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Soviet Policy Towards India And Pakistan: 1965-71

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University
November 1974
This thesis is my own original work

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Acknowledgments

I wish to express my thanks to the Australian National University for making this study possible.

As regards the substance of the thesis, I am indebted to the members of the Department of International Relations who commented on the work but especially to my supervisor Geoffrey Jukes and to David Armstrong.

I am also grateful to Prof. M.S. Rajan who helped to make my stay in New Delhi a profitable one.
The thesis is a study of Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan from 1965-71. Its principal focus is to describe and to explain the changing balance in the Soviet approach towards these two countries.

As a prelude to the main thrust of the thesis, an attempt is made to set out the context within which Soviet policy was to operate in 1965: the most important developments in the history of Soviet relations with India and Pakistan since the time of independence are analysed; the relevance of the broader Soviet approach towards the Third World is emphasised; and the adoption of a new Soviet policy towards Pakistan is described.

The analysis of the diplomatic record begins with the eruption of hostilities between India and Pakistan in 1965, firstly over the Rann of Kutch and then over Kashmir. It is shown that the Soviet response to this subcontinental war marked a subtle departure from the previous Soviet attitude towards these two countries. The war, and the subsequent meeting at Tashkent, signified the emergence of a 'dualistic' Soviet policy in which efforts were made to maintain cordial relations with both subcontinental states simultaneously.

In the course of the next few years, the logic of this dualistic policy was worked out in practice. The USSR, as a result of its hosting of the Tashkent Conference, was projected into the very midst of Indo-Pakistani relations. The cumulative strains which this imposed on Soviet policy surfaced conspicuously in 1969 when it became clear that the Soviet Government was less enthusiastic about persisting with its ostensibly 'even-handed' course.

The implications of this reversal in Soviet strategy were to be demonstrated during the crisis which developed between India and Pakistan in 1971 as a result of the course of events in East Pakistan.
Hence, the Soviet reaction to the Indo-Pakistan war in December of 1971 can be understood partially in terms of the ongoing course of its diplomacy on the subcontinent since 1965 and as a response to the burdens entailed by the Tashkent approach. It can, however, also be understood in terms of the contrasting international environments in which the two Indo-Pakistani wars of the period occurred. It is this second dimension of the question which the thesis explores in the form of a comparative analysis of the international contexts surrounding the wars of 1965 and 1971. The time period of the thesis is thereby justified because it not only concentrates on an interesting period of Soviet diplomacy but it also permits the execution of such a comparative analysis and thus provides us with a greater understanding of the nature of Soviet policy in the area.
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a) Purpose of the Thesis

This thesis does not pretend to be a comprehensive account of the Soviet Union's relations with India and Pakistan during the specified period. It does not incorporate, as separate entities, detailed treatments of, for example, Soviet trade and aid policies towards the two countries, Soviet military aid to India, nor Soviet relations with the indigenous communists in the two states. In part, the justification for the selective approach which has been adopted lies in the fact that recent years have witnessed a growing literature on the subject of Soviet involvement in the Indian subcontinent and that, consequently many aspects of the subject have already found adequate treatment elsewhere.¹

More fundamentally, however, the eclectic nature of the approach has been dictated by the interests which inspired the thesis - an interest in Soviet studies and an interest in the systematic study of foreign policy - and by the resultant limited focus of the thesis. In a word, the thesis is not concerned with two distinct objects of study - Soviet policy towards India and Soviet policy towards Pakistan - but rather with tracing out the fluctuating course of the Soviet posture between these two countries. The essence of the task lies, therefore, in integrating the Soviet approach to the two countries, in investigating the triangularity of the relationship between the three countries rather than concentrating on two disparate sets of bilateral relationships. This should not be misunderstood as an a priori assumption that Pakistan was the major element in Soviet policy towards India nor that India was the major element in Soviet policy towards Pakistan. On the contrary, it will be the function of the thesis to establish the extent to which the regional antagonism between India and Pakistan acted as a constraint on Soviet policy towards either of these states.

¹ The list is too long for specific citations to be made here. The works referred to will be found in the Bibliography.
Hence, the main effort will be devoted to determining as precisely as possible those dates which were significant in influencing the Soviet attitude towards the two countries and to explaining the particular balance, or imbalance, in the Soviet stance between India and Pakistan at any given point in time. It can, therefore, be seen that the material most relevant to this study derives from those aspects of Indo-Pakistani relations which were characterised by contention and on which the Soviet Union adopted a discernible stand. Such a study is made possible by the degree of friction and conflict endemic in Indo-Pakistani relations throughout the period 1965-71 and by the high level of Soviet involvement in subcontinental affairs during that time.

The reasons for attempting this exercise are several and may be classified in terms of the nature of the contributions to knowledge which the thesis seeks to make - internally, to the elucidation of the details of a specific diplomatic narrative and, externally, to a more general understanding of Soviet foreign policy or of international relations as a whole.

At the first level, one reason for confining the thesis to this specific perspective is to be found in the widespread feeling that the period 1964-65 witnessed a profound departure from the USSR's previous policy in relation to India and Pakistan. This feeling was prevalent amongst Indian and, to a lesser extent, amongst Pakistani politicians at the time and, subsequently, various opinions on the subject have been expressed in the pages of academic journals. However, while there has been broad agreement that Soviet policy during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war signified a departure from the previous Soviet line, there has been little discussion of, and little adequate analysis of, the precise nature of this change.

of this development. Moreover, the apparent ambivalence of the Soviet stand at that time endured thereafter and persisted throughout most of the period 1965-71. A reading of the Indian and Pakistani press during this period leaves the researcher slightly bewildered. One discovers some Indian politicians claiming that the USSR had ceased to support India and that, after 1965, the Soviet Union was at best neutral in Indo-Pakistani affairs or at worst was actively promoting the cause of Pakistan. Similarly, one finds Pakistani claims that, after 1965, the Soviet Union was much more responsive to Pakistani requests than hitherto and contradictory claims that the USSR was supporting India as firmly as ever. In short, there seemed to be ample justification for a study which attempted to describe as accurately as possible the precise modification in the USSR's posture between India and Pakistan at this juncture.

Another reason for the exercise lies in the context of a long-term assessment of the future direction of Soviet policy in the region. If the years 1964-65 witnessed the emergence of a new trend in Soviet policy but if the Soviet posture during the 1971 war was more reminiscent of the Khrushchevian period of commitment to India, has the trend initiated in 1965 been reversed? This question may best be answered by the approach adopted in this thesis. Basically, Soviet behaviour in 1971 will be viewed from two angles, a) as the product of a specific set of international circumstances, b) as the product of an evolving diplomatic whole. The point of this double exercise may be clarified in the following manner. Is the apparent reversion of Soviet policy to a pro-Indian posture in 1971 to be explained in terms of some aspect of the evolution of that policy from 1965 or can it be understood solely in terms of the crisis itself? Does the episode over Bangladesh mark a new long-term trend or was it a temporary aberration necessitated by the force of circumstances? These are, perhaps, the critical questions of the period because on the answer to them must hinge our projection of future Soviet policy in the region.
At the second level, the thesis is a case study of Soviet relations with the Third World. However, its sharply-delimited perspective should shed a different light on the subject from that which emerges from the conventional country by country approach. Moreover, the utility of this perspective is enhanced because the case of India and Pakistan presents some unique possibilities. Given the avowed interest of the USSR in promoting cordial relations between itself and the 'national liberation movement' in the Third World, given the fact that India and Pakistan had formerly constituted a single state and had achieved independence at the same time, given that in 1947 there seemed little reason for the USSR to display a preference for one country or the other and given the saga of interminable conflict by which India and Pakistan have been linked since 1947, the vastly different histories of the Soviet Union's relations with post-independence India and Pakistan should illuminate the criteria which have guided the selection of the USSR's main allies in the Third World and, as such, may increase our understanding of Soviet diplomacy in Asia, in particular, and in the developing world in general.

Again, the study may be viewed from the perspective of an extended attempt by a Super Power to control a regional conflict. As will be seen from the following account, the Tashkent Conference initiated a period when the Soviet Union was actively engaged in trying to normalise relations between India and Pakistan and to reduce the degree of friction between them. In the event, the war of 1971 would seem to suggest that this attempt ended in failure. Consequently, it is important to enquire why the attempt failed and whether it was seriously intended in the first place.

Yet another reason for undertaking the exercise results from the similarities between Soviet and US policies towards the region during the past decade or so. Indeed, to a certain extent, it can be argued that the policies of the two Super Powers have provided mirror-images of each other as far as the subcontinent is concerned. Initially, in the 1950's, the American commitment to Pakistan found its parallel in the Soviet commitment
to India; during the course of the 1960's, there were strong indications that both powers were moving towards a more balanced policy which took into consideration the interests of both India and Pakistan; and latterly, during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, we have again witnessed a distinct polarisation in the form of US support of Pakistan and Soviet support of India. The 'multiple symmetry' of these developments suggests the confluence of common pressures which have pushed both powers in similar, even if antagonistic, directions. As such, it seems worth asking whether these common constraints have issued from the conditions of the region itself or whether the nature of the international structure has imposed its own peculiar pattern on the South Asian subsystem. If it is possible to answer this question, we will greatly increase our understanding of Soviet subcontinental policy and may also derive some insights into the more general Soviet approach towards those regions which impinge on the 'relationship of major tension'.

b) Methodology

Three distinct techniques have been employed in the course of the thesis in order to describe, chronologically determine and explain the various phases of Soviet policy:–

1) Public assessments

Following upon a historical introduction and a chapter establishing the general context of Soviet attitudes towards the Third World, the thesis, in Chapter 3, sets out to analyse the nature of Soviet comment on India and Pakistan at various stages of the period 1964-71. This would appear to be a useful preliminary to the more substantial account of the diplomatic relations between the countries which will constitute the burden of the study. However, one caveat must be issued at the very beginning. There is no suggestion of a rigid causal relationship between these assessments, on the one hand, and Soviet policy postures, on the other.

The use to which doctrinal formulations have been put in the process
of ex post facto rationalisation is quite notorious and there is, therefore, a patent difficulty in relating 'ideological' material to concrete policy stances. The difficulty finds expression in the following dilemma: which comes first - the doctrinal chicken or the diplomatic egg? In other words, it is hazardous to state with any confidence whether changes in doctrinal assessments lead to new policy orientations, or conversely, merely reflect and register the de facto occurrence of such reorientations. Let us take an example: if, for instance, there emerges in the mid-60's a general Soviet persuasion, reflected in the Soviet media, that Pakistan is moving in a 'positive' direction, and if this coincides with a diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries, does this signify that the former 'caused' the latter or, reversing the relationship, does it mean merely that because of a new Soviet political stake in Pakistan, Soviet statesmen, media, publicists and academics are careful to adopt a more respectful tone when speaking of the country?

This is a crucial question to which there is no easy answer. However, this need not preclude us from making use of such material. There are two main reasons why this is so. Firstly, the type of assessment which began to appear around the mid-60's was not purely 'ideological' in the strict sense of the term. It related rather to the general performance and potential of the countries in a diverse range of fields. As such, these assessments provide us with evidence as to how quite tangible developments in the internal affairs of the two countries were received in Moscow. In short, it is important to know what the Soviet attitude was on any given issue even if we cannot discern the relative weight of the factors which have led to the assessment.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, such assessments provide us with useful information for dating the switches in Soviet attitudes to the two countries. Even if such assessments of performance serve only as rationalisations of diplomatic postures, they nonetheless are indicators of the timing of such new postures: if they do not present 'explanations' of
changes in attitude, they are yet vital in establishing their chronological locations.

It was, therefore, considered useful to disengage this material from the diplomatic narrative and to present it at the beginning of the study in order to map out, in time, the major phases of the Soviet attitude to the two countries. Because of the stark contrasts in Soviet interpretation from one phase to the next, and because these contrasts were reflected uniformly throughout the entire gamut of Soviet publications, the device of treating them separately focuses attention on what are likely to be salient turning points in the development of Soviet policy. Additionally, the striking correlation between the pattern of Soviet diplomatic activity in the region and the pattern of Soviet analysis of developments in the two countries enables us to use the latter to corroborate the basic chronology of the former. It need scarcely be mentioned that an accurate chronology is of the very essence in giving an adequate account of Soviet motivations.

One last point needs to be made by way of introduction to this technique. Much of the material cited in Chapter 3 has been culled from academic journals and books. This raises the question as to whether it is legitimate to assume any correlation between Soviet academic endeavour and Soviet official postures. In general, the consensus among present Sovietologists would be heavily slanted in favour of the view that such correlations are tenuous and that Soviet academic research is now autonomous in relation to official persuasions to an unprecedented extent. Nevertheless, in a situation where there is a very marked consensus of opinion between the Soviet academic world, press, radio, semi-official journals and political speeches, we may be forgiven for thinking that this orchestrated consensus is broadly representative of official opinion. This need not imply that Soviet academics are responsive to every whim of officialdom; it may only

mean that, at certain times, the Soviet leadership, and the communications system which it controls, finds it consonant with its policies to propagate and to emphasise information which may have a genuinely academic source. In either case, our point holds good and this kind of data, although 'soft', nonetheless is not without its validity.

2) Diplomatic Analysis

The main portion of the thesis, from Chapter 4 to Chapter 8, is devoted to a straightforward analysis of the diplomatic relations between the three countries, starting with the prelude to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and terminating in the aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict over the question of Bangladesh. The analysis focusses on the changes in the Soviet posture between the two countries and on when and why they occurred. More specifically, it concentrates on certain salient phases of Soviet policy and on important modifications of the Soviet posture. The thesis attempts, in Chapter 4, to date and to explain the Soviet rapprochement with Pakistan. In Chapter 5, which is devoted to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, it is demonstrated how this rapprochement worked in practice and, consequently, the precise nature of the rapprochement, and of the limitations inherent in it, is further refined. Chapter 6, which spans the years 1966-69, traces out the development of the Soviet posture as it had been established at Tashkent in January 1966. It points out the inherent tensions in the 'dualistic' policy. In Chapter 7, an attempt is made to explain the apparent failure of 'dualism' and to discover the reasons for the emerging alienation of the USSR from Pakistan. Chapter 8, an analysis of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, serves the same function as Chapter 5. Once again, the eruption of Indo-Pakistani hostilities was preceded by indications of a modification of Soviet policy and once again the Soviet reaction to the crisis provides us with tangible evidence of the specific nature of this modification.
3) Comparative Analysis

In an attempt to bring as much rigour to the subject as is possible within the general constraints of Sovietology (4), an attempt has been made, in Chapter 9, to compare in a systematic manner the Soviet responses to the two Indo-Pakistani wars of the period. The topic consists of a period study of Soviet policy bounded at either end by a crisis and a war in the policy area. Such a happy coincidence of symmetry presents certain possibilities which deserve to be exploited. Broadly, it is the intention of the thesis to approach the postures and objectives of the USSR in the region, a) as an evolving response to a changing scenario between two crises, b) by means of a comparative analysis of Soviet behaviour in the two crises themselves. It is hoped that the findings of such a systematic comparison of the two war situations will serve to reinforce the conclusions derived from a study of the main elements in the evolution of Soviet policy in the intervening period. It is proposed, therefore, to combine a historical analysis of the 'flow' of Soviet policy with a more rigorous attempt to construct a composite picture of the various environmental configurations which shaped the Soviet posture in the two specific crisis situations. In this way, Soviet policy will be placed in a wider perspective and we will have some measure by which to judge the extent to which Soviet policy was inspired by regional developments in Indo-Pakistani relations or by broader considerations of the USSR's global standing vis-a-vis that of the other major powers. This approach, in addition to giving a clearer perception of the basic considerations underlying Soviet behaviour, should also focus attention on the extent to which the crisis behaviour of the USSR in 1965 and 1971 was an integral part of Soviet policy throughout the period or, alternatively, the extent to which it constituted an aberration from the established pattern.

4) See section C, below
c) Conceptual Models and Soviet Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Although couched in terms of a theoretical discussion, the thrust of this section is sharply practical: it is both a justification and an apology. At a time when foreign policy analysts are becoming increasingly concerned to destroy the 'billiard ball' image of the state as an actor in international affairs and to penetrate its inner mechanisms and mysteries - in short, to dispel the illusions of 'reification' - the nature of the present Soviet regime and of the data available about it is, perversely, making such analytical perspectives increasingly difficult in the Soviet case. While sympathising with Rosenau's contention that "in a decision-making context, reification of the state and objectification of its circumstances are neither necessary nor desirable" (5), one almost invariably relapses into this practice when dealing with the Soviet Union. The purpose of this section is, therefore, twofold: it is an attempt to justify, on grounds of expedience, the obsolescent practice of referring to the Soviet Union, in its foreign policy activity, as if it were a single calculating entity; and, given the practical rather than the empirical reasons for this deficient analytic approach, to consider the implications of this mental reductionism for our mode of 'explaining' Soviet foreign policy. In this way, it is hoped to justify and make explicit the basic analytic procedure employed in the thesis.

The most forceful expression of the inadequacy of the unified, rational actor approach to international relations has been provided by Graham T. Allison (6). Allison's arguments are well-known but it may be appropriate to summarise his typology as his conceptual models provide a

6) 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis'. Page references are to the version found in Rand Paper p.3919 (Santa Monica, Sept.1968).
convenient method of discussing the various approaches to Soviet foreign policy. In essence, Allison sets out three paradigms by means of which a country's foreign policy may be analysed. In terms of Model 1, the rational actor approach, the analyst explains an action by demonstrating how it "constituted a reasonable choice, given national objectives"(7) and conversely, a state's objectives can be determined "by calculating what strategic values are maximised by the action performed."(8) According to Model II, the organizational approach, a state's policies are no more than "outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour"(9) because governments are not single entities but rather "consist of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations each with a substantial life of its own."(10) Lastly, following Model III the bureaucratic politics paradigm, state actions are best understood as "outcomes of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government". (11) Moreover, the choices of individual players are shaped by "no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national security, organizational, domestic and personal interests."(12)

It is not the intention of this introduction to comment on the relative virtues of these three models or on the adequacy of the typology as a whole. However, such a breakdown provides a convenient framework for ordering the discussion of the practical problems faced by the Soviet foreign policy analyst. What applicability, therefore, have these models to Soviet foreign policy?

Initially, this typology permits us to classify some of the literature on Soviet policy-making. It is immediately apparent that Model I has

7) ibid p.1
8) ibid p.9
9) ibid p.3
10) ibid p.15
11) ibid p.3
provided the 'inference pattern' for most writings in the field. It has furnished the dominant approach if not the exclusive one. Perhaps the work which best epitomises this genre of writing is A.L. Horelick's analysis of Soviet objectives in the Cuban missile crisis.\(^{(13)}\) The writers of another study appear to share the basic assumptions of this approach when they argue that the domestic political factor was marginal and "Soviet foreign policy generally and arms control policy in particular were basically a response by the top Kremlin leadership to the international situation."\(^{(14)}\)

However, this dominant pattern has been modified in various studies by application of versions of Models II and III, or by some combination of the two. It is possible to distinguish in the literature 'leadership conflict' explanations, which approximate to Allison's Model III. A typical exposition of the leadership conflict model as it relates to foreign policy has been given by Robert Slusser.\(^{(15)}\) Similarly, T.W. Wolfe has noted his opinion that "important Soviet foreign policy decisions under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have tended to reflect a kind of "committee compromise" among contending preferences and views within the ruling oligarchy."\(^{(16)}\)

13) 'The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior' World Politics April 1964.
The other major refinement of the single entity decision-making approach in the Soviet case, which in some respect resembles Allison's Model 11, has been that of competition between various bureaucratic organizations and policy interests although it has frequently been linked to leadership conflict analyses in as much as the latter have often been viewed as epiphenomena dependent on the former. According to this approach, the principal contenders in the struggle over policy are discrete organizations or, alternatively, more amorphous 'interests'. In terms of the former, Soviet policy is best understood as 'bureaucratic competition among the organs of administrative power', in as much as only institutionalised bodies have ready access to the channels of power in the Soviet Union. In terms of the latter, the clash which takes place during the course of the policy process, is less that between unified bureaucratic agencies than that between ill-defined 'conservative' and 'liberal' interests within the system as a whole. The 'organizational competition' perspective has found expression in Ploss's hypothesis of the "commanding influence of domestic politics in the form of bureaucratic group struggle over functions and funds...".

The most prolific exponent of the view that Soviet foreign policy has been largely influenced by amorphous 'interests' has been Vernon Aspaturian. According to his thesis, the major foreign policy alignments within the USSR take shape in accordance with the demands which various foreign policy postures make on the national budget. Consequently, "various individuals and groups develop a vested interest in a particular foreign policy or defence posture because of the role and status it confers upon them." Aspaturian then postulates a dichotomy between

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those segments of Soviet society which are favoured by 'tension-producing' policies and those favoured by 'tension-lessening' policies. The typical alignment suggested by Aspaturian is that between the ideologues, the military, the heavy industrial managers (the steel-eaters), on the one hand, and the state bureaucracy, light industrial interests, cultural, professional and scientific groups on the other. (20) The main point to note is that this analytical approach is intended as an explicit challenge to the single entity conception of the Soviet state. In the words of Aspaturian,

"Soviet foreign policy decisions are nearly always marked by controversy and conflict. The allegedly monolithic will and policy of the Soviet regime has been repeatedly exposed as little more than a veneer beneath which conflict rages more or less continuously." (21)

It is no part of the present argument to claim that the empirical reality of conflict depicted in the leadership struggle and bureaucratic struggle models has diminished within the Soviet system since 1964. Indeed, as the Soviet state in many respects represents the very essence of bureaucratic organization, one would suppose that conflict would be endemic in it. As T.H. Rigby has remarked "conflicts of interest and aspiration in the Soviet Union, denied a special political sphere of operation, tend to give a political coloration to processes ostensibly executive and administrative in character, that is, to generate a distinctive crypto-politics." (22) While agreeing wholeheartedly with this dictum, it appears nonetheless to be the case that, at any rate as far as foreign policy is concerned, the presence of this conflict has become less conspicuous and can be less meaningfully classified under the present leadership than under the regime of Khrushchev. Significantly, studies of the

20) Without specifying the same alignments, M. Tatu: 'Power in the Kremlin' (Collins, London 1969), p. 429ff, identified similar actors when he listed various 'lobbies'.
21) In Farrell op. cit. p. 248.
type which flourished on the evidence of conflict between Khrushchev and Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov, and Khrushchev and the entire 'anti-Party' group on various foreign policy issues have become almost non-existent since the inception of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime.

The reasons for this are not hard to detect. At one level, the proliferation of leadership struggle studies under Khrushchev was the result of the comparative 'openness' of his political operations. As one analyst of Soviet politics has pointed out "studies of process in sensitive areas of Soviet politics are extremely difficult and, not surprisingly, most of these have concentrated on cases from the Khrushchev era since Khrushchev's personality and political style made him more forthcoming with information than have been his successors." (23) This is but another way of saying that many of the internal conflicts in the 1950's were pushed to the point of public exposure and public denunciation - as in the case of the 'anti-Party' group. Indicatively, the political demise of Pyotr Shelest has been one of the few events in recent years where analysts have been able to adduce a link between foreign policy issues and signs of friction between Soviet leaders.

The dearth of relevant information in the post-Khrushchev period has circumscribed the utility of the leadership conflict approach in other ways. As yet another observer has noted "the rise of Comrade X and the decline of Comrade Y are not of great interest unless these comrades stand for different policies and little is known about the individual policy orientations of the present Politburo members - less, in fact, than was true under Khrushchev." (24)

Returning to the various models of bureaucratic competition, it is also possible to argue that they have fallen into disuse, probably not because the reality has altered, but because the original frameworks contrived by its adherents were too crude to capture that reality. Aspaturian's

perspective appears too restrictive: even assuming the validity of the approach, it would confine analysis to issues which impinged on the major questions of détente versus confrontation and which made clear demands, one way or the other, on the public purse. The unfortunate truth is that a vast spectrum of Soviet foreign policy actions fall far short of 'tension-producing' and 'tension-lessening' initiatives and to the extent that they exert or relieve pressure on the public purse, they do so ambivalently with the result that in most cases it would be scarcely possible to determine which sectors of society would benefit by an increase in status. Apart from such well-known examples as the antithesis between military expenditures and consumer interests and the corresponding harmony between high investment in heavy industry and military interests, one would be extremely hard-pressed to devise other issues in which this technique might usefully be employed to analyse the pressures on Soviet foreign policy.

Moreover, the Aspaturian thesis seems to have gone somewhat awry in the past few years. If it is admitted that the general tenor of Brezhnev's policy of détente may be characterised as 'tension-lessening', then the wrong sectors of Soviet society seem to have been benefiting from it: the juxtaposition of détente in foreign policy with the promotion of the military and KGB chiefs to the Politburo and with the continued hard internal line on 'dissent' suggests that the 'linkage' between Soviet foreign policy and Soviet domestic factors may not be as straightforward as Aspaturian seems to believe.

More generally, students of Soviet politics have been moving towards an increasingly sophisticated classification of the 'interests' expressed in the Soviet political system. While their efforts have not yet been entirely successful, they have been sufficient to render superficial such easy classifications as 'liberal' and 'conservative' and to render facile attempts to postulate entire organizations or sectors of society, such as the party apparatchiks, as sharing a common stock of values. The inadequacy
of some of these classifications has been graphically caricatured by Rigby, who referring to one such stereotype, described it as a "tug of war between 'technocrats' and 'apparatchiks' (with 'ideologists' shouting esoteric encouragement)."(25)

Even if the definition of 'bureaucratic competition' is restricted to struggle between and within state and party organs rather than between other amorphous interests, the paucity of evidence as to how this struggle impinges on foreign policy decisions remains an insuperable obstacle, a fact which will readily be conceded by most scholars. (26) Attempts to demonstrate the specific role of any group in determining Soviet foreign policy have almost invariably proved futile and resulted in imaginative excesses designed to draw scholarly blood from Kremlinological stone. Even such a well-informed observer as M. Mackintosh could come up with the scantiest of evidence to determine the role of the military in such explicitly military contexts as the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the SALT negotiations. (27) Mackintosh himself concedes that the evidence available on the military's foreign policy role in these case studies is "fragmentary and inconclusive."(28)

It, therefore, seems clear that even these partial attempts to refine the 'monolithic' character of Soviet foreign policy decision-making, which were developed mainly on the evidence of the Khrushchev period, have since fallen on rather stony ground. The case against a strict usage of Models II and III, as rigorously defined by Allison, in the present circumstances of the Soviet regime is even more persuasive. Allison himself has stated that explanation in terms of Model II would require information "about the behavior of specific organizations" and explanation in terms of Model III would depend on information "from the participants themselves"

25) op. cit, p.122.
28) ibid. p.10.
in the form of interviews, etc. Evidently, neither type of information is available at the moment, nor is it likely to become available for the foreseeable future.

The argument so far seems to suggest that we are inevitably thrown back onto Model 1-type approaches not because of the inapplicability of the others to the Soviet experience but through the hard reality of the inaccessibility of relevant data. This is not to deny the importance of organizational and bureaucratic factors but to argue that, as little of importance may be said about them they are best subsumed - faute de mieux - under a generic Soviet decision-making unit despite the shortcomings of personification or reification. The choice is that between elucidating a little by use of admittedly inadequate methods or obfuscating completely by use of the discipline's most refined tools.

The experience of researching this thesis confirms these impressions, both as regards organizational and leadership struggle models. With reference to the former, knowledge of the institutions involved in Soviet foreign policy formulation is slight and is insufficient for discovering correlations between 'Organizational' interests and specific policy alternatives. It may be assumed that the major institutions involved in determining Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan were the standard ones, generally accepted as having a foreign policy role. But this thesis was unable to establish the specific policy leanings of any of these institutions.

With reference to the latter, there was none of the customary signs of leadership conflict in relation to India and Pakistan. For the entire period, the Soviet political and publicity apparatus adhered to a common line and even when changes occurred in this line, they did so uniformly throughout the apparatus. Again, this must not be mistaken for an assertion that throughout an eventful period of some 7 years there was no

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29) For a representative list of the institutions involved in Soviet foreign policy-making, see J. Triska and D. Finley: 'Soviet Foreign Policy' (Macmillan, New York, 1968).
disagreement over Soviet policy in such a volatile and strategically-important region: it is merely a claim that without evidence of conflict and no matter how certain we are of its immanence, analysis in terms of it is essentially meaningless.

However, if analysts of Soviet foreign policy are to persist, on grounds of practical necessity, in referring to acts of the 'Soviet Union' or to the 'Soviet leadership' and to 'interests' and 'objectives' of the Soviet state, then they must at least make explicit the assumptions upon which they operate. It has been a major contribution of Allison's work that analysts engaged in foreign policy research can no longer unconsciously ignore the import of these assumptions.

What, therefore, is the status of the explanations provided by the researcher into Soviet foreign policy? Firstly, the analyst adheres to the outmoded practice of referring to a single decisional unit, not because he supposes that this is the reality, but because to do so obscures less than to attempt to describe a reality which is currently unknown and unknowable. But this operational principle is not without serious problems of its own. This part of the discussion can best be introduced by reference to an opinion expressed in a seminal work on the subject of decision-making, that of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin. In that book it was suggested that "to assume the organizational factors is perfectly permissible if one is interested only in what was decided ..."(30) That is to say, that research which confines itself to policy content can safely ignore the quagmires of Models II and III. Does this provide the Soviet analyst with an emergency exit through which he can escape with academic conscience unimpaired? There is little reason to think so. In order to take advantage of this escape, it would be necessary to restrict oneself to a much narrower interpretation of policy content than would be acceptable to most students of the subject. Clearly no self-respecting academic would be content to provide an account of Soviet policy in 1962 which said no more than that the USSR installed missiles

in Cuba: he would certainly feel obliged to give some explanation as to why this was done. And this would be justified because an adequate analysis of policy content must incorporate the 'why' question. To take an example. The reason why missiles were emplaced in Cuba in 1962 is an essential element in our understanding of the nature of Soviet policy because although policy at time 't' may have been the same no matter what motivation inspired it, policy at time 't+1' would differ in accordance with its determinants. There is a sense, therefore, in which Allison's three models do not only provide us with three alternative explanations of policy but actually describe three different policies because at time 't+1' (say, when the US had established its blockade of Cuba) Soviet policy would follow its own logic (or lack of it) depending on whether it was a means-end calculation or the mere outcome of organizational procedures or bureaucratic competition, or some combination of all three. Consequently, the analysis of 'content' is inextricably interwoven with the provision of explanations. Unfortunately, as has been seen, we must cut ourselves adrift in the Soviet case from the two types of explanation provided in Models 11 and 111 and, therefore, it is not only our efforts at explanation which will be partial but, indeed, our description of content must of necessity be equally incomplete.

The area of Soviet policy in which the analyst can most fruitfully employ his efforts in current conditions is in that sphere of policy content which combines descriptions of actions with Model 1-type explanations. The reason why this is so is that almost invariably the evidence to be relied upon is of a kind which postulates a means-end analysis. The two types of evidence available are, generally, visible policy actions and declaratory statements in the form of speeches, press articles, journal articles and radio broadcasts. The researcher involuntarily finds himself confined to constructing some relationship between the two and this can best be done in terms of an assumption of purposeful behaviour. Given a series of Soviet actions, and given avowed explanations of these actions by the various representatives of the Soviet state, the least and the most that the analyst
can do is try to establish a motivational relationship between the two.

But is this possible when we know that short-hand references to the 'Soviet Union' encompass within them a more complex reality, not a single calculating agent but more a 'pluralism of elites', the existence of which we can be reasonably certain even if we cannot adequately comprehend or characterise it? In the words of S. Verba "means-end calculations are made more difficult by the fact that policy decisions - especially in international relations - represent collective decisions". (31) There may be some escape if the assumptions of Model 1 are made less rigid and we postulate an entity which does not necessarily maximise its goals but, allowing for the organizational complexity of the state, is content to 'satisfice' them. But even this does not touch the basic question of the logical status of the explanations which would be provided by such an approach: if a state's policy is part 'decision' and part mere 'outcome', in an indeterminate mix, is not the attribution to the state of purposeful, motivational behaviour a misleading imposition? In other words, by assuming or subsuming the organizational and bureaucratic factors, do we not destroy the means-end relationship on which our explanation of Soviet behaviour must rely? As Verba has stated "when the decision-maker begins to search for an adequate choice rather than for the best choice.... it becomes very difficult to use the rationality model."(32) How much more so if policy, far from being an adequate choice, is in no strict sense a choice at all but only an unintended outcome?

As with the findings of Welch and Triska, it is difficult to avoid a gloomy impression of the status of Soviet foreign policy studies. (33) There is little choice but to accept the limited role of the Soviet foreign policy analyst which one talented practitioner of the art has urged upon us - that our efforts represent no more than "an exercise in

32) ibid p.113.
33) 'Soviet Foreign Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Models' World Politics XXIII July 1971.
reconstructing the plausible."(34) But having made this admission, it still appears worthwhile to make whatever contribution possible within the accepted limitations of the exercise. Academics, no less than bureaucrats, should 'satisfice' if they cannot 'maximise'.

In conformity with the general purpose of the study, this brief historical recapitulation will not attempt to set out a comprehensive account of the Soviet Union’s relations with either India or Pakistan but will rather seek to establish those dates which were significant in altering the balance of the Soviet posture between the two states and the reasons which prompted the USSR to tilt as it did.

At the time of independence in 1947 when British India split into the two dominions of India and Pakistan, there was little indication of a Soviet sympathy for the one country or the other. Diplomatically, the two countries were largely ignored by the Soviet Union whilst as regards journalistic and academic assessments of the two states by Soviet writers, India and Pakistan vied with each other in the matter of which received the more virulent criticism and the more depressing portrayal.

The very fact of partition was ill-received in Moscow. It was interpreted as a typical colonialist tactic of 'divide and rule', a ploy on the part of the British Government to enable it to continue its subjugation of India by promoting strife between Hindu and Moslem, between India and Pakistan. The Soviet view was most forcefully expressed by the prominent Indologist, A. Dyakov:

Relying on the support of the reactionary princes and of definite sectors of India’s propertied classes and exploiting their fear of the popular liberation movement, Britain wants to perpetuate her rule in India by splitting her in pieces and converting her into a conglomeration of feeble and, as far as possible, mutually hostile states.

And again:

The acceptance of the Mountbatten plan by the leaders of the Indian National Congress was the result of a compromise and deal between the Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism. The deal is based on concessions made by both sides. The British government announced that it was prepared to grant India dominion status. Congress, for its part, renounced the demand for immediate Indian independence and

The most important implication of this 'conspiracy' theory, and the one most repugnant to Indian sensibilities, was that India had not achieved genuine independence but was merely an actor in an elaborate charade: in the Soviet assessment, a superficial political document could not impinge on the reality of continued British economic and administrative dominance throughout the two dominions. Another Soviet analyst was therefore to refer to the partition as a 'perfidious act' of imperialist policy which was to lead not to 'genuine independence' but only to a 'fiction of independence'.\(^{(3)}\) This Soviet antipathy towards the fact of partition was to be tenaciously maintained by Soviet leaders beyond the Stalinist period. Even when a strikingly new Soviet image of India was to emerge in the mid-1950's, the same scepticism towards the need for partition was to be given expression by Khrushchev, even if the derogatory remarks about sham Indian independence had long since disappeared. Speaking in Srinagar, on the occasion of his South Asian tour in December 1955, the First Secretary of the CPSU broached this sensitive issue:

\[\text{If it is permissible, I should like to express my opinion about the division of India into two states. We friends of India were sorry that the imperialist forces succeeded in bringing about the division of India into two parts - India and Pakistan. After all, before the Indian people won the independence of their country there was a single India. The division of India into two parts was not carried out in the interests of the Indian peoples. But it was precisely for this purpose that passions were kindled over the difference of religious beliefs among the peoples of India... So the difference of religious beliefs among the population was not the chief factor in the creation of Pakistan and its separation from the Indian state. Other states, which follow the well-known principal of 'divide and rule' in their policy, took an active part in this matter. They made use of the presence of different religious beliefs for their own purpose.}\]

\[\text{We are deeply convinced that when passions have died down and when the peoples realise the full significance of this artificial division of Indian territory, they will regret it.}^{(4)}\]

Meanwhile, throughout the late 1940's there was little to choose between the two countries on the criteria presented by Soviet commentators.

3) I. Lemin, 'Plody Imperialisticheskogo Khozyaynichan'ya v Indii i Pakis-tane' (Fruits of Imperialist Domination in India and Pakistan), Voprosy Ekonomiki, no.1, 1952, p.73.
Both India and Pakistan became objects of severe Soviet attacks on account of their political leadership and of the domestic and foreign policies pursued by the respective governments. Repressive actions against 'progressive' and 'workers' movements and a failure to implement reform of the countries' economic structures were singled out for special censure by the Soviet media. Typically, one commentator equated the leading parties of both India and Pakistan in their political iniquity:

Neither the National Congress nor the Muslim League have fulfilled the promises they made during the 1945-46 elections nor do they appear to have any intention of doing so...

The police measures against the democratic organizations in the Indian Union and Pakistan indicate that the ruling circles in these Dominions are becoming more and more isolated from the masses and treading the path of reaction. The leaders of the National Congress and the Muslim League are becoming tools of the imperialists whose anti-people's policy they are blindly following.(5)

The Soviet picture of India was one of a country in truly distressing condition. Press articles gave widespread coverage to stories of mass starvation throughout India and of a population living in generally subhuman conditions. Significantly, the political moral of these tales was that the plight of the people was aggravated by government policy. As examples of this, harsh police measures and the encouragement of monopolistic exploitation, financed by foreign capital, were cited. Some leading Pravda articles faithfully convey the general tenor of Soviet comment on Indian government policy during this period. One such article lamented the fact that 'the recent period has been marked by a series of most cruel repressions against members of the labour movement and against the trade unions'. It went on to note that 'it is difficult to see efforts of the present ruling circles of India to give actual assistance to the liberation of colonial peoples from imperialist oppression' and added 'rather the reverse'. However, on the subject of economic policy, Nehru 'displayed the greatest readiness to make concessions to the American capitalists and to open Indian markets to them both for the sale of goods

and for the investment of capital'. (6) Dyakov summarised the Soviet attitude towards India with what he considered an apt analogy. He explained the growing Western interest in India in the following terms:

The imperialist camp would wish to place upon India the heavy and shameful burden of champion of Anglo-American aggressive plans in Asia. The choice of India is determined not only by the fact that after China, India is the largest Asiatic country; the main reason is that the political regime established in India is very similar to the reactionary regime directed against the people which existed in Kuomintang China. (7)

The foreign policy of India was no better received in Moscow at that time. The increasing penetration of India by foreign capital, and especially by American capital which was beginning to challenge the British position in the Indian economy, was reflected in the foreign policy stance of the National Congress leadership. Consequently, more than one Soviet analyst was led to the conclusion that 'the reactionary home policy of Congress is thus in complete line with its foreign policy. Congress-led India is being more and more drawn into the war machinations of the Anglo-American bloc'. (8)

Even on the occasions, in the early 1950's when India adopted stances which were acceptable to the Soviet Union - such as on the Korean question and on the issue of the Japanese peace treaty - Soviet commentators interpreted such stances not in terms of the spontaneous decision of the Indian Government but as a result of the fact that 'Indian ruling circles are forced to reckon with the Indian people's clearly expressed will for peace'. (9)

The economic dependence of India on Britain and the United States, therefore, placed in question Indian claims to be avoiding alignment with either camp in the cold war. Hence, in the face of India's avowed 'independent' foreign policy line, one Soviet article observed that 'the facts show that the policy of India's rulers by no means tallies with these declarations'. (10)

Contrary to the rhetoric of non-alignment, the underlying reality was quite different:

9) I. Lemin, op. cit., p.84.
India's rulers hoped to hoodwink the people of Asia by playing at neutrality and claiming that theirs was a 'middle course'. The facts show, however, that there is a good deal of ambiguity about this 'middle course'.

That such an appraisal of India's foreign policy should have been dominant in Moscow during the later '40's and early '50's can readily be explained. In order to arrive at a complete appreciation of the Soviet assessment of the Indian leadership and the nature of its policies, it is necessary to make some reference to international communist strategy at the time. The year 1947 was to witness a departure from Moscow's previous line of advocating a 'right' strategy of cooperation between the 'progressive' movement and the national bourgeoisie as represented by the Indian National Congress Party. One historian has dated this shift from a meeting of Indian studies arranged by the Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow in June 1974:

At the very same time at which the Indian Communist Party adopted its Mountbatten Resolution praising the Congress and offering its cooperation to the Congress government in a united front from above, this session was unanimous in sharply condemning the Congress. It thus marked a distinct change in Moscow's hitherto uncertain but never wholly hostile attitude toward the Congress and implied the necessity of a turn away from the 'right' strategy on the part of the Indian communists.

Whether this new strategy flowed from a revised assessment of the Congress leadership or whether a new appraisal of the Congress leadership flowed from this new strategy need not detain us for the moment. The important point to be made is the precise Soviet definition of the nature of the Congress leadership. An important article sets out the attitude which the Indian communists should adopt to the Congress Party. Firstly, it establishes the major principle of the 'left' strategy:

One of the most important conditions for the strengthening of the hegemony of the working class in the national-liberation movement in India is the removal from the leadership of the movement, and

11) ibid, p.31
the isolation of the national bourgeoisie. (14)

However, Balabushevich then proceeds to refine this proposition:

The final defection of the upper Indian bourgeoisie to the camp of reaction and imperialism does not prevent certain groups of the national bourgeoisie from being, for some time and at some period, fellow-travellers of the democratic forces in their struggle against imperialism and against its allies within India. (15)

Unfortunately, the Congress leadership does not even qualify for inclusion in this category:

In close connection with the final defection of the upper bourgeoisie of India into the service of the Anglo-American imperialists there should also be regarded the policy of the Indian National Congress, the leadership of which has always been in the hands of the bourgeoisie and the liberal landlords. At the present time, the National Congress has been completely transformed into a party of the reactionary bloc of the Indian upper bourgeoisie, landlords and feudal princes, with the bourgeoisie preserving a leading role in this bloc. (16)

In short, the Congress leadership fell within that section of the national bourgeoisie which had the strongest links with foreign capital, which was a major enemy of the democratic movement and with which not even short-term tactical alliances were permissible.

An integral part of the Soviet denunciation of the Congress Party and of the Indian leadership which had headed the struggle for independence from Britain was the unfavourable treatment of Gandhi and his philosophy during the Stalinist period. The most that one commentator would concede was that 'Gandhism played a certain progressive part' while on the whole Gandhi's tactics 'undoubtedly retarded the development of the national liberation movement'. (17) Another was to speak of 'the reactionary cloak of Gandhism'. (18)

14) V. Balabushevich, 'Novy Etap Natsional 'no-Osvoboditel' noy Bor'by Narodov Indii' (New Stage of the National Liberation Struggle of the Indian People), Voprosy Ekonomiki, no.8, 1949, p.44.
15) ibid., p.47. Balabushevich qualifies this by saying that 'these opposition sections of the Indian bourgeoisie should not be considered as reliable or permanent partners of the anti-imperialist camp'. Ibid., p.57-8.
16) ibid., p.48.
The leadership of Pakistan fared no better at the hands of the Soviet media. As in the case of India, independence was depicted as of a purely formal nature and Pakistan, accordingly, was seen to be still toiling under the yoke of foreign oppression. Also, as in the case of India, Pakistan was becoming the battle ground between British and American capitalism. Foreign investment was actively encouraged by the government and the low level of industrial development in Pakistan made the country even easier prey to Anglo-American imperialism. Moreover, in the opinion of one Soviet historian, the dominance of the semi-feudal, landowning class within the Pakistani leadership produced such political stagnation that, in the first decade of Pakistan's independence, not one significant reform was carried out. There was, therefore, in Soviet eyes, little to distinguish the policies of the two governments. Both were having equally deleterious results:

The chief and basic cause of the grave economic situation in India and Pakistan lies in the dominance of foreign capital and in the reactionary economic policy of the governments of both dominions. The foreign policy of Pakistan was subjected to the same hostile treatment as its domestic policies. Once again, the major charge was that Pakistan was unduly susceptible to the influence of the Western powers and by dint of its 'reactionary policy', the Pakistan government was seeking to turn the country 'into an imperialist stronghold in the East'.

Relations between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan, on the other, in the years immediately following upon independence, were minimal. There was a possibility of some advance in Soviet-Pakistani relations in 1949 when the Soviet Government invited Liaquat Ali Khan to visit the USSR but the invitation fell through when the Pakistani Prime Minister accepted Truman's invitation and visited Washington instead.

19) See e.g. Alexeyev, 'The Political Situation in Pakistan', New Times, no.47, November 21, 1951, p.10.
21) Lemn, op. cit., p.80.
Although Pakistan and the Soviet Union had agreed to exchange diplomatic missions in 1948, it was March 1950 before the Soviet ambassador arrived in Karachi. Likewise, Soviet relations with India during this period were anything but intimate. As late as September 1952, the Indian ambassador-designate to Moscow was to experience the chilly side of Soviet diplomatic protocol. K.P.S. Menon complains that at his departure for the Soviet Union 'one person was conspicuous by his absence'. This was K.V. Novikov, the Soviet ambassador in Delhi. 'He did not deem it necessary to see the Ambassador-designate off to his own country. This showed how lukewarm were the relations between India and the Soviet Union at that time.'

Although, as has been seen, for most of the Stalinist period there was no visible Soviet preference for either India or Pakistan, both being objects of a very hostile portrayal, there was a very short initial period when there was some indication that the Soviet Union entertained greater expectations of India than it did of Pakistan. Although this period was to be of very short duration, it is not without its significance. That more optimistic expectations of Nehru and the Congress leadership, however ephemeral, had existed at one stage in the Soviet Union, immediately prior to and immediately after independence, is revealed by the bitterness with which Soviet commentators denounced what to them was a 'volte-face' on the part of the Indian government. There are several examples of this. Zhukov argued that the degeneration of the Indian bourgeoisie and the party which represented it could be clearly demonstrated by 'the metamorphosis of Nehru who has been transformed from a left-wing Congressite and exposé of imperialism into an adroit servant of two masters - Britain and the U.S.A.'

24) ibid., p.25
25) For a first-hand account of the general climate of Soviet-Indian relations in the immediate post-independence period, I am indebted to Nehru's sister, Mrs. Pandit - the first Indian ambassador to Moscow - who granted me an interview in New Delhi, January 1973.
27) E. Zhukov, 'Voprosy Natsional'no-Kolonial'noy Bor'by Posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny' (Questions of the National-Colonial Struggle After the Second World War) Voprosy Ekonomiki, no.9, October 1949, p.58-9.
Other writers noted the same phenomenon. One recalled that 'in the first few months following the proclamation of independence, much was said in Delhi about the new dominion's separating completely from the British Empire,' but that this had not eventuated. Another maintained that 'at first the Nehru Cabinet claimed to pursue a policy independent of foreign imperialism and promised to establish friendly relations with other countries. But it soon abandoned its independent line...'

The significance of this early, albeit short-lived assessment, becomes clear in relation to the initial Soviet attitude to the Kashmir dispute. The Indo-Pakistani quarrel over Kashmir, which persisted throughout the entire period covered by this thesis, was to become the touchstone of both Indian and Pakistani appraisals of the sympathies of other powers and, as such, it is appropriate that considerable attention should be devoted to the early Soviet attitude towards this problem in order to discover whether any light can be shed on the partiality or otherwise of the Soviet approach to India and Pakistan at this time.

From Soviet accounts of the Kashmir dispute, written in the late 1940's and early 1950's, it is clear that the villain of the piece is neither India nor Pakistan but the imperialist powers of Britain and America. Just as Britain had partitioned India on a religious basis in order to retain its dominance by encouraging strife between the two states, so it had promoted conflict over Kashmir for the same reason. The purpose of an armed conflict was 'to enable Great Britain to strengthen her position both in India and in Pakistan and make the new dominions still more dependent upon her.' Moreover, it was a major ambition of the Anglo-American bloc to 'convert Kashmir into a link in the chain of military bases' surrounding the USSR.

It is in the context of the Soviet account of these imperialist plots that we are given the first glimmering of a distinction between India and Pakistan. While this did not immediately lead to any substantive policy actions on the part of the USSR, it can be seen to provide the origins of a Soviet approach to Kashmir which was to find its logical and fullest expression in 1955. The important distinction which was announced in 1948 was that Britain and America had opted for Pakistan in the pursuit of their nefarious schemes in Kashmir. That they should have done so was related to that brief period of time when India promised a more 'progressive' and 'independent' line than did Pakistan.

In the months preceding partition and immediately after independence, Pakistan, according to Soviet accounts, appeared the more likely agent for the attainment of British aims in the subcontinent. This calculation formed the basis of British policy at the time. This has been spelled out in several Soviet articles written in the late '40's. The first indication of the Soviet appraisal of the situation came from Dyakov who, commenting on the Kashmir issue, remarked cryptically that 'there is no doubt that British policy in the new dominions is based on the fact that in Pakistan (32) reactionary elements are stronger than in Hindustan'. Such a distinction was again hinted at later:

Britain strove to retain control over Kashmir by incorporating it in the dominion that would support the reactionary regime in the state, suppress the democratic movement and guarantee the preservation of British imperialist rule. Pakistan's position in this respect raised no doubts...

The argument was elaborated on in a subsequent issue of the same journal:

After the division of India into two Dominions the question of Kashmir's future was the cause of considerable anxiety to British ruling circles. In India, reactionary trends had not yet come out so openly as they have today and there was a growing tendency for secession from the British Empire and the establishment of an independent democratic republic. On the other hand, it was already clear that Pakistan would remain within the Empire and that this dominion would be entirely dependent upon British and American support.

In view of all this, the Anglo-American strategists felt that, if they were to retain Kashmir as a strategic military base, they must get it included in Pakistan. (34)

It can be argued therefore that, although there was no diplomatic activity to corroborate it, this Soviet account of the origins of the Kashmir dispute had implicit in it the seed of a future Indo-Soviet community of interest on the issue in as much as, if for the USSR the main enemy was the Western powers, nonetheless it was to Pakistan that these countries were extending their patronage.

Although the Soviet Union was largely to maintain official silence on Kashmir in the Security Council debates until 1952, it can at least be argued that if there was no explicit Soviet support for India, then at least the general drift of Soviet comment on the issue portended an attitude which was implicitly more favourable to the Indian position than to that of Pakistan. However, it should be stressed that the Soviet position derived from a perception of its own interests rather than from a desire to support India per se: to the extent that India and the Soviet Union were moving towards some common positions on the issue, they did so for their own and for disparate reasons.

One of the constant themes of Soviet comment on the dispute in its early stages was that the Western Powers were trying to prolong this contentious issue with the aim of either securing an independent Kashmiri state as a military base directed against the Soviet Union or of securing the introduction into the state of United Nations troops. Any such suggestions were bitterly opposed by the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet view that the Western-dominated Security Council was seeking through its mediatory efforts to prolong the conflict for its own ends:

The imperialists' aim is to create the impression that military conflict between India and Pakistan is inevitable and to use this as an excuse for stationing their own troops in Kashmir under the guise of United Nations forces. (35).

35) Alexeyev, op. cit., p.10.
The fullest statement of Soviet suspicions, however, was to come on January 10, 1952, from the Soviet representative in the UN, Jacob Malik, in reply to the report of the UN mediator, Dr Graham:

The United States of America and the United Kingdom are continuing as before to interfere in the settlement of the Kashmir question, putting forward one plan after another... The purpose of these plans is interference... in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir, and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States of America and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering assistance through the United Nations. Finally, the purpose of these plans in connexion with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base.(36)

Such Soviet suspicions influenced the Soviet view of the way in which the Kashmir issue should be settled. Taken in the context of the bitter cold war struggle of the period and in the context of the purpose to which the United Nations was being put in Korea, the Soviet silence in, and lack of action in the United Nations should not be interpreted as lack of policy; on the contrary, it signified a strong Soviet conviction that no solution acceptable to the USSR was likely to result from UN mediation and that the matter should more appropriately be settled by the Kashmiri people in conjunction with direct negotiations between India and Pakistan. Nor was Soviet reluctance to have the dispute submitted to UN arbitration the product of mere caprice. It reflected the contemporary reality of the imbalance in the UN and the fact that Moscow 'had tasted the bitter fruit of leading an apparently static bloc of five or six delegates... that was invariably outvoted'.(37)

The Soviet stance in this early period therefore, clarified itself as being based on two principles. In the first place, the fate of Kashmir should be determined by reference to the will of the people themselves. Thus the Soviet spokesman, Zorin, attacked a Western-sponsored resolution in 1952 on the grounds that 'all proposals about arbitration mediation etc...

are based on the defective principle unacceptable to the UN of intervention in Kashmir's internal affairs. The Anglo-American resolution proposed to the Security Council contains this same defect. It excludes any possibility for the Kashmir people to enjoy their just right to self-determination.\(^\text{38}\) Similarly, Malik had contended earlier in the year that 'the USSR Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves without outside interference. This can be achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people'.\(^\text{39}\)

In the second place, the USSR was strongly opposed to any form of UN mediation on the issue. This was made abundantly clear once again in Soviet comment on the July and August 1953 meetings between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Welcoming the agreement reached at these meetings to hold a free plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the future status of the state and to appoint a plebiscite administrator by April, 1954, Pravda's correspondent wrote as follows:

This initial success in settling the Kashmir dispute was possible only because the governments of India and Pakistan heeded the numerous demands of the peoples of their countries and chose the path of direct negotiations without participation of foreign 'arbitrators', 'mediators' and 'observers'.\(^\text{40}\)

Likewise, the same paper had earlier commented on the meeting that 'contrary to the desire of the enemies of peace, it was held without "mediation". The meeting in Karachi signifies success for the idea of direct negotiation among the interested parties'.\(^\text{41}\)

Such a Soviet stance has a direct bearing on the question of whether the Soviet Union was at this stage displaying any preference for the cause of either India and Pakistan. Indeed, it can be argued on the basis of the foregoing account that the Soviet position was much closer to that of India

\(^{38}\) Pravda, December 25, 1952.

\(^{39}\) Quoted by Sisir Gupta, op. cit., p.245.

\(^{40}\) O. Orestov, Pravda, August 22, 1953.

\(^{41}\) I. Alexandrov, Pravda, August 1, 1953. See also 'First Steps', New Times, no.27, July 1, 1953, p.16-17; 'Towards a Kashmir Settlement'. New Times, no.36, September 2, 1953, p.16-17.
than to that of Pakistan, albeit for its own reasons. The justification for this assertion is based on the polarisation of opinions between India and Pakistan, on the desirability of UN intervention, which had become manifest by the early 1950's. In the words of Sisir Gupta:

Thus, by this time (1951), two different opinions had emerged in the Security Council: one, favoured by Pakistan, of extending further the Council's role in the dispute and of effecting demilitarization of Kashmir through arbitration; the other, favoured by India, of throwing the onus on the parties themselves to proceed with direct contacts to solve outstanding problems. (42)

On another issue vital to Soviet interests, the Indian delegate had made the Indian position unequivocally plain, stating a principle which must have struck a receptive chord in the Soviet Union in view of the lavish attention devoted by the Soviet media to the subject. Addressing the matter of the stationing of UN troops in Kashmir, Mrs Pandit had declared that India had

long ago rejected this idea of the imposition of a foreign force on Indian territory as being derogatory to the dignity and territorial integrity of an independent nation. It is surprising that any one should think of suggesting to us that we should admit or receive back, on our soil, foreign troops whose withdrawal was an essential feature of our independence. It does not matter in what guise they are sought to be introduced or by whom. We shall not permit this to happen. (43)

If, as in the Soviet account, Britain and America saw their interests in Kashmir best served by Pakistan, it is likewise implicit in the policy declarations of the Soviet Union and India that the Soviet Union's interests would have been best served by India. Sisir Gupta is perfectly correct when he refers in passing to the 'indirect Soviet support to the Indian position on Kashmir' in the early 1950's. (44) The influences which caused the two countries to arrive at some common positions on the dispute were, of course, different in the two cases: India's quarrel was with Pakistan; the USSR's was so only marginally and indirectly. It is important, therefore, not to exaggerate Soviet sympathy for India at this early stage. As will be seen below, Soviet analysts had some very uncomplimentary things to say about the conduct of Indian policy in Kashmir. Hence, at

42) op. cit., p.233.
43) Quoted ibid, p.251.
44) ibid., p.245
the official level, the USSR did nothing which might suggest that she would actively support India as against Pakistan. The only interest which the Soviet Union had in the dispute was its fears of Western ambitions in the region. Nonetheless, looked at from this perspective, it is possible to see in Soviet fears the origin of a community of interests with India which was to predispose the Soviet Union to be sympathetic towards India's position and which was to lead to its logical culmination in 1955.

Already, India had made a few gestures which had been quite warmly received in Moscow. Stalin had welcomed Nehru's initiative in proposing discussions for an ending of the Korean war as early as 1950. India's contribution to the eventual ending of the war was recognised by Premier Malenkov and India's inclusion in the International Control Commission on Indo-China, appointed by the Geneva Conference in 1954, was favoured by the Soviet Union. However, these episodes in themselves are far from sufficient to account for developments in Indo-Soviet relations which were to occur in 1955.

The most important single event in shaping a Soviet preference as between India and Pakistan during the 1950's was unmistakably Pakistan's entry into the Western-sponsored alliance system. Pakistan's attitude to these alliances and the degree of its support for them were to become for the subsequent decade the principal measure by which the Soviet Union judged the direction in which Pakistan was moving and by which the Soviet Union assessed Pakistan's attitude towards the USSR. From the very commencement of the 1950's, Soviet commentators had expressed fears that Pakistan was moving dangerously close to the Western powers. Liaquat Ali Khan's decision to go to Washington instead of Moscow could only have confirmed these fears. At any rate, on his return from Washington, a Soviet journal was to accuse him of intending to 'take on the job of agent of Anglo-American imperialism in its fight against the national-liberation movement in Asia'. The general trend of Pakistan's foreign relations also app-

45) For a discussion of these events see J.A. Naik: 'Soviet Policy Towards India' (Vikas, Delhi 1970), pp.57-63, 72-5.
eared to be confirmed in Soviet eyes by the support the Pakistani premier
had expressed for United Nations action in Korea. During the following
three years, the Soviet press periodically referred to rumours that
Pakistan was about to join various western-sponsored blocs such as a Middle
East Defence Organization and subsequently the Turkish-Iraqui Pact. This
was coupled with accusations that Pakistan, in a direct military agreement
with the United States was permitting the latter to construct military
bases in northern Pakistan. Finally, the USSR transmitted the follow­
ing note to the Pakistani government:

...The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw the
Pakistani Government's attention to the fact that the Soviet
Government cannot be indifferent to reports on the afore­
mentioned negotiations (between Pakistan and the United States)
since conclusion of an agreement to establish American air
bases on Pakistani territory, that is, in a region close to
the borders of the USSR, as well as Pakistan's adherence to
plans for the formation of the aforementioned Middle Eastern
c bloc, have a direct bearing on the security of the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union would like an explanation from the
Pakistani government on the foregoing.

The announcement that Pakistan had joined SEATO in September 1954
was bitterly attacked by the Soviet Union on the grounds that the form­
at ion of the bloc was causing 'deep apprehension' amongst Pakistan's
neighbours and that there were 'very weighty grounds for their uneasiness'.

Pakistan's adhesion to the Turkish-Iraqui alliance was similarly denounced.

Soviet commentators eagerly seized on internal political developments
in Pakistan for some indication that the policy of alignment with the
west would be reversed but whereas they claimed to see in every event
evidence that the people of Pakistan were opposed to the country's alliance
policy, they could detect little to encourage them at the governmental
level. The landslide victory for the United Front Party over the Muslim
League in the 1954 elections to the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly
was attributed to the fact that the United Front, in contrast with the

47) ibid., p.19.
48) e.g. Izvestiya, August 25, 1951.
49) Pravda, December 2, 1953.
51) e.g. S. Kondrashov, Izvestiya, October 2, 1955.
Muslim League, was opposed to the military agreements with the United States.\(^{(52)}\) Similarly, the resignation of the Mohammed Ali cabinet in 1955 was explained in terms of 'public discontent with the government's foreign policy'.\(^{(53)}\) Such changes of government were each expected by Soviet analysts to produce some modification of the country's foreign policy but such expectations were constantly dashed. One such disappointment was in connection with the new government of Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, the leader of the People's League. According to one Soviet press report, the People's League was very critical of Pakistan's membership of the western alliances and the accession of the new government had produced a flush of optimism in the country. However, the writer had to conclude his report by conceding that 'the first steps of the government do not justify the hopes placed on it'.\(^{(54)}\)

That the western-orientation of Pakistan's foreign policy was the major obstacle in the way of Soviet-Pakistani relations at this time was made abundantly clear by Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin. Responding to a series of questions put to him by the editor of the United Press of Pakistan on the subject of the prospects for Soviet-Pakistani relations, Bulganin, while giving a very friendly answer and stressing the possibilities of trade with Pakistan and the extension of Soviet aid to the country, could not avoid raising this vital issue:

> While invariably pursuing the policy of peace, it stands to reason that the Soviet Union cannot view indifferently the fact that certain neighbouring states, in deference to foreign interests, are joining aggressive military groups threatening the security of the Soviet Union. We are the opponents of aggressive military and political groups such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact to which Pakistan belongs.\(^{(55)}\)

Relations between the two countries reached a new low in 1958 in connection with reports that missile sites were being constructed in Pakistan. The Soviet Government delivered through its ambassador in

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Karachi a stern warning to Pakistan on this issue.

The Soviet Government is compelled to note with regret that for reasons beyond its control, the relations between the USSR and Pakistan leave much to be desired... According to information at the disposal of the Soviet government, intensive construction of launching pads for guided missiles was begun in 1957 in a number of areas of West Pakistan...

In this connection the Soviet government turns to the government of Pakistan with a friendly appeal for a more sober evaluation of the present international situation and for consideration of the grave consequences for Pakistan if military bases to be used for aggression against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries are created in its territory. The Soviet government has repeatedly declared that in the event of aggressive actions against the USSR, the latter will be obliged to use every means at its disposal to strike a retaliatory blow at the aggressor, including the bases of the aggressor that are situated on foreign soil.(56)

Not satisfied with the Pakistani Government's explanation that the installations were required by the needs of Pakistan's defence, the Soviet Union repeated its warning on December 26, 1958.(57)


The warning was delivered on April 14 (Kompantsev op. cit. p.111). It is possible that Soviet apprehensions on this issue were inspired by the possibility that American IRBM's - in the shape of Thor and Jupiter missiles - might be installed in Pakistan. Such a possibility is not invalidated by the fact that the Soviet note complains of construction of launching sites in 1957 - over a year before the Thor was to become operational. As Khrushchev himself had pointed out early in 1958 on the subject of launching sites on the territories of the various members of the Western alliance system:

"But they still don't have missiles for these bases and don't plan to produce them until later on. That means that it will be two to three years before they can supply these launching sites with the necessary missiles." (Pravda Jan.26 1958)

Soviet suspicions of Pakistan's intentions were apparently heightened by recent meetings of the councils of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact in Manila and Ankara respectively. On the former, Pravda noted its belief that the Western powers were seeking the 'deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles in the territories of several Asian countries." (Mar.9 1958) Of the latter, the Soviet warning note to Pakistan complained that at Ankara "Pakistan demanded that all the Baghdad Pact member-states be equipped with the latest types of weapons. Judging from numerous press reports in various countries, the reference was to atomic weapons and missiles."

It is manifest that there were no IRBM's in Pakistan in April 1958. If the Soviet warning was related to the Thor missile, it may have been in terms of preemptive Soviet action to put pressure on Pakistan and so forestall such a development when the Thor became operational. Thor's range of upwards of 1500 miles would have placed the Baku oilfields, and conceivably parts of the lower Volga fields, within range of Peshawar. On the other hand, both these areas could more readily be reached by the Jupiters already installed in Turkey.

57) Pravda, February 20, 1959.
The novel strategic situation on the USSR's southern border and the importance which this lent to India has been figuratively conveyed by one Soviet author who, in discussing the creation of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, stated that this 'placed India between two powder kegs'. At any rate, it was more than mere coincidence that the rapid deterioration of the Soviet Union's relations with Pakistan had its obverse side in a striking improvement in the Soviet Union's relations with India. The first hint of a Soviet démarche towards India is generally recognised to be Malenkov's report to the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953. But more important, perhaps, as indicating the common interest which was conspiring to push the Soviet Union and India closer together was Malenkov's address to the constituents of Leningrad on March 12, 1954 when he remarked that 'we can only welcome the vigilance displayed by Indian government leaders in connection with the increasing intrigues of America's aggressive circles in Asia'.

The metamorphosis which India underwent at the hands of the Soviet press and publicists as a result of the Soviet Union's newly-discovered commitment to India was indeed striking. The entire tone of Soviet comment had changed radically by 1955. In contrast to previous descriptions of Nehru as a 'running dog of imperialism' and as a defector from the cause of India's liberation, we discover in 1955 that the Indian Government is led by 'the outstanding statesman Jawaharlal Nehru... Similarly, the Congress party has apparently been transformed from a tool of the most reactionary elements of the Indian bourgeoisie, bent on leading the country into the imperialist camp, into the champion of Indian progress. In the opinion of Soviet writers, the election results of 1957 were a victory for the Congress Party because the voters 'associate this party with the country's successes in developing the national economy and liberating the people from the heavy colonial yoke'.

58) P.M. Shastitko, 'Dvizhenie Storonnikov Mira v Indii' (Movement of the Supporters of Peace in India) in 'Bor'ba Narodov Azii za Mir' (Asian People's Struggle for Peace) (Nauka, Moscow, 1962), p.95.
59) See e.g. J.A. Naik, op. cit. p.73.
61) K. Perevoshchikov, Izvestiya, April 9, 1957.
The reassessment of India at this time affected also the image of Gandhi in the Soviet Union. The disparaging treatment of Gandhi in Soviet publications had always been a sensitive aspect of Soviet-Indian relations in the period after 1947. This was understandable in view of the high esteem in which Gandhi was held in his own country. However the Soviet Union remained deaf to Indian complaints. Menon informs us that he raised the matter with the head of the South Asian section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry - who as an ex-ambassador to India should have been receptive to Indian feelings - but notes despondently that he found him 'cold and unsympathetic'.\(^{(62)}\) By 1955, the maintenance of such an attitude on the part of the USSR was becoming an embarrassment to Soviet-Indian relations and the Soviet assessment of Gandhi's historical role was hastily revised. This was stressed during the crucial Khrushchev and Bulganin visit to India towards the end of 1955. Typically, Bulganin went out of his way in an address to the Indian parliament to emphasise that 'the ideas and the guidance of that outstanding leader of the Indian national movement, Mahatma Gandhi, were of great significance...'.\(^{(63)}\) This reassessment was followed by various apologies devised to explain the erroneous views of former Soviet writings on Gandhi. It is rare for historiographical revision in the Soviet Union to refer to the existence of previous interpretations which have since fallen into disrepute. Presumably, however, in this case, Indian memories were too acute for the anti-Gandhi line to be conveniently forgotten altogether. Consequently, some public explanation was in order to satisfy outraged Indian sensibilities. Khrushchev himself made a token effort in this direction when he commented in an interview granted to some Indian journalists that:

> In the past some incorrect statements about certain Indian figures appeared in various works by Soviet authors. We are trying to correct this so as to give their due to all people

\(^{(63)}\) Pravda, November 22, 1955.
who were really of greatness in your country and who made large contributions to the liberation of their native India from the colonialists. (64)

An even more elaborate attempt to justify the revised Soviet assessment was made by Academician Zhukov. Referring to the lack of a 'clear and lucid appraisal' of Gandhi in Soviet historical literature and to the existence of certain 'incorrect assessments', Zhukov went on to proffer some explanation of this defective analysis:

... until quite recently we did not possess sufficient knowledge of the facts of Indian history. As a result, the characterization of so complex a figure as Gandhi was bound to be one-sided. Our authors concentrated on criticizing certain aspects of the Gandhi philosophy, regarding his activities in complete divorcement from the concrete conditions and level of the anti-imperialist movement in India. And it must be admitted that most Soviet oriental scholars, myself among them, at one time shared these views which found expression in the press. (65)

In addition to assuaging Indian feelings, it may be assumed that this public penance served the additional function of removing the odium resulting from the anti-Gandhi remarks from the Soviet regime and placing it squarely on the shoulders of the academics.

That the more favourable Soviet view of India which emerged around 1955 derived from those aspects of Indian foreign relations which were welcome to Moscow and from India's refusal to adhere to Western military blocs - just as Pakistan had incurred Moscow's displeasure as a consequence of its alignment - is strongly suggested by the emphasis which Soviet writers began to place on the international significance of Indian policy and on the growth of India's global reputation. An Izvestiya correspondent was to go to the length of suggesting that 'India has emerged on the international scene as a great power without which not a single major problem can be settled not only in Asia but throughout the world'. (66) In a similar vein, Dyakov was to deliver an encomium to India which was titled suggestively 'The Sixth Great Power'. (67)

64) Pravda, August 5, 1958.
65) 'Gandhi's Role in History', New Times, no.6, February 2, 1956.
66) K. Perevoshchikov, Izvestiya, April 9, 1957.
writer was to assert that in view of the fact that India had actually become a Great Power 'the socialist countries... demand that she be invited to participate in major international conferences'.\(^{68}\) This was more than mere empty flattery. The Soviet government was soon to give substance to this principle with the outbreak of the crisis of 1958 in the Middle East sparked by the Iraqi coup and the landing of British and American troops in Jordan and the Lebanon respectively. Khrushchev suggested the convening of a summit conference in which the USSR, USA, Britain, France and India should participate.\(^{69}\) The elevation of India in Soviet esteem occurred, therefore, in practice as well as on paper.

By 1955, then, a clear distinction had been drawn by Soviet policy makers between India and Pakistan. As such, that year is a watershed which denotes the end of the period in which the Soviet Union was neutral in Indo-Pakistani affairs at the official level. And the reason for this discrimination between the two countries on the part of the Soviet Union was simply Pakistan's western-orientation in comparison with India's profession of nonalignment. Khrushchev himself was to summarise the respective Soviet images of the two countries:

> Whereas we see the Republic of India as our ally in the struggle for peace... we cannot, unfortunately, say the same about Pakistan... the policy of the ruling circles of this state alarms us.\(^{70}\)

The most decisive way in which the Soviet Union now sought to demonstrate this preference was in relation to the Kashmir dispute. It will be recalled that whilst the USSR had not taken a very active part in the early UN discussions of Kashmir and had maintained long silences on the subject, such views as it did express were determined largely by Soviet perceptions of Western ambitions in the region and by Pakistan's apparent role in Western schemes. With the public avowal of a connection between

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69) The Soviet suggestion did nothing to improve Sino-Soviet relations as India was to be included in the summit whereas China was to be excluded. The episode is discussed in J.A. Naik, op. cit, p.103-6.
Pakistan and the United States resulting from their military agreement, that latent strand of Soviet thought which had constantly drawn the USSR closer to India than to Pakistan on the Kashmir question, in theory if not actually in practice, was now made quite explicit. And given the nature of Soviet fears about Kashmir, it was no surprise that it should have been in the context of the Kashmir issue that the USSR should have made its most unequivocal declarations of support for India at the expense of Pakistan.

Pakistan's alliances with the Western powers impinged directly onto the Kashmir question. They did so in two distinct senses. From one perspective, the US-Pakistan agreement was seen as a manoeuvre to exert pressure on India - to resolve the Kashmir issue as far as Pakistan was concerned and to deflect India from its nonaligned stand as far as Washington was concerned. Thus, in retrospect, one Soviet author was to argue that even the 1950 visit of Liaquat Ali Khan to Washington had been designed to obtain economic and military aid in order to achieve a 'position of strength' in the negotiations with India.\(^{71}\) That this was a major motive of Pakistan's alliance with the United States was now stressed by Soviet publicists:

Some of the arguments used by Mohammed Ali in justification of a military compact with America are noteworthy. He asserted, for instance, that the arming of Pakistan would make for the 'easier settlement' of the Kashmir dispute with India. This can only be understood to mean that Pakistan intends to negotiate disputed issues with its neighbours from 'positions of strength'.\(^{72}\)

The American strategy was equally patent to Soviet analysts:

It must be realised that the USA is trying in addition to use its extensive negotiations with Pakistan to exert political pressure on India which refuses to submit to American dictation.\(^{73}\)

Leading directly from this reading of the situation, the military agreements between Pakistan and the United States resurrected and gave prominence to the abiding Soviet concern that, via the agency of Pakistan, via the agency of Pakistan,

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73) O. Orestov, Pravda, December 21, 1953.
Kashmir might become a military base for America. In the words of another article:

... the adherence of Pakistan to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact threw fresh light on the imperialist attempts to aggravate the problem, to wrest Kashmir from India and hand it over to Pakistan. Had success attended these attempts, Kashmir would have been brought into the orbit of the military preparations of the Pentagon. (74)

One of the first indications that the USSR was moving in the direction of express support for India on the Kashmir question was in relation to India's demand that American personnel be removed from the UN observer group supervising the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The Indian demand was based on the grounds that, in view of the alliance between Pakistan and the United States, American observers could not be considered disinterested parties in the issue. The Indian demand was regarded as 'legitimate' in the USSR. (75) Any remaining doubts as to the Soviet commitment to India were soon removed by Khrushchev and Bulganin during their visit to South Asia in 1955. Speaking in Srinagar, Khrushchev declared unequivocally that 'the question of Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India has been settled by the people of Kashmir themselves,' (76) and Bulganin was to reaffirm in his report of the tour to the Supreme Soviet that 'the Soviet Union supports India's policy on the Kashmir question'. (77)

In order to justify the new Soviet position on Kashmir and to present an unblemished record of India's activity in relation to that state, Soviet historians were once again presented with the task of touching up and rewriting Soviet accounts of the Kashmir dispute. As we have seen Soviet versions of the origins of the conflict had almost from the beginning carried an implicit bias against the Pakistani position on account of what was believed to be Pakistan's role in Western designs. However, this

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had not meant that Indian policy escaped unscathed. If there had been a hero in the early Soviet reports of the situation in Kashmir it had been the Kashmir people themselves in their struggle for freedom from colonial rule and from the oppression of the Maharaja. Hence a prominent place was given to Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference as being the major progressive force. But Indian policy towards the Maharaja and the National Conference had reflected anything but favourably on India. This can be seen from several contemporary Soviet accounts written in 1948. Typical of Soviet reporting at the time was the following accusation levelled against India:

In Kashmir, the Indian reactionaries aimed to use Sheikh Abdullah's popularity to stimulate the fight against Pakistan's invasion and then to reestablish the Maharaja - now their obedient tool - in power.(78)

And again:

... it was to the interest of the Indian reactionaries that Kashmir remain occupied by Indian troops. In these conditions, Sheikh Abdullah's government could be compelled to act in the interests of the Indian reactionaries, rather than Kashmir, and the Indian reactionaries could control the democratic movement headed by the National Conference.(79)

This was no isolated report. An earlier article had made the identical charge against Indian policy:

The government of India is inclined to strike a bargain with the Maharaja at the expense of the Kashmir people. The reactionary elements in the leadership of the Indian National Congress are clearly not interested in strengthening the influence of the National Conference and are steering a course towards restoring the Maharaja to power.(80)

All such references were expunged from Soviet accounts of the dispute which appeared after 1955. However, there were also other matters which had to be cleared up. It had now become the Soviet position that, as early as 1947, Kashmir was an inalienable part of India and that this reflected the wishes of the population of the state. This unfortunately conflicted with previous Soviet versions of the situation. In 1953, an

79) ibid.
80) Yershov, op. cit., p.29.
article had reported that 'in Kashmir itself there are different opinions as to the state's future' and that while some favoured adhesion to the Indian Union' there are also supporters of union with Pakistan'.

Even more interesting is the changed nuance now placed on the Act of Accession to India of October 27, 1947. Prior to 1955, it had been made clear that the accession had been wrought by the Maharaja, as was his constitutional right, in exchange for Indian military assistance to repel the invaders of Kashmir. As a Pravda article of 1953 was to note... the Maharaja turned to India for aid, expressing willingness to annex Kashmir to the Indian Union'.

Moreover, the same article argued that 'the Kashmir problem could have been settled long ago if the population had been given the right and opportunity to express its will freely and decide its own destiny'. Clearly, this implies that as late as 1953, the Kashmiri people had not been given such an opportunity. However, historical accounts written after 1955 were to present a quite different picture. In one we discover that the Kashmir people had already expressed their desire for union with India in 1947. In another, the Maharaja's part in the accession is conveniently forgotten and it is stated that 'Kashmir elected to become part of India'.

And in yet another, we are informed that the 'question of Jammu and Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India was decided by the Kashmir people in 1947'.

The Soviet position on Kashmir was consistently reaffirmed throughout the duration of Khrushchev's tenure of office. United Nations resolutions which were unacceptable to India were vetoed by the USSR both in 1957 and in 1962. It had been the Indian contention that Pakistan's involvement in military alliances had changed the entire nature of the Kashmir problem and hence India had moved away from the idea that a plebiscite was an

82) I. Alexandrov, Pravda, August 1, 1953.
83) R.M. Mukimdzhanova, 'Politika S.Sh.A. v Pakistane' (Policy of USA in Pakistan), (Moscow, 1961), p.11.
84) Y. Popov, op. cit, p.9.
appropriate mechanism for resolving the conflict. The Soviet delegate supported the Indian case that resolutions prior to 1954 were no longer relevant to present circumstances and were, therefore, in no sense binding, In the words of the Soviet representative, Sobolov, '... it would, of course, be unrealistic to be guided by recommendations and proposals put forward in connection with the Kashmir question many years ago'.

Relations with India continued to progress at the turn of the decade. One example of this was the support which the Soviet Union gave to India over the question of Goa. Bulganin had in 1955 termed the maintenance of a Portuguese colony on Indian territory 'an insult to civilized peoples'. Soviet condemnation of Portugal over this issue had largely been in the context of the fact that Portugal was a member of NATO and that Goa was, therefore, being preserved as a Western military base. In any case, in contrast to the Western response to the news that India had invaded Goa in 1961, the Soviet leaders expressed their approval of the deed. The likely Soviet reaction to such an invasion had been conveyed to the Indian government by Brezhnev, who was currently in India and the reaction was confirmed when Khrushchev sent Nehru a message of congratulations which welcomed the 'lawful and justified' Indian action.

Meanwhile, relations with Pakistan showed no signs of improvement. This was conceded by I. Benediktov, the head of a Supreme Soviet delegation to Pakistan, who, while expressing a wish for good-neighbourly relations between the two countries, stressed that 'if up till now no improvement has taken place in the relations between the two countries, the blame does not rest on the Soviet Union'. Subsequently, in 1960, Soviet-Pakistani relations reached something of a nadir with the downing of the U2 flight of Garry Powers and the news that he had taken off from Peshawar, an American

90) International Affairs, April 1958, p.65.
The contemporary Soviet attitude towards Pakistan was also reflected in the Soviet position on Pakistan's territorial dispute with Afghanistan. The source of contention was the fate of the tribal territory of Pushtunistan which was a part of Pakistan. The Afghan government was demanding that the people of this region should be permitted to decide whether they would remain as part of Pakistan, become a part of Afghanistan or become an independent state. The alienation of the Soviet government from Pakistan, which found expression in the Soviet backing of India on Kashmir, also led to simultaneous Soviet declarations in favour of Afghanistan on the Pushtu issue. While in Kabul in 1955, Bulganin stated that 'we view sympathetically Afghanistan policy with regard to the question of Pushtunistan', and later expressed the conviction that Pushtunistan had been incorporated in Pakistan in 1947 'contrary to the interests of the tribes living there'.

It can, therefore, be seen that, in addition to its desire to ingratiate itself with India and Afghanistan, the USSR's regional preferences were influenced by Soviet irritation with Pakistan. Indicatively, at the very moment when the USSR was coming out against the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir, it had arrived at the contrary position in relation to Pushtunistan. In the words of Khrushchev 'Afghanistan demands that the Pushtu people be given an opportunity through a referendum, a plebiscite held under free conditions, to evidence their will...' and on the basis of the Leninist national policy 'we consider this demand proper'. However, Lenin's national policy was, apparently, no longer considered applicable to Kashmir. In such doctrinal contradictions, there is manifest the extent to which Soviet preoccupation with Western designs shaped its policy towards the subcontinent and determined its posture between India and Pakistan.

91) Kompantsev, op. cit., p.129-33. Kompantsev is concerned to demonstrate the damage which the incident did to U.S. - Pakistani relations rather than to Soviet-Pakistani relations.
As a counterpoint to the Soviet attitude towards the Pakistan-Afghanistan territorial dispute, it is illuminating to discuss briefly the Soviet reaction to the Sino-Indian border conflict. Although this is a fairly familiar story (95) and is primarily of interest in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, some reference to it is necessary for an illustration of the condition of Soviet-Indian relations in the early 1960's and as a measurement of the respective Soviet assessments of India and Pakistan. In addition, if up until now we have concentrated on Soviet perceptions of Western policy as a factor in determining the USSR's own posture, a discussion of the Sino-Indian confrontation permits us to introduce the interlocking questions of China as a factor in shaping Soviet subcontinental policy and India as an element in the Sino-Soviet controversy. (96)

China had initially adopted the same hostile attitude towards India as was displayed by the Soviet Union during the Stalinist period. However, China had preceded the USSR in moving towards a reassessment of the country and in arguing for the possibility of utilizing India's nonalignment in the interests of the Communist bloc. (97) But, in contrast to the Soviet Union, China quickly reverted to a more inimical doctrinal approach towards India by the latter 1950's. Relations between China and India deteriorated sharply as a result of the Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the border incidents which followed closely upon this event.

The incidents of September 1959 evoked an impartial Tass statement which expressed 'regret' at their occurrence and which voiced Soviet neutrality by equating 'fraternal' China and 'friendly' India. (98) The Chinese were later to complain bitterly that this statement had been released in the face of strong Chinese representations. (99) The neutrality

95) J.A. Naik; op. cit. Ch.5; H. Ray: 'Policy of Russia towards Sino-Indian Conflict' Political Quarterly Jan/Mar 1965.
98) Sept.9, 1959
99) 'The Truth about how the Leaders of the CPSU have Allied Themselves with India against China', People's Daily, Nov.2, 1962.
of the Soviet posture was reaffirmed several weeks later in Khrushchev's foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet when he urged a settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue "through friendly negotiations to the mutual satisfaction of both sides."(100)

The eruption of the border war of 1962 was to witness an initial departure from the Soviet line of impartiality between the two countries. On October 25, Pravda published an article which came out strongly in favour of the Chinese position. It attacked the "notorious McMahon line" and stated that "it was never recognised by China." Moreover, the article welcomed the preliminary conditions for a settlement which had been set out by China:

"As for the Soviet people, they see that statement of the Chinese government as evidence of sincere concern over relations with India and eagerness to bring the conflict to a halt. The proposals made by the Chinese government are in our opinion constructive. Without impairing the prestige of the parties, they represent an acceptable basis for opening negotiations."

However, it is now generally recognised that the tone of this statement was inspired by the simultaneous events in Cuba which forestalled the Soviet Union from unduly antagonising China at such a critical juncture. Significantly, with the ending of the Cuban tension, the USSR resumed its former line of neutrality which, in view of the fact that one party to the dispute was a socialist ally, was widely interpreted as partisan support of India. Hence, a Pravda article which followed some ten days after that of October 25 no longer urged acceptance of China's conditions as a preliminary basis for negotiation. Instead, it insisted that "it is necessary to cease fire and, without any conditions, to sit down at the round table of negotiations."(101) That such Soviet declarations of neutrality barely concealed pro-Indian sentiments was shortly to be revealed in Khrushchev's 1962 report to the Supreme Soviet:

100) Pravda Nov.1 1959.
101) Pravda Nov.5 1962.
"Of course, people could be found who say: here is the CPR now withdrawing its troops actually to the line on which the conflict began; wouldn't it have been better not to have moved from the positions where they formerly stood? Such arguments are understandable."(102)

As Sino-Soviet relations became progressively worse, so Soviet comment on the Sino-Indian war became correspondingly more critical of China and more sympathetic towards the role which India had played. By 1963, Krasnaya Zvezda was to accuse China of "turning its weapons against neutralist India."(103) Similarly, a violent attack against China was to be launched by Pravda on September 19 1963. This article contrasted India's acceptance of the Colombo proposals with China's failure to do so and complained that "no constructive steps have been taken by the Chinese government." It then proceeded to the charge that "it is hard to believe that the Chinese leaders are sincere when they profess the desire for a peaceful adjustment of the frontier dispute with India." That the Soviet Union laid the responsibility for the Sino-Indian war squarely with China was affirmed by Suslov in his February 14 1964 report to the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee:

"It is a fact that precisely at the height of the Caribbean crisis, the CPR government extended the armed conflict on the Chinese-Indian border. No matter how the Chinese leaders have tried since then to justify their conduct at that time, they cannot escape responsibility for the fact that through their actions they in effect aided the extreme reactionary circles of imperialism, aggravating an already complex and difficult situation in the world." (104)

The two protagonists, China and the USSR, have both proffered various accounts of the ways in which their respective relationships with India aggravated the animosity which had arisen between them. At the doctrinal level, they both maintained contradictory assessments of the nature of the Indian regime. While, in the Soviet appreciation, "India tried genuinely to find the path to neutral absolute independence and there were many socialist elements which it was worth encouraging"(105), China clung to the

104) Pravda Apr 3 1964.
line that "India is neither a neutral nor a pseudo-socialist country." (106)

In other words, although China's reassessment of India in the early 1950's had preceded that of the Soviet Union, China's reevaluation had been short-lived and had quickly returned to the former position of stressing the class nature of India's leadership and its connections with foreign imperialism. As a consequence of its class essence, the Nehru government was pursuing in relation to the border issue a policy arising "out of the need of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India to oppose the people and the progressive movement of that country." (107) Moreover, in the face of Moscow's current tactical doctrine of cooperation between the local communists and the national bourgeoisie within the framework of 'national democratic' states (108) Peking was to belabour the 'revisionist clique' in the CPI, headed by S.A. Dange, on the grounds that it was "their intention to turn the Indian Communist Party into an appendage of India's big bourgeoisie and big landlords and a lackey of the Nehru government." (109)

The divergent assessments of India on the part of China and the USSR became manifest with the recrudescence of the border issue in 1959 and again in 1962, and were to lead to a series of mutual recriminations. For its part, China was to complain that it was the Soviet Union which made public the disagreement between the two countries in relation to India. In the words of People's Daily, "we would have preferred to be reticent about the origin and development of the differences between China and the Soviet Union on this question."

(110) Taken in conjunction with the neutral Tass statement of September 9 1959, the Soviet Union was, therefore, charged with having precipitated and exposed dissension within the international communist system:

"Those who accuse China of having pushed the Nehru government to the West are exactly reversing cause and effect. Throughout the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, these people have failed to distinguish right from wrong, have pretended to be 'neutral' and have called China 'brother' in words, while actually regarding the Indian

108) For a discussion of this concept, see Ch.2 below.
110) People's Daily Nov.2 1963.
reactionary group as their kinsmen. Should not these people examine their conscience and ask themselves what has become of their Marxism-Leninism and what has become of their proletarian internationalism?"(111)

The Soviet Union, likewise, was to level serious charges against China. According to one complaint, China invaded India in 1962 "without even informing the USSR beforehand."(112) In addition, just as China claimed to have pleaded with the Soviet Union in 1959 not to issue its Tass statement, so now the USSR lamented the lack of Chinese response to its appeals issued in October 1962:

"We begged - yes, we begged - the Chinese to stay their military operations immediately and we offered immediate mediation, for which India was ready."(113).

The principal Soviet objection to China's policy on the border question, however, was in respect of the damage which it could have done to Soviet-Indian relations and the stimulus which it provided for greater Indian military reliance on the West. The same CPSU letter drew attention to the large effort expended by the USSR in cultivating India and reminded China that 'this state of mutual trust required many years of difficult negotiations and patience before the fruits of mutual confidence and friendship were apparent."(114) This effort was, according to the Soviet complaint, jeopardised by Chinese intransigence over the border issue. As was stated quite explicitly:

"Thus years of hard striving for Indian friendship and Indian neutrality went for nothing. Not only that - and let us be straight - today the capitalists are supplying arms to India because Chinese aggression forced them to do so."(115)

The precise Soviet position on the question of Western arms for India is difficult to disentangle. At one level, as has been seen from the previous quotation, the USSR was opposed to the Sino-Indian confrontation for precisely the reason that it would increase Indian dependence on the West. That the prevention of such a development was a principal Soviet

113) ibid
114) ibid
115) ibid
concern was given special emphasis in Soviet polemics against China on this question. As the same document was to reaffirm:

"We wanted to prevent India from being forced to turn for military aid to the United States and Great Britain, who had been waiting for such an opportunity from the Chinese, who call themselves Communists."(116)

On the other hand, there were several contemporary reports which suggested that the USSR appreciated the necessity of an inflow of Western arms into India. Nehru himself claimed that in conversations with him, the Soviet authorities had raised no objection to India's receiving Western military aid. (117) Such a Soviet attitude - of compliance if not positive enthusiasm - is also suggested by the then US ambassador to India, J.K. Galbraith. When the US began its arms airlift into India, Galbraith noted in his journal the opinion that "under instructions from the Ministry of Defence, the papers are playing down the news of the arms lift. This, I believe, is in response to a Russian request." (118) The following day's entry also records the belief that "news of the airlift is still being played down in order, I suspect, not to arouse the Russians." (119)

These contradictory accounts of the Soviet position may be reconciled. It is quite possible that, although the USSR was strongly opposed to any long-term Indian dependence on the West, it should nonetheless have acquiesced in a short-term airlift to meet an emergency situation. The USSR could not reasonably complain of India's turning to the West for the simple reason that the Soviet Union itself had ceased to supply military equipment to India during the border war. This has been admitted in at least one CPSU document. (120) That the Soviet Union was embarrassed by

116) ibid.
119) ibid.
120) CPSU letter, January 1963 op. cit. "... during the Chinese aggression we stopped all deliveries of military material to India. When finally, but too late, the CPR stopped the aggression...... so for good material reasons the USSR came to the conclusion that there were no grounds for not fulfilling its commitments to friendly India, and it informed the Indian government that it would carry out all its treaty obligations, both civilian construction investment and military."
Western shipments of arms to India and that it, therefore, sought to avoid publicity for the shipments can be adequately explained by its own cessation of supplies and by the fact that it would be difficult for the USSR to comply with the recently concluded MIG deal of July 1962 in the context of visible Indian reliance on the West.\(^{(121)}\)

There is, then, considerable reason for believing that although the USSR was bitterly opposed to Western military aid to India in general - indeed, the MIG deal was welcomed in Moscow because it breached Britain's monopoly over the supply of military hardware to India - it was prepared to countenance a limited exception to this in the particular emergency of 1962. Moreover, if this was the order of Soviet priorities, it provides us with a useful indication of India's place in the overall Soviet assessment of the situation in Asia. It suggests that by the early 1960's the influence of China on Soviet subcontinental policy was beginning to balance, if not actually outstrip, that of the Western powers. That such a cardinal principle of India's nonalignment, her refusal to accept military aid, should have been breached in 1962 without undue demurral on Moscow's part suggests that the preservation of India as a viable military entity in relation to China was more important to the USSR than the maintenance of the pristine purity of India's doctrine of nonalignment.

The divergence between the Soviet assessments of the importance of India and Pakistan had, therefore, by the early 1960's become very wide indeed. Whereas the USSR had refused to back its nominal ally China against India and had by virtue of its neutrality given moral if not material support to India during the border confrontation, Pakistan was, at this very moment, choosing to move into an increasingly close relationship with China. The CPSU letter of January 1963 voiced the Soviet reproach of Pakistan and China:

"Before this treacherous attack India was, thanks to our untiring efforts, genuinely neutral. Her neighbour is a member of the aggressive SEATO pact. But with this appendage of the capitalists\(^{(121)}\) see I. Graham: 'Soviet MIG deal': Asian Survey, May 1964.
Thus, when the main concern of the USSR was the Western powers, India had won Moscow's gratitude by avoiding alliance entanglements with them whereas Pakistan quickly became a member of the Western alliance system: now, when China was becoming a source of Soviet concern, India had once again demonstrated its interest, if not its ability, to serve as some sort of counter to China whilst Pakistan had once again seen fit to move into close cooperation with another of Moscow's protagonists.

The year following the ouster of Khrushchev was to witness a significant Soviet reappraisal of its position vis-a-vis India and Pakistan and in order to grasp the nature of this reappraisal, it is necessary to place it in the context of the more general Soviet reassessment of its relationship with the Third World which was carried out during 1964-5. This is not to deny that many of the forces which helped to shape the new Soviet attitude to the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent were particular to that region alone but to stress that the nature of this fresh departure was such as to place it unmistakably within a pattern which was repeated in several areas of Soviet interest; without this broader perspective, the subtle modifications in the Soviet Union's relations with India and Pakistan may be seriously misconstrued.

As with most doctrinal debates, the outcome of the one which took place in the middle 1960's was not without its ambivalence. Nevertheless, the main outlines of the new directions to be followed are sufficiently clear and relate closely enough to concrete policy changes to permit us to catalogue the emergent policy tendencies. It is not the intention of this chapter to enter into a detailed exposition of the doctrinal intricacies involved in this reappraisal but merely to sketch out its general tenor and, more particularly, to concentrate on the policy implications of the new doctrinal atmosphere.

a) Doctrinal Reformulations

The abiding theme in the relationship between the Soviet state and the countries of the Third World, whether in their pre- or post-independence form, has been the effort to come to terms with indigenous nationalist movements. Whereas Soviet interest in the national bourgeoisie in the 1920's and 30's derived partly from the necessity of creating a framework of national liberation activity best suited to securing the independence of the colonial states and partly from the need for enunciating a strategy for the revolutionary advance to socialism, preoccupations with national
bourgeois regimes in the 1950's and 60's have focussed on their international
significance in the context of the cold war, on their claims for Soviet aid
and on the role of local communists in the process of internal development
of these regimes.

A fresh burst of interest in defining the current stage of development
of the Third World came about as a direct consequence of the post-Stalin
expansion of Soviet activities in the Afro-Asian arena and in response to
the need to justify cooperation with states which, whatever their value
as partners of the Soviet state on the international plane, on any object­
ive criteria would have scored but little in terms of revolutionary or
socialist potential. It was the necessity of according such doctrinal
approbation to the independent non-communist regimes of Afro-Asia which
was to lead to the ideological innovations of the Khrushchev period and to
'creative Marxism' of a most extravagant nature.

If the 20's and 30's had provided examples of tactical Soviet
endorsements of alliances with indigenous nationalist 'movements', it was
nonetheless left to Khrushchevian flair to expound a systematic doctrinal
rationale for alliances between local communists and indigenous nationalist
'governments'. The concept charged with this important task was the
'national democratic state' propounded at the Moscow Conference of 1960
and again at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961.\(^1\) The concept was
introduced in order to accord a special status to those progressive regimes -
notably, the UAR, Burma, Guinea, Ghana and Mali - which claimed to have
travelled furthest along the noncapitalist path and it served also as an
ideological divining rod capable of discerning within these regimes doc­
trinal virtues which would not otherwise have been apparent to the naked
Marxist eye.

The 'national democratic state' was envisaged as an intermediary

\(^1\) For a discussion of this concept, see W. Laqueur: 'Towards National
Democracy: Soviet Doctrine and New Countries' Survey July-Sept 1961;
Less-Developed Areas' World Politics April 1963; R. Lowenthal: 'Russia,
stage in the socio-economic transformation of the developing countries: it was to provide the political framework within which the new states could effect a transition to the noncapitalist path of development. According to Soviet formulations, such a state must possess several distinctive features. It must a) consistently defend its political and economic independence and struggle against imperialism b) struggle against penetration by foreign capital c) reject dictatorial forms of government d) assure broad democratic rights to the people (including the right to form political parties). (2)

The tactical principle which underlay such a state was that all the 'healthy forces' in the country should unite in a broad 'national democratic front'. In other words, local communists, the working class, the peasantry and the progressive intelligentsia should give their support to regimes which were headed by nationalist leaders and which were pledged to the general objectives specified for a national democratic state in order to make full use of "the revolutionary and anti-imperialist potential of the national bourgeoisie in the general interests of the liberation movement." (3)

For all that this concept represented an embellishment on traditional Marxist-Leninist theory on the nature of national liberation movements, it avoided as far as possible flagrant violations of existing doctrine on this subject. The concept had been developed, as Soviet spokesmen consistently reiterated, because the national liberation struggle was passing from the phase of external liberation from colonial domination to the phase of internal socio-economic liberation from reactionary domestic forces and from imperialist economic penetration. Within this context, however, the precise nature of the internal composition of these states was conservatively depicted. As one article was to point out quite explicitly, "a national democracy is not a Socialist state." (4)

3) 'Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie - Neot'emlemaya Chast' Mirogo Revolyutsionnogo Prosessa' (The National Liberation Movement is an Integral Part of the World Revolutionary Process) Editorial Kommunist no.2 Jan. 1962
4) G. Mirskiy: 'Whither the Newly Independent Countries' International Affairs Dec. 1962, p.27.
Thus while the last year of the 50's and the first two years of the 60's represented, in one sense, the zenith of the Soviet courtship of certain progressive regimes, especially in Africa (5), at the same time, until 1962, the doctrinal formulations which accompanied this diplomatic involvement were cautiously circumscribed by orthodox tendencies. This can be illustrated in relation to several aspects of Soviet writings on the developing countries.

The basic conservatism of the Soviet assessment of the developing countries in the period 1960-62 manifests itself in comments on the nature of various 'African' and 'Arab' socialisms. In the face of strong claims from parts of the Afro-Asian world that 'socialism' was susceptible to divergent 'national' interpretations, the USSR firmly reasserted the orthodoxy of the only true gospel - that of scientific socialism. For instance, in his report of an interview with President Nasser, Pravda commentator V. Mayevsky ended with an admonition directed against 'Arab' socialism:

"History has proved also that the peoples' path to freedom and happiness is socialism, based on the great teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Any other 'socialism' - and this too is an incontrovertible fact - is fraught with the danger of a triumph of capital and of enormous damage to the interests of the working people."(6)

On the question of the distance along the noncapitalist path which the leading newly-independent states had travelled, Soviet publicists at this time were equally conservative. Of Guinea, Ghana and Mali - the three most widely-cited candidates for national democratic statehood - the most that two academics would allow was that their "state sector is only starting to take form."(7) Likewise, while praising the radical economic

5) For instance, 46% of all Soviet aid to Africa during 1955-65 was extended during the 1958-61 period. See W.R. Duncan: 'Soviet Policy in Developing Countries' (Ginn-Blaisdell, Massachusetts 1970) p.4.
6) Pravda July 19 1962.
measures recently undertaken in the UAR, another article was quick to point out that "these measures do not in themselves transcend the framework of state capitalism." (8)

A further cautious statement on the nature of internal developments within the Third World and on the prospects for radical transformation of the socio-economic structure of these regimes can also be found in the CPSU's official journal. The author of the article, G. Starushenko (9) raises the issue of underdevelopment and its implications - including the lack of an organized working class - for the transformation into a socialist society:

"However, the conditions for immediately carrying out revolutionary socialist transformations and for embarking on the socialist path have today not matured in all the countries. Not all countries have a sufficiently organized working class, a peasantry ready to accept the leadership of the working class and a Marxist-Leninist party."

Having formulated the problem in orthodox Marxist fashion, Starushenko then proceeds to hint at an imaginative solution to the problem:

"Does this mean that in these countries social development must slow down or even come to a halt? Of course not. Revolutionary Marxists, having studied the special features and tendencies in the life of the young states, have established that they can have a progressive development along a noncapitalist path that will eventually lead to socialism."

However, it soon becomes clear that the most that the 'progressive' states - even those led by progressively minded intelligentsia - can achieve is transformations of a 'general democratic nature'. Thus Starushenko ensures that even the most advanced 'national democracies' are still rigidly segregated from countries which are actually building socialism. For a developing country to proceed to the socialist stage, Starushenko invokes the full weight of conventional Marxist wisdom to impose the traditional formula:

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9) G. Starushenko: 'Cherez Obshchodemokraticheskie Preobrazovaniya k Sotsialisticheskim' (From the General Democratic Transformation to the Socialist) Kommunist no.13 Sept.1962.
"The inevitability of the class struggle determines the character of the transition from the general democratic to the socialist stage of the liberation movement. Such a transition is possible only as a result of revolutionary socialist transformations effected in the course of the class struggle under the leadership of the working class, headed by a genuinely revolutionary party armed with a proletarian ideology."

By 1963, it was clear that more ambitious doctrinal formulations were coming to the fore and that the age of 'creative Marxism' had truly arrived. An article published in the middle of 1963 reveals the emergence of some of the more striking propositions which were to recur throughout 1963-4 while, at the same time, it restated a number of the conservative tenets of 1960-62. (10) As such, this article represents a compromise between the doctrinal orthodoxy of the former period and the doctrinal adventurism of the latter. Indeed, the article is a most unhappy juxtaposition of the new and the old. Thus, in its attitude to 'special socialism', the article betrayed characteristic ambivalence. While, on the one hand, it repeated the conventional line that such socialisms were 'extremely remote from genuine, scientific socialism and from Marxism-Leninism', on the other, it arrived at the less negative conclusion that 'it would be incorrect to reject all concepts of 'national socialism', all the tenets and conclusions contained in them.' On the matter of the transition of the developing countries to socialism, the article was even more inconsistent, combining in uneasy harmony two antagonistic propositions. The article makes the unequivocal declaration that:

"One must not forget the truth that under today's conditions the question is one not of the immediate construction of socialism in the liberated countries but of the possibility of their transition to a path of noncapitalist development."

Apparently forgetting what he has just said, Ogurtsov proceeds in the very next sentence to a somewhat different conclusion:

"The conditions for the emergence of the young states on the path of the immediate creation of a socialist society also exist and they are becoming ever more favourable."

10) S. Ogurtsov: 'The Developing Countries and Social Progress' Aziya i Afrika Segodnya no.7 July 1963, as translated in CDSF vol. XV no.37.p.10.
Indeed, if Ra'anen (11) is correct in his argument that the year 1963 witnessed a struggle between conservative and innovative theorists on this question, then this article is the classic example of the via media.

The article was also indicative of the direction in which the doctrinal wind was blowing. Advancing beyond the limitations of the 1960-62 period, Soviet theorists now began to assert a new role for 'revolutionary democratic' statesmen in the new states and became much less cautious about the prospects for their 'revolutionary' advance to socialism. Typically, a Pravda article implicitly equated the 'national democratic' and the 'socialist' revolutions. (12) The main thrust of the articles of this period was that in the absence of a developed working class in the newly-independent countries, the task of achieving social progress could be accomplished by 'revolutionary democrats'. However, in contrast with previous statements Soviet articles now suggested that these statesmen could not only preside over the general democratic revolution but could, in certain cases, also be at the helm of the socialist revolution.

Khrushchev himself gave a lead in this direction. In an interview, he welcomed the statements of some Third World leaders in which they had declared their "determination to build socialism." (13) He also went on to state that "while general democratic tasks are still being carried out, tasks that in themselves do not bear a socialist character, the prerequisites for the transition to socialism are created." (14) Other commentators went further in their claims than the First Secretary. Mirsky was to give a clear example of the exalted role which revolutionary democrats might play on the basis of the enlightened principles of 'creative Marxism', (15) and

13) Pravda Dec.22 1963
14) ibid.
was later to summarise his ideas for Pravda:

"In view of the present balance of power in the world arena, a country may pass to the noncapitalist path not only under the leadership of the working class but also under the leadership of revolutionary democrats.... It often happens that the revolutionary democrats, who have assumed the historical mission of breaking with capitalism, carry out the same basic social and economic transformations that have been advocated for decades by Communists." (16)

1964 was to witness a host of statements which exceeded conventional doctrinal limitations. The ideological extravaganza reached its zenith in May 1964 with the Khrushchev visit to the UAR where, amongst other excesses, he referred to the Nasser regime as "embarking on the path of socialist construction." (17) Similarly, with the announcement of the 1964 election results in Mali, Pravda quoted Keita approvingly as saying that Mali had "resolutely embarked on the path of socialist construction." (18)

The CPSU journal also added its word. In an editorial, it proclaimed that both Algeria and the UAR had embarked on socialist construction. (19) And in a subsequent issue of the same journal, an article suggested that the "national liberation revolution can, as the effort of Algeria shows, grow into a socialist revolution and, at a certain stage, the revolutionary process unites in itself features of both revolutions." (20)

The reason why such a transition was considered possible under other than communist auspices is to be found in another doctrinal principle which was stressed at this period. Throughout the Khrushchev era, it had been repeatedly argued that the national liberation revolution had been facilitated by the existence of the world socialist system. However, the connection between the two was emphasized in terms of the international situation.

17) Quoted by Ra'anan op. cit. p. 27.
18) Pravda Apr. 21 1964.
19) 'Soyuz Sil Sotsializma i Natsional'no Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya (Union of the Forces of Socialism and the National Liberation Movement) Kommunist no. 8 May 1964, p. 7-8.
20) K. Brutents: 'Sovremenny Etap Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya' (Contemporary Stage of the National Liberation Movement) Kommunist no. 17 Nov. 1964, p. 28.
Now, it appears, Soviet theoreticians were claiming something more than this: that in view of the existence of a strong international socialist camp, capable of giving both ideological and material assistance to the liberation movement, the socialist system could actually serve as a substitute for the working class in the process of internal transformation in countries where the necessary class formations were lacking.\(^{(21)}\)

The doctrinal innovations which characterised the last two years of Khrushchev's ascendancy did not long outlast his political demise. Indeed, it seems clear, that the post-1964 reappraisal of the Soviet relationship with the Third World was partly at least a reaction to Khrushchevian ebullience in this field, as in many others. If, as Ra'anana has suggested\(^{(22)}\), there was an undercurrent of opposition to the more fanciful theories of the ideologues in 1962-64, these forces quickly reasserted a more orthodox reformulation of the process of socialist construction after Khrushchev's departure from the political scene. The facile optimism, which propagated a belief in the possibility of 'revolutionary democratic' regimes scoring revolutionary successes in the near future, was no longer entertained.

The emergence of a less optimistic Soviet attitude towards the Third World and of more restrained expectations about the benefits to be derived from cultivation of it became apparent with the reassertion of neo-orthodox formulations about the nature of these countries. In short, it was soon to be demonstrated that hopes of revolutionary advance in the most progressive regimes had fallen rapidly down the scale of Soviet priorities.

That such a reappraisal did, in fact, occur can be documented from several angles. The emerging caution of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership in its approach to the Afro-Asian states expressed itself in various forms. Theoretically, it found expression in a declaration of the international function performed by the development of the Soviet economy - and, by

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\(^{(21)}\) For one statement of this argument, see Brutents ibid. p.31-2. Brutents claims that the 'socialist system' can play the role of an "international dictatorship of the proletariat." p.31.

\(^{(22)}\) op.cit.
implication, in a diminution of the priority assigned to the rendering of economic aid to the Third World. In fact, a rationale for such a development had always been in existence in Soviet writings on economic aid. In the words of one Pravda article:

"It is especially necessary to emphasise that the financial and other aid the Soviet Union renders to young countries is not a surplus of funds for which there is no application within our country. In a socialist society, there can be no surpluses that require export overseas."(23)

By the middle of 1965, it appears that the Soviet leadership had come round to the view that aid to the developing countries constituted a drain on the Soviet economy which the country could no longer afford. It was, therefore, tactfully suggested that the USSR could fulfil its international duty in other ways. A Pravda editorial was to make the point strongly:

"Significant events are now taking place in the life of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The countries of socialism are devoting great attention to improving the management of the economy, setting as their goal the achievement of the still greater effectiveness of their economic system and still more rapid progress on the road to socialism and communism. The peoples of the socialist countries see in this the fulfillment of their primary internationalist duty to the working people of the entire world."(24)

That such a position had its corollary in a decline in Soviet preoccupation with the Third World was also made explicit in the same editorial:

"It is first of all the peoples of the young national states who can put an end to all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism and raise the economy and culture of these countries.... the socialist countries.... cannot take the place of the peoples of the young national states in solving the tasks of the national liberation movement."

The reappraisal of the Third World was also reflected in a sharp curtailment of the more flamboyant formulations of the Khrushchev period, particularly with respect to the possibilities of transition to socialism in the developing countries. Throughout the Soviet media, the approach to these countries became more cautious, less optimistic of easy success,

less prone to facile generalisation and more given to detailed analyses of internal developments. A few illustrations will serve to capture the changed tone of Soviet pronouncements in this area.

In general, the new mood may be summed up in the observation of K. Ivanov:

"It may be said that the problems of the less developed countries' progress to Socialism, avoiding the stage of capitalism, are today practically much more involved than they seemed a short time ago."(25)

If we look at particular aspects of the developing countries, it becomes immediately obvious that there has been a uniform retreat from the salient doctrinal positions of 1962-4. Above all, there was a determined effort to differentiate between 'progressiveness' and 'socialism' and to bring once again into sharp focus those distinctions between 'national democracy' and 'the noncapitalist path', on the one hand, and socialism, on the other, which had been blurred towards the end of the Khrushchev period. Typically, a Pravda columnist issued the following cautionary note:

"Insufficient consideration of internal factors sometimes leads to obliteration of the differences between the progressiveness of one or another measure and its genuine socialist content... Socio-economic measures... may be very progressive and radical, but it is well known that their implementation does not automatically lead to socialism."(26)

Professor Ulyanovsky was later to return to the same theme:

"The noncapitalist path and the socialist paths are one in their goals and in their general orientation of social and economic development. However, the noncapitalist path, especially at its beginnings, is of course not identical with the stage of fullscale socialist construction. It is the stage of the social and economic development of the liberated countries in which the necessary prerequisites for the building of socialism are created by noncapitalist methods."(27)

In fact, Ivanov had in the month prior to Khrushchev's dismissal already published a challenge to the creative Marxists and this is perhaps

a sign that the more orthodox ideologists were even at that stage beginning to reassert themselves. In defiance of Khrushchev and of "Kommunist" in their protestations that Algeria and the UAR had already embarked on the path of socialist construction, Ivanov sounded a more circumspect note. Referring to economic measures in these countries, he observed that "in Algeria and the UAR they have become steps towards the noncapitalist and later Socialist path of development. It is difficult to foresee what phases such development will have to pass before it becomes Socialist. Here again the position should not be simplified."(28)

The previous aura of optimism about the future prospects of the 'progressive' regimes was also severely restrained. Whereas during the Khrushchev era it had been the fashion to argue that the advance of these countries to socialism was inevitable, theorists after 1964 began to emphasise the difficulties in the path of these states and the dangers of socio-economic relapse. As one analyst was to point out:

"The great successes of the national liberation movement in countries led by revolutionary democrats do not mean, of course, that the smooth advance of these countries along the road of social progress is ensured....

... it can hardly be right to think that in countries led by revolutionary democracy there are no grounds for the appearance of regressive phenomena in social development. Experience proves the contrary."(29)

Without going into the details, it can also be demonstrated that the neo-conservatism of this period led to a reassertion of the role of the working class in the process of socialist transformation(30) and to a

28) 'The National Liberation Movement and Noncapitalist Path of Development', International Affairs, Sept.1964, p.42. Emphasis added. A classic example of the new found caution is provided by Ulyanovsksy in Pravda Apr. 15 1966. Among the tasks of the revolutionary democrats he specifies "the beginning of the transition to a progressive new social system, the adoption of initial measures against the further development of capitalism, the clearing from the path for socialist construction of the obstructions of colonialism....


30) See N.A. Simoniya: Narody Azii i Afriki no.6 1966, as translated in Mizan Mar/Apr.1967. On the question of development into socialism, Simoniya writes as follows. "The ascendancy of the world socialist system does indeed create the conditions for the development in question,
reaffirmation of the indispensability of Marxist-Leninist doctrine vis-a-vis the variants of national socialism. (31) One last point may be made to complete the description of the post-Khrushchev approach to the Third World. If, as seems clear, this reappraisal was inspired by general Soviet disillusionment with the performance of many of the Third World countries, then one net result of the reappraisal was the downgrading en bloc of the entire Third World in Soviet estimation. That this in fact occurred has already been hinted at in the stress on the international function of the internal progress of the Soviet economy. The downgrading of the Third World was also made explicit in another sense. It had been common practice under Khrushchev to argue that there were three equal components of the world revolutionary process - the socialist camp, the working class in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement. (32) Within the context of the 1964-5 reassessment, however, it now emerged that the national liberation movement could only be accorded a subsidiary role in the revolutionary process. A Pravda article was to broach this issue:

"Another ideological trend that has become widespread in recent years is the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic theory of the decisive role of the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process..... However, it is perfectly obvious that the socialist states, as before, are shouldering the principal burden in combating imperialism." (33)

30 (cont'd) but only for those revolutions in which leadership has passed into the hands of the workers. The fact that the capitalist road is not obligatory does not mean that the noncapitalist road is obligatory. To say that with the world ascendency of socialism the national liberation revolutions in general go beyond bourgeois democracy and that their tasks merge with the tasks of socialist revolutions, and to suppress the decisive internal factor of leadership of the workers, is to exaggerate the significance of the external factor, and to submerge the real distinctions between different national liberation revolutions." p.44-5. Simoniya is thus attacking the notion put forward by Brutents (see footnote 21) that the socialist system can act as a substitute for a mature working class.

32) See e.g. K. Brutents: 'Integral Part of the World Revolutionary Process' International Affairs, Feb.1964.
b) Policy Implications

The reaction which set in during the mid-1960's has been documented by several Western analysts as have the concrete policy modifications which accompanied the reappraisal. To sum up this new departure in Soviet policy, it has been fairly accurately established that the new approach was more cautious in nature, less given to extravagant optimism, more clearly concerned with practical calculations of economic and political benefit and less influenced by considerations of the progressiveness of the internal make-up of these regimes.

It would, of course, be wrong to imagine that new policy attitudes flowed solely from doctrinal reassessments. In fact, it is evident that policy and doctrine reinforced and reflected each other. In other words, the doctrinal reformulations that succeeded Khrushchev were not the idle products of ivory-tower ideologues but were closely related to actual developments in the Third World and in the USSR's relations with these countries. To take but one example: if after 1965 the USSR was less enamoured of 'progressive' regimes than before, then this was at least partially a consequence of the fact that there were less such regimes after 1965. In quick succession, such revolutionary democrats as Sukarno, Ben Bella and Nkrumah toppled in Indonesia, Algeria and Ghana respectively.

At any rate, the doctrinal literature accurately reflects one development which was occurring in Soviet policy. The net outcome of the political calculations of the new leadership as regards the Third World has been aptly summarised by one scholar:" From the new long-range perspective of revolutionary transitions, the distance between these 'progressive' countries and the other Afro-Asian states was considerably foreshortened and meant that the immediate priority attached to developing closer Soviet contacts with the 'progressive' group was no longer so much greater than that of expanding ties with the other Afro-Asia nations." (35)


Translated into substantive policy actions, therefore, the disillusionment with the former policy of devoting attention primarily to a handful of Afro-Asian regimes was reflected in a new policy, the keynote of which was a more equitable distribution of Soviet favours over a greater number of developing states with less attention paid to the internal complexion of the regimes concerned.

The implementation of this policy can be discerned in several areas of Soviet interest. R. Legvold has described it as it applied to West Africa. Pointing to the emergence of a newly-discovered Soviet interest in states like Senegal, Legvold observes that "after an early flush of optimism, the revolutionary sequel has elongated and expectations have moderated. During Khrushchev's last year there was that moment of fervour in contemplating the future of Ghana, Mali, Algeria and the UAR but by the summer of 1965 a more modest assessment appeared... As the conviction grows that the course of events in Africa is erratic, the more tolerable and plausible does the Soviet Union find relations with countries such as Senegal... Not surprisingly, a primary concern of Soviet African policy is to avoid isolation, that is, ties confined, however successfully, to Africa's radicals."(36)

Analysts have drawn attention to the same process in the Middle East. Referring to the coups in Algeria, Ghana and Indonesia, A.L. Horelick observed that "... On the policy level, diplomatic attention and new foreign aid began to shift toward a select few strategically critical 'non-progressive' developing countries most of which were 'reactionary' even by Western standards and some of which were allied to the United States. In the Middle East the most dramatic changes came with respect to Turkey and Iran..."(37)

This spreading of the 'overheads' of Soviet involvement in the Third World was also reflected in the aid commitments of the second half of the

1960's. These showed a marked levelling off from the first half of the
decade. Yellon has, in fact, calculated that as a percentage of national
product, Soviet aid commitments during 1965-68 were lower than for the
period 1957-60 and also than for the period 1961-64.(38) Moreover, he
points out that as interest and repayments on former loans was increasing
in the second half of the 60's "the net flow of aid from the Soviet Union to
developing Afro-Asian countries in 1965-67 actually declined slightly not
only as a percentage of national product compared with 1961-64 but also as
an absolute figure compared with the preceding three years 1962-64."(39)

It is also apparent from aid figures that the new commitments after
1965 were going to novel recipients rather than to the previously-favoured
regimes. Without claiming that the figures are absolutely accurate, this
pattern is nonetheless quite evident from the following table.

Soviet Aid Commitments (US $m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Progressive' regime

'Selected' regime

Senegal 7
Sierra Leone 28
Morocco 44
Pakistan 30 11 50 84
Iran 38.9 289
Turkey 200

(Source. The table has been compiled from figures provided in K. Muller:
'The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China' (Walker,
New York 1964), p.219 and M. Kovner: 'Soviet Aid to Developing Countries -
A Look at the Record' in J.W. Strong (ed.) 'The Soviet Union under
Brezhnev and Kosygin' (Van Nostrand, New York, 1971) p.63)

38) op. cit. p.278.
39) ibid. Yellon's argument can be illustrated from the case of India:
(see next page)
The table undoubtedly shows, with minor exceptions, that aid to the progressive regimes is clustered in the period prior to 1964 and aid to the non-progressive regimes in the period after 1964. The implications of this must, however, be approached with some caution. One of the major difficulties faced by the Soviet aid programme in the middle of the decade was the phenomenon of non-utilised aid. The magnitude of this problem can again be illustrated from the example of India, the greatest single recipient of Soviet aid.

Soviet Loans to India (Rupees crores)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Authorised</th>
<th>Utilised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>101.96</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>502.48</td>
<td>117.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>158.33</td>
<td>326.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-7</td>
<td>258.33</td>
<td>36.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,021.10</strong></td>
<td><strong>526.79</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From this it is clear that by the end of 1968, half of the authorised loans to India had not actually been disbursed. Not surprisingly, there were no new Soviet aid commitments to India after 1966. It must also be assumed that failure to digest the large amounts of aid authorised at the zenith of Khrushchev's economic largesse accounts for the apparent stoppage of aid to the 'progressive' regimes after 1965.

39 (cont'd)  
Soviet Aid to India (US $m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>Interest/Repayments</th>
<th>Net Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961/2</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962/3</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963/4</td>
<td>100.3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964/5</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>129.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/6</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/7</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/8</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>-12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/9</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>-14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/1</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>-28.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source. Information Research Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London. (RE. AS. July 1972) Table 4.)
Again, while it is true that, as Yellon has pointed out, after 1964 the progressive character of a regime was no longer quite the political touchstone for receiving Soviet economic assistance as before"\(^{40}\), this is, in a sense, but another way of saying that after 1964 factors of economic rationality intruded more conspicuously into the determination of the Soviet foreign aid programme.\(^{41}\) A striking example of this new attitude can be found in the comments of an Izvestiya article on the subject of economic development in the UAR in which economic rationality is revered in an exceptionally forthright manner:

"In the last year to year and a half, steps have been taken that should give a new impetus to the development of industrialisation. The implementation of certain uneconomical projects has been discontinued. A course has been set toward the development of branches for which sufficient quantities of local raw materials are at hand. Steps have been taken to increase the profitability of enterprises and to expand the rights of managers of state companies and enterprises. Profits, as well as the ability to enter foreign markets, have become the criteria of the success of the enterprises' work."\(^{42}\)

Nonetheless, the general conclusion remains valid that after 1964 the USSR no longer concentrated attention solely on a few select regimes but spread its favours around in a more promiscuous fashion. It can, therefore, be seen that the Soviet reaction to the high-point in its commitment to the Third World was a dual and, in some ways, a contradictory one: at the same time as it emphasised a much more critical attitude towards those regimes previously rated highly in the doctrinal stakes, it also seemed to advocate the turning of a blind eye to the more distasteful elements in those 'reactionary' regimes which Moscow now saw fit to cultivate. That is to say that the process of minimising doctrinal virtues (in the progressive states) was matched by a process of minimising doctrinal sins (in the less reputable regimes).

One way of reconciling this apparent paradox is to argue that the doctrinal content of Soviet assessments in the latter half of the 60's was

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40) op. cit. p.278.
41) See especially Jaster and Valkenier, op. cit.
markedly different from that of the early 60's. It will be shown in the next chapter that this process of 'convergence' was the result of a much more pragmatic approach on the part of the Soviet Union in consequence of which the most important criterion was no longer that of 'progressiveness' or 'backwardness' but rather an overall assessment of performance in the social, political, economic, strategic and international fields. On the basis of a balanced appraisal of performance throughout this entire spectrum, the Soviet Union now calculated which regimes were worthy, and to what extent, of a Soviet political investment.

This chapter has been devoted to the policy implications of the doctrinal reformulations which followed upon the establishment of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. These policy implications have been discussed in some detail because of their relevance for Soviet policy towards the subcontinent. It will now be argued that the respective Soviet attitudes to India and Pakistan changed in 1964 in conformity with the general pattern of 'convergence' between favoured and disfavoured regimes. Having done so, we will be in a position to understand the nature of Soviet moves towards India and Pakistan during 1964 and 1965. In short, it has been the function of this section to provide a context for Soviet diplomatic activity which, if it does not in itself explain this activity, at least provides us with a framework within which this activity becomes intelligible.
In the course of 1964, Soviet comment on India became much more critical than before and Soviet comment on Pakistan much less so: the disparity between the two countries, in Soviet estimation, appeared to be rapidly diminishing. It is this development which suggests the relevance of the general Soviet reappraisal of the Third World for the particular course of events on the subcontinent: in conformity with the broad pattern of expansion of Soviet interests in the Third World, which commenced in the middle of the decade, Soviet publicists seemed to be preparing the ground for a departure from the previous policy of cultivating only 'nonaligned' 'socialist-oriented' India and for a change of direction towards a strategy in which Pakistan would play a much more prominent part.

It will be the purpose of this chapter to illustrate the change of mood in 1964 as it applied to India and Pakistan. This will be done in the course of a description of the changing nature of Soviet comment on the two countries from 1964 to 1971. By doing this before embarking on the diplomatic analysis, we will have mapped out for us the major phases in Soviet relations with the subcontinent. It should, however, be noted that no attempt will be made in this chapter to explain the changing Soviet perception: this is more properly the task of the subsequent narrative. But by describing and dating the various switches in public Soviet assessments of India and Pakistan, attention will be focussed on prominent turning points in the development of Soviet policy, turning-points which will be examined in close detail in the later chapters of the thesis.

a) The Assessment of India 1964-71

There is a clearly discernible pattern in the Soviet assessment of India since 1955. The myopic euphoria of the Khrushchev period, interrupted only by a few gentle intimations of uneasiness in 1962, gave way in 1964 to an openly critical attitude which reached its peak around 1967-8. In 1969, Soviet comment began to reflect a slightly more optimistic assessment
and by 1971 a large measure of the former euphoria had been restored.

India was never considered, even at the height of the doctrinal improvisations of the early 1960's, to be a member of that select group of progressive regimes viewed in Moscow as having reached the stage of 'national democracy'. However, India was consistently the major recipient of Soviet aid from 1955(1) and until the early 1960's had received an effusively favourable press in the Soviet Union. Although India did not, therefore, strictly fall into that category of 'progressive' Third World states in as much as reform of its internal economic structure was not sufficiently advanced, it can be argued that India fell into a class of its own which, in terms of the magnitude of Soviet aid to the country and of the warmth of Soviet praise for its foreign policy, placed India in close proximity to the 'progressive' regimes in the order of Khrushchevian priorities. The uncritical atmosphere of this earlier period has indeed been aptly summarised in an article marking the 20th anniversary of Indian Independence. Noting that the "democratic movement (in India) has had its ebbs as well as its flows", the writer nonetheless went on to confirm that "until 1962 it marched from success to success."(2)

The first minor breach in this euphoric edifice came about as a result of the Sino-Indian confrontation in 1962, although such forebodings as emerged at the time were markedly low-key in comparison with what was to follow. Pravda set the tone when it observed on Nov.5 1962 that:

"those circles in India which seek to suppress the progressive democratic forces of the country and to drive India from a position of nonalignment into the embrace of the aggressive military blocs want to take advantage, for their own purposes, of the atmosphere of military intoxication."

Subsequent comment on this subject followed the same line of highlighting

1) During the period 1954-65, India was granted 1,022 million dollars in Soviet aid which represented 20.3% of total Soviet aid to developing countries and placed India at the top of the Soviet aid league. Pakistan's share for the same period represented 1.9%. From L.Tansky: 'US and USSR: Aid to Developing Countries' (Fraeger, N.Y. 1967), p.18-19.
2) A. Kutsenko: 'Independent India; Twenty Years' New Times, no.33 Aug.16 1967, p.10.
the potential danger from reactionary forces to the foreign policy posture of India. Shortly afterwards, Frol Kozlov echoed Pravda's admonition in his address to the tenth congress of the Italian Communist Party when he warned that:

"the imperialists and also the reactionary circles of India, who in a state of chauvinistic intoxication dream of smashing the Communist Party and the progressive forces of the country, would like to take advantage of this conflict to divert India from the path of neutralism and to draw it into the aggressive blocs of imperialism."(3)

Khrushchev himself in his report to the Supreme Soviet had a few words to say on the subject. Directing his attention to the flow of Western arms to India in the wake of the border war, he expressed his anxiety that "this action is also of advantage to the militarists because it sets back the development of democratic principles in India and creates conditions for strengthening the positions of the reactionary forces in the country... After all, it is no accident that arrests of communists and other progressive figures have been going on lately in India."(4) In the course of the following year, Pravda occasionally remembered the influence which the war had exerted on the Indian domestic situation and the harmful effect this was likely to have on the country's future. Thus, in one instance, having proclaimed approvingly that "for many years the right-wingers did not dare to oppose the policy of nonalignment openly knowing that it enjoys a tremendous popularity among the popular masses," the paper was nevertheless forced to concede that "the Chinese-Indian border conflict, especially the large-scale armed clashes in the Himalayas in October and November 1962 was a windfall for them. Right-wing circles succeeded in substantially strengthening their positions."(5)

It was during 1964-5 that there became apparent a quite noticeable increase in the hostility of Soviet observations on developments within India. And it is crucial for our purpose to realise that this new atmosphere

3) Pravda Dec.4 1962.
came about not only as a result of objective changes in the situation in India but also in consequence of the newly-emerging critical perspective of the Soviet leadership and of Soviet academic circles during 1964-5. That this was the case is amply revealed by the fact that many of the pessimistic appraisals now openly voiced in Soviet commentaries were retrospective in nature: the change then was in the eye of the beholder rather than in the object observed. This, in turn, places the new critical attitude towards India firmly within the context of that broader reassessment of the Third World which was discussed in the previous section and as a result of which Soviet analysts probed deeper and more realistically into the internal workings of the USSR's chosen few Third World allies.

That much of the hostile criticism of India which began to appear around the middle 60's was retrospective can be easily demonstrated. While scarcely a critical note on Nehru's policies had been sounded during his lifetime, in 1964 after his death, an article by Professor R. Ulyanovsky, the Central Committee's expert on the region, stated quite baldly that "the methods Nehru and the National Congress had chosen in an attempt to abolish inequality without revolution, that is, without a fundamental change in the system of ownership and in relations of production... were bound to fail. Socialism cannot be built and universal equality assured through a 'socialist pattern of society' as an 'intelligent combination' of socialism and capitalism, as the embodiment of 'cordial relations' between capital and labour in the interests of national progress... "(6)

Moreover, that Soviet uneasiness with the course of development in India was not a totally new phenomenon in the middle 60's but had been felt for a long time although never openly expressed and was only now being voiced in the more critical atmosphere of the post-Khrushchev period, has been implicitly admitted by one Soviet commentator. Noting that "the period of

independence is marked... by a rapid growth in the number and power of the national monopolies and the concentration of the vital links in the economy under their control" and "by manifestations not only of antagonism but also of cooperation between big monopoly circles and foreign capital", the writer goes on to admit that "it cannot be said that scientists have been unaware of these economic, social and political processes in India. More is now being said and written about them in view of the increased political activity of the Indian monopoly bourgeoisie and consequently of imminent serious clashes in Indian society and potential departures from the established course in foreign policy."(7)

The critical element in Soviet commentaries on India in the middle and latter 60's was more severe and much more wide-ranging than anything which had preceded it. Once we have established the broadly pessimistic tone of Soviet writings on India during this period, we will proceed to discuss the various aspects of Indian development which became the foci of critical Soviet attention.

With the knowledge of hindsight we can now see that the Soviet appraisal of India from 1964-9 was one of deepening socio-economic contradictions leading to a political crisis at the end of the decade. India, in the Soviet view, was entering a critical period by 1964-5. As one article put it "Shastri came to the helm of state power in India at a difficult time when the country had to solve a range of major foreign and domestic policy problems."(8) Mr. Kosygin was even more candid in a speech to a Soviet-Indian friendship meeting during Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union in July 1966. Although extremely restrained, his remarks are nonetheless quite exceptional for an occasion of this sort and betray the uneasiness with which India was regarded by the Soviet leaders at this time. Underlining the fact that India "has great tasks before it in developing an independent national economy" the Soviet Premier acknowledged

7) N. Savelyev: 'Monopoly Drive in India': International Affairs Apr.1967 p.35.
8) O. Oskolkov: 'Sovetsko-Indiyskoe Sotrudnichestvo' (Soviet-Indian Cooperation) M.E.i.M.O. no.5 1965, p.111.
that despite all difficulties the Indian people have managed to achieve quite a lot." However, he went on to add that "at the same time the Soviet people know that India is now living through a stage of national development when the problems facing it are becoming very acute and when a serious exertion of effort on the part of the whole people and a wise policy of their leaders are required to solve them."(9)

The problems which India was seen by Soviet analysts to be facing were multifold, falling under the general rubric of the growth of reactionary forces within the country. It was noted that "lately the reactionary parties in India have become much more active"(10), that "reactionary forces have tried to take advantage of the not inconsiderable economic difficulties in the country, the sharp aggravation of the food problem, inflation and unemployment..."(11) and that democratic public opinion was alarmed at "the growing activity of the Right-wing parties dedicated to the service of foreign and local Big Business, landowners and other exploiting groups and classes."(12) Associated with this and as a symptom of the general malaise was the growth of communalism as a serious disruptive element within the country.(13)

The changing balance of internal forces was also perceived to be politically manifested by the continuing arrest of communists under the Law on Defence of India, introduced during the 1962 confrontation with China. The use of this law to suppress the communist movement came under increasing attack from the Soviet Union during this period. An article by I. Aleksandrov stated the position quite bluntly:

13) See A. Azarkh: 'Aktivizatsiya Ultrapravykh v Indii' (Resurgence of the Ultra-Right in India) M.E.i.M.O., no. 10 1970.
"The detention of hundreds of Communists and Trade Union and
democratic figures in prison without trial or investigation
and the suppression of the rights of the working people
fighting for their interests are causing alarm not only
among the democratic public of India but also among its
friends. The just demands of the Indian democratic forces
for the restoration of all civil liberties are finding
support in many countries of the world. The Soviet press,
particularly Pravda, as well as the Soviet public have
repeatedly spoken out against the arrests of Indian
communists and other democrats."(14)

Moreover, the vulnerable position of the 'democratic forces' within
India was made even more so by the rupture within the Communist Party of
India. This was seen in Moscow as a totally undesirable development for
which Peking must take the responsibility but as a result of which the
'democratic forces' in India would suffer the consequences. The threat
of an open split (before this actually occurred) was therefore said to
be "arousing serious anxiety" as it would mean "the weakening of the posi­
tions of the whole democratic movement in India and a strengthening of
the forces of reaction."(15)

If the Soviet Union was disturbed by the growth of 'contagion from
the right', it was no less distressed by the growth of 'contagion from
the left'. This was partly reflected in the fear that the split in the
C.P.I. which occurred in 1964, and the formation of a 'parallel' party,
the C.P.I. (Marxist), would lead to a Peking-oriented faction in the
communist movement but it was also to be seen two or three years later in
Soviet attacks on the Naxalite movement which was understandably not very
well received in Moscow. This movement, launched in 1967, although it was
said to represent a "genuine protest" against agrarian conditions in India,
was to be condemned because "the views of many Naxalite leaders are based
on Maoist conceptions" and because "Naxalite terrorist activities in
different parts of India have caused the authorities to retaliate mainly

14) Pravda Mar. 5 1966
by introducing emergency laws that are directed against the working
peoples' mass movements in general". The movement was therefore "adventur-
istic" and caused "objective harm" to the Indian democratic forces. (16)

These unfavourable political developments were regarded as having
their roots in the profound economic difficulties experienced by India in
the middle of the decade. Again, most of these difficulties were attributed
to the process of monopolistic expansion and the growth of the influence
of monopolies over the policies of the country. It thus became the theme
of countless Soviet articles that "one of the most characteristic features
in India's present development is the accelerated formation and growth of
national monopoly capital" and that "the expansion of the Indian monopolies'
positions in the country's economy leads to intensification of their role
in political life" and permits them "largely to determine the direction of
its economic policy." (17) Moreover, monopoly capital was seen as working
hand in hand with foreign capital in an effort to undermine Indian attempts
to create an independent national economy. In short, the obverse side of
the expansion of monopolistic activities in the private sector was the
erosion of efforts to build up a healthy state sector capable of determining
the future direction of the national economy.

In this respect, there arose another source of Soviet discontent with
the performance of the Indian economy. Soviet aid had been directed princi-
pally towards the building up of a state industrial sector and the opinion

17) O. Mayev: 'India: Monopolies' Role in Politics: International Affairs,
Jan.1967, p.97-8. See also N. Savelyev, op. cit; A. Medovoy:
'Osobennosti Kontsentratsii Proizvodstva i Kapitala v Indii' (Features
of the Concentration of Production and Capital in India) M.E.i.M.O.
no.6 1965; O. Mayev: 'Indiyskiy Monopolistichesky Kapital' (Indian
Monopoly Capital) M.E.i.M.O. no.8 1966 and no.3 1967; O. Mayev:
'Politicheskaya Aktivizatsiya Indiyskikh Monopolistov' (Political
Activisation of Indian Monopolists) M.E.i.M.O. no.9 1967; O. Mayev:
'Ekonomicheskaya Programma Indiyskikh Monopolistov' (Economic Programmes
of Indian Monopolists) Narody Azii i Afriki no.5 1964.
was now increasingly expressed in Soviet circles that India was not utilising some of these Soviet-aided projects in the most efficient manner. This was revealed by the Indian Minister of Planning, Asoka Mehta, in the Lok Sabha:

“As far as satisfaction or otherwise about credits that had been extended to us in the past is concerned, the Soviet Government is satisfied with the work that has been going on except that they have a feeling that as far as the Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi and the Mining Machinery Manufacturing Corporation, Durgapur, these two major projects set up with Soviet cooperation, their functioning is not geared up to the optimum level.” (18)

Later, in 1968, after several Soviet experts had been despatched to India to look into those projects, Mr. S. Skachkov, Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, further testified to the existence of some friction in this field. Commenting on discussions held with the Indian Government, he was quoted by a Soviet Embassy publication, as saying that

"When things are in progress there unavoidably arise many questions of the process of development which demand their practical solution to make the progress successful... Our Governments approved concrete measures which will help strengthen the state sector of the Indian national economy, measures which are ensuring from mutual obligations to make important industrial projects in India profitable." (19)

The most striking feature of Soviet commentaries on India in the period 1964-9 is that, not content with drawing attention to these economic and political processes in India which were considered 'negative', Soviet spokesmen, for the first time since the Stalinist period, openly attacked the ruling Congress Party and the Indian Government and held them responsible for the course of development in India: problems were no longer dismissed as being the consequences of centuries of imperialist domination but were laid squarely and candidly at the doors of the Indian Government.

One of the main targets of Soviet abuse became the Congress 'pretension' to be building a socialist-type society. Such claims were now dismissed by Soviet commentators as a mere facade. Thus one article, having described

the growing economic and political power of the monopolies in India, went on to suggest that we "bear in mind that all this has taken place behind the official slogans about building a Socialist society."(20)

Another stated quite unambiguously that India's economy was being developed along the capitalist path of development although one of the main points of the programme of the ruling Indian National Congress calls for building a 'socialist-type' society"(21) and that the "results of the practical actions of Congress... are very far from realising socialist slogans."(22)

Not only had the Government failed to implement its socialist policy but it had even failed to carry through some of the most basic reforms in its programme. Because advocates "of a capitalist path for India have gained the upper hand in Congress policy-making circles",(23) the party's approach to reform had been "inconsistent and hesitant"(24) and the party was now "in a state of profound crisis" because "in its twenty years in office it has not lived up to the people's hopes and expectations."(25) It therefore came as no surprise in Moscow that the Congress showing in the 1967 elections was so disappointing. The result, according to Moscow Radio, was to be expected because "internal strife, fear of carrying out radical social reforms and as a result serious economic difficulties in the country, price increases and a lowering of living standards of the working people have all estranged from the Party a large number of voters."(26)

Far from stemming the tide of adverse economic trends, the Government, according to Moscow, had gone out of its way to aggravate some of the elements in the situation. Pravda's Delhi correspondent called the attention of his readers to the fact that "in the search for a way out of growing economic difficulties, the Government of India recently has been making more frequent

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20) N. Savelyev: op. cit. p.36.
22) A. Reginin: 'Borba v Natsionalnom Kongresse': (Struggle in the National Congress), Aziya i Afrika Segodnya, no. 9, 1965, p.25.
24) A. Kutsenkov: op. cit.
use of the method of attracting private foreign capital into the country and granting serious concessions to monopolies."(27) The strategic advance of monopoly power in the Indian economy had been "largely accelerated by various incentives such as the further liberalisation of tax policies, the slackening of Government control over prices..." and faced with the resultant array of economic and social problems "Government attempts to undo this tight knot of contradictions proved to be generally ineffective."(28)

Even in the realm of foreign policy, the Soviet Union was beginning to drop some gentle hints that all was not well with the Indian performance. An article on India's non-alignment policy written in 1968 contained several such innuendos. It criticised the appearance of a "negative tendency in the policy of non-alignment when some non-aligned countries refuse, as they put it, to 'take anyone's side' when an international crisis arises, i.e. refuse to condemn aggression even though they are well aware who really is the aggressor and who the victim."(29) Moreover, one manifestation of this tendency was the attempt to "abolish the distinction between a policy of non-alignment and a policy of neutrality, to deprive non-alignment of its anti-imperialist content."(30) Even more unambiguously, the article warned that Soviet aid was not to be taken for granted. It attacked those politicians in India who "talk about joining the Western bloc", and "slander the Soviet Union" but at the same time wish to continue economic cooperation with the socialist countries. In particular it singled out Ranga of the Swatantra Party who advocated that India join the US military bloc but "when the question arose of securing economic aid for the 1966-70 Fourth Five-Year Plan, recommended the PM of India to go to Moscow for the purpose."(31) Oblique as it may be, this clearly demonstrates that Moscow would not

28) N. Saveliev: op. cit.
30) ibid. p.22.
31) ibid. p.23
tolerate such behaviour on the part of India; and the warning would not have been issued if Moscow had not believed that there was a danger of India acting in this manner.

The great difficulties faced by the Indian Government and its inability to cope with them resulted, according to the Soviet account, in a political crisis towards the end of the decade. The 'polarisation of forces' which Moscow regarded as a dominant trend of the period, finally took its toll on the Congress Party and manifested itself in the split which occurred within it in 1969. In retrospect, it can now be seen that this event signalled the emergence once again of a more favourable Soviet appraisal of India. As one commentator put it, "the majority of Indian politicians noted the expansion of the influence of the ruling party, the Indian National Congress, amongst the masses after the departure from their midst of the Right-grouping known as the 'Syndicate'." (32) The positive effect of the split in Congress has been described even more succinctly. Citing the opinion of Congress leaders, P. Kutsobin wrote thus: "Yes, hitherto the Congress resolutions about a 'society on the socialist pattern' have remained on paper; but that has been chiefly because those who belonged to the party's Right-wing - and who have since had to quit the party - obstructed the implementation of those resolutions." (33)

The issue which had brought to a head the 'polarisation of forces' within the party was the decision, taken in July 1969, to nationalise 14 major banks in India. This decision, and the victory over the Syndicate scored by Mrs. Gandhi and her followers, were regarded as important events and were warmly received in Moscow as reflecting a more favourable balance of forces within the country. This was all the more so when the Government began to implement several reforms, in the course of 1970-71, including state control over some insurance companies, measures to strengthen the

state industrial sector and to increase the state import monopoly. One commentator, listing the various beneficial reforms carried out by the Government, described this policy as a 'new course'.

If the nationalisation of the banks and the expulsion of the Syndicate were regarded in Moscow as symptoms of a more favourable trend, the March 1971 elections were viewed even more as a decisive event for India - as "a great turning point in the history of its independent development." The elections thwarted "the attempt by Indian reaction to seize into their hands the basic levers of power by parliamentary means." Moscow Radio too joined in the glowing tributes to the impressive Congress victory. It was of the opinion that the "renovated Indian National Congress Party led by Mrs. Gandhi has won a formidable victory" and that the results represented "a major victory for the country's progressive forces."

The tone of Soviet comment on India since 1969 and more especially since the elections in March 1971 has been markedly more favourable than during the period 1964-9 and at times it has equalled the euphoria of the Khrushchev period. Once again there has been a tendency to stress Indian achievements and to play down the difficulties still to be overcome. The tone of the following piece amply demonstrates the point:

"Last March, according to a picturesque description by a Delhi journalist the millions of people in independent India opened, as it were, a new page in their country's history and, imbued with faith in radical reforms, firmly stepped into the 1970's. Today no one has any doubts that the snap parliamentary elections were a big political event of non-transient significance for the destinies of this great Asian state."

Leonid Brezhnev himself reflected the change of attitude towards India in his report, delivered on March 30, 1971, to the 24th Congress of the CPSU. Arguing that "in some countries the progressive forces have

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34) Iverov: op. cit. p.105-6.
35) ibid. p.105.
already scored serious gains" he maintained that one

"need merely recall, for instance, events like the recent nationalisation of the big banks in India and the impressive victory scored over the Right-wing forces at the last elections to the House of the People of the Indian Parliament. This is evidence that the masses of the people in that country resolutely oppose the reactionary pro-imperialist forces, and stand for the implementation of a land reform and other socio-economic transformations and for a policy of peace and friendship in international affairs."(39)

The change of mood is apparent in several respects. Whereas in 1966 we had been told that the public sector's share of investments under the five-year plans is increasing more and more slowly(40), we have now been informed that "the state sector in the economy is steadily growing in size and strength."(41) Whereas in the mid-60's it was argued that India had embarked irrevocably on a capitalist course of development, by late 1969 we find an eminent Third World specialist, Professor G. Mirskiy, telling us that the nationalisation of the banks and the split in the Congress Party "came as a surprise to those who were already inclined to regard India as a country which has firmly embarked on a practically classical capitalist road of development" and that the forces "convinced that only socialism can provide a solution" to the country's problems "are growing and gaining in strength."(42)

Again, in contrast to the many Soviet assessments of the period 1964-9 which stressed the strengthening position of reactionary forces in the country, we discover after 1969 that this process, "the dominant trend in recent years", has been "checked"(43), and that the "present situation in India is fundamentally different from that in 1967" because "the alignment of class and political forces has changed radically: the champions of democracy and progress have gained considerable ground while the Right has been retreating."(44) Moreover, whereas Soviet attention in the second half

41) Gryaznov: op. cit. p.53.
of the 1960's had been devoted to examination of the countless difficulties faced by India, the pessimists have recently been attacked because in the discussion of the "home policy of the Indian Government, reactionary forces are exaggerating the difficulties and deliberately ignoring the country's achievements". (45)

The chronological switches in the Soviet assessment of India during this period are, therefore, clearly demonstrable. In addition, it can also be seen, that the elements which enter into this assessment are multifold, relating to the economic progress of the country, the balance of internal forces, foreign policy and the nature and quality of the national leadership. It is now proposed to carry out a similar survey of Soviet comment on Pakistan.

b) The Assessment of Pakistan 1964-71

The pattern of the Soviet assessment of Pakistan during these years is similar, but in reverse, to that for India. Whereas the Soviet Union was concerned to convey a very favourable image of India in the latter 1950's and early 1960's, this period represented the nadir of the Soviet appraisal of Pakistan. From the mid-1960's, this appraisal began to improve, a trend which continued until 1969. In the second half of 1969, there once again began to appear a less optimistic portrayal of Pakistan and by the time of the 1971 crisis over Bangladesh, Soviet commentaries were as bitterly hostile to Pakistan as they had been at any time in the 1950's.

It should be stated clearly at the very outset, however, that the Soviet assessment of Pakistan, even at its most favourable, has never been so lavish in its praise as in the case of India. Thus, even when they have gone to considerable lengths to stress Pakistani achievements, Soviet commentators have always done so with greater qualification than in the case of India. At times, therefore, in the absence of positive Soviet approval of the deeds of the Pakistani regime, we are forced, in order to arrive at the Soviet attitude, to fall back on what the Soviet press and media have

had to say about the opposition parties and leaders within Pakistan. Criticism of the main opposition parties may be fairly interpreted as qualified support for the existing administration and favourable references to opposition movements may be regarded as oblique criticism of the ruling regime.

The Soviet view of Pakistan in the 1950's was not distinguished by its generosity. The division of the former Indian Empire into two parts had been received in Moscow as a classic example of 'divide and rule' and when Pakistan became a member of SEATO and CENTO Soviet spokesmen claimed to see in this the real purpose behind the 'imperialist plot' of creating a puppet Pakistani state. The fact that the state was officially based on the Islamic faith again did little to endear it with the USSR. A quasi-feudal economy and a grossly inequitable social structure, topped by a military clique, completed the Soviet picture of Pakistan at this time. Typically, the plight of the country was seen as being the direct consequence of inauspicious policies pursued by its leaders. This has been stated quite explicitly:

"Independence opened the way to free development, but for some 15 years the country marked time due to the unwise policies of the Governments, which first took the country into SEATO and then into CENTO, both aggressive blocs. Pakistani leaders looked to Washington and London for their foreign policy decisions. They took a hostile course as regards the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries."(46)

The country's leaders were also held responsible for the failure to overcome the economic backwardness 'inherited' from the colonial period. In order to do this they should have "altered the colonial structure of the economy", attempted to create "modern industry" and "especially heavy industry". However, as one observer was to lament,

"participation in imperialist military blocs and the reluctance of the ruling circles of the country to infringe the interests of the big capitalists and landowners prevented Pakistan from fully taking advantage of the possibility which opened up before it after the achievement of political independence."(47)

The first chinks of light in this generally gloomy picture began to make their appearance in the early 1960's. The major Soviet complaint at this time was evidently in relation to Pakistan's foreign policy and its alliances with the West. And it was in the context of foreign policy that the first subtle signs of a changing Soviet mood came into evidence. The emerging theme in Soviet commentaries was that there was a growing groundswell of Pakistani opinion which was demanding that Pakistan quit her Western alliances. On February 23, 1963, Pravda claimed that "more and more frequently, open demands are made that Pakistan leave SEATO and CENTO military blocs and establish friendly relations with all countries..." This opinion was to be expressed regularly in the course of the next two or three years. A major article in Pravda by A. Kutsenkov carried the same message that "more and more Pakistanis understand and are giving voice to the view that a future for Pakistan is possible only along the path of independent economic and social development, along the path of an independent foreign policy." Moreover, this groundswell of opinion was not confined to 'progressive' and 'democratic' elements but was being repeatedly expressed in the Pakistani Parliament. Such Soviet reporting constituted a definite advance on the period of the 1950's. At the same time it should be noted that this kind of Soviet comment is as much hortatory as it is factual. That is to say that it represented an appeal to Pakistanis to come out against participation in those alliances more than it betokened the realisation of such a reorientation on the part of the Government.

However, it was not long before Soviet commentaries passed to this next stage and it can be argued that this phase dates from the beginning of 1965. Whereas the Soviet media had until this moment been satisfied with commenting favourably on developments in Pakistani opinion, they now conveyed the impression that there had been important reorientations at the official level.

49) August 21 1965.
and that the Ayub administration was to be congratulated for its initiative in this field.

This signalled a major development in the Soviet assessment of Pakistan and constituted the first public avowal of confidence in the Ayub military regime. The new tone of Soviet utterances on Pakistan was striking in comparison with the abuse of the 1950's. Thus an editorial in New Times commenting on the 'new atmosphere' surrounding Pakistan's National Day celebrations in 1965, noted that "the trend towards a reappraisal of certain foreign policy tenets is now assuming practical expression... Latterly, there has been a marked trend towards eliminating political and economic isolation and promoting friendly relations and cooperation with Afro-Asian and socialist countries..."\(^{50}\) A year later the same journal again observed that "a sober appraisal of the situation enabled the present Government, headed by President Ayub Khan, to extend its foreign ties by establishing friendly relations with the socialist countries."\(^{51}\) Comment in the latter half of the 1960's continued in the same vein. One journalist argued that "Pakistan is clearly taking a generally independent line in foreign policy" and that "although Pakistan continues to be a member of both blocs, we were told, its practical participation has been whittled down to nil. There seems to be a good deal of truth in these words."\(^{52}\) A clear example of this new orientation in Pakistani foreign policy was said to be the refusal of the Government to "aid US aggression in Vietnam".\(^{53}\) By 1969, two Soviet correspondents were able to write something which would have been inconceivable a decade earlier: "... all critics of the present leadership of the country avoid in their statements appraisals of foreign policy. This is noteworthy. The foreign policy of Pakistan is not a convenient object for

52) Pyadychev: op. cit. p.78.
criticism. Its positive aspects are earning ever-increasing recognition in the world."(54)

This more favourable Soviet perception of Pakistan's foreign policy gradually percolated through to other spheres of Pakistan's political and economic life with the result that there was an improvement in the Soviet assessment over a wide-ranging spectrum of issues. As in the case of the optimistic phases of the Soviet appraisal of India, the emphasis changed from the faults of the Government to the enormous problems inherited from the colonial period, from the actual achievements of the Government to its declared intention of taking remedial action and from the vast tasks ahead to what had already been accomplished. This is apparent in relation to several facets of Pakistani life. Long lists of statistics began to appear to demonstrate the extent of economic growth in the period since independence.(55) Stress was also laid on the administration's resolve to overcome pressing social and economic problems. As one publicist has remarked "there was evidence of a change of direction in Pakistani policy a few years ago; the country set out to boost its economy and fight poverty and dislocation", and again "in the last few years, the government has taken resolute steps to set up a national industry, drawing up five-year plans and a 20-year master-plan of economic development. President Ayub Khan said that as a nation the Pakistanis had accepted planned economic development and the five-year plan was a concrete programme of action."(56) Moreover, in dealing with what was considered to be Pakistan successes, comment was kept to a high degree of generality. Typical of this is the observation that in the years of Pakistan's independence "and especially in the last decade, Pakistan has succeeded in solving or in bringing significantly closer to a solution a number of difficult problems left to it as the legacy of the dark age of

56) Pyadyshev op. cit. p.77 & 79.
colonialism."

Concrete examples are conspicuous by their absence from this assertion.

Implicit Soviet support for the continuance of the Ayub regime and for the military administration which succeeded him was clearly revealed during the political crisis which developed in Pakistan in late 1968 and early 1969. Soviet reporting during this crisis voiced total distrust of the various opposition parties in Pakistan and, as such, may be regarded as an oblique expression of a preference for the status quo in the country. The motives behind the political unrest in the country were viewed with barely concealed suspicion in Moscow and a considerable effort was invested in conveying the impression that Ayub was more sinned against than sinning.

The Soviet line was clearly indicated in a Pravda article written by its Karachi correspondent, A. Filippov. The direction in which Soviet sympathies lay was suggested in no ambiguous fashion. Thus Filippov argued the rather tenuous case that the demonstrations which were breaking out all over the country did not have "an anti-government character". In spite of this, the opposition parties were taking advantage of the discontent to serve their own interests. As a result "there appeared slogans directed against Ayub Khan in which frankly pro-Peking elements displayed especial zeal." While sympathising with the workers in their demands for higher wages and better working conditions, Filippov remarked that "very often these demands bore no relation to the provocative acts of the oppositionists." Moreover, among the ranks of the oppositionists there were beginning to operate extremist anti-government forces "who were not squeamish about the complication of the situation - by violence, by arson and by provocations."

The general impression conveyed was that the opposition parties were suspect in Moscow's eyes for being either pro-Chinese or pro-American. And if it was not intended to tar all the parties with the same brush, then little was said to avoid this implication. Not a single party was singled

58) April 1 1969.
out as having some redeeming grace. This predominant theme was taken up again the following day in an article headlined suggestively 'Maulana to the Right and Maulana to the Left'. (59) Once more the impression created was that the choice which lay before the Pakistani people in the absence of the military administration would be the Scylla of pseudo-socialist pro-Peking extremists or alternatively the Charybdis of reactionary, religious-chauvinist pro-American elements. The consequence of the implementation of the programme of the latter parties would be "the transformation of Pakistan into a theocratic state and an attempt to restore in the country a feudal socio-economic order." (60) But both extremes were equally to blame for the current crisis in Pakistan. As one commentator was to put it, despite differences in ideologies and programmes, both right and left were united in their desire to make political capital out of the situation. In short, the actions of the opposition forces "prevented a constructive solution of the major vital problems facing the country." (61)

As will be seen in a later chapter, the favourable Soviet picture of, and implicit support for, the Ayub administration was inherited by its martial law successor, headed by former C-in-C Yahya Khan. However, there are numerous indications that Yahya's enjoyment of Soviet blessing was but short-lived and that within the year the Soviet view of the Pakistani leadership had become somewhat jaundiced: the trend towards ever more glowing reports about Pakistan came to a gradual halt in the second half of 1969 and was reversed soon after that.

A subtle reappraisal of the Pakistan regime became evident in Soviet reports on the election campaigns of 1970. In contrast with the sympathy which had been expressed for the state's leadership in early 1969, Soviet reporting now became critical of some aspects of the administration's policies. A typical example of the new perspective can be found in the following

60) Yu. Gankovsky op. cit. p.81.
61) ibid. p.81-2.
Mass unrest in East Pakistan and widespread strikes all through last year clearly show that the serious socio-economic problems which precipitated the crisis of President M. Ayub Khan's regime have not yet found their positive solution. The country's economy is still controlled by powerful local monopoly groups and the position of foreign capital is as strong as ever. The peasants, who constitute the bulk of the population, continue to suffer from poverty and lack of land and living standards on the whole remain low."(62)

Symptomatically, although the Communist Party had been banned in Pakistan throughout the past decade and a half, it was at this point that Moscow thought fit to publicly comment on the fact. The same article went on to point out that "Pakistani public opinion is surprised that the government's decision to lift the ban on political activity does not extend to the Communist Party. There is a growing demand for its legalization."(63)

Izvestiya too carried an article on the 'complicated' situation in Pakistan, noting the extent of industrial unrest and of political demonstrations within the country. Although it conceded that Yahya had only been in power for a short time, it nonetheless was critical of the fact that the new administration had not found its way out of the "tangled labyrinth" of its problems. "The majority of them are as yet not solved" it added.(64)

This same pattern in the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan can be traced out from another angle. If Soviet commentaries on the opposition parties within Pakistan were at various times indicative of their attitude to the prevailing regime, then this was especially true of observation on the separatist movement within East Pakistan. Evidently, any effort to convey a positive impression of developments within the country would necessitate the adoption of a critical approach towards the regime's opponents in the Eastern wing of the state. By the same token, public support of the secessionist movement can not but be construed as implicit Soviet opposition to Rawalpindi. Approached from this perspective, the above pattern repeats itself.

63) ibid. p.11.
During the period 1964-9, such Soviet comment as there was on the situation in East Pakistan and on the movement for autonomy for that region was acutely hostile to that movement and staunchly behind the central government. Thus the first references to discontent within the Eastern wing of the country were in the context of imperialist plots to keep Pakistan bound to the SEATO and CENTO alliance structures and to aggravate tension between India and Pakistan. Thus Moscow Radio observed that it was in an attempt to "sow dissension" in this region that "the American imperialists are also taking an interest in separatist trends in East Pakistan." (65)

An even more explicit statement of the Soviet view was to come later that same year in a hard-hitting article by Pravda's A. Filippov. It charged that "chauvinist and separatist elements are taking advantage of the difficult lot of the people and of the division of the country for their own interests". However, it went on to add that these elements found "no support amongst true patriots." Any division within the country would be inimical to the interests of the working class as a whole. As Pravda put it "democratic organizations consider that the successful struggle for the rights of the working class and for an improvement in living conditions depends on unity of action and solidarity of the workers of both parts of Pakistan. But this is possible only in the conditions of a united Pakistani state." Finally, Filippov accused that the elements adopting secessionist positions were exactly those which "came out against the Tashkent Declaration, and favoured 'confrontation' with India." (66) In the circumstances of the time this was the most damning indictment which the Soviet Union could bring against anyone.

Up to this point, the Soviet media had talked but vaguely about secessionist elements without referring specifically to any party and without naming any names. In the course of 1967, there was a new development in this respect. Moscow Radio noted that there existed in both India and

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Pakistan parties "seized by a chauvinistic fervour and encouraged by imperialist circles" and that in Pakistan "a chauvinistic campaign is being led by the leaders of the Right-wing parties". (67) Heading the list of these parties is the People's League (Awami League). Just what Moscow thought of this party at that time has been colourfully revealed in one of the Soviet Union's less prescient pieces of propaganda:

"The country's security organs have uncovered other facts of CIA activity in the country. The American agents in East Pakistan are fanning separatist feelings there. The Americans have come into close contact with the leaders of the Awami League party. Under their influence the party has come out with a memorandum on the so-called six points of political and economic autonomy in East Pakistan. For this memorandum the Party leadership was given 6,000,000 rupees - 1,000,000 for each point. The reactionaries from the Awami League have exposed themselves for the whole country to see as American hirelings and traitors of the nation's unity." (68)

This attitude was maintained until 1969. One journal, commenting on the events in Pakistan in late 1968 and early 1969 took exception to the many acts of violence perpetrated by "extremist elements" in East Pakistan. (69) And once again the bogey was raised of Peking's hand in the situation. The movement for autonomy was suspect because it was the "extremist pro-Peking element" which was calling for the "complete secession of East Pakistan". (70) By implication the Awami League was furthering the designs of Peking.

By 1970, the Soviet Union had apparently performed a complete volte-face on the question of East Pakistan and, by suggestion, in their attitude to the central government. Izvestiya reflected the changing perspective in an article which went out of its way to demonstrate that the union between East and West Pakistan was purely artificial, that political, economic and cultural links between the two wings had only begun to be forged after 1947, and that the union was based on one factor alone - religion. (71) Gone is

67) Moscow Radio, Jan.3 1967
68) Radio Peace and Progress, Mar.16 1967
69) Yu. Gankovsky op. cit. p.82.
any reference to the unity of the two parts being the prerequisite for the attainment of the interests of the working people of Pakistan.

Even more striking is the mutation which the Awami League has undergone by 1970. From being a tool of the reactionaries, we discover now that the People's League is one of the group of parties "standing in the vanguard of the Left-wing forces" and that it is headed "by the distinguished East Pakistani politician Mujibur Rahman." Further evidence of a move away from the regime in Rawalpindi and in favour of the movement for autonomy in East Pakistan was to be provided in 1971. In contrast with Soviet reporting on the situation in early 1969 with its implicit support of the status quo in the country, Soviet reporting of the crisis which developed in March 1971 reflected no such bias. It confined itself to factual accounts which showed the central government in an extremely unfavourable light. I do not propose at this point to embark on a study of Soviet policy during the 1971 crisis as this constitutes the subject of a later chapter: however, some illustration of the changes in the Soviet attitude as between 1969 and 1971 may be in order.

One example of this is to be found in the Soviet portrayal of the economic relationship between East and West Pakistan. As late as mid-1969 a Soviet journal, while conceding that East Pakistan was still economically backward, could still argue that this situation persisted in spite of the fact that "the ruling circles had taken serious measures to hasten the development of East Pakistan". By 1971 the same author was presenting a somewhat different picture. He showed that whereas in East Pakistan the money assigned to economic development represented 240 rupees per head, in West Pakistan the figure was 521 per head. This theme was taken up with enthusiasm. The picture now presented was that the relationship between the two halves was like that "between a metropolitan and a colonial"

73) Yu. Gankovsky op. cit. p.79.
country and that "the ruling clique of the country followed a policy aimed at preserving the economic backwardness of the Eastern province and at subjecting its economy to the interests of the development of West Pakistan."(75)

The role of the Yahya administration has been presented both during the crisis of 1971 and subsequently as one of utter nefariousness. His decision to hold elections with the aim of transferring power to a civilian government has been described as a "manoeuvre" calculated to appease the nation by giving it the semblance of parliamentary institutions. (76) As Yahya's reputation became increasingly tarnished in Soviet eyes, so the prestige of the Awami League went from strength to strength. Even at the commencement of the crisis it could be portrayed as embodying the "aspirations" of the people, a far cry from the days when it was seen as a tool of Washington or Peking, exploiting the difficulties of the country. (77)

It may be noted by way of conclusion that Soviet statements about Pakistan have become considerably more optimistic since the arrival of Bhutto's civil administration. This is in a sense surprising since few politicians in the region have been singled out for such abuse by the Soviet Union in the past as has Mr. Bhutto. He has been repeatedly denounced as an opponent of the Tashkent Declaration, as being rabidly anti-Indian and as being notoriously pro-Chinese. As late as 1970 he was the object of a Soviet hate campaign. (78) During the course of 1972 and 1973, however, Pakistan and Mr. Bhutto have received a very favourable press. Moscow claims to see in the present course of Pakistan a more realistic foreign policy, the preconditions of normalisation on the subcontinent and the prospect of important socio-economic changes in the

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75) O. Oskolkova: 'Narodnaya Respublika Bangladesh' (Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh): M.E.i.M.O., no.5 1972, p.139 & 140.
One final point needs to be made. This chapter has sought to establish the pattern in the fluctuations of the Soviet appraisal of India and Pakistan. It must be stressed, however, that these changes in assessment pertain to comparisons between the previous and subsequent performance of individual countries: they do not relate to comparisons between countries. That is to say that, in 1964, when the Soviet Union adopted a more realistic view of India in which the shortcomings of that country were no longer ignored, it also developed a view of Pakistan which placed more emphasis on its virtues and less on its failings. This does not mean that Pakistan became more doctrinally acceptable to the Soviet Union than India. Although India dropped down in Soviet estimation and Pakistan moved up, there was still a considerable gap between the two, in India's favour. This can be strikingly illustrated in an article comparing India and Pakistan which was published at the very time when the Soviet Union was becoming more critical of India and less so of Pakistan. The article clearly reveals the fundamental differences in the Soviet perception of the two countries and as such deserves quotation at length:

"India is a very typical example of a former colonial country which has taken the path of industrial development within the world capitalist system. She meets enormous difficulties in this path due to her colonial past and the resistance put up by imperialism and internal reaction which are hindering the development of an independent national economy. However, basing herself on her sovereignty and independent national policy, India has scored important successes in laying the foundations of her economic independence.

Industrial development in Pakistan has taken a different path. After reaching state independence, her ruling circles found themselves in the wake of the Western Powers which have drawn the country into their neo-colonialist military-political blocs. These circles refuse to wage an active struggle for the country's economic independence.

A comparison of the results of industrial development in India and Pakistan shows what additional difficulties lay in the way

of those young states who in their economic programmes orientate themselves towards the 'aid' and 'support' of their former colonisers or other imperialist powers. The examples of India and Pakistan can serve to illustrate two different approaches to the problem of industrialisation and the state sector in the industry of the newly liberated countries. During the same years of their independence, India, while opting for the state sector has to a certain extent succeeded in strengthening her economic independence, whereas Pakistan, having entangled herself in imperialist blocs, has failed to achieve any considerable progress."

In summary, it may be stated that as of the beginning of 1965, two emerging trends in the Soviet attitude towards India and Pakistan had become clearly discernible. At the one level, there persisted various indications that the USSR's preferences lay with India rather than with Pakistan, despite the less complimentary tone now adopted when referring to the former; at the other, it was also clear that the gulf between India and Pakistan in Soviet estimation was no longer as yawning as it had been only a few years previously. If, in the race for Soviet favours, India was still leading by a short neck, then at least it was no longer a one-horse race. The considerations which led to this rapprochement between the USSR and Pakistan is the subject of the following chapter.

80) V. Rymalov: 'Industrial Development in South and South-East Asia': International Affairs, October 1964, p.45-6.
Chapter 4

The Rapprochement with Pakistan

Taken in conjunction with the Bhutto visit to Moscow in 1960 to negotiate an agreement on Soviet assistance in the exploration of oil and the various repercussions of the Sino-Indian war, such as alleged Soviet disillusionment with India and friction in US-Pakistani relations over the supply of Western arms to India, many commentators have opted for the years 1960-62 as the decisive ones in effecting a Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement.

Notably, one historian of Soviet policy towards Pakistan has urged that "certain events in 1961-62 provided a major break-through in Soviet-Pakistani relations" and another has argued that "if the Sino-Indian conflict had brought into sharp focus the degree of Soviet commitments to India, it also marked the beginning of a process set in motion by the Soviet Union to broaden the base of its South Asia Policy." (2)

However, it is the contention of this thesis that, on the evidence of Soviet and Pakistani sources, such a position is untenable and that to argue in support of it is to confuse the emergence of the preconditions for a rapprochement with its actual realisation. It is of considerable importance to the subsequent argument of the thesis that we should have a clear perception of the significance of the improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations and of the precise date by which a major break-through had been achieved.

Indeed, only by bringing greater accuracy into the timing of the rapprochement can we understand the nature of this development in Soviet foreign policy. And in this respect it is crucial, in examining the evidence, that we distinguish between minor gestures which might, or might not, presage a change in policy and changes of self evident political substance. On the basis of such a distinction, it is impossible to date a Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement any earlier than the very end of 1964 or the beginning of 1965. There

are few, if any, signs of a Soviet attempt to reconsider its Pakistani policy before this date.

The evidence on this point is quite substantial. Thus although discussions between the two countries on economic cooperation around 1959-60 and the signing of the oil exploration agreement were important gestures, they did nothing to alter the political realities. As a Soviet historian of Soviet-Pakistani relations has been quick to point out, the negotiations for establishing economic links between the two countries were accompanied by officially inspired newspaper articles in Pakistan to the effect that "when the Russians conclude an agreement, they must clearly understand that it will not exert any influence on Pakistan's foreign policy and its participation in the military blocs." References in this hostile vein continued during 1963 and 1964. A letter of January 1963, circulated by the CPSU to the various communist parties abroad, drew attention to the fact that Pakistan was a member of "the aggressive SEATO pact" and accused China of negotiating a pact with "this appendage of the capitalists". Over one year later, there was little apparent change in the Soviet attitude. In his report to the plenum of the Central Committee on February 14 1964, M. Suslov included in his indictment of Maoist foreign policy the following passage:

"It cannot be denied that the Chinese leaders' approach to the selection of friends and allies is rather strange. It may be asked: How is it possible to pour filth on the socialist countries and the Communist Parties and at the same time, and in the eyes of the whole world, shower compliments on the reactionary regime of Pakistan? This is simply incomprehensible."(5)

That the Soviet position in practice did reflect this stubborn indifference to Pakistan has been confirmed by President Ayub himself. According to a Pakistani report, President Ayub, replying to a question as to why Russia was still not coming closer to Pakistan in spite of Pakistani efforts in that direction, remarked that "it was the sweet will of a country to

5) Pravda, Apr.3 1964.
respond to the call of friendship of another country. If a country did not want to have good relations, what could the other country do?"(6) Moreover, much of the case for saying that a Soviet-Pakistan rapprochement had been achieved by 1962 rests on the attempts to increase economic links between the two countries. But even in this sphere the attitudes of the two sides were far from cooperative. The Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan expressed his concern that "there was no response from the Pakistan Government to Soviet proposals for improvement of trade"(7), a feeling which was officially emphasised by the Soviet Embassy in Karachi. In a special press release, the Embassy noted that "further communication on the subject of increase in the volume of trade between the USSR and Pakistan was being awaited from the Pakistan Minister of Commerce."(8) It went on to add that "this fact cannot but be considered as a sign of the uncooperative attitude on the part of the Ministry towards the proposals made to it." Conversely, the Pakistan Central Minister for commerce was to reveal that a trade agreement still had not been signed more than a year later for the reason that "up till now I have not found the terms forwarded by Russia suitable for Pakistan for signing a trade agreement."(9)

Again, if we look at the Soviet stance on the Kashmir question, there is no indication whatsoever of a modification in favour of Pakistan at this early date. In June 1962, the Soviet Union was to use her Security Council veto in support of India's position on the question. Even as late as the Security Council meetings of February and May 1964, Fedorenko, the Soviet delegate, can be found reaffirming the Soviet position adopted as far back as 1955:

"As to the substance of the Kashmir problem, the Soviet Union's position in principle has, as we all know, been repeatedly stated by Mr. Khrushchev, the head of the Soviet Government, and by the representatives of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council chamber. The position of the Soviet Union

7) Hindu, Mar.9 1963.
8) Dawn, Apr. 4 1963. The Soviet Union had submitted proposals for such an increase in trade in August 1962.
is that the question of Kashmir's belonging to India has already been decided by the Kashmiri people."(10)

There is, therefore, nothing to suggest a change in the official Soviet attitude towards Pakistan as late as the middle of 1964. Such a state of affairs has indeed been confirmed by the Pakistani Ambassador to Moscow who declared towards the end of March 1966, at the inauguration of the Soviet-Pakistani Friendship Society that "two years ago he had been so pessimistic of Pakistan-Soviet relations that he would not have even dared to mention them."(11)

It is, however, possible to detect signs of a rapprochement by late 1964 or early 1965. Tass noted that a long spell of cold relations between the USSR and Pakistan started showing the first signs of a thaw during Foreign Minister Bhutto's visit to Moscow in January 1965.(12) Even so, the fact that this development was of very recent vintage and that the process of normalisation had not gone a very long way, is strikingly revealed in Ayub's own account of his trip to Moscow in April 1965:

"We had a formal conference in Mr. Kosygin's office on a bitterly cold and gloomy afternoon. Mr. Kosygin had Mr. Polyansky, Mr. Gromyko, and some other members of the government with him. The atmosphere inside the room was no less cold in spite of central heating. The Soviet delegation looked stolid and sullen. .... Mr. Kosygin started speaking, I thought, with considerable caution and restraint.... He then raised the question of Pakistan's membership of SEATO and CENTO, in which, as Mr. Kosygin put it, 'the US rules the roost'. He talked specifically of the U-2 incident which had generated much mistrust.... I then explained that our presence in the Pacts was serving as a moderating influence and, in any case, the Pacts were not hurting the USSR. Mr. Kosygin said, "They may not be hurting us, but they give us no pleasure either."(13)

The atmosphere conveyed by Ayub is not one of intimate friendship between the leaders of the two countries. However, there was almost unanimous recognition that the Ayub visit constituted a major step in the process of normalisation between the USSR and Pakistan. Ayub himself argues that by the time of his second interview with the Soviet leaders "the atmosphere

was distinctly different; already, there was much warmth and understanding.\(^{(14)}\)

Allowing for Ayub's proclivity to maximise his personal role in the process, the point still stands that 1965 was an eventful year for Soviet-Pakistani relations. Mr. Kosygin was able to express the view at a reception for President Ayub that "thanks to the joint efforts of the Governments of the Soviet Union and Pakistan our relations have improved of late, gradually ridding themselves of unnecessary overburdens\(^{(15)}\) while Dawn, commenting on the Ayub trip, saw fit to pronounce that "a thaw in Pakistan-Soviet relations... is now definitely discernible."\(^{(16)}\)

Such a chronology finds confirmation in the niceties of official Soviet protocol, the precision of which is nothing if not scrupulous. While India had been honoured annually in the slogans issued by the Central Committee to mark May Day and the anniversary of the Revolution, as late as October 18 1964, Pakistan was still omitted from the lists, although all the other countries in the region (Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan) were mentioned.\(^{(17)}\) It was only in the May Day slogans of 1965 that Pakistan obtained its first reference and then it was in a group of countries some seventeen slogans after India.\(^{(18)}\) By May Day 1966, Pakistan was given the honour of a slogan of its own, coming immediately after that of India.\(^{(19)}\)

Two points remain to be made. Such a timing of an improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations coincides with the emergence of the more sympathetic Soviet portrayal of Pakistan in 1964-5 which was discussed in the previous chapter. Secondly, if the rapprochement with Pakistan did not find tangible expression much before 1965, neither could it have occurred much after this date. A precondition of the Tashkent Conference was the appearance of an impartial Soviet posture as between India and Pakistan. If there

14) ibid. p.172.
15) Full text of speech in Dawn, Apr.5 1965.
16) Dawn, Apr. 5 1965; For further statements on the importance of the Ayub visit, see remarks of A. Gromyko, Dawn, Feb.19 1966; V. Kassis, Dep. Editor of Izvestiya, Dawn, Feb.23 1966.
18) Pravda, Apr.22 1965
had been no serious improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations prior to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Ayub could not have agreed to go to Tashkent. As one Soviet journal was to put the point later "without such trust would Pakistan ever have asked Premier Kosygin to act as mediator in producing the Tashkent Declaration?"(20)

The timing of this development in Soviet foreign policy is so crucial because all the indications are that, in terms of tangible political consequences, the rapprochement was almost entirely a post-Khrushchevian phenomenon.(21) The significance of this, in turn, lies in the fact that this places the Soviet cultivation of its relations with Pakistan firmly within the context of that general Soviet reappraisal of its relations with the Third World(22) which was carried out in 1964-5. One of the practical outcomes of this reappraisal, it will be recalled, was to be a geographical widening of Soviet relations with the Afro-Asian world (even though there was a simultaneous narrowing of the Soviet commitment to some of the countries in this area). The emphasis was, therefore, coming to be placed on a wide cultivation of the Third World rather than on a narrow concentration on a few key regimes.

That the Soviet cultivation of its relations with Pakistan is to be viewed in the context of some such wider policy is clearly demonstrable. Addressing the Security Council in September 1965, the Soviet spokesman, Morozov, declared that "the strengthening of the ties uniting the Soviet Union and Pakistan is part of my Government's general policy directed towards

21) Failure to come to terms with this basic chronology has led to some curious arguments. J.A. Naik, while claiming that the new Pakistan policy was the achievement of the post-Khrushchev team, inconsistently cites Suslov's remarks in his Plenum Report as evidence for the contention that the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership "did not succeed in evolving an ideological framework" for this new policy. Evidently, Suslov's speech (Feb.14 1964) preceded the new Government by many months. Suslov's speech merely reinforces Naik's original assertion that the new Pakistan policy only emerged after the ouster of Khrushchev. See J.A. Naik: Economic and Political Weekly July 17 1971: and 'India, Russia, China and Bangladesh (New Delhi 1972), p.45.
22) Discussed in Chapter 2 above.
safeguarding peace in Asia..."(23) More specifically, relations with Pakistan were viewed directly in the context of a broad lateral initiative vis-a-vis the countries on the Soviet Union's southern borders - Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. This has been explicitly and repeatedly asserted by the Soviet media. At the time of Ayub's visit to Moscow in April 1965, the Soviet weekly 'Moscow News' commented that it was a "landmark in the development of cooperation and understanding between the two countries" and then went on to add the following observation:

"The normalisation of Soviet-Pakistani relations is not an isolated fact. The process has been accompanied by a considerable improvement in the Soviet Union's relations with Iran and Turkey and the establishment of really friendly cooperation with other neighbouring countries in the east."(24)

The following year Pravda drew attention to the "desire to be free of the rut of the imperialist powers' bankrupt policy" which, it claimed, was manifesting itself "more and more noticeably in influential political circles of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan."(25) And significantly, when Pakistan obtained its first mention in the May Day slogans of 1965, it was in a wish that "the friendly relations between the Soviet people and the peoples of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey develop and grow stronger."(26)

An editorial in New Times also took up the same theme. Referring to the mutual visits between the USSR and the countries on its southern flank, the journal noted that "while each of these meetings was primarily designed to discuss relations between the two countries concerned, together they reflected the general new atmosphere that has developed in these past years around the Soviet Union's southern borders" and that "no one today can help seeing how greatly the international atmosphere between the Bosporus and the Indus has changed."(27)

23) S.C.O.R. Yr.20, Mtg. 1237, Sept.4 1965, p.36.
26) Pravda, Apr. 22 1965; See also Moscow Radio Aug.9 1965; Speech by Polyan'sky: "In the past year we took new steps that promoted the consolidation of friendship with Afghanistan and India... The improvement of relations with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey." Pravda, Nov.7 1965.
To say that this lateral offensive of the Soviet Union was in conformity with its general reappraisal of the Third World is not, of course, to deny that there were particular, and very real, regional pressures which exerted influence on Soviet policy. It is merely to suggest that in view of the recurrence of this pattern in other regions, more general considerations should also be borne in mind. Nonetheless, it is apparent that certain regional developments were providing powerful incentives for just such an initiative on the part of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet leaders were undoubtedly eager to exploit the growing disillusionment with the Western alliances, currently being expressed in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, the main links in the 'northern tier' containment policy. This disillusionment was perhaps most deeply felt in Pakistan. Since Pakistan had become a member of the Western alliances specifically to improve its regional position vis-a-vis India it came as no surprise that Ayub reacted adversely to the advent of a Kennedy administration which brought with it a proclaimed policy of making India a 'leader in Asia' and which more tangibly, began to send large-scale military aid to India in the aftermath of the border war with China in 1962. Little credence was placed in American assurances that these weapons would not be used against Pakistan. In short, exploitables anti-American sentiments were being vociferously expressed in Pakistan. As one Soviet account of the period has noted "the open acknowledgement of a reorientation in US South-East Asian policy towards India aroused a wave of indignation in Pakistan." (29)

It was the emergence at the official level of a growing Pakistani inclination to reconsider its former foreign policy priorities which created the immediate preconditions for a Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement. The following speech by Foreign Minister Bhutto could not have failed to make a favourable impression on the Soviet leaders:

28) In justifying Pakistan's membership of the pacts to the Soviet leaders, Ayub argued that "India's avowed policy was to isolate us and we had to seek friends somewhere." M.Ayub Khan, op. cit. p.171.

29) Kompantsev: op. cit. p.142.
"Perhaps that time has come for Pakistan to consider and to review its global interests, its foreign policy and its basic and fundamental national interests with the changing circumstances... When the Sino-Indian conflict arose in 1962 at that time we were told that the United States' and the United Kingdom's assistance to India was on an emergency basis... Now, we have the announcement that there is going to be long-term military assistance from the US to India... So that is a radical change in the situation. Sir, the time has come for us to review the situation in the country, to review our liability because although we had undertaken certain political commitments, these commitments were undertaken in an entirely different situation. The present situation is such that it would be dereliction of duty on our part if we are not to review our political and military liabilities..."(30).

Significantly a Soviet writer was later to observe that "a definite reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy in the early sixties made for an enlivenment of Soviet-Pakistani relations."(31)

There was a further motive to improving relations with Pakistan in strategic developments of this period. One analyst has drawn attention to the fact that "the north-west corner of the Indian Ocean (the Arabian Sea) an area of low interest for possessors of the Polaris A1 and A2, becomes altogether more attractive to the possessor of the A3, because from there the A3 exposed to attack all areas between the Western Soviet border and Eastern Siberia, on an arc extending almost as far north as Leningrad and including all main areas from the Ukraine to the Kuzbas."(32) It is not necessary to postulate a Soviet ambition to acquire naval facilities in this region (Iran and Pakistan) in order to understand the heightened importance which this development conferred on the littoral states of the North-Western Indian Ocean. The negative aim of preventing the US from using such facilities is sufficient to account for Soviet interest. Indeed, a Pravda article at the time came close to stating exactly this. In drawing attention to press reports that parts of the US Seventh Fleet were to be stationed in the Indian Ocean, the writer noted that such an action "makes this region in fact not only a sphere of operations of the American military but also a

very worried by the American plans, especially by reports that ships of the Seventh Fleet will use Pakistani ports." (33) Bearing in mind the Soviet predilection for expressing their own anxieties by attributing the same fears to various 'public opinions', it does not seem unrealistic to regard this as being indicative of genuine Soviet concern.

Again, the Soviet Union could not have remained indifferent to developments in Sino-Pakistani relations. The early 1960's had witnessed the gradual blossoming of Sino-Pakistani friendship. As Pravda noted "the Chinese Government has taken a number of steps towards settling its relations with Pakistan". (34) The reference here is to the provisional border agreement signed between the two countries in May 1962. Obviously, the crux of the Soviet dilemma in this respect was consternation that, whilst Pakistan was in many respects moving away from former dependence on the West, the present trend threatened merely to substitute Chinese influence for that of the United States. It is doubtful whether this would have been regarded as in any sense an improvement in Moscow's view of things. Moreover, it was in 1964 that China for the first time came out in open support of Pakistan's position on the Kashmir dispute and this more than anything forced the hand of the Soviet Union if Pakistan was to be prevented from becoming too susceptible to Chinese influence.

The last element in the Soviet calculus deserves attention. If the Soviet Union was inclined to a broadly-conceived course of cultivating the region then the conditions were particularly apposite for such a policy. It was in 1964 that the prospect of regional cooperation between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan took on some institutional substance with establishment of Regional Cooperation for Development. This organization promised a twin pay-off for the Soviet Union. Firstly, in the words of one student of the subject "the formation of RCD had the effect of diverting the attention and

energy of the regional countries from CENTO's economic projects and from CENTO itself."

Secondly, it facilitated the improvement of relations with all three states as a bloc: it provided a key which might open several doors simultaneously.

These were, therefore, some of the most important prerequisites and motives for a rapprochement in Soviet-Pakistani relations and the general geographical extension of Soviet relations with Afro-Asia was the background against which this policy was executed. It remains to make quite explicit the inherent importance of viewing the improvement in the Soviet Union's relations with Pakistan as a development of the period 1964-5 and within the context of this wider policy. It was a great weakness of the explanations which dated this rapprochement from the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 that they interpreted the move towards Pakistan as no more than the shadow effect of a move away from India as a consequence of Soviet disillusionment with India's poor military performance during the war. It is true that, for various reasons, there was emerging around 1964-5 an increasingly pessimistic Soviet assessment of developments within India. This assessment prompted, and the general reappraisal of relations with the Afro-Asian countries at this period reinforced, a Soviet persuasion that it was advisable to extend the range of Soviet options in the region. It is, however, quite erroneous to consider the antipathy between India and Pakistan in isolation and view Soviet policy as a zero-sum game in which the improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations was the direct product of a deterioration in Soviet-Indian relations: while there was a move towards Pakistan, there was in no sense a corresponding move away from India. It would be no more true to say that the subsequent decision to sell arms to Iran and the indignation which this provoked throughout the Arab world, especially in Egypt, represented a switch in the centre of gravity of the

36) See Chapter 3, Section a.
USSR's Middle Eastern policy from Cairo to Teheran.

This conclusion contains within it one of the salient themes in Soviet relations with India and Pakistan between 1965 and 1971. Soviet activity in the subcontinent may be viewed as the attempt of a Super Power to try to counteract the intrinsic antagonisms of a region and to base its policies towards the individual regional countries on its own perceived interests rather than let these policies be determined or vitiated by the dynamics of these regional antagonisms. In essence, this entailed the attempt to pursue towards Pakistan a policy which was not wholly determined by the condition of Soviet-Indian relations and vice-versa. It was an attempt to break out of the confines which Indo-Pakistani antipathy placed round the pursuit of Soviet regional objectives.

It is in this sense that we should accept, at face value, the repeated Soviet statements that in their dealings with Pakistan they were in no way acting contrary to the interests of third parties. What has usually been viewed as no more than a gesture to Indian sentiments then becomes a cardinal principle of policy. This was underlined, at the time of Mr. Shastri's visit to the Soviet Union in May 1965, in Mr. Kosygin's reassurance that "when the Soviet Union strives to improve its relations with other countries it does not do so at the expense of Soviet-Indian friendship." (37) Similarly, commenting on the forthcoming Ayub visit of April 1965, a Pakistani correspondent cited Soviet foreign ministry sources as saying that "on her part... the Soviet Union would like to deal with India and Pakistan separately in the light of their individual interests." (38)

37) Pravda, May 16 1965. I am not arguing that the Indian leaders saw the matter in this light or that the Soviet Union could have reasonably expected them to do so.
38) Dawn, Nov.14 1964. Ayub should not have found such an approach strange to him. His own exposition of the rationale of Pakistani foreign policy was that "we should endeavour to set up bilateral equations with each one of them (the Great Powers) with the clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should be such as to promote our mutual interests without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties." M. Ayub Khan: op. cit. p.118.
The argument of the previous three chapters points towards the following conclusions: a) that in its doctrinal reformulations, following upon the inception of the new regime, the USSR had prepared the ground for a pronounced expansion of relations with a wide range of developing countries of divergent internal political complexities; b) that in its assessments of India and Pakistan, this general trend had been reflected in such a way that India was no longer above criticism and Pakistan no longer beneath contempt; c) that in its diplomatic activity, the USSR was attempting to reconcile two countervailing pressures by making advances towards Pakistan while assuring India of Soviet constancy. Only when these various elements are put together can we claim to have arrived at an interpretation of Soviet policy which is fully consistent with the role which the Soviet Union was shortly to play during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and in the diplomatic negotiations which preceded and surrounded the Tashkent Conference.
If the Soviet Union was to broaden the base of its operations on its southern flank and to keep on good terms with Pakistan as well as India, it was evident to Soviet policy-makers that a precondition of such a policy was the elimination or reduction of the tension between India and Pakistan. Otherwise Indo-Pakistani antagonisms would vitiate Soviet attempts to maintain cordial relations with both states simultaneously. Conversely, in order to be in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Indo-Pakistan relations, it was essential for the Soviet Union to create, at the very least, the semblance of an impartial posture between the two states. There was, therefore, to be an inherent tension in Soviet policy: the process of concordance with Pakistan and of promoting Indo-Pakistan amity was self-reinforcing and constantly threatened to push the Soviet Union further towards Pakistan than was thought desirable in view of the relationship with India; at the same time, attempts to reassure India of honourable Soviet intentions were occasionally to come close to destroying the tenuous basis of Soviet-Pakistani accommodation.

That there had been no dramatic reassessment of the relative positions which India and Pakistan occupied in the order of Soviet priorities can be reasonably argued. Thus whereas the Soviet Union had "followed and shall follow a policy of developing and strengthening friendly relations with India" the most that Mr. Brezhnev would concede in relation to Pakistan, when he made his report to the plenum of the Central Committee in September 1965, was that "certain prerequisites for improving relations with Pakistan as well have been created."(1) Similarly, while Moscow Radio noted a marked improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations, it nonetheless felt compelled to draw attention to the fact that "not all obstacles in the path of bringing our countries closer to each other have yet been removed."(2) The continuing

1) Pravda, Sept. 30 1965.
Soviet concern to differentiate between India and Pakistan was once more to become apparent in Brezhnev's Report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in March 1966. In comparison with the observation that "our traditional friendship with India and with her great people, a friendship that has withstood the test of time, has grown even stronger", Mr. Brezhnev was much more subdued in his claim that "there has been a certain improvement in relations with Pakistan."(3)

Accordingly, it deserves to be stressed that the Soviet Union did not intend its relationship with Pakistan to effect detrimentally its policies towards India. This was to become the keynote of almost every Soviet utterance on the subject of India and Pakistan. With the outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir in 1965, a Tass broadcast made the point that "the USSR is anxious for closer relations with Pakistan acting on the principle that for our countries to be good neighbours is not inconsistent with our friendship with any other country."(4) Nor were such statements directed solely at Indian audiences. There is every reason to believe that the Soviet Union made a genuine effort to ensure that Pakistan fully realised the confines within which Soviet-Pakistani relations might be developed. This was the message which consecutive Soviet delegations brought to Pakistan. A.Vishnevsky, Deputy Director of Tass and the leader of a journalistic delegation to Pakistan went out of his way to underline that 'the Russians could not be expected to foster relations with any country at the cost of her relations with others"(5) and a Novosti correspondent, Spartak Beglov, speaking of Soviet-Pakistani relations, cautioned that "there should be no mistake about the fact that the friendly relations between these two countries are not to be built at the detriment of the already-existing relations of these states with third countries."(6)

3) Pravda, Mar.30 1966.
How did this Soviet policy operate in practice? A decisive indication of the Soviet desire to ingratiate itself with both India and Pakistan while ensuring that no undesirable pressures were brought to bear against India was to be provided by the Soviet stance during the Indo-Pakistan hostilities of 1965. This episode was to reveal in no uncertain terms that in order to achieve its new designs in the region, the USSR did not so much abandon its former positions as graft some new postures on to the substance of the old: the cultivation of Pakistan did not replace the previous Indo-centric approach; rather the old and the new approaches were maintained in uneasy coexistence. On to the substance of a policy orientation which was based on a perception of India as the primary vehicle of Soviet interests in the region was grafted a diplomatic mode of operation which precluded the Soviet Union from giving gratuitous offence to Pakistan. This was essential both for the reason of the intrinsic value of developing a relationship with Pakistan and for the reason that Indo-Pakistani accommodation was emerging as a principal Soviet interest. As a major Pravda article of the period was to express the point "we would like Soviet-Pakistani relations, like our traditional friendship with India, to be a stabilizing factor in the situation and to contribute to the normalization of relations between Pakistan and India."(7)

Most commentaries on the diplomacy of 1965 have tended to omit the period from the achievement of the cease-fire on Sept. 22 1965 to the convocation of the Tashkent Conference. This has resulted in an imbalance in the account of Soviet objectives at this period. The attainment of the cease-fire proved to be a turning-point in Soviet policy: if the period from the outbreak of hostilities to the cease-fire represented the dominance of the new Soviet concern with diplomatic neutrality, then, during the period from October to Tashkent the USSR reasserted its determination to prevent Indian interests being adversely affected on matters of substance. Although both elements were present in the two phases, there was a marked change of emphasis between them from the moment that the cease-fire was achieved.

When the dispute over the Rann of Kutch erupted in the Spring of 1965, it became apparent that the process of Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement had advanced sufficiently for the USSR to opt for a neutral posture. Negatively, this effect was created by the Soviet technique of absolving both parties from blame for provoking the fighting by means of describing the dispute as an imperialist plot and by stressing the deleterious effects which hostilities would have on the economies of the two countries. (8) Positively, a more explicit statement of the Soviet position was to come with the Tass announcement of May 8:

"Soviet official circles... express the hope that the governments of India and Pakistan will display the necessary restraint and patience and will find ways for settling this conflict by peaceful means. It is sincerely hoped in the Soviet Union that India and Pakistan will solve their differences through direct negotiations, taking into account the interests of both sides." (9)

Apart from such declarations, the main thrust of Soviet concern was that a settlement should be speedily reached. Mr. Kosygin, therefore, informed journalists that he would like to see 'the status quo ante' restored in the Rann of Kutch (10), and reported in a speech at a reception for Mr. Shastri that in his talks with the Indian leader "we arrived at the common opinion that ways must be found leading toward a political settlement of these questions." (11)

When Indo-Pakistan hostilities resumed later that year, this time over Kashmir, the formal Soviet posture of neutrality was reasserted in the form of a "commentator" article in Pravda, expressing the hope that:

"statesmanlike wisdom, the patience of the leaders of both states and their understanding of the grave consequences of the development of armed conflict in Kashmir will help India and Pakistan to settle the disputes and unresolved questions existing between them by peaceful means with mutual regard for each other's interests and without resorting to arms." (12)

8) See e.g. Pravda, Apr. 30 1965.
9) As reported, Pravda, May 9 1965.
10) Times of India, May 15 1965.
The burden of Pravda’s article was repeated by the Soviet delegate at the United Nations, Mr. Morozov, in his address to the Security Council. (13)

Mr. Kosygin went one stage further in seeking a non-partisan posture when he not only refused to apportion blame for the conflict between India and Pakistan but even went so far as to say that the question of blame was irrelevant to the issue. This assertion was made in letters, dated September 4, which were sent to Mr. Shastri and to President Ayub:

"I believe that you... will agree that in the present serious situation one should hardly put questions concerning the reasons or causes for the development of the conflict in the foreground or seek to know who is in the right and who is in the wrong." (14)

The letter included an offer of Soviet "good offices" in settling the dispute, an offer which was repeated in a Tass statement several days later. On September 20, Pravda published the text of further notes sent to the Indian and Pakistani leaders in which the offer of "good offices" was formalised into an invitation that the two leaders meet on Soviet territory, and Tashkent was suggested as a possible venue.

The USSR adhered scrupulously to the formal posture of neutrality throughout the conflict. To counteract fears in Pakistan that the Soviet Union was siding with India in the dispute, the Soviet Embassy in Karachi released a commentary by Novosti correspondent, N. Smetanin, which declared unequivocally that "attempts are at times made to claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly not objective and is inclined to support one side at the expense of the other side. Such opinions are far from reality." (15) This process culminated in the niceties of the Tashkent Conference itself. In his address to the opening session of the conference, Mr. Kosygin was careful to refer to India and Pakistan five times and then to reverse the order and speak of Pakistan and India on five occasions. (16)

16) See Pravda, Jan.5 1966.
While issuing its offers of good offices early in September 1965, the Soviet Union had placed the weight of its diplomatic efforts behind the attempts of the United Nations to bring hostilities to an end. This resulted in an almost unprecedented degree of unanimity between the principal members of the Security Council. Thus the New York Times was able to report on September 8 that "the US delegation has been encouraged by the manner in which the Soviet Union has cooperated in the Council and behind the scenes." Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was also to commend the Soviet Union for its "helpful" attitude. (17)

Another facet of the crisis at this stage was the outspoken Soviet support for the efforts of U Thant, the U.N. Secretary-General. Commenting on Thant's peace-making journey to the subcontinent, Moscow Radio castigated political circles in the West European capitals on the grounds that "a deliberate attempt is apparent to create the impression that his mission will be fruitless." (18) Several days later, it was reported that in conversation with the Indian ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Kosygin had conveyed to him that Russia fully supported the action of the U.N. Secretary-General. (19) Soviet spokesmen were fulsome in their praise of U Thant. N. Fedorenko, the Soviet delegate at the U.N., referred to "the steps taken by the Secretary-General in the course of his honourable and responsible mission" and spoke of his "fulfilling the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council." (20) Gromyko too was to speak of the U.N. and U Thant playing a "positive part." (21)

The sources of Soviet anxiety for a cease-fire are not difficult to detect. On September 7 the Chinese Government issued a statement on India's "naked aggression" in which it was declared that the Chinese Government

18) Sept. 9 1965.
"sternly condemns" India and that India "must bear the responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression."(22)

This was followed some ten days later by another Chinese note which demanded that the Indian Government dismantle certain military constructions on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim border.(23)

In response to this, the Soviet Government made public its concern about the nature of developments. A Tass statement drew attention to "forces" trying to take advantage of the situation by making "inflammatory statements" and warned that "no government has the right to add fuel to the fire."(24)

Moreover, the Soviet Government was anxious for the reason that "this region is directly contiguous with the borders of our country".(25) Consequently, while believing that the conflict should be resolved by India and Pakistan themselves, the Soviet Union was not prepared to "conceal the fact that we have the most lively interest that this should be done without delay."(26)

If the Soviet Union intended to maintain an impartial stance on matters of substance, the first of the elements which combined to make this impossible was Chinese diplomatic involvement in the crisis. By interlocking the Sino-Indian dispute (and hence the Sino-Soviet confrontation) with the Indo-Pakistani conflict, China made even more doubtful the prospect that the Soviet Union could or would serve as an "honest broker" between India and Pakistan. The Indian side, which was not noted for reticence if it suspected that the Soviet Union was moving away from its former support of India, was certainly satisfied with the Soviet performance on the question of the cease-fire resolution. This was evident in Chagla's statement in the Lok Sabha:

22) Text in Times of India, Sept. 8 1965.
"I must also express my appreciation of the great help we received from the USSR while the resolution was being drafted. If the House only knew that the resolution was passed at quarter to three in the morning and the meeting had been going on the whole of Sunday, every comma, every semi-colon, every sentence was considered and reconsidered, it is only then that you realise how the assistance of a country like the USSR in getting the resolution in this shape was invaluable."(27)

However, the most important evidence that the Soviet Union was doing its best to combine a diplomatic technique of neutrality with a continuation of its former concern for Indian interests is provided in the period after the cease-fire. As long as Moscow considered the main source of danger to lie in an escalation of military activities and the main obstacle to its policies to lie in continued Indo-Pakistan fighting, the policy of neutrality took precedence in the effort to exercise a moderating influence on both sides. However, with the cessation of hostilities, the divergence between Soviet aims and what Pakistan hoped to obtain via Soviet agency became increasingly conspicuous.

The first indication of a changing Soviet mood was evidenced by the breakdown of the Great Power unanimity which had characterised the debates prior to the cease-fire and by a movement away from the U.N. by the USSR. And it is apparent that the dominant motive for this change of heart was partly a desire to exclude external powers from participation in settling the political aspects of the Kashmir dispute but, more importantly, a desire to suppress any serious discussion of the political aspects of Kashmir altogether.

The first hint that Moscow was not entirely happy with the trend of post-cease-fire developments in the United Nations was an Izvestiya editorial which complained of "backstage intrigues" in the U.N. Specifically, Izvestiya objected to plans to send U.N. observers into Kashmir. "This calls for our anxiety" the paper commented. "These observers not by accident of course, happen to come from countries of the NATO camp and are

placed under the command of a Canadian general."(28) This was followed by an article in New Times one week later which recounted various Western 'plots' to install bases in Kashmir and various attempts to achieve Western ends via the agency of the U.N. Clearly, the relevance of this historical exercise lay in its implication that the U.N. was increasingly becoming the instrument of the Western Powers. (29)

The complaint of the USSR finally found official expression in the Security Council to the effect that the Secretary-General had exceeded his powers in the matter of the U.N. observers:

"The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to draw the Council's attention to the fact that the action taken by the Secretary-General with regard to the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan... is at variance with the provisions of the Charter, under which only the Security Council is competent to take the necessary decisions on all specific matters connected with United Nations observers... Meanwhile, all these questions are being settled outside the Security Council whose members are merely informed about measures that have already been taken."(30)

While the Soviet objection appears in the form of a procedural argument about the relative competence of two U.N. agencies, it concealed more substantial and practical Soviet interests. Partly, no doubt, it was inspired by a desire to avoid a long-term U.N. involvement in the area as had happened in the Congo, and to avoid recreating a situation in which the Secretary-General had a large measure of personal discretion over U.N. policy. That is to say that the USSR was concerned to ensure that it would always be in a position to exercise a controlling influence over developments. More particularly, however, the Soviet statement, taken in conjunction with the generally uncooperative Soviet attitude after the cease-fire, may be viewed as part of a deliberate policy of blocking U.N. activity on the

Indo-Pakistan question, of side-tracking the Council from a discussion of Kashmir and of making the U.N. disgorge the Kashmir question and so pave the way for an Indo-Pakistani summit under Soviet auspices. This became even more apparent in a subsequent meeting of the Council. The Soviet Union abstained in the voting on a resolution for the reason that "the questions of principle and constitutionality raised by the Soviet delegation were not given due consideration or taken into account." It was as a direct result of this, the Soviet delegate continued, that "the unanimity prevailing in the Security Council during the discussion of the India-Pakistan conflict was destroyed."(31) Nor was this all. The Soviet delegate issued an implicit ultimatum. If questions relating to U.N. observers continued to be decided outside the Security Council, he stated, "the Soviet Union reserves the right to draw the appropriate conclusions and reconsider its position accordingly."(32) In short, future U.N. resolutions on the subject would face not only Soviet abstention but a Soviet veto. Thus the Soviet Union hoped to check any further discussion of the matter at the U.N.

That Soviet and Pakistani aims became increasingly divergent after the cease-fire can be clearly demonstrated. This was so both in respect of the role which the U.N. could play in settling the dispute and as regards the relationship between the cease-fire and a political settlement of the Kashmir issue.

During the September discussions in the Security Council, a suggestion was made that the question of implementing the political aspects of the Security Council's cease-fire resolution be studied by a commission consisting of the four major powers (US, USSR, UK & FRANCE). This suggestion was backed at the time by U Thant. During October, Pakistan came out strongly in favour of the creation of such a body. (33) The Pakistani request was

31) S.C.O.R. Yr.29, Mt.1251, Nov.5 1965, p.18.
32) ibid.
repeated by Mr. Bhutto in a plea that the permanent members of the Security Council send a committee of 'eminent men' to Kashmir to study the situation.  

Meanwhile, India had flatly rejected the proposal, and it was soon revealed that the Soviet Union supported India on this issue. The Washington Post reported on October 11 that the Soviet Union had informed Pakistan that it did not consider such a four-power body to be an appropriate mechanism for resolving the Indo-Pakistan dispute and Dawn was forced to concede that "the proposed Big Four Commission, originally suggested by U Thant, is unlikely to take off because of Soviet reservations. It is learned that Russia prefers its own proposal that the Indian and Pakistani leaders meet on Soviet soil to negotiate on Kashmir under Russian auspices." Such a body would have given the Western Powers a voice in the Kashmir dispute and would also have deprived the Soviet Union of the use of its veto should it have felt the need for it.

More generally, as was seen above in relation to Soviet objections on the subject of U.N. observers, the Soviet Union was moving away from the U.N. as a suitable forum for the attainment of its ends. Thus while the Soviet Union had been quite content to encourage the U.N. in its efforts to terminate hostilities, it did not consider the U.N. an appropriate body for discussing the political question of Kashmir. This is confirmed by reports in the Pakistani press. Thus Dawn commented that "Russia is said to remain hostile to U.N. involvement in the substance of the Kashmir dispute though she went along happily with the U.N. call for cease-fire and troop withdrawals." Several days later the same paper again reported that "U.N. observers believe that there has been little thawing in the Russian attitude to a Kashmir solution through the machinery of

35) Times of India, Oct.3 1965.
the U.N." More specific evidence is provided by Soviet sources. In reply to the Soviet invitation that the leaders of India and Pakistan should meet on Soviet territory, Ayub Khan expressed doubts that a meeting at that stage would be fruitful. His reply concluded with the following paragraph:

"As a most influential and important member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union could lend a powerful helping hand in the framing of a meaningful resolution that could lead to an honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute so that, following a cease-fire, the cause of the conflict between India and Pakistan would in fact be removed." (39)

Both Pravda and Izvestiya carried summaries of Ayub's reply and both pointedly omitted this final paragraph of his message. (40) This part of the letter was released in Karachi. Since this was the crucial part of what Ayub sought to convey to the Soviet leaders, it would be absurd to argue that both leading papers had omitted it through inadvertence, and the political significance of such a deliberate piece of censorship is self-evident.

The Soviet Union's reluctance to proceed to a discussion of the political issue of Kashmir was also made manifest. The Soviet Union was obsessively concerned with the cease-fire and paid scant respect to Pakistani demands that this should be accompanied by a political settlement. This position was consistently maintained by the Soviet delegate at the U.N. On September 18, Fedorenko asserted that "it has become more clear than ever that the main task now is to achieve an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and to put an end to the bloodshed." (41)

There was never any suggestion from the Soviet Government that a cease-fire should be made conditional upon an Indian agreement to discuss Kashmir, as was demanded by Pakistan. Even after the attainment of the cease-fire, the Soviet Union was extremely sceptical about proceeding to the next stage, a discussion of the political settlement. As the Soviet U.N. delegate expressed it once again:

"It is our conviction that our most important task at present is to secure strict observance of the cease-fire agreement in the area of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Unfortunately we
know that violations of the cease-fire agreement are continuing... Obviously our main attention should be concentrated on matters connected with the direct settlement of the armed conflict... That is in fact the principle behind Council resolution 211 which clearly provides in paragraph 4 that only after a cease-fire and the subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel will consideration be given to the question of what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict.

At the present time, when these decisions of the Council calling for a complete cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel have still not been fully implemented, it would hardly be in keeping with the spirit and letter of resolution 211 for it to consider other aspects of the problem."(42)

Such a position was diametrically opposed to that of Pakistan.

The Indian position on Kashmir had been frequently reiterated. As one Soviet journal noted "Shastri repeatedly announced that he would not discuss there (Tashkent) the Kashmir problem which India considered settled."(43)

More specifically, while the Indian Government agreed to talk over the matter of Kashmir in the context of the 'totality' of Indo-Pakistan relations, it was not prepared to negotiate on the issue. As Shastri informed the Lok Sabha "if this talk is going to be held with a view to discussing Kashmir and 'settle Kashmir', this talk will never bear any fruit."(44) After the Tashkent Conference, India claimed to have maintained this position throughout. Swaran Singh, the Minister for External Affairs, reassured the Lok Sabha that "on the political question, namely about Jammu and Kashmir, the Prime Minister had made a very clear statement in the House and outside that this is an integral part of India and the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir is not negotiable... I can say without the least hesitation... that he stuck steadfast to this position all through these talks in Tashkent and he did not budge an inch from that stand."(45)

44) Times of India, Nov.17 1965.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Government attempted to deflect India from this position. On the contrary, the USSR was quite content to see the Kashmir dispute left in abeyance. Pravda chided Western reporters for repeatedly enquiring whether the Kashmir issue was being discussed because by doing so "they are attempting... to push to the foreground the most complicated questions of India-Pakistani relations..." Further Soviet comment on the Tashkent Conference also reflected the lack of Soviet interest in obtaining a settlement of the Kashmir dispute and the implicit acquiescence in the Indian refusal to negotiate the issue. While many Western journalists, in Tashkent at the time of the conference, speculated that Mr. Kosygin had induced Mr. Shastri to agree to negotiate on this matter, one Soviet commentator refuted this when he maintained that there "was major significance in the distinction between a 'negotiable problem' and an 'object of discussion'." The same observer later attacked Western commentaries on Tashkent because they "try to belittle the importance of Tashkent by saying that the Indo-Pakistan differences remain unresolved. But the whole point is that the war flames have been extinguished even while these problems remain... What was decided at Tashkent was the issue of war or peace in Hindustan. No more than that. But is that little?" As a factual statement of the realities of the Tashkent meeting this is accurate, but Pakistan could scarcely be expected to share the Soviet sentiment that this had been a most satisfactory outcome.

There had been other indications that the Soviet Union had no intention of putting pressure on India to force her into concessions. An article in 'New Times' was deeply critical of American policy in 1962 for the reason that the United States had attempted to do precisely this on the Kashmir question. Thus while promising India arms for use against China, America had

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made it clear that "the arms would be forthcoming only provided India agreed to negotiate with Pakistan on Kashmir and lent an ear to American recommendations."(49) Bearing in mind the Soviet habit of commenting on issues by means of historical parallels, this may not unreasonably be interpreted as a sign that no such 'blackmail' would be perpetrated by the Soviet Union.

Although complex, the rationale of Soviet policy during this period is, nonetheless, intelligible. The main Soviet preoccupation was to eliminate the fighting between India and Pakistan and to reduce the mutual antagonisms which were placing an undue strain on the recently-developed Soviet policy of maintaining equitable relations with both India and Pakistan simultaneously. However, this preoccupation was not to be entertained to the point of requiring Soviet action to wrest concessions of substance from India. And in order to understand why the Soviet Union was successful in combining the two ends and in winning Pakistani confidence while making only minimal concessions to Pakistani sensitivities, it is necessary to place Soviet policy in the context of the desperate plight in which the Pakistani leadership found itself when it agreed to go to Tashkent.

Pakistan had gambled on being able to bring sufficient military pressure to bear on India to force a reopening of the Kashmir question. In this aim she had failed. Far from furthering Pakistani ends, a continuation of hostilities was likely to lead to nothing short of a military disaster. By the time of the cease-fire in September, the military option had been effectively foreclosed as far as Pakistan was concerned. And not least amongst the reasons for this was the fact that while the United States and the United Kingdom had placed an embargo on military supplies to both India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union continued to sell arms to India. Thus when a Soviet historian notes that the American action was regarded in Pakistan as "discrimination", it must be remembered that it was the continued shipment

49) I. Andronov, op.cit. p,18.
of Soviet arms to India which constituted this discrimination.\(^{50}\)

Secondly, diplomatic recourse to the United States had proven to be a broken reed. Ayub had made an overture to President Johnson on September 15. Referring to the "enormous influence" of the United States, he had stated that "quite frankly, the United States has a role to play in this part of the world and they ought to play it more positively."\(^{51}\) The United States had not, however, taken the bait, and the only response which Ayub evoked was a very guarded White House statement that "the President wants to do anything and everything that he can to achieve peace but he and his advisers have believed that that route is through the United Nations and that position remains the same."\(^{52}\)

Unfortunately for Pakistan, as was seen above, the Soviet Union had succeeded in blocking the United Nations as an instrument capable of obtaining Pakistani satisfaction. In the circumstances, Pakistan had no option but to submit to Soviet "good offices". The Soviet Union had made it clear that Pakistan could not expect 'absolute justice' at Soviet hands. However, it had created an image of impartiality which was sufficient to satisfy a Pakistani leadership which now found itself in desperate straits. Although there could be little genuine hope that the Soviet Union would 'deliver the goods', there was no other option which could even create the illusion that Pakistani demands would be met.

By ceasing to affirm publicly Soviet support for the Indian position on Kashmir, the Soviet Union was able to obtain considerable leverage over Pakistan. Indeed, it suited the purpose of a harassed Pakistani leadership and of a disappointed public opinion to be able to claim that the Soviet Union had committed itself by its participation at Tashkent to a settlement of the Kashmir question: the Ayub administration was only too glad to lay responsibility with the Soviet Union. In order to do so, Pakistani spokesmen

52) ibid.
went out of their way to emphasise the impartial posture of the USSR and to assert that the realisation of Pakistani ambitions lay in the direction of the Soviet Union. Thus Foreign Minister Bhutto was concerned to put the best interpretation on Soviet motives:

"The Soviet Union is concerned about an international dispute with regard to a territory which previously it regarded and considered to be an integral part of India. Now that it has taken this important initiative it naturally implies that the Soviet Union recognises this dispute not only by offering its good offices' initiative but also by the position that the Soviet Union took in the Security Council where unlike in the past it did not veto the Resolution... These are all important and positive signs."(53)

After the Tashkent meeting, Bhutto was to bring further reassurances. He informed the National Assembly that:

"Article 9 talks about the machinery and this is important. On the 9th January when we were discussing the machinery I put a direct question to Premier Kosygin. I said 'in this question of machinery you must know that as far as we are concerned we can accept it if Jammu and Kashmir is made the main dispute for determination by this machinery' and he said 'Jammu and Kashmir is a dispute and naturally you have a right to bring this up under Article 9!' ... The most important question, and the prime factor, in the Tashkent Declaration is that the Soviet Union has recognised that there is a dispute between India and Pakistan in respect of the state of Kashmir... This is a breakthrough."(54)

However, even while placing this generous interpretation on the Soviet position Bhutto still felt compelled to add that "you cannot expect the Great Powers to turn turtle. You cannot expect them to turn round by 180 degrees."(55)

Nonetheless, the opinion continued to be widely expressed that the Soviet Union was committed to a solution of the dispute. The senior Deputy Speaker of the Pakistan National Assembly said in a statement that "Russia now seems to be directly concerned with the just solution of this dispute and a peaceful settlement should be possible"(56) and the Minister for Communications argued that "it was a great achievement for Pakistan that a

54) National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Mar.15 1965, cols.503-5.
55) ibid. col.504.
Great Power, Russia, was now anxious to have the Kashmir question permanently solved.\(^{(57)}\)

Given the realities of the Tashkent situation, there is considerable reason for believing that many of these statements were no more than a device by which the Pakistan administration attempted to propitiate a public opinion which had been led to expect some concrete advantage from the war and had then seemingly been disappointed. As a quid pro quo for rendering this service to the Ayub administration, the Soviet Union used its position as the architect of the Tashkent settlement to freeze the Kashmir issue. It is not the argument of this chapter that the Soviet Union was hostile to a settlement of this question per se. On the contrary, as the USSR was seeking to preserve peace in this region, it would undoubtedly have been only too pleased to see this perennial source of conflict removed. However, two considerations militated against such an outcome. There was absolutely no possibility that India would negotiate on the issue or submit it to any kind of arbitration and while the Soviet Union was eager to ingratiate itself with Pakistan, it was not prepared to do so by foisting a solution on India. Secondly, with the failure of Pakistan's military gamble, an attempt to force India into making some concession would have presented a greater threat to the stability of the region than a tacit acceptance of the status quo.

Mr. Bhutto, who of all the Pakistani leaders had been least enamoured of the Tashkent settlement, was one of the first to attempt to put an end to the charade which had surrounded that meeting and to reveal publicly the reservations which he had, no doubt, felt all along. In contrast with the prevailing orthodoxy that a settlement would be the direct outcome of Soviet participation, by the middle of 1966 Bhutto was reflecting a more

\(^{(57)}\) Dawn Jan.28 1966. For further Pakistani statements to this effect, see also Ayub Khan: Dawn, Jan.30; Chief Parliamentary Secretary: Dawn, Feb.6; Zafrullah Khan: Dawn, Feb7; Speaker of National Assembly: Dawn, May 4.
realistic assessment of the situation when he urged the National Assembly that "it is about time that this nation were to activate itself rather than go on pleading to other countries... I have already stated that the Tashkent Declaration is a complete document. The question of Soviet arbitration does not arise. It is not a question of Soviet arbitration or good-will... Why should we drag a third country all the time into our affairs?"(58)

That Bhutto should have come to adopt such a position by mid-1966 is perfectly understandable. The Soviet Union was making it increasingly plain that it had no intention of promoting a discussion of Kashmir and that it was becoming irritated by the perpetual Pakistani outcry on the subject. This is evidenced by an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta, written by B. Pyadyshev, a Soviet journalist who had recently returned from Pakistan as a member of an official Soviet delegation and who was also Deputy Head of the Press section of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(59)

Pyadyshev complained that there were elements in Pakistan "who came out in favour of the development of relations with the USSR only in order that they might count on its assistance in the settlement of the Kashmir question." Such elements were particularly strong in West Pakistan. By way of contrast, the political climate in East Pakistan was radically different. He observed favourably that on reading an East Pakistani newspaper he found that it did not contain one word about Kashmir. Again he observed that in East Pakistan people appeared to be more interested in questions of economic development, "many of which cannot be solved without cooperation with India." In short, he attacked the Pakistani leadership for being overly vociferous on the Kashmir question and for subordinating it to more pressing tasks. As such it was a fairly explicit attempt by the Soviet Union to dampen the enthusiasm of those Pakistanis who, in the period after Tashkent, referred to the USSR as some sort of deus ex machina come to put their world to rights.

Soviet neutrality was, therefore, in a sense fictitious. What it meant was a termination of public statements in favour of India: it did not mean positive attempts to obtain satisfaction for Pakistan. As India

was the status quo power, in order to be for her, it was only necessary for the Soviet Union not to be against her. Such a policy, applied towards Pakistan, entailed a freezing of the status quo. And in the circumstances it is evident that the Soviet leaders considered this, if not ideal, at least the best result attainable. There is every reason to believe that the assessment of India's ambassador in Moscow, in relation to Soviet objectives, is an accurate one. It was the contention of K.S. Shelvankar that "the Soviet Union is much less concerned for the time being about the form of the settlement in Kashmir than about keeping the peace between India and Pakistan."(60) In the final analysis, this Soviet indifference entailed acquiescence in the pro-Indian status quo.

Chapter 6
Tertius Non Gaudens - The Tashkent Burden 1966-69

a) The Tashkent Legacy

The period under review was to witness the working out of the logic of the Soviet Union's new policy towards Pakistan and of the posture which the USSR had adopted at Tashkent. It was to reveal that the Tashkent policy of ostensible nonpartisanship could cut both ways as regarded Soviet interests. That is to say that if the Soviet sponsorship of the Tashkent meeting brought with it an increase in Soviet prestige both in the region and internationally, it also had its less desirable effects in that the effort to sit astride Indo-Pakistan antagonisms was to occupy an increasing proportion of Soviet energies; and on more than one occasion it was to lead to acute diplomatic embarrassment for the Soviet Union. During this period, the tension between Soviet objectives was to become more and more pronounced. The attempt to cultivate Pakistan in order to bring India and Pakistan closer together began to appear counterproductive as it was leading to increasing Indian alienation from the Soviet Union. And not least amongst the reasons for this was the fact that the course on which the Soviet Union had embarked developed its own momentum and constantly threatened to push the USSR closer to Pakistan than had been intended.

The avowed aim of Soviet policy was the normalisation of Indo-Pakistani relations. Thus the joint communique signed at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow in July 1966 stated that "the Soviet side expressed the hope that the Governments of the two neighbouring countries India and Pakistan, would exert all efforts to normalise their relations in all fields..."\(^{(1)}\) Mr. Kosygin reiterated this fundamental objective

\(^{(1)}\) Text in Times of India July 17, 1966.
of Soviet policy during his visit to India in 1968 when he affirmed that 
"we, like all the friends of India and Pakistan, would like to see 
Hindustan as a region of stable peace, a region where the foundations 
of friendly cooperation between the two countries could be laid."(2)

There would appear to have been at least three motives underlying 
this Soviet strategy. Firstly, there was a strong conviction in Moscow 
that Indo-Pakistani antagonisms were conducive to external interference 
in the region on the part of the United States and China. The U.S. was 
portrayed as exploiting the economic difficulties of India and Pakistan 
consequent upon the 1965 war in order to bind Pakistan more closely to 
the CENTO and SEATO alliances and in order to deflect India from its 
nonaligned posture. The war of 1965 was regarded as having given a boost 
to the growth of pro-imperialist, reactionary forces in India and to 
chauvinistic parties in Pakistan which were opposed to the new directions 
in Pakistani foreign policy.

Similarly, the fighting over Kashmir had given China an opportunity 
for diplomatic intervention in the crisis. Although China had not given 
Pakistan direct military assistance, there could be no doubt that Chinese 
prestige had been raised in Pakistan as a result of China's having been 
the only major power to come out squarely in support of the Pakistani 
case. Moreover, this Chinese intervention had greatly complicated the 
new Soviet policy of befriending both India and Pakistan. As such, 
Indo-Pakistan hostility threatened to undermine the entire basis of 
Soviet policy in the region.

Secondly, the Soviet Union laid great stress on the economic 
development of both India and Pakistan and the normalisation of relations 
between the two countries was considered to be a precondition of any 
efforts in this direction. Hence, it was emphasised that "the interests

2) Times of India January 26, 1968
of India and Pakistan lie in the gradual strengthening of peaceful
relations and the creation of proper conditions for the discharge of
their tasks of economic betterment"(3) and again that "the signing of
the Tashkent Declaration made it possible for the efforts of these two
countries to be directed to the solution of tasks of economic construc-
tion."(4) This concern should not be viewed in isolation from that
of reducing the scope for Chinese and American intervention in the
region. It is an oft-repeated maxim in Moscow's discussions of the
Third World that full political independence requires the removal of
Western economic dominance. This is largely the rationale underlying the
Soviet Union's concentration on building up the state sector of the
economies of developing countries. Economic development was, therefore,
considered a prophylactic against external interference in this area
which is 'immediately adjacent to the Soviet Union's borders'.(5)
Moscow's concern for the revival of trade between India and Pakistan,
which had come to a halt in 1965, may be viewed from this perspective.
Such a resumption would serve the dual function of helping to produce
a more relaxed atmosphere on the subcontinent while also bringing
economic benefits to the two countries. Thus one Soviet commentator,
writing on the anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration recalled that
"for a long time, the economies of the Hindustani countries constituted
a single whole" and urged that "intercourse between these countries and
expansion of trade and business ties can benefit them today too."(6)

The third Soviet motive was no less compelling. Indo-Pakistani

3) Moscow Radio April 15, 1966
4) Moscow Radio January 3, 1967
5) On the relationship between economic underdevelopment and foreign
   interference, one article gave an example in terms of India's food
   production difficulties. "India depends considerably for the grain
   she needs on the developed capitalist countries. The US takes
   advantage of this to apply pressure and force her to effect changes
   in her home and foreign policies." V. Bylov & M. Pankin: 'India's
   Economy' International Affairs September 1967 p. 110.
6) Y. Lugovskoi: 'Second Anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration':
   International Affairs February 1968 p. 84.
hostility was the greatest constraint on the Soviet intention of pursuing

towards India and Pakistan policies based on a calculation of Soviet
interests in the region: normalisation was necessary in order that the
USSR might be freed to follow autonomous policies towards both countries.
Expressed in other terms, before the Soviet Union could deal with India
and Pakistan separately, it was necessary to deal with them conjointly
to produce a measure of reconciliation.

The period 1966-68 was to illustrate graphically the limits which
Indo-Pakistani antagonism placed on Soviet freedom of operation in
relation to the two countries. Indeed, far from furthering its intention
of conducting autonomous policies towards the two countries, the Soviet
Union soon realised that its embroilment in Indo-Pakistani affairs
increasingly circumscribed its freedom of action.

The Soviet Union found itself caught in the middle of the flow
of mutual recriminations passing between India and Pakistan. Both
governments continually reassured their respective public opinions that
they were keeping the Soviet Union, as a signatory of the Tashkent
Declaration, informed of the other side's violations of that document.

When, in 1966, Mrs. Gandhi made a brief stop-over in Moscow, she
announced on her return to India that the Soviet Government intended to
send an envoy to Pakistan to raise the question of violation of the
Declaration. This not unnaturally provoked an outburst in Pakistan
and resulted in considerable embarrassment for Soviet-Pakistani relat-
ions. Finally, Mrs. Gandhi had to clarify her statement and to reveal
that her information might not have been correct. (7)

This incident was typical of the new role which had been foisted
upon the Soviet Union - that of official receiver for the complaints of
both India and Pakistan. Thus while the Indian side alleged that "it

7) See statement by Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh,
has not been possible to achieve all its (Tashkent Declaration's) objectives and make further progress for lack of response by the Pakistani Government"\(^{(8)}\). President Ayub was informing the Soviet Government that "we have not been able to convince India that so long as the Jammu and Kashmir dispute remains unresolved, relations between our two countries will continue to suffer from stresses and strains."\(^{(9)}\) Later that year, when Ayub visited the Soviet Union, he again laid his complaints at the Soviet door. Deploring the fact that "our expectations have not so far materialised", the Pakistani President once more based his version of events on the uncooperative Indian attitude towards the Kashmir issue.\(^{(10)}\)

Such mutual recriminations placed the USSR in an unenviable position and forced the Soviet leaders into an uncomfortable balancing act. A great effort had to be invested in the task of appeasing both sides and assuaging both Indian and Pakistani fears. More importantly, this had to be done without compromising essential Soviet interests just as Soviet neutrality during the 1965 war had had to be curtailed by what was considered to be the Soviet interest, in the given situation, of suppressing the Kashmir issue. Soviet policy, therefore, took shape as one of making gestures to one side which would not unduly antagonise the other and of constantly informing the third party of the nature of contacts between the other two. As an example of the latter, it was not uncommon for a visiting Soviet statesman to round off a trip to Pakistan with a brief halt in India and vice-versa. As an example of the former, it is not difficult to find in the various joint communiques resulting from meetings of Indian and Soviet, or Pakistani and Soviet leaders, small concessions made to the susceptibilities of the suitor state.

\(^{8}\) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 1 col 273 March 20, 1967.

\(^{9}\) Message sent to Mr. Kosygin Dawn January 10, 1967.

\(^{10}\) Tass September 25, 1967.
Hence, the communique issued at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union in 1966 declared that the Indian side had informed the USSR of its efforts to implement the Tashkent principles and that the Soviet side "positively assessed" this information. Similarly, the communique at the end of Ayub's visit in 1967 reaffirmed the belief of both parties in the "principle of self-determination of people". There could be no mistake as to how this seemingly innocuous statement would be interpreted in Pakistan.

There is some reason for believing that faced with this 'ball in the middle' role and more clearly appreciating the difficulties in the way of a settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes, the Soviet Union now sought a limited disengagement from the 'forward' diplomatic position which it had adopted at Tashkent. This must not be overstated. The Soviet Union still professed its interest in producing an Indo-Pakistan accommodation, still remembered annually by way of its media the anniversary of Tashkent and by so doing continually sought to revive its flagging 'spirit', and was still involved in a high degree of diplomatic intercourse with the two countries. However, while continuing to pursue its general strategy, it nevertheless executed a few tactical retreats.

This can be seen in at least two facets of Soviet policy. Firstly, the Soviet Union began to give renewed emphasis to the bilateral nature of Indo-Pakistan disputes and to move away slightly from the salient 'good offices' position which it had adopted at Tashkent. This stress on the bilateral nature of the disputes represented a limited Soviet disengagement from its previous position. The Soviet leadership lost no opportunity for expressing its point of view. Mr.

11) Times of India July 17, 1966
Kosygin, while addressing an Indo-Soviet Friendship rally, stressed that Indo-Pakistan problems must be resolved "without any kind of outside interference".\(^{(13)}\) Similarly, the joint communique issued after Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow in 1966 declared the Soviet side's hope that outstanding problems would be solved by "direct bilateral negotiations".\(^{(14)}\) There is a sense in which such statements were no more than a continuation of the Soviet intention, first evidenced during September-December 1965, of preventing external intervention in the substance of Indo-Pakistan disputes. But in the post-Tashkent atmosphere it betokened more than this: it signified a diminution in the Soviet enthusiasm for taking the lead in producing the desired accommodation. If the USSR was still eager to see such an accommodation achieved, it was nonetheless disinclined to take any major initiatives on its own. This was made patently clear when Mr. Kosygin made a brief stopover in Delhi while returning from Pakistan in the spring of 1968. Asked if he proposed any new meeting between the Indian and Pakistani leaders, the Soviet premier replied that "it is entirely up to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan and I am sure if they feel there is any need they will get together." However, he went on to add that "we have not specially contemplated any new initiative."\(^{(15)}\)

In reemphasising the bilateral nature of the question, Soviet statements were more in harmony with the Indian position than with that of Pakistan. The Indian government frequently reiterated its

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13) Pravda July 15, 1966
14) Times of India July 17, 1966
15) Hindu April 22, 1968
position at this period. Mrs. Gandhi politely discouraged the idea of a further summit meeting under Soviet auspices at a press conference given in Moscow. She remarked that such a meeting "was possible in principle" but went on to suggest that "the opportunities offered by the Tashkent Declaration should be used to the end."(16) An even more explicit statement of this point of view was made by Mr. M. Chagla in the Rajya Sabha:

"I do not think this House would approve of the idea of mediation as between Pakistan and ourselves. The whole basis of the Tashkent Declaration is that we should settle our problems bilaterally. We have been informing the Russian Government as to the developments since the Tashkent Declaration and the Russian Government is fully apprised of the situation...but I do not think it is right that we should invite any foreign government to mediate in an issue which is an entirely bilateral issue." (17)

The Pakistani position was somewhat different and was critical of the Soviet Union for not being sufficiently energetic in its attempts to secure an Indo-Pakistani accommodation. Basically, Pakistan was suspicious that the Soviet stress on bilateralism was no more than a pretext by which the USSR sought to avoid those commitments into which, Pakistani leaders claimed, the Soviet Union had entered as a result of its good offices at Tashkent. The Pakistani foreign minister, Arshad Husain, gave voice to this resentment. He complained that "some of the permanent members of the Security Council, specially the Soviet Union, have recommended the solution of the Kashmir dispute through bilateral negotiations. Pakistan on its own tried the bilateral approach even

before the Tashkent Declaration but it never meant that the Security
Council was absolved from the responsibility to resolve the Kashmir
dispute."(18)

If a limited Soviet disengagement from the Indo-Pakistani
confrontation was signified by Soviet unwillingness to take any new
initiative in the field, it was also reflected in a more realistic
Soviet appreciation of the intractable nature of the disputes between
the two countries. The less optimistic approach was heralded by the
Soviet adoption of the 'step by step' strategy. Accepting the extreme
unlikelihood of any major breakthrough in Indo-Pakistani relations,
the Soviet Union was thrown back on a course of political quietism
which was characterised by pious expressions of hope rather than by
specific suggestions for action. The direction of Soviet hopes was
that India and Pakistan would gradually create a better atmosphere
between them by approaching the problems in their relations 'step by
step'. This was to become the standard Soviet formula of this period.(19)

b) Indo-Soviet Strains

The Soviet attempt to pursue an autonomous policy towards
Pakistan coincided with the appearance of some stresses and strains in
Indo-Soviet relations. And there is reason for believing that while
most of these strains had their origins in issues which were far removed
from Indo-Pakistani and from Soviet-Pakistani relations, not a few of
them took on for Indians a special significance beyond their intrinsic
importance and were exacerbated because of developments in Soviet-

18) Radio Pakistan News (Information Section, Pakistan High
19) See e.g. Indo-Soviet Communiqué, Times of India July 17, 1966;
Kosygin speech Dawn April 18, 1968.
Pakistani relations. Minor set-backs in Indo-Soviet relations came increasingly to be interpreted in India as being symptomatic of the whole new trend in Soviet policy. The eventuality which the Soviet Union had all along sought to prevent - that improved Soviet-Pakistani relations could only be achieved at the cost of Indo-Soviet relations - began to take on an ominous reality.

Most of the frictions which developed between the two countries were insignificant in themselves but taken together they make the period 1966-68 the most uncomfortable for Indo-Soviet relations in the two decades of their post-Stalinist development.

It is appropriate at this point to catalogue briefly the surface irritations which appeared between the two countries during this period. Firstly, it should be recalled that this period represented the nadir in the Soviet assessment of India for reasons that have been discussed above. This is the framework in which the following record of discord should be set.

It had been exceptional during the entire period since 1955 for the Communist Party of India to become a bone of contention between the Soviet and the Indian Governments. This in fact occurred in 1966 albeit on a very subdued note. The Soviet Union chose this moment, as has been mentioned previously, to protest against the continuing arrest of communists in India. Commenting on this protest in the Lok Sabha, Swaran Singh tried to claim that in discussions with the Soviet leaders "we have formed the impression that there is understanding of the problems faced by us" but he was probably being more candid when he prefaced his assurance with the caveat that "complete understanding and approbation of this action of the Government of India is not to be expected." Shortly after the Soviet protest, Indian communism

20) See Pravda March 5, 1966.
was again to provide a source of friction although this time the complaint came from the Indian side. A delegation of Indian communists visited Moscow and a communique was signed with them. This was regarded in India as official Soviet sanction for the activities of the CPI and as contradicting the support given by the Soviet state to the Congress Government. The Times of India commented editorially:

"Though Indian Communist leaders have frequently visited Moscow...it is the first time that the Russians have thought it fit to sign a joint communique with them...For the first time since 1955...the Russians have publicly affirmed their interest in the policies and activities of the CPI. Th is bold move has to be viewed in the context of recent shifts of emphasis in Soviet foreign policy. Moscow is openly courting Pakistan...." (22)

This was swiftly followed by problems in the way of Indo-Soviet trade caused by the devaluation of the Indian rupee. The devaluation affected existing Indo-Soviet trade schedules which required readjusting as the Soviet side, while sympathising with the Indian action, was not prepared to carry the burden of the devaluation. While it seems clear that a settlement was achieved in a reasonably amicable atmosphere, this was not done without some very hard bargaining. Testimony to the importance of the issue is provided by the fact that India thought it necessary to despatch to Moscow within a couple of days of each other two Ministers concerned, M. Shah, Minister for Commerce and A. Mehta, Minister for Planning. (23)

Also, in the international sphere, the Soviet Union was shortly to rebuff an Indian initiative on the subject of the Vietnam war. Mrs. Gandhi requested the USSR, as a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, to reopen that conference. However, the Soviet Union

22) May 4, 1966
rejected the Indian move. (24)

Two sources of perennial friction existed at the time in the broadcasts of 'Radio Peace and Progress' and in the details of Soviet maps depicting the Sino-Indian border. The radio broadcasts were viewed with particular distaste in India because during the years 1965-68 as was seen above, the Soviet media were portraying the Congress Party and some of its leaders in a very unflattering light. The Indian Government continued to raise this issue with the Soviet Union. (25) The issue began to wane in 1970 with the change in tone of Soviet comment and with the Indian Government accepting the rather artificial position that "Radio Station Peace and Progress is an autonomous body and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of the USSR." (26)

The subject of the Soviet 'cartographic aggression' was seldom absent from the Indian press or from the Lok Sabha debates in the second half of the '60's. Basically, the Indian complaint was that Soviet maps depicted the N.E.F.A. region and the Aksai Chin region as belonging to China. It was an issue on which the Government was constantly hard-pressed and it grasped at every straw to bring some reassurance to public opinion. Thus Minister for External Affairs, Chagla, informed the House in 1967 that there had been a definite advance on the previous Soviet position because now "they do not show the border. They just draw a legend and say that this is India and that is China." (27) At times too it was suggested that the use

of broken lines, implying a disputed border, constituted an improve-
ment in the Soviet position. This issue was to drag on beyond the
period under discussion. By 1970, the Indian Government can be seen
conveying Soviet assurances that "the delineation of maps had no
political significance" but rather reflected the historical attitude
of Russia towards the British position in this region:

"At that time they had adopted a particular alignment
and they have been repeating that. In those circum-
stances, obviously we know that historically the Soviet
sympathies were always against the British...and it was
for this reason that they, at that time, even before our
independence, adopted what was a Chinese claim in this
respect and that has been repeated in subsequent maps that
they have printed from time to time. (28)

Some of the heat was taken out of the dispute, at least temporarily,
with a Soviet assurance in 1970 that a new map would be published. (29)

It may be appropriate at this point to mention one episode
which caused a minor political storm in Delhi and which seemed to
indicate Soviet disrespect for the authority of the Indian Government.
The episode in question is that of the Soviet cultural centre in
Trivandrum in the state of Kerala. First reports in the Indian press
suggested that the Soviet Union had, without receiving any permission
from the Indian Government, proceeded to acquire land and to construct
on it a cultural centre and that the Indian Government had only become
aware of this because the building collapsed and some of the workers
engaged on its construction were killed. Later ministerial clarifica-
tions, however, were to demonstrate that the matter was more complex

than this and that the incident had blown up as much because of the Indian Government's mishandling of the situation as of Soviet lack of propriety. When the storm broke, it was initially reported that the Soviet Union had begun to construct the centre without waiting for Central Government approval. It was later revealed that the Soviet authorities believed they had received such approval albeit through unofficial channels. This was made clear in letters which K.P.S. Menon, a former Indian ambassador in Moscow, sent to Dinesh Singh, Minister of External Affairs, and which were read out in the Rajya Sabha. From them, it was evident that Menon had been acting as an intermediary between the Soviet and the Indian authorities and that, as President of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, he had encouraged the idea of a cultural centre in his native Kerala.

One of Menon's letters contains the following information:

"Nearly a year ago, I mentioned this proposal to the Foreign Secretary. He said that he saw no objection but that he would advise us to go slow in view of the impending political crisis in Bengal. I communicated this to Mr. Danilov, Counsellor and Head of the Cultural Department of the USSR Embassy. I understand that in June last Mr. Bolderiv, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires had a talk with Kewal Singh and understood him to say that there seemed to be no objection...We had unwittingly encouraged the Soviet authorities to go ahead with this project...The Soviet Embassy genuinely thought that there would be no objection to the establishment of a Cultural Centre." (30)

K.P.S. Menon is not, of course an independent observer and was no doubt inclined to place Soviet actions in their most favourable light. Nonetheless, that his version of events was substantially correct and that the incident was attributable to Indian bungling as much as to anything is corroborated by the rather crude methods which the Indian

Menon was to be made the scapegoat for the affair. As Dinesh Singh remarked in his statement to the House:

"I checked up with the Foreign Secretary and he categorically denied that he had any such conversation with Mr. K.P.S. Menon....He (Menon) is of course older in age and it was likely that he mixed up the issues. It was possible that he did not discuss it with the Foreign Secretary. There is no reason for us to doubt what has been said by the Foreign Secretary..." (31)

Foreign Secretary, T.N. Kaul, telephoned Menon and as a result of this call, it appears that Menon agreed to act as scapegoat. This was evidenced in a second letter from Menon read out by Dinesh Singh:

"Tikki telephoned to me just now and told me that he had no recollection of my talk with him regarding the Soviet Cultural Centre in Trivandrum. Since I am the older man, I suppose my memory must be deemed to be more frail...I often speak to Tikki informally about various matters not only as Foreign Secretary but as a personal friend and it is possible things might have got mixed up."

However, even while saying this, Menon could not refrain from inserting in his own defence "still, Mr. Danilov remembers my telling him that the ministry had no objection to the project but would advise them to go slow."(32) Obviously, Menon was a rather reluctant scapegoat. The Trivandrum affair was, therefore, more important as an issue of domestic Indian politics than as a crisis in Soviet-Indian relations.

Not even commercial matters were free from disagreement at this juncture. Both countries claimed to have cause for complaint. The Soviet Union was apparently perturbed by the Indian refusal to
purchase the commercial airliner which had been offered to it. An Indian Airlines committee reported that the Soviet TU-134, because it carried fewer passengers, was not as economical as some of its Western competitors such as the DC-9.\footnote{See e.g. New York Times September 15, 1968} On the other side, there was not a little disappointment in India at what was considered to be a Soviet breach of its promise to buy large consignments of railway wagons produced in India. On the 13th March 1968, a protocol was signed between India and the Soviet Union which laid down a schedule for the export of wagons to the USSR. Some 2000 wagons were to be exported in 1969-70 and the figure of 10,000 wagons per year was expected to be reached by 1972-3.\footnote{Statement by Deputy Minister of Commerce, Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 14 col 1399 March 19, 1968} The protocol was concluded between the State Trading Corporation of India and V/O Machinoimport of Moscow. However, the expectations of the protocol were not to be realised. It soon became apparent that the deal had faltered on the question of the price to be paid for the wagons. The Indian Minister for Foreign Trade announced that "while an informal understanding has been reached on most of the technical aspects of the envisaged contract, the price ideas of the two sides have been wide apart."\footnote{Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 33 cols 4-5 November 19, 1969} This fact was later to be confirmed by V.E. Dymshits, Vice Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, who claimed that the Indian price was between 150 and 200 per cent more than that paid for wagons in other countries.\footnote{See Indian press reports February 17, 1970}
Several other incidents were to place a strain on Indo-Soviet relations. Although the Soviet Union was no doubt pleased that India abstained on the U.N. resolution on Czechoslovakia, it was noted in Moscow that India 'deplored' the invasion even if it was not prepared to 'condemn it'(37) Consequently, a spokesman for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs announced that as a result of the periodical talks between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Firyubin, and the Indian Government there had been "no closeness of views" over Czechoslovakia.(38)

However, the major tensions arose over the questions of relations with Pakistan. Firstly, there was a reference, in a letter sent by Mr. Kosygin to Mrs. Gandhi, to the pattern on which the Indus Waters dispute had been resolved and this in the context of a wish that the two countries would settle their differences over the Farakka Barrage. (39) This was interpreted in India as Soviet backing for the Pakistani attempt to have the dispute internationalised and resolved through third party mediation. As such, the Soviet hint was quickly spurned by India. Mrs. Gandhi tried to place the most convenient interpretation on the Soviet Premier's reference. She explained that "there was no specific suggestion that this matter should be settled in the same way as the Indus waters dispute. The suggestion in the letter was that we should find some mutually acceptable solution of this matter."(40) However, in case the Soviet Union was harbouring

38) Times September 18, 1968
39) Times of India July 16, 1968
40) Rajya Sabha Debates vol 65 July 24, 1968
any delusions that a settlement might be achieved along these lines, the Indian Government stated its position quite unequivocally. A spokesman for the Ministry of External Affairs made it clear that there could be no comparison between the Indus Waters issue and that of the Ganga Waters and that the matter was essentially a bilateral one in which India would brook no interference from third parties.  

Even more symptomatic of the trend of Soviet policy, from the Indian point of view, were a couple of statements made by a visiting Soviet delegation in Pakistan in early 1969. The delegation was headed by Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko. During the visit, Vice-Admiral N.I. Smirnov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the USSR navy, was quoted as saying that "a powerful Pakistan navy would be a good precondition of peace in this part of the Indian Ocean." This was followed by reports that Grechko himself had stated that the Soviet Union was interested in Pakistan's strengthening its defence forces against its enemies and in the maintenance of a military balance in the region. The Indian reaction to such utterances was quite predictable.

The development which came closest to causing any serious breach in Indo-Soviet relations was the decision on the part of the Soviet Union to sell lethal weapons to Pakistan. This decision was made known in July 1968 after the arrival in Moscow of a Pakistani military delegation headed by Yahya Khan, C-in-C of the Pakistani forces. A discussion of some of the motives which inspired this Soviet decision will be provided later in this chapter but for the

41) Times of India July 16, 1968  
42) Dawn March 15, 1969  
43) Hindu April 6, 1969.
moment, the analysis will confine itself to the repercussions of the
decision. Firstly, with this development, it became increasingly
difficult for the Soviet Union to argue with any credibility that in its
relations with Pakistan it would do nothing to jeopardise the interests
of India. The move, therefore, exacerbated Indian resentment against
the Soviet Union.

However, secondly, it illustrated a general point which was
true of most of the friction between the two countries at this time -
namely, that the most vocal Indian critics of the USSR were not the
Indian Government, that the Indian Government on the contrary was try­
ing to exert a moderating influence but that continuing friction between
the two countries was beginning to endanger the credibility of the
Indian Government with its own public opinion. Thus, even if the Soviet
Union had been partially successful in persuading the Indian Government
that relations with Pakistan would not be developed at the expense of
existing relations with India, it was becoming increasingly less
successful in persuading the general Indian public of this.

The divergence between official and unofficial Indian reactions
to Soviet policy had been illustrated time and again with the Indian
Government always opting for the moderate line and trying to quell
the most strident demands of those sections of the Indian political
community which had been enraged by Soviet deeds and statements.
The Government came under severe domestic censure for not taking a
stronger line against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and for
refusing to condemn the action. Moreover, the Indian Government
throughout attempted to put the most optimistic interpretations on the
Soviet maps of the Sino-Indian border. This moderating influence
extended to other issues and appears to have been guided by a general principle. This principle was expressed by the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, K.K. Shah, in a debate on the subject of transmissions from Radio Peace and Progress:

"If there are some points on which they do not agree with us...it is the totality of the relationship that is built up that is to be taken into consideration. You may not agree with one or two points, but let us look at it in the context of the totality of the relationship." (44)

Again, on the subject of the Soviet decision to sell arms to Pakistan, the Indian Government was careful not to overreact to the situation. While Mrs. Gandhi felt bound to "express our misgivings and apprehensions to the Soviet leaders in all frankness" she nevertheless hastened to add that "we do not question either the motives or the good faith of the Soviet Union." (45) And when she instructed Congress M.P.'s not to say or do anything which might impair Indo-Soviet relations (46), she appears to have been acting on the basis of this principle once again. This was made explicit in the Prime Minster's statement to the Lok Sabha:

"The relations between India and the Soviet Union are many sided...This new development should, therefore, be seen in the context of the totality of these relations." (47)

This argument was more than a mere device to satisfy an outraged public opinion: it had a substantial basis in fact. That is to say that while recording the list of irritations which marred Indo-Soviet relations

44) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 13 col 2081 March 6, 1968
45) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 18 cols 289-90 July 22, 1968
46) Times of India July 19, 1968
during this period, it is important not to lose our perspective and to forget that throughout this period the Soviet economic, political and military stake in India continued undiminished. It was precisely because India continued to be so vital for the Soviet scheme of things, that Soviet leaders were irritated by the repercussions which relations with Pakistan were having on India. It is evidence of the strain which the Tashkent approach was placing on Soviet policy that whereas previously the Soviet Union had been content to assure India that its interests would not be adversely affected by developments in Soviet-Pakistani relations, Moscow was now driven to less diplomatic language and to blame on 'reactionary' Indian forces what was the inevitable outcome of Soviet actions. Typical of the diatribes which reflected Soviet desperation at this juncture was an article by Pravda's political correspondent, V. Mayevsky:

"It would be wrong to close one's eyes to the fact that there are avowed enemies of Soviet-Indian friendship in India. They are the reactionary antipopular forces... Seizing upon the development of Soviet-Pakistani relations as a pretext, the leaders of Jan Sangh made malicious statements against our country." (48)

Soviet radio stations took up the same theme:

"People in the Soviet Union could not help but noticing the increased attacks by reactionary Indian circles against the friendly relations existing between the Soviet Union and India. The reactionaries have been striving to convince the Indian people that the Soviet Union was developing its cooperation with Pakistan allegedly at the expense of its relations with India and that Soviet-Indian relations were supposedly losing their former warmth and sincerity. Such allegations are totally groundless." (49)

Izvestiya too added its word on the subject when it argued that "the caravan of Soviet-Indian friendship is going forward and while dogs may

48) Pravda July 29, 1968
49) Radio Peace and Progress April 17, 1969.
bark, it will continue on its onward course." (50)

Developments in Soviet-Pakistani relations

Soviet-Pakistani relations continued to improve during the period 1966-68. The favourable trend in Pakistani foreign policy was reflected in the more optimistic Soviet commentaries on Pakistan at this date. (51) Soviet media constantly carried reports about Pakistan's increasing disengagement from the SEATO and CENTO blocs and emphasised its uncooperative attitude towards American policy in Vietnam.

A high point in Soviet-Pakistani relations from the Soviet point of view, was the decision of the Pakistani Government not to renew the lease on the U.S. communications base at Badaber near Peshawar. The lease on the base would have expired at the beginning of July 1969 but in accordance with the terms of the agreement requiring one year's notice of non-renewal, Pakistan informed the U.S. on April 6 that it would be allowed to expire. (52) This seemed to represent a substantial pay-off for Soviet policy, especially as the Pakistani decision was made just one week before Mr. Kosygin arrived in Rawalpindi on a visit.

There were many suggestions in the press that the closure of the Peshawar base was a direct quid pro quo for Soviet agreement to supply arms to Pakistan. This thesis can neither establish nor disprove such a direct link. However, it does not appear unduly important to postulate such a direct equation. It is probably sufficient for the present purpose to maintain that both developments had a common source in the generally improved atmosphere between the two countries. Nonetheless, there is another side to the story. If the Soviet agreement to supply arms to Pakistan was partially the outcome of improvements in Soviet-Pakistani relations, it was also partially the logical culmination of the

50) Izvestiya April 20, 1969
51) Discussed in Ch. 3 Sect. b.
52) See Z. Hasan: Pakistan Horizon vol XXI No. 2 1968 p.151
Tashkent policy and of the pressures which Pakistan had exerted on the Soviet Union on this score.

It had been a constant Pakistani complaint in the years after Tashkent that the Soviet supply of arms to India imperilled the balance on the subcontinent, especially in view of the termination in 1965 of U.S. supplies previously the main source of Pakistan's equipment. Pakistan lost no opportunity for impressing this view on the Soviet Union. K. Mazurov was handed an open letter against Soviet supplies in May 1966(53) and Ayub claimed that the Soviet Union had been apprised of the Pakistani position.(54) A Pakistani military delegation, headed by Nur Khan, arrived in Moscow in June 1966 and this visit was symbolic of the Pakistani complaint. It is quite evident that this visit was calculated to impress on the Soviet leaders that if they would not cut off supplies to India, then in the interests of equity they must at least agree to supply Pakistan as well. The following year, President Ayub, while in Moscow, spoke of "the indiscriminate increase in armaments and the growing military imbalance in the Subcontinent",(55) and the reports in early 1968 that the Soviet Union was to supply India with more than 100 SU-7 supersonic jet fighter-bombers led Pakistan Foreign Minister, Pirzada, to complain that this would "further widen the military imbalance between Pakistan and India"(56)

Prior to the arms agreement of July 1968, it would appear that the only equipment supplied to Pakistan by the Soviet Union was of a 'non-lethal' nature. India was perturbed by reports that the Soviet Union was to sell Mi-6 helicopters to Pakistan but as Surendra Pal Singh, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, informed the Lok Sabha, "the USSR commercial organization 'Aviaexport' sells helicopters and

53) Dawn May 31, 1966
54) Dawn June 1, 1966
55) Tass September 25, 1967
civillian transport aircraft freely and these sales do not fall within the restrictions applied to the sale or gift of military equipment by the USSR to other countries." (57)

What, then, led the USSR to agree to supply military equipment to Pakistan in the middle of 1968? The Soviet Union apparently gave two explanations of the move in conversations with Indian officials. Swaran Singh referred to the Soviet assessment that "by supplying arms, the Soviet Union will succeed in weaning Pakistan away from China. It may be their assessment which they have not mentioned to us pointedly; there have been comments and sometimes it has been mentioned." (58) Later, the Minister for External Affairs was again to disclose that "at the time the USSR Government assured us that their arms supply to Pakistan was not intended to hurt India but might help in persuading Pakistan to normalise relations with India." (59) Even if we allow, as is reasonable, that these two considerations played a part in the Soviet calculation, this still does not provide a full explanation. It seems plausible, given the Soviet support for the Ayub regime which was to manifest itself in late 1968 and early 1969 (60), that a further Soviet motive might have been to shore up internally a regime which was coming increasingly under attack. That the Soviet Union valued the personal role of the President in the process of Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement had been underlined by a Soviet Embassy press release in Karachi on the eve of Ayub's departure for Moscow in 1967 when it asserted that "the Soviet public links the name of President Ayub Khan with a substantial improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations." (61)

57) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 8 col 18958-9 August 11, 1967
58) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 43 col 322 August 14, 1970
59) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 45 col 200 November 9, 1970
60) See above Ch 3 Sect. b
61) Dawn September 23, 1967
Given the nature of the regime, a Soviet agreement to supply it arms could do nothing but increase its domestic prestige.

More importantly, the Soviet Union had reached an impasse in its new approach to the subcontinent. The logic of that policy was pushing the USSR to make some commitment to Pakistan on the arms issue although it was patently clear that by doing so there was a serious possibility that Soviet-Indian relations would be seriously damaged. It is in the context of this dilemma that the closure of the Peshawar base became significant: it was precisely at this moment, when the Soviet leadership saw itself beginning to derive some benefit from its Pakistan policy, that the USSR was squarely faced with the option of succumbing to Pakistani entreaties or witnessing the erosion of its entire policy by obdurately refusing to make to Pakistan that one concession which counted above all others and which could really assure Pakistan of the sincerity of Soviet motives. Significantly, the Soviet Union opted for the policy of autonomy - for the policy based on a calculation of the further advantages to be derived from Pakistan by wooing her with military supplies.

In basing its policy on considerations intrinsic to the Soviet-Pakistani relationship itself, it would once again be wrong to say that the USSR was attaching greater importance to Pakistan than to India. In a sense, the Soviet move reflected the order of Soviet priorities rather than contradicted them. As the editor of the Pakistan Times was to point out on June 26, 1968 "we may get some arms from Russia but we can never overtake the fundamentals of its set policy of identity with India." This is perhaps to overstate the case but the thrust of the argument is broadly accurate. Soviet objectives as regards Pakistan were limited in comparison with those in relation to India. The USSR was seeking no more than that Pakistan should have with the Soviet Union a relationship which balanced that with the other
major powers - China and the U.S. In order to achieve such a position at this time, the Soviet Union was trying hard to ingratiate itself with Pakistan. The arms supply to Pakistan was therefore intended to obtain from the USSR a position of equality with those other powers (although the US had temporarily stopped its shipments). Again, it was precisely because the Soviet commitment to India was so wide in other spheres and because Indian reliance on the USSR had grown considerably over the preceding decade that the Soviet Union thought it could afford to take this step without causing long-term damage to Indo-Soviet relations. The decision reflected the relative strengths of the Soviet position in the two countries: whereas in Pakistan the USSR sought parity, in India it was, for the moment, at least 'primus inter pares'. 
Chapter 7
Dualism Falters - Soviet Disillusionment with Pakistan 1969-70

A) Two Responses to a Soviet Proposal

1) An Asian Collective Security System

On June 7 1969, Leonid Brezhnev informed the World Communist Conference in Moscow that "the course of events is also bringing to the fore the need to create a collective security system in Asia." The proposal was to meet with quite different responses from India and Pakistan and as such proved to be a decisive test of Soviet-Indian and Soviet-Pakistani relations respectively. More than any other episode in the period between the two Indo-Pakistani wars, this was to reveal the very large and the very real coincidence of interests between India and the Soviet Union and at the same time it was to depict graphically the limits on the advantages to be derived from continued Soviet cultivation of Pakistan. This is not to say that after 1969, the Soviet Union totally abandoned this course; it is only to emphasise that 1969 was a watershed in Soviet-Pakistani relations between 1964 and 1971 and that after this date, the Soviet Union had a clearer perception of the limits inherent in its Pakistan policy.

The immediate context in which the Soviet proposal was first mooted was one of extreme tension between the USSR and China. It was in March 1969 that the border fighting over Damansky Island had occurred. Moreover, the Soviet suggestion was preceded by an extensive press and radio campaign designed to convey the message that the border confrontation with the Soviet Union was but one example of the danger

1) Parts of this Section have already been published as 'The Indian Subcontinent and Collective Security-Soviet Style' Australian Outlook December 1972; and 'Collective Security in Asia' The Round Table October 1973.

2) Tass June 7, 1969
which the PRC presented to peace and security in Asia and of the
designs which China entertained against its neighbours in Asia. The
build-up to the collective security proposal, therefore, served to
place the suggestion in an explicitly anti-Chinese context.

For example, New Delhi Radio reported on March 19, 1969 that
Pyotr Reshetov, a member of the Praesidium of the Soviet Peace
Committee then visiting India, had suggested the constitution of a
"common front" between the Soviet Union, India and Burma against
"the adventurous policies of the Chinese Government." Mr. Kosygin
returned to the same theme in a speech at the funeral of the late
Indian President, Zakir Husain. While stressing that Soviet-Indian
cooperation was not directed against any third country, Mr. Kosygin
nevertheless felt compelled to add that "at the same time, in the
conditions of existing world tensions, this cooperation helps India
to secure its legitimate interests." More specifically, Mr. Kosygin
referred to the country's ability to defend its territorial integrity
"against adventurist encroachments by external forces seeking hege-
mony in Asia."(3) The threat which China constituted for the independ-
ence of the Asian states was heavily drawn. Moscow Radio warned more
than once that "Mao's policy, aimed at imposing Chinese domination on
Asia, constitutes a grave threat to the developing countries."(4) The
first explicit reference to collective security was made by Izvestiya's
leading political commentator in an article which refuted the notion
of a 'vacuum' in Asia in the wake of British withdrawal. Matveyev
maintained that India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Singapore
and other Asian countries were consolidating their sovereignty and,

3) Pravda May 7, 1969
4) May 19, 1969.
therefore, brooked no interference in their internal affairs. In
spite of this, the article continued, China gave credence to the vacuum
thesis and "judging from Articles in the Peking press, Mao Tse-Tung
and his associates have quite definite designs on several countries in
the area."(5) Finally, one week before the Brezhnev pronouncement,
Tass broadcast an appeal for "common resolution" in Asia on the grounds
that "the confirmation of such a stand acquires even greater importance
because some figures in Asia, obsessed by Great Power chauvinism, have
renounced the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with dif­
ferent social systems and are even resorting to force in futile attempts
to achieve world leadership."(6)

Given the overt anti-Chinese context in which the Soviet Union
broached the topic of Asian collective security, many Asian states were
nervous of its military-bloc implications and suspected that the Soviet
proposal might entail the military containment of China.

In the face of this lukewarm response on the part of the Asian
states, the Soviet Union took great pains to convey the impression that
what it had in mind was not a military grouping and that a collective
security system would in no way be directed against China. Rather,
the thrust of Soviet utterances on the subject now strongly suggested
that the security proposal was to be viewed in terms of an initiative
in the field of Asian economic cooperation. Such an option had in
fact been proposed by Premier Kosygin during his visit to Afghanistan
and Pakistan at the end of May 1969. He had, in a speech in Pakistan,
emphasised that the Soviet Union would like to see Pakistan, Afghanistan
and India develop relations of constructive cooperation. (7) Further
weight was given to Kosygin's words in a Pravda article which followed
within a couple of days of the Premier's statement. The article drew

5) Izvestiya May 29, 1969
6) Tass June 1, 1969
attention to "new hegemonic forces in Asia" which were "carrying on
dangerous subversive work, seeking to set at loggerheads Afghanistan
and Pakistan, Pakistan and India and to create an atmosphere of high
tensions in the area so as to achieve their great power aims". In
the face of this threat, the paper urged, "there is a need and obj­
ective conditions do exist for cooperation of India, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran and other states in economic fields and in the
preservation of peace."(8)

That regional economic cooperation was the idea behind the
Soviet collective security proposal or that, at any rate, it was
regarded as a step in the direction of a security system was revealed
by Izvestiya. The Government newspaper carried a review of the book
'View from New Delhi' by the American ambassador, Chester Bowles, in
which the reviewer favoured the idea of regional economic cooperation
because "in the opinion of many local observers, such cooperation can
establish the groundwork for a system of regional collective security."(9)

It soon became clear that the Soviet Union had a specific
economic project in mind. This was to obtain an agreement on transit
facilities in the region in order to establish an overland trade route
linking India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and the USSR. A project
of this nature had become feasible because in the course of the 1960's
a network of highways had been completed in Afghanistan, providing
routes through the country from the Soviet border to both Iran and
Pakistan. The Soviet Union had assisted in the construction of these
highways. In June 1969, the Afghan Government contacted the above states

8) Mayevsky & Filippov: Pravda June 2, 1969
9) Izvestiya June 20, 1969.
and invited them to Kabul to participate in a conference on the subject of transit facilities.\(^{(10)}\) The initiative for this move had obviously come from the USSR. As the Indian Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh was to inform a press conference "the Soviet Union had set the ball rolling and it was now up to the various countries to take up the proposal."\(^{(11)}\) Soviet commentaries on collective security increasingly concentrated on this theme of economic cooperation. A participant in a Moscow Radio discussion suggested that an agreement on transit trade would be desirable\(^{(12)}\) while the same station commented that the Soviet Union would like to see "Pakistan, Iran, India, Turkey and Afghanistan develop friendly, constructive and cooperative relations" even though there were "many obstacles and difficulties in developing large-scale economic and trade relations between these countries."\(^{(13)}\)

It is apparent that if the Soviet Union was pressing for this regional economic association as some sort of embryonic security system, it could not have failed to be motivated by another consideration - that of breaking the deadlock over Indo-Pakistan trade which had existed since the war of 1965. In this respect, it was no doubt considered that Indo-Pakistan agreement might be more easily secured within the context of a multilateral arrangement than in direct bilateral negotiations between the two countries themselves.

Some general discussion of the motives underlying the Soviet initiative may be in order. Three broad considerations can be discerned. At one level, the collective security suggestion, interpreted as

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10) Times of India June 26, 1969
11) Times June 24, 1969
12) August 17, 1969
13) September 15, 1969
regional economic cooperation, appears to be no more than an extension of some of the motivations which led to the cultivation of Pakistan and to attempts to effect a degree of Indo-Pakistani accommodation.\(^{(14)}\)

In particular, it is reminiscent of the argument that the elimination of regional conflict through the development of cooperation would help to check interference in the region by the other powers. Certainly, if Mrs. Gandhi's interpretation of the Soviet proposal is at all accurate, collective security was being put forward in order to "restrain the USA and China from making inroads into Asia."\(^{(15)}\) Economic cooperation was viewed as a major means to this end. This can be seen from several important Soviet articles of the period. One such contended that the aggressive designs of the US in Asia are countered by "the resolve of the independent Asian states to develop economic cooperation as an important means for promoting their own economic independence and safeguarding their interests: and went on to add that "in this the Asian states have the full support of the Soviet Union."\(^{(16)}\) Another article makes the same point:

"The desire to accelerate economic growth and to hold their own in the struggle against foreign capital leads the developing countries to adopt a constructive and purposeful policy. Commercial and economic relations within the third world are being extended and there is growing interest in the establishment of regional economic associations. Formation of regional and sub-regional association is of positive significance objectively." \(^{(17)}\)

\(^{(14)}\) These were discussed in Chapter 4.

\(^{(15)}\) Kyodo June 25, 1969


\(^{(17)}\) Y. Seleznynova: 'Developing States and International Relations': International Affairs May 1968 p 70-1. For an earlier and more scholarly treatment of Asian economic cooperation as a means to 'national independence' see A.S. Kodachenko: 'Problemy Khozyaystvennogo Sotrudnichestva Razvivayushchikhsya Stran Azii' (Problems of economic cooperation among the developing countries of Asia): Narody Azii i Afriki No 6 1967 p 11.
A second objective flows also from the example of Indo-Pakistani relations. Just as the Tashkent policy of the Soviet Union was predicated on a realisation that 'peaceful coexistence' between the two countries was necessary in order to meet the demands of the new Soviet policy of broadbasing its South Asian policy, so some such consideration on a wider scale emerged from the more general expansion of Soviet interests in Asia. We have seen how in the middle '60's, the USSR developed closer ties with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. In the later years of the decade, an appreciable improvement also occurred in Soviet relations with Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. In consequence, it was no doubt thought desirable that greater cooperation between the Soviet Union and these various countries should be accompanied by greater cooperation between these countries themselves so that Soviet policy might not be vitiated by conflicts between them. In short, this was a reflection of the greater stake which the USSR had in Asian politics and of the consequently greater stake which it had in the region's stability.

A third consideration lay in the continuing Soviet concern with encouraging the concept of nonalignment. The Soviet definition of such a policy had always left room for its 'anti-imperialist content'. However, there is reason for believing that at this point in time, the USSR was becoming dissatisfied with conceptions of nonalignment which it had fostered in the 1950's and which, from the Soviet point of view, were more important because they were anti-Western than because they were pro-Soviet. It would appear that the USSR sought, at this juncture, a more positive expression of the harmony of interests between the developing Asian countries and the Soviet Union and the rubric of collective security may be viewed in part as an attempt to revitalise the connection between the forces of 'national emancipation' and those of 'social emancipation'. This is suggested by several Soviet commentaries which
developing countries in their relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, one Soviet writer expressed the view that "the attitude to military-political groups is no longer the only criterion of neutralism at the present stage in the liberation struggle of the developing countries. The nonalignment policy has acquired a more intricate character which goes beyond the bounds of some of the traditional concepts that originated in the mid-1950's." And Moscow Radio promoted the Soviet suggestion for an Asian security system in the context of an admonition that "the strength and vitality of a policy of nonalignment does not mean that the countries pursuing this policy should avoid the most important international problems and withdraw into the realm of narrowly interpreted national interests." In a word, if Moscow was not quite asking the Asian states to pin their colours to their masts, then it was at least asking that nonalignment should be more than negative, and in some cases unconvincing, anti-imperialist statements.

2) The Indian Response

It was to be expected that the Soviet security proposal, in its economic cooperation interpretation, would meet with a favourable reception in India. There had been ample evidence to demonstrate that Indian thinking was already headed in this direction and that it was doing so in a context which was as explicitly China-oriented as that which had surrounded the Soviet proposal.

Early in 1967, the then Minister for External Affairs, M.C. Chagla,

18) Y. Seleznyova: op. cit. p.70
19) July 15, 1969
on the eve of visits to Indonesia and Burma, told newsmen that China posed a threat to Asia and that all the South-East Asian countries were afraid of it. In his opinion "the only way the Chinese threat could be countered was for the countries of the region to become economically strong and viable." Later that same year, the Washington Post was able to report that India was sounding out opinion on the forging of closer economic links in South and South-East Asia.

1968 was to witness a host of Indian declarations on the subject. Deputy Prime Minister Desai was reported as saying that "India was greatly interested in co-operating with other Asian countries in promoting the economic development of the entire region" and the following day the External Affairs Minister informed the Lok Sabha that the main danger in Asia was one of subversion and that the answer to this problem lay in strengthening the economic viability of the countries of the region. Mrs. Gandhi too had her word to say on the matter. While on a visit to Malaysia, she referred to economic cooperation in Asia in the face of 'certain forces in Asia' which "would like to subvert the national independence of Asian nations to make them subservient to their hegemony." And by the end of the year a meeting of the heads of India's Asian missions was informed by the Commerce Minister that "the time is now ripe for further international advance in the field of closer economic cooperation among Asian nations."

That India saw itself as sharing with the Soviet Union a common

20) Times of India January 14, 1967
21) September 9, 1967
22) New Delhi Radio April 3, 1968
23) New Delhi Radio April 4, 1968
24) Straits Times May 31, 1968
25) Times of India December 13, 1968
enemy in China had also been revealed by the support which India gave to the USSR in its border dispute with China. The declaration of India's support for the Soviet position was slightly delayed because of internal pressures which argued against making any firm public commitment on the dispute. Nevertheless, the declaration was made and, Dinesh Singh, in his statement to the Lok Sabha affirmed that "India supported the Soviet Union in upholding respect for historically-formed frontiers." He made clear where India thought the onus of responsibility for the fighting lay when he added that "Judging by our experience with China, we are not surprised that the Chinese Government is adopting similar postures towards the Soviet Union."(26)

Having said this, it must be admitted that the Indian reaction to the Soviet collective security suggestion was not immediately whole-hearted. India made clear its reluctance to participate in anything which smacked of a military alliance. Moreover, while India suffered no qualms about highlighting the Chinese threat on its own account, it was averse to taking up an anti-Chinese stance as part of an ostensibly bloc. The official explanation for this had been spelled out on many occasions on the grounds that military alliances would provoke counter measures on the other side.

Nevertheless, the proposal for regional economic cooperation was well received by India. Speaking in Kabul on the subject of Mr. Kosygin's suggestion for cooperation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Mrs. Gandhi said that "if Soviet initiative could achieve it, then it would be a good thing."(27) However, on returning to

26) Times of India April 9, 1969
27) Times of India June 11, 1969.
Delhi, she was quick to point out that India had always supported such cooperation in economic matters and that "there was no question of India's responding to the proposal under the influence of the Soviet Union." (28)

The official declarations of the Indian Government testified to a considerable degree of harmony between Indian and Soviet thinking. The Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Surendra Pal Singh, made a statement on Indian policy in which he declared that "the Government believe that economic development of the region through bilateral and regional cooperation will reduce the threat of subversion." (29) The following day, Dinesh Singh clarified in the other House:

"So far as the defence pact is concerned, the Soviet Union has made it clear that they are not thinking in terms of any defence pact in this area. They have talked of economic cooperation and also they have said that economic cooperation and general cooperation between countries will lead to greater security in this area." (30)

It was on the basis of such clarifications that Dinesh Singh, during his visit to Moscow in September 1969, was able to affirm that "their ideas are in line with our own." (31) This harmony found confirmation in the joint communique which resulted from the Singh visit:

"The Foreign Ministers agreed that the political and economic development of the countries of Asia and cooperation among them, based on equality, mutual advantage respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in one another's internal affairs is the best foundation for the maintenance and strengthening of peace, stability and security in this part of the world." (32)

28) New Delhi Radio June 16, 1969
29) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 31 col 108-9 August 6, 1969
30) Rajya Sabha Debates vol 69 col 2804-7 August 7, 1969
31) Times of India September 16, 1969.
32) Pravda September 18, 1969.
This interpretation need not entail a conspiracy thesis in which India is depicted as a mere pawn of the Soviet Union. These developments are more intelligible in terms of the shared interest which both countries had in such regional policies. A report in the New York Times highlights this mutual interest:

"New Delhi is playing the most active role in nonmilitary regional cooperative efforts that, while stemming from India's own desire for greater cooperation with her neighbours also coincide with what Moscow seems to have in mind." (33)

One example of Indian interest in regional cooperation on such matters was the decision the following year to send a team of experts to assist with the project of constructing a road in Afghanistan from Kandahar to the Iranian border near Zahidan. (34)

Indian actions found favour in the Soviet Union. Thus Moscow Radio was happy to report that "in the last few months, India has made great diplomatic efforts to develop its relations with its neighbours." (35)

More explicit approval for the Indian course was to come from V. Matveyev in an Izvestiya article on the collective security proposal. The writer drew attention to the fact that "India,...is devoting increasing attention to the development of its economic and technical ties with neighbouring countries" and went on to comment that "the future lies in precisely such a policy." (36)

3) The Pakistani Response

Pakistan refused to become involved in the proposals for economic cooperation put forward by the Soviet Union and did so in such a way as to cause some friction between the USSR and Pakistan. When Mr. Kosygin

33) Tillman Durdin June 18, 1969
34) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 39 col 217-8 April 6, 1970
35) January 17, 1970
first mentioned the idea of cooperation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the embryo of the proposal for a transit trade agreement between the countries of the region, he did so in a speech at an official dinner reception in Pakistan. Such formal functions are scarcely the place where important diplomatic demarches are made and it is inconceivable that Mr. Kosygin should have made the proposal without prior discussion of the issue with President Yahya. Moreover, he would not have made a public pronouncement as he did if Yahya's response had been totally negative. Indeed, it seems clear that Mr. Kosygin left Pakistan with the impression that he had obtained a favourable commitment from Yahya on this question. (37) That Mr. Kosygin entertained such a belief is supported by a report from the Times' Delhi correspondent to the effect that "it is widely known that the Soviet Union has informed the Indian Government that Pakistan is willing to take part in preliminary discussions." (38)

If this was the Soviet expectation, it was soon to be dashed. It took some three weeks for the Pakistani attitude to become known and it is possible that in this time Yahya had either had second thoughts or been subjected to pressures to change his mind. In any case, Pakistan soon made it clear that the Kosygin proposal was a non-starter. Karachi

37) This information was volunteered in an interview with Mr. Damodaran, Indian Minister in Moscow at the time, who stated that diplomatic circles in Moscow had heard that Mr. Kosygin was quite put out when he discovered that Yahya was refusing to cooperate and that the Pakistani President had apparently gone back on his word. Coming from Indian sources, this information may be unreliable but it has the ring of truth about it. Such an interpretation is also to be found in J.A. Naik: 'India, Russia, China & Bangladesh (New Delhi 1972) p.53.

38) Times June 24, 1969.
Radio gave the first indication of the official Pakistani reaction:

"While thinking of neighbourly cooperation in the region as a whole, Mr. Kosygin...casually rounded up the whole thing by bracketing together the three neighbourly countries who should make efforts to live in peace and amity...It seems India has read more into the Soviet Prime Minister's casual expression of goodwill than is perhaps warranted by the facts." (39)

A more direct rebuff to the Soviet proposal was to come from Yahya himself in a form which must undoubtedly have irritated Mr. Kosygin. When asked in a press conference to comment on the Soviet proposal for joint collaboration between India, Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan and Iran, Yahya remarked that "he was not aware of it, nor had Mr. Kosygin discussed the proposal with him." (40)

That there was a fundamental divergence of interests between Pakistan, on the one hand, and India and the Soviet Union on the other, was soon to be revealed. At the height of the discussions on the Soviet proposal and at the time when the Soviet Union was pressing for a transit trade conference, Pakistan sent a delegation to China which reiterated the existence of the bonds between the two countries and gave public assurances to the Chinese that Pakistan would not participate in any Soviet-sponsored schemes which had even an implicit anti-China connotation. This can be seen from a speech by the delegation's head, Air Marshal Nur Khan. He declared that "Pakistan and China have set an example in neighbourly cooperation which others can well emulate. Where such understanding is lacking and, furthermore, where differences exist on fundamental issues, any talk of regional co-operation on economic or other issues is unrealistic." (41)

39) June 18, 1969
40) Karachi Radio July 2, 1969
Moreover, the Air Marshal prefaced his remarks with the observation that "China does not pose a threat to any nation." This visit typified the limitations on Moscow's Pakistan policy imposed by Sino-Pakistani ties.

It could not have been pleasing for Moscow to see its proposal rejected on pro-Chinese grounds. However, the phrasing of the Pakistani rejection of the scheme was such as to indicate that, apart from mollifying China, Pakistan was using the Soviet proposal as a means of putting pressure on the USSR to achieve a settlement of Indo-Pakistani questions. In a word, Pakistan was coming close to making its participation in the Soviet scheme conditional upon Soviet efforts to intercede with India. Thus Karachi Radio indicated that "Pakistan is not wholly averse to the idea of regional conferences for cooperative purposes...but...until the basic disputes with India are resolved no kind of cooperation can flourish between the two countries."(42)

Later, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said in Islamabad that "since India-Pakistan relations remained strained due to major disputes, their joint participation in matters of regional cooperation was unrealistic."(43)

A similar statement was made by the Pakistani representative before a U.N. General Assembly committee. The spokesman told the U.N. that any regional security system should be preceded by a peaceful settlement of disputes existing in the regions concerned. He then added that "it would be unjust to seek a guarantee of territorial integrity of states through this system in regions where some states have usurped territories in violation of international agreement and against the wishes of the indigenous people."(44) The most unambiguous suggestion

42) June 18, 1969
43) Karachi Radio July 10, 1969
that Pakistan could increase its leverage with the Soviet Union by remaining cool to the Soviet proposal and that this might lead to some benefit for Pakistan in terms of Indo-Pakistani questions came from an unofficial Pakistani source, M.A.H. Ispahani, a former diplomat and Minister, in an address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. Noting that "even so far as the idea of an economic pact between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and the USSR is concerned, Pakistan cannot readily jump into it unless certain preliminary conditions are assured", Ispahani went on to argue that "to clear the way for cooperation and better understanding in our region, the Soviet Union should use the weight of its influence for the equitable resolution of the disputes that plague South Asia." (45)

Thus by the end of 1969, Surendra Pal Singh had to inform the Rajya Sabha that, although the Governments of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey had been favourable, no progress had been made on the Soviet proposal "because of lack of positive response by Pakistan." (46) Nor was there any change in the Pakistani attitude in 1970. This was evidenced in relation to a Soviet move to transport textile machinery and other equipment overland to Karachi. The Soviet initiative provoked the following comments from the Pakistan Times:

"About a year ago, Moscow proposed trade and economic cooperation between Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USSR. The latest Russian move would seem to be the first major step towards the realisation of that wider cooperation.

In normal circumstances, economic cooperation between the five countries may have some merit. The circumstances are, however, far from normal. Thus Pakistan has not favoured any trade and economic grouping in which it would be called upon to cooperate with an intransigent and even hostile India. Of course, Moscow has argued in the past that economic cooperation would lead to the resolution of the disputes but, in reality, such cooperation between Pakistan and India would finally set the seal of approval to the 'status quo' in Kashmir." (47)

45) 'Pakistan and New Regional Arrangements': Pakistan Horizon vol XXII No 3 1969.
46) Rajya Sabha Debates vol 70 col 2843 December 4, 1969
47) May 2, 1970
Yahya himself confirmed that his attitude had not changed. He told newsmen at Chaklala airport before his departure for Moscow that his views on regional cooperation and Asian security remained the same^{48} and stated in an interview with Moscow journal 'International Affairs', when asked about the possibilities for improving transit communications and transit trade in the region, that "success in such a matter depends on the basic friendship between the states. It is unimaginable to talk about transit between two friendly countries through an area which is an area of tension".^{49} The Pakistani rejection of this Soviet scheme was not to be without its repercussions on Soviet-Pakistani relations as will be seen in the next section.

B) Soviet Estrangement from Pakistan

From 1969, Soviet-Indian relations were steadily consolidated. It is true that minor irritations in respect of Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts, Soviet maps of the Sino-Indian border and the railway wagon deal continued. However, beneath the surface, India's leading role in Soviet strategy for the region was gradually reasserted. As a Soviet journalist, V. Kudryavtsev, was to remark "India has a primary interest for the imperialist forces...as so large a country as India will inevitably influence the development of other Asian states."^{50}

It is to be expected that the Soviet Union would be as impressed by this argument as the 'Imperialist forces'. At any rate, it seems apparent that from 1969 onwards, India came to play an increasingly prominent part in Soviet Asian policy. Thus although Mrs. Gandhi was eager to

48) Radio Pakistan News (Information Section, Pakistan High Commission, New Delhi) June 18, 1970
49) August 1970 p.65
50) Izvestiya November 15, 1969.
deny that "New Delhi has increasingly been turning to Moscow" she was nevertheless prepared to admit that "it is, in fact, Moscow which has turned more towards us."(51)

While Soviet-Indian bonds were becoming increasingly close, Soviet-Pakistani relations were beginning to show the first signs of strain. It will be recalled that in the course of 1969 the tone of Soviet comment on Pakistan underwent a striking change. The implicit support given to the Ayub regime during the 1968-69 crisis and the attacks on the opposition parties both disappeared during 1969 and were replaced by greater emphasis on Yahya's failure to solve the country's problems and on the virtues of the East Pakistani movement for autonomy.

When Dinesh Singh visited Moscow in September 1969, he claimed to have detected the setting-in of a "certain disenchantment" in Soviet-Pakistani relations.(52) While Singh's evidence cannot be accepted as impartial, there is reason for thinking that his impression was substantially correct. Firstly, there seems to have been some difficulty over Yahya's projected visit to the Soviet Union. Kosygin had issued an invitation for Yahya to come to the USSR when he visited Pakistan in the spring of 1969 and this invitation was renewed in October.(53) In spite of this, the date of the visit was several times postponed and it did not occur until the middle of 1970.(54) Although it cannot be known with certainty that these postponements resulted from difficulties between the two countries, as neither gave any official explanation for the delay, the very fact that no explanation was given suggests that matters of substance were involved and that

51) Interview with 'German International': Reported New Delhi Radio June 16, 1970.
52) Times of India September 16, 1969.
it was not simply a question of finding convenient dates.

There were also indications that the two countries did not see eye to eye on other matters. It was seen in the previous section that, in refusing to participate in the Soviet proposal for regional economic cooperation, Pakistan made its future participation in such a scheme conditional on a settlement of its outstanding problems with India and hinted that the Soviet Union should take the lead in securing such a settlement. That President Yahya was, in fact, angling for a Soviet initiative in India-Pakistan disputes can be seen from a letter sent by Yahya to the Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, on the occasion of the 4th Anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration. Yahya drew attention specifically to the question of the Farakka Barrage:

"Difficulties have recently been accentuated by India's unilateral decision to postpone the fourth round of talks on the Ganges water contrary to the explicit and unconditional agreement reached in July last year. As you are aware, the Farakka Barrage is nearing completion and the consideration of the substantive question relating to a mutually beneficial apportionment of the waters of the Ganges is yet to be taken up." (55)

Affirming that Pakistan would continue to seek peaceful solutions of disputes with India, Yahya then went on to make his plea. "We sincerely hope," he declared, "that you Mr. Chairman and the Government of the USSR would make further positive contribution in this direction." The appeal, as far as can be judged, evoked no response from the USSR. And when Yahya eventually visited Moscow, the communique revealed that Pakistani attempts to secure Soviet pressure on India had failed. In the words of the communique:

"The Soviet side expressed its firm conviction that the solution through bilateral talks of the disputable questions in Pakistan-Indian relations in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration would be in keeping with the vital interests of the peoples of Pakistan and India." (56)

55) Dawn January 31, 1970
56) Pakistan Times June 28, 1970
The nature of Pakistani hopes and the fact that they were dashed by President Yahya's trip to Moscow have been candidly demonstrated by editorial comments in the Pakistan Times, usually considered to be close to official opinion. At the commencement of the Yahya visit, the paper observed that "As the main supplier of arms to India and a major source of its economic wherewithal, the Soviet Union can surely play a vital role in bringing New Delhi round to reason and inaugurating a new era in Indo-Pakistan relations... Once this can be brought about, Pakistan would have no valid objection to the Soviet proposal of regional cooperation." (57) By the end of the visit, however, it was clear that the Soviet Union was not prepared to play any such role. As the Pakistan Times' editorial commented ruefully "on Indo-Pakistan relations, the Soviet stand remains more or less static. The hope that Moscow might be induced to renew its mediatory role has failed to materialise." (58) Indeed, the Soviet Union had hinted that two could play the game of exerting pressure: in the face of Pakistani tactical gambits which made participation in regional cooperation conditional upon Soviet mediation on Indo-Pakistani disputes, the USSR made the further development of Soviet-Pakistan relations conditional upon a more responsive Pakistani attitude towards Soviet plans for the region. This can reasonably be deduced from Mr. Kosygin's remark at a reception for Yahya in Moscow that "in the talks with President Yahya Khan we were guided by a desire to make the relations between our two countries still friendlier and at the same time we did not lose sight of the task of promoting

57) Pakistan Times June 22, 1970
58) Pakistan Times June 28, 1970
the strengthening of peace and international security, especially in Asia", an allusion to the collective security programme.\(^{(59)}\)

However, the most important evidence of a set-back in Soviet-Pakistani relations, evidence which dates the beginning of the trouble from that very time of Pakistan's rejection of Kosygin's cooperative scheme, is to be found in the history of Soviet arms shipments to Pakistan which can be pieced together from various sources. It seems reasonably certain that the deal which Yahya, as C-in-C, negotiated with the Soviet Union in July 1968, provided for three shipments of arms to be delivered around February, May and August 1969.\(^{(60)}\) According to information supplied to the Indian parliament, the first two shipments were delivered on schedule. Apart from 130mm guns, helicopters, radar sets and ammunition, the Soviet shipments consisted of T-55 tanks.\(^{(61)}\)

More specifically, it was clarified that "the Soviet Union have supplied about 50 T-55 tanks to Pakistan in May. This is in addition to about 50 tanks supplied by them in February."\(^{(62)}\)

Difficulties arose over the shipment or shipments which were to have been sent in the second half of 1969 and it is now clear that the Soviet Union defaulted on the delivery of arms after May 1969. This was first reported by the Times of India on September 20, 1969. This item indicated that "Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan have slowed down" and reported on the subject of tank deliveries that "a third consignment was due for shipment in August but there are no signs of it being sent yet." Such evidence from Indian sources

\(^{(59)}\) Pravda June 24, 1970
\(^{(60)}\) See Times of India August 18, 1969; September 20, 1969
\(^{(61)}\) Statement by Minister of Defence, Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 30 col 43 and col 150 July 23, 1969
\(^{(62)}\) Statement by Minister of Defence Rajya Sabha Debates vol 69 col 786 July 24, 1969
would not be conclusive by itself but this information has been confirmed by Pakistani sources. As the Pakistan Times was to point out on Yahya's departure for Moscow:

"...the immediate problem seems to be the delivery of weapons that Moscow had agreed to sell during President Ayub's time. It is widely known here that some of the arms the Soviet Union had agreed to deliver before the end of last year have not arrived so far." (63)

This was later given official confirmation by a spokesman for the Pakistani Foreign Office who provided the following information:

"...an agreement was signed in 1968 and while some weapons had been delivered, certain items were still outstanding. Actually, only a small quantity of weapons has been delivered. Although the 1968 agreement had stipulated that deliveries would be completed by the end of 1969, a bulk of the weapons have not been delivered so far." (64)

These weapons were never delivered. Whatever the cause of the interruption in supplies in the summer of 1969, it did not result in a mere temporary suspension but rather led to the permanent blocking of Soviet arms to Pakistan. A Soviet Embassy (Delhi) press note of July 6, 1971 made clear that the USSR had not supplied any arms to Pakistan throughout 1970-71. (65)

There are several possible explanations for the unscheduled Soviet termination of its supplies of arms to Pakistan. It was suggested by some newspapers at the time that the slowing down of Moscow's arms shipments merely reflected caution in the face of the change of regime in Pakistan. This is not very convincing. In the first place, the Soviet Union had gone out of its way to stress its support for the new administration in April 1969. Kosygin had sent Yahya a goodwill message in which he assured him on behalf of the Soviet Government "that the Pakistani people and its leaders can

63) Pakistan Times June 22, 1970
64) Pakistan Times November 6, 1970
65) Times of India July 8, 1971
always count on the friendly understanding and support of the Soviet Union." (66) Moreover, it was the early shipments of arms which coincided with the turmoil in Pakistan and with the change of regime which were delivered without any hitch. If Moscow had been cautiously awaiting to see what course the Yahya administration would follow, it would have been those early shipments which would have been affected. It seems more reasonable to conclude that Moscow became progressively less inclined to part with its arms, not because it was studiously following developments in Pakistan, but because it quickly came to the conclusion that the directions of the Yahya regime were not pleasing to the Soviet Union. Yahya himself was plainly aware of the friction which was developing between the two countries. He made known before his departure for Moscow in 1970 that he was not taking with him a shopping list of military hardware. (67) Given the massive effort which Pakistan put into acquiring arms and given that Pakistan had pressed the USSR for arms consistently throughout the period 1965-9, we can only assume that Yahya made no request for arms during his 1970 trip on the realistic calculation that the Soviet Union would turn down the request in any case.

Another explanation of the Soviet decision is that the arms shipments were terminated in response to Indian protests. It was in October 1970 that an official spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry first reported that India had been given an assurance that no further Soviet arms would be supplied to Pakistan. (68) Conveying this information to the Lok Sabha, Defence Minister Swaran Singh implied that credit for the decision lay with the Indian Government.

66) Dawn April 10, 1969
67) Pakistan Times June 22, 1970
68) Times of India October 20, 1970
"We are glad that the Soviet Government have given consideration to our representations and informed us that they have not supplied - and do not intend to supply - any military hardware to Pakistan in addition to that already supplied in the past." (69)

There are several difficulties in accepting this explanation. The Soviet Union had known that a decision to supply arms to Pakistan would evoke loud opposition in India. This had been shown by the storms provoked by numerous false reports of Soviet supplies of arms to Pakistan in the period 1966-8. It cannot therefore be said that the Indian response took Soviet policy-makers by surprise. However, even if it is conceded that the public reaction in India was much stronger than anticipated, there is a further difficulty with this interpretation. If, as seems clear from the above account, Soviet supplies of arms to Pakistan had been suspended by the summer of 1969 or by the end of the year at the very latest, and if the Soviet Union was motivated in halting them primarily by a desire to appease Indian official or public opinion, then why was there such a delay in making known that the shipments had been suspended? Indeed, consecutive Indian Ministers carried with them to Moscow in late 1969 and early 1970 protests against arms supplies to Pakistan; and yet, on the available evidence, the shipments had ceased by this date. (70) The credibility of this theory is further diminished by the admission of Swaran Singh, the External Affairs Minister, himself. As late as August 1970, many months after the flow of arms had ceased, he expressed the following opinion to the Lok Sabha:

"About protest notes and all that, I do not know

69) Lok Sabha Debates 4th series vol 45 col 200 November 9, 1970
70) See e.g. reports on Dinesh Singh's visit to Moscow, Times of India September 16, 1969 and Rajya Sabha Debates vol 70 col 2810-1 December 4, 1969.
what you get by protest notes and replies. The reality is that notwithstanding all our efforts to persuade them not to supply arms, arms are being supplied." (71)

A third possible explanation lies in Pakistan's relationship with China. In contrast with India, Pakistan had adopted a carefully neutral stance on the Sino-Soviet border dispute. Moreover, the dating of the first signs of difficulties in the Soviet-Pakistani arms agreement coincides with the demonstrative gestures made towards China by the Nur Khan delegation in July 1969 and it is possible that these gestures were sufficient to provoke a Soviet reassessment of its Pakistan policy.

A fourth explanation can be found in Yahya's rejection of the Kosygin proposal and in the manner of the Pakistani rejection. Chronologically, this interpretation fits well with the available evidence. It was in June and July of 1969 that the Pakistani position became known and it was the arms shipments due late in the summer of that year which went astray. Moreover, if it is accepted that the Soviet Government, and Mr. Kosygin in particular, felt that Yahya had in a sense crossed them - that he had gone back on his commitments - then it is plausible that they should have chosen to rebuke Yahya in this matter. The termination of arms supplies was a personal rebuff to the President himself for two reasons. Firstly, it was Yahya who as C-in-C of the Pakistani army had concluded the arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1968. Secondly, the strength of Yahya's regime rested heavily on its military support and Yahya himself was a representative of the military interest in the country. As such, the

Soviet move can be viewed as being specifically designed to undermine the position of the Yahya regime. (72)

In conclusion, if the various factors contributing to the Soviet decision had to be ranked in order of importance, then there would be solid grounds for arguing that an explanation is best cast in terms of a combination of the last two arguments - the Pakistani

72) William J. Barnds has rejected my view that the arms difficulties can be explained by the Pakistani position on Kosygin's regional economic cooperation proposal. See my correspondence with Mr. Barnds on the subject: Problems of Communism Nov/Dec 1972 p.91-2. He argues that "if the Soviets had been primarily concerned about this problem, it seems unlikely that they would have agreed to provide Pakistan with a million-ton steel mill in 1970." I would counter this on several grounds. Military aid is more responsive to delicate changes of political posture than economic aid. Indeed, as the Soviet Union continued to provide economic aid to Pakistan during the 1971 crisis, when Soviet-Pakistani relations reached their nadir, we should not be surprised that the evidence of economic aid does not enable us to detect the lesser friction which occurred during 1969-70. In this particular case, the evidence of military aid is more relevant than that of economic aid because, as argued above, the termination of military supplies was a direct challenge to Yahya's position. The Soviet quarrel was essentially with Yahya, not with Pakistan, and economic aid tends to bear in mind such longer term interests.

My view, that Pakistan's attitude towards regional economic cooperation caused a serious set-back in Soviet-Pakistani relations and could explain the non-completion of the arms deliveries, has been given implicit support by G.W. Choudhury, a member of the Pakistan Cabinet in 1969-71. Choudhury has written as follows: "Pakistan was now asked to pay the real (i.e. political) price for the Soviet arms: participation in the transit trade conference in Kabul in early 1968 and endorsement of Brezhnev's scheme for an Asian collective security system...However, Pakistan could not agree to new Soviet economic and military plans directed against China. Yahya...jeopardised the process of normalisation with the Soviet Union begun by his predecessor in 1965." (G.W. Choudhury: 'Moscow's Influence in the Indian Subcontinent': The World Today July 1972 p. 308.
attitude to China and towards regional cooperation. And it should be remembered that, as the rejection of the Kosygin proposal was heavily coloured by considerations of China, the two arguments are in any case closely bound together. Not only does this explanation accord well with the chronology of the arms shipments and with the more hostile vein of Soviet comment on Pakistan which emerged in late 1969, but it also points to a consideration - the negative value of Pakistan for Soviet policy in the region - which would be sufficiently powerful to produce a major reassessment of the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan.

Conversely, it seems certain that Indian protests were at most a contributory factor: because there seemed to be little further advantage to be gained from Pakistan, there was little incentive to continue to antagonise India. But once again the primary Soviet consideration was its own assessment of the value of its Pakistan policy and it was because of set-backs in Soviet-Pakistani relations, rather than in Soviet-Indian relations, that the arms policy was discontinued. Just as in 1964-65, when the deteriorating Soviet view of India facilitated a move towards Pakistan once this had already been decided on other grounds, so the decision to terminate arms supplies was reinforced by Indian complaints once it became clear that Soviet expectations of Pakistan were not being realised. But in neither case was the 'third party' the major determinant of Soviet policy.
Chapter 8
Bangladesh: The Crisis of 1971

The Soviet assessment of the state of its relations with India and Pakistan, respectively, was announced at the 24th Congress of the CPSU at the very commencement of the crisis in East Pakistan. In his Central Committee report, Mr. Brezhnev spoke as follows:

"Our friendly relations with India have developed considerably. The Indian Government's pursuit of a peaceable, independent line in international affairs, and the traditional feelings of friendship linking the peoples of the two countries have all helped to deepen Soviet-Indian cooperation." (1)

In stark contrast, the General Secretary observed coldly that "we have normal relations with Pakistan."(2)

The reasons for such contrasting appraisals are not hard to find. It has already been pointed out that Mrs. Gandhi's election victory in March 1971 evoked a flood of euphoria in the Soviet Union. To such an extent was this the case that Mr. Kosygin is reported to have referred to the election as "a historic victory" and to have told the Indian Ambassador, D.P. Dhar, that if Mrs. Gandhi visited the Soviet Union she would receive a warmer reception than that given to any other visiting statesman from the non-communist world. (3) The same report singled out three pieces of evidence to support the view that India had risen dramatically in Soviet estimation in the aftermath of the elections: the granting of a two-hour interview to Mr. Dhar by Mr. Kosygin although the latter was preoccupied with preparations for the party Congress; the renewal of the invitation to Mrs. Gandhi to visit the USSR; and the sudden upgrading of an economic delegation, about to set out for

2) ibid. p.33
3) Times of India March 27, 1971.
India, from official to ministerial level. In fact, Mr. Kosygin sent Mrs. Gandhi a message congratulating her on her election victory and complimenting her in glowing terms:

"Our people know you as an eminent statesman who consistently supports the strengthening of India's national independence, its development along the path of progressive reforms and peace among peoples." (4)

There are two broad explanations of the enthusiasm with which the Soviet Union viewed the election results in India. At one level, according to the Soviet perception, the result was symptomatic of a general tendency apparent throughout the developing world. As Moscow Radio was to express it,

"The elections were a fresh confirmation that there is a clear trend for a shift to the Left in the developing countries of the Third World. After the elections in Ceylon, Chile, Pakistan and India there is every reason to say that the developing nations show a greater consistency in rejecting the internal reaction which now cooperates with imperialism." (5)

At the more immediate level, the victory held out the prospect of domestic stability within India, of a drive towards desirable socio-economic reforms and of a continuation and strengthening of the 'positive' aspects of India's foreign policy course, not least amongst which was cooperation with the Soviet bloc. Such developments could reasonably be expected from the size of Mrs. Gandhi's victory and from the widespread defeat of what Moscow considered to be 'reactionary' elements. With the emergence of a situation in which Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party had a majority in its own right, the consequent diminution in the influence of the Communist Party of India, on which the ruling party no longer had to rely, was a small price to pay and was received in Moscow without noticeable disappointment.

4) Pravda March 18, 1971
The reason for the rather chilly Soviet appraisal of its relations with Pakistan is easily discerned. It was now obvious that Pakistan was sliding into a period of internal turmoil and that in such circumstances of uncertainty as to the future of the regime, there was little advantage to be derived from fresh overtures towards that country. However, if the current Soviet assessment was in part based on an appraisal of Pakistan's future performance and value for Soviet foreign policy needs, it was no less based on a calculation of Pakistan's past performance. Nor is there any mistaking the fact that the Soviet assessment of Pakistan's recent actions was negative and reflected Soviet disappointment at Pakistan's failure to conduct itself in a manner acceptable to Moscow. Subsequent Soviet comment has provided us with some insight into the Soviet Union's disappointment with Pakistan and the specific grounds on which Moscow took exception to its foreign policy course. One commentator drew attention to Pakistan's "old policy of unilateral orientation upon the West and military cooperation with China"\(^6\) which had impliedly not diminished despite the development of relations with the Soviet Union. Another article was even more revealing. Novosti correspondent Spartak Beglov mapped out the positive, peaceful and altruistic aspects of Soviet strategy "in the present conditions of Asia." Having done so, he then went on to make the following qualification:

"Of course, this is not a sort of unilateral charity. This kind of policy pre-supposes reciprocity."

The thrust of Beglov's argument soon became apparent when he proceeded to a discussion of Pakistan and the basis of Soviet-Pakistani relations:

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"...the Soviet Union stretched a hand of friendship to Pakistan, implying reciprocity, being convinced that such reciprocity is incompatible with behind-the-stage military-political overtures to imperialism and with the stirring up of strife between nations." (7)

There could be no more candid admission that in developing relations with Pakistan, the Soviet Union was hoping for some quid pro quo and that this quid pro quo had not been delivered. Soviet-Pakistani relations were conditional on a responsive Pakistani attitude towards Soviet interests in the region. Just how forthcoming Pakistan had been was amply demonstrated by the Pakistani response to the Soviet overtures of 1969-70.

Soviet View of the March Crisis in Pakistan

Forgetting all that had been said by Soviet commentators about Pakistan in the period 1964-69, the Soviet media presented the turmoil in East Pakistan as the inevitable outgrowth of the nature of the Pakistani state and of the policies pursued by the Ayub and Yahya regimes. What had previously been described by Soviet analysts as positive features in Pakistan's development were now totally ignored. Instead, the events of 1971 were depicted as being symptomatic of the deep antagonisms in the social, economic and political structure of the country.

The line was now taken that Pakistan faced great difficulties in remaining a viable entity. Elementary geographical facts militated against the unity of the state from its very inception. As one Pravda columnist was to argue "among the objective factors giving rise to difficulties for Pakistan's independent development, a major role was played by the absence of territorial unity."(8) Such geographical


separation was a large enough handicap but it was compounded by "the ethnic and economic contradictions inherent in the structure of Pakistan with its two wings." Thus while the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan was composed of Bengalis, the Western wing contained several national groups. The only bond between the two wings, as the Soviet media pointed out, was the religious factor.

The circumstances in which Pakistan became an independent state were, therefore, depicted as being anything but auspicious. Furthermore, the natural divisions between the two wings of the country were aggravated by the policies of consecutive administrations. This was true of both the economic and the social spheres. Pravda pointed out that "the conditions of the military regime facilitated the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few industrial and financial magnates and major landholders" and added that "all these monopolies are based in West Pakistan." The dominant position of West Pakistan in the economy of the Eastern wing was reflected in other statistics. Per capita income, in 1969, one Soviet journalist observed, averaged 312 rupees in East Bengal as against 854 rupees in Sind. Such a state of affairs existed despite the role played by the Eastern wing in earning foreign exchange through exports, especially by the sale of jute. Jute, and jute products, accounted for 50 - 60% of the export earnings of the whole of Pakistan. However, "most of the foreign

12) O. Oskolkova: 'Narodnaya Respublika Bangladesh': (People's Republic of Bangladesh) M.E.I.M.O. no. 5 1972 p. 139.
exchange it earned was appropriated by West Pakistan."(13) The economic discrepancies between the two wings were, therefore, magnified as the result of the exploitative policies of Pakistani administrations and of the economic interests represented by these administrations. In short, "as a result of these discriminatory policies the economic backwardness of East Pakistan, far from being overcome, in fact, became increasingly pronounced..."(14)

The nature of the relationship between the two parts of the country was also to be discerned according to Soviet accounts, in the social and political discrimination against East Pakistan. Thus, whereas the Eastern wing had a larger population than the West, Bengalis held no more than 10% of positions in the civil service, police and army. (15)

These facts had all been ignored by the Soviet media in the period 1964-69 in the effort to convey a more favourable picture of Pakistan and during the attempt to place relations with Pakistan on a better footing. In spite of this, it was now argued that the tide of East Pakistan opposition to the discriminatory policies of Islamabad had been growing in strength throughout the late 1960's. A major stimulus to the development of this movement had been provided by the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 which had had a disruptive effect on the economies of both countries. In Pakistan, it led to inflation and price rises which "sharply aggravated the people's discontent with capitalist exploitation and feudal tyranny."(16) One writer even went to the length of arguing that "it will be no exaggeration to say that the growth of autonomist sentiment in East Pakistan, the Awami

13) Volsky op. cit. p. 11.
15) Volsky op. cit. p. 11
League's victory and the subsequent tragic events in this province were all a consequence of the Pakistani-Indian conflict of 1965."(17)

In any case, matters were reaching a crisis by the time of the disruption which led to the downfall of the Ayub regime in early 1969. As one Soviet article claimed "after 1968, there was a noticeable upsurge in the activeness of Pakistan's broad masses."(18) A Tass statement of December 5 1971 was to speak of developments in East Pakistan as a "mass movement for autonomy and for elementary civil rights and freedoms"(19) whilst the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan, M.V. Degtyar, referred to the "growing popular striving towards a parliamentary government and broader democratic rights" and the call for "far-reaching socio-economic changes."(20) These demands, as far as East Pakistan was concerned, were represented in the six points of the Awami League programme, which called for autonomy for East Pakistan (except in the areas of defence and foreign relations), socio-economic reforms such as ceilings on landholdings, nationalisation of banks and other key industries, and a foreign policy predicated on withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO and normalisation of relations with India. Above all, the Soviet media were anxious to stress that the Awami League programme demanded autonomy within the Pakistani state and not a separate state structure: their claim was for autonomy not secession. As Pravda stated with due emphasis "the Awami League's programmatic documents had no clause on granting East Pakistan state independence."(21) The demand for a separate state was made only after the repressions which began in March 1971. That is to say that,

17) ibid p. 11
18) V. Shurygin Pravda December 16, 1971
19) Pravda December 6, 1971
20) Dawn February 10, 1971
in the Soviet view, the responsibility for the dismemberment of Pakistan lay with the authorities in Islamabad and not with the leaders of the Awami League.

However, the demands for autonomy and democratization were ignored by a central administration which "reflected the interests of feudal-monopoly circles and a reactionary clergy."(22) In these circumstances, the decision to hold elections in December 1970 was not a voluntary concession but was wrested under duress. The regime agreed to hold the elections only "under pressure from the mass popular movement"(23) and as a calculated manoeuvre designed to appease the demand for the transfer of power to parliamentary authorities by granting the semblance of parliamentary institutions.(24)

Moreover, the Soviet media noted that it was a significant comment on the nature of the Pakistan regime that the 1970 elections were the first to be held in the 23 year history of the country's independence.

The elections resulted in a decisive victory for the Awami League. In the provincial assembly they won 299 seats out of 310 and in the national parliament they gained 167 seats out of 317, thus giving them an absolute majority. It soon became clear, according to Soviet accounts, that Yahya had no intention of transferring power to the elected representatives of the Awami League. He entered into discussions with Mujibur Rahman and Bhutto (whose People's Party had won the majority of seats in the West Pakistan assembly and had come second to the Awami League in the national results.) However, the negotiations had no genuine basis. Rather than make any serious effort

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23) Pravda December 16, 1971
24) A. Maslennikov op. cit p. 100.
to meet the demands of the Awami leaders, Yahya "manoeuvred for some
time, building up his forces for a blow against the Bengalis."(25)
The talks were broken off on March 25 1971 and Rahman and other lead­
ers of the Awami League were arrested and put in prison. The ending
of the talks was accompanied by mass repressions against the people
of the Eastern wing, by what Mr. Brezhnev was to call "the bloody
suppression of the fundamental rights and the clearly expressed will
of the population of East Pakistan."(26)

The struggle of the people of Bangladesh against the Islamabad
regime has been depicted as a war of national liberation. Pravda
commentator, Viktor Mayevsky, referred to it as constituting "one of
the biggest battles, in the past decades, of the national liberation
movement"(27) while another commentator urged that the struggle "had
all the main characteristics of a national liberation movement."(28)
The struggle attained such a status for several reasons, not least
amongst which was the desire to embarrass Peking's policy of oppo­sition to the movement. Firstly, the movement had fought against the
forces of imperialism "against the forces of oppression and terror
supported by American imperialism and the Peking leadership working
together with it." It had done so not only because of the stance
which Washington was to adopt during the 1971 crisis but because in
fighting against the military dictatorship in Islamabad, the Bengalis
were struggling against a regime which had "from the very first years
of Pakistan's existence....established close bonds with American
imperialism."(29) Secondly, the policy of the West Pakistan ruling

25) V. Zhurkin & V. Kremenyuk: 'Indostan -ot Konflikta k Uregulirovaniyu'
(Hindustan - from Conflict to Settlement) Aziya i Afrika Segodniya
May 1972 p. 36
26) Address delivered at Warsaw December 7 1971 at 6th Congress of Polish
United Workers' Party. Reproduced 'Soviet Union and the Struggle
etc' op cit p. 17
27) Pravda December 22, 1971
28) Volsky op. cit p. 11
elite had been so discriminatory towards the Eastern wing that "East Pakistan was virtually a semi-colony exploited by the West Pakistani bourgeoisie and landowners."(30) The struggle, therefore, possessed two of the main features of national liberation movements in that it was anti-imperialist and occurred within the framework of a quasi-colonial relationship.

The movement was characterised by a third feature which distinguished it from purely secessionist struggles. Soviet commentators took great pleasure in contrasting the policy of Peking towards Bangladesh with the attitude Peking had adopted towards Biafra. In that latter case "the splitters received moral and material support from Peking, which was not concerned about either the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Nigeria."(31) Of course, Moscow itself had spoken with two voices in the Nigerian and Pakistani instances. Soviet analysts tried to justify the distinction between Biafra and Bangladesh in terms of the degree of support which the secessionist movement enjoyed within its own territory. Thus Mayevsky contended that "the Nigerian secessionist, Ojukwu," in setting up the state of Biafra, went against "the will of the majority of the peoples inhabiting the eastern provinces."(32) In contrast, the people of East Pakistan had demonstrated, in the 1970 elections, their support of the policy of autonomy as advocated by the Awami League. It was this fact, Soviet spokesmen claimed, which distinguished Biafra from Bangladesh, 'secession' from 'national liberation'. As one article was to put it "in contrast to movements for autonomy in

30) Volsky op. cit p. 11
31) Mayevsky Pravda December 22, 1971
32) ibid.
other countries, in Pakistan autonomy was demanded not by a national minority, but by the absolute majority of the population.\(^{(33)}\)

**March-July 1971**

During this period, the main lines of Soviet policy towards the East Pakistan crisis were set out while a not inconsiderable effort was made to keep open as many options as possible. It was the period of the most moderate Soviet attitude towards Pakistan and of attempts, while condemning the repressive policy of the Pakistani authorities, not to antagonise Islamabad unduly and to avoid losing all restraining influence on that country. In short, throughout the spring months of 1971, the USSR maintained a fairly 'low posture' in relation to events in East Pakistan.

The guiding line of Soviet policy during this period was President Podgorny's message to Yahya Khan of April 2. The message conveyed Soviet opposition to the course of repression in East Pakistan both because this would render a political solution more difficult and because its continuation might constitute a threat to the peace of the area. The message stated in part:

"We have been and remain convinced that the complex problems that have arisen in Pakistan of late can and must be solved politically, without use of force. Continuation of repressive measures and bloodshed in East Pakistan will, undoubtedly, only make the solution of the problems more difficult and may do great harm to the vital interests of the entire people of Pakistan. We consider it our duty to address you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, with an insistent appeal for the adoption of the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repressions against the population in East Pakistan and for turning to methods of a peaceful political settlement. We are convinced that this would meet the interests of the entire people of Pakistan and the interests of preserving peace in the area." \(^{(34)}\)

\(^{33}\) O. Oskolkova op. cit p. 140

\(^{34}\) Text reproduced 'Soviet Union and the Struggle etc.' op cit p. 8-9.
The Soviet President's communication clearly indicated that Soviet sympathies did not lie with the present course of Pakistan's military administration. At the same time, every effort was made to adopt towards Pakistan a stance which was as conciliatory as possible. Podgorny's message went out of its way in two places to refer to the interests of "the entire people of Pakistan" in an attempt to convey the impression that the Soviet Union was not siding with the East wing against the West and in an attempt to suggest that the solution to the problem was to be found within the framework of a single Pakistani state. Indeed, Pravda had several days before indicated that this would be the Soviet line when it, too, urged a "solution that will be in the interest of all the Pakistani people."(35)

There were other indications that the Soviet Union wished to retain some influence with Pakistan in order to prevent an escalation of the crisis. Soviet media reported at seemingly face value Pakistan Government claims that the situation in East Pakistan was returning to normal and that the army was in full control.(36) Moreover, Moscow tried to disclaim that it was adopting a partisan approach to the situation. Moscow Radio expressed surprise at Pakistani press reports which "claimed that the Soviet press has taken a stand unfriendly to Pakistan lately," and charged that "they are trying to distort the Soviet Union's stand and to attribute motives to this country that are alien to it."(37)

The same Radio station even delivered a sharp admonition to the most hawkish elements in India who were pressing for a military settlement of the refugee problem when it remarked that "tensions between India

35) March 26, 1971
36) See Moscow Radio March 28, 1971
37) April 15, 1971.
and Pakistan have, for no reason, already reached a dangerous pitch,\(^{38}\)
d and a subsequent article was to praise the Indian Government because it
was "resisting the demands of local extremists for war against
Pakistan."\(^{39}\) Similarly, the joint communique signed at the end of the
visit to Moscow by Swaran Singh, Indian External Affairs Minister, in
June 1971, reflected the twin Soviet concerns of the moment - a moderate
stance against Pakistan which pointed to its continuing territorial
unity, coupled with and facilitating efforts to maintain peace. In the
words of the communique, a political settlement "would meet the interests
of the entire Pakistani people, the cause of preserving peace in this
region."\(^{40}\)

The length to which Moscow was going to make these conciliatory
gestures towards Pakistan can only be appreciated when the Pakistani
reaction to the Podgorny message is recalled. In making their appeal
through this message, the Soviet Government had expressed the hope that
President Yahya would "correctly interpret the motives" underlying the
overture as being "a few words coming from true friends."\(^{41}\) If
this was the spirit in which the advice was given, it certainly was
not the spirit in which it was received in Pakistan. Yahya's reply to
Podgorny suggested that the military regime was totally unrepentant
about its its policy in East Pakistan and had little intention of
changing its attitude. The President's remarks indicated that the policy
of suppressing the Awami League would be continued:

\(^{38}\) July 9, 1971

\(^{39}\) Za Rubezhom No 3] July 7, 1971

\(^{40}\) Text in Soviet Review (Information Dept, USSR Embassy, New Delhi)
June 15, 1971

\(^{41}\) From Text of the Podgorny message op. cit.
"...no Government can condone or fight shy of dealing with subversive elements attacking its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Awami League leaders had no mandate from the people of Pakistan to dismember the country and yet they encouraged anti-national elements, materially supported by an actively hostile neighbour to destroy the unity of Pakistan." (42)

Furthermore, whereas the Podgorny communication had advised the Pakistan Government to put its own house in order, Yahya turned the advice on its head and suggested that the Soviet Union exercise restraint on India:

"In the circumstances, I would request Your Excellency to use your undeniable influence with the Indian Government in order to impress upon it the need for refraining from interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs." (43)

The Pakistani President also criticised the Soviet stance, none too obliquely, when he charged, in relation to Indian actions, that "for any power to support such moves or to condone them would be a negation of the United Nations Charter as well as the Bandung Principles." (44) Bhutto's retort to Podgorny's 'few words coming from true friends' came in more strident terms. He informed a press conference that he must register a "strong protest" against what he termed "blatant interference" by the Soviet Union in Pakistan's internal affairs. (45)

While the USSR was anxious to avoid cutting off all ties with Pakistan, the tone of the reply to the Podgorny note undoubtedly promoted Soviet-Pakistani antipathy. As such, it confirmed basic Soviet sympathies for India and Bangladesh even though these were not strong enough to evoke an unequivocal Soviet declaration in support of independence for the latter. The nature of Soviet sympathies at this juncture can be

42) Pakistan Times April 6, 1971
43) ibid.
44) ibid.
45) Pakistan Times April 6, 1971.
gleaned from several sources. Thus one writer revealed that Yahya's assurances, given at a news conference on May 24, that power would be transferred to civilian authorities could not be accepted at face value. As the article asked, quizzically, "to whom is power to be given if the Awami League, which won most of the seats in the National Assembly, is banned?" There were other hints as to the likely development of the Soviet attitude if Pakistan did not mend its ways, hints which may be interpreted as warnings to Islamabad to take measures for a political settlement of the situation in the East. Izvestiya commented after the visit of Swaran Singh that the "Soviet people view with understanding the problems that India has encountered because several million East Pakistan refugees are staying on her territory." And the Government newspaper hinted at possible formal recognition of Bangla Desh when it listed amongst the leaders sending condolences on the death of the Soviet cosmonauts, Sayed Nazrul Islam, "acting President of the Democratic Republic of Bangla Desh." The significance of this reference was not missed in Pakistan.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty: August 1971

There are four contexts in which the Indo-Soviet Treaty should be placed:

a) The first of these is the broad development of Indo-Soviet relations


47) July 10, 1971

48) Dawn July 17, 1971 drew attention to this and commented on it that 'though the breakaway leaders of 'Bangladesh' have not been formally recognised by Moscow...they were given tacit recognition of a sort.'
over one and a half decades. It has been seen that, after a period of strain in the relations between the two countries during the latter 1960's, the year prior to the signing of the Treaty had provided fresh evidence of increasingly close ties between the two and of a growing communality of interests between the countries. Testimony that relations between India and the Soviet Union had a purely bilateral dynamic and that cooperation between the two was becoming increasingly close was soon to be provided by the agreement, arrived at during Mrs. Gandhi's September visit to Moscow, to set up an inter-Governmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation. (49) From this perspective, the Treaty is but another, albeit a major, "landmark in the course of strengthening Soviet-Indian relations." (50) The significance of the Treaty is to be appreciated in terms of providing a legal basis for political, economic and cultural relations, of creating "conditions for the developing of bilateral links in all spheres." (51) This perspective is not without validity provided it is not pushed to its extreme. What is unacceptable is the view, expressed by one adherent, that "politically and ideologically, the Treaty does not, nor does it seek to, bring India and the Soviet Union any closer than before." (52)

49) See Lok Sabha Debates 5th series vol 12 col 34 March 30, 1972
51) Interview with K.S. Shelvankar, Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union: 'Na Blago Dvukh Narodov' (For the good of both Peoples) Aziya i Afrika Segodnya no 1 1972 p. 11.
Such an interpretation, which might have been acceptable in other circumstances, does not appear to take sufficient account of the timing of the Treaty and of the international context in which it was signed.\(^{53}\)

b) The second context was the developing crisis in India-Pakistan relations. Ostensibly, Gromyko's visit to Delhi and the signing of the Treaty was not accompanied by any modification in the Soviet attitude towards the crisis on the subcontinent. The joint statement at the end of the visit recorded that both sides had "reiterated their firm conviction that there can be no military solution" and went on to speak of a political settlement "which alone would answer the interests of the entire people of Pakistan."\(^{54}\) However, there are signs that India was, at this stage, pressing for a stronger line and that the Soviet Union, while still opposed to military action by India, was not averse to putting pressure on Pakistan by leaving the way open to such an eventuality. The communique noted that the reiteration of the conviction that there could be no military solution had been arrived at only "after a detailed discussion". Moreover, Izvestiya was shortly to inform its readers that the "Indian Government abides by the firm conviction that, under present circumstances, military methods are not an acceptable way to resolve this problem."\(^{55}\) This was a more

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53) While accepting the validity of the 'bilateral' argument, therefore, I cannot subscribe to Professor Rajan's contention that this is "all that the Treaty seems to do." ibid p. 207

54) Partial Text in 'Soviet Union and the Struggle etc' op. cit p. 10

55) August 15, 1971. That the references in the joint communique and in the Izvestiya article applied to a military solution of India's problems with Pakistan rather than just to Pakistan's internal problems with the eastern wing is evident from the context in which the references were made. The joint communique states that a discussion of military action followed upon a description by the Indian Minister of External Affairs of the "heavy burden placed on India's resources" by the refugee problem. This is even more explicit in the Izvestiya article where the Indian Government's "firm conviction" that military methods should be avoided is contrasted with pressures "from certain political parties and individuals within the country demanding total war with Pakistan: war, these parties and individuals feel, is the only way to solve the refugee problem and other differences between India and Pakistan."
ambiguous assurance than that contained in the Gromyko communique.

All the indications are that the Treaty was viewed at the time by both signatories as part of the policy of applying pressure on Pakistan and of neutralising Washington's and Peking's support for the Yahya regime. Foreign Minister Gromyko, according to a Tass report, highlighted "the significance of the Treaty in relation to the situation developing south of the borders of the Soviet Union and spoke of the importance of the clause requiring mutual consultations in case of attack or threat of attack against one of the parties to the Treaty."(56) Similarly, Mrs. Gandhi expressed the view that the Treaty would "act as a deterrent against any rash adventurism on the part of Islamabad."(57) Significantly, the signing of the Treaty coincided with a Soviet invitation to the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Sultan Mohammed Khan, to visit the Soviet Union.(58) This again suggests that the Treaty falls into the context of a concerted diplomatic effort to persuade Islamabad to put an end to the turmoil in East Pakistan as the only way of avoiding an Indo-Pakistani war: in the event of Pakistan's failure to do so, the Treaty lent credibility to Indian intimations that a military solution might be resorted to despite Pakistan's support from Peking and Washington. Even if the Treaty was not explicitly directed against Pakistan, psychologically, it was a factor which Pakistan had to take into consideration.

There have been further affirmations that the Treaty was designed

56) August 13, 1971
57) New Delhi Radio August 29, 1971. The station also quoted informed sources in New Delhi as having expressed the hope that "the treaty will have a healthy effect on the Bangla Desh situation and will persuade Pakistan's military rulers to think in terms of a peaceful political settlement." New Delhi Radio August 9, 1971
to meet the needs of the international situation developing on the subcontinent and to ensure an outcome which was acceptable to the parties to the Treaty as well as to the people of Bangladesh. This has been made abundantly clear by Pravda's Delhi correspondent in an article marking the first anniversary of the Treaty:

"Signed at a troubled time when the sinister clouds of war, provoked by the former military rulers of Pakistan, were looming over South Asia, the Soviet-Indian Treaty became a powerful shield for protecting the sub-continent from the intervention of hostile forces from outside and for promoting the triumph of the just cause of the people of Bangla Desh. Today there is hardly any one who can doubt that the Treaty was the shield which protected South Asia from the interference of outside forces during Indo-Pakistani conflict." (59)

c) A third relevant context can be found in the changing international alignments of the period and, specifically, in the process of normalisation of Sino-American relations. This process was to be significant because of the postures adopted by China and the United States in relation to events in Bangladesh. (60) The possibly adverse consequences for India and other states of a Sino-American rapprochement and the steps which India was taking to counteract such undesirable repercussions had been discussed by Swaran Singh in an address to the Lok Sabha:

"While we welcome a rapprochement between Peking and Washington, we cannot look upon it with equanimity if it means domination of the two countries over this region...We will not allow any country or combination of countries to dominate or interfere in our internal affairs...
...for some time we have been considering ways and means of preventing such a situation from arising and meeting it if it arises. In this we are not alone. There are other countries, both big and small, who may be more perturbed than we are. We are in touch with all such countries and we shall see to it that any Sino-American detente does not affect us adversely." (61)
The fact that India and the Soviet Union were engaged in a dialogue on the subject of Sino-American relations does suggest that the Treaty may, at least partially, have been designed as a calculated retort to this new alignment and its likely effect on the South Asian crisis. Significantly, when Swaran Singh laid the Treaty before the Lok Sabha, he reminded the House of changes "taking place in the configuration of various world forces." The changes to which the External Affairs Minister referred were twofold. The first was the "threat to India which has been held out by Pakistan and China"; the second was the "dramatic shift promoted by President Nixon in Sino-American relations."(62)

d) A fourth context to be borne in mind is the Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia. It will be recalled that, in 1969, India had been against any regional arrangement which had military connotations but had been favourably disposed to the idea of regional economic cooperation. When the Treaty was placed before the Indian parliament, it was revealed that its original conception had occurred two years previously.(63) This indicates that the Treaty was initially proposed at the height of the Indo-Soviet dialogue on collective security and regional cooperation in the second half of 1969.

That the Soviet advocacy of collective security in Asia might be aimed at producing treaties in the mould of that between India and the

62) New Delhi radio August 9, 1971
63) New Delhi radio August 9, 1971. Circumstantial evidence that discussions on this matter were carried out during 1969-71 is to be found in reported rumours to this effect circulating in New Delhi e.g. statement by S.N. Mishra, leader of the opposition. "There is now a rumour that an attempt is being made...to enter into a secret military or other arrangement with the Soviet Union. This matter is causing so much anxiety and suspicion that I feel it my duty to bring it to the notice of the Government for an authoritative contradiction..." Swaran Singh denied only that any such arrangement was in existence, not that it was being negotiated. See Rajya Sabha Debates vol 73 col 144 August 26, 1970.
Soviet Union or, at least, that it might be designed to promote the furtherance of the principles embodied in such treaties, has been strongly suggested by Soviet sources. Thus Radio Peace and Progress, for instance, proclaimed on August 2, 1972 on the subject of collective security that "the Soviet-Indian Treaty...can be regarded as the first step to creating such a system." The Soviet Embassy in Delhi has taken a leading part in disseminating this view. Its publications have variously asserted that "the compatibility of bilateral treaties of such a type with the idea of collective security is indisputable" and that "the significance of the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with such large developing countries as India, Iraq... goes far beyond the framework of the USSR's bilateral relations with these states...they are also creating more favourable conditions for the realisation of the idea of collective security in Asia. Indeed, the principles underlying the USSR's treaties of peace, friendship and cooperation with India and other Asian countries are consonant with those on which the system of collective security in Asia is proposed to be built." (65)

Subsequently, an article in International Affairs was to declare quite unambiguously that "the treaties of the USSR with India, Iraq and the UAR can be regarded as the first steps along the road to a collective security system in Asia." (66)

64) Editorial Soviet Review April 4, 1972 p. 3
65) Editorial Soviet Review August 8, 1972. Novosti correspondent, Svyatoslav Kozlov, had earlier noted in connection with the treaties with India and Iraq that "the extension of the principles on which these treaties are based to relations between other states of the Asian continent could facilitate the establishment of a collective security system." Soviet Review June 6, 1972 p. 33
September - November 1971

During the autumn months of 1971, although the USSR maintained its general line of advocating a political solution and opposing military action and while it continued to be ambiguous on the question of its attitude to independence for East Pakistan, this was accompanied by a noticeable 'hardening' of the Soviet approach to Pakistan. There was an early indication of this as a result of the visit to Moscow by Pakistan's foreign minister. On returning from the Soviet Union, Khan reported that his talks had been "timely and successful" and that the Soviet leaders had reiterated their "deep interest in the unity and integrity of Pakistan."(67) The Soviet leaders, if Pravda is anything to judge by, had a slightly different recollection of the talks. This was evidenced by Pravda's report of Khan's remarks. It noted his belief that the talks had been "timely and useful" but reported him as saying that he had been left with the impression that "the Soviet leaders were interested in maintaining peace on the continent."(68) At the same time, the Soviet posture was still not without its ambivalence.

The Soviet attitude towards resolutions tabled before a meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in early September appeared so divergent from the Indian stance that one Indian correspondent complained that the "stand taken by the Moscow representatives left little room for doubt that they would have nothing to do with a text that alluded even remotely to a reprimand of the Yahya Khan regime."(69)

Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow in September 1971 was regarded by

67) Dawn September 10, 1971
68) Pravda September 11, 1971
69) Dileep Padgaonkar; Times of India September 23, 1971.
many Indian commentators as marking a definite advance in the Soviet position. (70) Thus, while the communique which emerged from the visit continued to stress the need for a political solution to the crisis, it also contained signs of a modification in the Soviet stance. Notably, the communique demanded that such a political settlement should pay "regard to the wishes, the inalienable rights and lawful interests of the people of East Bengal." (71) The relevance of this lies in the fact, as an Indian broadcast was to point out, that it was "the first time that the Soviet Union has advocated a solution to the Bangladesh issue in accordance only with the wishes of the people of Bangladesh. Earlier, the Soviet stand was that the settlement should be in accordance with the wishes of the people of Pakistan which means the people of both wings of Pakistan." (72) In addition, the communique contained the following passage:

"The Soviet side took into account the statement by the Prime Minister that the Government of India is fully determined to take all necessary measures to stop the inflow of refugees from East Bengal to India and to ensure that those refugees who are already in India return to their homeland without delay." (73)

It should be noted that the Soviet side did not express approval of this warning of possible Indian military action ("all necessary measures") but merely took it "into account". At the same time, given the context in which this statement was made, the fact that this was expressed at all suggests, if not Soviet acquiescence in India's contemplation of a resort to force, then, at the very least, an implicit Soviet warning to

71) Text in Times of India September 30, 1971; the Russian version of the communique referred to 'East Pakistan'.
73) Times of India September 30, 1971.
In any event, the aftermath of Mrs. Gandhi's visit was to witness a marked increase in the hostility of Soviet press attacks on Pakistan. The tone of these accusations had in fact been set by Premier Kosygin himself in a speech at a luncheon for Mrs. Gandhi when he had remarked that "it is impossible to justify the actions of the Pakistani authorities which have compelled millions of people to leave their country, land, property and to seek refuge in the neighbouring India."\(^{(75)}\) This comment was singled out by Bhutto as being "partisan and biased".\(^{(76)}\) The more strongly-worded tone of Soviet press attacks did not escape notice in Pakistan and resulted in Pakistan taking the question up diplomatically with the Soviet Union. As one Pakistani paper noted "the press campaign against Pakistan has become noticeable since the Indian Premier visited the Soviet Union."\(^{(77)}\) The Soviet press campaign was accompanied by a 'spontaneous' flow of anti-Pakistani protests on the part of Soviet public organizations demanding the release of Mujibur Rahman and an end to reprisals against Awami League supporters. This "powerful popular campaign

\(^{74}\) Such a conclusion is not contradicted by the subsequent paragraph of the communique in which the Soviet side reaffirmed that its position remained as stated in the Podgorny message of April 2 1971. When, in that message, Podgorny stressed that the situation should be resolved politically "without use of force" he was clearly referring to a solution of the internal problems of Pakistan and not to the international problem between India and Pakistan. (c.f. footnote 55.

\(^{75}\) September 28, 1971 in 'Soviet Union and the Struggle etc.' op cit.

\(^{76}\) Dawn September 30, 1971

\(^{77}\) Dawn October 22, 1971.
began in October"(78) and involved numerous Soviet organisations.(79)

It is against the background of this hardening Soviet attitude towards Pakistan that Soviet appeals to avoid a military conflict should be viewed. The USSR, for the many reasons which had guided Soviet policy in the area since 1965, would have preferred to prevent a war between India and Pakistan but was not prepared to do so at any price and especially not at the cost of serious damage to India's interests. Hence, by October 1971, the Soviet demand for a peaceful solution was far from neutral in content. When President Podgorny reiterated the Soviet concern that "it is necessary to prevent further slippage toward a military conflict"(80) his advice was directed principally to Pakistan. Likewise, the basic direction of Soviet sympathies should not be mistaken on account of such declarations as that found in the Soviet-Algerian communique of early October.(81) Although this document affirmed the respect of both parties for "the national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan", it reflects Soviet sensitivity towards Moslem opinion rather than a firm Soviet commitment to Pakistan. The nature of the Soviet position can again be detected from the reports of the meeting between President Podgorny and

78) 'Soviet Union and the Struggle etc.' op. cit p. 4
79) See Tass October 1; Tass October 5. The organizations registering protests were: Soviet Peace Committee; Soviet Trade Unions; Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee; Soviet Women's Committee; Soviet Red Cross; Committee of Youth Organizations; Student Council of the USSR; Soviet U.N. Association.
80) Pravda October 2, 1971
81) Text in Pravda October 9, 1971.
that the Soviet President had "expressed his country's interest in the unity and integrity of Pakistan." Tass, on the other hand, while it stated that Podgorny and President Giri of India had taken part "in a warm and friendly conversation", noted only that Yahya and Podgorny had "exchanged views on problems of mutual interest." 

Joint Soviet-Indian pressure against Pakistan was stepped up in the last week of October. Firstly, there was the sudden arrival in Delhi of Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin. The significance of this visit was made apparent with the revelation that the talks between Firyubin and foreign secretary T.N. Kaul were held under the provision of Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The operative part of this article was that

"In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such a threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries."

The revelation that this article had been invoked can only be viewed as an explicit warning to Pakistan that its failure to normalise the situation in East Pakistan and its military preparations constituted a threat to the security of India. The close convergence of the Soviet and Indian positions was testified to by the joint statement resulting from the talks which declared that "the two sides were in full agreement in their assessment of the situation." A further display of Soviet support for India was to be provided by the arrival in India of the C-in-C of the

82) Radio Pakistan October 16, 1971
83) Tass October 15, 1971
84) Times of India October 23, 1971
Soviet Air Force, Marshal of Aviation, Kutakhov.\(^{(86)}\) The significance of this visit was not missed in Pakistan as can be seen from the fact that Pakistan refused overflight facilities to him.\(^{(87)}\)

The Pakistani response to this Soviet pressure was, from Moscow's point of view, totally negative. Far from seeking to defuse the situation, Pakistan made a gesture which, in Soviet eyes, was extremely provocative: a Pakistani delegation, headed by Bhutto, was despatched to Peking. And, as one Soviet journal has subsequently stressed, some members of the delegation were "prominent Pakistani military leaders."\(^{(88)}\)

This action was crucial in influencing Soviet policy. It was shortly to lead to a stern Soviet warning to Pakistan. The Indian press reported that the USSR had made "a fresh urgent appeal to Pakistan to desist from escalating the situation"\(^{(89)}\) and an official Pakistani spokesman confirmed that the Soviet Ambassador had recently delivered a message from the Soviet Government to President Yahya Khan.\(^{(90)}\)

The content of this message may be deduced from various Soviet sources including a subsequent Tass statement which was to declare that "since the Pakistani government took no steps to­ward a political settlement in East Pakistan and continued to build up

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86) Times of India October 29, 1971  
87) Times of India October 31, 1971  
88) V. Zhurkin & V. Kremenyuk op. cit p. 36  
89) Times of India November 26, 1971  
military preparations against India, the Soviet leaders informed President Yahya Khan that an armed attack against India by Pakistan, under whatever pretext it might be made, would evoke the most resolute condemnation in the Soviet Union.\(^{(91)}\)

The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War

The war resulted, in the Soviet account, from Pakistan's failure to heed Soviet advice and seek a political solution to the situation in its eastern wing. Despite Pakistani claims to the contrary, little or nothing was done to restore the East Pakistan situation to normal. As Izvestiya was to remark quite bluntly "the Pakistani Government's assertions to the effect that active steps are being taken in Islamabad to normalize the east Pakistani situation do not correspond to the actual state of affairs."\(^{(92)}\) Another account noted that "the Pakistani Government did not take measures directed towards a political settlement in East Pakistan but continued to intensify military preparations against India."\(^{(93)}\) Soviet reports claimed that, instead of taking remedial action,
the Pakistani authorities followed two hostile courses. Firstly, they tried to blame the non-return of the refugees on Indian machinations. Allegedly, although Pakistan had set up camps for the reception of the returning refugees, India was preventing their return.\(^{(94)}\) Simultaneously, the Yahya regime took steps which led to a further escalation of the crisis in the region. A chauvinist anti-Indian war psychosis developed in Pakistan which was encouraged with official complicity. One journal noted the dangers of such a hysteria "which the leaders of its military administration are doing nothing to stop."\(^{(95)}\) Another charged more directly, in relation to the formation of a 'Crush India' organization by a retired Pakistani Colonel, that "public and political life in Pakistan has been taken under stringent control by the military administration. The fact that a retired colonel and other chauvinist elements act with impunity in such conditions shows that they enjoy the

\(^{(94)}\) See A. Maslennikov & V. Shurygin: 'Indian Subcontinent Needs Peace' APN November 26, 1971 in 'Soviet Union and the Struggle etc.' op. cit. p. 37-8. These correspondents cited as the real cause of the non-return of the refugees reports from East Pakistan which revealed "that the amnesty which was proclaimed there covered only an insignificant number of people." While stressing the plight of the refugees and the problems they created for India, Soviet commentators were careful not to exaggerate the squalor of the conditions in which they lived as this would have reflected unfavourably on India. Noting that cholera and famine amongst the refugees had been overcome, one Soviet journalist stated that "the reason why I have reminded the reader of all this is that some Western journalists and politicians are exaggerating the plight, tragic as it is, of the East Pakistan refugees in their unscrupulous attempt to put the blame at someone else's door, to blame India." I. Shchedrov Pravda October 24, 1971.

patronage of some in the Pakistani administration who take a bellicose stand with regard to India." (96) The situation was further exacerbated by the Pakistani decision of November 23 to introduce a state of emergency over the whole country and to mobilise the country's reservists. (97)

Pakistan was branded by the Soviet Union as the aggressor on the grounds that it had launched air attacks against Indian airports on December 3, 1971. However, while this charge was consistently made by the Soviet press, at least one journalist gave some indication that the picture was not as simple as this suggested. Writing in Izvestiya, V. Kudryavtsev aired an argument the logic of which pointed to India being the initiator of hostilities. Kudryavtsev attacked certain organs of the bourgeois press because "in order to distract the public from the true causes of the conflict, they, as if using an apothecary's balance, define the aggressor according to who fired the first shot." (98) Perhaps realising the drift of his argument he then swiftly added that "everyone knows that Pakistani aircraft carried out an unprovoked bombing strike against Indian airports on December 3."

Some measure of the effort which the Soviet Union had made to avert a military conflict may be arrived at from other Soviet press articles. As late as November 23, Pravda was still urging that, despite the serious difficulties which the refugee problem was causing for relations between India and Pakistan "it should not become the cause of a military conflict between them." (99) Given the Soviet emphasis on the necessity of arriving at a political solution to the crisis, it may also be assumed that, if the

96) I. Borisov op. cit p. 10
97) V. Zhurkin & V. Kremenyuk op. cit p. 36
98) Izvestiya December 12, 1971
Soviet Union did not directly pressure India to prevent the latter from deciding on a premature recognition of Bangladesh, then, at the very least, Soviet advice must have reinforced Indian circumspection in this respect. Certainly, it was realised in the USSR that such a recognition would have closed the door on any possible political settlement. As a further Pravda article was to note, with apparent approbation for Indian caution,

"Until the very last moment it refrained from the steps which might hamper a political settlement in East Pakistan. India recognised Bangla Desh only after the armed forces of Pakistan began large military actions against India..." (100)

On December 5, the Security Council was called into emergency session and had placed before it a resolution moved by the United States. The main elements in this resolution were that there should be an immediate cease-fire between India and Pakistan, that all armed personnel of each country on the territory of the other should be withdrawn and that the Secretary-General should be authorised to place observers along the Indo-Pakistani borders. The resolution was vetoed twice by the Soviet Union, with eleven votes for and the Soviet Union and Poland voting against. France and Britain abstained. (101) The American draft resolution was rejected by the Soviet Union because it amounted "to a mere call for a cease-fire" and "completely ignored the basic causes of the conflict."(102)

In countering the American move, the Soviet representative followed two courses. Firstly, he appealed that a representative of the Republic of Bangla Desh should be heard by the Council in order that the Council's discussion might be better informed. This tactic met with no success and

100) V. Shurygin Pravda December 16, 1971
101) Times of India December 6, 1971
102) Volsky op. cit. p. 17.
led to a Pakistani protest being delivered to the Soviet Embassy in
Islamabad, alleging that "the Soviet action was wholly contrary to the
repeated assurances given by the Soviet leaders that they supported the
unity and integrity of Pakistan."(103) Secondly, the USSR came forward
with a draft resolution of its own. The three principal clauses of the
Soviet formulation were as follows: (The Security Council)
"1. Calls on all interested parties to bring about an immediate cease-
fire and stop all military operations as a first step.

2. Calls on the Government of Pakistan simultaneously to take effective
measures for a political settlement of the situation in East Pakistan and
to recognise without delay the will of the East Pakistani people as
expressed in the December 1970 election.

3. Declares that paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of the
present resolution make up a single whole."(104)

The wording of this resolution was to reveal the essence of the position
adopted by the USSR during the December war. This was that a cease-fire,
in itself, would be meaningless without the termination of the situation
in East Pakistan which had caused the conflict. The order of Soviet
priorities had been made clear by Premier Kosygin during Mrs. Gandhi's
visit to the Soviet Union:

"To ease the situation, it is necessary, above all, that an
opportunity is given to the refugees of returning home, that
the Pakistani authorities give them full guarantee that they
will not be persecuted and that they will have an opportunity
of living and working peacefully in East Pakistan. The peace-
loving public of all countries, all friends of India and
Pakistan expect from the Pakistani authorities an early political
settlement in East Pakistan which would take into account the
legitimate interests of its population, would safeguard its normal

103) Radio Pakistan December 5, 1971
104) Volsky op. cit p. 19.
development and eliminate the threat of further aggravation of Pakistan-Indian relations." (105)

The principle that such a settlement should be effected simultaneously with a cease-fire now became the crux of the Soviet position. It was because the United States' resolution failed to recognise this 'inseparable link' that the USSR felt unable to support it. In the words of one columnist, the military conflict and the suppression of the East Bengalis were "two aspects of the one question." (106)

The Soviet draft resolution was also rejected. As a result of the ensuing stalemate in the Security Council, the United States brought the issue before the General Assembly. The US resolution calling for a cease-fire was successfully carried in this forum by a majority of 104 to 11, those voting against being the Soviet bloc, India and Bhutan. However, this resolution had no mandatory power because its source was the General Assembly. Although the USSR had no veto power over the motion, it voted against it once again on the grounds that "it failed to touch on the essence of the conflict." (107)

As the war progressed and Indian forces reached further into areas formerly occupied by Pakistani forces, it became apparent that the USSR and India were in no mood to break off from their task of 'liberating' Bangladesh before it had been successfully accomplished. Close contacts between the two countries persisted throughout the height of the crisis. D.P. Dhar headed an Indian delegation to Moscow and V. Kuznetsov, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, arrived in Delhi where he was to stay for the duration of the war. (108)

The United States made a further bid to pass its resolution through

105) Speech September 28, 1971 in 'Soviet Union and the Struggle etc.' op. cit p. 16.
106) Yuri Zhukov Pravda December 10, 1971; see also G. Drambyants: 'Politika Internatsional 'noy Solidarnosti': (Policy of International Solidarity) Kommunist no 5 March 1972 p. 90
107) Moscow Radio December 9, 1971
108) Times of India December 12, 1971.
the Security Council on December 13. On this occasion, the Soviet
delegate attempted to avert the bringing of the issue to a vote. Mr.
Malik attacked American haste in pressing for a vote and suggested
that the United States' motive in doing so was so that "it could shift
the blame on the USSR that it had vetoed the move for a cease-fire."(109)
When a vote was taken the following day, the resolution was vetoed for a
third time by the Soviet delegate.

The announcement of the termination of hostilities which followed
the surrender by the Pakistani forces in Dacca was warmly received in
the Soviet Union on the grounds that "the necessary conditions are now
taking shape for the complete elimination of the armed conflict on the
Hindustan peninsula."(110) A subsequent Security Council meeting of
December 22 was to witness the culmination of Soviet policy and the
first public Soviet statement heralding recognition of Bangladesh.
Abstaining on what the London 'Soviet News' termed a "compromise
resolution", the Soviet delegate Yakov Malik, while noting the positive
aspects of the resolution, explained the Soviet action as emanating from
the belief that "only the elected representatives of East Pakistan could
decide whether that area should remain part of Pakistan or should form a
separate independent state, a question which the resolution passed over
in silence."(111) On January 25, the Soviet Union recognised the new
state.(112)

Soviet policy during the 1971 crisis still remains shrouded in
unanswered questions. To such an extent is this true that it is difficult
to discern what the pressing interests of the USSR were in relation to the

109) Times of India December 12, 1971
110) Soviet Foreign Ministry Statement Tass December 17, 1971
111) Soviet News January 4, 1972 p. 3
course of the above narrative that, at various points, the Soviet stance was equivocal on this issue. Certainly, there is little foundation to Swaran Singh's picture of Soviet policy as following an unswerving and unilinear course throughout 1971. Speaking on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Indo-Soviet diplomatic relations, the Indian Minister maintained that

"at no stage did the USSR deviate in the slightest from the course which was enunciated from the very beginning, starting from the well-known letter which was written by President Podgorny to President Yahya Khan. Whatever was mentioned in that letter continued to be the stand of the Soviet Union throughout the crisis. And history will bear witness to the fact that it was a correct stand and it did not require any alteration at any stage." (113)

One might reasonably retort to this that the Minister "doth protest too much." In any event, it is impossible to judge the consistency of Soviet policy during the period without first coming to some assessment of the interests which the Soviet Union sought to further by its posture during the crisis. And this demands an answer to the fundamental question of whether the Soviet Union had a clear preference, one way or the other, for an independent Bangladesh or for the continuation of a unified Pakistani state.

The ambivalence of the Soviet posture suggests that there were persuasive arguments on both sides. There are several ways of approaching this question. At one level, it is apparent that the Soviet Union's interest in the dismemberment of Pakistan was not as pronounced as that of India. Clearly, there was a strategic imperative as far as India was concerned in taking this opportunity to forestall future wars 'on two fronts' against Pakistan. It would be naive to assume, whatever other moral and practical considerations informed Indian actions, that such a

113) Soviet Review April 18, 1972 p. 18.
Equally clearly, if the USSR had an interest in a separate East Pakistani state, then it was a very recently acquired interest. It has been noted previously (114) that, until 1969, the tone of Soviet commentaries betrayed outright hostility to the separatist movement in East Pakistan in general and to the Awami League in particular. Partly, no doubt, this was the converse side of an effort to woo the Ayub administration. However, the nature of Soviet attacks on the movement for East Pakistani autonomy was such as to suggest a genuine fear that the movement was Peking-inspired and Peking-dominated.

On the other hand, given the high priority which the Soviet Union had assigned in the post-Tashkent era to the elimination of conflict between India and Pakistan, there was a considerable Soviet advantage to be derived from a separate East Pakistani state. A Soviet journalist, cited earlier, had as early as 1966 emphasised the distinction between the political climate in West Pakistan and that in the Eastern wing. (115) Public opinion in the latter wing was markedly less agitated by the Kashmir question, less given to anti-Indian hostility and more interested in economic cooperation with India as a result of the strong economic ties between East and West Bengal. Furthermore, the six points of the Awami League programme, enunciated in 1966, had made normalisation of relations with India a cornerstone of its foreign policy platform. In short, if East Pakistan could be salvaged from West Pakistani domination, at least half of the Soviet goal of Indo-Pakistani normalisation might be realised. And perhaps the rupture between Islamabad and Moscow of 1969-70 was all the incentive the USSR needed to push it in that

114) See Ch. 3 section b
direction. To this extent, the objection that before 1969 the Soviet Union was opposed to East Pakistani autonomy may be invalidated: if Islamabad seriously disappointed Moscow's expectations, it is reasonable to assume that the USSR would drastically reorder its regional priorities and that its new-found incentive to support the autonomy movement would be no less pressing for being of recent origin.

Unfortunately, the matter once again is not as straightforward as this would seem to imply. Even if Moscow had been disillusioned by the Yahya regime and had come to see the virtues of an Awami League dedicated to wide socio-economic reforms and to a foreign policy of withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO, there was still no compelling reason why Moscow should seek the dismemberment of the state. Indeed, given Yahya's professed intention of transferring power to civilian hands and given the Awami League victory in the 1970 elections, it may be argued that the optimal outcome for the Soviet Union was a unified Pakistan, under the Premiership of Mujibur Rahman, headed in the direction of socialism, nonalignment and closer cooperation with the USSR. It was such an eventuality which the Soviet Ambassador, Degtyar, had foreseen, albeit prematurely, when he had written in February 1971 that "although the difficulties to be overcome on the way to a Parliamentary government are not negligible, it is clear that the elections marked the country's entry into a new important period in its political development."(116) Likewise, Moscow Radio had claimed that great hopes had been placed on the elections "as an important stage in the process of democratising the country's political life" and had lamented that "the process did not work."(117) From this perspective, much of Soviet

116) Dawn February 10, 1971
policy becomes readily intelligible. The constant stress on a political solution in East Pakistan, based on the expressed will of the people, as being in the best interests of the 'entire Pakistan people' may not unfairly be regarded as pointing in this direction.

Such an interpretation is more plausible than that put forward by some United States' specialists as reported by the New York Times. Their conspiracy theory entailed the view that "India and the Soviet Union are quietly collaborating to promote the political separation of East Pakistan from the Central Pakistan Government."\(^{(118)}\) This view postulates a clearly-defined and unchanging order of Soviet interests during the crisis. On the contrary, it seems more in keeping with the facts that Moscow pursued its primary objective - the transfer of power to more 'progressive' Pakistani forces - as far as it could and only when this course proved futile in view of Yahya's obduracy did the USSR settle for the dismemberment of the country. In other words, the Soviet victory in 1971 was less complete than is sometimes assumed: while the USSR abetted the military 'liberation' of East Pakistan, it had been its desire to witness the political 'liberation' of the entire country.

A) Comparative Environments

1) Policy of the United States

The American responses to the two Indo-Pakistani wars were inevitably significant influences on Soviet policy. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the two wars is the marked correlation between the postures of the two Super Powers.

As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the main characteristic of American policy during the 1965 crisis was its ostensible neutrality. During the period 1962-65, U.S. policy in South Asia had undergone the same process of metamorphosis as that of the Soviet Union: whereas the USSR had moved to some kind of balanced position between India and Pakistan, the United States had also moved from a unilateral orientation towards Pakistan to a similar dualistic stand. The groundwork for such a development had been constructed by the Kennedy Administration and had been materially advanced by American military aid to India in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. As in the case of the Soviet Union, the effort to improve relations with the other party on the subcontinent had an adverse effect on the relationship with the original receiver of American attentions: the process of cultivating India developed its own momentum and led to further estrangement of Pakistan from the United States. Most notably, the new American attitude towards India provided further stimulus to growing Sino-Pakistani ties and, to some extent, to an improvement in relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

1) This section does not purport to be a balanced critique of American policy. It only seeks to set out those salient features of the American posture which appear to have influenced Soviet policy.
Signs of friction in US-Pakistani relations were quite visible by 1965. President Johnson's cancellation of Ayub's trip to the United States created a bad impression in Pakistan. This was followed by another incident. In July 1965 the United States delayed the discussion of aid for Pakistan's third five-year plan. Soviet commentaries provided two explanations of this action. Firstly, Izvestiya columnist V. Matveyev maintained that "it is no secret that Lyndon Johnson's letter was inspired by Washington's displeasure with Pakistan's position in regard to the war in Vietnam." A further explanation was said to lie in the fact that "the American imperialists are also worried because for some time mutually beneficial trade and commercial relations have been developing between Pakistan and countries of the socialist community."

These strains in U.S.-Pakistan relations provided the background to the American posture during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. On September 8, the United States suspended military aid to both India and Pakistan, a deed which was unfavourably received in Pakistan in view of Pakistan's heavy dependence on American military supplies. In harmony with the other permanent members of the Security Council, the United States supported UN resolutions calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces to the cease-fire line in Kashmir. In short, "instead of the former assistance to Pakistan, the US Government adopted an emphatically neutral position."

2) Although it should be pointed out that the invitation to Shastri to visit the United States was also withdrawn. See C. Bowles: 'Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life' Harper & Row New York 1971 p.498-9.
3) See e.g. I.M.Kompantsev: 'Pakistan i SovetskiySoyuz' (Pakistan and the Soviet Union) (Nauka, Moscow 1970) p.156.
7) Kompantsev op. cit. p.166.
The contrast with the American position in 1971 is very pronounced. It was the partisan stance taken up by the United States in 1971 which evoked the sternest Soviet criticism. Moscow Radio castigated the US administration because it "makes believe it is neutral. However, this neutrality is so thin that outright rather sharp anti-Indian feelings are clearly visible through it."(8) Similar charges have been expressed by other Soviet commentators. Thus one complained that "from the very beginning of the conflict, the USA perpetrated a series of actions directed to help the Yahya Khan regime"(9) whilst another argued that "despite assurances by White House spokesmen that the USA was taking an "absolutely neutral" attitude to the conflict on the Indian subcontinent, its biased stand is all too obvious."(10)

The principal American actions leading to this Soviet assessment are not difficult to discern. The first indication that the American attitude to Pakistan was broadly sympathetic came with the report that arms were continuing to be delivered to Pakistan in spite of what was believed to be an official embargo. When Swaran Singh returned from a visit to Washington in June 1971 he brought with him assurances that the United States would not be supplying further military equipment to Pakistan.(11) His return to Delhi coincided with reports that two Pakistani ships were on their way to Karachi with military supplies from the US. In the face of this report, Swaran Singh could only affirm that if it was correct "then it was a sure departure from the assurances the US Government had given to India."(12) It soon

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became apparent that the report was substantially correct. The Pakistani newspaper 'Dawn' was shortly to cite State Department sources as having acknowledged that millions of dollars more US military equipment would be sent to Pakistan.\(^{(13)}\) The Senate subcommittee on the East Pakistan situation, chaired by Senator Kennedy, confirmed that, despite the ostensible embargo, the administration had offered to sell Pakistan more arms as late as June.\(^{(14)}\) Commenting on such revelations, Tass quoted approvingly the words of Chester Bowles, writing in the New York Times:

"Since the onset of developments in East Pakistan in late March, the US has shipped three consignments of military equipment to Pakistan. At first this was interpreted as just another bureaucratic blunder, one not reflecting US policy. However, the past few days there is evidence that this was not an accident but a deliberate decision."\(^{(15)}\)

On December 1, the United States suspended the licensing of arms shipments to India on the grounds that Indian military forces had crossed the border with East Pakistan.\(^{(16)}\) This embargo involved 3 million dollars worth of ammunition. Two days later remaining licences were cancelled because of "continuing Indian incursions into Pakistan."\(^{(17)}\) On December 6, India recognised Bangla Desh and the same day the State Department announced that it had suspended economic aid worth 87.6 million dollars to India. Announcing the decision, spokesman Charles Bray declared that "the United States is not making a short-term contribution to the Indian economy to make it easier for the Indian Government to sustain its military efforts."\(^{(18)}\) Once again, American actions came under Soviet fire on the grounds of their partisanship. A Pravda article broadcast by Tass emphasised that "the US administration which tarried for several

\(^{(13)}\) July 10 1971.  
\(^{(14)}\) Times of India Oct 5 1971.  
\(^{(15)}\) July 8 1971.  
\(^{(16)}\) Times of India Dec 2 1971.  
months without stopping military assistance to Pakistan, immediately stopped military and economic aid to India."(19) Izvestiya took the US Government to task for similar reasons:

"The US ruling circles want to demonstrate their 'impartiality' in the Pakistan-Indian conflict, declaring that they hold a 'neutral' position with respect to it. But this 'neutrality' it turns out consists in the fact that the USA is applying economic sanctions to India (and only to India!): it has refused to grant this country loans totalling $87,600,000 although this sum had already been agreed upon."(20)

With the eruption of a full-scale war, the American position became even more vociferously critical of India. A spokesman for the State Department announced at a briefing session the official belief that "since the beginning of the crisis Indian policy in a systematic way has led to the perpetuation of the crisis, a deepening of the crisis and that India bears the major responsibility for the broader hostilities that have ensued."(21) The following day, George Bush, speaking in the Security Council debate, referred to India as the "main aggressor".(22) The declared reason for this hardening in the American attitude towards India was that India had disrupted American mediatory efforts and had forestalled a pacific settlement of the dispute. This information was provided in a 'backgrounder' by 'anonymous White House officials'.(23) The informant was later revealed to be Dr. Kissinger.

The substance of the American position was confirmed, in Soviet eyes, by the US posture in the Security Council. The American draft resolution according to Soviet complaints, was biased in that it made no mention of the situation in East Pakistan since March 25.

20) V. Kudryavtsev Dec 12 1971.
support the view that the United States went out of its way to declare
to Indian policy and to register backing for the Yahya
regime. From these documents, relating to the discussions of the
White House Security Action Group, the following revelations were
made: that the US considered having American arms transferred from
Jordan and Saudi Arabia to Pakistan; that "we are not trying to be
even-handed....The President believes that India is the attacker";
that Dr. Kissinger was "getting hell every half hour from the President
that we are not being tough enough on India."(24)

As a final overt gesture of its sympathies, the US despatched the
aircraft carrier 'Enterprise' to the Bay of Bengal. Although the avowed
purpose of this mission was to evacuate American personnel, the reports
leaked to columnist Anderson pointed to four military reasons for the
manoeuvre a) To compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow
the US task force b) To weaken India's blockade of East Pakistan c) To
divert the Indian carrier Vikrant d) To force India to keep planes on
defence alert"(25) The move evoked the expected retort from the USSR
which accused the US of having added "direct military demonstrations
to its diplomatic pressure and blackmail against India."(26) A sub-
sequent analysis of the naval diplomacy of the two powers during the
war also comes to this conclusion that the deployment of the Enterprise
flotilla was authorised as a demonstration against India. Its con-
clusion was that "Task Force 74 amounted to an 'expressive' show of
force, designed to emphasise the American attitude in action language."(27)

26) Moscow Radio Dec. 15 1971. See also V. Pustov: Krasnaya Zvezda
Dec 16 1971.
27) J.M.McConnell and A.M. Kelly 'Super Power Naval Diplomacy': Lessons
The eruption of hostilities between India and Pakistan in 1965 met with an instant reaction on the part of China. On September 7, the Government of the People's Republic issued a statement on the situation. It accused India of committing an act of 'naked aggression' and pledged 'firm support' for Pakistan in its struggle. It also warned the Indian Government that "it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression."(28) Ten days later, the Indian Government received another Chinese note which not only increased pressure on India but provides an insight into the further friction which the conflict was producing in Sino-Soviet relations. The note refuted in strong language Indian protestations that Indian troops had not crossed the China-Sikkim border or constructed military installations there. "This is a bare-faced lie" the note continued.(29) The note proceeded to issue a demand and a warning:

"The Chinese Government now demands that the Indian Government dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself within three days of the delivery of the present note.....Otherwise the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom."

While issuing this warning to India, China did not miss the opportunity of a few asides directed at the Soviet position. Obviously referring to Kosygin's letters of September 4 to Ayub and Shastri, in which the Soviet Union denied the importance of culpability for the crisis, the note stressed that "non-involvement absolutely does not mean failure to distinguish between right and wrong". It also cast doubts on the ostensible neutrality of the Soviet stance. "Some countries have acknowledged Kashmir as belonging to India. In that case, "the note queried, "how can one speak of their non-involvement in the dispute?"

29) Text in Times of India Sept 18 1965.
On the 19th September, China extended the deadline for compliance with its demand to midnight of the 22nd. (30) In fact, when the deadline was reached, China announced that India had dismantled its military works on Chinese territory. This announcement coincided with the news that Pakistan had complied with the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire as from midnight of September 22nd.

This is not an appropriate place to discuss the question of Chinese intentions and motivations in the crisis. It is relevant, however, to see what reaction Chinese deeds elicited from the Soviet Union. And in this respect, there seems to be every reason for believing that the Soviet Government was genuinely concerned about what it viewed as Chinese exacerbation of the conflict. It is not possible to ascertain whether the Soviet Union expected direct military intervention on the part of China. Certainly, Pakistani officials were informally claiming that there might be diversionary Chinese action on the border with India. (31) That the Soviet Government was not oblivious to this danger is suggested by a Pravda article which drew attention to foreign agency reports that "delivery by CPR representatives of the notes mentioned is attended by movement and concentration of Chinese armed forces on the borders with India." (32)

Clear testimony of Soviet anxiety in relation to the Chinese role in the crisis is provided by the Tass statement of September 13.

"There are, however, forces which seek to profit by the worsened India-Pakistani relations. By their incendiary statements they push them towards further aggravation of the military conflict."

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government warned that there was a danger of many states finding themselves "drawn into the conflict one by one." Significantly, while taking the initiative in warning

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30) Times of India Sept 20 1965.
32) Pravda Sept 23 1965
China against any provocative action, the Soviet Union issued an appeal to other powers to combine their efforts with those of the USSR in forestalling Chinese intervention. In the words of the statement:

"The whole world should warn those who help fan the conflict by their incendiary statements and by their policy that they thereby assume grave responsibility for such a policy, for such actions. No Government has any right to add fuel to the flames...."(33)

The nature of the international alignments of the period and the existence of American sympathies for the Soviet position was evident throughout the war. There can be no doubt that both the United States and the USSR saw themselves as sharing a common interest. On the same day as the Tass statement, the US made a low-key gesture to China in the form of a statement by Dean Rusk. Talking to reporters, Rusk advised China to "stay out and let the Security Council settle it" and also added that China was "fishing in troubled water."(34) Two days later, perhaps in response to Tass's insistence that the "whole world" should caution China, the US ambassador to Poland, in the course of the regular meetings between the US and Chinese ambassadors, warned China to stay out of the conflict. (35) The common Soviet-American interest in checking China was again highlighted by the American representative to the UN, A Goldberg. Addressing the September 18 meeting of the Security Council, the US spokesman emphasised the dangers of Chinese provocation:

"While we are meeting, in direct contradiction to our efforts, the Chinese communists are pursuing a course clearly designed to aggravate further the already grave situation. If a cease-fire between India and Pakistan was necessary on 4 and 6 September...it is imperatively necessary today. And it is doubly necessary that our voices be raised firmly against any efforts to spread the conflict and exploit what is already a tragedy."(36)

33) Text in Times of India Sept 14 1965.
In comparison with the Chinese role during the 1965 war, Chinese statements during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 were conspicuously moderate. At any rate, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was far less agitated about the possibility of direct Chinese intervention in 1971 than it had been in 1965 and this feeling was no doubt conveyed to the Soviet Union.

This is not to say that Moscow had no qualms about the course which China was following. The Soviet Union was bitterly critical of what it regarded as China's 'two-faced' posture in the crisis. Many commentaries stressed the fact that China had "tried in every way to worm their way into East Pakistan and, with the help of their agents, preached a 'people's war' there". However, with the onset of the repressions against East Pakistan, China had taken up a stance in support of the Islamabad authorities. In another respect, by accusing India of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs, China was, in the Soviet view, continuing its major regional policy of discrediting India and of exploiting her difficulties. The rationale of Chinese policy during the past decade was summarised by one Pravda correspondent:

"Since the time of the military clashes between China and India in the Himalayas in 1959, the Chinese leaders have been following an openly hostile line against India. They seek in every way to compromise India, especially in the eyes of the peoples of the developing countries and to isolate it. In this way, they seek to make easier their own path to leadership in the so-called 'third world'. At the same time, Peking would like to complicate the situation on the Hindustan peninsula and weaken India."

Such statements, however, scarcely went beyond the normal level of mutual Sino-Soviet abuse. They were not accompanied by the intense diplomatic activity and the repeated official pronouncements of 1965 which guarded against outside intervention in the Indo-Pakistan war. Significantly, the Soviet media on this occasion did

not contain, as they had done in 1965, scattered references to Chinese
troop movements and concentrations on the Sino-Indian border. Above
all, while the Chinese note of September 16 1965 had to be treated by
India as a genuine ultimatum, no demand of commensurate intensity was
made on India by China in 1971.

There was available to Soviet analysts evidence which suggested
the extreme unlikelihood of direct Chinese military intervention in
the 1971 crisis. This evidence existed at two levels - that deriving
from the objective strategic situation and that emanating from Chinese
policy declarations.

In terms of the former, there were several reasons why China
could not pose as credible a threat of intervention in 1971 as in
1965. Firstly, and least important, the time of the year in which
the war broke out was not conducive to Chinese military activity on
the Sino-Indian border. In 1965, the war had occurred in August-
September when the passes were still relatively clear of snow. In
1971, the war occurred in December when the Himalayan winter was
already firmly established. At the same time, this factor should
not be overstated as the condition of the passes was of relative, not
absolute, strategic significance: the fact that the 1971 campaign had
to be undertaken in winter must have made a Chinese military incursion
into India less likely but it could not be said to have placed a com­
plete interdiction on such an eventuality. Those who doubted China's
capacity to campaign during the Himalayan winter had only to recall
that in 1962, while the major fighting between India and China
occurred in October, Chinese manoeuvres continued until the cease­
fire of November 21 and the Chinese frontier guards did not withdraw
from their forward positions until December 1. (39)

A further factor militating against Chinese intervention must have
been a rise in China's estimation of India's military capability.

39) See e.g. N. Maxwell: 'India's China War' (Indian edition Jaico
Following upon the disaster of 1962, the Indian Government drew up a long-term programme for improving its defence potential. Their efforts produced a five-year plan which only became operative in 1964 and the full expectations of which would not be realised until after 1969. Consequently, in 1965, India was only embarking on this reconstruction whereas by 1971 most of its objectives had already been attained. Of special relevance for China were the efforts undertaken by the Indian government to improve the road and communication network in the region of the Sino-Indian border. Additionally, India had reaped the benefit of a decade of western and Soviet military assistance which had been denied to China. These various undertakings produced a qualitative difference in India's defence capacity, even between 1965 and 1971. In 1965 the army was understrength and a reliable report claimed that it would take "about eighteen months to bring the army up to its full strength". Major advances had also been registered in the Air Force by 1971 with the acquisition of a considerable fleet of high-altitude transport helicopters and, amongst other new additions, with the arrival from the USSR of some seven squadrons of MIG-21's.

Thirdly, Chinese reluctance to intervene could only have been reinforced by the nature of the military problem facing them. If, as can be reasonably argued, the most that the Chinese government would have committed itself to in support of Pakistan was a small diversionary action on the Sino-Indian border, then clearly such intervention would have been less likely to achieve its objective in 1971 than in 1965.

40) For a discussion of this see L.J.Kavic:'India's Quest for Security' (University of California Press 1967), Ch.2 'The New Indian Defence Programme'.
In 1965, the Indo-Pakistani war centred on the western border where Pakistan could, in some respects, match Indian forces. In 1971, the Indian thrust was into East Pakistan where Indian superiority over Pakistan was of an altogether different magnitude. Pakistan had only some 4 divisions in its eastern wing,\(^{(44)}\) and reinforcement was precluded by Indian naval superiority in the Bay of Bengal. It must have appeared in Peking, therefore, that even if China was able to syphon off some Indian troops to the north, this could provide only marginal relief to the beleaguered Pakistani forces in the eastern wing.

More positive evidence was available to the USSR in terms of the Chinese reaction to events in Pakistan. It is now clear that the Chinese government was embarrassed by Yahya's policy and regarded it as totally ill-conceived. That this was the case has been confirmed by Chang Wen-chin, a Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister who has made the following statement:

"No matter what mistakes the Pakistan government made in East Bengal, we consider this their internal affair. Of course, we do not consider the Pakistan policy to have been correct...."\(^{(45)}\)

Chinese discomfiture with Pakistan's policy was reflected in the precise phrasing of Chinese statements in support of Pakistan which betokened a very limited Chinese commitment and given the Soviet predilection for minute textual exegesis, the significance of Chinese statements could not have been missed by the state's intelligence gatherers. In mid-April, in the early stages of the crisis, Premier Chou En-Lai had given Pakistan the assurance that "should the Indian expansionists dare launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly

\(^{44}\) Australian Feb.14 1972.

\(^{45}\) Interview with party from the Australian National University in Peking June 14 1973. Information supplied by J.D. Armstrong.
support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard the State's sovereignty and national independence."\(^{(46)}\)

It was noteworthy that the assurance made no mention of protecting Pakistan's 'territorial integrity'. This remained the Chinese position throughout 1971. In November, when Bhutto led a military delegation to Peking, his delegation was again told this time by acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-Fei, that China would support Pakistan's struggle to defend its "state sovereignty and national independence."\(^{(47)}\) These declarations must have been interpreted as conveying a limited Chinese commitment to Pakistan and one which would not ensure Chinese support in the event of the dismemberment of the Eastern wing.\(^{(48)}\)

One short reference in the Soviet press would also seem to support the view that there was no serious expectation in the USSR that China would intervene directly in the war. The reference came in an article castigating China's "very noisy" but "politically absurd" position. Seeking to demonstrate that China had encouraged Pakistan's aggression, the writer recalled the Bhutto visit to Peking "to discuss beforehand military assistance to Pakistan." The article went on to argue that "it is also known that the CPR Government promised such assistance and support" but then added the qualification "in any case as far as arms deliveries are concerned."\(^{(49)}\) It seems clear that this was the assessment upon which the Soviet Union was operating.

3) Great Power Alignments\(^{(50)}\)

Underlying the contrasting postures of the USSR, China and the United States in the two Indo-Pakistan wars, respectively, was the changing nature of the relationship between these three powers. The

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47) N.C.N.A. Nov. 7 1971.
48) This point has also been made by J.A. Naik 'India, Russia, China, and Bangladesh' (Chand & Co., New Delhi 1972) p.63.
49) V. Kudryavtsev Izvestiya Dec. 12 1971.
50) Parts of the following section have already been published as 'Sino-American Relations in Soviet Perspective' Orbis Summer 1973.
common interest of the Soviet Union and the United States in forestalling Chinese intervention in 1965 has already been mentioned and the cooperative efforts of the two Super Powers in that situation will be further discussed below.

The contrast with the international configuration in 1971 is again conspicuous. There can be no doubt that one of the most decisive influences on the Soviet position during the 1970 Indo-Pakistani war was the rapidly changing international parameters of policy symbolised by the rapprochement in Sino-American relations. That this new alignment impinged on the Indo-Pakistani confrontation has been stressed in all Soviet accounts of the development of the Bangladesh situation. There were two aspects of Sino-American 'collusion' which concerned the Soviet Union. At the one level, Chinese and American backing was regarded as having reinforced Yahya's obdurate refusal to countenance a political settlement and as having encouraged him to seek a military solution. As one Pravda commentator was to write, "the actions of the Chinese leaders, combined with Washington's pro-Pakistani line, helped to fan a military conflict on the Hindustan peninsula."(51) At the other level, joint Chinese and American action in the United Nations, which concentrated on the attainment of a cease-fire, clashed with the Soviet insistence that a cease-fire should be accompanied simultaneously with a political settlement in East Pakistan. China, in fact, voted for all of the American resolutions in both the Security Council and in the General Assembly. This led Pravda to charge that "guided by their own narrowly selfish aspirations, the US and Chinese representatives are trying in a strikingly well-synchronised and coordinated way to do all they can to lead the Security Council away from the political realities of the situation."(52)

Moreover, such a coincidence of postures led to widespread Soviet suspicions of collusion between the two powers. As Moscow Radio was to put it:

"What strikes observers is the singular timing of the actions of the Peking leadership with those of the US imperialists. The Peking leaders so obviously back up Washington in the U.N. and in their incendiary anti-Indian statements that one involuntarily wonders whether the two countries had not reached some far-reaching agreements spearheaded against the independent and peaceloving states."(53)

In order to appreciate the precise nature of Soviet fears of Sino-American normalisation and the influence which they were to exert on Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan, it is necessary to place them in a wider perspective. Thus, although by the time of the Indo-Pakistan war, President Nixon had not as yet visited Peking, Dr. Kissinger had already been there twice and China had already been admitted to the United Nations. The Indo-Pakistani war was, therefore, to be the first international event of any importance to reflect the complex transmutations occurring in the relationship between the Soviet Union, United States and China.

The immediate significance of the Sino-American rapprochement, as far as Moscow was concerned, was that the United States had decided to bring China more directly into the play of a global balance which had recently been swinging in favour of the USSR. Kissinger's visits to Peking and China's admission to the United Nations were part of the process by which the US sought to "meet halfway the Maoists' great power claims and style" and to "persuade the world public that Washington really regards Peking as a 'full-fledged global partner' and is ready to play a serious great-power game with it."(54) By doing so, America sought to push the international hierarchy in the direction of an incipient tripolar order.

Ostensibly at least, the Soviet Union viewed the Sino-American rapprochement within the context of the domestic and foreign policy crisis currently believed to be occurring in the USA. As a discussion on Moscow Radio phrased it on one occasion "this stage is characterised by a further weakening of the USA's position and prestige in international affairs. In the confrontation with the Soviet Union...US imperialism now seeks new partners; and Washington is trying to find such a partner in China...what depths of crisis has American policy reached."(55) Regarded from such a perspective the US courtship of China could only be interpreted as a move designed to bolster the position of the USA in the international arena. In the words of one Soviet analyst:

"The policy of rapprochement with the CPR has been connected primarily with new elements in the American ruling circles' assessment of what at present are the optimal means of defending their class interests in the world."(56)

The basic Soviet contention was, therefore, that the timing of the American move necessarily cast doubts on the motives which had inspired it. This suspicion was voiced after Kissinger's first visit to China in July 1971 by G. Arbatov, Director of the 'Institute of the USA' of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. "It must be regretted," Arbatov argued, "that the USA has been holding back for such a long time from recognition of realities and has only now, in circumstances which make its position rather ambiguous, begun taking the first steps along the path of renouncing its 'cold war' policy towards the PRC."(57)

It was because the Sino-American rapprochement presented a challenge to the essential bipolarity of the global balance that the Soviet leaders took offence at American manoeuvres. Thus at the time of the announcement of President Nixon's proposed visit to Peking, a

56) Lukin op. cit.
Pravda article which was given great prominence by Soviet radio stations, carried the insistent reminder that "there are quite a few people in the USA who understand very well that much depends on the direction and course of the development of relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, both for the peoples of the two countries and for the entire international situation." (58) The line that the fundamental basis of world order should still be described in terms of the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the USA was subsequently to be given an even more forthright expression in a Soviet journal: "The implementation of men's desire for peace and progress is a truly noble task and is naturally dependent on the joint efforts of all peoples, of all states whether big or small. However, one must not fail to reckon with the importance for the international situation of the state of the relations between the Soviet Union and the US, the two states with the greatest economic and military might, particularly since the various aspects of relations between the USSR and the USA are closely interwoven with international issues which affect the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples but also of other nations." (59)

It was in the fact of a challenge to this simple picture that the Soviet Union appreciated that some new stage of the international system was in the process of emergence. And it was because the USA bore the major responsibility for ushering in this 'brave new world' that the Soviet Union was especially bitter. The Soviet leaders were, therefore, heavily conscious of the danger which this new alignment presented to the mainstream process of détente and of the essentially anti-Soviet reasons which had inspired the US to 'complicate' the structure by giving China an increased role in the system. Thus, on learning of the proposed Nixon visit to China, the main thrust of the Soviet media appeared to be a frantic search for a reassurance from the USA that the 'complication' would not be

58) Ibid.
taken to the point where the essential primacy of the Soviet-US dialogue would be lost sight of. It is from this perspective that we are to understand Pravda's admonition: "A dialogue on a broad range of problems has long been under way between the USA and the USSR. This dialogue is very important, but not easy, both because of the complexity of the problems and because, above all, confidence is needed for their successful solution. There can be no stronger blow at confidence than unscrupulous diplomatic manoeuvres, backstage intrigues and ambiguities."\(^{(60)}\)

The rapprochement, according to Soviet accounts, should not be interpreted as a sudden or unexpected development but rather as the culmination of a process of evolution which had its real beginnings with the Sino-Soviet rift and, hence, in the splitting tactics of the Peking leadership. One symptom of the emerging Sino-American accommodation was to be seen in the policies of the two countries in relation to Vietnam where 'disengagement' and 'Vietnamisation', based on the recognition of a Chinese sphere of influence, had been "necessary preconditions for the normalisation of American-Chinese relations."\(^{(61)}\) The process was also given a boost by the border fighting between the USSR and China in 1969. These open hostilities acted as a signal to the United States that China was 'on the market' at a mutually agreeable price. "When the Washington strategists received sufficient proof that the Maoists had departed from the common political line of the socialist states, "Moscow Radio observed, 'only then did the White House decide to review its doctrine with relation to Peking."\(^{(62)}\)

\(^{60}\) Arbatov op. cit.
\(^{62}\) Nov 30 1971.
By the nature of its overtures to Peking, the United States sought to promote the emergence of a tripolar system. Thus one Soviet commentator has noted that "the endeavour to stimulate the globalization of the 'Chinese factor' is closely connected with the adoption of a so-called 'triangular' foreign policy stance" and has cited the belief of American strategists that "China is, as it were, wedging itself into the traditional structure of the present-day world" and in doing so is "transforming this structure by introducing a new, additional coefficient of complexity into foreign-policy calculations."(63)

The concept of multipolarity has been resisted by Soviet theoreticians, although not without placing them in some paradoxical positions. At a time when the USSR is trying to realise major political programmes in Europe and Asia, it is sensitive to charges that in these settlements only Super Power interests will be respected. At the same time, as a result of the long conditioning of the bipolar cold war and because China is the instrument by which Washington seeks to modify the present international hierarchy, the Soviet Union is not favourably disposed towards multipolarity. Given this Soviet preference for the kind of system which characterised international life in the 1960's, the vehemence of its attack on the Chinese doctrine of the dominance of the two 'Super Powers' becomes readily intelligible.

Given the antagonism between the Soviet predilection for a simple bipolar situation and Soviet embarrassment in the face of Chinese charges of 'Super Power' hegemony, Soviet theoreticians have found themselves in an unenviable position. At the purely doctrinal level their arguments are compatible. Thus, when they attack the concept of a multipolar international system, they do so

63) Lukin op. cit.
in virtue of the fundamental ideological polarity - the struggle between two different socio-economic systems - which is supposedly inherent in the present world situation. Likewise, when they abuse the Chinese doctrine of the two Super Powers, they base their recriminations on the essentially non-class basis of the Chinese position. As one ideologue has put it "the logical nature of the struggle of the 'small and medium-sized countries' against the 'Super Powers' as preached by the Peking leaders proceeds from the anti-Marxist propositions of Mao Tse-tung concerning the primacy of national contradictions over class contradictions. It follows from this assertion that in today's world the motive force of social development is allegedly not the class struggle but the international struggle."(64) At this level, the two positions may be reconciled. However, at the level of state policy, there is more than a trace of suspicion that the very bipolar 'Super Power' doctrine which it attacks in theory, in practice forms the basis of Soviet misgivings about the emerging tripolar system.

One of the most revealing Soviet statements on multipolarity has been provided by L. Stepanov in an article in 'Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya.'(65) This article sees the socio-economic crisis in the US and the political decline of America as "the main motive force of the aspiration for such a reconstruction of the world, in which the competition of two social systems gives way to the polycentric or multipolar combination of state forces." Is it only because such developments were attempting to tamper with the ideological

64) Krasnaya Zvezda December 14, 1971
bipolarity of the world that Soviet commentators have displayed such
open antagonism to the idea of multipolarity? There is little reason
to accept the argument at face value. The article went on to describe
as utopian any attempt to restructure the world while ignoring the
basic laws of the epoch. If this was the case, there would be little
cause for Soviet concern. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
when they denounce any attempt to modify the bipolar ideological
confrontation, they are in fact attacking a much more insidious
development which is rather a multipolar configuration of state
entities, each impinging to an increasing degree onto the bipolar global
balance.

The reasons for saying so are twofold. It is not immediately
obvious why a 'multipolar combination of state forces' should in
any way obscure the dichotomy between the socialist and the imperialist
systems. It could be maintained that this fundamental contradiction
was as valid in the context of the multipolar inter-war system
from 1919-39 as in the context of the bipolar cold war structure. If
this is the case, and if the events to which the Soviet Union takes
exception represent no more than a partial reversion to this kind of
system, we are left with the conclusion that it is this kind of system,
rather than its doctrinal implications, to which the USSR objected.

Again, looking at a particular aspect of the question, we find
Stepanov telling us that "the rapprochement between Washington and
Peking breathed new life into the doctrines of multipolarity and evoked
a new flood of enthusiasm in their adherents."(66) As a statement of
fact, this is quite unexceptionable: as an implicit complaint it is

66) ibid
somewhat wide of the mark. If the objection of the USSR was to the blurring of the divisions between the two social systems, there could be no objection to the Sino-American accommodation. In fact, as Peking had previously all but gone over to the imperialist camp in any case (as the Soviets maintain) the rapprochement should be viewed as no more than a formalisation of an existing situation and hence as a clarification rather than a blurring of the ideological demarcations. However, as a complaint against increasing international political pluralism, both symbolised and precipitated by the rapprochement, Stepanov's observation becomes quite intelligible: China may be the thin end of the Japanese and West European wedges.

Soviet anxiety that developments in Sino-American relations might militate against its own relationship with the United States was stimulated by the American posture during the Indo-Pakistani war. In fact, from the Soviet point of view, it looked as if America might even be exploiting the Soviet apprehension to put pressure on the Soviet position vis-a-vis the Indo-Pakistani war. This became abundantly clear from another Kissinger 'backgrounder' given to reporters. In his remarks, Kissinger urged the Soviet Union to act as a restraining influence on India. If the USSR did not do so, Kissinger warned that "the entire US-Soviet relationship might well be re-examined" and "a new look might have to be taken at the President's summitry plans". In short, the proposed Nixon visit to Moscow might have to be cancelled. In this way, the Indo-Pakistani war not only reflected the changing alignments of the three great powers but threatened to push these alignments even more irrevocably in a direction inimical to Soviet interests.

B) Comparative Soviet Postures

1) Stance in Relation to India and Pakistan

Both crises of 1965 and 1971 reflected the shifts in the Soviet stance between India and Pakistan. As we have seen, the war of 1965 was preceded by concrete signs of an improvement in the Soviet Union's relations with Pakistan while the Soviet commitment to India continued largely unabated. Consequently, the Soviet posture in 1965 combined a diplomatic concern for neutrality with discrete efforts to back India on matters of substance. Similarly, the crisis of 1971 was preceded by the evaporation of some of the goodwill which had been developing between the USSR and Pakistan and by a strengthening of the bonds between the Soviet Union and India. In this case, although circumspection militated against a premature or unequivocal denunciation of Pakistan, there was no comparable effort on the part of the Soviet Union to adhere to a diplomatic mode of neutrality.

The respective Soviet postures can be discerned in the manner in which Soviet commentators attributed blame for the causes of the conflicts. With notable consistency, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 was portrayed as a set-back which had been deliberately foisted upon two 'innocent' states as a result of the machinations of the imperialist powers. There was no outright Soviet statement that the war had been precipitated by Pakistan sending infiltrators into Kashmir. As the commentator article in Pravda of August 24 1965 was to argue in regard to conflicting Indian and Pakistani accounts of the situation, "we will not go into a discussion here on which of these versions more precisely reflects the course of events." Instead, it went on to maintain that "the Kashmir problem...is essentially the heavy legacy of colonialism. Imperialists have often tried to use the Kashmir question to incite the peoples of India and Pakistan to quarrel with each
other." This was the line adopted by all Soviet commentators in order to avoid pronouncing on the relative culpability of the parties to the dispute. In a similar vein, another account of the war charged that "the armed conflict between India and Pakistan which flared up on August 5 1965 resulted from intrigues of the Western powers who are bent on greater world tension." (68)

The nature of Soviet comment on the 1971 dispute was fundamentally different. On this occasion, responsibility for the conflict was laid squarely with the authorities in Islamabad. As one Soviet article was to argue, the "direct cause" of the conflict in 1971 was to be found in the "chauvinistic policy of the feudal-bureaucratic regime in Islamabad." (69) There was little attempt to pass the dispute off as an imperialist plot. Moreover, while making clear that Soviet sympathies lay with India in the confrontation over Bangla Desh, Pravda also displayed support for India against Pakistan on the perennial issue of Kashmir, even though this subject had not been directly raised. In an attack on the Chinese position, the writer accused the Peking leaders of fanning "in every way the so called Kashmir question." (70) Clearly, the Soviet line on Kashmir was even more unequivocal than it had been in 1965.

2) Cooperation with the United States

In many ways, the most notable feature of the two Indo-Pakistani wars was the contrast in the respective relationships between the two Super Powers. As has been seen, the two powers displayed considerable

68) P. Kryukov: 'Results of the Tashkent Talks': International Affairs February 1966 p. 3
69) V. Zhurkin & V. Kremenyuk op. cit. p. 35
70) Yakubov Pravda December 28, 1971
unanimity during the 1965 war both in their efforts in the Security Council and in their more general diplomatic activities.\(^{71}\) Certainly, the Chinese view of the diplomacy surrounding the war was that the Soviet Union and the United States were actively colluding against Pakistan. Typically, NCNA charged that the US, Soviet and Indian delegates had "with one voice praised U Thant's proposal, exerted pressure on Pakistan and made every effort for the immediate implementation of the cease-fire in favour of India."\(^{72}\)

The atmosphere changed considerably after the attainment of the cease-fire on September 22. It has been shown that the source of contention which developed between the US and the Soviet Union was their opposing views on the relative competency of two UN agencies with respect to the organization of an observer force to supervise the Indo-Pakistan cease-fire. This issue led to the first visible signs of disagreement between the powers and to the following Soviet statement that the US position was no longer as constructive as it had been:

"...that part of the statement in which that representative (US) tried to depict the United States' delegation as having been constructive and cooperative in regard to the question under consideration does not correspond to reality. It is at variance with the truth and, in our statement at the 1247th meeting of the Council, we were obliged to remind the Council of what had really happened during the discussions, in particular during the very lengthy, highly complex tense and so-called informal consultations. The United States delegation failed to show the slightest desire to cooperate with regard to the questions of principle to which I referred a moment ago..."\(^{73}\)

The disagreement was not, however, a serious one. As has been argued earlier, Soviet intransigence on this question was inspired as much by a desire to remove the Indo-Pakistan question from the auspices

\(^{71}\) See Ch. 5 above

\(^{72}\) NCNA September 18, 1965

of the UN as by any fundamental difference of approach with the United States. Moreover, it appears that the United States was in many ways only too willing to see the Soviet Union attempt unilaterally to resolve the vexed questions of the subcontinent. The emergence of this dispute over an operational technicality should, therefore, not be allowed to conceal the basic coincidence of Soviet and American interests in the 1965 situation.

Soviet-American contacts during the 1971 crisis were at an entirely different level and were conducted in a radically changed atmosphere. In 1965 the principal, and shared, Soviet and American interest had been to put an end to hostilities as quickly as possible; in 1971, while this interest was still quite evident, it was subordinate to the need of both powers to promote the interests of their respective 'client' states. That is to say that whereas in 1965 the Super Powers could act conjointly through the UN to press for a cease-fire, in 1971 the most that the two powers seemed capable of was applying mutual pressure on each other to restrain their 'client' states. The situation was characterised by rivalry rather than by cooperation.

Ostensibly, the failure to cooperate in 1971 resulted from the contrasting assessments of the causes of the crisis arrived at by the United States and the Soviet Union. To the former, the danger lay in India's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs; for the latter, it was the internal situation in Pakistan which created the problem. In the words of one Soviet commentator, "one cannot agree, for instance, with the US Secretary of State Rogers that the developments in East Pakistan are purely of an internal significance and concern the Pakistani Government alone. This is a serious international problem."(74) But

these assessments reflected the more profound fact that in 1971 both Super Powers were concerned to further the interests of their respective 'clients' at the expense of any demonstrable show of neutrality: the assessment was the symptom of the changed relationship between the Super Power and 'client' rather than the cause of it.

It seems clear that the thrust of the diplomatic contacts between Moscow and Washington was confined to mutual demands that the Soviet Union restrain India and that the United States press Pakistan to foster a political solution to the situation in the eastern province.\(^{(75)}\) The main channel of the discussions was the US Embassy in Moscow.\(^{(76)}\) This was followed up by notes sent by President Nixon to India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union.\(^{(77)}\) Again, it can be assumed that the burden of President Nixon's communication to the Soviet leaders was a request that the USSR use its restraining influence on India. This may be deduced from subsequent administration claims that only American pressure, exerted through the Soviet Union, prevented India from invading the Western portion of Pakistan.\(^{(78)}\) Irrespective of the truth of these allegations, they are indicative of the tenuous basis of Soviet-American cooperation during the 1971 war.

3) The UN, Observers and Internationalisation

In 1965, the Soviet Union welcomed UN intervention in the Indo-Pakistani war as a promising means of securing a cease-fire between the two parties. This enthusiasm for UN participation was not repeated in the 1971 situation. As early as August 1971, the Soviet delegate to the

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75) e.g. New York Times October 22, 1971; Times of India October 23, 1971.
76) See Dawn November 24, 1971, November 25, 1971
78) Times of India December 19, 1971.
UN, Viktor Issraelyan, informed U Thant that the USSR was opposed to a Security Council meeting to discuss the tension between India and Pakistan.\(^{(79)}\) Soviet reluctance to submit the dispute to UN mediation was reinforced by Mrs. Gandhi's candid assertion that India saw no virtue in referring the problem to the UN.\(^{(80)}\)

In order to appreciate the reasons for Soviet opposition to UN intervention, it is necessary to examine the Soviet view of the nature of the conflict between India and Pakistan. In 1965, although the USSR did not denounce Pakistan as the aggressor, it was tactly accepted in the Soviet assessment of the outbreak of hostilities that the confrontation between India and Pakistan was genuinely international in nature having its roots in a Pakistani incursion into Kashmir. As such, it was a crisis which might appropriately be submitted to the international body of the UN. However, in the 1971 instance, the USSR found itself hard pressed to develop an adequate definition of the nature of the conflict between the two countries. Such a conclusion can be arrived at on the basis of the seemingly contradictory statements made by Soviet official organs. Thus, on the one hand, two Pravda correspondents asserted quite explicitly that "one can only agree with the statements of the leaders of India and many other countries that the problem of East Pakistani refugees has become, both in scale and in nature, an international problem."\(^{(81)}\) Similarly, a Soviet journal was later to insist that "as a result of the actions of the Pakistan military clique, events took on an international character."\(^{(82)}\) On the other hand, Pravda

\(^{79}\) Hindu August 20, 1971
\(^{80}\) Times of India November 29, 1971
\(^{82}\) V. Zhurkin & V. Kremenyuk op. cit. p. 36.
was to express, equally unambiguously, the opinion that "reactionary forces in Pakistan and abroad are doing everything to use the situation for aggravating Pakistani-Indian relations and for giving them the character of an international conflict." There were, therefore, two apparently contradictory Soviet assessments of the 1971 situation: the first was that the confrontation was essentially international in character; the second was that the problem was one internal to Pakistan but that the Pakistani leaders were trying to convert it into an international question. The contradiction is more apparent than real. Both positions can be explained in terms of basic Soviet sympathy for the Indian posture. At the one level, by asserting that the situation was the internal responsibility of Pakistan, the Soviet Union counteracted attempts by other powers to equate India and Pakistan as sharing the culpability for the mounting tension and also sought to undermine claims for outside intervention in the shape of UN mediation. At the other level, by affirming the international character of the dispute, the USSR upheld the Indian contention that events in East Pakistan threatened the economy and security of India and that India was, therefore, justified in intervening in the situation, primarily by means of supporting the Mukti Bahini. In short, by an ambivalent and not altogether convincing use of the word 'international' the Soviet Union attempted to guard the Indian right of intervention while forestalling such intervention on the part of other powers.

This interpretation can be substantiated with reference to the Soviet position on sending UN observers to patrol the border between India and East Pakistan. It will be recalled that in 1965, Izvestiya had

complained of 'backstage intrigues' in relation to UN proposals for extensions to the observer group to supervise the cease-fire line in Kashmir. However, the principal Soviet complaint at that time had been with regard to the constitution of the group, its financing and its term of duty. Specifically, the Soviet delegate in the Security Council, Nikolai Fedorenko, had demanded that "the Council should set a definite time-limit for the stay of the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan which it is our firm conviction should be strictly limited to three months." By way of contrast, in 1971 the Soviet Union was opposed to the very idea of stationing UN observers on the Indo-Pakistan frontier. This Soviet position was conveyed to the Indian leaders by the Soviet ambassador, Nikolai Pegov, in July 1971. Support for the stationing of observers on both sides of the Indo-Pakistani border came from Pakistan and during the summer of 1971 the idea was strongly canvassed by the United States. The proposal was, however, rejected by India with Soviet backing. Moscow Radio noted that "US ruling circles are dissatisfied with the Indian stand on the American proposals to involve the UN in the events on the subcontinent" and went on to give an account of Indian and Soviet opposition to the move. "The American ruling circles" the radio explained, "are taking pains to create the impression that India and Pakistan are equally responsible for the mounting tension. Hence the proposal to send UN observers to Pakistan and India." Morally, the stationing of observers on the border would have been an admission of India's shared guilt for the deteriorating situation. Practically, observers on the border would have hindered

84) Izvestiya October 6, 1965
85) S.C.O.R. Yr 20 mtg 1247 October 25, 1965 p.50
86) Times of India July 27, 1971
India's support for the Bangladesh guerrillas. This latter objection obviously constituted a major element in Soviet opposition to the observer scheme. This can be seen as late as the Security Council debates during the actual Indo-Pakistani war. Writing at the time, an APN commentator made it clear that Soviet and Indian objections were predicated on a realisation that UN observers would have spelled doom for the secessionist movement in Bangladesh:

"The US draft resolution provided for stationing of UN military observers on the Indo-Pakistan frontier. What would such a step entail? No less and no more than granting the Pakistan military administration an opportunity to continue with impunity its terror against its political opponents - the overwhelming majority of the East Pakistani inhabitants. Their condition would worsen a hundred times as compared with what existed earlier. An additional obstacle would arise to the saving of people by crossing the border. The UN Security Council would thus become a shield for the terrorist actions of the Pakistan authorities." (88)

Consequently, by supporting the view that Indian action across the East Pakistani border was legitimate, but by denying that the problem was one which could appropriately be handled by the UN, the Soviet Union upheld the 'international' aspect of the conflict in one sense but at the same time saw no contradiction in proudly claiming that "the position of the Soviet Union not only promoted the realisation of the principle of self-determination, the implementation of the will of the people of Bangladesh, but also prevented the intervention of imperialism under the guise of the 'internationalisation' of the conflict." (89)

4) Cease-Fire and Political Solution

A salient contrast between the Soviet posture during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war and that in 1971 was as regards the relationship between

88) I. Plyshevsky:'Remove the Source of Crisis in the Indian Subcontinent' APN December 10, 1971 Reproduced 'The Soviet Union and the Struggle etc.' op. cit. p. 44

89) G. Drambyants:'Politika Internatsional'noy Solidarnosti' (Policy of International Solidarity) Kommunist No. 5 1972 p. 90.
a cease-fire and a political solution. It has been shown above that throughout the crisis of 1965 and its aftermath, both before and even after the cease-fire, the Soviet Union concentrated solely on the need for achieving a cease-fire and then on ensuring that the cease-fire was observed. The question of a political settlement of Kashmir was relegated to a subordinate position and certainly was not viewed as a precondition for a cease-fire.

The Soviet position in 1965 was enunciated in numerous official statements. Mr. Kosygin himself voiced the opinion that the "main efforts should be concentrated on the immediate termination of military operations, stopping the tanks and silencing the guns." (90) A Tass statement of September 7 also revealed the order of Soviet priorities, the obsessive concern with the modality of the cease-fire:

"Tass has been authorised to state that the Soviet Government has urged both sides...to immediately stop military operations and to effect mutual withdrawal of troops beyond the cease-fire line established by the agreement between India and Pakistan in 1949, to remove the troops to the territory on which they were before the outbreak of military operations." (91)

There was no binding commitment that the cease-fire would be the prelude to a political settlement. The most that Tass would admit to was a vague and pious expectation that "India and Pakistan, acting in the spirit of the UN charter and the Bandung principles, enter into talks on a peaceful settlement of the conflict." (92) More than a month after the cease-fire, the Soviet delegate to the UN reflected Soviet unwillingness to go beyond the immediate issue of eliminating the possibilities of a renewal of fighting. There was still no mention of the steps to be taken for a

90) Letters, dated September 4, 1965 addressed to Mr. Shastri and President Ayub.
91) Text in Times of India September 9, 1965
92) ibid.
political settlement. Mr. Fedorenko stated the Soviet position:

"The positive results that have been achieved, namely, the agreement of the parties to a cease-fire are of course important but only a first step." (93)

However, the next step, which was implicit in Fedorenko's remark, was not a political settlement. Soviet concern was still restricted to the question of military de-escalation. As the Soviet delegate continued:

"Now the main task is to consolidate the cease-fire, to ensure strict and scrupulous observance of the cease-fire agreement and to take the next step towards strengthening peace between India and Pakistan. The withdrawal by both sides of their troops and all their armed personnel from the positions they occupied up to 5 August 1965 as provided for in the Council's resolutions, must proceed more rapidly. These are the questions that must be settled first, these are the questions to which attention must be given in the situation that has now arisen." (94)

The Soviet position in 1971 reflected a complete reversal on this issue. The main Soviet line in 1971 was that the question of a cease-fire could not be separated from that of a settlement in East Pakistan. It was on the grounds that consecutive American resolutions in the United Nations ignored the link between these two facets of the problem that they were vetoed by the Soviet Union and the USSR's own draft resolution called for a political settlement simultaneously with a cease-fire. It is therefore, not a little ironic that we find Soviet commentators attacking the United States and China in 1971 in words which neatly summarise the practical outcome of the Soviet posture in 1965. Thus one Pravda article castigated these countries because their delegations were "trying to lead the UN Security Council down a false path and to impose on it a solution of the Hindustan problem that would in fact mean not the elimination of the conflict but its temporary 'freezing'

93) S.C.O.R. Yr 20 mtg 1247 October 25, 1965 p. 49
94) ibid.
with all the tragic consequences ensuing therefrom."(95) This comment would aptly characterise the Soviet handling of Kashmir in 1965.

C) Comparative Analysis

Analytically speaking, there are four major points of comparison between Soviet behaviour in 1965 and that in 1971. The points may be listed as follows :-

1965

1) Diplomatic mode of neutrality (although combined with continuing concern for Indian interests).
2) Active Soviet mediation.
3) Cooperation with United States through UN.
4) Emphasis on cease-fire. Political settlement subordinate.

1971

1) Diplomatic partisanship.
2) No mediation.
3) Confrontation with United States in UN.
4) Demand for simultaneous cease-fire and political settlement.

In each of the sets of postures listed, the component parts of the overall strategy can be seen to be organically linked. This is important in that it facilitates the task of explaining the contrasting Soviet postures for the reason that once the key elements in a particular posture were established, other aspects of behaviour flowed logically from them. Equally importantly, the set of behavioural traits in each case points to a limited number of environmental variables which would be sufficient to account for the changes in Soviet policy. For the purposes of this section, it will therefore be assumed that Soviet behaviour in

1965 was the norm. This should not be viewed as an empirical statement but only as an explanatory device. For the remainder of this chapter, an attempt will be made to explain why Soviet behaviour in 1971 deviated from the 1965 pattern.

In order to understand why the Soviet Union pursued in 1965 a policy which may broadly be characterised as one of neutrality and why in 1971 it followed a course of partisanship, it is essential to place the two wars in the context of the ongoing process of Soviet policy in the region throughout the 1960's and early 1970's and especially in the context of the evolving Soviet internal and diplomatic assessments of India and Pakistan respectively. It will be argued below that international constraints made it impossible for the Soviet Union to remain neutral in 1971. But this does not explain why the USSR should have opted for India at the expense of Pakistan. The substance of Soviet policy makes sense only in relation to its evaluations of India and Pakistan both as regards their respective economic, social and political development and as regards their past and likely future diplomatic performances. And it is apparent that in 1971, the discrepancy between the two countries on every score was much more pronounced than it had been in 1965. The social and political direction in which India was headed after 1969 met with greater appreciation in the Soviet Union than had developments in India in the middle 1960's. Likewise, the minor frictions which had marred Indo-Soviet relations during 1966-68 had begun to disappear by 1970. Conversely, the earlier promise of the Ayub regime had not been fulfilled. Even if there had been little to commend the nature of the Ayub regime in Soviet eyes, it can at least be argued that a sound working relationship had developed between Ayub and the
Soviet leaders. This relationship had emerged from the reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy in the early 1960's from complete dependence on the West to a more balanced relationship with all the major powers. The pragmatic foundations of this rapprochement with the USSR had, however, been seriously weakened by President Yahya Khan. And taken in conjunction with the increasingly evident signs of impending internal collapse in Pakistan, the incentive for the Soviet Union to continue its Tashkent policy - with the consequent strains which this entailed for Indo-Soviet relations - markedly diminished.

The basic argument of these pages is, therefore, that in both the instances of 1965 and 1971, perceptions of the relative importance of India and Pakistan determined the basic substance of Soviet postures while international configurations provided the parameters which determined the Soviet diplomatic mode of operation. This contention can be supported from several angles. Having opted for a dualistic policy in 1965, predicated on the desire to effect some normalisation of Indo-Pakistan relations, the Soviet Union found the international environment conducive to precisely such a policy. Both the Soviet Union and the United States could be 'neutral' in 1965 because the other was. And both were neutral because this was the best means of attaining a speedy cease-fire which would forestall Chinese exploitation of the situation. It, therefore, seems likely that the extending Soviet-American detente, reinforced by a shared suspicion of Chinese intentions in Asia, was the single most important factor in determining Soviet and American policies during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. It is difficult to disagree with Hedley Bull's observation that "the Soviet-American side of the triangle, unlike the other two sides, already rests upon firm foundations of mutual understanding...They have developed a habit of tacit cooperation in relation to China on the Indian subcontinent."(96)
Just as these words were written, they ceased to be true. The situation in 1971 was quite different and the Soviet-American habit of tacit cooperation did not function on this occasion. Clearly, this was due to developments in Sino-American relations. As one Soviet commentator was to express the point "the US acted at the time of the Hindustan conflict guided above all by a striving not to frighten off its future partners in the Peking negotiations."(97) Given the close relationship between China and Pakistan, this led the United States back from its own dualistic stand of 1965 to a partisan position in support of Pakistan. The significance of this for the Soviet Union was twofold. On the negative side, it destroyed that basis of cooperation with the United States which had existed in 1965. This contrast has been underlined by Kosygin himself. Speaking through an official of his delegation while in Denmark at the beginning of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, Mr. Kosygin complained that "alone we can do nothing...The situation is very different from the situation before the Tashkent meeting in January 1966."(98) On the positive side, the Sino-American rapprochement induced the Soviet Union to act with less restraint in 1971 than it had in 1965: it placed a premium on outspoken support for India. Paradoxically, Sino-American attempts to place greater constraints on the Soviet Union in Asia resulted in the Soviet leadership pursuing a more adventurous policy in 1971 than it had in 1965 when it cooperated with the USA within the framework of an established code of conduct. The partisanship of 1971 was necessary to counterbalance the support which Sino-American contacts would entail for Pakistan. Izvestiya noted that the termination of American military supplies to Pakistan was "somewhat

97) L. Stepanov. op. cit. p. 87
98) Times of India December 5, 1971.
delayed so as not to annoy...the Peking authorities."(99) Moreover, another Soviet article quoted with approval the argument of an eminent Indian columnist that "America, which had adopted an ambivalent position on the Bangla Desh issue till Mr. Kissinger's first visit to Peking last July, took up a tough anti-Indian position soon afterwards."(100) It is perhaps, not coincidental that Soviet attacks on Pakistan increased commensurately at much the same period. In short, the environment in 1971 was conducive to a policy of partisanship.

The Soviet assessments of India and Pakistan, the different postures of the United States and the disparity in the credibility of Chinese intervention in the two situations reinforced each other: in 1965, at a time when the Soviet Union had a predilection for neutrality, conditions favoured it; in 1971, at a time when the virtues of India were becoming increasingly conspicuous in Soviet eyes in comparison with those of Pakistan, international conditions favoured partisanship in any case. These three principal influences also help to explain the other contrasting facets of Soviet policy. A semblance of neutrality was the essential prerequisite for the Soviet sponsorship of the Tashkent Conference. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Soviet Union made no attempt at active mediation in 1971. These particular circumstances apart, we have also seen that in the years after Tashkent the Soviet Union had already been moving away from the forward position of Indo-Pakistan 'good offices' because of the diplomatic burden which was involved.

The Soviet attitude to the cease-fire and its bearing on a political settlement may also be related to the foregoing elements of

99) V. Kudryavtsev Izvestiya December 23, 1971
Soviet behaviour. From one perspective, the contrasting Soviet positions on this question can be readily explained. In 1965, because the issue of a political settlement of Kashmir was relatively unimportant to the Soviet Union (and to the United States), it was comparatively simple for the two powers to concentrate attention on a cessation of hostilities without attaching any conditions to the cease-fire. In 1971, however, the issue of the resolution of the internal situation in East Pakistan was of vital concern to India and hence to the Soviet Union: the ending of hostilities without a resolution of the political question (in this case, the refugee situation) was not sufficient for Soviet and Indian interests as it had been in 1965. Hence, because of the importance of the political stake involved, the USSR was quite content in the final analysis to see the matter brought to a speedy and successful military solution.

From another perspective, it can be seen that the subordinate importance of the underlying political issue, taken with the other elements in the situation, combined to facilitate a greater flexibility in Soviet policy in 1965 than in 1971. Because in 1965 the Soviet Union was prepared to approach the cease-fire and the political question as two disparate issues, the Soviet leaders were enabled to pursue two simultaneous but discrete policies. On the issue of the cease-fire, they could present an image of absolute impartiality, could welcome the intervention of the United Nations and could work jointly with the United States. Meanwhile, on the question of Kashmir, they could continue to safeguard Indian interests, could remove the matter from the auspices of the UN and could act unilaterally at Tashkent without active American assistance but with tacit American consent. Such a course was not open to them in 1971 because of the pressing necessity of removing
the incendiary situation in East Pakistan. This prevented the
Soviet Union from going along with the United States and China on
the cease-fire resolutions and leaving the political issue in
abeyance. Once again the various elements reinforced each other.
The growing commitment to India symbolised by the Treaty, the changing
Sino-American relationship, the consequent 'tilt' of the United States
towards Pakistan and the interlocking of the political origins of the
conflict with the contemplation of the cease-fire all served to diminish
the utility of the United Nations in Soviet eyes, to eliminate the
grounds of Soviet-American cooperation and to produce a strong Soviet
line in support of India.
Conclusion

In analysing Soviet relations with India and Pakistan for the period 1965 to 1971, there are several principal developments which demand explanation. They are as follows: the rapprochement with Pakistan in 1964-5; signs of Soviet disillusionment with India during the same period and the impact which both of these factors had on the Soviet handling of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war; the signs of Soviet friction with Pakistan in 1969; the renewed blossoming of Soviet-Indian relations after 1969 and the impact which this had on the Soviet handling of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.

In the course of the thesis, there has already been some attempt to explain these developments in terms of specific political and strategic considerations. Accordingly, it would be appropriate to pull these various explanations together at this point.

The Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement in 1964-5 has already been examined in some detail. It was argued that this new departure could be accounted for by numerous pressures and calculations. The most significant of these were: a general movement towards the extension of Soviet ties with the Third World; a specific attempt to neutralise the 'northern tier' countries of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan; the demonstrable changes in Pakistan's own orientation towards the Great Powers; a pronounced improvement in Pakistan's relations with China; and strategic developments which focussed Soviet attention on the littoral states of the north-western Indian Ocean.

Ostensibly at least, this process of Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement was accompanied by symptoms of a cooling-off in the Soviet attitude towards India, partly at least as a consequence of the general trend towards diminishing priority for the most prominent of Moscow's Third World friends and partly as a result of specific internal developments in India which met with an unfavourable Soviet reaction.

The end result of this process of evolution was to be evidenced in Soviet diplomatic involvement in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. But as has been seen in the last chapter, and specifically in the international
conditions which provided the context of Soviet policy in 1965, the Soviet performance in that episode was the joint product of an evolving relationship with India and Pakistan taken in conjunction with the specific postures adopted by the United States and China during the crisis.

During the second half of 1969, the Soviet Government became progressively less inclined to persist with its efforts, initiated in 1964-5, to cultivate Pakistan. There would appear to have been several quite specific reasons for Soviet disenchantment with Pakistan in that year: the forced departure of Ayub Khan with whom the Soviet leaders had developed a satisfactory modus operandi; the apparent volte-face of Yahya Khan on the issue of the Soviet security proposals for Asia; Yahya's eventual condemnation of this proposal; the demonstrative Pakistani gestures towards China at this important juncture; and clearly visible signs of tension within Pakistan itself.

The background against which these considerations operated was one of the increasing strain which Soviet cultivation of Pakistan was placing on Soviet relations with India. And while it made sense to write off a proportion of Indian goodwill in return for the concrete political advantages expected from the Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement, it made little sense to persist so enthusiastically with the Tashkent policy in the changed circumstances after the middle of 1969. India had by this time apparently overcome some of her major internal difficulties and showed signs of a leftward movement in the wake of the internal split within the Congress Party. Moreover, Mrs Gandhi was displaying that degree of forceful leadership which might extract India from the doldrums of the middle 1960's. Above all, the much more favourable Indian response to the Soviet proposals of 1969 and India's backing, albeit rather delayed, for the USSR in its border confrontation with China, demonstrated beyond all doubt that it was with India, rather than with Pakistan, that the Soviet Union still shared the more extensive common interests.

No doubt the Soviet leaders, as they pursued a modified Tashkent
policy after 1969, would still have preferred to avoid making an outright choice between India and Pakistan. That this was the case is amply revealed by the moderate Soviet position during the early months of the Bangladesh crisis. But, unfortunately, it was a choice towards which they were relentlessly pushed by the internal dynamic of their own relationship with India and, even more so, by the interlocking of the 1971 crisis with what appeared to be a fundamental reordering of alignments between the Great Powers themselves.

It is in such a form that one is led to cast explanations of Soviet policy in terms of specific diplomatic and strategic developments. At this point, however, an attempt will be made to analyse the influences on Soviet policy during this period at a slightly higher level of abstraction. In essence, it is proposed to structure these individual explanations of Soviet policy in such a way that the components of policy are classified and combined in what is, hopefully, an enlightening manner. This is, of course, in no sense an attempt to construct any such thing as a general theory of Soviet foreign policy: it is rather a very limited exercise designed solely with a view to adding a further dimension to the explanations of Soviet policy already provided.

It was stated in the introduction to the thesis that the operational device employed in the study would be that the foreign policy performance of the USSR can be interpreted as the 'rational' acts of a calculating entity. As a consequence, we are at liberty to postulate a means-end connection between the actions of the Soviet Government, its stated objectives and its stated perceptions of the environment in which it had to function. To the extent that Soviet actions were not 'rational decisions', this aspect of the problem has been 'blackboxed' for the analytical purposes of this thesis.

How, then, can we best establish a framework within which to provide a general appreciation of Soviet policy during this period? A conventional systems analysis of a state's foreign policy would be
structured according to the following levels of analysis: the sources of policy would be divined in a) the international system b) the subordinate regional system c) the national system itself. Accordingly, the behaviour of a state would be explained in terms of the processes and structures of the global system as a whole, of its regional context and of its own national system. (1)

This framework is suggestive but is not entirely applicable to the instance of Soviet policy presently under examination. However, it does indicate some possible categories of analysis. It would certainly be desirable to incorporate the first level, that of the global system, as the Soviet perception of its relations with the other Great Powers as an influence on its own subcontinental policy has been a recurrent theme of this diplomatic narrative. It also appears useful that we should retain some truncated conception of a regional subsystem for understanding Soviet policy - not, however, the regional system in which the USSR itself is domiciled but rather the subcontinental system in which the USSR has chosen to participate as an outside actor. (2) Thirdly, it is evident that we possess important information for understanding Soviet policy at the level of the national system - but, once again, not in terms of the Soviet polity but rather in terms of the Soviet perception of internal developments within India and Pakistan.

(1) For an example of such a three tier framework, see L.J. Cantori and S.L. Spiegel: The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall 1970). In particular, note their claim that "such a delineation of three arenas of international politics - the globe, the region, and the nation-state - provides us with the basis of an analytical structure for the consideration of international politics... The dominant system, in the global arena, is the confrontation of the most powerful of nations; the subordinate system, in the region, is the total interaction of relations within that region; and the internal system, in the nation-state, is the totality of relations of the organizations which compose its domestic politics". ibid. p3.

(2) My definition of the regional system is, therefore, geographically a much more restrictive one than that found, for instance, in M. Brecher: 'International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia' World Politics no 2 1963. My conception refers specifically to India and Pakistan.
The entire range of evidence accumulated in the thesis can be classified according to these three categories. Moreover, if we adhere to the 'rational actor' model, it is possible to interpret Soviet behaviour as a succession of efforts both to shape, and to respond to, those three aspects of its subcontinental policy.

Accordingly, it is proposed to conduct a more general enquiry into the sources of Soviet conduct, employing this tripartite focus of analysis. The selection of these particular foci is not intended to reflect a preconception that it is in these areas alone that the major outcomes of foreign policy are determined. On the contrary, the selection has been dictated by the fact that it is only in these three areas that we possess any substantial evidence. It is the contention of this thesis, nevertheless, that Soviet policy during this period can meaningfully be described as the product of three variables: the relative Soviet assessments of India and Pakistan; the regional environment of subcontinental relations; and the global environment of Great Power relations. Obviously, such a framework ignores an entire spectrum of factors which would normally be considered important in the analysis of foreign policy. In no case is this more evident than in the complete absence of any reference to the domestic sources of Soviet behaviour.\(^{(3)}\) However, this is justified by the fact that it is only in respect of these three 'policy environments' that we can reasonably claim to possess objective information. And while this tripartite focus is necessarily a restricted one, it is nonetheless possible to claim that it provides a convincing framework within which to view the diplomatic history which has been examined in this thesis.

The various phases of Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan can be explained by changes within these three areas of analysis and, more particularly, by the resultant changes in the interplay between them. In order to provide a clear statement as to how these three areas interacted with each other, a table will be constructed in which developments in the three areas will be set against each other at any

\(^{(3)}\) The reasons for this omission are explained in the introduction, section C.
given point in time. For the purposes of this analysis, the historically important 'turning-points' in Soviet subcontinental policy will be selected. These are 1955, 1965, 1969 and 1971. The year 1955 is included because it will put the study in a wider historical perspective. For each year, a rating will be provided which illustrates whether the particular environment was operating in favour if an improvement in, or a deterioration of, Soviet relations with either India or Pakistan. The ratings, which are not objectively measurable but which are based on the analysis in the body of the thesis, are given in three forms:

- **positive** = environment operating in direction of improved relations
- **negative** = environment operating in direction of deteriorating relations
- **static** = environment not specifically operating in either direction.

Accordingly, the following table may be constructed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Regional Environment</th>
<th>Global Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Static</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Regional Environment</th>
<th>Global Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Static</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These ratings are for the most part self-explanatory given the discussion of these questions in the earlier chapters of the thesis. This is certainly true of the column headed 'Soviet Assessment', in which the rating is a depiction of the Soviet perception of the value
of the particular country based on its internal and external performance, and which follows on directly from the analysis contained in Chapters 1 and 3. However, as regards the other two columns, it is probably advisable that a few words of explanation be provided in order to avoid any ambiguities.

The regional environment refers specifically to the relations between the two objects of Soviet policy, namely India and Pakistan. The basic premise according to which the ratings in this column have been assigned is that Indo-Pakistani hostility has remained a constant throughout the period. The degree of this hostility has certainly fluctuated but not so much as to alter the fundamental condition that the regional environment continually operated against a favourable Soviet relationship with both countries simultaneously. Given this fact, and given also the premise that at no point has Pakistan usurped India's place in the order of Soviet priorities, it seems reasonable to conclude that the regional environment has perpetually militated against Soviet-Pakistani accommodation and perpetually in favour of an exclusive Soviet-Indian relationship.

The ratings in the global environment column have been assigned in accordance with the following considerations. In 1955, the bipolar confrontation of the USSR and the United States became interlocked with the situation in the subcontinent as a consequence of Pakistan's involvement in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. This pushed the Soviet Union towards India and away from Pakistan. By 1965, the global context had experienced a fairly radical transformation in response to two major developments. These were, firstly, the emerging detente between the US and the USSR and, secondly, the fact that this detente was at least partially the negative expression of the common interest shared by these powers in their opposition to China. It was in the Indian subcontinent that this transformation of international alignments was to find its most vivid illustration. As the containment of China began to exert increasing
influence on American and Soviet policy-makers, both countries moved towards a dualistic approach to the subcontinent, Kennedy's reorientation of American policy towards India finding its equivalent in the Soviet rapprochement with Pakistan. In short, as regarded Soviet policy, changing Great Power alignments in the shape of limited cooperation with the US and outright opposition to China, pressed heavily in the direction of a Soviet-Pakistani accommodation.

By 1969, it is difficult to see that any further major changes had taken place and this environment has, therefore, been described as static. However, throughout the period 1969-71, but more especially in the latter half of 1971 itself, there was increasing evidence of an impending rapprochement between China and the United States. As we have seen, this rapprochement was expressed in 1971 in joint Sino-American support for Pakistan. Hence, as the USSR felt threatened by this development, and by its particular manifestations on the subcontinent, the global environment in 1971 worked heavily in favour of more intimate Soviet-Indian contacts and placed ever greater strains on what remained of the USSR's policy of dualism.

Does the table furnish us with any insights into Soviet behaviour? It would appear from an examination of that table that certain aspects of Soviet policy become immediately intelligible, others less so. The outcome in 1955 is the simplest of all to understand as every element in the equation was operating in the same direction - that of a Soviet commitment to India and a consequent posture of opposition to Pakistan.

The situation in 1971 is nearly as straightforward. Once again, all three sources of policy under examination pressed in the direction of a rigid polarisation in Soviet preferences between India and Pakistan. One qualification which should be made of this statement, however, is that it only applies in its 'pure' form to the period after the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August and especially to the period of the December war itself. It is less applicable to the early months of the crisis when,
as has been shown in Chapter 8, the USSR went to considerable lengths not to foreclose its contacts with, and influence over, Islamabad.

The two turning-points which are not immediately explicable in terms of the table are the two most interesting ones. And it can be argued that the very puzzles which they present in themselves provide a good example of the utility of conceptualising Soviet policy in terms of the interplay of these three environments. To take the case of 1965 in the first instance. It was argued above that the regional environment of Indo-Pakistani hostility has constantly functioned as a hindrance to any attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to improve its connections with Pakistan. Nonetheless, the Tashkent period, commencing in 1965, provides us with an example of the Soviet Union attempting to achieve this very objective. Within the framework of the table, the impulses to do so came from the 'assessment' and the 'global' environments. In short, Soviet policy-makers were in 1965 presented with a dilemma in that while considerations of Pakistan's performance and of the Soviet Union's own relations with its global competitors pulled in the direction of accommodation with Pakistan, the regional environment was highly inimical to such an outcome.

In this fact is to be found the fundamental difference between the circumstances of the period 1955-64 and those of 1965-69. Consequently, it is a contention of the thesis that this difference sheds considerable light on the apparent ambiguities of Soviet policy during the Tashkent phase. The argument can be expressed in the following terms. Throughout the period 1955-64, Soviet policy was relatively consistent and unambiguous for the reason that during that period the regional and the global environments complemented and reinforced each other. After 1965, this ceased to be true. It is in this sense that 1965 was a major watershed in Soviet policy.

This argument requires some elaboration. In what way did the global and regional perspectives reinforce each other during the period 1955-64?
If Soviet moves in relation to India were initially inspired by the politico-strategic environment deriving from US containment policy, it was nonetheless the regional antagonism between India and Pakistan which gave 'meaning' to Soviet cultivation of India. The fact of Indo-Pakistani antipathy cast Soviet-Indian concordance quite overtly in the role of a counterpoise to Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact and to SEATO. In other words, the confluence of regional and global considerations provided the essential ingredients for an Indo-Soviet bargain: India, through its nonalignment, could make a contribution to Soviet interests at the level of global interaction; meanwhile, the USSR could make tangible gestures in favour of India's regional position because support of India, given the nature of subcontinental relationships, automatically implied opposition to Pakistan.

By 1965, however, the basic context of Soviet policy had changed. Those very ingredients which had constituted the elements of an Indo-Soviet bargain began, in the altered circumstances of the post-1965 period, to present a major obstacle to the achievement of Soviet objectives. Bipolarity had imposed its own rigid pattern on Soviet relations with the subcontinent and Soviet actions in the post-Tashkent period are best understood as an attempt, without destroying its relationship with India, to overthrow this former pattern in such a way that friendship with India would no longer necessarily imply tacit opposition to Pakistan. Unfortunately, while the global pattern had changed as a result of diminishing bipolar confrontation and as a result of the aggravation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the regional pattern had remained frozen along those former lines which had so readily accommodated the cold war into Asia. It is not too much to say that it was this fact - that half of the Soviet Union's policy context had remained constant while the other half had been radically transformed - that accounts for the ambiguities in Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan in the latter half of the 1960's. In its new relationship with Pakistan, the USSR set out to
imposed on its relations with India was clearly revealed the continuance of the subcontinent's inability to adapt to the new conditions on account of its own internal rivalries. In a word, if we were to provide a caricature of Soviet policy during the period of the 'Tashkent spirit' it would be to describe it as a sustained Soviet attempt to accommodate an atavistic regional environment to the changed conditions of a new global one.\(^{(4)}\)

As yet, there has been no serious attempt to resolve the issue as to whether Soviet 'assessments' have been an independent influence on foreign policy in their own right. There is still a large question mark hanging over the validity of the first column in the table. This, in fact, leads us back to a dilemma first raised in the introduction,\(^{(5)}\) as to whether changed assessments lead to policy changes or merely reflect their occurrence. It is doubtful if an entirely convincing answer can be given. However, at least some attempt should be made.

Looking at the table, we discover that in the instances of 1955, 1965 and 1971, the assessment column has reinforced the global column. If this is the case, then Soviet policy at these periods becomes all the more intelligible because we can point to at least two areas of its environment in which pressures were operating in the direction which was, in fact, selected. But clearly, this is to beg the question rather than answer it. It could reasonably be retorted that there is a striking consistency between the two columns because what the Soviet Union has said about India and

\(^{(4)}\) The relationship which I am describing here - the tension between the USSR's global interests and the regional characteristics of the subcontinent - is analogous to Leonard Binder's analysis of the Middle East as a subordinate international system and his contention that "if power were to be likened to rays of light, we might say that extra-area power is 'refracted' when projected into the Middle Eastern element". See Binder: 'The Middle East as a Subordinate International System' World Politics no 3 1958.

\(^{(5)}\) Introduction, section B
Pakistan is no more than a reflection of the current exigencies of Soviet policy and these exigencies, in turn, are derivations of the international context. In other words, to say that the assessment column reinforced the global one is a mere tautology because the former is, in any case, no more than the shadow-play of the latter.

This is a compelling argument and one which it is difficult to refute. However, such a refutation is perhaps possible. There are two main directions of counter-attack. The first would be that in dismissing Soviet assessments of a country's performance as an important ingredient in the determination of Soviet policy towards that country, one is dismissing more than the 'ideological' basis of Soviet foreign policy: rather, the result is a view of Soviet policy formulation in which the USSR ignores information which would almost certainly be taken into account by any responsible foreign affairs apparatus. Such a view is simply not tenable. To ignore the assessment factor would be to go from the extreme of viewing Soviet foreign policy as guided solely by the internal development of other countries to the opposite extreme of discounting internal developments altogether. To take the example of 1969. Whatever other considerations underlay Soviet policy, it seems quite reasonable to argue that a judgment that India was emerging from a period of internal crisis whereas Pakistan was sinking into one might well have had a profound influence on subsequent Soviet policy. This would be especially true if, as seems to have been the case, the arguments pro and con a continuation of the Tashkent policy were at that period finely balanced in Moscow and were already beginning to tilt in favour of a diminishing place for Pakistan in Soviet strategy. It is no part of this conclusion to maintain that such assessments were decisive on their own. However, that is no reason to discount them as not contributing to the balance of arguments from which policy finally emerged.
The problem of relating internal developments within countries to Soviet policies towards these states raises the general question, posed in the introduction, of the relevance of the thesis to an interpretation of Soviet-Third World relations. One of the most persistent themes in Western discussions of Soviet policy towards the countries of the Third World has been the extent to which Soviet behaviour has been conditioned by expectations of promoting the socialist revolution and this concern has been contrasted with the 'normal' non-ideological aspects of Soviet state interests. For the most part, the imposition of a rigid dichotomy of this nature onto Soviet foreign policy has been misguided. As one student of Soviet relations with West Africa has concluded "to say that Soviet perceptions were, at the outset, heavily coloured by revolutionary expectations is not, of course, equivalent to saying that an overriding priority of early Soviet policy was promoting the socialist revolution." (6)

There are two points which deserve to be made with respect to the 'ideological' content of Soviet relations with India and Pakistan. The first is that, in contrast with certain African countries, the Soviet leaders have never entertained optimistic revolutionary expectations of either India or Pakistan. As we have seen, India did not even come close to being considered a 'national democracy' and not even the most ardent Soviet analyst ever claimed to detect a high degree of socialistic potential within Pakistan.

The second point, however, is that this does not mean that the internal political, social and economic structures of these countries was a matter of indifference to Soviet policy-makers. It is at this stage that the antithesis between Soviet state interests and Soviet concern with the internal complexion of foreign regimes becomes an artificial one. The Soviet 'interest' in the stage of development

6) R. Legvold op.cit. p.334.
of India and Pakistan did not operate at a different level from the Soviet 'interest' in these countries which derived from the political interplay of Great Power involvement in the region. Rather the former 'interest' was stressed because it was on the basis of that assessment that the Soviet leadership calculated the value of the respective subcontinental states for its power-political strategy in the South Asian arena.

The point can be illustrated as follows. The Soviet posture between India and Pakistan has, since 1947, undergone several striking metamorphoses and four distinct phases of policy can be discerned. Indeed, it could be said that there has been a persistent tendency for the Soviet stance to oscillate back and forth between neutrality and partisanship. In the early Stalinist phase, the USSR remained uncommitted to either of these countries, displaying a contemptuous neutrality which, as Naik observes, reflected Soviet "disinterest in the affairs of the two countries" and arose out of "non-involvement in subcontinental affairs."(7) This nonpartisan approach was succeeded dramatically in 1955 with the reciprocal visits between the Indian and Soviet leaders and the proclamation of Soviet support for India's policy in Kashmir. In turn, this posture of outright commitment to India was to yield to a rather more ambiguous stand in the middle 1960's as a result of which the interests of Pakistan were no longer ignored by the Soviet leaders even if little of substance was done to further them. At the very least, in its official pronouncements, the Soviet Government made verbal gestures of neutrality in India-Pakistan affairs and, in due course, added to this the more tangible gesture of military supplies for Pakistan. Finally, in response to the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the USSR once again moved over to partisan support for India, having condemned the Government of Pakistan in terms as strident as those which had been characteristic.

of Soviet comment on Pakistan in the days when Pakistan had first joined SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

At one level, it is apparent that the single most important determinant of these changing Soviet preferences has been the USSR's competitive relationship with its Great Power rivals: a preference for nonpartisanship in the late 1940's because the USSR was preoccupied with the cold war in Europe; a preference for India in the mid-1950's because Pakistan had polarised the subcontinent in cold war terms; a preference for neutrality in the mid-1960's because this was the best counter to Chinese influence in the region; and a preference for India in 1971 because China and America had chosen to make support of Pakistan an important element in their emerging dialogue.

At another level, however, this is only a partial explanation. What it omits is the Soviet appreciation that the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, to a certain degree, reflected their internal make-up. It should be remembered that, even in the late 1940's, there had been a widespread Soviet suspicion that the more 'reactionary' nature of Pakistan would make her more amenable to Western interests. By the 1950's, this calculation had been proved substantially correct.

Similarly, in the 1960's, it is possible to discern a connection between the 'ideological' perceptions of the Soviet Union and its geopolitical interests. The Soviet assessment of internal developments in Pakistan and India facilitated a course on which, for its own strategic reasons, the USSR was already anxious to embark; the politico-strategic environment provided the impulse towards a Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement but it was the Soviet perception that there had been a substantial reorientation in the political attitudes of the Pakistani leaders which made it seem reasonable to expect that
Pakistan might now be of more value to the USSR in coping with this environment.

Likewise, in 1971, we have seen that there was a confluence of Soviet and Indian interests in response to the new international situation which was developing in Asia. Again, however, it is possible to argue that the USSR was more inclined to enter into formal commitments with India in 1971 than it might otherwise have been precisely for the reason that, at that time, those Indian leaders most acceptable to Moscow were most fully in control of the Indian domestic situation. It is such an interpretation of Soviet behaviour which has led one observer to claim, in relation to the Indo-Soviet Treaty, that "the Soviet Union fully realised that without a favourable balance of internal class forces such treaties as the present one are of no practical relevance to the signatories."(8)

This suggests the hypothesis that in order to avoid disastrous commitments of convenience, such as the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviet Government prefers to be persuaded not only that there is a temporary community of international interests between itself and the other party but also that the commitment has some roots in the internal political, economic and social constitution of the other party.

Thus far, an attempt has been made to demonstrate the relative potency of the three specified environments without any claim being made that the posited relationships are of universal validity. By way of conclusion, we can look at Soviet mediatory efforts from 1965 onwards as an illustration of the general principle that Soviet policy can be usefully construed as a 'puzzle-solving' reaction to the three aspects of its policy environment which we have just delineated.

Already, the rationale behind the Tashkent mediation has been described at length. In concrete terms, it has been depicted as an

attempt to cultivate Pakistan while preserving the substance of the Soviet Union's established relationship with India. In more abstract terms, it has been described as an attempt to shape a static subcontinental environment in such a way as to make it more amenable to Soviet interests as they derived from a dynamic global environment. There were, therefore, some important limitations upon the Soviet Union's mediation activities from the very beginning, the most important of them being that India's substantial interests should not be seriously impaired by Soviet initiatives. Within these limitations, however, Soviet policy-makers, to judge from published Soviet comment, would have welcomed a reconciliation of the differences between the two countries.

That the Soviet Government should have failed in its efforts can be adequately explained in terms of three considerations. The first was that the fostering of the Tashkent spirit was imposing an increasingly vexatious burden onto Soviet diplomats. The second was that the policy of mediation was ultimately meant to facilitate a Soviet-Pakistani accommodation and hence, as Soviet disenchantment with Pakistan slowly established itself, the assumptions upon which the Tashkent policy had been predicated became increasingly irrelevant.

The third development was, perhaps, the most important one. If, in terms of our description of the dualistic policy associated with Tashkent, Soviet mediation was intended to mitigate regional tension in response to the evolving pattern of Soviet-American detente and Sino-Soviet confrontation, then what swiftly put an end to any likelihood that the USSR would mediate in 1971 as it had in 1965 was that further switch in international alignments associated with the Sino-American rapprochement. If Tashkent-style mediation was a product of the disharmony between the subcontinental and the global contexts of Soviet policy, the demise of this mediation was equally the product
of the fact that, as a consequence of the Washington-Peking contacts, the USSR's regional and global environments once again operated in harmony and stimulated a polarisation of Soviet subcontinental interests of which India was the direct beneficiary.
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