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THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS

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STATEMENT

I hereby declare that this thesis has not already been accepted in substance for any degree, and is the result of my own independent research.

John Zarocostas
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INTRODUCTION

Cyprus is intrinsically an inconsequential micro-state, but its geo-strategic location has made it disproportionately vital in world politics. It is an island permanently disabled by its special vulnerability to foreign manipulation and intervention. As a chronic international dispute, the Cyprus conflict of the last twenty-five years has been analyzed from various perspectives, by academics, journalists, politicians, diplomats and strategists.

However, most serious studies produced to date have concentrated on one particular facet of the conflict, thus by-passing efforts to understand its labyrinthine interlocking aspects. The major works have focussed on themes such as the Cyprus conflict and Greece; the United Nations; the Superpowers; Britain; International Law; Political Geography; Constitutionalism; Nationalism. These works have helped to interpret factors of primary importance from the various phases of the dispute. But the developments of the 1970s, culminating in the 1974 crisis and its subsequent international repercussions, have resulted to date in only a small number of scholarly works; and despite the far reaching international implications of the 1974 developments, most contemporary studies have continued to analyze various crucial individual factors, bypassing a broad international study.

The present thesis will constitute a systematic attempt to help close this gap by developing a "macro" view.
of the international implications of the Cyprus conflict with special reference to the 1974 crisis and its aftermath. Particular emphasis will be placed on the linkage between the local, regional and global actors and determinants of the dispute. In order to present a critical perspective, the study will examine not only the developments since 1974, but every major international crisis over Cyprus since its emergence as an international dispute in 1954.

Within its purview the thesis will also explore a number of issues that have not been adequately discussed in relation to the Cyprus conflict, from the general, such as Detente, World Order, Strategic Doctrines, Crisis Management, to the very specific, such as NATO, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference, the EEC, the US Arms Embargo.

With the dispute still dangerously unresolved, most of the governments involved have imposed very strict guidelines on the availability of documents. In particular, secrecy has surrounded documents that deal with the July-August 1974 Cyprus crisis. Dr Kissinger's refusal to agree to a US Congressional Committee request to hand over State Department documents on the subject of Cyprus, resulted in his being charged with contempt of Congress. However, for numerous reasons of internal security and foreign policy, the governments of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey have been equally reluctant to release any documents related to the 1974 crisis.
The author was able to partially overcome this methodological problem by interviews with key policy makers, diplomats, politicians and government officials, during a field trip to the United States, Greece and Cyprus (both sectors). The interviews were useful supplementary material to the analysis of the written sources which were the cornerstone of research for this thesis.

Monitoring of primary documents such as US Congressional Hearings, House of Commons Reports, UN debates and reports, was carried out. Analysis was also made of secondary material such as newspapers, academic articles and monographs from Greek and English original material, and Turkish sources in translation. In areas where it was not possible to fully document arguments, a more general perspective was given. There are still points which are not clear and which will remain contentious until the relevant information is put forward either by governments or the responsible decision makers.

The thesis is divided into seven chapters which in turn are split in two parts. The first part consists of chapters I to III, which analyze the Cyprus conflict from its pre-independence international setting to the succession of crises that preceded the 1974 crisis. The section provides a macro-historical perspective that critically examines the causes of the various crises, with particular emphasis being placed on analysing the role of
the guarantor powers and the involvement of other foreign powers and organisations. These chapters are necessary background, to acquiring an understanding of the set of events that led to the July-August 1974 imbroglio.

The second part consists of chapters iv to vii and deals with the chain of international developments sparked off by the crisis. Chapter four will seek to explain the reasons for the failure of Kissinger crisis diplomacy. The next two chapters concentrate on analysing the profound effects the crisis had on the defence and foreign policies of the states involved, from the Greek withdrawal from NATO to the imposition of the American arms embargo against Turkey. Finally chapter 7 will examine the actions undertaken by international bodies in their search for a peaceful settlement.
CHAPTER 1

THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE INTERNATIONAL SETTING

Cyprus is situated in the Eastern Mediterranean, 500 miles from Greece and 40 miles from Turkey. Eighty percent of its population are Greek Cypriot, and 18 percent Turkish Cypriot. In 1878 the island was ceded to Britain, in return for a British undertaking of armed assistance in defence of the Ottoman Empire's Asiatic possessions against Russia. However, the island did not formally come under British control until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The sovereignty of Cyprus, was relinquished by Ataturk to Britain under Article 20 of the Lausanne Treaty in which he ratified the annexation proclaimed by the British Foreign Secretary, Grey, on 5 November 1914.

In 1925 Cyprus was declared a British Crown colony. The control of Cyprus reinforced the United Kingdom's important trade routes to the Middle East and East of Aden. However, Cyprus was not to be considered as vital strategic terrain until after World War II. British control of Palestine, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, proved sufficient for strategic purposes until after the second world war.

In the early 1950s the British Conservative government, led by Sir Winston Churchill, concluded that a base in Cyprus would strengthen Britain's posture in the Middle East after their decampment from Suez. This strengthened the Government's opposition to the renewed calls for "Enosis" by the Greek Cypriot majority on the island.

The civil war and the subsequent post war reconstruction, had forced successive Greek governments from seriously demanding from the British "Enosis" of Cyprus until 1954.
According to Mayes, a key factor behind Greece's renewed support for "Enosis" was her failure to achieve any positive breakthrough to her irredentist claims over Northern Epirus and on the "rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier". (9)

The refusal of the British Government to comply with Greece's demands and to agree to Anglo-Greek talks over Cyprus, led the Conservative Papagos Government to place the Cyprus Question before the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1954. (10)

On 16 August, the Greek representative at the United Nations submitted the Cyprus item to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "of the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples to Cyprus". (11) In the explanatory memorandum signed by Papagos, the Greek Government emphasized that the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people desired "Enosis" with Greece, and referred, inter alia, to the plebiscite of 1950 as one of the most recent proofs of this desire. The move to take the question before the UN also marked the internationalisation of the issue, and led once again to Turkey's direct involvement after an absence of nearly 30 years. (12) However, reflecting on this phase the former British Governor of Cyprus Sir Hugh Foot observed that, "the more the dispute became internationalised, and the more Athens and Ankara interfaced, the further would chances of a settlement disappear over the international horizon". (13)

At the UN however, the Greek delegation was confronted by coordinated British and American obstructionist tactics aimed to block debate of the Greek submission on Cyprus. (14) During the General Assembly deliberations on Cyprus, the Turkish delegation stated its preference for the maintenance of the status quo in Cyprus as well as its strong political interest in the issue. During the UN debate, it also became apparent...
to the Greek representatives that they had been over-optimistic about the number of votes that they could secure. The Greek delegation based its approach on the assumption that anti-colonialist member countries would decide their stand on the basis of the principle of self determination rather than their political interest, and had under-estimated the effectiveness of behind the scenes lobbying and political pressures exerted by the British and American delegations.\(^{(15)}\)

By 1955 the future status of Cyprus, well entrenched as a national political issue in Greece, Turkey and Britain, now received international focus in both NATO and UN forums. However, Whitehall and Ankara continuously blocked Greek attempts to increase the role of international organisations. In an attempt to torpedo the Greek move to bring the dispute before UNGA - "a project which would cause considerable embarrassment to Britain\(^{(16)}\)" - the British Government invited both Greece and Turkey to a tripartite discussion, hoping thus to foment trouble between them.\(^{(17)}\)

During the years 1955-1959 EOKA, led by Colonel George Grivas, waged guerilla warfare and terrorism on Cyprus in pursuant of "Enosis". The EOKA campaign further undermined Britain's declining ability to impose its will in the Middle East.\(^{(18)}\) The British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 and Suez in 1954 increased the value of Cyprus to Britain,\(^{(19)}\) and made it reluctant to change the status quo\(^{(20)}\) of the island or discuss its rights of sovereignty over it.\(^{(21)}\) The reasons for the British attitude lay in the international developments between 1945-1954, such as the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute of 1951, the Suez dispute with Egypt which continued from 1945 on; the downfall of the monarchy in Egypt in July 1952, and the fear that the Soviet Union might penetrate the Middle East.\(^{(22)}\) After
withdrawal from Suez, the British established their new Middle East headquarters in Cyprus. The Suez withdrawal, however, was a setback to Britain's status as the dominant Great Power in the Near East region. Its domestic repercussions were also dramatic. The Eden Cabinet consequently assured the "Suez rebels" that no similar withdrawal from Cyprus was contemplated. In the aftermath of the Suez imbroglio, retention of British sovereignty over Cyprus became a top priority of the Eden Government.

In retrospect it can be argued that British strategic policy at the time attached too high a priority to the defence of the Middle East against the perceived Soviet threat, and neglected to take into consideration or assess adequately the internal political developments of the countries in the Middle East region. In a calculated move to reinforce Britain's declining status in the Middle East, Eden created the Baghdad Pact, which was initialed on 4 April, 1955. The pact was the end product of a series of Western attempts over a number of years to devise a Middle East Command, as part of the containment strategy, and was based upon the US Secretary of State Dulles' conviction that the Arab regimes would not commit themselves to military alliance with the West, so that a Western controlled defence organisation was a "future rather than an immediate possibility". The Eisenhower Administration decided not to become a full member of the Baghdad Pact and opted instead for "observer" status. Dulles was interested in preventing Soviet penetration, and estimated that such an approach could only be successful if it managed to secure broad Arab sympathy and support. However, Eden's goal was to bolster Britain's presence and influence, regardless of the hostility shown against his Middle East policy by Arab Nationalists such as Nasser. The
widespread opposition by the local regimes in the end sealed the fate of Eden's policy. Washington's tacit support for Eden's policy in the region also failed to take into consideration the force of Arab nationalism, and in particular neglected the fact that Egypt was the dominant political force in the Arab world, and underestimated the possible threat to their strategic and economic interests in the area that Nasser's "Arab Nationalist" rhetoric could inflict.

The British Government was optimistic that the Baghdad Pact would help bolster the Iraqi regime of Nuri-es-Said. However, in 1958 the overthrow of Nuri-es-Said by the Bathist revolution also spelt the end for the Baghdad Pact. A contributing factor behind Britain's refusal to relinquish sovereignty over Cyprus was the possible undermining impact such a move could have had on Nuri-es-Said's Baghdad regime.

The similarity of British and Turkish interests in the Baghdad Pact indirectly strengthened Ankara's role in the Cyprus dispute. The growing Anglo-Turkish relationship led to Turkey becoming closely identified as an ally of Britain. In the meantime the British Colonial Secretary, Mr Lennox-Boyd, encouraged the Turkish version of self-determination (ie "Taksim" or partition). Turkish opposition to Greece's annexation aims, revived the historic Greco-Turkish antagonism. In Turkey, Greece's campaign of self-determination for Cyprus was interpreted as a revival of the Greek irredentist ideology "Megali Idea" (The Great Idea); the concept to build a new "Byzantine Empire" with its capital at Constantinople (Istanbul).

To counter the Greek Cypriot cause for "Enosis" spearheaded by EOKA, the Turkish Government covertly persuaded the Turkish Cypriots to intensify their calls for "Taksim" (partition).
In 1956 "Volkan" first and then TMT, were launched as the military arm of the "Cyprus is Turkish" Association. Turkish interests in the 1950's, however, towards Cyprus were primarily strategic. Turkish strategists viewed Cyprus as a vital strategic island located only forty miles from its coastline and pointing towards the strategic supply routes of Iskenderum and Alexandreta. Turkey refrained from making any demands for the partition of Cyprus so long as Britain continued to exercise sovereignty over the island. However, after Greece began to claim self-determination for Cyprus at the United Nations, Turkey proclaimed her own interest on Cyprus.

The Suez debate in 1956 and the subsequent review of British strategic policy provided an opportunity for the eventual solution of the "Cyprus Question" in 1959. Following the policy review the new MacMillan Government in late 1957 decided that it no longer needed "Cyprus as a base" but rather it needed "bases in Cyprus".

Negotiations at the time over the future status of Singapore, and the EOKA campaign in Cyprus resulted in heated debates in the House of Commons over the future of UK bases abroad. The Conservatives now asserted that the bases must be retained, if necessary even without the consent of the local population.

Setbacks to Britain in the Middle East such as Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, and Jordan's dismissal of Glubb Pasha, (the British military commander of its Arab Legion), added to the demise of British imperial power in the region. The contraction of British influence in the Middle East resulted in the entrance of the United States into the area in a forceful way. On 5 January 1957, the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine - basically a new version of the Truman Doctrine - pledged economic aid and
the use of "armed force to assist any (nation in the Middle East) requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism." (35) The doctrine made it explicit that it was not only a deterrent in the Middle East region against the spread of Soviet influence but also against any sources of inter-Arab conflict. (36) Some Arab regimes believed that both Washington and Whitehall were overreacting to the so-called Soviet threat. The Arab critique led to a costing of relations between the two western powers and some Arab regimes. Since 1955 the Soviet Union had returned to playing an active role in the Middle East political arena. In particular Moscow had skillfully exploited Arab divisions over Iraq's alliance with the west (37), and non-aligned Nasser expressed hostility towards Iraq for placating Western interests. (38) Soviet interests in the Middle East were shaped by certain factors which cannot be ignored. The Baghdad Pact had provoked the Soviet leadership and had revived their fears of encirclement. (39) However, the fundamental reason for Soviet interest in the Middle East is its geographic proximity. As McLaurin points out "although the West has been loth to accept this principle, it is a fact of geography that the Soviet Union is a Middle East power in a way the United States is not." (40) The Soviet leap over the Baghdad Pact encirclement, was considered by both British and American officials as an immediate threat against their global strategic interests. This subsequently resulted in a number of East/West Cold War incidents, which indirectly helped in securing the success of the London and Zurich meetings that led to the compromise solution of the Cyprus problem.
The "vacuum" theory on which the implementation of the Eisenhower doctrine was justified proved to be an untimely policy that had failed to acknowledge or address itself to the rapidly changing political climate of Middle East politics. Except for pro-Western states in the area such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel, the Eisenhower Doctrine received a hostile reception. In particular, Nasser's Egypt and other strongly anti-Western Arab states accepted the Soviet line that the Eisenhower Doctrine was a Western and neo-colonial and pro-Israeli instrument directed against Nasser and Arab nationalism. The doctrine's underlying weaknesses and limitations were a major setback for American foreign policy makers efforts to broaden Western influence in the Arab world. Indeed, the Doctrine became the target for similar attempts as the Baghdad Pact; the enmity of Arab Nationalist regimes, Soviet antagonism, and criticism from strongly anti-colonial, non-aligned, leaders such as Nehru.

The enticement of neutralist Arab regimes into the Western sphere was a major objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Although like the Baghdad Pact it was nominally directed against communism, its real aim was to contain the spread of Nasserism.

The succession of British policy, followed by the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine, led Washington into encouraging its NATO allies embroiled in the Cyprus question to find a solution, preferably between them. Washington was apprehensive that the dispute between its NATO allies over an island within close proximity to the volatile Middle East had to be resolved.

The Syrian Government's increased ties with the Kremlin, the overthrow of Nuri-Es-Said, and the Lebanese crisis of 1958 had disturbed the Turkish Premier Menderes and all the other anti-Soviet and anti-Nasser leaders in the region. In particular,
the Turkish leader who was an ardent critic of Nasserism admonished on the need to maintain the status quo and declared all movements of revolution and change in the area as Communist - and Soviet-inspired. (50)

In 1957 Turkey planned to invade Syria which had developed close relations with the Soviet Union and had adopted Nasserite policies, particularly in her foreign policy outlook, which were radically different from her own. As Ambassador Loy Henderson reported at the time, Menderes was determined to eliminate the Syrian regime. (51) Likewise at the time of the coup against Nuri-es-Said, Menderes at one stage planned military intervention in Iraq. (52) While in the 1958 Lebanon crisis, Turkey supported the pro-Western Chamoun government against the rebelling pro-Nasser forces. (54)

The widening Middle Eastern crisis focussing around Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, along with the Soviet military and technological breakthroughs in missiles and space travel, and the quasi-ultimatum of Khrushchev on Berlin, softened the three NATO allies in the Cyprus problem and made them more compliant in conducting talks for a compromise settlement. (55) The American Secretary of State Dulles had more than a subtle impact in this change of emphasis. (56) Washington now considered it imperative to secure the cooperation of the British and Turkish governments in order to strengthen its position in the renewed Cold War political and strategic problems sparked off by the so-called missile gap (57) and the tension over Berlin. (58) The East-West casus belli over Berlin relegated the Cyprus problem and was an influential factor which hastened the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, that set in motion the groundwork for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question. (59)
By the late 1950s the Cyprus problem besides its elevation into a UN and NATO problem, also evolved into a Cold War issue. The Eisenhower administration and in particular the Dulles brothers exerted substantial pressure on the MacMillan government as well, to resolve the problem before it turned into a repetition of another intramural NATO crisis as the Suez dispute had caused in 1956. The Cyprus problem had led to an atmosphere of mistrust between Greece and its NATO allies the UK and Turkey that posed a serious threat to the stability of the South Eastern flank of NATO. Greek-Turkish enmity over the Cyprus problem had been the causal factor for the collapse of the Balkan Pact, the bridge between the Atlantic Alliance and Tito's Yugoslavia. Moreover, the "Cyprus Question" was creating problems for the West in the UN bloc vote mechanism. Finally, it was seen as creating an opening for the Soviet Union, to enter the dispute by manipulating Greek-Turkish hostility which on a number of occasions resulted in threats of war.

In February 1959 the Greek and Turkish Premiers concluded an agreement at Zurich, which was endorsed in London, to establish a Republic of Cyprus. These accords were viewed by many Greek Cypriots as unconditional submissiveness by Karamanlis to Anglo-American pressure, which was more interested in NATO's cohesion than in addressing itself to the self-determination of the Greek Cypriots. Kyriakidis asserts that "the increasing importance of Turkey as a strategic factor to the United States and Great Britain, resulted in the corresponding weakening of Greece's position within the alliance which forced her to accept the Turkish position".
With the collapse of the pro-Western Iraqi regime on 14 July 1958, Washington policymakers feared that it could accelerate Soviet inroads into the area, leading ultimately to a Soviet controlled Middle East. To offset this threat, Dulles decided that Turkey, its only powerful ally in the area, must be strengthened by additional military and economic aid. General Grivas maintained that it was not Turkey's strategic significance but Ankara's determination and steadfastness in pursuing a single goal - partition - and of threatening withdrawal from NATO if it did not get half of Cyprus, that made British and American diplomats capitulate to Ankara's demands. Grivas was also critical of Greece's foreign policy, for failing to capitalise on Turkey's isolation from the Arab world. The Greek capitulation meant that Greece would not put the island before greater national interests.

The major weaknesses of the London-Zurich agreements was that they represented a pre-determined compromise solution drafted by Greek, Turkish and British experts and presented to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders as a fait accompli. The controversial accords were judged as being at best a set of mediocre documents that did not signify a gain for any of the three parties that conducted the deliberations. However, at Zurich and London, the Turkish Cypriot minority which represented 18% of the island's population was granted powers in excess of its demographic share.

The Greek Cypriot majority had imposed upon it an unwieldy constitution. The Cyprus constitution was drafted by Greek and Turkish constitutional experts - who however, failed to consult Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders - contained in it provisions for separation at all levels between the two communities making it virtually unworkable. The result was a form of quasi-
independence legitimised by an unworkable constitution which was, as events turned out, a perfect divissive instrument for the collapse of the new Republic, through the forced separation of the two communities leading to virtual partition. The constitution sharply limited the new island republic's sovereignty and independence. For example, the Treaty of Guarantee, a pact between the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey gave the Guarantor powers the constitutional right to intervene. Any developments in Cyprus interpreted as detrimental to the interests of the three Guarantors could lead to collective or individual action directed toward "re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty". This provision enabled that each Guarantor could give its own interpretation and terms of "re-establishing the state of affairs". According to Kyriakidis, the effect of this provision is negative because it links British, Greek and Turkish interests to the constitutional developments of the Republic of Cyprus.

Similarly, the Treaty of Alliance, a defence treaty between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, made provisions for permanent stationing of Greek and Turkish troops on Cyprus. The presence of Greek and Turkish armed forces on Cyprus reflects, moreover, the unwillingness of Greece and Turkey to allow the development of a Cypriot political consciousness.

Furthermore, the constitution institutionalised and gave over to forced separation and tension at a time when inter-communal cooperation was widely needed. The disproportionate power allocated to the Turkish minority coupled with the rigid and complex system of checks and balances practically guaranteed eventual governmental paralysis.
Under the 1960 accords the President had to be Greek and the Vice president Turkish, and respectively elected by their communities for a five year term.\(^{(73)}\)

However, according to Kyriakidis "it was the executive right of final veto, which also extended to matters stemming from decisions of the House of Representatives, that hampered most the process of government". For example, under articles 48(d) and 49(d) the President and Vice President were granted the power to veto any decisions of the Council of Ministers on any foreign affairs, defence or security issue. The veto power was also extended to cover any decisions passed by the House of Representatives.\(^{(74)}\) Most decisions of the House under the constitution required only a simple majority.\(^{(75)}\)

However, in certain key areas of legislation, the two communities are accorded separate communal majority votes.\(^{(76)}\) The use of the legislative veto however, in particular by the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, resulted in a constitutional crisis which culminated with the breakdown of the fragile government in December 1963.\(^{(77)}\)

The difference of interpretation given by both sides on the legality of key provisions of the constitution had adverse results. On the one-hand there was no attempt made by the Greek Cypriot leadership to preserve and uphold the Constitution, which they strongly believed did not represent an accurate picture of the Cypriot population. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot leadership looked upon the Constitution as the only means to protect their minority interests. The end result of this inter-communal rivalry permeated all spheres of government, and each new incident became an obstacle to compromise, and fostered instead an intricate system of legal crises, which set the two communities into perpetual constitutional factionalism.
Adams and Cottrell write: "when one examines the problem in greater depth, it is clear that these agreements, which were attempts to satisfy the conflicting demands of all parties to the negotiations, have not provided a flexible enough framework to meeting changing conditions. The historic roots of earlier unrest could not and did not disappear with the ratification of the agreements, the achievement of independence for the island, or the subsequent efforts of the Cypriot government." (78)

PARALYSIS, BRINKMANSHIP AND POWER POLITICS: CYPRUS 1960-1965

Cyprus re-emerged as a centre of conflict and international tension with the outbreak of inter-communal violence in late December 1963. After a pause of only three years, communal violence re-surfaced on the island, and threatened to engulf the patrons of the respective communities, Greece and Turkey, to the brink of war.

As outlined above, after August 1960 it became apparent that the limited form of independence granted to Cyprus had not managed to solve the long drawn dispute of the two communities, and in some cases independence exacerbated further old protracted differences. In November 1963 the legal authority "crisis" between the two communities prompted Makarios to put forward a number of constitutional amendments as a gesture aimed at breaking the stalemate. (79) His thirteen points were submitted to the respective guarantor powers and to the Turkish Cypriot Vice President Dr Küçük. (80) On 16 December, the İnönü Cabinet rejected outright Makarios' proposed unilateral amendments and repeatedly stressed the in-alienability of the 1960 constitution. (82) Hughes maintains, that "Makarios was wrong to push through his constitutional reforms, however necessary, without considering Turkish Cypriot sensibilities. Similarly the
Turkish Cypriot leadership was wrong to force him to this by subordinating every political issue to their sectional interests. Their grievances, however, were culpably encouraged by the Ankara Government in order to project internal dissatisfaction on to a foreign situation.  

Certain developments which had taken place in world politics since 1960, also indirectly elevated Cyprus's importance within world affairs, especially among the Super powers, who now perceived Cyprus as a vital area in their strategic rivalry in the critically important Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East regions. "For the West in general, the unique location of Cyprus vis-a-vis Europe, the USSR, the Levant and Africa made it a topic of renewed salience in international relations."  

Unlike the 1950's when Cyprus was primarily a colonial problem kept strictly within the confines of the West, by 1963 Cyprus was a fully fledged member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the World community, and had ceased being an exclusive Western interest. On the contrary, Cyprus's implementation of an active, non-aligned foreign policy, meant that any adverse development that threatened its sovereignty and territorial integrity would most probably invite some sort of Soviet involvement.  

Radical political change and shifting alliance of certain Middle East regimes, such as Iraq and Syria had undergone, now elevated Cyprus's strategic value in the East/West rivalry in the region. Indeed, Egypt's tilt in the early 1960s towards a radical line, the emergence of Ben Bella's Algeria, the creation of OPEC, along with the Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean alarmed Western strategists. It was within this tense and fluid international setting that the December 1963 crisis unexpectedly erupted.
As armed clashes between the two communities rapidly spread across Cyprus, at the request of the Cyprus Government, a limited peacekeeping operation was launched by British troops (stationed at the British sovereign bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia). However, this move failed to restore civil order. Moreover, Ankara's warning that it would carry out a unilateral intervention by invading the island and the unsuccessful request for help by the Makarios Government to the UN Security Council on 28 December 1963, widened the escalation of the crisis into a major international dispute. (87)

Following the inconclusiveness of the British diplomatic efforts at mediation (88) on 25 January 1964, the British Foreign Secretary advised the Johnson Administration that his country intended to seek a broader peacekeeping force (89) through NATO. (90) Furthermore, he underscored that if there was no other Western solution forthcoming, he was ready to transfer the Cyprus issue to the UN. With the memory of the British troops counter-insurgency emergency operations against EOKA still fresh, unilateral British intervention seriously threatened to revive anti-colonial and anti-British feelings among the Greek Cypriot population.

President Johnson accepted the British proposal (91) and from February 1964, the United States assumed the initiative. Washington's overt involvement, however, also precipitated strong involvement by Khrushchev. (92)

On 28 January 1964, President Johnson (93) sent General Lemnitzer, the NATO commander in Europe, as his special envoy to Athens and Ankara. (94) The supreme Commander's trip stalled the threatened invasion, and laid the groundwork for the machinery formulation of a "NATO plan" for Cyprus. (95) The move was a turning point in that it signified formal involvement of
American diplomacy. Washington was anxious to prevent Soviet entanglement in the dispute in particular via the avenue of Security Council vetoes. However, the NATO plan was not introduced, primarily because of Makarios' rejection. The Archbishop stated that while he accepted the plan in principle, he preferred the introduction of the proposed multinational force to come under the direct authority of the United Nations Security Council.

Renewed efforts were made to amending the NATO proposal (drafted by the US and the UK) more acceptable to Makarios, following his rejection of the initial proposal. On 9 February 1964, US Under-Secretary of State George Ball and his British colleague, Mr Sandys, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, made major changes on their original plan. The proposals now incorporated that the Guarantor Powers, Greece, Turkey and the UK, would not exercise their rights of unilateral intervention under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee for a three-month period while talks for negotiated settlement were being conducted under the chairmanship of an acceptable mediator. Despite the acceptance of the plan by Athens and Ankara and the severe pressure placed on Makarios by the American envoy George Ball, during his talks with the Archbishop on 12 February, Makarios in the end in an intransigent mood, refused both the NATO peace-keeping force or the alternative of continuation of the British peacekeeping force. According to Linda Miller "the plan did not fail because of Makarios's unwillingness to accept an international peacekeeping force. Rather, it was clear that the Cypriot President's rejection did not derive from the military deficiencies of these proposals, but from his conviction that the United Nations would serve as the most..."
reliable mechanism for realisation of his internal political goals". (99) His Beatitude believed that approval of the NATO plan threatened to identify him too closely with the Atlantic Alliance and could have placed under jeopardy the support that he had secured for his position from the Soviet bloc and the non-aligned states. (100) Confident that the Eastern bloc countries and members of the non-aligned movement would continue their support, Makarios decided to take the dispute to the UN Security Council. (101) On 15 February, both Britain and Cyprus respectively presented the issue to the Security Council. After exhaustive debates, delaying tactics and reservations over the formation of another UN peacekeeping force by some members, on 4 March the Security Council passed unanimously resolution 186 recommending the creation of UNFICYP - the UN force in Cyprus, and the appointment of a mediator "for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, bearing in mind the well being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security". (103) The adoption of resolution 186 marked a diplomatic setback for the Inoriu Government which believed that only NATO mediation could secure a just settlement. (104)

The return of the Cyprus conflict to the United Nations forum after a lapse of five years failed to break the impasse. To a degree, the restrictive terms of reference imposed on UNFICYP, by the UN Security Council plus the problem of securing adequate funds for the force, limited the scope of peacekeeping operations over Cyprus. Moreover, although resolution 186 was adopted on 4 March 1964, the first contingents of UNFICYP did not reach Cyprus until 27 March. The delay increased the risk of renewed inter-communal clashes. (105) It can be argued
that had it not been for the interim peacekeeping of the British troops, prior to the arrival of UNFICYP, the clashes might have escalated beyond control which would have probably led to a Greek-Turkish War. (106)

Linda Miller has written that in Cyprus the role of the UN was strictly confined to containing the conflict and preventing external intervention and in particular Greek or Turkish government involvement while working towards a negotiated settlement. In the case of UNFICYP, the UN wanted to avoid confronting problems similar to those it had experienced in the Congo. The separation of the peacekeeping functions of UNFICYP from those of the mediator highlighted the desire of the Security Council to ensure that it introduced a form of UN participation that "would place the burden for resolving the issues on the parties themselves rather than upon the Organisation". (108)

On 2 June 1964, the crisis entered a new critical phase with the decision of the Turkish Security Council on 1 June, to invade Cyprus, the object being to create a strategic beachhead and then force upon the Greek Cypriot side to accept partition of the two communities. (109) During the escalation of the crisis, American officials observed that both Greece and Turkey now viewed the Cyprus issue as an integral part of their respective national interests and placed it ahead of their commitment to NATO.

In their efforts to avert a Greek-Turkish War President Johnson and his staff were faced with a serious policy problem. (110) Whether it could be possible to balance the act of preserving the sovereignty of Cyprus without threatening the respective interests of the United States, NATO, Greece and Turkey? If the Johnson administration decided to support Makarios' case
for majority rule by the Greek Cypriots, it placed at risk its longstanding bilateral relationship with Turkey. On the other hand, if it opposed the Archbishop, it threatened to damage its close ties with Greece. Alternatively if it refrained completely it would have antagonised both the Greek and Turkish Governments, and creating an opportunity for Soviet involvement into what was considered clearly as a Western dispute.

The potential of a Greek-Turkish War over Cyprus presented similar problems for NATO as it had done in the period 1955-1958. The crisis threatened to weaken NATO's South-Eastern flank. Senior State Department officials such as Assistant Secretary of State Ball, now viewed the crisis and the islands continuation as a sovereign non-aligned state, as posing a serious threat to American interests in the Eastern Mediterranean because: "it threatened to lead to a Turkish intervention and thus a Greek-Turkish War; it threatened Greece and Turkey's ties to the United States; it had strengthened the position of AKEL and the USSR on Cyprus;\(^{(111)}\) and finally it had created a serious problem to the UN; and it had undermined NATO".\(^{(112)}\)

Following the failure of the successive Anglo-American diplomatic efforts, President Johnson in the end was forced to personally intervene and mediate during the summer of 1964, in order to prevent the dispute from escalating into a Greek-Turkish War.

On 5 June, Johnson warned the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü, that his country might not be the recipient of NATO support in the event of a Soviet attack, if her invasion of Cyprus were carried out.\(^{(113)}\) However, the seasoned Turkish leader viewed Johnson's ultimatum as an unwarranted intervention in his governments' affairs and led to an immediate deterioration of Ankara's relations with the Johnson Administration. Despite
the high political cost, Johnson's ultimatum succeeded in deterring the Turkish military from implementing their planned invasion. (114)

In a concerted effort to end the stalemate, the US extended invitations to the Greek and Turkish leaders to visit Washington to discuss the Cyprus problem. In June 1964 Johnson met in Washington, separately, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers' Papandreou and Inönü. (115)

Following the Washington talks, the Johnson Administration applied pressure upon U-Thant (the UN Secretary-General) to sponsor a new "Cyprus" mediation effort to be conducted by former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson. American policymakers insisted upon the Acheson proposal despite the fact that a UN mediator, Sakari Tuomioja of Finland had already been nominated. Diplomatic observers assessed the American directive as a calculated move by the US to remove the problem out of the UN forum and bring it back under Western mediation circles. (116) Washington's attempts to dictate to U-Thant on how the dispute should be handled was a radical departure from its previous support for UN mediation. (117) While voting publicly for the Security Council resolutions, the US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, stated "the United States has no position as to the form or the shape of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. The leaders of the two communities must work out their differences together". (118) Moreover, when in March 1964 the UN Security Council had passed the resolution recommending the reaction of UNFICYP, President Johnson had declared that "the United States Government will give full support to the efforts of the United Nations mediator in this direction". (119)
U-Thant's firmness in rejecting the Acheson proposal forced Washington to accept a modified role for Acheson as outlined by the Secretary-General. U-Thant agreed to Acheson playing a secondary role in the scheduled Geneva talks.

Discussions between Greek and Turkish Government representatives began in Geneva on 4 July 1964, under the chairmanship of the UN mediator, Tuomioja. It should be noted that, neither President Makarios nor the Turkish-Cypriot leader Dr Kückük were invited to participate. The results of American behind the scenes mediation efforts at Geneva were expressed in the "Acheson plan". This plan contained, inter alia, the following key points: "first, enosis of Cyprus with Greece, in return for a thirty to fifty-year lease of a military base to the Turks. The Turks would have sovereignty over the base, whose size was approximately equal to one fifth of the island. Second, the cantonisation of the island, creating two parallel governmental structures, one for each of the two ethnic groups. Third, a joint military command for Greece and Turkey". Acheson's plan also included provisions for the creation of a permanent Turkish military base on Cyprus and the annexation to Turkey of the small Greek island Castellorizo. Both the Papandreou and Makarios Governments rejected Acheson's plan and claimed that it was another form of "double enosis" or partition.

The Archbishop started to fear that the delegates to the Geneva talks under Anglo-American pressure might produce terms for a negotiated settlement that were contrary to the interests of the Greek Cypriots. To increase his leverage Makarios renewed his contacts with the Soviet Union and increased his Government's contacts with Nasser's regime. His Beatitude's foreign policy re-orientations received a cool
reception from both Greece and the US, who believed that Makarios's new policy line enhanced Soviet efforts to undermine NATO's south-eastern flank through infiltration. In particular, they were concerned that the Kremlin might exact a price in return for its material and moral support of the Makarios position, thus increasing the possibility of another Cuban scenario in the Eastern Mediterranean. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, at the time commented, "we feel that the four countries primarily concerned should try to settle this amongst themselves, and not have a situation festering which gives an open invitation to outsiders to interfere and try to fish in troubled waters."

The Papandreou Government questioned Makarios's increased contacts with Moscow and underlined that if for tactical foreign policy reasons Makarios accepted the support of the Soviet Union and of AKEL (the Pro-Moscow Communist party of Cyprus) at home, they were skeptical, whether he could retain his independence of them indefinitely. In June 1964, Papandreou infiltrated Greek army units to Cyprus, and on 19 June appointed General Grivas, commander of the Greek forces in Cyprus (which included not less than 20,000 infiltrated Greek military personnel). Besides the re-inforcement strengthening the defences of Cyprus against a Turkish invasion, and fore-stalling the introduction of Soviet military aid, the new forces, and the introduction of General Grivas, were also intended to introduce a new Conservative countervailing influence in Cyprus to that of Makarios.

Soviet-Makarios cooperation was partly facilitated by Makarios's apprehensions over Acheson's plans, and his policy to accept Soviet diplomatic and military help as a deterrent against Ankara's planned invasion. His Beatitude was restless that...
Papandreou might agree to accept an Acheson plan which did not include total enosis. Acheson's pro-Turkish tilt in Geneva reinforced Makarios's suspicions. (135)

In August 1964 inter-communal clashes erupted when once again, Turkish planes bombarded Cypriot villages, but this time the Turkish planes bombed Greek Cypriot positions in order to help improve the strategic defences of the Turkish Cypriots by using the bombings to deter the Greek Cypriots from launching any new offensives. (136) At this point, the Soviet Union abandoned its previous declared support for Makarios and suddenly adopted a more cautious line. Khrushchev now urged Makarios that although he sympathised with him he believed a cease-fire would be an "important contribution" to peace. For some observers the Soviet "about face" was similar to their Cuban missile crisis turn-around in 1962. Adams and Cottrell have written that "Khrushchev in classical Leninist fashion was "buying time" in anticipation of a high level Kremlin reassessment of the issue." (137)

Differences between Turkey and the United States such as the Johnson ultimatum to İnönü over Cyprus, presented the Soviet Union with an opportunity to upgrade the status of Turkish-Soviet relations. According to Campbell, "Moscow's shift of tack amounted, in effect, to the abandonment of a policy which had treated Turkey as totally committed to the US in the cold war, and as an advance US base to be threatened on occasion with nuclear annihilation, in favour of a policy which acknowledged Turkey's right to choose its own course and offered some alternatives to one-sided dependence on the West." (138) Following the Johnson ultimatum and the collapse of the Acheson mediation efforts, the Turkish Government considered a review of its foreign policy, and to change the direction that focused on a gradual
reduction of its military and political obligations towards the West. (139)

Rapprochement with the Soviet Union was seen by some analysts as a move to secure support from Moscow for Turkey's Cyprus position. Hotham is of the opinion however, that "the true nature of the operation was rather the reverse: that the Cyprus issue was used by the Turks as a means to obtain a more independent position within NATO, thereby facilitating the approach towards the Soviet Union". (140) Turkey's brinkmanship over Cyprus had isolated her in the World Community.

During 1964-65 Turkey's standing with non-aligned states was at an all time low. Particularly since Makarios, in October 1964, had managed to secure complete support for his position during the movement's meeting in Cairo. (141) The Archbishop offensive paid off when on 18 December 1965, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution which inter alia noted UNGA's recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus. (142) The rapprochement with the Soviet Union was Turkey's greatest political trump-card, to counter the broad diplomatic support for Makarios' position. However, contrary to previously outlined arguments, Ullman and Dekmejian (143) believe three factors seemed to have encouraged the Inönü government to turn towards Moscow. "The desire to gain the support of the communist block in the United Nations, after it became evident that no Cyprus solution agreeable to Turkey would be forthcoming on the basis of support from NATO; a second involved Inönü's belief that by such a rapprochement he could deny Makarios the privilege of threatening to call upon Soviet help if pressed by Ankara", and that such a shift would force Washington into pressuring the Greek Government to accept a negotiated settlement that incorporated or accommodated in part Ankara's demands." (144)
Although the rapprochement with Moscow was fully endorsed by most Turkish leaders, Ankara was faced with a dilemma in its attempt to re-direct its foreign policy priorities. All the political leaders, except the leader of the Workers' Party (Pro-Moscow), believed in retaining Turkey's relations with the US and NATO as the cornerstone of her foreign policy. However, at the same time the same leaders wanted to water down Turkey's high profile with NATO, in order to increase her manoeuvrability.

The government eventually compromised by deciding to retain its close ties with the West, while simultaneously pursuing an independent position on some issues. Besides the "Cyprus" motive some scholars maintain that Turkish-Soviet rapprochement could partly be attributed to the emergence at this period of "detente" and to the more direct motive of Ankara seeking economic aid from the Soviet Union to make up for the declining amount of American and European assistance.

Turkey's Soviet move paid off when in 1965 Turkey, extracted support from Moscow for its position for an "Independent federated Cyprus". Following the Turkish foreign minister's visit to Moscow in November 1965, and the return visit by a Soviet delegation in January 1965, the Soviet Union stated that besides the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, "the legal rights of the two national communities", should also be guaranteed, a radical shift from its previously firm support for Makarios. However, despite the shift the Soviet leadership was cautious in its policy over Cyprus and refrained from any overt interference in the dispute.
CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT 1965-69

In the period of 1966-1974 a succession of events occurred which induced the Ankara leadership to implement a hawkish approach against Greece over its Cyprus policy.

The object of Chapters II and III is threefold. First, to examine the pattern and dynamics of the Cyprus conflict. Secondly, to analyse the succession of crises during this period, their causes and consequences. It will be suggested that to a large degree the causes of the 1974 crisis are to be found in the developments in the period 1966-74, in which overt and covert intervention were dominant, and the stability of Cyprus depended ultimately on walking the political tightrope between domestic and external factors. The delicate balance was indeed a difficult exercise for Makarios to maintain, particularly because it depended upon the constantly changing manoeuvres of the regimes in Athens and Ankara.

Rift between Athens and Nicosia

The deterioration in relations between Athens and Makarios, which became most acute during the rule of the military in Greece, had its origins in the Greek Government crisis of July 1965. The dispute then between Greek Premier Papandreou and the Greek High Command over Cyprus had contributed largely to his ousting, which in turn helped sow the seeds for the 1967 coup d'etat.¹
The minority Conservative Cabinets that succeeded Papandreou (after the dismissal of his Government by King Constantine in July 1965) until the military coup of 21 April 1967, favoured the Acheson proposals and applied heavy pressure on Makarios to accept it. The minority Prime Minister, Mr Stephanopoulos, who succeeded Papandreou supported the Acheson plan. He disliked Makarios from the days when he was a member of Papagos' Cabinet in the mid 1950's and believed that solution of the Cyprus question could only be achieved through Greek-Turkish talks. He placed Greece's relationship with NATO above everything else, and was also an advocate of close Greco-Turkish co-operation. Makarios rejected the contents of the NATO and Acheson plans, and the Greek position towards them. The widening rift between Athens and Nicosia was also placing under pressure, Greece's relations with Washington.

With NATO insistence, secret talks between the Greek and the Turkish Governments were held from June to December 1966. Greek-Turkish talks over Cyprus had been a policy priority of the Johnson Administration but former Premier Papandreou had been reluctant to initiate such a dialogue. The Makarios Government had been apprehensive of bilateral talks. As Mr Georghadjis its Minister of the Interior, stated in July 1966, it explicitly "... reserved the right to reject any solution reached". The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers held discussions on a number of occasions to examine the basis of a possible settlement; but little progress had been made because of the diametrically conflicting objectives of the two sides, and the neutral position adhered to by Makarios. Turkey reiterated her position that neither community in Cyprus dominate the other, that the balance of forces in the Aegean between them should remain in equilibrium as stipulated by the Treaty of Lausanne, and that any
proposed changes to the agreements in force, should be concluded only after all the interested sides had been consulted.

A major turning point in the protracted Greek-Turkish talks was the protocol that the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Toumbas and Caglayangil, signed in Paris on 17 December 1966. It provided inter alia for "Enosis". At this meeting Greece agreed to grant to Turkey "Dhekelia" (one of the two British Sovereign Bases in Cyprus). As a further concession, Toumbas offered the "Karagatch triangle", a strategic area in the Evros River of interest to Turkey. The remainder of Cyprus would have been demilitarised. This would have dramatically altered the local balance in favour of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The Greek concessions were viewed more conciliatory than those outlined in the Acheson plan. The magnitude of concessions acceded by Toumbas, was also symptomatic of the disjointed foreign policy followed by the minority Governments, which were undermined by the continuing unstable domestic developments. This protocol was never ratified as the Stephanopoulos Government was dissolved shortly after, for reasons other than the Cyprus problem.

While the minority Greek Government continued its talks with Ankara over Cyprus its relations with Makarios deteriorated. His Beautitude was critical of the talks and warned both Athens and Ankara that no agreement that they reached would be honoured by his Government.

In contrast to Makarios' ability to politically manoeuvre independently from Athens, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was almost totally dependent upon Ankara. The threat of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus was the key factor which could underwrite the security
of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The Turkish minority was almost exclusively dependent, for military, economic and diplomatic support on Turkey.\textsuperscript{15} Makarios' neutralist foreign policy and in particular his opposition to NATO sponsored solutions, enhanced his popularity in Greece especially among the Centre and Left political camps. Therefore, any attempt by the minority Athens regime to side-step Makarios would have been difficult and politically damaging, more so, since elections were scheduled to be held in May 1967.

The avenue by which the Athens government could apply pressure on Makarios was through the Greek National Guard in Cyprus, commanded by General Grivas, who was responsible directly to the Greek General staff. His Beatitude however, exploited the Greek Government's weak position in order to regain control of the National Guard from Grivas. Makarios underlined that to counter Ankara's accusations that Cyprus was under de facto Greek occupation by clandestine Greek forces, it had to be clearly demonstrated that the National Guard was under Cypriot control. He proposed to replace Grivas by General Gennimatas (the former chief of the Greek General Staff whom former Premier Papandreou had wanted to remove in 1965.) His demand was also based on his assessment that the former EOKA leader was preparing either to assassinate him or stage a coup d'etat.\textsuperscript{16}

However, Grivas opposed Makarios' moves to secure control of the National Guard. After Makarios' abortive attempt to remove Grivas or undermine his position, the Makarios Government insidiously tried to erode the National Guard's strength, or counterbalance it by strengthening and building other armed bodies under their direct control. While appropriations for the National Guard were reduced, on 24 February 1966, Makarios decided to increase the size of the police force,\textsuperscript{17} and concluded an arms deal for
1,000 rifles, 1,000 sub-machine guns, 20 mortars, and 20 armoured cars to be imported from Czechoslovakia, to strengthen its capability.

With the disclosure of the secret arms deal in December 1966, relations between Athens and Nicosia plummeted further and led to a heated intra-Greek dispute. The first consignment of the Czech weapons were delivered but, a second consignment including tanks and armoured cars was not honoured by the Prague government in December, following a strong diplomatic protest by Turkey. The UN Secretary-General made no demur when he learnt of their purpose, but the reactions of Athens towards Makarios were quite hostile.

With the collapse of the Stephanopoulos Government in December 1966 the Turkish Premier Demirel called off the dialogue and declared that his Government was not prepared to conduct talks with an interim government expected to hold office only until the elections scheduled for May 1967. In February 1967, the caretaker administration convened a Crown Council meeting and promised Makarios, who was present, that Greece would not conduct any further negotiations, except on a basis acceptable to Nicosia.

Action and Reaction: The Greek Military Regime and Cyprus

On 21 April 1967, a coup d'etat staged by a group of Greek officers ousted the civilian caretaker government. The coup was viewed as an unwelcome development by the majority of Greek Cypriot leaders, who were now also sceptical about the prospect of "Enosis", as a military Government in Athens was considered to have few attractions. Fears were also held that a parallel coup might be attempted to oust
Makarios. In light of the Greek coup and of possible machinations in Cyprus orchestrated by the new regime, the Soviet Union which had refrained from total commitment to either the Greek or Turkish Cypriots was now supporting the extension of UNFICYP's presence on Cyprus (in contrast to its stance in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war). With Soviet support, the Security Council unanimously voted on 19 June, to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months.

"Essentially the Colonels were narrow in vision, parochial in analysis, devout, pure, pious nationalists without interest in compromise or the capacity to understand the art of the possible. Enosis was sacred; any alternative was treason. The great obstacle to enosis - Turkey - could easily be ignored or manoeuvred into concessions; the real culprit - Archbishop Makarios - had to be pilloried", concludes Bell. A large segment of Greek officers were of the opinion that; Makarios preferred to remain President of Cyprus than proclaim enosis, that he espoused a radical foreign policy, and that he was a fellow-traveller.

Isolated internationally, the Athens military saw resolution of the Cyprus problem as a means to bolster their diplomatic image. The Colonels were under pressure from the Johnson White House and NATO to resolve the Cyprus issue through bilateral talks with the Demirel Government. As Xydis has written, "at the time there was a general revulsion in Western Europe against the establishment of the first military regime in this area since the war. The revulsion was strong enough to force the governments of Western Europe into demonstrations of immediate disapproval, which were expressed in diplomatic démarches or public statements."
During a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting held after the June war, the Greek and Turkish Ministers under pressure from their colleagues to resolve their outstanding differences agreed to revive their dormant talks over "Cyprus". The Demirel Cabinet believed that the Greek coup had created the right conditions for a resumption of the talks. Moreover, Turkish officials assessed that the military was likely to remain in power for quite a few years and that its foreign policy was not likely to be influenced or shaped by public opinion like its civilian predecessors.

The policy of the new Athens regime on how to resolve the Cyprus problem agitated the Makarios Government. In July 1967, however, Athens was determined to initiate new moves to break the stalemate in Cyprus. In a statement issued in Athens in July the military, demanded the dismissal of Cabinet Ministers in the Makarios Government, who "on the eve of decisive developments, lay down groundless conditions and subversive prerequisites which would make 'Enosis' impossible". The statement called on these persons - "who, 'unhappily' included some who hold the highest posts in the State and influence the leadership of the Cypriot people to make room for those who trusted the national Greek Government and the Cypriot leadership and had the realistic spirit needed for a final solution that will be both profitable to the nation and generally acceptable". The Greek warning was in reply to a statement made during a House of Representatives debate by Mr Clerides in which he inter alia stated "that he was opposed to any plan for "Enosis" that would provide for a Turkish military base in Cyprus."

The Greek military Government believed that the major obstacle to an "Enosis" compromise settlement, was the Archbishop's refusal to any territorial concessions or the offering of military
bases to Turkey. The possibility of the Athens Junta agreeing to a negotiated solution which rejected or failed to incorporate Makarios' objections, forced his Beautitude into patching up his differences with Athens. The achievements of Ankara's diplomatic offensive, as shown with the visit to Paris of President Sunay and his talks with De Gaulle, and the continued diplomatic isolation of Greece, were factors that Makarios took into consideration in deciding to adopt closer relations towards Athens and Western Europe. Although from the outset Makarios was aware of the real intentions of the military concerning Cyprus, and while other members of his Cabinet were publicly critical of Greek policy, he remained silent. Makarios was hopeful that with time, he might be able to out-manoeuvre Athens over its Cyprus policy.

On 4 July, Makarios advised Athens that he would not accept any "bargain" made between Greece and Turkey on the future of Cyprus. However, in his dealings with the Athens military, Makarios adopted a cautious approach. His Beautitude was acutely aware that, firstly, the military were not sympathetic to Greek Cypriot aspirations. Secondly, the Israeli victory in the June war over the Arabs and in particular Egypt, had eroded the Arabs position and was also a drawback for Makarios' foreign policy, which closely identified with Nasser's policies in the region. Finally, the talk of an Athens-inspired coup in Cyprus had forced Makarios to evolve towards a policy of appeasement. Commentators on the Cyprus problem believed that, the Athens demand for the removal of Mr Clerides, might be the prelude to the removal of Makarios himself. Makarios managed to regain some lost ground vis a vis Athens by managing to secure once again the support of Moscow which was opposed to the newly installed anti-communist and pro-NATO Athens regime.
Following meetings between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in Bonn and Luxembourg during July 1967, Greece and Turkey renewed their talks over Cyprus. During a three day visit to Cyprus, Junta strongman Colonel Papadopoulos, pledged that "Greece would strive for enosis by peaceful methods, and in co-operation with President Makarios." However, the policy of Athens was contrary to this statement, and was highlighted by the fact that the Greek-Turkish talks were being held on a platform which stipulated "Enosis" in return for a Turkish base on the island, or a Turkish presence in a NATO base. The military's position clashed with Makarios' tactical position which, excluded outright a Turkish base or anything which espoused Turkish Cypriot autonomy. Anti-Communism and hence closer relations with Turkey - a NATO ally and the strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO were placed on a higher priority by the Greek regime than relations with Nicosia. Within this policy platform a non-aligned and neutralist Makarios in Cyprus was considered an anathema.

Athens persisted in its opening towards Turkey, despite the explicit warnings by the Turkish Foreign Minister that "Turkey will never accept a solution to the problem of Cyprus based on 'enosis'." Caglayangil's strong statement appeared to vindicate the view held by Greek Cypriot political leaders that, no negotiated settlement could be reached because of the fundamental differences of the Greek and Turkish positions and that no meaningful breakthrough would materialize from the consultations.

Greek-Turkish Summit Talks over the Cyprus Question

On 9-10 September 1967, a Greek-Turkish conference held at Kesan and Alexandroupolis at the suggestion of Demirel, ended in a major diplomatic
setback for the Athens military. In seeking the new diplomatic talks with Ankara, Athens underestimated the complexities of the Cyprus problem and announced prematurely in an optimistic tone that a final solution was in the offing. However, the talks proved inconclusive.

The Greek side was hopeful that if an accord could be reached with Ankara, Makarios might be persuaded to accept it. The Turkish Premier, however, repeatedly referred to the London agreement of 1959, which categorically excluded "Enosis", and also demanded the withdrawal of all the excess Greek troops from Cyprus before any other matter was discussed. Athens had certainly miscalculated by expecting to extract concessions from the Turkish side which came to the meeting in a political position far stronger than their own. In view of the diplomatic isolation of the military, Ankara rejected the Greek proposals and used the venue instead to enhance its position on other outstanding differences.

While the Greeks proposed "Enosis", the Turks referred to the London-Zurich agreements, and in the end the talks terminated, achieving only a vague communique on co-operation and future rapprochement. The conference was convened without sufficient background preparatory work by both sides and without consulting either the Greek or Turkish Cypriot leaders.

Even if Athens had succeeded in extracting a plan from Ankara — including a Turkish military base on the island — it would have been difficult for them to succeed in getting the Greek Cypriot leadership to approve or agree to any pre-determined deal. Without the Archbishop's consent
Athens ran the risk of agitating Makarios to publicly renounce "Enosis" which he had fought for so many years.

Makarios declared the summit talks a "failure", and said that "a solution should not be dependent on the dialogue." Similarly commenting on the same talks, the former United Nations mediator in Cyprus, Mr Galo Plaza, stressed that "The Cyprus problem cannot be solved by Greece and Turkey alone ... conferences between Greece and Turkey would reach no conclusion, particularly if Cypriot representatives were not included".

Upon his return to Turkey, Demirel noted the extent to which the talks had been a failure from the Greek point of view and made a similar appraisal to Plaza's. He reiterated that he had rejected the Greek side's proposal for "Enosis", and that he had insisted on the validity of the Zurich agreement.

The November 1967 Cyprus Crisis and American Shuttlecock Diplomacy: The Vance Mission

In November 1967, an outbreak of inter-communal hostility in Cyprus, escalated into a serious crisis that once again threatened to engulf Greece and Turkey into a possible war.

The crisis began when Greek Cypriot police (CYPOL) enforced their right of patrol through two villages, Ayios Theodorous (mixed population) and Kophinou (all Turkish). On 14 November, two CYPOL units patrolled the area without any incident. However, UNFICYP High Command advised the Cyprus government that the patrol had made its point, and that the additional CYPOL patrol led by Grivas on the same day was not needed. This was contrary to the established norm of periodic patrols and underscored to the Makarios
Government the dangers in its approach to sustain the pressure against the Turkish Cypriot enclave. On 15 November, a CYPOL patrol was stopped at Kophinou and attacked. This incident led to a full scale attack by the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Police Tactical Reserve Forces. By launching the offensive, the Greek Cypriot forces had disregarded UNFICYP's instructions. The attack was also contrary to the Security Council's advice "to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus, or endanger international peace". Prior to the November incident, the capture and later the release of the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash by Greek Cypriots and violations of Greek air space by Turkish air force planes on 2 and 4 November, had created an atmosphere of tension both in Cyprus and between Greece and Turkey. The Kophinou/Ayios Theodorous offensive led by Grivas had taken place with the covert approval of the Athens military - which had been briefed earlier on the likely ramifications of such an operation. Since Grivas was responsible to the Greek High Command, it was up to the Greek military to change the instructions to Grivas.

Turkey warned Greece and Makarios of the ultimate sanction of an invasion of Cyprus. The National Guard's attack on Turkish Cypriot enclaves, in November, strengthened the hand of "Turkish" hawks who were demanding a military invasion. On the 15th, Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, requested UNFICYP to intervene and negotiate a cease-fire. In the meantime throughout Turkey there were demonstrations in support of a Turkish invasion. On 16 and 17 November the Turkish National Assembly and Senate confirmed upon the Demirel Cabinet the power to use the Turkish armed forces to invade Cyprus. Demirel declared that his government would "do everything possible and necessary to stop Greek aggression in Cyprus." Despite the Turkish ultimatum, CYPOL on the 17th sent a patrol into
the hostile area. However, within 24 hours, UNFICYP had managed to negotiate a cease-fire and the Greek National Guard troops had withdrawn from the villages. Demirel took advantage of Greece's international isolation and decided that he would use the incident to extract concessions that would strengthen the Turkish Cypriot's security and Turkey's wider interests. In a note to the Greek Government he demanded:

(1) "Removal of the Greek soldiers on the Island in violation of the Treaty Alliance;

(2) Removal of General Grivas;

(3) Disbandment of the entire National Guard;

(4) Disengagement in the area where the fighting took place;

(5) Authorization for Turkish Cypriots to form their own local governments and police forces in their enclaves;

(6) Compensation to Turkish Cypriots for losses resulting from the attacks; and

(7) Enlargement of the United Nations' Peacekeeping force to preclude a repetition of the attacks."

The Greek Military's Reaction to the Turkish Ultimatum

Threatened by aerial bombardment plus an impending invasion of Cyprus and the risk of a clash on the Greek-Turkish border, Athens stalled for time. A diplomatic avenue was needed to be found in order to minimise the damage to its already shaky credibility. Athens accepted Demirel's first demand that General
Grivas be recalled to Greece and in a symbolic move to offset Ankara's threat appointed Mr Pipinelis, a career diplomat, as Foreign Minister on 20 November. Diplomatic observers however, saw the appointment of Mr Pipinelis as a ploy by Athens to gain time.

The military proposed bilateral talks with Turkey, however, Demirel accused Athens of delaying tactics and rejected the offer. Mr Tuley, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, said that "before Ankara could consider the Greek suggestion, Greece should reply to the set of demands submitted by the Turkish government".

These demands were viewed by Athens more as an attempt by Ankara to discredit the regime than to improve the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The demand that Greek forces in Cyprus be reduced to the treaty level was rejected by Athens in its reply to the Turkish note on 22 November. The Greek government's refusal to accept the Turkish preconditions for a settlement heightened the tension between them. Mr Pipinelis said "that Greece was determined to accept no settlement of the Cyprus dispute which would be incompatible with the national interest and Greek dignity".

Dismissing the Greek reply as unsatisfactory, Demirel threatened that an invasion of Cyprus was imminent and that it would be launched the next day. Ankara was now seeking a radical tilt in the balance of forces towards the Turkish Cypriot side. Such a move it argued was the only means to prevent another outburst of intercommunal violence. As the Turkish representative stated to the UN Security Council: "...The Turkish government firmly believes that the only element which threatens the peace on the island, which poses the greatest danger to the security of life of the
Turkish community, and the most direct impediment to the effective functioning of UNFICYP in Cyprus, emerges the presence of the Illegal Greek Army of occupation which has been brought to the island surreptitiously ...".81

Although Athens was ready to negotiate with Ankara, the thought of agreeing, to concede major concessions in order to appease the Turkish Government placed the Greek military in an unenviable position.82

Turkey's Strategic and Diplomatic Advantage

Ankara's carefully timed and orchestrated combination of military and diplomatic threat placed it in a vantage position whereby it could demand concessions from Athens, which under different conditions would have probably led to war. In particular, the Turkish side was favoured by the diplomatic isolation of Greece, which in turn weakened its posture towards Ankara by; Washington's involvement in Vietnam and by the erosion of support for Makarios83 by the Post-Khruschev Soviet leadership84. It has also been noted that most world attention at the time was focussed on the United Kingdom's Sterling crisis, and that it was probable that the Demirel Cabinet estimated that Turkey could over-react, and get away with it.85

Devoid of any diplomatic support and with its armed forces in a state of military unpreparedness, war seemed an unlikely option for Greece and placed Turkey into a forceful position to threaten war. A clash at this point in time in all probability, would have led to the demise of the military, which eventually occurred 7 years later. If Turkey had invaded Cyprus, Greece would undoubtedly have been compelled to intervene to defend the Greek Cypriots. Yet its ability to intervene effectively was limited both by distance and by the
disorganised state of the Greek armed forces, stemming in part from a purge of experienced battle seasoned officers as a result of the "ASPIDA" affair, and the April coup. The partial arms embargo imposed by the Johnson Administration, after the coup of 21 April, added to the level of unpreparedness of Greece's armed forces.

As the crisis escalated, it became apparent that the Greek armed forces were at a disadvantage. The situation also highlighted the "value in a crisis of local military superiority, and a will to use it out of proportion to the political issues at stake." During the crisis Demirel was looking for a way to secure the interests of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. However, his policy dilemma at the time was how to formulate an approach that would accomplish this without exposing the Turkish Cypriots to unnecessary risk. As Harris declares: "Precedent favoured [Turkey] making a convincing show of its determination to exercise its treaty rights to invade if necessary in order to compel a return to the status quo ante". An integral part of such a policy rested upon Demirel's skill to agree to an invasion. It was around this issue that Turkey exercised maximum strategic leverage over Greece. "Turkish military strategy planned to establish a beach-head, or occupy a port, in Cyprus. Meanwhile, the Turkish army in Thrace would await possible aggression from the Greeks. The overwhelming opinion was that the First Hellenic Army would not budge. In that case, the military actions would be limited to Cyprus". In the event of a Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus, Turkey's Air superiority and its close proximity to Cyprus, would, from the commencement of hostilities have placed it in a strategically superior position (as shown in August 1964). It was not possible for the Greek air force to provide adequate air cover over Cyprus, as the island was out of range from most Greek bases and any attempt
to reinforce Cyprus with additional troops would in all probability have led to Ankara countering the move by invading Cyprus. Reinforcement of the Greek ground troops by air support would have also been extremely dangerous, and there was a chance that the troop-carrying aircraft would have been shot down before they even reached Cypriot airspace. Ahmed states that "the decision not to intervene militarily was probably a wise one, for its outcome could have been partition of the island by Turkey and Greece. Strategically, this was never seen as being in the interest of Turkey, for 'double enosis' would have permitted a Greek military presence only forty miles from the coast of southern Turkey, and could have proved most dangerous in a future armed conflict. It was in Turkey's interest therefore to maintain an independent Cyprus, provided that the security and rights of the Turkish minority were guaranteed." 

Besides the local strategic superiority, the Turkish government correctly deduced that the international developments also placed it in a strong diplomatic position. Turkey skillfully used its newly acquired diplomatic flexibility to manoeuvre which resulted from the partial lifting of the Soviet threat from the North, thus strengthening its bargaining position over Cyprus. Although Moscow's rapprochement with Ankara came during and after the Cypriot crisis, wider considerations prompted the Kremlin to revise its policy towards Turkey. Good relations with Turkey were crucial for the Soviets to freely manoeuvre in the Mediterranean, as the deployment of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean required a guarantee of unrestricted passage through the Dardanelles. As Zoppo points out, "the operational capability of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet is curtailed by Turkish control of the Straits and ... neither modern technology nor friendly Arab ports can completely eliminate the constraint Turkish
control of the Straits places on the operations of the Soviet fleet west of Bosporus". 98

In 1967, the Soviet Union refrained from criticisms of Ankara when it threatened to invade Cyprus. The silence was interpreted by Turkish diplomats as signalling a pro-Turkish tilt by Moscow. This was confirmed on 23 November, when the Soviet Government released a statement stressing that: "The present events in Cyprus cannot be considered in isolation from the policy of the reactionary circles of Greece, which, with the support of outside forces, have for quite some time been drawing up plans envisaging a solution of the Cyprus problem by military methods, and the liquidation of the independence and territorial integrity of the Cypriot state through so called 'enosis'. 99

The Soviet leadership had opposed Turkish policy on Cyprus until 1965. Since that period, while "neutral" on the dispute, it outlined support for the Turkish position in several areas of its policy over the Cyprus problem culminating with its public support for Turkey in November 1967. 100 The rift between President Johnson and the İnönü Government in 1964 had played a part in the Turkish rapprochement with Moscow. Soviet relations with Turkey eventually expanded in 1966-67. In September 1967, the Turkish Premier went to the Soviet Union on an official visit. In the joint communiqué issued at the end of the trip, the two sides noted, "the grave danger created by attempts to aggravate the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, and deprive the Cypriot state of independence". 101

The policy followed by recent regimes in Ankara had been to continue its close ties with the West and in particular with the United States, while at the same time conducting normal diplomatic relations with
Moscow. The perception held by Turkish officials and in particular the Turkish military was that the Soviet Union was waiting in the wings to take advantage of any power vacuum. This led Turkish policymakers to administer a cautious foreign policy viz-a-viz the Soviet Union, which was counterbalanced by a firm commitment to NATO. Overall, its opening towards Moscow improved its manoeuvrability. Despite this move Ankara's strategic dependence on the United States and NATO was still vital.

Crisis Diplomacy "Concert" - The Vance Mission

On 22 November, in a move to prevent a Greek-Turkish war the Johnson Administration, in concert with the Wilson Government and Canada proposed a settlement formula. The Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, was chosen to make the proposal. The trilateral plan was presented to the Greek Foreign Minister on 22 November by their respective Ambassadors in Athens. The plan called for:

(1) the number of Greek and Turkish troops stationed in Cyprus to be reduced to the levels specified in the Treaty of Alliance accords;

(2) the size of UNFICYP to be increased;

(3) members of the Turkish Cypriot community who suffered injuries or damages in the incidents to be compensated, and the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority to be guaranteed; and

(4) the Demirel Government to guarantee that Turkey would not intervene militarily on the island.
The proposal which had the full diplomatic support of the three co-sponsors, was primarily a move to stall for time in order to help diffuse the latest Cyprus crisis. The peace plan contained some concessions for all the interested parties. The conflicting replies to Pearson's formula indicated that detailed negotiations would need to follow before any agreement that accommodated their respective interests could be reached. However, the atmosphere was so tense that it was not even possible to extract an agreement for representatives from Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey to come to the negotiating table "(No such meeting had taken place in the last four years.)" Moreover, the British Government with extensive first-hand experience in dealing with past Turkish-Greek animosity, was in this instance not in favour of placing the Cyprus problem before the Security Council. The premise being that such a move would have exacerbated the respective intransigent positions.

Demirel held the diplomatic trumpcard and played it effectively with aggressive diplomacy backed by the threat of war, he reiterated his demands. The Athens regime, after evaluating the stringent Turkish demands was now more receptive and agreed to meet with Turkish representatives. It rejected the Turkish ultimatum "no discussion without withdrawal" and counter argued "no withdrawal without discussion". In this climate of obstinance outside mediation seemed necessary.

On 22 November, President Johnson appointed former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, as his special envoy to mediate in the dispute. On the same day, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed José Rolz-Bennet (of Guatemala) as his special representative. On 24 November, Athens and Ankara
accepted a third mediator, Manlio Brosio, the Secretary-General of NATO.

As the crisis escalated it became evident that the impending invasion would be called off only as part of a total package which achieved both a reduction or withdrawal of the clandestine Greek troops in Cyprus and a strengthening of UNFICYP. The above package was not inherently unacceptable to either Athens or Ankara. To the Demirel Cabinet it offered the prospect of a Greek withdrawal and an improvement in security arrangements for the Turkish Cypriot minority. Similarly, to the Athens Junta it provided an opportunity to withdraw from a totally unfavourable position. The reasons why the Greek military did not find the withdrawal unacceptable is partly linked to the internal politics of Greece. In September 1967 the military had heard reports that King Constantine was planning a counter coup to overthrow the Junta with the help of "certain monarchist officers" in the armed forces. The Junta feared that a royalist counter-coup might be launched from within the Greek forces in Cyprus, possibly assisted by the "pro-Royalist" Makarios. (The Greek Pentagon had not placed, by November 1967, enough officers loyal to the Athens regime in key posts on the island.) Hence, the withdrawal of the Greek forces stood to eliminate the threat of a coup from Cyprus.

United States Foreign Policy and the 1967 Cyprus Crisis

From the outset Cyrus Vance was confronted with a policy dilemma in his task of averting a war between America's two NATO allies. He was placed in an uneasy position between them and was forced to play the "honest broker". Vance was aware that any move that favoured either Greece or Turkey, simultaneously ran the risk of alienating the other.
In Washington, in November 1967, State Department policymakers knew that President Johnson could not follow the same tactics he had used in 1964 to avert a Greek-Turkish war. It seems clear even without knowing Vance's actual instructions, that in 1967 the Johnson administration was not prepared to sanction the Turkish invasion by employing military force, and that the Athens military was probably so informed. War between two NATO allies was unacceptable for the Johnson administration in November 1967, as it had been in 1964, but US officials held fears that a Turkish invasion of Cyprus could lead to forceful counter-measures on the part of Greece. To avert this "worst case" scenario, Washington's only viable option was to press via diplomatic means, for a peaceful resolution, although State Department officials were conscious that advocating such a solution could threaten US-Turkish relations once again. Since its 1964 diplomatic intervention against İnönü, the United States had not been prepared to further undermine its relations with Turkey over the Cyprus problem. Without overt US intervention, and short of war, the only option available to the Athens military, was to accede to the Turkish ultimatum.

Vance's diplomatic effort was facilitated by the gradual emergence of an international consensus which, in this instance, also included the Soviet Union. On 22 and 24 November, the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, issued appeals to the President of Cyprus and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey: "I appeal to the three states most directly involved - Cyprus, Greece and Turkey - in the strongest possible terms, to exercise utmost restraint, particularly at this critical juncture, to avoid all acts of force or the threats of recourse to force."
On 24 November, the Turkish President, General Sunay, sent letters to world leaders declaring that Turkey had "decided to solve the Cyprus problem once and for all", after having tried all diplomatic means in vain. Sunay asserted that the London and Zurich agreements on Cyprus had been violated and that President Makarios's administration had annihilated the Cyprus Constitution. In the meantime, following an examination of the Cyprus developments, the UN Security Council adopted, on 25 November, without a formal vote a "consensus" which endorsed the UN Secretary-General's appeal for calm, and his subsequent recommendation that all external forces be withdrawn from Cyprus, except for those of UNFICYP. The Security Council consensus seemed to remove the threat of imminent war. In the management of the crisis the United Nations body supplemented the mediation efforts of Vance mostly through its existence as an acceptable forum. This provided both sides with the proper diplomatic venue and through impartial guarantees and peacekeeping, over an extended period of time through UNFICYP.

The decision by Moscow not to take an active interest in the November crisis indirectly assisted the US envoy's mediation efforts. Had the Soviet regime decided to intervene in an overt way, as it did in 1964, Vance's ability to manoeuvre in the dispute would have been limited.

Analysts within the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) monitoring the crisis noted the possibility that the United States and the Soviet Union could be locked into a confrontation over Cyprus. Even if a Greek-Turkish conflict did not lead to direct involvement by the United States or the Soviet Union, it would have been a major strategic setback for the United States if war broke out between two of its client states. Besides their NATO
membership, both had concluded bilateral defence agreements with the United States and together had received more than 4.5 billion dollars in American arms since 1946.\textsuperscript{122}

The Link between the Soviet Union's Middle East Policy and Its 1967 "Cyprus" Posture

Moscow's decision not to intervene in November 1967, contrasted sharply with the active role the Soviet Union played, in the neighbouring June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and its involvement during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. Western diplomats, at first, feared that the Soviet Union might play an active part in the latest Cyprus crisis and, thereby, underscore its presence in the Mediterranean. However, contrary to its assessments, Moscow decided to maintain an almost unprecedented air of detachment throughout the critical phase of the crisis. A number of developments could have been instrumental to the Kremlin's benign stance.

The Kremlin policy-makers responsible for Soviet policy on the Cyprus problem were continuously aware that the Cyprus dispute fell within the Western sphere of influence and any strong Soviet involvement would have affected Moscow's wider foreign policy relations with the US. The Kremlin was apprehensive throughout the 1967 crisis to avoid any "backfire" effect\textsuperscript{123} that could have turned the dispute into a major East-West issue. Such a scenario would have probably had negative results for the Soviets in that it would have resulted in a closing of the ranks by NATO, including the two adversaries Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{124}

The Soviet Union observed during the 1967 Cyprus crisis, as it did in the June 1967 Middle East War, the necessity of maintaining a buffer between local conflicts and a potentially global conflict.\textsuperscript{125} As
Adams and Cottrell state, "where the issues are complex, Moscow prefers to act not with tactical consistency but according to opportunity, thereby reinforcing fundamental and strategic objectives. Given the diversity of the political entities involved in the Cyprus problem and the Kremlin's special and often changing relations with each of them, the Soviet leaders wish, at all costs, to retain their flexibility. In their view, maintaining a strong position of influence over the affairs of one troubled island, and consistently supporting its indigenous communist party, is not worth the sacrifice of concomitant advantage elsewhere."  

A Critical Analysis of Cyprus Vance's Mediation Tactics

The Presidential envoy, tried to save as much face for both the Greek and Turkish sides by shuttling continuously between Athens and Ankara and gradually obtaining agreement on the major issues of contention. Vance's modus operandi was to first forestall a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and then attempt to extract a detailed agreement. He held talks alternately with Greek and Turkish officials. On 24 November, the US envoy advised the Athens military that rather than appear to be responding to Ankara's threats, Greece could consider a proposal to be channelled via the office of the UN Secretary-General on agreed terms and would project the view that Greece would be responding to U-Thant's recommendations rather than to Demirel's ultimatum. While offering the U-Thant option in Athens, in Ankara Vance tried to ensure that the Turkish Government did not increase its set of demands.

Throughout his "Cyprus" mediation Vance worked closely with both the NATO Secretary-General and U-Thant's special representative. Gradually, he managed
to get Greece and Turkey to draft a plan. The turning point occurred on 24 November, when the Athens military agreed to withdraw its excess troops stationed in Cyprus but only if some means could be found to ensure that their decision did convey the view that they had succumbed to Ankara's pressure. Vance, having obtained Greece's agreement to his formula, presented it to Ankara for acceptance. In reply, Demirel's government put forward a set of rigid counter-proposals. A combination of factors, headed by the Parliamentary Opposition's reaction, led to the Turkish Premier taking a tougher stance. He feared that the Greek side would evade the terms of a settlement if it dragged out.

An unforeseen setback in the de-escalation of the dispute developed as the Turkish Government re-examined the agreements extracted by Vance. Demirel's Cabinet was primarily examining closer the objections to Vance's proposals stipulated by some of the minor opposition parties. The Turkish Premier was trying to shield his political flank before he conveyed to the US envoy that the proposals were acceptable. The Turkish Government having also mobilised an invasion force in 1964, was aware that if that force disembarked without going anywhere it would have been under pressure, to show impressive results in order to placate domestic public opinion for once again, rejecting the military option of war over Cyprus.

Following days of drafting countless peace formulae, the prospects of averting war and peacefully resolving the crisis seemed a real possibility. At one phase the talks were only narrowly averted from collapsing. However, a last minute switch in outlook by the interested parties, enabled the Presidential envoy to successfully conclude the talks. Vance's diplomatic efforts were facilitated in part by the active participation of Brosio and Rolz-Bennet, both of
whom as envoys paid separate visits to Ankara and Athens. On 27 November, an inconclusive agreement was reached after Athens military accepted the Demirel proposals that Vance brought back from Ankara. Despite Athens concurrence, the agreement could not be ratified until it had also been approved by President Makarios.

For the first six days of his nine day mediation the US envoy focussed his attention exclusively on Athens and Ankara and totally bypassed the Cyprus Government. Vance's strategy was to extract an agreement from Greece and Turkey on an acceptable settlement, and then to provide Makarios with the option of either accepting the terms of settlement, or to be projected as the side torpedoing the agreement and prolonging the crisis. The reason for this was summed up by a senior diplomat, "It was not Vance's mission to get an agreement that would work - that, in view of the problems among the three countries, would have been impossible. His job was simply to get an agreement that would avert the immediate threat of war". By ignoring the Greek Cypriots' objections, Vance was able to secure an agreement between Ankara and Athens which permitted the Turkish leaders to begin political, if not yet military, demobilisation without stopping to demand what Makarios would do. It has been argued that had Vance tried from the outset to include Cyprus into the agreement the talks would have collapsed or made insignificant progress that Ankara would in all probability have carried out the invasion.

Makarios was acutely aware of the insignificant role his government played in the mediation efforts spearheaded by Vance, Brozio and Tafall to bring Athens and Ankara together. President Makarios, at the height of the crisis stated that, "Whether the war that threatens our island will be avoided or not does not depend on us".
Makarios, on 27 November, conveyed to the UN special envoy Rolz-Bennet that he would agree to the removal of all Greek and Turkish contingents from the island with a view to eventual demilitarisation. During Vance's first meeting with Makarios, on 29 November, the US mediator assumed rather prematurely that His Beautitude would fully endorse the proposed Turkish-Greek agreement which he had drafted. Makarios saw the talks as an opportunity to extract substantial concessions from Vance who had deliberately excluded him in the earlier phase of the negotiations.

On 30 November, Greece and Turkey agreed to the terms of Vance's formula. The move signified that the crisis had been deferred, and it was only the formality of the Secretary-General to issue the agreement under UN auspices and in turn being ratified by the parties. Last minute reservations by Makarios, however, threatened to torpedo the Vance settlement and forced the US envoy to return to Cyprus to avert the collapse of the agreement. In the meantime the UN Secretary-General who was scheduled to announce the terms of the agreement on 1 December 1967 was forced to postpone the announcement until an agreement was extracted from Makarios as well.

Makarios had added to the Turkish demand calling for disbandment of the entire National Guard and the demand for total demilitarisation of Cyprus and thus linking the removal of both the Greek and Turkish army contingents as specified under the London Agreement. The Demirel government strongly objected to Makarios' proposal. However, His Beautitude was determined to resist a reduction in the National Guard or to accept an increase in UNFICYP members except only if it was part
of a wider settlement that contained UN guarantees of Cypriot independence. Following a new round of Vance/Makarios talks, U-Thant issued a third appeal.\textsuperscript{141} In an attempt to force Makarios to abandon his intransigent position to the Vance formula, the Greek and Turkish Governments publicly stated that they both agreed with the terms despite Makarios' opposition.\textsuperscript{142} In the meantime, U-Thant appealed to the governments of Greece and Turkey, "... to carry out an expeditious withdrawal of those of their forces in excess of their respective contingents in Cyprus ... with regard to any further role that it might be considered desirable for UNFICYP to undertake, I gather that this could involve, subject to the necessary action by the Security Council, enlarging the mandate of the force so as to give it broader functions".\textsuperscript{143}

Greece and Turkey responded favourably to the appeal, and stated that they were "ready to carry it out expeditiously". The Greek Cypriot's reply was, however, interim and qualified. Representatives of Greece and Turkey signed an agreement, on 3 December, to reduce the number of the armed forces each had stationed in Cyprus.

The Greek-Turkish pact called for:

a. the removal from Cyprus, within 45 days, of all Greek and Turkish troops not authorized under the 1960 Cyprus accord;

b. the dismantling, within 45 days, of all Greek and Turkish war preparations that had precipitated the crisis;

c. the disarming of all local military forces on Cyprus, particularly the Greek Cypriot National Guard; and

d. the expansion of the 4,500-man UN force to prevent further communal clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.\textsuperscript{144}
In his talks with Vance, Makarios once again outlined his objections to the internal security arrangements for Cyprus agreed by Greece and Turkey. On 4 December, Makarios repeated his proposals, emphasising his positive response to U-Thant's peace plea. Inter alia he stated, "my government considers that effective guarantees against any military intervention in the affairs of Cyprus is a demanding necessity for peace, and should be insured through the Security Council". Makarios' proposal that any change in UNFICYP's status should be examined in terms of eventual demilitarisation, and considered by the UN Security Council, was opposed by the United States, Britain and other UN Security Council members on the grounds that such a meeting would only polarize further Greek/Turkish antagonism in the UN and lead to a barrage of charges by both camps.

Greece and Turkey approved the UN Secretary-General's recommendation to expand UNFICYP, but Makarios insisted that he would consider a larger role for UNFICYP, only if the Cyprus Government could exercise some degree of control over it.

Makarios attacked Turkey's demand to re-arrange the balance of forces on Cyprus using an expanded UNFICYP, a demand which in the final analysis did not stand much chance of being approved by the Security Council, as a veto on the question of expanding UNFICYP was expected from the Soviet Union and possibly France. In the end Makarios' adamant posture paid off. In the final agreement, there was no reference to the Turkish demand for the disbandment of the Greek Cypriot National Guard while the reference to possible expansion of UNFICYP was heavily qualified.
The November Crisis in Retrospect

The November crisis affected many diverse relationships. The crisis represented a defeat for the Greek military regime. Its retreat from the Cyprus arena meant that Athens' leverage vis-a-vis Makarios was at least temporarily reduced. By submitting to Demirel's demands for a withdrawal of the illegal Greek forces on Cyprus, the Athens military forfeited the hold that it had over Makarios on the "Enosis" issue. This was especially the case given that it had been forced to curb its own "Enosis" aspirations. Indeed by "capitulating", the Colonels' regime revealed its internal weaknesses and also produced a wave of anti-Greek Government feeling in Cyprus, where Greek Cypriot political leaders recalled the pledges of the Athens military to resolve the Cyprus problem. Following the withdrawal of the clandestine Greek troops, Makarios abandoned "Enosis" and became firmly committed to a policy of national independence.

The November 1967 crisis drastically altered the situation on Cyprus, and illustrated Makarios' political acumen and strength in standing up to the Turkish threat of invasion, while skillfully avoiding some of the consequences of the Athens and Ankara agreement. He ignored the Greek example, and refused to capitulate to Vance's pressure without first extracting substantial concessions.

In the case of Turkey, the crisis was a well orchestrated diplomatic success for Demirel though it failed to make any breakthrough on the inter-communal issue. However, in terms of domestic Turkish politics, the crisis was a political setback. In particular, "Demirel was criticised by all the opposition parties for having missed the opportunity to intervene and settle the Cyprus crisis once and for all." Ahmed
writes that "Turkish public opinion was convinced that, in calling off the invasion of Cyprus, the politicians had once again bowed to US pressure." 157

The 1967 crisis was a successful exercise in crisis management through co-ordinated mediation. It also illustrated that if a super power did not relinquish its responsibility for conflict resolution, and was in a position to exert pressure over both sides to a conflict, it could indeed play an effective mediatory role. There was also widespread agreement that the Vance mission helped remove the legacy of distrust of the United States that was left in Ankara following President Johnson's ultimatum to İnönü in 1964. The fact that Turkey was not isolated in the 1967 crisis was probably the central factor in the normalisation of Turkish-American relations.

Finally, the crisis was a successful exercise in effective co-operation between the State Department, NATO, and the UN representatives. In retrospect, the 1967 crisis also showed that the de-escalation of the crisis under UN auspices was the only alternative to war, or to radical territorial changes imposed by force. 158 The fact that in 1967, there were no protracted intercommunal clashes as had taken place in 1963 and 1964, could be partly attributed to the
effective presence of UNFICYP.
"Where they make a desert they call it peace."

Tacitus C.55 - C.117

"Peace is in the grave:/ The grave hides all things beautiful and good:/ I am a God and cannot find it there."

Prometheus Unbound I. 632
CHAPTER III

SUBVERSION AND INTERVENTION

1969 - 1974

With the de-escalation of the November 1967 crisis, a new era of peace seemed to dawn upon the political arena of Cyprus. As a gesture of reconciliation in March 1968, President Makarios announced several measures aimed at re-uniting the two communities. After preliminary talks in Beirut from 2-5 June, formal inter-communal negotiations began on 24 June in Nicosia under the auspices of Senor Bibiano Osorio-Tafall, the UN Secretary-General's personal representative in Cyprus. Between 1968 and 1971 negotiations deteriorated, diminishing the prospects for a solution. The increase of clandestine activity in the form of the formation of extremists Greek Cypriot organisations, such as the "National Front" and "EOKA-B", largely at the instigation of the Papadopoulos regime, polarised political activity on the island. During the period 1969 to 1974 there were numerous subversive actions such as the 1970 assassination attempt on His Beatitude, which his administration believed originated from Athens, resulted in a deterioration of relations between the two regimes. Makarios's decision to challenge the Greek government's attempts to undermine the sovereignty of Cyprus, which included the threat of forceful intervention, polarised the two sides leading inevitably to the July 1974 confrontation.

Subversion - The Formation of the National Front

The emergence in April 1969 of the pro-enosis extremist organisation, the National Front, threatened not only the future of the inter-communal talks, but also the survival of the Makarios regime. Modelled on the pattern of EOKA and dedicated to the pursuit of Enosis and the elimination of Communism, the National
Front became the vanguard for "enosist" extremists. In May 1969 it demanded that the Makarios government be overthrown and be replaced by a more militant pro-enosis government. The Front also focussed its attention on the inconclusive inter-communal talks by questioning the relevance of the talks. The increase of violent political actions by the organisation led the Cyprus government to introduce emergency measures including the banning of the National Front Movement in August 1969. Prior to this, Makarios had asked the group to dissolve itself. On 22 August, he stated: "I warmly appeal to all members of illegal organisations and groups to realise the great national harm they are causing to their country and to dissolve themselves. If their illegal activity continues the immediate consequences will be civil strife and a complete collapse of our internal front".

On 17 February 1970, the Soviet Union claimed that the "Athens Colonels", with United States and NATO support, were planning a coup to oust Makarios, annex Cyprus to Greece and incorporate it into the NATO defence system. The statement was evaluated by western diplomats as an exercise in disinformation aimed at fermenting anti-NATO feeling in Turkey. However, on 8 March 1970, an abortive assassination attempt against His Beatitude as part of a plan code-named "Hermes" brought to the forefront the schism between Athens and Nicosia. Relations, at a low level since the 1967 crisis, deteriorated further in 1969, when Papadopoulos had demanded that Makarios dismiss his Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Georkajis, because of his alleged involvement in an assassination attempt against the Greek dictator. In order to reduce the pressure from Greece, Makarios requested Georkajis to resign.
As a symbolic gesture of reconciliation, in 17 January 1970, in a joint communique with Makarios, Papadopoulos repudiated the activities of the National Front. However the move failed to mend the strained relationship. A speech on 12 February 1970, by General Yerakinis, the retired Greek officer who commanded the Cyprus National Guard, titled "Enosis Even By Force", fuelled fears among Greek-Cypriot leaders that the National Front had close links with dissident officers in the National Guard who in turn were receiving instructions from Athens. The Ankara government was also alarmed by the contents of the speech and lodged a formal complaint with the Greek government. To avoid a crisis the Junta was forced to severely reprimand the General.

The developments of March 1970 drew considerable international interest. The Soviet Union made approaches to the governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey, and reaffirmed her stand on non-intervention. The Turkish foreign minister Caglayangil expressed his country's partisan outlook when he stated:

"Turkey would not hesitate to intervene, if an attempt were made to overthrow the present regime in Cyprus and to impose a unilateral solution." (14)

The United States reaction was rather more ambivalent. Fifteen days before 8 March 1970, the American ambassador in Nicosia, David Popper, had warned Makarios of the assassination attempt. (15) The warning, Hitchens explains, was given for one of the following reasons: "Popper may have been part of the soft-line American faction, he may have been hedging a diplomatic bet in case the assassination misfired, or he may have been feeding disinformation about the date." (16) The accuracy of Popper's information and the suspicion that Eric Neff, CIA station chief in Cyprus, had been in close contact with the plotters
prior to the incident led to a deterioration in Cypriot-American relations. Shortly after Makarios declared Neff _persona non grata_.

Despite the link between Athens and the terrorist pressures, Makarios in 1970 decided to back away from a confrontation with the Colonels. Instead he followed a policy of moderation aimed at re-building the strained relationship. For example, despite the fact that evidence in the possession of Greek Cypriot authorities showed the involvement of Greek officers, Makarios denounced the "Hermes" plan as a forgery and publicly denied that the Greek regime was behind the plot to overthrow him.

The Athens-Nicosia divisions in intra-Greek relations had to a degree distracted the Makarios government from the crucial inter-communal talks. Moreover, the calls for "enosis" by the extremist group also hardened the position of the Turkish Cypriots. From 29 August to 9 December 1968 the two sides had exchanged proposals on the judiciary, the police, the legislature and local government. The negotiators in March 1969 had even established subcommittees to study technicalities. However by May 1969 the talks reached a stalemate over differences on the future standard of local government. In a move to break the impasse both sides agreed to shelve the discussion of this item and proceed with talks into other areas such as the judiciary where chances of progress appeared more likely. With the escalation of Greek-Cypriot tensions Denktash concluded that the time was not right to agree to a settlement. Patrick asserts: "There may perhaps have been an additional motive in such a 'holdout' strategy' the Makarios regime could have conceivably offered additional concessions to resolve the prolonged inter-communal dispute so that it could concentrate its resources on the conflict within its own community". However Makarios consolidated his
position and did not make any additional concessions.

On 2 December 1970 U Thant stated that the talks were far from satisfactory and deplored the fact that the situation remained strained and that there had been no significant advance.\(^{(20)}\)

In March 1971 Rauf Denktash commented that "the talks which lie ahead cannot be immunized; questions of principle or cardinal issues are still far apart, and the chances of bridging them in the near future seem rather dim".\(^{(21)}\)

The Impact of the 1971 Turkish Coup

In 1970 and 1971 Turkey was faced with a wave of student violence and terrorism, and Premier Demirel was failing in his efforts to contain it.\(^{(22)}\) Military chiefs warned against what they termed the 'idleness of Parliament' and the incompetence of the governing Justice Party in dealing with the problems.\(^{(23)}\)

On 12 March 1971 the military commanders intervened, forcing Demirel to resign. His ousting came after the armed forces submitted a memorandum to President Sunay informing him that if "strong and respected government" were not promptly formed to stop the anarchy the armed forces would seize power.\(^{(24)}\)

A coalition cabinet of an 'above party' character was formed with Professor Nihat Erim as Prime Minister.\(^{(25)}\) Under the new arrangement Parliament remained in session, with the army directing from the background. One explanation for the demi-coup d'état was that the military did not wish formally to seize power fearing that such an act would have led to Turkey's isolation abroad as had occurred with Greece after the 1967 coup.

The Erim government's decision to make the Cyprus problem the main element in its relations with Greece was to have serious implications in intra-Greek affairs. The new Turkish Foreign
Minister, Olcay, believed that it was not possible to isolate Turkey's relations with Greece from the Cyprus issue. Their geographical proximity and contractual bonds constituted a natural milieu for the development of co-operation between Turkey and Greece. A durable solution to the Cyprus problem, however, was a precondition to this development to relations. (28)

The Lisbon NATO Summit

With the consolidation of Erim's regime, an Athens-Ankara dialogue began to develop in the spring and summer of 1971. In May the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Ilter Turkmen, conveyed to the Greek Premier the following message:

"...relations between states cannot be run in accordance with the mentality of Archbishop Makarios, who is basically a nineteenth century priest wishing to run a chauvinistic state. We have an excellent opportunity. On Cyprus two communities live side by side in a de facto federation. Turkey and Greece have so many points of common interest and have so much reason to be friends and allies that it would be a great pity to ignore these simply to please Makarios. (29)

Papadopoulos informed Erim that he held similar views and stipulated that Greece and Turkey should improve their relations without awaiting a solution to the Cyprus question. However, Erim informed Athens that "so long as there remained a Cyprus issue Turkish-Greek relations could not possibly be improved." (30)

The Turkish premier held a strict interpretation of the London and Zurich accords and their binding legality until revised by accepted procedures. (31) On 2 April 1971, Erim had stated: "Turkey is determined as ever to use every means at its disposal
to defend its security and that of its kinsmen in the event of a new act of aggression against the rights occurring to the Turkish Cypriot community under the Cyprus agreement. On 30 May 1971 Papadopoulos voiced that friendship and alliance between Greece and Turkey was more important than the Cyprus question. Then later he underlined that the Cyprus question "should be solved within the framework of negotiations between Athens and Ankara; and that he was prepared to impose his will on Nicosia, if necessary by force".

Erim, considered a Cyprus expert, had been the Turkish representative during the "Acheson" mediation in 1964 and had also served as a Turkish expert on the commission for Cyprus during the transition period before independence. His coming to power contributed to the marked increase in Turkish Cypriot intransigence.

Wider political and strategic considerations centred around the Athens-Ankara rapprochement. It was viewed that an improvement in relations with Ankara would enhance the Colonel's position vis-à-vis the Nixon Administration, and help project the image that Greece was a staunch member of NATO, which on last analysis would have helped underwrite its claims for larger military and economic assistance from the US. On the other hand Ankara presupposed that by improving its relations with Greece, it could influence the Colonels' policy over the Cyprus issue. The exponent of this policy was Turkmen. He believed that the Cyprus question must be solved through the Greek government. The whole problem, he argued, was to get the government in Athens to act.

During the NATO summit in Lisbon, American Defence Secretary Laird talked about the need "for settling the remaining dispute between Greece and Turkey, as this was necessitated by the interests of reinforcing NATO's southern flank". The Lisbon meeting cemented the Greco-Turkish rapprochement with the
two countries using the forum for secret bilateral talks. Both agreed to make every effort towards speeding up the inter-communal talks in Cyprus with a view to a successful conclusion.

Athens's reluctance to brief the Cyprus government adequately over the Lisbon talks led Makarios to suspect that a deal might have been reached in the secret talks between Palamas and Olcay for a Greek-Turkish joint action to expedite a Cyprus settlement over his head. In order to improve his leverage, Makarios visited the Soviet Union in June 1971.

Makarios' Moscow Trip

The Archbishop's visit was seen by Athens as a gesture of defiance, and accentuated Greek anxieties about the growing influence in Cyprus of AKEL, the consistently pro-Moscow communist party of Cyprus. Makarios insisted on going to the Soviet Union despite Papadopoulos's advice to the contrary.

In Moscow, Makarios told the Soviet leaders that he would oppose any attempt at a decision leading to a political or geographical division of Cyprus, and that he would not agree to a limitation of its independence and sovereignty. At the end of the visit the Soviet Union stated its support for the independence and absolute sovereignty of Cyprus, and the peaceful solution of the Cyprus question without outside intervention on the basis of the UN Charter principles and resolutions. Makarios noted that: "Expression of Soviet opposition to intervention, the use of force, or threat of the use of force had always played a deterrent role."

Papaioannou, the leader of AKEL, praised the "unselfish support and assistance" pledged by the Kremlin to Makarios as "clear warning to all those planning intervention or aggression against Cyprus."
Rift Between Athens and Nicosia

Interpreting Makarios's trip to Moscow as evidence that His Beatitude was pro-communist, the Papadopoulos regime concluded that it was now imperative that Makarios must adhere to the dictates of Athens or be removed from power.

On 11 June 1971 the Athens government presented Makarios with a formula which it believed would end the inter-communal stalemate. The contents proposed giving the Turkish Cypriots a large degree of autonomy and appointing to the Makarios Cabinet, a Turkish Cypriot minister responsible for Turkish Cypriot local authorities. Makarios rejected the formula because he held reservations that it was part of a secret Greek-Turkish agreement (concluded at the Lisbon meeting) to impose a NATO solution. His outright rejection frustrated the Athens government. On 18 June, Papadopoulos warned Makarios to accept his guidelines and concluded, that if he refused the Greek government would be forced to take bitter measures. He should either settle his differences with the Turkish Cypriot community or face the consequences alone. Makarios replied to the Greek leader that the ultimatum was creating unacceptable developments in intra-Greek relations. His determination not to succumb to the dictates of the Athens government led to a freeze in their relations.

On 6 July 1971 the President declared that to save Cyprus he would accept aid from any direction, of any kind, and to any extent. Although there was no evidence that the Soviet Union had promised any military assistance to Makarios during his visit to Moscow, he skilfully promoted such a possibility through a series of statements. He also renewed his assertion that there was adequate proof to confirm the claims that an outside settlement in the NATO framework, which would more generally serve
the interests of the West, was imminent. Makarios forewarned that: "...a settlement against the will of Cypriot Hellenism would turn Cyprus into a source of great discord...and the Western world would not gain from this".

Inter-Communal Talks Stalemate, The Formation of EOKA B and Intervention by the UN Secretary-General

His Beatitude stated on 10 August 1971 that the inter-communal talks had reached deadlock, adding:

"We shall continue however, our efforts with patience and tolerance for a peaceful and democratic solution, although outside threats against the independence and territorial integrity of our country are becoming more frequent."

The talks had reached an impasse because both sides had hardened their positions on "local government". The Turkish Cypriot negotiator, Denktash, had recommended that the administrative, and judicial powers that pertained to local government be written in the Constitution. The Greek Cypriot side had accepted that the above provision should be included in the Constitution, however it was at variance with the alternative proposal by Denktash that "there should be a central local Government Authority either for the Greeks or for the Turks".

Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiator rejected the proposal and replied to his counterpart that "Your proposal regarding the creation of separate Greek and Turkish Central local Government authorities, apart from other ills will......make the administrative system completely unworkable and put into slow motion the development of the country..." Denktash feared that without such local authorities, Turkish Cypriots would not be able to achieve the communal and local autonomy
feared that such a development complicated his attempts to control
the organisation. During the EOKA struggle of 1955-59, Grivas had
shown on many occasions that he was prepared to play his own
game irrespective of the wishes of any government in Athens or
elsewhere. His claim that, in order to secure enosis, he would
contentance a NATO or even purely Turkish base in Cyprus as at
least a notional guarantee for the Turkish minority amplified
Makarios's suspicions that Athens and Ankara had already agreed
in principle on "double enosis" — partition of the island along
broadly demographic lines. (62)

The turbulence in intra-Greek affairs helped torpedo the last
meeting of the inter-communal talks. At the end of 1971 the
Greek regime's conflicting policy in Cyprus had become apparent. The
Papadopoulos regime publicly stated its support for the continuation
of the US sponsored intercommunal talks and at the same time directed
cover activities to overthrow the Archbishop.

In a move to revive the inter-communal talks U Thant, in an
aide-memoire on 18 October 1971, suggested to the governments of
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey that Mr Ozorio Tafall (his special
representative in Cyprus) should in the exercise of the Secretary-
General's Good Offices take part in the talks between the repre­
sentatives of the two communities. He also proposed that the
Greek and Turkish governments should each make available a constit­
tutional expert to attend the talks in an advisory capacity. (63)
U Thant had drafted the formula after consultations with Greek
and Turkish officials in New York. On 28 November Xanthopoulos-
Palamas (the Deputy Greek Foreign Minister) announced that Greece
and Turkey had signified their agreement to the formula. Greek-
Turkish Cypriot disagreement over the qualifications of Senor Osorio
and the "technical" consultants created a number of problems for
both sides. Denktash insisted that Taffall's terms of reference should not go beyond observer status. He feared that an increased role by the UN would probably undermine the guarantor status of Turkey. Conversely while Makarios accepted an increased role for the UN special representative, he wanted the Athens and Ankara appointees to have only peripheral functions. After a period of hesitation over the principle of direct involvement of Greece and Turkey in a settlement, the Cyprus government subscribed to the agreement. On 2 December the UN Secretary-General warned that the situation in Cyprus had deteriorated, and that tensions between the two communities had escalated to a critical level.

The 1972 Czech Arms Crisis

On 21 January 1972 the Makarios government covertly imported ten thousand cases of light arms and ammunition from Czechoslovakia. The order was first placed in 1971 after communal incidents in the Chattos areas where the Turks controlled a small enclave and Greek Cypriots sought the protection of the National Guard. However, the Greek army officers refused to provide protection on the grounds that their terms of reference were concerned with defence and not with local policing, thus reflecting the Greek governments measures to avoid any confrontation with Turkey that would have jeopardized its rapprochement with Ankara. It is also plausible that the division in intra-Greek relations partly contributed to the immobility of the Greek officers. Despite differences with Athens, the Nicosia government had informed the Greek Commander of the National Guard about the Czech arms order. The Athens government assumed that once the Nicosia-Athens differences were resolved the weapons would be handed over to the National Guard.
However, as relations deteriorated further, Makarios decided to use the Czech arms to reinforce his seven hundred strong Police Tactical Reserve (PTR). This had been his principle objective in purchasing the arms. With rumours of a possible coup by Grivas or the Athens government, the strengthening of the PTR was evaluated as a necessary counter measure.

Following Makarios's refusal to transfer the arms to the National Guard, the Papadopoulos government used the incident as a pretext and decided on a showdown with Nicosia. On 11 February, Panagiotacou handed Makarios a communique. It called for the immediate surrender of all imported arms to UNFICYP, for the Cyprus Cabinet to be drastically reshuffled to include pro-Athens elements, and Athens to be respectfully regarded as the "centre of Hellenism". A number of factors underlined the Colonels' move. They feared that the weapons might be used against opponents of Makarios such as "EOKA B" or the Turkish community. Failure to confront Makarios would have strengthened his position and independence from Athens, and exacerbated his intransigence against Papadopoulos's terms to make more concessions to the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios believed that acceptance of such demands would have led to partition, and degraded the Cyprus government into a puppet administration. The extremist faction of the ruling "Revolutionary Council" of the Athens Junta led by the strongly anti-Makarios Brigadier Ioannides were extremely provoked by the Czech arms which implied a flirtation with the Communists by Makarios (whom they considered pro-communist). They pressured Papadopoulos to intervene to "bring the communist influence under control in Cyprus and cut it down to size".

The arms crisis was quickly overshadowed by the more
stringent demands of the Greek government for the right to
dictate the composition of the Cabinet of Cyprus. Athens's crude
diplomatic tactics and heavy-handed approach stiffened Makarios' opposition. On 18 February Panagiotacos stated: "I think the
time has come when the rulers in Cyprus must understand that
Athens is actually the National centre and that taking initiatives
which could perpetuate the internal anomaly and have unpleasant
international consequences, without the knowledge of Greece, will
not be tolerated in the future". He also asserted that Greece
would exercise its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee for
unilateral intervention, "if national interest dictated it".    
Panagiotacos public statement signalled that the Athens military
Government was re-asserting its rights of intervention in case of a
threat to the status quo in Cyprus. However, whether the treaty
gave the Greek Government the right to intervene in the internal
affairs of the island to the point of determining what form or shape
the Government of Cyprus should have was rather suspect. But
in giving covert assistance to the subversive groups which sought to
destroy Cyprus' independence, the Athens regime was contravining
both the treaty of guarantee and the Cyprus constitution it was pledged to
uphold, as one of the three guarantor powers. While not capitulating to the
Greek demand, Makarios wanted a diplomatic arrangement that would defuse
the crisis. However, a period would have to elapse before he could
compromise with Athens and not lose face.
The Nixon Administration and the 1972 Crisis

A coup to remove Makarios had been expected by the Cyprus government on 12 February. This coup was called off as a result of the effective security measures which had been taken in time by Makarios and as a result of diplomatic pressure from the Nixon administration. United States officials feared that any hostilities on the island might jeopardize the position of the Turkish minority, raising the risk of a major crisis between Greece and Turkey. In the view of the American government Athens had acted too harshly when it dispatched the Panagiotacos memorandum to Makarios. Immediately an intensive diplomatic offensive was launched by the United States to limit the damaging impact of this move.

Popper informed President Nixon who in turn cabled instructions to Ambassador Tasca in Athens, to seek a meeting with Papadopoulos and to warn him against any violence in Cyprus. Tasca later testified in 1975 that "in 1972 I made a very strong statement about not getting involved. That stopped the whole business at that point".

Numerous explanations can be put forward for the American move which was undertaken even though Washington had no great admiration for Makarios, because of his co-operation with the pro-Moscow AKEL and his non-aligned policy which often clashed with American interests. Indeed in 1969 President Nixon had ordered that all US foreign aid to Cyprus be cut off after Makarios refused to co-operate in restricting Cypriot shipping to North Vietnam. Cyprus was also one of the seven countries that had reneged at the UN on their commitments on 25 October 1971 or the China issue which caused the US to lose the diplomatic campaign to keep Taiwan in the UN.
In 1972 US policy makers decided that, in terms of the whole stability of the crucial Eastern Mediterranean region US interest stood to suffer if the military regime forced its showdown with His Beatitude. The Nixon administration already under attack because of its benign approach towards the Athens military did not want to attract additional criticism, especially at a time when it was close to concluding its negotiations for new naval bases in Greece. It is plausible to argue, that the homeporting negotiations inspired the Papadopoulos regime to seek the overthrow of Makarios. (85) Assuming a passive American reaction the coup might have succeeded. However the timing was poor and the coup attempt backfired. With Nixon's historic Peking trip scheduled for 20 February the State Department probably did not want to face another Cyprus crisis. At the time the US feared that the Kremlin would exploit any international incident to minimise the impact of Nixon's trip. On the otherhand after Peking, Nixon was preparing for the Moscow Summit and SALT I in May 1972. Hence the need to forestall a crisis which could have drawn in the Soviet Union. (86)

Finally, the strong objection to a coup in Cyprus staged or directed by the Colonels regime that was voiced by Congressional opponents of the Junta and by a large cross section of the international community, signalled to American policy makers in the State Department of the high risk of the proposed coup, who in turn decided that it was in the Nixon Administration's interest at the time, to direct the Papadopoulos regime to abandon the proposed coup.
The Soviet Union and the February 1972 Cyprus Crisis

During the 1972 Cyprus crisis, the Soviet Union linked the Cyprus crisis with the planned establishment of US bases for the Sixth Fleet in Greece. On 15 February the Soviet ambassadors in Athens and Washington made critical representations to the governments of Greece and the US concerning the proposed installations. The Soviet Government conveyed to the Papadopoulos regime that the establishment of such bases would be a dangerous step, fraught with serious complications in the Balkans and the Mediterranean area. In the meantime it also warned Washington "that implementation of the above intentions would be a step towards aggravating the tension in Europe and contrary to the tendencies which emerged there lately". (88)

The Soviet Ambassador in Athens underscored to the Greek Foreign Minister not to overthrow Makarios while the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Grubyakov, stressed to the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Eralp, on 17 February that "Moscow would not remain indifferent to any moves to end the independence of Cyprus and to impose a solution by force." (89) He also said that Greece and the US had agreed between themselves to overthrow Makarios, proclaim "double Enosis" in Cyprus, and turn the island into a NATO base.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat also rallied to the support of Makarios. On 16 February he stated: "The United States has stepped up provocative intrigues in the Mediterranean area, secured the turning of the Greek port of Piraeus into a base of its Sixth Fleet, and is now weaving a plot against the government of President Makarios in Cyprus with the aim of turning the island into its base." (90)
The Role of Turkey and the United Kingdom

During the 1972 crisis, Turkey sided with the Greek regime. On 15 February the Turkish Foreign Ministry agreed with the Greek proposal that the arms consignment should be placed under the control of the UN force in Cyprus. The United Kingdom also agreed that the recently imported arms should be surrendered to UNFICYP. On 16 February, the Heath government categorically stated that "the latest developments in Cyprus were the concern of Greece and Cyprus and did not directly concern Britain". Diplomatically it was a tactical error on behalf of the Foreign Office. Britain was one of the three guarantor powers. The government by abdicating its treaty responsibilities was also undermining its own position in Cyprus. Indeed most diplomatic observers doubted its subsequent statement that "if things develop in such a way that endanger the independence of the island, Britain will have no alternative but to intervene". British influence had been diminishing in Cyprus since 1964, and its latest posture was a further indication of this devolution.

On 21 February Turkish Foreign Minister, Bayulkan, attacked Makarios over the Czech arms, and warned that "the arms might spread the outbreak of clashes to the Turkish Cypriot community." The Turkish threats in 1972 lacked the decisive impact of their 1964 and 1967 ultimatums. The different nature of the 1972 crisis (primarily an intramural Greek-Cypriot crisis and not an inter-communal confrontation) were partly responsible for Turkey's weak reaction. Moreover the instability which plagued the crumbling Erim government to a large degree refrained the Cyprus "Hawks" in Ankara from seeking greater involvement in the 1972 dispute.

In addition at the time the Turkish military were eager to consolidate their position in NATO and did not particularly desire a crisis.
The Bishops Ultimatum

On 2 March, the Bishop of Kitium (Larnaca) Kyrenia and Paphos, called upon Archbishop Makarios to resign as President of the Republic, on the grounds that his exercise of temporal and political power conflicted with his religious duties and was in breach of Canon Law. The move had been instigated by the Colonels government. After His Beatitude rejected the ecclesiastical ultimatum, the Athens regime finally accepted the Makarios formula of playing down the crisis and resuming negotiations as soon as the situation had settled down. Makarios notified Athens that he was prepared to surrender the Czech arms.

The United Nations as a Forum for Face-Saving Diplomacy

On 14 February, the UN Secretary-General addressed a message to President Makarios through Senor Osorio-Tafall, expressing his concern and offering United Nation's assistance. Subsequent efforts by Tafall and the UNFICYP commander helped in bringing the 1972 developments under control. The United Nations presence in Cyprus permitted both Greece and Cyprus to use it as an avenue to gradually edge back from confrontation without losing face.

On 10 March 1972 after protracted negotiations between Senor Tafall and Kyprianou an agreement was reached for the Czech arms to be stored under the supervision of UNFICYP. Dr Waldheim expressed the hope that the agreement would "result in a reduction of tension in the island and that all concerned will not find it impossible to resume the search for a solution of the underlying problems of Cyprus".

On 14 March Makarios informed the Greek regime that he had placed the Czech arms under UN control. His decision to surrender the Czech arms consignment restored some equilibrium between
Athens and Nicosia.

Following the UN arms agreement, Papadopoulos retracted most of his demands and indicated that he would be satisfied with a minor Cabinet reshuffle to eliminate one or two Ministers who reputedly opposed his military government. Makarios agreed to reconstruct his Cabinet in due course. In return Athens tacitly agreed to let Makarios continue to keep the reins of power, at least temporarily. The Archbishop was anxious to avoid another confrontation. There was however no reason at all for Makarios to assume that the Colonels had shelved their plans to overthrow him. The Archbishop quickly realised that out-maneuvering the military regime would not be sufficient to guarantee his survival.

The 1972 crisis had eclipsed the inter-communal negotiations. On May 1972 all the parties agreed to resume the talks on a new basis. The inaugural meeting was presided over by the UN Secretary-General, in June 1972. The resumption of the talks, partly restored some political equilibrium. In June 1972 Waldheim reported: "the situation on the island is anything but encouraging... the mutual suspicion led to a political instability and an atmosphere of tension and recrimination which is extremely dangerous". 
The schism was highlighted with the naval mutiny carried out by a group of officers in the summer of 1973. On the other hand to counter the increasing opposition to his regime by Western leaders (particularly by a group of influential US Congressmen led by Representative Benjamin Rosenthal) Papadopoulos was preoccupied with initiating moves toward what he called guided democracy. (106) In the meantime, a deterioration in relations between the Athens military regime and General Grivas, (107) forced Papadopoulos to cancel "Operation Apollo". The plan envisaged the overthrow of Makarios, by Greek officers stationed in Cyprus. (108)

However, in Cyprus throughout this period EOKA-B stepped up its terrorist attacks against the Makarios administration. To counter the threat by EOKA-B His Beatitude reinforced his security forces. The demise of Papadopoulos followed by the death of Grivas in January 1974 plus the leadership crisis in Ankara, forstalled at least temporarily, any new moves against Makarios. However, the formation of a co-alition government in Turkey, between the moderate Ecevit (Republican Peoples Party) and the Islamic fundamentalist Erbakan (National Salvation Party) who held ultra nationalist views, (109) and the emergence in Athens of the Anti-Makarios Ioannides, were ominous signals for His Beatitude. He once again became
very apprehensive, that new attempts would be made to challenge his sovereignty by either the Ioannides regime or the new Ecevit-Erbakan co-alition. Makarios also feared the possibility of secret collusion between Athens and Ankara over Cyprus.
CHAPTER IV
THE BREAKDOWN OF KISSINGER DIPLOMACY: CYPRUS 1974

The October War and Reassessment of the Strategic Significance of
Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean

In the early 70s, the relaxation of tension in Europe caused "the focal point of instability in East-West relations to shift in large measure from NATO's central front to its southern flank, the Mediterranean". Nasser's ability to lift the Arab-Israeli conflict from the local to the international level after the 1967 confrontation, followed by the war of attrition and the dangerous phase of "no war no peace", further amplified the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean. The extensive deployment of Soviet naval power after the Six-Day War in 1967, and the dramatic upsurge in the volume of arms transfers by both super powers to their respective clients, made the area a major threat to international security.

"In no area beyond European territory proper has the strategic military balance between the United States and the USSR been as important a factor in international affairs as it has been in the Mediterranean."

The Soviet buildup alarmed Western strategists, who had looked upon the Mediterranean as an exclusive Western possession. The threat by the Maltese Prime Minister Mr Mintoff to expel British forces from Malta raised suspicions in NATO circles that Cyprus might follow the Maltese example. The Jordanian crisis of 1970 and the number of Soviet ships in the region underscored the increase in Soviet naval power which was now countering the permanent US presence in the Mediterranean.

The growing Soviet influence in the area reaffirmed American commitment to Israel. If the pre 1967 defined Israeli territory was threatened the US would probably intervene, increasing the risk of a superpower confrontation. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the
Soviet Union deployed about 90 ships off the coast of Syria and Israel. Viewing the Mediterranean basin including the Middle East as a single strategic entity in terms of the strategic power balance, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey were now key vantage points not only in terms of NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, but also in terms of super-power rivalry in the Middle East region. "Cyprus provided a focal point for domination of the eastern littoral from Turkey to Egypt and the access to Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, and through these countries to Jordan." Cyprus makes a contribution to US strategic interests via the British bases of Akrotiri and Hekelia from where US planes conduct surveillance operations in the eastern Mediterranean. During the October War American U-2 planes operating from the British sovereign bases were used to monitor the war. The US electronic monitoring facilities at Yerolakos, Nea Milia and Karavas were also used. Finally, the American over-the-horizon (OTH) radar at Mt Olympus was used to monitor many of the nuclear testing areas in Soviet Central Asia of interest to American intelligence.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war introduced new variables to the super power strategic rivalry with the implementation by both Moscow & Washington of 'ocean strategy' as a mutual lever of deterrence. Although the US 6th fleet had a superiority in the Mediterranean the build up of the third Soviet 'Eskadra' in the Eastern Mediterranean was seen as an immediate threat for US naval forces that did not have adequate air cover. Moreover the high ambient noise levels in the Mediterranean sea made sonar conditions extremely difficult to monitor thus creating a problem for anti-submarine operations, making effective air cover a necessary prerequisite. US officials noted that if the Soviet fleet secured land-based air cover in the eastern Mediterranean, to support its operations, it would pose as a very formidable strategic force. In the aftermath of the Middle East nuclear
alert, American naval strategists stressed that for effective US deterrence in the region it was advisable that the US secure its land based air support for the Sixth Fleet, and that at the same time it should seek to curtail Soviet access to sea and land based support. The size of the Soviet fleet deployed in the Mediterranean has oscillated depending accordingly on the ability of Moscow to secure those facilities to reinforce its operations in countries in the region such as Egypt and Syria.

In both Greece and Turkey the US had a series of air and naval bases which were intended strictly for the support of the Sixth Fleet and US military and economic assistance to both Ankara and Athens was partly in the form of a quid pro quo for the use of such bases. In relation to Cyprus, American foreign policy interests were as follows: Firstly to oversee that the Cyprus 'problem' did not lead to another confrontation between its two allies Greece and Turkey. Secondly, to prevent Moscow from meddling in the dispute either by overtly supporting Makarios or through the pro-Moscow Cypriot Communist party (AKEL). Thirdly with increasing soviet influence in the region, the US was equally interested in maintaining its presence in the British bases on the island and its own electronic surveillance facilities in Cyprus.

With the 1973 October war the level of rivalry between the super powers changed in the Middle East, a sphere where detente had not been tested so far. During the crisis Kissinger stressed the determination of the US 'to go to the brink' over the question of a direct Soviet intervention in the Middle East. Moreover, the Yom Kippur war showed the erosion of Israeli strategic superiority over its Arab adversaries. Washington, however, reaffirmed its commitment to Israel, and despite the oil embargo, the US President ordered a massive military re-supply effort. The October War had created insecurity in Israel for the first time since 1948, and American policy in the region in the aftermath of the war was concentrated on strengthening
American influence not only in Israel but throughout the entire
region.

The American realisation of the precariousness of the Arab-
Israeli situation and the deterioration of the Western position in
Italy led the United States to attach greater importance to the
Greek Bases and territory. The revived US emphasis was more in
relation to its interests in the Middle East, and not necessarily
as part of NATO strategy. In bolstering the Colonels' regime the
United States ventured on a policy which was far from secure. If
the Colonels lost power, the United States, because of its close
association with them, risked suffering a serious political setback
and even ran the risk of being deprived of Greek naval facilities.
"In July 1972 President Nixon had stated that without aid to Greece
the United States had no viable policy to save Israel." Washington's
plan, however, to wrap a popular issue - Israel - around an unpopular
one - Greece - backfired with the development of the 1974 Cyprus
crisis."(21)

The Nixon administration's position was that "political differences
aside, the United States and Greece had mutual security interests
that could not be lightly dismissed". Despite rising opposition
of the Colonels' regime by a large group of Congressmen in the spring
of 1974, the White House continued "to accord pre-eminence to military
and strategic considerations over political and moral values."(23)
The Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than NATO security, influenced
the State Department to continue to show preference for the Greek
Colonels in 1974. Although the Greek government remained neutral
during the October War in the Middle East, it was fully co-operative
in allowing access to American communications facilities in Greece
and to other facilities such as Athenai Airbase and Souda Bay Airfield.
There were no restrictions placed on the movement of the vessels of
the Sixth Fleet home ported in the Athens area.
logistic facilities for the re-supply of the Sixth Fleet. Washington policy makers concluded that this security relationship was an important ingredient in the strength of the political-military posture of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean during the crisis. The Greek military regime was aware that by declaring its strong military commitment towards NATO and its bilateral military co-operation with the US strengthened the Nixon administration's position to confront its critics.

The collapse of the Papadopoulos regime and its replacement by the Ioannides Junta in November 1973 had far reaching implications for the Cyprus conflict. With the death of General Grivas in January 1974 the leadership of EOKA B eventually came, after removal of the new moderate EOKA B leader, Major George Karousos, under the direction of the Greek Intelligence Service, (KYP).

In the spring of 1974 there was much talk of an impending coup d'état in Cyprus to be organised by EOKA B and KYP. The Cyprus government alleged that there was considerable involvement on the part of the US government in support of Greek efforts to unseat Makarios. In March 1974, the Cypriot Ambassador to Washington, Nicos Dimitriou, warned State Department officials of the possibility of an attempted coup d'état. In light of the periodic rumours of coup plots and conspiracies that circulated about Cyprus, US officials rejected Dimitriou's advice. On the contrary, Kissinger instructed the US Ambassador in Athens, Tasca, to avoid making representation to the Ioannides regime. Although the regime was showing signs of disintegration, the Nixon administration continued to endorse it, especially within NATO forums. In May 1974, General Goodpaster (Saceur) praised Greece for maintenance of her forces at an excellent level of training and at a high degree of readiness. At the same time, a conflicting draft report to the North Atlantic Assembly declared:

"The effect upon the (Greek) armed forces of almost seven years of dictatorship, accompanied by periodic upheavals..."
and a succession of savage purges, has been severely to
distort their command structure and to create an atmosphere
of suspicion and antagonism among factions of the officer
corps with different political views and sharply divided
loyalties." (31)

"On 20 June 1974, Peter Kormilas, a Greek-born CIA agent, who
was Ioannidis's confidant and adviser, reported to CIA headquarters
that a coup in Cyprus was imminent. At the direction of Kissinger
and Sisco, Ambassador Tasca was instructed on 29 June to warn the
Greek regime that the United States disapproved of any move against
Makarios.

The Breakdown of Kissinger Crisis Diplomacy: Cyprus 1974

The first in a series of State Department miscalculations
began with the failure of Ambassador Tasca to pass on the Kissinger-
Sisco cable. Since this mode of contact fell through, the State
Department failed to warn the Athens government formally. It could
have done this by calling in the Greek Ambassador to Washington,
dispatching a special emissary to Athens, or releasing a White
House statement which could have had the same effect on the Greek
Junta.

In early July, a flood of leaks to the press by the Cyprus
government drew attention to the probability of a coup. On 5 July
a blueprint of the proposed coup appeared in the Cypriot paper
'Apogevmatini'. The next day, the same paper, published President
Makarios's letter to General Chizikis, the Greek President. The
text clearly outlined an Athens-orchestrated conspiracy, claiming
that the Greek officers with the Cyprus National Guard were working
with EOKA B terrorists to bring about Makarios's downfall. The
mass resignations on 8 July of Mr Tetenes (Greek Foreign Minister),
Mr Tjounis (Director-General, Political Affairs, Greek Foreign
Ministry) and Mr Vlahos (Secretary-General, Greek Foreign Ministry) (36) were further indicators of the forthcoming coup. Nevertheless, despite all the ominous signs, the Nixon administration remained firm in its support for the Greek Junta, and avoided making an executive decision which could have averted the coup. Instead, American-Greek liaison was kept at ambassadorial level, which under Kissinger was not a channel that always reflected the official view.

Furthermore, bureaucratic ineptitude, primarily through a breakdown in communications, erased whatever possibility existed of the lower echelons of the State Department hierarchy forcing the Athens government to cancel its Cyprus venture.

On 15 July Makarios was deposed in a coup staged by the National Guard and EOKA B and was replaced by Nicos Sampson. (38)

A whole range of motives could be discerned behind the Junta's miscalculated Cyprus putsch. The crisis may have been stoked up originally by the Athens regime largely for internal reasons, in order to restore their deteriorating position in the armed forces and in the country as a whole. (39) Since the removal of Papadopoulos in November 1973 the military had been divided into 5 factions. The royalist officers wanted the return of the exiled King, officers with democratic leanings were in favour of a return to civilian rule under the leadership of exPrime Minister Karamanlis, the Quaddafist faction wanted the Ioannides military to adopt a more radical line. Although anti-communist, the Quaddafist group espoused a socialist ideology, was anti-western, and argued that Greece should withdraw from NATO and pursue a non-aligned foreign policy.

The Ioannidis clique declared that for "purification" reasons the military needed to remain in power for a few more years and then allow a return to civilian rule. Finally another group favoured the return to power of the departed dictator Papadopoulos.

Success in Cyprus would probably have restored Ioannides deteriorating position.
split the Greek army officers, the majority were united when it
came to action on Cyprus. (40) By achieving a de facto form of Enosis,
the Junta would have managed to satisfy the ultra-nationalist demands
of some of the army factions which were also critical of the regime's
handling of the Aegean crisis with Turkey over continental shelf
rights. The Athens government apparently believed they could pull
off the annexation of Cyprus without having to fight a real war.
The moment seemed favourable, for Turkey was still convalescing
from a 30 month interval of semi-military rule, its new coalition
government had not settled, and Ecevit's decision to lift the ban on opium,
poppy cultivation had not pleased Washington (41). The Greek leadership
may also have been hoping that they would be able to trade conces­sions on the Aegean seabed issue for Turkish acceptance of enosis.
In June 1974 the Athens government threatened war with Turkey over
the Aegean issue. A Summit between the Greek and Turkish Prime
Ministers, during NATO's annual executive meeting in Brussels, on
26 June, broke down completely because of the Greek refusal to negotiate,
or to make counter-proposals. (43) It was indicative of the
junta's incompetence that it could have assumed that Turkey would
not react decisively to a defiant move on Cyprus.

United States Tilt Phase I

State Department experts contended that unless Kissinger denounced
the appointment of Sampson, his elevation might be interpreted by
the Turks to signify a virtual takeover of Cyprus by the Greek Junta,
and could prompt Turkey to invade the island. Kissinger rebuffed
their counsel, partly because he perceived that Makarios had lost
power physically and was unlikely to be restored by the UN (which
is what the Soviet Union was advocating), and in the first
few days, did nothing to minimise the effects of the coup. On
17 July the State Department ignored the possibility that the coup
was of Athens's making. Instead it referred to the coup as an internal situation, stating:

"In our view, there has not been outside intervention." (47)

Contrary to the American position, the Soviet Union moved speedily to denounce the coup; so did the British. The UK went on record with a demand to the Greek government that it replace the 600 or so officers assigned to the Greek National Guard, most of whom had evidently participated in the coup. In addition British Foreign Secretary, Callaghan, tried to persuade Kissinger to exercise America's more powerful influence in Athens, and to recognise the dangers in countenancing a regime in Cyprus as unstable and unsavoury as the puppet government of Sampson.

Ignoring Callaghan's advice and the advice of State Department officials to restore Makarios to power, Kissinger defended the Greek regime. The Secretary's decision was consistent with US policy largely dictated by the Pentagon but acquiesced by the State Department, viz. to defend the Greek Junta and to take timely steps to prop it up whenever it seemed to be in trouble. The rationale for this was the American need of air and naval bases in Greece for the defence of the eastern Mediterranean. "The increasing instability in Italy, the Portuguese crisis and the open Soviet support for Cunhal now meant that anything that reduced American and NATO strength in the Mediterranean was interpreted simply as an adverse shift in the balance of power." (51)

The weak American response, which deliberately did not endorse Makarios, gave Ioannidis reason to believe that the US approved of him and had even suggested that he was not to blame for the Cyprus situation. The United States stance in the United Nations further enhanced his position. (52) During 16 and 17 July the Security Council adjourned without passing a resolution condemning the coup. The American representative threatened to block any resolution that
stated the obvious fact: that the Cyprus National Guard was ordered into rebellion by its Greek officers. The American delegation used delaying tactics on the pretext that more facts were needed before it could approve UN action. The United Kingdom neglecting its obligation as a guarantor power, also failed to put forward a positive resolution while there was still time. Instead, apparently under American influence, the British delegation omitted to take any initiative at all until it was too late.

British Foreign Office officials emphasised to their American counterparts that "it is difficult to put pressure to the Greeks unless you take a position for the restoration of Makarios". However, in the United States, when the Washington Special Action Group met, on 16 and 17 July, it opposed the withdrawal of Greek troops on the grounds that their removal could cause a power vacuum in Cyprus. United States misjudgements and early indifference deprived Washington of credibility or leverage in both Athens and Ankara as the crisis escalated.

On 17 July Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit proposed to Callaghan that Sampson be removed, Cyprus be given a new federal system, the Greek soldiers be sent home, and negotiations to start such a system begin immediately. Ecevit also proposed that Turkey and the UK intervene jointly to restore the status quo ante. The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, declined to use force, hoping that the crisis could be resolved diplomatically. Without American support the British strategy of international action was doomed to failure.

After the United States had created the impression that it was tilting toward a de-facto recognition of the Sampson regime, Kissinger sent Sisco to Athens and Ankara, but apparently without a mandate to put pressure on either government. On 15 July the
White House had stated that the United States was deliberately handling the crisis 'low key' because it felt confident that its diplomacy would succeed.

When Sisco reached Athens, the Junta had virtually disintegrated and the American Under-Secretary of State squandered precious time searching for someone of authority in Athens. Eventually the Greeks agreed to replace rather than pull out the officers in Cyprus. The Turks, however, had no intention of becoming entangled in protracted negotiations that would permit the regime on Cyprus to consolidate its hold on the island and become a fait accompli. Ecevit reasoned that the further delay would only create the impression of Turkish weakness in Greek eyes. He rejected the Greek proposal, and while Sisco was bargaining with him that Turkey should postpone its invasion for 48 hours, Ecevit ordered it to proceed. "On 20 July a seaborne assault, backed by air support was followed by paratroop landings in the area of the Turkish-Cypriot village of Geunyeli, creating a wedge between Kyrenia and Nicosia." (61)

Turkey resorted to force even though not all possible avenues to a solution had been exhausted. Kissinger's eleven separate phone calls to Ecevit had also failed to postpone the invasion. During the debacle Kissinger rejected a suggestion by Tasca to use the Sixth Fleet to block the invasion. Tasca later was critical of both Sisco's shuttle diplomacy and Kissinger's activities during the critical phases of the conflict. He strongly condemned both Sisco and Kissinger for not informing him about what they were actually achieving. Tasca stated in his testimony:

"I was not informed on the results of the telephone conversations or on what was going on between the United States and the British." (63)

The former Ambassador placed the blame on the Secretary's modus
The Turkish Council of Ministers had, prior to Ecevit's 20 July decision, unanimously voted that Ankara should intervene militarily if diplomatic efforts and contacts failed. The weakness of the Greek government was a key factor in the Turkish decision to send its forces to Cyprus. Ankara skilfully exploited both this advantage and the lack of an effective or co-ordinated Greek response. In earlier crises Turkey adopted the strategy of open coercive diplomacy by bombing the island of Cyprus. In 1974 it abandoned its previous tactics and concentrated on ambiguous signals diplomacy. The new posture managed to isolate and diffuse the Ioannides regime from any form of action which could have cemented its Cyprus position.

The underlying motives behind the shift in Turkish tactics were the following: Turkey needed time to win the consent of the majority of international opinion and institutions to its projected invasion. Furthermore, it was known that the mismanagement of the Cyprus coup had widened the rift within the ruling Greek Junta, and the coup had triggered off civil war among the Greek Cypriots. The longer the civil war continued, the lower would be the resistance which the Greek National Guard could put up against the invading Turkish forces. Prior to the coup, senior Greek officers in Cyprus had advised Ioannides to postpone it because Greek military strength in Cyprus at the time was inadequate to defend the island against a Turkish invasion. Following the coup, the Ioannides regime failed once more to direct its policy measures close to the tangible reality of reinforcing its forces on the island.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 also owed more than a little to the classic reflex: recourse to foreign adventurism to ease internal stress. After all, "Ecevit's action to announce price increases on a wide range of products had proved very unpopular in Turkey." Moreover, the enactment of the political amnesty bill...
the spring of 1974, created another domestic crisis, threatening
the fragile Ecevit-Erbakan coalition. Furthermore, Erbakan's
National Salvation party's radical hawkish policy over Cyprus,
plus the fact that since the 1950s the Cyprus question had been a
national issue in Turkey, meant that at least for reasons of domestic
political expediency, a Turkish invasion was very much on the cards.
Foreign policy factors were also important in Ankara's decision.
If Turkey exploited the Cyprus crisis successfully it could have
used it to gain concessions from the Greeks over the Aegean issue.
In 1974, Turkey was to prove far less constrained by Washington
than it had been in previous crises. The full-scale invasion con­
stituted a calculated reaction to the coup against Makarios. The
new decree by the Ecevit administration on 1 July 1974 authorising
a resumption of poppy cultivation had caused a deterioration in
US-Turkish relations. This friction enabled Turkey to feel less
constrained towards Washington, giving it more room for independent
action in its gamesmanship over Cyprus. On a more general note the new
Nixon doctrine of remaining uninvolved in local disputes may have given
Ankara the idea that the US would not play as decisive a role in the
Cyprus question as it had in the past.

called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity of Cyprus, demanded an immediate end to foreign
military intervention, and called upon the three guarantors to enter
into negotiations without delay. Ignoring Resolution 353, Turkey
continued its offensive until a ceasefire was reached on 23 July.
In the meantime the military regime in Athens collapsed when the
chiefs of staff rejected Ioannidis's orders to mobilise the Greek
forces into action against the Turks. On 24 July Greece returned
to civilian rule with ex-Premier Karamanlis heading the new government.
An important factor in the Chiefs' decision to turn over power was the reluctance of the United States after 20 July to support their disintegrating military government, and US pressure to ensure that a Greek-Turkish conflict was avoided at all costs. This lends support to the critics' case that if US pressure had been applied on Athens from the beginning of the crisis, it would have been successful in removing Sampson and diffusing the crisis before the Turkish invasion took place.

American Tilt Phase II

Following the guidelines of resolution 253, on 22 July Callaghan obtained Greek and Turkish agreement for talks between the guarantor States in Geneva. As regards the negotiations, the Cypriot delegation at the UN, backed by the Soviet Union, objected to having three outside countries meeting together and deciding what should happen to Cyprus without the participation of the legitimate Cypriot government. The three power conference began on 25 July, attended by the foreign ministers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey. On 30 July it reached an interim agreement which provided that (i) the ceasefire line should be that held by Turkish forces at the time of the agreement; (ii) the three guarantor Powers reserved their rights and obligations as formulated by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; (iii) the talks would reconvene on 8 August when representatives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots would join the guarantors in considering the wider issues.

American shortcomings in policy making and policy execution continued, even after the signing on 30 July of the interim ceasefire agreement by the guarantor powers. While State Department officials insisted that US policy had not tilted towards Turkey, the US did remain publicly silent when the Turkish invasion force expanded its Cyprus bridgehead in violation of the ceasefire agreement. On 30 July, Makarios warned that unless the US attitude to the invasion
was made more clear and more decisive there would be a possibility of serious disturbances in that sensitive area, and also within NATO. Just after the first stage of the Geneva talks, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Hartman, told the Karamanlis government that the US opposed an early complete withdrawal of the Turkish invasion forces from Cyprus, because such action would lead to anarchy. Hartman omitted the possibility that a temporary increase of UNFICYP could have prevented this from happening. The State Department continued to tilt its policy towards Turkey after 8 August when the Geneva talks resumed. However, on 13 August, the talks collapsed and on the 14th Turkish forces resumed fighting, finally occupying 40% of the island.

The United States reacted to the series of Turkish ceasefire violations by emphasising only restraint rather than condemning the continuation by the invasion forces of 'the peace operation', as the Ankara government liked to call it. The US also failed to apply pressure on Turkey to revert to the status quo ante. Instead Washington recommended that Makarios not return to Cyprus, as his return might exacerbate the situation on the island. In these circumstances of the Turkish presence, as Karnow underlined, "even-handed appeals for restraint, such as the US issued, amounted to the encouragement of Turkish adventurism."

During the first phase of the Geneva talks, Kissinger managed to persuade the Turkish Prime Minister to postpone the deadline for the Turkish ultimatum. On 13 August, the US Secretary of State intervened and requested Ecevit to expand the Turkish ultimatum by 36 hours. However, this time the Turkish leader refused to accommodate Kissinger's approach and instructed his negotiators to walk out of the talks. The British Foreign Minister said that "the negotiations had broken down because of Turkey's arbitrary and unreasonable refusal to allow a delay so that all parties could consider its plan for a federated government." In calling for a Security Council meeting...
Callaghan warned the Turks that there could be no military solution that would stick. In an all-conceived move of both bad timing and policy on 13 August at a critical stage of the Geneva talks, the US issued a statement which stated inter alia "that Washington supported a greater degree of autonomy and protection for the Turkish Cypriot community". It immediately became apparent from the timing of the release and the emphasis on Turkish grievances, that Washington was supporting the Ecevit Government position in Geneva. The Turkish leadership interpreted the statement as a signal that the US would not oppose a second Turkish military offensive in Cyprus.

Makarios believed that "the US was fooled by the Turks, or perhaps was deceived when Turkey said it would be a limited operation - a police action - to restore constitutional order in two days. Perhaps they understood only later what Turkey's real plans were." (83)

Ankara claimed that the reason for the second military drive was diplomatic. It needed to strengthen its military position on the ground in order to improve its bargaining level when the Greek side refused to negotiate under threat, Turkey implemented phase two, on the pretext that "they were simply adhering to the thesis that they could not win at the conference table what they had not won on the battlefield." (85) More likely, it is possible that the Turkish high command, apprehensive that their flanks of its forces in Cyprus would be exposed if they remained in the volatile Kyrenia-Nicosia wedge, decided to advance. As George points out, "military leaders have a strong advocate's role in determining policies, and once a diplomatic crisis erupts into warfare, their bargaining position within the policy making arena becomes even stronger." (86) With the absence of any bold initiative on the part of the US to avert the coup, or the Turkish landing, Ankara correctly estimated that Washington would not intervene to stop this second advance.

Only after Greece's withdrawal from the military wing of NATO on 14 August did the US condemn Turkey's renewed assault. Kissinger
reasoned that there was no easy and permanent way of reconciling the competing interests of Greece and Turkey and once he had lost Turkey, and with the collapse of the Ioannides Junta, he decided to tilt for the time being with the stronger party, namely Turkey. In terms of Kissinger's realpolitik the US could not remain an impartial observer over Cyprus and risk seeing its two-allies drift into total war. However, in 1974 Turkey was more important to US strategic interest than Greece.

In Western geo-strategic thinking Greece does not have the same importance as Turkey. It is Turkey which directly borders on the Soviet Union, is an important link in the chain of direct encirclement of the Soviet Union and was geo-strategically and organisationally the link between the NATO and CENTO powers. What is more, Turkey controls the Dardanelles and holds a grip on the Kurdish ethnic group which lies astride the most direct route between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey's neighbours, Iraq and Syria, were already too firmly pro-Soviet for Washington to want to risk angering Ankara into adopting a similar attitude in the Middle East. This resolve was all the more important in the context of Kissinger's post-1973 diplomacy in the Middle East where US prestige was visibly committed to the solution of the Arab-Israeli problem unilaterally with the long-term objective of drastically reducing, if not completely expelling, Soviet influence from this strategic region. (67)

A Critique of Kissinger's "Cyprus Diplomacy"

Kissinger rejected accusations by Athens that the US had tilted in favour of Turkey because it regarded its military bases there as more important than those in Greece. He said the situation on Cyprus "tilted not because of American policy but because of the actions of the previous Greek government which destroyed the balance of forces as it had existed on the island." (88)
Kissinger further argued that during the 1974 crisis the US decided that under the circumstances quiet diplomacy would be the most effective course, and he refused to accept that America was partly responsible for the outcome of events. In response to criticism, he argued that a threat to cut off military aid to Turkey would have been ineffective as far as stopping the Turkish advance in Cyprus was concerned. Referring to the American interest in Turkey's strategic position bordering the Soviet Union, Kissinger stated that cutting off aid would have had the most drastic consequences for the Western alliance. (89)

In order not to contain the further internationalisation of the Cyprus issue the US had chosen to support Britain as the prime mediator. Although Britain had a legal right and a moral obligation to find a solution to this dispute, it lacked in 1974 the influence needed to restrain the Turkish invasion. As Callaghan pointed out, circumstances had so changed that the importance of Cyprus to Britain was no longer the same as in 1960 when the Treaty of Guarantee was signed. (90) Considerations of policy also played their part in British non-intervention. The British Foreign Secretary suggested that because the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee was a dead letter it was not politically expedient to seek to uphold it. As the former colonial power, Britain was also sensitive to charges of intervention. Finally, Prime Minister Harold Wilson stated that with 'Ulster', one moral commitment was enough for Britain. (91) In comparison with the 1964 and 1967 American mediation efforts, the 1974 decision reflected either a re-evaluation of American policy or a tactical error on the part of the US.
Watergate, World Order and Cyprus

Kissinger’s attention was mostly focussed on the world’s major powers small states on the other hand were mere pawns in his grand global strategy and were expendable. In his handling of the issue, Kissinger demonstrated that he was more concerned with stability in the region than pursuing a solution. Kissinger’s goal was secure a stable international order and that objective transcended all others. He argued that was the necessary pre-condition for peace and for continued US leadership in world affairs. Kissinger believed that “peace was derived from a certain balance of power and what diplomacy was supposed to sustain was not peace per se but this balance and that the structure on which peace and this balance were to rest was to be made up of three pillars: (a) partnership with friendly nations, (b) strength against potential aggressors, (c) willingness to negotiate with former adversaries.” Seen from this viewpoint, Kissinger’s ‘tilt diplomacy’ over Cyprus was in line with his goal of pursuing a world order favourable to the US. The tilt towards the Greek colonels and later towards Turkey, was in sequence with Kissinger’s objective of preserving American strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Kissinger was a strong advocate of the view that “a strong conventional posture backed by a strong nuclear capability offered the best hope for deterring the spectrum of alternative strategies open to a revolutionary power such as the Soviet Union.” Kissinger emphasised that deterrence of aggression remained an essential component of Western policy, new order or not, and that the foundation of deterrence must be built upon a strong conventional force.

From a totally different perspective, it has been widely asserted that Kissinger was too immersed in the developments around the Watergate crisis, and in the dispute between the Executive and Congress, to be able to give Cyprus his full attention. On a closer examination the evidence points to the contrary. When President Nixon began his
slow retreat under the pressure of his Watergate prosecutors the momentum of American foreign policy had been increasingly sustained by Kissinger alone. Kissinger was in a tactically secure position with almost total authority. As both Secretary of State and National Security Council Adviser to the President, he could protect diplomacy from the damaging effects of Watergate.

As Ball points out, "if Kissinger's initiatives during the Watergate period went well, he took credit for the success of the Middle East negotiations; if they went badly as in Cyprus, he blamed his failure on the breakdown of executive authority." Moreover there was no reason for Kissinger to believe that he would not remain Secretary of State under President Gerald Ford (who had already said he would retain him).

The Soviet Union's Reaction

Throughout the 1974 crisis, the Kremlin leadership accused the Greek military regime, and "NATO circles" as being responsible for the coup of 15 July. Although Moscow called for a return to the status quo ante that existed before July, their immediate reaction to the Turkish invasion was one of silent compliance.

It has been reported that the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean was under instructions to steer clear from Cyprus for the duration of the hostilities. It was only after the collapse of the Athens Junta, on 24 July and the negotiation of a ceasefire on Cyprus that Moscow distanced itself from the Turkish policy.

The Soviet Union was apprehensive that following the ceasefire on 22 July moves would be initiated to settle the dispute within NATO as an intramural issue. On 29 July the UN Security Council rejected the text of a Soviet draft resolution which recommended sending a UN Special Commission to Cyprus. At the end of July
Moscow protested against Turkey's logistical reinforcement of her forces on Cyprus. From the Soviet point of view the main danger lay in a possible division of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece - both NATO powers.

Following the second Turkish offensive in August, which was followed with Greece's withdrawal from the military wing of NATO, the Soviet Union began to tilt towards the Greek side. Overall however Moscow limited its involvement to submitting to the UN Security Council on 18 August (103) a new plan that called for the convening of an international conference to examine the problem. The Soviet proposal was immediately supported by the Greek Foreign Minister. Makarios also stated his support for the Soviet plan. However the Archbishop had many doubts whether this proposal could be implemented. He believed that it would come up against Turkey's refusal, and that if Turkey refused to attend such a conference there were not many chances of its taking place. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders stressed repeatedly that the Soviet policy of 'good neighbourliness' towards Turkey would continue uninterrupted, and would be unaffected by the events in Cyprus.
CHAPTER V

THE NATO INTRAMURAL DILEMMA

The Debasement of NATO's Political, Mediatory and Consultative Machinery

In previous Cyprus crises, NATO had played constructive mediatory roles between its inter-alliance adversaries, Greece and Turkey, over their Cyprus dispute. In 1974, however, in a radical departure from established policy, its crisis management machinery proved quite ineffective. The end result was a deterioration in the solidarity and cohesiveness of the organisation. On 14 August, 1974, the Greek government decided to withdraw from the military structure of NATO.

The intramural crisis was probably seminal for the collapse of America's (and NATO's) Mediterranean policy, after nearly three decades of undisputed supremacy. Karamanlis's 'Gaullist' withdrawal, the renewed arms race between Greece and Turkey, and the subsequent ambivalent nature of NATO's position on the southern flank threatened the stability of the region. To a degree, these developments can be regarded as direct by-products of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. In analysing the immobility of NATO on the one hand, and the post-crisis implications on the other, one is confronted with a wide range of conflicting determinants and viewpoints. That the Greek withdrawal inflicted a blow to the stability of the region is widely accepted. In order to provide a linkage analysis between NATO and the Cyprus issue this chapter will trace the whole sequence of developments of the NATO crisis, European Detente, the October War and the crisis in the Trans-Atlantic relations, the policy contradictions within NATO over Greece and Turkey, the Greek withdrawal and the subsequent deliberations over Greek re-entry to NATO under special conditions.
Trans-Atlantic Crisis, European Detente and NATO Disunity

In 1965, Kissinger wrote that "the atmosphere of detente removes the previous urgency for Allied cohesion". At the time he also suggested that "common defence against a military threat would soon lose its force as a political bond. Negotiations with the Eastern Bloc would prove corrosive unless they went hand in hand with the creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody them." Although Kissinger identified the problems of the alliance, he nevertheless viewed the role of the US as primus inter pares within NATO. Later, as a practitioner of American foreign policy, he drafted and implemented a Trans-Atlantic policy, which was inherently contradictory. In theory, the Nixon government continued to stress that the relationship was at the level of equal partnership. In practice, however, the administration under Kissinger applied a policy of secret global diplomacy, which put the stabilisation of relations between the superpowers ahead of Trans-Atlantic affairs. By failing to adequately consult the major NATO powers over US policies to the region the Washington administration undermined the solidarity and cohesiveness of NATO, and gave the European Governments the impression that they rated low on the list of US priorities.

Kissinger's failure to give his European allies advance information of his China breakthrough or the SALT I talks increased European anxieties about superpower summitry. Over SALT, West European leaders feared that Washington and Moscow would discuss and agree upon the critical issues affecting European security and only thereafter inform their respective allies. The talks were strictly bilateral, just as were the nuclear proliferation treaty (NPT) negotiations. "In 1969, Nixon had assured his NATO allies that, in any talks between the US and Soviet Union, the allies would be fully consulted both before and
during such talks, and their interests taken into account.¹⁹ During
the SALT I negotiations, however, US – NATO consultations with few
exceptions did not go beyond mere information, and came after, rather
than before, negotiating rounds.¹⁹ The transient consultations between
the US and the Atlantic Community reinforced the latter's fears about
the credibility of the US strategic guarantee, simultaneously increas­
ing friction with the alliance. Colley points out that SALT I
raised a number of questions in European minds, both political and
military. Newhouse, however, has concluded that European governments
were reluctant themselves to tinker with their political security
edifice and recognised that the web of East-West negotiations would in
time dislodge some of its foundations.¹¹

Following the signing of SALT I, a new set of factors threatened
the Transatlantic dialogue. Different perspectives over the future
role of FBS (Forward Based Systems) and clash of interest over MBFR
(Mutual Balance Force Reductions) widened the rift between them.
Western Europe's response to SALT was on the whole greeted favourably
in spite of some doubts about it.¹⁴

In 1973, the military and political relationship were indirectly
challenged and transformed by events in the non-military (especially
the economic) dimensions of the Trans-Atlantic relationship.¹⁵ Growing
disharmony over trade and financial issues openly threatened the already
fragile relationship.¹⁶ On 3 May, 1973, Nixon in a critical appraisal
of Trans-Atlantic affairs censured Western Europe for discriminating
against the US on financial and trade issues, while at the same time
they maintained a fastidious position on NATO security. Nixon argued
that the Europeans wanted to "preserve American protection in defence and
an undiminished American political commitment. . . . . . . this
raised a fundamental question: can the principle of Atlantic unity in defence and security be reconciled with the European Community's increasingly regional economic policies?" (18)

In search of a rapprochement in Trans-Atlantic affairs, Kissinger drafted a "New Atlantic Charter". He cautiously argued that, "If we permit the Atlantic partnership to atrophy, or to erode through neglect, carelessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been achieved and we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement." (19)

Kissinger's new policy, however, failed to reconcile the two camps, and charter received a hostile reaction in most of the European capitals. (20) The outstanding Trans-Atlantic differences overlapped with the developments in the Middle East to plunge the relationship into the public domain. The October War and the diverging American and European differences over it, illustrated the magnitude of the American and European positions on issues such as International Security, energy and world finance, and exposed the myth that prevailed about European unity.

The Yom Kippur War reflected differences between the European perceptions of its regional interests with American understanding of its global interests. (21) Washington considered that the maintenance of the Middle East military balance was as much in Europe's interests as its own. (22) The US view was that the "NATO" countries should have supported it. (23) The Europeans, however, felt that they had been little more than pawns in an American adventure with much greater hazards for it than for the US. Indicative of this was former NATO Secretary-General, Brozio's summation of European uneasiness over America's Decom 3 nuclear alert during the crisis, and its failure to consult NATO, "constituting the most clamorous episode." (24)

In 1973, the NATO countries had become more independent of US tutelage. One commentator summed up the emerging relationships thus: "They did not want an extension of the old British-American 'special
relationship' - i.e. a degrading of European governments to the status of advisers to Washington, able to advance their own interests only by influencing US policy decisions.\(^{(25)}\) The United States had also become disturbed at its NATO allies indifference towards the problems of European security.\(^{(26)}\) NATO Secretary-General Luns had noted that "as East-West relations seemed to be improving and the dangers of confrontation receded, so economic, monetary and other difficulties appeared increasingly to trouble relations between the Allies.\(^{(27)}\)

In the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East crisis, a new set of problems emerged, which surpassed, in order of magnitude, most of the other transatlantic differences. The crisis, as Hassner observed, "created a double feeling of identity and of impotence among West Europeans: the feeling that their interests were more different from those of the United States than before but, conversely, that they were more dependent than before on American power."\(^{(28)}\)

The October crisis, and the subsequent energy crisis, exposed not only the underlying nature of Trans-Atlantic policy differences, but also the fragmentation of intra-European interests with respect to political, economic, and trade issues.\(^{(30)}\) One instance of the Europeans task of cohesion was the inability of the Nine to agree publicly on any plan to share oil supplies after the Netherlands, (along with the US) was faced with a total oil embargo, on 17 October, from OAPEC countries.\(^{(31)}\) The embargo underscored the insecurity of Western Europe in the energy field.

Despite official announcements stressing the necessity for increased co-operation between Western countries in coming to terms with the escalating energy crisis, diverging tendencies emerged.\(^{(33)}\) Realising their dependence on OAPEC oil, the EEC countries temporarily set aside their differences\(^{(34)}\) and made a pro-Arab declaration on 6 November and
in return, received an undertaking that deliveries would be resumed. In making the move the EEC officially refused to follow the strategy of a strongly defensive stand advocated by the US.\(^{(35)}\)

In 1974, new complications between America and the EEC countries and an intra-EEC split broke out at the energy conference in Washington (11-13 February 1974). The Nixon administration emphasised to the West European foreign ministers participating in the conference\(^{(36)}\) that there could be no unilateral EEC solution to the energy crisis\(^{(37)}\) that could succeed, especially without the full participation of the US. It suggested that without their involvement, the world would be caught up in a vicious circle which would inevitably lead to a breakdown of the world economic order.\(^{(38)}\)

During the conference proceedings, Kissinger lobbied to have the bilateral negotiations approach scratched, and proposed, instead, a general energy conference of all countries under the auspices of the UN — without previous consultations between the consumer groups. The French representative, Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, rejected outright Kissinger's energy formula. The Secretary of State, however, with assistance from the German delegation, managed to isolate the remainder of the EEC countries\(^{(37)}\) from the intransigent French posture. Shortly after the Washington conference, the eight dropped the American plan, and returned to the French-sponsored bilateral approach.

On 15 March 1974 Nixon warned that "...the Europeans cannot have it both ways. They cannot have United States participation and co-operation on the security front, and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility, on the economic and political front."
And until the Europeans are willing to sit down and co-operate on the economic and political front, as well as on the security front, no meetings of Heads of Government should be scheduled.\(^{(40)}\)

Nixon's criticism heightened the fears already held by the EEC, that the US was seeking a renewal of its sphere of influence in Western Europe. The deteriorating situation illustrated that Western Europe had at least on a temporary basis moved perceptibly out of the ambit of American hegemony. It was faced, however, with a policy choice between the aim of seeking its political autonomy from the US, and the security solidarity stemming from NATO, restricted its room for manoeuvre.\(^{(41)}\)

A number of key NATO officials had assumed, at the time, that the October crisis, and the threat of a US–Soviet confrontation to which it gave rise, would have been sufficient to have dampened differences between America, NATO and Europe. As Secretary-General Luns has written this did not happen.\(^{(42)}\) In 1974, the resonance of the crisis also affected NATO. In analysing the failure of the Western powers (especially the United States) to manage the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the subsequent intramural dispute, the dis-integrative atmosphere that prevailed in the West on the eve of the crisis was one of the factors that thwarted Western mediation efforts. From the outset, differences developed over political and strategic priorities in managing the conflict. The clash of policy in the early phase began as an Anglo-American disagreement.\(^{(43)}\) However, as the dispute escalated, dissension over Cyprus also spread within the ranks of NATO and the EEC.

Despite the fact that the crisis threatened the collapse of the alliance's southern flank, both NATO and the EEC were content to play only a secondary role, leaving the job of mediation to the US and Britain hands. In a radical departure from past precedents of intervention,\(^{(44)}\)
the Secretary-General of NATO only sent messages to the Greek and Turkish Governments asking for restraint in the area. The Organisation appeared almost indifferent to the task of salvaging the conflict. Whereas the crisis broke out on 15 July, the supreme NATO body, the North Atlantic Council, was not used until a few days later. Moreover, although it became obvious that the Greek military regime was behind the Cyprus coup, NATO restricted itself in relation to restraining Turkey from invading Cyprus by playing a secondary role. Anything short of an active NATO involvement, to return the situation as near to the status quo as possible, would have been considered, by Ankara, as a NATO tilt towards the Athens regime. Hence the fear that the Greek Junta might have consolidated its position on the island, along with the prevalent anti-Junta mood in Western Europe, probably contributed to the Turkish decision to invade the island.

As the recent intra-EEC dispute over energy supplies had shown, the foreign policy of the EEC was still in a primitive stage of development and put an end to misleading assumptions about its increasing political influence. In its attempt to influence the outcome of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the EEC's inherently weak position became detectable once again. The conflict was only of 'peripheral' interest to the organisation. Since neither its economic, nor political interests stood to suffer directly from developments in Cyprus.

The involvement by the EEC was essentially an experiment in political mediation by the Nine who viewed the latest Cyprus crisis as an opportunity to develop its system of consultation on foreign policy issues.

Throughout its diplomatic intervention, the EEC did not venture beyond declarations. However despite its secondary importance the Cyprus crisis led to considerable discord within the European Community. Differences of opinion developed (especially between Germany and France)
over approaches to the problem. The breakdown in political co-operation was reminiscent of the recent inter-European disputes. Following the invasion of Cyprus, President Giscard d'Estaing of France called upon the EEC to take an active part in the solution to the crisis, and suggested that they should use all means available to them - and in particular economic pressure - to restore peace. The policy of Germany, however, was at variance with that of its French partner. Official spokesmen in Bonn did not expressly condemn the unilateral military actions as was done, in contrast, in the resolution adopted by the Security Council on the French proposals. The German government officials refused to define their stand toward the French initiative arguing that Bonn had not been asked beforehand. The clash of policy was evaluated by analysts as a contradiction to the official statements concerning the closest contact of Bonn with the countries of the EEC and NATO. Moreover, in contrast to the French stance, Germany did not lift the ban on arms supplies directed against the Greek Junta, even after installation of a civilian regime.

With the return to power of the 'Francophile' Karamanlis, the Giscard d'Estaing government now saw Greece as a likely sphere of diplomatic influence. The intense French mediation was also in line with its policy of re-asserting its role in Mediterranean affairs.

Besides the French perception of its role in the Mediterranean, the remainder of the EEC states lacked a common political purpose. The inability of the EEC to reconcile their divergent interests and perspectives also negated any possible bilateral approach with Greece or Turkey over Cyprus by an individual member state.

Without access to classified NATO documents, it is not possible to pinpoint, with absolute certainty the causes for NATO's ineffective mediation over Cyprus. Despite this limitation, however, an examination
of NATO's consultative network precludes the hypothesis that lack of advanced warning prevented a decisive NATO involvement. The nexus of NATO's machinery in 1974 was composed of a military and political consultation network that more than adequately monitored political and strategic developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. As figure 5:1 illustrates, the NATO circuit linked its headquarters in Brussels with the major areas of diplomatic activity: Washington, London, Athens and Ankara. At least 3 days prior to the Turkish landing, NATO had concrete evidence regarding the preparation on an invasion force at Adana, Mersin and Iskenderum. In particular, COMLANDSOUTH-EAST at Izmir and CINCSOUTH headquarters in Naples had more than sufficient proof of the Turkish preparations. That the information was readily available has been documented by military as well as reliable public sources. The chiefs of the Greek Army Officers assigned to COMLANDSOUTHEAST, Brigadier Sotiriadis and Brigadier Xalkias, on 18 and 19 July continually warned the chief of the Greek armed forces, General Bonanos, about the Turkish expeditionary force. Similar reports reached the Greek Pentagon from its officers stationed at CINCSOUTH. Similarly on 18 July, New York Times defence correspondent, Drew Middleton, reported in detail on the Turkish buildup. It is also probable that General Goodpaster, as SACEUR, besides NATO intelligence, would have also had direct access to DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency) and other US intelligence reports. The United States with C-130 and F-4 electronic and photographic reconnaissance planes based at Athens International Airport and in Turkey at Incerlik air base (located outside the city of Adana), plus its high flying U-2 spy aircraft operating off Akrotiri, was at a vantage point to collect accurate data. On 19 July, the assistant Greek military attache in London, Lieutenant Colonel Perdikis reported to the Greek Pentagon that a
Whitehall official had informed him that Ecevit had warned the British Government that Turkey would intervene in Cyprus.

(66) The United States' dominant stance in NATO, particularly over the Southern periphery, and Western Europe's reluctance to get involved in areas beyond the central front region, were the causal factors for NATO's ineffectiveness during the 1974 crisis.

Over a period of nearly three decades, the USA through NATO and a number of bilateral agreements, had succeeded in turning the Eastern Mediterranean into an American domain. As has been shown, with the emergence of East-West detente, the US came under criticism from most West European states over political and economic matters. In the area of security, however, its position had remained relatively intact, especially in Greece and Turkey. Within the NATO framework, the United States' direction of issues concerning NATO's posture in the Mediterranean was accepted by most West European states.

In general, the 'central front' states of NATO such as Germany have not concerned themselves a great deal with South European security matters. Their emphasis has been placed on the security situation in Central Europe. Nevertheless, policy towards the flanks (southern and northern) had caused latent differences between the US and NATO. It has been argued in the past that Greece and Turkey contributed little to the NATO defence in a military sense because their forces were essentially for self defence. Nor did the nations of Central Europe contribute much to the flanks. Overall the relationship of Continental NATO States, with the southern flank, was of a loose nature. To close the gap, the United States reinforced the integrated military organisation through bilateral measures.
American Strategic and Tactical With-hold

In 1974, American political will and determination to intervene was not forthcoming. Without the Nixon administration taking the lead, the organisation remained indifferent to the escalating political developments. In earlier crises both the Secretary-General and the Supreme Allied Commander had played key political mediatory roles. In most previous cases, however, NATO officials intervened only at the requests of the American government, and only after they had its full diplomatic backing. This created a political vacuum which undermined NATO's capacity to intervene and exposed, once again, the limitations of its crisis management mechanism. Without American leadership the organisation resorted only to appeals for moderation. As Deputy Secretary-General Cedronio conceded after the crisis, “its efforts did not bare the fruits that were hoped.” He blamed the limits of the organisation for this.

In 1974, American policy over Cyprus was characterised by what Hill has termed strategic with-hold. The US engaged in negotiations with third parties to the dispute without consulting or considering the interests of other alliance members in making its unilateral decisions. Only through high level intervention of the kind experienced during the 1960's crisis had NATO come close to effective arbitration over Cyprus. However, even during those interventions NATO only managed to forestall a Greek-Turkish war. From its foundation the organisation lacked effective consultation of the conciliatory kind.

Without America's all embracing influence, NATO could not reach a consensus over collective crisis management tactics. In 1974, the North Atlantic Council adhered to the unanimity rule, and it squandered valuable time by seeking to find a solution by compromise in order not to alienate either of its member states. The Council's approach
resulted in the problem becoming deliberately delayed.

From a different perspective it can be argued that NATO's ability to forestall the crisis was limited by its policy of supporting the Colonels' regime throughout the period 1967-1974. The United States, within NATO forums, used its privileged position to eliminate any criticism of the military regime from building momentum. It was a clear case of America's military dimension within NATO being used to censor any political stance that threatened US national security objectives. By withholding and defending the Athens regime, Washington preserved its flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre in Greece. However, its tactical withholding and bilateral NATO approach had the tendency of totally isolating any multilateral NATO approach with Greece. Without the US, which had decided and implemented in a unilateral manner the organisation's approach towards Athens, NATO lacked the means and determination and considered itself inappropriate to commit itself.

It can also be assumed that, with a military regime in power, it would have been easier to use a military envoy, such as General Goodpaster, as a troubleshooter. That option, however, probably would not have been an effective diplomatic channel in 1974.

Throughout the period 1967-1974, the United States government had used both key political and military leaders to placate and defend the regime. Despite the fact that the Junta had been plagued by internal dissension, and its military capabilities had been severely rundown, the Nixon administration, particularly through its SACEUR chief, continuously defended it. The appeasement of the Colonels had the effect of imprinting upon the Ioannides Government the illusion that Greece's role was paramount within the Alliance. The exaggerated perceptions contributed greatly in the decision to overthrow Makarios. Moreover, having a month earlier outlined the importance of Greece to
NATO, the position of General Goodpaster, had he been called upon to mediate, would have been weak in confronting the extremely naive and overconfident Ioannides regime.

Greece's misperception of its NATO role had cemented the idea upon the Colonels that the US and NATO would firstly not harass them, and secondly that they would intervene to prevent the Turkish invasion.

Karamanlis's Ambivalent Gaullist Withdrawal

A combination of domestic, strategic and diplomatic factors prompted the transitional Karamanlis government to decide upon an equivocal withdrawal from NATO.

As the Greek Premier noted, his regime was from the very first a captive of the accomplished facts of the crisis. Following the August Turkish operations on Cyprus, anti-American and anti-NATO hysteria swept the country. In order to appease the desperate and humiliated Greek populace the traditionally pro-Western leader had no alternative option, but to implement some form of anti-Western policy. He was disappointed with NATO for its oversight to stop the Turkish onslaught, particularly phase II.

Instead of constructive mediation following the collapse of the Junta, the US claimed that NATO emerged from its trial by fire in the Cyprus conflict with increased strength. The premature and exaggerated State Department claim, showed how much the American Government had systematically failed to accurately assess the difficulties that would emerge as direct repercussions of the crisis. From 24 July until 14 August no effective pressure was applied on Ankara, by either the US or NATO. During this critical period NATO Secretary-General Luns did not initiate any NATO mediation, in the form of either himself travelling to Ankara or sending a high-ranking official to...
persuade Ecevit to terminate his Cyprus venture. Instead as he revealed later on, he resorted to council-chamber diplomacy and quiet conversations. An avenue too distant, however, and unable to penetrate the corridors of power in Ankara.

George Mavros summed up the Greek mood that prevailed at the time. "The crisis of Cyprus has proven the bankruptcy of all international institutions. Greece found itself in the need to withdraw from the military alliance of NATO. The reasons are obvious. When a defence alliance is not in a position to prevent an armed conflict between two of its members then how can one possibly believe that it could protect its members from attack by a third country?"

The anti-American and NATO feeling was a reaction against the US for its overt course of action towards Greece during the Colonels' rule, which was in line with US policy of planning short term military considerations ahead of long term political interests. Secondly it was an expression of latent anti-NATO sentiment for its failure to prevent the Cyprus calamity.

In earlier Greek-NATO rifts over Cyprus, there did not emerge a consensus between the government of the day in Athens, and the opposition forces. In 1974 the extent of the anti-American and NATO mood was so high that the left and right for the first time rallied in support of Karamanlis. If the Greek Premier had a united front in the political spectrum then why was there an ambiguous approach towards NATO and at the same time a continuation of cordial bilateral relations with the US?

In previous disputes with NATO, Karamanlis had taken cautious and conciliatory positons, which from the outset appeared strictly as an elaborate charade designed for internal political effect.

In a deviation from established policy the Greek Premier in 1974
introduced an "Hellenic" version of Gaullism, by using the French precedent of 1966 as a blueprint for his selective withdrawal. Their greatest similarity was based upon the fact, that both had used the alliance to register their anti-American grievances. Comparatively Karamanlis had less room to manoeuvre than his French counterpart had in 1966. The consequences of a total military exodus would have been different for Greece. For example, NATO's forward defence forces in Germany interposed a shield between France and the Soviet Union. Greece on the otherhand had a common frontier with communist countries. Likewise the French had an independent nuclear deterrent, and a sophisticated arms industry. In contrast Greece did not possess a nuclear capability and its armed forces were completely dependent on Western, mainly US, supplies.

It can be assumed that in order to achieve maximum diplomatic and political leverage against Turkey, Karamanlis needed to carry through with an outright withdrawal. Such a tactic might have strengthened the Greek position in the sense that it would have forced NATO and the United States into coercing Ankara to abandon its intransigent position. There was an element of risk however, that the United States might have adversely tilted more towards Turkey in retaliation to such a move. In addition the Ford administration could have also terminated arms shipments towards her, which would have further undermined Greece's strategic position.

The possibility of Karamanlis tilting towards the Soviet Union was also not on the cards for the following reasons: firstly Greece was clearly within the boundaries of the Western sphere of influence, and it was unlikely that Moscow would have jeopardised the spirit of detente by making inroads into Greece. Secondly like its superpower counterpart it considered Turkey, as strategically more important than
Greece. Hence it seems most unlikely that it would have abandoned its slanted neutralist policy towards Ankara, in order to try to win over an insecure transitional regime with a pro-Western leader. Thirdly in order that his regime could survive the Greek Premier could not have formulated a pro-Soviet policy or accepted any Soviet initiatives. In August 1974 he had not yet consolidated his position and the former military rulers were still waiting restlessly in the wings. Any openly pro-Soviet move by Athens ran the risk of being misinterpreted by the military as a shift to the left, and used as a pretext to regain power. Similarly a total cut off from NATO could have resulted in extremist pro-Western officers seeing it as a radical departure from the Western camp, and thus grounds for staging a coup against him.

Within the NATO framework the decision to withdraw resulted in a thinning out of Greek participation in NATO bodies. Reportedly the NADGE (the NATO early warning system) was switched off, and Greek territory was no longer made available for NATO manoeuvres.\(^8\) Greece also withdrew its representatives from Izmir as well as the Hellenic first army from NATO control and the Hellenic 28th tactical airforce from SIXTAF's control.\(^9\) On 11 September 1974 Greece also formally withdrew from NATO's Defence Planning Committee.\(^1\) Politically, Karamanlis justified his government's withdrawal on the basis that NATO had shown total indifference to the Cyprus crisis. Greece he emphasized:

"could review its position in NATO only after the reasons which imposed its withdrawal from the military structure of the alliance are lifted. These reasons are linked to the elimination of the causes which created the crisis and led to the Greek-Turkish conflict for which Turkey, after its operation in Cyprus is solely responsible."\(^{93}\)
He cautiously noted that:

"the Greek decision does not imply that Greece shall break her political and mental ties with Europe to which she belongs." (93)

In the meantime Karamanlis also warned the Greek Cypriots that they must "obtain unity of the soul," or risk endangering all Greeks. This was a clear reference to the continuing divisions among the Greek Cypriots. Traditionally, Greece has supported the Greek Cypriots. However, the liaison between Athens and Nicosia has been far from perfect. Since independence the Makarios administration had demonstrated a high degree of independence from Athens. As already shown above, attempts by various Greek governments (especially by the military regime from 1967 to 1974) to impose their particular policies on Nicosia had usually produced intra-Greek rifts.

The Karamanlis administration, conscious of the previous schisms between Athens and Nicosia, was apprehensive of being involved directly in the issue. Since 1974 it pursued a policy which assumed that the solution of the Cyprus problem lies not in Athens and Ankara but in Nicosia. In the meantime, Athens fully supported the Greek Cypriots in their diplomatic campaign to gain support for their position in international forums. Policy priorities, national security and diplomatic tactics also underlied Greece's unprecedented low profile on the Cyprus question. Greek entry into the Common Market, reconciliation between Greece and Turkey and Greek re-entry into NATO ranked above Cyprus in the priority list of the Athens government. In the meantime, by rejecting the Turkish demand to elevate the Cyprus issue to the level of Greco-Turkish relations, the Greek government improved its diplomatic and strategic position over Turkey. By rejecting the
offer Greece enhanced the chances of the US arms embargo against Turkey being prolonged. If it had agreed to the Turkish demand the arms embargo would have probably been lifted earlier. The Treaty of Paris of 10 February 1947 prohibited Greece from fortifying the Dodecanese and other islands close to Turkey. Athens, however, used the Turkish invasion of Cyprus as a pretext to militarise the islands, improving further its diplomatic leverage on the "Aegean issue."

To balance the agreement (Washington made) with Ankara, the US offered Greece almost $1 billion for continued access to US facilities which the Greek government threatened to close in retaliation against the administrations' "Turkish tilt." Negotiations over the status of US facilities continued throughout 1975 and 1976. The Karamanlis government stalled for more than nine months before it initiated the new American-Greek defence agreement on 28 July 1977. Although the Greek deal was ready for initialling by October 1976, Greece opted to delay ratification. It was worried that if it went ahead, it might ease the way for the American-Turkish treaty and the lifting of the embargo, which Greece perceived as one of the few levers that it could apply to influence Turkish policy over Cyprus and the Aegean dispute. The ambivalent nature of Greece's official withdrawal from NATO and its decision to reach agreement with Washington, sparked a political storm in Greece. At the same time Greco-Turkish relations took a new and perilous turn for the worse as their territorial and mining dispute in the Aegean intensified. Taking the dispute before the World Court in the Hague, and the UN Security Council, Greece alleged that Turkey threatened peace in the region by violating Greece's sovereign rights in the Aegean.
At the Greco-Turkish Summit at Montreux on 10 and 11 March 1978 the Cyprus problem was officially separated from bilateral Greco-Turkish relations. In 1978 the Karamanlis administration under the assumption that the embargo would be repealed, withdrew its diplomatic support for the embargo and concentrated its efforts on securing military aid that would minimize the impact of the repeal. For the Athens government relations with Washington now ranked higher in priority than the Cyprus issue.

The Greek government seemed to accept the Carter view that the embargo, no matter how well intentioned, simply did not work to influence Ankara. Second, the intensity of the Carter administration effort to repeal the embargo meant that Greece would find increasingly hostile feelings from the White House if Athens insisted on supporting the embargo. Third, the death of Archbishop Makarios in August 1977 meant the removal of a political force with which Karamanlis had always to reckon with. The Archbishop had influence in Greece; no Prime Minister, could ignore Makarios. President Kyprianou, no matter what his political skills, is not a Makarios, and he cannot realistically pose a political threat to the "New Democracy" forces even if there were a public spirit between Greece and Cyprus. Fourth, the usefulness of the embargo for Greece had diminished. The embargo was very useful for Greece in its bilateral confrontation with Turkey in the 1975-1977 period. The Greek army was both demoralized and badly equipped after the junta years. It needed time to rebuild. The embargo provided this respite. But by early 1978 it was much less likely that there would be a military confrontation with Turkey. For these reasons, the Karamanlis government decided not to contest the Carter decision to repeal the embargo. Instead, the government
ordered its Washington embassy to protect Greek interests even while those of Cyprus were being undermined;\(^{(98)}\)

With the government under political pressure from the ascending opposition leader, Papandreou, who would like to pull Greece entirely out of NATO and who holds a hawkish position on the Aegean issue, Athens has been forced to harden its stance on the Aegean dispute and over the protracted deliberations in NATO about the special status requested by Greece. Turkey, however, has made its consent to this arrangement conditional on a redistribution of NATO’s operational jurisdiction in the Aegean sea and air space which had been left under Greek control.

In 1980 the new Athens government of Premier Rallis negotiated the re-entry of Greece into NATO, despite the fact that the criteria his predecessor had outlined for Greece’s re-entry into NATO, had not yet been fulfilled, i.e. removal of occupying Turkish troops in Cyprus, and a termination of the de facto partition of 40 percent of the island.\(^{(99)}\)
CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST TURKEY

Following the second Turkish military offensive on 14-17 August 1974 a consensus of Congressional opinion emerged in favour of imposing an arms embargo against Turkey. Subsequent Congressional developments concerning the drafting and enactment of the arms cutoff caused a heated debate between Congress and the Executive. This temporarily institutionalised the Cyprus issue in US foreign policy, contributed to the collapse of the Ecevit-Erbakan coalition government, and undermined Turkish-American relations, culminating with the closure of US bases in Turkey in July 1975.

Congress v. The Executive

"In the aftermath of US involvement in Cambodia, Vietnam and 'Watergate', Congressmen recognised that they were able to impose their will upon the Executive in key areas of foreign policy." The move for an arms embargo against Turkey was the first test case in the "post Nixon" era, precipitating a serious confrontation between Congress and the Executive over the control of foreign policy making. On 15 August 1974, in a meeting with Kissinger, a group of Greek-American Congressmen led by Representative Brademas criticised him for mismanaging the Cyprus crisis. Kissinger conceded that the crisis had not been handled by his department in the highest traditions of diplomacy. He, however, stressed that the resignation of President Nixon and other crises, plus the inauguration of the Ford administration had prevented him from giving much attention to the problem. He also partly blamed Callaghan for the collapse of the second Geneva conference.
At the meeting Brademas put forward the proposal that the United States cutoff its military assistance to Turkey until its troops were withdrawn from the island.(6) But Kissinger replied to Brademas:

"Some political and strategic exigencies are more important than the Laws."(7)

Contrary to Kissinger, on 18 August 1974 Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger criticised the advance of the Turkish forces and said that "the United States would have to re-examine its military aid programs for Turkey . . . the Turkish moves at this point have gone beyond what any of its friends or sympathisers would have anticipated, and I to accept."(8)

In the wake of Watergate a large percentage of Congressmen were not in a frame of mind to accept Kissinger's arguments. The cornerstone of their thesis was that the rule of law also applied to the conduct of foreign policy by the Executive branch. Frank and Weisband assert that "congressional distrust of the Presidency and a determination to 'get a handle' on foreign policy decisions intimately affecting American interests, rather than any profound commitment to one side or the other in the Cyprus crisis, informed and motivated the majority of members."(9)

On 19 September 1974 Kissinger, while addressing the Senate Democratic Caucus, was asked by Senator Eagleton to comment on the legality of Turkish use of military equipment supplied by the United States in the Cyprus crisis. Kissinger replied that "the dominant interpretation within my legal department" agreed with Eagleton's view that further aid to Turkey was illegal.(10). He, however, went on to explain that:

"foreign policy considerations obtained against applying
the penalty the law provided: suspension of further aid.\(^{11}\)

Under provisions in military aid legislation, US supplied weapons could be used only for defensive purposes. Congressman Solarz's comments reflect the view prevalent at the time about the rule of law and US foreign policy:

"... the movement out of the beachhead in August 1974 did appear to violate the restrictions of the Arms Export Control Act and thus required the cutoff of all new American arms to Turkey - if for no other reason than demonstrating to all the nations of the world that the United States was serious about the restrictions in American law. Indeed, it seems clear that once Turkey had occupied 40 percent of Cyprus, the credibility of American law was at stake. If the United States had not acted at that time, others would have been put on notice that they could use our arms with impunity regardless of their agreements with us."\(^{12}\)

On 24 September 1974 the House of Representatives voted (307 - 90) to ban military aid to Turkey until the President certified that "substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus."\(^{13}\) When continuing resolution authority 1131 was tabled in the Senate it was passed, despite President Ford's conviction that "it would destroy any hope for the success of the initiatives the United States had already taken or may take in the future to contribute to a just settlement of the Cyprus dispute ... the United States will have lost its negotiating flexibility and influence."\(^{15}\) A Joint Congressional conference committee drafted an Amendment, the text of which was similar to the defeated Mansfield and Rhodes amendment. However, on 7 October the House of Representatives rejected by 291
votes to 69 the advice of its leadership and amended the continuing resolution which required an immediate cessation of all US military assistance to Turkey. Ford once again cautioned that the amendment if passed by the Senate would imperil America's relationship with Turkey and weaken the position of the US in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean. On 9 October the Senate rejected Ford's advice and passed a similar amendment. On 14 October 1974 Ford vetoed H. J. Resolution 1131, arguing that if the resolution was enacted it would undercut his ability to assist the governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute. Following Ford's second veto of an identical cutoff to a new funding bill in the House of Representatives, both the House and the Senate passed a modified resolution (H. J. Resolution 1167) which was more moderate on the issue of US aid to Turkey. It permitted the President to suspend until 10 December prohibitions in the resolution itself as well as making the grace period conditional on the Turkish government sending no American supplied arms to reinforce its forces on Cyprus. The measure was signed with serious reservations by Ford on 18 October.

The six week grace period was permitted to encourage further negotiations. Congress agreed to the delay after the Ford administration, and particularly Kissinger, encouraged Congress that it would use that time period to put pressure on the Ankara government. Another reason for consenting to the delay was to give the new President a chance to act decisively to end the Turkish military presence and to rectify the consequences of the August military move. Since no negotiations took place, the cutoff began on 10 December and lasted until 31 December 1974, when an amendment re-enacted it but suspended its effect until
February 1975 when it was reimposed. In an attempt to forestall the implementation of the embargo, Kissinger initiated a series of meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, who were attending the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. Kissinger, however, failed to live up to his promises to Congress that he would achieve meaningful progress towards an eventual resolution of the crisis.

Collapse of the Ecevit Government and Failure of Kissinger's Initiatives

The collapse, on 18 September 1974, of the Ecevit-Erbakan coalition and the subsequent leadership crisis in Turkey complicated the efforts of Kissinger and the international community in their search for a breakthrough on the Cyprus situation particularly during the period October 1974 to March 1975. Although many contentious issues had plagued the fragile coalition it was policy differences over the Cyprus problem that contributed most to the fall of the Ecevit-Erbakan government. In 1975 Ecevit offered the following explanation:

"... insurmountable dissension and conflict arose between us and our coalition partner on the subject of Cyprus and also the general perspective on foreign relations. We reached a point where we could no longer conduct foreign affairs in co-operation with our partner...We realized that our coalition partner's stand did not and would not allow this. It is this realization that forced us out of government."(22)

The Turkish Prime Minister envisaged a situation for Cyprus to remain a federal, independent state with the two communities on the island to have zones or geographical regions where two
independent separate Greek and Turkish administrations would function. Ecevit's position was moderate in comparison to Erbakan's who called for the annexation of all Cyprus or at least the 40% under Turkish occupation. Ecevit used the pretext of a planned visit to Scandinavia to terminate the partnership. He refused to name Erbakan as acting Prime Minister during his planned absence. However, Erbakan claimed that as deputy Prime Minister he had every right to be acting Prime Minister as well, and refused to sign the government decree authorising Ecevit's trip. In retaliation Ecevit dissolved the coalition and proposed new elections.

Besides the clash with Erbakan, Ecevit, conscious that his decision to intervene in Cyprus had elevated his popularity status to that of a "National Hero", wanted to politically exploit it to strengthen his party's parliamentary position. The scheme, however, misfired. Most of the right wing political parties, believing that an early election would result in a victory for the Republican People's Party, opposed Ecevit's efforts in seeking a parliamentary majority for dissolution. In the ensuing cabinet crisis the Prime Minister failed to form a new coalition or to secure a mandate for the dissolution of Parliament. From 18 September to 6 November 1974, he continued to govern but only on a "caretaker basis".

In the meantime the embargo campaign was gathering momentum in Congress. This alarmed Ecevit who was in agreement with Kissinger that some form of progress had to be made on the Cyprus situation. On 1 November Kissinger warned the Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes that:

"If the Cyprus problem is not immediately drawn into an
atmosphere of negotiations it will ossify. In future you will not be able to take the steps that you could easily take now. You will appear as conceding to the public opinion and you will become the captives of domestic policy...Turkey was at the moment in a stronger position and it rested with Turkey to make the first gesture."\(^{(26)}\)

However Ecevit's caretaker status and the rigid opposition of his political opponents prevented him from introducing any new foreign policy initiatives. Contrary to the Prime Minister, Erbakan and the other political leaders ignored the pressure applied by Kissinger and some West European leaders, and opposed their suggestion that Turkey should implement a more conciliatory posture over Cyprus. They feared that Ecevit's electoral position would become even stronger if they supported him in securing a political breakthrough in Cyprus.\(^{(27)}\)

On 1 November 1974, Kissinger in a move to create a favourable atmosphere for negotiations proposed to his counterpart, Gunes, the following plan which he believed would be an appropriate good will gesture to break the stalemate.

* "Turkey would unilaterally withdraw five thousand troops. (These being the five thousand paratroopers on the island whom Kissinger argued had completed their mission.)

* Turkey would return a small pocket of territory which would in the meantime be evacuated by Turkish troops further than previously planned.

* The Greeks would be allowed to return to a few villages around Louroudjina.

* The owners of Varosha Hotels and the technical Greek personnel lacking in the Turkish region would be able to return (under
Turkish rule and administration).

* The port of Famagusta and Nicosia Airport would be opened for joint use.

Following the above gestures Kissinger's scenario also included a disclosure by the Greek Cypriot leader, Clerides, of his acceptance of the "bi-regional federation" principle which would be concluded after Greece stated that it also favoured the resumption of talks. To secure the implementation of his initiative Kissinger arranged to visit Ankara on 8-9 November 1974.

After examining Kissinger's plan, defence and foreign ministry officials advised Ecevit that the plan would not undermine Turkey's strategic and economic position. Moreover, they concluded that the resumption of talks would improve the government's foreign policy posture by removing the Cyprus problem from the forefront of world public opinion and reduce the condemnation and growing opposition to Turkey. Finally it would help forestall the imposition of the US arms embargo. Ecevit was prepared to form a minority government to implement the Kissinger scheme. However, when Ecevit consequently put forward the US scenario for endorsement by the Turkish National Security Council it was vetoed by Erbakan. The decision was a turning point for both Turkish and American policies towards the Cyprus issue. Following Erbakan's rejection, Ecevit asked the Turkish President Koruturk to permit him to form a minority government, as a means to by-pass the National Salvation Party's opposition to the Kissinger plan.

The Turkish President rejected Ecevit's proposal and terminated the Ecevit caretaker administration. On 7 November Kissinger cancelled his scheduled visit to Ankara, because of the non-existence of a responsible government in Turkey. In the absence of any other coalition securing parliamentary support, Koruturk, in mid November,
installed another caretaker cabinet of technocrats and a number (31) of politicians headed by independent Sadi Irmak. (But it failed to secure a vote of confidence from the Chamber, and collapsed in March 1975.)

The Cabinet crisis meant that an opportunity was by-passed for a Kissinger-led breakthrough to materialise. The absence in Ankara of both a formidable leader and government until 31 March 1975, alarmed the Ford administration which in turn considered that it was now necessary to provide greater diplomatic support towards Turkey. Kissinger skillfully exploited the Turkish crisis, to delay the imposition of the arms embargo by Congress. He argued, that with Turkey in a transitional phase it was difficult for him to apply any effective pressure on the Irmak government. (32)

Since no negotiations took place during the "Congressional" grace period, the cutoff took effect on 10 December and lasted until 31 December. In the meantime, during the NATO Foreign Ministerial Council meeting in Brussels on 11-13 December, Kissinger, had a series of talks with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers which led in turn to the resumption of discussions between Clerides and Denktash on Cyprus on 19 December. (33) The Ford administration used the Brussels breakthrough to intensify its lobbying efforts in Congress, conveying that suspension of the cutoff was needed to provide an additional interval for the resolution of the Cyprus situation. (34)

Beneath the surface of the Brussels initiative, orchestrated to have a maximum impact upon Congress, Kissinger was drafting the Ford administration's new position on the Cyprus conflict. Under the new guidelines the central issue of Cyprus was to be
relegated in order of priority. Indeed, the administration would concentrate on bilateral relations and national security issues associated with arms aid to Turkey, and during his Brussels efforts to secure an Athens-Ankara initiative, Kissinger completely by-passed the reinstated Makarios. Perhaps had he included the Archbishop in his scheme, Kissinger might have achieved some point of convergence. However, he eluded such a scenario, opting instead for a partisan policy towards Ankara. During the Brussels talks he embarked on a course that seemed to aim at formenting trouble among the ranks of the Greek Cypriot side rather than pursuing for a peaceful solution. During his deliberations with the Turkish Foreign Minister he advised him as follows:

"If you are going to play your cards on Makarios think twice. To ask for the Archbishop to become interlocutor means to increase his powers. Let Clerides handle the talks. He is a more reasonable man. Let Makarios back him. The disagreement cropping up among the two men will make your position stronger."

As a precondition for talks Esenbel demanded that the Greek side accept the bi-regional federation as precondition. Kissinger concluded that the Turkish proposals were too unreasonable and bought up other issues. In return for the 20,000 Turks held in the British bases, to pass to the north, Kissinger noted whether Turkey would accept also to take that many Greeks, and that it either accept a strong central government, or reduce its region. Kissinger managed to manoeuvre Bitsios into accepting the resumption of the talks without preconditions and supporting Clerides. He emphasised to Esenbel

"As our position is also the same, leave the Makarios
element aside. If Makarios adheres the agreement to be concluded, it is good. If he does not adhere to it we will support Clerides's stance" (36)

While trying to extract from an adamant Esenbel a commitment that Turkey would make concessions Kissinger reportedly stated:

"Instead of working on plans to deteriorate the relations between Makarios and Greece, by your insistence you are creating an opportunity for Greece to renege on the guarantee that it gave to me..." (37)

Despite his influence in Ankara, Kissinger failed to follow through any of the moves that he initiated in relation to Cyprus, to secure substantial concessions from Turkey. Unable to play the role of the "honest broker" because of his low standing with the Greek Cypriot side, he emerged in his deliberations with Turkish officials as the reluctant patron. Kissinger refused to sustain the pressure on Turkey to put forward a set of concessions, in case any overt intervention on his behalf threatened the status of the fragile Ankara government, which in turn might have threatened the status of US National Security interests in Turkey.

Kissinger's diplomatic manoeuvres of by-passing His Beatitude, and then presenting him with Athens-Ankara guidelines for talks increased Makarios's apprehensions about any US initiated moves. The Secretary of State's decision to place greater emphasis on Athens rather than Nicosia was underlined by his assumption that the new "Karamanlis" regime had sufficient leverage to impose a solution on a reluctant Makarios. However, Kissinger, ignored the fact that with a civilian regime in Athens a reverse relationship existed between the two Greek leaders. In the event of a serious clash of interest with Karamanlis, Makarios
had the option of overriding the Greek government and appealing directly to the Greek electorate, which held him in high esteem, for support. Moreover, at a period of tense Greco-Turkish relations the decision to focus his efforts in a solution emanating from a US backed Athens-Ankara diplomatic accord was both ill-conceived and badly timed. With both its allies engaged in an arms race and the state of their relations at an all time low it did not appear plausible that any Greco-Turkish dialogue could at the time impose a Cyprus solution.

Kissinger rejected alternative avenues of channeling American endeavours through the Security Council, arguing that such a move would have created an opening for Soviet involvement or supporting any new diplomatic initiative by Britain primarily because he believed, that Whitehall was partially responsible for the 1974 debacle and the collapse of the Geneva talks.

Foremost, however, Kissinger limited his personal intervention because he calculated that the Congressional momentum for an arms embargo would eventually disappear. Secondly, on philosophical principles he believed that the threat by Congress to impose an embargo was improper. Developments in January-February of 1975 refuted Kissinger's perceptions, and showed that he had underestimated the strength of the post "Watergate" Congress while at the same time he had failed to conceive the outcome that would emerge from the heated power struggle between established Congressional power brokers and emerging "Young Liberal" representatives. Kissinger as Stern has written, "seriously misapprehended the temper of Congress on the Cyprus issue. He sought to deal through the traditional leaders ... the senior chairman who held the established political franchises on Capitol Hill."(38) However with the advent of the 94th Congress in January 1975 came a major decentralisation
The 94th Congress included seventy-five freshmen congressmen with strong liberal convictions, who formed their own caucus to challenge the former leadership system in both chambers, by contesting some of the committee chairmanship positions. As Abshire observed:

"For decades, freshmen members of Congress had played pliable roles before committee chairman and majority and minority leaders, especially in matters of foreign policy. Consultation when it did exist, tended to be at the top." (42)

Reforms were introduced in 1973, with the objective to dissolve the monopoly power of the congressional elites, by dispensing power more evenly among all the members made it possible for the freshmen to challenge the status of the old power alignments. For example, the 1973 change allowing a secret ballot in the Democratic Caucus to elect Committee Chairmen. With the Democratic opposition having a two thirds majority in the House of Representatives, the "impact of the freshmen caucus on the Democratic caucus threatened the overturn of the very power structure of the House itself." (44)

A move that clearly undermined the Republican administration of President Ford. (45)

The Ford Administration and the Embargo

On 5 February the embargo was reimposed. (46) Following the formulation of a new coalition government by Demirel in March 1975, heightened the Turkish reaction towards the US. In order to placate Ankara the Ford administration urged a total lifting of the embargo. Contrary to Congressional opinion, Ford argued that it had created a number of problems, calling into question the ability of an ally to continue to fulfil its essential NATO responsibilities, thus
undermining NATO's strength in the Eastern Mediterranean; jeopardizing vital common defence installations which Turkey and the US jointly maintain; contributing to tensions which are not helpful to Greece; and, reducing American options to move the Cyprus negotiations toward a peaceful conclusion acceptable to all parties. (47).

With the support of the powerful Greek lobby, the House, on 24 July 1975, voted 223-206 to continue the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey, despite heavy lobbying by Kissinger and a last minute plea from the President. Ford and Kissinger conversely tried to divide the question of lifting the embargo against Turkey from the question of a Cyprus settlement. Ford remarked critically that the action by the Congress actually delayed, hampered and hindered the negotiating capabilities that the United States had at the time to work with both the new Greek government of Karamanlis and the Turkish government under Demirel. (48) Under Kissinger's pressure Congress partially lifted the embargo on 2 October 1975.

The Regional Implications

Ford categorically stated that the embargo would not make for an improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey without which a Cyprus settlement could not be reached. Twofold security interests prompted the Ford Administration to condemn the Congress-imposed embargo. Firstly, the Congressional action prolonged the Cyprus dispute, by continuing to have harmful effects on the triangular relations between Turkey, Greece and NATO. Secondly, it threatened the tenure of major installations, vital to US national security interests in terms of both nuclear deployment and US influence in the Middle East region. Ford stated that at a time of uncertainty
in the Middle East America should consider carefully any action which could add to the tension that already existed. He stressed that facilities in Turkey and mutual defense arrangements played a vital role in the security of the area. (49) Defense Department strategists assumed that US military influence in the Middle East would suffer substantially if Turkey were to turn her back on the US. (50) Washington policy-makers concluded that, taken in their entirety, US intelligence facilities in Turkey were extremely valuable and to a significant degree irreplaceable. America used these facilities to monitor Soviet compliance with the ABM agreement, and needed their renewed availability in monitoring Soviet compliance with the pending SALT II agreement. (51) The embargo altered radically the spirit and the content of Turko-American relations. Turkey considered the Congressional attempt to link the subject of aid with the subject of Cyprus a grave error. It warned that this attempt at duress was doomed to produce the very opposite result, as it was determined to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots under any conditions. (52)

Ankara in response closed down the American bases. At a time when Turkey was shaken by a severe economic crisis and political tensions arising from both foreign and domestic problems, Demirel had no option but to defer to the political opposition, (53) who demanded a strong line in dealing with both Americans and Greeks. Overall the embargo was a bitter blow for the Demirel government which had staked its political future on the Western alliance and which had great difficulty in surviving with a narrow-based coalition. (54) Moreover, at a time when Greece and Turkey were waging an arms race over the disputed Aegean seabed, the embargo had
a short term effect of decreasing Turkey's strategic leverage against Greece. The unfavourable development also increased Turkish inflexibility in the Cyprus negotiations.

Maintaining that the intelligence gathering facilities were essential to US security, and that some could not be duplicated, Washington sought to salvage continued access to them through negotiations. In the meantime Ankara, looking for a "congress proof" arrangement, reached in March 1976, a Defence Cooperation agreement with the Ford administration, whereby Turkey would receive one billion dollars in aid over a four-year period. With this agreement the link between Turko-American relations and the Cyprus problem and Greco-Turkish relations was severed.

With the psychological obstacle of the embargo, Turkey hardened its foreign policy line. Fully realizing that Congress might still refuse to ratify the accord, Ankara warned that if such a step was taken it would end its special relationship with the US. It also emphasized that it did not undertake to make concessions in Cyprus in exchange for the new agreement. Kissinger warned that for Congress to relate the Cyprus question to Turkish-American military relations would lead to disastrous consequences. Casting considerable doubt on both Ankara's and Kissinger's claims that no linkage should be made between the two, although politically there was a connection, Congress remained steadfast and reiterated that without Cyprus concessions there would be no arms agreement. The US-Turkish agreement threatened to upset the balance of power in the Aegean.

By the end of 1976, the embargo rather than the Cyprus issue had become the major issue. "It had superseded Cyprus, which was now the last priority. In the Turkish-Ford construction, the aid
relationship between the US and Turkey, instead of the situation in Cyprus which had precipitated change."(58)

The Carter Administration and the Cyprus Conflict

Makarios and the Greek government were convinced that the election of Carter, who as a candidate strongly supported the embargo and criticized Kissinger for trying to repeal it, was a change for the better in the American stand on the Cyprus problem. (59) In February 1977 Carter appointed Clark Clifford as a special emissary to the Cyprus area. The results of his fact-finding mission were the basis on which Carter formulated his policy towards this region. The new President seemed more determined than his predecessor to take an active interest in this area, to coordinate his moves with Congress, to appear genuinely impartial between Greece and Turkey and to use American influence to resolve the Cyprus dispute.

The Carter administration attempted to link aid to Turkey to concessions from Turkey on Cyprus, but the immediate Turkish reaction was a return to a tougher position, Demirel arguing that his weak coalition government and impending national elections made concessions impossible. The Carter approach represented a departure from the Kissinger policy of separating the Cyprus issue from Turkey's key NATO role, in that it linked ratification of the proposed four-year $1 billion military aid deal for Turkey to progress on Cyprus, and asked Congress to defer action on the agreement, making significant progress toward a Cyprus settlement a condition of Congressional approval of the treaty. (60)

Throughout 1976-1977, Makarios called for a "long struggle." It meant trying to internationalize the Cyprus problem by recourse
to international forums, like the UN General Assembly and the Non-Aligned Conference. Although the diplomatic campaign helped mobilize international opinion, Makarios was aware that in reality the US was indeed the country which could exert pressure on Turkey. The Archbishop reiterated in July 1977 that the role of the US for solution of the problem could be very decisive. Furthermore, he added, that if the two superpowers were in agreement as to the solution of the Cyprus problem, they could help solve it. (61) He was afraid, however, that they were not in agreement and consequently would not cooperate for its solution.

The sudden death of Makarios in August 1977, and the continuing climate of political uncertainty in Ankara, heightened tensions in the area. By the end of 1977 the Carter administration reduced the pressure on Ankara. Instead it resorted to playing down the embargo dispute. The consolidation of Spyros Kyprianou as President of Cyprus, Ecevit's return to power in Ankara, following the collapse of the Demirel government, and Karamanlis' new mandate at the 1977 polls, introduced new determinants in the multi-sided dispute.

In 1978 the Carter administration switched positions, returning to the Kissinger-Ford guidelines on the arms embargo, because it believed that it had not succeeded in forcing Turkey to withdraw its 30,000 troops from Cyprus. A number of factors prompted Washington to shift. Foremost, Ecevit's adoption of a "multilaterally dynamised" foreign policy, a more independent and flexible yet tougher approach than his right-wing predecessor, Demirel. Ecevit stated that there would be no change in Turkey's position on the Cyprus issue until the US Congress raised its embargo. Although the Turkish Premier allowed it to be understood that Turkey had no intention of deserting NATO or of accepting Soviet arms, he did
specify that Turkey was considering changing its relationship with the Western allies. Ecevit concluded that even if the embargo was finally ended, Turkey would undertake a new defence policy that inevitably would reduce its military contribution to NATO. He did however blame the American embargo for contributing to the Turkish economic crisis.

The US administration believed Turkey to be too strategically important to cut adrift. Carter now accepted the Kissinger line that preserving the strength of a NATO ally outweighed the moral considerations that Turkey breached agreements with the US and committed human-rights abuses in Cyprus. Secretary of State Vance maintained that "the Turkish forces had seriously deteriorated through lack of spare parts and new arms, weakening the southern flank of NATO." General Alexander Haig, the supreme allied commander in Europe, had revealed that "due to the embargo, certain parts of the Turkish military machine were operating at an efficiency of less than 50 percent of their former capabilities." A number of US officials warned that eventually Turkey might turn to the Soviet Union for aid, if the US continued to deny it. According to its CIA estimate, the Soviet Union had committed $650 million of economic assistance to Turkey in 1975. Ecevit's statements that he felt no threat to his country from the Soviet Union, led key American officials to argue that if America continued to coerce Turkey it would abandon the US and would go to the Soviet bloc. Lewis believes "the scare-mongering about Soviet influence was, moreover, a Washington-inspired campaign to muster Congressional support to repeal the embargo." With a resolutely anti-communist Turkish high command such a scenario seemed most unlikely. As Lewis has pointed out, few in Turkey wished to join the Soviet orbit, as
they knew that this would mean a status at best like that of Finland. The real danger for the US was not the triumph of a pro-Soviet force inside Turkey, but rather a gradual drift towards de facto non-alignment.

On 13 April the Turkish Cypriots presented a description of new proposals to the UN Secretary General. They followed this up with a new offer over Varosha involving the return of 35,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes to take effect as soon as intercommunal negotiations were resumed. The timing of the Turkish plan was seen as an effort to influence the US Congress in its decision on Carter’s request to end the arms embargo. Whereas the British government did not regard the Turkish Cypriot plan as an acceptable basis for the resumption of negotiations, Carter commended the new proposals as a positive and forthcoming step. Emphasizing that a significant gap continued to exist between the two Cypriot parties, the President categorically stated that "if talks were not resumed at an early date, opportunity for progress on the issue might well be delayed for some time to come, and the unfortunate de facto division of the island could further solidify." (70)

With the ratification of the Panama Canal treaty and the Saudi arms deal, Carter perceived the lifting of the Arms Embargo as one of the most important foreign policy issues facing his administration in 1978. The President asserted that "the points that the Congress intended to underscore three years earlier, when the embargo was imposed, had all been made, but now the embargo was neither contributing to a settlement of the Cyprus dispute, nor helping to improve US relations with Greece and Turkey. ... it had driven a wedge between those two countries and had weakened the cohesiveness and readiness of NATO." (71) Congress responded to
Carter's lobbying to lift the ban. On 25 July the Senate voted to repeal the embargo by 57 votes to 42. Similarly on 2 August the House of representatives voted by 208 votes to 205 to lift the sanctions. However, Congress tied the flow of arms to Turkey to progress on seeking a solution of the Cyprus dispute. It asked the Carter administration to report to it every 60 days on what progress had been made towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem. In Congressional terms the new directive gave President Carter sufficient discretionary powers to lift the arms ban.

The embargo decision received a mixed reaction. Opponents from the "Greek lobby" who included Senators Kennedy, Sarbanes and Eagleton, rejected this as being no compromise at all, but a tilt towards a pro-Turkish position. On the other hand, the Carter administration viewed the outcome as a recovery of executive authority in foreign affairs. The Greek government was disappointed with the result and Karamanlis stated that the decision to lift the sanctions could have unfavourable repercussions on the evolution of the Cyprus issue as on other Greek-Turkish differences related to security and peace in the region. Athens feared that one possible consequence of the decision might be that it could alter the military balance in the Aegean. The Kyprianou government warned that the decision would encourage further Turkish intransigence and render more difficult progress towards a solution. Although the Turkish Prime Minister conceded that Congress had made a "positive" move towards mending Turkish-American relations, he suggested that the terms on which the embargo was being lifted would still hinder the prospect of negotiation of a Cyprus settlement.

The American government proposed in November 1978, a twelve-point plan for a solution of the Cyprus dispute.
Canada also took part in putting the twelve-point approach together. The US initiative was the outcome of shuttle diplomacy, by Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. The Americans proposed a genuine and workable federal constitution under which defence, foreign affairs, economic and fiscal policy, and trade, would be the responsibility of the central government; a viable federal legislature; and "considerable" territorial concessions by Turkey, including the return of Varosha (Greek Famagusta). The draft also called for freedom of movement, settlement and ownership to be written into the constitution. Finally, the US plan proclaimed that a necessary part of the final solution (in addition to the specifically agreed one) would be the withdrawal of the non-Cypriot military forces from Cyprus, and suggested that the disarmament and demilitarization of the Cyprus Republic could also be studied. On 24 May 1978, President Kyprianou had made a similar proposal. While speaking at the UN Special Session on Disarmament, he proposed total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus.

The American initiative was designed to break the deadlock which developed after the Turkish side had submitted what the Greek Cypriots considered were tough peace terms. The realistic guidelines presented an opportunity to break the stalemate towards a peaceful settlement. The plan, however, was plagued by a number of limitations. The draft in many parts was not precise in detail. For example, it stated that the Turkish Cypriots "will agree to significant geographic changes in favour of the Greek-Cypriot side," but did not specify how much. The Greek Cypriots have argued in the past that the Turkish army of occupation is non-negotiable, in any final solution. The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand stress that its presence is a positive deterrent. Without it, Turkish
Cypriot leverage would be eroded, and in all probability, their status would once again be threatened by the more numerous Greek community.

Following the failure of the November 1978 initiative, the Carter administration returned to America's traditional foreign policy position of placing its security interests, as well as its interest in improving relations between Greece and Turkey in the name of NATO cohesion, ahead of a search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The incumbent Reagan administration is adhering to the same policy.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT

The 1974 developments radically transformed the political and physical parameters of Cyprus. This change in the status quo and the subsequent appearance of new determinants have resulted in more complex deadlocks. A wide range of international bodies, in particular the United Nations; the Commonwealth; the Non-Aligned Movement; the Islamic Conference; The Council of Europe; the European Economic Community have been preoccupied with attempts to resolve the impasse. The degree of involvement has varied from symbolic intervention to permanent diplomatic initiatives.

The role of the world community in the search for a solution arouses intense feelings in Cyprus with the key actors embracing diametrically opposite views on the role and effectiveness of these organisations. This chapter will concentrate on analysing the involvement of these international actors in search for a settlement. Particular emphasis will be placed on identifying and evaluating the issues that they have added to the problems of the dispute from those that have constructively enhanced reconciliation efforts.

The Commonwealth

The Cyprus question featured on the agenda of the Commonwealth Heads-of Government meetings at Kingston (1975) London (1977) and Lusaka (1979). This can possibly be attributed to the diplomatic initiatives of President Makarios. It was in line with his foreign policy guidelines in post 1974 of resorting
to the mobilisation of the world community as a means to securing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, by constantly trying to influence these bodies to pressure Ankara to remove its occupying forces from the island.

Makarios also sought to use the Commonwealth to strengthen his government's linkage with the African block, whose vote was crucial in the UN forum, by closely aligning with the African regimes' platforms. At the London meeting he declared "Cyprus joins in the condemnation of the violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa and in urging the adoption of measures for the elimination of these anachronistic policies".\(^\text{(2)}\)

The Heads of Government decided at Kingston "as a concrete expression of their interest and concern for a fellow Commonwealth country\(^\text{(3)}\) to set up an eight-nation committee\(^\text{(4)}\), whose mandate was "to follow developments concerning Cyprus, make recommendations and assist in every possible way towards the early implementation of United Nations resolutions\(^\text{(5)}\)."

The Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus

The institutional mechanism that emerged from the Kingston meeting was entrusted on the Commonwealth Secretariat. However, political and structural limitations restricted the Committee's operations. Mr Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, summed up the predicament: "The Commonwealth's capacity to influence events in Cyprus was extremely limited, but, indirectly, members could influence the situation in other international forums like the United Nations."\(^\text{(6)}\) Moreover the lack of any prior involvement by the Commonwealth, largely a by-product of successive British Governments' opposition, supported by persuasive diplomacy, handicapped
the Committee's performance. In its first two years the Committee held nine meetings, but put forward no recommendations, and circulated only a confidential memorandum to all Commonwealth Heads of Government. A revival of diplomatic pressure over the issue by Britain, which held reservations over any Commonwealth intervention, eroded the Committee's political consensus, restricting its manoeuvrability and credibility. A British commitment was a prerequisite for any Commonwealth initiatives having even a slight impact on the issue. However, in the aftermath of 1974, British interest in the Cyprus situation continued to diminish. The official explanation for the erosion in influence was justified as follows "Cyprus ...does not have the relationship to Britain that it had in the 1950's and it is not in the British interest that we should repeat that relationship." James Callaghan's biographers vividly depict Whitehall's readiness to leave the problem to the American Government, on the premise that no British policy on Cyprus could run counter to Dr Kissinger's. Some British diplomats have conceded that over this issue London followed Washington's lead even for trivial decisions. Following the Vienna talks of 1975, British behind the scenes diplomatic initiatives rapidly declined, eliminating any traces of an independent British involvement. One explanation offered is that the US had far more leverage with Turkey and could have been more effective in persuading it to make concessions.

According to another perspective the British failed to play their card, precisely because one side was too intransigent or, worse, that both sides did not desire an ad hoc solution and preferred to prolong the problem for years.
The enmity towards the Commonwealth could also be ascribed to the British Labour Government's trying to protect their political flank over the issue. In 1976 Callaghan attempted to strip the Select Committee on Cyprus of its power "to call for persons and papers". Only through the casting vote of the chairman, Arthur Bottomley, did the Select Committee not include the sentences:

"The Foreign Secretary's policies are totally negative. His pessimism and lack of ideas or initiatives is profoundly depressing." (12)

Despite Britain's status as a guarantor and its prestige as the supreme Commonwealth power, it delayed ten months from July 1974, before it considered the possibility of a Commonwealth commitment. In order to avoid a possible confrontation with the British Government, the Commonwealth Secretary-General refrained from including in his agenda the question of a visit by the Commonwealth Committee to Cyprus, for one year. Agreement for the trip was reached in principle on 6 January, 1977 (13), and it was felt that there would be value in undertaking a goodwill mission to the island provided all parties would be willing to receive it (14).

From its conception the Committee was viewed merely as a liaison body with the UN Secretary-General. Its complementary status and weak terms of reference were additional factors inhibiting its role. That after one and a half years the Committee had not formulated a policy on how it could best assist international efforts simply emphasised the predicament that confronted it.

Ramphal cautiously noted that "the Commonwealth was not the only mechanism for achieving a solution and must indeed be wary of being too grandiose in its efforts." To the extent that the Commonwealth could act as a catalyst, he added, "the
Secretariat stood ready to put its mechanism into action if and when requested."(15) The Committee could be activated at the initiative of member states. In the meantime the Secretariat made it clear that it was up to member governments to make use of the machinery they had established as they saw fit. Committee members, however, were reluctant to take the initiative. In many cases it was only persistent requests by the Cyprus Government, and its regional neighbour, Malta, that prompted the organisation into some follow-up action. Commonwealth expressions of solidarity with the Government of Cyprus and re-affirmations of support for United Nations resolutions had at least some symbolic value: for example, when the Turkish Cypriot side threatened a unilateral declaration of an independent Turkish Cypriot state (UDI), the Committee decided that "it would be useful and appropriate to recommend to all Commonwealth Governments that they take such action as they deem appropriate with a view to averting UDI or any other action by any of the parties which would jeopardise the inter-communal talks."(18)

Within the UN framework the Commonwealth's role also fell short of its stated intentions. Although it comprised approximately twenty-five per cent of United Nations members, the Commonwealth, as a group, did not jointly sponsor any new resolutions or undertake any major liaison functions.

A number of explanations account for the shortfalls in Commonwealth commitment. With the exception of Malta, Cyprus was not of regional importance for any of the Commonwealth states. African problems such as the "Rhodesian" question, had pre-eminence over Cyprus. Furthermore, whereas Britain had abandoned its commitments over Cyprus, it had become deeply engulfed in the Rhodesian problem. For nearly two decades it had continuously ranked on the forefront
of Whitehall's policy priorities. After 1974 African problems edged Cyprus out at Commonwealth meetings. Britain's refusal to deal with the latter, while simultaneously it urged the body to search for a solution to the Rhodesian question, illustrated the difference in its priorities over two problems in which it was at least legally, equally entrenched. The security and political implications of the African problem for many of the member states led to tactical moves over the issue by the 'African bloc'. At the Lusaka conference the future of Zimbabwe was the central item discussed. Cyprus remained on the periphery, securing the traditional gestures of solidarity and support, but failed to obtain a pledge for a more active role by the Commonwealth, which emerged from the conference claiming greater relevance. Whereas the organisation contributed to the partial resolution of one of the most sensitive international issues, it continued to follow a negative policy over Cyprus. In their review of the role of the Committee on Cyprus, the Heads of Government emphasised that the Committee could play a more constructive role. However, while making the gesture they did not introduce any more effective terms of reference, which was tantamount to confirming their continued reluctance to increase the institution's role.

The Non-Aligned Movement

Since the developments of 1974, the Non-Aligned Movement through a series of explicit undertakings has periodically made a significant impact on the Cyprus dispute. A fragile network of intricate political relationships plagued by an element of controversy have underlined the Movement's involvement. Its timely interventions have nonetheless rallied an overall consensus from the Non-Aligned states, at a period when the Movement was confronted with major ideological schisms and plagued by factionalism.
Cyprus' traditionally strong links with the Non-Aligned partly explains the latter's intervention. In terms of foreign policy objectives, Makarios had always interpreted the Movement "as a moral force and an instrument of peaceful progress." As a pragmatist however, he embraced no exaggerated illusions about its limited powers, but he perceived its great liaison value within the United Nations.

The Non-Aligned Movement's support was shown by their adoption and issuing of a number of declarations both by the group itself and by the Co-ordinating Committee. Mr Rahal of Algeria summed up their posture: "The attack against Cyprus, against its sovereignty and national unity, is felt by the entire group as an attack against the Non-Aligned countries and as jeopardising the very policy of Non-Alignment ... the Non-Aligned group would like to assure the Cypriot people of its total solidarity, being ready to do anything which would permit the rapid restoration of peace on the island and facilitate an agreement between the two communities."

The Co-ordinating Committee set up a contact group composed of Algeria, Guyana, India, Mali, and Yugoslavia. Given a mandate to closely monitor developments and to offer its Good Offices for reconciliation, the group managed to influence events a great deal more than observers had initially expected. During the 29th session of the UN intense diplomatic activity by the contact group led, on 1 November, 1974, to the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of Resolution 3212, which was endorsed on 13 December, 1974, in Security Council Resolution, 365, and laid down the framework and principles for the solution of the conflict in agreement with the position of the Non-Aligned countries. The resolution was evaluated by diplomatic observers overall as a positive and constructive document.
At the Security Council meeting called after the Turkish Cypriot leadership's unilateral action on 13 February 1975, the Non-Aligned members of the Council participated in the drafting of resolution 367, which inter-alia provided a mechanism for the resumption of the talks between the two communities. (30)

Subsequent undertakings by the Non-Aligned have received a mixed reaction from the interested parties to the dispute. A number of Western powers such as the United States and its ally Turkey, have been hyper-critical of Non-Aligned initiatives. Diplomatic vigilance by Greek Cypriot foreign policy makers succeeded in excluding any participation by Turkish leaders at Non-Aligned forums. (31)

In Non-Aligned meetings, Greek Cypriot representatives repeatedly made reference to the unilateral actions of Turkey and its forces of occupation. To consolidate further the solidarity and co-operation of the Non-Aligned states the officials outlined their country's independent foreign policy and undeviating principles of non-alignment. (32) Commenting on the strongly worded resolution on Cyprus adopted at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' conference in Belgrade in July 1978, (33) the Turkish Prime Minister stated his dismay at Yugoslavia and India for co-sponsoring the resolution, and concluded that "... the resolution has underlined one major fact ... that we have to explain ourselves more resolutely and we have to foster our relations with the non-aligned bloc." (34) Ecevit also stressed "I believe that the resolution did not contribute anything to the settlement of the Cyprus question." (35)

Denktash admonished the Greek Cypriot leaders by charging that they were: "shutting their eyes to realities by thinking that they can get their way by taking us to international conferences." (36)
The Cyprus government's diplomatic achievements were a constant reminder to the enraged Ankara policymakers, of Turkey's international isolation, and foreign policy failure with the 89 country movement. (37) The Greek Cypriot regimes had through their tactics managed to penetrate every corner of the organisation. (38)

Makarios's prestige in the Third World and his web of close ties with leaders of established radical Non-Aligned states such as, Castro (Cuba), Boumediene (Algeria), Assad (Syria) and with influential moderates such as Tito (Yugoslavia), Sadat (Egypt), Ghandi (India) countered Greek Cypriot efforts. His Beatitude's successor Kyprianou, while lacking the international stature of Makarios, formulated his foreign policy upon the same principles and criteria. (39) The Larnaca airport incident between PLO and Egyptian forces in 1978, tarnished the previously excellent relations between Nicosia and Cairo. In exchange for support from the Non-Aligned Movement, Cyprus skillfully cast its vote whenever it was required by the mechanics of Non-Aligned bloc ballots in the UN. Only a small group of Islamic states such as Oman, Kuwait, Tunisia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia stated reservations over some of the Non-Aligned group declarations over Cyprus. Their gestures were basically symbolic and did not spark off any protracted opposition or cause any major division.

The drafting of UN Resolution 34/30 in 1979, by the contact group, with its controversial paragraph 13 which inter alia stated that in the event of the Secretary-General reporting lack of progress in the negotiations he was authorised to appoint an ad hoc committee composed of no more than seven member states (40) added new dimensions to the intervention of the Non-Aligned Group. Foremost, the resolution received a hostile reaction from the United States and other Western powers. In the past, Washington policymakers, had opposed such a move
because they feared that it could drastically increase the probability of some form of involvement by the Soviet Union via the auspices of the UN. The Carter administration stated that it fully supported the efforts of the United Nations, and that it had consistently backed the Secretary-General's efforts and would continue to do so. However, when UN undertakings such as paragraph 13 seemed to offer the possibility of attracting Soviet participation, the US retracted from its stated position. Ideally the US would have preferred any international deliberations over Cyprus to be continued within the Western sphere.

The State Department enlisted the support of its European allies in applying intense diplomatic pressure on the Kyprianou government, not to insist on the formation of the ad hoc committee if the talks did not resume.

The Islamic Countries Conference

In a planned move to counter the initiatives of Greek Cypriot diplomacy in the Third World, the Turkish side in 1976 focussed its attention at the 42 country strong Islamic group. However, a combination of factors caused Ankara's "pro-Islamic policy" to fall short of its calculations. From the outset, Ankara's approach was handicapped by its commitment to the Kemalist ideals of "secularism", its alignment with NATO, a predominantly Christian, Western alliance, and its past role as an imperial power in the Middle East region under the Ottomans.

Neither of its neighbouring Middle East states, Syria, Iraq and Iran (post Shah) were pleased by the pro-Western posture of successive Ankara regimes, and viewed Turkey's role in the region with caution and reservations. Relations between Ankara and Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran on many occasions have been less than cordial.
In the 1970's, efforts by Iraq's Ba'athist leadership to defuse its Kurdish problem by offering a series of proposals that envisaged a degree of autonomy (rejected by the Kurds of Iraq) created a rift with Turkey, which feared that such accords of "autonomy" could spread and destabilise further its own Kurdish population (officially 3.5 million - unofficially 8 million). Similarly until recently, the compulsory levy imposed by Ankara on trucks crossing Turkish-Iranian borders had led to a deterioration of relations between the two regimes. Since the fall of the Shah its former CENTO ally Ankara-Tehran dialogue and regional co-operation has declined, with the "Khomeini" Islamic government not impressed by Turkey's pro-Western posture. Ankara's ambivalent stand on the Arab-Israeli question has also kept relations with the Assad government at a low level.

As the host of the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul between the 10 and 16 May 1976, Turkey secured on the agenda the appearance of Denktash. At the end of the conference the group drafted a vague resolution on the Cyprus Question and the cause of the Turkish Moslem Community of Cyprus. The resolution affirmed that "until the Cyprus problem is solved the rightful claim of the Turkish Moslem Community of Cyprus for the right to be heard in all international forums where the Cyprus problem comes up for discussion, on the basis of equality with the Greek Cypriot representative". However, the majority of the Islamic states that attended, did not honour their commitment at the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo and later in the UN debate on the Cyprus Question.

The Cyprus Government's long record of friendly relations with
Middle East states, and in particular its close ties with the more radical regimes, and organisations in the area such as Syria and the PLO, was an influential lever in the decision by Islamic Governments to reject the Turkish inroads and to uphold, their support for the Greek Cypriot position, by adopting objective resolutions. Arab leaders have objected to successive Turkish regimes making symbolic statements of support for the Palestinian cause while tilting its support towards Israel rather than the PLO. The training of Leftist Turkish guerilla groups by the PLO underlines Turkish policy of upholding a double-edged posture in the dispute. This clash of interests however, has blocked Turkish efforts to mobilise Islamic support for the Turkish Cypriots. At the 10th Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference held in Fez in June 1979 the Turkish Foreign Minister, Guaduz Okcun, and Denktash, addressed the conference but failed to secure recognition for Turkish Cyprus for the third consecutive time. Instead the conference called for both communities to "co-exist and join forces to achieve a truce leading to a peaceful solution through negotiations".

Conflicting policy preferences also undercut the efforts of the Turkish side. The Aegean crisis, the US arms embargo, and Turkey's search for international monetary loans in the face of its huge deficit ranked higher in order of priority than lobbying for unreliable Islamic votes. Moreover, with internal political instability, too close an identification with the Islamic conference increased the probability of some reaction by advocates of Kemalist ideology who already were dissatisfied with the increased influence of Islamic fundamentalists such as Erbakan. Ankara has since been content to pass over the Islamic initiative to Denktash. With the Iran-Irak war, Afghanistan, and the Arab-Israeli question dominating Islamic forums, in the meantime frustrated Denktash's
efforts of lobbying for Islamic support. At the 11th Islamic Countries Foreign Ministers conference held in Islamabad between 16-22 May 1980, the Afghanistan crisis dominated the proceedings. Despite the by-passing of the Turkish Cypriot case, Denktash's vigilance in attending the Islamic forum is in line with his policy goal to secure a basis of support in the event that he might call for UDI.

The European Economic Community and the Council of Europe

On 17 September, 1974 the EEC Foreign Ministers called for "political co-operation for a negotiated agreement of the Cyprus issue." A week later the then President of the Council of the European Community stated: "Troubled by this conflict and anxious to restore harmony on Cyprus and between two countries linked to the European Community by the same tie, the Nine have felt it to be their duty during the course of several meetings to add their efforts to those of the Security Council. The EEC was specific that the UN forum must exercise its influence to prevent the crisis from deteriorating and seek an acceptable settlement.

On 13 February 1975, the EEC announced its willingness to hold talks with the leaders of all the interested parties in the conflict. Furthermore the EEC offered its services as a mediator on the issue but was rejected by Turkey. After this setback, EEC interest in the dispute gradually declined. The escalation of tension between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean, and the imposition of an arms embargo against Turkey were probably key factors in precluding any new efforts by the Nine.

The EEC's approach to the question was subsequently heavily influenced by American policy towards Greece and Turkey.
On many issues concerning Cyprus the Nine's policies were a blueprint of American guidelines. With the exception of France, in 1976 the Nine decided to abstain on UN resolutions over Cyprus, abandoning their previous UN stance of condemning Turkish policy and unanimously supporting the Greek-Cypriot side. Officially, some member states explained that their abstention was a tactical move designed to increase their role in the search for a solution by enhancing the community's image as an honest broker in Ankara. According to Western diplomat's continuation of support for UN resolutions would only have exacerbated further the intransigence of Turkish policy-makers over the issue. The Nine decided to avoid a confrontation with Ankara, concentrating their energies at seeking a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, and abstaining from any initiatives over Cyprus which could have threatened their go-between diplomacy. Occasionally the Nine issued carefully worded statements calling for moderation. In a statement delivered by Britain on behalf of the Nine "the EEC hoped that concessions on both sides, taking into account the legitimate interests of the two communities, will result in an equitable settlement as regards both territory and institutions." (57)

The Community's lack of political cohesion ruled out the possibilities of concerted mediation over either problem. However, as a powerful economic entity the EEC was in a position to exert considerable influence on both Greece and Turkey. (58) (Both associate EEC members at the time).

With Turkey suffering from a severe economic recession, aggravated by the economic effects of the arms embargo, the West European States were in a strong position to offer Ankara monetary assistance, in return for political concessions over Cyprus.
However, the Nine rejected the option that in exchange for economic assistance they should insist on greater Turkish flexibility over Cyprus because the EEC believed that such an arrangement would be counter productive. The decision not to tie EEC aid to Turkey to concessions over Cyprus was partly due to an intense diplomatic campaign by the State Department and the West German government to rally West European support for the ailing Ankara regime.\(^{(59)}\) Securing the appropriation of international credits for Turkey, however, resulted in a clash of policy interests over Cyprus. The Nine bypassed this dilemma by deciding to chart a policy of realpolitik which meant an oblique tilt towards Turkey, and at the same time a retraction of interest over the Cyprus issue.

The community was also instrumental in limiting any developments in the European sphere that appeared to focus on Turkey's adverse Cyprus policy. The controversial proposal sponsored by EEC governments, postponing publication of the report of the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commission\(^{(60)}\) on alleged Turkish atrocities in Cyprus, was prompted by hopes that the suppression of this embarrassing document would induce Turkey to make concessions that would facilitate moves towards a settlement.\(^{(61)}\)

The report was submitted to the Council on 10 July, 1976. The Makarios and Karamanlis administrations pressed for a decision, accepting the report condemning Turkey and recommending drastic action against it including expulsion from the Council of Europe.\(^{(62)}\)

A series of resolutions shelved any ruling on the report by the Council.\(^{(63)}\) In October 1977 a committee of 18 Deputy Foreign Ministers met in Strasbourg, and postponed any decision on the report. Instead they called for an early resumption of the deadlocked inter-communal talks.

A two-thirds majority was needed for the committee to adopt a
resolution condemning Turkey's policy on Cyprus. The leading opponent of such a resolution was West Germany.

During talks held in Ankara on 3 August 1978, with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Herr Kahn-Ackermann, the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister told the Council leader that Turkey would reject all rulings on the Greek Cypriot complaint. There were some reservations at the time that the Ankara government might retaliate and resort to severe measures such as leaving the council, if faced with an unfavourable ruling. (69)

In a move to appease Turkish officials who viewed the report as an indictment against Turkish policy, the Council's Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution based on the report, which refrained from issuing any rebuke, urging only that "measures be taken in order to put an end to such violations as might continue to occur." (65)

Controversy also surrounded the report on the Cyprus issue submitted on 27 April, 1978 to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, by Austrian parliamentarian Franz Karasek. In contrast to its objections over the earlier human rights report, Turkey approved the contents of the Karasek report. On this occasion it was the Greek side that challenged the report's findings. The Greek representatives alleged that the report had been drawn up from a unilateral viewpoint. Proposals for amending the report submitted by French and Greek parliamentarians were rejected. Greece's failure to have the report amended was considered a major diplomatic setback.

To recapitulate, American diplomatic pressure and a strict adherence to realpolitik prevented Western Europe from playing an assertive part over Cyprus. With economic leverage over both Greece and Turkey, EEC states and in particular Germany, could exert concessions from all the interested parties. However, only
by securing American co-operation could the EEC states effectively intervene. But with America's global security interests and realpolitik, the prospects of such a scenario appear bleak.

**Negotiations, Deadlock**

In November 1974 Makarios declared, "I can't recognise a fait accompli, I can't legalize with my signature a situation created by the use of force". However, with Turkish troops occupying 40 per cent of the island, the local balance of power had shifted for the first time in favour of the Turkish Cypriot minority. This change in the status quo blocked the road to any form of effective reconciliation. Insecurity, formerly a Turkish Cypriot preoccupation, had now become a mutual concern for both sides, raising the level of intransigence between the two camps. The new developments created an obstinate negotiating atmosphere resulting in a vicious circle of negotiating failures and recurrent stalemates in the UN sponsored inter-communal talks. On 10 February, 1975, talks between the two sides resumed for the first time since the abortive Geneva talks in August 1974. In the ensuing five rounds of talks held from 28 April, 1975, to 21 February, 1976, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators failed to reach agreement or achieve a breakthrough of any significance. A former negotiator reflecting on the Vienna series remarked that negotiations never actually started and that the meetings were "two separate monologues of the deaf - talking for the record". Procedural problems on many occasions prevented the commencement even of preliminary negotiations. Emphasis centred on procedural matters because there was a lack of confidence in substance of the issues. The fact that the parties rarely sat around the conference table for longer than one week highlighted this problem.
With the sides unable to reach a point of convergence, the talks became increasingly tied up with diametrically opposed differences over semantics and the clash of principles. At the opening session in Vienna, the Greek Cypriot negotiator proposed a bi-communal multi-regional federation. The Turkish side proposed a bi-regional federation. At the second round the Turkish side set out its views on the powers and functions of the central government, but refrained, however, from making any meaningful breakthrough. In his report to the Security Council on 9 June, 1975, Secretary-General Waldheim, who also was chairman in the Vienna talks, reiterated, "the deadlock over the fundamental basis of a settlement persists. One of the principal difficulties in the talks so far has been a difference of opinion on the priority to be given to the different aspects of the future settlement mentioned above, one side wishing first to establish the powers and functions of the central government, the other wishing first to clarify the territorial aspects of a future settlement, which has, of course, among other things, a vital bearing on the refugee problem." Prior to the 3rd round of the Vienna talks Denktash submitted to the Greek Cypriot negotiator a document entitled "Turkish Cypriot proposals for a transitional joint government." Clerides replied the proposals were entirely unacceptable and could not even form a basis for negotiations. They aimed at the abolition of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which enjoys international recognition, and at the continuation of the occupation of 40% of the territory of the Republic by the Turkish forces. Denktash's contemplated at depriving the Greek Cypriots of their trump card by also becoming partners in their international relations. At the 3rd round, preliminary discussions were held on the powers and functions of a federal government and a discussion of the geographical aspects of a
future settlement. (78)

In the absence of concrete proposals, the 4th round of talks held in New York, between 8-10 September, 1975, were adjourned. (79) They were not resumed until the 17 February, 1976, when the 5th round began in accordance with the Proces-Verbal agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey in Brussels on 12 December, 1975.

According to one observer the negotiations had failed to resume because they were not isolated from preconditions. While the Greek side insisted that, to begin with Turkey should produce a map and give priority to the discussion of the territorial issue, the Turkish side insisted that the "regional federation" should be accepted in principle. (80) At the end of the 5th round, the two communities agreed to exchange written proposals, through the Special Representative in Cyprus of the Secretary-General within six weeks from 21 February, 1976.

In accordance with the agreement, both sides submitted proposals to Mr Perez De Cuellar (the UN special representative on Cyprus). The Turkish Cypriot side presented proposals containing "General Principles concerning the establishment of a Federal Republic" and on powers and functions of the central government. Denktash outlined the proposal that Cyprus should be a Federal Republic composed of two Federated States one in the North for the Turkish National Community and one in the South for the Greek National Community. (81)

The Greek Cypriot representative Mr Papadopoulos (who had replaced Clerides) rejected the Turkish draft proposal on the grounds that it was "not only contrary to the Resolutions of the United Nations ... but constitutes a further attempt to promote the arbitrary and unilateral action of the Turkish Cypriot side to set up a, "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". With regard to proposals on the territorial issue Denktash claimed the Greek Cypriot offer was false
and contained misleading references, and noted that any proposals by the Turkish Cypriot side would be made only "with a view to adjusting line between the two Federated States." The Greek Cypriot negotiator evaluated the offer as completely negative and concluded that, "the deliberate omission of the Turkish side to present any concrete proposals on the territorial aspect precludes a 'package deal' approach to the problem". (83)

These developments resulted in the postponement of the next negotiating round. In the meantime Makarios emphasised "Turkey's negative and unreasonably intransigent stance is constantly undermining and torpedoing the effort to open the way to the resumption of talks on Cyprus that is being made by various circles", adding that, "we recognize and we do not underrate today's difficult situation. But realism should not mean recognition and acceptance of faits accomplis and our surrender to the Turks". (84) On 7 June Denktash voiced "we pledge and take a solemn oath on the territory of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus ... we have already charted our course. It is the extension of the bridge built between Cyprus and Anatolia." (85)

In a move to find a way out of the stalemate that had led to a complete breakdown of the talks on 12 February 1977, a meeting took place in Nicosia between Makarios and Denktash in the presence of Dr Waldheim. (86) For the first time the two leaders reached an agreement in principle regarding four basic guidelines for further negotiations through the inter-communal talks. The first point stated that the two sides were seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, Federal Republic. (87)

The acceptance of a bi-communal federal state was seen as a major concession by the Greek side. The hopes of achieving a
rapprochement, however, quickly diminished as both leaders detracted from their stated commitment. The Turkish Cypriot leader resorted to his earlier position that the bi-zonality of the federation was not subject to bargain by offers, and qualified it to mean anything which would jeopardise the security of the Turkish community, anything which would put them under the economic, administrative domination of the Greek community. (88) His Greek Cypriot counterpart emphasised that an agreed solution due to necessity would mean compromises. Any compromise undertaken, however, must guarantee fully the unity and territorial integrity of the state. (89) According to Makarios, Denktash's reneging statements diminished the optimism created for an agreed solution.

At the first round of the new series of inter-communal talks held in Vienna under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General, Papadopoulos put forward written proposals on the territorial issue, together with a map showing the two regions proposed to come under Greek and Turkish Cypriot administration. The Turkish Cypriot side presented detailed constitutional proposals, while the Greek Cypriots did not offer detailed constitutional proposals but only submitted certain principles which should govern the constitutional structure and made substantive comments on the Turkish draft, on the other hand their Turkish counterparts refused to submit any territorial counter proposals. (90) The meeting failed to bridge the considerable gap between the views of the two sides. (91) The Greek Cypriots team argued that the Turkish offer of a confederation of two sovereign and equal states with a very weak central government was contrary to, and incompatible with, the guidelines of 12 February, especially those which required unity of the state. (92) The Turkish Cypriot negotiator Mr Onan admitted during the proceedings that what his side was proposing was in fact a "federation by evolution". (93) On his behalf the Turkish interlocutor
rejected the Greek Cypriot proposals as creating a unitary, not a federated state! (94)

The United Nations Secretary-General and Real Initiatives
A Critical Appraisal

On 12 March 1975, the Security Council by adopting resolution 367 empowered the Secretary-General with a mandate to "undertake a new mission of good offices and to that end convene the parties under new agreed procedures and place himself personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive negotiations carried out in reciprocal spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated."(95) The Delegation of Powers formulated (continued by subsequent resolutions) to help the Secretary-General achieve a peaceful settlement and the extension of UNFICYP peace-keeping operations by the Security Council have made the United Nations the most important international organisation despite the extensive powers of intervention available to Dr Waldheim and the suitable conciliatory framework, the United Nations efforts to resolve the dispute have been plagued by inherent weaknesses. In some instances the limitations of Dr Waldheim and his senior diplomatic staff have undermined the search for a solution, as much as the level of intrinsigence by the parties to the dispute outlined earlier. However, to what degree the initiatives by Dr Waldheim or his special representatives have added to the stalemate is a contentious issue. One school of thought argues that if Dr Waldheim's efforts have so far failed, it cannot be blamed on any deficiency in intent on the part of the Secretary-General but rather on the entrenched positions adopted by the conflicting parties. (96) On the other hand the
the Secretary-General's chairmanship status, performance and direction of United Nations peace initiatives over Cyprus have with some reservations come under severe criticism.

The decision by the Security Council to entrust Dr Waldheim with "good offices", the lowest terms of reference, immediately limited his scope for diplomatic manoeuvres. Prior to the Secretary-General's appointment, the Turkish side objected to the role of Dr Waldheim. The objections that the Turkish Cypriots raised concerning the terms of reference of UN mediator Galo Plaza, and their refusal to accept or implement the recommendation of his report, in 1965, weighed heavily in the Security Council's decision to reject the status of "mediator" or the higher term of reference of "arbitrator".

According to some Greek Cypriot officials Waldheim's limited mandate and his impartial chairmanship despite his prestige and stature has not succeeded in conclusive peace making efforts. In 1977 Papadopoulos in an evaluation of Dr Waldheim's performance noted that the role of the Secretary-General had not been very evident in the talks, stressed that "I would very much hope that the Secretary-General's role in the talks would be strengthened, that the present ambiguity as to his role would be cleared, because there is an ambiguity as to his role; we like to consider him as a chairman at these talks. The other side likes him to be something of a glorified clerk sitting there simply to arrange the meetings ... but with not much right to make any suggestions of his own or to make any comments on what passes".

While the Secretary-General's terms of reference permitted his bi-annual report to the Security Council to outline any factors
that hindered UN peace initiatives, he has refused to make a report that stated that the responsibility for the talks leading into deadlock or not resuming rested on the Greeks or on the Turks.

In adhering to his sensitive role of politician, diplomatist and civil servant the Secretary-General has not submitted any proposals unless both sides have agreed in advance that the proposals are acceptable for discussion. However, Waldheim has conceded, that despite his approach of trying to put everything in an impartial position and his intensive efforts, he had been unable to bridge the gap between the two communities. He has concluded that his involvement in the Cyprus problem had been one of the most frustrating experiences of his career as Secretary-General.

Although the Secretary-General has no other power in this dispute beyond persuasion, he holds one diplomatic trump card, the threat to report to the United Nations Security Council, any intransigence that undermined his deliberations with the two parties. On 19 May 1979, Waldheim threatened to use this ultimate sanction when he put forward a new set of proposals to Kyprianou and Denktash. The application of pressure paid off with the two Cypriot leaders, after an impasse of two years, reaching a ten-point agreement for resuming talks. Unfortunately five days after the talks began on 15 June a dispute over two words, "priority" and "bi-zonal", forced the talks to be recessed on 22 June 1979.

Kyprianou reacted by once again taking the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. In June 1980, the Secretary-General's special envoy Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar, after sounding out both leaders on re-opening the talks, managed to secure their endorsement. However, Mr Denktash withdrew his endorsement of the UN statement defining the common ground already agreed between the two sides as soon as it became apparent that the Greek Cypriots were prepared to accept the statement. The UN envoy publicly condemned the volte-face - the first time that a UN representative had been prepared to place the blame squarely on one side after yet another attempt at mediation had collapsed. This assertive move helped to overcome the persistent difficulties that had stood in the way of the resumption of the intercommunal negotiations process.
In retrospect, it can be asserted that the abrupt events of 1974 instigated a set of complex political developments. The 1974 Cyprus crisis illustrated that the neglect of the consultative process prior to 1974 had weakened the crisis-management machinery in the western alliance. At the height of the crisis NATO was thus powerless to act. The alliance failed to make any authoritative decisions, and without US support the prospect of NATO members intervening effectively as mediators appeared bleak. It was also the turning point that: sparked off a heated debate between Congress and the Executive over the control of US foreign policy; led to sudden shifts in Greece and Turkey's foreign and defence policies; induced a renewed arms race between the two Aegean states; caused the withdrawal of Greece from NATO that resulted in a longterm intramural crisis; undermined America's Mediterranean policy after nearly thirty years of undisputed supremacy; jeopardized the future status of US strategic interests in Greece and Turkey; and attracted the involvement of international bodies in search of a political formula, that would permeate the intractable nature of the dispute.

While initiating the overthrow of the Ioannides regime and the return of civilian rule, the events of 1974 also left the new Karamanlis government with no alternative option but to carry out a new appraisal of Greece's defence alignments, and adjust its foreign policy posture. In a radical departure from the policy adhered to by successive Greek administrations (that placed the Cyprus issue at the
forefront of their external relations) Karamanlis outlined that his government's position toward Cyprus now assumed that the solution to the Cyprus problem belonged not in Athens and Ankara but in Nicosia. The decision to detach Greece from the Cyprus problem coupled with the strong sentiment of "anti-Americanism" that now prevailed in the electorate also provided Karamanlis with an opportunity to diversify Greek foreign policy beyond the narrow confines of the Athens-Washington nexus, that had dominated its foreign policy since the application of the Truman doctrine.

He took advantage of the wider room for manoeuvre to broaden the horizon of Greek foreign policy, by: formulating new policies towards Western Europe while at the same time playing down Greek-American relations; laying the foundations for intra-Balkan cooperation; and formulated new policies towards the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Moreover, Karamanlis made use of the Cyprus developments to improve Greece's bargaining position with the US. In particular he made use of his leverage with the US pentagon to redress the strategic gap in the Aegean and to unofficially secure that US military aid to Greece, was pegged on a 7:10 ratio of American aid appropriated for Turkey. The strong anti-American stance taken by the effective and ascending opposition leader Papandreou, also had an impact on shaping many of Karamanlis's decisions.

In the case of Turkey, its 1974 intervention and subsequent occupation, damaged its diplomatic, strategic and economic interests. It isolated Turkey in the world community, and triggered the US Congress to impose an arms
embargo for four years; severed Ankara's relations with the US and depleted the capabilities of its armed forces.

The embargo institutionalised American involvement in the Cyprus conflict. However, successive US administrations formulated their tactical approach to the problem not upon a policy that examined Cyprus per se, but upon issues that revolved around America's security interests towards Greece and Turkey. State Department diplomats under constant pressure from Pentagon officials, failed to draw up a coherent policy, that grasped the complicated parameters of the dispute. The inherent contradictions in US policy led on a number of occasions to badly timed interventions that hampered rather than assisted peace efforts. In trying to walk the political tightrope between Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, America failed to utilize its leverage with Turkey to extract concessions. It also hindered attempts by the UN, by not applying sufficient forward diplomatic movement, in support of the Secretary-General's initiatives. Had it not been for the embargo the US would most probably have only shown a temporary interest in the problem. With the lifting of the embargo US foreign policy has returned to its traditional position of placing its security interests, as well as improving relations between Greece and Turkey, ahead of a search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The arms embargo also illustrated that unless supported by both congress and the executive, its effectiveness as a coercive diplomatic tool is very limited.

Throughout the latest phase of the Cyprus dispute the Soviet Union has followed a double-edged policy. While giving all out support to the Greek-Cypriot side at the UN, on the other hand it implemented a policy of "good neighbourliness" toward Turkey. Its two fold approach required Moscow to follow a policy that did not offend Ankara. Thus, the Soviet Union's lack of flexibility over Cyprus, made it as
negative a diplomatic force as the United States. Both superpowers in terms of their priorities, put their global strategic considerations in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East far ahead of searching for a resolution of the Cyprus problem. But then that is the nature of international politics where larger problems - strategic and political - tend to take precedence over smaller local issues; and great powers, whether in the regional or the global sense, are more concerned with improving their own strategic and political positions in their respective operational arenas and have little time to spare to contribute to a solution of primarily local issues - that is until another crisis is triggered off in the region as a result of the non-solution of what might have appeared a minor problem. Cyprus provides no exception to the rule.

The sudden death of Makarios in 1977 was a major setback to the UN sponsored peace-making. His Beatitute was the only Greek-Cypriot leader who could master consensus politics, and the only figure with a clear mandate to ratify an agreement with the Turkish-Cypriots. Both key factors, to a final solution. The Archbishop's powerful political base enabled him to undisputed control in the National Council, the supreme decision making body. None of the Council members ever publicly opposed Makarios, over his handling of the issue. Even in the event of a confrontation, the Archbishop, had the option to by-pass the Council and take the issue directly to the people by referendum. This avenue meant that his huge public support would have defeated any motion that challenged his control. His successor, Kyprianou, has been unable to close the political vacuum left by Makarios's legacy. He has neither the charisma and leadership qualities of the late Archbishop, nor a strong political base. His weak position has led to sporadic leadership crises, that have not enhanced the progress of the intercommunal talks.

In relation to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership the events of 1974 augmented the position of Denktash. During the parliamentary crisis in
Ankara he manoeuvred to secure support from all the political parties. At the same time Denktash increased his flexibility by developing close ties with the Turkish high command. However, with the presence of the Turkish army and his administration’s total dependence on Ankara for economic assistance, has led to a situation where the Turkish government is always the final arbitrar (3).

Peace-keeping operations by UNFICYP will continue as a necessary deterrent against renewed conflict, so long as a fragile status-quo dominates the political arena of Cyprus. For a breakthrough to occur it is essential that: a symbolic gesture be made by the Turkish-Cypriot side - such as the return of Varosha (without any preconditions); the Greek-Cypriot leadership exercise political will on the issue, rather than being concerned with protecting its political flanks; Ankara radically shift towards a more conciliatory foreign policy over Cyprus; the super-powers and all the interested countries focus their policies on strengthening the role of the UN; and the US, West Germany and the Soviet Union use their diplomatic leverage in Ankara into encouraging the Turkish government to implement a more conciliatory line over Cyprus.

Unless some or all of the above policies are implemented, the Cyprus problem will continue to remain a dangerously unresolved dispute. To recapitulate, the intercommunal talks are the only forum for an equitable solution, and every effort should be made to enhance their progress and prevent them, from drifting into another impasse.


11 Most of the post 1974 analysis has been in journal articles, government reports, or journalistic works. See Bibliography.


3 For extract of Treaty see appendix (A).


6 The Enosis movement started in the middle of the nineteenth century, its leaders being the high dignitaries of the Cypriot Orthodox Church. When Britain took over the island, the movement was already flourishing. Although the Greek Cypriots soon became discontented with British rule, the Greek Government advised them to be patient, for, in view of Greco-Turkish negotiations over Epirus and Thessaly, Greece could ill afford to offend the British. Furthermore the fate of Cyprus caused little emotion in Greece at the time because of the prevalent assumption that British rule in Corfu and its sister isles offered a seductive precedent which might be followed. In October 1915 the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, offered to cede Cyprus to Greece if Greece joined the Allies. This offer was refused and Cyprus remained in British hands. With the exception of the 1931 riots for enosis, the issue lay dormant, until a church-led plebiscite on 15 January 1950, registered a 95.7 per cent vote in favour of union with Greece and revived the enosis movement. *Cyprus: Background to Enosis*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, (RIIA) London, February 1958, pp. 2-10; Kofos, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-254; Seton Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 484.
Greece was now receiving assistance from the United States and was no longer dependent on Great Britain. Its incorporation into NATO in 1952, the signing of the Ankara Pact—a five year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation among Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, along with the conclusion of a US-Greek agreement, on October 12, 1953 on the use of naval and air bases in Greece, greatly enhanced Greece's position in world affairs. Similarly the relaxation of world tensions which became apparent after the death of Stalin (March 5, 1953) and the Korean Armistice (July 27, 1953) encouraged the Greek government of Field-Marshal Papagos to take a strong stand on the Cyprus issue. Had the atmosphere of confrontation in Europe persisted, it is questionable whether the Greek government would have been prepared to press a potentially explosive issue which was destined to paralyse NATO's south-eastern flank.


The increasing nationalism in Greece identified Cyprus as the last of the unredeemed Hellenic territories. As Macmillan has written, it was difficult if not impossible for any Greek government to ignore, the emotions aroused by the irredentist movement both in Greece and in Cyprus itself with its demand for "Enosis".


The Greek Delegation seems to have misjudged the role of the United States as a potential anticolonial power. On 28 July, 1954, US Secretary of State Foster Dulles sent to the Greek Prime Minister, Field Marshal Papagos, a personal message in which he outlined that a public debate at the UN on the Cyprus Question was untimely. He outlined that he favoured bilateral talks between Greece and Great Britain which he pledged to support, and finally that Greece should continue to co-operate with Turkey and Yugoslavia so that the Western Alliance would be supported. However, during October 1954 the American Ambassador in Athens, conveyed to the Deputy-Prime Minister Kanellopoulos that the US would vote against any plan for self-determination of Cyprus and suggested that Greece withdraw its UN submission. Vlakhou, op. cit., p. 78-79.

It failed to take into account cross-cutting solidarities of certain anticolonialist states with the colonialist antagonist, in the case of Jordan, for instance, which depended so heavily on British support for its existence. It disregarded the tendency of Asian and African anticolonialists not to be unduly concerned about the fate of a European people subjected to a colonial regime by another European state. And it was not sensitive enough to the fact that Greece's association with European colonial powers, through NATO, comprised, in the eyes of many anticolonialists, its position on Cyprus in terms of a South versus North alignment, in spite of economic solidarities in this respect – Greece being among the least developed of the developed countries or the most developed of the least developed ones. Xydis (1967), op. cit., pp. 32-33; Kyrou, op. cit., pp. 285-287; Xydis (1966), op. cit., pp. 16-17.


Eden acknowledged he deliberately wanted to underline the potential Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus in an effort to counteract the thesis that the Cyprus troubles were caused by old-fashion British colonialism.


On 31 March – 1 April 1955 a series of explosions of government buildings throughout the major cities of Cyprus marked the beginning of the EOKA liberation struggle. The aim of EOKA was to help achieve the political objective of "Enosis" through the military means of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Prior to the launching of the EOKA campaign Papagos had been reluctant to support the movement because it would have insured the enmity of Great Britain. Only after persistent pressure by Makarios did Papagos with reservations agree to support EOKA. For greater analysis of the EOKA see: G. Grivas-Dighenis, *Apomimounipouma* (Memoirs), Athens, 1961. D. Alastos *Cyprus Guerrilla*, Heinemann, London, 1960; R. Stephens, *Cyprus a Place of Arms*.
Grivas saw the use of violence not as an ultima ratio in case of breakdown of diplomacy, a failure in non violent means, but as a means for supporting diplomacy beforehand. EOKA had an inherently anti-communist character. Nancy Crawshaw believed that the explanation for this lay not so much in Grivas' pathological fear of Communists, but in his desire to impress American opinion at the time. 


As Macmillan recollects in his memoirs "the abandonment of Egypt caused our military authorities to choose Cyprus as the alternative base. Furthermore the new importance of air power made the island, although unsuitable for modern ships, highly desirable as a base for modern military aircraft."


The British Foreign Minister on September 1955, stressed at the Tripartite conference that "We do not accept the principle of self determination as one of universal application. We think that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, strategic and other considerations."

During the period 1955-1958 the British government offered a succession of proposals for the future. However it should be stressed that the British plans, including the Winster Constitution of 1948, the Radcliffe Plan, and the Macmillan-Foot Plan, were drafted in a way that assured the British and secondarily the Turkish and Greek governments, a maximum of manoeuver in Cypriot foreign affairs, defense, finance and internal security. For example Lord Radcliffe in 1956 stated: "There are two main problems involved in the framing of the Constitutional form. The first is, how to express the relationship between the control of external affairs, defence and internal security, which are reserved from the local legislature, and the control of other matters which fall within the scope of that Legislature. The other is, how to impose such restrictions on the local Legislature as to secure effective protection - protection 'with teeth' for the minorities in the island...." Greece rejected the British proposals, objecting to the limitations on Cypriot self-government, and to the lack of a set date for self-determination. On the other hand, Turkey approved them as acceptable criteria for negotiation. Lord Radcliffe, Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus, Cmd. 42, HMSO, London, December 1956, p.7; L. Miller, Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Stife, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No.19, June 1968, Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University.

By treaty, Great Britain had agreed to assist Iraq and Jordan (until 1957) if either were attacked and Libya in case of conflict. In addition it had commitments under the 1950 Tripartite Declarations with France and the US regarding the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab states and the preservation of borders and armistice lines. Every successive British withdrawal from the Middle East had been, if not brought about, at least hastened by the United States. John Marlow asserts that British withdrawal from Palestine was hastened by American support for, accompanied,
by a refusal to assist in implementing a pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. The expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from Iran, and its eventual replacement by an international consortium with a 40 percent American interest, was hastened by American diplomatic support for the Musaddiq Government. The British withdrawal from the canal was hastened by American diplomatic support for the Wafdist and later for the military government in their negotiations with the British Government. Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, Cresset Press, London, 1961, p.122.

23 By creating a strong and attractive focus in Iraq, Eden believed he could gradually isolate Nasser in the Arab world. It should be noted that Hopkinson's "never," was meant to reassure traditional Conservatives that there need be no fears of any forced withdrawal from Cyprus as there had been from Suez in 1954. It was therefore not a calm appraisal of the situation in Cyprus, but was deliberately put in for party reasons. D. Goldsworthy, British Colonial Policy after 1945. Clarendon Press, London, 1971.

24 In the spring of 1953 Dulles went to the Middle East and investigated the chances for a military alliance centred on Egypt. He came back from the region with the conclusion that the "heartland" of the Middle East was not ready for a defence organization, and switched his attention to the outer ring of the Middle East, which came to be known as "the Northern Tier," of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. It is due to Turkey's efforts that Dulles' concept materialized in a system of agreements among those four powers and between them and Britain. The Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) which called for military and economic cooperation among members was signed on 24 February 1955 by Iraq and Turkey. On 4 April Britain adhered to the Pact. J.C. Campbell, Defence of the Middle East, Harper, New York, 1960, pp.49-62; Y. Evron, The Middle East: Nations, Super-Powers and Wars, Elek, London, 1973, pp.130-133.

25 Strong representations from the Near East Asian Affairs Bureau of the State Department apparently convinced Dulles that overt American membership would antagonize not only Nasser, but other Arab leaders who shared his anti-British anti-colonial sentiments. T. Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, Andre Deutsch, London, 1974, pp.320-323.

26 Cyprus was not intended, as the Canal Zone base was, to support by itself a major theatre in a global war, but rather to provide a forward post from which British interests in the Middle East could be safeguarded. As the 1957 British Defense White Paper stated, bomber squadrons based in Cyprus and capable of delivering nuclear weapons, would be made available for Baghdad Pact purposes in the event of a Middle Eastern emergency. P. Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p.121; C.M. Woodhouse, "Cyprus and the Middle East Crisis" in International Journal, 1956, Vol. XI, No. 1, Winter 1955/56, p.5.

27 "I regard our alliance with Turkey as the first consideration in our policy in that part of the world," Eden, op.cit., p.414.

28 On 19 December 1956, Mr Lennox-Boyd remarked that "the exercise on self-determination should be considered on a communal basis
and therefore partition must be included as one future possibility." Dr Kutchuk, the Turkish Cypriot leader, called for "Taksim" in order to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriot minority which now feared the prospects of "enosis."  


30 The Turkish Cypriot terrorist organization was formed to prevent any form of cooperative contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In case of war outside assistance to the war potential of Turkey can come only through her western and southern ports of the Mediterranean. The western ports of Turkey are unfortunately within the effective operations area of the potential enemy. All these southwestern ports are under cover of the island of Cyprus. As Bayulken points out, whoever controls this island is in a position to control these Turkish ports. *Bayulken, op.cit.*, p.85.

31 The course of the Suez invasion had demonstrated the military limitations of the island. Furthermore, the outcome of the Suez adventure changed the situation. The direct link with Aden and the Persian Gulf had been broken by a ban on military aircraft flying over the intervening Arab countries and a long detour had to be made via Turkey and Iraq to reach Bahrain and Aden. In these circumstances the usefulness of Cyprus was greatly reduced.  


32 Duncan Sandys, Minister of Defence is supposed to have made a strategic re-evaluation of Cyprus in the summer of 1957. Command Paper 124, issued in April 1957, presented a new approach to Britain's defence needs that already had implicit in it a shift in this role expected for Cyprus. British military policy was changed to centre on integration of British with NATO forces, dependence on a nuclear deterrent, and reduction of the armed services to small and mobile professional contingents. *N. Rosenbaum, "Success in Foreign Policy: The British in Cyprus, 1878-1960," Canadian Journal of Political Science, December 1970, p.623; J. Frankel, British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, pp.290-306.*

33 The new strategy is reflected in the following analysis put forward by Field-Marshal Lord Harding (former Governor of Cyprus), "any support that we give to the Baghdad Pact and to the right flank of NATO in a military sense I think would have to be almost entirely by air power. To enable Cyprus to be used as our main operational air base in that part of the world - in the comparative role of that of the American Sixth fleet, there are minimum conditions that would have to be fulfilled. We must have undisputed control of two airfields, and the communications system, rights to transportation systems, and access to the power system and the Utility services of the island."  


The Middle East countries near or adjacent to Soviet borders formed a buffer protecting Russia's southern flank. One of the primary objectives behind Russia's Middle East policy in the 1950s, was the reduction of Western influence. It managed to deprive the West of the opportunity to turn the area into a firm link in the chain of military alliances that was being constructed around the Communist periphery. For greater detail, Glassman, *ibid.*, pp.8-9; R.D. McLaurin, *The Middle East in Soviet Policy*, Lexington, Lexington Mass., 1975, p.39; W.A. Berling (ed.), *The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy*, New York, 1973.

McLaurin, *op.cit.*, p.15.

Dulles and Eisenhower feared the Soviets would seize the opportunity to fill what they now perceived as a serious power vacuum,

Other than Secretary Dulles himself, and perhaps one or two officials who worked directly with him, there was not much enthusiasm in the Department of State for the Eisenhower Doctrine, and when Nasser reacted strongly to it there was little surprise. Officials concerned with policy towards the Middle East seemed to believe that once Nasser had become the wave of the future, by whatever method, they had no choice but to deal with him as such.


According to Humbaraci, the "vacuum" the Americans were so eager to fill had already been filled by the Arab and Egyptian nationalistic middle classes. Furthermore, the Eisenhower Doctrine repeated the usual Western mistake of looking at Middle Eastern problems only from the military angle. For a more elaborate analysis, A. Humbaraci, *Middle East Indictment: From the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet Penetration and Britain's Downfall to the Eisenhower Doctrine*, Hale, London, 1958, p.239.

Washington in April 1957, promptly came to the aid of King Hussein of Jordan when he overruled his pro-Nasser government and claimed that a communist-Egyptian plot sought to overthrow him. Against this background of these developments and the Suez crisis, Moscow's position as defender of the Arabs and source of arms for Egypt and other militant Middle East states became firmly entrenched.

Joshua, *op.cit.*, p.11.

Since the efficiency of the provision of aid in the manner of the Truman Doctrine was questionable in that the acceptance of aid sometimes added to the instability of the recipient. M.A. Fitzsimons, *Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century*, Benn, London, 1965, p.195.

President Eisenhower recollects Nehru's criticism of his doctrine in his memoirs: "Prime Minister Nehru wrote to me of his dislike of a 'Military approach to these problems' - an approach which, he thought, might excite ... passions and create divisions among the Arab countries and thus add to the tension. 'I do not think that, in existing circumstances,' Nehru continued, 'there is any danger of aggression in the Middle East from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is too much tied up with its difficulties in the Eastern European countries. Even otherwise, nationalism is a far stronger force in the Middle East than any other.'" Eisenhower, *op.cit.*, p.181.

Glubb Pasha points out that no Middle East government was threatened by communist invasion. The danger, he stressed, lay in the deliberate attempts made by Russia and Egypt to stir up rebellion in the other Arab countries. In other words, subversion not military invasion, was the form of aggression to be anticipated. No provision was made to deal with this, the only actually existin
danger. Similarly Campbell states that the most justified criticism was that the new doctrine ignored the specific problems like Palestine and Suez that had made it possible for the Soviet Union to build up its influence in the area, not by force, but by well timed political moves. Campbell, op.cit., p.123; Club, op.cit., p.339.

48 Marlowe, op.cit., p.146.


52 In both the Syrian and Iraqi crises, America planned to initiate action. The expulsion of the US officials from Syria "on charges of plotting with Turkey and Iraq to overthrow the Syrian regime and the visit to Turkey of Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Loy Henderson, in August 1957, increased tension between Ankara and Damascus. With a general election approaching, it is probable that the Democrats (Turkish) exploited the situation for internal political reasons. The army was mobilized on the Syrian border, and that led to Soviet mobilization on the Turkish border in the Caucasus. However, in both cases it reversed its policy. Soviet threats and troop concentrations greatly influenced the reversal of policy. Eisenhower, ibid., p.198; Harris, op.cit., p.64; F. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, Hurst, London, 1977, p.397.


54 Indeed, throughout this period, Turkey's allies in the Middle East were the autocratic monarchies, the Hashinites of Jordan and Iraq, and the Shah of Iran; her adversaries, the revolutionary and nationalist regimes. However, Turkey, while a Moslem country, could not expect to dominate the region. Her dominance of the region before World War I was too unfavourably remembered by the Arabs for them to accept her leadership. A further irritant between Turkey and the Arab states was Turkey's cordial relations with Israel, and was the only Moslem state to recognize Israel.

55 Xydis (1967), op.cit., p.36; Xydis (1973), op.cit., p.298.

56 While seeking to maintain its aloofness, uncommittedness, and neutralism with regard to the substance of a dispute that divided three of its NATO allies, the US government, with Dulles as Secretary of State, may have felt obliged to suggest a speedy and final settlement of this dispute at all costs at a time when it greatly needed a united front. Speaking in the UN General Assembly, US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, stated on 23 September 1955, that a resolution on Cyprus was not appropriate. The US, concerned about the developments in Cyprus, and their impact on Greek-Turkish relations, sent a number of identical notes urging an amicable negotiated settlement to both Greece and Turkey.
57 The truth was that the missile gap in favour of the Soviet Union was largely a fiction. The Russians boasted of having operational intercontinental missiles in 1958 and 1959. American intelligence experts apparently mistook Soviet capacity for building ICBMs for actual production. To counter this so-called advantage, the United States set up bases for nuclear-armed intermediate range missiles— for Thors in Britain, and for Jupiters in Italy and Turkey. See: D. Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration, ANU Press, Canberra.

58 Xydis (1973), op.cit., p.298.

59 The unexpected developments in which were to be found the seeds of a final settlement took place just before Christmas 1958 during a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council. During the period 1955-1958, the Secretary-General of NATO attempted in vain to persuade the parties that they should seek a solution to their differences within NATO. Britain and Turkey were willing, but Greece was not, probably because she feared that within NATO she would be at a disadvantage for three reasons: (1) there would be two NATO allies against one; (2) the United States was likely to assign greater weight to British and Turkish interests than those of Greece; and (3) a NATO solution would probably be worked out along the lines of strategic principles rather than according to the principles of national self-determination. Following the declaration by the British Government that it intended applying the Macmillan-Foot plan proposals unilaterally, a scheme Greece considered unacceptable, Greek Premier Karamanlis, warned the Secretary-General of NATO, Henry-Paul Spaak, that "it is bound to come as such a shock to Greek public opinion as to render Greece's continued membership in the alliance problematical." With the full endorsement of Foster Dulles, Spaak managed to conciliate the differences among Britain, Greece and Turkey. P.H. Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, 1936-66, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971, pp.280-304; Discussion on Cyprus in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, September-October 1958, Command Paper 566 (Misc. No.14), HMSO, London, 1959. For full text, see Appendix (B); A.J. Cottrell and J.E. Dougherty, The Atlantic Alliance, Pall Mall, London, 1964, p.214.

60 Cyprus also affected the broader American security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Since 1945, the primary American interest in this region had been the containment of Soviet expansionism in the southern part of the Balkans and the northern tier of the Middle East. Containment remained the primary American interest in this region because of the changing balance of power, as a result of Britain's post-1956 reappraisal of its strategic role in the region; the new Soviet advances in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean after 1955; the threat of Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

61 The Suez crisis of 1956, badly weakened the NATO alliance. For a period at least, the "entente cordiale" among the United States,


63 The two premiers made their way to London to present their proposals to the British government. After reaching a suitable accommodation with the latter, they summoned Archbishop Makarios from Athens to join in the negotiations. Guidelines had already been laid down at Zurich, so Makarios was presented with very much of a fait accompli; see *Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House*, Cmd 679 (Misc. No.4), HMSO, London, 1959.


65 Eden claimed that up until the late 1950s the United States was not prepared to accept the importance and reality of the Turkish interest. Turkey's renewed strategic importance altered the original US position. In the spring of 1958 the US and Turkey concluded a bilateral agreement which stated that the US would come to Turkey's aid in case of direct or indirect aggression. Eden, *op.cit.*, p.414.


68 In particular, Greece refrained from implementing policies over the Cyprus dispute that would harm its relations with NATO. *ibid.*, p.287.

69 Archbishop Makarios was put under tremendous pressure to sign by the British and Greek delegates. He finally signed when the British Colonial Secretary, Mr Lennox Boyd, informed him that if he persisted in his refusal, Britain would carry out a partition of Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish communities. For Makarios therefore, the acceptance of the Zurich and London accords constituted a lesser evil. For this incident, see the authoritative

70 See: Appendix (C) for Treaty outline.

71 For outline of the major provisions of the Treaty, see Appendix (D).

72 The constitution drafters attempted to create a balance of interests, by securing fixed minority community participation in government. In fact, this was ensured through fixed numerical ratios. These fixed ratios, however, did not reflect the proportional strength of the majority and minority communities of Cyprus. It is clear that the underlying assumption behind the ratio-fixing was to make the Turkish minority feel secure and to pacify the two communities. This, however, failed to materialize and the ratio factor helped exacerbate rather than pacify the Cyprus conflict.

According to Article 62, for example, a ratio of "seventy per centum" Greeks and "thirty per centum" Turks is provided for communal representation in the House. Article 46 provides for the same ratio in the Council of Ministers, and Article 123 provides similar communal participation in the Public Service. Article 129 fixes the ratio at 60:40 in the Army. Article 130 fixes the same ratio translationally to the police and gendarmerie. Kyriakides op cit p57

73 Article 43: The character of the roles and the executive powers of the President and Vice-President are exhaustively defined in the Constitution. In Article 47 there is a long enumeration of areas where both the President and the Vice-President exercise executive power conjointly. Article 48 specifically refers to the executive powers exercised by the President, and Article 49 refers to the specific areas of executive powers exercised by the Vice-President.

74 Article 50.

75 Article 78(1).

76 Article 78(2) states: Any modification of the Electoral Law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a separate simple majority of the Representatives elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities respectively taking part in the vote.

77 The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to secure and guarantee minority community participation in legislation. However, the separate majority vote was, in essence, argues Kyriakides, a legislative veto power entrusted to the majoritarian dominance. However, if misused, minority rights can be just as detrimental to
constitutional government as an unchallenged majority. Kyriakides, op.cit., p.66.


79 On the island the Greek President and the ethnically divided House of Representatives, could not agree. Three areas of difficulty emerged in attempts to implement the Zurich and London agreements. The staffing of government posts in the ratio of seventy Greek Cypriots to thirty Turkish Cypriots; the sphere of competence of the Turkish Cypriot municipalities; and the Turkish Cypriot use of the veto in the House of Representatives to block or delay legislation on customs regulations, income tax and the proposed Development Bank. For greater detail see President Makarios' revelations in: T. Anthem, "Crisis in Cyprus: President Makarios talks to 'The Contemporary Review,'" *Contemporary Review*, Vol.204, August 1963, pp.57-67; Makarios, "Proposals to Amend the Cyprus Constitution," *Cyprus Today*, Vol.1, No.6 (November - December 1963).

80 President Makarios' thirteen proposals are also listed in I. Salih, *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*, University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1978, pp.132-143.

81 According to Ahmad: "there was no question of the fragile coalition governments of the early sixties daring to negotiate even a compromise." Ahmad, op.cit., pp.404-405.

82 As early as August 1963, the Turkish Foreign Ministry warned against such action. It stated: "It is legally insupportable and impossible to argue that such an attempt is an internal affair, for the Cyprus Constitution was established in accordance with an international agreement, and the provisions of this constitution were guaranteed by the treaty of guarantees to which Turkey is a party." The statement ended: "A Government that can abandon some 100,000 dear members of our race to the arbitrary administration of foreigners will never come to power in Turkey." Ahmad, *ibid*.


84 Adams and Cottrell also stress that although Cyprus does not feel the logistical needs for ideal defence bases because of lack of good harbours, there is seemingly no substitute for Cyprus within the geographical boundaries of the Middle East. The vital importance of Cyprus is also based on its geographical proximity to the Dardanelles and to Turkey's main southern port of Iskenderum, terminal of the oil pipeline from Iraq. T.W. Adams and A.J. Cottrell, "The Cyprus Conflict," *Orbis*, Vol.8, No.1, Spring 1964-65, pp. 66-70.


86 "In the mid-1960s, the imminent development of the Polaris A2, which would be able to target major Soviet cities from the

87 As a warning, on Christmas Day, Turkish jets buzzed the Island, and İnönü told the National Assembly that Turkey would use its rights and intervene. Athens threatened that if the Turks intervened, Greek forces would do likewise. In Greece, the question of the future of Cyprus was evidently unable in the early stages to evoke the political passions that it formerly had been able to call up; and though the possibility of unilateral Turkish intervention in Cyprus on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots was feared, domestic politics at the time were more absorbing. Elections had been announced, and a caretaker government headed by Paraskevopoulos was running the country. However, the Greek government was disturbed by rumours that a Turkish invasion had been halted by Soviet influence in Ankara at the request of Makarios, and by reports that Makarios had announced that he would call for the abrogation of the Cypriot treaties with the assurance of Soviet support for his effort to achieve greater independence. On 30 December 1963, Dr Kutchuk declared "that the Constitution was dead," and that he no longer considered himself Vice-President of the Republic and both he and the Turkish Cypriot Ministers refused to participate in the Government. Kutchuk also forced the Turkish Cypriot civil servants to absent themselves from work and to set up parallel services in the Turkish controlled areas. L. Bloomfield, The Control of Local Conflict: A Design Study on Arms Control and Limited War in the Developing Areas, ACDA/WEC-98, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington DC, 1967, p.822; London Conference on Cyprus January 1964, Supplement B, PIO, Nicosia, August 1979, p.4; Ahmad, op.cit., p.405; C. Foley and W.I. Scobie, The Struggle for Cyprus, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, 1975, p.162.

88 With British initiative, a conference was called for 15 January 1964 to be held in London. The conference attended by the three guarantor powers and the two Cypriot communities, failed to achieve a permanent peace settlement. "During the conference there was a different approach to the handling of the situation by the Greek delegation and the Greek cypriot delegation. The undertones were as follows: the Greek delegation was anxious to see a quick cease-fire agreement implemented, because they were afraid that the perpetuation of the conflict could have engulfed Greece and Turkey into antagonism and tension. Secondly, the Greek delegation would have been happy to see a quick return to the London and Zurich agreements rather than attempt to work out a new solution because they believed that it would not be possible under the circumstances to achieve a better solution than the Zurich and London agreements provided for. Thirdly, they were afraid that if the opportunity was missed of finding at the London conference some kind of a compromise over the question of the cease-fire or over the question of a return to the Zurich agreement, and if we, as we had intended to go to the UN, they would not be able to provide a satisfactory new solution of the Cyprus problem." Interview with member of Greek Cypriot delegation to the 1964 London Conference, Nicosia, February 1980.
The British forces in Cyprus during 1963-1964 were not there solely to keep the peace. They were there first and foremost to preserve Britain's strategic interests in the island, which through bases and other installations, provided in theory the facilities for operations in the Middle and Far East. Since these interests could not be preserved while the island was in ferment, the UK perforce switched to internal security duties. If the conflict continued, damage could be done to Britain's strategic interests in the island. Moreover, since official British nuclear strategy in 1964 assumed the credibility of a nuclear threat as a means of limiting or deterring hostilities on the part of a minor power, Middle Eastern military targets were also among those earmarked for Cyprus-based aircraft. Secondly, the flying distance from Cyprus to Bahrain, Britain's forward headquarters and garrison in 1964 for the preservation of oil interests in the Persian gulf is sufficiently short to allow rapid intervention in the gulf area by troops sent from the former. If Britain had no strategic interests in Cyprus it is doubtful if it would have intervened in 1964 when Makarios made his appeal. A. Verrier, "Cyprus: Britain's Security Role," *The World Today*, March 1964, pp.131-137.

Buchan notes it was apparent that NATO could not both offer its good offices or act as a private intermediary and meeting place where Greek and Turkish representatives could evolve a compromise, and at the same time intervene in the dispute. A strong disinclination was shown to the British proposal on the part of the central and north European NATO powers to get involved in Mediterranean politics. For greater detail A. Buchan (ed.), *The Atlantic Papers*, Dunellen, New York, 1970, pp.317-318; E. Weintal and C. Bartlett, *Facing the Brink: An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy*, Scribers, New York, 1967, p.18.

The United States was concerned about Cyprus prior to the December crisis. Throughout 1963, the Kennedy Administration was reportedly concerned about the possibility of a communist government on Cyprus; the party was growing and President Makarios was doing little to answer that growing strength. *The New York Times*, 26 August 1963.

Chairman Khrushchev in a letter to President Johnson sent on 7 February 1964, warned that "the Soviet Union, although it does not border directly on the Republic of Cyprus, cannot remain indifferent to that situation which is developing in the area of the eastern Mediterranean - an area not so distant from the southern borders of the USSR." For full text of letter and President Johnson's reply, see *Department of State Bulletin*, 23 March 1964, pp.446-448.

President Johnson stressed that "It is the task of statesmanship to prevent the danger in Cyprus from exploding into disaster." *Department of State Bulletin*, 16 March 1964, p.399.

While Lemnitzer was dispatched to Athens and Ankara to prevent a showdown, Sir Alec Douglas-Home flew to Washington to see President Johnson, and raise the issue of a NATO peace keeping force.
The plan in reality was jointly conceived strictly as an Anglo-American plan. Under the proposed plan a three month NATO-recruited peace-keeping force of 10,000 men would be under British command with political guidance from a North Atlantic non-NATO country to bring about a political solution. The United States offered to send 1,200 combat troops for its share. For a detailed account of the plan, see: P. Windsor, "NATO and the Cyprus crisis," Adelphì Papers, No.14, November 1964, pp.13-14.

The Times, 10 February 1964.

Nikita Khrushchev's warning sent simultaneously to the US, Britain, France, Greece and Turkey that any move against the island would be "the source of international complications fraught with grave consequences" inserted the Soviet Union into the Cyprus issue, and reinforced Makarios' opposition to the NATO plan. "N.S. Khrushchev's message on Cyprus," USSR Mission to the UN, Press Release No.4, 7 February 1964.


The Government of Archbishop Makarios wanted to exert every possible influence on Turkey not to intervene militarily. This interest was one of the main motivations behind the Archbishop's insistence that the UN be the only international arrangement directly involved in maintaining peace on the island and in seeking to resolve the crisis. Miller ibid

It should be emphasized that besides Makarios' stubborn position and the strong Soviet opposition to the NATO plan, the rejection of the plan by Germany and France with the alliance was also crucial in the transfer of the crisis to the UN. The British Government after the failure of the plan for either a NATO or a Commonwealth peace-keeping force, recognized that there was little choice but to place the Cyprus problem before the UN.

In order to: (1) Secure a guarantee against possible, if remote, Turkish invasion; (2) Get the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee nullified; (3) Make the United Nations directly responsible for the solution of the Cyprus problem; (4) "Escape from the strait-jacket of new negotiations with the three guarantor powers alone"; (5) Isolate the Turks who have fewer friends at United Nations headquarters in New York than at NATO headquarters in Paris; (6) Rule out partition; and (7) Pave the way for a unitary state with majority [read Greek Cypriot] rule.

For an excellent account of the role of the UN in the crisis, see: J.A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1968, pp.57-58.

The sovereign state of Cyprus had its sovereignty limited by the treaty which created it. The Soviet Union, while most reluctant to approve further UN peace-keeping operations not subject to its veto, was seeking to gain influence in the region. It could not oppose Makarios, who insisted on precisely this intervention.
The force was to be stationed in Cyprus for three months, and all costs were to be met by the states providing contingents and by the government of Cyprus and by voluntary contributions. The Soviet Union and France abstained on paragraph four, which put it under the operational control of the Secretary General. Neither the Soviet Union nor France ever made the requested voluntary contributions to pay for UNFICYP, but they never opposed the periodic extension of its mandate. UN Doc.S/5575, 4 March 1964, para.5.

Turkey preferred to settle the question within the NATO alliance or by direct negotiation with the Greek government. Giritli outlines the reason for Turkey's preference, was that the Turkish community in Cyprus certainly could not deal with the Greek majority there, on equal terms. I. Giritli, "Turkey Since the 1965 Elections," Middle East Journal, Vol.23, No.3, Summer 1969, p.355.

By contrast, in 1960, 4,000 UN troops were on the ground in the Congo within three days after Security Council action. A. Chayes, "The UN Charter, the Purse, and the Peace," Department of State Bulletin, 8 June 1964, p.900.


The role of the UN and the Cyprus conflict is examined in detail in chapter 7.

Miller, op.cit., p.124.


Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, warned that because of Archbishop Makarios' flirtations with Moscow, this local quarrel could bring about the intrusion of the Soviet Union in the strategic eastern Mediterranean. G. Ball, "The Responsibilities of a Great Power," Department of State Bulletin, 5 September 1964, p.477.


In part, because of this episode, İnönü's government was ousted from power in 1965.

The Cypriot conflict lacked the kind of condemnable overt military intervention by other powers that President Johnson seemed to require for overt military intervention by the US in "just other"


117 The Soviet Union attacked the US move arguing that it was a diversion aimed at thwarting the Security Council Resolutions on peaceful settlement of the Cyprus crisis. Soviet commentators expressed such fears as early as March 1964. Pravda's UN correspondent on 5 March 1964, wrote "the object of the Western powers was to get the UN to confirm their plans for the occupation and partition of the island."


120 In his role as honest broker, Acheson at Geneva was assisted by Lord Hood of the British Foreign Office.

121 As late as 19 June 1964, Adlai Stevenson insisted that the United States "has no position as to the form or to the shape of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem ... it is not for any government to say what the final solution should be."
*United States Mission to the UN Press Release No.497*.

122 President Johnson pressured Greece to negotiate a Cyprus settlement. Johnson in a letter sent to the Greek premier on 2 July 1964, stressed that if Greece and Turkey went to war over Cyprus the United States would stand aside. Papandreou's reluctant acceptance was also motivated by the mounting tension on Cyprus and the increased interest in Cyprus shown by the USSR.


124 Greek Premier Papandreou at first was in favour of the Acheson proposals. However, he later reversed his decision after he heard Makarios oppose the plan before a meeting of the "Crown Council" in Athens. Interview with Senior Greek Cypriot political leader, Nicosia, February 1980; i.e. the prospect of a Greek acceptance of the plan confronted by a violent Makarios position. Hence only if Makarios agreed would Papandreou accept the proposal. A. Xydis, (*et al*) *Ho Makarios Kai Hoi Symmakhoi Tou* [Makarios and his Allies], Guttenburg, Athens, 1972, p.93.

125 Makarios stated, "I understand that pressure has been exerted by self-styled mediators for a fraudulent solution of the Cyprus problem." The Acheson plan, he added, was totally unacceptable.
Andreas Papandreou stated that, "while enosis did not suit the Allies, Cyprus' independence, with enosis precluded, contained dangers for NATO and American strategy. The experience with Cuba suggested that a small country geographically proximate to Greece and Turkey, which constituted the axis of the southeastern European wing of NATO, could create a major crisis between the two super-powers were it allowed to follow an independent foreign policy. Enosis had the disadvantage of making Greece too important, especially at the expense of Turkey, a faithful ally that had common frontiers with Russia. Thus, the Anglo-American ideal for Cyprus lay somewhere between enosis and independence." Papandreou, op.cit., p.131.

On 30 September 1964, Moscow witnessed the signing of a fifteen-year, £10 million commercial agreement, half gift and half loan, to supply thirty-two T-34 tanks, Komar class motor torpedo boats and ground-to-air missiles. Makarios wanted to obtain planes and submarines that would give Cyprus a limited offensive capability, but the Russians supplied only weapons that served the defensive needs of the island. However, six weeks later, the Turkish Foreign Minister visited Moscow and persuaded the Kremlin to change its posture over Cyprus. The ground-to-air missiles never reached Cyprus, and the Soviet Union abstained on the December 1965 UN Resolution. W.M. Dobell, "Division Over Cyprus," International Journal, Spring, 1967, p.279; The Times, 1 September 1964; W. Joshua and S.P. Gibert, Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy, John's Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1969, pp.21-22.

Greece would not risk a war with Turkey because of Makarios' independent action. Further, even under George Papandreou, Greece was conscious of the importance of NATO and of the strains that the Cyprus Question created for the alliance. See the exchange of letters between Makarios and Papandreou in A. Xydis, op.cit., pp.94-95.


The strategic significance of the region for Western defence was clearly outlined by Under-Secretary of State, George Ball: "The crisis obviously involves a very strategic area of the world. A conflict between Greece and Turkey could result in not merely a great loss of life, but it could tend to disrupt a very important element in Western defence." "Under-Secretary Ball Comments on the Cyprus Situation," Department of State Bulletin, 31 August 1964, p.301.

Department of State Bulletin, 21 September 1964, p.399.

For friction between Greece and Cyprus over the Cyprus issue, see The Economist, 22 August 1964; Ta Nea (Athens daily), 20 August

Papandreou, op.cit., p.134.

Makarios, in 1964, was aware that the new factors were deterrents against his power base. However, the impositions of the Cyprus problem at the time required acceptance of the Greek aid, even at the cost of having to face some controls from Athens. Coufoudakis, op.cit., p.253.


Each time that Turkey threatened to use force, but did not carry out its threat, the likelihood that it would ever actually intervene seemed to lessen. In 1964, Turkey lacked the necessary assault craft, so that any landing would have involved serious casualties. In March 1964, Turkey had gathered half a dozen landing craft from various sources, and these could have ferried companies ashore, but it would have been a hard task on the defended coast; and there would have been no replacements. Turkey's earlier bluffs were called. However, the August bombings were an attempt by Turkey to regain its credibility and to deter the Makarios government from resolving the crisis by force. Foley, op.cit., p.182; Purcell, op.cit., p.332, Ehrlich, op.cit., p.64.


Harris asserts that the impact of the Johnson administration on Turkey's foreign policy has been greatly exaggerated. He argues that there was never any question that a government of one of the major parties would consider severing the American connection. Moreover, Robinson has noted that it was frustrating to many Turks in the 1960s for whom the Ottoman Empire and its grandeur (presumed or real) still lived to see Turkey relegated to a second-rate power position. This perhaps in large part explains Turkish sensitivity to insult and resentment of the fact of its dependence upon the Great Powers. R.D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p.169; G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Washington, DC, 1972, p.118.

D. Hotham, The Turks, John Murray, London, 1972, pp.112-113. When the US decided to remove its Jupiter missile bases from Turkey in 1962, following the Cuban crisis, it was assumed in Ankara that this was part of a secret deal between Washington and Moscow. If the Kennedy administration placed its own security above the interests of its allies, Turkey argued it too should put its national interest first and regain some freedom of manoeuvre. For greater detail see, Laqueur, op.cit., p.16; D.L. Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics and 'Those Frigging Missiles' JFK, Cuba and

141 Purcell, op. cit., pp.356-357.

142 The ground for UN support was prepared by the submission by the Cyprus government of a document on minority rights in Cyprus which in content did not differ from the recommendations of the March 1965 report of the UN mediator, Galo Plaza. The Plaza report emphasized that a settlement must depend in the first place on agreement between the peoples of Cyprus itself. He suggested that this could be achieved only if the Greek Cypriots renounced "enosis" and the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara abandon proposals for partition, and that the island should be demilitarized. Because it was not politically expedient to renounce "enosis" the Greek side delayed on replying to the Plaza package. However, Ankara without consulting the Turkish Cypriot leadership, denounced the Plaza plan and declared that he was no longer acceptable as a mediator. According to Sir David Hunt (British High Commissioner in Cyprus, 1965-1966), the advice of the Turkish Foreign Service had been overruled by the government, which was weak in parliamentary terms and accordingly thought it vital to take a strong line. Moreover, the unstable political situation in Greece during 1965 added to the gloomy atmosphere that put an end to the UN initiative. In the meantime, by consolidating themselves in their barricaded enclaves, the Turkish Cypriots sustained the de facto segregation of the island (see appendix for map outlining major enclave). Sir David Hunt, On the Spot: An Ambassador Remembers, Davies, London, 1975, pp.157-158; UN Doc.S/6253, Report by the UN Mediator in Cyprus to the Secretary-General, 21 March 1965.

143 Ulman and Dekmejian, op.cit., p.779.

144 News of the Moscow talks brought Signor Manlio Brosio, NATO Secretary-General, to Ankara, fearful that the eastern flank of the alliance was being eroded. He was reassured that Turkey intended abrogating none of her treaties. The Soviet Union sustained pressure on Turkey and Iran to opt for a policy of de facto non-alignment. The general weakening of the CENTO alliance in the period 1963-1965 helped facilitate this move. Led by Pakistan, traditionally hostile Iran and Turkey now became more amenable to dealing with the USSR. For greater analysis, W.R. Duncan, Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, Ginn-Blaisdell, Waltham, Mass., 1970, pp.36-37; A.Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1977, p.236; Purcell, op.cit., p.357.

145 Mustafa Kemal's decision to make use of Soviet help in the 1920s, his subsequent rapprochement with the West, the treaties of Alliance with Britain and France, the non-aggression treaty with Nazi Germany, İnönü's acceptance of the Truman Doctrine and the decision of Menderes to fight in Korea and to seek membership of NATO, the careful steps to test intentions of Stalin's successors, were moves inspired not by quixotic impulses, but by sober calculations of national interests. These were, of course, shifts
of emphasis in the appraisal of the national interest. There were also mistakes. I. Giritli, "Turkish Soviet Relations," *India Quarterly*, Vol.26, 1970, p.16.

While in opposition, Demirel was more sceptical about the prospects of Soviet-Turkish rapprochement and the political benefits that Turkey could derive from it. He did not in principle oppose closer relations, but the main purpose of such was his view to bring pressure on Washington.

Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p.412.

Harris argues that Turkey's dependence on the West, especially the US, had increased with the East-West detente as well as with the revolution in arms technology which made Turkey relatively less important for Western military strategists. It was because of such innovations as the missile-firing Polaris submarine that NATO was able to adopt the strategy of flexible response which raised the specter for Turkish military planners, and for their civilian colleagues as well, that their partners in the alliance might not consider a localized attack from the Soviet forces on Turkey as necessitating military response. This meant that the allies could conceivably sacrifice Turkey in order to win an advantage somewhere else. Turkey was apprehensive of the US. The 1962 missile incident of the mutual withdrawal of weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States was still fresh. Ankara considered this action as a piece of bartering between the two super-powers. However, Turkey was more bitter over the fact that the Ankara government was not consulted on this decision by its American allies. Contrary to this thesis, Turkey's strategic importance had not lost much of its original weight in the age of ICBMs and nuclear parity, as events of 1967 were to show. Harris, *op.cit.*, p.150; Hotham, *op.cit.*, p.115; Laqueur, *op.cit.*, p.25.


Papandreou's leadership brought under challenge the position of prominence held until then by the Monarchy, the military and the United States in Greek politics. Papandreou challenged not only the domestic power balance, but also the external outlook and commitments of the country. The Cyprus incident compounded the difficulties between Greece and the US, especially when President Johnson insisted on the implementation of the Acheson plan proposals (see Chapter 1).

Contrary to the American position, Papandreou's Government supported the policy of Archbishop Makarios who advocated a neutralist independent Cyprus rather than the Acheson proposals. T. Coulombis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, p. 238.


Stephanopoulos immediately agreed to hold secret talks with the Turks at the instigation of the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk and NATO. At the same time, by means of the press, he threatened Makarios by stating that the Greek troops in Cyprus were there to impose the policy of the Athens government, rather than to defend the island from the Turks. Vanezis, op. cit., p. 167.


Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 25 March to 1 April 1967, pp. 21, 947.


According to a key Greek Foreign Office source present at the negotiations, the offer of the Dhekelia base had the full sanctioning of Britain. See the Athens daily Akropolis, 23 February 1975.


ibid, p. 158.

See the letter of the Greek signatory of the protocol, Admiral Toumbas, to the Athens daily Akropolis, 2 March 1975.

On 15 June, 1966, the Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou declared that "...no solution arrived at by other parties would be binding on Cyprus": Quoted in H.D. Purcell, Cyprus, Praeger, New York 1968, p. 367.

As far as the Greek side was concerned, matters were rather different. It is true that the Greek Cypriots were also dependent in many respects on moral and military support from Athens, but there the similarity ended. Locally, the Greeks in Cyprus were in quite a powerful position. They were in control of the whole island, except for the small Turkish enclaves. The Makarios Government continued to be recognized as the Cypriot government, and as the official government, advocating a non-aligned policy, it enjoyed significant freedom of action. L. Ierodiakonou, The Cyprus Question, Stockholm 1971, p. 266.

In support of these fears he produced a letter from Grivas to Sossidès, Stephanopoulos' private secretary, which on one interpretation suggested an embarrassing involvement of the government in this plot. Under these well contrived pressures the government was ready to accede to Makarios' view but instead yielded to pressure from Markezinis who threatened to withdraw the support of the Progressive Party if Grivas, whom he believed to be the only sure guardian of the enosis principle, was dismissed. J. Campbell and P. Sherrard, Modern Greece, F.A. Praeger, New York, 1968, p. 280.

President House of Representatives. The Nicosia government had also made it known that it intended to reduce the allocations for the National Guard by £350,000 in order to increase those for the police and Coast Guard. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 25 March to 1 April 1967, pp. 21947-8.

On 2 December, the Greek Government sent Lieutenant-General Constantine Tsolakas, Chief of the Greek General Staff, to Nicosia to demand that the arms to be supplied by Czechoslovakia should be placed in the custody of the Greek Army. After the General's talks with the Cyprus government leaders it was officially announced in Athens on 6 December that agreement had been reached not to use the Czechoslovak arms for the time being, but to store them in Cyprus under Greek control. Mr Georghadjis, the Cyprus Minister of the Interior and Defence, stated at the
same time that his government had previously asked Greece and other countries for "the supply of necessary arms" but that "all the countries to which Cyprus applied, except Czechoslovakia, rejected our request". Keesings Contemporary Archives, 25 March to 1 April 1967, p. 21948.

21 Mr Paraskevopoulos, the new Greek Prime Minister, proposed the resumption of the secret talks on 9 January 1967, stated that he considered it advisable that they should be continued "with firmness and sincerely" on both sides. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 25 March to 1 April 1967, p. 21947.

22 In order to forestall the elections scheduled for May 1967, the Greek military decided to seize power on 21 April 1967. Prior to the coup Papandreou had alleged a right-wing conspiracy in the army and was immediately confronted by his adversaries with an alleged left-wing conspiracy of ASPIDA, a left-wing military plotting group that supposedly drew its membership principally from among the Greek officers in Cyprus. The inference was obvious - the left-wing elements in the army were conspiring with the Cyprus government. Therefore, the military anti-Aspidists who seized power in Greece were not exactly the friends of Nicosia. See Gregoriadis, op. cit., Vol. 5, pp.11-111.

23 UN Doc S/RES/238, 1967, for the UN Secretary-General's report, and further details on Cyprus see U.N. Monthly Chronicle, July 1967, pp.81-86.

24 B.I. Bell, "Violence at a Distance: Greece and the Cyprus Crisis". Orbis Vol. 18, Fall 1974, p. 790-808.


26 In NATO more than half the member countries (Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy and Canada) repeatedly and in various sessions of the Council and other organs raised the problems of Greece's participation in the alliance, only to be countered by such pressure by the United States, inside and outside the conference room, that their strongly expressed doubts were watered down to general expressions of concern in the final communiques. Xydis, loc cit: p. 195.

27 The new Greek regime stated that it would seek a Cyprus agreement on basis of "enosis" union with Greece. However, the Greek Cypriots feared that the regime would be prepared to grant concessions to Turkey which could be quite unacceptable to them. Furthermore, they feared that if an agreement was reached with Turkey, the military would not hesitate to impose the solution by force. Washington Post, 4 May 1967.

29 Cyprus Mail, 5 July 1967.

30 Shortly after they seized power, on 21 April, the Colonels offered the Turks a settlement on lines which corresponded to the NATO solution proposed by Mr Dean Acheson in 1964. That the offer had been proposed was confirmed by Mr Mulley, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. The Times, 28 July 1967.

31 Cyprus Mail, 2 July 1967.

32 Perceiving the forthcoming danger, Makarios intervened to end the bitter feud between the Athens regime and those Greek Cypriots who were having second thoughts about Enosis after the Greek Army takeover. In an interview with the official Athens news agency, Makarios stated, "I regret that, instead of close and sincere collaboration, there is an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, affecting adversely, and to a highly damaging degree, relations between Mother Greece and Cyprus."

The Times, 23 June 1967.


34 On 2 May 1967, Makarios had warned that Cyprus would "react in many ways if the British bases were used against the Arabs". On 7 June, during the war, Makarios expressed support for the Arabs. Purchell, op. cit. p. 372.

35 Cyprus Mail, 4 July 1967.

36 During July 1967, a British Defence paper advised that "if on the instructions of the Greek government the Greek army in Cyprus staged a coup against Makarios in order to achieve Enosis, we should dissent from it but prevent our troops (15,000) getting engaged in any hostilities". When Richard Crossman asked the Foreign Secretary to comment on this astonishing proposal he said, "After all, the Cypriots have got a very bad record of voting with the Russians in all UN matters". The proposal was later deleted. R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 11, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London, 1976, p. 449.

37 The Soviet Union said, on 4 July, that it was concerned about developments in Cyprus and warned against a possible coup. The official news agency, Tass, said it had been authorized to state that, "The Soviet Union is concerned with developments around Cyprus, with attempts to aggravate again the situation in that area and endanger the existence of the Republic of Cyprus.... Those who are planning a coup in Cyprus assume the responsibility for the consequences it might have.... No-one may interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.... Only Cypriots themselves, both Greeks and Turks, have the right
to decide their destiny.... It is an open secret that the reactionary circles of Greece, supported by the United States and some other NATO members, have long been working on plans against independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus." Cyprus Mail, 5 July 1967; The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIX, No 27, 1967, p. 21.

38 The new diplomatic move was announced by Mr Orsorio-Tafall, U-Thant's special representative. Cyprus Mail, 29 July 1967.

39 Cyprus Mail, 13 August 1967.


41 Vanezis, op. cit., p. 135.

42 ibid. p. 135.

43 Cyprus Mail, 14 August 1967.

44 According to A. Xydis, the colonels failed to even inform the Cyprus desk officer in the Greek Foreign Ministry. Xydis, op. cit., p. 201.

45 Demirel invited Kollias the new Greek Prime Minister, to discuss the Cyprus situation, after the Greek Foreign Minister had approached Turkish Diplomats and had promised them that he had a plan that would overcome all their differences over Cyprus. A. Xydis, et al Ho Makarios kai Hoi Symmachoi Tou (Makarios and His Allies), Gutenburg, Athens, 1974, p. 125.

The Greek proposals provided for union of Cyprus to Greece, minority guarantees and territorial adjustments on the Greco-Turkish border in favour of Turkey. The Turkish delegation complained that the so-called new proposals had been made in December 1966 by the Stephanopoulos government. Hadjiargyris asserts that bureaucratic bungling within the Greek Foreign Ministry prevented the new regime from knowing that these proposals had been rejected previously by the Turkish government. Hadjiargyris in A. Xydis, et al loc. cit., p. 126.

47 Such as the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Xydis op. cit., p. 201.

45 According to Turkish officials, the negotiations concluded that, because of the need for close Graeco-Turkish defence co-operation in order to face the common Communist danger from the north, enosis was the "safest solution" for both parties. With enosis the island would automatically come under the system of western defence. However, the Turkish representatives insisted on the maintenance of the balance
of power, as defined by the Treaty of Lausanne, and the well-being of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. Thus, in exchange for "enosis," they demanded two military bases in Cyprus (the British ones) and 10 percent of the island's territory. *New York Times,* 11 September 1967; *Cyprus Mail,* 10 September 1967.


51 When the talks collapsed the Greek Cypriots were by no means displeased, for union with a Greece dominated by the authoritarian Junta had small appeal to most of them. Scobie, *op.cit.*, p.167.

52 *Cyprus Mail,* 30 October 1967.

53 *Cyprus Mail,* 14 September 1967.


55 For an excellent account of the crisis, see M. Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier,* Oxford University Press, London, 1970, pp. 145-161. The National Defence Council having heard the report of the army command and seen that the efforts of the UN to re-open the road failed, decided that some limited military action should be taken to open the road. The decision was subject to confirmation by Athens. The authorisation came back from General Spandidakis, the Greek Minister of Defence by which he authorised: the concentration of sufficient strength around Kophinou to act as a deterrent; to intervene militarily in a limited way for the purpose of re-opening the Kophinou road; on no account to attack or enter into the village of Kaphinou; an attack on Kophinou would only take place if strong enemy forces from Kophinou reacted and endangered the whole operation. Interview with member of Greek-Cypriot National Council, Nicosia, February 1980.

56 The fundamental and initial responsibility, asserts Harbottle, must lie with the Turks for refusing to allow the police patrols to resume. There could be no valid justification whatsoever in not allowing the resumption of a patrol which had operated without incident for two and a half years, and which had only been suspended temporarily in a voluntary effort to help restore a tense situation to one of calm. Furthermore, on previous occasions the villagers had made it clear that they might utilize their commanding position to control traffic on the Nicosia-Limassol road, one of the island's main arteries. Hence, the Greek Cypriots were worried that the Turks were in the process of establishing another armed enclave. If the Turks could have created another enclave in that area they would control the road from Nicosia to Limassol. The Makarios government was convinced that a repeat of the situation, which for four years had blocked the road to the northern coastal town of Kyrenia,


60 The Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on 16 November stated "The magnitude of the Ayios Theodoras operation and the speed which it was carried out clearly indicate that the National Guard had planned in advance to carry out this operation in the event of any show of opposition by the Turkish Cypriots ...." UN Doc. S/8248, 16 November 1967.


63 The government did so, and recalled Grivas to Athens on 19 November for consultations. The incident had been arranged by Grivas on the Greek Junta's orders. Following the hostilities, the Athens government sent several messages ordering an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of the Greek forces from the Kophinou area. General Grivas however, refused to accept the messages or to command the cease-fire. Athens then got General Karagiannis who was serving under Grivas, to order a ceasefire. Interview with former senior aide of President Makarios, Nicosia, February 1980.

64 UN Doc. S/8248, at 7 1967.


66 After the secret GNA session the assembly virtually unanimously voted by 432 to one with two absententious, to authorize the government to dispatch armed forces "outside Turkey", and deal with any new situation. *Cumhuriyet*, 16-18 November cited in *ibid*.


69 Ehrlich *op cit* p. 105.
Ehrlich argues that it is more than likely that Turkish leaders had determined that if a new crisis were triggered by attacks against Turkish Cypriots, this issue would be the focus of the Turkish response. The issue was well suited to achieve broader Turkish aims and was probably carefully considered in the weeks after the September summit talks collapsed. Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 104.

The Turkish forces had already been mobilized and their air force was carrying out reconnaissance flights over Cyprus; an invasion seemed imminent. Cemal Tural, who was chief of the General Staff, wrote later: "In the 1967 crisis the Cabinet took the decision to intervene in Cyprus. Later the Cabinet decided to postpone the action": F. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975, Hurst, London, 1977. p. 415.

Pipinelis had identified closely with British views on Cyprus, and he was considered to favour a solution that would be satisfactory to the Turks.

The Greek proposal was thought to be insincere while Greek troops were still being sent to Cyprus. The Times, 23 November 1967.

The Turkish note was not in the nature of an ultimatum, said Mr Pipinelis, and added that the Greek government's concern was to ease tension. The Times, 23 November 1967.

The Turks were determined to maintain their build-up at Iskenderun and on the Thracian border until their other conditions were also met.

Republican People's Party, Secretary General, Bulent Ecevit declared that "no matter which party happens to be in power, the sentiments of the ... nation in this matter constitute an important source of strength and inspiration for the government; today we wish the Turkish government success in its efforts", *Middle East Record*, Vol. 3, 1967, citing *Cumhuriyet*, Tercuman, 19, 27 November; Radio Ankara, 26 November, p. 527.

The Economist, 2 December 1967.


The declared purpose of the Turkish action was to place as many Turkish forces on the island as there were Greek forces. Turks were confident that they would easily defeat the Greek army, but it was admitted that the invasion of Cyprus might be costly. Vali, *op. cit.*, citing *Hurriyet*, 8-12 January, p. 258.


Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 415.


In 1966, one-third of the strategic weapons of the United States were seaborne. The dramatic rise in seaborne delivery systems, as McGwire states, meant that in many ways the eastern Mediterranean was now of greater defensive concern to the Soviet Union than its arctic seas. Moscow lies midway between the two, whereas the population and industry thin out to the north, to the south and east of the capital lies a large part of Russia's industrial strength. This new strategic interest reinforced the traditional requirements to prevent maritime intervention of the Black Sea. 


Recognizing that a modest move toward a more even-handed policy on the Cyprus dispute would earn large dividends in Ankara, Kosygin and Brezhnev took advantage of Foreign Minister Erkin's long projected visit to Moscow (in October 1964) to signal a new policy. In the communique issued early in November 1964, they proclaimed their recognition of the Turkish community's right to co-existence. This position, which Foreign Minister Gromyko reiterated in December 1964, was read by the Turkish Foreign Office as endorsement of the Turkish demands for Cyprus to be an independent and federated state. The new relationship was marked by high level visits. In January 1965, Podgorny (President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) headed a Soviet delegation to Turkey, the first in 30 years. G. Harris, "The Soviet Union and Turkey", in I. Lederer and G. Vucinich (ed.), The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post World War II era, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1974, p. 50. citing C.F. Erkin, Les relations turco-soviétiques et la question des Détroits, Ankara 1968, also Adams and Cottrell, op. cit., pp. 29-54. C.B. McLane, Soviet-Middle East Relations, Vol. 1, Central Asian Research Centre, London, 1973, pp. 106-107. See Chapter 1, p. 25.

After his return from the Soviet Union, the Turkish Premier declared that the visit had eliminated "the last traces of hostility from Soviet-Turkish relations". He went on to say, "Now I am not suggesting that all the doubts are gone, but I think the hostility is gone". See New York Times, 13 October 1967. Demirel's visit also helped in the conclusion of a significant economic agreement between the Soviet Union and Turkey which the Turks had agreed to in principle in March 1967, after long negotiations. The aid project was inaugurated in December 1966. The agreement included an oil refinery near Izmir and a steel complex estimated at $200m.; New York Times, 13 October 1967; McLane, op. cit., p. 107.
Thus for example, while the pace of high level visits between the two countries gained momentum between 1965 and 1967, Ankara insisted, as an explicit precondition for this exchange, that the Soviet leaders agree to forswear raising the question of Turkey's adherence to NATO and CENTO during these visits. Moreover, CENTO by this time was passing through a stage of acute internal difficulties and no longer appeared to hold any prospect of military or political threat to Soviet interests in the Middle East. G. Harris, "The Soviet Union and Turkey" in Lederer and Vucinich, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

The Canadian peace plan for Cyprus was discussed between Pearson and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London on 23 November, ibid.


Ehrlich, op.cit., p.111.

Cyprus Mail, 23 November 1967. In the British view, the Security Council should have been brought in only if necessary as a last-ditch attempt to head off renewed fighting.

See p.40 for list of all Turkish demands.

Times, 22 November 1967; Cyprus Mail, 23 November 1967.


See Chapter 1.

An assumption held by some Greek Cypriots and, perhaps, some mainland Greeks as well.

Adam and Cottrell, op.cit., p.72.

The similarities of this course with that of 1964 were not lost on the Turkish audience. A number of highly vocal Turks were by now disposed to assume that American conduct would repeat itself, i.e. Washington would exert itself energetically to block Turkish action. Middle East Record, Vol.3, 1967, citing Cumhuriyet, Tarawum; The Times, 24 November 1967; Cyprus Mail, 24 November 1967; Harris, op.cit., p.123.

During the crisis, US officials were very watchful of the Soviet Union. A former adviser of President Johnson recalls, "if there had been threatening statements made by the Soviet Union it would have elevated the crisis in the sense of the US government which could have meant a direct involvement by the President. In 1967 the Soviet Union did not oppose the essential outlines of US involvement." Interview, Washington, DC, December 1980.
President Sunay's action had unanimous support of all the Turkish political parties. Salvation Party leader, Turhan Feyzioglu's memorandum to Demirel, summarized the unity and feelings of the Turkish political world over the Cyprus dispute - "Cyprus is not merely a cause connected with the national security of Turkey and the protection of the Turkish Cypriots. The development of events has made the Cyprus Question a matter of national honour for Turkey. By using our right and might correctly, we can render ineffective the policy of gradual elimination (of the Turkish Cypriot Community) being followed by the Greeks and Makarios. We are now in a position to force the Greek Cypriots and Greeks to retreat, and now, before justice." Middle East Record, Vol.3, 1967, citing Cumhuriyet, 30 November, Radio Ankara, 30 November.

The Security Council (a) expressed "grave concern" at the tense and dangerous situation with regard to Cyprus; (b) noted, with satisfaction, the Secretary-General's efforts to help maintain peace in the region; (c) called upon all parties concerned "to show the utmost moderation and restraint, to refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation and constitute a threat to peace"; and, (d) further requested all concerned to "assist and co-operate in keeping the peace and arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 4 March 1964." New York Times, 25 November 1967.

The American involvement was not planned in advance. Senior State Department officials advised President Johnson that, unless a US presence was introduced, war would break out. However, they did not have a plan on how to handle the crisis. Prior to this move, the US had tried to get NATO, Great Britain and Canada to carry out more of the direct involvement, but was unsuccessful. The subsequent mediation moves by the NATO Secretary-General were made after the US initiative, but it was in support of it rather than an independent NATO initiative. Interview with former Under-Secretary of State under the Johnson Administration, Washington, DC, December 1979.

Tully, op.cit., p.105.

See US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, AID Special Report, prepared yearly for the House Foreign Affairs Committee; US Government Printing Office, Washington DC; See also Table

Adams and Cottrell, op.cit., p.53.

Soviet communications, intercepted by American listening posts, reported the State Department's INR had indicated the Soviet Union was concerned over the fate of its supply line to the Mediterranean, from the Black Sea through the Dardenelles Strait in the event of a Greek-Turkish war. Tully, op.cit., p.105.

Adams and Cottrell, op.cit., p.53.

During his Cyprus crisis shuttle, Vance travelled three times to Turkey, four times to Greece and twice to Cyprus.


The official United States position was that Vance did not threaten sanctions against either country. Erlich, op.cit., P.111. Vance did not have authority to commit the US to grant huge amounts of economic and military aid, as a means to pacify Greece and Turkey. He had no plan or direction that he was trying to sell. It was really pure mediation. We were trying to find elements that were acceptable to both sides. We mediated until Greece and Turkey found common ground on things that were possible."

Interview with former senior State Department official who assisted Vance during the 1967 crisis, Washington, DC, December 1979;

Mr Thant's appeal envisaged a staged withdrawal, leading to the "positive demilitarization" of Cyprus.

UN Doc.S/8248/Add 3.

According to one official interpretation, "The Greek military were very much opposed to the removal of the Greek force. However, after senior Greek diplomats advised them that this would undoubtedly provoke a Turkish attack on Cyprus, they became less adamant." Interview with former senior cabinet minister of the Makarios administration, who liaised between Athens and Nicosia during the 1967 crisis; Nicosia, February 1980. As to the troops themselves, the Greek regime apparently wanted a lengthy timetable for withdrawal, but Turkey insisted on quick action.

Premier Demirel had informed the Opposition of the proposals after getting approval for Turkey's agreement to them from the Cabinet and from the National Security Council. New York Times, 28 November 1967.

The parties of the extreme Right - Turkes' KPNP and Feyzioglu's RP were the most vocal. Middle East Record, Vol.3, 1967, citing Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, 30 November 1967, on statements criticizing the government's policy by leaders of minority political parties.


Throughout the crisis the three envoys met regularly to discuss their tactics. Cyprus Mail, 26 November 1967.

Ehrlich, op.cit., p.112.
Mr. Pipinelis said in his statement, "an agreement has been reached which, among other things, provides for phased withdrawal from Cyprus of the armed forces of Greece and Turkey, except for the regular contingents." Upon the insistence of Turkey, these regular contingents were to remain. This was one point that Makarios was objecting to. *New York Times*, 3 December 1967.

Withdrawal of the clandestine Greek troops was a decision exclusively taken in Athens. Ehrlich, *op. cit.*

During the crisis, Greek Premier Kollias "requested that Makarios listen to the voice of mother Greece and agree that the police force be placed under the command of UNFICYP and to dissolve the National Guard." Interview with former senior cabinet minister of the Makarios government of 1967, Nicosia, February 1980. *Cyprus Mail*, 5 December 1967.

The proposed role specified a strengthened mandate for the 4,500 strong UN force, whose main function was observation and mediation. *New York Times*, 3 December 1967.

Officially, the Turks expected the agreement on troop withdrawals and the dismantling of their invasion force to be followed by measures to disarm the Greek Cypriot National Guard and to strengthen the UN peacekeeping force on the island. Privately, Turkish officials conceded that Makarios had probably been successful in his efforts to prevent a reduction in the size and strength of the National Guard. *New York Times*, 5 December 1967.
In the aftermath of the November crisis, the Makarios regime became suspicious and apprehensive of the Greek-Turkish negotiations that proceeded discreetly under the personal supervision of Pipinelis (an avowed promoter of a quick understanding with Turkey at any cost). A. Stangos, "Greek Factors in the Mediterranean Equation, Tilting the Great Power Balance," *The New Middle East*, November 1968, p.13.


Demirel had to even face a censure motion for its handling of the Cyprus crisis and its agreement with Greece to settle it. The motion put up by Colonel A. Turkes, leader of the NRNP, was rejected by the National Assembly. *New York Times*, 5 December 1967; Ahmad, op.cit., pp.414-416.

Only the Republicans, remembering their own discomfiture in 1964, were surprisingly moderate and sympathetic to the government. Ahmad, ibid., p.416.

Ahmad, ibid., p.416.

Ahmad, ibid., p.416.

A former senior State Department official believes the US mediation was successful because it bypassed bureaucratic red tape. The management of the crisis was left to only three or four officials, as opposed to running it by senior committee. The decisions were made by telephone to each other as opposed to having to brief the Secretary of State once a day on it or to run up to a committee or the president and get approval of a policy and arguing and delaying. Finally, a contributing factor was that the crisis was not given much attention by the American press until Vance became involved. It was therefore not built up as a major story, so he was not under public pressure. Interview, Washington DC, December 1979.
CHAPTER 3 - END NOTES

1 Report of Secretary General, UN Doc. S/8622, 11 June 1968, para. 51.


5 According to a major study by R. Patrick, a former UNFICYP officer: "There was apparent disagreement among various factions as to the best method of achieving this change. Some advocated a popular uprising under the leadership of General Grivas, others advocated creating a state of apparent anarchy such that the Greek Government would feel compelled to intervene to re-establish order. Some again favoured the simpler expedient of assassinating President Makarios". Based on confidential interviews with anti-Makarios elements. R.A. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971*, Department of Geography Publication Series, No.4, University of Waterloo, 1976, p.147; see also the article by Nancy Crawshaw, "Subversion in Cyprus", *World Today*, Vol. 12, January 1971, pp.25-31.


9 An outline of the plan which first appeared in *Der Spiegel*, No.12, 16 March 1970. It incorporated the overthrow of Makarios in a combined military move by Greek officers that staffed the Greek Cypriot National Guard and National Front guerrillas. For complete text of plan, see Papageorgiou, *op. cit.*, pp.48-54; Appendix (E).

10 Besides assisting a mainland Greek who later attempted to assassinate Papadopoulos, Georkajis asserts Gregoriades had been guilty of resisting the penetration of the Greek Secret Services into the Cyprus Government? *Akropolis*, 6 February 1975, noted in M. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, Q Press, Edinburgh, 1979, p.131.


18 In September 1969 Makarios had warned that the activities of the National Front were having adverse effects on the negotiations. *Cyprus Mail*, 1 September 1970.

19 Patrick, op. cit., p.175.


21 UN Doc. S/10005, 2 December 1970.


24 For text of memorandum see Appendix (F).

25 Ahmad, op. cit., p.290.


27 F. Armaoglu, "Recent Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Dis Politika*, Vol. 1, No.1, March 1971, pp.80-82.


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33 Text of report of interview given to Milliyet, BBC/SWB/ME/3698/C/1-2, 2 June 1971; Eleutheria, 1 June 1971.

34 Patrick, op. cit., p.176.

35 After the 1967 Coup, President Johnson partially suspended arms shipments to Greece, but the Nixon administration substantially reversed this decision in 1970.


38 Excerpts from report of return from Lisbon of Osman Olcay, Turkish Foreign Minister, BBC/SWB/ME/3703/C/1, 7 June 1971; Eleutheria, 4-6 June 1971; H.I. Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State, University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1978, p.73.

39 Interview with former Cabinet Minister, Nicosia, February 1980.

40 The Greek Government denied the allegations that a secret agreement had been signed. K. Panagiotacos (former deputy Foreign Minister and Greek Ambassador to Cyprus, during 1971) Stin Proti Grammi Aminis (In the First Line of Defence), Giovanis, Athens, 1979, p.97.

41 Prior to his departure for Moscow, Makarios was warned by the Greek military to refrain from signing any agreement with the Soviet Union. "Makarios Visit to Moscow", BBC/SWB/ME/3698/C/4, 2 June 1971; Eleutheria, 2 June 1971.


45 For text of Papadopoulos ultimatum, see Appendix (H); Panagiotacos, op. cit., p.97. A. Katsi, Ape Tin Anaxartisia Stin Tourkiki Eivolti, (From Independence to the Turkish Invasion), Papazisi, Athens, 1977, p.144.
46 See text of correspondence between Papadopoulos and Makarios dated 18 June 1971, Appendix (i).


48 The Greek Foreign Ministry instructed its Ambassador in Cyprus to limit his contacts with Makarios and members of his Cabinet. Panagiotacos, *op. cit.*, p.98.

49 *Eleutheria*, 6-7 July 1971.

50 The Greek Government denied the allegation. See "Palamas on the Cyprus Problem", *BBC/SWB/ME/3729/C/1*, 8 July 1971.

51 "Makarios's Willingness to Accept Foreign Aid", *BBC/SWB/ME/3729/C/1*, 8 July 1971.

52 *Cyprus Mail*, 11 August 1971.


55 The Turkish Cypriot side opposed the use of the word "unitary" by their counterparts. They asserted its unrealistic interpretation (namely a State in which they would have no more than minority rights) in the negotiations disregarded the established status of the Turkish Community in an independent Cyprus based on the existence of dual communities. R. Denktash, "Cyprus on the Threshold of New Talks", *Dis Politika*, Vol. 2, No.2, June 1972, p.63.


59 For an analysis of the social origins of EOKA B recruits see Markides, *op. cit.*, pp.116-119.

60 Panagiotacos, *op. cit.*, p.94.

62 His Beautitude had repeatedly stated that though enosis was a cherished dream, its achievement was not at present feasible, and that his government's aim was to establish a firm basis for an independent State. The Times, 5 October 1971.

63 See text of speech by the former Ambassador of Cyprus to Athens Nicos Kranidiotis, The Cyprus Problem: The Proposed Solutions and the Concept of the Independent and Sovereign State, delivered at the International Symposium on Cyprus, Panteios School of Political Science, Athens, 10-14 March 1975, p.29.


66 The Times, 29 November 1971.

67 UN Doc. S/10401.


72 See Cyprus Mail, 10 February 1972. Panagiotacos, op. cit., pp.101-104, 122-124; the document was not secret and was simultaneously released to the Press.

73 For complete contents of note, see Appendix (I).


75 Cyprus Mail, 14 February 1972.

76 As head of ESA (Greek Military Police) he had played a decisive role in averting a challenge to Papadopoulos' leadership on 27 August 1970. Since then his power and influence had dramatically increased within the ruling Junta. Kakaounaki (Vol. 1), op. cit., pp.316-326.
77 Interview with former President of the House of Representatives of Cyprus, Nicosia, 7 February 1980; "Testimony of Ambassador Henry Tasca", Pike Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, 94 Congress, 1st Session, p.1537. On 17 February the Greek Armed Forces radio broadcast, "It is the Communists, particularly AKEL, who are following an adventurist policy, . . . Now the Cyprus Communist Party seeks to exploit events to disrupt Cypriot Hellenism to the point of civil war...." BBC/SW/B/ME/3918/C/13, 19 February 1972.

78 "Text of Panagiotacos interview with National Radio and Television Institute of Greece", BBC/SW/B/ME/3919/C/2, 18 February 1972; Cyprus Mail, 19 February 1972; The Times, 18 February 1972.

79 By EOKA.B, with the direct or indirect support of the Greek officers present in Cyprus. In spite of the censorship restrictions imposed on it, the independent Greek Press confirmed that a coup had been expected to take place in Nicosia. To Vima, 20 February 1972.

80 On 14 February Glafos Clerides and Mr Tompazos (Director of Greek-Cypriot Secret Police) had an audience with the American Ambassador in Cyprus, Mr Popper, and outlined to him that they had conclusive evidence that the Greek regime would launch a coup in Cyprus to topple Makarios. Kakaounakis, op. cit., p.142, Stern, op. cit., p.45; New York Times, 15 February 1972. According to the Archbishop's intelligence, on 14 February they found detailed plans in a raid on EOKA.B headquarters for a raid that was scheduled that day.

81 According to Stern, Popper seemed to have some advance knowledge of the coup, op. cit., p.45.

82 Pike Select Committee on Intelligence, op. cit., p.1537.


84 While the US officials refused to name the seven, the Washington Post reported on 27 October that they were Belgium, Cyprus, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia and Trinidad-Tobago.


86 The summit had such priority that Kissinger secretly visited the Soviet Union on 20-24 April 1972 to confer with Brezhnev on a variety of problems. See New York Times, 27 April 1972.


89 For Soviet commentary on the crisis see BBC/SW/B/SU/3923/A4/1-5, 18 February 1972; BBC/SW/B/SU/3927/A4/4-5, 29 February 1972.
Contrary to Makarios, AKEL showed its priorities. While being critical of the US Sixth Fleet, AKEL said the presence of strong units of the Soviet Fleet constituted a decisive deterrent against imperialist aggressive designs, *Cyprus Mail*, 20 February 1972; *Cyprus Mail*, 15 February 1972; *Cyprus Mail*, 19 February 1972.

92 "Haluk Bayulkan's Foreign Policy Statement in Turkish Senate", BBC/SWB/ME/3911/C/1, 10 February 1972.

93 BBC/SWB/ME/3918/C/2, 18 February 1972; BBC/SWB/ME/3921/C/2, 22 February 1972.


95 The three bishops with Makarios formed the Holy Synod of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Cyprus (autocephalous).

96 The argument the Bishops deployed rested on shaky historical foundations. The advent of Ottoman rule in Cyprus in 1571 led to the introduction there of the ethnarch system, whereby a Christian community was both administered and represented by its spiritual leader. Therefore what Makarios was doing was in full conformity with the church rules and regulations. Makarios was the elected Archbishop and in the tradition of the Cypriot Church, the elected Archbishop was also the ethnarch. The Bishops also proclaimed that Makarios had made "Enosis" more distant and that he had not been able to establish permanent co-operation with the National centre (Athens). They also charged Makarios with tolerating the growth of Communism and with permitting the rise of anti-Greek attitudes.


99 In a letter to the three Bishops on 19 March Makarios said that he did not agree with their suggestion that he should resign the Presidency. The three Bishops sent another letter to Makarios on 27 March renewing their demand for his resignation from the Presidency and expressing a strongly pro-enosis standpoint.

100 At the same time, he instructed his Special Representative to bring to the attention of the Government the difficulties which the importation of arms had created for UNFICYP. The UN role in the 1972 crisis is outlined in the Secretary General's special report to the Security Council. See UN Doc. S/10564.

101 UN Doc. S/10564, Add. 1; UN Doc. S/10564, Add.2.
For UN formula, see UN Doc. S/10401, para. 79.


Kakoukaki op cit., pp. 180-184; Grivas now believed that Papadopoulos had plans to partition the island in concert with Turkey rather than support "enosis", Papageorgiou op cit., pp. 202-216.

Stern op cit., p. 46.

See analysis in chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4 - END NOTES


3 The Soviet naval buildup was a response to the American deployment of sea-borne nuclear strategic delivery power and to the disastrous defeat of the Soviet clients in the Middle East.


7 The Soviets had fifty-two ships in place as tension in Jordan escalated. In very short order the number rose to seventy-two.


11 The OTH is a useful tool both for the military and for oceanographic and ionospheric studies. As well as detecting aircraft and missiles, OTH also reveals nuclear bursts. 


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20 Ibid.


22 Davies, op.cit., p.161.


24 Hartman and Davies, op.cit., pp.279-280.

25 The ultra-right leader was determined to overthrow Makarios (whom he believed used Greek-Turkish friction to enhance his own position), and impose his own guidelines for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Ioannides immediately began preparations towards his objective, by increasing the clandestine involvement of the Greek military officers stationed in Cyprus to officially train the 10,000 strong Cyprus National Guard with the terrorist organization EOKA-B. L. Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," Foreign Policy, No.19, Summer 1975, p.49.

26 Karousos had declared that EOKA-B would renounce violence and become a political party. Perhaps in order to encourage this the Cyprus Government had ordered an amnesty. But the extremist faction (supported by Ioannides) opposed Karousos and demanded to increase terrorist activities. Under orders from Ioannides, Greek officers kidnapped Karousos to Greece where he was placed under house arrest. K. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977, p.86; M. Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, Q Press, Edinburgh, 1979, p.135.
27 During the period May-June 1974 former US Ambassador to Cyprus, Tobby Belcher, was told in very strong terms that there was documentary evidence available to the government of Cyprus that the CIA was financing the EOKA-B through money passed by Ioannides in Athens. "Testimony of Ambassador Belcher," Pike Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings, US House of Representatives, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1975, p.760.

28 According to Dimitriou, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Roger Davies, had also heard similar reports, but he had been assured by the US Embassy in Athens that there was no substance in the rumours. Dimitriou warned Davies that if a coup took place "all hell will break loose and the US will not be able to control the situation." Interview, Larnaca, February 1980.


33 "Tasca Testimony," Pike Committee on Intelligence, op.cit., pp.1563-1565; Stern, op.cit., p.50.

34 Stern, op.cit., p.50.

35 Apogeamatini (Nicosia daily), 5 and 6 July 1974. For full text of letter in English, see appendix J. Cabinet was unanimous in its support of Makarios' decision to send the letter. However, it advised Makarios not to make the letter public. According to one of his senior aides the Archbishop was over-optimistic and based his judgement on logic, underestimating the reaction of the irrational coupists, Interview, Nicosia, February, 1980.


38 A figurehead president selected by Athens. The following works give good accounts of the 1974 Cyprus crisis from various perspectives: N. Sarris, I Alii Plevra: Politiki Pironografia Tis Eisvolis Stin Kypro [The Other Side: Political Chronicle of the Cyprus Invasion], Grammi, Athens, 1977; S. Psylaris, To Krisimes Imeres [The 70 Critical Days], Papazisi, 1976;


A number of officers at the Greek pentagon held reservations about such a move, because they believed in the event of a Turkish reaction Greece was handicapped strategically by distance and logistic support problems.


Akropolis, 19 and 20 June 1974.


*Stern*, *op.cit.*, 1975, pp.50-51.


The *Times*, 17 July 1974.

The *Times*, 18 July 1974.


The Times, 18 July 1974.

Interview with former Under-Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph Sisco, Washington, December 1979. Sisco concluded "We failed - sent on mission foredoomed to fail. It had gone too far to regress ... a last resort effort."


See Tasca Testimony in Pike Hearings op.cit., pp.1540-1563.

During intra-Greek hostilities on the island, communications between the Greek High Command in Athens and its officers in Cyprus were rather ad-hoc.

The rift between Ioannides supports and other factions in the military widened after it became known that Makarios had survived and had escaped from the island.

The National Guard instead of consolidating its position in Nicosia, was forced to break up its forces to counter the 1500 strong pro-Makarios militia, based around the Paphos district. The militia was large enough to challenge the National Guard. This meant that the Nicosia battalion responsible for the coastal defences of Cyprus, including the Kyrenia district (where the Turkish invasion later took place) was engaged in hostilities in various parts of the island. Hence it was not able to immediately take up its designated defensive position around Kyrenia, when the Turkish forces began to land on 20 July.

In October 1973 power was once again fully transferred to the Parliament. However, neither of the two largest parties, the "Justice Party (JP) and the Republic Peoples Party (RPP)", could secure an absolute majority. Eventually Mr Ecevit, the leader of RPP formed a co-alition with the radical minority party the "National Salvation Party" (NSP) led by the Islamic fundamentalist Erbakan. See also chapter 3.

In exchange for the support of the NSP Erbakan secured a disproportionate ratio of cabinet portfolios. The end result was that decision making on key foreign and domestic policies ground to a halt or were shelved as policy splits escalated between the coalition partners. Hurriyet, 20 April 1975, FBIS/TWE/No 708, 1975, p.82.


The Times, 24 July 1974; A useful chronology of events is found in Cyprus 1974, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its subcommittee on Europe, US House of Representatives, 1974, pp.53-60; See also S. Karnow, "Instability in the Mediterranean " the Cyprus Crisis", The New Republic, 10-17 August 1974, pp.17-19.

In the meantime on Cyprus the figurehead President, Nicos Sampson, was replaced on 23 July by Glafkos Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives, who in the absence of Makarios became under provisions of the constitution acting President, until 7 December 1974, when Makarios returned. Psykharis op.cit., pp.60-85; Stern (1975) op.cit., pp.48-56; S. Karnow, "America's Mediterranean Bungle", The Atlantic, February 1975, esp pp.5-7.


To Vima, 1 August 1974.

Interview with Senior official Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, January 1980.


The Times, 14 August 1974.


Orianna Fallaci, Interview with History, Liveright, New York, 1976, pp.312-316

Karnow (September 1974) op.cit., pp.6-7.


103 The plan called for an examination of the Cyprus problem by a representative forum of states reflecting the makeup of the world. The Soviet government stressed that "it is time to consider the question of convening an international conference for this purpose within the framework of the United Nations, and with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and all member-states of the Security Council". *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 26, No. 34, 1974, p. 17.

104 *To Vima*, 19 August 1974.
CHAPTER 5 - END NOTES

1 For detailed analysis of earlier NATO mediation during the 1950s and for its role during the 1964 and 1967 crisis, see chapters 1 and 2.

2 The Greek Government made the following statement after its withdrawal: "After the Atlantic alliance demonstrated its inability to prevent Turkey from creating a state of conflict between two allies, . . . Greece shall remain a member of the alliance only in connection with its political aspects". The decision was taken at a War Council meeting, chaired by Mr Karamanlis. The Times, 15 August 1974. See also Appendix (L).


Ibid., p.10.

4 Kissinger had pointed out that "many Europeans opposing American conceptions are not content with acting simply as advisors in an American decision making process", Ibid., p.22.


"During the NPT negotiations the superpowers' relations with their allies were seriously and adversely affected by the high-handed way in which the superpowers excluded others from their confidence during the negotiations". R. Ellsworth, "Europe and America", Survival, April 1971, p.118. At the time the author was US Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.


Some Europeans worried that the Soviet Union, with the formal ratification of strategic parity, might feel freer to take actions carrying a higher risk of war. Another concerned the impact of SALT on NATO, i.e. that the US might give priority to superpower detente and that, in the process, it might be prepared to accept some erosion of alliance solidarity. It was also assumed that future limitations on strategic armaments might affect European security either directly, or by hindering the modernization and
the growth of independent nuclear forces, or indirectly, as by reducing or redeploying American forces and weapon systems deemed essential to the maintenance of a military balance in Europe, J. Colley, "SALT II: Security Implications for the Atlantic Alliance", in R.L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (ed). Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control, Heath, Lexington, 1974, pp.124-126.


13 Frederick Nyle, a former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for European and NATO affairs, has put forward the following factors as the cornerstone of Transatlantic strategic differences, "Broadly speaking, Americans' approach to the problem of defence as essentially technical tasks to be mastered by the application of energy, physical resources, planning and organization. Europeans' approach to the problem of defence as essentially political, to be solved by calculation of interest and political purpose, and to be decided in large part by structuring political relationships and interests." "U.S., Europe, SALT and Strategy" in M.A. Kaplan (ed), SALT: Problems and Prospects, Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973, pp.142-143.

14 According to Pierre Hassner, European fears or objections were stirred much less by the SALT agreement itself than by the declaration of principles which accompanied it and, even more, by the June 1973 agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. "How Troubled a Partnership?", International Journal, Vol. XXIX, No.2, Spring 1974, pp.176-177.

15 Ibid., p.168.

16 In his report to the Congress in 1972, President Nixon pointed out that a constructive solution had to be found to accommodate the conflicting economic interests. He emphasized that, with the increased economic power of the EEC, a balance would have to be found to eradicate the discrepancy between continued US commitment to European Security and isolation and erosion of US economic interests. He proposed an increase in the burden sharing of NATO defence by Western Europe and warning, in the meantime, that a failure to do so could inevitably lead to discord. The Emerging Structure of Peace, 9 February 1972, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1972, pp.40-45.

17 Nixon pointed out that "the prospect of relatively close trading systems within Europe, notably in agriculture, and the preferential arrangements with third countries, was proceeding as the United States was suffering an increasingly unfavourable balance of payments". Shaping a Durable Peace, A Report to the Congress, 3 May 1973, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1973, p.78.
The reformulation of the goals in Kissinger's agenda for the future turned out a disputations operation. Herr Brandt's impression at the time was that Kissinger's New Atlantic Charter speech "had been somewhat hurriedly drafted, partly in order to divert attention from the political crisis at home by means of a new and resounding slogan". For greater detail see Brandt, op. cit., p.312. W.G. Crewe, "Western Europe, the United States and Japan - Structural Problems of an International Triangle", in K. Kaiser and H.P. Schwarz (ed), America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects, Heath, Lexington, 1972.

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt has argued that "while the fast movement of events precluded any meaningful prior consultation, the US could have gained capital with the Europeans by paralleling the messages to NATO authorities". "The Lessons for NATO of Recent Military Experience", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Winter 1974-1975, Vol.12, No.4, p.451.

In 1973 the Nixon administration continued to urge more NATO-Europe military defence strength and also rejected Congressional pressure to withdraw part of the American troops stationed in Europe. In 1973, Defence Secretary, Schlesinger, like his predecessor, Melvin Laird (1969-1972), left no doubt in his defence posture and force planning programmes that the US military contribution to the strategic balance in Western Europe would have to be modified to the overall US requirements and the "Nixon doctrine". Willy Brandt, "Europe's New Self-Awareness", Survival, July/August 1973, pp.193-194. Lothar Ruhl, "The Nine and NATO. The Alliance and the Community: An Uncertain Relationship", in P.C. Ludz, et al., Dilemmas of the Atlantic Alliance: Two Germanys, Scandinavia, Canada, NATO and the EEC, Praeger, New York, 1975, p.246.

Prior to the 1973 War, Europeans had tended for several years to believe that the failure of the US to use its influence to move Israel toward a Middle Eastern settlement contributed to continued instability in the region. At the same time, the Europeans viewed that the US supported Israeli intransigence as potentially imperiling to their essential oil supplies. Zumwalt, op. cit., p.480.

30 Attempts by France, Italy and Britain to formulate a unified EEC position over the crisis ran counter to the hesitations, and the opposition, of Holland and of Denmark (which were close to Israel), and of the German Federal Republic (which was eager to observe strict neutrality). For greater detail, see Francoise de la Serre, "Europe's Nine and the Israeli-Arab Conflict", International Journal of Politics, Vol. 5, No.1, Spring 1975, p.92.

31 For text of the OAPEC resolution, see Survival, No.1, 1974, pp.38-39.

32 In comparison with Western Europe which depended upon OAPEC countries for 80% of its oil imports, the United States, which imported only 8% from OAPEC, was the least vulnerable to the Arab "oil embargo". For greater detail on the above supply figures, see Ian Smart, "Oil, the Super-powers and the Middle East", International Affairs, January 1977, esp. pp.24-29.

33 For example, the blockaded Dutch hoped to receive overt help from the other EEC members and were angry when they did not get it. Louis Turner, "The European Community: Factors of Disintegration", "The Politics of the Energy Crisis", International Affairs, No.3, July 1974, p.409.

34 For a detailed analysis of the differences see Horst Menderhausen, Coping with the Oil Crisis: French and German Experiences, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976, pp.68-69.

35 In reference to the European posture, Kissinger, on 12 December 1973, made the following statement, "I would be less than frank were I to conceal our uneasiness about some of the recent practices of the European Community in the political field. To present the decisions of a unifying Europe to us as faits accomplis not subject to effective discussions is alien to the tradition of US-European relations"; Keesings Contemporary Archives, 14-20 January 1974, p.26293.

36 Besides the EEC countries, Norway, Canada and Japan also attended.

37 In January, the nine secretly agreed to convene an Arab-European conference. The proposal which was conceived by the French ran counter to the interests of the US which felt that the move smacked too much of a bilateral deal which would tend to bid up the price of oil. Turner, op. cit., p.413.

38 Grieve, op. cit.

39 They finally signed a communique without France, calling for a series of actions in the energy field and the creation of a group of senior officials to direct and co-ordinate them. Turner, op. cit., p.413.


42 As Ken Booth has pointed out, while the European allies accepted the logic of US military domination in the alliance, they were in no mood to allow the alliance to become a US dominated forum for the discussion of international and trade questions. "Security Makes Strange Bedfellows: NATO's Problems from a Minimalist Perspective", *RUSI*, Vol. 120, No.4, December 1975, p.10.


44 For an analysis of Anglo-American differences, see Chapter 4. See also *New York Times*, 18 July 1974.

45 During the independence struggle in the 1950s, Secretary-General Paul Henry Spaak had played a major role in reconciling Greece and Turkey. Similarly, during the 1964 crisis fervent NATO mediation contributed to the de-escalation of the crisis. For greater detail, see Chapter 1, Chapter 2.


47 According to Vive Nerlich, it was only under high level pressure from some West European capitals that Luns could be persuaded to at least be in Brussels while the Cyprus conflict was unfolding. "NATO, EEC, and the Politics of Detente: Regulating Frameworks of Western Foreign Policy-Making", in Andren and Birnbaum, *op. cit.*, pp.58, 64.


50 The majority of West European Governments had been critical of the Colonels before the crisis.

51 In 1974 the EEC was still basically an Economic Organization. The concept of European integration was still only an aspiring notion that had not made any progress beyond a stage of semantics.

52 In 1974 both Greece and Turkey were associate members. However, Greece's membership was frozen when the Colonels came to power in 1967. Turkey, on the other hand, with its economic environment in shambles, had no prospect of full EEC membership for at least a decade or more.

53 As S.I.P. van Campen (Director of the Office of the Secretary-General, NATO) has written, the European system of political cooperation was not sufficiently developed to have much impact, either positively or negatively. "NATO: A Balance Sheet After Thirty Years", *Orbe*, Vol. 23, No.2, Summer 1979, p.266.
54 The Times, 22 July 1974.


56 The German Government officials refused to define their stand toward the French initiative, arguing that Bonn had not been asked beforehand.

57 The Giscard d'Estaing administration decided to speed up the arms deliveries which had been ordered by the defunct Colonels' regime.

58 The Federal Republic, on principle, did not deliver any weapons in areas of tension. In 1975-76, Bonn abandoned this line and supplied Turkey with arms in the tense atmosphere that prevailed over the Aegean issue.

59 In 1971 NATO completed the construction of a satellite communications system which could facilitate simultaneous consultation by NATO heads of government during a time of crisis. In a related move it also built, in NATO headquarters, two allied intelligence centres that for the first time could furnish a prompt day-by-day pooling of military and political intelligence on an allied wide basis. The SHAPE operations centre at Casteaux contains an electronic and computerized data bank, linked with subsidiary data banks at far-flung lower-echelon commands, which constantly collects and analyses information necessary for military decision making. Similarly, at the situation centre in Brussels, a computer bank exists which collects not only military data, but more especially political and diplomatic information. E. Goodman, The Fate of the Atlantic Community, Praeger, New York, 1975, pp.340-341.


62 On 19 July a section of Turkey's armed forces allocated to NATO came under National Command. N. Sarris, I Allí Pleura: Politiki Kronografia Tis Eisvolis Stín Kypro (The Other Side: Political Chronicle of the Cyprus Invasion), Grammi, Athens, 1977, p.111.

63 It should be noted that failure to furnish DIA Intelligence summaries on Cyprus for the period 13 to 20 July was one of the reasons that the Pike Committee cited Dr Kissinger, in contempt of Congress, for his refusal to comply with the Forty Committee subpoena. For greater detail, see the secret report of the


The US presence, argues Duchene, has meant that "Crisis Management" in NATO has been, and is likely to remain, bogus to the extent that the basic reality of the Atlantic alliance, America's protective power, has overshadowed all other factors in crisis situations. Francois Duchene, "NATO's ability to deal with developing crisis situations", in F.A.M. Alting Von Geusau (ed), *NATO and Security in the Seventies*, Sijthoff, Leiden, p.39.

As Duchene observed, the Atlantic Alliance is primarily a series of bilateral alliances pointing inwards like the spheres of a wheel towards the US at the hub. Duchene, *loc. cit.*, p.33.


The majority of West European States, after the June 1967 War, isolated themselves further from the US position in the region. Their stance on the Arab-Israeli problem clashed with Washington's. Moreover, US officials now saw the southern flank as an essential component in maintaining and improving America's strategic posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. But, more in relation to the Middle East than NATO defence. The European States avoided a clash with their superpower ally by skilfully avoiding major commitments in the region.


76 See Chapter 4.

77 For a detailed analysis with documentation on Goodpaster's support for the Athens military, see I. Zighdis, Gia Ti Demokratia Kai Tìn Kypro (For Democracy and Cyprus), Papazisi, Athens, 1975, pp.162-191. Also G. Asoura, I Ellada Kato Apo Tìn Kyriarxìa Ton E.P.A. Kai Tòu NATO (Greece Under the Sovereignty of the United States and NATO), Khronos, Athens, 1975, pp.55-56.


79 "Karamanlis Address to the Greek Nation on 15 August, 1974", BBC/SWB/ME/4680/C1, 17 August 1974. For complete text see Appendix (L).


81 "Speech by Greek Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Navros on Domestic and Foreign Affairs", Athens Armed Forces Radio, 5 October 1974; FBIS/DR/WE/Y2, 7 October 1974.


83 For a detailed analysis on this point see T. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences, Yale U.P., New Haven, 1966, pp.93-118.

84 In 1956 when Archbishop Makarios was deported to the Seychelles, Greek naval and air bases were closed to Turkish and British forces. Moreover in the anti-NATO atmosphere that the Cyprus problem had created in 1958 Greece refused to permit NATO nuclear bases on Greek soil and it withdrew its officers from the NATO base at Izmir. Overall, however, the Conservative administrations resumed co-operation and their pro-NATO posture after anti-alliance sentiment quietened down. See Couloumbis, op. cit., pp.118; Chapter 1.

85 In 1966, General de Gaulle was very discriminate in deciding upon a renouncement posture against the alliance. Harlan Cleveland (US Ambassador to NATO at the time) has disclosed that the General did not withdraw from a long list of NATO military activities which were especially important to the defence of France, notably the air defence system, the communications net, and the research and development section. NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain, Harper and Row, New York, 1970, pp.103.

It should be stressed that in 1974 none of Greece's Communist neighbours posed an immediate threat. Albania was totally isolated as the maverick "Maoist" communist State in Eastern Europe. Tito's Yugoslavia practised its neutralist non-alignment policy. Lastly, even the strongly pro-Moscow Bulgaria did not pose as a strategic menace. Soviet troops had been withdrawn from its territory since the mid 1960s. In the contest of East-West strategic assessment, Conservative elements from both the military and political world continued to pay lip service to Cold War doctrine.

Greece was wholly dependent on NATO countries for its military hardware and training. Moreover it takes usually 7-10 years to re-equip and re-train the armed forces of a country on an alternative weapons system. In the meantime during such a transformation phase capabilities are not usually at a high level of efficiency and readiness. The 1974 Cyprus developments had intensified the arms race between Greece and Turkey. Hence in order to improve Greece's eroded strategic position Karamanlis was placed in the invidious position of increasing his country's dependence on Western arms supplies. For comparison of the Greco-Turkish arms race, see Tables 2-6 and Figures 1-3 in Appendix (T).

The Times, 26 May 1978.

W.A. Knowlton, "Security in the Mediterranean: A NATO Perspective," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol.15, No.3, Fall 1977, pp.58-59; In 1978 when it became apparent to Greece that only Turkish forces came under its command, it prompted Greece to speed up the procedure for reintegration in NATO for fear that changes at Izmir could prejudice their rights in the Aegean.


Apogevmatini, 2 June 1975.


United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.49, 1950, p.134; since the 1974 Cyprus Crisis, the Aegean confrontation had become openly military. Turkey responded to the Greek move by creating a new army on the Aegean and moving extra naval and air units into the area.


The Times, 19 April 1976, see also exchange of letters between Bitsios and Kissinger in appendix (Q).

See Appendix (R) for outline of subsequent diplomatic agreement; UN Monthly Chronicle, September/October 1976.

Unlike the former civilian administrations, the regime of General Evren after it consolidated its position, decided to lift the veto Ankara had used to block the re-entry of Greece. The Turkish generals, lifted the veto under the formula worked out earlier with NATO's Supreme Commander, General Rogers: reintegrate Greece into the military structure now and negotiate the Aegean dispute later. Greek acceptance of the Rogers formula was qualified by the demand that upon reintegration Greece would be granted its former command and responsibility for all NATO sea and airspace in the Aegean. The final agreement, which was unanimously accepted in December 1980 by the NATO Defence Planning Committee, had three general provisions. Firstly, Greece would fully reintegrate its NADGE air defense network into the NATO system. Secondly, all members would accept Greek reentry, and until such time that Greece and Turkey can resolve the division of their command and control dispute, NATO's Southern Command would assume overall responsibility, including an eventual Turkish command at Izmir and a Greek command at Larissa. Thirdly, the status of US forces would be determined in an updated 1977 Defense Co-operation Agreement, which was initiated but not signed and included $700 million in US military assistance to Greece.


2 Ibid., p. 34-35.


5 Stern, loc. cit.

6 On 2 August, Undersecretary Sisco talked about Cyprus with representatives Brademas, Sarbanes, Yatron and Bafalis. At this session, Brademas, too, warned Sisco that the movement for a mandatory halt in US arms shipments and sales to Turkey was rapidly gaining strength. He asked whether a Congressional mandated cut-off might not be helpful to State in stimulating a resumption of negotiations between Greeks and Turks. Sisco replied that, while a nonbinding "Sense of Congress" resolution merely urging the withdrawal of Turkish troops "would not hurt", actual threats or mandatory punitive steps against the Turks would almost certainly be counter-productive. Frank and Weisband quoting from Executive Branch Consultations with Congress on Military Assistance to Turkey. White House Memo, Unpublished, March 1975, op. cit., p. 38; According to Birand, Brademas retorted to Kissinger, "If you want you can stop the Turks. Turkey has violated the agreement with the US by using the arms she bought from us in Cyprus. The Nixon era in this country is over. Now it is the era to adhere to the laws and give account to the Congress. We want an arms embargo to be imposed on Turkey until all the Turkish armed forces withdraw from Cyprus. If you don't do this the Congress will do it". Birand, loc. cit.

7 Ibid.


9 Frank and Weisband, op. cit., p. 35.


11 C. Hackett, "The Role of the US Congress and Greek-American Relations", Unpublished paper presented at Conference on

12 S. Solarz, "The Arms Embargo and the Prospects for a Cyprus Settlement", in NATO, Turkey and United States Interests, American Foreign Policy Institute, Washington, 1978, p.46. Two provisions of US Law - section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act - prescribe the permissible uses of US military assistance to foreign countries. If these conditions or purposes are violated, an immediate aid cutoff is required. "Controversy over US Military Aid to Turkey", Congressional Digest, Vol.54, No.4, April 1975, p.107.

13 The proposed amendment to the funding bill had been made by Representative Rosenthal. In his capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, he had just completed a study mission to Athens and Ankara from 8-15 September. In his report Rosenthal presented a list of policy options and recommendations. He strongly advocated that a suspension of military supplies to Turkey, by Congressional action, would provide a significant restraint on Turkey and would correspondingly reassure the Greek government of American support for it. "Cyprus - 1974", Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, 93 Congress 2nd Session, 1974.

14 Kissinger and Ford in an effort to counter Rosenthal's amendment persuaded Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and House Republican leader John Rhodes to introduce an amendment to the Rosenthal amendment that would permit the administration to continue aid and credits to Turkey, providing that the President believed that Turkey was making efforts to reach a settlement. Their amendment was adopted by the Senate Appropriations Committee. The Senate, however, adopted Eagleton's floor amendment (by 57 votes to 20) which, without naming Turkey, prohibited any funds for military aid to a country deploying United States' weapons in violation of the law limiting their use to self defence. Frank and Weisband, op. cit., p.39.


16 The move signalled a victory for the rank and file members over the two chambers' own foreign policy elites. Under the rules, when House and Senate amendments are somewhat different, a committee may produce a compromise that differs from both House and Senate versions. Frank and Weisband, op.cit., p.40.


Ford pointed out that "should the measure become law, the United States would have lost the ability to play a useful role in this dispute and would in effect have to withdraw from the negotiations". "Second Veto of Continuing Appropriations Resolution", The President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res. 1163 Without His Approval Because of Provisions Concerning Military Assistance to Turkey, 17 October 1974. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol.10, No.42, 1974, pp.1316-1317.


Interview with Congressional Staff Member of Senate Foreign Affairs' Committee, Washington, 10 December 1979.

"Interview with Bulent Ecevit, RPP Chairman General and Former Prime Minister", Hurriyet, 20 April 1975, FBIS/TWE/No.708, 1975, pp.82.


The collapse was foreseen as imminent by the Turkish media. See editorial Cumhuriyet, 10 September 1974, FBIS/TWE/No.569, 1974, p.52-53; Editorial by Abdi Ipekci on the anticipated breakup of RPP-NSP Coalition: "As the forced marriage comes to an end", Milliyet, 11 September 1974, FBIS/TWE/No.566, 1974, pp.19-20.


Birand, op.cit.

Ibid.


In the national power structure of Turkey, the National Security Council (NSC) ranks above the government. Every government in Ankara knows that besides Parliament which may or may not pass its bills, it is also responsible to a higher authority, the NSC. Deliberations in this body are held jointly by army officers and politicians. H. Bechtold, "Dualism in Turkish Politics", Ausenpolitik, April 1977, pp.410-415.
In the meantime, the Ford administration contributed large amounts of funds to the international relief efforts of the ICRC ($4.2 million) and the UNHCR (20.8 million which represented about 47 percent of the total amount received). "Crisis on Cyprus: 1975 One Year After the Invasion", A Staff Report Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary US Senate 94th Congress, 1st Session, 20 July 1975, p.41.

Interview with US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff member, Washington, 10 December 1979.


Congress, while considering the Foreign Assistance Act for fiscal 1975, included in the amended terms of the Foreign Assistance Act passed in late December and signed by the President on 31 December, language authorizing the President to suspend the cutoff, at his discretion, until 5 February, Congressional Digest, op.cit., p.107. The moves for the suspension had been as follows: On 4 December while introducing the foreign aid bill, the Senate agreed to delay the cutoff to mid-February. The House of Representatives, however, refused, and on 10 December the embargo was in effect. Because of the Senate and House versions of the foreign aid bill-taking opposite positions on delaying the cutoff, the bill went to conference. A compromise concluded allowed the resumption of aid until 5 February. Frank and Weisband, op.cit., p.41.

A. Birand, "Diyet", 2nd instalment, Milliyet, 7 December 1979.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Stern, op.cit., p.142.


Ibid.

Stern, op.cit., p.142.

Abshire, op.cit., p.58.

While traditional House baronies saw their power reduced by some procedural changes, not all of it devolved to the speaker. Much of it filtered down to the subcommittee chairman or was simply scattered among individual members. M. Green, et al. Who Runs Congress?, Bantam, New York, October 1979, p.105.

Abshire, op.cit., p.58.
Kissinger was appalled by the decision which he considered "the single most senseless, calamitous thing I have ever seen," *Newsweek*, 24 February 1975; commenting on the embargo Schlesinger summed it up as "an extraordinary event. The only parallel one can think of, however imprecise, was the decision by John Foster Dulles in 1956 to cancel aid to Egypt for the Aswan Dam. It is that politically dramatic a decision on the part of the US Government." See interview, *Newsweek*, 17 March 1975; as a warning the Turkish Foreign Ministry proposed the closure of two bases. However, the Turkish president rejected it saying it was unnecessary at that stage. In the meantime Kissinger advised Esenbel, "don't show strong reaction; you will make our position difficult. We will make another attempt soon," *Milliyet*, 7 December 1979.


Taken in their entirety, US intelligence facilities in Turkey were extremely valuable. America used these facilities to monitor Soviet compliance with the ABM agreement and needed their renewed availability in maintaining Soviet compliance with the pending SALT II agreement. R.F. Ellsworth (Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs) "Strategic Importance of Turkey", *Outlook* (Ankara) No.518, 17 November 1976; *Greece and Turkey: Some military implications related to NATO and the Middle East*, a study prepared by John Collins, for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on International Relations, Washington D.C., 28 February 1975.


See "negotiations deadlock" in Chapter 7.

See *United States - Turkish Defence Co-Operation Agreement*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 15 September 1976.

loc cit., pp.25-35

Interview with Congressional Staff member of Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington D.C., 10 December 1979.

During the 1976 Presidential campaign Carter stated "In my judgment, we would be negligent of the moral issues and courting longer-range disaster if we fail to couple the improvement in relations with Turkey with increased fair progress on the Cyprus issue", quoted by Mary Costello, in "Eastern Mediterranean Security", Editorial Research Reports, 7 July 1978, p.487.

Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1978 (Part i), Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on International Relations, 1977, pp.277-8.


See Cumhuriyet, Tse No. 1276, 31 July 1978.

statement of Cyrus Vance, in The Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services US Senate, 28 June 1978, esp pp.4-5.


loc cit., p.15.


Lewis op cit., pp.18-20; To increase Turkey's room for manoeuvre Ecevit increased contacts with the Soviet Union. During a visit to Ankara at the end of April 1978 the Soviet army chief of general staff, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, hinted that the Soviet Union might be prepared to supply arms to Turkey. From 21 to 25 June 1978 Ecevit visited Moscow. The key factor behind his visit was to signal to Washington the changing relationship between Turkey and the US. "Turkey's Ecevit Visits the USSR", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol xxx, No 26, 1978, pp.8-9; "Cyprys : Moscows bit power game", Events, 14 July 1978.
According to a leading member of the "Greek lobby", the administration was able to secure the numbers more easily in the Senate, by exchanging promises to pro embargo Senators on issues other than the arms embargo. On the other hand, the Greek lobby leadership in the House of Representatives was very determined to retain the embargo. The key members being John Brademas, Edward Kennedy and Benjamin Rosenthal. Interview with Eugene Rossides (former Assistant Secretary to the Treasury) and President of the American-Hellenic Institute, Washington D.C. December 1979.

The Times, 4 August 1978; Kathimerini, 3 August 1978; the comments were made for domestic political consumption as Karamanlis, had decided in 1978, to now support the repeal of the embargo. For greater detail see chapter 5.

For outline of plan see Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank, Senate delegation Report 3-13 April 1980, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 1980, pp.44-46.

Text of Speech by President Kyprianou on UN Special session on disarmament 24 May 1978.

Firstly, as the Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandhis, pointed out, the emergence of the US plan was badly timed, being sandwiched between the meeting of the General Assembly and that of the Security Council concerning the Cyprus problem. Secondly, the plan which had started as "top secret" was leaked to the press creating an atmosphere that would eventually torpedo it. Thirdly, the Cyprus government had made it clear on many occasions that it would only accept initiatives on behalf of countries as long as such initiatives were taken under the auspices of the secretary-general. Therefore the Nimetz plan was a "non-document", as it was not politically expedient for Kyprianou, to be seen accepting strictly a Western set of proposals. Moreover, unlike his predecessor Makarios, who had undisputed power, Kyprianou lacked the kind of popular support that would permit him to make any unilateral decision over the American proposals, without at the same time undermining his power-base, which depended upon the support of the anti-Western EDEK (Socialist party) and AKEL (Communist party).
CHAPTER 7 - END NOTES

1 Over the years his Beatitude had acquired international prestige as a Statesman within the Commonwealth group, by skillfully cultivating leaders of key nations such as India, United Kingdom, Zambia, Kenya.


3 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, (CHOGM), Kingston, 6 May 1975, Communique, Par. 10 and 11.

4 Ibid. The designated member countries were: Australia, Britain, Guyana, India, Kenya, Malta, Nigeria and Zambia.

5 Ibid.

6 Commonwealth Secretariat, Record and Background Papers of the Meeting of Senior Commonwealth Officials held in Canberra, 26-28 May 1976, p.38.


8 Testimony of British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan before The Select Committee on Cyprus, 19 February 1976, Report from the Select Committee on Cyprus Session 1975-1976, HMSO, London, April 1976, p.61. See Appendix (N).

9 P. Kellner and C. Hitchens, Callaghan: The Road to Number Ten, Cassell, London, 1976, pp.138-139. They cite the decision by Callaghan to allow the Turkish Cypriot refugees sheltering in British base areas to travel north to Turkey, or the part of Cyprus under Turkish control despite Greek Cypriot fears, as an example of the British Secretary taking his lead from the American Secretary, who at the time was under great congressional pressure.

10 Interview with high level British diplomat, January 1980. A number of British policymakers were very apprehensive of the State Department's intervention and guidance in dealing with the problem. Many blamed the lack of political will on Callaghan for permitting the Americans virtually to take over policy - especially since in many instances British evaluations clashed with American assessments.

11 It was stressed that before the British would undertake an initiative they would want a report from their man on the spot on the chances and possibilities. Interview with a senior Greek Cypriot political leader with many years experience in dealing with British diplomats, Nicosia, February 1980.

12 Select Committee on Cyprus, op. cit.

14 The Secretary-General visited the Island in July 1975, in an exploratory capacity. While he received assurances by both sides that a visit by his committee would receive total co-operation, there was a reluctance in some Commonwealth quarters to having any intervention by the Commonwealth while meetings between the two communities were conducted. Dickie, loc cit., p.56.

15 Commonwealth Secretariat Record and Background, op. cit., p.39.

16 Ibid.

17 Lusaka CHOGM Communiqué, 7 August 1979, para. 27 to 31.


20 The Rhodesia issue had regional implications for the following Commonwealth countries; Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. The above bloc contributed to the constant liaison with the UN, and the Organization of African Unity and other organizations concerned with the problem.

21 Commonwealth Heads of Government Ministerial Statement by Mr Malcolm Fraser, Foreign Affairs Backgrounder, No.201, 29 August 1979, p.1.

22 Lusaka CHOGM Communiqué, 7 August 1979, para. 31.


24 While Cyprus was still a British colony Makarios attended the Bandung Conference and presented the Cyprus independence cause, as an observer, to the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries which had committed themselves to anti-colonialism. In 1961 he attended the founding meeting of the Non-aligned in Belgrade and thus Cyprus became one of the 26 founding members. His Heatitude had also built close friendships with the founding fathers, Tito, Nasser and Nehru.

25 The group had also played a less important role in the 1964 crisis. See Chapter 1.

Quoted in Cyprus and the Non-Aligned Movement, *ibid.*, p.5.

It held a number of meetings with Makarios, the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, and representatives of both Cypriot communities during the course of which a text of a resolution was drafted.


The Ministerial Session of the Non-Aligned in Havana, 23 March 1975, declared that: "any unilateral action like the one by the Turkish Community is regrettable and should not prejudice the final political settlement". Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, ed., *Non-Aligned Conferences: Basic Documents 1971-1975*, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, Colombo, 1976, pp. 127-38.

The Yugoslav and Romanian Presidents, Tito and Ceausescu, had promised in 1976 that they would support Turkish participation either as a guest or as an observer at the Colombo Conference. In the end, however, Romania (a member of the Warsaw pact) was admitted, whereas Turkey was excluded from the Conference. "Is Turkey's Attitude Toward Third World Countries Changing?" *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (Zurich), JPRS/T/WE/, 14 October 1976.


The resolution called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the foreign armed forces. It also considered that the UN should take all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, measures under chapter VII of the chapter.


Interview with Rauf Denktash, in Nicosia, 1 February 1980.

From their position they asserted that the Greek Cypriots had diverted the attention of the international community from the essentials of the problem, by striving to postpone the issue and gain time, so as to try again to internationalize the conflict and bring the issue before international bodies not fully informed on all the intricacies of the problem. *Turkish Foreign Policy Report*, No.7, 1 October 1975, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, p.9.

See Speech by the President of the Republic Mr Spyros Kyprianou, 28 February 1978, PIO, Nicosia, press release No.1, 28 February 1978.


This point was constantly highlighted in my interviews with Senior State Department Officials, Washington, December 1979.

Interviews with Senior Cyprus Foreign Ministry officials and Government leaders, Nicosia, January-February 1980.

Denktash indicated that he did not consent to hold talks even under the shadow of such a resolution. UN Secretary-General's Report to the General Assembly on developments concerning the resumption of the Inter-communal talks, 3 April 1980, quoted in Cyprus Bulletin, 12 April 1980.

This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1.


Periodic border incidents have complicated further the tangled relationship. The latest clash occurred on 1 June 1980, in the eastern border area of Hakkari when Iraqi soldiers killed 10 Turks. For greater detail see translated text of reports by Ankara Domestic Service, in Turkish) DR/WE/T1-T2, 5 June 1980.

The Syrian leadership has not forgotten that during its internal crisis in 1957, Turkey came close to a military intervention.

Paragraph 4 of Resolution on the Cyprus Question and the Cause of the Turkish Modern Community of Cyprus, Copy of text supplied by Turkish mission to the United Nations, New York.

For example Dr Vassos Lyssarides, the leader of the Greek Cypriot Socialist Party EDEK, and vice-president of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, has built close links with militant Arab States.

Mr Zakhariya 'Abd ar-Rahim, the PLO representative in Cyprus, in April 1979, stated: "We feel we have the same tragedy as Cyprus and we support Cyprus in attaining its unity, national independence and the return of the refugees to their homes and properties". Interview with Libyan publication Al-Jamahir, quoted in Cyprus Mail, 1 April 1979.

It should be pointed out that in comparison with the long-established PLO-Cyprus government relations, Denktash did not offer to authorize the PLO to open an office in the Turkish north until 14 May 1979; Middle East Economic Digest, 18 May 1979.

Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish DR/WE/P.T1, 10 May 1979; Middle East Economic Digest, 11 May 1979.
Denktash attended the extraordinary Islamic Conference in Islamabad between 27 and 28 January 1980, after which he stated that the Turkish Cypriot community would find itself in the Islamic world. *News Bulletin*, PIO (Turkish Cypriot) Nicosia, 30 January 1980.

The Economist, 24 May 1980. At the conference Turkish policy over Cyprus was opposed by the PLO representative Mr Abu Mayzer and other members from the "rejectionist front", led by Syria, Algeria and South Yemen. As a result the political solution proposal put forward by the Turkish side for a "federal state system was rejected. *Milliyet*, 30 May 1980, quoted in *Cyprus Bulletin*, 14 June 1980, p.2. Commenting on the resolution of Cyprus issued in a communique at the end of the conference, a Greek Cypriot government spokesman noted that the resolution was very objective. *I Simerinti*, 28 May 1980.

See Table 1 in Appendix (V).

Text of address by Jean Sauvagnargues, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, UN General Assembly, 23 September 1974.

*Cyprus Mail*, 18 February 1977.

At the time both had treaties of association with the EED. On 1 January 1981, Greece became the tenth member of the EEC.

The relationship is analysed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

The Commission represented 20 Nations of the Council of Europe including Turkey, Cyprus and Greece.

*The Times*, 3 November 1977.


As the respondent government, Turkey argued that Nicosia’s applications were inadmissible on the following ground: the applicants were not entitled to represent the Republic of Cyprus and accordingly had no standing before the Commission. The Turkish side reiterated that it was not allowed to make a similar application to the Commission about Greek Cypriot violations of human rights on the island. It also declared that, "Turkey cannot be required to accept the Greek Cypriot administration as applicant, since there is no authority which can properly require the Turkish Government to recognise against its will the legitimacy of a government which has usurped the powers of the State in violation of the Constitution of which Turkey is a guarantor." *Council of Europe: Cyprus against Turkey Report, op. cit.*, p.1, p.14; *The Times*, 5 August 1978.
Resolution DH(79) 1 adopted on 20 January 1979. By virtue of this resolution, the document was declassified on 31 August 1979. The report was classified for three years under a rule assuring secrecy for a period of time which the offending government is expected to redress the situation. *International Herald Tribune*, 1 September 1979.


Moves toward getting substantive negotiations under way were first put into motion by Kissinger at the NATO Foreign Ministerial Council meeting, in Brussels, on 12 December 1974. He managed to persuade the Greek and Turkish representatives Bitsios and Esenbel into giving him assurances that they would re-activate the talks. The American Secretary of State acted primarily to impress upon the US Congress which was building momentum for an arms embargo against Turkey, that tangible progress was being made. Kissinger's involvement is analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

Several meetings between Clerides and Denktash took place in Nicosia from 14 January 1975 to 7 February 1975, in the presence of the UN Secretary General's special representative Mr Louis Weckmann-Munoz, concerning the basis for the start of talks. For detailed account see UN Secretary General's Special Report on developments in Cyprus, UN Doc. S/11624, 18 February 1975.

Interview with former Greek-Cypriot negotiator, Nicosia, 5 February 1980.

Attention was drawn to this factor by Senior United Nations officials, during interviews in Nicosia, February 1980.

The duration of the Vienna meetings were as follows: 1st round, 28 April to 13 May 1975; 2nd, 5 to 9 June 1975; 3rd, 31 July to 2 August 1975; 4th, 8 to 10 september 1975 (held in New York); 5th, 17 to 21 February 1976.


At the time Makarios stated his reservations over the Turkish Cypriot stance: "A bizonal solution, in other words, a division of the island, is unacceptable. We offer a solution providing for several Turkish cantons. This in itself already constitutes a major concession to the Turks. Moreover, a bizonal settlement would mean the annexation of the Turkish part of the island by Turkey." *Interview with, Kronen-Zeitung*, (Vienna) 17 May 1975, translated in DR/WE/p.R3, 22 May 1975.
The decision by the Turkish Cypriot administration to hold a referendum at the same time that the 2nd Vienna talks were in session was perceived by the Greek Cypriots as a sign of Turkish intransigence. Conversely the Turkish Cypriot side made similar claims every time the Makarios administration took its case to international forums.


For complete text of Turkish Cypriot proposals, see M. Necati Münir Ertekün, _Intercommunal Talks and the Cyprus Problem_, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Nicosia, 1977, pp.108-110.

He added: "The Turkish proposals are so designed as to prejudice the solution of the Cyprus problem by compelling the Greek Cypriot side to accept not only the principle of a biregional federal state, but also the equal representation of the two communities, ignoring the fact that the Greek community constitutes 82%, whilst the Turkish community constitutes only 18%," _Cyprus Intercommunal Talks_, PIO, Nicosia, October 1979, pp.15-16.


Denktash had given an undertaking during the end of the third round to submit concrete and comprehensive proposals by the end of August. After his failure to put forward any proposals, the New York talks resulted in an impasse. text of Communiqué on Fourth Round of Talks by Conferees on Cyprus Issue, _ibid._, p.75.

Birand, Diyet, in _Milliyet_, 11 December 1979. The Brussels accord was agreed upon after Kissinger had persuaded Bitsios. The framework was an attempt to inject new impetus in order to get the intercommunal talks out of the stalemate of procedural arguments by re-starting the talks without prior conditions with a view of arriving at a package deal. For complete text of Brussels accord, see, Necati Munir Ertekun, _op. cit._, p.104.

"Proposals of the Turkish Cypriot Side on Various Aspects of the Cyprus Problem", in _Political documents: The proposals of the two communities on the various aspects of the Cyprus problem_, Nicosia, May 1976, pp.8-11.


Letter by the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Papadopoulos, to United Nations Special Representative in Cyprus, dated 22 April 1976, _ibid._, p.12.

In a speech in Klirou, 30 May 1976.
The meeting was largely due to the effective diplomacy of Perez de Cuellar. Prior to this a preliminary meeting between them took place in the presence of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus at which views were exchanged. On 9 January 1976 Denktash addressed a letter to Makarios in which he expressed his readiness to meet with the Archbishop. The Economist, 19 February 1976. For text of letter see Necati Munir Ertekun, op. cit., p.110.

For complete copy of guidelines, see Report of the Secretary-General Persuant to Para. 6 of Security Council Resolution 401 (1976) UN Doc. S/12323, 30 April 1977, p.2, para. 5. Territory was to be administered after discussion in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership, freedom of movement and settlement of property was to be discussed taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. Finally the powers and functions of the central government would be such as to safeguard the country's unity, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.


Makarios' interview with, I Kathimerini, 20 February 1977.


Ibid.

Loc cit.

Necati Munir Ertekun, op. cit., p.19.

On the constitutional structure provided inter alia that the territory of the Federal Republic, constitutes, a single and indivisible whole, and shall consist of the territories of the region. The state power of the Federal Republic shall be exercised throughout its territory on all persons therein. There shall be one sole citizenship for the whole of the Federal Republic. UN Doc. S/12323, op. cit.


UN Doc. S/6253, 26 March 1965, para. 121-123.
For Turkey's and the Turkish Cypriots rejection of the Plaza Report see UN Doc. S/6267, 2 April 1965, and UN Doc. S/6279, 9 April 1965.

Speech by Tassos Papadopoulos, representative of the Greek-Cypriot side at the inter-communal talks at the International Symposium of Journalists on the Cyprus Problem, Cyprus Journalist Union, Nicosia, 1978, p.128.

Interview with The Middle East, May 1980, p.11.

For complete text of agreement see appendix (U).

During their 19 May agreement, Kyprianou and Denktash had agreed that "priority" would be given to the question of the handing back of the Greek area of Famagusta known as Varosha. When the talks began, however, the Turkish Cypriots argued that Varosha was the fifth point and would be discussed fifth and only thereafter given priority. The Turkish side also insisted that before substantive talks could begin, the Greeks had to accept the "bizonal" nature of the island - without stating what the Turkish team meant by "bizonal". The term had been used in a loose way publicly, by the late Archbishop Makarios. The Economist, 30 June 1979; The Guardian, 16 August 1979; UN Chronicle, No. 8, September-October 1980, pp. 30-31.

See pp. 157-158.

Mr Denktash was branded publicly as intransigent and obstructive. The Guardian, 9 June 1980.

On 9 August 1980, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Hugo Gobbi in pursuance of the good offices mission secured an agreement that the talks would begin in Nicosia on 16 September 1980. Until August 1981, the negotiations have continued without leading to any new impasse so far. UN Chronicle, September-October 1980, pp. 30-31.
1. In the face of strong popular objections to the continued American military presence, the government has broken off the five month long negotiations with the Americans over the future of the four American bases (two near Athens, two in Crete) in Greece. The government has stipulated that the original 1953 agreement should be revised in a way that would help preserve the balance of power between Greece and Turkey and ensure the inviolability of Greek frontiers in the Aegean. Questions at issue in the talks included the extent of command and control of the Greek officer to be put in formal command of each base, and whether the bases should ever be used for purposes other than those connected with strictly Nato obligations. The Greek side was reported as making progress on all these issues, and especially on the key question of the ratio between US aid to Greece and that to Turkey, but in June the Greeks asked for a kind of bonus outside this agreed scale, of about $200 to $300 mn worth of sophisticated military equipment, as a condition for allowing the USA to go on using the bases. This request was turned down by the Americans, and it is hard to avoid the inference that it was made in the hope that they would: in other words, the government for electoral reasons was looking for an excuse to put the whole question into cold storage.


2. In the House of Representatives elections held on 24 May, 1981 Kyprianou's Democratic Party gained only 19.5% of the total vote, compared with 31.8% received by the conservative Democratic Rally, led by Mr Clerides and 32.7% by AKEL. In the elections held in the Turkish Cypriot sector, Denktash was re-elected President of the TFSC after he managed to win 51% of the vote. However, the pro-settlement Socialist Salvation and Republican Turkish parties doubled their numbers.

3. Ankara has drafted (and continues to draw up) most of the proposals of the Turkish Cypriots. At the Vienna talks in 1978, Mr Ecevits' constitutional expert Professor Soysal, made all the negotiating for the Turkish Cypriot side.
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Ackropolis
Anti
Apogeuvmatini
Avgi
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Epikaira
Kathimerini
Oikonomikos Takhidromos
Takhidromos
Rizospastis
Ta Nea
To Vima
Vradini

GREEK CYPRIO T

Agon
Dimocratiki Poreia
Eleutheri Kypros
Eleutheria
Kharavgi
Makhi
Oikones
Simerini
Ta Nea

TURKISH AND TURKISH CYPRIO T (through Translations Western Europe 1974-1981)

Cumhuriyet
Gunadin
Halkin Sesi (Turkish Cypriot)
Hurriyet
Milliyet
Turcumân
Yanki
Zaman (Turkish Cypriot)
APPENDIX A

No. 701 - Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne, 24 July 1923

1924 League of Nations — Treaty Series. 25

Article 18.

Turkey is released from all undertakings and obligations in regard to the Ottoman loans guaranteed on the Egyptian tribute, that is to say, the loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894. The annual payments made by Egypt for the service of these loans now forming part of the service of the Egyptian Public Debt, Egypt is freed from all other obligations relating to the Ottoman Public Debt.

Article 19.

Any questions arising from the recognition of the State of Egypt shall be settled by agreements to be negotiated subsequently in a manner to be determined later between the Powers concerned. The provisions of the present Treaty relating to territories detached from Turkey under the said Treaty will not apply to Egypt.

Article 20.

Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914.

Article 21.

Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.

Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality, in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish nationality.

It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government.

Article 22.

Without prejudice to the general stipulations of Article 27, Turkey hereby recognises the definite abolition of all rights and privileges whatsoever which she enjoyed in Libya under the Treaty (*) of Lausanne of the 18th October, 1912, and the instruments connected therewith.


No. 701 [12299] c 3

(i) The deposit of the instrument of ratification took place by Greece, 11 February 1924; by Turkey, 31 March 1924; by the British Empire, Italy and Japan, 6 August 1924.

APPENDIX B

DISCUSSION ON CYPRUS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION: SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1958

Introduction

The Cyprus question was discussed in the North Atlantic Council at the time of the statement of policy on Cyprus (Cmd. 455) made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on June 19, 1958. Further discussions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation took place before the Prime Minister's visits to Athens and Ankara for discussions with the Governments of Greece and Turkey, which led up to the further statement of policy issued by Her Majesty's Government on August 15.

2. The Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Monsieur Spaak, after visiting Athens on September 23, put forward to a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on September 24 a paper (Document No. 1) containing certain proposals on the question of Cyprus. Monsieur Spaak also proposed that an early conference should be held, between the three Governments with the participation of representatives of the two main Cypriot communities and of some neutral party, on the basis of his paper.

3. The North Atlantic Council at a number of subsequent meetings has considered the proposal for a conference in the light of Her Majesty's Government's statements of policy and Monsieur Spaak's paper. The discussions were concerned with the terms of reference and agenda of a conference and also with its composition and the place where it should be held.

4. In the course of the discussions the two following papers were drafted for consideration by the Council and discussed by them:

(a) a minute (Document No. II) recording the main points established in the Council's discussions and the attitudes of the three Governments principally concerned;

(b) a covering letter (Document No. III) for the Secretary-General to send in transmitting the minute (Document No. II) to the Permanent Representatives of Member Governments.

5. These documents were substantially agreed by the North Atlantic Council. Document No. II still contains two alternative paragraphs.

6. The United Kingdom Permanent Representative on the Council indicated that Her Majesty's Government could accept either of these alternatives.

7. It will be seen from the documents that Her Majesty's Government agreed that

(a) Her Majesty's Government's policy should be discussed at a conference.

(b) Modifications or additions to the policy agreed upon by the three Governments at the conference could be incorporated.

(c) The discussions of a final solution should also appear on the Agenda of the conference.

(d) Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives might participate, and if Archbishop Makarios attended as representing the Greek Cypriots, Her Majesty's Government would not object.

6. If the conference were held in Paris, the Secretary-General could at his discretion report to the North Atlantic Council, or convene the Council to consider the position reached; nevertheless, if it was desired that a representative of the Government of the United States, and of another Member Government, should be present as well as the Secretary-General, Her Majesty's Government would not object.

7. On October 29 the Greek Government confirmed through their Permanent Representative that in the present circumstances they abandoned the attempt to convene the conference.

A conference will take place as soon as possible between the British, Greek and Turkish Governments and representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The Secretary-General of NATO will offer his good offices.

The document which could serve as a basis for discussion would be as follows:

**Part I**

The Cypriot problem must be settled. This must be done for the good of the inhabitants and in order to restore understanding and friendship between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey.

2. It would obviously be highly desirable for the solution reached to settle the problems raised once and for all. This, unfortunately, seems impossible because of the passions roused by events and because of the political positions recently taken up.

3. It is therefore necessary to make up our minds to finding a provisional solution.

4. But to be acceptable and valid this provisional solution must not prejudge in any way the definitive solution which must be reached later. It is necessary, therefore, that in the application of the provisional solution nothing should favour or hinder either directly or indirectly any of the solutions hitherto envisaged and this without any exception.

5. A provisional solution must, at the same time, mark important progress towards the possibility of the Cypriot community governing itself and must include all necessary guarantees to protect the minority.

6. A provisional solution must equally safeguard the bases and installations necessary for Great Britain to fulfil its international obligations.

**Part II**

The principles on which the new institutions should be elaborated are as follows:

1. Creation of a House of Representatives for each of the two communities having competence in all communal affairs (education, religion, justice, everything to do with the personal status of the individual).

2. Creation of a representative institution having competence over questions of joint interest (internal affairs).

3. A governmental council presided over by the Governor with a Greek Cypriot majority having competence to deal with internal affairs.

4. Foreign affairs, defence and security will remain within the competence of the Governor.

5. The Governor will be British. He will be assisted in his executive task by the Presidents of the two Houses of Representatives.

6. Either of the Representative Houses will have the right to submit to an impartial tribunal any measure which it considers to be discriminatory or unfavourable to one or other of the communities.

7. The provisional solution will be for seven years.
The Council, in its examination of the problem of Cyprus, heard statements from the representatives of the countries directly concerned.

It took note:

(1) that the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey accepted the idea of calling a conference at an early date; and that these three Governments looked with favour on the presence at this conference of representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities of the Island.

(2) the United Kingdom Government desired that its plan should be examined, and agreed that it could be defined or modified on points over which agreement was reached at the conference;

(3) the Greek Government, for its part, desired that the suggestions put forward by the Secretary-General of NATO on 24th September, 1958, should be discussed.

(4) Finally, the Turkish Government asked that the British Plan should be taken into consideration but agreed that any amendment could be put forward at the conference, and moreover intended itself to present such amendments.

(5) The Council notes that while these statements of position each present special points of view, they are neither contradictory nor irreconcilable;

(6) it also notes that the three Governments are in agreement that, apart from the discussions proposed above in regard to a temporary solution of the problem of Cyprus, the discussion of a final solution should also appear on the agenda of the conference;

(7) it therefore recommends that the United Kingdom Government should take the initiative in calling a conference in the conditions indicated above;

(8) it further suggests that the conference be held in Paris and that the Secretary-General of NATO should, as representing the Organisation as a whole, extend his good offices to the parties directly concerned.

[Alternative paragraph 8:

(8) it further suggests that the Secretary-General of NATO, assisted by one of the Permanent Representatives on the North Atlantic Council, and a Representative of the Government of the United States, should attend the conference in order to help the participants by lending their good offices.]

Mr. Ambassador,

I beg to enclose, addressed to your Government, the text of a document relating to the calling of a conference having for its purpose the discussion of the Cyprus problem, the terms of which have been approved by the North Atlantic Council.

In the course of the discussions which preceded the approval of this document, the Permanent Representatives of the three countries directly concerned clearly expressed their desire that, in addition to the discussion of a provisional solution, a free and fair discussion should also take place to seek a final solution of the Cyprus problem.

The Government of Turkey indicated for its part that the discussion of a final solution could not, however, constitute a prior condition for the discussion of the provisional solution.

The British Government for its part made it clear that, in discussing the elements of a provisional solution of this problem, it would be appropriate to assess these in relation to their effect upon the final solution.

Finally, the Turkish Government emphasised that it could accept discussion of a provisional solution only on the condition that this did not prejudice the final solution.

In transmitting this document to you, I felt it my duty to draw your attention to the above declarations.
The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day’s date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

APPENDIX D

Treaty of Alliance

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,

I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them,

II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defence and to consult together on the problems raised by that defence.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE III

For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE IV

Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty.

The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE V

The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE VI

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature.

The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of the present Treaty renders them necessary.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

No. I

I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

II. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.
III. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as well as other immunities and privileges and any other military and technical questions concerning the organisation and operation of the Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance.

IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of officers charged with the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

No. II

ARTICLE I

A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognisance of any question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied countries shall agree to submit to it.

ARTICLE II

The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. In a matter of urgency the Committee of Ministers can be convened in special session by its Chairman at the request of one of the members of the Alliance.

Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.

ARTICLE III

The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special.

The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary for the fulfilment of its task.

ARTICLE IV

The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee's ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account of the Headquarters' activities.

APPENDIX E

Text of 'Operation Hermes' coup d'état plan

Source: S. Papageorgiou, Makarios: Poreia Dia Piros Kai Sidirou (Makarios: Route through Fire and Steel), Ladias, Athens, 1976.
"Operation Hermes"

(Οώδημικ ἀλλαγή ἐκ τῶν προφορικῶν διαταγῶν).

ά.ά. 6
ά.ά.ά. 2
ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΙΣ ΚΑΤΑΔΡΟΜΩΝ
27 Ιαν. 1970

ΔΙΑΤΑΓΗ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΩΝ 3
Χάρτης: ΛΕΙΚΟΣΙΑ — ΚΥΠΡΟΣ
1. ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΕΙΣ

α. Εξώτερες Δυνάμεις (Εσωτερικάς παράγων).

(1) Ο έσωτερικός παράγων λόγω τῆς επιχειρησιακής ανάπτυξης εκ τῶν πλέον τοῦ ΜΕΤΟΠΟΥ, ΚΙΝΕῖΤΑΙ σπαραμοδικάς πρὸς ἐξαπατήσων ύποπτηρίζεσις τόσο εκ τοῦ εσωτερικοῦ ἔνοχο καί εκ τοῦ ἔσωτερικοῦ, εἰς διαφόρων παραγόντων.

(2) Ἐκ πλειορροφησιν διεπιπτεύσεις ἠ διαφάνεια διαφόρων ἀρχών πλήγμα τοῦ ΜΕΤΟΠΟΥ αὐτό, ὑπολογίζεται διαθέτουσα ἀρτίης ὑποτευχησία τῆς ἐσωτερικῆς, κατὰ τὰς πρώτας ἡμέρας τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως ἐπί περιορισμένων χρόνων.

6. Φίλοι Δυνάμεις

(1) Δυνάμεις Καταδρομῶν θὰ προελάσουν ἀπὸ 282330 Μάτσου ἐν τῇ καταστάσει ΑΕΤΟΦΩΛΙΑ μὲ ταῖς ἀνατιθέμεναις ἀναπληροφορίες χειρών, καὶ ἐπικτήσεις καταλήψεως τοῦ ἀναπληρωτῆς.

(2) Διεπιπτεύσεις ΛΕΙΚΟΣΙΑΣ ύποδοθήσεις ἐπιχειρήσεως τῆς 18ου Τ.Π. ὡς σχέδιον Ἀρτέμις.

(3) Διαφάνεια ΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΙΑΣ ύποδοθήσεις ἐπιχειρήσεως τῆς 14ου Τ.Π. ὡς σχέδιον ΚΕΝΤΑΥΡΟΣ.

(4) Βεβαιώσεις Δευτεροβάθμιας ύποδοθήσεις ἐπιχειρήσεως τῆς 20 Τ.Π. ὡς σχέδιον ΠΑΡΘΕΝΩΝ.

(5) Νόσος ΛΕΙΚΟΣΙΑΣ ύποδοθήσεις ἐπιχειρήσεως τῆς 24ου Τ.Π. ὡς σχέδιον ΑΣΤΡΑΠΗ.

γ. Συμπληρωματικοί Δυνάμεις.

(1) 21 ΕΛΑΝ
(2) 2 (Δύο) Διαπραγμ. Διακανόνες
(4) 719 Δ.Γ.Μ.

2. ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΗ

Η Μ.Κ. προελάπσεως απὸ ΑΕΤΟΦΩΛΙΑ τῆς 282330 Μάτσου 1970 πρὸς ΛΕΙΚΟΣΙΑΝ, νὰ ἀποστέλῃ δια τής διαφάνειας ἀρτίης τῆς Πόλεως ΛΕΙΚΟΣΙΑΣ καὶ νὰ ἀπογορεύῃ πάνω ἀξιώματα καὶ ἀξιώματα ἀρχηγίας καὶ πολιτών. Τελική ἐπιδίωξις ἀπὸ τοῦ διατάξεις τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἀπὸ ἀρχηγίας ἀρχηγίας αὐτῆς.

3. ΕΚΤΕΛΕΣΙΣ

α. Ἱδέα Ενεργείας.
'Operation Hermes'

1. ΑΕΡΟΛΙΜΑΝΗ, ΜΟΝΗ ΚΥΚΚΟΥ, ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟΝ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ καλύπτει το στρατηγικό κινήμα Mεταφοράς Πιλοτής Μαρίνας Πάφου, Πλατεία Μεταξά.

2. ΑΕΡΟΔΡΟΜΙΚΟ ΜΕΓΑΒO, ΑΡΧΗΓΕΙΟΝ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΑΣ, ΡΙΚ.

(1) 'Ελεγμός.
   (α) Προέκλεισα από 282330 Ματου 1970 επί τόν καταυπόστασιν:

   1. ΑΕΡΟΛΙΜΑΝΗ, ΜΟΝΗ ΚΥΚΚΟΥ, ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟΝ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ καλύπτει το στρατηγικό κινήμα μεταφοράς Μαρίνας Παπά για την επιστολή Πάφου, Πλατεία Μεταξά.

   2. ΑΕΡΟΔΡΟΜΙΚΟ ΜΕΓΑΒΟ, ΑΡΧΗΓΕΙΟΝ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΑΣ, ΡΙΚ.

(2) Υποστήριξη
   (α) Εσωτερικά παράγοντα (ΜΕΤΩΠΟ)
(1) "Απαντές οι υποστηρίζουσας τήν ενέργειαν απαραίτητος θα έγινε
to αυτής.

(2) Θα αναγκασόταν η ενέργειαν ως αναγκαία πρόος της επικρατούσης αναπαραίτητης.

(3) Ισο Δάχος
   Νά προελάχισα από 282330 Ματου εν τη κατευθύνειν: ΑΕΡΟΛΙΜΑΝΗ — ΜΟΝΗ ΚΥΚΚΟΥ, νά καταλάβει τα συγκροτήματα των κτιρίων, με τελική επιπλέουση του απλούτου έλεγχον αυτών.

(γ) Ισο Δάχος
   Νά προελάχισα εν τη κατευθύνει: ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟΝ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ καλύπτει το στρατηγικό κινήμα των κτιρίων, με τελική επιπλέουση του απλούτου έλεγχον αυτών.

(β) Δάχος Ισο
   Νά προελάχισα από 282330 Ματου εν τη κατευθύνει: ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΚΟΣ ΣΤΑΘΜΟΣ ΠΥΛΗΣ ΠΑΦΟΥ — ΠΛΑΤΕΙΑ ΜΕΤΑΞΑ — ΑΡΧΗ ΠΛΗ- ΚΤΡΙΣΜΟΥ — ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΚΟΣ ΣΤΑΘΜΟΣ ΟΔΟΥ ΛΑΡΝΑΚΟΣ νά καταλάβει τα συγκροτήματα των κτιρίων, με τελική επιπλέουση του απλούτου έλεγχον αυτών.
'Operation Hermes'

(1) Άγνωστο

Να καταλήξει αμφέστη τον Απρίλιο του 1989 ΝΑΚΙΟΙ ΜΕΡΗΣΜΟΙ — ΑΡΧΗΓΕΙΟΝ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΑΣ — ΡΙΚ, για την κατάτηρηση των συναρμολογήσεων των κυρίων με τη λήψη των άδειών τους, και την επιθετική επεμβάσεις των άδειων τους.

(2) Άγνωστο

Περιλαμβάνει ενεργειες 1ου και 2ου Λόγου.

(3) Άγνωστο

Περιλαμβάνει ενεργειες 3ου και 4ου Λόγου.

(4) Άγνωστο

21 Ε.Α.Ν.

Τα Ελληνικά άρματα 21 Ε.Α.Ν. να εκτελέσουν περιπολίες ενάντια των κυρίων συναρμολογήσεων, ξεκινώντας από την έναρξη της έργασίας.

(5) Άγνωστο

2 (Δύο) Διαμορφία: Διαμέσωσεις

Να εγκαθιδρυθούν ενεργείες ΟΤΣ (ΣΤΣ) και να ζησουν όπως των αδειών τους, λήψη των αδειών της τηλεφωνικής επικοινωνίας, επικοινωνίας, διαμέσωσεις. Να μεταφέρουν δικαίωμα συναγερμών των τηλεφωνικών.

(6) Άγνωστο

'Εφεδρική

4ος Άγνωστος: Π.Μ. Κατά κανόνα να είναι έτοιμης και εποπτείς των αδειών των έως της Α.Γ.Δ.

(7) Άγνωστο

2ος Άγνωστος: Θέτει στην έργασία της Α.Γ.Δ. αποκλειστικός χώρος.

(8) Άγνωστο

Οι Άγνωστοι κατά την κίνηση να λάβουν μέτρα ασφαλείας.

4. ΔΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΗ ΜΕΡΙΜΝΗ

α. Τηλεφωνική Αναστολή

(1) 'Εφεδρική

(2) Τρόφιμα — Καύσιμα

1. Μετά την άνοιξη της περιπολίας έμφαση για κατανάλωση της 28ης Ματιά.

2. Απόθεμα για τους διερχόμενους των αδειών τους.

(2) Πυροπαχηματική

Τα προβλεπόμενα μετά των σκυλιών

(γ) Τηλεφωνική

'Εφεδρική

Όλα τα διαφόρως αποκλειστικά και επικοινωνιών.

(2) Πυροπαχηματική

α. Κατανάλωση των αδειών Α.Γ.Δ.

1. 1ος Άγνωστος: Π.Μ. 5 αδειών Γ.Χ.

2. 2ος Άγνωστος: Π.Μ. 5 αδειών Γ.Χ.

3. 3ος Άγνωστος: Π.Μ. 5 αδειών Γ.Χ.

4. 4ος Άγνωστος: Π.Μ. 5 αδειών Γ.Χ.

5. 5ος Άγνωστος: Π.Μ. 5 αδειών Γ.Χ.

6. 6ος Άγνωστος: Π.Μ. 5 αδειών Γ.Χ.

(3) Απόκλειστική Α.Γ.Δ. διαπιστώσεις διά ενότοτε Π.Μ. και λεγόμενα ημερήσιων.

(4) Απόκλειστική Α.Γ.Δ. διαπιστώσεις διά άναγκας Π.Μ. και λεγόμενα ημερήσιων.

5. ΔΙΑΒΙΒΑΣΕΙΣ

α. Επικοινωνίες

(1) 'Ασφάλεια μέσα

(2) Στιγμή διαμέσωσης μέχρι επικοινωνίας μετόχου.

(5) Αριθμ. ΣΥΓ. ΣΗΣ διά της συνθήματικής λέξης (ΠΕΛΑΡΓΟΣ).

(6) Ενώσωμα μέσα

Να χρησιμοποιηθούν στην τηλεφωνική συμφωνών OΤΕ (ΣΤΣ).

6. Σταθμοι Διοικητικοί

(1) Σ.Δ. 'Επικοινωνία ΑΡΧΗΓΕΙΟΝ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΑΣ

(2) Σ.Δ. Άγνωστον Περιπολικήν

ΔΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΗς
Parliament and the Government with their persistent policy, views and activities have pushed the country into anarchy, fratricide and social and economic unrest, made the public lose hope of reaching the contemporary civilization level, a target set by Ataturk, failed to realize the reforms stipulated in the Constitution (1961), and put the future of the Republic of Turkey in grave danger.

The solutions which would do away with the sorrow and hopelessness felt by the Turkish Nation and its armed forces, over this grave situation should be considered by Parliament with an understanding above Party politics. It is imperative that a strong and respected government be formed under democratic principles to stop anarchy, take up the reforms demanded in the constitution with a Kemalist understanding and apply those reforms demanded in the constitution with a Kemalist understanding and apply those reforms.

If this is not promptly undertaken the Turkish Armed Forces will use its legal rights and seize power directly to accomplish its duty of protecting and supervising the Turkish Republic.

signed Memduh Tagmac, Chief of General Staff
Faruk Guler, Commander of Land Forces
Celal Eyiceoglu, Commander of Naval Forces
Muhsin Batur, Commander of Air Forces

[the military members of the National Security Council]

'Top Secret' Greek Foreign Ministry Memorandum on Erim correspondence to the Greek Prime Minister.

Appendix G

*ΑΚΡΩΣ ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΟΝ*

'Εξ ἀσφαλος πηγῆς πληροφοροῦμαι ὅτι ὁ Πρωθυπουργὸς τῆς Τουρκίας κ. Νικάτ Έριμ ἀπέστειλε ἐπιστολήν πρὸς τὸν Πρωθυ-
πουργὸν τῆς 'Ελλάδος κ. Παπαδόπουλον διὰ τῆς ὁποίας καλεῖται ὁ κ. Παπαδόπουλος ὅπως ἔξασκησε πίσω ὑπὲρ τῆς Κυπριακῆς Κυ-
βερνήσεως ὁπότε διὰ ἀυτῆ νὰ παραχωρήσῃ πρὸς τοὺς Τ/Κ δι-
καιώματα κατά τη περιοδότερα τῶν μειονοτικῶν.

'Αφοῦ δ' ὁ κ. Νικάτ Έριμ ἐπέξεγε ὅτι τώρα εἶναι καίρος ὅπως
dιευθετηθοῦν ἐν πνεύματι συνεργασίας τὰ διάφορα προβλήματα τὰ ἀπαγολοῦνται τὰ δύο γιὰ τῇ προσθήκῃ ὅτι ἂν ὁ κ. Πα-
παδόπουλος ὅπως ἔξασκησε πίσω ὑπὲρ τῆς Κυπριακῆς Κυ-
βερνήσεως ὁπότε διὰ ἀυτῆ νὰ παραχωρήσῃ πρὸς τοὺς Τ/Κ δι-
καιώματα κατά τη περιοδότερα τῶν μειονοτικῶν.

Κατὰ τὸν κ. Ντενκτάς ἡ χρησιμοποιηθεῖσα γλώσσα ἐπὶ μάλ-
λον κυατρώπα.

'Ο κ. Ντενκτάς δὲν ἔλειξε ή ή εἰσήγησας τὸν κ. Έριμ ὅτι
gίνη ἄπειρη ὑπὸ τῆς 'Ελλάδος διὰς ἀυτῆ ἄρκῃ ἀπρίτη τῆς Ἀρ-
χιεπισκόπου ὧν ὁ πρὸς θὰ παραπέμψῃ τὸ θέμια "εἰς τὰς Ἐλληνι-
κικὰς καλλιάνες".

Γίνεται ἀντιληπτὸν ὅτι ἡ Ἐλληνική Κυβέρνησις δὲν ἔδωκε ἀκόμη ἀπάντησιν.

(ὑπογραφή)
Γενικός Διευθυντής
Υπουργείου Εσωτερικῶν

14.5.1971

Κοιν.: Πρόεδρον τῆς Βουλῆς τῶν Ἀντιπροσώπων
Υπουργόν παρὰ τῷ Προέδρῳ
Γενικόν Διευθυντήν 'Υπουργείου 'Εξωτερικῶν.

'Secret' letter of Ambassador Panagiotacos to Makarios.

APPENDIX I

Greek Note to Cyprus of 11 February 1972.

Athens Armed Forces Radio in Greek 21.00 GMT 14.2.72

"Full text" of Note:

(1) The Greek Government, having established that a considerable quantity of arms from Czechoslovakia had been imported, hastened from the very beginning to protest to the Cyprus Government. It recalled that Greece has special responsibilities in this respect for the security of Cyprus, both from the national and the international aspects.

(2) The Greek Government, fully conscious of the serious dangers caused by the aforesaid action of the Cyprus Government and aiming to avert these dangers as far as possible, submitted to the President of the Cyprus Republic the urgent recommendation to hand over the imported arms into the custody of the National Guard. The President of the Republic refused to accept this recommendation.

(3) The President of the Republic again absolutely rejected a second identical and categorical demarche by the Greek Government.

(4) Following this, the Greek Government, having in mind the special security conditions in Cyprus and the responsibility of the UN Security Council on this question, asks the Cyprus Government to place the imported arms under the control and the custody of the UN Peace Force immediately.

(5) The acute crisis affecting Greek Cypriot Hellenism is well known. It is necessary that recourse to violence be averted. The distribution of the imported arms for use in the internal Cyprus front would be a nationally disastrous action because it would inevitably lead to fratricide and destruction.

(6) Cypriot Hellenism is part of the nation. This must not be forgotten, just as it must not be forgotten that Athens remains the national centre. Despite this, the Greek Government does not intend at this moment to intervene in the internal affairs of Greek Cypriot Hellenism. It appeals to the prudence and patriotism of all responsible people in Cyprus.

(7) The Greek Government believes that the time has come for the formation of a government of national unity which will include all the nationalist parties of Greek Cypriot Hellenism, a government which would be the result of the free initiative of the political and church leaders. The people in this government should be of well-known prudence, of independent opinion, free from intolerance and capable of working for the restoration of the disrupted national unity.

(8) Such a development would make possible the harmonious co-operation and mutual confidence between Athens and Nicosia. Greece cannot accept any responsibility, in either the international or the national fields, for activities which are alien to it.

(9) The present Note, handed to the President of the Republic by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Panayiotakos, is not addressed only to the Cyprus Government but also to all the Cypriot people. Consequently, it is not a secret document and it can be released for publication.

Source: BBC/SWB/ME/3916/C/1, 16 February 1972.
APPENDIX J

Letter from Archbishop Makarios to President Gizikis.

MAKARIOS BLAMES GREEK OFFICERS FOR SITUATION IN CYPRUS

Nicosia APOGEYMATINI in Greek 6 Jul 74 p 8 M

(Text) This morning President Makarios' letter to General Gizikis was made public. The full text of the letter is as follows:

Mr President:

It is with profound grief that I have to set out to you certain inadmissible situations and events in Cyprus for which I regard the Greek Government as responsible.

Since the clandestine arrival of General Grivas in Cyprus in September 1971, rumors have been circulating and there have been reliable indications that he came to Cyprus at the urging and with the encouragement of certain circles in Athens. In any case, it is certain that from the first days of his arrival here, Grivas came into touch with officers from Greece serving in the National Guard from whom he received help and support in his effort to set up an unlawful organization and allegedly to fight for enosis. And he established the criminal EOKA-B organization, which has become the cause and source of many sufferings for Cyprus. The activity of this organization, which has committed political murders and many other crimes under a patriotic mantle, advancing enosis slogans, is well known. The National Guard, which is staffed and controlled by Greek officers, has from the outset been the main supplier of men and material to EOKA-B, the members and supporters of which gave themselves the nice ringing title of "Enosists" and the "Enosis Camp."

I have many times asked myself why an unlawful and nationally harmful organization which is creating divisions and discords, cleaving rifts in our internal front, and leading the Greek Cypriot people to civil strife, is supported by Greek officers. And I have also many times wondered whether such support has the approval of the Greek Government. I have done a great deal of thinking and made many hypothetical assumptions in order to find a logical reply to my questions. No reply, under any prerequisites and assumptions, could be based on logic. However, the Greek officers' support for EOKA-B constitutes an undeniable reality. The National Guard camps in various areas of the island and nearby sites are smeared with slogans in favor of Grivas and EOKA-B and also with slogans against the Cyprus Government and particularly myself. In the National Guard camps propaganda by Greek officers in favor of EOKA-B is often undisguised. It is also known, and an undeniable fact, that the opposition Cyprus press, which supports the criminal activity of EOKA-B and which has its sources of financing in Athens, receives guidance and line from those in charge of the Second General Staff Office and the branch of the Greek Central Intelligence Service in Cyprus.

It is true that whenever I have complained to the Greek Government about the attitude and conduct of certain officers, I have received the reply that I ought not hesitate to report the officers by name and state the specific charges against them so that they could be recalled from Cyprus. I did this only in one instance. This is an unpleasant task for me. Moreover this evil cannot be remedied in this way. What is important is to uproot and prevent the evil and not merely to face its consequences.

I am sorry to say, Mr President, that the root of the evil is very deep, reaching as far as Athens.

It is from there that the tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the Greek Cypriot people are tasting today, is being fed and maintained and helped to grow and spread. In order to be absolutely clear, I say that cadres of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activity of the EOKA-B terrorist organization. This also explains the involvement of Greek officers of the National Guard in illegal activities, conspiracy and other inadmissible situations. The guilt of circles of the military regime is proved by documents which were found recently in the possession of leading cadres of EOKA-B. Plenty of money was sent from the National Center for the maintenance of the organization and directives were given concerning the leadership after the death of Grivas and the recall of Major Karousos, who had come to Cyprus with him, and generally everything was directed from Athens. The genuineness of the documents cannot be questioned because those which are typewritten have corrections made by hand and the handwriting of the writer is known. As evidence, I attach one such document.
Letter from Archbishop Makarios to President Gizikis.

I have always adhered to the principle and I have on many occasions stated that my cooperation with the Greek Government for the time being is, for me, a national duty. The national interest dictates harmonious and close cooperation between Athens and Nicosia. No matter which Government of Greece has been in power, it has been to me the government of the mother country and I had to cooperate with it. I cannot say that I have a special liking for military regimes, particularly in Greece, the birthplace and cradle of democracy. But even in this case I have not departed from my principle of cooperation. You realize, Mr President, the sad thoughts which have been preoccupying and tormenting me following the ascertainment that men of the Government of Greece are incessantly preparing conspiracies against me and, what is worse, are dividing the Greek Cypriot people and pushing them to catastrophe through civil strife. I have more than once so far felt, and some cases I have almost touched, a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence. For the sake of national candidates on the list, I kept silent. Even the evil spirit which possessed the three defrocked Cypriot bishops, who have caused a major crisis in the church, emanated from Athens. However, I said nothing in this connection. I am wondering what the object of all this is. I would have continued to keep silent about the responsibility and role of the Greek Government in the present drama of Cyprus if I had been the only one to suffer on the set. But covering things up and keeping silent is not permissible when the entire Greek Cypriot people are suffering. When Greek officers of the National Guard, at the urging of Athens, support EOKA-B in its criminal activity, which includes political murders and is generally aimed at the dissolution of the state.

Great is the responsibility of the Greek Government in the effort to abolish the status of Cyprus as a state. The Cyprus state should be dissolved only in the event of enosis. However, as long as enosis is not feasible it is imperative that the status of Cyprus as a state be strengthened. By its whole attitude toward the National Guard issue, the Greek Government has been following a policy calculated to abolish the Cyprus state.

A few months ago the National Guard General Staff, consisting of Greek officers, submitted to the Cyprus Government for approval a list of candidates for cadet reserve officers who would attend a special school and then serve as officers during their military service. Some 37 of the candidates on the list submitted were not approved by the Council of Ministers. The General Staff was informed of this in writing. Despite this, following instructions from Athens, the General Staff did not take the decision of the Council of Ministers, which under the law has the absolute right to appoint National Guard officers, at all into account. Acting arbitrarily, the general staff trampled upon laws, showed contempt for the decision of the Cyprus Government and enrolled the candidates who had not been approved in the officers training school.

I regard this attitude of the National Guard General Staff, which is controlled by the Greek Government, as absolutely inadmissible. The National Guard is an organ of the Cyprus state and should be controlled by it and not from Athens. The theory about a common area of defense between Greece and Cyprus has its emotional aspect. In reality, however, the position is different. The National Guard, with its present composition and staffing, has deviated from its aim and has become a hatching place of illegality, a center of conspiracies against the state and a source of supply for EOKA-B. It suffices to say that during the recently stepped up terrorist activity of EOKA-B, National Guard vehicles transported arms and moved members of the organization who were about to be arrested to safety. The absolute responsibility for this improper conduct of the National Guard rests with Greek officers, some of whom are involved up to their necks and participants in the activity of EOKA-B. And the National Center is not free from responsibility in this connection. The Greek Government could, by a mere gesture, put an end to this regrettable situation. The National Center could order the termination of violence and terrorism by EOKA-B because it is from Athens that the organization derives the means for its maintenance and its strength, as confirmed by written evidence and...
Letter from Archbishop Makarios to President Gizikis.

The Greek Government, however, has failed to do so. As an indication of the inadmissible situation, I note here in passing that in Athens also slogans were recently written against me and in favor of EOKA-B.

On the walls of churches and other buildings, including the building of the Cyprus Embassy. The Greek Government, even though it knew the culprits, did not seek to arrest and punish anybody, thus tolerating propaganda in favor of EOKA-B.

I have a lot to say, Mr President, but I do not think that I should say anymore. In conclusion I convey that the Greek-officiated National Guard, the plight of which has shaken the Cypriot people's confidence in it, will be restructured on a new basis. I have reduced military service so that the National Guard ceiling may be reduced and the extent of the evil may be limited. It may be observed that the reduction of the strength of the National Guard due to the shortening of the military service does not render it incapable of carrying out its mission in case of national danger. For reasons which I do not wish to set out here I do not share this view. And I would ask that the officers from Greece staffing the National Guard be recalled. Their remaining in the National Guard and commanding the force would be harmful to relations between Athens and Nicosia. I would, however, be happy if you were to send to Cyprus about 100 officers as instructors and military advisers to help in the reorganization and restructuring of the armed forces of Cyprus. I hope, in the meantime, that instructions have been given to EOKA-B to end its activities, even though, as long as this organization is not definitely dissolved, a new wave of violence and murders cannot be ruled out.

I am sorry, Mr President, that I have found it necessary to say many unpleasant things in order to give a broad outline with the language of open frankness of the long-existing deplorable situation in Cyprus. This is, however, necessitated by the national interest which has always guided all my actions.

I do not desire interruption of my cooperation with the Greek Government. But it should be borne in mind that I am not an appointed prefect or locum tenens of the Greek Government in Cyprus but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism, and I demand appropriate conduct by the national center toward me.

The content of this letter is not confidential.

With cordial wishes.

APPENDIX K

Turkish Prime Minister On Military Operation 20 July 1974.

Turkish Prime Minister on Military Operation

(a) Ankara home service, 0700 GMT, 20 July 1974.

Text of report, including record of ERTV interview.

The Turkish Prime Minister said that the Turkish armed forces had received the command to conduct a military operation. He stated: "The large number of Turkish troops are moving towards Cyprus for peace, not for war." Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit issued the following statement to the press at the Prime Minister's Office, at 0920 GMT.

[Recorded] The operation by Turkey for peace and brotherhood in Cyprus began in the early hours of the morning. The Turkish armed forces, which have added glory after glory to the roll of honour of our great nation through their exemplary heroism and humanity throughout our history, started the operation after making every necessary preparation and taking into consideration every contingency.

A large number of Turkish troops are already immediately in Cyprus, doing their duty on Cyprus soil. Other units are moving towards Cyprus. The Turkish armed forces will not only demonstrate force, but demonstrate it in Cyprus not for war but for peace. They are in Cyprus to bring peace, not to end an end to a brutal invasion. Throughout the operation launched as dawn, they will liberate both the Turks and the Greek Cypriots from the darkness of the new despotic regime and bring them into the light.

The recent Greek operation in Cyprus was not only a coup, but a war. The aim was under its shadow to destroy the very foundations of the independent Cypriot state, and it trampled underfoot the agreements which constitute the legal basis of the Cypriot Republic. Turkey's action amounts to an exercise of the authority and the discharge of a task which devolves upon it as a state responsible for the independence, territorial integrity and constitutional system of Cyprus in accordance with international agreements as a guarantor state.

Turkey tested all other available remedies in vain before launching the operation. As is known, Turkey made attempts at a solution of all the problems between Turkey and Greece. Through negotiation and tried to achieve Turkish-Greek co-operation in all areas, but this was not reciprocated.

The unbalance of power created in Cyprus through brute force and unlawful means will be eliminated as a result of this operation. It is then, and only then, that Turkey will agree to negotiate on the Cyprus issue with those who respond not to justice but only to force.

May God bless the heroic Turkish armed forces, which have gone to Cyprus as liberators not only for the Turks but also for the Greek Cypriots, who have been deprived of their freedom and security of life, at the hands of their invading kinmen, as well as all the people of the island and the glorious Turkish nation.

Source: BBC/SWB/ME/4657/C/1, 22 July 1974.
APPENDIX L

Karamanlis Address to the Greek Nation 15 August 1974.

Fellow Greeks, the virtue of democracy is truth. The democratic people who decide their own destiny and form the State in a climate of free opinion, have a clear perception of the true facts of a given situation. My role is to present to you a clear perception of the situation we face.

You are aware of the conditions under which I assumed the responsibility of Government, just as I myself was aware of the awesome difficulties and sacrifices one has to undertake. Nevertheless, I accepted that responsibility because it is not merely my historical duty to do so. I was being called upon to act.

Indeed, I assumed this serious, and urgent, task on the basis of a situation that had already been created. You will all remember that situation since it unfolded in two phases... and one, moreover, that is not easily erased from a nation's memory. On 20th July the dictatorship attempted the senseless coup in Cyprus. The Turks were quick to take advantage of that mistake, and on the 20th of the month they invaded the island and stand in strength.

The resistance by the National Guard during the first two days was admirable. But the hard-pressed national forces could not be reinforced from Greece. As a result, they were finally unable to repel the invaders. Whereupon the men in Athens who were responsible for the situation were forced to bow to the tragic developments. On 22nd July they agreed to a cease-fire and shortly thereafter they accepted the invitation to take part in the Geneva conference.

My Government, which was sworn in on 24th July, was from the very first captive of the accomplished facts of this situation. It had no choice but to conduct the battle in the diplomatic sector. It did so, vigorously and methodically, and succeeded in swaying world opinion to the side of the Greek positions.

That swing was felt like a blow by Turkey. Succumbing to the powerful temptation to exploit the opportunity handed to her by the extinct regime, she began a series of illegal and illegal actions. She was, in violation of the international law, notably the resolution of the Security Council, that the very decisions she herself had signed in Geneva and that were passed in those infamous acts with the tolerance of those who should and could have checked her.

These infauses reached a climax in the last two days. Turkey put forward, in the form of an ultimatum, a plan for Cyprus— a plan that wasitionally, morally and legally, impossible in light of the Geneva settlement and an imposed attack on the military island.

The only reason for this flagrant Turkish action was assumed worldwide proportion that for itself, but also because some governments should be apprised with Violence, necessity with rectitude? Should we, too, resort to the law of the jungle?

Fellow Greeks, the policy I have pursued in the face of this situation is compatible neither with my character nor my history. It was, however, made mandatory by imperative national necessity, and it was incumbent upon me to have the fortitude to do what had to be done according to the dictates of that historic moment.

Armed opposition to the Turks in Cyprus was made impossible by reason of distance and also by reason of the accomplished facts I mentioned, and it could not be attempted without the risk of weakening the defence of Greece itself.

At this point I wish to declare categorically that the defensive capability of Greece is throughout the land-absolute. Greece is, and will continue to be, invulnerable to any foreign aggression.

Our immediate action to Turkey was, of course, a matter of political necessity. The Security Council and the Council condemned Turkey. He brought the great powers face to face with their responsibilities. I ordered our withdrawal from the military alliance of NATO and other action has been taken, and it being taken, which at the present moment cannot be disclosed.

These first measures have by no means exhausted the Government's efforts. The struggle will continue and new will be made of every expendable preserved by the nation.

Fellow Greeks, I am appreciative of the self-control and understanding with which you have confronted the critical events of the past week. It is in the political maturity of the people and the vigour of the armed forces that I see my optimism for the future. With courage, concord and resolution, we shall weather these difficult times.

You may rest assured that as we meet the legacy of wounds that have been inherited from the civil and recent wars, we will assure the power to correct the injustices to which she has subjected. And in the better and more lasting we shall lay the foundations for our national life.

Thank you.
Statements by the U.S. State Department following the change of Government in Cyprus and Greece, 24 July 1974.

Following are statements read to news correspondents on July 24 by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, together with the text of a message sent that day by Secretary Kissinger to George Mavros, Foreign Minister of the Hellenic Republic of Greece.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENTS

I have two announcements to make.

The first concerns Cyprus: The United States is conducting its relations with Mr. [Glafcos] Clerides, who, according to the Cyprus Constitution, has the right to act as President under certain circumstances.

And the other statement concerns Prime Minister [Constantine] Karamanlis' return to Athens: We welcome the new government and look forward to working with it bilaterally and in the NATO framework.

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER TO FOREIGN MINISTER MAVROS OF GREECE

Press release 616 dated July 25

JULY 24, 1974.

DEAR MR. MINISTER: I wish to extend my warmest congratulations to you as Foreign Minister of Greece. It is indeed a special pleasure for me to be able to extend best wishes to a valued friend of the United States as you assume your difficult duties at this initial period. I want to assure you that you will have my fullest support in your efforts to reach an early peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem.

I look forward to working closely with you in maintaining the close and friendly relations which have traditionally existed between the peoples of the United States and Greece.

Warm Regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

APPENDIX N

CONCLUSION

66. The tenor of the evidence given by the Foreign Secretary was to the effect that circumstances had so changed that the importance of Cyprus to Britain was no longer the same as it was in 1960 when the Treaty of Guarantee was signed. However Your Committee consider that Cyprus still matters to Britain. It is not only that her geographical position is strategically important. It is not only that she is a fellow member of the Commonwealth with close ties with Britain. These factors are important enough. What really matters is that Cyprus is a test of Britain's standing in the world. A country's true greatness should not be measured by its military might or its economic wealth. It should be measured by its standards of justice, integrity and humanity, and by the way it protects the weak. The Government's policy and the policy of some other Governments to Cyprus raises questions about the credibility and authority of the UN and the sanctity of international treaties and law.

67. Your Committee's task is done. It will now be for the House to ensure that Britain carries out her practical and moral obligations to all the people of Cyprus. Parliament has always been jealous to protect the rights of individuals. Cyprus is not just a country. It is made up of human beings whose rights have been trampled underfoot. The Foreign Secretary quoted Bismarck to the effect that "the strong are weak because of their scruples". He would do well to heed wiser words than those of Bismarck. "Let our strength be the law of justice; for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth".

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. There should be no delay in reappointing Select Committees, nor any attempt to restrict the powers normally given to them.

2. The decision of the Turkish Government not to put their side of the case directly is to be regretted, as is their decision not to allow Your Committee to carry out their appointed tasks in the North of Cyprus.

3. Britain had a legal right, a moral obligation, and the military capacity to intervene in Cyprus during July and August 1974. She did not intervene for reasons which the Government refuses to give.

4. Her Majesty's Government should raise with the members of the EEC the need for an early solution of the constitutional problems in Cyprus and invite early consideration of this issue in the European Parliament.

5. A further initiative on Cyprus should be made at the coming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

6. Britain should urge that all further progress in Turkey's developing relationship with the EEC should be withheld until an agreed solution of the Cyprus problem is arrived at.

7. The British Government must seek to ensure the implementation of Resolution 3395 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which calls on all parties to undertake urgent measures to facilitate the voluntary return of all refugees to their homes in safety and to settle all other aspects of the refugee problem.

8. The decision by the Foreign Secretary to move Turkish Cypriot refugees from the Sovereign Base Area was an error of judgment.

9. A thorough impartial investigation should be held into the fate of missing persons.

10. The British Government should give full support to World Bank proposals in relation to Cyprus, should hold discussions with the Cyprus Government about the provision of capital aid for development projects, and should initiate discussions in the Commonwealth on a programme of Commonwealth reconstruction aid.

11. The British Government failed to cope adequately with the problem of Cypriot refugees coming to the United Kingdom in 1974.

12. A permanent unit should be established under the authority of the Cabinet Office to coordinate and direct Government action in relation to refugees arriving unexpectedly as the result of sudden events in their own countries.

13. The Home Office should be more compassionate than hitherto over their treatment of Cypriot refugees.

14. The Sovereign Base Areas cannot be handed over to NATO or to any individual member of NATO.

15. Every effort should be made to show that the fears of British subjects with dual nationality and Greek sounding names that the British Government is adopting dual standards are groundless.

16. Her Majesty's Government should maintain diplomatic pressure on Turkey to allow British citizens the rights of freedom of travel accorded under the Treaty of Establishment.

17. Without accepting legal responsibility for the damage caused in the unique case of Cyprus the British Government should pay a lump sum to every family whose claim is registered with and approved by the British High Commission; such a sum should relate solely to those with claims for loss of personal property and possessions which cannot be recovered through normal insurance policies.

18. The Government should provide a sum not exceeding £25,000 to the British High Commission to be allocated, in consultation with the United Kingdom Citizens Association, to those British residents suffering real hardship.

19. The decision to end the supply of British food rations to Anzio Camp should be rescinded, an assurance should be given that the camp will remain open as long as it is needed, and a scale of contributions to be made by those employed on the base should be drawn up between the Sovereign Base Area authorities and the Anzio Camp Refugee Committee.

Greek men and women of Cyprus,

I have promised and I now renew my promise most categorically, that the Greek government will do its duty towards the Greeks of Cyprus. The fulfilment of this sacred duty is not an easy task. The mistakes which have been made by all sides have created a dramatic situation on the island.

The senseless coup of July 15th, has changed the drama to a national tragedy, for it has given to our enemies the pretext for invading Cyprus.

With its hands tied the newly established government of Greece was called upon to solve this problem in its international dimensions. But now it's time to search for or try to ascribe responsibilities. Now it's time for a national struggle. The whole nation has wholeheartedly undertaken to carry out this struggle by all means. The Greeks of Cyprus are requested to show unreserved mobilisation as well as confidence, prudence and hope.

A disaster may sometimes become the starting point for the renaissance of a nation. It's my belief that in our case this phenomenon may well come true.

At this crucial moment endurance as well as determination to face the numerous dangers facing us are necessary.

Greeks of Cyprus,

Let one idea, one word throw its life-giving power into our hearts and spirits. One word with its sacred meaning: “Unity”; spiritual unity of all who belong to Hellenism. It is only in this way that the suffering Republic of Cyprus may gain again its integrity, independence and happiness.


CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS,
Prime Minister.

APPENDIX P

Statement of principles to guide future US-Greek defense cooperation
initiated at Washington on 15 April 1976 by Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitri Bitsios.

1. The Governments of the United States of America and Greece will complete as soon
as possible a new defense cooperation agreement to replace the 1953 United States-Greek
military facilities agreement and other related agreements. The United States Govern-
ment will submit this Agreement to Congress for approval.

2. The new Agreement will be designed to modernize the United States-Greek de-
fense relationship reflecting the traditionally close association between the United States
and Greece and the mutuality of their defense interests in the North Atlantic Al-
liance.

3. This new Agreement will define the status and set forth the terms for operations
of military installations in Greece where United States personnel are present. It will
be similar to the United States-Turkish Agreement and will embody, inter alia, the
following principles:

(A) Each installation will be a Greek military installation under a Greek com-
mander.

(B) The installations shall serve only purposes authorized by the Government of
Greece. Their activities shall be carried out on the basis of mutually agreed programs.

(C) There shall be participation of Greek personnel up to 50% of the total strength
required for agreed joint technical operations and related maintenance activities and
services of the facilities and there shall be provisions for the training of such personnel
for this purpose.

(D) All intelligence information including raw data produced by the installations shall
be shared fully by the two Governments according to mutually agreed procedures. A
joint use plan for the United States forces communications system in Greece shall be
agreed upon.

(E) The Agreement shall remain in effect for four years and there shall be provisions
for the termination thereof before its expiration, as well as for its renewal.

(F) Within this framework there shall be annexes to this Agreement covering each
major installation (Nea Makri, Souda Bay, Iraklion), the United States element at the
Hellenikon Greek Air Force Base, as well as annexes dealing with status of forces
(SOFA), and command and control.

(G) The annex covering Souda Bay will be a revision of the 1959 Souda Bay Agree-
ment. Meanwhile it is understood that United States operations at this airfield will
be in accordance with the 1959 Agreement.

(H) It is understood that, pending the conclusion of the new Agreement within a
reasonable time, United States operations now being conducted from facilities in
Greece, which serve mutual defense interests, will be allowed to continue.

4. As an integral part of the new defense cooperation agreement, provision will be
made for a four-year commitment to Greece of military assistance totaling 700 million
dollars, a part of which will be grant aid. This commitment will be designed to further
develop the defense preparedness of Greece and meet its defense needs in pursuit of
North Atlantic Alliance goals.

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1976.

APPENDIX Q

Exchange of letters between Kissinger and Bitsios.

Foreign Minister Bitsios' Letter, April 7

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you are aware, the signing of a new defense cooperation agreement between the United States and Turkey creates problems and raises serious apprehensions in Greece. In light of this development, I will want to discuss with you how we should deal with the status of American facilities in Greece.

Meanwhile, I would appreciate having your position on the United States attitude toward the resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly on the danger of a serious deterioration in the situation in the Aegean. I would also like to know in what way the United States Government envisions its agreement with Turkey as contributing to the achievement of a speedy and just solution to the Cyprus question in light of previous assurances that the United States would make a major effort to this effect.

I believe your responses to these questions will assist my Government in formulating its policy. I hope they will be adequate to dissipate our concern to the benefit of both our countries and the Western Alliance as a whole.

DIMITRI S. BITSIOS
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Greece

Secretary Kissinger's Letter, April 10

DEAR MR. MINISTER: Thank you for your letter of April 7 in which you posed some questions regarding United States policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. I welcome this opportunity to make our position clear with regard to these issues.

You have asked about our attitude toward the resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly in the Aegean area. In this regard I should like to reiterate our conviction that these disputes must be settled through peaceful procedures and that each side should avoid provocative actions. We have previously stated our belief that neither side should seek a military solution to these disputes. This remains United States policy. Therefore the United States would actively and unequivocally oppose either side's seeking a military solution and will make a major effort to prevent such a course of action.

I should like to re-emphasize, with regard to Cyprus, that the United States remains fully committed to the objective of an early and just settlement of this issue. As I said in my United Nations address, the present dividing lines in Cyprus cannot be permanent. There must be just territorial arrangements. We intend to contribute actively in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem that will preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

With regard to the defense relationship between Greece and the United States, I believe it would be useful if you could come to Washington to discuss this issue in detail. I would welcome an opportunity to discuss with you other subjects of mutual interest as well. At that time we could agree on the framework of a new defense cooperation agreement between the United States and Greece that would benefit both of our countries and contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

GREECE-TURKEY: AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATION OF AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF ISSUE*
[Done at Berne, November 11, 1976]

Berne Agreement on Continental Shelf

Following is the full text of the ten-point agreement reached in Berne between Greece and Turkey on the future procedural treatment of the Aegean continental shelf issue (see page 1). The agreement was signed in Berne on 11 November 1976 and released simultaneously in Athens and Ankara on 20 November:

1) Both parties agree that negotiations be sincere, detailed and conducted in good faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on mutual consent regarding the delimitation of the Continental Shelf.

2) Both parties agree that these negotiations should, due to their nature, be strictly confidential.

3) Both parties reserve their respective positions regarding the delimitation of the Continental Shelf.

4) Both parties undertake the obligation not to use the details of this agreement and the proposals that each will make during the negotiations in any circumstance outside the context of the negotiations.

5) Both parties agree that no statements or leaks to the press should be made referring to the context of the negotiations unless they commonly agree to do so.

6) Both parties undertake to abstain from any initiative or act relating to the Continental Shelf of the Aegean Sea which might prejudice the negotiations.

7) Both parties undertake, as far as their bilateral relations are concerned, to abstain from any initiative or act which would tend to discredit the other party.

8) Both parties have agreed to study state practice and international rules on this subject with a view to deriving certain principles and practical criteria which could be of use in the delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the two countries.

9) A mixed commission will be set up to this end and will be composed of national representatives.

10) Both parties agree to adopt a gradual approach in the course of the negotiations ahead after consulting each other.


U.S. AND NATO MILITARY, POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORK FOR
THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION

APPENDIX S
### APPENDIX T

#### TABLE 1

**NATO DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1971-1977**

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#### TABLE 2

**% OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING 1972-1978**

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TABLE 3

US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY 1946-1977

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TABLE 4

ARMS TRANSFERS BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO NATO (GREECE, TURKEY) FROM 1966-1975 (% millions)

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<th>UK</th>
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TABLE 5

MILITARY BALANCE GREECE TURKEY NUMBERS IN ARMED FORCES FROM 1971-1978 (in thousands)

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Figure 1

Comparison of Defence Expenditures 1974-1977

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$millions

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$ per head

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$ per head
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% of GNP

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1. It was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979.

2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios - Denktas guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.

3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.

4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.

5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.

6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.

7. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.

8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.

9. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.

10. The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.

Source: Public Information Office, Nicosia
APPENDIX V

Recorded Voting Positions of EEC Member States on Cyprus Question in United Nations General Assembly

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Note: "Y" - Yes; "N" - No; "A" - Abstained

* Consideration of the "Cyprus Problem" was deferred in view of the recommencement of the intercommunal talks.

Total Recorded Vote on Cyprus Question in United Nations General Assembly

TABLE 7

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The chequered area represents the approximate location of the main Turkish enclave.

Other places with substantial sectors under Turkish control include Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol, Louroujina and Kokkina.
Map 2

Positions of the Turkish Invading Forces:

- On the 22nd of July 1974
- On the 30th of July 1974
- On the 8th of August 1974
- On the 16th of August 1974
- After the 16th of August 1974
- Boundaries of the British Bases