The once novel idea that religious institutions and actors ought to be involved in secular development initiatives appears to have become a new orthodoxy. The turnaround is neatly illustrated by the example of one of the world’s most powerful multilateral development agencies, the World Bank. According to Katherine Marshall, ‘despite the on-the-ground reality of numerous intersections,’ in the first half century of its existence the World Bank ‘rarely engaged with faith institutions’ and many of the bank’s country representatives saw religion as dangerous in terms of exacerbating ethnic or nationalist divisions and retrogressive on issues of gender equity and reproductive health (2008: 1997). Starting in the 1990s, however, the bank actively sought to engage with faith-based organisations, an engagement that Marshall suggests challenged both the bank and the faith-based organisations involved. Religious actors were among those who challenged the World Bank’s neo-liberal economic ideology, pointing out the human cost of the structural adjustment policies implemented in the 1980s and 1990s (Marshall 2011: 198).

The increasing, albeit often sporadic, engagements between religious institutions and multilateral and bilateral aid programs have produced a burgeoning literature on religion and development (recent edited volumes include Clarke 2013; Clarke, Jennings, & Shaw 2007; Haynes 2007; Marshall 2013). Some scholars ask not why the development sector is now engaging with religion but why it did not do so earlier — why were secular agents blind for so long to the development work that has always been done by religious institutions? From such a perspective, the increasing attention to religion within development studies is positive. As M. Clarke writes, ‘as participatory community-focused models of development have become increasingly dominant in recent years, religious organizations have become increasingly “attractive” as agents or key stakeholders in the development process due to their strong links to local communities’ (2013: 5). Others, however, explain this engagement in the context of potentially negative changes in development practice linked to the rise of neo-liberal ideologies. G. Clarke (2006), for example, points out that secular donors began to engage more intensely with faith-based organisations in the wake of Reagan’s mobilisation of the American Christian Right and as donor aid was increasingly linked to policies of market liberalisation. On the one hand, faith-based institutions moved into the gaps opened by retracting state institutions; on the other, donors increasingly sought alternative institutions that were not states but could be used to help administer programs and distribute development aid.

Literature on religion and development within development studies, especially studies that emphasise the positive potential of the religion and development nexus, has tended to focus on those moderate religious organisations with which secular donors are most intensively engaged. Thus, in a book on the theologies of development within world religion, Australian scholar M. Clarke devotes a chapter each to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism, describing their canonical teachings and texts to understand how they ‘understand and conceptualise development and related issues, such as poverty, quality of life and charity’ (2011a: 5). In the chapter on Christianity, Clarke mentions Protestantism in the first paragraph as one of three major branches of Christianity but then focuses entirely on Catholic social teaching, especially the preferential option for the poor.
The focus is not surprising: Catholic liberation theology seems to have much more to contribute to secular efforts at poverty reduction than, for example, neo-Pentecostal prosperity gospel. Some scholars have begun to explore the community development work of Pentecostal organisations (e.g. Ware et al. 2013), but the unabashedly spiritual orientation of many of the fastest growing forms of global religion has yet to receive sustained focus within studies of development and religion.

This paper focuses on the nexus of overseas Christian missions and secular development agendas in Solomon Islands during the era of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) — an Australian-led intervention that began in 2003 following a five-year period of civil conflict. RAMSI quickly restored law and order and, for a decade, undertook an ambitious program of state-building with a particular focus on increasing the capacity of policing, law and justice, and prison sectors of the Solomon Islands government (Braithwaite et al. 2010). In 2013, after 10 years of operation, RAMSI entered a period of ‘transition’ that saw the withdrawal of military personnel and a move to incorporate RAMSI’s assistance into normal bilateral and multilateral aid programs (Coppel 2012; Dinnen 2012).

In contrast to so many other postcolonial conflicts, religious affiliation did not overlay the politicised ethno-nationalist identities at stake in Solomon Islands. Rather than exacerbating hostilities, a shared Christian identity appears to have helped to minimise violence; moreover, Christian actors, including members religious orders and women’s fellowship groups, played critical roles in directly mediating between warring sides (Beu and Nokise 2009; Brown 2004; Carter 2006; Pollard 2000; Weir 2000). In the period leading to and following RAMSI’s intervention, churches were sometimes seen as alternative structures that might be harnessed for purposes of good governance and economic development, though scholars and especially church leaders themselves quickly pointed out that religious institutions may have neither the capacity nor the desire to administer donor-funded programs and projects (see Bird 2007; Douglas 2007; Hegarty et al. 2004; Joseph & Beu 2008; McDougall 2008; White 2007). Attention to churches were part of a broader effort on the part of donors and the Solomon Islands government to describe and bolster the informal, non-state, and highly localised forms of authority that sustained the nation during the period of state collapse (e.g. Allen et al. 2013). RAMSI’s mandate meant it was focused most directly on state institutions, but during the period of RAMSI’s operations (2003–2013), AusAID began to directly fund some church-run initiatives in Solomon Islands and elsewhere in the region.

This paper does not comprehensively review official engagements between religious institutions and RAMSI, AusAID, or other bilateral or multilateral aid programs. Instead, it explores the intersections between secular and religious visions of ‘capacity-building’ — a term that became a buzzword during the RAMSI era. I seek to illustrate that there is no single ‘religious’ perspective on secular capacity-building or on RAMSI more generally. The ethnographic starting point is an encounter with an Australian evangelical pastor in Honiara. This pastor’s overtly spiritual solutions to what he saw as the country’s problems contrasts with many of the established post-mission churches and seems to be at odds with the secular goals of RAMSI, yet he likened his work to capacity-building. In contrast, religious actors who have been much involved in partnerships with donors are articulating cogent critiques of the ruling rhetoric and the emerging inequalities of RAMSI-era Solomon Islands. I illustrate this with reference to the work of Reverend Dr Terry Brown of the Anglican Church of Melanesia.

Against literature that draws a clear line between fundamentalist religiosity aimed at spiritual transformation and church organisations with a more holistic orientation toward secular development, I suggest that neo-Pentecostal church planting should be kept in the same analytical frame as the aid programs of mainstream churches and the capacity-building gospel of RAMSI. To clarify, the point is not that secular development projects should attempt to engage directly with actors seeking supernatural solutions to social problems, but to suggest that we ought to pay more attention to what is clear
from even a cursory glance at the letters to the edi-
tor in the Solomon Star: Solomon Islands people envision change in ways that often resonate more closely with the vision of the Australian evangelist than with those of many agents of secular trans-
formation. In the context of growing inequality and deep frustration at a lack of structural change, efforts to build spiritual capacity may seem more compelling than secular capacity-building initiatives.

**Reversal and Continuity in Australian Missions to Solomon Islands**

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Catholics, Anglicans, and other Protestants from British colonies in Australia played critical roles in evangelising the islands of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (Hilliard 1966; Laracy 1969; Steley 1989). Solomon Islands, like most Pacific Islands, is overwhelmingly Christian: some 98 per cent of the Solomon Islands population claims adherence to a Christian church (De Bruijin 2000). Moreover, Christianity arguably shapes the possibilities for political action and, to the extent that the culturally diverse population shares a national identity or public culture, it is pervasively and evangelically Christian (Tomlinson & McDougall 2013; McDougall 2013). In contrast, while a modest majority of Australians declare themselves members of Christian churches and some political leaders affirm the nation’s underlying Judeo-Christian values (Fozdar 2012; Maddox 2005), numbers of adherents and levels of religious participation are steadily declining. Such statistics suggest that the direction of historical missionisation might be reversed, with Christian Islanders evangelising a secularising Australia.

The situation in the Pacific is part of a broader transformation of global Christianity. Demographi-
cally, Christianity is no longer a European, white, or Western phenomenon — today, most of the world’s Christians are in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. In his highly influential book *The Next Christendom* (2002), historian Philip Jen-
kins argued that Christianity’s future is not bound to the secularising societies of Europe and Euro-
pean settler states but to the vibrantly religious ‘global South’ (a counter-intuitive term from an

antipodean perspective). In the South, Christianity is not beleaguered, rationalised, or defensive; it is unapologetically supernaturalist, and growing at a remarkable rate. The leaders of this ‘next Christen-
dom’, moreover, are beginning to send missionaries to re-evangelise the secularised spiritual wastelands of the ‘global North’ (2002:244–50).

Some Solomon Islanders are working as pastors and priests overseas and some have prophesied that such a reversal of the direction of historic missioni-
sation is part of God’s plan for the islands. Bishop James Mason — the paramount chief of the island of Isabel — is currently serving as parish priest in the Anglican diocese of Exeter in south-western England (White 2012). Solomon Islanders work as pastors in Pentecostal churches in Australia and many more would certainly be willing to take up such positions, but restrictive immigration laws make it difficult and expensive for Solomon Islanders to enter Australia for any purposes. Since the 1980s, Pastor Michael Maeliau — former minister of the South Sea Evangelical Church — has shared a prophetic vision of a great wave arising from his home island, Malaita, to engulf the world and shoot heavenward from Jerusa-
lem (see Timmer 2008; 2012). Maeliau wrote:

> There was a fervent plea from the Melanesians to their counterparts, the Polynesian, Australian and New Zealand Churches to give them a chance to become active partners in World Missions. They had been on the receiving end for too long. Being like a little boy at the end of the Gospel relay race, they had no new country or territory to conquer. The only option left for them was to go back to Jerusalem via the route by which the Gospel first came to them (2006:20).

In 2000, Maeliau stopped in Australia to anoint Ayers Rock with holy oil and announce his vision ‘in the hearing of all the wicked Princes from the nations who were currently gathered showing off their pride and glory at the Olympic Games in Sydney’ (2006:59). While his prophecy is distinctive, Maeliau’s experience of travelling around the world with the support of international evangelical networks is shared by many established and emerging leaders of new churches in the Solomons.
Yet available evidence suggests that while some Christians of the ‘global South’ are evangelising the global North, Christians from the supposedly secular North are proselytising in the spirit-filled South in greater numbers than ever. Eves notes that despite high rates of Christian adherence, Papua New Guinea is among the ‘most evangelized places in the world’ where ‘thousands of missionaries are spreading the gospel, often to people who have long identified themselves as Christian’ (2008:2). Wuthnow (2009) has argued that even if the demographic centre of gravity is in the global South, money and political influence still largely rest with the global North. North American churches’ involvement in overseas missions is greater than ever. In 2001, some US$4 billion was spent on overseas missions, more than 100,000 people were employed full-time and 350,000 were employed part-time by mission agencies, and more than a million Americans undertook short mission trips (Wuthnow 2009:23). Much of this contemporary missionisation, moreover, is not simply aimed at saving souls: as in the colonial era, evangelism and projects of secular improvement often go hand in hand.

Connections between Australian and Solomon Islands churches were attenuated with the emergence of independent national churches (which, in some cases, pre-dated national independence). The rise of global evangelism, however, led to new sorts of engagements between Australia and Solomon Islands — many Australian preachers who were ‘born again’ in Christ during Billy Graham’s 1959 Southern Cross Crusade founded new charismatic and Pentecostal churches that expanded into Solomon Islands in the 1970s and 1980s (McDougall 2013:128–89; Eves 2007). That evangelical impetus was thwarted, in part, by a period of civil war in the 1990s that saw most expatriates, including missionaries, leave the Solomons.

The civil war in Solomon Islands is known as the ‘ethnic tensions’, but scholars have emphasised that much of the anger was focused on a government widely perceived to have been unresponsive to citizen demands and unable to mitigate the effects of uneven economic development (Allen 2007; Bennett 2002; Fraenkel 2004; Kabutaulaka 2001; Moore 2004). The violence began in 1998 when a militia group from the island of Guadalcanal began attacking people from the nearby island of Malaita who had settled along the coastal plain east and west of the national capital Honiara. The following year, a Malaitan counter-militia was formed, took control of Honiara, and unseated the elected Prime Minister in a ‘joint action’ with the police force. Despite the signing of a ceasefire and a peace treaty, violent disorder continued and undermined the viability of the state. Solomon Islands leaders had been calling for military assistance from Australia since 1998, but only in 2003 did the government of then-prime minister John Howard reverse a policy of non-intervention to initiate RAMSI.

RAMSI was justified to the Australian public in terms of both friendship and fear: it was to be a humanitarian intervention to ‘help a friend’ and an effort to secure Australia’s borders from terrorism and transnational crime that might arise in this failed state (Wainwright 2003; Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008; Greener-Barcham & Barcham 2006; Hameiri 2008; Kabutaulaka 2005; Nguyen 2005; Roughan 2006; Roughan et al. 2006). This secular mission involved member nations of the Pacific Islands Forum, including a significant contribution from New Zealand. With some justification, however, it has been seen to be dominated by Australia, if for no other reason than the fact that Australia is the biggest contributor to the mission in terms of both funding and personnel. Solomon Islands has received more than $200 million of Australian aid annually — a staggering amount given the Solomon Islands’ population of half a million. Most of this money, however, has gone not to Solomon Islanders but to Australians in the form of what supporters would call ‘technical assistance’ and what detractors label ‘boomerang aid’ (e.g. Anderson 2008). Since 2003, the Solomon Islands capital city Honiara has been flooded by Australians — military personnel, seconded public servants including AusAID staff, employees of private security firms including Patrick’s Logistics, and employees of the multiplying numbers of non-government organisations (NGOs) in the country. RAMSI was enthusiastically welcomed and swiftly ended the armed conflict. Broad support for the intervention continued,
with 86 per cent of respondents in a 2010 survey indicating that they supported RAMSI’s continued presence (ANU Enterprises 2011:5). As RAMSI enters a phase of transition, many have reflected upon its successes in restoring law and order, rebuilding a credible police force, strengthening economic governance, and improving the capacity of the justice sector (see, for example, Devpolicy blog). Some of RAMSI’s operations, especially in the core areas of improving policing and the justice system, are now being incorporated into more regular forms of bilateral aid programs.

Describing the RAMSI transition as a shift ‘from one modality of external assistance to another, namely, from a post-conflict intervention aimed at stabilisation and recovery to a more regular bilateral aid engagement’, Allen and Dinnen (2013) point out that it is only one among a number of other crucial transitions occurring in Solomon Islands today. Among the latter are a shifting economic base as the logging boom comes to an end, urbanisation and agrarian change, and dramatic shifts in the localised and informal structures of authority that remain important in ordinary villagers’ lives (Allen et al. 2013). To this I would add transitions in religious life: while the five historic churches in the Solomons remain vibrant and account for a significant majority of the population, there is increasing fluidity in religious affiliation. Overall, people are tending to leave four of the historic mission churches (Anglican Church of Melanesia, Roman Catholic Church, United Church, and South Seas Evangelical Church) with only the Seventh-day Adventist Church continuing to increase in relative numbers. A wide variety of other forms of Christianity and a few other forms of global religion are gaining adherents (Ernst 2006; McDougall 2008, 2009, 2013). As with the other transitions mentioned by Allen and Dinnen, these religious transformations are linked in part to developments that have occurred as a result of RAMSI’s intervention. While the crisis made it more difficult for overseas missionaries to access the Solomons, the peaceful conditions established by RAMSI reopened the country’s doors to a flood of mission workers (most enter on tourist visas and numbers are therefore difficult to estimate), many of them from Australia. Some are Muslims (contributing to the rise of an anti-Australian form of Islam attracting some Malaitans) and leaders from other religions, like the Unification Church. The vast majority of these post-conflict missionaries, however, have been Christian.

Transformations in Solomon Islands religion are part of global transformations. Jenkins posited a dichotomy between the secularising and theologically liberal global North and the spiritual and often theologically conservative global South, but adherents of many of the fastest growing churches in the North share much with their counterparts in the South. In her recent study of American evangelicals, anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann (2012) argues the God espoused by believers in this secular age is not a God stripped of supernatural powers as many social scientists and theologians predicted until the last decades of the twentieth century, but a magical and even ‘hyper-real’ God. This is a God shared by the (arguably) post-secular North and what Luhrmann (2012:386) calls ‘never secular’ societies that seem to characterise much of global South, societies in which people often wonder about the nature of supernatural power or debate questions about how this power may be accessed, but rarely doubt the existence of the supernatural. Many ordinary Solomon Islanders feel that the rise of new churches poses an enormous challenge to social stability; because churches are at the social and often geographic centre of most rural villages, opting out of a church entails opting out of a broader community. As I have argued elsewhere (McDougall 2013), however, the rise of various kinds of evangelicalism might also be considered an integral part of an emerging public culture, drawing citizens together in worship, prayer, and conversations about the future of their troubled post-conflict nation.

Such shifts are important not only for those concerned with the religious life of the Solomons, but also those concerned with secular development. The established mission churches are those with the most broad and deep engagements with local people, the most stable international connections, and theologies of development most appealing to secular outsiders and compatible with, for example,
the UN's Millennium Development Goals. Newer charismatic and Pentecostal churches may appear to be ambivalent or hostile toward secular forms of development and ambivalent toward the democratic process as a whole (see Eves 2008 on Papua New Guinea). At the very least, the overt emphasis on God's power to directly intervene in human affairs makes them uncomfortable bedfellows for secular development agents.

An Australian Pastor in Honiara

Why would a neo-Pentecostal pastor from one of the world's most secular nations 'plant a church' in one of the world's most Christian countries? This was the question foremost in my mind in early 2007 when I interviewed a pastor and his wife, whom I will call Jeff and Connie Smith. They had arrived from Perth six months earlier at a low point in relations between Australia and Solomon Islands in the wake of the 2006 riots and the unfolding saga of Julian Moti (Moore 2007; Nelson 2007). The newly established church they had come to pastor was brought to Honiara by the American predecessor of the Smiths in 2003 — the first year of RAMSI. The church was first established in the American West and has roots in the Jesus People Movement in the 1970s. Unlike other churches with similar origins, including Calvary Chapel and Vineyard Christian Fellowship, this movement did not become a mega-church but instead expanded into a network of more than a thousand smaller churches. Less than a decade after it was established, the American founding pastor of the movement established a congregation in Perth and led it for three years. When I visited a Perth congregation in 2007, perhaps half of congregants were from eastern Africa, having joined the church in their home countries and finding a branch in their new Australian home. It is a transnational religious network that links the global South and the global North in complex ways.

Pastor Jeff told me of his and Connie's decision to come to Honiara. They were together at an international conference of the church movement when his senior pastor told him of the opportunity and gave him twenty minutes to decide whether to take it. They were torn: they had the 'heart' to do mission work overseas but thought that they would wait until their children were older; but they didn't want the children to 'miss the opportunity of living in a place like Solomon Islands'. So Connie and Jeff first called the doctor of their child (who had a serious health problem) and then prayed before deciding to answer this call to mission. Like most other Australians employed in Solomon Islands — and like me, a university-employed academic — Pastor Jeff was on an expatriate wage, paid by his home church. He explained this by saying that as 'outsiders with children, we can't be expected to live in local style'. The church actually encouraged them to connect to other expatriates, rather than Islanders, to get things done effectively. They socialised primarily with expats rather than Solomon Islanders, playing golf and snorkelling to relax. They felt that their presence in their Solomon Islander congregants' homes made the Islanders uncomfortable so they limited their engagement to formal church events. The Smiths understood this discomfort in terms of cultural difference but it also has much to do with economic inequality. The cost of one cup of coffee in the Lime Lounge — the upscale largely expatriate cafe in Honiara where I interviewed the Smiths — was approximately equal to a day's wage for the clerks working in the shops beside it. Such a stark juxtaposition of wealth and poverty that became ubiquitous in RAMSI-era Honiara was less disturbing if attributed to cultural difference instead of economic inequality.

The church that Pastor Jeff was leading is what secular Australians or members of mainline churches might see as radical — it has been labelled a 'cult' by some disaffected former members. Church services involve glossolalia (speaking in tongues) and faith healing, with Bible-based messages delivered in services involving amplified rock music. Yet within the context of Solomon Islands Christianity, the church and its teachings are hardly remarkable. The Sunday service led by Pastor Jeff that I attended in a former storehouse in central Honiara was similar to other services in evangelical or neo-Pentecostal churches I have attended in the Solomons. Aside from references to Aussie Rules football, evolution, and the importance of raising independent children, the content of his message
was not unlike those delivered in services pastored by indigenous Solomon Islanders. Speaking in tongues is perhaps the most distinctive mark of Pentecostalism in Australia, but in the Solomons, members of mainline churches like the United Church may break spontaneously into glossolalia, particularly at times of revivalist fervour, youth rallies, or late-night prayer meetings. In the Sunday Service I attended, Pastor Jeff reminded us of the weekly 'hospital evacuation squad' that visits the National Referral Hospital on Saturdays to pray for the sick ('If you want to see miracles, come on Saturday'). Back home in Perth, a 'hospital evacuation squad' would be met with widespread scepticism or outright resistance in any of the metropolitan hospitals in Perth, including those affiliated with Christian churches. In contrast, most Solomon Islands Christians believe in spiritual healing — few doubt that Satan can cause bodily illness and that God can heal it.

I imagine that it must have been a revelation for Pastor Jeff and Connie to have their most fundamental belief in a God who has power to tangibly affect human lives tacitly affirmed by the Solomon Islanders they engage with. This was not, however, something that I discussed with them directly. Instead, I asked why it was necessary to 'plant a church' like theirs in the Solomon Islands. Wasn't this country saturated by Christianity?

Pastor Jeff disagreed with the basic premise of my question and, indeed, the larger research project described on the project information sheet I provided to him. The census says Solomon Islanders are Christian but most are Christian in name only. If they were really Christian, he explained, it would show out in their whole lives. The leaders of the country declare Christianity as the religion of the nation and declare themselves Christian in name only. If they were really Christian, he explained, it would show out in their whole lives. The leaders of the country declare Christianity as the religion of the nation and declare themselves Christian but it was a question of identity and does not impact behaviour. (Later, Connie added that even the term ‘born again’ is not taken seriously, recalling an advertisement in Perth for a service that allowed people to be ‘born again’ by getting out of credit card debt.) All Solomon Islanders identify with religion, but they haven't had an experience of regeneration and haven't made a personal choice to seek Christ's forgiveness and transform their lives.

Their ministry aims not at creating more nominal Christians but teaching people to apply the practical wisdom of the Gospel to life. Appropriating what he called a buzzword, Jeff said that as a pastor he is trying to ‘build capacity’ among indigenous leaders through discipleship.

As with missionary predecessors throughout the colonial world, the Smiths hope to spread the Gospel and bring people to what Connie called ‘right living’. The Smiths described to me some of the particular challenges of their mission in the Solomon Islands, focusing on problematic aspects of Solomon Islands culture. Some were indigenous: bride price, ideas about gender segregation, wantokism, ‘Solomon time’, and the lack of a work ethic. Other problems were new: welfare mentality, rising incidence of adultery, and broken marriages. Similar understandings were shared by other expatriates in Honiara working for RAMSI, aid agencies, or NGOs, who often blame the problems of the Solomon Islands today on some poorly mixed combinations of traditional attitudes and modern challenges. Their solutions, however, are different. A civilian and military intervention like RAMSI might be necessary but the real battle would be fought on moral and spiritual grounds.

**RAMSI and Church Actors: Capacity and Critique**

Pastor Smith's comment about discipleship as capacity-building was ironic, highlighting the way that while secularists may focus on institutions or skills, a real Christian will overcome personal and political problems by following the example of Jesus. Yet, immersed as he was in expatriate networks, with little social interaction with Solomon Islander congregants, he seemed little inclined toward any critique of RAMSI's capacity-building programs. Conversely, Australian state-building and developmentalist initiatives were unlikely to take note of Pastor Jeff’s ‘spiritual capacity-building’ — AusAID might support church-run health services, but not faith healing! More amenable to secular state-building are the holistic agendas of established churches, which have been involved in providing health and educational services and humanitarian assistance for more than a century.
In recent years, AusAID has become more engaged with churches in Melanesia, making use of existing partnerships between local churches and Australian faith-based NGOs in a quest for alternative delivery mechanisms for bilateral aid. Among the most prominent of such programs is the Church Partnership Program in Papua New Guinea (Anderson 2012; Clarke 2011b). Echoing common arguments in the literature on religion and development, Clarke suggests that donor countries are coming to recognise the advantages that religious organisations have, particularly where states have limited capacity:

Unlike secular NGOs, religious organizations have a natural constituency at the local level but in addition also have organizational networks both nationally and internationally. Utilizing the networks that exist at these different levels supports their ability to undertake development (2011b:7).

This AusAID program requires the Papua New Guinea churches to have institutional links with existing Australian-based NGOs, often the secularised development arms of the churches that were once overseeing missions of the local churches — a factor, Clarke points out, that makes the development of such programs in non-Christian contexts like Muslim-dominated Indonesia unlikely given that there are far fewer Muslim NGOs in Australia (2011b:18). The PNG Church Partnership Program is a tripartite relationship between AusAID (which provides funds), Australian faith-based NGOs (which administer funding), and the local churches (that implement the programs). Clarke suggest that the program helped improve communication among churches and opened opportunities to ‘strengthen service delivery and relations with the [government of] PNG’ (2011b:14). Yet such projects raise challenges for AusAID, especially in its expectation of a clear separation between ‘mission’ and ‘development’ — a separation that is often not clear for the local churches (2011b:15). Moreover, even as the partnership seems to be strengthening the institutional capacity of churches, Clarke notes that they also risk having their own often overtly evangelical or theological aims hijacked by better funded secular initiatives — a point also made by Bird (2007) in a baseline study of the engagement of Solomon Islands churches in service provision and governance.

In the case of the Solomons, the violence and disorder of 1998–2003 pushed traditional donors to seek alternative modes of delivering aid before RAMSI’s inception. Levels of bilateral development aid to Solomon Islands plummeted during the crisis years, especially after the 2000 coup; although the Republic of China (Taiwan) provided large sums in grants and loans, other donors including Australia, New Zealand, and the EU were reluctant to support a compromised government controlled by militants (Moore 2004:195). Some of AusAID’s assistance was delivered directly to communities in a program known as the Community Peace and Restoration Fund, which evolved into the Community Sector Program, and which remained the primary means through which AusAID sought to assist Solomon Islanders meet the development goal of ‘building strong and peaceful communities’ throughout most of the period of RAMSI’s operations (AusAID 2009a:19; Rhodes 2007). These programs only indirectly engaged with the most important players in the ‘community sector’, namely the churches (Brown n.d.). In 2004, however, AusAID did begin to work directly through the Anglican Church of Melanesia — the country’s largest church with approximately one-third of the population and strong networks across the central and eastern Solomons. The Inclusive Communities Program built on partnerships between the Anglican Church of Melanesia and two Australia-based Anglican NGOs (the Anglican Board of Mission-Australia and AngliCORD). This program, along with a partnership of the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) Australia and ADRA Solomon Islands, comprise two of the six partnerships that are included in AusAID’s Solomon Islands NGO Partnership Agreement (AusAID 2009b).

Reverend Dr Terry Brown has been centrally involved in the Inclusive Communities Programs and other projects that bring together donors and faith-based organisations in the name of capacity-building. Brown is a Canadian who worked...
in Solomon Islands between 1975–1981 as a theological lecturer and served as Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Malaita from 1996–2008. He also served as editor of the Report of the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was presented to the Solomon Islands government in 2012; when the government failed to release the report to the public, he took the controversial step of releasing the report via social media (Brown 2013a). Like Clarke and others, Brown worries about the ways that engagements with secular projects of development can undermine the overall mission of the church, particularly when organisations must create separate institutions for secularised development projects stripped of any theological agenda. He attributes the apparent success of the Inclusive Communities Program in Solomon Islands to the fact that the project worked directly through the existing infrastructure of the Anglican church rather than creating separate structures within the organisation (Brown n.d.).

If Pastor Smith uncritically invoked ‘capacity-building’ as a buzzword to explain his work with Solomon Islander congregants, Reverend Brown has argued that capacity-building undertaken by RAMSI has undermined local capacity and confidence. Although he supported RAMSI’s initial intervention, he argues that the operation eventually ‘became a kind of re-militarization’ that established a ‘virtual Australian military base’ where Australian reservists could train — an exercise in building Australian rather than local capacity (2013b). He critiques the focus of the intervention on the military, police, judiciary, and prison, as well as the relative lack of attention to delivering basic services in health and education or improving transportation. Instead of sending Solomon Islanders overseas for further qualifications or supporting the development of universities within the country, RAMSI ran six-week ‘short courses’ that Brown (2010) described as ‘paternalistic’. He asks, ‘Rather than doing the “capacity building” itself (with many of the financial proceeds going offshore to Australia, New Zealand or other Pacific Islands), why does not RAMSI empower the Solomon Islands government to do capacity building by assisting it with the expertise and funds to send many more students overseas to study in areas of high government priority?’ (2010:5).

Brown’s critique of the overall project of capacity-building focuses centrally on the dramatic inequality in power and wealth between Solomon Islanders and overseas staff brought in to assist them. Overseas staff were highly paid, provided with a vehicle and given Australian-standard housing; their task was to ‘advise’ ‘underpaid, disheartened, houseless, vehicle-less, under-resourced Solomon Islands personnel’ (2013b). Brown describes the situation in the Public Solicitor’s office, where RAMSI legal advisors were paid around 13 times more than their local counterparts. Not surprisingly, ‘locals often resented this high pay and felt that many RAMSI advisors were building up large savings back in Australia while they suffered to survive. Such inequality does not make for real capacity building’ (2013b). Brown’s anecdotal observations are supported by a survey-based study of study of remuneration disparities in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (Marai et al. 2010). Locally remunerated people were more likely to perceive disparities as unjust, more likely to think about leaving their jobs, and more likely to want to go overseas. Some reported withholding co-operation from a higher paid but poorly qualified co-worker on an international wage, but, on average, locally remunerated workers rated their own abilities lower than those on international pay — a sign of demoralisation. Surprisingly, the survey revealed that local workers were willing to accept dramatic differences in pay between themselves and expatriates: the mean response of locally remunerated workers in Solomon Islands to a question about what the maximum acceptable factor of difference between local and international pay was 5.47, not much lower than the mean response of 5.68 given by internationally remunerated workers to the same question. However, the international wages were, on average, more than ten times that of local wages and thus nearly double the level of disparity that both locals and expatriates considered acceptable. Mean local pay was $15,860 (in international dollars formulated to indicate purchasing parity), while mean international pay was $163,188. Moreover, again affirming Brown's
observations, only 14 per cent of locally paid workers said that their salaries were sufficient for their everyday needs, whereas 97 per cent of internationally paid workers did (Marai et al. 2010:354). Marai et al. concluded that dual wage structures lead to ‘poverty in both a relative and absolute sense’ (2010:354). Insofar as capacity-building projects of the sort undertaken by RAMSI rely on such dual wage structures, they are likely to undermine the confidence of local workers and exacerbate their experiences of impoverishment.

Other paradoxes of capacity-building are also well documented. Following Ignatieff, Dinnen and Allen suggest that ‘the more substantial and intense the engagement, the greater it risks “sucking out” local capacity rather than building it’ (2012:230). Their focus is on policing, which was from the beginning of RAMSI a key area of concern. The Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) was centrally involved in the June 2000 coup when a large contingent of the police force joined with the militant Malaitan Eagle Force in a joint operation. Beginning in 2003, RAMSI oversaw the resignation of more than one quarter of the existing police force, and it put in place a Participating Police Force (PPF), drawn largely from the Australian Federal Police and the military forces of other partner nations. The PPF worked alongside the reconstituted RSIP with the intention of supporting and training newly recruited and existing officers. Dinnen and Allen note a number of challenges in the capacity-building projects — Australian officers often found it easier to get on with policing than to help train their Solomon Islands partners and they usually measured Solomon Islands’ policing by Australian standards and were essentially blind to the particular challenges of policing in the local context (2012:229–30). Moreover, this project of capacity-building arguably distorted popular perceptions as Solomon Islanders compared the local police force to the much better equipped and remunerated foreign police force.

Reverend Brown’s critiques of RAMSI are not necessarily driven by a particular theological view; they are informed by, and resonate with, the work of secular scholars. Like religious actors who critiqued World Bank structural adjustment projects of the 1980s and 1990s (see above), however, he is well positioned to critique the approaches of secular development actors. Situated as he is at the intersection of a number of local and global networks, he is able to pass insights across worlds that are too often separate. RAMSI is ending, but projects of capacity-building are likely to continue, albeit in a less intensive fashion. In such a situation, these critiques will remain relevant.

Faith Mission or Social Gospel?

The difference between neo-Pentecostal and Anglican engagements with ideas about capacity-building may appear crystal clear. Some evangelical Christians of the global North engage in overseas mission primarily to spread God’s word to the unevangelised, and see secular development projects as a distraction from the main goal of saving souls. Some influenced by prosperity gospel may believe that if an individual, or a nation, has truly accepted Christ, material prosperity and worldly success will follow. Many mainline churches of Australia and their partners in Solomon Islands, in contrast, tend to frame their mission outreach in terms of some kind of holistic theology of development that is focused on spiritual, social, and material life. Yet the line between pure proselytism (which seems to characterise new fundamentalist and Pentecostal-charismatic churches) and a more holistic approach to development (more central in the global outreach of many mainline churches like the Anglican Church) is anything but hard and fast.

Indeed, approaches to service delivery may shift over the history of the mission. This point is made clearly in Cooper’s (2006) insightful ethnographic history of Sudanese Interior Mission in the Muslim Sahel. This conservative evangelical ‘faith mission’ was funded through the gifts of North American entrepreneurs. Aimed at pure evangelism, it explicitly rejected the civilising mission and social gospel of older, more established, and largely European mission societies. For pragmatic reasons, however, the mission gradually and somewhat haphazardly began to set up schools and clinics. By 2000, this mission was being challenged by
new and more explicitly modernist and globalised Pentecostal denominations whose emphasis on pure evangelism was very much like that of the Sudanese Inland mission in an earlier era.

Established historic churches in Solomon Islands once (and still sometime do) espouse an ideology that frames social service provision as a distraction from the main goal of saving souls. The South Sea Evangelical Mission (SSEM), for example, emerged out of the same conservative faith mission movement as did the Sudanese Inland Mission. In her memoirs, SSEM founder Florence Young (1924) seemed completely unconcerned with material wellbeing. For those who have fully accepted Christ, death was not something to be avoided but welcomed as a return ‘Home’ (as she called it); when writing of the deaths of her own family members, martyred European missionaries, or Melanesian Christians, she adopted a morbidly celebratory tone. As the mission developed, however, SSEM missionaries did establish schools and clinics, not only to win converts (for whom the promise of education and medical care was a major attraction of the mission) but also out of humanitarian concern.

The difficulty of neatly dividing ‘fundamentalist’ from ‘mainline’ churches is also obvious in the case of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Over the course of its history, it has been unabashedly ‘fundamentalist’ in theology. Adventism focuses on the inevitable and approaching return of Christ to usher in the millennium. Members see themselves as part of a Sabbath-keeping remnant that will come under attack as the end times approach and they predict that secular governments and Sunday-keeping churches will combine forces to persecute them. Far from ignoring material well-being, however, the global church has, from an early stage, promulgated a message of bodily health and emphasised education (Bull and Lockhart 2007). The Seventh-day Adventist church in Solomon Islands established and continues to run some of the most effective schools and hospitals of the country, having refused government grants and thus retained control of the institutions when other churches ceded control to the government following national independence (Steley 1989).

This paper has been a preliminary attempt to put mainline Christian critiques of secular capacity-building in the same analytical frame as a neo-Pentecostal pastor’s vision of social and spiritual improvement. Such an exercise does not lead to direct policy recommendations, but it is hoped that a broader picture of how diverse actors engage with rubrics like ‘capacity-building’ is useful to those working on these issues in the region. I also hope to have revealed some of the unintended consequences of the Australian intervention — namely an apparent increase in numbers of Australian Christians and people of other faiths working in the country. More research is necessary to chart the numbers and orientations of Australians doing religious work in the Solomons and elsewhere in the Pacific. What are their motives for evangelising among overwhelmingly Christian populations? More research is also necessary to understand how Solomon Islanders engage with these religious missions in the context of secular intervention. How do hospitalised Solomon Islanders feel about the visit of a ‘hospital evacuation squad’? Do they want faith healing or more hospitals?

An emerging tendency within development literature to label religious organisations and actors ‘faith-based organisations’ in a neat parallel to NGOs signals a basic tendency to assume that they are similar to any other organisation, with a sprinkling of faith on top. Religious organisations whose goals and orientations are incongruent secular developmentalist agendas fall out of the picture. While scholars might see the ‘theologies of development’ expounded by Pastor Smith and Dr Brown as utterly contradictory, I would suggest that many Solomon Islanders embrace both simultaneously. This is true not only within evangelical or fundamentalist denominations like the Seventh-day Adventist or SSEC, but also the mainline United, Catholic, and Anglican churches. Build hospitals and engage in faith healing; build schools but trust that God gives wisdom and power. Ordinary and elite Solomon Islanders seem inclined to seek spiritual and moral solutions to what many secular outsiders would see as social, political, and economic problems.
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Endnotes

1 Total Australian aid to Solomon Islands was estimated at $37.4 million in the 2003–04 AusAID budget out of a total budget for the Pacific excluding Papua New Guinea of $175.8 million (Papua New Guinea was allocated an estimated $333.6 million). By the following year, 2004–05, Solomon Islands budget jumped to $201.6 million. In 2011–12, the total bilateral aid from Australia to Solomon Islands was $261.7 million (AusAID comprised $124.3 million and other Government aid was $137.4 million) (AusAID 2011).

2 These are pseudonyms.
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