Ukun Rasik A’an:
Indigenous self-determined development and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste

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Candidate’s Statement of Original Authorship

Except where I have acknowledged assistance with translation, this thesis is entirely my own original work. The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution.

Signature:  
Date:
Acknowledgements

This PhD thesis is dedicated to Indigenous peoples worldwide who are struggling to build radical alternative spaces to achieve Indigenous self-determination. I salute the honesty and bravery of my East Timorese research participants and I dedicate my research to all the people of Timor-Leste who are striving for peaceful transformation in the face of pervasive structural and cultural violence.

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***

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Abstract

After decades of international activism by Indigenous peoples, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration) was endorsed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2007. The Declaration affirms the Indigenous right to self-determination and promotes development as a primary tool to implement this right peacefully and sustainably. My research explores the extent to which the current development system in Timor-Leste can support the implementation of Indigenous self-determination.

Timor-Leste is a conflict-affected Indigenous society with a long history of colonialism and violence. Since 1999, when the East Timorese people exercised their right to self-determination in a UN-sponsored ballot, the country has been impacted by numerous international development and peacebuilding interventions with mixed outcomes.

I specifically appraise perceptions of international development and peacebuilding interventions that have taken place in Timor-Leste since 1999, and undertake a comprehensive complex systems analysis of the root causes of violence and Indigenous peacebuilding practices in Timor-Leste. I argue that the current development system, rather than building peace, creates further structural and cultural violence because it overlooks or does not value or empower Indigenous knowledge systems or peacebuilding practices. I find that international practitioners have structural and cultural barriers that prevent them from engaging with Indigenous knowledge systems.

My research demonstrates that East Timorese people have strong Indigenous knowledge systems, deeply linked to land, place and kinship networks. Indigenous East Timorese people seek to find balance within their complex and plural knowledge systems, which are envisioned as ukun rasik a’an or self-determination and peace.

I used an ethnographic ‘listening’ methodology to undertake field research between 2009 and 2013 with around ninety East Timorese and international development and peacebuilding practitioners, and used abductive methods to analyse this data. Using primary and secondary sources I identify three main themes embedded in Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems:
• Culture / lulik: a plural system of cosmological and secular unity expressed through cultural practices and rituals;
• Power / lisan: a governance system grounded in the balancing of power dynamics through cultural practices; and
• Relationships / slulu: the primacy of localised relationship-based land, place and kinship systems.

Drawing on the experiences of East Timorese and international practitioners I provide guiding principles or practical recommendations for practitioners to use to transform the identified root causes of violence in Timor-Leste and implement Indigenous self-determined development, grounded in free, prior and informed consent. My research contributes to the ongoing critique of development and liberal peacebuilding through the use of complex systems theory and the prioritisation of Indigenous peacebuilding approaches and Indigenous knowledge systems.
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Acronyms

ADB – Asian Development Bank
AIATSIS – Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies
ALNAP – Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ANU – Australian National University
APODETI – Associação Popular Democrática Timorense (Portuguese: East Timorese Popular Democratic Association)
ASDT – Associação Social Democrática Timorense (Portuguese: Timorese Social Democratic Union)
AUD – Australia Dollar
AusAID – Australian Agency for International Development
CAP – Consolidated Appeals Process
CAVR – Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação (Portuguese: Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste)
CDA – Centre for Development Action Collaborative Learning Projects
CEP – Community Empowerment and Local Governance Program (World Bank)
CIVPOL – UN Civilian Police
CNRT – Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense (Portuguese: National Council of East Timorese Resistance)
CRP – Community Reconciliation Process
CRS – Catholic Relief Services
CSOs – civil society organisations
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
DFAT – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFIs – development financial institutions
EITI – Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
F-FDTL – FALINTIL Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (Portuguese: East Timorese Defence Force)
FALINTIL – Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Portuguese: The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
FPIC – Free, prior and informed consent
FRETELIN – Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (Portuguese: Front for an Independent East Timor)
G7+ – a group of twenty conflict-affected developing countries
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GNI – Gross National Income
ICC – Inuit Circumpolar Conference
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP – Internally displaced person
IFC – International Finance Corporation
IGC – International Crisis Group
ILO – International Labour Organization
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INGO – International non-government organisation
INTERFET – International Force in East Timor
ISF – International Stabilisation Force
IWGIA – International Work Group for International Affairs
JSMP – Judicial System Monitoring Program
KDP – Kecamatan Development Program
KOTA – Klibur Oan Timor Assua’in (Portuguese: Association of Timorese Warrior Sons)
KSI – Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute
M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals
MIC – Middle Income Country
MTB-MLE – mother tongue based-multilingual education
NDP – National Development Plan
NDPEAC – National Directorate of Planning and External Assistance Coordination
NGO – Non-Government Organisation
NSP – National Solidarity Program
ODA – Overseas Development Assistance
OECD – Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OPMT – Organização Popular da Mulher Timor (Portuguese: Popular Organisation of Timorese Women)
PDD – Pakote Dezenvolvimentu Desentralizadu (Tetum: Decentralised Development Package)
PDL – Programa Dezenvolvimentu Lokal (Tetum: Local Development Program)
PhD – Doctor of Philosophy
PNDS – Planu Nacional Dezenvolvimentu Suku (Tetum: National Suku Development Plan)
PNG – Papua New Guinea
PNTL – Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (Portuguese: East Timorese national police force)
PRADET – Psychosocial Recovery and Development in East Timor
RDTL – República Democrática de Timor-Leste (Portuguese: Democratic Republic of East Timor)
SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals
SDP – Strategic Development Plan
SUV – sport utility vehicle
TFET – Trust Fund for East Timor
The Declaration – 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The Government – The Government of Timor-Leste or República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL) (Portuguese: Democratic Republic of East Timor)
TNI – Tentara Nacional Indonesia (Indonesian: Indonesian military)
UDI – unilateral declaration of independence
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UN ICCPR – UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
UN ICESCR – UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
UN OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN WGIP – UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations
UN Women – United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNAMET – UN Mission in East Timor
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
UNDRIP – United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA – UN General Assembly
UNMSET – UN Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT – UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOTIL – UN Office in Timor-Leste
UNPFII – UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
UNSCR – UN Security Council Resolution
UNTAET – UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTL – National University of Timor-Leste
US – United States
USD – United States Dollar
UTD – União Democrática Timorense (Portuguese: East Timorese Democratic Union)
Glossary

*adat* (Indonesian: customary law)
*aldeia* (Tetum: hamlet or sub-village)
*arraias* (Portuguese: Indigenous militia)
*assimilados* (Portuguese: assimilated colonial subjects)
*Associação Popular Democrática Timorense* (APODETI) (Portuguese: East Timorese Popular Democratic Association)
*baikeno* (East Timorese mother tongue or local language)
*bandu* (Portuguese: prohibition; customary law or morals)
*barlaki* (Tetum: marriage exchanges)
*bee na’in* (Tetum: custodians of the water)
*biti bo’ot* (Tetum: large mat)
*biti kiik* (Tetum: small mat)
*buah malus* (Tetum: betel nut)
*Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação* (CAVR) (Portuguese: Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste)
*Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense* (CNRT) (Portuguese: National Council of East Timorese Resistance)
*Conselhos de Suku* (Tetum: Village Development Councils)
*daia* (Tetum: midwives, people who can assist women give birth)
*dame* (Tetum: peace)
*dato-lulik* (Tetum: noble who has spiritual authority grounded in ancestral order and values)
*datu* (Tetum: governors)
*ema bo’ot* (Tetum: the powerful)
*ema kbi’it laek* (Tetum: the voice of the powerless)
*FALINTIL Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste* (F-FDTL) (Portuguese: East Timorese Defence Force)
*fataluku* (East Timorese mother tongue or local language)
*feto* (Tetum: female)
*feto hakat klot; mane hakat luan* (Tetum: a woman is born for narrow steps, while a man is born for wide steps)
*fetsa* (Tetum: wife takers)
*Forças Armadas de Timor Leste* (FALINTIL) (Portuguese: Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)
*Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente* (FRETILIN) (Portuguese: Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)
*fulidaidai* (Makaleru: working collectively or together)
*hakawak* (Tetum: working collectively or together)
*hakmatek* (Tetum: stability or quiet, a situation where violence and disorder are absent)
*halerik* (Tetum: the singing or chanting of the suffering)
*heda* (Tetum: pandanus leaves)
*hun* (Tetum: the roots of the tree or source, meaning their ancestors, origins and history)
*indigenas* (Portuguese - people who are Indigenous, local or natives)
*Ita Nia Rai* (Tetum: our land)
*juramentu* (Tetum: binding oath, blood oath or oath of loyalty)
*jus cogens* (Latin: compelling law)
*katuas* (Tetum: customary elder)
*Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute* (KSI) (Tetum: Streams meet to become one river)
*Keluarga Berencana* (Indonesian: Indonesian National Family Planning Programme)
*Klibur Oan Timor Assua’in* (KOTA) (Portuguese: Association of Timorese Warrior Sons) *knua* (Tetum: larger group or clan)
*La’o Hamutuk* (Tetum: walking together)
*lia-nain* (Tetum: owner of words, a customary law expert, spokesperson, responsible for ritual authority and moral behaviour)
*lian inan* (Tetum: mother tongue)
lisan (Tetum: customary governance)
liurai (Tetum: hereditary leaders or ‘lords of the land’)
liurai (Tetum: local hereditary leaders or ‘lords of the land’ responsible for political authority, justice and resource management)
Loromonu (Tetum: West/sunset
Lorosa’e (Tetum: East/sunrise)
lulik (Tetum: sacred knowledge)
malae (Tetum: foreigner)
malisan husi matebian sira (Tetum: curse of the martyrs)
mambai (East Timorese mother tongue or local language)
mane (Tetum: male)
Maromak (Tetum: one who gives light or enlightens)
Maromak Oan (Tetum: Great Lord)
matak inan malirin inan (Tetum: mother of greenness and coolness)
matak-malirin (Tetum-terik: newly green or sprouting - cool)
matan-do’ok (Tetum: soothsayers, people who diagnose illness and use traditional plant medicines)
ambere ou mabere (Mambai: people of the countryside)
amun-alin (Tetum: elder-younger siblings)
Mesticos (Portuguese: a person with mixed Indigenous and European parentage)
moradores or arraias (Portuguese: Indigenous militias)
moris (Tetum: life and the future one seeks)
nacionalismo (Tetum: East Timorese nationalism)
nhe biti (Tetum: stretching or laying down the mat as a means to facilitate consensus, truth-telling or reconciliation)
nobles (Tetum: dato)
Organização Popular da Mulher Timor (OPMT) (Portuguese: Popular Organisation of Timorese Women)
Pakote Dezenvolvementu Desentralizadu (PDD) (Tetum: Decentralised Development Package)
Pakote Referendum (Tetum: Referendum Package)
Partido Trabalhista (Portuguese: Labour Party)
Planu Nasional Dezenvolvementu Suku (PNDS) (Tetum: National Suku Development Plan)
Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) (Portuguese: East Timorese national police force)
posto – now sub distritu (Tetum: sub-district)
Programa Dezenvolvementu Lokal (PDL) (Tetum: Local Development Program)
rai (Tetum: the land one stands on)
rai lulik timor (Tetum: The land is sacred)
rate (Tetum: the graveyard of your kin)
Rede Feto (Tetum: NGO network of Women’s Groups)
República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL) (Portuguese: Democratic Republic of East Timor)
rohan (Tetum: tips of the tree branches, meaning the present or the future)
Rotinohshonn (model of Indigenous self-governance from the knowledge system of the Kahnawake-Mohawk peoples)
sasan lulik (Tetum: ancient relics)
slulu (Mambai: cooperation or working collectively)
suku (Tetum: local level government areas / princedom)
tabula rasa (Latin: blank slate)
tais (Tetum: woven cloth)
tam kalsa (Mambai: put on trousers)
tara (Tetum: to hang up or suspend, often a piece of cloth)
tarabandu (Tetum/Portuguese: set rules and prohibitions)
Tat Felis (Mambai: a Christ-like character whose persecution and suffering has been linked to the struggles to attain East Timorese self-determination)
tempu beia (Tetum: time of the ancestors)
tempu rai-diak (Tetum: a time of tranquility)
Tentara Nacional Indonesia (TNI) (Indonesian: Indonesian military)
terra nullius (Latin: land that belongs to no one)

Tetum – a hybrid language, the common vernacular across Timor-Leste

Tupassi or Topasses (Portuguese: Black Portuguese)

ukun (Tetum: rule or regulate)

ukun rasik a´an (Tetum: self-determination: sovereignty, self-sufficiency and independence)

uma (Tetum: house)

uma fukun (Tetum: sacred house for extended family or clan)

uma kain (Tetum: immediate household)

uma lulik (Tetum: sacred houses)

umamane (Tetum: wife givers)

União Democrática Timorense (UDT) (Portuguese: East Timorese Democratic Union)

Xefe de Aldeia (Tetum: sub-chief)

Xefe de Suku (Tetum: elected chief of the village)
1 Introduction

1.1 The research problem

Worldwide, it is estimated that there are approximately 370 million Indigenous people (IWGIA, 2013). Indigenous peoples experience direct, structural and cultural violence at inter-state, national, community or individual levels. Not all conflict that takes place in Indigenous communities is negative: intra-group conflict is often constructive and necessary to enable change and transformation (Lederach, 2003; 2005a; 2015). However, significant levels of direct, structural and cultural violence exist in Indigenous communities as a result of prior and ongoing forms of colonialism. This violence manifests broadly as forced resettlement; practices of rape, murder and incarceration; the removal of rights; and restricted access to land and resources.

Due to the impacts of colonialism, Indigenous peacebuilding systems are often not able to transform the root causes of violence, so preventing Indigenous communities from meaningfully engaging or actively participating in their own self-determination. This problem is compounded because many Indigenous peoples are governed by non-Indigenous systems and institutions, are often unable to access service delivery and are dislocated from customary structures of law, leadership and decision-making. In this thesis I explore whether space can be found within the current development system to engage in a partnership with Indigenous peoples towards their goal of self-determination. I do this through a case study of Timor-Leste.

Indigenous self-determination is most clearly articulated as a theoretical concept and a legal framework in the 2007 United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration). In the Declaration development is promoted as a primary tool to implement Indigenous self-determination. This is critical because states, the private sector and non-government organisations (NGOs) world-wide are funding development interventions in Indigenous communities worth millions of dollars per annum. These interventions heavily impact on the lives and futures of Indigenous peoples but have not yet achieved the outcomes promised (Rihani, 2002).

Not all conflict or violence that exists in Indigenous communities is caused by development interventions. However, evidence (Easterley, 2006; 2014; Kothari & Minogue, 2002; Moyo, 2009; Rihani, 2002; Ramalingam, 2013) indicates that ineffective international development interventions have negatively affected Indigenous communities by causing and exacerbating existing conflict dynamics. I term this development-related violence, arguing that development, when practiced poorly, can exacerbate the root causes of violence and make development
interventions and their associated impacts both a cause and an effect of violence and instability in Indigenous communities. Evidence also shows that development-related violence has local and global economic, environmental, social, cultural, governance, gender and security impacts for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples (Anderson, 1999; Chand & Coffman, 2008; Collier, 2007; Richmond, 2010; 2015; Westoby & Dowling, 2009).

I argue that the use of the current development system to achieve Indigenous self-determination poses a significant dilemma because the current development system is fundamentally flawed for two main reasons: it does not legitimise or empower Indigenous knowledge systems and it exacerbates violence in Indigenous communities.

Timor-Leste is a conflict-affected society with a long history of colonialism and violence, which has been impacted by many development interventions, with mixed evidence of positive impacts. Since 1999, intra-state violence has continued to affect East Timorese communities. These ongoing high levels of violence underscore the need to examine whether violence is being exacerbated by development interventions. Despite the scope and scale of research about development and peacebuilding effectiveness in Timor-Leste, there is minimal research explicitly linking Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems to violence and development. By exploring how the current development system causes or exacerbates violence in Timor-Leste and the systemic change needed to transform development practice, my research aims to:

- map East Timorese development and peacebuilding goals, and reflect East Timorese and international practitioner views on the current development system and processes that could better achieve these goals;
- assess the extent to which the current development system exacerbates violence or contributes to peacebuilding in Timor-Leste; and
- construct a theoretical framework to better understand Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and apply this framework to support East Timorese development and peacebuilding goals.

This introductory chapter outlines the current research in development, peacebuilding and Indigenous studies and establishes the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the research problem. I examine a number of theoretical approaches and discuss how they are incompatible with this interdisciplinary approach. I discuss the current development system and propose that Indigenous knowledge systems, critical peace studies and complex systems theory can be used to can build a theoretical framework to understand, explore and transform the current development system. This theoretical framework aims to better understand how Indigenous peoples can transform violence, and create self-determined development in their communities.
As each chapter develops, definitions and concepts are examined and explained and the historical context will be provided to locate and frame the issues.

1.2 Peacebuilding, conflict and violence

Peace and conflict studies are the ontological and epistemological foundation of this research. In this section I differentiate conflict from violence and discuss how I engage with the concepts of peacebuilding and human security. I position my research as a contribution to critical peace theory and peacebuilding practice in Timor-Leste.

There are multiple, contested definitions of conflict. I use Lederach’s transformational perspective, where conflict is seen as: “a natural part of human experience and relationships… conflict [is] a valuable opportunity to grow and increases our understanding of ourselves and others” (Lederach, 2003). I agree that conflict can be positive and constructive, enabling societies and individuals to evolve to achieve necessary change and renewal. However, if conflict is not managed appropriately, it may become violent, as has been the primary historical experience of Indigenous peoples (Lederach, 1997; 2005a; 2006).

Using Galtung’s work I differentiate the term ‘conflict’ from ‘violence’. Galtung (1969; 1990; 1996; 2004) sought to understand peace by identifying, differentiating and connecting three fundamental forms of violence – personal or direct violence, cultural and structural violence (see Figure 1). Galtung (2004) explains that personal or direct violence is an event that can manifest visibly as physical, psychological and/or verbal behaviour. Structural violence is an indirect process caused by inequality. It: “comes from the social structure itself – between humans, between sets of humans (societies), between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world” (Galtung, 1996, p.2). Cultural violence is defined as: “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence–exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence” (Galtung, 1990, p.291). Galtung goes on to argue that direct violence reinforces structural and cultural violence and that cultural violence provides legitimising frameworks for direct and structural violence. This triangle of violence is useful because it helps portray the complexity of violence and emphasises the need for conflict transformation that targets violence in all its forms.
In his nuanced definition of violence Galtung (1969, p.190) explains that peace is not merely “the absence of violence”, which he terms negative peace, but that positive peace also includes the absence of structural and cultural violence, which he describes as “the presence of harmony” or the “integration of human society” (1964, p.2). Galtung (1969) describes positive peace as a sustainable situation where inequality, systematic societal disadvantage and the root causes of violence are eliminated. Lederach’s (2006, p.27) focus on conflict transformation positions positive peace as “centered and rooted in the quality of relationships”, where positive peace is not a static end-goal but a continuously dynamic and evolving quality of relationship. I argue that violence is multi-dimensional. It can be structural, political, economic, social, cultural, ethnic, religious, resource-based, gender-based. It is also a multi-tiered concept: violence is inter-woven and can take place simultaneously or separately at macro-, meso- and micro-levels. Violence involves multiple actors with multiple agendas.

In 1992, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992, p.11) introduced the concept of peacebuilding, which he defined as “action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Since then there has been much debate about the scope and definition of peacebuilding. I use the term ‘peacebuilding’ throughout my research to describe the meta-processes used to gain positive peace. I assert that peacebuilding is holistic; it incorporates all stages of conflict at all levels of intervention and it has a long-term focus on sustainably transforming the root causes of violence, particularly structural and cultural violence (Clements, 2004; Lederach, 2005b; 2015; Schirch, 2008). I support Boulding’s (1996, p.39) emphasis that peacebuilders should nurture “cultures of peace” which she defines as “a mosaic of identities, attitudes, values and beliefs, and institutional patterns that lead people to live nurturantly [sic] with one another, deal with difference, share their resources, solve their problems, and give each other space, so no one is harmed and everyone’s basic needs are met”. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation are therefore ongoing and holistic processes that change the socio-economic and cultural conditions that trigger violence; rebuild relationships, institutions and structures that support peace; and aim to
heal past traumas through broad, inclusive and long-term community participation and ownership of these processes (Hunt, 2008a; Lederach, 2015; Spence, 1999).

The concept of human security, which is articulated in the 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report, broadened the concept of violence and insecurity beyond its narrow focus on state or political violence to integrate the comprehensive security needs of individuals and communities (Newman, 2011). The UNDP (1994, pp.23-25) and the international NGO (INGO) Human Security Centre (2005) define human security as economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. They place collective responsibility for human security on all states, international organisations, NGOs, individuals, communities, families and other groups within civil society. I acknowledge the usefulness of the term human security in expanding the current definition of violence, although I acknowledge Suhrke’s (1999) assertion that while human security is progressive, it ultimately perpetuates state-centric understandings of security. In Chapters Five and Six I analyse violence by including threats to human security in Timor-Leste. Unless otherwise stated I will use the term ‘violence’ throughout this thesis to denote both human insecurity and direct, cultural and structural violence.

I agree with my East Timorese colleague Antero da Silva (2012, p.18) who underlines that post-conflict peacebuilding or a process of “re-conscientisation” must occur to prevent further instability. He suggests providing communities with safe spaces to share their stories and to enable true healing, to recreate societal links, and to bear witness to the suffering and bravery of East Timorese women and men during Indonesian occupation. The isolation caused by the Indonesian occupation and the ensuing collective trauma means that very few East Timorese have been able to develop their own understandings of positive peace in Timor-Leste. Jabri (1996, p.154) agrees, noting that communities emerging from protracted conflict and violence require the development of “a conception of peace that challenges war as a social continuity”. Candio and Bleiker (2001, p.71), Lederach (1996, p.20), Spence (1999) and Westoby and Dowling (2009) concur claiming that it is in the personal and community-level domains where peacebuilding transformation emerges to deal with grief, trauma, loss, fear and anger resulting from violence.

A peacebuilding focus is important because ongoing intra-state violence continues to affect Timor-Leste. Chapters Four to Eight will detail the broad scope of direct, structural and cultural violence currently occurring across all communities in Timor-Leste. Collier (et.al., 2003) asserts that around half of all states emerging from conflict have reoccurring violence within the ten years after the initial conflict ceases. The World Bank (2011a, p.10) found that on average states take between fifteen and thirty years, a full generation, to transition out of conflict and to build
resilience, and the World Bank (2004) reports that countries coming out of conflict face a forty per cent chance of relapsing within the first five years of peace. Chand and Coffman (2008) indicate that given the levels of violence experienced and other factors, development practitioners may be engaged in Timor-Leste until 2026. Considering Timor-Leste’s violent history, the social and economic development achieved so far in Timor-Leste is remarkably positive, however, I will argue that the ongoing intra-state violence is a major barrier to further development and peace.

At the heart of the challenge of achieving positive peace is the need to understand and transform the complex root causes of violence (Lederach, 1996; 2015). While there have been some useful contributions from East Timorese researchers and practitioners (Babo-Soares, 2003; 2004; da Silva, 2012; Trindade, 2006; 2008; 2014) and others (Belun, International Crisis Group (ICG) and The Asia Foundation) to building understanding, there are no comprehensive studies that investigate the root causes of direct, cultural and structural violence in Timor-Leste. Nor is there existing research that uses Indigenous critical theory to examine peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. My research aims to fill this gap by investigating the ways in which social institutions are built, sustained and changed by conflict; how conflict changes relationships between Indigenous peoples and international development practitioners; and how these patterns affect the way people understand and respond to conflict. I do this by analysing violence in Timor-Leste through an Indigenous critical theory lens and by providing a space for East Timorese to discuss and analyse their experiences of violence and to suggest practical solutions for conflict transformation.

1.3 Indigenous critical theory and complex systems theory

This section positions my research within two different but, I argue, connected theoretical approaches: Indigenous critical theory – which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Three – and complex systems theory, which I engage with throughout this thesis. I discuss the current development system and differentiate it from my concept of Indigenous self-determined development.

In this thesis, ‘Western’ is identified as the positivist, ahistorical liberal-democratic, market-economy doctrine, dominant to most states, that has extended its influence throughout the world. I refer to this as the current or modern system that dominates international development. This tradition is dominant, in loose geographic terms, in North America, Europe/Scandinavia and Australia/New Zealand. Non-Western states, including states from the Arab Gulf, Africa, North and East Asia and Central and South America, are included as actors in this current development system.
1.3.1 Indigenous critical theory


Critical theory is a trans-disciplinary project used within Indigenous studies to emancipate and liberate Indigenous knowledge systems, to overcome dominant power structures, and to achieve societal transformation and Indigenous self-determination (Horkheimer, 1972; 1993; Nakata et.al., 2012). I believe that applying critical theory to Indigenous studies can expose hidden power relationships and the hierarchy of knowledge systems in the current development systems. Indigenous critical theory opens up the existing dialogues to better understand and articulate Indigenous differences; exposing new ways of seeing old challenges and providing a deeper understanding of the power dynamics with the systems Indigenous peoples engage with. I use Indigenous critical theory as a tool to envision pluralist alternatives to transform complex violence in Indigenous communities.

Smith (1999, p.95) seeks to decolonise the current hierarchies of knowledge systems which problematise Indigenous peoples, invalidating their knowledge so that they have “no solutions to their own problems”. By “decolonising the academy” and aligning Indigenous research with Indigenous activism Smith (1999, pp.218,226) creates spaces for knowledge regeneration and radical resistance where Indigenous peoples can “talk back to or talk up to power”. Nakata et.al. (2012, p.124) also proposes that Indigenous scholars should engage in “de-colonial knowledge-making”. Nakata et.al., (2012, p.127) explain that Western knowledge seeks to reinstate Indigenous worldviews in a way that is simplistic and counter-productive, and can lead to binary dichotomies that do not acknowledge “dynamically adapting cultural practices”. This simplistic form of Indigenous studies is risky, as it reduces Indigenous knowledge to versions of
authenticity, and fails to recognise the pluralism of modern Indigenous ontologies that are actively engaged with, not separate from, modernism and colonialism. I agree with Smith and Nakata that Indigenous scholars must do more than contest Western knowledge frameworks, they should also create new complex analytical frameworks and nuanced language to help frame new paths for Indigenous knowledge.

The pluralism of Indigenous knowledge systems results in distinctly different approaches to self-determination for each Indigenous nation and individual. As Graham (2013a; 2013b) states, Indigenous peoples are located in multiple places throughout the world. These locations give rise to multiple dreamings and laws and therefore, multiple truths and perspectives. Indigenous scholars such as Alfred (1999; 2015), Corntassel (2008; 2009; 2012), Graham (1999; 2013a; 2013b), Nakata (1997; 2007; 2012) Rigney (1999; 2001; 2006) and Smith (1999; 2007a; 2007b) provide examples of unique governance and decision-making frameworks based on their own Indigenous knowledge systems. This research aims to value these multiple ontologies, and by practically applying them to their related contexts will continue to transform knowledge generation and decision-making in Indigenous communities. I note that it is impossible to translate one Indigenous knowledge system into another context. Theoretically that would equate all Indigenous ontologies as homogenous, which is not the case. In my research I apply Indigenous critical theory to the Timor-Leste context but do not seek to take Indigenous East Timorese knowledge out of context.

1.3.2 Complex systems theory

Complex systems theory is a way of understanding relationships between structures and behaviours. Complex systems are everywhere: they are integrated, interconnected, and self-organising, and understanding their intrinsic problems is at the root of restructuring or transforming the system itself (Meadows, 2008). Understanding and applying systems theory to real world problems allows us to “restructure the systems we live within…[and] leverage points for change” (Meadows, 2008, p.6). Systems theory is also a tool increasingly being used by peacebuilding practitioners in international organisations such as CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) and the Innovation Lab on Dynamical Systems Theory, Peace and Conflict1, who are applying dynamic systems theory to transform violence (Chigas & Woodrow, 2013; Körppen et.al., 2011; Ricigliano & Chigas, 2011). These practitioners explore how systems

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1 The Advanced Consortium on Cooperation Conflict and Complexity (AC4), the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution at Columbia University, The Institute of World Affairs at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University are participating in the Innovation Lab on Dynamical Systems Theory, Peace and Conflict. See: http://conflictinnovationlab.org
theory can help to identify patterns of behavior, decision, and interaction in multiple complex conflict scenarios.

I draw on Chigas and Woodrow (2013), Meadows (2008), Ramalingam (2013), Rihani (2002), Woodrow and Chigas (2011) and the work of Körppen et.al. (2011) to apply dynamic systems theory to understand poly-centric and non-linear Indigenous knowledge systems. Systems theory is a tool for examining how multiple decisions, behaviours and complex institutions change over time to affect outcomes. This tool provides ways of mapping power and relationships in a way that is non-hierarchical, non-linear and dynamic. My research aims to demonstrate that systems theory is useful for researchers and practitioners who are engaging with information that is both complex and plural, and form synergies with – rather than dominate – Indigenous knowledge systems.

Using complex systems theory allows me to compare Indigenous and non-Indigenous knowledge systems and experiences in the same context. This is why my research participants include both international development practitioners who have worked in Timor-Leste and many other development contexts over many years and East Timorese development practitioners. This broad cross-section of individual stories and experiences contributes to building patterns across multiple contexts using qualitative evidence. The current development system is analysed in Chapter Four; East Timorese knowledge systems in Chapter Six; and in Chapter Seven and Eight I use this complex systems approach to seek broader patterns of violence and peacebuilding across Timor-Leste.

One of the aims of Indigenous research methodologies is to transform knowledge generation. My research is only a small contribution to the building wave of Indigenous and non-Indigenous academics pursuing Indigenous cross-disciplinary studies and applying Indigenous critical methodologies to achieve knowledge pluralism in the (Western-dominated) academy and the wider community. My Indigenous critical theory and complex systems theory approach aims to analyse data to provide tools to rethink how Indigenous knowledge systems are generated, shared and applied. While there are limitations to the methodology used, I hope that my contribution expands the reader’s appreciation of the range and breadth of Indigenous critical theory.

1.4 Current development system

My research applies complex systems theory to the current development system. The current development system is grounded in modernisation and is characterised by liberal democratisation, property rights, market externalities, state territoriality and ethnocentric
individualism. This system seeks to resolve fundamental queries concerning justice, equality and power and uses linear, mechanistic models to find solutions to these complex challenges. Rihani (2002) and Ramalingam (2013) contend that applying complex systems theory helps us understand that the current development system is non-linear, interconnected, multi-dimensional and adaptive. They highlight that linear, mechanistic models cannot adequately encompass the scope of the challenges provided. Lennie and Tacchi (2013, p.58) use Rihani (2002, pp.80-81) to demonstrate that development is a global system with the following behaviours:

- “Active internal elements that have enough requisite variety that they can adapt to unforeseen circumstances;
- System elements are lightly, but not sparsely connected;
- Simple rules maintain global patterns, as opposed to rigid order and chaos; and
- Variations result in minor changes, but it is impossible to predict future outcomes”.

Many Indigenous communities and civil society, bilateral, multilateral and private sector organisations are trying to use the current development system to implement Indigenous self-determination. I argue that this is a fraught process based on an incorrect assumption that the current development system has the capacity to understand or integrate Indigenous knowledge systems. Rihani (2002, p.xv) asserts that new worldviews or theories will be required to engage in a necessary paradigm shift where development practitioners must “discard an inbuilt structure of beliefs and assumptions”. In Chapter Three I assert that an Indigenous critical theory approach could provide a radical alternative worldview, with context-specific models, to challenge the beliefs and assumptions implicit within the current development system. I examine the current development system further in Chapter Four.

1.4.1 Indigenous self-determined development

I posit that the ultimate goal of Indigenous peoples is Indigenous self-determination. While Indigenous self-determination is not easily defined, and the goals are different for different Indigenous peoples, I use the Declaration as a tool to frame and analyse Indigenous self-determination throughout this thesis:

Article 3: Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.

At some key points, the Declaration cites development as a primary tool to implement Indigenous self-determination. The Declaration guides the practical steps necessary to realise this goal in different contexts, much of which relies on working within the current development system.
system. In this thesis I argue that current development system is not effectively achieving Indigenous self-determination, and propose that if development is to be used to achieve Indigenous self-determination it needs to be a new form of development, grounded in Indigenous knowledge. I draw on Dodson and Smith (2003), Hemming and Rigney (2012), Hemming et.al. (2011), Hunt et.al. (2008) and Nuttall (2008) to propose that the term ‘Indigenous self-determined development’ should be used to describe this form of development that is owned and enacted by empowered Indigenous peoples. Indigenous self-determined development promotes the primacy of Indigenous peoples as responsible custodians of their land, resources, culture, spirituality and governance.

The right to Indigenous self-determination and development is a complex theoretical issue, discussed at length by Anaya (1994), Behrendt (2003), Corntassel (2008), Davis (2008a), Dodson (1994; 1999), Engel (2010), Venne (2011) and Watson (2011a; 2011b; 2014). These rights are often viewed as problematic and polarising; Indigenous knowledge systems are seen as hostile to modernisation, liberal democracy and economic growth, ideas that underpin the current development system (U-1800-031010). For example, Indigenous peoples simultaneously hold multiple communal and individual rights. I posit that the current development system is often unable to manage the complexity of incorporating these multiple layers of rights or prioritising Indigenous communal rights.

At the heart of Indigenous self-determined development is the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) (UN General Assembly, 2007; Ward, 2011, p.55). Nuttall (2008, p.70) contends: “Self-determination is also about the right to development and, based on the rights of people to govern themselves, it is about the right to make decisions and choices that determine the path development should take”. Development, Indigenous self-determined development and FPIC are discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

Using critical peace theory I also link the goal of Indigenous self-determination and self-determined development with positive peace, which is a process and an end goal with no direct, structural or cultural violence (Galtung, 1964; Lederach, 2006). I argue that Indigenous self-determination cannot be achieved due to the pervasive existence of violence in Indigenous communities. I posit that any version of self-determination that does not directly address threats and triggers to violence can produce violent outcomes. My research therefore examines the rationale and processes of transforming violence using Indigenous knowledge systems and Indigenous self-determined development.

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2 My system of referencing interviews is discussed in Chapter Two. To maintain anonymity, each interviewee is coded. For example, U-1800-031010 indicates a participant whose interview took place at 18:00 hours on 3 October 2010.
1.5 Other theoretical approaches

This section highlights the hierarchy of Indigenous and modern knowledge systems that result in continued structural violence toward Indigenous peoples. I examine some non-Indigenous theoretical approaches, particularly post-colonialism, post-structuralism, liberal rights, critical cultural studies, liberal peacebuilding and hybridity theories that have been used to describe aspects of the Indigenous experience. I show that these theories are challenged by Indigenous knowledge systems that more usefully enable and empower Indigenous peoples’ to prioritise their worldviews and experiences.

1.5.1 Post-colonial theory

Indigenous knowledge systems are different from post-colonial theory that, as Seth (2000, p.218) explains is an intellectual discipline that “arose in the West, and which takes its bearings from landmarks in the Western intellectual tradition”. Post-colonialism does have some common ground with Indigenous knowledge systems by explaining some of the historical power and identity dynamics; however, as a theoretical approach used to understand Indigeneity, post-colonialism is limited. As Hart (cited in Murphy, 2000, p. 31) argues: “Post-colonialism merely represents another calibration of politics that nomadically hunts and gathers inside the discursive landscape established by colonialism and the dispossession of the invaded” [my emphasis].

History has shown that colonialism took place through widespread and sanctioned practices of homicide, sexual abuse, disease and starvation, combined with an influx of external migration and exclusion from essential services. Through these practices, the Indigenous space is usurped by a brand of colonialism that promotes Western hegemony and epistemic violence (Wolfe, 1999). Wolfe (1999) argues that post-colonialism is pervasively Eurocentric; a narcissistic projection of the Western will to power. He differentiates between post-colonialism that arises from majority Indigenous populations asserting change in the context of forced labour and minority coloniser dependency, and settler colonialism, where Indigenous peoples are displaced or replaced to gain value from natural resources and land (Wolfe, 1999). Settler colonialism was supported by the doctrine of terra nullius (Latin: land that belongs to no-one), which asserted that the lands, waters and territories were not privately or collectively owned, and settlers who could cultivate land had the right to own it (Watson, 2014).
Since the middle of the twentieth century, states have (mostly) halted their colonialist expansion. However, scholars argue that through new institutions and structures, forms of neo-colonialism continue to evolve across the world, most prominently in settler colonial contexts (Fanon, 1967, 1963; Nkrumah, 1965). In these contexts, neo-colonialism has been and is categorised by systemic direct, structural and cultural violence against Indigenous peoples. Post-colonialism only explains part of the East Timorese experience as a result of Portuguese and Indonesian occupation. I categorise Timor-Leste as a neo-colonial state and I will draw on useful post-colonial concepts of welfare colonialism and co-option, described further in Chapter Three, to expand on the experience of Indigenous East Timorese.

### 1.5.2 Post-structuralism

Post-structuralism proposes that deconstruction can assist with a re-reading of colonial history. De Saussure (1993 [1917]), Derrida (1978; 2004) and Foucault (1970) indicate that a binary opposition exists within all cultures. This series of oppositions is the basis of all thought, text and language where, by indicating good/evil or violence/peace, one term is favoured over the other and a preference or hierarchy is set. Oppositions within society create the illusion of truths and structures and this limits the capacity for cultures to change and transform (Devetak, 2013). The process of deconstruction examines this hierarchy and undertakes “a critical operation by which such oppositions can be partially undermined” (Sarup, 1989, p.40).

Deconstruction highlights the binary oppositions within culture to emancipate the repressed, “the other”, and to form a politics of difference (Young, 1995; 1999). Derrida (1978) subverted hierarchies of privilege and marginalisation by interpreting terms in a non-hierarchical manner and without any stable central meaning. Post-structuralists believe that deconstruction shows there are no ultimate or correct paths for cultural evolution. Indeed truth is “nothing but a set of congealed or frozen metaphors whose metaphorical status has been mistaken for the literal” (Nietzsche in Deleuze, 1995, p.58). Anything is possible and all discourse is relative (Nietzsche, 1968).

Foucault (1970) scrutinised power and proposed that we deconstruct ourselves from the dominant discourse within our culture to see the alternative possibilities of human behaviour. Using this method researchers can explore the hierarchical “binary opposition” that is constructed between dominant modern Western and Indigenous notions of power, legitimacy and authority (Brigg, 2008; Derrida, 1978; Doxtater, 2004; Nietschmann, 1994, p.228). Post-structuralism also shows us that in Western political spaces, relationships are defined either by assimilation or by eradication of the Other by the Self (Day, 2001; O’Hagan, 2004). These destructive relationships have been illustrated in the violent historical experience of Indigenous
peoples, including forced resettlement, practices of cultural genocide, rape, murder, incarceration, and removal of rights and access to land and resources.

Indigenous critical theory can certainly draw on post-structuralism to break down the binary hierarchies inherent in neo- and post-colonialism. Post-structuralism also supports Indigenous emancipation and endorses a politics of difference. Where Indigenous critical theory differs from post-structuralism is in the pluralism of Indigenous knowledge systems, which create a layering of lived truths and identities. Indigenous peoples can draw on post-structuralism, but ultimately Indigenous knowledge systems provide more holistic structures to understand themselves and their communities.

1.5.3 Critical cultural studies

In the past twenty years, peace research and practice has increasingly acknowledged the importance of Indigenous approaches to peacebuilding and the role of culture in conflict transformation (Avruch and Black, 1991; Brigg, 2008; 2010; Brigg and Muller, 2009; Lederach, 1996). Lorenz (1966) and Weber (1946) argue that violence is inherent in the discourse of Western culture and that humans instinctively assume this aggressive behavioural pattern, and support and propagate it through institutions and norms that have been set in place. They believe that violence is not necessarily a ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ discourse, it is merely an outcome of cultural evolution, and change will not necessarily mean that non-violent behaviour would become the dominant discourse. This pessimistic view of human nature is supported by Freud (1961), Hobbes (1651), Lorenz (1966) and Wilson (1975). I disagree with Lorenz and Weber’s assessments that violence is inherent in Western or any other culture because it does not take into account evidence from Barash (1991), Bonta (1993), Galtung (1990), Giorgi (1999), Kropotkin (1914) and Lederach (1997) that many cultures are inherently non-violent and cooperative. Lederach (1997; 2005a) and Spence and McLeod (2002) also assert the importance of working toward long-term peacebuilding processes that support non-violent cultures.

I posit that alterity of behaviour is possible through an understanding of culture, and culture holds the key to changing conflict behaviour and building peace (Avruch & Black, 1991). Devetak (2013), Brigg (2008), Etzioni (1993; 2010) and Young (1995) state that culture originates in the discourse between power and knowledge and they suggest that using the philosophical tool of deconstruction and the politics of difference, humans can emancipate the limits of possible discourse and enact more inclusive, less structurally homogenising patterns of behaviour. Brigg (2008, p.14) specifies that Indigenous knowledge can provide “ways of knowing and relating to others across difference” and that scholars and practitioners can take a relational approach to culture that connects across difference. These theorists position culture,
power and relationships as fundamental to understanding and transforming violence and these three key concepts continue as primary themes throughout my thesis.

Within my research I view culture as publicly constructed; fluid and flexible; connecting individuals and communities to their histories, present and futures; and central to ontological and epistemological frameworks. Geertz (1973, pp.5,52) explains culture as “webs of significance” with “systems of meaning” that are created by and are the collective property of a group of peoples. Culture is mostly implicit and unexamined, yet Morphy (2014, p.3) underlines that culture also conditions and constrains possibilities for action. Culture includes the knowledge systems that produce art, music and artefacts and the beliefs and values that create patterns for behaviour. Drawing on Geertz (1973; 1994) I use Morphy’s (2014, p.2) definition that frames culture as a complex, adaptive system:

“Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other as conditioning elements of further action” [Morphy’s emphasis].

1.5.4 Liberal rights theory


Corntassel (2007; 2008), Davis (2008a; 2008b; 2012), Engel (2010), Venne (2011) and Watson (2011a; 2014) and others underline that the liberal rights and the Declaration are state-centric tools, only legitimising Indigenous self-determination within the limiting power of the state. Day (2001, p.173) sees Tully’s approach as possible “only at the expense of excluding dissenting voices from the intercultural dialogue”. Day argues that Western liberal multiculturalism is flawed because it does not seek to engage in dialogical interaction, but only in finite goals of a coherent identity (Day, 2001; Fleras & Kunz, 2001). Multiculturalism indicates that each state’s power and legitimacy lies within the recognition of the superiority of Western, non-Indigenous structures of governance and concepts of self-determination and self-governance; and the accommodation within the Western top-down organisational model of governance (Minh-ha, 1995; Murphy, 2000; Wilmer, 1993).
Turner (2006, p.42) emphasises this inequality of political power in his critique of Cairns and Kymlicka’s liberal rights theories noting that they consider the sovereignty of the state as non-negotiable and that “many if not most Aboriginal people see themselves as...citizens of an indigenous nation in addition to (and often prior to) being citizens of Canada”. Turner (2006, pp.73,9) agrees that liberal rights theorists constrain Indigenous peoples to explain their knowledge systems within modern political cultures, but that this effort is doomed to failure unless Indigenous knowledge systems are “viewed as legitimate” because “the normative source of indigenous difference lies in indigenous philosophy”. The modern state’s legitimacy over Indigeneity is also maintained by liberal rights theory and Minh-ha’s “logocentric naming and objectivising”, which classifies Indigenous peoples as marginal under the guise of multiculturalism (Minh-ha, 1995, p.216).

1.5.5 Liberal peacebuilding

Since the early 1990s international peacebuilding efforts have largely been attempts to impose liberal peacebuilding, which is grounded in liberal rights theory. Liberal peacebuilding is characterised by liberal democracy, cosmopolitan individualism, the rule of law, human rights, civil society, market-based economic growth, development and elite governance. It is usually associated with peacebuilding models that are top-down, state-centric, conditional, and that prioritise elite agreements, peacekeeping, mediation, and negotiation (Chandler, 2004; Paris, 2010; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007; Newman et.al. 2009; Richmond & Franks, 2007, 2008). Liberal peacebuilding prioritises immediate peace dividends, rapid reconstruction, demobilisation and reemployment of combatants (Suhrke et.al., 2005).

The record of liberal peacebuilding has been disappointing (Campbell et.al., 2011; Mac Ginty 2008; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2010; 2005). The failure of these models to create positive peace in so many different contexts from Kosovo to South Sudan has led to a broad range of criticisms. Richmond and Franks (2007, pp.30,46) and Richmond (2005) explain that liberal peacebuilding has resulted in a “virtual peace”, a situation where liberal hubris, local co-option and elite power politics are created by the wholesale transplanting of dominant Western ideals, without the necessary Indigenous ownership. There is heavy criticism of the international institutions and actors engaged in liberal peacebuilding.

Paris (2010, p.338) points out that elements of liberal peacebuilding remain important, including the obligations of international actors to support peacebuilding and the need to support non-elite actors’ involvement in peacebuilding. I agree that these are significant issues, and I believe there remains an vital role and a mandate for international actors to support
peacebuilding in complex contexts, particularly in post-colonial contexts where these international actors have actively perpetrated violence. Paris (2010, p.340), however, also argues that liberal critiques that call for increases in local-level capacities for peace are merely variations of liberal peace, and that there is “no realistic alternative to some form of liberal peacebuilding strategy”. I disagree with Paris, and aim to demonstrate throughout my research the legitimacy and power of Indigenous peacebuilding practices.

Mac Ginty (2008) argues that while liberal peace theorists are interested in using Indigenous conflict transformation practices, the structural power of ‘Western’ peacebuilding limits the space for these ‘alternative’ approaches. He explains that Indigenous conflict transformation approaches are being co-opted into liberal peacebuilding instead of being viewed as separate legitimate approaches. I agree with Mitchell (2009, p.667) who observes that liberal peacebuilding could: “replace ‘traditional’ forms of conflict not only with peaceful activity, but also with forms of structural conflict embedded in transformative processes and the ethics that drive them”. I agree with Grenfell (2012), MacGinty (2008), Mitchell (2009) and Richmond (2010; 2005) and seek to demonstrate that liberal peacebuilding in Timor-Leste has either co-opted or rejected Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices, resulting in “violent peace” where ongoing direct, structural and cultural violence continue to occur (Dewhurst, 2008).

1.5.6 Hybridity

Hybridity emerged as a critique of liberal peacebuilding, which sought to value local peacebuilding approaches but, as I will argue, has not managed to overcome its own limitations. Internationally, Indigenous peoples are currently engaging in a mix of two or more unclear and unstructured governance systems. This is often described as hybridity (Bhabha, 1994; Clements et.al., 2007; Pieterse, 2000; 2015; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). Pieterse (2000) articulates hybridity as a form of social evolution that could frame development beyond a Western or Eurocentric narrative in favour of transnationalism. Wulf (2007, p.8) notes that in hybrid political systems both “traditional” non-state and “modern” state actors are integrated into the governance system in an attempt at inclusivity. These actors each play key roles both in perpetrating violence and in conflict transformation and governance. Boege (2007, pp.1-5) describes “hybrid political orders”, where the post-colonial state is opened up to Indigenous permeation, with potentially disintegrative outcomes. In hybrid political orders, non-Indigenous structures dominate the hierarchy, distorting and disintegrating already fractured Indigenous structures (Boege et.al., 2008; Brown et.al., 2010; Richmond, 2009).

Mac Ginty (2010, p.403) refers to “hybrid peace” as a distorted form of liberal peace that is influenced by Indigenous knowledge and constituencies. He explains that hybrid peace is in “a
constant state of flux”, as local actors cooperate, resist, ignore or subvert liberal peacebuilding. Richmond (2015) further explains that hybrid peace, by failing to resolve the contradictions between local and international norms reiterates colonial epistemologies and results in a negative peace that perpetuates cultural and structural violence. Dinnen and Kent (2015, p.2) explain that hybridity, when used prescriptively, can “romanticise the local” and “hollow out already weak states”. They assert that even though the concept of hybridity is meant to overcome binaries, it can create a problematic binary between global and local, or modern and Indigenous, without acknowledging their interconnectedness.

Boege et.al. (2009), Brown and Gusmão (2009), Cummins (2014), Cummins and Leach (2012), Grenfell (2012), Grenfell and Winch (2014), Laakso (2007), Richmond (2011), Richmond and Franks (2008) and Wallis (2012) discuss liberal peacebuilding and hybridity in Timor-Leste. In Timor-Leste this is seen as dominant Western liberal state-centric institutions sitting uneasily over Indigenous systems, structures and processes. Wallis (2012) asserts that Timor-Leste is a good example of liberal and hybrid peacebuilding in practice. She explains that the failures of the post-1999 institutionalisation of liberal peacebuilding by the UN and other international organisations meant that the state sought to increasingly engage in liberal-local hybrid peacebuilding practices. I seek to evaluate these practices of liberal peacebuilding throughout this research.

I follow Bhabha (1994), Brigg and Bleiker (2011), Dinnen and Kent (2015), Grenfell (2012), Mac Ginty (2008), Mitchell (2011) and Richmond (2009; 2010; 2011; 2015) in their criticisms of liberal and hybrid peace theory. I argue that liberal peacebuilding and hybridity, because they are grounded in modernity and liberalism, do not go far enough in opening space to legitimise and empower Indigenous conflict transformation. Efforts toward hybridity have often been too simplistic or prescriptive to challenge liberal peacebuilding. Perhaps hybridity can usefully assess the peacebuilding challenges of Indigenous peoples existing within modern state structures, but liberal and hybrid peacebuilding processes tend to focus on theoretical frameworks and tools that are inadequate in transforming complex conflicts in Indigenous communities. Indigenous critical theorists (Alfred, 1999; Alfred & Wilmer, 1997; Turner, 2006) acknowledge that hybridity often idealises and essentialises Indigenous knowledge systems. At the same time, Indigenous conflict transformation practices are under extreme pressure by liberal peacebuilding to modernise (Boege et al., 2008; Brigg, 2008; Richmond, 2015, p.52). I would add that neither liberal or hybrid peacebuilding has truly engaged with or prioritised Indigenous knowledge systems.

I have summarised above some important theoretical approaches used by scholars to engage with and explain Indigenous peoples experiences of development and violence. While I
acknowledge that elements of these approaches are useful, they do not encompass the pluralism or the complexity of Indigenous knowledge systems. In Chapter Three I will discuss further my use of Indigenous critical theory in my research.

1.6 Thesis Outline

In Chapter Two I detail the research methods used and the theories underpinning them. I explain the data collection ‘listening’ methodology used during the field study to target discussions with East Timorese and international development practitioners. I also report on the Feedback Workshops I conducted in Timor-Leste to discuss my research findings. I describe my use of grounded theory and abduction analysis to analyse the qualitative data and build my theoretical framework. I describe the ethical processes necessary to undertake field research with Indigenous peoples and outline some of the difficulties encountered in the field and the limitations of the method and dataset.

In Chapter Three I identify East Timorese as Indigenous people with distinct lands and territories, shared cultural, ethno-linguistic and historical experiences. I argue that, in line with Indigenous theorists including Alfred (1999; 2015), Corntassel (2007; 2008; 2012), Garroutte (2003), Graham (1999; 2013a; 2013b), Nakata (1997; 2004; 2007) and Smith (1999), Indigenous critical theory and Indigenous knowledge systems should be prioritised when seeking solutions to the complex challenges facing Indigenous peoples. This chapter will provide a detailed examination of Indigenous critical theory, locating this as a broad, interdisciplinary body of knowledge that allows for flexibility to discuss Indigenous self-determination. I position Indigenous critical theory as both a practical and theoretical response to the challenge of achieving Indigenous self-determined development. I survey the history of Indigenous internationalism and the importance of this political movement in articulating Indigenous rights within the Declaration. I argue that the Declaration has limitations because it is created within, and defined through, modern state-centric processes. These constraints aside, I maintain that the Declaration is a valuable international legal tool as it contains the most current and comprehensive description of Indigenous self-determination.

The Declaration asserts that development can facilitate Indigenous self-determination. Chapter Four investigates the historical and current approaches of international practitioners and organisations to determine how, and to what extent these mechanisms engage Indigenous peoples and facilitate Indigenous self-determined development. This includes an investigation of the policy and programming interventions within the current development system. I also explore the potential within the current development system to exacerbate structural violence, which I term “development-related violence”. Through an examination of these relationships I
map how current development systems processes, structures and institutions act to cause or exacerbate violence. I argue that the current potential for development interventions to cause and contribute to violence can result in negative or negligible development outcomes and thus reduce the ability for Indigenous peoples to achieve self-determination. To do this I scrutinise the relationships between the República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL) (Portuguese: Democratic Republic of East Timor) (the Government) and its citizens, and external development stakeholders, such as bilateral donors, multilateral organisations, development financial institutions (DFIs), private sector, and civil society organisations (CSOs).

Chapter Five begins with an overarching history of Timor-Leste, with a focus on pre-colonialism, Portuguese colonialism, civil war and invasion, Indonesian occupation and the UN administration until independence in 2002. It focuses on building an understanding of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge and governance systems and how they have changed over time. I then review the broader conflict and security environment, with a particular focus on challenges to the security sector, the 2006–2008 crisis and ongoing intra-state violence. By focusing on the complex history of Timor-Leste I identify the root causes of intra-state and intra-community violence. This evidence shows that Timor-Leste is experiencing high levels of existing intra-state violence linked to a complex web of unresolved historical violence and violence that has arisen post-1999.

Chapter Six presents a comprehensive examination of Indigenous knowledge systems in Timor-Leste. I begin with an analysis of Indigenous peacebuilding practices in Timor-Leste. These practices emphasise that Timor-Leste has a long history of effective conflict transformation based on their Indigenous knowledge systems and these practices continue to be actively used across Timor-Leste. I assert that there are multiple ethno-linguistic peoples and different historical experiences across Timor-Leste resulting in a pluralism of Indigenous knowledge systems with differing identities and cultural practices. I then scrutinise Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems through a comprehensive framework that examines culture, power and relationships to better understand what this knowledge looks like and how it is connected to violence and peacebuilding. In the section on culture or *lulik* (Tetum: sacred knowledge) I expand on sacred houses and localised identities, languages and land and belonging. Under power, or *lisan* (Tetum: customary governance) I review decentralised governance, leadership and elitism, gender equality, education and choice and consent. Finally, I investigate how relationships or *slulu* (Mambai: cooperation or working collectively) are formed and sustained in Timor-Leste.

Chapter Seven reports the results of field research conducted in Timor-Leste between 2009 and 2015. I evaluate, from the perspective of the East Timorese participants, whether, and how, East
Timorese knowledge systems and goals of self-determination are incorporated into the current development system in Timor-Leste. I use the Indigenous systems framework (culture, power, relationships) to analyse the data from my fieldwork in Timor-Leste. I provide suggestions, from East Timorese who participated in my field research, about how the current development system could more effectively incorporate, legitimise and empower Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems to achieve self-determined development. Within this chapter I use three case studies to expand on the failures and successes of development interventions in Timor-Leste. The case studies provide examples from East Timorese participants of how international development practitioners can engage with Indigenous East Timorese knowledge in their development practice.

In Chapter Eight I analyse the findings of my field research with international development practitioner participants working in Timor-Leste and other development contexts. I use the framework to access whether and how these practices exacerbate existing violence in Timor-Leste. I use this information to document and assess the range of systemic failures that exacerbate violence and prevent international practitioners from prioritising Indigenous East Timorese knowledge in their work.

In my final chapter I analyse the fieldwork findings of both the East Timorese and international development practitioners and frame these findings as guiding principles to explain how the current development system can work to transform violence and achieve Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste. I discuss how these recommendations could be implemented effectively across different Indigenous contexts and suggest future research possibilities.

1.7 Conclusion

Indigenous critical theorists assert that differentiated citizenship rights and multiculturalism (citizenship theory), diverse liberalism (liberal minority rights and citizenship theory), state power and authenticity notions (post-colonial and post-structural theory), or forms of democratic liberal states (liberal peacebuilding and hybridity) do not construct political spaces that give equality, power, authority and legitimacy to Indigenous knowledge systems or Indigenous self-determination (Alfred, 1999; 2015; Corntassel, 2007; 2008; Day, 2001; Garroutte, 2003; Minh-ha, 1995; Murphy, 2000; 2002; Smith, 1999; Turner, 2006).

I suggest that Indigenous knowledge systems are a useful tool to differentiate and map the power relationships between structures, institutions and agents in the modern development system. I conclude that using non-Indigenous frameworks to understand and empower
Indigenous peoples perpetuates structural violence and does not provide Indigenous peoples with relevant tools and frameworks to help achieve their goals.

I argue that each of the theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter – while sometimes useful – persistently fail to understand the practical and ideological complexities necessary to assert Indigenous power and authority and gain Indigenous self-determination. Only Indigenous knowledge systems encapsulate the lived and historical experience of Indigenous peoples and enable a holistic understanding of the complex interconnections of culture, power, identity, and land at the heart of Indigeneity. Indigenous critical theory therefore remains the most important epistemological framework within my research.

As a non-Indigenous person, I take the Mohawk academic Professor Taiaiake Alfred’s advice as my goal for this thesis. He suggested that “non-Indigenous people should work to transform the [Western] culture from within and to focus their energies on undermining the power of colonial myths and attitudes to shape public perceptions” (Alfred, 2002, pers. comm., 7 August). In line with Alfred’s advice, my research is primarily aimed to guide international practitioners toward radical ways of thinking and acting; to provide practical recommendations and guidance for international peacebuilding and development practitioners to support Indigenous self-determination.

The current development system has not yet successfully integrated peacebuilding practice. I hope that by grounding this thesis within critical peace theory and practice the reader will be provided with new tools to transform the current development system. I also aim to facilitate a conversation between international practitioners and Indigenous communities about how practitioners can shift to engage more deeply with Indigenous peoples and seek to balance the current ‘disequilibrium’ of power. This is not a thesis that aims to tell Indigenous peoples what to do when confronted by development or peacebuilding interventions and the associated violence that concerns them. I do however hope that Indigenous peoples may be able to draw useful lessons and conclusions from this research to assist and empower them to understand the current development system and to use this information to transform their own relationships with international practitioners.
2 Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This section focuses on the qualitative multi-disciplinary research methodology used during my research. To begin, I identify myself reflexively explaining my relationship to the world I seek to explore. I explain how I have used ethnographic methods to collect qualitative data and I expand on how my two primary methods of data analysis, grounded theory and abductive analysis, are used to promote the discovery of theory constructed from Indigenous critical theory and methodological data analysis.

I detail the ethical processes undertaken prior to conducting the field research with both Indigenous East Timorese development practitioners and international development practitioners. I discuss the process of transcribing the data, and how I used qualitative software to code, map and analyse complex data. This chapter also outlines the feedback loops conducted to seek views and insights into the findings of this research in Timor-Leste. In conclusion, I outline some of the difficulties encountered in the field and the limitations of the method and dataset.

2.2 Reflexivity: locating the researcher

I am a non-Indigenous Anglo-Australian woman. Since 2003 I have lived and worked in a number of conflict-affected developing-states in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe and the Gulf States for the Australian Government, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) and UNDP on Indigenous, peace, conflict and development issues. From 2006 to 2014 I was employed as a Peace, Conflict and Development Specialist at the then Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) (now Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – DFAT). This period included a two-year diplomatic posting to Papua New Guinea (PNG) managing AusAID’s AUD 170 million Democratic Governance program.

Throughout my work, my local and international development and peacebuilding colleagues have shared stories about their challenging personal and professional experiences. Before I worked in PNG, my conversations with these practitioners had an air of unreality. My experience in PNG gave me deeper insight and experience into the challenges of the current development system. For example, in PNG sometimes I would attend eight meetings a day on eight different topics. I had goals I needed to achieve in each meeting, and rarely were they to build and strengthen the relationships between myself and my organisation and the people I was
sitting across from. I was contributing to the lack of inclusive participation and undermining the conditions that enable FPIC, exacerbating what I saw as forms of structural violence inherent in the current development system. These experiences have motivated me to focus my PhD research on contributing to improving international practitioners’ understanding as to why our efforts fail to reach the development and peacebuilding goals we aspire to reach.

I am a participant observer, where insights require connections, at least in part, to the research. This process recognises the presence of the researcher in the study, and acknowledges the critical importance of reflexivity for each researcher (Davies, 1999, p.3). Davies (1999, p.9) argues that: “The research process is more clearly perceived as an encounter in which knowledge is constituted in ways which reflect and maintain various power relations, a process with ethical implication”. I acknowledge I am deeply connected to this research, grounded in my experience of attempting to change institutions, policies and processes within the current development system.

In my research I am positioned as an insider / outsider. My aim is to be critically reflexive, allowing me to review my role of research–practitioner, my connection to the research context and relationships with the participants, and how my actions affect the research outcomes. I must examine my own practice and the practice of my fellow international practitioner colleagues working globally in developing and conflict-affected contexts. To do this successfully I must balance my dual role of connection and separation from the research.

2.3 Fieldwork methodology and processes used

This next section explores the methodologies used to undertake the fieldwork data collection and analysis. I also describe the processes used to obtain informed consent from participants, the confidentiality of this research, and how participants were chosen. Throughout this research I adhere to the ANU human ethics protocol clearance.

2.3.1 Data collection: ‘listening’ methodology

From 2006 to 2010 I managed AusAID’s program funding for CDA (Centre for Development Action) Collaborative Learning Projects. CDA is a US peacebuilding organisation that promotes the use of the Do No Harm principles and framework – a tool to analyse the effect of development and peacebuilding interventions on conflict and peacebuilding (Anderson, 1999; Woodrow & Chigas, 2009). Since 1999, CDA have progressed their Reflecting on Peace Practice and Listening Projects, which are systematic explorations of the ideas and insights of
people who are recipients of international development assistance. Their findings indicate minimal development outcomes, and a range of harmful impacts from these development interventions (Anderson et al., 2003). In October 2008, I participated in the Listening Project field exercise in Timor-Leste and found that the ethnographic ‘listening’ methodology worked effectively, collating rich context-specific data from a wide range of stakeholder groups (CDA, 2008). As a result of this experience, I used a modified version of the ‘listening’ methodology during my field research.

‘Listening’ uses ethnographic techniques to undertake semi-structured one-on-one qualitative interviews that gather qualitative evidence. These series of conversations between researcher and participants aim to map the scope and effectiveness of development and peacebuilding interventions in Timor-Leste. It is a flexible, rigorous and systematic evaluative mapping process allowing me to explore “a reality that is neither accessible directly though native texts nor simply a reflection of the individual anthropologist’s psyche” (Davies, 1999, p.6).

Ethnography is core to this research methodology. This is the study of social interactions, behaviours and perceptions between groups, through observation and interviews, to provide rich, holistic insights (Reeves et al., 2008, p.512). To do this I gathered participant observations and was directly engaged with and involved in the world I studied: the current development system in Timor-Leste.

Ethnographers use casual, conversational interviews to elicit highly candid data (Reeves et al., 2008, p.513). Conversations start with open-ended questions so participants bring up the issues that matter most to them, and allow the researcher to pace and sequence questions according to the context and explore critical areas of inquiry in line with the grounded theory approach (which I discuss further below). As conversations proceed, I ensure that certain themes and issues are explored and I use the methodology to further identify each participant’s needs, interests and positions in terms of peacebuilding and development. Data is collected on similar themes each time, allowing me to compare across multiple experiences of development interventions. This approach is challenging to analyse, and labour intensive to collect. It requires curiosity and facilitation, and is not a combative or intrusive process. This methodology has resulted in a broad, inductive set of evidence mapping Indigenous East Timorese and non-Indigenous peoples’ cumulative experiences of development, peacebuilding and violence.

‘Listening’, or ethnographic research, is not an Indigenous evaluation methodology. However, because it is grounded in narrative inquiry and empowers the interviewee to direct the conversation, it provides a radical space for Indigenous peoples to articulate their perspectives
as they choose, and places the researcher (or development practitioner) in a secondary and receptive position as a listener and a facilitator of dialogue. Powerful story and conversation methods can be used to authentically empower the different perspectives and knowledge systems particular to Indigenous peoples. Visenor (cited in Turner, 2006, p.71) emphasises the role of story and narrative as critical to Indigenous activism:

“We are more than a curious medicine bundle on a museum rack…We are trickster in the blood, natural mixedblood tricksters, word warriors in that silence between bodies, and we bear our best medicine on our voices”.

Between September 2009 and January 2010 I conducted field interviews with senior peace, conflict, development and Indigenous theorists and practitioners in Australia, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. My field research in Timor-Leste took place during August–October 2010, July 2013 and July 2015. Field research took place in Dili, excepting interviews that took place in Ermera District. Prior to conducting fieldwork in Timor-Leste, I established ongoing partnerships with the National Ministry of Culture that manages all in-country research and the Peace and Conflict Studies Centre at the National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL) led by Dr Antero Benedito da Silva. All interviews took place face to face in public locations or using Skype.

Table 1 below highlights the six key themes raised with each participant. While the sequencing varied, I always first asked each participant to define development in their own words. I used obtrusive interviewing research methods, where observations are made of behaviour and opinions with the participant's knowledge to minimise any perceived risks of conflict of interest.

Table 1: Six key themes raised during interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEFINE DEVELOPMENT:</th>
<th>EXPERIENCES OF DEVELOPMENT-RELATED VIOLENCE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What does the term development mean to you?</td>
<td>What are your experiences of, and views on violence and peacebuilding in relation to development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your view, has development been successful, what have been some of the challenges to success?</td>
<td>For example, as a result of development activities have you experienced or witnessed community or personal violence or peacebuilding? Please expand.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDEAS ON HOW TO ACHIEVE CHANGE:</th>
<th>DEFINE INDIGENOUS:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How could development practitioners or organisations better direct development /peacebuilding work to create more effective outcomes in communities?</td>
<td>What does the term ‘Indigenous’ mean to you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What tools or processes might be used?</td>
<td>In Timor-Leste how would you describe the current state of the relationship between Indigenous/local peoples and development actors?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HUMAN RIGHTS:
What are your views or experiences of ‘human rights’ in development?
Do you believe that these are ‘rights’ that Indigenous peoples are entitled to?

SELF-DETERMINATION:
What are your experiences of Indigenous ‘self-determination’ or ‘self-governance’?
Do you know of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration)?
How could development assist in implementing the Declaration?

Other sources of data were reports and other relevant materials from a wide range of East Timorese and international development organisations, think tanks and research institutions. This included data from reference books, research articles in professional journals, novels, blogs, and newspaper and magazine articles. I also drew on notes from conferences and seminars I attended, and my research journal, in which I documented my reflections throughout the research process.

2.3.2 Data analysis

This section details the process of qualitatively analysing the data collected during field research and how I used systems theory and applied it with Indigenous critical methodologies. I used abductive analysis to construct a new theoretical model to apply to current development practice. Abduction uses grounded theory to systematically code qualitative data, which I did using qualitative research software.

I focus on one major country case study, Timor-Leste, which I purposefully selected because of its unique, information-rich context. The case study approach allows me to demonstrate the complex, holistic and interconnected nature of the current development system. By reducing my data set to one major case study I can more precisely investigate how structures, institutions and behaviours interact in a specific time and context (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Johansson, 2003). I also use six smaller case studies in Chapters Seven and Eight to illuminate detailed examples of my research findings.

2.3.2.1 Abductive analysis

The three primary themes I developed are significant areas of inquiry within Indigenous critical theory as I highlight in Chapter Three. This signalled to me that even though I was seeking to construct theory grounded in the data, I continued to draw on my existing theoretical insights and personal subjectivity, which led me to appreciate these themes have a resonance beyond
Timor-Leste. This led me to explore the use of abductive analysis, first developed by Peirce, as a methodology to build new theory (Anderson, 1986; Fann, 1970; Peirce, 1955). While grounded theory, with its linear coding schemes and heuristic principles, was very useful to analyse large quantities of complex qualitative data I found that the induction method in grounded theory did not logically assist me in developing new theoretical insights. Grounded theory did not adequately account for or value my existing theoretical knowledge and social and intellectual positioning (Johansson, 2003, pp.9-10).

Instead, as I analysed the data I drew on my own experiences in peacebuilding and development, positioning me as a participant-observer. Davies (1999, p.5) describes this process as “the relationships between ethnographer and informant in the field, which form the basis for subsequent theorising and conclusion, are expressed through social interaction in which the ethnographer participates; thus ethnographers help to construct the observations that become their data”. Powdermaker (1966, p.19) defines this as a process of systematically “stepping in and out of society”, where it is essential for the researcher to continually involve and detach from the contexts they are studying. Luttrell (2000) also emphasises the importance of reflexivity in naming the tensions, contradictions and power imbalances a researcher encounters and naming these, rather than eliminating or ignoring them. This auto-ethnographic and reflexive research process underlines the presence of existing theoretical positions or bias in the researcher (Reeves et.al., 2008, p.512). It also fits with Timmermans and Tavory’s (2012) assertion that abductive analysis should be used to construct empirically based theory.

Timmermans and Tavory (2012, p.180) describe abductive analysis as “a qualitative data analysis approach aimed at generating creative and novel theoretical insights through a dialectic of cultivated theoretical sensitivity and methodological heuristics…rather than setting all preconceived theoretical ideas aside during the research project, researchers should enter the field with the deepest and broadest theoretical base possible and develop their theoretical repertoires throughout the research process…instead of theories emerging from the data, new concepts are developed to account for puzzling empirical materials”. Timmermans and Tavory (2012, p.176) highlight the importance of using careful methodological data analysis and explain that grounded theory methods in induction help abductive analysis by deepening our perceptions, allowing us to “see the phenomenon in socially interesting ways”.

I used abductive analysis to develop a new theoretical framework. This approach values the production of theory based on surprising research evidence which is generated by investigating non-linear interconnection, and the plurality and complexity of the data, which can be mapped and connected in different ways. My interview transcripts held multiple layers of codes (or meanings) and often this coding was repeated across multiple sources. As I re-read the
transcripts I became deeply familiar with the evidence, connecting codes in a myriad of possible themes. I used my whiteboard and visual systems maps from HyperRESEARCH to visualise the systemic patterns raised by the grounded theory data analysis process.

The primary themes within my research findings were used to develop theories about violence and self-determined development. In Chapters Seven and Eight I detail my research findings and explore the theoretical insights developed from this abductive research process. The ethnographic method used in Chapters Seven and Eight prioritises the Indigenous voice. Direct quotes are analysed contextually, and they are sequenced to build the theoretical framework.

2.3.2.2 Grounded theory

Abduction uses the grounded theory approach developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) to code qualitative data using systematic procedures of coding schemes and heuristic principles. My eighty-six field interviews ranged between thirty minutes to three hours, covering a wide range of topics, and to manage the large and diverse data set I required qualitative research software. I used HyperRESEARCH, a computer-assisted qualitative software tool. HyperRESEARCH differs from other qualitative software in that the primary unit of analysis and comparison is the case. In line with a grounded theory model, I built each case according to the key themes emerging from the data. In HyperRESEARCH, each case is linked to any number of empirical sources e.g. transcripts, and each source is linked to different cases via codes (a word or two that describes the significance of the text).

In line with a grounded theory approach I built the key themes and coded them before I analysed the data. Grounded theory uses three types of coding: open, axial and selective coding (Emerson, 1983, p.50). I used all three during my data analysis. Open coding is the “process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.61). To do this I examined each source document (interview transcript) for key concepts or ideas that were related to the six key research questions. I gave these initial ideas ‘codes’ and highlighted them in the relevant text. This process is time-consuming and necessitated detailed textual analysis.

The open coding process identified a large number of codes (ninety two), and it was necessary to break down these codes. As I proceeded through iterations of reading and coding the transcribed interviews, I used a process of axial coding to reduce the initial codes and where repetition occurred, clustered them into primary and secondary code groups. Axial coding is a “set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding by making connections between categories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.96). For example, links between
self-determination and independence also connected themes of power, ownership and decision-making.

Throughout the data analysis process I used selective coding to link primary and secondary categories, which is “the process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.116). From this process emerged three primary themes or cases: culture, power and relationships (see in CAPITALS in Table 2). Under the three themes are the primary code groups (see in **bold** in Table 2) and the secondary code groups (in *italics* in Table 2). The process of selective coding highlighted that the three primary themes are interconnected in multiple and overlapping ways.

Table 2: Cases and primary and secondary code groups used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CULTURE</th>
<th>POWER</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Insider / outsider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of Indigenous</td>
<td>Co-option</td>
<td>Indonesian occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maubere</td>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Portuguese colonialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship/family/clan</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>UN administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land/place</td>
<td>Expectations – entitled</td>
<td>NGO – non-state actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Political parties – politicians</td>
<td>Churches – faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Self-determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indigenous conflict</strong></td>
<td>Informing – socialising</td>
<td>Indigenous internationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>transformation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umu-lulik</td>
<td>Aid effectiveness</td>
<td>Nation-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law – justice</td>
<td>Duplication</td>
<td>State building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrilineal / patrilineal</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Shared vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Coordination/planning / prioritising</td>
<td>Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Misaligned development</td>
<td>Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict analysis/sensitivity</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na he biti bo’ot</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict – conflict trigger</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragility – fragile state</td>
<td></td>
<td>Staff turnover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security – stability</td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Timing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems – failure</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sacred knowledge/ information</strong></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Listening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Language issues / Tetum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding culture</td>
<td>Funding / budget / money</td>
<td>Ethics – morals – attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Recruitment – employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with context - targeting</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History – historical experience</td>
<td>Institutional strengthening</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dependency</strong></td>
<td><strong>Choice</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural – urban divide</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building relationships</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate – collective – together</td>
<td></td>
<td>Confidence / self-esteem</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assumptions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incentives</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human resources – capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ownership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3.3 Informed consent and the human ethics protocol clearance

Enabling participants’ FPIC in research is both a requirement of my ANU Full Human Ethics Protocol and a key standard for any Indigenous research grounded in meaningful engagement and reciprocity with Indigenous peoples. I have demonstrated my respect for Indigenous peoples inherent right to control and maintain their knowledge systems by forming long-term research partnerships with East Timorese organisations and undertaking feedback workshops and production of accessible research materials in Tetum.

I received my ethics clearance in 9 June 2009 and I was granted a variation approving field research in Timor-Leste in 14 May 2010. My Research Information Sheet (see Appendices A [English] and B [Tetum]) provides an overview of my research and the Informed Consent Form (see Appendix C) details the consent required. These were developed in line with the AIATSIS Guidelines for Ethical Research in Indigenous Studies (2001).

During my fieldwork, I began each interview by clarifying the informed consent process in English or Tetum and consent was negotiated via email, Skype and face to face. The ‘listening’ methodology provides a risk management strategy by providing space to clarify mistakes or misunderstandings during the interview and reorientate the focus of questions for subsequent interviews. This obtrusive interview method allowed participants to share their views with minimal risk. Only one interviewee did not permit me to record our interview citing institutional security reasons.

2.3.4 Confidentiality

Confidentiality is a critical element of the FPIC process and research that supports the rights of Indigenous peoples. Anonymity is fundamental in conflict-affected contexts when public criticism of the state, key individuals or organisations could result in physical harm, threats or targeted structural violence. In line with the informed consent process I assured each participant that any published data would be anonymous. In accordance with the ANU Ethics Protocol at no time did I engage in discussion of classified issues or criminal acts.

To maintain anonymity, each interviewee (or source) is coded. For example, TL-1300-170910 indicates a Timor-based participant whose interview took place at 13:00 hours on 17 September 2010. Sources have additional identifiers by sex (female or male), whether they are East Timorese and whether they work for a government or donor agency, NGO, International NGO
(INGO), multilateral organisation or university. I am the only person who has access to the coding key. Readers who would like to build on my research should contact me for referrals and advice.

I maintained accurate records by recording and transcribing all interviews myself. Digital recordings were used for transcription and are retained for the duration of the PhD. All recordings are stored on my private computer and backup drives both online, using Dropbox, and on external hard drives. If participants request they can access a recording or transcript of their interview. No other researcher will have access to the recording or transcript without the written or oral permission of the participant as per the Informed Consent Form (see Appendix C).

### 2.3.5 How were research participants’ chosen?

I used theoretical sampling to choose my field research participants. This is “the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his [sic] data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his [sic] theory as it emerges…controlled by the emergent theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.45). I used purposive sampling to identify interviewees. This process is not random, and people are selected because of their ability to comment on the research topic, illuminate key theories or help resolve challenges within the research.

Katz (1982, p.127) highlights the importance of representativeness of qualitative data to justify making generalisations. Emerson (1983, p.46) notes that most researchers commonly undertake twenty to thirty interviews to “saturate the categories, meaning to begin to find the same thing”. My supervisory committee determined that at least forty interviews, with at least twenty Timorese people and at least twenty development or peacebuilding practitioners, would create a representative sample and justify a convincing argument, without the need for quantitative testing of significance. Noting considerations of cost and time, I was able to interview more participants than anticipated: a total of eighty-six. Thirty-eight international development and peacebuilding practitioners during my initial field work in 2009–2010, and during my 2010–2013 fieldwork in Timor-Leste I interviewed forty-eight practitioners, twenty-three of whom were East Timorese (see Table 3). During feedback workshops in 2015 I discussed my research findings with twenty-two practitioners, six were East Timorese.

I have been privileged to have so many people share their stories with me. I listened to deep soul searching and frank admissions of error that triggered tears in some participants. Most
international practitioners live and work in isolated and challenging contexts and a number of participants described our discussion as cathartic.

Table 3: Research participants by gender and background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Timorese</th>
<th>Non-East Timorese in Timor-Leste</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout my research I use the term ‘international practitioners’ to describe people who work in the international humanitarian, peacebuilding and development sectors. I acknowledge that these are different professional sectors, where individuals are at different times engaged within conflict-affected developing contexts. I note that humanitarian assistance is one part of the development system and tends to be shorter-term and is focused on responding with protection, assistance and relief to a disaster (human or natural) or complex emergency situation beyond the capacity of national agencies (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) cited in Relief Web, 2008). In Timor-Leste my research participants were primarily development and peacebuilding practitioners. The international practitioners I interviewed in 2009 worked in the humanitarian, peacebuilding and development sectors.

My target participants were East Timorese and international practitioners who work in the current development and peacebuilding system, this included people working for bilateral and donor agencies, multilateral agencies, NGOs, CSOs, faith based organisations, private sector organisations and the media. They were academics and community members, government officials, public servants, youth, clan leaders, landowners, and ex-combatants. I sought a broad mix of participants to get diverse perspectives on the effectiveness of development and peacebuilding and in doing so I have covered all major actors within the system and added their voices. I aimed for a balance in gender, and between East Timorese and non-East Timorese people.

I note the potential contradiction that many of the East Timorese I interviewed during my field research were themselves elite. The majority were educated overseas, spoke English fluently, and were paid comparatively high wages to work as development practitioners in large INGOs or bilateral or multilateral organisations. These individuals were often critical of other elites and internationals, highlighting the complexity of East Timorese identity and politics. The use of ‘we’ is sometimes unclear, highlighting that many East Timorese participants recognise they are
elites and/or do not consider themselves a representative or spokesperson of the rural communities they are referring to. In citations I clarify attribution using [brackets].

I interviewed East Timorese practitioners and their international counterparts separately to compare experiences and views. Participants were recruited using word of mouth, email and telephone. There was no material benefit for participating and no incentives were offered. During field research in Timor-Leste nominal and symbolic gift giving was expected and was carried out according to custom by bringing food, or buying coffee during interviews.

2.3.6 Feedback workshops

To explore how my findings apply to development and peacebuilding practice I conducted feedback workshops with key stakeholders in Timor-Leste in July 2015. To facilitate these meetings I summarised my research findings from Chapters Seven and Eight into English (see Appendix D) and Tetum (see Appendix E).

International practitioners currently interact with East Timorese peoples through shared English-language reports or via summarised power point presentations, email and the Internet, using jargon and acronyms. In this way, practitioners generate and share knowledge through processes that are reductive, exclusive and available only to a minority of East Timorese, therefore excluding the communities they purport to work with and for. I will demonstrate that these restrictive forms of communication create limited feedback loops that shrink the possibility of generating new knowledge or resolving problems with empowered communities.

I worked with the Peace and Conflict Centre at UNTL and Belun and La’o Hamutuk, two East Timorese NGOs, and met separately with East Timorese and international practitioners to conduct feedback discussions. I sought partners’ views on whether my findings are useful and how my research fits in with ongoing analysis that contributes to their broader development and peacebuilding praxis. The findings of this feedback are described in Chapter Nine.

2.4 Limitation of process and dataset

There are three main limitations to the research methodologies I have used and the way I have collected and analysed my data. The ‘listening’ methodology works optimally when both the interviewer and participants have a shared language. I do not speak Tetum or other East Timorese languages, so most interviews were in English. This limited my ability to directly interview a wider group of East Timorese who participated in development and peacebuilding
programs, particularly those living in rural and remote areas. To overcome this language barrier, I worked with student translators from UNTL, particularly when undertaking interviews in Ermera. Tetum is a developing language so I have edited this text using Hull’s (2001) Standard Tetum–English Dictionary for consistency of spelling.

As a self-funded PhD student I was limited by my ability to take study leave from my full-time work. As a result, I had limited time in the field and usually only had one opportunity to interview participants. Therefore discussions were limited by what experiences each individual was comfortable to share at the time of the interview. Despite this limitation, discussions were wide ranging and I have a large data set for future research.

I have been trying to straddle the demands of two very different perspectives, the modern western academy of the university and Indigenous knowledge systems. The former seeks linear patterns and the latter prioritises non-linear, visual and verbal information. This thesis provides linear, easily applicable results, but also seeks to consistently prioritise Indigenous knowledge systems. I do not have answers that will be applicable to every development or peacebuilding context. My research is not a ‘how to manual’ for international practitioners struggling with their practice, unable to see through the apathy, grinding poverty, corruption and frustrating bureaucracy to find solutions. It is a contribution, which provides hope for positive systems transformation.

2.5 Conclusion

This is qualitative research, which uses a grounded theory approach combined with abductive analysis that draws on Indigenous critical theory to analyse complex data and build theory. From this fieldwork process I have developed a new theoretical framework to assist practitioners to support Indigenous communities to better achieve self-determined development. Use of this framework and the resulting guiding principles will be explored in detail in Chapters Seven to Nine. The findings of my research have implications for other Indigenous peoples seeking to fulfill their Indigenous right to self-determination. My focus on only one case study means that there are opportunities for further research in other contexts.
3 Indigenous Knowledge Systems

3.1 Introduction

In this Chapter I locate this thesis within the broad spectrum of Indigenous critical theory and explore Indigenous epistemologies or Indigenous knowledge systems. I begin by defining Indigeneity and address some of the concerns expressed by researchers about classifying East Timorese peoples as Indigenous, and explain why an Indigenous identifier works for the purposes of this research.

I examine Indigenous knowledge systems to better identify the structures and institutions that maintain or legitimise power and decision-making in Indigenous communities. Indigenous critical theory provides a theoretical framework to explain the structural and cultural violence experienced by Indigenous peoples, nations vs. states conflict, welfare colonialism and co-option, intra-state power dynamics, and Indigenous relationships to land and resources.

I detail how the dominant non-Indigenous system affects violence in Indigenous communities. It links this ongoing violence and the failure to achieve the Indigenous goals of self-determination and self-determined development with the need for conflict transformation or positive peace. I argue that empowering the radically different worldviews within Indigenous knowledge systems might better support the attainment of Indigenous self-determination.

I also summarise the history of Indigenous internationalism. I track the growth of political awareness and connectivity of Indigenous peoples, that has resulted in a proliferation of international law, norms and practice focused on Indigenous rights. This chapter focuses on the creation of the Declaration, the primary international legal document articulating the right to Indigenous self-determination. I highlight the potential solidarity and support for self-determination for East Timorese if they engage with other Indigenous peoples worldwide. In the Declaration, development is identified as a primary tool to implement Indigenous self-determination. I explore the right to development, introduce my concept of Indigenous self-determined development and emphasise the importance of FPIC.

3.2 Who are Indigenous peoples?

Defining who are ‘Indigenous’ has historically been problematic. Many definitions are viewed by Indigenous peoples as marginalising, disempowering and exclusionary. The lack of a definition may be considered problematic to this research, so in the section below I propose a working definition.
3.2.1 Identification of Indigenous peoples

Indigenous peoples are the most diverse and complex grouping of humanity. Worldwide, at least 370 million people are considered to be Indigenous (IWGIA, 2013). Represented across approximately 5,000 different nation groups, speaking at least 4–5,000 of the approximately 6,000 languages existing today, they are geographically located across all states and territories (Posey, 2002, p.26).

To be Indigenous is to exist within a multiplicity of global and collective identities. Through their geographic spread across nation-state borders, different faith communities, gender and ethnic boundaries Indigenous peoples embody identity pluralism (Barth, 1969; Berger, 1990). Identity pluralism is clearly articulated by Khan (cited in Talbot, 1998, p.1), who declared he had been a Pushtun for 4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years and a Pakistani for forty years. Indigeneity is not delineated by natural boundaries and state borders but by the social landscape where, “some of the strongest claims of difference are made by the marginalized and deracinated, by those who would otherwise be absorbed, eliminated and forgotten by dominant societies” (Niezen, 2003, p.6).

Due to the complexity and potential for exclusion in defining Indigeneity, the UN and many other international bodies have not adopted a formal definition of Indigeneity. Instead, the UN, led by the UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), identifies but does not define Indigenous peoples according to the following criteria – not all of which need to be fulfilled to claim Indigeneity (UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues, 2008):

- “Self-identification as Indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by their community as their member.
- Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies.
- Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources.
- Distinct social, economic or political systems.
- Distinct language, culture and beliefs.
- Form non-dominant groups of society.
- Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities”.

The primary importance of self-identification was outlined initially in Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO c.169) (International Labour Organization, 1989). The principle of self-identification is also clearly defined in Article 33 of the Declaration (UN General Assembly, 2007):
“1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of Indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live”.

Erica-Irene Daes, the former Chairperson of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, points out that a shared history and distinct cultural characteristics can help to identify some peoples as Indigenous (IWGIA, 2013). Jose R. Martinez Cobo (1983, pp.50-51), the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, provided the current working criterion of Indigeneity in his eminent Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations:

“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system.

This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the present of one or more of the following factors:

a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system, membership of an Indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.);
d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother tongue, as the habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
e) Residence on certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world;
f) Other relevant factors.

On an individual basis, an Indigenous person is one who belongs to these Indigenous populations through self-identification as Indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the group). This preserves for these communities the sovereign right and power to decide who belongs to them, without external interference”.

I agree that both Daes and Cobo’s criterion are relevant and applicable but for one phrase of Cobo’s that I have emphasised: “They form at present non-dominant sectors of society”. Dodson notes that these criterion are contextual, written at a time when most Indigenous activists were from settler-colonial contexts in Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Dodson, 2015, pers. comm., 16 October). I argue that this definition is not accurate for all Indigenous contexts, particularly in the Pacific Region where in most states, including Timor-Leste, Indigenous peoples are the majority population (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005, p.607). In these states, Indigenous peoples lead government, control the economy and resource use, use traditional languages and teach Indigenous culture in schools. These peoples, meet all the other
criterion or identifiers of Indigenous, including self-identification, and are also the dominant sector in their societies.

With this important difference in mind, I expand Cobo’s (1983) criterion of Indigeneity to reflect the experience of settler-colonial and non-settler colonial Indigenous peoples. The following definition is more inclusive and is used throughout my research:

“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. Depending on context, they form both non-dominant and dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system” [my emphasis].

3.2.2 Indigeneity in Timor-Leste

A number of East Timorese people and experienced researchers have questioned my use of an Indigenous critical theory lens in Timor-Leste. These people note correctly that few East Timorese people identify as being Indigenous, which underlines a dilemma with the issue of self-identification outlined above. Therefore, it is critical that I explain why I am talking about Indigenous peoples in Timor-Leste.

I argue that East Timorese peoples fit each of the categories of my earlier definition of Indigeneity. Most important is the evidence of strong, vibrant Indigenous knowledge systems practiced by East Timorese throughout the country. Research in anthropology, archaeology and ethno-botany also show that East Timorese people can trace ancestry to the island of Timor-Leste back thousands of years and their historical connection to the land prior to Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian invasion (McClean, 2014; Oliveira, 2008; Traube, 2007). East Timorese people consider themselves to be distinct from the peoples living in nearby islands, and they are the dominant nation grouping within the borders of Timor-Leste. East Timorese people are preserving and strengthening their independence and exploring how to integrate Indigenous culture into governance and legal systems, leadership and decision-making.

East Timorese scholars such as Babo-Soares (2004) and Trindade and Castro (2007) and international researchers including Loch and Prueller (2011) and Ospina and Hohe (2002) emphasise the important links between the struggles and experiences of East Timorese and Indigenous peoples globally. Nevertheless, I was informed that East Timorese mostly self-identify as Indigenous only when it suits them (Durnam & Boughton, 2010, pers. comm., 14
September; da Silva, 2010, pers. comm., 29 September). For example, identifying as ‘Indigenous’ might take place in a human rights debate in New York or Geneva, but rarely does a East Timorese person publicly identify as Indigenous. The term Indigenous is used in Timor-Leste, as an East Timorese peace researcher explained:

“Indigenous people means for me they are the people who live in that place, they have a long history from their grandfathers until now. They have strong, deep feelings about their land around them. They know the history of the land and the people there. They still believe in traditional ways to run their lives” (TTG-1500-300910).

She went on to warn that in a conflict-affected context the label ‘Indigenous’ can exacerbate violence by differentiating and separating East Timorese:

“I have heard that people say that the Indigenous people of Timor are all the people that have the black skin. If you are mixed, then you are not Indigenous anymore. They call it mestiços. I don’t want to make a difference between me and other people. Sometimes difference can create conflict” (TTG-1500-300910).

While it is rare to have a conversation about Indigeneity, if you were to raise ‘culture’ with East Timorese, you would have a lively and engaged discussion. When East Timorese people talk about culture they talk about a deep reverence, responsibility and relationship to place, clan, and family and reference the importance of language, resource exchange, law and spirituality. Many researchers including Grenfell (2013, pers.comm., 16 July) and Hunt (2013, pers.comm., 16 July) have proposed that the discussion about East Timorese development has shifted in the past five years from one of technical issues and governance, to a much more open discussion involving culture.

During Portuguese colonialism, and certainly for Portuguese-speaking East Timorese, it would have been highly improbable to label oneself ‘Indigenous’. The Portuguese used the term indigenas to describe people who are Indigenous, local or natives, and the term has connotations of savagery, and is associated with Hobbes’ social contract, which states that without modern political community the lives of people are “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1651). Cabral (2002, p.65) cites the 1954 Native Statute in Portuguese law that defines an indigenas as:

“A person ‘of black race, of black descent, born in the province or habitually resident in it, who has not yet the knowledge and the individual and social habits which are considered prerequisite to the complete application of the public and private law by which Portuguese citizens are governed’.

Under Portuguese colonialism, indigenas in Timor-Leste were denied civil rights, access to property and were geographically and socially separated from Europeans, assimilados
(Portuguese: assimilated colonial subjects) and *mestiços* (Portuguese: a person with mixed Indigenous and European parentage) (Cabral, 2002, pp.65-66). In a community striving for modernity, using the term Indigenous can be divisive. An East Timorese development analyst explains:

“The term Indigenous becomes part of a very racist speech. Here you have to be very careful with so much oppression. We are all East Timorese and we all started the idea that we should be independent” (TD-1700-130910).

The potential for structural and cultural violence must be considered when identifying Indigenous peoples and it is necessary to use a conflict-sensitive approach (Anderson, 1999). Taking this approach means considering how the identification and prioritisation of certain Indigenous nations over other groups can act to exacerbate violence or nurture peace. Internationally, there are examples where claiming Indigeneity has led to the marginalisation of other individuals and groups and Indigeneity has been used to threaten and practice large-scale violence. Claims to Indigeneity can be deeply divisive; however, such identification can also be empowering and lead to cultural, social and political transformation. A senior development practitioner proposed that the challenge of identifying Indigeneity has the potential to initiate violence between groups:

“The issue of Indigeneity it is a very conflictual issue. Examples in Rwanda and Nigeria show that we are not dealing with a romanticised view of Indigenous people, crushed by an oppressive national elite. There are many situations where these identities are used and exploited by political elite for their own gain, which leads to violence” (DD-2100-250110).

Claims to and definitions of Indigeneity in Timor-Leste are inconstant, fluid and politicised—but not irrelevant. I posit that, in Timor-Leste, East Timorese people’s understanding of custom, culture, power and identity are akin to Indigeneity. The issue of Indigeneity, and its questions of nationalism, identity, land, culture and power are at the heart of development, violence and peacebuilding issues in Timor-Leste. Indigenous critical theory is an important tool to better understand issues of structural and cultural violence in Timor-Leste. I argue, that while Indigeneity is complex, an Indigenous critical theory approach is highly relevant in Timor-Leste.

### 3.3 Indigenous knowledge systems

Indigenous knowledge systems are both a theoretical framework and political movement that assert the rights, cultural and political sovereignty of Indigenous peoples as distinct from non-Indigenous peoples. These knowledge systems have not arisen from Western tradition. By
identifying Indigenous peoples in international law, they are both a legal category and a theoretical and political construct.

My research prioritises the term ‘Indigenous knowledge systems’ over the use of ‘Fourth World theory’. The term ‘Fourth World’ was first widely used in 1974 by Shuswap Grand Chief George Manuel to differentiate Indigenous peoples from the Third, Second and First Worlds (common groupings in the then Cold War environment); and to indicate the marginalised position of many Indigenous peoples in relation to other political power structures (Bodley, 1999, pp.77-85; Churchill, 1992; Dyck, 1985; Griggs, 1992; Manuel & Posluns, 1974). Manuel and Posluns (1974, p.40) defined the Fourth World as “Indigenous peoples descended from a country’s aboriginal population and who today are completely or partly deprived of the right to their own territories and its riches”. Dyck (1985, p.1) emphasised the shared experiences of Indigenous peoples to form the collective Fourth World:

“[Indigenous peoples] in all parts of the world are struggling to retain traditional land, cope with government administration of their lives and to survive as culturally distinct peoples within nation states. They are the Fourth World - they are not ethnic minorities but the original inhabitants of lands that are now separated into nation-states”.

While there is a form of power in differentiating Indigenous peoples as Fourth World and Indigenous epistemologies as Fourth World theory, I argue this neo-colonial terminology is potentially disempowering in the post-Cold War context, locating Indigenous peoples as victims. I therefore use the term Indigenous critical theory, which provides a theoretical framework for Indigenous self-determination that promotes the primacy of Indigenous peoples as responsible custodians of their land, resources, culture and governance. Indigenous critical theories are logic systems located in Indigenous epistemology or Indigenous knowledge systems. I do not use the term ‘traditional’ as this can also be a limiting term, with connotations of an inflexible past (Alfred, 2015; Posey, 2002, p.28).

The epistemology and ontology of Indigenous knowledge systems are radically different from other theoretical or qualitative inquiries. Indigenous knowledge systems ontology is based on historical, collective experience of Indigenous peoples; reality is lived, multifaceted, interconnected and continuous throughout time (LaDuke, 1999; 2005). Indigenous knowledge systems offer a holistic, multilayered, plural vantage point from which to observe and critique non-Indigenous perspectives (Close, 2002).

This epistemology is extended through experiential and concrete findings; it is a practical form of knowing that is learnt, shared and practiced through dance, song, ceremony and relationships (Grenier, 1998; Langton & Palmer, 2003). It is the product of an interconnected spiritual and metaphysical link between Indigenous peoples’ land, ancestors, kin and personal identity -
located simultaneously in the past, present and future (Lynge, 1992; Peat, 1995). The
Indigenous knowledge system takes its intellectual landmarks from Indigenous ways of
knowing (developed over thousands of years) and articulates the power, rights, authority,
ownership, responsibilities and aspirations of Indigenous peoples (Shiva, 2000). It locates
power both individually and collectively.

Empowering Indigenous knowledge systems accords Indigenous peoples the collective power
and tools to assert their politics of difference from the dominant modern system. It provides
Indigenous peoples with an intellectual platform to make their fundamental claims to self-
determination and social and ecological justice separate from current discriminatory and
marginalising power systems. It offers a new mechanism for envisioning Indigenous
alternatives to the often violent structures and processes currently in place (Bates, 1995;
Beckett, 1987; Doxtater, 2004; Ortiz, 1984).

does not have the capacity to adequately engage with the holistic and spiritual nature of
Indigenous knowledge. Often science reduces nature to ‘objects’ or ‘components’ of knowledge
for human use and exploitation; it does not always engage with Indigenous knowledge and the
ensuing custodianship, which encompasses environmental management, responsibility and
reciprocation. Indigenous knowledge systems are radically different from non-Indigenous
worldviews:

“Indigenous Knowledge is stored in peoples’ memories and activities and is expressed
in stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, dances, myths, cultural values, beliefs, rituals,
community laws, local language and taxonomy, agricultural practise, equipment,
materials, plant species and animal breeds. Indigenous Knowledge is shared and
communicated orally, by specific example, and through culture. Indigenous forms of
communication and organization are vital to local-level decision-making processes and
to the preservation, development, and spread of Indigenous Knowledge” (Grenier,
1998, p.6).

Indigenous peoples have different relationships to land, resources and the ecosystems around
them than non-Indigenous peoples. Relationships to land are fundamental to continuing
Indigenous knowledge and cultures. For Indigenous peoples, land is the visible story that
explains the meaning of life, law and culture, and of personal and communal spiritual identity.
Indigenous peoples are morally and spiritually linked to their surrounding ecosystems and their
custodianship and responsibility is extensive. Within Indigenous knowledge systems it is
important to celebrate, renew and rejuvenate these physical and metaphysical spaces (Rigsby,
“The sacred places are not just simply geographically beautiful. They are holy places, even more holy than shrines, but not commemorated. They are sacred. The greatest respect is shown to them and they are used for the regeneration of history, the regeneration of Aboriginal people, the continuation of their life. Because that is where they begin and that is where they return”.

Indigenous languages are critical to the transmission of Indigenous knowledge systems and non-Indigenous language and discourse are a source of Indigenous oppression. As Fanon (1967, p.18) suggests, “A man [sic] who has a language, consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language”. Indigenous human rights specialists Skutnabb-Kangas and Dunbar (2010, p.37) agree: “our culture cannot survive without our languages”.

By contrast, Western knowledge is broken into disciplines and specialities; it constructs particular faculties as legitimate, eschewing others. Western knowledge systems tend to be reductionist, secular and place hierarchical structures and boundaries resulting in Indigenous knowledge being defined as inferior and unscientific (Garroutte, 2003; Shiva, 2000, p.vii). Western epistemologies have demonstrated their limited scope to differentiate and identify the experiences and needs of Indigenous peoples. This limitation creates a power imbalance in knowledge systems that have resulted in the assertion of Western intellectual, political, economic and cultural dominance over Indigenous knowledge systems (Close, 2002).

Murphy (2002; 2000) argues that Western knowledge has continued to fail Indigenous peoples because of the lack of capacity for Indigenous community participation and the impossibility of this single static non-Indigenous model to represent the multiple and inter-layered points of reference of the Indigenous community. As Minh-ha (1995, p.216) proposes, the central problem within Western epistemology is that by displacing Indigenous knowledge systems, it prioritises an ethnocentric, bounded and constricted knowledge system. Huggins (1998, p.36) agrees describing Western knowledge systems as “yet another alien discourse and institution designed by and for Whites without any consultation with Black people”.

Indigenous peoples are using Indigenous knowledge systems to emancipate Indigenous peoples from their historicist origins of oppression and colonialism, and to assert their claims toward Indigenous self-determination (Doxtater, 2004, p. 625; Murphy, 2000, p.89; Smith, 1999). Alfred (1999; 2015) understands that modern Western discourse dismisses the use, applicability and status of Indigenous knowledge and governance structures. He advocates a return to a more complex understanding of the Indigenous self and community through a process of deep ontological questioning and active cultural practice. He calls for Indigenous peoples to re-imagine and re-orientate the structures of Indigenous self-determination necessary for their continuity. Smith (1999) frames Indigenous self-determination at the centre of processes of
transformation, decolonisation, healing and mobilisation that are local, regional and global in scope.

It is important that the current hierarchy of knowledge systems is debunked and disregarded to achieve Indigenous self-determination (Garrotte, 2003; Nakata et al., 2012; Rigney, 1999; Smith, 1999). Indigenous peoples reject this “feeling of [Western] superiority” and argue that neither system is superior nor indifferent to the other (Todorov, 1984, p.2). An international peacebuilding specialist asserted that:

“Indigenous peoples should not just be the objective of study. They should be active agents in structures of knowledge production and South-South learning…Otherwise you are just continuing to privilege northern universities and knowledge production as the real thing” (X-1100-261109).

Turner, (2006, p.100) points out that there are epistemological problems in systematising, classifying, or writing down Indigenous knowledge systems that are sourced from an oral cultural tradition – but that this should not deter scholars from engaging with Indigenous studies. He promotes the use of a critical indigenous philosophy that Indigenous scholars and thinkers – “word warriors” – can use to protect Indigenous knowledge from exploitation and assert and defend Indigenous nationhood within the dominant culture.

While there is certainly a role for Indigenous studies to engage the Western academy as Turner (2006) and Smith (1999) suggest, I agree with Garrotte (2003), Alfred (1999) and Alfred and Corntassel’s (2005) suggestions that Indigenous theorists should recreate or regenerate Indigenous institutions and transcend colonial practices of knowledge transmission to cultivate self-determination. This is a more powerful intellectual project to achieve Indigenous self-determination. Their approach asserts that Indigenous peoples possess unique, viable philosophies, or worldviews that are tools for the generation and discovery of knowledge, which should stand alongside the Western academy as valid knowledge systems. Indigenous peoples should resist academic discourses that reject spiritual, sacred and pluralist knowledge and lived experience.

3.3.1 The structural violence inherent in states

Indigenous knowledge systems frame states as inherently perpetrating structural violence. Indigenous knowledge systems use the term “nation” to describe an Indigenous community, cultural group or society, united by common descent and/or language and connected to a specific and bounded geographic location (Nietschmann, 1994). There are political and geographic differences between nations and states (Nietschmann, 1985; 1994). The inalienable
and autonomous territorial borders of states are considered to be a predetermined right according to liberal theory (Mill, 1891, p.120; Morgenthau, 1973) but the territorial borders of modern states do not easily fit with the many overlapping Indigenous nations’ boundaries. In the statebuilding process however, Indigenous nations are usually deprived of the rights to their territories and natural resources, and both these lands and the peoples themselves are usually placed under fiduciary obligation (trusteeship) to the state (Anaya et.al., 1995; Anderson, 1991; Behrendt, 2002; Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p.9). This process of delineating boundaries between nations and states has, and continues to trigger direct, structural and cultural violence that will be discussed further in other chapters.

Nietschmann (1994) and Seth (1995) argue that Indigeneity challenges the dual framework of nations and states as the basis of modern geo-political power. Nietzen (2003, p.9) clarifies this divide by stating that this opposition: “sets social groups and networks apart from others in a global ‘we–they’ or ‘North–South’ dichotomy”. Western institutions deny Indigenous nations power, authority or legitimacy, exclude Indigenous points of reference, and fail to engage with Indigenous languages or cultures (Alfred, 1999; Murphy, 2000). Indigenous knowledge systems advocate equality between Indigenous nations and states, not a relationship categorised by this power imbalance that triggers violence.

Indigenous peoples pose tremendous potential power and potential threat to the status quo of the current system of state-based power. Indigenous peoples worldwide have realised that colonisation and assimilation into a state prevents them from controlling their own lives, resources and cultures and that the threat to their territorial base and surrounding environment may entail their own destruction (Gray, 1995). Indigenous knowledge systems therefore frame statebuilding actions as nation-destroying. These actions prevent the attainment of Indigenous self-determination and the resulting possible violence, lack of sustainable culturally-appropriate development, and the continued reduction in biological and cultural diversity (Gray, 1997; Nietschmann, 1994, pp.231-238; Sivertsen, 1999). State building can fracture or destroy Indigenous holistic, land-cultural-spiritual-ties, which are distinctly different from Western sustainable resource development practices, law, and property ownership (Deloria, 1973; Vel, 2000). The Indigenous right to self-determination challenges the assumed norms of state territoriality and “the legitimacy of political incorporation and cultural assimilation as an exercise of state sovereignty” (Wilmer, 1993, p.42). The assertions of Indigenous political status and autonomy challenge Anderson’s notion of the “imagined community”, which is fundamental to the western model of political community, where autonomous individuals participate in defining political community through collective rights and responsibilities exercised within the state’s territorial boundaries (Anderson, 1991; Dahl, 2000).
Empowered by their continuing existence and strengthened political status, Indigenous peoples claim collective rights across and inside state borders. As historical experience indicates, many Indigenous people, including Aboriginal Australians, Maori, the Zapatista in Mexico and the Mohawk peoples in US and Canada, have violently resisted state suppression. Manuel and Posluns (1974) emphasise the experience of Indigenous peoples as one of survival despite significant violence. In this way, Indigenous knowledge systems highlight the inherent structural violence of Western knowledge systems and their associated system of geo-political State territoriality. Indigenous knowledge systems aim to bring an alternative theoretical framework to dismantling and transforming state violence. My thesis applies this framework to the context in Timor-Leste.

3.3.2 Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems

This section highlights the importance of locating Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems within the broad spectrum of Indigenous knowledge systems. In line with my case above that East Timorese people can be identified as Indigenous peoples I argue that Indigenous East Timorese knowledge is geographically unique and deeply interconnected to ancestors, place and kinship networks and realised through customary practices occurring across multiple generations. As an East Timorese peacebuilding practitioner explained to me:

“The local laws are indigenous knowledge. They come from the community itself, from our culture, from our tradition. It has not come from abroad, but it has come from working together, living in one place, from our ancestors. That is why we call it local Indigenous knowledge, because it truly comes from the Timorese people. They have already existed for a long time” (TTO-1330-061010).

Indigenous knowledge in Timor-Leste is diverse, with at least 16 language groups, and each grounded in specific cultural beliefs, rituals and practices that are unique to a particular geographical site (Hull, 1998, p.4). Colonialism, violence and urban migration have changed people’s cultural practices, resulting in fewer people accessing Indigenous knowledge. Research participants explained that it is difficult to access Indigenous knowledge because within the primarily oral culture information had not been written down. Violence in the past has targeted customary leaders and knowledge holders, and as power structures changed in communities these people held less power and respect. Most of what is now publicly available is via the observations of international anthropologists and political scientists. These factors have resulted in fewer East Timorese accessing or practicing Indigenous knowledge. Many East Timorese are actively seeking to connect with their culture and explore Indigenous solutions to modern challenges. As one senior East Timorese UN adviser admitted:
“I do not really know about the real Timorese practice in my own community. So now I am trying to understand why they are doing this, to understand why we should have our own sacred house, because the sacred house is to bring together the kinship and all the relatives, the family” (TA-1100-090910).

In 2009 the Government produced guidelines on customary law. This guideline document recognises and records the practice but does not provide it with any formal legal status. Some local NGOs are working to record Indigenous knowledge to preserve it for future generations and to use it now to transform violence in communities. One East Timorese peacebuilding program manager explained the importance of recording this process:

“We have worked with the local community to promote local knowledge on traditional laws. We have to preserve it. So the community can use it as a model to resolve conflict at different levels” (TTO-1330-061010).

In Chapters Six and Seven I detail Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and explore East Timorese self-determination and peacebuilding practices.

### 3.3.3 Welfare colonialism and co-option

There are two major forms of structural violence that challenge Indigenous peoples striving to achieve self-determination: welfare colonialism and co-option. Both are outcomes of state-based neo-colonial policies, and both limit the effectiveness of Indigenous activism. Welfare colonialism, an internal neo-colonialist practice prevalent within the modern state, is a primary form of structural violence currently experienced by Indigenous peoples. Welfare colonialism is the deployment and institutionalisation of welfarist policies directed by modern governance processes, and this is linked to co-option, as outlined below. As Paine (1977, pp.xi, 3) who first used this term illustrated:

“We find a colonialism based on welfare, and a moral ‘double bind’ in the situation of those persons who make decisions on behalf of others…this kind of colonialism…is based on two illegitimate positions: the colonisers are illegitimately privileged, whereas the colonised are illegitimately devalued”.

Beckett (1987, p.14) further explains that welfare colonialism is a state instrument to manage Indigenous peoples, and is used when “The expropriation and marginalisation, which are the common outcomes of colonisation, have produced a level of poverty and deprivation [in the Indigenous group] that is beyond the capacity of the market or the welfare apparatus to remedy”. Jull (1986; 1991: p,54) described how welfare colonialism delegates power by co-opting Indigenous peoples into the modern system:
“A group of some type of formal authority carries out tasks with funds and program design determined by others outside the group or region. A welfare office on Indigenous land may be staffed by local people and may hand out the cheques and carry out other welfare functions within the guidelines of a higher authority”.

Co-option is the process by which Indigenous leaders become “tools of the state”, who are either “blind or complicit in the political subjugation of legitimate leaders” (Alfred, 1999, pp.30-31). Alfred (1999) highlights four methods the state uses to co-opt Indigenous peoples. First, the state influences the composition of community leadership by legitimising desirable people, relying on non-Native expertise, marginalising certain individuals and labelling ‘extremist’ views, and diverting attention from addressing structural flaws to managing the symptoms of colonialism. Then it amplifies community divisions to prevent unity and solidarity effectively challenging state power. Thirdly, the state removes the communities’ economic capacity for self-sufficiency in order to form welfare dependency on the state. Finally, it incorporates individual leaders and organisations who become agents of state policies and administration.

Alfred (1999, pp.75-76) criticises these co-opted Indigenous people for their “pathetic compromise of principle” whose actions are “nothing less than a betrayal” and whose “power derives from coercion and artifice – in effect, alienation from nature”. Boldt (1993) and Marule (1984, p.40) blame: “belief among some of our Indian [Indigenous] people that by replacing the white bureaucrats…with brown people, we will remedy all that is wrong with our situation”. Murphy (2000, p.67) argues that these policies lead Indigenous peoples to act as “brokers” or “Aboriginal experts” which “insulates government from the pressure of conflict”. Corntassel (2007, p.140) warns that co-option creates an “illusion of inclusion” incorporating Indigenous leaders and communities into the state power structures at the expense of their claims for Indigenous self-determination.

Welfare colonialism and co-option highlight the entrenched hierarchical relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, which play out subtly particularly in elite politics and dependency narratives. Corntassel (2007), Murphy (2000), Marule (1984) and Boldt (1993) argue that these practices demonstrate the structural violence inherent in neo-colonialism where Indigenous peoples actively participate in their own downfall. I emphasise that by marginalising Indigenous leadership and decision-making, policies of welfare colonialism and co-option prevent Indigenous peoples from realising their goals of Indigenous self-determination (Close, 2002). Welfare colonialism and co-option as structural forms of violence in Timor-Leste will be examined in detail in further chapters.
3.4 Indigenous self-determination

Indigenous self-determination is both a concept and a goal within Indigenous knowledge systems; it is also a process and a journey that all Indigenous peoples must take to fully realise their personal and community aspirations. Indigenous self-determination is the most fundamental right for Indigenous peoples, upon which all other rights are based. As Dodson (1999, p.44) asserts:

“Time and again Indigenous peoples express the view that the right to self-determination is the pillar on which all other rights rest. It is of such a profound nature that the integrity of all other rights depends on its observance. It is a right that has operated since time immemorial amongst our peoples, but it is the right that is at the centre of the abuses we have suffered in the face of invasion and colonisation. The dominant theme of our lives since colonisation has been that we have been deprived of the very basic right to determine our own future, to choose how we would live, to follow our own laws. When you understand that, you understand why the right to self-determination is at the heart of our aspirations”.

In *Peace Power Righteousness* Alfred (1999) describes the centrality of Indigenous self-determination and asserts that the current governance of Indigenous peoples is built on Western institutions of isolationism, welfare dependency, and co-option resulting in poverty and despair. Only when Indigenous communities are grounded in Indigenous values, will they heal these divisions. He argues for Indigenous communities to return to their customary political values to achieve Indigenous self-determination through the power of Indigenous systems and activism. To describe his vision of Indigenous self-determination, Alfred (1995) describes the complex Rotinohshonni model of Indigenous self-governance from the knowledge system of the Kahnawake-Mohawk peoples. He advocates for a new generation of Indigenous leaders who can resist the pressures of neo-colonialism and make Indigenous self-determination a reality.

There is no universal or pan-Indigenous model of self-determination and each Indigenous person and community will use their unique and plural Indigenous knowledge systems and varying historical, cultural, political, economic and geographic circumstances to understand and interpret Indigenous self-determination. There will be as many different types of Indigenous self-determination as there are Indigenous nations. Langton (cited in Dodson & Smith, 2003, p.3) agrees, noting that in Aboriginal Australia self-determination is “extremely localised…elaborated across regions”. For example, Indigenous self-determination in Timor-Leste is called *ukun rasik a’an*, a Tetum term that holistically encompasses sovereignty, self-determination, self-sufficiency and independence (Hunt, 2008a; La’o Hamutuk, 2003).

Therefore, not all Indigenous Nations will recognise, or even agree with, Alfred’s Rotinohshonni model of Indigenous self-determination but this model is only an example for
how other Indigenous peoples could begin a process of reflection and dialogue about how they would envision their own Indigenous self-determination (Garroutte, 2003). Indigenous self-determination as Alfred (1999) asserts, exists historically and theoretically outside the framework of Western theory and practice. Therefore the failure to currently attain Indigenous self-determination occurs because the modern governance system limits Indigenous self-determination to within the system. I argue that unless these issues of structural violence are directly addressed and resolved by Indigenous communities, they will not achieve Indigenous self-determination or positive peace.

Guidance exists, for example in the Declaration, to assist Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples to understand some of the vital processes, laws, protections, structures and institutions that may be necessary to construct to achieve Indigenous self-determination. I note that the Declaration frames these rights within the system. This is problematic, but I suggest is an important step toward systemic change (Jull, 2010, pers. comm., 30 January). To understand how this guidance was formed, the next section will explore how the right to Indigenous self-determination is articulated in the Declaration.

It is important to note that self-determination is broader than the concept of self-governance. Self-governance is defined as having “jurisdiction and a mandated control over the member of a group, its land and resources, ‘governance’ is about having the structures, processes and institutional capacity in place to be able to exercise that jurisdiction through sound decision-making, representation and accountability” (Dodson & Smith, 2003, p.2). Self-governance is the administration of management and leadership processes and systems necessary to enable Indigenous self-determination.

### 3.4.1 Indigenous internationalism

In the past few decades Indigenous peoples have made prodigious inroads into re-imagining their political landscape. The global groundswell toward greater collective political economic, social and cultural and legal autonomy is gaining momentum as peoples connect globally to discuss common problems and share experience and knowledge (Alfred, 1999; Berger, 1998; Corntassel, 2007; Deloria, 1973; Dodson, 1994; Henriksen, 1999; Jull, 1998; 1999; 2005; Niezen, 2003; Sanders, 1977; Semali & Kincheloe, 1999; Smith, 1999; Tauli Corpuz, 1999; 2004).

This section examines how Indigenous peoples have created a unified global political movement with common goals through processes of Indigenous internationalism. I examine the history of the creation of the Declaration, and the collective Indigenous right to self-
determination. I highlight the history of Indigenous internationalism because I believe there are a range of discussions and practical examples of Indigenous self-determination taking place globally that afford opportunities for solidarity and engagement between East Timorese and other Indigenous peoples.

The discourse and definition of self-determination is integral to international law and practice (Anaya, 1994; 1996; Fletcher, 1994; Lâm, 2000; Pritchard, 1998). The principle of self-determination has been recognised internationally since the 1919 League of Nations Charter and United States’ President Wilson’s 1918 speech to a joint session of Congress. Wilson and other liberal thinkers emphasised the right to self-determination for all nation peoples, and maintained that groups who attain self-determination are considered less likely to agitate toward aggressive territorial expansionism. Lynch (2002, p.419) argues that Wilson’s interpretation of self-determination was limited and relevant only when state concerns of security, politics and economics had been evaluated.

Chief Levi General Deskaheh led the first Indigenous diplomatic foray in 1923 to the League of Nations to request a hearing regarding his peoples’ dispute with the Canadian Government over self-government. The Canadian Government reacted dismissively and Deskaheh and his party were not heard or recognised formally by the League of Nations (Corntassel, 2008, pp. 109-110; Niezen, 2003). In 1924, Maori leader Tahupōtiki Wiremu Rātana travelled with a delegation to London and Geneva to protest the breaking of the Treaty of Waitangi but was denied access to the League of Nations. Deskaheh and Rātana successfully highlighted the moral and political dilemma of a constituent peoples seeking self-determination within an existing State.

Since the 1920s, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) within the UN system, created a series of treaties incorporating the rights of Indigenous peoples. The most crucial of which was the 1957 Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (ILO c107) and the updated 1989 ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO c169) which were the only international standards that stated that Indigenous peoples had the right to decide, control and participate in their own development. These treaties emphasised that states have the primary responsibility to develop and implement these rights and neither asserted collective rights for self-determination.

While self-determination is a legal tool, it is not a predetermined set of exact rules. The 1945 UN Charter restricted the term ‘peoples’ to citizens within states, preventing colonised and other assimilated peoples who were the victims of foreign occupation and domination from claiming self-determination (Pellet, 1998, p.105). Nevertheless the concept of self-
determination has experienced an evolution through subsequent UN texts, to be affirmed as *jus cogens*, a pre-emptory norm or right to prior acquisition (Panzironi, 2006; Pritchard, 1998). Self-determination was initially raised as a right for “all peoples” in the context of decolonisation in the 1960 *UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*. Panzironi (2006, p.80) explains that the 1966 *UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN ICCPR)* and the *UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN ICESCR)* set out, in legally binding terms, the notion of self-determination beyond its widespread understanding as an anti-colonial principle to that of a universal doctrine (UN General Assembly, 1966a; 1966b).

The formation of international organisations such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) (since 1973), the Indian Treaty Council (since 1974) and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (since 1975) provided structures for Indigenous peoples to collectively claim shared rights and goals. The Declaration evolved from this international Indigenous advocacy (Tauli Corpuz, 1999). Jull (1998) highlights the Indigenous power he witnessed when Inuit from Canada and Greenland and Saami from Finland, Norway and Sweden met at the inaugural 1973 ICC meeting. Dodson (cited in Niezen, 2003, p.47) also recalls the tremendous insight he experienced when participating in the 1998 UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN WGIP):

“I was sitting in a room, 12,000 miles away from home, but if I’d closed my eyes I could just about have been in Maningrida or Doomadgee or Flinders Island…We were all part of a world community of Indigenous peoples spanning the planet; experiencing the same problems and struggling against the same alienation, marginalisation and sense of powerlessness. We had gathered there united by our shared frustration with the dominant systems in our own countries and their consistent failure to deliver justice”.

Dodson and Jull’s experiences highlight that while Indigenous peoples have different knowledge systems and are geographically separated, they are members of a collective global Indigenous movement. This collective is a measure of Indigenous power and while slow moving, gives strength and sustainability to Indigenous assertions of their collective rights to self-determination (Jull, 1995; 1998).

I suggest that East Timorese activists, particularly those who feel the state and co-opted elites are not committed to achieving self-determination could seek to harness the power of this Indigenous solidarity and other global allies. I draw on Corntassel (2007), Churchill (2011), Venne (2011) and Watson (2011a; 2011b; 2014) to warn that there are risks in seeking authority and legitimacy through the same UN’s state-centric system that Indigenous peoples are simultaneously challenging. Churchill (2011) describes the Declaration as “a travesty of a mockery of a sham” and Corntassel (2007) contends that institutionalising and mainstreaming
Indigenous political movements within the UN system has impacted grassroots mobilisation toward Indigenous self-determination. Indigenous internationalism continues to be critical, but I would posit, should not be restricted to the UN.

### 3.4.2 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

After decades of debate, the Declaration was adopted by the Human Rights Council on 29 June 2006. On 13 September 2007 it was adopted by the UN General Assembly, and was endorsed by 143 countries (See Appendix F for the full Declaration text) (UN General Assembly, 2007). At that time, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand refused to endorse the Declaration, citing the unclear definition of Indigeneity, the linking of Indigeneity and self-determination, and concerns that issues of ownership of land and resources could provoke intra-state violence. The Declaration clearly incorporates rights within the boundaries of a pre-existing state and, with changes in political leadership and ongoing pressure from their Indigenous constituencies, all four countries have now endorsed the Declaration (Minde, 2008; Watson & Venne, 2012; Watson, 2011a; Werther, 1992, p.42).

The Declaration is the most substantial and authoritative international document detailing a broad consensus of Indigenous peoples needs and aspirations (Jull, 2010, pers. comm., 30 January; Lâm, 2000; Wilmer, 1993). The Declaration is not legally binding but some of the rights affirmed form part of customary international law (Adcock, 2014). There are problems of definition, universality and legitimacy associated with the Declaration, however, it unequivocally states that Indigenous peoples should occupy a privileged political and legal position within the UN (Bertrand, 1994; de Varennes, 1996, p.266; López-Reyes, 1995; Ryan, 2000).

Prior to the Declaration, no international standards specifically addressed Indigenous communal rights to self-determination (Anaya, 1996, p.114). The text asserts the full range of rights for Indigenous peoples to attain self-determination through five primary concepts divided between nine sections: recognition of collective human rights (I, VIII and IX); legal rights protecting against violent neo-colonial practices (II); cultural and social rights (III and IV); rights to traditional self-government (V) and territorial and/or political autonomy within the state-system (VII); and rights to economic sustainability and traditional resource management. The Declaration includes the need for Indigenous peoples’ active participation in self-governance (Article 4) and decision making that affects them (Article 18), it requires states to seek FPIC before adopting measures that will affect Indigenous peoples (Article 19) and highlights the right for Indigenous peoples to control land and resources as they choose (Article 26) (See Appendix F).

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After decades of Indigenous activism externally, and within the UN system the UNPFII was established in 2000 as the primary advisory body for Indigenous peoples within the UN system. The UNPFII is one of three UN bodies mandated to deal with Indigenous issues alongside the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (A-1000-010909; II-0700-230210). The Declaration is a significant achievement for all those Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous supporters who have fought to enable this text, however the arguably more difficult challenge of implementation remains (Adcock, 2014; Davis, 2008b; 2012; Jull, 2010, pers. comm., 30 January; Tauli Corpuz, 2004). My focus is on the Declaration’s prioritisation of development as a tool to achieve Indigenous self-determination. I term this goal Indigenous self-determined development and discuss this concept further in the next chapter.

3.5 Indigenous self-determined development

Development – while considered a theory, practice and a system – is also a collective right of all peoples and is linked to self-determination as recognised in Article 1 of the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development: “The human right to development also implies the full realisation of the right of peoples to self-determination” (UN General Assembly, 1986). The right to development asserts that fundamental issues of justice, equity, and consent must be at the basis of all development decision-making and action (Sengupta, 2000, pp.1-16). ILO c.169 (International Labour Organization, 1989) urges the importance of Indigenous people deciding their own priorities and participating in plans and programs that affect them directly.

As discussed above, both the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development and 1989 ILO c.169 are grounded in liberal, citizen and minority rights and locate the right to development inside the state (Turner, 2006). Problematically, neither prioritises Indigenous peoples’ FPIC (discussed below). These limitations signal the need for a broad definition of the Indigenous right to development. I draw on the Declaration to provide a more holistic definition of development that I use throughout this research (UN General Assembly, 2007). The Declaration explicitly raises the issue of development in Articles 3, 17, 20, 23 and 32, and addresses elements of development in Articles 1, 4, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 37, 39, 41 and 42.

Indigenous knowledge systems highlight the need for a holistic approach to development that values collective ownership, small-scale economies, and spiritual/physical ties to land and resources (Lynge, 1998; Minh-ha, 1995; Nietschmann, 1985; 1994). My working definition of Indigenous self-determined development is:
A holistic economic, social, cultural and ecologically sustainable process of societal systems change, that aims to expand human capabilities, reduce vulnerabilities and freely determine and develop the individual and communal well-being of the entire population, on the basis of their free, prior and informed consent.

The concept of Indigenous self-determined development, and an assessment of how this concept applies in practice in the current development system in Timor-Leste is discussed in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine.

3.5.1 Free, prior and informed consent

Indigenous self-determined development is owned and enacted by empowered Indigenous peoples, and is grounded in FPIC (Ward, 2011, pp.55-56). FPIC is “a requirement, prerequisite and manifestation” of the Indigenous rights to self-determination and development (Indian Treaty Council, 2008, p.2). In Articles 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, 30 and 32 the Declaration takes a holistic approach to the application of free prior and informed consent and specifies that it must occur in relation to reallocation, cultures and cultural property, legislation and administrative measures, the conservation and protection of the environment, land and territories, military activities, indeed all decision-making that relates to Indigenous lands, territories or other resources. The practice of FPIC is most clearly articulated in Article 32.2:

“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilisation or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources” [emphasis added] (UN General Assembly, 2007).

FPIC is a decision-making process that does not involve coercion or manipulation, is carried out before activities are undertaken and is founded upon decision-makers understanding the full range of issues and potential impacts. It involves granting or withholding consent (Weitzner, 2006). Researchers from Australia’s Desert Knowledge Cooperative Research Centre (2010) stress the importance of equal and respectful relationships to negotiate FPIC. The current development system is primarily focused on outcomes, and tends not to prioritise or incentivise relationship building. Mutual accountability and balanced power dynamics are implicit in the creation of consent, without FPIC, Indigenous self-determined development may not be achieved.

Although the Declaration is non-binding instrument within international human rights law, FPIC is a deeply contentious issue for states, bilateral, multilateral and private sector organisations within the current development system (Ward, 2011, p.84). Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and the United States which voted against the Declaration, specifically cited FPIC and third party rights among their chief concerns (UNGA, 2007). An Indigenous rights practitioner clarifies that free prior and informed consent is not technically a veto (O-1600-230909). If a process or a program does not meet FPIC criteria or negatively affects Indigenous peoples, then it may be subject to immediate cessation at the discretion of the Indigenous peoples involved (Indian Treaty Council, 2008, p.1).

A number of influential international institutions have specific policies focused on supporting the development of Indigenous peoples including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) (IWGIA, 2015). In 1982, the World Bank became the first multilateral institution to create a mandatory safeguards policy on Indigenous Peoples. This policy requires member states to undertake free, prior, and informed consultation before deciding on development programs affecting Indigenous Peoples (World Bank, 2011b; World Bank, 2013a).

The experiences of the World Bank indicate that operationalising consultation, let alone consent, has been challenging. Senior World Bank officials have assessed that this policy has been a very powerful incentive to force practical implementation of its recommendations, however, practical implementation of ‘consultation’ has been mixed, institutional change has been very slow, and Indigenous peoples continue to be harmed by World Bank development (Downing & Moles, 2002; O-1600-230909; K-0800-220909). The Indian Treaty Council (2005, p.5) argues that the World Bank’s interpretation of ‘consultation’ implies “an exchange of views devoid of any decision-making role”. Some participants argue that by using ‘consultation’, the World Bank has deliberately misinterpreted FPIC (K-0800-220909). A senior development practitioner asserted that FPIC should be used as the primary tool to balance power relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples:

“To me, the relationship is paramount. Until you have a reasonable relationship, then whatever agreement you get, will not be worth the paper it is printed on. The main point of the relationship is to recalibrate this huge asymmetry of power, which is absolutely inevitable. There are always language [and timing] barriers, which are very difficult…so it is open to negotiation. But negotiation is not meaningful between an elephant and a flea. Passing information and capacity building is all about rectifying this asymmetry of power” (K-0800-220909).

Strong community capacity to make informed decisions is crucial. Hunt’s (2008a, pp.261-262) research shows that capacity development was most effective when it “involved relationships, networking and exchanges, accompaniment and mentoring, and reflective learning”. These lessons align with UN Inter-Agency Team on National Capacity Development (2013) research
that promotes the role of long-term productive and constructive relationships to achieve capacity development.

FPIC enabled by strong relationships and capacity strengthening is the basis for self-determined development. I discuss issues of operationalising FPIC further in Chapters Seven and Eight.

3.6 Conclusion

I began this chapter by discussing the pluralism of Indigenous identity and defining Indigenous peoples as a collective that includes Indigenous peoples who are the majority and minority populations within a state. I explored some of the complexities raised when classifying East Timorese peoples as Indigenous and made a firm case that East Timorese peoples and their knowledge systems are Indigenous.

I located Indigenous knowledge systems as a powerful and authentic theoretical framework for Indigenous peoples to realise Indigenous self-determination. I explained how Indigenous critical theory can be used to analyse the structural and cultural violence experienced by Indigenous peoples. I postulate that welfare colonialism is an important concept to understand in the context of a conflict-affected developing country. I signal that co-option is also a useful term to critique the behaviours and decisions of Indigenous elite who reject Indigenous knowledge systems in favour of modern systems and liberal, democratic state-centred goals. Both of these concepts are relevant to my case study in Timor-Leste.

I also summarised the history of Indigenous internationalism and explored how the growth of political awareness and connectivity of Indigenous peoples internationally, has resulted in a proliferation of international law, norms and practice focused on Indigenous rights. This chapter examined the practical implications of these human rights mechanisms with a focus on the Declaration and the right to Indigenous self-determination. I suggest that Indigenous East Timorese peoples could engage with these international Indigenous fora to seek solidarity and learn and share innovative examples of Indigenous self-determination in practice. I finished by highlighting that the next challenge is the implementation of the Declaration, particularly Indigenous self-determined development.
4 The Development System in Timor-Leste

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a concise overview of the current development system. To begin, I define the current development system; I summarise key theories and major debates, structures and behaviours; and I note that this is a global system with complex, interconnected layers, multiple contexts and numerous actors. By establishing the barriers and challenges within this complex system at global, institutional and individual actor levels, I indicate the complexity and scope of the challenges Timor-Leste is currently contending with and how these challenges impact the achievement of self-determined development.

I will also explain the history and framework of the current development system and summarise the current development funding, policy and programming cycle. I explain the importance of the international institutions and structures including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Organisation of Economic Cooperation Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) and the G7+ (a group of twenty conflict-affected developing countries) that frame the current development system. I link the role of the MDGs, the OECD DAC and the G7+ in shaping and prioritising the East Timorese Government’s state-centric approach to development practice.

In this chapter I begin my analysis of Timor-Leste by providing a summary of the actors in the current development system. I describe how these dynamic relationships impact on violence and peacebuilding by drawing upon my field research and taking into account the policies and practices of bilateral and multilateral organisations, civil society and the private sector.

4.2 The current development system

In Chapter One I argued that development is a system constructed upon interconnected, multi-dimensional sets of relationships and fundamental queries of justice, equality and power (Meadows, 2008). Each society must experiment with innovative and context-specific ways to achieve these outcomes. I drew on Rihani (2002) and Ramalingam (2013) to argue that the current development system is fundamentally flawed due to its attempt to apply linear, mechanistic models to a complex, non-linear world. These two authors argue that solutions to multi-faceted problems emerge not from simple, predictable solutions but from trial and error grounded in interdependent variables, social networks, adaptation of behaviour and dynamic change. There are no specific technical solutions to the challenges communities face. Therefore,
Rihani (2002) and Ramalingam (2013) call for a paradigm shift in current theory and practice that directly acknowledges and engages with the unique development and peacebuilding challenges that communities face. My research upholds the argument that a longer term, strategic and political process of systemic transformation is necessary; where approaches that draw upon culture, power dynamics and relationships can enable development and peacebuilding solutions for each context.

The current development system has its roots in modernisation and Western post-World War Two discourses of geopolitical power and is global in scope (Desai & Potter, 2002; Kingsbury et al., 2008). Modernisation theorises that less developed countries’ shift away from customary cultural, social, political and economic norms as they become developed, prosperous and industrialised (Kingsbury et al., 2008; Kothari & Minogue, 2002; Rostow 1959; 1990). From this understanding arises the assumption that neo-liberal state-centric processes of economic growth, the rule of law, democratisation and modernisation are inherently beneficial (Emmerij, 1986; Preston, 1996). Modernisation is ethnocentric in its failure to consider any positive or redeeming characteristics in the non-modern. Many scholars argue that the current development system excludes Indigenous peoples; invalidating and marginalising their knowledge systems and framing them as powerless, problematic, non-scientific, irrational and primitive (Grenier, 1998; Lear, 2008; Sillitoe et al., 2002, p.3; Smith, 1999; Young 1999). Subsequently, there is an inherent conflict between modern and Indigenous views of development.

Development, modernisation and peace were first linked by the then US President Truman (1949) during his Inauguration speech. More recently Huntington (1998) and Fukuyama (1992) insinuated that alignment with Western neo-liberal democratisation leads to peace and prosperity because they assessed that few stable democratic states fought each other. This theory is grounded in Kantian notions of perpetual peace that asserts that democratic states seek economic growth through trade as opposed to inter-state violence (Kant, 1983). On the other hand, many scholars including Anderson (1999), Chand and Coffman (2008), Collier (2007), Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Richmond (2010; 2015) and Westoby and Dowling (2009) have linked the occurrence of insecurity and violence to ineffective or unequal development. These scholars assert that ineffective development has hindered local and external efforts to strengthen peace and security. Insecurity and violence signal the existence of deeper systemic barriers to peacebuilding within the current development system.

Aid effectiveness is the degree to which the development system succeeds in meeting its justice, equality and power objectives, and is the subject of a number of opposing theoretical discourses regarding the extent of this success. Many researchers and organisations (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; UN General Assembly, 2015; Yunus, 1999) believe that, on a global scale, development
has achieved some of its objectives, most notably a reduction of poverty, the prevention of
diseases, an increase in rates of education and improved access to clean water and basic
sanitation.

While the evidence shows that global poverty levels have reduced somewhat, this gain has been
ameliorated by the subsequent increase in inequality – a root cause of structural violence. Many
researchers and practitioners including Anderson (1999), Bauer (1976; 1986), Donini (2010),
(1999; 2001), Walker and Pepper (2007) and Walker and Russ (2010) have acknowledged the
ineffectiveness of the current development system to alleviate poverty and inequality.

These scholars commonly identify structural violence and inequality, as major flaws of the
current development system, noting that global development interventions, worth millions of
dollars per annum over the past sixty years, have not yet achieved the outcomes they promised.
The system is seen to have failed given that its underlying worldview and assumptions do not
account for the complexity of the challenges it seeks to transform (Escobar, 1995; Pieterse,
2000; Sachs, 1992; World Bank, 1997). Rihani (2002, p.2) asserts this failure:

“The scale and frequency of development failures and the inability of the experts to
change course, point to systematic problems associated with the framework within
which development is conceived and pursued”.

Reacting to development system challenges, practitioners have introduced a range of measures
to improve effectiveness. Chambers (2014) discusses the importance of participatory research
that has resulted in widespread use of more inclusive, participant-focused methodologies.
Results-based management processes are now broadly used to measure and analyse impact,
although the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian
Action (ALNAP) (2003, p.107) explain that it is extremely difficult to assess results without
adequate qualitative or quantitative indicators, clear objectives, baseline data and monitoring.
Sen (1999; 2001) has developed a framework that includes the measurement of an individual’s
increased capabilities to better understand the effect of development. Researchers including
participants to define capabilities and priorities for their unique context. Indigenous critical
theorists claim that these participatory methodologies are still facilitated by outsiders – donors,
consultants, multinationals, private sector and INGOs – and that the power relationship between
outsiders and Indigenous peoples is not equal (Novellino, 2003, pp.273-297). In response to the
challenges of development practice a number of international actors and institutions have been
working together to develop best-practice guidance to improve development effectiveness.
4.2.1 International guidance on development practice

Given concerns about the effectiveness of the current development system, since 1960 the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has set and monitored international guidance on development practice. Through the OECD DAC the international development community responded to such criticisms by expanding the number of targets, goals and policies. International practitioners developed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (the Fragile States Principles) (2007), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and formed the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (OECD, 2007; 2008; 2010a). These actions elicited further censure.

In 2012 the OECD DAC reported that only one of thirteen Paris Declaration targets on aid effectiveness had been met. Furthermore, it reported a considerable variation in the pace of development between countries. While the Paris Declaration is seen to increase accountability, knowledge and learning, and strengthen good practice norms, overall many targets are unrealistic and immeasurable, efficiency gains have been disappointing, and progress has been slow, uneven and not integrated into country systems (Chandy, 2011; OECD, 2012b; Wood et.al., 2011). For example, the Fragile States Principles have been criticised for perpetuating hegemonies of state power and have insufficient contextual analysis leading to pre-packaged solutions, inadequate local ownership and insufficient funding (Baranyi & Desrosiers, 2012; Naudé et.al., 2011; Nay, 2013; Ware, 2014; Wyeth, 2012).

International actors have also developed the MDGs, and now the SDGs, to identify targets for aid: maternal and child health, access to universal primary education and adequate shelter required to reduce global poverty are all examples. The MDGs have attracted significant criticism primarily because they are seen as unaccountable, donor-driven, not flexible or context-specific, overly simplistic and unachievable (Amin, 2006; Fehling et.al., 2013; Fukuda-Parr, 2010; Hill et.al., 2010; Oya, 2011; Reddy & Heuty, 2008; Sachs, 2012; Waage et.al., 2010). Minimal community participation in their development has led to limited ownership at a country and community level (Fukuda-Parr, 2006; Haines & Cassels, 2004). The MDGs also neglect human security, security sector reform and governance. These are all linked to stability, a necessary precursor for effective development (Karver et.al., 2012; Melamed & Scott, 2011). The recently affirmed SDGs, while identifying more targets and goals than the MDGs, are criticised as being too broad, aspirational, unachievable, difficult to measure and weak on gender equality.
In response to these criticisms, many development practitioners reject these internationally agreed ‘technocratic’ methods and are instead engaging with local or community-level cultural and social systems to achieve development. For example, Westoby and Dowling (2009) argue that many development problems require social solutions rather than shallow, technical results. By focusing on the latter, they suggest that development loses its capacity for community solidarity (the basis for the legitimacy of development) and becomes co-opted by modernity, triggering a crisis of legitimisation.

Since the 2010 inaugural meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, Timor-Leste has played a leading role in the G7+. The G7+, a group of states representing 1.5 billion of the world’s poorest people, are critical of the current development system (Wyeth, 2012). The G7+ and partner countries developed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the New Deal) (OECD, 2012a). Within the G7+, two of the more influential Fragile States Principles have been Principle One: “Take context as the starting point”, and Principle Three: “Focus on state-building as the central objective” (OECD, 2007). Consequently, the New Deal pushes for decision making and development funding to be channelled through developing country government systems and G7+ states tend to focus on centralised institutional capacity building to achieve statebuilding (OECD, 2010a; 2011; Pires, 2012; Wignaraja, 2009).

I caution that the New Deal is risky because it continues to perpetuate state-centric power structures that reduce community or citizen-level participation in development decision-making. Empowering language masks the continued focus on shallow, technical solutions. In practice, the G7+ approach skews funding away from NGOs and civil society to formal state systems, which risks compounding minimal community participation, creating an unbalanced power dynamic that compounds inequality between elites and citizens. Hunt (2008a) asserts that a strong and vibrant civil society is critical to keeping the state transparent and accountable to its citizens. UNDP (2013a) highlights that sustainable peace is founded in strong community capacity and resilient institutions with genuine national ownership. I caution that if international practitioners continue to channel funding primarily to the state, in line with the G7+ and other institutions’ guidance, these practices may exacerbate structural violence. This issue is examined more closely in Chapters Five to Eight.

4.2.2 The planning cycle

To ensure the achievement of internationally determined goals discussed above, an overwhelming number of institutions and actors, following both annual and multi-year planning cycles, perpetuate the current development system. These planning cycles (shown in Table 4)
are mostly linear with six main inputs, which allow organisations and stakeholders to track progress and timeframes, and to identify and manage risks (Anderson et.al., 2007). Ongoing learning and accountability is an important component but tends to be overly technical and relatively inflexible. From personal experience, it is not uncommon for development interventions to take several years before reaching the implementation phase, mainly due to the lengthy analysis and design processes undertaken.

Table 4: The planning cycle of international development organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy and Program Identification</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The organisation works with stakeholders to define key sectors and areas requiring technical or financial assistance. Objectives, imminent risks, alternative scenarios and a likely timetable for engagement are identified. Analysis is critical to building a comprehensive understanding of the context, needs and interests of all stakeholders. If not undertaken correctly, programs may target the wrong sectors, inappropriate stakeholders or fail to target root causes of violence.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Program Design</th>
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<tr>
<td>The organisation and stakeholders are responsible for undertaking a scoping/design mission and consulting with all stakeholders to map needs, interests and capacities. Systems required for financial management, procurement, reporting, monitoring and evaluation are agreed. Overarching issues such as environment, gender equality, and anti-corruption would be integrated into the design.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Program Appraisal</th>
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<tr>
<td>The strategy and programs are usually appraised in a peer review process that gives stakeholders an opportunity to review the program design and resolve outstanding questions. Stakeholders confirm the expected program objectives, intended beneficiaries and evaluation tools for monitoring progress. If incorrect or limited stakeholders are involved, any agreement on the design is problematic and can lead to future tensions.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Program Implementation</th>
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<tr>
<td>The bilateral, multilateral, non-government or private sector organisation implements the program under the strategy. The program's progress, outcomes and impact are monitored by the implementing agency throughout this phase to obtain evaluation data and measure the effectiveness and results of the program.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Program Completion</th>
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<tr>
<td>When a program is completed, the organisation and the stakeholders document the results; the problems encountered; the lessons learned; and the knowledge gained. The report describes and evaluates final program outcomes and compares them to expected results. The knowledge gained from this measurement of results aims to benefit similar future programs. If feedback does not occur, mistakes can become compounded.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation is undertaken throughout the cycle. It begins in the program identification phases and acts to support effective change. This process aims for ongoing testing of predicated and actual outcomes. In many cases M&amp;E is used to make program changes to achieve short-term or political outcomes.</td>
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</table>
I include this example of a planning cycle to establish some of the complexities and barriers within the development system described by Rihani (2002). The planning cycle compounds the inflexibility of the current development system at an institutional level. In Chapters Seven and Eight I will detail these systemic barriers and demonstrate that this planning cycle contributes to the difficulties for practitioners to engage in systems transformation.

4.2.3 Actors within the current development system

This section emphasises the range and breadth of actors within the current development system. The current development system became an industry with the creation of a professionalised international civil service within the UN in 1945. International practitioners operate at local, district, national, international, regional, and transnational (global) levels.

There are three core groups of practitioners within the current development system: public sector (which includes bilateral and multilateral organisations and development financial institutions (DFIs)); civil society (for example NGOs, CSOs, faith-based organisations, grassroots organisations); and the private (business) sector. Actors within the current development system fit loosely into three categories: donors (organisations that provide funding), implementers (organisations that manage programs that use these funds) and recipients (organisations, groups and individuals who are the beneficiaries of this funding and programs). Many actors fit into more than one of these categories.

DFIs aim to support private sector development by making loans, finances and technical assistance available at competitive global rates for developing countries, facilitating “a particular, capitalist-friendly, neoliberal version of development” (Kothari & Minogue, 2002, p.2). More traditional private sector organisations, including from the resource extraction, education, financial, and infrastructure industries, are also actively engaging with governments and communities to drive development (Ford, 2015). The corporatisation of the development system has helped to scale up implementation, but has also resulted in ‘boomerang aid’, where high salaries for international consultants can create dual economies and increase inequalities between local communities and international practitioners (Anderson, 2012; La’o Hamutuk, 2009).

International and local NGOs are usually facilitators for civil society and also work with governments. They aim to enhance public awareness, build trust, enable dialogue, generate political pressure for change and deliver development programs. Due to their relatively small scale their effectiveness can be limited and they face constraints from donors (Hulme & Goodhand, 2000; Hunt, 2008a, p.52). Indigenous organisations represent and manage the
interests of their Indigenous members, and are usually community-centred, endogenous and culturally constructed (Dodson & Smith, 2003; Hemming et al., 2011; Hemming & Rigney, 2012; Hunt, 2008b; Hunt et al., 2008). Sometimes NGOs can perpetuate authoritarian hierarchies and top-down governance and Indigenous organisations can enable co-option and welfare colonialism.

International practitioners often have significantly different expectations from those of their local counterparts about salaries, accommodation and workplace facilities, and have diverse work and communication styles (Currion, 2015). Donini (2007, p.49) says international practitioners are “generally far-removed from the realities of the people they purport to help”. The World Bank (2015, p.18) states international practitioners “may assume that poor individuals may be less autonomous, less responsible, less hopeful, and less knowledgeable than they in fact are”. Easterly (2014) is more explicit, arguing that deep racism and a willful neglect of history by international practitioners results in the flawed premise that poor people can not be trusted to make their own decisions.

I agree with Spence and McLeod (2002, p.63) who affirm the fundamental importance of relationships between actors; asserting that peacebuilding practitioners must consistently model the values, attitudes and behaviours necessary for positive peace. Grenfell (2012, p.213) specifies that international peacebuilding practitioners must be ontologically reflexive, actively questioning their own positions of modernity, to engage with different and plural ways of being and knowing without subscribing hierarchies of knowledge. Without constant reflexivity and modeling positive peace, international practitioners can become the instruments of oppression that they seek to alleviate. Unequal power relationships can potentially cause violence. I discuss the importance of relationships in detail in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.

### 4.3 The development system in Timor-Leste

In this next section I provide a broad overview of the current development system in Timor-Leste. I summarise the current process of development sectoral coordination, and some of the ongoing challenges.

During my field research many international and some East Timorese participants framed development within the current system, promoting the alleviation of poverty and improvement of socio-economic conditions through sustained economic growth and a liberal trade agenda. Other East Timorese and international practitioners envisioned development as a positive, holistic societal transformation for the benefit of future generations (TL-1300-170910; TK-
Timor-Leste is one of the highest recipients of ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) per capita in the world. Between 1999 and 2013 the OECD estimates that Timor-Leste received USD 3.408 billion in ODA funds (OCED, 2015). Overall ODA has been decreasing as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a result of strong economic growth, resource sector wealth and growing private sector investment. For example, the net official ODA received in 2012 was 5.69 per cent of GNI, a significant decrease from 2000, where net ODA received was 42.02 per cent of GNI (UNDP, 2013b, p.184). However: “[The] share of people living under the national poverty line increased from thirty-six per cent in 2001 to fifty per cent in 2007” (Government of Timor-Leste & UNDP, 2009). This data reveals that despite significant ODA funds, poverty is widespread and persistent (OECD, 2010b, p.10).

East Timorese NGO La’o Hamutuk (2010, p.10) estimates that between 1999 and 2009 Timor-Leste received approximately USD 5.2 billion in ODA (a calculation significantly higher than the OECD’s own figure). La’o Hamutuk calculates that in that time only one-tenth, or USD 550 million, reached Timor-Leste’s economy. Nine-tenths of these funds were spent on international salaries, foreign soldiers, overseas procurement, foreign supplies, consultant fees and overseas administration. Notwithstanding the differences in data between OECD and La’o Hamutuk, if La’o Hamutuk’s calculations are even close to the net ODA that reached Timor-Leste, these figures highlight serious inequalities and inefficiencies within the current development system in Timor-Leste.

4.3.1 Development sectoral coordination in Timor-Leste

Successfully meeting the vast development and peacebuilding challenges across Timor-Leste relies on effective coordination between all stakeholders. Coordination is difficult due to the complexity and scale of the task; time pressures; centralised decision-making; effectiveness of capacity development efforts; the multiplicity and fragmentation of donor-funded programs; and the need for assistance to be appropriately sequenced and phased (OECD, 2010a).

Six-monthly donor conferences, coordinated by UNTAET, were held from December 1999 to 2002. Since 2002 the Government has been working to create a clear strategic direction, realistic annual plans, manage donor funds in line with the national budget and planning process, and convene quarterly and annual Development Partners Meetings. Coordination is led by the National Directorate of Planning and External Assistance Coordination (NDPEAC) and

1700-160910). Many participants saw development as inextricably linked to self-determination (TTG-1500-300910).
the Aid Effectiveness Directorate within the Ministry of Planning and Finance. Government-led
coordination has been relatively effective given the constraints caused by shared languages,
unclear information and mixed participation from development actors (Ashcroft, 2014; TW-
1730-240910; TTC-1230-290910). Many NGOs identify their limited participation in
consultation processes as problematic.

In 2002, the Government created the 2020 Vision for Development and the 2020 National
Development Plan (NDP), focused on economic growth and democratisation and aligned
closely with the MDGs (Rodriguez-Garcia et.al., 2005). In 2007 a National Recovery Strategy
and an annual National Priorities Process was adopted to respond to the 2006 Crisis (see
Chapter Five for further analysis). Many donors found this short-term top-down planning
confusing and difficult to align with, so the Government created a medium-term Strategic
Development Plan (SDP) 2011–2030 focused on social capital, infrastructure development,
governance and institutional strengthening and economic development (República Democrática
de Timor-Leste, 2011a) (see Case Study in Chapter Eight for further discussion on the SDP
process). These centralised decision-making processes point to limited East Timorese citizens’
participation in development.

In line with the New Deal and other OECD DAC guidance, the Government has focused on the
prioritisation of centralised statebuilding and establishing a comprehensive legislative and
regulatory framework (OECD, 2010a; República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2011a). I argue
that by prioritising Fragile States Principle Three (“Focus on statebuilding as the central
objective”) the Government and international development organisations have failed to equally
balance the distribution of development funding in Timor-Leste across all areas of need (OECD,
2007).

Since 1999 the majority of development funding has been on economic infrastructure and other
social sectors, primarily the security and public sectors. Figure 1 (below) indicates that this
model has resulted in a huge skewing of funds away from sectors that directly impact the
majority rural population, including road infrastructure, rural development and agriculture. The
capacity constraints of the Government, particularly the failure to deliver critical services to
rural East Timorese, has sparked criticism that challenges the legitimacy of the state and the
effectiveness of the current development system.
This skewed funding model further unbalances development efforts, leading to tension between the Government and organisations delivering sectoral priorities, and communities who seek development outcomes, particularly in basic health and education, which were less than twenty per cent of bilateral ODA funding in 2011–2012. I would argue that this skewed funding model highlights the flawed development priorities of the Government and its international partners. I further highlight the implications of limited engagement of Government and international decision-makers with communities in Chapters Five to Eight.

4.3.2 Development actors in Timor-Leste

One of the first steps to understanding violence is to first identify key actors. Most actors have multiple interests and drivers for their behaviours and incentives. All actors are linked: through institutions, structures and behaviours, common language and experiences, or familial and umalulik ties. Some actors are powerful, some are ignored and some are resistant to systems transformation. It is critical to understand the power asymmetries, motivations and incentives to strategically engage to seek common ground and transform the root causes of violence. In any context there are ‘hard to reach’ individuals; groups or communities or challenging sectors that are missing out on critical interventions. These actors, nicknamed ‘spoilers’ by Stedman (1997), are important to identify when engaged in peacebuilding practice because they often have complex capacities to build and sustain peace as ‘unifiers’ and trigger and sustain further violence (Chigas, 2003; Chigas & Woodrow, 2009, p.50; Newman & Richmond, 2006).

This will be taken up in detail in further chapters; this section is an overview to introduce key actors in post-1999 Timor-Leste. While this section does not capture all the groups engaged in the development system in Timor-Leste post-1999, it does indicate the broad range of actors working across the country (also see Appendix G). I will summarise key actors, their role in the
development system, and their links to other key actors. This information is drawn from the Government and bilateral, multilateral and non-government organisations.

4.3.2.1 East Timorese Government

From 2002 the Government has had responsibly to govern across a country that has geographically isolated communities, poor infrastructure, and ongoing incidents of violence and insecurity. Most of the newly elected politicians, ministers and bureaucrats had limited capacity for democratic governance, severely constrained state resources, and were unable to respond rapidly to meet development needs (Hunt, 2008a). They had few clear guidelines and a massively challenging governing mandate. Many had fought or been active in the resistance and the many were part of the newly returned diaspora. Since 2002, the Government has grown progressively more confident and effective, although there remain significant institutional, legislative, regulatory and administrative challenges. In February 2015 the Sixth Constitutional Government was sworn in with a smaller executive, reduced from fifty-five to thirty-eight members, to better coordinate and focus on development results.

4.3.2.2 East Timorese Non-Government Organisations and civil society

Since 1976 NGOs have cooperated with the Indonesian authorities to support community development. Others were subversive: they both supported development and played a critical resistance role by pressuring the international community for human rights and humanitarian relief (Hunt, 2004; 2008a). In 1998 fourteen local NGOs formed the East Timor NGO Forum to help coordinate their efforts but it could not function until after September 1999 (Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 1 July). By December 2000 approximately two hundred local NGOs were operating and by 2004 there were over three hundred (Hunt, 2004; 2008a, pp.311-312). These numbers show enormous growth in the number of local NGOs, which included cooperatives, trade unions, media, human rights groups, women’s, student, church and youth groups.

A strong civil society is essential to hold government accountable. In Timor-Leste many local NGOs and civil society were excluded from development decision-making by the UN, other international actors and now government. In the early 2000s, parts of the Government were suspicious of NGOs political motives (Hunt, 2008a, pp.253-255,276). Although a few strong local NGOs continue to operate effectively, one international program manager explained that: “Civil society has been absorbed and co-opted. Some of the leadership is going over into government positions. It is complex to know how to engage meaningfully in government processes” (TTC-1230-290910).
4.3.2.3 Women

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) highlights that it is critical that women are equally included in all peacebuilding and governance processes. Women were active in the resistance against Indonesia, and since 1999, have continued to play leadership roles in government and civil society, publicly advocating for women’s participation at all levels. Today, however, this participation remains shallow and tokenistic, and many rural and less educated women are excluded. Gendered and age hierarchies, social status and familial relationships continue to dominate a woman’s ability to participate (Morrison, 2015, pp.9-10). The UN, the Government, international organisations and NGOs have been instrumental in highlighting women’s issues and have been active in designing laws, policies, programs and services to support gender equality and the empowerment of women. Rede Feto (Tetum: NGO network of Women’s Groups) has coordinated and supported women’s organisations push for greater gender equality, including advocating for legislation that supported quotas for women’s seats in parliament and in local-level elections and decision-making bodies (Hunt, 2008a, p.258). Nevertheless, women remain marginalised and disproportionately affected by violence.

4.3.2.4 Youth

Youth are potentially both instigators and moderators of violence. Here defined as aged between eighteen and thirty-five, youth usually do not hold Indigenous leadership or senior government positions because political and ritual authority are associated with increasing age (Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Wigglesworth (2005, p.125) describes East Timorese youth in the resistance as mature, rational, calm and inclusive, and many of the NGO leaders in the early 2000s were youth (Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 9 December). After 1999, many youth felt alienated from governance and decision-making processes. An INGO worker said:

“They are, as a group, the prime target for manipulation, the primary catalyst and agent and manipulators of violence in the country. [Manipulation] comes from the Government, from political parties” (TP-1830-200910).

Youth are often urban economic migrants, living apart from their customary familial systems. As a result of poor access to education and high youth unemployment, urban youth are particularly vulnerable to armed gangs, criminal activity and political manipulation (Scambary, 2009; 2013). Scambary (2006) demonstrates that youth are also engaging in positive activities aimed at unifying their communities. Wigglesworth (2005, p.127) reports that the participation of young women, who have not traditionally participated in decision-making and power-sharing
with men, is particularly important, while Crockford (2000, p.226) argues that young women should be provided with education and support to take on new roles in society.

### 4.3.2.5 Catholic Church

The Catholic Church is integral to East Timorese identity and unification and is strongly integrated within East Timorese cultural, governance and education systems. 96.9 per cent of East Timorese claim to be Catholics, but at the same time 70 per cent also practice forms of Indigenous knowledge (National Statistics Directorate, 2011, p.xvi; Rawnley, 2004, p.6). These belief systems are pragmatically viewed as mutually reinforcing, and across Timor-Leste many churches are located alongside *uma lulik*, and share symbolic icons (Ospina & Hohe, 2002; Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.31-32).

Many of Timor-Leste’s key leaders were educated through the Catholic school system and it played an important part in developing the nationalist movement (Cabral, 2002; da Silva, 2012). During Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church was an outspoken critic though its transnational social solidarity networks, especially during Pope John Paul’s visit in 1989 (Cristalis, 2009, p.32; Walsh, 2001, p.31; Wise, 2004, pp.162-166). Some East Timorese are critical of the Church in pressing for the abandonment of Indigenous practices, and there is also frustration with the Church’s conservatism toward gender equality. Candio and Bleiker (2001, p.71) suggest that the Catholic Church, combined with a vibrant civil society, are key actors in counter-balancing the potentially authoritarian and undemocratic government and profit-driven private sector.

### 4.3.2.6 East Timorese diaspora

After the 1999 referendum, many of the diaspora returned home from Portugal, Mozambique, Macao, Australia, Indonesia and other countries. Many of the diaspora had been active in the diplomatic resistance and student solidarity movements supporting East Timorese self-determination, but mostly they had not experienced the violence and trauma of the majority of the population and therefore were professionally and psychologically better able to position themselves in the independent Timor-Leste.

The diaspora are not homogenous. Crockford (2000, pp.228-229) describes “hierarchies of suffering”, where many East Timorese believe that those who “stayed at home” are more authentically East Timorese. Divisions within the diaspora, and between the diaspora and the general population were exacerbated by international practitioners who found it easier to
employ and engage with the diaspora with whom they had common languages, and who dominated leadership and decision-making (Candio & Bleiker, 2001, p.73). These inequalities compounded resentments between citizens and the educated elite that had existed since Portuguese times (Ingram, 2012, p.7).

**4.3.2.7 Bilateral organisations**

Prior to 1999 the only bilateral development organisation in Timor-Leste was Australia. By 2013 Timor-Leste received ODA funding from twenty-one bilateral development partners and Australia, the European Union, and Portugal were the three largest bilateral donors (OECD DAC, 2015). Since 2002 funding has been aligned to the Government’s strategic plans focusing on education, infrastructure, agriculture, security sector reform and institutional capacity-building (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2013; 2014). Many bilateral development organisations claim their interventions have been well-harmonised, neutral and flexible, and there have certainly been some effective programs. Significant criticism has also been levelled at bilateral aid effectiveness in Timor-Leste (OECD, 2010b). Bilateral partners are accused of working too fast and in short time frames, using confusing delivery modalities, perpetuating boomerang aid, and holding implicit political and economic motivations (Anderson, 2003; 2006; 2012; Fernandes, 2004).

**4.3.2.8 The United Nations**

On 20 September 1999, INTERFET (International Force in East Timor) was tasked to restore security and facilitate humanitarian assistance (Martin, 2001; Smith & Dee, 2003; UN Security Council, 1999b). Soon afterwards on the 25 October 1999, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was tasked with the most complex and comprehensive transitional administrative mandate the UN had undertaken to date. UNTAET was the first time the UN had exercised sovereignty over territory. This unprecedented mandate and short deployment timeframe created unique challenges and responsibilities (Chesterman, 2002; Rae, 2009; UN Security Council, 1999c). An independent review of the UN-sponsored Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) which coordinated all development funding and budgets noted some positive achievements but emphasised the failure to ensure local participation, consult with local leaders, or to value and use the existing governance system (see Bugnion et al., 2000). Chopra (2002, p.979), former head of UNTAET’s Office of District Administration, argues that by failing to decentralise and enable genuine East Timorese participation “the UN has given birth to a failed state”.

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UNTAET ceded to the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) at independence in May 2002 and then to the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) in May 2005. Each subsequent administration was smaller and with a reduced mandate (UN Security Council, 2002; 2005). Given the 2006–2008 violence, the UN has been widely accused of scaling down too quickly (ICG, 2006, pp.21–22). In August 2006 the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was created with a new expanded mandate including the command of national policing. UNMIT’s mandate was extended until December 2012 (UN Security Council, 2006). A regular UN country mission remains.

4.3.2.9 Multilateral Organisations and Development Financial Institutions

By 2013 Timor-Leste had received ODA funding from nineteen multilateral organisations (OECD, 2015). The World Bank organised a Joint Assistance Mission with the UN and East Timorese counterparts in October–November 1999, co-chaired with UNTAET the first donor meeting in December 1999, and managed all sector-based reconstruction financing through the multi-donor Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET). Since 2000 the World Bank has managed large development programs focused on private sector strengthening, infrastructure and governance targeting economic growth (see case study in Chapter Eight for more details on the World Bank’s Community Empowerment and Local Governance Program (CEP)). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been operating in Timor-Leste since 2004, working with the Government and the private sector to promote employment and sustainable livelihoods. They provide technical assistance and support government regulation for private sector investment, build basic infrastructure and provide microfinance (International Monetary Fund, 2005; 2014).

The neo-liberal World Bank and IMF model of reconstruction and financing promotes free market political economy principles which, Candio and Bleiker (2001, p.74) warn, “widens already existing social disparities”. A World Bank (2003, pp.23-24) report acknowledges that poor coordination between the Bank and UNTAET lead to fragmentation of funding mechanisms across all sectors, hampering efforts to strengthen capacity. The report also notes that the World Bank avoided working with ‘spoilers’ or key political and development challenges, including ex-combatants and addressing property rights.

Since 1999 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has supported economic growth to drive poverty reduction and is an implementing agency of the TFET for infrastructure rehabilitation and micro financing. The ADB has been criticised for its “poorly conceived and regressive” microfinance programs that were controlled by donors, not by East Timorese, and for spending TFET funds on extravagant international consultant fees whose performance was “unsatisfactory” (Aid/Watch, 2001; La’o Hamutuk, 2005, pp.34-35). World Bank and ADB
procurement rules were inflexible which delayed and complicated implementation (World Bank, 2003).

4.3.2.10 International Non-Government and Civil Society Organisations

International non-government organisations (INGOs) became involved in Timor-Leste in 1974–1975 to provide humanitarian assistance. In 1979 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) were permitted entry, provided they worked closely with Indonesian authorities. It was difficult to operate under Indonesian scrutiny (CAVR, 2005, pp.49-50,86-87; Hunt, 2008a, pp. 90,102). From September 1999 the access and roles of INGOs changed and they became critical intermediaries for aid delivery and a key source of financial and capacity support to local NGOs. By 2000, 112 INGOs worked in Timor-Leste and during 1999–2004 when larger amounts of ODA were provided to Timor-Leste, many INGOs expanded to work across a range of sectors (Engel, 2003; Hunt, 2008a, p.311). In 2015 comparatively few INGOs remain. Many have recruited East Timorese to senior positions and there are few expatriates. Hunt (2008, pp.112,116) highlights that, in 1999, INGOs had nil or inadequate institutional knowledge about Timor-Leste and had limited shared language skills, which led to difficulties working with local NGOs and civil society. Many East Timorese were critical of INGO’s focus on ‘service delivery’ to the detriment of seeking communities’ active participation and ownership in decisions about their development needs (Brunnstrom, 2000; Bugnion et.al., 2000; Hunt, 2008a).

A number of think-tanks including the Asia Foundation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the ICG have provided influential advice and analysis and have worked with local institutions to support reform and education. In 1999 Friendship Cities – voluntary networks linking local council municipalities in Australia to towns and villages in Timor-Leste – started to direct development assistance to rural communities with minimal administration costs (Hill & Thomas, 2005; Spence, 2006; Spence & Ninnes, 2007). Friendship Groups are criticised for their highly-fragmented way of operating; with no oversight or regular evaluation, these programs were said to waste resources, lack coordination and are not needs based (Ninnes, 2005). Spence and Ninnes (2007) explain that successful Friendship Agreements have a common commitment to long-term trust-building, careful prioritisation of needs, and clearly articulated intentions and capacity.
4.3.2.11 Private sector

The private sector has three major areas in Timor-Leste: the development financial institutions (DIFs) that aim to support private sector investment; international and local private sector companies that deliver development programs; and private sector companies engaged in business and resource extraction. Ford (2015) said that in Timor-Leste the UN and international practitioners ignored the private sector as a potential peacebuilding actor.

The World Bank (2013b) ranks Timor-Leste 172 out of 189 in the “Ease of Doing Business” survey. It is very difficult to register land or enforce contracts and there are few legal rights for borrowers and lenders. International private sector companies have been established to design, deliver, and monitor development programs flexibly and with reduced cost (Huysentruyt, 2011). Since 2009 local private sector companies have received Government and international development funds to implement development programs, particularly for rural infrastructure. Elite East Timorese own many of these companies. International resource extraction companies are currently playing a key role in the growth of Timor-Leste’s economy. Many of these resource extraction companies, and also banks and financial institutions, provide funding for development and corporate social responsibility programs to the communities with which they engage.

Critics warn that these profit-seeking enterprises reduce accountability for states and distort the objective of alleviating poverty. There have subsequently been claims of corruption, nepotism, overspending, and minimal community consultation or participation, further exacerbating inequality. There remain concerns that private sector investment is benefiting a few elite, while the majority of communities continue to lack access to business opportunities, or to scale up their current activities (ICG, 2013, pp.5-6).

4.4 Conclusion: Development ineffectiveness in Timor-Leste

I argue that the current development system is highly complex and interconnected and is dominated by Western, state-based liberal democratic, modernist underpinnings. It is characterised by linear, mechanistic models and inflexible guiding principles. This global system has numerous actors with competing agendas and top-down hierarchies.

Current development interventions are not centred on Indigenous knowledge systems but on modernism, liberal democracy, the rule of law and economic growth. In Chapter Three I explained that Indigenous peoples’ goals of self-determination may challenge the current development system’s state-centric goals. For Indigenous self-determined development to be
implemented significant transformation of the current development system must occur. International practitioners must be at the forefront of facilitating these changes if they are to remain relevant.

Success from some of the MDGs provides evidence that global poverty has been alleviated. In 2011 Timor-Leste moved into the lower Middle Income Country (MIC) category due to increased income from offshore petroleum, however I argue that this gain has been accompanied by the subsequent increase in inequality, a root cause of structural violence. The focus on institutional capacity building by the UN and INGOs during the transition administration from 1999–2002 established the framework for the current top-down, centralised development system in Timor-Leste (Chopra, 2000; 2002; Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 1 July). I argue that uneven international technical assistance has undermined East Timorese NGO capacity and the focus on centralised state institutions has failed to actively engage citizens in governance processes (OECDa, 2010). As a result the majority of East Timorese citizens have been excluded from development decision making. In doing so the international community has exacerbated structural violence.

Chesterman (2002), Ishizuka (2003) and Shurke (2001) underline that this ineffectiveness has contributed to a lack of trust and mounting frustration toward international practitioners. There are significant barriers to community participation in development decision-making, including ongoing insecurity and violence, unmet expectations, slow progress, and lack of sustainability. This imbalance drives structural violence in Timor-Leste. The diversity, lack of coordination between, and often differing goals of actors signal the challenges for individuals working within institutions to effect systems transformation.

This brief summary of the actors working in Timor-Leste since 1999 should give the reader an understanding of the vast array of practitioners working in a relatively small geographic area. This diversity leads to difficulties in coordination, communication and timing. These issues are expanded on in Chapters Seven and Eight. I highlighted that each actor has complex motivations and incentives, and that they can be both ‘spoilers’ and ‘unifiers’ depending on context. Whether actors choose to perpetrate violence often depends on their level of inclusion, ownership and participation in peace processes. It is my view that any actor in a peacebuilding space has the capacity to be a peacebuilding actor.
5 Timor-Leste: History of Violence and Development

The focus of this chapter is an analysis of the post-1999 development system in Timor-Leste. For background, this Chapter provides an analysis of the history of violence and development in Timor-Leste from 1511 to 1999, and then investigates the post-1999 context because this is when the greatest accumulation of development interventions took place.


My research does not attempt to catalogue the pain and trauma of the recent history of Timor-Leste, but focuses on understanding the history of Indigenous East Timorese governance and peacebuilding processes and on building an understanding of the types of violence and human insecurity that are present in Timor-Leste. I examine violence that can be categorised as development-related: violence or insecurity caused or exacerbated by development interventions. In the second half of this chapter I focus on the post-1999 context and aim to identify the root causes of violence within the current development system in Timor-Leste.

5.1 History of Timor-Leste

The people of Timor-Leste have experienced a long history of violence, colonialism and foreign occupation spanning almost 500 years of Portuguese colonialism and twenty-four years of foreign occupation by Indonesia before voting for self-determination in 1999. While parts of their colonial experience are similar to that of Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies, and their experience of occupation is comparable to that of West Papuans and Acehnese, regarding scale, scope and methods of violence, co-option, and resistance Timor-Leste’s history is unique.

This section examines four stages of East Timorese history until independence in 2002. Precolonialism, Portuguese colonialism, Indonesian occupation, and the UN transitional administration, with a focus on the two transition periods in 1974–1975 and 1999–2002, both of which are important for understanding violence and peacebuilding in current-day Timor-Leste.
5.1.1 Pre-colonialism

Timor-Leste has a rich history of continuous human occupation dating from prehistoric to modern times. It is a small territory in the Indonesian archipelago, approximately 265 kilometres long, 92 kilometres wide, and about 19,000 square kilometres in area. The sea surrounding it has significant oil and natural gas deposits. Timor-Leste has evidence of human use and active cultural practices in the oldest modern human settlement in South-East Asia, occupied more than 42,000 years ago (Lape, 2006; O’Connor, 2007; O’Connor et.al., 2013). Research indicates a continuity of resource exploitation over 40,000 years (O’Connor et al., 2010; Oliveira, 2008).

At least 16 currently spoken languages in Timor-Leste stem from two major language groupings, Austronesian and Trans-New Guinea languages (Fox, 2000a, pp.3-6; Hajek, 2013; Hull, 1998, p.4; Williams-Van Klinken & Williams, 2015). Eastern Tetum, also known as Tetum Terik (True Tetum) or Tetum-Dili is the common vernacular across Timor-Leste (Fox, 2000a). Tetum is a hybrid language introduced approximately 1,000 years ago, with a Portuguese superstratum and additional lexical influences from Indonesian, Malay, Central Moluccan and Macassarese languages (Hull, 2001, pp.ix-x). This ethno-linguistic variety, compounded with the archaeological data, indicates a long history of inter-island migration across the archipelago east of the Malaysian peninsula (McCLean, 2014, p.8-9). This evidence of transmigration fits with the two main origin stories shared across Timor-Leste: the voyaging of a common ancestor to the land and the sea as a birthing place for the East Timorese, and linking...
the island geography with the myth of a crocodile ancestor (Kehi and Parmer, 2012; Traube, 2007).

Common to many other Indigenous peoples worldwide, East Timorese people believe Timor-Leste is anthropomorphised (Fox, 2000a; O’Connor et al., 2013, p.212). The land is sacred (Tetum: rai lulik timor) and sites throughout Timor-Leste highlight the socio-cultural significance of cultural practices and landscapes, including a range of ritual and mythological sites (McClean, 2014; O’Connor et al., 2013). Nature and culture interconnect in an indivisible relationship and reciprocal responsibilities include ceremonial duties and obligations, such as the maintenance of ritual sites. These practices include processes to grant leadership, manage land and resource ownership and use, mark boundaries, and to manage violence. Some groups were matrilineal, and most balanced a dualism between men/women, insider/outsiders, centre/periphery that created functioning highly ritualised societies (Thu et al., 2007; Therik, 2004).

Boxer (1947), dos Santos and da Silva (2012), Fox (2002), Ospina and Hohe (2002), Pigafetta (1874) and Therik (2004) write that prior to Portuguese colonialism, Timor-Leste had a complex governance system. The eastern half of the island (approximately the territory of the current Timor-Leste) was divided into forty-six kingdoms each ruled by liurai (Tetum: local hereditary leaders or ‘lords of the land’ responsible for political authority, justice and resource management) and under the kingdoms were princedoms (Tetum: suku) and governors (Tetum: datu). The kingdoms were ruled by the Great Lord (Tetum: Maromak Oan). Within each kingdom the suku was located with important ritual, social and cosmic authority related to a complex interconnecting system of uma lulik (Tetum: sacred houses) that were controlled by a headman and a group of elders (Cabral, 2002, pp.157-158). This complex Indigenous knowledge system will be explored in more detail in Chapters Six and Seven, but it is important to note that while radically altered, key elements of this pre-colonial system endure in modern Timor-Leste.

5.1.2 Portuguese Colonialism: 1511–1974

Fourteenth century Chinese and Javanese texts describe the importance of Timor’s sandalwood trade. Portuguese explorers, the first Europeans to visit Timor in 1511, cited the abundance of this natural resource and the important trade in beeswax, honey, slaves and silver (Meitzner Yoder, 2011). In 1512 Portuguese Dominicans brought the Roman Catholic Church to Timor-Leste, which remains an enduring link to Portuguese colonialism (Cabrai, 2002, pp.155-156; Fox, 2000a, p.7).
In 1860 the Governor of Dili, Affonso de Castro, described Portuguese colonialism as merely a thin veneer: “Our empire on this island is nothing but a fiction” (De Castro cited in Fox, 2000a, p.18). Until 1913 when the border between East and West Timor was agreed upon, the Portuguese and the Dutch fought over their colonial boundaries and trading rights, and both constantly battled against the strong part-Portuguese part-Indigenous population known as the Tupassi or Topasses or ‘Black Portuguese’ (Boxer, 1947; Gunn, 2001, p.6). There was a short, but brutal period of Japanese interregnum where approximately 60,000 East Timorese died supporting the World War II Allies from February 1942 to September 1945, after that Timor-Leste reverted to Portuguese rule again (Cabral, 2002, p.163; Fox, 2000a, pp.6-21; Taylor, 1999). Chinese influence over retail and trade continued throughout this period.

In line with this colonial ‘fiction’, by the 1850’s Portugal engaged in the indirect administration of Timor-Leste, through a governance system that used the pre-existing system of suku and liurai, which were the basis for Indigenous governance. Portugal mobilised Indigenous militias’ known as moradores or arraias to provide security and suppress opposition. Militia groups continue to play a central role as conflict actors in modern Timor-Leste (Davidson, 1994; Robinson, 2001; Roque, 2012a, 2012b).

In the 19th century the Portuguese imposed greater control, establishing coffee and rubber plantations, demanding higher taxes and forced labour. They attempted to distort Indigenous governance by focusing on the suku and breaking down the customary power of the liurai (Ospina & Hohe, 2002). The liurai were co-opted and given wealth-promoting tasks such as tax collection, trade and commerce, marking them as the ‘new elite’ or assimilado and mestiço. The assimilado had to speak Portuguese, have proof of financial self-sufficiency, behave ‘appropriately’, and not object to military service (Cabral, 2002, pp.65-66, 157-160). The Portuguese administration did not result in broad development outcomes and communities were impoverished. Education, health and social welfare were neglected and in early 1970 there were no paved roads beyond Dili. Most people survived through subsistence agriculture.

Derogatory language and class hierarchies were used by the Portuguese to incite power divisions and to subjugate and separate ethno-linguistic groups. However, the co-option of the liurai and some mestiço families did not remove the Indigenous beliefs of ordinary East Timorese (dos Santos & da Silva, 2012). Trindade and Castro (2007, p.12) show that the Portuguese encouraged stereotyping, exacerbating existing divisions between ethno-linguistic groups to divide and rule. Brown (2012, pp.61-62) notes that this colonial experience continues in the suspicion cast on leaders and elites by ordinary East Timorese and vice-versa. These identity divisions had a significant impact on intra-state violence in 1974–1975 and post-1999 particularly during community tensions in 2006–2008.
Taylor (1991; 1999), Cabral (2002), Ospina and Hohe (2002) note that while the Indigenous system was oppressed and distorted it continued to be firmly in place sanctioned by strong political and kinship systems, a self-sustaining subsistence economy, cultural traditions and rituals. Therefore under the Portuguese, the Indigenous and colonial systems: “co-existed in a rather uneasy truce” (Taylor, 1991, p.12). These asymmetries of power, nurtured by the Portuguese colonialists, understanding the root causes of the divisions between urbanised, literate elites and their distinctive mestiço culture and the majority of the population, are central to understanding modern East Timorese history and leadership.

5.1.3 Civil War and Invasion: 1974–1975

Much of the current internal East Timorese violence and insecurity and the divisive relationships between leaders and their supporters has its roots in the brutal civil war that took place between Portugal and Indonesia over East Timor (Cabral, 2002; Cristalis, 2009; da Silva, 2012). Da Silva (2012) describes the period between the 25 April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal and August 1975 as divided with incidences of localised violence. During this time, three main political parties emerged; each had differing positions on self-determination, and different relationships with the colonial powers, which contributed to the internal tensions (Cabral, 2002; CAVR, 2005, p.12; Babo-Soares, 2000; Walsh, 2001):

- **Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente** (FRETILIN - Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), formally the Timorese Social Democratic Union (ASDT): appealed to young intellectual ethnic East Timorese and assimilados (including Mari Alkatiri, Jose Ramos-Horta, Nicolau Lobato, and Xanana Gusmão) and supported immediate independence from Portugal.

- **União Democratica Timorense** (UDT - East Timorese Democratic Union): politically conservative, represented elite establishment views (including many liurai and assimilados) and was linked to the Portuguese colonial administration. It initially rejected integration with Indonesia and saw continued affiliation with Portugal as the means to eventual self-determination.

- **Associação Popular Democrática Timorense** (APODETI - East Timorese Popular Democratic Association): supported an autonomous integration within Indonesia. They were supported by two smaller parties - *Klibur Oan Timor Assua’in* - KOTA (Association of Timorese Warrior Sons) and *Partido Trabalhista* (Labour Party).
Indonesia wanted the additional territory and access to Timor-Leste’s considerable resource wealth, and was concerned with regional insecurity associated with a potentially independent communist Timor-Leste. In August 1975, Indonesia told UDT that if it did not halt the ‘communist threat’ of FRETILIN then Indonesia would feel obliged to intervene (Way, 2000). The UDT attempted a coup, and on 15 August, FRETILIN formed FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste - Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) and launched counter-attacks against UDT (Cabral, 2002). FRETILIN believed independence would afford Timor more protection in the international community from an Indonesian takeover, and on 28 November 1975, made a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of the República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL – Democratic Republic of East Timor). The next day, under pressure from the Indonesian Government, APODETI, UDT, KOTA and the Labor Party signed the Balibó Declaration claiming Portuguese Timor’s integration with Indonesia. Timor-Leste’s internal violence enabled Indonesia’s military and clandestine forces to justify their invasion. On 7 December 1975 thousands of Indonesian paratroopers landed in Dili. Carrascalão (cited in Cristalis, 2009, p.40), a UDT leader, details his horror:

“Until that day I believed that the Indonesians meant well…I saw soldiers killing a woman who walked on the street with a baby in her arms…[T]hat day I saw they came as terrorists, as murderers, as thieves”.

The violence resulted in mass atrocities on both sides. Faced by overwhelming Indonesian forces, FRETILIN retreated to the mountainous interior and the resulting violence lasted for twenty-four years (Babo-Soares, 2000). It is these internal tensions, born in 1974, and nurtured through the Indonesian occupation, and the resulting corrosive relationships between elites, their supporters and the broader East Timorese society, that endure today, and are at the root of much current violence in Timor-Leste (da Silva, 2012).

5.1.4 Indonesian Occupation: 1975–1999

Between 1975 and 1999, during the Indonesian occupation, anywhere from 100,000 to 180,000 people, or one-third of the population of Timor-Leste were killed (CAVR, 2005, p.44; International Crisis Group, 2006; Rawnsley, 2004, pp.2-3). Cribb (2001, p.82) estimates that approximately 50,000 died in the initial bombardments and violence in 1975, and approximately 50,000 died of famine, disease and malnutrition due to forced resettlement and arbitrary detention in concentration camps. Massacres were systematically carried out by the Indonesian military (Martin, 2001; Rawnsley, 2004). Women were subjected to forced sterilisation, sex slavery and gang rape; and children were removed and reallocated to Indonesian families (de Oliveira, 2002; Mason, 2005).
During the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR – Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação) hearings, former Governor Carrascalão described Indonesia’s isolationist policies: “Timor-Leste was a closed land…it was a place of lies and falsities…the people that came here could do anything. It was secret” (CAVR, 2005, p.46). Testimonies from CAVR detail the widespread use of violence by UDT, FRETILIN, militias and the Indonesian military including, murder, rape and torture (CAVR, 2005, p.13). The abuse of women was organised and systematic, aimed at reducing the power of the resistance (CAVR, 2005, p.48).

Indonesia sought legitimisation of its annexation of Timor, basing their claim on the Balibó Declaration representing a legitimate act of self-determination, and in July 1976 legislated that Timor-Leste was the 27th province of Indonesia. FRETILIN appealed to the international community to intervene, but no key power acted (Cristalis, 2009; Fernandes, 2004). However, emboldened by constant lobbying from the East Timorese diaspora, the UN listed Timor-Leste as a non-self governing territory under Portuguese administration until 1999.

The context of international politics during the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste is critical. I will not go into detail in this thesis except to state that in the wake of the de-colonialist movement and the Cold War, a number of countries (including Australia, New Zealand, United States, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand and most of Western Europe) feared Timor-Leste was susceptible to communism and was a political and military threat, and therefore they supported integration with Indonesia, which was seen as stable (Cabral, 2002, p.176). Other issues swayed support including Australia’s negotiation with Indonesia over resource rights in the Timor Sea, security concerns and doubts over Timor-Leste’s economic self-sufficiency (Anderson, 2003). United States, Japan, United Kingdom and Australia trained, armed and provided diplomatic support to Indonesia (Chomsky, 2001, pp.127-129; Fernandes, 2004; Ramos-Horta, 2005). This lack of support for Timor-Leste’s self-determination between 1975 and 1999 by the majority of the international community has had significant implications for post-1999 bilateral relationships.

The violence with Indonesia went through a number of phases: direct violence between Indonesia and Falantil forces from 1974–1979; and from 1979–1999, a dual strategy of “diplomatic war” and an “arduous and protracted guerilla war” supported by clandestine activity which had two distinct phases (da Silva, 2012, p.183). The first was from 1979–1987 when the Commander-in-Chief Xanana Gusmão formally separated FALINTIL from FRETILIN to form a non-partisan national army. This act divided the political party from the military and gave political power to the diaspora. The second phase was from 1987–1999 when the focus of
resistance activity shifted to Dili and the major towns, and the diaspora-led FRETILIN boosted their efforts at international diplomacy with strong involvement of Timorese student activists and clandestine groups in Indonesia and Europe (Cabral, 2002; da Silva, 2012, p.205; International Crisis Group, 2006; Smith & Dee, 2003, pp.40-41). There was significant variation in the geographic areas of violence (Justino et.al., 2011, p.9). No group was homogenous; there were internal shifts within FRETILIN and between those who stayed to fight and the diaspora (International Crisis Group 2006, p.2). Ideological and personality divisions between key individuals during this time caused bitter rifts that are echoed in elite political power struggles today, and were instrumental in the 2006–2008 violence.

Some commentators (Cabral, 2002; Aarons & Domm, 1992) assert that Indonesia engaged in acts of genocide in Timor-Leste through military and other means. The Indonesian National Family Planning Programme *Keluarga Berencana* clashed with Catholic Church policy, and was viewed by East Timorese as a way of terminating population growth (Ingram, 2007). John Fernandes, an Indonesian civil servant, described the forced sterilisation under *Keluarga Berencana* as “indirectly aimed at murdering the indigenous people of Timor-Leste” (CAVR, 2005, p.49). De Oliveria (2002) also argues that Indonesia used systematic rape and sex slavery as a weapon of war to suppress, humiliate and terrorise women. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2000) reports that there were gross violations of human rights and breaches of humanitarian law, but did not explicitly describe these violations as constituting acts of genocide. Even if what occurred in Timor-Leste during this period does not meet the technical legal definition of genocide set out in the 1948 *UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, I agree with Saul (2001) that the violence could be viewed as ‘cultural genocide’ (UN General Assembly, 1948). Cultural genocide can mean “any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national group on grounds of national or racial origin, or religious beliefs” (Morsink, 1999, p.1023). But cultural genocide is not explicitly recognised as a form of genocide under international law. I note, for example that under the UN Convention the definition of genocide includes ‘forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’, which appears to have occurred in Timor-Leste (TTR-0900-061010; Adcock, 2015, pers. comm., 2 December; UN General Assembly, 1948).

Indonesian governance was different from the Portuguese: based on an authoritarian military model of state administration they largely subverted the Indigenous knowledge systems that had been mostly ignored under the Portuguese (Candio & Bleiker, 2001, p.67). Hunt (2008a, p.278) describes Indonesia as an “all-powerful, repressive, developmentalist state” and Candio and Bleiker (2001, pp.66-67) comment that any Indonesian service delivery was aimed at “winning hearts and minds” and “countering resistance”. Despite increases in service delivery, continued
human rights abuses and atrocities strengthened resentment and Indonesia never won mass East Timorese support.

Indonesian occupation militarised the community at every level; women, men and youth were actively involved either against the occupation or through martial arts groups, which were a response by Indonesia to impose social control and in non-combatant clandestine movements, the women particularly through OPMT (Organização Popular da Mulher Timor - Popular Organisation of Timorese Women) (da Silva, 2012; dos Santos & da Silva, 2012; Mason, 2005; Scambary, 2009, p.1). While the majority of the violence was committed by Indonesian military (TNI or Tentara Nacional Indonesia), inter-communal violence was also perpetrated by East Timorese on East Timorese through Indonesian-supported militias and East Timorese military battalions 744 and 745 (da Silva, 2012; Roque, 2012b). This inter-communal violence was intensified under Indonesian occupation but had its roots in hundreds of years of structural inequities begun under the Portuguese and continued in the 1974–1975 divisions. Understanding these historical layers is crucial to unpacking the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste post-1999.

Da Silva (2012), Cabral (2002), Hohe (2002a), McWilliam (2005) and Taylor (1991) emphasise that the resistance, structured around Indigenous governance systems, was a crucial factor in ending Indonesian occupation. While clandestine, uma lulik systems of kinship at the suku level enabled trust, mutual obligation and a commitment to independence (McWilliam, 2005, p.37). Indigenous systems were highly resilient under strain, flexible and intuitive to changes in personnel (through death or capture). By aligning with Indigenous systems the resistance was able to build trust, communicate and engage with the broader population. The Indonesian occupation was not just a military failure, it was a failure of governance, due to an inability of Indonesia to “win the battle for the hearts and minds” (McWilliam, 2005, p.35).

In 1997 after some previous attempts, the resistance factions, diaspora elite, Catholic Church and civil society united under the Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense - CNRT (National Council of East Timorese Resistance) to cooperate to achieve independence. Ingram (2012, p.7) signals CNRT unity as a future root cause of violence that masked “deep fault lines within the political elite”, divisions that were “much deeper, fuelled by ideology and grievance, parallel histories and tactical positioning to snatch the prizes of victory”. At this time, greater international awareness was crucial in creating a shift in the international political stance on Timor-Leste. For example the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, a more engaged international media, the awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and Ramos-Horta, sustained diplomatic lobbying at the UN, combined with the fall of Suharto and
broadening support from international solidarity groups (Babo-Soares, 2000; Cabral, 2002, pp.348–357; Ramos-Horta, 1987) all contributed to a change in international opinion.

5.1.5 End of Indonesian occupation: 1998–1999

“After so many years of oppression, liberation came to East Timor like a whirlwind” (Xanana Gusmão cited in Smith & Dee, 2003, p.11).

When Soeharto fell from power in 1998, greater space for political dialogue and change within Indonesia occurred under his successor, President Habibie. The UN worked to broker the 5 May 1999 Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal. This agreement led to the UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Timor) – which administered the referendum on 30 August 1999, where ninety-nine per cent of eligible voters in Timor-Leste voted overwhelmingly (78.5 per cent) for self-determination (Martin, 2001; UN Security Council, 1999a). Following the vote, the Indonesian military in Timor-Leste reacted with widespread organised and systematic violence, large-scale destruction and internal displacement. It was nicknamed the ‘scorched earth policy’ by the ICG (Babo-Soares, 2000, p.76). The Indonesian military, police and army-led pro-Indonesian militias in destroying seventy per cent of the country’s buildings and infrastructure including 60,000 houses, killing an estimated 1,400 East Timorese people, and forcing the evacuation of more than 250,000 East Timorese into West Timor (most of whom returned within three months) (Babo-Soares, 2000, pp.57, 71; Burgess, 2012, p.3; CAVR, 2005, p.627; Fox, 2000b).

While UNAMET was seen as vital to the referendum, it created expectations of civilian protection that could not be met and the international community underestimated Indonesia’s capacity for revenge (Martin, 2000, p.148; 2001, p.124). While Habibie assured a peaceful withdrawal, the violence arguably demonstrated the power of the Indonesian military leadership over its political elites (McWilliam, 2014, pers. comm., 16 November). In response to the vote and the extreme violence that followed, in September 1999 INTERFET was deployed and in October 1999 UNTAET was established to provide security and assist with the transition to independence (UN Security Council, 1999b; 1999c). The violence and destruction in the aftermath of the vote meant that the new transitional state started with the almost total destruction of the physical infrastructure and state governance institutions, which continues to influence structural violence today.

3 See da Silva (2012, pp.231-255) and Cabral (2002, pp.301-357) for detailed discussion from an East Timorese perspective about the role of international solidarity, particularly in Portugal and Australia, in supporting Timor-Leste’s independence.
During the violence in 1999, only a few journalists and UNAMET mission personnel remained in the country. By September 1999, more than sixty international humanitarian and development organisations, including twenty-three UN agencies, began to provide assistance to Timor-Leste, and by October 1999, access into Timor-Leste from Dili and West-Timor had opened (Hunt, 2008a). The primary focus of the international community and East Timorese leadership was on the initial humanitarian response, physical reconstruction of infrastructure and then on institutional state building through an international liberal democratic model (Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.64). East Timorese were critical of the international focus on centralised statebuilding. Many viewed this focus as “another invasion” or a “new form of colonialism” accompanied by incorrect assumptions about East Timorese capacity and pre-determined solutions (Hunt, 2008a, p.113). The international head of a bilateral organisation agreed: “Donors and foreigners, the international development organisations, are probably seen as the new colonialists” (TI-1400-150910). Many international practitioners assumed a *terra nullius* or *tabula rasa* (Latin: blank slate) of economic, political and leadership capacity in 1999. Chesterman (2002, p.63) notes that there was certainly an economic vacuum, but that the political and leadership system was highly complex, although divided. Chopra (2002), Hohe (2002a; 2003) and Philpott (2006) heavily criticised UNTAET’s *tabula rasa* approach highlighting that the UN failed to appreciate the resilience of Indigenous structures and failed to integrate Indigenous systems.

Ingram (2012, p.6) argues that the international community misread the significant East Timorese support for independence as an agreement to pursue the statebuilding agenda and internationally designed model of the machinery of government. Under pressure to deliver outcomes, UNTAET and other development partners did not pursue adequate consultation with either the East Timorese leadership or local communities which created early East Timorese disillusionment with the UN (Hunt, 2008a, pp.112-115; Suhrke, 2001). Trindade (2008, p.1) notes that by 2000, the unity of East Timorese leadership at independence was replaced by “competing and divisive narratives” and “a strong sense of exclusion and frustration”. Ingram (2012, pp.10,19) agrees, noting that UNTAET ignored the fractured local leadership and the complex political dynamics, resulting in misunderstanding and marginalisation of local priorities and distortion of particular local interests against others. Hunt (2008a) reports that many decisions were made at meetings held in English with no East Timorese present. East Timorese participation was also hampered by minimal access to the UN compound, shared language difficulties and a lack of transport and office facilities. By marginalising community participation, UNTAET further distorted the distribution of power, creating and compounding existing tensions.
Freitas (2005) notes that UNTAET and Timor-Leste inherited governance and administrative structures from Portugal and Indonesia that were not suitable for participative democratic governance. However, Hohe and Nixon (2003, p.7) underline that the minimal Portuguese colonial administration and the widely perceived corruption of Indonesia meant that in 1999 Timor-Leste’s diverse societies were rooted in Indigenous systems. Problematically as Brown (2009, p.150) comments, neither the UN staff nor FRETILIN “were sensitive to or broadly aware of the value of customary life or local community governance in East Timor”. It is this gap in understanding and practice between Indigenous and current development systems that will be further explored in my research.

The large international presence, working without effective coordination across multiple sectors and competing for finite funding, lead to overlapping programs, high operating costs, frustration, and overwhelming workloads. The large-scale and complexity of the international response in post-1999 Timor-Leste was similar to that in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and Cambodia, and it foreshadowed the international responses in Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti. As a result of the influx in international agencies, the housing stock was in crisis, food and fuel prices escalated, and the economy was reliant on international salaries and imports of goods and services (Carnahan et.al., 2006).

Early humanitarian support was hampered by bad weather, poor UN planning, unsustainable budgets and weak procurement and communication mechanisms. This was compounded by a volatile and unstable security environment which did not win the trust of local communities (Smith & Dee, 2003; Suhrke, 2001). UN personnel had no prior experience of Timor-Leste and East Timorese leaders had limited experience of administering modern governance and rule of law. East Timorese criticised the UN’s decision-making process, the slow pace, the unmet expectations, the high administrative costs, their failure to work with qualified East Timorese, or to explore the impact of local culture and politics on decision-making (Rae, 2009, pp.101-118; Smith & Dee, 2003, pp.62-65; Suhrke, 2001). These structural and institutional constraints and community frustrations were triggers for the ongoing unrest and instability and future structural violence.

The first national election for the Constituent Assembly, charged with developing the Constitution, was held on 30 August 2001 where FRETILIN won the majority. Competition during elections exposed repressed grievances between key leaders (International Crisis Group, 2006; Richmond and Franks, 2008). NGOs strongly protested that the short-time frame to develop the Constitution and the NDP did not allow true participation or inclusive discussion about the future of Timor-Leste and contributed to the violence that has emerged since 2006.
Despite the inefficiencies and shortcomings of UNTAET, by October 2001, security had been restored across the territory, and some 188,646 refugees had returned (Smith & Dee, 2003, p.87). On 20 May 2002 the country declared its independence. At this time the international community hailed UNTAET a success and under UN Security Council Resolution 1410 (2002) a follow-on UN mission was created, UNMISET. This milestone masked a range of potential community tensions and weak governance mechanisms that had been overlooked in the rush to establish the newest international state. Overall, UN efforts to achieve economic growth, community peacebuilding and national unity were viewed as superficial and easily redacted (Chopra, 2000, 2002; Gorjão, 2002; Gunn & Huang, 2004; Hohe, 2002a; Rae, 2009; Traub, 2000).

My summary of East Timorese political history prior to independence in 2002 aims to highlight the myriad tensions between outsiders and East Timorese, and within the East Timorese community itself. It establishes that over hundreds of years Portuguese colonialism, Indonesian occupation and then UN administration created and exacerbated various forms of societal inequalities. These outside governance structures distorted and changed Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems, reducing the number of knowledge holders and de-legitimising and marginalising these Indigenous systems. This has changed the whole balance of East Timorese society, creating new hierarchies and inequalities. These inequalities are deep rooted, perpetuated by modern economic and governance systems, structures and institutions that compound structural violence in Timor-Leste.

5.2 Violence and insecurity in Timor-Leste post-2002

In the next section I explore the major challenges to peacebuilding in Timor-Leste post-2002, particularly the root causes of violence. It is important to understand the context of historical and ongoing violence in Timor-Leste to attribute correctly the role of development in causing or exacerbating violence. I provide a summary of the security sector in Timor-Leste, highlighting particularly the violence from 2006–2008, and then identify other root causes of violence.

I use conflict-sensitive methods, based on principles of Do No Harm, to analyse, measure, map and better understand the root causes of violence in post-2002 Timor-Leste. I have integrated human security into my analysis. I draw on a number of East Timorese NGOs, academics and
local think tanks, including Belun, La’o Hamutuk and NGO Fundasaun Mahein and international organisations, such as The Asia Foundation, International Crisis Group and Interpeace, which have analysed violence in Timor-Leste since 1999.

5.2.1 Broader violence context

Timor-Leste has a population of approximately 1.16 million peoples across thirteen districts, including Oecusse, the former Portuguese enclave on the northern coast of West Timor, and the islands of Ataúro and Jaco (Government of Timor-Leste, 2015, p.13). When I first travelled to Timor-Leste in 2008 the fear and tension was palpable. Violence in Timor-Leste is not abstract or imagined. It is direct, cultural and structural – and it has significant implications for development and peacebuilding across all parts of East Timorese life. Every family has members who died or experienced physical or psychological harm during the Indonesian occupation, during the violent transitions in 1974–1975 and 1999, and during the community violence in 2006–2008. This history of trauma, anxiety and grief does not lie quietly on the land or its peoples. It is important to acknowledge, record and remember this collective history of violence and recognise that East Timorese are undergoing a shared process of healing and transformation.

At independence, Timor-Leste emerged as one of the poorest countries in the world, with low rates of literacy, high maternal mortality, minimal infrastructure and weak governance mechanisms in place. In 1999, the porous border with Indonesia, IDPs, refugees and ex-militia threatened ongoing inter-state violence with Indonesia. Intra-community violence, retaliation and vengeance killing stemming from the civil war in 1974–1975 and opposing sides under occupation to 1999 perpetuated the threat of intra-state violence (International Crisis Group, 2010; Scambary, 2006, Scambary, 2009; UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, 2006, p.16). In 2016, fourteen years on from independence, inter-state violence, particularly in relation to Indonesia has been largely resolved. I argue it is this latter, protracted intra-state violence that threatens the ongoing stability of Timor-Leste.

5.2.1.1 Security sector challenges

INTERFET restored basic security after 1999, but the security sector remained ineffective and divided. The depth of national trauma caused by the civil war in 1975, compounded by the Indonesian occupation, resulted in numerous East Timorese groups that could turn against their people (Cristalis, 2009, p.34). Many FALINTIL ex-combatants were traumatised and there were inadequate support structures to enable their reintegration. To manage this potential security
challenge, UNTAET created the *FALINTIL Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste* (F-FDTL) (Portuguese: East Timorese Defence Force) in February 2001. However, UNTAET was criticised for focusing on vetting and retraining former Indonesian police rather than reintegrating some but not all ex-FALINTIL fighters. This policy left many ex-combatants unemployed and frustrated that they were not receiving their ‘just rewards’ for their sacrifices (International Crisis Group, 2006; Traube, 2007).

From early 2000 there was a lack of agreement between Timor-Leste political leaders and their international partners on the nature of security sector reform. Dahrendorf (2003) suggested reforms to create a small professional army, the F-FDTL, and a larger national police force, the *Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste* (PNTL). These recommendations, while supported by the international community, did not gain traction with East Timorese leaders, who considered ex-FALINTIL fighters as critical to their power support base. Then Interior Minister Lobato (and former Vice President of FRETILIN), created special well-paid and armed PNTL units primarily staffed by ex-FALINTIL fighters. PNTL were placed in charge of law and order, border control, riot control and immigration; in comparison, the F-FDTL had no clear mandate regarding internal security. F-FDTL soldiers received only three months training, low salaries and had minimal regulatory and policy oversight (Scheiner, 2006).

Flawed international assistance also negatively affected the security sector (da Silva, 2006; de Carvalho, 2007; Ingram, 2012; Scambary, 2009). PNTL was provided with the majority of international funding and capacity-building support. However, both PNTL and F-FDTL remained weak, unaccountable and struggled for legitimacy (Wilson, 2012). Smith and Dee (2003, pp.73-75) and Wilson (2012) also argue that the UN civilian police (CIVPOL) was staffed with inadequately trained and sub-standard police officers from twenty-two countries, many of whom lacked focus and commitment, and failed to establish rapport and trust with the East Timorese. International organisations had significantly differing ideological approaches to policing and security, resulting in divisions and tensions between these international actors. This inadequate, unequal and imbalanced international assistance compounded existing rivalries and jealousies within and between the two security forces. Da Silva (2006) maintains that tensions between and within these formal security institutions, fuelled by easy access to weapons and conflicting leadership from key elites have exacerbated existing community violence in Timor-Leste, and is one of the root causes of the violence that occurred in 2006–2008.

Armed groups evolved from previously clandestine resistance groups to include disaffected veterans and youth in political fronts or political party militias, martial arts groups, crime syndicates and non-formal security organisations to form a heterogeneous collective that initiated armed violence and threatened state stability (Babo-Soares, 2004, p.19). Some of these
gangs were responding to disputes that had historical antecedents from Portuguese and Indonesian occupation. These groups primarily used low technology weapons, including homemade ‘sling-shots’ and incendiary devices (Scambary, 2009, p.1). I argue below that it is a combination of factors, including flawed security sector reform and the prevalence of armed groups, that triggered the 2006 Crisis and ongoing tensions.

5.2.1.2 2006 Crisis and ongoing intra-state tensions

Less than a year after UNMISET had scaled down in 2005, redolent with praise from the international community, Timor-Leste erupted into violence. The so-called Lorosa’e and Loromonu (Tetum: East/sunrise; West/sunset) intra-state violence that occurred in April 2006 and reoccurred in 2007 and 2008 was not predicted by a complacent international community. The violence resulted in the disintegration of PNTL and F-FDTL, thirty-eight people killed and more than 1,650 homes destroyed by armed gangs, and 150,000 people or fifteen per cent of the population displaced into sixty-five IDP camps (Trindade & Castro, 2007; UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, 2006, para.101).4

Lorosa’e are people from districts east of Dili such as Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem (associated with the original Papuan–Melanesian population who claim to represent the resistance fighters and be the custodians of an independent Timor-Leste). Loromonu are people from the western border areas or midlands such as Oecusse, Maliana, Suai, Ermera and Liquiçá (who were associated with the Malaysian–Indonesian population, stereotyped as supporters of Indonesian integration and anti-independence militias). These pre-colonial terms were recycled in 2006 as derogatory and divisive labels for the conflicting parties (Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.12). However the root causes of this violence were more complex than a mere geographic division.

The International Crisis Group (2006, p.1) contends that: “the entire crisis, its origins and solutions, revolve around less than ten people, who have a shared history going back thirty years”. I agree that the actions of these leaders were fundamental to the manifestation of direct violence, but I assert that the 2006 crisis was triggered by deep societal divisions and grievances manifested during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation that remained unresolved after independence. These divisions exposed significant weaknesses in the new nation state and the liberal peacebuilding model espoused by the international community (Brady & Timberman, 2006).

Niner (2007) explains that the 2006 Crisis was triggered by a combination of four key issues: elite masculine political divisions, inequities within the general community, endemic poverty and disillusionment with independence, and underlying pain, trauma and lack of justice. Brady and Timberman (2006) agree and add that there were severe inadequacies in the justice system and a widespread absence of reliable information.

This violence was also entrenched in issues of national identity. In a conflict-affected environment, where communities need unity and stability, creating regional identities through Loromou / Lorosa’e divisions for elite political gain was a potent cause of violence. Conflicting ideals of nationalism were aggravated by the personal political interests of elite leaders, particularly then President Gusmão and then Prime Minister (and FRETILIN Secretary General) Alkatiri, that date back to 1974–1975 (International Crisis Group, 2006; Trindade, 2008). These leaders opportunistically politicised two major internal conflicts within the security sector. The first was the March 2006 dismissal and public protests of a group of 594 F-FDTL soldiers nicknamed ‘the Petitioners’, who were predominately from western regions (Loromono), and were frustrated at perceived discrimination. The second issue was factional rivalries between PNTL and F-FDTL over a corruption case involving F-FDTL officials (da Silva, 2006, pp.2-3; Ingram, 2012, p.4; Kingsbury, 2007; Loch & Prueller, 2011). Gusmão’s “incendiary” speech in March 2006 provided legitimacy to the Petitioners claims, leading to mass resignations, dividing elite relationships further and inciting the fear and violence perpetrated by hundreds of disenchanted local youth and armed gangs (International Crisis Group, 2006, pp.7-8).

Aggrieved individuals and groups used this chaotic environment for personal advantage, taking the opportunity to seek revenge for perceived past crimes and unfair treatment (Loch & Prueller, 2011; Scambary, 2009; Trindade, 2006; Trindade & Castro, 2007). At the request of the Government, the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF) deployed in June 2006, and UNMIT replaced UNOTIL in August 2006 to restore security. The violence continued until 2008, when the leader of the Petitioners was killed after attempting to assassinate the then President Gusmão and Prime Minister Ramos-Horta. After that the Government made significant moves to pardon the remaining Petitioners, return all IDPs and restore security.

It is clear that neither the East Timorese leadership nor its international partners effectively addressed the root causes of violence within and between the two security forces before 2006. Indeed Government and international policies and programs actively exacerbated an environment of fear and mistrust. The 2006 Crisis and ongoing intra-state violence caused physical and psychological damage to an already traumatised population. While levels of
violence have decreased since 2008 potential triggers for violence remain in the security sector and reforms must continue.

5.3 Root triggers for violence in Timor-Leste

While there are no ‘quick-fix’ solutions to these deep community divisions and the issues that exacerbate them, I highlight that a greater understanding of the triggers for violence can assist future peacebuilding efforts. Some of these triggers are structural forms of violence, which can be categorised as either causes or consequences of violence depending on the context. As the previous discussion on violence and insecurity in Timor-Leste demonstrates, triggers and consequences of violence are all interconnected, in complex and non-linear patterns. Structural violence can result in grievances, which if left unresolved, cause further cycles of violence. In this next section I summarise some specific root triggers for violence (Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.5) and broad issues of structural violence (Sections 5.3.6 to 5.3.11), which will be discussed further in Chapters Six to Eight.

5.3.1 Land, property, and resource disputes

In Timor-Leste intra-communal violence is triggered by land and resource disputes that have been exacerbated by the long history of armed violence (Wily, 2009; Cryan, 2015a). The current inadequacy of formal legal mechanisms to resolve land and property rights disputes causes land tenure insecurity, homelessness and can trigger further violence (Batterbury et.al., 2015; Belun, 2009; Meitzner Yoder et.al., 2003). Stabilisation of land and property rights remains key to poverty reduction, economic stability, and strong and enduring links to Indigenous culture and identity (Fitzpatrick, 2002; Fitzpatrick et.al., 2008; Fitzpatrick et.al., 2013).

Approximately forty-two per cent of Timor-Leste is viable agricultural land, half of which is cultivated primarily by subsistence farming (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p.2). Portuguese colonialism introduced a four-tier land rights system that combined the East Timorese Indigenous land rights system and a ‘modern’ land titling system aimed to benefit plantation owners and elites (Wallace, 2007, p.26). During Indonesian occupation approximately 44,091 titles were registered, mostly to non-East Timorese (Gomes, 2007, p.6; Wallace, 2007, p.27). During Indonesian occupation East Timorese communities were forced to relocate causing displacement and dispossession. Over twenty-four years these ‘settlers’ had usually gained user and access rights to land and property through intermarriage into customary landowner communities or through labour and capital investment such as sharecropping (Thu, 2012). After the violence in 1999, most of the official land records were destroyed and approximately fifty
per cent of property in Dili was illegally reoccupied (Neupert & Lopes, 2006, p.33). After 1999, settler, returning diaspora families, and East Timorese communities in West-Timor displaced from violence in 1999 and 2006, have repatriated back to their home communities. Their claims to traditional and titled lands that have not yet been resolved and negotiations about land rights and use have resulted in exacerbation of decade-long rural community violence (Dale et.al., 2010; Thu, 2012; 2013).

Since 1999 both UNTAET and then the Government, have failed to build an effective land administration system to support sustainable development including the legal rights, the technical supports for record keeping, a mapping system, the land tax system, planning and development systems, and national land policy. Land system reform has been ad hoc and without inclusive community consultation or cohesive planning from the Government (Batterbury et.al., 2015; Cryan, 2015a; 2015b; La’o Hamutuk, 2010; Wallace, 2007, pp.25-27). Since 2002 Portugal has supported the Ministry of Justice to develop land rules and structures and the World Bank has provided policy analysis on land use for private sector investment. From 2008 to 2012 USAID implemented the controversial Ita Nia Rai (Tetum: our land) program that aimed to establish a land administration system and a national Land Law. Ita Nia Rai failed to meaningfully involve local communities and failed to consider the complexity of land use and ownership fundamental to Indigenous land management practices (Cryan, 2015a; 2015b; International Crisis Group, 2010; Rede ba Rai, 2012).

The focus on land has uncovered decade-long unresolved land disputes increasing the potential for direct and structural violence. Legislation alone will not resolve these challenges and while Indigenous peacebuilding processes are central to the transformation of land-related violence, some disputes are so complex that hybrid justice mechanisms may be required (Fitzpatrick et.al., 2013). Unless East Timorese have secure access to and use of land and support to engage in their Indigenous practices, land-related violence will be one of the biggest ongoing cause of violence in Timor-Leste.

5.3.2 Weak, corrupt or inaccessible governance systems

Approximately eighty per cent of East Timorese live in rural areas and neither the Portuguese, Indonesians, UNTAET nor the new state of Timor-Leste have been very effective in delivering services to these people (Ingram, 2012, p.12). Only five per cent of the UN mission spend between 2001–2002 went into the local economy and around eighty per cent was concentrated in Dili (Carnahan et.al., 2006, pp.12, 54; 2007). This created a parallel economy to meet the needs of international personnel that distorted labour and retail markets. The lack of effective decentralisation has exacerbated minimal outreach to the districts, including poor health and
education service delivery and poor infrastructure resulting in minimal access to markets. Brown (2009, pp.148-150) notes the inadequacies of the statebuilding and decentralisation model and reminds us that disconnection between the state institutions and elite decision-makers and citizens, combined with existing triggers, regularly translate to instability and ongoing violence.

There have been three main decentralisation programs since 2002 aimed at reducing poverty and increasing governance in rural areas: the Programa Dezenvolvimentu Lokal (PDL – Local Development Program), and the Pakote Dezenvolvimentu Desentrilizadu (PDD – Decentralised Development Package) and since 2011, the Planu Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suku (PNDS – National Suku Development Plan). These programs had weak participatory processes, missing important sectors of the community, weak complaints mechanisms, difficulties in integrating development priorities, and poor maintenance systems once programs were finalised (Cummins & Maia, 2012). Centralisation exacerbated economic divisions between urban and rural communities regarding service delivery and access to markets, justice, health and education (Scambary, 2013).

The absence of reliable information is a significant threat to community unity and stability, fuelling misinformation, exaggeration and disempowerment (Engel, 2003, p.178). Collier (2013) emphasises the importance of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in building transparency and accountability in states reliant on extractive industries. NGOs have worked hard to provide information about resource extraction and governance issues in multiple languages, and facilitated community consultations to diffuse potential violence (Hunt, 2008a, p.284). However, trust has not been built or sustained through the Government consultation mechanisms (Engel, 2003, p.171). This has heightened frustrations and widened the gap between the Government and citizens. In May 2014, the Government passed a proposed law regulating the media by forcing all local and foreign journalists to gain government certification. Human Rights Watch (2014) labelled the law “repressive” and in August 2014 the East Timorese Supreme Court found it to be “unconstitutional”. This authoritarian step risks subverting the emerging participatory democracy.

Corruption and nepotism are common political devices in authoritarian governance systems and the Government has made a number of poor choices compounding corruption and alienating citizens and the international community (Kingsbury, 2007). The Global Integrity Report (2013) rated Timor-Leste as having weak integrity levels; with sixty-five per cent for legal frameworks and forty-eight per cent for implementation. The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014 (Schwab & Sala-i-Martin, 2013, p.366) rates Timor-Leste low at 138 of 148 countries and cites corruption as the most problematic factor to doing business. Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (2013) rated Timor-Leste as very corrupt rating it 119 out of 175 countries. The Government initiated an Anti-Corruption Commission in 2009 with the power to monitor, investigate and inform the public on human rights, good governance and corruption. Sluggish bureaucracy has slowed the ability for the Commission to engage in meaningful reform.

5.3.3 Political differences between elites and manipulation to gain power

Leadership is both a cause of violence and a means to accord in Timor-Leste. Strong and courageous leadership from some key men and women during the 1974–1975 period and throughout the Indonesian occupation provided direction and unity to the cause of independence, and the CNRT alliance smoothed over tensions in favour of a unified stance toward self-determination. Since 1999 there have been significant tensions between East Timorese political elites and between elites and citizens, chiefly after power struggles that led to the breakdown of CRNT in 2001 to form separate political parties to contest the Constituent Assembly elections. Cabral (2002, p.425) notes that since 2001 divisionary political tactics between parties, unilateral decisions made by Gusmão and other elites without broad consultation has been highly divisive. Richmond and Franks (2008, pp.193-194) add that international efforts to promote democratic elections have failed as elections have been “hijacked” resulting in an “unrepresentative and dictatorial state government” that fails to act inclusively or share power. While the current Government is considered to be broadly representative of all key parties, elite decision-makers continue to dominate decision-making and there are significant differences in political power between elite East Timorese and citizens resulting in limited participation by citizens.

Unresolved elite leadership tensions inflamed other community grievances during the 2006 crisis resulting in widespread violence. The failure of these political leaders to reconcile after the 2006–2008 violence has slowed community-level reconciliation efforts, and emphasised existing societal divisions and priorities between the centralised elite and the broader population identified by Babo-Soares (2004, p.19). Significant ongoing violence has led to a “powerful undercurrent of discontent” directed at elite leadership and centralised state government (de Carvalho, 2007, p.4). These divisions are discussed in detail in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight under the sections on Power.
5.3.4 Gendered power imbalances

Timor-Leste is a heavily patriarchal society. Women and girls continue to disproportionately suffer from family and sexual violence and marginalisation from decision-making that affects their lives. During the Indonesian occupation thousands of East Timorese women were subjected to sex slavery, rape, torture, murder (de Oliveira, 2002). While cultural and gender norms are slowly changing, women continue to be vulnerable as a result of this historically high level of tolerance of violence against women (Harris-Rimmer, 2009; 2010). Rates of family and sexual violence in Timor-Leste are some of the highest in the Asia-Pacific. Nearly forty per cent of East Timorese women over the age of fifteen have experienced physical and/or sexual violence, while 34.6 per cent of women who have been married report having been abused by their husbands (UN Women, 2011, p.6). This violence is linked to the long history of hyper-masculinity, violence and trauma.

In 2010 the Government passed the Law Against Domestic Violence (Law No.7/2010) providing access to shelter, legal, medical and psychological assistance and emergency support. This law obligates Xefe de Suku (Tetum: elected chief of the village) to promote domestic violence awareness and prevention, and obligates the state to monitor rights violations, investigate and prosecute where there is sufficient evidence (Burgess, 2012, pp.3-6). Despite these legal advances, access to services remains scant or non-existent, particularly in rural and remote areas. While rates of reporting rape and family violence have increased since Indonesian occupation, in 2005 only 118 of 492 cases were referred to the prosecutor. Ospina (2006, p.48) explains that these low referral figures were caused by police recommending the use of Indigenous justice mechanisms and the withdrawal of accusations due to social pressure. The violent abuse of children continues to be an underreported matter (Burgess, 2012, p.7). The UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (2011, p.32) reports that East Timorese men and women with a disability are up to three times more likely to experience physical and sexual abuse and rape, and that women with a disability suffer double discrimination because of their gender.

5.3.5 Weak justice system and continued impunity for crimes

There are intrinsic challenges in negotiating the dual legal systems in Timor-Leste: the Indigenous lisan or customary system and the formal (also called Portuguese, UN or constitutional) justice system. There are no explicit laws or policies linking the Indigenous justice system to the formal justice system and the latter is highly overburdened and severely dysfunctional (TTR-0900-061010). After 1999, the UN and Timor-Leste created a formal justice system based on the Portuguese model that effectively marginalises the majority of
citizens from easily accessing legal documents or decision-making. There are now four local courts, but there is a need to effectively address the huge backlog of cases promptly to maintain the credibility of the system (La’o Hamutuk, 2010, p.14). The formal legal system is relatively inaccessible and understood by few lawmakers and citizens. Conversely, the Indigenous justice systems are widely understood and used, and civil society is calling for the two systems to be linked (Meitzner Yoder, 2007). However, there are some negative outcomes generated from the use of customary justice systems, including gendered violence and inter-generational debt (TX-1600-260910).

Serious problems currently facing the judicial system include the independence of the courts and the separation of powers, customary law practices and the issue of the President’s competence to grant pardons or amnesty (International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2010). Limited budgets or adequate staff, poor planning and coordination, and backlogs in the courts hamper efforts in establishing a rule of law and addressing human rights violations and crimes against humanity. The major perpetrators of atrocities during the Indonesian occupation and during the 2006 crisis were pardoned. CAVR was formed to address community-level reconciliation and reparations for past violence but its quite legitimate focus on pre-1999 crimes failed to address much of the intractable internal divisions from earlier in the occupation (Kent, 2007). This culture of impunity for past crimes has sparked significant frustration with East Timorese (de Carvalho, 2007, p.4). Inadequate law enforcement and a weak judicial system inflames grievances and is a continued threat to community security.

5.3.6 Poverty

UNDP’s 2014 Human Development Index ranks Timor-Leste as a medium human development country as its rank has grown significantly from 0.418 in 2000 to 0.620 in 2014, and it is now ranked 128 of 185 countries (UNDP, 2014, pp.262,226). However, 49.9 per cent of the population are deemed to be in severe poverty (UNDP, 2014, p.181). The GNI per capita is USD 5,446 and the GDP per capita is USD 1,393, which while considerably increasing since 2000, most of the East Timorese population remain very poor (UNDP, 2013b, pp.146,160,164).

The National Census states that the population in 2015 was 1,167, 242, with 71.88 per cent of the population living in rural areas (Government of Timor-Leste, 2015, p.22). The maternal mortality ratio is 300 deaths per 100,000 live births and the infant mortality rate of 48 per 1,000 live births makes Timor-Leste one of the most dangerous places in the world to give birth (UNDP, 2013b, p.158). 44.7 per cent of children are underweight and have malnutrition, and non-communicable diseases such as malaria are highly prevalent and life threatening (UNDP, 2013b, p.168). 41.4 per cent of the population is under the age of fourteen, life expectancy at
birth is 62.9 years, and the annual population growth rate is high at 3.9 per cent (UNDP, 2013b, pp.146,196). Only 58.3 per cent of those aged fifteen and older are literate, and the mean years of schooling is 4.4 years, with only fifty-six per cent of eligible young people enrolled in secondary school (UNDP, 2014, p.194). These demographic factors point to a ‘youth bulge’ that Urdal (2004, p.1) defines as: “extraordinarily large youth cohorts relative to the adult population” of a state. Collier (1999) and Urdal (2004, p.16) find that poverty, poor access to education and low economic growth can increase the likelihood of intra-state political and social instability and violence. This research highlights that Timor-Leste’s high poverty levels, low educational attainment and high youth population continue to be a risk factor for violence, as it was in 2006.

5.3.7 Food insecurity and food sovereignty

Food insecurity is one of the key drivers of rural poverty and cultural and structural violence in Timor-Leste, aggravated by low agricultural productivity and limited access to markets due to poor road infrastructure (Castro, 2013; Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2002; Kammen, 2012). Approximately a quarter of the population lived in hunger in 2010. Subsistence farming is the primary income source for seventy per cent of the population and provides links between Indigenous identity, culture and the environment. Based on principles of self-determination, local NGOs are calling for a diversification system of “food sovereignty”, which takes into account: “[T]he right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustain-able methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems” (La’o Hamutuk, 2013, p.6).

The current quality and diversity of crops and the quality of food available is uncertain. There are systematic food shortages across Timor-Leste between the end of the dry season and the start of the rainy season caused by a range of issues including food production, transport and storage systems, water supply system. The Government, together with Australia, is working to develop food security in the agriculture sector by providing high-yielding seeds, fertilisers and improving irrigation (International Monetary Fund, 2012; República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2011a). However, critics of this approach question the sustainability of this program and its ability to build national self-sufficiency, seeing it as a high-spending, short-term solution that will not meet the long-term nutrition needs of the population and distort customary agricultural practices. They argue that the Government should focus on promoting diverse diets, improved farming techniques and rural infrastructure to achieve food sovereignty (La’o Hamutuk, 2013, p.8).
5.3.8 Limited access to education

During Portuguese colonialism only very few elite East Timorese were educated, while the rest of the population remained illiterate, marginalised and submissive (Cabral, 2002, pp.162-3; da Silva, 2012, p.129; Hill, 2002, p.39; Taylor, 1999). This system reinforced colonial, patriarchal and urban socio-economic inequalities (da Silva, 2012, pp.44-45; Durnan, 2005, p.109). When Indonesia invaded, literacy rates were around five percent and gender disparities were high. FRETILIN drew on Fanon (1963; 1967), Freire’s (1970) and Cabral (1970) to promote popular education though mass adult literacy (Cabral, 2002; CAVR, 2005, p.50; da Silva, 2012, pp.87-90). Between 1976–1978, FRETILIN and OPMT established 400 schools across the country using Tetum and local languages aimed to non-violently ‘decolonise’ the education system that had co-opted elites and kept the majority of East Timorese illiterate and submissive, resulting in the suffocation of Timorese culture (da Silva, 2012, p.134, 208-9; Hill, 2002).

Indonesia focused on compulsory education, banning Portuguese and Tetum. Education performance and quality were low, affected by a shortage of classrooms and teachers and the unwillingness of many East Timorese to participate in the repressive school system (Justino et.al., 2011, p.10). When the Indonesians left, ninety-five per cent of schools and post-secondary institutions were destroyed or looted (Hill & Thomas, 2005, p.14). Durnan (2005; 2006), Lederach (1997) and Spence (2009) assert that inclusive education is critical to rebalancing socio-economic opportunities for youth and create and sustain a culture of peace in conflict-affected contexts. It engages the rural majority people as agents of social transformation and is a particularly important tool to rebalance gender inequalities by mobilising and empowering women (Durnan, 2006, p.94).

Limited education has consequences for intergenerational poverty traps where young people become stuck in a cycle of low human capital and low productivity, drastically impacting future economic and political stability (Boughton, 2009). World Bank analysis (Justino et.al., 2011) indicates that the Indonesian occupation has resulted in a substantial loss of human capital particularly among young men who were removed from school to work. This has affected labour market participation and has impacted the health status of individuals and households. Since 1999 young women have increased access to education but overall the education sector is in inadequate (Justino et.al., 2011). Progress developing curriculum, teaching materials and training teachers has been slow due to the difficulties of re-introducing Tetum and Portuguese.
5.3.9 Unstable state institutions and limited community participation

Timor-Leste has established unstable governance processes and institutions that systematically exclude communities from participating in decision-making. In 1999 UNTAET was mandated to support capacity-building for self-government, and the focus has been on the rebuilding of, and transfer of power to, key liberal institutions (Nakamura, 2004). This model described by Brown (2009, pp.146-147) as “breathtakingly mechanistic” has been heavily critiqued (Brown, 2009; Chopra, 2000; 2002; Grenfell, 2012; Richmond, 2005). They assert that it is impossible to deliver the state as a product without engaging in the deeper, more intrinsic questions of what makes up a political community, and the essential complexity of governance including participation, legitimacy and social-cultural contextual engagement. Grenfell (2007) argues that the focus on the state is disproportionate to its influence over East Timorese. They highlight that state building should not be addressed as a technical exercise as this creates further dysfunction, disconnecting and alienating citizenry from their government. Many elites supported UN’s focus on capacity building. However, NGO representatives stressed that sustainable political and administrative governance transition required the inclusive involvement of all East Timorese, not just the elite (Reis, 2000).

In 1999 political elites, UNTAET and other international practitioners considered Timor-Leste’s political and economic systems as *tabula rasa* (Brown, 2009 p.23; Kent, 2012; Shepherd, 2013, p.124; Wallis, 2014, p.79). *Tabula rasa* incorrectly assumed that there were no governance institutions in place which resulted in the delegitimisation of Indigenous institutions and structures and minimised the participation of East Timorese (Boege et.al., 2008, p.11). The false assumption of *tabula rasa* is at the heart of the failure to build trusting and respectful relationships between East Timorese and outsiders. In 1973 Alkatiri highlighted the sociological aspect of colonialism, pointing out that the capacity malaise was more complex - it was structural and systemic (da Silva, 2012, pp.55-56; Jolliffe, 1978, p.56)

The 2006–2008 violence indicated that despite significant capacity support the state remained unstable (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2011b). In 2008 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) assessed that government capacity remained low, efforts by international practitioners had been limited, fragmented, uneven and slow (Witheford et.al., 2008, p.2). Brown (2009, pp.145-146) notes that the Government and the majority of international development organisations have failed to equally support the capacity of civil society or Indigenous institutions.
5.3.10 Economic insecurity, unemployment and the ‘resource curse’

Urbanisation, unemployment and lack of equal access to economic opportunities and education have become a significant problem and cause of inequality and violence (Rae, 2009, pp.102-3; TTJ-1500-011010). Timor-Leste’s GDP was USD 4.5 billion in 2011: seventy-seven per cent was from the petroleum sector and only four per cent from agriculture and manufacturing. The Ministry of Finance projects that in 2014, sixty-one per cent of state revenue will come from oil, thirty-two per cent will come from past investment of petroleum income, and only seven per cent from non-oil sources (Scheiner, 2014). This points to serious concerns for economic security, Timor-Leste’s trade deficit and the need to work closely between government, private sector resource companies and civil society, with support from international organisations, to avoid the ‘resource curse’ experienced by other similar conflict-affected economies that are export-dependent on non-renewable resources (Collier, 2013; Scambary, 2015).

The Government is currently export-dependent on exploited petroleum resources within the Joint Petroleum Development Area in the Timor Sea. Oil revenues from the Bayu-Undan and Kitan fields peaked in 2012 (Scheiner, 2014). Timor-Leste established a Petroleum Fund in 2005 to provide a stable source of budget revenue. However since 2005, annual withdrawals have exceeded the Fund’s sustainability guidelines. It is estimated that the resources will be exhausted in 2026 at 2012 production rates and if spending rates continue they will exceed revenue by 2019. NGOs are lobbying the Government for a halt to unequal cash handouts, cancelling large, unviable projects like Tasi Mane and the Oecusse Special Economic Zone, and a refocussing of public spending toward a more sustainable model (Scheiner, 2012; 2014). There are continuing tensions with Australia over ongoing negotiations to establish a permanent maritime boundary between the two countries which influences treaty rights to the substantial oil and gas fields in the area, where Timor-Leste currently receives 30 per cent less revenue than Australia.

While the Government has worked hard to minimise external debt, among resource-rich countries, Timor-Leste is one of the highest spending. Expensive, and politicised Government programs such as the 2009–2010 Pakote Referendum (Tetum: Referendum Package) (funding for small-scale infrastructure using local companies) and cash payment schemes financed by the Petroleum Fund from 2008 continue to drive high Government expenditure and create dependency while failing to target some vulnerable groups (Scambary, 2015; Scheiner, 2012; Wallis, 2015). The difference in payments is huge: “Conditional cash transfers are limited to USD 240 per year, elderly pensions are USD 360 per year, and annual veterans’ pensions range from USD 2,760 to USD 9,000” (ADB, 2014, p.251). World Bank analysts explained that these policies are temporary and inflationary (Dale et.al., 2014, p.292). I argue that these policies are...
ineffective in redistributing income to those most in need, and they potentially create community unrest by favoring ‘spoilers’, who have engaged in violence and corruption over other citizens.

Use of an international currency (US dollar) has moderated inflation and partially hedged currency fluctuations however, in 2011, inflation climbed to 14.5 per cent, driven by higher global commodity prices, a weak US dollar and large increases in fiscal spending (IMF, 2012). High inflation places disproportion costs on poorer citizens, leading to significant economic pressure on the rural population who already experience higher poverty rates.

While much of the population is engaged in the informal sector the labour force participation rate for people over fifteen years is low with only 38.4 per cent women and 74.1 per cent men engaged in the formal labour force (UNDP, 2013b, p. 158). Urban unemployment is higher than in rural areas (16.7 per cent versus 6.9 per cent) (NSD, 2011, pp. xvi – xviii; UNDP 2014, p. 214). 63.1 per cent of households are involved in crop production, eighty-six per cent of households are rearing livestock and thirty-six per cent of the population work in subsistence agriculture (Scheiner, 2014). High rates of urban migration and youth unemployment create an environment for social tension, frustration and unrest and the gangs provide a source of status, livelihood, companionship and protection (Scambary 2009, p. 2). These youth are vulnerable to manipulation and incitement to violence (Crockford, 2000; Kingsbury, 2007; Wigglesworth, 2005; 2007).

The Net Emigration Rate is significant at -9.4 per cent, where economic stagnation, unemployment and poverty have lead many young people to seek work overseas (UNDP, 2013b: p. 184). Migration and remittances are rapidly increasing from USD 3,642,322 in 2006 to USD 130,765,500 in 2011 (Index Mundi, 2012). Remittances provide stimulation for community-level business and have boosted the economy and household incomes (McWilliam, 2014). Importantly these employment programs absorb some of the surplus labour of young men, possibly reducing their potential as conflict actors (Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 7 July).

5.3.11 Inadequate infrastructure

Infrastructure was largely destroyed in the aftermath of Indonesian occupation in 1999 and approximately ninety per cent of roads are in poor condition and seaport, airport and telecommunications infrastructure require urgent attention. One-third of East Timorese do not have access to improved drinking water, sixty per cent lack decent sanitation facilities and two thirds are living without access to electricity (UNDP, 2013b). The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 (Schwab & Sala-i-Martin, 2013, p. 346) notes that
constrained access to domestic and international markets due to inadequate infrastructure is the key barrier for doing business in Timor-Leste.

Under the SDP, the Government is focused on large-scale multi-year infrastructure spending, financed by withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund. The Government spent USD 268 million on capital in 2010, capital expenditure jumped to USD 718 million in 2011 and a planned USD 1,078 million for 2012 (IMF, 2012, p.4). While this focus is clearly necessary for long-run economic growth there are significant risks in undermining Petroleum Fund savings. A fall in oil prices would heavily impact the national budget. The IMF’s 2011 Article IV Consultations recommends slower capital spending to align with the absorptive capacity of the economy and a continued focus on building public financial management capacity to manage economic growth (IMF, 2012).

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I reviewed the history of peacebuilding, development and violence in Timor-Leste. I argue that there are four important historical periods and two transition periods from pre-colonial times to independence in 2002 that have each contributed to the current root causes of violence in Timor-Leste. These periods are: pre-colonialism prior to 1511, Portuguese colonialism from 1511–1974, the civil war and Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste from 1974–1975, the Indonesian occupation from 1975–1999, the end of Indonesian occupation from 1998–1999, and UNTAET’s administration from 1999–2002. These periods are important to understanding interpersonal dynamics, violence and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. Indigenous East Timorese culture, power dynamics and relationships between key actors are central to understanding the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste. However, I stressed that from Portuguese colonialism to 2002, Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems were deliberately marginalised, delegitimised and distorted by external actors who were in power.

I then examined the history of intra-state violence and human insecurity in Timor-Leste from 2002 onward, with a particular examination of the security sector and the root causes of the 2006–2008 crisis. I provided a broad analysis of the root causes for violence with a focus on land, property, and resource use disputes; weak, corrupt or inaccessible governance systems; political differences between elites and manipulation to gain power; gendered power imbalances; and a weak justice system and continued impunity for crimes. I reviewed significant related causes of structural violence including: poverty; food insecurity and food sovereignty; limited access to education; unstable state institutions and limited community participation; a lack of economic security including inequalities exacerbated by rewards to potential spoilers; unemployment and the ‘resource curse’; and inadequate infrastructure.
Many of these triggers are directly impacted by development and peacebuilding interventions. These interventions can exacerbate violence by not focusing on understanding and transforming these root causes. Therefore development, if executed poorly, it is a tool, or an enabler of development-related violence. The complexity of the violence creates challenges for an ‘outsider’ or international practitioner to understand, or predict how, when and where violence will occur.

In line with Lederach (2003) East Timorese participants explained that some level of conflict has always existed in Timor-Leste communities enabling necessary societal transformation. An East Timorese NGO peacebuilder clarified: “Conflict is part of being a human being, it is a natural thing…Conflict is always with us” (TX-1600-260910). I agree with Dewhurst (2008) who categorises Timor-Leste as currently experiencing “violent peace”; where continuing inequality and cultural violence create low-level direct and structural violence in communities and broader intra-state violence. Dewhurst (2008) argues that the historically high levels of violence in Timor-Leste have been sustained by a cultural-legitimisation of violent behaviour, where violence is normalised and is not condemned, resulting in the perpetuation of violence at all levels of society. In Timor-Leste, violence is experienced differently in rural and urban areas, between elites and citizens, and between genders and generations.

From the perspective of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge, the root cause of the protracted intra-state violence and insecurity in Timor-Leste is an imbalance in the secular and cosmological worlds. This imbalance manifests itself in multiple ways including physically, through violent combat; mentally, through emotional trauma and violent thoughts and words; structurally, through institutions; and culturally through repressed and marginalised cultural practices. It is also engendered through sexual and family violence and inequity. This violence is complex and interconnected.

I argue that since 2002, East Timorese elites have continued the marginalisation of Indigenous knowledge systems and peacebuilding practices. However, the resilience of these Indigenous systems is remarkable, and, while they have changed over time, these knowledge systems are strong and vital to communities today. In Chapter Six I will examine Indigenous East Timorese methods of peacebuilding used to transform community violence for thousands of years.
6 Indigenous East Timorese Knowledge Systems: Culture, Power and Relationships

6.1 Introduction

Chapter Five surveyed the history of Timor-Leste from pre-colonialism to 1999 and elaborated on the systemic root causes of violence in post-1999 Timor-Leste. In Chapter Six I expand on this discussion by establishing the foundations of the Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and providing a deeper analysis of my theoretical framework based on culture, power and relationships. I use historical, anthropological and political science texts and field interviews to expand on Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems.

Not all East Timorese have equal access, responsibilities, belief and trust in Indigenous knowledge systems and not all East Timorese peoples categorise themselves as Indigenous. I asserted in Chapter Three that East Timorese peoples are the customary owners of Indigenous knowledge systems – a shared set of widely used cultural categories that stretch across and within localities. In line with other Indigenous knowledge systems, East Timorese knowledge systems are categorised by multiple ontologies and epistemologies.

Respect for and use of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems are deeply influenced by an individual’s historical experiences during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation. Understanding also differs across and within language groups and leadership and governance hierarchies, depending on gender, age, and formal and informal education levels. As a result there is no single understanding of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge. However, there are some common principles within Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems that have emerged through analysis in my fieldwork findings (discussed further in Chapters Seven and Eight). In this Chapter I highlight and expand on these three central themes, culture/lulik, power/lisan and relationships/slulu as a framework to understand the complexity and adaptability of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems.

At the start of this chapter I explore how Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices are explicitly linked to Indigenous self-determination. In Timor-Leste, Indigenous peacebuilding is both a metaphysical and practical process aimed at bringing the cosmos and the secular world into balance. Realising tempu rai-diak (Tetum: a time of tranquility) or dame (Tetum: peace) is essential to the achievement of ukun rasik a’an (Tetum: self-determination). I draw on the work of East Timorese academics Babo-Soares (2004), da Silva (2012) and Trindade (2014) to examine how Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices, such as tarabandu, nahe biti, juramentu, matak-malarin, and halerik act to transform violence.
I move into an analysis of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems through the framework of culture, power and relationships (see Table 2). I highlight relevant Indigenous knowledge, practices, processes or rituals that specifically transform or exacerbate violence, particularly at a community level. In the first section on culture/\textit{lulik}, I examine sacred houses and localised identity, maubere-ism, multilingualism and complex systems of land and water ownership and use. In the second section on power/\textit{lisan}, I detail governance structures, leadership, FPIC and processes of participation and consultation. Finally, I extrapolate on how cooperative relationships/\textit{slulu} are built and sustained between East Timorese, with a focus on the relationships between women and men and processes of installing the outsider inside.

In exploring East Timorese knowledge through these central themes, my analysis broadly differentiates between East Timorese knowledge systems and the modern knowledge systems of international development practitioners. As identified in Chapter Two, while modern knowledge systems are centred on Western liberal ideas, modern knowledge systems are also complex and plural, as demonstrated by so many practitioners originating from different countries. Often, East Timorese and modern knowledge systems overlap, and both are used pragmatically by East Timorese peoples who fluidly engage with and interconnect the knowledge systems depending on whichever system is most practical for a given scenario. McWilliam et.al. (2014) draw on Sahlins (1985) and Tsing (2005) to explain that East Timorese flexibly respond in “culturally inflected ways” to change and difference.

Many of the \textit{Tetum} terms described in this Chapter are used to group common rituals, processes or forms from across different \textit{uma lulik} and ethno-linguistic groups in Timor-Leste. For each of these terms there are multiple local language forms and arrangements that may be different to the way I describe them in \textit{Tetum}.

### 6.2 Indigenous self-determination and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste

East Timorese peacebuilding processes are deeply ingrained in Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and have been practiced in Timor-Leste for centuries to actively manage community violence (Babo-Soares, 2004; Laakso, 2007; Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Trindade (2014) explains \textit{tempu rai-diak} (Tetum: the tranquil time) as a time of balance and dualism between the secular (physical and material) and cosmological (the world of the spirits and ancestors) worlds. In \textit{tempu rai-diak} people are connected to \textit{hun} (Tetum: the roots of the tree or source), meaning their ancestors, origins and history, and \textit{rohan} (Tetum: tips of the tree branches), meaning the present or the future. Babo-Soares (2003, p.89) describes \textit{tempu rai-diak} or \textit{tempu beiala} (Tetum: time of the ancestors) as a holistic, sustainable existence without
violence, when the Indigenous social, political and economic systems were in place before Portuguese colonialism:

“…life in the beiala period is portrayed as peaceful, calm and governed by the rules of ukun (rule or regulate) and bandu (forbidden) or customary law. Emphasis is placed on the point that in the time of the ancestors’ life was peaceful, calm and bountiful. There was no shortage of food and the people lived the good life. This is the kind of life later interrupted by the invasion of outsiders”.

These complex peacebuilding systems are continuous, non-linear and multidimensional. The system connects multiple generations, maun-alin (Tetum: elder-younger siblings), lineages and clans, rai (Tetum: the land one stands on), uma (Tetum: house), moris (Tetum: life and the future one seeks), and rate (Tetum: the graveyard of your kin) (Babo-Soares, 2004, pp.22-23). This cycle of balancing is also a process of reconciliation, where throughout their lifetime an individual aims to heal past mistakes and move to tempu rai-diak (McWilliam, 2007a). People and society become out of balance if the correct rituals and processes are not followed. Breaching these systems or creating imbalance can cause disaster, illness, violence, retribution or death and can only be rectified by following the correct ritual processes (McWilliam, 2007a; Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.24; Trindade, 2014). If the imbalance between the secular and cosmos is unaddressed, violence will continue (Babo-Soares, 2004).

One experienced East Timorese NGO peacebuilder explained that conflict is natural, but it is important to understand the root causes to resolve violence. When he trains other East Timorese in peacebuilding he uses the analogy of hun to highlight unseen or invisible triggers for violence:

“I say to them conflict is a normal thing. Even if you solve the conflict, please analyse it first, why did this conflict happen? If you want to plant a eucalyptus tree, and then you cut it down, and leave the root there. One day the root will grow again. This is the same as conflict. People want to try to solve the conflict, the thing they can see – people fighting each other – but they do not know why they were fighting each other. If you do not know the root cause of the conflict, you can solve the one that you can see, and you think that it is resolved, but in a month, or three months, you will have conflict again. If you dig deeply you can see the root, the root is like a coconut root, or like a tamarind tree [spreads out his fingers]” (TX-1600-260910).

The ultimate goal of Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding is to achieve tempu rai-diak or dame (Tetum: peace, a time of harmony and tranquillity) and hakmatek (Tetum: stability or quiet, a situation where violence and disorder are absent) (Trindade & Castro, 2007). These ideals are associated with ukun rasik a’an (Tetum: self-determination), a concept that holistically encompasses self-determination and concepts of sovereignty, self-sufficiency and independence (Babo-Soares 2004; Hunt, 2008a). Ukun rasik a’an is closely paralleled with tempu rai-diak, dame and hakmatek because it is also grounded in ethical concepts of balance
and fairness. *U kun rasik a’an* is also closely associated with empowerment, and holistic and integrated forms of governance that are responsive and inclusive (Pinto, 2015, pers. comm., 10 November).

I assert that *ukun rasik a’an* is the East Timorese equivalent of Indigenous self-determination as detailed in the Declaration, and an vital pre-requisite to the concept of Indigenous self-determined development discussed in Chapter Four. As one East Timorese academic explained: “We struggled very hard for independence; we want people to live in harmony, peace and prosperity” (TL-1300-170910). The fundamental difference between East Timorese and modern conflict transformation processes are that Indigenous East Timorese processes are grounded in both secular and cosmological dimensions. In theory, when these complex systems are legitimised, accessible, used and respected East Timorese peoples will achieve *ukun rasik a’an*.

### 6.2.1 Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices

The following section details some of the most widely observed Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices used today. Separately they demonstrate tangible alternatives to liberal peacebuilding practices, together they contribute to building an understanding of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems, and their deep connection to land, place and kinship networks.

Colonialism, Christianity, violent occupation and modernisation have significantly impacted these practices. As a result, there are differences between and within communities of how these peacebuilding practices take place, the actors involved, and the level or types of violence to which they are applied. Most of these practices are described using *Tetum*, but there are many local language equivalents of each term that have more specific applications (McWilliam, 2014, pers. comm., 16 November).

#### 6.2.1.1 Tarabandu

Indigenous ancestors set rules and prohibitions known today as *tarabandu*: a combination of *tara* (*Tetum*: to hang up or suspend [often a piece of cloth]) and *bandu* (Portuguese: prohibition; customary law or morals) (McWilliam et.al., 2014, p.313). This practice is controversial and McWilliam et.al. (2014, pp.313-315) assert that *tarabandu* is not an Indigenous practice, and is at best an amalgamation of different practices appropriated by international development organisations and the Government to press their conservationism and homogenous rule of law on rural communities. However, they position *tarabandu* as an important example of modern...
knowledge systems and institutions harnessing and codifying Indigenous knowledge systems for the purposes of natural resource management (McWilliam et al., 2014, pp.317-318).

Today tarabandu is used as a customary legal process of agreement making within the community to regulate behaviour and relationships between people, and between people, natural resources and economic decisions. If tarabandu are transgressed, communities believe the ancestors in the spiritual world will be angry, resulting in implications for the physical world including violence, starvation, disease or war (Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.17-18). An East Timorese university student described this living system to me:

“We believe that trees, they are not just trees, but that they are something, and that there are spirits that have been living there for ages. So we are not allowed to just [cut] them” (TJ-1500-150910).

Tarabandu are used today to place limitations on shifting agriculture, controlling natural resource harvest, deforestation, determining fencing boundaries and maintenance, deterring theft, prohibitions on pre-marital sex or killing of particular animals (Meitzner Yoder, 2007; McWilliam et al., 2014; Palmer, 2007; Shepherd, 2013). A tarabandu can now be authorised by customary and Government leaders who pronounce the prohibition to the community. The tarabandu is usually symbolised by placing a distinctive cloth, sign or document in a prominent place to inform and remind the community of the decision and punishment for transgression. This process is concluded by the community participating in ritualised animal sacrifice and a shared feast (Meitzner Yoder, 2007). An East Timorese university student explained how communities used tarabandu to make decisions about natural resource management:

“I used to work in Viqueque. The people there do a ceremony called tarabandu. It is a way of telling people that they should not [cut down] the trees, so they put a sign in that area so that people are aware. If they cut down the trees, they will have to pay a fine. We were doing advocacy and traditional law on a Tarabandu project. They did a water project where they have very big trees… [The INGO] wanted to cut down the trees so that they could build a water tank in that area for their program. The community said no and it did not happen” (TJ-1500-150910).

An East Timorese peacebuilder described how the tarabandu process works to create harmony and balance:

“All the good people in this community have to follow this tarabandu process. If youth fight, they have a penalty, they have to pay USD 1,000, or USD 100, or give pigs or buffaloes. People do not want to pay a penalty, so when people are angry with each other, they think, “We have to stop it”. If you have a paddy field, and my buffalo comes and eats something in your paddy field, then I have to pay you a penalty” (TTG-1500-300910).
Brown and Gusmão (2009, p.67) see tarabandu as “dynamic and adaptable”, empowering communities to “resolve problems and meet needs”. Tarabandu work best where there is stronger adherence to Indigenous cultural practices and when communities are not economically pressured to transgress the prohibition. Tarabandu can work well in rural locations, where communities are more cohesive and less transitory, and where customary authorities and local government can enforce the decision. Meitzner Yoder (2007, pp.45-46) provides examples of how tarabandu has regained legitimacy through hybridising with state justice regulation mechanisms. For example, in Oecusse, by 2004 there were 402 tarabandu in place across twelve sukus (Tetum: local level government areas), ranging from small areas encompassing sacred rocks and water to entire mountainsides.

6.2.1.2 Nahe Biti

An important cultural practice of seeking peace, resolving differences and creating a stable social order is called nahe biti (Tetum: stretching or laying down the mat as a means to facilitate consensus, truth-telling or reconciliation). Nahe biti is a series of complex ideas and processes that can be used for both wider kinship matters and smaller family-group conflict transformation, distinguished by biti bo’ot (Tetum: large mat) and biti kiik (Tetum: small mat). Minor disagreements between members of the same family are usually resolved by the head of the family unit, within the uma lulik. Large-scale violence involving multiple families, such as divorce, theft or land disputes, may need to involve elders from outside the uma lulik especially the Chefe de Aldeia and Chefe de Suku (Trindade, 2006, p.12). The function of nahe biti expanded in 1974–1975 to included political violence (Carroll-Bell, 2013, p.37).

The process of nahe biti is grounded in community participation. It requires extensive preparation, and the willingness on both sides to commit to the process, voluntarily accept culpability for past wrongs, and compromise to achieve tempu rai-diak. Babo-Soares (2004, p.24) explains that the five stages in weaving a biti are linked to the process of nahe biti: “Conceptually, a ready biti symbolises consensus. Bringing together different leaves in the form of a mat symbolises the willingness to bring together the conflicting parties and to find a common settlement”. He explains the first stage, preparing to plait the biti is likened to the process of contacting all the key parties to the conflict. The second, selection of the heda (Tetum: pandanus leaves) translates to seeking agreement and willingness from all parties to meet. Arranging the logistics; the third step is ensuring the heda matches each other, akin to the process of setting the parameters of the process including the recommendations for legal prosecution. The fourth step is the plaiting of the heda, which is the complex process of mediating compromise and consensus, creating a balanced or win-win solution; the final step is
the completion of the *biti*, which is accomplished by ritual ceremonies such as *juramentu* (described below).

*Nahe biti* is an active peacebuilding process grounded in Indigenous authority that facilitates participants to resolve their fear and intolerance. It creates a safe space (geographically defined by the mat) where conflicting parties can seek common ground and talk through complex violence, achieve reintegration and acceptance of wrongdoers and seek shared outcomes. While each *uma lulik* has slight differences in this process according to their differing customs, *nahe biti* is a Timor-Leste-wide conflict transformation tool. Carroll-Bell (2012, p.36) describes how the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) undertaken by CAVR used a version of *nahe biti* to discuss and resolve community violence in 1,371 cases by 2004. Indeed, The Asia Foundation (2004) found that ninety per cent of people surveyed wanted community leaders to take primary responsibility for dispute resolution. *Nahe biti* remains an important tool for transforming violence in Timor-Leste.

### 6.2.1.3 Juramentu

The practise of *nahe biti* includes a ritual ceremony to conclude and legitimate the process, usually before the *uma lulik*, where a *juramentu* (Tetum: binding oath, blood oath or oath of loyalty) is used to seal the agreement and bind all parties to the agreement (Babo-Soares, 2004, pp.21-28; Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.23-26). The *juramentu* ritual is a symbolic ‘death’ of violence and exchange of blood to bind the conflicting parties together as ‘blood brothers’. It is usually done by mixing the blood of a sacrificed animal with local palm wine and the mixture is drunk by both parties. Often *juramentu* is concluded by chewing of *buah malus* (Tetum: betel nut) to symbolise the normalising of relationships.

*Juramentu* is used to conclude conflicts, establish new social structures or relationships between groups so that family groups are not hostile to each other. These physical ritual connections parallel the new spiritual relationships created concurrently where the ancestors of each party are also engaged to maintain the peace to ensure a *juramentu* can be enforced inter-generationally (Trindade, 2006; Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.20-25).

### 6.2.1.4 Matak-malirin and Halerik

At the conclusion of Indigenous peacebuilding rituals participants hope to be provided with *matak-malirin* (Tetum-terik: newly green or sprouting, cool), dualistic symbols of good health and productive life force, which creates a balance between heating (physical and spiritual
danger) and cooling (well-being and fertility) (Kehi & Palmer, 2012, p.447; McWilliam, 2007b). *Matak-malirin* can be physically represented by harvested food and water in a pot that is called *matak inan malirin inan* (Tetum: mother of greenness and coolness). It is also the point where marriage exchanges took place at the conclusion of warfare (McWilliam, 2007b). The food and water received in these rituals are a metaphysical representation of peace, prosperity and protection from bad luck. The pots are exchanged during ceremonies to signal the harmonious and inter-connected relationships between visible and invisible life forces (Trindade, 2014). *Matak-malirin* and similar local processes that balance heat/cold, fire/water, sun/moon, are practices that both individuals and groups can use to create unity and harmony. Kehi and Palmer (2012, p.450) comment that water *matak-malirin* is also used to mark newborns as part of a symbolic ritual to bless them with good health and productive life energy.

Trindade (2014, pp.56-57) explains that when East Timorese do not have *tempu rai-diak* or *matak-malirin* they will undertake *halerik* (Tetum: the singing or chanting of the suffering). *Halerik* represents *ema kbi’it laek* (Tetum: the voice of the powerless), where those who are experiencing suffering express their problems to *ema bo’ot* (Tetum: the powerful). The act of *halerik* is a non-violent form of protest; through articulating their experiences, the sufferers gain strength and purpose. *Halerik* has numerous practical applications; it was used during Indonesian occupation by the resistance and clandestine networks to express desires for independence and self-determination. Mason (2005, p.743) illustrates the importance of women’s *halerik* during Indonesian occupation: “Central to both levels of struggle was the nonviolent resistance of women who took to the streets, staged sit-ins and yelled, sang and danced for East Timorese freedom”. *Halerik* is now used by civil society to protest and draw Government attention to socio-economic disparities.

### 6.2.2 Summary: Liberal versus Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding

East Timorese communities have been weaving Indigenous and modern methods of resolving violence and building peace since the arrival of Portuguese colonialism and Christianity. Ongoing violence has necessitated the use of Indigenous peacebuilding practices at a community level, and some East Timorese including Babo-Soares (2004) support use of Indigenous systems at a national level. However, many elite East Timorese and international practitioners do not support the widespread use of Indigenous peacebuilding practices, particularly for violent or complex criminal matters (Babo-Soares, 2004; Trindade & Castro, 2007). Babo-Soares (2004, p.17) states that political leaders only supported Indigenous processes after they were proven effective.
The liberal peacebuilding model rarely legitimises concepts of *tempu rai-diak*, *dame* and *ukun rasik a’an* or uses Indigenous knowledge systems to transform violence. Instead, liberal peacebuilding practices, such as mediation and the formal justice system using police and courts are prioritised, which do not always work smoothly in practice (TL-1300-170910). Many East Timorese are critical of liberal or hybrid peacebuilding processes, for example, Trindade and Castro (2007, p.2) note that “Recent Government-sponsored dialogue and peace-making initiatives by international actors present in East Timor have shown little impact on the sentiments and root causes underlying the eruption of violence”. An East Timorese peacebuilder elaborated:

> “International experiences and the elite Timorese interests, they ignore our culture. One example, in 2006…we wanted *nahe biti bo’ot*, but they completely used *malae* [Tetum: foreigner] way, very international way [sic], and ignored local ownership. So in that way it was not working” (TTR-0900-061010).

Historically, the Portuguese, Indonesians and international practitioners have also systematically manipulated Indigenous peacebuilding processes of *juramentu* and *nahe biti*. An international development consultant said:

> “The Indonesians were not stupid, they brought in the traditional ceremonies. In the militia, they would do oath-binding ceremonies, blood drinking ceremonies. They would give people a sense of being impervious to bullets by getting people to perform rituals. That might have denigrated the power of some of the processes. You can draw parallels with CAVR, where we drew on *nahe biti*. It is the same thing, perverting a traditional process and using it to your own ends” (TZ-1430-280910).

Liberal and hybrid peacebuilding efforts, such as the rule of law, have not been well understood or supported by communities, which limits their effectiveness. For example, a senior East Timorese peacebuilder stated that communities did not accept formal justice outcomes as retribution for past crimes: “They [people who had fought in militias] went to jail for five years and the community still would not accept them, so they had to go back to the refugee camp” (TTK-1630-100713). I asked what approach would have worked better. She explained that customarily a payment would be given. An East Timorese analyst illustrated that use of customary mechanisms can also contribute to the maintenance of relationships between parties to the disagreement:

> “If I go through the legal process and my neighbour has stolen my pig, if I win, they will go to jail. But then the neighbour will still hold some kind of sense of sentiment. He might not accept the accusation. It's very difficult, when he comes back it is very difficult to stay together especially if we are neighbours” (TTT-1400-011010).
The emphasis on compensation also potentially leads to the problem of Indigenous practices exacerbating intergenerational poverty and violence. A East Timorese NGO peacebuilder expanded:

“If we are fighting each other, and I go to you to solve the conflict, you say I have to provide one pig and two boxes of rice, but at the time I have no money. I have to go and borrow from someone, and I say: ‘no worries I will return it back in two weeks, in order to solve the problem’. So I give the pig [sic]. Everything is resolved. But, in two weeks, the person who I borrowed money from comes to ask for my money. I said: ‘sorry right now I do not have money’. So now my conflict with you is gone but I have a new conflict” (TX-1600-260910).

There is recognition that the scale of the violence determines what form of peacebuilding is used. A larger crime often necessitates use of the modern, criminal justice system, but the majority of East Timorese participants emphasised that it was preferable to use Indigenous systems to manage community violence and minor criminal acts:

“It depends on the level of the problem. When we involve the police [they] say this is a small problem, go back to your community and use tarabandu. Tarabandu is still relevant to use because the people in the community they feel more respect [for] the traditional than the legal law” (TN-1300-200910).

Peacebuilding is difficult to achieve if some portion of Indigenous knowledge is missing due to historical marginalisation of Indigenous knowledge holders and cultural practices. While recognising the importance of Indigenous peacebuilding at a community level, McWilliam et.al. (2014) and Grenfell et.al. (2009) question the effectiveness of these practices. They argue that it is unclear whether Indigenous peacebuilding can be used to transform widespread and endemic violence. They highlight that the practice of Indigenous peacebuilding has shifted, particularly since 2006–2008, and that significant gaps in knowledge and procedures may cause the overall process to be ineffective.

Trindade and Castro (2007, p.31) agree that often Indigenous peacebuilding practices used today are ineffective because they do not follow the correct process. They explain that all the correct customary standards and procedures must be followed by beseeching the ancestors and for balance to be restored. Failure to correctly implement standards and procedures leads to further imbalances and violence. A senior East Timorese peacebuilder suggested that more time, funds and patience are needed to follow the correct Indigenous peacebuilding process:

“During the crisis they tried to do the traditional conflict resolution. It is called nahe biti bo’ot, where you put down the mat; everyone sits down together to find a solution. I think it [nahe biti bo’ot] was more of a spectacle; it did not really address the underlying issues. I don’t think it could have. I think we need a much longer time to do it, logistically, the money and the time. Patience. There [are] still a lot of unresolved disagreements” (TTK-1630-100713).

“People were coming in here to teach conflict resolution. But we already have conflict resolution methods in place that we have used for maybe thousands of years. But then international people come in, they do a conflict resolution training for the Timorese. It's just confusing. All [these] new conflict resolution methods from outside are not always working because people don't believe in [them]. The result is very very minimal” (TG-1500-140910).

Ongoing significant levels of intra-state and community-level violence indicates that the current prioritisation of liberal peacebuilding over East Timorese peacebuilding practices is failing to transform the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste. The prioritisation of liberal peacebuilding practices appears to be exacerbating existing forms of cultural and structural violence.

6.3 Culture / Lulik

The concept of culture is central to Indigenous self-determined development and peacebuilding practice. Using anthropological and ethnographic sources and my field research, I explore how Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems are grounded in multiple narratives of culture. I also examine how the use of culture can cause, exacerbate or transform structural violence in Timor-Leste.

Timor-Leste is not culturally homogenous. However, some symbols or behaviours signal a shared Indigenous East Timorese culture. This includes concepts such *uma lulik*, *barlaki* (Tetum: marriage exchanges) and *nahe biti* and shared rituals and rites using similar artifacts.

Culture is the active customary practices and socio-political and economic structures occurring across Timor-Leste, particularly in the rural areas where 71.88 per cent of the population resides (Government of Timor-Leste, 2015, p.22).

I link Indigenous East Timorese culture with the term *lulik*, which can be embodied in place and artifacts, but is also practiced as norms, behaviours and ideas. Bovensiepen (2014b) highlights that *lulik* has agency, it can create and destroy life, and is associated with reverence and awe but also fear. *Lulik* in Timor-Leste determines all Indigenous systems of power and relationships.
between people, land and place. It is the “preeminent philosophical, religious, moral and epistemic order” guiding relationships between East Timorese and with outsiders (McWilliam et al., 2014, p.318). In Timor-Leste, multiple approaches to understanding and practicing *lulik* result in each individual and group imagining culture and identity differently.

Historical experiences in Timor-Leste, including experiences of violence and trauma, are critical to East Timorese culture (Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.69). Fox (2000a, p.1) emphasises that because of the multiple layers of geology, history, language, and cultures “Timor is not one place, but many”. Traube (2001, p.1) observes that “In East Timor today, culture both divides and unites the local peoples, or rather, local groups continue to draw on their cultural traditions both to assert distinctive local identities and to imagine themselves as members of a national community, that is, to identify themselves as East Timorese”. Da Silva (2012, pp.83-87) asserts that culture is the basis of all resistance and where there is strong Indigenous culture, outsider domination is not sustainable.

Constructing a shared East Timorese identity is core to any nation building and must involve all East Timorese (da Costa, 2010). The challenge is for East Timorese leaders to affirm, encourage and include plural East Timorese identities and acknowledge the “multiple dimensions of Timor-ness” (Crockford, 2000, p.231). Babo-Soares (2003, p.41) emphasises the importance of culture in constructing *nacionalismo* (Tetum: East Timorese nationalism). Nationalism can unite, but also holds risks of alienating and isolating individuals and groups, leading to violence. Brown (2009, p.158) acknowledges that nationalism constructed around a common enemy (Indonesia) was useful but highlights that building nationalism primarily around resistance is potentially divisive. For example, Kent (2011, pp.451-454) highlights an emerging ‘victim consciousness’ that broadens the discussion about the impact of violence during Indonesian occupation, including the specific experiences of women, and recognises the continued structural impacts of systemic violence. Kent (2011) warns that this ‘victim consciousness’ may pit one group against others, causing resentment. As one East Timorese expanded:

“When the UN handed over power to the Timorese Government there is [sic] a lot of diaspora in that group, who went on to include their diaspora family in key offices. There are reasons for doing so, related to capacity. But many people who remained here, and did the hard yards during the occupation, where is their payback? I lived in the jungle, and left my family for five years. Where is the pay off for all that in this new world? When do I get mine? Life has, for sure, got harder for most people. They are not getting shot, but the general cost of living is high” (TZ-1430-280910).

(2009, p.63) argue that elite educated East Timorese and the diaspora viewed East Timorese culture as backward and extraneous to achieving a modern political state. Consequently many Government and international practitioners framed their development interventions based on their own knowledge systems rather than drawing on Indigenous East Timorese systems (Wigglesworth, 2005, p.126). These actions sidelined East Timorese culture and devalued local governance processes, which alienated communities who linked these practices to their deeply held Indigenous knowledge systems.

Morphy (2014, pp.14-15) calls this a “museum” perspective which views Indigenous culture as backward, and where culture is categorised as “incapable of adaptive change”, where moving to a “modern culture” requires leaving behind the culture of the past. People who cling to past cultures are disparaged as “existing between worlds”, and are seen as dysfunctional and lacking decision making capacity. This “museum” perspective does not accept that culture can change and adapt, and does not acknowledge that many Indigenous people hold multiple identities or cultures simultaneously. An East Timorese academic explained how the “museum” perspective occurs in Timor-Leste:

“At the moment, they [traditional leaders] are sharing their knowledge in rural areas. They still practise their culture and traditions, but at a national level, it is being ignored. It is because they [East Timorese elites] think Timorese culture is backward, so they don't need to value it that much. Many Timorese elite who are in the Government right now, they don't have any connection to Timorese culture. For example if you are a mixed Timorese, half Portuguese - half Timorese, you do not live the life of a Timorese. They did not suffer during Portuguese time. They don't understand how Timorese live their lives, the value of the culture, the dos and do nots” (TG-1500-140910).

In the next section, I explore the plural and multi-layered Indigenous East Timorese culture to understand how *lulik* can be better understood and integrated into development and peacebuilding practice.

### 6.3.1 Sacred Houses and Localised Identity

East Timorese have multiple layers of national and localised cultures defined by geographical boundaries, and common ancestral and ethno-linguistic heritage. Da Silva (2006, p.1) elaborates: “Being East Timorese means both belonging to a nation and also to a locality”. Indigenous social, economic and cultural life in Timor-Leste is constructed around complex physical and temporal systems of *uma lulik* that unite seemingly antagonistic or opposing/binary principles. Babo-Soares (2003), Bovensiepen (2014b), Brown (2009), da Silva (2006), Fox (2000a), Hicks (2004; 2008), McWilliam (2005; 2007a), Traube (1986; 2001; 2011), and
Trindade (2006; 2012; 2014) all stress the physical and metaphorical importance of the *uma lulik* across Timor-Leste.

*Uma lulik* are the basis for identity in Timor-Leste, they are the central physical repositories of memory and culture, embody and localise all social relationships and ritual exchanges between people, and provide structure for all Indigenous East Timorese governance, judicial mechanisms, leadership, decision-making and conflict transformation processes. *Uma lulik* are the “fundamental epistemological orientation” of Indigenous East Timorese society and governance and are the basis for relational systems of social and moral order (Fox cited in McWilliam, 2005, p.32). Hicks (2008, p.167) highlights that *uma lulik* are not merely “ritual artefacts”, but “objects engaged in continuous dialectic relationships with the human beings they serve”. Babo-Soares (2003, p.39) cites a *lia-nain* (Tetum: owner of words, spokesperson, responsible for ritual authority and moral behaviour) describing the importance of *uma lulik*:

“We, human beings should know our house and our siblings. Those who do not know these do not know their roots. If people do not know their roots, they do not know their future; people of this kind live as an animal, no origins - no future. The East Timorese also say ‘ran ida be mai housi hun’ (Tetum: the blood inherited from the source), a reference to one's origin, identifying someone to a clan due to the blood inherited from their lineage”.

Each *uma lulik* is hierarchically ordered in sequence from the oldest to youngest ancestor who settled that land and provided it with security and fertility (Hohe & Nixon, 2003, p.14). The *uma lulik* contains the origins of the sacred ancestors, identified through use of *sasan lulik* (Tetum: ancient relics) and oral histories, and ritually remembered, reaffirmed and respected through ceremonies and rituals that unify and bind family members to the specific geographic territory of the *uma lulik* (Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.19-20). *Sasan lulik* allow East Timorese to acknowledge, relate to and position themselves appropriately to the past—the dead, the ancestors—and the future through the marriage ceremonies. Marriage ceremonies create and reaffirm a web of gendered relationships and peaceful alliances to form continuously larger social units to extend the family into the future (this matter is discussed in the section below on relationships).

Architecturally there is great variety in *uma lulik* across Timor-Leste; they differ regarding their orientation, structure, construction techniques, materials and symbolic properties. Like other nearby Indigenous South-East Asian communities, these sacred structures, while different, share “common properties and cultural concerns” within which “configuration of space and structural elements is encoded a rich cosmological and cultural system of meanings connected with ideas of life, death and gendered symbolism” (McWilliam, 2005, pp.29-30). For example, Traube (1986, p.140) describes the Mambai *uma lulik* as “polysemous”, where each built structure
symbolises the complexity and multiple layers of the gendered human body and geographic landscapes to form social and physical enclosures that both divide and unify.

During, but particularly at the end of Indonesian occupation in 1999, *uma lulik* were burnt by militias and the Indonesian military. They were viewed as a central symbol of resistance and cultural resilience (Bovensiepen, 2011; Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.4; McWilliam 2005; 2007a; 2007b; Trindade & Castro 2007: p.20). Indeed, McWilliam (2005; 2007a; 2007b) and Taylor (1991) place the reason for Indonesia’s failure directly on the continuation of strong Indigenous systems.

Since 1999, many communities are focused on rebuilding their *uma lulik*. The rebuilding process, including the reinterring of the sacred objects, is critical to community healing. This process is connected to laying to rest ancestors who have died without attendant funerary rituals, where appropriate rituals at the site of the *umu lulik* can consecrate the bones, or symbolic bones (stones) of the dead, and rebuild relationships across generations (Brown, 2009, p.153; Loch, 2007). To fail to undertake processes of rebuilding and interring the dead risks disturbing the ancestors who may react by cursing their *uma lulik*, causing further imbalance or violence. Due to the isolated location of many killings during the Indonesian occupation and the suppression of Indigenous practices, often no customary burial, sacrifices or other rituals were enacted by relatives as per customary obligations (Rawnsley, 2004). Some East Timorese say that the 2006 Crisis was a “*malisan husi matebian sira*” (Tetum: curse of the martyrs) resulting from the failure to restore balance and respect the sacred *lulik* power (Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.18).

Prioritising the rebuilding *uma lulik* is a good example of the different perspectives of local communities versus international development practitioners. The latter often did not perceive rebuilding as critical given the range of development needs. However, Loch (2007, p.291) estimates that between 1999 and 2004 approximately 150 to 200 *uma lulik* were built or reconstructed in the Baucau area alone. Each required their makers to follow correct ritual processes and to rebuild took between two and five months work and at least 1000 days of labour. “Rebuilding ancestral origin houses is a collective, traditional affair. It mobilises an array of social groups, combines technical with ceremonial activities, and is part of a complex, contested process of negotiating local and national identities” (Traube, 2001, p.2).

### 6.3.2 Maubere-ism

Indigenous East Timorese identity is linked with the term *maubere or mau bere* (Mambai: people of the countryside). During Portuguese colonialism the term *maubere* was a
condescending or derogatory term for an Indigenous person, used by Portuguese and Chinese people (Traube, 2011, p.216). It was used to insult and denigrate East Timorese and was associated with being “backward”, illiterate or poor; similar to the term _indigenas_ as discussed in Chapter Three (Leach, 2002; Traube, 2007, p.9).

During 1974–1975 and the Indonesian occupation, FRETILIN proudly reclaimed _maubere_ as a political symbol for grassroots emancipation (da Silva, 2012; Jolliffe, 1978, pp.103-105). Tobias (2011, pp.330-333) adds that _maubere_ was powerful in its capacity to unify individuals and groups for independence, based on solidarity and social trust. It was a tool to collectivise and mobilise the dispossessed peoples of Timor-Leste and to popularise East Timorese nationalism by celebrating what the colonialists had maligned (Babo-Soares, 2000, p.61; Cabral, 2002, p.363; da Silva, 2012, p.21, 102). Trindade (2008) explains that _maubere_ identifies a unique identity and cultural perspective associated with a specific worldview that is different from Portuguese or Indonesian. Cristalis (2009, p.40) notes that _maubere_ was considered racially divisive by UDT and KOTA, distinguishing “pure-blooded” East Timorese from _mestiços_.

Da Silva (2012, pp.310-311) argues that the resistance was grounded in _maubere_ philosophy or _mauberism_, which has five tenets. The first element is social solidarity; this is the concept of working together, or working cooperatively which is expressed in local languages as _slulu_ (Mambai), _fulidaidai_ (Makaleru) or _hakawak_ (Tetum) and is demonstrated through _uma lulik_ and _barlaki_ (Pinto, 2015, pers. comm., 8 December). The second element is the intrinsic and reciprocal relationship between East Timorese people and their surrounding ecology. The third is the spiritual and ritual relationship between the living and the dead and links to ancestors through the _umu lulik_. The fourth factor is the common historical experience of East Timorese peoples, their colonisation, oppression and liberation, which is linked to other freedom movements internationally. Finally, da Silva explains that _mauberism_ values popular democracy and active participation in decision-making at all levels. A senior East Timorese public servant explains that _mauberism_ supports unity and self-determination:

“We are _Maubere_ people; we fought against colonisation. It’s become an identity. The struggle of the people of _Maubere_, it is the struggle of the people of Timor-Leste. It can be used to differentiate from Chinese, _mestiços_, Arab, and now _malaes_, for foreigners. That word could be positive to use, to bring up again the spirit of nationalism, a sense of belonging to this country. We struggled very hard for independence; we want people to live in harmony, peace and prosperity. I use that word when our nation has a crisis of conflict, a crisis of identity, and can use that to raise awareness, to make people aware of their identity” (TL-1300-170910).

The different perspectives on and use of _maubere_ emphasise the contested and complex nature of identity in Timor-Leste.
6.3.3 Multilingualism

Widespread use of Indigenous languages is critical to the intergenerational transfer and sustainably of Indigenous culture and knowledge systems (Kirkness, 1998; Settee, 2008). In Timor-Leste, *lulik* practices are tied to the accurate naming of sacred places and spirits, and allow Indigenous knowledge holders to share myths and speak during rituals. The Declaration specifically mentions that loss of Indigenous languages is linked to the loss of cultural and intellectual diversity (Hale, 1992; Krauss, 1992; Settee (2008). Most East Timorese are multilingual from a young age, speaking their *lian inan* (Tetum: mother tongue) for example Galoli or Makassae (Caet & Taylor-Leech, 2012). The UNPFII (2008, p.8) recommend the use of mother tongue as the first learning language in bilingual or multilingual primary education. Indigenous language revitalisation is also supported by documentation and preservation, curriculum and resource development, teacher training, policy development and political advocacy, research, language classes and immersion practices (McIvor, 2009).

Map 2: Ethno-linguistic Map of Timor-Leste (Australian National University, 2011)

While speaking Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesian, the language of the colonisers, has always been contentious, post-1999 language policy is a highly politicised issue and a trigger for structural and cultural violence. From 1999, there was often no common language, except Portuguese, English and Indonesian, to communicate between international practitioners and East Timorese. Smith and Dee (2003, pp.105-112) propose that the lack of a common language or an effective public information program affected the ability for the international community to build trusted relationships.
Older resistance leaders and the diaspora generally favour Portuguese and do not consider Tetum as an effective language for governance although ninety-one per cent of East Timorese can understand it (Simonsen, 2006, pp.585-586). Hunt (2008a, p.272) highlights that Tetum is an important intergenerational connector and a common identifier across the multilingual state. However by 1999, ninety per cent of people under thirty understood Bahasa Indonesian and did not speak Portuguese (Simonsen, 2006, p.586). In 2002, the Constituent Assembly controversially determined Portuguese and Tetum as the official languages, and English and Indonesian as working languages. The aim was to develop Tetum within ten years to enable its use as an official language (Ingram, 2012, p.10). Ramos-Horta (cited in Simonsen, 2006, p.587) claimed this was a “strategic decision” that would “strengthen the uniqueness [and] the national identity of East Timor”.

Simonsen (2006, p.584) maintains that language policy is a “dangerously divisive issue”. Kingsbury (2007, p.371) also labelled the adoption of Portuguese as “divisive”, and Leach (2007, p.6) acknowledges that while Portuguese and Tetum were chosen for symbolic, economic and political reasons, Portuguese is now a contested signifier of difference. The younger generation is very critical of the older generation’s decision to prioritise Portuguese, which they believe will exclude them from employment and education opportunities.

The language policy is also linked to the effectiveness of education policy and programming (Caet & Taylor-Leech, 2012; Taylor-Leech, 2013). Use of a second or foreign language for instruction is a major cause of educational underachievement, poor literacy and early dropout (Caet & Taylor-Leech, 2012, p.295; Bühmann & Trudell, 2008). Brown (2009, p.150) adds that language policies have impeded Government and international organisations’ efforts to reach effectively beyond Dili, compounding rural poverty. The 2010 National Census statistics (National Statistics Directorate, 2011, p.xvii) shows that women are less literate than men, and rural people are less literate than those in urban areas. UNDP (2013b, p.146) reports that the mean schooling years is a low 4.4 years. While there are other barriers to education, the poor command by teachers and students of Portuguese has worsened poor educational outcomes since 1999. In response, in 2012 the Government launched a pilot program to evaluate the effectiveness of mother tongue based-multilingual education (MTB-MLE). Soares (2015) reports that oral reading proficiency has significantly improved as a result of this program.

Balancing education in all four official languages will continue to be a significant challenge to unity and equal socio-economic opportunities in Timor-Leste. I assert that it is critical to resolve this controversial policy to prevent structural and cultural violence. This view was emphasised by some East Timorese participants. One declared:
National identity. So many of the ideas are coming from the outside. Some people present Portuguese language as Timorese identity. We have never been Portuguese - even if we speak Portuguese it doesn't mean we are Portuguese. I speak English, I speak Indonesian, I don't claim that my identity is Anglo-Saxon. I am just East Timorese. But because of this lack of discussion about who we are, people manipulated it (TG-1500-140910).

6.3.4 Complex systems of land and water ownership and use

In Timor-Leste, Indigenous knowledge, identity and culture are connected to particular physical and geographic sights and places. Timor-Leste’s land system reflects its cultural, legal, social and spiritual heritage (Rede Ba Rai, 2013, p.6). Babo-Soares (2001; 2003; 2004), Fitzpatrick et.al. (2013), Forman (1977), Hicks (1976; 2008), Kehi and Palmer (2012), McWilliam (2007b), Palmer (2007; 2015), Palmer and de Carvalho (2008), Rawnsley (2004), Traube (1986; 2011) and Trindade (2012; 2014) extensively discuss the interconnectedness between culture and physical environment within Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems, where the land is the root of all lineages, where ancestor spirits dwell and are respected with fear and awe. Visible and invisible objects including rocks, escarpments, old trees and water sources are all potential lulik objects and this sacred realm gives and sustains the meaning of life.

Under customary law, all land is owned by liurai and/or customary groups and is accessed differently depending on gender and usage rights (International Crisis Group, 2010; Thu et.al., 2007). Wallace (2007) states that before Portuguese colonialism there were three categories of Indigenous land ownership: land recognised as common property by the liurai; land owned by one family but used by another family (who were required to pay ‘rent’); and land to which a family has full ownership rights. Fitzpatrick and Barnes (2010) emphasise the relative resilience of these customary systems, despite the violent, colonial past, in managing displacement and land and resource ownership and use.

The majority of rural East Timorese rely on Indigenous leaders and customary authorities and mechanisms, such as tarabandu, to address local land and resource rights, use and access disputes. Palmer (2015) and Kehi and Palmer (2012) discuss the complex systems of managing water access and use, where water can permeate the boundaries between the visible and invisible worlds providing access to matak-malarin to the living. Interactions with the natural environment through rituals such as matak–malirin encompass the complex socio-ecological world and connect these visible and invisible boundaries.

Multiple land rights systems have resulted in the dispossession of Indigenous land in Timor-Leste and a ‘jigsaw’ of land use and occupation. Large tracts of this arable land and urban property have been appropriated from Indigenous East Timorese communities with significant
social, cultural and economic implications and, as discussed in Chapter Five, are a significant root cause of violence (Cryan, 2015a; 2015b).

6.3.5 Summary: Lulik

Lulik, and its equivalent more local-level specific terms, is fundamental to unpacking the complex, pluralised understanding of Indigenous cultures in Timor-Leste. I established that culture and identity in Timor-Leste is localised, linked to uma lulik, kinship and place, which regulate and delineate all Indigenous social, cultural and economic practices. Grounded in lulik is the active participation of individuals and groups in the process of fluidly balancing secular and cosmological systems. As Morphy (2014, p.16) emphasises, culture itself is critical to how a community makes decisions about development and peacebuilding.

Prior to colonialism, conflict and violence regularly occurred between members of uma lulik and outsiders, although these were also resolved using Indigenous peacebuilding processes including nahe bitti, juramentu, matak-malarin, tarabandu, and halerik. These processes are complex, adaptive and are used to transform violence at local and State levels.

Throughout Portuguese colonialism, Indonesian occupation and UN administration, Timor-Leste has been controlled by outsiders and subjected to policies and programs resulting in significant division and marginalisation of communities and de-legitimisation of Indigenous knowledge and socio-cultural practices and the militarisation of society. In claiming that international practitioners have ignored or marginalised Indigenous practices, Trindade and Castro (2007, p.18) add that the Government’s lack of acknowledgement and respect for Indigenous culture and authority has also contributed to the imbalance of the Indigenous social order, leading to structural and cultural violence. The divisive language policy, that prioritises Portuguese over Tetum (and mother tongue languages) as the language of law, education and governance, excludes the majority of the population from participating in decision-making.

Indigenous identity, spirituality and culture in Timor-Leste are intrinsically linked to the physical landscape and natural environment. Indigenous land ownership and use practices, while resilient, have been distorted as a result of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation, and have contributed to economic, social and importantly cultural disenfranchisement. Current Government policies and international development interventions supporting land reform have not fundamentally resolved this imbalance and land and water use and ownership continues to be a highly contentious issue that can create community-level structural, cultural and direct violence.
6.4 Power / Lisan

Indigenous East Timorese governance systems are based on knowledge, custom, authority and power that is derived from the ancestors, agricultural cycles and from kinship networks (Fox, 2000a; 2006). Balancing these power dynamics enables both leaders and East Timorese citizens to practice lisan. This section explores lisan and its role in localised governance, leadership, and decision-making in Timor-Leste. As before I use the broad Tetum terms, and highlight that there are multiple local-level equivalents for lisan and accompanying Indigenous governance systems.


In Timor-Leste, as in many Indigenous knowledge systems, power is differentiated from authority; spiritual and political power are also separate. This system is gendered, connected to land and place, incorporating kinship ties and relationships with outsiders. Power and authority in Timor-Leste is dispersed across a broad range of Indigenous and modern institutions and individuals. Respect and use of Indigenous governance, leadership and decision-making structures and processes differ depending on each individual, their understanding and respect for Indigenous knowledge and practices, and their historical experiences. However, as I highlighted in Chapters Three and Five, if the Indigenous systems are significantly distorted or co-opted, an imbalance occurs and violence can result.

6.4.1 Governance structures

In this section I draw on Brown (2012; 2009), Cummins (2014) and Grenfell (2012; 2008) who underline the ideological and geographical divisions of the governance systems in Timor-Leste. The modern administrative governance structures are located primarily in Dili and district capitals, and Indigenous structures of decision-making usually occur at the community level. The multiple governance systems operating differentiate the experiences of East Timorese located in rural and urban areas; differences are also intergenerational and gendered. I
underscore that the lisan system is not stable or static across different Indigenous governance systems in Timor-Leste; it is in flux and is contested (Brown, 2012). The co-existence between the Indigenous and modern systems of governance (which are themselves multiple and interconnected) must be acknowledged.

Indigenous governance systems in Timor-Leste are grounded in interconnecting relationships between and within allegiance networks of uma lulik. Uma lulik do not exist alone; they are part of an interconnected geographic network of houses that are hierarchically ranked and locate each person socially, morally and physically within the community. Uma lulik determine community membership, identify and connect lineages, providing clarity about leadership roles, which are typically hereditary, and decision-making processes, which are usually consensus-based (Brown & Gusmão, 2009, pp.65-66; McWilliam, 2005, p.28). Each aldeia (Tetum: hamlet or sub-village) has its uma lulik and under each uma lulik is between two and twenty uma fukun (Tetum: sacred house for extended family or clan) that belong to a knua (Tetum: larger group or clan), that would represent up to twenty uma kain (Tetum: immediate household) (Sarmento, 2011, pp.13-15; Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.19).

Each uma lulik and sub-structures uma fukun, knua, and uma kain are associated with animist totems. Totems are associated with food and behavioural taboos that originate from ancestral myths that pass on restrictions for their descendants. For example, eating crocodile meat is forbidden across much of Timor-Leste and in Malabe the consumption of fish from Bee-Malai lake is prohibited due to its lulik powers (Castro, 2013).

A cornerstone of the Indigenous lisan systems is barlaki. Barlaki are made to build complementary and asymmetric relationships of exchange and reciprocity among members of uma lulik (McWilliam, 2005, p.34; Niner, 2012; Trindade, 2015). Exchanges are preferably unilineal, cross-cousin and intergenerational (Hohe & Nixon, 2003, p.13). A senior East Timorese peacebuilding practitioner explains:

“[Barlaki is] the exchange of gifts between families. The man’s family will give certain things and the women’s family will give tais [Tetum: woven cloth] or other things. In a cash economy they have quite different [things to exchange]. In our culture, barlaki was a value between men and women to recognise that women had rights. It also had a social value, to recognise that the families are joining together, that also the women is leaving her village and going to someone else’s village” (TTA-1600-280910).

The uma lulik that bestow the women are ‘wife givers’ and are symbolically male (Tetum: mane) and the sacred houses that receive the women are ‘wife takers’ (Tetum: fetsa) who are symbolically female (Tetum: feto) and indebted to the ‘wife givers’ (Tetum: umamane) (da Silva, 2012, p.149) (see Figure 2). The act of giving enables the symbolic ‘flow of life’ and
asserts the importance of women’s fertility. Any children resulting from this union continue the regeneration of the houses and forms the basis of intergenerational allegiances and patterns of exchange of gifts and labour. These ongoing exchanges must be enacted to minimise community violence by peacefully binding families and building reciprocal and intergenerational relationships between uma lulik (McWilliam, 2005, p.33; Niner, 2012; Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.20; Trindade, 2015).

Figure 3: System of wife giver and wife taker relationships between houses (Ospina & Hohe, 2002, p.25).

Through the barlaki system, outsiders are ‘installed’ as insiders, and both ritually and in practice provided positions within the cosmology and governance systems (McClean, 2014, p.11). This exchange acts as a reminder of continued obligations and forms a specific social contract between uma lulik. This complex system of barlaki also allows families to claim land ownership and user rights, for example, ‘wife givers’ claim land ownership, and ‘immigrant’ or ‘wife takers’ gain rights to cultivate and live on the land. Silva (2013) also explains that a modernised version of the barlaki system is ‘brokered’ by lia-nain who combine Indigenous and Christian systems to negotiate more symmetrical marriage ‘contracts’ between Dili-based elites.

The suku level is the focal point of modern administrative governance in Timor-Leste (Brown, 2012; Ingram, 2012). Suku-level governance, which has been occurring since Portuguese colonialism, while seemingly uniform at a national level, is extraordinarily diverse in practice. The suku usually encompasses multiple uma lulik and aldeia (Hicks, 2014) (see Table 5).

To support decentralisation, since 2005, the State has endorsed suku-level elections enabling the Government to have local-level administrative structures and contact points. The system focuses below the sub-district (Tetum: posto – now sub distritu) level. This system has Xefe de Suku, and at a sub-village level or aldeia, the Xefe de Aldeia (Tetum: sub-chief), and the Conselhos de Suku (Tetum: Village Development Councils). The Conselhos de Suku consists of two women and two youth representatives, the head of each aldeia, and a katuas (Tetum: customary elder) (Cummins, 2014; dos Santos & da Silva, 2012, p.206).
Table 5: Levels and numbers of administrative governance units across Timor-Leste.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Division</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Subdistrict (posto)</th>
<th>Village (suku)</th>
<th>Hamlet or sub-village (aldeia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totals across Timor-Leste</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>2336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The elected authorities in the *suku* and *aldeia* are responsible for administrative matters, particularly the implementation of national development priorities including health, education and infrastructure initiatives. Indigenous Timorese leaders linked to *uma lulik* are responsible for customary governance (which includes land and resources management, customary justice and social order). This model differs between communities depending on relationships between those involved in the different governance institutions and in many communities the *Xefe de Suku* is also the *lia-nain* (Marriot, 2010). This model attempts to divide governance tasks between Indigenous and modern systems, but Cummins (2014, p.66) claims the Indigenous system is regarded with “suspicion” by international practitioners pushing for decentralised democratisation.

There are high expectations by the Government and international actors for the capacity of community-level governance despite mixed experiences with decentralisation and hybrid governance since 1999 (Cummins, 2014; Nixon, 2013; Wigglesworth, 2013). The Asia Foundation (2004) suggests that both Government and international practitioners assumed that Indigenous governance systems could easily ‘scale-up’ to incorporate the responsibility toward and ownership of infrastructure and other local development programs (Cummins & Maia, 2012, p.7). Despite these assumptions, the focus on centralised institutional strengthening has reduced East Timorese participation in modern governance to voting in national and *suku* elections, or as recipients of service delivery and compensation (welfare) payments. Trindade and Castro (2007, p.14) and Ingram (2012) emphasise the lack of community ownership and argue that modern governance does not engage with *lisan* at an *uma lulik* level or provide accessible avenues for citizen participation. Wigglesworth (2013) adds that women are underrepresented and infrequently participate in both formal and Indigenous local-level governance resulting in exclusion of women from decision-making that affects them.

In my view problems have arisen because of an over-assumption of the strength of governance connections between *uma lulik* within a modern *suku*, and what community responsibilities and obligations mean if translated to a modern governance model. The checks and balances that lend power and authority to Indigenous mechanisms have not yet been generated for *suku*-level governance. The *suku* is a relatively large and dispersed grouping of peoples, incorporating many different *uma lulik*, some of which would not yet be connected by cultural and marriage
obligations. Tobias (2015) highlights the decreasing trend in national budget funds for decentralisation programs, which indicates it will take decades for these new systems to flourish at a local level.

It is clear that lisan has not been entirely co-opted by international or national statebuilding efforts. Many communities actively participate in governance at a local level exercising lisan. By using these mechanisms, they are: “generators of political community rather than passive recipients of the state-building project” (Brown, 2012, p.57). Efforts to decentralise governance create imbalances, inequity and divisions, and this modern system must be moderated by lisan and lulik processes to strengthen participation and ownership. Without this shift efforts to decentralise will continue to be unsustainable, exacerbating community-level inequalities and increasing the potential for structural violence.

6.4.2 Leadership

This section highlights the existence of three major groups of leaders or decision-makers in Timor-Leste. The first is the Indigenous leadership and decision-making system. Indigenous governance systems are stronger in rural areas, where leaders are primarily older men. The second group of decision-makers are the elite, represented by those politicians in Government and the bureaucracy, who are often overseas-educated and former diaspora. The third are international practitioners, represented primarily in international development and peacebuilding organisations, advisers to Government, and in INGOs and the private sector.

Social order and Indigenous leadership in Timor-Leste has been systematised through relationships of allegiance and ritual exchange within and between networks of uma lulik, extended families or houses (Fox, 2000a, p.18; Tobias, 2014, p.15). These mostly hereditary leadership positions are at the heart of complex leadership hierarchies grounded in political and ritual power and people in these positions are connected to key uma lulik across different ethno-linguistic groups (McWilliam, 2005, p.34). Leadership and social status is based on hierarchies of precedence founded on relative seniority recursively applied and is usually patrilineal (McWilliam, 2007c, p.359). Pre-colonial groups were divided into: chiefs and nobles (Tetum: dato); commoners; and slaves (Kammen, 2003, p.74).

Brown and Gusmão (2009), Cummins (2014), dos Santos and da Silva (2012), Hicks (2014), Hohe and Nixon (2003), and Trindade and Castro (2007) describe the three primary types of Indigenous leaders in Timor-Leste. The liurai (Tetum: local king, chief) is responsible for political authority, justice and resource management. The dato-lulik (Tetum: noble) has spiritual authority grounded in ancestral order and values (Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.66; McWilliam,
The *lia-nain* who is the judicial authority or arbitrator, has knowledge of ancestral rules, can determine compensation, land matters and interpret *tarabandu* for the community, and bind agreements by conducting *juramentu* (Marriot, 2010; Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.21). The *liurai* was customarily seen as inferior to the spiritual authorities, the *dato-lulik* and *lia-nain*, so dealt with all outsiders, such as the Portuguese and Indonesians, designing peace agreements and initiating *juramentu* or marriage processes.

Additional Indigenous leadership positions include the *bee na’ in* (Tetum: owners of the water) that provide important conduits between the sacred and secular worlds to manage water use and infrastructure (Hicks, 1976, pp.21-24; Palmer, 2015; Trindade, 2015). There are also specialist knowledge holders including *daia* (Tetum: midwives), people who can assist women give birth) and *matan-do’ok* (Tetum: soothsayers, people who diagnose illness and use traditional plant medicines) (Castro, 2011).

Generally, older men hold these customary positions although women can be *lia-nain*, and within the few matriarchal *uma lulik* older women hold customary authority (Cummins & Leach 2012; Trindade & Castro 2007, p.33). Knowledge exchange is passed between generations through an apprentice system using training, inheritance, spiritual powers and other means. An East Timorese government adviser observed:

“So local concepts, local ideas and values have been kept by traditional elders. Which often, because they do not have university degrees, people often ignored them. But if you talk to them, they are absolutely the ones who keep traditional knowledge. And they have a very different concept about life, about creating relationships with people, about how to live peacefully, about how to live in harmony” (TG-1500-140910).

Elite capture, corruption and abuse have resulted in contested relationships between elites and East Timorese citizens (Palmer, 2007). These hierarchical divisions occurred in pre-colonial times, which became distorted by the co-option of leaders through governance systems introduced by the Portuguese and Indonesians that sought to incorporate Indigenous leadership into formal and informal political authority (Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Traube (2011, p.217) describes elite co-option as “Timorese who had ‘put on trousers’ (Mambai: *tam kalsa*) and knew little about the people in whose name they claimed to speak”.

McWilliam (2005), Traube (1995) and Taylor (1991) argue that the Portuguese model paradoxically had the opposite effect to what was intended, resulting in the reinforcement of Indigenous systems. Traube (1995, p.47) explains that the Indonesian system regulated secular politics and reduced opportunities to enact ritual hierarchies. The Indonesian system of “erasing or denying” the structures and ritual practices of the *uma lulik* and “co-opting or excluding” East Timorese leaders also failed to eradicate these Indigenous systems (McWilliam, 2005,
Cummins (2014, pp.24,64) explains that some lia-nain were co-opted by the Portuguese and perpetrated violence against East Timorese. Therefore some East Timorese see the modern democratic system as a better model to achieve self-determination.

Timor-Leste has a long history of co-option and top-down, highly centralised decision-making associated with bureaucratic authoritarianism, including a pre-colonial history of hereditary Indigenous liurai rulers, Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation that promoted hierarchical, semi-presidential leaders (Kingsbury, 2007). Since 1999, leadership has been accorded primarily to those who fought in the resistance. Different historical experiences in communities affect the legitimacy and use of Indigenous leadership, for example, strong resistance leaders (who had no previous liurai lineage) may continue to have authority in the community; or if a liurai died without sharing their Indigenous knowledge, their community would usually use modern systems of governance (Brown, 2012, pp.64-65). Kinship is much less geographically focused due to forced resettlements during the Indonesian occupation, and now urban migration for education, employment and trade.

Identity pluralism and modern governance systems have allowed people to play leadership roles both within the sacred and secular spheres. Since independence, political leaders have not used sasan lulik to rule, but relied on elections to legitimate their power. Effective leaders tend to have both customary leadership and elected representative power and this power can be transferred during rituals where the liurai formally grants authority to the Xefe de Suku (Bovensiepen, 2014b; Brown, 2012, p.64; Ospina & Hohe, 2002). This ritual sharing of power is more prevalent in rural areas, as the legitimacy of liurai or uma lisan in urban or mixed communities tends to be diminished.

It is clear that some Indigenous leaders are co-opted, particularly those who collaborated with the Indonesians and had become wealthy, benefiting from lucrative jobs, status and power (Cristalis, 2009, p.33). These co-opted elites maintain their status quo hierarchies, including economic, social and political inequalities, through modern governance systems. For example, Belo (2014) explains that the proposed 2014 media regulation laws act to consolidate elite political power at the expense of citizen’s informed participation. Scambary (2009, p.2) cites the “irresponsible use of gangs” by elites for protection and provocation, the tolerance toward the Petitioners, and the pardoning of key participants in the 2006 violence as factors contributing to a culture of elitism and impunity.

The elite vision of independence, reflected in modern statebuilding, disables the ability of East Timorese citizens to frame their aspirations for independence through Indigenous knowledge systems (McClean, 2014, p.4). State power does not co-exist easily with Indigenous governance
systems, which created confusion and tension at a community level. Many East Timorese do not view the political elites as holding spiritual power, and many elites have indicated that they do not believe in *lisan* (Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Brown (2009, pp.143-144) and Brown and Gusmão (2009, p.61) assert this disequilibrium of power exacerbated negative attitudes toward Indigenous governance, polarising national politics and, “weakening the [local] capacity to resolve problems”. Trindade and Castro (2007, p.27) cite Alkatiri, then FRETILIN Secretary General, who expressed views that many elites hold:

“[T]o be East Timorese, we don’t need to go back to the *uma lulik*, we better defend our sovereignty and independence. [Whether] we like it or not, people of East Timor do not have *uma lulik* anymore, because the ancestors of East Timor are all wanderers”.

### 6.4.3 Free, prior and informed consent, participation and consultation

Seeking FPIC in Indigenous communities is a very contentious issue. I discussed this concept in Chapters Two and Four and while I will not reiterate those points here it is important to note that FPIC, indeed the entire notion of choice, participation and consultation, has been a significant challenge for East Timorese and processes toward *ukun rasik a’an*. FPIC is linked to meaningful consultation and active participation in decision-making for all community members affected by the decision. FPIC has clear implications for development, where there is a demand for increased education and literacy, adequate infrastructure so that people can attend meetings, and the production of legislation that promotes citizen engagement.

Customary decision-making, such as *nahe bitti*, takes place through a process of inclusive discussion and agreement. Those who held power and some community members would discuss all the possible solutions, sometimes for days. At the end of the discussion all parties must consent to the outcome, creating a ‘win-win’ scenario (Ospina & Hohe, 2002, p.72). The opposition is therefore reviewed, considered and subsumed, similar to the way in which ‘outsiders’ become ‘insiders’ (described in the section on relationships below). Balance is maintained and those opposed become reconnected through rituals like *juramentu*.

Importantly, neither the Indigenous nor the elected governance system strongly supports FPIC from all community members. Customarily only an elite few, usually men, made decisions on behalf of the general population. Women, youth and people with disability were informed of the decision and would have accepted and implicitly given their consent to this outcome. This trend has continued during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation to the current modern governance system. As a result, most East Timorese do not have significant political power or agency to engage actively in FPIC. This lack of agency is increased for rural people, women and youth who are often subjected to gender and age-discrimination.
Currently, the state provides minimal scope for community consent. In Chapter Eight, I expand on the example of the 2010 ‘consultation tour’ undertaken by then Prime Minister Gusmão for the SDP 2011–2030. I contend the SDP failed due to the lack of safe spaces for genuine discussion, inadequate listening skills, and limited practical capacity to take account of consultation outcomes (Brown, 2012, p.59). While modern governance systems are certainly more outwardly inclusive of women, minority and vulnerable groups, this does not mean these groups play a significant role in decision-making (dos Santos & da Silva, 2012, p.209). Brown (2012) highlights that elections and modern democratisation do not necessarily have the capacity to support genuine participation. These modern governance processes highlight how some East Timorese adjust to contemporary conditions and expectations, but they also signal processes that may trigger co-option, imbalance and exacerbate gendered violence (McWilliam, 2014, pers. comm., 16 November).

Leading on from Indonesia’s authoritarian governance, decision-making since independence tends to be top-down, patriarchal and Dili-centric. Limited or non-existent FPIC is the inevitable outcome of this autocratic governance model; that is unable to promote genuine participation, transparency and accountability and has a lack of respect for and marginalisation of Indigenous knowledge. This model is not conducive to unity or nation-building or democratic governance (Simonsen, 2006). Unfortunately, there are many significant blocks, interests and incentives hindering a shift to a more inclusive governance model that prevents FPIC.

6.4.4 Summary: Lisan

The clash between Indigenous and modern systems of power, governance and authority is directly connected to colonialism, occupation and the security and stability of the state formation process. These hierarchical inequalities between elites and East Timorese citizens have deep historical roots and are intimately linked to the root causes of violence.

Indigenous East Timorese governance and decision-making systems are finely attuned to maintaining a balanced system of power between and within uma lulik. History demonstrates that imbalances and power asymmetries between Indigenous and modern leaders, elites and community members; elders and youth; women and men, girls and boys; resistance fighters and collaborators; diaspora and those who stayed during Indonesian occupation; has led to direct and structural violence.

This section on Power highlights the differences in governance systems prioritised by citizens and elites, noting that not all East Timorese have respect for Indigenous knowledge systems
Current East Timorese governance is an entangled web of Indigenous and modern models of leadership, decision-making, authority and legitimacy sourced from across the island and from outside. There are East Timorese who use and perpetuate these Indigenous systems, and also East Timorese who value or prefer modern knowledge systems to find solutions to development-related challenges and resolve violence. This division is loosely between the elites, the majority of leaders in the Government, security forces and other key institutions, who hold very different views from the majority of the East Timorese population. This division exposes a rural-urban divide, which is also intergenerational and gendered. Importantly, these divisions are not clear cut; the pluralism of East Timorese identity results in individuals using a range of options depending on their context.

At the heart of these power asymmetries is the question of who participates in decision making. Elites in Timor-Leste tend to seek minimal participation in decision-making and respond to dissent with authoritarianism (for example, the 2006–2008 Crisis, the shutdown of NGO protests and recent media laws). Authoritarian models are risky in conflict-affected contexts, where flexibility, agility and inclusion are critical for peacebuilding. The modern governance system undermines Indigenous governance and distorts power dynamics. Understanding how violence has been caused or exacerbated by power imbalances is core to understanding why the current development system does not achieve self-determination and peace.

Timor-Leste must better recognise and prioritise mechanisms within Indigenous governance systems that creates balance and inclusion. To do otherwise will further exacerbate disenfranchisement, inequality and structural violence of East Timorese who are committed to using Indigenous systems to achieve self-determined development. To break down elite hierarchies and enable community FPIC, leaders must encourage citizen participation that includes Indigenous leadership and decision-making processes.

6.5 Relationships / Slulu

Previous sections have elaborated on lulik and lisan and explained why they are central to Indigenous knowledge systems in Timor-Leste. In this section, I illustrate that Timor-Leste is a localised, relationship-based society that has created and reinforced inter-generational connections between individuals and groups through reciprocal exchange and ritual obligations. Relationships between past, present and future generations are at the heart of all Indigenous cosmological, social, cultural, economic and environmental knowledge in Timor-Leste. As one senior East Timorese public servant described:
“People in the past were enemies, and they fought each other, but when they got independence they thought, “my goodness, we are brothers, we are from the same clan, we are from the same family”. And then they [got] back together, to build again this unity. Not only among them, but with their ancestors and the nature, the land itself. To reinvent a relationship. That is a very old sort of peacebuilding we are talking about” (TL-1300-170910).

It is important to acknowledge that there are three broad categories of relationships that I focus on within this research. The first are relationships between elite East Timorese and East Timorese citizens, the second are relationships between East Timorese citizens and outsiders, and the third relationships between elite East Timorese and outsiders. Relationships between East Timorese should also be analysed by gender, geography and age. Earlier chapters have revealed that there is a lack of strong and sustainable relationships between elite and East Timorese citizens, which is a fundamental block to peacebuilding and self-determined development in Timor-Leste.

In this section I examine what processes East Timorese value in building and sustaining relationships. I investigate Indigenous relationship-building processes in Timor-Leste where outsiders are incorporated ‘inside’ the society to regulate relationships. These processes seek balance and inclusion of different value and belief systems, where predictable and enduring relationships are built peacefully. These Indigenous peacebuilding processes must be done at a pace that is both ritually approved and enacted by Indigenous leaders, with active community participation and consent.

6.5.1 Relationships between women and men

In Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems authority is balanced between feminine and masculine power; both are required to create harmony (Trindade, 2012). The visible secular world on top of the earth is dominated by men, and the sacred underworld of the ancestors and the feminine earth god is the sphere of women who hold symbolic and ritual power in a deeper, less obvious way than men (Niner, 2011, p.417). There are many gendered deities which are seen as sun / fire / masculinity and moon / stars / water / rain / femininity (Kehi & Palmer, 2012, p.455). Maromak (Tetum: one who gives light or enlightens) refers to both male and female deities at the time of creation, when unity was balanced.

Within Indigenous East Timorese systems women practice high levels of socio-familial responsibility and hold important roles in financial management, income generation, health care and medicine. While predominantly patrilineal, there are three matrilineal groups, the Bunak, the Tetum-Terik Fehan and the Galolen, who represent about twelve per cent of the population (Niner, 2012, p.144). Da Silva (2012, pp.147-164), Kent (2011, p.446) and Wigglesworth
(2013) underscore the importance of women leaders in the resistance and clandestine movement, and highlight women’s use of collectivism and social solidarity to heal.

Trindade (2014; 2015) believes that before Portuguese colonialism, roles between women and men were complementary and interdependent, but Niner (2011) highlights that these Indigenous structures were not gender equal. She notes that while femininity and fertility are fundamental and powerful, and senior women have social and ritual responsibilities, women’s social status and power was and is below men: “feto hakat klot; mane hakat luan (Tetum: a woman is born for narrow steps, while a man is born for wide steps)” (Niner, 2011, p.418; Niner, 2012, p.140).

Niner (2011; 2012), Harris-Rimmer (2006) and Wigglesworth (2013) argue that East Timorese women’s political participation has been limited by the patriarchal Indigenous governance system, supported and reinforced by the Portuguese colonial system and the Catholic Church that is grounded in ideas of hierarchy and obedience. In 1975, OPMT identified the structural and cultural causes of gender inequality in Timor-Leste. It describes how under the colonial system cultural practices, such as barlaki, had become distorted from their original aim of aligning uma lulik, and that customary governance had become discriminating, forcing women into polygamy and hard labour, and alienating them from the resistance movement.

Distorted versions of barlaki have been particularly blamed for a sense of ownership, subjugation and commodification of women, where any sense of a woman’s inadequacy becomes a source of frustration and pressure on relationships that can result in violence. It has also become an economic burden for many families, placing several generations in debt (Hicks, 2012). I agree that firmly entrenched gender stereotypes including forced and early marriage and distorted versions of barlaki compound gender inequality in Timor-Leste.

In Timor-Leste today both Indigenous and modern systems can be characterised as conservative and deeply patriarchal; senior men hold responsibilities for power, authority and status. Niner (2011, p.415) argues that since 1999 dominant male elites “have patriotically promoted indigenous culture while denigrating international ‘gender equity’ policies as a foreign imposition, which will destroy Timorese culture”. De Oliveira (2002, p.58) contends that there are social and cultural structures in Timor-Leste that support men to maintain their power and influence, and where violence against women is part of a broader, state-sanctioned system of violence. As a result, dominant concepts of masculinity in Timor-Leste are militarised, tough, virile, aggressive and heterosexual (Niner, 2011; 2012). Imbalanced relationships between women and men are at the root of much direct, structural and cultural violence in Timor-Leste as discussed in Chapter Five.
6.5.2 Installing the outsider inside

Archaeological and anthropological research indicates Timor-Leste has experienced over 42,000 years of multiple waves of migration across the South-Asian archipelago resulting in constant and pervasive social and political change. To negotiate this change and manage any potential conflict East Timorese peoples developed systems and processes that flexibly ‘installed’ strangers into their Indigenous cosmological and secular systems. Babo-Soares (2003; 2004), Bovensiepen (2014a), Fox (2008), Hohe (2002a; 2002b), Ospina and Hohe (2002), Trindade (2008; 2014; 2015) all discuss how Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems were maintained over time by peacefully incorporating outsider perspectives.

Relationships between the Indigenous and the outsider are central to all political and ritual authority and identity in Timor-Leste. Since 1999, outsiders have been primarily international development and peacebuilding practitioners and private sector investors. In *Land and Life in Timor-Leste* (McWilliam & Traube, 2011) Traube, Fox, McWilliam and Barnes discuss how East Timorese communities engage in complex customs and rituals that bind and incorporate outsiders (both people from other parts of Timor-Leste and outside) into the myths and rituals of East Timorese identity, governance and leadership. The goal of these practices is to recreate the balance that is at the heart of East Timorese Indigenous knowledge systems. Fox (2008, p.202) highlights the flexibility of Indigenous structures and notes that the complexity and pluralism of East Timorese culture has led to the development of processes that simplify the cultural diversity, where: “The installation of the outsider inside effects a reordering of precedence whereby an outsider comes to represent the inside”. Hoskins (cited in Bovensiepen, 2014a, p.292) describes this process as a “diarchic balance” where power is politically constructed, constantly unstable and flexible to achieve equilibrium.

Customarily, violence and warfare are activities waged on the periphery or ‘outside’ (Traube, 2007, p.16). Under Indigenous Timorese peacebuilding systems, intra-group conflict (between peoples who share kinship and allegiance to the *uma lulik, knua or uma kain*) was actively managed through processes such as *nahe biti*, so that recourse to violence within a group would have been rare. Within this system of balance and reciprocity it is considered that “violence perpetrated within a house” by those who understand the system, is a greater moral fault than violence perpetrated upon a house by “outsiders” (Traube, 2007, p.21). Therefore, most conflicts in Timor-Leste are between communities, families or *uma lulik*, not within them. Since 1999, economic migration to urban centres has added to the complexity of these inter-*uma lulik* conflicts where violence often spread from an argument between two rural *aldeia* to the corresponding two family *aldeia* in Dili (Scambary, 2009, p.2).
Hohe and Nixon (2003, p.14) and Trindade (2012) note that the insider / outsider ritual is entwined with the marriage process of wife-giving and wife-taking, where the wife-giver is ‘autochthonous’ representing fertility, and the wife-taker is the ‘immigrant or outsider’ representing security. Binding together fertility and security, or insiders and outsiders, is the ritual process that allows the community to evolve and multiply. This marriage system allows outsiders to negotiate land use, power and rights, and ties previously separate families into lifelong responsibilities of mutual exchange and reciprocal obligations.

Traube (2011) describes the ritual of the ‘Stranger King’, an origin myth on diarchic leadership, where power is transferred from the Indigenous leader to an outsider who becomes the chiefly ruler. The liurai is separate from the spiritual or cosmological ‘inside’ world led by the lia-nain and dato-lulik. The liurai is the focal point for ‘external’ political decision-making or engagement with the ‘outside’ or secular world and leads this ritual. There are versions of this myth across different language groups across Timor, each view outsiders as returned ancestors who have come to share new knowledge (Ospina & Hohe, 2002, p.47). This myth allows all peoples to trace their identity to a common source, whether they are born in Timor or elsewhere (Traube, 2001). In this way, all outsiders are incorporated into the ordered system of Indigenous knowledge. Whether or not they integrate smoothly or cause violence depends on how they respect and fulfil their reciprocal rights and obligations within the system.

Traube (2007) elaborates on the insider / outsider myth through the Mambai story of Tat Felis, a Christ-like character whose persecution and suffering has been linked to the struggles to attain East Timorese self-determination. The myth of Tat Felis incorporates ritual exchange obligations, where those who suffered are ‘repaid’ or compensated for their sacrifice. This reciprocity myth indicates a naïve but “widespread expectation…that nationhood would usher in a general utopian transformation” (Traube, 2007, p.18). However, continuing high poverty levels since 1999, combined with a lack of a shared peace dividend has resulted in ongoing frustrations within the East Timorese community (Brown, 2009, p.143; Rae, 2009, p.106). Many East Timorese people believe they have not yet been adequately compensated for their suffering by the State, and are ignored by the elite in favour of former collaborators and the diaspora (Traube 2007; 2011). As a result, East Timorese see both international practitioners and many elites as outsiders.

The sheer volume of international practitioners in Timor-Leste has made it logistically challenging to undertake the necessary processes to incorporate these ‘outsiders’ as ‘insiders’. The majority are geographically located in Dili, rarely regularly interacting with East Timorese, who have a stronger history and great access to the necessary knowledge and rituals to undertake these processes. It is often also difficult to connect East Timorese with elites and
international practitioners who do not share languages. As a result, these logistical, geographic, and linguistic boundaries the majority of international practitioners have not been ritually incorporated ‘inside’. Insider / outsider practices have symbolic and tangible implications for balancing relationships in East Timorese society.

Indigenous cultural practices that locate outsiders ‘inside’ are very important for modern understandings of political leadership, representation and relationships between East Timorese. It also helps us to understand why East Timorese have been able to ‘forgive’ Indonesia and Portugal (and others) for their past crimes, but why it is still a challenge to manage the internal violence between East Timorese. It highlights the challenges for Timor-Leste in trying to build a unified national identity—with all East Timorese ‘inside’—when there are continuing divisions between East Timorese (Trindade, 2012). Bovensiepen’s (2014a) research shows the experiences of violence and displacement have engendered new modes of identity in Timor-Leste resulting in the recalibration of previously immutable binary relationships. She finds that individuals and groups have now become autonomous, self-replicating entities that embody both insider and outsider elements simultaneously.

The myth of ‘unpaid wages’ for past sacrifices has strong implications for East Timorese statebuilding, nation-building and justice. The concept has implications for the differences in behavioural expectations placed on insiders as opposed to outsiders. If the insider / outsider myth is applied to modern relationships, many East Timorese see a moral obligation for foreigners to assist them to achieve their goals of self-determination, and to this end, interventions from international development and peacebuilding practitioners were welcomed. However, this ‘obligation’ has resulted in raised expectations for assistance, and a number of my participants highlight a growing entitlement mentality from East Timorese—who see Government and international development assistance as their due, both as an outcome of economic and political emancipation from their violent and colonial past, and also as an ideological end point, grounded in custom and myth. An international consultant elucidated:

“Sacrifice has been made to gain independence. Whenever sacrifices must be made they must be paid back. You make a sacrifice to the ancestor spirits in order to retain their help. Almost everyone you meet will have some family member who has been injured or killed. Is the expectation that the state must now do the right thing by the people? That is the way I look at the discourse of self-determination. It is not a passive expectation, it has been written in terms of exchange and reciprocity. It is a two way process” (TTI-1400-011010).

Failure to pay back this debt highlights divisions in relationships between the State, represented by elites, and East Timorese citizens, and also with international practitioners. An international program manager expanded:
“It is almost like a religious figure, this person who struggles on behalf of the country, dies for development, then the rewards come in the end. I think people see the Government in [that] way. They have struggled, they have shed their blood for independence, and now it is their turn to have their debt repaid by the Government” (TTS-1700-290910).

6.5.3 Summary: Slulu

At the core of enabling peace and Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste is the need to create and sustain balance in the relationships between and within groups. Fox (2000a), Kent (2011), McWilliam (2005) and Traube (1986; 1995; 2011) show that East Timorese successfully practiced these Indigenous methods of building and sustaining relationships during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation. However this history left behind communities cauterised by deep societal rifts, distrust and enmities, many of whom were elites, isolated from the Indigenous relationship-building systems. Historical experiences have affected Indigenous practices of building and sustaining of relationships between East Timorese and between East Timorese and outsiders.

Distorted Indigenous practices, such as barlaki, aimed at creating a balance between women and men, have been blamed for gender inequality and violence, but the reality is far more complex. I agree that Indigenous East Timorese systems did not provide women and girls with what the international human rights system now terms ‘gender equality’. However, I also agree with Brown (2009, p.155) who asserts: “Upholding the rights of women and young people, while profoundly important, is not in itself an argument for sidelining East Timorese culture. It is rather an argument for engaging in a more sustained way with cultural practice”. Cultural processes that are harmful, discriminatory or endorse violence need to be carefully but systemically sanctioned and stopped through processes of public education, awareness and shaming (McWilliam, 2014, pers. comm., 16 November). I agree with Niner (2011) who says we must consider barlaki as part of a complex holistic system that provides women with pride, status and safeguards, and any changes to Indigenous practices many have additional negative impacts on East Timorese women.

Balanced and equitable relationships between women and men are key to Indigenous self-determination and peacebuilding. It is critical to sustainable peacebuilding and self-determination that women are active participants in decision-making at both national and local levels (UN Security Council, 2000). The triggers for violence, particularly against women and children in Timor-Leste, are deep and are linked to a history of violence and institutions and practices that cause gender and economic inequality. Research shows that the gender dimensions of violence in patriarchal societies are exacerbated, and women are more vulnerable
when their access to services and socio-economic opportunities are through male relatives who provide their security, as it is in Timor-Leste (Ospina, 2006, p.45).

With the influx of international practitioners since 1999, and a range of logistic, geographic and linguistic reasons, Indigenous systems of building relationships have been overwhelmed and unable to incorporate thousands of ‘outsiders’. As a consequence, relationships between East Timorese citizens and international practitioners have been very difficult to build and sustain. This process is similar to the experience for elite East Timorese, many of whom were of the diaspora and returned to Timor-Leste after 1999. International practitioners have tended to interact disproportionally with elite East Timorese and the majority of international practitioners and elites do not understand or respect Indigenous knowledge systems. This breakdown in relationship systems has resulted in significant challenges in achieving East Timorese goals of peaceful self-determination (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2008).

Indigenous practices that aim to enable better relationships between East Timorese and between East Timorese and ‘outsiders’ continue to affect modern relationships. The role and responsibilities of the State and international development and peacebuilding practitioners lies in the Indigenous East Timorese myth of *Tat Felis* (Traube, 2007). This myth directly incorporates international development and peacebuilding practitioners into East Timorese relationality, imbuing this mixed group with responsibilities and obligations. If this insider / outsider myth is followed to reasonable conclusions, there is a moral obligation for the Government and foreigners to assist the East Timorese in their goals, first to achieve independence in 1999, and then self-determination.

It is important to support good relationships *between East Timorese* as well as working to building and sustaining good relationships between international practitioners and both elite and East Timorese citizens.

6.6 Conclusion: An Indigenous East Timorese framework for analysis

The complex and pluralised Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems have embraced differing localised cultures and ritual practices, Christianity, and a broad range of historical experiences. Indigenous East Timorese peoples seek to find balance within their plural knowledge systems. This balance was symbolised by *tempu rai-diak, dame* and *hakmatek* in the past, and now it is envisioned as self-determined development and peace, or *ukun rasik a’an*.

From the perspective of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge, the root cause of the protracted intra-state violence and insecurity in Timor-Leste is an imbalance in the secular and
cosmological worlds. This imbalance manifests itself in multiple ways, including physically, through violent combat; mentally, through emotional trauma and violent thoughts and words; and structurally, through institutions. It is also engendered through sexual and family violence and inequity. These imbalances and the resulting violence are complex and interactive.

The heterogeneity of East Timorese identity means that each individual will experience and engage with Indigenous knowledge systems differently. Similar to the experiences of other Indigenous peoples, East Timorese skillfully negotiate complex public and private spaces on a daily basis aiming to achieve their goals. However I conclude that while individual East Timorese have pluralised identities there are significant differences in the way in which elite and citizens respect, understand and use Indigenous knowledge systems.

Internationally led and Government-supported modern governance model have marginalised ukun rasik a’an, and its associate concepts of tempu rai-diak, dame and hakmatek. This highlights the limitations of this external and elite-driven model, which does not have the capacity to encompass the much broader concept of ukun rasik a’an. To achieve ukun rasik a’an elite East Timorese people and international development and peacebuilding practitioners need to acknowledge and work with the complexity of knowledge systems in place in Timor-Leste. Until East Timorese Indigenous knowledge is valued and respected by elite East Timorese and international practitioners, consultation will continue to be merely an exercise in politicking, enabling self-promotion by co-opted leaders who do not want to or are unable to take account of community views.

This Chapter has provided a foundational understanding of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems with respect to lulik, lisan, and slulu. Throughout I have emphasised how each theme is interconnected to the next, providing complex, plural knowledge systems. Chapter Five outlined some of the key triggers for violence in Timor-Leste, each of which is caused or exacerbated by imbalances within the three central themes explored within Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. Seeking a greater understanding of about how these Indigenous knowledge systems can both transform and trigger violence is a critical element of my thesis.

- Culture / lulik: a plural system of cosmological and secular unity expressed through cultural practices and rituals;
- Power / lisan: a governance system grounded in the balancing of power dynamics through cultural practices; and
- **Relationships / slulu**: the primacy of localised relationship-based land, place and kinship systems.

East Timorese peoples are currently experiencing a predictable disjunction within the complexity between Indigenous knowledge systems and the fast pace of modernity where Indigenous knowledge systems are weakened and where Indigenous peacebuilding processes create only superficial or negative peace. This secular and cosmological imbalance within East Timorese Indigenous knowledge systems is seen within a development context as inequality, and within a peacebuilding context as structural violence and insecurity. Combined with existing unresolved violence, human insecurity, inequalities and structural violence, Timor-Leste can be categorised as experiencing a violent peace.

In Chapters Seven and Eight I provide concrete examples of how development and peacebuilding efforts have caused or exacerbated violence or human insecurity in Timor-Leste voiced through the experiences of East Timorese and international development and peacebuilding practitioners. By exploring the differences between these knowledge systems, I assert that a greater understanding, respect for and integration of East Timorese knowledge systems can support *ukun rasik a'an* and transform structural violence in Timor-Leste.
7 Through the Voices of East Timorese

7.1 Introduction

Using ethnographic methods, in this chapter I explore the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste and the effectiveness of post-1999 development interventions on transforming these root causes from the diverse perspectives of East Timorese peoples. During my field research, I interviewed twenty-three East Timorese development and peacebuilding practitioners. Unless specified, all direct quotes in this chapter are from East Timorese who participated in my field research and who are referenced as “participants”. The range of people who participated in this research included a UN adviser, former politicians, senior Government advisers and CSO representatives. As discussed in Chapter Two, many of my East Timorese participants are themselves elite, providing an interesting source of reflection on elite power and co-option. The deliberate methodological intention in this chapter is to enable these practitioners to voice their experiences and to share their solutions to development and peacebuilding challenges in Timor-Leste. I interrogate the responses of these participants to understand better the context and nuanced meanings of the information they are sharing.

In Chapter Six I discussed Indigenous knowledge systems in Timor-Leste through an analytical framework with three primary themes of culture / \textit{lulik}, power / \textit{lisan} and relationships / \textit{slulu}. I argued that Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems are plural, differing across and within communities in Timor-Leste, and that these systems are fundamentally different from the modern knowledge systems that the majority of elite East Timorese and international development and peacebuilding practitioners prioritise.

This chapter is divided into three sections, culture, power and relationships in line with the Indigenous East-Timorese knowledge framework developed. I initially explore how culture affects development practice with a focus on creating a unified national identity, shared languages, prioritising land and belonging. This section is followed by an examination of power with a focus on dependency, security, governance, leadership and elites, corruption, gender equality and education. Finally, I review the impact of development interventions on relationships. I propose the importance of sustainable capacity strengthening, cooperation, active consultation and participation, timing and targeting context to build and strengthen relationships and how international practitioners or ‘outsiders’ can work to become ‘insiders’ (Close, 2014).

Using case studies I elaborate on three development and peacebuilding interventions led by East Timorese NGOs: Kadalak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI) and the Ermera Agricultural Union, La’o
Hamutuk and PRADET (Psychosocial Recovery and Development in East Timor). These case studies are explored through the three primary themes of culture, power and relationships, and provide examples of how East Timorese are transforming the current development system in Timor-Leste.

7.2 Culture / Lulik (prioritise systems of people, land and place)

This section demonstrates my argument that the current development system fails to engage with or incorporate Indigenous East Timorese culture/lulik. This section provides examples of how Indigenous East Timorese culture/lulik is currently marginalised by international practitioners and East Timorese elites in development decision-making. I examine how marginalising issues of identity, land and natural resources, and language use and policy, contributes to cultural and structural violence in Timor-Leste.

Participants explained that while Indigenous knowledge and lulik practice is widely used, they emphasised that knowledge holders are usually older men and women based in rural and remote communities. As a result of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation both elites (many of whom were political refugees during the Indonesian occupation) and citizens who experienced significant violence and trauma, have been disconnected from their customary links to Indigenous knowledge.

These historical experiences have resulted in a divide between those who acknowledge, respect and use Indigenous knowledge and practice lulik, and those who do not. This section explains such divisions and provides participants’ solutions for connecting and sharing knowledge and ideas. I also investigate how two local NGOs, KSI and the Ermera Agricultural Union work together to transform land-related violence using Indigenous peacebuilding practices.

7.2.1 Cultivate and affirm Indigenous knowledge systems

Across Timor-Leste there is mixed respect, understanding and use of Indigenous knowledge and lulik. One senior development practitioner affirmed that respect for lulik is high, but that history has affected East Timorese access to this knowledge. He further explained that while Indigenous knowledge is taught, practiced and respected at a rural and remote community level, at a national level this knowledge is ignored and undervalued:

“It is because they [elites] do not value Timorese ideas that much. Because they think it is backward” (TG-1500-140910).
Elite East Timorese, in particular those who emigrated or were refugees overseas during the Indonesian occupation, usually did not have access to Indigenous knowledge and cultural practices. It is difficult for many of them to reconcile their modern belief systems with the Indigenous knowledge they are exposed to in Timor-Leste. People who migrated to urban areas have also experienced significant disconnection from Indigenous knowledge, sacred land and culture. A senior NGO peacebuilder observed that it is not a firm division between East Timorese respecting the culture, and outsiders and elites rejecting culture. People’s beliefs and practices are a complex mix of Indigenous and modern knowledge (TN-1300-200910). I asked who practiced Indigenous knowledge, and a senior UN adviser asserted that the majority of Indigenous lulik practices are politically conservative, prioritising men’s participation and that generational change will be necessary for both women and men to equally participate:

“While the old generation is still there, they will say this place is for men and those are the ones who have the power and the rights [sic] to talk and to make decisions. They are not really open to new ideas. There are some who adapt themselves to the new situation, but there are some who are very slow” (TA-1100-090910).

One senior peacebuilding specialist confirmed that some East Timorese elites continued to practice lulik, but that it was often done in secret. She frankly explained that she was challenged to believe in lulik:

“My grandma did it at home. I just watched. I am not sure [if I believe in it]. I believe in spirits and things. But rituals, I don’t know” (TTK-1630-100713).

I asked a peace researcher why there was such distinction between rural and urban use of Indigenous knowledge and she explained that it was due to the history of forced relocations and urban migration, which had disconnected communities from their customary practices (TTG-1500-300910). Participants proposed that international practitioners could best learn about lulik in rural communities. A university student informed me that:

“They [international donors] do not understand our culture. If they go to the fields, they will learn. But if they just come to work with Government, they will not learn” (TO-1000-190910).

An analyst with a multilateral organisation confirmed: “In the rural areas people are still connected to uma lulik, customary sacred houses and ceremonies. Compared with people in urban areas it is not happening” (TTT-1400-011010). A university student agreed:

“Grandmothers and grandfathers tell us the stories…linked to the land or cultural place. We still have the spiritual culture and rules. They still exist in all the districts. In Dili [they do] not [exist] anymore” (TM-1000-190910).
A UN adviser explained that since 1999 communities were reviving *lulik* practices and that many East Timorese, including herself, were actively seeking to learn. She identified the important role of the Government, particularly the Ministry of Education and Culture, in promoting this knowledge exchange (TA-1100-090910). A senior NGO peacebuilder also firmly placed responsibility on the Government to prioritise Indigenous culture and actively legitimise and sustain Indigenous knowledge systems:

“If we want to remain with our culture we must socialise and protect our culture” (TN-1300-200910).

An NGO peacebuilder affirmed the strength and depth of East Timorese culture. He proposed that when international practitioners and elites prioritised modern knowledge systems over existing Indigenous knowledge systems failed or ineffective development resulted (TX-1600-260910). I asked an experienced development practitioner whether international practitioners understood and respected East Timorese Indigenous knowledge and culture. He replied: “100% no. That is why many programs go to the wrong place” (TF-0900-140910). An experienced peacebuilding practitioner agreed, extrapolating:

“East Timor opened for the *malae*. Some people want to know more about the Timorese culture and they respect, but these other people, they just come with their culture. They do not want to know about the Timorese culture” (TN-1300-200910).

A program manager at a bilateral development organisation suggested that to rebalance this power disparity international practitioners and elites should seek to understand and respect Indigenous knowledge:

“One thing that I always say is before you do something in an area you have to have enough knowledge about context, local context; not just knowledge but you have to respect that (knowledge). I feel that sometimes people are very arrogant and they think that because they have the money they have more power” (TJ-1500-150910).

### 7.2.2 Recognise identity is plural and localised

Participants recognised that East Timorese hold plural identities. As a development analyst declared: “We are all Timorese. I am Timorese, and I am also *Makasai*” (TD-1700-130910). Participants explained that until a shared national identity is collectively negotiated, their community will be divided politically, spiritually, socially and economically. Many participants maintained that a lack of clarity on national identity has intensified violence in Timor-Leste since 1999. They explained that aiming for and achieving the goals of liberation from Indonesia and gaining rapid independence in 2002 were fundamental to national identity, but many East
Timorese now lacked a shared vision of who they were, and where they should be headed. One government adviser warned of a “national identity crisis”:

“It is because for many years we [have been] colonised, and our culture and tradition has been oppressed. The Portuguese, the Indonesians, the church, they come in and they claim they are culturally superior. Timorese feel really bad about themselves, their ideas and their concepts. We have a sense of cultural insecurity, because of the impact from external people. That makes us less able to discuss what we have” (TG-1500-140910).

He elaborated that it will be a difficult and slow process to develop a national identity, as the range of historical experiences and multiple ethno-linguistic groups means identity is localised: “Our identity should come from our culture. What kind of culture is still under discussion” (TG-1500-140910). He argued that nationalism has been imposed citing the National Constitution as divisive and a potential contributor to future violence, because by only recognising certain resistance groups it prioritises an idealised “warrior society”:

“We have never said that we will live together under one country, one nation. It has been imposed by the UN, by the elite. Because we fought together it does not mean we want to live together. It is another process…We will have more conflict in the future” (TG-1500-140910).

A university student urged that the lack of a cohesive identity and inequality separated East Timorese from achieving their development goals:

“How can we develop our country if Timorese are not united? They [the Government] have one strong national vision, but we still have lives in very bad conditions [sic], and these separate us” (TM-1000-190910).

A former politician also linked building a shared national identity to achieving development outcomes. He explained that people had been united in resisting Indonesia, and strong common beliefs and experiences were more important than divisions (TTH-0930-011010). An academic asserted: “They are talking about [difference] rather than seeking commonalities. You talk about national identities, but we don’t have a sense of identity or vision or a clear debate about where we are going” (TU-1230-240910). A development analyst also emphasised the importance of focusing on common issues to build a cohesive and inclusive national identity, and affirmed the effectiveness of the “Maubere Nation” as a cohesive concept which “brought together all the different ethno-linguistic groups” (TD-1700-130910). He warned that unless divisive issues of identity are carefully addressed it could trigger further violence:

“I think Government and [development] agencies need to be very careful when they have something to do with issues that are about identity. They would not want to generate Loromono/Lorosa’e thinking…you could certainly increase the number of conflicts in the country…Once we start fighting each other it will be a never-ending cycle” (TD-1700-130910).
Solutions for creating a harmonious and cohesive national identity were posited by participations. The *uma lulik* and its associated rituals were considered by many participants to be a key part of Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding (TL-1300-170910). An academic suggested that as the *uma lulik* remained a unifying force, Timor-Leste could create a national *uma lulik*:

“A Timorese clan lives together under one house. Within that house, they are not allowed to fight or create problems and if you create problems you always resolve it. So I propose to create a national house *[uma lulik]*, where it can shade everybody, regardless of whether you are Portuguese or Indonesian or mixed. Then we can have a good connection with each other” (TG-1500-140910).

A senior public servant explained that Timor-Leste has a competing mixture of Christianity, modern political democracy and Indigenous systems. He believed that no one system can dominate, and that East Timorese must work within their plural identities to seek solutions:

“Timor-Leste is in the process of building a nation, an identity…We are aware that this is a hybrid society, we can not always live only with one [system], if you are going to live with all the traditional things, it might not [work]. But if you only live with modern things, you are going to be modern. So, how to combine [sic]?=” (TL-1300-170910).

### 7.2.3 Preserve customary links to land and place

Participants cited lack of access to, and ownership of, customary land as one of the greatest barriers to achieving self-determined development in Timor-Leste. They explained that land conflict triggers direct, cultural and structural violence across communities in both rural and urban Timor-Leste. Most participants emphasised the sacred nature of land and place to East Timorese knowledge systems and cultural practice. They described the central role of land to how relationships between and within communities are generated, and identity and belonging are formed. A former resistance leader explained:

“In my town, we say we belong to the land and the land belongs to us. The land is our mother, the motherland. [It is] where we get food, water, anything, where we play and pray. In my town there is really a strong connection to the land” (TV-1530-240910).

Anthropomorphism is an important component of East Timorese identity. A university student revealed: “Most of our ancestors are very familiar with the natural world. Some of them get their power from what is around them. Our ancestors say that they can talk with the stones, the trees” (TO-1000-190910). A senior peacebuilding specialist illustrated the sacred and spiritual connection to land, highlighting that despite Portuguese colonization and Indonesian occupation,
Indigenous rituals and practices continue to take place according to the seasons and needs of rural people:

“Land is very important to Timorese, sacred land. It is something that you have [inside you]. They do tarabandu, you still have agricultural rituals, rain dances…Last year in Same, we had a big festival. At that time it was raining a lot. They brought all the wise men together to stop the rain, and it worked” (TTK-1630-100713).

These strong spiritual and cultural connections to land have fundamental implications for the use of natural resources and development decision-making in East Timorese communities. A former resistance leader described an incident where a community refused Government funding to build a school on sacred land:

“Some areas that are very sacred to them, that you cannot touch for resources [sic]. And the Government says I would like to build this school in this area, and they go to negotiate about an area that is sacred to us, so we say can you build it somewhere else?” (TV-1530-240910).

Access, use and ownership of land are critical issues for East Timorese. For communities to have control over sacred land, the Government must protect sacred sites and other areas of cultural significance. A university student warned that many East Timorese feel marginalised within a “capitalist” land-tenure system and were worried about the economic and political implications of foreign ownership of land and resources (TM-1000-190910). Another university student identified the responsibility of the Government to provide clear information to its citizens:

“Many tourists and many visitors have got the lands, they say ‘I have bought it, I have a certificate’. To me it is not good. The Government need[s] to go to the community and explain to them that according to the constitution they are not allowed to sell their land. Because of the lack of information this is happening” (TO-1000-190910).

An NGO director stated that since 2002 the Government has reviewed the land law and policies, but without any real progress or genuine consultation with communities. The Constitution does not provide adequate protection for Indigenous landowners, because the Government provides land rights to those who have certification of land ownership, the majority of which were granted under Portuguese and Indonesian occupation. She confirmed that this practice unequally benefits elites and outsiders, disrespecting East Timorese identity and culture, and further distorting land systems. She observed the disempowerment of women within the current administration of land: “Us Timorese, the majority of us are illiterate and the patriarchal system is very strong. So how are we going to listen to women about land?” (TTA-1600-280910). She provides an example to highlight her argument:
“In 2009 the Minister for Justice did a consultation on the proposed land law. It was not a real consultation. There was no real participation. It only happened at the district level, the only people who came were the administrator, the Xefe de Suku, the elected leaders. People live their lives in their local communities, not at the district level. The land law does not reflect people’s identity. The constitution says that people have the right to land for their daily needs, but the law gives more rights to those who have certificates. Does this respect Timorese identity and culture? No it doesn’t” (TTA-1600-280910).

Access to, ownership and use of, land is also linked to food sovereignty. As one development practitioner explained, the land practices of the past will not satisfy current population needs and many rural people are reliant on cheap rice subsidised by the Government:

“Before, I had one hectare and it was enough to reserve food [for my family] for one year. But what if they have grandchildren? It is not enough [land]” (TF-0900-140910).

Before 1975, East Timorese nutritional sources were more varied, providing greater food security for rural and urban communities (Oliveira, 2008). Many participants believed that since 1999, agricultural policies and development interventions had not adequately focused on sustainable rural development. A former politician identified the importation of rice as a failure of the current development system and Government policy, triggering food insecurity and reduced nutrition across the community:

“Food security is dependent on what we import. The nutrition is getting worse in Timor-Leste because, for them, nutrition is to fill their stomachs with the rice. That is why I would say this country is a complete mess” (TTH-0930-011010).

7.2.3.1 Case Study: KSI and the Ermera Agricultural Union

As an alternative to the huge influx of international development institutions, in March 2000, East Timorese student activists formed Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI) (Tetum: streams meet to become one river) to mobilise farming communities to become actively involved in campaigns for land reform, democracy, adequate housing, livelihoods and fair trade. KSI is based in Dili, but works closely with rural communities and receives funding from international development organisations (da Silva, 2012, pp.287-295). KSI advocates for land law that aligns with customary land use and ownership practices, and supports communities to claim their customary lands. One KSI development practitioner proposed the use of cooperatives to advocate non-violently for land rights and economic development:

“If conflict happens it will not give people the opportunity to improve their lives, through economic activities. If we have a gap in economic activity in the community, we also give an opportunity for the conflict to arise. You need to transform the mentality of the community, to improve their lives through economic activities, to give..."
motivation and capacity building to resolve their problems with nonviolence” (TN-1300-200910).

The local NGO Ermera Agricultural Union has strong leadership and receives funding, training and support from KSI to undertake non-violent mediation over land conflicts across the Ermera District. One senior community member explained: “In every area where there is a conflict about land claim, or land and property…our objective is to try to solve the problem” (TQ-1000-210910). One of their community leaders explained that the Ermera Agricultural Union had helped landowners prove their ownership:

“We will try to solve this problem and fight against the one who is not the owner of the land but tried to say the land belongs to him. The problem is this certificate of land. Sometimes people have false certificates” (TQ-1000-210910).

With KSI’s assistance, the Ermera Agricultural Union draws on Indigenous knowledge of land use and occupation. Using stories, ritual and customary peacebuilding techniques they record a legal document detailing the history of use, ownership and responsibility to a particular area of land so communities can claim back their land. By 2009, members of the Ermera Agricultural Union had resolved non-violently 27 land conflicts in the Ermera District over three years. Their community leader elaborated on the process they used:

“We go to the community and share with them that, if that is your land then you have to write a story – who is the owner of that land, and who was living in this place, and what trees were in this place. If their story is clear they will have a strong argument to claim that this land belongs to them. If they are telling the truth, we will write it down as evidence, and take pictures…Their stories are true, because it is from their fathers and their grandfathers” (TQ-1000-210910).

All communities needed to clearly articulate what they would use the land for when they gained legal ownership (TQ-1000-210910). Importantly for KSI and the Ermera Agricultural Union, this process of resolving land conflicts was directly linked to economic development in rural communities.

7.2.4 Learn and use local languages and Tetum

Participants affirmed the localised and multilingual identity of East Timorese. A former politician indicated the linguistic diversity:

“I did my primary school in Lautém. While I was there I could only speak Fataluku and Portuguese. If you don't know Fataluku you will be left alone, so I had to learn Fataluku. But then because of the Indonesian occupation we started using Tetum and Tetum became so popular. I'm not saying that everyone speaks Tetum. If you go to
Oecusse, you can speak Tetum but you need to translate that into Baikeno because that's what everyone there speaks” (TTH-0930-011010).

Complex language policy, and the varied use of Tetum, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesian and English are highly politicised and an area of ongoing tension. Many participants contended that the current language policy mandating the use of Portuguese in Government legal and policy documents discriminated against poor and un-educated East Timorese. There were mixed views about the use of Indonesian and English in the workplace. The use of both these languages was considered to have neo-colonialist implications, empowering different groups over others and marginalising the use of mother tongue or local languages. Participants postulated that language issues exacerbated inequalities and divisions between communities, stating that use of some languages reduced access to, and participation in, development decision-making and processes.

One goal of peacebuilding is to create safe shared spaces where disputing parties can seek or build common ground. Common languages are an enabler to clear communication and open discussion. An academic explained that “Language is very fundamental...you need to find a common language to communicate with each other” (TU-1230-240910). A security analyst explained that the Government’s language policy isolated many East Timorese from participating in decision-making. He declared that this policy affects development outcomes and also stability and peace:

“The language policy has to change…[Those who do not speak Portuguese] feel as though they are visitors in our own country. Ninety per cent of the prisoners are youth. Why are there increasing numbers of young people in prison? Because they cannot understand the law that is written. Why? Because it is written in Portuguese language, the language that they cannot understand…It is a silent takeover, by Timorese leaders and by foreigners, especially Portuguese-speaking countries…It is going to be a big bomb that is going to explode in the future. It will destabilise the country. It will have an effect on the security sector and the peace process” (TTR-0900-061010).

The inability of many international development and peacebuilding practitioners to clearly communicate with East Timorese in Tetum or local languages is an issue of ongoing concern and for one senior public servant, a new form of colonialism with a significant potential for violence. In his experience, this kind of neo-colonialism can be combatted by international practitioners learning Tetum and local languages:

“When people have a hard time communicating with each other they [East Timorese] say, ‘You can not hear me, and you colonialis me’. They [international practitioners] say, ‘Timorese are stupid, I come here to help you, and you don’t understand my position’. But that’s not valid. Foreigners [should] come and learn the language. When they learn language and live together, they understand each other” (TL-1300-170910).
He observed that without shared languages, there are limited opportunities for communities to communicate with international practitioners and the Government, or participate in decision-making. He explained, “If all this information is written in this language that they don’t understand. It alienates the people. Development has no meaning for them, so they don’t have freedom” (TL-1300-170910). He recommended that using Portuguese to develop Tetum would take time, but that it was a necessary process to create a unified national identity:

“We are trying to promote and preserve East Timor’s culture and identity. It will take time to develop our own language…because what the Indonesians did was intensify the cultural alienation of this country…We [can] use Portuguese to develop Tetum, to have a language that unites the people” (TL-1300-170910).

A focus on language in education policy was seen as a key step to creating a shared language, but some barriers were identified. A former politician explained that these changes would take the time to implement, as not enough teachers spoke Tetum and that a dual process must continue to take place to develop Tetum as a national language that should then be disseminated through a cohesive education policy (TTH-0930-011010). Other practitioners suggested that the best way to support community-level decision making is to prioritise the use of mother tongue through translators or locally engaged staff. A senior UN adviser suggested:

“The best way to do that is through a local. [The local] will be the best person to get good and accurate information from the community. Because even me, if I go to Bobonaro or Covalima, those persons speak another language…so it may be better for local to talk to local” (TA-1100-090910).

7.2.5 Deliver education for all

Access to education was one of the issues raised most often by my East Timorese participants. They linked education to sustainable capacity building, allowing people to have power and ownership over the development that takes place in their communities. An analyst with a multilateral organisation illustrated this point:

“Education should be fundamental, over other sectors. I give you an example; people have lots of tractors that few people understand how to fix. Instead of patching, we could train people to fix it first” (TTT-1400-011010).

Importantly, education was highlighted by the majority of participants as the primary tool to help people gain independence and achieve self-determination. A former resistance leader said:

“To [be independent] people need to be well educated to be able to say yes and no, because after the long time under colonialism, we always say yes, yes, yes. Now we
have to start thinking. People think that education it is only to get a job, for me it is not. Education is much bigger than this” (TV-1530-240910).

A security specialist argued that the current education system established by the Government and international development organisations is exclusionary and reduces the ability for East Timorese to access and participate in development (TTR-0900-061010). I asked why the Government had not been successful in providing inclusive education and he explained that the elites continued to perpetuate a system that excluded many East Timorese. He warned that this unequal education system has the potential to fuel violence within the community:

“The poor Timorese will continue not to be well educated because the system does not help. They cannot go and study abroad and they will not be able to access or understand the global information system. It is a time bomb: if the elite continue with this, it will create problems” (TTR-0900-061010).

A university student agreed with the difficulty of accessing quality higher education and she cited poverty, economic pressures, gender inequality, family expectations and culture as barriers (TM-1000-190910). Another university student observed that gender inequality, particularly in rural areas was a key barrier to education for women:

“The woman's right is limited. The women finish their high school and have to marry. They say let their brothers continue. That is why most of our young females do not continue their studies, mostly in the districts. In Dili it is different. They say both our sons and daughters need to finish their education because we need these people for the future of our country. But in [the] districts, no” (TO-1000-190910).

A former politician explained that much greater investment in research and education would be needed to actively encourage youth and provide the tools for future generations to learn about their Indigenous knowledge:

“There is a need for much more investment, to have expertise to study the culture, and ethno-linguistics, in order to incorporate it into the curriculum so that the young generation can understand and keep on with all these cultural values (TTH-0930-011010).

7.2.6 Implement targetted and context-specific models

The majority of participants criticised the way the current development system did not take account of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge, cultural and governance practices. They stated that development in Timor-Leste was less productive because the models used did not fit the local context and were not targeted to meet the needs of each different community. Participants equated this as a development systems issue perpetrated by, but not necessarily the fault of,
international practitioners. A development practitioner explained that poor untargeted
development is widespread, perpetrated by many international actors:

“More of the programs are not going to the right sites. [International practitioners are]
choosing the wrong places, the wrong people, the wrong groups” (TF-0900-140910).

A government adviser confirmed that the majority of development decisions are made by
outsiders:

“[Development] is carried out by internationals most of the time. All the planning was
carried out by internationals. They are the ones that are writing the reports, the
recommendations, they are the ones that are creating the national plan. Local ideas are
undervalued” (TG-1500-140910).

A development analyst saw that many outsiders come to Timor-Leste with unrealistic
expectations about their ability to transform the situation. He stressed that international
practitioners working in Timor-Leste regularly implement programs that are designed for other
country contexts:

“[International practitioners type] ‘Control F Afghanistan, replace all with Timor-
Leste’. Development partners are too lazy to sit down and talk to people who have been
working in country for a long time, they just skip that dialogue and go in and find the
closest country with a similar history and just copy that model” (TD-1700-130910).

An academic explained that international practitioners bring a “one size fits all” approach, but
that they need to first learn about the history and context of Timor-Leste before they start to
make decisions (TU-1230-240910). An NGO peacebuilder concluded that learning from other
contexts is important, but that ultimately the Timor-Leste context should be used to find
solutions:

“You need to learn from another country but if you want to implement something you
cannot take everything from another nation and then implement it in this country. It
does not work” (TX-1600-260910).

A senior public servant explained that while outside concepts and practices work well in other
contexts, they often do not work well in Timor-Leste:

“Many people are thinking, especially those from outside, that peacebuilding or conflict
could be solved by using [outside] methodologies. In Timor-Leste that is not the case,
Timor-Leste has our own culture of solving these conflicts” (TL-1300-170910).

A government adviser clarified that there is, “resistance coming from the inside” to a lot of
development interventions as “most of it is very patronising” (TG-1500-140910). He linked the
lack of context with systemic failures that promote unrealistic timeframes:
“Everyone coming in here has a fixed agenda. Often they will say we will civilise the uncivilised. Most people have worked somewhere else, and they think that this has the same problems. People are dark and black, and it must be the same. Most of the time development practitioners forgot about local contexts, because they have too little time. That is one of the failings of development” (TG-1500-140910).

Practitioners recognised that many international practitioners did attempt to contextualise their work by consulting with local people, however consultations were often done poorly. A senior UN adviser said that international practitioners should never assume they know what communities want. She suggested that the onus is on practitioners to seek this crucial information: “[otherwise] you are just wasting your money and your time” (TA-1100-090910). Ultimately participants suggested that international practitioners must be more flexible and understand that a different approach will be needed for each context (TJ-1500-150910). As one development analyst explained:

“You have to be flexible, and understand that in the community you will find elements that will respond to things in one way, and then something completely different might not respond to change” (TD-1700-130910).

An academic pronounced that development interventions do not effectively target vulnerable groups or meet community needs. He suggested that fewer interventions with more targeted assistance from international practitioners and greater ownership by communities are needed:

“When people do it themselves they do it better. We are driven by models that do not apply here…People are not critical about it, they accept it because they need jobs and they need money. There are too many interventions. So much confusion…They just need a little bit of assistance and they will do so much better” (TU-1230-240910).

A senior public servant advocated that development practitioners need to find ways of creatively combining approaches using both ‘Western’ and East Timorese knowledge systems:

“International agencies and the community need to improve how to combine these two ideas, Western perspectives of development and [the] Timor-Leste context. Some people, they need to try [harder] because we come from different histories, different backgrounds and climate, and it is not easy” (TL-1300-170910).

7.2.7 Summary: Lulik

My research reveals many different perspectives on the use of Indigenous East Timorese culture to achieve development and peacebuilding goals. There are distinct, complex and overlapping differences in the way in which Indigenous East Timorese culture is respected, acknowledged or used. Principally, the divisions indicated by my research are among citizens, elites and
international practitioners. There are also divisions between those who live in rural or remote Timor-Leste or urban areas, men and women, older people and youth, those who fought in the resistance, were involved in the clandestine movement or were Indonesian collaborators. The plural identities of most East Timorese mean that few individuals are easily categorised. My research shows that differing historical experiences under Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation have left many East Timorese with very different perspectives, respect for, understanding or use of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and cultures.

Participants stressed the importance of prioritising Indigenous peacebuilding practices; the need to recognise and value complex and diverse Indigenous knowledge systems; and understanding that East Timorese identities are plural and localised. They argued that it is important that decision-makers prioritise customary links to land and place, and the importance of land and place to community kinship networks and belonging, and food sovereignty. Participants also emphasised the importance of teaching and using local languages and Tetum to facilitate greater participation and consultation with East Timorese communities. Equal access to education for all citizens is viewed as fundamental to inclusive and informed decision-making. Finally, participants emphasised the importance of working with local contexts to target development and peacebuilding.

The movement towards a revival of cultural practices is crucial and is supported by some elements of the Government and international practitioners. This active support, coupled with greater use of Indigenous knowledge and *lulik* practice at a rural level provides a potential base for elites and international practitioners to learn more. To support these changes, international practitioners will need to undertake attitudinal changes that enable individual and organisational openness to learn about Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. To facilitate this change, East Timorese will also need to be open to sharing elements of their Indigenous knowledge systems with outsiders. This process of sharing knowledge and listening is and will be challenging for all practitioners.

Support for Indigenous knowledge exchange must entail more than rebuilding physical structures, such as *uma lulik*, or practicing customary dances or weaving. Revitalising Indigenous knowledge practices entails exploration into alternative perspectives on leadership and decision-making, conflict transformation and economic exchange, as I described in Chapter Six. These efforts will be complex because different communities across Timor-Leste hold very different Indigenous knowledge and practices but this living diversity underlines the importance of this endeavour.
7.3 Power / Lisan (seek balance within power)

At the heart of East Timorese Indigenous knowledge systems is an ongoing balancing of power/lisan between individuals and between and within groups. Chapter Five, particularly the sections on Indigenous peacebuilding practices and insider/outside rituals, provides examples of how Indigenous East Timorese knowledge is used to rebalance systemic inequalities and transform structural violence. Using these techniques, Timor-Leste has negotiated this balance throughout its challenging history with mixed results.

Participants saw inequality as a primary trigger of violence, and the crux of the failure to transform the root causes of violence. In this section I highlight issues of inequality and imbalance that East Timorese participants have witnessed or experienced which have distorted and changed power dynamics, and affected development and peacebuilding outcomes.

I study the inequality between East Timorese, and assess the impact of international practitioners and programs on inequality or structural violence. A program manager with a bilateral development partner explained that high levels of inequality impacted the effectiveness of development interventions:

“If there is no balance in power, [there is] also no balance in development impact. It will lead to [conflict] one day! In ten or fifteen years after the 2012 elections, we will see” (TTM-1500-150910).

In a case study of the East Timorese NGO La’o Hamutuk I observe some of the challenges of enabling FPIC. Participants offer suggestions on how to build greater equality across Timor-Leste, drawing on Indigenous East Timorese knowledge. It should be stressed that in the case of gender equality, participants also cited the importance of learning from modern relationships between women and men. This flexible approach demonstrates the pragmatism of East Timorese and underscores the complexity and adaptability of Indigenous knowledge systems and customary practices.

7.3.1 Work within Indigenous leadership and governance systems

Participants explained that Indigenous leaders still play very important roles within the rural communities, particularly in regards to decisions on land use and ownership. A community leader emphasised the importance of the lia-nain explaining that they were the people who know the stories and the background of land ownership and use (TQ-1000-210910). A former resistance leader agreed that the lia-nain continue to play a critical role in resolving community land disputes, particularly to alleviate the blockages within the modern court system (TV-1530-162
Participants asserted that both Government and international practitioners should work more closely with Indigenous leaders to support community-level decision-making and participation.

Many participants saw the modern, top-down, patriarchal and Dili-centric governance system as highly problematic, creating a disequilibrium of power between citizens and elites. An academic explained that the colonial system is still influencing current power dynamics: “Today we have a very centralised and top-down state government. You could call it a little fascist. It is no different [from] Suharto in Indonesia” (TU-1230-240910). A development analyst agreed, describing the governance system as “feudal” (TD-1700-130910). One senior peacebuilding specialist explained that “In Timor leaders are quite strict, because they have been oppressed for so long. If someone tells you what to do, you do it” (TTK-1630-100713).

A peace researcher viewed top-down governance as a systems failure that created inequality and aggravated violence. She explained that this power imbalance prevents Timor-Leste’s development:

“At the bottom of the pyramid people feel nothing. In the top there is just a few people but they control everything. I would describe that as a conflict between people …The Government has the power to change that system, but the Government does not use this power in a good way yet. All the Ministries just sit together and talk, and when they have to implement [programs] it is so hard, because they never involved the people [at] the bottom” (TTG-1500-300910).

Examination of the elite divide is fundamental to understanding how violence is triggered in Timor-Leste. All participants tied divisions between citizens and the elites to historical and recent violence triggered by the conflict between leaders. A security specialist expanded:

“There are unresolved problems during the resistance, and between the resistance leaders in the jungle and the resistance leaders abroad. After we got independence, we think everything is okay [sic]. But…when the crisis happened, most of these people were involved” (TTR-0900-061010).

Many participants cited poor leadership and unresolved violence as the key drivers for the 2006–2008 intra-state violence. Two university students described East Timorese leaders as self-interested and immoral, noting that the 2006 crisis could have been resolved without violence if the leaders had put aside their personal interests and talked (TM-1000-190910; TO-1000-190910). A program manager at a bilateral donor explained that strong elites dominated political decision-making and excluded and disempowered Indigenous and local peoples:

“The Indigenous people do not have power against those elite Timorese, who we call mestizos: half Timorese, half malae…There is no justice here, there is no rule of law. It
is the rule of deals. Rule of Xanana. Rule of Horta. Rule of Alkatiri. Not what we call the rule of the people, no” (TTM-1500-150910).

Political parties were seen to manipulate groups, especially youth, for their interests. As a result, many participants reported that they did not want to be involved in politics or political parties. An NGO peacebuilder illustrated the links between elite level conflict and violence in grassroots communities:

“They are fighting in the television and then you are fighting in the community. You know why? Tonight they are fighting on television, tomorrow night they are gathering together and having a big drink, eat, they are one, together. But you, you in the community are fighting for nothing. If two buffalo fight each other, they fight each other in the green grass, the buffalo never dies, but the green grass all around them has died. This is a simple example” (TX-1600-260910).

Politicians raise unrealistic expectations. A former politician criticised the unrealistic views of elites who think they can use the oil revenues to create a “mini-Singapore” (TTH-0930-011010). He observed that the current centralised government system did not yet have the institutions and structures to achieve development: “They have a lot of money but they cannot implement it…If you look at the rural areas, [there is] no significant change at all” (TTH-0930-011010). To manage these challenges, he explained that it was essential to create an inclusive national development plan and prioritise realistic goals in each sector so that people can live “by their own means, rather than live on handouts” (TTH-0930-011010). A development analyst agreed, emphasising that weak state institutions prevented effective decentralisation and he suggested that development practitioners should focus on empowering communities:

“The perception in villages is that there is no presence of the state. The only way to empower people is to give them some responsibilities and teach them how to perform [these responsibilities]” (TD-1700-130910).

Many participants questioned the sustainability and purpose of the current high level of government expenditure. An NGO director agreed that while there were benefits to the Government cash handouts, they could cause further dependency on the state. She asserted that: “The problem is that you [the Government and international organisations] are creating a handout mentality, they [recipients] lose their creativity and innovation. It is also a potential for conflict in the future” (TTA-1600-280910). An analyst with a multilateral organisation explained that using oil revenues for cash transfers was a culturally appropriate way of “repaying” those who fought in the resistance, but he questioned the sustainability and argued the practice increased corruption in communities. He suggested “not to give out money, but to increase the social services” (TTT-1400-011010). An academic declared that continuing economic disparities have caused tensions between elites and citizens:
“They told us that when you have independence in East Timor, everyone will be the same. But some people in the parliament they have USD 3,000 [per month] and how much do the people in the village earn every year? People don’t talk about this” (TU-1230-240910).

7.3.2 Break patterns of dependency

East Timorese expectations regarding reciprocity are not clear. Participants also highlight the contradiction between these expectations, which have their roots in customary systems, and the problems associated with high levels of dependency. Dependency places East Timorese in a less powerful position where they rely on outsiders and modern knowledge systems to resolve challenges. Systemic inequality creates structural violence. A majority of participants linked dependency to a lack of ownership and sustainability. They blamed high levels of dependency – by either international practitioners or government – for the failure to achieve peace and self-determination in Timor-Leste.

Participants explained that historical dependence on outside or elite authority figures had distorted East Timorese participation in decision-making and customary leadership. This past makes it very difficult to break patterns of dependency. A senior public servant identified that dependency as having left many East Timorese feeling disempowered and marginalised:

“Sometimes we take away people from the development, instead of putting people at the centre of development, and many people feel that they have been eliminated from their own country …People are starting to slowly deepen their dependency to the outside. It builds between people inferiority and superiority. It has changed the whole social system” (TL-1300-170910).

An analyst with a multilateral agency explained: “Many people are expecting the state to give them everything they need” (TTT-1400-011010). A senior peacebuilding specialist echoed Traube’s (2007) “unpaid wages” theory, explaining that many East Timorese have expectations that they deserve compensation for their suffering, without being accountable for their actions (TTK-1630-100713). An academic linked dependency to future violence (TU-1230-240910). A program manager at a bilateral development agency agreed that the failure to achieve development outcomes has resulted in unmet high expectations in communities, and created frustration toward international practitioners and the Government:

“I just feel like everyone is starting to have high expectations. They are complaining: ‘You said that once independent we would get a house for free’. The concept of self-determination wasn't very clear…When we talk about self-determination, we talk about independence. We must be free from everything” (TJ-1500-150910).
A former politician accused international bilateral and multilateral organisations of increasing dependency by raising expectations, and accused the Government of corruption. His statement indicates the significant levels of frustration many East Timorese participants directed toward international practitioners:

“I do not deny the support that we are receiving from the Australian Government, but they played a very bad role in Timor-Leste. They helped to raise expectations and to accuse the previous Government of corruption. It was very hypocritical. Other donors as well, even the World Bank…this is a sort of [moral] corruption. Probably they wanted to say this so that they could say that the Timorese are not capable of governing this country: ‘we should all stay here in Dili to teach them how to do things’” (TTH-0930-011010).

A senior UN adviser declared that communities want ownership over development programs; they do not want their needs determined by outsiders:

“Self-determination means that they [communities] are independent, that they don't want to be dependent on anyone economically, financially or socially. At the village level…they [communities] want these projects managed by the locals. We want to own these ourselves. We [international practitioners] want to encourage them to do this, because when we leave they [communities] are the ones who should continue to sustain whatever we have set up” (TA-1100-090910).

She added that independence equally applies to women who do not want to be economically or socially dependent on men (TA-1100-090910). A former resistance leader advocated that citizens must reclaim their independence:

“After a very long time under Portuguese colonialism, and twenty-four years under Indonesia's brutal regime, we have not jumped to develop an independent mentality. Under colonial rule we always were told what to do, but now we have to say: how can I develop this country?...We have to be independent thinkers, we need to be independent in economic ways. Everything must be transparent, accountable, credible and responsible” (TV-1530-240910).

A university student explained that East Timorese should work collectively, relying on local intelligence and capacities to meet challenges:

“We have potential, we have intelligence, we can change the future of this country. The most important thing is to sit together, discuss, and try to find out a solution. As a wise person said, just one stick will not be able to sweep the rubbish, but a group of sticks, they can sweep” (TO-1000-191910).

A peace researcher put long-term education and information sharing as the solution to dependency, pointing out: “In rural areas, people have no access to electricity, television, radio, and if nobody goes there to share information, how can they know?” (TTG-1500-300910). A
A senior public servant suggested slowing the pace of development to fit the capacity and needs of communities to overcome dependency:

“They will just take time because their way of life is different. We need to continuously support, not undermine, and value what exists and then go ahead. Sometimes we will fall down and fail; then they will find a way to get up. Development provides a way to gain experience, find an idea, to get their own small community and build confidence” (TL-1300-170910).

A development analyst saw community empowerment as the best way to reduce dependency toward the state and outsiders:

“I guess the best way of empowering people would be to set up a proper framework that allows co-management. People [should be] actually taking responsibility for the resources instead of the state becoming like the patron and people knowing, every time they encounter a problem, that the Government will do something about it. A lot of the time the solution is already there” (TD-1700-130910).

7.3.3 Recognise corruption as both moral and economic

Some East Timorese respondents saw corruption as being a widespread, influential and highly sensitive issue. Corruption was not just seen as an inappropriate exchange of goods or services where those involved benefitted materially. Poor moral decisions were also seen as corruption with respondents citing impunity, domestic violence, extra-marital affairs and substance abuse as examples of moral corruption. Participants identified three main perpetrators of corruption: individuals, the Government and international practitioners.

Economic corruption was attributed to selfishness and immorality, but there was also an acknowledgement that this type of corruption had roots in a distortion of the customary reciprocal exchanges used to cement relationships and agreements. A university student elaborated that relationships and cultural links through one’s *uma lulik* and ethno-linguistic groupings were often still more important than national identity. He believed this led to workplace discrimination where family members were prioritised over more skilled workers (TO-1000-190910). Another development practitioner explained how this corruption works in practice:

“If someone manages to become wealthier, they have to give their money away to their families. If I don’t have any money in my pocket, I will take it from my company…This is a mix of cultural and personal because it is obligatory” (TF-0900-140910).
This finding highlights how complex Indigenous systems can be distorted by modern development and governance systems. Many East Timorese find it very difficult to negotiate complex and plural governance systems without transgressing the rules of these different systems. Imbalances and corruption between and within these systems were seen as a key cause of inequality as well as structural and cultural violence.

Participants speculated that the foundations of corruption seen mostly in the Government and the private sector lay in the patron-client governance systems used by the Portuguese and Indonesians. A university student explained that the patron-client system worked to exacerbate differences between groups, which she described as “racial discrimination”. She warned that this unequal development could exacerbate intra-state violence (TM-1000-190910). A senior public servant believed that Timor-Leste’s history created a more individualistic and avaricious society:

“We just fought against colonialism and occupation, and we are just free from that, but we still [have] a long way [to go], a long struggle to free our people from our own selfishness, from our own idea of just thinking about ourselves, from the temptation that we will take more” (TL-1300-170910).

International development and private sector organisations were particularly seen as contributing to greater inequality and moral corruption. A former politician explained that it is important to review and publicise which organisation and sectors receive international, private sector or Government funding because financing can silence dissent and advocacy:

“The problem is that most of the national NGOs, most of them are now quiet because they receive money from the Government. They don’t dare to criticise the Government. International agencies are probably are also frightened to criticise, probably because the Government has threatened them [by saying] that they must leave the country...Now they are in a dilemma” (TTH-0930-011010).

One development analyst suggested that while he did not condone corruption, providing targeted support is an important part of building trusted relationships between partners. He explained that international practitioners should find ways to work within the existing patron-client system to support reciprocal exchanges:

“Be willing to provide before you ask them to do things. It’s all about exchanging favours. They need to trust you as a development partner. It’s a patron-client system. If you are a development partner you have to be a good patron. We are not talking about hundreds of dollars of unrestricted funds. If you target those little things you will build trust. Now if someone comes and asks for an international trip, well, no. Or if they ask for more per diem – just say no” (TD-1700-130910).
Participants equated moral and economic corruption with building resentment between citizens and elites, and international practitioners. Ultimately, both moral and economic corruption distort power and compound inequality. Greater levels of transparency of information, education and increased accessibility to free, accurate information were cited as key ways to resolve both types of corruption. Participants explained that transparent information sharing is an important way of enabling communities to make informed decisions and control the type of development and peacebuilding that occurs in their communities. Participants suggested that international practitioners should work closely with the Anti-Corruption Commission and NGOs which target accountability and transparency, such as La’o Hamutuk and the Judicial System Monitoring Program (JSMP) (TL-1300-170910).

7.3.3.1 Case Study: La’o Hamutuk

The Dili-based East Timor Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis, known as La’o Hamutuk (Tetum: walking together), is an independent local NGO formed in 2000. It is funded by private foundations, NGOs, governments of small countries and individual donations. La’o Hamutuk monitors and analyses the activities of the Government, the private sector and international organisations operating in Timor-Leste, to share information and build understanding between international actors and East Timorese. By sharing and making information public, it supports transparency and provides communities with the information fundamental to enabling their FPIC.

La’o Hamutuk provides written reports, government submissions and radio broadcasts in Tetum, English and Indonesian on diverse topics including security sector reform, land reform, law and justice and economics. La’o Hamutuk (2010, p.10) was the first organisation to publish information that between 1999 and 2009 Timor-Leste received approximately USD 5.2 billion in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), but only one-tenth reached the local economy. The majority of this ODA funding went to infrastructure and international staff salaries. This practice of paying international staff larger salaries is colloquially known as ‘boomerang aid’ and is seen to exacerbate social and economic imbalances within society. An NGO director elaborated:

“Often they have big budgets, but only a small part of this is shared with the people. Often there is an emphasis on companies to create physical infrastructure, or they spend a lot of money paying advisers. Twenty-five per cent stays in the country and seventy-five per cent goes overseas. One of our colleagues did a calculation and said that ten per cent of the last ten years of aid budgets stayed in Timor-Leste” (TTA-1600-280910).

A senior public servant voiced his frustration with this form of ‘boomerang aid’:
“What percentage of the money goes back to the country that sends the money? Buy a nice car, a nice laptop, rent a nice house with a huge salary, with a high per diem. How many people could be empowered with that small little bit of money? Australia declared USD forty million to Timor-Leste, but do they count how many million goes to Australia, and how many million goes to the people of Timor-Leste?” (TL-1300-170910).

Participants explained that East Timorese feel disempowered by the lack of control they have over the funding decisions of international organisations. They added that international organisations who held the funding consequently held the majority of power, even if they did not understand the context or the best way to deliver the programs. A senior peacebuilding specialist agreed:

“Impress upon the locals to decide, because [internationals] tend to focus on different areas [sectors], and other areas get underfunded. Then everyone offers to work on that area, because that is what the donors are funding, so that there are ten projects in one development area” (TTK-1630-100713).

An NGO director assessed that a lack of education and access to information aggravated violence and corruption during the 2006–2008 crisis:

“Part of it was a lack of information but part of it was the interests of foreign institutions and nations in Timor-Leste’s resources. Because of this lack of information, it was easy for these institutions and nations to influence Timor, to influence the political parties and it made it much easier for the people to fall” (TTA-1600-280910).

La’o Hamutuk’s widely publicised information about the extent of ‘boomerang aid’ in Timor-Leste had a big impact on bilateral aid policy. Their research, combined with information from other organisations, sparked international condemnation toward the very large salaries paid to international advisers. As a result, Australia changed its policy in 2010, setting a maximum cap on adviser salaries. La’o Hamutuk continue to make public information on a range of controversial issues and programs. Staff work with communities that are affected to understand the impacts of Government and international organisations’ funding decisions. This information sharing is key to enabling FPIC by East Timorese communities, supporting their response to potential violence and corruption.

7.3.4 Create balance between women and men

Inequality in relationships between women and men was raised as a significant issue causing structural and cultural violence in Timor-Leste. Gender rights, participation, family and sexual violence and economic empowerment were all cited as concerns involving a complex clash
between Indigenous and modern systems. Despite the increased focus on gender equality by international practitioners and some areas of the Government, many participants said gender continued to be overlooked or marginalised. Participants also explained that ‘gender’ is a tricky issue to discuss because the word is now associated with a range of negative connotations by many East Timorese men, and some women. Not only is ‘gender equality’ strongly and negatively associated with the type of liberal peacebuilding pushed by the UN and many international practitioners, but it is also associated with an abrogation of the customary relationships between women and men. As a result, participants said that many East Timorese do not want to talk about gender equality.

Some participants explained that in Timor-Leste, women are viewed as divine. Customarily they hold authority and power in a sacred balance with men. However, participants also acknowledged that these Indigenous systems do not equate with the modern concept of gender equality. As a result of colonialism and modernisation, the customary lisan balance between women, men and the sacred/divine has often been ignored, causing men to dominate decision-making and modern governance processes. An NGO director described how gender relationships had changed as a result of colonialism:

“In the time of our grandfathers’ grandfathers’, women and men could both access the land. When the colonialists came, they started to put limitations on what men and women could do. This started to undermine local culture” (TTA-1600-280910).

A government adviser extrapolated further on the gendered changes to Indigenous culture:

“Power is [with the men]. Ritual and authority is with the woman and men cannot act without the authority of women…The symbol that we have on the sacred house represents these values. The pigeon represent the female values, the star represents the sacred core or values, the buffalo represents strength, the male values…Our society functions based on the balance between the three [pigeon, star, buffalo]. Now it has been ignored, we have been functioning with only the buffalo horn” (TG-1500-140910).

He also observed that patriarchal colonialism and particularly the Catholic Church distorted Indigenous gender relationships:

“[The] Church came in and they introduced the idea of men as god. And they saw women as the sinner, and that changed Timorese’ minds when they saw all women as sinners. Which is not very good for gender at all. Before, we said ‘women are sacred’ ” (TG-1500-140910).

Gendered power dynamics in Timor-Leste create situations where women are confronted with both ideological and physical barriers to active participation. A senior UN adviser said that it was essential to establish a dialogue about gender equality and what that meant for changes to culture and relationships:
“It was very challenging for us to talk to those traditional leaders...In their mind they do not think that women also have a human right, like the others – like men...They say are you coming to change our cultures and traditions?...So we are trying to explain to them that we are not trying to change the culture, but we are trying to bring something that will change our lives” (TA-1100-090910).

She added that there are long-term systemic and cultural barriers to achieving greater women’s participation:

“I think from the patriarchal point of view we have been living in this kind of cultural system for a long time. Normally women are placed as second-class citizens. They are given roles in the domestic sphere but not the public sphere...Men are the ones who hold the power and make the decisions. If the women want to run, for example as Suku or village chief, or for an MP [Member of Parliament], then she has to sacrifice her family or children. If they don't have the support of the family or community then it is another challenge for them” (TA-1100-090910).

Many participants believed that gender inequality contributes to uneven and failed development in rural areas. As an NGO director confirmed, “In the rural areas in particular, women and mothers die because they cannot access health services” (TTA-1600-280910). A former politician agreed that women in rural areas experienced greater gender inequality and that this discriminatory culture must change for equal development to occur (TTH-0930-011010). A peace researcher argued that threats of violence prevented rural women in particular from participating in discussions:

“It is very hard for the women in rural areas to express what they feel and what they want for themselves and their families. They think everything that is decided by their husband or the father is the best thing for them...In the districts, the women will just say, ‘okay, okay my husband’, even though violence is happening in their houses” (TTG-1500-300910).

All female and many male participants agreed on the importance of taking the time and creating inclusive spaces to encourage women’s participation in discussions and decision-making. An NGO director explained that a simple method to encourage women’s participation in a culture dominated by men is to hold women’s only consultations:

“We need to give encouragement to women to participate. It is a patrilineal system. Men dominate. Often in meetings where there are both men and women, women don’t feel comfortable to participate. They think, ‘who is going to listen to me?’ One way is to have women only discussions” (TTA-1600-280910).

She also recognised the need to prioritise the education and inclusion of men to achieve gender equality:
“Often [men] do not give priorities and opportunities to women. Often our grandfathers will say, what is the point of a women to be educated if she is also going to come back and be in the kitchen? So part of it is also needing to [focus on] men too. So the men can cook and look after the kids while the women go to the consultation” (TTA-1600-280910).

Participants highlighted education as the primary, long-term method that can achieve balance in the relationships between women and men and women’s engagement in decision-making. A former politician acknowledged that increasing women’s education is a long-term process (TTH-0930-011010). A government adviser agreed, noting:

“If the woman gets enough education then they will know what they have to do for themselves. They will become an independent person. It is very long-term” (TG-1500-300910).

The complexity of gender inequality discussed by participants underscores that there is a need to find a new way of balancing relationships between women and men. This new relationship will need to be gradually negotiated, and should draw on Indigenous concepts of gender to examine how these concepts apply to today’s world (Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 18 November).

7.3.5 Summary: Lisan

Much of the power and decision-making during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation was held by non-East Timorese. Elites were co-opted into the colonial system and supported the integration and domination of modern knowledge and development practices. My research indicates that these practices continue today.

Participants highlight that the process of rebalancing power has been clouded by international development interventions and elites who have not understood or respected the need to rectify existing power imbalances within the East Timorese community. Evidence shows that the complex processes, institutions and structures that create violence and imbalance are sometimes difficult for both insiders and outsiders to identify and address.

Dependency and economic and moral corruption are forms of structural violence, supported by institutions and cultural expectations that disempower and position East Timorese knowledge, skills and capacities as less worthy. Increased access to education and transparent information sharing was recommended to overcome these challenges. Creating balance in the relationships between women and men is vital in order for all East Timorese to benefit from development.
Policies and programs from international practitioners that do not act to empower local communities, compound these structures of inequality. It is important to re-frame these development and peacebuilding institutions and approaches to allow East Timorese to take control over all decision-making and reduce dependency. Even if mistakes are made, or change is slow, this shift is seen by East Timorese as being a fundamental condition for preventing international practitioners from perpetuating structural violence.

Participants highlighted that to continue to exclude Indigenous East Timorese governance systems from the broader governance of Timor-Leste will result in the continued disenfranchisement of significant parts of the population who are committed to Indigenous East Timorese self-determined development.

7.4 Relationships / Slulu (work cooperatively)

Building strong and trusting relationships was cited by all participants as critical to achieving peace and development. Centuries of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation left behind a community characterised by deep societal rifts and historical distrust. Participants highlighted that historical unresolved violence is at the root of the asymmetrical relationships between East Timorese and elites. In Timor-Leste, trust between the Government and citizens existed only where pre-existing relationships and mutual understandings had been built (Hunt, 2008a). A senior peacebuilding specialist observed:

“Some [conflicts] have lasted for hundreds of years. Others are about who was in the resistance and who wasn’t. Some [are] about ‘you killed my brother’, those kinds of unresolved issues. They have not had justice” (TTK-1630-100713).

Trust is a critical part of relationships. A senior UN adviser illustrated how poor development destroys trust:

“Our work should bring trust. There are some organisations trying to help people, but after the project finishes, the building does not last long. The quality of the project is not very good. Are you just coming to bring the rubbish to bring here? Or are you trying to build something that can be used for a long time? Give it to them to build it so they can use it for a long time…It is very hard to build relationships” (TA-1100-090910).

Participants identified the importance of slulu, working in solidarity, to achieve self-determined development goals (Pinto, 2015, pers. comm., 8 December). This cooperative relationship building has deep cultural roots that lead to reciprocal exchanges across generations. An experienced NGO peacebuilder identified the importance of working collectively to achieve community goals:
“In traditional language we call it *slulu*. This is to motivate people to work together in their community, to contribute to the development in their community. The people always use the term *slulu* to participate in all the activities in their community” (TN-1300-200910).

She emphasised the importance of a strong working relationship between East Timorese and international practitioners to achieving development outcomes:

“The relationship, between [the NGO] and the partners, donors, can also contribute to development. The relationship with donors is through the financial support. Our donors have the same vision to contribute to development, in terms of transforming conflict in the community. We meet often with donors to develop our program better, discussing how to develop [the] capacity of staff, how to contribute to the community activities” (TN-1300-200910).

A government adviser also explained that the Government needed to value and work with all citizens, particularly Indigenous leaders, to resolve ongoing and unresolved violence:

“Peace should be coming from people. Government should facilitate people to have their meetings, to create relationships. This is another thing they [the Government] misunderstood about this country, because if they are smart, they can use elders. The traditional elders to create unity and peace among the population” (TG-1500-140910).

A former resistance leader adds that there are clear signs for international practitioners to help them know if they have been successful in building strong relationships while working in Timor-Leste:

“If you go to the airport and leave the country, all the local staff will accompany you to the airport. But if nobody comes, you need to make question marks” (TV-1530-240910).

This section describes East Timorese values of building and sustaining relationships, and their views on whether and how post-1999 international interventions have built relationships. I focus on the relationships between East Timorese elites, citizens and international practitioners. I also include a case study on East Timorese NGO PRADET, which supports psychosocial health and trauma work for peacebuilding.

### 7.4.1 Engage in respectful and sustainable capacity strengthening

At the heart of open, positive and constructive relationships is respect and acknowledgement for the inherent capacity within each person. Among all the topics discussed during my fieldwork, capacity was the issue that clearly differentiated the views between East Timorese participants
and international practitioners. At the heart of discussions was the passionately held belief by East Timorese that they possessed a strong capacity for change that was not valued. This view was differentiated from the negative assumptions toward East Timorese capacity perpetuated by the majority of international practitioners I interviewed in Timor-Leste.

A senior public servant acknowledged that a long history of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation, where the majority of East Timorese had no access to formal education, resulted in less capacity. He emphasised that this did not mean there was no capacity, just that the capacity was different (TL-1300-170910). He blamed international practitioners who, because of their assumptions that Timor-Leste was *tabula rasa* excluded East Timorese from participating in decision-making:

“\textit{When we got independence, a lot of people came from countries all over the world…in solidarity. People came with their perceptions, and they thought Timor-Leste is like a white paper. People come in and thought ‘we will start from scratch’. They undermined our local capacities, our local knowledge, local experience; humiliating people, their culture and identity}” (TL-1300-170910).

A former politician agreed that the human capacity of East Timorese was limited after 1999, but not absent. He added that this limited capacity reduced the ability to decentralise quickly and provide development impacts in rural areas:

“\textit{Most of the institutional memory was taken by the Indonesians. That's why we start from practically zero. I would never say that we started from zero}” (TTH-0930-011010).

East Timorese participants stated that their knowledge and capacities are often unrecognised and devalued by both Government elites and international practitioners. A program manager explained that criticisms of capacity were driven by international practitioners and Government unfairly comparing Timor-Leste to more developed contexts (TJ-1500-150910). A government adviser argued that development has been less effective as a result of assumptions about the limited capacity of East Timorese:

“\textit{Local ideas are undervalued and Timorese are undervalued. Maybe if you give the Timorese the chance to design some of these development projects, they will consider the local context, and culture. But because it has been designed by internationals some of the things they do are strange}” (TG-1500-140910).

Most East Timorese participants described the international focus on increasing state capacity as a failure, citing the need for international practitioners and elites to recognise, value and empower the use of Indigenous knowledge and skills to achieve peace and development. A
development analyst said poorly targeted capacity building had reduced the sustainability of development interventions:

“I think most of the development agencies have been a big failure. In ten years of capacity development and capacity building and still the reports always say that there is no capacity in the country. So what were they doing for the last ten years? I’m pretty critical of all of them. You need to be careful with the incentives that you are providing and make sure that the community will be able to maintain whatever you are providing, that it will not become a burden or create more needs” (TD-1700-130910).

A senior NGO peacebuilder asserted that East Timorese have strong Indigenous capacities, particularly to resolve problems non-violently (TN-1300-200910). A security specialist agreed, emphasising the need to work with existing capacities: “Set up the institutions for all Timorese, not for the malae, but for the Timorese. If we do not have enough capacity, set it up based on our capacity” (TTR-0900-061010). A senior public servant stated that international practitioners must value East Timorese capacities to achieve results:

“For international agencies I say, come and see the worth of the people, their potential, their experience, their skills. Sometimes the international agencies, undermine that. It makes people lose their freedom for their own development. Sometimes you need to take a long time. You can do it in different ways to make things happen” (TL-1300-170910).

He criticised the reliance on international consultants and advisers and said these outsiders must create genuine partnerships with their East Timorese colleagues to build capacity:

“International people are paid USD 17,000, USD 12,000 per month, Timorese get USD 200 to USD 150 per month. They [internationals] sit alone in their nice room and when they go home they have left nothing for us. It’s because of the language, their confidence. Some people work to transfer slowly their knowledge and they also have got [sic] experiences and knowledge from their partners, and their partnership is a genuine partnership with the local people” (TL-1300-170910).

Some participants cited limited human resources as a reason to slow the pace and timing of development, and to view development as a gradual process (TM-1000-190910; TTA-1600-280910). A program manager at a bilateral development organisation explained that international practitioners must focus on building community ownership, otherwise, she warned, communities will refuse development interventions (TJ-1500-150910). Another program manager suggested that programs needed monitoring, checks and balances to support sustainability and ownership (TTM-1500-150910). An analyst with a multilateral organisation emphasised the importance of capacity building to strengthen community ownership:

“[Otherwise] if the pipe is broken, we have to wait for people to come and fix it. It takes time. We need to own any project” (TTT-1400-011010).
A program manager for a bilateral development organisation declared that the focus on institutional capacity building resulted in dependency: “Everything is dependent on importing from Indonesia and externally” (TTM-1500-150910). A former politician explained that relationships between East Timorese and international practitioners have been damaged by poor development. He asserted that while there are issues of dependency, there was still a need for targeted and sustainable external assistance:

“Yes, [donors have] less power, because our people have become more aware that we are being stuffed up by those people…There is a belief that everything needs to be done by Timorese, I don't disagree, but while we still do not have the capacity, accept that we need to bring people in to help us…People with real expertise who come here willing to transfer their knowledge…not people who just graduated from university. We can pay for it, rather than waiting for donors to do everything (TTH-0930-011010).

Participants agreed that there was a need for external assistance to achieve development, but that Indigenous knowledge and capacities should also be valued and used to resolve the complex challenges in Timor-Leste. A peacebuilding practitioner agreed:

“We can adopt some models but we don't need to adopt all of it. Sometimes it can become a reference for Timorese to understand the development model” (TTO-1330-061010).

A senior public servant further illustrated this message:

“People here in Timor Leste, they know how to teach their young children about their identity, their culture, their systems. I say bring that international knowledge, and then bring others, and let them meet in the middle: two different perspectives” (TL-1300-170910).

Participants had many suggestions to help achieve stronger capacity. A senior public servant suggested learning a local language or Tetum (TL-1300-170910). A government adviser emphasised that international practitioners should be facilitators “rather than teaching them, patronising them” (TG-1500-140910). Participants proposed the importance of mentoring to achieve sustainable learning. A senior peacebuilding specialist explained:

“I prefer mentoring because it is more about building people’s confidence. I always try to mentor my staff. [A good mentor is] someone who is patient, good at listening, not someone who will takeover and do it because it is quicker” (TTK-1630-100713).

She asserted the importance of having East Timorese decision-makers in leadership roles, underlining that international practitioners should promote competent local staff to leadership positions:
“International heads of organisations tend to come and go, and they are not here for long. I think [my East Timorese colleagues] find it easier to work with a [Timorese director], it is more relaxed, less stressful. He has a deeper understanding of the context and is more able to form relationships with his staff” (TTK-1630-100713).

7.4.2 Enable inclusive consultation and participation

One of the key failures to building relationships identified by participants is the failure by international practitioners and the Government to engage effectively with and involve communities in decision-making. As a result, many East Timorese people feel voiceless, unrepresented and powerless. Exclusion of communities from decision-making is a form of structural violence, reinforced by patterns of cultural violence and threats of physical violence.

An NGO director explained that there is confusion in Timor-Leste about what consultation means. She explained that in Timor-Leste, communities use the term “socialise” to describe the model of information exchange, widely used by international practitioners and the Government, that does not require active participation from East Timorese:

“In Timor people often use the term ‘socialise’. It is kind of like a consultation, but you are not asking people what they think. For example if the donor wants to help people it doesn’t go and speak to the people, it speaks directly to Government. The donors never seem to realise this mistake. It is clear that people don’t participate in this process [of socialisation]” (TTA-1600-280910).

Her example illustrated that without community consultation, development interventions do not target community needs:

“The ideas [are] all brought in from the donors and often these projects do not bring benefits to the people. In Oecusse, the donors decided that the community needed to plant vegetables, keep chickens and pigs. They did not look at the basic needs. The community needed water and until that was resolved, how are they going to do anything?” (TTA-1600-280910).

A peace researcher outlined that limited community participation in determining and addressing their own development needs was a primary barrier to achieving development. She contended that centralised decision-making does not facilitate rural community participation:

“Outside of Dili, in the rural areas, they do not feel any development. They do not participate in the development process. We have not set up a good system of development that all Timorese can participate in” (TTG-1500-300910).
The current national strategic-planning processes used by the Government and supported by international practitioners were also roundly criticised by most participants. An NGO director provided an example:

“We don’t yet see an inclusive process. The reality is that the big important people make all the decisions. The referendum package [a Government funded program] had been used to build a school for the community. But the school was built far away from the community, and the road was bad, so people could not use it. It showed that there was a really bad planning process from the Government” (TTA-1600-280910).

A program manager at a bilateral development agency agreed that East Timorese did not feel part of the decision-making process, describing the lack of consultation as “arrogant” (TJ-1500-150910). An analyst with a multilateral organisation gave another example of development failure:

“A company said: ‘we will construct this road from here to here’. But when the design changed, they did not complete any consultation. So when it was completed there were people who were unsatisfied because the road is not what they expected. It is lack of transparency and accountability. There are not any clear complaints mechanisms” (TTT-1400-011010).

A program manager for a bilateral development agency pointed out that each community had different development needs that required localised solutions:

“Just a few people get together in a room with a laptop and come out with their strategic plan and go out to the community and say this is our plan. It is always a top-down approach. Different districts have their own needs. Development should come from the people who live in that particular area. Not us, strange people, who come from the outside” (TTM-1500-150910).

A government adviser suggested that failure to support consultation or participation is linked to incorrect assumptions about the limited capacity of East Timorese (TG-1500-140910). A senior UN adviser also observed additional barriers to consultation including poor road conditions, bad telephone and other communications systems, everyday commitments and routines including harvests and elections, and changeable weather (TA-1100-090910).

Women continue to be marginalised through both the distorted Indigenous and modern consultation and decision-making structures. A senior UN adviser explained that involving women in all aspects of decision-making were essential:

“Participation has been challenging because of the patriarchal culture. It is hard to talk to women to bring their own ideas about development…We have to have their [women’s] participation. But before we try to involve them we had to build their confidence, their self-esteem…Sometimes you have to go further, to dig down. You have to ask them what do they really want.” (TA-1100-090910).
Some participants cited the participation of youth as critical to the future development of Timor-Leste and observed that youth were also excluded from decision making (TF-0900-140910; TTK-1630-100713; TO-1000-190910). A senior peacebuilding specialist emphasised the need to work with East Timorese youth, to help them stand up as role models and engage positively in change (TTK-1630-100713). A university student declared that youth must contribute to development:

“`We need to change their [young people’s] minds. They cannot sit and do nothing, otherwise in ten years Timor will still be underdeveloped. If we start to do something, maybe [in] three or five years we can get out of conflict’” (TO-1000-190910).

Participants explained that duplication of development programs was an outcome of non-cooperation, failing to share information, and poor relationships. Duplication resulted in a waste of finite resources and community energy. A former politician argued that the Government should continue to facilitate regular donor coordination meetings every month to eliminate duplication. He observed: “Now everybody is left by themselves. They are doing what they can do in their own way. They are wrecking this country” (TTH-0930-011010). A peace researcher expanded:

“The donors, the Government and the NGOs need to work together, because if there is no information sharing, we just duplicate the work” (TTG-1500-300910).

Participation by communities in planning and decision making was suggested as the best way to build ownership and sustainably implement development. A senior UN adviser recommended that East Timorese are the best people to facilitate consultation processes to “get good and accurate information from the community” (TA-1100-090910). A development analyst explained that by building good relationships, working within community timeframes, and empowering local actors; participation will increase:

“To get more participation, you actually need more time and proper relationships with the people. Few agencies do that…When you come, don’t show that you have a timeframe. If people perceive you as being stressed, you will not get the right answers. Take the time to talk to people. Just ask, sit down, expect to wait a lot. If development partners take this approach I think they would get more out” (TD-1700-130910).

Participants endorsed extensive and long-term consultation in local languages with informed rural communities to support active participation. A former resistance leader believed that at the heart of consultation and active participation is listening, which indicates respect between all parties:
“I listened to you, I say something, you listen to me, and then we find a solution. In that way everybody respects each other: how to live in harmony and peace” (TV-1530-240910).

A development analyst explained that while there are many meetings, listening rarely occurs in the current combative development system. He said, “I think people don’t talk to each other here, and when they talk they are not willing to listen because the point of the meeting was to get your points across, not to listen” (TD-1700-130910). He described how international practitioners can support the participation of East Timorese in decision making by slowing down and prioritising relationship building:

“You will spend seventy to eighty per cent of your time talking about things that are not relevant to the topic that you are discussing. But in the last twenty per cent of the meeting you reach all the decisions that [you would] in a normal meeting. It may take longer, and you may get bored with the process. They [East Timorese] are trying to build a relationship with everybody in the room and the development partners do not see that because they are trying to do everything really fast, and to push Timorese to work in the same way. Sit down. [Spend] two hours meeting, and in the end have everything neatly organised and resolved. In the end we get the results, but they are not neatly organised. I think there are some serious problems with development partners understanding the process by which Timorese will participate in the process” (TD-1700-130910).

### 7.4.3 Design timeframes that suit communities

Almost all East Timorese participants perceived the short timeframes that international practitioners work to are highly unrealistic. These timeframes negatively affect the process of building relationships between communities and international practitioners, leading to limited participation, unmet high expectations, frustration and lack of trust. These unrealistic timeframes, supported by inflexible program cycles, indicate systemic failures within the current development system.

The problems with timeframes were perceived to be twofold. First, that the pace of development was seen as too slow to meet the high expectations of communities. Communities expected to see early development impact, or perhaps rewards for their sacrifices to gain independence. This perspective is in line with customary expectations around compensation for hardships experienced as discussed in Chapter Six. Because widespread development impacts have not occurred there is growing frustration toward elites, the Government and international practitioners. Second, practitioners disparaged the short timeframes for consultation, design, implementation and evaluation perpetuated by international organisations. They stressed the need for flexibility and long timeframes to allow for active participation and to meet the diverse
needs of communities. Both of these problems occur simultaneously, are contradictory and must be resolved in different ways.

An academic acknowledged that while most international practitioners have good intentions, relationships with communities have been soured by the failure of the current system to implement development evenly across Timor-Leste:

“Development is supposed to mean progress, but progress has been very slow. People are disappointed with all these development programs. International agencies, they have very good intentions, but sometimes [these intentions are] fake. Development is supposed to be long-term, say ten or twenty years. But the donor timeframes are maximum five years. Sometimes what we expect to achieve does not fall into the donors’ timeframe” (TG-1500-140910).

A senior peacebuilding specialist explained that a slow bureaucracy with hierarchical, lengthy or unclear approval processes delayed decision-making. She identified that this was the same whether she was working for an NGO, multilateral organisation, bilateral donor or national government – although she cited the UN and the EU as having particularly slow decision-making processes (TTK-1630-100713). A development analyst discussed the specific problem of different development organisations having different planning and reporting calendars. This led to a lack of coordination and has been a barrier to collegial environments, exacerbating frustrations and poor relationships:

“One starts in October and finishes in September, one starts in January and finishes in December. The one with the four-year program will take it easy, while the one with the one-year program will push the four-year program to do it faster so he can piggyback on the other’s work” (TD-1700-130910).

A development practitioner explained that the majority of development interventions in Timor-Leste are short term, resulting in minimal impacts. He suggested long-term systemic change is necessary to resolve this problem (TF-0900-140910).

A senior public servant emphasised a systems failure where individuals and organisations are pressured to design, implement, evaluate and report in very short timeframes:

“People want to do things very quickly because all this money is put under conditions, with all those indicators. People say yes, we will meet the criteria, meet the indicators, and we will give them a very nice report. We will take ten per cent and our people are free from poverty. Sometimes the system of aid puts them in a hard situation” (TL-1300-170910).
He also warned that implementation can be delayed by inflexible staffing and reporting requirements and that development practitioners need to be much more flexible and work with longer timeframes:

“Development partners have very strict deadlines…but here you have constant delays so you have to be open to postpone things. Development partners are not that flexible. Development partners just need to bear in mind, what you have budgeted might be right but it will take twice as long to implement. [Development partners should] provide, not more funds, but more time” (TD-1700-130910).

He explained that pushing East Timorese to achieve faster results had a negative impact on relationships:

“I think for the development partner agencies, they must realise by pushing they actually create more harm than good. A lot of the time they push, and they have a Timorese actually trying to drive that process. When the development partner is doing this [he] will destroy his whole social network, because other people will see him as a puppet of the aid agency…Just another way of colonising” (TD-1700-130910).

Participants suggested greater flexibility and much longer timeframes as the solution to unrealistic, rushed timeframes that hinder active community participation within the current development system.

7.4.3.1 Case Study: PRADET

Many participants concluded that there has been a comprehensive failure by the Government and international development practitioners to acknowledge the extent of trauma in East Timorese society. This trauma, caused by a history of repressive colonialism and violent occupation deeply affects many East Timorese adults, and also has a direct impact on the younger generation, many of whom lived through the intra-state violence in 2006–2008 (Brooks et.al., 2011; Field, 2004; Toome, 2012; 2013). Candio and Bleiker (2001, p.71) suggest that it is at the personal and grassroots domain where peacebuilding transformation emerges, and Lederach (1996, p.20) emphasises that peacebuilding transformation must involve grief and trauma work.

Since 2002, the East Timorese NGO Psychosocial Recovery and Development in East Timor (PRADET) has operated in Dili and rural Timor-Leste. PRADET is funded by the Government, UN agencies, bilateral donors (i.e. Australia, United States), INGOs and faith-based organisations (i.e. Trocaire, Plan International, Christian Blind Mission, Caritas Australia) and works with other local NGOs. PRADET targets people experiencing trauma, mental illness and other psychosocial problems, works to provide safe houses for women and children.
experiencing violence, and assists youth offenders in prison. They are the only local NGO that holistically targets psychosocial health and trauma (Hawkins, 2010). All mental health care takes place at a community level and there is limited coordination with hospital-based health services (Hawkins & Tilman, 2011). A senior peacebuilding specialist described how widespread trauma is:

“A lot of people suffered but they don’t talk about it. Sometimes without warning, they will say, this happened to me, and you just don’t know what to say. Timorese will tend to laugh when it is painful or sad, I guess it is a coping mechanism. There are mental health taboos here. I think it is quite widespread. Mental health is not well serviced” (TTK-1630-100713).

As a result of historical violence, many participants acknowledged that development in Timor-Leste required rebuilding physical infrastructure, but also healing and rebuilding of community psychological, spiritual and mental structures. An NGO peacebuilder identified this deeply personal challenge:

“If we are talking about development, you have to talk about healing. There are many people in remote communities who suffer from stress and trauma. We need to talk about it in development. Many people think about changing the world but no one things about how to change him or herself…Talking about development is good, but it is better to change yourself first, and then you can look after [others]” (TX-1600-260910).

An NGO peacebuilder agreed, reinforcing the point that complex peace and development goals take a long time to achieve:

“If you want to change [behaviour], it does not mean it will be happening in a week or a month. Maybe it will happen in four or ten years. When you are talking about change you are talking about transformation” (TX-1600-260910).

Participants acknowledged that unless this healing took place and healthy relationships were created, peacebuilding and development would not occur. Participants explained that unfortunately psychosocial health and trauma has not been an area of focus for policy or programming. Unless these are given much greater focus, and relationships are rebuilt within East Timorese communities, the risk of future violence is high. An international program manager explained:

“No one is taking on this aspect that will affect everybody’s people’s [sic] lives every day for a long time to come. People don’t heal their differences inside, the hurts inside, the conflict inside. It just swells up and bursts out, and once they find an avenue for it, it will happen. A lot of the stuff that happened in 2006–2007, was just people expressing hurt and disorder within themselves, people venting” (TB-1000-100910).
7.4.4 **Draw on insider / outsider practices to build and sustain relationships**

The evidence presented here shows that both international practitioners and some elite East Timorese, many of whom lived overseas for long periods of time, are often viewed as outsiders by other East Timorese. Participants suggested that Indigenous practices of negotiating ‘outsiders inside’ should be promoted to manage and sustain more positive relationships between East Timorese and with international practitioners. Becoming an insider is both a physical, ritual practice and an intellectual, spiritual process, allowing outsiders to become more aware and respectful of Indigenous East Timorese systems, and for East Timorese to peacefully negotiate a social, cultural and political space for newcomers. Such processes could contribute to better supporting self-determined development and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste.

Participants strongly linked the processes and rituals of insider / outsider as a potential method for creating a shared common cultural perspective with outsider development practitioners and a shared national identity for all East Timorese. A senior UN adviser explained that outsiders must commit time to building relationships and understanding Indigenous cultures and traditions to overcome the differences in knowledge systems and practices:

“You have to know the people and the culture first, to get involved. If you want to do something in this village then you have to get involved with [these] people” (TA-1100-090910).

Participants drew on Indigenous knowledge and cultural practices to explain and understand how outsiders fit into their complex social, political and economic system. A government adviser described the insider / outsider process as a way to possibly integrate development practitioners into East Timorese culture. He explained that it had happened successfully many times, particularly with Portuguese colonialists and the Catholic Church, to integrate peacefully new concepts and groups of people into Timor-Leste:

“We have the concept of insider and outsider and there are ways to integrate these two ideas, to include people….If we still see them as an outsider, there will be conflict….When we do the ritual you are considered as an insider and the ideas that you are bringing will be incorporated. Our concept is that all the foreigners, all the outsiders, are a returned insider… This is how we traditionally function” (TG-1500-140910).

7.4.5 **Transform the root causes of violence**

An NGO peacebuilder emphasised the critical importance of analysing and understanding the root causes of violence to create more effective development interventions (TX-1600-260910). He saw state building and peacebuilding as mutually interconnected, and advocated for a
partnership approach between government and communities to achieve peace and development goals:

“It doesn't mean that state building is on top and peacebuilding is underneath. We have to connect them together. If peacebuilding works then state building will also work. [If] peacebuilding is strong then development is also strong. But if there is no peace there will be no development” (TX-1600-260910).

An academic agreed, noting that the current development focus in Timor-Leste is on poverty reduction, but that high levels of corruption and ongoing violence highlight that international practitioners have failed to identify the root causes of violence:

“If you look at the World Bank reports or UN reports they always talk about poverty. Not looking at the causes of the poverty… I think the 2006 crisis, and today the crisis of governance reflects how we have missed the very important fundamental objectives of building our country” (TU-1230-240910).

Participants argued that long term, unresolved violence within the community must be transformed prior to achieving self-determined development. A program manager for an international development agency explained:

“The other issue that hinders development [is] the internal conflict that we have in this country… It is essential to have stability and security. If there is stability then everything can happen” (TTM-1500-150910).

A senior UN adviser confirmed that peace itself is key to development, and that without peace and security, Timor-Leste will not achieve development: “If there is no security they cannot develop themselves or their community as well” (TA-1100-090910). She explained that ongoing violence made it difficult for development workers to consult with rural communities, resulting in fewer programs targeting rural and remote areas (TA-1100-090910). An experienced NGO peacebuilder provided an example of how violence affected her work:

“Starting from 1999 up to 2005–2006, we feel secure to contribute to developing our community. In 2006 we faced the crisis, for almost one year we did not feel free to stay in Dili. We [went] to the mountains, secure places, to protect ourselves there with our families. [Now] our situation is peaceful, so we can come back to Dili to do our activities” (TN-1300-200910).

While discussing the significant level of ODA funding provided to the security sector, an academic warned that if the Government responds to ongoing violence by increasing support to security agencies they distort funding away from other important areas of development and peacebuilding. He maintained that East Timorese should look to their long history of using Indigenous knowledge systems to respond to violence:
“We need to be very careful about the link with security and development because we run the risk of building the militaristic culture. People should look after their own security. They have the mentality that police or military will come and solve the problem. [This] creates dependency of high investment into security instead of education and health. Their defence budget goes up, at the expense of social welfare. It is a very insecure country. Building up strong security will undermine a lot of other issues” (TU-1230-240910).

These views highlight the need to understand the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste and to explore the range of options, including Indigenous peacebuilding solutions, to transform these ongoing challenges. Participants advocated that without first working towards peace, self-determined development will not be achieved.

7.5 Conclusion: complexity and pluralism in the East Timorese system

Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems incorporate complex plural worldviews that, despite colonialism and violent occupation, continue to be relevant to the daily lives of East Timorese. Despite Timor-Leste’s long history of colonialism and occupation my field research provides evidence that while some Indigenous knowledge and **lulik** practices are lost, distorted and disrespected, respect for **lulik** remains strong in rural communities and cultural revival is taking place in a variety of ways. In this chapter I detail East Timorese participants’ perspectives of how the current development system exacerbates violence, and provide their solutions to transform the root causes of violence. In doing this a number of recommendations or guiding principles emerge, which I will summarise in Chapter Nine.

When considering how violence can be transformed in Timor-Leste it is important to engage with the cultural plurality and asymmetries of power and relationships between East Timorese, and between East Timorese and international practitioners. In Timor-Leste, unresolved violence within and between communities acts as a trigger for violence and a barrier to effective development. Direct violence is deeply connected to unresolved cultural and structural violence. It is necessary to understand the interconnected root causes of violence in Timor-Leste and to explore the range of options, including Indigenous peacebuilding practices, to transform violence. Participants asserted that Indigenous East Timorese knowledge must be validated and given equal worth to determine the direction and priorities of any development agenda, and so achieve self-determined development goals. Participants consistently contended that without peace, self-determined development will not occur.

My participants emphasised the importance of outsider knowledge to help achieve Timor-Leste’s development goals, but it is also clear that East Timorese participants strongly
emphasised the need for change to happen in a way that recognises and respects their knowledge systems and capabilities. For example, international practitioners are perceived as creating the specific conditions that cause and exacerbate economic and moral corruption.

The push by many East Timorese women and international practitioners to achieve gender equality poses a particularly challenge to my thesis which asserts the prioritisation of Indigenous knowledge systems in development practice. In this chapter, I have expanded on the views of East Timorese men and women, and explained that evolving relationships between men and women in Timor-Leste highlight the adaptability of Indigenous East Timorese culture and practice. Differing views on and practices of gender equality confirm the pluralism of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. Indeed, how gender relationships occur in Timor-Leste is an excellent example of the complexity of these systems.

The deep divisions between elites and East Timorese citizens are trigged by a lack of respect, understanding and use of Indigenous knowledge systems. These divisions are at the heart of the cultural and structural violence perpetrated mostly by elites toward citizens who want to prioritise Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. I argue that transforming these relationships is the basic precondition for peacebuilding and for implementing self-determined development.
8 Perspectives of International Practitioners

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter I analyse the views of approximately fifty international development and peacebuilding practitioners, called ‘international practitioners’. This evidence has been collated over my three separate fieldwork sessions in 2009, 2010 and 2013 in Australia, the US, UK, France, the Netherlands and Timor-Leste. All quotes in this chapter are from these international participants, and those interviewed represent a broad cross-section of institutions operating in the current development system, including bilateral and multilateral organisations, international financial institutions, civil society, faith-based organisations, research think tanks and INGOs. Most participants have worked for over twenty years in multiple developing and conflict-affected contexts. International practitioners who have not worked directly in Timor-Leste have been interviewed because of their expertise and lengthy practical experience in similar complex, conflict contexts. Participants interviewed in Timor-Leste are coded TA to TTV; all other participants are coded A to JJ.

The majority of international participants specifically assessed the effectiveness of development and peacebuilding interventions that occurred in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2010. The discussion incorporated how each practitioner, and their institution, engaged in the current development system and with Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. My analysis draws out the levels of direct, structural and cultural violence that result from the interaction of these complex systems (Close, 2014).

Overall, international practitioners raised many of the same issues about development practice as East Timorese, but often from very different perspectives and with different solutions. Participants were careful to say that not all internationally driven development and peacebuilding was harmful, and emphasised the relative success of Timor-Leste in achieving development outcomes. However, all participants acknowledged that it would be a long time before development and peacebuilding goals were achieved in all communities across Timor-Leste.

In this chapter I share the views and recommendations of these international practitioners to suggest how the current development system could better work with Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems to achieve development and peacebuilding goals. The issues raised under the section on culture include Indigenous knowledge systems; identities and cultures; a focus on the violence and peacebuilding context; land and resources; and local languages. In the section on power I look at issues of elitism, gender inequality, ownership and FPIC. Finally, in the
section on relationships, I draw out comments from participants on trust, commitment, 
competition, working with capacities, and the need to look after yourself and others 
simultaneously. I focus on understanding how international practitioners could reframe their 
relationships with East Timorese people to better support development and peacebuilding goals.

I illustrate these issues through three case studies: culture: the World Bank’s CEP a nation-wide 
program which ran from 2000 to 2004; power: the development of the SDP 2011–2030; and 
relationships: a new approach to capacity strengthening by the ILO.

8.2  Culture (respect cultural pluralism)

This next section reviews aspects linked to aspects of Indigenous culture in Timor-Leste 
detailed in Chapter Six, and describes how international participants viewed these aspects of 
culture regarding the current system of development and peacebuilding practice in Timor-Leste. 
Broadly, there was a general admission that international practitioners know little of Indigenous 
East Timorese knowledge systems and culture.

In this section, I describe some of the systemic barriers to greater understanding of Indigenous 
culture. This section draws on the voices of my international research participants to 
extrapolate some of the challenges to eradicating those barriers, and provides their suggestions 
about how to better value and engage with Indigenous culture. I include a case study of the 
CEP, which provides an example of a program that did not take account of local knowledge and 
governance systems and cultural context, creating unsustainable and parallel decision-making 
structures.

8.2.1  Value and engage with Indigenous knowledge systems

Most international practitioners admitted that they do not understand or actively engage with 
Indigenous knowledge systems, identities and cultures in their development and peacebuilding 
work. Most acknowledged that Timor-Leste has a complex and violent history and that East 
Timorese peoples have a mixture of cultures, languages and customary practices that are 
changing and adapting to modernity. They recognised that Indigenous knowledge remained 
important and was valued by many East Timorese. One international practitioner saw that East 
Timorese culture was very different from his:

“They have strong relationships with the natural world. More like the relationships you 
and I would have with each other. They see the creatures of the world, the sun and the 
moon, and aspects of flora and fauna. They have a kind of relationship with those things” (TK-1700-160910).
However, international practitioners confirmed that learning about and engaging with these complex and plural East Timorese knowledge systems is extremely difficult. As an international program manager explained: “It is really hard for a white person to understand the Indigenous worldview” (TTU-1600-280910). Another international program manager asserted that complexity, lack of trust and lack of access to knowledge influence why Indigenous knowledge systems are ignored by international practitioners:

“There are many Indigenous systems that go largely ignored. There are untold layers of Timorese society that are really difficult to explore, immensely complex and very much misunderstood by the development community….What exists is very difficult for a foreigner to access without trust, which of course does not exist. Mistaking its visible absence for a complete lack of culture… the development community places very little stock in the prior systems that exist. Instead it is a wholesale push to develop westernised or modern systems, without adaptation [to] local culture” (TP-1830-200910).

An international development consultant identified the cultural violence resulting from international practitioners who manipulate Indigenous culture: “All of us choose what we say is culture. That is particularly poisonous I think” (TE-0800-140910). An international development practitioner explained that the process of distorting or marginalising Indigenous knowledge systems is racist:

“I tell my students relying upon Western [knowledge systems], ‘claiming that everything has to be valued through the lens of Western science is just an invisible form of racism’. It is racism, and it is based on racist privilege. We as Westerners…get to decide what has value, against our own system of knowledge. To throw out what we do not think is of value, or to call it superstition, or to call it crazy or whatever” (GG-0700-290110).

Many practitioners saw identity and culture in Timor-Leste as a binary distinction between ‘Indigeneity’ and ‘modernity’, not as dynamic, pluralised and complex systems. One international analyst expanded:

“I still find the extent to which a person's political identity can be so diverse bewildering. The depth. It's very difficult to focus what people want at any one level. If you add another level you get a completely different breakdown. It is taking me a very long time to get the full sense” (TC-1500-130910).

An international peacebuilder explained that many people had lost part or all of their Indigenous knowledge systems (TT-1500-230910; TTF-0830-300910). An international consultant described these changes:

“I have witnessed an uma lulik ceremony, where you saw all the elders sitting around in a circle, from a few different villages, and conferring. They had forgotten a lot of the
rituals and incantations. So they were borrowing bits from each other and you could see that what was going to come out on the day had never been done before. It is part of modernity” (TZ-1430-280910).

One international practitioner also underscored the flexibility in Indigenous knowledge systems and the pragmatism of Indigenous peoples:

“Traditionally in Timor, there are food taboos, because your ancestors were cows or fish or a pig. Therefore you cannot eat them [cows or fish]. In most places it has almost died away, but it is strong still in the mountainous areas of Oecusse. They had access to prawns and fish but they could not eat them. We were thinking that because this is a traditional thing, you just had to leave it, and think of somewhere else for them to get some protein. We came back three or four weeks later, and all the children are eating prawns. And we said: ‘we thought it was forbidden’. They said: ‘yes, but we did a big ceremony and the ancestors said it was okay’ ” (TTF-0830-300910).

An international contractor saw his East Timorese colleagues as pragmatically and dynamically balancing their pluralised Indigenous and modern knowledge systems. He observed however, that the ambiguity within plural and localised East Timorese identity has been used to trigger instability and violence. Using this approach elites and international practitioners have actively contributed to these divisions:

“People who are divided are much easier to govern. So foster the infighting and use it to your own ends” (TZ-1430-280910).

An international program manager also warned that if international practitioners do not acknowledge the recent history of violence, sustainable development will not be achieved (TB-1000-100910). An international practitioner agreed emphasising that, “a lack of fit between the identity and culture of the people and the programs and agendas of the development agencies” can trigger violence (TK-1700-160910). One international practitioner accused international organisations of deliberately manipulating Indigenous culture leading to structural and cultural violence (TE-0800-140910). The head of a multilateral organisation agreed:

“When you are trying to bring in changes to systems and processes you are bringing in cultural change. That can potentially be a destabilising factor, or it might lead to a failure in the reforms that you are trying to promulgate” (TTD-1700-290910).

Participants explained that international practitioners must incorporate Indigenous knowledge systems and cultural practice into development and peacebuilding (TP-1830-200910). While many international practitioners recognise that plural identities exist, many do not understand how to incorporate this diversity within the current development system. One international analyst claimed that the international focus on state building is flawed because state institutions do not have the capacity to incorporate Indigenous pluralism:
“Timorese have the capacity to speak one language, which is the language of the modern state and its institutions, but also speak another language. It is a challenge because most of the work the international donors are doing is located in the modern world. The problem with the state is if you are unable to build strong institutions in which you can express the different identities” (TC-1500-130910).

An international program manager saw the international focus on state formation and centralised institutions as a potential trigger for violence:

“People's identities are localised. The notion of being Timorese, is a relatively new concept. People don't have a sense of identity, a sense of loyalty to the state or to institutions. They are more likely to reject or oppose those institutions, as a potential for conflict. I feel sometimes efforts to create national identity and develop cohesion are by identifying an ‘other’ ” (TY-1000-290910).

An international adviser saw the creation of a cohesive national identity as a challenging and urgent priority (TW-1730-240910). To facilitate this, an international consultant explained that international practitioners must step away so East Timorese have space to construct their own national identity: “[Donors] could potentially positively or negatively influence it [national identity] from the outside but I do not think that they can create it. They should not be meddling in it” (TTE-1930-290910).

8.2.1.1 Case Study: Community Empowerment and Local Governance Program

The World Bank managed three phases of the CEP in Timor-Leste, a ‘community-driven development program’, from 2000 to 2004 (World Bank, 2000; 2006). Funded through the multi-donor TFET and an additional grant from Japan, CEP aimed to “strengthen local capacity to build institutions that reduce poverty and support inclusive patterns for growth” (World Bank, 2006, p.xi). The World Bank has been accused of applying a ‘one size fits all’ approach with the implementation of the CEP in Timor-Leste because the CEP was modelled on the Indonesian Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) by the World Bank between 1998 and 2009, and is similar to Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program (NSP) run since 2003 (Guggenheim, 2006). Both programs have been accused of failing to achieve sustainable development impacts or democratic governance institutions (Beath et.al., 2015; Carroll, 2009). CEP was also accused of not working in partnership with UNTAET (Cummins, 2014; Hohe, 2004).

CEP attempted to form democratically elected village development councils to support local governance. It established parallel governance mechanisms, called Conselhos de Suku at the suku and posto levels. CEP provided small block grants to the Conselhos de Suku to rehabilitate and reconstruct social infrastructure (meeting halls, water and sanitation, health clinics, school
classrooms), for economic recovery (seeds, livestock), and social welfare activities (sport). By 2002, there were 416 Conselhos de Suku with 6,400 elected members. Women held fifty per cent of the available Council seats. Phung and Bauer (2004) note that while the CEP did not integrate into any other community-level capacity-building programs, it was able to deliver resources quickly to reach a large number of communities. Pires (2002) comments that the CEP was useful because the policy on equal gender representation created an expectation that women should and could participate in governance and decision-making.

Cummins (2014), Chopra (2002), Conroy (2004), Hohe (2004), Kingsbury (2012), Moxham (2004), Nixon (2013) and Ospina and Hohe (2002) are very critical of the CEP. They argue it failed to work in parallel with Indigenous community governance structures. Kingsbury (2012, pp.266-267) explains that CEP rapidly imposed external values, including on governance and gender equality, and did not allow for change to happen sustainably out of local, long-term processes. Chopra (2002) and Hohe (2004, pp.295-297) note that by excluding Indigenous leaders from the Conselhos de Suku, the World Bank established competing community governance systems resulting in uneven implementation, duplication and poor planning. Cliffe et.al. (2003, p.9) and Cummins and Maia (2012) explain that poor participation also resulted in increased community tensions. Moxham (2004) also claims that CEP was financially unsustainable: USD 9.7 million was spent between 2000 and 2002 to establish the program and approximately fifty-eight cents in every dollar was spent on administering the program (World Bank, 2003, p.25).

Carroll (2009) highlights that the CEP/KDP/NSP model is merely an alternative approach of the current development system to embed and sustain the neo-liberal market-based agenda through community-level governance structures. CEP’s failure to integrate with the existing Indigenous governance structures and knowledge systems created parallel governance structures, raised expectations without substantive or sustainable outcomes, and lowered community buy-in (Moxham, 2004; Ospina & Hohe, 2002). The failures of CEP demonstrate the importance of understanding, valuing and applying Indigenous knowledge and cultural systems to governance and decision-making.

8.2.2 Prioritise peacebuilding analysis and programming

Participants emphasised that the underlying triggers for violence are not easily apparent to international practitioners, and the state remains weak. Participants admitted that the international community did not predict the 2006–2008 Crisis. An international consultant explained that “There was a sense that we were on the right track and yet it unravelled so
quickly” (TTE-1930-290910). She asserted that the root causes of violence threatened development:

“The big challenge [here] is the underlying conflict in this country that has not been adequately dealt with. It is politically challenging, it is not somebody else's fault, it is not somebody else's problem. It is internal, still exists [and] simmers away” (TTE-1930-290910).

An international consultant believed violence was enabled within the current development system in Timor-Leste:

“Because of the policies of divide and conquer, there is a tendency for people to factionalise very easily, to divide along linguistic or political allegiances. That all ferments away. In a development context, you have a very strong and enabling environment for conflict” (TZ-1430-280910).

Some international practitioners identified the need to broaden the current international focus on state security to take a human security approach to peace and development. As an international security adviser explained:

“We went out to the community and asked how they perceive the police and military, what were their security issues. Quite often they would come back and say floods or locusts or food. These are the issues that concern them” (TTB-1000-290910).

Practitioners acknowledged that Indigenous knowledge and use of peacebuilding practices in Timor-Leste are strong, particularly in rural areas. An international consultant asserted the continuing value of Indigenous peacebuilding practices and strong intergenerational relationships in balancing, stabilising and unifying rural communities:

“These communities are much stronger and have much more unifying social forces than in Dili. There is more intense confrontation and escalation of conflict in Dili. There is the whole thing about balance within customary practices. The good community leaders will talk about balancing those needs” (TZ-1430-280910).

After the violence in 2006–2008, the Government provided a range of pension and infrastructure programs targeting violence reduction by potential spoilers, including ex-combatants and military veterans. Many participants, including one international consultant explained that these Government policies pacify people in the short term, but do not address the root causes of violence:

“The short-term solution is being used as the long-term solution, but the short-term solution could become a huge long-term problem. If you don't address some of the underlying issues, money itself is not going to solve Timor's issues. It is not a panacea” (TTE-1930-290910).
Another international adviser explains that this policy was pushed by vested interests: “You have a government that has obligations to various groups which it has to pay out on in order to maintain power” (TW-1730-240910). A head of a multilateral organisation speculated on the potential for further violence caused by this policy:

“You try and limit the competition on resources, so that you try [to] divide up the spoils, between the limited number of actors, to maintain the peace. So you have this very messy, imperfect arrangement between those who have the ability to generate violence, [who are] kept content through a division of the spoils” (TTD-1700-290910).

Some international practitioners emphasised the importance of integrating conflict sensitisation or explicit peacebuilding into development programming. An international consultant explained that because of the focus on short term goals international practitioners were not engaging in critical reflection or analysis: “In Timor, the way things are with Government capacity, no one is doing a lot of critical analysis. No one is interested in the reasons why things don’t happen” (TZ-1430-280910). One bilateral program manager said, “Donors just don’t get it. It is breathtaking, the absence of discussion to develop a coherent development strategy. We are trying to do work without any clear guidelines” (TTC-1230-290910). An international program manager explained why he tried to integrate conflict-sensitivity into all programs and sectors:

“Our goal is to be able to track the impact on conflict of our programs. Not just negative, that we have done no harm, but also positive, that we have contributed towards peace. Some are about working on conflict issues but some are about working more broadly in a conflict context” (TY-1000-280910).

Many international participants warned that conflict and peacebuilding analysis and programming needed to be supported by conflict-sensitive approaches, including acknowledging and managing the role and power of international practitioners. Any development and peacebuilding programming from the Government or international organisations must explicitly target root causes of violence.

### 8.2.3 Respect connectedness to land

International participants acknowledged that land and natural resources are very important to East Timorese, to sustain and renew Indigenous culture and to engage in economic development. Participants admitted, however, that the complex land system was not well understood. One international program manager declared that both international practitioners and elites – “Timorese outsiders” – failed to understand communities’ customary connection to the land (TTF-0830-300910). One international program manager explained the complexity of land ownership and use, noting that land remains a key trigger for violence:
“Traditionally, the landowners are the caretakers. People do not own the land, they own the right to use the land. This is hard because you might be able to use the land to raise your cattle, and I might actually own all the palm nuts that come off the palm trees. So if you went down and cut down one of those palm trees because you wanted to build a house, that would be an enormous problem” (TTF-0830-300910).

Many international participants described the confusion caused by unclear rights to land ownership and use. One international analyst explained that, “A lot of the questions about land conflict have been deferred until now because ownership rights have not been clear (TC-1500-130910). Many participants asserted the disruptive effect of colonisation and occupation. One international consultant explained that Indigenous knowledge systems had changed as a result of recent histories of economic reallocation and forced migration:

“A lot of people are dislocated from their home locations. When you are doing adat, when you are doing uma lulik, it is extremely connected to the landscape. Where are the locations of your lulik, the locations of your sacred sites? It is important. If you are disconnected from that, maybe the systems change” (TTI-1400-011010).

A clear land tenure system was seen as fundamental to economic development. An international consultant explained that the lack of clarity on land rights has created a dual economy in the capital and rural areas. He declared that the lack of regulation has led to corruption and poverty in rural areas where, without clear land laws, it is very difficult for investors to engage with communities on land (TTJ-1500-011010). An international analyst agreed that the current lack of a land titling system exacerbates insecurity (TC-1500-130910).

Opinions differed as to what type of land tenure system would best serve all East Timorese. The majority of participants recommended a new system, driven by the Government, that clarified land tenure and ownership. Others were more hesitant about a solution, acknowledging that government and community interests often differed on land and resource management.

8.2.4 Learn local languages and prioritise inclusive education

Participants asserted that in Timor-Leste languages are intimately connected to both localised and national identity. As a result, issues around language were viewed as a potential trigger for violence, particularly cultural and structural violence. Participants conceded that current language policy was determined by historical links with Portugal and a need to differentiate Timor-Leste from Indonesia and Australia (TTN-1900-051010). One international adviser saw the current language policy as divisive (TW-1730-240910).
Many participants stated the current language policy facilitated elite decision-making. The head of an INGO said, “The elite speak Portuguese and English; the people who have higher education are largely [of the] diaspora. They represent the cultural values of elitism” (TTP-1100-061010). Another international practitioner linked the language policy with the failure to achieve sustained and inclusive development:

“It is my sense that there is an elitist grouping in Timor that wanted to ensure that this club remained exclusive. It excludes great tracts of the population. I think that this has pushed the whole development of the country back” (TTB-1000-290910).

Participants acknowledged that strong local languages are at the heart of recognising and reinvigorating strong cultures and that shared languages facilitate building relationships and connecting groups. Some participants affirmed the importance of teaching children local languages to maintain strong cultural survival (TE-0800-140910). One international practitioner explained:

“At the moment it [Tetum] is rarely spoken. Most times when you are in rural areas, when people are chatting among themselves, they are speaking in their mother tongue. And they will flip back to Tetum to speak with you. I imagine with the way society is going this will die out, and this is a shame” (TTF-0830-300910).

Participants declared that the current language policy has contributed to poor access to and quality of education. Expectations of fluency were too high and timeframes were seen as too tight. One international practitioner said that a transition process should take place, using mother tongue and that Portuguese should be taught as a foreign language:

“It is a Government decision to promote Portuguese. They expect the teachers to speak in Portuguese but a lot of kids aren't learning anything at school. Our advice was to teach Portuguese as a foreign language. Teaching would be in Tetum or a local language. We are advocating for a transition solution. In two generations people will be more fluent” (TS-1000-220910).

Many international participants stressed the fundamental importance of learning local languages to build relationships, and demonstrated a commitment to listening and engaging with communities. An international consultant emphasised that shared languages build relationships and enable long-term engagement:

“Relationships are so important. Here language is a huge barrier toward developing solid relationships. I do not think all donors are investing sufficiently in language. The short-termism is a constraint, I think. Having a long-term focus, investing in building relationships: I do not think there is enough of that going on. That is a systems issue” (TTE-1930-290910).
An international peacebuilder (who speaks eight languages) demonstrated how learning languages breaks down barriers and helps practitioners learn how to work effectively:

“If you can really show that you care, that you are not just there to make a lot of money, it really helps. It really opens doors, the fact that I have learned to speak the local language” (T-1600-011009).

A head of a bilateral organisation urged that it was critical for effective development for international practitioners to learn local languages and Tetum: “The transfer of knowledge is obviously more effective than if you are having to work through an amateur language assistant” (TI-1400-150910). One international adviser explained that even if international practitioners learn the local language, they also need to recognise the cultural context of language, and that meanings differ between individuals and across groups. He cautioned that practitioners’ should never assume they understand what is going on:

“In terms of building relationships [and] trust, learning the language is a huge mess in Timor. How many people understand or are fluent in the four languages that the constitution prescribes? There are different cultural understandings in different sectors of society. So people’s perception of things is different from yours” (TTN-1900-051010).

8.2.5 Summary: Culture

The majority of international participants affirmed that they needed to value and engage with Indigenous knowledge systems, identities and cultures much more thoroughly than they currently did. Many practitioners saw that their failure to understand Indigenous East Timorese cultural pluralism resulted in a systemic bias toward modern cultural systems within the current development system.

Participants confirmed that although Timor-Leste is classified as a conflict-affected state, conflict and peacebuilding analysis and programming is not prioritised by international practitioners or their organisations. This lack of targeted and integrated peace programming demonstrated that the root causes of violence were ignored, which was seen as a key reason development efforts since 1999 have not been effective or sustainable.

International participants understood that while land and natural resources were critical to economic development, they were very complex, and connected to East Timorese culture, identity and spirituality. They saw that they needed to respect East Timorese spiritual and emotional connection to the land, and to do that would mean learning more about what this connection was like for individuals and communities. They also recommended international
practitioners support the Government to work with East Timorese citizens to develop a land rights system that took account of community connections to land and resources.

Participants linked the current language policies with elitism and division causing cultural and structural violence. They explained that prioritisation of Portuguese languages in schools resulted in poor access to and quality of education. They asserted that international practitioners should learn local languages to begin the process of better understanding Indigenous cultures.

8.3 Power (rebalance the disequilibrium of power)

International practitioners indicated a range of issues within the current development system in Timor-Leste that they believed caused or worsened inequality and power asymmetries. Many of these issues created or contributed to direct, structural and cultural violence. This section details the issues that were most often cited by international practitioners, including the need to acknowledge significant levels of elite co-option; rebalance the power disequilibrium; the fundamental importance of FPIC; community-level ownership and the complexities of gender equality. A case study of the national SDP 2011–2030 is used to draw out some of the challenges Timor-Leste experiences in unpacking and restructuring these asymmetries of power.

Many participants explained that the root of the current power disequilibria between international practitioners and East Timorese in Timor-Leste began with UNTAET’s administration in 1999. As one international practitioner described: “They [East Timorese] have had to deal with a new occupying force, in the sense that an international community has been here since 1999. Its presence sometimes facilitates people's aspirations, and sometimes it completely obstructs [them]” (TK-1700-160910). Participants asserted that the UN assessed Timor-Leste’s human capacity as zero or very limited and consequently focused on state formation as centralised institutional capacity building. One head of an INGO explained:

“State building is focused on formal institutions. Other areas are neglected. There is an institutional bias on the part of the UN. The UN does not work well with non-traditional structures, which has precluded meaningful involvement of non-state actors” (TTP-1100-061010).

As a result, the UN and other international organisations systematically excluded non-elites and rural communities from decision-making, which enhanced existing power asymmetries of power. Participants acknowledged that unless power asymmetries were more evenly balanced relationships between East Timorese and with international practitioners would continue to suffer. One international consultant suggested that international practitioners must deliberately work to reduce corruption and structural violence:
“If you have money and you are giving it to somebody else, you are in a position of power. And that should go right to the heart of all programming. Your aim should be to even out the power disparity. That is the core of all relationships” (TTL-0930-110713).

An international consultant explained that the disproportionate focus on strengthening centralised institutions and maintaining bilateral relationships with the Government was due to a combination of expediency and proximity, exacerbating inequality, which would lead to violence:

“I think that donors have concentrated too heavily on the centre, and on Government. Civil society and NGOs have not really had much of a look in. You cannot keep presuming to invest at the centre without actually making a difference at the district because it undermines the whole legitimacy of government. If districts continue to feel that they are being left out that has the potential to create division and potential conflict down the road” (TTE-1930-290910).

Importantly, international participants recognised that funding should be shared equally between the Government and civil society. An international program manager said, “There is now pretty much a consensus view that we do not have the balance right. We have not been channelling funds to civil society enough” (TTC-1230-290910). Another international program manager gave an example:

“If all the focus is on [the] state, is that really encouraging the right thing? Aid effectiveness really means building Government institutions and local actors. AusAID [former Australian bilateral aid program] have admitted that they have made that mistake. That they have put ninety-five per cent of their funds into Government institutions and then shared the five per cent [among] civil society” (TS-1000-220910).

Power asymmetries were most clearly seen in the lack of development in rural and remote Timor-Leste. An international consultant predicted that decentralisation would be slowed by resistance from elites and capacity constraints: “The current Government does not have control over the districts. If they decentralised, they will lose that power. There is fear associated with that decision” (TZ-1430-280910). An international consultant stressed that development must decentralise, enabling all East Timorese to experience positive changes:

“There needs to be genuine opportunity for people to participate, and not just people who are in Dili. There needs to be genuine service delivery in the districts. It needs to change otherwise it will just be a story about Dili, and the rising and falling of Dili. That is not Timor-Leste” (TTE-1930-290910).

Participants criticised the failure of both the UN administrations and the Government to administer decentralisation but explained that the ongoing violence contributed to continuing centralisation:
“Most of the conflict that has happened in the last ten years has either taken place in Dili or had their genesis in conflict and political issues in Dili. So it was felt that because Dili was the epicentre of conflict, certain things needed to happen in Dili before going out into the district” (TW-1730-240910).

In this section I include a case study critiquing how the SDP 2011–2030 was created, commenting particularly on the limited consultation and participation of communities, which failed to enable FPIC.

8.3.1 Acknowledge elite co-option

Participants expressed the need for all practitioners to recognise that there are both internal and external power disequilibria in Timor-Leste. This is the power disequilibrium between international practitioners and East Timorese (which occurs differently between elites and citizens), and the power disequilibrium between East Timorese elites and citizens.

Most participants emphasised the complexity and historical nature of elite co-option in Timor-Leste. An international practitioner explained that the Portuguese co-opted Indigenous leaders; “So that the power that people have does not just derive from Indigeneity and Indigenous culture, some of it derives from their colonial power” (TK-1700-160910). The head of an INGO affirmed that identity pluralism meant that individuals pragmatically aligned themselves with different identities or groups depending on the context:

“Timorese leaders get mileage out of emphasising difference. Ministries favour certain districts because of clan links. It is not as black-and-white as if you are elite or other” (TTP-1100-061010).

He explained that on the whole, decision-making is dominated by elites who do not respect Indigenous knowledge systems, and that the focus by international practitioners on the state and elite leadership increases divisions between East Timorese, and contributes to structural violence:

“They [elites] see the suku level as something that is backwards and not relevant to moving the country forward. They don't understand how important suku are to people's lives. If donors focus on the state it puts a fork in the road leading to increased elitism. [The] diaspora is co-opted. The elite do not identify with the Indigenous community, they are deferential to people with a white face” (TTP-1100-061010).

One international consultant agreed that over time the diaspora elite have lost their respect for Indigenous knowledge systems: “The current elite in Dili, who often do not speak the language and think that tradition is really backward, are essentially non-Indigenous Timorese” (TTL-
An international consultant reported that a senior Minister had said to him, “We are not savages and we will not use customary law” (TTJ-1500-011010). An international adviser extrapolated on the elite divide between Indigenous and modern knowledge systems:

“Members of the elite do not play enough attention to traditional culture in terms of building the country’s identity. I think that there is a perception that traditional culture is opposed to a certain sense of modernity. Seeing it as backwards, that they cannot live together” (TTN-1900-051010).

Many international participants reported that corruption and wealth disparity were increasing. One UN practitioner stated that economic inequality was a trigger for violence:

“Corruption is getting out of control. It is not getting to the people in the countryside. It isn’t even going to all the people in Dili; it is going to small elites. This is unsustainable. You don’t need to have the brains of an archbishop to work out that ain’t fair and [will] cause some sort of reaction” (TTB-1000-290910).

Many participants said that their international colleagues rarely acknowledged that they prioritised consultation and engagement with the elite, and that this practice limited who participated in decision-making. International participants admitted that they assumed that they were engaging with people who represented the majority of East Timorese, and cited the OECD Fragile States Principles to support their focus on statebuilding and work with Government decision-makers (OECD, 2007). However, some participants did not seem to recognise that they worked and made decisions primarily with people who were Dili-based elites. Overall, participants cited time pressures, geographical inaccessibility and funding constraints as additional barriers to engaging more broadly with East Timorese.

The head of a multilateral organisation acknowledged that the Government’s goals can be different from the goals of the average citizen (TTD-1700-290910). Elites tended to support modern, liberal peacebuilding, market economies and democratisation. A UN practitioner agreed:

“You need to be careful not to work on the assumption that everyone’s goals are the same. The mestizos, the Portuguese-born Timorese, have got [a] particular view, which is based round their heritage and their exclusivity. People [average citizens] were made to feel a foreigner in their own land. The people [the mestizos] actually making this decision might only reflect about three per cent of the population” (TTB-1000-290910).

One international consultant said that Indigenous leaders often had a better understanding of community needs and were less likely to be co-opted than the Xefe de Suku:
“We find it so much more effective to organise through the uma lulik because they have much more power to talk about the land, rather than the local leaders [Xefe de Suku]. The local leaders are more likely co-opted or swayed by the state” (TTL-0930-110713).

However, other participants recognised that elite co-option occurs widely and affects both state and customary leadership. One international practitioner warned that communities can be disempowered and marginalised by both international practitioners and elites:

“Unless it is empowerment right down to the beneficiary I don't see that it is intrinsically any more wonderful to have the Xefe de Suku making decisions for his people than having a public servant who has [had] fifteen years of training in Canberra. He is still imposing things and that is disempowering” (TE-0800-140910).

8.3.1.1 Case Study: A failure to consult: the Strategic Development Plan

In 2009–2010 the Government undertook a broad consultation process across all sixty-five sub-districts to finalise a new medium-term SDP 2011–2030 that focuses on four strategic sectors: social capital; infrastructure development; governance and institutional strengthening; and economic development (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2011a). The process of developing the SDP was widely criticised by many participants it was seen as top-down, patriarchal and promoting a “patron-client type of relationship” (TTD-1700-290910). This criticism highlights tensions between East Timorese citizens and elites over participation in decision-making. An international adviser explained the consultation process used for the SDP:

“The Prime Minister [Gusmão] has embarked on a consultation throughout the country. The entire community comes, he expresses the vision of the Government. Then representatives from each of the Aldeia and sub-Suku will provide him with a five minute discussion about their priorities. It is everything from corruption, to access to water, access to health centres, or schools with no teachers. It lasted three hours, and he will answer questions. The method of the consultation was in a very indigenous process. It is not easy, it is hard work and it is a full day” (TW-1730-240910) [my emphasis].

Some international participants believed that elite East Timorese represented the views of all citizens. The international adviser continued:

“The way that the Government conducts its strategic planning always has at the very forefront a deep knowledge of the people of Timor. Particularly Prime Minister Gusmão, who spent twenty-five years fighting side-by-side [with the resistance]. If anyone knows Timor, it is him. This is one of the reasons Timor has been able to experience this period of peace” (TW-1730-240910).

However, the SDP process was roundly criticised by many East Timorese and some international practitioners. They claimed that the ‘community consultation’ process was merely to ‘socialise’ the SDP after it was written, and to act as an early election campaign for Gusmão...
An international consultant cited Gusmão’s leadership in achieving substantial control and ownership over decision-making: “Xanana is the sort of guy that really digs in his heels. It is difficult for donors to influence someone like this” (TTJ-1500-011010).

An international program manager also described the politicisation of the SDP:

“The strategic plan is really Xanana and he developed it in his office by himself with advisers. It is not his party or his Government’s plan. It is a political issue. Politics is part of development” (TS-1000-220910).

An international consultant added:

“Policy processes here tend to be really weak and not very well thought out. The SDP just appeared. This consultation process was actually just a political process. So there was no opportunity to really influence it, and you can see that when you look at it, it does not reflect any of the priorities [of] civil society. There is so little accountability” (TTL-0930-110713).

As one international adviser confirmed, the SDP had limited consultation:

“In reality the people who are speaking at those [consultations] are the political voices, Xefe de Suku, Xefe de Aldeia. It would be good to speak to people on both sides. It isn't so free. If someone came along and wanted to say something, they would not have the chance” (TTF-0830-309010).

Another international consultant remarked that the SDP, while flawed, is a step toward greater ownership of development by East Timorese (TTE-1930-290910). A UN practitioner agreed:

“They said, ‘we have waited twenty-five years for independence; we want to do this ourselves. If we do it wrong, and we have to redo it, ok, we learn from it. If you want to help us do that–fine’. The key word here is ownership. It can’t be artificial” (TTB-1000-290910).

Despite the elite support, without substantive consultation with and participation of all stakeholders, implementation of the SDP will not eventuate. It remains to be seen how trust, consent and participation will be built and sustained, but certainly without these factors the current decision-making process will continue to disenfranchise and divide elites and citizens.

### 8.3.2 Encourage gender equality

All international participants cited the complexity of achieving gender equality in Timor-Leste. They acknowledged that gender inequality was a significant challenge and underscored their discussions of this issue with an understanding that East Timorese women experienced greater
poverty, had less access to education, health and legal services, experienced high rates of family and sexual violence, and had limited engagement in the cash economy.

Most international participants cited East Timorese culture or custom as the cause of gender inequality and many also acknowledged the damaging and distortionary impact of patriarchal colonialism. Many participants cited the comparatively high numbers of East Timorese women participating in formal and customary political spaces, but stressed that this participation was often limited, and cited barlaki as an institution that compounded gender violence. They linked gender inequality with unsustainable development and continued high levels of violence. The head of a multilateral organisation explained that the gender equality clashed with culture:

“Through these projects you are trying to effect change, and people are not often comfortable with change. What we might perceive as a development outcome might not be consistent with the local traditions and cultures” (TTD-1700-290910).

An international analyst agreed noting that sometimes women are marginalised in “non-formal governance systems”, and that there are differences in participation and engagement between Dili-based women and rural women (TC-1500-130910). An international program manager agreed, noting that some aspects of Indigenous systems disproportionately impacted women:

“Sometimes tarabandu is not very gender sensitive. There is a whole bunch of issues where you have to work out what are the gender implications of some of these rules. Are they impacting much more on women than men?” (TTF-0830-300910).

A UN practitioner agreed, explaining that Indigenous systems did not promote modern ideals of gender equality, but that incremental change was possible:

“Traditionally, culturally women are not used to being vocal or expressing their ideas or taking the lead in things. If it is a cultural thing it takes a long long time to change it. And sometimes changing it is controversial, but [it] is possible” (TT-1500-230910).

The refusal of many East Timorese men to share power with women was viewed as the key barrier to gender equality. An international consultant stated, “The constitution: it says that men and women are equal. It doesn't mean that the people want it. When I say the people I mean the men” (TE-0800-140910). She added that this provided a dilemma for international practitioners regarding respecting and working with East Timorese perspectives:

“We might say, ‘well, women have rights, individuals have rights. We don't care what your tradition is.’ And you can apply that to almost everything. It [marginalising East Timorese gender norms] probably will [cause violence]. You know, for certain almost everyone [international] agrees that we have to ignore local opinion. And the question is where do you draw the line?” (TE-0800-140910).
Participants argued that gender equality is a systemic challenge made more challenging in the context of a conflict-affected state (N-0900-230909; Z-1600-261109). One international peacebuilder observed that engaging male leaders was extremely challenging:

“In post-conflict environments the dominant idea is that they [men] are dominant and aggressive. How do development agencies engage with powerful men that object to change? There are issues of masculinity and a sense of entitlement to power” (W-1600-251109).

Some international participants emphasised the importance of embedding gender equality early in all new institutions and structures to create new power dynamics (TI-1400-150910). An international program manager underlined the history of violence and economic insecurity as major factors exacerbating gendered structural violence, and observed the current weakness of the Government to resolve gender inequality:

“With gender equality one of the major issues is culture, changing mindsets and practices. Another issue is the legacy of conflict. Violence is part of people's experience and it is not surprising that it manifests in the home. Another challenge is the inability of state institutions to tackle the problem” (TY-1000-280910).

Many participants explained that the way in which gender equality or a rights-based agenda had been prioritised by the UN and many other international organisations was not culturally sensitive, and had created divisions between international practitioners and East Timorese, and between East Timorese men and women. An international practitioner expanded:

“If you look at the Millennium Development Goals that have to do with gender, it is obvious that we are doing something that we all agree on in the international development community, but it is not always something that resonates well with local cultures” (Q-1030-250909).

They perceived that as a result, many East Timorese men, and some women, had rejected gender equality, seeing these ideas as culturally and structurally violent – distorting and rejecting customary practices and customary roles of women and men. Some suggested that because the term ‘gender’ was considered so divisive by many East Timorese, different language should be used to discuss gender equality. Grenfell (2015) suggests using the terminology: ‘relationships between women and men’ to reopen discussions. This approach could reframe the terminology and restart conversations on this critical issue. These participants recommended that East Timorese people need to be supported to engage gradually in these issues at their own pace. One international peacebuilder suggested:

“Do you say, ‘this is not what we perceive to be equitable, however we will take the soft path and look to take a long-term approach and seek to work with those who have the views to educate women in the long term?’ ”
8.3.3 Facilitate community ownership

Many participants recognised that a history of repressive top-down governance and elite co-option has perpetuated minimal community ownership of internationally supported development and peacebuilding processes. A UN practitioner explained that the current development system systematically disenfranchised Indigenous communities:

“We, the international community, we don’t mean to but we smash the existing infrastructure, the honour code, the command structures of these indigenous communities [and] expect them to adopt our ways. We should not be surprised when it does not work. They have to do this in their own way in their own time. Mould it to suit their particular character” (TTB-1000-290910).

An international consultant described this situation:

“I came back in August 2006. It was very much like when I had arrived in August 2000. A lot of humanitarians arriving, none of whom had any experience in the country. It seemed to be much more about people coming in to save the nation, and the Government could be involved if they wanted to be” (TZ-1430-280910).

Corruption was viewed as the reason many international organisations decided not to decentralise decision-making. An international program manager explained: “Many donors are resistant to that [decentralisation] because they don't feel that corruption is under control and they do not trust the Government to implement their money directly” (TS-1000-220910).

She affirmed the need for trust: “You need to trust us to be a strong institution that will not just swallow your money and run away” (TS-1000-220910). One international adviser stressed the complexities of this position:

“Development partners are reluctant to provide direct budget support [because] budget execution figures are low. The response [from the Government] is: ‘the systems are not strong enough to support this because you guys are not supporting it. How do you feel you can criticise Treasury, when you are not sitting here and helping us’ ” (TW-1730-240910).

Some international participants linked the lack of community ownership to structural violence. One international program manager said that prioritising one community over another can cause inequalities, exacerbating structural violence (TTF-0830-300910). Participants agreed that paternalism and lack of information prevents ownership (TTC-1230-290910). An international consultant explained:
“[International development organisations] profess to have Government ownership but really the Government has agreed to something (all too often imposing from the outside). I think it is a very paternalistic approach” (TTE-1930-290910).

One international consultant predicted future violence if the current system continued without reform and suggested strategically disengaging to encourage greater East Timorese ownership (TTJ-1500-011010). Other suggestions were made to increase community-level ownership. A bilateral program manager said that international practitioners must provide “space and time” to facilitate East Timorese ownership:

“We must give time to let things happen. I think that we can give them the knowledge, give them instruments, but let them find their way. From my experience they are rather happy, and we are trying to break their happiness with our model. Maybe their happiness is different from ours” (TTQ-1600-061010).

Participants explained that the heavy presence of international development organisations reinforced communities’ high expectations but did not enable community ownership (TP-1830-200910). Participants cautioned that international practitioners should enable greater community ownership by supporting East Timorese to make decisions without interference. One international program manager cited “a lack of a space to resolve conflict without either a donor money or military presence, that will be one of the key obstacles to Timor retaining a non-violent future” (TP-1830-200910).

8.3.4 Enable free, prior and informed consent

Many international practitioners recognised that many East Timorese communities were excluded and silenced from processes that would enable FPIC. An international consultant underscored the failure of the UN in establishing these processes:

“Participation of communities in government decision-making processes have been uniformly poor. The UN did not prioritise the involvement of the local population. They did not have a coherent or overarching strategy of consultation with local communities. They did not establish the forums where you effectively devolve decision-making powers to district levels” (TZ-1430-280910).

A head of a bilateral organisation agreed: “Overall there continues to be minimal genuine consultation with NGOs, civil society or ordinary East Timorese people on development priorities” (TI-1400-150910). One international consultant admitted that she had limited practical experience of community-level engagement:

“I don't know what happens at the district level, and the reason is because when I have been working inside a donor agency, my whole life was spent [at] a desk in Dili. I think
donors have been very focused at the centre, focused on planning and less on doing” (TTE-1930-290910).

Participants cited customary and historical hierarchies as barriers to wider participation. An international program manager explained, “It is hard to tell here which hierarchies are cultural and if they are influenced by colonialism” (TTU-1600-280910). An international program manager explained that a widespread lack of coordination compounded problems:

“People are fed up and sick and tired of people wanting to come in and wanting to talk. It is the same nine or ten people who are being met by several different donors, and they are going to several different training courses or interventions. There is no coordination. It’s a big problem of human resources, capabilities and availability” (TB-1000-100910).

One international practitioner explained the complexities of correctly assessing who to consult with: that there are differences between those who use, and those who are the custodians of the land, and that everyone must be included. An international consultant gave an example of failed community consultation, which resulted in violence:

“The road that was going to get built, they decided it would go through three or four different aldeia. What the people from the aldeia said [was] ‘we need to share the workers, everybody needs a piece of this pie’. That is a way to avoid conflict, it is cooperation. The project changed, so it ended up only going through a few aldeia. All these people who agreed to the co-operation are annoyed because the people whose village the road would now go through said, ‘this is ours’ ” (TTI-1400-011010).

International participants working in Timor-Leste explained that the term ‘socialisation’ was often used instead of seeking FPIC. An international consultant explained that socialisation is a process of: “sharing information about what a project is supposed to be doing and how it is functioning” (TTS-1700-290910). Socialisation was seen as different from consultation, which “is the process of getting feedback” (TTS-1700-290910). Many participants described FPIC as processes that enabled communities affected by the change to have a choice; which was fundamentally different from consultation or socialisation. One international program manager explained that for communities to consent they needed to have access to information and education; “If they have knowledge they can choose. Knowledge is the key to liberty” (TTQ-1600-061010). One international practitioner illustrated this point:

“Self-determination is about choice. Until people have the resources to make choices there is no choice. So agencies have to give people a capacity to make a choice. That means they have to improve their economic circumstances and give them an opportunity to educate themselves. If their kids cannot get an education, if they cannot feed themselves without working twelve hours a day, then they do not have a choice” (TK-1700-160910).
Many participants recognised that East Timorese felt excluded and marginalised from government and international decision-making. As one international consultant said, “It just comes down to national development [as] the priority, and it doesn't matter who you are, you do not have the right to get in the way” (TTL-0930-110713). A senior development researcher expanded:

“There are two barriers to the implementation of [FPIC]. The first is that developing country governments do not care about their Indigenous peoples. They don't see support for Indigenous people as a benefit for their economies. There is also the barrier of end users, such as companies, [who do] not really [want] to share benefits. They see free, prior and informed consent as a burden. We need to find points of self-interest…but this is a very slow process” (CC-1300-011209).

Participants affirmed that enabling communities to practice FPIC was very challenging. Neither international practitioners, the Government or communities were experienced in processes that enabled FPIC. An international adviser explained the complexity of seeking consent, and the difficulties communities had in articulating what they want:

“There is another issue which further complicates things: people not wanting to tell you they don't want it. Are they really against what you are trying to do or did they not understand it? And they can't tell you what they want. You need to learn how to read all the signs” (TTN-199-051010).

8.3.5 Summary: Power

My research indicates that a power disequilibrium exists between international practitioners and East Timorese elites, international practitioners and citizens and between East Timorese elites and citizens. Understanding these power disequilibria is key to transforming the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste. This imbalance directly causes or exacerbates structural violence. International practitioners need to acknowledge these internal and external divisions and seek common ground and ways of working that engage and connect communities, not exacerbate these existing divisions. Decentralising power is critical to achieving self-determined development in rural communities beyond Dili and balancing power from elites to citizens.

Many international participants blamed high levels of gender inequality and gendered violence on Indigenous cultural systems. They saw barlaki and limited women’s public participation in decision-making as proof of the inherent misogyny within Indigenous East Timorese culture. They argued that change was necessary and long term, and over time East Timorese men need to share their cultural, economic and political power with women. They recognised that as international practitioners they had not yet supported state or community-level institutions and structures that could support these changes. Some international practitioners also recognised
that the way in which the UN and other organisations had discussed and prioritised gender
equality in Timor-Leste had been divisive, and had not included the diverse views of East
Timorese.

Evidence indicated that international practitioners had not established the conditions to facilitate
greater community ownership over development and peacebuilding efforts. They cited
geographical isolation; a lack of shared languages; complex and inflexible decision-making; and
widespread corruption as the key reasons for minimal levels of community ownership.
However, some international practitioners acknowledged that they themselves were culpable.
These international practitioners cited their internally focused decision-making systems and
prioritisation of relationships with elites, which established or perpetuated the existing
conditions for corrupt behaviours.

Participants acknowledged that while FPIC was in theory, critical for self-determination, in
practice the current development system is not an environment that enables consent to occur. In
Timor-Leste international practitioners and the Government both use restricted processes of
socialisation and consultation instead of engaging in processes that would enable widespread,
informed participation in any decision-making process. Practitioners acknowledged that
enabling FPIC is key to rebalancing the current disequilibrium of power; supporting
communities to decide how, when and where they want self-determined development and
peacebuilding to occur.

8.4 Relationships (value humility and self-reflection)

Poor relationships are at the heart of perpetuating ongoing power asymmetries and structural
violence. Conversely, strong, enduring and respectful relationships are at the heart of
peacebuilding practice. The majority of participants affirmed the fundamental importance of
building relationships with communities to achieve sustainable development outcomes and
peace. However, international practitioners held very different perspectives on relationships
from East Timorese. While East Timorese are connected within and between communities
through deep historical and cultural links to land and place that are entwined with their plural
identities, international practitioners tend to view the natural environment as a resource to
achieve economic development. Some international practitioners had ties to Timor-Leste
through historical links or shared languages, but most identified as outsiders. One international
adviser underlined the deep historical divisions and conflicting relationships between outsiders
and East Timorese:
“There is a certain divide between _malae_ [foreign] people and Timorese people. You are always an outsider. It is a difficult culture that feels betrayed by generation after generation. The responsibility lies on our side. If you have a sense of history you’ll understand where people are coming from”  (TTN-1900-051010).

Some participants explained that the relationship between international practitioners and the Government in Timor-Leste has changed significantly since 1999 as ODA funding decreased. An international program manager outlined the differences between the East Timorese and outsider models of partnership:

> “International groups talk about partnership. They say that that does not mean that we provide the money and you do all the work. But very often that’s all it does. The partnership model in Timor is to sit and to listen and to talk”  (TB-1000-100910).

In this section I explore the ways in which relationships are formed, sustained or fractured between and within groups of international practitioners and East Timorese. A case study of the ILO illustrates how one international practitioner overcame challenges to support capacity and sustain better working relationships in Timor-Leste.

### 8.4.1 Nurture trust

An international program manager asserted that a lack of trust perpetuates divisions:

> “One of the other biggest problems certainly in Timor is the stratification between the development community and the local population. Lack of trust leads to complete social separation. It creates a tendency to objectify the Timorese as difficult to relate to, particularly for people who are white”  (TP-1830-200910).

A multilateral program manager highlights that these divisions also occur between East Timorese elites and between the Government and communities:

> “It would be difficult for the Government to have high levels of trust between civil servants and _suku_ leaders. They draw their sources of legitimacy from totally different places. I do not think that gives them [the Government] much legitimacy at a local level. There is often a lack of trust”  (TTS-1700-290910).

One international program manager agreed, noting that understanding history and context was critical and that the current development system compounded the lack of trust in relationships:

> “People don't realise: you need trust from the community in order for them to tell you. They just get caught up in this western modality of delivering programs, and they maybe do not necessarily reflect back on these things [history]”  (TTF-0830-300910).
More concerning, some alleged that the economic and political interests of international organisations and individuals distorted relationships and broke trust. One international program manager stated:

“They [foreigners] are fuelling it [violence]. They have massive interest in Timor. Twenty per cent of the world is controlling eighty per cent of what is happening here. I would be critical of Australia. You are giving all this money and aid but you are taking over AUD 200 million per day in oil revenue. I’d be critical of what happened in 2006, and the months leading up to it. What donors were funding the emergence of different political parties at that time?” (TB-1000-100910).

An international program manager blamed “donor fatigue” as a failure to build trust:

“Donor fatigue is an explicit [consequence] of the way things have been set up. It promotes a lack of trust in non-state actors, and foreigners in general. People are so used to NGOs coming through, doing a project, making a splash out of it and then pulling out without any follow-up or making empty promises that they cannot keep. The parachute model is happening in abundance in this country, which is an absolute waste of resources, a waste of time and a waste of credibility” (TP-1830-200910).

He suggested that long-term strategies, mandated follow through, and active monitoring and evaluation could be tools to promote trust and make sure programs are having the intended effects (TP-1830-200910). Participants consistently confirmed the importance of dialogue to manage changing relationships and sustain partnerships (TTF-0830-300910). The head of a bilateral organisation recommended the need to make information as accessible as possible, and then undertake open discussions so that communities can understand and own decisions that affect them:

“We know that it is an oral culture here so we do try to do things by reducing lengthy documents that are produced, and reports that are never going to be read by Timorese Government officials, for example, and to simplify language” (TI-1400-150910).

8.4.2 Commit for the long term

Participants pointed out that since 1999 East Timorese communities have experienced an enormous volume of social, economic, political and cultural change in a very short period of time. Participants observed that the development and peacebuilding needs in Timor-Leste are so broad and diverse that it is extremely difficult to prioritise across sectors, geographic areas or population groups. Government and international partners are under tremendous pressure to create development outcomes and peace dividends in short time frames. One international adviser asserted that this pressure took a personal toll:

“There is this four month barrier. International people hit a wall and say: ‘I want to go’.”
The other hit the wall moment is after four years. Cycles of hitting the wall. Every time you look to the side things go back to ground zero. It's so complex and it's so unfair” (TTN-1900-051010).

Participants identified two key systemic constraints regarding timing: employment contracts and programming funding cycles. The first identified that international practitioners usually work under short-term contracts, between three months and three years. This relatively rapid turnover by international (and sometimes local) staff means that long-term local staff and communities constantly have to rebuild relationships with newcomers. Building trust between East Timorese and outsiders takes time and the rapid turnover of staff makes this very difficult, if not impossible. One international practitioner criticised the focus on short-term engagements, highlighting the time that it takes to build trusted relationships:

“There is not much you can do as a fly in fly out person, unless you are really, really skilled and your area of expertise is such that you can do it quickly. Almost everything else requires you to build long-term relationships. This constant churn makes it hard. If you are going to put people into a place like this, especially one that has had conflict, you have got to be prepared to put them in for five to ten years. It takes that long for people to tell you the truth” (TK-1700-160910).

An international development practitioner asserted that it takes at least two years to begin to understand a given context:

“I think it comes down to a lot of investment that you make in understanding the context. Because after two years you are starting to understand the country. Maybe in five years you are able to make a contribution, maybe by ten years you are accepted. But until then you are seen as a tourist. People claim to be experts after being in a place in six months. We need to have more humility” (Z-1600-261109).

When I asked what long-term meant in Timor-Leste, a head of a multilateral organisation remarked:

“Long term? It depends on your development cycles. Short term in a post conflict country is possibly a generation or two. How do you get over the trauma? The pages are turning so quickly, there is no stability” (TTD-1700-290910).

The second systemic constraint is that development programs are usually only funded for up to three years, even in conflict-affected contexts. While there has been a significant push in the last decade to expand program funding to five or ten years, there continues to be constraints resulting in shorter programming time frames. Many participants viewed program sustainability and effectiveness as constrained by the poor timing of program cycles. Participants pointed out that international timeframes force the implementing agency to rapidly deliver complex programs, often without adequate design, monitoring and evaluation processes and without the time to consult and build meaningful partnerships with local institutions and communities.
Together the rapid staffing turnover and the short program lifecycle place tremendous stress on all actors, often damaging or exacerbating violence in an environment where relationships are already strained. An international program manager argued that this leads to ineffective and unsustainable development:

“A lot of development projects are time bound by the donor, not the communities. Projects planned to take place in twelve months, might take eighteen or twenty-four months. During that time they might not achieve any significant outcomes or outputs. In between the international donor might have a change in staff, so things will lose continuity, the projects are repeated and the same problems happen. The speed of how things can be done in Timor is very different from anywhere else” (TB-1000-100910).

One international consultant explained how short-term deployments and programs led to “death by planning” as a systemic failure of the current development system:

“Donors will come in with different ideas, changing it, and fiddling with that, and redesigning it. It is like putting the wheels on the bicycle while it is rolling down the road, and pulling them off again. There is no sense of the long-term. [They are] not giving things time to consolidate and invest[ing] in implementation. Some programs are never actually given an opportunity to get runs on the board before they are being re-evaluated, redesign, tinkered with, and sent in another direction” (TTE-1930-290910).

A UN practitioner elaborated that these short staffing and programming timeframes did not match East Timorese timeframes:

“We are always in a rush. We are not really here for the long term. We are pushing. As donors, we say we have mandates and deadlines that we need to report to. But the Timorese are saying, ‘That is your problem. We understand, but we are going to go at our own speed’ ” (TTB-1000-290910).

The head of a multilateral organisation also stressed that community members are busy, and that the Government and international practitioners needed to acknowledge the time burden associated with participation and consultation (TTS-1700-290910). She asserted that Government and community priorities were often different:

“Suku development planning processes are currently within very very short timeframes. Usually there is a community meeting, where people are asked to identify their priorities. I don't think any of us could plan and identify in that time frame. If you look at what projects are being identified by communities, and then comparing [them] to what the Ministry have prioritised, you will find that they often do not match” (TTS-1700-290910).
8.4.3 Build non-competitive work spaces

Many international participants outlined that within the current development system, organisations and individuals were internally conflicted, highly competitive and incentivised quick results over sustainable, inclusive processes. Some asserted that this conflict-oriented work model perpetuates cultural and structural violence. As one international program manager explained:

“As you know there are so many different agencies doing development projects. I'd be very critical of a lot of the so-called interventions. Are they interventions or are they interferences? Development is very often about competition, collaboration or coordination – and very often it is about competition” (TB-1000-100910).

An international consultant stressed the non-cooperative nature of the current development system:

“Donor competition is alive and well. I do not know what it is about human nature, you get your patch, their thing that they want to do, and they do not cooperate. They do not play well in the sandpit with others. Donors are some of the worst. [Donors are] talking about Paris and Accra [best practice guidance from the OECD DAC]. [But] in reality people are not walking the walk” (TTE-1930-290910).

Due to the high quantity of international practitioners and lack of coordination between organisations Timor-Leste has disproportionately experienced the negative outcomes of competition and lack of co-ordination. One international practitioner asserted:

“There are two problems. One is that the objectives of an individual donor may not correspond with the recipient. But the second problem, which I think is a bigger one, is that the objectives of the donors are different, and those agendas are often in competition with each other” (TK-1700-160910).

He stressed that competitive, conflict-oriented workplaces resulted in divisions and enmities between international practitioners, and within developing communities:

“Every development agency has friends and enemies in it. So you just have to work out who are your friends, and who are your enemies. One of the biggest challenges for people in Timor now is to learn how to deal with a different kind of enemy. This is an enemy who comes to you with money not guns. And is prepared to buy your submission, not to force it upon you” (TK-1700-160910).

I asked an international adviser the best way to achieve peace and development outcomes in Timor-Leste. She said that practitioners needed to depart from their competitive work cultures to build relationships through listening and dialogue:
“In Timor, it takes time, respect and humility: listening a lot more. Taking time to eat with people, really simple things. In Timor I have listened to a lot of ideas, and gone along with some things I did not agree with, because it was not my place to judge or jump in straight away. There have been times where I have got it so wrong. Because you are an outsider you have the capacity to move between different networks of power, which an insider cannot do. Recognising the power, but not abusing it; using it to help facilitate dialogue” (TTL-0930-110713).

Participants recommended facilitating safe spaces internally within international organisations for dissent and constructive criticism. An international peacebuilder also emphasised that when international practitioners engage with communities it should be in a facilitative role, aiming to create safe, inclusive spaces:

“Being a good facilitator is a radical thing to do. We have a paradigm [with] a limited range of options. That stops us from sitting down and hearing from the Indigenous people what they really want. Long-term engagement and flexibility is critical. A key word is respect. My role is to ask useful questions and bring useful comparisons from other places. But they are in the driver’s seat. The role of a good development specialist is going in and providing a safe space. Providing those outside ideas to stimulate and spark conversation” (FF-0703-280110).

8.4.4 Recognise and work with local capacities

The majority of international practitioners working in Timor-Leste described East Timorese human capacity as very low or zero at 1999. The head of a multilateral organisation summed up the views of many international practitioners: “The challenges are to deliver on their objectives given low capacity” (TTD-1700-290910). The head of a bilateral organisation said low capacity made achieving sustainable development extremely difficult:

“I think Timor is a really hard country to work in as well. It is the hardest country that I have ever worked in. It's because the starting base of the Timorese is much lower than any other country that I have worked in” (TI-1400-150910).

Some participants described East Timorese as lacking in strong modern work ethics. An international program manager agreed: “Culturally they are not pushed to develop their sense of initiative” (TP-18330-200910). Another international program manager said:

“Timorese people do not have a very strong work ethic. If you ask two Timorese people to build a ditch it will take two weeks; if you ask two Chinese guys it will take two hours. They have not really been exposed to what it means to build a country” (TS-1000-220910).

Conversely, some international practitioners recognised the strength and resilience of East Timorese peoples:
“I just can't believe people who survived those things and come out the other side. They just humble me every day. You know I meet people who go through things that I don't think I could ever go through” (TK-1700-160910).

An international program manager points out that with the assumption of zero or limited capacity, strong existing Indigenous knowledge and skills were ignored:

“People say, ‘Timor has nothing, it is starting from zero’. But you have the majority of the people who can manage to feed and house themselves. That is pretty amazing for a small island with a big population and not much of a cash economy. It does not seem to enter into people's [international practitioners’] minds” (TTU-1600-280910).

Within the current development system and liberal peacebuilding model, centralised state institutional capacity building is seen as the solution to increase governance and accountability (TTB-1000-290910; TTD-1700-290910). As one international adviser stated:

“The goal of development is ultimately to work yourself out of a job. Ultimately it is about capacitating people through projects and programmes that are sustainable. Capacity development is a long-term project, which occurs at a different pace in different contexts” (U-1800-031009).

In Timor-Leste the focus on capacity building or capacity substitution resulted in a very high use of international advisers working within central Government offices. One international consultant said this approach was driven by both the Government and donors, which gave advisers disproportional power and influence over decision-making (TTL-0930-110713). The head of a bilateral organisation believed that the UN and development partners had been too focused on state-centred capacity building and this had skewed development assistance, and failed to deliver on the short term needs of a conflict-affected community:

“The donors are talking about building, strengthening capacity, institutional strengthening...when the ordinary Timorese just want to have food on the table and shelter. The Timorese can't see that capacity building. It doesn't necessarily give them any confidence in donors. Sometimes I just wonder whether we donors were too purist in saying we will look at capacity building and institutional strengthening. We perhaps needed to focus on getting goods and services out into the rural areas for example, where they are really needed. I think we still would have built processes, strengthened institutions along the way” (TI-1400-150910).

An international analyst asserted that without advisers’ humility and a willingness to learn capacity building has been ineffective in Timor-Leste:

“One thing I find depressing is the level of engagement with local context. There is very little thinking about how people are writing themselves out of a job. It starts with the level of humility. You have a lot to learn about Timor, it is a two-way street. This exchange is important to set up any kind of relationship. When people have not been willing to do that, it can set up conflict” (TC-1500-130910).
An international program manager agreed: “Money has been spent on bringing in SUV’s [sport utility vehicles], setting up a development infrastructure, but not in developing Timor-Leste itself” (TP-18330-200910). One international consultant speculated that the significant salary differences for international advisers were a trigger for structural violence:

“Within Government, consultants are on well paid consulting rates. All these feelings have the potential to cause jealousy, complex, challenges, problems. I have not seen any processes in place at this point to manage it, I am not sure it is even acknowledged as a potential source of conflict at this point” (TTE-1930-290910).

One international program manager gave an example of unsustainable capacity building:

“Sometime between 2004 and 2006, the World Bank installed nine community radio stations. Project ended, they stopped funding, stopped providing technical assistance. So what do you think happened? Someone even stole the solar panels off one radio station. Without any proper training or maintenance, it was a plan with little follow through. That happens all the time here. It's a shame to see that waste. [You need] capacity building from a local level so people can take care of their own country” (TP-1830-200910).

A head of a bilateral organisation explained that advisers who stay for longer periods and work to build strong relationships have been more effective in building capacity:

“I think the more effective advisers that we have are those that have been embedded for longer periods. They have built their relationships and the Timorese have been able to tell them about the culture. It’s also about trial and error, and learning by doing” (TI-1400-150910).

Some international participants recommended the need for mentoring instead of capacity building. One international practitioner declared:

“Timorese are not treated in the way that [they] need to be treated by the donors. Timor needs very much a mentoring approach. It needs people to come and stay with no set agenda and spend time working with the staff in informal training and [giving] support to staff. We need people to come and stay over a longer period of time” (TB-1000-100910).

I asked what makes a good mentor and a UN practitioner advocated patience and learning the local language:

“This person has to speak Tetum and can work side-by-side with the Government staff and the project staff. Be very flexible and patient” (TT-1500-230910).
8.4.4.1 Case Study: The International Labour Organisation

This case study provides an example from one UN agency, the ILO, which has a focus on capacity building of national counterparts to achieve strong international labour standards to promote equality and sustainable employment (2015). The ILO has been operational since 1946, and in Timor-Leste since 2003.

A senior ILO development practitioner explained that he was asked to facilitate long-term capacity building and national ownership working with the Secretary of State for Employment Policy and Vocational Training. He took a very different approach from his previous ILO work in other countries, where he had used a model of capacity substitution where typically large numbers of international advisers, situated in UN headquarters separate from their national counterparts, completed much of the program. He explained how he met this challenge in his own words (all quotes from TH-1700-140910):

“From the first day I was determined to have a different set up. It came from assessing the past. The ILO is an old institution, it takes all of us a while to be able to challenge the institution and to fight for the things that you believe that you can do better. I have worked with ILO since 1984, and I [have] never been able to go as far as we have gone here”.

He explained that the ILO traditionally builds institutional capacity through a model where an international adviser, based in UN headquarters, works with a national counterpart, based in their office.

“All the UN system works in the same methodology. You have a counterpart institution and that you are supposed to build its capacity. Each of the internationals has a specific counterpart assigned and works in a specific department. So in Timor Leste, we decided to try a new approach”.

In this new approach he asked international advisers to permanently work in the same office as their counterpart, and all program tasking comes from national counterparts, not the international advisers. He described some of the challenges to working differently:

“We are more vulnerable in this approach, because something tomorrow could happen to the Secretary of State [who] will say, ‘sorry guys, I would prefer to do something different’. For the international staff, you need a special team to be able to cope with that. Each one of our experts [is] in the same office with his or her own counterpart. Each works in a mixed and messy environment. It is an integrated approach. This helps you create synergies between projects”.

As a result of this different approach, capacity strengthening has been sustained:
“We started in 2004 with one single project. Today all the programs we have are implemented through this [new process]. I'm not going to paint this all roses and tell you that everything happened exactly as planned, no. But after all these years there [are] very good results. The two directorates today [September 2010] have 147 staff; in October 2004 they had nine people. Today a competency-based training system has been approved by national legislation. When the project finishes things will not collapse. It would be never possible to achieve this in these years with the other option. The Timorese are fully involved. Most parts of the work is done by our colleagues”.

He emphasised the importance of ownership of funding for sustainability:

“If we start to give ILO money, the money comes from the donor. This is exactly what I wanted to avoid because there is no ownership from the national institution. So we tried a different approach. I managed to get permission to open an account in the name of the institution, managed by the department, and supervised by the Ministry of Finance. So today it runs on mixed funds from Government and donors. You create the system, but you give the system to them”.

This senior practitioner recognised that the regular approach of capacity substitution was unsustainable and ineffective:

“It's very easy to go in the traditional direction. If you do that again you have a situation in which you are promoting capacity substitution and not capacity building. Beautiful things [happen] during the project, but at the end we're leaving behind very little in terms of capacity built”.

He asserted the importance of building strong relationships for this approach to work:

“All this is only possible because of the approach, otherwise you would never reach the level of the relationship that allows you to work from inside the institution. I'm very happy with this set up. We worked really on the inside; there are no tricks and no beautiful reports. It is very simple but makes a big difference”.

During feedback workshops in July 2015, I spoke with staff from ILO Timor-Leste who confirmed that this radical approach continued to work well six years after my initial interview (TTV-1900-110715). In contributing to internal systemic change, this practitioner used significant personal courage, patience and persistence, and most importantly leadership.

8.4.5 Look after yourself and others simultaneously

Many international participants, usually at the conclusion of a lengthy discussion, were very frank about the challenges they had experienced while working within the current development system. They advocated the importance of practitioners cultivating healthy personal relationships, humility and the need to critically reflect on one’s practice to overcome these
challenges. An international adviser explained the personal implications of practicing
development and peacebuilding in complex conflict environments:

“It's kind of difficult to answer these questions without making them personal. It gives you, or it should give you, a sense of responsibility because you’re here, and making the money I make, and being in the position I am, obviously helping solve issues, but also creating problems at the same time [sic]” (TTN-1900-051010).

A number of participants questioned individual practitioner’s motivations for working in
development and peacebuilding. One development practitioner asked:

“Are we here for moral reasons? Can it be to share our wealth? Or are we here for our careers and wealth and privilege? Well, what is your incentive? How much does development have in common with colonialism? With social engineering? People get upset because they don’t like to see themselves in that light” (B-1230-150909).

An international peacebuilder said that too many practitioners were arrogant, lacking in self-
reflection, self-criticism and modesty:

“I think that there are still too many colleagues [who] are arrogant. They say ‘what we represent is good’. They don't get it that we are looking at each other, but they [local communities] also look at us” (Q-1030-250909).

Another international peacebuilder agreed:

“There are too many people around who do this work because it pays very well. They never have to commit to anything or anyone and they just move from one place to another. It is more about the lifestyle then about the commitment to what they are doing. Too much of our money is going to ourselves and not to the people that we are supposed to be supporting” (T-1600-011009).

One senior development practitioner underscored the importance of employing the right people
to work in complex conflict environments:

“You need to send the best of the best. You need to send the best of Europe, no less. It is complex enough for people who have the passion and ability – otherwise you are wasting money and creating more damage” (Z-1600-261109).

As one international consultant explained, international practitioners are outsiders and this will always have implications for power dynamics and relationships with the communities they purport to work with:

“Every opinion I've expressed [to] you comes from the malae mindset, a malae understanding of politics. I will never be Timorese. As much as feel that I understand what is going on, I will always be an outsider. The quicker that some people realise that the better” (TW-1730-240910).
Humility and self-reflection were suggested as key tools to break down power asymmetries. One development practitioner stated, “If you do not have humility you are not doing it right” (G-1000-170909). A senior development practitioner added that institutions and individuals needed to have humility and be brave:

“Aid workers need to have humility in order to not make it worse. We don't think and we need to challenge what is being said and done. We need to get out of our comfort zones. We should be brave and radical in order to create the shifts that are necessary. We need independent analyses, and the freedom to say it like it is. As a whole we're very bad at that. If you want to make criticisms we have to look at our own backyard” (N-0900-230909).

To assist creating healthy and holistic work practices, participants recommended practitioners engage in regular reflection. An international peacebuilder observed, “This approach is about providing peacebuilding at home first” (M-1400-220909). An international consultant reflected on the need to constantly be self-reflective to negotiate the inevitable power asymmetries:

“As an international person, you end up asking yourself, what is a legitimate role for me in a country like Timor-Leste? I really have to consciously remind myself to do that. I really wanted to be the same as everybody else there. But I am not. My skin is a different colour. I am from a different place. My education, my background [sic]. How do you negotiate that? It is all a process” (TTL-0930-110713).

One international peacebuilder highlights that organisations need to employ reflective people, engage in ethical debates and understand the limits of their organisation (R-1300-280909). An international peacebuilder also explained that each practitioner must model peace in their own relationships and organisations:

“When you are in the midst of [violent conflict], and bullets are flying, it is very hard sometimes to hold on to yourself. Gandhi said be the change that you want to be in the word, and I don't think we can do it out there unless we're doing it within ourselves. We are modelling what it is we want to see out there. The problems come when we lose sight of these core values and principles. Conflict is always about pain. For us to come in as healers into that pain we need to start with ourselves and our organisations, and take it out from there” (L-1000-220909).

An experienced development practitioner advocated individual responsibility:

“It was also important to develop people with listening skills and patience to hold conflict and allow it to take place constructively. Today I'm going to three meetings where there will be a lot of conflict. I will not get angry, I will not act hastily, I will not defend myself. I will listen, and I will try and understand. It all begins and ends with the individual” (P-0830-250909).
8.4.6 Summary: Relationships

The type of relationships international practitioners build with East Timorese elites and citizens are just as important as the need to build them. This evidence indicates that it is critical to ensure that funding or ‘partnership’ arrangements create real equality between actors, not subordinate relationships where NGOs or civil society are seen as beneficiaries, contractors, providers or implementers. NGOs, as well as the Government, need to be supported to guide and determine strategy and decisions, and East Timorese communities need to be prioritised as the primary resource and repository of Indigenous knowledge.

Building and sustaining good relationships is a complex process and requires the development of community capacity for all East Timorese. This process needs to be combined with systems that support broad and deep consultation; active participation; appropriate time frames – particularly longer-term programming and contracting; and decision-making that is grounded in FPIC. The current widely used process of ‘socialisation’ to inform citizens of decisions made does not equate to active, inclusive participation, and it certainly does not equate to a process that facilitates FPIC.

Trust is at the heart of building sustainable and respectful relationships. It takes time to create trust where parties can confidently rely on each other, understand each other’s perspectives and respect each other’s differences.

8.5 Conclusion: A flawed development system

Overall international practitioners had very mixed views about whether development and peacebuilding interventions in Timor-Leste since 1999 had been successful. Mixed views underscore the practical difficulties in measuring and reporting development effectiveness. Most acknowledged some successes but said there was no evidence of sustained peace and development. Significant ongoing violence was seen as a major barrier to achieving these goals. An international head of a bilateral organisation stated:

“In some ways, it could be seen as a giant experiment couldn’t it?...Development professionals saw Timor-Leste as an opportunity to test many of the new theories of practicing development in a fragile and conflict affected environment…I think there are some successes in Timor-Leste, but obviously it has been very difficult. There have been significant flare-ups of conflict. It is too early to say whether this has been a permanent success or just part of the country stabilising” (TI-1400-150910).

Others confirmed that there was such a high level of need that it is difficult to measure significant change. An international consultant remarked that “The effort has become so diffuse
and so scattered that any progress is very incremental at best” (TTE-1930-290910). A senior international practitioner claimed that development had occurred, but not in rural Timor-Leste:

“Timor has made some important steps in progress in the last ten years [with] institutions and processes to deliver services to people (building from a base that was pretty much zero). That has been successful. But poverty, getting service delivery outside of Dili, can be a challenge [sic]. Those problems do not seem to have been turned around” (TY-1000-280910).

In 2010, an international program manager declared that despite the large numbers of international organisations working in Timor-Leste, development has not been broadly sustained:

“It is just kind of disheartening. The sheer numbers of resources that have been invested here, keeping people alive, but the proportional lack of success [sic]” (TP-1830-200910).

Many argued that aside from ongoing violence, there were systematic issues preventing development from occurring in Timor-Leste. An international peacebuilder recommended investigating the underlying assumptions within the current development system:

“The premise that we have based our entire argument on may be faulty. What we haven't done yet it is look deeply enough and say: ‘my gosh, it's the premise’. I think we might be wrong about that, and we wonder why we are in such a mess. We need to look at the underlying assumptions [democratisation will lead to development] that we have made, beginning with that premise” (M-1400-220909).

Participants also stressed the importance of targeting development and peacebuilding programs to the East Timorese context:

“There is a lot of cut-and-pasting that goes on. There [are] a lot of external values that are being promoted: democracy, human rights, and campaigns against violence against women. It is not to denigrate those ideas, but there have been references made to malae ideas and malae people. The saturation of those kind of campaigns has probably led to the Timorese feeling force fed” (TZ-1430-280910).

One international adviser admonished international practitioners for taking this one size fits all approach:

“Often they provide the assistance that they have provided in other countries that does not fit the Timor context, despite Timor being recently out of conflict. Projects are not tailored to this country. That is because they are following the cookie cutter approach. It is the easy way out” (TW-1730-240910).

My evidence highlights that the current development system in Timor-Leste is deeply flawed. Findings from interviews with international practitioners, who are working in Timor-Leste and
other conflict-affected developing countries, show patterns in the types of direct, structural and cultural violence perpetuated by the interaction between the current development system and the East Timorese knowledge systems in Timor-Leste.

My evidence shows the interconnectedness between understanding culture and power dynamics, and the importance of building and sustaining strong relationships with both elites and citizens. International practitioners acknowledged that unless they built trusted relationships with Indigenous peoples and communities they would not access or learn about Indigenous knowledge systems and culture or break down the current disequilibrium of power. Likewise, a lack of understanding and respect for Indigenous knowledge systems could often inadvertently or deliberately cause or exacerbate existing tensions and relationships.

These findings demonstrate that the international and elite focus on centralised, institutional capacity building has failed to lay the groundwork for self-determined development. Instead it has increased inequality between elites and East Timorese citizens, strengthening and exacerbating structural violence.

The case studies in both Chapter Seven and Eight provide practical examples of the challenges of development and peacebuilding interventions and examples. Importantly, the case studies unpack and explore a range of ways in which international practitioners can begin to engage differently with the current development and liberal peacebuilding systems.
9 Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

Timor-Leste has changed rapidly since the majority of my field research in 2010. Since 2009 the Petroleum Fund has increasingly been used to provide the state with significant extra-budgetary funding for development programs. In 2011 the World Bank moved Timor-Leste to lower middle-income country status. UNMIT completed its mandate on 31 December 2012 and this event, combined with a decrease in overall ODA, precipitated a significant decrease in the number of international practitioners working in Timor-Leste. In February 2015 Xanana Gusmão stepped aside as Prime Minister provoking a generational change in leadership. These changes illustrate a veneer of stability or violent peace.

Significant development and peacebuilding challenges remain. In December 2015 the President Taur Matan Ruak vetoed the 2016 Budget claiming it was disproportionately skewed toward large economic and infrastructure projects and failed to target health, education and agriculture, sectors that impact the majority of the population. Civil society supported the President and protested that the Budget process lacked transparency, sustainability and equity (La’o Hamutuk, 2015). On 9 January 2016 the Parliament reconsidered the Budget and unanimously decided to make no changes and consequently the unchanged Budget was approved on 14 January 2016 (Inder, 2016). This incident demonstrates that elite democracy continues to marginalise the voices and development priorities of the majority of East Timorese.

My feedback discussions in Dili in July 2015 and the 2016 Budget difficulties reinforce that my research findings continue to be relevant to Timor-Leste. Elites in Timor-Leste continue to embrace the current development system categorised by centralised state sovereignty, the rule of law, elite democratisation and liberal economic reforms, with the support of the international community. The underlying triggers for violence continue to be ignored.

In this thesis I sought to assess the extent to which the current development system supported the implementation of ukun rasik a’an or Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste. This final chapter summarises the findings from my field research within a theoretical framework grounded in Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. Under three primary themes of culture, power and relationships I explore guiding principles that provide practical steps for how practitioners can engage in systems transformation to achieve Indigenous self-determined development.
In summarising my major research findings I highlight my contribution to the ongoing critique of liberal peacebuilding and the current development system and assert the primary importance of Indigenous knowledge systems and Indigenous peacebuilding practice to achieving Indigenous self-determination. I reiterate the enabling link between Indigenous self-determined development and FPIC. I conclude with brief remarks about the possibilities for future research.

9.2 Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development

This section identifies my East Timorese and international participants’ practical suggestions about how to work toward *ukun rasik a’an* or Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste. These findings are targeted at transforming the practice of international practitioners. I hope they are useful to elite East Timorese and those East Timorese citizens who are seeking new ways of engaging with elite decision-makers and international practitioners.

In Chapter Three I expanded on my concept of Indigenous self-determined development. I used the Declaration to assert that “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (UN General Assembly, 2007). I argue that Indigenous “economic, social and cultural development” is grounded in Indigenous knowledge systems, which are different for each Indigenous peoples. Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems are the foundation of my research, as discussed in Chapter Six, and they in turn are integrated with the three primary themes: culture /*lulik*, power /*lisan* and relationships /*slulu*.

Table 6 (below) is a summary of the research findings sourced from Chapters Seven and Eight incorporating practical guidance about how to transform the current development system to achieve Indigenous self-determined development. Both East Timorese and international practitioners discussed common themes of culture, power and relationships but often had different perspectives on how transformation could occur. The findings emphasise that to attain Indigenous self-determined development there must be active and vibrant Indigenous culture and customary practice; balanced power dynamics that facilitate peacebuilding; FPIC; and trusting, sustained relationships between individuals and communities.

In July 2015 I travelled to Timor-Leste and met with twenty-two Dili-based representatives from key East Timorese and international institutions to discuss these guiding principles in my research summary (see Appendices D and E for English and Tetum versions). Overall, these findings were well received by participants. Many appreciated the constructive recommendations and responded that the findings resonated with their practical experiences. Many East Timorese participants had never been provided with the results of academic research.
they had participated in – particularly not translated into Tetum – and they used the research summary to provide me with updates on Government policy, ongoing triggers for violence and new areas of concern. As a result of these discussions I made nuanced changes to sections on elite power, gender equality, use of mother tongue languages and land. The summary below includes comments and feedback from these useful discussions.

Table 6: Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations by East Timorese practitioners</th>
<th>Recommendations by International practitioners</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture / Lulik (prioritise systems of people, land and place)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Culture (respect cultural pluralism)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivate and affirm Indigenous knowledge systems</td>
<td>Value and engage with Indigenous knowledge systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognise identity is plural and localised</td>
<td>Prioritise peacebuilding analysis and programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserve customary links to land and place</td>
<td>Respect connectedness to land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn and use local languages and Tetum</td>
<td>Learn local languages and prioritise inclusive education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement targeted and context-specific models</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliver education for all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power / Lisan (seek balance within power)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Power (rebalance the disequilibrium of power)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work within Indigenous governance and leadership systems</td>
<td>Acknowledge elite co-option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break patterns of dependency</td>
<td>Encourage gender equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognise corruption as both moral and economic</td>
<td>Facilitate community ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create balance between women and men</td>
<td>Enable free prior and informed consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationships / Slulu (work cooperatively)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Relationships (value humility and self-reflection)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage in respectful and sustainable capacity strengthening</td>
<td>Nurture trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enable inclusive consultation and participation</td>
<td>Commit for the long term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design timeframes that suit communities</td>
<td>Build non-competitive work spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draw on insider / outsider practices to build and sustain relationships</td>
<td>Recognise and work with local capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform the root causes of violence</td>
<td>Look after yourselves and others simultaneously</td>
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</table>
This guidance for systems transformation is grounded in the identification of ongoing triggers for violence. These triggers are highlighted in Chapters Four, Five and Six. The evidence in Chapters Seven and Eight affirms that Indigenous self-determined development will be very difficult to achieve without transformation of these root causes of violence. These guiding principles provide concrete examples about what practitioners, both East Timorese and international, can do to work toward transforming the root causes of violence and achieving Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste.

The next section examines each of the three primary themes and the summarised findings from both East Timorese and international practitioners. While these findings are presented in a linear framework, each suggestion feeds into a complex and interconnected systems approach. These guiding principles are holistic, multilayered and are framed within Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems.

### 9.2.1 Culture / lulik

Table 7: Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste regarding culture / lulik.

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Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems remain strong and are actively practiced by the majority of East Timorese. East Timorese people in rural areas have a stronger link to Indigenous knowledge systems and their Indigenous identity than other East Timorese. These Indigenous systems have changed over time and have been impacted by the history of colonialism and violence but evidence demonstrates the widespread use, adaptability and resilience of these systems.
Participants emphasised that an understanding, by international and elite decision-makers, of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and the root causes of violence discussed here, is limited. Both East Timorese and international practitioners acknowledged that misinterpretation or manipulation of Indigenous knowledge systems combined with ongoing direct, structural and cultural violence, has prevented the achievement of development. Participants identified that the models used did not fit the local context and were not targeted to meet the needs of each different community. Ultimately participants suggested that international practitioners must be more flexible and understand that a different targeted approach, realistic community timeframes, active participation and community ownership will be needed for each context. Practitioners also suggested incorporating Indigenous peacebuilding practices to transform the root causes of violence.

International development and peacebuilding practitioners and East Timorese political leaders must acknowledge that Indigenous East Timorese are multilingual, hold plural identities and engage actively in both Indigenous and modern cultural systems. National identity in Timor-Leste is plural and fluid. It is a combination of many lived experiences and multiple ethno-linguistic groups with different Indigenous knowledge systems and 

I assert that Timor-Leste must develop a coherent, shared national vision to achieve its goals of peace and self-determination. There are a range of non-violent solutions to the ‘identity crisis’, most of which will necessitate broad community consultation and participation to develop a shared understanding of the future directions of Timor-Leste. Solutions must prioritise and incorporate plural identities. International practitioners can support or facilitate the East Timorese community to hold discussions on these important issues, but they must not lead or influence the debate.

East Timorese peoples express deep cultural, social, spiritual, economic relationships to land and water that are ignored, marginalised and violated by the majority of elite and international actors in the current development system in Timor-Leste. Without a clear land policy Timor-Leste is in danger of experiencing ongoing unresolved violence and insecurity that prevents the achievement of self-determined development goals. The Government should prioritise extensive community consultations to develop an inclusive land policy that takes account of Indigenous knowledge of sacred and customary land ownership and use. International practitioners should focus on the variety of ways they can respect Indigenous relationships to land and water, and work with East Timorese communities and the Government to facilitate these discussions, providing support as requested.
A shared and inclusive national language policy must respect the colonial past, acknowledging the usefulness of Portuguese, but make space to prioritise the development of Tetum as part of building a cohesive national identity. East Timorese policy-makers can achieve this change by funding Tetum language development and a cohesive education policy that acknowledges current capacity and supports teacher training and curriculum development. Outsiders must also take the lead on breaking down the communication barriers created by an absence of shared languages by learning Tetum and mother tongue languages where applicable. Language policies must also support the widespread use of mother tongue languages to sustain Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. Without shared languages, both elites and international practitioners will continue to make decisions without the active participation and FPIC of the majority of East Timorese. This is a major potential trigger for further cultural and structural violence.

My evidence indicates that there is continued structural and cultural violence within the current education system in Timor-Leste. This violence directly and disproportionately affects rural women and the poor, compounding the marginalisation of these groups within the community. An exclusionary education system, without free access to all levels of education and information, has consequences for all East Timorese citizens who are making decisions and choices without full, prior and informed consent. Inequality in the education system also affects access to and respect for Indigenous knowledge systems.

I warn, however, that an international practitioner can speak the local languages, understand customary practices and rituals and still perpetuate the underlying assumptions and knowledge systems of the current development system. More needs to be done to reframe the way in which international practitioners respect and work with Indigenous peoples and their knowledge systems to transform the current development system. Failure to do this compounds the existing high levels of structural and cultural violence.

### 9.2.2 Power / lisan

Table 8: Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste regarding power / lisan.

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</table>
Recognise corruption as both moral and economic
Facilitate community ownership
Create balance between women and men
Enable free prior and informed consent

Timor-Leste is characterised by significant levels of economic and political inequality. The high poverty rate of at least 49.9 per cent of the population in 2007, combined with the evidence from my field research, provides qualitative and quantitative data that demonstrate a significant increase in structural violence since 1999 (Cornwell et.al., 2015, pp.5,7). It is fundamental that international practitioners work to rebalance this disequilibrium of power otherwise the root cause of much of the direct and cultural violence in Timor-Leste will persist.

My research indicates three major power divisions in Timor-Leste: between elite leaders and citizens in Timor-Leste; between elites and international practitioners; and between citizens and international practitioners. The divisions between East Timorese are grounded in ongoing intra-state violence that has deep historical roots, with particular emphasis on the Civil War period in 1974–1975 and shifting allegiances during the Indonesian occupation.

Many East Timorese elites have been co-opted into the current development system and the liberal peacebuilding model. In doing so these leaders perpetuate neo-colonialism through policies of welfare colonialism that perpetuate structural and cultural violence. My evidence shows that international practitioners’ focus on elite leaders results in the further exclusion of community-level voices. International practitioners must understand this divide and take a conflict sensitive approach to their work. This involves engaging in consultation and participation processes that facilitate decision-making, shared management and ownership at all levels of the community. The continued failure of the international community to consider the different needs and interests of elites and communities – including understanding, respect and use of Indigenous knowledge systems – exacerbates structural violence in Timor-Leste.

States that are signatories to the OECD DAC guidelines and the New Deal are strongly committed to working through country systems to deliver development and peace outcomes. My research indicates that this is highly problematic because the state-centric systems currently in place compound inequality and limit community-level participation within Timor-Leste. If international practitioners continue to channel funding primarily to the Government it will exacerbate violence. A range of options, including core funding for local NGOs and civil society organisations, should be considered to rebalance the existing disequilibrium of power.

Participants explained that colonial history created patterns of dependency. Dependency is compounded by cultural expectations that East Timorese deserve compensation for their
suffering, without necessarily being accountable for their actions. Unmet high expectations for
development outcomes and peace have created tensions and dependency between citizens and
their government, and between citizens and international practitioners. Working collectively to
facilitate community ownership, and changing the pace to fit the capacity and needs of
communities is the best way to overcome dependency. International development practitioners
must value existing capacities and support East Timorese communities to take control of all
decision-making through FPIC processes.

Economic corruption was viewed as a colonial distortion of customary reciprocal exchanges
resulting in patron-client governance. Moral corruption was viewed as rife, particularly among
elites, and both forms of corruption were considered to cause cultural and structural violence.
Greater levels of accountability and transparency of information and education were cited as
ways to resolve corruption.

Customarily women hold authority and power in a sacred balance with men, but these
Indigenous concepts do not equate to gender equality. Colonialism and historical violence have
compounded gender inequality. Gendered power dynamics in Timor-Leste create situations
where women are confronted with both ideological and physical barriers to active participation.
Gender equality is strongly and negatively associated with the type of liberal peacebuilding
pushed by the UN and many international practitioners and it is also associated with an
abrogation of the customary relationships between women and men. As a result, many East
Timorese do not want to talk about gender equality.

The complexity of gender inequality discussed by participants underscores that there is a need
to find a new way of balancing relationships between women and men. This new relationship
will need to be gradually negotiated; drawing on Indigenous concepts of gender and how these
concepts apply to today’s world. Education was advocated as the primary long-term method for
achieving gender balance. Participants also underscored the importance of taking the time and
creating inclusive spaces to encourage women’s participation in discussions and decision-
making.

The majority of East Timorese communities were silenced and excluded from processes that
would enable FPIC. Socialisation, a widely used process of limited information sharing, does
not equate to the criterion of informed consent, and international practitioners, the Government
and communities are not experienced in processes that enable FPIC. FPIC is critical to greater
ownership and sustainability of development and peacebuilding interventions and, without it,
structural violence will persist.
9.2.3 Relationships / *slulu*

Table 9: Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste regarding relationships / *slulu*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations by East Timorese practitioners</th>
<th>Recommendations by International practitioners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engage in respectful and sustainable capacity strengthening</td>
<td>Nurture trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable inclusive consultation and participation</td>
<td>Commit for the long term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design timeframes that suit communities</td>
<td>Build non-competitive work spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draw on insider / outsider practices to build and sustain relationships</td>
<td>Recognise and work with local capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform the root causes of violence</td>
<td>Look after yourselves and others simultaneously</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

East Timorese participants asserted that East Timorese have strong Indigenous knowledge and capacities, particularly to resolve problems non-violently. They agreed that there was a need for external assistance to achieve development, but that Indigenous knowledge and capacities should also be valued and used to achieve development and peacebuilding goals. Many international participants viewed East Timorese capacity to engage in modern state building post-1999 as limited. This flawed assumption of limited capacity or *tabula rasa* is fundamental to the current failure to build trusting and respectful relationships between East Timorese and outsiders. Gaining a better understanding of the strengths of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems, particularly *lisan*, *lulik* and *slulu*, can help outsiders reframe their perspectives of East Timorese capacity. Participants agreed that even if programs take a long time to achieve results, development organisations need to be flexible with their timeframes and conditions to build genuine partnerships. Participants also suggested the importance of mentoring to achieve sustainable, shared learning.

Low levels of consultation and participation from both genders at a community level are the inevitable outcome of the current autocratic top-down governance model. The current processes can be viewed as merely an exercise in politicking, enabling self-promotion by co-opted leaders and international practitioners to ignore both women and men’s views. The current governance system in Timor-Leste has limited transparency and accountability, and there is marginalisation of and lack of respect for Indigenous knowledge by elites and international practitioners. Without meaningful and inclusive consultation and participation this system is not conducive to unity or Indigenous self-determined development.
Organisational structures and culture continue to be strong reasons for this lack of effective consultation and participation by international practitioners. Inclusive consultation and shared decision-making processes require strong pluralistic institutions and leaders to promote and demonstrate coexistence. Systemic violence can be transformed by providing regular, timely and accessible avenues for all citizens to participate actively in decision-making. This change would require the Government to appropriately resource and make accessible national, district and local-level governance mechanisms that encourage community-level engagement. Without these mechanisms Government legitimacy and social cohesion will continue to be weak.

Many international participants recognised that institutions within the current development system are non-cooperative and highly competitive with incentives for quick results over sustainable, inclusive systems change. These organisational models are structurally violent, resulting in divisions and enmities between international practitioners and between elites and communities. Practitioners recommended building relationships by listening and facilitating safe spaces for dissent and promoting constructive criticism.

In a conflict-affected environment where there is often significant pressure to deliver development and peacebuilding outcomes in very short timeframes, building relationships is not considered to be a high priority. Practitioners highlighted that East Timorese experience tremendous stress from imposed external timeframes. The limitations of short-term contracts means that there are limited incentives, interests and time to communicate and build successful relationships between international practitioners and communities. These structural challenges destroy trust and perpetuate divisions between groups already experiencing a disequilibrium of power.

Many groups within East Timorese society, particularly those who have had less access to information and education, require longer timeframes to meaningfully participate. To create self-determining development all East Timorese, including women, youth, veterans and peoples with disability, should be provided with capacity support to enable their active engagement in decision-making that affects them. International practitioners must consider how to flexibly change their institutional incentives and practices to support these changes.

While it is a critical aspect of conflict-affected development contexts, the need to recognise and transform traumatised communities is rarely considered outside the peacebuilding world. Even when trauma is acknowledged as an important issue, it is rarely provided with funding. Development actors should take note that healing from trauma is long-term and inter-generational, and that much greater attention, funding and programming for this issue is required in Timor-Leste. International practitioners should provide specifically targeted funding
and expertise focused on trauma and healing in both rural and urban communities. Use of Indigenous processes of healing and peacebuilding should be prioritised. International participants also need to engage constantly in regular processes of critical reflection, founded in humility and modesty, that acknowledge our limitations and weakness as individuals and organisations. This approach can help to break down the hierarchies of power and build stronger relationships. This approach acknowledges that unless international practitioners have strong, healthy personal relationships and good mental health, they will not be able to constructively contribute to peacebuilding in traumatised communities.

Relationships are always deficient when violence prevails over dialogue. One of the major challenges in creating effective consultation and participation in Timor-Leste has been to build decision-making structures that include citizens, elites and ‘outsiders’. Elites and international practitioners have found it very difficult to build trusted relationships with those groups in society that refuse to (or have been unable to) participate in decision-making processes.

A key to how international development practitioners can build strong relationships and integrate Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and culture into their practices lies in the customary processes that connect ‘insiders’ with ‘outsiders’. Evidence from anthropology and history indicates that, to manage potential violence, multiple waves of external cultures have been integrated into Timor-Leste’s knowledge systems. This practice of integrating ‘outsiders’ is a pragmatic Indigenous peacebuilding process that creates a shared common identity and balances power between different groups of people. Ultimately these rituals provide systems for communities to learn to manage change and potential violence between different knowledge systems. These rituals will be different in different communities across Timor-Leste and development practitioners should seek to engage actively with these different processes in each community to build and sustain relationships.

9.3 Major research findings

In this section I discuss the four overarching theoretical findings stemming from my research. The first point, which has implications for the rest, emphasises the relevance of working with complex systems theory to better understand violence, peacebuilding, development and Indigenous self-determination. Understanding how these multiple and interconnected systems influence and change each other is critical to working out how to practically achieve ukun rasik a’an or Indigenous self-determined development and peace. I also propose that the current development system in Timor-Leste has perpetuated structural violence, and I critique the liberal peacebuilding model espoused by the majority of international practitioners and
recommend the prioritisation of Indigenous peacebuilding practices. Finally, I advocate the notion that Indigenous self-determined development is grounded in FPIC.

9.3.1 The relevance of complex systems approaches

My research points firmly to the existence of multiple complex, interconnected systems in Timor-Leste. In this research I have focused on analysing two systems and how they connect: Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and the current development system. I have particularly emphasised the power asymmetries within and between each system to better demonstrate how violence, peacebuilding and Indigenous self-determination interconnect.

These systems are adaptive. The multiplicity of knowledge systems held by East Timorese are more than a binary disjunction between Indigenous knowledge systems and modernity; they are complex webs that include religious faiths, differing localised cultures and ritual practices, and a broad range of historical experiences. I do not seek to pinpoint identity binaries or to categorise individuals into groups, instead I actively acknowledge East Timorese peoples’ pluralist identities and the importance of exploring how these differences affect development and peacebuilding practice. My findings show that, similar to other Indigenous peoples worldwide, East Timorese skillfully and pragmatically negotiate these complexities on a daily basis.

I suggest that systems change is essential to transform violence and achieve *ukun rasik a’an* and Indigenous self-determined development. Timor-Leste’s struggle for self-determination from Portugal and Indonesia, and more broadly, the international Indigenous movement toward Indigenous self-determination are long and slow journeys. Both journeys are characterised by pragmatism, and have had some notable failures, but ultimately have been incrementally successful. Development systems change will surely be similarly gradual.

9.3.2 The current development system perpetuates structural violence

I argue that international development is dominated by Western ‘cultural underpinnings’, clearly apparent in the international guidelines and key conventions, declarations and policies that seek to control the nature of, and the right to development. As a result, development interventions are not centred on Indigenous communities’ knowledge systems, perspectives and goals. Current development practice often underestimates, undervalues or ignores Indigenous peoples – including their knowledge systems, local politics and leadership, socio-cultural realities, relationships with land, and spirituality.
Rejection of Indigenous knowledge by the current development system has resulted in the failure to transform the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste. I propose that greater use of and prioritisation of Indigenous perspectives can help build up a more contextualised understanding of peace and violence in Timor-Leste, thereby enabling positive peace and self-determined development to occur.

My research in Timor-Leste provides evidence that there are possibilities of expanding current development policy and practice, particularly within areas of community engagement, leadership and governance. However, I highlight that without prioritising Indigenous knowledge systems these variations or technical adjustments within the current development model merely serve as peripheral, superficial modifications. These changes will not result in the necessary systems transformation for achieving lasting peace and self-determination for the Indigenous peoples of Timor-Leste.

Both elite East Timorese and international practitioners perpetuate forms of structural violence through the current development system. Many elites actively marginalise, de-legitmate and de-value Indigenous knowledge. These elites promote centralised state institutions, elite democratisation and a liberal market economy in Timor-Leste and hold radically different worldviews from the majority of East Timorese. They have also established policies of welfare colonialism through the Referendum Package and the cash payment schemes, which create dependency while failing to target some vulnerable groups. This behaviour is elite co-option.

Not all elites reject East Timorese Indigenous knowledge; some elites, including those I interviewed, actively promote the use of Indigenous knowledge and culture. Nevertheless, prioritisation of modern worldviews places enormous pressure on outside knowledge systems to resolve complex challenges. International practitioners and the institutions they work within have structural and cultural barriers that prevent them from engaging with Indigenous knowledge systems. These barriers include restricted timing, funding, staffing, short-term contracting, limited language skills, and domestic political cycles in their home countries. My findings show that outside systems cannot fully encompass the complexity of the East Timorese context.

These findings indicate a deeper systemic violence generated by the different worldviews and understandings of violence and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. I argue that this failure of some elite East Timorese leaders and international practitioners to respect, acknowledge or use Indigenous knowledge prevent the targeting and transformation of root causes of violence. In Timor-Leste, this failure to prioritise Indigenous knowledge systems has resulted in great levels of structural violence.
A key conclusion from this complex systems approach is that Indigenous peoples are seeking a different type of development. I have termed this new approach ‘Indigenous self-determined development’ which draws on elements of ukun rasik a’an and Indigenous East-Timorese knowledge systems. I argue that the empowerment of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems will contribute to self-determined development in Timor-Leste.

9.3.3 A critique of liberal peacebuilding and prioritisation of Indigenous peacebuilding practice

My research contributes to the efforts to critique the liberal peacebuilding model still espoused and practiced by the majority of international development and peacebuilding actors in Timor-Leste. The liberal peacebuilding effort in Timor-Leste is actively focused on working within state systems, prioritising Western knowledge systems to deliver peace.

My research found that these efforts to target and transform the root causes of violence by the UN, then the Government of Timor-Leste after 2002, have been disappointing. Statistics show that there have been measurable improvements in health, education and infrastructure. The continuing high poverty measures and the ongoing community-level violence nevertheless affirm that peace remains elusive. Some East Timorese leaders and international practitioners have embraced a sanitised version of the Indigenous methods of peacebuilding, particularly with tarabandu and nahe biti. My evidence indicates that this remains superficial and does not demonstrate respect for Indigenous peacebuilding practices or Indigenous knowledge systems more broadly. I contend that the majority of international institutions and the Government, rather than transforming the root causes of violence, are instead creating further structural and cultural violence because they overlook or do not value or empower Indigenous knowledge systems or Indigenous peacebuilding practices. To achieve self-determined development, international practitioners must holistically engage with Indigenous peacebuilding practices.

Nevertheless, given the deep changes to Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems resulting from 500 years of colonialism and violent occupation, these Indigenous systems alone may not have the capacity to resolve the complex challenges Timor-Leste faces. The solution may require a mix of Indigenous knowledge and modern systems. This is a pragmatic conclusion, however I do not want to detract from my main argument: Indigenous knowledge systems must be acknowledged, legitimated, revived, taught and shared to achieve Indigenous self-determined development or ukun rasik a’an.
To achieve peaceful systems change it is important to consider broadly all available actors as potential peacebuilders. Actors that might be considered ‘spoilers’ are also potential peacebuilders and should always be given space to evolve. Actors must work to their comparative advantages: for example, churches, CSOs and NGOs are well placed to lead on community-level violence transformation, and related public information campaigns.

9.3.4 Indigenous self-determined development is grounded in free, prior and informed consent

My fieldwork in Timor-Leste reveals the fundamental importance of prioritising and empowering Indigenous knowledge systems to achieve Indigenous self-determination. Unless Indigenous knowledge systems are respected and integrated into all aspects of decision-making through FPIC processes then Indigenous self-determined development will not occur.

My case study on Timor-Leste demonstrates that limited forms of consultation or ‘socialisation’, as practiced by the Government and many international practitioners, are not akin to participation. Socialisation is a tool that affords communities minimal opportunities to influence decisions. I have provided examples demonstrating that socialisation practices in Timor-Leste, do not have the capacity to enable the levels of empowered community participation in decision-making that is fundamental to FPIC as envisioned in the Declaration.

Choice and empowered decision-making are essential to FPIC. My findings demonstrate a number of minimum conditions needed to create FPIC. In Timor-Leste the process of FPIC can be enabled by inclusive access to education that builds capacities. These processes must be supported by language policies that maximise community engagement and understanding of the process, and respect Indigenous knowledge systems. Participants also underscored the importance of timing that suited communities and the need for accessible and neutral locations for discussions to take place. These processes might require separate discussions to seek the consent of different genders and age groups. Supporting these processes could empower all East Timorese to actively participate in FPIC.

9.4 Concluding remarks

By prioritising Indigenous voices and Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems I have provided guiding principles for East Timorese and international practitioners to reassert and rebuild radical Indigenous alternatives to the current development system in Timor-Leste. These guiding principles from my research contribute to the practical implementation of ukun rasik
a’an or Indigenous self-determined development and positive peace. My case study on Timor-Leste provides a detailed example of how to apply this process to one location, but I believe that the methodologies I have used are highly applicable to other Indigenous and peacebuilding contexts.
Appendix

Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet
Researcher:
This research is being independently undertaken by Sophia Close towards her Doctorate (PhD) degree at the National Centre for Indigenous Studies (NCIS), Australian National University (ANU). She is a citizen of Australia and Britain (UK). This research is supported by a travel grant from the Australian National University.

Project Title: Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Development and Peacebuilding – a case study in Timor-Leste.

General Outline of the Project:
Description and Methodology: The purpose of this research is to gain a better understanding of what “development” and “peacebuilding” means for local people and other stakeholders in Timor-Leste. I will examine views on the concept of Indigeneity and how this identity relates to experiences of, and ideas about, development-related conflict. I will discuss with participants their views on how development can assist them to meet their goals, including self-determination.

Participants: The data will be collected during approximately 90 interviews with participants.

Use of Data and Feedback: The data will be used to complete my PhD thesis, publications and conference presentations and possible future research. Written and audio recordings will be made available on request to participants, a summary of the research will be provided to all participants in English and Tetum, and copies of the final thesis will be made available through the Peace and Conflict Studies Centre at the National University of Timor-Leste.

Project Funding: This research is entirely self-funded except for travel grants received from the Australian National University.

Participant Involvement:
This study involves interviewing people in Timor-Leste and other selected locations between 2009 and 2015. Potential participants are selected because you work or live in Timor-Leste or are experienced international development or peacebuilding practitioners.

Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal:
Participation in the project is voluntary and you may choose to stop participating in the research at any time without penalty. If you decide to stop participating in the research I will not use any of the information you have provided. Before we begin the interview there is another piece of paper called a ‘Consent Form’ that I will ask you to sign if you are happy to be interviewed. If you do not want to, you do not have to sign the form.

What does participation in the research request of you?: If you participate in this research project, I will ask you to attend an interview that will last up to one hour, held at a time and place most convenient to you. This will involve signing a consent form and answering questions about your work and your experience of development-related conflict. If you agree, I will record the interview and transcribe it for analysis. I will be the only person who has access to the audio recordings and transcripts.

Incentives: Your participation will not give you material benefits such as payment or development resources.

Risks: I do not intend to seek any information in interviews that is particularly sensitive or confidential. Accordingly, it is important that you do not tell me information which is of confidential status, or which is sensitive or defamatory. Declining participation in this research will not have adverse personal or professional effects.
Confidentiality:

Confidentiality: Only the primary researcher will have access to the material provided by the participants. During the collection phase and publication of results, anonymity of the participants will be preserved as no one except the primary researcher will have access to the coding key that provides details about the participants. Confidentiality will be protected as far as the law allows. In publications, participant information will be attributed using a coded pseudonym.

The information you provide is anonymous and your name will not be publically used unless your permission is expressly given. When you have talked to me, if you decide there are things that should not be written in my PhD, you can tell me and I will remove it. If you decide you want me to get rid of the whole recording you can tell me and I will do that. You can do this any time until I finish the PhD in 2015.

Data Storage:

Where: The sound recordings and transcripts and personal information from the interviews will be maintained during collection, analysis and preparation of results.

How long: This information will be securely stored by the researcher for a period of at least five years from publication. At the end of the storage period the data will be archived and/or used for future research projects and publications to be accessed only by the researcher.

Queries and Concerns:

For further requests for information or queries regarding the study participants should be directed to the Primary Researcher Ms Close or her PhD Supervisor.

Sophia Close: National Centre for Indigenous Studies, Australian National University A.C.T. 0200, Australia; Tel: +61 (0)411 361 076, E-mail: Sophia.Close@anu.edu.au

ANU PhD Supervisor: Dr Janet Hunt, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, A.C.T. 0200, Australia, Tel: +61(2) 6125-8209; E-mail: janet.hunt@anu.edu.au

Overseas Contacts: Mr Antero Benedito Da Silva, Peace and Conflict Studies Centre, National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL), E-mail: anterobi@gmail.com

Ethics Committee Clearance:

The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been conducted, please contact:

Ethics Manager
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee
The Australian National University
Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427
Email: Human.Ethics.Offer@anu.edu.au
Appendix B: Information Sheet (Tetum) (translated by David da Silva)

PAJINA INFORMASAUN
Indigenous Knowledge System, Development and Conflict –
Estudo ida iha Timor Leste

Periodu Peskiza: Janeru 2008 – Dezembru 2013

Detalhu kona-ba Peskizadora: peskiza ida ne’e dadaun hala’o ho independentemente husi sr. Sophia Close ba ninia nivel doktoradu (PhD) iha National Center for Indigenous Studies, Australian National University. Nia nuudar sidadaun Australiana no Britaniku (UK) ida. Peskiza ida ne’e hetan apoiu fundu husi Australian National University.

Objetivu husi Projetu:
Objetivu husi projetu ida ne’e maka atu hetan kumpriendesaun diak liu husi ema nia ideia no esperiensia sira kona-ba dezemvolvimento-relasaun konfliyu. Hau sei ezamina opiniaun sira husi konsetu original nia no oinsa identidade ne’e relata ho esperiensia no ideia husi ema nia esperiensia kona-ba dezemvolvimento-relasaun konfliyu. Hau sei diskute ho partisipante atu fô sira nia opiniaun kona-ba oinsa atu dezemvolvimento ne’e bele ajuda sira ho diak hodi hetan sira nia objetivu, inklui ukun rasik án.

Peskiza terenu ida ne’e nia intensaun atu:
- Bele hetan kumpriendesaun diak liu kona-ba signifika saída dezemvolvimento-relasaun konfliyu ba ema local no stakeholder sira iha Timor Leste.
- Kompriende diak liu oinsa dezemvolvimento bele kontribui ba jestaun no transformasaun konfliyu.
- Halo mapa ba Timor-oan sira nia objetivu dezemvolvimento, no refleta Timor-oan sira nia hanoi kon kona-ba sistema dezemvolvimento foun no prosesu sira ne’ebe diak liu hodi atinji objetivu sira ne’e; no
- Konstrui framework ida ba dezemvolvimento politika no programasaun ne’ebé bazea ba sistema matenek original (hanesan Timor-oan sira nia matenek) framework ida ne’e nia intensaun maka atu bele sai nuudar sasan pratika nia hodi minimiza dezemvolvimento-relasaun konfliyu no kria rezultadu dezemvolvimenetu ida ne’ebé sustentavel liu no kulturamente apropriadu iha komunidade.

Peskiza ne’e involve saída deit?
Estudu ida ne’e sei hilo intervista ba ema iha Timor Leste ba fulan 3–4 iha 2010 no 2011. Hau hili ona ita-bo’ot nuudar partisipante ida potensial tanba ita-bo’ot ema Timor-oan no ita-bo’ot servisu no hela iha area afetadu ka nuudar ema ne’ebe iha atensaun ba problema dezemvolvimento-relasaun konfliyu. Partisipasaun ida ne’e ho voluntariu no ita-bo’ot bele hili para hodi partisipa iha peskiza ida ne’e iha tempu ne’ebe deit laiha penalidade. Se ita-bo’ot diside hapara hodi partisipa iha peskiza ne’e hau sei la uza kualker informasaun ne’ebé ita-bo’ot fornese. Ita-b’ot nia partisipasaun sei la fô ba ita-bo’ot benefisiu material ruma hanesan pagamentu ka fontes dezemvolvimento ruma.

Se ita-bo’ot partisipa iha projetu peskiza ida ne’e hau sei husu ita-bo’ot atende intervista ida ne’ebe sei ramata iha oras ida nia laran. Ida ne’e sei inklui mos asina formatu akordu ida no hatan ba perguntas kona-ba ita-bo’ot nia servisu no esperiensia iha dezemvolvimento-relasaun konfliyu. Intervista ne’eu hau bele hala’o iha tempu ne’ebe deit no fatin ne’ebe diak ba ita-bo’ot. Se ita-bo’ot asetita, hau mos bele grava intervista ida ne’e iha audio tape.

Iha risku ruma se karik hau partisipa?
Hau laîha intensaun hodi buka informasaun ne’ebe partikularmente sensitivu ka segredu iha intervista ne’e. Nune’e, importante duni katak ita-bo’ot lalika tatoli ba hau informasaun ne’ebé nia estatu segredu, sensitivu ka hafo’er naran.
Ita-bo’ot nia diretu hodi dada-hikas material informasaun
Ita-bo’ot nia partisipasaun iha peskiza ne’e no informasaun ne’ebé ita-bo’ot fornese ne’e ba hau-nia teze PhD no bele mos publika iha jomal akademiku no livru. Informasaun ne’ebé ita-bo’ot hato’o ne’e segredu no ita-bo’ot nia naran publikamente sei la uzo so iha lisensa ruma husi ita-bo’ot karik husu ka fô duni.

Wainhira ita-bo’ot ko’alia tiha ho hau, se ita-bo’ot diside katak iha buat ruma maka la presiza hatama iha gravasaun ka hakerek iha hau-nia PhD, ita-bo’ot bele hato’o ba hau no hau bele hasai tiha. Se ita-bo’ot diside atu hau soe hotu gravasaun ne’e bele mos hato’o ba hau no hau sei halo tuir. Ita-bo’ot halo ida ne’e iha tempu ne’ebé deit to’o ramata hau nia PhD iha 2013.

Eskrita, audio no gravasaun visual bele iha nafatin kuandu husu. Hau sei fornese ba ita-bo’ot rezultatu husu peskiza wainhira publika ona.

Prosesu Rai Material
Gravasuan lian no eskrita sira husi itervista sei rai iha sentral arkivu ida seguru iha Canberra iha Australian National University.

Formatu Akordu
Sei iha akordu seluk mak hanaran ‘Formatu Akordu’ ne’ebe hau sei husu ita-bo’ot atu asina se ita-bo’ot kontente duni atu servisu iha projetu ida ne’e.

Iha tan buat balun ne’ebe inklui iha ne’e maka hau sei halo tuir hamutuk ho ita-bo’ot molok ne’e sei esplika detalhu oituan. Se ita-bo’ot kontente halo servisu ne’e ho hau, tuir mai hau sei presiza ita-bo’ot asina molok hau servisu. Se ita-bo’ot lakohi hala’o ne’e, ita-bo’ot la presiza tan atu asina.

Kontaktu Naran no Numeru Teleponika.
Se-karik ita-bo’ot iha perguntas ka interesante kona-ba estudu ida ne’e ho livrementa kontaktu ba:

- **Sophia Close**: National Center for Indigenous Studies, Australian National University A.C.T. 0200 Australia; Tel: + 61 (0) 411 361 076, E-mail: Sophia.Close@gmail.com
- **ANU PhD Supervisor**: Associate Professor Peter Veth, National Center for Indigenous Studies, Australian National University A.C.T. 0200 Australia, Tel: + 61 (2) 6125-9321; E-mail: VethP@law.anu.edu.au
- **National University of Timor Leste**: Sr. Antero Bendito da Silva, Peace and Conflict Studies Center, National University of Timor Leste (UNTL), E-mail: anterob@gmail.com
- **Timor Leste Ministry of Education**: Ms Cecilia Assis, National Director of Culture, Ministry of Education, República Democrática de Timor Leste, Villa-Verde, Dili, Tel: + 670 333 9647, E-mail: ceciliam.assis@gmail.com

Se-karik ita-bo’ot interesante relasaun ho meius peskiza ne’ebé hala’o bele mos kontaktu:

- **ANU Human Research Ethics Committee**, Human Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Australian National University. Tel: +61 (2) 6125 7945. E-mail: human.ethics.officer@anu.edu.au
Appendix C: Informed Consent Form

CONSENT FORM

Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Development and Conflict – A Case Study in Timor-Leste

This statement will be administered in English or Tetum or given orally rather than in written form as appropriate. If required, the consent process can be conducted orally and taped.

**Name of Participant:** [insert as appropriate]
**Name of Researcher:** Sophia Close, National Centre for Indigenous Studies, Australian National University

1. I ……………………………………… (please print) agree to participate in this project. I have read, or Ms Close has explained to me about this research project on Indigenous peoples, development and conflict. My consent is freely given.

2. I understand that if I agree to participate in the research project I will be asked to attend an interview. This will take up to one hour. I agree that it is alright for Ms. Close to ask me questions or record me telling stories, and for this material to be recorded and put in a safe keeping-place. I know that I can tell her to take out anything if I decide it should not be kept forever, or if there are things I don’t want people from other places to know about or hear.

3. Ms. Close has explained the following things to me, and I understand them:

   a) I understand that my personal information such as my name and contact details will be kept confidential so far as the law allows. The information discussed will be treated as ‘culturally sensitive information’ and will be subject to privilege from discovery (unless under an Australian Federal Court subpoena). This form and any other identifying materials will be stored separately in a locked office at the Australian National University. Data entered onto a computer will be kept in a computer accessible only by the researcher.

   b) I understand that I can pull out of this research project at any time, without providing any reason and that this will not have any negative consequences for me. If I withdraw, the information I provide will not be used by the researcher.

   c) I understand Ms Close is conducting research on the relationships between development, conflict and Indigenous peoples. This research aims to gain a better understanding of what “development” and “conflict” means for local people and other stakeholders in Timor-Leste, so that researchers like Ms. Close and other people interested can know more about how aid and development work to minimise conflict and create more effective development outcomes within communities.

   d) Ms. Close has told me that while information gained during the research project may be published in academic journals or books, my name and position title will not be used in relation to any of the information I have provided, unless I indicate that I am willing to be identified when quoted.

   e) She has told me that what we talk about will be taped, videotaped, written down and translated, and that I can check this to make sure that it is written down properly.
I have read this Consent Form and I agree with it. I consent to have my interview audio taped by the interviewer. I understand that the tapes will be stored securely at the Australian National University and will be erased at the conclusion of the research study.

Signature ________________________________ Date ________________
Research Participant/Witness

OR

I read this Informed Consent Form aloud to [name of research participant] and I believe that s/he understood and agreed to it:

Signature ________________________________ Date ________________
Research Participant/Witness

Signature ________________________________ Date ________________
Researcher – Sophia Close (Signed by or on behalf of the researcher)
Appendix D: Research Summary (English)


The Research Problem:
Worldwide, it is estimated that there are approximately 370 million Indigenous peoples. After decades of international activism by Indigenous peoples, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2007. The Declaration affirms the Indigenous right to self-determination as the right for all peoples to determine their own economic, social and cultural development and promotes development as a primary tool to implement this right peacefully and sustainably.


Timor-Leste is a fragile, post-conflict Indigenous society with a long history of colonialism, conflict and violence. Since 1999, when East-Timorese exercised their right to self-determination in a UN-sponsored ballot, the country has been impacted by numerous international development interventions with mixed outcomes. La’o Hamutuk (2010, p.10) estimates that between 1999 and 2009 Timor-Leste received approximately USD 5.2 billion in Overseas Development Assistance, but only one-tenth reached Timor-Leste’s economy. During this period health, education, infrastructure and governance indicators have slowly improved but 38.7 per cent of the population remain in severe poverty (UNDP, 2013). My field research explores the extent to which the current development system in Timor-Leste supports the implementation of the Indigenous right to self-determination.

Methodology:

I used a ‘listening’ methodology to undertake my field research with around 90 East-Timorese and international development practitioners and abductive analysis to analyse the qualitative data and build my theoretical framework. By extensively quoting my research participants I facilitate direct engagement with their stories.

Research Analysis:
Conflict can be positive and constructive, enabling societies and individuals to evolve to achieve necessary change. Using Galtung’s (1969, 1990) work, I differentiate ‘conflict’ from
‘violence’. Galtung explains that direct violence can manifest visibly as physical, psychological and/or verbal behaviour. Structural violence is an indirect process caused by inequality and cultural violence involves aspects of culture used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence. Significant levels of direct, structural and cultural violence exist in Indigenous East-Timorese communities as a result of historical competition for resources and power, and prior and ongoing forms of colonialism. I agree with Alfred (1999) and Turner (2006) that this violence prevents the attainment of Indigenous self-determination and development.

I constructed a comprehensive peace and conflict analysis focusing on the post-1999 period. I found that internal asymmetries of power, nurtured by the earlier Portuguese colonialists and the Indonesian occupation, are at the root of many current conflicts in Timor-Leste. This results in corrosive relationships between elites, their supporters and the broader East-Timorese society. I found that there are ongoing triggers for violence in Timor-Leste today, among them: poverty; security sector challenges; land, property and resource use and ownership; weak, corrupt or inaccessible governance; political differences between communities and elites; continued violations against human rights; food insecurity and food sovereignty; weak justice system and continued impunity for crimes; lack of economic security, high unemployment, reliance on oil and inadequate infrastructure.

My research demonstrates that East-Timorese peoples have strong Indigenous knowledge systems, deeply linked to land and kinship networks and ritual practices. Indigenous knowledge systems were maintained during colonialism and occupation and they incorporated outsider views into their Indigenous cosmological and secular systems. Indigenous systems can co-exist with modern systems but if imbalance occurs, significant violence can result. Indigenous peacebuilding practices of tarabandu, nahe bitti, and juramentu are widely used by communities to transform conflict. These Indigenous peacebuilding practices are usually cheaper, more readily available and more flexible than modern peacebuilding practices, but require elite support, resourcing and appropriate legislation, regulation and education.

Research Findings:
Drawing on experiences of East-Timorese peoples I argue that the current development system, rather than building peace, creates further structural violence in Indigenous communities because it does not value or empower Indigenous knowledge systems or peacebuilding practice. I suggest how international development practitioners can transform their practice to facilitate Indigenous self-determination in Timor-Leste. This analysis highlights the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste within a framework of culture, power and relationships.

Perspectives of East-Timorese development practitioners:
Culture: Many East-Timorese participants explained the widespread use of Indigenous knowledge and culture. They hold plural identities and highlighted that until a shared national identity is collectively negotiated, communities will be divided. Most participants emphasised the sacred nature of land and described how land is crucial in forming relationships, identity and belonging between and within communities. They cited lack of access to and ownership of customary land as triggers for violence across communities and as one of the greatest barriers to achieving self-determined development and food sovereignty.

Complex language policy is seen to be highly politicised and discriminatory toward poor and un-educated East-Timorese, exacerbating inequalities and empowering some groups over others. Without a shared language, both elites and international development practitioners will continue to make decisions without the active participation or free, prior and informed consent of East-Timorese.

Power: At the heart of East-Timorese Indigenous knowledge is an ongoing balancing of power. Many participants cited power imbalances and unresolved conflict as the key drivers for the 2006 - 2008 violence and saw removing inequality as central to transforming the root causes of violence. Much of the power and decision-making during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation was held by outsiders or elites, many of whom were co-opted into the
colonial system, and supported the domination of modern knowledge systems. Decision-making today continues to be top-down, patriarchal and Dili-centric creating a divide between citizens and elites. This dependence has positioned East-Timorese knowledge, skills and capacities as less worthy and resulted in the further exclusion of community-level voices exacerbating structural violence.

Inequality in relationships between women and men causes structural and direct violence. It involves a complex cultural clash between Indigenous and modern systems. Until East-Timorese Indigenous knowledge and gender equality is valued and respected, active and equal participation in decision-making by women and men will not occur. Participants also saw moral and economic corruption as being a widespread cause of inequality. Inclusive education was linked to shared language policies, sustainable capacity building and ownership over development. They explained that the current education system compounds structural violence, disproportionately marginalising rural women and the poor.

**Relationships:** Centuries of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation has left behind a community characterised by deep societal rifts, trauma and historical distrust. Unresolved conflicts and poor relationships with international practitioners act as triggers for violence and barriers to effective development. Duplication caused by non-cooperation and poor relationships resulted in waste of finite resources and community energy. Participants highlighted the importance of trust, ownership and working together. Cooperative relationship building has deep cultural roots that lead to reciprocal exchanges across generations.

Capacity was the issue that clearly distinguished the views of East-Timorese and international practitioners. East-Timorese believed that they possessed a strong capacity for change and this differed from the negative views of the majority of international practitioners. One East-Timorese practitioner explained: “They [international practitioners] undermined our local capacities, our local knowledge, local experience. Humiliating people, their culture and identity.”

Consultation and planning without any visible development outcomes creates unmet expectations that can lead to frustrations. Participants stated that development in Timor-Leste was less productive because the models used did not fit the local context and promoted unrealistic timeframes. Participants saw this as a systemic issue and suggested increased flexibility and longer timeframes. It was suggested that East-Timorese use customary practices that connect insiders (East-Timorese) with outsiders (international practitioners) to build stronger relationships and manage change and conflict between different knowledge systems and cultural practices.

**Perspectives of international development practitioners:**

**Culture:** Overall international practitioners raised the same issues as East-Timorese, but often with very different perspectives. International practitioners admitted they did not often recognise and engage with the complex knowledge systems, cultures and plural identities of East-Timorese. Many participants described their frustration with the multiple layers of society and identity, noting that culture was not always visible. It was recognised that repressing or distorting culture can lead to violence and there was a need for flexibility and time to build understanding.

**Power:** While most international practitioners viewed East-Timorese capacity as very low or ‘zero’ they emphasised that short-term interventions would not strengthen capacities and that active participation from communities and long timeframes are critical to achieving sustainable change. They acknowledged that the complex and rigid systems and processes to implement development can systematically exclude communities from ownership of development processes. Practitioners also said that gender inequality, corruption and centralised decision-making and service delivery exacerbated structural violence and limited development outcomes.
Many believed that the disproportionate power of international decision-makers and elites has increased inequality and fuelled structural violence. An international development practitioner explained: “To me, the relationship is paramount. The main point of the relationship is to recalibrate this huge asymmetry of power”. Free, prior and informed consent is a tool to balance power relationships but international practitioners identified systemic barriers to implementation. International practitioners tended to work with elites whom they can communicate with easily, and make decisions, because communities were difficult to reach and had limited capacities.

**Relationships:** Relationships are often seen as combative and many workplaces were viewed as highly competitive, preventing co-operation and achievement of shared, sustainable development goals. Many international practitioners highlighted the need to restore their own individual wellbeing prior to working in complex, post-conflict environments. They acknowledged a need to support safe, inclusive spaces for active participation, shared dialogue and conflict transformation for communities.

This table summarises what East-Timorese and international development practitioners say needs to change to transform the current development system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>East-Timorese Development Practitioners</th>
<th>International Development Practitioners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognise and value complex Indigenous knowledge systems</td>
<td>Understand existing conflict dynamics and use Indigenous peacebuilding processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity is plural and localised</td>
<td>Celebrate and engage with plural identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use and share local languages</td>
<td>Remove rigid systems and processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritise customary links to land and place</td>
<td>Learn languages and prioritise inclusive education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbalance in Indigenous and modern governance systems causes violence</td>
<td>Institutional capacity building has exacerbated structural violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency is a form of structural violence</td>
<td>Rebalance the disequilibrium of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality is fundamental to inclusive development</td>
<td>Free, prior and informed consent must be mandated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption can be moral and economic</td>
<td>Decentralise power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education supports inclusive decision-making</td>
<td>Gender inequality is exacerbated by inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationships</strong></td>
<td><strong>Relationships</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable capacity strengthening</td>
<td>Recognise and work with local capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritise personal healing from trauma</td>
<td>Build non-competitive workplaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active consultation and participation for all</td>
<td>The importance of healthy individual relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeframes must suit communities</td>
<td>Active participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revive insider / outsider practices to build and sustain relationships</td>
<td>Commit for the long term to enable sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target and work with context</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conclusion and Implications of Research:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not all conflict or violence that exists in Indigenous East-Timorese communities is caused by development interventions. However, evidence from my research indicates that there are two major systemic faults within current development practice in Timor-Leste: it does not value or empower Indigenous knowledge systems; and it exacerbates structural violence. Indigenous peacebuilding systems are often not supported to transform this violence, and ongoing triggers to root causes of conflict prevent communities from achieving their right to Indigenous self-determination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I draw on Meadows (2008), Rihani (2002) and Ramalingam (2013) to argue that the current development system fails because it tries to apply linear, mechanistic models to a complex, non-linear world. I argue for a paradigmatic shift in current development theory and practice that engages with Indigenous knowledge systems to find non-linear and holistic solutions for each context, drawing on culture, power and relationships. This practice of ‘Indigenous self-determined development’ should be grounded in free prior and informed consent and owned and enacted by empowered Indigenous peoples who use Indigenous peacebuilding systems to transform violence.

References:
• Richmond, O. P. 2015. The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive? Cooperation and Conflict, 50, 1, 50-68.


- Turner, D. 2006. This is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.


Ukun rasik an, Dezenolvimentu no Prosesu Harii Paz Indijena iha Timor-Leste

Peskiza nia objetivu:


Metodoloxia:
Hodi hala’o peskiza ida ne’e hau rona istoria husi partisipante hamutuk 90. Partisipante kompostu husi ema Timoroan no mós ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu nian iha Timor-Leste. Hau uza prosasu análize ‘abductive’ hodi análize dadus kualitativa no hodi harii hau nia teoria, signifika katak hau nia teoria bazeia ba observa kedas kontextu Timor no liiau hau ne’ebé partisipante sira fò mai hau. Iha prosasu hakerek hau uza liiau hau fó citacao hau partisipante sira hodi lee nain sira bele liga diretamente ho istoría partisipante sira.

**Anayza:**


Hau hala’o análize konflitu no paz ida ne’e’ebé kle’an no fokus ba periodu 1999 to’o agora. Liu husi análize ida ne’e hau haree katak inequalidade podér ne’ebé eziste nanis ona no haburas tan husi kolonialist Portugalês no okupasaun Indonesia sai nu’udar abut ba konflitu barcode ne’ebé agora eziste hela iha Timor-Leste. Ida ne’e hamosu relasaun moruk liu entre ema élite sira, sira nia apoiante no grupu, no mos povu Timor-Leste; Hau nia peskiza hatudu katak eziste hela problema barcode ne’e’ebé bele hamosu violénsia inklui mos: pobreza; problema setór seguransa; problema rái, propriéde no nain ba rekursus; governasaun ne’ebé fraku no susar ba povu atu asesu; korrupsaun; diferensia politiku entre élite no povu ki’ik sira; violasaun direitus umanus ne’ebé kontinua hela; menus seguransa ai-han no soberania ai-han; sistema justisa ne’ebé fraku; impunidade ba krime pasadu nian; menus seguransa ekonomia, dezempregadu barcode; dependénsia maka‘as ba setór petróleu no infrastrutura ne’ebé la to’o.

Hau nia peskiza hatudu katak povu Timor-Leste iha sistema matenek Indijena ne’ebé forte tebe-tebes no katak sistima hirak ne’e liga ba rai, familia no ritual lisan ne’ebé halo hela. Sistema matenek indijena eziste nafatín durante tempu kolonializmu no okupasaun. Dala barcode sistema matenek indijena foti no inklui konseitu balu husi ema li’ur no adapta konseitu foun ne’e tuir sira nia lisan rasik. Sistema Indijena sira bele eziste hamutuk ho sistema modernu maihê kuandu laiha balansu entaun bele mosu violénsia. Práftika harii pas indijena hanesan tara bandu, nahe biti no juramentu uza iha komunidade barcode hodi muda konflitu. Práftika hirak ne’e hanesan práftika ne’e baratu, fásil atu asesu no fleksivel liu duke sistema modernu sira. Maihe iha parte seluk práftika indijena sira presiza mos suporta hau grupu élite sira, rekursus, regulasaun apropiadu no edukasaun hodi nune’e bele la’o ho diak.

**Rezultadu Peskiza:**

Bazeia ba esperiénsia ema Timor-Leste hau nia peskiza hatudu katak sistema dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé ita uza hela hamosu violénsia structural iha komunidade Indijena nia let tanba la fô valór no la habbiit sistema matenek Indijena ka práftika harii paz pokal. Hau nia peskiza fô dalan oinsa dezenvolvimentu internasionál bele muda ninia hahalok hodi fasilita ukun rasik an indijena iha Timor-Leste. Análize ida nee fokus ba kauza abut violénsia iha Timor-Leste liu husi haree kle’an kultura, podér no relasaun ema nian.

**Perspetiva Timoroan ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu:**

**Kultura:** Partisipante Timoroan barcode esplika katak matenek no kultura Indijena agora uza hela iha Timor-Leste. Ema Timor hau nia identidade oin-oin. Partisipante sira hateten katak iha sentimentu fahe malu entre komunidade no katak ida ne’e so bele hadi’a liu husi prosedu barri identidade nasionál liu husi diskusaun koletivu. Maioria partisipante fô valór boot ba rai nu’udar
buat ida ne’ebé sagradu no hateten katak rai importante tebes ba identidade, kria relasaun ba malu no sentimento ‘nain’. Sira hatesen katak menus asesu ba rai kulturál nu’udar buat ida ne’ebé bele lasmosu violénsia iha comunità tebes no hanesan mós problema ida ne’ebé bele impaktu negativu tebes ba dezenvolvimentu bazeia ba ukun rasik an no soberania ai-han.

Partisipante tebes haton katak politika linguajen nasionál ne’ebé komplikadu, no politiku tebes halo diskriminalausaun ida ba Timoroan kiak ne’ebé laiha educasaua. Wainhira fa’alua no haburas tan lingua Indíjena bele hakle’an tan inegualdaide iha rai ralar no bele hakkiit grupu balu liu fali grupu seluk. Tanba laiha linguajen ne’ebé hanesan entre sira, grupu élite sira no ema internasional ne’ebé ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu sei kontinua hodi foti desizadau ne’ebé la partisipativa no desizadau ne’ebé la livre no la bazeia ba informasaun dahuluk (free, prior and informed consent).


Inegualdaide relasaun entre mane no feto mós lasmoso tan violénsia estrutural no violénsia direta iha Timor-Leste. Inegualdaide entre mane no feto kompleksu tanba sistema indíjena no sistema modernu hasoru malu. Foin mak ita respeitu matenek Indíjena Timor-Leste no mós respeitu igualdaide jéneru mak mane no feto bele partisipa ativu iha prosesu foti desizadau. Husi partisipante sira mós identifika katak la’os deit korrupsaun ekonomiku ne’ebé sai hanesan abut ida ba inegualdaide maibe korrupsaun moral mós nu’udar problema bo’ot ida. Partisipante hatutan katak educasaua ne’ebé inklusivu iha ligasaua ba politika linguajen nasionál, prosesu hakkiit kapasidade ne’ebé sustentável no ba prosesu Timoroan sai nain ba dezenvolvimentu. Sira esplika katak agora adaun sistema educasaua hatutan tan violénsia estrutural no halo marjinalizauna ba feto rural no ema kiak.

Relasaun: Kolonialismu Portugús no okupasaun Indonesia ne’ebé akontese tinan naruk hushik hela problema sosial ne’ebé kle’an, comunità ne’ebé trauma no menus fiar malu. Konflitu ne’ebé la resolve, no prosesu fakru ho ema internasional ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu nian sai hanesan kauza ida ba violénsia no mós bareira ida ba dezenvolvimentu efetivu. Duplikasaun servisu tanba laiha kooperasaun di’ak no relasaun ne’ebé fakru halakon rekursus no kometimentu comunidad dezenvolvimentu nian. Partisipante sira hateten katak fioar malu, sai nain no servisu hamutuk mak prinsipiu hirak ne’ebé importante tebes. Prosesu harii relasaun no kooperasaun di’ak iha abut kulturál ne’ebé naruk no bele mos fô beneficiu no kria ligasaua di’ak ba jerasaua futuru.

Kuandu ko’alia ona kona-ba asuntu kapasidade iha diferensa bo’ot entre perspetiva partisipante Timoroan no perspetiva partisipante internasional sira. Partisipante Timoroan hateten katak sira iha rasik kapasidade bo’ot hodi halo mudansa. Ida ne’e diferente tebes hush perspetiva ema internasional sira ne’ebé barak liu negativu no haree katak kapasidade la dun barak. Ema Timoroan ida ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu hateten “sira hatun ami nia kapasidade lokál, ami nia matenek lokál no ami nia esperênsia lokál. Sira hamoe ita povu Timor, ita nia kultur no ita nia identidade.”

Konsultasaun no planeamentu ne’ebé ikus liu la rezulta iha dezenvolvimentu ruma bele hasai comunidad tebesa nia expetativa no bele halo comunidad tebesa frustradu. Partisipante sira hateten katak dezenvolvimentu iha Timor-Leste la produtivu tanba prosesu la apâr ho kontextu Timor
no la bazeia ba prosesu no oráriu ne’ebé realístiku. Partisipante sira haree katala ida ne’e sai hanesan asuntu sistemátiçu no katala dezenvolvimentu efetivu tenke bazeia ba fleksibilidade no tempu naruk. Partisipante fo sujestaun katala di’ak liu uza pratika lisan ne’ebé bele liga ema laran (Timoroan) ba ema li’ur (ema internasionál sira) hodi bele harri relasaun forte, jere mudansa no hamenus konflitu entre sistema matenek diferente no pratika kulturál ne’ebé la hanesan.

Perspetiva ema internasionál servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu:

Kultura: Iha jerál partisipante internasionál sira foti asuntu hanesan mos partisipante Timoroan sira so sira nia perspetiva mak diferente tebes. Ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu hateten katala sira dala-barak la liga ho sistema matenek, kultura no identidade Timoroan nian. Partisipante balu hatudu sira nia frustrasaun tamba iha nivel sosiedade no identidade oin-oin ne’ebé kompleksu no hateten katala todan ba sira hodi haree no komprende didiak kultura Timor nian. Sira rekoñese katala atividade ka programa ne’ebé hatún ka representa bosok kultura sai hanesan risku no bele hamousu tan violénsia no katal presiza fleksibilidade no tempu naruk hodi bele komprende malu.

Kbiit no Podér: Maske ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu haree Timoroan nia kapasidade hanesan menus liu sira hateten katala intervensaun ka programa ne’ebé hala’o durante tempu badak la bele hafórsa kapasidade no katal partisipasaun ativu husi komunidade no tempu naruk mak fundamental ba mudansa sustentável. Sira rekoñese katala sistema dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé kompleksu no prosesu ne’ebé la fleksivel hatún komunidade ninia kapasidade atu involve-an iha prosesu dezenvolvimentu. Ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu nian mós hateten katala inegualdade jéneru, korrupaun no prosesu foti desizaun ne’ebé sentralizadu tebes mós impaktu ba prosesu hatutan servicios ba povu, haburas violénsia estrutural no limite rezultado dezenvolvimentu.

Partisipante internasionál barak hateten katala tanba kbiit boot hodi foti desizaun rai iha ema élite sira no ema internasionál sira nia liman mak bele haburas liu tan inegualdade no violénsia estrutural. Ema internasionál ida ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu esplika tuirmai: “Mai hau, relasaun entre ema mak importante liu. Relasaun nia funsaun mak hodi halo mudansa ba inegualdade podér ne’ebé agora eziste hela”. Konkordánsia ka akordu ne’ebé livre no bazeia ba informasaun sedu (free, prior and informed consent) hanesan dalan ida hodi halo balansu ba podér maih ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu identifika bareira barak ba implementasaun konseitu ida ne’e. Ema internasionál dala barak servisu hamutuk ho ema élite sira tanba fasil atu comunika no foti desizaun no tanba komunidade dook no iha kapasidade ne’ebé la to’o.

Relasaun entre ema: Partisipante internasionál barak hare’e sira nia servisu fatin hanesan fatin ne’ebé kompetitivu tebes no fatin ne’ebé la fasilita kooperasaun di’ak no la fasilita sira atu atinje alvu dezenvolvimentu sustentável conjuntu. Sira senti relasaun ba malu hanesan relasaun kontra malu mak barak. Partisipante internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu barak rekoñese katala presiza hadia sira nia saúde psikólojiku rasik mak foin bele mai hodi servisu iha ambiente kompleksu ne’ebé foin husik konflitu. Sira mos rekoñese katala presiza harri fatin seguru no inklusivu hodí komunidade bele partisipa aktivu iha diálogu konjunktu hodi muda no hamenus konflitu.
Tabelia ida ne’e hanesan sumáriu badak ba rekomensaun sira husi Timoroan no ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu hodi oinsá ita presiza muda sistema dezenvolvimentu agora nian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ema Timoroan ne’ebé servisu iha Setór Dezenvolvimentu</th>
<th>Ema International ne’ebé servisu iha Setór Dezenvolvimentu</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kultura</strong></td>
<td><strong>Kultura</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rekoñese ne’ebé valór ba sistema matenek Indíjena kompleksu</td>
<td>Comprende dinámika konflit no ne’ebé existente agora dadaun no uza prosesu harii paz Indíjena nian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rekonese katak identidade oin-oin existente iha Timor-Leste no katak identidade ne’e liga ho area lokal</td>
<td>Selebra no kria ligasaun ho identidade oin-oin</td>
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<td>Uza no fahe lingua lokal</td>
<td>Hasai sistema to’o no la fleksivel</td>
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<td>Rekoñese no fó prioridade ba ligasaun ba rai no fatin</td>
<td>Aprendre lingua lokal no fó prioridade ba edukasaun inklusivu</td>
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<td><strong>Kbii no Poder</strong></td>
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<td>Rekonese katak wainhira laiha balansu entre sistema governasaun indíjena no sistema governasaun modernu katak iha ne’e hamosu violénsia esturtrurál</td>
<td>Kapasitasaun institusional dala harabu liu tan violénsia esturtrurál</td>
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<td>Dependensia nu ’udar typu violénsia esturtrurál</td>
<td>Tenke halo balansu no muda inegalidade kbiit ne’ebé agora existente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igualdade nu’udar objetivu ida ne’ebé fundamental ba dezenvolvimentu inklusivu</td>
<td>Tenke implementa no legitimisa konkordánsia ne’ebé livre no bazeia ba informasaun sedu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korruksaun bele eziste liga ho ekonomia no mós liga ba moralidade</td>
<td>Tenke desentraliza kbiit no podér</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduksaun bele suporta prosesu foti desizaun inklusivu</td>
<td>Inegalidade jéneru móis haburas tan tanba inegalidade jerál</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Relasaun</strong></td>
<td><strong>Relasaun</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenke iha prosesu hasai kapasidade ne’ebé sustentável</td>
<td>Tenke rekoñese no servisu hamutuk ho kapasidade lokal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tenke harí’ la no kura trauma individual</td>
<td>Tenke harí’ fatin servisu ne’ebé la kompetitivu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tenke iha konsultasaun ativu no partispasaun ba ema hotu</td>
<td>Relasaun di’ak no saudavel individual importante tebes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oráriu no tempu tenke nato’ on ba comunidade</td>
<td>Presiza partispasaun ativu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presiza haburas tan ligasaun entre ema laran no ema liur hodi harí’ no sustenta ligasaun forte</td>
<td>Tenke fó kometimentu ba longu prazu hodi bele promove no asegura sustentabilidadé</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tenke servisu ho kontextu Timor</td>
<td></td>
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**Konkluzaun no Importánsia husi Peskiza ida ne’e:**

Peskiza ida ne’e la hateten katak iha ligasaun entre violénsia hotu-hotu ne’ebé akontese iha komunidade Indíjena Timor-Leste nia laran no intervansaun dezenvolvimentu. Maske nune’e peskiza ida ne’e hatudu katak iha fallansu bo’ot rua iha sistema dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé agora dadaun implementa hela iha Timor-Leste. Fallansu primeiru katak sistema dezenvolvimentu agora la fó valór no la hakbiit sistema matenek Indíjena Timor-Leste nian. Fallansu segundu katak prosesu dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé agora aplika iha Timor-Leste aumenta violénsia esturtrurál iha Timor. Sistema harí’ paz indíjena dala barang la hetan uza hodi muda violénsia ida ne’e no dala barang kauza abut ba konflit no ne’ebé la hetan rezolusaun prevene komunidade hodi atinje ukun rasik an indíjena.
Hanesan mos peskizadór Meadows (2008), Rihani (2002) no Ramalingam (2013) hau nia peskiza mós hatudu katak sistema dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé implementa agora dadaun falha tanba aplika hela modelu mekániku no simples ba mundu ne’ebé kompleksu tebes no la tuir liña ida deit. Tuir hau nia haree katak presiza iha mudansa fundamental ba ita nia teoria no pratika dezenvolvimentu. Prosesu dezenvolvimentu tenke muda an hodi servisu hamutuk ho sistema matenek Indijena sira hodi buka solusaun integradu no kompleksu ne’ebé bazeia ba kontextu ida-idak. Presiza mós katak ita bazeia fali servisu ida ne’e ba kultura, podér no relasaun entre ema. Sistema ukun rasik an Indijena tenki bazeia ba prosesu foti desizaun ne’ebé livre no bazeia ba informasaun dahuluk (free, prior and informed consent). Hodi la’o ba oin ema indijena rasik mak tenki kaer no sai nain ba prosesu dezenvolvimentu hirak ne’e no tenki uza rasik sira nia prosesu harri paz Indijena nian hodi transforma konfliktu.

References:

• Richmond, O. P. 2015. The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive? Cooperation and Conflict, 50, 1, 50-68.
• Turner, D. 2006. *This is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
Appendix F: Text of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(United Nations General Assembly, 2007)


The General Assembly,

Taking note of the recommendation of the Human Rights Council contained in its resolution 1/2 of 29 June 20065 by which the Council adopted the text of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 61/178 of 20 December 2006, by which it decided to defer consideration of and action on the Declaration to allow time for further consultations thereon, and also decided to conclude its consideration before the end of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly,

Adopts the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as contained in the annex to the present resolution.

Annex: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and good faith in the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the Charter,

Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such,

107th plenary meeting 13 September 2007

Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind,

Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust,

Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should be free from discrimination of any kind,

Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests,

Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources,

Recognizing also the urgent need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements with States,

Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing themselves for political, economic, social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring to an end all forms of discrimination and oppression wherever they occur,

Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,

Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment,

Emphasizing the contribution of the demilitarization of the lands and territories of indigenous peoples to peace, economic and social progress and development, understanding and friendly relations among nations and peoples of the world,

Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and communities to retain shared responsibility for the upbringing, training, education and well-being of their children, consistent with the rights of the child,

Considering that the rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements between States and indigenous peoples are, in some situations, matters of international concern, interest, responsibility and character,

Considering also that treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements, and the relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership between indigenous peoples and States,

Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, affirm the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,

Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with international law,

Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good faith,

Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particular those related to human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned,

Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role to play in promoting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples,

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6 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
7 A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III
Believing that this Declaration is a further important step forward for the recognition, promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and in the development of relevant activities of the United Nations system in this field,

Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples,

Recognizing that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region and from country to country and that the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into consideration,

Solemnly proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect:

**Article 1**
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights\(^8\), and international human rights law.

**Article 2**
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity.

**Article 3**
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

**Article 4**
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.

**Article 5**
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.

**Article 6**
Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality.

**Article 7**
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person.
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group.

**Article 8**
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.

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\(^8\) Resolution 217 A (III)
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
   (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
   (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;
   (c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
   (d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
   (e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.

Article 9
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right.

Article 10
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.

Article 11
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature.
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.

Article 12
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human remains.
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 13
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means.

Article 14
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of education of the State without discrimination.
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language.

Article 15
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and public information.
2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and cooperation with the indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all other segments of society.

Article 16
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own languages and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of expression, should encourage privately owned media to adequately reflect indigenous cultural diversity.

Article 17
1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to enjoy fully all rights established under applicable international and domestic labour law.
2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples take specific measures to protect indigenous children from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, taking into account their special vulnerability and the importance of education for their empowerment.
3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected to any discriminatory conditions of labour and, inter alia, employment or salary.

Article 18
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.

Article 19
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.

Article 20
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.

Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.
Article 22
1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities in the implementation of this Declaration.
2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of violence and discrimination.

Article 23
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own institutions.

Article 24
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to maintain their health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals. Indigenous individuals also have the right to access, without any discrimination, to all social and health services.
2. Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. States shall take the necessary steps with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of this right.

Article 25
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard.

Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 27
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.

Article 28
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.
Article 29
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent.
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed and implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented.

Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.

Article 31
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.
2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of these rights.

Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.

Article 33
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.

Article 34
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.
Article 35
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals to their communities.

Article 36
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other peoples across borders.
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right.

Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.

Article 38
States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.

Article 39
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical assistance from States and through international cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights contained in this Declaration.

Article 40
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well as to effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human rights.

Article 41
The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other intergovernmental organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the provisions of this Declaration through the mobilization, inter alia, of financial cooperation and technical assistance. Ways and means of ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on issues affecting them shall be established.

Article 42
The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of this Declaration.

Article 43
The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.

Article 44
All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals.

Article 45
Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future.

Article 46
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.
3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.
Appendix G: List of some of the development and peacebuilding actors working in Timor-Leste.

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<th>Sectoral or Organisational Groupings</th>
<th>Key Actors</th>
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<tr>
<td>East Timorese</td>
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<td>Political leaders</td>
<td>Xanana Gusmão, Marí Alkatiri, José Ramos-Horta, Ana Pessoa, Rui Maria de Araújo, Emilia Pires, Taur Matan Ruak, Rogério Lobato, Manuel Tilman, Âgio Pereira, Ana Isabel Soares, Dionísio da Costa Babo Soares, Isabel Amaral Guterres, Alfredo Pires, António da Conceição, Armindo Maia, Estanislau da Silva, Fernando de Araújo, Alfredo Pires, José Luís Guterres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-sector</td>
<td>PNTL, F-FDTL, Presidential Paramilitary Guard, martial arts groups, ex-combatants, family of ex-combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based Leaders</td>
<td>Senior clerics, local clergy, lay people, local faith-based development actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender or Women’s NGO organisations</td>
<td>REDE Feto (Women’s NGO Network), Organização da Mulheres Timorenses (OMT), <em>Forum Kommunikasi Untuk Perempuan Timor Loro Sae</em> (East Timorese Women’s Communication Forum – FKUPERS), Alola Foundation, GERTAK, Asosiasun Mane Kontra Violensia (Men as partners in promoting gender equality), PRADET, East Timor Women against Violence (ETWAVE) <em>Grupu Feto Foinsa’ e Timor-Lorosa’ e</em> (East Timor Young Women’s Group - GFFTL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based organisations</td>
<td><em>Organisacão da Juventude Catolica de Timor-Leste</em> (OJECTIL - East Timor Catholic Youth Organisation), Catholic Institute for International Relations, Caritas Dili, Naroman Yasona,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications networks including newspapers, radio and internet resources (i.e. blogs)</td>
<td>Newspapers, Radio Timor Kmanek, Vox Populi, Catholic newspapers, Seara,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth organisations</td>
<td><em>Organizacao Popular Juvent (or dos Jovens) Timorense</em> (OPJT - Popular Organisation of Timorese Youth), RENETIL - <em>Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste</em> (National Resistance of Timorese Students), Solidarity Council, Catholic Boy and Girl Scouts (Escuteiros), Intra-School Students Association (Organisasi Siswa Intra-Sekolah, OSOS), Association of Anti-integration Youth and Students (<em>Humpunan Pemuda, Pelaja, dan Mahasiswa Anti-Integrasi</em>, HPPMAI), Organisation of East Timorese Students, <em>Ikatan Mahasiswa Permuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur</em>, IMPETTU, Catholic Youth Organisation (OJECTIL) Secret Commission of the Timorese Students Resistance (<em>Comissao Secrete de Resistencia Nacionaldos Estudantes Timorense</em>, CSRNET), and the Clandestine Front of East Timorese Students (<em>Frente Estudantil Clandestina de Timor-Leste</em>, FECLETIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic or educational institutions</td>
<td>National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL); training institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>East Timorese communities living or studying overseas during Indonesian occupation mostly in Portugal, Guinea-Bissau, Macao, Mozambique, Indonesia and Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Agencies</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Volunteer Program (UNV), International Labor Organisation (ILO), UN DEF (UNDEF), UN Fund for Women (UNIFEM), UNMIT, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNESCO, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Health Organisation (WHO), UNOPS, UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Donors</td>
<td>Australia (AusAID, Australian Federal Police, Australian Electoral Commission, ACAIR), Portugal, China, European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Faith-based NGOs</td>
<td>Caritas, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development Trust, Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Mercy Corps, Church World Service, Christian Children Funds, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Japan, YWCA / YMCA,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Think Tanks / Analyst Groups</td>
<td>International Crisis Group (ICG), The Asia Foundation, Peace Dividend Trust (PDT), Centre for International Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business firms or organisations (micro, small, medium and large) including resource extraction companies engaged in oil and gas, minerals, logging</td>
<td>Conoco-Phillips, ENI, Santos, INPEX, Tokyo Electric and Gas Company, Woodside, Shell, and Osaka Gas, ANZ (Australia), Bank Mandiri (Indonesia), Caixa Geral de Depositos (Portugal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Consulting firms</td>
<td>GRM, IDSS, Cardno Emerging Markets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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