USE OF THESES

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MOBILIZING FOR TOTAL WAR:

THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST LEADERSHIP

AND

SOCIAL AND LABOUR PREREQUISITES

FOR INTENSIFYING

THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT, 1941-1945

A thesis

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

submitted to the Australian National University

by

Eleanor Iris Margarete Hancock

June 1988
I hereby attest that this thesis is my own original work and that all secondary material used has been cited,

Signed

Eleanor Iris Margarete Hancock

29 May 1988
This thesis examines the differing concepts of total war, and the resulting policies and strategies for their acceptance pursued from 1941 to 1945 by four prominent National Socialist leaders, Martin Bormann, Heinrich Himmler, Joseph Goebbels and Albert Speer. Speer and Goebbels suggested, and later historians have agreed, that the National Socialist government only reluctantly oriented its economic and social production to the war effort. A study of the policies and ideas of these men is important to see whether this was the case.

In examining the policies of the leadership, the thesis argues that previous interpretations of the National Socialist political system as either polycratic or monocratic have become too polarised. Instead it shows the existence at this level of both monocratic and polycratic elements of authority; but finally it emphasizes the importance of Hitler's authority for the pursuit of total war policies. It suggests the origins of this authority should be seen in the charismatic nature of his rule.

The changing policies which these men pursued both in their own areas of responsibility and in the wider German society indicate that they supported total war. There were differences in the emphasis on the policies to be followed. Early efforts to win more German workers to the armaments industry and the front in 1941-42 foundered on the availability of foreign labour and a failure to realize the seriousness of Germany's position. Speer and Goebbels supported a more economically efficient and rational use of resources and labour in the period 1943-44. Their efforts to make women liable for labour and to close inessential businesses met with some support from Hitler after Stalingrad, when a Committee of Three was set up to enforce the measures. This committee failed to make all the changes the two men thought necessary but their expectations were unrealistic. From 1943 on there was also support in the leadership for ideological mobilization and, eventually, paramilitary forces as a contribution to preventing defeat.

In addition to their emphasis on the economically rational use of resources, Goebbels and Speer were also aware of the need for burdens of the war to appear to be equally distributed. Himmler supported total war but his interpretation was more ideological. He
supported administrative simplification and sought to increase the role of the SS in economic production. By 1944 he was willing to abandon certain ideological precepts to prolong the life of the regime. Bormann's view of the need to orient the home front for the pursuit of the war was also more ideological; he also represented Hitler's opinions. For Goebbels in particular the policies of total war were to be combined with moves towards a compromise peace to allow the regime to remove itself from the war.

The thesis demonstrates that these members of the leadership did agree on the need for total war; in particular on the need for administrative simplification and greater use of labour reserves. Some of their policies foundered on opposition from Hitler; in other cases their expectations of what else could be achieved were unrealistic or foundered on other systemic constraints.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND GERMAN TERMS

Abt. - (Abteilung) - department.
Allgemeines Heeresamt - general army office.
Arbeitseinsatz - mobilization of labour.
av. - arbeitsverwendungsfähig - capable of work.
AWA - Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt - General armed forces office.
BA - Bundesarchiv - German Federal Archives, Koblenz.
BA MA - Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv - German Federal Military Archives, Freiburg.
Bereitsstellungsschein - certificate showing availability for call-up.
Chef. H.L. - Chef Heeresleitung - head of the army leadership.
DAF - Deutsche Arbeits Front - German Labour Front.
Deutsche Frauenwerk - German Women's Enterprise, Nazi-led federation of women's groups from 1934 to 1945.
Dreier Ausschuss - Committee of Three.
Ersatzheer - Replacement Army.
Fernschreiben - teleprint or teletype message.
Frauenschaft - Women's League of the NSDAP.
Führerhauptquartier - main Führer headquarters.
Führerinformation - submission.
g. - geheim - secret.
Gau - region, the main territorial division of the NSDAP.
Gauleiter - Nazi Party functionary responsible for administration in a province or federal state.
GBA - Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz - General plenipotentiary for employment.
GBK or GBTK - Generalbevollmächtigter für den Totalen Krieg - General plenipotentiary for total war.
GBV - Generalbevollmächtigter für den Reichsverwaltung - General plenipotentiary for Reich administration, Interior Minister.
GenGouv - Generalgouvernement - General Government, administration of unannexed sections of central occupied Poland.
Gestapo - Geheime Staats Polizei - Secret State Police.
gK - geheime Kommandosache - military top secret.
gR - geheime Reichssache - civilian top secret.
gv.H. - garnisonsverwendungsfähig Heimat - capable of serving in a garrison on the home front.
Gliederungen - Formations or divisions; the collective name for paramilitary groups and other sections, including the Hitler Youth.
Hauptamt - Main Office.
Hauptschule - high school.
Haushaltsabteilung - budget section or office.
HWaA - Heereswaffenamt - army weapons office.
Hoheitsträger - 'Bearer of sovereignty', title given to territorial chiefs in the PO.
HSSPF - Höhere SS- und Polizei Führer - Higher SS and Police Leaders.
IfZ - Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich.
Kampfzeit - literally period of struggle, period before the NSDAP came to power.
KDF - Kraft durch Freude - Strength through Joy, a DAF programme for worker recreation.
KL - Konzentrationslager - concentration camp.
Kreisleiter - district party leader.
KTB Chef Wi Amt - Kriegstagebuch Chef Wirtschaftsamt - war diary of the head of the armed forces' economic office.
Kristallnacht - night of broken glass, government sponsored anti-Semitic pogrom in November 1938.
kv. - kriegsverwendungsfähig - fit for active service.
Länder - province, administrative and government unit.
Leiter Pro. - Leiter Propaganda - head of the propaganda section.
Luftkriegsschädenausschuss - air war damage committee.
Machtergreifung - NSDAP seizure of power in 1933.
M-Beauftragten - Mobilisations-Beauftragten - mobilization deputies.
Ministerratsverordnung - ministerial council decree.
NL - Nachlass - private papers.
NSDAP - Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei - National Socialist (Nazi) German Workers' Party.
NSFO - Nationalsozialistische Führungsoffizier - National Socialist leadership officer in the armed forces.
NSKK - Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrer-Korps - National Socialist Automobile Corps.
NSKOV - Nationalsozialistische Kriegsopferversorgung - National Socialist war victims' welfare.
NS-Reichskriegerbund - National Socialist war veterans' league.
NSV - Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt - National Socialist welfare organization.
OKH - Oberkommando des Heeres - Supreme Command of the Army.
OKL - Oberkommando der Luftwaffe - Supreme Command of the Air Force.
OKM - Oberkommando der Marine - Supreme Command of the Navy.
OKW - Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - Supreme Command of the armed forces.
ORBs - Oberste Reichs Behörden - Supreme Reich authorities.
Ostministerium, or RMO - Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete - Reich ministry for the occupied Eastern territories.
OT - Organisation Todt - building organization involving state building administration and private firms.
Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer SS - Personal Staff of the Reichsführer of the SS.
Pg. - Parteigenosse - Party comrade; party member.
PK - Partei-Kanzlei - Party Chancellery.
PO - Politische Organisation - political organization; cadre for mobilizing NSDAP political activists.
Promi - Propaganda Ministerium - Propaganda Ministry.
RAD - Reichsarbeitsdienst - Reich Labour Service.
Reichspostdirektionen - Reich post management offices.
Reichsbevollmächtigte für den totalen Krieg - Reich plenipotentiary for total war.
RFSS - Reichsführer-SS - Reich leader of the SS.
RK - Reichskanzlei - Reich Chancellery.
RK - Reichskommissar - Reich commissioner; title of a Nazi chief of civilian administration in the occupied areas of Europe.
RKFDV - Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums - Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom.

RKO - Reichskommissariat Ostland - Reich commissariat Eastland; the territorial administrative area for the Baltic countries.

RKU - Reichskommissariat Ukraine - Reich commissariat Ukraine.

RL - Reichsleitung - Reich leadership; top level bureaucratic decisionmaking entity of NSDAP.

RM - Reichsmarks - German unit of currency.

RPA - Reichspropagandaämter - Reich propaganda offices.

RPL - Reichspropagandaleitung - propaganda leadership; NSDAP propaganda office.

RSHA - Reichssicherheitshauptamt - Reich Security or RSSHA Main Office.

RuSHA - Rasse- und Siedlungs-Hauptamt - Race and Settlement Main Office of the SS.

SA - Sturm Abteilung - Storm troop(s).

S-Betriebe - Sperr-Betriebe - blocked firms, in the occupied territories whose employees were protected from transport to Germany

Scheinarbeit - illusory employment, nominal employment designed to prevent the employee from being called on for actual labour.

Schlüsselkräfte - key workers, protected from call up because of their importance to the war effort.

Schnellbrief - priority letter.

SD - Sicherheitsdienst - Security Service (SS secret intelligence unit).

SE - Sondererziehung - special call up programme (known as SEI, etc.)

SS - Schutzstaffel - Guard squadrons.

SS-Führungshauptamt - SS Leadership Main Office.

uk - unabkömmlich - indispensable workers.

Verordnungsblätter - decree paper.

VJH - Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Munich.

Volksgemeinschaft - national community.

volkisch - national, racial, of the folk.

Volkstum - Germandom.

Volkssturm - 'People's Storm'; militia organization.

VoMi - Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle - Liaison Office for Ethnic Germans.

VWHA - Verwaltungs- und Wirtschafts-Hauptamt - Main Office for Administration and the Economy of the SS.

WaA - Waffen Amt - Weapons Office.

Warthegau - German Gau set up in the west of occupied Poland.

Wehrhilfsdienst - armed forces' auxiliary service.

Wehrmachtsanitätswesens - armed forces' medical service.

Wehrersatzdienststellen - armed forces' recruiting offices.

Wehrersatzplan - armed forces' replacement plan.

Wehrwirtschaft - defence economy.

Wehrpflichtige - those liable for military service.

WFSt. - Wehrmachtführungsstab - armed forces' leadership staff.

WiRüAmt - Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt - war economy and armaments office.

WVHA - Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungs-Hauptamt - Main Office for Economy and Administration in the SS (reorganization of VWHA).
LIST OF LESS WELL-KNOWN LEADERS

Amann, Max - Head of NSDAP publishing house, 1933-45.
Backe, Herbert - State secretary in the Reich ministry of agriculture 1933-42; acting minister of agriculture 1942-45.
Berger, Gottlob - Head of the SS main administrative office 1938-45; Himmler's personal liaison officer with the Ostministerium.
Brandt, Rudolf - Himmler's personal adjutant; second in command of the Reichsführer-SS Persönlicher Stab.
Bürckel, Josef - Gauleiter of the Palatinate 1933-44; Reich commissioner in Lorraine, 1940-44.
Daluege, Kurt - Head of the state police, 1936-45.
Darré, R. Walther - Reich minister of agriculture, 1933-42.
Dietrich, Otto - Reich press chief, 1933-45.
Florian, Karl - Gauleiter of Düsseldorf, 1933-45.
Frank, Hans - Governor-General of Poland, 1939-45.
Frick, Wilhelm - Interior Minister, 1933-43.
Friedrichs, Helmuth - head of the party division of the Party Chancellery, 1934-45.
Funk, Walther - Reich Minister of economics, 1938-45.
Ganzenmüller, Teodor - State secretary in the Transport Ministry.
Hanke, Karl - State secretary in the Propaganda Ministry, 1933-40; Gauleiter of Lower Silesia, 1941-45.
Heydrich, Reinhard - Head of the SD, 1933-1942; Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, 1941-42.
Hildebrandt, Friedrich - Gauleiter of Mecklenburg, 1933-45.
Hildebrandt, Richard - Head of the SS Race and Settlement Office.
Holz, Karl - Acting Gauleiter of Franconia, 1940-45.
Iffland, Otto - Party Chancellery official since 1938; Party Chancellery representative on von Unruh commission 1943.
Jüttner, Max - Head of the leadership office of the SS.
Klopfer, Gerhard - Head of the state division of the Party Chancellery, 1938-45.
Koch, Erich - Gauleiter of East Prussia, 1933-45; Reich commissioner in the Ukraine, 1941-45.
Krüger, Friedrich W. - Head of the SS in occupied Poland, 1941-43.
Meyer, Alfred - Gauleiter of Westphalia North, 1933-45; state secretary in the Ostministerium, 1941-45.
Milch, Erhard - Luftwaffe Field-Marshal and Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe.
Mutschmann, Martin - Gauleiter of Saxony, 1933-45.
Ohlendorf, Otto - Head of SD Amt Inland.
Pohl, Oswald - Reich treasurer of the SS, 1936 on; head of the SS economic administration office, 1942-45.
Prützmann, Hans - HSSPF to Southern Army Group, Kiev, 1941-43.
Sauckel, Fritz - Gauleiter of Thuringia, 1933-45; Reich plenipotentiary for labour, 1942-45.
Simon, Gustav - Gauleiter of Koblenz-Trier, 1933-45; chief of civil administration in Luxemburg, 1940-45.
Stuckart, Franz - State secretary in the Interior Ministry.
Tiessler, Walter - Liaison officer of the Party Chancellery to the Propaganda Ministry, 1940-43.
Wagner, Robert - Gauleiter of Baden, 1933-45; Reich commissioner in Alsace, 1940-45.

Wahl, Karl - Gauleiter of Swabia, 1933-45.

Walkenhorst, Heinrich - Head of the personnel office of the party chancellery, 1942-45.

Wegener, Paul - Gauleiter of Weser-Ems, 1942-45.

Weiszäcker, Ernst von - State secretary in Foreign Ministry to 1943; Ambassador to the Vatican 1943-45.

Zander, Wilhelm - Head of the party chancellery section on mobilization affairs, 1937-45.

INTRODUCTION

'The German example should have provided an adequate lesson of the results of initiating war measures too late', wrote Germany's Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels in March 1945.1 Since 1941 he had advocated policies, to which he gave the overall description of 'total war', designed initially to ensure German victory and later to avert defeat. Writing just before final defeat, he suggested that the National Socialist government should have taken more drastic action to mobilize all forces for war purposes two years earlier. Instead it had not done enough, and where it had adopted suitable policies, it had done so too late. Various leading members of the regime lacked the nerve and energy to take the necessary decisive steps.2

Germany's Armaments Minister, Albert Speer, had been Goebbels' ally in 1943 in seeking to make the conduct of the war more total. He also judged the war effort unsatisfactory. Writing to Hitler in March 1945, he suggested that the regime had lost precious time through comfort and indolence in the period 1940-41. 'Without my work the war would perhaps have been lost in 1942-43'.3


2. Entry for 4 March 1945, Trevor-Roper, Final Entries, p. 41. 'Neither in the military nor the civilian sector have we strong central leadership', he observed: entry for 7 March 1945, ibid., p. 71. The main tenor of Goebbels' criticisms, however, was against the military failings of Hermann Goering as commander of the Luftwaffe.

Immediately after the war, he blamed 'the corrupt and largely exhausted leading group' for being 'incapable of mastering further developments in the later stages of the war'. In his memoirs published some twenty five years later, he suggested as additional reasons for the unsatisfactory organization for war on the home front Hitler's fear of popular unrest which made him reluctant to ask the population for heavier burdens, his reluctance to face unpleasant realities, excessive bureaucratization in the administration and armed forces, and the failure to employ women fully.

Both men believed the German economy and society were not mobilized for 'total war', and they suggested Hitler's leadership style, the opposition of key leaders and the organization of the regime were obstacles. Their criticisms were based on an alternative model, sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, of 'total war', a 'design' for total war in Carroll's definition. The concept of total war will be examined more fully in Chapter One. It can be defined as the complete orientation of a society in its economic, political and social life for the pursuit of the war effort, involving both total mobilization of resources for war and the total destruction of the enemy. This thesis will examine the policies designed to achieve total war and the strategies for their acceptance pursued by four powerful National


5. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London, 1970), on Hitler's fear of unrest, p. 214; Hitler's reluctance to face reality about enemy capacity and to relinquish his building projects, pp. 165, 168, 181; excessive bureaucratization, p. 213; the failure to employ women, pp. 220-1.


7. ibid.
Socialist leaders, Martin Bormann, the Secretary to the Führer and head of the Party Chancellery, the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, Goebbels and Speer. It will set out how and why these views changed and competed, and will suggest that some of the competition arose because of differing concepts of total war. It will compare their proposals to Hitler's views, where these are known, and to the measures which Hitler approved. It will examine the extent to which Speer and Goebbels' assessments of whether policies failed, and why, were accurate. In studying these leaders' views the following questions arise. What were the proposals of the four leaders? What concepts of total war underpinned them? How did the leaders seek to have their ideas introduced? If they failed, why was this the case? At this level of the leadership, what were the reasons for the delay perceived by Goebbels and Speer in adopting total war policies? By studying the policies of several National Socialist leaders on total war issues, the thesis will assess whether Hitler's attitudes and decisions, leadership rivalries, conflicting ideas and/or the workings of the National Socialist political system affected the adoption of these proposals. It will seek to explain if the regime failed to mobilize for total war at the highest levels, and if so why.

The proposals for total war put forward by Goebbels in 1942-43, which were part of a more general 'package' aimed at avoiding defeat, and his attempts to have them adopted are used as a central focus for a study of the leaders' concepts of total war. By comparing Goebbels' ideas and actions to those of other leaders, and by examining the manner in which the leaders sought to have their ideas adopted, the workings of the National Socialist system of government at the highest levels will be further clarified.

The thesis concentrates on the period from winter 1941 to the end of the war in 1945, a period which saw the deterioration of
Germany's military position and the beginning of Goebbels' campaign to have total war policies adopted, the setting up of the Dreier Ausschuss, a committee to implement such measures, and the eventual appointment of Goebbels as Reich plenipotentiary for total war (Reichsbevollmächtigter für den totalen Krieg) in July 1944. It thus also studies a political system coming under increased stress, in which resources were becoming scarcer and competition for them accordingly fiercer, and in which options were steadily decreasing. In assessing the leaders' response to Germany's situation, the thesis will bear in mind that 'neither thorough planning of production nor the timely mobilization of every last potential reserve could have saved Germany'\(^8\) once her enemies included three economic powers (the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain) who could outproduce her and if a compromise peace was excluded by her enemies.

The thesis will not seek to re-examine the details of German economic mobilization for war, wartime labour policy, propaganda, or armaments production itself, all of which have been studied in other works, but will draw on these studies to examine what part these played in the leaders' conceptions of total war. Goebbels' total war policy after 1942 was part of a wider attempt to seek a political solution of the war. Studies of proposals for a compromise peace, the treatment of the Jews and of the Eastern peoples will accordingly be drawn on where they form a component of the debate on total war. The thesis will concentrate, as the leaders did, on the social and labour prerequisites of total war. There was far less debate on the allocation of resources for production, increasingly under Speer's control in the period under study, or about the military strategies to be followed, which were Hitler's responsibility. For reasons which will

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be developed in Chapter One, it was difficult for the leaders to criticize the military conduct of the war, because this entailed criticizing Hitler, and they tended not to do so.

Since the focus of the thesis is on the policies supported by the leadership, their underlying concepts and the reasons for the leadership's failure to agree, it will not examine the implementation and/or effectiveness of the policies at the local level, except where this came to the attention of the leadership and affected the policies they sought to pursue. The implementation of total war policies is a separate important question for study, but it presents considerable difficulties. It would be a useful supplement to the current study. This would, however, be the subject of several theses, requiring extensive regional comparisons and presenting considerable problems in finding sources, particularly for the Eastern Gaus. The implementation of total war policies during the war varied from region to region, and depended on the policies and attitudes of local party leaders, the economy of the area, and its location, particularly whether the area was heavily bombed or not.

The four leaders who have been chosen for analysis were all significant and powerful members of the regime, and their powers and responsibilities increased from 1941. Speer organized the armaments economy in this period; Himmler controlled the regime's police system and the implementation of its racial policies; Bormann, because of his powers in the party and his control over access to Hitler, could favour or thwart proposals; while Goebbels controlled the regime's mobilization of enthusiasm for the war. All four men had direct access to Hitler, enjoyed his confidence and gained powers directly relevant to any pursuit of total war in the period: Bormann as the leading member of the Dreier Ausschuss; Speer as the minister in charge of armaments production; Himmler as the leader of an
organization with its own economic enterprises and captive labour force, which also had links to the Economics and Agriculture Ministries; and Goebbels, both as the most vocal advocate of total war, and later as plenipotentiary for total war. Historians have seen all four men as occupying important positions on the home front during the war. The activities of other leaders will be considered where they affected the attitudes to and policies on total war of the four men studied. Göring, who had earlier exercised considerable power in economic decision making, took a less prominent role from 1941 on. His earlier role has been discussed in two recent studies.9

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The main sources which have been used for this thesis are the files in the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz of the Propaganda Ministry (R 55) and the Reichspropagandaleitung (NS 18), Goebbels' diaries (NL 118), the Reich Ministry of Munitions and War Production (R 3), particularly its ministerial office, the Party Chancellery files (NS 6), augmented by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte's reconstruction of these files, the files of the Reichsführer-SS's personal staff (NS 19) and the Reich Chancellery (R 43 II). The files of the Reich Chancellery are among the most comprehensive sources for the activities of the Dreier Ausschuss and those of the plenipotentiary for total war. Memoirs and interviews held by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte were also drawn on, as were the records of the trial of the major war criminals at Nuremberg. Military files, particularly those of the OKW and its Wehrwirtschaftsrüstungsamt, were examined at the Bundesarchiv

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Militärarchiv in Freiburg. In view of Keitel's position on the Dreier Ausschuss, I examined these files in the expectation that Keitel also may have followed an independent policy or sought to promote a 'design' for total war, but found no evidence that this was the case. Nonetheless he and the head of the Reichs Chancellery, Hans Lammers, were in positions potentially to thwart or support such issues.

The private papers of Speer and Goebbels' state secretary, Werner Naumann, are not yet available. The Propaganda Ministry files were extensively destroyed in 1945 and survive only in a fragmented state, with most remaining policy files being held in the German Democratic Republic's archives in Potsdam. Unfortunately, I was not granted permission to use these files, nor to consult the files of the Berlin Document Center. The records of the Berlin Gau do not appear to have survived the war. Inquiries to various German archives and of various researchers revealed no trace of them.

11. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel was appointed to head the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht-OKW) with a status equivalent to a Minister in 1938; Martin Broszat, The Hitler State (London, 1981), p. 295. He was made a Field Marshal in 1940; Keitel to Dr. Nelte, 25 March 1946, 'Fragen zur Person', BA MA N54/10, p. 1.


13. Advice from Dr. Real, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, and Ms Elke Fröhlich, Institut für Zeitgeschichte.


15. Mr. Nathan Stoltzfus of the History Department, Harvard University, has advised me that he did not find the Berlin Gau files in the archives of the German Democratic Republic.
prevented me from examining the measures Goebbels instituted in his own Gau.

The post-war moral revulsion at the National Socialist regime's policies, particularly its extermination of the Jews, have created particular problems for the historian. Memoirs of survivors are less candid than would normally be expected; there is a reluctance to make some material available to researchers, for fear of the use it might be put to. Denial of participation in or knowledge of certain events is accompanied by a tendency to cast blame on those members of the leadership who did not survive to put forward their side of the story, in particular Bormann, Himmler and Goebbels. In contrast Speer enjoyed the survivor's advantage of setting out his version of events at length. The Armaments Ministry files, while extensive, were edited by Speer at the end of the war, as was the Chronik or office diary of Speer's activities.\(^{16}\) His post-war accounts contain a large degree of self-justification, as Matthias Schmidt has shown in Albert Speer: the end of a myth, and alternately exaggerate or downplay his importance, using a technique of frankness to disarm the reader.\(^{17}\) These apologetics are more subtle than those of other National Socialists\(^{18}\) but still have to be used with care, particularly The Slave State.\(^ {19}\) Goebbels' account in his war time diaries also

\[\text{References:}\]


18. This can be seen in the contrast between the unpublished memoirs of Walter Tiessler, the liaison officer between the Propaganda Ministry and the Party Chancellery, 'Licht und Schatten oder Schonungsloser Wahrheit (1922-1945)', which are held in the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ), ED 158, and Speer's memoirs.

exaggerates his importance and effectiveness, but is still valuable as a reflection on the events at the time, rather than a post-war apologia. The major part of these diaries first became available in the 1970s, and consequently they have not been used by many historians of the period.

In addition, despite the extensive German archival holdings, there are gaps in the records. Hitler's personal archives, such as they were, were destroyed in 1945; the Goebbels diaries for the war-time period are incomplete and are not available for 1944; Todt's papers have not survived to any great extent. The fragmented state of the Party Chancellery files means that the extent to which Bormann influenced Hitler's views or merely reflected them is still not clear.

Studies of total war have so far concentrated on the questions of armaments production, and have tended to rely on Speer or Thomas' accounts of the National Socialist system. Carroll's Design for Total War concentrates on the concept of total war of General Georg Thomas, head of the OKW's Wehrwirtschaftsrüstungsamt, the armed forces supreme command economics and armaments office, from 1934 to 1942; Gregor Janssen's Das Ministerium Speer is a study of the Armaments Ministry and its increasing control over and achievements in armaments production;²⁰ Jutta Sywottek has studied the use of propaganda to prepare the population for war.²¹ The study of the 'mobilization of enthusiasm' in the regime's wartime


propaganda has been extensive. Ludolf Herbst has studied the
debate on total war from a different perspective, that of the
Economics Ministry and its plans for the post-war economy. He argues
that the absence of a clear concept of a normal National Socialist
economy made it difficult to maintain the population's willingness to
make sacrifices. His main focus is on the proposals for a National
Socialist economy which were put forward during the war to win
popular support.

Historians have differed in their judgements of Speer and
Goebbels' proposals. Ulrich Herbert considered that Goebbels was 'the
only one within the National Socialist leadership who could link a
clear view of the actual military and economic situation of Germany
at the change of year 1942-43 with a total concept of domestic and
foreign policy'. Some of Goebbels' biographers agree with the
assessment that he genuinely sought a mobilization of economic effort
for the war. Carroll and Herbst are more critical of Goebbels' sincerity.
Carroll claims Goebbels' design for total war 'was simply a
prolonged, shrieking demand for "sacrifices" on the part of the
German public'. Indeed she suggests that he was not innocent of the

22. See among others Jay W. Baird, *The Mythical World of Nazi War
Propaganda, 1939-1945* (Minneapolis, 1974) and E. K. Bramsted, *Goebbels

23. Ludolf Herbst, *Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die
Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda


25. Ulrich Herbert, *Fremdarbeiter - Politik und Praxis der "Ausländer -
Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches* (Berlin, 1985),
p. 238.

26. See, for example, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, *Doctor Goebbels
(second edition, London, 1969), chapters six and seven; Viktor Reimann,

sabotage of the total war effort by the Dreier Ausschuss.\textsuperscript{28} (Her study concentrates on the early years of the war and does not examine Goebbels' proposals in any detail.) Herbst sees Goebbels' moves to adopt 'total war' in 1943 as a response to a crisis of the credibility of the regime's propaganda and does not study it in a wider context.\textsuperscript{29} Janssen sees Goebbels' views as less soundly economically based than those of Speer.\textsuperscript{30} None of these historians have subjected Goebbels' proposals to close scrutiny. Speer on the other hand is generally given considerable credit for what steps were taken to mobilize the German economy for war in the period 1942-1944, although historians have been sceptical about his claims to have originated the system of 'industrial self-responsibility' for the armaments industry, and the other policies which assisted increases in production.\textsuperscript{31}

Historians have echoed some of Goebbels and Speer's criticisms of the regime's conduct of the war. They have agreed with Speer that female labour was never successfully mobilized.\textsuperscript{32} For ideological reasons 'the party left relatively untapped a large part of the country's labour resources'.\textsuperscript{33} Carroll, Milward and Herbst have suggested that Hitler sought to avoid total mobilization of Germany's

\textsuperscript{28} ibid., pp. 242-3.

\textsuperscript{29} Herbst, \textit{Totale Krieg}, p. 197. He does not appear to have been able to consult Goebbels' diaries or papers.


resources for war, only began to do so reluctantly at the end of 1941, and did not achieve total mobilization until 1944.34 Speer himself suggested that the leadership did not accept the need to prepare for a long war until autumn 1941.35 Other reasons for this delay have been suggested by Mason who argues that the regime could not mobilize fully because it could not rely on working class support36 and Herbst who sees the absence of a clear National Socialist economic policy, and the fear that total war policies would commit the regime to a certain line of policy after the war, as an obstacle.37 Milward suggests that the organization of the National Socialist political system into ad hoc overlapping organizations competing for power prevented effective organization for total war.38 More recently a historiographical debate has developed whether the regime began by seeking to maintain 'a peacetime war economy' or whether it oriented itself from the beginning, however inefficiently, to a long total war. (This debate will be considered in Chapter Two.)

While there has been considerable study of the organization of the German economy and the armaments industry during the war, particularly based on the files of the Armaments Ministry and Speer's recollections, there has not been an examination of the policies, concepts, competition and cooperation of these four men. Individual

34. Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 10, 93; Milward, German Economy, pp. 6, 8-16; Herbst, Totale Krieg, pp. 174-5; Edward R. Zilbert, Albert Speer and the Nazi Ministry of Arms: Economic Institutions and Industrial Production in the German war Economy (East Brunswick, 1981), pp. 228, 231.

35. Speer, Third Reich, p. 215.


38. Milward, German Economy, pp. 8-11; see also Herbst, Totale Krieg, p. 120.
aspects of Goebbels' campaign for total war have been studied, by Herbst and Longerich in particular, but this thesis is the first study of Goebbels' policy and concept of total war over the period 1941 to 1945, drawing on Goebbels' diaries and memoranda. This is also the first comparative study of Bormann and Himmler's views of total war, and in doing so sets Goebbels and Speer's ideas in a broader perspective.

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Before the debate on total war is examined in the succeeding chapters, two introductory chapters will provide information needed to set the debate in perspective. Chapter One will discuss the concept of total war in its historical context, linking this to the National Socialist interpretation of Germany's defeat in World War One; it will summarize the careers of the leaders to be studied and note the two differing interpretations of the National Socialist political system. Chapter Two will summarize the course of German preparation for war and note the differing interpretations of German preparedness for war. Each chapter concerned with the period 1941-45 will examine, where relevant, indications pointing to what each leader understood by, or advocated as, total war policies, particularly in the areas of simplification of the administration and the economy, transfers of production from less necessary to essential goods, and finding extra sources of labour. These views will be linked with the leaders' attitudes to the treatment of the peoples of the occupied East and the Jews, their assessment of the progress of the war, and moves for a compromise peace. Conflict and co-operation between the leaders will be examined. This will be set against the background of

Germany's changing military fortunes, and the policies which Hitler agreed to. Chapter Three will deal with the German attack on the Soviet Union and its consequences which raised for the first time in the leadership calls for a more 'total' war effort. Chapters Four and Five will analyze the response to Stalingrad - Chapter Four concentrating on the setting up of the Dreier Ausschuss, and Chapter Five on Goebbels' attempts to revitalize Göring. Chapter Six will look at the response to Italy's leaving the war, and further moves in 1943 to introduce total war on the Home Front. Chapters Seven and Eight will examine renewed attempts to have total war measures adopted in 1944; and Chapter Nine the results of Goebbels' appointment as Reichsbevollmächtigter für den totalen Krieg. Chapter Ten will look at the last attempts to pursue such policies in 1945.
CHAPTER ONE
TOTAL WAR AND THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST LEADERSHIP

This introductory chapter will present a model of 'total war'; it will then sketch problems in Germany's organization of the home front in the First World War and suggest that the National Socialist analysis of the defeat in the First World War influenced its leaders' planning for, and organization of the home front, in the Second World War. The conclusions drawn from this experience were more concerned with avoiding political rather than economic problems. As a result some policies which were not economically rational were still seen as contributing to total war. Finally it will set out the positions held in 1941 by the four leaders to be studied, their background and relations with Hitler, and summarize the different interpretations of the National Socialist system of government.

What is total war? It may be defined as the complete orientation of a society in its economic, political and social life for the pursuit of the war effort. In her survey of the origins of the concept, Berenice Carroll states that total war involves two main components - total mobilization of national resources for war, and total destruction of the enemy. ' "Total mobilization of national resources" . . . embodies both the "organization of enthusiasm" and "economic mobilization for war". '1 The demands of these varying components may be contradictory, for example resources used for the mobilization of enthusiasm in propaganda may have to be taken from armaments

1. Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 9.
production. In addition, the organization of a modern industrial economy for the effort of a long war is constrained by certain factors. A balance has to be struck between the resources necessary for maintaining the efficiency of both the armed forces and the civilian population. To do so the standard of living has to be kept at a level compatible with morale and effectiveness. Some consumer goods still need to be produced; and some 'inessential' goods and entertainments are necessary to maintain productivity.

The fundamental economic tasks of a government in war may be defined as 'to absorb into productive industry all employable resources of brain and muscle, material and plant' and 'to switch over to immediate war purposes as large a proportion of these resources as could be spared from their ordinary peacetime activities'. As many as three workers in industry were required by 1914 to maintain a single fighting man in the field, and this ratio has increased.

Since the French Revolution the idea of 'the nation in arms', a revolutionary or popular war supported by the efforts of the entire nation, has been part of the concept of total war. In 1793 the French Convention decreed a levée en masse, calling on all single men from eighteen to twenty-five to repel the Republic's foreign invaders. The decree proclaimed 'every French person must stand ready to serve

3. ibid., pp. 491-2.
4. ibid., pp. 10-11.
5. ibid., p. 14.
and support our armed forces. Young men will go to fight, husbands will forge weapons and manage the transport services; wives and daughters will make tents and uniforms and will serve in the hospitals; old men taking their stand in public places will inflame the bravery of our soldiers and preach... the unity of the Republic. It envisaged a complete focussing of all national energies on the production and supply of weapons for the new armies and stated the principle that all men owed military service to the nation. Ideology, political indoctrination of officers and men and propaganda was also used in a new political struggle. The American Civil War also contained important indicators of the form of modern total war. It was 'the first full-fledged example of an industrialized war' and demonstrated 'the vital importance of industrial capacity'.

Most European wars in the century 1815 to 1914 were short and fought for limited goals. World War I marked the full development of total war. The war was not fought for limited aims but for the total destruction of the enemy. Not only did World War I see the extensive mobilization of economic and social resources for


12. The involvement of the entire population meant that the war had to be fought for aims beyond the balance of power, and this made the scope and length of the war greater by reducing the possibility of compromise: McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p. 309. See also Aron, Century of Total War, p. 19; Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970, p. 106.
production for war purposes but also propaganda was used to motivate the home front, to influence neutral states and to undermine enemy morale.\textsuperscript{13} The development of air power and the widespread employment of the civilian population of both sexes in war production marked the extension of war to the civilian population, a development already visible during the revolutionary wars. Not only were civilians involved as producers but also as the objects of attack, suffering dangers similar to those of the soldier. World War One also presented an economic and social model of total war. The conduct of the war required increased taxation and borrowing, and the diversion of resources and labour from other purposes for war production; it removed the former limits on the industrialization of war.\textsuperscript{14}

In considering the development of the concept of total war another example, contemporary to that of the National Socialist regime, must also be noted, that of the Soviet Union. During the Second World War the Soviet population was comprehensively mobilized by a state leadership whose dictatorship was longer entrenched and who possessed greater control over the economy and population than its National Socialist counterpart. The Soviet war effort was marked by large scale evacuation of industry out of the range of German attack in 1941-42,\textsuperscript{15} and extreme sacrifice on the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} McNeill, \textit{Pursuit of Power}, pp. 317-18.
\end{itemize}
part of the population.\textsuperscript{16} Men aged 16 to 55 and women aged 16 to 45 were mobilized.\textsuperscript{17}

Total war thus can imply the mobilization of the entire nation to accomplish victory, a war with wide-ranging 'total' aims, usually also one waged with few restrictions on what is permissible to destroy the enemy, and with the use of political indoctrination and propaganda to maintain popular morale. Above all it involves the focussing of all necessary economic and social resources on winning the war. Thus one may agree with Carroll that total war is 'an accumulation of separate propositions, sometimes mutually contradictory, which have come to be associated under one term . . . . In practice, these varying components and interpretations of the idea of total war called forth varying blueprints for its realization.'\textsuperscript{18}

Inter-war German military thinkers recognized that the scale of World War One and the exertions it required introduced a new style of warfare which required a new response.\textsuperscript{19} German organization for war in World War I had suffered from many problems. No economic planning for a long war had been undertaken before the war started. The country's federal constitution and the creation at the outbreak of the war of twenty-four army districts whose commanding generals were responsible to the Kaiser made uniform policy on labour issues,

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17. Bond, \textit{War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970}, p. 177. Women had been 38 per cent of the civilian labour force in 1940 and were 53 per cent in 1942: Milward, \textit{War, Economy and Society}, p. 220.


food supply and other policies almost impossible.\textsuperscript{20} The military predominance in decision making led to attempts to 'command' labour.\textsuperscript{21} Although the industrialist Walther Rathenau successfully set up special corporations to allocate critical raw materials in the Raw Materials Department of the War Ministry,\textsuperscript{22} production was poorly co-ordinated before 1916.\textsuperscript{23} The demands placed on the economy by the armed forces aimed at a total orientation of effort and resources solely for direct war purposes.\textsuperscript{24} The calls for war production in the 1916 'Hindenburg Programme' were, however, divorced from practical economic reality.\textsuperscript{25} Lack of regulation and lack of effective taxation allowed for uncontrolled profitmaking, sometimes at the expense of government production.\textsuperscript{26} It has been suggested that in World War I Germany's economic failure lay in the misallocation of economic resources among all claimants, including the civilian population.\textsuperscript{27} Disorganization manifested itself particularly in the food supply, which was already inadequate before the blockade took


\textsuperscript{22} McNeill, \textit{Pursuit of Power}, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{23} This was partly due to strains on German administrative capacity: \textit{ibid.}, p. 328.

\textsuperscript{24} Geyer, 'German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare', p. 544.


\textsuperscript{26} Feldman, \textit{Army, Industry and Labor}, pp. 63, 158.

\textsuperscript{27} Hancock and Gowing, \textit{British War Economy}, p. 19.
Hunger accompanied by demands for political reform and peace led to industrial unrest in 1917 and mutinies in 1918. Germany's right wing blamed this unrest and the subsequent revolution of 1918, the so-called 'stab in the back', for the country's defeat.

The analysis and prognosis for the next war which arose as a result of this experience has been described by Herbst as the 'German doctrine of total war' or 'the völkisch doctrine of total war'. It derived both from the experience in World War One of the social and political requirements of war in the industrial age, and the experience of the World War One collapse. It was particularly influenced by the belief that the German home front had not proved as reliable as those of Britain and France. Believing that Germany had been outmanoeuvred by enemy propaganda, Ludendorff and other former military leaders, such as von Tirpitz, concluded that propaganda and ideological mobilization of the people would need to be given high priority in future wars. Another means for ensuring the loyalty of the home front according to Ludendorff was the creation of racial unity by the exclusion of Jews.

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In the 1930s Ludendorff publicized the term 'total war' and called for a total orientation of the state for the purpose of waging war before as well as during wartime. He saw war as being waged for total goals, the subjugation of enemy societies. He wanted politics subordinated to war and saw Germany in the next war as a beleaguered country under a dictatorial emergency, economically oriented to security from blockade and socially organized on the basis of a general duty to labour. He proposed to substitute a military command structure for complex social and political relations. Germany had to stockpile raw materials and quickly conquer other areas to secure her agricultural and raw materials base. Further elements of the development of the concept in Germany were contributed by Carl Schmitt who envisaged in 1931 the creation of a 'total state', drawing on the models of Fascist Italy and the Soviet Union, which would inter alia create the preconditions for total mobilization. Ernst Jünger in 1930 saw the next war as including the organization of all possible labour and materials into industrial production as well as total mobilization.

35. Herbst, Totale Krieg, p. 38.
36. ibid., p. 43.
37. ibid., pp. 65-6, 70.
38. ibid., p. 36; Sywottek, Mobilmachung, p. 19.
The strategic principle of Ludendorff's military thought and that of National Socialism was the escalation of force. In National Socialist thought war was seen both as a law of nature and a means of social reconstruction through the destruction of conquered societies. Carroll concedes that Hitler was an exponent of total war in that he sought the total destruction of some of his enemies, and recognized no moral limits to the means employed in warfare. National Socialist policy was also influenced by the specific analysis of World War I set out by Ludendorff. During the Czech crisis in September 1938, Goebbels commented after a speech by Hitler, 'One thing is sure: 1918 will never be repeated!' Hitler's political career began in 1919 and by his own account was prompted by his reaction to news of Germany's defeat in World War I. The National Socialist regime's response to war was affected not only by the German defeat in 1918 but also by Germany's experiences during the war.


42. Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 10.


45. See also Herbst, Totale Krieg, pp. 42-73.
suggested that the population was redressing 'the sins of the generation of 1918'.

Hitler's account of his First World War experiences noted the incidence of hunger at home in 1916. The National Socialist regime's wartime concern to ensure adequate feeding of the civilian population, and its monitoring of popular reaction to cuts in rationing, was based on this awareness of the political consequences of this hunger during World War One. (The impact of food supply problems on German morale in World War II justified the governmental resources devoted to this question.) The regime's political and social strategy was to provide a minimum standard of living for all in wartime. The efforts to create a feeling of national community and overcome class barriers in a Volksgemeinschaft were also an attempt to overcome the failings of the Wilhelminian regime. In contrast to

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47. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 192.


50. R.J. Overy, 'Germany, "Domestic Crisis" and War', Past and Present, Nr. 116, August 1987, pp. 159-60.
the social conflict and division of the Second Reich. Hitler emphasized the need to ensure that the workers were fully part of the nation. Hitler saw a need for a deep process of regeneration and political education in Germany to overcome Marxism, create a new national unity and prepare the people for war.

In his 1929 book, Grundlagen der deutschen Wehrpolitik, Konstantin Hierl, later leader of the Reichsarbeitsdienst, stressed that since modern wars were people's wars, propaganda and economic warfare were important. National Socialist and armed forces leadership saw propaganda as an important tool of warfare, both externally and internally. They believed that Imperial Germany had been completely outmanoeuvred by British propaganda, and had thus gained additional enemies, including the United States, and been undermined at home. Better propaganda, such as an appeal in 1918


55. This had been a major theme of inter-war studies of the conduct of modern war: Wolfram Wette, 'Ideen, Propaganda und Innenpolitik als Voraussetzungen der Kriegspolitik des Dritten Reiches', in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1979), volume 1, p. 122.

56. Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 181-9; Major Albrecht Blau, Psychologisches Laboratorium des Reichskriegsministeriums, Gruppe V, undated, 'Die Entwicklung der Propaganda als Waffe.', BA MA RW4/ v. 238, pp. 8-18; see
for the people to fight longer rather than face the consequences of defeat, would, in Goebbels' opinion, have been able to prevent the catastrophe.57 Attempts by the armed forces in the 1930s to control the overall direction of propaganda in wartime were unsuccessful.58 Hitler recognized Goebbels' abilities and the importance of his role, and this may have helped him maintain his position in 1938.59 Sywottek goes so far as to describe the mission of National Socialism as being to educate the population politically for battle.60

The 1918 mutinies justified the importance of ideological education of the armed forces.61 The notion of a militia or people's army, and of political commissars, was not entertained in the 1930s; ideological education remained the responsibility of the armed forces.62 But the party claimed, and the military conceded, a role in providing the ideological justification for combat. National Socialist


60. Sywottek, Mobilmachung, p. 20.


leaders such as Goebbels were careful when addressing military gatherings to disabuse them of the notion that soldiers could be apolitical.63

Writing in Mein Kampf, Hitler indicated that he considered Germany's enemies to have been numerically and technically superior from the outset.64 This was not of significant concern to him since a state was built by heroic virtues and spirit of sacrifice, not the 'egoism of shopkeepers'.65 Moreover, he clearly believed that a German victory should have been possible, particularly in 1917 after the collapse of Russia.66 He showed little awareness of the military importance of the United States' intervention. Marxist agitation, specifically organized and fomented by Jews, whom Hitler believed did not fight on the front as a rule, caused Germany's collapse.67 They exploited internal division.68 'The ultimate and most decisive [reason for Germany's defeat] remains the failure to recognize the racial problem and especially the Jewish menace', he claimed.69 Herbst has suggested that Hitler did not see total war as an abstract model of working the economy to capacity but as a realization of German


64. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 229.

65. ibid., p. 151.

66. ibid., pp. 194-5.


69. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 327.
ideology. Thus anti-Semitic policies could be seen as a contribution to total war. In the absence of conclusive documentary evidence, the historical debate continues whether the extermination of the Jews originated in a direct order from Hitler or whether it came as an 'administrative solution' devised within the SS to problems caused by the regime's earlier racial policies. The National Socialist analysis of the Jews as a treacherous and destructive element in Imperial Germany should be borne in mind in considering the regime's attitudes to total war. Not only was the war against the Jews a 'total' one but also the Jews were seen as an economically destructive element. As Germany's strategic position weakened the regime stepped up its campaign against what the leadership perceived as its most bitter enemy; it 'rationalized and industrialized mass annihilation'. The economic irrationality of genocide with its consumption of valuable materials (rolling stock, building materials for the camps) and destruction of a potential labour force was irrelevant for a leadership who would have argued that the potential workers were by their nature working for the Reich's destruction. From this point of view the resources allocated to the pursuit of the 'Final Solution' were also strengthening the war effort. Similarly, the


74. See for example 'Rede des Reichsführers-SS auf der Ordensburg Sonthofen am 5. Mai 1944', BA NS19/4013, p. 28.
resources diverted into propaganda, political education of the troops and maintaining popular morale were completely compatible in National Socialist eyes with a rational commitment of resources to total war.\textsuperscript{75} In understanding the leadership's approach to total war 'the total claim of the ideology \ldots\ must be taken into account just as much as the striving to achieve more efficient forms of armaments production'.\textsuperscript{76} The tension between these two goals was part of making the war more total.

Its analysis of World War One led the National Socialist leadership to emphasize policies aimed at preventing a repetition of the 1918 'stab in the back'. Not all these policies would necessarily be compatible with a more narrow definition of total war as the complete and economically rational use of resources, but they were compatible in the 'German lesson of total war'. The lack of a successful model from World War I for the economic and social organization of war seems to have been a contributing factor to the regime's problems in World War II just as the British Government was helped by the existence of a successful model. The National Socialist analysis contained an implicit admission of the Imperial Government's failings on the home front\textsuperscript{77} but concentrated on its political rather than economic or strategic problems. Profiteering and waste resulting from allowing industries to organize their own production did not, for example, gain as much attention as the

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75. Sywottek, \textit{Mobilmachung}, p. 238.


77. For more explicit comments see Goebbels, \textit{Der geistige Arbeiter im Schicksalskampf des Reiches}, p. 12; 'Rde des Reichsführer-SS vor dem Offizierkorps einer Volks-Grenadier-Division vor ihrem Abmarsch zur Front.', 'Geheim!', pp. 1-2, and 'Rde des Reichsführer-SS in Grafenwoehr am 25.7.1944', 'Geheim', BA NS 19/4015, pp. 2-4.
\end{flushleft}
stresses placed on the working class. Little was said about the less extensive use of women in military capacities than in Great Britain. 

More explicitly, the explanation adopted for Germany's defeat was the 'stab in the back'. Tim Mason has suggested that the entire approach of the National Socialist leadership to organizing the home front in World War II can only be understood in the context of the revolution of 1918. Hitler did not dare to ask the population to make sacrifices. Speer recalled that Hitler was particularly concerned to avoid any repetition of 1918, but there are few specific cases where Mason can show this to have affected wartime policymaking. It has been suggested that the employment of women was one such case. While 1918 is crucial to understanding the emphasis placed by leading National Socialists on certain of their policies during the war, to a certain extent the regime's policies, particularly the adoption of the Final Solution, could be expected to reduce the leadership's concern at such a repetition. In May 1942 Hitler told Goebbels that the German workers did not think of stabbing him in the back. 'The Germans only participate in subversive movements if the Jews seduce them', he claimed.

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79. Mason, German Democracy, pp. 226-7, 238. Other expressions of this opinion can be found in Milward, German Economy, p. 28; and Volker Berghahn, Modern Germany (Cambridge, 1982), p. 172.

80. Speer, Third Reich, p. 214.

81. Mason, German Democracy, pp. 228-9.

82. Quoted in entry for 30 May 1942, BA NL 118/46, p. 44.
While Hitler had seen active service, the four secondary leaders to be studied were younger and had experienced the First World War on the home front. What was the background and position of these four leaders? Aged 41 in 1941, Martin Bormann headed the Amt Hess in the Party Chancellery. Noted for his administrative talent and perseverance, he had displaced his ostensible superior Hess by the late 1930s, strengthening his position by his constant presence at Hitler's side. As a result of Hess's flight to Britain in May 1941, the position of deputy to the Führer lapsed and Bormann became head of the Party Chancellery. During the war, as Hitler became increasingly preoccupied with military matters, he was content to let Bormann handle most other issues, seeing him as a reliable servant of his will. His position as Secretary to the Führer from 1943 on was one of co-ordination between the ministerial level and Hitler's personal staff. Bormann gave every sign of being a fervent admirer of Hitler. He was able to affect the outcome of Hitler's decisions by the way in which he raised issues. The sources of his power were the trust Hitler placed in him, his access to Hitler, and his ability to


84. Speer, Third Reich, p. 175.


impede the access of others to Hitler. Von Lang has suggested that Bormann isolated Hitler.

Bormann's relative obscurity meant that his power was not always clearly recognized at the time. His tendency to work behind the scenes, leaving centre stage to others, has led to varying interpretations of his influence, whether he controlled Hitler or was Hitler's tool. Despite the work of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in reconstructing the fragmented Party Chancellery files, he remains a shadowy figure, and his views sometimes have to be inferred. Speer claimed that in the 1930s Goebbels and Bormann always sought to radicalize Hitler ideologically. In particular Bormann was a driving force behind actions to combat the influence of the churches. In wartime Speer claimed Bormann was slavishly dependent on expressions of Hitler's views. As will be seen in later chapters, Himmler and Goebbels believed Bormann followed Hitler's opinions...

90. Von Lang, Bormann, p. 220.
93. Speer, Third Reich, pp. 95, 122.
94. ibid., p. 253.
too rigidly, and prevented the development of more flexible policies.95

Joseph Goebbels, aged 44 in 1941, had been closely associated with Hitler since the mid-1920s. He was very able, hardworking and capable of dispassionate analysis of problems.96 He had been Gauleiter of Berlin since 1927, and Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda since March 1933.97 Through a system of cultural chambers and censorship he controlled the German press and cultural life. His Ministry was created in 1933 and was particularly responsive to his wishes. The Bundesarchiv's holdings of Propaganda Ministry files leave no doubt of Goebbels' close control of, and originating role in, his Ministry's activities. It has been described by Broszat as the most National Socialist of all the Ministries.98 In this position he saw his ultimate task as drawing the entire population on to the side of the regime.99 With the exception of his organization of the anti-semitic pogrom, the Kristallnacht, Goebbels had not played a prominent role in policymaking outside his sphere of influence in the 1930s. His main responsibility in wartime was the organization of enthusiasm for the war and the maintenance of morale. His position

95. On Himmler's view see Schellenberg, Labyrinth, p. 318, and for Goebbels' view see Speer, Third Reich, p. 258.


97. Manvell and Fraenkel, Goebbels, pp. 69, 112.

98. Broszat, Hitler State, p. 246.

strengthened during the war with the regime's increased need for propaganda.\textsuperscript{100}

In 1941 Goebbels was emerging from a period of disgrace after Hitler ordered him to end his affair with the Czech actress Lida Baarova in 1938. According to Dietrich, this was the only time Hitler's friendship with Goebbels was strained. 'At all other times Hitler praised Goebbels for his talents as an orator . . . publicly hailed him as his greatest friend, and backed up his hysterical theatricality.'\textsuperscript{101} Like Speer and Bormann, but unlike Göring or Himmler, Goebbels and his wife were members of Hitler's private circle.\textsuperscript{102} In this capacity he was particularly adept at using humour, anecdotes and malice to influence Hitler's opinions.\textsuperscript{103} Goebbels combined this formal and informal access to Hitler with a strong personal commitment to him.\textsuperscript{104}

Otto Dietrich, Hitler's press chief, described Goebbels and Himmler as two men of whose loyalty Hitler felt absolutely certain.\textsuperscript{105} Aged 41 in 1941, Himmler had led the Schutzstaffel (SS) since 1929. He held the positions of Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior.\textsuperscript{106} He was in charge of the

\textsuperscript{100} Broszat, \textit{Hitler State}, p. 313.

\textsuperscript{101} Dietrich, \textit{Hitler}, p. 238.

\textsuperscript{102} Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, pp. 120, 123-6; Dietrich, \textit{Hitler}, pp. 203, 233, 239.

\textsuperscript{103} Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, pp. 123-7.

\textsuperscript{104} See for example Goebbels to Hitler, 20 April 1944, 'Geheim!', p. 6; Goebbels to Hitler, Christmas 1943, BA NL 118/106, pp. 1-5. Von Oven described this as Goebbels' childlike love and veneration of Hitler: entry for 20 April 1944, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, p. 276.


Reich's internal security, including the secret police (Gestapo) and security service (SD), and also controlled the country's network of concentration camps. The increasing role during the war of the Waffen SS, the SS armed forces, strengthened the SS's position as the force underpinning the regime and silencing opposition. The SS's close links with the Ministry of Agriculture, its expanding economic interests in wartime and the appointment of Otto Ohlendorf as State Secretary in the Economics Ministry in 1943 also gave Himmler influence in economic questions. Himmler's position was strengthened by his partnership with his most able subordinate, Reinhard Heydrich, head of the SD. There is disagreement among his contemporaries and historians whether Himmler followed his own ideas or saw himself as implementing Hitler's ideas. Himmler certainly constructed a far more comprehensive and cohesive world view based on national socialism that any other of these leaders, except perhaps Bormann.

Aged 36 in 1941, Albert Speer had been a member of Hitler's inner circle since 1933 and was Hitler's architect. He was described by a close associate as 'highly intelligent, artistic in temperament, and ambitious to the point of power hunger, . . . always unpredictable . . .


Personally courageous'. Historians beginning with Trevor-Roper have often accepted Speer at his own valuation as either an apolitical artist linked to Hitler by common architectural interests or an apolitical technocrat. His links to Hitler were close and he showed an ability to prosper in the National Socialist in-fighting. His political offices had increased in the 1930s. In 1933 he became Chief of Artistic Production of Mass Demonstrations in the Reich Propaganda Office; in 1934 he became a department head in the Amt Hess and Head of the Beauty of Labour section of the German Labour Front (DAF); and in 1937 he became Inspector General of Building for the Capital of the Reich, entrusted by Hitler with drafting a complete urban renewal plan for Berlin.

In 1939 Speer had made his construction staff available to the war effort, and as a result assumed responsibility for erecting buildings for the armed forces, repairing bomb damage, building air raid shelters, and later repairing rail connections in the USSR. In this capacity, Speer's staff came under Fritz Todt, Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions since March 1940. Fritz Todt had joined the party in 1922 and was a convinced National Socialist. He had made his name by building the autobahns, and headed the Todt Organization which carried out building tasks. After the war began


113. ibid., pp. 50-2. See also the testimony of Otto Ohlendorf on 3 January 1946, *TMWC*, vol. 4, pp. 343-4.


Hitler gave increased responsibilities to Todt, who was largely uninvolved in the Party's internal intrigues.116 Unfortunately Todt's papers have not survived to any great extent.117

All the leaders whose policies will be examined in the thesis had close relations with Hitler, were trusted by him and delegated power by him. As members of the circle who lived at the Obersalzberg when Hitler was in residence there, Speer and Bormann had continuous contact with Hitler. Goebbels and Himmler, whose responsibilities took them away more often, nonetheless had good access to Hitler when they needed it. Increasingly as the war progressed Hitler worked mainly in various headquarters in the East, particularly the Führerhauptquartier in Rastenburg, East Prussia.118 He was thus physically removed from Berlin, the centre of administration, and from the home front itself.119 During the war, he came to concentrate increasingly on military questions, leaving a vacuum in domestic policy. The debate on total war was also partly an attempt to fill this vacuum.

Access to Hitler was particularly important in view of his undisciplined and unsystematic style of working, in which decisions


117. The Armaments Ministry files do not contain much material from Todt's period as Minister and the papers of the Todt Organization held in the Bundesarchiv concentrate on the pre-war period. Professor Alan Milward has also confirmed the fragmentation of these files in conversation with me.

118. In the period June 1941 to 1945 Hitler spent most of his time from June 1941 to July 1942 in East Prussia, July to November 1942 at Winniza in the Ukraine, November 1942 to April 1943 in East Prussia, April to May 1943 at the Berghof, Berchtesgaden, May 1943 to February 1944 in East Prussia, February to July 1944 at the Berghof, July 1944 to November 1944 in East Prussia, December 1944 to mid-January 1945 in Ziegenberg and from mid-January 1945 in Berlin: see John Toland, Adolf Hitler (New York, 1976), pp. 924, 978, 992, 1010, 1019, 1067, 1085, 1139-40, 1154.

119. H. Mommsen, 'Hitlers Stellung', p. 60.
were often made verbally in response to the arguments of the latest visitor.\textsuperscript{120} He would frequently refuse to decide or delay his response when important members of the leadership disagreed, or would make a decision which did not result in a victory for either side. He tended to respond to problems by creating plenipotentiaries or other special positions specifically for the task at hand without clearing away the powers of existing authorities in the field, thus creating an overlapping tangle of competing organizations without clearly defined responsibilities.\textsuperscript{121} Hilberg described this as 'government by announcement'.\textsuperscript{122} Hitler's method of working, his reluctance to put much on paper and the destruction of his private archive in 1945 add to the difficulty of assessing his reaction to the various proposals put to him on total war.

Hitler stood at the apex of various power systems: by combining the offices of President and Chancellor he stood at the head of the political and administrative system; he was also commander in chief of the armed forces; he led the party. The administrative system of the Weimar Republic and its ministries continued formally but was accompanied by an assumption of powers by various National Socialist organizations and office holders, and by the creation of new authorities. A tension existed between the bureaucracy, which had gained greater power with the absence of parliamentary oversight, and the party leadership who saw themselves as revolutionaries and

\textsuperscript{120}. ibid., p. 59; Tim Mason, 'Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism', ibid., p. 33; Orlow, Nazi Party. II, pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{121}. Broszat, Hitler State, pp. 263-7; Dietrich, Hitler, p. 115.

were impatient of due process. While National Socialist rule had some centralizing tendencies, the regionalism of German administration was strengthened by the development of power of the Gauleiters, regional party leaders directly responsible to Hitler, who often combined their party offices with regional state positions, and were capable of originating policies, and ignoring or transforming central directives.

There are two main interpretations of the National Socialist political system. The 'monocratic' interpretation argues that Hitler's intentions and power were of central importance to the development of policy. Policies were adopted because Hitler ordered them or agreed to them. While individual leaders may have exercised considerable autonomy in areas of policy which did not interest Hitler, or because they had gained his trust, he could withdraw their mandate if he wished. This interpretation recognizes the existence of conflict and overlapping in the political system which arose because Hitler governed by 'divide and rule' in order to

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124. They had the right of immediate access to Hitler: Orlow, Nazi Party, II, pp. 11, 33-5, 52; Zilbert, Speer and Ministry of Arms, pp. 43-4.


126. Göring commented in 1939 that once Hitler had made up his mind 'all the rest of us are no more than the ground under his feet': quoted in Trevor-Roper, Last Days of Hitler, pp. 88-9; see also Göring's testimony of 21 March 1946, TMWC, vol. 9, p. 621, and Schacht's evidence that Göring had no influence over Hitler: declaration by Schacht, 7 July 1945, Document 3936-PS, TMWC, vol. 33, p. 562.
maintain his authority. He was also prepared to delegate authority to subordinates whose loyalty seemed beyond question. In the final analysis, this was a system based on the personal authority of one man. This interpretation emphasizes the regime's totalitarianism and Hitler's central importance to the regime, irrespective of the 'chaos of responsibilities' at the secondary level of the leadership.

Other historians have put forward a 'polycratic' interpretation of the political system. Some go so far as to label Hitler a weak dictator. They argue that the role of the Führer achieved functional importance as a unifying factor because of the lack of agreement on ideology. Hitler's power did not grow out of a policy of divide and rule, but out of the relevant political and institutional divisions. The regime produced sudden and extreme decisions because systematization, regularity and calculability were seen as limiting factors. Radicalism became an end in itself and government disintegrated into an aggregation of ill-coordinated task forces. The resulting chaos and competition meant that various organizations, notably the SS and the NSDAP, achieved an independent power base. The regime's fragmentation reflected political and institutional

127. See Dietrich, Hitler, p. 119; Hildebrand, 'Monokratie oder Polykratie?', p. 74.


132. Ibid., p. 27.
divisions. Broszat argues that it increased the radicalization of policy in the National Socialist system and the emphasis on the negative aspects of the party's ideology: 'Even in the final war years . . . the Hitler regime was certainly capable of generating astonishing energy, but it had long been incapable of the rational exercise of power.' Historians emphasizing the polyocracy of the National Socialist system have on the whole not specifically analyzed the later period of the regime, except in the course of studies examining the genesis of the 'Final Solution'. Hans Mommsen has suggested that it was the polycratic nature of the political system which led it to take the strategic and political decisions that brought about its military defeat. Most 'polycratic' historians concede that Hitler's power appears to have been greatest in military and foreign policy, particularly from 1938 on when he had freed the regime from the restraints exercised by the traditional elites. Nevertheless, their picture of National Socialism would suggest that lack of cooperation on total war was an inevitable product of the competition among leaders and organizations. This argument has in fact been put forward by Alan Milward.

Historians of both interpretations agree that Hitler allowed large accretions of power to men he trusted; they disagree as to the

133. Broszat, Hitler State, p. xiv. On the radicalization of policy see also H. Mommsen, 'Hitlers Stellung', pp. 50-6, 61.
137. Milward, German Economy at War, p. 8; Milward, War, Economy and Society, pp. 27-28; see also H. Mommsen, 'Hitlers Stellung', pp. 58-9.
autonomous power of these empires.\textsuperscript{138} They also agree that at the level below Hitler the regime was marked by an institutional Darwinism. The party was aptly described as 'one of the most disorderly overlapping amorphous organizations in the world'.\textsuperscript{139} The lack of evidence on many central aspects of Hitler's rule, due in large part to his decision-making style, suggests that there can be no final resolution of these differing interpretations. The thesis will suggest a synthesis. Hitler's power, and the style of leadership and political system which developed, originated in the charismatic nature of his authority. His institutionalized charisma was superimposed on the rational bureaucratic system.\textsuperscript{140} Hitler had charisma in the sense defined by Weber, which created a willingness on the part of his followers to subject themselves unconditionally to his leadership.\textsuperscript{141} This explains Hitler's ability to convince his followers of victory even when reality was clear to them, and it explains his followers' ability


to gain strength and confidence from Hitler.\textsuperscript{142} It must also be borne in mind that 'despite their numerous bitter intraparty rivalries, the NSDAP's cadres . . . did think of themselves as a community of comrades which was committed to a radical restructuring of German values.'\textsuperscript{143} The dictatorship did not exist long enough to overcome many traditional values and structures. The importance of Hitler's authority and his practice of delegating aspects of it temporarily to trusted followers\textsuperscript{144} meant that 'institutional dynamics in the NSDAP [were] little more than the personal relationships and clashes of individual party leaders'.\textsuperscript{145} Gerth's pioneering study indicates that Hitler's hostility to routine, the delegation of powers for special tasks, the unchecked struggle for power waged by the organizations of subordinate leaders, the difficulties of co-ordination among the rival organizations and leaders and the need to prove loyalty to the leader were all consequences of Hitler's charismatic authority.\textsuperscript{146} These elements of the political system did not diminish Hitler's ultimate authority.\textsuperscript{147} Charismatic authority is inherently unstable, because it is dependent upon the person of the charismatic leader, and is eventually transformed into traditional or bureaucratic authority.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{142} Tiessler, 'Licht und Schatten', IfZ ED 158, p. 180; entries for 31 July 1943 and 16 March 1944, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 91, 252.

\textsuperscript{143} Orlow, \textit{Nazi Party}, II, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{144} 'Territorial limits, the personal charisma of the follower, and the ability to secure the confidence and favor of the leader alone determine how much power he [the follower] can wield': H. Gerth, 'The Nazi Party', p. 102.


\textsuperscript{146} H. Gerth, 'The Nazi Party', pp. 100-113.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 112-13.

More than other historians of polycracy, Broszat (the *Hitler State*) recognizes Hitler's charismatic authority which he sees as incapable of being combined with a rational and stable government.¹⁴⁹ Perhaps Broszat overestimates the rationality of the bureaucratic system, and underestimates the extent to which inter-organizational conflict is normally present in such a system.¹⁵⁰ He may also overlook the extent to which the organizational conflict of National Socialism served as, and was used by Hitler as, a substitute for the checks and balances of a parliamentary system¹⁵¹ and the extent to which it could pit organizations and leaders against each other in a quest for optimum performance.¹⁵² Equally, a recognition of Hitler's ultimate authority as the centre of the system does not exclude the possibility that his individual orders could be 'interpreted' in a way which suited the secondary leader.¹⁵³

The thesis will argue that the gap between these views has become exaggerated: the functioning of the leadership should be seen as a combination of both. The Third Reich was both monolithic and

¹⁴⁹. Broszat, *Hitler State*, pp. x-xii. While he still sees Hitler as having an independent authority by virtue of his role as a charismatic leader and still playing a role in the radicalization of the regime, later historians have reduced this.


"Intention" and "structure" are both essential elements of an explanation of the Third Reich, and need synthesis. Hitler's intentions seem important in shaping the climate in which the unleashed dynamic turned them into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The regime operated within certain economic, social and political conditions. Hitler's power was theoretically absolute but he did not exercise it at all times or on all issues. Some criticisms of monocracy are based on an ideal type of a dictator's powers. The structures and organizations set up by the regime had a continuing life and effect of their own. Polycracy reigned among the competing secondary leaders at the same time as they acknowledged and were bound by Hitler's authority where and when he exercised it. They sought to and did influence his decisions, but were willing to submit themselves unconditionally to his leadership.

This chapter has set out the positions of the four leaders in 1941 and has set this in the background of differing interpretations of the National Socialist patterns of government. It has pointed out that the German, and National Socialist, interpretation of the lessons of World War I contained more political recommendations for action than economic lessons, in contrast to the more usual economic and social interpretation of total war. Chapter Two will examine German preparations for war from 1936 on.

155. Ian Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 81, see also pp. 104-5, 128.
CHAPTER TWO
THE PATH TO WORLD WAR

By mid-1941 Germany had conquered most of Europe. In three sections, this chapter will outline the National Socialist regime's preparation for war up to 1939; examine the differing interpretations of the extent of these preparations; and summarize the mobilization of German society from 1939 to 1941, including the question of the employment of women. Chapter One suggested that the National Socialist analysis of the defeat in the First World War influenced the regime's planning for, and organization of the home front, in the Second World War. The conclusions drawn from this experience were concerned with avoiding political rather than economic problems.

Some German studies of the inter-war period demonstrated an awareness of the economic problems Germany would face in any conflict. The geo-politician Ewald Banse in *Wehrwissenschaft* drew the conclusion from the First World War that the state waging war had either to possess all raw materials necessary for economic production or ally itself to a state that had them. In a modern war a state could not hold out economically without allying itself to one of the three giant economic empires of Great Britain, United States or the Soviet Union. Papers, speeches and submissions prepared in the 1930s for consideration within the armed forces reflected similar thinking, but never put Germany's strategic choices as starkly as Banse had. In 1934 the Waffen Amt wrote of the need for German

foreign policy to secure 'many years of peaceful reconstruction' until the armaments industry overcame a dangerous bottleneck.² The Treaty of Versailles had greatly worsened Germany's position, especially with the loss of Lorraine and Upper Silesia. The possibility of conducting a long war without the Ruhr was completely ruled out.³ The Waffen Amt recommended as a protective measure the general evacuation to inner Germany of all armaments industries lying on Germany's borders, creating a new armaments centre about Berlin, and in the area Magdeburg-Merseburg-Bitterfeld, Hanover and on the lower Elbe.⁴ In 1937 in a speech to a political course for officers, Colonel Thomas, head of the OKW's Wehrwirtschaftsrüstungsamt, commented that Germany's economic situation influenced World War One from beginning to end, and ultimately decided it. Thomas listed the economic problems, including a lack of raw materials, that the German economy would face in time of war. He noted that the United States and the Soviet Union were the countries most favoured by their holdings of raw materials. Thomas then discussed short term means of maximizing Germany's position, including training women as specialist workers in the armaments industry.⁵ He argued strongly for

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3. ibid., pp. 7-9, 16. Hitler was also aware of this in 1939: Document 789-PS, TMWC, vol. 26, p. 334.


rerrangement in depth, total economic and political mobilization, and for the preparation of Germany for a long war.6 These analyses, and his belief that Germany was not well-prepared for war, were partly the basis for his opposition to war in 1939.7

The preparations for war undertaken in the late 1930s took into account the German economic weaknesses as set out by Thomas and others.8 In April 1936 Göring had been commissioned to review and improve Germany's situation regarding raw materials and foreign exchange. The adoption of the Four Year Plan in 1936, and the appointment of Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, marked a decisive move by Hitler towards accelerating the process of rearmament.9 The Four Year Plan provided for exploitation of all raw materials available in the Reich, the creation and extension of production of synthetic materials without regard to cost, and aimed at achieving a high level of self-sufficiency in four years. At the conclusion of his memorandum to Göring Hitler instructed him that the German army had to be operational within four years and the German economy prepared for war.10 Göring specifically stated that

6. Georg Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (1918-1943/45) (Boppard am Rhein, 1966), pp. 90, 145, 159; Fanning, 'German war economy in 1941', p. 29; Zilbert, Speer and Ministry of Arms, pp. 115-16; Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 42, 47.


the Four Year Plan had to prepare the German economy for total war.\textsuperscript{11} A large economic apparatus under his command was established to control the flow of resources to industries and to provide the general planning framework for investment programmes.\textsuperscript{12} Costly processes were used to develop artificial raw materials such as Buna - a substitute for rubber - and artificial substitutes for petrol.\textsuperscript{13} Such processes were necessary because, as Williamson Murray has commented, 'German resources of every strategic raw material except coal were at best insufficient, and in most cases simply did not exist'.\textsuperscript{14} Increases in the production of all raw materials followed.\textsuperscript{15} In 1938, recognizing that all goals of the Four Year Plan would not be fulfilled, the regime opted for an accelerated plan, (Schnellplan) which increased resources to key industries including munitions.\textsuperscript{16}

German rearmament began from a low base of 7 divisions (100,000 men) as a result of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. The December 1933 programme aimed for a 33 division field army of 300,000 men with 21 infantry and one armoured division. The August 1936 armaments programme showed that the commander in chief was working to establish operational readiness of the field army by 1 October 1939. The August 1936 programme aimed for a peacetime army of 830,000 men with a field strength of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Quoted in Overy, Goering, p. 82; R.J. Overy, 'Hitler's War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation', The Economic History Review, vol. 35, 1982, pp. 278-9.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Overy, Goering, pp. 60-1, 72, 74-5.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Stolper, German Economy, p. 136.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Murray, The Path to Ruin, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Volkmann, 'Die NS-Wirtschaft im Vorbereitung des Krieges', pp. 353-4.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Murray, The Path to Ruin, pp 24-5.
\end{itemize}
102 divisional units with 32 infantry divisions, 3 armoured divisions and 4 motorized infantry divisions.\textsuperscript{17}

The expansion of the armed forces and the ordering of their equipment was not part of an systematic or co-ordinated programme. What direction there was from Hitler simply consisted of orders to produce more. Attempts by officers in the armed forces supreme command (the OKW) to co-ordinate planning foundered partly on Göring's ability to go directly to Hitler. Each individual service drew up its own programme of expansion and the scale of each service's plans was limited only by the shortages of raw materials.\textsuperscript{18} Armaments efforts concentrated on the forces' immediate needs.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite the attempts to stockpile raw materials and to create replacement materials, shortages continued to exist. The capture of Austrian and Czech reserves of foreign currency and metals provided some temporary relief.\textsuperscript{20} German rearmament was constrained by foreign exchange shortages which hindered Germany's ability to buy raw materials overseas to produce more. Attempts to promote exports failed because of the priority given to fulfilling armaments orders. In November 1936 only half the army's copper requirements could be met, for example. On 1 January 1937 rationing of non-ferrous metals was introduced.\textsuperscript{21} In 1938 only 40 per cent of the iron ore used by German heavy industry came from German sources. In

\textsuperscript{17} See table in Deist, \textit{Wehrmacht and Rearmament}, p. 52. A more detailed study of the process of disarmament is contained in Wilhelm Deist, 'Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht', \textit{Deutsche Reich}, 1, pp. 400-532.


\textsuperscript{20} Carr, \textit{Arms, autarky and aggression}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{21} Deist, \textit{Wehrmacht and Rearmament}, p. 87.
1938 Germany once again faced a steel shortage which was overcome by use of captured Czechoslovakian productive capacity.22

Tim Mason has argued that the economic over-heating brought about by rearmament forced the regime to seek war in 1939. This assertion has met with considerable opposition.23 Overy claims that the government's plans for full mobilization led in 1938 to falls in consumption, rationing and shortages. Consumption as a share of national income declined from 71 per cent in 1928 to 59 per cent in 1938.24

What sort of preparedness for war had been achieved in 1939? In autumn 1939 Germany mobilized an army of three quarters of a million men in 103 divisions. Only 13 per cent of the army was motorized and less than 6 per cent armoured, partly due to fuel and

22. ibid., pp. 88-89. Other shortages at the outbreak of war are set out in Volkmann, 'Die NS-Wirtschaft im Vorbereitung des Krieges', pp. 359-68.


steel shortages. An aircraft industry, which had only employed 3000 people in 1933, had expanded to produce an airforce of over 4000 front line aircraft with 302 operational squadrons.25 In January 1939 Hitler had approved the so-called Z plan which gave priority to building a large fleet of ten battleships, three battle cruisers and three heavy cruisers. The navy was concentrated almost completely on the construction of a battleship fleet, possessing no carriers and only 26 oceangoing submarines.26 Continued large scale military production was planned.27

The weaknesses inherent in Germany's lack of raw materials and dependence on international trade had not been overcome, although the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939 provided considerable relief.28 Resources obtained in the conquest of Czechoslovakia were also of some help. They provided arms and equipment for 15 infantry divisions and the equipping of 3 armoured divisions with Czech vehicles by the French campaign.29 Only 80 per cent of minimum food supplies were assured. Germany was still importing 70 per cent of her iron ore needs, 80 per cent of her copper, 65 per cent of her petroleum and rubber needs.30 By the beginning of the war German and British aircraft production rates

25. Deist, Wehrmacht and Rearmament, pp. 89-91; Carr, Arms, autarky and aggression, pp. 120-2.
29. Deist, Wehrmacht and Rearmament, p. 89.
30. Stolper, German Economy, p. 159. See also Volkmann,'Die NS-Wirtschaft im Vorbereitung des Krieges', p. 351. See also Thomas, Geschichte, pp. 146-50.
were running at the same monthly level and the United Kingdom was producing more tanks.31

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In the 1930s foreign observers assumed that Germany had organized its economy for total war and possessed a quantitative superiority in arms. Discoveries of the inefficiencies of German production, made particularly by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, led to a reinterpretation. In his Germany's Economic Preparations for War, Burton Klein suggested that the view that Germany was making massive war preparations was much exaggerated. Germany could have achieved a far higher level of arms production by cutting back further on civilian production. Klein argued that the fact that production and consumption of consumer goods rose above the 1928-29 levels by the late 1930s was a sign that the level of civilian production was high.32 A much larger share of national product in 1938 could have been used for war purposes.33 The German economy produced 'more butter and less guns'.34 He suggested that a greater economic effort was prevented by the government because of its fear of deficits and a disinclination to ask for civilian sacrifices.35 Klein's conclusion was that the kind of war Hitler was planning to wage - Blitzkrieg - did not require large scale war preparations.36

31. Milward, German Economy, p. 6.
33. ibid., p. 21.
34. ibid., p. 76.
35. ibid., p. 79.
36. ibid., p. 25.
In The German Economy at War, Alan Milward also considers that Germany was geared to 'armament in width' not 'armament in depth', where what is meant by 'armament in width' is a relatively high level of ready armaments, while 'armament in depth' is the investment and redevelopment necessary to produce the level of armaments for a war against greater mass producing powers.\(^{37}\) Blitzkrieg 'seemed to offer a way in which Germany, no longer economically a great power, could wage war as if she were such a power.'\(^{38}\) Carroll, too, argues that 'total war was Hitler's nemesis rather than design'.\(^{39}\) Milward suggests that Blitzkrieg, among its other advantages, offered the regime an escape from total warfare, and conformed to the centrifugal tendencies and ad hoc administrative methods of National Socialism.\(^{40}\)

To Milward the German economy in the Blitzkrieg period (September 1939 to December 1941) was marked by a fairly steady overall armaments production, while the total output of consumer goods did not fall.\(^{41}\) '"Guns and butter" was Hitler's aim.'\(^{42}\) Milward and Carroll suggest that German production of consumer goods remained high until 1942. In this interpretation, the winter of 1941-42 is seen as the time when Hitler agreed to mobilize economic production more effectively for total war.\(^{43}\) Speer's period as

\(^{37}\) Milward, German Economy, p. 6.

\(^{38}\) ibid., p. 9.

\(^{39}\) Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 93.

\(^{40}\) Milward, German Economy, p. 8.

\(^{41}\) ibid., p. 28.

\(^{42}\) ibid.

\(^{43}\) ibid., pp. 65-71; Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 230-1; Herbst, Totale Krieg, pp. 174-5. Burchardt suggests that production of consumer goods
Armaments Minister, particularly from 1942 to 1944, coincided with Germany's move to a more comprehensive war economy, even if it was never as 'total' as it was in Britain. Carroll suggests that military expenditure did not dominate the whole economy until 1942; although still lagging behind the British distribution of resources at this time, Germany could be described as having a 'total war economy' after 1942.\(^44\) She is less inclined than Milward to attribute the increase in production to Todt or Speer's policies.\(^45\) Rather, she attributes the increase to the effects of propaganda. Because Germans were encouraged to work hard and because they believed that the regime had organized the economy for war, they worked harder and produced more.\(^46\)

The interpretation that the German government switched from Blitzkrieg to \textit{Totale Krieg} for the most part reluctantly and under the pressures of the Russian campaign still has much support among historians.\(^47\) Herbst has suggested that the National Socialist regime wanted to establish neither a peace nor a war economy, but instead an intermediate state of an economy always partly mobilized, a defence economy (\textit{Wehrwirtschaft}).\(^48\) There is evidence to support a

\(^44\) Carroll, \textit{Design for Total War}, pp. 188-9.
\(^45\) ibid., p. 247.
\(^46\) ibid., pp. 249-50.
\(^48\) Herbst, \textit{Totale Krieg}, pp. 96-8, see also p. 66.
different interpretation. In *Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft* Tim Mason believes that arguments that Hitler's strategy did not require the highest possible concentration on armaments cannot be sustained. He argues that Hitler wanted Germany to make the greatest possible efforts to strengthen its military potential by 1942. Mason points out that despite claims of a high level of consumer production, the consumption of foodstuffs in working class families fell from 1927 to 1937. For example, the consumption of eggs, milk and butter was not as high in 1938 as it had been in 1930. He shares with Milward and Klein the belief that the government's fear of public reaction constrained the kind of rearmament it could pursue. Hitler had to go to war earlier because of economic overheating caused by rearmament. War was the only way out to avoid workers' hostility to the regime. Yet Mason's own evidence suggests that the population was already making substantial sacrifices in its living standards before the war.

More recently this view of a 'Blitzkrieg economy' has been challenged by Overy and Williamson Murray. Overy has suggested an alternative model of the German economy as consciously mobilized from the outset for total war, even if inefficiently. In his study of Goring Overy suggested that Goring was planning for a long total war. Because, contrary to Hitler's expectations, 1939 was the beginning of

50. ibid., p. 115.
51. ibid., pp. 119-37.
52. ibid., pp. 120-3.
54. Overy, 'Hitler's War and the German Economy', p. 274.
wider conflict, the regime's plans for rearmament in depth were not complete.55 According to Overy the conversion of the economy began in 1939 with sharp and sustained increases in military spending and cutbacks in the production of consumer goods. The process of organization for war was also hampered by the unwillingness of many industrialists to co-operate.56 Economic mobilization and military expenditure continued to grow.57 Overy suggests that Göring and the regime did seek to mobilize all necessary resources, using material captured from occupied territories.58 By 1941 per capita civilian consumption had fallen by 22 per cent from its 1938 level.59 He does not see the armaments economy as being wound down in 1940-41 but agrees that bureaucratic competition and the lack of any system of control hampered the war economy.60 Hitler's lack of understanding of the way such an economy worked meant that he continued his building and other projects.61 Overy's account suggests that historians may have been misled into assuming a lack of commitment to total war by the regime's administrative

55. Overy, Goering, p. 89; see also pp. 98, 102.
57. ibid., pp. 280, 283.
58. Overy, Goering, p. 139.
60. Overy, Goering, pp. 154-8.
inefficiency,\textsuperscript{62} its need to build up a military infrastructure, high German standards of armaments production,\textsuperscript{63} and its failure to exploit female labour fully. Overy has since suggested elsewhere that women were employed to a far greater extent than previously assumed but has not developed this argument in detail.\textsuperscript{64}

The historians of the 'Blitzkrieg economy' see political constraints as forcing the government into a certain kind of rearmament. Williamson Murray argues in \textit{The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938-1939} that economic constraints meant that Germany could only rearm in the way she did. He suggests that the German armaments effort was immense and at a far higher level than that of the British and French.\textsuperscript{65} But the prewar German economy was limited by its dependence on imports and the inability of German industry to boost foreign exchange earnings significantly.\textsuperscript{66} The increase in armaments production for the Wehrmacht prevented important sectors of the economy from earning foreign exchange which in turn limited production.\textsuperscript{67} Even if the regime had been willing to cut food imports or consumer industries, the lack of skilled labour and raw materials would have meant that armaments production could not be expanded further. Germany could not have rearmed in depth because she did not possess the raw materials, industrial base or financial resources to rearm in such a manner. 'The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Overy, \textit{Goering}, p. 148; Overy, 'Hitler's War and the German Economy', p. 287.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Overy, 'Hitler's War and the German Economy', p. 286.
\item \textsuperscript{64} In a letter, 'The Audit of War', \textit{Times Literary Supplement}, Nr. 4332, April 11 1986, p. 393.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Murray, \textit{The Path to Ruin}, p. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{ibid.}, p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{67} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 14-15. Additional evidence for this is provided by Thomas, \textit{Geschichte}, p. 145.
\end{itemize}
only possible course, taken by Hitler, was to build German forces up as rapidly as possible and then, with that short-term military advantage, conquer the raw material and financial base for a long war'.

Williamson Murray's account therefore explains the perception of an apparent 'Blitzkrieg' economic strategy, a concept of which he is critical. National Socialist rearmament was incomplete not because Hitler wanted to keep it incomplete but because it could not become complete until it had access to the wider European economy. Germany was able to expand production in the period 1942-1944 because she controlled the resources of almost the entire continent. For example close to 40 per cent of steel production in 1941 took place outside the 1938 borders of the Reich.

The lack of unified central control of the economy seems to have influenced Klein for example into believing that priority was not given to the armaments industry. The fact that consumer spending was allowed to rise back to its 1928 levels led some historians to believe that the economy was only geared to Blitzkrieg and that the regime was not planning long campaigns. Historians have also tended, as Murray has pointed out, to see the existence of competing authorities as a weakness rather than, as he does, a possible sign of flexibility in a totalitarian regime. The idea that National Socialism was unable to command sufficient popular support to mobilize

68. Murray, The Path to Ruin, p. 27. On economic motives for German expansion see also Overy, 'Germany, "Domestic Crisis" and War', p. 157.

69. Murray, The Path to Ruin, pp. 12-13, 17, 37. He argues strongly against any links between the regime's economic and military strategies.

70. ibid., pp. 13-14.

71. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations, pp. 37-8. See also Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 183.

effectively may also exercise a disproportionate appeal to historians. The evidence put forward by Overy, Murray and Mason suggests that, if the German economy was not effectively mobilized before 1942, this was not necessarily due to a lack of will on the part of the leadership.

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What measures were taken by the German government to mobilize German society for war from 1939 to 1941? Although the German government had established extensive plans for economic mobilization in the event of war, the nature of the initial campaign in Poland and the fact that a major war came earlier than planned, led to these not being fully implemented. Herbst has argued that this was due to the unpopularity of the war with the people, or perhaps more accurately, party fear of the effect of such measures on popular morale. Goebbels was later to claim that one problem for Germany was that she had had early successes while only taking half measures. The British had been luckier because Dunkirk had made them aware of the need to tighten up their civilian economy.

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73. Von Gersdorff, Frauen im Kriegsdienst, pp. 48-51; Herbst, Totale Krieg, pp. 118-19; Thomas, Geschichte, pp. 153-7; Overy, Goering, p. 84. Hitler believed that Britain and France would not seriously pursue war in 1939: Speer, Third Reich, p. 165.

74. Overy, Goering, pp. 98, 102; Overy, 'Hitler's War and the German Economy', pp. 275-6; Kroener, 'Squaring the Circle', p. 286.


78. Speer, Third Reich, pp. 254-5.
Restriction of the German economy began in 1939. In the first two months of the war 100,000 small businesses (Handwerk) had been closed down, and their number of employees reduced by almost one million. The regime sought to achieve restructuring by closures rather than more open measures. To some extent Göring was impeded in taking such measures by opposition from the Gauleiters and the civil service. Administrative simplification was already underway.

Armaments production and economic organization for war were led by Göring. In addition to being Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, he held the position of Chairman of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defence and could issue decrees with statutory effect. This body soon lapsed. Initially 16 Gauleiters were appointed as defence commissioners; by 1942 all Gauleiters had been made defence commissioners. Hans Kehrl, then a senior official of the Economics Ministry, said that Göring had been given all the powers of deputy Chancellor but that he did not use them methodically and was distracted by his duties as commander of the Luftwaffe.


82. Overy, *Goering*, pp. 100-1.


suggests that Göring was hampered in his exercise of these powers by
the absence of a central administration and a national network to
implement the policies locally.85

Todt was appointed Inspector-General for Special Tasks in the
Four Year Plan by Göring on 23 February 1940 to investigate the
success or failure of measures taken by the Reich authorities for the
war effort. He subsequently set up 'combing out' commissions which
inspected firms' use of labour,86 and on 17 March 1940 he was
appointed to the new position of Minister for Armaments and
Munitions to supervise munitions production.87 In April he
introduced the beginnings of the system of industrial self-
responsibility, giving industrialists an official role in distributing
munitions contracts.88

The armed forces' war economy and armaments' office
employed armaments inspectors to check that the armaments firms
received the necessary workers and materials, but each individual
branch of the armed services planned its own armaments
requirements.89 Planning continued to be hampered by Hitler's
changing armaments priorities.90 In 1940 Hitler stressed to Thomas'
staff the need for great flexibility in the leadership of the economy
and the impossibility of setting down production programmes on a

85. Overy, Goering, p. 100.
86. Thomas, Geschichte, p. 239.
87. Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 217-9; Zilbert, Speer and Ministry of
Arms, p. 88; Fanning, 'German war economy in 1941', pp. 13-14; Thomas,
88. Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 222-3. She considers that Milward
exaggerates the importance of Todt's role: ibid., p. 221.
90. Thomas, Geschichte, pp. 169-70, 233-5; Fanning, 'German war economy in
1941', pp. 39-43.
long-term basis. Hitler was unrealistic; while he spoke of a long war he continued his building projects.

* * * * *

Germany went into the war with full employment because of the armaments programmes of the late 1930s. The German armed forces called up a higher proportion of men in the main age groups for military service than did any other combatant apart from the Soviet Union. Despite an ideology which wanted women to seek fulfilment in the domestic sphere, the number of women in employment under the regime had remained largely the same; 44 per cent of women were employed in 1933 and 46 per cent in 1939. The percentage of women employed was high by international standards. Full employment meant that most women, except some in the professions and/or traditionally male occupations, could find employment. Women predominated in agriculture and as assistants

91. Thomas, Geschichte, p. 204.
93. Stolper, German Economy, p. 137; Schupetta, Frauen- und Ausländererwerbstätigkeit, p. 37. Foreign workers were already being used to fill shortages: Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft, pp. 104, 145.
94. Milward, War, Economy and Society, p. 216.
95. Rupp, Mobilizing Women, pp. 15-17; Winkler, 'Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie', pp. 104-6.
97. At the beginning of the 1930s in the United States 17.7 per cent of women were employed, in the United Kingdom 26.9 per cent and in France 37.1 per cent: Schupetta, Frauen- und Ausländererwerbstätigkeit, p. 47.
98. Ibid, pp. 36-7.
in family businesses. In industry their jobs tended to be unskilled and boring, thus decreasing their interest in remaining in the workforce. Unlike in Britain, the German labour offices had no slack to take up but had to find extra workers from those with no previous interest in paid employment. The Government's pronatalist policies of the 1930s had also resulted in a slight increase in the birthrate, thereby reducing the pool of women likely to make themselves available for employment.

In the First World War German financial support for the families of soldiers had been extremely low. The rate for the Second World War was set in 1938 at a generous level, perhaps as an attempt to avert another 1918 uprising. The fears of Labour Ministry officials that it would discourage the wives of soldiers from seeking employment were ignored. Of the women who had a claim to family support, two thirds were looking after children under fourteen and therefore were not considered available for paid employment; only some 2.5 million were available for...

99. ibid., pp. 57-8; Koonz, Mothers of the Fatherland, p. 198; Winkler, 'Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie', p. 101.

100. Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft, pp. 143-4.


102. Koonz, Mothers of the Fatherland, p. 186 and note 20, p. 469.


employment. The high levels of support did act as a disincentive to female employment. This had been identified as a problem as early as November 1939, when tentative suggestions were made that women who were not liable for employment should be called up. Fear of coming into the labour registration system and then being unable to leave or change jobs was a disincentive for these women. There was resentment among workers that the entire burden fell on women who were already employed. Suggestions by Thomas in 1940 that firms encourage female employment by adapting the work environment to their needs do not appear to have been successful. Initially the levels of family support were reduced if the wife was earning money; this policy was stopped in 1941 but only a minority


107. Winkler, 'Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie', p. 113. Schupetta estimates that at least 300,000 women left the workforce because of the level of support: Schupetta, Frauen- und Ausländererwerbstätigkeit, p. 44; Thomas, Geschichte, p. 239. The one group excepted were farmers' wives who could only receive the allowance if they could show that farm income had decreased since the husband left: Jill Stephenson, 'Emancipation' and its Problems: War and Society in Württemberg 1939-45', European History Quarterly, vol. 17, 1987, p. 354.


109. Dr. Kaphahn, President of the Lower Saxon Landesarbeitsamt to Minister, 24 November 1939, 'Geheim', 'Fraueneinsatz im Kriege.', BA R 41/185, p. 4; 'Monatsbericht der Reichsleitung der NSDAP. Reichsfrauenführung für die Monate Januar-März 1941'; 'Bericht der Reichsleitung der NSDAP. Reichsfrauenführung für Januar/Februar/März 1942', IfZ APK, 117 07291, 117 07469.

of women returned to work. Efforts were also made to get women who had left the workforce since the war to return, by threatening a substantial reduction of their family support, but this only resulted in the return to work of 14,000 women. In 1941 labour offices were noting that they had to rely on women already in employment.

In 1940 Göring rejected a draft decree establishing an obligation for women to report for employment, since in his opinion the labour requirements could be met by employing prisoners of war (POWs) and the proposal would cause too much unrest in the public. In 1941 the Party organized a comprehensive publicity drive to encourage volunteers from women who had not previously been employed. Using the slogan 'German women help victory' ('Deutsche


112. Most of the women were found to have left work for justifiable reasons. Göring to Reichsarbeitsminister, 20 June 1941, 'Wiedereinsatz von Frauen, die ihre Berufstätigkeit nach Kriegsbeginn aufgaben.', pp. 1-4; Dr. Suren, Interior Ministry, to Göring, 'Wiedereinsatz von Frauen, die nach Kriegsbeginn ihre Berufstätigkeit aufgegeben hat.', BA R 43 II/652, pp. 1-2. Thomas claims that some 500,000 women had left the workforce by March 1940 but advertisement and moral pressure succeeded in bringing them back again. By summer 1940, he claimed, almost 300,000 more women were employed than at the beginning of the war: Thomas, Geschichte, pp. 239-40.

113. 'Auszug aus den Textberichten der Landesarbeitsämter über die Entwicklung des Arbeitseinsatzes im März 1941.', 29 April 1941, 'Geheim!', BA R 41/146, p. 2.

Frauen helfen siegen'), Hess called unsuccessfully for volunteers. Complaints of labour shortages led to 300,000 men being released from the armed forces on a ticket of leave system. The regime turned to the employment of foreign workers and prisoners of war. The number of foreign workers employed increased to 1.5 million by the end of April 1941.

The scarcity of consumer goods was reportedly depressing morale in 1941. Some controls over consumer production were indirect. In December 1940 raw materials were withheld from producers of small consumer goods. Carroll claimed that civilian consumption was the same proportion of GNP in 1940 as in 1937. While the absolute amount of consumer production was not reduced,


116. Fanning, 'German war economy in 1941', p. 157. Labour service for young women was also lengthened and the numbers involved increased: Sauer, Württemberg, pp. 334, 336.


118. Contemporary observers are quoted by Fanning, 'German war economy in 1941', pp. 163-4. Different conditions apparently prevailed in Cologne where the shops were well stocked considering the requirements of war: Adolf Klein, Köln im Dritten Reich: Stadtgeschichte der Jahre 1933-1945 (Cologne, 1983), p. 250. Klein's work is the only one of the local histories surveyed to make this observation.


120. Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 229. She looks at the volume of production rather than its allocation.
it was reduced by one-third per head of the civilian population.\textsuperscript{121} A large percentage of those consumer goods produced were used by the Wehrmacht.\textsuperscript{122} By July 1941 68 per cent of the industrial work force were engaged on direct military orders, a proportion higher than in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{123} The growth of war production was blocked by a lack of raw materials, equipment and skilled labour which could only partly be made up by exploitation of the occupied territories.\textsuperscript{124} By 1941 the German economy could be described as 'overtaxed'.\textsuperscript{125} Problems of sources and reliability of statistics may prevent a definite answer to the debate about the extent of German war production in 1939-41.\textsuperscript{126}

Notwithstanding the inadequacies of the German economy, by mid-1941 the government commanded the greater part of Europe with only Great Britain still unconquered. Despite the economic strengths of her empire and the increasing British organization of her economy for a long war, the threat from Britain could be contained. The German-Soviet pact had overcome some of the regime's raw materials problems. Germany began to exploit the resources of the

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{122} Steinert, \textit{Hitler's War}, p. 93; Overy, \textit{Goering}, p. 97.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Overy, \textit{Goering}, p. 140; Overy, 'Hitler's War and the German Economy', p. 284.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Rolf-Dieter Müller, 'Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum Kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg', \textit{Deutsche Reich 4}, pp. 158-60.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Rolf-Dieter Müller, 'Das Scheitern der wirtschaftlichen "Blitzkriegstrategie" ', \textit{Deutsche Reich 4}, p. 936.
\item \textsuperscript{126} On the problems of German statistics, see Fanning, 'German war economy in 1941', pp. 69-70; Carroll, \textit{Design for Total War}, pp. 262-7.
\end{enumerate}
conquered territories and to incorporate their economies into the German war effort.\textsuperscript{127} The conquered territories represented a great addition to Germany's productive capacity.\textsuperscript{128} This exploitation was initially inefficient and Germany did not begin to benefit economically from her victories until 1942-43.\textsuperscript{129} There was always a tension between the need for foreign labour in Germany and the desire to make the optimum use of the economies of the occupied territories.\textsuperscript{130}

The regime was waging war under certain constraints. The war was not popular with the population;\textsuperscript{131} Hitler feared a repetition of 1918's domestic unrest, and most importantly, Germany lacked the resources for a war of the scope she had embarked on.\textsuperscript{132} The period 1940-41 was not sufficient to incorporate European production into the German war effort. Military success made Hitler less rather than likely to listen to the cautions of his advisers when planning for the attack on the Soviet Union began. Chapter Three will deal with this attack and its consequences which raised for the first time in the leadership calls for a more 'total' war effort.


\textsuperscript{128} Milward, \textit{War, Economy and Society}, p. 137; France in particular was the most profitable, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 137-45. See Thomas, \textit{Geschichte}, pp. 223-5.

\textsuperscript{129} Fanning, 'German war economy in 1941', pp. 112, 125. Fanning differs from Milward in suggesting that German efforts to use the French economy met with failure on the whole: \textit{ibid.}, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{130} Fanning, 'German war economy in 1941', p. 194; Overy, \textit{Goering}, p. 141.


\textsuperscript{132} Geyer,'German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare', pp. 578-9.
In 1941 the regime's strategic decisions widened the war to a world war. The overconfidence with which the National Socialist regime began the attack on the Soviet Union also accompanied the declaration of war on the United States. As the campaign progressed without the expected defeat of the Soviet Union, the regime was faced for the first time with a crisis which brought forth calls for the war to be made more 'total' and for peace negotiations. Hitler agreed to measures to increase manpower for the front and armaments production. While armaments production rose, the measures to save labour were less successful. Renewed German military success in spring and summer 1942 seemed to lessen the urgency of the issue. The attitudes of Goebbels, Bormann, Himmler and Speer to various aspects of total war and to the cuts in staff will be examined. Todt and Goebbels will be seen to be the most concerned in marked contrast to Bormann.

Most of the leadership were unaware of the economic and military significance of the decision to attack the Soviet Union. The war against the Soviet Union marked a qualitative change in the National Socialist war leadership, with its goal being the total annihilation of the enemy.1 In Mein Kampf Hitler had clearly signalled his view that Germany did not possess the land and soil necessary for her role as a great power. This was to be gained from

Russia and her vassal border states. Russia's German-dominated ruling group, who had guaranteed the existence of the state, had been replaced by the Jews after the Bolshevik revolution and Russia, in Hitler's opinion, was accordingly ripe for collapse. He rejected the argument that the Soviet Union could be a useful ally. Not only were her present rulers by definition unreliable, but the Soviet Union was 'entirely out of the picture technically'.

Estimates made in the 1930s about the strength of other armed forces suggest that the Germans did not possess much information about the Soviet Union's economic and military potential. A 1939 paper about the Soviet Armed Forces estimated that the Soviet Union could mobilize eleven to twelve million men. The fighting value of the armed forces as a whole was judged to be weakened by the purges. The paper noted the recent creation of armaments firms on the Volga and in the Urals but concluded that the armaments industry centred on Moscow and Leningrad. This assessment appears to have been the basis of initial planning of the campaign, such as in Generalmajor Marcks' August 1940 paper, 'Operational draft East'. Marcks directed the main attack at Moscow because it formed the economic, political and intellectual focus of the USSR, and its capture would disrupt the coherence of the Russian state.


5. The quality of the officer corps was thought to be lacking in independence and initiative: ibid., p. 16.

6. ibid., p. 6.

7. Generalmajor Marcks, 5 August 1940, 'Operationsentwurf Ost'., BA MA R H2/v. 94, pp. 1, 9. See also Robert Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia
There was little doubt among the political and military leadership that the campaign was necessary and would not last long. As Hitler told von Rundstedt, 'you have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.' Before the war with Russia began, Himmler claimed that Russia was not a military threat. The officer corps was so bad that it could not be compared with German non-commissioned officers; the army was as badly equipped as it was trained, and could not be at all dangerous.

The leadership's assessment that the Soviet army would not be capable of prolonged resistance was influenced by their ideological interpretation of the Soviet system, including Hitler's use of race as a means of analysing military strength, their analysis of the Russo-Finnish war and a belief that Russian industrial capacity was centred in the west. More cautious intelligence assessments were ignored.

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10. Speech by Himmler at Gauleitertagung, 28 November 1940, BA NS 19/4007, pp. 18-19.


12. Entry for 24 June 1941, in Taylor, Goebbels Diaries, p. 428; Cecil, Hitler's Decision, p. 128. On actual Soviet strength see Joachim Hoffmann, 'Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs', and on the
Such assumptions led to the absence before the attack of any plans to appeal politically to the population of the Soviet Union. Planning for the economic exploitation of the territories to be occupied was already underway before the Russian campaign began.

Expansion to the East, extermination of Bolshevism and the destruction of Jewry were linked in the war against the Soviet Union which was cast from the beginning as an ideological war and a war of annihilation. This ideological radicalization began with the Commissar Order that Red Army and some civilian commissars were to be shot on the spot. This attitude, and the decision to give priority to feeding the German civilian population, also led during the course of 1941-42 to the deaths by starvation, disease and shooting

German leadership's assessments see Müller, 'Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum Kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg', Deutsche Reich, 4, pp. 75 and 115 respectively.


of Soviet POWs.\textsuperscript{18} Himmler later commented that it was 'regrettable' that in 1941 the Germans had not valued their Russian prisoners of war as they did by 1943.\textsuperscript{19}

It could be argued that Germany lost the war against Russia at the moment it began because of Russia's greater productive and military capacity.\textsuperscript{20} The ideological nature of the war waged against the Soviet Union also made victory difficult by provoking fierce resistance.\textsuperscript{21} The possibility existed however that the taking of Moscow and Leningrad might have precipitated a collapse of the Soviet political system. Lack of clear aims and objectives in German planning did not help the course of the campaign.\textsuperscript{22} Disputes between Hitler and the High Command, particularly concerning the priority to be given to the capture of Moscow, ensured that the chances of such a capture had faded by November 1941.\textsuperscript{23}

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\textsuperscript{18} Joachim Hoffmann, 'II. Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion' and Müller, 'Das Scheitern der wirtschaftlichen "Blitzkriegstrategie", Deutsche Reich 4, pp. 727, 731, 993-4, 1015-20. Some 3.3 million Soviet POWs out of a total of 5.5 million died: Förster, Policies of Genocide, p. 21.
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\textsuperscript{19} 'Rede des Reichsführer-SS bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung in Posen am 4. Oktober 1943', BA NS 19/4010, p. 3.
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\textsuperscript{20} Earl F. Ziemke, 'Germany and World War II: The Official History?', Central European History, volume 5, number 3, September 1982, pp. 406-7, has suggested that this is the argument of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. It is implied by Manfred Messerschmidt, 'Einleitung', Deutsche Reich 4, p. xviii.
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\textsuperscript{23} Geyer sees these disputes as a result of competitiveness among senior commanders: Geyer, 'German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare', pp. 588-90.
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Hitler told Goebbels as late as 29 November 1941 that the developments in the East were to be viewed positively: the enemy had lost his great armaments centres. The situation on the Eastern front was more fluid than Hitler's confident assertion suggested. German offensives in the East had floundered by 29 November 1941 when Soviet forces retook Rostov on the Don, and this was followed in December 1941 by the first failed Soviet counter-offensive. Hitler made himself Supreme Commander of the Army in place of General Brauchitsch on 19 December 1941. Hitler may have recognized that his strategy had failed but he did not alter it.

Hitler's declaration of war on the United States occurred at the same time as German forces ran into difficulties in the East. The significance of this decision in December 1941 was not recognized because of the leadership's underestimation of American military and economic potential. In Mein Kampf, which contains no mention of the role of the United States in the German defeat in World War One, Hitler was inclined to minimize the importance of economic factors in warfare. He later showed more consciousness of the economic power...
of the United States in his Secret Book.\textsuperscript{28} Hitler's belief that the United States was a racially inferior power, his desire to encourage Japan to move against the United Kingdom and his belief that the war would in any case be lost or won on the Eastern front all contributed to his declaration of war on the United States.\textsuperscript{29} On the whole the leadership persisted in a general underestimation of American political and economic strength. Those who sought to present a more accurate view of American production were not believed.\textsuperscript{30} In early 1942 Göring and Hitler still rejected as 'nonsense' SD reports of American economic capacity.\textsuperscript{31} In a discussion with Japanese ambassador Oshima in March 1941, Himmler agreed that Germany and Japan had to pursue an energetic military leadership in common against England, because this would at best keep America, 'about whose lesser moral value we very much agreed',\textsuperscript{32} out of the war. Goebbels' only concern about American entry into the war was the psychological effect it would have on the German people.\textsuperscript{33}

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\textsuperscript{29} For a discussion of the reasons influencing the decision see Gerhard Weinberg, 'Germany's Declaration of War on the United States: A New Look', World in Balance, pp. 75-95. A different interpretation is advanced by Hillgruber, 'Die weltpolitische Entscheidungen', pp. 459-60.


\textsuperscript{31} Schellenberg, Labryinth, pp. 199-200.

\textsuperscript{32} Himmler, 'Aktenvermerk über den Besuch des Japanischen Botschafters Exzellen Oshima am 5. März 1941 von 12 bis 12.25 Uhr', BA NS 19/2801, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{33} Entry for 13 September 1941, BA NL 118/26, p. 10. See also entries for 11 January 1942, pp. 11-12, 14 January 1942, p. 12, and 8 January 1942, BA NL 118/37, pp. 6-7.
Germany's leaders had reason to regain their confidence in the second half of 1942. German forces were still advancing in the southern USSR and North Africa and the regime commanded its greatest area of territory. German forces took Tobruk on 21 June and Sebastopol on 1 July. The first serious attempt to storm Stalingrad began on 16 August. During their September offensive the Germans came close to taking control of the southern half of the city. Hitler told Halder on 10 July 1942, 'the Russian is finished'. The early victories of the Japanese against American and British forces also reduced any disquiet about the strength of Germany's opponents. As late as December 1942, Goebbels still considered United States armaments production claims exaggerated. Those who believed that the United States was superior in raw materials and volume of production took comfort in the superior quality of German armaments.

Goebbels was apparently one of the first members of the leadership to adopt a more cautious attitude to German progress in the Eastern campaign. He had opposed the war; he warned openly about the danger of war at the time of the German-Soviet pact, and urged that Germany take a peaceful line. Goebbels may also have feared a loss of influence in wartime - there were few ministers more

34. Clark, Barbarossa, p. 261.
35. ibid., p. 241.
37. See the untitled unsigned report on the comments in November 1942 by Speer’s economic adviser, Professor Hettlage, 7 November 1942, 'Streng vertraulich und persönlich!', BA NS 19/2063, p. 3.
38. Speer, Third Reich, p. 162; Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, p. 28; Meissner, Magda Goebbels, p. 206.
civilian in outlook. He appears to have proposed the simplification of economic life at the beginning of the war and that the regime had to establish a positive war aim - the creation of a large continental European Lebensraum to secure Germany's future. His 1939-1941 diary entries show he was not at that stage seeking to influence wider policy.

Early in the Eastern campaign his diary entries do not indicate any concern about its course; he believed that Soviet industrial capacity had either already been captured or was within German grasp. He did not, however, share the optimism in Hitler's headquarters that the war would be finished in November. He considered that Soviet political control of the population meant that they had considerable reserves to mobilize, and he also believed that the Germans had misjudged Soviet military potential. His reasons for this opinion are unclear: he certainly did not have access to additional information, but may have wanted to avoid diminishing the credibility of his propaganda by over-optimistic claims. He was angered by Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich's announcement at the instigation of Hitler in October 1941 that the war in the East had been


40. Unsigned, 'Gedanken zum Kriegsbeginn 1939', BA NS 10/37 fol. 1-, pp. 2-4. The paper is undated and unsigned but is found in the Propaganda Ministry section of the Adjutantur des Führer files. Its style and contents suggest that it is the work of Goebbels.


42. Entry for 15 October 1941, BA NL 118/32, pp. 11-12.


44. Entry for 16 September 1941, BA NL 118/26, p. 23.
won, since he was aware that this would make continuing the war hard to explain. Goebbels saw his task as preparing the people for another winter of war. He did so partly by introducing more sobriety and realism into reporting of the campaign in the East. He suggested to the military in August 1941 that steps be taken to condition the Home Front to the possibility of an extended campaign by launching a public collection of winter clothing for the troops. In turning him down, General Jodl told him that by winter the German troops would be safely in quarters in Moscow and Leningrad.

Todt apparently began the Eastern campaign with the same optimistic assumptions as those of other leaders. Yet, after a visit to the Eastern Front in November, he had come to believe that the Germans were not physically or psychologically tough enough to

45. He described this as 'the greatest psychological mistake of the war' in entry for 11 January 1942, BA NL 118/37, p. 25. See also entries for 11 October 1941, BA NL 118/32, pp. 5, 7-8, and 19 October 1941, BA NL 118/33, p. 14. See also entry for 9 October 1941 in Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels - the man next to Hitler (Ohio State University reprint, 1982 of London, 1947 edition), pp. 54-5. Semler's name is incorrectly spelled as Semmler throughout the book. On the propaganda results of Dietrich's claims, see Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, pp. 246-7; Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, pp. 166-8.


47. Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, pp. 168-9; Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, p. 247. Hitler played a large part in the earlier German propaganda campaign which had been extremely confident: Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, pp. 153-6.

48. Boelcke, Secret Conferences, pp. 191-2; see also the entry for 6 January 1942, BA NL 118/37, pp. 7-8, and entry for 28 August 1941 in Semmler, Goebbels, pp. 50-1. Halder claimed that the decision not to provide winter clothes was Hitler's: Franz Halder, Hitler as Warlord (London, 1950), pp. 48-9. Consequently Goebbels had to introduce an appeal for winter clothing very late in December 1941: Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, pp. 172-3; Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, pp. 248-50.

49. On 30 July 1941 Speer offered to stop all unnecessary building during the war, but Todt believed that this could be put off for some weeks in view of the favourable conduct of operations in the East: 'Chronik der Dienststellen des Generalbauinspektors für die Reichshauptstadt 1941', (henceforth cited as Speer Chronik), BA R3/1735, p. 44.
withstand the rigours of the campaign.\textsuperscript{50} He was impressed by Russian military ability and concluded that American productive capacity in particular was so great that Germany would not be able to win the war. 'The decisive fact for him [Todt] was that Germany had to adapt itself to a long war and that with this the prospect of ending the war favourably dwindled from month to month.'\textsuperscript{51} Todt told Hitler that he had to end the war politically because it was already lost militarily and from the armaments point of view.\textsuperscript{52} He arranged for Rohland, an industrialist with knowledge of American industry, to tell Hitler of his assessment of American armaments production. In response to their presentation Hitler noted that he had sought peace earlier but had exhausted all political possibilities.\textsuperscript{53} Hitler here seemed only prepared to consider peace with the Western allies. Todt made further efforts to persuade Hitler of the true situation in January 1942 and during his last visit to Hitler's headquarters in February 1942.\textsuperscript{54} Todt's death in an aircraft accident at the end of this visit, in Rohland's opinion, 'eliminated from the government the only man at that time, who had a complete overview of the situation because of his connections with other countries and his clear judgement.'\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, p. 185; Janssen, \textit{Ministerium Speer}, p. 33.
\item Dr. Walter Rohland Interrogation by Mr. Pannson, 16 October 1945, 'Einstellung von Todt und Speer zum Kriege', Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) ED 99 Speer Interviews Band 9, pp. 1-4; see also Janssen, \textit{Ministerium Speer}, p. 33.
\item Janssen, \textit{Ministerium Speer}, p. 33.
\item Rohland Interrogation, 16 October 1945, IfZ ED 99 Speer Interviews Band 9, pp. 1-4.
\item Janssen, \textit{Ministerium Speer}, p. 33; Müller, 'Das Scheitern der wirtschaftlichen "Blitzkriegstrategie" ', \textit{Deutsche Reich 4}, pp. 1023-4.
\item Rohland Interrogation, 16 October 1945, IfZ ED 99 Speer Interviews Band 9, pp. 1-4.
\end{enumerate}
Todt's moves marked the first serious indication that a senior member of the leadership, responsible for armaments production, believed that the war could not be won even with increased arms production. His solution was not total war, but peace. Having reached these conclusions about the future course of the war, Todt's solution was to seek to persuade Hitler to change his policies. It seems that Hitler did not discuss Todt's proposals with other members of the hierarchy, and his reaction to them is not known. The absence of signs of further action by Hitler suggests that Todt had either not succeeded in conveying the seriousness of the situation or that Hitler was hoping for some way out of the situation, perhaps through renewed military victories. After the failed Russian counter-offensive, Hitler also reportedly rejected a peace offer from Stalin, because he was convinced he would ultimately be victorious. In March 1942, the head of the SD's foreign section (Amt VI), Schellenberg, learnt that the Japanese were trying to bring about a compromise peace between the USSR and Germany. Judging that Himmler was too much under Hitler's influence to act independently, Schellenberg had Heydrich raise the matter with Hitler, but with no result. Further Japanese soundings were rejected in April and June 1942.

The beginning of the extermination of the Jews would, however, make the option of peace with the Western allies less likely. At this time only Todt and Heydrich, influenced by Schellenberg, appear to have pursued plans for a compromise peace seriously. Hitler's ideological predisposition to prefer peace with the West precluded his


taking up the Russian peace feelers. The need for a settlement was not yet widely recognized; the last period of victories was beginning. Goebbels did not seem to plan a compromise peace; rather he hoped for a weakening of enemy resolve. In April and May 1942 he interpreted miners' strikes in Britain as 'signs of an internal decline, as we manifested in 1917 and 1918'. He judged a breakdown of Soviet society as unlikely because the Bolshevik terror was too strong to allow centres of resistance to develop.

The failure of Soviet offensives in the Crimea in April and May, and renewed German attacks beginning in June 1942 reduced the urgency of total war questions. Optimism about the regime's prospects was shared by some foreign observers. Many officials turned their attention once more to peacetime planning. On 29 May 1942 Hitler again told Goebbels that he viewed the military situation positively. The situation inside Russia was precarious and Stalin had exhausted his armaments potential. Such reassurances from Hitler would not have been given to Goebbels alone and they may account for the leaders' reduced attention to total war in spring and summer 1942.

58. Entry for 25 April 1942, p. 6, BA NL 118/46, and 31 May 1942, BA NL 118/42, p. 17.
59. Entry for 18 October 1941, BA NL 118/33, p. 24; 13 October 1941, BA NL 118/32, pp. 11-12.
60. See the comments of the Swedish military attaché in Moscow reported in Brandt, 'Aktenvermerk', 11 March 1942, BA NS 19/1627, pp. 1-2.
63. ibid., p. 29; see also General Rudolf Schmundt, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'Bericht über die Besprechung am 30.4.1942', BA MA R M7/259, pp. 2-3.
While Goebbels had not been interested in a compromise peace in March 1942, by July he was prepared to contemplate it. Moves for a compromise peace could serve either as an alternative to total war, particularly if this was judged unlikely to achieve victory, as Todt decided, or as part of a strategy of total war. Goebbels did not consider a compromise peace to be incompatible with a commitment to total war. For him total war was designed to make Germany a more threatening opponent and thereby make a compromise peace more attractive to the enemy. He suggested to his officials on 28 July 1942 that there was no German interest in the opening of a second front. He continued that 'Germany by no means intends to continue fighting Stalin under all circumstances; should Stalin . . . be prepared one day to come to an arrangement which would offer us a strategically good frontier and security against Russian rearmament, then such a possibility will certainly not be rejected out of hand on the German side'. Since the Germans were doing well militarily, he may have been motivated by concern at the length of the war. Alternatively he may have begun to doubt Germany's long term success and thereby also Hitler's military judgment. Goebbels did not set out his proposed peace conditions and it is not known whether he broached these ideas with Hitler or others. Whether he had or not, the more realistic preference for peace with Stalin rather than the West was Goebbels' and not Hitler's.

Less open and more serious moves for a compromise peace were being pursued with Himmler's approval. By summer 1942 Schellenberg concluded that total victory for Germany was no longer possible. He planned to open negotiations with both sides, and play

one off against the other. When he approached Himmler with this proposal, Himmler conceded that he had become worried about what would happen when American war production took off. Possible terms for peace were discussed - Schellenberg suggested a return to the status quo of 1 September 1939, with the prospect of Germany gaining her aims by peaceful cooperation. Himmler agreed that nothing could be achieved as long as Ribbentrop was still Foreign Minister, and wanted the scheme kept from Bormann, whom he believed made Hitler more uncompromising. He agreed to Schellenberg's plan. Initial contacts were made with the British, but the scheme foundered on Himmler's nervousness. He decided he had to advise Ribbentrop and Hitler who refused to allow Schellenberg to pursue the contacts. Hitler rejected Japanese offers of mediation with the Russians in June and October 1942.

Himmler did consider the war to be a total war. He told police leaders in January 1941 that they would have to be very sparing with their manpower since 1941 would require a total exertion of strength. He foresaw a collapse of Britain either through the rebellion of her hungry population or military annihilation.

66. Schellenberg, Labyrinth, pp. 299-301.
71. Speech by Himmler at Gauleitertagung, 28 November 1940, BA NS 19/4007, p. 8.
Once the Russian campaign began, Himmler's role expanded with the SS's tasks of repression and extermination of the Jews in the occupied territories, in keeping with the general ideologically radical cast of the war against the Soviet Union.72 Himmler's views as expressed in his speeches and as shown by the policies he pursued suggest that like Hitler he saw total war as the realization of German ideology. He did not appear to share the concern of Goebbels and Todt about military developments in the East. He considered the war with Russia to be 'the most necessary war' which prevented an attack on Germany by the Soviet Union.73 Himmler believed that winning the war was most important; all other problems could be solved in peace time. It did not concern him how many sacrifices were made for the victory which he still claimed was certain.74

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While the leadership took measures to reallocate labour and step up arms production, the wider question of total war was only broached by Goebbels in 1941-42. As a result of the fighting of winter 1941-42, German losses from June 1941 to the end of March 1942 were 295,000 killed or missing and 823,000 wounded.75 Two main non-military priorities of the regime were to make up for the losses of manpower and to increase armaments production. On 25 January 1942 Hitler called on the administration to free all available workers to the armed forces and armaments and ordered an end to

72. On the radicalization of the war see Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 29; H. Mommsen, 'Hitlers Stellung', pp. 63-4.
73. Himmler's speech to the leadership of the SS Division Das Reich, 19 June 1942, BA NS 19/2571, p. 1.
75. These figures were presented to Hitler by Halder on 21 April 1942: Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 (London, 1971), p. 228.
planning for peacetime tasks. The reports of measures taken provided to Lammers, the head of the Reich Chancellery listed measures of administrative simplification, rather than the numbers of staff saved as a result. On 26 April 1942 Hitler appointed General Walter von Unruh as 'special commissioner for the supervision of a purposeful war effort' to examine the armed forces' use of staff behind the lines and in the occupied territories. From May to July 1942 the von Unruh commission inspected organizations behind the lines in the East. Von Unruh's own reports indicate that he freed staff, made simplifications and acted as a kind of management consultant in suggesting improved administrative organization. In addition to uncovering cases of waste of raw materials and corruption, the commission found that overlapping organizational responsibilities led to many staff surpluses and inefficiencies. But von Unruh's reports

76. 'Erlass des Führers über die weitere Vereinfachung der Verwaltung. Vom 25. Januar 1942', BA R 43 II/353, pp. 1-3; Gutterer to ORBs, 30 May 1942, 'Abhaltung von Kongressen, Tagungen und sonstigen Veranstaltungen.', IfZ APK, 101 00704. He had already issued orders along these lines in 1941: Lammers to ORBs, 17 October 1941, 'Einschränkung der Versendung von Fragebogen.', IfZ APK, 101 07485-6.


78. Boelcke, Secret Conferences, p. 247. Some of von Unruh's reports to Hitler and Hoffmann's reports to Bormann about the commission's tour of the Eastern territories are the few sources of its activities in this period. Surviving records of the von Unruh commission are fragmented and mainly cover its activities in 1943. They are held in the Bundesarchiv as Rep. 312 from the Hauptarchiv Berlin-Dahlem, formerly the Prussian Geheimes Staatsarchiv. The commission set up to assist von Unruh in this task included representatives of the SS (With) and the Party Chancellery (Ifland, and Hoffmann). Orlow claims that Ifland strove to protect as many party leaders as possible from the commission's demands: Orlow, Nazi Party, II, p. 380, but I did not find evidence of this.
provide no overall numbers saved and no overview of his suggested methods for keeping administration simple. The commission did save staff in the occupied territories. It gave no exemptions from call up to workers born in 1914 and later. In August the commission freed some 700 of 3152 officials from the administration of the General Government, which it found to be overstaffed and top heavy. In Cracow as a whole the commission combed some 1,200 people out of the administration and industry. German firms were found to be moving their younger men into positions in the General Government to avoid call up. In total Hoffmann estimated that some 3,000 men were freed in the General Government from the civilian


80. Von Unruh reduced the employees of the Reichskommissariat Ostland from 457 to 300 men; Hoffmann considered a further 100 positions could be removed: Hoffmann to Bormann, 19 May 1942, 'Allgemeine Lage', BA NS 6/795, p. 5. It was able to reduce the staffs of the Reichskommissariats Ukraine and Shitomir by about one third: Hoffmann to Bormann, 5 June 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 6 Ukraine', p. 7; see also Hoffmann to Bormann, 7 June 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 7 Generalkommissariat Shitomir', ibid., p. 3. The civilian staff of the Kiev Generalkommissariat was reduced by some 1,200 to 1,500 people, 900 of whom would go to the armed forces: Hoffmann to Bormann, 10 June 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 8 Generalkommissar Kiew', ibid., p. 5.

81. Hoffmann to Bormann, 7 July 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 12 Generalkomissariat Nikolajew und Schlussbericht', ibid., p. 7.

82. Hoffmann thought 1000 more officials could have been removed: Hoffmann to Bormann, 20 August 1942, 'Geheim!', 'Bericht Nr. 3-Krakau', ibid., pp. 6, 7, 10.

83. Hoffmann to Bormann, 8 September 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 5 Radom und Lublin.', ibid., p. 24.

sector for the Wehrmacht or armaments.85 While the numbers of officials freed by the von Unruh commission were not great in comparison to German losses, its findings demonstrate the existence of excess capacity in the administration and indicate that Bormann was being advised that more positions could be cut. Hoffmann warned that there was a danger that offices would fill up with workers again after the commission ended. A limit on staff would need to be set from the top.86

Von Unruh’s commission was extended to the examination of offices inside Germany because of its successes in the occupied territories, Bormann advised party leaders, and von Unruh enjoyed Hitler’s ‘particular trust’.87 The von Unruh commission began examining each level of administration inside Germany on 15 November and aimed to finish by April 1943.88 Von Unruh also was to undertake inspections in the economy in agreement with Speer.89 Unfortunately the commission’s files governing these inspections contain only lists of employees listed by skill and fitness grading for various departments, provided for the commission’s deliberations. The results of its assessments of all levels of government, and the numbers it removed, have not survived.

After being named to replace Todt as Armaments Minister, Speer obtained Hitler’s agreement to the creation of a plenipotentiary

86. ibid., p. 7.
88. Hoffmann saw the support of the Gauleiters as crucial to their success: Fernschreiben Hoffmann to Bormann, 21 October 1942, BA NS 6/796, pp. 1-3.
for labour with extraordinary powers. In Speer's opinion the Gauleiters had shown themselves unwilling to transfer workers to other Gaus for armaments purposes; the bureaucrats of the Labour Ministry could not solve this problem which was one of political power.90 Despite Speer's preference for his friend, Karl Hanke, Gauleiter of Lower Silesia,91 the position was given to Thuringian Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel on 19 March 1942. Speer claimed Hitler agreed to the appointment of Hanke but Bormann had intervened, and persuaded Hitler that the position had to go to an experienced Gauleiter with the necessary authority to get agreement.92 Speer conceded that Sauckel was effective in identifying and mobilizing labour reserves in his first few months in the position: Bormann's support helped him overcome the resistance of the Gauleiters.93 Sauckel's office claimed that up to 31 December 1942 1,480,000 workers had come into the Reich and 1,725,000 prisoners of war

90. He considered the previous situation, where responsibility for providing labour lay with the State Secretary of the Labour Ministry, inadequate. 'Interrogation 3 Juli 1945' (interrogation of Speer), IfZ ED 99 Speer Interviews Band 13, p. 1; see also paper of 24 August 1945, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des Generalbevollmächtigte für den Arbeitseinsatz.', IfZ ED 99 Speer Interviews Band 9, p. 1.

91. On Speer's friendship with Hanke see Speer, Third Reich, pp. 21, 24; and on his preference for Hanke in the position, see Speer, paper of 24 August 1945, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des Generalbevollmächtigte für den Arbeitseinsatz.', IfZ ED 99 Speer Interviews Band 9, pp. 1-2.


(POWs) were employed. A total of 2.7 million workers had been transferred to the armaments economy in 1942.94

Sauckel and von Unruh's measures to win more staff did not affect other leaders for the moment. On their own initiative some leaders were beginning to reduce or reallocate their staff; these efforts give some indication of their attitude to total war. Other leaders appear to have been content to leave the responsibility for saving staff with von Unruh's commission, believing that it had the situation under control.95 Goebbels' diaries betrayed sharp concern about the 'winter crisis' on the Eastern Front, and in January 1942 he began to reduce the staff of his ministry and substitute female for male workers to make more men available to the army and to the armaments industry.96 Women were employed as drivers and messengers, and to perform less important administrative tasks. By the end of 1941 Goebbels had made 650 or 36 per cent of the 1770 employees in his ministry available to the armed forces and armaments industry. Of the remaining 1400 employees by March 1942 60 per cent were women.97 Other measures of simplification


95. The reports of some ORBs to Lammers in 1943 suggest that this was the case: see for example, Meissner to Lammers, 26 February 1943, BA R 43 II/660, pp. 1-2.


97. Leader of the personnel section, submission to the Minister, 30 April 1942, 'Fraueneinsatz.', BA R 55/18, pp. 1-4.
were also adopted in Goebbels' ministry.\textsuperscript{98} Hitler overruled Goebbels' plan to reduce uk\textsuperscript{99} positions in the arts, stating that cultural life was necessary to maintain morale and keep the home front from pessimism.\textsuperscript{100} He reported his own staffing measures to Hitler in a submission (\textit{Führerinformation}) but he did not suggest that they be adopted by other departments. He did however point out that while the Propaganda Ministry now had a ratio of 32 per cent men to 68 per cent women, the Armaments Ministry still had 35 per cent women to 65 per cent men.\textsuperscript{101}

Goebbels' staff also investigated the wider question of female employment, which he had already supported at the beginning of 1941.\textsuperscript{102} He and the Deutsche Arbeits Front leader, Dr. Robert Ley, had sought unsuccessfully in September 1941 to have compulsory registration of women for labour introduced. Hitler declined, saying he would consider it if America entered the war.\textsuperscript{103} At this stage Goebbels' staff did not envisage compulsion; rather it was hoped that

\textsuperscript{98} In January 1942 Goebbels' State Secretary Gutterer asked section heads to tell him which of their tasks could be shut down or combined, and which workers could subsequently be made free: Schmidt-Leonhardt to section heads, 16 January 1942, 'Maßregeln zwecks Freimachung von Arbeitskräften', BA R 55/414. (The relevant file does not record the response of the officials.) In April 1942 Gutterer's office sought and received advice from the budget section concerning simplifying its forms: Budget section (\textit{Haushaltsabteilung}) to Pg. Schmonsee, 10 April 1942, BA R 55/414.

\textsuperscript{99} unabkömmlich (indispensable) or uk.

\textsuperscript{100} Entry for 20 January 1942, BA NL 118/38, pp. 57-8; see also Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, p. 299.

\textsuperscript{101} Goebbels to Hitler, March 1942, 'über den Fraueneinsatz im Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda.', BA R 55/18, pp. 1-2.


\textsuperscript{103} Bormann to Lammers, 25 September 1941, 'Frauendienstpflicht', BA R 43 II/652.
moral pressure for women to do their duty would be enough. They reported to Goebbels that greater employment of women would free a considerable proportion of men to the armed forces. It would be most successful if the women were employed in administrative jobs in the first instance, and if the OKW participated in a propaganda campaign to persuade the men at the front that such an innovation was necessary. Goebbels prepared a propaganda campaign to encourage women to take over their husbands' businesses.

During the winter of 1941-42 Goebbels also originated a wider plan for mobilization of labour, the exact details of which have not survived. He planned a concentration of total industrial capacity on armaments but Göring persuaded Hitler it was not necessary. Goebbels' diaries suggest he also intended to recruit one million workers on a voluntary basis. Hitler rejected his plan, telling him he preferred to use Soviet POWs rather than German workers.

Himmler also showed a willingness to make cuts in his staff to support the war effort. By June 1942 he set high priority on making more men available for the front, and urged the SS leadership to reduce the numbers of men in their offices and headquarters continuously. They should improvise to the point that eventually perhaps only the wounded would be employed at headquarters. Himmler was not prepared to tell Hitler that more troops could not be

104. Leader of the personnel section, submission to the Minister, 21 January 1942, 'Ersatz männlicher Arbeitskräfte im Ministerium durch Frauen.', BAR 55/18, pp. 1-7.

105. Tiessler, untitled submission to Goebbels, 26 August 1941, BA NS 18/659.


108. Entry for 20 January 1942, BA NL 118/38, pp. 54-5.
provided. 'We can never use the word impossible.'\(^{109}\) In the winter of 1941-42 Himmler took another decision to relieve labour shortages; he expanded use of the concentration camps as an SS-owned source of compulsory labour.\(^{110}\) He was also interested in the SS assisting the development of new weapons.\(^{111}\)

Himmler claimed to favour administrative simplicity.\(^{112}\) He called on the SS leadership to reduce their own disagreements.\(^{113}\) He expected them to seek his advice quickly on matters of disagreement rather than let the dispute widen.\(^{114}\) Earlier, in a letter to Heydrich and Daluege, Himmler had sought to simplify SS administrative procedures. He asked them to decentralize the issuing of licences and permits, and to reduce the length of time and number of consultations for SS matters. Reports could be signed by delegates rather than personally by the heads of departments, and daily files were to be


\(^{111}\) Himmler to Jüttner, 17 April 1942, BA NS 19/1937, pp. 1-2.

\(^{112}\) Himmler to Interior Ministry State Secretary Stuckart, 4 March 1942, BA NS 19/2393. See also Himmler to Lammers, 31 October 1942, IFZ APK, 101 02285-6.

\(^{113}\) Himmler, speech to the leadership corps of the SS Division Das Reich, 19 June 1942, BA NS 19/2571, p. 7.

\(^{114}\) Instead of circulating critical memoranda on disputed points, he suggested they write personal letters to each other and then meet face to face and ascertain those points on which they agreed: speech of 9 June 1942, BA NS 19/4009, pp. 11-12; Himmler to Berger, 8 August 1942, BA NS 19/2369.
passed on immediately.115 In September 1942 he again called on SS officers to stop fighting over responsibilities.116

His overall approach to solving administrative and domestic political problems was punitive. Germany suffered from the jurisdictional disputes of its ministries and offices; he called on his commanders to send the 'useless bed bugs' who made a living from these disputes to the Eastern Front.117 Those who over-indulged in alcohol were to be strictly punished;118 while those who made gains while the soldier bled were to be eradicated.119

In April 1942 Himmler agreed to release a general order that the wives of SS men and their other female relatives should undertake voluntary work with the Frauenschaft.120 Himmler was not prepared to accept a draft decree by SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, leader of the SS-Hauptamt,121 which cast the measure in the context of total war, and which would have 'required' all SS men to see the female members of their family report to the local offices of the Frauenschaft.122 Instead Himmler's order was shorter, and omitted all mention of total war and the wider questions of women's

115. Himmler to Daluege and Heydrich, 7 February 1942, BA NS 19/300, pp. 1-2.
118. ibid., p. 13.
119. Himmler, speech to the leadership corps of the SS Division Das Reich, 19 June 1942, BA NS 19/2571, p. 7.
121. For biographical details of Berger see Kinder, 'Die Persönliche Stab Reichsführer-SS', p. 382 note 17 and Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 169.
employment. It merely 'asked' the female relatives to report to the Frauenenschaft.\(^{123}\) He did not comment on the wider problem raised by the Frauenenschaft leaders in their meeting with Berger - namely that their credibility with working women was diminished by the reluctance of privileged women to work. The Frauenenschaft leaders told Berger that Hitler and Göring had overruled Sauckel's plans to introduce a requirement for women to work.\(^{124}\)

Himmler thus favoured administrative simplification and the creation of a 'lean' behind-the-lines organization. He did not oppose the wider employment of women. His actions and those of Bormann show no wider or more coherently expressed concept of total war at this time. Bormann spent this period consolidating the power he obtained when he became chief of the Party Chancellery, a staff organization under Hitler's control. His office imposed some restrictions on the party's administrative procedures.\(^{125}\) At the beginning of 1942 he advised that military requirements made it impossible to ease the bar on new reserved positions. The party would have to give up more men and restrict its remaining uk positions as much as possible.\(^{126}\)

\(^{123}\) Brandt to Berger, 3 June 1942, \textit{ibid}., pp. 1-2.

\(^{124}\) While they accepted the principle that the first duty of women of (racial) worth was to have children, they noted that the inability to replace greatly overworked women in munitions factories resulted in a greater productivity loss than in the 1918 munitions strikes: Berger to Himmler, 2 April 1942, 'Besprechung mit Vertreterinnen des Reichsfrauenführungs', \textit{ibid}., pp. 1-5. Göring's opposition may have reflected Hitler's views since Göring had favoured the use of female labour in wartime in the 1930s: Overy, \textit{Goering}, p. 84.


\(^{126}\) Bormann, 1 January 1942, 'Geheime Reichssache', 'Rundschreiben Nr. 1/42 gRs.', 'Aufkündigung von Uk-Stellungen innerhalb der Partei, ihrer Gliederungen und angeschlossenen Verbände.', BA NS 6/339, pp. 1-2.
Bormann does not appear to have taken more far-reaching action to cut staffing in Party offices or to have made other simplifications at this time. Here he may have reflected the prevailing optimism in Hitler's headquarters about the outcome of the Russian campaign. Nor did he interfere with Goebbels' and Himmler's attempts to increase the number of men sent to the front from within their own organizations. His influence over Hitler, based on his ability to restrict access to Hitler, and on the way he brought issues and disputes to Hitler's attention, was not an obstacle to these internal departmental policies.

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The second area requiring greater attention as a result of the 'winter crisis' was armaments production. Throughout 1941 Hitler continued to switch priorities in armaments production. The armaments economy was impeded by the lack of a clear overview of German economic potential. At the end of 1941 Todt persuaded Hitler to extend the system of industrial self-responsibility from munitions to all war equipment. This set up a series of committees, largely staffed by factory managers, responsible for allocating munitions orders and developing weapons. Hitler preferred to rely


128. For example the belief in a quick victory over Russia led him to expand air and sea armaments in July: Hitler, 14 July 1941, order 'Nr. 441219/41 g.Kdos.Chefs.', Document 074-C, T.M.W.C., vol. 34, pp. 298-302; Thomas, Geschichte, pp. 284-5. For other evidence of changing priorities see Fanning, 'German war economy in 1941', pp. 51-3; Janssen, Ministerium Speer, pp. 27-8; Carroll, Total War, p. 228.


130. Hitler decree, 3 December 1941, 'Vereinfachung und Leistungssteigerung unserer Rüstungsproduktion', BA NS 19/3513, pp. 1-6; see also Milward, German Economy, pp. 60-8 which sets out the workings of the committee system: Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 230.
on industrialists than on military direction of the economy. Todt had also introduced a system of price fixing for war contracts by December 1941. On 4 February he announced the appointment of Zangen, head of the Reich Industry Group, to extend rationalization to the civilian economy. In 1942 all Gauleiters were made defence commissioners and the boundaries of other organizations were revised to correspond with the Gaus. An attempt by Kehrl to ensure greater co-operation in the field of economic policy in 1942 failed. Although Goebbels and Funk agreed to the principle neither wanted to take the initiative for real co-operation, because, Kehrl believed, they feared upsetting the balance of powers among the leadership.

Speer was appointed Minister after Todt's death in February 1942. There were few attempts to poach on the ministry's responsibilities, largely due to Hitler's clear support for Speer. 'For a considerable time I found myself moving in a kind of vacuum that

132. Milward, German Economy, pp. 69-70.
133. Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 231. This initiative seems to have foundered after Todt's death.
134. Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 207.
136. Milward, German economy, pp. 59-62. He was nominally responsible to Göring in the Four Year Plan in his capacity as Generalbevollmächtigter für Rüstungsaufgaben: Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 56.
offered no resistance whatsoever,' Speer later observed. In a dispute Speer had with Rosenberg over control of the economy in the occupied Eastern territories, Hitler not only decided in Speer's favour but also declared that he would sign anything which came from Speer. This support may have been prompted not only by Hitler's personal friendship with Speer but also by his recognition that clear authority was needed for armaments production, since he had already agreed to a considerable expansion of the powers of Todt's ministry.

Hitler's support facilitated the creation of the office of plenipotentiary for labour and enabled Speer to create new coordinating organizations such as the committee, Zentrale Planung (Central Planning), staffed by Speer, Milch and Koerner which allocated resources to the various industries and provided a partial solution to the lack of a central office for the German war economy. Speer set up a 'key worker' (Schlüsselkräfte) system to secure key and skilled workers from call-up. The Wehrmacht's War Economy and Armaments Branch and its armaments inspectors were


139. Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 47.

140. Milward, German Economy, p. 70.


143. Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt, abbreviated to WiRüAmt.
subordinated to Speer on 7 May 1942.144 The resulting increases in production also reduced attempts to cut across Speer’s responsibilities.

Although he had not originated the system of industrial self-responsibility, Speer made it his own and argued that bureaucracy was the death of improvisation.145 In a speech to Gauleiters on 24 February 1942, Speer urged them to put an end to their peacetime planning and told them not to be influenced by what they might consider to be exceptional circumstances in their Gaus. He told them that it was not the party's task to determine and organize the remaining industrial economy; that was the task of the armaments economy. The party's task was to increase the productivity of the German worker.146 He called for the total mobilization of all auxiliary forces to achieve victory by October 1942.147

Todt's concern about Germany's productive capacity has already been noted. Other leaders did not yet seem to be worried. They may have been lulled by rises in German production; overall armaments production increased 55 per cent between February and July 1942, probably as a result of Todt's reforms,148 and they continued to underestimate enemy productive capacity. Despite his usual caution,

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144. Speer Chronik for May 1942, BA R 3/1736, pp. 34, 37. Despite Thomas’ support for this amalgamation he was soon frozen out by Speer: Thomas, Geschichte, pp. 310-14, 352-3; Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 51; Carroll, Total War, pp. 235-40.
145. Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 47; see also Speer, Third Reich, pp. 208-9.
147. Speer, Third Reich, pp. 214-5; Schmidt, Speer Myth, p. 71.
148. Milward, German Economy, p. 70.
Goebbels regarded American production figures of early 1942 as exaggerated for propaganda purposes.149

This lack of concern or urgency about German policy extended to other areas of relevance to the mobilization of all forces for the war effort, such as the treatment of Eastern peoples and the treatment of the Jews. In the first six months of the Eastern campaign there was very little sense of urgency about the debate about the treatment of the peoples of the occupied East. It was assumed that the war was already won. At a time when the population in the occupied territories was at its most sympathetic to the Germans, there were no efforts to win their support. A skilful attempt to win the population in the East at this time might have yielded substantial results.150 The Soviet General Vlasov, captured in July 1942, sought German support for the exploitation of anti-Stalin feeling and the formation of a Russian army but was not able to gain significant political support.151

Goebbels was among the first to be persuaded of the need for a change in tactics. As early as September 1941 he considered 'the main problem' of the Russian campaign to be the need for a positive political policy towards the Russian people.152 He prepared a memorandum to Hitler on the political handling of Russia. It is not clear whether he submitted the memorandum to Hitler. He certainly

149. Entry for 14 April 1942 in Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, p. 169.
150. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 44-59, 65.
152. He was asked by experts on Russia to put these views to Hitler: entry for 4 September 1941 in Semmler, Goebbels, p. 51; see also entries for 29 September, 4 October and 11 October 1941, ibid., pp. 52-3, 56 respectively; entries for 29 January 1942, 11 February 1942, 25 April 1942 and 22 May 1942 in Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 55, 77, 185 and 225.
raised the question of the treatment of the Russians with him.\textsuperscript{153} Hitler told him that it was Rosenberg's responsibility and not something he should interfere in.\textsuperscript{154} His poor relations with Rosenberg hindered his efforts to change these policies.\textsuperscript{155} He blamed the weakness of the Ostministerium for some of these problems.\textsuperscript{156} Goebbels' diary entries of June 1942 suggest that he had not raised the matter again with Hitler, partly because, reflecting Hitler's rebuke, he believed that it was not one of his responsibilities.\textsuperscript{157} Instead he used his subordinates in an attempt to counter these policies,\textsuperscript{158} but Hitler remained steadfast.\textsuperscript{159} Bormann, on the other hand, was receiving advice favouring harsh policies in the East and was reinforcing Hitler's hardline views on the issue.\textsuperscript{160}

Goebbels wanted more flexible and lenient policies introduced in the East. He wanted action against the churches postponed until

\textsuperscript{153} Tiessler, 'Licht und Schatten', IfZ ED 158, P. 158. Goebbels raised the question of the treatment of Russian POWs with Hitler in November 1941 when Hitler told him that they would be treated better in Germany than in the USSR: entry for 30 November 1941, BA NL 118/36, pp. 43-4. Hitler later ordered better feeding of the Russian POWs; entry for 21-22 March 1942, Boelcke, Hitlers Konferenzen, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{154} Tiessler, 'Licht und Schatten', IfZ ED 158, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{155} Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{156} Entry for 4 June 1942, BA NL 118/46, pp. 12-13.

\textsuperscript{157} ibid.

\textsuperscript{158} As for example in his unsuccessful use of Tiessler, his state secretary Gutterer and the head of his Eastern section, Dr. Eberhard Taubert, to stop the SS distribution of a racist pamphlet on the Eastern peoples: Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, pp. 161-4.

\textsuperscript{159} Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 154.

\textsuperscript{160} On the advice Bormann received see Hoffmann to Bormann, 23 June 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 10 Uman, Tscherkassy, Aleksandrija, Snamenka, Perwomaisk, Kirowograd', pp. 3, 7; Hoffmann to Bormann, 7 July 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 12', pp. 11-14; and Hoffmann to Bormann, 14 June 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 9 Fastow-Proskurow-Kamentz-Podolsk-Kasatin-Winniza', BA NS 6/795, p. 4; on Bormann's reinforcement of Hitler's views see Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 126, 141.
after the war was over because it diverted energy from the goal of winning the war,161 and he believed he had Hitler’s agreement to this approach.162 Nonetheless he increased his efforts to drive Jews from Berlin.163 Indeed Goebbels linked the struggle against the Jews with decisiveness and thoroughness in the war effort.164 On 29 May 1942 he gained Hitler’s permission to ‘evacuate’ Jews from Berlin. Hitler gave Speer the task of replacing Jews employed in the German armaments industry by foreign workers as far as possible.165 Goebbels commented that 40,000 Jews at liberty with nothing to lose were a security threat.166 By the end of May 1942, Goebbels pointed out to Hitler how much more favourable the German situation was than in 1917. Hitler replied that the German workers did not think of stabbing him in the back. 'The Germans only participate in subversive movements if the Jews seduce them.'167

Similarly, for Himmler the war was an ideological war, a war to the death between the Germans and the subhuman Slavs who were

161. Entries for 29 August 1941, BA NL 118/23, pp. 20-2; 14 September 1941, BA NL 118/26, pp. 16-17; entry for 30 May 1942, BA NL 118/46, pp. 21-2.

162. Entry for 30 May 1942, BA NL 118/46, p. 60.

163. Director Propaganda Section to Goebbels, 12 November 1941, ‘Material über die wirtschaftliche Lage Berlins.’, BA NS 18/645, pp. 1-9; entry for 24 October 1941, BA NL 118/33, p. 19; on Hitler’s support for this, see entry for 20 January 1942, BA NL 118/38, p. 68.

164. Entry for 28 May 1942, BA NL 118/46, pp. 29-30. His diary entries for 1942 are more anti-semitic than those of 1941, illustrating the intensification of the ideological side of the war.


166. Entry for 30 May 1942, pp. 39-41; see also entries of 28 May 1942, pp. 29-30, and 31 May 1942, BA NL 118/46, pp. 20-1.

167. Entry for 30 May 1942, ibid., p. 44.
governed by Jewish Bolshevism. Accordingly, although he did not state this in his speeches of the time, the SS implementation of the Final Solution would have been consistent with his commitment to total war. Jewish armaments workers were removed from armaments firms in the General Government despite the economic objections of the armed forces. 'Economic interests should fundamentally be left out of consideration with the settlement of the problem.' By December 1942 only 500,000 Jews were still alive in the Polish deportation area.

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In 1942 Himmler was certain of victory in the East although he warned that it would be no easy fight because Stalin used the most modern weapons and had no regard for human life. He considered

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173. 'Rede des Reichsführer-SS am 16. September 1942 in der Feldkommandostelle vor der Teilnehmern an der SS-und Polizeiführer-
that subordinates like Schellenberg overestimated Russian strength.174 Goebbels still did not share Hitler's confidence.175 By November 1942 he had also retreated from his earlier hopes about a possible disintegration of Britain. He commented that the Germans often indulged in such 'vain' hopes because of their experience in 1918, where they foundered 'because of our ideologists and because of our own lack of political education'.176

Germany continued to need to replace losses on the Eastern front. By 21 June 1942 they amounted to 271,612 dead and 65,730 missing in the East, and 851,053 wounded by 10 May 1942.177 In an attempt to compensate for these losses and to exploit new sources of labour, Hitler ruled on 29 July 1942 that girls employed by the Labour Service were to be transferred to the Wehrmacht and state administration offices for a further six months war service, and the OKW announced in late 1942 that all wounded soldiers capable of military service were to take the places of men fit for active service in the Replacement Army (Ersatzheer).178 In December Keitel ordered that soldiers who were not able-bodied or who had participated in

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177. ibid., p. 247.

178. ibid.
World War One should be exchanged with younger fit soldiers in reserved positions.\textsuperscript{179}

Even though some one million foreign workers arrived in Germany from May to October 1942,\textsuperscript{180} they could not satisfy the economy's need for labour.\textsuperscript{181} The use of prisoners of war in economic production expanded.\textsuperscript{182} Speer was having to rely more on the use of concentration camp labour.\textsuperscript{183} The question of employment of women became more important\textsuperscript{184} and there was dissatisfaction at their unequal treatment.\textsuperscript{185} In a speech on 18 November, Sauckel claimed that he had planned on taking up his position to increase female employment, but had changed his mind after talks with Hitler and Göring. As a result of these talks, he recognized that it was necessary to restrict female employment 'for biological reasons', to increase the birth rate.\textsuperscript{186} Unfortunately it was not possible to correct the resulting injustice to women who had been working for years. Hitler's

\textsuperscript{179} Keitel considered that two principles had to take priority - putting young active men at the front and putting everyone in the place where he could be most effective. If specialists could not be used in the Wehrmacht then civilian jobs had to be found for them. Keitel order, 10 December 1942, 'Personaleinsatz in der Wehrmacht-Austausch vom minderkriegsbrauchbaren Soldaten und Weltkriegsteilnehmern gegen uk-gestellte kv-Wehrpflichtige jüngerer Geburtsjahrgänge.', BA MA R W4/v. 473, pp. 1-4.

\textsuperscript{180} Alan S. Milward, \textit{War, Economy and Society}, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{181} Signature, 8 July 1942, 'Vermerk für Herrn Reichsminister Speer.', 'Arbeitseinsatz b.d.Fa. Friedrich Krupp AG., Essen', BA R 41/228a, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{182} Signature, Armaments and Munitions Ministry to Dr. Timm, 9 June 1942, BA R 41/172, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{183} Speer Chronik for September 1942, BA R 3/1736, pp. 72, 83.

\textsuperscript{184} Entry for 11 December 1942 in Lochner, \textit{Goebbels Diaries}, p. 237.

\textsuperscript{185} Kebbel minute to Spangenberg, 23 October 1942, BA NS 18/638.

views, as reported by Sauckel, may have reflected the importance he attached to questions of racial policy, his continued confidence in German success or a belief that the call-up of women would cause social unrest.\textsuperscript{187} Sauckel was able to promise increased numbers of foreign labour. To a considerable extent the prospects of increased foreign labour allowed members of the leadership to adopt such an attitude to the question of increased employment of German women. While both Himmler and Goebbels supported increased female employment,\textsuperscript{188} the clear indications from Sauckel and the Frauenschaft that the opposition came directly from Hitler deterred further moves. The fear of a repetition of the unrest of 1918 can be seen in Hitler's attitude to the employment of women. Goebbels on the other hand believed that his propaganda would have averted a 1918 style uprising.\textsuperscript{189} Employment of women nonetheless increased, including in the SS. On 30 November 1942 Himmler issued guidelines for German women employed by the SS and police, especially in areas outside the Reich.\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{187} Mason, 'Zum Frauenarbeit im NS-Staat', Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, vol. 17 (1977), p. 580. Hitler ordered the recruitment of some 400-500,000 Ukrainian women to become household servants: unsigned report, 4 September 1942, 'Geheim', 'Hereinnahme hauswirtschaftlicher Ostarbeiterinnen in das Reich', Document 025-RS, TMWC, vol. 25, pp. 84-5. Ultimately some 100,000 women were employed in this capacity: Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, note 262, p. 407. The figures of 500,000 women put forward by Speer are incorrect: Speer, Third Reich, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{188} On Goebbels' support see entries for 1 March 1942, in which he recognized the disincentive of the allowances paid to soldiers' dependents, and 11 December 1942, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 107-8, 237.

\textsuperscript{189} Entry for 27 November 1943, ibid., p. 533.

\textsuperscript{190} Reichsführer-SS, 30 November 1942, 'Richtlinien für die Betreuung der in Bereich der SS und Polizei eingesetzten deutschen Frauen insbesondere in den Gebieten außerhalb der Reichsgrenze', BA NS 19/3324, pp. 1-3.
Although Goebbels described the fall of Stalingrad as imminent in October 1942, he continued to reduce the size of his Ministry further. He gave an official from his Ministry, Ministerialdirigent Haegert, the task of combing out the Ministry's staff and that of related organizations. Haegert suggested ending 81 UK positions in the Ministry up to the level of specialist (Referent), freeing 100 of the 550 UK positions in publishing and the closure of nine organizations. By 28 November Goebbels had agreed to close all these offices and a radio station (Reichssender Köln), resulting in the freeing of 105 workers and the saving of 3,028,000 Reichsmarks. The Reichmesseamt lost 113 positions. By the end of the year 2,598 UK positions had been removed from the Ministry since 1 June 1942 in this voluntary process. The Ministry and its related offices employed 19,033 people on 1 June 1942, 17,683 on 1 October 1942 and 16,435 on 1 January 1943. Goebbels had always sought to keep his Ministry relatively small, but these reductions are a


193. Head of Section S to head Section H, 28 November 1942, BA R 55/414.


particular sign of the importance he attached to 'total war'. The increasing problems of the air war and its effect on civilian morale could equally have been used to justify an expansion of the Propaganda Ministry because of the importance of the 'mobilization of enthusiasm' in total war.

Bormann undertook some restrictions on the party: the number of UK party leaders was reduced in the first ten months of 1942 from 20,319 to 15,458.196 At the same time the party was laying claim to increasing areas of responsibility. Hoffmann's reports proposed expansion of party activities in the East together with restraint for other organizations.197 Bormann further consolidated his position in 1942, as Hitler increasingly concentrated on military matters. His authority was demonstrated when Hoffmann sent him copies of von Unruh's reports, despite express orders from the Wehrmachtshauptamt that these not be transmitted further. Hoffmann believed Bormann had to be informed how Keitel would report to Hitler.198

Labour shortages expanded the SS's role in economic production.199 Himmler promised a large labour force even though

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196. Orlow, Nazi Party, II, p. 341. At the end of 1942 the party employed some 85,327 fulltime functionaries. More than one sixth (15,711) of the fulltime party leaders were of military age but were draft exempt: ibid., p. 408. In Baden the party gave up 25 per cent of UK positions of political leaders and Gauleiter Wagner continued to demand the release of more staff: Grill, Nazi Movement in Baden, p. 456.


the actual workforce the SS commanded has been estimated to have been no more than 500,000 at any one time.\textsuperscript{200} On 7 July 1942, following a discussion with Schieber of the Armaments Ministry, Himmler proposed that a factory would be built in Buchenwald to produce 55,000 carbines, Neuengamme would make the .08 pistol, and an SS company would be established to produce communications equipment in women's concentration camps.\textsuperscript{201} On 15 September 1942 Speer agreed to the creation of 300 more barracks at Auschwitz and to the employment of workers available in concentration camps for large armaments tasks. The price of this agreement for the SS was abandonment of their principle of relocating all such production inside the camps. Instead, factories outside had to be emptied of their personnel and filled totally by the SS's prisoners. 50,000 Jews would be employed.\textsuperscript{202} The SS had also offered Speer other production as well.\textsuperscript{203} These plans met resistance from representatives of the army and industry, who saw the SS as competitors.\textsuperscript{204} Later in September Speer, Saur and Sauckel persuaded Hitler to end the plan to bring 50,000 Jews back into the Reich for employment in these projects. Hitler agreed because he considered Sauckel had solved the question of labour supply.\textsuperscript{205} Himmler was to retain some production for

\textsuperscript{200} Milward, \textit{War, Economy and Society}, p. 227. On the SS use of labour see Hilberg \textit{Destruction of European Jews} 3, pp. 917-36.

\textsuperscript{201} Himmler to Pohl, 7 July 1942, BA NS 19/1542.

\textsuperscript{202} Pohl commented that earlier attempts by the SS Hauptamt to achieve this had foundered on resistance from those close to Speer, particularly Saur: Pohl to Himmler, 16 September 1942, 'a) Rüstungsarbeiten. b) Bombenschäden.', BA NS 19/14, pp. 1-3.


\textsuperscript{204} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 21-4.

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 21-5.
armaments purposes but not to the extent he and Pohl had planned.206

Although Speer saw the SS's economic production as a considerable obstacle to rational planning of production and resented the empire building that was involved,207 Himmler's actions and statements suggest that he saw SS economic production as part of the SS's contribution to total war.208 'Every internee had to be employed in the armament industry to the extreme limit of his forces. The Reichsführer constantly and on every occasion kept this goal before our eyes', testified the commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Hoess.209 Himmler combined his support for total war with his ideological preoccupations. Therefore, despite his concern for increased production, he asked both Sauckel and Göring to have ethnic Germans removed from employment and the armed forces and made available to the Hauptamt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle to be used in political activities.210 These requests were refused because of the labour shortage and the need for ethnic German interpreters in the armed forces respectively.211

206. ibid., pp. 24-5.
207. This view is presented by Speer, Slave State, passim.
208. ibid., pp. 48-9. At this time Himmler refused to allow Ohlendorf to become State Secretary of the Economics Ministry, considering that this would only lead to the SS being blamed for any economic failures: Himmler, 21 October 1942, 'Geheim', 'Aktenvermerk', BA NS 19/2731. Speer claims that Himmler's decision was due to Hitler's support for the work of the industrialists in the self-responsibility of industry: Speer, Slave State, pp. 66-7.
210. Himmler to Göring, 7 September 1942, pp. 1-2, and letter of same date to Sauckel, BA NS 19/3597.
211. Sauckel to Himmler, 26 October 1942, 'Ausgliederung der volksdeutschen Arbeiter aus dem Arbeitsprozeß in Reich', and Keitel to Himmler, 3 December 1942, BA NS 19/3597, pp. 1-3.
Speer could shield himself from some of Himmler's attempts to expand the SS's economic role because of the independence he gained as a result of his continuing success in armaments production. By July 1942 the general index of finished armaments production was 55 per cent above that of February; production rose again from October.\(^{212}\) Milward has suggested that Speer's opposition to Hitler's attempts to revert to a Blitzkrieg economy in this period caused him to begin to lose Hitler's favour, but he provides no evidence for this.\(^{213}\) There are no signs of such a loss of favour in late 1942.

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The intensification of the bombing offensive against Germany, marked by the thousand bomber raid against Cologne in June, made air defence and care for the air raid victims an additional task for the leadership and one which absorbed increasing resources.\(^{214}\) Himmler abandoned his usual avoidance of areas outside his jurisdiction to suggest improved air protection, and also arranged for three SS building brigades to be created to help in repair and clearing up after air attacks.\(^{215}\) The air war not only increasingly weakened the effectiveness of propaganda but also provided problems for morale: the German civilian population tended to over-estimate the

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212. Milward, *German Economy*, p. 100.


214. Hitler decided that the party should help find the necessary personnel for anti-aircraft batteries, drawing on the local SA and Hitler Youth leadership: Hitler, 2 December 1942, 'Verfüigung V 23/42', BA NS6/78, p. 1.

215. He advised SS-Gruppenführer Martin in Nuremberg about fire and securing equipment during air-raids: Himmler to SS-Gruppenführer Martin, 9 September 1942, and he wrote to SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Daluege suggesting precautions to be adopted on trains in case of air attack: Himmler to Daluege, 9 October 1942, pp. 2-3, 5-6; Himmler to Pohl, 9 September 1942, and Himmler to Speer, 9 September 1942, BA NS 19/14.
effectiveness of Allied bombing.216 A certain level of consumer production was needed to replace household goods lost in bombing and to meet the increased demand of foreign workers.217 Goebbels opposed Kehrl’s proposals to issue a ration card for household goods because of the psychological impact of not being able to honour such cards. The two agreed instead on increased control and allocation of such goods to the bombed areas.218

Goebbels proposed that an ‘air protection section’ of the Propaganda Ministry co-ordinate preparation of broad guidelines for repair measures.219 This was opposed by the head of the Party Chancellery’s political department, Friedrichs, because it would tie down more staff and further complicate responsibilities. Such measures could be carried out by the Gauleiters.220 Despite this opposition, Goebbels was eventually successful in gaining control of civil response to air raids.221 In January 1943 the


218. Goebbels commented that he doubted if Kehrl would be able to meet the clothing card, as proved to be the case, let alone a new card: Kehrl, Krisenmanager, pp. 270-1; see also entry for 4 January 1943, Semmler, Goebbels, pp. 63-4.


221. In April 1942 Hitler had already given him responsibility for introducing immediate measures for all bombed areas where the Gau’s own resources were insufficient: Goebbels to all Gauleiters, 28 April 1942, ‘Hilfsmassnahmen bei Bombenschäden.’, IIZ APK, 103 06794.
Luftkriegsschädenausschuss, an inter-departmental air war damage committee, was set up under his control. Its task was to 'centralize, coordinate and above all to activate civil measures of the Reich' in event of air damage. Goebbels' persistence on this issue brought him success, possibly because he was the only member of the leadership willing to take on such a potentially difficult task. His role also expanded because of the leadership's concern about popular morale. Various steps were taken to improve morale, including a decree from Hitler asking the leadership to ensure that it observed all wartime restrictions.

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Two of the regime's most influential and able leaders, Fritz Todt and Reinhard Heydrich, died in 1942. In this period they had been the members of the leadership to pay the greatest attention to the wider implications of total war. Their attempts to persuade Hitler to seek a compromise peace indicate that they believed that a more thorough application of German resources to the war effort would not be enough to improve Germany's chances of victory. Their task was difficult because they were seeking to have Hitler change the entire basis of the war to one for limited goals.


224. 'Erlaß des Führers über die Lebenshaltung führender Persönlichkeiten. Vom 21. März 1942.', IfZ APK, 101 00506. Other steps taken included a campaign originated by Hitler to ensure greater politeness on public transport by officials to passengers: Dr. Stuckart, Interior Ministry to the Reichsstatthalter, July 1942, 'Höflichkeit in öffentlichen Verkehrsmitteln', BA R 55/7, Bormann telex to Lammers, 2 June 1942, IfZ APK, 101 04586; a Propaganda Ministry campaign for 'more courtesy' (Mehr Höflichkeit) and the stopping by Hitler of a policy of confiscating at the border from soldiers on leave parcels of food intended for their families: Keitel to OKH-Gen QU, 20 July 1942, and Himmler Fernschreiben to Streckenbach, 16 August 1942, BA NS 19/350.
Of the other leaders only Goebbels showed great concern, but he had not yet articulated any analysis of the overall situation. His initial interest appears to have come from his general approach to problems: 'The watchword must be: keep one's nerve and a cool head. And prepare everything down to the last detail.' Some of the distinctive elements of Goebbels' approach to the issue of total war were already beginning to emerge. There was no doubt that he believed that the population's loyalty could be relied on and that they could be urged to greater efforts if this was accompanied by a reduction in privileges. He believed that it was psychologically important for each citizen to feel they were contributing to the war effort. He regarded developments like the black market as the inevitable consequences of a long war. He was already using the party crises of 1930 and 1932 as a model of the situation the regime faced and writing with admiration of the more radical Russian war effort. By December 1942 Goebbels was planning to make closer contact with

225. Entry for 29 March 1941, Taylor, Goebbels Diaries, p. 286. See also entries for 26 January and 19 March 1942 in Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 49 and 129; and Boelcke, Secret Conferences, entries for 12 December 1939, 11 April 1940, 20 September 1940 and 14 October 1940, pp. 8, 31, 94, 104.

226. Entries for 1 February 1942 and 13 February 1942, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 64, 84; see also the views he expressed to Speer as set out in Speer's comments in an undated record of a meeting to discuss the November 1942 labour intake, Dr. Dörr, 'Arbeitseinsatz für November 1942', BA R 3/1697, p. 4. He was probably basing this view on public morale as reported by SD reports; 'Anlage' to 'Meldungen aus dem Reich Nr. 263', 26 February 1942, Meldungen, vol. 9, pp. 3382-91.


228. Entry for 22 October 1941, BA NL 118/33, pp. 18-19.


the Gauleiters. Although he later was to write that it was at this time that he began to urge that more vigorous policies be pursued, there is little extant evidence of how he did this. He apparently approached Hitler in winter 1941 to argue for more radical action but met with little response. In March 1942 Goebbels claimed that Hitler agreed with his proposals to conduct the war in a more radical manner but he noted opposition from the bureaucracy.

In addition Goebbels took what steps he could in his own sphere of authority. This too was Himmler's response. Their efforts to simplify were also affected by a psychological factor. Just beginning such simplifications and closures would seem an achievement; at this stage minor simplifications would seem considerable even if, by the standards of later years, this was not so. Only later, once these changes had been absorbed, would greater cuts be psychologically possible. The availability of foreign labour and of concentration camp inmates contributed to a general lack of support for more drastic measures.

Himmler stated his commitment to total war, and sought to have his subordinates act on it, but did not try to extend these policies beyond his own area of responsibility. Bormann's lack of attention to the wider issue probably reflected the more optimistic atmosphere at Hitler's headquarters, while by concentrating on his new tasks Speer could hope to influence Germany's chances of success in the war directly. His position in itself was a contribution to total war. Todt and Heydrich seem to have reacted differently because of their ability to gain the information to make a wider judgement, especially about the capacities of Germany's enemies.

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232. ibid., p. 134; entry for 19 March 1942, ibid., p. 129.
This period is important because this was a time of lost opportunities to take decisions to intensify the war effort and to seek a compromise peace. Although it was clear by the end of 1941 that the hopes of an early political collapse in the Soviet Union had failed, it was not as clear that the regime had to move quickly to salvage its own position. The winter crisis of 1941 brought recognition on the part of some members of the regime that policies needed to be altered, but they were not successful in conveying their views to Hitler. Those of the leadership who were concerned did not seek to mobilize support among their peers. Rather they sought to persuade Hitler to their point of view: only he had the authority to pursue a compromise peace. Hitler’s preoccupation with the military campaigns meant that leaders who were present at his headquarters in East Prussia and later in Winniza in the Ukraine\textsuperscript{233} (as Bormann was), had their headquarters near his (Himmler, Lammers, Keitel)\textsuperscript{234} or were frequent visitors to his headquarters (Speer, Todt) had more chance to influence him. Goebbels, who was the most firmly based in Berlin of all the leaders, had less direct access to Hitler at this time.

Any of these leaders who was experiencing some disquiet about the conduct of the war was a civilian and therefore in a difficult position to challenge the professional expertise of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{235} Above all it was psychologically and politically difficult for them to question Hitler. Germany’s series of victories before the

\textsuperscript{233} From June 1941 Hitler spent most of his time at his headquarters at Rastenburg, East Prussia; from July to November 1942 he was at Winniza: Toland, \textit{Hitler}, pp. 924, 978.

\textsuperscript{234} On Himmler’s headquarters, Kinder, ‘Die Persönliche Stab Reichsführer-SS’, p. 392.

\textsuperscript{235} Goebbels’ attempts to warn Hitler about the failings of the German air force were dismissed. He was told that he was a pessimist and an ignorant civilian who did not understand military matters: entry for 16 February 1945, Semmler, \textit{Goebbels}, p. 181.
Russian campaign increased their reliance on Hitler's judgment and encouraged the tendency to think of the winter crisis as a temporary setback. Accordingly they concentrated on their own spheres of influence. The irony was that while the war could not be won militarily, the Russian peace feelers suggest Germany still had the cards to seek a political settlement. There was still territory to be traded, and the United States had not yet begun land operations against Germany. Looking back on this period in 1943, Goebbels was to claim that 'total war leadership should already have been introduced one and a half years ago. But then we had unfortunately not drawn the necessary hard consequences from the terrible winter crisis, and when the sunshine woke again the ghosts of dangerous illusions woke again and gave themselves hopes which unfortunately could not be fulfilled.'

In this period leaders could readily assume that Hitler would support their moves for total war. His close interest in the details of armaments production, his appointment of Speer as Armaments Minister, the clear support he gave him in the position, and the setting up of the von Unruh commission suggest that he did believe greater action was required. It was easy to believe that only more effort was needed to persuade Hitler to take other necessary steps. This confidence did not survive the second winter of the Russian campaign, as will be seen in Chapter Four.

CHAPTER FOUR

'DO YOU WANT TOTAL WAR?' THE RESPONSE TO STALINGRAD

The comparative lack of urgency felt even by those leaders who favoured total war policies vanished temporarily under the impact of Stalingrad, which prompted Hitler to take a number of decisions designed to ensure total mobilization of the home front for the war effort. This gave rise to hopes that he could readily be persuaded to do more. The measures taken were wideranging but in the first few months seemed to have had little effect. Hitler's initiatives met an initially enthusiastic response, but before long Goebbels and Speer felt that they were insufficient and the committee he set up to implement these policies was criticized.

The German Sixth Army of some 250,000 men had been encircled at Stalingrad since 23 November 1942. Attempts to relieve it in November and December 1942, led by von Manstein, failed, as had the Luftwaffe's attempts to keep the army supplied by air. Speer suggested Hitler still hoped Stalingrad could be held or relieved.¹ Outside Hitler's headquarters and the armed forces it is possible that the true seriousness of the situation at Stalingrad was not quickly grasped.² Goebbels' diaries for December 1942 do not exhibit undue concern. The reactions of the leaders do not suggest that the difficulties were seen as other than temporary. Hitler ordered the army to hold Stalingrad at all costs, but the area in German hands was

1. Speer, Third Reich, p. 248.
2. Early propaganda on the fight for Stalingrad had been optimistic: Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, pp. 176-8; Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, pp. 259-60.
steadily reduced until the final surrender of German forces on 31 January.

The worsening military situation in the East led to greater interest in the consequences of the treatment of the Eastern peoples. Schellenberg's efforts to persuade Himmler to adopt different policies continued. Early in 1943 (his account is not specific as to the date), he prepared a report for Himmler, advocating different policies in the East, including the removal of the Reichskommissars and Einsatzgruppen, creation of autonomous states and overhauling the economic administration. Schellenberg was not able to convince Himmler to take action. Goebbels too favoured a more flexible and constructive policy in the East. He hoped for great propaganda opportunities in the use of General Vlasov, but was aware of Hitler's lack of interest in such moves.

From January 1943 on the National Socialist leadership paid greater attention to 'total war'. Why did Stalingrad have so great an effect on National Socialist leaders? It could be argued that the turning point for the German armies on the Eastern Front came earlier in winter 1941. Stalingrad was strategically important partly because Hitler made it so. It became a clash of wills between him and Stalin, a 'Verdun on the Volga'. Stalingrad signalled that, despite the renewed victories of summer 1942, the winter of 1941 had been the


5. Entry for 5 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 4. He supported the Smolensk declaration issued by Vlasov but wanted it made more general: entry for 17 January 1943, BA NL 118/50, pp. 9-11.

harbinger of things to come; the end of the battle also marked the first surrender in the war of an entire German army to the enemy, with the loss of some 215,000 men.

The publicity given to the sacrifice of the German army in Stalingrad meant that even the most ill-informed members of the leadership realized that Germany's situation had worsened and some action had to be taken. Early in the New Year Goebbels had recorded in his diary his disapproval of Hitler's decision (reflecting the worsening military situation) that ministers should no longer be briefed about the military situation, a decision which did not apply to him. Hitler may have feared a weakening of his position had such briefings continued. Ignorance led to many leaders not drawing the correct conclusions about the policies to be adopted, Goebbels noted.7 Goebbels' position as Propaganda Minister meant that he continued to receive such information, which helped him to see events in their context.

While the German public was not kept informed about the course of events at Stalingrad in December 1942,8 by mid-January 1943 Goebbels had won Hitler's approval for a propaganda treatment of Stalingrad which highlighted the sacrifices of the troops. For three days German radio suspended normal programmes and plunged the nation into a period of mourning.9 This was intended to create a myth of heroic sacrifice among the population; the leadership may have felt the need to respond to the mood it had originated. German

7. Entries for 7 and 12 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, pp. 17-18 and p. 16 respectively. After Stalingrad Hitler became reluctant to meet with party leaders, meeting the Reichs- and Gauleiters only three times in 1943: Orlow, Nazi Party, II, p. 412.
propaganda now emphasized waging war totally for total victory, a true people's war borne by the entire nation.\textsuperscript{10} From Hitler down the regime gave a higher priority to increased support by the home front for the war effort in January 1943, even before the end of the battle for Stalingrad. For example, even Göring, who had been discredited by the failure of the Luftwaffe's attempts to supply Stalingrad and who had generally been taking a less active role in policy formulation, exhibited concern about German employment policies and US armaments potential.\textsuperscript{11} At least initially Gauleiters and other state and party leaders responded. The suggestion that an organization could be shut down or have its functions reduced not only served the goals of total war but could also further the power of one leader at the expense of a rival.\textsuperscript{12}

In December 1942 Goebbels had apparently sent Hitler a memorandum proposing total war measures.\textsuperscript{13} On 2 January Goebbels passed to Lammers for study suggestions on total war prepared by


\textsuperscript{11} Ironically, in view of his earlier views on the employment of women, as reported by the Frauenschaft, he was particularly concerned about German employment of women in comparison to Britain and the United States: Ministerialrat Dr. Gönnert to Sauckel, 23 February 1943, BA R41/229 and 'Besprechung Reichsmarschall 15.-17. (einschl.) II. 43 Reichsm. Polit. und Mil. Lage' BA MA R L2 1/22, pp. 25-7.

\textsuperscript{12} In January 1943, for example, Ley proposed the closure of the greater part of German cultural societies and the merging of their functions into his own KDF Amt Feierabend while SA Chief Lutze suggested shutting down the National Socialist physical training society. Hitler rejected both these suggestions: Berger to Himmler, 9 January 1943, 'Vortrag Stabschef Lutze u. Reichsorganisationsleiter Dr. Ley', BA NS 19/2679.

his Ministry. Goebbels' proposals were intended to reduce the civilian sector of the economy by introducing labour service for women, completely suspending production of luxury and commercial goods industries, closing department stores, redirecting at least 60 to 70 per cent of Germany's transport personnel, and the complete transfer of industries from civilian consumption to war production. Action followed quickly, probably in response to Goebbels' proposals. On 8 January Lammers chaired a meeting of ministers which discussed the need to increase employment of the able-bodied in the armaments industry, including greater employment of women, and calling up all those capable of active service to the army. The only dissent came from Sauckel who claimed that the employment of women was unnecessary. It was agreed that workers from department stores and shops needed to be transferred to the armaments sector.

On 13 January 1943 Hitler signed a decree ordering the total mobilization of the home front for the war effort, which met at least some of Goebbels' goals. The first priority was to provide more manpower for the forces and for armaments production. For the first time all men aged between 16 and 65 and all women aged between 17 and 50 had to report for employment, with the exception of men and women working in agriculture or the civil service, women with one child below school age or two children below 14. (The upper age limit for women was later lowered to 45.) Keitel and all supreme Reich authorities (Oberste Reichs Behörden-ORBs) had to inspect

14. Entry for 3 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, pp. 16-17. Measures needed included the punishment of saboteurs and the need to supplement exhortation by laws and decrees, entry for 7 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, pp. 13-14.


positions and abolish those which were not necessary to the war economy or securing essential goods. Staff freed were to be transferred to armaments and the armed forces. All inessential work in the administration was to stop; Hitler repeated his order of 25 January 1942 that planning for peacetime tasks should cease. The Reich Economics Minister in agreement with Sauckel, through the Reich defence commissioners, was to order the closure of firms and businesses, or parts thereof, whose tasks were not necessary for tasks of the war economy or securing essential needs. A three man committee, the Dreier Ausschuss of Keitel, Bormann and Lammers, was set up to supervise the implementation of these measures and to investigate whether further measures were needed. They were to maintain close contact with Goebbels in view of his important, but unspecified, tasks in connection with the decree. Members of religious orders and clergy were exempted from the scope of the decree, presumably for political reasons.

The purpose of the decree in Bormann's view was to reorient the economy to supply the necessary replacements to the armaments industry and the armed forces by freeing those already at work through simplifying their tasks and employing those not previously employed. The Ausschuss's activities would not affect von Unruh's investigation which the party was to support 'most energetically'.


Herbst has suggested, drawing on the SD's Meldungen aus den Reich and the work of Steinert, that from winter 1941 on there had been a crisis of trust in the regime among the population. This crisis arose because of the gap between the military setbacks and the regime's earlier exaggerated propaganda campaigns, and from problems in food supply. He sees Goebbels' total war policies as a response to the problems his propaganda was facing, as a response to this crisis of trust. Speer, on the other hand, has suggested that Goebbels' moves were a sign that he doubted victory and was looking for a way out. The emphasis Goebbels placed on the 'optics' of total war, the outward signs that abuses were being rectified and that burdens were shared equally, may reflect his awareness of a crisis of trust of German propaganda and the regime. Goebbels believed that careful attention to the appearance of equality would prevent a repetition of the unrest of 1917-18. While Goebbels was aware of the problems of morale and the need for propaganda to adopt a more realistic tone, this was not his sole motive for putting forward his


22. Speer, Third Reich, p. 258.


ideas. As has been shown earlier, he had devised his plans for women's work and for making large numbers available to the front earlier but had been unable to get them accepted. He had supported measures such as female labour duty even before the invasion of the Soviet Union. Goebbels was also motivated by a social levelling tendency and he certainly planned to use class hostilities to introduce a more equitable division of the burden, a kind of 'war socialism'.

Despite the promulgation of the decree, Goebbels was soon worried by what he saw as insufficient progress on the various proposals for total war. This was, in his opinion, the virtually inevitable result of appointing a committee rather than one man to oversee the changes. He was not persuaded by Sauckel's argument that there were not many men listed as uk: the number of healthy young men who could be seen in the cities proved this wrong. He was concerned that 'forces are at work already in order to spare, on the one hand, the party, on the other the administration and to act according to the methods of "skin washing but not wetting". The regime had to draw on its old National Socialist methods and virtues to master the situation once again. Goebbels derived some comfort from a discussion with Bormann on 18 January about the functions of the Dreier Ausschuss. He concluded that his work on total war defined (präzisiert) that of the Ausschuss more precisely and would have


considerable influence. There was no danger that he could be outmanoeuvred.\textsuperscript{31}

Shortly after this meeting, Goebbels spent a day with Hitler at his headquarters during which he suggested to Hitler a programme similar to that he proposed to Lammers, involving labour duty for women, disbanding all organizations and concerns not important to the war effort, and the complete focussing of civilian life on the war's requirements. His diary entry does not indicate how these measures would have been more extensive than those of the Dreier Ausschuss. Goebbels claimed that Hitler not only agreed to all his proposals but also was more radical on many points.\textsuperscript{32} Hitler and Goebbels agreed that shops, department stores and luxury restaurants would be compelled to close and the age limit for female labour service set at forty-five. Hitler promised that no great obstacles would be put in the path of Goebbels' work: he would not listen to any complaints but refer them all to Goebbels. In turn Goebbels promised to make some 1.5 to two million soldiers available from these measures by the coming summer.\textsuperscript{33}

Hitler explained that he did not want Goebbels to join the Dreier Ausschuss himself, so as not to be burdened by the administrative work involved, but he wanted Goebbels to attend all meetings of the Ausschuss and be present at any reports to him, and to play the role of a galvanizing motor on the issue. No submission which had not received Goebbels' approval was to go to Hitler. In this way he would know that the submission was radical enough.\textsuperscript{34} After his meeting

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with Hitler Goebbels referred to the Ausschuss as the Vierer Ausschuss (Committee of Four) in his diary, reflecting his view that he was a de facto member. He saw his task as intensifying and radicalizing measures, using Naumann, who was head of his ministerial office, to prepare the ground.35

Goebbels' initial criticisms of the Ausschuss came before it had really had time to embark on its task - they began some four days after Hitler's decree. His sense of urgency about the measures he thought necessary was genuine.36 He continually compared the inadequacy of German measures with the Russian example.37 Goebbels' criticisms of the Ausschuss's failings may have been due in part to his assessment of the individuals on the committee. He described Lammers as a wet blanket.38 They were in large part due to his not being a formal member of the committee. He was disappointed at Hitler's seemingly inexplicable decision not to make him a member of the Dreier Ausschuss.39

There is no direct evidence of Hitler's reasons for not including Goebbels. There are a number of possible explanations. It was unlikely that the real reason for Goebbels' exclusion was the burden of excessive administration, since the members of the Ausschuss themselves would have had greater administrative burdens than Goebbels. Hitler may still not have been persuaded of the need for the

35. Entry for 26 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, p. 22.
36. Every day lost was a loss for them all: entry for 9 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, pp. 35-6. See also entries for 26 and 29 January 1943, Semmler, Goebbels, pp. 67-8.
37. Entry for 16 January 1943, BA NL 118/50, p. 9; entry for 16 January 1943 in Boelcke, Secret Conferences, p. 316.
38. Entry for 20 January 1943, Semmler, Goebbels, p. 66.
drastic policies which Goebbels envisaged. In agreeing with Goebbels' views on the need for total war in their meeting of 22 January he may have been demonstrating a willingness to agree with his most recent visitor. Alternatively he may have believed that the Ausschuss itself would be sufficient to achieve these measures. Bormann, and possibly Hitler himself, may have been nervous of concentrating power in Goebbels' hands. Goebbels was later to claim to his staff that Lammers and Bormann had outmanoeuvred him. They had led him to believe he would be on the committee while Bormann told Hitler that Goebbels was content with the role of herald of total war and would leave the implementation to specialists.40 Goebbels saw his task as relieving Hitler of the cares of internal politics.41 Berger, Chief of Staff of the SS Hauptamt, had already interpreted Goebbels' proposals as an unsuccessful attempt to be made Führer of the Home Front.42 In this context it is significant that all the members of the Ausschuss were based at Hitler's headquarters so he was closely involved in supervising their activities.43 Goebbels' honorary position was probably designed to placate him.

The Ausschuss drew on preliminary work by the Reich Chancellery staff which proposed an end to the duplication of work by the party and state, SS and state, and DAF and state, concentration of work in fewer agencies, possible elimination of some middle and lower layers of administration, and decentralization and abolition of appeal rights.44 A subsequent submission to Lammers suggested

41. Entry for 7 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, p. 15.
42. Berger to Himmler, 29 January 1943, BA NS 19/2687, pp. 1-2.
closing the Prussian Finance Ministry, removing tasks from the Ostministerium, which had already been reduced from 1312 employees to 812 by von Unruh's activities, and transferring support of army dependents from the military to the Labour Ministry. An estimated 1700 to 1800 civilian officials would replace 4000 military officials if the last measure was adopted. The submission also suggested an end to the award of non-military decorations, reduction of personnel in Länder ministries, merging the administration of some towns, and an end to the establishment of Hauptschulen.\footnote{Paper signed F., 2 February 1943, 'Durchführung des Führererlasses vom 13. Januar 1943 auf dem Gebiete der Verwaltung', \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1-5.}

Goebbels recorded a lively discussion in a meeting on 28 January about Funk's proposal to close inessential business activities. Fundamental differences of opinion emerged with Goebbels and Speer supporting the measures energetically while Bormann opposed them.\footnote{Entry for 29 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, p. 16. See also unsigned note of the meeting, 28 January 1943, \textit{1.) Vermerk.}, BA R 43 II/662, pp. 1-3.} A meeting, attended by Keitel, Frick, von Unruh, Bormann, and others, was held in Lammers' field headquarters on 4 February to discuss implementing Hitler's 13 January decree. It unanimously agreed to propose the dissolution of the Prussian Finance Ministry to Hitler. While a dissolution of the Church Ministry was not politically possible, it was agreed that von Unruh should reduce its personnel as much as possible and that the Ostministerium's role should be restricted to providing overall leadership of German policy in the East. The weakest ministries and those with the least popular constituencies thus were first to lose their numbers. Keitel agreed to draw up proposals for handing over support of Wehrmacht dependents to the Labour Ministry, and Bormann to institute further reductions in the personnel and responsibilities of the Party.
Chancellery.47 Similar measures to those planned in the Reich were also to be implemented in the occupied territories, where shops unnecessary for the war effort, such as jewellers and stamp dealers, were to be closed and the activities of shops for tobacco, textiles, and household goods restricted. Nightclubs, bars, luxury hotels and unimportant handcrafts firms were to be closed.48

Despite this promising start, by 23 February 1943, only a few measures were underway. A decree had been sent to the supreme Reich authorities (ORBs) amplifying Hitler's decree of 13 January; Sauckel had issued a decree governing labour service; and the Dreier Ausschuss had issued an order making workers available for war work. Various pay and taxation measures had been simplified; the Justice Ministry had dissolved 150 local courts and the Post Office 12 Reichspostdirektionen. The number of staff freed by these measures was not stated and presumably therefore was not great.49 The measures adopted were a mixture of the practical, mainly measures to make staff available, and the symbolic, the latter including the restriction of awarding decorations to those relevant to the war effort and the honour cross of the German mother.50 Various ministries did report their numbers of employees and the savings they had made:


the most notable was the Post Ministry which offered to give up 25,000 staff from the classes of 1901 and younger. Their reports suggest that there were not many more staff who could be won from the administrative sector.

By February there seemed to be some justification for Goebbels' complaints about the Ausschuss. Its bureaucratic structure appears to have slowed decision making, and encouraged its members to respond to reports of abuses by denials of responsibility rather than by investigating the validity of the reports. By reducing their sense of personal responsibility for measures it may have made it harder for the leaders to take the first steps. Goebbels had hoped to use improvisation to overcome the difficulties in calling up large numbers. He believed that the atmosphere of crisis was needed to make the measures effective; nothing much would result if it was left to orderly development.

Other evidence of reluctance to act can be seen from Goebbels' comments that when he put his views to other leading men, they agreed with him but passive resistance began as soon as two or three of them met together. He may have been able to persuade leaders by argument in private conversation but when they left his presence either self-interest, particularly the need to protect their own administrative fiefdoms, inertia or further reflection prompted

51. Mussehl to Dr. Killy, 29 January 1943, BA R 43 II/281b, p. 4.
54. Entry for 29 January 1943, ibid., pp. 16-17.
resistance. Even his own State Secretary, Gutterer, had not adjusted to the new course and was creating difficulties for Goebbels' plan to send UK film and theatre artists to entertain the troops. His proposals met opposition because their successful implementation would require National Socialist leaders to reduce the size of their organizations and the range of their powers. In a system marked by intense competition for power, this would be seen as a loss of influence.

Labour duty for women met resistance. Goebbels had Tiessler, the Leader of the Reichspropagandaring, contact Friedrichs in the Party Chancellery to ensure that an explanatory circular was issued. Tiessler's draft stressed the need for the home front to take its fair share of burdens and drew attention to the willing service of working women, who were calling for total mobilization. Goebbels believed that they would be able to persuade all except the habitually lazy. His message was that the party was aware of the difficulties for women who had not worked before but that their sacrifices were small compared to those of the front, and were already being made by working women. 'Common work is . . . the requirement of the hour.' The Party Chancellery's alterations to the text omitted Goebbels' more pointed references to complaints about unequal treatment from employed women. As part of his efforts to encourage women's work, he had his officials participate in plans to employ 40,000 of the

56. This explained to him why most heads of organizations would not get things done; they declared themselves unable to overcome the difficulties: ibid.

57. Entry for 26 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, p. 23.

58. Fernschreiben Tiessler to Friederichs, 22 January 1943, 'Eilt sehr, sofort auf den Tisch. Streng vertraulich', 'Meldung Nr. 55.', 'Meldepflicht von Maennern und Frauen', BA NS 18/638, p. 3. The complete draft text is contained on pp. 2-3.

women called up in day care centres for the children of those called up.\textsuperscript{60}

Goebbels hoped to be able to use the names of the wives of prominent Party members who were now employed in factories in his propaganda.\textsuperscript{61} These moves on Goebbels' part were based on his belief that burdens had to be seen publicly to be borne equally.\textsuperscript{62} For a time after Stalingrad, his wife, Magda Goebbels, worked at a Telefunken factory but when her example was not followed by any of the other leaders' wives she gave up the work. Later she did some outwork for industry.\textsuperscript{63}

Goebbels expected that women's labour service would allow at least two regiments to go to the front.\textsuperscript{64} He learned on 27 January that Lammers had persuaded Hitler to alter the order concerning female labour duty. Hitler agreed with Lammers that women with one child under six or two children under fourteen were to be exempted, even if, Goebbels observed, they had adequate domestic service.\textsuperscript{65} Attempts by Sauckel and Goebbels to have the exemptions

\textsuperscript{60} Tiessler, 19 March 1943, 'Vorlage für den Herrn Minister', 'Betreuung der Haushalt und Kinder von dienstverpflichteten Frauen.', BA NS 18/462, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{61} Tiessler, 27 February 1943, 'Vorlage', 'Arbeitseinsatz von Frauen prominenter Parteigenossen', BA NS 18/736.

\textsuperscript{62} This did not of course prevent private preferential treatment. While the Goebbels household had a large staff and he continued decorating his homes lavishly, Magda Goebbels ran the household for the first six months of the war on official rations and his household entertained on rations: Meissner, \textit{Magda Goebbels}, pp. 207, 224-6; entry for 13 January 1941, Semmler, \textit{Goebbels}, p. 16; entry for 19 June 1943, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 37-8; Heiber, \textit{Goebbels}, pp. 320-1.

\textsuperscript{63} Heiber, \textit{Goebbels}, p. 320.

\textsuperscript{64} Entry for 27 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{65} Entry for 27 January 1943, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 23-4. Lammers' account suggests the the initiative for these measures came from Hitler; note by Lammers, 26 January 1943, IFZ APK, 101 09428-9. The policy, as Goebbels anticipated, led
construed more strictly were rejected by Hitler, who did however agree to let Sauckel remove unnecessary domestic help from households. Goebbels saw these concessions as a sign of weakness. They were, however, considerably less generous than the British guidelines of spring 1942 which exempted a woman from work if she lived in her own house and looked after at least one other person. Women with children still living at home did not have to work. Goebbels described Lammers as 'a complete canker' because he saw the issue of women's employment from a comfortable middle class perspective.

How did Goebbels account for the resistance he met? Goebbels believed earlier that he had the support of the Wehrmacht and the party, and the elite of the state had to be forced if necessary to accept the correct views. His explanation of Lammers' resistance suggests he saw it as originating in the social and political conservatism of the bureaucracy. (Speer described Lammers as 'a government official without initiative or imagination'.) This explanation of Hitler's change of mind did not threaten his belief in the revolutionary and radical potential of National Socialism. Goebbels found it hard to acknowledge that opposition to total war also came from party circles and from Hitler. At the same time, he received information which
clearly indicated that he was also being opposed by Bormann. Goebbels attended a meeting of the Ausschuss where Bormann opposed measures to close down inessential business activities. Bormann had received instructions from Hitler that shops should only be closed if their staff were needed immediately, a view which Goebbels considered was not completely correct.

Here Bormann's opposition clearly seems to reflect Hitler's view that action should only be taken when it had a direct effect on the war. This dispute centred on the question whether shops should only be closed where there was a possibility of their employees being used elsewhere, the view supported by Bormann and Hitler, or whether it was better, for largely symbolic reasons, to proceed with closures at any cost, the view supported by Speer and Goebbels. This last view may have been designed to prevent evasion of the measures by spurious claims of inability to redeploy. It prevailed for a time and resulted in some cases of loss of employment for people too old, unfit or immobile to work in armaments factories.

There were now indications in Goebbels' diaries, and even more in his discussions with other leaders, of his differences with Hitler. He was aware that Hitler insisted on his own point of view and had to be approached repeatedly on an issue to persuade him to change his mind. Yet he did not canvass the reasons why Hitler changed his mind and watered down measures he had agreed to. Did Goebbels

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71. Entry for 29 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, p. 16.
72. ibid., pp. 16-17.
73. Hitler's views are quoted in Bormann, 5 July 1943, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 99/43'; 'Tragen langer Hosen durch Frauen in der Öffentlichkeit', BA NS 6/342, p. 2.
74. Speer, Third Reich, p. 258 and note on p. 543.
75. Entry for 23 January 1943, BA NL 118/50, p. 31.
misinterpret or exaggerate Hitler's support for his ideas? Or was Hitler influenced by his most recent visitor? Hitler's motives are unclear.

Soon after changing the regulations on women's employment, at Goebbels' and Speer's suggestion,76 Hitler called on the Gauleiters to remember the Kampfzeit (period of the struggle for power) and proceed with similar measures for total war. He criticized the continued existence of luxury restaurants, such as Horchers, and stated that women's and sporting magazines needed to be dissolved.77 He called on them to mobilize all national strength for the war effort.78 It was Goebbels' view that the Gauleiters were not completely aware of the seriousness of the situation and lived as if they were in peacetime.79 The Gauleiters were a crucial level of power for the implementation of centrally decreed measures at the regional level;80 it was a matter of concern that their assessment of the situation was so different from that of the senior levels of the leadership. The restrictions Hitler imposed on the dissemination of information about the course of the war may well have contributed to this.

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On 12 January Hitler approved a number of measures to provide the army with new manpower. Industry had to make 50,000

76. Entry for 8 February 1943, BA NL 118/52, p. 15.
77. ibid., p. 42-3.
78. ibid., p. 63.
men born between 1908 to 1922, with the fitness grading kv, available for call-up, 20,000 of them on 20 January and the rest a month later. Sauckel would supply 50,000 specialists to the factories to replace these 50,000 kv men, and would make a further 30,000 workers available to the army. Where Sauckel would find the 50,000 specialists was not stated. In addition industry had to supply the army with 150,000 kv men born between 1908 and 1922 in the exchange action 'Rü. 43 Tausch' to conclude by 31 March 1943. The army would make available soldiers less suitable for active service, classed as av and gv.H., for at least a year as replacements. A further 100,000 men liable for military service were to be called up from mid-January to bridge the gaps which the exchange would create for the army. Thus these measures would involve a further 180,000 men being withdrawn from the economy. No organization was exempted from these measures; Bormann advised the party that it too would have to lose some personnel. On behalf of Hitler he explained that the Gau and Kreisleitungen were exempted from releasing workers, since their remaining uk positions were so few that they could not sustain losing them. Accordingly the Party's central offices would have to give up greater numbers.

81. Abbreviation for kriegsverwendungsfähig - fit for active service.

82. An abbreviation for arbeitsverwendungsfähig - fit for work, capable of being used in staffs, offices and units, garrison battalions. Arbeitsverwendungsfähig Heimat (av.H.) meant fit for work in these categories on the home front.

83. Abbreviation for garnisonsverwendungsfähig Heimat - capable of service in a garrison on the home front.

84. Bormann, 12 January 1943, 'Geheim', 'Anordnung A1/43 g', 'Aufkündigung von UK.- Stellungen (Rü.43 Tausch)', BA NS 6/344, pp. 1-3; Speer to Betriebsführer der deutschen Rüstungs-Wirtschaft.', 19 December 1942, BA R 41/282, pp. 1-2. These callups of armaments workers were the first special call-up, Sondererziehung or SE.
The von Unruh commission's work was extended by Hitler to cover the entire German civilian administration. Von Unruh advised Meissner, the head of the Presidential Chancellery, that his work was based on two principles: no male citizen born in 1901 or later should be employed on the home front unless he was classified gvH or less, and women workers were to be used to the greatest extent possible. It is not clear how many workers the von Unruh commission freed. Von Unruh, for example, instructed Meissner to make ten female workers available to the Labour Office by 1 March 1943; he freed some 28 male and 21 female employees after inspecting eighteen educational offices. The numbers may have been low because of the broad definition of tasks essential to the war effort set down by the Interior Ministry. Von Unruh's investigations covered all areas of administration and also resulted in recommended simplifications and reallocation of staff. In areas which were politically vulnerable or less able to justify their continuing functions during the war, he was able to achieve greater savings, such as his reduction of the Ostministerium staff by 500. The absence of detailed records for the commission's work do not allow a final assessment of the numbers it


88. Frick Schnellbrief to the Reichsstatthalter and others, 8 January 1943, 'Überprüfung des Kriegseinsatzes', BA Rep. 312 Nr. 4/2, pp. 5-9.

freed. Those savings contained in the commission's files seem tiny when set against the loss of 200,000 men at Stalingrad, and are low in comparison to the numbers his commission had removed in the East. Indeed, when General von Unruh visited Speer on 15 January, the Speer Chronik described the results of his 'combing out' of civilian offices as 'somewhat inferior' to his results with the military offices. Nonetheless they suggest once again that there were still positions which could be shed.

Goebbels and Bormann criticized von Unruh's effectiveness. Despite his professed desire to save manpower, Goebbels soon clashed with the commission. When asked by Generals Olbricht and von Unruh in February to account for his failure to provide his quota of 3,400 men to the army, he pointed out angrily that von Unruh had been intended to sweep out the Wehrmacht with an iron broom and lead fat, well-fed Majors to useful occupations. With, the SS representative on the commission, advised Himmler that he and Ifland, the Party Chancellery representative, regarded Goebbels' remarks as 'welcome and necessary'. He described Keitel's role as

92. Goebbels believed that as a general von Unruh was not capable of inspecting the armed forces rigorously enough: entry for 6 February 1943, BA NL 118/52, p. 22.
'uncertain'. At a meeting on 10 February which von Unruh was not told about, Goebbels and Keitel discussed the matter. Keitel did not defend von Unruh but asked Goebbels not to be angry. Ifland and With believed von Unruh had become a thorn in Keitel's flesh and was perhaps becoming too powerful. Keitel's reaction may alternatively have reflected his assessment that Goebbels was politically more powerful than von Unruh. Goebbels himself noted that Keitel had become 'very small' on the subject of von Unruh.

Probably as a result of this disagreement, Hitler issued an order on 10 February that the performing arts were to be exempted from the combing out of uk positions, and Goebbels received the necessary powers to ensure this. Hitler prohibited the closure of theatres and orchestras. The Propaganda Ministry subsequently pointed out to the Allgemeines Heeresamt of the OKW that it was not able to make 3,400 men available but could free 309 kv men from the age groups 1901 and younger.

Goebbels' protection of his own staff against von Unruh contradicted his overall commitment to restrictions on the home front. By his resistance, Goebbels had reduced the number of staff he had to give up, had been able to get part of his area of responsibility protected from further 'combing out' actions and had had his power

95. ibid.
96. Entry for 14 February 1943, BA NL 118/52, p. 29.
98. Entry for 14 February 1943, BA NL 118/52, p. 29.
99. Signature, letter to OKW Allgemeines Heeresamt, 8 February 1943, 'Geheim', 'Rekruteneinstellung Februar 1943 für das Heer, 2. Rate', BA R 55/324.
in the cultural sphere re-emphasized. His main motive was probably a desire to protect his jurisdiction since the Propaganda Ministry continued its own measures to cut staff. A submission to Goebbels indicated that there were 781, 857 and 5507 men liable to military duty, rated \( k_v \) and born in 1901 and later, in the three protected sections (radio, film, theatre and orchestra). These sections were to investigate the possibility of making personnel who were not artists available to the Wehrmacht.\(^{100}\) As the Propaganda Ministry pointed out to the Allgemeines Heeresamt the Ministry had already combed out its offices considerably, giving up over 2,000 people in 1942. It had also increased the percentage of its staff who were female compared to other ministries. Goebbels was however seeking a privilege which, if extended to other ministers, would have made a mockery of his plans for total war. He would also have been among the first not to extend such consideration to other ministers. Goebbels' success in persuading Hitler of his case was helped by the importance Hitler attached to propaganda in wartime, an importance which had led Hitler to dissuade Goebbels from cutting \( u_k \) positions in the arts before.

By implication Bormann also criticized von Unruh's effectiveness. In a circular to the Gauleiters he pointed out that repeated reports indicated the Wehrmacht did not apply the same staffing restrictions in its own offices that civilian organizations did. Such reports were denied by the OKW. Bormann asked the Gauleiters to report any such overstaffing of military offices by 20 January if possible. 'Naturally the matter must be treated secretly and without

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being conspicuous.' Surviving Party Chancellery records do not indicate the results of this call. Both Bormann and Goebbels' criticisms assumed that there was still considerable overstaffing in the Wehrmacht, particularly the army, behind the lines.

With the creation of the Ausschuss, Hitler had placed his authority publicly behind mobilization of the home front. Local party leaders were instructed about the measures which needed to be taken to implement the total war decrees. Bormann's own measures inside the party to rationalize administration increased. He believed himself authorized by the 13 January decree to shut down areas of the party unimportant to the war effort. He suspended the operation of six subsidiary organizations from 15 February 1943 for the duration of the war. In addition the NS-Frauenschaft, the Deutsche Frauenwerk, the NSKOV and the NSV were to stop maintaining their card indexes, and the DAF and other offices to introduce substantial simplifications. The NS-Reichskriegerbund was dissolved freeing some 270 staff. Bormann successfully used


103. The Hauptamt für Erzieher, the NS-Lehrerbund, the Hauptamt für Beamte, the Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten, the Kolonialpolitisches Amt and the NS-Dozentenbund.


these simplifications to centralize authority in the Party Chancellery.106

Bormann called for party leaders not to hold unnecessary meetings but to make use of the party's telegram network. By Hitler's 'strict order' meetings should only be held if matters could not be settled in writing and should not go for more than two days.107 Hitler ordered that male officials of the party and its associated organizations should no longer take leave except for medical reasons.108 Gauleiters were also urged to support Speer in his task of increasing tank production immediately. Hitler ordered that the Party support Speer by appealing to workers' consciences and sense of responsibility. Specifically, Gauleiters were to read Hitler's appeal to the workforce at a tank factory in working hours.109 Party officials also had to explain to parents the need for school boys to be employed by anti-aircraft batteries.110

What was Himmler's reaction to Stalingrad? He continued to favour reductions in staffing and abandoning matters inessential to the war effort. By his definition policies derived from National Socialist ideology did not fall in the latter category. He decreed in January 1943 that all officers of the Waffen SS up to the age of 40 had to be released for active service. The resulting inconveniences

107. Bormann, 2 February 1943, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 17/43', 'Tagungen', BA NS 6/340 pp. 1-2. This measure was introduced despite Bormann's opposition as the result of pressure from Goebbels and Tiessler: Tiessler, 'Licht und Schatten', IfZ ED 158, p. 152.
had to be endured or mitigated by lengthening working hours or merging offices, he suggested. 'All forces must be given up to the front and all comfort must take a back seat to this duty.'\textsuperscript{111} He was able to increase the numbers of police without a corresponding increase in the number of administrative employees.\textsuperscript{112} He ordered the responsible SS and Police Leaders of Ukraine and Russia-Centre to take the entire working population and all men capable of military service with them when evacuating districts. In no cases were men whom the enemy could use to fall into their hands.\textsuperscript{113} Despite these orders, 30,000 possible workers in the area of the Army Group Don were left behind.\textsuperscript{114}

In addition Himmler notified Ohlendorf that he did not have the time to give a talk to the Gauleiters on questions of Germandom (\textit{Volksstum}) since such a talk was in no way decisive to the war.\textsuperscript{115} He also agreed to a suggestion from Agricultural Minister Backe to waive the supply of some 30 sets of ration cards to prevent hostile rumours arising among the population about the lifestyle of the leadership.\textsuperscript{116} Yet he persisted in his attempts to have ethnic Germans made available for settlement in the East, although Sauckel pointed out that

\textsuperscript{111} Himmler, draft decree, January 1943, 'Erfassung aller Kriegsverwendungsfähigen SS-Führer', BA NS 19/2092.

\textsuperscript{112} 'Bericht des Chefs der Ordnungspolizei über den Kräfte- und Kriegseinsatz der Ordnungspolizei', 1 February 1943, BA NS 19/3731, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{113} Fernschreiben Himmler to Higher SS and Police Leaders (HSSPF) Ukraine Kiev and Russia Centre, 13 February 1943, BA NS 19/2844.

\textsuperscript{114} SS-Brigadeführer Zimmermann, 17 February 1943, 'Aktennotiz über meine Besprechung mit dem Generalquartiermeister, Generalleutnant Wagner, am 17.2.43', BA NS 19/808, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{115} Himmler Fernschreiben to Ohlendorf, 23 January 1943, NS 19/3787.

\textsuperscript{116} Backe to Himmler, 10 February 1943, 'Geheim! Persönlich!', 'Sonderregelungen für Diplomaten', pp. 1-2; Himmler to Backe, 20 February 1943, 'Geheim', BA NS 19/280.
they were needed in armaments factories to interpret for Eastern workers.

1943 saw the beginnings of a wavering of confidence in the regime's approach to the war. There was criticism from Hitler down of the army's lack of radicalism and of National Socialist commitment. Russian military success was attributed to political education and this led to the belief that similar education would improve German military effectiveness. Waffen SS ideological education had already been intensified in May 1942. Berger advised Himmler that the Russians reserved eight hours a week for political education which continued even in the front lines. This instilled an 'incredible will to resist' in Russian soldiers. Berger suggested that the Waffen SS introduce more extensive ideological education and Himmler introduced such training in a decree issued on 24 February.

Himmler's main tasks continued to be the extermination of the Jews, the maintenance of the regime's security and the use of concentration camps for forced labour. He ordered the Higher SS and Police Leaders (HSSPF) to refrain from setting up their own local concentration camps since it was necessary that prisoners' labour


118. Entries for 9 March and 10 May 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 280, 368.

119. Berger to Brandt, 12 May 1942; Berger to Jüttner, 13 May 1942, BA NS 19/1616.


power be used systematically and centrally to fulfil the SS's armaments tasks.\textsuperscript{122} In January 1943 Hitler and Goebbels had again agreed that the Jewish question in Berlin had to be solved as quickly as possible. As long as there were still Jews in Berlin, Germany did not have internal security.\textsuperscript{123} Despite the increased need for labour large transports of Jews from Berlin, including Jews employed in armaments factories, began.\textsuperscript{124}

Since May 1942 two new police corps, the Land- and Stadtwacht, had been set up, comprising all those with emergency service obligations, those with World War One military experience, and men in reserved positions not active in military economic factories. The Landwacht numbered 380,000, and the Stadtwacht, set up in December 1942, 180,000 men. Daluege, the head of the state police (\textit{Ordnungspolizei}), maintained that these corps were necessary to maintain order and security in the Reich by capturing escaping foreign workers and prisoners. They were in a position to counter any attempts at strikes by foreign workers in firms of military significance.\textsuperscript{125} The report on their activities did not suggest any fear in the SS of a possible repetition among Germans of the civil unrest of 1918.

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\textsuperscript{122} Himmler to RSSHA, 15 January 1943, 'Geheim', BA NS19/1542. He planned to expand SS armaments factories in the General Government: Himmler to Pohl, 11 February 1943, 'Geheim!', BA NS 19/2648; Pohl to Daluege, 17 December 1943, 'Geheim!', BA NS 19/261.

\textsuperscript{123} Entry for 23 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, pp. 73-5.

\textsuperscript{124} Ball-Kaduri, 'Berlin wird judenfrei', p. 208.

\textsuperscript{125} 'Bericht des Chefs der Ordnungspolizei über den Kräfte-und Kriegseinsatz der Ordnungspolizei', 1 February 1943, BA NS 19/3731, p. 16-17.
In 1943 German armaments production was aiming to maintain qualitative superiority in weapons. The responsibilities and power of the Speer ministry continued to expand. The growth in Speer's power is an example of Hitler's support for increasing production and the extent of Hitler's trust of Speer. Speer won control of foreign exchange questions in the armaments industry from the WiRüAmt, control of price inspections unopposed by Keitel and of all financial requirements for armaments with the OKW only assigning the amounts.

'Next to the armaments sector concerns the Minister occupied himself with measures for the reduction of procedures unimportant for the war and for greater labour entry into armaments concerns', the Speer Chronik noted. He introduced a stamp marked 'Return to sender! Not decisive for the war effort!' for unimportant post in his own office. In his capacity as Generalbauinspektor, Speer put an end to the few planning activities still under way for the rebuilding of Berlin. He simplified licensing for building from five processes to one and sought the Interior Ministry's approval of lengthened working hours for all officials.

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129. *ibid*.

130. *ibid*., p. 21.

131. On licensing for building see Speer Chronik for January 1943, and on the lengthened working hours see Speer Chronik for February 1943, *ibid.*, pp. 4-5 and p. 19 respectively.
On 16 February Speer and Sauckel issued a common decree ordering the transfer of technical workers in construction offices and firms to a programme concentrating on armaments priority areas, the Schwerpunkt programme. In a later decree they asked the leaders of armaments factories to ensure that new workers were used as quickly and effectively as possible. This period saw the beginning of Speer's expressions of concern at the effects of call-ups of workers on production. He advised Hitler and Keitel of his concern that proposals to call-up 200,000 specialists would prevent continued increases in production.

Goebbels' diaries praised Speer's achievements in raising armaments production. He could use Speer's demands for more workers to increase production as support for restrictions of inessential economic production. Goebbels believed he had Speer's full support in radicalizing the conduct of the war. While Goebbels welcomed Speer's efforts and believed his achievements in increasing production to be considerable, his own concept of total war extended beyond armaments production to labour policy, administrative simplifications and introducing a 'spirit of total war' among the regime and the population.

Stalingrad increased the urgency and importance with which Goebbels viewed the question of total war. He considered that news of the battle provided the right psychological moment among the...
population for more drastic measures.\textsuperscript{137} Goebbels planned to use public opinion as an ally should he run up against greater difficulties in the \textit{Vierer Ausschuss}.\textsuperscript{138} For the purposes of his propaganda and to ensure that he could help muster public opinion behind the increased effort, Goebbels wanted measures in keeping with the 'optics' of total war, which gave the impression that burdens were being shared equally. This accounted for his preoccupation with the question of the employment of the leaders' wives.

In his own Ministry, Goebbels continued to implement a variety of measures. He gave Reich Press Chief Dietrich the task of reducing the number of magazines produced by twenty per cent within a week.\textsuperscript{139} The creation of new art prizes, and the widening or extension of existing prizes, was halted for the duration of the war.\textsuperscript{140} He discussed with Esser, state secretary for tourism in the Propaganda Ministry, closing all gourmet restaurants, bars and night spots, and restriction of the restaurant trade in general.\textsuperscript{141} In addition he proposed to use the head of publishing, Max Amann, to intervene on the total war issue not only because of his ruthlessness but also because of his thorough reorganization of the printing industry.\textsuperscript{142}

Stalingrad prompted a swift reaction from the leadership, which included the introduction of some measures which Goebbels had considered necessary for some time. On the positive side the leadership had agreed to the principle of women's labour service and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{137} Entries for 13 and 28 January 1943, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 18-19 and 23-4 respectively.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Entry for 28 January 1943, \textit{ibid.}, p. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Entry for 23 January 1943, \textit{ibid.}, p. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Gutterer to Reichstatthalter and others, 8 February 1943, 'Verleihung von Kunstpreisen', BA R 55/698, pp. 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Entry for 28 January 1943, BA NL 118/51, p. 20.
\item \textsuperscript{142} \textit{ibid.}
\end{itemize}
had set up a mechanism to pursue measures of simplification and rationalization. The policies seemed comprehensive but it was difficult to tell in early 1943 how successful they were likely to be. While Goebbels was perhaps too quick to judge that the committee had not been effective, due to his own omission from the committee, the slow progress made by the Ausschuss did justify his criticisms to some extent. Its tendency to soften the measures which had been adopted also aroused the suspicions of Speer and Goebbels. The creation of the Dreier Ausschuss had not gained Goebbels the powers he believed necessary nor resulted in the radical measures he advocated being adopted. The Ausschuss was making decisions in which Goebbels had not participated, he protested to Bormann. Bormann gave way under his protests. Goebbels saw this as an example of repeated attempts by people like Lammers to exclude radical elements from decision making. Goebbels did not intend to accept this: he considered the situation too urgent, and began to plan alternative strategies. He was seeking allies in the leadership and among the population to help him counter opposition; this process will be examined in Chapter Five.

143. Entry for 13 February 1943, ibid., pp. 20-1.
Goebbels attempted to give additional momentum to total war policies in February/March 1943. The way he did shows his understanding of the way the National Socialist political system worked. How he sought to do so, the failure of his efforts and some possible reasons for his failure will be discussed. The remainder of the chapter will examine what policies Hitler agreed to in the period, and the measures adopted by the individual leaders in their spheres of authority. Although Hitler continued to support von Unruh, the latter's effectiveness continued to come under criticism, particularly from Bormann.

Soviet offensives attacking Kursk and Kharkov followed the fall of Stalingrad. The Germans had stabilized their front by March; Soviet forces had established a massive salient at Kursk, and German losses were estimated at 470,000. After March a 'lull' set in while both sides planned new offensives, with the Germans preparing to attack Kursk in July. This lull led to a certain regaining of confidence on the German side and a tendency to see Goebbels as an advocate of superfluous sacrifices. The German forces in North Africa were also defeated in March 1943 in the battle of Mareth. Two months later the

2. Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 82-3.
3. ibid., p. 128.
German-Italian bridgehead surrendered with 150,000 Germans and Italians becoming prisoners of war.5

Goebbels was astonished at the leadership's lack of flexibility concerning political questions in the East and contrasted the situation unfavourably with their tactics before the National Socialist Machtergreifung.6 The advice of Vlasov, the captured Soviet general who was seeking to set up a Russian 'liberation movement' on the German side, were ignored.7 In his capacity as Reichspropagandaleiter Goebbels, in his 'first clear-cut "pro-Easterner" statement',8 issued a proclamation stating that all National Socialist propaganda had to make clear to those still under Bolshevik control that a German victory was in their interest. Leaders had to avoid inept and inappropriate references to the inferior racial status of the Eastern peoples or plans to convert their countries into German colonies.9 In agreement with Bormann he requested strictest observance of these guidelines. While Himmler advised all SS offices that he considered it

5. Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, p. 370.
8. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 177.
'very important' - to help win the war all SS offices had to obey it\textsuperscript{10} - he did no more than pay lip service to it. \textsuperscript{11}

Goebbels was aware that because Hitler took such a strong stand against the question of a political declaration on the Eastern question, he could not raise it again for the time being.\textsuperscript{12} He still seems to have been unaware of the strength of Hitler's views or may have believed rational argument would alter them. In March Himmler stated that Wehrmacht propaganda for Vlasov's Russian committee was against Hitler's will.\textsuperscript{13} In a discussion with Keitel and General Zeitzler on 8 June, Hitler indicated that he favoured the hardline policies of Erich Koch, Commissioner for the Ukraine,\textsuperscript{14} and ruled out a political approach to ending the war in the East. He counselled against the development of false hopes on the German side that nationalist movements fighting on the German side would win the war for Germany. As in the First World War, they would simply follow their own national interests.\textsuperscript{15} It was better to use the Russians as workers to free Germans for military service.\textsuperscript{16} Here Hitler provided an example of what Herbst has suggested was a general difficulty for the regime. Herbst argued that policies adopted for total war appeared to

\textsuperscript{10} Brandt to Berger, 'Geheim', 20 February 1943, 'Behandlung der europäischen Völker', BA NS 19/279.

\textsuperscript{11} In March 1943 he opposed attempts by Propaganda Ministry officials to stop the distribution of a SS brochure depicting the Russians as inferior (\textit{Untermenschen}): Dallin, \textit{German Rule in Russia}, note p. 181.

\textsuperscript{12} Entry for 16 April 1943, Lochner, \textit{Goebbels Diaries}, p. 330.

\textsuperscript{13} Andreyev, \textit{Vlasov}, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{14} These policies were also supported by Bormann: Dallin, \textit{German Rule in Russia}, pp. 126, 159-61.


\textsuperscript{16} \textit{ibid}.
set the agenda for post-war political decisions and were therefore not acceptable to the regime or its middle class supporters. Goebbels did not see this as an obstacle. His approach was to promise whatever was necessary for victory, but not to draw any conclusions about long term policies from this. He did not share Hitler's apparent desire for consistency.

By mid-January 1943, despite the creation of the Dreier Ausschuss, Goebbels had judged that there was insufficient movement on the issue of total war. In order to overcome what he saw as Hitler's inertia, and the unsatisfactory approach of the Dreier Ausschuss, Goebbels now sought allies within the National Socialist leadership. These plans led him to support moves for a compromise peace and to attempt to strengthen Göring's political position. Since December 1942 he had begun to meet regularly with Ley, Funk and Speer; in 1943 this group widened to include Milch, Sauckel and Backe in a Wednesday night salon. Goebbels had intended his 18 February 1943 speech on total war to demonstrate to Hitler that the German people were ready to bear the sacrifices of a total war and to give direction to the work of the Ausschuss.

The plans of Goebbels and his supporters had included the replacement of Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister, another illustration that Goebbels did not see total war and a compromise peace as mutually exclusive options but wanted both to be pursued. Goebbels

19. Entries for 29 January and 13 February 1943, in Semmler, Goebbels, pp. 68, 69; Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, pp. 192-4; Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, pp. 264-8; Longerich, 'Joseph Goebbels und der totale Krieg', p. 295. The response of some listeners was that the population in areas under air attack was already living in conditions of total war: Kehrl, Krisenleiter, p. 295.
hoped to frighten the Western allies by highlighting the threat of Bolshevism to Europe and by signalling, in adopting total war, that Germany was willing to make any sacrifice. He had sought to make an appeal to the Western powers in his 'total war' speech and subsequently sought to turn Hitler against Ribbentrop. In response Hitler described Ribbentrop as 'greater than Bismarck' and forbade Goebbels extending any more such feelers.

Hitler also rejected a further effort by the Japanese to mediate with the Russians after Stalingrad. On this occasion, according to Hesse, Hitler forbade Ribbentrop to speak of negotiations. Fleischhauer suggests that Goebbels was able to persuade Hitler to take up Russian peace soundings after Stalingrad. Negotiations faltered when the Russians demanded the partition of the Ukraine and a large part of the Baltic. In addition the announcement by Roosevelt at Casablanca on 24 January that the Allies would insist on the 'unconditional surrender' of Germany discouraged advocates of a separate peace. In May Ribbentrop again ruled out the pursuit of

20. Goebbels' speech of 18 February 1943, 'Kundgebung des Gaues Berlin der NSDAP.', Helmut Heiber (ed.), Goebbels-Reden Band 2. 1939-1945 (Dusseldorf, 1972), pp. 176-81; Speer, Third Reich, p. 257; entry for 14 March 1943, Semmler, Goebbels, p. 76. Some felt that this appeal made a compromise peace more difficult: see note of 17 February 1943, Hill, Weiszäcker-Papiere, p. 324, and the hostile reaction of Edgar Klaus, the middle man in Sweden for the various peace feelers to the Russians: Fleischhauer, Chance des Sonderfriedens, p. 120.


peace feelers. Goebbels was still interested in the idea of a German-Soviet peace but from this time on, Hitler showed no interest in plans to exploit differences among the enemy, commenting that Germany had burnt its bridges.

Goebbels had concluded that Hitler's isolation from the conduct of domestic politics had allowed Bormann too much power and that Bormann did not support total war policies. On 27 February he told a group including Speer that domestic politics were controlled by Bormann who allowed Hitler to feel he was still directing matters. Bormann was guided by ambition, and his doctrinaire approach meant that he represented a danger to any evolution of policy. (This was a similar conclusion to that reached by Himmler in 1942). Bormann's influence had to decrease and Hitler had to be persuaded to come to Berlin more often and take charge of policies. By this means Goebbels hoped that they could influence Hitler's thinking. Here Goebbels also admitted that whatever he could temporarily persuade Hitler to do on total war, his arguments had had no lasting effect. His criticisms of Bormann may therefore have been a means of evading the realization that Hitler did not accept that certain measures were necessary. He concluded: 'We are not having a "leadership crisis", but strictly speaking a "Leader crisis"!' Speer believed that these moves by Goebbels demonstrated his lack of faith.

27. Fleischhauer, Chance des Sonderfriedens, p. 131.
28. Speer, Third Reich, p. 293.
29. Speer, Third Reich, p. 258; see also entry for 15 May 1943, Semmler, Goebbels, p. 86.
30. Speer, Third Reich, p. 258.
in victory. Goebbels' initial plan was to persuade Göring to use his powers as 'Chairman of the Council of Ministers for Defence of the Reich', a position which allowed Göring to issue decrees independent of Hitler, to counter Bormann and Lammers. Speer claimed that he and Milch originated this means of countering Bormann. (The exact details of this plan to reactivate Göring can only be reconstructed in part from Speer's memoirs and Goebbels' diaries, as there is little other remaining evidence.) Goebbels believed that a strong authority was needed in domestic policy to give direction. He also wanted a National Socialist 'senate' to criticize incorrect decisions and to supervise the Gauleiters. He was seeking to overcome the problems of lack of co-ordination of measures on the home front by using Göring's powers as quasi-deputy Chancellor.

Although Göring's powers and responsibilities were still great on paper, since 1941 he had increasingly retreated from the strong position he had previously possessed. His power had drained away, weakened by his inability to create an effective alternative to the military/economic apparatus and by the failures of the Luftwaffe. Apart from his powers over the economy, Göring had had considerable influence over Hitler in the past. He had been, and possibly still was, the most popular National Socialist after Hitler; he

31. ibid.
33. Speer, Third Reich, p. 258.
34. Entries for 2 March and 16 March 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 267, 301.
35. Entry for 15 May 1943, Semmler, Goebbels, p. 86.
37. ibid., pp. 204-6.
had a prestige and popularity with the public and in the party which Goebbels or Speer lacked. In Goebbels' opinion, Göring's authority could not be dispensed with in any future reorganization of the Reich's leadership.\textsuperscript{38} To Goebbels Göring may have seemed reliable because he was a long standing member of the leadership group, a known quantity compared to Bormann. Goebbels wanted to form a more radical group.\textsuperscript{39} He believed that in any union of a more and a less radical group or policy the more radical one would always win the upper hand.\textsuperscript{40} He may have thought that if a more radical group could guide Göring in the greater exertion of his powers, it would soon dominate him.

Relations between Goebbels and Göring had been strained because as Gauleiter of Berlin Goebbels had closed Horchers, the Berlin luxury restaurant patronized by Göring.\textsuperscript{41} Speer therefore made the first approach, flying to the Obersalzberg to hold talks with Göring on 28 February.\textsuperscript{42} Göring's view of the situation in 1943 had some similarities to the views of Goebbels and Speer. He considered that the German position was recoverable provided the people recognized how serious it was. His suggested solution was 'economize on soldiers, women as replacements everywhere it is possible'.\textsuperscript{43} Göring responded well to the moves and criticized Bormann's

\textsuperscript{38} Entry for 6 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 5; entries for 20 April 1943 and 22 May 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 337-8, 389.

\textsuperscript{39} Semler believed that Himmler and Bormann also belonged to this more radical group but Goebbels would prefer them to be in the opposite group: entries for 20 March and 9 April 1943 in Semmler, Goebbels, pp. 79-80, 82.

\textsuperscript{40} Entry for 1 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{41} Speer, Third Reich, p. 257; entry for 18 March 1943, Semmler, Goebbels, pp. 77-8.

\textsuperscript{42} Speer Chronik for February 1943, BA R 3/1737, p. 27.

influence on Hitler. Progress was smooth and a 'fundamental political' meeting of Speer, Goebbels and Göring took place on 1 March. During this meeting they also discussed the need to replace Ribbentrop with someone who could persuade Hitler to adopt a rational foreign policy. They had to pursue the war politically as well as militarily. When, however, Goebbels next met Hitler, Hitler strongly criticized Göring because of recent heavy air raids. Goebbels and Speer therefore judged it politic not to raise these proposals for the time being. They again met with Göring on 17 March to discuss armaments propaganda, and Speer met Göring on the Obersalzberg on 28 March.

The group of allies, headed by Goebbels and Speer, planned to use Göring to call Sauckel to account for allegedly using false figures about the labour force he had supplied for industry. At the meeting on 12 April, Göring supported Sauckel and attacked Milch, so that the effect was that no light was thrown on the question of the figures. Speer suggested Bormann used bribery and evidence of Göring's drug addiction to blackmail Göring into changing sides. Overy attributes

44. Speer, Third Reich, p. 260.


46. Speer, Third Reich, p. 260.

47. Entry for 2 March 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, p. 266.

48. Speer, Third Reich, pp. 262-3; entry for 9 March 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 279-82.


50. Speer Third Reich, pp. 264-5.

51. ibid., p. 265. See also entry for 13 April 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 326-7.
Göring's stand to distrust of the leading conspirators and a hesitation to attack the SS openly.\textsuperscript{52}

The deterioration of Germany's position in the air war in 1943 progressively weakened Göring's standing in Hitler's eyes.\textsuperscript{53} While Goebbels still wanted to revive Göring's authority by 6 April,\textsuperscript{54} it was clear that these efforts had failed. Göring recognized the need for different policies but he was no longer willing to take a stand. Orlow has suggested that Göring was too discredited by the Luftwaffe's failure.\textsuperscript{55} (By August Goebbels' comment was that politically Göring might as well be dead.\textsuperscript{56}) Bormann may already have been more powerful than either Goebbels or Speer realized and that therefore their move came too late. In addition those who filled the vacuum created by Göring's failure to exercise his powers had no interest in his reactivation. Speer and Goebbels' biographer Reimann have suggested that Lammers and Bormann were wary of Goebbels because they knew that if given new powers, Goebbels would use them, thus upsetting the elite's established balance of power.\textsuperscript{57} Goebbels could not understand why in an authoritarian state there was not enough power to achieve what was believed necessary.\textsuperscript{58}

Goebbels had been able to create a 'bloc' of members of the secondary level of the leadership who agreed with his plans to

\textsuperscript{52} Overy, \textit{Goering}, pp. 221-2.

\textsuperscript{53} Testimony of General Karl Bodenschatz, liaison officer between Göring and Hitler, 8 March 1946, \textit{TMWC}, vol. 9, pp. 30-3.

\textsuperscript{54} Entry for 6 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{56} Entry for 10 August 1943, Semmler, \textit{Goebbels}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{57} Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, p. 206; Reimann, \textit{Goebbels}, pp. 269-70.

\textsuperscript{58} Entry for 2 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 8.
increase the mobilization of the home front. However he was unable to persuade Göring to take a stand against Bormann. He attributed his failure to convince Hitler of the measures he believed necessary to Hitler's 'bad counsellors'. He may thereby have concealed from himself the realization that Hitler did not fully support his ideas. Hitler did give conflicting signals. In April for example Speer reported that Hitler, under the influence of two Austrian Gauleiters, Eigruber and Uiberreither, supported total war.59

The manner in which Goebbels set about having his ideas accepted demonstrates his understanding of the sources of power and decisionmaking in the regime. Like Todt, he began by seeking to persuade Hitler in private conversation. He described the means he used to persuade Hitler as follows. Hardly anyone in the armed forces could handle Hitler correctly because they believed that when they brought a matter before Hitler once, it was settled. This was not so. A matter had to be brought to Hitler's attention repeatedly, and one could not be defeated by the first refusal. Hitler insisted on his own point of view, and to persuade him otherwise required tenacity and a strong belief in one's own point of view.60 He gained promises from Hitler that the policies he favoured would be implemented. When he found that others had interceded with Hitler to have them overturned, he identified the problem as being with Hitler's advisers and sought to circumvent them. He was not prepared to counter Hitler openly.

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In his speeches at the time Goebbels spoke of total war as meaning the total preparedness of the population to concentrate all

60. Entry for 23 January 1943, BA NL 118/50, p. 31.
its energies on the fight for victory.\(^{61}\) He spoke of the need for Germany to give up all comfortable middle class customs.\(^{62}\) A voluntary sacrifice of living standards was necessary to a significant degree.\(^{63}\) He stressed his belief that the public was prepared to bear burdens if they were treated equally.\(^{64}\) The specific measures which Goebbels mentioned were necessary were: women to replace men wherever possible; temporary closures of businesses not needed for the conduct of the war; the population working a 14 to 16 hour week if necessary; offices to stay open until the job was done however long it took.\(^{65}\)

Goebbels also signalled that some measures would be taken which were not of vital importance to the war but were necessary to maintain morale at home and at the front, the 'optics of war'. He foreshadowed the closure of bars, nightclubs, luxury restaurants and shops, and his ban on riding in Berlin. At the same time he stressed that means of relaxation - theatres, cinema, sport - would still be maintained.\(^{66}\) This emphasis seems designed to overcome the problems of inequality which damaged public morale in the First World War. These speeches do show, as Herbst has suggested, a concern for the maintenance of morale but they were also intended to signal to Hitler that the public would bear more restrictions.

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62. ibid., pp. 161, 165.
63. Speech of 18 February 1943, ibid., pp. 184-6.
64. ibid., pp. 187, 206.
65. ibid., pp. 205, 200, 204, 192 respectively.
66. ibid., pp. 189-90, 193, 195-6.
Goebbels' concept of total war in these speeches was one of rationalization of manpower and resources so that the greatest possible number of staff could be employed in armaments and the greatest possible number of soldiers freed for the front.\(^{67}\) He specifically spoke of the Germans needing to counter the ruthless Soviet methods of mobilizing the population with measures of equal value, but not Bolshevik in spirit.\(^{68}\) For Goebbels the economic model of total war comprised freeing producers and soldiers, and breaking down the structural obstacles to production. He did not appear to see any need to alter the provision of raw materials or organization of the economic infrastructure as a precondition for increased production; nor was he expressing opinions about the military conduct of the war.

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In his memoirs Speer alleged that with the failure of this plan, Goebbels resigned himself to the extent of Bormann's influence and entered into an informal alliance with him. Speer claimed to have declined similar overtures.\(^{69}\) Goebbels' diaries of the period do not support Speer's interpretation. Moreover Goebbels did not lose the sense of urgency about total war, which prompted his plan to overcome the 'Führer crisis'. He was concerned that spring would see the resurgence of a dangerous 'illusionism'. On learning in April that casinos in Baden-Baden, Baden and Zoppot had reopened, he deduced that the concept of total war was already being weakened by the first good weather.\(^{70}\)

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67. ibid., p. 196.
68. ibid., pp. 184-5.
69. Speer, Third Reich, p. 267.
70. Entry for 6 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 5.
Despite Goebbels' belief that Hitler had not wavered in his views on total war,\(^71\) there is evidence that he did not always judge Hitler's views correctly. Alterations made by Bormann and Hitler to Goebbels' speech at the Sportspalast of 5 June 1943 made his references to the preceding crises, the possibility of surrender or defeat, and the existence of weapons of retaliation less specific. Goebbels' claim that the number of workers available to the English and Americans 'scarcely' compared to those available to the Germans was altered to 'could not' compare.\(^72\) The entire section dealing with the 'setback' in North Africa was removed, including Goebbels' justification of this campaign as buying time for Europe to consolidate its defences.\(^73\) These alterations indicate differences of emphasis on how far the public should be kept informed; they may also demonstrate differing assessments of the seriousness of Germany's position.

Differences of opinion on policy matters have been shown to exist on the question of the treatment of the Eastern peoples and can also be seen on housing. Goebbels believed that in the long run compulsory seizure of unoccupied homes would have to be used to solve housing problems in bombed areas.\(^74\) In the same month, April, Bormann advised party leaders that Hitler had rejected the introduction of compulsion for the moment and had opted for an appeal for second homes and houses not being fully used.\(^75\)

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71. Entry for 3 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 8.


73. ibid., pp. 45-8.

74. Entry for 3 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 6.

75. Bormann, 5 April 1943, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 59/43.', 'Wohnraumlenkung.', BA NS 6/341. Here Bormann may have been reflecting earlier public opinion as reported by the SD: 'Meldungen aus dem Reich Nr. 257', 5
Attempts to supersede it by a more radical group having failed, the work of the Dreier Ausschuss continued. A meeting took place on 16 March 1943, attended by Goebbels and Speer as well. (The relevant Reich Chancellery file contains records of no further meetings until June.) The meeting discussed various proposals aimed at cutting down staff, such as reducing the staff of the environmental planning office from 56 to twelve, and restricting the range of activities carried out on the home front, including restricting horse racing and a proposed tax on theatre and cinema tickets. Goebbels proposed that a draft decree on the need for the leadership to set an example be more strongly worded. Interior Minister Frick objected to the practice where some unnamed organizations negotiated settlements with the armed forces which exempted them from the quotas for raising troops; this aggravated the position of the remaining agencies. Keitel claimed that for his part he did not permit such blockages. The Chronik commented that Speer barely participated in the discussion since 'hardly any useful help for armaments was to be expected from the proposals advanced'. Speer refrained from pointing this out at the meeting. He did not advance other proposals which he considered more useful. Subsequently on


77. 'Niederschrift über die Besprechung des Ausschusses vom 16. März 1943, 16 Uhr', BA R 43 II/654a, p. 4.

78. ibid., p. 5. Frick may have been alluding in part to the protection Goebbels had obtained for the cultural sector from von Unruh.

the advice of the Propaganda Ministry, export reporting requirements were simplified.80

Goebbels had banned horse racing and betting in Berlin.81 When the matter was submitted to Hitler by Bormann and Lammers, he decided that horse racing and sporting competitions should not be stopped because they provided one of the few remaining popular entertainments and absorbed excess purchasing power.82 After Goebbels again approached Hitler, he succeeded in having racing restricted.83

The gap until the next meeting on 24 June suggests that Goebbels had some justification for his charge that the Ausschuss was not acting expeditiously enough. The loss of some 150,000 men when the Tunisian bridgehead surrendered on 12 May84 did not seem to increase the sense of urgency in the Ausschuss. The 24 June meeting, which was also attended by Goebbels, Frick and Seldte, again dealt with a mixture of important and trivial issues. Frick undertook to investigate further Goebbels' suggestion that in future only one wreath for each sector (state, party, armed forces) would be provided for burials. The most important decision of the Ausschuss was that business closures would continue till 30 September 1943. The responsible authorities could order this without notifying any external agency. Probably to counter the unrest which had developed

80. Director Propaganda Section to Goebbels, 27 May 1943, 'Totaler Krieg', BAR 55/621.
82. Note by Lammers, 4 March 1943, 'Sofort!', ibid., pp. 1-2.
84. Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, p. 370.
as a result of the measures, a public announcement would indicate that such closures took place solely because of total war; recognizing the importance of maintaining a healthy middle class, the government would encourage these firms to reopen as soon as possible after the war. The Reich Chancellery record of discussion on this issue does not bear out Carroll’s claim that this marked a retreat by Goebbels from the realistic introduction of total war. Goebbels had earlier believed with Speer that it was more important to close down affected businesses totally, but by April he had come to believe that such measures had to be taken with an eye to their hoped for effect, freeing staff.

The closures of businesses in the various sectors of the economy, extended from the original finishing date of 15 May, were completed by 30 September 1943. They were divided into four categories - food stores and businesses which were exempted from the measures, various household good producers where enough capacity was retained to allow for repairs; other businesses were either closed or a restricted number allowed to remain open. Some cases of businesses continuing to pursue peace time production were stopped. The extent of business closures seem to have varied

87. Though it might have seemed that way to the Economics Ministry representatives whose record of the meeting she uses: Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 242-3.
88. Entry for 3 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, pp. 6, 8.
90. Gauleiter Jordan of Magdeburg-Anhalt found whole areas of the economy unaffected by the war, including a firm employing hundreds of specialists in purely peacetime functions: Jordan, Erlebt und Erlitten, p. 243.
according to local enforcement of the guidelines. They appear, for example, to have been strictly enforced in Nuremberg.\textsuperscript{91} Suggestions were made that the closures acquired a momentum of their own beyond any employment gains and included elements of rationalization of various areas of business.\textsuperscript{92} They freed materials and power as well as labour\textsuperscript{93} but did lead to unemployment particularly in areas without armaments industry or among people ill-suited to other work.\textsuperscript{94}

Herbst has demonstrated that the programme of closing down businesses provoked considerable unrest among middle class business owners and small tradesmen.\textsuperscript{95} These difficulties produced a proposal from Tiessler to Goebbels for a propaganda campaign to demonstrate that National Socialism supported the middle class and countering any confusion of war-time measures with a long-term policy.\textsuperscript{96} The state secretary of the Interior Ministry, Stuckart, claimed that the political porcelain being broken was irreplaceable.\textsuperscript{97}

The files on the closures and women's employment suggest that civil

\textsuperscript{91} Nadler, \textit{Stadt im Schatten Streichers}, pp. 135-6. See also Sauer, \textit{Württemberg}, p. 371, for a similar situation.

\textsuperscript{92} Stuckart to Kritzinger, 17 March 1943, BA R 43 II/662; Sauckel to Lammers, 19 May 1943, 'Einsatz von Männern und Frauen auf Grund der Stillegungsverordnung vom 29. Januar 1943.', BA R 43 II/662a. Complaints were received from people whose businesses were closed: submission to Lammers, 8 April 1943, '1.) Vermerk:', 'Durchführung des Führererlasses vom 13. Januar', BA R 43 II/662a.

\textsuperscript{93} Unsigned note, '1./ Vermerk:', 4 June 1943 and unsigned note, '1.) Vermerk:', 'Ausschußsitzung.', 23 June 1943, BA R 43 II/662.


\textsuperscript{95} Herbst, \textit{Totale Krieg}, pp. 219-20, 230-1; Steinert, \textit{Hitler's War}, pp. 197-8, 201.

\textsuperscript{96} T(iessler), submission to Goebbels, 'Der Nationalsozialismus bejaht den Mittelstand.', BA NS 18/266.

\textsuperscript{97} Stuckart to Kritzinger, 17 March 1943, BA R 43 II/662.
servants such as Lammers and Stuckart were more concerned about
the political consequences and more conservative in their attitudes
than party leaders. The Gauleiter of Mark Brandenburg, Emil Stürtz,
told Lammers he had received a flood of complaints from business
people about the closures, but he wanted all ORBs to stand firm on the
measures. Bormann claimed the process had been 'frictionless and
successful' but complained about the 'misplaced leniency' of some
areas. The party had to guaranteed that Hitler's order was carried out
quickly and without compromise.

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The Ausschuss was most active in the period January to June
1943: but it does not seem to have fulfilled the expectations which
the decree of 13 January raised. The proponents of more radical
policies, Speer and Goebbels, seem to have had unrealistic
expectations of the total numbers which could be freed. As a result of
the Ausschuss's activities some 2 million more men were called into
the armed forces. Some ministries and organizations lost
considerable numbers of staff and instituted substantial
simplifications. The Post Ministry freed 121,000 employees by the

99. Fernschreiben Bormann to all Gauleiters, 'Stillegung von Betrieben.', ibid.
102. The Reichsarbeitsdienst gave up 54.6 per cent of its leaders to military
service, despite its role in training the classes of 1925 and others due to be
called up: Hierl to Lammers, 11 March 1943, 'Durchführung des
Führererlasses vom 13.1.1943 über Einsatz für Aufgaben der
Reichsverteidigung.', BA R 43 II/660, pp. 1-2. See also Ganzenmüller,
Transport Ministry, to Lammers, 'Erlaß des Führers über den umfassenden
Einsatz von Männern und Frauen für Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigung
vom 13.1.1943.', BA R 43 II/660, p. 1 and Wohlhaupt, office of the Reich
commissioner for price fixing, to Lammers, 'Vereinfachungen auf dem
Gebiet des Besoldungsrechts, des Beamtenrechts und der Stellenpläne',
BA R 43 II/658a, pp. 1-2.
end of February 1943. Some organizations showed imagination in encouraging women’s work. The railways decided to use the wives of their workers for all railway work because it was believed they would already have a considerable knowledge of the requirements of the work.

In 1944 Lammers claimed that the Ausschuss had been successful in winning 2,506,000 workers from the following actions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meldepflicht</td>
<td>1,126,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inspection of uk positions</td>
<td>830,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closures</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combing out</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Lammers stated that he had no numbers for the savings made by individual ORBs. Some of its proposed measures had not found Hitler’s agreement or had foundered on the resistance of the departments. In some cases where it has been suggested that Hitler weakened the measures, he merely altered the means of implementing them, to avoid strong public reaction. He was against unnecessarily disturbing the population by bans but wanted production shut down. For example, instead of maintaining the ban on hair perms, he aimed to

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get the same effect by stopping the repair of the relevant machines.¹⁰⁶

Many of those freed in the closure of businesses were aged and only one third proved re-employable, mostly not in the armaments economy.¹⁰⁷ Of the 1.6 million women who were brought into the workforce, some 500,000 had left again by the end of 1943, the Armaments Ministry pointed out.¹⁰⁸ A further 0.7 million could only be employed half daily.¹⁰⁹ Policy varied from Gau to Gau. Gauleiter Bürckel of Westmark ordered lower party leaders to report any women still avoiding work to the labour offices.¹¹⁰ Lax enforcement or uneven interpretation of the guidelines¹¹¹ and lack of a mechanism to ensure that women did not slip out of the system again appears to have been a contributing factor in the low numbers


¹¹¹. Koonz claims that officials were reluctant to enforce the decree rigorously: Koonz, Mothers of the Fatherland, p. 398; Rupp, Mobilizing Women, p. 56. Popular opinion believed this to be the case: 'Meldungen aus dem Reich Nr. 366', 11 March 1943, and 'Meldungen aus dem Reich Nr. 373', 5 April 1943, Meldungen, vol. 13, pp. 4934, 5075-80. For an earlier case of uneven interpretation of the guidelines on the inspection of domestic servants see 'Meldungen aus dem Reich Nr. 260', 16 February 1942, Meldungen, vol. 9, pp. 3332-3.
In part the British experience suggests it was to be expected that high percentages of women could not be employed.\(^\text{113}\)

Despite Goebbels' hope that compulsory reporting for labour would overcome public perceptions of unequal treatment, these perceptions were if anything strengthened by the Ausschuss's activities.\(^\text{114}\) The belief that only upper and middle class women were evading employment was too simple. There is evidence that it was inaccurate\(^\text{115}\) but it persisted, thus vindicating Goebbels' unsuccessful efforts to publicize leaders' wives working. Goebbels had therefore failed in any attempt to use class animus to introduce stricter policies, as seems to have been one of his intentions,\(^\text{116}\) because the measures did not appear radical enough. The registration of women for work had not stilled working class resentment of what was believed to be upper and middle class evasion of labour duty; the policy on closure of businesses and compulsory reporting for women on the other hand caused middle class unrest.\(^\text{117}\) Herbst concludes that the halfheartedness of the measures meant that the support of neither

\(^{112}\) Winkler, 'Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie', pp. 118-19.

\(^{113}\) In August 1941 1.5 million women in Britain were registered for employment but only 61,400 were actually employed as a result: Hancock and Gowing, *British War Economy*, p. 308.


\(^{115}\) Mason, 'Zur Frauenarbeit im NS-Staat', p. 583. In 1939 58 per cent of all women not in paid employment had working class husbands: Schupetta, *Frauen- und Ausländererwerbstätigkeit*, p. 147, see also pp. 146-7.


group was secured, and that they weakened public support for the regime.\textsuperscript{118}

There were definite elements in Goebbels' concept of total war of radicalism for its own sake, of at least rhetorical wartime socialism and levelling. Goebbels' belief that a more egalitarian approach to total war policies would result in the population being more willing to bear burdens was drawn from the SD reports on morale. In December 1942 Ley had suggested to Himmler that the incidence of shirking in industry should be countered by welfare measures rather than coercion.\textsuperscript{119} Reflecting the tenor of the SD reports on morale, Kaltenbrunner told Himmler he agreed with Ley's proposals. Most German workers submitted themselves more willingly to the requirements of total war than 'a great part' of well-to-do German circles.\textsuperscript{120} Additionally he suggested that the leadership had to subordinate itself still more to the requirements of total war.\textsuperscript{121} Himmler's response is not on record.

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Von Unruh suspended his commission's activities for a few weeks in March 1943 to allow the Ausschuss's measures to take effect.\textsuperscript{122} The commission continued to encounter difficulties when it proposed to abolish duplicated work. For example, General Fromm opposed proposals that Speer take over the raw materials offices of the Head of Army Armaments and that of the Weapons Office

\textsuperscript{118} Herbst, \textit{Totale Krieg}, p. 230; see also Winkler, 'Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie', p. 119. Herbst's conclusion is derived from his view that this was the main purpose of the measures.

\textsuperscript{119} Ley to Himmler, 14 December 1942, BA NS 19/2636, pp. 1-11.

\textsuperscript{120} Kaltenbrunner to Himmler, 12 May 1943, 'Geheim!', 'Hebung der Arbeitswilligkeit', \textit{ibid.}, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{122} Fernschreiben von Unruh to Hitler, 15 March 1943, BA Rep. 312 Nr. 27.
Von Unruh's staff inspected the Heereswaffenamt and were able to suggest changes to save some 150 of the total staff of 480 men. Von Unruh authorized the call up of as many men as possible from the administration and economy of the General Government. SS officials suggested that von Unruh's reduction of staff in the General Government had not been great since many of the positions he had abolished had been recreated by the civilian administration. The administration was able to use the argument that younger men were needed in the positions because of the security situation in the General Government. To some extent this was not a failing on the commission's part; Hoffmann had indicated in his reports that action needed to be taken from the top to prevent the return of excess staff. It may have been evidence in certain cases that von Unruh cut too much, that the positions abolished were necessary and had to be replaced.


125. With to Himmler via Persönliche Stab, 26 February 1943, 'Heranziehung der Volksdeutschen aus dem Generalgouvernen zum Wehrdienst', BA NS 19/2648.


Hitler's belief in von Unruh's effectiveness continued. He gave von Unruh the task of preparing suggestions to unify the building organizations of each section of the armed forces in January 1943. By May a proposal to merge them into the OT for the duration of the war had been developed and forwarded to Speer and Keitel. Göring had already ordered that the air force's building section should go to the OT on 2 May.\

On 28 April von Unruh had discussions with Speer, Sauckel and Rail Minister Dorpmüller to review gaps which had arisen in the fulfilment of a programme to deliver 800,000 men to the armed forces. Bormann's comment on the meeting was that unfortunately von Unruh had 'very weak command power, weakest in the armed forces'. Here Bormann was voicing the suspicion, as Goebbels had earlier, that as a military officer von Unruh was not capable of taking a firm enough stand on possible cases of overstaffing in military offices.

Hitler did not appear to share or be influenced by this suspicion, and decreed on 10 May that von Unruh should examine whether all Germans in the occupied northern and western countries, and in Italy were employed in tasks important for the war effort. This expansion of his powers was designed to prevent staff from being moved from Germany into the occupied territories to avoid military

130. Bormann's handwritten comment, ibid., p. 1.
131. Bormann, 3 June 1943, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 86/43', 'Nachprüfung des Kriegseinsatzes in den besetzten norwegischen, niederländischen, belgischen und französischen Gebieten sowie in Dänemark und Italien;', BA NS 6/796.
service.\textsuperscript{132} After his first inspection in France, von Unruh reported to Bormann that the administration was quite economically staffed. The main problem was to rationalize duplication between various offices and the military commander's office.\textsuperscript{133}

Surveying five months of the von Unruh commission's activities, Ifland suggested to Bormann that the methods of finding men for the armed forces needed to be reorganized. The different approaches of individual Gauleiters led to varying results.\textsuperscript{134} Ifland criticized the Wehrmacht's disorganization and reluctance to give up soldiers, even if they could be better used outside the army. He proposed that the Reich defence commissioners be given the right to inspect staffing levels in all areas including the armaments sector and the armed forces. He was suspicious of both sectors' use of staff, and claimed that 600,000 men had slipped between the cracks because of disorganization in the Wehrmacht.\textsuperscript{135} As a result of the armaments sector not delivering its quota, the 800,000 man programme would not be filled. Since Speer's sector was the one remaining source of labour, future programmes were less likely to be successful.\textsuperscript{136}

Bormann's reply foreshadowed pressure on Speer's area of authority. The armaments industry had been treated 'extremely considerately' and was the only sector which had so far not carried

\textsuperscript{132} Ifland, 'Vorlage an Reichsleiter Bormann', 19 February 1943, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{133} Von Unruh to Bormann for Hitler, 15 June 1943, 'Bericht Nr. 1. Frankreich', \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1-6.

\textsuperscript{134} Gauleiters Wegener and Kauffmann had done nothing; a lot had been done in North Westphalia and nothing in South Westphalia: Bereichsleiter Ifland, 26 May 1943, 'Vorlage an Reichsleiter Bormann', 'Geheim', 'Sicherstellung des Wehrersatzes aus den UK-Gestellten: Mitwirkung der Reichsverteidigungskommissare.', BA NS 6/780, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 7, 12-13.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1 - 2.
out its responsibilities.137 The party had exceeded its quota by 150 per cent and could give up no more staff; other organizations were in a similar position. Bormann believed that the remaining men in uk positions were so small in number that they were of little consequence; any further drafts had to come from the armaments sector.138 (This view may reflect a belief in the Führerhauptquartier that von Unruh had effectively scrutinized uk positions.) In view of Speer's ban on any intervention in armaments, 'coming demands must be raised from the outset not with Pg. Speer, rather with the Führer, so that the Führer takes the decision. As was seen with the progress of the 800,000 man programme to 15 May, no office achieves a result without this Führer decision.'139 It signifies the strength of Speer's position that Bormann considered that Hitler's personal intervention alone could overrule Speer. Bormann seemed nonetheless confident that Hitler would be persuaded to intervene and overrule Speer.

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Individual leaders continued with efforts to pursue total war measures, both minor and major, in their areas of responsibility. Himmler approved various restrictions: SS and police travel forms were simplified, a measure which von Unruh considered the armed forces could copy;140 SS offices were instructed to move out of houses to make accommodation available to the bombed out, resulting in 119


138. ibid., p. 2.

139. ibid., p. 3.

140. Von Unruh to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Oberkommando des Heeres, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, and Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, 7 June 1943, BA NS 19/992, pp. 1-2.
homes with 630 rooms being made free, 45 rooms made available to hospitals, and 11 for a recuperation home for the wounded; in response to a request from Sauckel, Himmler agreed to make a Swiss SS officer available to recruit skilled Swiss metal and building workers, and to support Sauckel’s attempts to gain workers from areas of partisan activity in the East. He also issued orders to the SS armaments factory at Buchenwald to ensure that the brass in used 2 cm flak ammunition cases was recovered, a move which Speer welcomed and suggested could be introduced more generally.

Speer proposed to Hitler that workers being called up be placed in units which would see action only in large operations. With this and the help of longer working holidays, Speer could use the workers in quiet times for armaments production. He also submitted a proposal to Hitler for more purposeful employment of technical workers in the army. In a decision which was later to be of great significance to Germany’s capacity to resist, Speer opposed the

141. Himmler, 8 March 1943, 'Anordnung', BA NS 19/366. See also Brandt to Berger, 8 March 1943, 'Geheim'; Brandt to SS-Brigadeführer Klopfer, 8 March 1943; Berger to Klopfer, 8 March 1943; Berger to Himmler, 20 May 1943, 'Geheim!', 'Anordnung des Reichsführers - SS über die Räumung der von SS-Dienststellen benutzten Wohnungen v. 8.3.1943', BA NS 19/366 and Pohl to Brandt, 17 May 1943, 'Geheim!', 'Ausquartierungsmaßnahmen', BA NS 19/167.

142. Sauckel Fernschreiben to Himmler, 9 March 1943, 'Dringend!', p. 1; Fernschreiben Himmler to Sauckel, March 1943, 'Geheim!', BA NS 19/2844. He rejected an appeal by Speer that he free ethnic Germans working with the OT’s protective commando in southeast Russia from call up to the Waffen-SS, but he did offer to make older men available in their place: Speer to Himmler, 9 June 1943, 'Freistellung des Schutzkommandos der OT im Südosten vom Dienst in der Waffen SS.', pp. 1-2; and Himmler to Speer, 19 June 1943, 'Freistellung des Schutzkommandos der OT im Südosten vom Dienst in der Waffen (?) den Organisation Todt', in BA NS 19/372.

143. Himmler to Speer, 5 March 1943, pp. 1-2; and Speer to Himmler, 26 March 1943, BA NS 19/181, pp. 1-2.

144. Speer Chronik for June 1943, BA R 3/1737, p. 79.
evacuation of armaments firms from Essen, which he insisted had to remain the German armaments centre.\textsuperscript{145}

Goebbels was gratified by Speer's reports of increases in production, including record March 1943 figures achieved despite considerable call ups to the forces and heavy bombing. Speer attributed the increases in part to propaganda, which encouraged armaments workers to feel themselves in the public spotlight and led them to exert themselves more.\textsuperscript{146}

Goebbels continued to express concern about attempts to undermine total war. In April he observed that unnamed people on the Obersalzberg, possibly either Bormann or Lammers, were attempting to undermine press restrictions, but he believed that he would be able to persuade Hitler that it was an inappropriate time to found a new illustrated film magazine.\textsuperscript{147} He also claimed that in Berlin women's employment was restricted because of the extraordinarily lax approach of Sauckel and his officials. Of 150,000 women liable for service in Berlin only 78,000 were classified as employable. Goebbels was concerned about the bad effect such half-measures would have on the morale of employed women.\textsuperscript{148} Goebbels' disappointment at this result, which classed 52 per cent of those reporting as employable, suggests that he may have had unrealistic expectations about the results of such registration. In 1943, when the British extended registration of women for work to the age group 45 to 50, encompassing a total of 1,737,000 women, the

\textsuperscript{145} Entry for 6 April 1943, BA NL 118/54, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{146} Entry for 6 April 1943, ibid., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{147} Entry for 2 April 1943, ibid., pp. 7-8; see also entry for 3 April 1943, ibid., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{148} Entry for 2 April 1943, ibid., p. 8.
net increase in those employed was 10,000, or some 0.5 per cent of the total.\textsuperscript{149}

Goebbels' attempts to have the employment of Party leaders' wives publicized met with continued resistance and appear to have come to nothing. On 17 March the Party Chancellery objected to the plan because it would raise the question why these women had not worked before.\textsuperscript{150} Tiessler commented that Goebbels was unlikely to accept this argument. The people were aware that on the whole the leaders' wives had not been employed in factories. Such an announcement would pacify circles who suspected total war was not genuine. It was therefore right that unobtrusive mention of this employment should occur as often as possible.\textsuperscript{151} At the same time as this publicity was resisted, Bormann criticized press publicity of visits to the wounded by the wives of prominent citizens as 'aping the customs of an epoch of society made outmoded by National Socialism'.\textsuperscript{152}

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On 12 April 1943 Hitler named Bormann as Secretary to the Führer.\textsuperscript{153} Bormann explained to Himmler that this was necessary because for years he had received tasks outside the Party

\textsuperscript{149} The number of women in this age group in Britain in 1945 is found in Central Statistical Office, \textit{Statistical Digest of the War} (London, 1951), p. 2, while the numbers employed as a result are taken from H.M.D. Parker, \textit{Manpower a Study of War-time Policy and Administration} (London, 1957), p. 292.

\textsuperscript{150} Signature, 17 March 1943, 'Notiz für Pg. Tiessler.‘, 'Arbeitseinsatz von Frauen prominenter Parteigenossen-Ihre Vorlage vom 27.2.1943‘, BA NS 18/736.

\textsuperscript{151} T(iessler), 24 March 1943, 'Notiz für Pg. Witt‘, 'Arbeitseinsatz von Frauen prominenter Parteigenossen‘, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{152} They should do such duties in a less public way: Bormann, 5 May 1943, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 71/43', 'Verwundetenbetreuung durch Frauen Prominenter.', BA NS 6/341.

\textsuperscript{153} Lammers to all ORBs, 8 May 1943, 'Sekretär des Führers.', BA NS 6/159.
Chancellery's area of responsibilities. He would not be creating a new office.\textsuperscript{154} Bormann was aware that Goebbels was not pleased by the announcement.\textsuperscript{155} Bormann could now intervene in any field he wished, and Goebbels believed that Bormann would not allow less doctrinaire policies to be adopted.\textsuperscript{156}

Bormann saw himself as having the responsibility for the total war decrees of January 1943. 'I started the whole thing, I set it in motion, and now I have to see to it that . . . there are as few blunders as possible.'\textsuperscript{157} Bormann's comments and actions, such as his views on the closure of businesses, suggest that he did see himself as introducing 'total war' measures and indeed as leading the entire process. Despite Goebbels' earlier criticisms, he was committed to the policy. Differences arose between Bormann and Speer and Goebbels for two reasons. Bormann certainly, and Hitler probably, was opposed to the creation of a central authority outside Hitler's headquarters. He also did not share the sense of urgency about the measures which Speer and Goebbels possessed.

Bormann's instructions to the party on total war increased. These instructions were issued mainly on Hitler's behalf, either because they were prompted by Hitler or because Bormann initiated the action but wanted Hitler's name to ensure action. The instructions reflect a fear of the effects on public morale on any evasion of total war policies by party members and a concern for morale within the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{154} Bormann to Himmler, 1 May 1943, BA NS 19/1205, pp. 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Bormann, 8 May 1943, 'Aktenvermerk für Pg. Dr. Klopfer und Pg. Friedrichs', BA NS 6/159, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, pp. 254, 258.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Martin Bormann to Gerda Bormann, 14 February 1943, \textit{Bormann Letters}, p. 5.
\end{itemize}
party itself. At the beginning of March Bormann advised the party leadership that Hitler directed that total war measures could only be carried out with the full support of the National Socialist movement, and 'the personal example' of each leading party member was of decisive importance. Hitler called for party members to practise as well as preach the virtues of the Kampfzeit. There was, for example, no justification for teas or receptions unless they were needed for foreign policy purposes. Individual national socialists had to become 'the motor' for the changes on the home front. Members whose comments betrayed doubt or defeatism were to be expelled from the party. Hitler repeated similar orders in May and June 1943, prompted by a loss of heart among party members. Bormann conveyed Hitler's desire that the use of adjutants by leading state and party officials be considerably reduced, and where possible able bodied men be replaced as adjutants by war wounded. Hitler

158. The party in Bavaria was discredited because, in the eyes of the population, the leadership led a life largely untouched by the war: Teil VII Stimmung und Verhalten der Bevölkerung unter den Bedingungen des Krieges. B. Berichte des Sicherheitsdienstes 1940-1944', Bayern in der NS-Zeit. I, pp. 595-6.


160. ibid., p. 3.


further expected that the wives and children of leaders who reported for work should not be given lighter or 'fake' work (Scheinarbeit). Those who did not have to report to work because of their age or the size of their family should undertake voluntary work.165

In March, Bormann advised that Hitler wanted the NSKK to train women as quickly as possible to replace men as civilian motor vehicle drivers.166 Bormann advised that Hitler himself had decided that all newspapers and magazines serving political, intellectual and material war leadership would continue to be produced. Only one specialist magazine would appear in other areas. This was a wartime solution and a general end to competition was not envisaged. The publication of 53 papers was discontinued, and the number of specialist magazines reduced from 125 to 40.167 Bormann asked that party leaders only intervene in particularly important cases, noting that the changes would save lead and free workers.168

Bormann's influence can also be seen in the Ausschuss' consideration of the proposed disbandment of the Prussian Finance Ministry, which would have freed some 232 men.169 Hitler opposed the dissolution but left it to Lammers to discuss the matter with Göring.170 In the June meeting Lammers reported on the conversation


168. ibid., pp. 1-3.


170. 'Niederschrift über die Besprechung des Ausschusses vom 16 März 1943, 16 Uhr,' ibid., p. 4.
with Göring. Bormann considered a dissolution of the Ministry to be psychologically correct, and the remaining members of the meeting agreed. Bormann probably believed that he could change Hitler's mind. The continued existence of the Ministry in June 1944 indicates that he was no more successful than Lammers. This example shows that at least some of the restrictions on closures came from Hitler himself. In this case all members of the Ausschuss agreed but Hitler's resistance prevented action being taken.

The implementation of the quotas Hitler ordered was encountering difficulties at this time, such as for Post Minister Ohnesorge. In Berger's opinion Ohnesorge would do anything in his power to win the war. Ohnesorge had impulsively volunteered 25,000 men to von Unruh even though only 16,000 were required. Keitel told him that he could not waive 4000 men from this quota and would not count men already made available to the army as part of the quota. On receiving this news Ohnesorge appealed to Himmler for assistance, pointing out that his increased quota would mean giving up men from the telecommunications service. The OKW's replacement section refused to count the men he made available to the Waffen-SS as part of the quota. Himmler's staff supported Ohnesorge. Berger commented that it would be understandable if

171. 'Niederschrift über die Besprechung des Ausschusses vom 24. Juni 1943, II Uhr,' ibid., pp. 4-5.
174. Keitel to Ohnesorge, 21 March 1943, pp. 1-2; see also With to Himmler, 24 April 1943, 'Anrechnung von 4000 Mann Fronthilfe der deutschen Reichspost auf die Auflage Plan.', ibid.
175. Fernschreiben Ohnesorge to Himmler, 18 March 1943, ibid.
Ohnesorge never volunteered help again. Himmler asked Berger to instruct With about the circumstances. This case illustrates some of the pitfalls for organizations and/or leaders who were willing to make substantial sacrifices of personnel for the war effort: their commitment was vulnerable to exploitation.

It also underlines the significance of Bormann’s victory in April 1943 when the OKW agreed that all uk positions for male Party employees would be agreed in the future ‘without exception’. Responsibility for the number and length of uk positions lay with the Party. Bormann made it the duty of senior party officials to ensure that no one stayed in a reserved position longer than was absolutely necessary. Continuous inspections would free men for the front in exchange for older men and the war wounded or other soldiers.

In this debate about total war, at a time when renewed measures to find labour at home and abroad were underway, it is important to note that none of these members of the leadership advocated a greater use of Jewish labour in the economy, outside of use of SS prisoners. Speer sought to restrict the SS’s use of building materials but the overall allocation of resources for the SS’s purposes, which included the concentration camp system and the extermination of the Jews, was not questioned.

177. ibid.
The regime had responded to the Stalingrad crisis with a flurry of policies, aimed at getting more labour for the armaments factories, simplifying the home front, and making more men available to the front. The measures adopted suggest commitment to some concept of 'total war' from Hitler down, and were accompanied by a propaganda campaign emphasizing that the government was serious about total war. The debates in the Ausschuss, and the positions adopted, suggest that Goebbels and Speer were motivated in part by radicalism for its own sake. There appears to have been little reason to close down businesses if their employees could not be re-employed. In his concern for popular morale Bormann represented his own sectional interest, that of the party; equally Speer reflected his own sectional interest in seeking to drive all production into his own sphere of influence, the armaments economy. The model of total war he pursued was one of efficiency, economic rationality and austerity. It was a model which ignored the other elements of waging a modern war as set out in Chapter One - the need to maintain morale by producing some items which are not 'essential'. The German worker would not necessarily have worked more productively had Speer had his way. For all Goebbels' calls for sacrifices, he understood the need to maintain some items for the sake of morale. This was not inconsistent with a policy of total war. Himmler did not become involved in such debates. Instead in this period he pursued both the Final Solution and the expansion of SS armaments production, both contributions to total war in a National Socialist definition.

When Stalingrad was not followed by a general weakening of the Eastern front, there was a tendency to relax, as seen in the

pattern of Ausschuss meetings. Still at least two of the members of the leadership, Goebbels and Speer, considered that the response had not been radical enough. In particular they believed that less consumer production and a greater employment of women could be achieved. Their efforts to overcome Bormann's influence aimed at having a more flexible foreign policy adopted, despite evidence that Hitler was not interested in this. Instead the creation of the office of Secretary to the Führer had strengthened Bormann's position. For the remainder of 1943, the regime's attention on the domestic front was focussed on ensuring the armed forces need not fear a stab in the back, as will be shown in Chapter Six.
CHAPTER SIX
'A SYSTEM OF SUBSTITUTIONS' (JULY TO DECEMBER 1943)

After the flurry of measures with which it responded to Stalingrad, the regime did not maintain the same impetus in the second half of 1943. The second half of 1943 faced the German leadership with no military crises as dramatic as Stalingrad, but was marked by a more rapid deterioration of Germany's position on the Eastern front, and the opening of a new front in Italy. The losses of the German army at Stalingrad could not be replaced and the eastern front had to give up units for Italy and other areas. In this period there were continuing demarcation disputes between the party, ministries, SS and armed forces as further attempts were made to save manpower and rationalize production. The regime also faced a political crisis when Italy left the war, and it appears to have focussed on this at the expense of further simplifications in the administration and the economy. The measures adopted in response to the Italian surrender were, by the regime's definition, as much an expression of total war as labour policy or the simplification of production. The effects of the Italian surrender and the pressures of the air war led Hitler, Himmler and Bormann in particular to intensify the ideological mobilization of the population.

Despite careful preparation and initial success, an attack by the Germans on 5 July, intended to remove the Russian position at Kursk, had failed by 12 July, and the Russians took Orel and Kharkov in their

1. Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, p. 478.
counterattack. The Germans lost half a million men in these battles.\(^2\) Hitler refused to sanction any withdrawals.\(^3\) Russian advances continued and by November Soviet forces had taken Kiev. Goebbels and Hitler, and German propaganda overall, now held out the hope of retaliation with new weapons and played on the fear of Bolshevism.\(^4\) During this period, the air war against Germany also increased in momentum.\(^5\) The 'firebomb' raids on Hamburg took place in July and August, with over 40,000 being killed.\(^6\)

The loss of North Africa in May and June 1943 had led to an unprecedented crisis in German public morale.\(^7\) The Allies followed their successful campaign in North Africa with the invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943. By 17 August the fighting for Sicily was over.\(^8\) Following a vote of no confidence from the Fascist Grand Council, Mussolini was dismissed by the King on 25 July and succeeded by Marshal Badoglio.\(^9\) The fall of Mussolini prompted renewed suggestions from the Italians that Germany make peace with Stalin.\(^10\)

2. ibid., pp. 478-9.
3. From this time on Hitler never spoke despondently and always displayed confidence in victory: Speer, *Third Reich*, p. 292.
The signing of the act of surrender was disclosed on 8 September, and the Germans immediately occupied Rome. The German armies were then deployed to resist the Allied invasion of Italy.

The German leadership was surprised by the news of the dismissal of Mussolini and found it difficult to decide how to present the news to the German people.11 The fall of the fascist regime, and the subsequent indications of its unpopularity in Italy, concerned the National Socialist leadership for a number of reasons. Not only had a new front opened, but discontented elements in Germany might be encouraged by fascism's easy overthrow.12 Symbolically, this was a blow similar to Stalingrad. Italy's withdrawal from the war as a result of internal political changes also reminded National Socialists of Germany in 1917-18, a parallel explicitly drawn by Jodl in a speech to Reichs- and Gauleiters in November 1943.13 During this period, the leaders in their speeches frequently compared the situation in 1943 favourably to that of Germany in 1914-18. On a number of occasions Himmler attributed the difference to the removal of the Jews, who in his opinion had acted as saboteurs and agitators in 1916-17, and to the absence of communist cells.14

11. Goebbels' diary entries suggest that they had expected a different result from the Grand Council meeting: entries for 25, 26 and 27 July 1943 in Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 403-7, 410-11; entries for 27 and 31 July 1943 von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 85-96. Baird judges German propaganda to be at its most equivocal in dealing with the Italian crisis: Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, p. 208.


The sudden fall of fascism prompted concern at the regime's effectiveness in reeducating the German people. The leadership agreed that the workers had remained loyal, unlike 1918, and were unlikely to be swayed by the Italian example. The frequency with which the loyalty of the German worker was stressed, especially to party audiences, suggests a need for reassurance in the party about this. The leaders agreed that the middle class, upper class and/or intellectuals were less reliable than the workers. Speer praised the exemplary attitude of the German worker as responsible for the favourable armaments situation. He singled out 'middle class critics' while Himmler claimed that defeatism was more prevalent among the upper classes and intellectuals than the middle or working classes. Men married to women from enemy countries, linked to former ruling houses or international economic circles were to be


18. ibid., p. 2.

removed from positions of influence. There were, however, limits to this concern for morale. Popular unrest in the Niederlausitz district did not prevent the displacement of farmers to set up a military training area there.

While Hitler responded to the Italian crisis more calmly than his entourage, he ordered Himmler to apply severe police measures to prevent anything similar happening in Germany. The least sign of trouble from foreigners in Germany would need to be firmly punished, Himmler told SS leaders. Hitler also sought to prevent public discontent by reducing the privileges of the leadership. Party leaders who owned more than one house, apart from at their place of work, should make these extra homes available for evacuees. This order seemingly had little effect since it was repeated in November. Himmler also considered it important for public morale to stamp out corruption and alcoholism. He must have believed control of these abuses to be possible, since he regarded bans or restrictions which

21. Himmler to Lammers, 29 September 1943, 'Errichtung eines Truppenübungsplatzes in der Niederlausitz.', and other papers in BA NS 19/1373.
23. ibid., p. 411.
24. 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, p. 43.
27. 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, pp. 91-3.
could not be enforced were damaging. Nonetheless he told Kehrl that he did not have the power to alter the inappropriate behaviour of some party leaders.

Himmler subsequently admitted that the fall of Italy had resulted in a wave of defeatism in Germany, supplemented by the efforts of enemy radio. He claimed that he had not chosen to punish every defeatist but rather chose to make examples of a few - by carrying out some 150 death sentences, as he later explained. By the end of the year Goebbels assured Hitler that in this war the home front would hold out to the last.

Reporting to Gauleiters in October 1943, Himmler assured them that they did not need to set up individual troop units to protect themselves against a revolt or paratrooper attack. This would only lead to organizational confusion. He assured them that no uprising or difficulties would occur. In July he and Bormann had agreed that such units should not be set up without an explicit Führer decree. Bormann and Himmler strongly supported this point of view in

28. For Himmler's opinions on the ban on listening to foreign radio, see ibid., pp. 38-9.
30. 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführerstagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, pp. 38-9; 'Rede . . . vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern', 6 October 1943, ibid., p. 20.
31. 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführerstagung', 4 October 1943, ibid., pp. 40-1.
33. Goebbels to Hitler, Christmas 1943, BA NL 118/106, p. 3; for another favourable judgement of the popular mood see Himmler, 'Rede . . . vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern', 6 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, p. 13.
34. 'Rede . . . vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern', 6 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, p. 15.
putting a stop to Swabian Gauleiter Karl Wahl's defence forces.\textsuperscript{36} Himmler described Wahl's plan as 'well meant but destroying all existing organization'.\textsuperscript{37}

The final measure taken to ensure internal order, recognized as such by the population,\textsuperscript{38} was the appointment of Himmler as Interior Minister on 20 August 1943.\textsuperscript{39} This appointment was a symbol of the seriousness with which Hitler viewed the possible effects of the Italian example. Himmler saw his tasks as Interior Minister as restoring the Reich's authority, eradicating corruption and bad conduct, and decentralizing unimportant tasks.\textsuperscript{40} In addition he had to secure the mood and attitude (Stimmung und Haltung) of the home front.\textsuperscript{41} Himmler believed that he had strengthened the State's authority by simplifying the Interior Ministry (removing two sections

\textsuperscript{36} Among the correspondence on this subject see Bormann to Wahl, 18 October 1943, pp. 1-2; Bormann to Himmler, 18 October 1943, pp. 1-4; Himmler to Bormann, 28 November 1943, 'Bildung einer Heimatschutztruppe in Gau Schwaben.', pp. 1-2; Himmler to Bormann, 14 December 1943, pp. 1-2; Himmler to Wahl, 17 December 1943, pp. 1-2; Bormann to Wahl, 18 December 1943, 'Bildung einer Heimatschutztruppe in Gau Schwaben. Ihr Schreiben vom 3. November 1943.', pp. 1-3; all in BA NS 19/798. See also Hüttenberger, Gauleiter, pp. 163-5. Despite these reassurances, Ley, in his capacity as Reich Organization Leader, spoke to Bormann about the possibility of political leaders being equipped with weapons: Bormann, 'Aktenvermerk für Pg. Friedrichs und Pg. Klopfert', BA NS 6/156, p. 4. By November the party treasurer's office told the Armaments Ministry that they had to provide more weapons to the party, since Hitler had ordered the provision of a total of two million pistols to equip political leaders: Buchberger, Hauptamt IV, Reichsschatzmeister, to Col. Kipping, Armaments Ministry, 16 November 1943, 'Waffenlieferung an die Partei', BA R 3/1600, pp. 1-3, and see also an undated speech by Ley, from its context end of 1943, BA NS 6/793, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{37} Himmler to Bormann, 'Geheim', 14 December 1943, BA NS 19/798.

\textsuperscript{38} Kaltenbrunner to Himmler, 26 October 1943, 'Meldungen zur Ernennung des Reichsführer-SS zum Reichsminister des Innern', BA NS 19/3270, p. 1 and 'Anlage', pp. 1-7.

\textsuperscript{39} Speer, Third Reich, p. 311.

\textsuperscript{40} 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, pp. 60-1.

\textsuperscript{41} ibid., p. 102.
and one state secretary), introducing clear responsibility among officials and removing undesirable personnel policies such as nepotism.42

Himmler criticized excessive over-centralization of small issues, but stressed that there had to be clear Reich authority to solve the questions of the war. In questions of the economy and armaments in particular, he told the Gauleiters on 6 October 1943 that the views of central authority had to be decisive.43 These comments created hopes that Himmler could be used to provide a strong central leadership and overcome the Gauleiters' resistance to Speer's proposals.44 But these hopes proved to be in vain, for despite his increased powers, Himmler continued his usual approach of not seeking to cut across other responsibilities. He referred to Speer's disputes with the Gauleiters concerning continued production of inessential items to the Party Chancellery rather than having the Interior Ministry investigate them.45 He also refused to make a judgment on proposals to simplify German propaganda in France, saying he knew too little.46

As Germany's military position deteriorated, moves were made to gain more labour through more positive policies in the East, and to make the regime's military task easier by a compromise peace with either the Western allies or the Soviet Union. Attempts were made to persuade Himmler to support different policies in the East. Colonel

42. 'Abschrift Rede des Reichsführer-SS vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern, Posen, Rathaus, 6. Oktober 1943', ibid., pp. 3-4.
43. 'Rede ... vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern', 6 October 1943, ibid., p. 31.
44. Speer, Third Reich, p. 312.
45. ibid., pp. 313-14.
46. With to Himmler, 28 July 1943, 'Beseitigung der Doppelarbeit auf dem Sektor Propaganda in Frankreich'; von Unruh Fernschreiben to Lammers, Keitel and Bormann; and Brandt to With, 9 August 1943, BA NS 19/342.
Martin, the OKW's liaison officer with Goebbels, passed on reports criticizing current policies to Berger for Himmler;47 Stuckart, State Secretary in the Interior Ministry, sought Himmler's help to fight corruption among German officials in the Ukraine;48 and Hildebrandt, head of the SS Race and Settlement Main Office, forwarded to Himmler reports from German officers stationed in the East advocating different agricultural and political policies.49 Himmler's response was that such officers should concentrate on their duties at the front and leave the politics to others.50 He did not allow himself to be drawn into expressing an opinion on the wider issues raised. Although he saw dangers in the 'Declaration on the Introduction of Peasant Landed Property' Rosenberg issued in May 1943,51 Himmler did not respond to the efforts of Ukrainian Reichskommissar Koch to get him to oppose the decree. He contented himself with objecting to the failure to consult the SS in drawing up the decree.52

Himmler also showed a lack of interest in making use of Vlasov for the time being.53 He was more concerned with ensuring that all men and women capable of working were taken with them by the

49. SS-Obergruppenführer Hildebrandt, Head of the RSHA, to Himmler, 1 July 1943, BA NS 19/17, p. 1.
50. Brandt to Hildebrandt, 23 July 1943, ibid.
51. Himmler to Bormann, 13 July 1943, 'Geheim', BA NS 19/195, p. 1. This decree recognized the peasants' landholdings in the commune as private property: Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 360-1.
52. Himmler to Lammers, 13 July 1943, 'Geheim'; Himmler to Berger, 19 July 1943, 'Geheim'; Koch to Himmler, 2 September 1943, pp. 1-3; and Berger Fernschreiben to Koch, 14 October 1943 in BA NS 19/195, p. 1. On Koch's sabotage of the decree see Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 361-2.
retreating Germans. He obtained additional means of influencing Eastern policy when he agreed to Rosenberg's suggestion that Berger be made head of a new operational staff in charge of political issues in the Ostministerium. He warned SS leaders that it would be dangerous if German soldiers came to believe that only Russian soldiers could defeat the Soviet Union, but he had nothing against use of the Vlasov movement purely as a propaganda tool. Here he was echoing Hitler's views, which he repeated to army commanders on 1 July 1943. To say that the Germans were willing to give up the territory they had conquered in the East would be tantamount to saying they had no war aims, Hitler argued. Such a statement would demoralize the soldier at the front, just as similar statements had done in World War I. Because of this psychological effect, he could not promise an independent Ukraine, even as a tactic. Bormann himself favoured a hard line against the peoples of the occupied East: Dallin has suggested that he supported the hard measures of Koch and presented issues in such a way that Hitler continued to support Koch. His attitude to Eastern policy seems to vindicate Himmler and Goebbels' assessment that he was too doctrinaire.

54. Himmler to Chef Bandenkampf-Verbände, HSSPF Ukraine and Russia Centre, 10 July 1943, BA NS 19/1436.
56. 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, pp. 13-19; 'Rede . . . vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern', 6 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, pp. 5-7. These German attitudes discouraged Vlasov and his movement: Andreyev, Vlasov, pp. 54-6 and Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 553-86.
57. 'Auszug aus der Ansprache des Führers an die Heeresgruppenführer am 1.7.43 abends (s. 55-61).', BA MA RW4/v. 700, p. 57.
58. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 124-6, 159-61.
Earlier in 1943 Goebbels had shown considerable interest in the need to adopt more flexible policies in the East. He was concerned by the 'extremely critical' situation on the Eastern front. The Germans were experiencing a period where strategy, in Schlieffen's words, was a system of substitutions. Goebbels does not appear to have developed further his proposals on the treatment of the Eastern peoples. He may have considered it too late for such measures to have an effect, or he may have realized that Hitler was not interested in such considerations. He certainly judged that his increased powers over propaganda in the East came 'very late, almost too late.'

In the period following Soviet victory at Kursk, Soviet conditions for a compromise peace became harsher. The Japanese made further efforts to mediate between the Germans and the USSR in July 1943. Japanese Ambassador Oshima raised the matter with Hitler who claimed that the USSR could still be beaten in 1943. Oshima gained the impression that Hitler had no intention of ending the war by a compromise peace.

Goebbels' emphasis now was on the need for a negotiated peace. This runs like a thread through his diary entries for the

59. During the final months of 1943 he concluded, with partial success, a lengthy dispute with Rosenberg about responsibility for German propaganda in the East: papers in BA R 55/799 and BA R 55/1436, and Dalin's account of the disputes in German Rule in Russia, pp. 178-80.

60. Entry for 10 September 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, p. 434.

61. Entry for 8 September 1943, ibid., p. 426.


63. Fleischhauer, Chance des Sonderfriedens, pp. 177-9; Below, Hitlers Adjutant, p. 347.

64. On the hopes Goebbels placed on an agreement with Russia in particular, see entry for 25 November 1943, von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 186-93. Only the most senior members of the leadership could discuss or consider such proposals without being accused of defeatism. Bormann considered that Wagemann, the leader of the Institute for German Economic Research, had
second half of 1943 and is an implicit criticism of Hitler's military conduct of the war. By 1943 Himmler and Goebbels agreed with General Guderian that Hitler should no longer directly command the army on the Eastern front, but were not willing to take the matter up with Hitler.65 After Stalingrad, Hitler had turned on those who came to him advocating peace; now he was willing to discuss the prospects for it with Goebbels at length. Hitler still wanted to deal with the Western Allies, but Goebbels considered Stalin would be more realistic and approachable. Goebbels pointed out to Hitler that they had succeeded in 1933 by moderating their demands to get into government, but had still succeeded in obtaining their ends. The same circumstances prevailed with regard to the peace.66

Hitler's views on a compromise peace seemed to change, since on 22 September he was more willing to negotiate with Stalin than with Churchill. His plans for peace were less realistic than those of Schellenberg, since Hitler did not believe Stalin could cede what he would demand (the Ukraine). It was this demand by Hitler which prevented a compromise peace earlier in 1943. He also discussed with Goebbels the prospects of the English becoming tired of the war.67 Goebbels did not believe that there was any war-weariness in America, but he hoped that the strains in the enemy coalition were increasing.68 Bormann also reflected Hitler's altered position.

lost his right to hold his position by calling for a compromise peace: Bormann to Funk, 14 September 1943, BA NS 19/2053.

65. Clark, Barbarossa, p. 408.

66. Entry for 10 September 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 435-7. See also entry for 1 September 1943, von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 120-3; Kehrl, Krisenmanager, pp. 302-4.


68. Entries for 2 and 3 November 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 493-4.
Bormann was reportedly worried about the course of German foreign policy and the war in general.\textsuperscript{69}

Soundings by Ribbentrop continued in the later part of 1943. Russian demands were for a return to the 1941 borders, but the mood in Hitler's headquarters was still too optimistic to agree to this.\textsuperscript{70} German peace feelers with East and West continued unsuccessfully in September and October.\textsuperscript{71} Himmler also seemed to hope for a break up of the Allies. He drew the attention of SS leaders to their disagreements over the Balkans and commented that these disputes would produce good fruits for the Germans.\textsuperscript{72} The coalition would break up one day and be no longer threatening to Germany.\textsuperscript{73} He believed that the Germans had to adopt political as well as military means of ending the war,\textsuperscript{74} but he did not seem disposed to proceed with peace negotiations independently. Himmler's contacts with the opposition to Hitler were known to the leadership,\textsuperscript{75} but there have been suggestions that he played a double game.\textsuperscript{76} His position was ambiguous. Some in the SS leadership wanted Himmler to play a greater role. Berger told him that though Göring, Goebbels

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{69} Entry for 30 November 1943, ibid., p. 539.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Fleischhauer, \textit{Chance des Sonderfriedens}, pp. 185-99; Seaton, \textit{German Army}, p. 212.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Fleischhauer, \textit{Chance des Sonderfriedens}, pp. 203-14.
\item \textsuperscript{72} 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{73} ibid., pp. 49-59.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Entry for 8 November 1943, Lochner, \textit{Goebbels Diaries}, p. 502 and Goebbels quoted in entry for 1 March 1944 in von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 244-5.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Entry for 7 November 1943 in Lochner, \textit{Goebbels Diaries}, p. 502.
\end{itemize}
and Ley lacked credibility with the population the time was not yet ripe to give Himmler prominence, implying that Berger saw such a time approaching.77

Reactivation of the party on the home front, and increased ideological training of the armed forces were the two positive policies used to combat the influence of the Italian collapse. Energy and fanaticism were treated as secret weapons to combat the enemy.78 In August 1943 Bormann agreed to a submission which noted the trough in public mood, criticized Goebbels' propaganda directed at the party and suggested that the party hold general parades to provide propaganda orientation for members and to reactivate the membership as soon as possible.79 The party aimed to keep closer contact with the population.80 Bormann referred Gauleiters to the party's experiences in the Kampfzeit as their model.81 In September party members were called on to set a good example to the rest of the population by willingness to participate in the war effort (Kriegseinsatzbereitschaft), by implementing all measures needed to secure armaments and agriculture, and were warned that those


78. Manfred Messerschmidt, 'Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat', Nationalsozialistische Diktatur, p. 474; see also Grill, Nazi Movement in Baden, p. 310.


81. Bormann to Wahl, 16 October 1943, BA NS 19/798, p. 2.
members who were not up to these tests were to be dismissed from the party. This last warning was a response to increasing reluctance of party members to identify themselves as such.\footnote{Bormann, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 133/43.', 'Kriegseinsatzpflicht der Parteigenossen.', BA NS 6/342, pp. 1-3. This in turn was partly due to the public reception they sometimes got: Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, pp. 209-10.} The party's failings reflected in these exhortations suggest Bormann's reluctance to adopt some total war measures may have been based on an awareness that the party could not be relied upon to carry them out effectively.\footnote{Goebbels was now critical of Hitler's loyalty to party comrades who were not up to their jobs: entries for 27 September and 23 October 1943, von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 141-2, 161-2.}

In order to strengthen the popular will to resist and to influence public opinion, Bormann ordered general membership parades to be addressed by the Gauleiters and to be held within four weeks from 15 October 1943. Participation in the meetings was obligatory. Speakers at the meetings emphasized the need for party members to influence public opinion by word of mouth.\footnote{Bormann, 29 September 1943, 'Anordnung Nr. 55/43', 'Generalmitgliederappelle zum verstärkten Führungseinsatz der gesamten Parteigenossenschaft', BA NS 6/167, pp. 1-2.} Quarterly propaganda marches of the party were to be held from October on. One purpose of these marches was to increase the members' feelings of support and power.\footnote{Bormann, 30 September 1943, 'Anordnung A56/43', 'Aktivierung der Parteimitglieder-Durchführung von Propagandamärschen', ibid., pp. 1-2, and on the strengthening of feelings of purpose, see undated speech by Ley, from its context the end of 1943, BA NS 6/793, p. 3.} By the end of the year the Gaus were reporting, predictably, that the meetings and marches had been well-attended by party members and had a good effect on public opinion.\footnote{Lindau, 'Auszug aus den Berichten der Gaue über die Durchführung von Generalmitgliederappellen und Propagandamärschen.', BA NS 6/793, pp. 1-2. See also a speech given by Friederichs to Reichs- and Gauleiters 23 February 1944, BA NS 6/784, pp. 1-3.} By December
Bormann claimed that these measures had led to a successful party war effort (*Kriegseinsatz*), and all that remained was for the measures to be continued without new orders being needed. All able-bodied party members had to share the party's responsibilities and tasks. The significance of this party policy in the context of total war is difficult to assess. It is not clear what effect the measures had. They may have served as a substitute for more rigorous measures at home. Yet as times got tougher it was also more necessary to 'mobilize' the population psychologically.

During this period other measures of psychological mobilization were underway in the armed forces. Many Germans claimed that Russian military successes were due to their use of political commissars. Himmler himself attributed part of the Russian successes in winter 1941 to the commissar system. Russian use of captured German officers in the National Committee for a Free Germany and the League of German Officers under General Seydlitz may also have prompted counter measures. Gottlob Berger, the head of the SS Main Office, assured an army colonel, Colonel Hübner, that Himmler would support his proposals for three to four week courses for officers to educate the army ideologically.

87. Bormann, 6 December 1943, 'Anordnung A64/43.', 'Sinn und Ziel der Aktivierung der Partei.', BA NS 6/343, pp. 1-3. See also Bormann, 24 December 1943, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 174/43', 'Zusammenfassung aller Kräfte der Bewegung', *ibid.*, pp. 1-2, concerning the need for close collaboration with the leaders of the party's formations (*Gliederungen*) in carrying out this work.


89. 'Rede ... bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, p. 3.


Himmler that he was supporting Hübner because of the army's 'particular ideological plight',\(^{92}\) which he attributed to the officer corps not being oriented to the ideas of their supreme commander.\(^{93}\) Hitler agreed to Hübner's proposals and undertook to write an introduction to Hübner's paper which was to be distributed among the officer corps.\(^{94}\)

A fanatical belief in national socialist ideology came to be relied on as German military strength shrank. Jacobsen has suggested that this marked an attempt by Hitler to transpose the tactics of the Kampfzeit - propaganda, indoctrination, ad hoc weapons - to military conditions.\(^{95}\) The army's lack of revolutionary spirit had already been criticized by Goebbels in early 1943.\(^{96}\) Blaming the armed forces' failure on lack of revolutionary spirit was also politically and psychologically easier than facing the fact that Germany's military problems were due to Hitler's decisions. In November Hitler decided that the officers for military ideological leadership (Wehrgeistige Führung) were to be renamed officers for national socialist leadership (Nationalsozialistischer Führungsoffizier, or NSFOs). The change of name indicated that they not only had the task of ideological

\(^{92}\) Berger (?) to Himmler, 11 September 1943, ibid., p. 1.

\(^{93}\) Berger to Brandt, 10 October 1943, 'Geheim!', 'Brief des Obersten Huebner', ibid., p. 1.

\(^{94}\) Hübner to Obergruppenführer (presumably Berger), 13 October 1943, ibid., pp. 1-2.


\(^{96}\) Entries for 18 December 1942, 9 March, 18 March and 10 May 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 248, 280, 306-8, 368; see also entries for 10 August and 3 November 1943, von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 108, 177-8.
education but also were responsible for explanation and guidance on topical questions. These measures gave the party an increased control over the armed forces. On 22 December Hitler ordered that ideological leadership and troop education in the armed forces was to be strengthened. In agreement with the Party Chancellery, the OKW was to create an office to lead this, the NS-Führungsstab. General Reinecke, head of the Allgemeine Wehrmachtsamt, was appointed to lead this office. In calling for all sections of the Wehrmacht to appoint NSFOs Keitel described this leadership as being of 'decisive significance to the war'. Party Chancellery officials believed that the party had to participate in all aspects of setting up the NS-Führungsstab and in the choice of officers to staff it. The NSFOs soon ran into difficulties, General Reinecke told Bormann. Keitel's real attitude could be seen from the fact with 5,000 men in the OKW he had no NSFO in order to save manpower.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss the development of ideological training for the armed forces in detail. The increased emphasis on ideological training as a means of securing victory marks


the persistent strength among members of the leadership of the 'German model of total war' and the continued comparison of conditions and problems to those of 1917-18. The creation of the NSFOs as well as the appointment of Himmler as Interior Minister again suggest that in certain senses Hitler was prepared to make the war more 'total'. The appointment of the NSFOs reflected Hitler's emphasis on the importance of the will to resist in military engagements, the hope that fanaticism and political reliability would make up for material deficiencies. They opened the way for the 'partification' of the army.103 On the one hand they reflected the party getting the upper hand in its relations with the army, and an increasing radicalization of policy. The references to the Russian example suggest however some loss of ideological self-confidence, a belief that the enemy handled some issues better.

Bormann's prominence, both in the campaign to reactivate the party and to ensure the political reliability of the armed forces, suggests that his concept of total war was primarily an ideological one, along the lines of the 'völkisch doctrine of total war'. The emphasis of these and other measures he had initiated was on maintaining the stability of the home front and using ideological reliability and commitment as a means of securing victory.

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The need to man the Italian front as well as Germany's continuing losses in the East meant the Germans urgently had to increase their available manpower. By the end of 1943 30 divisions, 15 per cent of those on the Eastern front, were disbanded for lack of replacements.104 Further attempts were made to reduce the numbers

104. Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, p. 478.
of civil servants, culminating in a 'combing out' of the armed forces behind the lines. To save more staff, Hitler decreed that male and female members of the RAD were to be employed in anti-aircraft measures, the men in RAD anti-aircraft units, the women in communications.\(^{105}\) A further 5,000 women were sought for anti-aircraft units through the Reichsfrauenführung. The decision not to advertise for such positions initially may have been due to concern about public reaction to this measure.\(^{106}\) Subsequent rumours about this prompted Bormann to issue guidance to Gauleiters. There was no intention of placing women at the front or their using weapons. Rumours that the Germans planned to create women's battalions like the Russians were to be strongly countered by party members.\(^{107}\)

In his capacity as plenipotentiary for the Reich administration (Generalbevollmächtigter für die Reichsverwaltung), Himmler ordered a reduction in the numbers of UK positions for civil servants on 1 September. Each organization in Berlin had to give up about 50 per cent of its UK positions by 10 September 1943. At that point, the Ministries with the largest number of men from the class of 1897 and younger still in UK positions were the Foreign Ministry with 362, the Justice Ministry with 279, the Ostministerium with 361 and the Armaments Ministry with 241. In comparison the Propaganda Ministry had 131 men in this category and the Interior Ministry

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Accordingly such measures would not win great additional numbers for the front.

A letter was sent on Goebbels' behalf from the Propaganda Ministry, stating that the Ministry could not agree to this measure. The Propaganda Ministry's 'repeated voluntary combing out actions' in 1942 had already freed all workers possible. Instead Gutterer offered to make 27 men available to the armed forces before their planned call up time. A direct approach to General Olbricht at the OKW prevented the callup of the Propaganda Ministry workers. Goebbels was also successful in halting attempts by von Ribbentrop and von Unruh to remove the Propaganda Ministry's responsibility for propaganda in France, which would have saved 150 staff. This protection of staff under Goebbels' control served to maintain his power base; he could also justify it because of the importance of the mobilization of enthusiasm in total war. This had acquired a particular importance in the aftermath of the Italian collapse. It also demonstrates a slackening of his own efforts in combing out and possibly that he did not intend to shed more staff while other ministers were not prepared to do the same.

108. Dr Hein, 3 September 1943, 'Einberufungen zur Wehrmacht Erlaß des Generalbevollmächtigten für die Reichsverwaltung vom 1.9.43', BA R 55/324, pp. 1-2.


110. Acting head of the personnel section, unnamed, to ORR Dr. Collatz, Minister's office, 9 September 1943, 'Einberufungen zur Wehrmacht', ibid., pp. 1-2.

111. Von Unruh Fernschreiben to Keitel, Lammers and Bormann, 27 July 1943, and With to Himmler, 28 July 1943, 'Beseitigung der Doppelarbeit auf dem Sektor Propaganda in Frankreich', in BA NS 19/342; Goebbels to Hitler, 24 November 1943, BA NL 118/106, pp. 1-7; entries for 14 November and 9 December 1943 in Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, pp. 512, 547.
The party too was called on to give up more men in uk positions of the classes 1897 to 1922 from its central offices. Even though the party's main office had already given up more than half its personnel to the front, Hitler again asked the party in December to give up more personnel. Specifically men of the class of 1906 and younger, who had not yet served or who had only served for six months, were to be made available to the armed forces. Reichs-, Gauleiters and organizational leaders were exempted; other exemptions had to meet with Hitler's approval. In exchange the Wehrmacht would return some men of a lesser degree of fitness to the party. On 1 June 1943 the Party Chancellery still employed 14,677 uk party leaders. Bormann freed 1-2,000 lesser leaders.

On 21 November 1943 Hitler turned down an attempt by Sauckel to have the age limit for women to report for work raised. Both Bormann and Lammers agreed that the age level should be raised but considered, for unspecified reasons, that at the moment this was completely inopportune. Bormann and the Gauleiters believed that such a measure would only obtain 140-160,000 women, the call up of most of whom would adversely affect the work of their husbands.

112. Bormann, 30 October 1943, 'Geheim', 'Anordnung Nr. A5/43 g.', 'Beteiligung der NSDAP bei den Einberufungen zur Wehrmacht im Winterhalbjahr 1943/44', BA NS 6/345, p. 1. Bormann ordered that no more men were to be given up by the Gau and Kreis offices because they had such low uk numbers.


In a further effort to find more men for the front, Hitler called for fewer troops to be kept behind the lines. He believed that the imbalance between fighting troops and the large numbers of soldiers behind the front threatened to be 'not only a purely military, but also a psychological danger.'\(^{117}\) Hitler not only specifically mentioned the World War One criticisms of the étappe\(^{118}\) but also showed that he shared the perception of Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann that the armed forces were overstaffed behind the lines. This was a common perception among civilian wartime leaders on both sides\(^{119}\) and indicated a misunderstanding of the increased need of modern warfare for a large technical and support system behind the lines. Later writers have seen the Wehrmacht as comparatively lean and efficiently organized considering its limited resources.\(^{120}\) It is, ironically, judged by van Creveld to have allocated comparatively few resources on logistics, administration and management.\(^{121}\)

Since, in his opinion, all possibilities of increasing numbers from the civilian sector were exhausted, Hitler ordered all sections of the armed forces and the Waffen-SS to find one million men from their organizations at home. At least 25 per cent of their manpower on the


\(^{118}\) ibid., p. 1. The étappe was the area behind the lines which gained a bad reputation for corruption, overstaffing and malingering: Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, The War and German Society: The Testament of a Liberal (first published 1937, New York, 1971), pp. 26-8, 286-7 note 5.

\(^{119}\) See, for example, Churchill's views quoted in Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns (Canberra, 1963), pp. 35-6. I am grateful to Lt. Col. David Horner for drawing my attention to this reference. Air Marshal Milch also shared this view, claiming in 1943 that only 25 per cent of the army of 8 million was at the front: Overy, Goering, p. 158.

\(^{120}\) See Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power - German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, 1982), pp. 49-51, 53.

\(^{121}\) ibid., p. 164.
home front had either to fight or free other soldiers capable of fighting. The 'unwieldy' administrative apparatus of the armed forces was to be simplified. The commanders of army groups had to set up control commissions which were to abolish any manifestations of the étappe, and to scrutinize the number of offices and units in towns. Keitel's supplementary orders indicated that armed forces personnel were only to be listed as uk with the authorization of the commanding general, and these listings were to be checked by von Unruh. Soldiers who would not regain their fitness for six months were to be exchanged for fully fit men holding uk positions in the war economy. Simplifications of armed forces' pay, health care and uniforms were also underway.

The results of a paper prepared for Himmler analysing the number of staff used by the armed forces in the First World War as a means of comparison would probably have reinforced suspicions of excessive staff behind the lines. The SS Inspector for Statistics Korherr noted an increasing bureaucratization of the World War, with 3 million men in uk positions, 2.7 million men on the home front and some half million men in the étappe. In his opinion this decisively weakened the front in 1918. Professional military officials as a group


only experienced low losses, and Korherr considered that this group would therefore require particular scrutiny.\footnote{125}

The leadership's belief that the Wehrmacht was overstuffed and inefficient led them to believe that more soldiers could be found there than was probably the case. Hitler's judgement that there was no possibility of increasing the numbers from the civilian sector demonstrates either a lack of interest in expanding the numbers of women employed, or a belief that no more women could be employed. It indicates that he believed that the policies of von Unruh and the Ausschuss had freed all the labour there was. Hitler's lack of response to Speer and Goebbels' urgings for stricter measures to free labour may therefore have been because he believed reserves on the home front were exhausted.

There was agreement on the need to provide the army with more men, and to find more staff for armaments production. Additional labour was provided by captured Italian prisoners of war.\footnote{126} Speer approached Himmler to use prisoners from Auschwitz\footnote{127} and asked Keitel for help in overcoming decreasing productivity on the part of prisoners of war. Strict discipline was needed, with loafing prisoners of war and their guards being punished.\footnote{128} Assaults on German employees should earn the death sentence, Speer advised Keitel. He also referred to Keitel a suggestion,

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which he considered relevant, that escaping foreign workers be made
prisoners of war when they were recaptured.\footnote{129}

Difficulties in obtaining foreign labour meant that the
armaments industry had to rely more than before on German labour,
according to Sauckel.\footnote{130} An end to unnecessary production,
particularly of consumer goods, was proposed. Quotas for the delivery
of staff were set for the following industries - textiles, paper and
printing, clothing, construction material, glass, ceramics, leather, wood
production - by Sauckel and Speer in July.\footnote{131} Restrictions on the
optical industry and the production of electricity meters had already
freed some 9,000 workers.\footnote{132} Bormann asked the Gauleiters on 2
August to accelerate fulfilment of the quotas for individual Gaus
because of the increased requirements of the armaments industry.\footnote{133}
Consumer production was to be taken over by firms in the occupied
teritories or by use of workers unsuited to armaments employment
due to restricted mobility and other reasons.\footnote{134}

Increases in production required an increased labour force.
Speer and Sauckel disagreed on the means of achieving this. Sauckel

\footnote{129. Speer to Keitel, 18 December 1943, ibid.}
\footnote{130. Sauckel to the Presidents of Landesarbeitsämter, 30 July 1943, 'Geheim!','Auskämmung des zivilen Sektors zugunsten der Kriegswirtschaft', BA R 41/280, pp. 1-2. The amount of foreign labour obtained by Sauckel decreased in the second half of 1943: Boelcke, Hitlers Konferenzen, note p. 324.}
\footnote{131. Dr. Fremerey Schnellbrief to Reichstatthalter and others, 7 August 1943, 'Geheim', 'Rundschreiben Nr. 436/44 LWA', 'Umsetzung von Arbeitskräften in die Rüstungswirtschaft.', BA R 41/280, p. 1.}
\footnote{132. Text of speech given at the Posen Gauleiter meeting in October sent by Speer to all Reichs and Gauleiters, November 1943, BA R 3/1548, pp. 30-1.}
\footnote{133. Bormann, 2 August 1943, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 109/43.', 'Auskämmung des zivilen Sektors zugunsten der Kriegswirtschaft', BA NS 6/342, p. 1.}
\footnote{134. Sauckel to the Presidents of Landesarbeitsämter, 30 July 1943, 'Geheim!','Auskämmung des zivilen Sektors zugunsten der Kriegswirtschaft', BA R 41/280, pp. 1-2.
wanted to transport foreign workers to Germany, while Speer wanted them employed in the occupied territories working for German armaments. On 5 October he signed a decree about the 'blocked firms' (Sperrbetriebe) in the occupied territories. This formally protected the employees of firms working for German commissions in the occupied territories from transportation. As the Chronik noted, this broke with the policy previously defended by Sauckel. This dispute, which Speer had won by the end of the year, with Hitler's support, had, like Speer's decision not to evacuate armaments firms from Essen, gained Germany temporary advantages with regard to production at the expense of later costs. Speer was now vulnerable to a loss of the workers through an opening of the Second Front; similarly by not evacuating armaments firms from Essen, he had prevented an immediate disruption of production but increased the effects of the air war and had left the plants in a position of vulnerability on Germany's borders should an invasion succeed. This was a particularly short-sighted decision since the Ruhr's vulnerability had been highlighted in inter-war studies. He may also have assumed that German war production could only be continued with the resources of the occupied territories. His decisions were ruling out any possibility of a later defence of Germany along the lines of the defence of the Soviet Union in 1941-42. Speer appeared to seek solutions to his immediate problems without thought to the later consequences.

136. Speer Chronik for October 1943, ibid., p. 156.
137. Speer Chronik for December 1943, ibid., p. 204.
138. Record for meeting of 16-17 December 1943, Boelcke, Hitlers Konferenzen, pp. 323-4. See also Kehrl, Krisenmanager, pp. 344-6.
Labour shortages, restrictions on production and increased pressure on civil service staff all put considerable pressure on the regime's remaining resources. Because he had so large a role in allocating the resources, Speer was a particular focus for such conflicts. His role in allocating raw materials created resentment on the part of those who did not get what they sought. In August Speer planned to shut down less important production, transfer the firms concerned to arms production and allow their previous tasks to be taken over by foreign or by small firms. Hitler agreed to Speer's proposals. Speer devoted considerable time to this plan in September, holding discussions with the Army's procurement officials about the need for such shutdowns in the sector providing army equipment. He offered the civilian production to French firms during the visit of French Production Minister, Bichelonne. He believed that the industries themselves could not be expected to achieve these reductions so he planned to use men from those areas of the armaments industry which needed staff. By October Speer claimed to have freed 40,000 workers by these measures.

139. For example, the SS and the Army disagreed over the percentage of the class of 1926 to be allotted to the Waffen SS: Keitel to Himmler, 3 September 1943, 'Geheim', Freiwillige des Geburtsjahrganges 1926.; and Berger to Himmler, 18 September 1943, 'Geheim', in BA NS 19/4. For another dispute over the allocation of a former children's home in Lemberg in the General Government, see Pohl to Brandt, 9 October 1943, 'Ehemal. Kinderheim in Lemberg, Bachstr. 2.', pp. 1-2; and Brandt to Fromm, 22 October 1943, 'Ehemal. Kinderheim in Lemberg, Bachstr. 2.', BA NS 19/973, pp. 1-2.

140. Entries for 11-12 October 1943 and 30 September-1 October 1943 in Boelcke, Hitlers Konferenzen, pp. 293, 304.


143. Text of speech given at Posen in October sent by Speer to all Reichs and Gauleiters, November 1943, BA R 3/1548, p. 33.
transferring production to the occupied territories, Speer opted for a quick solution without too much dislocation at the expense of future problems. In August 1944 Bormann was to comment that events had proved Sauckel right and proved how wrong Speer's agreement with Bichelonne had been. They would have done better to move the workers to the Reich than to move the machines to France and lose both workers and machines.¹⁴⁴

Speer made three speeches in September and October 1943 explaining and justifying the policy by pointing to the excessive orders still made for the Wehrmacht and for civilian consumption in general.¹⁴⁵ He made much of the production of typewriters, cameras and boots for the Wehrmacht. Where he conceded that such goods were necessary his proposed solution was that they should be confiscated from people or firms who had them.¹⁴⁶ Any further production for civilian use would have to be the simplest styles possible.¹⁴⁷ Speer may have assumed too readily that production which was not under his direct control was inessential. In addition his proposals for confiscation had a number of flaws. Once again this was a short-term solution, and one not taking the continuing losses of all such possessions by bombing into account. It was not likely to meet with the support of any of the agencies, particularly the party, whose


¹⁴⁵ See 'Niederschrift über Vorträge der Reichsminister Funk und Speer vor einem Kreis der Wirtschaftspresse in Reichswirtschaftsministerium am 7. September 1943 abends', BA R 3/1965, pp. 4-5; 'Rede von Reichsminister Speer auf der Tagung der Reichsredner und Gaupropagandaleiter an 24.9.1943 (Krolloper), BA R 3/1548, pp. 7-9; text of speech given at Posen in October sent by Speer to all Reichs and Gauleiters, November 1943, BA R 3/1548, pp. 17-22.


¹⁴⁷ ibid., p. 12.
help would be needed for it to succeed. Speer's own focus on armaments production may have been serving to narrow his view. Goebbels' own position was more ambivalent. He criticized inessential production, but at the same time was aware of the need to maintain some production for reasons of morale. In particular the air war made some continued civilian production unavoidable.

Speer told the Gauleiters at Posen in October that the requests for exemptions from shutdowns of various Gauleiters showed a lack of understanding of the current situation. If a Gau did not comply with his orders within fourteen days, he would announce the closures himself. Himmler would deal appropriately with Gaus which did not carry through his measures. (This was Speer's unsuccessful attempt to mobilize Himmler against the obstruction of the Gauleiters.) Speer also used SD reports to select firms for possible closure and to combat cases of corruption in firms. He asked the Gauleiters to recognize that only the sharpest measures would allow them to master the situation and added that he was convinced that if the Germans wanted to win the war, then they would also have to make the sacrifices. It was necessary that Germany now pursue total war in the area of production. He added 'I understand by total war 1) adjustment (Einstellung) of the home front to the living standard of the front, if by this an advantage should result for the


front, 2) the highest performance (Leistung) of all workers, and 3) the utmost economy with the resources available to the nation. The Chronik described the purpose of Speer's speech as to remove any pretext of ignorance of conditions on the part of the political leadership. The speech caused anger among the Gauleiters but Hitler did not appear concerned about their reaction.

Speer's comments in this speech raise the question whether his concept of total war and that of Goebbels included a delight in sacrifice for its own sake, a kind of 'puritanism of total war'. In addition Speer's suggestion that the Germans rather than others should sacrifice for the sake of victory certainly ran counter to many aspects of German policy in the occupied territories. If the party could be accused of being too concerned about morale, Speer may have disregarded it too much.

Speer gained additional powers to pursue his goals on 2 September. He obtained control over all production decisions, while Funk, the Economics Minister, remained responsible for the supply of consumer goods, for foreign trade questions and finance. The decree was accompanied by a change of title for Speer to Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production. Bormann explained to the Gauleiters that the general war situation made these powers

153. Speer to all Reichs-and Gauleiters, November 1943, ibid., p. 36.
154. Speer Chronik for October 1943, BA R 3/1738, p. 156.
necessary. Bormann assured the Gauleiters that Speer would only order all workers to leave a firm if the worker's employment by an armaments firm was guaranteed. Such changes would only occur with trade (Handwerk) firms of more than 50 employees and industrial firms with more than 100 employees. Speer planned to close firms in armaments centres where staff could quickly be redeployed and delegate their tasks to firms in smaller areas. Speer also gained additional control over electricity production, and sole power to use Italian armaments capacity.

Speer believed that Bormann was undermining his position with Hitler. One example of how he could do this was when Bormann drew to Hitler's attention Speer's decision to close the State Porcelain Factory at Nymphenburg. Speer pointed out to Bormann that he had already approved continued production and asked him not to bother Hitler with such small matters in future. (Hitler continued to protect the cultural sphere in keeping with his refusal in 1942 to agree to Goebbels' plans to list uk positions in the arts.) Bormann


158. ibid., pp. 1-2.

159. Speer to all Reichs- and Gauleiters, November 1943, BA R 3/1548, pp. 15-17.


162. Speer, Third Reich, p. 313.


164. For other examples see Hitler's opposition to a ban on landscape postcards; Bormann to Lammers, 24 April 1943, BA R 43 II/609a; and his decision not to call up staff employed on his building projects; Mussehl to Killy, 12 February 1943 and Mussehl to Killy, 16 February 1943, BA R 43 II/660. Similar examples for a later period are contained in Speer to Bormann, 25 March 1944, and Bormann to Speer, 23 June 1944, BA R 3/1573. Despite the
also rebuked Speer for putting the draft decree on the concentration of the war economy to Hitler before getting the agreement of all interested organizations, ignoring bureaucratic procedures. Speer's tendency to ignore normal bureaucratic procedure and rely on his access to Hitler would have worsened the two men's relations. Speer was already becoming vulnerable to criticism because his claims of increased production did not seem to be borne out by the facts. Speer's accumulation of offices was one of the greatest in the Third Reich and was justified by the needs of the war. This authority and Speer's tendency in late 1943 to speak of himself as Hitler's successor possibly contributed to these counter-measures by Bormann.

The two men also differed in their judgement of the measures necessary for total war. In Bormann's opinion only measures really necessary for the war should be taken. He noted Hitler's repeatedly stressed view (which Himmler shared) that the effect of bans had to be considered. It was 'foolish' to impose a ban whose compliance could not be controlled or whose violation could be foreseen. Where possible 'more adroit, non-punitive action' should be employed in such cases. 'Directly for the further course of the war, it is necessary only to take such measures as are really necessary for the war, but

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166. Entry for 7 November 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, p. 499.


not such measures as bring practically no effect for the outcome of the war'.

As well, Speer's restrictions on the activities of the Gauleiters encroached on Bormann's power base. Gauleiters were building fortifications in the West and East of Germany when labour shortages meant there were not the weapons to occupy them. Speer emphasized to Bormann that Hitler had to decide which was more important - securing the borders or equipping the troops. Opposition to Speer's powers existed but was still latent. It would, however, be incorrect to see all the Gauleiters as opposing Speer.

In November 1943 Otto Ohlendorf of the SD became the Ministerialdirektor of the Economics Ministry, increasing Himmler's influence in economic policy. Ohlendorf was a strong defender of the middle class and a critic of the self-responsibility of industry. He was to claim at Nuremberg that the policy allowed individual entrepreneurs to have state authority over their competitors. Despite Speer's opposition, the SS armaments concerns continued to expand. However irritating this intervention was and however much Speer believed that it frustrated a well run armaments economy,

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171. In October the Speer Chronik noted that the Gauleiters could be divided into two groups - those who always and those who never made difficulties if closures of firms in their Gaus were ordered: BA R 3/1738, p. 171.

172. Herbst, Totale Krieg, pp. 187, 260, 273. While Herbst suggests that this gave Himmler power over economic policy, he does not show this power as influencing armaments production. Himmler ignored Berger's suggestion that Ohlendorf be relieved of his position in the SD lest Himmler be held responsible for everything which happened in the Economics Ministry: Berger to Himmler, 7 December 1943, 'Geheim!', 'SS-Brigadefuehrer Ohlendorf', BA NS 19/786.

173. Boberach, Meldungen, vol. 1, p. 32; Speer, Slave State, pp. 64-5, 76-82.
Himmler clearly saw these measures as contributing to the war effort. It also allowed Himmler to use the captive labour force under the control of the SS for the war effort. He saw their purpose as being to overcome difficulties or to rescue firms in a sorry state. Every SS subordinate had to be educated to intervene when needed. Despite his reluctance to intervene in Speer's disputes with the Gauleiters Himmler maintained 'we want to help irrespective of conflicting responsibilities, for we want to win the war.'

Himmler advised Speer that he would take over responsibility for the A-4 rocket programme (subsequently to become the V-2). He had given the task to Pohl and set SS-Brigadeführer Kammler under him as the responsible leader. Himmler also pursued a programme of building underground factories at Hitler's request after private industry and Speer refused to cooperate.

Himmler continued to advise senior SS officers that he wanted a system of clear authority without disputes over responsibilities. To free more men for the front, he had established a school for female assistants to the SS (SS-Helferinnen). He now saw it as 'regrettable' that in 1941 the Germans had not valued the Russian prisoners of war as labour and had consequently allowed so many to starve to death.

Nonetheless, he still refused to make 30,000 ethnic Germans

174. 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, p. 64.


177. 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, pp. 89, 97.

178. ibid., pp. 108-10.

179. ibid., p. 3.
available to the armaments industry despite a promise to this effect from the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.\textsuperscript{180} Himmler also responded indirectly to charges that Jewish workers were needed for armaments in his speech to the Gauleiters at Posen. The Jewish firms in the Warsaw Ghetto were described as armaments firms but, he claimed, they really made fur coats and clothing. He and Speer would clean out the remaining firms.\textsuperscript{181} As in his response to the lobbying for changes in policies to the East and for greater ideological training, Himmler here countered criticism of the ideological basis of the war and defended the SS against following economically irrational policies. His speeches and actions show that he was trying to simplify and help the war effort but, like Hitler, he was not prepared to adopt measures which seemed to him to counter the ideological purposes of the war.

Goebbels appears to have been less active on the question of total war in late 1943, although he was, of course, involved in the propaganda campaigns to boost morale\textsuperscript{182} and he was increasingly involved in countering the effects of the Allied bombing campaign. He set up an office 'Totaler Krieg' for members of the public to send suggestions and complaints to.\textsuperscript{183} He believed that National Socialism had to undergo a renovation and link itself more socialistically with the people than before.\textsuperscript{184} The people were the 'very kernel' of the

\textsuperscript{180} Milch to Himmler, 18 September 1943, p. 1, and Himmler to Milch, 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/3597.

\textsuperscript{181} 'Rede . . . vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern', 6 October 1943, pp. 19, 22; and 'Rede . . . bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung', 4 October 1943, BA NS 19/4010, pp. 82, 89.

\textsuperscript{182} Brannsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, pp. 275-6. He issued 'Thirty articles of war for the German people', which aimed at ensuring a positive popular attitude to the war: \textit{ibid.}, pp. 286-8.

\textsuperscript{183} Signature to Oberlehrer Hickl, 29 December 1943, BA R 55/583, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{184} Entry for 10 September 1943, Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, p. 438.
war effort. He now criticized the total war measures of early 1943 for being watered down. His staff observed him distancing himself from Hitler, an indirect admission that he no longer thought Hitler capable of mastering the situation.

One Gauleiter wrote that 'from 1942 to the end of the war my work had increasingly and, finally almost only, concerned defence from the enemy air war, activation of civilian air protection, [and] the mobilization of all means . . . of assistance.' The intensification of the air war heightened the pressure on resources and personnel, and lessened productivity. While the volume of consumer goods production had ostensibly decreased by only 12 per cent, it now barely met the needs of 10 per cent of the affected population. Speer advised Hitler that the effects of the bombing would require increased provision of household goods which he planned to meet by increasing the amount of such goods produced in the occupied territories and by producing simplified standard types. Speer and Goebbels were concerned at the effects of the raids on production, but

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186. Entry for 7 August 1943, Semmler, Goebbels, p. 96; entry for 1 September 1943, von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 119-20.


189. Boelcke, Hitlers Konferenzen, note p. 316. For confirmation of this at the Gau level, see Sauer, Württemberg, pp. 365-6.

190. Entry for 6-7 December 1943, Boelcke, Hitlers Konferenzen, p. 315.
Goebbels believed that popular morale would continue to be good.\textsuperscript{191} Goebbels had taken on increased responsibility for mitigating the physical effects of the air war as well as countering its psychological effects by propaganda.\textsuperscript{192} The inter-departmental \textit{Luftkriegsschädenausschuss} was based in his ministry, despite proposals that the party take over responsibility,\textsuperscript{193} and issued regular bulletins of instruction (\textit{LK-Mitteilungen}) to members of the committee, Gauleiters and the Reichspropagandaämter.\textsuperscript{194} Goebbels issued a large number of instructions concerning the evacuation of the population and industry,\textsuperscript{195} the latter having to take precedence over all other measures.\textsuperscript{196} Repeated requests that Gauleiters refrain from taking their own uncoordinated measures and overloading the transport system appear to indicate that he was powerless to stop this practice.\textsuperscript{197} The SS building brigades which Himmler had set up

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{191} See entries for 10 September, 21 September, 27 and 28 November 1943, in Lochner, \textit{Goebbels Diaries}, pp. 436, 462, 532, 535.
\item \textsuperscript{192} He gained popularity because of his willingness to visit the bombed areas: entries for 10 July and 24 November 1943, Semmler, \textit{Goebbels}, pp. 88, 110; entries for 23 June and 10 August 1943, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 40-2, 101-8.
\item \textsuperscript{193} Walkenhorst, 8 July 1943, 'Notiz für Pg. Friederichs.', 'Stellungnahme zum Schreiben Dr. Leys.\textquoteright, BA NS 6/166, pp. 2-3; entry for 27 July 1943, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 84-5.
\item \textsuperscript{194} The Interior Ministry, Economics Ministry, Armaments Ministry, Air Ministry, Transport Ministry, OKW, Party Chancellory and a wide range of other organizations were represented: list contained in Ellgering, 6 August 1943, 'LK. Mitteilung Nr. 15', BA R 55/447, pp. 2-5.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Goebbels Schnellbrief to Bormann, Speer, Ley and others, 29 July 1943, and Goebbels to all Gauleiters, 9 December 1943, 'LK. Mitteilung Nr. 71.', 'Aktivierung der Nachbarschaftshilfe für die Bombengeschädigten', in \textit{ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Goebbels to all Gauleiters, 26 August 1943, 'LK-Mitteilung Nr. 30', \textit{ibid}., p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{197} Halm to members of the Luftkriegsschädenausschuss, 9 August 1943, 'LK-Mitteilung Nr. 16', and Goebbels Schnellbrief to Gauleiters, 'LK-Mitteilung Nr. 78.', 'Umquartierungen.', \textit{ibid}., pp. 1-2.
\end{itemize}
earlier in 1943 continued their work, reporting to Himmler regularly.\textsuperscript{198}

Just as it met the Stalingrad crisis with a flurry of 'total war' measures, the regime overcame the internal effects of the defection of Italy with a combination of greater security measures and greater party activity. The emphasis on the need for such measures seems to have resulted in the economic aspect of total war being given reduced priority. As the resources at their disposal diminished and the external pressures on the Reich grew, the leaders' disagreements about the allocation of labour and materials sharpened. This worsening situation resulted in increased interest in a compromise peace but neither Goebbels nor Speer were able to persuade Hitler to adopt the measures they considered necessary for more successful pursuit of the war. This resulted in a certain degree of disillusionment for Goebbels.\textsuperscript{199} The leaders could only await 1944 with apprehension, since the regime no longer held the military initiative.

\textsuperscript{198} Pohl to Himmler, 14 July 1943, 'Einsatz von Maschinen und Baggern für die Baubrigade in Westdeutschland', and SS WVHA, 9 November 1943, 'Einsatz der SS-Baubrigaden Bericht Nr.5', BA NS 19/14, pp. 1-6.

\textsuperscript{199} Entry for 7 August 1943 in Semmler, \textit{Goebbels}, p. 96.
Germany's military position continued to worsen in the first six months of 1944. Despite this deterioration, Germany's leadership did not respond by adopting more drastic methods of organizing German society for war. Improvisation continued. The expectation that the opening of the Second Front provided a decisive opportunity to defeat the Anglo-American forces may have created a tendency to wait for this rather than act decisively. It may also have been difficult to agree on action in the absence of a crisis. Continued ideological inflexibility, Speer's illness and jurisdictional disputes hampered action. This chapter will examine what moves the four leaders made on total war matters in the first six months of 1944. It will be seen that apart from an unsuccessful attempt by Goebbels to persuade Hitler to make a compromise peace offer, the period was marked by continued jockeying for position and an expansion of the activities of the SS and the party.

On the Eastern front Soviet offensives in January and February 1944 cleared Leningrad and cut the Sixth Army in the South in two. A further Soviet offensive in the Ukraine in March split the German front, capturing considerable German equipment on the way, and forestalling plans by Speer to bomb Soviet electricity works. On 8 April Soviet attacks began on the remaining German forces in the Crimea who surrendered by 12 May, with the loss of 80,000 men.

Altogether in the fighting from Kursk to May 1944 some 41 German divisions were virtually destroyed. The Soviet summer offensive began on 9 June against Finland, and on 22 June against the Germans' Ukraine salient and White Russia. One week after the opening of the offensive, the German defensive system had been broken, with the loss of 350,000 men. Hitler had hopes of manning a rear defence line where the Soviet advance could be stemmed. Soviet attacks continued and by 1 July the Berezina was taken, marooning two corps of the German Fourth Army.

The German position worsened on 6 June with the landing of the Anglo-American invasion in Normandy. German defences had been built up, and Rommel had anticipated the likely area of the attack, but his forces were unable to dislodge the invaders who landed a million men in France by the end of the first week in July. At the end of June, the Allied forces were still bottled up in Normandy. The failure to defeat the invading force quickly depressed popular morale. A brief upsurge in morale following the first use of V-1 rockets against Britain soon dissipated.

The opening of the Second Front weakened Germany's ability to withstand the pressure on her lines of defence in the East. Before the invasion, Germany's leaders had hoped that the successful repulsion...

3. Erickson, *Road to Berlin*, Chapters 4 and 5, especially pp. 232, 238-9, 244-5, 251, 257-60, 299-301, 481.
of an invasion might lead the Western allies to withdraw from the conflict. This could give Germany a year or two's breathing space in the West. If not Goebbels told his aides in April Germany would have to find a way of ending the war with the Soviet Union.

In early 1944 Goebbels continued to gather influential members of the regime for discussions and supper on Wednesday nights. The so-called 'Wednesday Group' comprised Speer, Funk, Ley, Milch, Sauckel, Backe, Friedrichs, Stuckart and Naumann. Semler described them as acknowledging Goebbels' authority without always agreeing with his ideas. Goebbels believed that they would prefer to work in a Cabinet under him rather than in the present conditions. Due to Goebbels' loyalty to Hitler, there was no chance of the group organizing opposition. Goebbels aimed to fill a Chancellor position, to combine all offices for a government capable of action. This was another attempt to recreate the powers of 'deputy Chancellor' which Göring had possessed in 1939-41. Goebbels saw the clique under Bormann in Hitler's headquarters as the main danger since they profited from the current conditions.

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12. ibid.
Goebbels continued in his efforts to have Hitler alter German foreign policy. The 1944 diaries have not yet appeared in the West but Semler's diary relates that Goebbels had prepared a forty page memorandum which was sent to Hitler on 12 April 1944. (This memorandum itself is not known to have survived.) The memorandum ruled out military victory for Germany in view of the drain of the war on two fronts. Goebbels suggested that it was vital to stop the war on one front as soon as possible.

While a separate peace with the Western powers would be preferable, Goebbels still believed that Stalin, because of his anti-British and anti-American attitudes, could be more easily persuaded to change his policies. Soundings could be made through the Japanese, and the Germans would have to make Stalin a definite offer. He proposed that Russia be conceded Finland and North Norway as spheres of influence; the Baltic states would be absorbed into Russia; Poland would be conceded as far west as the frontier of the Warthegau. The future of Czechoslovakia was to be left open; Romania, Bulgaria and Greece would be allotted to the Soviet sphere of influence. Goebbels believed that such an offer would be attractive to Stalin, because Greece would give him a foothold in the Mediterranean, and it was far more than Molotov had demanded in Berlin in November 1940. The memorandum also suggested that Ribbentrop should not be entrusted with such a diplomatic offensive, but that Goebbels should attempt it.\textsuperscript{13} Semler reports that Bormann buried the paper in his in-tray; he would not take the responsibility of forwarding the paper to Hitler because it advocated betrayal of Germany's allies. Goebbels' response was that these allies had long ceased to feel any loyalty to Germany, and that the slogan 'my

\footnotesize{13. Entry for 2 May 1944, Semmler, Goebbels, p. 122, 128-9.}
country, right or wrong' should apply. On the 'rediscovery' of the paper Hitler asked to see it but showed no annoyance at Bormann's action.\(^\text{14}\) This lack of concern suggests that he may have found Bormann's role as a barrier to new proposals useful. Goebbels hoped to hear of Hitler's response to the memorandum when he was called to the Obersalzberg on 5 June but it was not mentioned.\(^\text{15}\)

Goebbels' explanation of Bormann's action was that 'in the circle round Hitler, which is dominated by Bormann, the war situation is still regarded with irresponsible optimism'. They did not understand the importance of Goebbels' paper because only 'blind party doctrine' got a hearing.\(^\text{16}\) Hitler's hopes that the invasion in the West could be repulsed and the Western Allies thereby encouraged to withdraw from the war may partly have accounted for his lack of interest in Goebbels' suggestions. The other leaders were inactive on the question of a compromise peace during the period, and Goebbels appears to have been a voice crying in the wilderness. While members of the leadership did not explicitly criticize Hitler's military conduct of the war, their earlier support of a compromise peace indicates that they did not agree with Hitler's policy of a dogged defence of each captured territory and his refusal to compromise with the Soviet Union. Goebbels was hoping to use the territory still held as pawns to exchange for a settlement.

The strength of Goebbels' position can be seen first in that, unlike Bormann, he felt that he could make such proposals, and second that such moves did not lead Hitler to suspect him of treason. The weakness of his position was that he could not get Hitler to agree.

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16. Entry for 2 May 1944, ibid., p. 128.
Once again Goebbels' attempts for the regime to salvage what it could shattered on Hitler's reluctance to make a compromise peace.

The tendency in these proposals to urge the dismissal of Ribbentrop stemmed partly from a belief that he was too mistrusted by the enemy to be effective. It indicates a lack of communication among the senior members of the leadership. Goebbels assumed that Ribbentrop was responsible for Hitler's inflexibility on the question of a compromise peace. In fact Ribbentrop had also urged Hitler to make terms. Here again Goebbels preferred to blame Hitler's 'bad advisers' rather than Hitler himself. As late as 1945 Goebbels refused to believe that Ribbentrop had proposed negotiations, describing him as Hitler's 'evil genius, driving him on from one reckless adventure to the next.'

This memorandum by Goebbels again demonstrated his dual approach to ending the war - total war and the pursuit of a compromise peace are complementary elements. Hitler's rejection of this attempt was an important missed opportunity. The period before the opening of the Second Front was the last time for the Germans to have been able to talk to the Soviet Union while they still had some bargaining counters. Goebbels' proposals were in addition more 'realistic' than earlier German proposals.

Bormann's views on the military situation can be seen not only from his treatment of Goebbels' memorandum. He also described a speech by Goebbels on the current situation as being of fundamental political significance. In this speech Goebbels ruled out capitulation, and claimed that despite the difficulties of the air war, the resulting

loss of production in no way threatened the war effort. He also maintained that the retreat on the Eastern front in 1943 was due to Italian treachery: one could not speak of Hitler having lost operational freedom in the East, although the territory and raw materials lost was significant. Goebbels held out the prospect of differences among the English elite about the war, and compared Germany's situation to the Nazi position in December 1932. Bormann's comments indicate that these were the views he considered to be the correct ones to put to a party audience. In view of his treatment of Goebbels' memorandum, he may also have believed these analyses. Another possible sign of his optimism was his consideration of proposals to increase the birthrate after the war.

In public Himmler maintained his optimism about the outcome of the war. He reassured party and military leaders about the strength of the internal situation in comparison to 1918. He had fulfilled his promise to Hitler at the beginning of the war that the German armed forces could turn its face to the outside world without any fear of another stab in the back. He had achieved this because

19. Goebbels, 'Geheim!', 23 February 1944, 'Die politische und militärische Lage', BA NS 19/1870, ruling out capitulation, p. 5, on the difficulties of the air war and ways of overcoming them, pp. 30-40, and on the loss of production, p. 16.
20. ibid., pp. 25-7.
24. 'Rede . . . auf der Tagung der RPÄ-Leiter', 28 January 1944, BA NS 19/4012, p. 54. See also 'Rede des Reichsführer-SS auf der Ordensburg Sonthofen am 5. Mai 1944', BA NS 19/4013, p. 31.
criminals and communists were not free to undermine national security. The Germans would not have been able to withstand the Allied bomber offensive had Jews still been in Germany, he claimed. His speeches suggest that he saw the maintenance of internal order as the main precondition of victory. Himmler drew parallels with the Nazi Party's problems in 1932 and the trials of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years War.

He claimed the enemy had reached their maximum armaments output, but was much more conscious of Soviet military strength than in his earlier speeches. He contended that victory would go to the side whose nerve held. He seemed to be hoping for a breakdown in the enemy coalition. His speeches drew attention to what he saw as favourable developments - racial tensions in the United States, strikes and the growth of Communist influence in Britain - but warned that these developments would not bear fruit

27. ibid., p. 31.
28. 'Rede . . . auf der Tagung der RPA-Leiter', 28 January 1944, BA NS 19/4012, p. 82.
29. 'Rede des Reichsführer-SS auf der Ordensburg Sonthofen am 5. Mai 1944', BA NS 19/4013, pp. 50-3.
32. 'Rede . . . auf der Tagung der RPA-Leiter', 28 January 1944, BA NS 19/4012, p. 84.
immediately. The Germans would go through a difficult six to nine months but had to keep their nerve to win.33

Schellenberg's efforts to urge Himmler to push for a negotiated peace had failed. His efforts had led however to a wavering in Himmler's loyalties.34 Himmler did move on a related issue. His strong opposition to the Vlasov movement in 1943 has been noted, but as Germany's position in the East worsened, the SS too adopted a more flexible position. During the first half of 1944 Himmler was persuaded by Gunter d'Alquen, editor of the SS weekly Das Schwarze Korps, to support Vlasov. Specifically he authorized an SS operation to increase the numbers of deserters from the Red Army using officers of the Vlasov group.35 Himmler's conversion to a more flexible policy came too late to have any practical political effect since Germany had lost most of her conquered territory in the East and had lost credibility by harsh occupation policies. It appears to have been a product of desperation rather than conviction or even opportunism, in view of his comments on the extensive criticisms of German policy made by Frauenfeld, Generalkommissar for Crimea.36 Himmler and Bormann discussed the paper on 25 March, and concluded that a new

33. 'Rede des Reichsführer-SS auf der Ordensburg Sonthofen am 5. Mai 1944', BA NS 19/4013, pp. 50-3.
34. Ohlendorf claimed at Nuremberg that from this time on Himmler and other SS leaders were toying with the idea of assassinating Hitler: Conot, Nuremberg, p. 255. Himmler's disclosures of the Final Solution in January 1944 speeches have been attributed to increasing psychological strain as he distanced himself from Hitler: H. Mommsen, The Realization of the Unthinkable, p. 131, note 14.
35. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 602-6.
occupation would have to find forms other than the milder policies suggested by Frauenfeld.37

Another important belated sign of Himmler's willingness to abandon ideology for the sake of victory can be seen in the negotiations held on his behalf with representatives of the Hungarian Jewish community where the offer was made in April 1944 by the SS to trade the lives of 1,600 Jews in exchange for approximately RM four million.38 In May 1944, acting on Himmler's orders, Eichmann called on Joel Brand, the representative of a Hungarian Zionist relief committee, and offered to save Hungarian Jews in exchange for goods and war materials, including 10,000 trucks to go to the Waffen-SS on the Eastern front.39 Despite a lack of response from the Allies, a limited deal was struck in June 1944 when the Hungarian committee exchanged material and goods with a value of 2.5 million RM for the lives of 18,000 Jews.40

Both these moves indicate that Himmler's view of the regime's prospects had become more realistic than it was in 1943, and that he was prepared to make significant changes to protect his own position. The treatment of the Jews had still not been raised as part of any wider debate about how the war should be waged: only Himmler, whose responsibility they were, could make such a change of policy. In early 1944 Himmler showed himself willing to abandon ideological

37. Himmler's handwritten notes dated 26 March 1944 on the back page of Bormann's letter, ibid. Frauenfeld had urged a more lenient and politically adroit policy.


policies which he had pursued at great economic and political cost to the war effort in 1941-3. This change dramatically highlights both his comparative optimism about the war effort up to 1944 and his increased realism in 1944 with the collapse of the German front in the East. In view of these changes, Himmler can not be said to have had a coherent concept of total war unlike Goebbels or Speer. From 1941 to 1943 he aimed at victory through implementation of National Socialist ideology, as well as greater production and simplification. At this stage he was not willing to bend on issues such as the treatment of the Eastern peoples where other leaders, particularly Goebbels, were prepared to be flexible. Once he realized Germany's military position had deteriorated, Himmler was then willing to dilute many of the policies in the implementation of which he had played a leading role. Himmler from now on was vacillating, one moment clinging to his old ideological pattern of total war and at other times willing to abandon all these policies.

Bormann's optimistic view of the situation has already been noted; Speer had other preoccupations during this period. On 18 January 1944 he was hospitalized with a knee injury. His heavy workload in 1942 and 1943 may have contributed to the complications which resulted. His hospitalization and convalescence, first in the Red Cross's Hohenlychen Hospital under SS-Gruppenführer Dr. Gebhardt and then in Salzburg and Meran, lasted until 8 May. Speer continued the work of his ministry from his sickbed despite Gebhardt's protests that this would delay his recovery, and Gebhardt

41. Speer's suggestion that Gebhardt's treatment of him was suspicious seems to be post-war exaggeration. For these suggestions see Speer, Third Reich. Chapter 23 - Illness, and for a detailed rebuttal of Speer's claims see M. Schmidt, Speer Myth. Chapter Six. Gebhardt's own reports to Himmler give no indication of any malevolent intentions: Gebhardt to Himmler, 21 February 1944, pp. 1-2; Meine to Gebhardt, 26 February 1944; and Himmler to Gebhardt, 20 March 1944, all in BA NS 19/1867.
was only successful in forbidding visits of an official nature from 8 to 20 February.42

Speer claimed that his illness and consequent absence from Hitler's presence weakened Hitler's influence on him and his influence on Hitler.43 There is no contemporary evidence of this, but the memoranda he sent Hitler in July 1944 suggest his illness caused him to reflect on the overall situation and the need for more thorough use of the nation's resources for war.44 His reactions after the July 1944 assassination attempt and his later resistance to Hitler's 'scorched earth' policies suggest that the need to secure his future after National Socialism may also have occurred to him.

During his illness, Speer sent four submissions to Hitler. Schmidt has interpreted these as symptoms of a fear that lack of personal contact with Hitler might lose him power.45 Despite this fear, Hitler visited him three times during his illness.46 In the first submission Speer proposed to Hitler that he increase the number of workers available to the armaments industry by strengthened intervention of the party, in particular the Gauleiters, and Sauckel. He could only do this if the Gauleiters and all other offices unconditionally complied with all his specialist directives, and if Sauckel regarded himself as an assistant to the tasks of the armaments industry and did not seek to interfere in the use of the workers provided, which was Speer's

43. Speer, Third Reich, pp. 330, 335, 341-2.
44. These are dealt with in Chapter Eight. After his illness Speer concluded that the smooth working of his ministry showed that he did not need to worry about details but should concentrate on fundamentals; 'Amtschef-Besprechung am 10. Mai 1944', BA R 3/1549, p. 5.
45. Schmidt, Speer Myth, pp. 87-8.
responsibility. If Hitler agreed with this he should sign a decree regulating the forms of collaboration of the Reich defence commissioners. Speer pointed out to Hitler that naturally he did not intend to opt for political activity either in the war or after the war. He saw his current employment purely as wartime employment and looked forward to taking up his tasks as an artist again. In this way he sought to reassure Hitler about extending his powers, just as Goebbels assured Hitler of his disinterested loyalty when making his foreign policy proposals.

In a second submission Speer defended himself against charges that the armaments industry was failing in its obligations to the front, and suggested that he make presentations in Berlin and in Hitler's headquarters on the armament industry's achievements from 1941 to 1943. In his third submission he again sought to reduce Sauckel's influence. Sauckel had urged workers in his own Gau of Thuringia to increase their productivity; this was correct, but in publishing the speech in all newspapers Sauckel was using the speech as a platform in his capacity as plenipotentiary for labour (GBA). He asked that Sauckel be instructed to seek Speer's permission before holding such meetings in future. He sought in addition to have all articles and announcements dealing with armaments production referred to his office for approval, and to have the final say when and how often other such publications occurred. While Goebbels and Speer had collaborated in the past about armaments propaganda, Speer could

48. Entry for 12 April 1944, Semmler, Goebbels, p. 121.
have anticipated that this request would meet with Goebbels' opposition as well as Sauckel's. Hitler did not respond to these memoranda. The question arises why Speer made them in this form. Had his illness, as Schmidt suggests, led to a fear that his position might be weakened? His 'perceived' position of being undermined contrasts with the vast number of powers he had actually been granted.

Speer also tried to protect himself against intrigues in his ministry by Xavier Dorsch, his deputy in the Organisation Todt, by seeking Hitler's support. Speer refused to take up some of his functions and spoke of resignation, because of what he believed was lack of adequate support from Hitler. Field Marshal Milch intervened to secure a reconciliation between the two on 20 April. In a meeting on 24 April Hitler declared that he agreed with all measures Speer had taken in the building industry and halted attempts to separate building from armaments. The result, according to the Chronik, was that Speer's authority was strengthened. Hitler hinted to Speer that

52. Speer, Third Reich, p. 330.
54. Dorsch had provided politically damaging material about other members of the Ministry; Goebbels, as the man responsible for the politics and attitudes of officials, supported Speer. Speer wanted one of Dorsch's colleagues sent to a concentration camp as a result: Speer to Dorsch, 27 January 1944, pp. 1-8, and Speer, 29 January 1944, 'Führer-Vorlage: 5', BA R 3/1515, pp. 7-9. See also Speer to Bormann, 11 March 1944, 'Oberregierungsrat Dr. Birkenholz', BA R 3/1573, and Speer Chronik for April 1944, BA R 3/1739, pp. 50-6. In seeking Goebbels' support, Speer had expressed the hope that Goebbels would continue to show the usual warm comradely relationship: Speer to Goebbels, 27 January 1944, pp. 1-3; see also Speer to Goebbels, 31 January 1944, BA R 3/1614, pp. 1-2.
he was not influenced by complaints made against him by the Gauleiters.56

Speer's illness had prompted his opponents to move to reduce his powers and Speer countered this strongly.57 His memoranda and particularly his moves against Sauckel indicate unrealistic expectations of the extent of his powers. The first half of 1944 marked the final period in which German armaments production was still able to increase,58 before loss of territory and labour sources together with the intensifying air war made this impossible. The fuel situation was already deteriorating.59 On 1 January 1944 Speer was able to report to Hitler that he had met all the targets in the armaments programme set him in February 1942.60 Milch attributed the increases in productivity, especially in the fighter programme, to the loyalty of the German workers.61 Armaments production was concentrated among fewer firms.62

Speer demonstrated his radical view of total war in telling Gauleiter Meyer of Westphalia North that the war had to be pursued to the last consequence. It was no longer possible to consider how an area would be placed at the end of the war, only how it could be used

56. Speer, Third Reich, pp. 343-4.
58. If production in January-February 1942 was set at 100, then it reached its high point in July 1944 with 322: Herbst, Totale Krieg, note p. 343.
for the war. Speer also continued his plan to transfer firms to more important production, a move he and Goebbels had advocated for some time. By January firms transferred, including the entire confectionery and papermaking industries, numbered 117,500. Resistance in the cigarette industry to the closure of two firms was overcome with the support of Gauleiter Mutschmann of Saxony in March. With Goebbels' approval, Speer appointed Haegert from the Propaganda Ministry to cut back the production of printed material.

Falling fighter production due to increased air attacks in January and February led Speer to set up the Jägerstab (Fighter Staff), led by the head of his ministry's technical office, Karl Otto Saur, on 28 February. This was able to raise production to 1670 new fighters in March from an average production of 1100 machines in the preceding seven months. As a result of his illness, Speer found, when he attended its meeting for the first time on 26 May, that the Jägerstab had become too strongly under Air Ministry influence. He took the reins back into his hands, according to the

67. Saur was an engineer who had worked for Todt since 1937 and entered the Munitions Ministry in 1940. His office oversaw continuing technical developments of weapons and he headed the final production of the weapons and munitions programme: Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 41.
By June 1944 Speer had gained control over the air armaments industry. What Speer considered to be unjustified intervention by the Party, in particular by Gauleiters, in the economy increased in this period. Tensions were caused by Speer's role in the allocation of resources. He protested at the use of armaments workers in communal work to restore transport connections after an air attack. He also encountered Party criticism because, against Hitler's wishes, a considerable number of German firms were forced to work on the 1 May holiday, particularly in mining, iron production and the fighter programme. Speer agreed to Goebbels' request, however, that the Propaganda Ministry be more strongly involved in all questions of war clothing, an indication that their informal alliance on the question of total war continued. Speer's position was still strong enough for him to disregard an order from Himmler as Interior Minister banning leave because of the increased threat of invasion.

70. Göring decree, 20 June 1944, BA R 3/1551.
71. On 3 February Speer was visited by Klopfer of the Party Chancellery to discuss the question of the involvement of the party in armaments tasks through the Gauleiters, particularly co-ordinating various middle level armaments offices. Speer emphasized that the Gauleiters should not make any difficulties for the industrialists called on to cooperate: Speer Chronik for February 1944, BA R 3/1739, p. 21.
72. For example, he reduced the party's allocation of wood for the first quarter of 1944: Speer to Schwarz, 11 March 1944, 'Barackenkontingent der Partei für das I. und II. Quartal 1944', BA R 3/1600.
73. Speer Fernschreiben to Bormann, 14 April 1944, BA R 3/1573. For another example of alleged political interference in economic policy, see Speer to Grohö, 3 February 1944, BA R 3/1581 concerning export of cell jute to Sweden.
74. Bormann to Speer, 12 May 1944, BA R 3/1573.
75. Speer to Goebbels, 27 May 1944, BA R 3/1580.
76. Speer Chronik for May 1944, BA R 3/1739, p. 89.
The pressure on economic production led to increased suspicion in the party of the use of non-party industrialists and businessmen in the system of self-responsibility of industry. These were the first suggestions that industry and allocation of raw materials might also need alteration for a more effective pursuit of the war effort. The SS alleged that Speer’s system of rings and committees allowed larger firms to build up their own economic position under the guise of the common good. The system did have potential for waste of material and labour, continuation of peace time production and corruption. Ohlendorf claimed that Speer countenanced corruption, black marketeering and profiteering as incentives to industrialists. The truth of these allegations is difficult to investigate in view of the uneven survival of some records and the reluctance of most firms to allow access to their files of the period. Speer challenged attacks on men active in the industry committees and rings by speaking to the SD and sending a memorandum to Bormann on the matter in January. The increasing hostility to self-responsibility of industry was partly a result of Speer’s illness, and of the greater difficulties for the German war effort. For all the rises in production the new weapons were not having an effect on the battlefield.

The picture of the German economy which Speer put forward was one of the comparative efficiency of armaments and his ministry, because of the self-responsibility of industry, and the comparative inefficiency of the party and its attempts to interfere with the

77. Reichsgeschäftsführer des Ahnerbe to Brandt, 6 May 1944, 'Erhaltung der Firma H. Hensoldt u. Söhne als Familienbetrieb.', BA NS 19/3054.
78. Milward, _German War Economy_, pp. 90-1.
economy. Carroll's suggestion that there was also inefficiency and confusion in the Speer ministry gains some support from the problems encountered by Gauleiter Eigruber of the Upper Danube. Gauleiter Florian of Dusseldorf also pointed out that often the armaments industry committees and rings interfered in attempts to reallocate workers to urgent production.

However much Speer put the conflict in terms of 'technocracy' versus the 'party' after the war, this was an over-simplification of the disputes. Some Gauleiters, such as Goebbels and Hanke, seem to have been very active where total war was concerned. The Chronik saw the success of the Ruhrstab to show that Gauleiters need not be an obstacle to successful work. In addition there were reasons for concern about the effects of the self-responsibility of industry. Hoffmann's reports of conditions in the occupied Eastern territories indicate that industry as well as administration and party could be wasteful and corrupt, and pursue its own interests at the expense of the war effort. It is simultaneously a measure of Hitler's support and Speer's influence that he was largely able to ensure that the system remained comparatively untouched.

Speer and Sauckel's disputes continued. Speer believed that labour was the area of armament production which failed most

82. Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 244-5, 248; Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 175.
83. Although he and Speer had agreed on the necessary closures of firms, in each case the committees and rings sought to have the decisions reversed. Other misunderstandings arose from poor communications in Speer's ministry: Eigruber to Speer, 24 February 1944, 'Geheim', 'Betriebsstillegungen.', BA R 3/1577.
84. Florian to Speer, 2 June 1944, 'Arbeitseinsatzlage im Gau Düsseldorf.', BA R 3/1578, p. 3.
86. Hoffmann to Bormann, 9 August 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 1', p. 13; Hoffmann to Bormann, 27 August 1942, 'Bericht Nr. 4 Distrikt Krakau', BA NS 6/795, p. 3.
often. The invasion ended any hope of increasing the use of foreign labour. This meant that for the first time the numbers in armaments employment decreased. On 31 May and again on 30 June Speer and Sauckel met to discuss the pros and cons of bringing workers out of France. Sauckel supported this, while Speer wanted workers from the Sperr-Betriebe to be left in France. The question was not clarified in their 30 June meeting. Hitler’s decision was that in doubtful cases on the creation of new Sperr-Betriebe the decision was to be left to Speer.

Where did Speer believe additional labour could be found? He could hope to win some workers from the closing down of unimportant production, and planned to set up a reserve of armaments workers to meet the most urgent requirements. His Ministry believed that an additional two million men and women could be employed by expanding out-work (Heimarbeit), lessening the incidence of illness and absenteeism, and making better use of

92. Liebel to Lammers, 12 May 1944, 'Arbeitseinsatz in Frankreich.', BA R 3/1588; see also entry for 6-7 April 1944, Boelcke, Hitlers Konferenzen, p. 347.
foreign workers. There are no indications that Speer was actively seeking to change Hitler's mind on the question of female employment at this time, and no sign that he urged firms to take measures to encourage women to work. In an attempt to take Hitler's attitudes into account Speer was planning to transfer as much production as possible to work which could be done in the home. Generaloberst Model, commander of Army Group North, sought to get Himmler's support for measures to encourage more German women to work in agriculture, but Himmler did not appear to support these measures. No response is on the file.

Despite his advocacy of increased female employment, Speer did not attend part of a meeting with Hitler in April 1944 which discussed Ley's proposal to have equal pay for equal work introduced. Hitler had recently agreed to lengthen the labour service of some girls to meet Luftwaffe requirements for staff, irrespective of the dangers this might provide to their health. But he rejected the policy of equal pay except for unspecified exceptional cases, otherwise the regime would set in motion measures they could not control. The post-war goal had to be that women left the factories and

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97. He claimed in a letter to Sauckel that the percentage of women employed in Germany was considerably less than in Britain: Speer to Sauckel, 28 January 1944, BA R 3/1597.

98. Lammers, 1 April 1944, 'Sofort!', 'Reichsarbeitsdienst der weiblichen Jugend.', IIZ APK, 101 06173.
returned to the family. In the discussion Bormann echoed Hitler's views. Ley found no support and the discussion did not really focus on the consequences of the decision for war time production or for encouraging more women into the workforce. Once again, as with his refusal to agree to more flexible policies in the East, Hitler's concern apparently was to prevent ideologically undesirable future developments rather than to overcome the present obstacles. An attempt by Sauckel to broaden the categories of women eligible for the Meldepflicht to include women, whose children were more than one year old and who had a female relative living with them, aged over 18 and not in paid employment, was altered by Bormann and Lammers without referral to Hitler. After their intervention the change applied to women with children over the age of two with female relatives aged between 18 and 70 who were not studying. Women should look after their own children below the age of two.

In addition, Speer had to be aware that both the free and captive sources of labour were diminishing as the territory under German control decreased. There were limits to the amount of staff who could be given up by some organizations. The Reichspost had given up 70 per cent of its male employees to the front at a time when the volume of work had increased by two to three times that of


100. See the correspondence on BA R 43 II/654, especially Bormann to Lammers, 7 April 1944, 'Entwurf einer Zweiten Verordnung über die Meldung von Männern und Frauen für Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigung.', and Bormann to Sauckel, 7 April 1944, 'Entwurf einer Zweiten Verordnung über die Meldung von Männern und Frauen für Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigung.', pp. 1-3.
The reduced supply of foreign workers led Speer to approach Himmler for greater employment of concentration camp inmates, because, he explained, of the willingness to help Himmler frequently displayed. In particular he requested 7,500 prisoners for the OT's building in the Atlantic Wall and 10,000 prisoners for use in Upper Silesian chemical works in addition to the 15,000 prisoners already used for tank production.

Party leaders, including Bormann, Ley and various Gauleiters favoured a greater involvement of the party in examining positions and 'combing out' staff. They believed they could gain better results. Bormann predicted that Speer would respond by saying that the party would have to take over responsibility for armaments, and Hitler would in consequence reject such moves. Bormann was suspicious of Speer's claims that more workers could not be freed from the armaments industry. Hitler's intervention was necessary to force armaments, railways and the post to give up


their staff. Keitel's belief that the involvement of the Gauleiters would alter this was completely false in Bormann's opinion. Speer already passed over the Gauleiters' opinions 'laughing'. Current conditions could only be altered by Hitler's orders in Bormann's opinion. Whatever Speer's assessment of his standing with Hitler, Bormann suggested here that Speer still had Hitler's confidence to such an extent that the Gauleiters could not intervene. Bormann showed a wary respect for Speer's influence with Hitler.

Goering and Speer asked Hitler to draw on industry to ensure increased rationalization of the armed forces behind the lines. In March Hitler made von Unruh available to Keitel to free more men from the replacement army for the front, particularly soldiers from the class of 1897 and younger. Von Unruh was empowered to make various organizational simplifications to achieve this. Hitler appointed General Ziegler as his special deputy heading a commission to simplify the armed forces, acting as a successor to General von Unruh. This appointment suggests that von Unruh was no longer considered suitable for such a position. The reasons why this occurred, after he had been relied on by Hitler for so long, are obscure. Von Unruh had advocated the creation of a war ministry to administer all sections of the armed forces and the placement of all fighting units under a

106. Fernschreiben Bormann to Friedrichs and Klopfer, 29 June 1944, 'Geheim!', 'Sicherstellung des fuer die Wehrmacht notwendigen Ersatzes.', ibid., pp. 4-7.


This may have resulted in his falling into disfavour as such measures would have reduced Hitler's direct control over the armed forces. Speer described Ziegler as 'an extraordinarily active, clear thinking front line general.' Six commissions were formed under Ziegler to simplify building, supply (weapons, munitions, equipment, lorries), armed forces transport, feeding, clothing, and the budget. Speer appointed the industrialists for the commission and he placed great emphasis on choosing industrialists whose judgement was valued by Hitler. Speer promised Goebbels that he would be able to equip all the soldiers being made free for the front as a result of these measures. Pohl, head of the SS administration and economy main office, for his part told Himmler that he did not expect much from the appointment of leading industrialists as chairmen. He predicted that this action would come to nothing like that of General von Unruh. Instead of the setting up of six commissions, Pohl preferred the appointment of an experienced, decisive administrative dictator possessed with revolutionary momentum.

The sixth commission - that for administration - was the first to meet. It was chaired by the industrialist, Hellmuth Röhnert, who was a member of Speer's armaments council (Rüstungsrat). An SS-Gruppenführer Frank was his deputy. The report of this meeting

109. Mussehl to Killy, 27 April 1944, BA R 43 II/681, p. 27.
111. ibid.
113. Pohl to Himmler, 13 April 1944, 'Geheime Reichssache!', 'Führerbefehl vom 27.11.1943 (Vereinfachung Wehrmachtsverwaltung).', BA NS 19/1752, pp. 1-2.
shows that Ziegler intended to set up a war ministry equipped with full powers to unite the administration of all sections of the armed forces while putting all fighting units under a supreme commander, despite evidence that von Unruh's advocacy of similar ideas had been unsuccessful. In Pohl's judgement Frank succeeded in largely taking over this commission and giving the SS the running. Himmler declared himself to be very pleased about Pohl's letter and Frank's report, but objected to the proposal to unite the armed forces' administration. He favoured unification and coordination of regulations to ensure that they were the same, but separate implementation. He continued to advocate administrative simplification and oppose internal disputes. SS offices also resisted an initial order by Himmler that they transfer responsibility for SS welfare (Versorgung) to the Reichsarbeitsministerium, but this was enforced. Himmler also ordered the unification of the nine SS


119. 'Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler zum Vortrag des Reichsleiters Fiehler', 13 February 1944, p. 2 and 'Rede des Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler auf der Tagung der Oberbürgermeister', BA NS 19/4012, pp. 3-4.

Verordnungsblätter into one with effect from 1 January 1944.\textsuperscript{121} By August he had been advised that this was not possible.\textsuperscript{122}

On 26 January Speer informed Bormann that concentration of the war economy required an end to production which was not important to the war effort, the transfer of firms to armaments production and the sharp rationalization of remaining firms and production. He and Funk had appointed Walter Rafelsberger, the deputy leader of the production office for consumer goods, to plan and suggest the necessary measures.\textsuperscript{123} Funk and Speer appointed Rafelsberger to rationalize the economic administration and accountancy, drawing on all previous experience to simplify administration and make workers available for armaments.\textsuperscript{124} Bormann in turn requested that Speer advise him about Rafelsberger's exact task and specifically whether Speer's measures would affect other officers.\textsuperscript{125} Speer replied that they would but only with the agreement of the supreme Reich authority (ORB) involved.\textsuperscript{126} (Rafelsberger's commission continued until 30 September 1944 when Speer considered it to be superfluous in the

\textsuperscript{121} Himmler order, 4 January 1944, BA NS 19/2934 and subsequent correspondence on the same file.

\textsuperscript{122} SS-Hauptsturmführer Berg, 7 August 1944, 'Vermerk für SS-Standartenführer Dr. Brandt.', BA NS 19/2934, pp. 1-2. See also Berg, 22 December 1944, 'Vermerk.', 'Wiedervorlage nach dem Kriege.', \textit{ibid.}, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{124} Funk and Speer to Rafelsberger, 15 January 1944; Speer to Rafelsberger, 20 January 1944, BA R 3/1573.

\textsuperscript{125} Bormann to Speer, 27 February 1944, 'Rationalisierung des Rechnungswesens und der Wirtschaftsverwaltung.', \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{126} Speer to Bormann, 9 March 1944, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1-2.
light of the appointment of a plenipotentiary for total war.)^{127} Speer also ordered his offices to give up to the armed forces or armaments at least 25 per cent of their male personnel without regard to age or fitness grading.^{128} He also supported proposals by Backe to reduce numbers employed in agriculture by 15 to 25,000 people and suggested still more savings could be made.^{129}

The SS economic activities continued to expand, with Pohl investigating the building of caves for the location of armament production, and the use of tunnels as storerooms.^{130} Himmler claimed that the SS's prisoners achieved about 35 million hours of armaments production a month.^{131} He decided that SS units needed to be armed more with medium and heavy mortars and deputized Jüttner, the head of the SS Leadership Main Office,^{132} and Pohl to make contact with officers of the armaments ministry so that such production was undertaken in a concentration camp. In this way the SS could retain a

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127. Speer to Rafelsberger, 28 August 1944, ibid., pp. 1-2. The end of his commission was partly due to Speer's displeasure at Rafelsberger's discussing his proposals with other ministries before submitting them to Speer: Speer Chronik for August 1944, BA R 3/1740, pp. 213-14. His report is contained in Rafelsberger to Funk, 12 June 1944, 'Rationalisierung des Rechnungswesens und der Wirtschaftsverwaltung.', BA R 3/1595, pp. 1-16. Almost all his suggestions were realizable: Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 267.


131. 'Rede Himmlers vor Vortretern der deutschen Justiz.', 25 May 1944, 'Geheim', BA NS 19/4014, p. 11.

132. Since August 1940 Jüttner had headed the SS Leadership Main Office (SS-Führungshauptamt, FHA), which was 'practically an SS general staff for military training and operations': Robert Lewis Koehl, The Black Corps: The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS (Madison, 1983), p. 194.
great number of mortars for their troops. Himmler encouraged Pohl in his plans to expand the use of the Oranienburg brick works for this production. He considered the matter to be very important and instructed Pohl to ensure he received the necessary powers from Saur. The foundry should be set up as quickly as possible 'with the Russian style of improvisation'.

Schieber, the head of Speer's office for the provision of raw material and labour requirements for armaments, the Rüstungslieferungsamt, described Himmler as having decided to involve himself to the greatest extent in the economic leadership and to build up firms as a financial foundation for various SS tasks. He considered that the SS opposition to the self-responsibility of industry played a considerable role in this expansion, which had been made possible by its almost unlimited labour resources. If the armaments industry was not more successful in transferring concentration camp prisoners into its own firms, it would lose them to SS firms. Some elements of this attitude can be seen in an exchange between Himmler and Kehrl. Himmler was Hitler's plenipotentiary for the rubber plant, taraxacum kok-saghyz. He took umbrage at a letter from Kehrl, leader of Speer's planning office (Planungsamt), criticising the extraordinarily small yield from the

133. Himmler to SS-Obergruppenführer Jüttner, SSFHA, 8 February 1944, BA NS 19/1542.
135. Himmler Fernschreiben to Pohl, 19 February 1944, 'Geheim!', 'Rüstungsfertigung in Großziegelwerk Oranienbg.', BA NS 19/443; other papers on this file set out the further progress of this project.
kok-saghyz harvest.\textsuperscript{138} In telling Kehrl he did not have the right to make such decisions, Himmler said that he received his order from Hitler, who alone was in a position to release him from it. Both Kehrl and Himmler, had the duty of obedience to Hitler. 'I personally am not ready to break this tradition of obedience.' He added that Kehrl's letter demonstrated 'a typically narrow big capitalist mentality' which feared undesirable competition for I.G. Farben's Buna.\textsuperscript{139}

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Bormann's influence continued to grow: his treatment of Goebbels' foreign policy memorandum demonstrates its basis in his ability to restrict access to Hitler.\textsuperscript{140} A Party Chancellery official described the SS and the Hitler Youth as the only organizations which did not follow Party Chancellery orders.\textsuperscript{141} Bormann severely reprimanded Speer because his staff had stopped the building of air raid shelters for foreign missions. Hitler had deputised Bormann to tell Speer of his indignation. 'Orders of the Führer are to be carried out by every German and can in no case be annulled or stopped or checked without further ado.'\textsuperscript{142} His increasing authority led him to

\textsuperscript{138} Kehrl to Ost-Gesellschaft für Pflanzenkautschuk und Guttapercha m.b.H., 14 March 1944, 'Errichtung von Werken für Kok-Sagys-Kautschuk-Gewinnung-Ihr Schreiben vom 23.2., Br./Es.', BA NS 19/1802.


\textsuperscript{140} See also charges that he misled Hitler on six cases of youth policy: Berger to Himmler, 23 April 1944, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'Zusammenarbeit Reichsjugendführung/Parteikanzlei', BA NS 19/2185.

\textsuperscript{141} Berger to Brandt, 27 May 1944, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'I. Besprechung in Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete', BA NS 19/2181, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{142} Bormann to Speer, 1 March 1944, BA R 3/1611, p. 1.
criticize attempts by the SD to take over the party's role in judging
the political reliability of State officials.143

Bormann called for party officials to combat corruption by
setting a good personal example. He agreed with a SD report which set
out instances of corruption in the allocation of raw materials and uk
positions and which warned that corruption was 'one of the most
conspicuous causes of the 1918 collapse'.144 There were continuing
problems in the party, particularly with its preparedness to work
with the zeal judged necessary by Hitler and Bormann.145 This led to
the introduction of national socialist family evenings to be held by the
local party organizations,146 and repeated general instructions on the
need for party members to serve as an example in fulfilling their war
service (Kriegseinsatzpflicht),147 and in providing an example of
strong nerves and bravery.148 The wives of leading men were also
being called on to observe war regulations in an exemplary
manner.149 The party was however fulfilling an important role in

143. Bormann to Himmler, 27 April 1944, 'Persönlich!', 'Einflußnahme des SD
auf die Personalpolitik.', BA NS 19/1903, p. 2.

144. Attachment, SD submission, 'Bekämpfung der Korruption.', Bormann, 6
May 1944, 'Bekanntgabe 103/44 g.', 'Bekämpfung der Korruption.', BA NS
6/350, p. 1. The attachment provides examples of the various corrupt
practices on pp. 2-7.

145. As late as 1944 the local party in Baden occasionally refused to vacate
premises needed for the war effort: Grill, Nazi Movement in Baden, p. 456.

146. Bormann, 3 April 1944, 'Anordnung 74/44.', 'Nationalsozialistische
Familienabende', BA NS 6/346, pp. 1-5.

147. Bormann, 24 January 1944, 'Anordnung 15/44.', 'Kriegseinsatzpflicht der
Parteigenossen.', ibid., p. 1.

148. Bormann, 17 May 1944, 'Führungshinweis Nr. 17', 'Führung und Haltung

149. Bormann, 4 February 1944, 'Anordnung 22/44.', 'Verhalten der Ehefrauen
und Familienangehörigen führender Parteigenossen.', pp. 1-2. The order
had to be repeated later in the year: Bormann, 7 August 1944, 'Anordnung
172/44', 'Verhalten der Ehefrauen und Familienangehörigen führender
Parteigenossen; Anordnung 22/44', BA NS 6/347.
combatting the effects of the air war. In a speech to Gau- and Kreisleiters Friedrichs noted that the series of blows experienced in 1943 had made some party members weak and tired. The Sprechabende and general membership meetings had been successful in combatting this. The efforts to ensure that party leaders were adequately equipped with weapons continued, but without the armed forces being able to supply the amounts desired. The seriousness of the demands which might be placed on the party were seen in a circular issued by Bormann concerning the party's activities in case of an invasion, which suggest that he saw the party as exercising an increasing role in military matters. The party had to prepare for possible paratroop attack, sabotage commandos and risings of foreign workers. Its most important practical task was direction of the mobilization of all men in the home front in collaboration with the armed forces recruiting offices (Wehrersatzdienststellen). The local party leader would command the total reserve of German civilian workers. Party formations had to be prepared for the giving of the alarm and capable of action. A precondition for this was that each man had only one mobilisation order (Mob-Beordnung) for his employment outside the area. In directly affected Gaus it might be necessary to use women to help in camouflage and planning. This would require careful organizational and psychological preparation, and would have to occur through leadership of the party. Evacuation


152. Schwarz to Speer, 4 February 1944, 'Ministersache, Sofort zu bearbeiten', 'Waffenlieferungen an die Partei.'; and Speer to Schwarz, 26 May 1944, BA R 3/1600, pp. 1-2; Speer to Ley, 15 June 1944, BA R 3/1592; and Schwarz to Speer, and Schwarz to Generaloberst Fromm, 28 June 1944, 'Geheim', 'Waffenlieferung an die Partei', BA R 3/1956, pp. 1-2.
of industry and agriculture and destruction of positions would be the
task of the Wehrmacht and the police, while the sole task of the party
would be to work on all matters to do with possible evacuation of the
German civilian population. Precautions also needed to be taken to
destroy party records in event of invasion.¹⁵³

In order to ensure Party influence over the NSFOs, Bormann set
up a working office (Arbeitsstab) in the Party Chancellery to secure
cooperation between the party and the OKW NS-Führungsstab, which
had been set up in December 1943.¹⁵⁴ He wanted work to begin
quickly.¹⁵⁵ The head of the OKW NS-Führungsstab, General Reinecke,
described the relationship between the two offices to Hitler as
close.¹⁵⁶ Hitler described the task of National Socialist leadership as
decisive to the war effort.¹⁵⁷ Bormann agreed.¹⁵⁸ He wanted a
thorough 'partification' of the armed forces.¹⁵⁹ Officers had to be the
fanatical representatives of the National Socialist state. Hitler was
cconcerned by opposition to the NSFOs in the Army. He knew from his
experience as an instruction officer (Bildungsoffizier) with the

¹⁵³. Bormann, 31 May 1944, 'Geheime Reichssache', 'Rundschreiben 123/44 g.
¹⁵⁴. Bormann, 7 January 1944, 'Anordnung 6/44', 'NS-Führungsoffizier.', BA
NS 6/346, pp. 1-2; and Bormann, 7 January 1944, 'Bekanntgabe 5/44', 'NS-
Führungsstäbe und -Offiziere', BA NS 19/750.
¹⁵⁵. Bormann Fernschreiben to Friedrichs, undated, 'NS-Führungsstab,
Aufnahme der Arbeit, Vorlage vom 4.2.', BA NS 6/761.
¹⁵⁶. 'Besprechung des Führers mit General Reinicke(sic) am 7. Januar 1944 in
der Wolfsschanze.', BA NS 6/162, p. 4. Keitel and Bormann were present at
the discussions.
¹⁵⁷. 'Rede des Hauptbereichleiters Ruder auf der Tagung der Reichsleiter,
Gauleiter und Verbändeführer am 23.2.1944 in München.', BA NS 6/346,
p. 2.
¹⁵⁸. He strengthened the emphasis given to the importance of NSFOs in his
corrections to a draft letter to the Gauleiters: untitled draft letter to
Reichswehr that the opposition of a regiment or battalion commander could completely kill such a thing. He warned of the tendency to make NSFOs of officers capable of nothing else. Bormann was also aware of the need to choose the correct workers. He proposed to supplement the work of the NSFOs by calling on the Gauleiters to help politicize the army by using Gau deputies (Gaubeauftragte) for armed forces questions. He aimed for a common political and ideological orientation, and an increase in political dynamism.

The Party Chancellery view was that the NSFOs would follow party guidelines. The party had to suggest suitable people, provide educational material, activate party members serving in the armed forces, and make contact with NSFOs through the Gau deputies. Hitler ordered that the Party Chancellery was responsible for any tasks arising from NS-Führung and the views of party offices were only to be given to the Wehrmacht with Bormann's agreement. Bormann had to agree to all personnel and technical measures


161. 'Besprechung des Führers mit General Reinicke am 7. Januar 1944 in der Wolfsschanze.', BA NS 6/162, p. 21. For an example of one such attempt, see Amann to Bormann, 12 February 1944, 'NS-Führungsoffiziere.', BA NS 6/522, pp. 1-2.


164. 'Rede des Hauptbereichsleiters Ruder auf der Tagung der Reichsleiter, Gauleiter und Verbändeführer am 23.2.1944 in München', BA NS 6/346, p. 4.

concerning NSFOs. Himmler also took additional measures on ideological education when he appointed an inspector of ideological education in the SS and police. In addition to demonstrating the growing power of the party, the attention paid to the NSFOs was a further expression of the view, of which Bormann was increasingly the representative, that political radicalism and party control would lead to more effective military resistance. It derived from the belief that ideological fanaticism and will power could outweigh material strength. It marked a weakening of the comparatively independent position of the Wehrmacht.

The air war again required the diversion of staff and materials from other purposes. Between November 1943 and February 1944, for example, 11.7 million additional ration portions were distributed, while some 500,000 foreign workers were used to repair the damage. Bormann believed that greater use had to be made of purchases in occupied territories to replace destroyed goods. These resources had to be diverted because of the importance the leadership attached to maintaining public morale, which was being

166. 'Rede des Hauptbereichleiters Ruder.', 23 February 1944, BA NS 6/346, p. 2. The Party Chancellery's increased involvement in the issue can be seen in BA files NS 6/150, NS 6/522, NS 6/761 and BA MA R H13/v. 3.

167. Himmler decree, 1 January 1944, 'Inspektor fiir Weltanschauliche Erziehung', BA NS 19/750.


affected by the bombing.\textsuperscript{172} The air war increased tension because of the differing requirements of the various offices. Workers had to be redirected to secure transport connections.\textsuperscript{173} While Speer supported the necessary air protection measures, he told Gutterer that they could not detract from armaments production.\textsuperscript{174}

The need to counter the destruction of the air war involved all civilian sources of authority. Here the party played an important role.\textsuperscript{175} Gaus with considerable experience of air attack provided detailed advice to other areas.\textsuperscript{176} It had set up formations to counter damage and care for the population after air attacks;\textsuperscript{177} the SS building brigades continued to be in demand.\textsuperscript{178} Particular measures were taken to protect Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{179} The activities of Goebbels' inter-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{172} 'SD-Berichte zu Inlandsfragen vom 4. Mai 1944 (Grüne Serie)', \textit{Meldungen}, vol. 17, pp. 6510-11.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Speer to Gauleiter Greiser, 11 January 1944, BA R 3/1581, pp. 1-2. He opposed efforts by Gauleiters to build new bomb secure headquarters because of the strain on resources - such headquarters had to be built in existing buildings: Speer to Gauleiter Meyer, 11 March 1944, 'Geheim', BA R 3/1590, pp. 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Accordingly he would not free German workers in the armaments industry to become air defence police (\textit{Luftschutzpolizei}): Speer to Gutterer, 13 January 1944, 'Geheim!', ibid., p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Jordan, \textit{Erlebt und Erlitten}, p. 205; Orlow, \textit{Nazi Party II}, pp. 438, 441.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Secretary to the Gauleiter of South Westphalia, Fernschreiben to Walkenhorst, 3 January 1944, pp. 1-3, and signature to M-Beauftragten of all Gaus, 26 January 1944, 'Erfahrungsberichte aus dem Gebiete des Luftschutzes.', BA NS 6/294, pp. 1-9; Jordan, \textit{Erlebt und Erlitten}, pp. 229-31.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Bormann, 16 February 1944, 'Bekanntgabe 43/44.', 'Einsatzbereitschaften der NSDAP'; BA NS 6/350, pp. 1-3.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Pohl to Head of Amtsgruppe C and others, 28 February 1944, 'Geheime Kommandosache!'; 'Aufstellung der 5. SS-Baubrigade.'; Grohé Fernschreiben to Himmler, 2 May 1944, 'Persönlich', BA NS 19/14.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Goebbels to Himmler, 16 March 1944, 'Geheim!', 'Reichsinspektion zur Durchführung ziviler Luftkriegsmaßnahmen im Reichsgau-Oberschlesien', BA NS 19/994.
\end{itemize}
departmental air war committee continued to widen;\textsuperscript{180} Hitler instituted a Reich inspection of civil air war measures led by Goebbels to standardise practice.\textsuperscript{181} As a result of the inspection's work Hitler agreed to common measures of both specific and general nature.\textsuperscript{182} The co-ordination which the German leadership undertook to combat the weakening of morale and to ensure that the remainder of the country learnt from the experience of those cities already bombed diverted labour, raw materials, consumer production and administrative resources.\textsuperscript{183} It prevented the breakdown of morale and avoided the administrative problems of the British response to bombing.\textsuperscript{184}

What action there was on total war in this period concentrated as much on the ideological aspects of uniting the nation and ensuring

\textsuperscript{180} Goebbels to all Gauleiters, 3 March 1944, 'LK-Mitteilung Nr. 100', BA R 55/447, pp. 1-2. See the various \textit{LK-Mitteilungen} for the period in BA R 55/447; Goebbels to Speer, 8 February 1944, BA R 3/1580; Goebbels to Himmler, 16 March 1944, 'Geheim', 'Reichsinspektion zur Durchführung ziviler Luftkriegsmaßnahmen in Reichsgau Oberschlesien.', BA NS 19/994, pp. 1-2.


\textsuperscript{182} Goebbels to all Gauleiters, 28 January 1944, 'Geheim!', 'Reichsinspektion zur Durchführung zivilen Luftkriegsmaßnahmen', BA R 55/447, pp. 1-4; Friedrichs to M-Beauftragten of NSDAP Gauleitungen, 20 March 1944, 'Luftkriegseinsatz der Partei.', pp. 1-2; Siebert, 5 April 1944, 'Anordnungen des Führers', BA NS 6/294. Of general significance was Hitler's decision for the NSKK to train and place women as bus drivers, to have the population as a whole involved in air protection, and to stop withholding ration cards to prevent the return of the evacuated, and to stop fining parents who had not evacuated their children, and who could not send them to school because the schools were closed. Other measures, particularly graphic propaganda highlighting the dangers, were to be found to encourage parents to evacuate their children: Siebert, 5 April 1944, 'Anordnungen des Führers', BA NS 6/294 and Goebbels to all Gauleiters, 28 January 1944, 'Geheim!', 'Reichsinspektion zur Durchführung zivilen Luftkriegsmaßnahmen.', BA R 55/447, pp. 1-4.

\textsuperscript{183} On the resources tied down by the bombing, see Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, pp. 278-9.

\textsuperscript{184} On the problems of administrative strain, dispensing relief and the slowness to learn from previous experience in Britain: Tom Harrison, \textit{Living through the Blitz} (London, 1976), pp. 154-5, 165-8, 232-3, 292-9.
it still had the will to fight as on further simplifying production and administration, and devoting more resources to the war effort. The comparative lack of urgency about action on total war during this period is difficult to explain. There may have been a feeling that the measures taken in 1943 had to be given time to take effect; they may have been considered to be sufficient. Perhaps the gradual deterioration of Germany's position allowed it to go unnoticed. Speer's illness meant the temporary removal of one of the more forceful and persistent advocates of total war. Goebbels' efforts to have a compromise peace offered to Stalin were blocked, even though the period before the opening of the second front may have been the last chance for such a move. The expectation that after the second front opened, the Anglo-American forces would be quickly defeated and a compromise peace could be negotiated may have led to continued optimism. Despite Hitler's interest in such a peace in late 1943, there were no signs that any further action had been taken. The opening of the second front will be shown in Chapter Eight to have changed the regime's approach.
If Germany's deteriorating position was not obvious to some of the German leadership in the first six months of 1944, there could be no mistaking the seriousness of the situation later in the year. It led both Speer and Goebbels to seek Hitler's approval for more radical measures to secure more men for the armed forces as well as more production. Finally a decision was made to appoint Goebbels plenipotentiary for total war. The next two chapters will cover the second half of 1944. This chapter will set out the arguments used by the two men to persuade Hitler to make the appointment, the reasons he did so and the significance of the choice of Goebbels for the position; Chapter Nine will discuss Goebbels' policies in that position.

From July to December 1944 the German position on the Eastern Front declined dramatically. In a few weeks in June and July 1944 the Germans lost almost 50,000 square kilometres of territory.¹ In July the Fourth Army surrendered with the loss of fifty-three German divisions, and some 350,000 men. By mid-August 1944 advance units of Soviet forces had reached German territory in East Prussia, and were less than 400 miles from Berlin. In August Germany's allies, Romania and Finland, sought armistices with the Soviet Union.² As a result of these developments public morale continued to decline.³

1. Entry for 1 July 1944, von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 376.
2. Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 304, 327, 411-12, 437, 442.
3. See 'Tätigkeitsberichte' of the Reichspropagandaämter (RPÄ) dated 4 and 10 July 1944, in BA R 55/601, pp. 1-9 and pp. 1-10 respectively.
So rapidly did Germany's position on the Western front deteriorate in August and September 1944, that the war was expected to be over by the end of the year. On 20 August the Allies closed the gap between Falaise and Argentan in Normandy, closing 60,000 German troops in the pocket. This marked the end of the battle for Normandy; and by 24 August Paris had surrendered. By the beginning of September Montgomery's army had taken Brussels and Antwerp.

Bombing spread to areas which had previously been unaffected, and the strafing of civilians by fighter bombers in the West disrupted agricultural production. Overcoming the effects of the air war was 'a labour of Sisyphus'. The costs of the air war can be illustrated by the example of the Firma Bosch in Württemberg which had sustained bomb damage of 88 million Reichmarks. The firm was split into 213 offices in 102 locations at a cost of 28 million Reichmarks for the evacuation. Transport connections and fuel supplies were also severely affected by the bombing. Armaments production began to


5. Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, pp. 519-23.


decline. With Hitler's agreement Speer had already adopted policies to concentrate armaments production on priority programmes, creating an armaments staff (Rüstungstab). By July in Württemberg more room for production could only be gained by closing other firms. In November Speer proposed an emergency armaments programme to Hitler and emergency measures to restore transport links in and out of the Ruhr. He warned that a continuing loss of Ruhr industrial production would be untenable for the whole German economy.

The failure of the Allied plan to seize the bridge at Arnhem was followed by a temporary breathing space for the Germans. Hitler gave von Rundstedt the task of holding what was left of the Siegfried line and of planning an offensive in the Ardennes for December. This was to be directed at what Hitler judged the most militarily vulnerable enemy power, the United States. The offensive, launched on 16 December, had faltered by the end of December and after initial successes the Germans were forced onto the defensive.

Himmler took a step to secure his position in any peace negotiations with the Western allies by ordering an end to the

13. Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, pp. 523-5.
15. Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, p. 526.
extermination of the Jews in September-October 1944. Military developments also led Himmler to increase his support of Vlasov. He and Vlasov met and agreed to set up new Russian divisions, set up a real Russian national army and end propaganda about the Eastern peoples being 'sub-human'. These moves came too late as the population of the Eastern territories had already fallen back under Soviet control. The Propaganda Ministry was also pleased to see their plans to arm Ukrainian nationalist partisans become reality. These efforts were undercut by Hitler's decision to appoint Koch as Reich commissioner for Ostland. Because of Koch's harsh rule as commissioner in the Ukraine, Taubert described the decision with understatement as a problem for propaganda.

The worsening position of German forces on both fronts prompted Speer and Goebbels to renew their efforts to persuade Hitler to appoint a delegate with greater powers to introduce total war measures. There was now a more widespread general agreement that more decisive policies needed to be adopted. Speer gained Hitler's agreement to a discussion of the possibilities of raising more staff with a small circle - Himmler, Lammers, Keitel, Goebbels.

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20. ibid., p. 1.

Speer and Sauckel. Bormann was a notable omission on this list. Klopfer of the Party Chancellery chaired a meeting with Naumann and Kritzinger of the Reich Chancellery which decided that radical measures were needed to call up more workers. Bormann advised all Gauleiters that they had to adopt harsher measures and employ all workers in activities important to the war. Sauckel had ordered men and women of the ages encompassed in the Meldepflicht to report to the labour offices if not already working.

Comments Speer made in his speeches at the time give an indication of how he viewed organizing for total war. He stressed repeatedly, including to the Gauleiters, that the war was a technical war. He claimed that only armaments, food and transport were important for the war effort. On several occasions he compared the German war effort unfavourably to that of World War I. Specifically, speaking to the Gauleiters, he made the following unfavourable comparisons: the World War I Waffenamt had ten times


27. Speech to the Hauptausschuss Waffen, 10 August 1944, BA R 3/1554, p. 12.

fewer personnel than its 1944 counterpart; the share of German women working in firms was greater from 1914 to 1918; and the restrictions in many areas of the home front had been more incisive then.\textsuperscript{29} He claimed that the time the Germans had had to prepare for the Second World War had created an excess of organizations which prevented them from reaching the 1917 levels of production in 1939-40.\textsuperscript{30} Speer used the example that people continued to pay their taxes now they were not collected and that takings in the underground and on trains had not gone down since the abolition of conductors as evidence that further administrative simplifications could be undertaken without disruption.\textsuperscript{31}

These comments reveal a number of aspects of Speer's view of total war. His emphasis that the war was a technical war served to protect his own position from criticism. It also justified the extension of his powers at the expense of others. Speer's model of total war, mirroring his own powers and training, emphasized the efficient use of economic resources. If anything it was too narrowly focused on such considerations. Despite Speer's calls for a proletarianization of the country,\textsuperscript{32} there were reasons to maintain some 'inessential'

\textsuperscript{29} 'Minister Speer auf der Gauleiter-Tagung am 3. August 1944 in Posen', 'Geheime Reichssache', BA R 3/1553, pp. 2-3; see also Speer to Hitler, 20 July 1944, 'Geheime Reichssache', 'Denkschrift II', BA R 3/1522, pp. 6-8, 18. Sauckel stated, however, that the percentage of women employed in 1939 was greater than that in 1914: 'Ausführungen des Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz auf der Reichs- und Gauleiter-Tagung am 5./6. Febr. in Posen.', 'Geheim!', Document 1739-PS, TMWC, vol. 27, p. 595.

\textsuperscript{30} 'Minister Speer auf der Gauleiter-Tagung am 3. August 1944 in Posen', 'Geheime Reichssache', BA R 3/1553, p. 5; speech to Hauptausschuß Waffen, BA R 3/1554, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{31} Speech to the Hauptausschuß Waffen, 10 August 1944, p. 14; Speer speech to the meeting of the Hauptausschuss Munition, 11 August 1944, pp. 12-14; speech by Speer to a meeting of the chairmen of armaments commissions, Berlin, 10 August 1944, BA R 3/1554, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{32} Speer, Third Reich, p. 255.
activities for the sake of morale, reasons which Speer seemed to disregard. Speer's comparisons of the German war effort to World War One provides other evidence that his view of total war was too narrow. If production of some weapons was less than in World War One, the overall variety of weapons to be produced was greater as were the other demands on the German economy. The increased technical complications of the war accounted for the greater numbers employed in weapons development and procurement. Above all there were good reasons not to restrict the home front as much as has been the case in World War I.

On 12 July 1944 Speer wrote to Hitler, noting Hitler's belief that three to four months of production of Germany's new technically superior weapons would overcome the crisis. To achieve this production the Germans needed to employ their last strength. At the same time more soldiers had also to be made available to the Wehrmacht. He proposed that the Army free 100-150,000 soldiers from the home front (to be replaced by either Italian military internees or German women); the railways could give up 30,000 workers and armaments more than the required 50,000 if suitable, German, replacements were available. Completely contradicting the policy he had enforced in 1943 and early 1944, Speer continued that 'of course' he thoroughly agreed with Sauckel that as many workers as possible had to be brought in from occupied territories, and he supported Sauckel's efforts to gain the necessary powers.

Germany could not rely on foreign workers alone. Speer gave specific examples where German workers could be obtained: some 300-400,000 female domestic employees; some 400,000 office cleaning women (1/3 or 1/4 of the total number of cleaners); some 30,000 female students of inessential subjects; the 100-150,000 man German air defence police (Luftschutzpolizei) who could be employed
as a body in the armaments firms. Simplifications in the administration and home offices of the Wehrmacht sections would also free more staff: everything not absolutely necessary had to disappear.33

Speer's view was that the total involvement of the German people in the war effort had to begin at once, but would take some months to have a visible effect. It was still too early to call on armaments workers for the highest productivity - additional workers had to be transferred into armaments. Speer claimed that there were still reserves in the home front and pointed out that the experience of bombed towns showed that life was possible without the normal requirements of daily life. Everything inessential had to disappear.

For such measures to succeed one man had to be given power over the entire economy and all ministries. Such a conscious break with Germany's bourgeois ideas about the course of life had to be carried out in a revolutionary manner. Those who came from the economy, armed forces or administration were unsuited to carry through such measures: this was already shown by the failure of the Dreier Ausschuss to have its measures implemented. Committees could be no longer relied on; power had to be given to individuals who had the courage and nerve to take risks. He promised that the proclamation of total war would be received by the population with enthusiasm. Total war would have to be carried through, not merely proclaimed. If they did not act, Germany's workers would reproach them with indecisiveness and might lose their vigour.34

In a second letter dated 20 July 1944, Speer commented that while he kept Hitler continuously informed about the production and distribution of weapons, and the organization of the army, no one

34. ibid., p. 7.
gave him an overview of German labour reserves. There was an absolute incongruity between the numbers used to defend the country and those for unproductive maintenance of living standards and administration. In order to solve the problems of manpower Hitler had to occupy himself with this question to a great extent. Only radical measures would bring success.

Speer presented the following comparative figures:

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<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total employed</th>
<th>uk positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army armaments</td>
<td>1.94 m</td>
<td>81,000 of the class of 1910 and younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air armaments</td>
<td>2.33 m</td>
<td>97,000 of the class of 1910 and younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy armaments</td>
<td>530,000</td>
<td>22,000 class of 1910 and younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>970,000</td>
<td>91,000 class of 1910 and younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron industry</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>120,000 class of 1910 and younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration,</td>
<td>about 3 m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including armed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>forces administration</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>3.18 m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants</td>
<td>1.45 m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. Speer to Hitler, 20 July 1944, 'Geheime Reichssache', 'Denkschrift II', ibid., pp. 1-2. In another speech Speer claimed there were still 1.4 million employed as household help but he included in these figures workers in canteens: speech by Speer to a meeting of the chairmen of armaments commissions, 10 August 1944, BA R 3/1554, p. 18.
These figures were subsequently questioned. Lammers objected to Speer's claim that 3.8 million were employed in administration and stated there were 1.5 million in administration in May 1942 and 420,000 in the Wehrmacht administration. Stuckart of the Interior Ministry stated that the administration now almost totally occupied itself only with important questions. The Reich Chancellery was still protesting suggestions that the administration had a surplus of staff in November, stating that it had made 330,000 staff available to armaments.

Speer claimed that matters were not better in the armed forces. The Germans had formed 210 fighting divisions from 10.5 million called up into the armed forces or Waffen SS, while in 1917, excluding Austria, they had 230 divisions. He suggested that if the average strength of an infantry division was taken as 11,000 men, and if the air force and navy numbers were excluded, Germany only had 2.3 million of these troops in its fighting divisions. Speer attributed this to organizational mistakes; overestimation of the value of behind the lines organization; and 'the terrible German organizational habit' of creating as many independent units as possible. He cited as an

37. ibid., p. 8.
38. Submission to Lammers, 4 November 1944, 'Pressekomuniké "Totaler Krieg".', BA R 43 II/666b, pp. 2-3.
41. ibid., p. 8.
example the fact that supply, transport, and health care were organized separately for each section of the armed forces.

Looking at the numbers available to the Germans from the age group 1910-1926, Speer found a total of 7.4 million men of whom some 600,000 were wounded or missing. 588,000 of this age group were in uk positions. He estimated that the Wehrmacht therefore should have at least 4.3 million more men available from this age group. He suggested a three fold process for delivering the classes of 1918 to 1926, some 3.6 million men, to the front. No replacements would be provided. There was no sense in calling up older armaments workers to do behind the lines duty; soldiers for such purposes would have to be found from the simplification of the Wehrmacht administration.

In this paper Speer repeatedly compared the over-organized army of 1944 unfavourably to the more efficient German army of the First World War. He believed that the supply of munitions to the front was better organized in the First World War. The Germans and English were tradition bound while the Americans and Russians were able to improvise and simplify. Germany could only win the war if, together with the total employment of the home front, an organizational simplification of the Wehrmacht was carried out. The OKW itself did not have the strength to carry such measures through; an individual equipped with complete powers was necessary.

Speer's arguments about the number of men and women who were still available both in the armed forces and the economy in

42. ibid., pp. 12-13.
43. ibid., p. 15.
44. ibid., p. 19. See also Speer, Third Reich, p. 213.
45. ibid., p. 21.
general suggest that he was at best exaggerating in the hope of persuading Hitler that such powers would bring results. The existence of large numbers behind the lines was not necessarily a sign of inefficient or wasteful military organization. Speer, whose speeches emphasized the technical nature of the war, should have been aware of the need for a modern fighting force to be maintained by a large tail of supply and administration, and of the need for a greater proportion of the workforce to remain in the industrial economy than in earlier wars. Large numbers of troops were required to hold down the occupied territories.

Similarly Speer's suggestion that all remaining 4.3 million men were available for call up was simplistic. The number of men available also depended on their level of fitness and the availability of replacements to do their jobs if they were performing necessary tasks. Even jobs whose occupants were not classed as indispensable might still be necessary or might not be readily replaceable. It was not necessarily clear whether women, who were largely industrially unskilled, could quickly be trained to take the place of skilled industrial workers, or could easily be transferred to areas of labour shortage.46 British experience of female registration for employment suggested that 'the existence of a large reserve of transferable "unoccupied" women had proved a mirage: they were mainly . . . running households for other people'.47 Because of their family commitments women cleaners in Hamburg, for example, may not have been free to move to other areas of the Reich to work unless the regime was prepared to change social expectations of women's roles.

46. British World War II experience suggested that the number of women who could be classed as mobile by the standards of the time was limited: Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 307-8, 457.

47. ibid., p. 308.
Speer did not apparently consider these factors in making his assessments.

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In an apparently completely unrelated move, Goebbels wrote to Hitler with a similar proposal on 18 July. His letter contained more fulsome assurances of his loyalty and belief in total victory than Speer's. Describing enemy forces as totally unattainable in numbers and almost unattainable in materiel and technical matters, Goebbels nonetheless expressed his belief that this coalition would finally disintegrate. The question was did Germany have enough 'pawns' at its disposal to be able to take advantage of any crisis.

Goebbels claimed that Germany had not yet exhausted its strength. Speer could make young workers available from armaments if he received the necessary replacements. The war leadership had asked too much of some and not enough of others. The von Unruh commission had not succeeded because it lacked the necessary powers. Hitler needed to appoint men with backbone and character who would act without regard to people or offices, and who had clear authority. This had to be done by an outsider from the party or the economy. He explained that while he had an unreserved trust in the party, his trust in the armed forces was heavily shaken and he did not believe the Wehrmacht was capable of reforming itself.

Goebbels implicitly criticized the system of administration. There was hardly any area in public life where three or four authorities did not govern next to each other, whose main activity consisted of making difficulties for each other. He specifically mentioned those organizations which maintained propaganda organizations in competition with him, Rosenberg's Ostministerium

and the foreign office. In civilian life there was also a need for some person or organization to be given comprehensive powers, greater than the powers already in existence, carried out by the party which alone had the initiative and improvisational talents for the process. Goebbels seemed to envisage a looser control by this office than Speer. He proposed that it distribute guidelines, fire up the movement to total war and oversee the implementation of total war. The guidelines within which a Gauleiter might act would be set out but the rest would be left to the Gauleiter's ability. He suggested to Hitler that if Hitler gave the Gauleiters this task, they would vie with each other to fulfil it quickly. Despite Goebbels' own private judgement that the party membership as a whole was not up to its task, he still gave the party a position of prominence. He seems to have decided to exploit Hitler's loyalty to his party comrades, on which his earlier proposals had foundered, for his own purposes.

Goebbels also warned Hitler against expecting too much from a committee. The work of the Dreier Ausschuss had been a tragedy, since each decision was discussed until only a shadow of the original remained. The man Hitler appointed should be instructed to draw up a plan to follow, a meeting of all concerned would be held and then each man proceed with his task. Such an appointment, Goebbels suggested, would make 50 new divisions available in three to four months time and would also give Speer additional workers to increase armaments production.

Goebbels concluded by assuring Hitler that he was not motivated by personal ambition but by concern for the fatherland.

49. ibid., pp. 300-1.


51. Goebbels to Hitler, 18 July 1944, BA NL 118/107, pp. 5-6, 8-9, 10, 12, 14.
and he pointed out that he had always been a loyal and unswerving supporter of Hitler. He warned that too often the enemy had forced the Germans to take the necessary steps. A decision taken too late had no practical effect as the example of the winter 1941 wool collection showed.\textsuperscript{52} Goebbels' letter is distinguished by its repetitions of total loyalty, including a statement that he and his family would not wish to live in a world that was not national socialist. 'You know, that my life belongs to you.'\textsuperscript{53}

Goebbels' letter was less specific than Speer's in identifying areas of potential surplus staff; its promises of manpower for the front were less extravagant. Fifty new divisions, using Speer's average of 11,000 men a division was a promise of 550,000 extra men, or if the wartime staffing of 17,000 was adopted, 850,000 extra men; Speer's figures for the classes 1910 to 1926 promised an additional 4.3 million men, or some 390 peacetime, or 246 wartime additional divisions, to the front. Neither man considered the situation yet desperate enough to suggest the introduction of female military service. It probably did not occur to them as an alternative.

Both Speer and Goebbels criticized the measures taken by the Ausschuss as insufficient. However a paper prepared by the Reich Chancellery claimed that the January 1943 Meldepflicht (reporting of men and women for labour duty) had resulted in the workforce increasing by 1,126,000 and a further 150,000 workers were made free by closing down industry. 400,000 more workers were transferred to more important areas of the economy by 'combing out' actions. The paper was not able to give any figures about the numbers freed by individual supreme Reich authorities (ORBs). This

\textsuperscript{52} ibid., p. 34.

\textsuperscript{53} ibid., p. 39.
suggests that the Ausschuss did not or could not exercise oversight of these measures, and thus provides some vindication of Goebbels' criticisms of early 1943. The paper noted that Hitler himself had had a personal influence on the choice of measures.\textsuperscript{54} So Speer and Goebbels' criticisms of the Ausschuss were also in effect criticisms of Hitler's lack of radicalism.

Goebbels' proposals, unavailable to researchers at the time of Carroll's study, are sufficiently detailed to disprove her contention that he simply shrieked for sacrifices.\textsuperscript{55} Both papers sought the appointment of a man equipped with total powers; Goebbels' paper differed from Speer's in setting his proposals against a wider political context. Goebbels' tone was more fulsome and less matter of fact than Speer's; this reflected partly the nature of their different style in approaching Hitler and also perhaps the fact that Goebbels' had already been rebuffed making similar proposals before. Goebbels' phrases echo many of Speer's, although there is no other evidence that the moves were co-ordinated. Like Speer, Goebbels claimed that such measures had to be adopted at once in order to obtain results in three to four months time. Both men referred to the likelihood of the war being lost if their measures were not adopted. Both men sought to reassure Hitler that there would be popular support for such moves. Goebbels criticized the competition and duplication of German administration, listing the Ostministerium, the Wehrmacht offices, and the Foreign Office's propaganda offices as examples. He also sought to reassure Hitler that simplification was possible by pointing to the way in which they had managed without many of these offices after air raids. Goebbels' letter did not specify where staff might be saved, and

\textsuperscript{54} Untitled undated notice, attached to Lammers to Dietrich, 26 July 1944, 'Erlaß des Führers über den totalen Kriegseinsatz.', BA R 43 II/664a, pp. 1-5.

\textsuperscript{55} Carroll, \textit{Design for Total War}, p. 242.
may have thereby been more politically adroit in not raising Hitler's expectations unrealistically or creating new enemies for the programme from the beginning. Like Speer, he claimed that the reserves of the home front were not exhausted. Both men lacked understanding of some of the economic and social factors influencing the kind of mobilization they proposed. They underestimated the political and social difficulties of finding and using what reserves remained. They both assumed that further radical cuts could be made in civilian production and consumption, and showed little awareness of the limits on such measures as set out in Chapter One. Both papers suggested unrealistic levels of men and women who could be won to the armed forces and armaments.  

Goebbels' memorandum was a further attempt to create a coordinating body which could act to control and guide the government. It differed from his previous attempts along similar lines in that it proposed one person rather than a committee or council. Longerich accordingly sees it as an attempt to take over internal political leadership and to raise the question of resolving the succession. He sees Goebbels' powers, and his later work methods as plenipotentiary for total war as 'the long desired realization of pure National Socialist rule'. Goebbels' suggestion of the appointment of a plenipotentiary came after he had already long sought unsuccessfully to establish other forms of co-ordination; Longerich's judgment therefore seems harsh.

56. Others also shared this view. Schmelter claimed in May 1944 that a further 1.8 million men could be led to the armed forces: Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 274.
58. ibid., p. 304.
59. ibid., p. 303.
Speer's proposals for total war were not part of a comprehensive plan to maximize the regime's chances of emerging from the war intact as Goebbels' were. Goebbels' ideas must be linked to his foreign policy initiatives of 1944 and involved exploration of peace feelers, and his hopes of splitting the enemy alliance, as well as relying on the party to implement armed forces' reform. Speer's proposals centred far more around his own ministry. His measures would allow Hitler to maintain the fronts until the (unspecified) new weapons, largely developed within his area of responsibility, could be brought into action and decide the war.

Goebbels was able to display his loyalty dramatically when he took the leading role in the suppression in Berlin of the conspiracy against Hitler on 20 July. Two points are worth noting: the role Goebbels played in quashing the revolt, including the coolness and decisiveness he showed compared to Bormann and Himmler, and the presence among the conspirators of men to whom both Goebbels and Speer had had links. Speer subsequently exaggerated the extent to which suspicion was cast on him by the Plot, but he was justified in pointing to his links with some of the army conspirators and their shared criticisms of the conduct of the war. Goebbels too discovered that his friends, Berlin Police President von Helldorf and Rommel, were among the conspirators. Criticism of the current state of affairs among the leadership was widespread and the critics divided by whether they were willing to consider the replacement of Hitler or not.


After the defeat of the Putsch Goebbels travelled to Hitler's headquarters, where he seized the opportunity to urge total war policies on Hitler. He told his staff after meeting Hitler that he saw two possibilities - either peace negotiations, which he judged unlikely to be successful at that time or an effort to regain the military and political initiative. His persistence in repeatedly putting his views on total war to Hitler had finally succeeded. Goebbels had guaranteed Hitler that he would raise an army of one million men within three months, a pledge his staff thought over-optimistic. At the same time he was aware that his appointment would be a great and thankless task. He claimed that, had he gained his new powers when he first sought them, the war would probably be over, 'but it takes a bomb under his arse to make Hitler see reason.' It is not clear why Hitler decided to give the position to Goebbels rather than another senior member of the leadership. Goebbels' persistence in advocating 'total war' may have made him seem the suitable choice to Hitler. If Hitler still believed that 'total war' needed to be sold to a reluctant population, and needed to embody elements of ideological mobilization as well as economic reorganization, then Goebbels again would have been the logical choice. In addition, Goebbels had proved his loyalty during the assassination attempt. Timing may have been a factor - Hitler received Goebbels' memorandum at a time when he was in the mood for radical policies.

62. See his comments on how to persuade Hitler of a point of view: entry for 23 January 1943, BA NL 118/50, p. 31.


64. Entry for 23 July 1944, Semmler, Goebbels, p. 147.

A meeting was then held at which, taking their cue from Hitler, the various leaders agreed on the need for total war measures and the need for Goebbels to take charge of them. The meeting was prompted by Speer's submission to Hitler (presumably that of 12 July), which Berger described as having only a general orienting significance. (At the end of the meeting Goebbels advised Berger that the implementation of Hitler's order of 27 November 1943 - directing that fewer troops be kept behind the lines - would produce at least 500,000 additional soldiers, and Berger responded that Himmler would have the greatest understanding for all measures, including the most severe.)

Hitler was said to want a short discussion of the questions touched on by Speer, but not a debate going into details. Giving an overview of what had already been achieved, Lammers commented that the Ausschuss had done overall what was possible with the means available. Lammers proposed Goebbels to comb out the civilian sector and Himmler the military sector. Goebbels himself saw Himmler's role as involving a rigorous combing out of the home front and étappe with the help of the Head of OKW. Speer called for radical measures to be taken.

Goebbels stressed the importance of the psychological and symbolic effects of the adoption of total war. The reform of public life would in part only have an optical or symbolic character, but the effect of this should not be underestimated, probably because of its effect on public opinion. He claimed that the administration did not

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69. ibid., pp. 3-4.
contain notable reserves of labour. It had to reduce tasks rather than men. The party's task was to secure the carrying out of measures by the middle and lower authorities, while Lammers' was to codify all necessary legal regulations and bring them in a legally impeccable form. Bormann agreed that the powers granted by Hitler had to be clear and unmistakeable, and the whole action carried through with elan and tempo. Goebbels and Lammers adroitly steered the discussion away from examination of details. Goebbels stressed the need for the party to become involved along the lines of his letter to Hitler. Longerich sees the measures discussed at this meeting as a reduced programme because it involved Speer and Himmler in implementation as well and not Goebbels alone: Goebbels does not seem to have seen it as such.

Hitler's decree of 25 July ordered Göring as chairman of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defence to adapt public life to the requirements of total war leadership. The decree claimed that Göring suggested the appointment of a Reichsbevollmächtigter für den totalen Kriegseinsatz, a plenipotentiary for the total war effort, whose task it was to ensure that all public gatherings were suitable to the goal of total war and did not draw workers from the armed forces or armaments, to inspect the entire state organization and all public establishments, institutions and firms with the goal of a complete rational use of workers and material, by restricting less important tasks, simplifying organizations and conveying workers to the army. He could require information from ORBs and give orders, in agreement with Lammers, Bormann and the plenipotentiary for

72. ibid., p. 5.
administration. An additional decree of the same date appointed Goebbels to the position. Bormann was to use the party to support the measures. The decree extended to the occupied territories. When the matter was discussed with Hitler, it was decided that the Wehrmacht would be excluded from the scope of the decree, but Hitler refused a Foreign Office request for exclusion. Hitler agreed with Lammers that the Reich, Presidential and Party Chancelleries did not have to report to Goebbels. Offices directly placed under Hitler were not mentioned in the decree. Special handling of these offices had to be accepted to enable Lammers to meet legal requirements. Lammers assured Goebbels that this was no obstacle for fulfilling his task. The protection of Hitler’s building projects from cuts appears thereby to have continued.

Bormann had been deputized by Hitler to take all the necessary steps to implement total war in the party, by closing down offices and


75. Lammers Schnellbrief to ORBs, 26 July 1944, ‘Erlaß des Führers über den totalen Kriegseinsatz.’, BA R 43 II/664a, p. 1.


78. The general building inspector for the Reich capital (Generalbauinspektor für die Reichshauptstadt), the general building inspector for the capital of the movement (Generalinspektor für die Hauptstadt der Bewegung), the head of the building control office for Linz (Reichsbaurat für die Stadt Linz a.d. Donau) and Hitler’s general inspector for motoring (Generalinspektor des Führers für das Kraftfahrwesen).

79. Lammers to Goebbels, 26 July 1944, ‘Erlaß des Führers über den totalen Kriegseinsatz.’, BA R 43 II/664a, p. 2. Goebbels had earlier attempted unsuccessfully to have these offices included in the decree: Goebbels Fernschreiben to Lammers, 24 July 1944, ibid.
freeing workers. Bormann's interpretation was that the party had to be kept as small as possible, but its important political tasks must not be restricted. A large number of party papers were closed, all research and planning work was stopped in the party, and considerable staff were saved in the DAF.

The disloyalty of sections of the armed forces hastened and intensified the extension of their control by the party and led the regime to adopt forms of paramilitary mass mobilization. 'Perhaps for the first time in the history of the NSDAP' in a speech to the Gauleiters Himmler blamed Germany's World War I defeat on the incompetence of the officer corps and general staff. Himmler became commander of the Ersatzheer, which he believed to have been overstaffed and intended to cut back. He raised a further 500,000 troops for the front, and founded 15 new divisions, the Volksgrenadier divisions, which were closer to a militia than normal army divisions. This appointment gave him additional involvement in armaments in his capacity as chief of army armaments (Chef H.

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82. The numbers saved were not stated: sixth in a series of undated press communiqués, BA R 43 II/666b, pp. 1-3; Ley, 4 September 1944, 'Aufgaben des Hauptpersonalamtes und der nachgeordneten Dienststellen im totalen Kriegseinsatz.', IfZ APK, 117 07937-8.
86. ibid., pp. 72-3.
It was followed by his appointment on 2 August to oversee simplification in the armed forces and on 22 September by the setting up of the Volkssturm, a 'Home Guard' of men aged from 16 to 60, of which Himmler was the military commander and Bormann the political and organizational leader. Speer promised the Volkssturm all the weapons needed. Bormann was closely involved in all details of its establishment. Bormann saw the Volkssturm as a purely party matter. The Volkssturm was financed by the party and its territorial organization corresponded to the Gaus, having no relation to German military districts. The Volkssturm was an expression of the hope that popular enthusiasm and revolutionary leadership by the party could overcome the deficiencies of material and the failings of the professional army. It was to be a symbol of national unity across classes and professions and of the participation of the whole


89. Entry for 18 October 1944, von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 500.

90. See the numerous teletypes to and from Bormann on this subject on BA NS 6/313 and NS 6/763.


nation in the war. Bormann saw the role given to the Gauleiters in organizing the Volkssturm, and building fortifications, as a sign of Hitler's 'boundless trust' in them.

Himmler does not seem to have responded to a suggestion from Berger that the establishment of the Volkssturm marked the right time for Germany to make contact with the USSR but that Ribbentrop was the wrong man to do so. Berger implied that Himmler was the man to pursue this policy, stating that only Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels retained credibility with the public.

Some observers suggested that these appointments created a triumvirate of Bormann, Goebbels and Himmler. Bormann's position strengthened with the combination of Hitler's failing health, Hitler's concentration on the military situation and Lammers' inability to see Hitler since September 1944. Despite Bormann's increased role the Party continued to be a weak reed, with Propaganda Ministry officials suggesting that it had to make a stronger appearance in internal life. Some 80 per cent of the seven to eight million party members were judged to be 'driftwood', counting on the loss of the war.

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94. Bormann, 23 August 1944, 'Geheim', 'Anordnung 190/44g.', 'Einsatz der NSDAP zur Durchführung unmittelbarer Reichsverteidigungsaufgaben und sonstiger Großeinsätze.', BA NS 6/351, p. 2. On the local effects of this see Klein, Köln, p. 270.


97. 'Tagebuchauszug Werner Beumelburg vom 30.7.1944 in Neu-Fahrland bei Potsdam.', note of meeting with Kreipe, BA MA RL21/21, p. 2.


99. Kuhn to Wächter, Head of the Propaganda Staff, Propaganda Ministry, 24 October 1944, 'Vertraulich!', 'Vorschlag zur Aktivierung der Partei im Endkampf.', BA R 55/621.
Hitler also ordered a strengthening of National Socialist leadership on the front, in the face of great difficulties for the NSFOs. The involvement of the party in military issues increased with the organization of the frontier Gaus for building fortifications. The question of responsibility in an operational area had already been addressed; the military supreme commander was given the right to give orders necessary for battle tasks to the Reich defence commissioner for the operational area and to the civilian offices. A civilian Reich defence commissioner would be appointed for the operational area with executive power. Party offices were instructed to continue their activity in operational zones.

The development of the NSFOs and the Volkssturm strengthened the emergence of another aspect of the concept of total war: the idea of the 'nation in arms', substituting revolutionary loyalty and fervour for professional military expertise. This development was supported and led by Himmler and Bormann, with Goebbels playing the role of a herald of the Volkssturm. This highlights that Goebbels' view of total war had elements both of the economic rational model and the ideological model.

On 2 August Hitler deputized Himmler to inspect the organization and administration of the armed forces and the Waffen-SS, OT and the police and to simplify them with the aim of saving

100. Unsigned, 10 October 1944, 'Vorlage an Herrn Reichsleiter Bormann', 'Führerbefehl für die Verstärkung der nationalsozialistischen Führung in der Wehrmacht.' BA NS 6/140; Orlow, Nazi Party, II, p. 465.

101. Bormann, 6 October 1944, 'Geheime Reichssache', 'Rundschreiben 302/44 g. Rs. ' Stellungsbau.', BA NS 6/352, pp. 1-2; Bormann, 19 November 1944, 'Geheim!', 'Anordnung 405/44g.', 'Kräfteeinsatz im Stellungsbau während der Wintermonate.', BA NS 6/352.


manpower. Himmler was authorized to shut offices and transfer staff in agreement with the heads of the armed services. Hitler wanted the greatest concentration of men in the army by means of fundamental reforms and radical measures. Himmler believed that it was possible to bring more men to the front and ordered Pohl to begin work immediately. Reviewing progress on armed forces' simplification to date, Pohl considered that von Unruh's failure was 'obvious' but Ziegler's commissions had achieved much. He estimated that some 70-75,000 men would be freed if all their recommendations were strictly implemented.

In October Himmler also took over Ziegler's responsibility for the simplification of Wehrmacht administration. Himmler welcomed this transfer of responsibility and was pleased by the savings achieved so far. He instructed Pohl not to make the slightest concessions to the OKW and to proceed without any further inhibitions since the population expected results from the SS. Most of the commissions were dissolved. Pohl suggested to Himmler the current military situation made the upheaval of creating a central office for all armed forces administration unjustifiable. Pohl's office

106. Himmler order, 5 August 1944, and Himmler to Pohl, 19 August 1944, 'Persönlich', BA NS 19/3191.
108. Pohl to Himmler, 3 October 1944, ibid., pp. 4-5.
investigated the other proposals. Berger also wanted Himmler to take over responsibility for reinforcements (Ersatzwesen) and make them over to Berger.

An indication of Himmler's general attitude at this time came when he welcomed a proposal from Frank that the General Government's civilian administration be wound up, both as a symbol of total war and because only one fifth of the General Government's area was now held by the Germans. Himmler noted that Hitler might want to keep a skeleton organization in place, as he had done with the Ostministerium, to avoid giving the impression of a political renunciation of the territories.

Hitler's decision to grant such powers to lesser leaders and to appoint Goebbels as plenipotentiary, whether at Goebbels' or Speer's suggestion, seems to have been prompted by his escape from death. This as much as the invasion persuaded him that radical action on total war was necessary. The appointment may also served to 'reward' Goebbels for his loyalty during the plot. The party leadership reacted to the plot with an increase in radicalism and a closing of ranks. Like the Italian treachery of 1943, it provided an explanation for all the regime's setbacks and was met by severe repression.

112. Berger to Himmler, 1 August 1944, 'Geheim!', 'Befehl des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht.', BA NS 19/2409, p. 1.
113. Himmler's attitude is reported by Klopfer, Fernschreiben to Bormann, 2 September 1944, 'Generalgouverneur Dr. Frank (Aufrechterhaltung des Generalgouvernements.)', BA NS 6/166, p. 3.
115. See for example Bormann to Gauleiter Eggeling, Halle/Saale, 8 September 1944, 'Persönlich!', 'Stimmung der Bevölkerung', BA NS 6/153, p. 2.
directed not only against the plotters and their families, but also against any pre-National Socialist political figures capable of forming a successor government. The threat to their leader united the Party as it momentarily united the nation.\textsuperscript{116} While popular mood was still described as depressed or resigned, national shock at the assassination attempt made the population receptive to the introduction of drastic measures.\textsuperscript{117} Reports suggested that the mood among the working class was optimistic, and more receptive of radical policies to continue the war effort, than in other circles.\textsuperscript{118}

The attack worsened Hitler's already deteriorating health.\textsuperscript{119} This and the military setbacks caused his authority and command of events to weaken.\textsuperscript{120} Hitler had responded to the threat on his life by finally granting Goebbels the powers to implement total war which he had been seeking for at least a year and a half, but he gained these additional powers at a time when more power was also given to Himmler and Bormann. Hitler had effectively divided some of his powers among them. All three men could be seen as advocates of a more radical approach to the conduct of the war. Goebbels still did not

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\textsuperscript{117} RPÄ reports, Tätigkeitsberichte', 24 July 1944, pp. 1, 10; 25 July 1944, p. 10; and 7 August 1944, p. 1; and other reports in BA R 55/601. See also Steinert, \textit{Hitler's War}, pp. 264-72; Baird, \textit{Nazi War Propaganda}, pp. 232-3.
\textsuperscript{119} Entry for 10 November 1944, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, p. 510.
\textsuperscript{120} Goebbels told his former adjutant in 1945 that he should be glad he had not seen Hitler again because 'the Hitler, in whom you once believed, has not existed for a long time': testimony of Prince Friedrich Christian zu Schaumburg-Lippe, in Kempner, \textit{Dritte Reich im Kreuzzehr}, p. 160; Jordan, \textit{Erlebt und Erlitten}, pp. 253-4, 256; Orlow, \textit{Nazi Party}, II, p. 477.
\end{flushright}
have an unrestricted right to make the necessary changes. How he used his powers and the resistance he met will be studied in Chapter Nine.
Goebbels had been granted extensive powers by Hitler to adapt German life to the requirements of total war, powers he continued to exercise until the end of the war. As plenipotentiary for total war he undertook extensive simplifications of life on the home front. He increasingly made inroads on UK staff and as a result this period was marked by growing tension between his attempts to meet the armed forces' manpower needs and Speer's claims for manpower for production. Both goals were necessary for continuation of the war; neither could be met effectively; and the resulting disputes illustrated the over-optimism of the claims the two men had made to Hitler in July 1944 concerning the additional staff they could raise.

Goebbels moved quickly to establish his authority and had set up planning and executive committees by 30 July. The planning committee (Planungsausschuss) was to undertake overall planning of measures to be taken, to provide ideas for individual acts to 'totalize' public life, and to inspect all suggestions coming from the population for their practicality. Led by Naumann, the state secretary of the Propaganda Ministry, it would prepare proposals, note objections and document the expected saving of workers. The executive committee (Exekutivausschuss), led by Gauleiter Wegener, had the task of carrying out those suggestions of the planning committee with which Goebbels agreed in connection with the responsible offices. The committees would have advisory members from the offices of Lammers, Bormann, Himmler both as RFSS and
Generalbevollmächtigter für die Reichsverwaltung, Speer, Funk, Sauckel, DAF, and von Unruh. Faust, a regional council chairman (Regierungspräsident), was the General Secretary of the two committees, responsible for general coordination of business, including reports to Hitler, weekly presentation of estimated and actual results, and informing the public. The committees worked quickly and unbureaucratically.

Goebbels' plan was that the department heads and Gauleiters would themselves implement all measures so that he would only intervene directly if particular difficulties had to be overcome. The executive committee would send deputies into Gaus to help carry out measures. Only twenty people would be employed by these two committees. Any substantial measures would be placed before Hitler in a submission via Bormann.

**Structure of the office of the plenipotentiary for total war**

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Minister

    Generalsekretär

    Planungsausschuß   Exekutivausschuß
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3. Attachment to Naumann to Killy, BA R 43 II/666b, pp. 2-3.
4. Ibid., p. 1.
Goebbels introduced the following immediate measures: a ban on sham work (Scheinarbeit), with employees and employers subject to punishment after 15 August; a decree by Sauckel raising the upper age limit for obligatory labour duty for women from 45 to 50 years; reduction of the postal service to one service a day and none on Sundays; simplification of railway control measures and replacement of men by women where possible; closing university and specialist schools; simplifying questionnaires, card systems, the tax system and the legal system. On 23 August Hitler agreed to the extension of the upper age limit for women's labour duty to 55. Goebbels continued calls for the leadership to ensure that its own style of life, that of their relatives and public life in general was brought into line with total war. Some measures were taken to improve the 'optics' of war, to remove suspicion that the leadership was not serious about total war, such as a ban on accepting hunting invitations, but they were undercut by other measures which attracted public criticism such as the introduction of a new uniform for political leaders. Although there was public support for the measures taken, the morale of the populace continued to decline.

7. Goebbels undated circular to all ORBs, 'Lebensstil im totalen Krieg.', BA R 43 II/665, pp. 1-3; see also Bormann, 'Anordnung 159/44.', 28 July 1944, 'Kameradschaftliche Veranstaltungen.', and Bormann, 'Anordnung 167/44', 1 August 1944, 'Verhalten der Parteiführerschaft.', BA NS 6/347, p. 2.
Goebbels aimed to mobilize public enthusiasm for the campaign by use of a special field post box, 'Feldpost-Nr. 08 000 Totaler Krieg', for suggestions. Both the Armaments Ministry and the Propaganda Ministry already had similar schemes, which served partly to give the public the feeling that their views were influencing the government. A 1944 analysis of the more than 50,000 suggestions received concerning total war to that date claimed that they were of a 'unanimous radicalism'. In apparent vindication of Goebbels' analysis of public opinion, the main correspondents were soldiers, workers and the middle classes while officers, professionals and the nobility barely participated.11 Letters of complaint comprised 17 per cent but the overwhelming number of letters showed an honourable concern about the future, the Ministry reported. The number of contributions decreased after a high point in August 1944. By 24 January 1945 Propaganda Ministry staff could note that they had received 109,832 suggestions. They considered the system to give them an insight into previously inaccessible institutions, and presumably also thereby a means of finding new areas where labour could be saved.12 The contributors wanted still further simplifications, reduction of luxuries and increased employment of women. The main suggestions contained in these letters were the setting up of a commissar style system and other increased party influence in the armed forces, and a similar setting up of a system of economic commissars or plenipotentiaries to oversee total war in the economy.13

11. Unsigned, undated submission to the head of the propaganda section, 'Wochenübersicht über Zuschriften zum totalen Kriegseinsatz.', BA R 55/623, pp. 1-3.

12. Bade to the head of the propaganda section with attachments, 24 January 1945, BA R 55/1394, pp. 1-3.

13. Undated 'Entwurf.', containing a list of suggestions from Feldpost Nr. 08000, ibid.
Hitler ordered the creation of new divisions which were filled by the personnel raised by total war measures. This meant that they could only meet one-third of the losses of existing divisions. The pressure for these increased numbers came from Hitler but Goebbels and Speer's memoranda of July 1944 may have encouraged him to believe the numbers could be obtained. Goebbels saw his task as transferring recently trained, and still \textit{uk}, \textit{kv} men to front service and replacing these workers in the armaments industry. His measures increased the involvement of the Gauleiters in the armaments economy. In contrast to Speer's calculations in his July 1944 memorandum to Hitler Goebbels appears to have found that the only additional sources of men were those in \textit{uk} positions. The Wehrmacht demanded for the months of August and September each 150,000 trained \textit{uk} soldiers, for September 100,000 untrained soldiers and for October to December each 200,000 untrained soldiers. In contrast to the demand for around a million soldiers there was a reserve of only some 1.5 million \textit{uk} positions; the Wehrmacht's requirements could only be met if the numbers of \textit{uk} men could be reduced by 66 percent. In a submission to Hitler in early August 1944, Goebbels envisaged a decree forbidding any \textit{uk} positions for the classes of 1914 and later outside the armaments industry. Only the personal approval of the Gauleiter would allow such positions to continue. The overwhelming numbers of \textit{kv} men still available were in the armaments sector and agreement would have to be reached with Speer to exchange them. Speer had ordered that all \textit{uk} men from the class of 1918 and later were to be given up to the Wehrmacht, thereby freeing some 47,000 men. Speer was also prepared to give up


all kv men from the classes of 1910 and later from firms in industries less important to the war, such as the textile industry. Replacements would come from the ministries and areas which had agreed to give up the following numbers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry/Area</th>
<th>Staff Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural life</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF troop care</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign domestic servants</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers were not guaranteed, Goebbels advised Hitler, but gave an approximate picture of how extensively workers would be freed.16

Workers would be given up according to a scale of priorities; first of all those who could be spared without great sacrifices from the public, such as closing lotteries, statistical offices, simplification of questionnaires. In a second category more serious cuts had to be made - culture, films and theatres. A final category would encompass those firms and organizations which had to exist as long as possible for economic or psychological reasons and would only be restricted or stopped in extreme emergency, such as closing breweries, stopping cake baking and transport restrictions.17 Goebbels and Sauckel had

16. ibid., pp. 2-5.
agreed that the labour offices were to be placed more strongly than ever under party influence so the 'improvizational art of the national socialist movement' could be used.\textsuperscript{18}

The submission then proceeded to give Hitler an overview of the sources of an additional 850,000 workers, by extensive restriction of educational courses so that only disciplines important to the war continued, restriction of various law courts and closure of up to 75 per cent of the Reichskulturkammer.\textsuperscript{19} Goebbels proposed extensive restrictions to the film industry and publishing, including the simplification of tickets, restriction of staff in cinemas, restriction of film studios, closing down all but one daily paper in all cities except Munich and Berlin and restricting armed forces and specialist publications. Out-work (\textit{Heimarbeiter}) would be energetically encouraged.\textsuperscript{20} An estimated 5,000 staff were saved from the film industry.\textsuperscript{21}

In a further submission Goebbels noted that the cultural sector had previously been completely exempted from call up measures, a principle which would have to be abandoned. He wanted to prevent complaints that his area was not making the best use of its staff, he told Hitler. He therefore planned to make 140,000 artists free, closing theatres, orchestras, art training schools and art exhibitions for six months. The most gifted artists were still to be exempted, and all others were to be employed in such a way that their future ability to carry on their profession would not be harmed. Publication of literature was to be restricted to standard ideological works, school

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{18} ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid., pp. 8-12.
\textsuperscript{20} ibid., pp. 12-20.
\textsuperscript{21} Mammach, \textit{Volkssturm}, p. 18.
\end{flushleft}
books, scientific and technical, and publications relating to armaments. Newspaper publication was to be extensively restricted. The result of the printing restrictions would be to free 14,000 workers and totally make up for the loss of Finnish paper production. (Finland left the war in August 1944.) Haegert estimated that 145,000 staff were freed from the cultural sector. Despite these restrictions, the film director Veit Harlan claimed that Goebbels withdrew 187,000 soldiers and 4,000 sailors from active duty for the film Kolberg in mid-1944. Whether these figures are exaggerated or not, Goebbels was being inconsistent, even if the propaganda importance he attached to the film's message of holding out against the enemy and the parallels it drew between the Volkssturm and the 1813 war of liberation against the French is taken into account. He may have believed that the film would help overcome the growing defeatism and crisis of confidence in the leadership.

22. 'Führerinformation Nr. A I 467 II. August 4 über die totalen Kriegsmassnahmen auf dem Kulturellensektor.', ibid., pp. 1-25. The submission contains further details of the measures to be introduced.


25. ibid., pp. 225-34.

On 11 August a meeting under the chairmanship of Ministerialdirigent Haegert from the Propaganda Ministry discussed the release of postal workers. In keeping with Ohnesorge's previously noted commitment to the war effort, the proposed measures were extensive, freeing mainly unskilled or semi-skilled female workers. The Post Ministry's two stage plan involved the making of 50,000 workers free in stage one, and 75-100,000 workers in stage two. In Haegert's own view the measures envisaged in stage two came close to closing the post. Stage one would involve the stopping of handling printed materials, business matters and samples, restriction of forwarding small parcels, quotas on the forwarding of packets by individual post offices, restriction of registered mail to letters to and from officials, the end to postal deliveries on Sunday and if possible only one delivery a day, restrictions on long distance phone calls apart from for business reasons, and on telegrams with prepaid answer forms. Those attending the meeting pointed out legal difficulties in stopping private registered mail and were concerned that the proposed savings all imposed burdens on the population. Instead they suggested ending the issue of separate stamps and postmarks. 

Bormann advised Goebbels that Hitler's response had been to ask if in each case the effect really justified the dislocation. Hitler objected to the harshness of many of the proposals and believed that care had to be taken lest the measures weaken morale. He therefore wondered whether the ban on sending of small parcels was necessary, and also had some objections to the plan to stop private telegrams for distances under 150 kilometres. In some circumstances this might mean that family members could not be advised of a

death. Simultaneously Bormann told Ohnesorge that Hitler wanted the halving of parcel mail not to be implemented too rigorously. He also pointed out to Goebbels and Ohnesorge that they had proceeded without seeking the permission of all the necessary officials.

Goebbels proposed to meet Hitler's objections by allowing small parcels up to 1000 grams and making the proposed quotas on the parcel post milder. The post office would proceed with understanding vis-à-vis catastrophes. Private telegrams would continue in local areas in case of death or accidents. Soldiers would also be allowed to continue to receive their home town papers, a proposal Goebbels had previously opposed.

Goebbels appointed Dr. Hayler, the State Secretary of the Economics Ministry, to prepare suggestions and make the necessary investigations to simplify the economic administration. This task was similar to that with which Speer and Funk had entrusted Rafelsberger in 1943. Since 11 August there was a general ban on leave and business and the administration were working a minimum 60 hour working week. Rationing was simplified and measures were

29. Bormann, Fernschreiben to Ohnesorge, 14 August 1944, 'Durch Boten! Sofort zustellen!', ibid., p. 2; Ohnesorge, 12 August 1944, 'Deutsche Reichspost und totaler Kriegseinsatz.', Amtsblatt Nr. 258, August 1944, IfZ APK, 114 0007-11.
32. 'Führerinformation Nr. A 1 467 11. August 4...', ibid., p. 22.
taken to allow late shopping and business opening hours. Local offices and administrative organizations were further simplified. Some offices suffered considerable reduction. In October Goebbels ordered an end to all planning activities concerned with developments after 1 October 1945. He continued to introduce further economies in his own Ministry and sought to reduce positions in areas under his control.

Various undated press releases indicated additional measures which Goebbels took after 17 August and before 19 September. One announced the immediate dissolution of the Prussian Finance
Ministry, some eighteen months after this was first suggested. (Bormann had obviously not been successful in overcoming Hitler's opposition to the measure in June 1943.)\textsuperscript{40} It also listed the restriction of educational facilities and publications to those directly necessary for the war effort, and reported that by replacements and use of female workers the German Red Cross had been able to free tens of thousands of workers.\textsuperscript{41} Another press communiqué announced the simplification of taxes and foreshadowed further restrictions on commercial life. German commerce had employed some 3.4 million men at the beginning of the war; these numbers had been reduced by 45 per cent and would be reduced further. Even those firms whose production was judged necessary for the war would be inspected. Firms occupied with fashion accessories, toys, flowers, zoological articles, perfume, confectionery, jewels, furs etc were to be closed completely.\textsuperscript{42} The employment of domestic servants was inspected again and they were only allowed to remain

\textsuperscript{40} 'Niederschrift über die Besprechung des Ausschusses vom 24. Juni 1943, 11 Uhr', BA R 43 II/654a, pp. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{41} Second 'Pressekommuniqué.' (undated), BA R 43 II/666b, pp. 1-10. Additionally in September army convalescent homes were converted to the exclusive use of the wounded: Dr. Handlosch(?), head of the Wehrmacht medical services, OKW to OKH, 19 September 1944, 'Verteilung von Bettenraum für Lazarettenzwecke.', and earlier papers on the same subject on BA R 55/619.

\textsuperscript{42} Third undated 'Pressekommuniqué.', BA R 43 II/666b, pp. 1-13. Further measures are listed in two more 'Pressekommuniqués'. Pay simplifications introduced are set out in Schnellbrief Stuckart to Finance Ministry, 25 August 1944, BA R 43 II/666a. Staff unsuited to armaments work were to be employed in trade (Handwerk), the building industry and firms meeting the needs of the bombed out: undated seventh 'Pressekommuniqué', ibid., p. 2.
in households where there were three children under the age of 14. Sauckel agreed to release 200,000 Ukrainian women, partly employed as servants and partly working in canteens, for armaments.

On 10 December 1944 Hitler signed a decree giving Goebbels responsibility for inspecting and combing out the entire armed forces. This appointment again reflected the belief of both Hitler and Goebbels that the armed forces kept too many men behind the lines. Goebbels hoped by this means to bring a further one million men to the front. In theory Goebbels believed that eight million men could be freed but he recognized that he did not have the time to achieve such a reorganization. He believed that the ideal ratio should be 90 per cent fighting and 10 per cent behind the lines, a ratio which he believed applied in the Soviet armed forces. The appointment suggests that Hitler had decided that Himmler had been ineffective in his combing out. Goebbels now had powers to rationalize and simplify over both civilian and military sectors.

There proved to be limits to the extent of the willingness of various leaders, including Speer, to cooperate with Goebbels. Some of Himmler's advisors wanted the SS to take over Goebbels' recently acquired powers. The wartime Chief of the SS Main Office, Berger, suggested to Naumann in August that there were no more labour


44. Speech by Speer to meeting of chairmen of armaments commissions, 10 August 1944, BA R 3/1554, pp. 6-7.

reserves in Germany, except for women still to be employed. The need for soldiers and military equipment had to be met through an increase in efficiency per hour and head. Rather than maintain the existing system of rings, armaments inspectors and various other layers of responsibility, a new productivity organization of firms had to be set up, whose task would be to inspect all work processes exactly from planning to dispatch, and to judge the productive capacity of firms. This could only be carried out by technicians. Payments linked to productivity should be introduced. Berger proposed the establishment of a Wehrmeldeamt comprising all previous participating organizations; its central office would be led by Himmler or a representative, and would liaise closely with Goebbels. Naumann's response is unrecorded but Goebbels can be expected to have opposed the proposals. Nothing further appears to have come of them. Separately, Ohlendorf unsuccessfully approached Speer with a proposal to create a super ministry, including armaments, food, agriculture, the economy, labour and armaments, with Speer as minister and Ohlendorf as secretary-general. These moves suggest SS hostility to the extent of Goebbels' new powers.

Notifying party leaders of Goebbels' appointment, Bormann told them that the seriousness of the situation required quick and judicious treatment. He formed a Sonderstab für den totalen Kriegseinsatz. Goebbels planned a decree to involve the Gauleiters more specifically in his work. Bormann agreed with Goebbels' attempt


47. Speer, Slave State, pp. 72-3.


49. Mammach, Volkssturm, p. 23.
to use the Gauleiters' initiative, but wondered if his proposed circular would serve this purpose. The decree would grant them lesser rights than they already possessed as Reich defence commissioners. An alteration of the ministerial council decree (Ministerratsverordnung) was all that was necessary to expand their authority to railways, post and finance administration. It was also necessary for Gauleiters to intervene more strongly into the inspection of the numbers of uk positions, especially in armaments. A suitable means here was the appointment of Gau and Kreis commissions.50

Gau and Kreis commissions were to be formed with the right to inspect all firms, including armaments and army firms, and to make recommendations for more purposeful employment. Speer agreed with the view that their tasks were to deal with 'optical' cases of abuse of uk positions and to make new workers available to armaments.51 In August Goebbels was empowered to give directives to the Reich defence commissioners who had a comprehensive right to obtain information and issue directives vis-à-vis all middle and lower offices, and who were to take all measures necessary to carry out ORB guidelines.52 Gauleiters had responsibility for matters which impinged on other Gaus.53 Bormann opposed attempts by ORBs to supervise measures in detail, since this restricted the flexibility of middle level officials, firms and Gauleiters. He was aware that he and

50. Bormann Fernschreiben to Goebbels, 8 August 1944, 'Blitz - Fernschreiben! Eilt sehr! Sofort auf den Tisch!', 'Einschaltung der Gauleiter bei der Durchführung des totalen Kriegseinsatzes'; submission to Lammers, 8 August 1944, 'Stellung des Reichsbevollmächtigten für den totalen Kriegseinsatz.', BA R 43 II/666a, pp. 4-5.

51. Speer to Bormann, 5 September 1944, enclosing Hanke to all Kreisleiters, 30 August 1944, BA R 3/1615, pp. 1-6.


Goebbels had agreed to prevent all irregular and hasty measures of individual Gaus. For this reason their decree asked Gauleiters to act within ORB guidelines which had to be broad and allow for independent decisions. Bormann also opposed Speer's proposals that Gauleiters become the chairmen of armaments commissions. This would signify so strong a subordination to the Armaments Ministry that the party's initiative in armaments would be completely crippled. The influence of the party was greatest everywhere it could develop its initiative most fully vis-a-vis the state.

Orlow has suggested that the Achilles heel of Goebbels' proposals was his reliance on the Gauleiters for their implementation, and claims that the new scheme had come to a standstill by September. The only evidence he provides is that Bormann exempted party leaders from being allocated to armaments and that the Party Chancellery did not treat decrees as binding until they had Bormann's counter-signature. In general he claimed that the Gauleiters continued to lack the will to impose hardships on the people. Goebbels had realized the weaknesses of the party and the difficulties of controlling the Gauleiters in 1943; he had given them a role at least in part because his attempts to circumvent them had failed. He recognized that they might pose problems.


57. ibid., p. 470.

58. ibid.
The question of how effective Goebbels' measures were requires the widespread local studies suggested in the Introduction for a conclusive answer. Semler suggested that there was a considerable waste of manpower in the course of Goebbels' simplifications. Some of the staff freed found other administrative positions while not all measures filtered down to the lower levels: Goebbels could not see beyond the numbers of staff released.\(^5^9\) While there clearly was wastage in the process of the closures, the unemployment Hierl complained of\(^6^0\) signified that the measures Goebbels ordered were adopted but there was a delay before the staff freed were absorbed by the armaments industry. The 'time lag' was not evidence of lack of action but of lack of planning and co-ordination of the measures.\(^6^1\) Simplifications and the freeing of staff did continue during and after September,\(^6^2\) and the local histories consulted give no indication that these decrees were being circumvented or that the Gauleiters were reluctant to impose hardships on the people. They depict, rather, a life increasingly oriented towards bare essentials.

In practice Goebbels increasingly served as a source of information to and from the Gauleiters and as a 'court of appeal' for them. They approached him for assistance in solving problems they had with the central administration, sought reassurance and guidance from him as to their actions in the Gaus and as to the regime's

\(^{59}\) Entry for 22 September 1944, Semmler, Goebbels, pp. 151-3.

\(^{60}\) Entry for 10 September 1944, von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 473-4.

\(^{61}\) Similar unemployment arose when inessential activity was stopped in Britain: Summerfield, Women Workers in the Second World War, p. 32.

\(^{62}\) Bisse and Jahoff, Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel to Lammers, 'Durchführung des Führererlasses über den totalen Kriegseinsatz bei der Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel.', IfZ APK, 101 03325-6; see also the measures listed in footnote 35.
future. In December Naumann noted that Goebbels had for some time been having a conference by radio with all Gauleiters, speaking to them about the political and military situation. The manner in which they turned to Goebbels to fill this role reflects his higher profile but also suggests that Bormann chose not to act in this manner, or did not do so adequately. Possibly he was too concerned to secure his position with Hitler and meet Hitler's needs rather than represent the Gauleiters' interests to Hitler.

Like Bormann Speer's initial response to Goebbels' appointment was positive. He reportedly promised Goebbels that he could equip 100 new divisions. He saw the total war action as giving the armaments industry a one off possibility to gain 1.3 million people. They had to take as many people as possible to build a cushion in armaments, presumably against later losses of staff. Indeed he claimed to have urged Goebbels' appointment to Hitler because he believed 'Goebbels was the best man to put across austerity measures on the home front'. Only changes of the most far reaching kind could make this plan successful. He noted that members of his

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63. See for example the Propaganda Ministry investigation of the postal difficulties following a complaint from Gauleiter Hoffmann of South Westphalia: Goebbels Fernschreiben to Hoffmann, 13 January 1945, 'Reform der Post Verteilung', BA R 55/622, pp. 1-3 and other correspondence on this file.

64. Naumann to section heads, 7 December 1944, BA R 55/711. See also 'Gauleiter-Unterredung mit Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels am 2. März 1945, 13.00 Uhr in Berlin (Besprechung mit Leiter Propaganda - Dr. von Borcke)', BA R 55/1394, pp. 1-3; entry for 16 August 1944, von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 460-1; Orlow, Nazi Party, II, p. 468.


ministry were often in a position to see the possibilities of simplification in the economy and army which could not always be seen by other organizations. Speer therefore ordered the leaders of his ministry to make at least one suggestion of organizational change to save workers personally by 10 August. In addition the staffing of the administration of the Ministry, its outside offices, and the administration of firms involved in armaments production after 1 November was to be reduced by 30 per cent. Goebbels in turn undertook that the firms' administrative work would be reduced by the same amount.\(^69\) Goebbels wanted an overall reduction of government administrative work by 30 per cent.\(^70\)

Speer's ministry prepared suggestions in August to win additional workers. Measures proposed included: the transfer of 30 per cent, or 450,000, of workers employed in domestic service to armaments; another combing out action of the civilian sector; the dissolution of the RAD and transfer of its personnel to the Wehrmacht and armaments; employment of all female students (except those studying medicine, chemistry and technical subjects) and the current female matriculation year students in armaments; an intensified drive to ensure evacuated women were employed; introduction of restrictions in public life so that unbombed towns operated under the same restrictions as bombed towns; only one daily postal delivery; immediate employment of men in air defence for armaments; no more tram conductors; combing out and restriction of customs; and other restrictions.\(^71\)

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70. Stuckart Schnellbrief to ORBs, 18 September 1944, 'Auskämmung des zivilen Sektors 1944', IfZ APK, 114 0005-6.

In August Speer set up a minimum building programme to secure all production necessary for war production, transport connections and fortifications works. About 60 percent of present building capacity was required for its fulfilment. His decree of 28 June expressly stopped all building tasks not in this programme. The OT was too busy to pursue the shutting down of forbidden building tasks, and Speer asked Wegener of the Exekutivausschuss to use the party to ensure that all building workers and equipment were used for the minimum building programme.\(^\text{72}\)

The need for workers led Speer to intervene with Goebbels against a ban Sauckel issued on the employment of Hungarian Jewish prisoners in Thuringia. This might lead to other Gauleiters introducing a similar ban. Of course, Speer told Goebbels, their employment was also contrary to his feelings, but under current conditions they had to resort to such an emergency measure. He therefore asked Goebbels to influence Sauckel to withdraw the ban.\(^\text{73}\) Goebbels' response was not recorded. In August Speer approached Goebbels with the request that the tens of thousands of theatre and film tradesmen be employed in armaments.\(^\text{74}\)

Speer told Keitel on 11 August that he could not make 150,000 trained \(kv\) men of the 1901 class and younger available in August from armaments. He had the following actions underway: first, he would probably make the classes of 1918 to 1926 available from armaments. This would make declining coal production unavoidable. He would suggest to Hitler that this be carried through together with the four fighting forces also freeing men from the classes 1918 and younger for the front. Second, he would probably make those of the

\(^{72}\) Speer to Gauleiter Wegener, 11 August 1944, BA R 3/1605, pp. 1-2.

\(^{73}\) Speer to Goebbels, August 1944, BA R 3/1580, pp. 1-2.

\(^{74}\) Speer to Goebbels, 11 August 1944, ibid.
classes 1910 to 1926 who were kv and not technically employed free from the armaments administration; third, from less important production, such as textiles and glass, he would probably make the classes of 1910 to 1926 available. In addition he was calling for industry leaders to give up uk positions voluntarily and would introduce a further exchange action with the commander of the replacement army. He stressed that Hitler had told him that at the moment the production of weapons, tanks and planes was more important than calling up men in uk positions, a view shared by Guderian.75

On 11 August Goebbels advised all Gauleiters of Speer's call to industry leaders to give up voluntarily the age groups 1918 to 1926 from armaments. He completely shared Speer's view that the production of important weapons and armaments was at least as important as soldiers; Gauleiters were to avoid placing the heads of firms under any kind of moral pressure to give up more uk positions. Firm leaders would only ascertain how many workers were to be given up when replacement workers actually arrived in the firms. In no cases were workers to be given up on the promise of replacements, and influence on the head of the firm was only to follow in conjunction with the armaments offices.76

On 17 August, however, Goebbels told all Gauleiters that Hitler needed to create new fighting divisions from 165,000 kv men from 1897 and later. Quotas were allocated for each Wehrkreis and Gau to be completed by 1 September. Goebbels called on the Gauleiters to advise of any difficulties but he hoped that simplifying measures would free sufficient men and women to exchange for the men to be


76. Goebbels to all Gauleiters, 11 August 1944, pp. 1-2, and see also the attachment, Speer to Betriebsführer, 8 August 1944, BA R 3/1615, pp. 3-4.
given up. The quotas Goebbels set were needed to allow him to fulfill his commitments to Hitler. By the end of August Speer complained to Goebbels that the majority of Gauleiters were not keeping to their agreement that giving up staff would be voluntary and were setting firms such high quotas that production breaches resulted. For example, in Hamburg a quota of 3,400 men was set; in Schleswig-Holstein 16,123; in Main-Franken 50 percent of all kv. He asked Goebbels to point out once again the voluntary nature of these quotas. Speer did consider that some Gauleiters did cooperate well with armaments in these commissions.

Speer's complaints suggest in fact that instead of being reluctant, as Orlow states, the Gauleiters, were as Goebbels predicted in his July memorandum, proving eager to vie with each other to deliver the most men for the forces. This issue led Speer to telephone Klein, an official in Goebbels' office, on 1 September to ascertain whether Goebbels wanted the quotas in the Gaus to be raised in every case. Klein confirmed that this was their impression but all kinds of difficulties had arisen. Everywhere the heads of firms had declared their willingness to give up staff but then were not willing to sign the necessary written declarations. Where disruption in armaments production had occurred the men would be called back or replaced. On the whole the replacement situation was such that the

77. Goebbels Fernschreiben to all Gauleiters, 17 August 1944, 'Aufstellung neuer Kampfdivisionen.', ibid., pp. 1-3.

78. Speer to Goebbels, 25 August 1944, p. 2; see also the untitled and unsigned paper on this subject dated either 3 or 8 September 1944, ibid.; pp 54-8 as numbered by the Bundesarchiv. See also Speer Fernschreiben to all armaments inspectors, 'Geheim', ibid.


80. Armaments officers at the middle level experienced the pressure of the Gauleiters whose ambitions for the provision of soldiers had been awakened, according to the Chronik: Speer Chronik for August 1944, BA R 3/1740, p. 228.
armaments industry would hardly need to be involved for September and October. Klein estimated that some 40-50 per cent of kv workers, or about 150,000 men, had been given up by the armaments industry. During the discussion Speer repeated his opinion that call ups could only follow with the written agreement of the head of the firm; Goebbels agreed with him on this, he claimed. Klein pointed out that in order to provide the promised 30 new divisions to the front eventually some 60 percent of uk positions in armaments would have to go.81

Speer and Goebbels clashed heatedly in a meeting about the calling up of uk positions from armaments at this time and Goebbels forced Speer to deliver his share of a 300,000 man quota for call up. This marked a significant breach between the two men. Goebbels complained afterwards of the reactionary nature of the armaments industry and commented that he would no longer defend Speer.82 Speer appealed to Hitler who called Goebbels to his headquarters. Instead of backing Speer, as Goebbels and Speer expected, Hitler and Bormann completely took Goebbels' side. Hitler decided he wanted both weapons and soldiers. By 1 September Goebbels had provided 300,000 men and Hitler decided he wanted a further 450,000 in September.83 The question prompted Speer to write to Goebbels again on 4 September noting that when Goebbels' position was created they had agreed on the need to carry out the necessary measures together. He had discovered that instead of calling up only kv men of 1910 and later, as they agreed, men from the classes of 1898 to 1905 had also

82. Entry for 1 September 1944, von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 462-4.
been called up; instead of the agreement that armaments and party offices together would approach the firm leaders, in numerous Gaus the party offices had approached the firm leaders on their own; in almost all cases psychological pressure was placed on the heads of firms to fulfill quotas. He refused to take responsibility for any resulting breaches in production. Speer warned that they would soon have more soldiers than weapons.84

On 5 September 1944 Speer told the Gauleiters that he would not accept responsibility for breaks in production due to the call ups,85 and he advised the armaments inspectors that the guidelines he and Goebbels set down were still in force, and the call up of those UK positions given up would be carried out. It was the duty of the armaments office to resolve any disruption of output through suitable measures by finding replacements and transfers from other production.86 On 8 September 1944 this was followed by a telegram to all Gauleiters from Speer, Goebbels and Bormann, noting that the quotas called on for 1 September from Gaus by Hitler had been fulfilled, but due to the need to act quickly various irreplaceable workers had been called up. These exceptional cases were to be inspected and to be resolved judiciously. This applied not only to production of weapons and material but also to the coal, mining, chemical, and iron industries. Drawing on the reports of the chairmen of the armaments commission, the Gauleiters were to report the probable effects of the call up on armaments. The Gau and Kreis commissions had to seek to prevent any breaks in production by

84. Speer to Goebbels, 4 September 1944, BA R 3/1615, pp. 1-4.


86. Speer to Rüstungsinspektionen, 5 September 1944, 'Einberufungsaktion.', ibid.
producing replacements, or returning those who were called up. If there was no agreement, then the decision of Goebbels, Speer and Bormann was to be sought. The order stated that Hitler wanted both more soldiers and more weapons; this required a close and trusting collaboration between all responsible offices. It thus also placed a difficult choice before the Gauleiters. It concluded by calling on all Gauleiters to support securing all production important to the war.87

Goebbels' closures had initially created considerable unemployment as staff were freed before they could be taken on by the armaments industry.88 The RAD head, Hierl believed this unemployment would continue because Speer refused to free workers in armaments and equally refused to take up the new staff,89 presumably because this would weaken his stand against giving up existing staff. From this period on Speer was engaged in a continuing battle with Goebbels against plans to call up armaments workers. The pressure for numbers to which Goebbels was responding was partly the inevitable result of heavy German losses and partly the product of Hitler's demands, encouraged by Speer and Goebbels' promises that replacements would be possible. The Chronik recorded that where Speer had previously fought for workers with Sauckel, he now struggled with Goebbels who did not take account of armaments. Goebbels had 'valuable allies' in Bormann and Keitel.90

87. Speer, Goebbels and Bormann Fernschreiben to all Gauleiters, 8 September 1944, ibid., pp. 1-4.
88. Entry for 1 September 1944, von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 463.
89. Entry for 10 September 1944, ibid., pp. 473-4.
90. Speer Chronik for August 1944, BA R 3/1740, p. 228. Bormann lacked any sympathy for Speer's demands: letter Martin Bormann to Gerda Bormann, 8-9 September 1944, Bormann Letters, p. 104. He believed that armaments, railways and the post had never made the numbers requested of them available: Bormann to Himmler, 2 July 1944, 'Wehrersatz aus der Landwirtschaft', BA NS 19/3631.
Speer told Goebbels that he was fundamentally prepared to make all still dispensable workers available. He wanted to wait until the effects of previous call ups were obvious, and suggested no further call ups for the August quotas after 20 September to allow him to gain an overview of the overall numbers of Wehrpflichtigen in armaments. There were many troops on the Western front who did not have any weapons; there was no sense in providing more troops if they can not be completely equipped with heavy weapons.\textsuperscript{91} 'In this war, which is a technical war, a 'le\'eve \`en masse' is not decisive'.\textsuperscript{92} Here Speer was directly jibing at Goebbels' hopes for a levée en masse.\textsuperscript{93} These conflicts led to 'tension and irritation' on both sides.\textsuperscript{94}

Speer also protested at the refusal of Gauleiters to exempt armaments employees from trench digging. He asked Bormann for Hitler to decide whether securing the borders or equipping troops with weapons was more important. If these workers were not returned to the firms in eight days, then he would not accept responsibility for the consequences. The Gauleiters had to maintain production completely until the last minute.\textsuperscript{95} Speer experienced a partial victory when Bormann ordered their return on 20 September.\textsuperscript{96}

Speer then defended himself against the claims of the Gau Berlin that the armaments sector was not using workers becoming

\textsuperscript{91} Speech by Speer to armaments commissioners, 19 September 1944, BA R 3/1555, p. 4; Orlow, \textit{Nazi Party}, II, p. 471.

\textsuperscript{92} Speer to Goebbels, 15 September 1944, 'Geheim', BA R 3/1615, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{93} Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, p. 419.

\textsuperscript{94} Speer Chronik for September 1944, BA R 3/1740, p. 252.

\textsuperscript{95} Speer Fernschreiben to Bormann, 18 September 1944, 'Geheime Reichssache', BA R 3/1615, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{96} Speer Chronik for September 1944, BA R 3/1740, p. 258; Janssen, \textit{Ministerium Speer}, p. 278.
available - allegedly only 4,000 of the 120,000 people freed in Berlin through total war measures had been employed. Since the beginning of measures for total war the following had been employed in armaments production: 30,000 in Berlin, 4,000 of whom came from the Meldepflicht action (women 45-50). The rest came from other measures - closing theatres, restricting authorities. That week 3,000 were employed from the Meldepflicht action, 6,000 from other total war measures. A further 42,000 workers could be expected in Berlin: 10,000 from cutting back on government authorities and other total war measures, 24,000 from the 30 percent restriction of administration of armaments firms, 3,000 from the combing out of domestic servants, 5,000 from students and schools. These would continuously become available in the next eight weeks. Once they had lost their previous job they would be transferred to the armaments industry within 24 hours. Speer considered it necessary to set the record straight since Goebbels might otherwise gain an unfavourable impression of the will and capacity of German armaments.97

Despite Speer's claims in July 1944 that all men born between 1918 and 1926 could be called up without replacements, and his suggestion to Hitler that some 4.3 million men in the economy could be drawn on for the armed forces, in practice he objected to all Goebbels' attempts to reduce the staff at his disposal. His concern above all was to protect his own area of responsibility, and his power base.98 This may have been one of his motives for his later attempts to ensure that abandoned factories were disabled rather than destroyed; and certainly motivated his consistent resistance in this period to attempts to reduce the staff at his disposal. He asked Goebbels to ensure that women employed in the armaments industry

98. Schmidt, Speer Myth, p. 122.
were exempted from any call ups.\textsuperscript{99} He did not believe that the work of the Reichspatentamt could be dispensed with during the war, and therefore asked that its tasks be restricted to tasks of particular importance to the war.\textsuperscript{100} He requested Goebbels to abandon plans to form a committee to examine levying (Erhebungswesen) since attempts to simplify this were already underway in the Economics Ministry and his own Ministry.\textsuperscript{101} On 20 September he wrote to Hitler defending himself against allegations that his ministry was dominated by people hostile to the party and by reactionary economic leaders. He pointed out that he had set up the self-responsibility of industry system on Hitler's advice and claimed he saw his task in seeking to prevent any conflict between the system of self-responsibility of industry and the party.\textsuperscript{102} Hitler handed the letter to Bormann who told Speer he was subordinate to Goebbels.\textsuperscript{103} He was able to obtain a notice from Hitler commending German industry leaders for the increase in production in August, and stating that the self-responsibility of industry had once again proved itself to be the best.\textsuperscript{104} Speer claimed that this would normally have represented a victory for him but that Hitler's authority in the party was waning, 'the first clear signs of disintegration'.\textsuperscript{105} Some evidence for this can be deduced from Bormann's advising the Gauleiters that there were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{99} Speer to Goebbels, 20 September 1944, BA R 3/1580.
\item \textsuperscript{100} Speer to Goebbels, 23 September 1944, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1-3.
\item \textsuperscript{101} Speer to Goebbels, 25 September 1944, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, p. 398.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Hitler, 23 September 1944, 'An die Betriebsführer der deutschen Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion', BA R 3/1615.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Speer, \textit{Third Reich}, p. 398.
\end{itemize}
ways around a decree from Hitler ordering Gau economic advisers not to interfere in the process of armaments production.\textsuperscript{106}

Hitler was advised by Goebbels' Planungsausschuss that Himmler and Keitel had ordered the release of 250,000 \textit{kv} men as the September quota of the military replacement plan (\textit{Wehrersatzplan}). Armaments, which still had some 1.2 million men in the classes of 1901 and later, had to give up 100,000. Speer had recognized that the distribution was correct but would only agree if Hitler ordered that the armaments economy had to free the men without regard to any production consequences. Asked by Bormann, Keitel, Himmler and Klein of the Planungsausschuss, leading industrialists believed they could bear the required demands.\textsuperscript{107} Speer also did not get the support he expected from industrialists at a meeting in late August. Most considered the giving up of \textit{uk} positions was acceptable; and were more concerned that the inclusion of the party meant they faced dual lines of command.\textsuperscript{108} Speer also reprimanded Gauleiters who assumed that because their armaments industry could give up workers, the rest of the Reich could.\textsuperscript{109}

Since Speer would not agree with the callup of 250,000 \textit{kv} men, Bormann, Speer and Klein asked the Gauleiters' opinions. The overwhelming numbers of the Gauleiters, predictably, declared that armaments could still give up \textit{kv} workers. Hitler was asked for his view.\textsuperscript{110} Speer's own submission argued that the proposed call ups

\begin{enumerate}
\item[106.] Orlow, \textit{Nazi Party}, II, p. 472.
\item[107.] Dr. Klein, Planungsausschuss, 25 September 1944, 'Führerinformation', BA R 3/1615.
\item[108.] Speer Chronik for August 1944, BA R 3/1740, p. 230.
\item[109.] Speer Fernschreiben to Gauleiter Rainer of Kärnten, 9 October 1944, BA R 3/1595. Gauleiters who supported his view won his support: Speer to Gauleiter Simon, Moselland, BA R 3/1598.
\item[110.] Dr. Klein, Planungsausschuss, 25 September 1944, 'Führerinformation', BA R 3/1615.
\end{enumerate}
would damage armaments, since the current call up action had not yet finished and he needed some three to four months before a new action could be contemplated. The possibility existed after 25 October of calling up uk positions again, because by then the new staff would be trained in their work. Each premature call up lessened the possibility of training new workers. By 25 October 1944 armaments could make 60,000 men free for the call up, of whom 5,000 students and 16,000 Rüstungsurlauber\(^\text{111}\) could come some fourteen days earlier. Some further 40,000 uk workers could be called on 15 November 1944.\(^\text{112}\)

On 1 October 1944 Bormann, who had become increasingly involved in the termination of uk positions, claimed that the armaments industry was not absorbing the workers becoming available in the various total war measures satisfactorily. This could either be the result of armaments firms being saturated with staff or of a false estimate of the call ups from the armaments industry in the next months.\(^\text{113}\) The industry leaders had to face the possibility that by the end of the year, with the exception of a few irreplaceable workers, they would lose all k\(v\) men from the classes 1906 and younger. A number of measures were necessary to overcome any bottlenecks - the firms had to train workers as soon as possible; workers who could not immediately be employed should be given a Bereitstellungsschein (standby certificate).\(^\text{114}\)

\(^{111}\) Men from the armed forces working on a ticket of leave system.

\(^{112}\) Speer, 26 September 1944, 'Stellungnahme zur Führerinformation v. Dr. Goebbels.', BA R 3/1527, pp. 1-2.

\(^{113}\) Janssen argues that this conflict arose because Goebbels and Bormann calculated on the basis of Goebbels’ target numbers while the armaments firms and Speer operated on the numbers which actually arrived: Janssen, Ministerium Speer, p. 280.

\(^{114}\) Bormann, 1 October 1944, 'Rundschreiben 293/44', 'Weitere Gestaltung der Freisetzungsaktion.', BA R 3/1615, pp. 1-2.
On his return from a journey in the West, Speer learnt that Hitler agreed that the 60,000 *uk* workers were to be given up on 14 and not 25 October.\textsuperscript{115} He had agreed with Göring that a giving up of the *Rüstungsurlauber* from the Luftwaffe who were working in air armaments would be credited to his quota. He asked that the teletype to the Gauleiters be altered or that Hitler be made aware of his objections. He repeated that he could not be held responsible if the call ups could not be carried out before the date set by him and in a greater number.\textsuperscript{116} Speer also turned to Guderian and Göring in his efforts to have this decision overturned.\textsuperscript{117} Since 20 July he had given up 50,000 men voluntarily, 150,000 men through Goebbels' action largely without his agreement, a further 60,000 men at Hitler's orders and a planned further 80,000 men in November - a total of 340,000 in *uk* positions. These would lead to severe consequences for production.\textsuperscript{118} To Göring Speer confided that Hitler had refused to count 16,000 airforce *Rüstungsurlauber* against his quota; they would instead be counted against the Luftwaffe's quota. This would doubly affect airforce armaments. He asked Göring to meet his quota without these 16,000.\textsuperscript{119} Speer also objected to Hitler that his decision was extraordinarily serious and drastic. He had already pointed out on 26 September and 2 October that he could no longer take responsibility for an unrestricted implementation of armaments if these measures

\textsuperscript{115} Janssen claims that this was at Bormann's instigation: Janssen, *Ministerium Speer*, p. 277.


\textsuperscript{117} Bormann saw Speer as allying himself with Göring against Goebbels and Bormann: Martin Bormann to Gerda Bormann, 4 November 1944, *Bormann Letters*, p. 146.

\textsuperscript{118} Speer to Guderian, 3 October 1944, BA R 3/1581, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{119} Speer to Göring, 3 October 1944, BA R 3/1615, pp. 1-2. See also Speer to Himmler, 3 October 1944, BA R 3/1583, pp. 1-2.
were carried out. He did not know if Hitler had been advised of his views, and he had to report that these changes would interrupt production. He again asked Hitler to decide which was more important - soldiers or weapons.\textsuperscript{120} Goebbels later blamed Speer for delaying the freeing of such workers and thereby weakening the front at critical times.\textsuperscript{121}

Speer's objections were strong and frequent, but their very frequency demonstrated the extent to which he was losing ground. In fact his position with Hitler seems to have weakened once he fell out with Goebbels, and no longer had the latter's protection or support.\textsuperscript{122} He later wrote that Hitler sought to mediate between him and Goebbels by first deciding in favour of one and then the other.\textsuperscript{123} Hitler could not decide between weapons and men since he wanted, and needed, both.\textsuperscript{124} Despite Speer's complaints, in November Hitler placed several programmes under total protection from call up - shipyards, anti-aircraft, munitions, infantry and fighter production.\textsuperscript{125} In the same month Speer had to agree to the co-responsibility of Gauleiters and Gau economic advisers in the production of armaments.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{120} Speer to Hitler, 3 October 1944, BA R 3/1527, pp. 1-4. The fighter ace Oberstleutnant Rudel told Goebbels at the end of the year that the German lines in the East were undermanned rather than lacked weapons: entry for New Year 1945, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, p. 534.

\textsuperscript{121} Entries for 4 and 13 October 1944 and 8 February 1945, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 490-1, 495, 575-6.

\textsuperscript{122} Goebbels noted that Bormann, Himmler and all the Gauleiters opposed Speer: entry for 1 September 1944, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, p. 464.


\textsuperscript{124} Janssen, \textit{Ministerium Speer}, p. 277.

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 280.

\textsuperscript{126} Orlow, \textit{Nazi Party II}, p. 480.
In October Speer described his position as extremely weak.\textsuperscript{127} He was criticized for the loss of production due to his earlier decisions to transfer production to France and other occupied territories.\textsuperscript{128} His claims for German production, particularly aircraft production, were not believed since there were allegedly no signs of this production arriving at the front.\textsuperscript{130} (His production claims were exaggerated.\textsuperscript{131}) Reports that large industrial firms were already transferring to peacetime production also did not help his position.\textsuperscript{132} Bormann clearly suspected Speer's future plans and described him as seeking to take away the few remaining responsibilities of the Economics Ministry.\textsuperscript{133} Speer had much less success in maintaining his position against Goebbels in his role as plenipotentiary than against any other earlier moves to reduce staff or interfere in production. Speer and Goebbels had been longstanding allies in their moves to adopt total war. Speer had urged that Goebbels be given such powers and that staff should be cut back ruthlessly but once

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\textsuperscript{127} Fernschreiben Berger to Himmler, 31 October 1944, 'Dringend', BA NS 19/2058, p. 2; Orlow, \textit{Nazi Party.} II, p. 470.

\textsuperscript{128} Bormann file note, 7 August 1944, 'Aktenvermerk für Pg. Friedrichs, IIM., Pg. Dr. Klopfer, Pg. Schütt, Berlin', BA NS 6/785, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{129} Speer claimed that armaments production was continuing to rise and that it was usually higher than United States production: unsigned, 11 August 1944, 'Protokoll der Besprechung am 11. August 1944.', BA R 3/1987, pp. 3-8; 'Tagung der Leiter der Reichspropagandaämter am 28.u. 29. Aug. 1944 Vortrag von Reichsminister Speer: Die.deutsche Rüstung und der totale Kriegseinsatz.', BA R 3/1554, pp. 2-3.


\textsuperscript{131} Boelcke, \textit{Hitlers Konferenzen}, pp. 7-8, 25.

\textsuperscript{132} SS-Sturmbannführer Backhaus, Agriculture Minister's office, to Brandt, 26 August 1944, 'Geheim!', BA NS 19/830, p. 1; SS-Scharführer signature, 26 December 1944, 'Vermerk', BA NS 19/488.

\textsuperscript{133} Bormann file note, 3 November 1944, 'Aktenvermerk für Pg. Dr. Klopfer', 'Rücksprache mit Reichsminister Speer.', BA NS 6/785, p. 2.
Goebbels made use of these powers he objected. Indeed he claimed after the war that Goebbels came out openly as his enemy after the appointment. There is evidence that both more weapons and more soldiers were needed. Speer's frequent assurances that he could supply weapons for the various new levies helps explain Goebbels' demands. In view of these promises Speer's later statements were suspected to be based on a desire to keep staff in his own area rather than a reflection of actual conditions. Despite the justification for at least some of his objections, Speer was also defending the basis of his power - factories and the men and women staffing them - from reduction in size. The armaments industry had previously gained staff when other offices lost theirs; in 1944 it too had to lose staff; and Speer accepted this unwillingly.

In making arrangements for the fate of industry in areas under threat of enemy occupation, Speer ordered that only the most urgent production be evacuated. He wanted only those industries having more than 50 per cent of the total Reich production in the affected area to be evacuated. When in 1945 Speer opposed the 'scorched earth' policies of Hitler and claimed that the war was lost once key industrial border areas were lost, his own earlier decisions partly added to the speed of the German collapse. The vulnerability of Germany because of the concentration of her industry in the Ruhr and

134. Entry for 28 November 1953, Speer, Spandau, p. 235. These disputes later allowed Speer to distance himself from Goebbels. Speer's equivocal behaviour after the July plot suggests that he may already have been conscious of such considerations: Schmidt, Speer Myth, pp. 104-11.


137. Boelcke, Hitlers Konferenzen, p. 20.

Silesia was well known. Speer’s attitude prevented any replication by Germany of the large scale Soviet evacuation of industry in 1941. Here Speer’s policies seem to have been serving the interests of industry, and his own post-war position, rather than the interests of the regime.

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Despite the acquiescence of other members of the regime in the powers granted to Goebbels and the seeming lack of significant resistance on labour issues other than from Speer, Goebbels encountered opposition to his plans to set up a women’s armed forces auxiliary (Wehrhilfsdienst). Here a more conservative solution was achieved than Goebbels wished. ‘The German pattern has been to resist the presence of women in the armed forces in anything but a marginal, preferably civilian, capacity.’139 Women were increasingly used in building fortifications and trenches in the border areas, and to free men for the front, including in previously male areas such as floodlight batteries.140 Hitler had decided that women would be protected from direct participation in Volkssturm training but the BDM and Frauenschaft could be involved in equipping and clothing units.141 Goebbels’ initial proposals were for the callup of all women of the classes of 1914 and later, and involved the women being trained to use what some defined as weapons - smokescreen


companies, barrage batteries and radar establishments.\textsuperscript{142} In October plans to call up women of the classes 1920 to 1924 in such an organization were 'pending'.\textsuperscript{143} Sauckel considered that a special ruling governing their employment was unnecessary,\textsuperscript{144} while Göring stressed that only women without children should be included in the decree.\textsuperscript{145} By the end of October Goebbels had presented a draft decree for Hitler's signature making childless women of the classes 1914 and later liable for military service.

There was concern in the Reich Chancellery at the effects of such a decree on morale, and on the employment of women in other sectors. Goebbels' draft decree would call up some 600,000 women for each individual class instead of the 300-400,000 they believed were needed. A discussion between officials of the Reich Chancellery, the plenipotentiary for labour (GBA) and Party Chancellery agreed that it was better for the time being to proceed using existing powers.\textsuperscript{146} Bormann and Sauckel agreed.\textsuperscript{147} In Bormann's view

\textsuperscript{142} Submission to Lammers, 28 October 1944, 'Weiblicher Wehrhilfsdienst.', BA R 43 II/666c, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{143} Submission to Lammers, 4 October 1944, 'Eilt!', 'Weiblicher Kriegshilfsdienst', ibid., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{144} Sauckel Schnellbrief to Reichsarbeitsführer, 24 October 1944, 'Wehrmachteinsatz des RAD.', ibid., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{145} OKW WF St/Org (II) to Naumann, Lammers, Bormann, Stuckart, 2 October 1944, 'Geheim', 'Entwurf für den Erlaß des Führers über den Wehrhilfsdienst der weiblichen Jugend.', p. 1. See also Bormann Fernschreiben to all Gauleiters, 17 October 1944, 'Weiblicher Kriegshilfsdienst. Einziehung von 80000 Frauen zur Wehrmacht.', IfZ APK, 117 08468-9; Keitel's views set out in signature OKW to Naumann and others, October 1944, 'Geheim', 'Entwurf für den Erlaß des Führers über den Wehrhilfsdienst der weiblichen Jugend.', ibid., p. 1; and General Reinecke's views; General Reinecke OKW, 'Nr. 1649/44 geh AWA/AgWV2 (III)', September 1944, 'Geheim', 'Weibliches Wehrmachtsgefolge', BA MA RW4/v.499.

\textsuperscript{146} Submission to Lammers, 28 October 1944, 'Weiblicher Wehrhilfsdienst.', ibid., p. 3.

\textsuperscript{147} Submission to Lammers, 2 November 1944, 'Weiblicher Wehrhilfsdienst.', ibid., pp. 1-2.
publication of such a decree would lead to a certain disquiet in the public, and would encompass many more women - he estimated 10 million - than were needed. The experience of earlier callups showed that women in these age groups were almost all employed in war work. Lammers, who continued to adopt a conservative position on the issue of women's employment, described himself as completely persuaded by Bormann's arguments. Moreover, Bormann told Goebbels, they could not yet regard the use of labour by the Wehrmacht as rational. This had to be the first priority. As long as positions which could be handled by women were still occupied by men, the use of weapons by women had to be rejected. He conceded, however, that the party andFrauenschaft had to prepare the population for a far greater use of women, even in some cases with weapons. The Reichs Chancellery agreed with this position 'unreservedly'. Instead of Goebbels' proposal to call up classes of women, the formation of a female auxiliary armed services corps (Wehrmachthelferinnenkorps) of some 120,000 to 150,000 personnel, either volunteers or women made available through total war


149. See for example the exclamation mark he placed against a statement by Bormann that women might be trained to use weapons on Bormann to Goebbels, 16 November 1944, 'Einziehung von Frauen und Maedchen zum truppenmaessigen Wehrmachteinsatz.', ibid., p. 3.

150. Lammers to Goebbels, 11 November 1944, 'Entwurf eines Führererlasses über den weiblichen Wehrhilfsdienst.', ibid., p. 4.

151. Bormann to Goebbels, 16 November 1944, 'Einziehung von Frauen und Maedchen zum truppenmaessigen Wehrmachteinsatz.', ibid., pp. 3-4.

152. Submission to Lammers, 17 November 1944, 'Weiblicher Wehrhilfsdienst.', ibid., p. 4.
measures, was planned.\textsuperscript{153} All women's auxiliaries were combined into one armed forces female auxiliary corps by February 1945.\textsuperscript{154}

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A survey, apparently by an official of the Armaments Ministry, of the first three months of the total war measures claimed that they had a great effect. Lengthening of working hours had made more workers available while ensuring that the same amount of work was done. Decrees simplifying salaries and pay, and banning leave, had also freed staff. At the same time various measures had been taken which made life easier for those employed, including keeping offices, shops and doctor's surgeries open later. The report concluded that 'an enormous regrouping of workers has occurred in favour of the Wehrmacht and armaments.'\textsuperscript{155} The report did not however give specific numbers of staff freed.

There was some disagreement about the number of men encompassed in all the plans under way to gain staff.\textsuperscript{156} Goebbels had fulfilled his promise to Hitler to send one million men to the front, albeit not in the three month time span. Overall approximately one million men, previously \textit{uk}, were sent to the front from August to December 1944. But from August to October 1944, however, German

\textsuperscript{153} Submission to Lammers, 27 November 1944, 'Wehrmacht- helferinnenkorps.', pp. 1-2. See Goebbels, Bormann and Keitel, 29 November 1944, 'Zweite Anordnung für die Durchführung des totalen Kriegseinsatzes.', \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1-3. 150,000 women were encompassed from 15 January 1945: Mammach, \textit{Volkssturm}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{154} Tuten, 'Germany and the World Wars', p. 56.


\textsuperscript{156} Undated, 'Stellungnahme WFSt/Org.', BA MA RW4/v. 26. From August to October 1944 451,800 men were made available: Keitel to Goebbels, 11 November 1944, 'Abrechnung über den Wehresatz August-Oktober 1944', BA MA R W6/v.415. From August to October 451,800 men were sent to the front: attachment, \textit{ibid.}, p. 3.
losses were 1.89 million killed and wounded.\textsuperscript{157} The search for more manpower continued,\textsuperscript{158} with the Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt of the OKW preparing a Wehrmacht replacement plan for 1945, drawing on figures supplied by the Statistisches Reichsamt. The figures set out in the plan provide a yardstick by which the failure of attempts to gain more staff can be measured: they explain the continued belief that there were still more labour reserves to be exploited, and provide some vindication of it. Figures, taken from the 1939 census, suggested there were still 13,535,000 German men available for employment inside Germany on 30 September 1944. Of these some 7.4 million were of fitness gradings suitable for service,\textsuperscript{159} and 6.5 million of these men were in uk positions.\textsuperscript{160} The report noted that of the 22,857,000 women aged between 15 and 50, some 14,897,000 were employed (65.17 per cent of the women of this age group). Some two million women over 50 were also still employed. The total number of women in employment, however, was only 271,000 more in September 1944 than May 1939.\textsuperscript{161} Before the war foreign workers were 0.8 per cent of the workforce; by September 1944 they were 16.8 per cent of the work force, or 20.8 per cent if POWs were included. The percentage of women in the workforce had risen by 10 per cent from 37 to 47 per cent, but this increase was mainly in foreign workers. From 1939 to mid 1941, the report suggested, the employment of German women constantly declined, and then only

\textsuperscript{157} Mammach, \textit{Volkssturm}, pp. 21-2.
\textsuperscript{158} Combing out of various organizations proceeded: Kritzinger, 9 December 1944, '1.) Vermerk:', 'Totaler Kriegseinsatz.', BA R 43 II/682a, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{159} Undated, 'A. Bevölkerung', in 'Wehrmacht-Ersatzplan 1945', BA MA RW6/v. 416, pp. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{160} ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{161} ibid., pp. 1-4.
gradually increased again later. 'Despite all the measures of the GBA' by the end of September 1944 only 500,000 women had been mobilized; 230,000 of whom replaced older women leaving the workforce, and 270,000 were a net addition to the workforce.\textsuperscript{162} Agriculture relied heavily on foreigners (23 per cent) and women (59 per cent).\textsuperscript{163} The local female labour force in industry was much less. There were only 849,500 less German men employed in industry in September 1944 than May 1939; about half of the German male industrial workforce in September 1944 occupied UK positions (2,657,800 out of 4,710,700). While 761,900 more women were employed in industry than in 1939, only 4,500 of these were German. From 1 June 1943 to 31 May 1944 102,600 German women left industry, while 52,300 were added as a result of the third Meldepflichtaktion.\textsuperscript{164}

The report also found that the reduction of staff in the administrative sector was less than expected; it was only 17 per cent less than in 1939. German men were now 46 per cent of those employed, compared with 68 per cent in 1939. Female employees had grown to 343,900 of whom 327,300 were German.\textsuperscript{165} The AWA believed that more women could still be employed in administration, and also in armaments and the armed forces.\textsuperscript{166} The armaments sector of the economy, which included civilian employees of armaments, police and workers of the Speer Ministry, employed 112 per cent more staff than in 1939, 47 per cent more men and 484,400

\textsuperscript{162} 'Deutsche Volkswirtschaft' in \textit{ibid.}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{163} 'B c) Landwirtschaft', \textit{ibid.}, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{164} 'B e) Industrie (Gesamtbereich)', \textit{ibid.}, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{165} 'B i) Verwaltung.', \textit{ibid.}, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{ibid.}, p. 3.
additional German men. Female employees of the Wehrmacht had increased by 468 per cent in total, of whom 506,900 out of 535,500 (94.65 per cent) were German. The police, who had succeeded in employing 110 per cent more German men than in 1939, still employed an 'astonishingly low' number of women.

Goebbels appears to have been successful in shutting down production, aided by the sense of urgency induced by the invasion and the attempt on Hitler's life, but he had met resistance from Speer in his attempts to reduce staff. The reductions and simplifications Goebbels introduced seem to have pared German life on the home front down to the essentials and to have freed staff. Yet he was not able to free them in the numbers which either he and Speer believed possible in July 1944. The reservoir of staff they believed existed proved elusive. If these staff existed, then, from the Wehrmachtersatzamt's figures, they were to be found in the female population of which it had been found difficult to make extensive use. Here too the expectations of Goebbels and Speer were exaggerated. Claims that Germany made insufficient use of women in the workforce rely on an implicit comparison with the mobilization of other countries, particularly that of the United Kingdom. These studies emphasize the increase in the percentage of women employed. The German percentage of women employed only increased by one per cent during the war. However this was still a greater percentage of women employed than were employed in either Britain or the United States. The proportion of women fourteen and over in paid employment in Britain rose from 27 per cent in

168. *ibid.*, pp. 3-5.
1939 to 37 per cent in 1944; in the United States it rose from 26 per cent in 1939 to 32 per cent in 1944; while in Germany 47 per cent of women were employed.\textsuperscript{170} German women were 51.1 per cent of the German civilian workforce in 1944.\textsuperscript{171} The percentage of women employed was only slightly less than in the Soviet Union where a different ideology concerning the role of women and a historical pattern of greater participation of women in heavy industry and the armed forces existed.

The problems in the German employment of women lay in their allocation. The conditions of German agriculture meant that 40 per cent of women in paid employment were in this sector from which they could not be spared.\textsuperscript{172} Reorganization and modernization of agriculture was in itself a massive task which could not have been undertaken in wartime. Of the 1.36 million domestic servants an unknown number were effectively agricultural workers on farms.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{170} The British figures are taken from Hancock and Gowing, \textit{British war economy}, note, p. 372; the American figures come from Alan S. Milward, 'Arbeitspolitik und Productivität in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft unter vergleichendem Aspekt', in Friedrich Forstmeier and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds.) \textit{Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung 1939-1945} (Dusseldorf, 1977), p. 88; while the German figures are taken from Klein, \textit{Germany's economic preparations}, p. 68 and Rupp, 'Women, Class and Mobilization in Nazi Germany', p. 53. In \textit{Mobilizing Women} Rupp gives lower figures for German female participation rates (35.6 per cent in 1943) but her figures are taken as a percentage of all German women, not only those of working age, and she admits that they underestimate the German participation rate: Rupp, \textit{Mobilizing Women}, pp. 184-6. If Koonz's higher figure of female participation in 1939 is used then German female participation rose above 50 per cent during the war: Koonz, \textit{Mothers of the Fatherland}, note 47, p. 471.

\textsuperscript{171} Rupp, \textit{Mobilizing Women}, pp. 185-6.


\textsuperscript{173} Mason, 'Zum Frauenarbeit im NS-Staat', p. 583.
In other cases domestic servants enabled small family businesses to continue.\textsuperscript{174} Some women who were not in paid employment were carrying out voluntary work which helped the war effort.\textsuperscript{175} Women up to the age of 25 were largely involved in various forms of compulsory service which did not count as employment; women aged 25 to 34 were mainly married with children; so the main untapped group was women over 35, an age where their productivity in armaments decreased.\textsuperscript{176} In addition the rate of employment of German women was already so high that in attempting to gain still more workers the government was running into obstacles due to contemporary perceptions of the roles of women, their child rearing responsibilities, etc. These obstacles were not as obvious in those countries where fewer women had been employed in peacetime. This raises the question why there was so strong an impression in Germany among sections of the leadership and the population that insufficient numbers of women were employed. The lack of any dramatic visible increase in female employment may account for some of these perceptions.

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Jockeying for increased personal powers and to succeed Hitler undoubtedly played a part in the motives of all leaders who advocated total war. Once granted the increased powers he sought, however, Goebbels did not abandon his wider view of total war nor did he allow his absorption in his work as plenipotentiary to stop him from urging it on Hitler. Goebbels still toyed with the idea of creating

\textsuperscript{174} Stephenson, '"Emancipation" and its Problems', p. 352.

\textsuperscript{175} For example women volunteers were used to adapt materials donated in the 1941 winter clothing campaign for use at the front: Bramsted, \textit{Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda}, p. 250.

a cabinet or a deputy chancellor, with Himmler as war minister. The current system did not work unless Hitler concerned himself with the smooth course of its government machinery.\footnote{177} He continued to pursue the cause of a compromise peace.\footnote{178} In an undated letter written to Hitler, which can be dated by internal evidence as written in September 1944,\footnote{179} he noted that the Germans had lost the line they hoped to hold in the East and had failed to repel the invasion. Goebbels pointed out that Germany had never in history won a two-front war, and could no longer do so in this war. The Quebec conference once again showed the contradictions in the enemy coalition despite attempts to conceal them. He suggested that the Western powers might have been toying with the possibility of dissociating themselves from the formula of unconditional surrender, and Eden's journey to Quebec was to convey the Kremlin's protests at any such attempt. Stalin's attempts to secure his position in South-east Europe could lead to an irreparable conflict with the West, and it had to be the task of German diplomacy to seize the opportunity.\footnote{180}

Although he judged peace with the West to be the more logical alternative, and the one which most suited Hitler's foreign policy goals, internal politics made it impossible for Western leaders to contemplate it. Stalin, on the other hand, had no such internal constraints and could take decisions without taking public opinion into account. He had 'a cool realism' which Churchill lacked, and would

\footnote{177}{Entry for 16 October 1944, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 497-9.}

\footnote{178}{In September he was approached by Japanese Ambassador Oshima about an alliance between Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union. Goebbels was attracted by the idea but felt that Germany had little to offer the Soviet Union: entry for 2 September 1944, Semmler, \textit{Goebbels}, pp. 148-9.}

\footnote{179}{Von Oven dates it as having been written on 21 September 1944: entry for 21 September 1944, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 479-82.}

\footnote{180}{Goebbels to Hitler, BA NL118/107, pp. 1-5.}
be aware that he would eventually come into conflict with the Western powers.

Goebbels then proceeded to reassure Hitler about possible objections to his plans. Japan would be prepared to help bring about a German-Soviet understanding; the regime no longer needed to take into account its European allies who had given up themselves; the people would be deeply satisfied with such a turn in the war. This would not be the victory they had dreamed of in 1941 but it would still be the greatest victory in German history.\textsuperscript{181} Hitler might dismiss this as Utopian, but it had to be tried, naturally with care and circumspection.

Goebbels concluded that he did not consider Ribbentrop to be capable of overseeing such a development. The Foreign Office was largely defeatist and corrupt, and could not work for victory 'with glowing fanaticism'.\textsuperscript{182} Before proceeding to criticize Ribbentrop, Goebbels disingenuously claimed, ignoring his earlier criticisms of Rosenberg for one, that he had never before written Hitler a critical judgement about a colleague but in this case he considered it his duty. There was no member of the leadership who did not share his opinion. They needed a minister with intelligence and flexibility, tenacity and clearness about the goal who could follow Hitler's clear guidelines, deepen the divisions among the enemy and clean up the foreign office.\textsuperscript{183} Once again Goebbels hoped to change Hitler's views by replacing Ribbentrop. According to his staff, Goebbels aimed to replace Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister. As in his memorandum on total war, Goebbels denied any personal ambition, and referred to his

\textsuperscript{181} ibid., pp. 5-7.
\textsuperscript{182} ibid., pp. 8-11.
\textsuperscript{183} ibid., p. 13.
plans to leave politics after the war. He had not discussed the matter with anyone else. He did not doubt that Hitler would lead them to victory, but he presumed to provide his own advice, the result of countless lonely evenings.

The atmosphere of the regime was such that attempts to foresee difficulties could be seen as defeatism.¹⁸⁴ In October 1944 Göring had told his chief of staff that he did not dare to suggest peace negotiations to Hitler for fear of losing Hitler's trust.¹⁸⁵ Goebbels' increasing closeness to Hitler can be inferred from the comparative plain speaking of his letter. His letter can be classified as an attempt to overcome 'the completely hazy, unreal atmosphere of mistaken ideas in the Führerhauptquartier'.¹⁸⁶ Once again Goebbels attempted to place his domestic total war proposals in a wider context of a foreign policy aimed at salvaging something for the regime. Goebbels again demonstrated an lack of recognition that Hitler was incapable of accepting such policies. In 1943 Hitler told Ribbentrop that if he made peace with Russia he would not be able to help himself; he would attack Russia again the next day.¹⁸⁷

Nothing came of Goebbels' memorandum. In October Goebbels learned that Bormann had not submitted the memorandum to Hitler but had only told him that the memorandum contained nothing new and that Goebbels wanted to be Foreign Minister. As a result Hitler greeted Goebbels curtly and told him these was no question of a

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¹⁸⁴. As seen in Ley's criticisms of Gauleiter Meyer entertaining the possibility of having to give up the left bank of the Rhine: Ley to Hitler, 30 November 1944, BA NS 6/135, p. 3.

¹⁸⁵. Entry for 12 October 1944, diary of General Kreipe, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, BA MA RL21/21, pp. 31, 37.

¹⁸⁶. 'Tagebuchauszug Werner Beumelburg vom 30.7.1944 in Neu-Fahrland bei Potsdam.', BA MA RL 21/21, p. 3.

change of minister. Goebbels was completely shattered. Goebbels' standing with Hitler was such that he was able to make these proposals with little fear of Hitler's reaction or of being accused of defeatism, but he was unable to move Hitler further along the path he outlined. The urgency with which Goebbels threw himself into his work as Generalbevollmächtigter and his continuing attempts to pursue a separate peace are both testimonies to his assessment of the regime's prospects. Goebbels' realism was, of course, limited by his commitment to the person of Hitler and to the regime.

Bormann's decision not to pass Goebbels' memorandum on to Hitler is striking evidence of the extent of his influence, which was negative rather than positive. Bormann's victories were never victories in depth. Bormann himself was often not in a position to persuade Hitler to adopt a certain course of action, but he could stop others from presenting a certain point of view to Hitler. Tiessler suggested that he was particularly prone to do so when he feared that Hitler would agree with their views. It seems unlikely that Hitler would have agreed with Goebbels' proposals in any case. He had always rejected Goebbels' earlier proposals along similar lines, and he did reject Goebbels' plan to replace von Ribbentrop.

Goebbels continued to argue for a compromise peace but without any apparent response from Hitler. These efforts were too late, as Goebbels was aware. Goebbels had gained the powers he wanted to orient the home front completely to the war effort but

189. Entry for 27 July 1944, ibid., p. 439
Germany was too obviously at the end of her tether to tempt the enemy. By the end of 1944 Goebbels was aware that the chances of a compromise peace were gone.

Greater simplifications and rationalizations were achieved by Goebbels. A number of factors made his task easier. The shock of the invasion and the attempt on Hitler's life made such measures obvious to even the most recalcitrant or obtuse. The earlier rounds of simplification and the effects of bombing also made later more drastic simplifications possible. At the same time the conditions of the various Gaus, and the problems facing them became more diverse so that a unified policy could less easily be implemented. Various groups, including industry, were preparing for a non-National Socialist future, which did not help the cause of increasing arms production. The regime's response to the attempt on Hitler's life was to seek to mobilize the entire nation. Two means had been used for this - Goebbels was employed to mobilize the forces of the economy and labour while Bormann and Himmler were to mobilize the 'nation in arms' in the Volkssturm. The latter concept in particular came to predominate in the regime's last four months of existence in 1945 as will be shown in Chapter Ten.
CHAPTER TEN
'A NATION IN ARMS'?

In the circumstances which faced the German leadership at the beginning of 1945 can one still speak of a leadership pursuing total war policies? This chapter will examine what remained of those policies, and efforts to have them adopted, in 1945. It will examine the efforts to mobilize the nation to repel the invader, to create a 'nation in arms', and discuss the reasons for the failure of these efforts. In the first few months, there were still purposeful policies adopted to win more men for the battle field, to convey more workers to the armaments factories and to maintain armaments production as long as possible. These policies may no longer have been able to serve the purpose of winning the war, but they did serve the purpose of prolonging the life of the regime, and therefore of some of its leaders. Even at this late stage there was disagreement about the policies to be adopted, but an overall trend of radicalization can be detected. Efforts were also made to mobilize the entire nation to resist the invader. The period also was marked by the final weakening and disintegration of Hitler's authority under the impact of impending defeat and his reluctance to intervene in day-to-day administration.

The failure of the Ardennes offensive had removed any last hopes of staving off defeat. Some National Socialists were still hoping for a 'miracle' brought about by new weapons.\(^1\) Speer was disclaiming

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responsibility for this propaganda. At the very beginning of January 1945, the Germans still held most of their advances in the West. The worsening of the air war made all aspects of administration and defence more difficult, and further depressed public morale, particularly in the West, which saw no way out. The leaders recognized these effects of the air war but were powerless to prevent them, a refrain which is a constant one in Goebbels' Final Entries.

On 12 January a new Russian offensive began in the East. Hitler had appointed Himmler as commander of the Army Group Weichsel (Vistula) on 21 January 1945. His task was to close the gaps existing between the Army Groups A and Centre, to prevent a breakthrough of the enemy in the direction of Danzig and Posen, to close off Posen, secure the deployment of new workers, and to organize national defence behind the whole Eastern Front. Himmler described this at the time as 'perhaps the most difficult task of my life up to now', and his life as 'at present unpleasant'. This appointment may have been prompted by Hitler's trust in Himmler. He had earlier commanded the

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2. Speer speech to 3. Lehrgang of commanding generals, 13 January 1945, BA R 3/1555, pp. 31-2; but see Schmidt, Speer Myth, pp. 112-17, for Speer's role in continuing this propaganda, and for his role in maintaining Goebbels' belief in the new weapons, see entry for 14 November 1944, Semmler, Goebbels, pp. 163-6, and Naumann's testimony in Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, p. 219 and note 10, p. 299.

3. Speer claims that Hitler and Bormann were still optimistic: Speer, Third Reich, p. 419.


5. See for example entry for 12 March 1945, Trevor-Roper, Final Entries, p. 113.


7. Himmler Fernschreiben to Hofer, 18 February 1945, BA NS 19/3298.
Army Group Upper Rhine with little success\(^8\) and proved ill-suited to his new position. He was replaced by Heinrici on 22 March.\(^9\) He was also replaced as head of army armaments by General Buhle in January 1945.\(^10\) The SS continued with its attempts to make military use of Vlasov and his supporters.\(^11\) Himmler considered, too late, that the Vlasov movement was of great importance to Germany.\(^12\) Goebbels and Himmler agreed on the need to dismiss Göring and Ribbentrop but Himmler did not see how to persuade Hitler to do this. Goebbels was toying with a reconstruction of the Cabinet with himself as Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Himmler as head of the armed forces and Bormann as Minister for the party.\(^13\)

By the beginning of February the Russians had reached the Oder and Neisse rivers, while on the Western front an American unit crossed the Rhine at Remagen. What little civilian life remained was decisively interrupted to send all possible men to the front.\(^14\)

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10. This occurred because Himmler's deputy, SS-Obergruppenführer Juttner, kept interfering with the system of self-responsibility of industry. When Hitler heard of this, he had Himmler replaced. Speer comments that the atmosphere of general indifference in Hitler's headquarters was such that this did not excite much interest: Speer, Third Reich, p. 420.


Attempts were made to contact both the British and the Soviet Union for peace negotiations but it was now too late for the regime to have anything to offer its enemies. The final Russian attack on Berlin began on 16 April. Hitler committed suicide on 30 April and his successor Admiral Dönitz surrendered by 8 May 1945.

Armaments production in January 1945 was still higher than the yearly average of 1943. The difficulties of pursuing any coherent economic strategy of total war intensified under the pressures of implementing defence measures, evacuation and destruction. Pressures on labour continued into 1945, since manpower was needed for the armed forces and armaments industry.

In April 1945 the Wehrersatzamt concluded that from 3 January to 27 March 1945 a total of 330,632 had come from call ups initiated by Goebbels, the widened armaments call ups, calling up of the age groups 1884 to 1896 and 1926 to 1928. In January 1945, despite Speer's objections, Hitler decided that from January to March 80,000 men would be called up a month. Goebbels reported to Hitler the results of an inspection to see which Luftwaffe soldiers


16. Herbst, Totale Krieg, p. 343. It had completely collapsed in some areas of the Reich; Sauer, Württemberg, p. 482; entry for 7 February 1945, von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 571.

17. Every last effort was made to increase working hours: Imhoff to Staatssekretär, 8 January 1945, 'Arbeitszeit der Röntgenassistentinnen und technischen Assistentinnen.', pp. 1-2; Imhoff to Staatssekretär, 18 January 1945, 'Arbeitszeit der Röntgenassistentinnen und technischen Assistentinnen.', pp. 1-2; Generalsekretär to Leiter Pro., Imhoff to Staatssekretär, 8 February 1945, 'Arbeitszeit der Röntgenassistentinnen und technischen Assistentinnen.', BA R 55/1221.


could be freed, and proposed far-reaching reductions in the size of
the Luftwaffe.20 Himmler issued orders to have all available SS
leaders report to the army or the Waffen-SS.21 On 1 February 1945
Bormann issued a circular on legal sanctions to secure inspection of
the armed forces, Waffen-SS and police in the home front. He pointed
to a 26 January decree on securing the front which threatened the
strongest punishment if such inspections were sabotaged.22

The disputes about priority for troops or the economy grew
even more heated as the pressure on the limited staffing resources
became greater. In January 1945 Berger was still urging on Himmler
the need for a central office to govern the total employment of
German men, which would have decentralized offices so that in every
area there was both a defence and work office.23 Berger provided
evidence to Himmler for Speer’s claim that weapons rather than men
were needed.24 In January Speer was still defending armaments
firms from attempts by Gauleiters to impose the giving up of those
liable for military service (Wehrpflichtige) of the classes 1900 and
older on his firms to relieve the flak helpers of the class of 1928. This
measure had not been discussed with Speer and he had to oppose it.

20. Goebbels to Hitler, 20 March 1945, BA NL 118/106, pp. 1-4; see also entry
for 16 March 1945, Trevor-Roper, Final Entries, pp. 152-3. On Goebbels’
continued combing out of the armed forces see entry for 28 January 1945,
von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 554-6.

21. SS-Hauptsturmführer sig to Gen.v. Herff, Chef des SS-Personalhauptamtes,
und bedingt kv.) durch die Hauptämter der SS’; Pohl to von Herff, Chef des
Personalhauptamtes, 30 March 1945, ‘Freistellung von Führern des
Wirtschafts-Verwaltungsdienstes für die Verwendung als
Truppenführer’, BA NS 34/17.

22. Bormann, 1 February 1945, ‘Rundschreiben 50/45.’, ‘Strafbestimmungen
zur Sicherung der Überprüfung der Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS und Polizei


24. ibid., p. 1.
He could not agree to give up staff over and above the special call up programme underway on Hitler's orders (SE Vi Aktion). He asked Goebbels only to order the giving up of staff from the war economy once it had been discussed with him and his armaments offices.\(^{25}\) In February he told Goebbels that he could not meet his request to make a further 20,000 kv men free from the OT to the army. The OT had already given up some 25,000 men to the front and only had 55,000 kv liable for military service of the classes 1901 and younger left, of whom 15,000 were being given up in the SE Vi-Aktion. A further 10,500 were already in the Army or Volkssturm in the Eastern Gaus, so he only had 30,000 remaining, many of whom were building the fortifications which Bormann advised could not be freed.\(^{26}\) On the same day Speer countered Goebbels' assumption that the armaments sector had only fulfilled one third of its January rate for call up action.\(^{27}\)

Speer again defended himself from allegations that the Armaments Ministry had not been willing to give up staff in a meeting with Naumann in February. The two men agreed that the Armaments Ministry had fulfilled its duty and call up itself was a matter for the armed forces recruiting offices (Wehrmachtersatzdienstellen). The two disagreed as to whether Volkssturm men should be seizable.\(^{28}\) In a subsequent circular Bormann advised the Gauleiters that call ups from the armaments industry had in all circumstances to be carried out with the


\(^{26}\) Speer to Goebbels, 15 February 1945, ibid., pp. 1-2.

\(^{27}\) Speer to Goebbels, 15 February 1945, ibid., p. 1.

\(^{28}\) Dr. Schmelter, 15 February 1945, "Vermerk über die Besprechung Reichsminister Speer-Staatsekretär Dr. Naumann.", ibid., p. 1.
agreement of the armaments offices. A letter from Bormann, Goebbels and Speer to the Gauleiters on 31 January noted that Hitler had ordered the raising of 240,000 kv men from the armaments industry of the classes 1901 and younger, but had also particularly protected emergency weapons programmes from these measures. The Gauleiters were asked to cooperate to implement both orders. The armaments offices on their own responsibility would name those to fulfil the quota. The Gau and Kreis commissions were to support the recruiting offices and postpone call up if possible. This was the draft letter which was also discussed in Speer and Naumann's meeting. Speer had expressed the desire, with which Naumann agreed, to have a very short circular making clear the Gauleiters were to cooperate. He believed that Goebbels' original draft left too many possibilities of interpretation.

In October 1944 Hitler had ordered the creation of the Front-OT, 25,000 young fit members of the OT used for building tasks. They could not be given up and they should therefore be left out of Speer's rate in future calculations of quotas, Speer contended. Himmler inspected the organization and administrative basis of the OT to suggest measures to free men for the front. The first result suggested that some 20,000 men could be saved.


30. 'Anlage' to 'Rundschreiben 100/45g.', 17 February 1945, Bormann, Goebbels and Speer, 'Einberufung aus der Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion.', ibid., pp. 2-3.


The need to reconquer lost territory, withstand new attacks, cope with the influx of refugees from border territories and protect the population complicated the pursuit of other policies and administration. Gaus and regions faced differing pressures, and the capacity and will to implement central directives varied greatly. Nonetheless, despite the disintegration of the country the apparatus of government and military defence continued, more or less effectively and with bureaucratic rationality, until the end. The SD judged the popular attitude to be particularly good. 'This time the home front can not be accused of a collapse.' 34 RPÄ reports suggested that the working class was the most in favour of radical measures to pursue the war. 35

Meetings of the state secretaries were held in Berlin to coordinate administrative matters and respond to the problems of the refugees. This coordination was particularly necessary in the light of the increasing decentralization of leaders, and evacuation of ministries. 36 In January schools in reception Gaus were closed to make room for refugees. Only political schools were excepted. 37 In February Lammers issued a decree banning the evacuation of central offices from Berlin without Hitler's approval. This ban was


35. Steinert, Hitler's War, pp. 302-3.

36. Uwe D. Adam, 'Persecution of the Jews', p. 141; Baird, Nazi War Propaganda, p. 244.

subsequently extended to middle and lower offices. Goebbels also favoured a policy where the removal of Wehrmacht and civilian offices from the East only occurred with express approval. The capital was not to be seen as threatened, because 'the Oder position must be held under all circumstances', Bormann advised in February. By then the state secretaries agreed that the evacuation in the East was no longer planned; the prospect of evacuating a million people to the east of the Rhine was also investigated. By 23 March 1945 Hitler had agreed to the evacuation of the population ten to twenty kilometres behind the battle area of Army Group West. The first priority was to be the evacuation of fourteen to seventeen year olds and all those liable for service. He ordered areas, whose occupation by the enemy was anticipated, to be evacuated; he made it the duty of the Gauleiters to secure this. Although seemingly impossible the rescue of citizens had to be coped with, Bormann


41. Signature, 6 March 1945, 'Vortragsnotiz', 'Staatssekretärsbesprechung am 5.3.1945.', pp. 1-2; signature, submission, 15 February 1945, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'Staatssekretärsbesprechung am 15.2.14.00 Uhr. Vortragsnotiz.', p. 2; signature, submission, 28 February 1945, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'Staatssekretärsbesprechung am 28.2.1945 Vortragsnotiz.', BA MA RW4/ v. 703, pp. 1-5.

advised.\textsuperscript{43} In practice these instructions were increasingly ignored because they could not be followed.\textsuperscript{44}

As late as 18 April the question of evacuations from Berlin was still being discussed at a meeting of state secretaries. They suggested to Hitler that some 500,000 women and children could still be evacuated to Mecklenburg. It was also decided that the suggestion of setting up a Reich fortress Tyrol (\textit{Reichsfestung Tyrol}), as suggested by its Gauleiter Hofer, would only have a purpose if the feeding of the troops and inhabitants was secured. The Armaments Ministry was to inspect the area with a view to setting up production for infantry munitions and anti-tank weapons (\textit{Panzerfäuste}).\textsuperscript{45} Earlier meetings of these state secretaries had occupied themselves extensively with the continuing influx of refugees. They planned to withdraw the classes of 1929 and 1930 from areas threatened by the enemy, and to collect the class of 1929 in training camps. Speer promised to use all means to maintain railway travel. Two million workers were to be used, and thousands of men continuously stationed in the junctions to completely recreate shunting or marshalling stations. It was agreed that the priority for transport was first operational transport for the armed forces, including fuel, second coal, third food, fourth armaments and fifth refugees. Hitler was to uphold this order so that the Gauleiters, who independently often put refugees first, were

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[43.] Bormann, 23 March 1945, 'Geheime Reichssache!', 'Rundschreiben 166/45 g. RS.', 'Aufnahme der umquartierten Volksgenossen etc. aus Räumungsgebieten', BA NS 6/354, pp. 1-2.
\item[44.] Entries for 13 March, 27 March and 4 April 1945 in Trevor-Roper, \textit{Final Entries}, pp. 124, 244, 314.
\item[45.] Signature, WFS\textit{t/Qu. Nr. 003766/45 g. Kdos., 19 April 1945, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'Staatssekretärbesprechung am 18.4.1945.', 'Vortragsnotiz.', BA MA RW4/v. 703, pp. 1-3. On these plans for a last Alpine redoubt, see also Hildebrand Troll, 'Aktionen zur Kriegsbeendigung im Frühjahr 1945' in Martin Broszat and Hartmut Mehringer, \textit{Bayern in der NS-Zeit V} (Munich, 1983), pp. 687-8.
\end{enumerate}
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bound by this.\textsuperscript{46} An attempt by Gauleiter Hofer to seek exemption from the evacuations was rejected by Himmler who pointed out that the need and distress of other areas of the Reich was much greater.\textsuperscript{47}

In the middle of March Speer wrote to the Army General Staff stating that operationally important street bridges could only be destroyed on the particular order of the OKW; others which were not operationally important should only be dismantled.\textsuperscript{48} In April at Speer's suggestion Hitler ordered that operationally important bridge building works had to be destroyed so that their use by the enemy was impossible. The OKW would ascertain the areas and the strongest punishments would be exacted if the measures were not obeyed. All other works were to be destroyed only if the Reich defence commissioners and the responsible offices of the Transport and Armaments Ministries ascertained the suspension of their production or the impossibility of evacuation. All other objects of transport were to be paralysed.\textsuperscript{49} Speer ordered firms which were not evacuated to continue production to the last day.\textsuperscript{50}

Speer kept Hitler continuously advised of the consequences of the losses of German territory for the economy and armaments production. In January he pointed out that the Russian advance endangered the rail line from Oppeln to Gotenhafen. Disruption of this

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\item Signature, 8 March 1945, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'Vortragsnotiz', 'Staatssekretärsbesprechung am 8.3.45.', pp. 1-2, and signature, 6 March 1945, 'Vortragsnotiz', 'Staatssekretärsbesprechung am 5.3.1945.', BA MA RW4/v. 703, pp. 1-3; Speer to Bormann, 22 January 1945, IfZ APK, 108 00849.
\item Himmler, Fernschreiben to Hofer, 18 February 1945, BA NS 19/3298.
\item Speer to General Staff of the Army, General of Pioneers and Fortifications, 15 March 1945, BA R 3/1593.
\item Bormann, 13 April 1945, 'Geheime Reichssache', 'Anordnung 209/45 g. Rs.', 'ARLZ.-Massnahmen.', BA NS 6/354, pp. 1-2.
\item Speer to Gauleiter Uiberreither of Steiermark, 4 December 1944, 'Geheim', BA R 3/1603, p. 1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
line would endanger sea travel in the Baltic, the armaments industry and rail transport.\textsuperscript{51} By the end of January Speer warned that if Upper Silesia were lost Germany would lose its one remaining source of coal, the remaining coal supply capacity being only 26 per cent of that of January 1944. The loss of crude steel capacity would mean that only some 175,000 tonnes of munitions could be produced. Speer concluded that the German armaments industry would then not be in a position to meet the requirements of the front in munitions, weapons and tanks.\textsuperscript{52} Speer's paper of 15 March, discussing the economic situation of March-April 1945, began by noting that the economic collapse of the Reich would be effected more quickly since the loss of Upper Silesia. He emphasized that in four to eight weeks they could count on the final collapse of the German economy.\textsuperscript{53} Berlin had become the Reich's armaments centre.\textsuperscript{54}

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The need for more troops seemed pressing to the leadership.\textsuperscript{55} Hitler agreed in February that Himmler should call up 6,000 of the class of 1929 to strengthen his rear defensive lines. He also agreed to the setting up of a women's battalion 'on probation'.\textsuperscript{56} The women


\textsuperscript{52} Copies of this memorandum went to Hitler, Guderian, Ganzenmüller and Bormann: Speer, 30 January 1945, 'Geheime Reichssache', 'Zur Rüstungslage Februar-März 1945.', BA R 3/1535, pp. 1-10.


\textsuperscript{54} Entry for 29 January 1945, von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 560.

\textsuperscript{55} The armed forces called up men to the class of 1886: Bormann, 14 February 1945, 'Geheim!', 'Bekanntgabe 93/45g.', 'Verwendung der Offiziere des Heeres im 6. Kriegsjahr.', BA NS 19/772, pp. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{56} Bormann, 28 February 1945, 'Vermerk für Pg. Friedrichs und Pg. Dr. Klopfer', 'Verstärkung der kämpfenden Truppe.', BA NS 6/785, p. 1. See also entry for 4 March 1945 in Trevor-Roper, Final Entries, p. 41.
should be trained as soon as possible in connection with the Reichsfrauenführung. If this women's battalion proved itself then others would immediately be set up. Hitler expected a decided repercussion on the attitude (Haltung) of the men. This plan and others for female participation in the Wehrmacht were never realized.\(^57\)

Bormann pointed out that while they offered fifteen year olds and women to strengthen the front, some 500-600,000 soldiers were in the Reich on leave passes given out too easily. This had to be tackled with particular severity.\(^58\) This was a problem which also concerned other members of the leadership.\(^59\) Bormann's concern about this found expression in a March order which made every citizen responsible for seizing deserters who had to be ruthlessly eradicated. The number of scattered Wehrmacht personnel who had lost contact with their units were also to be seized quickly. Keitel issued an attached order to restrict travel and leave for members of the Wehrmacht.\(^60\)

57. Tuten, 'Germany and the World Wars', p. 56.

58. Bormann, 28 February 1945, 'Vermerk für Pg. Friedrichs und Pg. Dr. Klopfer', 'Verstärkung der kämpfenden Truppe.', BA NS 6/785, pp. 3-4. For another indication that the Party Chancellory considered this to be a problem, see Dr. Metzner, 8 March 1945, 'Vermerk für Pg. Walkenhorst', 'Nicht erfaßte und herumreisende Soldaten.', pp. 1-4, and Dr. Metzner, 10 March 1945, 'Vermerk für Pg. Walkenhorst.', 'Stellungnahme zum Vermerk des Reichsleiters Bormann vom 28.2.45 über die Verstärkung, der kämpfenden Truppe an Pg. Friedrichs und Pg. Dr. Klopfer.', BA NS 6/785, pp. 1-4; Bormann, 10 March 1945, 'Geheim', 'Anordnung 129/45g.', 'Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der Kampfkraft der Front durch Erfassung der Versprengten bzw. fahnenflüchtigen Soldaten sowie Verminderung des Urlauber- und Reiseverkehrs der Wehrmacht.', BA NS 6/354, pp. 1-3.

59. Entries for 3 and 7 March 1945, Trevor-Roper, Final Entries, pp. 33-4, 70. Efforts by Gauleiter Wagner of Baden in September 1944 to organize stragglers into effective fighting units had little effect: Grill, Nazi Movement in Baden, p. 458

60. Bormann, 10 March 1945, 'Geheim', 'Anordnung 129/45g.', 'Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der Kampfkraft der Front durch Erfassung der Versprengten bzw. fahnenflüchtigen Soldaten sowie Verminderung des Urlauber- und Reiseverkehrs der Wehrmacht.', BA NS 6/354, p. 3.
The attitude to increases in employment of women remained ambivalent. Despite Hitler's plans to train a women's battalion, in March he decided the first priority in the use of women by the armed forces was to secure their protection. The employment of women by the armed forces was unrestricted outside the territorial areas of the command of army groups. The commander of the army group had to ensure the evacuation in good time of all women not directly necessary for maintaining action readiness. In general, with the exception of the volunteer flak batteries, women could not be called on to work firing weapons in battle. Those who conveyed orders to the fighting troops or serviced equipment were to be treated as combatants.61 Women aged up to 55 were on the other hand used to build fortifications and dig trenches in some areas.62

The fortifications and defensive lines built up with great effort, particularly the Westwall and those in the Eastern Gaus, were found to be quickly overrun and achieve insufficient or no contribution to defence.63 The manpower to occupy the positions was not present in the East. Hitler therefore decided that in future all available workers and means were to be used at the focal points to build the necessary deepness of the positions. All available units and weapons were only to be employed in these defence lines. It was the Gauleiters' task to impart a positive attitude to the constructing personnel and to do everything to place the newly built positions into a condition capable

62. Mammach, Volkssturm, p. 27.
of defence.64 Speer had earlier recommended use of the party to ensure supply of materials in the front line.65

Use of the Volkssturm continued to be urged, both as a military means of gaining additional troops, as a response to what was seen as the defeatism of regular army officers66 and as a political means of making the struggle more all encompassing. Despite Speer's promises the Volkssturm was short of weapons.67 This meant that Volkssturm units not immediately in action had all their weapons except the Panzerfaust taken from them.68 The Volkssturm encompassed all men, in case of a threat close to home. Until then they were not to be continuously withdrawn from important civilian activities.69 Volkssturm units were to be employed in the face of a direct enemy


threat, rather than used as an additional reserve to be exhausted.\textsuperscript{70} In particular the Volkssturm was not intended to interfere with the production of the armaments emergency programme (\textit{Rüstungsnotprogramm}). The call up of specialists employed in the armaments emergency programme could only follow by arrangement with the chairman of the armaments commissions.\textsuperscript{71}

Even greater reliance was placed on the employment of National Socialist ideology as a means of strengthening resistance and attaining victory.\textsuperscript{72} In March Bormann made the political activation and fanaticizing the troops the most urgent task of troop leaders.\textsuperscript{73} He wanted German propaganda considerably strengthened. The Wehrmacht had to speak to the people frequently.\textsuperscript{74} A Party Chancellery official, Noack, suggested that NSFOs fall back on the old proven propaganda methods of the Kampfzeit.\textsuperscript{75} The surviving Party Chancellery files of this period indicate that considerable attention was paid to this issue. Yet there was still concern from Himmler and


\textsuperscript{72} Bormann, Fernschreiben to all Reichsleiter, 7 April 1945, BA NS 6/134, p. 2; Göring, 17 February 1945, 'Reichsmarschall Befehl Nr. 14', BA MA RL1/4, pp. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{73} Bormann, 14 March 1945, 'Rundschreiben 148/45.', 'NS-Führung der Wehrmacht.', BA NS 6/353, pp. 1-3.


\textsuperscript{75} Noack, 9 March 1945, 'Entwurf. Propagandaanweisung für die Wehrmacht.', BA NS 6/137, p. 3.
the Party Chancellery that the NSFOs should not seem like political commissars.76

On 10 April Walkenhorst, a Party Chancellery official, reported that National Socialist leadership work in the armed forces had come to an absolute stop, as a result of the holding up of Hitler's order of 13 March, which granted Bormann a decisive influence in political leadership in the Wehrmacht, dissolved General Reinecke's National Socialist leadership staff and replaced it by a national socialist leadership staff led by Bormann.77 Party Chancellery officials considered General Reinecke to have failed, and wanted to be able to give fundamental orders about political education and leadership to the Wehrmacht.78 Bormann himself suggested a direct role for the Party Chancellery in February. He rejected a suggestion that Reinecke be replaced by General von Hauenschild, and commented that Himmler could not take it over since Hitler opposed giving Himmler more tasks.79 These plans did not come into effect because the various opposing, but unidentified, streams in Hitler's headquarters (presumably the military staff) had proved stronger than the Party Chancellery.80 A decree by Hitler authorizing the change drawn up on 13 March had still not been signed by 29 March. The result was an uneasy interregnum in which Reinecke no longer felt responsible yet


the Party Chancellery could not yet act as the centre of command.\textsuperscript{81} Bormann's response to calls by his officials to clarify matters was to 'let the matter be'. In view of the various enemy breakthroughs it would be foolish for them to occupy themselves with organizational changes. All men should now be in action.\textsuperscript{82} The change in Bormann's attitude from February to late March suggests that he may not have fully recognized the seriousness of Germany's situation in February.\textsuperscript{83}

In January 1945 a Kreisleiter Dotzler prepared suggestions for the creation of a resistance movement in the Eastern territories occupied by the Bolsheviks. Bormann considered the paper worth reading and passed it to Himmler. Himmler considered that some unspecified suggestions by Dotzler were practicable, and instructed SS-Obergruppenführer Prützmann to discuss his special task with Bormann.\textsuperscript{84} Despite Dotzler's hopes of encouraging sabotage behind the lines, the OKW was aware that Germans behind Soviet lines did not resist. A paper on conditions behind the lines stated that the only sabotage, and the greatest help to German fighters behind the lines


\textsuperscript{82} See Bormann's comments on the side of Hess's document, BA NS 6/144, pp. 1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{83} For other evidence of this, see Martin Bormann to Gerda Bormann, 28 January 1945, \textit{Bormann Letters}, p. 163; Orlow, \textit{Nazi Party}, II, p. 479.

(Rückkämpfer), had come from Poles.85 The Volkssturm had not been trained to engage in partisan warfare86, even though Himmler had pointed out the need for such training in 1944.87

The war situation forced the Germans to exhaust all possibilities to reduce the attacking strength of their enemies, Bormann told Party leaders in March. This could be achieved by striking at his supply, destruction of camps and communication links, and reporting of military developments behind enemy lines. Only determined brave men and women were suitable for these tactics. The Gauleiters were to deputize reliable party activists to select people for these tasks, and to report their names to the responsible HSSPF with the catchword 'Werewolf'.88 The enemy had to be taught that he had no weapon against the secret war of the Werewolf, Bormann claimed.89

The extent to which the Werewolf organization, which was intended to fight a guerilla war behind enemy lines, seriously functioned as such is doubtful.90 Goebbels certainly hoped it would encourage resistance among the German population itself,91 and devoted considerable effort to strengthen its activities so that it was led with

86. Wright, 'Army of Despair', p. 22.
87. 'Rede des Reichsführers-SS in Grafenwoehr am 25.7.1944', 'Geheim', BA NS 19/4015, p. 19.
89. Bormann Fernschreiben to all Reichsleiter, Gauleiter and Verbändeführer, 7 April 1945, BA NS 6/134, pp. 1-2; Bormann to Himmler, 8 February 1945, 'Geheime Reichssache', 'Vorbereitungen für die bevorstehende Feindoffensive im Westen.', IfZ APK, 107 01002.
90. See Whiting, Werewolf, pp. 146-8, 188-9.
91. Entries for 29 and 31 March, 1, 2 and 3 April 1945, in Trevor-Roper, Final Entries, pp. 269, 289, 296-7, 304.
'spirit and enthusiasm'. He also wanted to radicalize the conduct of the war further by withdrawing Germany from the Geneva Convention, but Hitler was persuaded by Keitel, Himmler, Bormann and Speer not to agree to this proposal. Goebbels' comment on Speer and Bormann's attitude was that it was 'semi-bourgeois. Their thinking may be revolutionary but they do not act that way.'

The Party leaders were urged to carry out their orders with determination. Authorities were to ensure that their orders were carried out quickly and without contradiction by offices under them. Bormann also pointed to the duty of party leaders to provide higher offices with a clear knowledge of the situation. (Gauleiters continued to seek advice and support from Goebbels.) The closest collaboration between the party and Wehrmacht was necessary to lift the people to the final struggle. Bormann concluded that as in 'the struggle and time of need that was 1932', the party had to be the 'unbreakable backbone and the engine of our war leadership which drives everything forwards.'

92. Entry for 2 April 1945, ibid., p. 297.


97. Bormann, 10 March 1945, 'Geheim!', 'Anordnung 129/45 g.', 'Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der Kampfkraft der Front durch Erfassung der versprengten bzw. fahnenflüchtigen Soldaten sowie Verminderung des Urlauber- und Reiseverkehrs der Wehrmacht', BA NS 6/354, p. 3.
The failure of party and civilian offices, particularly in the East, to withstand the 'evacuation psychosis', which allegedly led to many areas being evacuated without being defended, led to a proposal to use political leaders in endangered western and eastern Gaus to mobilize and employ all manpower and material for resistance. Bormann accepted these suggestions and by 15 March was advising Keitel and Gauleiter Henlein to that effect. These proposals were criticized by Berger, who asked that Himmler be informed that with the current mood at the front such political fighting commanders (Kampfkommandanten) in party uniform would be killed. The policy proved to be unsuccessful. Increasingly the SS de facto and not the party fulfilled the role of ensuring that resistance continued under all conditions. Himmler pointed out to a Higher SS and Police Leader that he would have SS leaders shot for failures in this regard.

Gauleiters were exhorted by Bormann that Hitler expected them to master the situation in their Gaus 'with lightning speed and utmost

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98. Ruder, 24 February 1945, 'Vorlage', 'Sondereinsatz der Parteikanzlei: zur Verstärkung der Partei in frontnahen Gebieten.', BA NS 6/169, p. 2. These problems manifested themselves as early as November 1944 in the evacuation of Alsace - Himmler to Hofmann HSSPF Südwest, 29 November 1944, 'Nur persönlich öffnen!', BA NS 19/2230, pp. 1-2. See also signature, HSSPF West to Himmler, 12 December 1944, 'Geheim!', 'Tätigkeitsbericht.', BA NS 19/751, p. 3; Himmler to Bormann, 23 February 1945, BA NS 19/475.


100. Berger to Brandt, 18 February 1945, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'Politische Kampfkommandanten.', BA NS 19/3833, pp. 1-2. On the increasing hostility to the party, which Bormann refused to believe, see Steinert, Hitler's War, p. 308.

101. It also involved sending party leaders to army personnel offices and the offices of military district commanders: Orlow, Nazi Party. II, p. 480.

102. See for example Ryan, Last Battle, pp. 226-8, 344, 379.

hardness'.

All political leaders who had led the population back in treks were given until 20 February to report to the responsible Kreisleitung. If not they would be treated as deserters. In February party leaders were reminded by Bormann that the current situation required exemplary leadership and unconditional trust. Hitler expected that every party leader placed his personal ego in the background and lived for his leadership tasks. All who abandoned others for their family, sought to distance themselves from the party or did not fight to the last were to be expelled from the NSDAP.

Again in March Bormann exhorted party leaders to direct themselves always so their 'courage and energy' gave an example to their party comrades. Political leaders had to fight or fall in their Gaus. These instructions illustrated Bormann and Hitler's unpreparedness to contemplate behind the lines resistance; repeated with threats of increased punishment, they were prompted by increasing evidence that while the administration and armed forces may have possessed the discipline to keep at their posts as the situation worsened, the party leadership, particularly at the level of Gauleiters, did not. The highest levels of the leadership were aware of this and apparently


108. Bormann Fernschreiben to all Reichsleiters, Gauleiters and Verbändeführer, 1 April 1945, 'Anordnung', ibid., p. 1.

had no explanation for it.\textsuperscript{110} The party as well as the armed forces had 'crumbled'.\textsuperscript{111} Goebbels commented 'in the good days many of the old fighters and their wives played popular leader and mother of the country, but now they wish they were back in their cheese shops or plumbing establishments.'\textsuperscript{112}

There was some justification to party claims that the army did not understand how to use the Volkssturm in a people's war:\textsuperscript{113} the lack of training the Volkssturm in the techniques of partisan warfare, and Major General Kissel's view that the Volkssturm should only be used where the Wehrmacht units were too weak.\textsuperscript{114} Because of its role in the creation and organization of the Volkssturm the party itself must share responsibility. Bormann appears to have emphasized political education and reliability at the expense of its military role. A reluctance to admit that training in guerilla warfare tactics might be necessary, because it admitted the possibility of defeat, helped contribute to the Volkssturm's problems.\textsuperscript{115}

The Volkssturm, the hopes Goebbels pinned on a defence of Berlin like the defence of Moscow in 1941,\textsuperscript{116} and attempts to set up partisan movements only proved to be of limited success, with the


\textsuperscript{111} Entry for 7 February 1945, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, p. 572.

\textsuperscript{112} Quoted in entry for 26 March 1945, \textit{ibid.}, p. 623.

\textsuperscript{113} 'Bericht des . . . Pg. Mauer', BA NS 6/169, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{114} Wright, 'Army of Despair', p. 206.

\textsuperscript{115} Entry for 11 March 1945, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, p. 606.

\textsuperscript{116} Entries for 28 February and 4 March 1945, Trevor-Roper, \textit{Final Entries}, pp. 8-10.41; entry for 1 March 1945, von Oven, \textit{Finale Furioso}, pp. 595-7. Himmler had also recommended this as a model: 'Rede des Reichsführers-SS in Grafenwoehr am 25.7.1944', 'Geheim', BA NS 19/4015, p. 4.
Volkssturm's younger members being more committed to their tasks than the older men.\textsuperscript{117} It was hampered by lack of public support.\textsuperscript{118} The regime's reluctance to make use of women in a military capacity prevented it from exploiting some committed supporters.\textsuperscript{119} The effects of the air war were largely responsible for the absence of serious resistance in the West once the formal military and governmental apparatus had been removed, as members of the leadership recognized.\textsuperscript{120} War weariness and the lack of a political culture of the 'citizen soldier' also played a part in dashing the regime's hopes. Instances of corruption and a 'sauve qui peut' mentality among party leaders also lessened the chances of calls to a 'nation in arms' being successful.

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On 15 March in a paper warning Hitler that the German economy would collapse within four to eight weeks, Speer asserted that the German people had done their duty, and could not be blamed for the loss of the war. He suggested a number of measures to help the population such as distribution of stocks of clothing and other consumer objects, and measures to secure German agricultural

\textsuperscript{117} See the examples cited in Alfons Heck, \textit{A Child of Hitler} (New York, 1986), pp. 184-7, 190, 195-6; Burton Wright III, \textit{Army of Despair}, p. 234. Possibly because of the effects of the air war, and the fear of Soviet occupation, the Volkssturm fought considerably better in the East than the West: Wright, \textit{Army of Despair}, pp. 237-8, 210, 224.


\textsuperscript{120} Entries for 4 and 14 March 1945, Trevor-Roper, \textit{Final Entries}, pp. 38, 134. See also Klein, \textit{Köln}, pp. 270, 273.
production. More importantly Speer suggested that no destruction of industry, energy or transport should occur if battle was carried further into the Reich; even the previous paralysing of firms had to end if reconquest was not possible. Instead on 20 March Hitler issued his 'scorched earth' order. He ordered that all important installations and objects in Reich territory which the enemy could use to continue the fight were to be destroyed.

Telling Hitler that he was one of his few colleagues ever to tell him his views openly and honestly, Speer again wrote to Hitler on 29 March, claiming he believed in a favourable change for their cause until 18 March. He pointed out that he had achieved much for Germany. 'Without my work the war would perhaps have been lost in 1942-43'. He had not mastered his task with specialist knowledge but with the qualities of an artist. Speer now claimed that in the days of victory in 1940 the leadership had shown themselves too easy, and lost a year of precious time through comfort and indolence. In passing Hitler his letter of 15 March he had firmly expected that Hitler would agree with the proposals, but Hitler's comments indicated he believed the people were lost if the war was lost. The future belonged to the stronger Eastern peoples, Hitler told him. He had been 'deeply shocked' by these words, and saw the destruction order as the first


step to carry out these views. Until then he hoped that not only the new weapons and planes but also their fanatical belief in the future would enable the people and leadership to make the last sacrifice. He could not however believe in their success if at the same time they were destroying the foundation of the people's life.

The final months of the regime brought increased pressure on all its leaders, pressure to decide their own fate. At the same time the prize of so many rivalries - the leadership - seemed nearer than ever. Bormann had wanted Hitler to evacuate to Bavaria while there was still time but elected to stay with Hitler, the source of his authority, in Berlin. At the same time, his actions show an intensified desire to oust his rivals. Here he was assisted by the efforts of Göring and Himmler to take on Hitler's authority, Göring believing that Hitler would be sealed off in Berlin and Himmler being persuaded by the group surrounding him - principally, Schellenberg, his masseur Kersten, Berger and Rudolf Brandt, the deputy chief of Himmler's personal staff - into negotiations with representatives of the World Jewish Congress and Count Bernadotte to free Jewish and other concentration camp victims. The publicity given to an aborted attempt by Himmler to negotiate with Eisenhower led to Hitler's dismissing him from the party. After Hitler's death Bormann clearly still hoped to be able to exercise a role in the government of Hitler's successor Doenitz, and was killed while attempting to make

124. ibid., p. 4.

125. For accounts of these negotiations see Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls, pp. 46-7, 58, 64-5; Schellenberg, Labyrinth, pp. 377-405; Kersten, Kersten Memoirs, chapters 38 and 39.

126. On these negotiations see Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls, pp. 87-8, 91-3, 105-119.

his way to Flensburg. Himmler too still saw himself as a potential figure in Doenitz’s government. Because of the support he initially gave Doenitz and the forces still at his disposal, he could only slowly be eased out of any position. It appears likely that Himmler did not realize the outside world’s view of him and had not anticipated an end to his political activities or his life.

The two leaders who can be said to have been more clear sighted about total war proved also to be more clear sighted about their future prospects. While Goebbels had hoped until the end in the possibility of a breakdown of the enemy alliance, he had been preparing himself for years for the prospects of defeat.\textsuperscript{128} To him this had meant suicide and the deaths of his entire family; he did not share the illusions of Goering, Himmler or Speer that there might be a place for him in a Germany after National Socialism. He took refuge in the consolations of philosophy and in the perfection of the myth of national socialism. Appointed Chancellor by Hitler Goebbels enjoyed a last day of authority in Berlin and a last triumph over Bormann in that his authority rather than Bormann’s survived Hitler’s death.\textsuperscript{129}

Speer’s actions in the last few months of the regime - in particular his well known thwarting of Hitler’s scorched earth orders - may be seen in part as a preparation for life in a Germany after national socialism.\textsuperscript{130} The decrease in Hitler’s authority made evading his orders less dangerous than it had once been. Indeed Orlow suggests that the scorched earth order broke the spell of Hitler’s


\textsuperscript{129} For detailed accounts of the last minute maneouvrung see Hugh Trevor-Roper, \textit{The Last Days}, passim., and James P. O’Donnell, \textit{The Berlin Bunker} (London, 1979).

\textsuperscript{130} On Hitler’s reaction, see entry for 27 March 1945, Trevor-Roper, \textit{Final Entries}, p. 250.
Speer was assisted by Gauleiters Hoffmann, Schlessmann, Kaufmann, by the Reich commissioner for the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart, by Ohlendorf and by Bormann's deputy Klopfer. Only three Gauleiters (Grohé, Florian and Meyer) refused to cooperate with his sabotage of Hitler's orders and only a few Gauleiters like Hanke, Goebbels and Stürtz of Brandenburg continued the struggle fanatically. Speer would have been aware that the effects of Hitler's scorched earth policy could not have been as catastrophic as he suggested. Speer succeeded in making the transition to the Flensburg government as Minister of Economics and Production, even when Doenitz dropped other leading National Socialists. Editing the files of his ministerial office to remove incriminating documents, Speer was also presenting himself to his interrogators as an apolitical technocrat. He may have unrealistically hoped to be able to pursue his career as a Minister, but he had realistically assessed his ability to distance himself from the regime he had once hoped to lead.

Increasingly in 1945 the population and the party had been exhorted by the leadership to stand firm, to resist with fanaticism and radicalism. These exhortations became all the more vehement as the regime's own ability to influence events decreased. The gradual capture of various areas of Germany diminished the effectiveness of

136. ibid., pp. 14-15, 139-42, 144.
any central government orders. The demands may therefore be seen as an attempt to overcome feelings of powerlessness. They also reflect the last hope that some miracle of extraordinary effort or enemy dissension could prevent defeat. Attempts to create a 'nation in arms' by means of the Volkssturm under party leadership failed despite the regime's increasing verbal and actual radicalism in pursuit of the war effort. The process of political radicalization which continued in 1945 was the strongest expression of an emphasis which began to emerge from 1943 on and which originated in the National Socialist analysis of World War I, the importance of ideology in overcoming the odds. Willingness to contemplate abandoning the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war on the part of Goebbels, and in particular Hitler's final willingness to set up a women's battalion were signs of the leadership's recognition of the desperation and seriousness of the situation.
At least two National Socialist leaders, Goebbels and Speer, looking back on the war effort in 1945, believed that Germany had not organized the home front sufficiently for the war effort. They attributed this to failings of leadership, lack of support for total war among the leadership, the lack of central authority and Hitler's unwillingness to take the necessary steps. For the greater part of the period 1942 to 1945 they had been allies in seeking to have greater mobilization of the home front for the war effort. Speer and Goebbels criticized the pace and scope of measures to be adopted. They were more conscious of the urgency of the situation facing Germany than either Bormann or Himmler appear to have been. Rather than apply measure after measure in a piecemeal fashion they wanted all possible measures introduced as soon as possible. They, particularly Speer, are also seemingly less aware of the geographic and social restrictions on making more staff available.

Over-confidence, and lack of political planning, marked the German decisions to declare war on the Soviet Union and the United States. Hitler responded to the resulting military crisis of 1941-42 by appointing von Unruh to find additional manpower for the armed forces, ordering the government and party to simplify their staffing and responsibilities and agreeing to Todt's proposals to control armaments production. These measures and the free path he ensured for Speer after his appointment showed that Hitler was willing to adopt measures to reorganize the home front, increasingly orienting it to the demands of war. He was not, however, prepared to accept the
more urgent timetable that Goebbels in particular proposed, nor was he willing to support moves to seek a compromise peace. This was the period when the regime still had the most options but Hitler still seemed to hope for military victory. It also was the period when leading members of the regime realized that action needed to be taken but their efforts were unco-ordinated. Psychologically it was difficult for them to follow policies with any sense of urgency: Hitler's authority had been strengthened by his series of military successes; there was still the hope that the military setbacks were temporary; and small initial measures seemed adequate. Todt and Schellenberg were alone in their analysis that the war had to be ended quickly by political means.

After Stalingrad Hitler set in motion requirements for men and women to report for labour duty, businesses in inessential areas to be closed and further restrictions of numbers in, and functions of, government. These measures proved to be less effective in practice than might have been expected. Some, particularly the direction that women should report for work, were interpreted conservatively; others, such as the closures of inessential businesses, were implemented unevenly. The Ausschuss' bureaucratic structure seems to have slowed the process of decision making and encouraged defensive reactions to criticism. The problems of public morale which the measures were partly designed to counter were intensified by their implementation. At the same time the setting up of the Ausschuss seemed to lead to a lessening of attention to the need for stricter policies on the organization of the home front.

The thesis has suggested that the hopes of Speer and Goebbels about the amount of production and labour which could still be squeezed out of the economy were probably exaggerated. Some of
Speer's complaints about the regime's failings where total war was concerned may be attributed to his desire to flatter post-war interrogators. This is not to say that there was not inefficiency, overlapping, disorganization and confusion in the economy. This was compounded by regionalism, as exemplified in the role of the Gauleiters, and in this respect Germany can be compared unfavourably to the more centralized British administration. For the greater part of his ministerial life Speer had had support from Hitler for the expansion of his powers such as few other ministers received; his complaints that he did not receive even more power suggest unrealistic expectations. While Speer devoted considerable criticism to the Gauleiters as an obstacle to more efficient policies, he did not suggest that the 'self-responsibility of industry' created similar problems. Just as the SS's responsibility for concentration camps and the extermination of the Jews went unquestioned by these leaders so, on the whole, did the efficiency of industry. Although there were suggestion of corruption and inefficiency in industry the only opposition to Speer's methods came from party circles, including Bormann and Sauckel. Greater rationalization and control of the armaments industry might have brought greater production.

If there was one area which might have been scrutinized further it was this, but such scrutiny and criticism only developed slowly and without a strong political campaign along these lines. Since Speer's system appeared to be delivering increased production this would have muted criticism. Hitler's admiration for successful entrepreneurs, the party's own middle class support and Speer's ability if attacked to call on Hitler's approval of his policy may have made some reluctant to criticize. These obstacles were less likely to affect Goebbels or Bormann, both of whom exercised at least a verbal
radicalism. In Goebbels' case this went further. One of the attractions of total war for him seemed to be that it allowed scope for an anti-bourgeois animus and a certain radicalism. The absence of such criticisms in the main until late 1944 suggest that Speer's success in increasing production, his alliance with Goebbels on the issue of total war, his capacity for self-advertisement and his emphasis on the 'technical' nature of his task discouraged criticism. As long as Speer's system of industrial self-responsibility produced results, he enjoyed Hitler's protection. The failure of this production to affect the course of the war weakened his position by mid-1944 and the party gained an increased influence in the economy. This influence had positive as well as negative effects. At times Speer was inclined to overlook practical or political considerations for the sake of pursuing short-term production increases.

Speer and Goebbels expected too much. In 1944 they delivered almost one million extra men to the front, and had maintained production under increasingly difficult conditions, even when the production could not be used. The regime had succeeded in keeping part of Goebbels' promise of 1938 - the 'stab in the back' of 1918 was not repeated.

The regime did not have the resources to fulfill all the demands it had to meet. This explains both the urgency with which Goebbels and Speer in particular pursued the cause of even greater use of resources for the war effort and why they were disappointed. They were expecting more than was possible could be achieved because they knew more had to be achieved for the regime to survive.

Members of the regime were aware of a lack of popular support for the war; some of them like Goebbels had shared it. They were conscious of a lack of national self-confidence, a brittleness among the
population as a whole. This was a constraint on their demands on the population. Additional restrictions on the leadership were from 1942 on cumulatively the economic and psychological impact of the air war, the worsening military situation and the fear of a repeat of 1918.

These factors hampered the leadership’s room to manoeuvre in a variety of ways. The impact of the air war and the needs of a population in a long war meant that a certain level of civilian production had to be maintained to allow for the replacement of lost goods. The air war also made expenditure and production to maintain morale necessary. Germany’s occupation of other European territories required men to be committed behind the lines in administration and control of these countries.¹ As the military situation worsened, the regime progressively lost territory, raw materials and sources of labour. Decisions to allocate war resources became more and more difficult, and intensified competition between the various ministries and organizations. Increasingly in 1944 and 1945, the choices the regime had to make were not between what was necessary for the war effort and what was inessential but between two policies both necessary for the continuation of the war.

It has been argued, particularly by Tim Mason, that the fear of a repetition of 1918 hampered the regime’s ability to ask the population to make sacrifices, and therefore meant it could not organize the home front for total war. The thesis has shown that the leaders studied on the whole did not consider this an obstacle. The thesis has shown that Goebbels, Speer and Himmler in particular were confident that they did not need to fear a collapse of the home

¹. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, he held back eight divisions in Norway and Denmark, 38 in France and eight in the Balkans: Cecil, Hitler’s Decision, p. 118.
front. In many ways the government's policies, both positive and negative, encouraging and punitive, had been designed to remove the danger of such unrest and aimed to correct the mistakes of the First World War. In another sense, however, the model of 1918 and of World War I in general was a distraction. As long as the German soldiers and home front were loyal, members of the leadership were sometimes blind to the seriousness of other problems.

Mason has described Hitler's comments that workers were his most loyal supporters as 'conversion fantasies'. These may have been fantasies but they were widespread among the leadership. It was confidence that the lessons of 1918 had been learnt and that the population could be relied upon which led members of the leadership such as Himmler, Speer and Goebbels to consider that more radical measures could be adopted. The representative of the SD at a meeting of the State Secretaries in 1945 commented that this time the reproach of failing the soldiers could not be made to the home front. There is of course no means of knowing conclusively if their confidence was justified, except to point to the fact that the population, as a whole, continued to work and fight as long as the state apparatus existed.

The 'fear of 1918' is a more accurate description of the responses of Hitler, and to a lesser extent Bormann, but it is not a complete picture of their response. This is not to say that Hitler was totally confident of the ability of the German population to withstand

4. SIGNATUR, submission, 15 February 1945, 'Geheime Kommandosache', 'Staatssekretärbesprechung am 15.2. 14.00 Uhr Vortragsnotiz', BA MA R W 4/v. 703, p. 3.
the pressures of the rigours of war. Hitler's response reflected his own preconceptions rather than any close knowledge of conditions of the home front; those leaders who had a greater opportunity to assess popular morale were more optimistic about the population's being able to bear a greater burden. In fact the evidence suggests that the living standard of the civilian population was progressively reduced, even if the food shortages of World War I did not recur. There is evidence that Hitler was attentive to the 'cosmetic' effect of reductions in consumer goods. In early 1943 particularly he showed himself susceptible to arguments in favour of altering measures such as the compulsory employment of women or the closure of hairdressing salons out of concern for morale. But in these cases he believed that the same results for the war economy could be achieved by other means - use of foreign labour and a stop to the production of hairdressing materials and equipment respectively. Hitler's attitude seems to have derived from a belief that the measures already agreed to would be sufficient rather than a lack of interest in waging a total war. As Germany's position worsened in 1944 Hitler overcame his reluctance to employ women more widely. He intervened occasionally to ensure that the measures took popular interests into account, but the extent to which he affected the impact of these measures can be exaggerated.

While there is considerable evidence that Hitler did not always hold to a firm line on individual policies, there is very little to support the argument that he did not want a state organized for 'total war'. What he understood by 'total war' was less radical than the models of Speer or Goebbels, the last of whom was influenced by the model of Soviet mobilization. The most notable anomaly in Hitler's view was the question of more extensive employment of women. But
here the wavering of which Goebbels and Speer were so critical in 1943 had less effect than they feared. The examination of their criticisms of the mobilization of manpower in 1943 and 1944 suggests that the reserves they believed existed were not always there; and that they took no account of suitability for employment and mobility in their assessments of the numbers which could still be obtained. Comparisons with the British mobilization of women suggest that without fundamental changes in the perceptions of women's roles, the numbers of women capable of being mobilized were not greater than those employed in Germany. For Goebbels, influenced as he was by the Soviet example, more could have been possible but this would have required changes which even he might not have been able to persuade the population or the leadership of. In any case the extent of Soviet employment of women was not dramatically greater than the German. The problem for the Germans was where women were working rather than how many they employed, a problem which Speer and Goebbels recognized to some extent.

Hitler's attitude can be described as ambivalent, and this in turn may reflect what Speer described as his reluctance to face unpleasant realities.5 Speer pointed out that in 1939 Hitler spoke and acted as if he were planning a long drawn out war which would involve a bid for world domination; at the same time he refused to draw the necessary conclusions and restrict his building projects. Much the same pattern can be seen in Hitler's response to arguments about total war. In early 1943 Goebbels could get him to agree to these measures but Hitler was not prepared to draw all the necessary conclusions about the policies to be followed.

The thesis has found additional evidence for Overy's argument that there was agreement on the need for total war among the leadership and attempts were made to implement it. The various local histories and oral histories examined contained few details of the implementation of total war. They do suggest that after 1942 there was not an abundance of consumer goods, nor of unnecessary business or economic production. The impact of the air war seems in any case to have reduced public life to the bare minimum required to continue living.

The thesis has shown that problems did not arise from lack of nerve or energy or commitment to total war on the part of the four leaders examined. Problems arose not for lack of commitment to total war but because of problems of organization, lack of follow up and conflicting priorities. Examination of the concepts of total war of four significant members of the secondary level of the leadership in the period 1941 to 1945 has suggested that there was more agreement in principle to the measures to be adopted than Goebbels or Speer realized. Bormann and Himmler agreed with them that more rationalization and simplification was necessary, and that less staff should be used in areas other than the armed forces. The main area of significant disagreement was on the question of employment of women, where Bormann in particular was more conservative. Another significant group with more conservative attitudes than the

7. Ibid., pp. 359, 361.
leadership was that of the senior civil servants who displayed these in 1943 on the closure of businesses and the employment of women in particular.

Some of these differences of emphasis and resulting conflicts came from self-interest. All four men could defend themselves from restrictions of their staff numbers by pointing to the importance of their organizations for the pursuit of the war effort.

Some of the tensions between members of the regime on total war arose because of the existence of differing concepts of total war. Total war is usually defined as the complete orientation of the resources of a nation to the war effort; it encompasses a rational use of economic and productive resources, aiming at the total defeat of the enemy, and involving the civilian population of the combatant countries as well as its fighting forces. To fight such a war the enthusiasm of the population as a whole has to be maintained. Most historians who have assessed Germany's preparations for total war have used a model of total war as economic rationality - the optimum use of resources, labour and production to further the nation's war aims. The National Socialist model of total war was specifically influenced by their interpretation of Germany's experience in World War I, which emphasized various ideological and psychological measures designed to maintain the unity of the home front. This resulted in an emphasis on ensuring that the population was adequately fed, on establishing a popular community (Volksgemeinschaft), on the importance of propaganda, and on the ideological education of the armed forces. The absence of scrutiny in the area of industrial self-responsibility and the delays and ambivalence about the employment of women can also be attributed in part to their being among the 'unlearned lessons of World War
One'. The leadership was concerned to prevent a repetition of the revolution of 1918. Anti-semitism was 'justified' by the 'lessons' they drew from World War I, and in this analysis the extermination of the Jews was seen as a contribution to the war effort. It is important to bear in mind that divergence from an economically rational model of total war was often intended as a contribution to total war according to this 'German doctrine of total war'. The ideological requirements of this policy often conflicted with the requirements of economic rationality; pursuit of these ideological goals did not illustrate opposition to total war but rather a different understanding of what total war involved.

Military defeats led to the development of a view that such defeats derived from a lack of ideological commitment and reliability on the part of the armed forces. The fall of Mussolini and the surrender of Italy revived memories of 1918 and led to extensive measures to mobilize the population and armed forces ideologically. For the regime this was as much part of total war as labor policy. These problems and Hitler's continuing preoccupation with the military situation increased Bormann's influence. He ensured that the Party Chancellery increased its role in the ideological education of the armed forces and sought to steady the party members.

The study of the leaders' attempts to introduce 'total war' leads us to various conclusions. While there were differences in emphasis among the four men studied, none can be said to have been against 'total war'. For Bormann and Himmler, and to a lesser extent for Goebbels, total war carried implications of a levée en masse which sought to use popular enthusiasm to overcome deficiencies of material. For Bormann and Himmler victory was to be achieved by the pursuit of ideological goals. For Goebbels in addition there was a
revolutionary style to his policies of total war which sought to harness class antagonisms to reduce social privilege.

Both Speer and Goebbels were willing to make ideological concessions within certain limits for a more effective war effort, such as Goebbels' campaign for better treatment of Eastern workers. Goebbels' attitude to total war can be described as nonideological. He was prepared to set aside or bypass most elements of National Socialist ideology to win the war or achieve a satisfactory peace settlement. His informal alliance with Speer was aided by the fact that Speer shared a similar approach. Speer's view of total war was overwhelmingly one of maximizing production by controlling living standards, sparing material and increasing productivity, which meant inter alia that his powers increased.

The regime's Jewish policy was where such compromises stopped. These policies were not questioned in the name of total war, except by Himmler after 1944. Initially a firm advocate of the pursuit of ideological goals as a means of achieving victory, Himmler showed a willingness to abandon all such considerations. Hitler on the other hand was not willing to set aside ideological goals for short term gains after 1941.

The leaders' concepts of total war extended beyond the simplification of life on the home front and the devotion of all available resources to the war effort to ideas of a levée en masse, a revolutionary war and mobilization of the people under the leadership of the party or the SS. Unsurprisingly, differences of emphasis arose and many of these derived from the particular institutional perspectives of the various leaders. It is not surprising to find the head of the Party Chancellery advocating a greater role for the party or to find Speer, a minister dependent on the support of
industry for the success of his policies, advocating a purely economic approach. It has been shown that the main emphasis of the leaders' debates on total war was on the social and labour prerequisites of mobilizing for total war - freeing labour, simplifying the administration and economy, abolishing anything inessential. While the provision and allocation of raw materials and the conduct of the military campaigns are equally aspects of total war, they did not form part of the debate or the policies put forward. On the whole the leaders seem to have agreed with Hitler that Speer's allocation of raw materials was efficient; they did not dare openly criticize the conduct of the war, although they were increasingly critical in private. The pursuit of plans for a compromise peace can be seen as an implicit criticism of, and proposal to alter, the overall conduct of the war.

Disagreements arose from differences of perception and of priorities among the measures to be taken. Of all of them Bormann appears to have been the least radical in his approach; he was also the most optimistic about the military situation and perhaps not coincidentally he was the one who had the best opportunities to reflect and/or influence Hitler's views. While the thesis has shown instances where Bormann clearly influenced Hitler's decisions, at other times he was seen to be reflecting Hitler's views and/or powerless to influence them. While Bormann exerted considerable influence, particularly in 1944-45, to call him an éminence grise is perhaps an exaggeration. His importance was more as a blocking rather than initiating force. By using the party he could interfere with, and prevent the success of, the policies of other leaders; it was more difficult for him to seek to pursue a positive course himself.

One problem for members of the leadership was that to find a role for the party in their plans of total war meant increasing
Bormann's power. Speer's opposition to the interference of the party in his ministry and his attempt to exclude the party from a role in the economy was therefore based on an unrealistic assessment of power relationships. Goebbels on the other hand resigned himself to the inevitable and by 1944 came to an agreement with Bormann. He recognised that the party's involvement was necessary although he did not have a high opinion of the capacities of most of his party colleagues.

Because of Hitler's central importance to the exercise of authority in the Reich his resulting vacillation on individual aspects of total war, such as the abolition of the Prussian Finance Ministry, held up the proposals of the other leaders and gave the appearance that other members of the regime shared his doubts. On the other hand Hitler's caution can also be justified at times or understood as stemming from a greater concern with the question of imposing constraint for the sake of constraint. He was more alive to the political sensitivities of an issue.

The thesis has shown that Hitler's approval was central to the progress of total war measures. Those secondary level members of the regime who sought to pursue such policies in the absence of his agreement were easily blocked. This is illustrated by the course of Goebbels' total war policies. Blocked from 1942-4, he was considerably more effective in getting the measures he wanted adopted in late 1944 once he won Hitler's support. In addition those leaders who favoured or opposed various plans demonstrated by their own actions that they considered Hitler's agreement of paramount importance to their success. This is not to say that considerable scope did not exist for the leaders to pursue lines of policy in their own areas of responsibility and vis-à-vis members of
the leadership with lesser access to Hitler. The extent to which Himmler was able to dabble with plans for a separate peace and links with the resistance indicates the freedom of action enjoyed by those Hitler trusted. The interpretation of the National Socialist political system which the evidence examined supports accords neither with the strictly monocratic or polycratic models, but suggests a combination of the two. The leaders were hampered by the absence of institutional forms of cooperation; competition for resources and attention occupied the various organizations and leaders; nonetheless the role of Hitler remained crucial. Leaders were dependent on Hitler's agreement to get measures outside their own narrow areas of responsibility adopted; Goebbels' failure in 1943 to achieve change by seeking support among the secondary group of leaders is a case in point.

The period from late 1944 on was marked by greater exercise of individual initiative and disregard of Hitler's authority without retribution. Hitler's ill health, the weakening of his charisma through military defeat and the increased difficulties for a centralized control of government all contributed to this. Not only Speer but Himmler and Bormann began moves aimed at securing their position after Hitler's death. These moves were prompted partly by ambition and a desire to secure personal survival but also arose from concern at the course the war had taken and Hitler's policies. As early as 1943 Guderian had found that both Goebbels and Himmler agreed that Hitler should no longer command the army in the East.9

There were administrative difficulties in the implementation of the various policies which were agreed on in the period 1941 to 1945, particularly because of the lack of any reliable method of

9. Clark, Barbarossa, p. 408.
coordination and control. The fact that the Gauleiters could report directly to Hitler made it difficult for secondary leaders to control them. Various attempts were made in the period studied to provide this coordination: the Dreier Ausschuss, the Reichsbevollmächtigter für den totalen Kriegseinsatz, Goebbels' abortive attempt to get Göring to exercise his powers, Goebbels' plans for a National Socialist 'senate'. The powers Hitler gave initially to Göring and later to Speer suggest that there was no theoretical obstacle to the creation of such a coordinating body. Neither man however seemed to be able to set up an apparatus to enforce his powers. Here Bormann's role was increasingly crucial. In seeking to protect his own control over the party, he obstructed other attempts to control the Gauleiters.

The experience of the Ausschuss suggests that the power given to Gauleiters as direct agents of Hitler was a considerable obstacle to any uniform implementation of total war policies. The extent to which German resources were used efficiently and rationally in pursuit of the war effort therefore varied from Gau to Gau, as the central leadership sometimes acknowledged. The Gauleiters, whatever their personal commitment to total war, impeded the introduction of uniform measures. The variations given during earlier chapters concerning Speer's relations with the Gauleiters indicates that a detailed study of various Gaus is needed to understand how the measures were variously implemented. One reason for the different enforcement of such measures was the differing wartime experiences of the Gaus. In many Gaus the effects of bombing would have persuaded both the party leadership and population of the need for urgent measures and simplifications; indeed bombing helped enforce these policies. In Gaus which were further East, whose records are less accessible, in central Germany and in agricultural areas the
immediate impact of the war was less, and therefore perhaps also the need for total war measures may have seemed less urgent.10

The thesis has also shown that while individual ministries had set up internal means of checking on the implementation of their programmes and policies, this was much more difficult to achieve in the area of co-ordination of the home front. It was never adequately achieved and particularly for the period 1944-45 there seems to have been little means of checking on the implementation in some areas.

Partly because his own position as Propaganda Minister required him to have an overview of the situation, Goebbels put forward policies aimed at strengthening not only his position but that of the regime. From the beginning of the war Goebbels considered a 'positive' war aim necessary. Soon after the beginning of the campaign against the USSR he was persuaded of the need for better treatment of the peoples of the Soviet Union to make military success easier. He came to develop his proposals for total war on the home front as part of an overall effort to better Germany's political position. In 1944 he twice sought by means of a formal memorandum to persuade Hitler to treat for peace. While no similar formal memoranda exist for 1943, his diary entries indicate that then too he was seeking to persuade Hitler to take this step. The compartmentalization of the system of government, the absence of formal cabinet meetings and the way in which other forms of consultation had atrophied meant that Goebbels seems to have been unaware of the efforts made by some of Himmler's subordinates, particularly Schellenberg, to negotiate a peace with Himmler's half-

hearted support. There could therefore be no means of combining these efforts.

Goebbels' criticisms of the regime's failure to adopt total war policies in part reflect despair at his failure to persuade Hitler to adopt his wider strategy. For Goebbels total war was a means to an end, not an end in itself: it was a means to ensure the survival of the regime. In order to do this, like Stalin, he was willing to make promises to the German people and to others that he had no intention of keeping. Goebbels had developed a coherent although implicit policy which aimed both to meet the social and labour needs for intensifying the war effort and to counter Hitler's political and military conduct of the war. The nature of the regime, however, meant that such a policy needed Hitler's support for its adoption, and this it never gained in full. The adoption of the total war policies Goebbels sought would have made the cost of victory higher for the enemy powers; thus he hoped it would be a means of persuading them to the conference table. If this was not successful, then at least the life of the regime, and his life, would be prolonged. The urgency he felt about total war was in many ways an urgency about saving the regime. Himmler came to share these concerns but was also unable to persuade Hitler. Ultimately, unlike Goebbels or Speer, Himmler chose to pursue a compromise peace separately.

With the exception of Bormann, who echoed Hitler's conceptions, by the end of 1942 there was a common perception that the war needed to be ended quickly. Goebbels, Speer, Himmler and other members of the leadership were all prepared to forego the regime's total ideological goals for the sake of its survival. Even Himmler, who had pursued most radically the total destruction of Germany's enemies, intended to settle for less and by 1944 was willing to
abandon principles he had earlier pursued at the expense of Germany's needs for labour and political support. But without Hitler's support their moves were in vain. Speer suggested after the war that Hitler's lack of interest in such proposals was a reflection of his greater realism. He knew that with the implementation of the 'Final Solution' there was no way out. Goebbels was trying to win Hitler's support for a policy of realism and compromise. This was the very opposite of the 'all or nothing' approach Hitler had adopted since Barbarossa.
APPENDICES

GERMAN RANKS

Civil Service Ranks

Reichsminister
Staatssekretär-StS.

Minister
Administrative head of the ministry.

Unterstaatssekretär-USStS.
Ministerialdirektor-MinDir.
Ministerialdirigent-MinDirig.

Ministerialrat-MinRat.
Oberregierungsrat-ORR.
Regierungsrat-RR.
Referent

Oberregierungsrat-ORR.
Regierungsrat-RR.
Referent

usually an expert; this level prepared first drafts of most legislation.

SS and Army Ranks

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS</th>
<th>German Army</th>
<th>US Army</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reichsführer-RFSS</td>
<td>Generalfeldmarschall -Gfm.</td>
<td>General of the army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberst-Gruppenführer</td>
<td>Generaloberst -Genobst.</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obergruppenführer</td>
<td>General der Infanterie, Artillerie, etc.-Gen. d. Inf.</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gruppenführer-Gruf.</td>
<td>Generalleutnant-Glt.</td>
<td>Brigadier-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadeführer-Bgf. or Brf</td>
<td>Generalmajor-Genmaj.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oberführer-Obf.</td>
<td>Oberst-Obst.</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standartenführer-Staf.</td>
<td>Oberstleutnant-Obstlt.</td>
<td>Lieutenant-colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obersturmbannführer</td>
<td>Major-Maj.</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OStubaf.</td>
<td>Hauptmann-Hptm.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sturmbannführer</td>
<td>Oberleutnant-Olt.</td>
<td>First lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Stubaf.</td>
<td>Unftersturmbannführer-HStuf</td>
<td>Second lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obersturmführer-Ostubf.</td>
<td>Oberleutnant-Olt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untersturmführer-USstubf</td>
<td>Leutnant-Lt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military expenditure, state expenditure and national income in Germany 1938-44 (billion RM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military expenditure</th>
<th>State expenditure</th>
<th>National income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938/39</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941/42</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942/43</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>124*</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943/44</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>130*</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures based on revenue from occupied Europe and Germany together.

## Distribution of labour in Germany 1939-44 (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Civilian labour force</th>
<th>Foreign labour and POWs</th>
<th>Armed forces</th>
<th>Total lost</th>
<th>Active strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>men</td>
<td>women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5/39</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/4/40</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/5/41</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/5/42</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/5/43</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/5/44</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/9/44</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index of German armaments finished production  
(Endfertigung)*

Quantities: January/February 1942=100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>285</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>273</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* according to the calculations of the Planungsamt

Taken from Dr. Rolf Wagenführ, *Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945*, (Berlin, 1963), pp. 66, 114.
Male and female civilian foreign workers according to country of origin, 30 September 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Women as % of all foreign workers</th>
<th>Total as % of civilian foreign workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>170,058</td>
<td>29,379</td>
<td>199,437</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>603,767</td>
<td>42,654</td>
<td>646,421</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>265,030</td>
<td>22,317</td>
<td>287,347</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>294,222</td>
<td>30,768</td>
<td>324,954</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>233,591</td>
<td>20,953</td>
<td>254,544</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>20,857</td>
<td>16,693</td>
<td>37,550</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>17,206</td>
<td>7,057</td>
<td>24,263</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>1,062,507</td>
<td>1,112,137</td>
<td>2,174,644</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,115,321</td>
<td>586,091</td>
<td>1,701,412</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,986,306</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,990,367</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,976,673</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Bundesarchiv Koblenz

Adjutantur des Führers, NS 10.

Der Beauftragte für den Vierjahresplan, R 26.

Kleine Ewerbungen. Files consulted were 66-2 and 66-3 (Ohlendorf) and 554 (Bandekow).

Nachlass Goebbels, NL 118.

Parteikanzlei der NSDAP, NS 6.

Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS, NS 19. At the time I was using these files the Bundesarchiv was in the process of reorganizing them; the guide to the collection was a sketchy handwritten card catalogue.

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Reichskanzlei, R 43 II. The main files consulted were in the 'Krieg' series.

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Reichspropagandaleitung, NS 18.

SS Hauptamt, NS 31.

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von Unruh commission files, Rep. 312. These files are from the Hauptarchiv Berlin-Dahlem, formerly the Prussian Geheimes Staatsarchiv. They are few and very fragmented.

**Bundesmilitärarchiv Freiburg**

Oberkommando des Heer

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Chef des Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres, R H14.

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Wehrmachtführungsstab, R W4.

Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt, R W19.

Nachlass Keitel, N 54.

**Luftwaffe**

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**Institut für Zeitgeschichte**


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