USE OF THESES

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'Communist Nationalism' in the USSR, the GDR, and Yugoslavia: Three Case-Studies of Nationalism and Internationalism in Marxist-Leninist States Incongruent With the Nation

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University

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Statement

I hereby declare that this thesis has not already been accepted in substance for any degree. It is the result of my own independent investigation, and all authorities and sources which have been consulted are acknowledged in the bibliography and notes.

Signed ................................
To Zoë,

whose interest, patience and encouragement
made perseverance possible.
History [in a Marxist-Leninist state] is the past seen in the light of present interests.

Frederick Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism
Preface

All translations used in the text are my own except where specified. The various files of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe contain originals and translations of a large number of East European newspaper and journal articles, as well as relevant Western material in languages other than English. Access to these files has been an invaluable research aid, and where such translations have guided me to the originals, this is indicated in footnotes by the name of the article in question being cited according to the English translation used in these files.

For transliteration from Russian, the Library of Congress system without its three diacritical marks has been used.

My main thanks for help during the preparation of this thesis are due to my two supervisors, Dr T.H. Rigby and Dr R.F. Miller, both of the Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Over a course of four years, they have combined detailed and constructive criticism with constant encouragement. Not only have I greatly appreciated their efforts, I have been grateful for the privilege of working with two such stimulating individuals.

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Any errors which remain, both of form and content, are of course my responsibility.
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Abstract

This study tests two theories of the official propagation of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in Marxist-Leninist states. Such nationalism is understood as the manipulation of a range of public pronouncements, most importantly on national history and the cultural heritage, designed to confer on states of this type 'nationalist' legitimacy. It focuses on three such states characterised by a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state—the USSR, the GDR, and Yugoslavia. The analysis tests the two more widely encountered and influential theories which attempt to account for this phenomenon, 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical opportunism', distinct models united by their positing of élite manipulation of extant mass national sentiment in communist societies.

Bearing in mind these two theories, the study attempts to throw light on the phenomenon as it manifests itself in each of the three states. In addition, given that it has been claimed that the extent to which communist states resort to the exploitation of nationalism may be related to the ethnic structure or 'situation' of such states, the study attempts to explore whether the 'type' of state selected reveals common behavioural patterns. In this 'type' of communist state, we might assume that officially sanctioned nationalism either would not be permitted or would be held on a tighter leash than in other Marxist-Leninist societies not characterised by such lack of congruence between nation and state. On top of the disincentive presented to all communist states—that nationalism conflicts with the internationalism and class analysis of Marxism, this would be due to the possibility that (in the cases of the USSR and Yugoslavia) such behaviour would threaten to alienate ethnic groups other than the Russians and the Serbs, thus potentially destabilising the political system, and in the case of the GDR, because it would risk sustaining popular identification with a wider German nation which includes an entity beyond the state's borders perceived as committed to the GDR's destruction—West Germany.

The case of the USSR suggests that elements of both theories account for aspects of the use by the Soviet state of Russian nationalism,
but that both are also misleading and obscure important aspects of its exploitation as much as they are enlightening. Most importantly, they both overlook the fact that the USSR has exploited Russian nationalism only in the context of 'communist nationalism', it having been resolved by the leadership at a relatively early point in the development of the Soviet state that appeals to both Russian nationalism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism were necessary to ensure the survival of the state and its ruling elite. This doctrinal hybridisation has been retained since this decision without essential changes, being marked by relatively stable continuity rather than further 'deradicalisation' or regular 'tactical' oscillations.

The case of the exploitation by the GDR of German national sentiment represents a more persuasive vindication of elements of the 'deradicalisation' thesis as argued by a number of its proponents, occurring as it does during the 'post-mobilisational' phase of the GDR's development, following the failure of other potential generators of legitimacy to produce enthusiasm for, or loyalty to, the state. As with the case of the USSR, and as we might expect, the official exploitation of the national sentiment of the population has been combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology, or taken the form of 'communist nationalism' rather than nationalism pure and simple. As hypothesised, the GDR desisted from attempts to encourage feelings of German nationalism until the mid-1970s, that is, so long as the authorities took the doctrinal position that there was a single Germany whose reunification should be striven for - or encouraged a view of the nation as wider than the state.

Communist Yugoslavia, where state-sponsored nationalism turns out to have been the exception rather than the rule, suggests that only the 'tactical' explanation may be satisfactory in accounting for the central leadership's occasional exploitation of, or acquiescence in, Serbian nationalism. Like the case of the GDR until the mid-1970s, the history of post-war Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of such an ideological shift.
The three case-studies reveal that theories of both 'deradicalisation' and 'tactics' as applied to the communist uses of nationalism are flawed and are not universally applicable. The study also reveals little apparent correlation between the ethnic 'situation' of the three states studied and the level of likelihood of their resorting to appeals to the national sentiment of their dominant (or single) ethnic group. Nevertheless, with the important exception of a communist state without a decisively dominant ethnic group such as Yugoslavia, the study suggests the at least partial accuracy of the central proposition of the 'deradicalisation' theory - that Marxist-Leninist regimes at some stage partially reconcile themselves to a range of traditional sentiments and attitudes, including nationalism, and attempt to cater for them in order to shore up their legitimacy. Aspects of the 'tactical' theory, by contrast constitute a useful description of the Yugoslav resort to 'communist nationalism', as well as fluctuations in the Soviet exploitation of the phenomenon.
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Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to analyse and account for the phenomenon of the official uses of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in three Marxist-Leninist states characterised by a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state. After defining the key concepts used in the analysis, this introduction examines the range of available pertinent theories, sets out the arguments of the study, and elaborates the methodology of the thesis.

The first problem such an exercise must tackle is to define in what sense 'nationalism' is to be understood. According to the most influential existing definition, that of Hans Kohn, nationalism is a political creed that focusses loyalty on the nation-state either existing or desired. Yet because there has been a tendency to see the significant historical and sociological variant of nationalism as a spontaneous mass or intelligentsia-led social process, few writers have attempted to grapple with the form of the phenomenon inspired and directed by the state.

Nationalism has come overwhelmingly to be seen as a political creed which threatens, by treating as illegitimate, all polities where the nation does not coincide with the state. From its origins in the French Revolution, to its contribution to the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and West European colonial empires, nationalism has been seen as a threat to states which do not coincide with nations - either as a mobilisational tool of intelligentsias, or as a consequence of the spontaneous consciousness of wider classes. Hence, the study of the concept, despite the fact that it by definition embraces wider phenomena, has focussed largely on nationalisms which proclaim anti-status quo goals such as independence, unity, or national self-aggrandisement involving violence. This tendency has been reinforced by the emergence in the recent history of Western states of ethnic separatism, which, coupled with the nationalist movements characteristic of wide areas of the Third World, has given rise to a rich literature
concerned with the causes of the phenomenon. Seeking to understand why national self-consciousness grips certain groups at certain points in history, most modern theories have attempted to explain nationalism in terms of modernisation or 'social mobilisation' in the context of cultural pluralism, especially where such pluralism is juxtaposed with economic or other forms of inequality. As such, the study of nationalism has come to be identified with spontaneous social phenomena, and an anti-status quo creed. Hence we find that a recently published work entitled Nations and Nationalism restricts its understanding of nationalism to 'a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'.

Yet, it would seem, such approaches suggest the confusion of a part with the whole. As Henry Krisch has observed, numerous polities can be identified where 'nationalism' is an induced phenomenon, serving to integrate the populace in the interests of the political leadership. Indeed, such a writer as Paul Brass, writing on ethnicity in Northern India, has rightly reinforced the under-emphasised half of Kohn's definition by conceiving of nationalism as 'the process by which ethnic groups ... are mobilised for action to attain political ends'. Such 'nation-building' in the context of system-maintenance may variously take the form of the state attempting to build up a sense of national identity from a number of nationalities, identifying the state with one of a number of ethnic groups, encouraging a sense of national cohesion across class-lines in a nation-state, or attempting to destroy one sense of national identity and build up another.

'Communist nationalism' which, it is argued in this study, is the form of nationalism which invariably emerges in Marxist-Leninist states, is understood in this thesis as a variant of 'state' or 'induced' nationalism involving political manipulation by a Marxist-Leninist state, which must at the same time guard such elements of official ideology as 'internationalism' and the 'class' approach to the analysis of history and culture. It manifests itself as official, or officially sanctioned behaviour on the part of the Party-State apparatus in which biases towards a historically or demographically dominant ethnic group are evident (in the case of a multinational Marxist-Leninist state),
or where a 'class-based' view of the historical and cultural heritage partially disappears in practice, giving way to a more positive evaluation of the national past. 'Communist nationalism' means either that elements of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group are combined with at least pro forma acknowledgements of the importance of 'internationalism' and class analysis, or that more than usually unadulterated nationalism may be tolerated on tactical grounds for a time, to be followed by the inevitable reassertion of the need for more orthodox Marxist-Leninist elements in analysis and writing. 'Communist nationalism' is thus the bizarre welding of mutually exclusive world views into the state ideology of Marxist-Leninist regimes, or alternatively, the regular fluctuation between these world views.

Even the more casual observers of communist affairs tend to be aware of the fact that this form of nationalism has characterised the behaviour of many of the world's states which define themselves as Marxist-Leninist. It is well documented that where such regimes have come into existence, 'internationalist' attitudes of indifference or hostility to the pre-revolutionary history or culture of the nation (or predominant nation) concerned, while perhaps holding sway in the early period of revolutionary euphoria, has been the exception rather than the rule. Frequently, however, there is a tendency to conceive of such 'communist nationalism' as an aspect or manifestation of the more widely studied phenomenon of 'national communism', the term used to describe Marxist-Leninist regimes which have refused fully to support the Soviet Union internationally, a political choice which has usually (but not always) involved departures from the Soviet model with regard to internal policies. In a number of instances, policies or behaviour which we might define as 'communist nationalist' have indeed roughly coincided with international reorientations. The most celebrated case, of course, involves the Soviet Union itself. The emergence of the doctrine of 'socialism in one country' in the mid-1920s was followed only a few years later by the establishment of more traditional official views on Russia's people, history, and culture. In later years, the appearance of 'communist nationalism' also appeared to coincide in a number of instances with the assertion by a number of regimes of their independence from Moscow, occasionally to the point of isolationism.
While we should not ignore the occasionally manifest 'national nihilism' which in a number of instances accompanied charges of Soviet 'revisionism', the cases of China from the 'Great Leap Forward' onwards, Albania from the early 1960s, Romania from the mid to late 1960s, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge come to mind.\footnote{8}

Such a coincidence of 'communist nationalism' with 'national communism' has by no means always been the case, however, and the cause of the former is obviously not necessarily the latter. The case of 'national communism' par excellence - Yugoslavia - would appear to be the communist state least renowned for any tendencies towards 'communist nationalism'. Moreover, in the case of a number of allies of the Soviet Union - Poland, the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, North Korea, Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam, the close 'internationalist' relationship with Moscow does not appear to have inhibited officially sponsored nationalistic exploitation of the pre-revolutionary past designed to enhance the legitimacy of such regimes - or 'communist nationalism'.\footnote{9}

It would appear that whereas the spread of 'national communism' is by no means inevitable while the Soviet Union remains convinced of the need for political satellites, 'communist nationalism' appears to be a virtually universal characteristic of Marxist-Leninist systems (the apparent exception being Yugoslavia). Why should this be so?

In attempting to account for the official use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group within a given Marxist-Leninist state, few disputes have emerged among observers concerning its function: there is a wide consensus (with one important exception) that the identification of nation and state serves to enhance political legitimacy. Early attempts at political socialisation failed to alter the political culture in the sense of forging loyalty to class, and the wider popular focus of political loyalty remained the nation. Hence, creating congruence between the 'official' and 'dominant' political cultures remained a powerful, if problematic, potential generator of allegiance to Marxist-Leninist regimes.
The major area of contention revolves around the question of the wider significance of the use by Marxist-Leninist regimes of "communist nationalism". Theorists of 'deradicalisation' argue that the development signals an irreversible reconciliation to a wider range of traditional values, which may even suggest the ultimate 'withering away' of the ideology of the regime and its transformation into a totally 'de-Marxified' nationalist dictatorship; by contrast the 'tactical' or 'temporary opportunist' approach argues that the phenomenon is a constant, even unremarkable, feature of regimes which will grasp any available ploy capable of shoring up the power of the Party. Once the need for such concessions is removed, so it is claimed, a reversion to ideological norms invariably occurs.

The major spokesmen for the 'deradicalisation' school have been Robert Tucker and Robert Wesson. They are united by the view that 'radical movements which survive without remaking the world tend to undergo deradicalisation', or make 'an accommodation to the world as it stands'. While Marxist-Leninist dogma continues to supply a legitimacy of sorts in such societies, the state in the post-revolutionary or totalitarian-coercive stage can no longer be sure of the allegiance (or quiescence) of its citizens. Thus, runs the argument, all mature communist states increasingly attempt to secure the loyalty of their citizens by a number of means, of which the two most important are the replacement of idealistic collectivism with individualistic consumerism, and an increasing use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group at the expense of consistent revolutionary proletarian internationalism and the 'class' approach to history and culture.

The 'deradicalisation' process has been analysed by numerous additional observers whose phraseological apparatus varies, but whose message is essentially the same. Leszek Kołakowski notes the emergence of a 'real state ideology' which 'appeals to the attitudes, expectations and values that existed before anyone had heard of communism'. Both Peter Ludz and Victor Zaslavsky have argued the 'ficticization' of official doctrine, as the legitimising 'operating ideology', which includes nationalism, moves further away from orthodox revolutionary doctrine in the 'consolidating phase' of a Marxist-Leninist state.
Henry Krisch posits a transition from a 'heroic age' which stresses drastic social transformation in the service of millenarian goals to later post-mobilisational development marked by appeals to conservative values, while Maria Markus has stressed a growing body of 'covert' practices which constitute an attempt to confer 'traditional legitimacy' on Marxist-Leninist regimes.13

There appear to be two serious shortcomings with the 'deradicalisation' approach, as far as it has been developed. The first is that while it claims that ideological variations have occurred in the form of there being 'more' nationalism in the later, compared to the earlier periods in the life of communist states, no exponent of this approach has attempted to argue specifically what this means, or to 'operationalise' the argument empirically. While the school of interpretation may have much truth, the 'deradicalisation' approach clearly lacks a methodology for the investigation and explanation of ideological variations.

The second shortcoming is that while it suggests incremental change, the approach lacks an account of the limits of ideological change in Marxist-Leninist states, or the telos of such trends. This is aside from the prima facie implausible accounts of such observers as Yanov, Lendvai and Wesson, who forecast the evolution of such states into more conventional, authoritarian states which will at some stage shed their Marxist-Leninist baggage, and become de-Marxified nationalist dictatorships.14

According to the 'tactical' model, by contrast, the official use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group, rather than being understood deterministically as a symptom of a unilinear 'deradicalisation' process, is seen as a temporary weapon used by communist states in situations of perceived domestic or foreign threat. The classic formulation of this approach, stimulated by the Stalin experience, is that of Frederick Barghoorn:

> When the Party feels strong, it tends, other things being equal, to reduce concessions to popular traditions and attitudes. It tends to broaden its symbolic and attitudinal base when it feels threatened.15
Analysts such as S. Enders Wimbush have continued to apply Barghoorn's model of the Soviet case, interpreting the various phenomena which fall under the rubric of the official uses of nationalism as 'temporary pacifiers'. The model has also been applied, if somewhat more tentatively, to other Marxist-Leninist states, as in Bogdan Denitch's view that segments of the Yugoslav League of Communists 'may be willing to make occasional tactical alliances with national sentiment', despite the inevitable subsequent crackdown. Others, such as Andrew Janos, and George Klein and Milan Reban, have seen tactical 'ethnic pragmatism', or using nationalism at 'convenience' as a phenomenon applicable to communist states in general. Archie Brown has argued that it is crises, triggered by other stimuli, which produce such political situations 'in which the strength and direction of political change may be strongly influenced by the dominant - and no longer dormant - political culture'. While Brown's example is Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960s, this interpretation would also embrace communist states tactically employing nationalism (given that the 'focus of political loyalty' is held to be one of the elements of political culture).

Again, the problems this approach raises relate to the questions it does not tackle. Does the tendency to use the 'temporary weapon' increase as time goes on in Marxist-Leninist states, or after it has proven itself as a mobilisational tool, and at what point does 'temporary' or 'tactical' become, to all intents and purposes, permanent? Is the official use of nationalism as a temporary ploy equally available to all Marxist-Leninist states, or is it, again, related to the ethnic structure of a given communist state?

The above two approaches essentially argue that communist nationalism can be explained by political elites exploiting the extant emotional force of loyalty to the nation, which early attempts in the sphere of political socialisation did not succeed in eradicating. In the words of Henry Krisch 'in communist countries ... nationalism is the product of the decisions and attitudes of elites'. It is 'an induced, deliberately cultivated factor which serves certain interests of a political leadership'. Disagreement between the 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical' schools is restricted to the chronological pattern and
tendency of the phenomenon. However, a third approach sees a more active role played by mass sentiment, viewed as a fluctuating rather than unchanging phenomenon, and interprets the actions of the state as more reactive to the national mood than to internal or external threats.

Observers who support this interpretation, which we might term 'reactive acquiescence', point to an array of social, spiritual, and political stimuli which have aroused spontaneous nationalism, to which the communist state has, in turn, accommodated itself. In the case of the Soviet Union, numerous observers have attempted to account for the perceived re-emergence of official Russian nationalism, which coincided with the crystallisation of an unofficial Russian nationalist movement in the mid-1960s, in terms of this explanation. Jack Haney, for example, has pointed to social factors such as 'increasing industrialisation, pollution and the destruction of natural resources' as catalysts, while Roy Medvedev, Ludmila Alexeeva and Thomas Bird suggest as reasons growing apathy and disenchantment with official ideology, and a sense of 'spiritual and moral degradation'. Mary McAuley has pointed to a 'social identity crisis' where loyalty to class and state are no longer options, which is analogous to Gail Lapidus' view that Russian nationalism can be understood as a consequence of modernisation, ethnic affiliation providing emotional reassurance after the destruction of traditional social arrangements. John Dunlop finds the immediate cause in Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign. Spontaneous reaction to the threat of China, biological attrition revealed by the 1970 census results, and increasingly assertive minority nationalism have also figured in such explanations.

Similarly, Zeline Ward, in attempting to account for the emergence of official nationalism in East Germany, has pointed to the 'monolithic sameness of industrial technology' which affects 'most industrial societies'. Further, the view of communist nationalism as a spontaneous emergence 'from below' fits better with a frequently encountered interpretation of Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia - a phenomenon usually inspired among the broad intelligentsia in response to specific social and political catalysts, which, in turn, is tolerated for a time by the state apparatus.
On the face of it, such accounts would appear implausible. Aside from the fact that communist regimes must ipso facto at least appear to espouse and propagate an internationalist philosophy, which necessarily sees nationalism (as opposed to legitimate elements of 'national sentiment') as a dangerous survival of the pre-revolutionary order, such regimes have not been noted in their general behaviour for the co-opting of public opinion, particularly where such opinion is inconsistent with the state's avowed ideology.

A final approach which should be considered is that the official use of nationalism in Marxist-Leninist states is neither manipulative nor reactive, nor a combination of the two, but purely 'expressive'. Applications of this interpretation frequently refer to the case of Stalin. Robert Tucker, in his biography of Stalin as a revolutionary, argues that in his early years, Stalin's sense of 'historic mission' led him to make the 'requisite psychic break with his native Georgianness' and to identify himself with the wider revolutionary stage of Russia. Stalin, according to Tucker, consistently modelled himself, both intellectually and in a more general cultural sense, on the Russian revolutionary, of whom his ideal was Lenin. If the identification in his early years was with the revolutionary Russia, with the later consolidation of his personal power came a gradual identification with the Russian state, stretching deep into the pre-revolutionary past. Implying the same view that the official Russian nationalism which emerged under Stalin was a product of the General Secretary's identification with Russia's destiny rather than a conscious desire to manipulate the populace for other political ends, Adam Ulam asks rhetorically with reference to Stalin, 'Why the frantic Russian nationalism of his last years?' He answers:

This undoubtedly represented the final state of Stalin's own Russian chauvinism rather than a response to specific political needs or apprehensions [my emphasis]. To be sure, in the so-called Zhdanov campaign there was also an element of historical caution: the USSR had to be immunised against Western ideas so that such ideas would not corrupt Russia's intellectual elite as they had after another victorious war, that of 1812-1815. But these precautions were not connected to any fear for his own power, which at the time was threatened by only one enemy - old age.
The 'expressive' view is of particular importance since it is the only approach which does not assume that communist nationalism constitutes an attempt by the state to enhance its legitimacy by attempting to identify itself with the nation, either by unilaterally initiating nationalism, or permitting its spontaneous manifestation.

Given the influence of traditional views which until recently had it that the goal of legitimacy was of little importance to communist states, particularly during the Stalin period, the absence of an intention to legitimise the state (as distinct from whether the various phenomena which constitute communist nationalism functioned to legitimise it) is a possibility which should be considered. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that such an explanation conflicts with the fact that political élites, communist or otherwise, have generally been concerned above all with the preservation of their power, and hence have tended to tailor their political behaviour to this end. Furthermore, in communist regimes ideology has traditionally played a particularly important role in the rationalisation of the political system, so we would tend to assume that ideological changes would be carefully weighed up and considered rather than being subject to caprice.

We may conclude that the phenomenon of nationalism in communist states has been explained in three ways: as the product of élite manipulation of a constant, unchanging popular national sentiment (interpreted alternatively as either 'deradicalisation' or 'tactics'), élite reaction to a fluctuating national sentiment, or simply the expression of the national sentiment of the leadership without reference to mass sentiment.

Clearly it is not within the scope of a single thesis thoroughly to analyse the dynamics of this form of nationalism, and to make judgments on the available explanations for it, within the communist world as a whole. However, it is possible to throw light on the various forms of behaviour engendered in one 'type' of communist state. The fact that within the spectrum of communist states multinational Yugoslavia is the single country not renowned for attempting to achieve legitimacy by exploiting the nationalism of its dominant ethnic group, suggests that,
rather than correlation with 'national communism' explaining where we tend to find 'communist nationalism' (as opposed to the related but separate issue of how we explain the emergence of 'communist nationalism' in a given state), there might be a relationship between the extent of the use of the latter and the ethnic structure or 'situation' of a given Marxist-Leninist state. This possibility has in fact been suggested by Archie Brown. Brown argues that the extent to which nationalism is used in a Marxist-Leninist state may be related to how 'risk-laden' it is, which, in turn, is related to the ethnic structure of the society (that is, the fewer non-core ethnic groups within a state, the fewer the groups likely to be alienated by the particularistic ideology of nationalism). Brown argues that the other factor instrumental in determining the 'extent' to which a Marxist-Leninist state resorts to 'communist nationalism' is the degree to which it has satisfied the other principal indicator, in his view, of 'deradicalisation' - the attempt to appeal to individualistic consumerism. Although Brown argues that most communist states attempt to use both as means to legitimacy, he indicates that the case of the extreme nationalism (or 'communist nationalism' in the terms of this study) of Romania, for example, may in part be explained by that state's inability to meet the demands of consumerism.  

In order to explore the possibility that the extent to which 'communist nationalism' is used in a given Marxist-Leninist state is related to its ethnic structure (or 'situation'), the 'type' selected for analysis in this study is that characterised by a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state, where we might hypothesise that a degree of restraint would be displayed in the extent to which nationalism is exploited. To this end, the cases of the USSR, the GDR and Yugoslavia have been selected for analysis. Of course there are obvious differences in the ethnic 'situation' of the three states. The USSR and Yugoslavia are both multinational states, but whereas in the former the 'dominant ethnic group' has historically been the most powerful in political and economic terms (as well as in demographic terms for most of this century), its equivalent in the latter, Serbia, constitutes ethnically the country's largest minority (as opposed to the Russian majority), is, economically, a less developed territory than large areas of the country, whose position of would-be predominance in the state
began far more recently, and, moreover, has been more vigorously opposed by relatively strong ethnic rivals to an extent never experienced by Russia. The GDR, by contrast, is in ethnic terms a virtually homogeneous state which, however, despite the protestations of GDR ideologists, remains part of a wider German nation. Irrespective of these differences, however, the three states share a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state, a situation in which, we might hypothesise, a degree of restraint would be displayed in the extent to which nationalism was exploited.

The question arises as to how the four 'theories' of communist nationalism, as set out above, can be tested in the three Marxist-Leninist states selected for comparison. With regard to the 'reactive' and 'expressive' models, the researcher strikes immediate difficulties. Both are based on sentiment and state of mind, either at the individual or mass levels, 'hard' evidence of which tends to be elusive even with regard to more open Western societies. To make out a case for either of these two models requires either detailed psychological study of individual communist rulers (such as Tucker's biography of the younger Stalin), or, in the case of the 'reactive' theory, concrete sociological analysis of a given society at a given time, using survey or other such data.

Neither of the above is attempted in the present study. What this analysis does attempt, however, is to judge whether the other two more widely encountered and influential theories positing elite manipulation of unchanging national sentiment can assist us towards an understanding of the communist uses of nationalism. They offer, by contrast, the possibility of their being tested by means of research involving relatively easily available documents. In the case of 'deradicalisation', if it proves correct, we should find not only the emergence of increasingly overt state-sanctioned nationalism, but evidence of an ever greater reliance by the authorities on the national sentiment of the major ethnic group under their control. If the 'tactical' model, by contrast, is an accurate guide, we should find an unchanging (rather than incrementally more extreme) official nationalism, but only occasionally and temporarily in situations of perceived domestic or foreign threat.
The four 'theories' of communist nationalism outlined above are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and it is certainly not the case that this complex phenomenon can be explained by a single factor which excludes all others. This study does not, therefore, attempt to judge definitively the correct balance of factors which have permitted the emergence of official nationalism in the three Marxist-Leninist states considered. Rather, it attempts to answer part of this question, and in so doing, to reveal some clues as to this aspect of the behaviour of such states in general.

Within these limitations, the study proposes the following arguments.

The case of the USSR suggests that elements of 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical opportunism' account for aspects of the use by the Soviet state of Russian nationalism, but are also misleading and obscure important aspects of its exploitation as much as they are enlightening. Neither draws out the fact that the USSR has permitted the exploitation of Russian nationalism only in the context of 'communist nationalism', it having been resolved at a relatively early point in the development of Soviet communism that appeals to both Russian nationalism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism were necessary to ensure the survival of the state and its ruling elite. This doctrinal hybridisation has been retained since this decision, without essential changes by successive leaderships.

The case of the exploitation by the GDR of German national sentiment represents a more persuasive vindication of elements of the 'deradicalisation' thesis as argued by a number of its proponents, occurring as it does during the 'post-mobilisational' phase of the GDR's development, following the failure of other potential generators of legitimacy to produce enthusiasm for, or loyalty to, the state. Again, however, and as we would expect, the official exploitation of the national sentiment of the population has been combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Consistent with our hypothesis of official restraint, the GDR desisted from attempts to encourage feelings of German nationalism until the mid-1970s, that is, so long as the authorities took the doctrinal position that there was a single Germany whose reunification should be worked for - or encouraged a view of the nation as wider than the state.
Communist Yugoslavia, in revealing state-sponsored nationalism as the exception rather than the rule, suggests only the 'tactical' explanation in the regime's occasional acquiescence in Serbian nationalism. Like the case of the GDR until the mid-1970s, the history of post-war Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of such an ideological shift.

The three case studies reveal that while elements of the two models analysed are useful and indeed necessary to an explanation of the phenomenon, neither is capable of accounting for the pattern or degree of its manifestation - either in any one state or comparatively within the 'type' selected. The study also reveals little apparent correlation between the ethnic structure - or 'situation' - of the three case studies and the level of likelihood of their resorting to appeals to the nationalism of their dominant (or single) ethnic group. The ethnic 'situation' of both the GDR and Yugoslavia appears to have been a decisive restraining factor in this area, in contrast to the markedly less inhibited behaviour of the Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, elements of the two theories are useful, and, indeed, essential to any explanation of the phenomenon.

To support these arguments, documents reflecting the official attitude to the chief spheres in which 'nationalism' and 'internationalism' emerge in the behaviour of each of the three communist states are analysed. The spheres which are most important in this connection are the official view of the pre-revolutionary history of the dominant (or single) ethnic group and of its cultural heritage. In addition, in the cases of the multinational states, the USSR and Yugoslavia, the 'internationalism' of nationality policies which genuinely attempt to cater for cultural equality may be contrasted with the 'nationalism' of policies which take less account of the rights of minority, or non-core nationalities, such as assimilationism. As such, it is hoped at least in part to correct the divorce observed by Mary McAuley, between those interested in nationalism and those interested in the nationality question in Marxist-Leninist states. In the Soviet case, official doctrine on the role and status of the Russian people in the USSR is also of importance.
The various regimes' view of the pre-revolutionary history of their dominant (or single) ethnic group, their cultural heritage, and, in the case of the USSR, doctrine on the role and status of the Russian people in the Soviet Union, are therefore analysed as the principal criteria in assessing the validity of the various theories of the official uses of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in the three selected case studies. Of course, the balance between nationalism and internationalism may also be observed in such areas as political practice, institutional arrangements and economic policies. Where it is considered appropriate in the course of the analysis, evidence relating to such secondary spheres is also presented.

The longer history of communism in the USSR by contrast with the GDR and Yugoslavia and, accordingly, the larger amount of evidence to be considered, dictate that a disproportionate amount of the study is devoted to the Soviet case. Chapters I, II and III, therefore concerned with the USSR, consider the Soviet case with regard, respectively, to the three major political eras of the post-Lenin period, those dominated by Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. For background purposes, the policies which preceded Stalin's 'communist nationalist' revolution after the Bolshevik Revolution are examined in the Appendix. Chapters IV and V consider the cases of the GDR and Yugoslavia, respectively.

A wide range of relevant newspapers, journals, books and pamphlets, both primary and secondary, have been surveyed and used as source material for the study.
1. Hans Kohn, 'Nationalism', in David L. Sills, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, 1972, p. 63. As to some of Kohn's more questionable writings, such as what has come to be referred to as the 'Hans Kohn dichotomy' which distinguishes between the nationalism of Western Europe and the nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe, see Andrzej Walicki's critique, largely based on the case of Poland, 'Polish Romanticism: The Meanings of the National Idea', Reports on Philosophy, 1981, no. 5.


3. The major issue in this sphere has been the precise chronology of the appearance of the phenomenon. The influential view of Karl Deutsch and the 'Chicago School', largely based on the United States' immigration experience, was that while nationalism was a significant feature of the early stages of the 'social mobilisation' process, this process increasingly broke down ties of kinship, and induced increasing loyalty to the modernising state. See Nationalism and Social Communication: An Enquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, New York and London: Cambridge UP, 1953. The subsequent experience of ethnic separatism in such developed states as Canada, Britain, France, and Belgium, however, suggested that nationalism, on the contrary, was linked to a 'post-mobilisational' phase. This induced a radical reformulation of theory and the realisation that the ethnic assimilation which could be argued in the case of the United States was largely inapplicable to non-immigrant multi-ethnic societies. On this question, see Walker Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?' World Politics, XXIV, No. 3 (April 1972), esp. pp. 319-57; and Sami Zubaida, 'Theories of Nationalism', in Gary Littlejohn et al, Power and the State, London; Croom Helm, 1978.


7. R.F. Miller suggested this term to me, also used by Tadeusz Szafrar, as a neat formulation of the phenomenon under analysis. As stressed later in the introduction, it should not be confused with 'National Communism' which has been used to refer to communist states which have departed from the Soviet political model and sphere of influence. Thus Anthony D. Smith's chapter 'Communist Nationalism' actually refers to 'National Communism'. See Anthony D. Smith, ed., Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Canberra: ANU Press, 1979. Of course most of those concerned with the phenomenon of nationalism in communist states have been concerned with the spontaneous separatist or minority variety. Some recent examples of the recent burgeoning literature in this area would include Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, New York: Newsweek, 1982; Georg Brunner and Boris Meissner, Nationalitätenprobleme der Sowjetunion und Osteuropa, Cologne, Markus Verlag, 1982; K.C. Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myths, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.


21. Ibid., p. 17.


25. See Alexeeva, loc. cit., and Lapidus, loc. cit.


28. This term was suggested to me by T.H. Rigby.


33. McAuley, loc. cit.
This chapter argues that the Stalin era, of the three periods of Soviet history analysed, gives greatest support to the 'deradicalisation' model. The 'tactical' model, while useful in explaining the forms official nationalism took during the Second World War, fails to take account of the fact that the Soviet Union under Stalin resorted increasingly to Russian nationalism. This argument is supported by demonstrating that from the late 1920s onwards (the first concrete examples being found in 1928) a tendency to promulgate Russian nationalist positions becomes increasingly apparent in the official view of the Russian people, and its history and culture. During the Stalin period overall, despite important shifts in the way the phenomenon is used, which coincide with particular political needs, a gradual increase may be observed in the degree to which nationalism can be detected, both in the sense of increasingly dramatic departures from the relatively consistent 'internationalist' positions and 'class' analysis characteristic of the Soviet view of the world up to the late 1920s*, and in the sense that the phenomenon 'infects' an increasing number of areas of the Soviet view of the pre-revolutionary Russian past. Crucially, however, this development never signalled the unleashing by the Soviet communist state of a pure Russian nationalist ideology: analytic and doctrinal changes likely to appeal to Russian national sentiment were always balanced (even if not in the same text or immediately) with appeals to loyalty to 'internationalism', communism, and the multinational Soviet Union. The official use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group - Russian nationalism - therefore emerged in the context of 'communist nationalism'.

'Communist nationalism' could take either the usual form of elements of nationalism being combined with elements of class analysis or internationalism within the same text, or of more than usually unadulterated nationalist works being tolerated for a period, to be

* See Appendix.
followed by a reassertion of the need for more orthodox Marxist-Leninist elements in analysis and writing. As part of their failure to grasp that 'nationalism' in Marxist-Leninist societies must always be 'communist', theorists of 'deradicalisation' have confused periods of greater tolerance of Russian nationalism (such as during the war) with periods of 'deradicalisation'. This ignores the orthodox 'crackdown' which has always followed such phases, which have essentially been aberrant in their ideological leniency.

Given the fact that the theory of 'deradicalisation' does not take account of the possibility of such fluctuations, this aspect of 'communist nationalism', as used under Stalin, suggests more the applicability of the 'tactical' interpretation. Although those who have suggested this model have implied that the communist authorities alternated the use of elements of nationalism with consistent 'class' analysis and 'internationalism', the 'tactical' use of Russian nationalism under Stalin did in fact reveal fluctuation between more or less Russian nationalism within the 'communist nationalist' fusion. It is true, as Barghoorn contends, that the lead-up to European conflict in the 1930s as well as the hour of extreme peril for the survival of the Party during the war coincides with the emergence and progressively greater exploitation (in accordance with the perceived level of threat) of Russian nationalism. However, when victory was apparent towards the end of the war, moves were made to reassert the authority of orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology. The origins of Stalin's 'communist nationalism' lie in his belief, we must assume, that the vision of most of the Bolsheviks of the future of Soviet Marxism was largely irrelevant to the strength and survival of the USSR.

In the decade and a half following the victory of Stalin's policy of 'Socialism in One Country' over the advocacy by Trotsky, Zinov'ev and Kamenev of a continued policy of consistent internationalism, the Soviet state began to pursue a policy of greater pragmatism in international affairs designed to delay, if not avoid, the expected armed confrontation with the capitalist world. The coming to power of the Nazis in Germany in 1933, the German-Polish pact of the following year, and the consistently aggressive behaviour of Japan towards the Soviet Union made such a policy
all the more urgent. To this end, it sought non-aggression pacts, joined the League of Nations, wound down the activities of the Comintern, and ordered Communist parties in foreign countries to form 'popular fronts' with their non-fascist political opponents.

Commenting on the position of the Soviet Union in the international context in 1931, Stalin declared 'we are fifty to a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we shall go under.' Accordingly, in the domestic arena, the 'Second Socialist Offensive' was launched with the first five-year plans and collectivisation, designed to strengthen and centralise the state, and to destroy 'hostile class elements', such as the kulaks. In this situation the leadership evidently took the view that the stresses and strains of such titanic social changes in a hostile international environment required a form of 'moral rearmament' of the populace (or at least for its Russian majority) which could both further strengthen the state, by identifying it with the Russian nation, and decrease discontent by catering for popular tastes and attitudes where these did not conflict with the interests of the state. Moreover, specifically in the area of historiography, the upheavals launched on Soviet society by Stalin during this period could be justified by judicious use of Russian historical precedent. Obviously Marxism-Leninism, which legitimised the existence of the Soviet state, could not be abandoned. However, it could be modified and supplemented to make it more emotionally satisfying (if less logically coherent) to the Russian populace.

As foreshadowed in the Introduction, this chapter, like the following two, is divided into three sections which examine in turn 'communist nationalism' and Russian history, 'communist nationalism' and Russian culture, and doctrine on the role and status of the Russian people in relation to Soviet communism. With regard to the first two of these three areas, the relevant evidence falls into two categories: that which relates to the official position on Russian history and culture as discrete subjects, and that which relates to the authorities' stance on Russian history and culture in interaction with the history and culture of other (mainly present-day Soviet) nationalities. For this reason, the tension between Russian nationalism and internationalism in the
first two sections of this and subsequent chapters devoted to the 
Soviet Union is discussed for convenience in two parts. The sections 
on Russian history are divided into two parts concerned respectively 
with the pre-revolutionary Russian state as a discrete subject, and the 
pre-revolutionary Russian state as a colonial power. Those concerned 
with Russian culture consider in turn the official position on the 
pre-revolutionary Russian cultural heritage, and Russian culture and 
Soviet nationalities policy.

(i) 'Communist Nationalism' and Russian History 
(a) The Pre-Revolutionary Russian State

Despite a brief partial reversal between 1945 and 1948, the presence 
of nationalism in the historiography of the pre-revolutionary state 
increases during the period, drawing further away from the norms of 
historical analysis which prevailed for the first one and a half decades 
following the Bolshevik Revolution. This can be detected despite the 
fact that the stress of this nationalism shifted, as did the requirements 
of the state, from justifying the draconian state-builders of Russian 
history, to glorifying the state's military heritage, to, finally, 
stressing the alleged historical self-reliance and superiority of the 
Russian state. Nevertheless, each of these three 'themes' was present 
to a greater or lesser extent from the early 1930s onwards.

The demands of the Party for a revision of Soviet historiography, 
formulated in various official documents from 1934 to 1937 (termed by 
Tillett the 'Thermidorian Reaction to Pokrovskii') broadly set the tone 
for Soviet history-writing on the pre-revolutionary Russian state until 
1953. However, within this period, three phases may be distinguished, 
marked by slight variations: the mid-1930s to 1941, the war years, and 
the post-war period up to the death of Stalin.

From the outset, it was evident that the revised approach to 
history was intended to inspire patriotism amongst the Russian masses. 
Most obviously, this could be adduced from the fact that from 1934 onwards, 
hitherto taboo terms such as 'rodina' and 'patriotizm' (in the usual 
nationalist sense) began to be positively used in the media. Also in 
1934, it was announced, 'treason against the nation' would henceforth 
carry the death penalty. In the area of the history of the pre-
revolutionary Russian state, works began to be published which at first appeared to have more in common with a Tsarist than a Marxist world-view. However, certain elementary differences are evident between the works of conservative historians of the Tsarist period, and those produced under Stalin. Aside from the fact that the new histories were clearly attempting to harness Russian nationalism to the service of the communist, multinational Soviet Union (and this was always explicit except at times during the war), most of the works were concerned with clear general conclusions, rather than scholarly analysis, and were hence usually written in an emotional, jingoistic style. Even many articles in academic journals were of a popular character, as is revealed by the work of such individuals as S.V. Bakhrushin, M.N. Tikhomirov, and N. Iakovlev.9

In addition, the rehabilitation of pre-revolutionary Russian history was highly selective. At first, the figures selected for adulation were those who had played key roles in the formation of a politically and militarily powerful, united Russian state. Hence, most prominent were such figures as Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, Catherine II, Alexander Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Pozharskii and Minin, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Vladimir Monomakh, Ordin-Nashchokin, Rumiantsev, Daniel of Galicia, and Golitsyn.10 Amongst those overlooked were equally significant (from the point of view of Russian strength and independence) ecclesiastical leaders (although most of those selected for adulation had strong links with the Church), together with military figures of non-Russian origin, such as Münnich or Barclay de Tolly.11 In addition, significantly less emphasis was placed on the achievements of the Tsarist government in the century after the Napoleonic invasion.

Although Soviet historians were evidently cautious at first, clinging to elements of pre-1934 interpretations, by the mid to late 1930s, numerous works of history were reflecting the new demands. Ivan the Terrible became one of the most publicised of Soviet historiographic heroes.12 Former 'bourgeois' historians such as R.Iu. Vipper were returned to favour on the understanding that they glorify Ivan, and find justifications for the oprichnina terror.13 As shown by the published writings of S. Tomsinskii and V.I. Lebedev, Peter the Great also emerges at this time from official ignominy. Having been dismissed by Stalin as late as 1931 as 'a drop of water in the sea', Peter rises to the
status of an ever more positively viewed statesman.\textsuperscript{14} After numerous unsuccessful attempts to satisfy the officially required portrayal of Peter, Aleksei Tolstoi's final version of Peter I, published in 1938, has him as an unambiguously positive Russian national hero.\textsuperscript{15} Of great symbolic importance was the fact that the film Aleksandr Nevskii was shown for the first time on the eve of the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1938. Pravda said of the public response to the film,\textsuperscript{16}

The youthful members of the audience, especially the members of the Komsomol, enthusiastically applauded the deeds of the great Russian leader who lived seven hundred years ago. They did so because the Russian nation is imbued with flaming patriotism, and has been imbued with it throughout its history.

The attempt to inspire the Red Army by means of elements of Russian nationalism was evidently regarded as a particularly important aspect of the ideological reform. The change in the form of oath required for induction into the armed services is noteworthy in this regard. While earlier the Soviet recruit swore to 'pledge all deeds and thoughts to the great aim of emancipating all workers', and undertook to 'fight for the Soviet Union, for socialism, and the brotherhood of peoples', from January 1939 onwards, he was required to 'serve to his last breath his people, his homeland, and the Government of the workers and peasants'.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition, emphasis was placed on the rehabilitated glories of Russian military history. This is well illustrated by the revised view in the late 1930s of Napoleon's invasion of Russia and the Campaign of 1812. Throughout 1937 and 1938, Pravda and Izvestia attacked those historians who failed to extract the correct patriotic lessons from the struggle with Napoleon.\textsuperscript{18} In 1938, E. Tarle's work, Nashestvie Napoleona na Rossiiu was judged to have satisfied the new requirements.\textsuperscript{19} Tarle's work, marshalling arguments often in direct contradiction to his biography Napoleon of 1936, expostulates at length on the heroism of the Russian people united in struggle against the foreigner, and makes clear the view that the Russian military, and Kutuzov in particular, executed their duties with brilliance.\textsuperscript{20} In the same year 1938, Red Army Commanders were instructed, 'you must fully grasp the aggressive strategy of such remarkable Russian generals as Suvorov and his pupil Kutuzov', while Krasnaia zvezda declared 'it is time to rehabilitate the memory of
Bagration, and to recognise in him a national hero, beloved by the army, who sacrificed his life to the independence of his fatherland'. While Bagration was a Georgian, his pre-eminent reputation in the Russian patriotic version of history as a hero in the struggle with Napoleon might suggest that it was unlikely that the 'fatherland' which the newspaper had in mind referred to his native Georgia.

Earlier campaigns were also to be re-interpreted as instructive epics. Thus Krasnaya zvezda stated in connection with Dmitrii Donskoi's battle with Mamai Khan's Mongols in the fourteenth century,

The victory at Kulikovo Field opened the way for the growth of the Russian national state. The Russian people understands that only patriotism can give strength and secure a glorious future for the fatherland.

Perhaps most remarkably of all, while the post-Napoleonic period of Tsarist history was largely ignored for the time being, certain military operations of the ancien regime within living memory were held up for adulation. Thus in 1938, in the same Krasnaya zvezda, we read that the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation of October 1914 'showed the world that the Russian army was as good as the German. Once more it displayed the courage and endurance of the Russian soldier'.

Associated with this process of rehabilitation was the publicity granted to the restoration of Russian historical monuments, and the official encouragement of the populace to become aware of the national glory they symbolised. Thus in 1934 an exhibition on the history of Red Square was organised, while the battlefields at Poltava, Kulikovo and Borodino, together with the Peterhof palaces, were restored and fashioned into national monuments. Significantly, Pravda, in commenting on the neglect and vandalism with which such monuments had been treated in the earlier years of the Soviet regime, identified those responsible as 'enemies of the people', who were aware of the affront they were causing to 'a great nation'. Such behaviour, it was stressed, had induced hostility to the Party and Government.

The final theme of national history to receive official blessing in the 1930s is that of the early founding of the first Russian state. From 1937 on, Soviet historians are concerned to identify the historical
origins and geographical locus of the first Russian, or East Slav, state.\textsuperscript{27} In addition, in 1938 a call was published in \textit{Vestnik drevnei istorii} for a revival of Byzantine studies.\textsuperscript{28} Shortly afterwards the Academy of Sciences' Institute of History established a section devoted to Byzantine studies, while the scholar M.V. Levichenko published his major \textit{Istoriia Vizantii}.\textsuperscript{29}

The writings of Levichenko, together with those of other such historians as V. Parkhomenko, S. Bakhrushin, N. Rubinshtein, and S.A. Zhebelev, reveal the doctrinal \textit{sine qua non} of addressing the issue of the early history of Russia during the late 1930s.\textsuperscript{30} It was necessary to identify and applaud all developments which signalled the strengthening of a centralised, autocratic Russian state, and to stress the importance of national solidarity and patriotism in defending it. Foreign influences on Russian development are denied or minimised. Needless to say, while 'class struggle' was mentioned from time to time, to emphasise the concept was obviously regarded as superfluous to the type of history required, and it therefore received little more than \textit{pro forma} acknowledgement from such authors.

Following the German invasion of June 1941, a dramatic growth in the official uses of Russian nationalism can be observed, at least until after the victory at Kursk at the end of 1943. The 'internationalist' component in Soviet propaganda, while by no means totally disappearing, moves significantly into the background, while a wide range of pre-revolutionary historical personalities and traditions are rehabilitated. In a number of cases a less ambiguously nationalist view is taken of historical personalities and events already rehabilitated in the pre-war period.

If during the period from 1934 to 1941 the great state-building autocrats, such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, were the principal targets for historiographic rehabilitation, Stalin's major speeches of November 1941 consolidate the positive view of many of Russia's traditional military heroes. In the speech of 6 November 1941, the only pre-revolutionary political or military names to be mentioned in an inspirational list of celebrated Russians are Suvorov and Kutuzov.\textsuperscript{31} The following day, Stalin expanded the list to six Russian figures.
renowned for defending the soil of the motherland. The speech was clearly aimed only at the Great Russian population of the Soviet Union:

In this war you must draw inspiration from the brave example of our great ancestors (predkov) - Alexander Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Kuz'ma Minin, Dmitrii Pozharskii, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Mikhail Kutuzov. 32

Stalin's inventory of Russian military heroes was to expand only marginally in the course of the war, to include heroes of the Civil War, Bagration, Kutuzov's colleague, and, in 1943, Brusilov, the most successful Russian general of the First World War, and one of the few military leaders in that conflict without the reputation of an overt counter-revolutionary. 33

Historiographic themes developed in the pre-war period and continued during the conflict reveal an even more overt emphasis on patriotic significance at the expense of historical accuracy. Thus, with regard to the Campaign of 1812, the Battle of Borodino is interpreted unambiguously as a victory, while a range of extravagant claims are made with respect to the then Russian army, its leadership, and tactics. 34 For the first time it became possible for Soviet writers to contradict a figure such as Engels, where he cast doubt on a Russian nationalist thesis - such as the charge that Kutuzov was guilty of numerous mistakes during the Battle of Borodino. 35 Significantly, Barclay de Tolly, a non-Russian who, evidence suggests, was the originator of the tactics of the Tsarist army in 1812, was not permitted to receive any attention which might detract from the adulation directed at Kutuzov. 36

The increasing intensity of official Russian nationalism after the struggle with Nazi Germany began is indicated by a number of other features of the early war years. In July 1942, Orders of Suvorov, Nevskii, and Kutuzov were announced for the Red Army. 37 Similarly the title of 'Guards' (Gvardiia), which had referred in the pre-revolutionary past to units of the Russian army entrusted with the protection of the Tsar and the Romanov Dynasty, was resurrected in November 1941 for Soviet units which had proved themselves 'outstanding'. As Mehnert observes, the Russian soldiers of 1941 were in this way deliberately associated with those of the Tsarist past. Pravda made this abundantly clear by declaring in December 1941:
Glorious were the old Russian Guards. They were in Berlin and Leipzig and Paris. They died in the battles of the (First) World War. More generally, the war years permitted a significant relaxation of ideological control over those who wished to express Russian nationalism. The material published by the journal Leningrad, organ of the Leningrad Union of Writers, (examined further in the next section) was a particularly noteworthy example of this. Even more remarkable for the apparent abandonment of the 'internationalist' dimension of Soviet ideology are provincial pamphlets which were published in the immediate vicinity of fighting. Barghoorn cites one of the few copies to reach the West, from Orël, entitled O borbe orlovskikh partizan s nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov. In it, 

... the partisans are quoted as referring to Stalin's call for a 'holy fatherland war' to which the partisans responded. The partisans recalled the 'glorious traditions of our ancestors' and the fact that in past centuries the Orël and Briansk peasants had fought bitterly against the armies of Charles XII and Napoleon.

There is a good deal of evidence which suggests that the growth of Russian nationalism during the war climaxed in 1943, after Stalingrad, and particularly after the victory at Kursk in July, when the conviction grew that 'the war had been as good as won'. The appearance of films such as Eisenstein's Ivan the Terrible, the establishment of the neo-Tsarist 'Suvorov Schools', and the articles of General Krivitskii praising General Brusilov all lend credence to this view. The trend may be seen to have peaked in December, when a new state anthem was adopted, lauding 'Great Rus'.

Crucially however, despite what at least one Soviet communist referred to as the 'nationalist NEP', it is clear that the 'internationalist' dimension of Soviet ideology had been temporarily placed in the background, rather than jettisoned. Even if a Russian nationalist song had been proclaimed as the state anthem of the USSR, the 'Internationale' remaining the Party anthem was not brought into question. In addition, the Russian nationalism described above was balanced, particularly at times such as the Twenty-fifth anniversary of the Revolution in journals such as Bol'shevik, by reminding readers
of Marxist internationalism and the global mission of the Soviet Union, the battles against the Allied interventionists in 1918-21, and the inspirational character of Leninism being responsible for victories against the Nazis.45

The period from the end of the Second World War until Stalin's death sees a second shift of emphasis in the way the Soviet state exploited Russian nationalism during this period. Essentially, particularly in 1945-46, the authorities demanded a degree of return to 'Party spirit' (partiinost'), which in effect meant that less Russian nationalism and more obeisance to the spirit of 'internationalism' was required. However, almost simultaneously, or at least from late 1946 onwards (which of course coincided with the onset of the 'Cold War'), the 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaign publicly launched by the People's Commissar for Culture, Andrei Zhdanov, resulted in a virulent and progressively more extreme Russian nationalism being required, in order to combat perceived 'fawning before the West'. Clearly, these final eight years of Stalin's rule were a period when it was virtually impossible for any but the most adroit historian to be without sin, the Party being ever watchful for lapses into either of the gravely viewed forms of deviation, 'bourgeois objectivism' (insufficient Marxist-Leninist content, or too much respect for non-Marxist Russian figures), or 'bourgeois cosmopolitanism' (insufficient respect for Russian history or achievements, or any favorable attention paid to the West).46

The Party's policy towards historiography immediately following the war was that Russian nationalism in certain areas should be toned down, and that a degree of 'internationalism' in analysis, and more orthodox ideology generally, should regain sway. This is despite the parallel phenomenon of the emergence of the 'Russian originality' theme shortly after the victory at Stalingrad.47

Zhdanov indicated the new delicate analytic balance required of historians in August 1946:

Today we are not the Russians we were before 1917, and our Rus' is not the same as that of yesterday.48
Stressing anew the debt owed by the Soviet people to the Bolshevik Party, and emphasising the need for 'Party spirit' in scholarship, Zhdanov went on to condemn the abandonment of 'theoretical questions', and the tendency to what he termed 'factism' (tendencies he had called for twelve years earlier). Despite all this, the use of the rhapsodic term Rus', inter alia, clearly indicated that not all features of the 'nationalist NEP' were to be abandoned.

To be sure, during this period a partial reversal took place in the extent to which Russian nationalism was exploited. The new journal Voprosy istorii attacked 'distortions ... in the direction of imperialistic chauvinism' which were held to have occurred during the war, including 'the restoration of bourgeois conceptions in the depiction of the growth' of the Russian state, the denial of a revolutionary significance in the peasant uprisings, and idealisation of the leaders of the autocratic structure, and the rejection of the class analysis of historical phenomena'. As late as 1948, the journal attacked a variety of such theses, together with a number of perceived specific excesses, such as the Russian nationalist interpretation and justification of the expansionist wars of Catherine the Great, and the Crimean War. Journals such as Kul'tura i zhizn' attacked writers of fiction who developed themes concerned with 'tsars, noblemen and khans'.

For a short period in 1946, 'internationalist' and more orthodox Marxist-Leninist scholarship appeared to have overshadowed its more Russian nationalist counterpart. This is illustrated by, for example, the confrontation between V. Mavrodin, Head of the Department of the History of the Peoples of the USSR, and N. Rubinshtein, a senior official of the Central Committee's Administration of Agitation and Propaganda. With reference to a work of Mavrodin published the previous year, Obrazovanie drevnerusskogo gosudarstva, a work which met all the post-1934 Russian nationalist requirements, Rubinshtein accused the author in the pages of Voprosy istorii of committing 'extreme distortions of a patriotic, indeed of a chauvinistic sort'.

The policy of greater emphasis on the role of the Party in the victory over Nazi Germany required such writers as Aleksandr Fadeev, Valentin Kataev, and Konstantin Simonov to rewrite works with a strong
Russian nationalist bias which had clearly satisfied official requirements during the war.\textsuperscript{53} In addition, the cult of the Russian military tradition was 'reduced to more modest proportions, within a framework of heightened Party vigilance' after the war.\textsuperscript{54}

Finally, the approval apparent since the late 1930s to make use of Russia's pre-revolutionary historians, such as Solov'ev, Miliukov and Kliuchevskii, was thrown into doubt when Soviet Byzantinists and Medievalists were attacked for excessive reliance on such non-Marxist figures.\textsuperscript{55} The fact that such attacks represented part of a trend would appear to have been confirmed by the considerable evidence of greater obeisance to more orthodox Marxian analysis in later works during the period, notably the various studies of Russian economic development in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{56}

Thus there was a tendency in the years immediately following the war to reassert the status of 'internationalism' and Marxian orthodoxy in historiography, and to excise excessive or superfluous, from the Party's point of view, elements of Russian nationalism. However, from 1946 onwards, this tendency co-existed with, and was eventually superseded by, Zhdanov's 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaign, which encouraged emphasis on certain elements of Russian nationalism in the drive to destroy links with, and respect for, the West.

While the above-quoted August 1946 statement of Zhdanov had largely stressed the 'rehabilitation of Marxism-Leninism' side of the post-war ideological drive, the beginnings of the 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaign can also be traced to Zhdanov, specifically, to his contribution to the discussion of G.F. Aleksandrov's Istoriiia zapadno-evropeiskoi filosofii in June 1947.\textsuperscript{57} The previous year had seen a degree of ideological confusion concerning the relative requirements of nationalism and 'internationalism' on the pages of such publications as Voprosy istorii with, on the one hand, the historian Mavrodin attacked for 'chauvinistic distortions', but at the same time attacking, together with two other historians (including S. Iushkov, of pre-Soviet training) a work by P.P. Smirnov, Voprosy obrazovaniia russkogo natsional'nogo gosudarstva.
The author, who was seeking to infuse more Marxist analysis than had been the norm into his work, was accused of a 'reversion to Pokrovskii-ism, displaying itself in a one-sided isolation of economic factors, and a neglect of factors of a non-economic order'.

Zhdanov's stand clearly indicated the correctness, from the Party's point of view, of the latter position. However, the required manner of expression of Russian nationalism was to differ in emphasis by contrast with the war and pre-war periods. The increasingly positive view taken of the pre-revolutionary state tended to take the form of Tsarist Russia's foreign and military behaviour being justified and praised even more than they had been during the war. This is shown by the cases of Stalin's 'posthumous liquidation' in 1949 of Engels, as far as his unsympathetic views of late nineteenth-century Russian foreign policy were concerned, and the attack in Bol'shevik in 1951 on Tarle's 1938 work, Nashestvie Napoleona na Rossiiu 1812 goda, which had up to this time been viewed as a satisfactory interpretation of Russia's performance in the war with Napoleonic France, for not being sufficiently unqualified in its praise of Russia.

The main stress, however, was placed on Russia's alleged historical superiority to, and independence from, any influence from the West. In pushing this line, the bulk of historiographical and critical articles which emerged during the campaign attempted to propagandise the new themes of dogma.

Firstly, the historian was required to argue that the genesis and development of the Russian state was entirely independent and uninfluenced by other ethnic groups. 'Normanist' theories were one of the main heresies in this regard, positing as they did the establishment of the first Russian state by the Germanic Varangians. This and any other argument which smacked of such views was branded 'cosmopolitanism', defined in the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia as 'a reactionary bourgeois ideology which rejects national traditions and national sovereignty, advocates an indifferent attitude towards the fatherland and the national culture, and seeks the establishment of 'world government' and 'world citizenship'.
Thus, official Russian nationalism took something of a new turning, becoming more 'extreme', particularly as far as the question of Russia's historical relationship with the West was concerned. In the 1930s, intimate links with the West were stressed in order to establish that Russia was not historically backward, but had assimilated the best from what was conceded as being the centre of modern civilisation, post-Renaissance Western Europe. This view and the assumptions underlying it were now subsumed under the catch-all of 'cosmopolitanism': nothing was permitted to call into question the new thesis that Russia had always been superior to and independent from the West, no matter which criteria were considered.

The line of the immemorially independent and superior Russian people thus became one basis for criticism of a wide range of scholarship. Most notably, articles which had stressed Western influence on Russian monarchs (such as the description of English influence on Peter the Great, above criticism during the war) came under attack from journals such as Literaturnaia gazeta, while the entire direction of the recently rehabilitated field of Byzantine studies was reversed in order to show Russian influence on Byzantium.

Secondly, Soviet scholars were called on to concentrate on the historical and geographical issues surrounding the formation of the Russian people, and the first Russian state. Scholars were not permitted, without risk of violent criticism, to admit that Russian historical development had at any point (for example, in the 'period of the formation of feudal relations') lagged behind the West. Perhaps the flavour of the time, as far as historiography is concerned, is best summed up by the article 'Protiv ob''ektivizma v istoricheskoj nauke' which appeared in the final issue of Voprosy istorii for 1948. Listing the alleged achievements of Soviet historiography, the article makes clear that as far as non-Soviet history is concerned, the issues of traditional concern to Marxists, couched in consistently Marxian phraseology, continue to be addressed. It is in the area of Russian history where the issues given priority in research might appear eccentric to a non-Soviet Marxist. While some recent writing on the more 'orthodox' topic of peasant history is revealed, the weight of attention is paid to the origin of the Eastern Slavs, and the formation of the 'ancient Russian state'.
In conclusion, in the evaluation of the pre-revolutionary Russian state under Stalin's regime, the themes and emphasis of nationalism vary, roughly in accordance with the needs of the state. However, despite the important immediate post-war period of partial reassertion of 'internationalism' and orthodox Marxism in analysis generally, Russian nationalism, from the inception of its official use in 1934, intrudes progressively more into the evaluation of the pre-revolutionary state, drawing continuously further from what may be seen as the norms of Soviet Marxist analysis of the past established before 1934.

(b) The Pre-Revolutionary Russian State as a Colonial Power

The incremental rehabilitation during the Stalin period of the behaviour of the pre-revolutionary Russian state as a colonial power presents a picture of gradually more positive reappraisal similar to the evolving view of the more general view of the pre-revolutionary Russian state, discussed in the previous section. The major differences are that with regard to the former, the infusion of Russian nationalism began somewhat later, and that the partial 'radicalisation' at the end of the war, while detectable, is distinctly less marked.

Soviet historiography on the issue of Tsarist colonialism does not vary from the pre-1934 spirit in any significant sense until 1937. Thus E. Shteinberg could publish his Ocherki po istorii Turkmenii in 1934, a work which describes Russia, viewed from its colonies, as a 'barbaric, half-Asiatic, feudal gendarme state', and a less desirable colonial power than Great Britain. Similarly, S.D. Asfendiarov published Istoriiia Kazakhstana in 1935, a work which at certain points comes close to equating Russian colonialism with a policy of genocide. As Tillett notes, when Asfendiarov was denounced in 1936 on charges of 'bourgeois nationalism', criticism of him omitted any mention of deviations in the evaluation of Tsarist colonialism.

In addition, one of the historiographic criticisms formulated by Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov, published in January 1936, was that Soviet historians did not sufficiently condemn 'the annexationist-colonising role of Russian Tsarism, together with the Russian bourgeoisie and landlords' (one of the slogans popularised at the time with the intention of summing up the desirable orientations of historical works was 'Tsarism-Prison of Peoples').
However, in August 1937, the 'Zhdanov Commission', in cataloguing the mistakes of entries which had been unsuccessful in a competition for a standard history textbook to be used in schools, claimed that authors had been in error in not recognising the positive significance of Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, the 17th century Ukrainian responsible for the unification of his country with the Russian state. In addition, Stalin himself for the first time set out the 'lesser evil' formula with respect to the Ukraine and Georgia. In both cases, he claimed, the submission to the Russian state should not be seen as an 'absolute evil', but as a 'lesser evil' to absorption by other powers.  

Other suggestions of a shift in the official line were the claims, in 1940, that 'national contingents' had fought (willingly) on the Russian side in the Campaign of 1812, and the absence, in a survey of the military traditions of the peoples of Central Asia in Istoricheskii zhurnal, of any mention of struggle against the Russian colonisers. Yet up to this point, little, comparatively speaking, had changed. Marksist-istorik assured its readers that the 'lesser evil' formula by no means applied to all Tsarist conquests, and, most importantly, Tsarist colonialism was still officially regarded as 'reactionary', while resistance to it continued to be interpreted as being of a 'progressive', 'national-liberation' character.

As might be expected, the onset of war inspired a large increase in the number of references to the 'friendship' of the various peoples of the USSR, together with a call for more inspiring propaganda exploiting both nationalism and the 'friendship of peoples'. Thus, in 1942 Propagandist criticised the almost complete lack of books on national heroes, on the participation and military co-operation of the various peoples of our country in popular, patriotic wars against foreign conquerors. Yet of all the national heroes given favorable publicity, only one pre-revolutionary non-Russian figure featured - Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, a symbol of voluntary union with Russia. The inescapable fact was that the majority of non-Russian national heroes - unlike Khmel'nitskii - acquired their renown in resisting Russian imperialism, and hence were not symbols of the 'friendship of peoples' in co-operative armed struggle.
against 'foreigners' (which was never taken to include Russians). The consequences of this fact must have dawned quickly on the authorities who did publish small numbers of pamphlets on certain non-Russian heroes (including the celebrated Shamil') in 1941: the pamphlets 'were turned out in small editions and not reprinted'.

However, the change in official position on the resistance to Tsarist colonialism was not revealed openly until the closing stages of the war. In line with the more generally observable increase in Russian nationalism following the victories at Stalingrad and Kursk, and the conclusion apparently reached in official quarters that appeals to non-Russian national consciousness worked against Soviet unity, the Party from 1944 onwards published detailed decrees intended to remove 'incorrect', 'bourgeois nationalist' views from non-Russian writings on history, the arts, and literature. The most prominent indication of the Party's change of heart was the reception of a work by M. Abdykalykov and A. Pankratova, Istoriia kazakhskoi SSR. S drevneishikh vremëõ do nashikh dnei, published in 1943. The work was devoted specifically to the pre-revolutionary 'struggle for independence and political unification' of Kazakhstan, placing particularly positive emphasis on the rebel leaders at the time of Russian colonisation, especially the national hero, Kenesary Kasymov, whom the authors regarded as 'revolutionary' and 'progressive', despite their (the rebel leaders') aristocratic origins. Warmly received by Pravda in July 1943, in 1945 the work was to be condemned, together with the recently written histories of numerous other non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union. The July 1945 issue of Bol'shevik contained an article by Georgii Aleksandrov, Head of the Central Committee Directorate of Agitation and Propaganda, who attacked non-Russian historians for stressing historical events which had divided 'the peoples of Russia'. He claimed, on the contrary, that 'the history of these peoples had been a record of the overcoming of mutual antagonisms and of consolidation around the Russian people'.

The subsequent eight years until the death of Stalin saw, in effect, a continuation of the process of 'rehabilitating' Tsarist colonialism. This is despite the fact that Voprosy istorii warned historians that admitting 'the complete rehabilitation of the colonial aggressive policy
of Tsarism' was incorrect. The problem of correctly striking the officially required balance between the complete rehabilitation of Tsarist colonialism on the one hand, and the requirements of an at least pro forma ideological respectability on the other, was solved by acknowledging that the phenomenon was 'reactionary', despite the fact that its consequences were 'progressive'. Discussions of concrete historical cases invariably admitted at most a token generality concerning the 'reactionary' nature of Tsarist colonialism, while its 'progressive' consequences were almost exclusively concentrated on. Further, as the Stalin era moves toward its end, in terms of substantive analysis, treatment of the 'reactionary' aspects of Russian colonialism becomes virtually (but never totally) non-existent, giving way to ever more euphoric litanies on the many benefits derived by the native populations from the pre-revolutionary Russian colonial presence.

In addition, with the emergence of the doctrine of the pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples' during the war with Germany, a drastic rewriting of the history of Tsarist colonialism was clearly called for. As Aleksandrov unambiguously stated, scholarship should serve the requirements of Soviet nationality policies in this regard:

> our scholars - historians, ethnographers, literary writers - must promote in their works the flowering of the friendship of peoples living in the Soviet Union by truthfully reconstructing their history.

Hence, the impression was to be built up in the new histories that hatreds between the Russian colonisers and their non-Russian subjects had never existed. 'Class alliances' and common revolutionary struggle across ethnic boundaries were discovered, while the alleged cultural and economic benefits of incorporation into the Russian empire were stressed. Importantly, two of the most prominent non-Russian national heroes, the Kazakh Kenesary and the Daghestani Shamil', hitherto regarded as standard-bearers of their respective 'national liberation' struggles (although, as indicated above, general concerns on the historiographic line on such areas began to be voiced earlier) were violently denounced as reactionaries in 1949 and 1950 respectively.

In the final three years of Stalin's rule, what Tillett has termed the 'Bagirov line' - referring to the Azerbaijani Party First
Secretary responsible for the 'fall' of Shamil - was 'consolidated', or applied to the histories of other non-Russian peoples of the USSR. In addition, Bagirov denounced the long-standing dogma of the 'lesser evil' at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, virtually proposing an 'absolute good' formula:

> The Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences makes an incorrect approach to questions relating to the history of the peoples of the USSR ... instead of fully raising the question of the progressive, beneficent nature of the annexation of the non-Russian peoples to Russia, the journal (of the Institute) has initiated an aimless, abstract discussion ... on the so-called 'lesser evil' formula ...

An additional new feature of this period was the formulation of the 'voluntary union' thesis, whereby a given Russian colonial 'conquest' had not occurred at all, annexation rather being requested by the given state or people. One of the first of such novel claims was revealed by the indication in early 1952 that the new edition of *Istoriia kazakhskoi SSR* would demonstrate the pre-revolutionary 'striving of the Kazakh workers for voluntary submission to Russian rule'.

By the time of Stalin's death, when the 'benefits from the elder brother' thesis was reaching its full flower, and the 'greater evil' of foreign colonial powers had multiplied while the 'lesser evil' of Tsarist colonialism had virtually disappeared, any popular movement which could be identified as anti-Russian was condemned as 'reactionary'. Of particular significance in this connection was the fact that the Kazakh Andizhan Valley revolt of 1898, regarded up to 1951 as 'progressive', slipped, as Tillett puts it, 'into the doubtful column' at that year's Tashkent conference of historians. Another newly doubtful case was the 1916 Central Asian revolt, regarded until 1953 as 'the most glorious of insurrections, a curtain-raiser to the October Revolution in the colonies'. The *Voprosy istorii* debate of that year focussing on the Revolt, while not condemning it decisively, did lay particular emphasis on the involvement of 'feudal-clerical elements', 'representatives of the exploiting aristocracy', and foreign (German and Turkish) agents.

Hence, despite a somewhat later start, and little evidence of the brief 'radicalisation' after the war which marked the interpretation
of those areas of the history of the pre-revolutionary Russian state discussed in the previous section, the gradually more positive reappraisal of Tsarist colonialism over the period indicates the same tendency of progressively drawing further from the Bolshevik internationalism expressed in historiography by the writings of those such as Mikhail Pokrovskii in the direction of Russian nationalism.

(ii) 'Communist Nationalism' and Russian Culture

As is the case with the official attitude to pre-revolutionary history, the Stalin era reveals the fusion of Marxist internationalism and Russian nationalism in the approach to the Russian cultural heritage. The period is marked by an ever more obvious departure from the 'class' analysis which dominated the cultural sphere in the first decade of the Soviet Union's existence - despite occasional reversals and changes of course - in both the evaluation of the Russian cultural heritage understood discretely and in overall cultural policy with regard to the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union.

(a) The Pre-Revolutionary Russian Cultural Heritage

During the first decade of Soviet power, although the political leadership at no stage rejected as worthless or pernicious the classical Russian cultural heritage as such, the regime sanctioned experimentation reflecting the artistic view of the Revolution in most areas of culture. It also permitted the ascendancy of groups such as Proletkul't, which viewed this heritage as one aspect of the class superstructure of the ancien regime and hence useless, if not a subversive influence, for the new society.* Stalin's policy on this question, by contrast, involved essentially a populist cultural revolution. As part of the overall centralisation of power in the Soviet Union during the late 1920s and 1930s, creative writers and artists were brought under strict central control, a process which culminated in the proclamation of the concept of 'Socialist Realism' at the first Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934. However, while 'Socialist Realism' was at first taken to indicate the

* For more details, see Appendix.
necessity of works which would induce enthusiasm among the masses exclusively for Soviet socialism, by the mid-1930s it was apparent that the authorities expected that a significant degree of inspiration in the various areas of cultural activity would be derived from aspects of traditional Russian culture, notably 'folk' art and the mainly nineteenth-century classics. While the reversal of the policy of sanctioning Modernist experimentation in the various fields of culture also meant that a large proportion of the non-Russian pre-revolutionary heritage also returned to favour, both re-published Russian pre-revolutionary works and contemporary writings would, the leadership hoped, inspire a degree of patriotism amongst the Russian populace. The change of course was also a means of catering for popular demand and taste in a way which did not undermine the power of the leadership.

The introduction of 'communist nationalism' with regard to the Russian cultural heritage coincides almost precisely with the reversal of policies in the area of historiography, and the requirement that Soviet historians take a more favourable view of the pre-revolutionary Russian past. Until approximately 1935, first under the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) and then the Union of Soviet Writers formed in 1932, creative writers became administratively committed to inspiring popular loyalty exclusively to the Communist Party and Soviet socialism. This position had its corollary in a continuing negative view of the classics of Russian culture. The fifth issue of Novyi mir for 1934, for example, stated that Leo Tolstoi

... is almost useless because of his classless position. Such scenes as the conversation between Princess Oblonskii and peasant women are in fact harmful, since there can be no understanding between women of different classes. The same must be said of the scene between Pierre Bezukhov and Marshal Davoust, as all talk of human brotherhood is hurtful.

The dramatic change of policy in the area of the Russian cultural heritage came about not by specific decrees which signalled reversal in the area of historiography. As Timasheff notes, it is probable that the programme of 'The Great Retreat' in art was never consistently formulated. Rather, the salutary effect of several actions was observed; the leadership then increased pressure in the direction which proved to have been correctly chosen.
The year 1935 reveals a number of developments which indicate that the leadership had decided on a change of course in this area. Throughout the year the press reported the popularity of traditional songs, particularly 'lyrical' ones, among Soviet youth. Folk song 'olympiads' were organised, and recordings of such music produced. To indicate the importance of these developments, Pravda reported in November of that year that Stalin had attended (and enjoyed) a concert of Russian folk and traditional popular music on the anniversary of the October Revolution. The newspaper commented that 'popular art' was the correct inspiration for Soviet artists, and that Western and indigenous non-traditional cultural trends, which had previously found favour among Soviet artists, amounted to the 'rotten art of the petty bourgeoisie'. Soon afterwards, Pravda reported that Voroshilov had lectured some young officers of the Red Army on the necessity of a thorough knowledge of classical literature. The Red Army, according to Voroshilov, was a 'school of culture' in which the classics must play the predominant part.

Soviet publications reveal the continuity of this trend throughout the following year, 1936. For example, publicity was given to the revival of Cossack military formations and choirs (one of which was invited to perform before Stalin), as well as customs such as the transmission of hereditary swords from father to son.

The policy towards Russian culture which followed contained two salient elements: a campaign against what was termed 'Formalism', and the rehabilitation of much of Russia's cultural heritage - which meant that not only was the public again exposed to a wide range of the products of Russia's pre-revolutionary culture (both that of the peasantry and of the 'ruling classes'), but that creative artists were expected to take as their model the norms and standards of the 'greats' of this era. Other aspects of the revised approach to Russian culture included newly respectful official attitudes to Russia's language, social customs and traditions, and even the Russian Orthodox Church.

The campaign against 'Formalism' - or those non-traditional post-Victorian trends in art and culture to which the authorities had been sympathetic during the first decade of Soviet power - took the form of the selection of scapegoats who had allegedly indulged the phenomenon, and the media reporting conferences organised to discuss the concept. Thus, following.
a number of articles in the first months of 1936, Pravda castigated Shostakovich's new opera Ledi Makbet mtsenskogo uezda, in an article entitled 'Khaos v muzyke', as cheaply derivative of Western trends, as well as 'alien' and 'incomprehensible to the masses'. Similar charges of 'Formalism' were levelled at a new suite for orchestra and choir by the composer Aladov, and a 'Kolkhoz ballet', 'Ziiaiushchaia vesna'.

In June of the same year, Moscow's celebrated Tretiakov Gallery was singled out for similar 'errors'. As Pravda stated,

The managers of the principal museums of the USSR have acquired pictures without the requisite discrimination. The celebrated Tretiakov is full of pictures of the Formalist trend, which provokes the righteous anger of the workers. You have Larionov's Soldat - the face is roughly painted, the legs are unnatural, while the only element carefully painted is a fence with obscene writing on it. Udal'tsov's Avroportret is simply a combination of lines and squares ...

On the other hand, products of genuine realism, the works of Vereshchagin, Repin, Serov, Levitan and Shishkin, have been relegated to storerooms.

The Tretiakov's 'mistakes' were corrected by again exhibiting in pride of place its nineteenth-century Russian Realist art.

Similar conservatism dominated the new official attitude to architecture. The new favoured form was the 'Russian Empire' style of the early nineteenth century. Timasheff narrates that when the Finnish Embassy submitted plans in 1936 for a new embassy in the 'Modernist' style, it was asked to replace them with something in the neo-classical mould (of the early nineteenth century), this having been chosen as the style for the further development of Moscow.

Finally, in 1938, somewhat later than the denunciation of 'Formalism' in other areas, Meyerhold, perhaps the 'Formalist' par excellence of the Soviet stage, was condemned and forced to recant his views. As if to symbolise the new requirements, his 'Malyi' theatre, hitherto the focus of the avant-garde of the Soviet theatre scene, produced Gogol's Revizor in the unadventurous style of the 1860s. Similarly, traditional 'melodramatic' performances of such works as the stage-setting of Anna Karenina, after receiving initial criticism, were defended as
having been produced 'under the guidance of the highest Party authorities'. As the actor Moskvin was quoted as saying, 'We are returning to the glorious tradition of Russian realism'. In addition, encouragement was given to the performance of traditional 'folk plays'.

The new attitude to the cultural heritage found particular expression in publicity surrounding anniversaries and the restoration of cultural monuments. Of particular note in this regard is the attention devoted to Aleksandr Pushkin, the centenary of whose death fell, conveniently, in 1937. Typical of the simplistic adulation directed at the poet's memory were such statements as 'Pushkin is a genius who discovered the music of the mother tongue. He is the guiding star of Russian poetry. He is alive in the hearts of the people.' The stature of Pushkin on a world scale was also taken as a source of pride. Pravda's editorial of 5 January 1937 declared, for example:

> In defining the services of Pushkin to his motherland and to humanity in general, the very great importance of the Russian literary language and of Russian literature to the cultural development of the Russian people and to world culture in general is widely acknowledged.

Not surprisingly, given such publicity, the official newspaper of the Commissariat for Education reported in 1938 that in factory libraries Pushkin and Tolstoi were in greatest demand. In addition, the various places where Pushkin lived and worked were restored, and pilgrimages were organised to them. This was also the case for Iasnaia poliana.

Importantly, however, for the interpretation of later trends in the official approach to Russian culture, the Russian nationalism which emerged at this time was not coupled with the unflinching xenophobia of later years in the Stalin era. For example, the Literaturnaia entsiklopediia published in 1935, while claiming that Pushkin had achieved an evolution from classicism to realism in twenty years, a process which had allegedly taken a hundred years in the West, acknowledged that such figures as Byron and Shakespeare had influenced the poet more greatly than had Russian figures such as Fonvizin or Radishchev. Similarly, in the proceedings of a symposium published two years later under the title Stil' i iazyk A.S. Pushkina, it was claimed that Pushkin was 'heir to everything progressive and advanced in European culture'.

As far as the production of contemporary works of culture was concerned, the position of the Party remained that such works should be guided by 'Socialist Realism', interpreted as art and literature which would inculcate both Russian patriotism and the love of Soviet socialism. As Kalinin stated in 1939,

What is socialist realism? That is not clear. Maybe it is the reproduction of Russian patriotism and of socialism as it is in life, not in books. This actual socialism is sometimes awkward, but this should not deter the author or painter. The formula is in essence that to be a socialist realist one must love the fatherland and have full command of Marxist-Leninist theory.111

The requirement of a Russian patriotic dimension was not to be underestimated. In a spirit similar to that of Voroshilov's comment on the importance of the Russian classics quoted above, the author Aseev stated in 1940,

We, Soviet writers, are still trying to forge a literature. We have tried first one way, then another, and have seen that our works have been failures. Suddenly, we have become conscious of the existence of such giants as Pushkin, Shakespeare, Dickens, Gogol and Tolstoi. We realise that they have centuries of culture behind them, and were brought up by men with cultivated minds. And now we, Soviet authors, must try to produce something to equal them.112

However, while such a comment is significant in revealing that the rehabilitation of pre-revolutionary Russian culture was at first partly balanced by a newly positive view of certain non-Russian cultural figures as well (a balancing which would later have been denounced as 'bourgeois cosmopolitanism'), it is doubtful that such statements amount to more than symbolic rhetoric. As Timasheff comments, Soviet artists were expected to be 'moderate realists', looking for 'inspiration in folk art and to create in simple forms understandable to the masses'.113

The simultaneous rehabilitation of the art forms of both the pre-revolutionary peasantry and educated classes may also be observed in the area of music. Reference has already been made to Stalin's importantly symbolic attendance of a concert of folk music organised in November 1935. This personal endorsement by the dictator of this art form - and hence, it was suggested, traditional popular tastes in culture
as a whole - continued to be stressed, as, for example, a 1939 Pravda story on Stalin's interest in the revival and preservation of a particular Russian folk-song indicates. Equally, the classical music of the pre-revolutionary era received the stamp of official approval. Just as the modernist compositions of those such as Shostakovich were condemned, a report in Vecherniaia Moskva in 1939 on a performance of Glinka's Life of the Tsar comments that the audience preferred a work such as this to the creations of contemporary composers.

The tendency to rhapsodise over the Russian language which also emerged in the mid-1930s has already been noted in connection with the rehabilitation of such pre-revolutionary literary figures as Pushkin and Tolstoi. Yet the media, in addition to claiming such figures as part of the Soviet heritage, now stressed that the state should be seen as the guardian of this element of Russia's culture. The writer Chukovskii was quoted at the time as saying that Russia's traditional literary language should not be altered, while in 1939 Krasnaia nov' claimed, The Russian language has resisted the strain of revolutionary years very well. The tendency to use official abbreviations has disappeared; as of September 1 1938, post offices have been forbidden from passing on mail if the addressee is referred to in an abbreviated form. The number of foreign words in use now is smaller than before the Revolution. For many such words, Russian equivalents have been found which have been universally accepted. The Russian language is more Russian than ever.

Finally, and possibly of the greatest significance for the daily lives of the Russian masses, the 1930s witnessed the revival of numerous traditional social habits and traditions, and some significant re-evaluation of the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. The family, which had declined as a social institution in the first decade of Soviet power, with official sanction being given to divorce, abortion and 'unregistered marriages', came to be viewed more and more as a worthwhile institution, while traditional attitudes such as the respect of youth for age were given official encouragement. Again, a symbolic act by Stalin indicated the direction of new policies: in October 1935, Izvestiia gave a detailed account of the leader's visit to his aging mother in Georgia, stressing the son's love and respect for the woman. The introduction of a
neo-traditional school system placing less stress on Marxist-Leninist class analysis, and more on customary school subjects as well as social principles such as discipline and obedience, mirrors this development.\textsuperscript{120} The re-establishment of forms reminiscent of Tsarist Russia went as far as the restoration of uniforms for all schoolchildren, the recommendation that girls wear their hair in traditional pig-tails, and the abandonment of co-education.\textsuperscript{121}

As to official policy on the Russian Orthodox Church, while the most dramatic manifestations of accommodation with the state were reached during the pressures of war with Nazi Germany, the first indications of a change become apparent, again, in the 1930s. Most importantly, the report of the August 1937 'Zhdanov Commission' stressed the 'progressive' role the Orthodox Church had played in medieval Russia. In line with the position evidently required by Zhdanov we find, for example, that Bednyi's \textit{Bogatyri} which, \textit{inter alia}, satirised Prince Vladimir, was ridiculed in the following terms:

\begin{quote}
It is well known that the Christianisation of Russia was one of the main factors in the drawing together of the backward Russian people and the people of Byzantium and later with the peoples of the West - peoples of higher culture. It is also well known what a large role clergymen, especially the Greeks, played in advancing literacy in the Russia of the Kiev period; hence, from a historical point of view, Bednyi's libretto is an example not only of an anti-Marxist, but of a frivolous attitude towards history and a cheapening of the history of our people.\textsuperscript{122}
\end{quote}

By 1939, despite the overt violence, desecration and persecution which had been typical of Soviet policy in practice towards religion (and which had revealed themselves fully as recently as the Great Terror of 1937-8), the official view of the Russian Orthodox Church, at least as far as propaganda was concerned, was consistently displaying circumspection. For example, the sixth issue of that year of \textit{Antireligioznik} (which could be expected to be among the most hard-line of Soviet publications in matters of religion) reveals that while Church benediction of a figure such as Aleksandr Nevskii is a discredit to him, the Church was in line with mass sentiment in canonizing him:
Despite the fact that Aleksandr Nevskii is viewed as a saint by the Orthodox Church, and that many churches and monasteries have been dedicated to his memory, atheists should avoid any defamation of him; they must remember that he is a beloved hero of the people, and that he deserved the gratitude of later generations by his patriotism and military prowess. The Church canonised him in consideration of the people's love for him; the Militant Atheists' League has failed to follow an equally wise policy.  

With the onset of the War, even greater tolerance was extended to (and use made of) the traditional elements of Russian culture, although, partly no doubt because of the anti-Nazi coalition with the USA and Britain, Russian cultural nationalism was not permitted to degenerate into xenophobia. Hence, traditional Russian folk motifs were extensively exploited in such wartime musical works as the Tale of the Battle for the Russian Land, and while the theatres of Moscow continued to stage 'Soviet' plays, II'ia Erenburg was quoted as saying that at the Front, 'men listen to songs with words by Lermontov and Fet, discuss Turgenev and Leo Tolstoi, read Chekhov, Gorki, Balzac and Hugo'. A previously difficult figure, from the regime's point of view, such as Dostoevski, was referred to for the first time in 1942 as 'the great Russian writer F.M. Dostoevski', while a year later, the regime ceased all vacillations and referred to him in the Kratkaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia as a writer 'of genius'. Such tolerance was also extended to the quite apolitical, usually lyrical Russian patriotism of such contemporary literary figures as Akhmatova and Tikhonov, who were permitted to publish in such journals as Leningrad. The adulation directed at the Russian language was permitted to reach new heights. In 1941, a compendium of nationalist and messianic views of the Russian language enunciated by numerous pre-revolutionary Russian writers (including the Tsarist conservative N.M. Karamzin) was published as Iazyk gazety. The work claimed, for example, that learning Russian 'gave Marx a new and mighty weapon in the struggle for the cause of communism'.

Most dramatic of the various extensions of Russian cultural rights during the War, however, was the greater freedom extended to the Russian Orthodox Church, coupled as it was with publicity emphasising Church-State co-operation and tolerance. As Timasheff recounts, soon after the German
invasion, antireligious publications and museums were closed. The new restrained attitude on the part of the state is indicated by a statement of Kalinin in 1943:

Because religion still grips large parts of the population, and some people are deeply religious, we cannot combat it by ridicule. Of course, if some of our youth find it amusing that is not so bad. However, we should not permit this to develop into mockery.\(^3\)

In addition, taxes on the Church were reduced, and after the first expulsions of German forces from previously occupied territories, the Soviet press expressed indignation at the destruction and desecration of Russian churches and sacred objects.\(^{132}\) The newly acquired status of the Russian Orthodox Church was revealed by a number of acts of acknowledgement by the state. In October 1943, a Council for Russian Orthodox Affairs was created, which was to act as a link between the Government and the Moscow Patriarchate.\(^{133}\) A year earlier, Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev had been appointed to an official commission investigating German atrocities.\(^{134}\)

Stalin's personal association with the Russian Orthodox Church conferred on it the ultimate blessing of the state. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Revolution, Acting Patriarch Sergius congratulated Stalin, referring to him as the nation's 'God-given leader'.\(^{135}\) The Party leader was equally forthcoming in his praise of the role of priests in the war effort, while wide publicity was given to Stalin's indication to Sergius that the Government 'would not hinder in any way' the election of a new Patriarch.\(^ {136}\) On the death of Sergius (who was duly elected to the position) in 1944, and the appointment of Metropolitan Aleksei of Leningrad as Acting Patriarch, Izvestia quoted Aleksei's letter to 'Dear Iosif Vissarionovich', in which he described Stalin as 'the wise leader placed by the Lord over our great nation'.\(^{137}\) After the election of a new Patriarch in January 1945 at a ceremony attended, in line with the ancient tradition, by other Patriarchs of the Orthodox world, a message was sent to the Soviet Government and 'the highly honoured Iosif Stalin' thanking them for their help to the Church.\(^{138}\)

Soviet policy on the Russian cultural heritage following the War until the death of Stalin represents a complex picture, but as in the
area of historiography, involved essentially an onslaught on expressions of Russian patriotism which had not been balanced by partiiinost', a tendency gradually superseded by the 'anti-cosmopolitan campaign', which aimed at exercising any and all sentiment sympathetic to, or admiring of, the West, and to this end encouraged a crude and boastful form of Russian chauvinism. On balance, therefore, the late Stalinist Soviet state placed reliance on a form of 'communist nationalism' in which Russian cultural nationalism played a greater role than had been the case in the decade before.

The brief campaign against those creative artists who failed to balance their 'nationalism' with 'communism' selected a number of targets. Several writers were criticised for their positive descriptions of characters who revealed amiable but weak national traits, such as 'Russian good nature'. More specifically, Anna Akhmatova and Tikhonov were denounced, inter alia, for their form of patriotism which did not coincide precisely with the state's post-war requirements. Akhmatova (together with Mikhail Zoshchenko) was attacked in Zhdanov's decree on literature of 14 August 1946, in the context of the denunciation of the journals Zvezda and Leningrad, for 'specialising in the writing of empty, trivial works, without content, and permeated with a rotten lack of ideas and political indifference, calculated to disorient our youth, and poison its consciousness'. Around the same time, the chief organ of the post-war campaigns against ideological deviation in the cultural sphere, Kul'tura i zhizn', denounced a number of Soviet dramatists including N. Pogodin for dealing with the theme of the 'unplumbed depths' of the 'Russian soul' - ideologically overlooked during the war, now condemned as dangerous neo-mysticism.

Another aspect of this campaign was the abrupt halting of the rehabilitation of Dostoevskii. As noted above, during the war years, Soviet writers for the first time became unrestrained in claiming Dostoevskii as a 'great Russian writer' and a 'genius'. Following the war, official approval of the writer appeared to reach full fruition with a number of important works being published on his life and works, notably V. Ia. Kirpotin's Molodoi Dostoevskii and F.M. Dostoevskii, A.S. Dolinin's V tvorcheskoi laboratorii Dostoevskogo, B.V. Tomashevskii's
editing of the Sochineniia, and A.L. Slonimskii's F.M. Dostoevskii. 'Mal'chiki', all published in 1946 and 1947. Nevertheless, these works did not imply unambiguous approval of the writer: where they discuss the ideology of Dostoevskii, they typically balance favourable views with criticism of him as a thinker. Dostoevskii is held to have powerfully illuminated through his art an unsatisfactory and incomplete society, marked by oppression and suffering. His proffered solutions, especially during his later years, are played down to the greatest extent possible. All the same, despite early favourable reviews of the new works, in December 1947 a campaign was unleashed against the alleged 'idealisation' of Dostoevskii. D. Zaslavskii, in that month's issue of Kul'tura i zhizn', ridiculed the claims of the authors that Dostoevskii was anything but a consistent reactionary in his later years. While he concedes that Dostoevskii painted a realistic picture of Russian life and the evils of capitalism, he condemns the various scholars for their having ignored Gor'kii's evaluation of the writer, delivered at the first Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, in which he characterised Dostoevskii as the 'evil genius of the Russian people'. Articles in the same vein as Zaslavskii's continued to appear under such names as V.V. Ermilov and N. Burov.

The beginnings of the xenophobic 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaign can be traced to 1944; hence, for a time the Soviet ideological apparatus campaigned simultaneously against both perceived lack of Russian nationalism, and the expression of Russian nationalism without the balance of partiinost'. In June of that year a 'scientific conference' was held at Moscow University on the theme of the role of Russian science in the history of world culture. The principal drift of the Conference was indicated by A.N. Zelinskii, who claimed that 'Russian science, like all Russian culture, has always been original and independent'. Similar theses, combined with violent attacks on any writings which drew back from such claims, were confirmed as Party policy in the various subsequent Central Committee decrees and speeches of Andrei Zhdanov between 1946 and 1948 on literature, music, and philosophy. In January 1949, with the attacks on the group of 'anti-patriotic theatrical critics', the xenophobic and ethnocentric nature of the campaign intensified, with thinly veiled imputations of crimes perpetrated collectively by Jewish intellectuals.
The decree on music of 10 February 1948 was typical of the campaign. Entitled 'On the Opera "The Great Friendship" by V. Muradeli', it castigated works by such composers as Shostakovich, Prokof'ev, and Khachaturian. Their music was alleged to be an imitation of the 'modernistic bourgeois music of Europe and America, which reflects the decadence of bourgeois culture, the total denial of the art of music, its dead end.' Muradeli's opera was attacked for falsely suggesting that such peoples as the Ossetians and the Georgians had in the past at times been hostile to the Russians. Muradeli, moreover, was attacked for ignoring 'the best traditions and experience of classical opera in general, and of Russian classical opera in particular', described as 'the best in the world'. Kul'tura i zhizn' charged Soviet composers overall with having been unfaithful to the 'democratic ideals of Russian musical culture'.

More generally, extravagant claims about Russia's historical pre-eminence in all fields of culture were made during this period. Thus the article on art in the 1953 edition of the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia claims, stressing that mastery of the 'national heritage' is essential for the development of culture, that Russian art of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was 'one of the highest achievements of humanity' (Soviet art is 'the most advanced in the world'). The philosopher P.A. Shariia analogously claims at the time that Chernyshevskii and Dobroliubov were unprecedentedly pre-eminent in combining ethics and social progress before the advent of Marxism. Similarly, the scholar V.M. Shtein claimed that Russian economic thought in the middle of the nineteenth century was superior to that which prevailed in Germany - although it was conceded that Marxism made Germany temporarily ascendant in this area. Other writers claimed that such figures as Radishchev foreshadowed the Western thought of the likes of Rousseau. And while the spirit of the campaign against the 'idealisation' of Dostoevskii appears to have had a permanent effect - the second edition of the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia reveals an overall negative evaluation of such figures as Danilevskii, Katkov and other conservative nineteenth-century thinkers associated ideologically with the late Dostoevskii - scholars such as Shtein nevertheless argued that the Slavophiles were original rather than derivative in their reactionary outlook. In his
Ocherki razvitiia russkoi obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskoi mysli XIX-XX vekov, published in 1948, he rejects the view that the German political philosopher Haxthausen gave to these Russian thinkers their ideas on the peasant commune: predictably, he argues that the reverse was true. Finally, the theme of Russian originality in the area of science and technology, which had first appeared in the late 1930s in claims such as that Popov had 'invented' the radio, reached new heights, suggested by the claim of Komsomol'skaia pravda in September 1950 that 'Russia is the home of the internal combustion engine, the photo-electric cell and the electric motor'.

As if to remove any doubt that the required dosage of Russian cultural nationalism - balanced by overtly expressed loyalty to Stalinist communism - had increased in the post-war period, all inhibitions regarding the nationalist adulation of Pushkin disappeared as the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the poet's birth was celebrated in June 1949. The use which the authorities made of Pushkin may be contrasted with the publicity surrounding the hundredth anniversary of his death in 1937. According to Pravda's editorial of 6 June 1949, Pushkin profoundly understood the Russian people, 'for whom history had prepared the great mission of the liberation of mankind'. While during the 1937 anniversary there was a considerable outpouring of Russian nationalist sentiment, the use of Pushkin for such nationalist messianism had been quite absent. In addition, there were no references to the poet having been influenced by non-Russians, the reverse being claimed in several instances.

Thus the Stalin period in the area of policy towards the pre-revolutionary Russian cultural heritage reveals the development of 'communist nationalism', and a more extreme use of the Russian nationalist element in this ideological admixture at the end of the period than at the beginning. Nevertheless, the progressively greater use of Russian cultural nationalism is not even or unilinear: the fluctuations indicated by the different forms of Russian nationalism granted official sanction during the 1930s, the war years, and the post-war campaigns against 'cosmopolitanism' and wartime nationalism which allegedly lacked partiinost', suggest that far from reflecting an inevitable decline of Marxist-Leninist internationalist and class-based ideology, the various changes of policy course reflect the altering perceived political needs of ideology in changing circumstances.
(b) Russian Culture and Soviet Nationalities Policy

The transition from the class analysis of Leninist internationalism to Stalinist 'communist nationalism' in official policy towards the Russian cultural heritage had its corollary during this period in a drastic curtailment of the cultural rights of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, and the propagation of state-wide cultural policies which to a large extent revived assumptions and attitudes associated with pre-revolutionary Tsarist colonialism. Such a change in policy served the purpose of consolidating what was in some ways a genuine federation into a highly centralised and hence, in the leadership's view, more powerful state. Moreover, the re-establishment of colonialist patterns and attitudes, with the constant proclamation of the Russian people as the cultural Herrenvolk of the multinational state, no doubt also gratified traditional Russian nationalist (and racist) attitudes.

As Barghoorn has aptly observed, the history of Stalin's nationalities policies amounted to a 'gradual whittling away of restraints imposed by the conditions of the 1920s upon a weak regime'. Following the numerous acts of administrative centralisation in the late 1920s and 1930s, by the war period only several of the politically less sensitive responsibilities were left to the Republican Commissariats.

Stalin's cultural policies with regard to the nationalities of the Soviet Union mirrored such administrative centralisation by both envisaging and advocating the assimilation of existing cultures into a 'world culture'. Crucially, however, large and powerful cultures such as the Russian would survive, while the future of smaller cultures lay in assimilation. Stalin first put this view in his 1925 article 'On the Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East', in which he made plain his view that permitting the non-Russian, particularly Asiatic, nationalities of the Soviet Union to wield extensive cultural rights was a temporary expedient designed to consolidate Soviet power in such areas. Again at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930, Stalin stressed that as well as standing for the 'flourishing' of individual cultures under Socialism, Soviet ideology envisaged the ultimate merger of national cultures into one common ... culture with one common language'. While it was not specified that this language would be Russian, it was
understood that the Russian language and culture would form one of its most important ingredients. Given the proclaimed inevitability of the survival of Russian and the eventual disappearance of smaller cultures, a theoretical corollary was formulated for the gradual abandonment of remaining federal aspects of the Soviet political system and policies which emphasised and encouraged the cultural diversity of the USSR.

The push for greater Soviet unity by means of the Russian culture and language, which accompanied the more direct execution, imprisonment and disappearance of non-Russian 'bourgeois nationalists', began in earnest in the middle to late 1930s. In a typical statement of the time, Komsomol'skaia pravda declared in 1938 that the peoples of the Soviet Union recognised their brotherhood and unity, and wished to consolidate this unity around the 'great Russian people'. Thus the emergence at this time of the term 'Soviet people' for the first time. With regard to the promotion of linguistic unity, in 1938 the study of Russian became a compulsory school subject, beginning in the Third Grade, in all non-Russian schools of the Soviet Union. In schools in which Russian was already taught (for example, it had been compulsory in the Ukraine since 1926) there was a sharp increase in the number of hours devoted to the subject. Similarly, by the time of the outbreak of war, four hours a week of Russian was taught to non-Russian recruits of the Red Army, with Russian soldiers serving as 'monitors'. In 1939, Krasnaia nov' suggested the increasingly obvious policy that Russian was to be regarded as the official language of the Soviet Union: it stated that in the schools of the non-Russian Republics, Russian was the pupils' 'favourite subject'. All students reportedly did their best to get a good command of Russian, and the Russian language was eagerly learnt in order that communication between different nationalities was possible.

At the same time, between 1935 and 1939 the written form of numerous languages of the Soviet Union, particularly in Central Asia, was changed from the Latin to the Cyrillic. While the reasons for this move obviously included the desire to minimise Central Asian feelings of ethnic unity with Turkey (which under Atatürk had converted the form of its written language to the Latin alphabet) and to ease the absorption
by the local populations of Russian, the authorities, evidently at first exercising some sensitivity to non-Russian feelings, defended this move on the grounds that the Cyrillic alphabet, with twelve letters more than Latin's twenty-six, was more suitable for the transcription of Turkic sounds. 172

Further measures designed to put the Soviet Union on the road to cultural uniformity included the reversal of the policy current in the first decade of Soviet power of attempting to stress the uniqueness and individuality of each ethnic group. Thus, in the early 1930s, linguists were given the task of elaborating new Ukrainian and Belorussian literary languages which would emphasise their kinship with the Russian people, rather than their 'distance' from it. 173 As part of the same policy of encouraging a popular feeling of All-Soviet ethnic kinship to the extent that this was possible, in the Asian areas of the Soviet Union, the earlier policy of identifying and developing distinct languages wherever possible was abandoned. Instead, 'languages' were decided upon for groups of kindred dialects. However, while the authorities were evidently concerned about the tendency towards ethnic parochialism, an equal fear appears to have been the possibility of lending encouragement to Pan-Turkism. Thus, distinct languages were developed for each of the Republics of Central Asia, such as Azeri, Uzbek, Kazakh and Kirghiz. The chosen form for the Uzbek literary language, for example, which up to 1937 had been based on the town of Turkestan in southern Kazakhstan, was changed in that year to that of the dialect of Tashkent, which was less comprehensible to the other Turkic peoples of Central Asia. 174 In addition, the lull in anti-religious activity against Islam noticeable in the first decade of Soviet rule ended with the beginnings of collectivisation, although the intensity of this campaign declined between 1938 and 1947. 175

As in most other areas which touched on the role of the Russian people in the Soviet Union, during the final years of Stalin's rule, essentially Russian nationalist policies (paying due reverence to Stalinist communism) strengthened their hold over Soviet nationalities policies. This is most conspicuous in the area of policy relating to the role of the Russian language in the Soviet Union. The prelude to
policy changes in this area involved the purge of the disciples of
the dead but still dominant scholarly figure in the area N.Ia. Marr.
This development was in a sense equivalent to, and as significant as,
the condemnation of the ideas of Pokrovskii in the mid-1930s. Marr,
like Pokrovskii, had elaborated a theory of his discipline based
uncompromisingly on the Marxist tradition, which could hence not easily
be adjusted to the changing requirements of the Stalinist state - such
as the post-mid-1930s line of encouraging a degree of Russian nationalism,
and forging greater Soviet unity through cultural policies. Marr
essentially argued that language was part of the cultural 'superstructure'.
All languages developed as part of the same process, which implied that
they could be classified as having reached 'lower' or 'higher' levels of
development, according in turn to the determining level of economic
development of the society concerned. This necessarily implied that the
languages of advanced capitalism, such as English and French, had reached
a 'higher stage' than Russian. 176

Stalin's celebrated intervention into the debate, which took the
form of four articles published in Pravda in July and August 1950, opposed
such theories by claiming that language was not a part of the
'superstructure', that the process of linguistic unification referred
to by Marr lay in a distant, globally socialist society, and that the
more immediate prospect was the development of world 'zonal languages',
based on social and political systems. The language of socialism was
Russian, and as a consequence there must be an intensive development
of this language within the socialist 'zone' before the dawn of world
communism. 177

The theoretical stage was thus set in the final Stalin years for
quite intensive Russification of the non-Russian nationalities. In
addition to the merciless and thoroughgoing purges of anything which
could be identified with non-Russian 'bourgeois nationalism' during the
late 1940s and early 1950s, the authorities for the first time admitted
their hope that Russian culture would gradually whittle away and
superimpose itself on the Soviet Union's non-Russian cultures. Thus
A.R. Mordinov, writing in Voprosy filosofii in 1950, contended
The great Russian language nourishes and enriches the languages of all our peoples, giving them its strength and power, its beauty and flexibility, its wealth and diversity. The enrichment of the word-stock of the languages of all the peoples of the USSR by increasingly borrowing from Russian has become a rule of their development.\textsuperscript{178}

The 1950 edition of Pedagogika, the official Soviet handbook for instruction in schools, similarly stated that 'it is essential that the children of non-Russian nationalities master the Russian language as early as possible so that they may be able to make use of the rich cultural values of Russian scientific and cultural literature.'\textsuperscript{179}

Michael Rywkin cites examples of such penetration being encouraged. Taking the case of Uzbek, he notes that such phonetically transcribed Russian terms as abed, abida and abzor replaced equivalent Turkic words in the official media, while Russian grammatical forms also began to replace the vernacular: thus the Russian plural kommunisty replaced the Turkic kommunistlar.\textsuperscript{180}

In addition, the earlier somewhat coy explanations for the replacement of the Latin written form of many Asiatic languages of the Soviet Union with Cyrillic in the late 1930s were abandoned. As the Soviet linguist N.A. Bakakov openly proclaimed in 1952:

\begin{quote}
\textit{One of the most important cultural gains of the peoples of the USSR ... is the development of alphabets and systems of writing for the languages of the (non-Russian) peoples on the basis of Russian characters ... The adoption of the Russian script by most languages has not only been of benefit for their development, but has been of notable assistance to the various nationalities of the Soviet Union in their successful mastery of the Russian language and in their assimilation of Russian culture.}\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}

More generally, the media favourably reported the taking up by non-Russians of Russian ways and customs. For example, S.M. Abramtsov, writing in Sovetskaya etnografiia on the condition of collective farms in Kirghizia in the early 1950s, claims profound Russian influence in a wide range of social habits, customs, tastes and attitudes. He approvingly concludes that 'the cultural life of the ayil is developing under the ever-increasing influence of all that is best in Russian culture.'\textsuperscript{182}
Significantly in this regard, the number of non-Russian newspapers in the Soviet Union declined between 1939 and 1947 from 2,294 to 1,959.183

In conclusion, the policy of the Stalin years of sacrificing the bulk of the cultural rights of the non-Russian nationalities in favour of political centralisation and consolidation inter alia by means of Russification and the gratification of Russian nationalism not only reveals a dramatic departure from the relative cultural liberalism of the first decade and a half of Soviet power, but indicates a progressively greater reliance on this aspect of 'communist nationalism' as the Stalin era moves forward.

(iii) Official Doctrine on the Role and Status of the Russian People in Relation to Soviet Communism

The third area touching on the dichotomy between Marxist internationalism and Russian nationalism under examination, the evaluation of the role and status of the Russian people in relation to Soviet communism, also shows an incremental drawing away from Bolshevik 'class' positions (which, it will be recalled, laid particular emphasis on guarding against expressions of Russian chauvinism) under Stalin's regime.

Some indication of change in this area is evident by 1930, when Stalin claims that the revolutionary workers of all countries hail the Russian working class as the 'advance guard of the Soviet workers'.184 By the late 1930s, such claims are routine, and even more overtly self-congratulatory. For example, in May 1938, a Party propagandist wrote in an article entitled 'Velikii russkii narod' that 'the Russian people leads the struggle of all the peoples of the Soviet land for the happiness of mankind'.185 Such standard sources of reference as *Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* reveal that in the next few years this line became firmly consolidated.186

War was the catalyst for the introduction of a more extreme version of the doctrine of Russian leadership and superiority. The term 'elder brother' (coined by Tsarist officials and particularly favoured by General Kuropatkin, the last Tsarist Governor-General of
Turkestan appeared in Pravda soon after the invasion, while it became common to ascribe heroic characteristics to the Russian people. One of the first instances of such official adulation appeared under the name of Emel’ian Iaroslavskii in Pravda at the end of 1941. His points were presented as follows:

- The Russian People: The Great Builder
- The Russian People: Versatile Artist
- The Russian People: Bold Reformer
- The Russian People: An Industrious People
- The Russian People: Bold Inventor, Persistent Researcher, Fearless Pathfinder.

In the subsequent war years, the official media routinely rhapsodised over additional alleged qualities, such as 'greatness of soul', 'strength of will', and 'clarity of mind'. Stalin's overt benediction of this line, his toast to the Russian people after the victory over Nazi Germany, stressed that the Russian people was to be regarded as in every sense the leading nationality, in terms of its 'character', of the Soviet Union:

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading people, but also because it has a clear mind, a firm character, and patience.

After Stalin's accolade, the doctrine of Russian leadership knew few bounds. For example, in 1952, A. Pankratova published Velikii russkii narod. In addition to reciting the late Stalinist line on Russian colonialism, it argued at length the alleged Great Russian contribution to the Soviet Union in such areas as achieving industrialisation and collectivisation, as well as claiming a disproportionately high number of Russian Stakhanovites and Heroes of the Soviet Union. The trend was given further impetus by the xenophobia of the 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaign. In such works as Matiushkin's Sovetskii patriotizm, published at the time, arguments such as those suggesting that there was no outside influence on the Russian revolutionary movement, and that Russia was 'the most revolutionary state at the end of the nineteenth century', emerged.

(iv) Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the Stalin era does to a certain extent support the 'deradicalisation' model. The
historical period from the late 1920s until the death of Stalin reveals a progressively greater official use of Russian nationalism in two senses. Within each of the three areas of Soviet writings analysed, we find interpretations and arguments which depart ever more radically from the Leninist, consistently class-based 'internationalist' lines of analysis of the Russian people and their history and culture which prevailed in the first decade of Soviet power. In addition, we find such 'communist nationalism' progressively penetrating more spheres as time moves forward.

Yet the development of official Russian nationalism in the context of 'communist nationalism' under Stalin was neither unilinear nor uninterrupted. From 1945 to 1948, while some of the new nationalist theses remained unaffected, the Party propaganda apparatus signalled that writers should infuse more Marxism and 'internationalism' into their analysis, and correspondingly reduce the amount of Russian nationalism. This, however, was only a more than usually overt indication of what was the norm throughout the Stalin years: 'communist nationalism' and not Russian nationalism pure and simple was the required ideological formula for the consumption of the Soviet Russian republic. The principle was that Russian nationalism could grow to extraordinary proportions so long as it remained the handmaiden of the Soviet state apparatus. To this end it was clearly required that overt Russian nationalism always be symbolically balanced with the formulae of more orthodox, or Leninist, Soviet ideology, such as the various claims subsumed under the alleged 'internationalism' of the USSR. 'Communist nationalism' as an ideological formula thus obeyed the dictates of raison d'état rather than aspiring to any logical consistency.

This chapter has also argued that the war saw the emergence of unprecedentedly spontaneous Russian nationalism, particularly in the area of literature, which coincided with the relegation to the background (but not total abandonment) of orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology. When victory came into sight towards the end of the war, moves were made to reassert the authority of more orthodox elements of Soviet ideology such as 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis at the expense of such more spontaneous manifestations of nationalism. Given the fact that the theory
of 'deradicalisation' does not take account of the possibility of such fluctuations, this aspect of 'communist nationalism' as used under Stalin suggests more the veracity of the 'tactical' interpretation. Although some of those who have suggested this model have implied that the communist authorities alternate the use of elements of nationalism with consistent 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis, the 'tactical' use of Russian nationalism under Stalin did in fact reveal fluctuation between more or less Russian nationalism within the 'communist nationalist' fusion.
Chapter I: Notes


2. Timasheff in this connection comments, 'Stalin and his associates did not renounce International Socialist Revolution. But that revolution ceased to obsess them. If this revolution materialized, well and good; but if it did not, ruling over one-sixth of the earth remained an interesting possibility. After 1928, the internationalism of the Russian communists was no longer as it had been; perhaps it could be termed "ambivalent".' Op. cit., p. 156. See also pp. 156-64.


4. J.N. Westwood writes that the targets for the second Five-Year Plan were re-written in the first year of its operation: 'This change was occasioned by the realisation that things could not go on in the same way; a limit had been reached in what the economy could do and what the people could take. Living conditions were by this time horrifying, initial enthusiasms of the first plan had worn off and the population had become too apathetic to respond to any further coercion. Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History 1812-1971, Bungay: Oxford UP, 1973, p. 304.

5. Tillett, op. cit., p. 40.

6. The major events which were to alter so drastically the nature of Soviet historiography were a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of May 16, 1934, signed by Stalin and Molotov, and the observations of Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanov of 14 August, 1934, approved as early as 1932, but not published until 27 January 1936. The original resolution, issued jointly by the Central Committee and the Sovnarkom, was entitled 'On the Teaching of Civic History in the Schools of the USSR'. Shteppa has concisely summarised
its main demands: '... the presentation (and consequently the study) of concrete historical facts, instead of "abstract sociological themes", and a description of historical figures; lively picturesque teaching (consequently, also lively and picturesque description) of history with a depiction of events in full detail; strict observation of chronological sequence; adequate attention to the events of so-called "outside" history, that is the history of foreign relations, wars and all kinds of institutions - in short, all that had not been in Soviet scholarship up to that time'. Op. cit., p. 125.

In addition, the decree suggested the crucial importance of historical writing as an arm of the state. This was despite the fact that the resolution did not specifically prescribe the content of textbooks.

More specific advice came to historians in the form of official commentary on the makety (textbook 'models' or 'mockups'), which appeared on 14 August 1934. Together with urging Soviet historians to stress the reactionary foreign and colonial policies of Tsarism (a line which, as Tillett observes, began almost immediately to be revised), and calls for emphasis on the Western influences which came to bear on the Russian revolutionary movement (to be revised during the 'Zhdanovshchina' after 1946), it called for a synthesised history of the USSR, rather than simply histories of individual nationalities.

However, this was still apparently considered insufficiently specific advice for Soviet historians, despite the fact that most appear to have gleaned what was expected of them from the May 1934 decree. The August 1937 report of the 'Zhdanov Commission' was the first official specific indication of the required content of analysis. Most importantly for the orientation of histories on the pre-revolutionary Russian state, Zhdanov stressed the 'progressive' role the Orthodox Church had played in medieval Russia, and rejected the view that all rebellions against the state (including the rebellion of the strel'tsy against Peter the Great) had been 'progressive'. The major documentary sources for these developments are translated in Martin Pundeff, ed., History in the USSR: Selected Readings, Stanford, Ca: The Hoover Institution, 1967, esp. pp. 91-92. For the famous Stalin-Kirov-Zhdanov comments, see Pravda, 27.1.1936. See also Bol'shevik, no. 3, 1936, p. 62; Direktivy VKP(b) i postanovleniia sovetskogo pravitel'stva o narodnom obrazovanii.Sbornik dokumentov za 1919-1947 gg, Moscow-Leningrad, 1947, pp. 188-90; 200-1. See also Tillett, op. cit., pp. 40-6; C.E. Black, 'History and Politics in the Soviet Union', in Black, op. cit.; Shteppa, op. cit., pp. 124-6.

7. The first known positive official reference to the term 'rodina' in the Soviet Union occurs in the Pravda of 9 June 1934. In October of the same year, Komsomol'skaia pravda published the comments of a Komsomol leader to the effect that one of the duties of the organisation was to foster 'love of the motherland'. See the edition of 18 October 1934.
8. See Timasheff, op. cit., p. 166.


11. See Yaresh, ibid., p. 105.

12. For some examples of 'outdated' works published about this time, see I. Merzon, 'Kak pokazyvat' istoricheskikh deiatelei v shkol'nom prepodavanii istorii', Bor'ba klassov, no. 5, 1935; F. Konstantinov, 'O marksistskom ponimaniu roli lichnosti v istorii', Bol'shevik, nos. 10-11, 1938.

13. See R.Iu. Vipper, Ivan Groznyi, 3rd ed., Moscow, 1944 (1st ed. 1922); see also Yaresh, 'Ivan the Terrible ...' for an extended bibliography of such works.

14. A typical reference at the time runs as follows: 'The workers of the Putilov factory show great interest in the past of our fatherland. They are especially interested in Peter the Great's epoch, in his war with Sweden, and in the great feat which was the creation of the Russian navy'. Pravda, 13 March 1938. See also S. Tomsinskii, 'Znachenie reform Petra I', Istorik-Marksist, no. 2 (54), 1936, pp. 9-21; V.I. Lebedev, 'Vvedenie' to Reformy Petra I, Sbornik dokumentov, Moscow, 1937, pp. 5-10.


17. Yakobson, loc. cit., p. 77.

18. See Pravda, 28 April 1938; Izvestiia, 3 March 1937; Krasnaia gazeta, 3 March 1937.


23. Krasnaia zvezda, 8 September 1940.
24. Krasnaia zvezda, 22 November 1938.


29. M.V. Levichenko, Istoriiia Vizantii, Moscow-Leningrad, 1940.


31. See Pravda, 8 November 1941.

32. Ibid., 9 November 1941. See also Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945, London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1964, esp. 'Stalin's Holy Russia Speech', pp. 243-51.

33. See Tillett, op. cit., p. 69; Werth, op. cit., p. 740.

34. See for example, A. Kats, '0 zamysle Kutuzova v borodinskom srazhenii', Istorik-Markisist, no. 3 (91), 1941, p. 114; B. Sokolov, 'Strategiia i taktika borodinskogo srazheniia', Istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 2, 1943, p. 71; N. Korobkov, 'Voennoe iskusstvo Kutuzova', Voprosy istorii, I, nos 3-4 (March-April), 1945, p.5.

35. Sokolov, Korobkov, ibid.

36. This was a particularly cynical perversion of history, as strong evidence, marshalled by, among others, Friedrich Engels, suggests that de Tolly was the originator of many of the military tactics used against Napoleon. For an article which is particularly brazen in this connection, see N. Korobkov, 'Kutuzov strateg', Istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 5, 1942, pp. 38-52. See also Stalin's attack on Engels' suggestion that in the Russian campaign de Tolly was the only figure on the Russian side worthy of note. See I.V. Stalin, 'Otvet tov. Stalina na pis'mo tov. Razina', Voprosy istorii, vol. III, no. 2 (Feb.), 1947, pp. 6-7.
37. See Pravda, 30 July, 1 August 1942; see also Tillett, op. cit., p. 68.


39. See Leningrad, March 1943.

40. See Barghoorn, loc. cit., p. 189.

41. Werth, op. cit., p. 738.

42. See ibid., p. 740.

43. See Pravda, 1 January 1944. See also Werth, op. cit., pp. 741-2.

44. Werth states that several months after Stalin's November 1941 speeches, a 'very orthodox communist' remarked 'at that time it was absolutely essential to proclaim a "nationalist NEP"'. Op. cit., p. 250.

45. See Bol'shevik, nos 19-20, 1942, esp. articles by M. Mitin, G.F. Aleksandrov et al.

46. See Shteppa, op. cit., p. 223.

47. See, for example, the reports on the Moscow University conference on the significance of Russian science in the history of 'world culture', held in June 1944. Pravda, 5 June 1944.

48. Doklad Tovarishcha Zhdanova o zhurnalakh 'Zvezda' i 'Leningrad', Moscow, 1946, pp. 35-6. The research for this study has revealed little evidence to support the thesis of Werner G. Hahn, that Zhdanov's ideological influence after the Second World War was one of 'moderation' rather than 'extremism'. See his Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, London, Cornell UP, 1982.

49. See 'Zadachi zhurnal "Voprosy istorii"', Voprosy istorii, no. 1, 1945, pp. 3-5.

50. 'Protiv ob''ektivizma v istoricheskoj nauke', Voprosy istorii, no. 12, 1948, p. 10.


53. For the cases of Fadeev and Kataev, see Boris Shub, 'Humanity Deleted: Alexander Fadeyev Rewrites a Novel', Problems of Communism, no. 2, 1952; for the case of Simonov, see Pravda, 22 November 1946, and Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 243.

55. See in particular Voprosy istorii, nos 11, 12, 1948, and no. 2, 1949.

56. See, for example, E.I. Zaazerskaia, Razvitie lëgkoï promyshlennosti v Moskve v pervoi chetverti XVIII veka, Moscow, 1953; E.V. Spiridonova, Ekonomicheskaia politika i ekonomicheskie vzgliady Petra I, Moscow, 1952.

57. See Voprosy istorii, no. 1, 1947.

58. See V.V. Mavrodin, 'Neskol'ko zamechanii po povodu stati P.P. Smirnova ...', Voprosy istorii, no. 4, 1946, p. 47; S. Tushkov, 'K voprosu ob obrazovanii russkogo gosudarstva v XIV-XVI vekakh', ibid., no. 4, 1946.

59. The contents of the 'letter' in which he attacks Engels are approvingly quoted in the editors' article 'Zadachi sovetskikh istorikov v oblasti novoi i noveishei istorii', Voprosy istorii, 1949, no. 3. Stalin's 'letter' was originally written in 1934 and published as 'O stati F. Engel'sa "Vneshnaia politika russkogo tsarizma" ', in Bol'shevik, 1941, no. 9.

60. See S. Kozhukhov, 'K voprosu ob otsenke roli M.I. Kutuzova v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda', Bol'shevik, no. 15, 1951, pp. 21-35.

61. Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Second edition), XXIII, p. 113.

62. See A. Krotov, 'Primirennost' i samouspokoennost', Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 72 (2455), 8 September 1948, p. 2.

63. See, for example, 'Protiv burzhuznogo kozmopolitizma v sovetskom vizantinovedenii', Vizantiiskii vremennik, II (XXVII), 1949, pp. 3-10.

64. For a good example of this, concerning an attack on the 'archaic' view of Russian law, see editorial notes on Grekov's Krestiane na Rusi s drevneishikh vremen do XVII veka in Voprosy istorii, no. 8, 1947, p. 143.

65. Voprosy istorii, no. 12, 1948.


68. Tillett, op. cit., p. 34.
69. See Pravda, 27 January 1936.

70. See Direktivy VKP(b), op. cit., pp. 200-1.


72. See E. Iaroslavskii, 'Nevypol'nennye zadachi istoricheskogo fronta', Marksist-istorik, no. 4, 1939, pp. 3-11.

73. See the article by M. Morozov and V. Slutskaja in Propagandist, no. 17, 1942, p. 46.

74. Tillett notes that the authorities went so far as to create an Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskii. See op. cit., pp. 75-7.

75. Tillett cites a number of these publications, very few of which ever reached the West. See ibid., p. 78.


77. Pravda, 10 July 1943.

78. See Bol'shevik, no. 14, July 1945. See also ibid., nos 10-11, May–June 1944 for similar criticisms concerning the 'defects' of Bol'shevik Kazakhstana.

79. 'Protiv ob''ektivizma v istoricheskoi nauke', loc. cit., p. 10.

80. Aleksandrov in Bol'shevik, loc. cit., p. 17.

81. For detailed analysis of these episodes and extensive bibliographical references see Tillett, op. cit., pp. 110-47.

82. Pravda, 7 October 1952.

83. 'V Institute istorii, arkheologii i etnografii Akademii nauk kazakhskoi SSR', Voprosy istorii, no. 2, 1952, p. 149.


85. See, for example, S.D. Asfendiarov, Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe vosstanie 1916 goda v Kazakhstane, Alma-Ata, 1936.

86. See, for example, A.F. Iakunin and O.K. Kuliev, 'Vosstanie 1916 goda v srednii Azii', Voprosy istorii, no. 3, 1953, pp. 33-49, and compare with the above.

87. On this question, see Timasheff, op. cit., Chapter IX, 'The Cultural Transfiguration: Scientists and Artists in Uniform', passim.
88. Novyi mir, 5 November 1934.
89. Timasheff, op. cit., p. 269.
90. See Komsomol'skaia pravda, 14 June 1935; Izvestiia, 28 August 1935; Pravda, 18 October 1935.
91. See Pravda, 20 January 1936; Sotsialisticheskoe zemledel'ye, 15 January 1936.
92. Pravda, 8 November 1935.
94. Sotsialisticheskoe zemledel'ye, 18 February 1936; Molot, 11 February and 5 March 1936.
95. Pravda, 28 January 1936.
96. Pravda, 6 February 1936; Za kommunisticheskoe prosveshchenie, 18 February 1936.
97. Pravda, 9 June 1936.
98. Vecherniaia Moskva, 15 February 1938; Pravda, 13 February 1938.
100. Ibid., p. 277.
101. Pravda, 16 April 1939; Vecherniaia Moskva, 15 June 1939.
102. Vecherniaia Moskva, 9 April 1939.
103. Izvestiia, 26 October 1943.
104. Vecherniaia Moskva, 4 April 1939.
105. It is of interest that the commentator in Pravda stated that 'we have dropped the silly attempts to make of Pushkin a revolutionary, a precursor of Bolshevism'. Pravda, 17 December 1935. See also Izvestiia, 6 June 1936.
108. Pravda, 18 June 1939.
109. Pravda, 11 July 1939; Izvestiia, 4 and 17 April 1939.
111. Pravda, 10 June 1939.
112. Pravda, 25 March 1940.


114. See ibid., pp. 27-2, and Pravda, 16 January 1939. It is also of interest that around this period the press gave publicity to the fact that the state was again producing one of the national musical instruments of Russia, the accordion. See Pravda, 8 February 1936; Sotsialisticheskoe zemledel'e, 3 February 1936.

115. Vecherniaia Moskva, 29 May 1939.


117. Krasnaia nov', 1939, no. 1.

118. See Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 197-203.

119. Izvestiia, 23 October 1935.


121. Ibid., pp. 218-2. See also Izvestiia, 8 January 1944, 8 and 10 August 1943.

122. New York Times, 10 November 1936. Also see footnote 6 of this chapter.

123. Antireligioznik, 1939, no. 6.

124. Izvestiia, 5 March, 25 April, 30 December 1943; 12 March and 21 April 1944.

125. Timasheff notes that shortly before the outbreak of war, 'the repertoire in Moscow's theatres was comprised of 75% of classical plays, with Ostrovskii, Chekhov, and Shakespeare in leading positions, and only 25% of post-revolutionary plays performed'. Op. cit., p. 281.

126. Il'ia Erenburg, 'The Word is a Weapon', Novoe russkoe slovo, 6 August 1944.

127. The changed official position was granted particular prominence in that this was the title of an article evaluating the writer. See V.V. Ermilov, 'Velikii russkii pisatel' F.M. Dostoevskii', Literatura i iskusstvo, 9 May 1942.


129. See also N. Tikhonov, Leningrad prinimaet boi, Leningrad, 1943, esp. pp. 3-11.

130. Iazyk gazety, 1941, p. 43.


135. Izvestiia, 10 November and 29 December 1942.

136. Izvestiia, 5 September 1943.

137. Izvestiia, 21 May 1944.

138. Pravda, 1, 2, 5, and 7 February 1945.


145. Ibid. For Gor'kii's evaluation of Dostoevskii, see 'Doklad A.M. Gor'kogo o sovetskoi literature', Pervyi vsesoiuznyi s'ezd sovetskih pisatelei, Moscow, 1934.

146. V.V. Ermilov, 'F.M. Dostoevskii i nashi kritiki', Literaturnaia gazeta, 24 December 1947; N. Burov, 'Apologety reakcionnykh idei Dostoevskogo', Literaturnaia gazeta, 3 January 1948; 'Uluchshit' rabotu izdatel'stva Sovetskii pisatel', Kul'tura i zhizn', 11 January 1948 (unsigned).

147. Pravda, 5 June 1944.

149. O zhurnalakh 'Zvezda' i 'Leningrad': o repertuare dramaticesikh teatrov; o kinofil'me 'Bol'shaia zhizn'; ob opere 'Velikaja druzhba', Moscow, 1951. These were the principal decrees of the Central Committee which amounted to what has come to be known as the 'Zhdanovshchina' in literature, the cinema, the theatre and music. See pp. 26-7.

150. Ibid., p. 25.

151. See Kul'tura i zhizn', 20 February 1949.

152. See volume XVIII.


156. See Shtein, op. cit., chapter IV.


158. 'Priority belongs to Russia', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 6 September 1950.

159. Pravda, 6 June 1949.

160. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 35. For the most detailed available study of Stalin's nationality policies, see Donald R. Farmer, The Theory and Practice of Soviet Nationality Policy, Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1973. (The thesis was written in 1954.)


162. I.V. Stalin, Marksizm i natsional'no-kolonial'nyi vopros, Moscow, 1938. Of interest for later nationality policies is the fact that while Stalin's policies were assimilationist and the dictator predicted the emergence of a 'world culture', he rejected the notion of 'merging' as relevant before the dawn of communism: 'the victory of socialism in one country does not create the necessary conditions for the merging of nations and national languages, ... on the contrary, this period creates favorable conditions for the renaissance and flourishing of the nations that were formerly oppressed by Tsarist imperialism'. The National Question and Leninism, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1950, p. 16.
163. J.V. Stalin, 'Political Report of the Central Committee to
the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU (B)', Works, Moscow, 1955,
vol. 12, p. 380 and passim. See also 'Russification and
Sovietisation', in Walter Kolarz, Communism and Colonialism,

164. For the more brutal side of Stalin's policy re-orientation,
see Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 37-8.

165. Komsomol'skaia pravda, 14 February 1938.

166. It appears that the first regular use of the term may have been
from 1939, when the Malaia sovetskaya entsiklopediia used the
term to denote the peoples of the Soviet Union in armed unison.
See volume VIII, column 33. See also Barghoorn, op. cit.,
pp. 21-22.

167. Ibid., p. 21.

168. See ibid., p. 98, and Harold R. Weinstein, 'Language and Education
in the Soviet Ukraine', The Slavic Yearbook, American series,
vol. I, 1941, pp. 124-48. See also 'Russkii iazyk v shkolakh
Ukrainy', Pravda, 26 March 1938. While by 1938 various parts of
the Soviet Union (such as the Ukraine) had instituted compulsory
Russian in schools, this was not the case in other areas. Pravda
vostoka of 20 March 1938 reported that 2,159 of 3,481 Uzbek
primary schools did not teach Russian, while most of those that
did, did so 'poorly'.

169. See Izvestiia, 11 April 1939, and Krasnaia zvezda, 21 April 1939.

170. Krasnaia nov', 1939, no. 1; Izvestiia, 14 January 1944.

171. For an example of the way the switch was reported, see the article
in Pravda for 25 April 1938 which claims that the 'intelligentsia'
of the Crimean Tatar Republic had 'requested' the introduction of
the Russian alphabet.

172. See Michael Rywkin, Russia in Central Asia, New York: Collier
Books, chapter VI, 'Cultural Policy'.

173. See Timasheff, op. cit., p. 188.

174. See Stefan Würm, Turkic Peoples of the USSR: Their Historical
Background, Their Language, and the Development of Soviet
Linguistic Policy, London: Central Asian Research Centre and
St Anthony's College Oxford, 1954, pp. 45-47. See also Rywkin,
op. cit., p. 87.

175. Rywkin, op. cit., p. 91. Rywkin notes that the number of
functioning mosques in the Soviet Union declined between 1912
and 1942 from 26,279 to 1,312. Ibid.

176. In connection with the linguistics controversy, see Klaus Mehnert,
Weltrevolution durch Weltgeschichte, Kitzingen-Main, 1951;
Boris Meissner, 'Stalinistische Autokratie und Bolschevistische


178. A.R. Mordinov, 'O razvitii iazykov sotsialistichestikh natsii v SSSR', Voprosy filosofii, no. 3, 1950, p. 92. Vinogradov, who replaced Marr as the mentor of Soviet linguistics, was quoted in the Soviet press expressing similar sentiments: 'The language of the great Russian nation is a mighty means of communication of all the peoples of our motherland ... The great Russian language has become an inexhaustible source for all the languages of all the peoples of the Soviet Union.' Pravda, 20 June 1950. It was also suggested during this period that Russian should influence 'socialist' cultures other than those of the Soviet Union. As D.I. Chesnokov stated in the 1952 work O sovetskom patriotizme, 'the Russian language is the means of communication among the peoples of the Soviet Union, and for the peoples of other cultures it is the synonym of a new world and a new culture, the culture of socialism'. See p. 54.


180. Rywkin, op. cit., p. 87.


185. B. Volin, 'Velikii russkii narod', Bol'shevik, no. 9, 1938, p. 36.

186. See reference to the leading role of the 'great Russian people' in Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, Moscow, 1941, vol. IX, p. 326.

187. Kolarz-, op. cit., p. 27.

188. 'Velikaia druzhba narodov SSSR', Pravda, 29 July 1941.

190. Izvestia, 14 April 1943, and 1 May 1944.


193. See for example N.I. Matiushkin, Sovetskii patriotizm - moguchaia dvizhushchaia sila sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva, Moscow, 1952, p. 4.
Chapter II

1953-1964: Leninist Reform and Stalinist Continuity Under Khrushchev

If the emergence of 'communist nationalism' during the Stalin period lends some support to the 'deradicalisation' thesis and somewhat less to the 'tactical' model, the cases of the subsequent Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods give markedly less credence to either of the two theories. In broad terms, both regimes represent the continuity of Stalinist 'communist nationalism' which allowed them the option of either loyalty to the former dictator's largely consistent (if occasionally fluctuating) pattern of Russian chauvinism, or of tactically reverting to elements of Leninist internationalism in the areas of policy which affected the non-Russian nationalities. Such continuity, of course, cannot sit with either the 'deradicalisation' or 'tactical' theories of the official exploitation of nationalism.

Most of the spheres of analysis and activity which reflected the intrusion of Stalin's Russian nationalism were retained by the successor regimes. Khrushchev and Brezhnev desisted from either abandoning in any lasting or significant sense Stalinist Russian nationalism, or from taking 'deradicalisation', as far as the use of Russian nationalism was concerned, further than Stalin had. The view of the Russian people as the Staatsvolk and Kulturträger, together with the official 'rehabilitation' of most of Russia's pre-revolutionary history and culture, remained unaltered - except at times when cosmetic changes were temporarily made for areas affected by de-Stalinisation (such as 'cults of the personality' in the distant Russian past) and areas which were relevant to tactical attempts to curry favour with the non-Russian nationalities (such as Stalin's near-total apologia for Tsarist imperialism). Such symbolic acts of de-Stalinisation did not have any serious or lasting impact on the Soviet uses of Russian nationalism. Stalinist Russian nationalism was not followed by a reversion to consistent 'internationalism' and 'class analysis' of history and culture, which might vindicate the 'tactical' model.
The Khrushchev period, surprisingly, represents relatively unttiled soil for the student of the Soviet uses of Russian nationalism. Untested assumptions of 'deradicalisation' accounting for the period are matched by the widespread opposite view that the years between the death of Stalin and October 1964 represent a period of significant revitalisation of more orthodox Marxist 'internationalism', and a concomitant reduction in the extent to which Russian nationalism could be found in Soviet ideology, at least compared to the previous Stalin, and the subsequent Brezhnev-Kosygin periods.  

This chapter argues, however, that despite Khrushchev's overall policy of attempting to reform the system built up under Stalin, the departures between 1953 and 1964 from the official Russian nationalism of the late Stalin period are at most marginal and temporary. Essentially, no substantial alterations to the 'communist nationalist' synthesis of Russian nationalism and Soviet Marxist 'internationalism' distinguish the Khrushchev period from the Stalin regime. This is despite brief periods of 'radicalisation' up to 1956, which included the condemnation of the features of Stalinist historiography mentioned above, together with Khrushchev's early 'liberal' policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Such shifts in policy had little serious or lasting impact on the Soviet uses of Russian nationalism. Continuity rather than change was the predominant characteristic of the Khrushchev regime in this area of its behaviour.

Elements of early Khrushchevian 'radicalisation' in this area gave way, by the late 1950s, to a reversion to Stalinist norms. The one significant sphere of Stalinist Russian nationalism which reveals important policy differences under Khrushchev is that of the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. This institution, while retaining a number of its privileges - thus suggesting the at least partial continuity of this component of Soviet 'communist nationalism' - experienced the same administrative and agitprop hostility to which all the Churches of the USSR were exposed during the anti-religious campaign, part of the cultural dimension of Khrushchev's drive for 'full-scale communist construction' during the late 1950s and early 1960s. This aspect of Khrushchev's policies - particularly as it in part involved the neglect and even
destruction of Russian 'monuments of culture' (a concept which has always included many items associated with the Church), lay him open to the charge of waging a campaign against the Russian people's heritage. This is despite the fact that such policies constituted an exception to the Party leader's overall retention (or reinstitution after initial changes) of Stalin's 'communist nationalist' synthesis. The charge was, nevertheless, vigorously exploited by those who succeeded Khrushchev.

Such continuity has not been widely noticed and discussed and therefore is not the subject of competing theories. Plausible explanations which may be suggested, however, include the fact that Stalin's successors associated the retention of elements of Russian nationalism with the continued security of the Soviet state - Stalin's innovation in this area having shored up and possibly saved the regime during the War - and the suspicion with which at least a significant proportion of the Soviet élite has viewed change since Stalin's time. As Barghoorn has observed, Marxist-Leninist states such as the Soviet Union have tended to alter their behaviour (ideological and otherwise) only as a consequence of strong pressures or enticing opportunities. But more than this, Stalin's 'communist nationalist' hybrid suggested its own retention. It was sufficiently flexible that the system could, depending on the political situation and the constituency addressed, stress either internationalist loyalty to class and national equality, or its particular concern for the Staatsvolk, the Russians. Without 'communist' rhetoric, the legitimacy of the Soviet élite ruling in the name of Marxism-Leninism would be seriously undermined, while the removal of doctrines of internationalism that this would entail would destroy the theoretical underpinning of the Soviet Union as a multinational entity. On the other hand completely to abandon Russian nationalism for consistent 'internationalism', the ideology of the first decade of Soviet rule, would reduce the extent to which the Russians identified with the Soviet Union (an identification on which, the War demonstrated, the security of the regime in large part depended), thus potentially undermining the future survival of the USSR in the event of a confrontation with the outside world.

This chapter attempts to substantiate this view of Khrushchev's relationship with Stalinist 'communist nationalism' by examining in
turn the official position during his tenure on pre-revolutionary Russian history, culture, and the view of the role and status of the Russian people. For convenience, the chapter also discusses relevant developments in the period immediately following Stalin's death, which preceded the full establishment of Khrushchev's ascendancy.

(i) 'Communist Nationalism' and Russian History

With regard to official historiographic policy on the centralisation and strengthening of the Tsarist Russian state and its wars with other powers, the required evaluation during the period remained overwhelmingly laudatory (and hence somewhat mitigated the effect of the campaign against past 'cults of personality', given that these referred to historical figures responsible for the centralisation, strengthening and defence of the growing Tsarist state). As to the official view of Tsarist colonialism, the late Stalinist formula of stressing the 'progressive consequences' of incorporation into the Tsarist Russian empire, together with the alleged pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples', remained unchanged. Emphasis on the evils of Russian colonialism and the heroism of the resistance of ultimately subjugated nationalities (the official line until well into the Stalin period) was hardly more acceptable to the authorities than during the final years under Stalin's rule. As suggested above, however, this is with the exception of brief periods in 1953 and 1956 when the opposite approach became temporarily ascendant.

(a) The Pre-Revolutionary Russian State

With respect to the historiography of the pre-revolutionary Russian state, a number of moves were made to excise some of the more blatantly Russian nationalist arguments and biases which had permeated this area during the Stalin period. However, of the three historiographic themes within this area given emphasis by the Soviet media - heroic individual rulers of the past, the centralisation and strengthening of the Russian state, and the waging of wars by the pre-revolutionary state against other powers - only the first was subject to any significant re-evaluation.

The condemnation carried on the pages of Voprosy istorii of the Stalinist idealisation of Russia's draconian autocrats, which appeared
soon after the dictator's death, was the first indication of the single major revision in the official evaluation of the pre-revolutionary Russian state carried out during this period.² Stressing the 'historical initiative and creativity' of the masses, and hence the historiographic unsoundness of creating cults around individuals, the period witnesses criticism of much of the hero-worship surrounding figures such as Ivan III and IV, Alexander Nevskii, and Peter the Great, together with some condemnation of 'ignoring class contradictions' and depicting 'class reconciliation and solidarity when fighting a foreign enemy'. This reversion to a position more closely resembling the stance of Bolshevik historians such as Pokrovskii is reflected consistently in Soviet published works throughout the Khrushchev period as well as Malenkov's brief tenure.³

In de-Stalinising certain aspects of the Soviet historiography of Russia there also occurs a partial, cautious reassessment of the figure of Mikhail Pokrovskii himself. This is most visible in the reassertion of the guilt of Russian imperialism, claimed by Pokrovskii, in sharing responsibility for causing the First World War, a thesis rejected under Stalin on the grounds that Russia had not been an independent international actor, being a 'semi-colony' of the West. Nevertheless, Pokrovskii continued to be criticised for going to the opposite extreme in 'placing on Russia the full responsibility for unleashing the war'.⁴ This can be seen as part of a wider stress on the until recently relatively neglected subject of the Russian state's behaviour in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, briefly permitted in 1956, when again it became possible to print irreverent Pokrovskian claims such as Russia having been one of the 'three great highway-brigands' responsible for the War.⁵

With these exceptions, however, Soviet historiography of the pre-revolutionary Russian state in this period adhered consistently to positions established under Stalin. Despite the new acknowledgement that 'M.N. Pokrovskii ... performed services for historical science in our country', Stalin's new historiographic requirements in the mid-1930s are referred to as the means whereby 'Pokrovskii's mistakes were overcome'.⁶ Thus, Soviet scholarship's heavy concentration on the distant national past is vigorously defended.⁷ The doctrine of the 'unassisted' emergence of the Russian state is maintained, and late-Stalinist views on Byzantium
as the recipient of Russian influences (rather than the converse) remain unaltered. A typical indication of the fundamentally unchanged positions overall of Soviet historiography during the period is the comment in Voprosy iazykoznaniia, in 1954, that 'problems of the formation of the Russian nationality and the Russian state occupy the centre of attention of Soviet scholarship'.

Despite the condemnation of idealising past Russian autocrats, especially if their methods were infamously draconian, historiography during this period, particularly during the final five years of Khrushchev's rule, reveals continued approval for the formation of a strong, centralised state capable of upholding national independence, and, ultimately, expansion. This historical development continues to be interpreted as 'progressive', even while historians are called on to acknowledge the concomitant growth of the 'feudal yoke'.

Illustrative of this is the official approval conferred on the wars of Tsarist Russia, notably the view that the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 had 'progressive consequences', and, most strikingly, the unchanged official view of the Campaign of 1812, the 150th anniversary of which was celebrated in 1962. The Soviet media treatment of the 1812 Campaign before and during 1962 reveals little variation from the appraisal which held sway in the later Stalin years. Indeed, one set of commentators - V.P. Danilov and L.V. Danilova, writing in Istoriia SSSR - explicitly defended interpretations formulated at this time.

The single change from the position of the previous regime appears to be the claim that the Russian struggle with Napoleonic France could be interpreted as a 'war of national liberation'. As under Stalin, however, most commentators ignored the issue of class cleavages within Russian society at the time of the War, stressing rather a united Russian people, who, through a strong sense of patriotism, expelled an invasion whose origins lay in the 'plans for establishing the world hegemony of the French bourgeoisie'. The focus evident during the Second World War on the figure of Kutuzov, and his glorification, remains unchanged.

(b) The Pre-Revolutionary Russian State as a Colonial Power

With respect to the official evaluation of Tsarist colonialism, as far as the 'communist nationalist' balance between 'internationalism'
and Russian nationalism is concerned, the period between 1953 and 1964 suggests a basic picture of retention of the Stalinist status quo, punctuated by brief periods of official re-evaluation. For two relatively brief periods - from Stalin's death until the arrest three months later of Lavrentii Beria, and the period from January to October 1956 - significant reversals of the Stalinist rehabilitation of Tsarist colonialism took place. Aside from these relatively short-lived aberrations, however, historiography on this question reveals little variation from the pattern established under Stalin. This is despite an overall situation which was marginally more flexible from the point of view of the individual writer or publication, by contrast with Stalin's day, when, in Tillett's words, a 'numbing uniformity' was the rule. Particularly during the years after 1956, despite historiographic conformity with official dictates through the thorough control of editorial boards, limited variations from the official position were permitted so long as history-writing conformed to the main lines (mainly late Stalinist in content) expected by the Party. In this section, each of the four chronological phases into which the evaluation of Tsarist colonialism can be divided during this period will be examined in turn.

During the three months following Stalin's death when Beria was influential in the Soviet oligarchy, a number of impressive official gestures suggested that the balance of 'communist nationalism' might shift more in the direction of 'internationalism'. The gestures mainly took the form of apparent overtures to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. Most prominent in this connection was the taking of measures against those responsible for the anti-Semitism surrounding the alleged 'Doctors' Plot', and the removal of Party and police officials in non-Russian Republics, especially the Ukraine and Georgia, who had 'falsely charged' persons with 'bourgeois nationalism'. Most spectacularly of all, the Ukrainian Party First Secretary Mel'nikov was replaced because of alleged anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian biases. Pravda on 13 June 1953 stated that the erstwhile First Secretary had permitted a distortion of the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy of our Party, expressed in the defective practice of advancing to leading Party and Soviet positions in the western provinces of the Ukraine personnel drawn primarily from other oblasts of the Ukraine, and also in the conversion of instruction in the higher education institutions of the western Ukraine to the Russian language.
Similarly, on 28 June 1953 Pravda quoted the Latvian Party First Secretary Kalnberzins as stating that not enough 'Latvian national cadres' had been promoted to Party and state organs in that Republic.\(^19\)

Despite the retention of the doctrine of the superior qualities and leading role of the Russian people,\(^20\) an additional gesture consisted in a change in the line concerning the official evaluation of Tsarist colonialism. In the ninth edition of Kommunist for 1953, released by the censors on 18 June (nine days before the arrest of Beriia) articles appeared by P. Fedoseev and S. Iakubovskaia which amounted to a serious criticism of the Stalinist line on the colonialism of the pre-revolutionary Russian state. In his article 'Sotsializm i patriotizm', Fedoseev wrote:

*the struggle against the attempts of certain historians to glorify the reactionary policy of Tsarism [i.e. its colonialist policy], and also against manifestations of national exclusiveness, against nationalist distortions in certain books on the history of peoples of the USSR, and in certain works of literature and art, has great significance.*\(^21\)

In the same issue of the journal, S. Iakubovskaia, in her article 'The Formation and Flourishing of Socialist Nations in the USSR', defers ideologically to the single Party figure of Beriia. Importantly, she quotes Beriia to the effect that it is only under Soviet rule that the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union have made strides. It will be recalled that the official position under Stalin after 1945, by contrast, was that progress in non-Russian territories had been made in all areas from the first point of historical contact with Russians. As Iakubovskaia states:

Tsarist policy ... denied all rights to the non-Russian peoples. They lacked 'statehood', and they were governed by officials who spoke only the Russian language, which was not understood by the local nationalities. However in the Soviet system all the peoples of the country have acquired and developed their own statehood and their own high culture ... The inequality of peoples, a heritage of the Tsarist past, has been liquidated.\(^22\)

After the denunciation of Beriia in July, *inter alia* because, according to the Pravda of 10 July 1953, 'by various sly stratagems (he) attempted to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union
and ... to activate bourgeois-nationalist elements in the Union Republics', the official line on Tsarist colonialism reverted to positions virtually indistinguishable from those required under the late Stalin regime. 

Publications for the remainder of 1953 included an article in the November issue of Kommunist, by the Latvian D. Latsis, which argued that Baltic-Russian friendship extended back to the fifth century, and the monograph Nasha velikaia rodina, which argued that all the peoples of the Soviet Union had voluntarily joined the Russian state.

During the subsequent two years, it was made clear that very little in this area had changed by comparison with the Stalin era. Despite the denunciation of Bagirov (who had formulated the most extreme rehabilitation of Tsarist colonialism during Stalin's final years) as a public enemy after Beria's arrest in July 1983, the line established by him on Tsarist colonialism received no comparable vilification. As one observer has pointed out, ironically, the period of the most consistent reflection of Bagirov's historiographic line was the three years he spent in prison awaiting his fate. Perhaps even more ironic is the fact that Bagirov was one of Beria's chief supporters.

The retention of the 'Bagirov line' was revealed as official at two major conferences on the history of the Caucasus held in August 1953 and March 1954. In addition, approval was given to the publication of numerous works prepared during the final Stalin years according to this line, which, because of time-lag, were not ready until 1954 and 1955. A particularly significant example of this reversion is the 1954 publication of a revised version of M.V. Nechkina's school textbook Rossiia v XIX veke. Five years later, when the ideological climate had moderated somewhat, A.V. Piaskovskii wrote in Voprosy istorii that in Nechkina's book, the evils of Tsarist colonialism were overlooked to such an extent, that 'not a word is said about the aggressiveness of the Tsarist autocracy in Central Asia, and furthermore, the expansionist character of the Tsarist offensive in that area is even denied'.

Another powerful indication that Soviet historiography had reverted to Stalinist norms over the issue of Tsarist colonialism was the manner in which the 300th anniversary of the Ukraine's unification
with Russia, celebrated from January to June 1954, was marked. In accordance with the Stalinist thesis that the Ukrainian hetman Bogdan Khmel'nietskii, responsible for the unification, was a hero (as opposed to the Pokrovskiian view that he was a villain who betrayed the Ukrainians to the serf-holding Muscovite autocracy), Izvestiia, in setting out the 'theses' in commemoration of the unification, claimed that the 'reunion' was 'the culmination of a prolonged struggle of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people against foreign enslavers and for reunification with the Russian people in a united Russian state'. Thus the marking of the event involved a reversion to an extreme Stalinist position, with no concessions to a pre-Stalinist historiographic evaluation.

The second brief 'thaw' of the Khrushchev period, as far as the official line on Tsarist colonialism was concerned, began with the publication of the proceedings of a 'Konferentsiia chitatelei', held in January 1956, in Voprosy istorii (although slight indications of a cautious reappraisal of the important figure of Shamil' can be detected in the course of the previous two years). However, the move seriously to de-Stalinise the Soviet appraisal of Tsarist colonialism, of which this conference was the first manifestation, appears in the light of subsequent developments as a brief aberration associated with the short-lived 'liberalism' (in the Soviet sense) of the Twentieth Party Congress.

As noted by Tillett, the Twentieth Party Congress paid more attention to the problems of history and historical writing than any other before or since. Khrushchev, Mikoian, Suslov and Shepilov all addressed themselves to the issues which these questions raised. Most importantly, Khrushchev in his address referred to the 'mutual distrust which existed among the peoples of Tsarist Russia'. This reference strongly implied the casting of doubt on the doctrine of the pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples'. In addition, Mikoian, referring to history as 'perhaps the most backward sector of our ideological work', attacked 'hackwork, falsification, and the interference of Moscow historians in work in the Union Republics'. This strongly suggested criticism of the Stalinist imposition of Russian nationalist interpretations of history on non-Russian scholars.
The initial reappraisal of Tsarist colonialism during this period, which appeared, as mentioned above, in the January 1956 issue of *Voprosy istorii*, was led by E.N. Burdzhalov, the Deputy Editor of the journal. Attacking 'distortion' and 'falsification' by Soviet historians, the central symbolic issue for Burdzhalov was Bagirov's evaluation of Shamil'. While it was made clear that the 'progressiveness' of the annexation of the Caucasus was not being called into question, those who had 'covered up the evils' of Tsarist colonialism were criticised. Such contributors as A.M. Pikman attacked the 'gross falsifications' surrounding the evaluation of Shamil', and argued that Muridism (the Daghestani nationalist-religious movement of which he was the leader) should be viewed as a 'progressive phenomenon', as it was before the late Stalin years.

Such arguments for historiographic de-Stalinsation were, however, by no means unanimously accepted by Soviet historians. Three speakers at the Konferentsiya persisted in the view that the Muridist movement was reactionary, despite their revealing a degree of greater flexibility on certain other issues, such as the affirmation of the 'progressive' and 'liberal' character of the 1916 Central Asian revolt. Moreover one speaker expressed concern that a positive re-evaluation of the violence which Shamil' carried out against 'other peoples' would have a negative effect on the 'friendship of peoples' of the Soviet Union.

However, somewhat more dramatic departures from Stalinist historiographic theses appeared on the pages of *Voprosy istorii* in the months following the Twentieth Congress. In its March issue, the journal published an article by A.M. Pikman, the most outspoken critic of the 'Bagirov line' on Shamil' at the January conference. The article, 'O bor'be kavkazskikh gortsev s tsarskimi kolonizatorami', claimed that the views of Marx, Engels and Dobroliubov on the matter had been 'ignored' or 'distorted', and that the sole criterion by which a political movement such as Muridism should be judged was whether it 'contributed to the general movement of European workers for freedom from oppression'. Pikman abandoned the ideological caution of Burdzhalov, not only by concentrating on the 'progressiveness' of Shamil' and his followers to the virtual exclusion of any 'negative' aspects, but by failing to refer
to the two sacred cows of late Stalinist historiography on Tsarist colonialism: the compulsory acknowledgement of the 'progressive consequences' of annexation to Russia, and the pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples'.

The vagueness of the Congress directives to historians, however, led to a certain lack of doctrinal unity in the Soviet historiography of Tsarist colonialism. The July issue of Voprosy istorii published another article on Shamil', this time by G.D. Daniialov, which termed his movement 'progressive' without qualification, and again failed to give substance to the two Stalinist sine qua non of historiography on Tsarist colonialism referred to above. Yet in April of the same year, a conference organised by the History Faculty of Moscow University revealed greater conservatism. Two well-known historians expressed their displeasure at the revision of interpretations valid until recently. One of the two, A.M. Sakharov, criticised 'the general denial of everything that has been done by historians in the last few years'. He also spoke against the 'dogmatic and ill-considered revision of several controversial questions, as for example, that made by A.M. Pikman'.

The closing phase of the second 'thaw' in the area of the evaluation of Tsarist colonialism can be identified with the October and November conferences on Shamil', the first held in Makhachkala, the second in Moscow. The October Makhachkala conference essentially attempted to confirm the rehabilitation of Shamil'. Associated with this was the revision of the Bagirov line, 'which the participants attacked with obvious relish', and savage attacks on Tsarist colonial policy and its consequences. Notable, however, was the re-emergence of the Stalinist doctrinal requirements for history on Tsarist colonialism, to which ritualistic reference was again made.

The November Moscow conference, as Tillett has observed, can be understood as 'deliberately planned as a corrective to the earlier discussion'. While some speakers still defended an unqualified pro-Shamil' line, most speakers, in contrast to October, were noticeably more cautious. At the conclusion of the conference, while the 'anti-colonialist' nature of the Muridist movement was acknowledged as legitimate
on the grounds that it had been 'provoked by the aggressive and colonial policy of Tsarism', two Stalinist tenets on the figure of Shamil had re-emerged: an emphasis on the 'reactionary class nature' of the leadership of the Muridist movement, and the 'striving of the ruling circles of Britain, Turkey and other powers to use the movement of the Caucasus mountain peoples in their own interests'.

The same 'thaw' period of 1956 witnesses further revisions concerning the official line on Tsarist colonialism. Even if no attempt was made to rehabilitate other non-Russian national heroes, Stalinist theses concerning Tsarist colonialism were frequently disparaged. In the articles and monographs of Chekovich, Suiunshariaev, Oslikovskaia, and Snegov, which appeared soon after the Congress, the distinctive cultural achievements of non-Russian peoples before and after annexation are described, which implied a radical downgrading of the view that Russian cultural influence had been of overriding importance from the first date of contact with Russians. Yaroslav Bilinsky recounts that the Ukrainian historian I. Boiko could print that 'serious research work on the history of the period of the Ukraine's annexation to Russia' did not exist, even though there had been a flood of publications on these events at the time of the above-mentioned anniversary celebrations two years earlier. Other Ukrainians called for a 'more realistic interpretation' of the role of Bogdan Khmel'nitskii in the unification of the Ukraine and Russia, and for attention to be paid to the accomplishments of 'bourgeois' Ukrainian historians. Re-evaluations of Tsarist colonialism in accordance with the new 'liberal' line also appeared with respect to the histories of Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Turkmenia.

From the period of this second brief 'thaw' of the Khrushchev period, in 1956, until the fall of Khrushchev, Soviet historiography on Tsarist colonialism reverted once more to basically late Stalinist positions, a trend which became increasingly clear after the nationalist purges of the late 1950s, and the centralisation of power over scholarly activity by the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1963. The only two qualifications to the interpretation of this phase of historiography as being essentially Stalinist are, firstly, that the evils of Tsarist colonialism could at least be discussed (though less so after 1960) as
long as this was balanced by emphasis on the 'progressive consequences' of annexation and the negative side of indigenous resistance to colonisation, and, secondly, that school curricula in non-Russian areas re-introduced the teaching of their national histories (as distinct from 'All-Union' history). This reversed the tight co-ordination of the histories of the peoples of the Soviet Union instituted under Stalin some twenty-five years before.52

Because of the persistence of Burdzhalov's Voprosy istorii in publishing articles in the more 'liberal' spirit of the Twentieth Party Congress until November 1956, a line which by this time was clearly judged to be incorrect, Kommunist criticised the journal at least four times during the second half of that year.53 However Burdzhalov's defiance extended to accusing E. Bugaev, Deputy Editor of Partiinaia zhizn', who had also attacked Voprosy istorii, of ignoring the line on pre-revolutionary Russian historiography laid down at the Twentieth Party Congress, an accusation tantamount to 'Stalinism'.54 In November, however, the isolation of Burdzhalov's journal was confirmed by additional denunciations from Pravda and Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR.55

As a consequence, articles adopting a basically Bagirov line re-emerged on the pages of Voprosy istorii.56 However, a degree of residual deviationism was retained by its publication of the proceedings of the October and November Shamil' conferences. As noted above, particularly with regard to the October conference, many speakers emphasised the virtues of resistance to colonisation at the expense of the once again de rigueur 'progressive consequences' of annexation to the Russian state.57

The second 'thaw' may be said to have finally come to a close in March 1957 with a Central Committee resolution relieving Burdzhalov of his position, and the simultaneous setting out by Kommunist of the required line in analyses of Tsarist colonialism. With reference to the key question of evaluating Shamil' and the Caucasus, the journal made clear that three points were essential to the official position: annexation of the Caucasus was unquestionably 'progressive', Shamil' and the Muridist movement were linked to the interests of foreign powers, and Muridist
ideology was that of a feudal, clerical aristocracy. Of this Bagirov-Stalinist litany, however, the March issue of Voprosy istorii indicated which element should be considered by historians as the most crucial. The issue (which appeared two months late, suggesting lengthy deliberation and/or reorganisation) incorporated a long editorial in which the new editors illuminated the mistakes of their predecessors. Focussing on A. Pikman's article on Shamil', only one specific sin of omission was indicated: the failure to stress that the annexation of the Caucasus had been a 'progressive' event.

Significantly, Khrushchev, in a major address in 1958, if not contradicted, at least significantly modified his anti-Stalinist acknowledgement of the 'mutual distrust which existed among the peoples of Tsarist Russia' made at the Twentieth Congress in 1956. Addressing an All-Union conference of cotton-growers in February, he stated:

We not only did not weaken the fraternal ties which existed among the peoples of Tsarist Russia, but, resolutely eliminating from our path all remnants of national inequality inherited from Tsarism, we created a genuine friendly family...

In accordance with the renewed acceptance of the Stalinist position on Tsarist colonialism by the authorities, histories of other non-Russian areas reverted to positions essentially conforming to lines elaborated under Stalin, while a wave of new histories stressed the positive consequences of annexation, making only pro forma acknowledgement of the evils of Tsarist colonialism. As noted above, however, in accordance with the less rigid style overall of the Khrushchev regime, some mild variation from this pattern was tolerated (as in the case of the 1957 Istoriia turkmenskoi SSR) as long as certain Stalinist tenets were observed, and the evils of resistance movements, together with the positive aspects of colonialism, were given strong emphasis.

On top of the re-establishment of Stalin's Russian nationalist interpretation of Tsarist colonialism, there are strong indications of attempts to consolidate the doctrines associated with this interpretation between 1959 and 1964. The beginning of this period coincides with the major purge of non-Russian leaders, together with numerous more minor
officials, following the Twenty-First Party Congress (which included the dismissal of the Party First Secretaries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on charges, inter alia, of tolerating 'bourgeois nationalism'). In addition, at an All-Union conference of historians held in 1960, Boris Ponomarev laid particular emphasis on the Party's demand that historians stress the pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples'. Underlining the allegedly positive aspects of Tsarist colonialism, Ponomarev explicitly indicated, was required of historians in the interests of the Party's nationality policies:

In demonstrating the progressive significance of the annexation of peoples to Russia in the broad historical perspective, the historian promotes the strengthening of the friendship of peoples of our country and the further drawing together (sblizhenie) of the nations of the Soviet Union.

The greater infusion of Russian nationalism in this period is also reflected in a renewed tendency to interpret the Tsarist empire as a state sui generis, together with a marked new emphasis on discovering the 'friendship of peoples' in the pre-revolutionary past. The trend is well illustrated by a comparison of the 1960 and 1963 editions of the three-volume Istoriia SSSR, published by the Higher Party School of the CPSU Central Committee. The earlier edition carried the following claim:

The liquidation of the backward Mongol-Tatar Khanates brought the peoples of the Volga and Ural areas, and of the North Caucasus and Siberia, higher forms of social relations, agriculture, trade, and higher culture. At the same time Tsarism and the ruling classes of Russia were cruel oppressors of the non-Russian nationalities. (emphasis added)

However, in the revised 1963 edition, the same text is repeated on the same page and in the same chapter, but with the final underlined sentence deleted.

Khrushchev himself lent authority to the new shift in emphasis by claiming the existence of a pre-revolutionary 'friendship' of the peoples of Russia and Georgia, in contrast to the brief de-Stalinising 'liberalisations' of 1953 and 1956, when it was stressed (at the Twentieth Party Congress by Khrushchev himself) that a 'friendship of peoples' did not emerge among the peoples of the Tsarist empire until the coming of
Soviet power. Concerning contacts between Georgians and Russians in the eighteenth century, the Party leader stated on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Soviet Georgia, in May 1961,

Georgia's finest sons saw in friendship with Russia a bright future for their country, their bulwark and hope.68

Also during this period he lent his authority to the stress on the 'progressive consequences' of Tsarist colonialism. In August 1964, speaking on the 'Achievements of Soviet Kirgizia', he stated:

Russia's influence made itself felt in the development of the economy, culture and everyday life of the Kirgiz.69

Intriguingly, however, this statement, reflecting a 'Stalinist' approach to the evaluation of Tsarist colonialism, is juxtaposed with a statement more reminiscent of 1956, and more likely to assuage the fears of non-Russians:

The voluntary incorporation [of Kirgizia] into Russia took place in contradictory circumstances.
The colonialist policy of Russian tsarism hindered the development of the economy and culture of the Kirgiz.70

In addition, the coining of euphemisms to describe Tsarist colonialism is particularly conspicuous in Party publications during the period. Various works speak of the 'true historical importance of individual empires', and the 'development' in Tsarist Russia of 'a multinational state'.71 Kommunist, in June 1963, refers to the Bolsheviks, in the early days after the Revolution, far from establishing a 'friendship of peoples', as 'leaning on the ancient tradition of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, which even Tsarist colonialism could not break'.72

Finally, on top of the reversion to the late-Stalinist doctrine of the pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples', numerous cases suggest the abandonment of the notion that this 'friendship' was based on a 'class alliance' of Russian and non-Russian workers. Rather, any conceivable form of affinity, including religious, literary, or 'spiritual' historical links between Russian and non-Russian nationalities are used to suggest allegiance. Khrushchev's statement on the 'friendship' of the Russian and Georgian peoples, quoted above, would appear to be a case in point. In addition, the people of Tuva are described during this period as having
had a 'centuries old striving' to unite with Russia, while Ivan Bodiul, First Secretary of Communist Party of Moldavia, asserted at the Twenty-Second Party Congress:

Since olden times the Moldavian people has gravitated towards Russia and the Russian people. Despite long isolation of a large part of the population from its motherland (sic), the Moldavian people did not forget the Russian language and lovingly preserved common traditions.

Similar claims of a non-class form of 'friendship of peoples' focussed during this period on Russia's past protection of fellow Christians in Georgia, and Pushkin's associations with Azerbaijan.

Thus the historiography of Tsarist colonialism in the Khrushchev period reveals, essentially, the retention of Russian nationalist positions established during the late Stalin period, interrupted by two partial, temporary reversions to a more 'internationalist' stance in 1953 and 1956. The retention and entrenchment of Stalinist positions becomes particularly evident in the final years of the Khrushchev era, when the doctrine of the 'friendship of peoples' is applied with increasing rigour and consistency to the history of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union.

(ii) 'Communist Nationalism' and Russian Culture

(a) The Pre-Revolutionary Russian Cultural Heritage

As with the case of the history of the pre-revolutionary Russian state, the Soviet approach to Russia's pre-revolutionary culture under Khrushchev reveals broad continuity with positions formulated in the Stalin period. There appears to have been no serious attempt to reverse Stalin's rehabilitation of Russia's traditional culture and his policy of official adulation of this heritage, although there may have been some pressure from certain quarters in the later Khrushchev years to have Russia's culture 'internationalised' along with those of the non-Russian nationalities, according to the policy of 'convergence' (sblizhenie) and 'merging' (sliianie) through 'mutual enrichment' (vzaimoobogashchenie), which formed part of Khrushchev's drive for 'full-scale communist construction' (razvernutoe kommunisticheskoe stroitel'stvo) from the late
In addition to this improvement, the only changes of any significance during this period were that the passing of the 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaign meant that Western culture could again be treated with relative objectivity, and that the Russian Orthodox Church, while, paradoxically, retaining many of its privileges, was not spared the persecution meted out to all religious institutions in the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1964. Thus, with these qualifications, the official position on Russia's cultural heritage between 1953 and 1964 does not deviate significantly from that which held sway under Stalin. This is despite the officially articulated cultural policies for all the nationalities of the Soviet Union mentioned above, and Khrushchev's rhetoric directed against Stalin's policies in this area, deemed a perversion from the exemplary 'Leninist nationality policy'.

References to Russian literature, music and art in official publications therefore have much the same flavour as under Stalin. Importantly, however, the use of Russia's pre-revolutionary culture as an object of adulation and imitation is balanced, at least up until the end of the 1950s, by a new 'internationalist' respect for the cultural achievements of the West, which contrasts starkly with the xenophobic aspect of Stalin's 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaign. During this period, usually in connection with the anniversaries of births or deaths, articles appear regularly in the printed media praising the great cultural figures of the West, such as, for example, Mozart, Handel, Haydn, Schumann, von Suppe, Voltaire, Schiller, Andersen, and Velazquez.

With regard to the treatment of pre-revolutionary literature during this period, there are few detectable changes from the Stalin years. Tolstoi continues to be regarded as a 'genius' (War and Peace being the 'greatest work of world literature'), while most of the other well-known figures of nineteenth-century Russian literature (Gogol', Nekrasov, Krylov, Pushkin, Griboedov, Chekhov, Lermontov, Turgenev, Tютчев) are regularly termed 'great Russian writers' and feted in the media in connection with anniversaries, the erection of monuments to their memory, or the restoration of buildings connected with their lives. Significant
publicity surrounds the republication from 1956 to 1958 (for the first time since the 1920s) of the complete fictional works of Dostoevskii, which suggested a return to the careful rehabilitation of the writer which was taking place before his effective denunciation at the height of the Zhdanovshchina. While still considered a 'contradictory' figure, Dostoevskii is again referred to in official publications as 'the great Russian writer'.

The retention of a defensive and laudatory approach to Russia's literary heritage in general can be detected in various encounters with Western Slavists during the period. For example, Literaturnaia gazeta in 1958 writes approvingly of the fact that Western contributors to an international congress of Slavists 'write with respect about the heritage of Russian literature' and are achieving 'a more profound understanding of its traditions. A somewhat more vociferous defence of Russian literature appears on the pages of Izvestiia in 1963 after the American Slavic Review had allegedly suggested that Russian literature was derivative and had 'no vital existence of its own'. The newspaper responded by claiming that, on the contrary, there was a general recognition that Russian literature had been the centre of development of 'world literature' in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and that there was hardly a major Western writer during this period who had not 'spoken with deep emotion about the exceptional importance of Russian literature for his creative work'. Such writers had more than once, the article claimed, 'recognised Russian literature as the most powerful and influential, the most humane and truthful, the leading literature of the world'.

Continuity in the official approach to Russia's literary heritage is matched, as under Stalin, by the official sanctioning of contemporary writing infused by an obvious love of the specifically Russian land and people which is balanced by the expression of enthusiasm for the communist future. The emergence of the 'rural prose' school (the derevenshchiki) with the publication of Vladimir Soloukhin's Vladimirskie proselki bears witness to this policy. Nikolai Tikhonov's comments on Aleksandr Prokofiev's Invitation to a Journey in 1961 encapsulates what was permitted and expected of this School:
The work is permeated with ringing song, wondrous imagery, folk wisdom, and a vast love for Russia, for the people that has withstood all heroic tests, the hero-people blazing its way to a bright future, to communism...85

Similarly, Konstantin Paustovskii, writing in Literaturnaja gazeta in May 1959, praises a group of young writers (Iurii Kazakov, Sergei Nikitin, Natalia Tarasenkova, Vladimir Tendriakov, Iurii Trifonov, Iurii Bondarev, Iosif Dik, together with one 'token' non-Russian, Richi Dostian) who 'belong heart and soul to the people, and have a wondrous knowledge of the people's life, are bone to the bone, and flesh of the flesh of the people'. Their writing, according to Paustovskii, contains 'all the distinctive hallmarks of the folk ethos shaped through the ages, and combines them with the notable new traits born in the people since the October Revolution'. He continues:

The air of our vast and beloved country, the breath of our wonderful homeland emanates from these tales, just as a golden autumn day is filled with the pure breezes of our lakes and rivers, our woods, our fields.86

Continuity with Stalin's policies towards music also marks the decade following the dictator's death. In 1958 the CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution concerning Zhdanov's February 1948 decree 'On the Opera "The Great Friendship" by V. Muradeli'. The 1958 resolution held that the 1948 decree, which had accused a variety of composers of 'modernistic' bourgeois decadence and ignoring the 'best traditions and experience of classical opera in general and the Russian classical opera in particular', had played a broadly 'positive role' in the development of Soviet music. While the decree had contained 'several unjust and unsubstantiated criticisms of the creative work of a number of talented Soviet composers', it had 'correctly set out the path of folk content (narodnost') and realism for the development of Soviet art, and contained correct criticism of erroneous, formalistic trends in music'.87 Pravda's editorial on the subject, published the same day, further amplified the Party's position:

The programmatic importance of this (1948) decree lay primarily in its affirmation of the lofty principles of realism and folk content (narodnost') in Soviet music. It gave a clear and profound definition of the realist school
of music. The principles of this school are: 'recognition of the immense progressive role of the classical heritage and of the traditions of the Russian school of music in particular; use of this heritage and further development of it; the combination in music of lofty content with artistic perfection of musical form; music that is truthful and realistic and that has a profoundly organic link with the people and their music and songs; and a high professional mastery coupled with simplicity and comprehensibility'.

This position was again affirmed at the 1960 Conference of Composers of the RSFSR. Dmitrii Shostakovich, speaking before the Conference, stressed that the development of Russian 'musical culture' depended on 'the ties of our creative work with Russian folk art, with Russian songs and Russian dances'. In supporting this stance, Sovetskaia Rossiia warned that 'cosmopolitan tendencies among a small segment of the younger composers are especially alarming':

... Russian composers must not forget about the danger of a broadening concept of the national element in Russian music, wherein the national element begins to be diluted and its impact is small. A tendency to obscure the deep roots of Russian folk music and the whole original complex of the living traditions of Russian music is noticeable among some of our composers.

Such dire warnings could be taken as suggesting both an attack on those who permitted themselves to be influenced by Western modernism, and a questioning of the application of the Party's policy of the 'drawing together' and 'merging' of the cultures of the USSR (discussed below) to Russian culture. Similar continuity was characteristic of the official approach to Russia's pre-revolutionary artistic heritage. References to Russian art in the media tended to concentrate on such figures as the medieval Andrei Rublev and the nineteenth-century realist Repin, the preservation of the artistry left by Russia's Petrine and Novgorod periods, and the popularisation of Russia's traditional crafts. Moreover, concern was expressed in 1958 that the study of Russia's ancient art had declined. Professor N. Voronin, a Doctor of Historical Science, wrote in Pravda in May of that year:
The fully justified Party statements about the lag in elaborating the experience and history of contemporary Soviet art and the need for studying it more profoundly were hardly meant to curtail, let alone eliminate, other branches of the history of the Fatherland's art. However, such work in the field of ancient Russian art has to all intents and purposes disappeared ... This is why it is quite urgent that a large independent department of the history of ancient Russian art ... be organised in the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Art History.92

Apparently, this situation was later judged to have been corrected, at least in part, as an editorial two years later on the state of Soviet 'historical science' in Voprosy istorii congratulated members of the USSR Academy of Sciences for, amongst other things, their disclosure of 'the wonderful richness of ancient Novgorod's material culture'.93

Concern for the preservation and popularisation of Russia's pre-revolutionary artistic heritage can also be detected in calls for a Society for maintaining 'monuments of culture and history'. Izvestiia in April 1962 called on the authorities to follow the example of Georgia and form such a society, for the protection of 'outstanding examples of Russian architecture' (a number of which were cited, mainly examples of monumental ecclesiastical architecture).94 In August of the same year, the same newspaper called for 'action not words' on the proposal.95 However, it was only with the Brezhnev regime that this demand was realised.

It will be recalled that under Stalin, the Russian language assumed not only the role of the cultural spearhead for the assimilation of non-Russian peoples, but, as an element of Russian culture, received praise and adulation in its own right. Under the subsequent regime, the virtual absence of this tendency in the printed media suggests that the policy was in abeyance until the late 1950s when, again, articles in the press glorified the language, and called attention to the need for its preservation.

Thus, for example, Literaturnaia gazeta published an article in May 1959 which defended the place of much pre-revolutionary Russian
culture in Soviet society on the grounds that 'we must not contravene Lenin's belief that the people of a communist society should enjoy all the achievements of world culture. In this context, Konstantin Paustovskii (quoted above in another connection) stated:

The Russian language is one of the great marvels on earth. For many centuries Russia was beggared, hapless, downtrodden and ignorant. Despite this, however - in defiance of it - our people forged a language of true genius; brilliant, songful and vivid, the richest in the world. Do we cherish this language? No we do not! On the contrary, the language is being increasingly polluted, twisted, and reduced to a garble. We are in danger of seeing the pristine purity of the Russian language crowded out by the impoverished and lifeless language of bureaucracy ...

By what right do we allow the mighty language of our classics to be cast on the dust-heap, the language created by generations of our great forefathers, from Pushkin and Lermontov, to Leskov, Chekhov, Blok, Bunin and Gor'kii?

We undertake to defend a narrow conception of what is contemporary, at the same time forgetting that the salvation of the Russian language is not only a contemporary task, but an urgent and immediate one, absolutely necessary for our country and people. It is the writer's duty to fight everywhere and always for the purity and richness of the language, and to do so at once and without let-up, while young people are still able to perceive its beauty and all its splendid qualities, and before the rising generation has yet accepted this debased language as the model of authentic Russian.96

Although Paustovskii claims that all he says of Russian is applicable to other languages of the Soviet Union, in addition to Russian, he mentions only the 'engaging, melodious and lively' Ukrainian language, also being 'bureaucratised', he claims. However, there is no evidence that rhapsodic claims concerning Soviet languages other than Russian - let alone assertions comparable to those contained in Paustovskii's article - were permitted at this time (or at any other) in the Soviet media.

Numerous articles in a similar vein appeared in subsequent years. For example, Neva in September 1960 published an article by a Boris Timofeev on the need for purging slang from Russian.97 In a second article published some months later in Izvestiia, Timofeev also criticised the acceptance in Russian of words from foreign languages. As often occurred under Stalin, Timofeev praised Lomonosov's attempts to 'cleanse' the language of foreign words.98
Izvestiia went somewhat further in October of the same year by publishing a letter entitled 'On our native tongue', which called for the formation of a Society to guard the 'purity' of the Russian language. The newspaper claimed that it had selected this letter from a number concerned with the same question, because of the 'importance of the subject'. Calling for a 'discussion' on the topic, it followed the letter a week later with twelve letters supporting the position of the first.

Official media treatment of the Russian language continued in a similar vein for the remainder of the Khrushchev years, allowing the expression of even more overtly Russian nationalist sentiments towards the end of the era. For example, in October 1964 Literaturnaia gazeta favourably quoted Lomonosov's comment on the views of Charles V on the various qualities of the languages of Europe:

Had he mastered Russian, he would have found in it the magnificence of Spanish, the liveliness of French, the firmness of German, the tenderness of Italian, and, above all, the richness and precision, strong in imagery, of Greek and Latin.

Perhaps most remarkably of all, Vladimir Soloukhin was permitted during 1964 to propose on the pages of Nedelia that the 'dry, formal' term of address 'citizen' (grazhdanin or grazhdanka) be replaced by the 'old-fashioned but still charming' 'sir' (sudar') and 'madam' (sudarynia), terms which, while ancient Russian forms, carried distinctly pre-revolutionary bourgeois overtones. As with the demand for a society for maintaining Russia's 'monuments of history and culture', those in ultimate authority during the Khrushchev period failed to prevent such demands and arguments being publicised, but stopped short of their gratification.

While official policies towards Russian culture under Khrushchev remained broadly consistent with those which held sway under Stalin, an important exception is the case of the Russian Orthodox Church. Whereas policy changes towards this most important institution of Russian culture had been one of the major elements of Stalin's 'communist nationalist' revolution from the late 1930s onwards, the Russian Church was not spared the assaults of the 'anti-religious' campaign of 1958-1964, part of the
ideological dimension to Khrushchev's 'full-scale communist construction'. At the same time, however, a number of its symbolic privileges, as far as its treatment in the media was concerned, were retained, suggesting that it was a weapon not to be totally discarded from the arsenal of 'communist nationalism'.

The attacks on the Church during this later period, as part of the wider anti-religious campaign, may be simply outlined. In contrast with Khrushchev's early policy indicated by the 1954 Central Committee resolution which affirmed the continuation of the policy of broad appeasement of the Russian Orthodox church, the year 1958 saw the initiation of attacks on the Church by the authorities, at both the administrative and ideological levels. Culminating in 1964, when Party ideology spokesman Il'ichev declared Stalin's concessions to the Russian Orthodox Church to have been a 'departure from socialist legality', these years witnessed the closing of roughly 10,000 Orthodox Churches, 40 of 44 monasteries, all baptismal chapels, and most seminaries, as well as numerous other draconian measures.

On the propaganda level, the Church, not excluding such venerable institutions as the Zagorsk Troitsko-Sergeevskii monastery, was regularly and publicly accused of charlatanism, 'parasitism', and every form of hypocrisy: its priests were frequently accused of debauchery, greed, drunkenness, and even, on occasion, murder. Such cases as the apostasy of Aleksandr Osipov, Professor of Old Testament Scripture and Classical Hebrew at Leningrad's Theological Academy, were vigorously exploited by the press. Osipov was quoted in Pravda in December 1959 as saying,

I have left a world that I now perceive to be one of illusions, of estrangement from reality, and often of knowing deception in the name of personal enrichment ...

Who needs these ritual turnings and bowings, the gestures, the raising aloft of the arms and cheap effects?106

In a later interview in Izvestiia, Osipov further alleged that,

Russian Orthodoxy is the most backward of all the Christian churches from the point of view of scientific progress ...

As for its administrative and managerial aspect, the Church is ruled by unbridled anti-democratic centralism, with a dictatorship of persons of appropriate rank at each hierarchical level ...107
At the same time, however, numerous press items attest to the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church continued to be granted a relatively privileged position, at least compared to other religious institutions. For example, the practice initiated under Stalin of reporting in a formal, uncritical fashion news regarding the activities of the Church continued throughout the Khrushchev period. Thus, official press reporting of such items as Council of Ministers Chairman Bulganin receiving Aleksei, 'Patriarch of Moscow and All the Russias', wishing him a happy birthday, and news of the Patriarch being awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour and leaving the Soviet Union on overseas trips, were still encountered. Similarly, Aleksei was quoted at length in the press (including his references to appropriate scriptural support) in his speeches defending the Soviet line on disarmament and arms control initiatives, while the fiftieth anniversary of the Moscow Patriarchate is noted in the press.

In addition, occasional articles during the period implied that while a consistent policy of militant atheism should be directed towards the Russian Orthodox Church, extenuating circumstances not applying to other religions of the Soviet Union should be considered. Hence, the caveat contained in the following Voprosy filosofii editorial, published in March 1960, was not repeated in the case of other religions discussed in the course of the article:

A prominent place in our work should be assigned to criticism of the ideology of Orthodoxy. Many Orthodox Church leaders in the USSR are known to be participating in the struggle for peace and to hold patriotic views on a number of issues. But this does not eliminate the problem of combating the ideology of contemporary Orthodoxy, which clashes with science just as any other religion does.

Similarly, in April 1964, Izvestiia published an interview with Metropolitan Nikodim in response to alleged Western claims that 'Christ is in agony in Moscow'. Nikodim asserted in the interview, in answer to the allegation, that 'in our country religion, and particularly the Russian Orthodox Church, is leading an active life.'
The main reason why the Orthodox Church continued to enjoy official status and pretended respect even at the height of its persecution was, in all probability, its role as an apologist for the Soviet regime and its policies in international Christian circles, especially the World Council of Churches, in which other Soviet religious denominations were not of comparable importance. However, given the importance of Stalin's revised attitude towards the Church in securing victory in World War II, it cannot be excluded that the residual privileges of the Russian Orthodox Church were retained also in order not to alienate totally the concern of Russian national sentiment for this most important symbol of the national culture.

It should also be noted in this context that while the Party called for the replacement of the traditions and customs of non-Russian nationalities regarded as 'obsolete' (which included religion) with those formed 'in the process of communist construction', on the rare occasions where attempts were made to replace Russian Orthodox traditions, they tended to be with 'new' customs which would appeal to the Russian national consciousness. Thus, for example, in 1960, the journal Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia complained that the new festival of 'Russian Winter' had as yet been unable to replace the Russian Orthodox Shrove Tuesday.

Finally, and more generally with regard to Khrushchev's policy towards Russian culture, the media continued in the decade following Stalin's death to publicise any plausible (and at times implausible) Russian cultural and scientific achievements of past centuries, and to revive and publicise (non-religious) Russian customs. This policy is revealed in acts as diverse as the publicity surrounding the 'four-hundredth anniversary of Russian typography', and the achievements of early Russian metallurgists, to the revival of Kvas, 'invented by our forefathers, the ancient Slavs'.

It should be pointed out, however, that while policies on balance favoured a continuation of Stalin's line towards the Russian pre-revolutionary cultural heritage, in the overall context of an ultimately assimilationist nationality policy, there is significant evidence of lack of unanimity in the leadership on this issue. The fact that Izvestiia called twice on the authorities to form a Society concerned with the protection of
monuments of Russian culture and history (fruitlessly, as it turned out, until after the fall of Khrushchev) is important in this connection. Indeed, while broad continuity with Stalin's rehabilitation of this heritage continued to hold sway, certain voices called for a more unambiguous adherence to this position, while others implied that Russian culture should not be excluded from the proclaimed policy of All-Union cultural 'convergence'. The former category included the editors of Izvestiia, and the writer Vladimir Soloukhin, who was permitted space on the pages of Literaturnaia gazeta in February 1962 to challenge the notion put forward by Party spokesman A. Agaev that the content and appeal of literature should be increasingly 'international' as part of the overall policy of 'convergence'. In his criticism of Agaev, while Soloukhin is obviously also concerned with artistic freedom, his opposition is based on disquiet with regard to the later nationality policies of the Khrushchev regime: culture in Soviet society, according to Soloukhin, should be unchangingly national in form, Russian writers should be able to concentrate in their work on the characteristics of Russian national distinctiveness, while attempts to draw cultures closer to one another as envisaged by current policies could be seen as 'cosmopolitanism' rather than 'internationalism'. A conference of literary translators of the Transcaucasian Republics, held in Tbilisi in March 1962, also criticised Agaev's articles which had appeared in Literatura i zhizn' (though not those which had appeared in Izvestiia), a stance which the Georgian edition of Kommunist supported.

Agaev, however, whose position had been previously supported by Pravda, was permitted the last word in his dispute with Soloukhin. While not specifying that Russia's national culture would be spared the 'mutual enrichment' involved in the 'convergence' of the Soviet Union's cultures, he attacked Soloukhin's ideas as amounting to a call for 'preserving national differences and peculiarities forever'. As such, the writer was charged with being out of touch with the 'whole Marxist-Leninist understanding of the national question'. Particularly during Khrushchev's later years of proclaimed 'full-scale communist construction', similar calls were occasionally made for Russia's culture (or aspects of it) to conform to the process of 'convergence', to which the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union were subjected. Thus, for example, in 1959 Izvestiia
published an article entitled 'Stil' nashei arkhitektury' which condemned the continued use, as in Stalin's time, of pre-revolutionary Russian architectural styles, and called for the development of 'uniform types of buildings for serving communist forms of work, everyday life, and culture'. A. Vlasov, the author, continued:

We do not at all intend to belittle national traditions in architecture. At the same time, an uncritical application of methods and forms of the past to contemporary architecture is clearly not called for ... Even comparatively recently some architects have understood the national features of Russian Soviet architecture to mean the restoration of ancient forms, the forms of the Russian classical or baroque. The Volga-Don Canal, the tall hotel on Komsomol'skaia Square in Moscow, and the Arbat underground station are examples of this. The majority of architects have abandoned this concept, but it is still to be seen in our practice in some places.121

There are additional occasional references throughout the period to the fact (which, it is usually implied, is laudable) of Russian culture having absorbed elements from other cultures of the Soviet Union. Thus Sovietskaia Rossia in 1960 claims, in the context of the 'mutual influence of our national cultures', that 'in enriching the music of all the Soviet peoples, Russian musicians have also enriched their own national culture'. Similarly, K.A. Fedin, addressing an All-Union Conference of Young Writers in May 1963, stated:

There are very great opportunities for learning, for making use of the heritage of the past and the traditions in our national literatures. I am not only speaking of Russian literature, which we know comparatively well. But take the literature of Central Asia, take a Soviet writer like 'Aini ...',123

However, compared to the constant calls directed at the non-Russian nationalities after the launching of Khrushchev's call for 'full-scale communist construction' to work towards the 'internationalisation' of their cultures, such statements were untypical and unforceful, and - even if supporting a line favoured by powerful elements within the leadership - had little influence on the position of Russia's culture (with the partial exception of the Russian Orthodox Church), which remained much as it had under Stalin.
The successor regime to Stalin's thus maintained broad continuity in its approach to the question of Russia's traditional culture: its literature, music, art and language. Moreover, the anti-religious campaign did not result in the abandonment of all the privileges and pretended respect enjoyed by the Russian Orthodox Church after June 1941. While there is some indication of attempts to apply the post-1957 policies of the 'internationalisation' of the cultures of the Soviet Union to Russia's culture as well - and Russia's religion, like the others of the Soviet Union, was attacked as part of the drive for 'full-scale communist construction' in the 'spiritual' sphere - overall, such consistency with Soviet nationality policies is the exception rather than the rule.

(b) Russian Culture and Soviet Nationalities Policy

If the essence of Stalin's nationality policy had amounted to the sacrificing of the bulk of the cultural and political rights of the non-Russian nationalities in favour of political centralisation and consolidation, inter alia by means of Russification and the concomitant gratification of Russian chauvinism, the successor regime pursued a policy of important - if not sweeping - reforms of previous policies in this area, at least until 1957. However, from this year until October 1964, Khrushchev presided over a nationality policy which, if anything, was more integrationist and less concerned with the interest of non-Russians in preserving their cultural identity, than had been Stalin's. On balance, Inkeles' claim that 'only minor modifications' took place in the Khrushchev era in the area of nationality policies stands. 124

In terms of the distribution of administrative power in the context of nationalities policy, the early post-Stalin period represents a distinct break with the past. This was in addition to a number of symbolic concessions to the non-Russian nationalities following Stalin's death, already touched on in the previous section. Several weeks after Stalin's death, the Presidium of the Central Committee decreed that the position of Party First Secretary in each Union Republic should be held by a representative of the indigenous nationality. 125 This reform, combined with the numerous other acts of administrative decentralisation instituted at this time (such as the dismantling of the All-Union Justice and Finance
Ministries\textsuperscript{126}, clearly served Khrushchev's interests in establishing the support of Party officials in non-Russian areas, yet also resulted in a significant redistribution of power away from Moscow to the non-Russian nationalities, particularly in such areas as economic and cultural policies. Particularly favoured by the reform was the Ukraine, where Stalin's policy of placing Russians - or in one case a Russified Jew - in the position of the Republic's Party First Secretary (Postyshev, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mel'nikov) was especially noticeable.\textsuperscript{127} Khrushchev's appointment of Kirichenko as First Secretary in the Ukraine, together with his promotion (often to Moscow) of numerous other Ukrainian officials, came to symbolise the regime's 'new deal' for the non-Russians (despite the fact that the Ukrainians were disproportionately the beneficiaries of this policy).

The cultural policies pursued in the four years following Stalin's death also contrast, though to a lesser extent, with those the former dictator pursued towards the non-Russian nationalities. These years are marked by numerous 'festivals' of non-Russian cultures, the elevation to 'junior elder brother status' of the Ukrainians,\textsuperscript{129} and, most importantly, Khrushchev's apparent commitment to the independent and perpetual cultural development of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union in the Resolution to the Twentieth Party Congress:

\begin{quote}
In its nationalities policy the Party has always proceeded from Lenin's thesis that socialism not only does not eliminate national differences and characteristics but, on the contrary, ensures the all-round development and flowering (rastsvet) of the economies and cultures of all nations and nationalities. The Party must continue to consider these characteristics most carefully in all its practical work.\textsuperscript{130}
\end{quote}

In addition, from 1956 onwards, Khrushchev explicitly condemned Stalin's nationality policies, emphasising, as was claimed in the 'Secret Speech' for the first time, that the former dictator's policies were 'gross violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationalities policy of the Soviet state'.\textsuperscript{131} Khrushchev thus sought to identify the regime with the more 'liberal' nationality policy which Leninism represented. Khrushchev's strategy was also supported by his wider onslaught on the 'cult of the personality'. As part of this campaign, in June 1956
Kommunist printed a number of previously unpublished documents written by Lenin, including a letter entitled 'On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomising"'. The journal comments:

V.I. Lenin's letter ... is of very great importance. The letter provides a vivid picture of V.I. Lenin as the real inspirer and creator of the USSR, of his concern for applying the correct policy towards the nationalities, and for strengthening the USSR. In his letter, written at the time of the preparation for, and holding of, the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, V.I. Lenin demanded that the principles of proletarian internationalism be applied, and that the friendship of Soviet peoples, large and small, be strengthened. He sharply criticised haste and high-handedness in settling questions of policy toward the nationalities, in particular the mistakes of I.V. Stalin, who had put forward a plan for 'autonomising', which envisaged not a Union of Soviet republics enjoying equal rights, but their entry into the Russian Republic as autonomous entities, and Stalin's conciliatory attitude toward manifestations of great-power chauvinism.132

To amplify the final point, Lenin is quoted as warning that internationalism on the part of the oppressing or so-called 'great' nation (although it is great only in violence, great only as a gendarme is) must consist not only in observing formal equality of nations but also in such inequality as would be compensation by the oppressing nation, the large nation, for that inequality which actually takes shape in life.133

Despite Khrushchev's attempts to associate his nationality policy with Lenin's internationalism, Stalin's policy of aiming for the ultimate assimilation of the non-Russian nationalities through linguistic policies continued without challenge in the first years after his death. The spring of 1954 saw another push in the drive to make Russian the 'second native language' of all Soviet citizens, which took the form of adding an extra year of Russian language instruction to the curricula of most non-Russian areas.134 The Russification of non-Russian languages also continued to receive official support, as exemplified by the July 1955 Resolution which held that abbreviations introduced into Kazakh should be in their Russian form,135 the instruction by Turkmenskaia iskra in
October of the previous year that Turkmenian place-names should be spelt in their Russian rather than their indigenous form (i.e. Ashkhabad was to be written rather than Ashgabat), and the conversion of the Abkhaz language (which had been written since 1938 in the Georgian alphabet) to the Cyrillic script.  

The fact that such policies amounted to a continuation of the Stalinist policy of encouraging the 'enrichment' of the non-Russian languages of the Soviet Union by Russian was also implicitly admitted by Turkmenskaia iskra:

Bourgeois nationalists have tried to erect all possible obstacles in the way of the enrichment and development of the Turkmen language through the beneficial influence of progressive Russian culture, have tried to instil disrespect for everything Russian, have furiously opposed the entry into the Turkmen language of words and expressions from the Russian vocabulary, and have tried to drag in Arabic, Persian and Turkish words which are alien and hardly intelligible to the Turkmen people.

After 1956, Soviet official organs continued to claim the fundamental difference between Khrushchev's nationality policies and those practiced under Stalin, while the concepts of the 'flourishing' of the nations and the Party's commitment to being attentive to national distinctiveness were retained, though perhaps stressed less frequently. Indeed, not only did the Party continue to claim that it had 'set a firm course towards the expansion of the economic and cultural rights of the Union Republics', but that the purge of the 'anti-Party group' had given further impetus towards the implementation of a genuinely 'Leninist nationalities policy'. As Mukhitdinov claimed in his address to the Twenty-First Party Congress:

The smashing of the anti-Party group, whose members showed signs of chauvinism and mistrust of the ability of the peoples of the national republics to cope with All-Union tasks, has encouraged a further consolidation of friendship among the peoples, and their unification around the Party.
In fact, the administrative decentralisation initiated by Khrushchev early during his reign continued only until approximately 1960. From 1957 to 1959, numerous legislative acts and Party decrees transferred state bodies from Moscow to the Union Republics (including the RSFSR). Hence the abolition during this period of the All-Union Ministry of Transport, the decrees in 1957 and 1959 increasing the powers of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics, and the establishment of the localised sovnarkhozy. At the same time the RSFSR was equipped with many of the standard Soviet accoutrements of national individuality which it had previously lacked. This included the establishment in 1956 of a CPSU Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR, the founding in 1959 of Unions of Writers, Artists and Composers specifically for the Russian Republic, such organisations as the All-Russian Choral Society, the publications Sovetskaia Rossiia and Literaturnaia Rossiia, as well as a number of additional journals and publishing houses.

After the turn of the decade, the recentralisation of economic administration was matched by something of a reversion to old patterns as far as the realities of the balance of power between the centre and the periphery was concerned. This is aside from the fact that Khrushchev, to a far greater extent than Stalin, tended to appoint individuals of the indigenous nationality as Party First Secretaries of the Union Republics. As Michael Rywkin writes of the Republics of Central Asia in 1961, 'all Second Secretaries of the Party Central Committees, all Heads of the Departments of Party organs, all Ministers of Communications, and all Heads of the Republican KGB were Russians.

In the cultural, as opposed to administrative, sphere, the final eight years of Khrushchev's rule witness the introduction of a nationality policy far more ambitious in its integrationism than Stalin's, and far more overt in its proclamation that the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union would, in the foreseeable future, lose their national distinctiveness (not to mention the 'state-legal' status of their Republics and other territories).

Beginning in 1957, such theorists as Sverdlin, Rogachev, Koltakhchian, Tsamerian and Semionov began to elaborate doctrinally
heterodox theses in a number of journals which contrasted markedly with
Khrushchev's unequivocal commitment at the Twentieth Congress to the
'flourishing' of the cultures of the USSR, and the promise that the
Party would consistently 'take into account' national peculiarities.
Tsamerian, in the fifth issue of Voprosy istorii for 1957, exemplifies
the new line on the nationality question now pushed by these 'specialists'
in the area:

The merging (sliianie) of nations in the
future, the withering away and the replacement
of (their) national tongues by a common
language - all this will occur as a result
of the flourishing (rastsvet) of the
communist nations.

Crucially, Tsamerian added that 'Russian is increasingly becoming the
common language for all the socialist nations of the USSR'. While
the implication of such theories was objectively Stalinist and Russian
nationalist in their denial of cultural equality to the non-Russian
nationalities, their authors challenged Stalin's concept of the nation,
especially with regard to his criterion of common 'psychological' or
'spiritual' makeup, and attacked him for his postponement of the process
of the 'merging' of the nations to the distant future in his Natsional'nyi
vopros i Leninizm. Essentially, such writers implied that Stalin
saw the nation as an immutable social phenomenon, a view which they held
to be incorrect: nothing in the makeup of 'socialist nations', according
to these theorists, prevented their 'drawing together' and ultimate
'merging' on a timetable less leisurely than that envisaged by Stalin.
Such theories, it should be noted, did not go without challenge: other
specialists such as Burmistrova, Tavakalian, Dzhunusov (at least at first)
and Mnatsakanian countered such claims by alleging the relative immutability
of nations on anything less than a millenial timescale, and relying more
on the received dogma of established Soviet theory in the area, heavily
influenced as it was by Stalin's writings.

In 1958, however, it was obvious that the Party had approved the
theory of simultaneous 'drawing together' and 'flourishing'. From this
year on, numerous items in the media laid particular stress on the more
widespread use of the Russian language being the means to such 'drawing
together', not only by becoming the 'second native language' of all
Soviet citizens, but by 'nourishing' the other languages of the USSR.
As such, its practical advantages were given great stress - the fact that Russian was the sole means of 'inter-nationality discourse' in the Soviet Union, and that it was the only available avenue for an individual to 'scale the heights' of science and technology, as well as have access to 'Russian and world culture' (access to the former, it was always implied, being more desirable than the non-Russian's own culture, not to mention other non-Russian cultures of the Soviet Union). Significantly, it was in the same 1958 that the leadership implemented the All-Union schools reform, which effectively gave further impetus to the learning of Russian at an early age by the non-Russian nationalities by, for the first time, not making the study by non-Russians of their indigenous languages compulsory.

Most importantly, however, the Party made public its espousal of such theories at the Twenty-First (Extraordinary) Congress of the Party in 1959, as part of the programme of 'full-scale communist construction', and sanctified them in the Third Programme of the CPSU, published two years later. The relevant part of the Programme stated:

Full-scale communist construction signifies a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR, characterised by the extensive drawing together of the nations and the achievement of their complete unity.

Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo explained that the 'complete unity' of the nations (which does not imply their assimilation) was but a stepping-stone on the way to their 'merging' (which does). The goal was 'the achievement of the all-round unity of the Soviet nations with the ultimate perspective of their complete merging'. Even though such 'merging' was usually envisaged as taking place after the 'worldwide communist victory', it was also stressed that 'the formation of a single language and culture is a long and complex process which has its basis in conditions today'. Khrushchev, at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961, not only lent the prestige of his public endorsement to such concepts, but implied that the 'drawing together' of the Soviet nations occupied a prominent place on the political agenda:

Communists do not wish to preserve and perpetuate national distinctions. We depend on the natural process of an even closer fusion (слияние) of nations and nationalities.
The final element which made the new policy a radical turn towards assimilationism was the claim (contained in the Programme) that the borders between the Soviet Republics were 'increasingly losing their former significance'.\textsuperscript{158} Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo commented that 'the level of federation, the character of national statehood, the juridical content of national-state borders, have signified a guarantee of national freedom, but now, in essence, they no longer have this significance - already now, it can be said with confidence that ... national statehood and the federation have fully achieved their historical mission'.\textsuperscript{159} The following year, Voprosy filosofii commented that changes were probable 'in relation to the borders and forms of the national-state formations'.\textsuperscript{160}

The process of 'drawing together' through the 'mutual enrichment' of cultures was held to be a process natural to a socialist society, yet the Programme envisaged encouraging the process through both linguistic and demographic methods. Firstly, the Russian language should be even further encouraged as the 'second native language' (and ultimately the 'first native language') of the non-Russian nationalities. In addition, non-Russian cultures, it was constantly stressed, owed much to the 'enrichment' conferred by contact with Russian culture. If further 'mutual enrichment' were to take place (and, as argued above, instances of genuine 'mutuality' in the sense of Russians being urged to take on aspects of non-Russian cultures were rare and then usually tokenistic)\textsuperscript{161} this process should continue.

Soviet theorists did not, however, admit that the linguistic Russification (though this term was never used) of non-Russian groups meant the Russification of their cultures. Numerous such specialists argued that it was quite possible to use (and develop) a non-Russian 'national culture' in the Russian language.\textsuperscript{162} Hence, spokesmen for the 'national republics' came to claim that the national cultures they represented were not based solely on indigenous elements. As Sharaf Rashidov, First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee stated in 1963:

Uzbek Soviet literature and art base themselves in their development not only on the progressive traditions of the national culture, but also on the advanced heritage of all the fraternal peoples, first of all that of the Russian people.\textsuperscript{163}
Similarly, M. Koval, 'Honoured Worker' in the Arts of the RSFSR, stated in 1960 that 'Russian composers have helped and are helping with enormous enthusiasm to form our socialist national cultures'. It is significant that, three years later, citing instances of 'exchange' and 'co-operation' in the development of national cultures, Khrennikov, of the Union of Soviet Composers, listed the development of ballet in Kirghizia, and other forms of traditionally Russian musical culture (or at least European culture in its Russian interpretation) in various areas of Central Asia.

Ultimately, spokesmen for the Party's policies had to concede that while Stalin's policy of the cultures of the Soviet Union being 'socialist in form and national in content' had not been abandoned, 'national form' was no longer to be seen as immutable, and would 'have the tendency of gradually and steadfastly changing to traits of an All-Soviet culture'.

Secondly, the Programme stated that the 'increasing scale of communist construction demands the constant exchange of cadres between nations'. Thus, various demographic processes were initiated or encouraged, in order to 'internationalise' elements of the Soviet population, as well as to speed up the development of non-Russian areas. To this end, on the one hand, nationalities other than those indigenous to national units were encouraged to settle in such areas, thus 'internationalising' them by encouraging the wider diffusion of the 'language of inter-nationality discourse', and, it was hoped, Russian cultural traits more generally. The exemplary case of this phenomenon was the 'Virgin Soil Territory' of Northern Kazakhstan, established in 1960. With regard to such ethnic experimentation, Voprosy filosofii commented approvingly that,

in the course of socialist construction in the Republics which were especially backward before the Revolution, a tendency for the decline of the proportion of the indigenous nationalities reveals itself clearly. At the same time, the proportion of representatives of other peoples in the population of the national republics and regions is steadily increasing. If in 1926 5% of Russians lived outside the RSFSR, in 1959 the figure was already 14.2%.
Despite the fact that such demographic processes were allegedly encouraged in the context of 'mutual enrichment', theorists such as Tadevosian made it clear that these trends implied the movement of Russians (as well as Ukrainians and Belorussians) to non-Russian areas, and not vice-versa.  

Particularly unambiguous was the destiny of 'small ethnic (or "ethnographic") groups'. Specialists such as Kammari held that it was natural that they, together with 'extra-territorial national groups', would naturally undergo 'voluntary merging'. Kammari states in this connection 'especially important is the acquisition by the merging ethnographic and extra-territorial national groups of the language of the large, progressive socialist nation amongst whom these groups live.'\textsuperscript{171}

On the other hand, members of non-Russian nationalities were encouraged to settle - usually for purposes of work - in other areas of the Soviet Union. This process was also held to lead to the learning of the Russian language by non-Russians. As Tadevosian claims in Voprosy istorii in 1963:

\begin{quote}
The growing mobility of the population contributes to the gradual linguistic drawing together of the nations and nationalities by means of both the mutual influence and mutual enrichment of the national languages, and the turning of one of them - Russian - into the common language of all the socialist nations.\textsuperscript{172}
\end{quote}

Hence, the claim in the 1959 census that 10 million non-Russians had adopted Russian as their 'mother tongue' was greeted as 'legitimate... and profoundly objective'.\textsuperscript{173}

The assimilationist goals of the late Khrushchev regime were supported not only by official linguistic and demographic strategies, but by the ideological campaign directed against most manifestations of the cultural distinctiveness of the nationalities of the Soviet Union, a campaign from which the Russian nation was, on the whole, excluded. Although one aspect of this campaign was the anti-religious drive, this was but one aspect of the attack on 'obsolete' traditions and customs. Suslov, in an address in 1960, reveals, albeit elliptically, the official position on such phenomena:
It would be a mistake to conceive of national tradition as found only in the features that distinguish one national culture from another, or only in the things that are connected with a people's past, its history, and with the things that reflect the burdensome life of the people under social and national oppression. It is necessary to have a clearer perception of, and to give support to, the new traditions and general features that are formed in the relations between the Soviet socialist nations in the process of building communism.

In practice, only rarely were Russian traditions or aspects of culture attacked as being 'obsolete', whereas with regard to the non-Russians, virtually anything which could be identified as nationally distinctive could, and often did, come under vigorous attack. Accordingly, the media during these years attack targets as diverse as the clinging to national costumes in Central Asia, the alleged constant rhapsodising over 'manure, smoke, kumiss and sheepskin' in Kirgizia, the restoration of castles in Lithuania, and even those who tended to 'exaggerate' the 'old way of playing songs' in Uzbekistan. Pel'she's complaint concerning Latvians' concern with their heritage exemplifies the regime's intolerance of such reminders of the (non-Russian) past:

Is it necessary on every occasion and on any pretext, to stir up all the ancient traditions and pass them off as features of the national cultural pattern? ... Only people who have become ossified and cut off from life by their office walls can fail to hear the new songs which the Latvian collective-farm women sing, to see the new pictures of industrial labour, or to see the new traits of communist morality and of the new, Soviet way of life of Latvia's working people.

Similarly, 'intellectuals' in all the non-Russian areas were urged to develop new 'All-Soviet', 'socialist' traditions, such as 'selfless labour' and 'collectivism'. Such calls were hardly ever directed at Russian audiences.

As noted above, the anti-religious campaign, which formed part of Khrushchev's would-be 'cultural revolution', did not spare the Russian Orthodox Church in either its ideological or administrative manifestations, although the treatment of the Russian institution is distinguished by
that Church's retention of a number of privileges by contrast with other religions of the Soviet Union. However, the fury of the overall campaign for 'the final and complete eradication of religious privileges', amounted to yet another force working for the elimination of the cultural distinctiveness of the non-Russian nationalities. Particularly with regard to both Islam and Catholicism, the media, using such newly founded atheist organs as Nauka i religija, stressed with novel fury the connection traditionally claimed by Soviet propagandists between 'religious prejudices' and 'bourgeois nationalism'. With regard to the former, the propaganda apparat had no inhibitions about attacking the entire social culture of the Islamic areas in the most inflammatory terms. The media regularly talked of the 'primitive law of the Shariat', 'stagnant prejudices', and 'outmoded feudal-bey customs', the latter often referring to much of the daily way of life of the Soviet Union's Islamic population.

In conclusion, therefore, if Stalin's partial substitution of Russian nationalism for Leninist internationalism in the area of policy towards the Soviet nationalities question can be seen as part of his overall 'communist nationalist' revolution, Khrushchev's policy in the area can be seen as at most a partial and impermanent reform. While some substantial and symbolic changes made the position of the non-Russian nationalities less invidious after March 1953, most of these gains were lost in the quite radically assimilationist nationality policy pursued from 1957 onwards, which, if not Stalinist in the fine points of its theoretical underpinning, certainly coincided with the dictator's disregard for the cultural rights and aspirations of the non-Russian groups of the Soviet Union, and the importance evidently attached by him to gratifying Russian national consciousness.

(iii) Official Doctrine on the Role and Status of the Russian People in Relation to Soviet Communism

It will be recalled from the previous chapter that until the late 1930s, Soviet ideology did not deviate from the position of consistently proclaiming the equality of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and adhering to this position in practice by denying that the Russian people occupied privileged status or had made a unique contribution to the USSR. Indeed,
combating 'great-power chauvinism' was one of the distinctive features of the approach to the nationalities question in the early years of Soviet power. Yet in the late 1930s, Stalin, while adhering rhetorically to the 'equality of Soviet peoples', in practice formulated the doctrine of Russian supremacy within the Soviet Union, a doctrine which contained two elements: firstly, that the Russian people occupied a superior status, symbolised by attributing to it titles such as the 'great' ("velikii") Russian people, or the 'elder brother' ("starshii brat"), as well as various worthy traits and characteristics; secondly, that the Russian people was first and foremost responsible for the alleged achievements of Soviet communism.

As is the case with the two preceding areas of Soviet doctrine analysed, the variations under Malenkov and Khrushchev from the late Stalinist position of significant concessions to Russian nationalism are at best marginal, and there are strong indications of a reversion to a more unequivocally Stalinist position during the final years of Khrushchev's rule.

As claimed by a number of observers, the doctrine of the 'friendship of peoples' (referring to the Soviet as opposed to pre-revolutionary period) became markedly more prominent in the media in the years following Stalin's death. Yet this tendency, reflecting a revival of 'internationalism' in this area, was not matched by the disappearance of the dogma of Russian supremacy. Even during the 'Beriia interlude', non-Russian nationalities continued to express gratitude to the Russian people in unchanged ritualised form, and a word-count carried out by Barghoorn of Pravda editorials during this period actually reveals a dramatic increase in the number of references to 'Russia', 'Russian people' and 'Russian' (at the cost of more 'internationalist' language) by contrast with February 1953. P. Fedoseev, in an article in the issue of Kommunist released nine days before Beria's arrest, while condemning some areas of Stalinist Russian nationalism (such as the position on Tsarist colonialism) emphasised the leading role of the Russian people in both pre-revolutionary and Soviet history. The single change at this time appears to have been a (very) temporary lull in the ascriptive terms 'great' Russian people, and 'elder brother'.
The limited degree of restraint evident during this period was quickly abandoned after the arrest of Beriia. Such a work as Nasha velikaia rodina was published in the latter half of 1953, a work which describes Soviet Russia as the 'mother republic' of the USSR, and talks at length in the Stalinist rhapsodic manner on the qualities and leading role of the Russian people.\(^{185}\)

With the coming of 1954, the return to the doctrine of Russian supremacy is conspicuous in the prominent use of the term 'elder brother'. This is particularly evident in the celebrations to mark the 300th anniversary of the 'reunion' of Russia and the Ukraine,\(^{186}\) the March conference of social scientists of the three Transcaucasian Republics,\(^{187}\) and in the editorials of the press. For example, according to an April 1954 issue of Uchitel'skaia gazeta:

> Ukrainians and Belorussians, Latvians and Estonians, Kazakhs and Uzbeks, Georgians and Armenians, Tatars and Udmurts, Yakuts and Evenks, in fact all the large and small peoples of the USSR study with love the language of their elder brother, the great Russian people, which marches in the vanguard of contemporary mankind.\(^{188}\)

In a similar vein, a year later Voprosy istorii called for a conference which would discuss the role of the Russian people in 'overcoming the economic and cultural backwardness of other peoples of the Soviet Union'.\(^{189}\)

Just as the doctrine of Russian leadership underwent no real changes following Stalin's death, there would appear to be little to support the view that Khrushchev, at the Twentieth Party Congress, 'threw the "elder brother" out the window', or was reluctant to acquiesce in the use of such Stalinist terms as the 'great' Russian people, or 'elder brother' during the period of his rule, as claimed by such observers as James Critchlow and Boris Lewytskij.\(^{190}\) In fact, as Lowell Tillett has observed, the subsequent years saw something of a 'popularisation' of the 'elder brother' concept,\(^{191}\) while in the discussion reports of the Twentieth Congress itself, seven (out of sixteen) First Secretaries of non-Russian Republics and Autonomous Republics expressed their gratitude to the 'great Russian people'. A further First Secretary (the Kirgiz Razzakov), in thanking the Russian people, referred to it as the 'elder brother'.\(^{192}\)
As is the case with other areas which have been analysed, the official evaluation of the role of the Russian people in the USSR reveals a tilting of the balance of 'communist nationalism' further in the direction of unequivocally Stalinist positions during the period from 1959 to the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. While numerous publications in the earlier Khrushchev years continued to cite the doctrine of the 'selfless assistance' of the Russian people to the other nationalities of the USSR, the post-Stalin political leadership refrained from expressing such notions until 1959. At that year's Twenty-First ('Extraordinary') Party Congress, Khrushchev for the first time referred publicly to the role of Russia in contributing to the alleged successes of the other Republics.¹⁹³

A more pronounced use of this element of dogma followed. In the following year, Suslov, in a reference unusual for an ethnic Russian, referred to the assistance of the 'great Russian people' in allegedly achieving gains in the Baltic states.¹⁹⁴ In a similarly unprecedented statement for the Khrushchev period, the newly formulated 'Programme' of the CPSU, published in 1961, referred to the assistance rendered by the 'great Russian people' to the Soviet Union at large.¹⁹⁵

The Twenty-Second Party Congress of 1961 reveals clear quantitative and qualitative increases in the amount of such official adulation directed at the Russian people. Whereas eight First Secretaries had expressed gratitude on behalf of their non-Russian nationalities to the Russian people in 1956, in 1961 fourteen did so (a figure higher than for all subsequent Party Congresses).¹⁹⁶ In addition, while seven had referred in 1956 to the 'great Russian people', nine did so in 1961. Two First Secretaries referred to the 'elder brother' at the later Congress, as opposed to the single case of such a reference in 1956. Strikingly, in contrast to the previous two Congresses, the Ukrainian and three Baltic First Secretaries, who, it would appear, unlike their Transcaucasian and Asian counterparts, were previously and subsequently 'exempt' from such national obsequiousness, all came into line in expressing their gratitude to the 'great Russian people'. The one consistent inhibition of the Khrushchev years in this area, by contrast to under Stalin, appears to be that the 'elder brother' formula is not used by the Party leadership, central Party press, or non-Russian Europeans.¹⁹⁷
The identification of the Russian people with particular virtues, usually by non-Russians, also appears to have returned with vigour in 1959. However, somewhat in contrast to earlier and later periods, the characteristics identified tend to be more closely associated with official ideology, such as 'revolutionary sweep and communist efficiency'.

Conclusion

Despite Khrushchev's overall policy of attempting to reform the system built up under Stalin, the departures between 1953 and 1964 from the official Russian nationalism of the Stalin period are at most marginal and temporary. Essentially, no substantial alterations to the 'communist nationalist' synthesis of Russian nationalism and Marxism-Leninism distinguish the Khrushchev period from the Stalin regime. This is despite brief periods of 'radicalisation' up to 1956, which included the condemnation of such features of Stalinist historiography as 'cults of the personality' in the more distant Russian past and the effective sanctification of Tsarist colonialism, as well as Khrushchev's early 'liberal' policy towards the non-Russian nationalities.

While the official position on the pre-revolutionary Russian cultural heritage did not vary in any significant sense from Stalinist norms during the period, historiographic and nationality policies revert to essentially Stalinist positions following the high point of Khrushchevian 'liberalism' at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. With regard to the latter, the apparent reversion to elements of the spirit of Leninist internationalism following Stalin's death was followed in the final seven years of Khrushchev's rule by the assimilationist policies launched in the late 1950s, as part of the Party's push for 'full-scale communist construction'.

Finally, the official view of the role of the Russian people in the Soviet Union reveals little departure from the pattern under Stalin. The practice of ascribing the alleged advances and successes of the non-Russian Soviet nationalities to the 'selfless assistance' of the Russian people continues to be prominent, while, after a brief interruption in 1953, the expressions 'great Russian people' and 'elder brother' revert to their former ritualistic usage.
Essentially, therefore, the Khrushchev regime reflects the continuity of Stalinist 'communist nationalism'. Such continuity cannot, of course, sit with either the 'deradicalisation' or 'tactical' theories of the official exploitation of nationalism. To be sure, the use of 'communist nationalism' under Khrushchev reveals significant fluctuations between the norm of Stalinist continuity, and aberrant periods where we find the authorities require greater dosages of 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis for public consumption. Such 'aberrations' can be explained by Khrushchev's need at certain periods to establish his credibility as a de-Staliniser, and to curry favour with non-Russian elites. Khrushchev's brief reversions to greater 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis with regard to history and culture were therefore tactical - although this is not what 'tactics' theorists discussing the official uses of nationalism tend to have in mind when they use the term. Such tactical flexibility which the 'communist nationalist' synthesis allowed, together with a general reluctance among Stalin's successors to tamper too drastically with his legacy, especially where there was no clear advantage to be gained, account for the Khrushchev regime's behaviour more satisfactorily than do either of the two theories considered.
Chapter II: Notes


3. For some examples, see the report on the meeting of the History Faculty of Leningrad University to discuss this issue, in Voprosy istorii, no. 2, February 1954, pp. 182-4; V.P. Danilov and L.V. Danilova, 'Reviews: Rewriting Russian History. Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past', Istoriiia SSSR, no. 6, 1959; 'Meeting of Historians with Writers', Voprosy istorii, no. 7, July 1959; B.N. Ponomarev, 'All-Union Conference of Historians', Pravda, 19.12.1962.


5. Ibid.; see also Black, 'The Reforms ...' in Black, op. cit., p. 270.


7. Ibid.


11. 'Review of Short History ...', loc. cit.


13. Ibid., pp. 16, 17.

14. Ibid. See also 'Act of Fraternal Friendship of Peoples', Pravda, 20.5.1962, p. 2; 'War and Peace at the Moscow Film Studio', Moskva, no. 1, 1962, pp. 219-23.
15. See for example 'Memorial to Glory of Russian Arms - Opening of Panorama Museum of Battle of Borodino', Pravda, 19.10.1962.


17. In addition, Barghoorn indicates his impression that there was a more general return to 'internationalist' official language at this time. Op. cit., p. 44.

18. Pravda, 13 June 1953. It can be taken that the 'other oblasts' of the Ukraine refers to eastern, predominantly ethnic Russian ones.


20. See P. Fedoseev, 'Sotsializm i patriotizm', Kommunist, no. 9, 1953.

21. Ibid.

22. S. Iakubovskaia, 'Obrazovanie i rastvetanie sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR', Kommunist, no. 9, 1953.

23. Pravda, 10 July 1953.


25. Nasha velikaia rodina, Moscow, 1953, pp. 410-11. See also the article of A. Kravchenko in Kommunist, no. 11, 1953.


27. See 'Nauchnaia sessiia po voprosam istorii kabardinskogo naroda', Voprosy istorii, no. 10, 1953, pp. 150-3; Trudy ob"edinennoi nauchnoi sessii AN SSSR i AN zakavkazskikh respublik po obshchestvennym naukam, 29 March-2 April, 1954.


29. Izvestiia, 12 January 1954.


32. Ibid., p. 199.


34. Ibid., 18 February 1956.

35. Burdzhalov, loc. cit.
36. A.M. Pikman, 'O bor'be kavkazskikh gortsev s tsarskimi kolonizatorami' Voprosy istorii, no. 3, 1956, pp. 75-84.

37. Burdzhalov, loc. cit.

38. Ibid.


42. See O dvizhenii gortsev pod rukovodstvom Shamilia. Materialy sessii dagestanskogo filiala AN SSSR, Makhachkala, 4-7 October, 1956. The proceedings are summarised in 'Obsuzhdenie voprosa o kharaktere dvizhenii gorskich narodov severnogo kavkaza v 20-50 kh godadh XIX veka', Voprosy istorii, no. 12, 1956, pp. 188-98.


44. Ibid, p. 12.

45. 'Obsuzhdenie...', loc. cit.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.


50. See Tillett, op. cit., pp. 226, 228.

51. Tillett devotes well-documented, detailed analysis to this area. See ibid., pp. 228-49.

52. See 'O prepodavanii istorii v shkole', Pravda, 16 September 1959.
53. See the following issues of Kommunist for 1956: no. 10, pp. 14-26; no. 15, pp. 44-58; no. 16, pp. 122-28; no. 18, pp. 52-67. See also E. Bugaev, 'Kogda utrachivaetsia nauchnyi podkhod', Partiinaia zhizh', no. 14, 1956, pp. 62-72.


57. See p. 38.


61. Tillett documents this exhaustively. See op. cit., pp. 228-49.


63. The 1949 work of Geidar Guseinov, Iz istorii obshchestvennoi i filosofskoi mysli v Azerbaidzhane v XIX veke (Baku, 1949), which was recommended for a Stalin Prize and subsequently condemned, due to the official change of line on Shamil', was republished in 1958. However, the editors dissociated themselves from Guseinov in the Introduction by describing his pro-Shamil' stand as 'obsolete'. This position was repeated in a 1963 review of the work: see A.V. Fadeev, 'O sud'be odnoi knigi', Voprosy istorii, no. 1, 1963, pp. 121-30. See also Tillett, op. cit., pp. 263-4.

64. For a compilation and analysis of the various charges, as printed in Central Asian publications, see '"Nationalism" in the Soviet Moslem Republics', Central Asian Review, VII, 1959, no. 4, pp. 341-3.


68. '40 let ustanovleniia sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii ...' (rech' tov. N.S. Khrushcheva), Pravda, 13 May 1961, p. 3.

69. 'Uspekh sovetskoi Kirgizii - torzhestvo leninskoi natsional'noi politiki' (rech' tov. N.S. Khrushcheva), Pravda, 14 August 1964, p. 3.

70. Ibid.

71. See Bushchik, op. cit. (1963 edition); 'Orientation of the Projected "History of the USSR"', Voprosy istorii, no. 2 (February), 1961; P.M. Rogachev and M.A. Sverdlin, 'The Soviet People is a New Historical Community', Kommunist, no. 9 (June), 1963, pp. 11-20.

72. Rogachev and Sverdlin, loc. cit.

73. S. Toka, 'V sem'e bratskikh narodov', Pravda, 10 October 1959, p. 2.

74. Pravda, 27 October 1961, p. 3.

75. '40 let ustanovleniia sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii ...', loc. cit.

76. Veli Akhundov, First Secretary of Azerbaijani Party organisation, is on record as stating that a 'spiritual affinity was created between Russia and Azerbaijan ... Pushkin's muse in a way sanctified a long-existing kinship between Russia and its outlying parts'. 'Celebration of Brotherhood and Unity', Molodezh' Gruzii, 28 March 1964. See also 'The "Progressive" Nature of XIX-Century Russian Conquests', Radio Liberty Research Notes, no. 2730, 16 April 1964.

77. See 'Bicentenary of the Birth of the Great Austrian Composer W.A. Mozart - Meeting at the USSR Theatre', Pravda, 28 January 1956, p. 1; 'Great Son of the German People - On the Two-Hundredth Anniversary of Handel's Death', (by Dmitrii Shostakovich), Pravda, 14 April 1956, p. 4. For treatment of the other figures mentioned, see Izvestiia, 11 April 1959, p. 4; Izvestiia, 12 April 1959, p. 6; Pravda, 1 June 1959, p. 4; Pravda, 26 June 1959, p. 6; Pravda, 28 August 1959, p. 6; Pravda, 11 November 1959, p. 6; Izvestiia, 25 November 1959, p. 3; Pravda, 9 June 1960, p. 4; Izvestiia, 7 August 1960, p. 4.

78. Leonid Leonov, 'A Discourse on Tolstoi', Pravda, 20 November 1960, pp. 3-4.

79. 'War and Peace at the Moscow Film Studio', Moskva, 1962, no. I, pp. 219-23. For other examples of the official position on Tolstoi, see, for example, Pravda, 4 October 1959, p. 2; Pravda, 11 August 1960, p. 2; Izvestiia, 21 September 1960, p. 4; Izvestiia, 23 September 1960, p. 4; Izvestiia, 22 October 1960.
For Gogol', see *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, 27 March–2 April 1959 (in connection with the 150th anniversary of his birth); for Nekrasov, see *Izvestiia*, 11 March 1959, p. 6; *Izvestiia*, 29 July 1960, p. 6; for Krylov, see *Pravda*, 21 May 1959, p. 3; *Pravda*, 2 March 1960, p. 6; for Pushkin, see *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 2 June 1959, p. 2; *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* throughout June 1959 (in connection with the 160th anniversary of his birth); *Pravda*, 28 February 1960, p. 4; *Pravda*, 21 March 1960, p. 4; *Izvestiia*, 21 June 1960, p. 4; *Izvestiia*, 17 July 1960, p. 8; *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, 2–11 February 1962 (in connection with the 125th anniversary of his death); *Pravda*, 19 August 1962, p. 4; *Izvestiia*, 17 August 1962, p. 4; *Izvestiia*, 17 November 1962, p. 4; *Izvestiia*, 3 April 1963; for Griboedov, see *Pravda*, 28 June 1959, p. 6; for Chekhov, see *Izvestiia*, 7 July 1959, p. 4; *Izvestiia*, 18 November 1959, p. 3; *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* throughout January and February 1960 (in connection with the 100th anniversary of his birth); for Lermontov, see *Pravda*, 26 April 1959, p. 4; *Izvestiia*, 25 September 1959, p. 6; *Izvestiia*, 14 August 1960, p. 3; *Izvestiia*, 29 July 1962, p. 2; *Izvestiia*, 28 July 1964, p. 6; *Izvestiia*, 13 September 1964, p. 6; for Turgenev, see *Izvestiia*, 4 June 1960, p. 6; *Izvestiia*, 21 July 1960, p. 6; for Tiutchev, see *Izvestiia*, 1 July 1961, p. 4.


82. V. Rovogin, 'Arsenal of Revisionism', *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 10 July 1958, p. 2.


88. 'The Path of Soviet Music is the Path of Folk Content and Realism' (editorial), *Pravda*, 8 June 1958, pp. 3–5.
89. 'Create for the People', Pravda, 6 April 1960, p. 3.

90. M. Koval, 'Create Together with the People', Sovetskiaia Rossia, 2 April 1960, p. 3. For other references indicative of the official position on music - that pre-revolutionary Russian classical and popular music continued to be considered the model of excellence - see, for example, Pravda, 12 March 1960, p. 4; Izvestiia, 16 March 1960, p. 4; Izvestiia, 10 June 1960, p. 3; Pravda, 22 May 1961, p. 4 (all on Tchaikovskii); Pravda, 22 January 1959, p. 6 (on Rimskii-Korsakov); Izvestiia, 3 April 1963, p. 4 (on Rakhmaninov); Izvestiia, 21 March 1964, p. 4 (on Mussorgskii); Pravda, 13 February 1959, p. 6; Pravda, 3 July 1959, p. 3; Izvestiia, 20 March 1963, p. 4 (all on popular Russian music).

91. See (on Rublev) Izvestiia, 22 January 1960, p. 6, Pravda, 14 and 16 September 1960, and Izvestiia, 15 and 16 September 1960; (on Repin) Pravda, 13 April 1959, p. 4, Izvestiia, 3 December 1959, p. 4; (on the preservation of pre-revolutionary Russian art and architecture) Izvestiia, 28 April 1959, p. 4, Pravda, 28 May 1959, p. 4, Izvestiia, 7 June 1959, p. 4, Izvestiia, 15 July 1959, p. 6, Pravda, 13 August 1959, p. 4, Izvestiia, 7 August 1959, p. 6, Izvestiia, 10 June 1960, p. 6, Izvestiia, 22 September 1962, p. 3, Pravda, 18 May 1964, p. 6; (on the preservation of Russia's traditional crafts) Pravda, 8 August 1960, p. 4, Izvestiia, 10 November 1960, p. 4.


93. 'Soviet Historical Science at a New Stage of Development' (editorial), Voprosy istorii, 1960, no. 8 (August), pp. 3-18.

94. See 'Something to Remember and be Proud of', Izvestiia, 6 April 1962. The Georgian organisation was formed in 1959. See Pravda, 13 August 1959, p. 4.

95. See 'Not Appropriations, but Attention', Izvestiia, 11 August 1962, p. 3.

96. Paustovskii, loc. cit.


98. See Izvestiia, 16 November 1960.


100. See Izvestiia, 30 October 1960.


103. See the speech of L. Il'ichev before the ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee, reported in Kommunist, 1964, no. 1 (January), p. 29. On the position of the Russian Orthodox Church in the early post-Stalin years, see Gerhard Simon, Church, State and Opposition in the USSR, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1974, pp. 70-71.

104. For detailed accounts of the administrative dimension to Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign, see ibid., pp. 71-88; Trevor Beeson, Discretion and Valour: Religious Conditions in Russia and Eastern Europe, Glasgow: Fontana, 1975, Chapter 3, passim; Nikolai Goffman, 'Massovoe zakrytie monastyrei v SSSR posle XXI s"ezda KPSS', Radio Svoboda: Materialy Issledovatel'skogo otdela, 1 April 1976.


106. A. Osipov, 'A Rejection of Religion is the Only True Path', (letter to the editor), Pravda, 6 December 1959, p. 4.


108. 'N.A. Bulganin Receives Patriarch Aleksei of Moscow and All the Russians', Pravda and Izvestiia, 27 March 1956, p. 1; 'To His Holiness Aleksei, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia', Pravda and Izvestiia, 9 November 1956, p. 8.

109. 'Decree Awarding the Order of the Red Banner of Labour to Aleksei, Patriarch of Moscow and All the Russians', Izvestiia, 11 November 1962, p. 1; 'Patriarch Aleksei Departs', Izvestiia 17 September 1964, p. 4.


111. 'For the Creative Treatment of the Problem of Scientific Atheism' (editorial), Voprosy filosofii, 1960, no. 3 (March), pp. 3-7.


114. 'A Book is a Tremendous Force - Miracle of Miracles', Pravda, 13 March 1964, p. 3.


117. For the earlier articles of Agaev, which Soloukhin was attacking, see A. Agaev, 'V sem' e vol'noi novoi', Izvestiia, 5 December 1961; A. Agaev and V. Tel'pugov, 'Kladovaia solntsa', Literatura i zhizn', 15 December 1961; A. Agaev, 'O natsional'nom egoizme i natsional'nykh chustvakh', Literatura i zhizn', 17 November 1961.

118. See V. Soloukhin, 'Chto nas rodnit', Literaturnaia gazeta, 6 February 1962.

119. See Armenian Kommunist, 28 March 1962. For other articles critical of Agaev and the theories he represented, see Nafi Dzhusoiti, in Voprosy literatury, 1962, no. 6. He writes that such theories are 'permeated with a spirit of nihilism ... towards the languages of the small peoples (of the Soviet Union)', and that 'there is one incontestable truth: national literature is formed in the national language'. Similarly, the Daghestani poet Rasul Gamzatov wrote pointedly in the Literaturnaia Rossiia of 1 January 1963, 'Let all the stars shine on us brightly, there is no need to make out of them one moon!'.

120. See A. Agaev, 'Magistral' istorii i proselki Vladimira Soloukhina', Literatura i zhizn', 2 March 1962. For Pravda's support of Agaev's position, see the issue of 20 November 1961.


122. M. Koval, 'Create Together with the People', Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2 April 1960, p. 3.


126. Ibid., pp. 56-7.

128. Ibid., esp. p. 52.


131. See 'Khrushchev's Secret Speech', in Current Soviet Policies, New York, 1956, vol. II, p. 182. It is of interest that despite Khrushchev's specific condemnation of Stalin's nationality policies, particularly those practiced during the war, some of the affected nationalities (such as the Estonians) were later permitted to describe their experiences in print, while others (such as the nationalities of the North Caucasus) were not. Compare in this connection 'De-Stalinization Extended to National Questions', Research Notes on Soviet Affairs, no. 1758 (8 January 1963) (which deals with the situation in Estonia), with B. Baitugan, 'O severokavkazskoi literature', Research Notes on Soviet Affairs, no. 1553 (17 July 1963). See also R. Conquest, The Nation Killers, London: Sphere, 1972, esp. chapters 7-14.


133. Ibid. See also 'Documents of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee: New Documents of V.I. Lenin', Pravda, 22 April 1956, p. 1.

134. See Uchitel'skaia gazeta and Russkii iazyk v shkole throughout the spring of 1954. See also Barghoorn, op cit., pp. 101-3.

135. See Komsomol'skaia pravda, 12 August 1955. The Resolution was passed by the Kazakh State Terminology Commission.

136. Turkmenskaia iskra, 5 October 1954; Zaria vostoka, 5 February 1954.

137. Turkmenskaia iskra, 8 October 1954. See also 'Soviet Language Policy: The "Russianisation" of the USSR' (unpublished paper), by Radio Free Europe Evaluation and Analysis Department, Munich, 2 January 1961.


139. 'Triumph of Leninist National Policy', loc. cit.

140. Mukhitdinov's speech to the Twenty-First Party Congress, loc. cit.


143. Ibid.

144. Forwood, loc. cit.

145. See Edward Allworth, 'Ambiguities in Russian Group Identity and Leadership of the USSR', in Allworth, ed., op. cit., pp. 24-5; Michael Rywkin, 'The Russia-Wide Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR): Privileged or Underprivileged?', in ibid., p. 180; 'Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 28 May 1958 ...', loc. cit., p. 6. Rywkin's comments (in the above cited chapter, p. 179) on the overall symbolic position of the RSFSR vis-a-vis the other Republics of the Soviet Union are of interest in this context: 'Russians in the USSR lack some of the essential symbols of official Soviet recognition. They have no separate RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee (sic), no Russian (as opposed to USSR) Academy of Sciences, no separate capital (Moscow is the capital of both the USSR and the RSFSR). Certain union republican ministries usually found in the individual union republics, wherever the latters' industrial activity warrants their presence, are also absent ... Their functions at both RSFSR and Union-wide levels are directly assumed by the corresponding USSR ministries. Similarly, television and radio broadcasting in the RSFSR is directly managed by the State Committee for TV and Radio of the USSR Council of Ministers.'


151. For some examples during this period, see N. Dzhandil'din, loc. cit.; Mukhitdinov's speech on the 'draft' Third Programme of the CPSU, Pravda, 25 October 1961, pp. 6-7; 'Mysli o znachenii russkogo iazyka dlia latyshskoi kul'tury', Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvi, 1961, no. 10; 'Eloquence and Orthography', Izvestiia, 24 March 1962; I. Kebin, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia, in Druzhba narodov, 1962, no. 1, and the reports of the 'Second Inter-Republican Scientific Conference on the Improvement of the Teaching of Russian in National Schools', published in Pravda Vostoka, 29 May-2 June 1962. See also M. Mondich, 'Obzor vystuplenii uchastnikov konferentsii po uluchsheniitsu prepodavaniia russkogo iazyka v natsional'noi shkole', Radio Liberty Research Notes, nos. 1289 and 1292 (13 and 18 June 1962). It is also of interest in this connection to note the severity with which Izvestiia attacked one V. Lobin, who had questioned the dogma of Russian being a pre-requisite for a non-Russian in gaining access to the culture of the wider world. See Izvestiia, 28 December 1962.

152. On the 1958 changes to the school system, see 'Soviet Language Policy ...', loc. cit.; Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-59 and Soviet Nationality Policy', Soviet Studies, 1962, October, pp. 138-57; A. Avtorkhanov, 'Kommunisticheskii programa denatsionalizatsii natsional'noi SSR', unpublished paper delivered to the 16th Conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1964, esp. p. 44. See also G. Dongarov's article in Partiinaia zhizn', 1962, no. 23 ('Edinoi sem'ei - k pobede kommunizma') in which local authorities are taken to task for allegedly not allowing certain non-Russian parents the opportunity to have their children educated in Russian, and hence objectively perpetuating 'artificially maintained nationality distinctions' and impeding the 'natural law' of the 'spread of the Russian language'.


154. See P.G. Semenov's article, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1961, no. 12, p. 23.

155. See, for example, Dzhandil'din, loc. cit., and Kommunist on the new Party Programme, in the 3rd issue of 1961 (February).

156. Kommunist, 1959, no. 13, stated: 'The merging of the nations and national cultures must not be conceived of as a process which can only begin after the victory of Communism in all countries of the world. The formation in the future of a single language common to all mankind, and the merging of national cultures into a universal culture is a long and complex process which, in our view, has its basis in the conditions of today'. (See p. 9) Somewhat later during the Khrushchev era, however, there is some evidence that the Party may have wished to appear less alarmingly assimilationist in the short term. Kommunist, 1963, no. 11, wrote in connection with a recently held All-Union
Conference on nationality questions, 'in recent years there have appeared articles and pamphlets in the publications of certain Union and Autonomous Republics in which the problems of the drawing together and the total merging of nations are confused: the merging of nations is incorrectly stated as a practical problem for the near future. In the process of the drawing together of socialist nations, there are undoubtedly certain elements of the merging of nations. However, this does not mean that in contemporary conditions the problem of the merging of socialist nations has yet reached full maturity'.


158. See Programma ..., op. cit.

159. Semenov, loc. cit., p. 23.

160. See Voprosy filosofii, 1962, no. 11, p. 47.

161. See pp. 105-6.

162. See, for example, Voprosy filosofii, 1961, no. 9, and the articles of A. Agaev, cited in Footnote 117.


164. M. Koval, 'Create Together with the People', Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2 April 1960, p. 3.

165. See Khrennikov's report to the Congress of Soviet Composers, Izvestiia, 27 March 1962.

166. The seminal article revising this element of dogma was N. Gadzhiev, Secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee, 'The National Education of the working People', Partiinaia zhizn', 1960, no. 8.


169. Similarly Voprosy istorii KPSS stated in 1964: 'In essence the national republics are already multinational republics. In 10 of the 15 Union Republics, representatives of non-indigenous nationalities constitute more than a quarter of the whole population. In this connection the percentage of the indigenous nationality in the entire population of the republics is growing smaller ... At the same time in the make-up of the population of the national republics the proportion is growing ... of above all representatives of the Russian people'. See 1964, no. 4, p. 57. See also P. Rogachev and M. Sverdlin, 'Sovetskii narod - novaia istoricheskaia obshchnost' liudei', Kommunist, 1963, no. 9 (June), passim, E.V. Tadevasian, 'Dal'neishee sblizhenie sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR', Voprosy filosofii, 1963, no. 6 (June), passim, and Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'The Rulers and the Ruled', Problems of Communism, 1967, September-October, p. 18.

170. See Tadevasian, 'Dal'neishee sblizhenie ...', loc.cit.

171. See Voprosy filosofii, 1961, no. 9, p. 40. In some instances, Soviet theorists claimed that the process of the 'merging' of small ethnic groups involved two stages: firstly, intra-group 'consolidation' in the form of 'Uzbekisation' or 'Georgianisation', and secondly, inter-group assimilation in the form of Russian cultural 'internationalisation'. See P.G. Pod'ialychik, Naselenie SSSR, Moscow, 1961, pp. 112-3, and Avtorkhanov, loc. cit., p. 40.

172. Loc. cit. See also Pravda's call on 2 November 1961 for a greater exchange of cadres between the Soviet nationalities.

173. See I. Kravtsev, Radianska Ukraina, 13 April 1960. On the same question, see Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie, 1960, no. 4 (April). See also CIA, 'Ob"iasnenie usileniu russkogo vliiania v nerusskikh respublikakh', Radio Free Europe Research Note, no. 1586 (7 August 1963), and M. Mondich, 'Konferentsiia po voprosam sotsialisticheskogo internatsionalizma v Talline', ibid, no. 1739, (21 April 1964). It should also be noted in this context that in addition to the Party's policy of encouraging assimilation, theorists claimed for the first time the existence of a 'multinational community of the whole people' or 'multinational Soviet people'. (The term 'Soviet people' was in use from the late 1930s on, but specific theoretical significance was not attributed to it up to this point). This 'community' (obshchnost') was held to have come into existence in the course of 'socialist construction', and was united by a common territory, common economic life, and common psychological traits, 'showing themselves in the common content of socialist culture'. The concept of a 'community' was held to be 'higher and wider' than either 'people' or 'nation'.

174. 'Unity, Cordiality, and Creative Inspiration', Pravda, 18 July 1960, pp. 1-2. The attacks on the cultural distinctiveness of the non-Russian nationalities were accompanied by a number of purges, particularly following the 'schools reform' of 1958. Most conspicuous were the attacks on 'bourgeois nationalism' in Azerbaijan and Latvia. For the removal of the First Secretary
of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, I.D. Mustafaev, because 'confusion had been introduced into the wholly clear question of language', see Bakinskii rabochii, 11 July 1959. For the attempts by the Latvian Party to place restrictions on the appointments of non-Latvian individuals, see V. Hazners, 'Nationalism and Local Tendencies in Occupied Latvia', Baltic Review, 1960, no. 19 (March), pp. 43-7. See also Simon, 'Nationalismus and Nationalitätspolitik ...', loc. cit., p. 58.

175. See P. Rogachev and M. Sverdlin, 'The Soviet People is a New Historical Community', Kommunist, 1963, no. 9 (June), pp. 11-20; N. Konovarov and Iu. Ponomarenko, 'Is this the Time to Restore Castles?', Izvestiia, 20 December 1960, p. 4; Sh. Rashidov, First Secretary of Uzbek Communist Party, 'Our Strength and Good Fortune are in Friendship', Pravda, 23 May 1963, pp. 2-3; A. Kazakbaev, Secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, 'Traditions or Survivals?' Izvestiia, 9 June 1960, p. 3; A. Karliev, USSR People's Artist, 'Let us Attack Lack of Taste: Clothing that Weighs a Pood', Izvestiia, 19 November 1960, p. 4; 'When the field of Vision is Narrow', Izvestiia, 15 February 1962; L.F. Il'ichev, Secretary of CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, 'Young Writers and Artists Should Serve Great Ideas', Sovetskaia kul'tura, 10 January 1963, pp. 1-3.


177. See Dzhandil'din, loc. cit.; A. Pliushch, 'Let Us Continue the Discussion of Traditions', Izvestiia, 29 March 1959, p. 4; N. Churakov, 'The Birth of Fine Traditions', Izvestiia, 8 July 1959, p. 3.


179. It was announced that the new journal would come into existence to assist in the struggle against religion in June 1959. See 'Nauka i religiia - New Magazine', Pravda, 12 June 1959, p. 6.

180. For a typical example, see A. Padalka, Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the L'vov Province Party Committee, 'Vigorously Conduct Anti-Religious Propaganda', Agitator, 1958, no. 16 (August), pp. 48-51.

181. For some examples, see M. Kleshchinov, 'Fanatics', Izvestiia, 19 October 1958, p. 6; T. Pulatov, Tadzhik Republic Minister of Education, 'Take Local Conditions into Account', Izvestiia, 21 November 1958, p. 4; P. Sorokko, 'Letters with Commentary: Don't Contemplate, Act!', Izvestiia, 11 September 1959, p. 2; R. Eldarova, 'Follow-up on Izvestiia Report: Don't Contemplate, Act!', Izvestiia, 27 October 1959; T. Rustanova, Instructor of The Tadzhik Communist Party Central Committee, 'One Step Behind Her Husband', Izvestiia, 24 November 1959, p. 2; Berdy Kerdabaev, Writer, 'World of Intelligent Men: First Generation', Izvestiia, 1 April 1960, p. 3; M. Brainin, Senior Scientific Staff Member
of the Criminal Law Institute of the USSR, "Struggle Against Survivals of the Feudal-Bey Attitude to Women", Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost' 1960, no. 4 (April), pp. 33-5.

182. See, for example, Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 45; Shteppa, 'The "Lesser Evil" Formula', loc. cit., p. 120.


184. Fedoseev, loc. cit.

185. Nasha velikaia rodina, op. cit.


188. Uchitel'skaia gazeta, 7 April 1954.

189. Voprosy istorii, no. 6 (June) 1955, pp. 168-72.

190. Critchlow, loc. cit.; Lewytskij, loc. cit.

191. Tillett, op. cit., p. 252; see, for example, one of the papers presented to Orientalists in Tashkent in 1957: 'Rol' velikogo russkogo naroda v istoricheskoj sud'be narodov srednei Azii', Materialy pervoi Vsesoiuznoi nauchnoi konferentsii vostokovedov v gorode Tashkente 4-11 iiunia 1957 g., Tashkent, 1958.


193. Pravda, 28 January 1959. Khrushchev referred to assistance to the non-Russian nationalities from the 'Russian Federation'.


195. See Programma ..., op. cit.


197. Ibid.

Chapter III

1964-1982: Populist Neo-Stalinist Continuity Under Brezhnev

As was noted in the introduction to the previous Chapter, if the emergence of 'communist nationalism' during the Stalin period lends some support to the 'deradicalisation' thesis and somewhat less to the 'tactical' model, the cases of the subsequent Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods give markedly less credence to the two theories. In broad terms, both regimes represent the continuity of Stalinist 'communist nationalism' which allowed them the option of either loyalty to Stalin's pattern of Russian chauvinism, or of reverting to elements of Leninist internationalism in the areas of policy affecting the non-Russian nationalities. Such continuity, of course, cannot sit with either the 'deradicalisation' or 'tactical' theories of the official exploitation of nationalism, in the latter case, at least, not in the way in which it has been conceived by most of its proponents.

Unlike the case of the Khrushchev regime, however, the Brezhnev administration, as far as it is relevant to the concerns of this study, also lends support to the view that Marxist-Leninist regimes at times 'tactically' exploit the nationalism of their dominant ethnic group. As was argued for the analogous case of official tolerance of a similarly unadulterated form of Russian nationalism during the War, the peril that war presented to the Soviet system brought with it particularly marked concessions to the national pride of the Russians. The early years of the Brezhnev regime reveal that tactical concessions may also take place in a situation less drastic than military confrontation with the outside world. Such was the case after October 1964 when the new leadership attempted to consolidate support (or at least minimise hostility) from key sectors of Soviet society. This included the attempt to curry favour with that element of the population which might be described as Russian nationalist in its concerns and attitudes.
Just as there is a widespread view that the Khrushchev regime in a serious sense abandoned the official use of Stalinist Russian nationalism in favour of a return to Leninist internationalism, the view is frequently encountered that the Soviet Union during these years proves the case for 'deradicalisation': that the Brezhnev regime presided over the movement towards an officially sanctioned less ideologically adulterated form of Russian nationalism as a means of legitimating Soviet rule in the eyes of the USSR's most important political 'constituency'. This Chapter attempts to demonstrate that it is true, in fact, that during these years, in contrast to the Khrushchev period, virtually no attempts were made to depart from the patterns established under Stalin (though there is some continuity with Khrushchevian policies of symbolic de-Stalinisation in certain areas during the regime's early years). Indeed, while the authorities continued undeviatingly to expect the doctrinal dualism of 'communist nationalism' - those writing in official publications being regularly reminded that they were not, in discussing any aspect of Russia's history, culture or people, to forget the Soviet Union or Marxist-Leninist ideology - policies, opinions and analysis likely to appeal to those concerned with the Russian national heritage (a group which, whatever the reality of the situation, saw Khrushchev and his policies as its enemy) emerged in additional areas of intellectual analysis and social activity under Brezhnev. In this sense, 'populist' neo-Stalinist continuity is a characteristic of Brezhnev's eighteen-year tenure as Party leader, in which a reaction to the (more perceived than real) 'national nihilism' against Russia of the late Khrushchev period resulted in the new regime permitting, albeit guardedly, an organised interest in Russia's pre-revolutionary historical and cultural monuments and non-Marxist moral and intellectual heritage, as well as a continuation of the essentially Stalinist (and Khrushchevian) 'communist nationalist' position on the history of the pre-revolutionary Russian state, the Russian language, and the nation's pre-revolutionary literature, music and art. The regime also attempted to distance itself from the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church carried out under Khrushchev, and practised a wide indulgence of the propagation of implicit anti-Semitism. Moreover, as during the Khrushchev period, after an initial period of 'liberal', somewhat more 'internationalist' policies towards the non-Russian nationalities (no doubt intended to secure the allegiance of the non-Russian
élites to the regime as well as the Russian populace), essentially Russian chauvinist assimilationist nationality policies analogous to those which held sway under Stalin and during the late Khrushchev years reappear. Similarly following a brief lull at the beginning of the era, there is a reversion to a pattern characteristic of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras - the ritualistic praise of the implicitly superior and allegedly heroic characteristics of the Russian people, held to be exemplified first and foremost by its paramount contribution to the building and defence of Soviet communism.

None of this, of course, represented a further 'deradicalisation' vis-à-vis Stalin's use of Russian nationalism. All of the above aspects of the official exploitation of Russian national sentiment owed their origin to the Stalin period, the authorities requiring, moreover, the correct balance between 'nationalism' on the one hand, and 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis and evaluation on the other. The partial exception to this picture is the regime's indulgence of elements of more 'public' and spontaneous (and therefore less adulterated) Russian nationalism, particularly during the first years of its existence. This was particularly so in relation to the organised interest permitted in the nation's pre-revolutionary 'historical and cultural monuments', and non-Marxist moral and intellectual heritage. This indulgence, however, did not constitute further 'deradicalisation', but a tactical policy shift, no doubt part of a wider desire to consolidate support for the new regime from as many 'interest groups' as possible.

While these circles - notably the derevenshchiki and those associated with such publications as Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik - succeeded in publishing writings which reveal a less adulterated form of Russian nationalism than that expected by those in authority, after a few years of relative impunity, they came to be engaged in a constant polemic with the authorities about the ideological slant of their works. Despite the fact that these groups appeared to be constantly lobbying for a greater official accommodation with Russian nationalism - or 'deradicalisation' - and could at times be defiant of highly placed criticism to an extraordinary degree (almost certainly playing a role in the removal in 1973 of A.N. Iakovlev, First Deputy Head of the CPSU Central
Committee Propaganda Department and the purging of Novyi mir in 1969),
the leadership during the Brezhnev period refused to buckle to any
significant degree to this pressure, and retained Stalinist 'communist
nationalism' as the required model for expressions of Russian nationalism.
The Brezhnev era for the purposes of this study can therefore be interpreted
as a period when the Soviet state attempted to make as much accommodation
as possible, within the necessary limitations of an avowedly Marxist-
Leninist system, with the powerful and restless nationalism characteristic
of a significant proportion of the Russian populace. Essentially the
regime did so by permitting a greater amplification to areas of analysis
and social activity of elements of Russian nationalism which had their
origin under Stalin. The Brezhnev regime in this area of its behaviour -
as in so many others - therefore represents caution and continuity (with
the exception of the abandonment of most of Khrushchev's innovations),
and the attempt to achieve maximum consensus with minimum change to the
system built up by Stalin.

How is this continuity in this area of the regime's behaviour to
be explained, given the lack of explanatory value of the 'deradicalisation'
and 'tactics' theories? As suggested in the previous Chapter, Stalin's
successors no doubt associated the retention of elements of Russian
nationalism with the continued security of the Soviet state - Stalin's
innovation in this area having shored up and possibly saved the regime
during the War - and, moreover, since Stalin's time, change has tended
to be looked on suspiciously by at least a significant proportion of the
Soviet élite. This was even more the case after the removal of Khrushchev
and his energetic, if erratic, infliction of change on Soviet society. As
Barghoorn has observed, Marxist-Leninist states such as the Soviet Union
have tended to alter their behaviour (ideological or otherwise) only as
a consequence of strong pressures or enticing opportunities. But more
than this, Stalin's 'communist nationalist' hybrid suggested its own
retention. It was sufficiently flexible that the system could, depending
on the political situation and the constituency addressed, stress either
internationalist loyalty to class and national equality (which the regime
did to a greater extent than was the norm from 1964 to 1967, and,
unexpectedly, from 1980 to 1982), or its particular concern for the
Staatvolk, the Russians (as was the rule during the regime). Without
'communist rhetoric', the legitimacy of the Soviet élite ruling in the name of Marxism-Leninism would be seriously eroded, while the removal of doctrines of internationalism that this would entail would remove the theoretical underpinning of the Soviet Union as a multinational entity. The complete abandonment of Russian nationalism for consistent 'internationalism', the ideology of the first decade of Soviet rule, on the other hand, would reduce the extent to which the Russians identified with the Soviet Union (an identification on which, the War demonstrated, the security of the regime in large part depended), thus potentially reducing the chances of the survival of the USSR and therefore the regime in the event of a confrontation with its enemies.

The relationship between the Brezhnev period and 'communist nationalism' can thus be understood as the maintenance of Stalin's hybrid in relatively unchanged form, combined with tactical reversion to greater 'internationalism' when judged necessary, together with tactical indulgence of elements of more spontaneous and therefore less adulterated Russian nationalism, particularly during the first years of the regime's existence.

The argument of this Chapter is organised, as the previous two have been, into an analysis of developments with regard to pre-revolutionary Russian history, culture, and the official view of the role and status of the Russian people.

(i) 'Communist Nationalism' and Russian History

(a) The Pre-Revolutionary Russian State

Analysis of Soviet media treatment of this subject during the Brezhnev era reveals the broad stability of Stalinist Russian nationalist positions, prevailing over attempts to reassert alternative historiographic doctrines of both the 'left' - or historical interpretations more closely resembling the stance of Bolshevik historians such as Pokrovskii - and the 'right' - or the Russian nationalist approach to historical issues paying less lip service to Marxist internationalism than had been the norm under Stalin and Khrushchev. The adoption by certain writers and publications of such deviationist positions, are answered by authoritative
Party calls for a return to greater ideological orthodoxy in analysis and propaganda, most notably in 1965-6, 1972-3 and 1981-2.

The initial overall impression created by the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgornyí regime after October 1964 was that it intended conspicuously to associate itself with Russian nationalism. Certainly the official encouragement of an interest in Russia's historical and cultural heritage, symbolised in the formation of the 'All-Union Society for the Preservation of Monuments of History and Culture' (discussed in the next section) lends weight to this view. However, equally significantly, the regime in its first two years also attempted to dissociate itself from evidently perceived excesses of those reacting against the 'national nihilism' of the Khrushchev years, as well, paradoxically, as from Khrushchev's nationality policies, seen by non-Russian groups as being essentially Russian nationalist and chauvinist. As will be seen from Section (iii) of this chapter, the first Party Congress of the new regime (the Twenty-Third) was far less 'Russian nationalist', in terms of the formulae carried in delegates' speeches, than its predecessor, Khrushchev's Twenty-Second Congress.

In addition, authoritative articles, for the first time in some years, called on historians for a return to a degree of 'communist nationalist' orthodoxy in the analysis of the Russian past, reminding them that positive appraisals of the pre-revolutionary Russian past should be balanced by appropriate obeisances to Soviet power and the ideology of Marxist-Leninist class analysis. Thus, in October 1965, Izvestiia, quoting the conclusion of an All-Union Conference on History claimed that 'a departure from class positions is still taking place, reflected in an incorrect appraisal of the activity of various Tsars, princes, emirs and khans'. Calling for 'socialist' and not 'abstract' patriotism, together with a 'class approach' to events of the past, the authors warned that 'love for the ancient past is radically distinct from its idealisation, which was typical of the reactionary Slavophiles and their successors'. Specifically, the article reiterated the Khrushchevian condemnation of 'cults of the personality' from the Russian past:
mistakes have occurred ... in our monumental propaganda, in which the accent was not on the glorification of revolutionary traditions and on the mass exploits of the people, but on the exaggeration of individual figures of the past.

The preferred official historiographic emphasis was spelt out: the authors state that 'we especially despise our enslaved past', and that Soviet citizens are guided 'above all by the necessity of glorifying the revolutionary past of their fatherland'.

Another major article arguing along the same lines appeared three months later in Izvestiia, in January 1966, under the name of M. Beliavskii. However Beliavskii went somewhat further in attacking the implicit and explicit tolerance allegedly shown to the 'reactionaries' of the Russian past. Criticised were the adoption by Moscow University's newly founded 'Russian Club' of Karamzin as an ally, the passing over in silence of Tsarist brutality associated with newly restored and publicised historical and cultural monuments, and even certain editorial policies of Soviet television. Citing as the explanation major mistakes in 'ideological work', Beliavskii asks:

How else can one explain that Central Television shows the tombs of Muscovite princes and Tsars to the accompaniment of a mighty choir singing to their eternal memory and glory?

It should not be concluded, however, that the above articles called for radical departures in Soviet historiography, or a full rehabilitation of the Pokrovskian or consistently Marxist 'internationalist' approach to historiography. The approval of the restoration of monuments associated with the Campaign of 1812 which is indicated in one of the articles (as well as elsewhere during the period), combined with the absence of unambiguous attacks on the various themes and dogmas of Stalinist historiography, clearly imply less radical goals. Essentially, in addition to reaffirming the validity of Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin's 'cults of the personality' from the Russian past, the articles attack those who strayed from the Stalinist policy of the selective rehabilitation of figures and events of the pre-revolutionary past for the purpose of enhancing loyalty to the Soviet regime into a general and undifferentiated positive evaluation of the history of the Russian state.
This line appears to have held sway until late 1967. Up to this time under the new regime, the familiar themes in the history of the Russian state granted positive attention after 1934 - mainly associated with the names of Russian autocrats responsible for advancing the cause of the state - appear to have been somewhat downplayed by Soviet historians. From 1967, however, quite the reverse held true. Particularly in the period to 1972, years which marked a halt to de-Stalinisation in Soviet historiography generally (perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the 'Nekrich affair'), a dramatic increase in the extent of glorification of 'the princes both great and independent ... of the Russian state' (as put by Izvestiia) again occurred. Not only did the celebrated autocrats of Russian history return to prominence in the Soviet media, but invariably the significance or 'moral' of their rule was spelt out, as under Stalin. Thus, Prince Igor was mentioned in the context of the 'need for unity in the face of terrible external danger', Peter the Great is associated with the 'grandeur of Russia', while Oleg's role in the positively viewed unification of Novgorodian and Kievan Rus' was stressed. The epic exploits of such figures as Pozharskii and Minin (the 'liberators' of Moscow from Polish occupation in 1612), as well as Alexander Nevskii, were given great prominence, while Komsomol'skaia pravda even described, complete with illustrations, a full re-enactment of the latter's entrance into Novgorod on the anniversary of the 1270 event. The condemnation by Literaturnaia gazeta of a historical work by the historian Chukhontsev, in which the author was accused of 'idealising' Kurbskii, the celebrated opponent of Ivan the Terrible, and the newspaper's evaluation of Kurbskii's actions against the monarch as a 'struggle against Russia', indicated a return to a positive evaluation of Ivan the Terrible, the figure of pre-revolutionary Russian history to whom favourable attention was devoted most of all under Stalin. 'Varangian' arguments concerning the origins of the Russian state, which questioned Russian self-reliance in evolving its own social and political structures, were again attacked. Moreover, the institutional arms of the pre-revolutionary state, such as the Tsarist armed forces, were again praised in official publications.

The period from 1969 to 1972 reveals, by Soviet standards, a remarkably visible ideological debate in various publications between the supporters and opponents of retaining and invigorating the Russian
nationalist element in Soviet ideology and propaganda. The debate centred mainly on the derevenskaia proza school of writing, and the journal Molodaia gvardiia, and will be examined at length in the next section of this chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that ultimately, representatives of both factions in the struggle were subjected to a public purge, although those forces which consistently attacked the propagation of Russian nationalism in the Soviet media from a 'left' or 'internationalist' standpoint (of which the main champion was Novyi mir) emerged somewhat 'more' defeated than those who had forgotten that Russian 'nationalism' had to be combined with 'communism'.

A second major onslaught on Molodaia gvardiia, launched in November 1972, involved a trenchant attack on certain historiographic theories which had been developed by a number of figures associated with the journal. A.N. Iakovlev, the authoritative First Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee, was the author of this second attack, published on the pages of Literaturnaia gazeta. As Peter Reddaway has pointed out, Iakovlev expressed disquiet, albeit in a somewhat defensive tone, at the prominence of Russian nationalism in Soviet intellectual life, finding the phenomenon in belles lettres, poetry and literary analysis, as well as historiography ('even in the Soviet encyclopedia'). In addition to vigorously attacking a 'non-historical', 'non-class' approach to questions of history, ethics, and literature, Iakovlev took the unprecedented step of questioning the post-1934 interpretation of the Campaign of 1812. Using arguments which bore the distinct stamp of 'Pokrovskiism', Iakovlev attacked M. Lobanov, who had analysed Tolstoy's War and Peace in an article in Molodaia gvardiia three years previously, in which he presented, generally speaking, the established Stalinist evaluation of the Campaign of 1812. Iakovlev claimed:

M. Lobanov treats the Patriotic War of 1812 as a period of class peace, of a certain national harmony. M. Lobanov is hostile to the ideas of the Great French Bourgeois Revolution: in his opinion, deliverance from these ideas as 'borrowed, artificial, and forcibly instilled', and a return to the 'integrity of Russian life' ensured the 'moral invincibility of the Russian troops at Borodino'.
How far such ideas are from the truth is indicated by the fact that it is to the influence of this Revolution and of the Enlightenment philosophers, who prepared the ideology of the Revolution, that the best portion of Russian society was indebted for the development of the advanced ideas of their time, and that it is impossible to imagine the spiritual atmosphere of the era of Pushkin and the Decembrists without this influence.

Despite the fact that Lobanov's talk of 'moral invincibility' characterises his analysis as relatively more 'non-class' and 'unscientific' than had been the norm in official discussions of this period of pre-revolutionary history, Iakovlev's article amounted to a serious questioning of some of the mainstream dogmas of Soviet historiography of the previous thirty-five years. Despite apparent Party support, however, - indicated by the strong backing given by Pravda, both later during the same month of November, and in the early months of 1973, and by a conference of historians, reported in Voprosy istorii KPSS in May 1973, in which criticism was voiced of 'instances of idealisation of the distant past and of certain historical figures who expressed the interests of the exploiting classes', Iakovlev was dropped from his position as part of a wider purge which also had its victims from amongst the Molodaia gvardiia camp. However, the effect of this act was not as even-handed as this symbolism might suggest.

Molodaia gvardiia, together with a number of other publications showed little sign of changing its editorial policies, while articles critical of the journal and the ideological stance it represented did not reappear for some years. Iakovlev's article was the first and last assault on the essentials of Stalinist historiography during the Brezhnev era. While criticism emerged spasmodically throughout the remainder of the regime of excesses in the direction of Russian nationalism, Stalinist 'communist nationalism' rather than Leninist internationalism was to be regarded as the required norm.

As if to symbolise the ideological defeat and unacceptability of the Iakovlev position, the same Literaturnaia gazeta which had published his article fourteen months previously printed an article by a namesake, Professor N.N. Iakovlev, author of the lengthy attack on Solzhenitsyn in the work 1 Avgusta 1914 (not to be confused with Solzhenitsyn's novel
of almost the same name), published by the Molodaia gvardiia printing house in 1974. In the article, entitled 'The Mercenary: On A. Solzhenitsyn's Traitorous Activity', Iakovlev quotes Solzhenitsyn's alleged views on the Campaign of 1812, views which are historiographically akin to those of A.N. Iakovlev:

We are so accustomed to taking pride in our victory over Napoleon that we lose sight of the fact that it was thanks to this victory that the emancipation of the peasants did not take place a half century earlier; it was thanks to this victory that the throne, strengthened by it, crushed the Decembrists. The French occupation, on the other hand, was not a reality for Russia.

N.N. Iakovlev's comment on this analysis reveals the extent to which such doubts deviated from the officially required Stalinist position:

These maxims need no commentary - they are the monumental confession of a ferocious hatred for everything that is sacred to Russians, and the self-exposure of a lampoonist.

The regular appearance of analogous Stalinist historiographic positions in the Soviet media, without serious Party criticism, was a feature of the Soviet scene for the remainder of the 1970s, although attempts in some quarters to rehabilitate figures previously judged 'beyond the pale' - such as the nineteenth century General Skobolev - could be guaranteed to draw rebuke.

Particularly notable in the overall context of the apparently officially tolerated xenophobia of this period is the emergence of anti-Semitism as an element in historical accounts of the pre-revolutionary state. Writers such as Iurii Seleznev, in his 'Mify i istiny', darkly hint at the harmful influence of Judaism in the history of the early Russian state, while figures such as Dmitrii Zhukov, in his Koz'ma Prutkov i ego druz'ia suggest that the nineteenth-century Tsarist minister Krankin, allegedly partly Jewish, granted a monopoly in the alcohol trade to a predominantly Jewish syndicate of merchants. Moreover, according to Zhukov, another nineteenth-century minister, Nesselrode, Tsarist Russia's (ethnically Russian) Minister for Foreign Affairs for much of the first half of the nineteenth century, who
presided over his country's defeat in the Crimean War, was a 'cosmopolitan reactionary' who had 'no mother country'. Suggesting that even ethnic Russians of the past can be tainted with the 'cosmopolitan' brush, he adds that 'all patriotic sentiment, every national interest, was alien to him'. Elsewhere, Zhukov claims that the firm Gregor-Gurwitz-Cogan made vast profits selling shoddy goods to the Russian Army during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78). Sergei Semanov, writing on the same theme, accuses the trio somewhat more openly of being 'of foreign stock and therefore indifferent to the outcome of the war'.

Stalinist 'communist nationalism' in the area of the historiography of the pre-revolutionary Russian state culminated thematically at the end of the 1970s in the celebrations marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo Field.

Neither the Party nor the 'mainstream' Soviet media departed in their treatment of the anniversary from the 'communist nationalist' Stalinist approach to the Russian past. The distant victory, as was the case with the anniversary of the Campaign of 1812 under Khrushchev, was extolled in emotionally charged terms, and its 'patriotic significance' (both Russian nationalist and Soviet internationalist) and broader relevance was given constant emphasis. This can be seen from the broadly similar articles of A.L. Narochnitskii, V.V. Kargalov, D. Likhachev, and A. Vladimirskii. In addition, the theme of Russia as the saviour of European civilisation was stressed. For example, as Feliks Kuznetsov, the Chairman of the RSFSR Writers' Union comments, after quoting Pushkin's familiar words on the significance of Kulikovo:

... for almost three whole centuries, Russia blocked with its own body the terrible path to the West of Genghis Khan's nomadic hordes. It is no exaggeration to say that it saved European civilisation and itself served as the West's shield against barbaric annihilation, while for two and a half centuries it (Russia) arrested and suspended its own historical development. And today ... the West should know its history and remember the lofty destiny and sacrificial exploit of Russia, which, six centuries ago, with its own life, its own grief, and its ultimate victory, created the conditions for the West's development.
However, along with such 'mainstream' departures from class analysis, Nash sovremennik published a number of analyses of the conflict which represented quite novel historiographic interpretation. The new line was also reflected in a number of analyses of the early history of the Russian state. The historiographic innovations of this journal were to induce, for the third time in the Brezhnev era, apparent rebukes by the Party press, rebukes which, however, would prove to be as ineffectual in quashing 'excessive' Russian nationalism in certain quarters as they had been on the previous two occasions.

Two articles were published by Nash sovremennik concerning the significance of the battle, one by Iurii Seleznev, which appeared in the third issue of the journal for 1980, and one by Vadim Kozhinov, published in the eleventh for 1981. The latter was published in the same month as a Professor I. Malyshev complained in Moskva of the general unavailability of Nikolai Karamzin's History of the Russian State and Vasiliy Tatishchev's Russian History, both reflecting Tsarist-Russian nationalist views of the Russian state's history. Seleznev's article interpreted the struggle as one between the principles of the pure, homogeneous nation, as represented by the 'peoples of the Fatherland', and the 'denationalised', 'cosmopolitan' horde, which 'preyed parasitically on the living bodies of many of the peoples of our Fatherland'. The author claimed that the invading armies of Napoleon and Hitler, as well as contemporary 'imperialism', represented and continue to represent analogous 'cosmopolitan' threats to the principle of the pure nation, of which the exemplar is allegedly the Soviet Union. Hence, the article achieves a degree of 'communist nationalist' respectability by combining the theme of the 'cosmopolitan' threat, an appeal in the Soviet context to traditional Russian anti-Semitism and nationalism, with references to the hero of Kulikovo being the peoples (rather than the Russian people alone) of the 'Fatherland'.

Kozhinov's article drifts somewhat further in the direction of an apparent attempt to identify the 'Golden Horde' with the Jews. It sees in the former a 'civilisation of merchants' who were ruled by the 'principle of naked profit', terms which, again in the Soviet context, can be taken as aesopian references to Judaism. Kozhinov also indulges in a remarkable amount of what V. Iuren'en aptly terms 'Old Testament neo-mysticism'.
Figures such as Valentin Sorokin were also permitted to publish poetry which no doubt revived ancestral memories of the threat from the East. For example:

Nomads: dark of complexion,
Tanned by cruel deserts and noons of August,
Taking aim slowly from their horses,
Pierced me with their arrows.²⁹

Sorokin goes on to suggest that the struggle at Borodino was one between Islam and Christianity.³⁰ Similarly, L. Lavlinskii spoke in his 'Rodnye khol'my' of Russia scattering the ashes of its history, and their settling on the ruins of mosques.³¹ It is also noteworthy that a number of writers used quite abusive language concerning the Tartars, Sorokin terming them 'unclean', while Petr Vagin uses the term 'Tatarka', in reference to the Eastern invader, a contemporary Russian term of derision for Tartars.³²

After considerable delay, the Party press finally reacted to these interpretations, in February 1982. Professor V. Kuleshov, Head of the Department of Russian Literature at Moscow University, wrote a lengthy critique of such arguments, as had A.N. Iakovlev ten years before, claiming them to be part of a wider deviation from Marxist-Leninist norms of analysis.³³ With the vagueness characteristic of such condemnations, Kuleshov stated generally:

The Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU decisively condemned lack of ideological spirit, lack of discrimination in world outlook, and departures from clear class positions concerning various figures and events.

Turning specifically to Kozhinov's interpretation of Kulikovo, Kuleshov characterises the arguments of the former as 'blasphemous and demeaning to its (the Battle's) enormous patriotic significance'. Contemptuously dismissing theories of 'global-cosmopolitan aggression' (vsemirno-kosmopoliticheskaia agresssia), Kuleshov concludes 'how naive and idyllic history looks through the eyes of V. Kozhinov'.

Kuleshov's article, while the first to attack 'incorrect' interpretations of Kulikovo, was not the first to attack Nash sovremennik or its ideological ilk by name for analogous errors. Following a general criticism of excessive Russian nationalism in official publications in
the Kommunist of May 1981, Iurii Surovtsev, writing in Pravda the following August, condemned 'certain arguments being propagated by Nash sovremennik concerning the historical development of the Russian state'.

Similarly, in a wide-ranging survey of historical fiction in October 1979, Pravda attacked a number of authors who overstepped the mark with regard to Russian nationalist interpretation of the past. Valentin Pikul's novel on Rasputin U poslednei cherty (which had been serialised in Nash sovremennik), which combines a rather sympathetic view of Nicholas II with consistent anti-Semitism, was singled out for criticism, as was Valerii Poluiko's novel on Ivan the Terrible, printed under Komsomol auspices. Pravda stated that it was not as justifiable as Poluiko appeared to believe for Ivan to have meted out 'savage execution' to those who opposed him.

Soon afterwards, and in the same vein, one of the Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Academy of Sciences, P.N. Fedoseev, criticised the 'naivety' of judging contemporary historiography to contain 'only positive knowledge and emotions'. In his article, published in both Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR (in December 1979) and Kommunist (in January 1980), Fedoseev chose the case of the analysis of the rule of Peter the Great to highlight the flaws of current Soviet historiography. While acknowledging the greatness of Peter's contribution to Russia, he points out that in the recent past, in certain works we have been offered a one-sided view of the time of Peter I - that of an epoch in which the Russian state and society flourished. However, facts attesting to the cruelest oppression by landlords and autocratic despotism have been entirely ignored.

Molodaia gvardiia, for one, did not take this apparently authoritative criticism lying down. Gennadii Gusev, writing in the October 1981 issue of the journal, cited Lomonosov as defence for his earlier praise of Peter the Great, which he had expressed, according to Gusev, fully aware of the 'barbarous means used by Peter to drive barbarism out of Russia'. Lomonosov claimed that such terrible means justified the end of progress, according to Gusev.
Voprosy istorii joined in the debate in August 1981, attacking Soviet writers who based historical writing on the evidence of Tsarist 'reactionaries'. Specifically attacked was S. Dolgova of the Central State Archives, who had relied on the testimony of the Tsarist official A.I. Sulikadzev (1771-1830) in research into the 1825 Decembrist revolt. Perhaps of most significance amongst such criticism, though, was Pravda's August 1981 attack on Nash sovremennik and those akin to the journal's editorial policy. Pravda's article would appear to have been prompted by two monographs published in 1980, together with the critical response they received: a work by F. Nesterov, Sviaz' vremen. Opyt istoricheskoi publitsistiki, and V. Oskotskii's Roman i istoriia. Traditsii i novatorstvo sovetskogo istoricheskogo romana.

Nesterov's work argued, along familiar Stalinist lines, that the centralisation of all power by the early Russian state was not only a proper response to the threats facing it, but an influential factor in developing Russian power. Novel, however, was the claim that Russia was a 'politically cohesive state', supported by all strata of the population, because of the 'Russian people's special attitude toward their state and their unqualified devotion to it'.

Both Nash sovremennik and Ogonek unhesitatingly supported Nesterov's arguments. V. Kargalov, writing in the former, argued the obsolescence of focussing 'mainly on questions of socio-economic development, class struggle, and the general laws of the historical process'. Instead, argued Kargalov, 'in order to counteract Russophobia in bourgeois propaganda, we need to study the genuine national historic characteristics of Russia and show the world our true historical legacy. This is what F. Nesterov has attempted to do in his recent book'. Alone among Soviet publications, Novyi mir noted Nesterov's many 'extremely dubious conclusions and positions'.

Oskotskii's work, by contrast, aroused controversy by its criticism of the extent of penetration by Russian nationalism of the Soviet historical novel. Examining a wide range of such novels, the author constantly stresses the need to be faithful to 'precise social guidelines',
'a class approach', and the 'scientific method'. A. Kuz'min, in the fourth issue of Nash sovremennik for 1981, undertook a direct attack on Oskotskii's views. Rejecting his characterisation of the early Russian state as 'antagonistic' and riven by the 'class selfishness' of its rulers, Kuz'min claims (while side-stepping the central issue) that 'by and large the princes' rule played a positive historical role at the dawn of the formation of the Russian state'. In addition, Kuz'min argues that the author of the 'Song of Igor's Campaign' reveals a more accurate understanding of Muscovy's early rulers than the Soviet novelist Zagrebel'nyi, who focusses on the 'class selfishness' of the ruling elite, which allegedly 'doomed them to treasonable submission to the Horde's yoke'. The former, argues Kuz'min, is 'more faithful to historical truth when, while reproaching the princes for discord amongst themselves, he at the same time praised them for courage and bravery'. In conclusion, Kuz'min argues for a 'poeticised history' of Russia, stressing, as does Kargalov, that 'the defence of socialism is closely bound up with the defence of our country's history', and 'anti-communism and anti-Sovietism are increasingly taking on the character of Russophobia'.

The claim by Nash sovremennik that the concept of 'class struggle' was irrelevant to the study of Russian history was answered by Surovtsev's above-mentioned article in Pravda. Surovtsev complained that 'aspects of an asocial treatment of the national element have been noted more than once in certain articles appearing in the literary criticism department of the journal Nash sovremennik'. Specifically concerning Kuz'min, he noted:

The 'knockout blow' that A. Kuz'min delivers to V. Oskotskii's work about historical novels is unjust. Specific opinions held by V. Oskotskii may, of course, be disputed, like those of any other author, but the critic's endeavour to take a social approach to national-historical problems deserves support.

While Surovtsev's defence of 'class analysis' may smack somewhat of understatement, given that the issue is the almost total rejection of the principles of Marxist-Leninist 'class' analysis in certain official Soviet publications, its appearance in Pravda may be taken as a serious attempt (apparently, at any rate) on the part of the Party to dissociate itself from such 'deviations'. Pravda persisted in its apparent efforts.
In September 1981, S. Khromov, Director of the Institute of USSR History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, attacked those concerned with the past who 'depart from principles of class and party spirit in analysing the phenomenon of the past, and ignore the achievements of present-day Marxist historiography, as a result distorting the true picture of events'.

Despite the fact that from late January 1982 a widespread campaign was launched against a variety of ideological deviations, of which Kuleshov's Pravda article was a part (in addition, the second issue of Kommunist for 1982, released on the previous day, had also trenchantly attacked Nash sovremennik for publishing certain 'idealistic' views of Vladimir Soloukhin on its pages), the campaign appears to have had only mixed success, if we take the goal of the campaign at face value. A considerable muting of Russian nationalist themes may be noted in the Party and 'mainstream' media for some time after the drive; nevertheless Nash sovremennik returned, after a brief lull, to adherence to its more overtly Russian nationalist position. Further official criticism was required in the course of 1982 to alter the journal's behaviour.

In conclusion, the historiography of the pre-revolutionary Russian state in the Brezhnev era reveals that the Party's ideological authorities required adherence to the norm of 'communist nationalism' established under Stalin. At the same time, occasional calls are made for a reversion to ideological and historiographic 'orthodoxy' in this area - usually in response to the appearance of 'unbalanced' or more overt Russian nationalism in certain Soviet publications. Hence the short-lived continuation of the Khrushchevian line in 1965-66 that the state-builders of the pre-revolutionary Russian past should not be glorified, A.N. Iakovlev's (and Pravda's) questioning of certain tenets of Stalinist historiography in response to the 'Chalmaevism' of Molodaia gvardiia in 1972, and the criticism by the Party press in 1981-2 of the overt dismissal of the relevance of class analysis to the study of Russia's past, and of the suggestion that past international struggles could be seen as being between the principles of racial purity and 'cosmopolitanism'. These apparent drives consistently had little or no effect in such publications as Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik, yet served at least to publicly dissociate the Party authorities from positions occasionally adopted by these publications, which at times do not appear even partly reconcilable with official Marxist-Leninist ideology.
(b) The Pre-Revolutionary State as a Colonial Power

A certain stability emerged in the Soviet analysis of Tsarist colonialism after the conclusion of the political battles revolving around Bolshevik internationalist and Stalinist approaches to historiography in the early Khrushchev period. With the basically Stalinist line re-established by 1957, the Brezhnev era, as does the late Khrushchev period, essentially reflects immobility from the main lines of acceptable analysis set down by the Party during this period. Although a number of cases of such Stalinist analysis in the Brezhnev period appear unprecedentedly extreme in isolation, no theories or formulae which emerge during this period are without precedent in the previous two Soviet periods.

Thus the approach of Soviet historiography during these years is to present apparently plausible arguments capable of consolidating the myth of the 'friendship of peoples' before the revolution, and to stress the positive consequences of the incorporation of non-Russian nationalities into the Tsarist empire. Familiar arguments formulated under the previous regimes continue to be used: hence, we find that the predominant emphasis in analysis of Tsarist colonialism is placed on 'class alliances' of Russians and non-Russians struggling jointly for social progress, and the citation of the various alleged economic, cultural and social 'positive consequences' of annexation. This section outlines the marginal variations from previous patterns evident through the period.

In line with formulations which emerged during the late Stalin and Khrushchev periods, the expansion of the Russian state is described euphemistically and apologetically with regard to an apparently ever-growing number of present-day Soviet nationalities, while the negative aspects of Tsarist colonialism are granted only pro forma attention. Thus, Voprosy istorii forgives the subjugation of Abkhazia on the grounds that 'the Treaty of Paris (1856) put Russia's southern defences in jeopardy', while the defeat of Kirgizia in the third quarter of the nineteenth century is described in terms of the 'vigorous penetration' of the Russian Empire into that part of Central Asia. Such apologetic, or admiring, explanation of Tsarist colonialism is associated with the revival of the late Khrushchevian euphemism 'the expansion of the borders of the
multinational state' to describe the acquisition by the Russian state of non-Russian territories, and the claim made with increasing frequency that annexations were 'voluntary'.

The description of Russian expansionism as a growing 'multinational' or 'multiethnic' state is prominent in such more overtly Russian nationalist publications as Nash sovremennik, but is by no means restricted to them. Hence, with the popularisation of the concept of the 'Soviet people as a new historical community' during the Brezhnev era, certain writers attempted to project the notion into the remote past. For example, M.A. Andreev claimed the existence of a 'friendship of peoples' and 'sense of community' (obshchnost') dating from the earliest 'territorial expansion of the Russian national state and its transformation into a multinational one':

Already at that time the formation began of a single territory, a single language of inter-nationality discourse, the consciousness of being part of a single international community, and the rudiments of the friendship of the peoples of Russia. Moreover, Nash sovremennik attempted to explain the alleged pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples' in terms of the claim that 'the Russian people never placed itself in the position of lord and master'. In the already cited article by Kargalov, F. Nesterov's Sviaz' vremen is paraphrased to the effect that

Russia grew up as a unity of peoples, wherein the specifically Russian element, with its natural plasticity, served as a cement, joining the most diverse ethnic elements together in a political community. In the face of threats from without, the mosaic Russian empire possessed a monolithic solidity. Similarly, A. Kuz'min, in his hostile review of Oskotskii's Roman i istoria, rejects the characterisation of Tsarist Russia as a 'prison of peoples', describing this as a 'thesis that some people in our country championed back in the 1920s' (thus identifying the thesis with 'Pokrovskiism'). Kuz'min goes on to claim that

... even the ancient Russian state was multiethnic; nothing changed later except that the multinational state's borders were expanded, especially in the 16th to the 18th centuries. Furthermore, most of
this expansion was in the form of the voluntary union of other peoples with Russia. What 'turned Russia into a prison' was not the expansion of its borders but the triumph of serfdom, and the intensification of autocratic high-handedness, developments from which the Russian people itself suffered the most.\(^56\)

The general claim that the expansion of the Russian empire was the result of 'mostly voluntary' union correlates with the tendency during the Brezhnev period to make this claim in connection with an increasing number of specified nationalities, nationalities whose acquiescence at the time of annexation, frequently, was not claimed previously.

The historiography of at least three nationalities - the Moldavian, Kazakh, and Chechen - reveals the emergence of unprecedented claims of 'voluntary' union with the Russian state. With regard to Moldavia, Republic Party First Secretary Bodiul referred at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 to its historical 'gravitation' towards Russia. Subsequently, however, in something of a contretemps between Romanian and Soviet scholars in the mid-1960s, the former gave prominence to Russia's annexation of the territory in 1812, in collaboration with Turkey. Bodiul responded by claiming that Moldavia had voluntarily united with the Russian state in 1711.\(^57\) Similarly unprecedented claims concerning Kazakhstan and Chechnia emerged in 1979 and 1982 respectively.\(^58\) With regard to other nationalities, the tendency is reflected in claims that large or 'progressive' portions of the population or territory sought voluntary union with the Russian empire.\(^59\)

Other observable tendencies in the Brezhnev era concerning the evaluation of Tsarist colonialism include the ascription of worse conditions to non-Russian areas before the arrival of the Russians than had previously been alleged (including, for example, describing certain areas as existing in conditions of 'medieval barbarism' or in 'darkness and despotism' before the arrival of the Russians),\(^60\) the continued formulation of explanations for the pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples' which bear no apparent relationship to 'class alliances',\(^61\) and the adding of Chinese colonialism to the category of those from which various non-Russian peoples were allegedly saved by Russian imperialism.\(^62\)
Thus, while the historiography of Tsarist colonialism during the Brezhnev period produces some remarkable claims and reversals of position, changes during these years represent nothing more than the 'consolidation' of lines set down for the treatment of the subject under Stalin and essentially adhered to by Khrushchev. The essential 'deradicalisation' introduced by Stalin into this area was that the allegedly positive consequences of the incorporation of non-Russian areas into the Tsarist state, and, where remotely plausible, the peaceful means of such incorporation, should be given predominant emphasis, while the negative side of such expansionism should be granted no more than minimal acknowledgement. Historians and public spokesmen under Brezhnev, as during the later Khrushchev years, were evidently given the task of gradually working their way through the histories of the numerous non-Russian nationalities with the aim of applying this approach universally.

(ii) 'Communist Nationalism' and Russian Culture

(a) The Pre-Revolutionary Russian Cultural Heritage

In the previous chapter, it was argued that despite the widespread view that Khrushchev was a committed Leninist and 'promethean' in his ideological outlook, with little interest in the pre-revolutionary cultural heritage rehabilitated by Stalin, actual cultural policies between 1953 and 1964 reveal only marginal variations from the norms established by his predecessor. Official positions on the pre-revolutionary cultural heritage - Russian literature, music, art, and the Russian language - did not change in any significant sense. The exceptions were the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church in the context of the general anti-religious campaign from the late 1950s to October 1964 (the Russian Church nevertheless retaining certain privileges not enjoyed by other religious institutions), and the view occasionally put that the Russian national culture should not be spared the processes of 'internationalisation' and 'mutual enrichment' to which the other cultures of the Soviet Union were to be subjected after 1957, at least in theory, as part of Khrushchev's overall drive for 'full-scale communist construction'.
The official criticism of Khrushchev's 'hare-brained schemes' and 'subjectivism' under the post-October 1964 leadership had its echo in the cautious and pragmatic style of the new leadership, intent as it was on establishing as broad a base of popular support as possible. It therefore jettisoned policies - particularly in the area of culture and ideology - which were irrelevant to this goal. Khrushchev's mild attempts to infuse Stalin's 'communist nationalist' synthesis with a modicum of Leninist internationalism was one such area subjected to significant revision during the Brezhnev era. One of the first acts of the new regime was to remove Leonid Il'ichev, who had served after 1961 as the CPSU Central Committee Secretary for ideological matters. In March 1965, he was dismissed and replaced with the reportedly more pragmatic Petr Demichev.63

The main thrust of the new regime's policies in this area was change in a number of fields of cultural policy, no doubt calculated to strengthen its legitimacy vis-à-vis the Russian populace - or at least its nationalist intelligentsia. In doing this, it was, in contrast to previous regimes, giving rein to what we may take to be genuinely spontaneous sentiment which had arisen in response to Khrushchev's perceived 'national nihilism' with regard to the Russian nation.64

Most importantly, the new regime permitted the formation of voluntary societies for the protection of historical and cultural monuments, allowed a number of periodicals, newspapers and publishing houses to print material which would appeal to those concerned with the preservation of the Russian moral and spiritual heritage (so long as alienation from the Soviet present was not too overtly expressed, and religious overtones could not be detected), distanced itself from the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church, and permitted the publication of increasingly (but never entirely) open and unambiguous anti-Semitism, especially after June 1967. These measures supplemented the standard Stalinist and Khrushchevian means of suggesting the Soviet state's benign view of the Russian people in the area of the cultural heritage - the official positive view of most pre-revolutionary literature, music and art (in contrast to the deadly enemy - twentieth-century innovation and experimentation in the field of culture), and the likewise sanctioned conservative view of the Russian language. Nevertheless, in addition to the undeviating requirement that those expressing a form of Russian nationalism make some form of obeisance
before Soviet power, at times during the Brezhnev era, when published material was perceived by those in power as threatening the authority and legitimacy of the ruling ideology - and therefore the system - or when the required formula of 'communist nationalism' became 'nationalism' pure and simple, the regime acted to correct the situation. The Brezhnev regime's cultural policies, from the point of view of the concerns of this study, thus, as in the case of historiography, represent neo-Stalinist continuity rather than the evolution towards the less ambivalently Russian-nationalist based polity, as is occasionally suggested.

The approval conferred by the authorities on the formation of the 'voluntary societies' for the preservation of Russian culture was the first tangible manifestation of the Brezhnev regime's new policy towards the Russian cultural heritage. Reacting to an apparently significant groundswell of concern for the protection of the physical reminders of this heritage in the wake of Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign (which had involved widespread physical destruction and neglect, particularly of ecclesiastical buildings), the founding of the first such Society, the 'Rodina' club, was permitted in late 1964. This was reportedly after a number of students from Moscow State University had visited the ancient Russian towns of Zagorsk, Vladimir and Suzdal', and had discovered for themselves the world of antiquity. According to TASS, the aim of the Club was to 'promote the study of historical monuments', and to 'study ancient history'. In addition, collecting voluntary contributions, the Club set about restoring churches.

The following year, the RSFSR Council of Ministers decreed the founding of the far more ambitious Vserossiiskoe obshchestvo okhrany pamiatnikov istorii i kul'tury (All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Monuments of History and Culture) - VOOPIK. This followed the unsuccessful lobbying for such a Society during the late Khrushchev years by such figures as Il'ia Glazunov. The regime conferred its blessing on the organisation (while keeping it under control) by inaugurating it under the Chairmanship of V.I. Kochemasov, Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, in June 1966. The 'Honorary Chairman' of the Society became Marshal V.I. Chuikov, 'Hero of Stalingrad'.
The Society's public expressions were marked from the beginning by boldness and self-confidence. Early in its life, a number of its members (including the writers Efim Dorosh and Vladimir Soloukhin) were permitted to complain on the pages of Literaturnaia gazeta that the Society's organisational committee included a number of individuals whose careers had been marked more by the destruction than the preservation of Russian monuments of the past.\textsuperscript{71} Leonid Leonov, another member, used the same issue of the newspaper to attack the destruction of Russian monuments of antiquity, which, he alleged, had by no means ceased,\textsuperscript{72} while such publications as the Komsomol's Molodaia gvardiia took up VOOPIK's cause by brazenly attacking the destruction of such cultural monuments in the Soviet past. For example, Vladimir Soloukhin stated in his 'Pis'ma iz Russkogo muzeia', published in Molodaia gvardiia in 1966,

Forty years were spent building a grandiose architectural monument, the Church of Christ the Saviour, on the money of the people. It was built as a memorial to the famous Moscow fire, as a monument to the defiance of Moscow in the face of a powerful enemy, as a memorial to the victory over Napoleon. The great Russian artist Vasilii Surikov painted its walls and arches. It was the tallest and most majestic building in Moscow. One could see it from any corner of the city. The building was not an ancient one, but, together with the Kremlin, it served to organise the architectural centre of our capital. They tore it down ... and built a swimming pool in its place.\textsuperscript{73}

Molodaia gvardiia also published numerous letters sympathetic to Soloukhin. A typical one read:

Amends cannot be made for what we have destroyed in the Kremlin itself - the Krasnoe Kryl'tso of the Granovitaia Palace, the Chudov and Voznesenskii monasteries. We destroyed the ancient walls and towers of Kitaigorod, the Sukhorev Tower, the Palitsyn palaces in Okhotnyi Row, the Triumphal and Red Gates, a dozen ancient monasteries, the famous churches of Potapov (on Pokrovka) and Kazakov (on Zemlianyi Bank), and 400 other valuable architectural monuments ...\textsuperscript{74}

Similarly, calls for such acts of preservation and restoration as the retention of Moscow's remaining old street-names, the reintroduction
of the ringing of church-bells at complexes such as Rostov-Velikii (as, according to Sovetskaia kul'tura, it was an 'ancient folk art' which had long ceased to have a religious significance), the reintroduction of municipal coats-of-arms, and the incorporation of ancient works of architecture in contemporary works were voiced, even by editorials in Pravda. VOOPIK Chairman Kochemasov himself stressed that the 'centuries-old history of our country has handed down to the present generation a large number of wonderful monuments'. In veiled criticism of the policies of the Khrushchev regime, he chided 'some individual local Soviet executive committees' who 'fail to wage a struggle against incorrect attitudes towards the cultural heritage', attitudes he characterised as 'national nihilism' (the initial reluctance openly to blame the Khrushchev regime is also reflected in Sovetskaia kul'tura's prominent attack at the first VOOPIK Conference on the 'nihilism' engendered by the policies of both the '1920s' and the period of the 'cult of personality'). Mentioning that VOOPIK had been most concerned in the recent past with 'improvements to places associated with the lives and activities of Pushkin, Tolstoi, Nekrasov and Esenin', as well as preparing an inventory of 11,000 'works of ancient Russian art', Kochemasov called for the 'popularisation of the historical and cultural heritage', and the use of all available media 'in propagandising historical treasures'.

The tendency on the part of Kochemasov not to balance concern for the Russian pre-revolutionary with concern for the Soviet resulted in stern rebukes by both Kommunist and Partiinaia zhizn'. The two journals stressed the familiar line that while there was room in Soviet patriotism for feelings of love for the nation, patriotism should essentially be a sentiment of loyalty to Soviet internationalist socialism.

Despite such criticism, on subsequent occasions Kochemasov again spoke of 'our people's heroic past', 'sacred places' such as Kolomna and Mikhailovskoe (places connected with the Soviet past such as Ul'ianovsk usually featuring well down the list), and the 'incorrect attitude toward the preservation of monuments' which had been in evidence 'in the early 1960s'. It is possible that Marshal Konev was implicitly supporting such sentiments when he stated in 1969 that it was gratifying
that 'since the October (1964) Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee, the attitude toward military-patriotic upbringing has changed appreciably'.

Nevertheless, following the warning salvos of the two most important ideological journals, attempts were made to lend the concerns of the Society a somewhat broader Marxist-Leninist legitimacy.

Thus Izvestiia published an article in early 1966 which, while lauding VOOPIK's inculcation of 'respect for the sacred objects of the homeland's history and the monuments of its culture', emphasised alleged moves in this direction by the early Bolshevik government, and stated that VOOPIK paid due regard to 'sites connected with Lenin and relics of the revolutionary, military and labour glory of the Soviet people'.

Similarly, Vladimir Soloukhin write in his S liricheskikh pozitsii:

*They say ... that almost during the first year of Soviet power, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin noticed a broken window while strolling about the Kremlin ... Vladimir Il'ich immediately scolded the head of the museum section, saying that the task of preserving monuments in the Kremlin must be properly attended to ...*  

The sanctioning by the regime of VOOPIK was not, however, without qualification. Aside from being attacked when its spokesmen forgot the regime-maintenance function of the organisation, as noted above, the regular complaints concerning VOOPIK's 'church bias', and the criticism that the restoration of monuments was often a waste of money, the general complaint was occasionally heard that 'too much enthusiasm for gold cupolas works to the detriment of showing what our Russia has achieved in fifty years of Soviet power'.

The organisation was not successful in its request for a journal or publishing house. Moreover, while during the 1960s the defenders of VOOPIK generally had the last word against detractors, there are indications that during the 1970s, as part of the wider crackdown by the regime on manifestations of Russian nationalism unbalanced by at least symbolic obeisance before Soviet internationalism, the authorities placed VOOPIK on a somewhat tighter leash. Following the publication by the Sovremennik publishing-house in 1972 of a collection of articles by various members of VOOPIK, entitled Pamiatniki otechestva, Nauka i religiia published a critical review of the work, pointing out that its contributors had consistently failed to mention the 'reactionary'
dimension to many of the objects of their attention, in particular Russian Orthodox Churches as centres of 'ruling-class ideology'. Despite the fact that Sergei Semanov put up a spirited defence of the position of the VOOPIK contributors (citing the above-quoted words of Society Chairman Kochemasov), Aleksandr Shamaro, the author of the Nauka i religia article, was permitted the last word in the debate. Moreover, certain articles published under the auspices of VOOPIK in the less inhibited mid to late 1960s, such as Soloukhin's 'Pis'ma iz russkogo muzeia', were re-published in the 1970s, but with significant cuts. More generally, following the second VOOPIK Conference in 1972, the Society began to pay markedly greater attention to 'monuments' connected with the pre-1917 revolutionary movement and the Soviet period.

Within these limits, the Society since its inception has been granted considerable scope for glorifying and publicising the physical reminders of pre-revolutionary Russia's cultural and historical achievements. It should be recalled, however, that under both Stalin and Khrushchev, whatever the reality, it was regularly claimed that the Soviet state took a caring attitude to pre-revolutionary Russia's historical and artistic 'monuments'. The establishment of VOOPIK represented a possibly more convincing and effective means of pushing home this claim. Most significantly, often reportedly in the face of considerable opposition from hostile local authorities (as was claimed at VOOPIK's third Conference in 1977), the Society has been instrumental in numerous acts of restoration since 1965, in the overwhelming majority of cases monuments of the pre-revolutionary Russian past. This has involved far more numerous and ambitious projects (which were in turn given greater publicity) than under the two previous regimes. Most noteworthy have been restoration projects in all of the ancient Russian cities of the 'Golden Ring' (Suzdal', Zagorsk, Vladimir, Rostov-Velikii, Pereislav-Zalesskii, Iaroslavl') as well as such historic centres as Novgorod and Archangel. Individual projects have included the Kizhi church complex, the Riazan' Kremlin, Petrodvorets, the Men'shikov and Pavlovsk palaces, old Tomsk houses, ancient Russian huts, Novospasskii monastery, and the Pirogoshcha Church of the Assumption in Kiev. Details of the projects were usually reported in the authoritative dailies Pravda or Izvestiia. Further, calls were reported for the restoration of such
'monuments' as the Optyna Pustyn' monastery, the literary estates Khmelita, Abramtseso and Kolomenskoe, as well as areas of pre-revolutionary vintage of Vologda, Grodno, Pskov, Gor'kii and Taganrog, while Kochemasov was granted space on the pages of Pravda in 1980 to criticise 'instances of indifference towards monuments' both restored and unrestored. Such calls were frequently accompanied by the rhetoric that 'aesthetic disarmament is tantamount to ideological disarmament'.

In Moscow, prominent publicity has been given to involvement with the restoration of the Bol'shoi Theatre, the Slav'ianskii Bazaar restaurant, and the saving of the Arbat area from redevelopment. More generally, the criticism of radical plans drawn up in the mid-1960s for the complete redevelopment of Moscow (the more extreme 'conservationists' such as Vladimir Soloukhin in turn being criticised) may have had some influence on the change in line revealed by Izvestiia in 1971, when it stated that Moscow would become 'a space-age city preserving the best of its gold-domed antiquity'.

In addition, VOOPiK attempted to fulfill its propaganda role by conducting a lecture programme (according to John Dunlop, between 1973 and 1976, 13,000 lectures and speeches were given in the Leningrad oblast' alone), and disseminating publicity through numerous publications, as well as television, radio and cinema, and the promotion of tourism. Moreover, a further indication of the overall influence and prestige of VOOPiK was the fact that in December 1976 a new USSR law was passed on the 'Protection and Utilisation of Historical and Cultural Monuments', followed by an equivalent RSFSR law in December 1978, and a further RSFSR Council of Ministers Resolution in early 1980 'On Measures for Improving the Protection, Restoration and Utilisation of Historical and Cultural Monuments in the Light of the USSR Law and RSFSR Law on the Protection and Utilisation of Historical Monuments'.

If the indulgence granted by the new regime to the formation of the 'voluntary societies' represented an attempt to co-opt those concerned with the preservation of the physical reminders of the Russian national past, as well as to portray the regime as sympathetic to their concerns, the authorities under Brezhnev also permitted, for a time without serious criticism, the publication of works concerned with the
The most important of these works were those of the movement that was to become the dominant literary school of the Brezhnev era, the derevenshchiki, or village prose-writers, whose works were printed regularly by such publications as Molodaia gvardiia, Nash sovremennik, and Moskva.

As has frequently been noted, there is a profound thematic difference between the derevenskaia proza of the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev eras. The transition from the former to the latter was broadly marked by a movement of concern from 'socio-economic and economic-organisational questions' (having simply been Socialist Realism in a rural setting under Stalin) to 'moral, ethical, psychological, and even philosophical ones', in the words of Literaturnaia gazeta, bound up with the question of Russian national identity. As Philippa Lewis has aptly observed, the emphasis in the mid-1960s came to be focussed on 'not what we outsiders can do to improve the lot of them, the peasants ... but what we, the prodigal sons who have left the village, may learn from our fellow peasants'. It is thus possible to generalise that the first-generation urban-dwellers who constitute most of the derevenshchiki - Vladimir Soloukhin, Fedor Abramov, Valentin Rasputin, Sergei Zalygin, Vasilii Belov, Viktor Korotaev, Evgenii Nosov, and Viktor Likhonosov, are united by an acute concern about what must be done so that what has been accumulated by our forefathers, what is beautiful and ours, the strength of traditions, national culture, without which a person is naked, cheated of his fair share, homeless, is not lost, not forgotten in the noisy new way of life.

Numerous works of the derevenshchiki recount tales of sons and daughters who have deserted the village for urban areas, learning in the process to be condescending to village ways, yet discovering on their return the integrity of the values and way of life of the older generation which remained isolated, particularly in the more remote parts of the Russian countryside. To this end the writers often accentuate a morally exemplary but simple representative of the older generation - such as Abramov's Milent'evna in Dereviannye koni, Belov's Katerina in Privychnoe delo, or the old mother in Rasputin's Poslednii srok. Other derevenshchiki, notably Sergei Zalygin and Boris Mozhaev, focus more boldly on the destruction
of the village brought about by collectivisation, suggesting that during this period not only was the age-old system of Russian agriculture destroyed, but that the peasants of quality were replaced as figures of authority by the village rabble. The works are united, however, by both the sadness of a dying world, and the artistically accentuated moral strength of the authentic villagers, contrasted with the vacillating weakness and ethical uncertainty of those who left. The typical artistic contrast set up by the two worlds is revealed by such works as P. Glinkin's Zemlia i asfal't, and by the lines of O. Dmitriev, published in Molodaia gvardiia in 1965:

Countryside, my counsellor and healer,
Cure my sadness, my spleen!
... Accept and quench my grief,
Accept me with my blind heart,
I who am tired of lies and nonsense.

Moreover, it is repeatedly made clear that the village is to be viewed as a symbol of the eternal, authentic Russia. As Nikolai Rubtsov writes,

Russia, Rus', wherever I look ...
For all your sufferings and battles,
I love your olden times, Russia,
Your forests, churchyards and prayers,
I love your little izbas and flowers,
And skies burning with heat,
And the whisper of willows by the deep pool's water
I love for ever, until eternal peace ...

While there were unmistakable political (not to mention implicitly religious) overtones to the themes of the derevenschiki — parallels with the nineteenth-century pochvenniki are unmistakable — the school awaited figures such as Viktor Chalmaev to use its works for somewhat more blatant political purposes. In an article published in Moskva in 1965, Chalmaev pointed out the alleged uses of derevenskaia proza to the regime. According to the writer, village prose 'formed (in Russian citizens) a sense of homeland and poetry, and a sense of the beauty and stability of everyday life'. In later articles, such as his 'Neizbezhnost', he contrasted the crass materialism of the 'bourgeois' West making inroads into Russian society with the alleged spiritual integrity of traditional Russian village life. Moreover, in his 'Filosofia patriotizma', published in Molodaia gvardiia in 1967, Chalmaev took his polemical use of the derevenschiki somewhat further, contrasting the Russian patriotism of the School with those involved in 'liberal' and 'modernist' trends
in Russian contemporary literature, whose lack of concern for the Russian cultural heritage was, he suggested, comparable in essence to the acts of official vandalism perpetrated against Russian monuments of the pre-revolutionary period during the 1920s and 1930s. In reasoning bordering on the Slavophile, he lauded the values canonised by the derevenshchiki, so far from 'dead rationality, from naked, soulless logic'. In other similar articles, he continued to develop his neo-Slavophile nationalism, for example pushing the notion that true art must be the expression of the 'national soul', and claiming the 'uncontrollable pagan freedom' of the Russian national character.\textsuperscript{111}

Such neo-Slavophile interpretation of, and support for, the derevenshchiki was paralleled in the late 1960s by a number of writers in Voprosy literatury attempting to re-open the question of the regime's evaluation of the Slavophiles, viewed officially as reactionaries in accordance with the judgement of nineteenth-century liberals and revolutionaries. However, Aleksandr Ianov, in an article entitled 'Zagadka slav'ianofil'skoj kritiki', published by Voprosy istorii in 1969, made explicit his approval of their Russian patriotism (while of course acknowledging their 'contradictions') and called for a re-opening of the question of how they should be viewed. Ianov's call was supported by three other writers in the same issue of the journal - A. Ivanov, V. Kozhinov, and L. Frizman. For example, Ivanov stated: 'It has been long overdue to restore historical justice to the Slavophiles, it has been long overdue to remove the curtain covering everything to the right of the revolutionary democrats'.\textsuperscript{112}

If initially the authorities had regarded the derevenskaia proza school as at least a potential source of 'communist nationalism' - maximising loyalty to the Soviet state on the part of Russians concerned with their 'heritage', it was thought (even though 'communist' elements were frequently difficult to detect), by developing pride in Russia and love of the native land - it soon must have become evident that much of the implicitly anti-modernist output of the school was at least potentially subversive, contrasting as it did the goodness and timeless, frequently specifically Russian values of the village with the alienation and disorientation of the urban environment, the dominance of the latter in
Soviet society having been encouraged by a Promethean ideology — most notably the unbounded Marxist-Leninist faith in the 'Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia' — which had been responsible for the destruction of much that was considered by these writers as of value in, and essential to, Russia. Politicisation of the cause of the derevenshchiki by such figures as Chalmaev, mirrored in some quarters by attempts to rehabilitate the nineteenth-century Slavophiles who took a similarly okhranitel'nyi view of all the Russian village symbolises, must have made the issue of preventing a degeneration into an implicitly anti-Soviet form of Russian nationalism amongst some organs of the media all the more urgent, at least from the point of view of those ideologists schooled in the unwritten rules of Stalin's 'communist nationalism'.

Nevertheless, official criticism of the derevenshchiki was remarkably restrained from publications responsible for ideological supervision, at least until the turn of the decade, the only serious and sustained criticism emerging from the traditionally 'liberal' wing of the Soviet literary establishment. In Party publications, the position appeared to be that it was legitimate to 'love' the Russian village, but not to 'idealise' it. Effectively, this meant that individual derevenshchiki singled out for criticism were invariably chided 'for excesses of a basically sound approach rather than fundamental errors'. A number of critics, however, from the 'liberal' and less influential Literaturnaia gazeta, Novyi mir, Voprosy literatury, and Iunost', consistently criticised many of the derevenshchiki, suggesting, as might be expected, their alienation from Soviet society, and pointing out the indiscriminate 'Russian chauvinism' which infused many of their works, blinding them to the reactionary and negative dimension of traditional (i.e. pre-revolutionary) Russian village life. For example, F. Levin warned in Literaturnaia gazeta in 1968 that the village had 'solicitously preserved not only truly fine aspects of the people's character, but also much that is inert and backward: customs and beliefs going back to pagan times, superstitions, long-suffering submissiveness and meekness, the humiliation of women, and mistrust of any innovation'.

Yet the somewhat more provocative articles by Chalmaev received a more unambiguously hostile response — although not, until the early
1970s, identifiably from the highest Soviet authorities. In November 1968, Iurii Surovtsev published an article entitled 'Pridumannaia neizbezhnost' (an obvious response to Chalmaev's 'Neizbezhnost') in Literaturnaia Rossiia, in which he attacked Russian nationalist bias in Chalmaev's argument, his 'mystical' manner of expression, and, most importantly, the editorial board of Molodaia gvardiia for having permitted the publication of such material in the first place. Surovtsev wonders aloud whether 'Nikon and the Old Believers, the evening ringing of church bells, and the speechless little horse Savrasushka ... will encourage the genuinely patriotic, communist upbringing of youth'.

Similarly, I. Dedkov, writing in Novyi mir in 1969, describes Chalmaev's 'philosophy of patriotism' as embracing 'the extraordinary heroes of our native folklore - Ivan the Fool and Petrushka, the cock's crow and the taste of Vologda cranberries ... the works of the Archpriest Avvakum and P.Ia. Chaadaev ... and in general all Russia with her greatness present and past - up to 1917'.

Following further defence of Chalmaev's position on the pages of both Molodaia gvardiia and Moskva in early 1969, the momentum of criticism of the derevenshchiki and their defenders built up with an article by A. Dement'ev, a member of the editorial board of Novyi mir who had already skirmished with the Russian nationalists grouped around Molodaia gvardiia in his attack earlier during 1969 on attempts to formulate a more favourable view of the nineteenth-century Slavophiles. Dement'ev's article, entitled 'O traditsiiakh i narodnosti', and published in Novyi mir, constituted the most wide-ranging and serious criticism of 'Chalmaevism' (a less ideologically adulterated form of Russian nationalism) to have been published up to this time in the Soviet Union. Dement'ev agreed that much Russian culture had been unjustifiably ignored in recent times - citing as examples mainly modernist and Soviet era Russian cultural figures such as Skriabin and Stravinskii - but stated that he found Chalmaev's views overall more akin to reactionary Slavophilism than to those expected of an individual writing for a Soviet periodical. Dement'ev attributed much of the blame to those in charge of Molodaia gvardiia, who, he alleged, had consistently permitted the views of those such as Chalmaev onto the journal's pages in recent years.
The savage response which was permitted to Dement'ev's article, and its administrative follow-up, indicated that the struggle had been won for the time by Molodaia gvardiia's editorial line, and the ideological line of the likes of Chalmaev. In July 1969, Ogonek published an article above the names of eleven Soviet writers entitled 'Protiv chego vystupaet Novyi mir?'. While acknowledging certain 'shortcomings' in Chalmaev's writings, the letter essentially praised Molodaia gvardiia's past editorial policies. At the same time, it linked Novyi mir with the attempted 'counter-revolution' in Czechoslovakia the year before, noted the influence of dissident Andrei Siniavskii (whose works had been published in previous years by the journal) and stated that its editorial philosophy cultivated 'a sceptical view of the social-moral values of Soviet society'. It also referred to 'cosmopolitan ideas, so dear to the hearts of certain critics and writers grouped around the journal Novyi mir'. And, as Yanov has stated, most threateningly of all, Ogonek accused the traditionally 'liberal' journal of dangerously underestimating the challenge of Western 'bourgeois' ideology and cultural influences. While Novyi mir was permitted to reject the charges, the Ogonek article was followed by a purge of the editorial board of Novyi mir, which resulted not only in the ousting of the bête noir of the Russian nationalists, Dement'ev, but the dismissal of the Editor Tvardovskii, Associate Editor A.I. Kondratovich, as well as I.I. Vinogradov, V.Ia. Lakshin, and I.A. Sats. Yanov recounts that according to highly placed members of the Party Central Committee, Dement'ev's article was the occasion if not the cause for the purge.

Despite this apparent victory for the Molodaia gvardiia camp, in the second half of 1970 it appeared that its fortunes were reversed, for a time at least. In November 1970, Anatolii Nikonov, Chief Editor of the journal, was dismissed from his post, while some months later, one of the key members of the neo-Slavophile group around the journal, Iurii Ivanov, was removed from his position at Moscow State University. However, in contrast with the treatment meted out to Novyi mir, the editorial board of Molodaia gvardiia retained such proponents of its post-1965 line as Mikhail Lobanov and Vladimir Soloukhin, while, following a brief interregnum, Anatolii Ivanov, a former assistant editor of the journal (and therefore intimately associated with its past editorial
policies), took up the editorship starting with the fourth issue of 1972. Samizdat sources have speculated that the Party's move on the journal (which allegedly followed a meeting of the Komsomol Secretariat and Brezhnev's consideration of the question in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, both events pushed by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee Secretariat over the resistance of its Cultural affairs department) was prompted by a militant defence of Chalmaev written under the name of S. Semanov, published in the August 1970 issue of Molodaia gvardiia.\(^{123}\)

Whatever was the cause, the seventeenth issue of Kommunist for 1970 published an article under the name of V. Ivanov, entitled 'Sotsializm i kul'turnoe nasledstvo'. The article essentially attacked deviation at both ends of the ideological spectrum, for which Novyi mir and Molodaia gvardiia were used as the symbols. As to the former, the toppled A. Dement'ev was criticised for his 'suspicion of the love of the native land'. At the same time, Kommunist warned of the dangers of 'idealising' the 'patriarchal' village, and reminded readers of Lenin's distinction between 'the two cultures in every culture'. As to Molodaia gvardiia itself, Kommunist condemned the journal's 'clearly mistaken direction', stating in particular in connection with the arch-offender, Chalmaev:

V. Chalmaev's essay 'Neizbezhnost' ... immediately attracted attention by its, if you will, utterly unprecedented ... extra-social approach to history, its mixing of everything with everything else in the history of Russia, its attempt to place in a favorable light everything reactionary, even to the pronouncements of such arch-reactionaries as Konstantin Leont'ev.\(^{124}\)

A similar line was taken in the issue's editorial, under the name of B. Solov'ev.\(^{125}\)

Nevertheless, the high-level defenders of the Molodaia gvardiia line must have retained at least a degree of influence, as articles which reflected no significant change in the journal's ideological position began to reappear in 1971 and continued into 1972, including essays under the names of such contributors of the late 1960s as Vasilii Belov, Sergei Vikulov and M. Lobanov.\(^{126}\) In addition, as Reddaway observes,
no serious criticism appeared in print concerning *Molodaia gvardiia's* line between late 1970 and November 1972.\(^{127}\) Finally, as if to remove any doubt that the journal had re-emerged into favour with the authorities, on the fiftieth anniversary of its founding, in August 1972, *Molodaia gvardiia* was awarded a Soviet order - although not perhaps one of the most prestigious - the Order of the Red Banner of Labour.\(^{128}\)

However, at the end of 1972, *Molodaia gvardiia* was subject to a second major attack from the Central Committee (the first being the criticism carried by *Kommunist* in late 1970). As was touched on in the first section of this Chapter dealing with historiographic policies, A.N. Iakovlev the First Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee (and who, according to Ianov, had stood behind the earlier salvos fired at *Molodaia gvardiia*)\(^{129}\) delivered the attack in November 1972 in *Literaturnaia gazeta*.\(^{130}\) While most of the details of Iakovlev's charges have been examined in the earlier section, it is sufficient to point out here that the article, entitled 'Protiv anti-istorizma', projected the self-confident bombast to be expected of one of the Soviet Union's leading ideological spokesmen, and came close to accusing those around *Molodaia gvardiia* of disseminating counter-revolutionary ideology, claiming that 'behind all this there is an ideological position which is dangerous in that it objectively contains an attempt to bring back the past'. Apparently full Party support for Iakovlev's position was indicated by the strong backing given by *Pravda* to his stand, both later during the same month of November, and in the early months of 1973.\(^{131}\)

However, despite the apparent authority of this call, together with the various official statements apparently in support of Iakovlev, there was no appreciable lull in the activities of those more openly Russian nationalist groups attacked. On the contrary, a reassertion of the influence of these forces followed - although they may have lost a highly placed protector. In April 1973, Iakovlev was relieved of his position and posted abroad as an ambassador.\(^{132}\) With his removal, little additional criticism of excessive Russian nationalism appeared for some time in official publications. Yet in another apparent show of resistance to both forms of ideological deviationism on the question of the appropriate balance of elements within 'communist nationalism' (Iakovlev,
Despite his senior position, it will be recalled, had made the mistake of criticising 'Chalmaevism' not from a position of the necessity of Stalinist 'communist nationalism', but from a virtually 'revisionist' point of view, questioning as he did a number of the important changes made to the official interpretation of Russian history under Stalin), two additional individuals were removed from their positions in early 1973, of whom at least one had unmistakable associations with Molodaia gvardiia. Iurii Melent'ev, the director of the Molodaia gvardiia publishing house, who, there are grounds to believe, unsuccessfully proposed to elements within the leadership that a less tramelled and qualified form of Russian nationalism be unleashed, was removed from his position. Similarly, Dmitrii Polianskii, who may have been a defender of the editorial policies of Molodaia gvardiia in leadership circles, was dropped from the Politburo in early 1973, and, like Iakovlev, posted abroad as an ambassador.

Yet, again, the actual consequences for Molodaia gvardiia's position were less serious than might at first have been thought. Not only was the journal itself and its editorial board left intact, but Melent'ev, after a short interval, re-emerged as Deputy Minister of Culture of the RSFSR, a position which, it is to be assumed, permitted just as much if not more ideological influence than his former directorship of the Molodaia gvardiia publishing house.

Nevertheless, following the political debates and developments surrounding the derevenshchiki and Molodaia gvardiia between 1968 and 1973 - which devolved on the central issue of what the balance of ideological elements in Soviet 'communist nationalism' should be - subtle changes can be detected. Essentially, the remainder of the 1970s witnesses the continuing confident - if less extreme - self-expression and self-defence of both Marxist-Leninist internationalists and Russian ethnocentrists in the sphere of contemporary Russian literature, with markedly less, however, of the public ideological imbroglio which marked the earlier period. This suggests that while the Rusity received assurances that, within reason, they could continue publishing, the ideological flamboyance and audacity of 'Chalmaevism' was to be viewed as an excess to be avoided. Thus, while it appears to be legitimate to
claim, as does Georgii Tsvetov in 1977, that 'the circle of literary scholars who... have continued working with great artistic effort on the theme of the motherland-Russia... becomes stronger and expands', it is also valid to claim, as does Jack Haney, that although material dealing with such well-tried themes as motherland and patriotism continue to be published during the period, 'the religious overtones are more difficult to discern, the tone less strident'.

This may be partly explained by the concerted attack on many of the thematic assumptions of the derevenshchiki (which stopped short of the generalised and denunciatory criticisms of the Dement'ev and Iakovlev variety) in such publications as Novyi mir from 1973 intermittently onwards, while the co-opting of the Komsomol into the Nechernozem'e project (discussed below) may also have been a factor. Most significantly, Feliks Kuznetsov, Chairman of the USSR Union of Writers, in an article in Novyi mir in 1973, condemned the apparent alienation of the derevenshchiki from the Soviet Union's much-proclaimed 'Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia', cited Lenin's warnings about 'sentimental romantics' in the field of culture, and reminded readers that the structure of village life in old Russia 'did not fall from the skies but was the result of the economic structure of peasant life'. Two years later, Kuznetsov again warned Russian writers of the twin dangers of nationalism and 'national nihilism':

Criticism must see two extremes, two dangers: the danger of negativism in relation to the past of the fatherland, and, on the other hand, the danger of a supra-social, supra-class approach to the history of one's own country, which leads to the idealisation of the past, to anti-historicism in one's approach to it.

Similar criticism was regularly carried by other relatively 'liberal' publications such as Voprosy literatury.

Such criticism may explain the fact that in his address to the Sixth Congress of Soviet Writers in 1976, one of the elder statesmen of the derevenshchiki, Fedor Abramov, balanced his eloquent and impassioned defence of the concerns of the school with apparently contradictory references to Russian writers 'getting hopelessly bogged down in the village back-roads' and the rhetorical question 'what has happened to
the avant-garde role of our literature? ... Perhaps our literature is, to put it mildly, not exactly marching in step with the times.'

The somewhat less indulgent ideological climate with regard to the derevenshchiki after 1973 may partly explain why some of their number, most notably Vladimir Soloukhin, remained inactive for some time. Nevertheless, members of the movement including Valentin Rasputin, Mikhail Lobanov, Igor' Dedkov and Sergei Voronin continued to publish, and remained prominent. Rasputin serves as a good example of a member of the school who developed its central themes throughout the 1970s - the moral integrity of the Russian peasantry contrasted with the ethical and spiritual inferiority of its urban relatives, and the sadness of the decay of the way of life of the former before the march of modernisation - and was rewarded by the Soviet establishment for his efforts. The writer published a collection of his works in 1976, which included the classically derevenskaia 'Proshchanie s materoi' (serialised in Nash sovremennik the same year), which tells of the imminent destruction of an ancient, isolated Russian settlement as a consequence of the building of a dam. The following year, Rasputin was awarded a Soviet State Prize for Literature for his 'Zhivi i pomni'.

In addition, possibly partly because of the constant criticism of the 'idealisation' of pre-revolutionary Russian village life, many derevenshchiki shifted their focus in the mid to late 1970s to analysis of the suffering of the peasantry during the Soviet era, particularly the 1920s and 1930s. Such writing is remarkable for illustrating how far the authorities were prepared to go in accommodating the Russian nationalist concerns of the Rusity. Such writing is exemplified by writers such as Vasilii Fedorov, Igor' Isaev and Petr Proskurin, who focus during this period on such questions as the 'moral experience of the building of the Baltic-White Sea canal', deal in such metaphors as the Russian muzhik as the 'tear of flint' from which 'the Great One struck the fire', and the physical hardships suffered by the Russian peasantry following the Second World War. The theme of the effect of collectivisation on the Russian land, cautiously taken up for a time in the 1960s, is also apparent, revealing itself in some remarkably uninhibited works, by such writers as Viktor Astaf'ev, Sergei Vikulov,
Nikolai Pal'kin, Oleg Volkov and E. Galkin. Viktor Astaf'ev, for example, in his 'Poslednii poklon', details the consequences of 'this barbaric attitude toward the land', which 'started in my native village of Ovsianka, in the stormy days of the thirties':

- Bewildered muzhiks and their wives shut themselves up in their homes. Weeds, hawthorn, elder-bushes and all the evil spirits of the forest moved onto the defenceless land ...
- Fields which had once been won from the impenetrable taiga and made to grow hardy turnips and corn were soon devastated, turned to nothing.¹⁴⁵

An editorial in an issue of Sovetskaia Rossia in 1979 also suggests that by this period it was no longer strictly taboo to raise the subject of the effect of the great famines of the collectivisation on the Russian homeland.¹⁴⁶ But perhaps most outspoken on the subject was the literary critic I. Vinnikova, who wrote in the same year that the peculiarities and contradictions of present-day agriculture have their roots in the collectivisation of the Russian village ...

- Collective property and mechanisation delivered the peasant from hard, exhausting toil, liberated him from fear of the morrow ...
- But to some extent they weakened the feelings of deep bonds with the soil; they weakened the responsibility of the man who is the master of his own land for his daily work on the land.¹⁴⁷

A number of writers cautiously generalise that the reason for such suffering is what Agurskii terms 'the break in continuity'. Writers such as Fedor Abramov, Aleksei Khvatov and N. Tolchenova talk of 'the eternal values of the spiritual culture accumulated during the ages of the people's experience' and warn that 'the revolutionary re-birth must be followed by care in preserving what was positive in the past'.¹⁴⁸ However, such figures as Petr Proskurin and Anatolii Ivanov go somewhat further in identifying the Revolution with the destruction of the Russian cultural heritage. For example, in Ivanov's novel Vechnyi zov, he has his hero say:

- Wars ... used to weaken every nation, since besides the physical extermination of a part of the nation, they tear up its spiritual roots, trample on and raze the foundations of its morality, burning books, destroying monuments, and turning churches into stables.¹⁴⁹
As Agurskii states, it does not require great imagination to interpret Ivanov as elliptically suggesting that the 'wars' referred to symbolise the experience of Soviet rule.  

By contrast, numerous other writers - including such past proponents of Russian nationalist views as Viktor Chalmaev - appeared in print during this period in such publications as Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik giving greater stress to more orthodox Soviet and internationalist themes, while writers focussing on the more predictable Russian ethnocentric themes in such journals, such as Aleksandr Khvatov, infused hitherto unusual Marxist analysis into their writings. Moreover, it is significant that writers such as Vladimir Soloukhin and Sergei Semanov had volumes of their collected works published in this period, but with the more controversial sections or articles from the 1960s excised. The greater element of official caution surrounding the propagation of views by the derevenshchiki and Molodaia gvardiia/Nash sovremennik group is also suggested by the warning contained in K.N. Lumunov's introduction to the first of a series of monographs on the Slavophiles, Literaturnye vzgliady i tvorchestvo slavianofilov, 1830-1850 gody, published in 1978. Lumunov warns:

By a strange filiation of ideas, individual points of the slavophile doctrine elicit sympathy on the part of a few (true, very few!) representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia. History does not turn backward. A group of literary critics and publicists from the journal Molodaia gvardiia seems to have forgotten this immutable truth when it strives in its own way to resurrect the Slavophile contrast of the patriarchal village and the industrial city and, following that, declares the peasantry to be the sole preserver and mouthpiece of 'the people's' expectations and convictions for all time - and therefore for today.

The Brezhnev era concluded with an increasingly tense polemic surrounding the ideological stance of Nash sovremennik - symbolising the extent to which Russian nationalism could be tolerated by the Soviet establishment - similar to that which revolved around the question of the derevenshchiki and Molodaia gvardiia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. From approximately 1979 onwards, the Party press began to
reiterate its warnings concerning the publication of intolerably Russian nationalist works in official publications. The July 1979 issue of Kommunist thus attacked Molodaia gvardiia for its attempt to rehabilitate F.V. Bulgarin, a 'reactionary figure of the first half of the nineteenth century ... an odious individual in the history of Russian literary-artistic life', while Pravda in October the following year insisted on making clear to its Russian readers that the Soviet homeland was not synonymous with 'the realm of the silver birches'. However, the Party's position cannot be said to have been unambiguous, given, for example, the stance of the eighth issue of Kommunist for 1981, which proposed a form of Soviet patriotism laced with an unusually heavy dose of Russian nationalism (while at the same time the interest of elements of the intelligentsia in figures beyond the pale from the regime's point of view, such as the late nineteenth-century Head of the Church Synod Pobedonostsev, was attacked).

However, the Party appears to have come out decisively against excessive indulgence of Russian nationalism on the pages of official publications in early 1982. Coming shortly after the Party's shrill call for greater ideological vigilance which emerged in other areas in January, and the death of Mikhail Suslov on January 27, both Kommunist and Pravda trenchantly attacked such manifestations of ideological deviationism within two days of each other. The second issue of Kommunist for 1982, released on January 31, severely attacked Vladimir Soloukhin for his 'Pebbles in the Palm', published in the third issue of Nash sovremennik for 1981. A professor of the USSR Academy of Sciences, M. Rutkevich, was given the task of condemning as 'zaigryvanie s bozhen'koi' Soloukhin's flirtation with the notion of a 'higher rational principle' ('vysshee razumnoe nachalo'). Soloukhin's ideas were condemned as part of a wider 'weakening of attention to questions of philosophical outlook' in literary and socio-political publications. In this connection, Rutkevich questioned the reliability of the editorial board which had permitted the publication of Soloukhin's views:

How does the Primary Party Organisation on the editorial board of the journal Nash sovremennik react to the propagandising of idealist views on its pages?
The attack on Soloukhin and Nash sovremennik took on a particular significance from the fact that on the day following the release of the above issue of Kommunist, Pravda carried a major attack on another writer who had appeared in Nash sovremennik. Professor V. Kuleshov, Head of the Department of Russian Literature at Moscow University, wrote a lengthy critique of an article by V. Kozhinov, which had appeared in the November 1981 issue of Nash sovremennik. Pravda's issue of 1 February 1982 attacked Kozhinov under Kuleshov's name not only for the former's mystico-symbolic views of Russian history (discussed in the previous section), but for his apparent sympathy for Dostoevskii's pochvennistvennyi Russian nationalism. 'Under the banner of "love" for Dostoevskii', Kuleshov writes, 'one notices an apologetic glossing over of his glaring contradictions'. Such errors, Pravda thunders, suggest that Nash sovremennik has forgotten Party policy on such questions:

The Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU decisively condemned lack of ideological spirit (bezydeinost'), lack of discrimination regarding the world-view (mironovzrencheskaia nerazborchivost') and departures from clear class positions concerning various figures and events. Precision of criteria, loyalty to Marxist methodology for analysing the artistic process and its concrete manifestations, a developed sense of responsibility - these should be the constant commandments of the literary critic.

However, despite a relatively minor symbolic concession on the part of Nash sovremennik, such calls did not succeed in significantly modifying the behaviour of the journal or its circle. The concession was that the March 1982 issue of Nash sovremennik signed to press on February 18 (17 days after the two high-level attacks) contained a striking symbolic difference. Beginning with the June 1981 issue, the inside cover opposite the table of contents of the journal had started featuring the slogan 'Rossiia- Rodina moia'. Under the slogan were featured photographs of ethnic symbols such as birch trees and Russian folk architecture, as well as symbols which evoked the Soviet Union as well, such as the Kremlin and members of the armed forces. However the third issue for 1982 interrupted the pattern by replacing the slogan and
accompanying photographs of Russian and Soviet symbols with a greeting to women on the occasion of International Women's Day. Subsequent issues reverted to the previous pattern. The same third issue, however, also suggested defiance of the Party authorities by publishing another segment from Soloukhin's 'Pebbles in the Palm'. Presumably in response to this act, the Chief Editor and Secretary of the Primary Party Organisation of Nash sovremennik were required to publish a letter of self-criticism, acknowledging the fairness of Kommunist's criticism of the journal's ideological slant in general, and its mistake in publishing Soloukhin's essay in particular. The statement of self-criticism was carried in the eighth issue of Kommunist for 1982. Nevertheless, the seventh issue of Nash sovremennik for 1982 indicated little genuine repentance, carrying as it did articles which differed little from Soloukhin's (except that they did not teeter quite so conspicuously on the brink of religiosity) by such derevenschchiki as Rasputin and Semenov. The Party's response suggested that only the authority and prestige of a Central Committee resolution could be expected to have any effect on the editorial board of the journal (and whichever political forces were behind it). In late July it passed a directive, essentially reiterating the accusations of Kommunist and Pravda earlier in the year, entitled 'Concerning the Creative Links of Literary-Artistic Journals with the Task of Communist Construction'. The publication of the directive does appear to have resulted in a distinct lull in the activities of the Rusity in and around Nash sovremennik for the remaining months of the Brezhnev era.

There are obviously important differences between the official attitude to the derevenschchiki and most of the areas where, from Stalin onwards, the Soviet authorities have attempted to co-opt Russian national sentiment to the consolidation of their power. Most importantly, rather than this aspect of Soviet Russian nationalism being a case of a tightly-disciplined and monolithic information administration altering the official position on Russian history and culture, as had usually been the case, the derevenschchiki (no doubt like most of the activists in VOOPIK) were sincere Russian nationalists who usually paid insufficient lip-service to Soviet power and Marxist-Leninist ideology, and yet who were largely tolerated by the regime.
Although the authorities from time to time permitted or initiated attacks on their ideological flaws (thus dissociating the Soviet state from such overt Russian nationalism), and apparent public pressure built up on the writers to correct these, the fact is that on balance their behaviour did not alter in any significant sense, and a degree of ideological 'pluralism' entered the Soviet scene during the Brezhnev years, in the form of the dominance of a number of journals and publishing houses by a Russian nationalism less qualified and equivocating than Stalin's 'communist nationalist' hybrid. Moreover, as illustrated by the Dement'ev and Iakovlev cases, the authorities during these years found the more consistently Marxist orientation of certain individuals and editorial boards (such as that of Novyi mir) who forgot that the changes made by Stalin to the interpretation of pre-revolutionary Russian history and culture remained current doctrine, more expendable than the numerous and provocative Rusity with their various journals and publishing houses.

Before moving on to other areas of the pre-revolutionary Russian cultural heritage relevant to the question of 'communist nationalism' during the Brezhnev era, two cases related to the derevenshchiki and the publications which backed them deserve consideration: those of the artist Il'ia Glazunov and the plan to regenerate the nechernozem'e.

The case of the former suggests that the regime also took a somewhat more benign, but nevertheless not infinitely indulgent, view of a figure who has expressed artistically many of the Russian ethnocentric and quasi-religious literary themes of the derevenshchiki. Glazunov, one of the driving forces behind moves to found VOOPIK in the early 1960s, was granted permission in June 1978 to exhibit 400 of his works in Moscow's Manezh Exhibition Hall. In contrast to previous exhibitions permitted Glazunov, in which numerous of his works were forbidden, at the exhibition in Moscow, and that which followed in Leningrad, only his provocative 'Mystery of the Twentieth Century' could not be shown. In the course of a month, between 500,000 and 600,000 visitors saw the exhibition, which included the only marginally less provocative 'Return of the Prodigal Son', as part of his four 'cycles', including 'The History of Russia', 'Russian Literature' (which included no figures of
the Soviet era, for which Glazunov was rebuked by Feliks Kuznetsov), 'Portraits', and 'The Life of Our Times'. Dunlop describes 'The Return of the Prodigal Son', which attracted particular attention, as follows:

... based, of course, on a parable from the Gospel of St Luke ... (it) depicts a shirtless young man in blue jeans on his knees and being comforted by a Christ-like figure, behind whom stand holy men and cultural figures from Russia's past (St Sergii of Radonezh, Dostoevskii, Gogol', etc.). In the painting's foreground, from which the young man has turned away, are scenes associated with wild debauch, Soviet prometheanism, and political terror (e.g. a banquet table, a harlot, two exceedingly plump and smug swine, barbed wire, a skyscraper).

Despite the reported objections of the Leningrad Party authorities, and the deriding of Glazunov in Leningradskaiaprvada the following year, the exhibition was also shown on his home-ground of Leningrad, where it reportedly attracted 1,000,000 visitors, or a quarter of the city's population.

The fact that these exhibitions were permitted to go ahead can be explained by the fact that those with ultimate authority in the matter took neither the censorious view of Glazunov adopted by the Leningrad Party authorities, nor the predictably ecstatic view of the artist as did publications such as Nash sovremennik (not to mention some émigré publications), but took the position that despite certain 'shortcomings' (which, it was suggested, were being overcome), the ideological basis of Glazunov's work was generally sound. Dmitrii Zhukov set out this remarkably non-doctrinaire position in Pravda in June 1978:

Internationalism is impossible without a love for one's Fatherland and for its history. And it is not accidental at all that attention is being attracted to those paintings (of Glazunov's) which are connected with the history of Russia. The artist's interest in the art of ancient Russia and in the sources of (its) centuries-old culture is well-known ... The unfading beauty of Russia - her cities and churches, fields and forests - is imprinted in the historical canvasses. 'A Russian Song', 'Legend of the
Tsarevich Dmitrii', the 'Kulikovo Field' cycle, 'Lord Great Novgorod', 'Boris Godunov' - the titles alone compel one to recall heroic and dramatic pages from the past of our people. Unfortunately, the people itself does not receive enough reflection in the works of the artist ... The work of Il'ia Glazunov is far from uncontroversial. A certain one-sidedness in the selection of themes, a penchant for religious motifs, an accentuation of the tragic aspects of Russian history all draw attention to themselves. There is insufficient reflection in the artist's works of those moments and moving forces of history which led to the birth of the mighty Soviet state and of an authentically democratic culture. Incontestably, one's roots should not be forgotten. But does one have to affirm this so deliberately? Sometimes the artist loses a sense of measure ... unthinkingly opposes the spiritual life of the past to contemporary social and scientific-technical progress, thereby contradicting his own effort to reveal the indestructible links between times. One could include 'The Return of the Prodigal Son' in the ranks of such controversial paintings ... One would like to wish the artist a deeper understanding of our Soviet reality and, of course, of history. And an overcoming of the shortcomings mentioned above. I already see a movement in this direction in many of his portraits of our contemporaries ...

The fact that powerful voices within the regime retained a broadly positive view of Glazunov is further attested to by the fact that the artist was awarded the title of RSFSR People's Artist the following year, was interviewed on Moscow radio (where he made tokenistic obeisances before Soviet internationalism in the context of an otherwise uninhibited Russian nationalist diatribe), and was able to publish an article in Pravda in September 1980 entitled 'The Eternal Heritage'. In addition to lauding the participants in a Conference in St Petersburg in the winter of 1911-12 for rediscovering 'the world of beauty of ancient Rus', he reiterated his view that art must seek national inspiration, and that the stop put to abstract and modern art in the 1930s in the Soviet Union was healthy and praiseworthy. In 1982, Glazunov was also permitted to publish
an article (in Izvestiia) on the subject of Dostoevskii, paying the bare minimum of attention to the writer's 'contradictory' dimension. For most of the article, Glazunov excitedly refers to the writer as 'a genius and a prophet', 'our national genius', who 'shook the world with his revelations, forcing it to look upon Russia and himself through the eyes of the Russian people'.

Thus, revealing policies comparable to the official position on the derevenshchiki and VOOPiK, the authorities during the Brezhnev period, while at times being critical of the ideological defects of Glazunov (and thus distancing themselves somewhat from his blatant Russian nationalism), nevertheless evidently judged it useful to allow him a relatively free hand to encourage popular feelings of Russian nationalism.

The second case concerns a development which went to the root of the concerns of the derevenshchiki - the official announcement in 1974 that the nechernozem'e (the non-black earth region of Russia), the setting for most of their narratives, was to be extensively renovated and regenerated. In a situation contrasting markedly with the 1960s, the Komsomol was co-opted into supporting the project, with publications such as Molodaia gvardiia - the original champion of the second school of derevenskaia proza - calling on the writers to abandon their backward-looking romanticism, and embrace the cause of the redevelopment (which had little to do with conservationism) of the ancient Russian heartland. Thus 'communist nationalism' was opposed to a form of Russian nationalism which the authorities had concluded, no doubt, had little interest in Soviet power.

The announcement of the project followed nine years after Brezhnev's first speech as leader of the Party before the Central Committee, in which he stated, within the overall context of the proposed reform of Khrushchev's agricultural policies, that greater attention would be devoted to the problems of the central zone of Russia. Brezhnev was supported in this endeavour by a number of Party officials from the oblasts of the nechernozem'e, who condemned Khrushchev's neglect of 'our vast, immemorably Russian lands', in the words of B. Petukhov of Kirov oblast. Petukhov
went on to praise the greater attention being devoted to the area:
'This also includes writers ... they love and know the countryside. They can see the changes occurring in it and share with their readers their valuable artistic insights'.

While the goal of the programme was economically (and hence, it was hoped, demographically) to revitalise the nechernozem'e, it also aimed at abandoning hundreds of villages and resettling their inhabitants in larger rural centres, thus threatening 'to destroy those vestiges of the past left in the central Russian countryside and, along with them, the remnants of the historical bases of Russian ethnic self-identification'.

Despite the fact that Soviet modernisation thus set as its goal the possibly final destruction of those elements of Russian life treasured by the derevenshchiki - it possibly being wrongly assumed by elements of the leadership that the correction of neglect through development would be more likely to appeal to Russian ethnic sentiment than the preservation of the status quo (or even the restoration of the status quo ante) - Soviet propaganda clearly attempted to appeal to Russian national sentiment to help mobilise support for the project (Russian biases also having possibly played a role in this part of the Soviet Union's countryside being chosen for large-scale investment). Hence, echoing B.N. Ponomarev's words on the 104th anniversary of Lenin's birth that the project would 'renew the ancient lands of Russia', Semen Shurtakov stated in Literaturnaia gazeta in 1976:

The nechernozem'e is the authentic, deep Russia. Authentic, because in historical terms the Urals, Siberia and many other areas were 'added' later, and because the root - the beginning of the Russia in which we now live - is here, in her so-called central zone.

Despite the Russian nationalist element in such appeals, they appear in part, at least, to have fallen on deaf ears, certainly as far as such publications as Nash sovremennik and Sovetskaia Rossiia were concerned. In such quarters, grave warnings to the effect that the project would mean that there might be 'no motherland' in the future were voiced by writers such as A. Larionov and Ivan Filonenko, (figures who were no doubt equally unenthusiastic about the importation
of non-Russian labour to work in the under-manned zone). Despite such hostility, elements of the Soviet press have insisted that the derevenshchiki abandon their backward-looking romanticisation of the patriarchal Russian village in favour of mobilising support for the plan — in effect returning to the Stalinist model of derevenskaia proza.

As N.V. Sviridov has enthused about the 'great cradle of central and northern Russia' in Molodaia gvardiia (which, it should be recalled, is the Komsomol monthly),

In the great transformation of the nechernozem'e, literature plays a great role...
The irresistible influence of ideas and images, expressed by the power of the writer's talent, sets it even more decisively in the first rank of the most powerful means of communist education.

Importantly, while Sviridov stresses that the nechernozem'e produced such masters of pre-revolutionary Russian culture as Tolstoi, Dostoevskii, Pushkin and Nekrasov, he also emphasises that the region nurtured 'three revolutions', most importantly that of 'Great October'.

The Brezhnev regime's espousal of the nechernozem'e project is important if one is to see its attempt to co-opt Russian nationalists in perspective. While the authorities were prepared at times to be quite extraordinarily tolerant of manifestations of Russian national sentiment, and indeed attempted to exploit this sentiment in consolidating support for the project, they were not prepared to deviate from a policy such as the planned regeneration of the nechernozem'e even in the face of concerted and vigorous protests (by Soviet standards) on the part of this 'lobby group'. Indeed, as if to bring home to them their ultimate powerlessness, one of the principal organs of the Rusity, Molodaia gvardiia, could with apparent ease be transformed into a propaganda mouthpiece opposing the concerns of its erstwhile derevenskaia constituency.

The most important means whereby the Brezhnev regime associated itself with the continuity of Stalinist 'communist nationalism' in the area of the Russian cultural heritage, are those realms covered above, which essentially amounted to the regime permitting broad scope for those concerned with the preservation of the Russian physical and spiritual
heritage. This approach to the Russian past was also evident, however, in policies towards pre-revolutionary literature, music and art, the Russian language, and the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. Official policies also indulged one of the less attractive aspects of traditional Russian culture, anti-Semitism.

With regard to pre-revolutionary literature, art and music, Brezhnev remained faithful to the policy initiated by Stalin and retained by Khrushchev of encouraging love for this heritage in such a way that the emotion would also, it was hoped, induce Soviet patriotism. Thus S. Kovalev wrote in Pravda in August 1967 that Soviet cultural policy was opposed to both 'bourgeois reformism' which denied any connection between culture and material living conditions, viewing culture as the outcome of a non-class 'spiritual stream', and 'petit-bourgeois nihilism', in which the victorious proletariat rejects the entire pre-revolutionary cultural heritage. The latter, according to Kovalev, reflected the 'petit-bourgeois ideal' of a 'poor and spiritually indigent people', and was characteristic of the Proletkul't, the 'left-wing' communism of the 1920s, and the 'Cultural Revolution' in China. Voprosy literatury reaffirmed that such 'leftists' were particularly mistaken in neglecting 'the Russian national tradition, especially the realistic tradition'.

The principal consequences of this position for cultural policies in the Brezhnev period were that those areas of literature, music and art rehabilitated under Stalin to supplement the hybrid traditionalism and 'socialist realism' of contemporary works - broadly 'ruling class' Russian culture of the pre-revolutionary period (with some recognition of peasant and working class culture in the popularisation of folk literature, music, and art) - remained objects of adulation (the concrete manifestations of culture usually being connected in some manner with Russian patriotism), while deviations from such canons, in particular the cultural experimentation of the early Soviet period and Western popular culture, come in for regular savage criticism. Thus, in connection with anniversaries, the erection of monuments or the release of relevant works, the Soviet authorities as under Stalin and Khrushchev regularly laud such figures as Pushkin, Turgenev, Lermontov, Gogol', Griboedov, Ostrovskii, Tiutchev, Leskov, Tolstoi and Dostoevskii in the area of
literature - though in the case of the last three, tokenistic references to their 'contradictory', though on balance exemplary, natures had to be made. In the area of music, Tchaikovskii, Borodin, Rimskii-Korsakov, Glinka (whose name was chosen for the title of the RSFSR Music Prize) and Rakhmaninov continued to be regarded as the standards in the classical sphere, together with pre-revolutionary folk, martial, and choral music, and classical ballet, which, it was constantly stressed, should adhere strictly to (pre-revolutionary) tradition in the form of their performance. Similarly with regard to the Russian artistic heritage, virtually all pre-revolutionary art (with the exception of some early Twentieth Century 'Modernism') remained positively viewed, in particular the nineteenth-century realists such as Repin (as with Glinka for music, in 1966 the RSFSR Art Prize was named the 'Repin Prize'), the medieval iconographers such as Rublev, and Russian folk art. In keeping with this essentially conservative and nationalistic approach, post-revolutionary experimentation in the cultural sphere was consistently castigated, whether it be the sin of 'vulgar modernisation' or 'decadence' manifested in the Theatre of the Absurd, atonality in music (including Western popular music), or the use of abstract, cubist or constructivist forms in art. Crucially, the mistake of departure from the canons of pre-revolutionary Russian culture is identified with 'cosmopolitanism'. Thus, Igor' Stravinskii, while being assessed on balance by Pravda as a 'great Russian composer' is held to have deviated from patriotism in his creative work in at times departing from Russian classical style:

... he mastered ... almost all the fashionable trends of the Twentieth Century - from jazz and neo-classicism to ultra-modern styles of composition. Sometimes these transitions brought no significant artistic results and remained experiments, as it were. It was at precisely these times, perhaps, that the composer's isolation from his native soil had its greatest impact ...

The association suggested between approved manifestations of Russian culture and 'the Russian nation' was thus frequently exploited for political purposes under Brezhnev (as it was under the previous two regimes) - for example it is frequently stressed that the German 'fascist beasts' pillaged Iasnaia Poliana, that the Czechs deleted Tchaikovskii
and Prokofiev from concert programmes in early 1968, and that to listen to Western popular music is to ignore and therefore to 'slander' the traditions of Russian classical and folk music. Pre-revolutionary Russian traditions have also been used as criteria to attack such figures as the experimental stage producer Iurii Liubimov, and to question the production of plays which reveal social conflict.\(^{197}\)

No doubt encouraged by the emergence of the 'voluntary societies' during the Brezhnev era, numerous works on the art and literature of Russia's formative and mediaeval periods continued to be published.\(^{198}\) The prestige and importance accorded to this work is indicated by the fact that one of Soviet Russia's foremost literary scholars, Ia.S. Lur'e, was permitted to complain in his \textit{Istoki russkoi belletristikii}, published in 1970, that 'restraints', presumably political, had long been placed on the study of old Russian literature.\(^{199}\)

Moreover, in line with the growth of a somewhat more self-confident school of Russian nationalists around journals such as \textit{Molodaia gvardiia} and \textit{Nash sovremennik}, names such as Pushkin and Goncharov are sometimes made to serve novel propaganda purposes. For example, Iurii Ivanov wrote in \textit{Molodaia gvardiia} in 1969, in an article entitled 'An Echo of the Russian People', that Pushkin achieved greatness only after he had 'matured' away from Western influences, and the 'scepticism and lack of faith' these involved.\(^{200}\) S. Polikarpov similarly accuses 'Europe' of having caused the death of the great poet, an act interpreted as part of a larger and wider conspiracy against Russia.\(^{201}\) The re-evaluation of Ivan Goncharov's novel \textit{Oblomov} also deserves attention. Traditionally in Soviet criticism, the slothful Russian of the novel's title has been interpreted as at best a figure of fun, starkly contrasted as he is with the dynamic and industrious German, Stoltz. However, in a biography of the writer published in 1977, I. Loshchits reinterprets the novel as a Russian nationalist rejection of European civilisation, with Oblomov playing the part of an unequivocally positive hero.\(^{202}\)

Similar policy held sway in the area of the Russian language. Bombastic praise of the qualities of Russian is continuously encountered in official publications throughout the era. Typical of this idolatry -
which, of course, was also prominent in previous decades under Stalin and Khrushchev—are the words of poet Igor' Isaev, quoted in Zvezda in September 1981:

The Russian language is thrice great! Great as the language of a great people. Great as the language of each of us comprising this people.

Possibly as part of a response to the large influx of foreign words into Russian during the Brezhnev period (in addition to the fact that as part of the Russian cultural heritage the language inspired a predictably conservative, nationalist response), those concerned with maintaining its alleged 'purity' continue to have wide access to the media. Nevertheless, certain figures—such as Ruben Budagov—remain conspicuous by polemicising with the more brazen Russian nationalist claims in this area.

Linguistic conservatives were, however, those given greatest exposure by the media. Following the support lent by Kommunist in 1965 to the usual ethnocentric Russian claims and concerns regarding the language, writers such as Konstantin Iakovlev, Viktor Chalmaev in Molodaia gvardiia, and P. Antokol'skii in Iunost', were given relatively free rein to criticise the alleged debasement of the language (a process usually described as emanating from the West) and to propose such partial solutions as the wider study of Old Church Slavonic by Russians. Iakovlev in his Kak my porchim russkii iazyk was particularly scathing of those who 'attempt tightly to close off the national nurturing sources' (narodnye, rodnikovye istoki) of the Russian language, such as Kornei Chukovskii, who in the early 1960s had advocated the acceptability of introducing foreign terms into Russian. Similarly, a writer such as Vil' Lipatov appealed for Russian not to lose its 'national' (narodnaia) basis, while Literaturnaia gazeta conducted something of a campaign in 1974 to stop the influx of foreign, mainly Western terms into Russian, a campaign with which publications such as Komsomol'skaia pravda persisted until at least the end of the Brezhnev era.

Following the severe repressive measures of the later Khrushchev years with regard to the position of the Russian Orthodox Church (which,
as was pointed out in the previous chapter, did not deny the Church all the privileges granted it by Stalin after the beginning of the Second World War), the Brezhnev regime associated itself with an importantly symbolic improvement in the situation of the institution and its fifty million active members,\textsuperscript{213} toning down persecution in both the administrative and propaganda areas.

The first means by which it did so was the relatively open criticism in the official press of policies pursued under Khrushchev's rule towards religion in general, and the Russian Church in particular. It was acknowledged soon after Khrushchev's fall on the pages of \textit{Nauka i religiia}, \textit{Komsomol'skaia pravda} and \textit{Voprosy filosofii} that the main effect of the former regime's none too subtle administrative and propaganda campaign amounted to the usual consequence of religious persecution: the creation of sympathy for, and interest in the Church, combined with a tendency for it to go underground. Official behaviour towards the Church of the sort encouraged under Khrushchev also, it was conceded, tended to reinforce the convictions of believers. Most notably, early in 1965, \textit{Nauka i religiia} attacked one of the more prominent atheist propagandists of the Khrushchev era, A.Ia. Trubnikova, for her offensive personal attacks on Orthodox clergy and believers.\textsuperscript{214} Other publications carried on their pages throughout the year 'self-criticism' of the \textit{antireligiozniki} responsible for such 'slander' and the wide use of crude 'administrative measures' in attempts to curtail religious belief.\textsuperscript{215} The new situation, in contrast to the 'subjectivism' of the past, was summed up by \textit{Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma}, the journal of the newly founded Institute of Scientific Atheism of the similarly new Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee:\textsuperscript{216}

Applied to atheist work, the ['scientific', 'rational'] approach requires a scientific explanation of the nature of religion and of the ways of overcoming religious survivals. To deviate from this principle is the subjectivist conception which ultimately reduces the essence of religion to the deception of simpletons by charlatans, and ascribes the causes of the existence of religious survivals in our country on the one hand to alien ideological influence and the resourcefulness of churchmen, and on the other, to the shortcomings of atheist
propaganda. Such a conception leads to incorrect practical conclusions. It revives the attempt artificially to speed up the overcoming of religiosity, and encourages administrative methods in atheistic work. The fundamental defect of this conception lies in its subjectivism, in the departure from a scientific-materialist approach to religion, in the ignoring of the objective social factors underlying the tenacity of religious superstitions... Basic efforts should be concentrated on the steady reduction of the reproduction of religiosity among the new generations of Soviet society.  

Moreover, in a remarkable turn-around from his previous statements, the Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers V.A. Kuroedov, went on record in 1966 reflecting a similarly 'softer' line.

Thus, in addition to regularly singling out the Russian Church as the model Soviet religious institution in terms of loyalty to the interests of the Soviet state (a feature which had persisted under Khrushchev), the Russian Church was now to be spared the vitriol with which Soviet atheist propaganda continued - the difference being that after the deposition of Khrushchev only the members of non-Russian religions (especially unauthorised sectarian groups, but also Moslems, Catholics and Protestants) of the Soviet Union were regularly branded with terms such as 'fanatics', 'ignoramuses' and 'parasites'. Atheist agitation against the Russian Orthodox Church during the Brezhnev era (which was no doubt additionally motivated by fear of the growing popular interest in the Church) tended to be dominated by quasi-sociological studies of the reasons for belief in traditionally Russian Orthodox areas, and attempts to devise secular holidays and festivals (preferably of traditional Russian origin) which could replace Russian religious ceremonies and holidays.

In line with this reorientation of the state propaganda offensive, the Brezhnev regime made a number of minor administrative concessions affecting the Russian Orthodox Church of important symbolic value. While the closing of churches and the suppression of parishes was largely discontinued, in March 1966 the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR passed a
law, in practice of course of little real use to believers in a society such as the Soviet Union, explicitly stating that discrimination against religious believers was to be a criminal offence. In addition, the theoretical right of appeal to the Supreme Soviet was reinstituted for church closures, approximately 1% of the churches closed under Khrushchev were re-opened, and the situation of the Church's few theological schools was improved. Moreover, two of the more rabid anti-religious publications of the Khrushchev era, Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma and Ezhegodnik muzeia istorii religii i ateizma were closed, while in January 1965 the Ukrainian-language monthly Voiovnychi ateist ('Militant Atheist') was given the somewhat less foreboding title Liudyna i svit ('Man and the World'). Perhaps the most substantial administrative concession, however, was the authorities' acquiescence in the election in June 1971 of Metropolitan Pimen' as Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, rather than the candidate favoured by the Party, Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad and Novgorod, who, however, was less popular, inter alia, because of his widely-rumoured KGB ties.

Nevertheless, despite the abandonment of the all but totally repressive approach to the Russian Church of the Khrushchev years, the authorities under Brezhnev reacted on occasion with critical salvos when too great a popular or intellectual interest was shown in the Russian Orthodox Church as a religious institution. This was the case, for example, in 1971, as part of the wider attack around this time on the ideological slant emerging from such publications as Molodaia gvardiia. All the same, the regime's general approval of VOOPIK and the second school of derevenskaia proza indicated that elements within the Russian intelligentsia were to be indulged, up to a point, in their concern for the preservation of Russian ecclesiastical architecture and the traditional moral outlook of the fast disappearing rural narod, as well as their interest in the study of the history and art of the church (though the latter had already been cautiously sanctioned since the 1930s). This was in spite of the fact that all of these concerns were bound to reveal and encourage, at least in part, religious searchings (as opposed to the purely ethnocentric motivations for such interest approved by the state). This likelihood was proved in the writings of such figures as Vladimir Soloukhin, Valentin Sorokin, Dmitrii Zhukov, Petr Proskurin,
Viktor Astaf'ev, Vasilii Elesin and Efim Dorosh, the last of whom experienced difficulties with the censorship because of his quasi-religious thematic overtones (as later Soloukhin did). An example of the leanings of such writers towards all but overt religiosity in their ostensible concern with the question of the Russian cultural heritage is revealed, for example, by the following lines of Sorokin, published in Moskva in 1977:

> The absence of the crosses on our cathedrals
> recalls to me the age when earth and grass
> were soaked deep in blood.
> The cathedrals stay on alone in the fields ...
> like warriors with their heads cut off by
> Ghireans.229

The Church hierarchy, for its part, particularly at events such as the Local Council of the Church held in Zagorsk in the spring of 1971 (which elected Pimen' as Patriarch), and the celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of the Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1978, continued to stress the unity of the Church with the Russian people, reminding its audience of its past services to the Soviet government in calling for the defence of the *rodina*, work which had been 'highly appreciated by the Soviet Government'.231 It also continued to lay great stress on its support for the Soviet Government, particularly in the area of its foreign policy.

The Brezhnev regime's policy with regard to the Russian Orthodox Church, therefore, while obviously not one of the principal elements of its strategy, was nevertheless important for establishing its credentials with Russian nationalists. While the marginally improved treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church could hardly have been calculated to generate support for the Soviet government from genuine Orthodox believers, the toning down of overt persecution, combined with the various minor propaganda concessions it made, could at least be judged to remove the risk of the regime being seen as having no Russian nationalist legitimacy whatsoever, as would appear to have been the response engendered among many Russians by Khrushchev's persecution of the Church.

The final area of the Russian cultural heritage which deserves examination in terms of the policies relevant to this study is that of
the anti-Semitism of the Brezhnev period (the question of anti-Semitism in writings on the history of the pre-revolutionary Russian State having already been examined in the previous section).

While the regime which was installed following Khrushchev's removal did not openly accuse the two former Party leaders of anti-Semitism, the first two to three years of the Brezhnev era are notable for the number of condemnations of this phenomenon carried on the pages of official publications. For example, Il'ia Erenburg was permitted to publish a lengthy condemnation of anti-Semitism during the period of the 'cult of the personality' on the pages of Novyi Mir in early 1965. However, with the Sinavskii - Daniel dissident trials of early 1966, and particularly with the Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, an unparalleled and relentless campaign against 'Zionism' emerged in official publications. As Ogonek claimed at the time of the Arab-Israeli War, while Zionism was one of the 'principal forms of anti-communism', it was 'little known' until the 'Israeli oppression' of June 1967.

Zionism has been consistently vilified in highly-charged emotional terms as 'a mixture of Judaistic mysticism, nationalistic hysteria, shameless social demagogy and racialist concepts of the superiority of "God's chosen people" over all other peoples'. It is allegedly inextricably bound up with American 'monoplastic capitalism' and 'imperialism', and its adherents are alleged to have collaborated with the Nazis, West German 'revanchists' and anti-Semites in general, it being alleged that Zionists encourage anti-Semitism as it furthers the cause of a Jewish homeland. It is therefore, of essence, anti-communist and anti-Soviet. Reports frequently stress the large extent of 'Zionist' infiltration of the West's governmental, business, academic and journalistic circles, and the consequent disproportionate Zionist control of wealth, power and information in the West. For example, Zhurnalist in 1972 quotes the American Saturday Evening Post to the effect that 'members of the Jewish community control a good half' of the biggest publishing establishments in the United States. Moreover, in Ivan Shevtsov's 1970 novel Vo imia otsa i syna, the author claims that 'Zionism' 'secretly infiltrates the life-cells of all the countries of the world, undermining from within all that is strong and healthy ...
grasping all that is important in the administrative, economic and spiritual life of each country'. The loaded term 'Zionist bankers' is one frequently encountered.

Of more specific concern for Russians, on top of the alleged 'haughty contempt' of Zionists for Russians, Zionists are held to have played a major role in the 'counter-revolutionary' developments in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (particularly in connection with the figures of Goldstuecker, Kriegel and Šík, even though the last was not Jewish), the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and to have used Trotsky to infiltrate the Soviet leadership during the 1920s. Most insidiously of all, in accordance with the claim that the chief enemy of Zionism is the 'Socialist' commonwealth, it is frequently claimed that with its formidable resources, it is constantly attempting to corrupt Jewish citizens in such countries and recruit them into its nefarious subversive plans.

There are strong grounds for believing, however, that the convoluted Soviet official position on Zionism which reached full flower during the Brezhnev period - that the Soviet policy of agitating against Zionism is incompatible with and indeed the opposite of anti-Semitism - serves as a thin disguise for catering to traditional Russian anti-Semitism in an ideologically defensible form. This is despite the elaborate efforts to demonstrate that the Soviet State distinguishes between Zionists and Jews - revealed from frequent attempts to demonstrate the claim that Jewish culture thrives in the Soviet Union, to the identifiably Jewish names often attributed as authors of anti-Zionist pieces. As Paul Lendvai and Harry Shaffer argue, 'the average Soviet ... reader of the by now daily diet of "anti-Zionist" literature would have to make an almost superhuman effort to remember that the stereotypes apply only to the nebulous Zionists and the far-away Israelis, not to the Jew who may happen to live next door'. As Shaffer adds, despite the Soviet claim that a clear distinction is to be drawn between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, 'there is no denying that in much that has appeared in print since 1967 on matters Jewish in the Soviet Union, both fiction and non-fiction, the distinction between "good Jews" and Zionists and between decent, honest, loyal Jewish comrades and the age-old stereotypes of Jews created by anti-Semites of past generations seems to have gotten
lost in the shuffle'. Shaffer's point is supported by the frequent portrayal of Jews as evil degenerates in much fiction produced in the Soviet Union after 1967. Notable in this regard is Ivan Shevtsov's Liubov' i nenavist' (later condemned together with his Vo imia otsa i syna by Pravda in July 1970, but only after several months, when the large printing runs of both novels had been sold out), which centres on the Jew Nachum Holtser, a mercenary sadist who murders his mother for the inheritance, and then proceeds gruesomely to destroy a stereotypically beautiful Russian young woman. Similar themes are revealed in Boris Nikol'skii's The Memory Formula, published in 1981.

Other examples might include one of Sergei Shurtakov's works, quoted by D. Zhukov in Nash Sovremennik. In the work, a talented Russian architect is married to a 'slender, darkish Marina'. As a consequence, the husband loses his interest in Russian church architecture, a development which is reversed when the two are separated. Other cases of thinly disguised Jewish spouses corrupting and exploiting their Russian partners (or in which Jews are simply described negatively) recur in the works of A. Bakhvalov, M. Kuz'min and Anatolii Ivanov.

Other writers have elliptically implicated the Jews in crimes relating to the Soviet past. On top of the implied claims of writers such as Semanov and Alpatov that the Jews have borne an unrelating hostility to the Revolution and the Soviet State throughout its existence, figures such as Petelin and Belza have suggested that the Jewish critics and theorists prominent on the Soviet cultural scene in the 1920s inhibited or destroyed much genuinely Russian cultural output during these years (examples suggested being Bulgakov's Master i Margarita, and the poet Esenin, driven to suicide). On the other hand, the writings of Zhukov, Safronov, and Lazarev reveal criticism of Jewish cultural figures during the first decades of Soviet power - such as Erenburg, Mandel'shtam and the composers Sheferan and Piatskovskii - with unmistakable anti-Semitic overtones.

Trofim Kichko's Judaism Without Embellishment should also be noted in this connection. Written in the late Stalin era, the work contained the claim that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 'every Jew
is a Judaist', and any 'Judaist' could be considered 'an Israeli'.

Also encountered is the claim that a Jewish nationalist is indistinguishable from a Zionist. (As is apparent from those parts of this study which focus on Soviet nationality policies, the distinction between the legitimate preservation of non-Russian national distinctiveness and 'bourgeois nationalism' is frequently lost on the Soviet authorities.) While Kichko was denounced shortly after the death of Stalin as a wartime collaborator in the Ukraine, in the late 1960s he was 'rehabilitated', receiving an honour from the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the above work, moreover, being republished (in 1968) under the title Judaism and Zionism in an edition of 60,000.257

The Stalinist tactic of identifying the perpetrators of misdeeds with groups of Jewish names serves further to blur the distinction between Zionists and Jews. Thus, for example, Molodaia gvardiia in 1979 accused unspecified overseas Zionist organisations of having motivated various 'swindlers' arrested by the KGB. The journal notes that 'such Ilizarovs, Boksiners and Kleins' can only be 're-educated' with difficulty.258 A similar 'blurring' effect must also be caused by the 'cartoon' illustrations of 'Zionists' often found in Soviet publications, depicted as they are as 'stereotype Jews, short, fat, hook-nosed, wide-mouthed, and ugly, showing them to be unsavory, greedy, evil characters'.259 Unlike other areas of 'communist nationalism' in the area of policies concerning the Russian cultural heritage, there does not appear to have been any significant attempt to tone down Russian anti-Semitism in official publications after the late 1960s. This is aside from Pravda's somewhat belated condemnation of Shevtsov's two novels of 1970 as 'ideologically vicious and artistically weak'. The attack, as can be seen from much of the above, does not appear to have had any significant effect on the publication of thinly disguised anti-Semitism throughout the 1970s. Indeed, Shevtsov, whose career did not appear to be compromised by the official attack, published another novel in 1977, Borodinskoe pole.260 Most notably, the novel contains a section in which an explanation is given for Hitler's hatred of the Jews from the mouth of a captured officer of the Reich. The author makes no attempt to respond to the argument, or to distance the narrative from the views expressed. In contrast to Shevtsov's experiences in the earlier part of the decade, the book was well received by the critics.261
Even more blatant was V. Begun's (and his reviewers') thinly-disguised attempt to 'rehabilitate' the anti-Semitism of the pre-revolutionary era. As V. Emelianov states in a review of Begun's Vtorzhenie bez oruzhia, published in 1977:

Begun writes that, from a Marxist rather than a nationalist point of view, past persecutions of Jews can be seen as instances of class antagonism rather than of anti-Semitism, 'if the people's wrath was directed against Jewish moneylenders, tavern-keepers, factory-owners, merchants and other exploiters'. 'After all, say Begun, 'let us not today hold against our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers, who were fighting for a just cause, the fact that they were disrespectful toward their oppressors, regardless of relationship and national origin.'

Nevertheless, the existence of some remaining inhibitions is revealed by the fact that Evgenii Eseev's openly anti-Semitic The Place of Zionism in the Anti-Communist System, reportedly published by the Soviet Interior Ministry after being passed by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, was not permitted to go on sale, its distribution being limited to members of the Soviet élite.

Following Brezhnev's condemnation of anti-Semitism in his address to the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress, parallel with other areas examined in this chapter, the final two years of the Brezhnev era reveal a number of articles in Izvestiia and Pravda which again take issue with those who are 'indifferent' to remnants of anti-Semitism in Soviet society (the later article possibly being in response to Nikol'skii's Memory Formula, published during the previous two months in Neva). However, ritualistic Soviet condemnations of anti-Semitism remain harder to interpret than most other ideological pronouncements, given the official position that the phenomenon is alien to Soviet society.

The Brezhnev period therefore reveals the widespread use of implicit anti-Semitism which, while at times veering perilously close to becoming overt, was kept on a leash and not permitted to do so by the regime. Anti-Semitism hence played a role in Soviet 'communist nationalism'
alongside other aspects of the Russian cultural heritage. This, however, does not represent any further 'deradicalisation' by the Brezhnev administration. Such official anti-Semitism was, of course, not without precedent in the Soviet Union, it having been resorted to by both Stalin and Khrushchev, even though under Brezhnev it may have been more widespread and consistently exploited. With the Brezhnev period however, as with its two predecessors, it was essential that anti-Semitism, a useful tool whereby the regime could, inter alia, tap Russian national sentiment, never be admitted as a conscious policy. Consequently, anti-Semitism could never be permitted to be overtly expressed.

The above survey attempts to demonstrate that official policy towards the pre-revolutionary Russian cultural heritage during the Brezhnev era reveals the continuity of Stalinist 'communist nationalism' even though elements of Russian nationalism are perhaps more visible than at any time since the late Stalin years, and powerful elements within the Soviet establishment - who, no doubt, granted support to such individuals as the derevenshchiki, the figures associated with Molodaia gvardiia and Nash Sovremennik and the artist Il'ia Glazunov - were constantly pushing for a less ideologically adulterated form of official Russian nationalism. The regime's behaviour in this area must be characterised as representing continuity with Stalin's 'communist nationalism' rather than 'deradicalisation' in that none of the regime's Russian nationalist behaviour with regard to the cultural heritage was without precedent in Stalin's time. The apparently widely diffused Russian nationalism of the populace, encouraged by the perceived 'anti-Russian' policies of Khrushchev, was accommodated as far as possible within the limitations of an avowedly Marxist-Leninist system by the collective leadership after October 1964. Most importantly, the new regime permitted the formation of voluntary societies for the protection of historical and cultural monuments, allowed a number of periodicals, newspapers and publishing houses to print material which would appeal to those concerned with the preservation of the Russian moral and spiritual heritage, distanced itself from the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church, and permitted the publication of increasingly (but never entirely) open and unambiguous anti-Semitism, especially after
June 1967. These measures were in addition to the standard Stalinist and Khrushchevian means of suggesting the Soviet state's benign view of the Russian people in the area of the cultural heritage - the official positive view of most pre-revolutionary literature, music and art (in contrast to the deadly enemy - twentieth-century innovation and experimentation in the field of culture), and the likewise sanctioned conservative view of the Russian language. Nevertheless, in addition to the constant requirement that those expressing a form of Russian nationalism make some form of obeisance before Soviet power, at times during the Brezhnev era, when published material was perceived by those in power as threatening the authority and legitimacy of the ruling ideology - and therefore the system - or when the required formula of 'communist nationalism' became 'nationalism' pure and simple, the regime acted to correct the situation, or at least attempted to dissociate itself from the propagation of such non-Marxist-Leninist ideas.

(b) Russian Culture and Soviet Nationality Policies

It will be recalled that following some drawing away from Stalin's policies of cultural integration of the Soviet nationalities and the deprivation of many of the cultural rights of the non-Russian groups during the first four years following the death of Stalin, Khrushchev presided over a nationality policy which, if anything, was more integrationist and less concerned with the interest of the non-Russians in preserving their cultural identity, than had been Stalin's. In this later period, the Party proclaimed that as part of the overall drive for 'full-scale communist construction', it had identified the process of the nationalities' 'drawing together'. The concept of the alleged 'flourishing' of the cultures of the Soviet Union, given so much publicity in the four years following Stalin's death, was not so much abandoned during this later period as combined with that of ethnic 'drawing together', such that Soviet spokesmen came to speak of the 'dialectical unity' of the two processes, processes which would climax at some stage in the foreseeable future in the achievement of the Soviet nationalities' 'complete unity', or in their 'merging'. This forecast (and goal) was embodied in the 1961 Third Programme of the CPSU. However, the 'internationalisation' involved in the latter process clearly was code for Russification, actively supported as it was by All-Union linguistic
and demographic policies, as well as by the more general Party encouragement to abandon the specific traits of the non-Russian nationalities' ethnic distinctiveness, in favour of 'All-Union' or 'Soviet' characteristics. The process as envisaged under Khrushchev also included the disappearance of the state formations representing the nationalities of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's policies in this area - like Stalin's - in their denial of Soviet 'internationalism', at least as interpreted during the first decade of Soviet rule (relatively genuine cultural egalitarianism), could thus legitimately be seen as another case of the fusion of Russian nationalism with the goals of the Soviet state - or 'communist nationalism'.

In a crude sense, the Brezhnev period represents a similar picture to the Khrushchev years in terms of official nationality policies. The first years of the new regime after October 1964 represent an obvious attempt to curry favour with the non-Russian nationalities, alienated as they were by the essentially Russian chauvinist assimilationist policies of the previous regime, and seeking reassurances that their cultures would be permitted to 'flourish' rather than be 'internationalised' - or merge with Russian culture. However, while the early Khrushchev period reveals the almost total absence of a proclaimed goal of ethnic assimilation, the Brezhnev regime in its early days sought only to eliminate the extremism of Khrushchev's assimilationism. Thus, there was a tendency to debunk the notion of rapid 'merging' while the policy of more gradual 'drawing together' - which retained the notion of the Russian Kulturtraeger - was kept.

This caution had dissipated, however, by the late 1960s, from which period onwards most of Khrushchev's concepts denoting the goal of rapid assimilation revert to regular usage. Nevertheless, a modicum of caution continued to condition the regime's behaviour in this regard. While official publications again begin to talk of the goal of 'full unity', and the borders between the constituent units of the USSR increasingly 'losing their former significance', the notion of 'merging' in its Khrushchevian sense remains generally (though not always) beyond the pale. Moreover, the focus of attention and publicity in the nationality policy area is fixed on the notion of the 'Soviet People',

a concept which suggests process towards the achievement of ethnic fusion, while at the same time being claimed as largely a unity based on 'social' and 'class' factors.

The reversion to assimilationism in the late 1960s also sees the return to vigorous attempts to encourage linguistic Russification through educational and demographic means, as well as heightened alertness to non-Russian 'bourgeois nationalism', such a pliable term that it was frequently interpreted in practice as being synonymous with the cultural distinctiveness (other than language) of the non-Russian nationalities.

The general picture of the mounting Russian chauvinism in the nationality policies of the Brezhnev years is qualified, however, by a brief and partial infusion of greater 'internationalist' concern for non-Russian cultural rights into policy during the final two years of the regime.

The Brezhnev regime acted to assuage some of the fears of the non-Russian nationalities, at least in its first years, by jettisoning the prospect of 'complete unity' and 'merging' in the short term - as was set out in the 1961 Party Programme. Perhaps ironically, while the Party did not reverse Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation (at least immediately), Stalin ceased to be used as the symbol of the perversion of the 'Leninist Nationality Policy', the official line reverting to seeing the dictator in league with Lenin 'solving' the Soviet nationalities question. While the Party recentralised power through such acts as the abolition of the sovnarkhozy, ('balanced' by the much-publicised abolition of Khrushchev's Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR in 1966), compensatory gestures (or at least rhetoric) towards the non-Russian nationalities were particularly prominent during the first years of the new regime. Indeed, as a consequence of a number of administrative rearrangements, a 1966 Pravda editorial claimed that 'the Union Republics have now been granted new rights in the spheres of planning, capital construction, financing, labour and wages. The role of the Union Republic State Planning Commissions has been increased'. The new regime also sought to popularise its nationality policy by criticising the implicitly less 'liberal' and 'internationalist' policies of the Khrushchev regime in
this area. Thinly veiled criticism of the policy 'of the recent past' (or later 'the early 1960s') of 'merging' – which, it was suggested, was tantamount to 'national nihilism' – came to prominence on the pages of official publications. For example, *Druzhba narodov* wrote in early 1967:

... in the last few years there have been hot-heads among critics and publicists who have demanded work in the direction of the merging of languages. It has been as if they have forgotten that national differences will survive for an extremely long period, remaining even after the victory of communism on a world-wide scale.  

Importantly, in 1969, a *Kommunist* editorial spelt out the regime's view of the difference between, and the relative importance of, the two related but very distinct concepts of 'drawing together' (sblizhenie) and 'merging' (sliianie):

The formation of a new historical community – the Soviet multinational people – represents an outstanding expression of the international unity and equality of the Soviet socialist nations and nationalities. The Soviet people is an international community of socialist nations and nationalities. Under the leadership of the Communist Party the multinational Soviet people firmly proceeds towards communism. Each Soviet nation and nationality brings its own weighty contribution into the successful construction of the new community. In the process of the creation of communism they attain an all-round flourishing and ever closer rapprochement of nations and their international unity should not be viewed as merger. The elimination of all national differences is a long process, and it is possible only after the complete victory and consolidation of communism in the entire world.

Of equal importance for indicating the new line on nationality policies was the fact that Petr Fedoseev of the USSR Academy of Sciences introduced criticism of 'national nihilism' (to balance 'bourgeois nationalism') in articles on the nationality question, while such relative 'moderates' as Dzhandil'din were permitted to attack the 'administrative implementation' of the process of 'drawing together'. Dzhandil'din, Secretary for ideological affairs of the Kazakh Party Central Committee, while also
criticising those unenthusiastic about the 'mutual penetration' of cultures, attacked those who

fail to understand that the process of the drawing together of nations and national cultures ... defies 'rushing on' by means of artificial, administrative measures, that any attempt to 'outstrip' the natural course of a normal process can only impede. 273

It is also noteworthy that the writings of erstwhile prophets of rapid cultural 'internationalisation' such as Akhad Agaev continue to be printed after October 1964, their names, however, now being associated with less hasty and monumental visions of ethnic assimilation. 274

While a marginally greater sensitivity to the feelings of the non-Russian nationalities than was the case under Khrushchev can be detected throughout the Brezhnev period, the end of the 1960s sees a return to more accelerated assimilationist policies, which continued for the remaining years of the regime. Nevertheless, following the first months of the new administration when a degree of conflict or indecision is suggested by the silence of the leadership on the nationality question (in contrast with a continuation of the Khrushchev line in the media and outside Moscow), 275 the concept of dialectically unified 'drawing together' and 'flourishing' re-emerged, the ideological apparatus continuing to suggest - as it had done under Khrushchev - that such ethnic processes were relevant exclusively to the non-Russian nationalities. 276 At the same time, the new leadership indicated the essential continuity of policy at the 1966 Twenty-Third Party Congress in a way no doubt calculated to contrast as starkly as possible with the drastic descriptions of the pace and scale of ethnic amalgamation encountered under Khrushchev. The second sentence of the following excerpt from Brezhnev's address harks back to the statements encountered frequently in the first years following the death of Stalin, and rarely encountered after 1957 during the Khrushchev years:

The Party and all Communists ... are called to work indefatigably to bring about the further comprehensive strengthening of the friendship and fraternity of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and to make their economic, cultural and spiritual ties closer and more varied. In solving any problem, whether it be of the political, economic or cultural development of our country, the Party will continue to show concern for the interests and national distinctiveness of each people. 277
Moreover, most discussants at the preceding Republican Party Congresses either ignored the dialectic of Soviet ethnic development altogether, or only mentioned the 'flourishing' of their cultures under Soviet socialism. Similarly, in keeping with the relatively 'liberal' approach of the early Brezhnev regime to the nationality question, journals such as Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo also stressed that there would be no more questioning of the future of the 'national-state' components of the USSR, as there had been under Khrushchev. Nevertheless, within the parameters of this marginally less promethean approach to nationality policy, the non-Russian nationalities were urged in 'developing' their cultures to look to the models of Russian chiefly classical culture, as well as to learn Russian, and to acquiesce in the influence of Russian on their indigenous languages.

The broad change in emphasis in nationality policies during the early years of the Brezhnev era, however, was also reflected in academic discussion of the desirable direction of nationality policies, a development which began soon after the deposing of Khrushchev. As Grey Hodnett has perceptively noted with regard to Soviet debates over ethnic assimilation in connection with competing conceptions of the nation, 'to stress the primacy of economic ties as the foundation of nationhood while minimising psychological factors is to hold that as the economies of the national republics become increasingly merged into a single indivisible whole, so the nations will automatically dissolve'. Hodnett is more questionable, however, in stating that the debate which surrounded the national question in the early years of the Brezhnev era necessarily indicated uncertainty of policy direction amongst the leadership - fairly clear biases indicating favoured 'lines' can be detected in the selection of opposing points of view (as was also the case under Khrushchev).

While both those who predicted 'merging' in the foreseeable future, and those who saw national differences persisting for a long time continued to debate with one another, particularly during the Voprosy istorii debate of 1966-68, there are some indications that the works of those figures who predicted (and therefore implicitly advocated) rapid 'merging', such as Sverdlin, Rogachev and Semenov, were published more rarely after the fall of Khrushchev. Moreover, Sverdlin and Rogachev, in particular,
came under criticism for their cavalier prediction and advocacy of the inevitable and swift destruction of national barriers under socialism—a process they claimed was inevitable as they claimed it also occurred under capitalism. I.P. Tsamerian reminds the writers in 1968 that 'national prejudice can also be aroused by irresponsible statements made in scientific studies and in literature'.\textsuperscript{283} Such criticism forced the two somewhat onto the defensive, Sverdlin and Rogachev being compelled to argue that while 'internationalisation' as a tendency predominated over national 'flourishing', the former had 'nothing to do' with 'chauvinism', 'as is often thought'.\textsuperscript{284} Concomitantly, those emphasising the dangers for non-Russian cultural rights of extreme and rapid assimilationist policies, such as Burmistrova, Dzhunusov and Mnatsakanian, were given a somewhat wider press.\textsuperscript{285} Other figures such as V.I. Kozlov stressed their disagreement with the assimilationists while agreeing with much of their criticism of Stalin's 'metaphysical' and 'eternal non-socio-historical' concept of the nation.\textsuperscript{286}

Moreover, many of those who opposed the Khrushchevian pursuit of ethnic 'merging', opposition to which was argued within a theoretical framework of defending Stalin's definition of the nation, were given greater scope to do so during the early Brezhnev years. Theorists such as Dzhunusov were conspicuous in this regard, challenging the notion that the national unit could be reduced to linguistic, economic or territorial criteria, and hence made the material of social engineering. While it was acknowledged that ethnic groups evolved (and those who ignored Lenin's theory on 'two cultures' in every culture were attacked for fallaciously implying the existence of an indivisible 'national community of culture'), the chronological gulf between ethnic and class change was stressed as greatly as possible.\textsuperscript{287} As one of the 'liberals' in the debate, Burmistrova, perhaps paradoxically stated in defence of Stalinist theory on this question:

... in criticising a formula which does not satisfy us today, we must not reject what has been won by Marxist thought over the past hundred years, and which has become totally accepted in scientific usage.\textsuperscript{288}
While *Voprosy istorii* summed up and concluded the debate in 1970, apart from affirming that a common economic life and common 'psychological make-up' were essential elements in any definition of the nation - thus defending Stalin's definition against the more Khrushchevian proponents of rapid assimilation - the journal indicated that perhaps the leadership's mind was generally but not totally made up on the issue, by calling for a lack of dogmatism and further specialised research on the whole nationalities question.\(^{289}\)

However, by the time of the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in 1971, the Brezhnev regime's desire to be seen as distancing itself from the assimilationist policies of the Khrushchev era had evidently either waned somewhat, or become a lesser priority, as the regime around this time aligned itself with nationality policies which placed significantly more stress on the international 'drawing together' side of the dialectic than the 'flourishing' of the component nationalities.\(^{290}\) The most significant demonstration of this reorientation was the publicity surrounding the re-launching of the notion of a *Sovetskii narod*, for which Brezhnev was chiefly responsible at the 1971 Party Congress. The proclamation of the existence of the 'novaia istoricheskaia obshchnost'\(^{291}\) was also repeated at the two subsequent Party Congresses, while one of the changes in the 1977 Constitution was the inclusion of a reference to the concept.\(^{292}\) This notion, while receiving significantly more propaganda support than in its first incarnation (it had in fact never dropped completely out of the Soviet ideological lexicon since its inception),\(^{293}\) was essentially identical to that proposed by Khrushchev during his final seven 'promethean' years in power. The concepts, sloganised either as *novaia istoricheskaia obshchnost* or *edinyi mnogonatsional'nyi sovetskii narod*, essentially conveyed the Party agitprop position that much progress had already been made in the elimination of national differences between the peoples of the Soviet Union (meaning basically the acquisition by non-Russians of Russian cultural traits), and suggested that such 'drawing together' towards greater ethnic homogeneity was the desirable tendency in nationality relations, in order that the Soviet people become even more 'monolithic' and 'consolidated'.\(^{294}\) Soviet scholars nevertheless protested that they were not claiming that the 'Sovetskii narod' was an ethnic or supra-ethnic (nadnatsional'nyi) formation, rather that it was
more of a social or class phenomenon embracing numerous nationalities united by a number of common characteristics. The apparent desire of the regime to retain this incrementally assimilationist notion, while at the same time attempting to argue its distinctiveness from more drastic assimilationist policies, has been a feature of Soviet writings on the national question since its revival. For example, in a review of a work by specialist in nationality questions I.P. Tsamerian published in 1973, Professor E. Tadevosian stated in Izvestiia:

The book shows the error of some authors who believe that the contemporary stage of development of national relations in the USSR can be described as a stage of the merging of nations and that the formation of a new historic community - the Soviet people - can be described as the emergence of a new ethnic community, the 'Soviet Nation'. It would be appropriate in this connection to mention the words of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, spoken at the presentation of the Order of the Friendship of Peoples to Kazakhstan: 'In speaking about the new historic community of peoples, we certainly do not mean that national differences are already disappearing in our country, or, all the more, that a merging of nations has taken place. All nations and nationalities populating the Soviet Union retain their features, national character traits, language, and their best traditions.

The prestige of the Party leader was further added to such disclaimers, when Brezhnev, in his report on the draft of the new Soviet Constitution, rejected the 'proposals' of 'certain comrades' to refer in the final document to an integral 'Soviet nation', to weaken or eliminate the Union and Autonomous Republics, and to abolish the Soviet of Nationalities, reiterating the Party's position in terms similar to those set out above.

It is, however, clear that the concept of a Sovetskii narod involves process, and that the conclusion of this process is envisaged as the fusion of the component ethnic parts of the 'Soviet people' into a new formation (Soviet scholars remain vague on the characteristics of this higher formation). This is strongly suggested by the fact that Brezhnev also spoke, for example in his speech on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR, of the creation in the future of a 'new communist culture which knows no cultural barriers'. The
difference between the theoretical prometheanism of Khrushchev and Brezhnev in this area is that under the latter, the great length and 'non-administrative' nature of the process was given elaborate emphasis. Otherwise, both the theoretical and the practical differences are indeed negligible. For example, the trend towards the revival in the second half of the Brezhnev era of much of Khrushchev's theoretical apparatus with regard to the nationality question was further reflected in the new claim that of the two dialectically related elements of the ethnic process in the Soviet Union, 'internationalisation' predominated over national 'flourishing', and Brezhnev's re-introduction of the stated goal of 'full unity' of the nationalities at the Twenty-Fifth CPSU Congress in 1976, the formula canonised in Khrushchev's 1961 Third Programme of the CPSU.

In addition, the term 'merging' was not always subject to the taboo which is often assumed. The term is in fact occasionally encountered, if rarely in the more authoritative Soviet sources. Nevertheless, P. Fedoseev, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in a major article on nationality policy in Pravda in 1972, alluded to the concept: 'Scientific communism', he stated, 'substantiates the prospects for the drawing together and subsequent merging of nations at the time of the total victory of communism on an international scale, and, at the same time, reveals the need for attentive and tactful consideration of the interests of every nation and nationality'.

Moreover, less caution was exemplified by the open statement of satisfaction at the gradual decline in the number of Soviet ethnic groups from census to census. Further in keeping with the more assimilationist mood, the 'liberal' theorist of Soviet nationality questions A.N. Mnatsakanian, given obvious prominence in the 1966-68 Voprosy istorii debate, was denounced in 1972 for 'his denial of the historically transitory nature of the nation' and for the fact that he had allegedly ignored 'the objective tendency of the peoples towards unity', while the familiar phrase 'the national boundaries within the USSR are losing their former significance' reverted to common usage.
The reversion to more assimilationist policies is also reflected in the greater encouragement given in official publications to manifestations of culture increasingly taking on an 'international' flavour. For example, in an address to the Fourth Congress of Artists of the USSR, N.A. Ponomarev, while stating that 'the national uniqueness of each art is accepted as something of universal significance in harmony with the spirit and principled content of Soviet culture', stressed that 'artistic discoveries in one national art quickly become the property of all'. Similarly, Kommunist around the same period lauded the fact that 'while retaining the diversity and picturesqueness of the national form, theatres are focussing to an ever greater extent on expressing the unity and community of the Soviet peoples. There is less superficial decorativeness and picayune ethnographic detail'. In the same vein, E. Bagramov stressed Soviet respect for 'national traditions', but not 'idolisation of archaic customs'. Needless to say, such ideological desiderata are drawn at a suitably abstract level, in order that they can be interpreted to suit the Party's actual policies and interests at any given time. During the later Brezhnev period, the actual or operating policy was that the Russian people's culture in its various aspects would not only be preserved intact by the Soviet State, but that the Russian people would continue to play the primus inter pares and Kulturträger role within the Soviet Union. Those who were expected to take the Party's policies on internationalist assimilation seriously were the non-Russian nationalities.

Concrete examples of areas where 'internationalisation' was desirable (or exemplary) therefore invariably focussed on the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, while less distinction tended to be drawn between legitimate and 'obsolete' (byvshie) customs in connection with these areas. Moreover, the much proclaimed 'mutuality' of 'cultural enrichment' consistently turned out to be a decidedly unidirectional phenomenon, with the overwhelming majority of concrete examples involving non-Russians expressing their gratefulness for the beneficent influence of Russian culture.

As noted by Brezhnev's statements above, however, the delicacy of the balance sought by the Party on the nationality question was indicated by the fact that official publications were quick publicly to
attack (often setting up 'straw men') individuals who claimed that 'merging' was 'already characteristic of the age of socialism', or that the Soviet federal structure had 'outlived its usefulness'.

A careful distinction would be made in such criticism between this incorrect claim and the legitimate point that the national boundaries within the USSR were 'losing their former significance'.

A further indication of the Brezhnev regime's desire to push assimilation but at the same time to minimise, if possible, non-Russian anxieties, was the attempt to re-define 'merging' into a less threatening concept. This task was first attempted by Fedoseev, in the first issue of Kommunist for 1980. Quoting Lenin speaking of the future 'merging' of the nations, he adds:

... by the voluntary merging of nations under socialist conditions, he meant not the elimination of national differences, but the closer unity and fraternal alliance among socialist nations. National differences, Lenin pointed out, will be retained for quite a long time, even after the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a universal scale.

Fedoseev goes on to stress that within the notion of the 'Soviet people', the languages and cultures of the Soviet Union 'are preserved'. Similarly, in the fourth (quarterly) issue of Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia for 1982, R.I. Kosolapov, editor-in-chief of Kommunist, condemned 'some scholarly organisations and journals' for having a 'psychological resistance' to the notion of ethnic merging. Yet Kosolapov proposes a concept of 'merging' 'in unadulterated form', and opposed to the 'vulgar-utopian interpretation which assumed that merging meant the total eradication of all linguistic and ethnic differences among national groups'. To remove all ambiguity that he had jettisoned the original Soviet meaning of 'merging' (the formation into a single ethnic group of a number of ethnic groups after a period of their 'drawing together') - though he at no point spells out how the notion should be re-defined - Kosolapov states of nations: 'in principle they are indestructible'.

Despite the retention of much of the Khrushchevian theoretical apparatus on the nationality question which was revived in the early 1970s until the conclusion of the Brezhnev era, something of a liberalisation
in the area of non-Russian rights was revealed at the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress in February 1981. In contrast to earlier addressses, Brezhnev not only noted the complexity of the nationalities issue - desisting from claiming its exemplary resolution in the Soviet Union - but suggested the need for greater political and cultural rights for at least some non-Russians:

The unity of the Soviet nations is stronger than ever before. This does not mean, of course, that all questions in the sphere of relations among nationalities have been resolved. The dynamics of the development of such a large multinational state as ours gives rise to a good many problems that require the Party's sympathetic attention . . . The population of the Soviet republics is multinational. Naturally, all nations have the right to proper representation in their Party and government agencies. Needless to say, the business and ideological-moral qualities of every person must be given a strict evaluation.

In recent years, a number of republics have seen a significant increase in the number of citizens of non-indigenous nationalities. They have their own specific needs in the fields of language, culture and everyday life. The republic Communist Party Central Committees and the territory and province Party committees should investigate these questions more thoroughly and propose timely ways of resolving them.316

Brezhnev's address, motivated, no doubt by the increasingly alarming (from the Russian point of view) demographic imbalance of ethnic growth-rates, and the need to encourage reluctant Central Asian workers to labour in underpopulated areas of the RSFSR (though the recent more serious sociological approach to ethnicity in the Soviet Union, largely sponsored by the 'Arutiunian Team' of the Council of Nationality Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences - which easily discredited the traditional glib cliches concerning the 'solution' of the nationality question in the Soviet Union - may have had some influence)317 resulted in at least a greater rhetorical recognition of the rights of nationalities beyond their indigenous areas, and the greater incidence of a less doctrinaire approach to Soviet nationality problems.318
In line with the transition from the early Brezhnev regime's concern to assuage the fears of the non-Russian nationalities by distancing itself from policies of cultural assimilation to the revival of such concepts and goals as the 'Soviet people' and 'full unity' in the 1970s, the crucial means to assimilation, the teaching of the Russian language to the non-Russian nationalities, was given greater attention.

During the 1960s of the Brezhnev period, the issue continued to be addressed, if in a somewhat more low-key manner, propaganda stress being placed on the rights of the non-Russian languages in the overall context of a need for the 'language of inter-nationality discourse'.

The revised line during these years is best exemplified by the words of V. Kutsevol, First Secretary of the L'vov oblast' Party Committee, on the relative uses of Ukrainian and Russian:

The language of Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko is freely spoken in our land ...
At the same time, as economic and cultural ties develop, the role of the Russian language as a means of intercourse among nations is growing.

The policy of 'merging' in the recent Khrushchev years was held to have resulted in the neglect of the non-Russian languages, a policy, it was frequently claimed, corrected under the new leadership. For example, A. Khakimov in June 1967 contrasts the busy industry of translation into Bashkir 'ten or fifteen years' before, with the decline of this activity at the same time as the 'ill-considered talk of the merging of languages'. Khakimov suggests that the situation has been corrected.

By the late 1960s, however, articles calling for the more intense study of Russian by the non-Russian nationalities (frequently not 'balanced' by rhetorical recognition of the importance of the non-Russian languages) again became common, as did the Khrushchevian stress on how the Russian language had 'enriched' the non-Russian languages of the Soviet Union. By the early 1970s, for the first time since the Khrushchev period, marked emphasis was again placed on the diffusion of the Russian language supported by administrative measures. Thus, various Union Republics such as Armenia and Azerbaijan lowered the level at which
Russian was first taught to schoolchildren in 1970 and 1971 to the first grade of primary school. Two years later, the USSR Ministry of Education Council on Questions of the Secondary General Education School adopted a decree making the study of Russian more intensive in non-Russian schools, strengthening extra-curricular activities involving Russian, and approving the establishment of 'mixed schools' in which both Russian and the native language would be used. This was followed in October 1975 by a Conference convened by order of the CPSU Central Committee, on the study and teaching of Russian in the 'national republics', held in Tashkent. Most important was the address of M.A. Prokof'ev, in which he advocated the introduction of Russian in First Grade throughout the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union (this was, as noted, already the case in some areas), and suggested that it would be possible, on the basis of Uzbekistan's experience, to introduce the teaching of Russian through 'games and discussions' in pre-schools. 'Specialists hold that the sooner familiarisation with a second language begins, the better it is learnt', Prokof'ev emphasised. Prokof'ev's proposals, at least with regard to the introduction of Russian in first grade, were heeded by two of the five remaining republics which did not already have such a policy in place. Moreover, at a 1978 meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, convened to review the state of the teaching of Russian throughout the Soviet Union (the Academy of Sciences had been given the task at the 1975 Tashkent Conference of co-ordinating scientific research and pedagogical practice), Vice-Chairman Fedoseev revived the argument prominent in the late Khrushchev years that there was no contradiction between the maintenance of non-Russian cultures and languages, and the greater dissemination of the Russian language. Indeed, non-Russian national cultures could be freely expressed through the medium of the Russian language. In addition, Fedoseev attacked the teaching of specialised academic and technical disciplines in non-Russian languages, a phenomenon which had 'once' been 'progressive', but now impeded the task of training specialists who could work throughout the USSR. At the same time, publications consistently claimed that the existence of the 'language of inter-nationality discourse' in no way diminished the role of the 'national languages' which allegedly retained 'full equality'.

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The culmination of all of the above was the USSR Council of Ministers Decree of 13 October 1978, 'On Measures for Further Improving the Study and Teaching of the Russian Language in the Union Republics'. In addition to numerous measures designed to make the teaching of Russian more effective, Russian was introduced into all pre-school institutions, while the practice of teaching specialised disciplines exclusively in Russian was more widely disseminated. A further decree of December 1978 issued by the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education again affirmed the need for the teaching of specialised disciplines in Russian, and provided for more teaching of Russian at the expense of optional subjects.

The Second Tashkent Conference on the teaching of Russian, convened largely to examine means of implementing the various new decrees on the wider dissemination of the language, is of significance in revealing that the motivation for this policy sprang not only from the overall policy of ethnic assimilation of the non-Russians into a broadly Russian mould, but from a perception of demographic threat to the Russians revealed by the preliminary data from the 1979 census. Fedot Filin, emphasising the need to achieve bilingualism among the non-Russians (if not the preferred monolingualism in Russian), stated in this connection:

Whereas on the whole the Russians constitute more than half of the population of our country, in connection with the decelerated growth of population in those areas inhabited by the great bulk of Russians and the considerable increase in population in the Turkic-speaking republics, the correlation along nationality lines of children in the pre-school age group (and also in the school-age group), is shifting substantially in favour of the Turkic-speaking population. In this connection, knowledge of the Russian language is becoming particularly urgent.

It should go without saying that the encouragement of bilingualism, pushed particularly in the final decade of the Brezhnev era, was held to be relevant only to non-Russians - with the partial exception of the final two years of the Brezhnev era (examined below). As Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR states,

the main goal of language policy in our country is to achieve harmonious bilingualism in the national republics and regions.
During this period only very rarely (up to 1981) is it suggested that it would be desirable for Russians to learn a non-Russian language (despite the extensive 'colonisation' of non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union by Russians throughout its history). M.I. Isaev even reveals this bias and ambivalence in a monograph intended for Western readers:

> While a knowledge of any two languages and their utilisation in daily communication can be regarded as bilingualism, the specific type of bilingualism that is needed in the Soviet multinational state is the one in which a person knows both his native tongue and Russian. While other forms of bilingualism may also be developing ... their importance is of a local character.333

It is clear from the above that from the beginning of the 1970s onwards, the Soviet Union placed great emphasis - comparable to under the late Stalin and Khrushchev periods - on the acquisition by non-Russians of Russian. A comparison of the resolutions on the fiftieth and sixtieth anniversaries of the USSR, published in 1972 and 1982 respectively, is sufficient to confirm not only that this emphasis persisted as during certain periods of the previous two regimes, but that the concern for the issue took on, from the authorities' point of view, a progressively greater urgency and priority. The relevant section of the earlier resolution read:

> all nations and nationalities of the USSR freely chose the Russian language as the common language of international discourse and co-operation. It has become a mighty weapon of intercommunication and cohesion of the Soviet peoples and a means of providing access to the better achievements of domestic (otechestvennoi) and world cultures.334

Ten years later, the equivalent section read:

> Soviet multinational literature is published in tens of languages of the peoples of the USSR, many of whom did not have a written language before the October Revolution. The Russian language, having been freely accepted by the Soviet peoples as the language of international discourse, has become an important factor in the consolidation of the socio-political and ideological unity of the Soviet people, and in the development and mutual enrichment of national cultures.
It has given all of our peoples broad access to the spiritual treasures of world civilization. To cite Lenin's words, every Soviet citizen has the possibility of learning the great Russian language. Today 82% of the population of the country is fluent in the language.335

Nevertheless, within the context of this continued concern for the dissemination of Russian, greater sensitivity was decreed in the area of language policy in keeping with Brezhnev's unexpectedly 'liberal' shift with regard to nationality policy at the Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress. In a development which suggests the usefulness of the 'communist nationalist' hybrid in permitting a given Marxist-Leninist state to shift its policy in keeping with new requirements while acknowledging no ideological change, for perhaps the first time in recent Soviet history Pravda in 1982 called for Russians in non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union to study the local language. In referring to the importance of bilingualism, the author, A. Zdravomyslov, stated:

I am referring here not only to the mastery of Russian as the language of communication among nationalities - which is unquestionably in the interests of the development of every nation and every republic - but also to the mastery by representatives of the Russian nationality of the languages of the peoples on whose territory they are living.336

Estonia was particularly noteworthy in attempting to fulfill this unwonted directive.337

The Brezhnev regime also persisted with the second of the means instituted under Khrushchev for accelerating the 'drawing together' of ethnic groups: the use of demographic policies to encourage 'international areas of settlement which would in turn, it was hoped, encourage both bilingualism and even the conversion to monolingualism in Russian.338

For example, in an article in Kommunist in 1966, N. Dzhandil'din defended the role of population dispersal in the process of ethnic assimilation, acknowledged as largely involving migration from the more to the less developed areas of the Soviet Union. It was a fact, according to Dzhandil'din, that the national republics of the Soviet Union were 'multinational' and
Life itself and the interests of communist construction dictate the need for a constant movement of a portion of the population from one region of the country to another.\textsuperscript{339} 

Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie draws the implications for Soviet nationality policies:

The processes of migration which result in a stronger multinational population composition of the republics is also beneficial to the further drawing together of the nations.\textsuperscript{340}

Numerous such articles applaud the ethnic de-homogenisation of the non-Russian areas, emphasising the allegedly positive 'internationalising' consequences of numerous nationalities inhabiting the same republic (which never referred, until the late Brezhnev period, to the predominantly Russian areas of the RSFSR), usually with specific reference to such phenomena as collective or state farms, or construction projects, and the greater tendency to 'international marriages' these produce.\textsuperscript{341}

While the 1970 and 1979 censuses proved such policies to be effective in significantly diluting the non-Russian European low birth-rate areas of the Soviet Union with Russian language and culture, the high birth-rates of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus reduced the effects of such policies.\textsuperscript{342}

Later in the Brezhnev era, particularly following the revelation of the results of the 1979 census, the need to encourage migration from underdeveloped high fertility areas such as Central Asia and the Transcaucasus to low-fertility areas of the Soviet Union, predominantly in the RSFSR, became an additional reason for encouraging ethnic intermingling (which traditionally and largely has been a case of 'whites' settling in 'native' territories, and 'natives' of various nationalities being intermingled outside European areas). For example, Professor L. Rybakovskii stated in Pravda in September 1981 that 'the problem of increasing the mobility of the population of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics, especially in rural localities', was becoming more urgent, not only 'for the formation of a uniform socialist way of life', but to check the lack of manpower in such areas as Siberia and the non-black earth region of Russia.\textsuperscript{343}
Finally, the third aspect to Khrushchev's encouragement of ethnic 'drawing together' - the relentless attack on non-Russian 'bourgeois nationalism' - continued unabated in the overall context of discouraging the persistence of non-Russian cultural traits (only very rarely is there evidence of 'nationalism' beyond the cultural pre-occupations freely allowed the Russians). Essentially, the proclaimed campaign against 'archaic' cultural remnants of the past was interpreted in non-Russian areas as one against all manner of reminders of the pre-revolutionary past.

Hence, for example, in contrast to the relatively benign official attitude towards Russian Orthodoxy, other religions of the Soviet Union identifiable with specific nationality groups, such as Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism and Buddhism (not to mention Judaism) were subject to the most vitriolic and uninhibited propaganda, not only frequently linking them with remnants of non-Russian 'bourgeois nationalism' but accusing their adherents of being either 'fanatics', or ignorant, drunk and debauched 'parasites'. Readers of official publications are frequently reminded of alleged instances of Catholic and Protestant collaboration with the enemy during the Second World War. A special place in Soviet atheistic propaganda is marked out for wholesale attacks on the law of the Islamic Shariat, Soviet publications regularly attacking the multitude of customs and habits of everyday life (particularly those connected with the role of women) inextricably linked with the Moslem faith. Islamic customs are routinely ridiculed as the 'bestial essence' of 'village' survivals, or the 'rubbish of the past'. More generally, aspects of non-Russian tradition from Georgian wakes for the dead, to the building of 'reception rooms' in Moldavian houses, to Buriat weddings, are regularly attacked as vestiges potentially, if not actually, linked to nationalism, which allegedly 'stand in the way of the new life'.

This is not to claim that all aspects of non-Russian pre-revolutionary culture were automatically branded 'bourgeois nationalism' and persecuted during the Brezhnev era: Soviet propagandists frequently resorted to suggesting that non-Russian religious rituals and ceremonies should be replaced by traditional folk customs, religious institutions other than the Russian Orthodox Church were used by the Soviet state for
propaganda purposes (if given significantly less rein than the Russian institution), and voluntary societies for the protection of monuments of history and culture were instituted also for such areas (even if they were overwhelmingly more concerned with products of the Soviet period and the 'revolutionary' past than their Russian equivalent). However, in addition to being subject to Soviet policies of cultural assimilation, specifically including linguistic and demographic policies designed to hasten the 'internationalisation' of non-Russian groups, only spasmodically and tokenistically were these nationalities' distinctive traits spared the threat of being branded obsolete archaisms, closely connected with 'bourgeois nationalism'.

Within this overall context, as on other matters, the 1970s witnessed a somewhat tougher line towards the non-Russian nationalities than had been the case in the first years of the Brezhnev era. The purge of the First Secretaries of the Ukraine and Georgia - Shelest and Mzhavanadze - during this period on implicit charges of nationalism (in the latter case inter alia), combined with Brezhnev's relatively unprecedented denunciation of 'bourgeois nationalism' in his address marking the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR in December 1972 (followed by systematic criticism of 'bourgeois nationalism' amongst most of the major non-Russian nationalities during 1973), together with a somewhat more vigilant attitude throughout the remainder of the regime, bear witness to this changed climate.

In a general sense, therefore, the Brezhnev period represents a similar picture to the Khrushchev years in terms of official nationality policies. The first years of the new regime after October 1964 represent an obvious attempt to curry favour with the non-Russian nationalities, alienated as they were by the essentially Russian chauvinist assimilationist policies of the previous regime, and seeking reassurances that their cultures would be permitted to 'flourish' rather than be 'internationalised' - or merge with Russian culture. However, while the early Khrushchev period reveals the almost total absence of a proclaimed goal of ethnic assimilation, the Brezhnev regime in its early years sought only to eliminate the extremism of Khrushchev's assimilationism. Thus, there was a tendency to debunk the notion of rapid 'merging' while the policy of more gradual 'drawing together' - which retained the notion of the Russian Kulturtraeger - was kept.
This caution had dissipated, however, by the late 1960s, from which period onwards most of Khrushchev's concepts denoting the goal of rapid assimilation revert to regular usage. Nevertheless, a modicum of caution continues to condition the regime's behaviour in this regard. While official publications again begin to talk of the goal of 'full unity', and the borders between the constituent units of the USSR increasingly 'losing their former significance', the notion of 'merging' in its Khrushchevian sense remains generally (though not always) beyond the pale. Moreover, the focus of attention and publicity in the nationality policy area is fixed on the notion of the 'Soviet People', a concept which suggests progress towards the achievement of ethnic fusion, while at the same time being claimed as largely a unity based on 'social' and 'class' factors. The reversion to assimilationism in the late 1960s also sees the return to vigorous attempts to encourage linguistic Russification through educational and demographic means, as well as heightened alertness to non-Russian 'bourgeois nationalism', such a pliable term that it is frequently interpreted in practice as being synonymous with the cultural distinctiveness (other than language) of the non-Russian nationalities.

The general picture of the continuity after a brief lull of Russian chauvinism in the nationality policies of the Brezhnev years is qualified, however, by a brief and partial infusion of greater 'internationalist' concern for non-Russian cultural rights into policy during the final two years of the regime, a shift which could be comfortably accommodated within the parameters of the ideological hybrid of 'communist nationalism'.

(iii) Official Doctrine on the Role and Status of the Russian People in Relation to Soviet Communism

With respect to this area of 'operating ideology', consistent with the more 'liberal' nationality policy of its first years, the Brezhnev period reveals a lull in the use of ritualised praise of the Russian people until after the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966. From this date forward, however, a quantitative increase in the amount of such praise can be observed, although the formulations and phrases used do not vary
from those employed under Khrushchev and Stalin. With regard to the
ascription of desirable qualities and virtues to the Russian people,
the late Brezhnev period reveals the return of certain forms of extreme
obsequiousness uncommon under Khrushchev.

The most striking feature of the first two years of the Brezhnev
period with regard to official pronouncements on the role and status of the
Russian people is the disappearance of the term 'elder brother' in the
discussion reports of non-Russian Republic Party First Secretaries at
the Twenty-third Party Congress, a trend also reflected in a drop, though
not the disappearance, in the extent of the term's use in extra-Party
Congress material. In addition to the fact that this Congress was
the only such gathering since the early Stalin era at which no delegate
expressed the 'elder brother' formula, only seven non-Russian Party
First Secretaries expressed gratitude to the Russian people, compared
to fourteen at Khrushchev's Twenty-second, and nine at the subsequent
Twenty-fourth. In addition, during the early period of the regime,
one of the members of the Party leadership (in strong contrast to later
years) mentioned the assistance of the Russian people in the successes
of the non-Russian nationalities.

Reversal of this apparent policy of restraint on the part of the
leadership can be dated to 1968. In July of that year, the Order of
the October Revolution was awarded to the RSFSR. Presidium President
Nikolai Podgorny explained in his address,

The award of the Order of the October Revolution represents recognition and
appreciation of the outstanding services of Russia's working people, and their
enormous contribution to the common cause of the entire Soviet people ... In
constructing a new life, the Russian people has always marched and continue
to march in the vanguard, winning the enthusiasm of all our homeland's peoples
through their selfless and inspired labour ...
They respectfully call the Russian people their elder brothers, and justly place
them first among the builders of communism.

In the course of the subsequent fourteen years, members of the leadership,
while rarely indulging in such extravagant praise as the above case of
Podgorny, regularly expressed the claim of Russia's 'selfless assistance' to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Brezhnev expressed this dogma in four of the five arguably most prominent addresses of the remainder of his career (as well as in many more minor speeches): his reports to the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Party Congresses (1971 and 1981 respectively) and his speeches in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR (1972) and the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution (1977). Brezhnev's address on the first such occasion, to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, must be taken as highly indicative of the required line in this area. In language virtually unprecedented for an ethnic Russian Soviet leader, Brezhnev stated,

All the nations and nationalities of our country, above all the great Russian people, played a role in the formation, strengthening and development of this mighty union of equal peoples that have taken the path of socialism (applause). The revolutionary energy, selflessness, diligence and profound internationalism of the great Russian people have rightfully won them the sincere respect of all the peoples of our socialist homeland (prolonged applause).

In trends which, it may be argued, were a consequence of the Party leader's address, the 1970s reveal a striking return of such (usually obsequious rather than self-congratulatory) language. The 1971 Party Congress, in addition to Brezhnev's statement concerning the Russian people, reveals a return of the 'elder brother' formula, with four of the sixteen non-Russian Party leaders using the term. At the subsequent Twenty-fifth Party Congress (1976), the figure rises to seven. As is the case with the use of such phraseology in the discussion reports of the non-Russian Party First Secretaries at Khrushchev's three Party Congresses (1956, 1958, 1961), by the final stage of the Brezhnev era, the Baltic and Belorussian delegates, who appear previously to have been exempt from such official ethnic obsequiousness, express their gratitude to the 'great Russian people'.

The references by such Party leaders as Podgorny, and particularly Brezhnev, to the 'revolutionary energy, selflessness, diligence and internationalism' of the Russian people appears to have encouraged a trend,
particularly among non-European Party leaders, to reiterate such claims. Such praise of the Russian people reached a new level unprecedented in the post-war period with the publication by Pravda in February 1979 of an article entitled 'Russkii kharakter - my sovetskii narod', by Sarkis Grigorian. Included in the characteristics attributed by Grigorian to the Russian people are:

- Bravery and steadfastness in struggle
- with difficulties, beauty and generosity
- of heart, clarity of thought and
- selflessness in work, a consciousness of,
- and sympathy for, the troubles of others.

To these are added 'tolerance, humanitarianism, and genuine friendliness', the 'stern, exceedingly brave' qualities of the Russian 'warrior' (voin), who is also trustful, benevolent and kind, as well as 'fair at the front'. The Russian, according to Grigorian, possesses a 'noble, knightly heart'. Finally, 'lofty examples of the logic and clarity of mind of the Russian people' can be observed in the allegedly peaceful policies of the CPSU.

In terms of the role of the Russian people in the claimed successes of the Soviet Union, the Russians are frequently held up as responsible during the period, as under Khrushchev and Stalin, for the USSR's 'formation, strengthening, and development'. The Russians are described as the 'vanguard people', leading the joint struggle, and generally 'bearing the brunt of the struggle for freedom and happiness'.

The view of the Russian people 'founding a new civilisation' commands the mainstream support of figures such as P. Fedoseev writing in Kommunist, while by 1979, the thesis that the October Revolution was a Russian national revolution, purging the country of foreign usurpers and founding a distinctively Russian and more virile regime (a thesis included among those condemned by A.N. Iakovlev in his 1972 article) can be noted in various quarters.

In other theses which remain widespread, the peculiarly 'heroic' qualities of the Russian working class continue to be lauded, while virtually all of the arguable achievements or extremes of experience of the Soviet Union – including the greatest suffering – have been attributed at one time or another to the Russian people. While at
other times these achievements are attributed to the 'fraternal co-operation' of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union, this includes the winning of the Civil War, the 'Great Patriotic War', the Space Programme, as well as relatively more mundane accomplishments, such as the building of the Karakum Canal, the reconstruction of parts of Tashkent after the earthquake, and the transport of grain to Kazakhstan during times of drought.

Conclusion

Just as there is a widespread view that the Khrushchev regime in a serious sense deviated from the official use of Stalinist Russian nationalism in favour of a return to Leninist internationalism, the view is frequently encountered that the Brezhnev regime presided over the movement towards an officially sanctioned less ideologically adulterated form of Russian nationalism as a means of legitimating Soviet rule. It is true, in fact, that during these years, in contrast to the Khrushchev period, virtually no attempts were made to depart from the patterns established under Stalin (though there is some continuity with Khrushchevian policies of symbolic de-Stalinisation in certain areas during the regime's early years). Indeed, the authorities continued undeviatingly to require the doctrinal dualism of 'communist nationalism' - those writing in official publications being regularly reminded that they were not, in discussing any aspect of Russia's history, culture or people, to forget the Soviet Union or Marxist-Leninist ideology. At the same time, policies, opinion and analysis likely to appeal to those concerned with the Russian national heritage - and often balancing Russian nationalism with only the most tokenistic references to such institutions - emerged in additional areas of intellectual analysis and social activity under Brezhnev. In this sense, essentially Stalinist 'communist nationalism' combined tactically with somewhat populist overtones (the latter particularly marked in the VOOP'IK phenomenon) is a characteristic of Brezhnev's eighteen-year tenure as Party leader, in which a reaction to the (more perceived than real) 'national nihilism' against Russia of the late Khrushchev period resulted in the new regime's permitting, albeit guardedly, an active interest in Russia's pre-revolutionary historical and cultural monuments and non-Marxist moral and intellectual
heritage, as well as a continuation of the essentially Stalinist (and Khrushchevian) 'communist nationalist' position on the history of the pre-revolutionary Russian state and its colonialism, the Russian language, and the nation's pre-revolutionary literature, music and art. The regime also attempted to distance itself from the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church carried out under Khrushchev, and reveals a wide indulgence of the propagation of implicit anti-Semitism. Moreover, as during the Khrushchev regime, after an initial period of 'liberal', somewhat more 'internationalist' policies towards the non-Russian nationalities, essentially Russian chauvinist assimilationist nationality policies analogous to those which held sway under Stalin and during the late Khrushchev years reappear. Similarly, following a brief lull at the beginning of the period, there is a reversion to a pattern characteristic of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras - the ritualistic praise of the implicitly superior and allegedly heroic characteristics of the Russian people, exemplified first and foremost by its paramount contribution to the building and defence of Soviet communism.

While there were circles which succeeded in publishing writings which reveal a less adulterated form of Russian nationalism than that expected by those in authority - notably the derevenshchiki and those associated with such publications as Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik - these circles, after a few years of relative impunity, came to be engaged in a constant polemic with the authorities about the ideological slant of their works. Despite the fact that the individuals associated with these publications appeared to be constantly lobbying for a greater official accommodation with Russian nationalism - or further 'deradicalisation' - and could at times be defiant of highly-placed criticism to an extraordinary degree (almost certainly playing a role in the removal in 1973 of A.N. Iakovlev, First Deputy Head of the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department and the purging of Novyi mir in 1969), the leadership during the Brezhnev period refused to buckle completely to this pressure, and retained Stalinist 'communist nationalism' as the required model for expressions of Russian nationalism. The Brezhnev era for the purposes of this study can therefore be interpreted as a period when the Soviet state attempted to make as much accommodation as possible, within the necessary limitations of an avowedly Marxist-
Leninist system, with the powerful and restless nationalism characteristic of a significant proportion of the Russian populace - if one is to judge by the enormous interest shown in such organisations as VOOPIK. Essentially the regime did so by permitting a greater amplification to areas of analysis and social activity of elements of Russian nationalism which had their seeds in Stalin's time. The Brezhnev regime in this area of its behaviour - as in so many others - therefore represents caution and continuity (with the exception of the abandonment of most of Khrushchev's initiatives), and the attempt to achieve maximum consensus with minimum change to the system built up by Stalin.

As was noted in relation to the Khrushchev period, such continuity cannot, of course, be explained by either the 'deradicalisation' or the 'tactical' theories of the official exploitation by Marxist-Leninist regimes of nationalism. Nevertheless, the regime's policy with regard to the phenomenon during these years reveals 'tactical' considerations in two senses, which, however, do not correspond to the 'tactical' model as outlined in the Introduction. Firstly, as under Khrushchev, the use of 'communist nationalism' during the Brezhnev years reveals important fluctuations between the norm of Stalinist Russian chauvinism, and aberrant periods when we find that the authorities require greater dosages of 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis for public consumption. The flexibility of 'communist nationalism' which permits different emphases to be presented to different audiences, depending on political circumstances, no doubt constitutes one reason for the fact that the Brezhnev regime's use of the phenomenon was marked by continuity, rather than further 'deradicalisation' or reversion to consistent Bolshevik 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis. Moreover, Stalin's successors including Brezhnev no doubt associated the retention of elements of Russian nationalism with the continued security of the Soviet state, Stalin's innovation in this area having shored up and possibly saved the regime during the War. Since Stalin's time, in addition, change has tended to be looked on suspiciously by at least a significant proportion of the Soviet élite. This was even more the case after the removal of Khrushchev and his energetic, if erratic, infliction of change on Soviet society.
Secondly, the regime 'tactically' indulged for a time groups concerned with Russia's national heritage who perceived in Khrushchev's policies 'national nihilism'. While the regime essentially retained Stalin's model of 'communist nationalism', therefore, attempts were made at various times either to give greater gratification to Russian national sentiment or to mollify non-Russian national feeling.

This study, in attempting to test two theories of the official uses of nationalism in Marxist-Leninst countries, characterised by marked lack of congruence between the nation and the state, has taken as one case that of the Soviet Union. In conclusion to this part of the analysis, elements of 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical opportunism' account for aspects of the use by the Soviet state of Russian nationalism, but are also misleading and obscure important aspects of the use of such nationalism as much as they are enlightening. During the Stalin period, the Soviet leadership hybridised its official ideology by adding to it elements of Russian nationalism - thus hoping for the greater commitment of the Russian people to the Soviet state - at a time of intense and often violent mobilisation when armed conflict with the outside world was expected in the near future. 'Communist nationalism' meant either that elements of Russian nationalism had to be combined with class analysis or internationalism in the same text (even if only symbolically), or that more than usually unadulterated Russian nationalism, being 'tactically' tolerated for a time, was to be followed by the inevitable reassertion of the need for more orthodox Marxist-Leninist elements in analysis and writing. The former has been the norm, while manifestations of the latter may be observed during the War and for a time during the Brezhnev period.

The balance of 'communist nationalism' was permitted by the regime to tilt progressively further in the direction of Russian nationalism until a point was reached at the end of the Stalin period where any further officially sanctioned ideological contradiction with Marxist-Leninism might seriously threaten the legitimacy of the regime and therefore the security of its elite. Following this stage in the history of the recent Soviet state, the 'communist nationalist' synthesis is
retained without further 'deradicalisation' despite occasional 'tactical' indulgence of more spontaneous - and therefore less ideologically adulterated - national sentiment. The hybrid was sufficiently flexible that the Party leadership could, depending on the political situation and the constituency addressed, usefully stress either internationalist loyalty to class and national equality, or its particular concern for the Staatsvolk, the Russians. Without 'communist' rhetoric, the legitimacy of the Soviet elite ruling in the name of Marxism-Leninism would be seriously undermined, while the removal of the doctrines of internationalism this would entail would demolish the theoretical underpinning of the Soviet Union as a multinational entity. On the other hand to abandon 'nationalism' in favour of consistent 'internationalism', the ideology of the first decade of Soviet rule, would be to act to reduce the extent to which the Russians identified with Soviet power. Given that the War had demonstrated that this identification had been the basis on which the security of the regime in large part depended, such behaviour would no doubt be seen by any Soviet leadership as undermining the future survival of the state in the event of confrontation with the outside world.

The case of the Soviet Union, therefore, suggests the correctness of the central proposition of the 'deradicalisation' theory: that Marxist-Leninist regimes at some stage attempt to enhance their legitimacy by associating themselves with a number of traditional values, among them nationalism. It fails to point out, however, that such 'deradicalisation', as a process, can go no further in the direction of nationalist ideology than that stage represented by the balance of 'communist nationalism' at the end of the Stalin period. Furthermore, the 'tactical' fluctuations which complicate the picture of essential continuity since the passing of Stalin have involved oscillations between greater and lesser uses of nationalism, as well as between the norm of Stalinist Russian chauvinism and occasional reversions to greater internationalism in those spheres which have been surveyed. Theories of 'tactics' which suggest fluctuations between relatively consistent and unadulterated nationalism and internationalism would not appear, therefore, to be accurate. In essence, the defects of both theories are based on the fact that they fail to take account of the Soviet political imperative of a fusion of Marxism-Leninism and Russian
nationalism. Given this ideological hybrid, and the usefulness of the form in which Stalin developed it, it would be most unlikely that 'deradicalisation' would ever take place to the point of the abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology, or that the nationalist component would ever, even temporarily (as some 'tactics' theorists suggest) be abandoned.
Chapter III: Notes

1. 'Reflections on Letters: Not Every Prince is to be Honoured', Izvestiia, 30 October 1965, p. 4.


3. Indeed, in Brezhnev's speech in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, he links the 'glory of the partisan patriots of the Patriotic War of 1812' and the 'Patriotic War of 1941-45'. See 'Great Victory of the Soviet People', Pravda, 9 May 1965. See also in this connection P.M. Rogachev and M.A. Sverdlin, 'Discussions and Deliberations; On the Concept of a 'Nation'', Voprosy istorii, I (January) 1966, pp. 33-48; Professor K. Lumunov, 'War and Peace on the Screen', Pravda, 10 December 1967, p. 3.


7. 'One Thousand Years Later', Izvestiia, 29 August 1971, p. 4.


11. 'The fact is that the Russian Navy has a glorious history', concludes one article drawing the connections between the Tsarist and Soviet Navies. See 'Russian and Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean', Voenny-istoricheskii zhurnal, IX, 1970, pp. 37-47.


See 'Important Tasks in History', Voprosy istorii KPSS, 1973, no. 5 (May), and 'Follow-up on Articles in Kommunist', Kommunist, 1973, no. 7 (May), p. 127.


For some indications of the strong dose of Russian nationalism in a number of areas of Soviet analysis between the early 1970s and the end of the decade, see, for example (on the significance of Tsarist naval power) A. Larionov, 'Legacy of the People's Genius: Preserve the North's Historical and Cultural Monuments for Future Ages', Sovetskaia Rossiia, 15 September 1978, p. 3, and (on the educational significance of the Borodino battle site) D. Likhachev, 'For Oneself and One's Descendants', Pravda, 10 November 1979. Also see articles which stress the alleged virtues of the behaviour of the Russian state in contrast to the deviousness of China in the seventeenth century, for example, Professor M. Kapitsa, 'Books: From the History of Russian-Chinese Relations', Izvestiia, 21 November 1979, p. 5; 'Documents that Confirm the Truth: From the History of Russian-Chinese Relations', Izvestiia, 14 November 1972, p. 5; K. Cherevko and A. Iakovlev, 'Contrary to Historical Truth', Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 8, August, 1974, pp. 140-2.


The Battle of Kulikovo Field was fought in 1380 between the Tatar-Mongol forces of Mamai Khan, and Russian forces led by Prince Dmitrii Donskoi. While the Russians were victorious on the field, this success led only gradually - over the course of the next century - to the departure from Russia of the invaders.
24. See A.L. Narochitskii, 'Kulikovo Field: Where the Russian People Achieved a Great Victory 600 Years Ago', Izvestiia, 7 September 1980, p. 3; Interview with Professor V.V. Kargalov, 'Dialogue Between a Historian and a Film Critic', Ogonek, no. 31 (August) 1980, p. 9; D. Likhachev, loc. cit.; 'In the RSFSR Council of Ministers: On Preparations for the 600th Anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo', Izvestiia, 28 October 1979, p. 3; A. Vladimirskii, 'Mezh Nepriavdol i Donom', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 8 December 1979, p. 2.

25. The passage continues, 'Russia was given a lofty destiny. Its boundless plains swallowed up the Mongol forces and stopped their invasion at the very edge of Europe; the barbarians dared not leave an enslaved Rus' at their rear, so they returned to the steppes of their own east. The developing Enlightenment was saved by a devastated and dying Russia'. F. Kuznetsov, 'Field of Russian Glory', Literaturnaia gazeta, 10 September 1980, p. 1.


27. Professor I. Malyshev, in Moskva, 1981 (November).

28. See Iuren'en, loc. cit.


31. L. Lavlinskii, 'Rodnye khol'my', Nash sovremennik, 1979, no. 3.


35. Pravda, 8 October 1979. See also V. Pikul', 'U poslednei cherty', Nash sovremennik, 1979, nos 4-6.


40. Nesterov, *op. cit.*,

41. Ibid., pp. 76-7.

42. V. Kargalov, 'Continuity', *Nash sovremennik*, no. 1 (January), 1981, pp. 187-91. With regard to the Ogoněk article, see 'Sovetskiy avtor obosnovyvaet velikoderzhavnyi shovinizm', *Nasha strana* (Tel Aviv), 2 April 1981, p. 5.


44. Oskotskii, *passim*.


46. Ibid.

47. Surovtsev, *loc. cit.*.


49. See *Kommunist*, no. 2 (January), 1982. See also Higgie, *loc. cit.*, vol. 12, no. 15, p. 7.

50. See the discussion of later developments in 1982 in the second part of this chapter.

51. V.I. Adamia and A.E. Kuprava, 'Makhadzhirstvo and Problems of Abkhaz History in the Nineteenth Century', *Voprosy istorii*, no. 3 (March), 1978, pp. 139-41.


54. Andreev, loc. cit.
55. Kargalov, loc. cit.
56. Kuz'min, loc. cit.
57. Compare Bodiul's speech in the discussion reports of the Twenty-second Party Congress (Pravda, 27 October 1961) with his article in Sovetskaia Moldaviia (23 & 24 November 1965), 'May the Friendship of Soviet Peoples Grow Stronger and Flourish'. For an analysis of the little-known dispute between the USSR and Romania over this issue, see 'Moldavian Party Secretary Bodiul on Friendship of Soviet Peoples', Radio Liberty Research Notes, no. 3672 (3 December 1965), and S. Gamburtsev, 'The Exacerbation of the Nationality Problem in Moldavia: Some Specific Aspects', Radio Liberty Research Notes, no. 2228 (20 April 1966). It should also be noted that while Bodiul claimed in 1965 that Moldavia had voluntarily united with the Russian state in 1711, in the discussion reports at the Twenty-third Party Congress he intriguingly claimed that 'the Moldavian people have been building their lives side by side with the great Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples within a single state for 150 (sic) years'. See Pravda, 3 April 1966, pp. 3-4.
58. For some earlier references which do not claim that Kazakhstan entered the Russian state on a voluntary basis, see N. Dzhandildin (Secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee), 'Some Questions of Education Among the Nations', Kommunist, no. 13 (September), 1959, pp. 30-43; Speech by N.S. Khrushchev in Alma Ata, Pravda, 25 June 1961; V. Shmanov (Deputy Head of the Ideological Department of the Kazakh CP Central Committee), 'Kazakhstan is a Laboratory of International Education' (broadcast on Alma Ata domestic radio service in Russian on 29 August 1961, 0850 gmt), Radio Liberty Broadcast Transcription, r 2912002. Compare the following analogous articles in which the 'voluntary' claim has appeared: B.P. Gurevich, 'Some Problems of the History of Kazakhstan and Central Asia and their Distortion in the CPR Press', Istoriia SSSR, no. 2 (March-April), 1979, pp. 192-210, and 'Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Unification of Kazakhstan with Russia' (broadcast on Moscow domestic radio service, 28 September 1981, 1500 gmt), Foreign Broadcast Information Service, SU/6848/B, 8 October 1981, p. 3. For the case of Chechnia, see the exhaustively researched 'Another Chapter in the Rewrite of History: "The Voluntary Incorporation of Checheno-Ingushetia"' by Anne Sheahy, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 396/82, 30 September 1982.
59. Thus, only Eastern Armenia is claimed to have voluntarily united with Russia, while when Siberia was penetrated by the Tsarist empire, 'a large group of inhabitants ... voluntarily assumed' Russian citizenship. Other peoples of Siberia 'paid tribute' to the Russians. Similarly, it has been claimed that the Akhal tribe of Turkmenia asked to come under Russian rule, while at the same time acknowledging the forced submission to the Russians.


64. See Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 36-7. This is not to say that all interest in the Russian past was motivated by Russian nationalism. Jack Haney correctly attributes the phenomenon also to the 'Sterility of official dogma' and the novelty of the past

65. An anonymous contribution to the ninth issue of Veche wrote:

'Oone should make clear that the decisive factor in the creation of the Rodina club and of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural monuments was not at all an understanding of these problems by government circles but ... an elemental pressure, a change in the mood of Russian Society. People saw in Khrushchev's destructive campaign a final blow. Churches were not only closed, they were being blown up. This was perhaps the most symptomatic but not the only cause for alarm. Russian culture was being wiped from the face of the Russian earth, while it was found possible to take the national feelings of other peoples into consideration. Thus, for example, societies for the preservation of monuments were created in Georgia, Armenia and the Baltic many years earlier than in the RSFSR. Such asymmetry looked sinister.

O.M., 'Survey o russkom natsionalizme' (Veche, no. 9), Arkhiv Samizdata, no. 2040, p. 169, quoted in Dunlop, op. cit., p. 67.


67. See the TASS release announcing that the Club had attracted 500 members on 2 December 1965. See also Andrei Amalrik, 'Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?', Survey, 1969, no. 73 (Autumn), p. 64. Also Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 65-6.


69. Dunlop paraphrases Vladimir Osipov to the effect that 'under Khrushchev ... Glazunov and his friends made an attempt to interest the volatile Soviet leader in the formation of a society for the preservation of monuments, but Khrushchev impatiently cut short the reading of the appeal, putting an end to the matter. Undaunted, Glazunov thereupon proceeded to found a section for the preservation of monuments under the umbrella of the Committee for the Defence


71. Literaturnaia gazeta, 30 October 1965.

72. Ibid.

73. Vladimir Soloukhin, 'Pis'ma iz russkogo muzeia', Molodaia gvardiia, 1966, no. 9 and 10. See also his 'Dialogue', Literaturnaia gazeta, 3 December 1965, p. 2; 'Chernye doski: Zapiski nachalnushchego kolektsionera' Moskva, 1969, no. 1; and Slovo zhivoe i mertvoe, Moscow: Sovremennik, 1976. Frederick Barghoorn has aptly described Soloukhin as 'the most sophisticated and talented of all these writers' (the derevenshchiki) 'and also the most moderate and tactful'. 'Four Faces of Soviet Russian Ethnocentrism', in Allworth, op. cit., p. 58.


78. See 'Sovetskii patriotizm', Kommunist, 1965, no. 8; and 'Moguchaya sila sovetskogo patriotizma', Partiinaia zhizn' 1965 no. 13. For other criticism of the unbalanced or overzealous character of VOOPIK, see Aleksandr Mikhailovich, 'Notes of a Publicist: It's a Sane, Sane, Sane World', Izvestiia, 27 March 1966, p. 3.

79. Quoted in S. Semanov, 'Moskva ne stroilas' srazu', Moskva, 1974, no. 7. See also V. Kochemasov, 'Places of Historical Interest - Year of Quests, Year of Hopes', Istoriiia SSSR, 1967, no. 5 (September-October).


81. V. Serov, President of the USSR Academy of Arts, et al, 'Our Thoughts and Disputes: The Living Past', Izvestiia, 25 January 1966, p. 5. See also Iu. Iaralov, Secretary of the Board of the USSR Architects' Union, 'Monuments and the Present Day', Izvestiia, 15 April 1967, p. 3.

82. Vladimir Soloukhin, Sliricheskikh pozitsii, Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1965, p. 164.


85. Semanov, loc. cit.

86. Aleksandr Shamaro, 'Pis'mo v redaktsiiu: Eshche raz o pamiatnikakh otechestva', Nauka i religiia, 1975, no. 7. See also Dunlop, loc. cit., p. 30.


88. See Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 76-7.

89. Materialy, op. cit., and Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 74-5. The existence of another 'preservationist' organisation concerned with the Russian land became known during the 1970s: Vserossiiskoe obshchestvo okhrany prirody (All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Nature). Nevertheless, before the formation of this Society, articles appealing to Russian national feeling through evocations of the beauty of the national landscape are not uncommon. See, for example, 'Answering Your Question: Will We Have a National Park?', Pravda, 17 January 1967, p. 4. By 1971, the organisation reportedly had 19 million members. See also John B. Dunlop, 'Ruralist Prose Writers in the Russian Ethnic Movement', in Allworth, ed., op. cit., p. 85. The figure is


93. See, for example, Vladislav Soshin, Doctor of Philology, 'What We Think and Talk About: With No Wrong Notes', Izvestiia, 18 October 1981, p. 3.

94. See V. Kozhinov, 'Between the Boulevard and the Sadovoe' (Letter to the Editor), Komsomol'skaia pravda, 9 April 1967, p. 4; L. Margolin, 'Where Onegin Dined', Izvestiia, 7 April 1968, p. 5; Pravda, 1 February 1973, p. 6.


98. Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 72-3.


101. Exemplified by such figures as Aleksandr Iashin, G. Troepol'skii, Efim Dorosh and Valentin Ovechkin, who, as Philippa Lewis states, 'did for the village what writers such as Dudintsev, Erenburg, Granin, Nekrasov etc. were doing in an urban setting at the time'. Lewis, loc. cit., p. 549. See also Prokopovich, op. cit., Chapter II: 'The Early Derevenschchiki - A Desire for Reform'. 


103. Lewis, loc. cit., p. 551.


107. See the description of Rasputin's Lusia, a daughter who has forgotten everything from the village, in 'Poslednii srok', loc. cit., no. 7, p. 53. For more on the artistic depiction of the tragedy of the physical and spiritual passing of the older generation in the village, see E. Nosov, 'Za dolami, za lesami', Novyi mir, 1966, no. 2; V. Likhonosov, 'Rodnye', ibid., 1967, no. 2; and 'Na ulitse shirokoi', ibid., 1968, no. 8. It should come as little surprise that the theme of the contrast between Russian urban and rural dwellers was taken one step further in the samizdat literature, the rural Russian being depicted as the bearer of natsional'nost and samobytnost'. See for example, Mikhail F. Antonov, 'Uchenie Slavianofilov: Vysshii vzlet narodnogo samosoznaniia v Rossii v doleninskii period', Veche, no. 1, p. 34.


111. See for example, 'Filosofiiia patriotizma', Molodaia gvardiia, 1967, no. 10. For other works which appeared under Chalmaev's name, see Geroicheskoe v sovetskoi literature, Moscow, 1964; Mir v svete podviga, Moscow, 1965; 'Velikie iskaniia', Molodaia gvardiia, 1968, no. 3; and "Neizbezhnost'", ibid., 1968, no. 9.

113. Lewis, loc. cit., p. 567. See also Efim Dorosh, 'Obrazy Rossii', Novyi mir, 1969, no. 3 for the difference between 'loving' and 'idealising' the Russian village.

114. F. Levin, 'Obosnovana li trevoga?' Literaturnaia gazeta, 1968, no. 3. See also V. Gusev, 'O proze, derevne i tsel'nykh liudiakh', ibid., 1968, no. 7; S. Pokrovskii, 'Mnimaia zagadka', Voprosy istorii, 1969, no. 5, p. 127; and I. Dedkov, 'Stranitsy derevenskoi zhizni', Novyi mir, 1969, no. 3, pp. 231-2. The fact that only partial or aesopian criticism was permitted of the derevenshashchi during the 1960s is further suggested by Vsevolod Kochetov's novel And What Do You Want?, published in 1969 in Oktiabr'. The novel contains a negative religious character, Bogoroditsa. Strong parallels emerge between the figure and Vladimir Soloukhin, who has written a poem entitled 'Bogoroditsa'. Efim Dorosh also wrote a critique of the derevenshashchi (even though he was at some stages identified with the school), if a somewhat less severe one. He evidently regards such interest in the past as 'fashion'. His position appears to be that far greater attention being paid to Russia's cultural heritage is desirable, concomitant mysticism and chauvinism, however, are not. It should be noted in this connection that Dorosh is reportedly Jewish. See 'Obrazy Rossii', loc. cit., esp. p. 182. See also his Zhivoe derevo iskusstva, op. cit., and Dozhd' popolam s solntsem: derevenskii dnevnik, Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1973. See also Lewis, loc. cit., p. 55.


120. 'Protiv chego vystupaet Novyi mir?' Ogonek, 26 July 1969. The letter was signed by Mikhail Alekseev, Sergei Vikulov (later to become editor of Nash sovremennik), Sergei Voronin, Vitalii Zakrutkin, Anatolii Ivanov (later to become editor of Molodaia
gvardiia), Sergei Makashkin, Aleksandr Prokof'ev, Petr Proskurin, Sergei Smirnov, Vladimir Chivilikhin and Nikolai Shinduk. It is of interest to note that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn also attacked Dement'ev in his Bodalsia telenok s dubom, describing his polemic as 'journalistic swill' and 'cold, heartless squalor'. Molodaia gvardiia, he observes 'at least indirectly defends religion'. Quoted in Dunlop, op. cit., p. 226.

121. Yanov, op. cit., p. 50. See also Lewis, loc. cit., pp. 566-7, and Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 218-27.


126. See, for example, Vasilii Belov, 'Eshche raz o iazyke', Molodaia gvardiia, 1971, no. 6; Sergei Vikulov, 'O derevne i "derevenshchikakh"', ibid.; poems by the same writer in ibid., 1972, no. 6; M. Lobanov's review of Nikolai Rubtsov's Zelenye tsvety, in ibid. However, it should be pointed out that Voprosy istorii sought to distance itself from the neo-Slavophilism of the Molodaia gvardiia group. It did so by initiating a debate on a 1941 evaluation of the Slavophiles. Most participants concluded that the author of the article in question had exaggerated the Slavophiles' progressive traits. See E.A. Dudzinskaia, 'Burzhuaznye tendentsii v teorii i praktike slavianofilov', Voprosy istorii, 1972, no. 1.

127. See Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 145.

128. See the editorial, Molodaia gvardiia, 1972, no. 8.


130. See footnote 12. There has been some speculation that Mikhail Suslov may have stood behind Iakovlev in this endeavour. See Dunlop, op. cit., p. 232.

131. See footnote 13.

132. Yanov, op. cit., p. 59. See also Dunlop, op. cit., p. 229.
133. Yanov, op. cit., pp. 55-7. Melent'ev had also been one of the deputy heads of the Culture Department of the CPSU Central Committee in the mid to late 1960s.

134. Ibid., p. 60.

135. Ibid., p. 56.


142. Valentin Rasputin, Povesti, Moscow: Molodaja gvardiia, 1976. 'Proshchanie s materoi' was also published in Nash sovremennik, 1976, nos. 10 and 11. For an indication of the attitudes of the authorities to Rasputin, see the discussion between CPSU Central Committee member Boris Stukalin and Liudmila Gvishiani in Moskva, 1980, no. 1. For other examples of derevenskaia proza after 1973, see M. Lobanov, 'Uroki "derevenskoj prozy"' in Vnutrennoe i vneshnee, Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1976; I. Vasil'ev, in Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1979, no. 17.

143. John B. Dunlop, 'Ruralist Prose Writers ...', loc. cit., p. 84.


1977, no. 3; Sergei Vikulov, 'Ostalsia v pole sled', Molodaia gvardiia, 1978, no. 5; Oleg Volkov, 'Bez prikras no i bez mery', Nash sovremennik, 1978, no. 11. See also the criticism of the Bolshevik attitude towards the village in I. Kuz'michev, 'My zanovo poznaли svoi narod', Volga, 1979, no. 5; and Oleg Mikhailov in Literaturnaia Rossiia, 5 January 1979.

146. See Nikolai Pal'kin, editor of Volga, 'Khleb-vsemu golova', Sovetskaia Rossiia, 26 August 1979. The subject was also alluded to in Mikhail Alekseev's 'Seiatel' i khranitel', Nash sovremennik, 1972, no. 9, p. 96.


150. See Agurskii, loc. cit., p. 13.


152. See, for example, Aleksandr Khvatov, 'Cherty narodnosti', Nash sovremennik, 1973, no. 1, esp. p. 182.

153. See Sergei Semanov, Serdtse rodiny, Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1977, which excluded the article cited in footnote 123. With regard to the case of Vladimir Soloukhin, see footnote 87.


155. Ploss, loc. cit., p. 2, states in this connection that 'in mid-1979, the Moscow rumour-mill claimed that "Russophiles" ... within the Party bureaucracy and intelligentsia sensed that the Brezhnev era was coming to a close and were manoeuvering to sharpen traditional Russian anti-semitic antagonism in the Party's top echelons ... (and) were also alleged to be seeking to heighten traditional Russian xenophobic fears that "foreigners" and foreign influence would irreparably dilute the unique spiritual values of "mother Russia"'.

156. See Kommunist, 1979 (July).


158. See 'Vsegda aktual'naia tema' (unattributed), Kommunist, 1981, no. 8 (May).
The shrill call for greater ideological vigilance emerged in January of 1982. Deep concern with regard to the cynicism and increasingly widespread pacifism of Soviet youth(i) was evident in the reports of a congress, held January 20-22 in Moscow, jointly sponsored by the political administration of the Soviet army and navy, DOSAAF (the 'voluntary' society to promote the armed forces) and the Znanie (Knowledge) society, with the Civil Defence system, the Komsomol and the War Veteran's organisation in supporting roles. A. Marchenko in Izvestiia of January 28 took up the theme of the conference by attacking parents who encourage pacifist attitudes in their children. Soviet Chief of Staff Ogarkov followed with a pamphlet devoted to the same theme.(ii) Komsomol Chief Pastukhov subsequently widened the target of criticism in the February edition of Kommunist in which he attacked Western 'ideological sabotage' in the form of fashions and music.(iii) This new aggressiveness soon emerged in Komsomol'skaia pravda which, in reports concerning Soviet rock musicians, changed its line from relatively dispassionate reports to savage criticism.(iv) Such an atmosphere of increased ideological vigilance perhaps raised the issue of the dubious writings of the Russophiles, particularly if elements of 'idealism' or 'mysticism' could be detected in their works.

As to Suslov, some commentators have suggested that he was a defender of elements of Russian nationalism remaining part of Soviet ideology.(v) And it has been noted that in other areas of policy, notably the official attitude to the Italian Communist Party, articles appearing immediately before and after his death reveal significant differences in both content and form.(vi)

(i) The article 'Soviet Peaceniks?' in the Christian Science Monitor, March 11, 1982 stated that 'a survey published in a Soviet research journal last year found that only 58 per cent of draft-age respondents felt positively about serving in the armed forces'.

(ii) See Reuters, February 26, 1982.

(iii) 'Bring up Patriots, Internationalists'. Kommunist, 1982, no. 3 (February).


(vi) See RL 75/82, 'Pravda Softens Tone of Debate with PCI', February 15, 1982.


161. Ibid.

162. V. Kozhinv, 'And Every Tongue in it Shall Call my Name', Nash sovremennik, 1981, no. 11.
163. Professor V. Kuleshov, Head of the Department of Russian Literature, Moscow State University, 'Tochnost' kriterii', Pravda, 1 February 1982, p. 8.


170. Novosti in English, 8 June 1978.

171. Dunlop, op. cit., p. 123. See also Glazunov's autobiographical essay, 'Doroga k tebe, iz zapisok khudozhnika', Molodaia gardiia, 1965, nos 10 and 12. For further Western reports on Glazunov's exhibitions, see Craig Whitney, 'Unbridled Artist Proves Popular at Soviet Show', New York Times, 18 June 1978, p. 12, and Olga Carlisle, 'Reviving Myths of Holy Russia', New York Times Magazine, 16 September 1979. The Glazunov exhibitions, it should be noted, were not the first inspired by Russian ethnocentrism. See Ogonek's report on a Moscow samovar exhibition in 1969 at which there was reportedly 'no relief' from the crowd. See Ogonek, 12 July 1969.

172. See Dunlop, op. cit., p. 60. Dunlop cites the Düsseldorf Khudozhnik i Rossii, 1980, pp. 153-4, in support of this claim. For more on the purported attempts of the Department of Culture of the Leningrad oblast' Party Committee to cancel or limit the effectiveness of the exhibition, see Dunlop, op. cit., p. 122. Recent émigré Semen Reznik claims that Glazunov's exhibitions had the personal support of Suslov. See ibid., p. 291n. See also the remarkably candid interview conducted with Glazunov, touching on this subject, originally published in Vol'noe slovo, in Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 308-11.

173. Dunlop, op. cit., p. 122. For some of the overwhelmingly enthusiastic (and hence Russian nationalist) comments left in the Visitors' Book at the Leningrad exhibition, see ibid., pp. 127-8.


181. B. Petukhov, 'Urozhainyi marsh', Literaturnaia gazeta, 30 March 1965, pp. 6-12. See also the comment that both cultural and economic revival was necessary, in 'Concluding the Dialogue', ibid., 11 March 1965, p. 2.

182. Nepomnyashchy, loc. cit., pp. 89-90. See also Daniel Vanderheide, 'Ethnic Significance of the Non-Black Earth Project', in ibid.

183. See Vanderheide, loc. cit., p. 219. Vanderheide quotes US Government figures to the effect that while overall USSR investment for the tenth five-year plan grew by 32.7% over its predecessor, investment in the Nechernozem'e during this period grew by 79.5%.

184. 'Pursuing a Leninist Path Toward Communism - Report by Comrade B.N. Ponomarev at a Ceremonial Session in Moscow Dedicated to the 104th Anniversary of Lenin's Birth', Pravda, 23 April 1974.

185. Semen Shurtakov, 'Moe nechernozem'e ', Literaturnaia gazeta, 1976 no. 1, p. 3. For Pravda's enthusiastic response to Brezhnev's announcement of the plan, see 'O merakh po dal'neishemu razvitiu sel'skogo khoziaistva nechernozemnoi zony RSFSR', Pravda, 3 April 1974, p. 1. For other examples of the deliberate linkage of the project with Russian national sentiment, see A.N. Gladishchev, Proizvoditel'nye sily nechernozemnoi zony RSFSR, Moscow: Mysl', 1977, pp. 238; Vladimir I. Staroverov, Sotsial'no-demograficheskie problemy derevni, Moscow: Nauka, 1975, p. 246; 'Otchet Tsk VLKSM i zadachi Komsomola po formirovaniu u molodezhi kommunisticcheskoi soznatel'nosti, gotovnosti, voli i umenia stroit' kommunizm:


189. See, for example, V. Akimov, 'An Essential Book', Voprosy literatury, 1981, no. 3 (March).

190. For some examples of the treatment of such figures during the Brezhnev era, see Izvestiiia, 20 December 1964, p. 6; Pravda, 14 March 1965, p. 3; Pravda, 5 June 1965, p. 1; Izvestiiia, 5 June 1965, p. 4; Izvestiiia, 23 October 1965, p. 4; Izvestiiia, 21 July 1966, p. 6; Pravda, 3 May 1967, p. 2; Pravda, 7 August 1967, p. 3; Izvestiiia, 21 October 1967, p. 6; Izvestiiia, 7 November 1967, p. 8; Pravda, 11 April 1968, p. 6; Izvestiiia, 20 April 1968, p. 2; Pravda, 5 November 1968, p. 3; Pravda, 12 February 1969, p. 3; 'Extremely Rare Find - Hitherto Unknown Pushkin Letter', Literaturnaia gazeta, 9 December 1970, p. 6; L. Rosenblium, 'On the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of F.M. Dostoevskii: Literature is the Banner of Honour - New Material from the Heritage of a Great Writer', Izvestiiia, 7 October 1971, p. 5; Boris Aseev, Doctor of Arts, 'Modernity of the Classics' (Theatre Review), Izvestiiia, 12 June 1976, p. 5; V. Kulesskov, Doctor of Philology, 'Polemical Notes: But was there any Kingdom of Darkness?' Literaturnaia gazeta, 19 March 1980, p. 6.
For some examples of the treatment of music, see Izvestiia, 31 March 1965, p. 4; Pravda, 8 May 1965, p. 6; Pravda, 12 June 1965, p. 4; Pravda, 15 July 1966, p. 6; Izvestiia, 6 January 1967, p. 4; Pravda, 2 January 1969, p. 6; Pravda, 14 September 1969, p. 3; Pravda, 19 July 1971, p. 1; Pravda, 3 April 1973, p. 3; M. Vasin, Staff Correspondent, 'Preserve the Voices of the Past', Pravda, 4 July 1974, p. 3; Iu. Stanishevskii, 'Theatre: From the Wellsprings of the Classics', Pravda, 18 July 1980, p. 3; E. Maksimova, 'What are You Working On? Voices of Russia', Izvestiia, 25 May 1978, p. 3; V. Vanslov, 'When the Mirror is Warped', Sovetskaia kul'tura, 8 September 1981, pp. 4-5. For instances of where it was stressed that musical performance should adhere to tradition, see K. Massaltinov, RSFSR People's Artist, 'Wellsprings of the Folk-Song', Pravda, 31 October 1972, p. 3; Nina Meshko, conductor of the State Northern Russian Folk Chorus, 'The Artist and the Times: A Living Source', Pravda, 25 December 1974, p. 3; Andrei Novikov, Conductor of the State Siberian Russian Folk Chorus, 'The Artist and the Times: Thou Art Lovely, Russian Song', Pravda, 24 October 1975, p. 3. It is of interest to compare the consistent formal conservativism expressed in the above articles with the call for the acceptance of change with regard to an equivalent manifestation of non-Russian culture, such as the Lithuanian polka. Compare, for example, with Vladas Bartusiavicius, 'What we Think and Talk About: Link Between the Times', Izvestiia, 17 June 1972, p. 5.

'In USSR Council of Ministers - Prizes of Russia', Pravda, 14 October 1966, p. 1.

See, for example, Izvestiia, 8 January 1965, p. 4; Pravda, 19 June 1965, p. 4; Izvestiia, 13 August 1966, p. 4; Pravda, 13 February 1969, p. 6; Pravda, 26 July 1969, p. 6; Pravda, 11 June 1971, p. 6.

For some examples of such criticism, see A. Solodovnikov, 'On Attitudes Towards the Classical Heritage', Kommunist, 1968, no. 13 (September); V. Ivanov, 'Criticism and Bibliography: On Certain Topical Questions of Literature', Kommunist, 1972, no. 9 (June); G.M. Markov, First Secretary of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union, 'Soviet Literature in the Struggle for Communism and its Tasks in the Light of the Decisions of the Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress', Literaturnaia gazeta, 1 July 1981, pp. 1-2, 4. See also an article on Soviet film-makers of the 1920s, such as Sergei Eisenstein, in which their 'Proletkul't' mistakes are highlighted: A. Shredov, 'At the Sources of Soviet Cinema', Oktiabr, 1972, no. 5 (May).


See 'For Exploits of Battle and Labour - Order of Lenin to Tula', Pravda, 9 December 1966; 'Look Truth in the Eye', Izvestiia, 15 October 1968, p. 2; Mikhail Mel'nikov, 'The Cares of the Ninth Muse', Nash sovremennik, 1980, no. 12 (December);
B. Pastukhov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Young Communist League, 'Rear Patriots and Internationalists', Kommunist, 1982, no. 3 (February). See the report of Pravda's attack on Liubimov's modernistic production of Tchaikovsky's 'Queen of Spades', in which the daily stated that 'to permit this is to issue an indulgence for the destruction of Russian culture. To permit this means to bless a crusade against what is holy to us'. Olga Carlisle, 'Reviving Myths of Holy Russia', The New York Times Magazine, 16 September 1979, p. 64. Similarly, Mark Liubomudrov wrote in 1981, in connection with recent plays, that the concept of harmony was 'central for the Russian popular consciousness and native culture'. See Sovetskaia Rossiaia, 12 November 1981.


201. S. Polikarpov, 'Dushi predel zhelannyi', Molodaia gvardiia, 1979, no. 6, p. 10.

202. I. Loschchits, Goncharov, Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1977. See also the favourable review of D. Zhukov, 'Biografija biografii', Nash sovremennik, 1979, no. 9, and the violent reaction, particularly on the part of Molodaia gvardiia, to the claim made by the Kazakh Olzhas Suleimenov, in his Az i ia: kniga blagomernogo chitatelia, published in 1975 (Alma Ata: Zhazushi), that the Slovo o polku Igoreve was more Turkic than Russian. See A. Kuz'min, '"Tochka v kruge", iz kotoroi vyrastat repy', Molodaia gvardiia, 1975, no. 12. See also D.S. Likhachev, 'Gipotezy ili fantazii v istolkovanii temnykh mest "Slova o polku Igoreve"', Zvezda, 1976, no. 6 (June).


207. See Konstantin Iakovlev, Kak my porchim russkii iazyk, Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1976; Chalmaev, 'Neizbeznost', loc. cit.; P. Antokol'skii, in Iunost', 1972, no. 8.

208. Iakovlev, loc. cit., p. 42.

209. See Kornei I. Chukovskii, Zhivoi kak zhizn': razgovor o russkom iazyke, Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1962.


211. See the debate initiated by Nikolai Fedorenko's 'Ne perevesti li na russkii?' Literaturnaia gazeta, 30 January 1974, p. 6. See also V. Vasil'ev, 'Monolog o slove', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 23 September 1977, p. 4.

212. See footnote 205.


216. See Simon, op. cit., p. 93.


218. Izvestiia, 30 August 1966, p. 4.

219. See E. Filimonov, Candidate of Philosophy, 'Talks at Your Request: What is Happening with Religion, its Rituals and Traditions in Our Day?' Izvestiia, 9 October 1981, p. 3. See also the report on an alleged Soviet confidential brief concerning official
policy and attitudes towards the Russian Orthodox Church, which apparently found its way to the West. See Axel Krause, 'Soviet Document Outlines Efforts to Control Church', International Herald-Tribune, 10 April 1980.

220. For cases of the latter, in particular attempts to popularise concepts such as 'Livestock Breeders' Day', 'First Furrow Day', 'First Sheaf Day', 'Harvest Day' and the 'Russian Winter' festival, see, for example, A. Vlasov, Vice-Chairman of Penza oblast' Soviet Executive Committee, 'Beautifully and ceremoniously - New Ceremonies Enter Daily Life in the Village', Sel'skaia zhizn', 6 September 1970, p. 3; 'There's More Creativity in a Creative Collective', Nauka i religiia, 1981, no. 1 (January). Atheist agitators often complain that the ceremonies most difficult to devise secular alternatives for are funerals and Easter.

221. See Bociurkiw, loc. cit., p. 139. This is not to ignore the significant offensive against dissident Orthodox believers, particularly during the 1970s, symbolised by the imprisonment of Vladimir Osipov in 1974 for a sentence of eight years. See Dmitrii Pospielovski, 'Ethnocentrism, Ethnic Tensions, and Marxism-Leninism', in Allworth, ed., op. cit., p. 131.

222. Simon, op. cit., p. 93.

223. Ibid., pp. 88, 90. It is noteworthy that at least one contributor to Nauka i religiia in 1965 advocated the abandonment of all administrative restrictions placed on the practice of Russian Orthodoxy. See D. Balashov, 'Traditsionnoe i sovremennoe', Nauka i religiia, 1965, no. 12, p. 28.


226. See Literaturnaya Rossiia, 22 October 1971; M. Evchuk, Director of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, in Kommunist, 1971, no. 15. Perhaps this concern was in part generated by the conclusions of a conference hosted by both the Komsomol and the 'Znanie' Society in June 1971. V.A. Zhiteniev, a Secretary of the Komsomol, stated, 'Sometimes there are found among atheists those who assert that religion is not exerting any influence on the generation which is growing up. Facts indicate the opposite.' "Vospityvat'" ubezhdenia', Nauka i religiia, 1971, no. 11, p. 3; 'Ovladevat' teorii, nesti znanie v massy', ibid, 1971, no. 11, esp. p. 7. For Vladimir Osipov's speculation on the reasons for the apparent increase in official vigilance with regard to the Russian Orthodox Church, see 'Beseda ... V.N. Osipova ...', Vestnik RSKhD, 1972, no. 4, p. 302.

228. See, for example, Dorosh's description of how he was brought to tears in a Zagorsk church in Zhivoe derevo iskusstva, op. cit., p. 233. See also his 'Meditations in Zagorsk', Novyi mir, 1967, May. Dorosh's proposed collection of essays Antiquity is Next to Us was not passed by the censors. See also Soloukhin, esp. 'Chernye doski', loc. cit., and V. Elesin, 'Derevnia', Nash sovremennik, 1978, no. 10, and the condemnations of the sale of icons to the West in the 1920s and 1930s, in Dmitrii Zhukov, 'Restavratory' Literatura Rossii, 27 July 1979, and Viktor Astafev, 'Tsar'-Ryba', Roman-gazeta, 1977, no. 5, esp. p. 105.

229. 'Chireans' refers to Tartars who invaded Russia in the sixteenth century. In E. Safronov, 'Otsvety togo bol'shogo ognia', Moskva, 1977, no. 6, p. 214, quoted in Agurskii, loc. cit., p. 16. How successful the regime has been in winning support (or at least stemming hostility) because of its policies towards the Russian Orthodox Church is a question beyond the scope of this chapter. But for some indications, including the attitude of dissident Orthodox believers, see Dunlop, op. cit., Chapter 7, 'The Church'; Michael Aksenov-Meerson, 'The Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian Ethnic Identity Today', in Allworth, ed., op. cit., Marina Ledkovskii, 'Russian Orthodoxy and Ethnic Identity Today', in ibid.

230. For an interesting Albanian view of the 60th anniversary celebrations, whose contents are suggested by the title, see 'Religion in the Service of the Soviet Social Imperialists', ATA in English, 15 July 1978.

231. See Patriarch Pimen's report in 'Zhizn' i deiatel'nost' Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi', Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, 1971, no. 7. See also Bird, loc. cit., pp. 26-7. For details on the support of the Church for goals of Soviet foreign policy, see Lupinin, loc. cit., pp. 6-8.


235. In line with this reasoning, it is frequently claimed that Zionists gained their ideas from Mein Kampf, or are engaged in a struggle for Lebensraum. See, for example, 'A Zionist's Revelations', Pravda, 27 November 1971, p. 5; M. Mitin, 'Zionism is a Variety of Chauvinism and Racism', Pravda, 18 December 1971, pp. 4-5. Soviet Jews are regularly recruited into echoing such claims: see the article by Veniamin E. Dymshits, the highest ranking Jew in the Soviet political system, in Pravda, 6 March 1970. See also Krasnaia zvezda, 10 March 1970.

237. See, for example, Komsomol'skaia pravda, 4 October 1967.

238. Lev Korneev, 'Roots and Shoots of Zionism', Zhurnalist, 1972, no. 3 (March), pp. 70-71. See also V. Iugov, 'Exposing Zionism' (Book Review), Pravda, 14 January 1979, p. 4.

239. Ivan Shevtsov, Vo imia otsa i syna, Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1970. The novel was produced in an edition of 60,000. Despite the author's attempt to balance his rather thinly-veiled anti-semitism with the inclusion of a 'positive' Jewish character in the novel, he was subsequently officially criticised for the work. For part of the international reaction which works such as Shevtsov's novel engendered, see, for example, W. Bergman, 'Soviet Anti-Semitic Pornography', Soviet Jewish Affairs, 1971, no. 2.


244. See Shevtsov, Borodinskoe pole, Moscow, 1977, esp. p. 274; A. Ivanov, Vechnyi zov, op. cit., pp. 46-8; M. Kolesnikov, S otkrytym zabralom, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977 (which includes the claim that Trotsky represented not only a 'Zionist' but a masonic conspiracy); and A. Znamenskii, 'S otkrytym zabralom', Nash sovremennik, 1978, no. 10. Trotsky is also accused of genocide of the Russians during the Civil War in two re-interpretations of Sholokhov's Tikhii Don. See S. Semanov, Tikhii Don - literatura i istoriia, Moscow, Sovremennik, 1977; M. Alpatov, Otkuda techet Tikhii Don, Moscow, 1978. For other allegations regarding Trotsky's behaviour during the Civil War, see S. Semanov 'U kolybeli Krasnoi armii', Moskva, 1980, no. 2; A. Vladimirskii, 'Glavnyi geroi-narod', Molodaia gvardiia, 1978, no. 8.

245. See Major-General A. Malygin, 'In the Battle of Ideas There are No Compromises', Molodoi kommunist, 1969, no. 1; V. Bolshakov, 'Bankrupts from the Zionist Concern', Pravda, 11 May 1971, p. 4; D. Kogan and V. Shvarts, 'In the Nets of Zionism', Pravda Ukrainy, 26 April 1972, p. 3.

247. Paul Lendvai, 'Jews Under Communism', Commentary, 1971, December, p. 68, and Shaffer, op. cit., p. 31. Such views have also been reflected by Umberto Terracini, the most senior Jew in the Italian Communist Party. See the interview with Terracini in La Stampa, 18 November 1972.

248. Shaffer, op. cit., p. 32.

249. Pravda, 12 July 1970, and Shaffer, op. cit., p. 34.


251. Boris Nikol'skii, The Memory Formula, published in Neva, in August and September 1981. The novel concerns Efim Feigin, a Jewish scientist working in the field of memory who proves susceptible to the intrigues of Western intelligence agents despite the warnings of his Russian colleague. Nikol'skii draws on anti-Semitic stereotypes for his description of Feigin, and, like Shevtsov, attempts to contrast him with his wife, also a stereotypically beautiful Russian woman.


253. A. Bakhtvalov, 'Nezhnost' k revushchemu zveriu', Molodaia gvardiia, 1978, no. 1; M. Kuz'min, 'Posle puteshestviia', ibid., 1978, no. 6; Anatolii Ivanov, 'Vechnyi zov', loc. cit. The last-named work, like those of Shevtsov's, apparently attempts to compensate particularly virulent (though always implicit) anti-Semitism by introducing a 'good Jew' into the narrative.


256. See D. Zhukov, loc. cit., p. 146; A. Safronov, 'V glub' vremenii', Molodaia gvardiia, 1979, no. 8, p. 114; V. Lazarev, 'Dostoinstvo pesni', Nash sovremennik, 1979, no. 7, p. 179. A more general taboo regarding the cultural and scientific achievements of Jews is suggested by the fact that in 1979 Henri Poincaré was referred to as the 'father' of the Theory of Relativity. See A. Tiapkin and A. Shibanov, 'Rozhdenie teorii otnositel'nosti', Sovetskaia Rossiiia, 8 April 1979.


259. Shaffer, op. cit., p. 33. For examples of such illustrations, see ibid., pp. 35, 36.


261. Ibid., p. 329. See also V. Shatilov, 'Bessmertnaia slava', *Molodaia gvardiia*, 1978, no. 2.


263. For details of the contents of this work, see Reuben Ainsztein, 'Soviet Jews Prepare for the Worst', *New Statesman*, 25 April 1980.


265. For example, E. Bugaev states, referring to the early years of the Soviet State, that 'On the basis of a report by I.V. Stalin, the conference adopted a resolution written by V.I. Lenin on the national question'. See 'Fiftieth Anniversary of the Seventh (April) Conference of Russian SDLP (Bolsheviks) - In the Name of the Victory of the Socialist Revolution', *Pravda*, 7 May 1967, pp. 2-3. Also see Iu. Krasin's vigorous attempt to refute the argument that the destruction of Trotskyist internationalism led necessarily to 'great power chauvinism'. 'Questions of Theory: Experience of Lasting Significance', *Pravda*, 11 January 1967, pp. 2-3. However, for overall assessments of Stalin during the Brezhnev period, which vary little from the position established under Khrushchev, see *Pravda*, 21 December 1969, and 21 December 1979.


268. See, for example, the announced legislation liberalising the position of the Crimean Tartars, in *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 9 September 1967, p. 3.


272. See, for example, Academician P. Fedoseev, 'Dialectics of Life and Philosophical Science', Pravda, 16 March 1966, pp. 2-3.


274. See, for example, his articles in Kommunist, 1966, no. 6, and Literaturnaiia Rossiiia, 20 May 1966.

275. For some examples of members of the leadership, such as Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Suslov ignoring the question of ethnic assimilation in addresses related to nationality matters, see Brezhnev's addresses on the occasion of the forty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution, Pravda, 7 November 1964; and 'In a Single Friendly Family - Jubilee Celebration in Uzbekistan', Pravda, 21 November 1964; Kosygin, Pravda, 26 November 1964, pp. 1-2; and Suslov's address, 'Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Soviet Lithuania. In the Fraternal Family of Peoples - Ceremonial Meeting in Vilnius', Pravda, 18 July 1965, p. 2. Such reticence is in marked contrast to the continuation of the Khrushchev 'merging' line in numerous quarters. For example, the November 1964 issue of Lithuanian Kommunist contained an article by G. Zimanis, entitled 'Cultural Co-operation - An Important Condition for the Further Merging of Cultures'. Similarly, Bodil mentioned 'merging' in his report to the Twenty-Third Party Congress - see Pravda, 3 April 1966, pp. 3-4, while the Pravda editorial of 5 September 1965 quoted Lenin to the effect that 'socialism ... tremendously speeds the drawing together and merging of nations'. For other instances of the notion being used (in its unrevised form) during the Brezhnev period, see A.D. Danialov, 'Gody bor'by i pobed', Sovetskii Dagestan, 1967, no. 6; M.S. Dzhunusov, 'Sokhraniatsia li natsii?', Sovietskaia Rossiiia, 4 November 1979; 'Beseda kandidata istoricheskikh nauk N.F. Shitova, 'Stroitel'ство kommunizma i buduchnosti' natsii', RFE-RL Soviet Media Monitoring, (Radio Moscow I, 10 February 1966, 1400 hrs), p. 1.
This is illustrated by the fact that, for example, at the Fifth Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers, only the non-Russian delegates touched on the questions of 'internationalism', 'drawing together', and 'mutual enrichment' as issues in Soviet literature. See 'Fifth Congress of Union of Soviet Writers: Devote Inspiration and Talent to the People', Izvestiia, 1 and 2 July 1971, p. 3. It is also suggested by the frequent obituaries of Soviet cultural figures in official publications: non-Russian figures are consistently referred to as having made a contribution to their national 'Soviet literature', and also to 'Soviet multinational literature'. Russian figures are rarely given an equivalent posthumous reminder of their internationalist role and duty to the Soviet State. For some examples of such obituaries of non-Russian figures, see, 'Akakii Alekseevich Khorava', Pravda, 29 June 1972, p. 6; 'Teodor Eduardovich Zalkaln', Pravda, 9 September 1972, p. 6; 'Andrei Vasilevich Golovko', Pravda, 8 December 1972, p. 6; 'Mirzo Tursun-Zade', Pravda, 27 September 1977, p. 4.

Pravda, 30 March 1966. For similar rehearsals of this line during the early years of the new regime, see 'Friendship of the Peoples of the USSR and Our Great Victory' (editorial), Pravda, 6 May 1965, p. 2; I. Dizhbit, et al, 'In Baltic Republic Newspapers: In a Family of Free and Equal Men', Pravda, 18 April 1965, p. 3.


See, for example, A. Korneichuk, Hero of Socialist Labour, 'Towards All-Union Writers' Congress - A Lofty School', Izvestiia, 11 May 1967, p. 3; 'To the Fourth USSR Writers' Congress', Pravda, 23 May 1967, p. 1; N. Abalkin, 'Moscow Tour: Deserved Recognition', Pravda, 10 June 1969, p. 6. For an article cursorily examining the results of such policies in one Union Republic, see 'Soviet Republic Losing Traditions', New York Times, 14 January 1969.

The vast majority of Sverdlin and Rogachev's articles and monographs were published between 1957 and October 1964. Semenov similarly published mainly during this period, although early during the Brezhnev period he continued to publish pro-assimilationist works such as Lichnost', obshchestvo i gosudarstvo, Moscow: Nauka, 1966 (see esp. ch. VII), and Teoriia gosudarstva i prava, Moscow: Izuridat, 1965 (See esp. ch. XII).

I.P. Tsamerian, 'The International Significance of the Experience of the CPSU in Solving the National Question in the USSR', Voprosy istorii KPSS, 1968, no. 9 (September).


See, for example, Burmistrova, in Voprosy istorii KPSS, 1965, no. 2; and Voprosy istorii, 1966, no. 12; Dzhunosov in Voprosy istorii, 1966, no. 4; and Voprosy istorii, 1967, no. 1; Mnatsakanian, Voprosy istorii, 1966, no. 9. For secondary sources on the discussion, see Hodnett, loc. cit., and Meissner, loc. cit., esp. pp. 18-21.

See his article in Voprosy istorii, 1967, no. 1.

See, for example, Dzhunosov, in Voprosy istorii, 1966, no. 4. For other 'liberals', or 'anti-assimilationists' in the debate, see N.A. Tavakalian in Voprosy istorii, 1967, no. 2.

See Burmistrova in Voprosy istorii, 1966, no. 12, p. 105.


An ironic aside to the final twelve years of Brezhnev's nationality policies is that while they tended to revert more to open assimilationism, their alleged liberalism was frequently contrasted with the 'Great Han chauvinism' of Chinese nationality policies. The criticised elements of Chinese policies usually bear an uncanny resemblance to Soviet policies. For some examples of such criticism, see Murat Khamraev, Doctor of Philology, 'Poetry Dragged Through the Mud: The Fate of Uighur Literature in Maoist China', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 7 April 1970, p. 3; M. Iurchenko, 'Peking's Great Han Course', Izvestiia, 12 February 1972, pp. 3-4; S. Trapeznikov, 'Soviet Historical Science and the Prospects for its Development', Kommunist, 1973, no. 11 (July); M. Barnabekov, 'Going Against the Times: Autumn Flies from Kuangming Jihpao', Literaturnaia gazeta, 1973, no. 45 (7 November), p. 9; Hsiao Chu-Mao, and Ma Lieh-Sreng, 'Letter from China: Dangerous Resemblance', Literaturnaia gazeta, 1974, no. 32 (7 August), pp. 9, 14; A. Tev-Grigorian, 'Maoism unmasked - Under the Chauvinists' Yoke', Izvestiia, 23 December 1975, p. 4;


293. See, for example, D. Kornovan's speech at a Conference on the 'Development and Drawing Together of Soviet Nations and Nationalities', at Tiraspol, Moldavia in December 1966, in Kommunist Moldavii, 1966 (January), p. 49.


295. For Brezhnev on the 'Sovetskii narod' concept, see 'Otchetnyi doklad Tsk KPSS XXIV s"ezda KPSS: Doklad general'nego sekretar'ia Tsk tovarishcha L.I. Brezhnev, 30 March 1971', Kommunist, 1971, no. 5 (March), p. 61; 'Delo Lenina zhivet i pobezhdaet' Kommunist, 1970, no. 7 (May); 'O piatidesiati-letii SSSR', Kommunist, 1972, no. 18 (December); 'K narodam mira', Kommunist, 1972, no. 18 (December). The Soviet authorities, of course, consistently deny that the process of 'internationalisation' essential to the concept has anything to do with Russification: see Boris Lewytzskij, 'Die Kommunistischen Parteien der Unionsrepubliken', Osteuropa, 1982, no. 1, esp. p. 53. See also M.P. Kim et al, Sovetskii narod - novaia istoricheskaia obshchnost' liudei, Moscow: Nauka, 1975. For more references to the vast Soviet literature which has emerged on this subject, see Ruslan O. Rasiak, '"The Soviet People": Multiethnic Alternative or Ruse?' in Allworth, ed., op. cit., and Meissner, loc. cit., p. 23n.
296. See, for example, S. Kaltakhchian, 'Questions of Theory: On National Unity, Real and Illusory', Pravda, 26 November 1968, pp. 3-4.


300. 'Joint Ceremonial Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: On the 50th Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Report by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee', Pravda, 22 December 1972.


See, for example, V. Kistanov, 'The Leninist Nationalities Policy and Economic Regionalisation in the USSR', Voprosy ekonomiki, 1972, no. 12 (December).

N.A. Ponomarev, First Secretary of the Board of the USSR Artists' Union, 'Ideological Conviction and Skill - The Fourth USSR Artists' Congress: The Soviet Artist is an Active Participant in the Construction of Communist Society', Sovetskaia kul'tura, 18 May 1973.


See, for example, the appraisal of recent Azeri fiction in V. Oskotskii, 'Literary Review: The Moral Theme', Pravda, 12 May 1974, p. 3.

See, for example, Boris Kimiagarov, 'My - synov'ia odnoi rodiny', Izvestia, 29 November 1977; Sharaf Rashidov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, 'On a Path of Unity and Fraternity', Pravda, 23 May 1980, pp. 2-3.

See, for example, V.P. Sherstobitov, 'The Formation of the USSR and the Historical Destinies of our Country's Peoples', Istoriia SSSR, 1972, no. 3 (May-June).

Kommunist, 1980, no. 1.

R.I. Kosolapov, 'Class and National Relations at the Stage of Developed Socialism', Sotsiologicheskie issledovania, 1982, no. 4 (October-November). Following the death of Brezhnev, however, the term 'merging' - in its original sense indicating the formation into a single ethnic group of a number of closely related ethnic groups - again became officially respectable, Andropov himself using the term in the course of his first major address on nationality policy. In addition, Kommunist used the term in its original sense on one occasion in the final days of the Brezhnev regime. However, this may have been more a foretaste of the Andropov regime's policies, than an eleventh-hour return to Khrushchevian terminology. For this development and the nationality policies which emerged under Andropov, see Roman Solchanyk, 'Merging of Nations Debated', Soviet Analyst, 1982, no. 22 (18 February 1983); 'Merger of Nations: Back in Style?' Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 18 February 1983; and Higgie, loc. cit.

Pravda, 24 February 1981.

The first indication of such writing (concerning the less than exemplary relations between Russian and native schoolchildren in the Bashkir ASSR) occurs in 1977: see 'Don't Let Insults Be Your Guide', Pionerskaia pravda, 25 January 1977, and 'The Session Remains Open', ibid., 1 April 1977, p. 2. See also Professor Iu.V. Arutiunian, Doctor of History and Head of the Sociology


319. For some examples during these years, see I. Dizhbit, et al, 'In a Family of Free and Equal Men', Pravda, 18 April 1965, p. 3; Iu. Desher'ev, 'The Development and Mutual Enrichment of the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR', Kommunist, 1965, no. 13 (September); N. Dzhandildin, 'A Single Multi-National Culture', Kommunist, 1966, no. 5; A. Agaev's article in Literaturnaia Rossiia 20 May 1966; V. Pomerantsev, 'Vchera i segodnia', Nauka i religiia, 1966, no. 5.


See the report of the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Armenian Communist Party in which it is stated that Russian is to be taught in first grade throughout the Republic, 'With a Confident Stride', Pravda, 3 March 1971, p. 2. See also L. Tairov, Staff Correspondent 'In the Language of Brotherhood', Pravda, 28 October 1972, p. 3, and 'Leninskaia natsional'naia politika i razvitie literaturnykh iazykov', Radio Liberty Research Notes, 111/73 (4 April 1973), p. 2.


M.A. Prokof'ev, 'Russkii iazyk v natsional'noi shkole i dol'skol'nych uchrezhdeniakh', Russkii iazyk v natsional'noi shkole, 1975, no. 6, p. 20.


ibid., p. 28.

'0 dal'neishem razvitii issledovaniia po problemam funktsionirovaniia i izucheniiia russkogo iazyka, prepodovaniia russkoi literatury v soiuuznykh i avtonomykh respublikakh, avtonomykh oblast'iah i okrugakh SSSR', Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR, 1979, no. 5, pp. 14-15. Moreover, for another instance of use of the argument in the 1970s that there is no contradiction in the development of a non-Russian culture in Russian, see R. Lynev, 'Strange Marriage', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 6 January 1971, p. 2. It was also stressed at this time that the teaching of Russian literature in non-Russian languages was undesirable. See F. Chernyshev, Candidate of Pedagogy, 'Tolstoi Should be Read in Russian', Uchitel'skaia gazeta, 29 July 1972, p. 2. For claims that the 'national languages' retained full equality, see, for example, Sherstobitov, loc. cit., 'Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee: On Preparations for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics', Pravda, 22 February 1972, pp. 1-2; P. Mashero, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, 'On Certain Features of Nationality Relations in the Conditions of Developed Socialism', Kommunist, 1972, no. 15 (October); 'Nauchnogo razrabotka problem funktsionirovaniia i izucheniiia russkogo iazyka v natsional'nykh respublikakh i avtonomykh oblast'iah SSSR', Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR, 1977, no. 3, p. 68; S. Kaltakhchian, Doctor of Philology, RSFSR Honoured Worker in Science, 'Questions of Theory: The Soviet People's International Unity', Pravda, 2 October 1981; N. Charikov and P. Redzhenov, 'Without Backward Provinces', Turkmenskaia iskra, 10 July 1981.

As Roman Solchanyk recounts, the existence of the Decree was not announced publicly at the time, and was apparently referred to for the first time in a specialist journal in 1979. See Solchanyk, 'Russian Language ...', loc. cit., p. 30. See also Ann Sheahy,
'New Measures to Improve the Teaching of Russian in the Union
Republics', Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 120/79 (17 April
1979), and Roman Solchanyk, "Russification" To Be Stepped Up',

330. See Solchanyk, loc. cit., p. 31. For the nationalist protests
sparked by the new Decrees, especially in Lithuania, Estonia
and Georgia (and to a lesser extent in Latvia, Belorussia and
the Ukraine), see ibid., pp. 31-6.

331. Fedot P. Filin, 'Russkii iazyk v sovetskikh natsional'nykh
respublikakh', in Russkii iazyk kak sredstvo mezhnatsional'nogo
obshchenia, Moscow 1977, p. 60. Quoted in Solchanyk, 'Russian
Language ...', loc. cit., p. 24. For another indication of such
official fear, see Professor Iu. Belchikov, Doctor of Philology,
'Criticism and Bibliography: Reliable Means of Communication
for Peoples of the USSR', Kommunist, 1978, no. 13 (September).


333. M.I. Isaev, National Languages in the USSR: Problems and
Solutions, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 350. Quoted
in Jonathan Pool, 'Whose Russian Language? Problems in the
Definition of Linguistic Identity', in Allworth, ed., op. cit.,
p. 243.

334. 'O podgotovke k 50-letiiu obrazovaniia SSSR', Pravda, 22 February
1972. Quoted in Roman Solchanyk, 'Resolution on Sixtieth
Anniversary of USSR Mirrors Current Soviet Nationalities Policy',

335. 'O 60-i godovshchine obrazovaniia SSSR', Pravda, 21 February


337. See Ann Sheahy, 'Why Shouldn't Russians Learn the Vernacular?'
Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 18/82 (14 January 1982), and
'Estonian-Language Olympiad Instituted for Pupils of Russian
Schools in Estonia', ibid., 66/82 (10 February 1982). Only one
previous instance of support for such a policy has been found.
In 1974, A. Voss, First Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Latvian Communist Party said that just as Latvian schoolchildren
learnt Russian, 'Schoolchildren of other nationalities, in learning
the language of the Republic in which they live, are actively
becoming familiarised with its history and culture'. 'The "New
Man"', Izvestiia, 3 December 1974, p. 5.

338. See, for example, A.V. Topilin, Territorial'noe pereraspredelenie
See also Matthews Pavlovich, 'Ethnic Impact of Russian Dispersion
in an Beyond the RSFSR', in Allworth, ed., op. cit., and Robert
A. Lewis, 'The Mixing of Russians and Soviet Nationalities and
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341. See, for example, A. Gadzhiev, 'Ot aula do tselogo mira', Molodoi kommunist, 1967, no. 1.


344. See, for example, 'An Important Topic', Nauka i religiia, 1972, no. 5 (May); 'Tsverkov vo vremia voiny: vymysly i real'nost', Sovetskaia Kirgizia, 29 July 1977; L. Sepetis, Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, 'The School's Lofty Duty is to Instil in Pupils the Best Qualities of Builders of Communism', Sovetskaia Litva, 17 April 1982, p. 2.

346. See, for example, A. Riazev, 'A Wedding Without a Bride?' Komsomol'skaia pravda, 3 April 1969, p. 2.


348. See Davitashvili, loc. cit., who suggests that certain 'Church survivals' be replaced with, for example, a day remembering Shota Rustaveli. See also Rakhim Esenov, 'The Times, People and Morals: Union of Two Hearts', Pravda, 12 April 1978, p. 6.

349. See, for example, a report on the upbringing of young Estonians which states that 'it has become traditional throughout the Republic to have mass excursions of young people to sites of their father's labour, revolutionary and military glory, and meetings with veterans of revolutionary battles and the patriotic war'. V. Valjas, Central Committee Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, 'Notes on the Upbringing of Young People: We are Internationalists', Izvestiia, 1 September 1971, p. 3. See also 'The Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments of Uzbekistan', Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 313/81 (11 August 1981), and Svod pamiatnikov istorii i kul'tury Kazakhstana, Alma Ata: Nauka, 1983.


352. See Pravda, 30 March-4 April 1966.

353. See Pravda, 31 March-10 April 1971.

354. See Brezhnev's report to the Twenty-third Party Congress, or any early speeches of Kosygin or Podgorny, for example (for Kosygin), 'In the Bloom of Creative Forces', Pravda, 25 November 1965, p. 2, or 'Twenty-fifth Anniversary of Soviet Lithuania: In the Fraternal Family of Peoples', Pravda, 18 July 1965, p. 2. In the case of Podgorny, see 'In the Friendly Family of the Peoples of the USSR: Towards New Successes in the Building of Communism - Presentation of the Order of Lenin to the Azerbaijani SSR', Pravda, 22 June 1965.


358. See Pravda, 31 March-10 April 1971.


363. See, for example, Aliev, loc. cit.


'Natsional'naia politika soiuza SSR' (broadcast on Radio Volga, 8 February 1982, 2230 gmt), Radio Liberty Broadcast Transcriptions, 8 December 1982, p. 19. For the Civil War, see 'Heroic and Selfless Labour - Cordial Meetings with Caspian Oil Workers', Pravda, 2 October 1970, p. 1, and '... On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR', Pravda, 22 December 1972, pp. 2-5. For the Second World War, see Palieckis, loc. cit., Mazurov, 'Feat of the Hero-Fortress is Immortal', Pravda, 2 November 1965, p. 2. It is of interest in this connection that a report on the unveiling of a monument at Babi Yar in 1976 lists Russians first among the victims of the Nazi massacre, despite the fact that more Jews and Ukrainians died. See 'Monument at Babi Yar', Pravda, 24 June 1976. Similarly, on one of the rare instances when a Western (non-Soviet line communist) journalist was quoted verbatim in Pravda, he was quoted as stressing that the Russian people 'bore the main brunt of the last war'. See 'Russia at War - Book by British Journalist on the Heroic Feats of the Soviet People', Pravda, 28 December 1964. See also a report on plans to erect a monument to the unknown soldier in Moscow, which states that the statue would be of a mourning Russian woman symbolising 'mother homeland'. See 'By the Ancient Walls of the Kremlin - Design for Monument to Unknown Soldier is Confirmed', Pravda, 11 January 1967, p. 6. For the Space Programme, see the forthcoming work on Iurii Gagarin, entitled Syn Rossii, to be published by the Molodaia gvardiia publishing house. For other achievements attributed to the Russian people, see Karaev's report to the Twenty-first Party Congress; Sh. Rashidov, 'In the Fraternal Family of Soviet Peoples', Pravda, 30 May 1970, p. 2, and his report to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress; Dzhandil'din, loc. cit.; 'In the United Ranks of Soviet Republics - Presentation of the Order of the Friendship of Peoples to the Kazakh SSR', Pravda, 16 August 1973, pp. 1-3; 'Major Victory of Kazakhstan Farmers: A Billion Poods of Grain in the Homeland's Granaries', Pravda, 14 October 1972, p. 1.
Chapter IV

'Communist Nationalism' : The Case of the GDR

The present chapter argues that elements of the 'deradicalisation' approach are useful for understanding the recent exploitation by the GDR of a form of German nationalism. It is difficult to see how the 'tactical opportunism' model could apply in this case of 'communist nationalism'. Having relied for the early part of its history mostly on coercion, the propagation of official Marxist-Leninist legitimacy and, later, economic incentives in order to extract compliance from its populace, the GDR reveals the emergence of 'communist nationalism' following decisions of the political leadership at the Ninth Congress of the ruling Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) in 1976, at a stage of development unambiguously 'post-mobilisational'. Evidence does suggest a link between economic performance and these decisions, as argued by some proponents of the 'deradicalisation' model. There are few grounds for concluding that the new line was a temporary ploy, reconfirmed as it was at the Tenth Party Congress, and unaltered since. However, as in the case of the Soviet Union, there is equally little evidence to suggest that the Party has permitted (or will in the future permit) any serious erosion of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. The German 'nationalism' evident recently has been juxtaposed with vociferous affirmations of 'internationalism' and loyalty to the Soviet Union - even if the apparent differences which emerged between the GDR and the USSR over the former's 'mini-détente' with West Germany in 1984 suggest that theory (or rhetoric) and practice may not always necessarily coincide. East German 'nationalism' has been expressed in the context of 'communist nationalism'.

The lack of congruence between the boundaries of nation and state was, indeed, a strong disincentive (among others) to the emergence of the phenomenon. In the years up to 1971 when the GDR under Ulbricht recognised and indeed stressed in its propaganda the existence of a common German nation, 'communist nationalism' did not emerge (although suspicions of
Ulbricht moving towards a form of 'national communism' apparently played a part in his downfall). Only after the Honecker regime began to argue that the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR constituted distinct nations - thereby attempting to prevent any channeling of loyalty to the wider German nation, it must be presumed - did the phenomenon of German 'communist nationalism' emerge.


(i) 1945-1961: From the SBZ* to the Building of the Berlin Wall

The first decade and a half of the existence of East Germany as a separate political entity, first as the Soviet zone of occupation, and after October 1949 as the German Democratic Republic, was precarious and uncertain, given Soviet policy on the German question. Stalin favoured the creation of a united, neutral Germany, and following his appeal to German reunification sentiment in 1949, repeated offers were made to the West to form a confederation. In addition to the Soviet-sponsored offers of 1952 and 1957, as Ronald Asmus has observed, there was a 'continuous flow of pro-reunification propaganda from the GDR' until at least the 1960s.¹ The status of East Germany in Soviet foreign policy generated obvious problems of legitimacy for the Party. As Stephen Bowers observes, 'as long as the continued existence of the GDR as a separate state remained an unresolved question, the SED's effort to generate enthusiasm for identification with the GDR faced considerable difficulties'.²

Nevertheless, the SED was faced with the problem of exacting compliance from its population in launching the 'construction of socialism', which began in earnest in July 1952, soon after Konrad Adenauer's rejection of the March reunification offer, and the seemingly irrevocable steps toward the integration of West Germany into the Western alliance.³

* Soviet Occupation Zone (Sowjetische Besatzungszone)
This 'mobilisational' or 'revolutionary' phase in the GDR involved the rapid transformation of the social and economic order, most importantly the reconstruction of industry and the collectivisation of agriculture. The regime's lack of legitimacy combined with the stresses of drastic social transformation for low reward were clearly demonstrated by the June 1953 revolt and the fleeing west of some 2½ million East Germans, which was the principal reason for the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.

Yet only limited attempts were made to exact compliance by means other than the most basic forms of coercion and claims to legitimacy based on Marxist-Leninist dogma. This was reflected in the attitude during this phase of the GDR's development to the German national heritage.

The formal dissolution of the state of Prussia by the Allied Control Council in February 1947 reflected the view of both East and West that the Third Reich had been not an aberration, but the logical outcome of certain trends in German history. Early published works in East Germany concerning the national past, such as the 1947 work of Alexander Abusch, Der Irrweg einer Nation (The Mistaken Way of a Nation) stressed the continuity between such figures as Luther and the Prussian kings on the one hand, and Hitler on the other. For example, Abusch states of the 17th century,

(it) brought the birth of the Prussian state and with it the development of that Prussian spirit which today is identified with brutal militarism and often with the spirit of Germany as a whole. In fact, the 'Prussian spirit' was a decisive source - if not the only one - of the spirit of Nazism.

Symbolically, moreover, Christian Rauch's 1851 equestrian statue of Frederick the Great, pointing east, was banished from East Berlin's 'Unter den Linden' area, while the Hohenzollern city palace behind it was destroyed.

Yet the Party drew short of a total 'year zero' concerning the national past. Consistent with the orthodox Marxist-Leninist class analysis of history and Lenin's views of the 'two cultures' in any society, elements of the German past were hailed which could be identified
with revolutionary progress, or more generally, the 'humanistic' tradition. Thus, the GDR proclaimed itself the worthy successor to the peasant revolts associated with the Reformation, the liberal German nationalists of 1848-49 and, understandably, the powerful German Marxist tradition. In addition, legitimate respect for Germany's 'humanistic' tradition meant that the GDR could associate itself with the great names of German culture, an early indication of which was the celebrations surrounding the two-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Goethe in 1949. Indeed, literary ideologues could find justifications in the writings of Lenin for positively evaluating figures of the past for having contributed to the 'enrichment of the bourgeois cultural heritage and our artistic tradition'.

Yet in its positive evaluation of the 'progressive' historical and cultural heritage ('reactionary' elements in the past were, as Asmus notes 'seen as an albatross to be shifted whenever possible to the FRG'), the GDR did consistently restrict this concept to the 'revolutionary' in history, and advances in the cultural sphere. This remained so even with respect to the most delicate case of positive evaluation, that of the Prussian 'liberal aristocrats', a group of prominent military figures who achieved widespread reforms of the Prussian state between 1806 and 1813. The members of the group - held to consist at this stage of the figures of Clausewitz, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and the Freiherr vom Stein - were clearly associated with the ruling class of the vilified Prussian state, yet were accorded historiographic redemption due to their efforts at transforming Prussia from a 'feudal' to a 'bourgeois' state. Despite the evident disquiet of socialist Poland (many members of the group had been instrumental in the crushing of the 1831 Polish rebellion), Abusch's 1947 work, referred to above, indicated a strongly positive evaluation of the group. The National People's Army (NVA)*, set up in 1956, took on Scharnhorst as its Traditionsvater (his name also graced the Army's highest order), while the memory of Gneisenau was honoured by such gestures as naming the town of his birth, Schildau, the 'Gneisenau-town'.

The importance of this area of positive evaluation should not, however,

* Nationale Volksarmee
be exaggerated. The official view of the Prussian reforming aristocrats offends more the spirit than the letter of the early East German view of the past, and in any case analyses of the group stressed how exceptional they were in the otherwise 'reactionary' history of the Prussian state. Undoubtedly the positive comments of Marx, Engels, Mehring and Lenin on the figures in question, together with their location in a period of history which could be claimed as a precedent to the much-hailed GDR-Soviet 'comradeship-in-arms' (Waffenbruderschaft)* were instrumental in the benign evaluation granted to this single area of ideologically dubious evaluation of the past.\textsuperscript{15}

Moreover, the claiming of the 'progressive' traditions of the past as an element in the attempt to generate legitimacy for the early East German state, as most observers agree, took second place to attempts to legitimate the state on orthodox Marxist-Leninist grounds.\textsuperscript{16} The authority of the Party and its ideology was too recent and precarious, and memories of Nazism were too fresh for its socialist Slavic neighbours to allow a prominent place in propaganda for the national heritage, no matter how justified by the Marxist classics a discriminating exploitation of the past might be.

(ii) 1961-1971: The Building of the Berlin Wall to the Fall of Ulbricht

The final decade of Ulbricht's rule coincides with the emergence of the 'post-mobilisational' phase of the GDR's development, and the shift in the main basis of the regime's legitimacy to economic performance, individual ambition, and social participation. The position of the SED on the German question and the national heritage remains largely unchanged until the eve of Ulbricht's fall, when the theory of 'two nations' first appears, largely as a result of West German Chancellor Willi Brandt's stress on the unity of the German nation as part of the Ostpolitik of the newly formed Social Democrat/Free Democrat coalition.

The shift in the basis of legitimacy took the form of a number of reforms, known as the New Economic System (NES), introduced in 1963. As

\textsuperscript{*} In February 1815, Prussia and Russia signed a treaty of alliance and declared war on France.
Thomas Baylis argues, the authorities sought to introduce market-like mechanisms, such as profitability, as a means of stimulating economic growth and efficiency and rationalising the allocation of resources. At the same time reorganization of party and state structures of economic decision-making was instituted so as to increase the prerogatives and creativity of lower-ranking officials and managers. Just as important, the introduction of the NES was associated with a significant reorientation of GDR ideology and propaganda towards advocating economic modernization and rationalization, 'with special emphasis on the deconcentration of economic decision-making, both within industry itself and in its control agencies'.

The reforms and accompanying propaganda of the 'GDR economic miracle' (Wirtschaftswunder DDR) was thus essentially an attempt to generate legitimacy through rewards: the new elite of technicians and managers produced by the 'construction of socialism', largely completed during the previous decade, was granted a measure of power, and rapid economic development could be expected to satisfy the rising material expectations of the wider population. However, the fears among elements of the leadership that the NES threatened the leading role of the Party appear to have been confirmed by the experience of Czechoslovakia in 1967-68, which suggested 'spillover' from economic reform to 'political liberalization'. As a consequence, the reforms and their ideology were abandoned while an attempt was made to fill the legitimacy void by stressing the 'rationality' of central economic planning, and intensifying the rhetoric of 'mass participation'. Greater impetus was given to the claim that the GDR represented a distinctive model of 'advanced socialism', a factor which certainly contributed to Ulbricht's removal in May 1971.

As to the position of the SED on the German question, despite the fact that the building of the Wall suggested the permanence of the GDR, and socialised East Germans into not expecting an end to the division of Germany, the theme of re-unification continued to be stressed for some time. The continued emphasis on the unity of the nation, and calls for a confederation (the building of the Wall was laid at the hands of the 'imperialists' who had 'destroyed the unity of the nation') reflected a policy of 'Change Through Rapprochement' (Wandel durch Annäherung) which pinned particularly high hopes on influencing the course of the West German
Social Democratic Party (SPD), especially after the resignation of Adenauer in 1963, a development which was interpreted as a signal that 'the post-war period [had] come to an end'. While the SED declared that it would favour an SPD government in Bonn, the CDU/FDP government under Erhard snubbed East German proposals on two occasions, on the first by ignoring a proposal for a 'German Council', and on the second by enacting legislation which suggested that West German law applied to citizens of the GDR as well, after the SPD had agreed to exchange speakers with the SED.

In what followed, observers such as Gerhard Schweigler have detected the beginnings of the 'demarcation' (Abgrenzung) policy whereby the differences between the two Germanies were stressed, as opposed to the previous policy of concentrating on the claim to be the champion of German unity. Thus, the SED ceased proposing a German confederation (except, as a matter of form, in the 1968 Constitution), initiated a policy of hostility to the SPD (from now on, the segment of the West German population held to retain commonality with the population of the GDR was narrowed from the working class to supporters of the SED), and, symbolically, adopted a law providing for citizenship of the GDR.

Yet despite an observable tendency from this point onwards for ideologists (including Politburo member Albert Norden) to place greater emphasis on the distinction between 'bourgeois' and 'socialist' nations, this abstract distinction, for the time being, was not applied to the two German states. Hence the GDR continued to be described as the 'socialist state of the German nation', while the 1968 Constitution retained the commitment to 'rapprochement' with West Germany and reunification.

The final impetus which encouraged the GDR leadership to abandon the notion of a single German nation was in all likelihood the widely publicised line of Willi Brandt on the national question. In his first major address after assuming the Chancellorship, in October 1969, Brandt emphasised not only the 'continuing feeling of belonging together' (fortdauernde Zusammenangehörigkeitsgefühl) of the German people but, on the grounds of this common sentiment, the need for a 'special relationship' (Sonderbeziehung) between the two states. Three months later, Ulbricht
proclaimed the new line on the national question. 'This is the historical reality: The German Democratic Republic is a Socialist German nation-state, the West German Federal Republic is a capitalist NATO state with limited national sovereignty'. After Brandt repeated his arguments and provoked a display of popular sympathy in the East German city of Erfurt some months later, the SED made its position even less ambiguous. In a December 1970 speech on preparations for the 25th anniversary of the SED, Ulbricht formulated the position which has remained unchanged since:

The GDR is the socialist German national state. Within it proceeds the evolution of a socialist nation. The FRG is an imperialist NATO state and embodies the remnants of the old bourgeois German nation in conditions of the state monopolistic ruling system.

As regards policy toward the German national heritage, SED policy up to the end of Ulbricht's rule reveals strong continuity with the previous decade: use of the 'progressive' past functions as an auxiliary, though subordinate, basis of legitimacy. The SED continued to claim that the GDR was the 'worthier' expression of the German nation and hence was entitled to assemble into its 'inheritance' those individuals and periods it evaluated positively. Ulbricht attempted to underline this point by questioning the 'German' credentials of the Federal Republic. As he claimed in an address before the People's Chamber in August 1968: West German culture is becoming ever more Americanized, whereas the German Democratic Republic's socialist culture nurtures the humanistic traditions of our people and develops in the spirit of the socialist human community.

The decade thus witnesses 'claims' to a number of individuals from Germany's past, who could be argued as having contributed to cultural progress. Yet of significance in the light of later trends is the continued claim to an 'All-German' inheritance. Hence, of four individuals given particularly prominent attention - the Pietist and educator Francke, Beethoven, Albrecht Dürer and Heinrich Mann - only the first had an unambiguous connection with the territory of the present-day GDR. Otherwise, the esteem of the state toward the Prussian reformers continued to be symbolised (monuments to Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Blücher and Yorck
were erected in Berlin in 1969), while the position on the 'reactionaries' of history remained unchanged, as shown by the denigration of Martin Luther and praise awarded the peasant leader Thomas Müntzer in Meyer's 1964 Lexicon, and in the celebrations surrounding the 450th anniversary of the Reformation in 1967.

(iii) 1971-1976: The Honecker Era from the 8th to the 9th Party Congress

The first half of the Honecker era confronted the regime with formidable challenges, to which it responded with a good measure of desperation. Satisfying its Soviet ally in agreeing to the Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) with West Germany, one element of the wider détente of the early 1970s, was achieved 'at a certain cost to the hermetically sealed border with which the SED had preserved the population of the GDR from Western influence since 1961'. While regime propaganda proclaimed the state's espousal of consumerism and 'welfarism', these increasingly came to be based on economic reliance on the West. At the same time the policy of Abgrenzung initiated in the last years under Ulbricht was given full prominence, most notably in the elaboration of theories which claimed the GDR's emergence as a distinctive nation and a thorough campaign to remove all symbols connecting the GDR with the concept of a single, united Germany. In addition, proletarian internationalist solidarity with the Soviet Union was given far greater emphasis while it was made clear that the GDR would adhere far more rigidly to the Soviet model in all spheres than had been the case under Ulbricht. While state policy concerning the national heritage did not change at this stage, the beginnings of the later tendency of publicising historical individuals and events from present GDR territories rather than Germany in its entirety was observable.

In terms of the main basis of its legitimacy, the early Honecker regime presents subtle yet significant changes by comparison with the Ulbricht administration of the 1960s. As Melvin Croan has observed, by contrast to Ulbricht's grandiose schemes,

Honecker emphasised the here and now, with respect to both productivity and consumption.
His socio-economic program featured a reallocation of resources to consumer goods;
a massive investment in housing, with
incentives to encourage private initiative; a gradual but major revamping of incomes policy so as to bring wages into line with productivity; and a much publicised commitment to relatively stable prices. 39

In addition, after 1973 GDR citizens were permitted to possess Western currency which could be spent at hard-currency 'Intershops', previously reserved for Westerners, while a number of Western products (notably 10,000 'Volkswagens') became available for East German currency. 40

Also suggestive of the extent to which the regime struggled for legitimacy in the early Honecker era was a certain reconciliation between the authorities and the artistic community. At the 8th Party Congress, the limits of freedom, in both form and content, were extended for 'all those who stand on the platform of socialism'. As Krisch observes, a relatively liberal cultural policy - often termed the 'Plenzdorf era' - followed, no doubt designed to minimise as much as possible the alienation of this group. 41

The reasons behind the SED's prominent espousal of consumerism, social welfare and cultural liberalism are not difficult to fathom. In addition to the fact that the technical and managerial elite enjoyed less power after 1971 than it had under Ulbricht, 42 following the ratification of the 1973 Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR, millions of West Germans visited the GDR. If the greater volume of postal and telephone contact is added to the fact that an estimated 90% of the population regularly watch Western television broadcasts, Croan's conclusion appears inescapable: that at the individual and family levels, reassociation between the two parts of Germany had now become a social reality. 43 The constant stream of large numbers of visitors from affluent, democratic West Germany was a threat to the GDR's legitimacy on a scale that no Soviet-type state had been previously expected to sustain, and from the leadership's point of view, called for drastic measures. As has often been pointed out, despite having comfortably achieved the highest standard of living in the Marxist-Leninist world (indeed the material standard of living according to certain indicators overtook that of Great Britain in 1974), East Germans continued to compare their standard of living and level of freedom with the citizens of the Federal Republic. 44 The leadership was aware of the fact that, in these conditions, so long as the economy of the Federal Republic continued to outperform that of the GDR, Honecker could not be a success in the eyes of his
Thus, as Naimark observes, the more apparent the GDR's inferiority to the Federal Republic became, the more dependent the GDR became on its rival Germany, securing large credits from Bonn and accumulating one of the highest per capita debts in the industrialized world, such that it 'simply could not afford to stop the flow of West German visitors and their hard currency'. As Naimark goes on to note, the economic viability of the GDR was maintained only by the continuing prosperity of the Federal Republic: the East German state's legitimacy thus came to be based to an ever-growing extent on the economic successes of its chief ideological adversary.

Yet the GDR's attempt to maintain or exact the loyalty of its people was two-pronged. In order to minimise the effects of extensive Western contacts, in addition to efforts at competition with the attractive features of West Germany, the SED instituted a drive to develop the notion formulated under Ulbricht that the GDR and the FRG constituted separate nations. As Stephen Bowers has observed, 'in contrast to the usual problem of nation-builders, the SED has had to destroy the sense of national unity.'

Wide prominence was therefore given to the policy of Abgrenzung, used in the normative sense of the need to stress the differences between the 'socialist' nation of the GDR and the 'bourgeois' nation of the Federal Republic. Abgrenzung* in this sense, it was often stressed, was of vital importance given the claims that 'peaceful co-existence' involved a sharpening of the 'ideological struggle'.

Launching this position at the 8th Party Congress in 1971, Honecker vehemently rejected Brandt's claims that Germans, East and West, were characterised by a fortdauernde Zusammenangehörigkeitsgefühl and that there should hence be a Sonderbeziehung between the two states. Our Republic and the Federal Republic relate to each other just like each of them to any third state. The FRG is therefore a foreign country (Ausland), and what's more: it is an imperialist foreign country.

* The term is also used to describe the process of the growing apart of the two systems.
Elaborating on this view, Honecker claimed that the German bourgeoisie had led Germany into two catastrophic world wars, and hence had 'lost the right to govern the nation'. 'Only the working class is qualified to renew the nation on democratic principles and to ensure its unity within the framework of an anti-fascist democratic German State'. This, Honecker claimed, occurred in East Germany after the fall of the Third Reich, when the 'proletarian class' captured political power and constituted itself as the 'national class'. While the Party leader left open the possibility of a future transformation of West Germany into a 'socialist' nation, it was made clear that the Federal Republic represented a state where the power of the 'monopolistic bourgeoisie' had remained intact. All West Germans who supported this status quo by supporting either of the CDU/CSU or SPD/FDP coalitions were defined as members of the 'bourgeois nation'.

Honecker's essential claim that there exist qualitatively distinct types of nations whose character is determined by which class wields political power, was subsequently given extensive elaboration by GDR ideologists and theoreticians, such as Albert Norden, Kurt Hager, Hermann Axen, Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt. While much of this literature involves the repetition of established positions, the authors have attempted to mitigate the absurdity of the official position by distinguishing between 'nation' and 'nationality'. The GDR and the FRG are said to constitute 'socialist' and 'bourgeois' nations of common German nationality. The former, it is claimed, is defined by the relative power of classes within it, and emerged with the spread of capitalism (in Germany, the 15th and 16th centuries), while the latter refers to the sum-total of characteristics (language, customs etc.) of the ethnic group, said to have emerged with feudalism (the 9th and 10th centuries). Notable in the works of such writers, however, is a degree of implicit disagreement on the question of whether the 'socialist nation' is developing distinctive ethnic characteristics which will result in a GDR nationality, and hence make such re-unification impossible.

An arguably less tortured method of attempting to destroy the identification of East Germans with Germany as a whole was the move in the first years of the Honecker regime to remove from public life all
references to German unity, and, as far as possible, the terms 'Germany' and 'German' as well. Thus the SED succeeded in preventing any mention of a 'German nation' in the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two states.  

Similarly, in what Die Zeit referred to as the 'Entdeutschung der Verfassung', 1974 amendments to Ulbricht's 1968 Constitution erased all references to the German nation, removed the section which referred to the state's All-German mission of re-unification (as well as the reference to Germany's 'division imposed by imperialism'), and characterised the GDR not as the 'socialist state of the German nation', but as a 'socialist state of workers and peasants' (as the USSR is described in the Soviet constitution). All remnants of the notion of a single German nation were soon purged from the press and public life, excepting a few major newspapers and periodicals, for example Neues Deutschland, and the title of the Party itself (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands). As Asmus adds, the terms 'Germany' and 'German' were removed from the names of hotels, stores and various cultural organizations and replaced with the initials DDR. Thus, the one-time Deutschlandsender became Stimme der DDR (Voice of the GDR); the German Union of Journalists became the Union of Journalists of the GDR, etc. The letter 'D' for 'Deutsch' even disappeared from some abbreviations and when at that time the Leipzig 'Hotel Deutschland' was renamed 'Hotel on the Ring', a Leipzig newspaper managed to produce the following sentence; 'The "Hotel on the Ring" will in future be called "Hotel on the Ring"'.

The final component of Abgrenzung and Entdeutschung was an unambiguous affirmation that the destiny of the GDR lay with the socialist states of the Soviet bloc, though the desire to overcome Ulbricht's incipient deviationism may also have been a factor. The high pressured proletarian internationalism of the early Honecker years, as well as providing an alternative 'mission' for the GDR, removed any lingering suspicion of East German vanity or insubordination. As the Party leader stated in Moscow in October 1971,

complete coincidence of viewpoints and interests between the SED and the CPSU in all questions of socialist and communist construction and in international policy as a whole characterizes
our cooperation ... The increasingly close interweaving of our countries' national economies, the coordination of plans, and the joint solution of long-term tasks benefit each of our states.58 Thus, at the June 1971 8th Party Congress, Honecker reflected virtually every shift and nuance detectable from the earlier 24th CPSU Congress, while the 1974 Constitutional amendments replaced the reference to 'all-round co-operation and friendship' with the statement that the GDR was 'for ever and irrevocably allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (the constitutional description of the GDR in terms identical to the Soviet Union is mentioned above).59 The term Annäherung* ('drawing together') was used to describe the process and the policy of greater political and economic integration within the Soviet bloc; indeed the GDR set itself the goal of setting the standard 'for the future assimilation of the socialist nations' (in the words of the 1975 GDR-Soviet Treaty).60 Honecker's meticulous subservience to the Soviet model and his rhetoric of integration, rather than simply alliance with the USSR, drew Norman Naimark to observe that the policy was 'reminiscent of the over-zealous Tito of 1945'.61

While no overt changes can be detected in policy toward the national heritage, as might be expected a certain lull is observable in propagandising 'progressive' figures and events of the past. However, when the claim was made during the period that the GDR represented 'the embodiment of the best traditions of German history' (as it was by Honecker at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee in May 1973), the same peasant revolts, nineteenth century liberal reformers and twentieth century Marxist movement are cited as worthy of admission to the Pantheon, as well as the humanistic 'cultural treasures' of earlier times.62 The single major anniversary celebration at this time recalling a common German past (apart from that devoted to Thomas Mann in 1975),63 commemorated the 400th anniversary of the Peasants' War. Significantly, the festivities

* The term is the equivalent of the Soviet concept of sblizhenie.
ignored or only mentioned in passing the events in Franconia and Swabia (areas located in today's FRG) giving obvious emphasis to Münzer and the Peasant's War to the extent that it took place within the GDR's territory.

The suggestion that an 'All-German' heritage was being abandoned for one whose territorial borders coincided with the GDR was reinforced by the publication of two monographs during the period partially concerned with the cultural heritage of five figures (Heine, Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, and Herder), whose 'beliefs and aspirations' had allegedly been realised 'in the present-day reality of the German Democratic Republic'. Only the first of these five did not have substantial links with the territory of the GDR.

The view of the 'non-progressive' dimension of German history is best exemplified by the essentially unchanged view of Martin Luther. The view of the church reformer in Meyer's 1974 revised Lexicon remains constant in its negative evaluation, formulated in the 1964 edition (although the references to Luther's influence on the division of Germany, previously condemned, had of course been expunged), while schoolchildren were still taught 'that Luther had betrayed the peasants' cause, and that he was a 'lickspittle of feudal authority'.

(iv) 1976- : The Honecker Regime After the Ninth Party Congress

By 1976 the Honecker regime's attempt to generate loyalty to the GDR through its sponsorship of consumerism and relative cultural liberalism had become seriously flawed. At the same time, at that year's Ninth Party Congress, the SED called for the development of a GDR 'national consciousness' making much wider use of the historical and cultural heritage than had hitherto been the case. Since, a wide range of previously denigrated individuals and classes have been re-evaluated as 'progressive' (while the claim continues to be made that their 'class-bound limitations' are not forgotten) on the grounds that they hastened the development and strengthening of capitalism, or contributed to the cultural heritage. Publicity has with increasing obviousness centred on individuals and classes from the territories of the present
GDR, most notably the ruling classes of Prussia, especially Frederick the Great, and Martin Luther. While re-introducing the terms 'German' and 'Germany', ideologists have continued vociferously to maintain the distinction between the 'bourgeois' nation of the FRG, and the 'socialist' nation of the GDR.

While some commentators date the emergence of the GDR's economic problems from the late 1960s (after the re-centralisation of the economic decision-making process at the end of the NES), there is a wide consensus that the economy faltered seriously in the mid-1970s, and that to this problem was added the alienation of wide strata of society. With the dramatic increases in Soviet oil prices in the early 1970s, shortages of needed Western technology and excessive borrowing from Western banks, insufficient finished goods were exported resulting in a serious balance of payments problem vis-a-vis the USSR, and a 16 billion Mark debt to the West. While it was probable that Honecker's economic problems would only grow worse, conditions dictated a degree of austerity which sat uncomfortably with the Party's earlier promises of ever-increasing prosperity.

To make matters worse, the Party propagandised 'even more loudly on behalf of the superiority of socialism in maintaining "technological-scientific progress" and perfecting "the performance principle" (Leistungsprinzip)'.

Not only did the SED deny the difficulties of the socialist economy, its achievement of placing a television in every worker's home meant that East Germans could compare their conditions with those in the West, in addition to the fact that 'internal policies of the SED are critically examined by Western television [which reaches most parts of the GDR] in the quiet and safety of East German homes'.

If East Germans in general suffered from the performance of their economy, two social groups were particularly frustrated. Firstly, middle- and lower-level functionaries had access neither to the generous perquisites of the elite, nor to the benefits of 'Intershop Communism' afforded the common citizen. Unlike tradesmen they could not earn hard currency from their marketable skills, and were forbidden contact with Westerners, another possible source of West German marks. Given that the only remaining source was relatives abroad, one intellectual critic of the regime has noted, 'Socialism's basic formula holds "to each
according to his achievements" and not "to each according to the address of his aunt".\textsuperscript{71} Secondly, the closer ties with the Soviet Union established under Honecker finally caught up with the policy of cultural liberalism, of which the regime had attempted to make so much. As Naimark notes, Annäherung 'meant no criticism of the Soviet system, the presence of Soviet armed forces in the GDR or the history of Soviet hegemony of the country'.\textsuperscript{72} The 'punitive reflex' towards artists and intellectuals who transgressed this principle made its first prominent appearance in the Honecker era with the cancellation of the citizenship of popular balladeer and poet Wolf Biermann in November 1976. Protests led to more of the same as, during the mid to late 1970s, the SED exiled many of the GDR's leading writers, critics and actors to the West.\textsuperscript{73} The August 1978 revisions to the GDR penal code included prison sentences for such offences as 'denigration of the state' and 'disturbing the socialist way of life'.\textsuperscript{74}

Clearly such factors are not irrelevant to the formulation at the Ninth Party Congress in 1976, and since, of new doctrines concerning the uses of the historical and cultural heritage. While the attempt to build a GDR 'nationalism' has not been the only resort of the regime (a drive was also launched to improve relations with the Church, while East German missions in the Third World in league with the USSR and Cuba may have been undertaken at least partially to bring glory to the state),\textsuperscript{75} the emphasis given it in the media would suggest that the SED regards it as its chief ideological weapon.

At the Ninth Party Congress, Honecker placed particular emphasis on the need to instill a 'noble feeling of pride in the Fatherland, the socialist GDR'. Specifically he called for a broader use of the 'progressive, humanistic inheritance of German history' in order to consolidate the 'socialist national consciousness' of GDR citizens.\textsuperscript{76} Following the Congress, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism Ernst Diehl set out, somewhat less elliptically, what was required of propagandists and theoreticians: the 'socialist historical framework' should be expanded, he claimed, as all periods of German history contained 'progressive' achievements which should be illuminated.\textsuperscript{77}
Subsequent theoretical formulations and practical applications of this doctrine revealed a profound change in the GDR evaluation of the past. Gone was the view that rebels and revolutionaries should occupy the principal place in historiographic propaganda. 'Progressive' took on the widest possible meaning of referring to those who flowed with the Marxist tide of history: in particular, those who served the interests of developing capitalism in Prussia entered the Pantheon of the Vorläufer of the GDR. A pattern familiar from the historiography of other Soviet bloc states becomes apparent as past individuals, groups and events are described as 'contradictory', pro forma acknowledgement being paid to their 'class-bound' limitations, while the weight of emphasis is placed on the 'progressive' aspects of the subject of analysis. Significant changes in the 'flavour' of GDR historiography were evidently called for in summons to 'look at the production of a surplus product not merely under the aspect of exploitation' and to devote attention to the lives of monarchs described as 'partly unintentionally reactionary personalities' whose rule had had 'positive consequences'. In the cultural arena, the SED all but abandoned Lenin's teaching on the 'two cultures' in class societies by asserting that ... among the traditions we cultivate in the GDR are the work and legacy of all those who have contributed to progress and to the development of world culture, regardless of the social and class-bound links they had.

Theoreticians justified the change in doctrine by distinguishing between the role of national heritage in the earlier stages of the dictatorship of the proletariat and under 'developed socialism'. The theory proposed was that early in the life of a revolutionary state the priority of the ideological struggle must be directed at the reactionary past. However, once socialism has been established and the 'roots of reaction' are removed, it is possible, 'more calmly' to face up to the entire historical and cultural heritage and begin the process of 'differentiation' (Differenzierung), or the re-evaluation as 'progressive' of areas of the past previously seen as 'reactionary' or ignored, a process which allegedly conforms to the 'intellectual demands' of the citizenry and the requirements of the 'ideological struggle'. As Lothar Romain has paraphrased such theories:
As long as socialism has not been established, the cultivation of tradition must serve the development of revolutionary consciousness and with its help obliterate the entire reactionary past. However when socialism is developed and consequently the victory of the working class is a reality, then that part of history, of the heritage, which previously was a reactionary argument of the banished (der Ausgewiesenen), a weapon in the hand of the class enemy, can be taken over.

While theorists such as Walter Schmidt claim that the search for the 'progressive' must embrace all of German history - 'chronologically, territorially and socio-structurally' - in reality quite distinct biases influence all three criteria. Firstly it is clear that GDR ideologists favour emphasising the 'progressive' contributions of the ruling classes. Most publicity, in practice, has been devoted to this stratum, while historians such as Ingrid Mittenzwei have made the bias explicit by stating that while a concern with the masses 'has for years been a particular concern of Marxist historians', it is now important to examine 'how the ruling class at certain times, under the compulsion from objective necessities, contributed to advances and development'. Secondly, it rapidly became clear that writers should not concern themselves with the German heritage as a whole, but GDR Heimatsgeschichte.

As Professor Horst Bartel has stated,

As a socialist nation takes shape in the GDR, so the people naturally display a growing interest in the history of the lands which now form the territory of the German Democratic Republic. This interest also extends to Saxony, Thuringia, Mecklenburg and Anhalt, but it focusses on Prussia.

Reflecting this 'growing interest', according to Walter Schmidt, Director of the Institute of the German Labour Movement of the GDR Academy of Sciences, 'our special attention has to be directed at historic testimonials, processes and personalities that are tied in with territories now part of the GDR'. In addition, clear encouragement has been given to the study and preservation of local traditions, folklore and linguistic peculiarities of GDR territories, as well as preserving and restoring the physical reminders of the human past. In 1979, the Kulturbund, whose task is the advancement of 'Socialist German national
culture' founded the Gesellschaft für Heimatsgeschichte, to give greater encouragement to this task. Finally, to date, 1871 is the cut-off point for identifying the 'progressive' achievements of the ruling classes (although some changes are beginning to alter this picture). While few taboos affect periods before 1871, analysis of history after this point tends to locate phenomena worthy of adulation only in the revolutionary workers' movement.

At the same time the policy of Abgrenzung, if in theory still operative, has at least lost its aspect of Entdeutschung. At the Ninth Party Congress, in contrast to its predecessor, reference was made to 'socialist German national culture', while two years later the terms returned in earnest with the fanfare surrounding the space-flight of the first GDR cosmonaut, Sigmund Jaehn. Neues Deutschland declared that 'the first German in space is a citizen of the German Democratic Republic', the first occasion since Honecker's intensified Abgrenzung policy that a citizen of the GDR had been referred to as a 'German'. A year later, in the celebrations marking its 30th anniversary, the GDR was described as 'the new, the socialist Germany', and as 'the inheritor of Germany's great traditions'. These departures have signalled the end of the Entdeutschung policy. Yet the fact that the thesis of 'two nations on German soil' was not abandoned may indicate a degree of division or uncertainty among ideologists. The theory has only been modified to the extent that the question of possible future reunification is not, as was formerly the case, universally rejected. However, subtle changes have emerged in the manner in which GDR ideologists have treated the question of the West German nation. In rejecting what is referred to as the FRG doctrine of the united Kulturnation, the claim has continued to be made that while the GDR has inherited all that is 'progressive' in the German past, the FRG has inherited all that is 'reactionary'. Yet the GDR's 'claim to sole representation' (Alleinvertretungsanspruch)

* In a typically crude example of this policy, Thomas Müntzer, radical leader in the Peasants' War, has been claimed as part of the GDR's 'heritage'. However, the 'symbolic representative' of the 'torturers, suppressors and butchers of those peasants' - Georg von Waldburg - is, accordingly, accredited to the 'heritage' of the Federal Republic.
of the German heritage has increasingly moved towards suggesting that the 'Americanised' Federal Republic represents not so much the negative side of the German tradition, as a 'nihilistic' or 'cosmopolitan' alienation from the true German nation. Hence the claims that West Germany 'betrayed the nation' in maintaining the system of 'monopolist capitalism', that West German culture debases the German national heritage, that historians in the Federal Republic 'seek, pseudoradically, to present German history as protracted "German misery", an activity equated with "cosmopolitanism" and "national nihilism"', or that Luther's Reformation, depicted as 'a revolt against excessive alienation killing everything national' could be seen as a reaction to conditions in West Germany which 'surrendered itself' to US and West European interests. Finally, Rehistorisierung has involved vociferous denials that the process amounts to nationalism, a claim which has been juxtaposed with repeated affirmations of loyalty to the Soviet Union and socialist bloc. Continuously disclaiming that the concern with history and tradition could be compatible 'with any national narrow-mindedness' or any form of 'nationalism', such figures as Central Committee member Hans Koch emphasise the purpose of GDR 'patriotism':

This patriotism, which - closely bound up with proletarian internationalism - is a distinguishing characteristic of our culture, is concerned with the historical position, the revolutionary prospects, the history and assured future, the country and state of the GDR, with the respect it enjoys - closely allied with the USSR - in the community of socialist states. Our patriotism comprises the will to defend all the accomplishments, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our homeland against any imperialist machinations.

Rehistorisierung in practice has illuminated the 'progressive', as suggested above, not in the history and culture of Germany in its totality, but in the ruling classes of territories of which the GDR is the heir. Hence the main areas of concentration have been the ruling classes of Prussia, the figure of Frederick the Great together with the previously positively judged 'aristocrat-reformers'; Martin Luther and the Reformation; and an increasing number of figures, all associated
with the territories of the GDR, who contributed to the 'cultural heritage' and whose achievements are allegedly represented in, and nurtured by, the GDR.

The launching of the re-evaluated GDR image of Prussia can be dated to an article by Horst Bartel and Ingrid Mittenzwei entitled 'Prussia and German History', published in the sixth issue of Einheit of 1979. The authors, stressing that 'progressive' achievements could be attributed to all of the social strata of Prussia, stressed that historians should not ignore positive aspects of Prussia's bourgeoisie, 'liberal autocracy' and even the Hohenzollern dynasty [Frederick I and II (the Great) are mentioned]. The accomplishments listed are 'the expansion of trade and improved economic organisation, the increase in educational and cultural facilities, and laying the base for a centralised and national state apparatus'. Following this cue, a profusion of writers, after the pro forma acknowledgement of the 'contradictory' nature of Prussia, and not denying the element of reaction, have dramatically expanded its 'progressive' credentials. Prussian absolutism is now held to have 'encouraged productive forces', while Prussian militarism, once the ultimate bête noire, is cited by Mittenzwei as having been usefully instrumental in the liberation from Napoleon's rule. Prussia under Frederick I is described as an 'Athens', while the early 19th century after the defeat of Napoleon, previously described as a period whose chief characteristic was the restoration of feudal absolutism, is now painted as an age of flourishing development, of Prussia's ruling classes rapidly transforming their state into one of the main centres of European capitalism. Importantly, the 'continuity' thesis, which saw an unbroken line connecting Prussia with Nazism, is now rejected. At the same time, there are strong indications that the official position on the unification of Germany in 1871, once held up as the unambiguous triumph of Prussian reaction, has now been modified. Prussia's forging of a 'nation-state' is now held to have been a 'progressive' development, and, on balance, the unification of Germany is judged to have been a 'contradictory' event, which in addition to serving the interests of Prussian conservatism, 'conformed to the needs of capitalist development'. Its forger, and one-time arch-villain, Count Otto von Bismarck, is seen in this light as 'the most far-sighted
of the Junkers', while Engels is quoted to the effect that he was a 'right royal revolutionary'. The gradual 'rehabilitation' of Bismarck was clearly taken somewhat further in an address in December 1983 by SED Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary for ideological and cultural matters Kurt Hager. Hager claimed that there were a number of 'conservatives' connected with the history of GDR territory who deserved praise, including Yorck von Wartenburg, Bismarck, Rathenau, Stauffenberg and other persons connected with the conspiracy of 20 July 1944. With regard to Bismarck, while making pro forma acknowledgement of his 'contradictory' side, Hager praised Bismarck's 'sober' handling of foreign policy, particularly his push for good relations with Tsarist Russia in the 1880s. Hager suggested that Western governments should look to Bismarck as an exemplary exponent of 'realistic diplomacy'. Calling on East German historians to reappraise the first German Chancellor, Hager added that 'our recalling of Bismarck, albeit within clearly marked limits, is certainly timely'.

As to other members of the Prussian ruling classes, as might be expected, a good deal of attention continues to be paid to the early 19th century 'aristocrat reformers'. However, this area of positive evaluation reveals no novel development aside from the unusual extent to which the figures are publicised. The main individual other than this group to be awarded attention is Frederick II ('the Great').

A number of GDR historians and ideologists have acknowledged that the re-examination of the reign of Frederick, and the discovery of 'progressive elements', has become something of a symbol for the wider phenomenon of the re-evaluation of Prussia as a whole. The revival of the issue of the evaluation of the monarch was sparked by the 1979 work of Ingrid Mittenzwei, Friedrich II von Preussen. Mittenzwei's work encouraged the view that because of Frederick's domestic reforms, his rule could best be understood as 'enlightened absolutism'. While explaining his policies as dictated by the drive to turn Prussia into one of the principal European powers, a wide range of progressive developments were attributed to his reign. According to Mittenzwei and others, the monarch encouraged innovation and reform in a number of areas, notably jurisprudence, land improvement, irrigation schemes and farming
His efforts further to centralise the state are viewed as a positive development, while the flourishing of culture and science under his rule is attributed to his innovative spirit and 'relative liberalism in domestic matters' generally. This, it is stressed, 'did win him the sympathies of many progressive representatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia'. His attempts to strengthen Prussia economically meant the encouragement of productive forces, such that when he died in 1786, 'commerce and manufacturing flourished, the middle class grew strong'.

As to Frederick's foreign policy, the recent analysis has been less favourable, but by no means amounts to a consistent condemnation. The launching of the War of the Austrian Succession with the aim of conquering Silesia, which required the waging of the Seven Years' War to retain the newly acquired territories, is condemned by Mittenzwei as 'aggressive' and a cause of suffering to the people of Prussia. Yet, revealing perhaps elements of implicit admiration, she also states that the conquest turned Prussia into 'a great European power', and that 'what his predecessors had sought to achieve in vain, this glory-craving Prussian King accomplished at once'. Elsewhere Mittenzwei is even less resolute in condemning Frederick's Drang nach Osten. In an article written in conjunction with Horst Bartel, she condemns the conquest of Silesia and the First Partition of Poland on the grounds that they amounted to a waste of resources which could otherwise have been invested in the developing economy. Similarly, her biography of Frederick euphemistically refers to the fact that he 'acquired' ('erlangt', 'sich angeeignet') Polish territories, and avoids discussion of colonialist and Germanising policies towards the Poles.

Judged on balance a ruler of 'remarkable personal qualities' who without doubt towered above the mediocrity of all the other German princely figures of the time, despite the de rigueur acknowledgement of his 'limitations', the ultimate accolade was to be paid to Frederick by Erich Honecker. Intimating that he valued Mittenzwei's biography 'very highly', he described the monarch in an interview as Frederick the Great, a hitherto proscribed form in the GDR, as the title was conferred on the monarch in honour and praise of his conquest of Silesia.
In the same interview, published in *Neues Deutschland*, the SED leader stated that Rauch's equestrian statue of Frederick, removed in 1950, 'might be returned'. A month later, in August 1980, the statue was indeed returned to its original spot, and Frederick again pointed east.

The simultaneous rehabilitation of Martin Luther, together with overtures to the protestant churches of the GDR, has been no less dramatic. Karl-Heinz Baum narrates that the earliest indications of change in the official evaluation of Luther can be located in school history texts. The teaching guide for GDR historians in 1980 contains the following instructions: it is important to explain Luther's Reformation as a national movement against the Papal Church in Germany ... Great tribute is to be paid to Luther and Münzer ... The Bible translation was an important contribution to the formation of the German national consciousness ... whereas Luther joined the camp of the princes, Thomas Münzer subsequently represented the radical wing of the antifeudal camp in Germany ... The peasants, as the most exploited and suppressed class, most consistently demanded that the Reformation be turned into a genuine antifeudal people's reformation ... (The pupils have to be made aware of the connection between the defeat of the German peasants and Luther's Reformation becoming the princes' 'Reformation'). While the above already represents a significant rehabilitation of Luther by contrast with earlier periods when the ecclesiastical reformer was castigated with such terms as a 'lickspittle of feudal authority' or a 'princes' lackey' (Fürstenknecht), a re-evaluation of Luther's relationship with state power which had not yet reached the school curriculum denied that any such collaboration had taken place. In a series of 'contributions' to a revised school textbook of German history Max Steinmetz wrote, 'a prince's lackey' Martin Luther did not become ... Though he maintained the principle that government ruled by divine decree, he kept 'hauling the princes over the coals'.

Similarly, in a significant modification of the earlier view that Luther had unambiguously betrayed the popular revolution ignited by the Reformation, Steinmetz claimed that 'during the months of the Peasants' War, Luther increasingly distanced himself from the fighting peoples' masses.'
The progressive purging of Luther's 'reactionary' dimension, together with the 1979 admonition that school teachers should be 'discreet' in treating Luther, was no doubt undertaken to prepare the GDR public for the volte-face of mid-1980. In June it was announced that a Church-State committee, chaired by Erich Honecker, had been set up to conduct three years of anniversary celebrations which would culminate in the commemoration of the 500th birthday of Martin Luther in November 1983. Honecker claimed Luther as 'one of the greatest sons of the German people', praised his translation of the Bible as 'one of the greatest achievements of our history', and hailed the Reformation as the 'early bourgeois' revolution of the German people.

Subsequent analysis elaborated on Honecker's position, stressing Luther as a revolutionary and a German patriot, 'the Father of the Fatherland', whose 'shortcomings', progressively given less emphasis, were increasingly explained away. A series of articles stressed the revolutionary potential of ecclesiastical reform in the late middle ages, particularly if launched against the Papacy, the foreign exploitative 'international centre of the feudal system'. The Einheit 'theses' setting out the official SED position on Luther even continued to judge him a revolutionary in his previously vilified late life: the theoretical journal located in his final days an attempt to advance a 'moderate bourgeois reformation' with the aid of the princes 'from the top'. Other commentaries expressed pride in the honour that had been brought to Germany because of Luther, and his effect on world history: he 'belongs among the great personalities of German history of world rank', while subsequent revolutions in England, North America, France and the Netherlands were allegedly 'based on the German early bourgeois revolution'. Luther's overt anti-Semitism was now ignored, while his failure to support the Peasants' War, previously attributed to his perfidy, was now to be understood as 'consistent with his moderate bourgeois point of view'.

Finally, emphasis continues to be placed on the achievements of a wide array of distinguished figures from the German past, of whom the overwhelming majority are those connected with the territories of the GDR. Figures such as Goethe, positively evaluated at an earlier stage in the history of East Germany, continue to be publicised for their
contribution to the 'humanistic heritage' and the alleged connection of their ideas with the reality of the GDR. Extremely prominent and positive attention is given to the philosophers Kant and Hegel, while the rehabilitation of Richard Wagner (from an official evaluation which might be described as 'lukewarm') has been signalled by the decision to open museums honouring the composer in East Berlin and the village of Altgraupa. Einstein has been reclaimed from the relative obscurity to which he had been relegated by GDR officialdom, to be honoured on the 100th anniversary of his birth, while the equally recent Ideologisierung of Handel produced the claim that his transition from the medium of opera to the oratorio represented a 'turn to the cause of the people'. His 'Messiah' is allegedly 'a beacon of the struggle against oppression' and a 'promise of the socialism of the future'. Finally, Nietzsche, like Bismarck, has recently been transferred from being judged as unambiguously reactionary, to being evaluated as 'contradictory', a change generally the first stage on the journey to an individual's Rehistorisierung.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis suggests that as the GDR moved through various stages of development, the principal mode of legitimation also changed. In its attempts to exact compliance and loyalty from its population, the SED has passed through three distinct phases. During the 'mobilisational' or 'system-building' period which lasted, roughly, until 1961, widespread coercion and orthodox Marxist-Leninist claims were used to achieve the goals of the Party. The 'post-mobilisational' or 'system-maintenance' period, by contrast, has comprised two distinct phases: an earlier stage marked by appeals to social ambition, consumerism and a degree of intellectual liberalism; and a later stage, which reveals the resort to what may be the final available potential generator of legitimacy for Marxist-Leninist regimes - nationalism.

This nationalism has taken the form not of an Ulbrichtian ideology of All-German mission, but an attempt to inspire among the citizens of the GDR a sense of pride in a vastly expanded array of history-making forbears. Central to this form of nationalism is that such forbears are
claimed for the GDR, both in the sense of having made their mark on history in GDR territories, and in the sense that such figures allegedly belong to a 'progressive' stream in German history which culminated in the GDR 'nation'.

Turning to the three issues set out at the beginning of this chapter, these findings suggest a number of conclusions. Firstly in interpreting the use of nationalism as one aspect of a wider reconciliation by Marxist-Leninist regimes to traditional social values and attitudes, a change which occurs in their 'post mobilisational' phases, the 'deradicalisation' approach appears to hold for the case of the GDR. The use of nationalism (and, for that matter, other traditional appeals) does not suggest 'temporary opportunism' and the concomitant regular resurfacing of original radical goals, as the 'tactical' approach argues.

Secondly, difficulties involved in the appeal to other traditional values appear to be causally linked to the emergence of nationalism in the GDR. The appeals to individual ambition, consumerism and intellectual liberalism constitute the first phase of 'deradicalisation', possibly because they are less obviously inconsistent with overt tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology than are appeals to nationalism.

Thirdly the notion that a lack of congruence between nation and state is a powerful additional disincentive to a Marxist-Leninist state exploiting nationalism, appears to be borne out by the case of the GDR. As well as clearly being a 'last resort' to the achievement of some form of legitimacy, only after a formidable propaganda campaign throughout the first half of the 1970s attempted to instill the concept of separate GDR national identity, was nationalism, in the form it has assumed - a peculiar amalgam of rehabilitated pre-revolutionary phenomena specifically linked with the GDR and claims to the GDR embodying all the best in the German tradition - permitted to emerge.

Finally, two additional factors would appear to command attention. Firstly, the case of the GDR suggests that nationalism is one tool of system-maintenance among others employed by a ruling elite whose major aim is the preservation of its power. Hence, as has been observed in
the case of the Soviet Union, an unwritten law in the Marxist-Leninist exploitation of nationalism is that it must take the form of 'communist nationalism': symbolically juxtaposed with nationalism must be elements of 'internationalism' and echoes of 'class analysis', while the whole must be expressed in orthodox phraseological form. There is little evidence, at least in the case of the GDR, of movement in the direction of totally overt nationalism, stripped of all qualifications or associations with the orthodox ideology. The disappearance of symbolic obeisance to original positions would amount to a self-inflicted assault on the authority and legitimacy of the Party. Commentators such as Yanov, Lendvai and Wesson who see in the emergence of nationalism in Marxist-Leninist states the impending transformation of such regimes into 'de-Marxified' nationalist dictatorships, must reconsider the legitimating function of ideology as part of the imperative of self-preservation of ruling Marxist-Leninist parties.

Secondly, the case of the GDR suggests that a theory of 'communist nationalism' must clearly take into account international political relationships. The attitude of other powers is of little importance to the Soviet Union, we may surmise, as it weighs up the advantages and disadvantages of exploiting Russian nationalism. The attitude of the Soviet Union may, however, be of considerable significance to a relatively small client-state such as the GDR as it considers the analogous use of German nationalism. Doubts expressed by the Soviet press on the amount of 'progress' to be found in Prussian history may reveal not only sensitivity to the authority of the Party and its ideology in an important ally of the USSR, but also constant alertness to the possibility of yet another case of 'national communism'. The Party having been aware of this potential concern, nationalism in the GDR has been particularly 'communist' in its emphatic claims of 'internationalist' commitment and loyalty to the socialist bloc, and in particular the Soviet Union - even if the apparent differences which emerged between the GDR and the USSR over the former's 'mini-detente' with West Germany in 1984 suggest that theory (or rhetoric) and practice may not always necessarily coincide.
Chapter IV: Notes


10. See Hans-Joachim Hoffmann (on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the death of Goethe), 'His Legacy will be Preserved and Carried on by a Free People on Free Soil', Neues Deutschland, 23.3.1982, p. 4.


15. See, for example, Prof. Dr Reinhard Bruhl, Major-General, Director GDR Military History Institute, 'Carl von Clausewitz - Patriot and Military Theoretician', Einheit, vol. 35, no. 3 (March 1980), pp. 314-21.


17. Baylis, loc. cit., p. 49.

18. Ibid., p. 50. See also Thomas A. Baylis, 'Economic Reform as Ideology', Comparative Politics, January 1971, pp. 211-29.


21. Ibid.

22. Asmus has located other transgressions that must have irked the Soviets. At the 24th CPSU Congress of March 1971, he notes that Ulbricht 'not only invoked his personal acquaintance with Lenin to the effect that the Soviets also had things to learn, but also conspicuously failed to join in the fraternal indictment of China'. Asmus, 'Variations on a Theme...', loc. cit., p. 9. On this point see also Melvin Croan, 'East Germany: The Soviet Connection', Washington Papers, vol. IV, no. 36 (1976), p. 42. Clearly, however, the main reason for the removal of Ulbricht was his failure to follow Moscow's shift in favour of Bonn's Ostpolitik, detectable by early 1971. Convinced that the cause of Czechoslovakia's aborted 'revisionism' was contact with the West, he refused to compromise on a number of issues with West Germany, and even attempted to subvert the 1971 Four-Power Accord in Berlin. See Norman M. Naimark, 'Is It True What They're Saying About East Germany?' Orbis, Fall 1979, p. 556; Dr Gunter Heydemann, 'The Theory-Boom in the GDR's Marxist-Leninist Historiography since 1967: Causes - Development - Prospects', Deutschland Archiv, vol. 13, no. 3 (March 1980), p. 44. Heydemann cites the following claim from an East German publication: 'Especially in connection with the events in the USSR one could see the great danger in the so-called Ostpolitik. It has turned out to be the centre-piece
of psychological warfare systematically prepared by the General Staff ... So dangerous thus is FRG imperialism'. See also E. Engelberg, 'Party-Mindedness and Objectivity in Historical Science', Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenshaft, vol. 17, no. 1-2, 1969, p. 79.

23. For the effect of the building of the Wall on the East German population, see Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr, 'Political Socialization of Divided Germany', Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27, no. 2 (1973), pp. 191-2; Bowers, loc. cit., p. 149.


27. Ibid., pp. 100-101.

28. Ibid.


33. Ibid., p. 9.


35. For references to the anniversary celebrations of the four see (for Francke) Heydemann, loc. cit., p. 60; (for Beethoven) Neues Deutschland 25.6.1970; and Bowers, loc. cit., p. 171; (for Dürrer) Neues Deutschland 6.2.1971; (for Mann) Neues Deutschland 12.3.1971.
36. 'Honecker Speaks of Frederick the Great', Frankfurter Allgemeine 27.8.1980, p. 5. In addition, in 1968 a unit of the NVA was named after Gneisenau. See Winters, loc. cit.


40. Croan, 'New Country, Old Nationality', pp. 156-7; Naimark, loc. cit., p. 559. Naimark has suggested that the Polish food riots of 1970 may have added impetus to Honecker's consumerist drive, ibid., p. 568.

41. See Krisch, 'Political Legitimation ...', p. 115.

42. Ludz, 'Legitimacy in a Divided Nation ...', loc. cit., p. 169.


44. See, for example, 'New Country, Old Nationality', loc. cit., p. 155; and Naimark, loc. cit., p. 560.


46. See ibid., pp. 558-9.


48. Einheit claimed at the time that 'imperialism' was continuing an ideological struggle against socialism through such 'secret and devious means' as 'cultural pressure' and demands for 'freedom of ideas and opinions'. See Harold Lange, 'Alarmierende politische Szene in der BRD', Einheit, no. 12 (December 1977), pp. 1333-36, cited in Bowers, loc. cit., p. 156. See also Hans Lindemann and Kurt Müller, Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der DDR: Die kulturelle Abgrenzung der DDR von der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1974.

49. Quoted in Schweigler, op. cit., p. 103.


53. The most detailed exposition of these theories was in Alfred Kosing's *Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart : Studie zur historisch-materialistischen Theorie der Nation*. Berlin: Dietz, 1976. Honecker reflected the distinction between nation and nationality by stating that East Germans should conceive of themselves as of 'Citizenship - GDR; Nationality-German', Asmus, 'The Search for Historical Roots ...', *loc.cit.*, p.12.

54. There is some indication that views on the question of reunification hardened after the 8th Party Congress. While the early arguments of Albert Norden (SED Central Committee Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda) suggest an attempt to 'keep open an ideological back door for eventual reunification' (as did Honecker's comments at the 8th Party Congress) (Schweigler, *op.cit.*, p.105), the removal of all references to the existing or future unity of Germany in the 1974 constitutional amendments (discussed below), and certain views presented by Kosing (also in 1974) throw doubt on this position. According to the latter, writing with Schmidt,

'The question of whether later, when the working class in the FRG, united with all workers, has achieved the transformation of society and the nation, a unified socialist nation can arise, will be decided by history, if the necessary conditions for it have matured'.


55. Hacker, *loc.cit*.

56. In addition, the words of the national anthem, which includes the phrase 'Germany, Our United Fatherland', were dropped. As Asmus narrates, GDR schoolchildren were no longer taught the words of the anthem, while textbooks began printing only the music. 'Variations on a Theme ...', *loc.cit.*, p.12. See also Inge Christopher, 'The Constitutions of the German Democratic Republic : An Analysis of Development', *GDR Monitor*, no.4 (Winter 1980/81); and Krisch, 'Nation-Building and Regime Stability ...', *loc.cit.*, p.27.

57. Asmus, 'Variations on a Theme ...', *loc.cit.*, pp.11-12.

59. Ludz, ibid; Christopher, loc.cit., p.42. In addition, the central role of Soviet ambassador Petr Abrasimov under the Honecker regime has been noted. See Naimark, loc.cit., p.562.

60. Krisch, 'Nation-Building and Regime Stability ...', loc.cit., p.27. In addition to this treaty, between 1972 and 1975 the GDR renewed its alliances and bilateral treaties with other Soviet-bloc states, which it claimed reflected increasing closeness to the 'fraternal nations of the socialist community'. Hacker, loc.cit.


62. See Brayne, loc.cit., p.36; Ludz, 'The SED's Concept of Nation ...', loc.cit., pp.207-8, 210-11

63. See Murray Seeger, 'Nationalism - And Anti-Soviet Sentiment - Coming to the Surface in East Germany', International Herald-Tribune 27.2.1978.

64. See Gobel, loc.cit.


70. Ibid., pp.567-8.


73. Ibid., p.563. See also 'Political Legitimation in the GDR', loc.cit., p.193.


75. For details on attempts to improve relations with the Church, in particular the celebrated '6 March 1978' meeting between Honecker and the Chairman of the Federation of Evangelical Churches of the GDR, Bishop Schönerr, see Brayne, loc.cit., pp.38-9; 'Honecker Assumes Chairmanship of Martin Luther Committee', Frankfurter Rundschau, 25.3.1980, p.4; Karl-Heinz Baum, 'Ost-Berlin priest Luther', ibid., 1.11.1982. The GDR has been a supplier of aid, including military aid, to Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen, as well as the Zimbabwe 'Patriotic Front', and Namibian 'SWAPO'. See Krisch, 'Political Legitimation in the GDR', loc.cit., p.191.
76. 'Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands', Einheit, no.2, 1976.


78. See Prof. Siegfried Schmidt, '... On Prussia's Role in German History', Das Volk (Erfurt), 25.7.1981, p.3; 'Not a Revival of Bourgeois Parochial History - Our Criterion for Any Type of Historical Research and Heritage Appropriation: What was the Ancestors' Contribution to Social Progress?', Ibid., 22.7.1981, p.3.

79. Prof. Dr Hans Koch, (Candidate Member, SED Central Committee; Director, Institute for Marxist-Leninist Culture and Art Studies, GDR Academy of Social Sciences), 'Legends and Realities', Einheit, vol.35, no.12, (December 1980).

80. Romain, loc.cit., p.477. See also Prof. Dr Horst Bartel (Central Institute of History, GDR Academy of Sciences), 'Our Picture of History has Sharp and Valid Features ...', Berliner Zeitung, 19.3.1981, p.9; Prof. Siegfried Schmidt, 'How Window-Dressers Present a Picture of History', Das Volk, 29.7.1981 p.3. Such explanations were also presented in the Polish Przeglad Zachodni: see Oschlies, loc.cit., p.6; Eckhart Foertsch, 'Revising the Prussia Image?' Deutschland Archiv, no. 3, 1979, p.168.

81. Prof. Dr Walter Schmidt, (Director, Institute for German Labour Movement History, GDR Academy of Social Sciences; Member SED Central Committee), 'The Past is Never Finished - What Must be the Basis for a National History for the GDR?', Sonntag, vol.34, no.27, 5.7.1981, p.9.

82. Dr Ingrid Mittenzwei (interview), 'Why are we preoccupied with the Prussians?', Leipziger Volkszeitung, 15-16.8.1981.


86. 'Programm der SED', loc.cit.; see also Ludz, 'The SED's Concept of Nation', loc.cit., p.208.
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90. Hans Koch, 'Legends and Realities', loc.cit.; for typical GDR analysis of West German 'Kulturnation propaganda', see Koch, 'On the Continued Development of the Socialist National Culture in the GDR', Deutsche Lehrerzeitung, 27/21, 23.5.1980; Walter Schmidt, 'Why in the GDR the Socialist German Nation is an Inevitable Development', Freie Presse, 3.4.1981. p.6; Karl-Heinz Dubrowsky, 'We See even Prussian History as it was - A Chapter of History and the Two German States' Approach to it', Volksstimme (Magdeburg), 1.9.1981, p.3; Fred Dumke, 'Our Socialist Nation in the GDR - An Irreversible Reality', Der Nationale Demokrat, no.21, December 1981.


92. Ibid.


94. Ibid., and Oschlies, loc.cit.


96. Prussia and Nazism are extricated from one another in, for example, the following: Klaus Scheel, 'Iron and Blood in New Form - The Potsdam Marriage of Fascism with Old-Time Reaction', Berliner Zeitung, 23.7.1981, p.9; Thomas, loc.cit., Schmidt, 'Without any Magic Wand ...', loc.cit.: 'How Window-Dressers ...', loc.cit.

97. See Albert Wucher, 'Wie die DDR die Nation Vereinnahmt', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.12.1981; Bartel, Mittenzwei and Schmidt, loc.cit.; Schmidt, 'Without any Magic Wand', loc.cit., Mittenzwei, 'Why are we Preoccupied ...', loc.cit. A 1981 semi-satirical play produced in the GDR, dealing with the rehabilitation of Frederick the Great, suggested that Bismarck might be next in line for a similar re-evaluation. See Manfred Nüssig, 'History in Action -
On the Premiere of Klaus Hammel's Comedy, "The Prussians are Coming", at Volkstheater Rostock', Theater der Zeit, 36/9 September 1981; and 'Background Report' by FRG Ministry of Inner-German Relations, 'GDR Theater Season Without Climaxes', Informationen, (Bonn), no. 4, February 1982.


100. Ingrid Mittenzwei, Friedrich II von Preussen, Berlin, VED Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1979. Asmus states that the book's first edition sold out in a matter of hours and consequently has been very difficult to obtain in the West.


103. Mittenzwei, ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Bartel, Mittenzwei, Schmidt, loc. cit.

106. Oschlies, loc. cit., p. 4.

107. Collitt, loc. cit., p. 4.

108. Mittenzwei, 'Why are we Preoccupied ...', loc. cit.


110. 'Honecker Announces Return of Frederick Statue ...', loc. cit. Some months before, the prestigious Frankfurter Allgemeine
predicted that the SED would 'not go so far' as to return the statue to its original position. Peter Jochen Winters, 'East Berlin Has Second Thoughts About Prussia...?', Frankfurter Allgemeine, 27.2.1980, p.12. Needless to say, many saw the return of the statue as an 'eerie coincidence' at a time of unrest in Poland. Collitt, loc.cit.

111 Karl-Heinz Baum, 'Is the Former Prince's Lackey Now Becoming a Comrade...?', Frankfurter Rundschau, 29.3.1980, p.3.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. See Brayne, 'Luther ...', loc.cit.; Honecker Assumes Chairmanship ...'; loc.cit.


119. Brayne, 'Luther ...', loc.cit., p.40; Kathe, loc.cit. Needless to say, the potential for the Luther celebrations bringing Devisenbringenende Touristen was not lost on the GDR authorities. See Marlies Menge, et al, 'Luther in fünf Tagen', Zeitmagazin, 29.10.1982. For the most detailed available analysis of the GDR's treatment of the Luther Anniversary, see Ronald D. Asmus, 'The GDR and Martin Luther', Survey, 1984 (Autumn).

120. For articles concerning Goethe, the 150th anniversary of whose death was marked in 1982, see Hans-Joachim Hoffmann (GDR Minister for Culture), 'His Legacy will be Preserved and Carried on by a Free People on Free Soil', Neues Deutschland, 23.3.1982, p.4; Eberhard Straub, 'The Goethe of Socialism - Commemoration of a Bourgeois Poet in Weimar ...', Frankfurter Allgemeine, 27.3.1982, p.23; Karl-Heinz Baum, 'Was Goethe schon vom realen Sozialismus ahnen konnte', Frankfurter Rundschau, 20.3.1982; Wolfgang Werth, 'Fleiss und Leistung : Sehr Gut', Suddeutsche Zeitung, 24.3.1982.

122. For the case of Einstein, see Asmus, 'The search for Historical Roots ...', loc.cit., p.11; for Handel, see Wucher, loc.cit.

123. For the case of Nietzsche, see Karl-Heinz Hahn, 'The Inheritor Inherits also Useless Stuff ...', Das Volk, 26.8.1981, p.6; and 'Against the Tabu on Nietzsche in GDR ...', Iwe Tagesdienst ('Iwe-Kultur supplement), (Bonn), 1.9.1981.

Chapter V

'Communist Nationalism': The Case of Yugoslavia

Analysis of the extent to which the communist Yugoslav state has attempted to exploit the nationalism of its dominant ethnic group - in its case that of the Serbs - gives little support to most of the would-be explanations of the phenomenon offered in the secondary literature. In general, the case of Yugoslavia - unlike those of the USSR and the GDR - simply does not reveal any long-term or sustained shift on the part of the authorities to attempting to associate the state with the dominant ethnic group, and therefore lends little credence to the 'deradicalisation' theory. Like the GDR, Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of such an ideological shift. While certain biases have continually served to associate Yugoslavia with Serbia more than with any other Republic, and pressure has frequently been applied for more movement in this direction, any buckling to such pressure or recognition of the Serbs as the Staatsvolk has usually been perceived by the leadership (particularly during Tito's lifetime) as politically suicidal, and has therefore been prevented. The perception by Yugoslavia's non-Serbs of Serbian political, cultural and economic privilege has in fact led to a leitmotif of Yugoslav political life being the condemnation of Serbian 'hegemonism', as well as extreme caution (usually resulting in abandonment) with theories of ethnic convergence such as 'Yugoslavism' ('Jugoslovenstvo'), which have invariably been interpreted by non-Serbs as presaging their cultural assimilation by the Serbs.

Political analysts and professional politicians have been profoundly divided on the central question relevant to these conclusions: has the post-war Yugoslav state represented continuity with, or a departure from, the pre-war history of Yugoslavia as a vehicle for Serbian* hegemony and privilege? Necessarily enmeshed in this issue is the question of whether communist Yugoslavia has practised unacknowledged

* used in this study, except where specified, to include the Montenegrins.
favouritism toward Serbia, or resorted to 'communist nationalism' according to the definition used in this study.

The official Yugoslav position on this issue has been that with the coming to power of the Communist Party, Serbian hegemony, and the concomitant alliance of the state with Serbian nationalism, was banished forever. Indeed, it is claimed that the success of the Partisans in the 'National Liberation Struggle' (NOB)* can largely be attributed to the fact that it was the single force in Yugoslavia not based on narrow nationalism, while the post-war socialist order is contrasted with the monarchist regime in allegedly being grounded on the principles of national equality, brotherhood and unity. Western political analysts, by and large, have concurred in such official claims, if not always out of admiration for Yugoslavia's brand of Marxism, then out of the conviction that political realities dictated (and dictate) such a state of affairs.

Thus, Bogdan Denitch sees socialist Yugoslavia as a 'multinational state with no dominant nationality', a judgment ascribed implicitly to his optimistic view that the revolution has generated legitimacy through widespread acceptance of the 'new political culture' of socialism, and that there has consequently been no need for the state to resort to the use of nationalism, which is in any case the ideology of social classes which are in the process of disappearing.2

Other observers see Realpolitik, as opposed to Yugoslavia's allegedly sincere Marxist internationalism as responsible for the state's faithfulness to certain of its proclaimed principles. The demographic and historical circumstances of the dominant ethnic group figure most prominently in J. Frankel's explanation for the Yugoslav restraint of Serbia, in contrast with the status accorded Russia in the Soviet Union:

In one significant respect the Yugoslavs departed from the Russian example - they never evolved a parallel to the 'leading nation' position of the Great Russians with the Soviet Union and therefore, although based on the same theory and conducted within an identical institutional framework, their

* Narodno-oslobodilacka borba.
actual solution of the national problem was quite different. The departure was dictated by the circumstances of Yugoslavia. The only nation which could aspire to the 'leading' position, the Serbs, did not reach absolute majority. Moreover, the Communist movement had been built on opposition to Great-Serbian oppression and had secured its war-time successes by stressing national equality. Hence, national equality did not remain an empty letter.³

Similarly seeing Serb hegemony and dominance ending with the communist victory, observers such as Paul Shoup, George Hoffman and Fred Neal, and Carl Ströhm, argue that in order to meet the imperative of preserving the Party's and state's 'multinational' image, a constant struggle has been waged against the 'real and imagined' threat of renewed Serbian dominance, while even the cautious integralism of the 'Yugoslav idea'* was abandoned.⁴

A diametrically opposite view of the role of Serbia in communist Yugoslavia is presented by a second group of observers, who can almost all be described as Croatian nationalists. Rather than seeing a profound and central contrast between pre-war Serbian hegemony, and the post-war situation being one of genuine national equality being established, such observers see any differences as illusory and at most propagandistic. Thus, Bogdan Raditsa claims that 'in both Yugoslavias the Serbian ruling circles manifested their ability to alienate all other nations by refusing to share power with them', with the Croats representing 'the principal opponent of Serbian supremacy in the multinational state'.⁵ Suggesting strong analogies with the status accorded Russia in the Soviet Union, Raditsa refers to Serbia as the 'so-called "leading republic" in Yugoslavia',⁶ just as Ante Ciliga claims that Yugoslavia is 'based on a single dominant "elder brother" nation', the Serbs.⁷ Claiming wide discrepancies between the theory of ethnic equality, and the rights in practice of the Serbian and Croatian nationalities, Franjo Tudjman adds,

... it is clear that the example of the Yugoslav multinational community has demonstrated the historical law that in every multinational state one, usually the largest, nation nearly always retains or gains a leading and privileged position over the other nations ...⁸

* See Section (iii) of this Chapter.
A historical survey of the relationship between the Yugoslav communist authorities and Serbian nationalism suggests, however, that neither of the above schools presents a wholly satisfactory interpretation. Rather, examining the development of Yugoslavia in its various, chronological phases from the beginning of the Partisan struggle, we find important differences over time.

Throughout the existence of communist Yugoslavia, ultimate power has rested with a Party which, because of the way the Partisan struggle developed, coupled with more remote historical and cultural factors, has revealed a disproportionate predominance of Serbs. While the communists' internationalism, experience of the disastrous consequences of pre-war Serbian hegemony, and post-war formal structures acted as balances to this bias, there have been periods of both lesser and greater reinforcement of this institutional ethnic predominance. Hence, vigorous wartime propaganda stressing national equality in virtue and in sin in order to induce ethnic fraternity, gave way following the war to a number of constitutional, symbolic, territorial, and cultural biases toward Serbia, evidently permitted (or initiated) with the end of winning over the Serbs to the new order. The various phases of Yugoslav development following the split with the Cominform continued to reveal institutional and ideological biases which favoured Serbia (including a campaign for accelerated cultural merging from 1958 to 1964), although the rights of all nationalities were given unwavering propagandistic emphasis, and actual and perceived Serbian national assertiveness increasingly became a target of attack. With the devolutionary reforms of the 1960s and the fall of Aleksandar Ranković in 1966, the centralised Party-state machine symbolised by Belgrade, and associated in the minds of non-Serbs with Serbian nationalism, become more and more prominently singled out as the béte noire of Yugoslavia, a trend partially reversed by the re-vitalisation of the Party following the Republican purges of 1971-72. Finally, since the death of Tito in 1980, and particularly since the Albanian nationalist outbursts in Kosovo, there has been markedly less success in restraining the Serbian leadership and media from appealing to Serb national feeling.

Thus, both extremes represented by the 'official Yugoslav' and the 'Croatian nationalist' accounts of the relationship between the communist state and Serbian nationalism are demonstrably unsatisfactory.
Clearly, while the communist authorities have never sought or permitted the overt recognition of Serbian leadership comparable to the pre-war state, or to the status of Russia in the Soviet Union, they have acquiesced in significant biases in institutional and other privileges in favour of Serbia, especially immediately after the war, and since the death of Tito. Generalising somewhat, by contrast, the periods of greatest (but by no means absolute) political and symbolic restraint of Serbia have been at times when the Yugoslav communists, headed by Tito, confronted actual or potential hostility to their power: from 1941 to 1945 from the Germans and their allies, and following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, from the Soviet bloc.

In order to substantiate this argument, the case of 'communist nationalism' in Yugoslavia is examined below in six chronological phases which usually coincide with particular trends as far as the focus of this analysis is concerned: the period up to 1948, including the NOB and the policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) on the national question; 1948 to 1958, from the break with the Cominform to the Seventh Party Congress; 1958 to 1966, from the Seventh Party Congress to the fall of Ranković; 1966 to 1972, from the fall of Ranković to the purges of the Republican leaderships; 1972 to 1980, from the purges to the death of Tito; and 1980 -- , since the death of Tito.

(1) 1941-1948: Beginnings of the NOB to the Cominform Split

The circumstances of the military collapse of the Yugoslav ancien régime, the philosophy and policies of the Partisans during their wartime struggle, and the actual course of this struggle, all lead to the conclusion that, with certain qualifications, Serbian nationalism was considered during the war years as much an obstacle to the establishment of communist power as any of the other Yugoslav nationalisms.

Analysis of the reasons behind the rapid disintegration of Royalist Yugoslavia in the face of the Axis invasion of April 1941 appears to have reinforced the commitment of Yugoslavia's communist revolutionaries to the national equality which their Marxist ideology taught them. The overwhelming identification of pre-war Yugoslavia with Serbia in
political and symbolic terms had generated a disastrous, as it turned out, lack of allegiance to the Kingdom beyond the core ethnic group. Hence, in contrast to the claims of Ćetnik propaganda which blamed the collapse on the perfidy of the Croats, the central place in CPY demonology became the 'greater Serbian hegemonism', and consequent national oppression held to have been the essential political characteristic of pre-war Yugoslavia. Tito, in the 1942 article which set the CPY line in this area, identified 'Versailles Yugoslavia' as the very 'model of national oppression' (in which it was not forgotten that the Serbs suffered class oppression), which was also the central cause of the state's weakness.

Thus the policy of 'brotherhood and unity' with which the CPY entered the struggle had its origins not only in internationalist Marxism, but in the recent salutary lessons in the consequences of hegemony and disunity. The pre-1937 Comintern policy calling for the break-up of Yugoslavia was gradually abandoned, and the Partisans became the only force advocating national equality, brotherhood and unity within the framework of the continued existence of the multinational state.

However, the Partisans' policies faced one of their most severe tests in reconciling the desired international image with the marked ethnic biases which emerged as a consequence of the manner in which the war developed, together with various other cultural and historical factors. The immediate impetus which swelled the ranks of the Partisans in 1941 and 1942 was the genocidal policies of the so-called Independent State of Croatia (NDH)*. At first the Partisans, consequently, were an overwhelmingly Serbian force, largely from outside Serbia proper (chiefly from Bosnia-Hercegovina, other areas of the NDH, and the Sandžak area of south-western Serbia), although its relative homogeneity was soon broken down by the addition of some Croats from the Dalmatian hinterland. Nevertheless by 1943, when the Partisans had evolved into a genuinely multinational and mobile (as opposed to an overwhelmingly Serbian locally-based) force, some 60% of their number remained Serb. This bias, attributable to Ustaše racism, the traditionally warlike characteristics of the (largely Serb) Dinaric

* 'Nezavisna Država Hrvatske'.

+ Apart from the leadership which, if anything, reflected something of a non-Serb bias.
highlanders, and Croat suspicion of a force that was so heavily Serb in its early days, was inevitably reflected in outbursts of Serbian nationalism within Partisan ranks, particularly in 1942. The tendency to pay particular attention to the protection of Serbs in 'liberated' areas of Croatia, cases of refusing to accept Croat volunteers, and reprisals against the Croat civilian population irrespective of their behaviour toward the Ustaše, gave way by 1943 to stricter discipline, and greater enforcement of the principles of 'brotherhood and unity'. Despite the claims of Croatian nationalists that the massacres enacted at the war's end represented Serbian nationalism, it would appear clear that the Partisan policy was one of the destruction of all domestic non-Partisan forces, which naturally included the Ustaše, but, according to the testimony of Milovan Đilas, did not spare the Četniks, or the Serbian and Slovenian 'Home Guards' (Domobrani).

If Tito's 'impartiality among the various ethnic communities in a country where ethnic identification has always been considered a primary attribute of personality' was reflected in the restraint of Serbian nationalism in a disproportionately Serbian force, it also inspired a Partisan mythology designed to encourage feelings of national tolerance. Thus, following the 1941 collapse, in response to the Četnik thesis of Croat betrayal, the CPY developed the position that the non-Serb nationalists were not to blame if they were disloyal to the idea of a Yugoslav state, and in any case, it was claimed, the Croat front held out longer than the Serb. Later, Tito's above-mentioned 1942 article balanced the denunciation of pre-war 'greater Serbian hegemonism' and Serbian imperialist attitudes with emphasis on the great contribution being made by the Serbian people to the Partisan struggle, a contribution which, it was claimed, was serving to remove the slur from their name produced by the behaviour of their bourgeoisie, and was an example which should be emulated by the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Similarly, Tito attempted to mitigate widespread loathing of the Croats by understating their sins and by stressing that, in any case, they did not have a monopoly on vice: the Partisan leader referred to 'small numbers' of Ustaše bands, and balanced his criticism by mentioning in the same breath the Četniks. In general in Partisan propaganda, Pavlić is rarely mentioned without an accompanying reference to Nedić.* Even in a war-time article

* Pavlić was the war-time leader of the Ustaše-run NDH. Nedić was the puppet leader of German-occupied Serbia.
by Aleksandar Ranković, in which his admiration for Serbia's role in the conflict is obvious, he stresses that the Partisans 'protected the Serbs from the Ustaše, and the Croats from the Četniks', while 'every honest Serb sees how others fought for the liberation of Serbia'.

Yet if at the beginning of the struggle it had to be acknowledged that the bulk of the Partisan forces was Serbian (even if Serbia as a whole tended to be unsympathetic to the Partisans until towards the end of the war), by 1945, and since, the official line has been that every nationality made its contribution to the struggle, and that each nationality (except of course, for the non-Slavic groups such as the Hungarians and Albanians) made an at least substantial contribution to the 'liberation' of its own territory. The final element in the Partisan myth is the shifting of responsibility for a good deal of the wartime suffering to the invading Axis powers, in particular the Germans. The claim is made that the occupiers 'exploited the consequences of Serbian hegemony' and deliberately incited further hatred in order both to facilitate short-term economic exploitation of the country, as well as to advance towards the alleged long-term goal of German Lebensraum in Yugoslavia. Thus, an event such as the deportation of Serbs from Croatia in 1941 is explained in terms of the NDH acting in accordance with ultimate plans for the Germanisation of the western parts of Yugoslavia. Hence, concentration on conflict with non-Yugoslav forces, and emphasis on (some say exaggeration of) the brutality of the foreign, especially German, forces on Yugoslav soil serves several purposes. It distracts attention from the history of Yugoslav fratricide during the war, mitigates the responsibility popularly attributed to domestic groups guilty of collaboration (most importantly the Croatians), and highlights the role of the CPY as Yugoslavia's 'saviour'.

The new order which was established after the Partisan victory in all areas of the country, and codified in the 1946 Constitution, broadly speaking aimed at achieving formal national equality, in contrast to pre-war Serbian hegemony. At the same time, demonstrably pro-Serb and anti-Croat biases emerged in a number of areas, notably the ethnic breakdown of the Party-State apparatus, the territorial arrangements of
the new state, its symbolic accoutrements, and cultural policies, particularly with respect to the treatment accorded the various Churches of Yugoslavia. Some of these biases can be explained as the outcome of circumstances having nothing to do with ethnic favoritism on the part of the state, while others can only be accounted for by a degree of 'communist nationalism', and insensitivity to Croat perceptions of victimisation.

As R.F. Miller observes, despite the fact that the 1946 Constitution ordained a system more unitary than federal - as 'a concomitant of the drive for rapid integration and mobilization for accelerated industrialisation' - the inclusion of the forms of federalism 'did offer the non-Serb peoples some guarantee that a socialist Yugoslavia would not be another vehicle for Serbian domination'. The inclusion of the formal right of secession, the recognition of four official languages, and the establishment of 'largely symbolic' Republican Communist Parties reinforced this impression.

The choice of Belgrade as the capital of socialist Yugoslavia, however, introduced important obstacles to the goal of removing pro-Serb bias in the new state. Since the Party structure was largely made up of those who had been involved in the Partisan struggle and, as noted above, the Partisan ranks revealed a disproportionately high number of Serbs (both throughout Yugoslavia and in multinational areas, such as Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo), the Party was already biased towards Serbia. The decision to centre power in Belgrade added further weight to this product of circumstances and history. Its consequence was the staffing of a highly centralised state administration - with the exception of its highest levels and the foreign service - with Serbs, who, 'consciously or subconsciously, identify "federal interests" with those of Serbia'. Understandably, the suspicion was also kindled in non-Serb minds that strong elements of continuity had emerged to connect the regime with its pre-war equivalent. The decision, which represented a symbolic bias in favour of Serbia, in addition to introducing political biases, was made, according to Djilas, on the grounds of 'tradition', and the 'recognised importance of not humbling the Serbs, as well as the geographic isolation and underdeveloped communications infrastructure of its only serious rival, Sarajevo'.
In terms of the territorial divisions imposed on the new Yugoslavia, there can be little doubt that the new arrangements were a blow from the point of view of a centralised, united 'greater' Serbia, comprising territories conquered, traditionally included, or claimed by Serbia. In the face of Serbian opposition (represented in particular by the Serbian Orthodox Church), Macedonia and Montenegro were established as separate Republics, while Kosovo and the Vojvodina were granted autonomy within Serbia.30

On the other hand this 'struggle against the greater Serbian hegemonism' was not as 'merciless' as some, such as Slobodan Stanković, claim.31 Indeed, certain decisions concerning the territorial arrangements of the Vojvodina, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro lead (admittedly biased) observers such as Tudjman to ask 'why in all these cases of determining the status of various lands the historical and natural rights criteria were applied to the advantage of Serbia and Montenegro and to the detriment of Croatia'.32 While the claims of injustice concerning Bosnia-Hercegovina may be dismissed, as Tudjman claims that the territory should have been associated with Croatia on the contentious ground that its Moslem inhabitants are ethnically Croat, the grounds for finding pro-Serb bias in certain decisions concerning the Vojvodina and Montenegro have some validity. The constitutional status which was determined for Kosovo-Metohija may also be questioned on grounds of national equity.

The Vojvodina was included in the Republic of Serbia despite the fact that it had never been part of the Serbian state. This may have been justified by the Serbian majority of the multinational territory, and its history as an outpost of Serbian culture. More dubious however, was the inclusion in the Vojvodina of the largely Croatian Srem (or Srijem) which had formed part of Croatia until 1918, together with the equally predominantly Croat northern Bačka.33 Similarly, two border decisions favoured Montenegro: the granting of the historically Croatian Boka Kotorska, and the Bosnian Sutovina to the new Republic.34

The decisions concerning the predominantly Albanian territory of Kosovo-Metohija betray a somewhat less ambiguous Serbian bias. According to the 1946 constitution, the territory became the Autonomous Region
('oblast') of 'Kosmet', as part of the Republic of Serbia.\textsuperscript{35} At the same time, the Vojvodina became an Autonomous Province. As Fred Singleton comments, the distinction between autonomous province and autonomous region was never clearly defined. Vojvodina, as an autonomous province, had its own supreme court and people's assembly but in other respects the relationship of the two areas to the Serbian and federal governments was similar. However, the implication was that Kosmet was of lower status.\textsuperscript{36} Given that the Albanians were demographically predominant within their own territorial unit, and in any case outnumbered one of the newly declared 'peoples' (narodi)*, two explanations are available for why Kosmet did not become Yugoslavia's seventh republic. Firstly, the Albanians, as a non-Slavic people with a low record of allegiance to a Yugoslav state, if classified as a 'people' with their own Republic and right of secession, might have attempted to use this right. Secondly, as Borowiec observes, 'the reason that Kosovo did not simply become a separate republic is historical and emotional rather than practical'.\textsuperscript{37} The fact that Kosovo is identified in the Serbian collective memory as the national heartland associated with significant elements of its historical and cultural development, cannot have been ignored in decisions taken at the time.\textsuperscript{38} The only available explanation for the fact that Kosmet was not only refused republican status, but was awarded a level of autonomy lower than the Vojvodina, must be that 'regional' status was the politically minimal available acknowledgement of the ethnic distinctiveness of the territory (which also permitted the bare minimum of institutional independence from Serbia) which could be accorded at a time when pockets of Albanians within Yugoslavia were still engaged in active armed resistance to the new regime.\textsuperscript{39} Hostility to the new order induced a Serbian police regime over the region which, according to all accounts, combined oppression of the Albanian majority with political and cultural privileges for the Serbian minority.\textsuperscript{40}

* Republican status carried with it the constitutional designation of the titular nationality as a 'people' (narod). The Albanians, and other nationalities, not granted their own republic, were designated by the term 'nationality' (narodnost).
Thus, the territorial arrangements of the new Yugoslavia, together with the constitutional status of the various units, represented a compromise between dismantling Serbian hegemony and assuaging Serbian national feeling. While the formal separation of Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosmet and the Vojvodina from the Serbian heartland clearly represented a departure from the more uncompromising Serbian nationalist expectations, the inclusion of historically Croatian and Bosnian territories in the new boundaries of the Serbian Vojvodina and Montenegro, together with the lowly status awarded the Kosmet, ensuring its retention not only for socialist Yugoslavia but for the Serbian political and symbolic realm, can be seen as something of a recompense for Serbian losses. The latter cases of 'compensation' are particularly understandable given that, according to Djilas, certain Serbian elements of the CPY leadership called in addition for the establishment of Bosnia-Hercegovina as an autonomous province within Serbia, while others (notably Moša Pijade) favoured the formation of a Serbian autonomous province within Croatia.\textsuperscript{41} The territorial and constitutional arrangements in favour of Serbia and Montenegro, together with the establishment of the capital in Belgrade, can thus be interpreted as attempts to 'win over' a Serbia whose champions had suffered both losses and frustrated ambitions (and whose core territory had been largely hostile to the Partisans until 1944).

The third area in which policies could be interpreted as deviating from principles of national equity is the cultural arena. While all attempts were made by the new rulers during this period to distance themselves from 'Yugoslavist' policies of cultural integration (the otherwise sycophantic CPY ignoring - until after the split - the example in the Soviet Union of a 'leading' Russian nation), cultural policies in a number of areas were applied with greater liberality in Serbia than in the next-largest unit, Croatia.\textsuperscript{42} While this could be explained by the historical fact that fascist ideology had become more entrenched, and institutions had been involved in more collaboration in Croatia than in Serbia, discriminatory treatment on the basis of such divergences nevertheless amounted to a pro-Serbian bias on the part of the state.

The first such differences were detectable in the area of publishing and cultural institutions, as well as policy on historiography. While the Agitprop machine of Milovan Djilas was charged with the task of making all
information institutions into efficient sources of CPY propaganda, a
good deal of symbolic continuity was permitted for the Serbs, but not
for the Croats. Thus, such traditional guardians of Serbian national
identity as the Serbian Academy of Sciences and the Arts, Matica Srpska*
and the Srpska Književna Zadruga† continued to function. In Croatia,
the equivalents of the latter two institutions were dissolved and banned,
while the branch of the Academy of Sciences in Zagreb was entitled the
‗Yugoslav Academy of Sciences‘. Similarly, in Serbia, the pre-war
daily newspaper Politika, which while pro-communist was also well-known
for its greater Serbian views, was permitted to reappear together with
established Serbian literary journals, whereas equivalent Croatian
publications concerned with national culture were not permitted to
continue. For example, the Croatian Obzor, a liberal publication
censored during the war, was not allowed to reappear. Furthermore, in
1945, the Party took a number of steps to mollify the Serbian population
in Croatia and began to talk of the ‗special status‘ of the minority.
However, after permitting the continued publication of the Serbs‘ local
newspaper Srpska ričev (no Croatian publishing or cultural institution
could include in its name ‗Hrvatski‘) and permitting various other
cultural institutions to be set up, many of the privileges which had been
introduced were gradually withdrawn after a display of Serbian sentiment
at a congress of Serbs, organised in Zagreb in October 1945, which the
authorities evidently judged excessive.

In the area of historiography, the communist approach, in theory,
largely excluded from favourable publicity those national heroes whose
activities and lives generally could not be reconciled with a class-based
view of history. However, excluded from respectability as well in
Croatia were (not surprisingly) those who had created the ‗Croatia alone‘
type of nationalism, as opposed to the form of Croatian nationalism which
emerged in the context of desire for the unification and independence of
the South Slavs. The effect of these policies was that virtually all
of Croatia‘s national heroes – apart from leaders of peasant rebellions,
and Croatian heroes of the Partisan struggle – were excluded from the

* ‗Serbian Homeland‘, a Serbian publishing and cultural institution
with a long tradition of ‗guarding‘ Serbian culture.
† ‗Serbian Literary Association‘
Pantheon. Of particular note, this resulted in a negative evaluation of Stjepan Radić, the pre-war leader of the Croatian Peasant Party and advocate of confederalism, and Josip Juraj Jelačić, who led the Croat resistance to the resurgent Hungarian nationalism of 1848. Such policies were applied with far less vigour in Serbia. Indeed the coat of arms of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, described in the 1946 Constitution, proudly carries the date of the first Serbian rising under Karadjordje (1804), together with his heraldic crest on which is inscribed an abbreviation of the traditional Serbian cry of defiance 'only solidarity saves the Serb'. In addition, the coat of arms, alone among the Republican banners, carried the date '1941', an acknowledgement of predominantly Serbian contribution to the revolutionary struggle inconsistent with the official line that the Revolution was the achievement of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. Further symbolic continuity was permitted to link socialist Serbia with its Royalist predecessor. Such place-names as Kraljevo ('of the King') were retained, while the names of the streets of Belgrade continued to pay homage to the national heroes of Serbia - from the medieval kings of greater Serbia to 19th and 20th century patriots of all classes - with virtually no exceptions. Serbian was also made the official language of military command.

The element of cultural policy which arouses the greatest passions on the grounds of alleged pro-Serb and anti-Croat bias, however, is the question of post-war policy toward the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia, in contrast with that imposed on the Serbian Orthodox Church. Typical of Croat nationalist arguments is the claim that while the Communist state conducted a campaign of persecution against Roman Catholicism, the 'greater Serbian' character of the regime was manifest in its favoritism to the Serbian Orthodox Church, allowing it to 'regain its influence'. Any alleged persecution of the Serbian Church is dismissed as superficial and lenient.

In reality, as Stella Alexander argues, the authorities were determined to break the political power of both churches, and turn religion into a 'folklore survival'. While there may be elements of truth in the Croat nationalist interpretation, the treatment accorded

* 'Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava'. The abbreviation is also widely popularised as representing 'Sveti Sava - Srpska Slava' ('St. Sava - Serbian Glory').
the two institutions can largely be explained by differences in their wartime behaviour, and the degree to which they were amenable to accepting the role required of them in the new order.

In addition to the confiscation of church lands and a drastic reduction in its influence in all areas of society, a fate suffered by all the religious organisations of Yugoslavia, as a consequence of the 'wholesale collaboration' of the Croatian Catholic Church with the NDH, the new authorities initiated an 'all out attack' on the Church until 1946, and thereafter maintained an attitude of 'unrelenting hostility' towards it until well into the 1950s. This involved the purging and trial of collaborators, real and imagined - most notably the Archbishop of Zagreb, Alois Stepinac - the closing down of most Catholic publications, and the frequently violent harassment of bishops and priests as part of a campaign to coerce the clergy into state-controlled 'Priests' Associations', thereby curtailing the institutional independence of the Church, and preventing Vatican (and hence, in the state's eyes, Western capitalist) influence over the organisation.

The communists were also concerned with cases of collaboration of the Serbian Orthodox Church with the Četniks and the puppet Nedić regime. Yet, as Alexander argues, there were important differences between the two cases:

The pattern of harassment of priests and bishops which occurred in the Catholic areas was equally widespread in the Orthodox areas, though it was probably less severe, and there was no central event like the trial of Archbishop Stepinac in Zagreb ... 

In addition to being spared the more severe persecution unleashed on the Catholic Church, the Serbian Church was granted other privileges. It was permitted to continue publishing its journal Blagovest (the Croatian Glas Koncila was closed down), while it was also honoured with the responsibility of performing certain functions in league with the state. Thus, government representatives and a detachment of the Red Army attended a Requiem in Belgrade Cathedral soon after the communist victory, while the Patriarch addressed the December 1946 Pan-Slav meeting in Belgrade on the subject of Slav unity, and gratefulness to 'mother Russia' for its assistance in the recent struggle.
The reasons for such relatively better treatment include the fact that there were important links between the Serbian Church and the Partisans, and that the Serbian Church greeted the communist victory with some apparent enthusiasm (it carried out such symbolic acts of solidarity with the new order as undertaking collections for the Partisan and Soviet wounded). Such senior officials of the Church as the Rev. Jevstatije Karamatijević and the Rev. Milan Smiljanić, to name only two, had served with the Partisans, while the latter at war's end became Vice-President of the Presidium of the Serbian Assembly.

In further contrast with the Croatian Church, the fact that the two most senior members of the Serbian church, Patriarch Gavrilo, and Metropolitan Josif, had solid credentials as Serbian patriots (the latter having fought in the Balkan wars) appeared to cast them in a positive light with authorities (though, no doubt, Gavrilo's consistently anti-fascist stand was also taken into account). Indeed, Alexander mentions that the Yugoslav government was anxious for the return of Gavrilo, since because of the inevitably impending execution of Draža Mihajlović, the state wished to establish that it was 'not anti-Serb, as it was already accused of being'.

In addition, the Serbian Church did not confront the new order head-on as the Croatian Catholic Church had. The former was more prepared to accept its allotted role, and in any case, 'the Orthodox Church, in lands which had been under Ottoman rule, had for five hundred years used silence, evasion and mystification to defend itself, habits which are not easily lost'. Finally, the relationship of the Serbian Orthodox Church with the other Orthodox Churches of eastern Europe, particularly the Russian Orthodox Church, rendered it a more useful symbolic tool of fraternity with the Soviet block than did the Westward-looking Catholic Church.

Thus, despite the post-war establishment of a regime in which formal national equality was established by its authors as central, the elaborate care which had been apparent at the height of the Partisan campaign to balance natural Serbian biases was somewhat neglected. Reinforcing these biases induced by that nationality's disproportionate contribution to the Partisan struggle, and therefore
membership of the Party, the new state's constitutional apparatus, symbolic features, territorial arrangements and cultural policies all betray detectable biases towards Serbia, although these biases have often been exaggerated by those with anti-Serbian axes to grind, and are not on a scale comparable to the privileges of Serbia in the pre-war state, or the position of Russia in the Soviet Union.


The new order established in 1945 was set up by a Party whose ideological outlook and recent experience of the fruits of national hegemony had encouraged it to form a system which would guarantee far more equality and 'brotherhood' than had been the case in Royalist Yugoslavia. This, however, did not prevent a degree of bias towards Serbia in a number of areas, for a variety of reasons, one of which was the apparent conviction that Serbia, by contrast with the other nations of Yugoslavia, notably Croatia, had to be 'won over', if the new state were to be viable.

In the next phase of this survey, from the split with the Cominform in 1948 to the Seventh Party Congress in 1958, while certain institutional biases toward Serbia remained largely unchanged, despite important reforms, the authorities attempted to inculcate a sense of all-Yugoslav identity and enthusiasm for the 'Yugoslav idea\(^*\). Despite the unitarist overtones of these concepts (reflected in the withdrawal of some formal national rights), these first stirrings of 'Yugoslavism' did not represent Serb nationalism in a new guise, as often claimed by Croat nationalists. On the contrary, a variety of factors influenced the authorities during these years to be particularly sensitive to manifestations of Serbian nationalism, and it may be generalised that Yugoslavia's isolation following the split induced the state to dissociate itself from biases in favour of Serbia, in order to maximise the allegiance of all the nationalities of Yugoslavia.

\(^*\) These terms may be grouped under the term 'Yugoslavism' ('Jugoslovenstvo') which has been used officially over the years in two senses: (1) a feeling of belonging to Yugoslavia, and loyalty to the idea of a united, socialist Yugoslavia, while retaining one's allegiance to one of the nationalities of Yugoslavia, and (2) the notion that social processes are drawing the nationalities together preparatory to their eventual 'merging', a notion generally accompanied by the conviction that such processes should be encouraged.
Despite the important institutional re-arrangements introduced in the wake of the confrontation with Stalin, these did not significantly alter the Serbian domination of the political system established during and after the war. After Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, following an initial period when Tito attempted to affirm his loyalty to the Bloc, a wave of reform lasting until the 'thaw' with Stalin's successors transformed the country's system into a unique form of Marxism-Leninism. Despite its continued existence as a one-party state controlled by a Party organised on Leninist principles, the 'self-management' system was introduced, collectivisation was abandoned, central planning was minimised, the CPY became the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), its role allegedly changing from the commanding force in society to an institution charged with 'educating' the populace, while a significant amount of economic control was devolved to local and republican levels. While the reforms were, as Vladimir Bakarić observes, sufficiently important in the eyes of the Republics to induce the first nationalism of any significance in the post-war state, the central Party-State apparatus with its ethnic bias relinquished little power. As Miller notes, according to the 1953 Constitution, the Republics made some gains in the areas of local and federal powers, yet 'exclusive federal jurisdiction was retained over a wide range of matters'. No doubt because of the growth of officially sponsored 'Yugoslavism' (discussed below), certain provisions actually reduced the symbolic significance of the ethnic groups: the Council of Nationalities in the Federal Assembly was replaced by a Council of Producers, while the albeit purely formal right of secession, specified in the 1946 Constitution, was deleted in the 1953 version. Centralised power was threatened even less, for a time, when, after the Kremlin's overtures following the death of Stalin, Tito and his colleagues 'tacitly put a stop to the further implementation of the various institutional measures which had been designed to emphasise Yugoslavia's disapproval of the basic Soviet model'. The contrast in political trends between the mid- and early 1950s was sufficiently marked for Joseph Frankel to write in 1955, 'the present trend is towards complete unitarianism'. This is demonstrated by the fact that the centralist approach to Yugoslav economic development prevailed for as long as it did. As Lendvai observes,
The program to equalise development levels between the north and south prevailed for over fifteen years. Under the wartime slogan 'Brotherhood and Unity', exploitation of the resources in the developed northern areas was subordinated to the 'over-all goals determined by the top political leadership'.

This is exemplified by the manner in which Croat proposals for the 1957 Five-Year Plan were dismissed: while Croatian suggestions for upgrading road and rail facilities connected with Rijeka and Split were overruled, emphasis in the Plan was put on improving the 'small and comparatively unused' Montenegrin port of Bar. Thus, in the decade following the break with Moscow, power essentially remained in centralised, disproportionately Serbian hands. On balance this power continued to be used in Serbian interests, a feature of the system legitimised because it coincided with the developmental strategy for Yugoslavia formulated by its ethnically heterogeneous leadership.

Turning to the cultural and historiographic sphere, there are few grounds to support the claim that the 'Yugoslavism' which appeared following the split was essentially a guise for the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group, as may be argued in the case of the pre-war Yugoslav state, or the Soviet doctrine of the emerging 'Soviet people'. The new 'Yugoslavism' clearly appeared in order to consolidate belief in Yugoslav unity as a consequence of the pressure being applied by the Soviet bloc. Implicit in the notion was the belief that nationalism was a 'bourgeois' phenomenon which was bound to disappear as 'self-management' ideology became internalised by the masses. Yet it coincided with a number of concessions to local feeling and national rights (even though, as noted above, by 1953 it had been decided to delete certain formal rights and powers of ethnic groups) and involved severe official criticism whenever praise of the Yugoslav idea came too close to implying approval of the pre-war regime. It was also associated with severe criticism of Soviet nationality policies, particularly the concept of the 'leading nation', which of course implied the need to restrain Serbia in the Yugoslav context.

While the 'Yugoslavist' emphasis brought developments in a number of areas, notably the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement officially establishing the status of Serbo-Croatian as a single literary language (containing two

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* This reversed the line of the 1946 Constitution, which had recognised Serbian and Croatian as separate languages, reverting to the principles of Vuk Karadžić's 1850 Vienna Accord.
variants) and the setting up of the 'Council of Cultural-Educational Unions of Yugoslavia', the most prominent manifestation of the new stress on 'Yugoslavism' was in the area of historiography. In contrast to the earlier unqualifiedly negative evaluation of 'Versailles' Yugoslavia, writers were encouraged to describe approvingly the concept of a united Yugoslavia while at the same time not mitigating their condemnation of the old regime. Following the cue of Milovan Djilas and Lazar Mojsov in 1949 and 1950, numerous writers made contributions in response to this demand, generally arguing that despite the unfortunate consequences for the non-Serbs in the pre-war state, the idea of Yugoslavia contained a rational essence, since, given the strategic circumstances of its location and the constant potential hostility of its neighbours, the nationalities could achieve a degree of freedom and independence only within the wider framework of a united South Slav state. The difficulty involved with such a line was the lack of ease with which it could be reconciled with a negative view of the 'bourgeois' founding fathers of Yugoslavia. Implying that such analysis was becoming apologetic vis-à-vis Royalist (and hence, Serbian nationalist) Yugoslavia, a Party Commission in 1956 reviewed the activities of the historians and concluded that future works on Yugoslav history should continue to examine the question of Yugoslav unity, but that this goal should be pursued using a 'purely Marxist' form of analysis.

The 'Yugoslavism' of this period, in addition, gave little room to the expression of Serb biases or nationalism because of the attack on the Soviet 'leading nation' doctrine, which formed part of a wider denunciation of Soviet nationality policies. Although Yugoslav ideologists, notably Djilas, appropriated such Soviet concepts as the 'drawing together (zbližavanje) and unification of peoples' under socialism, such notions were attacked in cases where they were formulated in conjunction with a recognition of national inequality, as was the Yugoslav assessment of the function of such concepts in the Soviet Union. Soviet doctrines of the leading Russian nation, together with claims, amounting to the all-world mission of the Russian people and its culture were denounced

* Veće Kulturno-prosvetnih Saveza Jugoslavije
as perversions of Leninism. As Tito stated at the Sixth Congress of the CPY in November 1952,

The theory of the leading nation in a multinational state is an expression of actual subjugation, national oppression and economic exploitation of other nations within a country by the leading nation.

At this stage of Yugoslavia's history, after the split, and the maverick communist state's attempt to distance itself as far as possible from the Soviet model of socialism, it was clearly judged imperative that Serbia should not be seen to wield privileges vis-à-vis the other Yugoslav nationalities.

This interpretation is supported by the somewhat greater emphasis given to controlling Serbian nationalism during this period. While the state continued to conduct its campaign against the Roman Catholic Church, particularly in Croatia, the first anti-nationalist campaign of the regime, conducted in the latter half of 1953, placed particular emphasis on the danger of Serbian nationalism. Thus, in an October 1953 edition of Kommunist, Mirko Tepavac severely criticised the nationalism allegedly widespread in Serbian artistic and intellectual life.

In addition, Djilas in his 1949 article setting out what was required of the Yugoslav historian, chose as a negative example of historiography a recent Montenegrin work on the Monarch Nikola, a work which he berated for its 'neutrality' which, he suggested, sprang from nationalist sympathies. Similarly, writers such as Dušan Nedeljković gave extensive publicity to Serbian pre-war and wartime 'racism'. To be sure, these cases were balanced by continuing, if less frequent, signs of a relatively benign view of the Serbian historical and cultural heritage. This is demonstrated as much by the 1952 reprinting of Ranković's relatively unrestrained wartime articles on Serbia's role in the struggle, as by the 1954 attempt to secularise and appropriate the appeal of Prince Njegoš from the Serbian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless the post-split isolation of Yugoslavia reinforced the need for the allegiance of all its nationalities, and hence necessitated a reduction in Serbia's real or perceived national privileges.
If the period from 1948 to 1958 revealed tendencies which suggested affirmation in the political and cultural sphere of greater equality and 'brotherhood', the subsequent eight years revealed such tendencies far less ambiguously. Further devolution of economic power, and the genesis of the process of dismantling the centralised power of the LCY went far towards undermining the disproportionate power of the Serbs in the overall management of society. This process was underlined and reinforced by the defeat of the conservative centralist forces of Aleksandar Ranković, which while not exclusively Serbian, were widely identified (including by the Party) as pursuing a policy which placed Serbia's interests first. With the victory of predominantly northern 'decentralising' forces over predominantly southern and eastern 'centralist' forces in the mid-1960s, the policy of advocating 'Yugoslavism' was also abandoned after a period in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the concept was increasingly defined as predicting and advocating a form of cultural integration. In keeping with the above development, while all nationalities were ritualistically attacked, the singling out of Serbian nationalism for vilification became increasingly apparent, particularly later during the period.

While, as was argued in the previous section, the first ten years following the split reveal important formal institutional rearrangements, Serbian domination of the still centralised Party-State apparatus remained largely unthreatened. During the following eight years, the first period, up to 1963, though revealing gradual reform, displays more continuity than change. From this year onwards, however, devolutionary changes exerted a profound influence on the power structure of the state.

As Miller argues, the unacceptable price demanded by Khrushchev for Tito's return to the Soviet camp induced the beginning of Yugoslavia's second wave of reform. This wave lasted, albeit with delays and setbacks, until 1974. Yet during the first years of this process, devolution proceeded slowly. As Dušan Bilandžić states,
At the end of the fifties and beginning of the sixties, when the 10th anniversary of the transfer of the factories to the management of the workers was being celebrated in Yugoslavia, the power of the state in the administration of the economy was still very great. State organs disposed of almost the entire surplus value, in the main directly by special centralised funds for investment and for intervention in the economy.

Thus, in the two five-year plans initiated in 1957 and 1960, despite a somewhat wider role played by republican and local organs, and the moderation of some Serbian demands for investment funds after Tito's criticism of economic 'localism' in November 1959, investment was still directed by the state to Serbia and the largely southern underdeveloped regions. Thus, although in response to Tito's call plans for the Belgrade-Bar railroad* were shelved, while Zagreb was allowed to keep the Yugoslav International Fair, Serbia was given a disproportionate share of development in the 1960-1965 period: work was funded for such projects as the Iron Gates power scheme, the Smederevo Steel Works, the Danube-Tisa-Danube canal system, and the Pančevo fertiliser plant (the last two being in the Vojvodina).

Other moves favouring Serbia were the decisions to manufacture television sets at Niš rather than Kranj, Slovenia (which already had the necessary infrastructure), and the move to establish Yugoslavia's seventh university (i.e. the first outside a Republic capital) at Niš. To be sure, all of the traditionally underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia received developments funds largely appropriated from the North. Numerous 'political factories' continued to be set up in these areas, often 'created without economic justification, operating at a loss, and producing far below capacity'. Celebrated examples of this were the Nikšić steel-plant in Montenegro, and the Cetinje and Bitola refrigerator factories, in Montenegro and Macedonia respectively.

Despite certain additional measures which further liberalised the powers of enterprises in the first half of 1961, in the summer of 1962, as Rusinow states, 'a still ultimately centralised Party and State apparatus was under the predominant control of Party 'Tories' grouped

* The projected railroad took, according to Dennison Rusinow, 'the pan-Serb route to the sea which Serbian and Montenegrin politicians had dreamed of since 1879, and the only route which completely avoided non-Orthodox lands and dependence on Croatian or foreign sea-ports'.

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around Aleksandar Ranković. As Miller notes, while work on a new constitution had begun at the end of 1960, the sudden improvement in relations with the Soviet Union at the end of 1961, and the simultaneous economic downturn, strengthened the hands of such conservatives.

However, a number of circumstances, including the adverse economic effects of decentralisation measures, resulted in the Party conservatives being unable to command a majority in the Executive and Central Committees or Tito's firm support, at least after the middle of 1962. Although Tito appears not to have lent his unwavering support to the liberal 'decentralisers' until the end of 1964, a series of reforms from 1963 onwards devolved power from the centre to the 'self-managing' units and Republics. These included the abolition of the Central Investment Fund in the same year, the granting of a measure of real power to the Republican Communist Parties in 1964, and finally, the July 1965 Reform which in theory established the autonomy of the individual enterprise, thus introducing 'market socialism', and drastically reducing the power of the centre. The April 1963 Constitution also constituted an important step along the road of devolution away from the centre. The new constitution provided for the 'Autonomous Region' ('oblast') of Kosmet being renamed the 'Autonomous Province' ('pokrajina') of Kosovo-Metohija, thus removing its implicit inferior status vis-à-vis the Vojvodina.

The victory of the liberal 'decentralisers' over the faction headed by Aleksandar Ranković, appointed Vice-President in 1963, may be seen as the reformists' coup de grâce. While the latter, together with other elements of the Yugoslav leadership, ultimately accused Ranković of being a Serbian nationalist - and there was clearly a good degree of truth in this - the basis of his opposition to the reforms of the early 1960s was belief in a strong, centralised Party which would retain firm control over the economy. As such, he attracted a wider field of support than simply the Serbs (while, conversely, some Serbs figured among the proponents of economic reforms). As Susan Bridge argues, the supporters of Ranković were:

conservative, locally based communists employed in Party and government hierarchies in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and some of the poorer parts of Croatia and Serbia. It was in these places that obtaining and distributing benefits from the federal government had been a vital part of the political
Ranković's fear was that the transfer of power to the 'technological-managerial elite' involved in the reforms would thus undermine the 'most communist' areas of the country. In his consequent attempt to subvert the changes, Ranković exploited the concomitant 'confusion and discontent' (which included increases in inflation and unemployment levels), made personnel changes throughout the country in favour of 'reliable' officials (which in the case of Croatia usually meant replacing Croats with Serbs), and placed numerous individuals associated with the reforms, including Tito himself, under surveillance.

The fourth ('Brioni') Central Committee Plenum which dismissed Ranković in 1966, as a result of a coalition of the political leadership of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, together with an incensed Tito, initiated an official campaign (in which such authoritative publications as Komunist played a prominent role) identifying the ex-Vice-President with Serbian nationalism and stressing the dangers of the 'centralist hegemonism' Ranković was held to represent. This was despite the obvious oversimplification of such charges, particularly given that Ranković had specifically attacked Serbian nationalists at an earlier Central Committee plenum in March. Nevertheless, despite the campaign, the Serbs were not pushed too far: Ranković was pardoned, purged Serbs were replaced with other Serbs, while Serbs were charged with the task of denouncing their fellow Serb Ranković's UDBA* and the ex-Vice-President's 'fractional group'.

If in the political and economic arena the forces of decentralisation had scored a victory, this gain was matched by success in the area of cultural independence, in the defeat of the concept of 'Yugoslavism', at least in its integralist sense. During the decade following the split with Moscow the concept had been advocated, but generally only in the relatively innocuous sense of fostering belief in and loyalty to the idea of a united South Slav state. From 1958 onwards, however, the

* 'Uprava Državne Bezbednosti' ('State Security Administration')
term could be interpreted as conveying the notion of cultural convergence. In that year Edvard Kardelj published a revised edition of his Development of the Slovenian National Question*, which he prefaced with a lengthy theoretical introduction. While, as Shoup observes, the introduction is 'frequently and mistakenly interpreted ... as a defence of the rights of the republics', quite the reverse would appear to be true.118 Positing a 'Yugoslav socialist consciousness' higher than 'democratic national consciousness', unleashing a criticism of nationalism virtually unprecedented in Yugoslavia for its vitriolic denunciation of national sentiment as well, and formulating the dialectical unity of national 'flourishing', 'drawing together', and 'merging' (à la mode in the Soviet Union at the time it will be recalled), Kardelj indeed seemed to be drawing away from the postulate of equal recognition of cultural individuality, a principle adhered to, in theory at least, since the beginnings of communist power in Yugoslavia.119 Perhaps most significantly, Kardelj modified Stalin's definition of the nation to interpret Yugoslavia as the only authentic 'nation', and hence the only unit capable of resisting hegemonic pressures from Moscow, and at the same time, capable of restraining the disintegrative tendencies of the individual Yugoslav nationalities.120 While denouncing pre-war 'bourgeois Yugoslavism' and 'Illyrianism', Kardelj for a period continued to predict and advocate the movement of peoples (and specifically those of Yugoslavia) into a 'higher all-human (opštečovečansko) society' comprising a 'wider national area'.121

The influence of Kardelj's theories was widespread. The reference to a 'growing Yugoslav socialist consciousness' combined with a placatory recognition of the cultural individuality of the peoples of Yugoslavia, made its way into the final resolution of the Seventh Party Congress (1958) as well as the Programme of the LCY, published the same year.122 Numerous articles repeated and elaborated Kardelj's theories, giving particular stress to the role of technological progress in the breaking down of cultural barriers and 'quickening the process of their drawing

* Razvoj Slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja

+ The nineteenth-century notion according to which the Yugoslavs were three tribes of one nation, a notion accepted in Royalist Yugoslavia.
together ('zbližavanje') and merging ('spajanje'). At the same time, articles which implicitly praised the founding fathers of 'bourgeois' Yugoslavia, interpreting the emergence of the old regime as the 'lesser of two evils' for the working class (an argument familiar to students of Soviet views - albeit of an earlier period - of Tsarist colonialism), began to be published by Yugoslav historians. Despite a certain amount of official embarrassment and consequent assurances when the Serbian author Dobrica Ćosić suggested, in a polemic with the Slovenian Dušan Pirjevac, that Yugoslavia would continue to be plagued with ethnic rivalries 'as long as Republics exist', an influential group largely of Serbian intellectuals continued to advocate the merging of the Yugoslav cultures. Importantly, in his May 1962 address in Split, the Party leader claimed that cultural life should 'strengthen the socialist community', and hence called on writers, poets and historians 'to grow within a Yugoslav framework'. Titodeclamed, 'we are now creating an all-Yugoslav (opštejugoslovensku) socialist culture'. Similarly, in the same year at Rijeka, Tito called on the Republics to think of economic problems again in all-Yugoslav terms, while the following year he defended individuals wishing to label themselves as 'Yugoslav' for official purposes.

However, the alignment of forces at the Eighth Party Congress (December 1964) was such that all talk of a 'single Yugoslav nation' was condemned. While Tito and Kardelj clung to concepts such as 'Yugoslav socialist integration' and 'Yugoslav socialist consciousness', the former significantly shifted his earlier apparent view, by attacking

... persons, and even communists, who think that nationalities in our socialist society have outlived themselves and should wither away. They confuse the unity of nations with the liquidation of nations and with the establishment of some kind of artificial, that is one single, Yugoslav nation, which is tantamount to assimilation and bureaucratic centralization, to unitarism and hegemonism.

After other politicians, notably Veljko Vlahović, had made similarly covert attacks on 'Greater Serbian hegemonism' (as 'Yugoslavism' tended to be interpreted by non-Serbs as amounting to), the concluding resolution of the Eighth Congress rejected the idea of a Yugoslav uniform
nation as being a 'harmful suggestion', while at the same time warning against 'nationalism' and 'chauvinism'. While later the point would occasionally be made that 'Yugoslavism' was not so evil as was its interpretation in Serbia, it was clear after the Congress that any all-Yugoslav, let alone integralist, notions would be viewed with grave suspicion by the victorious 'decentralisers'. This was illustrated by, for example, writers going so far as to replace the term 'Yugoslav patriotism' with the formula 'socialist patriotism of the peoples and nationalities (naroda i narodnosti) of Yugoslavia'.

Finally, the period from the early to the mid-sixties witnesses an increasing, and ultimately marked tendency to single out real and imagined Serbian nationalism for attack, a process which emanated both from Croatia in particular, and from the Party in general. The first cases of this trend surround the interpretations by two scholars, Petar Moraca and Velimir Terzić, of the Croatian role in the Yugoslav collapse of 1941, published respectively in 1961 and 1963. Both were interpreted by the Croatians as laying the bulk of the blame for the rapid disintegration of Royalist Yugoslavia on Croatia, and not distinguishing sufficiently clearly between the Croatian people, the Ustaše, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Roman Catholic Church.

In response, Croatian writers went on the offensive, claiming the explanation for the collapse formulated by the CPY in 1941 had been ignored by the writers, an explanation which claimed that the 'Serbian ruling clique' had blamed the Croatians in order to 'clear itself of responsibility' for its 'treasonous work'. In keeping with this version, the critics of Terzić, exonerated by such authority the 'oppressed peoples' (Croats, Albanians, Macedonians) of pre-war Yugoslavia for any collaboration, at the same time adducing the fact that the Croatian front held out longer against the Germans than the southeastern front to demonstrate that Croatia, despite recently having been the victim of Serbian hegemony, was nevertheless actively anti-fascist. Similarly, Vaso Bogdanov, in a particularly open attack on what he evidently perceived to be the Serbian nationalism of Moraca, strongly*

When these terms are juxtaposed, 'chauvinism' generally refers to the 'centralist' variety of nationalism, while 'nationalism' suggests its peripheral counterpart.
suggested that his views were comparable to those of Draža Mihajlović claiming that 'hatred directed at the Croatians by the Serbs' was 'an attempt to hide Serbian responsibility for its betrayal' (during the war). A similarly bold and vehement Croatian attack on historical interpretation was that published in 1964 by the Zagreb Institute for the Study of the Worker's Movement (under the directorship of the now émigré Croatian nationalist Franjo Tudjman) on a new Party history. The criticism published by the Institute attacked the Party history for an unqualifiedly negative evaluation of the Croatian Peasant Party [and the 1939 'Cvetković-Maček Sporazum'] and for being less hostile toward the London [Yugoslav exile] government, as well as 'for giving the impression that the National Liberation struggle was not well developed in Croatia'. While the Institute's attitude earned it a reprimand in Komunist, it is of significance that the Institute felt sufficiently confident to be so outspoken.

More generally, from this point onwards, the Party press began to single out Serbian nationalism for attack and to stress that the Serbs, as the largest Yugoslav nationality, had 'the greatest responsibility for curbing manifestations of nationalism within their own ranks'. A wide range of articles identified areas of Serbian nationalism and emphasised the need for Serbian self-restraint. The sensitivity of the Party to manifestations of the phenomenon extended so far as to condemn Miodrag Pavlović's 1964 Anthology of Serbian Poetry which included the prose of St. Sava and various medieval monks. The work was interpreted as 'religious bigotry and chauvinism', and Pavlović was criticised for lacking 'progressive and revolutionary zeal'. Similarly, a 'Serbian dictionary', published in 1966 by Miloš Moskovljević of Belgrade University, which ignored the officially adopted orthography and linguistic principles as set out in the Novi Sad Agreement, was confiscated in March of that year, while earlier in 1966 Komunist condemned Belgrade 'café nationalism'.

Clearly by the mid-sixties, the official attitude to Serbia, summed up by Tito's address to the 'Brioni' plenum, and particularly by his comment that Belgrade was 'a city of all South Slavs', was that far from its

* 'Understanding'. The accord granted Croatia a measure of autonomy.
being the centrepiece of a Yugoslav form of 'communist nationalism', its publicly visible restraint was considered necessary to ensure the allegiance of the state's other ethnic groups. By the mid-sixties not only was the political power of the Ranković faction and the concept of 'Yugoslavism' pilloried officially because of their alleged associations with Serbian nationalism, but the institutional arrangements which had granted Serbia disproportionate power in Yugoslavia since the war had been dismantled to a significant degree. According to one observer, the mood in Serbia was that 'everything which expressed [its] tradition had been curtailed in order to satisfy the other units'.

(iv) 1966-1972: The Fall of Ranković to the Republican Purges

The process of devolutionary institutional reform which had been underway in Yugoslavia, albeit in fits and starts, since the split with the Cominform, reached its zenith in the years from 1966 to 1972, although at the end of this period, following the Republican purges of 1971-72, Tito instituted a strengthening of the role of the LCY in Yugoslav society, to balance the potentially polycentric tendencies in the system. By the end of this period, after the numerous constitutional amendments, institutional reforms and rearrangements affecting Party, State and the system of 'self-management', a political system which, formally at least, operated according to a system of strict national equality, had dramatically reduced Serbia's influence in Yugoslavia as a whole. These processes coincided with an explosion of nationalist sentiment among all of Yugoslavia's nationalities. Yet paralleling the anti-Serbian direction of institutional change, while nationalist manifestations among all of the non-Serb nationalities were met with an official measure of severity generally in proportion to their seriousness, the treatment of occasions of Serbian nationalism can be seen as somewhat harsher: in public and cultural life, and with respect to the issues of language and the Serbian Orthodox Church, extremely intense sensitivity can be detected towards manifestations of Serbian nationalism which were comparable with, or more innocuous than, their non-Serb equivalents.

Of the reasons for the political changes during this phase of communist Yugoslavia's history, Jacob Walkin observes:
With the grip of the party and police relaxing, it was inevitable that the fiction of the harmony of interests among the republics deduced from the establishment of a Marxist order break down, that the republics acquire increasing powers of autonomy in relation to the federation and that the federation gradually be converted from an ersatz to a real federation. 149

One might add, as Miller does, that the very real fear of the USSR's 'Brezhnev Doctrine' enunciated in justification of its invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, further induced Yugoslavia to differentiate its system from the Soviet model. 150

The power structure of Yugoslav society was altered by a total of forty-one constitutional amendments between 1967 and 1971, and by important reforms affecting the nature of the Party, enacted in late 1966, and at the Ninth Party Congress, in 1969. The first constitutional amendment, in 1967, went a good way to making the Yugoslav system into a 'real federation'. 151 In addition to granting the Republics control over internal security, the powers of the Chamber of Nationalities, one of the Chambers of the Federal Assembly, were expanded. 152 Later, in December 1968, the same chamber was upgraded to become the senior of the Chambers, thus increasing the powers of the Republics. 153 Further changes in late 1968 and early 1969 included the constitutional affirmation of ethnic parity at the federal level, 154 more rights for the Slovenian and Croatian Republics, the recognition of Slav Moslems as a distinct ethnic group, and the greater symbolic accommodation of the Albanian minority. 155

Continuing the process, in April 1970, the Party Presidency moved to speed up the introduction of national 'keys' or quotas for all areas of the federal administration. It also moved to apply the constitutional principle of equality between all languages and scripts in the federal administration, in the armed forces, 'and even in the conduct of international relations'. 156

Finally, in the state sphere, the twenty-three constitutional amendments of July 1971, or the '1971 Constitution', as it has been called, turned Yugoslavia into a 'virtual confederation of sovereign republics'. 157 Most importantly, the Republics acquired veto powers
over a wide range of issues, a collective Presidency was instituted with Tito presiding over equal representation of the republics and provinces, and the federal budget was left with only a single central fund for the accelerated development of the less developed regions out of the previously numerous central agencies for financial and fiscal management.

As regards the Party, following the devolutionary reforms of the LCY's executive organs in October 1966, and the acquisition of Republican rights over cadre appointments, the Ninth LCY Congress in 1969 further expanded the powers of Republic Party organs at the expense of the federal organisation. In the new Presidium and Executive Bureau, in future to be elected by Republic organs, strict national quotes were to be adhered to. As Mackenzie observes, Yugoslavia became a true federation with republic organizations quite free to determine their own policies and assume a major role in policy debates in the federal level. The highest LCY organs now frequently deadlocked over inter-republic differences which placed heavier burdens on state bodies.

However, a decentralised Party was to be a short-lived phenomenon. While the nationalist upheavals of late 1971 and the subsequent purges of the Republican leaderships did not affect reforms on the state level, the 'Tito letter' of September 1972 heralded significant reversals in the federalisation of the Party. Tito called for a return to 'democratic centralism', as well as the more widespread requirement of Party membership for those employed in key professions, and greater Party involvement in, and leadership of society generally. His strategy focussed on the 'need for a strong centre in order to inhibit abuses of the new freedoms.'

The period from 1966 to 1972 dramatically demonstrates the emergence of nationalism into public life. A number of the Republican Parties, most obviously in Croatia, increasingly obviously identified with the interests of their titular ethnic group, a factor that partially explains Tito's purges of the Republican leaderships in 1971-72. The situation in Serbia, however, reveals strong contrasts with Republics where the Party converged with local nationalism: rather, the official attitude, on the part of both the LCY and the local Party to Serbian
nationalism during these years, with few exceptions, suggests an 'excess of anti-nationalist zeal', an attitude most spectacularly demonstrated by the purging of the Serbian leadership in 1972. While the scale of the purge was less thoroughgoing than that conducted in Croatia, given that the sins of Serbia were hardly analogous to those of her north-western neighbour, the retribution conducted by the LCY against Serbia was remarkably severe.

This particularly vigilant attitude towards Serbian nationalism on the part of the authorities begins to be evident during this period with the purging of Ranković in July 1966. Following his dismissal, grievances were redressed in non-Serb areas of Yugoslavia against Serbian officials who had abused their powers, while in Serbia itself numerous persons rightly or wrongly suspected of Serbian nationalist attitudes were gradually weeded out from positions of authority. (The one concession to wounded Serbian pride appears to have been the decision in late 1966 to drop the Montenegrin candidate Veljko Vlahović, proposed as President of the National Assembly, putting forward instead the Serb Milentije Popović).

The first case of evident hyper-sensitivity during this period to real or imagined manifestations of Serbian nationalism involves the denunciation and later removal from the Serbian Central Committee of Jovan Marjanović and Dobrica Ćosić. At the May 1968 meeting of the Republican Central Committee, the two members had criticised manifestations of Albanian and Hungarian nationalism in Kosovo and the Vojvodina respectively. The two claimed that Albanian 'nationalism and irredentism' were being overtly advocated in Kosovo. Moreover, Serbs were alleged to be suffering systematic discrimination in the area of employment policies in the Province. To support their case, they cited the emigration from Kosovo of an increasing number of Serbs and Montenegrins, 'especially the intelligentsia'. While the two also expressed concern that a sense of all-Yugoslav identity was no longer being encouraged, Marjanović balanced his criticism by speaking in addition of the 'growing nationalistic activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church (in relation to the Kosmet)' and its 'open anti-communist propaganda', while Ćosić referred to widespread 'primitive Serbianism' ('primitivno srpstvo'). Nevertheless, both members were condemned in Borba for
expressing nationalist sentiments, and purged at the Serbian Congress six months later. As John Besemeres comments, it had become apparent that the 'nationalist concerns of the largest national group were grounds for excommunication, whilst elsewhere the Party organs of smaller territorial units were in some cases consecrating nationalist arguments as Party orthodoxy'.

The pattern was to continue for the next four years, particularly given the new young 'liberal' leadership of the Serbian Party after the 1968 Congress. Thus, the following year, the Party condemned a number of candidates in national elections on the grounds that they were 'Party conservatives'. These candidates included individuals such as Svetoz Ourović who previously had been tainted with the charge of Serbian nationalism. Similarly, during the summer of 1969, local political leaders conducted a concerted campaign against Serbian nationalism. Indeed, the following year, the Secretary of the Republican Central Committee, Latinka Perović, evidently felt it necessary to answer charges that the Serbian leadership was 'a-national', at the same time criticising 'those communists' who allowed nationalism 'to be rejuvenated' through them. In October of the same year, Perović somewhat mitigated her total public dissociation from Serbian national interests, by suggesting that given the rights of non-Serbs to their own linguistic facilities in Serbia, Serbs should be entitled to similar facilities in non-Serbo-Croat speaking areas.

With the passage of the devolutionary constitutional reforms of 1971, popular Serbian nationalism peaked. As Miller argues,

... the broader the autonomy granted to the other republics and provinces, the greater the disillusionment of the leading Serbian politicians and intellectuals, a disaffection that was understandably intensified by the intemperate anti-Belgrade (read 'anti-Serb') accusations and demands emanating from outside of Serbia ...

Wounded Serbian pride was consequently evident in numerous trends and incidents, most notably the debates conducted by Belgrade University's Law Faculty, in which the predominant view of the 1971 reforms to emerge was that they were 'directed against the fundamental interests of the Serbian nation'. Such and similar sentiments, interpreted officially as nationalistic, were constantly attacked in the press. Thus, Borba
and Politika ridiculed and vilified cases such as the warning by the President of the Union of Belgrade Youth that the citizens of Belgrade were 'not immune from' anti-Croatian feeling.\textsuperscript{184} Similarly, Borba in December 1971 favourably reported the sacking of a prominent Party member in Smederovo for 'singing nationalistic and orthodox songs',\textsuperscript{185} while Politika in the same month reported the arrest of the president of the Serbian and Montenegrin Bar Association, Slobodan Subotić, who was allegedly preparing for the break-up of Yugoslavia and the 'defence of Serb interests'.\textsuperscript{186}

The events, however, which most convincingly demonstrated official disregard for Serbian national sentiment during this phase of Yugoslavia's history, are the purges of its Republican leadership in the Autumn of 1972. As noted above, the post-1968 Serbian leadership was anything but predominantly Serbian nationalist in outlook. Nevertheless, the LCY at this time demanded the resignations of Marko Nkzeć and Latinka Perović\textsuperscript{*}, while a widespread purge followed of Serbian party, government and media functionaries, as had occurred earlier in Croatia.\textsuperscript{187} While it appears clear that the reasons for the purge in Serbia were more the Republican leadership's 'liberal' insubordination, as well as a desire on the part of the LCY leadership not to permit the appearance of victimisation of any one Republic,\textsuperscript{188} official publications continued to denounce Serbian nationalism.\textsuperscript{189}

The suspicion of any form of Serbian self-assertion in public life was matched by the imposition of restraint in several other spheres. Thus, consistent with the condemnation of 'unitarist' and 'integralist' notions of 'Yugoslavism' at the Eighth Party Congress (and possibly the view that the earlier propagation of the concept had played a role in inflaming the non-Serb nationalisms of the 1960s),\textsuperscript{190} the concept's meaning reverted officially to indicating loyalty to a united Yugoslavia and the regime's brand of Marxism. Official calls for greater 'Yugoslav socialist patriotism' - in order to stem the nationalist tide - were careful to clarify that this did not involve any threat to the right of existence of national cultures, or the abandonment of the Party's policy of tolerating ethnic consciousness.\textsuperscript{191} As Vucinich states, to define an individual ethnically as a 'Yugoslav' in 1969 was considered a

\* President of the Republican Party Central Committee, and Secretary of the Executive Committee, respectively.
'reactionary concept'. Moreover, as suggested above, one of the reasons for the branding of Marjanović and Ćosić with the charge of 'Serbian nationalism', together with their dismissal from the Central Committee, was most likely their concern that a 'supranational sense of Yugoslav identity' was no longer being encouraged. Yet even 'Yugoslavism' in its more benign interpretation induced extreme Croatian hostility towards Serbia, Croatian politicians and intellectuals refusing to see anything but Serbian imperialism in the notion. Thus, Savka Dabčević-Kučar, at the 1970 Plenum of the Croatian Party, called 'Yugoslavism' a 'unitarist' concept 'which does not include equality or the free expression of national feeling', while the Croatian intellectual Šime Djodan saw in the concept 'Svetosavski Marksizam', which implied 'nationalism or even racism, the consequence of which is the assimilation of the weaker and non-Slavic peoples of Yugoslavia'.

Similarly, dominant elements in the Party sought to restrain the flaring up of Serbian nationalism after the linguistic issue became a subject of inter-ethnic rivalry in early 1967. In March of that year, 17 leading Croatian cultural organisations, involving 130 prominent scholars, published a 'Declaration on the Name and Position of the Croatian Literary Language', claiming the existence of Serbian linguistic imperialism, and calling for the annulment of the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement and recognition of a Croatian literary language. In response, a group of forty-five Serbian writers formulated a 'Proposal for Reflection' which also demanded the annulment of the Novi Sad (and Vienna) Agreements, called for the exclusive use of Serbian (in Cyrillic script if written) on the Belgrade electronic media, and demanded greater access to printed and electronic media in the Serbian dialect and Cyrillic script for the 650,000 Serbs of Croatia.

Importantly, in contrast to the Croatian 'Declaration', the Serbian Party Organisation had forbidden the publishing of the Serbian proposal. The fact that it was nevertheless published induced the Serbian Party to condemn the original Croatian 'Declaration' on the grounds that 'extreme

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* President of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia at the time.

** Sveti Sava (St. Sava) is the patron saint of the Serbs.

+ 'Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju Hrvatskog književnog jezika'.
nationalist elements' in Serbia had derived 'cynical pleasure' from the Croatian Declaration and had used it as a 'screen for their ultranationalist counteractions'. Similarly, the Serbian Writer's Association refused to approve the Serbian 'Proposal' because it was considered detrimental to federal unity and equality. Later attempts to express nationalist sentiment over the issue of the Serbian language and script also led to official denunciations.

Finally, the increasingly prominent tendency in the late 1960s for the Serbian Orthodox Church to act as the guardian of the Serbian nation raised the hackles of the authorities. The manner in which the Church commemorated, firstly, the laying to rest of the bones of Tsar Dušan the Mighty (1308-1355) in 1968, then the 750th anniversary of the establishment of the autocephalous Serbian Church in 1969, and finally the 50th anniversary of the restoration of the Serbian Patriarchate in 1970, drew severe criticism from Politika.

This followed two earlier occasions when the Church had been attacked by the authorities for 'Greater Serbianism'. The first such occasion followed the refusal of the Serbian government to assist the Serbian Church in its struggle to prevent the establishment of an autocephalous Macedonian Church, which resulted in the latter unilaterally declaring its independence in July 1967. The Serbian Church, refusing to recognise the Macedonian nationality, excommunicated the Macedonian Bishops. The Serbian Church was publicly exposed to the criticism of both Belgrade's Politika and Skopje's Nova Makedonija for speaking of the Macedonians as an 'ethnic group' rather than as a fully-fledged 'nation' (narod). Moreover, something of a general press campaign emerged, in which the stand of the Serbian bishops was denounced as 'chauvinistic, nationalistic, and even reflecting the interests of reactionary circles abroad.'

Similarly, from mid-1969 to mid-1970, the issue of custody of the bones of the nineteenth-century Njegoš, 'Prince-Bishop of Montenegro', returned to the agenda. The Party reiterated its intention of erecting a mausoleum containing the Prince's remains, which entailed removing them from a chapel belonging to the Church, a proposal the latter rejected.
The Serbian Orthodox Church was thus accused of 'political action aimed at denying the existence of a Montenegrin nationality'. While clearly this accusation was partly attributable to the 'nation-building' strategy of the Montenegrin Party, there can be little doubt that the Party, in all relevant parts of Yugoslavia, had decided that another means of thwarting 'Greater Serbian' nationalism was to treat the Serbian Orthodox Church 'increasingly as the local church of that republic'.

(v) 1972-1980: The Republican Purges to the Death of Tito

Following Tito's purges of the Republican leaderships in 1971-72, the predominant feature of Yugoslav political life for the remainder of the decade was a revival of the Party's centralist authority and the greater requirement that individuals wielding professional power be LCY members. At the same time most of the reforms of the state and social system were preserved. These years, however, in contrast to the earlier period, involved constant vigilance on the part of the authorities for any form of deviant political behaviour - which was mainly identified as involving the twin evils of nationalism and 'anarcho-liberalism'. Yet, because of the principles of 'parity' and 'appropriate' representation on the Federal Central Committee, continued disproportionate Serbian membership of the LCY was not reflected in disproportionate Serbian political power. Nor did the shift to centralism correlate with 'Serbo-centric' policies in other areas. Thus, the 'Yugoslavism' of earlier times remained discredited, while there is little evidence to suggest any greater leniency towards Serbia in the realm of national self-expression. This is aside from the fact that Serbia was not subjected to an anti-nationalist witch-hunt on a scale comparable to that which occurred in Croatia during the 1970s.

With respect to the institutional changes engineered by Tito following the leadership purges, a degree of inconsistency seems at first apparent. As Miller states, the paradox consists in

... the almost simultaneous adoption, on the one hand, of the new 1974 Constitution, which incorporates the various devolutionary amendments to the previous constitution and adds some complex procedural elements to the processes of economic and political decision-making on a mass-participatory basis, and, on the other hand, of a new Party
involvement in all areas of public life and tightening political controls over nominally self-managing institutions. Clearly central to an explanation of Tito's juxtaposition of these apparently conflicting elements is the symbolic function of Yugoslavia's 'self-management' system. In order to avoid 'a total alienation of the leaders and citizens of the outlying republics he ... sought to retain as many of the forms and practices of devolution and socialist self-management as possible'. And while the division of the LCY into eight republican and provincial bodies has resulted in the view that it is 'incapable of unified or coherent action', the 'principles of democratic centralism in decision-making and the careful vetting of the candidates for all responsible positions in government, society and the party itself remain central features of the Yugoslav communist party system as in others'. To quote Miller further,

To argue that the real base of power has shifted to the regional party organizations is not only unhistorical and formalistic, but it also overlooks the power of the Federal Central Committee machine in Belgrade and the careful supervision of party organizational matters by figures in the central leadership specifically charged with that responsibility.

Yet this decentralised, revitalised machine did not imply the re-ascendance of Serbia, as Yugoslavia's previous political history might suggest. Indeed, the forms of the decentralised self-management system were retained while, most importantly, the disproportionately Serbian membership of the LCY (54.5% in 1977) was not reflected in disproportionate power at the Central Committee level. Finally, cultural policies in no way favoured Serbia.

Hence, as from the mid-1960s onwards, the term 'Yugoslavism' continues to be accepted, although it describes a somewhat emasculated concept. Thus, for example, Dušan Ičević in 1976 uses 'Yugoslavism' in the sense of 'belonging to a self-managing socialist community, not some new nation or supranational construction'. The concept also

* In 1978, for example, the Serbian and Montenegrin share of both the population and Central Committee membership was between 44% and 45%.
incorporates 'Yugoslav socialist patriotism' involving loyalty to the integrity and independence of Yugoslavia. The Programme of the LCY does not propose a future nation', Ičević emphasises. Similarly, Gazmen Zajmi emphasises that Marxism treats of the death of the state but not of the nation. Indeed, a range of authors emphasise that a policy of forging new nations has no Marxist legitimacy. Integralist 'Yugoslavism', it is officially accepted, is a 'bourgeois nationalist concept, primarily a Greater Serbian one', and according to such writers as Muhamed Kešetović, similar to reactionary non-Marxist concepts current in the USSR such as 'the Soviet People'. In another indication of the anti-integrationist mood, Radovan Radonjić in 1979 claimed that 'not even under socialism is merging based on equality possible'.

The more repressive atmosphere of the 1970s entailed official intolerance of manifestations which could be construed as nationalism in either the political or cultural sphere - in any of Yugoslavia's Republics. Such restrictions were particularly severe in Croatia. Although certain heroes of Croatian history, such as Stjepan Radić were no longer regarded as 'class enemies', severe restrictions and Party supervision were imposed on wide areas of the cultural life of the Republic. The 'Matica Hrvatska', as after the war, was abolished as part of the purges, while the manner in which the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia marked its 1100th anniversary in September 1979 raised sufficient suspicions to induce an anti-clerical campaign in the course of the following two years (involving the particularly marked harassment of clergy in Bosnia-Hercegovina).

The attacks on any form of conceivable deviationism focussed on Serbia as well. The widespread purges which took place in Serbia after September 1972 removed from their positions numerous 'Serbian nationalists' notably members of the staff of Borba and Politika, as well as alleged 'anarcho-liberals'. In addition, the nationalist stand of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the late 1960s was answered by new laws in 1975 which severely restricted its activities, and a campaign against the public observance of religious ceremonies such as Christmas. Nevertheless, despite such signs of unflagging concern for indications of Serbian nationalism, no witch-hunt comparable to that conducted in Croatia occurred in those areas of national self-expression viewed as legitimate in principle.

* 'Croatian Homeland' cultural society. cf.Section (1)
Under the stimulus of the major Yugoslav political development since the death of Tito - the explosion of Albanian nationalism in the Kosovo beginning in March 1981 - a good deal of evidence suggests that the restraint of Serbian national feeling, a central factor in virtually the entire post-Cominform split period while Tito was at the helm, has given way to a degree of local alliance with the phenomenon, both within the Party, and in the media. The tendency has been paralleled and reinforced by revived support for forms of 'Yugoslavism' associated with assimilationism, although some Croatian intellectuals have conducted a spirited campaign against the latter.

Perhaps the most significant sphere in which the retreat from 'anti-nationalist zeal' can be observed during this period is that of the Serbian Party organisation itself. As Slobodan Stanković observes, the passing of Tito appears to have been central in inducing greater assertiveness on the part of Serbian politicians. This is exemplified by the case of the 'Blue Book', a publication which critically described Serbia's position in Yugoslavia, with particular reference to the growing hardship of the Serbian and Montenegrin populations in Kosovo. In 1977, Tito had ordered its suppression, but after his death, at the December 1981 Republican plenum, its distribution was promised to members of the Serbian Central Committee. The new mood was also reflected in calls for the 'unity and togetherness' of Serbia, made both by Dragoslav Marković* (Chairman at the time of the LCY Central Committee Presidium and Serbia's most important party and state leader and at the time of writing President of Yugoslavia's National Assembly) and Tihomir Vlaskalić (then President of the Serbian Central Committee), calls whose apparent innocence disguised an implicit questioning of the relative independence from central Serbian control of the two Autonomous Provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. At the time of the 12th Congress of the LCY in June 1982, General Nikola Ljubičić, the new State President of Serbia, threatened to reduce the constitutional prerogatives of the Kosovo, while an overt anti-Albanian bias, widely visible in the Serbian media, also found its way into the Party position adopted on Kosovo at the Congress.

* Of some possible significance for the nature of Markovic's views is the fact that in 1979 he authorised an 'extended recollection' of the first Serbian Rising in 1804, to commemorate its 175th anniversary.
Despite the official view that the events in Kosovo must not be permitted to induce 'Albanophobia', and that Serb and Montenegrin chauvinism should also be castigated, Serbian politicians, while passing over in silence the question of the grounds for justifying the denial of republic status to Kosovo, have continued to voice the need for ethnocentric strong-arm tactics in re-assuming control of the province. Nikola Ljubičić has been particularly prominent in this respect. He has repeatedly stressed the need to re-establish the unity of Serbia, which he argues is crucial to the unity of Yugoslavia, according to means 'as in a time of war with the enemy'. Particularly noteworthy was his advice to a group of Serbian veterans who approached the Republican leadership concerned with the events in Kosovo. His advice to the group was to put 'affairs in order yourself - don't wait for the official call'. Such vague but nevertheless detectable condoning of Serbian nationalist activism would do little to dissuade Albanian Kosovars that the LCY was failing to restrain the tendency to ethnocentrism of the Serbian Party organisation. The LCY did, however, ultimately react. 

Evidently seeing Serbian nationalism as one aspect of a wider phenomenon, the LCY issued a declaration in early 1983 to the effect that 'the most dangerous counter-revolutionary tendency today [is that] all nationalisms are operating more or less through legal institutions - most of all in education, culture and the press ...' While the declaration did not include any condemnation of the Republican political systems, the concern of a number of non-Serbian LCY politicians with Serbian behaviour has become evident. Thus, at the April 1982 (26th) Plenum of the LCY Central Committee devoted to 'political-ideological problems', Dušan Popović accused the Serbs of 'again' trying to impose unitarism and centralism on Serbia (i.e. on its two Autonomous Provinces), a charge Tihomir Vlaškalić attempted to deflect by denying that the Republic was 'returning to the nationality policy of the past'. Similarly, LCY President Mitja Ribičić made critical allusions regarding the Serbian leadership in relation to the anti-Albanian biases noted above in the wake of the 12th Party Congress. 

Criticism of Serbian biases has also come from some of that Republic's politicians. In October 1982, Špiro Galović (member of the Presidency of the Serbian Party) criticised the fact that in Belgrade, attacks were heard more frequently on non-Serb nationalisms than the
domestic variety. 'The present open battle with Albanian nationalism should not mean we [in the Serbian Party] close our eyes to Serbian nationalism', he claimed. More recently, in June 1983, two Serbian Party Organisations charged with examining inter-national relations emphasised the dangers of both Serbian revanchism, and - an allegedly often ignored form of Serbian nationalism - separatism.

The view that Serbian nationalism became a prominent feature of that Republic's media output would seem to be borne out by a survey of newspaper and journal articles which appeared in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. This first became evident in mid-1981 with such publications as Enver Hodžina Albanija, which contained statements expressing low esteem for the national achievements of the Albanians. Meier, citing this work, alludes to the fact that the League of Prizren is portrayed as useless, and that the Albanian national hero Skenderbeg is a figure of 'minor historical significance'.

In mid-1982, however, the major issue in the Serbian media, the reporting of which expressed national bias, became the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the Kosovo. While the issue was, as Bavrić Jovanović stated in Iluckovana Politika, 'long a taboo subject' for fear of inflaming national passions, from September 1982 onwards the Serbian press devoted a great deal of attention to the issue. While the press coverage was not generally overtly nationalistic (there were some exceptions, for example, the publication by Politika of a plea by the Serbian Orthodox Church for protection from the Albanian nationality), its detailed reporting of the dimensions of the exodus, the nature of the harassments directed at the Serb community, and the personal suffering experienced by those forced to leave contradicted the official principle that news reporting should never deviate from attempting to inspire feelings of 'brotherhood and unity'. In addition, the Serbian reporting revealed biases in avoiding the discussion of the recently curtailed privileges enjoyed by the Serbs in the Kosovo, and failing to be critical of residual Serbian chauvinism in the province. Not surprisingly, the latter themes, together with the issue of Albanian migration from other parts of Yugoslavia to Kosovo, dominated the Albanian-language reporting in the Enver Hoxha's Albania.

+ The Albanian nationalist movement originally founded in 1878 to resist the decision of the Congress of Berlin to cede a number of Albanian districts to Montenegro.
province. As Louis Zanga has observed in relation to political debates concerning the issue in the province,

The most frequently heard disagreement between the two sides is the charge by the Serbs that their Albanian counterparts tend to "minimise" the question of migration, while the latter claim that the other side tends to "dramatise" the problem. Clearly the concentrated Serbian reporting of the issue unambiguously represented a 'dramatisation' of the (undeniably dramatic) phenomenon.

However, the concern with the fate of the Serbs in Kosovo has been only one aspect of a wider recent concern for things Serbian in the media, a concern which has focussed particularly on Serbian historical and cultural achievements, and which has often been expressed in an intemperate and jingoistic style.

Particularly noteworthy in this connection has been media attention to epic Serbian achievements in the First World War. Thus, in October 1982, a prominent article in Politika in commemoration of the 66th(!) anniversary of the Serbian army's withdrawal to Corfu is permeated with praise of the qualities of the Serbian soldiers ('marvellous blokes, those Serbs!'), which included gratifying compliments from the enemy ('... they knew how to defend their country!'). At the same time, Politika also published a several part series concerned with the early days of Serbia's confrontation with Austria-Hungary in World War I, partly using reprinted articles from the pre-war Politika, written in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first battles of the war between the Habsburg Empire and Serbia. Both the contemporary and (as might be expected) pre-war articles abound in references to the 'glorious' Serbian soldiery, and sympathetic references to their flamboyant jingoism, expressed, for example, in the title of one of the articles, taken from a Serbian song of World War I, 'Come on Hun, Take a Look at What Mettle Serbian Tekeriš is Made of'. The series concluded with an account of the Battle of Cer, which resulted in a Serbian victory ('the first Allied victory of World War I'), the liberation of the Serbian town of Šabac, and the temporary eviction of the forces of Austria-Hungary from the territory of Serbia. The series openly expressed pride in the quality of Serbia's resistance to the might of the Dual Empire.

* 'Dodji, Švabo, da vidiš šta je srpski Tekeriš!' Tekeriš is a town in Serbia around which a battle was fought.
Numerous other articles have also appeared devoted to the military accomplishments of both individual Serbs and the nation as a whole.\textsuperscript{256} These are matched by articles stressing the traditional cultural pre-eminence of Serbia. Thus, material in commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the Serbian school in Trieste stressed at length the Serbian migrants' significant contribution to the cultural and economic development of the city.\textsuperscript{257}

In response to such trends, as well as the implicit attacks on Serbian nationalism directed at the Serbian Party Organisation, the media have also contained more broadly directed criticism. An officially commissioned analysis of Serbian media commentary on Kosovo reported in October 1982 that

\begin{quote}
certain articles and programmes brought out emotions, inflamed nationalist passion and provoked cases of Serbian nationalism. While this picture ... was not dominant it has brought about negative political consequences on a wider scale, and caused harm.\textsuperscript{258}
\end{quote}

Also, journalists were reminded of the contribution required of them to 'brotherhood and unity',\textsuperscript{259} while criticism of alleged Serbian nationalism in specific literary works was stepped up.\textsuperscript{260}

The concern in Serbian public and intellectual life for the fate of the nation, supported by circles influential in the Serbian media if not the highest levels of the LCY, was matched by the simultaneous resuscitation after early 1981 of a form of 'Yugoslavism' which often contained clearly assimilationist overtones.

This trend emerged following the publication of the results of the 1981 census in which a significantly greater proportion of the citizenry defined itself ethnically as 'Yugoslav' (Meier on the basis of this feature of the census raises the question of whether pressure was exerted on individuals to thus identify themselves).\textsuperscript{261} Certain Croatian intellectuals, notably Dušan Bilandžić, were quick to condemn the finding, identifying such 'Yugoslavism' as an attempt to demote the importance of ethnic affiliation, and pave the way for 'integralist' or assimilationist Yugoslavism, the version identified with 'Illyrianism' and the nationality policies predominant from 1958 to 1964.\textsuperscript{262}
Equally quickly, numerous apologists for the trend responded that 'Yugoslavism' did not suggest Party-sponsored incipient assimilation, as claimed in certain quarters, but rather the laudable 'feeling of belonging to the Yugoslav socialist community'. On this basis the concept was praised, and a campaign was launched in order further to revive the concept. Thus, at the July 1981 Plenum of the Serbian Party Central Committee, two speakers called for a 'practically grounded Yugoslavism', while it was lamented that after 1971, 'with the throwing out of unitarism, we also drew out every form of Yugoslavism'. In line with this concern, later plenums of the Serbian Central Committee called for more inter-republican cultural co-operation, while more 'Yugoslavism' in particular, and ideological work in general, was called for in universities. However, the campaign soon integrated into the concept more than simply loyalty to the state based on the 'feeling of belonging to the Yugoslav socialist community'. A number of intellectuals, while making the assurance that there was no contradiction between 'Yugoslavism' and ethnic affiliation, criticised the low level of inter-ethnic cultural contact in Yugoslavia. Thus, Stipe Šuvar stressed the broad similarities of Serbian and Croatian culture in Croatia, and urged the Croatians to end the 'walling off' of the Serbs by making greater efforts to learn the Cyrillic script, for example. Stojan Djordjić called for more 'cultural unity' through greater exposure of the arts and letters of individual nationalities throughout the country, a task for which, he declared, literary criticism held great responsibility. Political, artistic and individual parochialism was attacked in general.

Taking such calls somewhat further, such writers as Muhamed Kešetović and Tomislav Ognjanović stressed the inevitability of national 'drawing together and integration' on the basis of technological progress. However, two spokesmen were permitted to come particularly close to the advocacy of an 'integralist' brand of Yugoslavism. Firstly, Predrag Matvejević argued for a 'real' Yugoslavism in which the 'Yugoslav cultural mosaic should be the basis of our further progress'. Arguing on the grounds that 'Yugoslavism' in culture was necessary for cultural development, Matvejević called for the abandonment of 'cultural keys', since 'not everything can be of value'. Similarly, Zorana Sinaković, commenting on the finding that one-third of Belgrade's high-school students identified

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* The 'ethnic key' in the Yugoslav context refers to the principle of equal ethnic representation in a given institution.
themselves ethnically as 'Yugoslavs', approvingly quotes Radomir Rakić to the effect that the students' choice is justified since they are simply attempting to 'build up their identity and sense of community'.

Conclusion

In the introduction to this part of the study it was argued that those who have addressed the issue of the relationship between communist Yugoslavia and Serbian nationalism have fallen into two camps. On the one hand, official Yugoslav writers, with the concurrence of many Western observers, have argued that post-war Yugoslavia has represented the most profound contrast with its Serbian-dominated, Royalist predecessor: ethnic equality, it is claimed, has been proclaimed in theory and achieved in practice. Thus, any 'communist nationalism' - official or officially sanctioned behaviour on the part of the Party-State apparatus in which biases towards a historically or demographically dominant ethnic group (in this case Serbia) are evident - in the history of the new Yugoslavia is denied. By contrast, a group which may almost exclusively be described as Croatian nationalists has refused to acknowledge serious differences in the national policies of the pre- and post-war states: Serbian dominance and biases in favour of the Serbs in communist Yugoslavia, they claim, are comparable to both the pre-war state and the position of Russia in the Soviet Union.

The preceding analysis has attempted to argue that both of the above characterisations of the problem are simplistic and inaccurate. In fact, the attitude of the Yugoslav communists to a Serbo-centric 'communist nationalism' has varied significantly from one period to another. Thus, during the 'National-Liberation Struggle', despite a disproportionate Serbian contribution, the communists' doctrinal internationalism, reinforced by their observation of the disastrous consequences of Serbian hegemony for the old regime, led them to develop a form of propaganda which paid meticulous care to the principle of ethnic equality (which was generally matched by their behaviour) in order to induce 'brotherhood and unity' in the struggle against non-Yugoslav forces. This policy was adhered to in the setting up of the post-war state in as far as the principle of formal ethnic equality was concerned. However, evidently in part at least out of a desire to 'win over' Serbia to the new order, Serbian domination of the political system was reinforced by a number of
constitutional, symbolic, territorial and cultural biases. Following the split with the Cominform, however, Yugoslavia embarked on a long if uneven road of institutional devolution, transferring power from the Serbian-dominated centre to the various Republics and Provinces. While the favouring of Serbian interests was still evident until the early 1960s, from this point onwards, devolutionary reform of state and party structures (a process confirmed by the purging of the Serbian 'centralist' Ranković) significantly emasculated the Serbian centre and introduced a degree of genuine federalism. The quickening pace of decentralisation in the mid-1960s also coincided with the abandonment (for the time being) of 'Yugoslavism' interpreted as cultural integralism, a policy perceived by non-Serbs as congruent with the assimilation of the smaller units by Serbia. Finally, from the Cominform split onwards, official policy rarely deviated from vilifying manifestations of Serbian nationalism. This policy was dictated as much by a need (particularly in the early years) to distinguish Yugoslav national policies from those of the similarly multinational 'Stalinist' and 'dogmatist' Soviet Union, as by the need to maximise the allegiance of all ethnic groups, in a situation of grave peril for the state, by minimising any perceptions of national favoritism.

After the process of devolutionary institutional reform which came to an end with the purges of the Republican leaderships in 1971-72, the recentralisation of the Party and the extension of its social role did not involve the reinstitution of Serbian biases, as might be assumed would have occurred with a still disproportionately Serbian membership of the LCY. However, since 1980, while the LCY continues its policy of dissociation from and vilification of Serbian nationalism, the Serbian Party organisation (and media), under the stimulus of the rise of anti-Serbian Albanian nationalism in Kosovo and the passing of the restraining hand of Tito, have increasingly associated themselves with Serbian nationalism, a process which has coincided with the re-emergence of advocacy in certain quarters of an integralist form of 'Yugoslavism'.

Thus the two periods in Yugoslavia's post-1941 history when communist power has linked itself to Serbian nationalism in any significant sense, or resorted to 'communist nationalism', are the immediate post-war period, and since the death of Tito. Obvious differences, however, distinguish the two cases: in the former, the institutional actor was the highly
centralised Communist Party of Yugoslavia, whereas in the latter it was the League of Communists of Serbia, whose behaviour has been viewed with suspicion by the LCY (or at least its non-Serbian leadership). By contrast, the periods of greatest political and symbolic restraint of Serbia have been at times when the Yugoslav communists, headed by Tito, confronted actual or potential hostility to their power: from 1941 to 1945 from the Axis powers, and following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, from the Soviet bloc. During these periods, communist dissociation from any form of Serbian favoritism has been a key feature of propaganda (symbolised by constant official attacks on Serbian nationalism) even though objective political or other biases may have favoured Serbia (as in the period from 1948 to 1964).

We must conclude that despite apparently powerful disincentives, the Yugoslav Party (or in the case of the 1980s, the Serbian Party) has, at times, resorted to 'communist nationalism'. As to the question of the competing explanations of 'deradicalisation' and 'temporary opportunism', the latter would appear to be a likely element in any explanation of the concessions to Serbian national feeling in the years up to the Cominform split following the war: in order to legitimate the new order in the eyes of the Serbs, certain (relatively parsimonious) concessions in the first years of its existence had to be made in their favour. A degree of simultaneous 'delegitimation' of the new order in the eyes of non-Serbs may have been regarded as a matter of little concern given the extensive armed power of the new state. However, an additional element in any explanation must be the fact that the Communist Party contained numerous Serbs in whom an 'internationalist' outlook remained relatively under-developed, and who, consequently, thought in terms of compensating Serbia for her suffering, and punishing Croatia for its sins.

While the post-split decades continue to reveal objective biases in favour of Serbia (both inherited from Partisan recruitment patterns, and in the call for a form of 'Yugoslavism' which would consolidate the various nationalities), the need to induce loyalty to Yugoslavia encourages the rhetoric of fraternalism and ethnic equality, and sensitivity to overt displays of Serbian nationalism which could potentially sabotage such claims. Clearly, such a policy had much to do with the figure of Tito, who pursued the highly rational policy, from the point of view of not
destabilising communist power in Yugoslavia, of preventing the CPY (later LCY) from being associated with any one nationality, and whose unchallenged charismatic power was able to restrain the various Yugoslav nationalisms through persuasion, intimidation and, if need be, purge. The consequence of his death which had the greatest bearing on the concern of this study has been the LCY's subsequent inability to restrain manifestations of Serbian nationalism - not to mention nationalisms of other varieties - both within the Serbian Republican Party and in the media.

While the fact that the unrestrained behaviour of the Serbian Party coincides with the severe economic difficulties experienced by Yugoslavia as a whole in recent years makes a 'deradicalisation' hypothesis tempting, insufficient time has passed to confirm whether this is indeed a plausible explanation for its recent behaviour. In the meantime, and judging by past such behaviour in Yugoslavia, the 'tactical' explanation would appear to be the most persuasive.

In conclusion, the case of Yugoslavia - unlike those of the USSR and the GDR - simply does not reveal any long-term or sustained shift on the part of the authorities to attempting to associate the state with the dominant ethnic group. Like the GDR, Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of such an ideological shift. While certain biases have continually served to associate Yugoslavia with Serbia more than with any other Republic, and pressure has frequently been applied for more movement in this direction, any buckling to such pressure or recognition of the Serbs as the Staatsvolk has usually been perceived by the leadership (particularly during Tito's lifetime) as politically suicidal, and has therefore been prevented. The perception by Yugoslavia's non-Serbs of Serbian political, cultural and economic privilege has in fact led to the condemnation of Serbian 'hegemonism' as a leitmotif of Yugoslav political life as well as extreme caution (usually resulting in abandonment) with theories of ethnic convergence, as 'Yugoslavism' has usually been interpreted (by non-Serbs). The two aberrant periods in which the phenomenon of 'communist nationalism' comes out into the open somewhat in the history of the post-war State - immediately after the war and since Tito's death in relation to Kosovo - suggest (with the qualifications outlined above) 'tactical' explanations.
Chapter V: Notes


6. Ibid.

7. Paraphrased by R.F. Miller, 'Tito as Political Leader' in Occasional Paper (no. 14), Canberra: Department of Political Science, R.S.S.S., A.N.U., 1977, p. 54. Research has revealed no references to Serbia being described in official sources as either the 'leading republic' or the 'elder brother'.


10. 'Versailles Yugoslavia', called until 1929 the 'Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes', amounted essentially to Serbia writ large. The at first constitutional monarchy was placed under the Serbian Karadjordjevo dynasty whose monarch was also head of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Taking the view that the peoples of Yugoslavia were 'three tribes of one people', King Alexander, soon after the establishment of his new realm, referred to the 'inclusion of the remaining South Slav lands of the Kingdom of Serbia', and announced the new state's constitution on Serbia's national holiday, St. Vitus' Day, in 1921. For the entire inter-war period the state machinery remained heavily dominated by Serbs: Borowiec states 'in 1939 Serbs occupied all posts in the Office of the
Kingdom's Prime-Minister, 89% in the Ministry of the Interior, 96% in education. Of 165 army generals in active service at the outbreak of war, 161 were Serbs, 2 were Croats, and 2 were Slovenes'. (Op. cit., p. 34). In attempting to account for the uncompromising thoroughness of Serbian dominance of pre-war Yugoslavia (mitigated somewhat by the 'last ditch' 1939 Cvetković-Maček Agreement, granting a measure of autonomy to Croatia), historians have pointed to the Serbs' highly developed sense of imperial mission as the 'torch-bearers of Slavism' in the Balkans, a history as a centralised nucleus to which territories were added, and a strong collective consciousness of Serbia's medieval power and glory, combined with a desire to 'avenge Kosovo' by regaining that former glory. See Duncan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia, London: Cambridge U.P., 1980, chapter 2; Ferdo Čulinović, Nacionalno pitanje u jugoslovenskim zemljama, Zagreb: Biblioteka instituta za historiju države i prava na pravnom fakultetu u Zagrebu, 1955, pp. 9-10, 15; Denitch, op. cit., pp. 105-7; Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, Trowbridge: Macmilian, 1976, p. 229; Shoup, op. cit., p. 11; Svetozar Marković, 'Neodrživost mpanarhističkih težnji za stvaranjem Velike Srbije', in Miloš Nikelić, et. al., eds, O nacionalnom pitanju: Zbornik tekstova, Belgrade: Sedma Sila, 1967, p. 70; Dimitrije Tucović, 'O zajednici ravnopravnih balkanskih naroda', Ibid., pp. 75-6; Stevan K. Pavlovitch, Yugoslavia, London: Ernest Benn, 1971, pp. 57-8; Ivo J. Lederer, 'Nationalism and the Yugoslavs', in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds, Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969, p. 424; Lendvai, op. cit., p. 170; Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

11. Josip Broz Tito, 'Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji u svetlosti narodno-oslobodičke borbe', Proleter, XVII, December 1942 (16). See also Tito, 'Došlo je vreme da se svaki narod u Jugoslaviji ponosi velikim slavnim tradicijama svoje braće', in Nikelić, op. cit., p. 227, and 'Brastvo i jedinstvo ne sastoji se od raznih parola nego se ispoljava u svakodnevnom životu, ibid., p. 228. For similar views from other Yugoslav communists, see for example, Mita Miljković, 'O položaju nacionalnih manjina u narodnoj republici Srbije', Crvena Zastava, 2 (October), 1948, pp. 29-31; and Jovan Marjanović, 'Politika KPJ u nacionalnom pitanju', Komunist, 16 April 1959, p. 5.

12. See Patrick Moore, 'Tito and the National Question', Radio Free Europe Research Bulletin, 5 May 1980, p. 17. For other references to the CPY and the Comintern policy on the national question in Yugoslavia, see Frankel, 'Communism and the National Question...', loc. cit., p. 51; Wayne S. Vucinich, 'Nationalism and Communism', in Vucinich, ed., op. cit., pp. 241-3. It should be pointed out that the policy of equality, brotherhood and unity specifically excluded one national minority, the Volksdeutsch. See Miljković, loc cit., p. 35; Shoup, op. cit., p. 75.


14. This was largely due to Croats fleeing Četnik reprisals for Ustaše atrocities. Dalmatia was occupied by Italy, and Četnik forces held freer reign there than in the NDH. See Lendvai, op. cit., pp. 64-5; Shoup, op. cit., pp. 66-7, 94.
15. Lendvai, op. cit., p. 64.


17. For Serbian biases in Partisan behaviour in the early years of the struggle, see Shoup, op. cit., pp. 68-70. Such nationalist outbreaks should not surprise us, given, as Shoup recounts, that little attempt was made by the Partisan leadership to alter the regional loyalties of the bulk of the troops, beyond developing a sense of tolerance toward other nationalities. Given the widespread ethnic bigotry of peasants, this was a constant impediment to the implementation of the spirit of 'brotherhood and unity'. See Shoup, op. cit., pp. 64, 94-5.


23. See Tito, 'Concerning the National Question and Socialist Patriotism', in J.B. Tito, Selected Speeches and Articles 1941-1961, Zagreb: Naprijed, 1963, p. 98; 'U čemu je specifičnost oslobodilačke borbe i revolucionarnog preobražanja nove Jugoslavije', Komunist, 1, October 1946: Moore, loc. cit., p. 19. A recent official Yugoslav publication even claims that the 'brotherhood and unity' of Serbs and Albanians (of whom the latter fought against the new order until well after the conclusion of the war) was 'forged in blood in the course of the NOB'. See Velimir Popović, ed.-in-chief, Events in the SAP of Kosovo: The Causes and Consequences of Irredentist and Counter-Revolutionary Subversion, Belgrade, 1981, p. 10.


28. Lendvai, op. cit., p. 150. After the fall of Ranković, Lendvai cites the Belgrade weekly journal Ekonomsa politika as admitting the heavily Serbian bias of the Belgrade state administration. See ibid.


30. See Tudjman, op. cit., pp. 120-1.


33. Ibid., see also Shoup, op. cit., p. 117.

34. Tudjman, op. cit., pp. 115-16.

35. Singleton, op. cit., p. 234.

36. Ibid.


38. Ibid.


40. This much was admitted by the LCY after the 1966 'Brioni' Central Committee plenum that ended Ranković's career, including his virtually personal rule over the region. See Mark Baskin, 'Crisis in Kosovo', Problems of Communism, March-April 1983, p. 20.


42. The furthest the CPY went in attempting to inculcate a sense of all-Yugoslav consciousness in the immediate post-war period was Tito's call for mutual pride in the achievements of the various nationalities, and lauding projects which involved a multinational workforce. See Tito, 'Došlo je vreme ...', and 'Bratstvo i jedinstvo ...', loc. cit. Shoup notes in this connection,

'On the one hand, cultural freedom was circumscribed by ideological considerations which sharply limited the extent to which national figures (especially those of the recent past) could be held up for praise and emulation. On the other hand, cultural autonomy took
on special importance under the Communists because of the absence, in the postwar period, of national (Yugoslav) cultural and scientific institutions ... To have placed more emphasis on Yugoslav themes in the fields of culture and education would have run the risk of associating the Party with the practice of cultural and national assimilation, and this the Communists were determined to avoid at all costs.'

op.cit., p. 123.


45. Raditsa, loc. cit.

46. Ibid.


49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. See Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 270. Vucinich states that at the time of writing (1973), 'there is much resentment in certain circles, especially among the Croats, against the use of Serbian as the language of military command. The military establishment has refused to yield on this point ...' ibid.


59. Ibid., p. 151.

60. Ibid., pp. 163, 169.
62. Ibid., p. 166.
65. For a good account of the similarities with and differences between the Yugoslav and Soviet models of Marxism-Leninism, see Miller, 'Tito as Political Leader', loc. cit., p. 41.
68. Miller, op. cit., p. 6.
69. Ibid., p. 7; Frankel, 'Communism and the National Question', loc. cit., p. 56; Shoup, op. cit., p. 188.
70. Miller, 'Tito and the Development of Yugoslav Socialism', loc. cit., p. 27. See also Miller, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
71. Frankel, 'Federalism in Yugoslavia', loc. cit., p. 430.
72. Lendvai, op. cit., p. 144.
73. Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 495; Lendvai, op. cit., p. 145.
74. Shoup recounts that, for example, republican communist parties were set up in Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina, while certain aspects of a dual-language administration in Rijeka (to cater for the local Italian minority) were introduced, op. cit., p. 140.
76. Pavlowitch, op. cit., p. 169. Shoup recounts that prior to the establishment of the Assembly 'steps were taken to encourage exchanges and end duplication, partly through establishing co-ordinating bodies in various educational, scientific, and cultural fields'. The Assembly was formed 'as a co-ordinating body among the autonomous cultural societies of the republics'.
78. See, e.g., Boris Ziherl, 'Komunizam i otadžbina', Komunist, 3 (May) 1949, esp. p. 61; Čolaković, loc. cit., p. 49; Čulinović, op. cit., p. 18.

79. Shoup, op. cit., p. 198; Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 278.


82. Quoted in Frankel, 'Communism and the National Question ...', loc. cit., pp. 55-6.

83. Alexander notes that the pressure on the Catholic Church in Croatia peaked in 1951-52, a period which immediately precedes the severing by the Vatican of diplomatic ties in 1952. Shoup notes that these years also coincide with a campaign against Islam. However, as Singleton recounts, with the passing of the 1953 law on religious organisations, the situation with regard to the Serbian Orthodox Church and Islam improved, while the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia remained relatively worse until the 1960s. See Alexander, op. cit., p. 135; Shoup, op. cit., p. 109; Singleton, op. cit., p. 203.

84. Shoup, op. cit., p. 189. Shoup also notes that when Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža wrote an article 'mildly critical of Belgrade' in 1952, the journal in which his article was published, Svedočanstvo, responded with two articles permeated with Serbian nationalist defensiveness. The journal 'ceased publication soon after this affair'. Ibid., p. 190.


87. Ranković, op. cit.


90. Ibid., p. 20.


92. Rusinow, op. cit., p. 134. Vucinich notes that 'there is a widespread belief among the Croats ... that the Belgrade-to-the-sea railway is being built across the Sandjak and Montenegro to satisfy Serbian pride, and that economic considerations dictated a route through Croatian territory instead. Specifically they see no reason for building a port on the Montenegrin coast. The
defenders of the Belgrade-Bar railway reply that the line provides the shortest connection between the country's heavily industrialized capital and the Adriatic Sea, thereby reducing transportation costs, that it will increase tourist trade because it crosses a spectacular part of the country, and that it will ameliorate conditions in some of the most underdeveloped regions in the country'. The railroad was ultimately completed in 1976.

96. Pash, op. cit., p. 159.
98. Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 263.
100. Pavlowitch, op. cit., p. 283.
103. Rusinow, op. cit., p. 133.
104. Miller, op. cit., p. 9.
106. Lendvai, loc. cit., p. 159.
107. For commentary on the 1965 Reform, see Miller, 'External Factors ...', loc. cit., p. 25; Hondius, op. cit., p. 320; Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 266.
108. Miller says of the 1963 Constitution, 'the elaborateness of the new assembly system attracted a good deal of attention abroad, but the practical impact of the 1963 Constitution was on the whole minimal. Economic and financial power was still concentrated in the hands of the federal bureaucracy and other central agencies; and the resurgence of political conservatism and secret police repression in the context of suddenly improved Yugoslav-Soviet relations created an atmosphere that was decidedly uncongenial to the realization of even the limited elements of devolution and democracy contained in the new Constitution'. Ibid. For other commentaries on the 1963 document, including on the reintroduced right of secession, see Viktor Meier, 'Yugoslavia's


111. Ibid., p. 309; Miller, 'Tito and the Development ... ' loc. cit., p. 30; Miller, 'External Factors ... ' loc. cit., p. 25.


114. Lendvai, op. cit., p. 15.


116. As Shoup argues, 'At the Third Plenum of the Central Committee held in March 1966, at the height of the struggle over the issue of economic reform, Ranković had spoken unequivocally on the national issue, castigating nationalistic manifestations in Serbia. Apart from Ranković's actions in defence of what he conceived to be Serbian national interests in refusing to carry out the reforms aimed at liberalizing the economy in the summer of 1966, there was no concrete proof forthcoming that he had acted contrary to the spirit of the Party's national policy prior to his disgrace'. op. cit., p. 225. As Pavlowitch notes, there were clearly other plausible reasons for the purging of Ranković: notably he could serve as a useful scapegoat for the difficulties involved with the Reform, while many of his actions suggested rivalry with Tito. See op. cit., p. 311. However oversimplified the official accusations of 'Serbian nationalism' were, there was clearly a widespread feeling among ordinary Serbs that Ranković stood for Serbia's national interests. See Lendvai, op. cit., p. 16: Ströhm, op. cit., pp. 257-8.


119. Shoup, op. cit., pp. 201-7; Kardelj, 'Kritika staljinove teorije nacije', (from 'introduction' to Razvoj ...) in Nikolić et al, eds. op. cit., p. 34.

120. Shoup, op. cit., p. 206.


122. Shoup, op. cit., p. 207; Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 256. Dušan Bilandžić recently claimed that certain circles at the Seventh Party Congress intended to 'liquidate' the nations. See 'Plima deklariranih Jugoslavena', Vjesnik, 8 May 1982.
See, for example, Enver Redžić, 'Jedan prilog marksističkoj 
teoriji nacije', Pregled, X, nos. 11-12, (Nov.-Dec.), 1958; 
Latinka Perović, 'Neke pretpostavke integracionih procesa u 
kulturi i nacionalne kulturne vrednosti', in Nikolić et al, eds., 

op. cit.

See esp. Jovan Marjanović, 'Politika KPJ o nacionalnom pitaju', 
Komunist, 16 April 1959, p. 5; 'Prilog uzačavanju jugoslovenstva 
See also Shoup, op. cit., p. 201.


Lendvai, op. cit., p. 154.

Tito, 'Jačajući naše jedinstvo mi moramo stvoriti svoju jugoslovensku 
socijalističku historiju', and 'Mi sada stvaramo jednu 
opštijugoslovensku socijalističku kulturu', in Nikolić, et al. 
eds., op. cit., pp. 229, 231.

Tito, 'Mi Sada stvaramo ...' loc. cit., p. 231.

Tito, 'Mi nastojimo i radimo na tome da svaka republika misli u 
Jugoslovenskim razmjerama', in Nikolić et al, eds., op. cit., 
pp. 231-2.

Shoup, op. cit., p. 224.


Hondius, ibid.

Ibid., p. 316.

Milentije Popović, 'O medjunacionalnim odnosima i o nacionalizmu' 

Ibid., p. 119.


Vucinich, op. cit p. 279.

Ibid. p. 280.

Vaso Bogdanov, Porijeklo i ciljevi Sovinističkih teza o držanju 
Hrvata 1941, Zagreb: Historijski institut Jugoslovenske akademije, 

Shoup, op. cit., p. 200.

Komunist, 26 March 1964, p. 4.


144. Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 269.

145. Ibid.


147. Pash, op. cit., p. 179.


155. Ibid. See also footnote 175.


158. Walkin, loc. cit., pp. 55, 63.

159. Miller, op. cit., p.10.

160. Ibid.


162. Miller, 'External Factors ...', loc. cit., p. 28.


164. Ibid. In a further breaking of new ground, Republican Party Congresses were held prior to the Federal Congress in 1969. Tudjman, op. cit., p. 128.


Rusinow, op. cit., p. 246.
Singleton, op. cit., p. 235.
Rusinow, op. cit., p. 274.
Lendvai, op. cit., p. 167.
Rusinow, op. cit., p. 246.
Ibid.
Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 261.
Borba, 31 May 1968; Rusinow, op. cit., p. 246. It is also of significance, of course, that in addition to the numerous arrests following the 1968 disturbances in Kosovo, a number of the Albanians' nationalist demands were met, much to the fury of Serbian nationalists. These included the acceptance by Belgrade of the Albanian flag as Kosovo's symbol, the dropping of the Serbian 'Metohija' from the Province's name, and the agreement to set up a University in Priština. See Pedro Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1963-1983, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 159.
Besemeres, loc. cit., p. 17.
Rusinow, op. cit., p. 274.
Urošević, a 'People's Hero', was said to enjoy the support of the 'political underground', which was 'said to mean Serbian nationalists, former UDBA men and Ranković supporters, former supporters of the Cominform and other philo-Soviet elements, ex-Chetniks and those who really believed that self-managing market socialism spelled anarchy and neglect of underdeveloped areas, and that Yugoslavia needed a (Serbian) firm-hand rule to hold it together'. Ibid., p. 266. See also Wilson, op. cit., p. 192.
Pavlovitch, op. cit., p. 356.
Ibid., p. 357.
Ibid., pp. 357-8.
Miller, 'External Factors ...', loc. cit., p. 30.
Tudjman, op. cit., p. 131; Miller, 'External Factors ...', loc. cit., p. 30; Rusinow, op. cit., p. 283.
Singleton, op. cit., p. 230.
Ibid.
Carl-Gustaf Ströhm recounts that Nikezić had developed something of a reputation for dissenting from Tito's policies. Earlier, as Yugoslav Foreign Minister, he favoured closer ties with Western Europe and a policy of neutrality during the Six-Day war, in contrast with Tito. Later, domestically, he formulated the slogan of a 'Modern Serbia', planning to make the republic economically pre-eminent in Yugoslavia. Finally, shortly before his fall, he warned against the dangers of 'Stalinist' tendencies in the Party, op.cit., pp. 260-67.

For example, Borba claimed in its edition of July 12, 1972, that 'one of the difficulties in the struggle against Greater Serbian Nationalism has been the fact that in Serbia unitarism has never been considered as nationalism'. Quoted in Bertsch, loc. cit., p. 15.


Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 276. Vucinich also notes that because of the delicacy of the issue, there was no official marking of the 50th anniversary of the formation of Yugoslavia in 1968. Ibid., pp. 280-1.

Rusinow, op. cit., p. 246.


Šime Djordan, 'Gdje dr Stipe Šuvar 'pronalazi' nacionalizam a gdje ga ne vidi', Kolo (7), 1969, p. 697.


Lendvai, op. cit., p. 167.

Ibid. Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 271.


Vucinich, loc. cit., p. 271.

Ibid.
202. For example, see Politika, 10 December 1971, attacking the 'well-known' Serbian painter, Milić of Mačva, who returned a letter sent to him by the National Museum of Valjevo with a covering note stating that: 'the Milić of Mačva Atelier receives no letter written in the Latin alphabet from the Socialist Republics of Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro or Macedonia... If you wish to write to me in the Latin alphabet, please do so from Croatia or Slovenia'. Singleton, op. cit., p. 230.


204. Petrovich, loc. cit., p. 127.

205. Ibid.

206. Ibid.

207. Pavlowitch, op. cit., p. 358.

208. Ibid.

209. Ibid.

210. Ibid., p. 356.


212. Miller, 'External Factors ...' loc. cit., p. 33.

213. Miller, op. cit., p. 29.

214. Ibid.

215. Ibid., p. 28.

216. Ibid.


218. Ibid., p. 141.

219. Ibid., p. 143.


224. Meier, loc. cit., p. 54.

225. See, for example, Prof dr Balša Špadijer, Federalizam i medjunacionalni odnosi u Jugoslaviji, Zemun: 'Sava Mihić', 1979, p. 20; Vladimir Dedijer, 'Yugoslavia Between Centralism and Federalism' in Dedijer et al. eds., History of Yugoslavia, New York: Maple Press, 1974, p. 533.


227. Meier, loc. cit., p. 54.

228. Robinson, op. cit., p. 60.


236. Ibid. See also Elez Biberaj, 'The Conflict in Kosovo', Survey, 1984 (Autumn).


238. The above-cited official view of the Kosovo appears to justify refusing Kosovo Republican status on the grounds that this necessarily excludes the interests of non-Albanians. Ibid., p. 20.


240. 'Dnevnik 1982: Nikola Ljubičić', Ilustrovana politika, 12.10.1982, pp. 8-9. The militant stand of Serbian veterans over the Kosovo crisis has been noted before. See Baskin, loc. cit., p. 72.


247. This was admitted in an interview with Bavric Jovanović, 'Čiji se planovi ostvaruju?' Ilustrovana politika, 12.10.1982, p. 10.


250. Zanga, 'Why are so many Serbs ...', loc. cit., pp. 3-5.

251. Ibid., p. 4.


254. Ibid., 15.10.1982.

255. Ibid., 18.10.1982.


263. See, for example, Svetozar Tadić, 'Ko je - Jugosloven?' Borba, 17.2.1981; Sergije M. Petrović, 'Sasvim normalna pojava', ibid., 22.7.1982.


268. See in addition to other sources cited, for example, Predrag Matvejević, 'Medjunacionalni odnosi u kulturi: Štur i neuverljiv govor o zajedništvu', Komunist, 16.7.1982, p. 17.


271. Ibid.

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to test two theories of the official propagation of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in Marxist-Leninist societies in the case of three such societies characterised by lack of congruence between the nation and the state – the USSR, the GDR and Yugoslavia. Given that considerations of methodology and space have excluded a consideration of all four available theories, the analysis has been limited to a testing of the two more widely encountered and influential of the four, 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical opportunism', distinct theories united by their positing of elite manipulation of extant mass national sentiment in communist societies. Bearing in mind these two theories, the study has attempted to throw light on the phenomenon as it manifests itself in each of the three states. In addition, given that it has been claimed that the extent to which communist states resort to the exploitation of nationalism may be related to the ethnic structure or 'situation' of such states, the study has attempted to throw light on whether the 'type' of state selected reveals common behavioural patterns. In this 'type' of communist state, we formulated a working hypothesis at the beginning of this study that officially sanctioned nationalism either would not be permitted or would be held on a tighter leash than in other Marxist-Leninist societies not characterised by such lack of congruence between the boundaries of nation and state. On top of the disincentive presented to all communist states – that nationalism conflicts with the internationalism and class analysis of Marxism, this would be due to the fact that (in the cases of the USSR and Yugoslavia) such behaviour would threaten to alienate ethnic groups other than the Russians and the Serbs, thus potentially destabilising the political system, and in the case of the GDR, because it would risk sustaining popular identification with a wider German nation which includes an entity beyond the state's borders perceived as committed to the GDR's destruction – the FRG.

The case of the USSR suggests that elements of both theories account for aspects of the use by the Soviet state of Russian nationalism,
but are also misleading and obscure important aspects of its exploitation as much as they are enlightening. Most importantly, they both overlook the fact that the USSR has exploited Russian nationalism only in the context of 'communist nationalism', it having been resolved by the leadership at a relatively early point in the development of the Soviet state that appeals to both Russian nationalism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism were necessary to ensure the survival of the state and its ruling élite. This doctrinal hybridisation has been retained since this decision, and continuity (rather than further 'deradicalisation' or dramatic 'tactical' oscillations) has marked the attitude of successive leaderships to the question.

In order to substantiate this position, the study has analysed the official Soviet view of the pre-revolutionary history and cultural heritage of the Russian nation, the USSR's nationality policies, and doctrine on the role and status of the Russian people vis-à-vis the other nationalities of the Soviet Union. These areas have been examined for the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras.

Chapter One argued that the Stalin era gives greatest support to the 'deradicalisation' model. The 'tactical' model, while partly useful in explaining the forms official nationalism took during the Second World War, fails to take account of the fact that the Soviet Union under Stalin resorted increasingly to Russian nationalism over the period as a whole. This argument is supported by demonstrating that from the late 1920s onwards, a tendency to promulgate Russian nationalist positions becomes increasingly apparent in the official view of the Russian people, and its history and culture. During the Stalin period overall, despite important shifts in the way the phenomenon is used, which coincide with particular political needs of the dictator, a gradual increase in the degree to which nationalism can be detected may be observed, both in the sense of increasingly dramatic departures from the relatively consistent 'internationalist' positions and 'class' analysis characteristic of the Soviet view of the world up to the late 1920s, and in the sense that the phenomenon 'infects' an increasing number of areas of the Soviet view of the pre-revolutionary Russian past. Crucially, however, this development
never signalled the unleashing by the Soviet communist state of a pure Russian nationalist ideology: analytic and doctrinal changes likely to appeal to Russian national sentiment were always balanced (even if not in the same text or immediately) with appeals to loyalty to 'internationalism', communism and the multinational Soviet Union. The official use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group - Russian nationalism - therefore emerged in the often absurdly contradictory form of 'communist nationalism'.

If the emergence of 'communist nationalism' during the Stalin period lends some support to the 'deradicalisation' thesis and somewhat less to the 'tactical' model, the cases of the subsequent Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, examined respectively in Chapters Two and Three, give markedly less credence to either of the two theories. In broad terms, both regimes manifest the continuity of Stalinist 'communist nationalism' which allowed them the option of either continuity with Stalin's broadly consistent (if occasionally fluctuating) pattern of Russian chauvinism, or reverting to elements of Leninist internationalism in the areas of policy which affected the non-Russian nationalities. Such a picture of broad continuity cannot, of course, sit with either the 'deradicalisation' or 'tactical' theories of the official exploitation of nationalism, in the latter case at least not always in the way in which it has been conceived by its proponents.

Most of the areas of analysis and activity which reflected the intrusion of Stalin's nationalism were retained by the successor regimes. Khrushchev and Brezhnev refrained from either abandoning in any lasting or significant sense Stalinist Russian nationalism, or from taking 'deradicalisation', as far as the use of Russian nationalism was concerned, further than Stalin had. The view of the Russian people as the Staatsvolk and Kulturträger, together with the official 'rehabilitation' of a positive view of most of Russia's pre-revolutionary history and culture remained unaltered - except at times when cosmetic changes were temporaril made for areas affected by de-Stalinisation (such as the issue of 'cults of personality' in the distant Russian past), and areas which touched on tactical attempts to curry favour with the non-Russian nationalities (such as the re-examination at times
under Khrushchev of Stalin's near-total apologia for Tsarist imperialism). Such symbolic acts of de-Stalinisation did not have any serious or lasting impact on the Soviet uses of Russian nationalism. Stalinist Russian nationalism was not followed by a reversion to consistent 'internationalism' and 'class analysis' of history and culture, which would have vindicated the 'tactical' model.

We have seen that the Khrushchev period, surprisingly, represents relatively unexplored territory for the student of the Soviet uses of Russian nationalism. Untested assumptions of 'decentralisation' accounting for the period are matched by the widespread opposite view that the years between the death of Stalin and October 1964 represent a period of significant revitalisation of more orthodox Marxist 'internationalism', and a concomitant reduction in the extent to which Russian nationalism could be found in Soviet pronouncements, at least compared to the previous Stalin, and the subsequent Brezhnev-Kosygin periods. Chapter Two argued, however, that despite Khrushchev's overall policy of attempting to reform the system built up under Stalin, the departures between 1953 and 1964 from the official Russian nationalism of the late Stalin period are at most marginal and temporary. Our survey of the official view of pre-revolutionary Russian history and culture, together with doctrine on the place of the Russian people in Soviet communism during these years, suggest that essentially, no substantial alterations to the 'communist nationalist' synthesis of Russian nationalism and Soviet Marxist 'internationalism' distinguish the Khrushchev from the Stalin regime. This is despite brief periods of 'radicalisation' up to 1956, which included, as mentioned above, certain cosmetic changes to Soviet historiographic policies, as well as Khrushchev's early 'liberal' policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Such shifts in policy had little serious or lasting impact on the Soviet uses of Russian nationalism. Continuity rather than change was the predominant characteristic of the Khrushchev regime in this area of its behaviour.

Such elements of 'radicalisation' as did temporarily emerge, moreover, gave way by the late 1950s to a reversion to Stalinist norms. The one significant sphere of Stalinist Russian nationalism which
reveals important policy differences under Khrushchev is that of the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. This institution, while retaining a number of its privileges vis-à-vis other organised religions in the USSR – thus suggesting the at least partial continuity of this component of Soviet 'communist nationalism' – experienced the same administrative and agitprop hostility to which all the religions of the USSR were exposed during the anti-religious campaign, part of the cultural dimension of Khrushchev's drive for 'full-scale communist construction' during the later 1950s and early 1960s. This aspect of Khrushchev's policies – particularly as it in part involved the neglect and even occasionally, the destruction of Russian 'monuments of culture' (a term which has always suggested many items associated with the Church) – lay him open to the charge of waging a campaign against the Russian people's heritage. This is despite the fact that such policies constituted an exception to the Party leader's overall retention (or reinstitution after initial changes) of Stalin's 'communist nationalist' synthesis. The charge was, nevertheless, vigorously exploited by those who succeeded Khrushchev.

Unlike the Khrushchev regime, however, the Brezhnev administration, as far as it is relevant to the concerns of this study, in addition to revealing broad continuity with its two predecessors, also lends support to the view that Marxist-Leninist regimes at times 'tactically' exploit the nationalism of their dominant ethnic group. As was argued for the analogous case of official tolerance of a relatively unadulterated form of Russian nationalism during the War, 'communist nationalism' may take the form of the state making such tactical concessions at times of perceived peril. The early years of the Brezhnev regime reveal that tactical concessions may also take place in a situation less drastic than military confrontation with the outside world. Such was the case after October 1964 when the new leadership attempted to consolidate support (or at least to minimise hostility) from key sectors of Soviet society. This included the attempt to curry favour with that element of the population which might be described as Russian nationalist in its concerns and attitudes.
Just as there is a widespread view that the Khrushchev regime in a serious sense abandoned the official use of Stalinist Russian nationalism in favour of a return to Leninist internationalism, the view is frequently encountered that the Soviet Union during the post-Khrushchev years proves the case for 'deradicalisation': that the Brezhnev regime presided over the movement towards an officially sanctioned less ideologically adulterated form of Russian nationalism as a means of legitimating Soviet rule in the eyes of the USSR's most important political 'constituency'. Chapter Three has attempted to demonstrate that it is true, in fact, that during these years, in contrast to the Khrushchev period, virtually no attempts were made to depart from the patterns established under Stalin (though there is some continuity with Khrushchevian policies of symbolic de-Stalinisation during the regime's early years). Indeed, the authorities continued undeviatingly to require the doctrinal dualism of 'communist nationalism'—those writing in official publications being regularly reminded that they were not, in discussing any aspects of Russia's history, culture or people, to forget the Soviet Union or Marxist-Leninist ideology. At the same time, policies, opinion and analysis likely to appeal to those concerned with the Russian national heritage—often balancing Russian nationalism with only the most tokenistic references to such institutions—emerged in additional areas of intellectual analysis and social activity under Brezhnev. In this sense, essentially Stalinist 'communist nationalism' combined tactically with somewhat populist overtones (the latter particularly marked in the VOOPIK phenomenon) is a characteristic of Brezhnev's eighteen year tenure as Party leader, in which a reaction to the (more perceived than real) 'national nihilism' against Russia of the late Khrushchev period resulted in the new regime's permitting, albeit guardedly, an active interest in Russia's pre-revolutionary historical and cultural monuments and non-Marxist moral and intellectual heritage, as well as a continuation of the essentially Stalinist (and Khrushchevian) 'communist nationalist' position on the history of the pre-revolutionary Russian state, the Russian language, and the nation's pre-revolutionary literature, music and art. The regime also attempted to distance itself from the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church carried out under Khrushchev, and practised a wide indulgence of the propagation of implicit anti-Semitism. Moreover, as during the Khrushchev period, after an initial period of 'liberal', somewhat more
'internationalist' policies towards the non-Russian nationalities (no doubt intended to secure the allegiance of the non-Russian elites to the regime), essentially Russian chauvinist assimilationist nationality policies analogous to those which held sway under Stalin and during the late Khrushchev years reappear. Similarly, following a brief lull at the beginning of the era, there is a reversion to a pattern characteristic of the Stalin and Khrushchev periods - the ritualistic praise of the implicitly superior and allegedly heroic characteristics of the Russian people, held to be exemplified first and foremost by its paramount contribution to the building and defence of Soviet communism.

None of this, of course, represented a further 'deradicalisation' vis-à-vis Stalin's use of Russian nationalism. All of the above aspects of the official exploitation of Russian national sentiment owed their origin to the Stalin period, the authorities requiring, moreover, the correct balance between 'nationalism' on the one hand, and 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis and evaluation on the other. The partial exception to this picture is the regime's indulgence of elements of more 'public' and spontaneous (and therefore less adulterated) Russian nationalism, particularly during the first years of its existence. This was particularly so in relation to the organised interest permitted in the nation's pre-revolutionary 'historical and cultural monuments', and non-Marxist moral and intellectual heritage. This indulgence, however, did not constitute further 'deradicalisation', but a tactical policy shift, no doubt part of a wider desire to consolidate support for the new regime from as many 'interest groups' as possible. The policy with regard to such groups was significantly modified after a number of years.

Such continuity under Khrushchev and Brezhnev has not been widely noticed and discussed and therefore is not the subject of competing theories. A plausible explanation which may be suggested is that Stalin's successors associated the retention of elements of Russian nationalism with the continued security of the Soviet state, Stalin's innovation in this area having shored up and possibly saved
the regime during the War. Moreover, since Stalin's time, institutional change has tended to be looked on suspiciously by at least a significant proportion of the Soviet élite. As Barghoorn has observed, Marxist-Leninist states such as the Soviet Union have tended to alter their behaviour (ideological and otherwise) only as a consequence of strong pressures or enticing opportunities. In addition, Stalin's 'communist nationalist' hybrid suggested its own retention. It was sufficiently flexible that the system could, depending on the political situation and the constituency addressed, give unusual stress to either internationalist loyalty to class and national equality (as happened spasmodically during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years), or adhere to the norm of expressing its particular concern for the Russians. Without 'communist' rhetoric, the legitimacy of the Soviet élite ruling in the name of Marxism-Leninism would be seriously undermined, while the removal of doctrines of internationalism that this would entail, would destroy the theoretical underpinning of the Soviet Union as a multinational entity. The complete abandonment of Russian nationalism for consistent 'internationalism', the ideology of the first decade of Soviet rule, on the other hand, would reduce the extent to which the Russians identified with the Soviet Union (an identification on which, the War demonstrated, the security of the regime in large part depended), thus potentially undermining the future survival of the USSR in the event of a confrontation with the outside world.

The case of the Soviet Union therefore demonstrates only the partial usefulness of the 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical' theories. In the early 1930s, at a time of intense and often violent social mobilisation, when armed conflict was expected with the outside world in the near future, the Soviet leadership hybridised its official ideology by adding to it elements of Russian nationalism, thus, no doubt, hoping for the greater commitment of the Russian people to the Soviet state.

The balance of 'communist nationalism' was permitted by the regime to tilt progressively further in the direction of Russian
nationalism until a point was reached at the end of the Stalin period where any further officially sanctioned implicit ideological contradiction with Marxism-Leninism might seriously threaten the legitimacy of the regime and therefore the security of its elite. Following this stage in the history of the recent Soviet state, the 'communist nationalist' synthesis is retained without further 'deradicalisation'.

Not only did 'deradicalisation' not continue following the Stalin regime, but the uninterrupted consistency of the Soviet state's use of Russian nationalism clearly cannot always be explained by the theory of 'tactical opportunism'. Nevertheless, the theory is enlightening as an explanation for two periods when the regime was evidently particularly anxious to establish itself as legitimate in the eyes of Russians - the Second World War and spasmodically throughout the Brezhnev regime. During these periods, more 'public' and spontaneous Russian nationalism, particularly in the sphere of letters, was permitted than when the regime presumably felt more secure. Moreover, the inverse of the 'tactical' use of Russian nationalism has been characteristic of the Soviet regime: the exploitation of Russian national sentiment having been an uninterrupted feature of its political behaviour since the early 1930s, the reversions to greater 'internationalism' and 'class' analysis would appear to be 'tactical' aberrations rather than the norm from which departures occur.

Chapter Four examined the case of the official uses of German nationalism in the GDR. It argued that certain aspects of the 'deradicalisation' approach are useful for an understanding of the phenomenon. The GDR having relied for the early part of its history on coercion, the propagation of official Marxist-Leninist legitimacy and, later, economic incentives in order to exact popular compliance, East German 'communist nationalism' emerged following decisions of the political leadership at the Ninth SED Congress in 1976. Unlike the case of the Soviet Union, this, indeed, occurred at a stage of the GDR's development which may be characterised as 'post-mobilisation' (a stage identified by certain 'deradicalisation' theorists as typical of the emergence of state-sponsored nationalism). Again in
according to a notion forwarded by at least one proponent of 'deradicalisation', evidence does suggest a link between these decisions and the decline in the functioning of such other potential generators of legitimacy as economic performance. There are few grounds for concluding that the new line was a temporary or 'tactical' ploy, reconfirmed as it was at the Tenth Party Congress in 1981 and unaltered since. However, as in the case of the Soviet Union, there is equally little evidence to suggest that the Party has permitted (or will in the future permit) the erosion of elements of the official ideology. The German 'nationalism' evident recently has been juxtaposed with vociferous affirmations of 'internationalism' and loyalty to the Soviet Union - even if the apparent differences which emerged between the GDR and the USSR over the former's 'mini-détente' with West Germany in 1984 suggest that theory (or rhetoric) and practice may not always necessarily coincide. East German 'nationalism' has been expressed in the context of 'communist nationalism'.

Chapter Five examined the case of Yugoslavia. Analysis of the extent to which the communist Yugoslav state has attempted to exploit the nationalism of its ethnic group with most claims to being dominant - in its case that of the Serbs - gives little credence to most of the would-be explanations of the phenomenon offered in the secondary literature. In general, the case of Yugoslavia - unlike those of the USSR and the GDR - simply does not reveal any long-term or sustained shift on the part of the authorities towards attempting to associate the state with the dominant ethnic group and therefore lends no credence to the 'deradicalisation' theory. Like the GDR until the mid-1970s, the case of Yugoslavia suggests that the officially recognised lack of congruence between nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of such an ideological shift. While certain biases have continually served to associate Yugoslavia with Serbia more than with any other Republic or nationality, and pressure has frequently been applied for more movement in this direction, any buckling to such pressure or recognition of the Serbs as the Staatsvolk has usually been perceived by the leadership (particularly during Tito's lifetime) as politically
suicidal, and has therefore been prevented. The perception by Yugoslavia's non-Serbs of Serbian political, cultural, and economic privilege has in fact led to a leitmotif of Yugoslav political life being the condemnation of Serbian 'hegemonism', as well as extreme caution (usually resulting in abandonment) in the handling of officially proposed theories of ethnic convergence such as 'Yugoslavism', which have invariably been interpreted by non-Serbs as presaging their cultural assimilation by Serbia.

In the history of the post-war Yugoslav state, there are two aberrant periods in which the phenomenon of 'communist nationalism' may be detected. The first is immediately following the Partisan victory in the Second World War when a number of (relatively parsimonious) concessions appear in favour of the Serbs, notably the ethnic breakdown of the Party-State apparatus, the territorial arrangements of the new state, its symbolic accoutrements, and cultural policies, particularly with respect to the treatment accorded the various churches of Yugoslavia. There were a number of factors which contributed to these concessions, but we may speculate that among them was the 'tactical' goal of 'winning over' the Soviet Union, and the need for state-wide solidarity. Such biases tended to be avoided and, up to the death of Tito, the practice of Yugoslav communism resembles, with some fluctuations and qualifications, the national equality preached. The second instance of protracted 'communist nationalism' in Yugoslavia relates to the lack of restraint of Serbian nationalist sentiment following the 1981 Albanian nationalist disturbances in Kosovo. While the fact that the unrestrained behaviour of the Serbian Party (not to mention the LCY) in this regard, coinciding with the severe economic difficulties experienced by Yugoslavia as a whole in recent years, makes a 'deradicalisation' hypothesis tempting, insufficient time has passed to judge whether this is indeed a plausible explanation for its recent behaviour. In the meantime, and judging by past such behaviour in Yugoslavia, the 'tactical' explanation would appear to be the most persuasive.

The cases of the official use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in the USSR, the GDR and Yugoslavia reveal that neither of the two theoretical explanations of the phenomenon tested in this study
is capable of accounting for the pattern or degree of its manifestation - either in any one state or comparatively. Nevertheless, elements of the two are useful and, indeed, essential to the explanation of such manifestations of the phenomenon in each individual state.

However, by means of a number of refinements and qualifications to the notion of 'deradicalisation', it is possible to offer certain cautious general conclusions on the basis of the foregoing study. The cases of the USSR and the GDR would suggest that in states characterised by a clearly dominant ethnic group, Marxist-Leninist movements which survive without 'remaking the world' do tend to undergo 'deradicalisation', or make an accommodation with the world as it stands. This process involves a reconciliation on the part of the communist state with elements of the political culture of significant groups in society, of which popular nationalist sentiment is frequently a characteristic (attempts to forge internationalist loyalty to class invariably having failed). Where such 'deradicalisation' occurs, one aspect of this development is therefore that a form of ideological dualism or hybridisation emerges, encouraging loyalty from the dominant ethnic group while at the same time retaining Marxist-Leninist ideology; this allows the state to shore up its legitimacy by harnessing traditional ethnic patriotism.

Yet 'deradicalisation' in a communist state cannot be a unilinear process culminating in the 'de-Marxification' of the state and its ideology as is claimed as likely by some observers. To assume this is to ignore the legitimating function of ideology as part of the imperative of self-preservation of ruling Marxist-Leninist parties. Ideological 'deradicalisation' reveals itself as a limited short-term, rather than a revolutionary long-term process, which accommodates national feeling to the greatest extent possible consistent with not allowing contradiction with the class and internationalist aspect of Marxist-Leninist ideology to be too self-evident or glaring. The case of the Soviet Union suggests that after this process of ideological transformation has been completed, successive regimes tend to be persuaded of the desirability of the retention of 'communist nationalism', and it becomes a norm of the political scene. Elements
of official nationalism may be apparent not only in the 'post-mobilisational' phase of a communist state's development, but can be detected at any stage in its life other than the immediate period after its birth, when there tends to be a wholesale rejection of the pre-revolutionary national historical and cultural heritage, other than those pre-revolutionary trends or events associated with the national group concerned which could be seen as precursors of the revolutionary transformation (peasant rebellions, the activities of certain pre-revolutionary 'democrats' and the like).

The process of 'deradicalisation' implies that 'communist nationalism' comes to be used in such states consistently and uninterruptedly. Nevertheless, the Soviet case in particular suggests that within this context there may be times when more 'public' and spontaneous nationalism may be temporarily tolerated. Such fluctuations suggest the partial veracity of the 'tactical' model, positing as it does greater concessions to popular attitudes at times when the Party leadership feels particularly insecure.

There is, moreover, little apparent correlation between the ethnic structure of the three countries studied and the level of likelihood of their resorting to appeals to the nationalism of their dominant (or single) ethnic group. Of course there are obvious differences in the ethnic 'situation' of the three states. The USSR and Yugoslavia are both multinational states, but whereas in the former the 'dominant ethnic group' has historically been the most powerful in political and economic terms (as well as in demographic terms for most of this century), its equivalent in the latter, Serbia, constitutes ethnically the country's largest minority (as opposed to the Russian majority), is economically less developed than large areas of the country, has far more limited experience of dominating its multinational 'empire', and, moreover, has been more vigorously opposed by a relatively strong rival to an extent never encountered by Russia. The GDR, by contrast, is in ethnic terms virtually homogeneous, a state which, however, despite the protestations of GDR ideologists, remains part of a wider German nation. Irrespective of these differences, however, the three states share a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries
of the nation and the state, a situation in which, we might hypothesise, a degree of restraint would be displayed in the extent to which nationalism was exploited. Matching this hypothesis, Yugoslavia has generally regarded it as essential to prevent any identification between the state and the dominant ethnic group of Serbia. Likewise the GDR desisted from attempts to encourage feelings of German nationalism until the mid-1970s, or for so long as the authorities encouraged a view of the nation as wider than the state. To exploit elements of nationalism, the GDR leadership had to attempt to destroy the sentiment of ethnic community with areas outside the state. Few such inhibitions have appeared to affect the various leaderships of the Soviet Union after the first one and a half decades following the Revolution.

The differences - particularly between the cases of the USSR and Yugoslavia - suggest that the Soviet state can afford to take risks in officially exploiting the nationalism of its dominant ethnic group which Yugoslavia would not, because, despite elements of apparent similarity, Russian demographic, geographical, historical and cultural dominance of the Soviet and Tsarist empires has been decisive to a degree never experienced by Serbia within Yugoslavia. Such differences have, of course, been reinforced by the fact that Stalin introduced elements of Russian nationalism into Soviet ideology, and the Soviet system has remained very largely the one established by the dictator. Moreover, this same system was arguably saved by the state's exploitation of Russian nationalism during the Second World War. By contrast, the legitimacy of the Yugoslav communists has traditionally been built on the Party's multinational credo in a part of the world renowned for the extreme and destructive nationalism of its politics.

With the above refinements and qualifications, the notion of 'deradicalisation' has much to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of the official uses of nationalism and internationalism in communist states, except those without a decisively dominant ethnic group such as Yugoslavia, where protracted attempts to exploit the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group would no doubt ensure the opposite of 'system maintenance'.
Appendix 1917-1928: Leninist Internationalism in the Soviet Union

One of the characteristic features of Marxist-Leninist societies is the existence of an official view, or 'line', on all social phenomena. It is thus possible in such societies to distinguish between abstract dogma on a particular question (which may, of course, change) and specific writings, which may or may not reflect the guidance of the relevant dogma. The case of the relationship in Soviet writings between the 'nation' and related abstract concepts on the one hand, and specific historical nations, such as 'Russia' on the other, is a case in point. The significant feature of the first decade of Soviet rule in this regard is that the conceptual approach of the official ideology to the question of the nation, and officially sanctioned views on the Russian people and its history and culture, are broadly consistent.

This, of course, was but one aspect of the internationalism of the early Soviet state. As Sergius Yakobson has observed, for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the nation had no intrinsic value. It represented, rather, an 'instrument in the struggle of the world-proletariat for freedom, and a transitional stage to a higher super-national order'. Accordingly, a large part of the energy of the Soviet state (at least until the triumph of the policy of 'Socialism in One Country' in the mid-1920s) was devoted to its 'foreign policy' - the promotion of world revolution through Zinov'ev's Comintern. It was consistent with this political atmosphere that the treatment of the issue of the nation - be it Russia or the other nations of the USSR - in historiographic and cultural policies was made to conform with the principles of internationalism.

Marxist dogma holds that a pre-socialist nation is an entity characterised by generally irreconcilable antagonisms, both internally, and in its relations with other nations. It thus exists in an international environment of which the salient principle is violence. Nations, internally riven by class warfare, reflected in antagonistic class-based cultures (rather than a 'national culture') and the absence of a genuine 'national interest', are divided in the international arena into the predatory and the enslaved. A socialist nation is thus an entity essentially distinct from its capitalist predecessor. To convey an impression of historical or cultural continuity between the two is fundamentally inconsistent with this view.
In keeping with this approach, wherever possible the early Soviet state attempted to avoid potential areas of symbolic continuity with the pre-revolutionary regime. Thus the exclusion in 1922 of the name of Russia from the new official state title, 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'. Similarly, 'patriotism' was acceptable only as loyalty to the state on the grounds of its socialist, revolutionary character. This view may be summarised by the words of Education Commissar Lunacharskii in 1923:

> The teaching of history which would stimulate the children's national pride, their nationalistic feeling, and the like, must be banned, as well as such teaching of the subject which would point at stimulating examples in the past for imitation in the present. For I do not know what kind of a thing is a healthy love for one's fatherland. Let us look at things objectively and recognise that we need internationalist, universalist education.3

Similarly, the Entsiklopediia gosudarstva i prava, published between 1925 and 1927, claimed that 'patriotism in our times plays the role of the most reactionary ideology, whose function is to justify imperialist bestiality and to deaden the class consciousness of the proletariat, by setting impassable boundaries to its struggle for liberation'.4

In the area of historiography, while published writings were by no means ideologically homogeneous until the administrative arrangements of 1928-29 (which followed politically from the formation of the Association of Marxist Historians in 1925) effectively prevented the continued professional existence of the remaining 'bourgeois' historians, the dogma set out above concerning the nation may be taken as an accurate guide to the officially sanctioned orthodoxy during the period. This was the ideological position of the 'school' of Mikhail Pokrovskii, Vice-Commissar for Education, which held political sway until the mid-1930s.5 In addition, the teaching of Russian history up to the period of the rise of the Russian labour movement was characterised as all oppression and misery, or ignored.6

If the central assumption of a Marxist historian is that the salient principles of pre-socialist history are antagonism and violence, his method of investigation is 'to identify the system of production and
the class relations that form its substructure within the framework of historical materialism, and to relate this substructure to the political and social superstructure'.

To this analytic task, the Pokrovskian school added to the historian's duties that of the evaluation of past events and figures as either 'progressive' or 'reactionary'. Thus, despite the fact that, in a general sense, the Marxist views all pre-socialist history negatively, in the class struggle which has existed throughout human history 'except at its extreme chronological ends', he sides with those forces that, put crudely, represent the future. Hence, he may legitimately side with feudal or bourgeois forces, evaluating them as 'progressive' or 'reactionary', depending on the particular historical context.

That being said, early Soviet historiography reveals a tendency to debunk the pre-revolutionary past rather than engage in careful scholarly analysis within the Marxist framework. Such 'debunking determinism' can be found in a number of areas of Soviet historiography during this period.

In the area of the history of the pre-revolutionary state, the approach of the Pokrovskian school was, accordingly, economic determinism at an analytic level, combined with a good degree of emotional hostility. The role of the individual in history was denied or minimised. Later Stalinist heroes such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great were interpreted simply as representatives of classes, rather than as independent historical movers, although their personal qualities were variously evaluated by different authors. Indeed, Stalin himself stated at the time that Peter the Great was but 'a drop of water in the sea', who, if he had achieved anything, was motivated purely by class selfishness 'at the expense of the serf peasantry'. Along with a generally critical attitude to the development and expansion of the Muscovite state, such areas as Byzantine studies were pilloried as Tsarist ideological weapons 'in the struggle for the straits'. 'Bourgeois' interpretations of the wars of the Russian state as instructive national epics were ridiculed. Taking the view that wars were merely clashes between antagonistic groups of exploiters, historians attempted to remove the mystique from such conflicts as that of 1812 between Russia and Napoleonic France. Pokrovskii, dealing in passing with this struggle...
in his Diplomatiiia i voiny tsarskoi Rossii XIX stoletiia (1924) and Russkaia istoriia s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei (1924-25), argues that Russia was to blame no less than France for causing the conflict, and that Russia's military, headed by the onetime national hero Kutozov, was in any case unimpressive.13

In accordance with this attitude, the desecration of former monuments to national glory was permitted by the regime. The battlefield at Borodino is a case in point. In 1938 Pravda reported that under the influence of such cynical attitudes to Russia's past, the monument to Bagration had been sold as scrap iron, reliefs on the monument to Kutuzov had been vandalised, the celebrated church on the battlefield had been demolished, while on the wall of a former monastery, a sign had been placed reading 'there is no need to take care of the remnants of the accursed past'.14

As to the evaluation of the Tsarist state as a colonial power, and the position on the relationship between nationalities in the pre-revolutionary period, the Revolution was regarded until the Stalin period, as Lowell Tillett observes, as 'the dividing line between darkness and light'.15 Stalin himself observes during this period (in an article published in 1919) that Tsarist colonialism had 'aroused in the peoples of the East a feeling of distrust and hatred for everything Russian'.16 This spirit is amply reflected in Pokrovskii's writings on Russian imperialism17 during this period. Seeing only the most base and primitive motivations for the acquisition of empires, Pokrovskii rejects the possibility of any pre-revolutionary 'friendship of peoples', or 'voluntary unions' with Russia. Allowing no benefits for the colonised or mitigating circumstances, he has only contempt for the Russian conquerors, whose cultural level he assesses as usually below that of their victims, and respect for the indigenous defenders. If anything, following Marx, he regards the Russian empire as marginally worse than others, as his relatively favorable comments concerning the British in India would suggest.18 As might be expected, this extremely negative evaluation of the Russian empire, combined with the spirit of anti-imperialism which was still influential, meant that any and all resistance to Russian colonialism was judged 'progressive'.19
The spirit of internationalism was also the cardinal principle in the area of cultural policies in the early years of the Soviet state. Taking the view that the Russian cultural heritage (aside from what could be identified as the 'workers' culture) was irrelevant, if not dangerous, to the needs of a revolutionary society, the cultural establishment which held sway during the first fifteen years or so following the Bolshevik Revolution attempted to set about reforming the outlook of the citizenry. As Bukharin declared at the Thirteenth Party Congress, 'the outcome of the Revolution ... hangs on our ability to mould the younger generation into material capable of constructing a socialist economy and society'. In this enterprise, the manifestations of culture permitted by the state could clearly be crucial in delaying or hastening a socialist outlook.

In the areas of art, literature and music, resources and official approval were granted to schools which broke drastically with 'bourgeois' tradition, and gave emphasis to a spirit of change and revolution. In September 1918, the 'Proletkul't' was formed with the task of 'working out a new proletarian culture'. In line with this, Maiakovskii's 'Futurists', as well as the later 'Fellow Travellers', frequently expressed aggressive contempt towards classical Russian culture. As Maiakovskii declared during the Civil War, 'guns have been placed everywhere, but why has Pushkin not yet been attacked?' The lack of awe before the Russian literary heritage is also reflected in the fact that at the end of the 1920s, a proposal to abandon the Cyrillic alphabet and replace it with a Latin one was seriously considered.

Similar iconoclastic radicalism, which had first appeared in the immediate pre-revolutionary period, gripped the world of art, where such groups as the Cubo-Futurists and the Suprematists vied with one another for the more fundamental break with the 'bourgeois' past. Government support meant that products of the new schools replaced pre-revolutionary works in museums. Similarly, the field of music was dominated by such modernist experimentation as the Persimfany (orchestras without conductors), 'noise' instruments and 'noise' orchestras (which imitated the sounds to which the proletariat was accustomed), and the experimental Association for Modern Music.
NEP induced some changes in the cultural scene in the Soviet Union: the State Publishing House had to meet its costs by publishing more popular and accessible works than could be supplied by the various schools of modernist writers, while pre-revolutionary art could again be seen at exhibitions. Nevertheless, the Party Central Committee affirmed in 1924 that cultural leadership rightfully belonged to the proletariat, and that 'neutral' art could not be tolerated. This did not necessarily imply a consistently negative view of pre-revolutionary Russian cultural figures. Rather, where the works or studies of such figures - for example Pushkin or Dostoevskii - were published, writers had to concentrate on illuminating their 'progressive' sides, or at least place emphasis on elements in their work which vindicated Soviet Marxist ideology.

The Russian Orthodox Church, in some senses the most important and powerful symbol of pre-revolutionary Russian culture, came under even more vigorous attack than those elements mentioned above. Naturally, in the eyes of the Bolsheviks, the Church was not simply an aspect of pre-revolutionary culture, but an appendage of the Tsarist state responsible for the oppression of the proletariat, and an obstacle to the ideology of materialism. The Russian Orthodox Church, because of its close relationship with the pre-revolutionary order, was singled out for especially savage persecution. As Nicholas Timasheff, who has conducted a particularly thorough study of the experiences of the Church in Bolshevik Russia, has written, the state

... jailed and executed bishops, priests, and active laymen. It forcibly closed churches, desecrated objects of veneration, prohibited any kind of religious education and propaganda, as well as any kind of charitable, cultural or social activity on the part of the churches. It organised, on a large scale, antireligious education and propaganda of a highly offensive style. It ridiculed religion and associated it with the forces of political and social reaction. In 1923, it fostered the rise of the so-called Living Church, a schismatic movement in the midst of the Russian Orthodox Church. After the death of Patriarch Tikhon (1925) the Russian Orthodox Church was not permitted to elect a new Patriarch.
With regard to cultural policies towards the non-Russian nationalities, the official position during the early years was to allow, in accordance with the November 1917 Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, the fullest possible development of the culture of each nationality of the former Tsarist empire, most of which were to be granted a constituent unit of the federal USSR. If anything, because of the exigencies of the international political situation, the Bolsheviks looked with a more indulgent eye on the formerly oppressed non-Russian peoples of the empire than they did the Russians. This tolerance of cultural rights was particularly marked in relation to the Moslems of the Soviet Union after their various independence movements had been successfully subdued, mostly the case by the early 1920s. This tolerance, it was acknowledged, frequently meant that the policy of self-determination implied in practice tolerating the growth of minority nationalism. This was, of course, conditioned by the hope of this example inducing a revolutionary response in the Moslem East beyond Soviet borders, which would further weaken the bourgeois West, ripe, in the leadership's view, for revolution.\(^{31}\)

So radical were the cultural rights granted to such groups (which were not balanced by any cultural or linguistic policies aimed at imposing unity on the USSR) that it is possible to see in part a policy of transforming the Soviet Union into 'a miniature International'.\(^{32}\) Numerous languages, particularly in Central Asia and Siberia, were given a written form for the first time. In Moslem areas, this took the form of the introduction in 1922 of a modified form of Arabic, likely to appeal to Moslem nationalism. The Latin Script, earlier introduced as the written form of numerous non-Moslem languages, and the form of writing used by most of the world's proletariat, replaced Arabic as the written form of the Central Asian languages in 1926.\(^{33}\) Literary forms of previously discouraged or neglected non-Russian languages were rapidly developed, and were granted official status for use in the bureaucracy, courts, and educational institutions. In some instances it was clear that the policy was to make the various cultures and languages of the Union as distinct from one another as possible. Hence the attempt to make the Galician dialect of Ukrainian (the dialect 'furthest' from Russian) the official Ukrainian literary language.\(^{34}\) Mass literacy programmes were undertaken, while all available media were exploited to enable the use of non-Russian languages.
Such symbols of previous imperial domination as Russian street- and place-names were changed into the vernacular, while the policy of the official language of a territorial unit being that of its major ethnic group meant that there were cases of the denial of cultural rights to Russians in predominantly non-Russian areas. Finally, a greater degree of religious tolerance than had been shown in Russian Orthodox areas prevailed with regard to the non-Russian nationalities (especially those who practised Islam) until the latter part of the decade.

As to the official position on the role of the Russian people relative to other groups in the Soviet Union, a general scorning of notions of Russian superiority or 'special contribution' to the USSR or Marxism is characteristic of this period. This is indicated by vigorous attacks on 'Great Russian chauvinism' at Party Congresses up until the end of the 1920s (the Twelfth in 1923 is particularly noteworthy in this regard).

Thus, up until the late 1920s, the policies of the Soviet state with regard to the official portrayal of Russia's pre-revolutionary history, cultural heritage and people are quite consistent with its avowed policy of internationalism. The pre-revolutionary Russian state and empire are evaluated largely as is any other large, powerful, capitalist state: as an internally antagonistic, acquisitive polity, whose negative characteristics should be contrasted as starkly as possible with the state which emerged after the Revolution. Similarly, the Russian cultural heritage and institutions are persecuted or ignored, while the previously oppressed non-Russian cultures of the Soviet Union are encouraged to develop as rapidly as possible. If anything, because of the traditional privileges of the Great Russians, the first years of Soviet power reveal a certain prejudice and discrimination against their history and culture, as well as a constant alertness to the re-emergence of chauvinist attitudes, which allegedly persisted amongst them.
Appendix: Notes

1. Yakobson, loc. cit., p. 73

2. For example, Lenin, at the Seventh Party Congress in March 1918, stated that 'International imperialism disposing of the might of capital cannot co-exist with the Soviet Republic. Conflict is unavoidable, and here is the greatest difficulty of the Russian Revolution, its greatest historical task, that of provoking International Revolution'. V.I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. XXII, p. 37. As late as 1925 Zinov'ev reiterated the sentiment, stating 'We are the Party of World Revolution, not of the Russian Revolution'. XIV s"ezd Rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b), 1926, p. 354. Also on this question, see Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 151-56.


5. The end of the period of relative academic freedom for non-conformist historians was marked by the purge and internal exile of Platonov and Tarle. A collection of articles attacking their mistakes was also published. See Zaideman and Zwieback, Klassovnyi vrag na istoricheskom fronte, 1931. See also Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 244-49.


8. For a typical Soviet statement of the importance of such evaluation, see A.V. Piaskovskii's concluding remarks to the Second Tashkent Conference of Historians, quoted in Tillett, op. cit., p. 171.


10. For an example of early Soviet historiography which radically minimises the role of the individual in history (in this case Ivan the Terrible), see M.N. Pokrovskii, Russkaia istoriia v samom szhatom ocherke, Moscow, 1920, p. 44. See also Leo Yares, 'Ivan the Terrible and the Reforms of the Oprichnina', in Black, op. cit., p. 232; and Black, loc. cit., p. 253.

11. J.V. Stalin, Sochineniia, Moscow, 1946-51, vol. VIII, p. 120.


14. See Pravda, 31 August 1938. For similar articles, see Trud, no. 183, 1938, and Vecherniaia Moskva, 16 June 1939.

15. Tillett, op. cit., p. 11.


20. XIII s"ezdRossiiskoi kommunisticheskoipartii(b), 1925, pp. 538–9.

21. However, due to the arrogance and incompetence of most members of the organisation, Proletkul't was disbanded the following year, on the grounds that its members were needed for service in the Red Army. See Timasheff, op. cit., p. 261.

22. See ibid.

23. See ibid., p. 166.

24. See ibid., p. 265.

25. Ibid.


27. See ibid., p. 265.

28. See ibid., p. 262.

29. Thus, those poems of Pushkin's which were permitted were from the writer's early period, and praised freedom and revolt against tyranny. Similarly, such figures as V. Pereverzev could write about Dostoevskii, so long as the emphasis remained on the author's depiction of the suffering of oppressed classes. See his Tvorchestvo Dostoevskogo, Moscow, 1922, and the entry on Dostoevskii in the Literaturnaia entsiklopediia, Moscow and Leningrad, 1930, vol. III. See also John C. Fiske, 'Dostoevskij and the Soviet Critics', American Slavic and East European Review, vol. IX, no. 1 (February 1950).


32. Timasheff, op. cit., p. 186.


34. See Timasheff, op. cit., p. 186.

35. Proceedings of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, 29 July 1929. See also Timasheff, op. cit., p. 186.

36. As Rywkin states of Central Asia, 'considerations of local political opportunism have not been disregarded, however, and the religious issue has not always been pressed with the same determination. Religious toleration existed from 1917 to 1920 and, in somewhat curtailed form, lasted until 1928. Rywkin, op. cit., p. 91.

37. XII s"ezd Rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii, Moscow: Krasnaia nov', (November) 1923, pp. 645-7. See also Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 35, and Tillett, op. cit., p. 19.
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