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'Communist Nationalism' in the USSR, the GDR, and Yugoslavia: Three Case-Studies of Nationalism and Internationalism in Marxist-Leninist States Incongruent With the Nation

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University

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November 1985
Statement

I hereby declare that this thesis has not already been accepted in substance for any degree. It is the result of my own independent investigation, and all authorities and sources which have been consulted are acknowledged in the bibliography and notes.

Signed ..........................
To Zoë,

whose interest, patience and encouragement made perseverance possible.
History [in a Marxist-Leninist state] is the past seen in the light of present interests.

Frederick Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism*
Preface

All translations used in the text are my own except where specified. The various files of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe contain originals and translations of a large number of East European newspaper and journal articles, as well as relevant Western material in languages other than English. Access to these files has been an invaluable research aid, and where such translations have guided me to the originals, this is indicated in footnotes by the name of the article in question being cited according to the English translation used in these files.

For transliteration from Russian, the Library of Congress system without its three diacritical marks has been used.

My main thanks for help during the preparation of this thesis are due to my two supervisors, Dr T.H. Rigby and Dr R.F. Miller, both of the Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Over a course of four years, they have combined detailed and constructive criticism with constant encouragement. Not only have I greatly appreciated their efforts, I have been grateful for the privilege of working with two such stimulating individuals.

My thanks go to the Australian National University for supporting me on a Ph.D. scholarship between 1981 and 1984. Moreover, during this period, the Department of Political Science allowed me to undertake fieldwork relevant to the thesis in the USSR, West Germany, and Yugoslavia. I am most indebted to it for its generosity, which allowed me to gain access to a wide range of sources which would otherwise have been unavailable, and which also gave me the opportunity to discuss the thesis with a number of interested individuals outside Australia.

In this connection I would like to express my thanks to Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe in Munich, and in particular to Dr Keith Bush, Dr Roman Solchanyk, Dr Ronald Asmus, Mr Slobodan Stanković, and
Mr Martin Dewhirst. In Belgrade, my thanks go to the Faculty of Political Science of Belgrade University, which supported me on the basis of the Yugoslav-Australian Cultural Agreement while I undertook private research at the Serbian National Library. For their kindness and help during this stay I am particularly indebted to Dr Radoslav Stojanović and Professor Dr Balša Spadijer.

In Canberra, a number of other individuals assisted me with suggestions and comments at various stages of the project's development. They included Dr John Besemeres, Dr Stephen Fortescue, Dr Roger Hillman, Mr Kevin Jackman, Professor Eugene Kamenka, Mr William Maley, Mr John Miller, Mr Declan O'Connell, and Dr Andrzej Walicki. To all of them go my thanks.

I would also like to thank the Department of Foreign Affairs, and in particular Mr John Trotter, Assistant Secretary, Europe Branch, for granting me study leave to assist me in completing the thesis.

Finally I am indebted to the Department of Political Science, and especially Mrs Carol Beames, Miss Andrea Allen and Mrs Joy Brigstocke, for undertaking the onerous task of typing the final draft.

Any errors which remain, both of form and content, are of course my responsibility.
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Abstract

This study tests two theories of the official propagation of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in Marxist-Leninist states. Such nationalism is understood as the manipulation of a range of public pronouncements, most importantly on national history and the cultural heritage, designed to confer on states of this type 'nationalist' legitimacy. It focusses on three such states characterised by a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state - the USSR, the GDR, and Yugoslavia. The analysis tests the two more widely encountered and influential theories which attempt to account for this phenomenon, 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical opportunism', distinct models united by their positing of élite manipulation of extant mass national sentiment in communist societies.

Bearing in mind these two theories, the study attempts to throw light on the phenomenon as it manifests itself in each of the three states. In addition, given that it has been claimed that the extent to which communist states resort to the exploitation of nationalism may be related to the ethnic structure or 'situation' of such states, the study attempts to explore whether the 'type' of state selected reveals common behavioural patterns. In this 'type' of communist state, we might assume that officially sanctioned nationalism either would not be permitted or would be held on a tighter leash than in other Marxist-Leninist societies not characterised by such lack of congruence between nation and state. On top of the disincentive presented to all communist states - that nationalism conflicts with the internationalism and class analysis of Marxism, this would be due to the possibility that (in the cases of the USSR and Yugoslavia) such behaviour would threaten to alienate ethnic groups other than the Russians and the Serbs, thus potentially destabilising the political system, and in the case of the GDR, because it would risk sustaining popular identification with a wider German nation which includes an entity beyond the state's borders perceived as committed to the GDR's destruction - West Germany.

The case of the USSR suggests that elements of both theories account for aspects of the use by the Soviet state of Russian nationalism,
but that both are also misleading and obscure important aspects of its exploitation as much as they are enlightening. Most importantly, they both overlook the fact that the USSR has exploited Russian nationalism only in the context of 'communist nationalism', it having been resolved by the leadership at a relatively early point in the development of the Soviet state that appeals to both Russian nationalism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism were necessary to ensure the survival of the state and its ruling elite. This doctrinal hybridisation has been retained since this decision without essential changes, being marked by relatively stable continuity rather than further 'deradicalisation' or regular 'tactical' oscillations.

The case of the exploitation by the GDR of German national sentiment represents a more persuasive vindication of elements of the 'deradicalisation' thesis as argued by a number of its proponents, occurring as it does during the 'post-mobilisational' phase of the GDR's development, following the failure of other potential generators of legitimacy to produce enthusiasm for, or loyalty to, the state. As with the case of the USSR, and as we might expect, the official exploitation of the national sentiment of the population has been combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology, or taken the form of 'communist nationalism' rather than nationalism pure and simple. As hypothesised, the GDR desisted from attempts to encourage feelings of German nationalism until the mid-1970s, that is, so long as the authorities took the doctrinal position that there was a single Germany whose reunification should be striven for - or encouraged a view of the nation as wider than the state.

Communist Yugoslavia, where state-sponsored nationalism turns out to have been the exception rather than the rule, suggests that only the 'tactical' explanation may be satisfactory in accounting for the central leadership's occasional exploitation of, or acquiescence in, Serbian nationalism. Like the case of the GDR until the mid-1970s, the history of post-war Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of such an ideological shift.
The three case-studies reveal that theories of both 'deradicalisation' and 'tactics' as applied to the communist uses of nationalism are flawed and are not universally applicable. The study also reveals little apparent correlation between the ethnic 'situation' of the three states studied and the level of likelihood of their resorting to appeals to the national sentiment of their dominant (or single) ethnic group. Nevertheless, with the important exception of a communist state without a decisively dominant ethnic group such as Yugoslavia, the study suggests the at least partial accuracy of the central proposition of the 'deradicalisation' theory - that Marxist-Leninist regimes at some stage partially reconcile themselves to a range of traditional sentiments and attitudes, including nationalism, and attempt to cater for them in order to shore up their legitimacy. Aspects of the 'tactical' theory, by contrast constitute a useful description of the Yugoslav resort to 'communist nationalism', as well as fluctuations in the Soviet exploitation of the phenomenon.
Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to analyse and account for the phenomenon of the official uses of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in three Marxist-Leninist states characterised by a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state. After defining the key concepts used in the analysis, this introduction examines the range of available pertinent theories, sets out the arguments of the study, and elaborates the methodology of the thesis.

The first problem such an exercise must tackle is to define in what sense 'nationalism' is to be understood. According to the most influential existing definition, that of Hans Kohn, nationalism is a political creed that focusses loyalty on the nation-state either existing or desired. Yet because there has been a tendency to see the significant historical and sociological variant of nationalism as a spontaneous mass or intelligentsia-led social process, few writers have attempted to grapple with the form of the phenomenon inspired and directed by the state.

Nationalism has come overwhelmingly to be seen as a political creed which threatens, by treating as illegitimate, all polities where the nation does not coincide with the state. From its origins in the French Revolution, to its contribution to the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and West European colonial empires, nationalism has been seen as a threat to states which do not coincide with nations - either as a mobilisational tool of intelligentsias, or as a consequence of the spontaneous consciousness of wider classes. Hence, the study of the concept, despite the fact that it by definition embraces wider phenomena, has focussed largely on nationalisms which proclaim anti-status quo goals such as independence, unity, or national self-aggrandisement involving violence. This tendency has been reinforced by the emergence in the recent history of Western states of ethnic separatism, which, coupled with the nationalist movements characteristic of wide areas of the Third World, has given rise to a rich literature
concerned with the causes of the phenomenon. Seeking to understand why national self-consciousness grips certain groups at certain points in history, most modern theories have attempted to explain nationalism in terms of modernisation or 'social mobilisation' in the context of cultural pluralism, especially where such pluralism is juxtaposed with economic or other forms of inequality. As such, the study of nationalism has come to be identified with spontaneous social phenomena, and an anti-status quo creed. Hence we find that a recently published work entitled Nations and Nationalism restricts its understanding of nationalism to 'a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'.

Yet, it would seem, such approaches suggest the confusion of a part with the whole. As Henry Krisch has observed, numerous polities can be identified where 'nationalism' is an induced phenomenon, serving to integrate the populace in the interests of the political leadership. Indeed, such a writer as Paul Brass, writing on ethnicity in Northern India, has rightly reinforced the under-emphasised half of Kohn's definition by conceiving of nationalism as 'the process by which ethnic groups ... are mobilised for action to attain political ends'. Such 'nation-building' in the context of system-maintenance may variously take the form of the state attempting to build up a sense of national identity from a number of nationalities, identifying the state with one of a number of ethnic groups, encouraging a sense of national cohesion across class-lines in a nation-state, or attempting to destroy one sense of national identity and build up another.

'Communist nationalism' which, it is argued in this study, is the form of nationalism which invariably emerges in Marxist-Leninist states, is understood in this thesis as a variant of 'state' or 'induced' nationalism involving political manipulation by a Marxist-Leninist state, which must at the same time guard such elements of official ideology as 'internationalism' and the 'class' approach to the analysis of history and culture. It manifests itself as official, or officially sanctioned behaviour on the part of the Party-State apparatus in which biases towards a historically or demographically dominant ethnic group are evident (in the case of a multinational Marxist-Leninist state),
or where a 'class-based' view of the historical and cultural heritage partially disappears in practice, giving way to a more positive evaluation of the national past. 'Communist nationalism' means either that elements of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group are combined with at least pro forma acknowledgements of the importance of 'internationalism' and class analysis, or that more than usually unadulterated nationalism may be tolerated on tactical grounds for a time, to be followed by the inevitable reassertion of the need for more orthodox Marxist-Leninist elements in analysis and writing. 'Communist nationalism' is thus the bizarre welding of mutually exclusive world views into the state ideology of Marxist-Leninist regimes, or alternatively, the regular fluctuation between these world views.

Even the more casual observers of communist affairs tend to be aware of the fact that this form of nationalism has characterised the behaviour of many of the world's states which define themselves as Marxist-Leninist. It is well documented that where such regimes have come into existence, 'internationalist' attitudes of indifference or hostility to the pre-revolutionary history or culture of the nation (or predominant nation) concerned, while perhaps holding sway in the early period of revolutionary euphoria, has been the exception rather than the rule. Frequently, however, there is a tendency to conceive of such 'communist nationalism' as an aspect or manifestation of the more widely studied phenomenon of 'national communism', the term used to describe Marxist-Leninist regimes which have refused fully to support the Soviet Union internationally, a political choice which has usually (but not always) involved departures from the Soviet model with regard to internal policies. In a number of instances, policies or behaviour which we might define as 'communist nationalist' have indeed roughly coincided with international reorientations. The most celebrated case, of course, involves the Soviet Union itself. The emergence of the doctrine of 'socialism in one country' in the mid-1920s was followed only a few years later by the establishment of more traditional official views on Russia's people, history, and culture. In later years, the appearance of 'communist nationalism' also appeared to coincide in a number of instances with the assertion by a number of regimes of their independence from Moscow, occasionally to the point of isolationism.
While we should not ignore the occasionally manifest 'national nihilism' which in a number of instances accompanied charges of Soviet 'revisionism', the cases of China from the 'Great Leap Forward' onwards, Albania from the early 1960s, Romania from the mid to late 1960s, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge come to mind. Such a coincidence of 'communist nationalism' with 'national communism' has by no means always been the case, however, and the cause of the former is obviously not necessarily the latter. The case of 'national communism' par excellence - Yugoslavia - would appear to be the communist state least renowned for any tendencies towards 'communist nationalism'. Moreover, in the case of a number of allies of the Soviet Union - Poland, the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, North Korea, Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam, the close 'internationalist' relationship with Moscow does not appear to have inhibited officially sponsored nationalistic exploitation of the pre-revolutionary past designed to enhance the legitimacy of such regimes - or 'communist nationalism'.

It would appear that whereas the spread of 'national communism' is by no means inevitable while the Soviet Union remains convinced of the need for political satellites, 'communist nationalism' appears to be a virtually universal characteristic of Marxist-Leninist systems (the apparent exception being Yugoslavia). Why should this be so?

In attempting to account for the official use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group within a given Marxist-Leninist state, few disputes have emerged among observers concerning its function: there is a wide consensus (with one important exception) that the identification of nation and state serves to enhance political legitimacy. Early attempts at political socialisation failed to alter the political culture in the sense of forging loyalty to class, and the wider popular focus of political loyalty remained the nation. Hence, creating congruence between the 'official' and 'dominant' political cultures remained a powerful, if problematic, potential generator of allegiance to Marxist-Leninist regimes.
The major area of contention revolves around the question of the wider significance of the use by Marxist-Leninist regimes of 'communist nationalism'. Theorists of 'deradicalisation' argue that the development signals an irreversible reconciliation to a wider range of traditional values, which may even suggest the ultimate 'withering away' of the ideology of the regime and its transformation into a totally 'de-Marxified' nationalist dictatorship; by contrast the 'tactical' or 'temporary opportunist' approach argues that the phenomenon is a constant, even unremarkable, feature of regimes which will grasp any available ploy capable of shoring up the power of the Party. Once the need for such concessions is removed, so it is claimed, a reversion to ideological norms invariably occurs.

The major spokesmen for the 'deradicalisation' school have been Robert Tucker and Robert Wesson. They are united by the view that 'radical movements which survive without remaking the world tend to undergo deradicalisation', or make 'an accommodation to the world as it stands'. While Marxist-Leninist dogma continues to supply a legitimacy of sorts in such societies, the state in the post-revolutionary or -totalitarian-coercive stage can no longer be sure of the allegiance (or quiescence) of its citizens. Thus, runs the argument, all mature communist states increasingly attempt to secure the loyalty of their citizens by a number of means, of which the two most important are the replacement of idealistic collectivism with individualistic consumerism, and an increasing use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group at the expense of consistent revolutionary proletarian internationalism and the 'class' approach to history and culture.

The 'deradicalisation' process has been analysed by numerous additional observers whose phraseological apparatus varies, but whose message is essentially the same. Leszek Kočakowski notes the emergence of a 'real state ideology' which 'appeals to the attitudes, expectations and values that existed before anyone had heard of communism'. Both Peter Ludz and Victor Zaslavsky have argued the 'ficticization' of official doctrine, as the legitimising 'operating ideology', which includes nationalism, moves further away from orthodox revolutionary doctrine in the 'consolidating phase' of a Marxist-Leninist state.
Henry Krisch posits a transition from a 'heroic age' which stresses drastic social transformation in the service of millenarian goals to later post-mobilisational development marked by appeals to conservative values, while Maria Markus has stressed a growing body of 'covert' practices which constitute an attempt to confer 'traditional legitimacy' on Marxist-Leninist regimes.13

There appear to be two serious shortcomings with the 'deradicalisation' approach, as far as it has been developed. The first is that while it claims that ideological variations have occurred in the form of there being 'more' nationalism in the later, compared to the earlier periods in the life of communist states, no exponent of this approach has attempted to argue specifically what this means, or to 'operationalise' the argument empirically. While the school of interpretation may have much truth, the 'deradicalisation' approach clearly lacks a methodology for the investigation and explanation of ideological variations.

The second shortcoming is that while it suggests incremental change, the approach lacks an account of the limits of ideological change in Marxist-Leninist states, or the telos of such trends. This is aside from the prima facie implausible accounts of such observers as Yanov, Lendvai and Wesson, who forecast the evolution of such states into more conventional, authoritarian states which will at some stage shed their Marxist-Leninist baggage, and become de-Marxified nationalist dictatorships.14

According to the 'tactical' model, by contrast, the official use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group, rather than being understood deterministically as a symptom of a unilinear 'deradicalisation' process, is seen as a temporary weapon used by communist states in situations of perceived domestic or foreign threat. The classic formulation of this approach, stimulated by the Stalin experience, is that of Frederick Barghoorn:

When the Party feels strong, it tends, other things being equal, to reduce concessions to popular traditions and attitudes. It tends to broaden its symbolic and attitudinal base when it feels threatened.15
Analysts such as S. Enders Wimbush have continued to apply Barghoorn's model of the Soviet case, interpreting the various phenomena which fall under the rubric of the official uses of nationalism as 'temporary pacificers'. The model has also been applied, if somewhat more tentatively, to other Marxist-Leninist states, as in Bogdan Denitch's view that segments of the Yugoslav League of Communists 'may be willing to make occasional tactical alliances with national sentiment', despite the inevitable subsequent crackdown. Others, such as Andrew Janos, and George Klein and Milan Reban, have seen tactical 'ethnic pragmatism', or using nationalism at 'convenience' as a phenomenon applicable to communist states in general. Archie Brown has argued that it is crises, triggered by other stimuli, which produce such political situations 'in which the strength and direction of political change may be strongly influenced by the dominant - and no longer dormant - political culture'. While Brown's example is Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960s, this interpretation would also embrace communist states tactically employing nationalism (given that the 'focus of political loyalty' is held to be one of the elements of political culture).

Again, the problems this approach raises relate to the questions it does not tackle. Does the tendency to use the 'temporary weapon' increase as time goes on in Marxist-Leninist states, or after it has proven itself as a mobilisational tool, and at what point does 'temporary' or 'tactical' become, to all intents and purposes, permanent? Is the official use of nationalism as a temporary ploy equally available to all Marxist-Leninist states, or is it, again, related to the ethnic structure of a given communist state?

The above two approaches essentially argue that communist nationalism can be explained by political elites exploiting the extant emotional force of loyalty to the nation, which early attempts in the sphere of political socialisation did not succeed in eradicating. In the words of Henry Krisch 'in communist countries ... nationalism is the product of the decisions and attitudes of elites'. It is 'an induced, deliberately cultivated factor which serves certain interests of a political leadership'. Disagreement between the 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical' schools is restricted to the chronological pattern and
tendency of the phenomenon. However, a third approach sees a more active role played by mass sentiment, viewed as a fluctuating rather than unchanging phenomenon, and interprets the actions of the state as more reactive to the national mood than to internal or external threats.

Observers who support this interpretation, which we might term 'reactive acquiescence', point to an array of social, spiritual, and political stimuli which have aroused spontaneous nationalism, to which the communist state has, in turn, accommodated itself. In the case of the Soviet Union, numerous observers have attempted to account for the perceived re-emergence of official Russian nationalism, which coincided with the crystallisation of an unofficial Russian nationalist movement in the mid-1960s, in terms of this explanation. Jack Haney, for example, has pointed to social factors such as 'increasing industrialisation, pollution and the destruction of natural resources' as catalysts, while Roy Medvedev, Ludmila Alexeeva and Thomas Bird suggest as reasons growing apathy and disenchantment with official ideology, and a sense of 'spiritual and moral degradation'. Mary McAuley has pointed to a 'social identity crisis' where loyalty to class and state are no longer options, which is analogous to Gail Lapidus' view that Russian nationalism can be understood as a consequence of modernisation, ethnic affiliation providing emotional reassurance after the destruction of traditional social arrangements. John Dunlop finds the immediate cause in Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign. Spontaneous reaction to the threat of China, biological attrition revealed by the 1970 census results, and increasingly assertive minority nationalism have also figured in such explanations.

Similarly, Zeline Ward, in attempting to account for the emergence of official nationalism in East Germany, has pointed to the 'monolithic sameness of industrial technology' which affects 'most industrial societies'. Further, the view of communist nationalism as a spontaneous emergence 'from below' fits better with a frequently encountered interpretation of Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia - a phenomenon usually inspired among the broad intelligentsia in response to specific social and political catalysts, which, in turn, is tolerated for a time by the state apparatus.
On the face of it, such accounts would appear implausible. Aside from the fact that communist regimes must *ipso facto* at least appear to espouse and propagate an internationalist philosophy, which necessarily sees nationalism (as opposed to legitimate elements of 'national sentiment') as a dangerous survival of the pre-revolutionary order, such regimes have not been noted in their general behaviour for the co-opting of public opinion, particularly where such opinion is inconsistent with the state's avowed ideology.

A final approach which should be considered is that the official use of nationalism in Marxist-Leninist states is neither manipulative nor reactive, nor a combination of the two, but purely 'expressive'. Applications of this interpretation frequently refer to the case of Stalin. Robert Tucker, in his biography of Stalin as a revolutionary, argues that in his early years, Stalin's sense of 'historic mission' led him to make the 'requisite psychic break with his native Georgianness' and to identify himself with the wider revolutionary stage of Russia. Stalin, according to Tucker, consistently modelled himself, both intellectually and in a more general cultural sense, on the Russian revolutionary, of whom his ideal was Lenin. If the identification in his early years was with the revolutionary Russia, with the later consolidation of his personal power came a gradual identification with the Russian state, stretching deep into the pre-revolutionary past. Implying the same view that the official Russian nationalism which emerged under Stalin was a product of the General Secretary's identification with Russia's destiny rather than a conscious desire to manipulate the populace for other political ends, Adam Ulam asks rhetorically with reference to Stalin, 'Why the frantic Russian nationalism of his last years?' He answers:

This undoubtedly represented the final state of Stalin's own Russian chauvinism rather than a response to specific political needs or apprehensions [my emphasis]. To be sure, in the so-called Zhdanov campaign there was also an element of historical caution: the USSR had to be immunised against Western ideas so that such ideas would not corrupt Russia's intellectual elite as they had after another victorious war, that of 1812-1815. But these precautions were not connected to any fear for his own power, which at the time was threatened by only one enemy - old age.
The 'expressive' view is of particular importance since it is the only approach which does not assume that communist nationalism constitutes an attempt by the state to enhance its legitimacy by attempting to identify itself with the nation, either by unilaterally initiating nationalism, or permitting its spontaneous manifestation.

Given the influence of traditional views which until recently had it that the goal of legitimacy was of little importance to communist states, particularly during the Stalin period, the absence of an intention to legitimise the state (as distinct from whether the various phenomena which constitute communist nationalism functioned to legitimise it) is a possibility which should be considered. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that such an explanation conflicts with the fact that political élites, communist or otherwise, have generally been concerned above all with the preservation of their power, and hence have tended to tailor their political behaviour to this end. Furthermore, in communist regimes ideology has traditionally played a particularly important role in the rationalisation of the political system, so we would tend to assume that ideological changes would be carefully weighed up and considered rather than being subject to caprice.

We may conclude that the phenomenon of nationalism in communist states has been explained in three ways: as the product of élite manipulation of a constant, unchanging popular national sentiment (interpreted alternatively as either 'deradicalisation' or 'tactics'), élite reaction to a fluctuating national sentiment, or simply the expression of the national sentiment of the leadership without reference to mass sentiment.

Clearly it is not within the scope of a single thesis thoroughly to analyse the dynamics of this form of nationalism, and to make judgments on the available explanations for it, within the communist world as a whole. However, it is possible to throw light on the various forms of behaviour engendered in one 'type' of communist state. The fact that within the spectrum of communist states multinational Yugoslavia is the single country not renowned for attempting to achieve legitimacy by exploiting the nationalism of its dominant ethnic group, suggests that,
rather than correlation with 'national communism' explaining where we tend to find 'communist nationalism' (as opposed to the related but separate issue of how we explain the emergence of 'communist nationalism' in a given state), there might be a relationship between the extent of the use of the latter and the ethnic structure or 'situation' of a given Marxist-Leninist state. This possibility has in fact been suggested by Archie Brown. Brown argues that the extent to which nationalism is used in a Marxist-Leninist state may be related to how 'risk-laden' it is, which, in turn, is related to the ethnic structure of the society (that is, the fewer non-core ethnic groups within a state, the fewer the groups likely to be alienated by the particularistic ideology of nationalism). Brown argues that the other factor instrumental in determining the 'extent' to which a Marxist-Leninist state resorts to 'communist nationalism' is the degree to which it has satisfied the other principal indicator, in his view, of 'deradicalisation' - the attempt to appeal to individualistic consumerism. Although Brown argues that most communist states attempt to use both as means to legitimacy, he indicates that the case of the extreme nationalism (or 'communist nationalism' in the terms of this study) of Romania, for example, may in part be explained by that state's inability to meet the demands of consumerism.

In order to explore the possibility that the extent to which 'communist nationalism' is used in a given Marxist-Leninist state is related to its ethnic structure (or 'situation'), the 'type' selected for analysis in this study is that characterised by a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state, where we might hypothesise that a degree of restraint would be displayed in the extent to which nationalism is exploited. To this end, the cases of the USSR, the GDR and Yugoslavia have been selected for analysis. Of course there are obvious differences in the ethnic 'situation' of the three states. The USSR and Yugoslavia are both multinational states, but whereas in the former the 'dominant ethnic group' has historically been the most powerful in political and economic terms (as well as in demographic terms for most of this century), its equivalent in the latter, Serbia, constitutes ethnically the country's largest minority (as opposed to the Russian majority), is, economically, a less developed territory than large areas of the country, whose position of would-be predominance in the state
began far more recently, and, moreover, has been more vigorously opposed by relatively strong ethnic rivals to an extent never experienced by Russia. The GDR, by contrast, is in ethnic terms a virtually homogeneous state which, however, despite the protestations of GDR ideologists, remains part of a wider German nation. Irrespective of these differences, however, the three states share a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state, a situation in which, we might hypothesise, a degree of restraint would be displayed in the extent to which nationalism was exploited.

The question arises as to how the four 'theories' of communist nationalism, as set out above, can be tested in the three Marxist-Leninist states selected for comparison. With regard to the 'reactive' and 'expressive' models, the researcher strikes immediate difficulties. Both are based on sentiment and state of mind, either at the individual or mass levels, 'hard' evidence of which tends to be elusive even with regard to more open Western societies. To make out a case for either of these two models requires either detailed psychological study of individual communist rulers (such as Tucker's biography of the younger Stalin), or, in the case of the 'reactive' theory, concrete sociological analysis of a given society at a given time, using survey or other such data.

Neither of the above is attempted in the present study. What this analysis does attempt, however, is to judge whether the other two more widely encountered and influential theories positing elite manipulation of unchanging national sentiment can assist us towards an understanding of the communist uses of nationalism. They offer, by contrast, the possibility of their being tested by means of research involving relatively easily available documents. In the case of 'deradicalisation', if it proves correct, we should find not only the emergence of increasingly overt state-sanctioned nationalism, but evidence of an ever greater reliance by the authorities on the national sentiment of the major ethnic group under their control. If the 'tactical' model, by contrast, is an accurate guide, we should find an unchanging (rather than incrementally more extreme) official nationalism, but only occasionally and temporarily in situations of perceived domestic or foreign threat.
The four 'theories' of communist nationalism outlined above are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and it is certainly not the case that this complex phenomenon can be explained by a single factor which excludes all others. This study does not, therefore, attempt to judge definitively the correct balance of factors which have permitted the emergence of official nationalism in the three Marxist-Leninist states considered. Rather, it attempts to answer part of this question, and in so doing, to reveal some clues as to this aspect of the behaviour of such states in general.

Within these limitations, the study proposes the following arguments.

The case of the USSR suggests that elements of 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical opportunism' account for aspects of the use by the Soviet state of Russian nationalism, but are also misleading and obscure important aspects of its exploitation as much as they are enlightening. Neither draws out the fact that the USSR has permitted the exploitation of Russian nationalism only in the context of 'communist nationalism', it having been resolved at a relatively early point in the development of Soviet communism that appeals to both Russian nationalism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism were necessary to ensure the survival of the state and its ruling elite. This doctrinal hybridisation has been retained since this decision, without essential changes by successive leaderships.

The case of the exploitation by the GDR of German national sentiment represents a more persuasive vindication of elements of the 'deradicalisation' thesis as argued by a number of its proponents, occurring as it does during the 'post-mobilisational' phase of the GDR's development, following the failure of other potential generators of legitimacy to produce enthusiasm for, or loyalty to, the state. Again, however, and as we would expect, the official exploitation of the national sentiment of the population has been combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Consistent with our hypothesis of official restraint, the GDR desisted from attempts to encourage feelings of German nationalism until the mid-1970s, that is, so long as the authorities took the doctrinal position that there was a single Germany whose reunification should be worked for - or encouraged a view of the nation as wider than the state.
Communist Yugoslavia, in revealing state-sponsored nationalism as the exception rather than the rule, suggests only the 'tactical' explanation in the regime's occasional acquiescence in Serbian nationalism. Like the case of the GDR until the mid-1970s, the history of post-war Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of such an ideological shift.

The three case studies reveal that while elements of the two models analysed are useful and indeed necessary to an explanation of the phenomenon, neither is capable of accounting for the pattern or degree of its manifestation - either in any one state or comparatively within the 'type' selected. The study also reveals little apparent correlation between the ethnic structure - or 'situation' - of the three case studies and the level of likelihood of their resorting to appeals to the nationalism of their dominant (or single) ethnic group. The ethnic 'situation' of both the GDR and Yugoslavia appears to have been a decisive restraining factor in this area, in contrast to the markedly less inhibited behaviour of the Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, elements of the two theories are useful, and, indeed, essential to any explanation of the phenomenon.

To support these arguments, documents reflecting the official attitude to the chief spheres in which 'nationalism' and 'internationalism' emerge in the behaviour of each of the three communist states are analysed. The spheres which are most important in this connection are the official view of the pre-revolutionary history of the dominant (or single) ethnic group and of its cultural heritage. In addition, in the cases of the multinational states, the USSR and Yugoslavia, the 'internationalism' of nationality policies which genuinely attempt to cater for cultural equality may be contrasted with the 'nationalism' of policies which take less account of the rights of minority, or non-core nationalities, such as assimilationism. As such, it is hoped at least in part to correct the divorce observed by Mary McAuley, between those interested in nationalism and those interested in the nationality question in Marxist-Leninist states. In the Soviet case, official doctrine on the role and status of the Russian people in the USSR is also of importance.
The various regimes' view of the pre-revolutionary history of their dominant (or single) ethnic group, their cultural heritage, and, in the case of the USSR, doctrine on the role and status of the Russian people in the Soviet Union, are therefore analysed as the principal criteria in assessing the validity of the various theories of the official uses of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in the three selected case studies. Of course, the balance between nationalism and internationalism may also be observed in such areas as political practice, institutional arrangements and economic policies. Where it is considered appropriate in the course of the analysis, evidence relating to such secondary spheres is also presented.

The longer history of communism in the USSR by contrast with the GDR and Yugoslavia and, accordingly, the larger amount of evidence to be considered, dictate that a disproportionate amount of the study is devoted to the Soviet case. Chapters I, II and III, therefore concerned with the USSR, consider the Soviet case with regard, respectively, to the three major political eras of the post-Lenin period, those dominated by Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. For background purposes, the policies which preceded Stalin's 'communist nationalist' revolution after the Bolshevik Revolution are examined in the Appendix. Chapters IV and V consider the cases of the GDR and Yugoslavia, respectively.

A wide range of relevant newspapers, journals, books and pamphlets, both primary and secondary, have been surveyed and used as source material for the study.
Introduction - Notes

1. Hans Kohn, 'Nationalism', in David L. Sills, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, 1972, p. 63. As to some of Kohn's more questionable writings, such as what has come to be referred to as the 'Hans Kohn dichotomy' which distinguishes between the nationalism of Western Europe and the nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe, see Andrzej Walicki's critique, largely based on the case of Poland, 'Polish Romanticism: The Meanings of the National Idea', Reports on Philosophy, 1981, no. 5.


3. The major issue in this sphere has been the precise chronology of the appearance of the phenomenon. The influential view of Karl Deutsch and the 'Chicago School', largely based on the United States' immigration experience, was that while nationalism was a significant feature of the early stages of the 'social mobilisation' process, this process increasingly broke down ties of kinship, and induced increasing loyalty to the modernising state. See Nationalism and Social Communication: An Enquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, New York and London: Cambridge UP, 1953. The subsequent experience of ethnic separatism in such developed states as Canada, Britain, France, and Belgium, however, suggested that nationalism, on the contrary, was linked to a 'post-mobilisational' phase. This induced a radical reformulation of theory and the realisation that the ethnic assimilation which could be argued in the case of the United States was largely inapplicable to non-immigrant multi-ethnic societies. On this question, see Walker Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?' World Politics, XXIV, No. 3 (April 1972), esp. pp. 319-57; and Sami Zubaida, 'Theories of Nationalism', in Gary Littlejohn et al, Power and the State, London: Croom Helm, 1978.


R.F. Miller suggested this term to me, also used by Tadeusz Szafar, as a neat formulation of the phenomenon under analysis. As stressed later in the introduction, it should not be confused with 'National Communism' which has been used to refer to communist states which have departed from the Soviet political model and sphere of influence. Thus Anthony D. Smith's chapter 'Communist Nationalism' actually refers to 'National Communism'. See Anthony D. Smith, ed., Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Canberra: ANU Press, 1979. Of course most of those concerned with the phenomenon of nationalism in communist states have been concerned with the spontaneous separatist or minority variety. Some recent examples of the recent burgeoning literature in this area would include Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, New York: Newsweek, 1982; Georg Brunner and Boris Meissner, Nationalitätenprobleme in der Sowjetunion und Osteuropa, Cologne, Markus Verlag, 1982; K.C. Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myths, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.


21. Ibid., p. 17.


25. See Alexeeva, loc. cit., and Lapidus, loc. cit.


28. This term was suggested to me by T.H. Rigby.


33. McAuley, loc. cit.