaphor for knowledge-power relations suggests that any definition of such relations can only reflect yet another power relation. This thesis clearly exemplifies this point. It would be disingenuous if I do not admit that the narrative and analysis I present here can only be a manifestation of my power as an individual located within the matrix of power-relations called scholarship. At some point in the future, at least some of my informants might have a chance to read my account and they might find that my understanding is different from theirs. I can always defend myself by saying that I have talked to other participants, have read materials that they never did and have carefully analysed various viewpoints. My version, thus, is supposed to carry more weight than theirs. But how would I really know? What right do I have to suppose that I know better than people who lived through these controversial projects? Or how would anyone, in fact, be able to decide which version is closer to the real? Scholarly protocols are no doubt in place which can help decide, but such protocols are themselves within the ambit of power relations. At the very least, what I can do is to be transparent about my own position in the scheme of things and to apologise to those people, dead or still alive, who might be adversely affected by my scholarship. Scholarship is power and it can only empower to the disempowerment of others.

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CONCLUSION
WHEN CLIO MEETS THE TITANS

History is not a web woven with innocent hands. Among all the causes which degrade
and demoralize men, power is the most constant and most active.

- Abigail Adams

Often seen with an open scroll and a chest of books, Clio is known as the
muse of history. In Greek mythology, the muses embody the lofty
aspirations of arts and intellect. They represent dignity, finery, gentleness,
knowledge, wisdom, eloquence and service. These are some of the qualities that
define the good, the truth and the beautiful (Boecklin 1875).

The Titans, on the hand, were a race of gods who ruled the cosmos for a
long time. They personified many forms of power: natural, political, personal,
among others. They were “composite deities, with several distinctive, though
overlapping representations” (Theoi Project 2006). Their reign ended when the next
generation of would-be rulers led by Zeus challenged and defeated them. The
Titans were very powerful, yet not omnipotent.

Clio has long been invoked as a sort of ‘patroness’ of historians. She signifies
not just a noble pursuit of truth, but even truth itself. She sets the bar which
historical profession aspires to reach and to maintain. The problem, however, is
that, as Oscar Wilde (1995[1895]) said, “The truth is rarely pure and never
simple.” Often it has to be fought for. The ‘history wars’ alluded to at the beginning
of this study were manifestations of this struggle. Clio has become a battleground.

The battles are being fought between competing forces or interests, which
may be varied. In many cases, however, the powerful state is the primary actor as it
tries to impose its will on the others, who in turn react or resist in ways they like or

1 The specific source is not specified, but I took this quote from “Zaads Beta,”
they can. The state, and its allied groups or individuals, constitutes the modern incarnate of the Titans. Both stand as a metaphor for strength, power and dominance.

What happens when an embodiment of truth and goodness encounters a personification of supreme power and self-interest? This is the question that this study addresses using the cases of two state-sponsored history writing projects, the SNI and the Tadhana. While Clio’s professional disciples ran these projects, they were funded by, and were meant to serve the political interests of the Titans’s grandchildren. The encounter promises to be a showcase of exciting possibilities.

In encounters like this, the fairly common tendency is to regard the state, or its representatives, as all-powerful. The notion of ‘official history’ is a good illustration of this. What usually goes with the label ‘official’ is the comfort of knowing whose interests are reflected in a history being offered. It often carries the burden of being perceived as less than ‘true’ history and is often dismissed as self-serving. On the other hand, the concept is misleading for the same reasons. The transparent source of authority that gives rise to it (history) easily produces a general perception that there is not much in it other than the will of the patron/s. The equation $\text{Power} = \text{Knowledge}$ is made unequivocal, one-way and uni-dimensional and this is precisely the source of the problem. As the role of the other players is downplayed, if not totally ignored, the result is often an unbalanced picture of otherwise very dynamic interactions. After all, to pursue the metaphor further, Clio’s mother was a Titan. A Titan’s blood ran through her vein, and so the opposition or separation between the two—state and historians, power and knowledge—is not as clear-cut as it seems. What needs to be done, therefore, is to formulate a more nuanced or differentiated characterisation of the relationship between the two. This study has aimed to contribute towards this end.

The first major point being raised in this study is that there is no inherently oppositional relationship between good scholarship and political interests.
Whether the relationship would be antithetical, or complementary depends on many factors including the intention, meaning or value attached to a knowledge claim. The fluidity of meaning ensures that knowledge (scholarly-type or otherwise) takes on life of its own apart of the intention of the author. Marcos’s use of a highly scientific treatises to bolster his politically-motivated claims pointed to this. The same is the case of Volumes 1 to 5 of the SNI that were implicated in the political character of Volumes 6/7.

There is one sense, however, that scholarship (neutral or not) appears to be at its very core a political act—a deeply concealed political act. To re-echo Bourdieu’s idea, it is in the interest of the scholars to be seen disinterested; it is in their politics to appear apolitical. The scholars’ pursuit of objectivity; their mastery of methods necessary for such an undertaking; and their exclusive control of adjudicating mechanism for establishing protocols and standards for evaluating knowledge-claims, have bestowed upon them an authority or power that nobody else, even supposedly the most politically powerful person in the land, possesses. The usefulness of the scholars to Marcos and the New Order regime rested primarily on their being the ‘operators’ or guardians of the scholarly enterprise. Their entry into the project (this is truer of the Tadhana than the SNI) was moved by a desire to pursue personal interests, among others. That Marcos had sought the service of supposedly objective and highly credentialed scholars and that Salazar and Tan had a well-defined historiography agenda to pursue, exemplified this point.

The foregoing suggests the second major point, that is, the scholars and scholarship are in themselves a power to reckon with, and that they were not mere puppets at the mercy of the manipulative control or influence by the state. This point is most clearly shown in the ability of the multi-dimensional approach as employed in the SNI (1975) to restrict the parameter within which Nugroho and his team could pursue their propaganda intent. The scholars and scholarship, therefore, should be factored into the analysis of the knowledge-power nexus.
The third major point addresses another question. If scholarship and politics are not necessarily opposites, why are they often framed as if they are? What role does morality play in formulating such dichotomies? It appears that, aside from genuine moral outrage, the moral framing of the criticisms against the Tadhana scholars and Nugroho was not just a rhetorical device to strengthen the position of their critics but this also served to divert the attention of the people away from the apparently inherent ties between the scholarly and the political, between knowledge and power. By ostracising Nugroho, Salazar and others, by calling them derogatory names, their critics in effect declared them as apostates to the supposedly genuine cause of scholarship. This move in effect obscured the other possibility, that is, that they (Nugroho, Salazar and others) were castigated for endangering the interests of the scholarly class, for exposing the secret that served as a well-spring of the scholars' power: the myth of objectivity and the fiction of the inherent opposition between the scholarly and the political.

The fourth main point concerns the character of knowledge and power. What was initially considered as knowledge in this study was the historical knowledge that was produced by the scholars. Power, on the other hand, referred to the ability of the state to impose its will as may be manifested in the shape of historical knowledge. The narrative and analysis presented in this study point to the fact that this formulation is over-simplified. What seems to capture more accurately the relationship between the two is the mathematical metaphor of the calculus, that is, knowledge and power are formed at the confluence of criss-crossing factors whose possible combinations are infinite and the process of their formation continuous. Clear illustrations of this include the vicissitude of fortune that the SNI experienced along with the change of political atmosphere in Indonesia, regardless of the quality or tone of the contents. The same occurred in the case of the Tadhana which despite its scholarly content was rejected outright as propaganda, but what holds for its future is uncertain as revitalisation of the Marcos image cannot be totally ruled out. This point is also shown in the altered status of certain knowledge claims that used to be heresy or gossip during the New
Order but gained a level of respectability as they formed part of the movement for *pelurusan sejarah* ("straightening of history"). In the same vein, Salazar's ideas about indigenous history were ignored and denigrated as part of the Tadhana project, but essentially the same ideas became fairly well-accepted later and served as a foundation for what eventually became, outside the domain of the Tadhana, one of the dominant schools in Philippines historiography, the *Pantayo Pananaw* (Us-Perspective).

Also suggested in this study, and this is the fifth main point, is the autonomous power of knowledge. At first glance this amounts to a restatement of the classic 'knowledge is power.' There is an important difference however. In the 'knowledge is power' dictum, somebody or a certain group uses the power of knowledge for their purposes, including the control of nature or other people. Knowledge thus is seen as an instrument to advance the interest of an agent. The autonomy of knowledge referred to here, on the other hand, emanated from the fact that meaning, which is constitutive of knowledge, is continually being shaped by the interaction between the individual knower and the social forces with which he or she has to contend with. These forces are beyond an individual's control though he or she has the capability to influence the outcome of such interactions. In the case of Marcos, for instance, his desire to have the project seemed to indicate the power of the socially defined notion of history over him, power that was activated or strengthened partly by his recognition of such power. If he did not recognise the power of history over him, it would have been less likely that he felt the need to use Tadhana to explain himself to the people of the future. That he felt such a need suggested his recognition of a power above his own, and such recognition could have stemmed, at least partly, from (1) what he knew history was, or what he thought to be the society's understanding of what history was; and (2) what he thought his position in such history should be. Considering, however, the nature of my data, this point cannot be pursued far enough here. It calls for a further research on the psychoanalysis of the consumption of historical knowledge.
Finally, the two projects suggested a possibility that a similar logic underpinned the knowledge-power relationship and that it was in the logistics of power that particular cases may differ. This means that knowledge is a function of power and it is in the distribution, combinations, sources, and types of power that determine the differences between specific cases. The question thus of “Whose or what power shapes what form of knowledge?” is crucial. The political, economic, social, cultural and intellectual factors in each society determine the modes of distribution and combination that define the characteristics of a particular knowledge-power relation. This logistical difference is manifest in different names—gossip, memory, propaganda, history, and so forth—that are given to different forms of knowledge. As the case of the SNI showed, in terms of the truth-content a rumour about the PKI, about certain personalities or events, for instance, cannot be readily assumed to be less true than history that paraded as ‘official’ or that which was presented in journals as ‘scholarly.’ What seemed to be the case was that a weaker constellation of power made a specific idea mere rumour, whereas lies or falsehood that are consistent with the interests of the powerful gained the status of ‘official’ or ‘authoritative’ knowledge. Of course, this study has dealt only with two cases and further research on other similar cases or other types of knowledge may confirm or deny what amounts to as hypotheses being offered here.

The points identified above suggest the possibly inherent link between knowledge and power as well as between their respective embodiments. If we take note of the very nature of knowing as a process whereby the power of human cognition comes in direct contact with reality, a formulation in standard treatment of epistemology (see Zabzebski 1999, and Appendix B for a detailed explication), it follows that at the most fundamental level, knowledge is formed by power. What can explain, then, the fairly common tendency to deny the very fundamental link between the two? And why, where such a link is recognised as the case of many poststructuralist scholars, their recognition stops right at the door of its most
logical conclusion, that is, strong relativism or nihilism? Why the refusal or fear of admitting that any knowledge is no more than a manifestation of power?

For many scholars, the link between knowledge and power is a challenge to overcome, not a natural state to accept and live with. This position has its inherent value but it also contains danger for it conceals the self-interest of the scholars. One consequence of this concealment is that it could make scholarship an unwitting partner of political interests, as the Tadhana and the SNI projects showed to an extent. We may recall that the expertise and the supposed objectivity of the high-credentialed scholars was what Marcos needed for his political interests. Likewise, the professional training and the standing in society of the team members of, say, the SNI Volume 6 lent its content, despite dubious scholarly quality and its obvious propaganda intent, certain level of acceptability. It seems that if the scholars would be true to their avowed desire to help their society, they had to be transparent about their own interests. By doing so they could help forestall the insidious marriage between knowledge and power. The first step, I think, towards this end, is to identify the obstacles to a full understanding of the relationship between the two. Some of these obstacles are philosophical, methodological, attitudinal and political in nature. What will be identified and discussed shortly are the attitudinal and political obstacles. For the philosophical and methodological hindrance, see Appendix D.

The first obstacle is manifest in the anxiety towards the mixing of politics and scholarship. The assumption is that true scholarship equates to a genuine pursuit of truth and objectivity and, therefore, should not be 'contaminated' by politics or by power play. True, honest and good scholarship, in other words, is deemed to be politically neutral, or apolitical. If it is political, then it is not true scholarship. One problem with this formulation emanates from the too narrow definition of the political, which in turn is rooted in the restricted definition of power. If we broadly define power as a generalized capacity to make a difference, as is done in this study, then we extend the definition of the political to include any
exercise of power with a result, intended or not, of empowering one self or one’s group at the expense of another. With this definition in mind, we can see that scholarship is in itself a political act, a deeply-concealed political act in fact.2 (See Appendix C for a more detailed discussion on the need to expand the definitions of ‘power’ and ‘political.’) Whether or not scholars succeed in the pursuit of an objective or a ‘true’ knowledge is a different question altogether. The very act of formulating and validating knowledge-claims presupposes the exercise of power which only they have. As this study suggests, the usefulness of the scholars to the two regimes rested primarily on the power of their expertise and the effects of their social standing—forms of power that even Marcos and the Suharto did not have. At the same time, the case of Salazar, Tan and Sartono who have specific historiographic agenda to pursue indicated that their participation in the project constituted their quest for a greater empowerment, realised once other people recognise their approach or knowledge-claims as valid and once they (approach and knowledge-claims) assumed the performative function of influencing the life and thoughts of the scholars and the people in general.

The other way the false dichotomy lurks is in the presumption that if a knowledge claim is true or valid in scholarly terms, then there is no politics in it. As clearly shown in the case of Tadhana, the high level of scholarship put into it did not preclude politicisation. Such a scholarly quality was precisely what Marcos needed for his political purpose. It seems that the intent of an actor, among other factors, politicises knowledge. The question of veracity is therefore divorced from the question of politics. Sartono’s case was also instructive. Many would agree that Sartono was (and still is) almost a paragon of personal integrity and his scholarship was known for political neutrality (Kuntowijoyo 2000). However, his scholarship had unwittingly reinforced statist nationalism through his Indonesia-sentrisme (Indonesia-centrism) as it had the effect of de-legitimising the nationalist aspirations of those aspiring to form their own nation-states, such as Papua and

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2 The expanded notion of the political is consequent to the corresponding reconceptualisation of power as the ability to make a difference. For an extended discussion of this, see Appendix C.
Aceh provinces. Without him being consciously political, the location of his scholarship within the existing discursive formation has inevitably made it so.

Still another obstacle lies in the false dichotomy between the exercise of power (or to be political) on the one hand, and to be ethical or to be good, on the other. As Foucault (1980) complained about, too often is the case that power is associated with negativities: coercive, destructive, limiting, and controlling. People who aspire for power are suspected of questionable ethical credentials. Scholars, on the other hand, who are imbued with good intentions, genuinely believing in the liberating power of their scholarship, can only reject offhand any suggestion of a link between scholarship and power. This explains why, for instance, many scholar-participants in the Tadhana were quick to wash their hands of any political intent of the project. What is often missed is what Foucault and Nietzsche had emphasized very well: that power can also be positive, creative and liberating (Foucault 1980). Power by nature is neither good nor bad. Power simply is, as Anderson nicely put it (Anderson 1972). Lest we forget, ethical standards are in themselves a function of power relations. The right and the wrong are defined subject to the fluid configuration of powers within the society. Conflicting definitions only mean that people are far from agreed on the standard to follow. What happened to Indonesia may be a case in point. The fall of Suharto ushered in changes that, among other, challenged what used to be a fairly clear-cut definition of the good and the bad in relation to the 1965-66 mass killings. It is fitting, therefore, to emphasise that the question of ethics does not override the question of power relations; ethics is subsumed under it. It does not take precedence over power, as scholars, owing to their claim to good intention and nobility of their profession, tend to assume. It does not mean a rejection of ethics, it only means that the ethical standard has to be fought for hard enough to make it the dominant standard.

The last hindrance that I will discuss here, and perhaps the most formidable, is the scholars' self-interests and their well-meaning, but ultimately unfounded,
fear of epistemological and political anarchy. As Bauman and Bourdieu argue, it is to scholars' interests not to be seen as interested and it is to the extent that they are seen powerless that they are powerful. Any reference to the knowledge-power nexus tends to explode the myth that props up the appearance of their powerlessness, and thus endangers their power. They have conceded some forms of relativism but their uneasiness towards it is manifest in that any move approaching full relativism—the logical conclusion or implication of the knowledge-power nexus—is proscribed. As shown in the cases of Salazar and Sartono, the grasp of the methods, not to mention the possession of empirical data, constitute a stable source of scholars' power. The scholarly class seems to remain powerful on the basis of their expertise alone and there is no reason to suppose that they will be deprived of their power. What may happen is that their traditional reservoir of power could shrink because the transparency of the knowledge-power relations means that they could no longer partake automatically from the power of the scholar as a class who have the exclusive control of the 'knowledge machine.' For scholars who are truly honest about their avowed willingness to help other people, such a diminution of their power-sources should be a small price to pay.

By extension, because of their expertise, the need for which is imbedded in the socially defined configuration of powers, the condition of anarchy is virtually impossible. Recognition of full relativism will not mean total chaos and disorder because various sources of powers will always align in accordance to the equilibrium compatible with the convergence of ever-changing competing interests, reinforced by highly differentiated and ever fluid access to social, economic, political and cultural capitals. The relativist position that is backed-up by the confluence of most powers will therefore emerge the most dominant among various competing relativisms. In the present set-up, that is called objectivity. If at this point, there is no epistemological chaos, there seems to be no reason why things would be different if scholars recognise fully the knowledge-power nexus. The only difference perhaps is that we are transparent about whose power shores up what knowledge. If that transparency is achieved, the road to 'communicative
competence' necessary to attain a well-oiled democracy that Habermas aspired to, might be achieved more easily. It seems ironic, therefore, that for all Habermas's biting critique of Foucault (Ingram 2005), what seems required to achieve communicative competence is precisely the recognition of Foucault's essential point about knowledge/power. The implication is dire. It seems to suggest that the role of the scholars and the position of scholarship in the scheme of things pose a serious obstacle to the full realisation of a true democracy. It could even be suggested that the power of the scholars and scholarship is perhaps a reflection and a pillar of such a lack of democracy.

The problem with the notions of truth, objectivity and impartiality is that they all tend to clothe knowledge with metaphysical attributes that effectively invest it with insidious powers—powers that may be instrumental in causing, maintaining or justifying injustice, inequality and violence, both physical and symbolic. It is only in exposing the source of such insidious powers that we can be in the position to neutralise it. In the end, it is not just an epistemological or a political obligation; it is moral as well.

The serious ethical problem that accompanies the notion of knowledge as a function of reality is that it elides the question of accountability. The scholars by claiming to be neutral, by claiming that they merely follow historiographic or scientific methods, effectively reduce the process of knowledge production to a set of technical or methodological questions. Such and such claim is true based on the established methods, they would say. By doing so, they can and often do remove themselves from the responsibility for whatever consequences their knowledge might have. This is evident in the disavowal by Salazar and others of any political responsibility for whatever use the knowledge they produce might serve because, anyway, they worked on topics far removed from the Marcos era. Since anyone, like a Marcos or a Hitler or a regime, can use any authoritative or 'objective' knowledge for whatever purpose they might have, often apart from the original meaning or intent of scholars who produced it, they could also easily absolve
themselves of responsibility by passing it on to the scholarly establishments. They could easily claim that what they did is based on truth because scholarship has validated it. This is more the case for the SNI than for the Tadhana whose authorship was solely claimed by Marcos. The point here though is that no one in the end might be held accountable. If scholars shall be completely honest about knowledge being power-driven, this can no longer be the case as the first question to ask is: "Whose or what powers, or confluence of powers, prop up this knowledge claim?" The question thus of accountability occupies a center-stage. If the constellation of power is more or less transparent, individuals will be in a better position to decide whether to accept certain claims as knowledge. Once they accept it, it will already be their own and they will be responsible for how such knowledge will be used. The individuals thus will have to share the burden of 'knowing.' Before, they merely stood at the end of the transmission process, passively receiving the already processed 'knowledge.' Now, as the knower is actively involved, the terms 'translation' rather than 'transmission' better captures the whole process.

There are times when certain knowledge, aimed at influencing policies that might adversely affect many people, circulates freely as a valid knowledge and its validity hinges on its scholarly attributes. Without seeing such a knowledge as power-driven, the question of accountability will time and again be ignored. If this happens, as it often does, the scholars and the university are in effect unwittingly being complicit in the act of oppressing or controlling others—exactly the thing that they believe they have been fighting against. (Bauman 1992) As shown in the case of Tadhana, even what seems to be very esoteric and highly technical knowledge that appear to be politically harmless, may be utilized for political purpose as knowledge, I would like to reiterate, assumes a life of its own. We can avoid such a situation by being honest enough to admit that knowledge is indeed power-driven and that it is just a matter of asking whose or what power props knowledge up: the scholars and the scholarly methods are but among those powers that determine the shape of knowledge. This will lead to everyone being
accountable for the knowledge they claim or profess. In other words, it is through exercising the ethics of accountability that everyone, most particularly scholars can contribute considerably to minimising the use of knowledge as a handmaiden of irresponsible power. As suggested earlier, knowledge has an insidious character and that is because it is in the 'prison-house' of power. The scholars, serving as the warden of such prison house are enormously empowered. By giving up the monopoly of their gate-keeping function, scholars pave the way for making knowledge production and adjudication a transparent process. It does not mean anarchy. It only means shared responsibility for the knowledge that we produce and for the freedom that goes with it.

Earlier, I chided Abdurachman and others for moralising what seemed to be an academic-political issue in relation to their critique of Nugroho and the Tadhana scholars. I have argued that it was a rhetorical device to compensate for their seemingly weak position. I would be dishonest if I do not admit that what I have just done here in the Conclusion is essentially the same thing. Whether my arguments are indeed weak such that I need assistance from ethics, let the readers decide. What seems clear to me is that any philosophical point, regardless of strength, has a corresponding counterpoint. Reason is its own limits and sound arguments alone might not suffice. That people, including me, resort to ethics might indeed be for rhetorical purposes. But it should be for more. It is a testament to our power to decide for ourselves what is right. At the end of the day what matters to us is what is good, and what is good is a power in itself.

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APPENDIX A

THE SCOURGE OF RELATIVISM?

Relativism occupies a very uneasy and tenuous position in the philosophy and the social sciences.¹ This has been a long-standing and seemingly never ending point of conflict. As Brown notes, ever since Plato took exception to Protagora's declaration that 'man is the measure of all things,' battle over relativism rages almost incessantly down to this day (Brown 1989, vi).

Relativism refers to an idea, an attitude or an epistemological standpoint that recognizes the contextual factors in formulating a supposedly valid justificatory device to assess knowledge claims. That is, A is true based on standpoint B, but may not be true from standpoint C. It is easy to understand why relativism would not sit well with the scholarly community for it tends to undermine the very notion upon which scholarship is built—that is, that things can be known as they are.² To the extent that relativism is recognized and adopted as a scholarly device, it is tempered with moderation, or is forced to moderate its temperament.³ Friedman and Kenney (2005, 2) nails the point when they declare:

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¹ Many philosophers regard adjudication of knowledge claims the sole province of epistemology (Ben-David, 1978, 1981 as cited in Shapin 1995, 296). So the very notion of 'sociology of knowledge' was met with strong opposition from the philosophers. See Dant (1991, 34-40) for a brief discussion of hostile responses from philosophers to Mannheim's project. For a full-length debunking, see Norris (1997).

² The grip of positivism and empiricism in the social sciences has been progressively relaxed with proliferation and accommodation of various approaches and theoretical standpoints. Nonetheless the objectivist (or 'impartialist') aspiration to be like 'hard-sciences' remains strong. In Scott's interesting take on Weber's idea of value freedom, he argues that it was not strictly a methodological principle nor a code of ethics but also "professional strategy of scholars" to advance their own interests (Scott 1997, 55-57).

³ This moderation takes several forms. In the case of Mannheim he confined his relationism to social sciences. He excluded natural sciences (as cited in Pels 1996a) In the case of Barnes (1976) and Bloor (1991), they have what is known as "value-free" relativism. Lynch and Fuhrman (1991, 234) criticised the latter for bracketing normative consideration in the analysis of the production of natural scientific knowledge. For an assessment of 'value-free relativism,' see Kim (1994). Another case is Knorr-Centina (1982, 320-1), she defends her relativist stance by making distinction between epistemic and judgmental relativism. Epistemic relativism, she said of what she considers defensible type of relativism, is committed to the idea that the

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"Although we argue that all history is subjective, this is not to suggest a kind of relativism."

The history of sociology of knowledge is exemplary in this regard. Emerging in the era of Weimar Republic in the late 1910s up to 1930s, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge had been met with a mixture of strong interest and disparagement. The latter prevailed as time wore on and the field suffered marginalization even within sociology itself. It's 'obituary,' as one scholar noted, has been announced for a couple of times already but it has found ways to regenerate itself. Writing in 1986, John Law notes that as early as the 1940s, sociology of knowledge was already foundering and he laid the blame on Mannheim's 'intractable epistemological problems' (Law 1986). By this he meant Mannheim's relationism. This seems to be just another term for relativism but its subtle difference is instructive of Mannheim's uneasiness about relativism, despite

basis for identifying 'objective' reality is "itself grounded in human assumptions and selections which appear to be specific to a particular historical place and time."[321] Another good example is McCarthy (1997). Even if he recognizes the social situatedness of knowledge, he is quick to rescue his appreciation of Levi-Strauss's contribution to SSK by saying: "...to insist, after Levi-Strauss, that everything 'factual' is discursive does not require that one embrace a nihilism or an agnosticism about the moorings of these discourses....As sociologists from Marx to Durkheim to Mannheim have argued, there is an institutional bases to 'cultural production.' (McCarthy 1997, 62). In the case of Basu and Das (2005), they make distinction between subjective partisanship and partisan history, the latter being clearly political in intent whereas the former employ judicious examination of evidences but nevertheless cannot but be ultimately subjective in making selection and inferences.

4 For a detailed and interesting story of the formative decades of sociology of knowledge in Germany, see Frisby's The Alienated Minds (1992). For an overview of sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), arguably the most successful and dominant form of sociology of knowledge, see Shapin (1995).

5 Meja and Stehr (1990a) note that 'sociology of knowledge dispute' was one of the four most major methodological controversies that excited the scholarly community in Germany in the past hundred years. Unlike the 3 others (disputes on methods, value judgment and positivism), however, this was short-lived as it was prematurely halted by the rise of Nazism in Gemany. For a compilation of several reaction papers and reviews of Mannheim's key article "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon," See Meja and Stehr (1990b).

6 Mannheim has been the favourite 'whipping boy' of the sociologists of science. He is often cited in contemporary sociological discourse as the one who attempted to rationalise the irrational (see Stehr, 1997, 773). That he is not mentioned even once in Shapin's (1995) comprehensive review is emblematic of the continuing disregard of his legacy. This may be because of Mannheim's categorical declaration that 'hard' sciences were not a proper domains of sociological examination. However, come of scholars have noted, even argued, for the centrality of Mannheim's ideas and that they could even provide antidote for the some of the problems the field faces. (See Pels 1996a, Kim 1994, Vandenberghe, 1999)

7 Lewis Coser, "The Sociology of Knowledge is Alive and Kicking" (1987, 218-220). In a comprehensive and authoritative account of the state-of-the-art written in 1995, Shapin makes it clear sociology of knowledge is not just alive but has gained notable success. This time, however, it is in the form known as sociology of scientific knowledge or social studies of knowledge. See Shapin (1995)

8 Rather than Mannheim, Merton is recognised as the 'father of sociology of science. (Shapin 1995, 294.)
strong conviction that its opposite, objectivity, is untenable. Dant explains that Mannheim himself wanted to avoid the ‘nihilism of an unconditional relativism’ (Dant 1991, 16). So his relationism was meant to eschew the evaluative element (truth/falsity of knowledge claims) inherent in objectivism-relativism dichotomy in “favour of understanding the social context” within which a knowledge claim was formulated (Ibid., 17).

Mannheim’s uneasy attitude towards relativism seems paradigmatic. Not only practitioners of sociology of knowledge are anxious about it but also most other scholars. Even many proponents of post-structuralism and other theories that are attuned to relativism are careful not to be too deep into it. Otherwise, one may be branded as ‘anarchist’ or ‘nihilist,’ terms that are disparaging within and beyond the academe.

Critics focus on the supposed intellectual, moral and political vacuity of relativism. In scholarly term, it is simply not right because truth cannot be more than one. In moral sense, the multiple truths that relativism gives rise to allegedly undermine the moral order, peace and stability in the society. From the political

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9 Longino seems to capture the deep-seated assumption harboured by many critics of relativism when she states, referring to a group of philosophers critical of social studies of knowledge, they “seem to assume that Western science represent the pinnacle of human intellectual achievement and that treat it as anything other than the expression of a rationality guided by sound epistemic norms is to open the gates to the barbarians.” [emphasis original] (Longino, 2002, 43)

10 Spivak’s classic turn-around from the critique of essentialism which resulted in ‘strategic essentialism’ while not about relativism is functionally emblematic of the attitude of many postie scholars of the uneasiness towards relativism. They would be relativists only to a certain point.

11 The very hostile reaction to Paul Feyerabend’s Against Methods represents a very good example of how bad things can get in one’s effort to explain the limits of science and to expose its time-honoured ‘pretensions.’ Feyerabend is reported to have gone on depression and wished he had not written the book because his anarchist position cost him dearly in term of academic prestige (cited in Preston 2006). In the literature on sociology of science that I have read, he is depicted in very negative terms. (‘anti-science philosopher,’ ‘irrational,’ etc) I have read parts of the book and I think scholars’ maligning of him is largely undeserved and they are missing a lot of important insight by dismissing him offhand for his anarchism. For a review that is frank, level-headed while mildly hostile but unfortunately misses Feyerabend’s most important arguments, especially its ethical vision for a freer, happier society, see Gellner (1975).

12 This is called monistic realism, that is, “for any natural process there is one and only one correct account.” (cited in Longino, 2002, 44)

13 The “fascination with fascism” of intellectuals identified with poststructuralism such as Heidegger, Paul de Man, Nietzsche, among others, is often used to exemplify the moral and political danger being posed by relativistic, anti-foundational philosophies. See Wolin’s The Seduction of Unreason (2004 xi-xv).
viewpoint, on the other hand, it purportedly tends to disarm well-meaning individuals in their struggle against social inequality and injustice.\textsuperscript{14} As Brown (1989, vii) opines, "relativism...tend(s) to produce quietism and inaction rooted in a sense of hopelessness and pointlessness."\textsuperscript{15}

Of course, relativism is pitted against its opposite, objectivity—what Novick (1988) calls the 'noble dream' of professional historians. While the earlier is value-dependent, the latter is supposedly value-free. The purported superiority of the latter is predicated on the neutrality of its standard, its freedom from spatial and temporal influences which are exactly the opposite of what relativism concedes as inevitable.

Taking the cases of Nugroho and Abdurahman, if we ask a Martian (a hypothetically 'absolutely objective' person from Mars) to take an impartial look at these cases what could possibly happen? Let me create possible scenarios.

The first possibility is that the Martian, I would call her Ms. Martian, would find the position of Nugroho more acceptable considering that there seem to be more people who agree with him. Abdurahman, however, would argue with Ms. Martian that number should not be the primary basis for judging. For one, it is not unlikely that a thousand people will get something wrong which one conscientious individual got right. The focus should then be on the rigour of the methods employed. That brings us to the next possible scenario.

Ms. Martian examines all the works—newspaper articles, books, journal articles—of Nugroho and Abdurahman. At the middle of scrutiny, the Martian suddenly falls in deep thought. She asks herself, "How should I decide? What kind of assessing instrument will I use?" Then she has an idea. She calls in ardent defender of Surjomihardjo, I call Defender A, and another one, Defender B, an avid

\textsuperscript{14} In Wolin's (2004, xiv) words: "...postmodernism's hostility towards 'reason' and 'truth' is intellectually untenable and politically debilitating...its practitioners are left...morally and politically defenseless."

\textsuperscript{15} Brown (1989, vii) for instance chided 'relativist-minded' sociologist for how they can fight social ills by saying "Yes, all theories are equally good; they merely serve different social interests?"
supporter of Nugroho. She asks them to explain their “master’s” respective set of methods and guiding philosophy in writing history.

Nugroho’s defender explained first, detailing the tenets and the justifications of relativistic approach. He emphasized that history can never be objective because it entails interpretation and that the interpreter is a human being with all the idiosyncrasies brought about by highly differentiated and personal experiences. What a historian can do is just to apply the methods as best as possible and then be explicit of the fact that the resulting interpretation is his and his responsibility alone. It’s up to the readers to decide if they accept such interpretation. So in instances when there are 12 historians writing about the same event, 12 sets of interpretations are not unlikely. Ms. Martian understood the explanations and after asking some clarificatory questions called in Abdurahman’s follower to render his side.

Defender A highlights that among the community of historians, there are agreed strict procedures to follow in writing history. These procedures have a long pedigree, refined through long years even centuries of practice. While absolute objectivity may not be attainable, one is duty-bound to pursue it and uphold impartiality at all times. The 12-historian, 12-interpretations aphorism trivializes historical methods. While interpretations do vary, strict adherence to historical methodology precludes such fluidity.

“Are you trying to imply,” Ms Martian asks, “that one is being objective or impartial if one follows strictly historical methodology?” Defender A responds affirmatively. “Can strict adherence to the methods ensure that one captures the truth?” Ms. Martian asked further.

“Not all the times. But most of the times, it is at least nearer to the truth than otherwise it might have been,” Abdurahman replied.

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16 Nugroho’s favourite example is the glass that is half-filled. One person describes it as half-empty, but the other one considers it half-full. Singe fact, two interpretations by two different persons.

17 Nugroho actually gave the example of 12 historians.
"How can you be sure that you get at least near to the truth most of the times?" asks Ms. Martian.

"Because historical methods entails finding verifiable evidences, cross-checking it with other evidences and subjecting them to rigorous internal and external criticisms," Defender A reasons out.

"Do you or can you get all evidences first before you write history, or you write history based only on available evidence?"

"Getting all the evidences is the ideal situation. But history is written based only on evidences at hand. When new evidences are found, then history will be rewritten to accommodate the possible changes." Abdurahman explains.

"Does that mean that all histories are provisional or tentative accounts of the past based on each historian’s reconstruction or analysis of available data?"

"Well, yes you can say that."

"Hmm, if that’s the case, will I be right to say that your objectivity or impartiality only refers to the data at hand, and not to reality itself? There is no way we should confuse data with reality, is there?"18

"The rigorous methods of external and internal criticisms are precisely aimed at weeding out invalid from valid data. But yes, distinction must be drawn between data and reality."

"If all histories are provisional accounts based on historian’s reconstruction and interpretations following what you call long-sanctioned historical methods, is it fair to say that you call a scientific or objective history is just an avatar of relativism? It seems to me that an account may be authoritative but nonetheless

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18 For an extended, honest, self-reflexive analysis of the limits of historical research and historical explanation by a historian, see Ged Martin’s The Impossible Necessity of History (2004)
relative to the views of what you call objective or impartial historian.\textsuperscript{19} You seem to merely bracket out all relativisms aside from your own and install it as the objective yardstick. Can I say then that objectivism is not much other than a ‘sanctioned’ or ‘officialised’ form of relativism, or relativism in disguised?\textsuperscript{20} Isn’t it better if historians would be honest enough about their interpretations which are relative to their own views rather than pretend that they are being objective or impartial? Where did the notion that objectivism or impartiality is necessarily better than relativism come from? Has it always been there?” asks Ms. Martian.

“I am not sure, but the notion of objectivity seems to be closely tied to the development of modernity in Europe from Renaissance, Reformation, Scientific Revolution all the way to Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution.”\textsuperscript{21} Abdurahman retorts.

“In that case, could it be that preference for objectivism within scholarship today is a product of long, subtle process of naturalization and conditioning and that there is no reason to suppose that it is by nature preferable?\textsuperscript{22} If relativism presupposes the influence of value-system in evaluating knowledge claim, isn’t objectivism also reflective of a certain value-system that developed in Europe from

\textsuperscript{19} In very interesting studies done by Knorr-Centina on laboratory experiments in the hard sciences (high-energy physics, molecular biology), she demonstrates, for instance, that physics relies for solidification and stabilization of its empirical findings on self-validated, self-referential, not on supposedly context- or value-dependent, strategies and procedures. (cited in Pinch [2000, 1473] and Longino [2002, 30]) If physics is like that, how much more history might be? For reviews of her important book, Epistemic Cultures: How Sciences Make Knowledge, see Markovsky (2000), Cutcliff (2001) and Pinch (2000) Knorr-Centina’s observation is compatible with the coherence theory of knowledge pushed by Bloor (1991, chapter 2) which posits that the notion truth is sustained by internal coherence within a theoretical system.

\textsuperscript{20} This echoes Bourdieu’s declaration: “The legal consecration of symbolic capital confers upon a perspective an absolute, universal value, thus snatching it from a relativity that is by definition inherent in every point of view...” (1989, 22) Changing the word ‘legal’ with ‘scholarly’ or ‘academic’ makes it applicable to historiography.

\textsuperscript{21} This echoes Knorr-Centina’s idea of epistemic relativism which refers to the type of relativism that is committed to the idea that the basis for identifying ‘objective’ reality is “itself grounded in human assumptions and selections which appear to be specific to a particular historical place and time.”(1982, 321)

\textsuperscript{22} Latour’s very provocative book We Have Never Been Modern (1993), argues that the penchant for objectivity is a product of modernity at the bedrock of which is human desire to control nature, political emancipation of the people and the strict separation between the two (science and politics). Such strict separation, he further claims, is a necessary precondition to the success of the first two. (as noted in Harbers (1995, 271)
the Renaissance to Industrial Revolution? Is it not that the primary difference lies only in the earlier’s admission and the latter’s denial?”

As Abdurahman kept silent, Ms. Martian continues. “I understand that my job here is to adjudicate as to which of your approach is more acceptable. I came from another planet and that presumably makes me an objective or an impartial judge. After hearing all the arguments, however, I think, it would require a high dose of pretension on my part to proclaim one approach as naturally more preferable than the other and at the same time call myself impartial. I believe one cannot be impartial; she can only be accountable for her partiality. Impartiality presupposes a set of standard whose transcendental character can only be assumed. And such assumption can only be derived from a set of necessarily partial propositions. Impartiality renounces humanity (or “martianity”). It is tantamount to denying human responsibility for a human-made decision. It absolves one from the need to be responsible for one’s own action. Of course, I can say that relativism is superior to objectivism, or vice versa, but does the fact that I am from Mars makes my judgment necessarily better because it is supposedly objective? My judgment can only reflect my Martian preference, my own understanding and my own power to express and fight for my preferences and beliefs. In other words, my choice represents my own politics and I am duty-bound to be responsible for it. Whether my choice would eventually be upheld as correct is dependent ultimately on the network of powers beyond my own. The point is that I’d be hard-pressed to find an unquestionably value-free standpoint through which judgment about knowledge, or perhaps about anything can be made. I can only hide the value-system or be honest about it, and I’d rather be honest.” so goes Ms. Martian’s parting words.

Michael Williams tell us in his article ‘Skepticism’ in Blackwell Guide to Epistemology that in Western epistemology, sceptical arguments are grouped into two: Agrippan and Castesian. The first is very ancient as it goes back to classical Greece and the other one is attributed to Descartes. For my purpose here I focus on
the first, the well-known Agrippa’s Trilemma but I will draw on Cartesian scepticism as well. Agrippa’s trilemma refer to three propositions that cast doubt on human beings’ claim that they can really know: (1) Any justification rests on a previous justification and each can always be questioned. That is, infinite regress; (2) Authoritative justification, one that does not supposedly regress, can be made only through dogmatic assumption, which in itself can in principle be questioned; and (3) One can justify only by using assumptions or other justifications that have been a priori established—circular argument. At the heart of Cartesian skepticism on the other hand is compatible with that of Agrippa’s: that is, “there is no way to justify any belief about the external world, even that such world exists.” In other words, epistemological justification is a ‘complete illusion.’ These sceptical propositions have been debated since then, Williams claims, but there is still no agreed solution (Williams 1999, 38-47).

If these epistemological paradoxes have not been really solved despite being recognised for centuries, what does it suggest considering that for the same length of time, we have been producing unquantifiable amount information and ideas we call knowledge? We cannot set these skeptical arguments aside as wrong, because they are rooted at the heart of our logic. On the other hand, we cannot say that knowledge we produce are false simply because of these skeptical postulates. Perhaps there is something wrong with the logic that we use and the system of rationality that gave rise to it, but entertaining such possibility invites considerable difficulties. Foucault has precisely done that in *Madness and Civilization* and he was rebuffed by Derrida’s philosophically dexterous arguments. Can I then raise the

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23 Williams claims that by denying what he calls ‘Prior Grounding Requirement’ upon which Agrippa’s trilemma thrives, Agrippa’s skepticism can be ‘defanged’ (51-52). However, this seems to me an unsatisfactory solution for this only means that the burden of proof must be shared both by the claimant and sceptic. That is, the default situation consists in that both sceptical and knowledge have equal status and each claimant on both sides should provide rational justification for their respective claim. In other words, skepticism is not the natural state that must be proven wrong by knowledge claimant in order for knowledge to be justified. In effect this grants the possibility of true knowledge by installing a priori assumption that at least it is 50% possible. His solution therefore concedes (at least 50%) that Agrippa’s 2nd postulate is correct. (50-54), still leaving Agrippa some ‘fangs’ with which to bite.

24 Among the many reviewers of Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization*, observers agree that it was Derrida’s (1978) critique that really hit the mark. Briefly, Derrida argued that no one can stand outside of Reason so
possibility that the amount of knowledge we have is a measure of the distance between the 'natural state' defined by skepticism and the product of our power to deny or prove skepticism wrong? Does it mean that we know only because we exercise power to do so? That knowing is not the primordial state, but a product of one's power? In other words, is it fair to say that at the very heart of knowledge is power and any suggestion to the contrary cannot but require application of a counter-power? Was Ms. Martian then justified in saying that there can be no non-value-laden (non-power-based) platform upon which we can evaluate knowledge or anything?

The ambiguous but largely rancorous reactions within the academe towards the rise of poststructuralism/postmodernism/postcolonialism (henceforth PS/PM/PC) illustrate the tension generated by abovementioned questions. Parenthetically, despite the differences among these theoretical projects, they are one in asserting or at least recognizing the possibility that knowledge is a function of power. This view is upheld by scholars, relatively small in number, who saw PS/PM/PC as liberating, sophisticated, stimulating, radical and eye-opening. On the other hand, it is viewed by many as destructive, counter-productive, contradictory, reactionary and regressive. The boundary between the two seems not as sharp as before for it appears that there is an increasing cross-fertilisation of theoretical appropriation between the two groups. However, the over-all attitude remains hostile such that many of those who appropriate PS/PM/PC concepts are careful to be very selective. They tend to discard or de-emphasize the most radical aspects or implications of these theories. Among these include the radical interpretation of Foucault's *power/knowledge* and Derrida's *difference*.

The critics may be classified into three groups: (1) those who understood it and alarmed by it nihilistic or highly relativistic implications; (2) those who believe that it is not intellectually tenable because it cannot stand the test of reason; and (3)

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*Foucault’s exclusion of madness to signify the space outside of Reason is impossible. The Unreason can be apprehended only through Reason. See Boyne (1990, 53-89) for the explication of this philosophically exhilarating exchange.*

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those who think that it is plainly wrong because they largely misunderstood it. Proponents on the other hand tend to deny its alleged nihilistic elements and that with some adjustment, one can mitigate its self-refuting tendencies.

In my view, one cannot apprehend the most radical and the most useful aspects of poststructuralism by denying or rejecting offhand its nihilistic implications. I believe that both critics and the proponents are bound to miss a lot by doing so. Since this is central to my argument in this study—that knowledge is a function of power—and, conversely, that this goes against what we scholars take for granted, I shall attempt to demonstrate the erroneous logical foundation of the tendency to utilize ‘nihilism’ or ‘epistemological anarchism’ as the proverbial intellectual ‘boogeyman.’ At the same time I will try to uncover what is being concealed when some scholars conjure up the specter of nihilism.

Our Reason, our logic, demands that evaluative concepts go in pairs. That there is such a thing as Reason presupposes the existence of Unreason. That we consider Reason as correct indicates that we take Unreason as wrong. Conversely, we reject Unreason as wrong on the basis of the presumption that Reason is right. The problem, however, is this, “On what platform independent or outside of Reason can we prove that Reason is correct?” Logic prohibits that we prove something based on itself. We thus cannot say that Reason is correct because it is reasonable. That constitutes Agrippa’s third paradox—circularity. We cannot also say that Reason is correct because it has been tested for so long or that it has a long pedigree. This is because all these justifications, as Agrippa’s first conundrum indicates, rest on a priori established reasonable assumption that in itself requires another justification—an infinite regress. We are left then with the last option possible in Agrippa’s trilemma. That is, to install a ‘dogmatic assumption’

25 The following arguments are products of my own synthesis based on fragmentary ideas borrowed from a number of scholar. I have been toying with this idea for sometime and have been looking for books or articles that could support it. So far, however, I have not found any. I am sure there are published works on it. Perhaps I just did not know where to find.

26 I got this idea from Derrida’s critique of Western metaphysics. See ‘Cogito and the History of Madness.’ (1978)
(Williams 1999, 39) and thereby stop regress. In other words, Reason is correct because people—the brilliant, the powerful, almost everyone—think and have proven (or so they thought) that it is. The foregoing has two far-reaching implications.

First, nihilism cannot be exiled to epistemological oblivion as what many scholars have done in the most cavalier way. In the same that madness (Unreason) cannot be excluded from reason, as Derrida argued against Foucault on *Madness and Civilization*, nihilism has a definite logical place at the opposite end of epistemological possibilities. It cannot be dismissed as an absolute wrong for it allows us to establish Reason as correct. Our logic demands that we cannot establish what is right based on what is wrong. If we insist, as many unwitting scholars do, it denies them the foundation for claiming that Reason is right.27

Second, and this is more salient, it is perhaps too strong to use William’s term of installing a ‘dogmatic assumption’ to establish the correctness of Reason. However, it captures an essential point: that Western rationality—the foundation of our Reason, logic and morals, etc.—developed as a product of historical forces and it has been installed as “the” basis of rational thinking through long process of collective and individual approbations. Reason is, in final analysis, human-made—made by collective and individual powers of human subject. Any attempt thus to present it as if it is natural should be subjected to deconstructive analysis to uncover the hidden agenda behind such a move. All these are of central relevance to the power-knowledge nexus being explored here.

I would like to raise another set of questions: Can there be a homologous relationship between the debates on objectivity-vs-relativity and Reason-vs-Unreason? Is it the case that if Unreason cannot be dismissed offhand, so too

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27 I got the inspiration for this line of thoughts from Boyne’s discussion of the very stimulating debate between Derrida and Foucault. As Boyne and others pointed out, among so many reviews and critiques of *Madness and Civilization* Derrida’s critique proved to be the one that really hit the mark. The point of contention was Foucault alleged misinterpretation of Descartes’s philosophical meditation on the exclusion of madness. See Boyne (1990, pp. 53-89.) See also Miller (1987, 101-105) for a less comprehensive, less penetrating discussion of the same issues.
relativism? That if Reason has been installed as authoritative by a dogmatic assumption (Agrippa's Second point), so is the case the same for objectivity? In other words, does it mean that the two sides in the two debates are two faces of the same coin? That since one presupposes the other, then neither is necessarily superior and it is only through human intervention, human power, that one can be installed as more preferable than the other?

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CONCEPTUALISING KNOWLEDGE

The starting point is to look at how knowledge is conceptualised in standard epistemology. In the article "What is Knowledge?" in Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Linda Zagzebski (1999, 92) tells us that "(k)nowledge is a highly valued state in which a person is in cognitive contact with reality." It is, she continues, a relation whereby a conscious subject (knower) interacts with the "portion of reality to which the knower is directly or indirectly related" (Ibid.). Direct relation forms what she calls "knowledge by acquaintance" and indirect relation "propositional knowledge." The first is directly experiential while the latter is by way of a ‘true proposition about the world.’ (Ibid.) The key words here are "true proposition." She declares that "(i)n the state of knowledge, the knower is related to a true proposition" (Ibid., 93).

She goes on to say that philosophers focus much of their attention on propositional knowledge rather than knowledge by acquaintance and that this may be due to two possible reasons: (1) knowledge takes the form of a proposition and this makes it transferable to another, something that knowledge by acquaintance is not, at least in a straightforward way; and (2) it is commonly assumed that reality has a propositional structure or that it is in such a structure that ‘reality becomes understandable to human mind’(Ibid. 92-93). It should be underscored, for my purpose here, that the transferability of propositional knowledge is an important factor that pulls the interest of epistemologists away from knowledge by acquaintance.
Among philosophers, there are many complex theoretical issues involved in the quest for an adequate definition of knowledge. These are closely tied to how 'true proposition' may be identified or established. This is not a place to engage these issues. Suffice to note that in much of these efforts, knowledge is restricted to those ideas and/or information that have undergone or 'survived' a test of truth justification. Depending on the type or hierarchy of knowledge, the requirements of such a test vary, with the scholarly and scientific knowledge being the most rigorous. For knowledge to be considered as scholarly acceptable, it undergoes strict processing: documentation, verification, analysis, synthesis, peer review, and continual inter-subjective assessment. Those that cannot satisfy designated requirements are relegated to the dustbin and are called various names such as ideology, opinion, belief, hypothesis, myth, memory, superstition, hearsay, gossips or rumors, old wives' tale, folklore, etc - names that can only imply the extent of their distance from the ideal, that is scholarly knowledge.¹

The main problem with restricted definition of knowledge lies in what they occlude, and the repercussion of such occlusion. By limiting acceptable knowledge to those that have undergone the processing machine, called scholarship, we take for granted that the scholarship machine, and its scholar-operators, is a neutral instrument, with no interest (or power) to promote or pursue. There are reasons to believe that this may not be the case.² The claim to neutrality of the scholars and scholarship and the privileged position of the knowledge they sanction should not be a priori accepted because they are included among the sites of power that need to be examined.³ How has scholarship been able for so long to maintain the veneer of neutrality upon which its authority is based is in itself an interesting question.⁴

¹ According to Longino (citing Ryle, 1946), knowledge is one of those 'success terms' ascribed to certain things that satisfy set of requirements. In other words, it is a also a normative concept, not just descriptive. See Longino, The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 10.
² Since the publication of Said's Orientalism (1978) which elicited bitter polemics, the idea of innocent scholarship seems to be forever shattered.
One consequence of restricted definition of knowledge is that it prevents scholarly efforts from recognising and analysing an unrestricted field of powers that constitutes knowledge. We instead tend to divert all our focus to the methodologies or technicalities of knowledge production, on the one hand, and to the influences on knowledge of big, highly visible political power players, on the other. This has resulted, for one, in incomplete and partial consideration of knowledge-power nexus best exemplified by most approaches in sociology of knowledge including its most radical version thus far, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK).

Because of the need to start with a clean slate, I adopt a definition of knowledge that is inclusive of all attempts to represent or understand reality regardless of whether they are in fact true or not. Knowledge, therefore, as I define here, refers to an idea or information (or a set of ideas/information) that is believed to be true. By whom? By individuals or groups who willfully exercise power to
believe and/or assert that they know. Here I do not a priori assume that the social takes precedence over the individual, or vice versa. This is to allow space for each circumstance to determine which one carries more weight.\textsuperscript{9} Certainly, putting history, social sciences and others side by side with the so-called opinion, ideology, myth, gossip, memory, folklore, etc. will horrify many but this is necessary as a strategic analytic move.\textsuperscript{10} This will allow us to see the types or sources of powers that sustain classification and 'hierarchization' of different knowledge claims. As McCarthy aptly puts it, ideas and knowledge are produced through cultural practices which are contentious:

The contentious feature of cultural practices is not, at any given moment, \textit{ex \textit{equo}}: some of it is 'knowledge,' other things are 'facts' or 'opinions,' still others are 'ideologies.' The status of these designations are tenuous and because of that, negotiable.\textsuperscript{11}

The following cases will give us idea why there is a need to reject the a priori assumption about knowledge:

One cannot deny that there are instances when what we call gossips or personal memories contain more truth than history books would ever tell us. A good example of this is the case of the knowledge about mass killings of 1965-66 (and related events) in Indonesia that for so long had been repressed by political imperatives. The first hand knowledge of the villagers who may have witnessed

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the capacity of individuals to think and decide for themselves. In this instance, Latour (1986) would be very useful. His aversion towards over-socialized conception of human in the social sciences led him to formulate what is now called Action Network Theory whose basic premise is that "society is not what holds us together, it is what is held together. Social scientists," he further declares, "have mistaken the effect for the cause." (1986, 276)
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{9} Methodological wholism versus methodological individualism is a long-standing dispute in the philosophy of social sciences. I need not take side here. In the concluding chapter, I will raise the possibility that the long disputed antinomies such as nomothetic-ideographic, agency-structure, objective-subjective and many others become a problem only because scholars refuse to admit the artificiality and inherent limitations of these concepts vis-à-vis the complexity of reality that these concepts aim to capture. Scholar's refusal, I think, is closely linked to their denial that knowledge is a function of power.

\textsuperscript{10} Durkheim in \textit{Elementary Forms of Religious Life} argues that science is not fundamentally different with other forms of knowing, such as religion. He claims that just like other forms of knowledge, science comes from a particular combination of social forces. (cited in Kaufman-Osborn, 1988, 130-132)

the events circulated as mere 'gossips' while official lies paraded for long as history, even up to now. In the post-Suharto period, the situation has radically changed. Scholarly efforts have tried to make those 'gossips' as history, and the former history as lies, and they succeed to a certain degree. However, as far as many Indonesians are concerned, at least part of the old history remains to be the proper history and outside of it are mere lies or gossips cooked up by people with political interests to promote.\footnote{In the past few years, there has been increasing number of scholarly publication detailing and discussing relevant issues. See Budiawan (2004), Heryanto (2006), Zurbuchen (2005), Roosa, Ratih & Farid (2004)}

Another case in point is the whole idea behind what is popularly called the Sub-Altern Studies. For the people who are marginalized (generalized as the sub-alters) the information or idea they have about themselves and the means through which they express them—perhaps in the form of epics, poetry, songs, folk lore, sayings, etc—all constitute what to them as knowledge. It has been there for so long as their ways of making sense of the world. It is a wonder of wonders, then, that it requires a sub-altern scholar to collect, document, analyze and synthesize those ideas or information to validate them to become acceptable knowledge. And in this form, a hypothetical sub-altern actor might be surprised that he cannot recognize himself in it, but since it already has the stamp of scholarly imprimatur, then it becomes authoritative. Relevant questions include: Why can society not take sub-altern knowledge on its own term? Why do we need Sub-Altern scholarship to make their knowledge considered as knowledge? What enables Sub-Altern scholars to feel that they can know better than those people who actually live reality?\footnote{Bourdieu calls this the "intellectualist or theoretist fallacy" which refers to the common mistake committed by scholars evident in the claim: "I know better than my informant." Interview with Loic Wacquant, see Wacquant (1989, 34)}

These two cases suggest that knowledge is not necessarily about the truth. It is about what people think to be true. What gave the sub-altern scholars a head-start is not necessarily that they knew things more accurately, but their privileged
position as scholars. In short, the different names given to different knowledge claims—history, ideology, memory, gossip, etc.—represents not necessarily their distance from the truth but more fundamentally the strength of the constellation of powers that backs each of them.

14 Following Bourdieu, scholars have symbolic power which is based on symbolic capital—a “power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition.” Scholars have through a long process of institutionalization have gained the symbolic power to “consecrate or to reveal things that are already there.” (1989, 23)
APPENDIX C

RE-DEFINING POWER AND THE POLITICAL

The concept of power is ambiguous. Mark Haugard (1997, 2) tells us that power is among those considered by Wittgenstein as ‘family resemblance concept.’ By that he refers to the variety of interrelated connotations attributed to the concept used in a day-to-day speech but just like different members of a family, one can hardly expect that one (usage or individual member) is exactly the same as the other.

Not only is the concept of power ambiguous, it is also highly contested.¹ (Lukes 1974, 9; Wartenberg 1990, 12-17) Haugard explains that what was at stake in the power debates in the 1960s and 1970s involving C. Wright Mills, Dahl and Bachrach & Baratz, Lukes, among others, was the legitimacy of the liberal democratic practices and institutions. A definition of power that is narrow, with the domain of the political confined to the public sphere, legitimises the liberal democratic perspective. That is, liberal democracy such as what is being practiced in the US may be taken as a model of democracy. On the other hand, a broad definition of power, as Lukes' is, will uphold the position of the left-wing as the 'true democrat.' (Wartenberg 1990, 10)

This is not a place to review the multi-pronged debates about the nature or properties of power, both as operational concept and as a social or political force.

¹ Lukes and Wartenberg concur but for different reasons. For Wartenberg, the reason for confusion is the misunderstanding by other scholars of the nature of power and the consequent misappropriation of it. Lukes, on the other hand, suggests that reason could because the way how power is defined has a far reaching implication on the question “Who is a more democrat or who is more radical?”
Literature on this abounds. What I shall do is to extract certain conceptual and analytic elements from these debates that will serve the purpose of this study.

In the conventional sense, power is associated with the influential political institutions, and individuals or interest groups that operate within or against them. It is often considered as a sort of 'thing' possessed and exercised by actors and groups with the view to acquire, maintain or enhance it further. It is likened to an instrument that enables a few to coerce, control or limit the thoughts or behavior of the many. (Lukes 1974, 13) This conception of power is often referred as "power-over."

Another conception is known focuses on the legitimate capacity to act, that is "power to." Among theorists who subscribe to this are Parsons (1963/1969), Arend (1970, as summarized in Wartenberg 1990, 37-49) and Barnes (1988). Hindess (1996, 1) notes that while this concept of power is often seen idiosyncratic in power theorizing, it is in fact central to much of western social and political theory.

Lukes, Wartenberg and Foucault, among others, argue that that no longer is it sufficient to regard the 'powerful' as only those highly visible political

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2 For collections of various notable articles discussing various facets of the power analytics, see Olsen and Merger (1993) and Lukes (1986). For a theoretical approach that also include summaries of contending points, see Digerer (1992) Wartenberg (1990), Barnes (1988), Wrong (1979), Luke (1974). For a more recent, see Dyrberg (1997) for what seems to me a sophisticated attempt to synthesize and interpret Foucault's power analytics and to recast it in the light of theoretical efforts by Laclau, Moufe and Zizek. This also includes a very rigorous philosophical analysis of positions and assumption of various participants in the power debate (Chapters 1 & 2, pp. 20-84)

3 This is the state-centered conception of power and this restricts the domain of the political within the activities of the state institutions and actors and those who oppose or support them. A paradigmatic example of this is de Jouvenal's On Power (1945). It equates power to the activities of the governments. Foucault categorically opposed such conception of power. As Foucault's pithy call goes, there is a need to cut the head of the king in political theory. See Miller and Rose's article Political Power Beyond the State (1992) for an eloquent review of the state-of-the-art in the theory of power which pushes for a beyond-the-state conception of power.

4 This refers to the concept of power as "power to" (as legitimate capacity). Among theorists who subscribe to this include Parsons (1963/1969) and Arend (1970, as summarized in Wartenberg 1990, 37-49) and Barnes (1988). Hindess (1996, 1) notes that while this concept of power is often seen idiosyncratic in power theorizing, it is in fact central to much of western social and political theory.

5 Associated with Hobbes, Lukes (1974, 13) tells us that this conception is central to the attention of power theorists for so long.
institutions, interest groups or individuals who occupy vital positions in them. In so far power-knowledge interplay is concerned, a narrow conception of power misleads us into assuming that the state or the elite, or certain key individuals (such as, say, Nugroho Notosusanto) as the only or the primary key to understanding the shape of knowledge. Since often are the cases when the interests of the visibly powerful do not coincide neatly with the shapes of knowledge, it gives observers a *prima facie* reason for dismissing offhand knowledge-power nexus. The key is to expand the notion of power to encompass generalised capacities of individuals or groups or anything. Simply stated, power is a capacity or ability to make a difference. As ability, power is at once a cause and an effect of a confluence of social interactions. As Dyrberg (1997) eloquently demonstrates in his book, power is circular in structure and Barnes (1988) argues that knowledge is one of the nodal points that make such circularity possible.

Such a definition of power carries far-reaching implications on the concept of the political. Traditionally, the domain of the political has been confined to activities of the state and the responses of the 'civil society' to these activities. Carl Schmitt's well known article *The Concept of the Political* defines the political based on the distinction between friends and enemies. (1996, 26-36) Such a definition has been considered as keenly insightful but it has also been criticised for being narrow or exclusionary. Agnes Heller, for one, offers an alternative. She claims, thus: “The practical realization of the universal value of freedom in the public domain is the modern concept of the political” (1991, 340). In my view, Schmitt's stress on conflict and Heller's emphasis on freedom (or any interest for that matter) can be combined together to produce a more adequate conceptualization such that attainment of freedom (or any interest) may be achieved in the context of a struggle between two or more opposing groups. Both Heller and Schmitt, however, give

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6 Dyrberg in his effort to interpret or synthesise Foucault power analytic defines power in this way. The essence of his definition, however, is very different from what I mean here. Along with many scholars such as Weber (1978 as cited in Hindess, 1996, 2), Parsons, Barnes (1988), and others, this capacity is agent-based, unlike Foucault and Dyrberg who rejects subject as sources of power.

7 The ideas in this paragraph I have previously discussed in my earlier paper, "Behind, Between and Beyond Politics" (Curaming 2005)
premium to the public as the domain where the political is operative. If power permeates the society, if it is conceived as ability to make a difference and thus everyone has this attribute, then the private or personal sphere is equally liable to politicization. As feminists happily proclaim ‘the personal is the political’. In short, the field of the political encompasses practically all facets of human interaction. I should emphasize though that it does not follow that everything is political. It only means that everything can be politicized and this is contingent on the configuration of social forces.

Foucault’s oft-referred regicide—i.e. the metaphorical cutting of the head of the king in political theory—no doubt contributed significantly to this effort. By rescuing the concept of power from the confines of the question of sovereign power, he not only destroyed the walls that for so long restricted the sphere of the political, as separate from the social. He also sets power analytics that allows analysis of wide-ranging phenomena that previously were thought to be inherently non-political, including knowledge itself. This is far from saying that knowledge was never an object of social and political analysis before Foucault. As early as Greek philosophers, perhaps even earlier, social and political influences on knowledge production have been mulled over. A more systematic approach such as sociology of knowledge, for instance, dates back to early 1900s (Frisby 1992) The importance of Foucault (and Derrida) rests, among other things, on making it possible to push the effort to understand knowledge-power nexus to its logical conclusion.

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8 While it is Foucault who is well known to be associated with the concept of power that is all pervasive in the society, similar view has been advanced by many scholars of different theoretical suasion. See for instance Lukes (1974), Barnes (1988).

9 Foucault (1980, 121). In his words, “We need to cut the King’s head: in political theory that has still to be done.

10 One of Foucault’s provocative points is that the political is in the social. (cited in Dyberg, 112) According Foucault, he did not mean to say that State is not important but “for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, (it) is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because (it) can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations.” (Foucault, 1980, 122)
APPENDIX D

PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONCEPTUAL OBSTACLES

The first major philosophical obstacle is evident in this question: Does the fundamental assumption that underlies the effort to demonstrate that power is a function of knowledge and vice versa, rest on a firm philosophical foundation? If knowledge, a critic would say, is indeed shaped by power, then this claim cannot be true or acceptable for power is a dubious epistemological justificatory device (Taylor 1984). That facts are now routinely established and that we have a rigorous, time-tested set of criteria for truth verification, the critic would aver, indicates that knowledge is tested against verifiable facts and it is its ultimate measure (Norris 1997). In other words, the knowledge-is-power-driven proposition does not, or cannot rest on a firm epistemological standpoint, which only means that it is invalid as a knowledge claim. There are a number of possible solutions to this.

The first solution I suggest is philosophical in nature. Allow me to explain this by referring first to a functionally similar problem: the paradoxical statement, "Everything is relative." Critics of relativism often point out that to the extent that such statement holds true, it refutes itself, which serves as a proof that there is something absolute. Such an assertion, however, rests on a false premise: that language can 'exist' only on one level, as correspondent to a referent in reality 'out there.' It seems, however, that language is, if not by nature at least by function, a

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2 Norris’s Against Relativism (1997) is a comprehensive and rigorous critical evaluation of various anti-realist, cultural-constructionist theories that challenge the standards of truth verification in the sciences. See specifically Chapter 9 that discusses the science of aerodynamics as a test-case for various forms of relativist doctrines.
meta-language (Mauntner 2000, 305). It is a higher-order description of reality, and such ordering could theoretically spiral out to infinity. This means that a referent may not only be an object ‘out there’ (first-level ordering) but also a set of signs that referred previously to an object (second-level), and yet another set of signs referring to the signs at the second level (third level), and so on as the principle of referentiality applies to an infinite number of levels of possible ordering, depending on the need for it. This idea is functionally similar to Derrida’s idea of differance, only taken in reverse. The proposition thus that ‘everything is relative’ “exists” as a higher level description of the ‘everything’ in a lower level, making it non-self-refuting on its own level. ⁴

In the same way, the power = knowledge proposition is a postulate of a higher order. It posits the relationship operative at the lower level between power and knowledge using an epistemological yardstick applicable to that level. Many might complain of the artificiality of such differentiation. They may argue that logic is logic and it either applies to everything or not at all (Putnam 1987, cited in Prado 1995, 46). ⁵ However, it is precisely the hard-and-fast, black-and-white nature of logic that makes its efficacy limited. Reality is much too complex to be captured by logic. The logical reality and the existential reality may not be one and the same, and conflating the two is as foolhardy as it is dangerous. ⁶ The analysts (historians, social scientists, any scholar), thus, have no choice but to make use of logic and language (in which logic is operative) and this makes it necessary to formulate a device, artificial it may be, to address the problems inherent in their tools. What may be fruitfully invoked is the “meta” property of both language and logic. Le

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⁴ This conundrum is addressed a little differently by Haugaard (1997). In his defense of Foucault against critiques (Habermas, Taylor, among others, see Hoy 1986, 93-94) who claim that archaeological and genealogical methods are self-refuting, he also invokes the need to differentiate levels of analysis. He claims that critics tend to conflate philosophical and sociological levels of analysis and this results in contradiction.

⁵ Putnam (1987) argues that reason can not be historicised because history itself, or historical accounts presuppose reason. As a regulative principle, it sets the platform that allows critical evaluation of everything.

⁶ There is a very strong current in Continental philosophy that posit the limits of Reason. The works of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida are outstanding examples.
me illustrate this complicated point by referring to an example of how I have done the analysis here.

That the SNI and the Tadhana are examples of power-determined forms of knowledge has been demonstrated in this study using various kinds of evidence such as interviews, published articles and the content analysis of the books. This evidence constituted the first-level ordering of the phenomenon cited above. My own effort to analyse and synthesise this evidences to form my own arguments represents a second-level order effort. Anyone in the future who might use my study for his or her own purposes would constitute third-level attempt, and the chain goes on. In each level of these attempts at representation, language and logic are utilised with the view to capture what is thought to be real, in my case the proposition that knowledge is a function of power. That I use tools—language and logic—that are, admittedly, by their very nature power-determined does not necessarily negate the possibility that I can validate the proposition I aim to establish. It only means that in order to find out whether or not I in fact succeed in my attempt, it requires a set of criteria or standard of truth verification that is established to be valid for this particular level, in which case, the existing scholarly conventions. The proposition that knowledge is a function of power, in short, is not necessarily refuted by itself. It may even be self-validating if we recall that scholarship itself is a set of an organised but concealed power relations. Let me explain this further.

What is often referred to as the 'time-tested set of criteria for truth verification' seems to be ultimately power-determined. It represents a composite of all powers—negative, positive, good, bad, creative, restrictive—that came into play and installed it as a valid standard. This means that before epistemology, scientific methods, historiography, among others, have been installed as a valid or acceptable basis of producing knowledge, they have undergone centuries of history of struggle among competing claims. In the case of the two projects discussed here, this struggle was manifest in the historiography war in the
Philippines which Tadhana's indigenous historiography wished to engage with, as well as in the biting critiques by Soedjatmoko (1958, 1960) and Oetomo (1961) of the 'unscientific nationalist' history and Surjomihardjo's (1980) rebuke to Nugroho's relativism. Struggles such as these are often regarded as a process of weeding-out what is true from what is false or what is effective and what is not, and thus regarded as nothing to do with power a struggle. The resulting outcomes—epistemology, science, historiography as we know them today—are taken as the refined, authoritative version. One thing, however, cannot be denied. The scientific method itself undergoes continuous evolution as it reflects the acceptable paradigm of the time. Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (1962) is clear on this. Of course, Kuhn and others did not regard the existing paradigm as a manifestation of contemporary power relations within the scientific community, but how else did they manage to establish the norm or the standard protocol other than through consensus, which seems just another term for the confluence of powers emanating from several competing and complementing sources? Foucault's idea of *discourse* makes explicit the power relations that underpin the formation of such a consensus. Within the sphere of scholarship, therefore, the proposition that knowledge is a function of power is self-validating, not self-refuting.

The other philosophical obstacle is that analysis of the knowledge-power nexus tends to presuppose what it seeks to prove which results in a circular or tautological explanation. That is, the conclusion that knowledge is a function of power is already presupposed in the premise that knowledge and power are intimately linked. I will note here two aspects. First, considering that in the strictest philosophical sense any explanatory statement can only fall into three problems—what is known as the Agrippan Trilemma: infinite regress, dependence on dogmatic *a priori assumption* and tautology—that this one seems tautological is not

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7 The Agrippan trilemma is a set of sceptical statements that since classical Greece has yet to be fully solved. At the heart of these trilemma is the 'illusion' of epistemological justification (Williams 1999). For a more detailed explanation of this please see Appendix A.
so bad at all. According to the coherence theories of knowledge, knowledge is a system and justification may be sought not based on foundation but on the interrelationship between knowledge claims. Tautology, therefore, which seems built-in in the systemic nature of knowledge, is not easy to avoid (Kvanvig 2003). The two other problems could be worse, especially the implicit dependence on dogmatic a priori.\(^8\) (For a more detailed discussion on this, please see Appendix B)

The second point to emphasise in relation to the issue on tautology is methodological rather than philosophical in nature. This study does not seek to establish causal connection between knowledge and power. Such a relationship is already posited in the theoretical postulate that gave rise to this study. What it aims to do is to explore or demonstrate the various possible ways by which such relationship may be constituted and manifested. The idea is to determine whether there are sources of power that are left out in the conventional analysis of knowledge-power relations. As it turned out, there are in indeed, and among these is the power of the scholars and scholarship.

The leaving out of the power of the scholars and the scholar is a consequence of the restricted definition of the concept of the powerful and power itself. The powerful often refers to the big political and economic figures such as the rich, the oligarchs, leaders, regimes and others. Too often we easily assume that if indeed power shapes knowledge then the interest of the ‘powerful’ – dominant class, the state, certain sectors—should coincide considerably, if not perfectly, with the shape of knowledge. Sometimes, that is the case, but in other instances that is not so. This tends to cast doubt on the purported inalienable relationship between power and knowledge, and occasions the assertion that at its best, knowledge corresponds to reality and it was just a matter of using proper methods to achieve such correspondence. If we define power broadly and simply, and regardless of

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\(^8\) Much of what we call authoritative knowledge—sciences, history, philosophy, etc—fall into this category. They are held true because in the final analysis there is a dogmatic a priori upon which they stand on. The trenchant problems, therefore, that emanate from knowledge-power nexus are precisely consequent to the essence of Agrippa’s second postulate.
interest, as the capacity to make a difference, and not, as in many instances, as a relational difference between the ‘powerful’ and the ‘powerless’ (a tautology at its worst), we in effect broaden the bases of who or what are the potentially powerful that could influence the shape knowledge. It is often at the confluence of the unpredictable combination powers of persons, institutions, situations, prior knowledge, and other indeterminate factors that knowledge takes shape. This is to an extent evident in the SNI where the fluidity, inconsistencies and even contradictions in narration and interpretations are found. Sometimes, as in the case of personal memories, through a will-power of a single individual knowledge may also be constituted. In other words, power resides in many agents and there may even be types of power that are not based in specific agents but in the confluence of various and even indeterminate agents. The notion of social ontology is derived from this type of agency. In other words, the metaphor of the Titans being embodiments of many types of power is particularly apt. Likewise, being powerful yet not omnipotent, the Titans represent very well the authoritarian regimes of Marcos and Suharto.

The narrow definition of knowledge is also an obstacle. By limiting knowledge to those that have undergone the processing machine, called scholarship, we take for granted that the scholarship machine, and its scholar-operators, is a neutral instrument, with no interest (or power) to promote or pursue. As argued earlier, scholarship is hardly an innocent or apolitical act. By expanding the definition of knowledge, as is done in this study, to include all attempts to represent or understand reality, it opens the door to the examination of the various types or sources of power that gave rise to knowledge claims that carry different names such as gossips, superstition, propaganda and so on. Certainly, putting history, social sciences and others side by side with myth, gossip, memory, folklore, etc. will horrify many. As shown in this study, however, one cannot deny that there are instances when what at one point are called gossips or personal memories contain more truth than history books would ever tell us. Scholars tend to dismiss such instances as either as fault of the scholars or as ‘collateral lapses,’ as
isolated cases that do not in anyway invalidate the overall efficacy of scholarly methods. This is not, I think, a question of validity of scholarly methods, the claim for which neither do I nor can I reject, but a question of why in instances when these scholarly methods fail to capture reality, their output remain (at least until proven patently wrong and that takes time) considered as the 'knowledge,' more acceptable than rumors, personal memory and others. The answer, of course lies, in the power relations between those who have access to the mechanisms for knowledge production and distribution and those who do not. The SNI was a case in point. What for so long was considered 'history' proved to be distortions of reality whereas the 'truth' which certain marginalised groups held had been considered as lies for so long.
# APPENDIX E

## CHANGES IN DIFFERENT EDITIONS

<table>
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<th>VOLUME</th>
<th>CHANGES</th>
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| Volume 1 | - Not much change. Most of the sentences, for instances, are the same to letter.  
- The changes: added new data from new researches up to 1978 about East Timor; added glossary, index, photos and tables (see Soejono’s Foreword, p.xxv) |
| Volume 2 | - “…additional data and sharpen the analysis but overall the changes do no really alter the general picture.” (Foreword to Volume, Bambang Sumadio, pp. xvii-xviii)  
- Substantial reworking was done on the chapters on Srivijaya and Mataram especially about Wangsa Sailendra in Java |
| Volume 3 | - Overall, the changes were quite substantial, but far from the extent of change in Vol. 6. There are chapters or sub-chapters that were added or almost completely re-written. These concerned the processual or chronological parts. Chapters that are ‘structural’ in approach remained the same.  
- The index and bibliography that the 1st edition did not have, have been added.  
- Note: The editor, Uka Tjandrasasmita, noted in the Prakata for the first edition that most of the materials used were secondary sources and thus the book contains a lot of weaknesses. |
| Volume 4 | - The 4th edition is unusual for having Leirissa as the one listed as the editor. As his Prakata explaining thing is dated July 1980, there is a possibility that he was installed as the editor since the 3rd edition (1980).  
- After Vol. 6 and Vol. 3, this volume ranks in terms of the extent of changes.  
- Changes took the form of adding new materials or improving the writing. Of the 4 chapters, 3 chapters experience being enriched with new data. There were certain sub-chapters that were re-written.  
- Suljipto, in his Prakata for the first edition, admits that most of the materials used were secondary. |
| Volume 5 | - Absolutely there was no change in the content of the second edition (he said it was dated 1976 but I think it was 1977), except typographical errors and bibliography.  
- 1984 edition also underwent no meaningful changes. Changes were limited to adding of index and a few editorial changes |

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Volume 6

- First, second and third editions (1975, 1977 and 1980) are very similar.
- The 1984 edition constitutes a total overhaul of previous editions.
- The 1993 edition is in many respects just copied from 1984, but it is also significantly different. More materials and a new volume (Volume 7) was added, specifically just for the New Order period.
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