USE OF THESES

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IMAGE AND IDEOLOGY: ROMAN IMPERIALISM AND FRONTIER POLICY IN THE SECOND CENTURY A.D.

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A Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts of the Australian National University

March 1992
Except where specific acknowledgement is made to quoted sources this work is the result of my own research carried out under the supervision of Professor Beryl Rawson, Head of the Department of Classics, in the Australian National University.

March, 1992

A.C. Wilson
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I would like to thank the Australian National University for its generosity in awarding me the post-graduate scholarship that enabled me to complete this thesis.

I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Dr. Peter Brennan, Senior Lecturer in Ancient History in the School of Archaeology, Classics and Ancient History, at the University of Sydney, for his continuing interest and support. It was his learning, enthusiasm, and meticulous scholarship that first aroused my desire to study the ancient world, and his wise advice, perceptive comments and unfailing good humour have contributed greatly to this final product. It is a great privilege to have had the benefit of his experience, understanding, and friendship.

Many other people have helped me greatly with support, advice and, in some cases, comments. Among them are: Simon Barlow; Professor Graeme Clarke, Director of the Humanities Research Centre, ANU; Leonie Hayne, Lecturer in Ancient History, University of Sydney; Dr Cameron Hazelhurst, Research School of Social Sciences, ANU; Janet Quartermaine; Kerrie Scott; Martin Stone, Lecturer in Ancient History, University of Sydney; Rosemary and Alix Webb; and all the staff of the ANU Library. I would particularly like to thank past and present members of the Department of Classics, ANU, for their advice and patience with my never-ending questions: Robert Barnes; Edyth Binkowski; Fiona Crowe; Dr Andrew Farrington; Dr Doug Kelly; Dr Colin Mayrhofer; Dr Elizabeth Minchin; and especially Mrs Zeta Hall, Classics Secretary, for her kindness and help during my stay in the Department. Dr Reg Gardner deserves a special mention for his willingness to indulge in long conversations on all manner of esoteric points at a moment’s notice, and for his continuing encouragement, advice, and comments.

But my greatest debt is to my supervisor, Professor Beryl Rawson, Head of the Department of Classics, ANU for her enlightened dedication to the task. Without her invaluable assistance and learned
advice this thesis would be less than it is. To her repeated insistence that I produce, at regular intervals, drafts of chapters for her to read I owe the fact that I have completed both the research and writing within the time-frame dictated by my scholarship. Despite an enormous workload, testament to her scholarship and dignitas, she never had to be reminded to return my drafts, and always provided perceptive and useful comments. Professor Rawson encouraged me to continue when the problems seemed insurmountable, and directed my sometimes less than rigorous research with warmth and understanding. The strengths of this thesis are a tribute to her experience and knowledge, the failings, of which I am all too aware, remain my responsibility alone.

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ABBREVIATIONS


CIL  Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, Berlin, 1863 - .


ILS  H. Dessau, Inscriptio Latinae Selectae, Berlin, 1892 - 1916.


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INTRODUCTION

When Gibbon wrote that "The principal conquests of the Romans were achieved under the republic; and the emperors, for the most part, were satisfied with preserving those dominions which had been acquired..."¹, he echoed a sentiment that has been accepted almost unquestioningly ever since. For the subsequent two centuries the accepted view of the external policy of the Roman empire has placed too much emphasis on the Varian disaster and the consequent **consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii** of Augustus² and so has failed to accept imperialist motivations in any post-Augustan territorial increase.

The framework for most modern discussions of the principate has been that any expansion after 9 A.D. was purely the result of exceptional strategic or political requirements. Claudius' annexation of Britain is not recognized as the blatant territorial aggrandizement it was, but is dismissed because necessitated by considerations of internal politics. The annexations of Dacia and Arabia by Trajan, and his later Parthian expedition, are excused as being responses to external aggression, or as attempts to increase the security of the empire by establishing so-called 'scientific frontiers'³. Hadrian, by abandoning all Trajan's conquests east of the Euphrates and his subsequent lack of interest in campaigning, is often viewed as having returned to the policy of Augustus. Antoninus Pius, despite the fact that under him the imperial frontiers in Britain and of the Rhine provinces reached what was to be their greatest extent, is seen as following in Hadrian's footsteps. Marcus Aurelius is still respected as the archetypal 'philosopher-emperor' who was unfortunate in having to spend most of his reign fighting wars to defend the empire against encroaching barbarians. Septimius Severus, in purely territorial terms the most expansionist post-Augustan emperor, is widely regarded as untypical and an aberration. In spite of the apparent contradictions

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² Tacitus, *Annals*, I.11
inherent in such a position, it is still the dominant view of Roman frontier policy under the Principate.

In my view a better framework for analysis of Roman imperialism in the post-Augustan world sees external policy during the Principate as being dependent on a continuing state of tension between those elements of the ruling class that held to the politics of expansion, and those which adhered to the politics of the 'surfeited empire'. There can be no doubt that such differences of opinion existed and had an effect on emperors. Despite Luttwak's view of the matter, external policy during the Principate was demonstrably inconsistent. This helps explains why Tiberius, having helped Augustus acquire more territory than any other Roman leader, was content to keep the empire as it had been left to him, and why Claudius, impelled by political needs, accepted the ideological option and annexed Britain, earning in the process four triumphs. The Flavian emperors, very much 'new men' after a century of the Julio-Claudians, and needing military prestige, made provinces of most of the client kingdoms of Asia Minor as well as adding the Agri Decumates to the empire, a valid, if easy, method of enlarging the empire.

The second century was no different. Trajan, still regarded as the archetypal 'soldier-emperor', added more to the empire than any other emperor after Augustus by his annexation of Dacia, Arabia, and, although unsuccessful, Armenia and Mesopotamia. These wars of Trajan, as I hope to demonstrate, were motivated primarily by nothing more than a desire for territorial aggrandisement. Trajan's attention to civic projects such as his alimenta scheme for poor children and the maintenance of the corn supply should not divert us from his military ambitions. Indeed his attempt at blending the traditional elements of military glory and civic activities, but always with the main emphasis on martial achievements, goes far to confirming his pre-eminent position as the best of Rome's emperors, no less than the optimus princeps described by Pliny and Dio Chrysostom.

Under Trajan, as Luttwak has pointed out, "wars were feverishly anticipated, and this time there was no disappointment". After two

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4 Luttwak, p. 54.
wars fought over a period of five years, Dacia was annexed as a province in 105/6. Arabia, hitherto a client kingdom, was also made a province in 105/6, possibly in advance preparation for the Parthian wars. After a number of decisive military engagements in the east Armenia became a province in 114, and Mesopotamia likewise in 115. Trajan made alterations in the administrative arrangements for the provinces: Pannonia was divided into two imperial provinces, Superior and Inferior; Thrace was made an imperial province; and Galatia-Cappadocia was again separated into two imperial provinces. Imperial provinces, always with the exception of Egypt, were invariably at this time governed by legati Augusti pro praetore, and it is tempting to see in this creation of three extra imperial legateships a move by Trajan to create additional posts that could be used as rewards for his successful generals and supporters.

Hadrian who had a traditional, if not a particularly successful, military career, is generally seen as peace-loving and non-expansionist. The contrast is all the more obvious following so closely on the military expeditions of Trajan. Trajan was widely loved and served as a model for how all future emperors should behave, indeed was seen as the best type of autocratic ruler even in the middle ages. Hadrian died "hated by the people" according to Dio. It is implied that this was due to his murder of various members of the Senate, particularly the four Trajanic consulars who were put to death, either on Hadrian's direct order or by a Senate intent on sycophancy. The deed, whatever its necessity and whoever its author, went down the years in infamy. According to Dio it was one of the primary reasons the Senate refused to deify the dead emperor in 138. The long period in which Augustus reconciled the Roman aristocracy to the Principate did not, and could not, bring an end to political discord within the Senate. Adherents and friends of a particular emperor came to the fore on his accession and held sway in the Senate. The killings of 117 were either ordered by Hadrian or advocated by the emperor's partisans in the Senate with his knowledge and agreement.

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6 Cassius Dio, LXIX, 23.2.
7 Dio, LXIX, 23.2-3.
It is hard to see in these killings anything but an attempt to remove vocal critics of Hadrian's foreign policy. The four put to death were all consulars and at least three of them were highly talented and successful military commanders. There might well have been a plot, if these leading generals were dissatisfied, as they might well have been, with Hadrian's withdrawal from the East and parts of Moesia. The existence, or otherwise of a plot against the new emperor does not alter the point that the most likely explanation for the deaths is the opposition between the expansionists as exemplified by these four consulars, and the static imperialists as exemplified by Hadrian and his friends and advisers. In his latter days Hadrian is said to have denied any participation in the deaths and even to have destined Nigrinus for the succession. I cannot accept this. The source for this was seemingly Hadrian's autobiography, surely not the most unbiased of sources. And that Hadrian in early 118 can have spent time considering the succession, let alone have made a decision, seems highly improbable.

Now the Senate may have seen itself opposed to the autocracy of emperors (although I doubt this) but senators' memories were not that long or unforgiving. There must have been more to the senate's attitude in 138 than four deaths 20 years before. Why can we not suppose that the hostile tradition arises in part from Hadrian's continuing refusal to allow the expansionists to have their way? It was not a person who respected either the Senate or tradition who put an equestrian in charge of both Pannonia and Moesia with the same powers as the prefect of Egypt. It was not a respecter of tradition who gave up conquered territory, or who built fortified border walls; or who indulged in gladiatorial combat in public. In these matters Hadrian showed himself an innovator. It is equally plausible that his external policy was a departure from the Roman tradition of expansion and as such incurred the hatred of more traditional senators.

Hadrian's successor, Antoninus Pius, had held no military commands in his career, nor had he served time away from Rome except for the proconsulate of Asia in 134/5. It may well be that he was chosen for

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SHA, Hadrian, VII.2.
this as much as any other reason. One of the first actions of Antoninus Pius, when he succeeded Hadrian, was to push the frontier of Britain forward (discussed below, p. 106f). It is highly probable, as A.R. Birley has suggested, that this was a 'sop' thrown to the military traditionalists who had been held in check for so long. At the same time the frontiers of the Rhine provinces were moved forward about 40 kilometres, although this was more likely to have been recognition of the extent of Roman military control than outright territorial expansion (see below, p. 119f.). It is certain that no other territorial aggrandisement took place under Antoninus, as the traditional view of him would lead us to expect. Unlike Hadrian, Antoninus had excellent relations with the senate. It is possible that this good reputation was a product of the emperor's attempts to appease all shades of senatorial opinion, including those who had been neglected by Hadrian. And it is unlikely that he would antagonise senators when he was able to avoid it. What better way of legitimising his position and propitiating the senate than by allowing the active expression of different policy options?

Marcus Aurelius, who is still remembered as a philosopher rather than a soldier, spent most of his reign away from Rome fighting barbarians. For once a war in the east was begun by Parthia, although the presence of a Roman force well inside Armenia cannot be adequately explained. Evidence suggests that Lucius Verus' eastern wars resulted in the stationing of Roman troops in Armenia and northern Mesopotamia. Even if no new territory was annexed, Rome must have effectively controlled these one-time provinces of Trajan as a result of the war. There is ample evidence as well that Marcus Aurelius intended to annex Marcomannic and Sarmatian territories through his northern wars. We also have evidence in the *Historia Augusta* of a difference in opinion between the two emperors on the northern operations which might indicate that each held to a different position on the issue of external policy.

There is clear evidence for Commodus' abandonment of his father's

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10 Birley, *RFRFP*, p. 17.
11 See the discussion in Birley, "Roman Frontier Policy under Marcus Aurelius", p. 10-11.
12 *SHA*, Marcus Antoninus, XIV.4-7. See the discussion below, p. 133f.
northern wars in the *Historia Augusta*\(^{13}\). The speech of Pompeianus recorded in Herodian, while not necessarily accurate, at least indicates that different opinions were held by those who advised the new emperor. Commodus clearly came down on the side of the non-expansionists, ignoring the older military men who had advised his father\(^{14}\). It is also noteworthy that under Commodus the defensive fortifications on the Danube were markedly increased, also suggesting that the anti-expansionist policy had gained the ascendancy.

The evidence given above, not necessarily conclusive, certainly suggests the existence of a dichotomy in approaches to Roman external policy at least during the first two centuries of the Principate. If not compelling it is, nevertheless, an encouragement to further examination in more detail of the functioning of Roman external policy in the light of the existence in Roman political opinion of an imperialist option of expansion.

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\(^{13}\) SHA, *Commodus*, III.5. Also Cassius Dio, LXXII, 1.2.

\(^{14}\) Herodian, I, 6.4-8.
PART 1: Problems and Definitions

The Problem

In 1974 A.R. Birley published a paper which questioned the whole basis on which assumptions about external policy in the imperial period had been made. Birley's contention is that desire for territorial aggrandizement was a real factor in imperial frontier policy and in his article he comes to the conclusion that "only a few of the first twenty or so emperors were able to resist the romantic urge to create an imperium sine fine." Birley is, in short, arguing for the existence of a continuing ethos of imperialism in Roman politics but his paper has been largely ignored since its publication. Certainly the most recent and lucid work which advocates the view that frontier policy was dictated by strategic requirements, Luttwak's Grand Strategy, either missed or ignored Birley's article.

In 1988, before I had been able to read Birley's article, I completed a thesis for a M.A. Preliminary degree that examined relations between Rome and Parthia in the second century A.D. That thesis, I believe, demonstrated that neither strategic nor economic considerations could explain the extent of Roman invasions over the Euphrates during the second century. Combined with the apparent lack of concern about the Parthian menace revealed by the literary sources, the obvious conclusion was that Parthia never posed, nor was thought to pose, either a military or economic threat to Roman hegemony in the east. On that basis it seems to me that Roman military involvement in Parthia in the period under study is best understood in terms of imperial propaganda and ideology, and the related exercise of a permanent option of territorial expansion in imperial politics.

Recently Benjamin Isaac has reached the same conclusions about the operation of Roman policy on the eastern frontier in his excellent 1990

1 Birley, RFRFP, p. 24. The paper was originally delivered in 1970 and published substantially as delivered.
2 See Preface, note 3.
work on the Roman army in the East. His monograph presents, in opposition to Luttwak, the view that Roman frontier policy in the East was governed by a persistent expansionist ideology, and represents the first major work to take up Birley's premise. On the basis of Isaac's research there is an obvious need for a re-assessment of Roman frontier policy generally and I doubt that Isaac will be the last scholar to take up the challenge. Isaac's view is one that I am much in agreement with and there seems no reason why such an ideological stance should only apply to Roman external policy in the east. This thesis is, therefore, an attempt to investigate further the continued existence of this ideology in the wider sphere of imperial external policy generally.

The conventional and dominant view is that imperialism as a characteristic of Roman foreign policy ended with the consolidation of the empire by Augustus, and Tiberius afterwards, following the Varian disaster in 9 A.D. The wars of conquest carried out by Claudius in Britain, Trajan and Septimius Severus in the East, and Marcus Aurelius north of the Danube, to name but a few, are conceded by historians but explained as aberrations, or as justified by purely strategic requirements. These views ignore what I see as a continuing belief by elements of the ruling class in the legitimacy of territorial expansion as part of Roman external policy. Such a belief seems to me to be an important aspect of Roman politics under the Principate, and helps explain some of the continuing tension between the Emperor and the Senate. My thesis is an attempt to explore and correct this 'blind spot' in modern approaches to the history of the Roman Empire, specifically in the area of frontier policy. I do not intend to theorise about the origins of imperialism, Roman or otherwise, nor do I intend to develop an explanation or causal analysis that will explain Roman imperialism and the reasons for the failure of that imperialism. I have less grandiose aims. My purpose is to show that the frontier policies of Roman emperors in the second century A.D. were dependent on the persistent functioning of an ideology of expansion in Roman imperial politics. I hope to show that this is the best structure for explaining one of the aspects of the political life of the Principate. Thus I am attempting to take up Anthony Birley's implicit suggestion for further research into the functioning of an imperialist ideology during the Principate.

This thesis will examine only the initial phase of imperialism, expansion. Expansion I here define as any act, either diplomatic or military, that is aimed at territorial aggrandizement beyond the existing borders. I have not dealt with aspects of the economic and cultural expansion of the Roman empire primarily because of limitations of both length and time. It is my belief that economic and cultural expansion are less relevant to the functional ideology of the Principate than glory-seeking and territorial aggrandizement. In the economic sphere the lack of any centrally co-ordinated economic system would preclude a centrally-directed effort to expand the economic system of the state, although there can be no doubt that the economic benefits of certain military campaigns were eagerly anticipated by both soldiers and the ruling class. Similarly, in the ancient world, ties of cultural dependence between centre and periphery, prior to territorial annexation, were not possible since mass communication methods were lacking. This is not to deny that there was a cultural by-product of expansion. I refer, of course, to the cultural assimilation of the ruling ‘élites’ of the conquered peoples. This was a very real factor in the generally wide acceptance of Roman imperial rule but it cannot have been a motivating force behind territorial expansion. In fact modern day examples, such as Pepsi in Russia, Macdonalds in Japan, and the ubiquity of American television programs, demonstrate that economic and cultural expansion proceed even in the absence of politico-military expansion, and are no necessary index of its existence. Although the ‘lure of profit’ functioned in the ancient world as much as in modern capitalist economies, the difference is that the profit motive was not the function of a centrally-directed economic system as was arguably the case for recent imperialist states such as Britain, or modern ones like the USA. In practice, then, the clearest expression of expansion in the ancient world is territorial aggrandisement. Creation of ‘client-states’ or other forms of political dependency are, on the surface, more ambiguous forms of expansion, but in reality they amount to the same thing. Obviously

4 In attempting this definition of expansion I have been influenced by S.I.P. Van Campen, The Imperator: Consequences of Frustrated Expansion, Aphen aan der Rijn, 1978, p. 8.

5 For example Tacitus, Annals, II.62, reports that after Germanicus’ victories over the Rhine a number of Roman traders (lixae ac negotiatores) had settled on enemy soil.
expansion, in these terms, does not always have to be successful. Intentions of territorial aggrandizement are enough to characterise a particular action as expansionist, and therefore within the realms of imperialist behaviour.

With this in mind it is clear that the existence of a concept of Rome's god-given right to world rule as a functional aspect of the political ideology of the Principate is central to my thesis. I have started with a survey of the development of this belief from the time of Polybius up to the fifth century A.D., while concentrating on the second century A.D. As a corollary to this survey I have discussed ancient and modern writings on Roman imperialism. Integral to this ideological framework is my belief that the public image of emperors in the second century, and probably later, although that is outside the scope of this research, was generally an aggressively military and expansionist one, as befits a society in which the traditional political ethos of the republic still operated. In the light of this persistently aggressive image I have investigated what can be reconstructed of the actual external policies of emperors on the basis of the literary and archaeological evidence. Some discussion of patterns of provincial appointments under individual emperors is included. In essence, I believe that my examination shows that in very few cases, if at all, were Roman efforts at territorial aggrandizement motivated by strategic concerns. Rather, the underlying motivation seems to be a belief that expansion was the right and proper aim of Roman external policy. In this particular world-view the glory-seeking motive, so often encountered in the contemporary ancient sources, or perhaps even a revived idea of world conquest, predominated. That the policy of Hadrian prevailed in the later imperial period does not enable one to conclude that any other policy was doomed to failure. In a very real sense emperors such as Hadrian were more of an aberration than Trajan or Septimius Severus, and it may well be, as Mann has intimated, that the seeds of Rome's destruction were sown when emperors gave up the fight for world dominion and settled on a policy of shutting the empire in behind defensive barriers.

Not all emperors shared this belief in world-conquest, Hadrian being

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6 J.C. Mann, "The Frontiers of the Principate" in ANRW, II, 2.1, p. 514 (hereafter referred to as "Frontiers").
the most obvious case, and it is apparent that these differences of attitude need explaining. My belief, as noted above, is that the decision of an emperor to take up or reject the expansionist option demonstrates the operation of an internal political tension whose limits were always set by the reigning emperor. I have not, in this thesis, endeavoured to elucidate the functioning of internal politics under successive reigns in the second century. That would require a different thesis and more time than was available to me. It might well be that a study of appointments to the governorships of armed provinces and the eponymous consulships could demonstrate the workings of an internal political struggle between those who supported the 'surfeited empire' concept and those who urged the virtues of territorial aggrandizement. But it would be necessary to first show that such a political dichotomy existed, instead of trying to infer it from patterns in appointments. And my primary intention is to show that the atmosphere of imperial politics was such that a dichotomy could exist, rather than trying to prove its existence.

What this thesis is not is an attempt to explain the underlying causes of Roman imperialism or to settle the question of when Roman imperialism started or ended. I do, however, hope to show that Roman imperialism did not cease at some variable point during the Principate but that it continued to function as a valid policy option for emperors. One further disclaimer. In a thesis constrained by considerations of both length and time it has not been possible for me to identify and examine all the relevant factors at play in decisions on external policy. I have concentrated on the continuing importance to the ideology of the Principate of the concept of Rome's world-dominion and the expression of this concept through the public image of emperors. These seem to me to be the most obvious areas in which a basis for the functioning of an imperialist external policy can be perceived. As I have explained above, it has simply not been possible for me to endeavour to identify, examine and analyse material relating to the economic and cultural factors at work in Roman imperialism. I do not mean to imply that these factors were non-existent or unimportant, but I do not believe that they were as central to the decision making processes as the simple belief in Rome's divine mission of *imperium sine fine*. 
Imperialism: Some Definitions

Nowadays imperialism is a loaded term implying an unjust and oppressive control of one people by another. The phenomenon has been much written about in the twentieth century as political analysts and sociologists attempt, with varying degrees of success, to explain its occurrence or justify the growth of various imperial systems. There are probably as many definitions of imperialism as there are works on the subject; indeed there is one monograph solely devoted to a discussion of the semantic development of the term\(^7\), and it seems unlikely that any consensus about the meaning or development of the concept will ever be reached. What most modern analyses have in common is that they stress that the term generally denotes a specific type of relationship, between a ruling power and those under its control, that is characterised by an inequality of power\(^8\).

The idea of imperialism as an expression and function of the capitalist state was first propounded by the radical English liberal Hobson in his renowned 1902 work *Imperialism: A Study*\(^9\). To Hobson imperialism was annexation, and a product of the lust of capitalist financiers for profit. A similar, although more programmatic, view is that of Lenin and the followers of Marx. Lenin's view, put simplistically, saw imperialism as the final stage in the capitalist process whereby an economically strong state exploited the resources of a less powerful state. He believed that the inequality of power was brought about by the capitalist system itself and equated imperialism with the monopolistic stage of capitalism\(^10\). This theory was further refined during the twentieth century by a number of different Marxist theorists. What all the Marxian views have in common, in spite of their disagreements, is a general definition in which imperialism is seen as "the domination of one country by another in order to economically exploit the dominated", where domination is carried out by military, economic or


ideological means\textsuperscript{11}. For Lenin imperialist systems existed before capitalism, and Rome was a typically imperialist society, existing on slave labour and carrying out an imperialistic policy in its treatment of the provinces. In a sense, of course, the Roman empire can be typified this way since the provinces were economically exploited. However, decisions to go to war from Augustus onwards were the sole prerogative of the emperor, whatever the fiction of Augustus' renewal of Republican institutions\textsuperscript{12}. No ancient source, however hostile, levies the charge against an emperor that he made war for the purposes of profit, in fact Appian articulates the opposite view (see below). And, however real the prospect of enrichment through warfare for the upper class this cannot have been a model applicable to external policy under the emperors, whatever its relevance to the Republic.

Another view, sociological rather than economic in outlook, is examined in a well-known essay by Joseph Schumpeter\textsuperscript{13}. For Schumpeter "imperialism is the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion"\textsuperscript{14}, the key word here being "objectless". Schumpeter was not primarily concerned with Roman history but in developing a general theory of imperialism that could be applied to a range of societies and eras. He does, however, use his theory to interpret Roman history. Thus in Schumpeter's view, much of Rome's territorial expansion under the Republic was the result of an objectless drive by the elite that controlled Rome, the landed aristocracy, acting on behalf of its own class interest, although Schumpeter denies that the aristocracy had a militaristic disposition. He believes that expansionist wars were dictated by the need of the governing class to divert the attentions of the populace from agrarian reform\textsuperscript{15}. Accordingly, Schumpeter believes that under the emperors Rome was not imperialist because he assumes that wars from Augustus on were concerned with defense and security and not with protection

\textsuperscript{11} There is a wide range of opinion among mainstream Marxist interpretations of imperialism. See A. Szymanski, \textit{The Logic of Imperialism}, New York, 1981, p. 68. The definition is from page 5.
\textsuperscript{13} J.A. Schumpeter, \textit{The Sociology of Imperialism}, New York, 1951.
\textsuperscript{14} Schumpeter, p. 6.
and enhancement of specific class interests. The opinions of Hobson, Lenin and Schumpeter, different as they may appear, are all 'metrocentric'. Empires are a product of the imperialism of the central metropolis, that is to say its internal expansionist drives. A recent seminal book by Michael Doyle summarises these views and discusses the new theories of empire which have been developed in the decades since the Second World War by such people as Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher. These more modern interpretations emphasise the importance of peripheries rather than the centre as the source of imperialism. But this view is again primarily an economic one, centring around trade between unequal states and the economic dependence this entails. A third set of views holds that imperialism is a necessary function of the relationships between states when those states differ in the amount of power they wield. Imperialism is thus a structural dynamic of international politics. This results in three motives for empire: a surplus of people, goods, or capital and can be applied to both ancient and modern examples of empires.

Following his summary of the major theories Doyle goes on to detail the characteristics of empires and attempts an initial definition of empire as "effective control, whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society", where imperial control implies an asymmetric exercise of influence and power, and involves both the process of control and the outcomes. Imperialism does not, then, have to involve formal administration such as is represented by placing a governor and his staff in the peripheral area. If, in Doyle's words, "enough of the articulation of interests...can be influenced...sovereign decisions will be controlled" and direct rule is not necessary. We thus arrive at a more complete definition of empire as "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the

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16 Schumpeter, p 50ff. As a sociologist Schumpeter was concerned to explain imperialism in sociological terms, so it is not surprising that his basic explanation of Roman expansion lay in the sociological structure of Roman society. See Cohen, p. 12.
18 Summarised by Doyle, pp. 25-6.
20 Doyle, pp. 30 and 40.
21 Doyle, p. 37.
effective political sovereignty of another political society", and imperialism is then merely the process whereby an empire is established. Both the control and establishment of the empire can be achieved by means of force, political acquiescence, or economic, cultural and social dependence. Doyle's work rests on a synthesis of the three models discussed above with the addition of the thread, common to them all, of the needs of the transnational economic system. In using his model to analyse Roman imperialism Doyle appears to be leaning towards the Schumpeter view. He recognizes that the roots of Roman expansion lie in Roman society and politics and that the method lay in the effectiveness of the Roman armies. Peripheral influences on Roman expansion seem largely to be the lack of any other power strong enough to resist Roman expansion.

Clearly Doyle's analysis is of some relevance to Roman imperialism. In this thesis the word imperialism, following Doyle, will be used to refer to the whole process by which one state achieves and maintains power over other states or peoples. In this context power implies the ability to control the internal and external affairs of the subjugated state. There are thus two phases of imperialism: the actual process that acquires an empire i.e. expansion; and the means by which that empire is maintained i.e. control. Both these phases are multi-faceted. Acquisition of territory can take place by any combination of outright military aggression, diplomatic subtleties, and economic and cultural mechanisms. Control over the imperial lands can be similarly maintained by force, by diplomatic manoeuvrings, or by use of economic and cultural subordination.

22 Doyle, p. 45.
23 Doyle, pp. 85 and 88.
24 This is the definition used by Harris, p. 4.
Part 2: Empire Without End

Introduction

To state that the acquisition of empire was a function of the political culture of Rome is obvious, but necessary. This culture, "the ideal of the nobility of the Republic"\(^1\), was the very framework of political life in Rome. The ideal was to participate in public life and win public office, and then by achieving great deeds in the service of the state earn personal gloria. Within such a schematic for public life ambition was a laudable and necessary attribute for the aspiring politician, and the funerary monuments of leading Romans all throughout the Republican period attest to the importance of this culture. Polybius describes funerals of Rome's leading men at which catalogues of virtues and successes were delivered, when a "grown up son...discourses on the virtues and successful achievements of the great man"\(^2\). Livy comments on the practice of touching up the records of the deeds of one's ancestors and Cicero describes the use to which these records are put: "in order to preserve the achievements of the family and document its nobility, even to the extent of adding invented triumphs, additional consulates, false claims to patrician status..."\(^3\). Thus Roman politicians were motivated to participate in service to the state, and in the process gained an empire.

Rome, having disposed of her neighbouring city-states, began, in the late fourth century B.C., her first wars with peoples outside the borders of Latium. Over the course of the next three hundred years there was continuous warfare in almost every campaigning season and Rome established itself at the heart of an empire that stretched from the sands of Arabia deserta in the east to the wet and remote island of Britain in the west, from the Rhine in the north to well below the first cataract of the Nile in the south. The acquisition of this vast territory represented a stupendous drain of both money and lives over three centuries and has

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The summary of the political culture following this quote is indebted to Earl's lucid explanation of that culture, Ch. 1, *passim.*

\(^2\) Polybius, VI, 53-4.

\(^3\) Cicero, *Brutus*, 62.
generated a myriad of modern explanations and justifications. To the ancients, however, there was nothing to explain. Warfare was endemic in the ancient world and seen as the natural condition of human society. Ancient literary sources do not concern themselves with either explaining the phenomenon of warfare or questioning its place in the world\textsuperscript{4}. That is a modern preoccupation. Neither Polybius nor Cicero nor Tacitus nor Cassius Dio (to name only the most prominent) investigates the question of why war takes place. Their predominant interest when matters martial arise is in explaining or justifying or condemning the outbreak of a particular and specific military event. The failure of ancient writers to examine the underlying issue of causation is a direct result of their belief that warfare was the natural way for a state to achieve its ends\textsuperscript{5}. As Yvon Garlan has observed "The '\textit{pax Romana}' , which the official propaganda of the Empire made so much of, seems to have been largely a myth; it took no account of the latent or declared hostilities which throughout several centuries kept an army of between three and five hundred thousand men constantly on a war footing\textsuperscript{6}.

\textbf{Ancient Ideas of Rome's World Empire}

Always central to Rome's imperial mission was the continuing belief that her expansion had been ordained by the gods. The most famous pronouncement of this destiny of Rome is in the \textit{Aeneid}, of Augustan date, when Virgil has Jupiter say that he gives to Rome and the Romans \textit{imperium sine fine}: rule without limits in time or space\textsuperscript{7}. The phrase is both prophetic and a statement of fact and it is no mere hyperbole or poetic flourish. There is every reason to believe that the prospective audience of the \textit{Aeneid} shared this view of the world and Rome's place in that world. It seems to have long been an integral part of the aristocratic Roman ethos that Rome's god-given destiny was to be ruler of the whole world.

\textsuperscript{4} On the question of concepts of warfare in the ancient world see the excellent chapter 5 of M.I. Finley, \textit{Ancient History: Evidence and Models}, London, 1985, pp. 67-87.
\textsuperscript{5} Finley, p. 70-71.
\textsuperscript{7} Virgil, \textit{Aeneid}, I. 277-8.
Thus to most ancient writers imperialism, as it appeared in the phenomenon of Rome's expansion, presented no problem and was hardly discussed in those terms. However as has been observed by Gamse and Whittaker "Conquerors can hardly be expected to explain their motives as a deliberate attempt to increase their Machtbereich". All the same, Polybius, the first ancient writer to attempt an analysis of Rome's rise, had no doubts about Rome's aim. The Greek exile in Rome saw the virtues of Rome's mixed constitution and set out in his histories to treat "the how, when, and wherefore of the subjection of the known parts of the world to the dominion of Rome...". The purpose of the initial books of his work was to make clear to his readers that Romans "had quite adequate grounds for conceiving their ambition of a world-empire and adequate means for achieving their purpose", and it is clear that Polybius viewed the aim of Roman external policy after 202 B.C. as world conquest. He says of Romans that "it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose". Similarly Polybius has Scipio Africanus tell his soldiers before the battle of Zama that if they win "not only will they be securely in control of affairs in Africa, they will obtain for themselves and their country incontestable dominion and power over the rest of the world". The point is not the veracity of the speech but that Polybius believed the desire for world conquest was the dominating aim of Roman foreign policy in the second century B.C., and had no qualms that his audience would dismiss such sentiments. And it all seemed perfectly natural to Polybius. Although he does not attempt to justify Rome's expansion he states quite clearly that it was Rome's choice: "...the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary...". Clearly Polybius had no misgivings about Rome's self-appointed rôle as ruler of the world and for him it was a perfectly natural product of the political culture of the Republic. By the time he was writing, in the second half of the 140's B.C., it seemed to him that Rome had by then "attained to universal

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8 P.D.A. Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker (Eds.), IAW, p. 4.
9 Polybius, Histories, III, 1.4.
10 Polybius, Histories, I, 3.10.
12 Polybius, I, 63.9.
13 Polybius, XV, 10.2.
14 Polybius, I, 63.9. Polybius' view of expansion is discussed in Harris, pp. 107-117.
empire"\textsuperscript{15}, and he concludes his histories with the statement that by virtue of his treatment of world history students "will attain the best and most salutary result, which is to know how and by what system of polity the whole world was subjected to the single rule of Rome"\textsuperscript{16}.

Always part of Rome's imperial rhetoric was the conceit that her empire was willed by the gods, and prominent in Polybius' analysis of world history is the role of Fortuna ($\tau\upsilon\chi\eta$). It is the function of this capricious goddess to both give men what they desire and, having raised them up, dash them down again. Indeed she sometimes appears as the single most important influence in the rise of Rome and is the direct cause of Rome's acquisition of her world-empire, an empire which is "the finest and most beneficent of the performances of Fortune. For though she is ever producing something new and ever playing a part in the lives of men, she has not in a single instance ever accomplished such a work, or ever achieved such a triumph, as in our own times"\textsuperscript{17}.

Historically close to Polybius were the various Greek philosophers who settled in Rome after Romans had become masters of their homeland in the mid-second century B.C. Unlike Polybius these philosophers apparently attempted to justify Roman imperialism on the basis of their own philosophies. Perhaps the most influential of them, certainly the most durable, were the Stoics. To them Rome's pre-eminence rested on a natural superiority of race and culture, and an obvious desire to do the best for the conquered nations. Panaetius, and his successor as head of the Stoic School, Poseidonius, while retaining the Stoic ideal of a universal brotherhood of man, believed that Rome's mixed constitution (as described by Polybius), was the optimum framework for achieving this desirable goal\textsuperscript{18}.

There is every indication that beliefs of this kind still flourished in the

\textsuperscript{15} Polybius, \textit{Histories}, VIII, 2.3. 
\textsuperscript{16} Polybius, \textit{Histories}, XXXIX, 8.7. 
\textsuperscript{17} Polybius, \textit{Histories}, I, 4.4. 
The evidence has been collected and analysed by P.A. Brunt and I do not intend to repeat his masterly work. It is sufficient to note that Cicero did not attempt any theoretical justification for Rome's wars or expansion but clearly was aware that a thirst for glory had been a dominant motive for Romans in the past: "...maiores suos multa mira atque praeclara gloriae cupiditate fecisse...". Furthermore, when describing his view of the ideal state Cicero characterises great Romans as those who had extended the boundaries of the empire for their own glory and thus rendered service to the state. Nevertheless, Cicero can claim that Rome fought wars only to protect her allies and had gained dominion of the world in this manner. Although, as Brunt observes, "...Romans themselves liked to believe that they had acquired their dominions justly, by fighting for their own security or the protection of their allies". Cicero, however different his private opinion might have been, was certainly not ashamed to appeal to the notion of Rome's imperial destiny in his public utterances. "Our people by defending their allies have gained dominion over the whole world" he states in his discussion of the ideal state.

In other writings, Cicero speaks as if he believed that Rome already ruled the whole world. In the *Philippics*, for instance, he calls Romans "leaders [principes] of the world and of all nations", and the concept appears elsewhere in his speeches. Integral to this concept was the importance of Roman piety to the gods. Piety was owed to the gods not only because they looked over the city and its empire, but also because it was the favour of the gods that had helped Rome achieve her empire. Despite his private scepticism, Cicero in public argues the truth of the belief that "Rome is governed by the will and the power of the

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19 The evidence has been assiduously collected by P.A. Brunt, "Laus Imperii" in *LAW*, pp. 159ff. I am heavily dependent on this excellent article for my summary of Cicero's public opinions.
20 Brunt, "Laus Imperii", pp. 159-191.
22 His ideal statesmen "...must strive, too, by whatever means they can, in peace or in war, to advance the state in power, in territory, and in revenues. Such service calls for great men; it was commonly rendered in the days of our ancestors...": Cicero, *De Officiis*, II.85.
23 Cicero, *De Officiis*, I.34-5. This view is shared by Sallust, e.g. *Cat.*, 6.5
25 Cicero, *De re publica*, III 35
26 Cicero, *Philippics*, III.35. See also *II Verr.*, 4.81; *De domo sua*, 90.
immortal gods"\textsuperscript{27}, and he gives voice to the pervasive idea that "it was by our scrupulous attention to religion and by our wise grasp of a single truth, that all things are ruled and directed by the will of the gods, that we have overcome all peoples and nations"\textsuperscript{28}.

With the age of Augustus we come to more conscious problems of ideology and propaganda. Was Augustus merely fooled by his own propaganda rather than being a brilliant and aggressive warmonger? Did the notable propaganda of the poets of the Augustan age (and the \textit{Res Gestae}) really reflect the aims of Augustus himself? And if he was in truth the greatest expansionist of all how does one explain his legacy to Tiberius? The question of Augustan imperialism has generated much controversy. The widely held view is that Augustus was not an expansionist and that he was merely concerned with securing the frontiers of the empire. The bellicose sentiments that appear in the work of poets such as Horace, Virgil, and Ovid are held not to reflect contemporary reality. However, as P.A. Brunt has pointed out, in a review of a book by H.D. Meyer that brilliantly analyses the evidence\textsuperscript{29}, if the poets were not speaking for themselves or expressing public opinion, as Meyer believes, then they must have been speaking for Augustus himself. Furthermore Brunt, who originally held that the poets were not expressing public opinion, now believes that Meyer was correct in his "assumption that 'the poets were heirs of Republican aspirations and the spokesmen of a public opinion that shared those aspirations'"\textsuperscript{30}.

Thus sentiments of world-rule, and Rome's divine right to such rule, which were commonplace in the late Republic, also abound in the Augustan writers. The consistent appearance of these concepts in Augustan writing must, therefore, as Brunt claims, reflect the

\textsuperscript{27} Cicero, \textit{in Catilinam}, 3.21.  
\textsuperscript{28} Cicero, \textit{de haruspicum responsis}, 18ff. See Brunt "Laus Imperii", p. 165.  
\textsuperscript{29} P.A. Brunt, "Review of H.D. Meyer \textit{Die Aussenpolitik des Augustus und die Augusteische Dichtung}", \textit{JRS}, LIII (1963), p. 171. Meyer's position is that Augustus was all along against expansion (further references as "Meyer").  
\textsuperscript{30} Brunt in his original review thought this statement incorrect. He has now reconsidered this opinion in the chapter "Roman Imperial Illusions" in P.A. Brunt, \textit{Roman Imperial Themes}, Oxford 1990, p. 443 (further references as "Illusions").
contemporary atmosphere of public discussion\textsuperscript{31}. Thus when Vitruvius claimed, shortly before 27 B.C., that Augustus governed the whole world and had subdued all its peoples\textsuperscript{32} he was neither innovative nor out of touch. Augustus indeed claimed the same thing for himself. When Augustus opened his new temple of Mars Ultor in 2 B.C. the forum Augusti was adorned with memorials of Augustus' own conquests and statues of old triumphators "qui imperium p. R. ex minimo maximum redidisset"\textsuperscript{33}. Augustus had announced that he had had the statues placed there so that the citizens might require of him and future emperors that they follow their example. And it should not be forgotten that, following that example, Augustus added more to the empire than any other individual. The preamble to the \textit{Res Gestae}, posthumous but undoubtedly similar to the original wording\textsuperscript{34}, reads: "The achievements of the Divine Augustus, by which he brought the world under the empire of the Roman people..."\textsuperscript{35}. And he remarks later in the \textit{Res Gestae} that he achieved this by undertaking "many civil and foreign wars by land and sea throughout the world"\textsuperscript{36}. This was no idle boast. By 25 B.C. all of Spain had been occupied and divided into three provinces; Gaul, conquered by Caesar, was also divided into three new provinces; the Alpine foothills from the Danube to northern Italy were incorporated into provinces by 15 B.C.; the rest of the territory south of the Danube between Macedonia and the mouth of the river was subdued by 9 A.D.; and in 12 B.C. Roman troops had reached the Elbe\textsuperscript{37}.

I do not intend to examine all the evidence for the continuing belief of Rome's destiny of world-conquest in the Augustan writers. This has been more than adequately done by P.A. Brunt in his review of H.D. Meyer mentioned above (note 30), and by E.S. Gruen in a paper delivered at a conference on the age of Augustus (note 32). But it is clear that it was Augustus' aim to project an image of himself as the true

\textsuperscript{32} Referred to in Brunt "Illusions", p. 433.
\textsuperscript{33} Velleius Paterculus, I.39
\textsuperscript{35} "Rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romano subiecit..."; \textit{Res Gestae}, Preamble.
\textsuperscript{36} Augustus, \textit{Res Gestae}, Preamble and 3.1.
\textsuperscript{37} Summarised in Luttwak, p. 8.
inheritor of Republican tradition. To quote Gruen: "The emphasis of his ideology did not fall upon peace and tranquillity. Augustus had emulated and surpassed the Republican martial heroes of old..."\textsuperscript{38}.

In spite of the seeming insistence of Augustus that the empire should remain as he left it, territorial expansion remained a viable option for Roman emperors, and one that was frequently taken up. And Augustus' radical re-shaping of the political institutions of Rome did not change the basic political ethos, the ethos that had won Rome a huge empire. It has been observed of this ethos (described above) that "from being the ideal of the nobility of the Republic it became the standard of the governing class of the Empire"\textsuperscript{39}. In the light of the downfall of the Republic poets like Virgil and Horace tried, unsuccessfully, to reformulate the political tradition by divorcing \textit{gloria} from the concept of \textit{virtus}\textsuperscript{40}. In the Republican political ethos these two concepts were inextricably linked not only with each other but also with \textit{nobilitas}. Since the \textit{nobiles}, through the pursuit of individual \textit{gloria} and personal aggrandisement at the expense of the state, had brought about the downfall of the \textit{respublica} Virgil tried to redefine the noble ethos by disentangling \textit{virtus} from \textit{gloria}. Nevertheless, the ideal persisted. The attractions of \textit{gloria} and tradition "were too deep-seated a part of the consciousness...of the Roman political class" for them to disappear from the Roman psyche\textsuperscript{41}. After Augustus political structures might have changed, \textit{libertas} been circumscribed, the rule of the few replaced by the rule of one \textit{princeps}, yet tradition still firmly ruled the practice of politics in Rome. If the composition of the Senate changed over the centuries, as did its influence, still the political environment within which emperors such as Domitian, Hadrian, and Septimius Severus operated was essentially that which governed the lives of Flamininus or Scipio during the Republic. It should not be surprising, then, that external policy options under the Principate reflect the political tensions that were such an integral part of the Republic, and that these same tensions and differences appear in the literary expression of imperial ideology.

\textsuperscript{38} Gruen, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{39} Earl, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{40} Earl, pp. 65-73.
\textsuperscript{41} Earl. p. 81.
How, then, do we explain Augustus' *consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii* 42? Augustus passed on to Tiberius this desire that the empire be kept as it was and Tiberius complied, since he was wont to treat Augustus' requests as commands43. It has been supposed that this legacy was the result of the Varian disaster in 9, which is held to have so shocked Augustus that he gave up any further plans for expansion. However, it is hard to believe that an individual as ambitious and forward thinking as Augustus would abandon his aims in such a manner. Possibly he foresaw the need for a period of consolidation and regeneration after Varus, and enjoined this upon Tiberius. Alternatively, is it possible that Tacitus has composed this statement himself, unhistorically, to explain the foreign policy of Tiberius, whom he characterises as *princeps proferendi imperii incuriosus* 44? Thus Tacitus is able to castigate Tiberius for being *incuriosus* to extend the empire. Conversely Suetonius speaks approvingly of Tiberius' dislike of aggressive military action45. Suetonius is as wrong in this case as he is about Augustus (see below page 30f.). If Tiberius was so averse to military aggression why did he allow Germanicus to campaign for 3 years over the Rhine in 'free' Germany? Dio records that "Germanicus...invaded the enemy's country and tarried there, giving the troops plenty of work and food in abundance at the expense of aliens"46. These campaigns followed immediately on the suppression of the mutiny of the Rhine legions after the accession of Tiberius. They were not occasioned by any action of German tribes, but seem to have been directed solely at reviving the morale of the legions. There may be something in the opinion of Tacitus and Suetonius, since Tiberius did not allow Germanicus to continue his campaigns after 16, and the Germans were left to themselves. Nevertheless, a contemporary source, Velleius Paterculus, attests to the continuing belief in Rome's world-empire. Speaking of the Pax Augusta Velleius says that it "preserves every corner of the world safe from brigandage"47. And at the very end of the work, admittedly an encomium on Tiberius, he expresses his

44 Tacitus, *Annals*, IV.32.
46 Cassius Dio, LVII, 6.1.
47 Velleius Paterculus, II.126.3.
wish that the empire might have "successors whose shoulders may be as capable of sustaining the empire of the world [terrarum orbis imperium] as we have found his to be..."48.

Claudius, indifferent to Augustus' admonition, extended the boundaries of the empire by invading Britain and incorporating it as a province. Of this campaign Suetonius says disapprovingly, but evidently correctly, that it was done merely to give the emperor an undeserved triumph49. Claudius, however, considered his success real enough and on the strength of it extended the *pomerium* of the city50. He was proud enough of his achievement to boast that he had extended the boundaries of the empire beyond the ocean51. There is no evidence that his invasion was motivated by concern that British tribesmen would invade the Gallic coast from their island. So the glory motive appears to be real enough in this case.

Vespasian similarly enlarged the *pomerium* of the city on the strength of his own additions to the empire, although these were no more than annexations of 'client states'. The existence of fragments of Vespasian's *lex de imperio*, which states that the emperor "be permitted to carry forward and advance the boundaries of the *pomerium* when he considers it in the interests of the state, just as Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus was permitted"52, make quite clear that emperors were expected to extend the empire if they so desired. Clearly for both Claudius and Vespasian expansion was a very real option, and one of no little symbolic importance, in light of their extension of the *pomerium*. In 77 Pliny the Elder dedicated his Natural History, completed earlier, to Vespasian's eldest son, the Caesar Titus. In the preface, commenting on other works of history, he says of Livy "he ought to have composed his history for the glory of the world-conquering nation and of the

48 Velleius Paterculus, II.131.2.
50 *ILS* 213 and Tacitus, *Annals*, XII.23. Despite Harris, p. 125 n. 6, Tacitus quite clearly states that the *pomerium* could be extended if the boundaries of the empire were advanced.
51 Brunt, "Illusions", p. 471.
52 *ILS* 248 for the expansion. For the law on Vespasian,*ILS* 244: *Utque ei fines pomerii proferre promovere, cum ex republica censebit esse, liceat, ita uti licuit Ti. Claudio Caesari Aug. Germanico.
Roman name, not for his own"53. And he introduces his description of the European continent with the words "To begin then with Europe, nurse of the race that has conquered all the nations..."54. Clearly Flavian emperors expected to be addressed in these terms.

Under Domitian sycophancy in literature reached a new height. However, despite the dubious motives behind the sentiments, praise of the emperor was in terms that were acceptable to him and reflected concepts understood and expected by all. The two major poets of the era were Statius and Martial. Both express themselves in similar words and a common thread is references to Domitian as ruler of the world. Thus Statius calls Domitian, whom he refers to as Germanicus, "renowned Lord of the world [pater inclitus orbis]..."55. In a piece celebrating Domitian's 17th consulship Statius has Janus address the emperor as "great father of the world..."56, and in lines thanking Domitian for a banquet given by him in the palace he speaks to Domitian in these terms: "O ruler of the nations and mighty sire of the conquered world [regnator terrarum orbisque subacti magne parens ]"57. Martial uses phrases which precisely mirror those of Statius. In his first book of epigrams he expresses the hope that if Domitian reads the work it will enable him to "lay aside the frown that rules the world"58. The seventh book addresses the emperor as "ruler supreme of the universe and father of the world [summe mundi rector et parens orbis ]"59. Finally, describing Domitian's recent military successes on the Danube the poet calls him "the Lord of Earth and God of the Universe" [terrarum dominus deusque rerum ]60.

When it comes to the period on which I am concentrating, the second century, our inquiry becomes more difficult. The only ancient source to deal with the history of Trajan's era is Cassius Dio, and even that only survives in the version of the epitomator. The last four books of Martial's oeuvre were apparently composed early in Trajan's reign but

53 Pliny the Elder, Natural History, praef. 16.
54 Pliny the Elder, Natural History, III.5.
55 Statius, Silvae, III, iv.48.
56 Statius, Silvae, IV, i.17.
57 Statius, Silvae, IV, ii.14.
58 Martial, I.4.
59 Martial, VII.7.
60 Martial, VII.12.
they reflect the new mood of the times and scarcely mention the
emperor at all. The best ancient historian, Tacitus, did not write about
the period after Domitian, although his own opinions can be
reconstructed from his writing. The only contemporary witnesses for
the Trajanic period are Pliny and Dio Chrysostom, and neither can be
regarded as historians. Nevertheless, their works will admit to some
historical inquiry.

Dio Chrysostom articulates a Greek perception of the Roman Empire
that advocates accommodation with the imperial rule. In line with this
pragmatism is the development of the idea, common in Greek thought,
of the divine basis of the Roman emperor's power. A particularly
revealing inscription comes from the base of a statue erected to Trajan
in Athens towards the western side of the Parthenon, probably in 113.
The inscription addresses Trajan as "God, son of a God" and calls him
"benefactor and saviour of the world [ΕΥΕΡΓΕΤΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΟΠΛΑΣΤΗ]
[ΟΙΚΟΜΕΝΗΣ]". Dio's first discourse on Kingship shows a
similar development. Trajan is compared to the demi-god Hercules,
who is described as having "held empire over every land from the
rising of the sun to the setting thereof". The start of the third
discourse on Kingship introduces the subject and says that when "a man
governs and holds sway over all mankind..." then it is his duty to set an
example in justice, wisdom, and energy for those he rules. The oration
then proceeds to discuss the most conspicuous forms of government,
and Dio says of the principate "One is the first to come into existence
and the most practicable — that which forms the subject of the present
address — where we have a city, or a number of peoples, or the whole
world well ordered by one man's good judgement and virtue..."
[ἀσκεῖται γνώμην καὶ ἀρετὴ] Dio uses the same reference point about
Rome's empire as earlier writers and clearly "Dio's audience knew that
Roman emperors claimed the same world-rule [as Alexander]...".

Pliny the Younger, consul in 100, expresses similar sentiments and
gives evidence for the continuing conceit that Roman emperors had the

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61 IG II/III² 3284.
62 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 1.60.
63 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 3.45.
whole world under their care. On the anniversary of Trajan's dies imperii in 112, while Pliny was governing Bithynia, Pliny records in a letter to the emperor "We have celebrated with appropriate rejoicing, Sir, the day of your accession whereby you preserved the Empire; and have offered prayers to the gods to keep you in health and prosperity on behalf of the human race, whose security and happiness [tutela et securitas] depends on your safety", and on the same occasion a year later Pliny again writes to Trajan informing him that "We have celebrated with due solemnity the day on which the security of the human race was happily transferred to your care...". The famous Panegyricus of Pliny, delivered on the occasion of his consulship, has, in its delineation of the qualities of the ideal ruler, affinities with Dio Chrysostom's discourses on kingship. In a passage comparing Trajan to Jupiter Pliny declares that Jupiter "has given you to us to fill his rôle with regard to the whole human race". And in the closing formula of the speech Pliny calls "on the gods, the guardians and defenders of our empire, speaking as consul on behalf of all humanity..." to continue to provide the empire with their benefits in perpetuity.

Pliny takes the opportunity given by his panegyric to compare, like Dio Chrysostom, Trajan to Hercules, the son of Jupiter. Coin issues of 100 depict Hercules Gaditanus and thus show an identification of Trajan, who originated in Gades, and the demigod Hercules coin types continued to be issued for most of Trajan's reign. For Pliny, too, the old virtues are the most desirable. His encomium of Trajan notes that now "Rome has a leader [dux] who ranks with her heroes of old, on whom battlefields covered with the slain and seas filled with victory conferred the name Imperator...". If Trajan delights as much in peace as in war this is because he is the perfect prince, and the Panegyricus is, after all, not meant to be more than an adulatory address to the emperor on the occasion of a consulship. Notwithstanding this it is an expression of an ethos of imperial rule that was acceptable to both princeps and subject alike.

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65 Pliny the Younger, Epp. X.52; X.102.
66 Pliny the Younger, Panegyricus, 80.5; 94.1.
67 Pliny the Younger, Panegyricus, 14.5 and 82.7.
68 See for example RIC, ii, p. 247 no. 37; p. 293 nos. 689, 690, 699.
69 Pliny the Younger, Panegyricus, 12.1.
It is by now well known that Tacitus saw the history of the Empire since Augustus as a struggle between liberty and power, between Senate and Emperor. Yet he accepted the system embodied in the Principate because he knew of none better. The mixed constitution, so praised by Polybius and Cicero, did not work: "if created its tenure of life is brief"\(^{70}\). A deep regard for the institutions and ideals of the Republic suffuses Tacitus' historical works. It is ironic that he begins the *Annals* with Tiberius, the emperor for whom he reserves his greatest censure. Tiberius, we are told, was *incuriosus* to extend the empire, as unlike Republican heroes as possible. And yet of all the Emperors of Rome Tiberius was the one with the greatest respect for republican traditions of *libertas*\(^{71}\). Tacitus' attitude to Tiberius is revealing both for Tacitus' own attitude to expansion, and as an expression of the sentiments of his time and social class. The scathing and pejorative force of the term *incuriosus* cannot be understated. Tacitus was a traditionalist and an admirer of military glory which was earned by extending the boundaries of the empire. If he was aware of the "double face of Roman rule"\(^{72}\) he still held to republican ideals of service to the state and *gloria* through military conquest. His heroes are the aggressive military leaders, men like Germanicus and Corbulo, and not those emperors like Tiberius who were uninterested in the traditional formulation of Roman external policy.

Yet what comes from the pages of Tacitus is ambivalence. He did not know whether to oppose a political system that made a desert and called it peace, or to support the Principate as the only viable form of government. He was loyal to Rome and the empire, believed in Rome's destiny of world rule, but realised that the logic of Rome's drive for world dominion left "individuals and nations no choice but to submit to its inevitability or succumb to destruction"\(^{73}\). All the same, the historical writings of Tacitus repeat the message of Rome's world empire. Speaking of Claudius, whom he derides for his less than authentic triumphs, he comments on "the extremely onerous labours of

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\(^{70}\) Tacitus, *Annals*, IV.32.


the sovereign which embraced the management of a world”\textsuperscript{74}. In a passage concerning the debate during the trial of Thrasea Paetus, Eprius Marcellus asks whether Thrasea disagrees with Rome’s "world-wide peace”\textsuperscript{75}, and, in his description of the voluntary abdication of Vitellius, Tacitus acknowledges that "Here was a Roman emperor who, but yesterday lord of all mankind [\textit{Romanus princeps et generis humani paulo ante dominum}], now, abandoning the seat of his high fortune, was going through the city to give up his imperial power”\textsuperscript{76}.

Tacitus the historian seems to approve of the \textit{imperium Romanum} and to support territorial aggrandisement\textsuperscript{77}, Tacitus the man was reconciled at last with the Principate as it had developed by the end of the first century when "Nerva has united things long incompatible, the principate and liberty" and "Trajan is increasing daily the happiness of the times”\textsuperscript{78}. If this was not the best of all possible worlds at least it was possible now to live in dignity and security.

Hadrian, philhellenic by choice, increased further the assimilation of the emperor to god\textsuperscript{79}. Hadrian, says Pausanias, "contributed very much to the happiness of his various subjects. He never voluntarily entered on a war" and for modern scholars he is permanently characterised as an emperor who was unwilling to fight wars\textsuperscript{80}. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is rare to find Hadrianic authors expressing ideas of Rome’s world dominion. The best known writer of the age is perhaps Suetonius. His one surviving work, biographies of Rome’s rulers from Julius Caesar to Domitian, is characterised by disapproval of expansionist policies. Suetonius says of Augustus that he "never wantonly invaded any country, and felt no temptation to increase the boundaries of the empire or enhance his military glory...”\textsuperscript{81}. This is in

\textsuperscript{74} Tacitus, \textit{Annals}, XII.5. Claudius celebrated 27 triumphs during his reign, 4 of them for the invasion of Britain.
\textsuperscript{75} Tacitus, \textit{Annals}, XVI.28.
\textsuperscript{76} Tacitus, \textit{Histories}, III.68.
\textsuperscript{78} Tacitus, \textit{Agricola}, 3.1.
\textsuperscript{80} Pausanias, I, v.5. Hadrian’s non-aggressive policy is also attested in: SHA, \textit{Hadrian}, V.1; Cassius Dio, LXIX, 5.1; Fronto, \textit{Principia Historiae}, 10 and 11.
\textsuperscript{81} Suetonius, \textit{Divus Augustus}, 21.
such blatant disagreement with the *Res Gestae* and the attitudes of poets like Horace and Virgil, and the facts, that it can only be explained by the fact that Suetonius was writing under Hadrian who liked to style himself as the new Augustus. Augustus, the model emperor, was therefore made to appear non-aggressive, befitting the image of Hadrian, that most unaggressive of emperors. As discussed above Suetonius speaks approvingly of Tiberius' reluctance to fight wars: the emperor we are told "sanctioned aggressive action only if it seemed unavoidable."\(^2\)

A different picture emerges during the reign of the Antonine emperors. Antoninus Pius, for all our perception of him as a peaceful ruler, fought many more wars than Hadrian. And there is other evidence for the continuing belief in the tradition of Rome's world-rule under this emperor. The two most illustrious writers of this period, both Greek, are Appian and Aelius Aristides. Both present a conception of the Roman empire that differs from the traditional view. But in this concept they still present Rome's empire as world-wide, in a process of assimilation that divides the world now into Romans and non-Romans. There is a repeated message of Rome's world-wide dominion: "if one looks at the whole empire and reflects how small a fraction rules the whole world he may be amazed at the city, but when he has beheld the city herself and the boundaries of the city, he can no longer be amazed that the the entire civilized world is ruled over by one so great."\(^4\)

The difference in Aelius' formulation is that he seems to recognize that certain parts of the world are not worth having, although Rome could conquer them should she so desire. Rome has erected walls to defend her empire but it is not clear from whom the empire is being defended, since "it is right to pity those outside your hegemony, *if indeed there be any*..."\(^5\). This declaration divides the world into those within the empire, and those without, who are not to be feared but pitied since they are unwanted by Rome.

This is not just a re-categorization of the world from its old division of

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\(^3\) Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 37.
\(^5\) Aelius Aristides, *Roman Oration*, 81; 99 (my emphasis).
Greek and barbarian: Aelius shares an attitude that is given its most graphic voice in the Preface to Appian's *Roman History*. In this preamble Appian describes the extent of the empire and the benefits conferred on its inhabitants and then proceeds to outline the most arrogant of attitudes about Rome's conquests:

"Some nations have been added to the empire by these emperors, and the revolts of others have been suppressed. Possessing the best part of the earth and sea they have, on the whole, aimed to preserve their empire by the exercise of prudence, rather than to extend their sway indefinitely over poverty-stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians, some of whom I have seen at Rome offering themselves, by their ambassadors, as its subjects, but the Emperor would not accept them because they would be of no use to him. On some of these nations they spend more than they receive from them, deeming it dishonourable to give them up even though they are costly. They surround the empire with great armies and they garrison the whole stretch of land and sea like a single stronghold".

Although Appian is justifying the world-view encapsulated in Hadrian's external policy he shares an attitude with both the emperor and with Aelius Aristides. Their common attitude is that Rome has conquered, if not the whole world, then everything that is worth having. Any peoples that remain outside the empire now, if there are any, will remain so and are therefore to be pitied. This would seem to be a statement reflecting the abandonment of the old ideal of *imperium sine fine*. This view of Rome, however, is an expression of Greek culture. Appian and Aelius Aristides were both from the Greek east and Hadrian had become deeply attached to Greek culture, hence his derogatory nickname of 'the little Greek' [*Graeculus*].

But this opinion was not widespread. Lucian, who had travelled widely through the Roman world, east and west, makes contemporary attitudes

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87 Birley, "Reflections", p. 19.
88 SHA, *Hadrian*, I.3. This is the conclusion also reached by Birley, *RFRFP*, p. 24.
quite clear in his satirical *How to Write History*, written during the course of Lucius Verus' Parthian war. There appears to have been an ongoing war-mania and "ever since the present situation arose...every single person is writing history". This plethora of histories is typified by the historian "who even included the future in his history...He has promised to write of future happenings in India and the circumnavigation of the outer sea...". Implicit in Lucian's writing, despite its satirising, is a general attitude that Roman expansion was welcomed and even delighted in, and really just a great big adventure. This attitude is best summed up by Lucian in his statement that any other wars that might be worth writing about will be other tribes fighting each other: "Celts against Getans or Indians against Bactrians (no-one would dare fight us - we've beaten everybody already)". And it is noteworthy that it was under the Antonines that Florus chose to compose his epitome of the wars of the Romans. This summary covers a period of 700 years down to the time of Augustus when so "widely have they extended their arms throughout the world, that those who read of their exploits are learning the history, not of a single people, but of the human race" and the whole world has been pacified. In Florus' opinion emperors after Augustus, by their inactivity, allowed the Roman people to degenerate, until Trajan renewed the vigour of the race with his expansionist policies.

Ideas of Rome's world dominion continue to appear during the middle and late empire, with few dissenting voices. Cassius Dio with his hostile attitude to expansion is one non-conformist. But Dio does not question the validity of waging war when necessary for reasons of strategy or defence. What he deplores is territorial expansion for its own sake i.e. the traditional functioning of Roman external policy. So there are certain passages in Cassius Dio that have been used as evidence for the defensive nature of Augustus' external policy. But as Brunt, following Fergus Millar, points out in his review of Hans Meyer's book on the Augustan poets: "Dio was always opposed to expansion...he would have

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91 Lucian, *How to Write History*, 35.
94 Cassius Dio, LIII.10 on 27 B.C. and LIV.8 on 20 B.C.
been very ready to make Augustus, the exemplar for later emperors, more pacific than he really was"95.

There is other evidence for Dio's hostility to the tradition of expansion, but his statements on this subject really re-inforce my notion of its place within the functional ideology of the Principate. Discussing Trajan he comments on the usual result on soldiers of an aggressive military policy: they become conceited and arrogant. He says, rather disdainfully, of Trajan's Parthian war that it was really motivated by a desire to win renown [ὁμορροφεῖον] rather than by the behaviour of the Parthian king which was used as a pretext by Trajan. And in his final summing up of the Parthian war he notes that "the Romans in conquering Armenia, most of Mesopotamia, and the Parthians had undergone their hardships and dangers all for naught"96 because the territorial additions had been given up by Hadrian. In another passage Dio comments that Septimius Severus "out of a desire for glory made a campaign against the barbarians", and in a yet more famous passage makes the remark of Severus that:

"He used to declare that he had added a vast territory to the empire and had made it a bulwark of Syria. On the contrary, it is shown by the facts themselves that this conquest has been a source of constant wars and great expense to us. For it yields very little and uses up vast sums; and now that we have reached out to peoples who are neighbours of the Medes and Parthians rather than of ourselves, we are always, one might say, fighting the battles of those people"97.

We have almost come to the end of our survey of ancient opinion about the empire. The idea of Rome's world dominion did not die out during the second century. It reappears throughout the middle and late empire in such authors as Ammianus Marcellinus and even amidst the disintegration of the empire emperors such as Diocletian and Julian.

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96 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 7.5; 17.1; 33.1.
97 Cassius Dio, LXXV, 1.1; 11.2-3.
were "styled dominus orbis "98. The concept is given a further ironic voice in Claudian's speech on the consulsiphip of the Vandal Stilicho in 400. Once again, we are told, the world "blossoms with Rome's ancient virtues" and Stilicho has become the "protector of a city...who extends her sway over all the earth"99. Eventually the concept was even taken over by the Christian writers. Origen, writing against the pagan Celsus in the third century, gave a typically Roman expression to the theme when he noted that Augustus was "the one who reduced to uniformity, so to speak, the many kingdoms on earth so that he had a single empire"100. Orosius, in his"Seven Books against the Pagans"composed some two centuries later, states that he will write of the history of Rome "up to the principate of Caesar and the birth of Christ, from which time the control of the world has remained under the power of the City, even down to our own time"101. Of course Christian writers had their own ideological program but belief in Rome as the ruler of a Christian world empire is part of an unbroken tradition that stretches back at least to the third century B.C.

In the end Dio's view that expansion was not justified and its embodiment in Hadrian's policy of the 'surfeited empire' were to prevail through "sheer necessity" as Birley puts it102. The attitude shared by these two individuals, unrepresentative as it was, seems to have been adopted by many modern historians of the imperial period as the common and accepted view of the world during the principate.

Modern Opinions of Roman Imperialism

The modern approach has usually been to see Rome's expansion as only defensive or 'accidental' imperialism. Central to this view is that Rome did not consciously want an empire but acquired territory unwittingly, as a result of defensive action in response to threats to her security, or the security of those with whom Rome had some treaty of friendship, formal or informal. Such a view was in part a response to Polybius'
assertion that Rome desired an empire and that it was natural for her to
go to war with the aim of winning territory, in part to the historical
circumstances under which the major advocates of this vision wrote.
The sentiment that the Roman empire had been acquired by defensive
imperialism was originally the premise of the great German scholar
Theodore Mommsen. His view of the accidental nature of the
acquisition of that enormous territory was contained within his
*Römische Geschichte* first published over the years 1854-56. It is a
romantic vision inspired by the dream of a unified Germany after the
struggles of the 1848 revolution, and is clearly a product of
Mommsen's particular circumstances and experience.\(^{103}\)

The view was re-stated by Holleaux in 1920. In this work Holleaux
stressed the 'accidental' nature of Rome's territorial expansion in
Greece, and believed that factors outside Rome's control had pushed her
into acquiring an empire.\(^{104}\) This judgement, which sees the causes of
Roman expansion in the peripheries rather than the centre, has
remained prominent in the literature for 70 years. Ernst Badian, not
himself a proponent of the 'defensive' approach but one who accepts the
accidental nature of the conquests, has made perhaps the most recent
formulation of the terms of this particular stand. He particularly
emphasises the idea that there was a total lack of economic motivation
for expansion; whatever economic consequences flowed from territorial
aggrandizement were purely unintentional, however desirable, and
believes that an apparent reluctance of the Senate to annex territory in
the second century is evidence for the non-aggressive nature of Roman
expansion.\(^{105}\)

Recently there has been a re-action against the defensive/accidental
imperialism approach. In 1979 William Harris published *War and
Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327 - 70 B.C.*, an iconoclastic

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103 A sympathetic account of the work and Mommsen's sentiments is contained in
Jerzy Linderski, *"Si vis pacem, para bellum: concepts of defensive
imperialism"* in W.V. Harris (ed.), *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome*,

104 M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au IIIe siècle

44ff; p. 9ff.
rebuttal of the defensive imperialism concept. J.A. North believes that "The major achievement of War and Imperialism is surely that it makes this view virtually untenable". Indeed North goes on to state "The achievement of this book should not be under-estimated, nor its implications missed". Put briefly those implications are that "Our whole understanding of imperialism and its origins is in question". What has Harris done? It seems to me that he has effectively demolished the accidental notion of Rome's territorial gains. He has established that the ethos of all Romans, not just the aristocracy, was geared towards the waging of regular wars; that those most directly involved in policy decisions consciously made substantial profits from Roman expansion; that expansion was a publicly stated aim; and that Roman wars were primarily aggressive in intention.

Harris sought to show that all Roman wars were aggressive in intent but it is this section of his book (Chapter V) that is the least successful and has attracted the most criticism. However if his position is sufficiently modified to the extent of saying that most of Rome's wars under the Republic were aggressive in nature, rather than trying to demonstrate that all of them were, there seems no effective counter-argument. Harris himself has accepted the implied objections of both Sherwin-White's review article and North's more general article in regard to this assertion, and makes the point in the preface to the corrected paperback edition that he does "not maintain that the Romans planned the construction of their empire long in advance...or that they were the aggressors in every war they undertook during the middle Republic...".

Needless to say the dominant view of Rome as a defensive imperialist state has influenced perceptions of the empire under the principate and later. It seems to be tacitly assumed, often without argument, that all expansion, defensive or otherwise, ceased with Augustus. Any military actions made by Roman emperors are assumed to be aimed at providing

106 See above note 11.
108 North, p. 2. It is this discussion that has generated most of the objections from A.N. Sherwin White in his review of the Harris' book in JRS, LXX (1980), p. 177f.
109 Harris, p. v.
a secure frontier. The total lack of books on the principate equivalent to Harris' work on the Republic (or indeed to the earlier creeds of Mommsen, Holleaux, Badian, etc.) is one indication of the pervasive influence of the position. P.A. Brunt's magisterial survey of the British and Roman empires does not in fact discuss the concept of imperialism but only examines the workings of the empires themselves\textsuperscript{110}. Mason Hammond, who has made a comprehensive survey of contemporary Roman attitudes to expansion and empire, stopped with Augustus because, as Hammond puts it, "he put an end to the imperialistic expansion of Rome"\textsuperscript{111}. The most recent and influential book on the Roman frontier, E.N. Luttwak's \textit{The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire}\textsuperscript{112}, is underpinned by an assumption of the total lack of desire by emperors for any territorial aggrandizement. J.C. Mann, in his otherwise perceptive analysis of the non-existence of any co-ordinated strategic frontier policy in the imperial period, states that "The fact that Roman expansion ground to a halt is a change not unconnected with the establishment of the principate"\textsuperscript{113}. (To be fair, Mann's position has been modified: see the discussion below.) Even Harris, otherwise extremely revisionist in his arguments, accepts that Augustus put a halt to expansion\textsuperscript{114}. I believe that these views ignore an important dynamic of Roman politics, a dynamic of expansion that did not disappear with the end of the Republic, but which was always a part of imperial politics and always an option for reigning emperors.

There are, however, some hopeful signs that there is a movement towards a revision of our attitudes to aspects of Roman politics and external policy under the principate. Recently voices dissenting from the accepted dogma have been raised. The earliest I have come across is a 1974 article by Anthony Birley published in a relatively obscure British journal. That article, "Roman Frontiers and Roman Frontier Policy: Some Reflections on Roman Imperialism"\textsuperscript{115}, presents an

\textsuperscript{110} Brunt, "Reflections on British and Roman Imperialism", \textit{passim}. In fact Brunt's overall position is revisionist. He holds the view that Rome pursued world-empire and explicitly claimed to control states beyond its frontiers.

\textsuperscript{111} Hammond, p. 120. Can territorial expansion be non-imperialistic in terms of modern definitions?

\textsuperscript{112} See above note 3.

\textsuperscript{113} Mann, "Frontiers", p. 511.

\textsuperscript{114} Harris, p. 118, p. 164

\textsuperscript{115} See above note 36.
alternative view of a persistent ideology of expansion under the principate. Fergus Millar in his review article on Luttwak's *Grand Strategy* argues, *inter alia*, for a conceptual framework within which decisions about external policy were made that includes ideas of expansion. And Mann's view quoted above had changed by the time he came to write his own forceful review article on Luttwak's book. Mann now believes that the "desirability of expansion...was held out at least as an ideal for emperors to pursue...". A new book on the Roman army in the east by Benjamin Isaac, *The Limits of Empire*, is another non-conformist attack on the received wisdom, particularly the point of view offered by Luttwak. Isaac examines Roman wars against Parthia and Persia and perceives that "the frontier policy of Rome in the East intermittently but persistently aimed at expansion". And Moses Finley has made a lucid and compelling analysis of the dichotomy between the evidence in ancient writers for attitudes to warfare and empire and the models used by today's ancient historians. The reluctance of historians to question this dichotomy has led, in Finley's words, to "the once prevailing and still tenacious nonsense that Rome, like Britain, acquired an empire in a fit of absence of mind". I hope to lighten somewhat the fog of this 'tenacious nonsense'.

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118 See Chapter 1 above.
120 Finley, p. 79.
Part 3: The Public Image Projected by Emperors

Introduction

I offer no excuse for making a study of imperial coin types central to my investigation of the public image projected by second century emperors. Irrespective of intention or audience, coins are a fundamental source of information about the principate. As has been pointed out by C.H.V. Sutherland, "The imperial coinage was, fundamentally, a government-controlled economic instrument which also said things, and usually illustrated them. This much is beyond question or denial"\(^1\). The very multiplicity of types, and the constant introduction and withdrawal of different types, as well as their proliferation throughout the imperial period demonstrates unequivocally that coin images had a purpose. Two questions integral to this belief have formed the basis of much vexed academic discussion: were the images chosen by the emperor or by an official of some sort; and, secondly, at whom were the coin messages aimed and did this audience take any notice of the messages?

There are two opposing positions on these questions, although a range of nuances exists on different aspects. On one side is the view that designs were chosen by some minor treasury functionary and were consequently unimportant and little regarded by those through whose hands the coins passed. On the other is the view that the emperor was personally, or very closely, involved in the choice of designs and these designs were part of a process by which an emperor disseminated a picture of his program and benefits to his people. We might call these two stands the 'economic' view and the 'propaganda' view\(^2\). Given the modern association of the word 'propaganda' with deliberate falsehood it might be better to refer to the latter as the 'publicising' view\(^3\). Levick believes that all the different views are not necessarily incompatible\(^4\), but generally it seems that those who discount the emperor's

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4. Levick, p. 105.
involvement in choice of types believe coins were unimportant as a means of disseminating information.

The 'publicising' view was the traditional one and remained dominant until the middle of this century. Two classic works by exponents of this view were published in 1950 and 1951. These were Michael Grant's *Roman Anniversary Issues* and C.H.V. Sutherland's *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, respectively. A lengthy quote from Grant's book well illustrates the 'publicising' position:

"Roman coinage...served a propagandist purpose far greater than has any other national coinage before or since. This was the means which the Roman government, lacking modern media of publicity, used to insinuate into every home in the empire each changing nuance of imperial achievement and policy. Their unremitting use of this means is evidence enough, if evidence is needed, that in the course of their vast circulation these coins were studied with an attentiveness that is quite alien to our own practice...For if this were not so, the hard-headed Roman government would not have been so foolish as to continue, for centuries, this lavish outlay of energy and ingenuity".

Unfortunately Grant has not discussed directly the issue of responsibility for choosing coin types — it is implicit in his argument that the decisions were made by the emperor.

In 1959 A.H.M. Jones published an article attacking this viewpoint and proffering the alternative that coins were basically an economic phenomenon and the designs simply commemorative and not chosen by the emperor. Jones believes that the silence of the literary sources is enough reason to doubt the importance of coin types and legends "for, if coin legends and types had possessed the importance that some numismatists attach to them, it would seem likely that some ancient

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6 Grant, p. 8.
author would have commented on them." Jones does admit that coins could be propaganda, but his concern is that their importance has been exaggerated by numismatists. Jones is also of the opinion that coin legends were irrelevant to the western portion of the empire since the native, tribal, tongues were anything but Latin; they were equally irrelevant to the eastern half since the literate proportion of the population spoke only Greek. This, of course, is all pure speculation, but just as today English is as close to an international language as is possible, so too was Latin in the ancient world, and the literate population of the east was more likely to be bi-lingual than only Greek speaking. Just one example will suffice. Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus, from Sardis in the Greek east and suffect consul in 92, was commemorated in a library built at Ephesus by his heirs. Celsus was buried in the basement of the building and visitors who approached the entrance could read on either side of the doorway his career, in Latin on the right, Greek on the left. And we must not forget, also, that soldiers were required to learn Latin. C.H.V. Sutherland has pointed out, in his reply to Jones' article, that it is clear "that the coinage mainly absorbed by the common soldiery in the average permanent camp consisted of ases and dupondii, with very few sestertii and virtually no gold and silver," and it seems obvious that soldiers were a prime target for the messages of the so-called senatorial coinage. The language surely had a much wider audience than Jones would allow, and an audience that at least understood the allusions of the legends and types.

The question of who was responsible for choosing or approving types and legends is less amenable to examination. Barbara Levick published an article in 1982 that proffers an argument that is a refinement of the Jones position. Levick re-directs the question of the audience of the coins by suggesting that the types were chosen by the moneyers to flatter the emperor. She believes that "mint officials proposed types and

8 Jones, p. 14.
9 Jones, pp. 14f.
11 C.H.V. Sutherland, "The Intelligibility of Roman Imperial Coin Types", JRS XLIX (1959), p. 53.
12 As Jones admits, p. 15.
13 See note 3. On the question of choice Jones merely notes that we do not know who chose the types and legends, p. 14.
legends that they believed would gratify the Princeps, that presented him on the coinage as he wished to see himself\textsuperscript{14} and for this reason discounts the 'publicising' view of coinage. Her belief is not, however, incompatible with the view that coin images and legends were aimed at publicising an emperor and his program. An emperor would, logically, have his own concept of his image and coins would necessarily reflect this. It seems to me that Levick's examples can be used just as consistently to support the 'publicising' argument as to prove her own view. One of her examples is the appearance of Nero and Agrippina on coinage towards the end of Claudius' reign. Levick believes their prominence on the coins, which is beyond anything accorded to Claudius, is proof that the coins were produced, in this instance, by the moneyers for their future master without the approval of the current emperor\textsuperscript{15}. However, I believe, this one example destroys her position. The whole point of her argument is the belief that the moneyers were "presenting their employer to himself in the most favourable aspect..."\textsuperscript{16}. In 52, when coins featuring Nero and Agrippina first began to appear, Claudius was still very much emperor. Why would moneyers publicise Nero and Agrippina at the expense of Claudius, as Levick argues, when Claudius was still very much their master, and no decision on the succession had been made publicly? Clearly the emperor must either have approved this re-focus, or moneyers were not merely concerned with presenting the emperor in as favourable a light as possible. In either case Levick's argument cannot be sustained. And in fact the revised edition of volume 1 of \textit{The Roman Imperial Coinage}, points out that examples of these particular coins are rare, suggesting that they were never minted in large quantities anyway\textsuperscript{17}.

The question of who actually chose coin legends and images cannot be answered, although various points of view have been proposed. Jones, although he does not investigate the question, implies that they were chosen by minor officials. Levick believes the moneyers themselves decided. The traditional viewpoint, exemplified by Sutherland, is that there can be no doubt that the choice, whether made by the emperor

\textsuperscript{14} Levick, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{15} Levick, p. 111-112.
\textsuperscript{16} Levick, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{RIC}, i, pp. 117 and 119.
personally or by some delegated official, reflected the emperor's wishes. Common sense leads me to believe that it would not have been possible for the emperor to choose personally each and every type. Equally I cannot believe that the choice was completely at the discretion of the moneyers, although undoubtedly situations would arise when there can have been no direct involvement by an emperor. It seems probable that approval of types was made by someone close to the emperor, and with the emperor's imprimatur, and always reflected the emperor's own desires.

It is difficult to differentiate between pacific and martial emperors on the basis of coin imagery alone. Victory, for example, was always, throughout the imperial period, one of the four most important personifications, on the basis of the quantity of extant evidence, along with Concordia, Fortuna, and Salus, and was used frequently even by unmilitary emperors like Nerva and Antoninus. Thus the appearance of Victory types in themselves does little to establish the ideology pursued by a particular emperor. It is when the Victory types are examined, not in isolation, but in comparison with the occurrence of all other types under a particular emperor that we begin to appreciate their importance to that emperor. And this holds true for other types. Appendix 1 is a comparative table of types for the period under examination. Reference will be made to this table in the course of the following discussion.

A second method of value as evidence for the image an emperor wished to portray is to look at those coins which depict the emperor and differentiate between those that involve military activities and those that portray civil and/or religious duties. The table at Appendix 2 summarises the result of this categorisation for each emperor. It, too, will be referred to from time to time in the following discussion.

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19 For instance the first year of Trajan's reign before he had returned to Rome from Germany. Coins were issued and Trajan cannot have been personally involved in the choice of types. But he had friends in Rome and it is futile to hold that he would not have communicated with them. The very nature of the coins this early in his reign suggests that a general program had been made known to the moneyers.
20 JR Fears, "The Cult of Virtues and Roman Imperial Ideology" in ANRW, II, 17.2, p. 935 (hereafter "Cult of Virtues").
Trajan continued the Flavian innovations in regard to coin iconography, and during his reign there is a great flowering of the types and numbers of the 'personified abstractions' appearing on coins. I find it hard to accept Fear's argument that Pliny's *Panegyricus* to Trajan is an official program for the new reign. Instead it is what it is: a speech of thanks to the supreme potentate of the state, and as was the formula for such speeches it dwells at great length on the virtues of the emperor. If it is sycophantic we should accept that it could not be otherwise. The Principate, even under Trajan and the Antonines, was an outright autocracy. The *Panegyricus* was in a tradition of rhetoric whose reality cannot be denied. The program Pliny discusses is one that encompasses neatly the qualities hitherto displayed by Trajan, and the virtues of a ruler that make him an example for all time. As he himself declares under the vote of thanks, the purpose of a speech such as the Panegyric is that "good rulers should recognize their own deeds and bad ones learn what theirs should be."

The *Panegyricus* emphasises those qualities of Trajan that all men wish to see in their ruler. In a very short space early on in his speech Pliny specifies twenty moral qualities that should be possessed by the good emperor: pietas, abstinentia, mansuetudo (2.6); humanitas, temperantia, facilitas (2.7); pudor (2.8); modestia, moderatio (3.2); frugalitas, clementia, liberalitas, benignitas, continentia, labor, fortitudo (3.4); severitas, hilaritas, gravitas, simplicitas (4.6), and over the course of the Panegyric mentions a number of others: honor et potestas (24.4); iustitia (33.2); sapientia (55.8); libertas (58.3); felicitas (74.1); patientia (76.1); aequitas (77.3); diligentia (92.2).

As can be perceived in the table at Appendix 1 the coin issues reflect these generalities. Thus in the first year of Trajan's reign, while he was

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21 *RIC*, ii, p. 238. See also *BMC*, ii, p. xc.
23 Pliny, *Panegyricus*, 4.1: "boni principes quae facerent recognoscerent, mali quae facere deberent".
absent from Rome and in no position to approve or directly influence the choice of coin types, we see issues of types of Annona, Concordia, Felicitas, Fortuna, Pax, Vesta, and of course Victory. A coin issued in this year bears early witness to the emphasis throughout the reign on military success. It shows Germania seated on shields, holding an olive branch. Such an issue in this year, which he spent travelling in the Rhenish and Danubian provinces, might serve to advertise his presence on this frontier, and to remind, during his absence, of the direction he would take.

Alternatively the coin might be a reference to Trajan's GERMANICUS epithet which formed part of his imperial title immediately after his accession. Although it seems that the epithet was taken by Nerva in October 97, soon after Trajan's adoption, in the absence of evidence for Trajan's use of the title before his accession, it must be regarded as having been inherited by Trajan. It is not clear, however, for just which action the title was taken by Nerva. No coins relating to the event specifically seem to have been issued, although two issues of Victoria in 97 might refer to a military success of some nature. An inscription referring to the award of equestrian military dona to Q. Attius T. f. Maecius Priscus, military tribune of legion I Adiutrix, names the campaign as a bellum Suebicum. This is generally taken to be the occasion for the assumption of the GERMANICUS epithet by Nerva. It has also been argued that the epithet was taken after Trajan successfully put down a rebellion of one of the Rhine legions in 97. In light of the silence of Pliny, and the difficulties such a scenario raises in regard to the placement and number of legions on the Rhine, it is perhaps better to discount this argument. Whatever the occasion, it was so obscure as to leave no trace in any of the extant literary sources, and I, at least, remain sceptical about the reality of this victory.

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25 RIC, ii, p. 245 no. 5.
26 RIC, ii, p. 238, notes that the coins commemorate the "subjugation of the Germani and other Teutonic tribes in the Rhine district...".
27 RIC, ii, pp. 222 and 236.
28 See the discussion below, p. 95f.
29 RIC, ii, p. 224 nos. 21 and 22. These were issued as Imperial coins in gold and silver but interestingly no senatorial issues of this type are known.
30 ILS, 2720 (= CIL, v, 7425).
31 See, for instance, Garzetti, p. 304.
Conversely, GERMANICUS was also part of Domitian's titulature. It is just conceivable that it was assumed by Nerva when the praetorian guard became restless, also in 97, in order to establish more firmly his link to the previous emperor\(^3\). In any case Nerva's assumption of the title is indicative of the continuing importance to emperors of visible military successes. Such names were not usually inherited\(^4\) and the assumption of the title by Trajan after his adoption by Nerva had a singular purpose. Since this was the first instance of an emperor adopting a non-dynastic successor the aim was to place the heir-apparent in a position where the transfer of power could not be challenged\(^5\). It was on this occasion that Trajan, despite his apparent non-involvement in the action, was acclaimed imperator for the first time, while Nerva took his second such acclamation.

An interesting feature of Trajan's coins in these early years is their very lack of legends apart from those of titulature. The first issues bearing legends, other than those of the standard titulature, therefore assume significance. The first issue with an extra legend is a coin of 98 with the legend PROVID, showing Nerva or the Senate, and Trajan\(^6\), no doubt celebrating the foresight and good management represented by Nerva's choice. The next coins with additional legends appear in the period 101-102, probably later in this period rather than earlier. These bear the reverse legend DACICVS COS IIII P P\(^7\). The 'Dacieus' type shows Hercules standing, and undoubtedly commemorates success in the first Dacian war. The next issue of Trajan's which carries an additional reverse legend again commemorates victory over Dacia. This coin has the legend DACICVS COS V P P\(^8\) and shows Victory, flying, holding a wreath and palm\(^9\). Another issue of the same period shows a Dacian seated on a pile of arms resting his head on his left hand\(^10\). All these serve to emphasise the military success of Trajan and the military subjugation of Dacia.

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3. This is also the opinion of J.B. Campbell, The Emperor and the Roman Army, Oxford, 1984, p. 132.
4. Campbell, p. 130.
5. Campbell, p. 126.
6. RIC, ii, p. 246 no. 28.
7. RIC, ii, p. 247 no. 45.
8. RIC, ii, p. 249 no. 73.
9. RIC, ii, p. 249 no. 78.
Other issues of the period of the first Dacian war portray Hercules, although without additional legends, and there is a proliferation of the Victory types under Trajan. Hercules is generally associated with war, good luck and travellers. Trajanic types of this demigod show him carrying his club and lion-skin, occasionally sacrificing at an altar. One Victory type of 101-102 has the emperor holding a spear and parazonium, being crowned by Victory, who holds a palm. A separate Victory type portrays the emperor holding a spear while erecting a trophy which rests upon a Dacian. Another type shows Victory standing inscribing DACI CA on a shield fixed to a trophy. A denarius of the period portrays the figure of a Dacian, seated on a pile of weapons, his arms bound, and with the legend DAC CAP in the exergue. There can be no clearer picture of the message conveyed by these Victory types: the complete conquest of Dacia. Compare these to issues celebrating the acquisition of Arabia, issued at approximately the same time as those of Dacia. One type shows Arabia standing, holding a branch, and at her feet a camel. The reverse legend reads ARAB ADQVISIT, plus the emperor's titles. The difference in the wording indicates the different ways in which the new provinces were added to the empire: Dacia by military capture, Arabia by peaceful acquisition.

A different type illustrates that Trajan was supported in his endeavours by the great god of war Mars. There are many such coins issued under Trajan (some 7% of the total issues). The first appearance of such a coin is in the period 101-2 following the successes of the first Dacian war. This, without legend apart from the titles, shows Mars walking with a spear and a trophy. More types of Mars, probably issued after the second Dacian war, portray Mars walking left carrying Victory and a sceptre, while yet others have Mars in military dress, standing, holding a spear and with one hand resting on a shield supported by a

40 See for example RIC, p. 247 no. 49; p. 255 no. 152.
41 RIC, ii, p. 248 no. 69.
42 RIC, ii, p. 249 no. 70. Dacian issues represent 6.6% of the total under Trajan.
43 RIC, ii, p. 253 no. 130.
44 RIC, ii, p. 250 no. 96.
45 RIC, ii, p. 250 no. 94; p. 278 no. 465, etc.
46 RIC, ii, p. 248 no. 52.
47 These carry COS V in the obverse titles, but also DAC, which was not assumed by Trajan as part of the imperial titulature until 103/4.
In connection with the Dacian war reference must be made to a type which would appear to commemorate Trajan's brilliant engineering feat of bridging the Danube. This type, which carries the reverse legend DANVIVVS in the exergue, and COS V P P S P Q R OPTIMO PRINC, shows Danube reclining on rocks, his left arm resting on an urn, his right hand holding a ship's prow and a cloak floating above.

Types which portray Trajan taking part in military activity are also representative of military successes like the Dacian wars. One such shows the emperor, standing, being crowned by Victory. A number of types picture Trajan in a quadriga holding a laurel branch in one hand and a sceptre in the other. A more martial spirit is obvious in coins which show the emperor mounted on a horse thrusting a spear at a fallen Dacian. The emperor is shown in other poses placing his foot on the head of a Dacian, or accepting a shield from a kneeling Dacian. Trajan was not one to let men forget his successes. Coins of 111 show Victory with her foot on a helmet, inscribing DACI CA on a shield attached to a palm tree, and issues in the period after 112 remind of the acquisition of Arabia, showing Arabia holding a branch with the reverse legend ARAB ADQ in the exergue.

The grand enterprise of Trajan in the East was bound to be commemorated, and many coins of the period 112-117 attest to Trajan's desire to see his deeds remembered. The whole progress of the eastern campaigns can be followed on the coins of the period. There are coins dating from the period 112-114 with the reverse legend REX PARTHVS and the figure of a Parthian attended by 5 soldiers, being received by Trajan who sits above him on a platform. It is probable
that this represents Trajan's reception of ambassadors from Chosroes at Athens in 113. The military phase of the campaign began in the spring of 114 with an invasion of Armenia, which was taken with only minor fighting. This is perhaps represented by a denarius of uncertain date which seems to show Armenia standing, but carries no legend except the imperial titles. A senatorial sestertius of somewhat later date carries the legend ARMENIA ET MESOPOTAMIA IN POTESTATEM P R REDACTAE, and shows Trajan standing with a spear and parazonium, while before him on the ground recline the figures of Armenia, the Euphrates, and the Tigris. It was presumably for this success in late 114 that Trajan was given his seventh acclamation as imperator. Another coin of this time, which can be dated only to the period 112 to 114 on the basis of the imperial titles, bears the reverse legend MARS VICTOR and portrays Mars holding a trophy and a spear. It must celebrate successes in the east.

As the campaign continued so further successes were represented on the coinage. One coin type issued after 115 describes a PARTHIA CAPTA and shows a trophy between two seated Parthians. A further coin with the legend PARTHICO P M TR P COS VI P S P Q R and a bust of Sol commemorates Trajan's assumption of the title PARTHICO. Coins with the legend REGNA ADSIGNATA are generally held to represent Trajan receiving the kings of Armenia, Mesopotamia and Parthia. On the basis of the titulature these can be dated to the year 116-117, but may represent some of the Parthian vassal kings who came to Trajan suing for peace. A feature of these types is the exaggerated size of the

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58 Dio, LXVIII, 17.2. These types are generally held to represent Parthamasiris' meeting with Trajan at Elegeia in 114 (see for instance RIC, ii, p239). However, the titulature on the coins cannot be used for a more specific date than the period 112 - late 114, and the description REX PARTHVS cannot be applied to Parthamasiris, since at the time he was King of Armenia, and only nephew of the Parthian King Chosroes. It is unlikely, therefore, that they do represent Trajan's meeting with Parthamasiris, and for this reason I prefer my own interpretation of the coins.


60 The titles are too brief to be used for precise dating. See RIC, ii, p. 270 no. 375.

61 RIC, ii, p. 289 no. 642.

62 See for example RIC, ii, p. 265 no. 309.

63 RIC, ii, p. 262 no. 258.

64 RIC, ii, p. 267 no. 324.

65 RIC, ii, p. 267 no. 326.

66 For example RIC, ii, p. 240. For the coins: RIC, ii, p. 269 no. 366, and p. 291 no. 666.

67 For example: Abgarus king of Osroene, Dio, LXVIII, 21.1; Manisarus, and
emperor. An overwhelmingly large figure of Trajan is also a feature of a single senatorial sestertius of 116/116. This bears the legend REX PARTHVS DATVS and shows Trajan seated on a platform presenting Parthamaspates to the Parthian people.

As mentioned above Victory issues are significant numerically under every emperor, in fact this Virtue must be recognised as of "central importance...in the ideological and political justification for imperial power". Nerva, himself old and unmilitary, issued Victory types in 96, 97, and 98, some bearing the legend VICTORIA AVGVST. Thus Victory issues need not reflect any specific event, and those of Trajan issued in the years 98-100/101 certainly do not refer to any known military success. To use the issues on their own to prove military activity is circular. Compare Victory statistically with other types and its significance (or otherwise) for an emperor becomes apparent. Of the 469 types listed for Trajan in the table, Victory is the single most frequent type with 91 issues, representing 19.5% of the total. Victory is thus of major significance under Trajan because of the frequency with which the types were issued. Although all Trajan's Victory issues are without additional legends, in the context of the nature of the image of Trajan presented by the coins as a whole there can be no doubt that the type represents the vigorous martial spirit and success of the soldier-emperor. Many of the attributes of the Victory issues portray just these qualities. Some have been discussed elsewhere but others are worth noting, such as the many coins showing Victory holding a wreath and palm, traditional attributes of military victory.

Almost as significant as Victory is Pax, since it is not one of Fears' four most frequent personifications, yet it is the second most frequently occurring type under Trajan with 42 issues (8.9%). Fortuna is the third most frequent type under Trajan representing 7.7% of the total. The two other major types identified by Fears, Concordia and Salus, together represent only about 4% (19 issues). The frequency of Pax issues is interesting and significant. Pax is frequently seen as the...
outcome of military success since it is this success which enables Pax to flourish\textsuperscript{72}. Thus one type of Pax issued after 106 show Pax holding an olive branch and sceptre while at her feet is a kneeling Dacian. Another of the same period depicts Pax holding an olive branch and cornucopia setting her foot on a Dacian\textsuperscript{73}.

There are other types which because of their general character emphasise the martial calibre of Trajan's temperament. Virtus, a traditional Roman virtue, was the combination of courage and steadfastness that were the quintessential qualities of a man. As such it is representative of prowess in the military sphere and, although it does not appear on coins before Nero, its iconographic allusions are strictly martial\textsuperscript{74}. Virtus types, although representing only about 1.4\% of the total issues of Trajan, support this linkage. One issue which bears the simple reverse legend S P Q R OPTIMO PRINCIPI shows a standing Virtus holding a spear and parazonium, with her left foot on a helmet\textsuperscript{75}. Another issue of this type carries the legend VIRTVTI ET FELICITATI, and implies that Trajan engenders FELICITAS by his own VIRTVS. It shows Virtus holding a spear and parazonium, and Felicitas carrying a caduceus and cornucopia\textsuperscript{76}.

It is interesting, finally, to note that Trajan associates his conquest of the east with some of the more traditional imperial virtues. While these other virtues are not necessarily martial their association with success in the Parthian war implies that they are the direct result of military victory. A coin (post-115), which shows Fortuna, seated, holding a rudder and cornucopia, associates the emperor's assumption of the epithet PARTHICUS with good fortune for the state. It anticipates his return to Rome with the legend FORT RED in the exergue, and bears PARTHICO P M TR P COS VI P S P Q R around the edge\textsuperscript{77}. Still other coins associate the capture of Parthia with the foresight for the management of the empire shown by good rulers, that is Providentia\textsuperscript{78}.

\textsuperscript{72} See for example, Campbell, p. 146: "Victory brought with it peace...".
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{RIC}, p. 256 no. 187; p. 257 nos. 190a; p. 280 no. 503.
\textsuperscript{74} Wallace-Hadrill, p. 320.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 257 no. 202.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 263 no. 268.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 266 no. 315.
\textsuperscript{78} For examples see \textit{RIC}, ii: p. 269 nos. 357, 361, 364.
And the health of the empire is directly associated with the emperor. The first Salus type issued under Trajan is an undated aureus, probably of the period 103-111, bearing the legend SALVS GENERIS HVMANI. The coin shows Salus holding a rudder and a patera, her foot on a globe and an altar before her. An essential ingredient of Pliny's Panegyric is the vivid portrayal of Trajan as the saviour of the Roman State through his adherence to the traditional values and virtues of the republic. In one explicit passage Trajan's adoption is referred to in the words "non servitus nostra sed libertas et salus et securitas fundabatur". In conjunction with the message of the Panegyric and the coin legend itself this particular type seems to link Trajan's military success with the health of humanity, and therefore the empire, although there is perhaps also reference to the civil benefits flowing from war booty, e.g. alimenta. This unusual legend appears infrequently on imperial coinage. It was used sparingly and briefly by Galba, where it occurs as a legend with SALVS ET LIBERTAS. That particular phrase, salus generis humani, represents the exact wording of the appeal from Vindex to Galba to be the leader in rescuing humanity from Nero. It does not re-appear in the second century until the time of Commodus.

The Image of Trajan Himself

All the emperors issued coins depicting themselves performing recognisable functions. A great many of the coin issues under Trajan portray the emperor taking part in activities of military, civil or religious nature. The total number of such types under Trajan is 113, and of these no less than 76 (67%) depict the emperor engaged in military activity. This, it seems to me, is the most obvious evidence for the image of himself the emperor wished to present. Thus Trajan, a military emperor, has a preponderance of types on which he is involved in military activities. These activities include the emperor erecting trophies, riding in a chariot holding a wreath and/or spear, being crowned by Victory, riding a horse and thrusting spear at enemy or

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79 RIC, ii, p. 254 no. 148b. Dating given by RIC.
80 Pliny, Panegyricus, 8.1. Poorly translated by the Loeb edition as "security, happiness, and freedom".
81 BMC, ii, p. xix.
82 RIC, i, p. 291 no. 297.
83 Suetonius, Galba, 9.
riding over enemy, on horseback holding weapon, on foot or mounted holding Victory, and so on.\footnote{Erecting trophy: \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 249 no. 70; riding chariot: \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 247 no. 48, p. 249 no. 77, etc.; crowned by Victory: \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 248 no. 69; riding horse and spearing enemy: \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 258 no. 208; mounted with weapon: \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 273 nos. 403, 404; holding Victory: \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 264 no. 291.}

Of course portrayals of the emperor performing civil or religious business occur but these only account for some 33\% of the types featuring the emperor. Such types commemorate his \textit{alimenta} scheme, and the restoration of Italy that this would ensure.\footnote{\textit{RIC}, ii, p. 250 no. 93, p. 251 no. 105 (with the legend REST ITAL).} One hybrid coin of uncertain date portrays Trajan holding a sceptre and patera\footnote{\textit{RIC}, ii, p. 270 no. 376.} and there are coins commemorating his distribution on accession with the legend \textit{COS II PP CONG PR S} by \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 272 no. 380.\footnote{\textit{RIC}, ii, p. 700 no. 409, is a \textit{Clementia} issue showing the virtue with the legend \textit{CLEMENTIA AVG}. It is recorded as hybrid with a Hadrianic reverse, so its authenticity as a coin of Trajan must be doubted. \textit{Clementia} had not previously appeared on coins of the Principate and its issue by Hadrian would be more likely than by Trajan, who only introduced one new virtue during his reign \textit{i.e. Providentia}.} Despite the occurrence of such types they represent a very small proportion of the total number of issues of Trajan and the conclusion to be drawn can only be that Trajan did not wish these aspects of his administration to be as emphasised as the military aspects.

\section*{Hadrian}

Under Hadrian the representation of virtues and 'personified abstractions' on coins reaches its climax, and after this period coin types are generally distinguished only by their sameness and lack of originality.\footnote{Wallace-Hadrill, p. 311.} Hadrian's coins are remarkable for the number of different virtues and the frequency with which they appear. In the first few years of his reign coins appear showing types never before used: \textit{Clementia}\footnote{Although \textit{DISCIPLINA} appears for the first time in coin legends under Hadrian the virtue itself is never personified on coins, unlike the other new types introduced by this emperor.}, \textit{Hilaritas}, \textit{Indulgentia}, \textit{Liberalitas}, \textit{Patientia}, \textit{Pudicitia}, and \textit{Tranquillitas}.\footnote{Wallace-Hadrill, p. 311.}
Nerva's adoption of Trajan had been celebrated, as far as we know, on only one coin issue: the aureus and denarius of 98-9 showing Trajan receiving the globe from Nerva, with the legend PROVID\(^{91}\). Coin issues representing Trajan's supposed adoption of Hadrian are frequent in the first year of Hadrian's reign. One example is a coin with Hadrian's titulature on the obverse, showing on the reverse Trajan and Hadrian standing, holding a globe between them\(^{92}\). Another shows Trajan and Hadrian clasping hands and has the legend PARTHICI DIVI TRAIAN AVG F P M TR P COS P P, with ADOPTIO in the exergue\(^{93}\). Many of the types issued in 117-8 are an attempt to unite Hadrian with the militarily renowned Trajan. Accordingly the imperial titles used by Hadrian include Parthicus, Germanicus and Dacicus\(^{94}\). These were dropped later in 118 and Hadrian never used such titles again, but their use in 117-8 is significant as an attempt to ratify Hadrian's accession and accentuate the dynastic link with the previous emperor. These issues appear with the legends and types of Concord, Fortuna Redux, Iustitia, Pax, and Pietas. Pax, under Trajan the virtue that the emperor brings by his military success, perhaps indicates here that Hadrian inherited from Trajan an empire at peace (see below, p. 57). Of similar import are the numerous types which carry both obverse and reverse legends describing Trajan as the divine father of Hadrian, or of Hadrian as the son of Trajan\(^{95}\). "The lady doth protest too much, methinks" says Hamlet to Ophelia in another time and place\(^{96}\), and likewise Hadrian's insistence on the legitimacy of his accession is suspicious. Perhaps Dio is right to cast doubt on the adoption\(^{97}\). In this context the fact that no senatorial coins of the period carry these legends gives some credence to Dio's belief.

The new types introduced by Hadrian, while not numerically significant, are nevertheless of some consequence for the portrayal of the emperor. All are gentle, civic virtues and represent a startling

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\(^{91}\) RIC, ii, p. 246 no. 28.

\(^{92}\) The obverse titles read IMP CAES TRAIAN HADRIANO OPT AVG GER DAC.

\(^{93}\) See RIC, ii, p. 338, no. 2.

\(^{94}\) RIC, ii, p. 338 no. 2; p. 339 nos. 3-8; p. 340 no. 14 etc.

\(^{95}\) Examples: RIC, ii, p. 342 nos. 23-25a; p. 346 no. 53.

\(^{96}\) W Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act, III, scene ii, line 242.

\(^{97}\) "Ἄφιγαν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν Τραϊανοῦ ὁ παῖς ἐκπολίθητον". Dio, LXIX, 1.1.
increase in the number of virtues or moral qualities, as opposed to 'personified abstractions', appearing on imperial coinage. Most of the new types were issued in two series in about 119 and 128. Hilaritas and Pudicitia appear in 119/122 and not 128, and Clementia and Liberalitas appear in both series. The attributes of the various virtues reinforce the civic nature of these qualities: Clementia holds a patera and sceptre; Hilaritas raises a veil from her face; Indulgentia, seated, holds a sceptre; Liberalitas is depicted holding a pileus and sceptre; Patientia holds a sceptre; Pudicitia appears as a veiled figure with right hand on her breast and no other attributes; and Tranquillitas stands holding a sceptre.

Under Hadrian the most important types, based on frequency, are Fortuna and Roma (9.5% each), Felicitas (8.2%), Salus (6.2%), and Pietas (5.2%), Concordia and Victory (4.8% each), and Liberalitas. Together these 8 types account for 52.8% of Hadrian's types. Except for Victory, none figures prominently as military virtues. Victory, however, at 4.8% of the total number of issues, is insignificant when compared to its 19.5% under Trajan. Victory was not a personification that Hadrian could advertise too loudly since he had seemingly given up military activity. Victory types of 118 might represent the new emperor's eastern settlement but do not make him a martial spirit. Victory types of the period 134-138 are the only issues of this personification under Hadrian which carry legends attesting to VICTORIA AVG. They probably illustrate the successful outcome to the Jewish uprising in 134-5. As is to be expected, the associated type of Virtus is an infrequent one under Hadrian, only 8 issues are recorded from a total of 582 (1.4%). Virtus coins with legends appear at the same period as these Victory issues with legends, and probably also celebrate the end of the Jewish uprising. A typical one, with the legend VIRTUVTI AVG, pictures Virtus with one foot on a helmet holding a spear and parazonium, and no doubt personifies the virtus of Hadrian that secured Victory for Rome.

98 See Wallace-Hadrill, p. 308ff, for the arguments, accepted here, for a difference between virtues and 'personified abstractions'.
100 RIC, ii, p. 344 nos. 36, 37.
101 RIC, ii, p 372-3 nos. 281-286.
102 RIC, ii, p. 372 no. 287.
Apart from the preponderance of coins that carry the personified abstractions such as Concordia, Felicitas, Fortuna, and so on, many of Hadrian's less numerous issues present civic virtues and activities, and portray Hadrian as the restorer of stability and well-being. A prime example is his action, soon after his accession in 118, of abolishing debts to the tune of 900 million sesterces owed to the fiscus. This generosity is trumpeted on aes issues of 118 which loudly declare RELIQVA VETERA HS NOVIES MILL ABOLITA. Associated with the restored wealth of the state, this last-mentioned type broadcasts are the aes issues of 119-122, which carry the legend LOCVPLETATORI ORBIS TERRARVM and illustrate Hadrian seated on a platform with Liberalitas in front of him emptying a cornucopia. In front of this group two citizens stand to receive the outpouring of riches. In the same vein are further aes issues of the same period announcing RESTITVTORI ORBIS TERRARVM and showing Hadrian raising a kneeling woman who holds a globe.

Another of the less numerous types of Hadrian is Pax, and the contrast with the use of this personification by the previous emperor is interesting. Under Trajan Pax appears with military attributes in keeping with the view of this virtue as the outcome of successful military action. Hadrian uses Pax only once with a martial attribute. This is a coin of the period 119-122 without legend which depicts a seated Pax holding Victory and a branch. Possibly the coin was issued after the conclusion of the military action in Dacia and signifies that peace has been achieved by a successful end to the problem. All other Pax issues of Hadrian depict the goddess with peaceful attributes such as cornucopia, sceptre, and branch. The contrast between the aggressive external policy of Trajan and the peaceful one of Hadrian is obvious.

Hadrian was to emphasise his restoration of the well-being of the Roman world throughout his reign. Illuminating in this regard are the types issued in 134-6, both in gold and silver, and as aes coins, that

103 SHA, Hadrian, VII.6.
104 RIC, ii, p. 416 no. 590.
105 RIC, ii, p. 415 no. 585a.
106 RIC, ii, p. 416 no. 594a,b; p. 417 no. 603.
announce TELLVS STABIL, and picture Tellus with various attributes relating to the products of agriculture: wheat; fruit; grapes\textsuperscript{107}. This is the first named appearance of Tellus on Roman coins, and the type has a double significance. As well as pointing to Hadrian's reform of agriculture it is another association with Augustus since the type can be linked to the coins celebrating the \textit{saeculum aureum}. The 150th anniversary of Augustus' \textit{ludi saeculares} fell in 134 and it is more than likely that the latter type were issued from 134 onwards\textsuperscript{108}.

Hadrian's commemoration of the provinces he visited on his travels is well known. There is a large number of different types celebrating these tours undertaken by Hadrian at two separate stages of his life. On his first travels, in the period 121-125, he visited Gaul, Germany, Britain, Spain, Greece and Sicily\textsuperscript{109}. During his absence from Rome there appears to have been a hiatus in the minting of coins there\textsuperscript{110}. His return in 125 is obviously memorialised by the institution of a new obverse portrait and the legend HADRIANVS AVGVSTVS. It is possible that these gold coins, issued in 125 or early 126 showing Hadrian astride a horse raising his right hand, and with no reverse legend apart from COS III, celebrate the emperor's return to the city\textsuperscript{111}. The course of his travels is not delineated on the coins issued between his return from this expedition and his departure on the next. The use of the coin title HADRIANVS AVGVSTVS seems to be a conscious attempt by Hadrian to set himself up as a new Augustus\textsuperscript{112}.

This second overseas tour, begun in 128, took in Africa, Greece, Asia, Syria, Cappadocia, Arabia, Egypt, and, in a roundabout manner, Judaea\textsuperscript{113}. Hadrian returned to Rome in 134 and his return is commemorated in the gold issues of this year which have the legend ADVENTVS AVG, and show Roma seated on a cuirass and arms clasping hands with Hadrian\textsuperscript{114}. Possibly these coins are also an attempt

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 372 nos. 276-8.  
\textsuperscript{108} Grant, p. 103.  
\textsuperscript{110} See \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 323. Certainly \textit{RIC}, ii does not record any coins for the period 122-125.  
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 361 no. 186.  
\textsuperscript{112} Grant, p. 101.  
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{SHA, Hadrian}, XIII.5-XIV.7.  
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 366-7 nos. 224-8.
to link a martial Hadrian with the Jewish war. It is in the period 134-138 that the province issues appear, commemorating provinces visited on both of the voyages. There are types of aurei and denarii representing Africa, Alexandria, Asia, Egypt, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Nile. These types were issued in a long series of aes coinage together with a whole series of 'adventus' types for the provinces. In both of the aes series are types of provinces that do not appear in the gold and silver issues: Britain, Cappadocia, Dacia, Judaea, Mauretania, Sicily, Arabia, Bithynia, Cilicia, Gaul, Macedonia, Moesia, Noricum, Phrygia, and Thrace.

Finally there are Hadrian's 'Exercitus' types. These also reflect upon particular visits on both tours, those to the frontier provinces. The types commemorate the armies of Britain, Cappadocia, Dacia, Germany, Spain, Mauretania, Moesia, Noricum, Raetia, and Syria and carry the reverse legend EXER[CITVS] with the name of the province. There were similar issues for the praetorian cohorts with whom the emperor travelled, generally counted among the 'exercitus' types, and sharing the legend COH[ORT] PRAETOR. Both types of issues show Hadrian, either on horseback or on a platform, at any rate raised above the other figures, haranguing a group of soldiers. It seems likely that Hadrian did have good relations with the army but the fact that these issues appear only on aes coins means that they were directed at a wider audience, primarily soldiers and not the senatorial class. Again it seems to me that there is a suspicion of a deliberate and concerted effort by Hadrian to placate the army by this commemoration on coins. This was something that Trajan, with his penchant for aggressive wars and territorial aggrandisement, obviously never felt compelled to do himself. It might be observed that Hadrian's concern with the army was administrative in nature in contrast to Trajan's bellicose interests. Hadrian, we know, made a number of changes to soldiers' conditions and rights. He encouraged a process which had been developing through the latter part of the first century: increasing recruitment of soldiers from frontier provinces. He extended legal

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115 *RIC*, ii, p. 374-5, nos. 296-314.
116 All these appear in *RIC*, ii, pp. 445-456 nos. 838 to 907.
recognition of soldiers' wills to those of veterans, and, most significantly, he ruled that the sons of soldiers, technically illegitimate since soldiers could not legally marry, were able to inherit their father's property. Thus it is apparent that an interest in the army, although not necessarily a warlike one, and the creation of a military persona were essential requirements for all emperors who wished to have harmonious relations with the troops.

The Image of Hadrian Himself

In common with all emperors Hadrian issued coins depicting the importance of his personal involvement in the everyday life of the empire. These, however, bear a marked difference from those issued by Trajan. The number of different types in this category under Hadrian is 207. Of these 146 (70.5%) show the emperor undertaking civil or religious duties, while only 61 (29.5%) portray military functions. The civil and religious types associate Hadrian with a number of other gods such as Jupiter, and with non-military personifications like Felicitas, Fortuna, Roma, and the Genius of the Roman people. Thus it appears that the image Hadrian wished to project was the reverse of that emphasised by his predecessor, and focussed not on his martial spirit but on his civic mission.

One example is an aureus of the period 119-122 without legends apart from titulature. On this coin Hadrian is shown receiving a globe from Jupiter, who also holds a thunderbolt, while between them is an eagle. No overtly martial association can be drawn from this issue since no legend associates it with a military occasion. A number of issues depict Hadrian facing the Genius of the Roman people and sacrificing over an altar which stands between them, some carrying the extra legend V S PRO RED. Another innovation of Hadrian is the preponderance of coins associated with distributions and celebrating the emperor's liberalitas. The only such type issued under Trajan reflects his second distribution to the people and commemorates CONGiar.

120 RIC, ii, p. 353 no. 109.
121 RIC, ii, p. 353 no. 109a; p. 356 no. 140.
SECVND\textsuperscript{122}. Hadrian, however, has 13 issues of \textit{liberalitas} (it is noteworthy that under Antoninus Pius there were 43 such issues). Hadrian made 7 distributions of largesse to the people and each one is celebrated on his coinage\textsuperscript{123}.

A most particular and instructive type, also of the period 119-122 and minted in gold and silver, has the legend \textit{SAEC AVR} and depicts a male figure, who is taken to be Hadrian, holding a phoenix on a globe while emerging from an oval frame\textsuperscript{124}. Here Hadrian is depicted as the spirit and bringer of a new golden age of peace and plenty, in a flagrant attempt to proclaim him as a new Augustus, and his reign as a re-birth of the almost mythological goodness of that of the founder of the Principate. This coin relates, in its message of a new 'golden age', to the types, discussed above (p. 57f), of \textit{TELLVS STABIL} and \textit{RESTITVTOR ORBIS TERRARVM}, both of which serve to emphasise the all-embracing solicitude shown by the emperor for the empire and the people. Undoubtedly also associated with this propagandising is one of the so called "cistophori" of Hadrian, dated to 138, and issued from the mint of Asia. This silver coin of the value of three denarii carries the reverse legend \textit{HADRIANVS AVG P P REN} and shows a veiled Hadrian holding corn-ears. On the obverse is the head of Augustus and the words \textit{IMP CAESAR AVGVSTVS}\textsuperscript{125}. It has been plausibly suggested that \textit{REN} is to be read as 'renatus', and the message of the coin is that Hadrian is a reincarnation of the first Augustus\textsuperscript{126}. Just as the external policy of Hadrian looked back to the \textit{consilium} of Augustus, so too did his coin issues and his building works\textsuperscript{127}.

\textbf{Antoninus Pius}

\textit{RIC} says of Antoninus that "the coinage...like his reign is rather lacking
in conspicuous interest..."128. Indeed the whole tenor of the reign is evident from the general conservatism of the coins. At some time in early 138 Antoninus assumed the name HADRIANVVS and his title appears on coins and inscription as IMP T AEL CAES HADR ANTONINVS129. It would seem that the name disappears from coin titulature early in 139 when Antoninus accepted the title 'Pater Patriae', presumably after the deification of Hadrian130. The message Antoninus seems to have been conveying was that as emperor he would model himself after Hadrian. The new emperor was only ten years younger than his adoptive father and a conservative. He had had a distinguished, but by no means exceptional, career and as far as is known held no military commands. A proconsulship of Asia about 134-135 indicates good reputation in the senate but little else. Like Hadrian he was to assume no epithets celebrating military victories and he obviously preferred a sedentary involvement in imperial affairs to the peripatetic style of Hadrian. His conservatism carries over to the coin types. With perhaps one exception no new types were introduced, and all the types issued by Hadrian, even the more obscure ones, were continued. It is thus of some significance that most of the types introduced by Hadrian and continued by Antoninus were not used by Marcus Aurelius. The new types of Clementia, Disciplina, Indulgentia, Libertas, Pudicitia, Spes, and Tranquillitas, introduced by Hadrian, continue to be minted under Antoninus, but disappear after 161, although Spes and Libertas do re-appear on coins of Commodus. We might also include Aetemitas on this list. Used sparingly by Trajan it does not appear on coins of the second century after its appearance on posthumous issues of Faustina, wife of Antoninus.

Antoninus was adopted by Hadrian early in 138. One of his first acts after his accession was to request the deification of his adoptive father. This was strongly resisted by the Senate131 and only two coin issues bear witness to the deification of Hadrian. Issued early in 139 they carry the obverse legend DIVVS HADRIANVS AVG and CONSECRATIO on the reverse. One depicts Hadrian being borne

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126 RIC, iii, p. 13.
130 RIC, iii, pp. 3-4.
131 SHA, Hadrian, XXVII.2; Cassius Dio, LXIX, 23.3.
heavenward by an eagle\textsuperscript{132}. Given the amount of senatorial opposition to the deification it is not surprising that Antoninus should choose not to emphasise the event. Nevertheless his reign was remarkable for the good relations exhibited between emperor and senate. Following the apotheosis Antoninus assumed the epithet Pius as part of his imperial title. Consonant with the incorporation of this epithet is the number of coin issues of Pietas types. These are spread consistently throughout the 22 years of Antoninus' reign, although types without legends are concentrated in the years 138-141, and in the late 150's. Typical Pietas issues show the goddess standing and holding a box of incense, or sacrificing over an altar\textsuperscript{133}. In keeping with the epithet 'Pius' adopted by Antoninus Pietas issues are the 7th most frequent type and represent about 6.8\% of the total issues, compared to 4.6\% under Hadrian and only 1.5\% for Trajan.

The only new coin type inaugurated by Antoninus was Apollo\textsuperscript{134}. This has little significance in terms of absolute numbers, but because of the scarcity of the type generally in imperial coinage must be accounted of some importance in Antoninus' propaganda. Previous issues of reverse types of Apollo had been under Nero, an emperor who prided himself on his peaceful arts and creative skills. They do not appear again until the time of Commodus. All those issued by Antoninus depict Apollo standing with a patera and lyre. Some bear a legend, additional to the titulature, which announces APOLLINI AVGVSTO\textsuperscript{135}. Apollo, as the god of music, prophecy, medicine, and philosophy was associated with the higher development of civilisation. His appearance is symbolic of all those things for which Antoninus wished to be remembered and which are so tellingly celebrated by Aelius Aristides in his descriptions of the benefits brought to the world by Rome's dominion. It is through the excellence of the government of Antoninus that "the whole civilized

\begin{footnotes}
\item[132] \textit{RIC}, ii, p. 385 nos. 389a and 389b.
\item[133] \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 27 nos. 13-14b; p. 30 no. 42.
\item[134] Types portraying Apollo had been issued by Hadrian: there are three recorded in \textit{RIC}. They are all 'cistophori' issued by the mint of Bithynia. \textit{RIC} p 400 no. 482 shows Apollo (Citharoedus) holding plectrum and lyre, no. 483 shows Apollo (Didymeus) holding stag and bow, and no. 484 shows Apollo standing holding raven and branch. Since these were all 'cistophori', perhaps even struck as medallions, distribution would have been limited and they are not to be accounted the same significance as normal coin issues.
\end{footnotes}
world lays down the arms which were its ancient burden and has turned to adornment and all glad thoughts..."136. These are the manifestations of Apollo's influence on the world through his agent Antoninus.

Roman foreign policy under Antoninus was characterised by the emperor's frequent quoting of those words of Scipio "qua ille dicebat malle se unum civem servare quam mille hostes occidere"137. With this basis it might cause no surprise that Antoninus is remembered for the treaties he made with foreign kings and his efforts to secure the borders of the empire by diplomacy rather than by force of arms. And perhaps the statement of Aelius Aristides in his Oration that Antoninus preferred to stay at home and "manage the entire civilised world by letters"138 is a better guide to the character of Antoninus' reign than the Historia Augusta. Certainly the Oration reinforces one's everyday impression of this period. Nevertheless, a number of military campaigns, "per legatos suos plurima bella gessit"139, are recorded. After Antoninus' accession he successfully concluded campaigns against the Brigantes in Britain, the Moors of Mauretania Tingitana, the Germans, and the Dacians et multas gentes, as well as the Jews. Rebellions in Achaea and Egypt were put down and raids of the Alani were checked140. It is curious after all that he is remembered as being a man who semper amaverit pacem141, and that his settlement of what appear to be dynastic squabbles142 by diplomacy rather than military action is taken to be characteristic of his foreign policy, instead of the use of force which does in fact dominate the written record. The peaceful nature of these particular settlements is remarked upon in the coins of the period 140-144 which declare REX QVADIS DATVS and REX ARMENIIS DATVS and show Antoninus handing a crown to the kings in question143.

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136 Aelius Aristides, Roman Oration, 97.
137 SHA, Antoninus Pius, IX.lO: "in which he stated that he would rather save a single citizen than slay a thousand foes".
138 Aelius Aristides, Roman Oration, 33.
139 SHA, Antoninus Pius, V.4.
140 SHA, Antoninus Pius, V.4-5.
141 SHA, Antoninus Pius, IX.lO.
142 SHA, Antoninus Pius, IX.6-9 reports on Antoninus' interference in the succession in the kingdoms of the Lazi, Osrhoene, and his settlement of "causas regales".
In spite of our usual impressions of the reign military achievements did not go unrecorded. Antoninus assumed his second imperator salutation for the victory in Britain which advanced the frontier to the position of the Antonine wall. A number of coins of the period 143-144 announce the victory and the emperor's new title. Most show Victory with various attributes (palm, globe, sceptre, wreath) and have the legend IMPERATOR II. As well, a number of types celebrating the victory of Lollius Urbicus include the legend IMPERATOR II BRITAN. A further type exhibits the same legend and Jupiter holding a sceptre and thunderbolt, while yet another depicts Mars holding a spear and resting his left hand on a shield. The legend reads IMPERATOR II MART VLT.

Other isolated types issued during the later part of the reign also testify to military successes. Issues of Jupiter Stator, with the legend IOVI STAT ORI and showing Jupiter leaning on a sceptre holding a thunderbolt, can perhaps be linked with issues which depict Britannia sitting on a rock with shield and sceptre carrying the legend BRITANNIA to indicate the successful conclusion to a minor military engagement, unrecorded in the sources. Similarly coins of 156-157 depicting Jupiter with the same attributes (sceptre and thunderbolt) might refer to another obscure minor military success.

Despite Antoninus' reputation traditional military themes begin to appear more frequently during his reign. Mars, for example, was the great military god of Rome, and second only to Jupiter in the pantheon. Issues featuring Mars, frequent under Trajan, had been insignificant under Hadrian. Under Antoninus coins with types of Mars begin to increase, although the type is not significant in terms of overall numbers: 5 issues under Hadrian (.86%), and 13 under Antoninus (1.9%), whereas the 31 issues of Mars issued by Trajan represent 6.6% of his total issues. However, the trend continued and Mars issues under

144 RIC, iii, p. 39f nos. 108-113.
145 RIC, iii, p. 119 no. 719, p. 121 nos. 743-45.
146 RIC, iii, p. 40 no. 113a.
147 RIC, iii, p. 142 nos. 927 and 930, 934.
148 RIC, iii, p. 145 nos. 962, 968.
149 Hannestad, p. 211.
Marcus Aurelius are his second most common type, with nearly 14% of the total. And it is notable that Aelius Aristides pictures Antoninus as receiving the blessing and support of the gods, and, listing the gods, he describes how they "seem to lend a kindly hand to your empire in its achievement and to confirm you in its possession"\(^{150}\). Mars is not ignored in this list but Aelius praises him because "he dances the ceaseless dance along the banks of the outermost rivers and keeps the weapons clean of blood"\(^{151}\). In other words Mars has fulfilled his military duty to the Roman empire because he has prevented the outbreak of any wars!

An additional aspect of Antoninus' increasing use of military themes (as compared to Hadrian) is his need to refer to the personification Fides Mililitum/Exercitus, often with the legend FIDES EXERC[ITVVM]. Trajan had almost no recourse to such types and even Hadrian's only coins in this vein, aes issues recording CONC[ordia] EXERC[ituum], were issued in the period 119-121 when, following the killing of the four consulars, relations with the army were probably at their most strained\(^{152}\). Antoninus, who, if the Historia Augusta statement can be accepted\(^{153}\), never left Rome after his accession, had a practical need to convince people of the loyalty of the army. This will help explain the number of his donatives, which probably paralleled the largesses to the people celebrated on the Liberalitas types, and also his regular announcements attesting to the loyalty of the troops. Among these latter can be included types of 'Concordia Exercituum' which portray Concordia holding Victory and a legionary eagle and carry the legend CONCORDIA EXERCITVVM, and those of 'Fides Militum/Exercitus' which show Fides standing carrying standards\(^{154}\). Certainly the 'Fides' types with the legend FIDES EXERC are specific in intention, like the 'Concordia Exercituum' appearing only on aes issues\(^{155}\).

The emphasis during the reign was not, in spite of the martial

\(^{150}\) Aelius Aristides, *Roman Oration*, 104.
\(^{151}\) Aelius Aristides, *Roman Oration*, 105.
\(^{154}\) Concordia: *RIC*, iii, p. 107 no. 600, p. 113 no. 657, p. 115 no. 678, etc. Fides: *RIC*, iii, p. 28 no. 21, p. 146 no. 965.
\(^{155}\) *RIC*, iii, p. 141 no. 926, p. 143 no. 939, p. 144 no. 349.
endeavours reported in the *Historia Augusta* and the increasing use of military themes on coins depicted above, one of warfare and military glory. And this is made obvious from the overall proportion of coin types issued under Antoninus. Of the four major personifications identified by Fears Salus, Fortuna, and Victory feature in the top six under Antoninus. Concordia, the missing type, is almost unnoticed with only 5 issues out of 585, less than 1%. The top types, in descending order, are Liberalitas, Annona, Fortuna, Salus, Pax, Victoria and Pietas; together they account for exactly half the issues under Antoninus. Annona, surprisingly, is the second most frequently used type under this emperor with 8.5%. It should be noted that Victory, Trajan's most common type and Hadrian's fifth most common, is still in fifth place under Antoninus. With the exception of Victory the most common types of Antoninus are all personifications of virtues that typify peace and prosperity. And all these attributes of the new 'Golden Age' of Rome are celebrated in the *Roman Oration* of Aelius Aristides, the whole of which is a magnificent sustained encomium on the virtues of the rule of Antoninus.

It is not surprising, then, that with Antoninus' emphasis on prosperity Liberalitas issues should appear so frequently, announcing the emperor's generosity. Associated with his type in portraying peace and bounty are Fortuna and Salus which occur frequently throughout the imperial period. Personifications of these types represent the benefits conferred by a particular godhead but their use on coins with AVG also implies that it is the emperor who brings about the appearance of such benefits, i.e. the particular personification is one of the emperor's virtues. In this regard Fortuna represents the good fortune attendant on the reign of Antoninus, the most frequent attributes of this type under Antoninus are the rudder and cornucopia. Salus stands for the health and well-being of the empire which is a consequence of the excellence of the emperor and her attributes include all those we would normally expect to find associated with this personification: snake, patera, altar, sceptre. It is not so usual to find Salus with rudder but types with this

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156 See note 1.
attribute do occur under Antoninus\textsuperscript{158}. As Aelius Aristides puts it "the civilized world, which had been sick from the beginning, as it were, has been brought by the right knowledge to a state of health"\textsuperscript{159}.

Neither is it unexpected to find types of Pax occurring so frequently under an emperor characterised by his unwillingness to involve the state in military activity. Pax under Antoninus is the sixth most common type with 6% of total issues. One type issued in 139 depicts Pax setting fire to a pile of arms with the legend TR POT COS II S C PAX AVG\textsuperscript{160} and it is valid to see this Pax as the personification which puts an end to war. Undoubtedly some issues of Antoninus, like the one mentioned above, carry this message, but the predominant association of Pax is the peace of the empire associated with the rule of this emperor. The most common attributes (37 of 48 types) of Pax on coins during this reign are peaceful ones i.e a branch and cornucopia, branch and sceptre, branch and caduceus, and the association of these articles is plainly the peaceful state of the empire and the benefits this brings.

It is rare, however, to find Annona featuring so prominently as the second most common type with 8.5% of issues. Annona, in association with Ceres, is the personification of the corn supply and occurs on Antoninus' \textit{aes} issues from 139 until the end of the reign. In this guise Annona is pictured with some or all of the following: corn-ears, modius, rudder, cornucopia, ship's prow, and occasionally a globe\textsuperscript{161}. It is noteworthy that the Annona types appear only on the bronze coinage. Since these are the denominations with the widest circulation it follows that the message was aimed at the great mass of the population, to demonstrate a quality of Antoninus' reign that would appeal to people who were more concerned with food than imperial policy. One Annona type issued during the period 145-161 shows Annona with various attributes (tablets, rudder) while in the background are represented two ships and a light-house with beacon-light. This might possibly refer to the restoration of the light-house of Pharos to watch over the departure of the grain-ships from Egypt\textsuperscript{162}. It might also refer to the alleviation

\textsuperscript{159} Aelius Aristides, \textit{Roman Oration}, 98.
\textsuperscript{160} RIC, iii, p. 101 no. 550.
\textsuperscript{161} RIC, iii, p. 107 no. 597, p. 131 nos. 840, p. 137 no. 884, etc.
\textsuperscript{162} RIC, iii, p. 123 no. 757 and p. 9. Pharos is mentioned in SHA, \textit{Antoninus Pius},
of a food shortage reported in the *Historia Augusta*\(^{163}\). This report tells us that Antoninus "relieved a scarcity of wine and oil and wheat with loss to his own private treasury...".

Throughout the reign there is a continuing emphasis on the grain harvest. Coins such as the LAETITIA types of 149-50, and the numerous Ceres types, can be associated with this repetition of the emperor's concern with ensuring the reliability of the grain supply\(^{164}\). There is a reflection of this concern with trade generally, in Aelius Aristides. The *Roman Oration* celebrates the heights to which commerce has reached and the availability in Rome of products from all ends of the earth: "there is a common channel to Rome and all meet here, trade, shipping, agriculture, metallurgy, and all the arts and crafts that are or ever have been, all the things that are engendered or grow from the earth."\(^{165}\).

**The Image of Antoninus Pius Himself**

The disparity between the number of issues which depict the emperor engaged in some civil or religious activity and those which show him undertaking military activities reaches a peak under Antoninus. No less than 82.5% of issues featuring the emperor depict a civil or religious activity (98 of 119). This is of prime importance in interpreting the image of himself Antoninus wished to portray. There can be absolutely no doubt that as these particular issues emphasise Antoninus' non-military role so it was this aspect of his reign that the emperor wished to be remembered. In fact one can go further and suggest that Antoninus was endeavouring to push an image of himself as an emperor who operated only 'behind-the-scenes', in a 'low-key' fashion.

Of the 98 non-military issues 56 are types celebrating Vota, and 26 are Liberalitas issues. In other words 68.9% of the total issues depicting the

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\(^{163}\text{SHA, Antoninus Pius, VIII.11.}\)

\(^{164}\text{Laetitia: RIC, iii, p. 49 no. 190. Ceres is numerous for the whole period, see for example RIC, iii, p. 65 no.319, pp. 70-1 nos. 356-362.}\)

\(^{165}\text{Aelius Aristides, Roman Oration, 13. This is the culmination of the conceit, begun and continued in Sections 11 and 12, of Rome as the greatest emporium of the world where the products of all arts and crafts from all countries meet.}\)
emperor (83.7% of the non-military issues) portray just two particular undertakings: the emperor's distributions of largesse; and votes of thanks given to the gods for the longevity of the reign. Michael Grant has observed that "the decennia and vicennia of imperial accessions were punctiliously celebrated"\(^{166}\), and Antoninus had the longest reign of any emperor since Augustus. The Liberalitas type of 160-1 possibly looks forward to the 'vota' for the 25th year of the reign (162), and perhaps Antoninus hoped to equal the founder of the Principate in the length of his reign. Antoninus resembled Augustus, and also Claudius and Domitian, in his celebration of the Secular Games, and he made other attempts to link himself with the first emperor. An example is his restoration of the temple of Augustus and Livia, which is commemorated on coin issues of 157-8 which bear the legend TEMPLVM DIV AVG REST\(^{167}\).

Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus

Any examination of the coinage and art of the reign of Marcus reveals a glaring dichotomy between the accepted picture of the 'philosopher-emperor' and the actualities of imperial rule. Marcus himself was aware of the ambiguity between the stoicism of his preferred philosophical stance and the realpolitik involved in managing the empire, and speaks in his meditations of the gap between the ideal and the real\(^{168}\), the same problem enunciated by T.S. Eliot in his "between the ideal and the reality falls the shadow".

Nevertheless, he seems to have been concerned to live a life of justice and temperance, and the first book of his communings with himself is a dedicatory preface in which all those from whom Marcus had received some benefit are thanked and their contribution named. The book is no less than a list of the qualities for which Marcus thanks his friends and relatives. We can see that high on the list of virtues are such qualities as modesty, justice, manliness, fear of the gods, dignity, and beneficence,

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\(^{166}\) Grant, "Anniversary Issues", p. xii.

\(^{167}\) For example RIC, iii, p. 44 no. 143. See also Grant, "Anniversary Issues", p. 106f.

\(^{168}\) Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, X.36.
to name but a few. This was the apparent temper of the reign and to some extent this is reflected in the coins. But there are also marked changes from the coinage of Antoninus. Many of the more obscure types of Hadrian, which Antoninus was too passive or uninterested to change, were done away with entirely by Marcus. And so Clementia, Disciplina, Indulgentia, Libertas, Pudicitia, Spes, and Tranquillitas do not appear, nor does Aetemntitas, an infrequently used type under each of the three preceding emperors. Iustitia, too, seems curiously neglected. RIC records only one issue of this type, a denarius of 179 showing Iustitia, seated, holding a patera and sceptre, and bearing the legend IVSTITIA AVG TR P XXXIII IMP X COS III P P.

For a so-called 'philosopher-emperor' Marcus' coin imagery is redolent of war and martial activities, and there is an increasing emphasis on these activities throughout the reign. In regard to his image, the titulature is surprising, and of supreme importance. Trajan, the quintessential 'soldier-emperor', assumed three epithets testifying to his victorious military campaigns. On his adoption GERMANICUS was conferred on him and Nerva, his annexation of Dacia brought with it DACICUS, and his successful expedition to the Parthian capital, Ctesiphon, earned him the epithet PARTHICUS. Three martial epithets was more than any other emperor. Yet the supposedly peaceful Marcus outdid even this bombast, assuming five epithets attesting to success in war: Armeniacus in early 164, Parthicus Maximus in February 166, Medicus in summer 166, Germanicus and Sarmaticus in June 175. Only the brevity of Lucius' reign will have prevented him from assuming all five epithets, but as it was he equalled Trajan's three in accepting Armeniacus, Parthicus Maximus and Medicus. It is of note also that Lucius accepted five imperator acclamations while Marcus accepted ten.

Not all the epithets are attested on coins, even in the obverse titles, but an inscription from Alexandria in Egypt, dated after 175, has all five together: IMP. CAESARI M. AVREL. ANTONINO AVG. ARMEN.
MEDIC. PARTH. GERMAN. SARMAT. MAXIM. An issue of each emperor representing the Armenian victory shows Armenia seated in a mournful attitude with various sorts of weapons surrounding her and carries the legend ARMEN\textsuperscript{174}. The epithet assumed for the subjugation of Parthia is less explicitly attested, although undoubtedly the Victory types of early 166 refer directly to the military success as do issues with the legend VIC PAR\textsuperscript{175}. The German successes were also celebrated on coins of the 170's. There are Victory issues of the year 170/1 with the legend VIC GER, presumably to announce the victory over the Marcomanni\textsuperscript{176}. Other types, both in this year and later, also record initial success in Germany. A number of bronze types announce GERMANIA SVBACTA and show Germania seated at the foot of a trophy, surrounded by arms\textsuperscript{177}; and there are issues of 173 with the reverse legend GERMANICO AVG IMP VI COS III\textsuperscript{178}. In 176 and 177 appear\textit{æs} issues bearing the legend DE GERM[ANIS] and DE SARM[ATIS]\textsuperscript{179} and which depict trophies and piles of arms, often with captives. Connected with this increasing militarisation of the image of the emperor is the naming of Faustina as \textit{Mater Castrorum} in 174. She was the first emperor's wife to accept the title\textsuperscript{180}.

A consideration of the proportion of types on the coins of Marcus reveals the true military nature of the reign, and bears out the dichotomy between the stereotype of Marcus and the reality of his reign. This surely indicates the need for a re-assessment of our image of the 'philosopher-emperor'. On the other hand the image we have of Lucius Verus, whose character from the letters to Fronto appears self-aggrandising\textsuperscript{181} and of a martial bent, despite his unwillingness to become involved in the physical realities of fighting, is reinforced by considering his coin issues. The most frequent types under Marcus, in descending order, are Victory, Mars, Roma, Felicitas, Salus, and


\textsuperscript{175} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 225 nos. 156-8; p. 226 nos. 160-164; p. 286 no. 922; p. 287 nos. 929-936.

\textsuperscript{176} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 231 no. 240; p. 295 nos. 1029-1032.

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{RIC}, iii, pp. 294-5 nos. 1021-1027; p. 297 nos. 1049-1057.

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{RIC}, iii, pp. 297-8 nos. 1058-1062.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{RIC}, iii, pp. 239-40 nos.337-342; p. 241 nos. 362-367; pp. 306-7 nos. 1179-1190.

\textsuperscript{180} Hannestad, p. 225, n. 317, refers to an aureus published by M. Thirion in \textit{Schweizer Münzbliitter} 17 (1967). A coin of Diva Faustina issued 176-80 has the legend MATRI CASTRORVM. See \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 274 no. 751.

\textsuperscript{181} See especially Fronto, \textit{ad Verum Imp.}, ii.3 (Haines, vol. II, p. 195).
Providentia, which together account for some 53.4% of the total. Here only two of Fears' four major personifications are present, although Concordia is in tenth most frequent place with 4.6% of the total. Fortuna is practically insignificant under Marcus with only 21 issues (2.7%). Under Lucius the four types of Victory, Fortuna, Mars, and Providentia (in that order) make up 59.7% of the total issues. It should be noted that the great majority of the 'Fortuna' coins are issues of the type 'Fortuna Redux' and are thus associated with the return of the emperor from his military campaigns. Of the four principal personifications, Salus, is only the tenth most frequent under Lucius with 3.3%, while Concordia is in eleventh place with a mere 2.3%.

Concordia will bear some further discussion. The type is not especially significant numerically on either emperor's coins, being only tenth most frequent of Marcus' coins and eleventh under Lucius, but the high proportion of issues with the legend CONCORDIA for both emperors in the years 161 to 163 is interesting. As the personification of social harmony, general emphasis on 'Concordia' was important at many stages of an emperor's term, but to Marcus and Lucius it seems to have been particularly important to announce this harmony right at the start of their joint reign. It is possible to see in this early marked stress on 'Concordia' a certain amount of insecurity in their accession, based partly on a complete lack of experience of either military command or provincial administration, and partly on the possibilities for conflict inherent in joint rule. Issues with the legend make up almost a third of the issues of Marcus for 161 (11 out of 32), and half of those of Lucius (13 out of 26). The type stresses both the harmony the emperors will bring to the empire, and the harmony between the two emperors themselves. Most examples of the type read CONCORD AVG and show Concordia with a patera, or with Spes and a cornucopia\(^{182}\), representing the hope the new emperors bring to the empire by the harmony of their relationship.

Of similar interest to the 'Concordia' types, and of more importance numerically, are the numerous 'Providentia' issues. This is the fourth most frequent issue of Lucius (10%) and the sixth most frequent of

\(^{182}\) RIC, iii, p. 215 no. 1; p. 250 no. 444.
Marcus (5.8%). The types advertise the far-sighted protection and care the gods have shown for the empire by placing it under the care of the co-emperors. 'Providentia' types of both emperors are remarkably similar: those of 161 carry the legend PROV DEOR and show Providentia holding a globe and cornucopia\textsuperscript{183}, and most issues have these attributes or a sceptre instead of the cornucopia, thus associating Marcus directly with the Providentia of the gods\textsuperscript{184}. Lucius stopped issuing 'Providentia' types after 163, but although Marcus continued to issue them until about 175 they are relatively infrequent after 163. It is almost as if the more immediate pre-occupations of warfare and the welfare of the populace have pushed aside the opportunities for commemoration of the more abstract qualities of imperial rule.

Although the relatively unmilitary kinds of personifications like Concordia and Providentia have an important place, the martial nature of the coin imagery of this period becomes clearer when it is seen that under both emperors Victory is the single most frequently used type, comprising 15.4% of Marcus' issues and 26% of Lucius'. Of even more interest is the high frequency of issues of Mars, which is the second most common type under Marcus with 10.3%, and third most common under Lucius with 10.7%. Thus these two eminently martial types make up 25% of Marcus' issues and over one-third of Lucius'. No types of Victory or Mars appear during 161 and 162 but after this initial silence they are far and away the most frequent types. After the establishment of military superiority in Armenia Victory and Mars types appear on the issues of both emperors, and from 163 onwards both types appear frequently and regularly. Bronze issues of Marcus' from 163 and of Verus from 164 portray Mars holding Victory and a trophy, and a large number of Marcus' Mars issues in 164 carry the same message of a victorious god of war\textsuperscript{185}. Victory types of the same date show the goddess holding a wreath and palm, and one particular Victory issue of 164 pictures the goddess holding a trophy with a defeated Armenia at her feet, and bears the legend VICT AVG\textsuperscript{186}. Similar issues of both types occur among the rest of Lucius' issues and throughout the reign.

\textsuperscript{184} For example \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 284 no. 905.
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{RIC}, iii, pp. 281-2 nos. 851 and 854-868; p. 323 nos. 1377-8.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 222 nos. 115-118; p. 281 no. 853; p. 283 no. 890.
of Marcus; their association with particular campaigns can be
determined by the number of the imperator salutation in the titles, and
occasionally by reverse legends of the style VIC GERM.\footnote{187}

Lucius, more than Marcus, seems to concentrate, on his coins, on the
aspects of his career that he enjoys most, predominantly the military
ones. Thus his coins display only 18 identifiable types in contrast with
the 29 employed by Marcus, and the 30 or more used by Antoninus.
Aequitas, identified by her scales and cornucopia, is perhaps the most
common of the minor types but appears only on coins issued after 166,
and always without legends. The Liberalitas of Verus appears on coins
with the legends LIBERAL and CONG, and Salus, too, is represented
although for a limited period only, 162-3, and always with the legend
SALVTI AVGVSTOR.\footnote{188} There are a number of other types used but
these are of such infrequency that they need not be examined. The rest
of Lucius' issues concentrate on his participation in the campaigns in the
East and in the first campaign in Germany.

In 162 Lucius left Rome to take personal charge of the conduct of the
campaign against Parthia.\footnote{189} The departure is commemorated on
Profectio types of 162 showing Verus on horseback in military garb
holding a spear.\footnote{190} The actual voyage to the east seems to be
remembered on issues of early 163 showing a ship with standards and
sometimes Victory on the prow, accompanied by the legend FELIC
AVG.\footnote{191} The safe arrival in Antioch is announced on the Fortuna issues
of 163, which have the legend FORT RED and show Fortuna with
rudder and cornucopia.\footnote{192} Fortuna is the second most frequent of
Lucius' types (13%), but always appears on his coins in the guise of
Fortuna Redux, celebrating the safe arrival of the emperor after his
voyages; journeys which are always for military purposes. The
iconography and legend of all the Fortuna issues of Lucius are the
same, except for minor differences in titulature. Initial successes in

\footnote{187} One example \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 233 no. 257.
\footnote{188} \textit{Aequitas}: \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 260 no. 576; p. 261 no. 590. \textit{Liberalitas}: \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 258 no.
486; no. 492.
\footnote{189} \textit{SHA}, Verus, VI.7; Dio, LXXI, 2.2.
\footnote{190} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 252 nos. 477-481; p. 319 nos. 1321-1323.
\footnote{191} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 319-20 nos. 1325-40.
\footnote{192} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 320 nos. 1341-1355.
Armenia, including the capture of the capital Artaxata, appear on coins of Verus depicting a defeated Armenia, and the installation of a Roman nominee on the throne, Sohaemus, is noted on coins with the legend REX ARMENIIS DATVS\textsuperscript{193}. Further victories and the final success of the invasion of Parthia are celebrated on the numerous types of Victory laurelled or diademed and carrying trophies presiding over conquered barbarians, the types of Mars bearing arms, and also on those coins showing captive Parthians\textsuperscript{194}. Pax types of 166 show Pax bearing an olive branch and cornucopia with the legend PAX AVG. It is clear that there are strong and conscious military overtones to this particular personification which represents Pax as the ultimate outcome of a successful conclusion to war.

At about the end of 167 the two emperors left Rome for the Danube frontier to deal personally with the incursions of Quadi and Marcomanni which had reached as far as Aquileia\textsuperscript{195}. No coins celebrate the profectio but a bronze medallion of Verus depicts the emperors mounted on horseback, armed with spears and preceded by soldiers. It has been dated to the period December 167-February 168 on the basis of titulature, and clearly refers to the departure of Lucius and Marcus\textsuperscript{196}. The end of this campaign and the settlement of the Danubian provinces do not appear explicitly on Lucius' coins, undoubtedly because of his premature death during the return to Rome. However, the types issued in 168 with the legend TR P VIII IMP V COS III and depicting Victory holding a wreath and palm seem to be an indirect reference to the end of the campaign which resulted in the fifth imperator salutation, as does a Mars type of the same year which represents Mars carrying Victory and a trophy\textsuperscript{197}.

While Marcus' issues in the period 161-168 are mostly very similar to those of Lucius some overall differences are apparent. Felicitas types, of which only one issue is recorded for Verus, feature more prominently under Marcus. They are his fourth most common type

\textsuperscript{193} RIC, iii, p. 255 nos. 507 and 511-513; p. 322 nos. 1364-1369 and 1370-1375.
\textsuperscript{194} For example RIC, iii, p. 287 nos. 533, 539-542; p. 258 nos. 550-554; p. 323 nos. 1383-1390, 1392-1396.
\textsuperscript{195} Cassius Dio, LXXI, 3.1.
\textsuperscript{196} Mentioned in RIC, iii, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{197} RIC, iii, p. 261 nos. 587-590; p. 330 no. 1481.
accounting for 7.2% of his issues, and begin to appear on gold, silver and \textit{aes} issues throughout the reign. The attributes of Felicitas, usually cornucopia, caduceus, globe, and sceptre, seem to associate this personification with Providentia (discussed above). The type itself is representative of the happiness and betterment of the state deriving from the rule of the emperor. In 161 Marcus issued both denarii and \textit{aes} coins showing Felicitas standing holding a caduceus and cornucopia with the legend FEL TEMP TR P XV COS II\textsuperscript{198}. In late 165, and thus after the final military success in Parthia, we see issues of the type without legend depicting Felicitas holding a caduceus and cornucopia with her foot on a globe, indicating that the well-being of the whole world will benefit from the reign of Marcus\textsuperscript{199}. Similar issues of the type continue to occur frequently throughout the 160's and 170's. A variation which appears after the death of Lucius Verus, interesting because it seems to directly associate Felicitas with the rule of Marcus, shows the goddess holding a caduceus and sceptre\textsuperscript{200}. In fact the type is more frequent in the decade following Verus' death when the situation was arguably much less happy than it had been for the previous decade. There is a sense of the emperor trying to convince both himself and the people that the situation was under control and favourable to their well-being.

The other obvious difference between issues of Marcus and Lucius is the number of Annona issues. This type is the ninth most frequent of Marcus' issues representing 4.7% but there are only two issues recorded for Verus, both produced in the last few months of his life. Marcus' issues appear fairly regularly throughout the reign, reminding people of the care the emperor took to ensure the grain supply. The coins are without legends and usually show Annona holding corn-ears and emptying a cornucopia into a modius\textsuperscript{201}.

Evidently Marcus had a clearer conception than Lucius of the need to advertise the civic virtues associated with imperial rule. Nevertheless the dominant message of his coin imagery is of a distinctly military

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 215 no. 12; p. 278 no. 804.
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 223 no. 130; p. 284 no. 901.
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 229 no. 199.
\textsuperscript{201} Examples: \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 220 no. 94, p. 224 nos. 142-3, p. 290 no. 968, pp. 303-4 ncs. 1128-1135.
nature. Victory and Mars are the two most frequent types, as discussed previously, and plainly indicate the truly martial image of Marcus. Associated with these two self-evidently military types are personifications of Roma which depict her armed and holding Victory, or with other military attributes. This type is the fourth most common of all Marcus' issues, accounting for 7.5%. In fact since all of Marcus' issues of the type depict Roma with such military attributes as a spear and shield, or holding Victory, it is clear that the coins proclaim Rome as a victorious city and associate both the city and its rulers with military success and glory. This is consistent with the general appearance of Roma on coins throughout the Principate - as a victorious martial goddess. The first appearance of the personification of the city is on silver issues of 165, after the final victory over Parthia and the taking of the two chief cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon. The coins show Roma seated on a shield holding palladium and parazonium. The reverse legend reads PM TR P XIX IMP III COS III²⁰², and thus dates the issues to the last quarter of 165. The type was to appear continuously throughout the rest of Marcus' reign and features as well on Verus' coins. One issue of the type even portrays Roma seated on cuirass and shield handing Victory to Verus²⁰³. The legend TR POT VII IMP III COS III S C dates the coins to 167, after Verus' return from the east.

Another feature of Marcus' coins is the emphasis on defeated enemies: Armenians, Germans, and Sarmatians. Together these types of issues account for nearly 10% of Marcus' issues. Coins depicting either a defeated Germany or captive Germans are most numerous, making up 5.9% of Marcus' issues and appearing as the sixth most frequent type, equal with Providentia issues and more common than both Liberalitas and Annona. All issues of the German type occur in the last 10 years of the reign, although military success in Germany was recorded as early as 168. The type first begins to appear on bronze issues in Marcus' 27th tribunician year (172) and show Germany seated at the foot of a trophy surrounded by a pile of weapons. The legend reads GERMANIA SVBACTA IMP VI COS III S C²⁰⁴. Silver issues of the following year

²⁰² RIC, iii, p. 224 nos. 138-140.
²⁰³ RIC, iii, p. 329 no. 1463.
²⁰⁴ RIC, iii, pp 294-5 nos. 1021-1027.
show a German seated at the foot of a trophy, sometimes surrounded by arms, but without an extra legend\textsuperscript{205}. Similar coins of late 175 and 176, joined with the obverse title SARMATICVS, savour the subjugation of Sarmatia and portray a trophy between captive Sarmatians\textsuperscript{206}. An unusual variation appears on some of Marcus' coins of 176 and 177 which bear the legend DE GERM and DE SARM and show piles of arms or captive Germans/Sarmatians with trophies\textsuperscript{207}. This legend is a direct transfer of the language of triumphal inscriptions to coin imagery, and its only previous appearances are on a small number of issues of Vespasian and Domitian.

Other types testify further to the increasing acknowledgement of the importance of military accomplishments. In 173 Marcus issued coins, in bronze only, with the legend RESTITVTORI ITALIAE IMP VI COS III depicting the emperor standing holding a sceptre and raising Italia who holds a globe. At the same time bronze coins were issued with the legend SECVRITAS PVBLICA IMP VI COS III with Securitas placing a wreath on her head and holding a palm\textsuperscript{208}. As the editors of RIC have pointed out this is a tacit endorsement of the value of warfare in the north in bringing greater security and prosperity to the homelands of the empire. Furthermore, the globe held by Italia symbolizes "an expansion of territory", while the unusual attributes of Securitas indicate "rejoicing as the outcome of victory"\textsuperscript{209}. Another unique coin also bears mentioning. This is a sestertius of late 177 with the singular legend PROPVGNATORI IMP VIIII COS III P P S C. The coin shows Jupiter standing nude hurling a thunderbolt at the enemy and, taken with the legend, clearly represents Jupiter Propugnator\textsuperscript{210}. This distinctive epithet of Jupiter has connotations of defense and custody but the iconography of the particular coin is much more aggressive than defensive.

A further refinement of the military image is attested on a medallion

\textsuperscript{205} RIC, iii, p. 235 nos. 277-280.
\textsuperscript{206} RIC, iii, p. 240 no. 341, p. 306 nos. 1185-7.
\textsuperscript{208} Restitutor: RIC, iii, p. 299 nos. 1077-1082; Securitas: RIC, iii, p. 299 nos. 1083-1088.
\textsuperscript{209} RIC, iii, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{210} RIC, iii, p. 310 nos. 1224 and 1225.
found during work at Curium and dated to about 177-8. On the obverse the medallion has busts of both Marcus and Commodus facing each other, without inscription, while the reverse legend, enclosed in a wreath, reads PROPAGATORIBVS IMPERII. Propagator is an accepted epithet of Jupiter meaning one who enlarges the boundaries and as such can be properly applied to the rulers of Rome whose particular patron was Jupiter. The appearance of the word here in the dative suggests that Marcus and Commodus are being acclaimed because they have extended the boundaries of the empire and is eloquent testimony to a volte face in imperial foreign policy from that of Antoninus Pius. The term appears only once in a public inscription before this, and is otherwise unattested until the reign of Septimius Severus, for whom some 23 examples are known. The earlier example is an inscription of Lucius Verus dated to 166 at Ostia, in which he is described as PROPAGATOR IMPERII. This date places the inscription after the success of the Parthian wars waged by Verus and perhaps supports a conclusion that Parthian territory was added to the empire.

The Image of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus Themselves

As with the other emperors discussed in this chapter Marcus and Lucius both issued coins depicting themselves engaged in identifiable activities which may be classified as military and non-military (civil and religious). Previously coins depicting an emperor have reinforced the image presented by other coin types. Such a trend is not so evident on coins of the co-emperors. Of the 101 types issued by Marcus Aurelius depicting himself only 38 (38%) have recognisable military associations while 63 (62%) picture civil or religious undertakings. For Lucius Verus the total is 89, of which 40 (45%) represent military activity and

211 DH Cox, Coins from the Excavations at Curium, 1932-1953, New York, 1959, p. 114 no. 230. Cox discusses the import of the adjective propagator and seemingly prefers, because attested on coins of Caracalla, the interpretation that means "one who continues". The alternative is given by Cox, and fully discussed by A.R. Birley in RFRFP, p. 21.
212 See JR Fears "The Cult of Jupiter and Roman Imperial Ideology" (hereafter "Jupiter") in ANRW, II, 17.1, pp. 3-141 for a full discussion of the relationship between Roman emperors and Jupiter.
213 Listed in Birley, RFRFP, p. 23. CIL VI, 958, records a private inscription set up to Trajan in which he is given the epithet PROPAGATOR.
214 CIL, XIV, 106.
49 (55%) are of non-military projects. This non-military image of both emperors is due wholly to the disproportionate number of types announcing concord between the emperors issued by them in 161 and 162, which has skewed the totals. If we consider issues depicting the emperors, but exclude such concordia types, we see a completely different trend. 34 of Marcus’ 63 non-military types are concordia issues: without these the proportions for his issues are 57% (38 issues) representing military activity and 43% (29 issues) representing non-military affairs. Similarly for Lucius Verus, without concordia issues military types are 40 out of 47 (85%), and non-military types thus represent only 15% of the self-portrait issues. The emperors’ images on this basis are more in keeping with the image evinced in the other types.

The preponderance of issues representing the cooperation and harmony between the emperors in 161 and 162 thus needs some explanation. All the issues depict Marcus and Lucius facing each other with clasped hands and have the legend CONCORDIA[E] AVGSTOR[VM]215. The type accounts for fourteen of the sixty-two issues of 161 for Marcus and twenty-eight of Lucius’ fifty-eight issues for that year. The pattern for 162 is similar for both Marcus, sixteen of forty-three, and Lucius, fourteen of thirty-eight. These types showing the emperors with the legend CONCORDIA disappear after 163, so it seems clear that many of these early issues were directed at curbing the rumours, prevalent after the accession, that Lucius was not a suitable partner for Marcus216. Combined with the frequency of actual Concordia issues in the same years these coins emphasise the general harmony of the rulers and seem to insist that the new emperors, although untested in both administration and war, will nevertheless benefit the empire. It appears significant, then, that the type disappears after Lucius had arrived in Syria and taken personal control of the campaigns against Parthia.

Other coins which display Marcus and Lucius are of the types generally associated with previous emperors, although of restricted variety. Apart from the concordia coins there are issues celebrating the Liberalitas of

215 RIC, iii, p. 215 nos. 7 and 8; p. 250 no. 449, p. 251 no. 456.
216 Rumours abounded after Lucius’ arrival in the east attesting to his licentious and luxurious mode of life. See SHA, Marcus Antoninus, VIII.12; Verus, IV.4-5, VII.1. However indiscriminate his behaviour, he can hardly be blamed for importing the plague to Italy. See particularly SHA, Verus, IX.1.
the emperors which depict them distributing largesse to the populace and the soldiers\textsuperscript{217}, as well as coins commemorating the various Vota offered by and for the emperor\textsuperscript{218}. Additional issues representing non-military undertakings without legends usually show the emperor sacrificing or can be associated with Liberalitas\textsuperscript{219}. Military activities depicted are of a wider range. There are a number portraying Verus mounted and thrusting a spear at some enemy\textsuperscript{220}. While Marcus is not depicted in such aggressively martial behaviour there are issues depicting him in military dress holding a spear or parazonium and military standards\textsuperscript{221}. And there are three issues of Marcus celebrating the martial \textit{virtus}, that most Roman of personal virtues whose attributes are always of a military nature. They bear the legend \textit{VIRTVS AVG} and show Marcus crossing a bridge over the Danube accompanied by soldiers\textsuperscript{222}. These are a new type of coin for Marcus, representing military undertakings against the Germans, and can be dated to his twenty-sixth tribunician year (Dec. 171-Dec. 172). In 163 Lucius issued coins depicting his departure for the eastern wars with the legend \textit{PROFECTIO AVG} and depicting Verus in military dress accompanied by soldiers. Similarly, issues of Marcus of 169 and 170 have the legend \textit{PROFECTIO AVG} and show the emperor in military dress accompanied by soldiers\textsuperscript{223}. These clearly announce the departure of Marcus for a new campaign against the Marcomanni in 169.

**Commodus**

Under Commodus coins are used as a medium of propaganda in more explicit ways than previously. There is a marked increase in the number of different types, 34 as compared to Marcus' 26 and Verus' 18, and the reverse legends are remarkable for the innovative nature of both their iconography and their messages. Types that are new on Commodus' coins when compared to those of his father include Cybele (not

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\textsuperscript{217} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 215 no. 15; p. 251 no. 459; p. 278 no. 806; p. 317 no 1301.

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. p. 232 no. 249.

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 244 no. 400; p. 318 no. 1307.

\textsuperscript{220} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 257 no. 543; p. 324 no. 1402.

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 235 no.281; p. 284 no. 908.

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 234 no. 270; p. 296 nos. 1047 and 1048.

\textsuperscript{223} Verus: \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 319 no. 1321. Marcus: \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 290 no. 903; p. 291 no. 977.
appearing previously on coins of a reigning emperor issued by the mint of Rome), Hercules (used by Verus but not Marcus), Janus, Libertas, and Nobilitas. During this reign, too, there is a marked increase in the close association of various divinities with the person of the emperor, a process that reaches its apex in equating Commodus with Hercules by early 192.

It is typical of Commodus' character, as rendered in the surviving histories, that immediately after Marcus' death the war with the Marcomanni was brought to a speedy conclusion by the signing of a truce, a diplomatic solution to the frontier problem rather than a military one. For Commodus "hated all exertion and craved the comfortable life of the city" and had no interest in pursuing military campaigns. The author of the life of Commodus in the Historia Augusta criticises the emperor for allowing his legates to conduct the military defense of the empire. In keeping with this apparent lack of interest in warfare the coins of Commodus actually present a somewhat ambivalent emperor, whose rule in affiliation with various gods brings peace and security to the empire and its subjects. The most frequent type in this reign is Victory, yet again. The other most frequent types are, in descending order: Roma, Jupiter, Fortuna, Felicitas, Minerva, and Providentia. These seven most frequent types account for only 49.2% of the total issues, whereas over half (53.4%) of Marcus' issues are made up of only six types and the top three of Verus' types account for 49.7%. The difference is solely due to the greater number of different types issued by this emperor. It is also notable that only half of the most common types of Commodus are personified virtues, the increasing concern with the identification of the emperor with traditional Roman gods on the coins representing a wider religious trend. Three of the most frequently appearing virtues in Fears' characterisation are represented; Concordia, which accounts for merely fourteen issues, is missing, rating only in sixteenth place with 2.3%.

For an emperor demonstrably indifferent to actual campaigning there is a surprising emphasis on Victory. This type is the most frequent under

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224 Cassius Dio, LXXII, 1.2: "μισούντως τε ὁν καὶ τῆς ἀστυκῆς ἀντλώντες ἑμθημοῦν".
225 SHA, Commodus Antoninus, XIII.5.
Commodus, even though it accounts for only 10.4% of the total issues. Compare this with Hadrian whose expansionist ambitions were of the same order as Commodus' yet under whom Victory rates as only the sixth most frequent type (4.8% of the total). Issues of Victory appear in almost every year of Commodus' 12-year reign, and it should be noted that the issues are predominantly imperial mintings in gold or silver, 41 of these compared to 18 Senatorial issues. The great majority of all the issues appear without specific reverse legends, 42 without and 17 with legends, but the legends that do appear are by no means unusual. Early issues of the type in 180 and 181, on the gold and silver denominations only, show Victory holding a patera and palm or with a wreath and palm, and commemorate the cessation of the war with the Marcomanni and the apparent Roman victory. Coins of Minerva holding Victory and spear, and Roma holding Victory and parazonium, seem to directly associate victory with the intervention of Minerva and the strength of Rome. Victory types of 183-4 show Victory in a more aggressively martial mode, inscribing a shield with captives seated nearby, and refer to the outbreak of fighting in Britain and the success of Ulpius Marcellus. Bronze issues of the same date show Victory sitting on shields while she inscribes a shield on her lap, and carry the legend VICT BRIT.

In 185 the first of the Victory coins with the legend SAEC FEL appears. This shows Victory standing with her foot on a helmet while setting against a palm a shield which is inscribed VO DE. As a coin legend SAEC FEL was unique, not appearing before this, and its association with Victory was unprecedented, although it has been pointed out that the celebration of the vota for the emperor was closely connected with the notion of victory. This association of type and legend has overtones of later developments in the Commodian propaganda program. Another novel association of Victory and legend occurs in 189 with the production of the last Victory issues of

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227 RIC, iii, p. 367 no. 8a; p. 368 no. 20a.
228 RIC, iii, p. 366 no. 4; p. 367 no. 11a.
229 Cassius Dio, LXXIII, 8.1-6.
230 These also appear in 185. RIC, iii, p. 416 no. 440; p. 418 nos. 451-2; p. 419 no. 459a.
231 RIC, iii, p. 378 no. 113; p. 417 nos. 449a and 449b.
Commodus. These coins carry the legend VICTORIAE FELICI and depict Victory carrying a wreath in both hands. This is a quite unequivocal linking of military success with the happiness and prosperity of the empire.

The second most frequent type on Commodus' coins, and again unusual for its prominence, is Roma (8.8%), the goddess who personifying the city, the heart of the empire, came by association to symbolize the empire as well as the city. This Roma, who appears to be a synthesis of the emperor, the state and the Roman people, cannot be entirely separated from Victory since she is most regularly portrayed on coins in the second century with a definitely military nature. The connection between Victory and Roma is not entirely clear and has been little discussed, but it seems likely that Commodus was intent on emphasising the inseparable connection between military success and the everlasting empire of Rome. In the first year of Commodus' reign coins of Roma appear depicting the goddess with a spear and parazonium, and the very next year she is depicted holding Victory and a parazonium. In fact the type of Roma holding Victory accounts for some 41 of the 50 issues of the type. It is thus clear that Roma was being pictured as a militarily victorious goddess, and it was solely in this guise that the personification of the state was to appear on coins during the reign of Commodus. Even the depictions of Roma without Victory portray the goddess with military attributes such as spears or standards. More remarkable are the legends associated with the city's appearance on coins. Less than one-third of the Roma issues (13 out of 50) have reverse legends additional to usual titulature. The first additional titles read merely ROM and appear in 183/4, but in 188/9 we see issues of the type with the legend ROMAE AETERNAE. It can be no mere coincidence that this is 50 years from the dedication of Hadrian's grand new temple of Roma and Venus. There is an obvious connection with issues of Roma carrying the legend ROMAE FELICI issued the very

233 RIC, iii, p. 385 no. 180; p. 427 no. 530.
234 See the extended discussion by R Mellor "The Goddess Roma" in ANRW, II, 17.2, pp. 950-1030.
235 RIC, iii, p. 366 nos. 1 and 5; p. 387 no. 11a.
236 RIC, iii, p. 376 no. 98a; p. 385 no. 177.
237 Grant, "Anniversary Issues", p. 127; and Mellor, p. 1021f. The temple is mentioned in Dio, LXIX, 4.1 and SHA, Hadrian, XIX.12.
next year\textsuperscript{238}, and both issues are inextricably bound up with Commodus' new 'golden age' and his desire to be seen as another Augustus. The only previous appearance of either legend was when Hadrian used ROMAE AETERNAE and ROMA FELIX on issues of the type in the 130's\textsuperscript{239} which commemorate his introduction of the cult of Rome, previously worshipped only in the east, into the city itself.

We can see in the ever closer identification of Commodus with specific Roman gods, mentioned above, aspects of the spirit of religious syncretism that especially characterises this age and which reached its peak with coins announcing IOVI EXSVPER (see below). It was this trend that also saw Commodus placing more emphasis on the cults of Cybele, Isis, and Sarapis, all of whom appear on coins of this period. And an emphasis on the association of the emperor with Jupiter found increasing expression on Commodus' coins. It is another idiosyncrasy of Commodus' coins that Jupiter should be so featured. It is not the use of the chief god that is unusual rather the frequency with which the type was employed by Commodus. The Jupiter type is the third most frequent of all his types, amounting to some 7.8\% of the total, with 44 issues. Jupiter has many guises, representative of his unique position in the Roman pantheon, and the attributes and epithets used on issues of the type bear careful delineation.

On the bronze coins of Commodus Jupiter types appear with legends from 180. The first issue of the type on these coins depicts Jupiter with Victory and a spear, and reads IOVI VICTORI\textsuperscript{240}. In the same year, also, Jupiter appears with the legend IVPPITER CONSERVATOR carrying a thunderbolt and sceptre, and holding his cloak over Commodus who holds a branch and sceptre\textsuperscript{241}. From then on issues of the type on imperial and senatorial coins parallel each other. The imperial coinage before 186 portrays Jupiter without additional legends but the depictions are familiar: Jupiter appears on coins of 183 holding Victory and a spear and in 183-4 with thunderbolt, sceptre and an eagle at his feet\textsuperscript{242}. From 185 Jupiter is associated on imperial issues with

\textsuperscript{238} RIC, iii, p. 388 no. 203; p. 432 no. 583.
\textsuperscript{239} RIC, ii, p. 370 nos. 263-265.
\textsuperscript{240} RIC, iii, p. 401 no. 291.
\textsuperscript{241} RIC, iii, p. 403 no. 304.
\textsuperscript{242} RIC, iii, p. 371 no. 46; p. 373 no. 70.
legends that expressly call him: Defensor Salutis (wielding thunderbolt and carrying a spear), Exsuperans (branch and sceptre or thunderbolt and sceptre), Juvenis (thunderbolt, sceptre and eagle), Optimus Maximus (thunderbolt and sceptre), Sponsor Securitatis (holding thunderbolt and with arm on Commodus' shoulder), and Ultor (holding Victory and sceptre)\textsuperscript{243}.

The significance of these Jupiter types for Commodus’ program should not be under-emphasised. Although Jupiter had previously appeared on coins with the attributes used on Commodus’ coins most of the legends appearing now were new, and the specific linking of Commodus and Jupiter was quite a departure from previous conceptions of the god. The IOVI IVVENI type, never before used, portrays Jupiter with a thunderbolt, sceptre and eagle and is a harbinger of Commodus’ new ‘golden age’, with hints that Commodus is a young Jupiter. Similarly the EXSVER type, also previously unused, bears an innovative legend and establishes Jupiter, and thus the emperor who is Jupiter’s viceroy, as the epitome of the state. In 192 Commodus expressed his association with Jupiter even more unequivocally by assuming the epithet ‘Exsuperatorius’, and announcing himself as the bringer of another ‘golden age’\textsuperscript{244}.

With the exception of some issues of the IOVI EXSVPER type, all Commodus’ coins of Jupiter depict him holding either the thunderbolt or Victory; other attributes are usually a spear and sceptre. The EXSVPER type, as the only exception to strictly military attributes of Jupiter, shows the god carrying a branch and sceptre, but even some of the aes issues of this type have the god wielding a thunderbolt and sceptre\textsuperscript{245}. As an attribute of the chief god the thunderbolt symbolizes military struggle and warlike aggression and its predominance as an attribute of Jupiter on Commodus’ coins bespeaks an emphatic association of Jupiter, Commodus, and the military success of the Roman state. Significantly Trajan was the first emperor consciously to portray himself wielding the thunderbolt; this merely complements the

\textsuperscript{243} RIC, iii, p. 381 no. 138; p. 384 no. 173; p. 387 no. 192; p. 388 no. 200; p. 396 nos. 255 and 256.

\textsuperscript{244} Cassius Dio, LXXII, 15.4, 15.6. SHA, Commodus Antoninus, XIV.3.

\textsuperscript{245} RIC, iii, pp. 381-3 nos. 139, 152, 153; pp. 422-3 nos. 483, 488. With thunderbolt: p. 425 no. 508, p. 427 no. 531.
increasing emphasis during that emperor's reign on the emperor as the earthly vice-regent of Jupiter elected by him to rule the world\textsuperscript{246}. The central position of Jupiter and his importance to Commodus are clear from this imagery, as are the benefits of his military qualities to Rome. It is clear that there is a consistent purpose behind these portrayals of Jupiter which aimed at elevating both Commodus specifically and the emperor's image more generally to Jovian status.

Clearly linked with this program of Commodus is his close association and eventual identification with Hercules. The pattern for such identification had been set by Trajan who was the first emperor to use Hercules on coins to any great extent. This demi-god, generally regarded as the son of Jupiter, is the quintessential warrior and hero, and it is for this reason that he is regarded as the patron deity of gladiators. As such he is linked to Commodus through the emperor's pride in, and demonstration of, his own gladiatorial skills. The type is the tenth most frequent on Commodus' coins, representing 4.1\% of his total issues but is highly innovative in the legends linked with the type. By 190 the apotheosis of Commodus to Hercules had become complete. Both gold and bronze coins were issued that year bearing the legend\textsuperscript{247} HERC[VLI] COMMODIANO and showing Hercules sacrificing over an altar and holding a cornucopia while a lion-skin hangs on a tree. We are told by both Herodian and Cassius Dio that at this time Commodus also assumed as part of his imperial title the name Hercules, and then renamed all the months after his titles\textsuperscript{248}.

Minerva, once again a type unusual for its frequency under Commodus rather than its appearance, is another goddess who, almost without

\textsuperscript{246} For a full discussion see Fears "Jupiter", ANRW, II, 17.1, pp. 80-85.
\textsuperscript{247} RIC, iii, p. 390 no. 221; p. 432 no. 581.
\textsuperscript{248} Herodian, I, 14.8. Cassius Dio, LXII, 15.3. A further element in this process was the desire of Commodus to be seen as the refounder of Rome, as another Romulus. It was now (190) that Commodus chose to rename Rome as Commodiana, announced on coins of 190 with the legend COL[ONIA] L[VCIAJ AN[TONINIANAJ COM[MODIANAJ and a depiction of a veiled Commodus ploughing with two oxen: RIC, iii, p. 430-1 nos. 560, 570. Romulus, the mythical founder of Rome, had earlier been commemorated on coins with the legend ROMVLO CONDITORI on a denarius of 189: RIC, iii, p. 388 no. 204. In 191/2 Commodus issued coins in gold and bronze to HERC ROM CONDITORI: RIC, iii, p. 394 no. 247; p. 436 no. 616. These depict Commodus as Hercules ploughing with two oxen and here he is obviously laying out the boundaries of the city in his role of the new founder, as prefigured on the earlier type of Romulus.
exception, is used by Commodus in a martial guise. Normally seen as a multi-aspected goddess linked to a number of human endeavours, including labour, the arts, wisdom, and peace, under Commodus her aspect is as a goddess who brings victory to the Roman state. Thus in 180 she is depicted holding Victory and a spear with a shield at her feet, and in 183 she appears on coins brandishing a javelin and holding a shield. In 188/9 a new issue of Minerva appears which shows her holding Victory and a spear, a shield and trophy at either side. The legend reads MIN[ER] VICT. A late type of Minerva, the only exception to the purely military aspect of the goddess pictured on the coins, issued in 191 has the legend MINER AVG and shows Minerva holding a branch, spear and shield. This image represents Minerva in her role of bringer of peace, but the martial allusions are not entirely absent. The spear and shield, articles of war, connect peace, represented by the branch, to the successful conclusion of military action.

Other types used by Commodus are more standard and less overtly martial in tone. Fortuna, fourth most frequent (6.5%), and Felicitas in fifth place (6.2%) are common types, although here again there is innovation in the legends associated with issues of the types. FEL PVBLICA, even if not new, was a rare legend used by Commodus in 186 and 187, and the type of FEL PERPETVAE, which shows Felicitas holding a sceptre clasping hands with Commodus who holds a cornucopia, is previously unattested. Similarly unique is a gold issue of 192 which refers to the prosperity of the empire due to Commodus, and carries the legend FELIC COM. The coin shows Felicitas with her foot on a prow holding an abacus and cornucopia. Fortuna issues of 188/9, with the unique legend FORTVNAE MANENTI, usually show Fortuna holding a horse by the bridle and carrying a cornucopia (one depicts Fortuna holding a thunderbolt and sceptre), and seem to express

249 H. Mattingly, "The Roman Goddess of War", Proceedings of the African Classical Associations, 1 (1958), argues that one important aspect of Minerva was as the Roman war goddess.
250 RIC, iii, p. 366 no. 4; p. 372 no. 56; p. 410 no. 368a.
251 RIC, iii, p. 385 no. 176; p. 427 no. 528.
252 RIC, iii, p. 390 no. 222; p. 432 no. 582.
253 RIC, iii, p. 420 no. 467; p. 423 no. 495. Previously used by Titus: RIC, ii, p. 127 no. 89.
254 RIC, iii, p. 395 no. 249; p. 433 no. 595.
255 RIC, iii, p. 393 no. 238.
the permanence of the empire's good fortune\textsuperscript{256}.

Similarly types of Liberalitas and Salus are standard and conventional in their imagery. Two largesses were given before the accession, with seven more to follow irregularly over the next 12 years. Each was commemorated on coins that depict Commodus, sometimes with Liberalitas, holding a cornucopia and abacus, and attended by officers\textsuperscript{257}. An unnumbered Liberalitas issue of 184/5 that does not fit with the known largesses might indicate that the sixth largesse, commonly dated to 186, was actually given in late 185\textsuperscript{258}. Salus, with Liberalitas the seventh most frequent type (4.6\%), appears on Commodus' coins with equally familiar legends but seems to be more closely associated with specific events than is usually the case. Thus the many Salus issues of 182 have been seen to refer to either an illness or a conspiracy against the emperor\textsuperscript{259}. Certainly those issued in 183, notably all on bronze coinage\textsuperscript{260}, refer to the escape of Commodus from the plot organised by his sister Lucilla\textsuperscript{261}. In 185 the conspiracy of Perennis was uncovered and the escape of the emperor is again commemorated on regular issues of Salus showing the goddess feeding a snake, as well as on some Felicitas issues of that year which carry the legend FEL AVG and show Felicitas holding Victory and a winged caduceus\textsuperscript{262}. It was probably this event which explains the issue of FID EXERC\[IT\] types in the same year depicting Commodus holding a sceptre and haranguing a number of soldiers\textsuperscript{263}. Again, the thwarting of that extravagant plot of the bandit Maternus to kill the emperor in 187 is celebrated on Salus issues of that year which bear the legend SAL AVG and depict a seated Salus feeding a snake which is coiled around an altar\textsuperscript{264}. An issue of the SAL[VS] GEN[ERIS] HVM[ANII] type in 191/2 most probably refers to the waning of the plague which had been

\textsuperscript{256} RIC, iii, p. 386-7 nos. 191a, 191b; p. 427 no. 534; p. 429 no. 547.
\textsuperscript{257} For example RIC, iii, p. 368 no. 22; p. 381 no. 134; p. 406 no. 329; p. 430 no. 564. Throughout RIC read 134 for 133 as the exemplifier of the type.
\textsuperscript{258} RIC, iii, p. 417 no. 448. Again read 134 for 133.
\textsuperscript{259} Thus Mattingly, RIC, iii, p. 357.
\textsuperscript{260} RIC, iii, pp. 409-412 nos. 356, 359, 381, 390.
\textsuperscript{261} Herodian, I, 8.6; SHA, Commodus Antoninus, IV.3.
\textsuperscript{262} RIC, iii, p. 377 no. 109; p. 382 no. 147; p. 418 no. 450; p. 420 nos. 466, 467; p. 421 no. 473.
\textsuperscript{263} RIC, iii, p. 378 nos. 110a-d; p. 420 nos. 468a-d.
\textsuperscript{264} RIC, iii, p. 424 no. 504. See Herodian, I, 10.
ravaging Italy since 189. The coins, issued in both silver and bronze, portray Salus holding a sceptre around which a snake twines, extending her hand to raise a kneeling figure.

The Image of Commodus Himself

The message of the iconography of the coin types seems ambivalent, although it does present military success given by the gods that ensures the bestowal of other benefits (Felicitas, Salus, Fortuna) which combine to dispense longevity, prosperity, and well-being to the empire. It almost seems that Commodus wished to present himself as equally able and successful in both the civic world and military world. The coins which depict the emperor himself, however, yield a less two-sided image.

There are 94 identifiable issues with Commodus on the reverse. Some of these are difficult to categorise. For instance, coins with the legend IVPPITER CONSERVATOR which depict Jupiter, who holds a thunderbolt, protecting Commodus with his cloak, are somewhat ambivalent in their message. Is it Jupiter's strength which conserves the emperor/empire or the aggression characterised by the thunderbolt? On the whole I have preferred to see such types as military images rather than civic ones. On this basis military issues represent only 40.5% of the issues depicting the emperor, thirty-eight of the ninety-four issues. Even if the Jupiter types are included among the coins with non-military attributes the proportion of such coins is only slightly less, falling to 37.25% (thirty-five out of ninety-four). All these coins of the emperor, like those of the other types discussed above, seem to have been issued in much more immediate response to contemporary events than was usual for other emperors whose coins, on the whole, advertised a more general program. The distribution of these issues is also significant. Fifteen of the issues showing military activity were imperial coins (39.5%), and twenty-one of the fifty-six non-military types (37.5%). Nearly two-thirds of the coins of both the military and

265 Cassius Dio, LXXII, 14.3; Herodian, I, 12.1-2.
266 RIC, iii, p. 396 no. 260; p. 434 no. 600. The kneeling figure most likely represents Italia being restored by Salus
267 RIC, iii, p. 403 no. 304.
non-military issues are on the aes coinage. Clearly Commodus' propagandising was aimed at the general populace rather than the senatorial class, and its success is attested to by the fact that Commodus remained on good terms with the mass of the population until at least 190\textsuperscript{268}.

The military types picture Commodus in the usual range of such activities. The first issues featuring the emperor were issued in 180 coinage and showed Commodus advancing, holding a spear and trophy. This issue together with the ADVENTVS AVG type depicting Commodus riding a horse with his right hand raised\textsuperscript{269}, and a type of FORT RED, issued in the same year, celebrate the return of the victorious military commander from the Danube front. These types were all issued in bronze. The first imperial coins depicting an aggressive Commodus appeared in 182 and carried the legend VIRT AVG with a representation of Commodus on horseback brandishing a javelin at a lion\textsuperscript{270}. The next to appear were those of FID EXERC which appeared in 185 after the escape from the plot of Perennis. An issue of the CONC MIL type the next year again proclaims the harmony existing between the emperor and the army, and shows Commodus in the centre of a group of four soldiers\textsuperscript{271}. A more general type issued on both the imperial and bronze coins portrayed Commodus in a quadriga holding an eagle-tipped sceptre, sometimes crowned by Victory\textsuperscript{272}. These appear regularly throughout the reign. A type issued in 191/2, unusual but consistent with Commodus' sympathy for oriental religions, depicts the emperor crowned by Victory clasping hands with Serapis over an altar, with Isis standing to one side\textsuperscript{273}. The message is a repetition of Commodus' conviction that all the gods have given Victory to Rome.

The issues depicting civil or religious undertakings cover the usual range of such activities. Thus Commodus presides over Liberalities and

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{268} Herodian, I, 15.7: "So far Commodus was still quite popular with the mob...".
\item\textsuperscript{269} RIC, iii, p. 401 nos. 293, 294, 295.
\item\textsuperscript{270} RIC, iii, p. 371 no. 39. The lion is variously the symbol of the town of Lugdunum or representative of Africa but in this type probably represents no more than Commodus' aggressive nature as exemplified by hunting.
\item\textsuperscript{271} RIC, iii, p. 380 no. 127.
\item\textsuperscript{272} RIC, iii, p. 389 no. 213; p. 403 no. 306; p. 411 no. 376; p. 430 no. 558; p. 436 no. 615; etc.
\item\textsuperscript{273} RIC, iii, p. 394 no. 246; p. 436 no. 614a.
\end{itemize}
makes sacrifices to the gods on the anniversaries of his accession. Some more unusual types do feature on these coins and the issues celebrating the refounding of Rome as Commodiana have already been referred to. In the late 180's appear issues of coins attesting to Commodus' affection for the senatorial order, even while he was in the process of causing the death of a number of its members. In 187 he issued silver and bronze coins bearing the legend PAT[ER] SENAT[VS] showing Commodus holding a branch and sceptre. And in 188 were issued types with the legend PIET[ATI] SENAT[VS] which portrayed the emperor standing and clasping hands with a standing senator.

Another unusual legend appears on a bronze and silver issue of 191. The legend reads FELIC PERPETV AE and shows Commodus holding a cornucopia clasping hands with Felicitas who holds a sceptre. The legend had not appeared before on coins of the imperial period but the message is consistent with Commodus' other propaganda. One other unusual issue puts forward the very same message. Minted in gold and bronze this has the legend PROVIDENTIAE AVG and pictures Commodus as Hercules standing with his foot on a prow, holding a thunderbolt and clasping hands with Africa who holds a sistrum and corn-ears. The reference is to the care the emperor gives to the empire as well as referring directly to the emperor's maintenance of the com-supply.

Military Propaganda

Celebration of military victories was always an important part of the imperial image. As evidence of Rome's invincible military might triumphs and acclamations served an important ideological function all through the Principate. With few exceptions even the most unmilitary emperors received acclamations as imperator and celebrated triumphs for victories both real and imagined, and these confirmed the emperors'
right to rule\textsuperscript{279}. The theme of victorious Rome is a constant feature of imperial coinage, statues, and inscriptions.

Three elements are important: triumphal celebrations, \textit{cognomina}, and acclamations as \textit{imperator}. The triumph was the peak of a military career and the highest honour that could be bestowed on an individual by the state. Until the establishment of the Principate triumphs were still awarded to individuals for outstanding military success. The last private individual to be awarded a triumph was apparently Cornelius Balbus, who celebrated his in 19 BC for a victory over the Garamantes in North Africa\textsuperscript{280}. From thenceforth only emperors and members of the imperial family could achieve this singular distinction. Even so not many were celebrated. Clearly emperors wanted the triumph to mean something and they were not lightly awarded. In the whole of the first and second centuries only nine triumphs were celebrated, whereas "between 252 and 53 BC there had been 70 triumphs"\textsuperscript{281}.

Claudius, lacking in military experience and skill, except perhaps of a bookish kind, was the first emperor after Augustus to celebrate a triumph, being voted one by the senate for the victories of his commanders in the British campaigns\textsuperscript{282}. Vespasian celebrated a triumph for his Jewish wars, and Domitian likewise celebrated two triumphs for his German wars, although Cassius Dio is scathing about Domitian's actual achievements\textsuperscript{283}. In the second century emperors continued to advertise their martial qualities with triumphs, although by this stage the presence of the emperor with the armies was a necessary pre-condition for the ceremony. Trajan celebrated two triumphs: one in 105 for his successful conclusion to the Dacian wars, and another posthumously in 118 for his Parthian campaigns\textsuperscript{284}. In 166 Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus celebrated a joint triumph for their own

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{280} V.A. Maxfield, \textit{The Military Decorations of the Roman Army}, London, 1981, p. 103. Maxfield has an extended discussion of the constitutional issues raised in awarding triumphs to individuals at the start of the Principate, pp. 103f.
\bibitem{281} Discussed in Campbell, p. 136-137 and p. 137 n. 79.
\bibitem{282} Cassius Dio, LX, 22-23.
\bibitem{283} Vespasian: Josephus, \textit{The Jewish War}, 7.125. Domitian: Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 7.3-8.4.
\bibitem{284} Dacian triumph: Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 15.1; Parthia: Cassius Dio, LXIX, 2.3, and SHA, \textit{Hadrian}, VI.3.
\end{thebibliography}
Parthian campaign, and in 176 Marcus and Commodus celebrated a triumph for their success over the Sarmatians\textsuperscript{285}. It is noteworthy, if inexplicable, that Septimius Severus did not celebrate a triumph for any of his victories\textsuperscript{286}. In keeping with the image we have of both Hadrian and Antoninus Pius as men of peace, neither of them celebrated a triumph, Hadrian in fact refused the triumph which was celebrated posthumously for Trajan\textsuperscript{287}.

An adjunct to the celebration of triumphs was the acceptance of *cognomina* which announced a military victory over a specific vanquished enemy. As was the case with triumphs, these *cognomina* were restricted to the imperial family. The Julio-Claudian emperors, with the exception of Claudius, bore only the cognomen *Germanicus*, although in this instance it was inherited from their common ancestor, the elder Drusus\textsuperscript{288}, and had not been directly given for military victories. After the death of Nero, however, it seems that emperors felt that such epithets had to be earned by real military victories. Domitian is an exception for he seems to have claimed the cognomen *Germanicus* for an apparently imaginary victory over the Germans\textsuperscript{289}. Nerva, too, adopted the title *Germanicus* for a seemingly insignificant victory in Germany. The cognomen was taken by Nerva in October 97 and was seemingly inherited by Trajan on his adoption\textsuperscript{290}.

All the second century emperors who adopted such epithets accepted more than one; in fact there seems to have been an escalating scale of such names. Trajan took two other cognomina for specific military victories, *Dacicus* and *Parthicus*, giving him a total of three. Lucius Verus took three, *Armeniacus, Medicus* and *Parthicus Maximus*, while

\textsuperscript{285} ILS 374 (= CIL VI, 1014). SHA, Marcus Antoninus, XII.8-11; XVII.3; XXVII.4. The triumph may not have been celebrated jointly as stated in SHA, Commodus, II.3. SHA, Commodus, XII.5 says Commodus celebrated his triumph on 23 December 176, while Marcus celebrated his as tr. pot. XXX, i.e. before 9 December 176.

\textsuperscript{286} See the discussion in Campbell, p. 142.

\textsuperscript{287} SHA, Hadrian, VI.2.

\textsuperscript{288} Cassius Dio, LXVII, 4.1. RIC, ii, 158, no 39, dated to 83/4 by TR. POT. II COS VIII DES X, is the first coin issue bearing the epithet GERMANIC.

\textsuperscript{289} ILS 277 records the epithet in Nerva's title. Dating to October 97 is on the basis of the inscription's *tribunicia potestate II cos. III designatus III*. There is no evidence for Trajan's use of the title before his accession.
the peace-loving Marcus Aurelius took a total of five: Armeniacus, Medicus, Parthicus Maximus, Germanicus, and Sarmaticus. Commodus, who abandoned all his father's military campaigns in Germany, took three himself: Germanicus, Sarmaticus, and Britannicus Maximus. Severus, too, accepted a number of cognomina, four in all: Arabicus, Adiabenicus, Parthicus Maximus, and Britannicus Maximus. The last two of these were conferred by Severus on his sons Caracalla and Geta, while Caracalla, not to be outdone, added to his titles the epithet Germanicus Maximus. The increasing appearance of the descriptive Maximus from Marcus onwards suggests that emperors felt the need to advertise that they had outdone whichever of their predecessors had already conquered the people indicated by the cognomen. Perhaps, too, the use of an increasing number of such names shows that the value of the titles had become cheapened, and Maximus began to be used to demonstrate that the victory was real and significant.

The two second century emperors so far unmentioned, Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, took no cognomina. This is in keeping with the stereotyped image of both these men as men of peace who never willingly went to war. There are coins of Hadrian issued in 117, while the emperor was still in the east, which record the emperor's titles as IMP CAES TRAIAN HADRIAN OPT AVG GER DAC. This was not in keeping with the image Hadrian wished to project and they were almost immediately dropped, presumably when the moneyer was given more specific instructions by the emperor.

Another important element in advertising the martial achievements of emperors were imperator acclamations. These were in constant and frequent use from Augustus onwards and the current number of an emperor's acclamations formed part of his imperial titulature. The occasions on which such acclamations were given were usually of less significance than those for which cognomina were taken or triumphs celebrated as the very number of them indicates. Indeed such

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292 *ILS* 421.
293 *ILS* 437.
294 Also discussed by Campbell, p. 131f.
295 *RIC*, ii, pp. 338-9, nos. 2-8.
acclamations need not have had anything to do with a specific battle, and their proliferation might instead point to political difficulties. Of the first century emperors Augustus received 21 acclamations, Tiberius 8, Gaius 7, Claudius 27, Nero 11, Vespasian 20, Titus 17 and Domitian 22. After this first century proliferation of acclamations the second century seems tame by comparison: Trajan 13; Hadrian and Antoninus Pius 2 each; Marcus Aurelius 10; Lucius Verus 5, Commodus 8; and Septimius 11. Obviously these acclamations served an ideological need, emphasising an emperor's military qualities, whether real or not, and serving to legitimise his rule with the whole population.

In the context of the ever present statements of Rome's divine right to rule the world and the martial image most emperors presented on coinage, the emphasis on triumphs, cognomina, and acclamations as imperator indicates that advertising military achievements was an important and permanent part of the public image of emperors. Clearly such advertisement served a political need of emperors that was dictated by the functional ideology of the Principate.

Conclusion

In this survey of the public image of second century emperors one thing stands out clearly. Martial images were important to all emperors, with one glaring exception. Trajan typifies this with his overwhelming use of military coin types, and the martial connotations of even non-military personifications like Pax. Complementary to this is an innovation in the use of cognomina in his imperial title, a departure in both number and style. He is not the only emperor to show such an emphasis on military virtues. Both Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius, contrary to the stereotyped image, portray martial images on their coin issues. In the case of Antoninus this is not carried over to the specifically military propaganda: only two imperator acclamations, for instance, and no additional cognomina. With Marcus the martial image is confirmed in

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296 Campbell, p. 123f.
297 As is suggested by the appearance of imperator acclamations in the imperial titles. The list of acclamations is in Campbell, p. 124. The discussion of the political use of these titles on p. 124ff is clear and compelling.
the military publicity: 10 acclamations and 5 new cognomina. In his military propagandising Commodus does not show the ambivalence that is a feature of his coins. He took 8 imperator acclamations and added three cognomina to his title. Clearly he was aware of the need to retain the loyalty of soldiers and thought it important to relate directly to the army on its own terms, even if he had little interest in actually campaigning or extending the boundaries of the empire.

The one exception to this general rule was Hadrian. Not even Commodus, for all the ambivalence of his coins, ignored the potential of direct military propagandising. Hadrian was in this case, too, a radical departure from the norm. His coin issues directly reflect an emphasis on non-military virtues and a corresponding lack of interest in martial qualities. His military propaganda confirms this: no acclamations, and no additional cognomina.

In the matter of the award of military decorations also Hadrian stands out as being unique. Maxfield points out that "the Hadrianic period stands out as being distinctly anomalous" because there are only two clearly attested cases of awards to senatorial commanders. Not only were the quantity of Hadrian's awards anomalous but the scale of individual awards was also much less than had been common under his predecessors\textsuperscript{298}. And the same situation applies to equestrian awards under Hadrian which were "few in number and small in size"\textsuperscript{299}. However, when we consider centurions and primipilares we see that Hadrian's awards to these ranks do not reflect the paucity of his awards to the senior ranks, and are on a par with those of previous emperors\textsuperscript{300}.

Campbell has argued that the award of military dona was specifically associated by soldiers with the emperor\textsuperscript{301}. If this is the case, and the evidence presented by Campbell suggests that it was, Hadrian's attitude to decorations is easy to explain, and consistent with his general military policy. It seems that his view of external policy is reflected in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{298} Maxfield, p. 147.
\item \textsuperscript{299} Maxfield, p. 177.
\item \textsuperscript{300} Maxfield, p. 194.
\item \textsuperscript{301} Campbell, p. 200.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
his attitude to senatorial and equestrian commanders: Hadrian confirms
his deliberate rejection of the expansionist option by paying little
honour to those whom he might expect to support territorial expansion as
a class, and who might express their support of that option. The
professional serving soldiers, who had no opportunity to voice their
opinion in the area of external policy, are decorated in the same fashion
as they had been by previous emperors, in order to retain their loyalty
and preserve their morale under an emperor who was not inclined to
justify their raison d'être by sending them out to war.

The coins issued by emperors differ in both type and frequency but
types alone are no guide to the image presented by a particular
emperor. More telling is a comparison of the actual types used by an
emperor, and the frequency of their issue. Despite social expectations
which made Victory types so pervasive and frequent, individual
emperors could still find room to differentiate themselves, as can be
seen in their use of military cognomina and salutations as imperator.
These aspects of the emperors' image are part of a differentiation that is
reflected not only in the literary expression of the political ideology but
also in the practical expression of external policy.
PART 4: The Execution of External Policy

Introduction

Current interpretations of imperial Roman frontier policy seem compelled to explain military campaigns on the basis of pressing strategic or economic concerns, without regard for the very different justifications offered by the ancient sources. Now this may be purely because our century regards aggressive territorial expansion per se as undesirable, but it is nevertheless underpinned by an implicit assumption of Roman longer term strategic forward planning, as exemplified by Luttwak's book on Roman strategic planning whose very title, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire From the First Century AD to the Third*, imposes an anachronistic perception on imperial military thinking. The ancient sources, contemporary or otherwise, explain Roman foreign policy completely differently (see above Part 2). It does not seem enough to brush aside these explanations on the basis that ancient writers were not privy to policy deliberations and thus could not report strategic thinking of whose existence they were unaware. Romans were pragmatic to a fault and if a consistent policy is seen under these circumstances it is for the reason that effective policies were continued until such time as they stopped working. In fact Luttwak's 'grand strategy' is itself separated into three quite distinct phases, all different, whose very differences support my contention. In the absence of a coherent centuries-long policy why should we be so ready to dismiss the rationale for military campaigns offered by authors like Dio and Herodian and rely instead on interpretations based on twentieth century military theorising?

To Luttwak the second century frontiers represent "the workings of a rational administrative policy, not an undirected expansionism"¹, this despite the fact that the borders were indeed nothing more than the result of the undirected expansion of the Republican period. The borders were not established by successive Roman emperors but in most

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¹ Luttwak, p. 87.
cases by wealth- and glory-seeking consuls, and Augustus. What 'rational administrative policy' would have conquered and annexed Britain, and then continued to hold onto it? What rational administrative policy allowed the huge re-entrant of the 'Agri Decumates' to exist until the last quarter of the first century? What rational administrative policy annexes a peaceful client kingdom that had given no trouble for decades and from which no threats ever arose (Arabia)? It just will not do - no rational policy adhered to by successive emperors from Augustus onwards existed or can have existed. If rationality can be seen from the perspective of two thousand years then all that can be argued is that Roman haphazardness looks like rationality to us. It needs no consistent centuries-long policy to justify the use of the most tactically or strategically viable frontiers. In fact most borders were not sited in the most strategically viable positions anyway, as I discuss below.

With this in mind a closer examination of the ancient sources themselves might be of much value in revealing the underlying basis of Roman foreign policy in the second century A.D. The frontiers will be dealt with systematically in a clockwise direction, beginning with that enigmatic frontier furthest from the civilised delights of Rome. Additionally this part will look at some of those men who appear through the second century as military commanders and provincial governors. I do not claim to be exclusive here, but some appointments reflect, as it seems to me, the operation of the external policy of particular emperors.

A useful starting point is Birley's statement that "Emperors were bound to be affected to some degree by the climate of opinion, at any rate in the circles in which they had moved before their accession, and among men with whom they surrounded themselves when in power"². Firstly I believe that this can be extended to cover those men appointed as governors of, in particular, the armed frontier provinces. It seems feasible to assume that both expansionist and non-expansionist emperors would surround themselves with men who shared their world view, as well as appointing such men to the commands of imperial provinces.

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² Birley, RFRFP, p. 16.
Provincial appointments are of course problematic. The exigencies of barbarian incursions across borders or internal rebellions will call for legionary commanders of no less military worth than those required by an expansionist emperor intent on adding new territories to the empire. And so often appointments depend on personal or familial ties between emperor and senator.

As Syme rightly points out "...provincial commands and iterated consulates identify the chief personages in the government"\(^3\). It seems clear that these chief personages were military men, perhaps not the *viri militares* as defined by Syme, but with a definite orientation toward men whose expertise lay in the military field rather than the civil one. Not that I wish to suggest that these men were incompetent at civil and administrative affairs. But this is a long way from stating, as Campbell does, that "It should be stressed that the legionary legate had certain administrative duties which no doubt figured prominently in any assessment of his character and ability"\(^4\). This is tendentious. Since the role of a legionary legate was to command a legion, possibly in action, the abilities that would be judged of pre-eminent importance are those that relate to leading men and winning battles. A legionary legate never knew when he might be called upon to fight. A bit late to change a 'pen-pusher' for a tactical leader when battle was joined 1000 miles from Rome. Needless to say administrative duties must be carried out, but those in positions of such direct command are chosen for leadership and tactical ability not for administrative expertise, such as happens even in modern armies.

**Britain**

As has been observed the Roman frontier in Britain has been so exhaustively studied that clear perspective is difficult to reach\(^5\). As well, long periods of the second century remain obscure and the *fasti* for the province contain numerous lengthy gaps. However, a summary of the history of the province here will suffice to delineate the major elements.

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4 J.B. Campbell, "Who were the 'Viri Militares'?", *JRS*, LXV (1975), p. 20.
5 Mann, "Frontiers", p. 529.
in the establishment of Roman control in the island and consolidation of the frontier in the second century.

The conquest of Britain by Claudius in 43, apparently unmotivated by any specific strategic concern (see above p. 25), initially established Rome in the southern portion of the island. Under later governors, most notably Agricola, Roman control was extended to Wales and into Scotland and Tacitus makes it clear in the Agricola that complete control of the whole of Britain was the ultimate end. Roman legions advanced into the far north-east of Caledonia until by the mid-80's, under Agricola's unknown successor, a major legionary fortress was being constructed at Inchtuthil, some distance north-east of the Forth-Clyde isthmus line, most likely as a base for further advances into unconquered territory in the far north of Scotland. Shortly after 86, however, these forward positions were abandoned, perhaps because more troops were needed for Domitian's German wars of the late 80's, and the frontier was re-established at the Forth-Clyde isthmus line.

Trajan, with no experience of Britain but eager for renown, sought military glory in more traditional fields north of the Danube and east of the Euphrates. And, whether this was a motivating factor or not, there is no comparison in terms of strategic importance between the Danube or Euphrates and the insular province of Britain. Thus concerned to expand Roman territory into Dacia and Parthia Trajan chose, of necessity, to renounce any desires to dominion over the far north of Britain. In contrast to his aggressive expansion elsewhere the Trajanic period in Britain was one of withdrawal and consolidation, and Trajan made no move to replace the governor appointed by Nerva, T. Avidius Quietus. A list of the governors known to have been appointed to the province by Trajan shows that he "clearly gave Britain low priority."
BRITISH FRONTIERS IN THE SECOND CENTURY A.D.
Avidius' successor was L. Neratius Marcellus, brother of the famous jurist L. Neratius Priscus. Adlected into the patriciate in 73/4 this man's only previous military experience was a military tribunate with leg. XII Fulminata in about 75. The only other known governor of the province under Trajan is M. Appius Metilius Bradua, cos. ord. in 108. The choice of Bradua, like that of Marcellus, is, in the words of Birley, "a little surprising", since he had little previous experience and had governed only one province prior to Britain, probably Germania inferior.

Despite the almost total obscurity of the period up to the early 120's it seems certain from archaeological evidence that under Trajan there was an orderly withdrawal of troops to the Tyne-Solway line. This boundary, chosen for no apparent strategic reason, was, in the event, to prove the most enduring of Rome's frontiers in Britain. Nevertheless Rome retained control over areas north of this line until the early years of the second century when the northern legionary fortresses at Caerleon, Chester and York underwent rebuilding work, a process of reconstruction to replace wooden structures with stone. This period of nine years from 99 to 107 also saw the construction of forts along the Stanegate at half-day intervals, indications that in some provinces the boundary between Rome and the barbarians was solidifying. In giving up territory as far as the Forth-Clyde isthmus line, Trajan was foreshadowing Appian's sentiment that what wasn't Roman territory was not worth having anyway. A similar process was to occur on the borders of the German provinces at about the same period.

Hadrian is, of course, remembered for a wall, that great symbol of defensive foreign policy which bears his name. The ancient sources are consistent in describing Hadrian as an emperor averse to warfare and in this light a construction like the wall is readily understandable. The Historia Augusta tells us that: "Adeptus imperium ad priscum se statim morem instituit et tenendae per orbem terrarum paci operam

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13 ILS 1032 (= CIL IX, 2456) gives the career. See also Birley, Fasti, p. 88f.
14 Birley, Fasti, p. 92f.
15 Breeze and Dobson, p. 20.
16 Discussed in detail in Breeze and Dobson, pp. 25-7.
17 Appian, Roman History, Preface, 7.
impe{dit}”, while Cassius Dio confirms that ”καὶ τῷ μήτε τινά πόλεμον 
παράξει καὶ τοὺς δύνας πάσας”, and Eutropius characterises Hadrian as 
an emperor who ”studied rather to defend the provinces than enlarge 
them”18. Shortly after Hadrian’s accession there were uprisings in many 
of the frontier provinces. The Britons, we are told, ”could not be kept 
under Roman control”19, and a Hadrianic coin of around 119 with the 
legend BRITANNIA, showing a seated Britannia resting her head on 
her right hand and holding a sceptre, with a large shield to the right, 
conceivably refers to success in putting down the uprising20. Perhaps it 
was this uprising that motivated Hadrian to install Pompeius Falco as 
governor of Britain. Falco’s career was one with some emphasis on 
military appointments: Xvir stilitibus iudicandis; military tribune of 
legio X Fretensis in 97; quaestor; tr. pl.; praetor; legate of legio V 
Macedonica; legate of Lycia-Pamphylia ca 102/3-104/5; and legate of 
Judaea and legio X Fretensis in 105/6-107/821. Falco had received the 
dona militaria from Trajan for his part in the early campaigns of the 
first Dacian war but had to wait another 6 or 7 years for a consulship. 
This was a suffect consulship in 108 (the same year as Hadrian’s first); 
after which nothing, until the governorship of Moesia Inferior 
sometime in the period 115-118. His career under Trajan had been 
slow, and he was not one of the favoured ‘viri militares’. After Britain, 
where he remained until about 122, he became proconsul of Asia about 
123/422. This was usually the culmination of a man’s political career 
and indicates high-standing among senators. He enjoyed a long life in 
retirement - he was still alive in 14023. His career appears distinguished 
but he was never given that extra mark of prestige: an iterated 
consulship. Had he fallen out of favour with Hadrian who refused to 
reward him for his military success?

On his first ‘royal progress’ in 122 Hadrian made a visit to Britain, the 
first emperor since Claudius to do so. No itinerary of the visit is extant 
but it is not inconceivable, and is indeed probable, that the northern

18 SHA, Hadrian, V.1; Dio, LXIX, 5.1; Eutropius, Breviarium, VIII, viii.
19 “Britanni teneri sub Romana dicione non poterant”: SHA, Hadrian, V.2 with a 
list of all the hostilities.
20 RIC, ii, p. 412 no. 577.
21 PIR R68.
border was included in the tour. Shortly after the visit, work seems to have begun on construction of a wall "eighty miles in length, which was to separate the barbarians from the Romans"\textsuperscript{24}. A long inscription, found at Jarrow, attests to the construction of these defense works under A. Platorius Nepos, Falco's replacement as governor, so they will have commenced not long after July 122\textsuperscript{25}. The two events must be connected. We cannot know from where Hadrian derived his idea of a fixed barrier but a similar concept was imposed on the German \textit{limes} at about the same period (see below, p. 118). Hadrian had no doubt observed on his travels that the Rhine and Danube formed natural boundaries on the continent, the Euphrates served the same purpose in the East, and in North Africa there was always the desert. To any military strategist there are obviously only two options available for securing Britain: conquest of the whole island, or the installation of a man-made barrier to function as a river or desert might. Since use of the first option was not part of Hadrian's strategic thinking, only the second was acceptable. The wall itself was not located in a position to serve any overt tactical or strategic purpose, and even before it was completed changes were made in its design and construction in an attempt to overcome the restrictions of the original plan\textsuperscript{26}. Even if the purpose of the wall was "to control movement, not to prevent it"\textsuperscript{27}, its construction, like that of the palisade in Upper Germany, was a significant departure from previous conceptions of the frontier. There is no reason why previous methods of controlling movement of tribes or individuals should not have continued to work, especially in Britain where, despite the endemic nature of uprisings, the Roman army had no problem in achieving military success.

Under Antoninus Pius frontier policy in Britain assumed an abrupt \textit{volte face}, although throughout the rest of the empire it was very much a continuation of the precedent set by Hadrian. At least that is my

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] Mann, p. 531. See Hanson and Maxwell, pp. 54-58, for a full discussion of construction of the wall and the changes made to the design of the defense works.
\item[27] Breeze and Dobson, p. 37.
\end{footnotes}
perception. The Augustan History in fact supports this judgement in only two brief passages. The first of these describes Pius as a lover of peace who "was continually quoting the saying of Scipio that he would rather save a single citizen than slay a thousand foes"; the second says that he "almost alone of all emperors lived entirely unstained by the blood of either citizen or foe so far as was in his power". As far as it goes this is a better reception than Hadrian gets in the same work. Yet the Historia Augusta also records a far larger number of wars under Pius than it does for his predecessor. We are told that "he waged a number of wars but all of them through his legates". These wars included the victory of Lollius Urbicus over the Britons, other victories over the Moors, the Germans, the Dacians "and many other tribes, and also the Jews", as well as a successful curbing of the Alans and the putting down of rebellions in Achaea and Egypt. Perhaps our perception of Antoninus Pius needs updating? Pius is not known for expansionist wars but it seems to me at least that there were two serious campaigns during his reign: in Britain, an identifiably expansionist war; and in Mauretania (discussed below, p. 160.).

We know that at some stage in the early 140's the border of the province of Britain was advanced back to the Forth-Clyde isthmus line that had been its de facto limit before the Trajanic withdrawal. The Historia Augusta passage cited above states that "Lollius Urbicus, his legate, overcame the Britons and built a second wall, one of turf, after driving back the barbarians". Confirmation, of sorts, is provided by Pausanias who records that Pius "took away from the Brigantes in Britain the greater part of their territory, because they too had begun an unprovoked war on the province of Genounia, a Roman dependency". Genounia has been much disputed since the name is unknown for Britain. It has been suggested that Pausanias has confused the Brigantes in Britain with the Brigantii tribe in Raetia whose immediate neighbours were the Genauni. If this is the case it seems

28 SHA, Hadrian, IX.9; XIII.4. Presumably Scipio Africanus.
29 SHA, Antoninus Pius, V.4-5.
30 SHA, Antoninus Pius, V.4: "nam et Britannos per Lollium Urbicuim vicit legatum alio muro caespiticio summotis barbaris ducto...".
31 Pausanias, VII, xliii.4.
32 Cogently argued by J.G.F. Hind, "The 'Genuanian' Part of Britain", Britannia, VIII (1977), pp. 229-234. See the ingenious article by E Birley: 'The Brigantian problem, and the first Roman contact with Scotland' in Roman Britain and the
that the topographer's reference to events in Britain is so unreliable as to render it almost useless for purposes of historical interpretation. However, it seems improbable that Pausanias was referring to some trouble in Britain that has completely escaped all other literary sources and at the same time ignored the British campaign which resulted in Antoninus Pius accepting his second imperator acclamation, so the passage should be accepted as accurate.

In conjunction with Pausanias' statement that Pius never willingly involved the Romans in war\(^{33}\) the passage referring to Genounia has been used to prove that the war was begun by the Brigantes. On this view it was a real military threat and not simply a sop to the military elements of senatorial society who had been starved for too long of military campaigns. I might make two points: if Pausanias in this particular passage is as vague about circumstantial details as he appears and if he is wrong about the Genousian province, why should we accept his statement about Pius' lack of aggression; secondly, the fact that the Brigantes might have started a war does not exclude a decision in response to go for maximum territorial expansion in order to quieten the dissenting voices in the senate. If the emperor was searching for a pretext to placate the military elements it was pure coincidence that Britain was the scene of the action. In support, the archaeological evidence for an uprising of the Brigantes is to all intents and purposes non-existent, although slight evidence does exist for the route of Urbicus' campaign\(^{34}\). If there was trouble with the Brigantes it was of such a minor nature that an expansion of Roman territory seems an unjustified response. The appointment of Q. Lollius Urbicus as governor, in 139\(^{35}\), suggests premeditation on the part of the emperor. Urbicus was a member of Pius' consilium and, after governing Britain went on to become Pius' praefectus urbi\(^{36}\). His career before Britain is, on the surface, typical but not outstanding\(^{37}\): IVvir viarum curandarum; tribune of leg. XXII Primigenia; quaestor urbis about 125; legate of the proconsul of Asia; tribune of the plebs as a candidate of Hadrian;

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\(^{33}\) See Hansan and Maxwell, pp. 60.
\(^{34}\) See Hansan and Maxwell, pp. 63-68.
\(^{35}\) Date of appointment is on the basis of an inscription from Corbridge: RIB 1147.
\(^{37}\) PIR 2 L327. See also Birley, Fasti, p. 113-5.
praetor the same; legate of leg. X Gemina; and service in Hadrian’s Jewish war as a staff officer for which he was awarded military dona of a single gold crown and hasta. This was followed by the consulship in 135 and then a stint as legate of Germania inferior. But things are not so simple. Hadrian was notoriously frugal in his award of military dona, so the honour paid to Urbicus by that emperor was notable: only 3 other senatorial recipients of the awards are known for the whole of Hadrian’s reign. The evidence suggests then that Urbicus was one of the leading military figures of his generation, and his appointment to Britain so soon after Pius’ accession cannot have been mere coincidence.

Antoninus Pius came to the throne militarily unknown. He had had no military experience and his only overseas post had been the proconsulship of Asia in 134/5. His antecedents were impressive - both his grandfathers had been consul twice - yet his career was nothing out of the ordinary. If we assume there were elements of senatorial opposition that had been hoping for a change in frontier policy, unrest on the British border was a chance to both legitimise Pius’ accession and to satisfy the demands of this frustrated coterie of military-minded senators. The new emperor was above all an exponent of a policy of consensus and all shades of senatorial opinion needed to be conciliated. As A.R. Birley has pointed out, "By abandoning what was in effect a brain-child of Hadrian’s, he must have gone some way towards satisfying the many senators who loathed Hadrian with a vindictive passion". The advance could even be justified strategically since the new line of the frontier was just about half the length of the old, and some of the tribes in the new territory were friendly to Rome.

The new turf wall constructed from the isthmus of the Clyde river to the Firth of Forth was some 40 Roman miles in length. While it acted

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39 Birley, RFRFP, p. 17.

40 Supported by Hanson and Maxwell, p. 69. But see Luttwak, p. 88, for the illusory nature of this strategic advantage.

41 Hanson and Maxwell, p. 121.
as a physical barrier to movement and perhaps as an administrative demarcation it was not the northern limit of Roman presence in Britain. Just as small forts were occupied north of Hadrian's Wall, so there was a military presence in Caledonia as far as the river Tay. Indeed the occupation of southern Scotland was intended to be permanent, witness the deliberate backfilling of the two mounds of the *vallum* of Hadrian's Wall into the ditch at regular intervals, and the removal of gates from the milecastles to facilitate movement across the wall. Despite these signs of permanence there appears to have been a very slight break of occupation of the Antonine Wall around 158, during the governorship of Cn. Julius Verus (?155-158), and possibly caused by an internal uprising of the Brigantes. The hiatus was so brief, however, as to leave practically no time for reconstruction work on Hadrian's Wall before re-occupation of the northern border, and the turf wall of Antoninus Pius seems to have remained the frontier until about 164. Again it appears that the re-settlement was intended to be permanent, despite a reduction in the size of the garrisons that followed it.

With some regularity the frontiers of the empire came under attack at the period of change-over from one emperor to another. The accession of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus was no different. Early in the reign the Parthian war began, and "war was threatening in Britain, and the Chatti had burst into Germany and Raetia." Although details about these agitations are otherwise non-existent in the literary sources it is known that Marcus initially despatched M. Statius Priscus to deal with the problem in Britain, probably soon after Marcus and Lucius had become emperors. Priscus' career had been relatively slow, although unusually distinguished. Starting as an equestrian officer he achieved the notable honour of *consul ordinarius* for 159, only the second *novus homo* in Pius' reign to achieve this distinction. His military career was

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42 Hanson and Maxwell, p. 101.
43 Breeze and Dobson, p. 82.
44 See Birley, *Fasti*, p. 120.
45 The complex evidence for the abandonment of the Antonine Wall at this date, and possible interpretations, are discussed at length in Hanson and Maxwell, pp. 137-148.
46 Hanson and Maxwell, p. 149f; Breeze and Dobson, p. 121f.
47 SHA, Marcus Antoninus, VIII.6-7.
long and outstanding and included: three military tribunates; the award of military dona by Hadrian; legateships of legg XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina; and the governorships of Upper Dacia and Upper Moesia. His appointment to Britain suggests that Marcus had intended to pursue an active military policy in the province. He was only in Britain for a short period, perhaps a year at most, before a more serious military need required his transfer east for Lucius Verus’ Parthian war. On any interpretation Priscus was an outstanding military figure and enjoyed the confidence of both emperors as his subsequent career confirms.

His replacement in Britain, Sextus Calpurnius Agricola, was to oversee the final abandonment of the Antonine Wall. Suffect consul in 154 with Ti. Claudius Iulianus, Agricola was later to see service under Marcus in the Marcommanic wars. His career details are not known, although there can be no doubt as to his military abilities. An inscription on part of a dedication slab, found at Corbridge, which reads: [SOLI INVICTO] VEXILLATIO LEG(IONIS) VI VIC(TRICIS) P(IAE) F(IDELIS) F(ECIT) SVB CVRA SEX(TI) CALPVRNI AGRICOLAE LEG(ATI) AVG(VSTI) PR(O) PR(AETORE) attests to the presence of Agricola on the northern borders of the province in late 163. Coin hoarding, "generally accepted as an indicator of troubled times", rises to a peak under Marcus Aurelius but otherwise archaeological evidence to supplement the Historia Augusta notice is non-existent. Thus, there is no clear military or strategic reason that explains the withdrawal from the Antonine Wall in 164, nor any evidence of internal unrest that indicates an over-stretching of the British forces that would have required strengthening of the garrison. Significantly, this second, permanent, move south was not accompanied by troop transfers to the east or to the Pannonian frontier so exigencies of frontier defense in more strategically important parts of the empire cannot have been the rationale. In any case it is not conceivable that Hadrian’s Wall would require fewer troops to man it than the Antonine, not least because the southern wall is twice the length of the northern. Even a sober judgement by Marcus that the push north under Antoninus was nothing
but aggressive expansion does not indicate a need to relinquish the territory, the more so because Marcus did not show himself averse to expanding the boundaries of the empire on other fronts\textsuperscript{54}. The reasons for the second withdrawal from the Antonine Wall must remain obscure and enigmatic.

The British frontier appears on two more occasions in sources for this period. The \textit{Historia Augusta} records tantalizingly that "war threatened...in Britain"\textsuperscript{55}. Cassius Dio also reports that as part of their peace terms in 175 the Iazyges were required to supply Rome with 8,000 cavalry, 5,500 of whom Marcus sent to Britain\textsuperscript{56}. It is tempting to connect these two events but dating remains a large problem. The \textit{Historia Augusta} passage can perhaps be dated to about 172-3 on the basis of its position in the \textit{Vita} so it might be that the Iazygian cavalry were sent in response to the crisis of the early 170's. However, the interval is perhaps too long between threat and response, and other explanations offer themselves. A.R. Birley has pointed out that 5,500 troops is a very large reinforcement to send. Although it can never be more than conjecture it is in keeping with Marcus' expansionist policies to suppose that these troops were sent prior to a projected return to the Antonine Wall\textsuperscript{57}. In line with this hypothesis it is significant that the new governor of Britain appointed at this time was Q. Antistius Adventus, consul in about 166/7. Adventus was a man with a strongly military career, including the military tribunate and the post of legate of \textit{leg. III Augusta}, and he had taken part in Verus' Parthian war, commanding the legion II \textit{Adiutrix} and receiving the \textit{dona militaria}\textsuperscript{58}. After the Parthian war he had a stint as governor of Arabia from about 164, in which province he held the consulship \textit{in absentia} in 166 or 167. Following this he was appointed to an extraordinary command over Italy and Illyricum for the German wars of Marcus Aurelius, \textit{leg. Aug. at praetenturam Italieae et Alpium expeditione Germanica}, and after the governorship of Lower Germany, 170-3, he was transferred to Britain in about 173. His presence in Britain can be taken to imply a

\textsuperscript{54} Posited by Breeze and Dobson, p. 124, and implicit in the Hanson and Maxwell analysis, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{55} SHA, Marcus Antoninus, XXII.1.
\textsuperscript{56} Cassius Dio, LXXI, 16.2.
\textsuperscript{57} A.R. Birley, "Roman Frontier Policy under Marcus Aurelius" in RFS 7, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{58} Career details from Birley, Fasti, p. 130-1.
need for an able military commander, and lends some evidence to support Birley's proposal.

When Commodus became emperor on the death of Marcus in 180 the frontier tribes again took advantage of the uncertainty that always attended a change of emperor and Dio tells us that Commodus' "greatest struggle was the one with the Britons". The tribesmen crossed the wall and "cut down a general (στρατηγός) with his troops". According to Cassius Dio's account Ulpius Marcellus was sent to deal with the uprising. An inscription from the fort at Benwell on Hadrian's Wall is evidence for the governorship: DEO ANICITICO IVDICIS OPTIMORVM MAXIMORVMQVE IMP(ERATORVM) N(OSTORVM) SVB VLP(IO) MARCELLO CO(N)SVLARV 60. The use of the phrase iudiciis optimorum maximorumque imp. n. indicates that the inscription was set up under, or very soon after, a joint reign: that of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus has usually been assumed. Yet the statement of Dio must mean that Ulpius was sent to Britain by Commodus. It has been supposed by Birley that this Benwell inscription refers to another Ulpius Marcellus who was governor under or quite soon after a joint reign, probably that of Septimius and Caracalla in 211/212. The main point in Birley's argument is that Dio is clear that Ulpius Marcellus was sent by Commodus and just as clearly the inscription indicates Ulpius served under a joint reign. Since no other person is known to have governed Britain twice it is Birley's argument that this points to the existence of two different men with the same name. The mere lack of evidence for repeated governorships is not conclusive but is probably compelling. However, it seems unlikely that there will ever be conclusive evidence and the verdict, in my mind, must remain unproven.

There has been some dispute as to the identity of the wall mentioned by Dio but evidence of damage to the Hadrian's Wall forts of Halton Chesters, Rudchester and Corbridge point to this wall being the one meant in the Historia Augusta. Commodus' seventh imperator

59 Cassius Dio, LXXII, 8.1-2.
60 RIB 1329 (part only).
61 See the discussion in Birley, Fasti, pp. 140-1.
acclamation and the assumption of the title *Britannicus* in 184 are evidence for the successful conclusion to the campaign\(^\text{62}\). After this victory some of the more northerly outposts of the frontier system beyond Hadrian's Wall were given up and a number of the turrets on the Wall itself were abandoned\(^\text{63}\). As well adaptations were made to some of the milecastles to inhibit the flow of traffic through their gates\(^\text{64}\).

In 185 the army in Britain attempted to raise as emperor a man known only by his cognomen of Priscus. The rebellion was dealt with by despatching Helvius Pertinax to the province. Pertinax seems to have made an early decision to follow a military career, applying through his patrons for a centurion's commission but instead being made an equestrian officer\(^\text{65}\). His military record is long and notable, including the governorship of four consular provinces, and his experience enabled him to quell the mutiny in Britain. It should be noted that the dissension within the army of Britain was not followed by barbarian raids. This argues for a successful re-imposition of Roman rule on the natives of the island by Ulpius Marcellus, and the advent of some sort of lasting peace with the tribes immediately neighbouring the Wall. Following the revolt of the troops against Perennis in 186 events in Britain generally, and in particular those on the northern frontier become shrouded in obscurity, even though a number of governors' names are known. It is not until after Septimius Severus' thwarted attempt to conquer all the island that a clearer view of the frontier situation can be achieved\(^\text{66}\). That period, however, lies outside the scope of this thesis.

**Europe**

Because the northern frontiers of Rome in mainland Europe basically followed the line of the two major rivers of the continent, the Rhine and the Danube, flowing west and east respectively, it is convenient to

\(^{62}\text{Discussed at length in Hanson and Maxwell, p. 198f.}\)

\(^{63}\text{Hanson and Maxwell, p. 199.}\)

\(^{64}\text{Breeze and Dobson, p. 131.}\)

\(^{65}\text{SHA, Pertinax, 1.5.}\)

\(^{66}\text{Breeze and Dobson, p. 132.}\)
treat the northern frontier in two distinct sections centred on each of the rivers. The Rhine frontier will deal with Lower Germany, Upper Germany and Raetia. Although the last two frontier provinces are not contiguous with the river their fates in the imperial period seem to be closely tied. The Danube frontier comprises the provinces of Noricum, Lower Pannonia, Upper Pannonia, Upper Moesia, Dacia, and Lower Moesia.

a) the Rhine frontier (Lower and Upper Germany, Raetia)

In 98 Nerva died and Trajan succeeded him as emperor. Perhaps not coincidentally it was also at this time that Tacitus completed and published his great ethnographic treatise on the peoples occupying what we conveniently know as 'free Germany' i.e. Northern and Northwestern Europe outside the boundaries of the empire. For Tacitus, and Rome, these long-established boundaries, which separated Roman provinces from the Germanic barbarians, were the Rhine and the Danube. Following consolidation of the Rhine border of Gaul by Iulius Caesar, Augustus had planned to control all the territory between the Rhine and the Elbe. The Varian disaster in 9 caused him to shelve such plans, although in my mind this was meant to be only a temporary halt to the forward movement of the legions. Tiberius, following Germanicus' successful campaigns over the Rhine in the period 14-16, re-established the Roman frontiers on the Rhine and the Donau. From then, with one exception, until the German wars of Domitian this section of the northern frontier remained static, despite the abortive attempt of Gaius to achieve military prestige with a German campaign.

The one exception to the general stability of the German frontier was the revolt of Civilis and his Batavians in 70. After the crushing of this rebellion there was a rebuilding and expansion of forts, and a redistribution of troops along the Rhine, resulting in a much more permanent frontier on along the left bank of the river. The reason for

68 This and the following summary of the pre-Trajanic history of the Rhine frontier is taken from: M Todd, *The Northern Barbarians 100 BC - AD 300*, Oxford, rev edn. 1987, pp. 1ff.
69 J.H.F. Bloemers, "Acculturation in the Rhine/Meuse Basin in the Roman Period: Some Demographical Considerations" in J.C. Barrett et al., *Barbarians and
Domitian's war in 83-5 is not given by any extant source but it has been suggested that Domitian took the military initiative to establish his credentials after being overshadowed by his brother Titus for so long\textsuperscript{70}. Be that as it may the campaigns of Domitian resulted in the incorporation of the *agri decumates* and solved the problem of the great re-entrant between the upper Rhine and upper Danube. However, as Schönberger has observed, these wars marked a real turning point in Rome's approach to the problem of free Germany\textsuperscript{71}.

On Nerva's death in 98 Trajan, the designated heir, was at *Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensis* (modern Cologne), the chief city of Lower Germany\textsuperscript{72}. Instead of returning to Rome, as might be expected, Trajan spent the next twelve months touring the Rhine and Danube frontiers and did not arrive in the capital until early in 99. His tour was to produce a number of changes in personnel, although it is impossible to be definitive about the names of the governors of the two German provinces. The conventional view is that Trajan was governor of Upper Germany when he succeeded Nerva, and that he chose L. Iulius Ursus Servianus as the new governor. Ursus was then appointed to Pannonia Superior in 98 when Trajan stopped there on his way to Rome. L. Licinius Sura was either appointed to Lower Germany by Nerva or by Trajan on his accession, where he remained until 101\textsuperscript{73}. This view cannot now stand. The basis for assigning Sura to Lower Germany, AE 1923, 33, is not now held to be safe evidence for such an appointment\textsuperscript{74}.

As well, the governorship of Trajan on his accession remains, to me, problematic. The *Breviarium* of Eutropius records that when Nerva

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\textsuperscript{70} The theory is that of H. Nesselhauf, mentioned in H. Schönberger, "The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey", \textit{JRS} \textbf{LIX} (1969), p. 158.
\textsuperscript{71} Domitian's campaigns are described in some detail in Schönberger, pp 159-160.
\textsuperscript{72} Eutropius, *Breviarium*, VIII, 2.1. Trajan's whereabouts on this crucial date are not mentioned by any other ancient author, nor is the name of the province of which he was governor. This has been assumed to be Upper Germany on the basis of SHA, Hadrian, II.5. I have argued below that this passage of Eutropius and the appointments of Servianus following Trajan's accession fit better with governorship of Lower Germany. No historian I have come across discusses Trajan's presence in *Colonia Agrippensia*.
\textsuperscript{73} This is the view expounded by Eck, p. 242.
\textsuperscript{74} Discussed by R. Syme "Review of A. Degrassi I fasti consolari dell'Impero Romano dal 30 avant Cristo al 613 dopo Cristo", \textit{RP I}, p. 255.
died, Trajan was at *Colonia Agrippina*, the chief city of Lower Germany. The *Historia Augusta* passage which is supposed to demonstrate Trajan's governorship of Upper Germany before Ursus states that after Hadrian had brought news of Trajan's adoption by Nerva to Trajan he (Hadrian) was transferred to the upper German command\(^75\). This statement is taken prove Trajan's governorship of Upper Germany, although no such conclusion is obvious from the passage. But the *Historia Augusta* goes on to relate the story of Hadrian's desire to be the first to bring to Trajan news of Nerva's death, and the obstacles put in his way by Ursus Servianus wanting that office for himself. The *Historia Augusta* passage reads *ex qua festinans*, implying that Hadrian was travelling from Upper Germany to wherever Trajan was situated i.e. *Colonia Agrippina*\(^76\). A reference in a letter of Pliny is used to demonstrate a command in Upper Germany for Ursus\(^77\). It is held that Ursus had been appointed there by Trajan immediately after his accession to the throne. It must be noted however, that the letter of Pliny merely refers to Germany [*germania*] without a qualifying adjective. The existence of a convention that insists such a usage refers to Upper Germany is undemonstrable. A better explanation for the admittedly ambiguous evidence has Trajan as governor of Lower Germany, where he was on the basis of Eutropius and inference from the *Historia Augusta*, and Ursus as governor of Upper Germany from 96 to 98, the period generally assigned to Trajan. This makes more sense of the otherwise seemingly haphazard transfer of Ursus to the Pannonian command, and is a more convincing explanation for Trajan's presence at *Colonia Agrippina*.

Apart from changing governors Trajan seems to have chosen to do very little on the Rhine frontier, turning his attention to what were always, for Rome, more lucrative arenas further east. There are indications that the frontier defence works were strengthened\(^78\) and some attention was paid to Roman settlements across the Danube in non-Roman territory\(^79\). These actions apart, the frontier was left very much to its own devices. The relatively settled nature of the German frontier is demonstrated by

\(^{75}\) SHA, *Hadrian*, V.5.
\(^{76}\) SHA, *Hadrian*, II.6.
\(^{77}\) Pliny, *ep.* VIII, xxii.5
\(^{78}\) Schönberger, p. 104.
\(^{79}\) Eutropius, *Breviarium*, VIII.2: "urbes trans Rhenum in Germaniam reparavit".
the lack of reaction to the transfer, in 101, of *legio XI Claudia* from Vindonissa to the Danube and in 104 of *X Gemina* from its base at Noviomagus to Pannonia. By 104 then Upper Germany was left with only two legions but in Lower Germany three legions were maintained with *X Gemina* replaced for a short while by *IX Hispana* on that legion's transfer from Britain. That such changes seem to have been met with indifference by the so-called 'barbarians' over the Rhine argues for a stability that the rest of the frontiers of the empire lacked, and suggests that on the Rhine Romanization had become a cross-border process.

Much the same policy was continued by Hadrian. There is no record of interest in the lower Rhine frontier, indeed the literary sources for this part of the frontier are practically mute for the whole of the second century, and the archaeological evidence supplies few details of activity in the period. More information is available for the eastern section of the Rhenish *limes*, and we know that on the borders of Upper Germany and Raetia in this period was begun the *Historia Augusta*’s wooden palisade of "high stakes planted deep in the ground and fastened together". Whether this was begun when Hadrian visited the region in 121 or at a later date is uncertain, but in the light of Hadrian's overall foreign policy of consolidating the empire behind its boundaries the construction of the palisade is entirely consistent.

A number of Hadrian's appointees as provincial governors had had obscure or slow careers under Trajan, and careers that did not show any particularly military trend. One such is A. Platorius Nepos, appointed governor of Lower Germany in 119, who seems to have risen rapidly under Hadrian. Following his stay in Lower Germany he was sent to Britain to oversee construction of Hadrian's Wall. Although his career had a conventional beginning, with a military tribunate and legateship of *legio XXII Primigenia*, he was not appointed to any armed provinces before his suffect consulship, also awarded under Hadrian, in 119. Since he was not patrician the consulship will have been held around his fortieth year. Although Hadrian was to turn against Nepos

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80 Schönberger, p. 105.
82 Career details from *ILS* 1052.
Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensis

Argentorate

Mogontiacum

Miltenberg-Ost

Rhine

Welzheim

Danube

Castra Regina

Vindonissa

RAETIA

GERMANYA INFERIOR

Noviomagus

Vetra

Elbe

GERMANYA SUPERIOR

NORICUM

RHINE FRONTIERS IN THE SECOND CENTURY A.D.

NOR! CUM
later, the evidence certainly suggests a close relationship in the early years of the reign.

Dio's statement that Hadrian visited all the forts and garrisons and removed some to more desirable places, abolished some, and built some new ones can be confirmed. Archaeological evidence points to the enlargement of the fort at Saalburg between the years 125 and 139 to take a cohort, and attests to the construction of small forts on the northern section of Hadrian's palisade to house the numeri who guarded this part of the frontier. Evidence also exists in the archaeological record to suggest that some of the Raetian cohorts were moved from their bases in eastern Raetia, where the frontier was formed by the river, possibly in 132 for service in Hadrian's Jewish war. That such reductions in the garrison were possible without reaction from the supposedly hostile tribes across the border confirms the stable nature of this frontier that is evident from Trajan onwards.

Very little of the frontier arrangements on the Rhine, Upper Germany, and Raetia were changed under Antoninus Pius, but this is consistent with the general state of foreign policy under Pius. There is some suggestion of further entrenchment on the frontier by the rebuilding in stone of certain of the forts garrisoned by numeri, and the construction of stone watch-towers in the Odenwald region of the Upper German limes, although it is possible that certain of these were constructed earlier in the century. But it was under Antoninus Pius that the Rhine boundaries of the empire were pushed forward to their furthest extent, as was also the case in Britain. Sometime around the middle of the century the Odenwald and Neckar limes were abandoned and a new frontier line established along the Miltenberg-Ost – Welzheim line 25 kilometres further east, possibly at the same time as the Antonine wall was being constructed in Britain. In the Historia Augusta we read that Antoninus "through other legates or governors...crushed the Germans

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83 Cassius Dio, LXIX, 9.1.
84 Schönberger, p. 165.
86 Schönberger, p. 169.
87 Schönberger, p. 167 and p. 170.
and it is likely that the forward movement of the *limes* was the result of this campaign. It is apparent that there were already Roman forward outposts along this eastern line, before the new auxiliary forts were constructed, for there is evidence of earlier occupation at a number of sites. A feature of this new frontier was a practically ruler-straight stretch of some 80 kilometres.

There were also a number of new forts founded on the northern Raetian *limes* to coincide with the constructions in Upper Germany, at Aalen and Busch for example, and a new fort was constructed under Pius at Passau-Altstadt, right on the boundary between Raetia and Noricum, to house a cohort. Advancing the border and constructing extra forts points to a policy of containment, a defensive rather than aggressive posture. The new line of the frontier formalised control over territory that was already under Roman military purview, and took the operational area further from the Romanised towns and settled river valleys of Upper Germany.

The relatively peaceful conditions which had lasted from Domitian's time until the death of Antoninus Pius were dramatically altered in 161/2. In that year, according to the *Historia Augusta*, the Chatti had burst into Upper Germany and Raetia. This tribe lived east of the Rhine around the upper reaches of the Weser, north of the *agri decumates*. The Chatti had long been raiding across the borders but had not, it seems, previously carried out aggression on such a scale. Luttwak, however, believes that "even earlier [than 162] there had been incursions by the Chatti against the Taunus *limes*, resulting in attested destruction of frontier forts". I believe that Luttwak has misinterpreted a passage of Schönberger in which the latter says: "At the town of Heddernheim, where the fort had been evacuated by 110 at the latest, traces of destruction attributable to these years has been found in earlier investigations of the town site...For the first time in a

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90 Schönberger, p. 170f.
limes-fort, I believe that my excavations at Altenstadt have revealed destruction caused by these attacks". Luttwak has apparently linked these two statements to the year 110, rather than the attacks of the Chatti in the years 162 and 170 mentioned in the sentence immediately previous to the quoted ones. But it is clear that by referring to "these years" in the first of the quoted passages Schönberger means 162 and 170, not 110. The passage actually confirms, on the basis of archaeological evidence, that the invasion in 162 was the first serious incursion by the Chatti.

The troubles might be associated with the transfer of troops east to deal with the situation on the eastern borders. We know that the legio I Minervia was moved from Bonn in Lower Germany and two more legions were taken from the Danube frontier. It is likely that equivalent numbers of auxiliary troops were also transferred, and the borders of all the northern provinces consequently weakened. Although the depredations of the Chatti in Upper Germany were serious enough to have caused destruction at a number of Roman forts it is likely that there was only a minor incursion into the north-western part of Raetia, and a similar circumstance holds for the later wars of Marcus. C. Aufidius Victorinus was sent to Upper Germany, in the wake of the invasion, to deal with the situation, probably in late 161, as has been argued by Champlin. Little is known about Victorinus' early career. He was a close friend of Marcus' and suffect consul in 155. After the proconsulship of Africa in 173/4 he was praefectus urbi at the end of Marcus' reign, and became consul for the second time in 183 with Commodus. The successful outcome of his campaign against the Chatti was signified by the award of military dona to Victorinus, and by a dedication to Jupiter which was crowned with ornamental decorations. With the northern frontier settled for the time being Victorinus was replaced in about 166 by the obscure L Iunius Victorinus.

94 Schönberger, p. 171. Emphasis added.
95 Schönberger, pp.171-2. Generally the decade 161-170 was a peaceful one in Raetia.
97 SHA, Marcus Antoninus, III.8; PIR² A1393.
98 CIL XIII, 11808.
99 CIL VII, 940. Almost nothing is known about this Victorinus, save for the legateship of legio VI Victrix p. f., during the 120's.
The serious military operations on the northern frontiers, which followed almost immediately the victorious conclusion to the Parthian campaign, and which are collectively referred to as Marcus Aurelius' northern wars, seem to have hardly touched the western provinces, and there is as yet only slight evidence in the archaeological record of destruction that might be attributed to these invasions. This relative peace can be attributed to the fact that at some period during the northern campaigns, most likely during the so-called first Marcomannic war, the newly formed legion III Italica was stationed in Raetia, at the new fortress of Regensburg. On the lower German border, however, there was some apparently unrelated unrest in 172 when the Chauci tried to cross into Gaul. They were apparently stopped by the governor of Lower Germany, Didius Julianus, but since no archaeological traces of these hostilities have yet been found they were clearly of slight concern.

Although the borders of the western provinces of the empire show no archaeological traces of trouble during Commodus' reign the Historia Augusta does report uprisings of inhabitants in a number of provinces, including one of the Germanies. This was clearly an internal uprising and no trace of any destruction has been found in the limes forts for these years. Commodus, nevertheless, wanted to lead an expedition to Germany but the "senate and people" persuaded him to give it up. If there were plans for such a campaign, and ILS 1574 seems to confirm this, it must indeed have been a minor uprising since Commodus, who "hated all exertion and craved the comfortable life of the city", is unlikely to have embarked on an expedition that involved danger and required him to live in campaigning conditions in the field. The attractions of a German expedition might have been nothing more than the chance to win an easy triumph. The only other sign of activity on

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100 Evidence of destruction at Munningen can be dated to about 170. See D. Gabler, "The structure of the Pannonian Frontier on the Danube and its development in the Antonine period - some problems" in RFS 12, p. 644.
103 It is not specified whether the province involved was Germania Inferior or Superior or both: SHA, Commodus Antoninus, XIII.5: "in Britannia, in Germania et in Dacia imperium eius recusantibus provincialibus".
104 SHA, Commodus Antoninus, XII.8. See also ILS, 1574.
105 Cassius Dio, LXII, 1.2
the Rhine frontier during Commodus' reign is archaeological evidence for building work on a number of the forts on the border of Upper Germany. A completely new fort was built at Niederbieber, just where the palisade left the right bank of the Rhine, in the period 185 - 192, and other forts were enlarged to accommodate more troops. So, despite the pejorative nature of the comments on the emperor in Cassius Dio and the Historia Augusta, Commodus does in fact seem to have been concerned enough to continue to strengthen the defense works of the northern borders of the empire.

Roman external policy with regard to the Rhine provinces (including Raetia) seems, all through the second century, to have been one of studied non-interference. Certainly, defences were strengthened when required, and cross-border incursions dealt with promptly, but overall policy was defensive in nature rather than aggressive. It seems that after the wars of Germanicus, in the period 14-16, Roman emperors, not excluding Domitian, gave up any ideas of territorial increase beyond the Rhine. Tacitus' implicit call for Rome to complete the conquest of 'free Germany' was ignored, when more pressing needs on the Danube and eastern frontiers of the empire required an active military policy.

b) the Danube frontier (Noricum, Upper and Lower Pannonia, Upper Moesia, Dacia, Lower Moesia)

This part of the northern frontier was always more troubled than the western section and the occasion of Trajan's adoption, for instance, is said to have been a message of success from Pannonia. For Noricum, which in this period was an equestrian province, there is little evidence in the literary or archaeological record until the period of the Marcomannic wars. More archaeological field work has been carried out in the other Danubian provinces and consequently the exiguous literary sources can be supplemented with physical evidence. The Danube frontier seems to have been the scene of construction work for

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106 Schönberger, p. 173.
107 Dio, LXXII, 1.2; SHA, Commodus Antoninus, III.5.
108 Tacitus, Germania, 37.
109 Cedrenus, 1, p. 433 20 - 434 2. Cedrenus records the district as Paonia (Paeonia) but it seems clear that this is a transcription error for Pannonia.
the whole period from Vespasian to Trajan, under whom the building of forts on this border was completed. It is noteworthy that permanent legionary bases were not constructed along the river, and perhaps this indicates that in Roman eyes the Danube was only a temporary frontier?

In 101 Trajan's first war on Dacia began. Much earlier than this, however, Trajan had laid his plans for an invasion of Decebalus' kingdom. These plans were inspired, according to Cassius Dio, by the past aggression of the Dacians and the amount of money that was being paid to them as a result of Domitian's settlement, and because he "observed that their power and their pride were increasing." A number of construction works were set in train by Trajan during his tour of the Danubian provinces prior to his entry into Rome in 99. The works included the construction of the famous bridge at Pontes (modern Kostol), mobilisation of the Danube fleet, reorganisation of military bases north of the river, and construction of canals beside areas of the river which were un-navigable due to rapids. Clearly the invasion of Dacia was a long-term plan of Trajan's and one for which preparations were made well in advance.

Just as important as construction works were the personnel in charge of the armies of the Danube, and the emperor installed his own governors during the tour of inspection in 98/99. In Upper Moesia the new governor was C. Cilnius Proculus, consul in 100, possibly in absence since he remained governor until the end of the first Dacian war when he was replaced by Q. Sosius Senecio, cos. 99. In Lower Moesia Q. Pomponius Rufus, praetorian governor of Dalmatia in 94, suffect consul in 95 and proconsul of Africa in 109/110, replaced L.(?) Iulius Marinus. Little career or other details are known for these two men. In the all-important province of Pannonia, a single imperial province until 104, Trajan replaced the ageing Cn. Pinarius Aemilius, consul in 79 or 80, with L. Iulius Ursus Servianus.

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110 Gabler, p. 637ff.
112 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 6.1.
114 ILS 1994. Unless of the patrician Pinarii, which is undemonstrable, this
Ursus, as Ser. Iulius Servianus\textsuperscript{115}, was suffect consul in 90 with L. Antistius Rusticus. Sometime between 90 and 98 he was adopted by L. Iulius Ursus, consul in 84 and 98, and described by Crook as an \textit{amicus} of Trajan\textsuperscript{116}, after which he appears with the full name L. Iulius Ursus Servianus\textsuperscript{117}. Ursus achieved even greater success. Consul for the second time as \textit{ordinarius} in 102 with the eminent L. Licinius Sura (also cos. II), he went on to a third consulship under Hadrian in 134. A friend of Pliny\textsuperscript{118}, his wife was Hadrian's sister, and his daughter married Cn. Pedanius Fuscus Salinator\textsuperscript{119}, who was to be consul in 119. Ursus held the province until 101 at which time he was a \textit{comes} of the emperor in the first Dacian War\textsuperscript{120}, when he was replaced with Q. Gliarius Atilius Agricola, another exceptionally able military man\textsuperscript{121}. Iterated consulships indicate high favour or signal success and Ursus' second consulship in 102 was a mark of distinction earned for meritorious performance in the Dacian War. Indeed his whole career marks him out as an important and close friend of Trajan, perhaps instrumental in helping him secure the imperial throne. The adoptive father L. Iulius Ursus was \textit{praefectus Aegypti} in 82/3, consul in 84, in 98 with Trajan II, and possibly in 100\textsuperscript{122}, and together with Servianus represents a powerful father-son combination that flourished under Trajan.

In preparation for the war the legion \textit{XI Claudia} was transferred from its base at Vindonissa on the Rhine to a new base in Pannonia, perhaps at Brigetio, and in addition a new legion, \textit{XXX Ulpia}, was raised and also sent to the Danube front, although the exact location of its base is unknown. With these two extra units Trajan had a total of 12 legions on the Danube for use in his offensive against Dacia, 40\% of the total consulship in 79 or 80 argues a birth date of the late 30's, so Pinarius would have been about 60 at the time of Trajan's tour.

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textit{PIR}² 1569.
    \item Syme, \textit{Tacitus}, p. 635, has a fuller discussion of the relationship.
    \item Pliny, \textit{ep.} III.17.
    \item Pliny, \textit{ep.} VI.26.
    \item See Pliny \textit{ep.} III.17.
    \item \textit{PIR}² G181: cos. suff 97, cos II ord. 103, awarded military \textit{dona} for the Dacian war.
    \item \textit{RE}, Supp. vii, 1624. See also R. Syme, "Guard Prefects of Hadrian and Trajan" in \textit{RP III}, p. 1280.
\end{itemize}
military resources of the empire, although in the event not all of these forces took part in the fighting\textsuperscript{123}. It is clear from Dio that the first Dacian war was not motivated by any action or overt threat of Decebalus. The Dacian king in fact, "on learning of Trajan's advance [δρυμ] became frightened"\textsuperscript{124}, and before the first engagement of the war "the Buri and other allies advised Trajan to turn back and keep the peace"\textsuperscript{125}. The clear implication of this statement is that the war was solely due to Trajan's aggressive policies. Trajan was not swayed by the entreaties of the allies for he had other plans. He was determined to carry the war to its conclusion, in spite of Decebalus' moves to negotiate, and finally forced the surrender of Decebalus in 102 by an attack on the undefended rear of Sarmizegethosa while Decebalus' main army was engaged with the main Roman forces advancing towards the city from the south\textsuperscript{126}.

One condition of the peace treaty is puzzling: Decebalus was required to "withdraw from captured territory"\textsuperscript{127}. Perhaps Rome had suffered some reverses and lost previously occupied or garrisoned territory, or it may be that Decebalus had illicitly acquired territory prior to 102\textsuperscript{128}? Once the peace treaty had been concluded Trajan returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph after leaving "garrisons here and there throughout the remainder of the territory"\textsuperscript{129}, and it seems likely, on the basis of epigraphic evidence, that a garrison was stationed at Sarmizegethosa itself\textsuperscript{130}. A new city, Colonia Ulpia Traiana Dacica, was established east of Tapae, and a number of other forts close to Dacian strongholds remained occupied by Roman forces\textsuperscript{131}. The Roman presence in the conquered territory was strong but seems to have mainly been confined to the sub-Carpathian zone of the region.

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\textsuperscript{123} H.M.D. Parker, The Roman Legions, Oxford, 1928, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{124} Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 6.2.
\textsuperscript{125} Delivered to Trajan in camp near Tapae: Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 8.1. See also A.G. Poulter "The Lower Moesian Limes and the Dacian Wars of Trajan" in RFS 13, p. 519, for a discussion of the flimsy basis for the evidence used to support an invasion of Lower Moesia by Decebalus as the start of the war.
\textsuperscript{127} Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 9.5. Trajan also assumed the title "Dacicus."
\textsuperscript{128} R. Syme, "The Lower Danube under Trajan" in DP, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{129} Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 9.7.
\textsuperscript{130} ILS 2417 (= CIL III, 7904).
\textsuperscript{131} Cataniciu, pp. 9, 13-14.
Notable efforts in the first war were rewarded with iterated consulships and military *dona*. Thus Q. Sosius Senecio, consul in 99, was appointed to Moesia Superior in place of Cilnius Proculus. Glitius Agricola, governor of Pannonia during the war but involved in the campaigns, was awarded military *dona* and given an iterated consulship in 103 with M' Laberius Maximus, another of Trajan's leading commanders. Also during the interval between the first and second Dacian wars the province of Pannonia was divided into two separate imperial provinces, each with its own proconsular governor. New forts were constructed in Lower Moesia at Troesmis, where a legionary fort was built, and at Carsium, and it is clear that the region east of the lower Danube up to the Black Sea was also brought under Roman control by this date.

The second Dacian war was also begun by Trajan, possibly with provocation since he had evidence that Decebalus was not adhering to the terms of the treaty. Among other things, Decebalus had "annexed a portion of the territory of the Iazyges" so he was declared an enemy by the senate and Trajan set out on his second Dacian war. Probably in about 103/4 the garrison of Lower Moesia was doubled to four legions, indicating the renewed strategic importance of the province for the second war. Perhaps there was also an intention to include much of the territory of the Roxolani between the rivers Alutus (modern Olt) and Siret. Since Roman troops were already occupying sub-Carpathian Dacia, the valley of the Alutus, and some of the territory of the Roxolani east of the Alutus, the aims of the second war seem to have been limited to occupying the capital and the northern areas of the Dacian territory, and, presumably, the capture and neutralisation of Decebalus. The Iazygian territory annexed by Decebalus, given as one of the actions of the Dacian king which brought about the second Dacian war, was not returned to the Iazyges when they asked for it, surely proof that Trajan was intent, insofar as he was able, on gaining territory, not on establishing 'scientific' frontiers. The outcome of this

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132 Poulter, p. 521.  
133 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 10.3.  
134 Poulter, p. 523.  
135 Cstancicu, p. 10.  
136 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 10.3. Luttwak does not comment on this blatant example of Trajan's territorial ambitions.
refusal was to be a war with the Iazyges during the period of Hadrian's governorship of Lower Pannonia\textsuperscript{137}.

With the war successfully concluded for Rome and Decebalus dead, Trajan made Dacia a consular province with a garrison of two, or perhaps three, legions, \textit{XIII Gemina} at Apulum\textsuperscript{138}, and \textit{IV Flavia} whose location is unknown, and possibly \textit{I Adiutrix} at Apulum as well\textsuperscript{139}. The first governor of the new province of Dacia was D. Terentius Scaurianus, suffect consul in 104, clearly an important person\textsuperscript{140}. Little enough is known about Scaurianus but it is not improbable that he held a command in the war that reduced Dacia\textsuperscript{141}. His son, D. Terentius Gentianus, reached the consulship in 116 before the age of 30, an almost unique achievement, and then went on to become governor of Macedonia in 118\textsuperscript{142}.

The prospect of further expansion might explain the limited number of forts on the northern and eastern borders of Dacia: the frontiers will have been left relatively undefined to facilitate their forward movement. This might be especially valid if it is the case that the tribes outside the province – Dacians, Costoboci, and Bastarnae – were friendly to Rome or in the position of clients, as has been suggested\textsuperscript{143}. Although the evidence for events on the lower Danube is scanty, it appears that after the second war the trans-Danubian territory east of the Alutus river was incorporated into the province of Lower Moesia\textsuperscript{144}. In 110 the garrisons began to be reduced, and in 114 large numbers of troops were withdrawn and sent east for Trajan's Parthian wars, the Dacian garrison being reduced to just one legion: \textit{XIII Gemina}. Despite the weakened state of the frontier defenses there is no evidence that any of the non-Roman tribes took advantage of the situation to raid Roman territory.

\textsuperscript{138} Cataniciu, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{139} R. Syme, "The First Garrison of Trajan's Dacia" in \textit{DP}, p. 101 (hereafter "First Garrison").
\textsuperscript{142} R. Syme, "Consulates in Absence" in \textit{RP I}, p. 391.
\textsuperscript{143} Cataniciu, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{144} Cataniciu, pp. 10 and 19-20.
Hadrian, quite soon after his accession, had to deal with an uprising of both the Roxolani and the Iazyges. In the initial fighting the governor of Dacia appointed by Trajan, C. Iulius Quadratus Bassus, had been killed. Bassus is a famous name.\textsuperscript{145} The predominant general in the second Dacian war, he was to receive the \textit{ornamenta triumphalia} for his enterprise. Further honours followed. He became governor of Cappadocia from 107-110, and subsequently governor of Syria, 114-117. His final appointment by Trajan was as governor of Dacia in 117.\textsuperscript{146} Apparently he was killed in action there in 118. He was an illustrious politician and perhaps the leading commander of his day. He, more than anyone else, typifies the strength and character of the military men under Trajan. After his death Hadrian united the provinces of Dacia and Lower Pannonia in a special command under a new equestrian governor, Marcius Turbo.\textsuperscript{147} A number of forts east of the Alutus were destroyed at this period, either by the Roxolani, or by Roman troops on their withdrawal.\textsuperscript{148} As well as defeating the Iazyges Turbo was probably responsible for the separation of Dacia into at least two separate provinces: Dacia Superior and Dacia Inferior. Uncertainty surrounds the creation of Dacia Porolissensis and the renaming of the other two provinces as Dacia Malvensis and Apulensis but they were certainly in existence by 123.\textsuperscript{149}

In accordance with Hadrian's non-expansionist policy the successful conclusion of the war, by 119, when Turbo was replaced with a senatorial governor, Cn. Minucius Faustinus, was not followed by any territorial annexation. On the contrary, there is evidence that Hadrian gave up all of the area of Lower Moesia on the left bank of the Danube that had been occupied by Trajan,\textsuperscript{150} possibly as a concession to the Roxolani in exchange for some form of promise to maintain peace. If Roman emperors worked to a 'grand strategy' the defeat of the Iazyges and the conciliation of the Roxolani in 119 was an opportune moment.

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{PHR}\textsuperscript{2} 1508.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{SHA}, \textit{Hadrian}, VI.7.
\textsuperscript{148} Forts at Drajna de sus, Malájséseti, Tigrsőr, and Rucar: Catanciu, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{149} Catanciu, p. 37 and note 328.
\textsuperscript{150} Syme, "First Garrison", p. 108: "Hadrian gave up a wide expanse of territory beyond the lower Danube which had been assigned to Moesia Inferior".
for the establishment of a more defensible 'scientific' frontier from where the Danube makes its sharp southern turn near Budapest (Aquincum) to the eastward bend at the mouth of the Danube on the Black Sea near Troesmis. That no such action was taken is a serious weakness in the argument that Roman emperors followed a rational long-term frontier policy, as argued by Luttwak.

It seems to have also been during the 120's that Hadrian's policy of erecting artificial boundaries, so well demonstrated in Britain, was extended to the eastern border of Dacia Inferior/Malvensis with the construction of the earth wall along the line of the *limes* slightly east of the Olt river, the so-called *vallum transalutanum*\(^\text{151}\). Hadrian visited the Danube region in 124 and the construction of both the earth wall along the Olt and the rebuilding of most of the forts on the Pannonian frontier in stone probably date from this visit. There can be no doubt that the construction of such defense works characterises Hadrian's frontier policy as one of total abandonment of any ideas of territorial expansion.

One more event at the very end of Hadrian's reign deserves note. In about 136 there was military action involving the Quadi on the Upper Pannonian *limes* around the city of Aquincum. Archaeological evidence attests to burning in the legionary fort, and it is possible that this was the occasion for entrusting Hadrian's heir, the former L. Ceionius Commodus, with the joint governorship of both Pannonias\(^\text{152}\). Ceionius, the third generation of a consular family, had been *consul ordinarius* in 136, having been born about 100\(^\text{153}\). Following his adoption Ceionius was given proconsular *imperium* over the two Pannonias, an unusual combination. The question of why his command was over both provinces seems unsolvable. His military experience was negligible, and Hadrian might possibly have been attempting to rectify this lack of administrative and military experience by giving Ceionius an abnormal

\(^{151}\) Cataniuciu, pp. 33-4. There is some suggestion from archaeological evidence that the earth wall was not built until the time of Antoninus Pius in the 140's. See N. Gudea: "Recent research on the *limes* of Roman Dacia" in *RFS* 12, p. 803-4.

\(^{152}\) Ménosy, p. 102-3. SHA, Aelius, III.2; Hadrian, XXIII.13.

\(^{153}\) The grandfather of Ceionius was *cos. ord.* in 78 and then governor of Syria (PIR2 C603). The second generation Ceionius (PIR2 C604) was consul in 106 with Sex. Vettulenus Civica Cerialis.
joint command with which to deal. The war, left unfinished by the heir's untimely death, was eventually concluded early in the reign of Antoninus Pius, between 140 and 145, and resulted in the investiture by Rome of a new king for the Quadi, as attested by a coin with the inscription REX QVADIS DATVS\textsuperscript{154}.

Antoninus Pius, under whom both the British and Rhine frontiers reached their maximum extent, was content to leave the Danube frontier much as he found it, while finishing off the stone construction work on the borders of Germany and Raetia begun by Hadrian\textsuperscript{155}. The rebuilding in stone of the Danube forts also seems to have begun under Antoninus Pius but was not completed until after the end of the Marcomannic wars of Marcus\textsuperscript{156}. In the matter of provincial governors Antoninus was content to leave in place those who had been appointed previously. In the Danubian provinces T. Haterius Nepos Atinas Probus Publicius Matenianius was governor of Pannonia Superior for the period 138 to 140/1. Nepos was an Arval Brother, suffect consul 134 and had been governor of Arabia from 129 to 132\textsuperscript{157}. It was under him that the military action against the Quadi was completed, and Nepos was awarded the \textit{ornamenta triumphalia} for his success.

In Pannonia Inferior [Claudius?] Maximus remained as governor for the period 138 to 141/2\textsuperscript{158}, while M. Antonius Hiberus, the governor of Moesia Inferior, was replaced in 139 by Iulius Crassus. Since he was probably appointed in 136 replacement at this time is not unusual and not indicative of any policy changes\textsuperscript{159}. The governors of Moesia Superior are unknown until P. Cluvius Maximus, suffect consul in 143, was appointed, probably late in 143 following his suffect consulship\textsuperscript{160}.

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{RIC}, iii, p. 110 no. 620.
\textsuperscript{155} Móésy, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{156} Gabler, p. 645.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{2}} H30. This appointment also followed the death of Aelius Caesar who had held a joint command over both Pannonias. G. Alföldy, \textit{Konsulat und Senatorenstand Unter den Antoninen}, Bonn 1977, p. 235 (hereafter \textit{Konsulat}).
\textsuperscript{159} Crassus: \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{2}} 1278; Hiberus: \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{2}} A837. On Hiberus see also Alföldy, \textit{Konsulat}, p. 230. Antonius Hiberus is a shadowy figure who disappears after this post; his cognomen indicates Spanish antecedents: Birley, \textit{Fasti}, p. 377.
\textsuperscript{160} \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{2}} C1204. Alföldy, \textit{Konsulat}, pp. 146 and 233-4.
In Dacia Superior L. Annius Fabianus, *cos. suff.* 141, seems to have remained as governor until 141, having been appointed in 138, possibly after the death of Hadrian, to replace C. Iulius Bassus. What is noticeable about these men, with the exception of Nepos, is their almost total lack of experience in military commands. Nepos' appointment does not fit the pattern but can be explained by the need to deal with the incursion of the Quadi into the province. Thus, a number of governors, appointed presumably because of their relationship with the emperor, were replaced when military need dictated.

The *Historia Augusta* records that Antoninus' legates waged his wars for him. The war involving the Quadi has been discussed above, another involved the crushing of an uprising of the 'free' Dacians. Archaeological evidence reveals that a number of the Dacian forts were rebuilt in stone after suffering destruction by fire, and epigraphic sources confirm that the already large Roman forces in Dacia Superior were increased, although the province still kept only one legion.

Dating for these disturbances is problematic, but there is no evidence of any serious breach of the Dacian *limes*, and the threat must be regarded as low level. It is unlikely that Marcus' Marcomannic wars erupted totally 'out of the blue', and the Danubian frontier in the decade prior to 166/7 becomes increasingly restive, attested to by the increased amount of construction in stone. The Danubian *limes* seem to have remained among the most peaceful of the empire's frontiers, but the reign of Antoninus turned out to have been very much a case of *'apres moi la deluge'*.

It was under Marcus Aurelius that the most serious of Rome's northern wars took place, along the Danube frontiers. Conditions of relative peace which had held sway on the Rhine and Danube encouraged Marcus to move large numbers of troops east for the Parthian war of Lucius Verus. It seems that at least three legions and probably an equivalent number of auxiliaries were taken from the Rhine and

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162 *SHA, Antoninus Pius*, V.4.
163 Catanciuc, p. 42. Although only one legion held the province there was a very large number of auxiliary troops in Dacia, and the size of the garrison was equal to that of Britain: Syme, "First Garrison", p. 102.
164 Mócsy, p. 103.
Danube forts, with *vexillationes* from some of the other legions based on the frontier\(^\text{165}\). Perhaps encouraged by the weakened state of Roman arms on the northern borders barbarian tribes began to advance on the frontier in large numbers. Preparations were made to meet the forming crisis. Two new legions were raised in 165: *legg. II* and *III Italicae*. As well, M. Iallius Bassus, a proven commander in the Parthian wars, was appointed, in early 166, to govern Upper Pannonia, most in threat from the barbarians. Bassus, suffect consul in 161, had been governor of Lower Pannonia between 156 and 159 and governor of Lower Moesia in 161/2 from where he had been transferred east to serve as *comes* of Verus\(^\text{166}\). At about the same time Ti. Claudius Pompeianus was sent to govern Lower Pannonia. Unquestionably a close friend of Marcus, marriage to Marcus' daughter Lucilla following Verus' death is evidence enough, his career is obscure save for an iterated consulship in 173\(^\text{167}\). It is clear, if all these actions are taken together, that Marcus 'had far-reaching plans' for the Danube frontier\(^\text{168}\).

In 166 or 167 6,000 Langobardi and Obii crossed the Ister and burst into Pannonia. Despite the numbers involved this was no more than a small raid, as Cassius Dio suggests. The tribesmen were easily driven back by the provincial commanders, M. Macrinius Avitus Catonius Vindex and the otherwise unidentifiable Candidus. Subsequently, eleven barbarian tribes, who may not have been initially involved, with Ballomarius, king of the Marcomanni, at their head, made a treaty with the governor of Pannonia Superior, Iallius Bassus\(^\text{169}\). The peace that ensued was only temporary and the tribes who had been refused help allied to invade Roman territory. By this time, however, the emperors themselves were present on the northern front. An initial difference of opinion between Marcus and Lucius concerning a return to Rome has


\(^{166}\) PIR\(^2\) 14. See also Birley, *MA*, p. 142f.

\(^{167}\) PIR\(^2\) C973.

\(^{168}\) Birley, *MA*, p. 142.

\(^{169}\) Cassius Dio, LXXI, 3.1a. Since it appears that the eleven tribes referred to by Dio were not involved in the attack on Pannonia their treaty with Bassus can be interpreted either as an attempt to gain help from Rome against the more distant tribes who were impelling them onto Roman territory, or, with the same aim, an attempt to be settled in Roman provinces. See SHA, *Marcus Antoninus*, XIV.4, and Mőcsy, p. 186.
been plausibly explained as a difference in strategic thinking between the emperors. Marcus, preferring pre-emptive action, advocated an offensive response while Lucius, concerned about the effects of the plague, preferred a defensive stance. Marcus' view took precedence and the emperors moved forward to Carnuntum where they established their forward base.

The subsequent chronology of the wars and barbarian invasions is unsettled, especially in regard to the invasion of Italy mentioned by Cassius Dio. I do not intend to discuss all the operations in detail. Sometime after 168 the war was renewed with increased vigour and all the Danubian provinces suffered varying degrees of invasion and destruction. Between 168 and 171 the eastern frontier of Noricum was overrun and the barbarians advanced towards the Alps. Large amounts of destruction are archaeologically attested at this time for the eastern part of the Noricum limes. That the aim of the tribes was to invade Italy, however, is suggested by their failure to press on into the open heartland of Noricum. They subsequently moved on to invade Italy through the passes in the Julian Alps, besieging Aquileia, and sacking Opitergium. Their relative weakness explains their inability to take the unwalled Aquileia and suggests that plunder rather than conquest was the aim. Mócsy believes that this invasion occurred before the two emperors stayed in Aquileia in 168/9, while the archaeological evidence so far points to an invasion date of around 170. This supports the lucid argument of Birley which places the invasion in 170.

Despite the invasion of Italy, in both 170 and 171 the focus of the invasion was apparently Pannonia, and in 171 the praetorian prefect, Macrinus Vindex, who was in the province with Marcus, was killed during a battle. The Roman response to this massive threat was a

170 Discussed in Gardner, p. 96.
171 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 3.2. Also mentioned by Lucian, Alexander, 48, and Ammianus Marcellinus, 29.6.1.
173 The unwalled town of Virunum in central Carinthia "remained unmolested": Alföldy, Noricum, p. 154.
174 Gardner, p. 104.
175 Mócsy, p. 187; Gabler, p. 642f.
176 Birley, MA, p. 250f.
177 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 3.5.
long series of campaigns beginning with an offensive in Pannonia in 172 and ending in 175 with the defeat of the Cotini, Marcomanni, Quadi, and Iazyges. Other events then intervened to bring about a less than complete solution to the wars. Dio tells us that Marcus wished to exterminate the Iazyges utterly but instead negotiated a hasty peace with them after the rebellion of Avidius Cassius in Syria in 175. The Historia Augusta credits him with the intention of making provinces out of Marcomannia and Sarmatia except that the revolt of Cassius also stopped this plan178. One feature of the treaty was the surrender of 8,000 Iazygian cavalry, 5,500 of whom were sent to Britain.

During Marcus' absence to deal with Avidius, fighting had broken out on the northern frontier with another invasion of Pannonia by one of the German tribes, and there is also evidence for further troubles in northern Dacia. The fighting in Dacia continued even after the province ceased to be threatened by the barbarians179, lending support to the idea that Marcus intended to annex territory north of Dacia. The second stage of these campaigns against the Marcomanni, Quadi, Sarmatians, and Hermunduri, the second German expedition, lasted three years until Marcus' death 180 and, according to his biographer in the Historia Augusta, "had he lived a year longer he would have made these regions provinces"180. In 179 the territory of the Marcomanni and Quadi was finally occupied by Roman forces and a number of forts and bath-houses built to ensure the comfort of the occupying forces181. Also in 179 Marcus' troops stopped an attempted emigration of the Quadi to the land of the Semnones to the north, an indication, according to Dio, that Marcus merely wanted to punish the people and not acquire their territory182. However, as Birley points out, this is a misjudgement on Dio's part. Unoccupied land was useless to Marcus, especially in the aftermath of the devastating plague when whole regions of countryside were depopulated, and Marcus' aim was therefore the Romanisation of the major barbarian tribes and the annexation of territory183.

178 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 16.1-17.1. SHA, Marcus Antoninus, XXIV.5-6. See also Birley, MA, p. 183.
179 Catancicu, p. 47.
180 SHA, Marcus Antoninus, XXVII.11.
181 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 20.1.
182 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 20.2.
Can we in fact assume that the biographer in the *Historia Augusta* is correct in stating that Marcus' aim was the creation of two new provinces? The question merits some discussion. The raising of two new legions in 165 suggests, in itself, an intention to annex territory\(^{184}\). The notion of annexation might have been temporarily shelved by Marcus in the light of losses to the plague and the invasions of 168 but it will not have been permanently dropped\(^ {185}\). Dio's narrative describes how in 179 Marcus stationed 40,000 troops in the territory of the Marcomanni and Quadi. Dio relates that the Iazyges and Buri would not make an alliance with Marcus unless he undertook to deal finally with the Quadi\(^ {186}\), and perhaps we might date to the occasion of the occupation an inscription to Jupiter found at UnterSaal in Raetia which reads: I O M STATORI | FL. VETVLENVS CENT. | LEG. III ITAL REVERISYS AB EXPEDIT IT BVRICA | EX VOTO | POSVIT\(^ {187}\). As a pre-emptive move against the remaining Quadi, an *expeditio Burica* was possibly to be launched during 180, forestalled only by Marcus' death. We learn too that Marcus made some of the barbarian tribes into Roman citizens, a highly unlikely procedure unless he planned to make their territory part of the empire\(^ {188}\). The balance of the evidence suggests that the *Historia Augusta* interpretation of Marcus' policy should be regarded as valid.

Commodus, however, had other ideas and Marcus' plans were never realised. Despite the severity of the conditions imposed by the new emperor on the Quadi and Marcomanni, he was also responsible for abandoning "all the outposts in their country beyond the strip along the frontier that had been neutralized"\(^ {189}\). If we can believe Herodian, Ti. Claudius Pompeianus, one of Marcus' chief advisers, tried to talk Commodus out of his plan of abandoning the war, urging the extension

\(^{184}\) J.C. Mann, "The raising of legions during the Principate", *Hermes* 91 (1963), p. 483ff., describes the evidence.

\(^{185}\) See on this point Birley, *MA*, p. 254.

\(^{186}\) Cassius Dio, LXXI, 18.

\(^{187}\) *CIL* III 5937.

\(^{188}\) Cassius Dio, LXXII, 19.1; see also A.R. Birley, "Roman Frontier Policy under Marcus Aurelius" in *RFS* 7, p. 11ff, where the evidence is discussed in more detail. Birley also discusses Dio's denial of such an aim.

\(^{189}\) Cassius Dio, LXXII, 2.4.
of the Roman empire to the boundaries of Ocean\textsuperscript{190}. The exactitude of Herodian’s words is not at issue here. They cannot be accurate but they do represent a difference in the opinions offered by Commodus’ advisers that must have been a feature of the accounts used by Herodian for his history\textsuperscript{191}. The same difference in opinion is evident during Marcus’ conduct of the wars, and the positions of Marcus and Lucius with regard to the conduct of the campaign were opposed\textsuperscript{192}. Marcus’ view won the day in the 160’s and 170’s, but in this later instance those advocating peace and a defensive external policy won the debate\textsuperscript{193}.

The treaties Commodus made, however, kept the peace with the tribes who had been involved in the northern wars. Such a favourable result was more likely to have been the consequence of the successive victories of Marcus’ army commanders in 178 and 179 than a harsh peace treaty of Commodus. There was, nevertheless, some further minor fighting on the Dacian frontiers with the barbarians to the north. In these skirmishes both Clodius Albinus and Pescennius Niger, the two later rivals of Severus, achieved fame\textsuperscript{194}. Under Commodus some work was undertaken to strengthen the defences along the right bank of the Danube, as is attested by an inscription from below Aquincum which reads: IMP CAES M [aur commodus an]|TONINVS AVG PIVS SAR[mat germ]| BRIT FONT MAX TRIB POT X [imp vii]|COS IIII P P RIPAM OMNEM BV[rgis]|A SOLO EXTRVCTIS ITEM PRAES[i]|DIS PER LOCA OPPORTVNA AD|CLANDESTINOS LTRVNCVLO|RVM TRANSITVS OPPOSITIS|MVNIVIT PER...\textsuperscript{195}.

For decades after this the northern frontiers of the empire remained relatively untroubled, testament to the success of Marcus’ campaigns. Future threats to the empire from the north came from other barbarian groups who were either conglomerations of hitherto unknown tribes or part of the great westward migrations from Asia. That these new

\textsuperscript{190} Herodian, I, 6.6.
\textsuperscript{192} SHA, Marcus Antoninus, XXII.S. Compare SHA, Lucius Verus, IX.7 and SHA, Marcus Antoninus, XIV.5.
\textsuperscript{193} Herodian, I, 6.8-9; SHA, Commodus Antoninus, III.5; Cassius Dio, LXXII, 1.2.
\textsuperscript{194} Cassius Dio, LXXII, 8.1. SHA, Commodus Antoninus, XIII.5.
\textsuperscript{195} ILS 395 (=CIL, III, 3385).
barbarian groups were held off for over a century is evidence for the wisdom of Trajan's expansionist policy and suggests that the realisation of Marcus' territorial ambitions might well have brought the northern frontiers a much longer period of peace.

The East

A history of the eastern frontiers of the empire is to a large extent a history of Rome's relations with Parthia/Persia and I propose to examine both the Euphrates and Arabian sections of the frontier in the context of that relationship. It is also necessary to point out that the state of archaeological field work in the east does not equal that of the northern or British frontiers and consequently material evidence to complement the literary sources is generally lacking. In the north any traces of the northern sector of the Cappadocian limes have been erased by a caravan route established during the Ottoman period, while very little exploratory work has been done further south between Satala and Melitene where the Euphrates valley becomes more rugged and inaccessible. On the Arabian limes no military site had been excavated until the mid-1970's and no complete survey of the frontier had been carried out until the work of S.T. Parker in 1976.

a) The Euphrates frontier

Since many of the wars between Rome and Parthia were ostensibly to do with the succession in Armenia a brief history of the establishment of the dynastic arrangements is necessary. That Parthia always had a legitimate interest in the occupant of the Armenian throne cannot be doubted. In Tacitus' Annals we read that a Parthian delegation had been sent to Rome to ask the emperor Claudius for a new king for Parthia.

198 Tacitus, Annals, XII.10. I do not wish to examine the implications of this statement here since I believe that the status quo changed with the Neronian
After a civil war which was concluded unsuccessfully for the pro-Roman elements within Parthia Tacitus reports that "Gotarzes II soon fell ill and died. He was succeeded by the king of Media Atropatene, Vonones II...". Another passage about Parthia from the *Annals* also refers to a dynastic arrangement of the Arsacids in Armenia. Tacitus reports a speech of Vologases I (Parthian king during Nero's reign) to his council in which he says that after the death of his father, the previous king, he "awarded" to his brother Tiridates, "the third-ranking kingdom, Armenia; for Pacorus had already been given Media Atropatene". It seems then that the thrones of Armenia and Media Atropatene were used by the Arsacid reigning in Parthia as a reward, possibly for assistance rendered by other members of the dynasty during the succession squabbles that occur so frequently during the Parthian period. Tacitus' evidence may also indicate more generally that a change of Parthian king resulted in a change in the occupant of the Armenian throne: this is certainly borne out by the speech of Vologases noted above. Such statements in Tacitus indicate that during the Julio-Claudian period in Rome the Parthian appointee to the Armenian throne was usually the Arsacid prince second in line for the throne. Similarly Media Atropatene seems to have been used for the prince standing in immediate line of succession to the Parthian throne.

By the agreement made between Nero and the Parthian king, Vologases, in 63, the throne of Armenia was to be given to a nominee of the Parthian king although the investiture, actual or symbolic, was to be by the Roman emperor. The Parthians had removed the Parthian nominee, Tigranes, from the Armenian throne and replaced him with Tiridates, brother of Vologases, king of Parthia. Nero had sent his ablest commander, Corbulo, to restore the status quo, but, despite many Roman successes, at the end of 5 years of fighting the agreement between the two empires left the situation as Parthia had desired it: an Arsacid prince nominated by Parthia on the throne of Armenia.

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200 C. Toumanoff, "The Third Century Armenian Arsacids", *Revue des Études Armeniennes*, 6 (1969), p. 243, says that "It was an established practice, moreover, that while an elder Arsacid prince...was King of Media, a younger one...was King of Armenia".

201 Tacitus, *Annals*, XV, 28 - 30, for the diplomatic arrangements.
There should be no mistake about the implications of this. The peace treaty of Rhandeia in 64 which established the dynastic scheme "meant de facto defeat for the Romans in their rivalry with the Parthians over the control of Armenia...".

Trajan used as a pretext for his invasion the fact "that the Armenian king had obtained his diadem, not at his hands, but from the Parthian king". The absence of a Roman rôle in determining the Armenian succession broke, as far as Trajan was publicly concerned, the terms of the agreement made between the Parthian king, Vologases, and Nero in 63 A.D., and was taken by him as a casus belli. However, as I have described above, the Neronian settlement did not allow Rome to choose the Armenian king, but only seems to have given her a right of investiture. It is probable that by this time the agreement was honoured as a mere formality and it is unlikely that every new Armenian king since 63 A.D. had had to personally travel to Rome to undergo a formal investiture, and we know that Roman emperors did not travel to Armenia to place the crown on the head of the nominee. We certainly do not read of this in the contemporary sources (which are admittedly meagre), and the arrangement is likely to have been mere convention by this time, the Parthian king perhaps doing no more than requesting from Rome approval for the installation of a new Armenian king. Longden believes that the installation of Parthamasiris by Osroes in 113 was a "gross flouting of Rome's prerogative", but the terms of the Neronian agreement did not give Rome the prerogative of choice, which is Longden's inference, and the installation should be seen for what it was, or in fact had always been: the normal functioning of Parthian domestic politics.

No Roman emperor had ever led Roman forces to the east and Trajan's presence with a large expeditionary army argues that his intention was never to merely replace Parthamasiris with a Roman nominee, but to annex Armenia itself and invade Parthia. After the annexation of Arabia Petraea in 106 Armenia remained as the only buffer state.

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202 E. Dabrowa, "Roman policy in Transcaucasia from Pompey to Domitian" in EFRE, p. 73. See also Mitford, p. 1179.
203 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 17.1.
between the Roman Empire and Parthia. Osrhoene, whose status, like that of Armenia, was often a bone of contention between Rome and Parthia, had been sold to Abgar VII, son of Izates, king of Adiabene, by Pacorus in about 110, but remained subservient to Parthia. Elsewhere the borders of the two empires were contiguous. Trajan's determination to invade and annex Armenia in 114, removing even this buffer, significantly changed the ground rules of Roman-Parthian relations. It is also apparent that Trajan had been planning a campaign in the east for some time. C. Iulius Quadratus Bassus, who received *ornamenta triumphalia* for his capture of Decebalus in the second Dacian war, was given long and varied experience in eastern commands. He was appointed governor of Judaea from 102-105, returning to Rome for a suffect consulship in 105. In 107 he was sent out to govern Cappadocia where he remained until 111. His next post was as governor of Syria from 114 to 117, followed by the governorship of Dacia (see above). Such repetition of eastern commands suggest to me that Bassus was a close and valued friend of Trajan whose military skills were put to use getting the eastern legions in shape before Trajan's invasions of Armenia and Parthia. In conjunction with the annexation of Arabia in 105/6 there is evidence that the eastern campaigns had been conceived as a long-term plan by Trajan.

Between 64 and 162 there is no record in our sources, and, despite their exiguousness, no reason to suggest that any Parthian king ventured to raid Roman territories. Nevertheless, in 115/6 Trajan, having annexed Armenia, entered Parthia with an expeditionary army, the first Roman emperor to do so, and on 3 more occasions in the second century emperors were to follow his example. Trajan's radical departure from what had been the norm of Roman-Parthian relations significantly changed the basis of that relationship to such an extent that in future all major wars between Rome and Parthia, whatever their immediate cause, required the presence of an Emperor with the army. When Trajan invaded Parthia in 115 he had no such justification as those given for his earlier invasions of Dacia in the period 101-6 (see above).

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It may be that he began his invasion of Parthia with the example of the Dacian booty in mind, and he could reasonably have hoped to amass large amounts of bullion in Parthia. He failed to do so, and his Parthian victories, in the end ephemeral, were achieved at a much greater cost of men and money than had been the case in his Dacian adventures\(^{207}\).

The internal situation in Parthia was in its habitually confused and fluid state and it appears that at the time of Trajan's decision to invade there was an internal political struggle over the kingship between Vologases III and Osroes. Osroes, seen by Rome as the legitimate king\(^{208}\), would not have wanted to arouse the hostility of Rome if he was engaged in a civil struggle with Vologases, and when he learnt that Trajan was advancing east with a large army an embassy was sent to the emperor at Athens. This embassy, offering gifts, asked for peace and requested that the throne of Armenia be given to Parthamasiris. Osroes appears to have been attempting to continue with the convention of Nero's settlement, by which Rome confirmed the Parthian nominee to the Armenian throne. Dio's comment is that Osroes told Trajan he had deposed Axidares "inasmuch as he had been satisfactory neither to the Romans nor to the Parthians"\(^{209}\).

Trajan's rejection of both the proposals and the gifts of the envoys was, in the face of the facts, provocative and serves to indicate that not only was he not interested in a peaceful settlement to the Armenian problem, but that he was no longer interested in avoiding open warfare with Parthia. Indeed his very presence with an army travelling to Armenia, the first emperor to be present in such a situation, argues that he had always intended to undertake a major military expedition. During a parley with Parthamasiris Trajan bluntly told him that "he would surrender Armenia to no-one; for it belonged to the Romans and was to have a Roman governor"\(^{210}\), an outright contradiction of the Neronian

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\(^{208}\) This is the impression gained from references to him in Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 17.1

\(^{209}\) Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 17.3.

\(^{210}\) Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 20.3.
settlement. Trajan's further treatment of Parthamasiris indicates that no compromise was to be accepted, for when the Arsacid prince had been refused the crown of Armenia and was riding off in anger he was killed by a Roman cavalryman\textsuperscript{211}. Trajan's justification for this was that Axidares had the best right to rule Armenia and Parthamasiris merited his treatment\textsuperscript{212}. This after having stated that Rome was about to annex Armenia and give it a Roman governor!

Armenia was duly annexed as a Roman province and put under the control of L. Catilius Severus in a combined province of Armenia minor, Armenia maior, and Cappadocia\textsuperscript{213}. Severus is, on the face of it, an unusual choice. He had been \textit{cos. suff.} in 110 and was to receive a second consulship under Hadrian in 120, but his cursus does not indicate any particular distinction: \textit{sevir equitum Romanorum}; tribune or aedile; urban praetor; legate of Asia (twice?); \textit{praefectus aerarii militaris}; \textit{praefectus aerarii Saturni}\textsuperscript{214}. For his services in the Parthian war he was given the military \textit{dona} by Trajan. The preponderance of praetorian posts (six in all) does not indicate a brilliant career or extraordinary talent. Quite the opposite, and his choice suggests that Trajan's military needs kept all the better qualified men with him on campaign. Hadrian made him governor of Syria in 117 where he lasted until 119/120, the only one of Trajan's eastern commanders to be so favoured. Despite this seeming favour Severus was persecuted by Hadrian towards the end of his reign, when \textit{praefectus urbi}\textsuperscript{215}, although the incident remains obscure. For Syme it is not beyond belief that Severus was seeking the throne for himself in 138, as the \textit{Historia Augusta} states\textsuperscript{216}. However a man who had been through 6 praetorian

\textsuperscript{211} This is the interpretation in Debevoise, p. 224, based on the statement in Fronto, \textit{Principia Historiae}, 15 (Loeb, II, p. 212). Certainly Fronto's words leave no doubt that Parthamasiris was killed: "it is not easy to absolve Trajan from the murder of a suppliant king Parthamasiris", but it is not necessary to assume that the death of Parthamasiris occurred on this occasion, rather than at another stage of the campaign in Armenia.


\textsuperscript{213} ILS 1041 and Magie, p. 608. It now appears that when the single combined province was created Galatia and the western parts of Cappadocia were separated and given to an equestrian governor: Mitford, p. 1199.

\textsuperscript{214} ILS 1041.

\textsuperscript{215} SHA, \textit{Hadrian}, IV.7.

posts before his first consulship showed "a far from resplendent" career. In such a case his access to the consulship was retarded and he must be regarded as past the normal age for non-patricians of 42. It seems unlikely then that Severus' first consulship was before his mid- to late- forties. That would make him nearer 80 than 70 by 138 and it is inconceivable that he can have even considered the succession for himself. The evidence of hostility perhaps indicates that he publicly disagreed with Hadrian's choice and put forward the claims of a rival candidate.

Trajan met with little or no resistance on his advance down the Euphrates in 115, since, as Dio wryly remarks "the Parthian power had been destroyed by civil conflicts and was still at this time a subject of strife," presumably between Osroes and Vologases, who at this stage were regularly exchanging power in Seleucia. Osroes was also conducting a campaign against one Manisarus who had captured parts of Armenia and Mesopotamia. There is no evidence for the allegiance of Manisarus and he is not mentioned again in the sources, but it seems likely that he was a partisan or relative of Vologases who had been entrusted with the task of taking Armenia and Mesopotamia back from Osroes. By all accounts western Parthia at least was in the grip of a serious and long-lasting dynastic struggle, which can only have helped Trajan's expedition and serves to underline the impossibility of any real threat to Rome from Parthia. Trajan reached Ctesiphon with his armies in 116 and immediately sailed down the Tigris to the Persian Gulf. Here another version of the age-old Roman dream of surpassing Alexander the Great revealed itself in the utterance attributed to Trajan that had he been younger he "should certainly have crossed over to Indi too...".

During Trajan's journey to the Persian Gulf the conquered territories rose in revolt behind him. Uprisings initiated by Jewish elements of the subject population of Parthia, as well as in Syria, forced the emperor to return from Babylon, which he had visited after the Gulf, and make dispositions to quell the uprisings. Three armies were directed to

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218 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 26.4.
220 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 22.1.
221 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 29.1.
various parts of Parthia, one under the command of Maximus, another under Lusius Quietus, and a third under Erucius Clarus and Iulius Alexander. Maximus, a consular, was subsequently killed in battle but remains otherwise unidentifiable. Lusius, a prince of Mauretania, was one of Trajan's most important and distinguished military commanders. Lusius is credited in Dio with occupying Singara and some other towns without a battle in the campaigns against Armenia. In 116 Lusius recovered Nisibis and besieged and captured Edessa, which he sacked and burned. His achievements brought about his posting to Judaea to quell the Jewish uprisings which had broken out all over the Roman east during Trajan's foray into Parthia. Hadrian immediately dismissed Lusius from his governorship. Similarly neither Erucius Clarus and Iulius Alexander, a consular pair in 117, were given military provinces by Trajan's successor, although Clarus was made cos. II in 146 and held the post of praefectus urbi under Hadrian.

Ultimately Trajan's conquests were lost and he did not live to see any benefits from his eastern wars, dying at Selinus in Cilicia on his way back to Rome. The argument that because of the uprisings Trajan's conquests in the east had been lost and that Hadrian's surrender of them was the only option is tendentious. Despite the rebellion of the lands that had been overrun in the east, it is not adequate to believe that Trajan, had he lived, or a militarily adventurous successor, would not have successfully overcome these uprisings. With Trajan at the Persian Gulf the forces he had with him were undoubtedly over-extended. But consolidation would have achieved much and it is clear that before Trajan's death Roman armies were steadily re-occupying the rebel cities. To suggest that territories in Trajan's rear that had risen against him were not Roman conquests because of those uprisings surely misses

222 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 30.1-2.
223 Cassius Dio LXVIII, 32.4: "Maupwv ἀρχηγὸν ἔθεν". PIR² L439: he had achieved prominence during the first Dacian war as commander of a cohort of Moorish horsemen and was subsequently enrolled by Trajan among the praetors. In 117 he achieved the distinction of a suffect consulship, while governor of Judaea.
224 Cassius Dio LXVIII, 22.2.
226 PIR² E96.
227 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 33.3.
228 This opinion is widely held but without foundation. See, for one example, Luttwak, p. 110.
the point. Such a statement would not be accepted about Judaea, and rightly so. But until the wars of 132-135 Judaea was never free from unrest. It was no less a Roman province for all that. There is no doubt that had Hadrian had the political will (for the military force was available) much of Trajan’s eastern conquests could have been retained as Roman territory. Certainly Armenia and most of the Mesopotamian plain between the two rivers could have been held with proper garrison placements.

After Trajan’s death Hadrian did not continue his expansionist policy but reverted to the idea of static frontiers. He gave up much of the territory annexed by Trajan in the east but did not return strictly to the borders of Augustus. All of Trajan’s conquered lands east of the Euphrates were relinquished, but the provinces of Arabia Petraea, south of Judaea, and Dacia, across the Danube were retained. Hadrian appointed the deposed Parthamaspates to the throne of Osrhoene, which was retained as a client kingdom, but Armenia was given up and again “permitted to have its own king.” In fact Hadrian was reverting to the arrangement concluded by Nero in the treaty at Rhandeia. Hadrian’s frontier policy in the east was thus no different from his frontier policy in Britain or Europe, save that no physical walls were constructed. That policy is characterised by Hadrian’s concern to settle frontier disputes by diplomatic negotiations backed up with an exhibition of force along the borders. Thus his journeys around the empire, and to the frontier armies, served the purpose of keeping the legions ready to provide support to the units manning the frontier posts, if and when needed.

Hadrian’s successor was chosen because he was in Hadrian’s mould. Significantly he did not immediately set about replacing governors of the imperial provinces as Hadrian had done after succeeding Trajan, except perhaps in Britain (see above). Thus in Cappadocia L. Burbuleius Optatus Ligarianus, attested for July 138 and probably appointed before the death of Hadrian, remained governor until 140/1. In Syria

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229 SHA, Hadrian, V.4.
230 SHA, Hadrian, XXI.11.
231 See the discussion in E. Birley, "Hadrianic Frontier Policy" in RAP, p. 32f.
232 Eck, p. 239; Alföldy, Konsulat, p. 220.
Palaestina too, the Hadrianic governor, P. Calpurnius Atilianus (cos. ord. 135), kept his appointment for the normal tenure. The name of the governor of Arabia at Hadrian's death is not known, but if his replacement, L. Aemilius Carus, took office in 141/2 then Aemilius Carus' predecessor will have been appointed in 138. Likewise in Numidia where T. Caesernius Status was governor from 138 until 141 when he was replaced by C. Ulpius Pacatus Prastina Messalinus.

Antoninus Pius has come down to us as a man of peace, and certainly he seems to have tried to settle matters by diplomacy rather than war. This is especially true in the case of the Parthian and other Eastern kingdoms. In the Historia Augusta, for instance, we learn that the Emperor "induced the king of the Parthians to forego a campaign against the Armenians merely by writing him a letter, and solely by his personal influence brought Abgarus the king [of Osrhoene] back from the regions of the east. He settled the pleas of several kings", although there does also seem to have been some troop movements in Syria. This Abgarus is possibly the one who fled east after Edessa was sacked by Trajan's armies in 116, but we are not to take this return to mean that he was given back his throne, since the king of Osrhoene at this time appears to have been named Mannus. Dio refers to both an Abgarus of Osrhoene and a Mannus, "ruler of the neighbouring portion of Arabia", and it seems possible either that there were two lines of kings in Osrhoene, or else that Edessa existed as an independent city-state within Osrhoene, and had its own kings.

If the mechanism of changing the Armenian ruler discussed previously is correct the reference to a campaign against Armenia probably indicates an attempt to replace a ruling Armenian king with another Parthian nominee on the occasion of a change of ruler in Parthia. Magie

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233 Eck, p. 232; Alfoldy, Konsulat, p. 241. No governors are known between Calpurnius Atilianus and Iulius Kadus in 150.
234 As Alfoldy suggests, Konsulat, p. 242.
235 Alfoldy, Konsulat, p. 247.
238 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 18.1.
239 Cassius Dio, LXVIII, 21.1.
believes\textsuperscript{240}, without giving a source, that a Parthian vassal was appointed to the throne of Armenia by Antoninus, and a coin of Antoninus, dated between 140 and 144, before the accession of Vologases IV it should be noted, with the reverse legend \textit{REX ARMENIIS DATVS} over a scene of an investiture\textsuperscript{241}, certainly bears out this assumption. Even allowing for the propaganda uses of imperial coinage the investiture by Rome of someone to the throne of Armenia does not imply that Rome was now appointing Armenian kings. The emperor could be styled as having given Armenia a king even if all he was doing was approving the Parthian nominee as arranged by Nero’s settlement.

Vologases IV succeeded to the throne of all Parthia in about 147, and it seems likely to me that an attempted replacement at a date after this was the occasion on which Antoninus Pius was able to forestall an Armenian campaign by Parthia. An inscription which reads (in part): "L. \textit{NERATIO C. F. PROCVLO...MISSO AB IMP. ANTONINO AVG. PIO AD DE[e]DVCE[N]d]AS VEX[i]LLATIONES IN SYRIAM OB [b]EllVM [Par]THICVM..." confirms that during Antoninus’ reign troops were sent to Syria in preparation for a Parthian war\textsuperscript{242} and there is no reason to doubt that this was the occasion referred to in the \textit{Historia Augusta}. There are some suggestions that the campaign should be dated to very early in Pius’ reign, perhaps 139/40\textsuperscript{243}, but the argument for the occasion being intervention by the new Parthian king seem to me stronger.

As soon as Pius died in 161 the Parthian king, Vologases IV, attacked Armenia. Vologases had no rivals for the Parthian throne and during the long period of his reign he seems to have remained totally in control. It can be hypothesised that the reason for his delay in completing the Armenian campaign was a need to ensure his total control over all of the Parthian empire, including the troublesome kingdoms along the eastern edges of the empire. Vologases’ obvious power and control make clear that he had successfully consolidated his

\textsuperscript{240} Magie, p. 659.
\textsuperscript{241} \textit{RIC}, III, p. 110, no. 619.
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{ILS}, 1076.
hold over all the satrapies and vassal kingdoms of the Parthian empire. No doubt in the uncertainty that always surrounded the death of a Roman Emperor Vologases, having secured his power, could see the opportunity to complete his planned move against Armenia and replace the incumbent with his own nominee. The name of the king installed by Antoninus has not come down to us, although it is tempting to suppose that it may have been the Sohaemus installed by Lucius Verus after the capture of Artaxata in 163.

The chronology of subsequent events in Armenia is obscure. Cassius Dio reports that the "the Roman legion under Severianus that was stationed at Elegeia" was destroyed by the Parthian king. Dio clearly believes that the unit, whatever its size, was stationed at Elegeia, not advancing towards it. If this is so it was possibly placed there under Pius when he forestalled the reported Parthian attempt to start a war. Vologases' actions can then be seen as an attempt to impose full Parthian suzerainty over Armenia. On the other hand Lucian's story of the prophesy that lured M. Sedatius Severianus to his doom implies that the Cappadocian governor had in fact advanced into Armenia with his troops, and if this is the case it is doubtful that he would have been inciting war with less than a full legion behind him. Elegeia lies on the most obvious route from Syria and Cappadocia to Artaxata, the Armenian capital, but is unlikely to be part of an itinerary for invading Armenia from Parthia. It is more probable, topographically, that Vologases invaded by way of Adiabene or Media Atropatene, advancing on Artaxata from the south or south-east, and the encounter with

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244 This perhaps explains the reference to Vologases carrying out the war he had planned under Antoninus Pius, in SHA, Marcus Antoninus, VIII, 6.
246 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 2.1. The word used by Dio, στρατόπεδον, is not necessarily the equivalent of the Latin legio and it is unlikely that Severianus had an entire legion with him, possibly the unit involved was a vexillation of one of the Cappadocian legions: Mitford, p. 1203. The hypothesis that the legion destroyed was the ninth must remain pure speculation for lack of evidence.
247 Lucian, Alexander The False Prophet, 27.
248 RE, "Sedatius", no. 1, argues for M. Sedatius Severianus as more correct than the P. Aelius Severianus accepted by Magie, see SHA, Marcus Antoninus, VIII, 5, note 3. PIR, no. 438, calls him "legatus", Fronto refers to him as 'consularis'. (Principia Historiae, 16) i.e. he was consular legate in Cappadocia. Debevoie, p. 246, citing Pauly-Wissowa, incorrectly calls him "C. Sedatius Severianus, the Gallic legate of Cappadocia".
Severianus and his mysterious force occurred while the Parthian king was making his way to the south-west. Whatever the explanation of the defeat at Elegeia there were clear political and strategic reasons for Vologases to impose his control on Armenia.

Contrary to modern analyses of the strategic value of Armenia, however, Vologases, once Severianus was defeated, did not turn his attentions to the eastern provinces of Asia Minor, but moved on to Syria. On the way Osrhoene was occupied and the pro-Roman king Mannus replaced by a certain Waël. We know from Dio that after Vologases left Edessa he made a raid into Syria, where he defeated the Syrian governor, Attidius Cornelianus in early 162. It may be that Vologases, an energetic, powerful king, saw himself as a legitimate heir, not to the Seleucids but to the Achaemenids, and his actions subsequent to the installation of Pacorus can be seen as an attempt by Vologases to demonstrate his power by making his presence felt in part of the original Achaemenid empire. Conversely it might have been nothing more than a raid for plunder to reward the Parthian forces for successful operations in Armenia. Although there was support for Parthia in Syria, and Vologases' presence there may have had the effect of mobilising anti-Roman sentiment, especially among the Jews, it is going too far to suggest that Vologases was trying to seize and hold Roman territory.

The situation in the east had become serious and the remedy seized upon by Rome was an invasion of both Armenia and Parthia. Accordingly in

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249 See, for example, Longden, p. 26, and Luttwak, p. 105, who both argue that Roman control of Armenia was necessary to prevent Parthian invasions of Roman Asia, despite the fact that Parthians never, in the second century, threatened the provinces of Asia Minor, even in 161 when Cappadocia was open to them.

250 Debevoise, p. 246. However, Birley, MA, p. 130, wants to place the installation of Waël after the Roman re-capture of Armenia. This seems to be a misreading of events for two reasons: 1. Birley himself says that there were Parthians in Syria in 153, so they had not left to occupy Edessa in 162 as he first suggests; 2. Osrhoene is on, and in, the way for an attack on Syria, and Vologases would certainly not have wanted an unfriendly kingdom in his rear during operations in Syria.

251 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 2.1, says that Vologases "was now advancing, powerful and formidable, against the cities of Syria". For Cornelianus: SHA, Marcus Antoninus, VIII.6, he had been governing Cappadocia since 157, perhaps left for a longer term in anticipation of trouble on the eastern frontier. See R. Syme, "Avidius Cassius: His Rank, Age, and Quality" in RP V, p. 692.

162 Lucius Verus was sent to Syria under the tutelage of three of the Empire's more successful military commanders: Statius Priscus, Avidius Cassius, and P. Martius Verus\textsuperscript{253}. These were all competent military commanders and demonstrate the care taken by Marcus to select the correct men for the campaigns. Priscus, especially, had had wide experience and must be rated as the leading general of the period. The man was a widely experienced soldier, starting life as an equestrian. He had held military tribunates in 3 legions\textsuperscript{254} prior to command of a vexillation during Hadrian's Jewish war. This was followed by the procuratorship of Narbonensian and Aquitanian Gaul. Subsequently it appears that he was awarded the broad stripe, probably by Antoninus, and allowed to stand for senatorial office\textsuperscript{255}. He was thus substantially older than his contemporary office holders but he seems not to have suffered thereby. His senatorial career was again long and varied: legate of both XIV Gemina Martiae and XIII Gemina in turn, following which was the command of the Dacian legion, held probably until the end of 158 or early 159, and a suffect consulship in 159 with Plautius Quintillus.

The consulship was immediately followed with the position of legate of Moesia Superior in late 159 or early 160. The post was held for only a very short period for in 161/2 Priscus was transferred to Britain. Hardly had Priscus arrived there when he was transferred to deal with the far more serious situation in the east. This eminent and prominent general is not heard of after the early part of the Parthian war and we must presume death or retirement. Neither would be surprising, since his military service as a young man in Judaea with Hadrian must indicate a birth around 110. His replacement was L. Iulius (Statilius) Severus\textsuperscript{256}, whose career details are not known in full. He had been suffect consul in 155, and prior to his appointment to Cappadocia was legate of Moesia Inferior about 160\textsuperscript{257}.

Since Lucius Verus was able to install himself and his army in Antioch with no problems, Vologases cannot have remained in Syria, except

\textsuperscript{253} SHA, Lucius Verus, VII.1.
\textsuperscript{254} I Adiutrix, X Gemina, III Gallica.
\textsuperscript{255} PIR S637.
\textsuperscript{256} Alfoldy, Konsulat, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{257} PIR\textsuperscript{2} 1588, 1575.
perhaps in the eastern region of the province on the Euphrates, where battles at both Sura, on the Syrian, and Nicephorium, on the Parthian, side of the Euphrates are recorded\textsuperscript{258}. After some time spent getting the Syrian troops into fighting shape, Armenia was invaded, Pacorus removed, and Sohaemus given the throne in his stead. As well a new capital city was constructed, simply named Kainepolis (New City)\textsuperscript{259}. With a new king of Rome's choice on the Armenian throne it might be thought that legitimate Roman concerns had been satisfied. The subsequent actions of Lucius Verus and his army commanders were a demonstration of Roman force that was intended to intimidate Parthia to ensure that Vologases' actions did not recur\textsuperscript{260}. Their actions were, thus, only in the widest possible sense strategic.

What was decided was nothing less than an all out invasion of Parthia. Probably in the early stages of the invasion letters were sent to Vologases seeking to put an end to the war 'by agreement'\textsuperscript{261}. Diplomatic negotiations had by now become a formality of Roman-Parthian confrontations: that they took place is confirmed by a letter from Lucius Verus to Fronto, in which he writes: "I will send you also my parleys with the enemy..."\textsuperscript{262}. Rome's concern to be seen to be waging only a \textit{iustum bellum} may mean that these 'parleys' took place before any military engagements had occurred, or they may have taken place after the Armenian capital had been re-captured, and after the battles at Sura and Nicephorium when Rome was in a position of greater strength. Vologases, not surprisingly, refused to consider terms; he was, unusually for Parthia, in a position of some strength and the terms were no doubt unfavourable to Parthia, given that Roman perceptions of Parthia made it a dependent state. The Roman armies, under the command of Avidius Cassius, marched on Mesopotamia. Osrhoene was retaken, the pro-Roman Mannus replaced on the throne\textsuperscript{263}, and, after a major engagement at Dura-Europus (which was

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\textsuperscript{258} Sura: Lucian, \textit{How to Write History}, 29; Nicephorium: Fronto, \textit{Ad Verum Imp.}, ii.1 (Loeb, II, p. 132).
\textsuperscript{259} Birley, \textit{Marcus Aurelius}, p. 131, for the installation of Sohaemus and the founding of Kainepolis.
\textsuperscript{260} In the sense of force as intimidation, discussed by Luttwak, p. 195ff.
\textsuperscript{261} Fronto, \textit{Principia Historiae}, 14. Unfortunately the silence of all other sources on this make it impossible to place the diplomatic moves chronologically.
\textsuperscript{262} Fronto, \textit{Ad Verum Imp.}, ii.3 (Loeb, II, p. 195).
\textsuperscript{263} Birley, \textit{MA}, p. 140.
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henceforth to remain in Roman hands), the legions advanced to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, both of which were taken. Seleucia, which must have remained an essentially Greek metropolis throughout the Parthian period, welcomed the Roman troops but after some disagreement, about which we know nothing, the soldiers of Avidius Cassius stormed the city and burnt it. The palace of Vologases, at Ctesiphon across the river, was similarly razed.

While the army was encamped at Seleucia an epidemic of plague broke out among the troops. This was said to have begun because a soldier, looting the temple of Apollo, had cut open a golden casket, releasing the "pestilential vapour" into the air. The army was severely affected by the plague and forced to retreat back to Syria, in which withdrawal many men were lost. The disease was brought by soldiers back into the western parts of the empire where it raged for a number of years, eventually spreading to the Rhine and Gaul. Vologases must have been able to re-occupy most of his territories soon after the withdrawal.

At an indeterminate date thereafter Sohaemus, the Roman backed incumbent, was expelled from Armenia and forced to seek aid from Rome. The evidence for this lies in a passage in Dio that turns into an encomium of Martius Verus. He had been rewarded for his part in the war with a consulship in 166, and had been made governor of Cappadocia after Statius Priscus, in about 172. The Dio passage relates that Martius Verus "had sent out Thucydides to conduct Sohaemus into Armenia, and this general, thanks to the terror inspired by his arms and to the natural good judgement that he showed in every...

264 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 2.3.
265 SHA, Lucius Verus, VIII.2.
266 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 2.4 says that "he lost a great many of his soldiers through famine and disease", although Birley, MA, p. 140, would only have it that "some men had contracted plague".
267 Dehevoise, p. 253. I cannot agree with the assertion in Birley, MA, p. 144, that there was a further invasion across the Tigris involving the Parthian territory of Media Atropatene in 166. Birley does not give any source for this statement and his attribution of it, based on the possible misplacement of a passage in Dio (LXXI, 3.1), is unargued; I remain unconvinced. All other evidence indicates that Roman operations in Parthia had ceased by early 166 A.D. Lucian writing before the end of the war, when the triumph of Lucius Verus had yet to happen and the war is far from over, makes it clear in 30 that Media had already been invaded, How To Write History, 31.
268 PIR² P348.
situation, kept pressing vigorously forward"\textsuperscript{269}.

The passage goes on to tell of the condition of the soldiers left in the New City (Kainepolis) by Priscus, suggesting that the incident should be dated after the founding of Kainepolis during the Armenian campaign in 164, and possibly during the late 160's or early 170's when Martius Verus was governor of Cappadocia. It seems that it was usual for the Cappadocian governor to have charge of military affairs involving Armenia. It is plausible then that such a move by Verus was necessary because anti-Roman elements in Armenia had succeeded in replacing Sohaemus with a pro-Parthian king\textsuperscript{270}. Possibly it is to this time that we should date the incident mentioned in Dio when a 'satrap' named Tiridates stirred up trouble in Armenia, killed the king of the Heniochi, and "thrust his sword in Verus' face when the latter rebuked him for it..."\textsuperscript{271}. Tiridates may have been a replacement king but it is more likely that he was a Parthian satrap, possibly ruler of Media Atropatene, and had been undertaking his own adventuring in Armenia.

A curious note is that in the two eastern provinces of Syria and Cappadocia governors appointed after the end of the Parthian expedition were allowed to remain in office for extended periods. In Cappadocia P. Martius Verus remained for the period 166 to 174/5 while Avidius Cassius governed Syria for the same length of time. Both men must have been trusted, and equally the situation must have remained stable for a long period of time. Following Cassius' rebellion and death his replacement was Martius Verus, while the new governor of Cappadocia was C. Arrius Antoninus, suffect consul in 170\textsuperscript{272}.

Commodus, apart from his religious inclinations, seems to have had no interest in the East and for almost 30 years after the events of Marcus' reign the East remained quiescent, suggesting on the one hand that Rome's actions had succeeded in intimidating Parthia, or on the other, more plausibly, that Parthia was not interested in threatening the Roman empire's eastern provinces. And perhaps the serious situation on

\textsuperscript{269} Cassius Dio, LXXI, 3.1.
\textsuperscript{270} Birley, \textit{MA}, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{271} Cassius Dio, LXXI, 14.2. The Heniochi were a tribe of Asiatic Sarmatia.
\textsuperscript{272} \textit{PIR}^\textregistered A1088, and additional volume II, p. xv.
the empire's northern borders rendered events in Parthia of no importance to Rome for the rest of Marcus' reign. Parthian rulers were thus able to play out their Armenian policy without interference from Rome. Septimius Severus put an end to this state of affairs by undertaking two campaigns in Parthia in the 190's, without even the excuse of Parthian interference in Armenia to validate his actions. Indeed Cassius Dio says that Severus "out of a desire for glory made a campaign against the barbarians - against the Osrhoeni, the Adiabeni, and the Arabians"273, and the Historia Augusta comments: "It was commonly rumoured, to be sure, that in planning a war on the Parthians, Septimius Severus was influenced rather by a desire for glory than by any real necessity."274. The reasons advanced by Septimius himself to justify his invasions of Parthian territory were, in the face of the evidence, blatant fabrications designed to justify his aggressive imperialism. But that is another story.

b) The Arabian Frontier

When Rabbel II, the Roman client king of Arabia Petraea, died in 106275 Trajan sent the Governor of Syria, A. Cornelius Palma, to occupy Arabia Petraea and make it a Roman province. Rabbel did not die childless, having left an heir named Obodas276, so his dynasty did not end, and Roman annexation was not the taking over of a leaderless client state but outright expansion. It is possible that there was some slight military activity involved in the annexation277, but coins bearing the legends ARABIA ADQVISITA, as opposed, for example, to the DACIA CAPTA issues278, reinforce the notion that it was a diplomatic rather than military success, despite an apparent delay in the issue of such coins until 111279. Just at this time Pacorus II, the sole king of Parthia, stopped minting coins and this suggests that he was overthrown by the next king, Vologases III280. It may be that this fortunate

273 Cassius Dio, LXXV, 1.1.
274 SHA, Severus, XV.1.
276 Bowersock, p. 80.
277 Bowersock, p. 80 n. 13.
279 The delay cannot be explained. See J. Eadie "The evolution of the Roman frontier in Arabia" in DRBE, p. 244.
280 Sellwood, p. 235. There is no evidence for the statement by McDowell, Coins from
concurrence of events led Trajan to formulate, earlier in his reign than
is generally assumed, his plans for an invasion of Parthia. Palma, for
his endeavours received an iterated consulship as ordinarius in 109 with
P. Calvisius Tullus Ruso.

The first governor of the new province was C. Claudius Severus suffect
consul in the last months of 112 with T. Settidius Firmus. Unless he
held the consulship in absence his post in Arabia should have run 106 to
111 or early 112. However milestones bearing his name as governor
exist for the years 111, 112, and 113 so a consulship in absence, still
a rarity, cannot be excluded. Again this longer than normal
governorship is interesting, and significant, because it imparts an air of
premeditation to Trajan's activities on the eastern frontier. In this
context the annexation can be seen as an attempt to secure the southern
flank of the empire and provide a secure base before embarking on a
trans-Euphratene expedition. The events in Arabia suggest that a long
term plan was involved, and G.W. Bowersock has suggested that the
annexation of Arabia Petraea "looks very much as if the mission of
Claudius Severus in the province of Arabia over the course of nearly a
decade was to provide continuity in preparations for the fulfilment of
Trajan's great dream to re-enact the conquests of Alexander the Great
and conquer the kingdom in Iran."

Following the annexation a new military road, the via nova Traiana,
was constructed between 107 and 114 from Bostra in the north to
Aqaba on the Red Sea in the south. In the southern districts of the
frontier a number of new fortifications were built but further north the
Nabatean forts and watch-towers were taken over by the Roman forces
and re-used. It was in this northern sector, too, that auxiliary forts were
constructed east of the via nova possibly to control movement through
some of the more important wadis. Under Trajan a legion was

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Selucia on the Tigris, Ann Arbor, 1935, p. 77, that Pacorus II was king until 115.
Certainly his coin issues cease in ca. 96 A.D. (See W. Wroth, Catalogue of the
Coins of Parthia, London, 1903, p. lv.) and when coins began to be issued from
the Selucia mint in 108 they were those of Vologases III.

281 PIR² C1023. See also Bowersock, p. 83.
283 Bowersock, p. 85.
284 Eadie, p. 244.
285 Parker, p. 866. There was a Roman fort, apparently of Trajanic foundation, at
stationed at Bostra with auxiliary units strategically placed along the military road, and there is some suggestion that Hadrian abandoned permanent military installations along Trajan's road in the lack of evidence for Hadrianic fortifications, the absence of Hadrianic inscriptions from the province, and the sudden appearance of evidence for the legion at Bostra in the early years of Antoninus Pius' reign 286.

Evidence for Roman Arabia in the mid to late second century is hard to find and little is known about the policies of Antoninus, Marcus, and Commodus to this frontier province. Possibly the Hejaz inscriptions which demonstrate a tie between the Roman administration and a Thalmudic tribal confederation 287 suggest that in Arabia, at least, Roman control was maintained by a careful policy of diplomatic conciliation. Under Marcus, presumably because of the Parthian campaigns, a garrison was placed in the great trading oasis of Palmyra, hitherto secured by an Arab force 288, but commanding the major route from Mesopotamia and the Euphrates to Damascus and the Mediterranean ports. No evidence exists to show that Commodus undertook any action in Arabia. Certainly no military threat to the province is known in this period. Under Septimius Severus further expansion and strengthening of the Arabian frontier was carried out 289, and although this might point to unrest along the borders it seems more in keeping with the overall policy of that emperor of securing the borders by pushing them forward.

North Africa

The Roman provinces of Africa took up all the northern coastal regions of the African continent, stretching from Egypt in the east to the Atlantic coast in the far north-west corner of Africa, some 2,000 kilometres in length. All are bounded to the south by extensive desert.

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286 J. Lander "Did Hadrian abandon Arabia" in DRBE, p. 450-1.
287 S.T. Parker "Retrospective on the Arabian frontier after a decade of research" in DRBE, p. 635.
288 Mann, "Frontiers", p. 523.
AFRICAN PROVINCES IN THE SECOND CENTURY A.D.
The territory that made up this part of the empire was acquired over the course of two centuries following the sack of Carthage in 146 B.C. Although Egypt was garrisoned with two legions from Tiberius' time onwards there is little indication that their presence was for any other reason than control of internal uprisings. Certainly the size of the garrison in the far south of the province, never more than three cohorts, suggests that Rome had little to fear militarily from that part of the continent. Similarly Cyrene, constituted as a province with the island of Crete, appears to have played little part in the development of Roman frontiers in Africa. There are few units attested for the province until the time of the 'Notitia Dignitatum' in the fourth century. Numidia, home of the one African legion outside Egypt, III Augusta, was only a de facto province until separated from Africa Proconsularis by Septimius Severus in 196. The other African provinces, Africa Proconsularis, and the two Mauretanias: Caesariensis and Tingitana, were garrisoned with a number of auxiliary troops. The total, including the legion in Numidia, perhaps approached 30,000 troops. These military arrangements lasted until the third century, and suggest that Roman policy in North Africa was directed at the control of tribal affairs rather than the establishment of military frontiers.

Under Trajan little took place in the region except for the reinforcement of the southern limes by construction of a line of forts south of the Aurès mountains in the southern district of Numidia. One of these forts, Lambaesis, was the new headquarters of legio III Augusta, and indicates that the frontier of the province, or at least the territory Rome considered under its control, had again been pushed further to the south-west. Similarly the frontier of Mauretania Caesariensis was advanced towards the west in about 114/5. A

290 M. Speidel, "Nubia's Roman Garrison" in ANRW, II, 10.1, p. 768.
291 Mann, "Frontiers", p. 527.
292 A good summary of the formation of the provinces is to be found in J. Wacher, The Roman Empire, London, 1987, chapters 10 and 11.
293 I.M. Barton, Africa in the Roman Empire, Accra, 1972, p. 25.
296 P. Salmé, "Les déplacements successifs du limes en Maurétanie césarienne (Essai de synthèse)" in RPS 11, p. 584.
number of roads throughout the region were rebuilt in the period 100 to 105, veterans were settled at Cyrene, and a number of new Roman colonies were established, such as *Colonia Ulpia Marciana Traiana Thamugadi*, evidently a colony at the site of a tribal settlement.\(^{297}\)

Africa was possibly visited twice by Hadrian on his two extensive tours of the empire. There is some indication that after visiting Spain in 123 the emperor made an excursion to Mauretania although specific evidence is lacking.\(^{298}\) In early 128 he arrived in Carthage where a fall of rain made it seem as if the emperor was personally responsible for breaking a five year drought. He then moved inland to inspect the frontier defenses, beginning at Lambaesis where the legion *III Augusta* was permanently stationed. Record of his visit is preserved in fragments of speeches made to the troops after the emperor had surveyed field manoeuvres, early in July 128. The southern fortress at Gemellae dates from this time as does the so-called 'fossatum Africae'. This artificial barrier has similarities to Hadrian's Wall in Britain, although its function was probably not as overtly military as the earlier construction.\(^{299}\) The fossatum appears to mark the southern edge of permanent pasture in Numidia and the evidence clearly points to its use for controlling tribal movement rather than as a fighting position.\(^{300}\)

There was intense road construction activity all over the empire under Hadrian, and Africa did not miss out. A milestone of 123 on the road from Carthage to Theveste attests to construction work in the region. As well, a new road was constructed in Numidia to give easier access to the sea from the interior, possibly in the very early years of the reign, and there is epigraphic evidence for more road construction work in Mauretania and Cyrene. Other administrative provisions in Africa provided for the proper demarcation of territories between urban settlements and tribal lands, and so on. Plainly Hadrian's activities in Africa mirrored those in the rest of the empire — concentration on administrative reforms and the military preparedness of the army.

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297 Garzetti, pp. 337, 344.
298 Accepted by Garzetti, p. 395, no evidence cited.
300 Thus E. Birley, p. 33; Mann "Frontiers", p. 527. Against see Luttwak, p. 79.
Under Antoninus Pius an internal revolt in Mauretania Caesariensis in about 145 developed into a full-scale war\textsuperscript{301}. At first the situation was dealt with by T. Flavius Priscus, equestrian procurator of the province, but eventually a senatorial commander, Uttedius Honoratus, was appointed\textsuperscript{302}. Little enough is known about the progress of the fighting, which apparently lasted until 149, although victory is attested in an inscription from Rome\textsuperscript{303}. The epigraphic evidence also suggests that before the war was over detachments of troops from Britain, Spain, Lower Pannonia, Noricum, even Syria were transferred to Mauretania to assist the garrison of auxiliaries already in the province. If such was the case the war seems to have been more serious than the sources will admit\textsuperscript{304}. In conjunction with the campaign roadworks and defense constructions went on over a wide area\textsuperscript{305}.

Under Marcus Aurelius the Moors were still causing trouble, even invading Spain on two occasions, in 171-3 and 176\textsuperscript{306}. The concern about the Moorish problem is reflected by the granting of Roman citizenship to various members of the local Numidian aristocracy, presumably pro-Roman elements\textsuperscript{307}. However, the wars on the northern and eastern frontiers of the empire left little time for much involvement with African affairs, although some evidence exists to suggest that work on consolidating the fixed frontier defenses was carried out\textsuperscript{308}.

A similar situation obtains under Commodus. The Moors were again causing trouble and a campaign against them was conducted in the period 183 - 185\textsuperscript{309}. An inscription from Mauretania attests to repairs to the defense works along the border and the construction of some new ones: IMP. CAESAR M. AVREL. COMMODVS ANTONINVS AVG. P.

\textsuperscript{301} SHA, \textit{Antoninus Pius}, V.4; Pausanias, VIII, xliii.3.
\textsuperscript{302} Birley, \textit{MA}, p. 89f; and R. Syme, "The wrong Marcus Turbo" in \textit{RP II}, p. 551, although Syme puts the appointments in reverse order.
\textsuperscript{303} \textit{CIL} VI, 1208.
\textsuperscript{305} Garzetti, p. 453f.
\textsuperscript{306} SHA, \textit{Marcus Antoninus}, XXII.11. See Birley, \textit{MA}, pp. 190 and 204; and Garzetti, p. 499.
\textsuperscript{307} Birley, \textit{MA}, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{308} Salama, p. 584.
\textsuperscript{309} Garzetti, p. 535.
GERMANICVS SARMATICVS BRITANNICVS MAXIMVS SECVRITATI PROVINCIALIVM SVORVM CONSVLENS TVRRES NOVAS INSTITVIT ET VETERES REFECIT OPERMV MILITVM [s]IVORVM CVRANTE CL. PERPETVO PROC. SV0

Although little attention was paid to the rest of the region there are suggestions that Commodus was more favourably thought of in Africa than the rest of the empire, perhaps because of his indolence and lack of interference in the provinces.

Long the granary of Rome, Africa began, after Commodus, to play an important rôle in the political life of the empire. Under Septimius Severus, the first emperor from Africa, the provinces of the continent reached their greatest size, with the further southward movement of the frontiers in the 190's. In the Senate men of African origin had been increasing their representation all through the second century, and on two occasions in the chaotic fourth-century African commanders rebelled against the western empire.

Conclusion

The borders of the Roman empire do not reflect a coherent continuing strategic policy. Often they were simply marked out where the crusading armies stopped, through inertia, exhaustion, or logistic problems. No rational policy conceived the incomplete subjugation of Britain. The best, i.e. most strategically viable, position would surely have been Roman control of the whole island. The see-sawing frontier line of the province mirrors the way the expansionist option was regarded by various emperors, not strategic realities. Had Agricola or Septimius Severus, both outside the chronological scope of this study, had their way the frontier would have been pushed forward to the far north coast of Caledonia and there would have been no more 'British problem'.

310 ILS 396.
311 See Garzetti, p. 544.
312 Salama, p. 586f.
The back and forward movement of the frontier in Britain is evidence that, in the minds of some emperors at least, the borders of the empire were never fixed geographically\textsuperscript{314}. The same attitude is evident on the northern frontiers in Europe, and in the east on the frontier with Parthia. Perhaps because of the limiting factor of the desert there were no comparable attempts at frontier extension in the African provinces, although there was an observable southward movement of Roman controlled territory.

Border incursions can be contained by the use of force, and barbarians held back by displays of power and the payment of subsidies, always an option in Roman external policy\textsuperscript{315}. The presence of enemy forces on Roman territory does not indicate that the purpose of such a presence was conquest. In fact there are only two recorded instances of serious barbarian invasions of Roman provinces in the second century, and no indication that either was an attempt to permanently settle on Roman soil\textsuperscript{316}. Hostile barbarian actions did not have to be met with full-scale invasions of enemy territory and attempts at annexation. The success or otherwise of such aggressive policies is not the issue. That annexation appears to have been the aim on more than one occasion in the second century points to the continuing existence of imperialist notions in Roman political ideology, and their continuing acceptance as a functional option in external policy.

\textsuperscript{314} \textit{Contra} see Gardner, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{315} The observation that power is not consumed in its application whereas force is, is by now a commonplace. See Luttwak, p. 195ff. The history of Roman subsidisation of barbarian tribes is summarised in C.D. Gordon, "Subsidies in Roman Imperial Defence", \textit{Phoenix}, 111 (1949), pp. 60 - 68.

\textsuperscript{316} The Parthian invasion of Syria in 161 and the barbarian invasion of Italy and the Danube provinces in 169/70.
PART 5: Conclusions

This thesis set out to examine an important aspect of Roman external policy during the second century, the period of five 'good' emperors, after which the affairs of the Romans "descends from a kingdom of gold to kingdom of rust" as Cassius Dio wrote. Specifically I hoped to show that ideas of territorial expansion did not disappear when Augustus changed forever the functioning of politics in Rome but remained an acceptable option in the formulation of imperial foreign policy.

Some of the more obvious evidence for the existence of an internal struggle over the execution of external policy was briefly introduced. This focussed on Trajan's wars, Hadrian's killing of the four consulars, the advancement of the British frontier under Antoninus Pius, and disagreements between Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius, and between Commodus and Pompeianus. Although the individual pieces of evidence might, separately, be interpreted differently there is enough, when all are taken together, to suggest the existence of an on-going debate over external policy whose outcome differed from reign to reign.

An attempt was made to set this debate in an ideological context, after a brief discussion of the problem of modern attitudes to Roman imperialism under the Principate, and a summary of modern theories about imperialism. I examined in some detail the ancient literary expressions of the concept of Roman imperialism, an integral part of which was Rome's assertion of its god-given right to rule the world. From the time of Polybius in the third century B.C. to the end of the Republic expressions of the concept are numerous and widespread, even in the public speeches of Cicero, whose private opinion was probably different. The Augustan age is a pivotal one in Roman literature and politics and all the Augustan poets confirm the true imperialist nature of the first emperor's policies, demonstrating that in this regard at least Augustus was true heir of the Republican tradition.

1 Cassius Dio, LXXI, 36.4.
Despite modern asseverations about the cessation of Roman expansion after the defeat of Varus in 9 A.D., expressions of Rome's imperial mission continue to appear in literature of the period under study. It is apparent that under Hadrian and Antoninus Pius the terms in which the concept was expressed changed, most notably in the Preface to Appian's Roman History and in the Roman Oration of Aelius Aristides. But this change, not denying that Rome ruled the world, merely gives voice to the Hadrianic repudiation of territorial expansion, perhaps an opinion restricted to certain elements of Greek thought rather than being a world-wide feeling. Concepts of Roman expansion and Rome's right to world rule continue to appear down to the end of the western empire. If the idea of military aggression was inimical to Christian writers they, nevertheless, were not averse to adopting the notion of Rome as mistress of the whole world, a notion that necessarily depends upon successful military action.

The issue is not one of the reality of the notion or whether the individuals who expressed this idea of Rome's world-wide dominion sincerely believed in it. What is relevant is that the concept continued to be expressed and that in this continuing expression was reflected ideas that were commonplace, and acceptable to writers. One might even go so far as to say that as a literary topos this notion was expected by the audience. The literary evidence thus examined suggests strongly that notions of imperialism and expansion remained a fundamental part of the political ideology of the aristocratic classes of the empire.

If such notions formed part of the functional ideology of the Principate we would expect them to be reflected in other areas of imperial life. An obvious starting point is the public image presented by emperors. Coins, as the only widely disseminated medium of publicity in the ancient world, are central to any examination of the imperial image. As would be expected Trajan's image is blatantly martial. What is not expected is that the image presented by both Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius is to a large extent military in tone. We know Marcus spent most of his life fighting barbarians but the stereotyped image we have is that he was a reluctant soldier who wanted peace. The coin image does not support this vision. On the basis of the coins Marcus was as aggressively martial an emperor as Trajan. Hadrian, again as we would
expect, is conspicuously different. His coin image overwhelmingly concentrates on peaceful and civic virtues. Commodus presents a somewhat ambiguous picture. The sources are consistent in stating that he abhorred campaigning, preferring a life of ease in Rome. This is borne out by the coin image, but not to the same extent as under Hadrian. Evidently Commodus tried to portray himself as a happy marriage of military and civil qualities, the perfect emperor in fact.

Other areas in which the ruling ideology might be expressed are on monuments and in an emperor's relations with the army. Because of limits in time and length I have been unable to examine monumental imagery fully, apart from brief discussion of some inscriptions. However, aspects of an emperor's relationship with his troops are more amenable to examination. Thus triumphs, the number of imperator acclamations an emperor received, and his use of ethnic cognomina are all evidence for the military image of an emperor that reinforces the coin propaganda. Hadrian and Antoninus Pius again stand out as being much less interested in presenting an aggressive military image, while Trajan, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, and Commodus, all present more overtly military images.

It is apparent that a martial image was almost a necessary condition of ruling the empire. Even an emperor like Antoninus Pius, who had no military experience and no desire to wage wars presented, on coins, a predominantly martial image of his reign, although his specifically military propaganda reinforces the literary image. Hadrian appears as radically different in this respect, as in so many others. There is really only one explanation for such an otherwise strong emphasis on military virtues: ideas of military aggression were an important part of the functional ideology of imperial rule.

Finally, such an ideology would be expected to show itself in the execution of external policy under the Principate, always allowing for differences in the result of the on-going debate over foreign policy under individual emperors. I examined in some detail Roman military operations on specific frontiers of the empire. Although the evidence is sometimes inconclusive it is clear that external policy under Trajan, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius was substantially different from
its operation under Hadrian and Commodus. The fact that border incidents were often answered by seizure of enemy territory, when such a response was unnecessary and unjustifiable, is compelling evidence for the important functional rôle of aggrandisement in external policy. That there are such obvious differences under Hadrian and Commodus suggests that external policy in the second century was not a fixed and continuing one, but depended to a large extent on the desires of individual emperors in regard to expansion and military campaigning.

I had originally hoped to demonstrate, in this thesis, that the use or rejection of the expansionist option was dependent on the workings out of an internal political struggle between those who accepted the value of expansion and those who held to a concept of the 'surfeited empire'. However, it was clear from the start that the prosopographical approach was fraught with difficulties, not least because second century sources are so exiguous. I had thought that the result of the struggle in a particular emperor's reign could be observed by examining the men appointed to commands of the armed imperial provinces and those who held iterated and eponymous consulships. I soon became aware that too many factors were at play in the selection of personnel, ties of patronage and blood to name just two, for this sort of evidence to be conclusive, especially in the light of the gaps in the provincial fasti, and our lack of complete career details even when names are known. Such a study would be a thesis in its own right and was precluded for me by restrictions on length and time. The prosopographical approach might help illuminate a period beset by source problems yet important in the development of imperial rule.

The evidence gathered together and examined in this thesis suggests that imperial foreign policy was determined by the outcome of a debate over the merits of territorial expansion. Further research along the lines adumbrated in the previous paragraph is certainly warranted and could help shed light on the functioning of internal politics during the second century. But one thing is clear. The republican ideal of expansion of the boundaries of the empire did not die with the death of the republic. Even after Septimius Severus, probably the last successful propagator imperii, Roman emperors remained imperialists. Virgil's imperium sine fine was a true statement of the imperial ideal.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Table of Coin Issues — Types and Frequencies

This frequency table was drawn up by counting the issues of each coin type as they are recorded in *RIC* for each emperor. Since *RIC* is not a catalogue of an individual collection, but a conspectus of all known types each appearance of a coin in *RIC* has been counted as a separate issue for the type. Types which do not portray a god or goddess, or a personification of a virtue or country/province, have not been counted. Types which show the emperor in association with a personification have been counted in this table. It will be noted that for each type that appears in the table there are two rows of figures. The top row in each case represents issues of the type *without* legends additional to the imperial titulature; the bottom row represents issues of the type *with* additional legends.

Some infrequently occurring types do not appear on the table, but have been included in the totals for calculation of percentages. For each emperor these are:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trajan:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Danube</strong></td>
<td>1 issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Saturn</strong></td>
<td>1 issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hadrian:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disciplina</strong></td>
<td>1 issue</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Isis</strong></td>
<td>1 issue</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Patientia</strong></td>
<td>1 issue</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Antoninus Pius</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bonus Eventus</strong></td>
<td>7 issues</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Honos</strong></td>
<td>2 issues</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Ops</strong></td>
<td>4 issues</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Tiber</strong></td>
<td>4 issues</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marcus Aurelius</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tiber</strong></td>
<td>4 issues</td>
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<tr>
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Appendix 1: Table of Coin Issues — Types and Frequencies

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Appendix 1: Table of Coin Issues — Types and Frequencies
Gods and Goddesses

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Appendix 2: Table of Coin Issues — Activities of Emperors

This frequency table was drawn up by counting coins in *RIC* which portray the emperor himself. As noted for Appendix 1 each appearance of such coins in *RIC* has been counted as a separate issue. Coins which portray the emperor in association with gods and goddesses, or with personifications of some type, have been counted in this table as well as the previous one. Some discussion on the division of coins into military and non-military activities will be found in the text, on page 91. Generally the coins have been classified by the attributes of the emperor or an obvious activity such as haranguing soldiers, sacrificing for *vota*, and so on.

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Note: In footnotes the letters of Fronto are cited by the original book divisions, as well as the volume and page numbers of the Loeb edition. Cassius Dio references give the Boissevain book numbering.

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<td><em>de Officiis</em>, tr. W. Miller, Loeb Classical Library, 1913.</td>
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<td><em>de Re Publica</em>, tr. C.W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library, 1928.</td>
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Eutropius


Fronto

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Herodian


Horace


Josephus


Juvenal


Lucian


Marcus Aurelius


Martial


Origen


Orosius

Pausanias


Pliny the Elder


Pliny the Younger


Plutarch


Polybius


Statius


Suetonius


Tacitus


Tacitus


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