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THE CATHOLIC-MARXIST IDEOLOGICAL
DIALOGUE IN POLAND (1945-1980)

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Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any University; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

[Norbert A. Zmijewski]
Synopsis

In this thesis I examine first the attitudes of the Catholic groups toward Marxist ideology and the policy of the Party and secondly the attempts of Marxists to overcome a crisis of their philosophy by discussing the Catholic ideas. In the last chapter I discuss the philosophies of Karol Wojtyla and Leszek Kolakowski – the two outstanding philosophical outcomes of the Catholic-Marxists dialogue. The arguments discussed in this thesis fall into two groups: those contributing to the process by which Catholicism developed into a philosophy of opposition and those illustrating the disintegration of Catholic and Marxist social doctrines. I argue that the nature of the dialogue significantly influenced political and intellectual life in Poland.
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For a thousand years, many Poles believe, or long believed, the Polish state, Polish independence and the Polish sense of identity have been inextricably intertwined with Catholicism and the international ties and alliances that this made possible. Being Catholic (by culture if not by strict orthodox belief) has been an important, though never an essential part of being a Pole. The romantic Polish nationalism elevated by Adam Mickiewicz, as A. Walicki has shown, rested on a profoundly religious, messianic conception of Poland's martyrdom and her destiny among nations - she was the sacrifice that would bring redemption, she was the elect among nations. This view of things declined sharply in influence after 1863, but the popular strength of Catholicism as the religion of most Poles remained.

Marxists and many socialists and ' progressives' - even in pre-war Poland - had a different picture. For them, Catholicism (and religion more generally) were part of an old and bad world, based on the economic exploitation, the political suppression and the ideological obfuscation of the masses, promoting resignation, dependence and superstition. A Polish People's Republic - or even a genuine Polish democracy - would be a secular state, in which secular, scientific opinion would triumph (ultimately by persuasion, or immediately through appropriate state action) over medievalism, unscientific error and sheer superstition.

The conflict over Catholicism within the Polish intelligentsia was sharpened in the inter-war period by strong anti-intellectual trends in the Polish church of the period. It saw its base as lying in the village and not in the city, in the peasantry and the military
caste, in the romantic symbols of Poland's national past; it was conservative, sentimental, and often blinkered. Its opponents, in pre-war Poland, were not only Marxists, but large portions of the open-minded intelligentsia. Some approved the dominant line of the hierarchy from within the church, organising groups that worked for a more liberal Catholicism, and often becoming sympathetic to Marxism in the process. Others, largely of a democratic socialist persuasion, combined criticism of the church with criticism of the authoritarian-military regimes of Pilsudski and his successors.

The conflicts, confrontations and interactions between Catholicism and Marxism in the Polish People's Republic that was actually formed and soon taken over by Marxist Communists after the Second World War are thus part of a complex picture. For some Poles, even now, Catholicism is Polish and rooted in the sentiment of the people below; Marxism is Russian-dominated and Russian-imposed, a symbol of Poland's powerlessness to change an external geo-political configuration of forces that rob her of any real independence. For other, and most of those studied here, the problem is not as simple as this: there is a wider tension and confrontation between Catholicism in its traditional varieties and beliefs and 'modernity' - both as secular and as involving important intellectual progress in philosophical analysis, moral perception, etc. This was already evident before the war. The relation between Catholicism and politics, between theology and the 'real' world leads to a reappraisal, or deeper understanding, of Catholic philosophy itself.

The chapters that follow and the thesis they constitute are primarily philosophical, or at least intellectual and theoretical, in approach. They are interested in the interaction of ideas studied for their own sake, as having independent value and cogency,
not in the overtly political dimensions and significance of Marxism and Catholicism in Poland. They assume as a fact, pleasing to neither party, that Marxism had to reach some accommodation with Catholicism in Poland, and that Catholicism could not ignore or extirpate Marxism. As this thesis seeks to show, there was not only debate, but some interaction. In that debate, paradoxically, the Marxists often began to appear as conservative, old-fashioned, dogmatic, while some of the Catholics took the stage as defenders of modern ideal, modern philosophy, modern conceptions of science, against dated nineteenth-century views. They, not the Marxists, constituted the link with the great logical and analytical achievements of pre-war Polish philosophy.

The structure of this thesis, therefore, is not dominated by political events, by simple 'confrontations' between religion and the Party, or by successive crises in church-state relations. It concentrates rather on the effect that Marxism and Catholicism had on each other, on the appearance of new ideas as Marxists and Catholics strove to answer each other. It studies the intellectual aspects and development of a dialogue, in the course of which participants come to change their ideas, or to adopt new emphases. This dialogue, of course, took its departure from a historical ideological base, which is not discussed in detail. Polish Marxism and pre-war Catholicism are not discussed in detail and are characterised only where necessary. Neither do Stefan Wyszynski and other members of the hierarchy, directly executing church policy, constitute a main focus. The policies of Church and Party created a background against which lay intellectuals were working on the reconciliation or accommodation of Catholic social ideas with the Marxist state.
The main force of this work is the intellectuals and groups playing a significant role in Polish ideological discourse from 1945 to 1980. In this thesis, the notion of 'Catholic-Marxist dialogue' is understood in a much broader sense than a simple exchange of opinions between the participants, as for example in the Paulus Gesellschaft established by Erich Kellner. Factual confrontation and exchanges of opinion often happened indirectly over momentous issues. The ideology of groups was directly connected to the practice of co-existence, which determined any intellectual dispute. Additionally, though Marxists produced a number of works critical of religion or the policy of the Church, Catholics were rarely allowed to respond in the state press or even in their own. In the 1970s, when Marxists opened their press to Catholics and made great efforts to attract them to discussions, they were not successful.

The material in this thesis, then, is organised according to the appearance of new Catholic and Marxist ideas. Primacy is given to the Catholic perception of Marxism for three reasons. First because Marxist ideology and the Party, supported by the Soviet Union, were newcomers, whereas Catholicism had a well-established position. Second, the Catholic approach to Marxism was much better defined, whereas Marxists tended to accept or to reject co-operation, seeing it as a political manoeuvre. Third, the literature on Marxist ideology in Poland is quite accessible, while there is no work on Catholic ideology.

In the first chapter I discuss the encounter of neo-Thomism with Dialectical Materialism. The second and third chapters study
how the notion of 'political realism', of Znak and Pax, should be understood. The fourth chapter focusses on the development of political realism into 'ideological realism' which led to the famous dialogue with opposition groups. The fifth chapter is devoted to an analysis of new Marxist ideas in the 1970s. The final chapter concentrates on Wojtyla's and Kolakowski's ideas, explaining some of the philosophical problems of Marxist-Catholic dialogue.

The thesis deals with the period up to 1980 and goes beyond that only when required for coherent argument. The events of August in that year concluded a chapter of recent Polish history and created different political and social parameters for Marxist-Catholic co-existence.

The main purpose of this work is a study of the bilateral influence of Marxism and Catholicism on attempts to accommodate moral and social philosophy or to criticise the methods, principles, solutions and social functions of the other side. I argue that over a period of thirty years both doctrines have undergone significant mutations caused by the necessity of co-existence and by an assimilation of each other's philosophical ideas. Simplifying the problem, it may be said that Marxist-Catholic dialogue contributed to, if it did not cause, the evolution of both doctrines and simultaneously led to a modification of their social, moral and original philosophical position.

Catholic and Marxist ideas are reconstructed from journalism and essays. The method of reconstruction is based on the constant bringing together of philosophical analysis and history, on a
combination of diachronical and synchronical interpretations. It is hoped that this study of Catholic and Marxist ideas in Poland, a country traditionally Catholic but making a significant contribution to Marxist tradition, will have value for a further understanding of the difficult relationship between the two.

A Ph.D. student is rightly expected to write his own thesis. Yet he incurs many debts. Professor Eugene Kamenka and Dr Andrzej Walicki, who supervised this thesis, gave me the opportunity of learning much. Whether I have done so, others will judge. Many others have been generous with time and materials. Mrs Elizabeth Short has striven, over a number of years, to help me de-Polonise my English. In the spelling of Polish names and words, at least, I have adopted the nearest English orthography.

Norbert Zmijewski

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1. Thomism versus Marxism: the philosophical dispute.

The end of World War II completely changed the conditions of political and intellectual life in Poland. The Red Army, together with a small group of Polish communists imposed an official ideology which, as many writers have emphasised, was quite foreign to the political and intellectual mentality of most Poles. Polish Marxists drew all their ideas from Soviet philosophy and strongly criticised past Polish works on Marxism. This break with the interwar intellectual tradition and the enforcement of Marxist ideas by administrative means impeded the possibility of intellectual and critical discussion. After a series of congresses in 1948-9, laying down Marxist principles for nearly all aspects of culture, acceptance of the ideology became indispensable, though a plain declaration of allegiance to the Marxist position (however it might be determined from the top) was more important than rigorous scrutiny of the content of Marxism.

This elevation of the Party and its doctrine polarised the intelligentsia. The doctrine's freshness, vehemence and optimism attracted many who had been disappointed in the previous socio-political order. The past, the fear of finding oneself on the rubbish-heap of history, the uncertainty of the future, were put forward as reasons for polarisation. The acceptance or rejection of Marxism involved acceptance or rejection of the regime and so affected each person's own professional career. These factors explain why Marxism expanded its instrumental functions at the cost of its theory.
In the late 1940s Marxists ruthlessly eliminated all other ideologies from official circulation and created an illusory intellectual monism. Marxist dialectical materialism claimed to be a scientific philosophy, a synthesis of the natural and social sciences as well as a prescription for the ultimate development of humankind. Such claims were unacceptable to the older generation of Polish philosophers. Marxism contradicted the very principles of their understanding of philosophy.

The dominant strain in pre-war philosophy was the 'scientific philosophy' (*filozofia naukowa*) developed by the Lvov-Warsaw School. This has been established by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) who taught many of its prominent members. As Tadeusz Kotarbinski emphasised in his introduction to Twardowski's selected works, Twardowski's efforts were consistently and inseparably associated with care for clear and distinct expression of thought'. Twardowski's programme for improving the clarity of philosophical expression after the period of Romantic literary philosophy rested on the development of scientific language and the suspension of metaphysics and Weltanschauung reflection. Philosophy, in his opinion, was not a single science but a group of sciences concerned with objects given in 'internal experience' (*doswiadczenie wewnetrzne*) or with the relation between 'internal' and 'external experience' (*doswiadczenie zewnetrzne*). 'Internal experience' was the proper sphere of psychology, whereas the relation between 'internal' and 'external' was the subject of metaphysical investigation which required clear and well-defined psychological foundations. Therefore psychology was for him the basic philosophical science and metaphysics a secondary science, which could not be adequately studied until psychology has developed solid foundations.
Weltanschauung stood in a similar relationship to philosophy. A philosophical association, Twardowski declared at the 25th anniversary of the Polish Philosophical Association in 1929, could not be 'a commune of believers...Between them and scientific philosophy an impossible gap exists...as membership of a political association...is based less on logic than on emotional factors'. Weltanschauung was a private concern restricted to the realms of art, journalism or political discussion. Twardowski expressed the hope that in future philosophy would develop exact foundations for a scientific Weltanschauung but he assumed that, as with the solution of metaphysical problems, this process would never be fully accomplished.

Jan Wolenski declared of the Lvov-Warsaw school that all its members followed Twardowski's ideas of metaphilosophy. They understood philosophy not as a system but as a collection of individual problems. They criticised speculative philosophy, demanded the submission of philosophical expressions to logical verification, emphasised the need for close association of philosophy with the analysis of language and called for the separation of philosophy from Weltanschauung.

This scientific philosophy also influenced Catholicism. In the 1920s Innocenty M. Bochenski, Jan Salamucha and Jan F. Drewnowski made a combined effort to 'modernise' theology, establishing the Kolo Krakowskie (The Cracow Circle). Their aims, according to Drewnowski were:

- the contextual definition of notions like the unimaginable in opposition to the imaginable and the incomprehensible in opposition to the comprehensible as a procedure which might help to explain theological categories,
- the definition of certain notions like material and immaterial,
the development of an analogical methodology in theology
and the differentiation of belief and reason.

This programme was partly accomplished in Bochenski's *The Logic of Religion* where he used logic to lay the foundations of 'a meta-
theological system' which might help with the classification and
formal verification of theological discourse. Such a system was much
more relevant to the subject of theology, in Bochenski's view, than
any logical system was to science. ¹⁰

It is worth emphasising, as Drewnowski did in the article
above, that this approach to theology was uniquely Polish. There were
only three universities at which logical theology was studied. Poles
held two of the chairs: Bochenski at the Anglicanum in Rome and
Salamucha at the University of Cracow. After the war Bochenski
was one of the first to break 'through the conspiracy of silence
surrounding (Marxist) philosophy' and to organize 'an extensive and
large-scale study of Soviet and East European philosophy'. ¹¹ He
furthered a serious analysis of *diamat* distinguishing between its
philosophy and its political propagation. The philosophy of Marxism
corresponded to and incorporated certain traditional directions of
thought, such as pragmatism, rationalism, materialism and realism.
For Bochenski the fact 'that there are today some men in Russia who...
are trying to develop a philosophical attitude is a weighty proof of
our assertion that there are principles in philosophy which are valid
for humanity in general and which transcend the limits of any particular
culture'. ¹² He regretted that these philosophers in the 1940s and
the early 1950s were in a minority in the Soviet Union: a minority
moreover, which was 'being barbarously and systematically attacked
and liquidated'. The political propagandist aspect of Marxism Bochenski
saw as a 'theology', a kind of atheistic catechism for believing members of the Party which was related to the Soviet mentality'. The introduction of the Western style of philosophy might weaken this theological aspect.

In the 1960s Bochenski continued to emphasise the difficulty of establishing a serious philosophical dialogue with diamat regardless of its philosophical message. In the book published in his honour in 1984, his students concluded that philosophical dialogue with the Soviets still seemed unpromising. Thus, Guido Kung of the University of Fribourg stressed that Rawls's theory of justice, which could be of special interest to Marxists, had so far been little discussed by Soviet scholars and that such discussion as there had been was limited to a superficial consideration of the incompatibility between Rawls's individualism and Marxism.

Bochenski and his pupils at the Institute of East European Studies in the University of Fribourg were searching for a philosophical dialogue with Marxists under different conditions and for different purposes than were Catholic thinkers in Poland. Polish Catholic philosophers also used the critical method originating in the Lvov-Warsaw School's concept of philosophy. But while Bochenski and others aimed at an academic understanding of diamat, Polish Catholic philosophers were defending their position in conditions where philosophical discussion was subordinate to and restricted by political coercion. Yet there are certain similarities in the ways in which lay thinkers in Poland and Bochenski's group abroad conducted discussion of Marxism, trying to limit its expansionism. Ossowski's criticism exemplifies this and helps to describe a specific character of the criticism of Marxism by Catholic thinkers.
Stanislaw Ossowski (1897-1963) was a pupil of the Warsaw-Lvov School. Initially he wrote mainly on semantics, later he turned to the philosophy of the social sciences and sociology. In his discussion of Marxism he focussed primarily on internal contradictions between the postulated dynamism of social actions and the absolutisation of Marxist theory. He wrote: 'In the contemporary Marxist milieu a struggle for progress is developed but in the sphere of the problems encompassed by Marxist doctrine...neophobia and a refusal to go beyond the notions and problems of the later nineteenth century are common, just as in face of the doctrine of progress the belief exists that in this sphere nothing has changed since then'.

According to Ossowski it was not the theory but the inappropriate attitudes of its adherents which hampered the future progress of Marxism. Ossowski made a distinction between a follower of Marx and a Marxist. The former was a scholar or a political activist who had mastered Marx's teaching but did not favour an orthodox stance, examining Marx's thesis in the light of scientific or social practice. By contrast, a 'Marxist' was a member of the Marxist community, an exegete of the theory which was integrated into the movement and deprived heuristic functions'.

Though Marxism in the above sense was a religion, Ossowski believed that some of its valuable features could be saved for scholarly study and a progressive social movement. He proposed the reintroduction of scholarly research on Marxism through a proper analytical discussion of Marx's original writings and clarification of their key notions. The supplemented and corrected Marxism would loose nothing of its social dynamic but would, he declared, become a more adequate theory for directing social change in modern society. Ossowski tried, as Marxist revisionists were to do in the second half of the 1950s, to eliminate dogmatism and
to subject to scientific discussion the theses proclaimed by the official ideology.

Marxists, on the other hand, were defending the priority of the social function of their doctrine over any scientific verification. They tried to deflect Ossowski's accusations by pointing out that the dilettantism, ignorance or conceit which produced the religious attitude were likely to occur in any ideological camp and that Marxism could not be held responsible for such developments. Adam Schaff discerned in Ossowski's criticism an attack on the dialectical unity of theory and practice but stressed that this alleged stigma would worry only those who were not engaged in the building of the communist society.

The difference between Ossowski's scholarly perspective and the Marxist revolutionary position prevented any further discussion. In the 1960s, when Ossowski again undertook a discussion with Marxists on empirical and 'ideological' sociology, the exchange of opinion was confined to consideration of the methodological principles of sociology. His criticism of Marxism was representative of the older generation of philosophers. Narcyz Lubnicki, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbinski and others concentrated on criticism of the conservatism and unreceptiveness of Marxist theory. In embarking upon a dialogue with these philosophers, Marxists hoped to clarify their position on positivism, which they in part accepted, while fearing the damaging effects of empirical verification on the dialectical unity of theory and practice. That was the main reason why the former members of the Warsaw-Lvov School received more attention than Catholic philosophers. Marxists neglected Catholic idealist philosophy and failed to notice that, while they were creating a totalist theory, Neo-Thomism became reconciled
with modern science and could compete successfully with their scientific theory.

Apart from the logical tendency in Polish Thomism there was another trend, equally modern and equally debatable. This aimed at modernising Thomism by adapting it to the requirements of modern science, technology and culture. Its adherents, however, went much further than the logical modernisation of old Thomist theses, wanting to impair the conviction that Catholics are constitutionally dogmatic and so inapt for free research and critical thought. This 'open Thomism' was often described as 'an authentic Christian philosophy whereby', according to Jean Daujat, 'adaptive ability should be open to any achievements of human thought...to everything that the development of science could bring'.\textsuperscript{22} This 'open attitude' was developed by Cardinal Marcier's school in Louvain. In Poland some Catholic philosophers followed this trend but it was not widespread and after Vatican II practically disappeared.

Kazimierz Klosak (1911-1982), the main Thomist critic of Marxism, was a populariser of open Thomism in Poland. He was a pupil of Konstanty Michalski, a prominent student of medieval philosophy and an alumnus of the University of Louvain. There, among other subjects, he had studied logical theology under Robert Feys at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie. From Michalski, who believed that the injunctions of Leo XIII's \textit{Aeterni Patris} (1879) could best be fulfilled through historical study, Klosak acquired a sound knowledge of medieval scholastic philosophy. At the University of Louvain, which was in intellectual conflict with the orthodox Thomism developed in the Anglicanum and with which Michalski sympathized, Klosak, however, developed an uncompromising dislike of orthodoxy. Jozef Tischner has
written that Klosak belonged to that group of Thomists 'who aimed at dialogue with the sciences by confronting them with the fundamental notions and rules of St. Thomas's philosophy'.

Klosak's criticism of Marxism was two-sided. On the one hand he attempted to demonstrate that Marxism did not deserve the name of a 'scientific theory'. On the other he developed and gave more weight to Thomist position with regard to contemporary science. His discussion of Marxism differed from that of Ossowski and other critics. He saw the internal contradictions of Marxism not as an effect of its expanding totalitarian dogmatism but as a failure of its philosophy. Overall Klosak understood Marxism as a metaphysical system which provided the foundation for a social ideology, whereas Ossowski, correctly in relation to the Marxism of the 1940s-50s, saw it as a social ideology inappropriately broadened to include science, culture and possibly all aspects of the social order. Lay critics of Marxism concentrated on defending the autonomy of culture and science against Marxist ideology. Klosak, on the other hand, believed that Thomism could replace Marxism as a foundation for the principles of scientific and social order. In his criticism of Marxism Klosak referred to Adam Schaff's book Wstęp do teorii marksizmu (Introduction to Marxist Theory - 1947) which was the official exposition of Marxism in early post-war Poland. Schaff here characterised Marxism as the culmination of scientific progress: 'Dialectical materialism was raised upon the ruins of speculative philosophy as its negation...it is the highest generalisation of scientific results in their historical development'. He went on to say that dialectical materialism was not a passive synthesis of contemporary science but, above all, a philosophical materialism advocating a specific theory of nature. Klosak therefore began his analysis of Marxism with a discussion of the terms 'materialism' and
'dialectic' which constituted the very heart of this philosophy.

He noted that Marxism, as there presented, was a monistic materialism expressed in two principles. First it was monistic in the epistemological sense because it sought an explanation of the world as whole within purely materialist parameters, in spite of the fact that Marxists themselves admitted the irreducibility of mental processes to matter. Second he observed that Marxist materialism was also monistic in a metaphysical sense because it asserted the existence of only material entities. According to Klosak the contradiction between these two statements arose from a credulous confidence in Feuerbachian materialism and from an undue trust in the ability of dialectic to cope with the vast problems of contemporary science.

Klosak argued that the philosophy of Feuerbach did not represent a consistent materialism. The main difficulty was created by separating Das Ich from the perceptible world. 'If Feuerbach', he wrote, 'had said that the separation of the Psyche from the body is only a theoretical illusion there would be no contradiction in his system'. His observation that Feuerbach's philosophy was not a firm materialism finds confirmation among other critics of the philosopher. Eugene Kamenka has written: 'Feuerbach marshalled a number of arguments against absolute or reductive materialism, arguments that took their departure from his insistence on the specific, irreducible, qualitative nature of thought and its power to react back on bodily states, as well as the fact that thought, unlike physical processes, involved truth-claims'. Klosak noticed that Feuerbach had concentrated not directly on materialist principles of nature but on man and that this anthropocentric point of view he justified by the fact that only man was capable of possessing knowledge of the world. Such an epistemological
approach, Klosak claimed, should be extended to ontology and accomplished in the acknowledgement of a separate existence of psychic or spiritual reality. This inconsistency in the materialist position had been carried through to Marx's and Engels's philosophy. If Marxists, Klosak argued, accepted the authenticity of psychic functions they should also accept the separate existence of their ontological base. On the other hand if, like Schaff, they considered the psychic function as a function of the highest organisation of matter they should acknowledge a certain potentiality of matter in the Aristotelian sense. But for Schaff and other Marxists the organisation of matter (or 'form' in Aristotelian terms) was the criterion of its hierarchical order and not the criterion allowing man to distinguish a non-material entity. This meant that although the Psyche was the highest development of matter significantly different from its lower forms, it was not a separate entity. As Thomas Aquinas wrote: 'Since matter exists for the sake of form and not vice versa, we must discover, on the side of soul, the reason why the body should be united to it'. The reasoning of Catholics and Marxists was diametrically opposed. For Catholics 'soul' was the form of body but not yet the perfect being. Man was half way up of the ladder of being between material and spiritual worlds whereas for Marxists man was at the top as the highest development of matter. Feuerbach and, later on Marx and Engels, cut off the rungs above man but did not properly consider how to base different attributes of psychological function in matter.

Schaff argued that science provides sufficient and irrefutable arguments against the existence of an independent spiritual reality. He named three such arguments:
1. that the theory of evolution has not yet discovered a proof for autogenesis but studies already conducted confirm this hypothesis; 

2. that contemporary neurophysics is approaching a point at which it will be able to demonstrate the location of psychological functions in the human brain; 

3. that linguistics shows that a notion cannot exist without a material foundation in vocalisation.

Klosak disputed the value of these arguments. In discussing them he did not draw such philosophical conclusions as that the process of evolution either did or did not require a first element or cause which, according to him, could not be a direct outcome of scientific research. Instead, he compared dialectical theory with traditional theories of evolution and concluded: 'The dialectical theory of evolution differs from the traditional theory to a significantly lesser extent than Schaff insists, although there are statements in the dialectical theory of evolution with which no traditional theory of evolution would agree...namely its thesis concerning the transformation of quantity into quality'.

The invalidation of dialectical logic in the theory of evolution undermined the Marxist claim that organic and spiritual life had emerged from quantitative changes in non-organic matter. Consequently the Catholic thesis of the possible existence of non-material reality need not be excluded.

Second, referring to the actual state of psychological knowledge, Klosak argued that the theory of localisation was only one of a number of hypotheses, no better proven, for example, than the theory of the comprehensive functioning of the brain, which again did not eliminate the possibility of the existence of an independent being of psychological function.
Finally, Klosak confronted Schaff’s arguments for the material foundation of the thought process with the theory of the dialectic unity of the phonic and mental components of speech. Acceptance of a material foundation for the process of thought required acceptance of the difference between the bio-physical process and meaningful speech. Acceptance of the dialectical unity of the two led to the 'supernatural theory of speech' where meaning is identified with the physical act of speech. The former theory, Klosak pointed out, is rejected even by radical spiritualism. It is not necessary to go deeper into Klosak's arguments because the rapid development of science since the 1940s has defused many controversies. Nevertheless the knowledge of science he demonstrated during his discussion with Marxists earned him high repute although his opportunities for discussion were limited. Marxists largely ignored the merits of Klosak's criticism focusing not on their coherence and scientific merit but on their social and political consequences.

The second important component of Marxist philosophy, one original in formulation, was the concept of dialectic. Dialectic defined by Engels, in contrast to Hegel, as not a law of reason but the law of nature, was seen in this way in the official ideology of the 1940s, and elaborated to provide a new logic supplementing the traditional static formal logic which was unable to deal with change and transformation. Klosak confronted this claim arguing that, if dialectic was a logic of movement and independent of formal logic, there had to be a proven insufficiency in formal logic with regard to the phenomenon of movement. He wrote: 'Professor Schaff is right when he insists, as the Eleatics did, that movement cannot be composed of the sum of motionless states. But he is wrong when he presumes that acceptance
of the ontological and logical formulation of the principle of identity and the principle of the excluded middle bring about the atomisation of motion into a series of motionless states'. According to Klosak it was a wrong concept of movement rather than an error of logical analysis. Actually logical analysis demonstrated that the contradiction exposed by Marxism derived from an insufficient and illogically determined ontology. Schaff and other critics of formal logic, Klosak observed, failed to pay attention to the fact that movement consisted not of discrete changes of place but of continuous changes between actual and potential states of being. He contrasted the logical dualism of Marxism, i.e. the separation of the spheres of relevance for dialectic and formal logic, to Thomist dualism of states of being, i.e. the differentiation between actual and potential states of being, writing that 'If we call the actual "taking place" the perfect act (actus perfectus, actus ultimatus) of being and its ability to "taking place" we call pure potentiality (potentia pura) than we comprehend movement as a mediatory state between pure potentiality and the perfect act'. Such an approach, following Aristotelian hylomorphism, did not require any limitation of formal logic. Thus, in Zeno's paradox, so often exploited in confirmation of dialectic logic, the arrow cannot simultaneously 'be' and 'not be' in one place. At each moment of time the arrow changes its position: being in one place is in potentia to be in the next one.

According to Klosak, dialectical materialism failed to synthesise scientific results and to create a new universal approach to natural phenomena. In these respects, he stressed, Thomism appeared more advanced and better prepared. Its theses were not, and probably would not be fully verifiable by science. But its metaphysical dualism
and theory of ontological hylomorphism would have no reductionist influence on science and could be readily accommodated to scientific results. Thomism could also have a positive, though so far little exploited, influence on society since it allowed a good balance between spiritual values and engagement in material activities.

This opinion was shared and further developed by other Polish Thomists. Stefan Swiezawski, for example, criticised not only the radical materialist position developed in Marxism but also the radical spiritualism of Catholicism. He attributed these developments to either an uncritical acceptance or a mechanical negation of Platonic idealism. Catholic Platonism had taken the primacy of spiritual ideas as the only truth 'struggling in the bonds of material limitations'. Marxism, on the other hand, essayed to liberate material truth from spiritual superstition. Swiezawski contrasted Platonism with the Aristotelian philosophical current which promoted harmony between the spiritual and material components of reality. He strongly emphasised the need to preserve this harmony 'if Christians do not want the world to be built without their participation and so without the fundamental truth of their faith'. As Catholic reactions to Marxism often led to abstract spiritualism his message was extremely important and more timely than Klosak's analytical results.

Klosak followed the methodology of the Lvov-Warsaw School in believing that world-view, and especially political statements, should be separated from philosophy. But this was ineffective in the face of the increasing totalitarianism of Marxism, when philosophy was merged with politics and its truth dictated by the state. True, the Polish model of 'scientific socialism' was less aggressive and its adherents
were less contemptuous of other ideas than Soviet scholars. The scientific foundations of Marxism were more cautiously elaborated and Polish Marxists were more flexible in avoiding, wherever possible, a confrontation with science. The social sciences were more stringently controlled than the natural sciences, but still less conscientiously controlled in general than its branches directly ideological in character such as economics, theory of law and state (a name coined by the Marxists) social policy and the problems of Marxism–Leninism. This control was not extended to all branches of philosophy: professors dismissed from teaching positions were still able to translate and publish classical works of philosophy with little interference from the authorities. Non-Marxist texts such as Władysław Tatarkiewicz's History of Philosophy were published in small editions for limited circulation and the Library of Classical Philosophy provided good translations for philosophical study. The existence of an 'underground' philosophy made Klosak's criticism of Marxism not entirely vain and helped to restore the serious study of the philosophy of science after 1956.

The most important feature of Klosak's criticism was the deconstruction of Marxist theory. He challenged several proofs allegedly confirming Marxist social theory. On the relationship between the Marxist theory of revolution and the theory of gradual change in evolution, for example, he asked: 'why is there this interest on the part of official science in the theory of step-by-step changes in evolution...would it not be more proper to take the revolutionary or evolutionary position regarding the problem of social order as independent whether the biological theory of step-by-step change has been accepted or not?' Klosak considered two separate orders in
evolution: 'the physical' referring to biological change and 'the moral' referring to social change. The two orders were not directly related and did not share the same rules.  

Marxists in the early 1950s wanted to create a total theory which could be applied to all aspects of culture, science and philosophy. The differences between the scientific, philosophical and moral orders were less important since all were underpinned by the concept of a social order which would create a new mentality, a new science and culture. Theoretical coherence or justification gave way to a justification based on a world view and social action. Indeed in this Marxism of the period resembled medieval Thomist philosophy, which in the course of serving theology gave up its heuristic functions for a simple reinforcement of the Christian world view. At the same time as Marxists were consolidating their total world view Catholicism was going through a process of deconstruction. The new Thomist philosophy, as De Wulf wrote, 'is not a theology, the former might be entirely renewed while the latter remained quite stationary and uninfluenced. The Middle Ages bound up philosophy with theology in a system of the closest hierarchical relations: the natural outcome of a civilisation in which religion held undisputed sway over public as well as private life and in which Catholicism enjoyed a monopoly...but religious as well as political continuity has long since been interrupted and broken in society...and to attempt a reconstruction of them would be endeavouring to set up a régime whose very foundations have disappeared'.  

This abandonment of the total model of Catholic thought had a number of side effects. Since Aeterni Patria, philosophical interpretations had overwhelmed theology. Ideas of God's death, promotion of the sacred
through profane or dialectical theology, flourished in the 1960s. Catholicism acknowledged, beside the absolute truth of the faith, the truth of the world, the secular truth which must be seriously taken into account by religion.

Marxism went through the reverse process. Marxists divided the whole history of human thought into two currents, the wandering maze of idealism and the clearly-marked path on which Marxist materialism was the highest achievement. Klosak criticised this division, showing that the criteria used in making it were neither consistent nor adequate. He discussed three of the most frequently used criteria. Engels's criterion permitted a classification of philosophical positions depending on how the relationship between thought and being or spirit and nature was solved. Unfortunately for the further course of Marxism, Klosak stressed, Engels had not precisely determined the terms of this division. For example the ideas of 'nature' and 'world' were probably not synonymous with the idea of 'matter'. George Plekhanov developed Engels's concept, giving more distinct definitions. A discrimination between materialism and idealism might be made according to whether matter was considered as the primary and exclusive source of knowledge (materialism) or whether the world was to be explained by spiritual phenomena (idealism). This criterion became the most popular among Marxists although, as Klosak emphasised, it was no better defined than Engels's. Klosak found another criterion in Plekhanov's writings. This referred to the unity of spiritual and material elements in human being and by this criterion the acknowledgement of dualism amounted to taking an idealist position.
The last criterion discussed by Klosak was formulated by Maurice Cornforth who divided philosophy according to the application of the theory of truth. If truth was understood as a coherence of ideas then the philosophical system was idealist but if a system was based upon the assumption that truth was the correspondence of its theses with reality, then it was materialist. Klosak focussed mainly on Engels's criterion and insisted that it could not properly be used to classify a number of philosophical positions. Among these were Alfred Whitehead's, for whom spirit and matter were only subjective constructs breaking up the reality of events, Bertrand Russell's concept of events as 'neutral stuff' and Tadeusz Kotarbinski's system of pansomatic metaphysics which maintained that physical objects with the ability to sense (przedmioty doznajace) developed from the physical objects with potential ability to sense. Paradoxically, in spite of his consistent materialism, Kotarbinski was classified by Marxists as an idealist. 'Kotarbinski's real idealism', Jordan wrote, 'reveals itself (for Marxists) in a threefold way: in his semantical reism, which is one of the trends of idealistic semantics; in his somatism and pansomatism which are conventionalist doctrines, and in his nominalism which undermines the scientific world outlook and promotes the interpretation of scientific theories in terms of subjective idealism'.

Jordan enumerated the Marxist arguments for classifying Kotarbinski's materialism as an idealism. Klosak, by contrast, claimed that difficulties with the classification of Kotarbinski's pansomatism indicated a limitation of the criterion which did not embrace radical materialist monism in the metaphysical and epistemological sense.

Leszek Kolakowski, in answer to Klosak, stressed the misinterpretation by Catholic writers of the essence of the Engelsian
Engels's classification', he wrote, 'is not simply a methodical classification, it is a discovered law of the historical progress of philosophy and only because of this the classification does not fulfil the formal rules of classification but it defines the rules of ideological progress'. Kolakowski, like most Marxists at that time took the concept of progress, defined by Marxist theory, as a support for the thesis also put forward by Marxism. This self-renewing dogmatism contrasted with the 'openness' of the Thomists; Klosak's discussion of the problems related to the existence of God exemplifies it well.

In the early post-war years and even later in the 1960s, Marxist scholars distorted and minimised the problem of the relationship between idealist philosophy and the assertion of God's existence. They identified the Catholic position with a simplified version of Platonism. Schaff, for example, imposed on Thomist nominalism the ideas of Platonic realism. In Klosak's opinion this realism was not a position held by Catholic philosophy. The existence of God was not derived from a notion of God and the world was not a substance of God's consciousness. Klosak argued that, although the origin of the world was derived from and dependent on God, its further existence was autonomous. Creational theism and nominalism could not, he emphasised, be identified with Platonist spiritualism. In contrast the Thomist position, like Marxist materialism, belonged to metaphysical realism. The essence of metaphysical idealism relied on the subordination of matter to a subject or on the reduction of the real existence of the world to phenomena of a subjective spirit. Such a system could be created independently whether or not the existence of the God-creator was assumed. 'Opposition to metaphysical idealism', Klosak wrote, 'is metaphysical realism which is divided into materialism
and dualism including spiritual and material components of being'.

The assertion of God's existence did not imply an idealistic metaphysics.

To defend Thomist realism was not difficult for Klosak as Schaff and other Marxists were making palpable errors in their characterization of Thomist philosophy. Klosak made quite important points in separating the assertion about God's existence from the metaphysical or general philosophical position. First, Marxists did not concern themselves with the meticulous analysis of philosophical positions but classified and studied them by using simple key-ideas to which they attached negative moral or epistemological values. Klosak at least obstructed their interpretation and use of the concept of God, religion and so on in relation to idealism. Second, by demonstrating that Marxism and Thomism held the same metaphysical position, he facilitated a philosophical dialogue. The philosophical theory which, in his view, could also be accepted by Marxists was 'direct critical realism'. He was aware that such a position evoked a definite interpretation of Marxism and that 'if a different epistemological position is employed, the criticism of Marxism would take a different shape' although, he added, 'it is difficult to imagine how it would be different'.

Direct critical realism rests on the assumption that 'colours, intuitive continuity, intuitive shapes, in one word sensual qualities...are the immanent content of the individual consciousness, in the sense that the qualities listed do not belong to the world existing independently of consciousness...but besides these subjective interpretations of sensual intuitions...we have a direct conviction about the existence of the external world, though the nature of this conviction is as yet unknown'. Our conviction about the existence of the world is based
on intuition - there is no scientific objective proof of such existence. Paradoxically, 'if objectivism is interpreted as objectivism of a transcendental reality discovered by science, Klosak wrote, such a conviction must be based on the acceptance of partial agnosticism and the subjective interpretation of sensual data'.

Klosak observed that Marxism, as a philosophy ambitious for integration with and confirmation by science, has no option but to acknowledge partial agnosticism and partial subjectivism. Although Marxists objected to this idea, he argued that their own statements, like Lenin's 'theory of reflection', disclosed such a partial agnosticism. Their realisation of this hidden agnosticism, he believed, could form a starting point for a fruitful discussion.

Klosak's formulation of agnosticism resembled Kant's position. He wrote that: 'what the external world is in itself and behind our minds nobody knows or will ever know'. This agnosticism should be distinguished from that of the phenomenalists, who claimed that we have no visualisation or cognition of nature itself, and from that of radical conventionalism, which holds that cognition is determined by a prior epistemological perspective. From Klosak's theory it followed that radical phenomenalism was erroneous, because on the basis of sense content we can obtain a clue about nature, for instance that it is changeable and differentiating. 'What we cannot find out', he wrote, 'are real equivalents of our impressions or their attributes'. He also disagreed with radical conventionalism because in its system sensory content was not distinguished from the perceiving subject which transcended this content to the same extent as the external world did.
Klosak's version of agnosticism met with criticism on two fronts. From the Marxist side Kolakowski focussed mainly on Klosak's direct critical realism which he understood in political rather then philosophical terms. Kolakowski, himself a strong opponent of positivism, did not criticise Klosak's partial agnosticism, a concept which Kolakowski was later to develop, but its use for the propagation of a 'scientific Catholicism'. Klosak's direct critical realism and consequent partial agnosticism were also criticised by the Catholics, who saw precarious consequences for the coherence and sovereignty of Thomism in his ideas. The world, in their view, undoubtedly exists and the very fact of its existence is a premise of God's existence. Science, as Mieczyslaw Krapiec, Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, put it, is an abstraction 'in which a thing ceases to be a "thing" and becomes "essence" because it is separated not only from the individual existence of things (podmiotowe istnienie rzeczy) but also does not possess its individual attributes'. Philosophy was on a higher level of abstraction and theology on the highest but all operated on the basis of data taken from reality. Klosak's partial agnosticism undermined this hierarchical model in which sensory data constituted the heart of knowledge. But it was his attempt to reconcile natural theology with science which aroused the greatest controversy. He observed that St.Thomas formulated his proofs of God's existence in accordance with the state of knowledge of his time. Therefore when Schaff insisted that, in the light of modern physics, movement is a permanent attribute of matter requiring no impulse from outside and that this invalidates the proof of God's existence as the prime mover, Klosak agreed 'Schaff is right in his rejection of the kinetic proof of God's existence...but acceptance of the contemporary approach to
the genesis of movement in matter does not end the possibility of thinking about God'. Most Thomists would reject Schaff's discussion on the grounds that formulation of the proof of God's existence belongs to the highest level of abstraction which science is unable to reach. But Klosak saw reasoning about God as parallel to science and therefore subject to the same method of verification. In the two volumes of his *Search for the First Cause* he reformulated Aquinas's proof by comparing theological and scientific arguments. In the concluding chapter the scientific arguments override the philosophical reasoning. Here modern physics not only provides the terminology but also reinforces a metaphysical solution to the problem. After Klosak's endeavours to reformulate Thomism, Catholic philosophers reminded him that 'philosophy was not a synthesis or conglomerate of scientific results but had a separate subject and method suitable for its study'. Neither object nor method in science were the same as object and method in philosophy. Hence, wrote one of Klosak's critics, 'the existence of God cannot be decided in the field of physics...Klosak overestimated the significance of the argument supplied by science'. Krapiec emphasised that 'only philosophy, which is not concerned merely with a part of reality (as science is) but explains the whole of reality, can effectively study the problem of God's existence'. He continued that 'the principle *omne quod movetur ab alio movetur* expresses the efficient cause which, at the deepest ontological level, means that it is impossible to transfer from possibility to reality without the intervention of an external element and...St. Thomas's kinetic proof of God's existence is based on such-an interpretation'. Klosak retorted that even in the above formulation the proof would require a priori 'knowledge' about God as the almighty creator, a knowledge which science is incapable of conforming or falsifying. It is worth adding that Marxists eagerly agreed with this opinion.
Klosak discussed Marxism in a serious way, considering its philosophy to be worth the effort. Bochenski concluded his study with the observation that neither Marxism nor Catholicism constituted a specific, distinct philosophical subject or method. Klosak reached a similar conclusion and was ready to abandon the most important Thomist positions. The problem, however, was that Klosak was writing in a situation where philosophical reflection was linked to politics, where the general philosophical study of Marxism and Catholicism was impossible without a consideration of the particulars of political co-existence. He entered into a dialogue with the Marxists at a time when neither they nor the Catholics wanted or believed in the possibility of philosophical discussion. In fact only believers benefitted from Klosak's discussion, recognising that their belief did not inevitably contradict science. Under increasing pressure from other Catholic philosophers, Klosak withdrew to a much more moderate position at a time when revisionist opposition to Stalinism was emerging. His activity was often equated with atheist ideas. For example, two articles in the same issue of the monthly Znak advanced arguments against Russell and Klosak, on clearly similar grounds.

Klosak reopened his dialogue with Marxists in the 1970s when the former saw in the philosophy of Teilhard de Chardin a bridge which might reconcile their position with the Catholic philosophy. Klosak again opposed the employment of a revealed religious truth in scientific and philosophical arguments and distrusted the idea of building up a combined Catholic-Marxist world view. Before 1956 the openness of Klosak and the conservatism of the majority of Catholic thinkers were stimulated by Marxist ideological domination and its intervention into scientific domain. Klosak hoped to show that possibilities for dialogue
existed and that the Marxist and Thomist positions with respect to epistemology and metaphysics allowed of parallel studies need not include the question of belief. Most of the clergy, however, objected to this 'positivist' dialogue and aimed at a strict distinction of their position from Marxist materialism.

After 1956 the Marxist and Catholic positions on science went through similar changes. During the Stalinist ascendancy Marxists had believed or had been forced to believe that their ideology was based on scientific assumptions and a modern methodology which enabled them to comprehend reality in a new and progressive way. At the same time traditional Catholic philosophy had entered upon the modern world stage, burning with the responsibility of reconciling the Catholic view with rapid changes in scientific outlook. In effect Catholicism lost its totalitarian character.

Marxists claimed that their doctrine was progressive and advanced, that it had outrun the current state of social affairs and that society, if it was to make social progress ought to develop positive trends and eliminate out-of-date attitudes. One of the most important out-of-date attitudes to be eliminated was religion. In the early post-war years only a few Catholic philosophers tried to discredit what was to them a militant ideology. Klosak based his criticism of Marxism on his conviction that science had a critical role to play in philosophical thought. But in his search for the truth he also criticised Thomism. Most Catholic philosophers in the late 1940s sought to distinguish their position from that of Marxism. Dialectical materialism was first and foremost an atheist philosophy attacking the very foundation of their doctrine and belief. Discussion
with such an opponent was, they felt at once impossible and un-
necessary.

Nor did Marxists demonstrate any increased interest in dialogue. From their point of view Catholic philosophy dealt with a supernatural reality which ex definitione has nothing in common with the material reality of science. They contrasted spirituality and matter but not in the Catholic sense. In their view 'spiritual' meant 'non-
natural' which was not and could not be considered an object of scientific research. Catholics, on the other hand, understood spirituality as corresponding with God the absolute being and as the subject of psychic functions. The spiritual for them was not opposed to the material but second in a hierarchy of being, a component of reality. When Marxists called them 'idealists' the Catholics could not agree. For them, idealism was opposed to the dualism they advocated. Generally Catholics and Marxists operated in different linguistic conventions, which significantly hindered communication. Ossowski and Klosak could not have any useful discussion with Marxists because the latter reduced philosophical language to ideological terms not acceptable in the sphere of science. Stalinist ideology, unlike some Catholic groups which cunningly abandoned such language, resisted any evolutionary changes and in consequence broke down completely in the late 1950s.

Marxists were not happy to engage in serious dialogue with a philosophy which was in their terms non-discussable. On the other hand, for Catholics like Klosak dialogue with the Marxists provided an opportunity for changing the image of Thomism. Marxists were aware of both difficulties and were therefore readier to change their examples and expressions under criticism than to enter into open dialogue with the Catholics. Kolakowski was one of the few to answer
Klosak's propositions but even he preferred to raise political arguments against Klosak's metaphysical thesis. In this way he avoided difficult philosophical discussion in which he would have had to use distorted positivist arguments. Marxists accepted neither positivism, which reduced everything to empirical verification, nor Catholicism, which like them stressed the inadequacy of such an approach. They had never fully determined their philosophical position vis-a-vis positivism and neo-Thomism and, after 1956, had abandoned the discussion of science in ideological terms. Catholics too abandoned the discussion of the proofs of God's existence — what Pascal had once called 'weak arguments for faith'.

When, in the 1970s, Marxists such as Leszek Nowak, Jerzy Kmita and others developed the philosophy of science in Poznan they readily agreed to discussion with the Catholics and also to several of their propositions. They saw science, unlike the earlier pre-1956 conception of it, as an ideal model of reality, based on fully describable assumptions and partial indeterminism. Nowak wrote: 'The ultimate task of science, according to the Marxist approach, is the transformation of reality...One of the theses of the Marxist concept of science is that every scientific theory is based on central ontological principles which indicate what sort of components are of primary importance (or generally essential) for the subject of study'. Science created idealised models or projects which were tested and realised in social practice. The important element in this concept was that science, in which Nowak included social ideology, was only a project, not a necessary law. Confirmation of these projects in social practice, according to Nowak, narrowed the sphere of common sense and so the multiplication of options for the development of future society, leading to the rationalisation of social life.
The moral obligation imposed by Stalinism to fulfil the iron laws of history has been exchanged for the process of testing different social projects. This pragmatic approach opened up the way for a discussion of science in a more general humanist perspective which also admitted the Catholic point of view.

In the late 1970s, to the benefit of the philosophy of science, both Catholicism and Marxism lost interest in accommodating their doctrines to science. In his recent book Nowak proposed a non-Marxian historical materialism which was based on the 'suppression of Marx and Marxist historiosophy by the construction of a new theory which would save all that was and still is cognitively worthwhile'. The attempted formalisation of Marxism by the Poznan School ended by abandoning the adjective 'Marxist'. The confrontation between Thomism and Marxism in the early years of the communist regime in Poland demonstrated, to both participants, that scientific arguments either for God's existence or for communist society had little sense.
In 1985 Tygodnik Powszechny (the Universal Weekly) celebrated its 40th anniversary. As well as being the most popular 'lay' Catholic periodical, it is also the one closest to the Hierarchy. In that anniversary issue Jerzy Turowicz, a Catholic lay intellectual from Cracow and the journals' editor-in-chief for the entire period, published an article 'Church and Politics', reiterating the political programme of Tygodnik. According to him, the Church 'has a right and a duty to react to events and situations, to accuse and condemn injustice and violence, to defend the wronged and the oppressed, to demand justice and respect for dignity and the rights of man and particularly the right to be a self-governing subject, to determine one's own fate'. While the Church, according to this, has the right to enforce changes in the moral and social domain, it is not in a position to enforce political order. This limitation does not refer to lay Catholics. They can and should be involved in the dissemination of Catholic social and political teaching in the Marxist state.

In the same jubilee issue Stefan Kisielewski reminisces about the early days of Tygodnik, when its political image was being created, and recalls the original resistance which it encountered. The Hierarchy feared that the weekly might develop too close a collaboration with the Marxist regime, but Cardinal Sapieha's support alleviated this concern. Throughout the forty years of its activity, Tygodnik, unlike the group Pax, which I will discuss later, has maintained the initial trust of the Hierarchy. Following Kisielewski's example, I shall turn back to the first issue of Tygodnik Powszechny.
In this, published on 24 March, 1945, Father J. Piwowarczyk wrote: 'One cannot delude oneself that the end of the war will mean a return to the form of social order of before September 1939, that our work will be continued as before...We are witnessing what Spengler called the "Untergang des Abendlandes". But Piwowarczyk was not entirely pessimistic. He pointed out that 'for Catholics the forms of social order are a matter of indifference, only their content matters'. The content of any social order is created by the consciousness of the people. The task of Catholics, therefore, was shaping a new consciousness which would bring together equal, natural rights with natural social duties in a new political environment. Briefly, Piwowarczyk wanted to find a way of balancing Catholic consciousness with the new ideology. As this initial programme shows, Tygodnik did not take refuge in the past. It initially accepted the existing state of things and attempted to find proper channels for Catholic spirituality. Students of Polish Catholicism often called this 'the realistic and responsible' approach to the new political reality.\(^2\) About a year after the inception of Tygodnik Powszechny came the first issue of the monthly Znak (Sign), created by the group of intellectuals associated with Tygodnik. Since then, the group has been popularly known as the Znak group (officially the name Znak referred to the group of deputies to the Sejm created in 1957).

Before discussing the programme of this group, it must be emphasised that Znak, unlike Pax, had no one consistent, political programme or clearly distinguishable leadership. A presentation of its ideas must take account of two factors. First, a consideration of members of the editorial boards of the two periodicals, or of persons permanently co-operating with them, makes it possible to
distinguish the respective principles of their political thought. Second, with the help of those principles it will then be possible to discuss the scope of their interpretation by particular members.

Such a discussion of principles was initiated by an article published in the first issue of Znak (July, 1946). The author of this article, S. Stomma, joined the group in 1945, when he came to Cracow from Vilno. In this, he outlined a suggested Catholic position towards Marxism. He emphasised that, although 'the future of civilisation was cut off from the past by the red line'³, this need not be considered the actual end of western civilisation. Some way of incorporating the old values into the new reality must exist. Marxism, he suggested, would attempt to destroy Christian values and would have at its command administrative and propagandist means which the Church could not possess. Therefore the French model of dialogue between Marxists and Catholics was inadequate in a Marxist state.

In this situation Stomma proposed the creation of an underground or catacomb Church focusing the preservation of Christian spirituality in a world soon to be dominated by Marxism. He criticised 'maximalist tendencies' toward involvement with politics within Catholicism. He felt they could only result in the degradation of Catholicism, in the relativisation of its absolute values and finally in the loss of its spiritual power. Stomma warned the adherents of the maximalist position in Poland, who were attempting confrontation or co-operation with the regime on ideological issues, that 'the direction in which Polish Catholics are looking and moving is dangerous and can lead to an eclipse of the religious and moral problems by transient, sociological problems ...the situation would become urgent if political activities ultimately
His repudiation of maximalist involvement of Catholicism with politics, while at the same time making it responsible for moral renewal resembled the ideas of his teacher in Vilno - M. Zdziechowski. In 1915 Zdziechowski had thought that the moral renewal of the individual was paralleled by the renewal of the Church, though the moral renewal of humankind was not an automatic fulfilment of Christian eschatology. In contrast, Zdziechowski emphasised the pessimism with which we must view the situation on earth of man, of man who has to reconcile himself with the unknown 'will of God'.

Stomma argued against military confrontation with either the Soviet or Polish authorities, which would exacerbate the conflict and eliminate any chance of reconciliation. He was pessimistic about the result of ideological dialogue with the Marxists. His 'third way' between support and confrontation was a consideration of a geopolitical situation and the preservation of the essential values of the faith threatened by communist ideology.

During the discussion of this programme most of the participants objected that Stomma propagated the 'splendid isolation' of Catholicism and neglected its auxiliary functions in difficult times. In reply Stomma insisted that 'in a time of crisis...people had great hopes of the Church, expecting of it much more than guidance for economic well-being...there is an expectation that the Church will help in the search for essential values, in the development of personality and individuality'. He rejected the suggested protective view of Catholicism as a 'civil religion' juxtaposed to Marxist ideology, stressing that it provided values which no secular ideology could deliver. Therefore the goals...
to be pursued by Znak in regard to Catholicism were to preserve it from the possibly damaging effect of political involvement.

The group’s approach to politics was well characterised by Cardinal Wojtyla, when he wrote, in the introduction to Turowicz’s book, that 'Catholic principles ought to be released from their utilitarian implications and then they can give an absolute foundation for social engagement'.

In trying to understand this anti-utilitarian Catholicism of Znak completed by a utilitarian approach to politics it is necessary to refer to the intellectual heritage of members of the group. Most had taken part in the activities of the Odrodzenie (Revival), a group created by Catholic intellectuals in 1919. No less important for an understanding of their philosophy is R. Dmowski’s theory of national interest developed in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Dmowski's political philosophy was a reaction against romantic messianism, which saw the misery of Poland as possessing a universal, soteriological value. This view declined in popularity after the 1863 uprising and, in spite of attempts to revive it, had lost its significance by the end of the nineteenth century. Romantic, universal ideas gave way to positivist, egoistic, national particularism. Dmowski, the spiritual leader of the new current in Polish political philosophy, wrote: 'Our views of our fatherland, so far, have vacillated between unbroken belief in a great future and deep despair and hopelessness... now the times have changed...the nation begins to aspire to the European standard'. This European standard appeared as political rationalism, pragmatism and consideration only of the national interest. In Dmowski's opinion, a redefinition of Polish political thought was
necessary for national survival and well-being in the midst of the expansionist nationalism of other countries. He condemned the traditional heroic individualism of the Polish nobleman, who saw the fight for freedom as the nation's first and most important task, pointing out that, although the fight for freedom was a patriotic duty in a particular situation, it had to be postponed to times propitious for victory. The fight for freedom should not be considered 'the ultimate goal but rather a vehicle for national development'. In 1908 Dmowski opted for co-operation with Russia, seeing a possibility of achieving independence through a possible Russian victory in a future conflict with Germany. He predicted that the Russians would be incapable of maintaining their power over the whole Polish nation and therefore would have to grant independence. His views were not new in Polish political discourse, but their clear formulation opened the way to a pragmatic, non-Messianic view of the geopolitical situation.

After Polish independence in 1918 Dmowski's philosophy became the subject of various interpretations and developments, two of which survived after the World War II. His idea that 'nationalism should be grounded in the existence of the state, since the nation is a product of the state', found two main responses. For Falanga Catholics who, after the war, were to emerge as Pax, this meant securing the existence of the state through an ideology which combined nationalism with Catholicism and a rejection of 'parliamentary' politics. This totalitarian interpretation flourished after 1925 when the Concordat strengthened the position of the Church. In the 1930s Dmowski had developed a new position which rejected the doctrine of 'naked' national egoism as incompatible with Catholicism. Seeking the support of the clergy, he wrote: 'the Polish nation...does not refuse its citizens
the right to believe in something other than the Catholic faith, but it does not grant them the right to policies opposed to the character and the needs of the Catholic nation or to anti-Catholic enterprises'.

The Church enjoyed unshakeable privileges which it did not have to share with any other religion and these made it and Catholicism in general an attractive adjunct to political programmes.

The views of Odrodzenie were in marked contrast to those of nationalist Catholics. Odrodzenie also saw the existence of the state as the primary aim and precisely for this reason the group refused to accept a rigid ideological blueprint. This position is best stated by Bunt Młodych (Youth's Rebellion), a group closely co-operating with Odrodzenie. Their aim was 'the power of the state as guarantee of national independence. Such an attitude is ultimately in opposition to the doctrinal position of the older generation which is interested only in doctrines like nationalism, socialism, liberalism and so on and for which the state is the laboratory'.

Odrodzenie was mainly composed of young Catholic intellectuals, amongst whom were Fr. Stefan Wyszyński and Jerzy Turowicz.

Odrodzenie did not construct a distinct political ideology although it had a political programme, critically theoretical in character. The objects of criticism were the negative phenomena in Catholicism and politics; they condemned the employment of the Polish Catholic tradition in propagating anti-communism, nationalism and anti-Semitism. Catholicism, according to them, should have only indirect political influence through moral criticism and consideration of the prerogative of the state as the basic principle of politics to which others were merely secondary. Turowicz characterised Odrodzenie as an 'apolitical organisation' in the sense that 'the time for political
activity will come after the completion of study and full clarification of its own world view'. The time did not come. War interrupted studies, but still Odrodzenie was able to develop its vision of Catholicism, based on a universalist model, rejecting 'the superficial, shallow, traditional and sentimental Catholicism' of the nationalists which, according to Turowicz, 'could not create a real world view'.

Odrodzenie's position was not well known or understood before the war. Popular nationalist Catholicism has often been taken to represent pre-war Catholicism. For example, J. Zawieyski, one of the members of Znak, saw pre-war Catholicism as hostile to progressive social movement, anti-intellectual and sentimental. He wrote: 'When I read Turowicz's utterances about Odrodzenie...I ask my dear friend: where was it, when was it; in Poland, or on some other planet?'. Odrodzenie was an elitist group operating mainly in universities and was not popular or well known enough to balance the nationalist image of Catholicism.

This popular image often caused a rejection of Catholicism as the narrow-minded and sentimental religion of nationalists. The young intelligentsia usually found fulfilment for their social commitment in socialist or Marxist movements. Catholicism, as Zawieyski's case demonstrates, did not attract potential socialist disciples; on the contrary, it repelled them, as a symbol of social conservatism and nationalist particularism. After the war the Catholicism of Odrodzenie and Dmowski's political philosophy were amalgamated in a so-called 'political realism' which attracted a significant body of intellectuals, though the numbers varied over time.
The political realism of Znak was based on two main assumptions. First, that revolution could not improve the political and social situation and might bring about new conflict and malevolence. This corresponded with the ideas expressed in *Rerum Novarum* and repeated in *Quadragesimo Anno*. The second assumption was that politics dealt with objective facts which could be submitted to objective evaluation. These assumptions, though not original or inventive, were important for the accommodation of Catholicism to a Marxist state without having to make significant compromises. Znak pronounced its readiness to judge political action not according to the origin of its ideas but according to its practical outcome, and simultaneously declared its refusal to engage in subversive activities. Therefore from one point of view the Znak group paved the way for co-operation on practical issues while leaving the ideological gap between Catholicism and Marxism unbridged.

Adam Bromke, in his chapter on Znak's position, emphasised two elements of its political thought. The first is that Znak 'denied the value of military struggle for Poland' and regarded 'political realism as merely an alternative method of advancing the same goals as political idealism', and the second is that Znak, like Dmowski, 'felt that the major danger to Poland came from Germany'. The first observation perfectly corresponds with the group's position, the second needs clarification.

Bromke stressed that Znak's foreign policy focused mainly on protection of the western border along the Oder and Neisse rivers, the loss of which would constitute a serious threat to Polish independence. An additional element of foreign policy, distinguished by Bromke, was
Znak’s scepticism about help from western countries and therefore its active support for an alliance with the Soviet Union even against the United States. According to Bromke, Znak was aware of difficulties which might be encountered in arguing for alliance with the Soviet Union against a popular pro-western orientation. He pointed out that this pro-Soviet orientation had met with trenchant criticism from Wyszynski. In practice Znak, in the early period, adopted a pro-Soviet orientation, for geopolitical reasons, but in the 1970s and later geopolitical arguments lost their significance. In the 1940s and 1950s Znak’s criticism of the anti-Soviet position aimed at elimination of a complex about the Soviet Union, which made a pragmatic approach to foreign policy difficult or impossible. The presence in Znak’s columns, in the early post-war years, of frequent remarks on the western origin and affiliation of Polish culture was intended to create a balance between pro-western and pro-Soviet orientations which would clear the political sphere of emotional prejudice.

Znak, as mentioned, had never had a consistent and unanimously accepted programme on political and social questions but, in every case, reasons of state had provided the perspective by which it tested its policy. All intellectuals cooperating with it acknowledged that Poland was trapped by the East-West polarisation. They attempted to carry out internal reform within this framework anticipating little chance of change in the near future. Their position was and still is characterised by careful consideration of the conditions under which reform can be negotiated with or forced on the regime. This realism on the part of Znak should also be understood as aimed at a reconciliation between the political realities dictated by participation in the Eastern Bloc and the Latin cultural tradition, between compulsory acceptance of a Marxist ideology and attempts at democratisation, between opposition to the regime and selective co-operation.
In 1985 Bromke noticed that the political realism of Znak had been accepted by the 'liberal' faction in the Party and that it could be included in the western style of politics, in contrast with the eastern political style of ultimate aims and radical means. These latter, according to him, were reflected in such opposition groups as KOR, KPN and Solidarity. Although strict differentiation between western and eastern political styles is difficult, Znak owed the above features to the simple fact, often overlooked by students of Polish politics, that it was composed of intellectuals who had experienced the nationalism of the 1930s, the war against fascism and finally Stanlinist totalitarianism and who, in addition, were educated in modern Catholic philosophy and attached to its spirituality.

The Catholicism of Znak was neither fully integral (conservative) nor progressive, but had, according to the group, its own internal dynamism which protected it both from fossilisation in rigid doctrine and from the full loss of transcendental substance through adjustment to a changing culture. They claimed that it derived sufficient protection from its separation from secular movements and political ideas. Under such conditions Catholicism could influence politics through its moral and spiritual power without being *sensu stricto* involved in politics. Turowicz and Stomma decisively rejected any attempt to transform Poland into a Catholic state in the way promulgated by Pax. They conceived those attempts 'to be contradictory to Catholicism'. Instead they were searching for an alternative to Marxist moral, social and political opinion. The purpose of this strategy was the democratisation of the Marxist state. Such democratisation, through on the one hand, continuously demonstrating an alternative
solution to the actual problems often related to capitalist pragmatism and, on the other, safeguarding Catholic fundamentalism, gave a conservative flavour to the group. Indeed, encounters with Marxism reinforced conservatism, but of a more progressive type than the advertised progressivism of Marxist ideology in socialist countries. This claim could be proved by even a superficial examination of successive changes in the policy of the Communist Party, which carries out reforms by a partial adoption of western economic policy.

The terms in which Znak saw co-operation with the government are explained in the following quotations. Immediately after signing the agreement between State and Church on 14 April, 1950, the group reflected: 'we have two options; to co-operate with the Party or to play a part in those activities where participation does not require an acceptance of joint responsibility for political decisions which are undertaken by the governing party...we opt for the second...we respect the Marxist political position and we want them to respect our different position'.

After 1956 Znak declared: 'In our policy we consider such facts as the position of Poland, the participation of our country in the Eastern Bloc, and ongoing changes. The governing party has taken responsibility for those changes which have been made according to Marxist doctrine. Professing a different world view and having very limited possibilities for influencing the existing state of affairs, we are aware of our strictly defined joint responsibility, the symbol of which is the presence of the Znak group of Catholic deputies in the Sejm...Without even the slightest departure from our principles, we want to take an active and creative part in building the Poland of today'. These statements clearly showed that on the basis of
ideological pluralism Znak withstood both ideological co-operation and confrontation as pervasive policies but adopted a policy of co-operation where the interests of the state and nation were concerned. The early Znak's realism was in strong contrast to the position of the present opposition. Adam Michnik and Lech Walesa proposed the 'ostracism of collaborators with the regime [in the Polish language the word "collaboration" has a pejorative meaning equivalent to that of "traitor"], the boycott of official initiatives', and so on. It is intriguing that the Party Commission on the Cause of Social Conflict described the Solidarity movement in identical terms to those used by Znak in condemning the military struggle in the 1940s. They characterised the Solidarity mentality as 'the still persisting mentality of the Polish nobility, uninterested in building up a new industrial society and interested more in propagating individual freedom than in the national interest'. Dmowski's and Znak's language is easily recognisable.

Znak's political realism supplied a framework for different approaches to social problems. The differences appeared in the first issues of Znak in a discussion of Marxist and bourgeois social ideas initiated by Stomma. In the 1940s two different conceptions of 'bourgeois' were present in the writings of Marxists. One was the psychological characteristic of a particular model of behaviour and values; the second involved the bourgeois class of owners of the means of production. The second concept was well defined; the first, on the other hand, was a term of abuse. Marxists often accused the Catholic Church of being 'one of the last bastions of the bourgeoisie', using the word in its first sense. Stomma in his article dealt with this charge, pointing out the complete irrelevance of the word to Catholicism.
First, he emphasised that 'bourgeois as an attitude is not identical with the meaning of the notion "the bourgeois class"'. The bourgeois attitude might be encountered in any social stratum and he implied that it was quite common among Marxists. He distinguished three basic features of the bourgeois attitude which I will compare with the official and popular version of Marxism at that time. The first was practical materialism, which did not necessarily pertain to philosophical materialism but rather demonstrated a wish to gain the maximum material advantage from any activity. Marxists claimed that the world was matter but criticised materialism as a social attitude or view, although they attempted to motivate social action by holding out the promise of future fulfilment of material needs. The second was the naive optimism of the bourgeois attitude which Stomma, like Zdziechowski, saw as an escape from acknowledging the existence of evil and chaos and the improbability of achieving a full and radical improvement of the human condition. Marxists assiduously promoted the idea of an idyllic communist state. Finally, Stomma discussed quiescence which was characterised by reluctant or hostile attitude to change. In the 1940s scientific dialectical materialism was based on a theory of continuous change but such change was taken neither to encompass its own theory nor the final communist stage of the transformation of society. Further, Stomma tried to suggest that the bourgeois mentality rested comfortably on Marxist doctrine. He compared the Marxist doctrinal stance with the bourgeois attempt to find in Catholicism 'a lightning-conductor against storms and changes in life'. The bourgeois often turned to Catholicism unaware that it could not deliver such protection. Catholicism, as Turowicz stressed 'is an affirmation of the whole of humanity, a whole system
of symbols, of which culture consists, in spite of the fact...that it is a system full of disharmony'. Catholicism therefore was not called upon to help to cope with the variety of life but was a spiritual power allowing the individual to remain open to that variety. The Catholicism of Znak, though fundamentalist, was also minimal, in the sense of not providing an ideologically bound form of guidance which could petrify its flow. This openness, which contrasted with Marxist ideological density, helped to fertilise political and social ideas within the group.

The clergy advised Znak to maintain its minimalist, moderate social philosophy at a point 'between social conservatism and progressivism'. Bishop Kominek warned Catholic intellectuals against a possible commitment to the Marxist mistake of *pars pro toto* and argued for the retention of the centralist position between the extremes of left and right. Stomma and Turowicz, the intellectual leaders of Znak preserved the centrist position, although there were two departures from it: socialism and liberalism. The first was based on Catholic moral solidarism; the second grounded in individualism. The differentiation of the two arose during discussion of Stomma's article on the bourgeoisie. J.M. Swiecicki reproached Stomma for rejecting the bourgeois attitude too easily and noticed that this attitude was based not on the endless multiplication of goods but 'the marking of reality with the individuality of man's work'. Catholicism, he held, could benefit from its ethos of family life and hard work. Although this ethos flowered under capitalist egoism, he and Father Piwowarczyk believed that Catholic morality could lessen both it and exploitation while at the same time making use of its most valuable features. In several articles Swiecicki and Piwowarczyk independently promoted the idea of
social solidarity and a model of the state congenial to the socialism of the welfare state. It was a rival idea to Marxism and Father Piwowarczyk was the most prominent expert on and critic of Marxism in the group's periodicals.

On the other side of the Znak ideological spectrum stood Stefan Kisielewski and Leopold Tyrmand. In contrast to Piwowarczyk and Świecicki, these saw the germ of totalitarianism in the Catholic doctrine of moral solidarity, which might increase in appropriate political conditions. The remedy for this was, in their view, 'the legalised concept of Christian liberalism, Christian individualism as a contrabalance to solidarism'. Piwowarczyk did not accept Tyrmand's and Kisielewski's position, which will be discussed later, for doctrinal reasons but appreciated its political implications. Bearing in mind the growing totalitarianism of the Marxist state, he wrote that 'the contribution of the liberals in fighting state absolutism was real'. Piwowarczyk was convinced of the impossibility of producing a totalitarian regime via Catholicism. He emphasised the protective role of the 'unchangeable deposit of faith' which 'does not allow infringement of the right of the person to selfdetermination'. Among those rights was that of the individual to own property. This incontestable right meant that he basically accepted a capitalist economy although he also argued for state protectionism similar to that propagated by Marxism.

In contrast to Piwowarczyk, Turowicz claimed that 'Catholics had no obligation to fight for a concrete political programme, or concrete shape of culture 'as Catholicism was not bound up with any culture'. In the early 1950s Piwowarczyk's ideas lost their political
significance and thereafter Turowicz's ideological indifferentism dominated. Only occasionally did the ideas of moral solidarism appear, mainly as a criticism of liberalism. In this way the teaching of Papal encyclicals in Znak was transformed into not so much propagation of the third way as development of political pragmatism. The consequences of this pragmatism may be observed by studying the activities of Znak in 1956, the later 1960s and finally the early 1970s.

Between 1953 and 1956 Tygodnik Powszechny had been taken over by Pax. The ostensible reason was Tygodnik's refusal to mourn after Stalin's death but in fact the authorities took the decision to close it down about a year earlier. In 1956, with the Polish October, the weekly was restored under the direction of the old editorial board. A year later it reflected: 'In October 1956 the insensate, integral system of bureaucratic coercion of man was broken down. In October the Party acknowledged the existence of society and appealed to it... We see, however, deadly dangers for this achievement. The first is the anarchist tendency in the nation...the second lies in the eventual victory of the forces which would be tempted to return to methods of mechanical constraint'. Tygodnik tried to limit the euphoria of 1956 by demanding a consideration of Polish political and social reality. It persuaded revisionists to adopt a moderate position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and to conduct reforms within the limits of this alliance.

Znak was subjected to two types of criticism. The first came from the revisionists of Przegląd Kulturalny (The Cultural Review), who accused it of 'immoral, positivist conformity', and the second came from the adherents of the hard ideological line, amongst them Pax.
They argued much less politely that the ideology of solidarity propagated by Znak linked it to fascism. Znak calmly responded that its adversaries merely demonstrated a lack of knowledge concerning Znak's position and that of the Church in general.

The most severe criticism of Znak's realism was published in Pax. P. Jasienica, historian, writer and a former member of Znak, was a wellknown critic of that blend of nationalism and religion which he had in the 1940s called an 'ill-assorted marriage'. He was arrested and imprisoned by Bierut's regime and released in 1956. Piasecki had been helpful in securing this release, so Jasienica was paying off a debt, but he did it in such a naive way as to cast doubt on the honesty of his criticism. He condemned Znak's realism as 'putting out the fire of freedom' and deceitfully aimed at the acquisition of political power. But, as was usually the case with Znak, Pax even then was unable to provoke an ideological discussion with the group.

Znak opposed the noisy and only marginally effective ideas of the revisionists which, it felt, could only damage the relationship with the Soviet Union and conceal the need for urgent reforms. The group favoured pragmatic tendencies within the Party and generally supported Gomulka's policy, initially promulgated in 1956, in its search for co-operation with democratic forces, even if 'they profess a different ideology'. For them the Marxist regime was a requirement of the geopolitical situation, democracy and pluralism of the internal situation. Therefore, in spite of their opposition to socialism as ideology, they accepted its external function as part of their joint account with the Soviet Union.
In January 1957 Stomma, Zawieyski, Makarczyk, Kisielewski and Gladysz formed a group of deputies, Znak. The group continued its realist policy, although around 1958 the conflict between Church and State deteriorated. Turowski's article of 1960 sounded a note both of disappointment and of warning to the authorities. He wrote: 'Tygodnik Powszechny represents the same principal position, has the same aims and ideas, but also because...its ideology is not promoted in a abstract vacuum...today Tygodnik is much more sensitive to certain events'. He recalled the times when the Church experienced harsh treatment from the authorities, when Cardinal Wyszynski with other priests was detained and argued that all this only strengthened the Church. He also stressed that the Church was now more determined than ever to fight for its rights. But even in this tense situation Znak maintained a mediatory position. The group declared in the Sejm: 'The present crisis has sharpened ideological contradictions between Catholics and Communists...this situation demands that we draw practical conclusions...we decisively declare that a policy of sharpening internal conflicts contradicts the national interest and also that for Catholics it could be a suicidal policy. The good of the nation requires a softening of internal contradictions'. And again: 'Political realism dictates a necessary quantum of discipline. Mobilisation of the nation is a requirement for its survival'. Znak tried to overcome ideological controversies warning against their possibly disastrous consequences.

In September 1959 Stomma wrote: 'There are two progressive currents in the world, internationalism and democracy in the capitalist world, and democratisation in the socialist world. Upon their development
depends the future of humankind...since 1956 our fatherland has turned its face to the future. Now we are not lagging behind in the great ferment of history'.

Stomma's reading of world political trends was entirely different from that of Piasecki who at the same time recognised communism as the dominating current. Znak's belief in the possibility of the democratisation of internal policy was very strong. They were the only group in the Sejm to defend the rebellious students in March 1968. This defence had two results; first, it marked the beginning of the end of the group, which was completely overtaken in 1976 by Zablocki's more submissive one. Secondly, Znak's intervention attracted the attention of the group which later became the so-called 'lay left'.

Since the deterioration of Znak in the 1970s, the policy of realism has gradually lost its significance. Then in its columns ideas began to appear that were not entirely new but that were being given a new significance. They came from young intellectuals who attempted to create a bridge between the position of Znak and the personalism of Wiez. These ideas centred on a concept of moral solidarity which resembled Piwowarczyk's views in the 1940s. Solidarity, according to Cywinski, ought to take the place of the class struggle. He wrote: 'The problem of the class struggle has not become less real but its content has changed, the essential accents have shifted from material interests to the problem of the human consciousness and dignity. After 1968 Cywinski argued for this concept of solidarity and what he called the ethics of the non-humble'. In September 1969 Cywinski's name appeared on the editorial board of Znak, demonstrating a recognition of this new direction. Further explication of this new
policy came in Cywinski's book *Rodowody niepokornych* (Genealogy of the non-Humble), which was published in 1971. Cywinski subsequently became the editor-in-chief of *Znak* prompting the reconciliation between the Catholic position and that of the lay opposition. In his book, discussion of a history of nineteenth-century ideas, he suggested that the idea of national sovereignty and protection of human rights united adherents of different social and political ideologies. This idea of situational moral unity in occupied Poland corresponded with but also exceeded *Znak*'s idea of political realism. Stomma set against this romantic mentality propagating well-calculated actions. Cywinski, following Abramovski, a socialist famous for his criticism of the 'oppressive state' which produced 'moral slavery', criticised Stomma's pessimism and advocated a new romanticism based on the moral and spiritual unity of the people. In his book, Cywinski described 'non-humble people fighting for the highest social values, peoples who sacrificed their lives in defence of others against institutional oppression'. The moral strength founded on Christian values was superior to political and social division. The book indirectly recalled the time of the German occupation when the fight for freedom overpowered all other problems. The proposed moral and patriotic unity of the opposition attracted Adam Michnik and other members of KOR (Committee for the Defence of Workers established after the strikes in Radom and other cities on 23 September 1976). Cywinski's book contained no particular political programme and focussed entirely on moral attitudes, on the individual's specific duty to fight against moral and national oppression.

What Cywinski ascribed to the *intelligentsia* of different persuasions, Michnik ascribed to the church in his book *The Church*,
the Left and Dialogue, published six years later.

Until then, according to Michnik, the lay opposition had not recognised the role of the Church in the democratisation of political life. The Church carried on its activities without any support from the groups fighting for the same aims. The lay left often saw the Polish Church as Constantinian, in opposition because it had been deprived of political power. In fact the Church's fight for existence in a Marxist state reflected the individual's fight for freedom of belief and self-determination. The morality propagated by the Church united adherents of different political and social ideas and did not evoke violence or hatred. For this reason the lay left should have been co-operating with the Church not as an institution with political force, but as one with moral authority.67 To Cywinski's suggestion that the Church was and would be ready to support the fight for social justice and human rights68, Michnik answered that 'the values of the lay left have arisen from the Christian tradition'.69 Michnik rejected the idea of direct involvement of the Church in politics70 or the construction of an anti-communist ideology based on Catholicism.71 Against any 'totalitarian unification of world views', as developed by Pax, he saw the Church as the spiritual leader of opposition and the defender of pluralism and moral values.

In the 1980s Cywinski, then an adviser to Solidarity, took his proposition further, arguing that the history of East European countries showed a frequent involvement of the Church in struggles for national independence. In these the Church contributed to the spiritual strength of a particular nation but had not so far developed feelings of brotherhood between nations.72 Cywinski insisted that the Church create a forum for communication between separate nations.
sharing common aims and that Catholic universal morality could unify
nations. This was a radical development of Piwowarczyk's initial
moral solidarity, exemplifying the developments which Znak had fore­
shadowed. Initially minimalist and apolitical, Znak's Catholicism
gave rise to the use of Catholic morality for political purposes,
a morality uniting people and nations fighting against unbidden
régimes. Although it may be a simplification to claim that this
political interpretation overtook Catholic minimalism and political
realism or that the older members of the group such as Stomma, Turowicz
and their contemporaries had given up their ideas, nevertheless
Cywinski represented a development of Znak's original ideas in the
1940s which took the lead in the 1980s. Today Znak and Tygodnik
Powszechny are generally recognised as the legal opposition to the
régime, publishing articles unacceptable to the official press,
though now Cywinski's position is not entirely identified with the
group's philosophy. In contrast Kisielewski has been associated with
Znak for the entire period although his liberal philosophy contradicted
its fundamental ideas.

Stefan Kisielewski (1911- ), composer, music critic and
passionate political journalist who signs his column 'Kisiel', is
probably the most controversial member of Znak. Hansiakob Stehle,
in his book on society and politics in Poland since 1945, calls him
an enfant terrible and the most independent figure in Poland's political
life, 'a man who belongs to the liberal species which is rare in
Poland'. His liberalism may be traced to his membership of the pre­
war Catholic organisations Bunt Mlodych and Odrodzenie. His political
passions were aroused at an early age. As a young member of Bunt
Mlodych he had criticised stadne zachowania (herd-behaviour) and the
lack of individuality prevalent amongst Polish nationalists.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{Bunt Młodych} represented a conservative social philosophy, which was not based on the 'historical pessimism' prevalent amongst Stanczyków Krakowskich and characteristic of Polish conservative thought in general after 1866,\textsuperscript{75} but on religion. Religion, according to such writers as Adolf Bochenski, provided a universal morality which was an indispensable element in any democratic system.\textsuperscript{76} The education of society for democracy required that it should be continually reminded of these values by the intellectual-moral elite. These universal values played a real role in the life of the nation and this, as Marcin Krol noticed, marked the difference between Dmowski's and \textbf{Bunt Młodych} philosophies. 'If for conservatives', Krol write, 'the natural primacy of universal values was only sometimes set aside for reflection on actual national questions, in Dmowski's thought national aims and values had indisputable priority and universal ideas were mentioned only out of courtesy...and not for fundamental reasons'.\textsuperscript{77} The difference was significant, overlooked by those who, like Bromke\textsuperscript{78}, tended to see the ideas of \textit{Znak} purely in the categories of Dmowski's philosophy. In addition to universal religious values, statehood was considered a universal institutional form by means of which the nation existed and participated in civilisation.

On a basis of conservative philosophy the group advocated individualism and opposed ideas which promised to change the existing social situation by demanding a surrender of human rights. The problem of the relationship of individual and state was vaguely presented: the individual could not exist outside the apparatus of law and state but the state likewise must not abuse its power over individuals.
Kisielewski has continued the philosophical tradition of Bunt Mlodych in so far as spiritual attachment to its type of conservatism was concerned, although this should in no sense be understood as a faithful transfer of the groups' ideas to post-war Poland. The ideas which remained unchanged in Kisielewski's writings were those of moral conservatism and the priority of the prerogative of the state in political thought.

In post-war Poland Kisielewski defined liberalism as a morality detached from any historical or social context, as a form of respect for one's fellow men and the opinions of others 'a certain kind of "book of instruction" for civilised man, independent of the social order, or the time or place in which he lives'. Such liberalism could not emanate from or be circumscribed by a particular culture but was produced by civilisation as a whole, a civilisation which, according to Kisielewski, was founded on Christianity. In thus identifying western civilisation with Christianity, he took account not only of its material products but, most of all, of the moral attitude of individuals. The individual was the ultimate subject of morality and therefore should not be submitted to any ideology which imposed rules on man. Though often referring to the radical individualists among German thinkers, he held that individualism meant something different in politics and in Catholicism. In politics he advocated the individual's right to hold his own opinions while criticising the romantic individualism which tried to form one particular opinion into the voice of the nation. Within Catholicism he considered individualist philosophy as a protection against the development of totalitarianism.
Kisielewski applied similar reasoning to his discussion of the relationship between state and individual. He distinguished two contexts for the functioning of the state: the internal context, in which the state should be tolerant, allowing pluralism of opinions and enterprise, and the international context in which the state should be strong, capable of defending its sovereignty. Depending on the political situation, he applied one or other of these principles. When Party, Church or opposition developed any kind of monist position, Kisielewski criticised this and advocated pluralism. By contrast, when internal discourse passed the bounds of political realism he argued the prerogative of state. Generally he urged a competitive model of society, motivated by a sense of the dangers of stagnation. Whether in ideas or in action, competition was, he believed, the best protection against the evils of a totalitarian order.

In the late 1940s Kisielewski realised that, after the tragic experience of war, free-market capitalism would not enjoy popular support among the Poles. 'The last war', he wrote, 'and the preceding period taught us a deep distrust of greed-motivated ideologies, wanting to subordinate and organise the parts of society on one total plan... Also the philosophy of capitalist liberalism carried within itself... the germ of serious social crisis...so societies united by their fight against totalitarianism face the task of finding a new universal idea... Such a one is the Christian idea...which stands up to the pressures of the present time'. Kisielewski later changed his opinion. In the 1960s and especially in the 1970s he saw free-market capitalism as a remedy for the weaknesses of the socialist economy. But he never considered the modification of capitalism in terms of the Rerum Novarum.
The role of Christianity was not to promote the welfare state but a morality which would temper the egoistic expansion of capitalist competition.

Kisielewski met with strong opposition of his ideas. In the 1940s Piwowarczyk, representing the Church authorities in Tygodnik Powszechny, wrote: 'So-called "humanitarian" liberalism...is unethical and even cruel...Wherever it appears Catholics are persecuted...Liberalism is harmful to society; it exaggerates the value of freedom, breaks up the bonds of society, destroys the authority of the state and threatens to unleash destructive social forces...In addition, when adopted as a moral norm it is used to justify the exploitation of the weak by the strong'. The leading Polish Catholic philosopher Jacek Woroniecki allowed no compromise with liberal philosophy, calling it the enemy of Catholicism.

One might have thought that there was no place for a liberal on the board of Tygodnik Powszechny. In attempting to throw light on this question, I need first to look at Kisielewski's arguments for liberalism within Catholicism, second at his reasoning on behalf of Tygodnik Powszechny. His liberalism was based on the conviction that no single doctrine could embrace the world order created by God. This order was a harmony hidden in plurality and belonged to the secular sphere which was separate from the profane. Kisielewski called himself a deist, indicating that, although the existence of God is indisputable, theology might be wrong in its account of his nature. The tension between his deep religious conviction and the vagueness of theological terminology did not allow him to press an orthodox Catholic world view. Indeed, in forty years of writing he produced
only occasional articles dealing with problems of faith. He agreed with Hayek's postulate that a liberal is fundamentally a sceptic and at the same time stressed that 'there is no reason why this need means an absence of religious belief on the part of the liberal...what distinguishes the liberal from the conservative here is that, however profound his own spiritual beliefs, he will never regard himself as entitled to impose them on others and...for him the spiritual and the temporal are different spheres which ought not to be confused'.

Kisielewski did not want to be identified with either side of the political spectrum in Poland. He wanted to remain an independent Catholic defending liberalism in the name of liberalism. Resigning the security of the ideological position accepted once and for all, he wrote: 'I do not like self-satisfied people'. He saw liberal philosophy mainly as a means of destabilising ideological polarisation in Poland. Unlike American conservatives he hoped to stimulate a plurality of radical positions opposing each other's opinions and providing controversial approaches to social problems. All his activities were aimed at energising pluralism which is 'as much stronger than any monism as is the cover of a balloon made of a number of pieces rather than just one'.

Kisielewski remained consistent in this adherence to pluralism and often attacked the policies of both the Party and the Church. He appreciated the reputation of the latter as the established stabiliser of national identity but disapproved of attempts by the clergy to exert power or meddle in politics. On the other hand, he was willing to enter into discussion with liberal Marxists. To one such (Lagowski) he wrote in 1985: 'Am I perhaps simply you? Have I perhaps changed
my opinion and found myself in Zdanie [a Marxist periodical] wanting at last to be the right man in the right place? Maybe I am a man who for forty years has been talking with enthusiasm to an icon; where am I, here or there?  

Kisielewski's interpretation of Znak's political realism awoke a response among Party liberals. After the failure of ideological control of political life in Poland, made evident by the Solidarity movement, a pragmatic approach seems to prevail. Nevertheless this pragmatic policy of the Party is seen as insufficient and strongly criticised by the opposition. In a recently published book Michnik points out that 'Wyszynski did not fully understand the phenomenon of Solidarity' with the result that his successor, Cardinal Glemp, 'was trapped in negotiations'. Michnik argues for radical opposition as the only realistic position to adopt towards the regime. At present it is clear that Kisielewski's position and, for example, that of Daniel Passent (a publicist on the staff of Polityka, which in the 1980s adopted a centralist position), are to some extent convergent. Both criticise the dogmatic 'no' maintained by the opposition to any cultural or economic initiatives taken by the government, although full reconciliation between them has not so far taken place.

In pursuit of a better understanding of Kisielewski's liberalism it is instructive to look at differences in the application of his ideas in Poland and in America. Leopold Tyrmand, Vice-President of the 'Party of Crazy Liberals' established by Kisielewski in the early postwar years, left Poland for the United States in 1966. Before doing so, during the 1950s when cultural and political life was supposed to be shaped by Marxist ideology, he published a crime novel
The book described events more probable in New York than in Warsaw; its popularity annoyed the authorities who wanted a clear distinction between socialist society and corrupt Western culture. It was generally recognised as a protest against cultural uniformity. Kisielewski himself also employed this pattern of writing on taboo subjects, mentioning persons and events, the existence of which Marxist propaganda had tried to wipe from people's memories. The level of political manipulation of culture in the 1950s was exemplified by an ironic twist when a cubist painting in Tygodnik Powszechny was criticised by the bishops as Bolshevik propaganda and by the Marxists as bourgeois excess. Only Kisielewski and Tyrmand then had the courage to defend it as independent art. They both believed that 'communism is really afraid only of writers, students and isolated liberals', that is, not of dogmatic opposition but of independent minds. Even today Kisielewski criticises those writers who use opposition to government as a vehicle for their artistic production. Tyrmand and Kisielewski's philosophy of destabilisation produced different results in the United States. There the former became active in the conservative movement. His chief slogan was 'to defend America from itself', its democracy from excesses which could develop the forces threatening its own liberty. As an editor of the Chronicle of Culture published by Rockford College (Illinois) he traced new movements attempting to bring about social change in America. The defence of liberalism produced stability whereas in Poland the same philosophy was used to stimulate destabilisation.

Kisielewski, after Tyrmand's death in 1985, praised his individual approach, pointing out that 'wanting to play a part at a complicated historical juncture does not mean swimming in a shoal of
herrings; it is better to take shelter in a side pool and observe, but observe sharply'. The essence of their liberalism rested on the intellectual criticism of society and on opposition to institutions which usurped the right to self-determination of individuals.

Kisielewski's individualism corresponded better with Znak's minimalism than with Cywinski's solidarism. He did not promote unification or the reconciliation of Catholicism with any social ideology; no social ideology, in his view, could fully express its morality. From inside Znak he defended realism and pragmatism in politics, yet he considered himself an independent Catholic intellectual, resisting classification. The withdrawal of Catholicism from direct confrontation with secular reality united Stomma, Turowicz and Kisielewski and the latter was only distinguished from the other two in that his Catholicism was less fundamental and his policy more liberal.

His liberalism played an important role in redefining the image of Polish Catholicism which had persisted since before the war. It is impossible to cover this problem fully but the fact that a liberal was present on the Catholic weekly significantly influenced the relationship between Marxist ideology and Catholicism. First a discussion in the 1970s initiated a competition of Marxist and Catholic views of history. In both, similar eschatological element was central to their structures. Catholicism saw the true fulfilment of the destiny of mankind in salvation beyond earthly history, whereas Marxism urged the realisation of salvation by means of radical change in economic and social relations. The Church rejected revolutionary change to the economy because of the price which individuals would have to pay in any supposedly transitory period. They believed in
effecting desirable change by moral improvement of the individual. Therefore, as Tyrmand observed, a liberal and individual philosophy in a coherent Marxist ideology was impossible. By contrast, liberalism remained to some extent arguable on the basis of Catholic doctrine.

In this context the acceptance of liberalism and the propagation of individualism signalled the Church's ideological openness and its consideration of the fundamental rights of the person as superior to any abstract good of humanity. On the one hand, this was an easy task, as Marxism encountered some theoretical difficulties on this issue which were especially exposed in and after 1956; on the other the propagation of liberalism supplied Marxists with demonstrable proof of the Church's sympathy with capitalist individualism and so of exploitation of the working class.

The presence of liberalism also helped the Church to defend itself against the Marxist accusation that it preferred strong to weak regimes. Its explanation was that weak regimes gave the Church no occasion to demonstrate its potential political power. Conversely, co-operation with or opposition to a strong regime increased its power. Indeed if the popularity of the Church were a measure of the strength of the regime, then the whole post-war history of Poland would testify that its strength had been too great by the standard of the Polish people. Although this observation seems plausible the Church does not welcome attention being drawn to it, as it is eager to demonstrate that an exclusive interest in Christian morality and tolerance motivates its political actions.

In this light Kisielewski's presence in Tygodnik Powszechny can readily be explained. The Church probably sees a practical
justification for his presence in that it acts to soften the Marxist state apparatus. Additionally, so long as his liberalism keeps within the general principles of Catholicism, this position also demonstrates the Church's universality and political tolerance.

Kisielewski's attempts to encourage individualism and liberal philosophy in socialist Poland can be illustrated by the following actions. After World War II when Marxist propaganda was employing allegedly irrefutable slogans referring to the unification of the nation and the implementation of social justice, he opposed them. It was his 'no' period when he described himself as follows: 'I want to be a good citizen and I want the best for Poland, hence I declare to all that my name is Becwalski [a name symbolising a silly person - NZ]; I do not know what is at issue, I do not understand it, but I am against it'. This programmatic 'no' had a double significance. Kisielewski disagreed with the imposition of the communist order in Poland. At the same time he saw alliance with the Soviet Union as a Polish raison d'État and actually the best possible option for Poland. For this reason he did not consider military struggle or belief in a favourable change in the international situation as reasonable. In such a situation, criticism which showed the complexity of the problems counteracted too hasty a declaration and solution.

This 'no' also played a psychological role. People relieved from the terror of occupation might become vulnerable to political totalitarianism. The provocative 'no' was a call to political vigilance, which would help to distinguish the reality of politics full of errors, failures and mistakes from the polished precision of ideological promises, application of which usually brought terror. The promises
of totalitarian ideology might, Kisielewski believed, particularly attract a people numbed and made hopeless by such historical disasters as the late war. He suggested that Hitlerism in Germany had won support because of the hopelessness of a people stunned by the economic crisis of the 1930s. The awakening of vigilance might immunise people against a naive trust in ideologies.

Besides encouraging political vigilance Kisielewski also tried to promote a certain positive side of Polish reality. He argued that Poland had escaped complete biological and cultural destruction during the war and occupation. The Stalinist order allowed people to live and work in relative peace; the margins of freedom and independence of the state could be used to strengthen its economy. But he stressed that this economic strength would not be achieved on Marxist lines, by planned and centralised industry alone. Growth in heavy industry must come about as the result of planning but must be accompanied by a simultaneous growth of private light industry, trade and craft. Right after the war he accepted a planned economy as part of the general direction of development but he saw no reason why industry as a whole should be nationalised, why the challenge of the free-market economy should lead to its abolition. Time and again he insisted that the economic model should be varied, according to actual requirements at the time and to international and national conditions.

There were two periods, from 1945 to 1949 and in 1956-57 when Kisielewski directly devoted much comments to Marxist ideology. In the early post-war years Kisielewski was not entirely opposed to the idea of Marxist ideology taking root in Polish culture. He wrote:
'Poland - a traditional Catholic country in the "materialist bloc", a country educated in Latin culture in the Eastern bloc - is a paradox, and paradoxes are always creative, always the source of valuable ferment, a chance for unexpected synthesis'. In this respect, contemporary Polish history has not been a disappointment since the Solidarity movement, but Kisielewski throughout his career, has constantly accused Marxism of not playing its 'materialist' and 'rationalist' role. In the 1950s he wrote in Tygodnik Powszechny 'we decided to fight both radical rationalism and radical fideism...but it was difficult because our general opponent Kuznica [a Marxist periodical of 1945-50 - NZ] after a short superficially rationalist stage...came out with a new variant of lay fideism'. The propagation of Marxist ideology as independent of experience greatly surprised him. As a materialist philosophy faithful to its own principles Marxism should be verified by the economy, by its ability to deal with practical questions. Such a Marxism, Kisielewski argued, might create an interesting synthesis with Catholicism, while the presentation of Marxism as a set of pious directives required theological, non-practical discussion. He accused Marxism of betraying its own principles and of transcending the domain of secular ideologies and usurping the universality and idiosyncrasy of religion. Later he demonstrated that it was unable to create other than a religious type of ideology. It is, however, provocative that Protestants in Ireland used a similar argument against Catholicism as he had against Marxism. Denis Clark wrote: 'the theologically comprehensive worldview of Roman Catholics is an ideology...and it typically relies on indoctrination for its propagation. There is no transcendent perspective available to mere mortals from which we might impartially adjudicate the relative merits of alternative ideologies'. Catholicism in Ireland, where religious divisions
correspond to political ones, is there considered an ideology in the same sense as Marxism in Poland was by Catholics i.e. as suppressing the freedom of the individual and usurping a universality which it does not possess.

In the 1940s Kisielewski suggested a simple solution for the secularisation of Marxism. This involved the application of dialectical and materialist principles to its own theory and practice.¹⁰² In opposing the theoretical assumptions of Marxism to its ideological, codified model, Kisielewski was allied to such critics as Stanislaw Ossowski or Narcyz Lubnicki¹⁰³ and very different from Kazimierz Klosak and other Catholic critics. The former emphasised its incoherence, the latter pointed out its ontological inadequacy.

In the early postwar years, although with increasing difficulty until now, Marxist regimes have tried to propagate the universality of their political, economic and cultural position. Marxism claims that the working-class is the agent of humanity as a whole and that by means of revolution it will impose a new non-hierarchical order of society. In the 1940s Kisielewski devoted many articles to criticism of this claim. He wrote: 'Where man exists, there is a hierarchy'.¹⁰⁴ Hierarchy in society is healthy when it is born out of free competition between not classes but individuals. 'Equality', he wrote, 'has always been the standard slogan of democracy - the famous "egalite"...but it is also often superficially interpreted ...The real equality, with which democracy is concerned, is the equality of rights and opportunity...aiming to remove injustice and privileges, and it should not be interpreted as though people were equal (in ability); which is obviously absurd'.¹⁰⁵ An attempt to achieve social equality through
the overthrow of one social class by another amounts to oppression of the people and the imposition of ideas which life will unceasingly contradict. Therefore what is right in Marxism, according to Kisielewski, is the statement that reality is changeable and full of contradictions. What is wrong is its non-dialectical theory of dialectic. For him as for the Australian philosopher, John Anderson, the main obstacle to acceptance of Marxism is its sanctified monistic theory.

In 1956 he welcomed the renewed 'consideration of the Polish problem in a democratic, realistic, pragmatic and patriotic manner, a new integration, a reconciliation of world views, synthesis restoration, enthusiasm and so on'. In short he expected a pragmatic turn in Polish internal politics. He extended his activities, taking part in the sessions of the Sejm; but disappointment came quickly. The Vice-President of the Sejm and the Secretary of the Party, Zenon Kliszko, indicated that the changes taking place would in no way change the position of Catholics, that they would only be tolerated in the Sejm. After 1957 the censor confiscated many of Kisielewski's articles. In one of these Kisielewski advised a definitive settlement of accounts with the problem of Stalinism and argued against pretending to march into the future without radical changes. He postulated a liquidation of the state of permanent hangover and expressed confidence in the possibility of deconstructing the ideological-industrial monolith of Stalinism through a discussion of the philosophical and economic aspects of Marxism rather than the theological scholastic and metaphysical ones. A few months later he observed sarcastically: 'Poland before October was like a broken car; after October it is still the same car only its horn has been repaired'. The lack of frank reconciliation between the Party and society and a return to
the previous method of government developed and gradually widened the
gap between groups wanting a continuation of reform and the government.
From the late 1950s onward a resistance to the 'pure philosophy of words'
degraded by vapid discussion dominated Kisielewski's articles. The
post-Vatican II movement towards dialogue was met in Poland by Gierek's
movement to a reconciliation of the nation. Gierek was pushing for a
dialogue between Catholics and Marxists which might provide recognition
of his regime as representing the whole nation. In early 1971
Kisielewski changed the name of his column to 'Without Dogma' pointing
out that he, unlike other Catholic intellectuals 'would keep up the
Polish eastern perspective considering the real Polish position within
the Eastern bloc instead of oscillating towards the fashionable occidental,
universal perspective'. In this he said 'no' not only to Gierek's
smokescreen of a westernised Poland but also to those Catholics who
were attracted by the superficial dialogue. He wrote: 'The Vatican's
catchword 'dialogue' shouted with mechanical unanimity distracts attention
from matters fundamental to Poland and turns people's gaze away from
problems and moral complications which the Polish Church has to face
here and now...the famous dialogue looks different in every country,
in every social system and personal order; it is worthwhile to understand
the actual Polish meaning of this word "dialogue" and above all its
hidden meaning...but try to have something different to say on this
subject and a choir of Marxists and Catholics will shout you down,
beating your head with the clubs of verbal slogans'.

Today Kisielewski still occupies a centralist position,
although Tygodnik Powszechny (urged by the younger generation) has
abandoned the political realism now partly adopted by the organisations
sponsored by the government as PRON and the Party itself. The present
situation of the group is characterised by a search for dialogue. But as a member of the editorial board, Marek Skwarnicki, during his recent visit to Canberra, stressed the parameters of this dialogue have not yet been defined. Kisielewski represents the minimalist Catholicism and political realism of Znak. If his liberalism could be understood as an instrument in the overcoming polarisation in Poland and nothing else, the representation would be perfect. But it does not seem to be so. It is paradoxical that in a socialist state a Catholic liberal and radical individualist takes a centralist position in the political spectrum.

Znak formulated its ideology in the early post-war years, when Stalinist ideology had not yet been fully imposed and was better known by reputation than by merit. Stomma, and other members of Znak, discussed the Marxist threat to Western civilisation, which had been considerably weakened by the cruelty of the last war. The group evolved a philosophy protecting the sediment of faith and developing the principles of political realism. It was a minimalist philosophy requiring further elaboration, a philosophy which, though adequate for the early period, would prove insufficient for co-existence with the maximalist Stalinist ideology of the 1950s. Its realism was only apparently successful for a short time after 1956 but even then Znak experienced some set-backs which finally led to the abandonment of its neopositivist policy.

Minimalist philosophy gave rise to two extreme interpretations. The first, developing from moral solidarism to the philosophy of political opposition, was elaborated by the younger generation. The second, a liberal interpretation, was the creation of one man whose brilliant writings made it well-known and even considered as the policy
of the group. The political realism of Znak could legitimise co-existence with a Marxist regime. But the ideological idealism of the Party hindered communication and was partly responsible for the development of more radical positions.
3. Pax – the Pursuit of Power

The Pax group, like Znak, claimed to be searching for a realistic policy toward the Marxist regime. But its realism produced a different ideology, according to which Catholics had to unite with Marxists into one political force. This idea was the work of Boleslaw Piasecki, the founder of Pax and its leader until his death in 1979. His ambition was not, as is often supposed, to support the Marxist regime but rather to gain political power by overcoming the divisions between Catholicism and Marxism.

In the course of his political career Piasecki led three political organizations, each operating in different conditions: Falanga in the 1930s, when Poland was governed by Pilsudski's followers; Confederation of the Nation during the German occupation, and finally Pax under the Marxist regime. It is characteristic of Piasecki, however, that despite radically differing conditions the programmes of the three varied only slightly. More precisely, the same philosophical ideas can be seen underpinning the different organisations. Since the main context of the present study is the post-war period, Piasecki's early activities will be discussed only to the extent necessary to bring out the continuity of his ideas. Piasecki himself was rather an enigmatic person, hidden from the public eye and protected by a group of trusted associates. Only a few biographical details about him are known. Even the alleged date of his birth differs in different sources. Andrzej Micewski gives it as 18 February 1915, Lucjan Blit suggests 19 February 1914 and others 1913. ¹

From his youth he was involved in nationalist movements and, as both the authors mentioned above suggest, he had enormous gifts and
ambitions as a commander. His desire was to be a leader with absolute power of government. As a fifteen-year-old he entered the Stronnictwo Narodowe after the split of this party led to the creation of the Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny, a nationalist, semi-fascist organisation, he participated in the Oboz youth section. The Oboz existed legally for only three months (14.4. - 10.7.1934). After a terrorist attack on the Ministry for the Interior by the Ukrainian nationalists Piasecki, with other members of the ONR, was held in preventive detention in the Bereza Camp for three months in the summer of 1934. It was probably there that he developed the idea of a new and more radical political organisation. A year later he created his own political programme and paramilitary, Catholic-nationalist organisation Falanga. Of central importance to its programme was the slogan: 'God is the highest destiny of man; to work for the power of the nation is the best way to God'. During its four years of existence, Falanga became known for its terrorist attacks against liberals, Jews and communists. Piasecki's choice of the name Falanga was an attempt to draw attention to the Spanish nationalist movement, especially to its connection with Catholicism. The social and political situation in Spain in the 1930s caused Catholics and fascists to have strong reasons for collaboration. Catholics, as Father Ayala of the Association Catholica Nacional de Propagandistas wrote, ought 'to train men for public life' and to support a regime that had saved the Church from destruction. The main ideological enemy of Catholicism was the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936), called The Republic of Workers of all Classes, whose strong anticlericalism threatened the Catholic hierarchy. Falange Espanola promised collaboration with the Church and respect for its rights. On the other hand Falange also benefited
from its alliance with Catholicism. Conservative Spanish Catholics often argued against liberalism and democracy, providing moral and philosophical support for the fascist ideology. In addition Piasecki, who fancied a harmonious society, appreciated the group's solution to class conflict. **Falange**, as Caballero wrote, believed that an aggressive international policy diverts attention from or reduces internal social problems. The combination of Catholic absolutism with nationalism, the conversion of social into international problems and, most of all, the co-ordination of whole nationalist movements in one organisation were features which Piasecki tried to bring to the attention of his potential supporters. Unfortunately for the fulfilment of his ambitions, he overlooked the fact that Poland lacked a favourable environment for the propagation of such ideas. Polish Catholicism enjoyed its privileges, it was not threatened by the state and the nationalist movement was much less radical than in Spain. But Piasecki who belonged to the same generation of 1930s nationalists as Jose Antonio, the leader of the **Falange Espanola**, did not pay much attention to differences of environment. Falangist views, exemplified in such pronouncements as: 'We declare that the historical fulfilment of Spain lies in her empire' or 'The state is a totalitarian instrument in the service of national integrity and declaration ... Our movement links Catholic consciousness, which enjoys a glorious tradition in Spain, where it greatly predominates, with national reconstruction', were congenial to Piasecki.

Piasecki expressed his nationalist philosophy in the book **Duch czasow nowych a Ruch Mlodych**, he observed the growth of nationalism in European countries and saw this as an effect of people's subconscious attempts to anchor the life's unstability in a stable world view. This was one
reason why a growing number of people became committed to those salubrious nationalist principles' and 'rejected an out-dated and useless democracy'. But, he went on, the value of the nation could not be conceived as absolute. It required integration with religion, representing the only true absolute value. The nationalist and religious values united in one ideology provided a scale by which the value of the individuals in society could be measured. Piasecki formulated a simple criterion according to which the individual can attain the absolute good 'only if he works for the good of the nation'. In this way he made religious salvation dependant on obedience to civil authorities and fulfilment of civil duties. His book was mainly addressed to those Polish nationalists who did not, in Piasecki's opinion, understand that Poland, as a Catholic country, could lead the way to the desired synthesis of Catholicism with nationalism. This idea was explicitly formulated in Falanga's programme of 1935, where Piasecki wrote: 'The historical mission of Poland, the Catholic state of the Polish nation, is to lead Europe against communism and domination by the Germans'. In pursuit of this leadership Polish nationalism must instigate a national revolution which would straighten out internal affairs - i.e. abolish all political parties, create one national party, expel Jews, achieve unity and increase the military power of the nation. Falanga advocated the nationalisation of industry, in which 'the source of income is not the work of the owner ... and in which ownership could be considered nameless'. At the same time Falanga supported private ownership of small crafts and trades, leaving the rest of the economy under the control of the totalitarian state. Its members were less consistent in their view on the economy than the communists, but they were more consistent, as Jan L. Lipski has stressed,
in their 'totalitarian morality'. That which in communist totalitarianism, he wrote, 'is covered up by a smokescreen of traditional rhetoric on freedom, the fascist openly promulgates'. Indeed, Piasecki asserted the full subordination of man to the state, but left some room for private enterprise in the economic sphere. Overall his main interest was not the economy but vindication of absolute power.

Piasecki’s tactics for the realisation of his political ambitions were twofold. By means of terrorist activities he hoped to maintain military discipline in the ranks and to threaten Falanga’s opponents. But the essential strategy was the infiltration of influential political circles, carried out by Piasecki himself. This substitution of a policy infiltration for a policy of power, which he roundly rejected in his theoretical writings, proves that Piasecki probably was well aware that, because of limited means and support, a fascist revolution might be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, he believed that a coup d’etat carried out by another group, could create a good situation for Falanga. He co-operated with the leader of the Camp of National Unification, Colonel Adam Koc, and exerted some influence on the youth organization of the Camp. In 1937 Falanga organised a Great Assembly in which about 1500 members, called 'bright shirts', took part. Here Piasecki emphasised his moral and religious certainty concerning the programme of seizing power and complained of the shortage of technical means for its realisation. The Assembly, which resembled those organised by the fascists in Germany, brought increased discredit to Piasecki and his supporters within the government.

In spite of the strong anti-communist stand taken in Falanga’s programme, Piasecki accepted certain features of communist organisation
of society. He praised the changes which had occurred in Soviet internal policy in the 1930s and wrote that 'Stalin's triumph over international communism shows the healthy and elemental tendencies in his policy'. He greatly appreciated the fact that 'although the social order of the Soviet Union is based on election the real power belongs to the Communist Party, which freely governs the state.\(^{14}\)

His admiration for totalitarian communism is an important clue to understanding his post-war switch from anti- to pro-communism. Most of all he was an adherent of totalitarianism, irrespective of its philosophical base. He was convinced that Catholicism could not co-exist with liberalism and democracy but could co-operate well with any order which had a plan for the future shape of society, strictly defined moral code and hierarchy of aims. In contrast to the concept according to which absolute values are revealed in a dialogue between man, Piasecki sought their integration with a secular ideology. He had carefully observed ideological fluctuations in the world, following those which corresponded with his vision of Catholicism. His ideas, strikingly similar to those of Action Francaise, had not been popular in pre-war Poland. Yet most of the leftist intelligentsia saw the group's ideas as radical but not contrary to the development of pre-war Catholicism. For others the group damaged the whole image of Polish Catholicism. After the war the Marxist regime also took this image as representative and expected Piasecki to be the best person to infiltrate Catholic circles.

After Poland's defeat by fascist Germany in 1939, Piasecki did not change the fundamental ideas of Falanga's programme. He established an underground organisation Confederation of the Nation.
(Konfederacja Narodu), to fight Germans and communists, organise a whole Slavic empire, destroy the Soviet Union and finally prepare for the prospective military government of Poland. Again the Confederation, like Falanga before the war, won no support. Its programme was too radical in social questions and too naive in international policy. In the areas occupied by Germans or Soviets Piasecki carried out ostentatious, minimally effective actions with a small group of former Falanga members. In November 1944 he was arrested by the Soviet authorities but he was released after less than a year. There was and still is much speculation concerning the terms on which he was released at a time when the majority of detainees were executed for much more trivial political reasons. The most exciting and controversial matter is the content of the conversation which Piasecki is believed to have had in prison with Ivan Alexandrovich Serov, who was responsible for the operation of the NKVD in Poland. Most writers consider that this conversation provided a direct cause for his release.

According to Josef Swiatlo, a former officer in the Ministry of the Interior, Piasecki first prepared a document in which he offered help in settling the problem of the Home Army's officers. This postponed his execution. Then Serov decided to use Piasecki and his followers against the Church. After his release Piasecki had two supervisors, Jerzy Borejsza and colonel Luna Brystygerowa, who ensured that he fulfilled his duty. Piasecki was seen as a passive agent of the NKVD, completely subordinated to its orders.

By contrast, Czeslaw Milosz gives a literary reconstruction of the conversation. Although Milosz has on several occasions passionately criticised Polish Catholicism as a narrow-minded blend of nationalism
and religion, his view of Piasecki differed from that commonly held.
He did not support the opinion that Piasecki had been recruited into
the NKVD for spying on the Polish Church but suggested that in the
course of the conversation Piasecki and Serov had reached a certain
ideological agreement. He attributed to Serov the words: 'The fact
that we were able to reach an understanding is not accidental', and
added, 'Ah, a mystical faith. Admirable. The only possible way of
dreaming about a resurrection of the Middle Ages. I know. A
cathedral and all around it small houses inhabited by craftsmen. Order.
Each man in his place. By hereditary right. A cobbler with cobblers,
a Jew with the Jews in the Ghetto. A little bit of T.S. Eliot.
Enchanting'. The imaginative version of the conversation, or at
least its basic point, is convincing. Piasecki always supported and
understood the later leaders of the Polish United Workers' Party who
wanted to impose a similarly totalitarian model of society.

In July 1945 Piasecki handed a proposal to the Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party. The document
was in four parts. In the first Piasecki outlined the philosophical
principles of the new Catholic movement in Poland, which included an
acknowledgement of the absolute values of the Catholic world view and
the acceptance of a hierarchy of aims beginning with God, then mankind,
the nation and family, and concluding with a determination to create
the best material and cultural conditions for the functioning of the
human individual. In the second part he presented his views on the
social order, expressing his attachment to the ideas put forward by
the communists in the July Manifesto of 1944, whose economic programme
basically corresponded with the Falanga programme of 1937. The third
part of this document consisted of arguments for close co-operation
with the Soviet Union, which he saw as indispensable to the existence
of a sovereign Polish state. He urged the abandonment of the popular
view that the Soviets had brought socialism to Poland and argued that
the people should be taught that the Soviets had merely brought to
fruition Poland's own revolution. In the last part Piasecki discussed
the ideological controversies between Catholicism and Marxism, insisting
that Marxists should undertake full co-operation with Catholics, who
had passed through a spiritual revolution comparable to their own
materialist revolution. 'A coalition between Marxists and Catholics',
Piasecki wrote, when the communists had not yet fully controlled the
country, 'could help...to mobilise society for the important tasks of
the state...and cut off the psychological roots of widespread conspiracy.
A starting point could be the creation of a press, with an ideological
title to give an opportunity for loyal criticism of Polish reality.'

On the basis of this document the group of progressive Catholics
associated with the weekly Dzis i Jutro (Today and Tomorrow) was es­
established on 25 November, 1945 and the group was subsequently registered
as the association Pax in April 1952.

In the early post-war years the appearance of the group was
welcomed by the Hierarchy who hoped that it would help in establishing
a good relationship with the regime. The group even received financial
aid from Cardinal Hlond. This expectation was initially fulfilled.
Together with Tygodnik Powszechny the group was responsible for the
letter to Pius XII, of 7 June, 1948 on the problem of the recovered
territories and the letter to President Boleslaw Bierut of 20 November,
1946, on the need for a modus vivendi between Church and State. Even
then, however, future conflict was signalled. In a letter to Cardinal
Hlond of 9 August, 1946, Pax expressed the hope of fulfilling the
'difficult and unrewarding task of analysing the attitudes of Catholics in Poland towards the changes which have recently occurred in the country, without the involvement of the Hierarchy' and, as they had earlier suggested, of supporting 'any initiative aimed at finding a "modus vivendi" between the ruling party and the Hierarchy'. Piasecki understood *modus vivendi* in a way the Hierarchy could not accept. A *modus vivendi*, for him, should define the Church's rights in a socialist state and therefore help it to proceed with its ecclesiastical functions. Consequently, he hoped, the Church would be released from political engagements and the political representation of Catholics could be handed over to Pax. The Hierarchy did not approve this division of roles. From 1946, when Piasecki openly tried to eliminate the Episcopate as the political representative of all Catholics, the Episcopate was suspicious of Pax. This suspicion grew and turned to enmity as relations between Church and State deteriorated and Piasecki developed his idea of doctrinal reconciliation which, at this time, closely resembled the ideas he could have shared with Serov. Articles discussing the similarity between Catholic and Marxist doctrine and criticising the Church for its disinclination to support socialism and to sign the agreement with the government started to appear in *Dzis i Jutro* from 1949. However, it must be stressed that the Episcopate was also quite guarded in regard to Pax's actions. As early as September 1947, at a meeting of the editors of the Catholic press to which Piasecki had not been invited, came a statement that Pax's periodicals did not meet the requirements of the Catholic press. Micewski, a former member of Pax who is now strongly critical of the Pax position, thinks that 'at that time the exclusion of the group from the Catholic community was not justified'. Wasiutynski,
another former member of Pax, insists that in the beginning Pax took up important social questions which the Hierarchy had until then neglected. The first reason for the Hierarchy's sensitivity was the growing tension in State-Church relations and the polarisation of positions. Other reasons were Pax's involvement with Marxist anti-Church propaganda and its undermining of the arguments used by Catholic philosophers against Marxism. Piasecki's suggestion, which he later developed into a theory, that Marxism helped to uncover the hidden value of religion destroyed the arguments used by Catholics that Marxism simplified religion and only partly addressed social problems. This guardedness of the Episcopate was apparently increased by its apprehensions concerning the introduction by the Polish authorities of a much more sophisticated method of fighting the Church than that used in the Soviet Union. In a book written in the 1950s Claude Naurois stressed that Soviet and Polish communists were aware that employing the standard Soviet methods in Poland might be ineffective. Conversely, they feared an increase of the Church's popularity as the assumed defender of freedom under the communist regime. The communists, according to Naurois, wanted to fight the Church in Poland not openly but through infiltration of the Hierarchy. They anticipated the possibility of causing a split within the clergy over a doctrine created under the influence of Marxist philosophy. For this purpose, as Naurois noted, a school to elaborate the new theology was created in the Soviet Union. The Episcopate may have suspected that Piasecki was the right person for the execution of such a programme in Poland. His political ambitions, his miraculous release from prison, his close collaboration with the Marxist regime and most of all his doctrine initially supported the suspicion. Piasecki published two slightly different versions
of his doctrine: that of the 1940s might be characterised as relatively passive in contrast to the 1953-4 version.

In the first issue of Dzis i Jutro Piasecki published an article 'Zagadnienia Istotne' (Essential Problems) which later provided the title for the book condemned by the Holy See. In this article Piasecki argued for co-operation between Marxists and Catholics based on a realistic recognition of the internal and international situation. He did not predict changes in the division of spheres of influence in Europe, implicitly criticising the popular expectation that such changes would bring back the pre-war order of things. According to him, this false expectation had resulted in a situation in which, 'although some Poles dwelt physically in the country, their hopes and thoughts persistently clung to the West'. He added: 'The feelings of aimlessness and hopelessness regarding co-operation with the present regime were born out of such an attitude'. In seeking to cure 'this national schizophrenia', Piasecki proposed an end to partisan war and acknowledgement of the political features of the present situation as permanent.

At the same time he attempted to gain an influence in the Association of Priest-Patriots, an organisation established in 1949 by clergy terrorised by the regime, of which the main purpose was to create a split in the Church and to threaten the Hierarchy. He sought to persuade the communists who at that time forbade any independent organisation, that a lack of confidence in the positive intentions of Catholics towards the new regime might lower their chances of uniting the nation and rebuilding the country. Briefly, Piasecki assured the communists that Pax was ready to help them bring Catholics to co-operate. This appeal to a practical motivation for co-operation
was supplemented by a more general missionary and eschatological purpose. Piasecki wrote: 'It is a fact that the future of Poland and its position in the world depend first on ideological values, on the role which our nation will play in moulding the style of political life'. Concerning Marxism, he wrote: 'The world view which is revolutionary today will dominate tomorrow. It is therefore the duty of every Pole to fight for the shape of the Polish revolution', adding the warning that 'The ups and downs of international games and auctions must not hypnotise or disable us. Such lethargy of the will could lead to spiritual disintegration'.

After the war, in Piasecki's view, Marxism was the dominant ideology in the world. Its strength and its dislike of both liberalism and democracy made Marxism a perfect adjunct of Catholicism. He did not believe that Marxists were capable of governing the state without the participation of Catholics. Additionally, according to him, Poland once more had a chance to lead the European countries, at this time not against the German or Soviet domination but against the disarrayed bourgeois world. The element of 'power policy', reinforced by Stalinism, still persisted in Piasecki's ideology.

The main difference between the early and the fully-fledged doctrine rested on a shift in emphasis from collaboration based on commonly accepted political and economic principles to collaboration based on acknowledgement of the convergence of Marxism and Catholicism. He formulated this doctrine when the Stalinist regime was prosecuting the Church and when any ideological heresy or independent intellectual activity could lead to imprisonment or to execution. At the heart of Piasecki's doctrine lay the aim of acquitting Marxists of atheism.
The new version of his doctrine came in the introduction to his book *Zagadnienia istotne* in 1954. At this time Pax was the only group still operating. In 1953 Cardinal Wyszynski was imprisoned, Znak was closed, its *Tygodnik Powszechny* and Caritas (a corporation run by the Episcopate) were handed over to Pax. Piasecki closely collaborated with Brystygerowa from the Ministry for the Interior and, as Swiatlo claimed, he carried out 'dirty actions' against the Episcopate, such as blackmail and espionage. For these reasons Piasecki's doctrine was often seen as not his own invention but formulated under the instruction of security forces. Nevertheless, the doctrine resembled the *Falanga* programme and at least its final form was produced by Piasecki himself.

Piasecki claimed that Catholicism had no social doctrine of its own but a moral responsibility for social affairs. The moral philosophy was put into practice by a political movement which, in return, often helped to interpret Catholic principles. This happened in the 1940s when the Marxist movement and the victory of socialism revealed, in his view, certain deficiencies in the interpretation of Catholic principles up to this time.

According to Piasecki, the Church had placed too much emphasis on the motif of redemption while overlooking the motif of creation. This had resulted in 'several, far-reaching, social consequences'. Christianity, he stressed, consists of two orders. The order of redemption, in which through God's grace man achieves salvation, and the order of creation, in which man can continue God's act of creation. The Marxist philosophy of work perfectly corresponded, he held, with this forgotten order of creation. By focussing on redemption Catholicism had neglected the possibility of progress and the betterment of life
on earth. This blindness to the optimistic, Promethean aspect of Christianity resulted from a lack of proper social philosophy matching its order of creation. So far, he claimed, no social ideology proposed a new, creative approach to work. Catholic theology explained labour as a punishment for original sin. But this was an improper interpretation of the creative character of work based on false social ideologies.29 God could be praised, he went on, by a continuation of God's act of creation, by, as he called it, 'ontological worship'. He contrasted this worship to 'intentional worship' which consisted of acknowledging God's existence and participating in the congregation. The hitherto dominating role of worship was not sufficient. Full praise of God required continuation of God's creation, production of a better world for man. By the distinction between intentional and ontological types of worship Piasecki supported the controversial thesis that Marxists were not the enemy of God.

Piasecki's arguments started from the presumption that an adversary of God could only be someone who acknowledged the existence of God but did not want to serve Him. Consequently a person who did not acknowledge the existence of God could not be God's foe. Such a person 'could however be a supporter of the ideological function which the notion of God played in a given epoch'.30 He concluded from this that Marxist atheism was not directed against God but against the social role which religion played in the contemporary world. On the other hand, the ontological worship of God might be the work of believers or non-believers, irrespective of their intentional position. In this, he stressed, lay the essence of the universality of Catholic doctrine: non-believers could worship God even better than declared believers. Marxist atheism was directed against the role of religion
in history, against the misinterpretation of Christian spirituality but not against God. In his doctrine atheism does not seem to be possible at all. His reasoning appears to differ only slightly from Wyszynski's criticism of atheism, when in his address of 3 August, 1964 on the fortieth anniversary of the Primate's ordination he said: 'You may have a scientific theistic philosophy, but not an atheistic one, since there can be no true science a nihilo. Even a beginner in metaphysics would understand that the first requirement of any subject of a science is that it should exist. And here they try to talk about a science without either a material or a formal subject'.

Piasecki approached this subject from another point of view. By playing down Marxist atheism he wanted to unite believers and non-believers in the service of God and nation and, therefore, to force them to follow only the party capable of joining Catholicism with Marxism. His universal doctrine was thus not the basis for subordination of the Church to the Marxist regime but rather for claiming sole political power.

Piasecki was criticised for this ideology only by Catholics; Marxists ignored his theory altogether. For Catholics, the admission of the equality of believers and non-believers in the worship of God was the most crucial point of Piasecki's doctrine: it undermined the very reason for the existence of the Church. If man can worship God through work and the Church is merely concerned with the intentional type of worship to be a member of a congregation may be insufficient or unnecessary for Catholics. Furthermore Piasecki's doctrine also undermined the role of Christ the Redeemer; man could gain salvation
by working for his own good. I.M. Bochenski, being himself convinced of the Christian origin of Marxism, accused Piasecki of heresy and the Vatican became alarmed.\(^{32}\) Piasecki's book and periodicals were condemned by the Holy See in the Decree of June 8, 1955. Further theological difficulties related to the secularisation and misinterpretation of the relationship between God and man. Piasecki's theory, according to Naurois, created a surrogate of religion in which God was given second place to man. This conversion Naurois has called an enormous mystification, which even an honest Marxist would not accept: 'On n'invite pas Dieu à tuer Dieu'.\(^{33}\) As has been mentioned, Naurois sees it as part of a general plan to overthrow religion and put Marxist doctrine in its place.

Theological criticism of Piasecki's views was inseparable from its rejection for political reasons. In the political context of the early 1950s Piasecki's idea of uniting Catholicism with Marxism was primarily seen as an attempt to subordinate the Church to the Marxist regime. However, this accusation was not entirely justified. He had tried not so much to support the regime as to demonstrate the necessity of handling political power over to his group. That this was his original ambition, may be supported by the following observation. He wanted to present the group's ideology as his sole invention; contemporary discussions of related subjects did not interest him. Further, Piasecki himself was openly stating his political ambitions.

In Piasecki's interpretation of Marxism and Catholicism the most important part is his analysis of the ethos of work. He founded his doctrine on the claim that the philosophy of work had been developed by Marxism and in this he was right, if he understood the
primacy of Marxist philosophy in a chronological sense. There was a monastic tradition, for example the Benedictines, of cultivating work as a kind of prayer but the development of Catholic social doctrine in the nineteenth century had not only been stimulated by, but had been a direct response to, the questions raised by Marxism. On the other hand, if he had in mind more recent Catholic philosophy or theology, he was mistaken. The punitive interpretation of work had ceased to be dominant in the early 1940s and one of the heralds of the new theology of work was Cardinal Wyszynski. Immediately after the war, in 1946, Wyszynski published a book **Duch pracy ludzkiej** (The Spirit of Human work), in which he underlined the necessity to take as a pattern the non-Catholic countries which, by a different attitude to work, had achieved great wealth.³⁴ For Wyszynski, however, this did not mean following their example uncritically. On the contrary, he claimed that a purely materialist approach to work diminished its creative functions and produced a dream of society with no compulsion to work, a social order in which work could only be a pleasure.³⁵ According to him the communist dream had been born of a mechanical and utopian negation of capitalist materialism. Work must not be either pure pleasure or pure mechanical fulfilment of duty. Properly organised, work provided an opportunity for individual development by struggle with resisting matter and for the integration of the individual with society. For Wyszynski, as for Marxist Georg Lukács, work by its nature united people and was the ontological base of society in which a project was realised, and that 'which ought to be' took real shape. He stressed that 'Work...is the participation of man not only in the act of our redemption but also in the act of creation...in the act of transforming the world created by God'.³⁶ In spite of this close
resemblance Piasecki nowhere referred to Wyszynski and this omission, together with the merely superficial presentation of these problems, prompts the conclusions first, that he wanted to direct attention not to Catholic ideas as such but to his group and second, that he had created a place for Marxist ideas within Catholic doctrine for purely political reasons. But also his interpretation of Marxism was not relevant to the discussion of the 1940s-50s. An interpretation of Marxism as the ideology for creative transformation of the world might be acceptable within general Marxist tradition but could not be identified with any official Polish or Soviet interpretation at that time. His efforts to juxtapose Catholicism and Marxism are readily apparent in the following quotations, taken from Essential Problems (a collection of articles from 1945-54). 'Catholic philosophy and the philosophy of Marxist materialism acknowledge the existence of objective human tasks and needs. Both philosophies are normative - the tasks of humankind which they describe must be realised under the sanction of betrayal of the foundation of morality'. 37 'From the universality and realism of both the world views under discussion arises, among other things, a need for the realisation of the following truth: massive efforts of will and intellect should progressively master history and nature...to free every man from necessity'. 38 Marxism, on this interpretation, involves a voluntarist but at the same time normative moral command: the subordination of the individual to the laws of history and the simultaneous pursuit of freedom. Deprived of its militant atheism, determinism and dialectical materialism, Piasecki's interpretation of Marxism did not resemble Stalinist ideology. In brief, Catholicism and Marxism are presented, in general terms with no concrete specifications, as two Promethean world views.
Neither did Piasecki refer to the well-known Promethean concept of work discussed by Kamil Cypman Norwid, a nineteenth-century poet and philosopher or, in relation to Catholicism and Marxism, to Stanislaw Brzozowski's ideas. Norwid's and Brzozowski's ideas created an ideological background for the 1930s group Art and Nation. Piasecki sympathised with this group, which included such writers as Kamil Baczynski and Tadeusz Gajcy, who both died in the Warsaw uprising in 1944, in which Piasecki also took part. Omission of any references to these indicates that he was not interested in purely philosophical discussion.

On several occasions Piasecki supported the claim that the Marxists should hand over political power to his group with the following reasoning: 'It is clear that the existence of two world views in one nation could cause a severe weakening of its power'. But he also maintained that he could not see a reasonable prospect of converting Marxists to Christianity or Catholics to materialism. Therefore the difference could only be overcome by a third ideology. He twice tried to force Catholics and Marxists to acknowledge his policy. In 1953, when most Catholic periodicals and institutions were closed and six months before Wyszynski's arrest, he felt quite safe in trying to force the Hierarchy to acknowledge his theories, arguing that 'the conscious co-operation of the Hierarchy in the work of those Catholics...who, with full conviction, collaborate with a state dedicated to socialism...may secure that the authority so necessary for the Church will be not only formal but also ideologically reinforced'. At that time Piasecki did not test Stalinist acceptance of his ideology. In the 1950s, official Marxist ideologists saw no possibility of reconciling Marxism with religion, labelling such a
conjunction a 'perfidious trick' or a 'creation of phantasy'. During the dramatic days of the Polish October Piasecki still supported the Stalinist faction in the PUWP, hoping that finally it would again control the Party, and promoted his own understanding of the 'Polish way to socialism'. 'The history of People's Poland equates the terms "people's" and "national". At present the terms "people's" and "national" carry the same meaning of Polish patriotism. Poland in the national sense is the People's Poland and vice versa'. He also claimed that it was not just for patriotic reasons that progressive Catholics had participated so fully in constructing the socio-economic socialist system but also as an authentic ideological socialist force. He put it more decisively in "Słowo Powszechne" (10 May 1957): 'A patriot who is not a socialist is a reactionary, opposed to Poland's national interest; a socialist who is not a patriot is a dogmatist infected with an inexcusable and ideologically false cosmopolitanism'. But again his political sense played him false. His affiliations to the Stalinist faction and his criticism of the revisionist movement jeopardised the very existence of Pax and brought great personal tragedy to Piasecki when an unknown group kidnapped and murdered his son. Piasecki somehow survived and when the October period of liberty was over, he again started to propagate Pax's ideas. In a series of articles published in the 1960s he insisted that the future development of socialism in Poland depended greatly on the alliance of the PUWP with the progressive Catholics. He wrote: 'It is beyond question that the Polish state apparatus belongs to and is created by the two world views...and those who for the last twenty years have built up socialism under the direction of the Party have achieved a range of ideological and political joint-ownership (wspolgospodarzy)'. Elsewhere he stated: 'Power in Poland
should be shared between those who are supported by millions — i.e., by the PUWP and Pax. His arguments ran as follows. Polish authorities would not succeed in securing full subordination of or control over the Church. The exclusion of Catholics from a share of power might also significantly diminish their success in building socialism. But if they took the risk of sharing power with the progressive Catholics the Polish experiment, besides producing advantage to the nation, might attain a universal meaning for a world in which bourgeois cosmopolitanism and liberalism were, as he saw it, clearly in a state of disarray. The alternative could only be an ideology unifying the materialist strength of Marxism with the spiritualism of Catholicism. At this time he even more strongly urged the Episcopate to surrender its political power to Pax. When Wyszynski, in a memorial (6.6.1963) to the French Episcopate which evoked many controversies, accused Pax of collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior Piasecki answered in an open letter to Wyszynski (4.8.1964): 'It is an unfortunate confusion... by Cardinal Wyszynski that it is considered necessary for him to hold, along with religious authority, the function of political representative of lay Catholics... We are convinced that the situation of the Church in the People's State has been decided and will be decided overall by the ideological and political attitude of the masses of lay Catholics'. He was insisting that only Pax has a full right to represent Catholics politically. Further, he persuaded the PUWP that, after the elimination of the Hierarchy from the political game, Pax would not disappear but would rather develop increased force in Polish politics. He underlined the impossibility of any stable regulation of Church-State relations if the state treated the Episcopate as an ideological partner. In Secret Instructions for the Board of Pax (1966) Piasecki proposed
a plan according to which the seizure of power might occur in three stages. First, he predicted, in the near future the communist party would allow an election in which only groups accepting socialist ideology would participate. Second, those groups which did not stand firm on the socialist position would be deprived of social support and eliminated from competing for political power and finally PUWP would have to acknowledge the association with Pax. The Instructions were smuggled overseas together with the programme of the illegal Communist Party of Poland founded by Kazimierz Mijal in March 1966. This underground Communist Party demanded increased ties with Albania, whose 'admirable adherence to principle resisted the brutal pressure of Khrushchev and stayed faithful to Marxist ideology'. This party described Gomulka's regime as an open betrayal of socialism 'made by the Jews and Polish nationalists'. The two ideologies closely corresponded with each other and their publication in a single book gave a good indication of how Piasecki greatly admired totalitarian regimes and a 'hard' ideological line. In the Instructions of 1966 Piasecki had also expressed dissatisfaction with the existence of other Catholic groups in Poland. He wrote: 'The Movement of Progressive Catholics can see no benefit from the existence of many Catholic political groups and will attempt to unify them...'. Pax accused Znak of holding an 'abstract and dogmatic' political position. One of its members, Jozef Wojcik, writes: 'I have a valid accusation to make against Tygodnik Powszechny. Not everyone who directs his efforts towards a solution of the ideological problems of socialism is doctrinaire. But certainly anyone who takes a static position on ideological problems and is an adherent of a doctrinaire, dogmatic and non-progressive understanding of socialism, as a result of which he stays beyond socialist
forces, is truly doctrinaire'. Piasecki carefully prepared Pax for the future government of Poland. After 1960 every event, every fluctuation of power in the Party and every strategic movement was monitored and discussed. In 1971 he published a set of articles covering the whole spectrum of these problems, which proves that he had not basically changed his policy since the time of Falanga. He wrote in 1968, for example, that 'the presence of Zionists in the apparatus of power - as the present experience has demonstrated - is extremely harmful to the interests of the state and nation'. Elsewhere in the book he reminds the reader of the German threat to the Polish state and repeats, in the same words as in 1935, his conviction that the continued existence and power of Poland depend on its participation in the current dominant political ideology of the world.

Piasecki did not succeed in seizing power. The events of 1968 and 1969, leading to changes in the political line of Gierek's regime, destroyed his chances. From 1970 Pax ceased to stir up ideological controversies and was better known as a publisher than a political group. But the group continued its totalitarian policy and even Piasecki's death did not mark the end of its belief in the ideological salvation of Poland. Zenon Komender, the present leader of Pax, underlined the point that it was the only group in Poland to keep a firm and consistent ideological position and stressed that today's crisis should be seen as the direct result of a departure from Marxist ideology. He did not mention the group's co-operation with radical opponents of the regime during the Solidarity period, for which the former leader, R. Reiff, was dismissed at the meeting on 23 February, 1982. Although Reiff and Komender supported different political groups, they were united in detestation of a party, 'weak and divided into factions,
hesitating and of deprived authority', as Reiff described it.

Piasecki elaborated his doctrine nearly twenty years before the theology of liberation took full shape, but his ideas might be composed with the ideas of Guterriez, Ferrie, Maltman, Metz and others. The liberal theologians also adapted Marxist social philosophy but, as even superficial discussion demonstrates, for different reasons and purposes. The main difference between the traditional and radical theologians lay in their interpretation of the Bible. By the most radical it was no longer considered as a message capable of interpretation only in purely theological terms but as a book describing certain spiritual, social and moral situations, whose message could therefore be read and interpreted consistently from a variety of perspectives. The recently issued collection of texts of radical theology mentions at least four such perspectives: sociological, psychological, hermeneutical and Marxist. A partial desacralisation of the Bible arose from the recognition, as J.L. Segund put it, 'that there is an empty space between the conception of God that we receive from our faith and the problems that come to us from an ever-changing history'. J.P. Miranda, one of the contributors, concluded from this that the empty space should be eliminated through revolutionary change. He wrote: 'In both Marx and the Bible, the basis of all thought is this thesis, which is the most revolutionary imaginable: sin and evil are inherent in humanity and history, they began on one day through human agency and they can, therefore, be eliminated'. Marx and Engels, according to him, had developed original Christian ideas in spite of their declared atheism. It was Marx, in fact, who had made the concept of God irrefutable, a new image of God as justice, which is realised throughout history.
Piasecki was not interested in interpreting the Bible as a source of revolutionary ideology. On the contrary, he searched for justification of the existing state of affairs, for absolute values which could help to create a hierarchical organisation of society and absolute totalitarian government. His interpretations were not progressive but conservative. He even strove to observe the limits on permissible interpretations of Catholic doctrine and had his articles checked by a well-known theologian. But Piasecki did not escape condemnation, mainly because he advanced his doctrine in the time of the 'cold war' when it was suspected of weakening the Church. Criticism of the theology of liberation in the Instruction of 3.9.1984 concentrated mainly on the bringing together of Bibliocal redemption and the class struggle and warned that revolution did not automatically produce just social relations (Chapter XI, point 10). Piasecki would accept no secularisation of Bibliocal content because, most of all, he needed the absolute values of religion for his doctrine. He indicated that the existing interpretation of the Bible was unbalanced, emphasising one of its aspects over all others. He also, unlike contemporary theologians of liberation, never claimed to be attempting to reform official Church doctrine or that he represented a reformist movement within the Church. On the contrary, he frequently underlined the fact that he represented the Front of National Unity, the body created by the PUWP, that he separated himself from the reactionary clergy and that he did not want to involve the Church in, but to restrain it from, politics. Liberation theology was not the focus of his attention, even when he claimed that 'the basic criterion of progress for the contemporary Christian is participation in struggle or work for social and national liberation', substituting, on every occasion, social with national terminology.
In his activities Piasecki gained the support of neither the PUWP nor the Church. He was not even popular among people promoted by Pax. Graham Green, who visited Poland at Piasecki's invitation in 1955, said: 'My impression of Piasecki is rather negative...Generally speaking it does not seem to me that the leaders of Pax are trustworthy people'. Piasecki required military discipline from the ranks of Pax. In 1955, when some members - among them Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the future leader of Wiez and Janusz Zablocki, the future leader of ODISS - disagreed with their leader they had to leave Pax. Piasecki alone took responsibility for Pax's policy; blame was not usually transferred to deserters when they separated from the group. The Polish Hierarchy has been more cautious in its criticism of Pax than emigre circles. In 1950 Jan Nowak of Radio Free Europe asked the Episcopate in Poland for recommendations on how to deal with the Pax question. He was told that while there were probably communist agents in Pax, the group as such was not schismatic; that they had helped to set up the agreement of 14 April 1950 and wanted to persuade the communists not to treat Catholics as enemies of social progress. Nonetheless Nowak remained convinced of the interrogative role of Pax and its co-operation with the Soviets. In his review of Nowak's book, referring to these problems, Kisielewski wrote: 'I cannot...agree with the one-sided and demagogic judgement of Pax and Piasecki. I do not think that it is proper to give such a strict and authoritative verdict'. Pax's position is far more complicated than many writers like to admit. From one point of view Piasecki's attempt to take over political power from the Marxists was a complete failure. He did not gain support but if he had carried out his activities in a different political environment or had had at least a political sense as strong as his ideological convictions, his
ideas would not have been so decisively rejected. Bromke sees Piasecki's ideology as 'falling into the trap that lies in the path of every political realist' and supports this with the observation that Piasecki 'as an avowed Catholic...could not admit to the same motivation [as Marxists]. He had to justify [Pax's] activities in terms of pure political realism...thus the Pax leader not only lost his chance to gain political support but also his integrity. In the eyes of the Poles, Piasecki ...embraced a position which they labelled "Quislingism". It seems, however, that not his political realism but his political idealism should be blamed for his failure.

Piasecki's political cast of mind was totalitarian. He consistently sought the power derived from ideology. His religion was always that of the status quo, of which, as Bruce Lincoln, analysing the relations between religions and revolutions, has said: 'The main goal is to establish an ideological hegemony throughout the state which lies always beyond its grasp, and which meets strong resistance amongst various sectors of the population, particularly those which have most reason to be dissatisfied with the status quo, and those most alienated from the dominant party'. Neither the Church, harassed by the State, nor the PUWP, troubled by the independent Church, could accept Piasecki's ideology, simply because neither was satisfied with the status quo.

While initially similar to Znak's, the political programme of Pax evolved into a totalitarian theory bringing together Marxism and Catholicism. This theory was promoted as a way of achieving power by overcoming the polarisation between Church and Party. Piasecki's group was the only one to co-operate so closely with the Marxists. Wiez,
the group created by young dissenters from Pax, combined certain elements of Znak's and Pax's policies.
4. **Wież: Humanist Socialism**

Nikita Kurshchev's secret speech at the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 gave the green light to the process of revisionism which had been gathering pace since Stalin's death in 1953. The main ideas of the revisionist movement will be discussed in the sixth chapter. The present focus is on the parallels between Marxist and Catholic revisionism.

In Poland Marxist revisionism had two closely related components: the restoration of national policy and the reinterpretation of Marxist ideology. It was a protest against the abuses of power, the openly sycophantic attitude to Moscow and, most of all, against the perversion of Marx's original ideas. The revisionists criticised determinist and 'scientific' interpretations of Marxism making praxis the central category of Marxist thought. According to them, praxis was not the confirmation of theory but revolutionary action, making the world one in which man was not a powerless object of history but an active subject hinging about changes. This emphasis on praxis in the sphere of epistemology deprived ideology of its scientific pretentions. Instead, Marxism became a philosophy of action. A similar transformation of Catholicism from belief in a transcendent God into action for the betterment of life on earth inspired the work of the Wież group.

Wież had been formed by the former members of Fronda, a dissentient group within Pax. The Fronda led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Janusz Zablocki, first appeared in 1953, but became better known in 1955, when Piasecki published his doctrine. Its main characteristic, criticised
by Fronda, was the close association of religion with politics, in such a way that religion was used to justify and confirm political action. This mixing of religion and politics, in Fronda's view, could be attributed to the non-democratic structure of Pax and to the support of the Party's orthodox faction. In two letters to Piasecki, published a month before the condemnation of Piasecki's doctrines by the Holy See, Fronda expressed its disagreement with his ideology. Piasecki would not tolerate this schisma and, in spite of the firm support given him by Fronda after the condemnation, Mazowiecki, Zablocki and six others were deprived of Pax's membership on 9 September 1955. After October 1956, when Gomulka was put into power, Fronda at first co-operated with the Znak group, but it soon became clear that the Fronda would have to create a new group. Znak had not changed its reluctance to create a bridge between the Marxist and Catholic ideological positions. Its members co-operated, but only in carefully selected, non-ideological problems. Pax, on the other hand, insisted on a return to the hard ideological line in spite of the fact that even a superficial observation of the situation should have excluded such a move. Here, in the lack of a forum for discussion with the new Marxism of the 1950s, lay a stimulus for the creation of a new Catholic group. The parallels between humanist Marxism and the personalist philosophy which Wiez adopted as its ideological background harked back to the 1930s. At the same time as Marx's early writings were being published or republished in 1927-1932 Catholics developed the idea of personalism. In the first issue of Esprit, which appeared in 1932, Emanuel Mounier, with a group of Christians, Jews and communists advertised the personalist revolution. This new movement, by concentrating on the universal
value of the person, was to unite a variety of ideological positions. Mounier and his philosophy were well known in Poland before the war but in 1948, after his visit to Poland, Znak thought that his ideas would find few adherents there because, as they suggested between the lines, an adherence to personalist social philosophy could be interpreted as support for the Marxist regime.²

In 1958 the Polish personalist group Wież emerged from the Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia established two years earlier. Initially, the group searched for an ideological compromise with the regime based on the ideas of personalist philosophy, and on acknowledgment of the positive value of socialism. In contrast with Pax, Wież did not want to create a situation of two co-operating world-views in Poland, it propagated rather a pluralism harmonised by personalist philosophy. Unlike Znak, Wież disagreed with Catholic minimalism and supported the maximalist engagement of Catholics in the creation of a new social order.

In the late 1950s Marxists did not pay much attention to Wież's ideas but these ideas strongly influenced the post-revisionist Marxism of the 1970s.³ Also, the Hierarchy did not support the group's modernising approach to Catholicism. For these reasons the group, hoping to gain allies, did not formulate its programme in unequivocal terms. Essentially, Wież followed Mounier's ideas. Esprit was seeking co-operation between groups of different persuasions. It propagated philosophical pluralism. As Mounier wrote:

'Philosophy is no longer a lesson to be learnt, as by force of habit it had become in the scholastic decadence, but a personal meditation which anyone is invited to begin again on his own account. It begins, like Socratic thinking, with conversion - conversion to existence',⁴
Mounier conceived Marxist philosophy as an attack on Hegel's 'spirit of abstraction' and as criticism of the bourgeoisie: for Catholicism to ally itself with the bourgeoisie was contradictory to the spirit of Catholicism, since the bourgeoisie made materialism as a moral stance, whereas in fact it be justified only as an approach to history. The state, according to Mounier should be strong: 'Advocates of personalism', he wrote, 'have sometimes felt that their aspirations ought to be expressed by a demand for a pluralist state, in which the division and balance of its constituent powers would mutually guarantee them against abuse. But the formula is in danger of appearing too contradictory; one should speak rather of a state articulated in the service of a pluralist society'.

He rejected bourgeois democracy as 'an empty play of words in parliament'. His personalism was intended to be 'a new historical idea' which would unite the divided world under one personalist philosophy.

Polish personalists did not develop this philosophy much further. Rather, they narrowed it, adjusting it to accord with the existing political situation. Unlike their French partners, they had to be more careful in the expression of their position. In a situation of growing polarisation between the Church and the State in the 1960s the modernisation of Catholicism was an issue susceptible of various interpretations.

In the first issue of the monthly Wiez (February 1958), the group declared in its editorial 'Rozdroza i wartosci' (Crossroads and Values) that since 'man is of the highest value in the natural order, we want to promote the development of personal values in contemporary life'. Like the Marxist revisionists, Wiez elevated the sovereign subject as the aim of social change. Like the Marxist revisionists,
Wiez did not consider 'man' to be the absolutely free individual of the existentialists. 'Man', they emphasised, is embodied in society and his freedom depends on conditions created in society for the expression of individual personal values. Wiez saw the subordination of the individual to social institutions and values as the main obstacle to such expression, however, they held up the goal of eliminating alienation from socialist society could unite Marxists revisionists and Catholic personalists.

The attitude of the members of Wiez to the Polish political situation then, was as follows:

1. They rejected 'external points of view' which neglected the ideological situation in Poland.

2. They propagated openness towards non-Catholic ideological propositions and rejected the so-called 'intellectual ghetto' of Catholicism.

3. They sought co-operation with Marxists in 'the sphere of primary problems of the human person in a way similar to 'that taking place in France'.

To gain influence, Wiez did not proclaim 'orthodox' Catholicism; it tried rather to rid Catholicism of its 'rustiness' and thus to stiffen its capacity to resist to atheist attack. This, Wiez felt, was the only way to rescue Catholicism in the contemporary world. 'Certain chapters in the history of every nation must be closed for good. Therefore a thought which does not consider the fact that Poland cannot return to a capitalist order is fruitless. However, the problem is to develop the socialist socio-economic order in the most beneficial way for the nation and for human rights, which socialism should serve. In October 1956 a radical turn of policy was
achieved, but in the post-October period there were not only achievements but also failures. We insist that there is no better way of maintaining the achievements than by further efforts towards a reconciliation between the authorities and society'. In this passage, written in the first number of Wiez, the group expressed support for the liberal reforms. It warned that their abolition could result in a permanent break down of communication between the Party and society. But in 1958, when Wiez was created, the liberal reforms had already been halted. Some members of the group, indeed, did not expect a resumption of reforms and started to search for a different option. Janusz Zablocki and his associates argued, instead, that patriotism and national feelings could form a permanent base for co-operation with the Party. At the beginning, this idea, which closely resembled Pax's nationalism did not find support in the group as a whole. In the late 1960s the controversy between Mazowiecki's expousal of liberal reforms and Zablocki's identification with a nationalist faction divided the group and caused a split. Zablocki's ideas, will be discussed first, then those of Mazowiecki's group. In the early issues of Wiez Zablocki, the future leader of ODISS, insisted that the maintenance of the October, 1956, achievements required above all the reorganisation and rationalisation of industry, as 'the struggle for democratisation takes place not in the political but in the economic sphere'. Reorganisation should be based on proper recognition of the national interest, but it should be within the framework of the socialist economy. This article, written in 1958, referred to the ideas of Mieczyslaw Moczar's group, which wanted to restrain liberal reforms and focus on the development of
industry. This group, popularly known as 'partisans', appealed to nationalist feeling, insisting that liberal reforms were the work of a Jewish group acting against Polish interests. In contrast with this support for the 'hard-line' and anti-Semitic faction, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the actual leader of Wiez, argued in more philosophical terms that 'the true defence of man could be achieved only by defending the life of the community' and that the main task of Wiez must be to prevent the depersonalisation of social relations, which in practice meant support for liberal reforms. 11

From the very beginning of Wiez's existence to the late 1960s this controversy between the demand for liberal-moral reform of the socialist system and support for upgrading the economy and for a socialism based on national sentiment dominated the group.

From the beginning, Zablocki tried to take over leadership of Wiez and so force his political philosophy on Wiez. He would have answered Jan Eska's rhetorical question, 'What is the task of religion: self-defence or the shaping of the individual and, later, society?', 12 by saying that the task of religion is to arouse and stimulate patriotic engagement. His dominating idea was to associate personalist philosophy with a nationalist outlook on the intellectual as well as on the political plane. Zablocki promoted his ideas with diplomatic skill; as a basis for intellectual leadership he was preparing a PhD. thesis on Mounier's philosophy under the supervision of Leszek Kolakowski 13 and he gave the title At the Polish Cross-Roads to a selection of articles from 1949-72, adding the adjective 'Polish' to the title of a programmatic article from Wiez. In this way he tried to show that personalism was not an abstract search for values but that it had to be considered in national terms. When Andrzej Micewski
completed a book which gave the impression that he supported a strong political power based on national legitimacy,\textsuperscript{14} and tried to demonstrate that personalism does not need to be deprived of a national flavour, Zablocki took over the book from the edited version published in the series Wiez and published it under his own auspices. Subsequently, according to Micewski, he used it to contribute to the disintegration of Wiez, which embarrassed Micewski and finally led to the latter's withdrawal from co-operation with ODiSS and Wiez.\textsuperscript{15}

Zablocki made clear his nationalist philosophy in the English version of the Marxist periodical Dialectics and Humanism. 'The personalist attitude', he wrote, 'demands to note and accept in the national ties and patriotism true values for the person. It is also from this perspective that one must see and evaluate the contemporary ... renaissance of national cultures ... In this reflection, finds its expression the feeling that a national community includes certain values which no other can furnish and that in the process of the unification of the world, alongside all material profit and facilitations of life, those values can be lost and destroyed. At the source of the vitality of national ties there lies thus not only the strength of a historical chaos, as cosmopolitan critics tend to claim, but also the fact that it defends and expresses certain rightful aspirations of every human being. It hence has a profound personalist meaning'.\textsuperscript{16} In a pamphlet written in Rome in 1978, Zablocki accused the Catholics, the lay opposition and other groups of not acknowledging the ultimate value of the nation, the existence of which, even as a state with only limited sovereignty, is the highest value. Promoting the idea of 'selective support' for the initiatives of the Marxists,
he rejected co-operation with the lay left which, 'being defeated in the battle to seize the Party, is seeking a new alliance'.

He concluded by recalling the Liga Polska (Polish League), the predecessor of the National Democracy, whose revolutionary programme was based on a nationalist philosophy. His national philosophy was not entirely in tune with Mounier's hope that 'the world is in fact becoming more and more international' and that achievement of this internationalism 'is one of the aims of the personalist movement'.

Besides his nationalist interpretation of personalism, he differed from Wiez in the application of Mounier's ideas to Poland.

In the ODiSS (Center for Documentation and Social Studies) programme set out in the first issue of its periodical Chrzescijanin w Swiecie (The Christian in the World) in September 1969, the group defined its role as 'filling the gap created by the present weakness and inadequacy of lay Catholicism'.

ODiSS saw two areas which were insufficiently developed. The first was concerned with 'religious spirituality'. Although, the group claimed, Polish Catholicism was influential in political and social life and although 'the nation is Catholic, Catholicism as such is absent'. It was not the hostility of the authorities to religion that should be held responsible for this separation of Catholicism from the everyday life of the people; it was the passivity of Catholic intellectuals. The Catholic groups, focussing on politics inhibited the development of a national religiosity. The second underdeveloped area, for ODiSS was the engagement of Catholics in active support for the development of the national economy. The 'clean hands' complex interfered with full participation in the creation of a new social reality. Purely intellectual engagement, without
taking the moral risk attached to political decisions, could lead to a 'moral perversion of the engage position'. The group stressed that reading the signs of the times from a Catholic perspective and active participation could prevent this stagnation and resolve the dilemma of Catholics. Zablocki postulated that the ideas of Gaudum et Spes had essentially been realised by the Marxists in Poland. Further, if they introduced and guaranteed the principle of pluralism in politics, the fulfilment of the Catholic engage position would not meet with any obstacle. Initially, in line with his personalist philosophy, Zablocki did not want to create a fully-fledged political party but rather a 'para-political movement' which would influence political decisions and their execution. According to him participation in the Front of National Unity (a socio-political organisation established to integrate satellite parties in 1952, restructured in 1956 and abolished in 1983) was the best means of Catholic engagement in politics. The acceptance of the Front as a forum for the participation of Catholics in politics exposed him to strong criticism in emigre circles and from some Catholics in Poland. But neither the critics in Poland nor those overseas rejected his ideas completely. Unlike Piasecki, Zablocki was active in the 1970s when Marxist ideology ceased to form the exclusive basis of industrial planning and cultural development. The regime was much more liberal; it co-existed more easily with a variety of positions within the institutional and legal framework of socialism. The Church, more powerful and representing the human rights issue, was not afraid of becoming involved and welcomed Zablocki's mediations with the regime. Additionally Zablocki strongly defended the independence of Catholic
intellectuals, holding that they should have the right to develop their own independent ideas and that this right should be defined within the Church. After 1919, lay Catholics had been seen only negatively as non-clerics, a perception not changed by Vatican II, although that Council advised the clergy 'to ... recognise their [lay Catholics'] experience and competence in the different areas of human activity, so that together with them the clergy will be able to read the signs of the time ... Priests should also confidently entrust to the laity duties in the service of the Church, allowing them freedom and room for action'. The Church became more open to lay Catholics, but formally their rights remained undefined. According to Zablocki, without such positive definition the laity would not be able properly to fulfil its task of helping the Church to 'regain its lost position in the world'. This demand was a part and parcel of Zablocki's later efforts to establish a Catholic association. 

Like the leader of Pax, Zablocki aspired to represent the whole Catholic movement in Poland. One successful step towards achieving this ambition was to take over control of the club of deputies, Znak. In 1968 Znak's declaration in defence of students exposed the group to attacks by other deputies and caused the resignation of Jerzy Zawieyski, one of its prominent members and founder of the Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia, from the post of vice-chairman of the National Council. This changed the emphasis in Znak's policy from selective co-operation to opposition to the regime, and in practice left the official representation of Catholics to Zablocki's group. Znak's move to opposition happened in the atmosphere of the 'Jewish' controversies. Znak was criticised by Pax for supporting
'Zionism' which, according to Piasecki, 'wanted to push the country into anarchy and finally to a coup d'état ... The presence of Zionists among the authorities in our country is, as the present experience shows, extremely harmful to the interests of state and nation ... We are grateful to the deputies of Znak for the fact that, in their declaration they did not mention the Catholic world view. Most loyal citizens have a basic political instinct; they understand the socialist and patriotic lines of the Party and all its allied forces'. Using the anti-Jewish fever, Pax attempted to discredit Znak. Zablocki, on the other hand, blamed Znak for its involvement in a controversy of no concern to Catholics. He considered the March 1968 student rebellion as the effect of an internal conflict between the liberal-Jewish and national factions within the Party. Nevertheless, he himself did not escape accusations of anti-Zionism. When it became known that he and Micewski had written an article entitled 'For National and Social Authenticity', as yet unpublished, their criticism of Znak was read as presenting an active anti-Zionist position, although Micewski explained that this had not been their intention. Zablocki expressed his nationalist philosophy more carefully than Pax, and this allowed him greater flexibility in political controversies. In 1976, when Stomma, the only deputy to abstain voting for the amendments to the constitution, had to resign Zablocki and ODiSS largely displaced Znak in the election of 21 March 1976.

In the late 1970s and 1980s when Solidarity was formed ODiSS enjoyed several political successes. Zablocki led the new Znak in the Sejm, Jerzy Ozdowski, a member of ODiSS and professor of economics at the Catholic University of Lublin, was appointed a Deputy Prime
Minister (the first Catholic in this position), the group's periodical Chrzescijanin w Swiecie increased its frequency of publication and a new periodical, Lad (Order), was established. Prior to the appointment of Ozdowski there had been prolonged negotiations between Church and State, aimed 'at restoring confidence in the government' at a time when social unrest and opposition to the government was growing. This appointment of a member of ODiSS, (made after consultation with Wyszynski) might suggest the support, or at least the approval of the Hierarchy, for the nationalist policy of the group at a time when Znak and Wiez were involved in collaboration with the opposition. After the appointment, a Spanish weekly, Cambio, published interviews with Ozdowski and Turowicz who represented a centralist position in Tygodnik Powszechny. Ozdowski emphasised the trust which Wyszynski had expressed to him personally and said that Wyszynski had promised him full support in the face of public opinion in Poland and in the world. No other group enjoyed such support in the early 1980s. In the next issue of Cambio (5.1.1981) Turowicz said: 'Mr. Ozdowski is a member of the Znak group. I have always been attached to the old Znak which does not acknowledge the new Znak as authentic. We are not very happy with this nomination. It is a slightly ambiguous situation'. The fact that not Znak, but ODiSS, had a representative in the government indicated the policy of the Church towards participation of Catholics in the events of the 1980s. It is appropriate here to digress from the time frame of this work and focus on the activities of the Catholic group in the 1980s, first because observation of the channels by which the Episcopate influenced politics may give a clue to its attitude towards the Catholic groups and secondly because Zablocki's movement played a significant role in those events.
In *Zycie Warszawy* (16.4.1981) in an article 'Pluralist Society and the Secularity of the State' written after Walesa saw the Pope and Jaruzelski who meanwhile had replaced Pienkowski as Prime Minister, Zablocki claimed: 'the Polish Episcopate does not consider this moment of attenuation of the state authorities suitable for settling accounts with them'. In another article ODISS (after January 12, 1981 renamed Polski Związek Katolicko-Społeczny, Polish Catholic-Social Association) criticised the cooperation of the Solidarity movement with the opposition. After the Solidarity Congress, at which Walesa was reelected chairman but where it also appeared that more radical forces were influencing Solidarity and pushing for the creation of a 'Self-Governing Republic', Zablocki wrote in *Lad* (4-11 October 1981): 'The true relationship of Solidarity to the Church can be verified, not by the presence of religious symbols in the life of the union, but in their real attitude towards the advice which the Church gives to Solidarity ... There are emerging in Solidarity tendencies ... to false exposition of an alleged threat from the Church and ... attempts to make the movement the exclusive domain of the lay left ... Cardinal Wyszynski is aware of these problems and the danger which they pose to Solidarity. Therefore he too is often attacked'.

Here Zablocki expressed a realistic but rather unpopular view of the Episcopate. In many publications the Church was described as a definite centre of opposition to the regime. Although to a certain extent this was so, episcopal policy in general must always be distinguished from the opposition of particular priests or particular Catholic circles. The Episcopate in Poland had a strong regard for political reality, in addition to which the Church as a whole
has to focus on its own development, and it is therefore more pragmatic than any illegal group. Hence, Pax was condemned more for its policy than for theological heresy. Znak was approved for its realism, until it became involved in radical opposition. This, too, is why Zablocki's group, notwithstanding its ideological position (which had not been fully accepted by the Church) achieved a good basis of support from the Church from which to advertise the necessity for Catholic political association in the 1980s.\(^{35}\) In \textit{Lad} (6.12.1981) Zablocki proposed that the new Catholic Association should release Solidarity from non-union functions and the Church from direct involvement in politics, promising to help the PUWP in reconciling the nation. Consistently keeping up a mediatory position, Zablocki voted against the imposition of martial law (12.12.1981) and continued his efforts to bring about an agreement.

There was a significant difference between the policies of ODiSS and Pax, in spite of the fact that Zablocki was attached to many elements of Piasecki's nationalist philosophy. After the imposition of martial law, Pax, radically changed its policy and supported the hard-liners who opposed Jaruzelski's reforms. Those responsible for backing the extreme factions of Solidarity were expelled, among them the former leader of Pax, Jerzy Reiff.\(^{36}\) In contrast with Pax, which had acted again in a vacuum, the Chrzesci janskie Stowarzyszenie Społeczne (Christian Social Association), which separated from Pax in 1957, handled its initial policy much more skilfully. It was the only Catholic group considered by the authorities to be 'lawful, patriotic and realistic'.\(^{37}\) Zablocki has received no such praise, yet his group maintains its support of the Episcopate and the centralist factions in the Party. The above
remarks show that no Catholic group in Poland can be held to represent Church policy without consideration of the relevant political context. Reasons of state have always dominated Episcopate policy, regardless of any ideas of reconciliation or opposition; this may be why the Episcopate is so often criticised as conservative. A group which read the signs of the time in this perspective usually found approval. Zablocki's national philosophy with carefully formulated social ideas and support for the regime, matched the Episcopate policy. Wiez, which developed a moral philosophy of opposition, had much less open support of the Hierarchy.

Led by Mazowiecki, Wiez had a different ideology and appealed mainly to the intelligentsia, expecting it to carry on the moral revolution in Poland. The term 'moral revolution' appeared in Wiez publications at an early stage. In the late 1950s, the publicists of Wiez were already writing about the need for conscious moral change at all levels, affecting Marxists and Catholics alike, those who govern and those who are governed. The intelligentsia, as agents of this revolution, had first to be attracted to Catholicism, to be persuaded that in Catholic moral and social teaching it would find stimulation, values and a channel for activity. Popular Polish Catholicism, sentimental and anti-intellectual in character, held no attraction for them. Wiez promoted a different image of Catholicism, more intellectual and often borrowing from the West, especially from the French model. Traditional Polish Catholicism was understood to be a Catholicism of partition, which helped to maintain the national identity, as a Catholicism of Polish patriotism, in short as the Catholicism of the nation. In this model there was little place for 'social' Catholicism, i.e. religion concerned with
social injustice, the liberation of the oppressed, and so on; its basic category was rather the nation. Wiez tried to introduce the category of the individual and history, but the history of the human race in general, focusing on social and not on national problems. Wiez's idea of Catholicism and its relation to earthly affairs was not original; in this, as in other matters, it followed Mounier, who conceived of history as a kind of 'collective sacrament of God's kingdom', with one meaning only and one direction. The nature of the progress of history will always remain unknown yet there are certain observable rules for man to follow. This position excludes equally 'gloomy prophecy and priestly good humour' attitudes which Mounier contrasted to 'tragic optimism' - seeking with no light to guide, journeying without maps, the pursuit of personal development at all costs. In spite of our ignorance of the nature of history, Mounier pointed out, history as communion requires conditions of equality for every human being, conditions which do not interrupt person-to-person contact. The social order should therefore be organised on a personal basis, where relations between individuals are less subject to estranging influences. This order, in contrast with existing societies or orders based on the rules of history. Mounier called the community. There was a difference, according to Wiez, between French and Polish ways of creating a community. In France the transformation of society into a community demanded the overthrow of capitalism; in Poland the transformation had to be achieved within the parameters of socialist reality. This transformation of a socialist society into a socialist community was the task undertaken by the Catholics of Wiez.

The intellectuals of Wiez saw this ideal community as a vision,
according to which the contemporary reality of the socialist Poland was to be judged. For personalists, community was an utopia which neither existed nor could exist but which was a temporary guiding principle in an otherwise anarchic, non-personal world of despair. Against the optimistic Marxist belief in achieving the ultimate social order by means of revolution, and the existentialists' despair about the solitary individual, personalists set the ultimate value of the person and the community, but this value must persist only as a utopian belief. Beside the French tradition, another source of Wiez's ideology can be found in the Polish intellectual tradition of nineteenth century. Edward Abramowski, a philosopher who was under an influence of Marxism, postulated changes of the social order through moral revolution. His philosophy, based on anarchist ideas and a belief that authentic community ties could be strengthened by increasing opportunities for individual self-realisation, stimulated the younger generation of Wiez's intellectuals and Marxist revisionists. Today, Abramowski is considered the spiritual forerunner of Solidarity.

In brief, then, the personalists of Wiez contrasted Marxist scientific ideology with their own affirmation of a utopian ideal. In the 1970s, when Marxism was still the official ideology, though little insisted on, when ideological directives were rather latent and communism had lost its scientific meaning, coming to mean 'gradual economic improvement rather than apocalyptic communist political salvation', utopian personalism attracted a great response. Then, Wiez advocated 'engagement in contemporary history' for socialism, which was a great step forward in the 'emancipation of humanity'. While full of mistakes and bad ideology, socialism was, according to Wiez, a basically advantageous idea requiring serious modification.
It was, in fact, not an order to be overcome but one which provided a basis for personalist engagement.\(^\text{51}\)

Janusz Kuczynski,\(^\text{52}\) Tadeusz Jaroszewski\(^\text{53}\) and other Marxists had expressed reservations about the personalist acceptance of socialism. Jaroszewski suggested that the movement of 'the Catholic left ... wants to exchange the anti-communism of crusades and cold war for the anti-communism of a positive alternative'.\(^\text{54}\) Marxists considered the Wiez engagement on the side of socialism as a tactical, instrumental move,\(^\text{55}\) since Wiez, in their view, in spite of advocating anti-clericalism, aimed at the Christianisation of social life. Nevertheless, this threat mobilised Marxists in the 1970s to create a positive alternative to the ideas of personalism.

Wiez demanded that the Marxist state create conditions for 'individual initiative and social energy',\(^\text{56}\) in other words, the conditions for a pluralist society within the socialist state.\(^\text{57}\) A pluralist society would, on this view, restrain abuses of power in a basically homogeneous state structure. If we compare the demands of Wiez with those discussed by revisionists in the 1950s, we find that they share the idea of socialist self-criticism. The revisionists' and Mazowiecki's styles of writing are closely related. Mazowiecki insisted, and Zygmunt Bauman\(^\text{58}\) and Julian Hochfeld\(^\text{59}\) would have agreed, that the actual level of secularisation of the Marxist state 'is comparable to the level of secularisation characteristic of the first stage of the bourgeois state'.\(^\text{60}\) The main idea was to understand socialism as a value which induces a certain ethos and praxis, and to focus much more on action than on the creation of a consistent ideology. This anti-transcendental spirit, rejecting the theoretical absolute, united Wiez with the revisionists.
Around 1968 most former Marxist revisionists either emigrated, participated more or less openly in opposition, or withdrew into 'psychological emigration'. As early as October 1957 Gomulka had clearly denied intellectuals any significant role in the control of the Party. At a press conference he said: 'You claim that writers are the conscience of the nation ... Comrades, the conscience of the nation is the Party, the Communists. We are also the conscience of the Party, although we are not writers'. Gierek did not repeat Gomulka's mistake. He promoted a wide spectrum of humanist studies under government sponsorship, such as 'The Problem of Polish Culture' (with many sub-branches), 'The Problem of Marxist-Catholic Dialogue', 'The Polish Perspective until the year 2000' and so on. The flow of money to the research institutes draw in the intelligentsia and gave them the impression of real involvement in Party policy.

Turowicz highlighted the new conditions of the so called 'period of normalisation' in his Mickiewicz Memorial Lecture at Carleton University (27 October 1971). 'As Poland ideologically becomes a more and more pluralist society, we need a more open attitude in the Church. We have to change the image of the Church viewed as a beleaguered fortress, defending its rights. A strange kind of fortress, by the way, easier to leave than to join. What is needed now is a Church seen rather as a stimulant by which human society is being reshaped from inside, a Church more concerned about man's rights than about its own'. He added: 'It is evident that the old patterns of Church involvement in politics could not be operational in socialist or communist countries. They would unavoidably lead to political confrontation, and result in a political conflict the Church could not win, because in the strictly political sphere, the State ... will always be stronger'; therefore, 'It becomes evident that the return
to old patterns and attitudes is no longer possible in the rapidly changing world. Turowicz directed attention to the necessity for reformulating the position of the Church and changing its emphasis on confrontation with the regime to a concentration on the human rights issue within the socialist system. He also suggested that the propagation of those issues, and pluralism, might bring back some believers to the congregation. In the late 1960s Wiez was much more radical, demanding that Marxism narrow its interest to the economy and administration and acknowledge the leading role of Catholic morality in the sphere of international relations and philosophy. The publicists of Wiez did not have in mind Marxist ideology, which did not play a very important role, right before the conflicts at the Gdansk shipyard, they wanted to limit the power of the Party to the control of industry. They saw the resolution of the conflict between Marxism and Catholicism in terms of a division of influence: Catholicism, which had adopted the best ideas of Marxism and developed a universal personalist philosophy, would take over exclusive control of the ideological sphere, while Marxism would be responsible for the economy, allowing external control of the Party's activities while, respecting human rights and social pluralism. It is interesting that the Marxists did not respond to these propositions by pointing out the universality of Marxism. Like Stanislaw Poplawski, the Marxists argued that the Catholic world view is particularist by comparison with the universality of the scientific outlook. 'The world view perspective', he wrote, 'of social development is not pluralism, but the universality of the scientific outlook ... which is gradually shared by all people in the objective process of the ripening of the individual and social consciousness and the overcoming of all mysteries in the interpretation of the world.'
Both Party and Church found the Wiez position difficult to accept, although, during the period of normalisation the former assimilated its ideas better than the latter. Wyszynski rejected Wiez's ideas because of the element of the secularisation of religion which they contained, calling 'the forms of political speculation on religious grounds' a delusion, which considered neither the essence of religion nor political reality in Poland. He pointed to militant atheism which, as he noticed, had not had a great success in Poland, as one of the features which should restrain the adherents of progressivism from propagating too hazardous ideas and warned that 'the threat to faith' is equal to 'cutting off the roots of peace, order and the well-being of the nation'. Wiez did not acknowledge Marxist atheism as a threat to faith but saw it rather as cleansing religion of fossilisations, out-of-date doctrines and a fatal passivity. Atheism, on this view, was not an absolute evil but a permanent element of civilisation, helping religion to preserve a balance with the ongoing processes of change. Put more simply, the Catholicism of Wiez was developed in a context of Marxist ideology and relativised in line with contemporary conditions. The intellectualisation of Catholicism attempted by Wiez attracted some former revisionists and organisers of the 1968 March rebellion at Warsaw University. Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron were then leaders of the Commandos, a youth organisation numbering among its members students whose parents held important positions in the Party and which had little or no sympathy with Catholicism. In the 1970s both these former student leaders had changed their views and started to publish under pen-names in Wiez and Znak. M. Gajka (Kuron) wrote in Znak in 1975: 'God is an accident in my life but the fascination of Christianity is not'. Michnik admitted that Wiez created a
frame for communication between Catholics and the lay left, whereas Znak's policy of neopositivism was 'a serious mistake'.\textsuperscript{70} The attempt to intellectualise Catholicism brought recognition of its morality but no recognition of God. In this reduction the lay left followed Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the German theologian whose ideas had formerly been strongly propagated by Pax. He had argued that, Christ is at the centre of human experience and that man should therefore follow his intelligence and live 'as though there were no God'.

In the 1970s the ideological differences between Znak and Wiez became blurred. A younger generation took over the periodicals from its elders and developed a new Catholicism, one created by a blend of acceptance and rejection of some Marxist ideas, by opposition to the political situation but acceptance of certain of its elements, by the advocacy of human rights and distributive justice; it was, in short, a type of social and political Catholicism created in a Marxist state. The younger members of the group were more ambitious than the older generation. As the poll conducted in 1959 demonstrated, they wanted to broaden the evangelisation of the world which 'alone has the power to build up a humanism encompassing the whole of human kind'.\textsuperscript{71} The difference between the two generations was significant. Older members rejected the creation of political power on the basis of Catholicism: for them, the slogan 'Pole-Catholic' stood for the association of Polish culture with the Latin tradition of Catholicism.\textsuperscript{72} Younger members, on the other hand, tended to define it in terms of opposition to the civil authorities, who neglected human rights. The Catholicism of the younger members of Wiez in the late 1950s found partial expression in the Solidarity movement, where 'Pole-Catholic'
was a distinctive sign of opposition to the regime. The leader of Wiez, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, became the editor-in-chief of the Solidarity weekly Tygodnik Solidarnosc and, together with Cywinski, an organiser of the Committee of Advisors to Solidarity. In this way the development of the political realism of Znak and Wiez's idea of socialism as a community of believers found fulfilment in Solidarity, though it is an open question whether the initial ideas were incorporated into, or simply lost their significance in, the movement.
5. Marxism and the Dialogue of the 1970s

The failure of Znak neopositivism and the development of a philosophy of opposition to government ended a chapter of Catholic-Marxist dialogue. The bloody suppression of strikes in December 1970 and the coming to power of the 'pragmatic' regime created a completely different situation for dialogue. Gierek's new policy and the Vatican's aggiornamento coincided. The adherents of modern Catholicism strove for liberal reforms, reconciliation with the modern world and, as part and parcel of these, dialogue with Marxism. On the other hand, Gierek sought international recognition for his government as uniting all Poles; Catholics and Marxists alike. Dialogue was meant to promote the openness and popularity of Gierek's regime. Therefore, both the Vatican's and Gierek's decisions confined the scope of the dialogue: it should neither focus on difficult internal Marxist-Catholic conflicts nor sharpen controversies; it should rather confine itself to mutually recognised values and ideas. In such a situation, the burden of political responsibility passed to the dialogue between KOR and the intellectuals from Znak and Wiez. The officially promoted dialogue was an adjunct to political decisions; it was therefore, deprived of the vigour of the early post-war dialogue. This separation of the official dialogue from the real problems of co-existence was one reason why Wyszynski and most Catholic intellectuals refused to participate in what they saw as a dialogue of courtesy.

In the earlier phase of the dialogue philosophical ideas had almost immediately become political, in the sense that they constituted political programmes of the groups and were subject to political testing; now, in the 1970s, it was not so. The discussion was dominated by
philosophical, abstract problems loosely related or not at all related, to social reality, to the growing disappointment with and opposition to the regime.

In the 1970s, Gierek relieved Marxist philosophy of the need to perform direct service to the Party. He changed the Party's rhetoric and gave the intellectuals more freedom in exploring so far forbidden subjects, such as the Polish Marxist tradition, pre-war philosophy and Marxist-Catholic relations. For many, the discussion of contemporary Catholic ideas was a more pleasant occupation than a study of Soviet philosophy. This form of intellectual dialogue was not only accepted but passionately supported by a group of Marxist scholars notably those from the Polish Academy of Science and the universities of Warsaw and Lublin. Their engagement in the dialogue was made clear by Tadeusz Pluzanski, who wrote: 'Dialogue, as a form of intellectual contact between Marxists and Christians is, in the Polish situation, not only a condition for national reconciliation but also a condition for the vitality of Marxism'. Another participant, Janusz Kuczynski, insisted that the existence of dialogue would destroy the arguments of the radical right, which was still calling for an anti-communist crusade in the name of the defence of 'the Church of silence'. Both emphasised that a discussion with Catholicism would improve the image of Marxism.

Marxists hoped to modernise and to revive Marxism by encouraging confrontation with contemporary philosophy. Thus Catholic philosophy became a natural ally for many reasons. In 1973, at the XVth World Congress of Philosophy in Varna, Pluzanski suggested that Teilhard de Chardin's *vision du monde* might provide a basis for a discussion of progress which would be conducted in terms which were not purely
The philosophy of Teilhard fascinated the Marxists. His vision united man with nature, technical civilisation with moral values, the individual with society, providing a total idea of society and nature in marked contrast with the intellectual inertia of the official Marxist doctrine. Marxists yearned for such a vision and hoped that a discussion with Catholics would settle this problem. Further, they had encountered some difficulties with their elaboration of the philosophy of man, not only because of the lack of relevant references in the classical works of Marxism. Their humanist breakthrough happened at a time when European thought was dominated by anti-humanist bias. Structuralism-voicing 'the death of the individual', post-structuralism-searching for deconstruction of the logocentrism of Western thought, even existentialism advocating a painful individuality, often are admitted to a Marxist ancestry. Polish Marxist scholars opposed this anti-humanist interpretation, contrasting with it their own interpretation of Marxism as a theory of human practice. Isolated Marxists turned to Catholics who were also dissatisfied with the contemporary anti-humanist bias.

This recognition of Catholics as the natural ally of Marxists did not come rapidly, but the way was prepared by certain changes which occurred in Marxism and by the earlier discussions. Catholic groups had been organising discussions with Marxists since 1956. In April 1960, for example, the Club of Catholic intelligentsia organised a discussion on Catholic philosophy or, again, there was a discussion between Tygodnik Powszechny and Argumenty (a periodical devoted to the criticism of religion) on Catholic universalism. These discussions were not published but they did prepare the ground for a further exchange of opinions. The development of a new Marxist approach to history was
more significant for recognition of Catholic humanism. Until the later
1950s Marxist philosophers, following the Leninist philosophy of
history, had seen the Middle Ages as the 'dark ages', where humanism
was constrained by religious ideology. The allegedly negative role
played by medieval religion was taken to demonstrate its organically
anti-humanist character. In 1955 Jan Legowicz claimed that Aquinas,
engaged in a fight with the lay social movement, turned his back on
reality, on the material and social world, and took up a position of
unconditional fideism, wanting to give the latter its most rational
form. Scholastic philosophy was held responsible for arresting
the development of culture, science and, above all, the humanist outlook.
Thomism, according to Legowicz, served as an ideology used by the
Church to suppress free human activity. This system did not reflect
the true medieval mentality but distorted it for purely political
purposes, those of the Church. In 1979 a different picture of the
Middle Ages was drawn by Legowicz, who concluded his *History of Medieval
Philosophy* with the observation that 'The core of medieval philosophical
thought was, undoubtedly, metaphysics, but ... we should not forget
its primary Aristotelian methodology, which was based on sense data
and scientific experience; "philosophy" as a kind of metascience was
present in the writings of many medieval scholars, among them Thomas
Aquinas.' Legowicz emphasised that the development of science and
culture took place not beyond, or in opposition to, but within the
scholastic tradition. This change of opinion reflected a general
methodological shift in Marxist historiography. The Leninist
dualism of idealism-materialism, itself already significantly modified
in Soviet philosophy under Khrushchev, was replaced by a more flexible
approach. In the new version developed by the Poznan School history was
no longer the exclusive source of meaning but was subject to interpretation according to assumed rules or schemata. Catholic philosophers mostly agreed with such an approach, but the most important thing was that the new approach, by ending apriori consideration of Catholic philosophy as a model of idealism and anti-humanism, opened the way for more serious discussions. Occasionally, in the 1960s, Catholics and Marxists discussed the problems of history and the crisis of civilisation.

But these discussions had poor intellectual outcome and were held for the purpose of demonstrating Catholic support for certain government initiatives. Nevertheless, even then a methodology for future discussions became apparent. Marxists and Catholics usually agreed in their diagnosis of such problems as the destruction of the natural environment or the problem of peace, but differed in the remedies they prescribed. Catholics emphasised the necessity of the moral enhancement of man, whereas Marxists stressed the necessity of rearranging the social order. Each side in the dialogue attempted to demonstrate the capacity of their theory to include the arguments of their opponents. In effect, in the 1970s, the dialogue evolved into a dialogue of attitudes or points of view, in which the characteristic and conflicting features of both doctrines lost their paramountcy. The problem of the destruction of the natural environment was mainly discussed in the framework of the philosophy of labour, as a dilemma of the limited or unlimited growth of production and it did not result in any particular Marxist or Catholic solution. By contrast, the discussion of world peace and the related problem of the meaning of evil in history did yield some results, or at least conflicting positions. The main controversy centred on whether a change in people's moral attitudes,
without a prior change of social structure, would be sufficient to maintain peace. Andrzej Grzegorczyk, a well-known logician from the Polish Academy of Science and an adherent of the Catholic Non-Violence movement, opted for radical individualism. Janusz Zablocki, from ODISS, argued for the need to combine Marxist social theory with Catholic personalism as the guarantee of world peace. The Marxist position, as put by Jaroszewski, was: 'A full and permanent solution to the problem of peace can only be achieved through the elimination of all forms of exploitation and the realisation of the aims of socialist humanism'. The uniformity of the Marxist position contrasted the diversity of Catholic stances in the early 1970s. Nevertheless, Marxist language had significantly changed; socialism was now defined by humanist values and not, as in earlier writings, by economic and historical determinants. This trend was intensified when Marxist scholars worked out a theory which incorporated Catholic personalism. The growing influence of Catholicism on social affairs, after Wojtyla was elected to the papacy, heightened the search for a bridge joining Marxist and Catholic positions. For example Miroslaw Nowczyk stressed that the Pope's policy of moral preparation for peaceful co-existence was sound, though the creation of proper, just social relations was also indispensable. Hence, he argued, the Catholic 'minimal programme' of moral revolution should be united with the Marxist programme of social revolution. The search for ideological reconciliation dominated the whole dialogue in the 1970s.

The philosophical basis of the dialogue of the 1970s was not controversies about materialism (as in the 1940s) but controversies about the eschatological meaning of history and created meaning in history. Two positions dominated Catholic philosophy of history. The first,
for example Josef Tischner's phenomenology of values, emphasised the hermeneutic circle of discovering values and acting according to them. The second, more positivist, insisted on evaluation of plans and programmes in social practice. The two Catholic positions matched comparable positions in Marxism.

Tischner, a phenomenologist from the Theological Seminary of Cracow, claimed that Marxism had accurately described and analysed evil and injustice in nineteenth-century society. In the middle of the 1970s, when the Lay Left had already formulated its ideology, he stressed that Marxism gave hope to the working class and even directed the attention of Catholic philosophy to the problem of labour. In both Marxist and Catholic philosophy labour was not seen simply as the production of goods but was considered as the creation of a new world and a new man. But in contrast with Catholicism, Marxists narrowed their view to the discussion of the socio-economic and material aspects of work. In effect, the Marxist theory of man and society became reductionist, focussing only on 'the dialectics of forces', i.e. on relations between 'contradictory' (opposing) economic and social forces, and neglecting the 'dialectics of values', i.e. the impact of moral and national values on social order and individual life. Due to this neglect of values, Marxism encountered severe difficulties with the philosophy of history. As Tischner has argued, Marxism promoted the overcoming of evil in history through social revolution while failing to provide philosophical foundations for this transcendent position in relation to social reality. In a critical essay on Séve's concept of the Marxist theory of personality, Tischner points out the main difficulties: 'Marx, in Séve's view, states the problem (of person) in quite a different way from the Aristotelians, including Husserl. The
essence of non-human objects (things) is in "the own being" of a given object; the essence of horse is in the horse, the essence of table is in the table. The essence of man is beyond man. Between man and his essence a particular relationship of "adaptation" occurs as man "adapts himself" to his essence, of which social relations are the original abode. Man has had to adapt to an abstract essence which is external to his own being. This mode of thinking about man led to the development of a radical anti-humanist position, of which the 'death of the individual' in structuralism, Tischner claims, was the logical conclusion. Therefore Seve had failed to demonstrate that the anti-humanism of the structuralists was the result of a misinterpretation of Marx. Moreover, it was Sève's theory of personality that was difficult to defend within Marxist parameters. This accusation was clearly levelled against Marxists like Jaroszewski, Kuczynski and Pluzanski, who found supporting arguments for their criticism of structuralism in Sève's theory of personality.

On the other hand Tischner's discussion of Marxism as a philosophy which requires a transcendental adjunct well matched the discussion of Christianity by the KOR group. Their concept of religion as morality realised in social actions exemplified the need for a transcendental dimension in leftist philosophy. As Tischner stressed, traditional Marxism and Thomism had both become obsolete for modern man. Tischner contrasts the 'non-human', 'rational' and imposed sense of history in Marxist and Thomist reflections with that born in the 'situational dialogue between human beings'. The dialogue in which, he claims, evil is detected as an anti-value, that which destroys the good. It is a 'tragedy' when man cannot detect good or predict the possible result of a conflict between good and evil'. Radical philosophical
thought, he emphasises, is a form of preferential mutiny against this tragedy, but one which does not desert or destroy the world; its primary aim is to understand the world.\textsuperscript{16} He advocates a kind of hermeneutics in which interpretation discloses a hidden sense of conflict between good and evil, which would never be expressed in a single theory. In spite of this lack of theoretical support every individual, in his view, possesses the 'sense of reality', all human beings are capable of discovering and realising values. By acting according to these values, and by a critical evaluation of this realisation, man prevents the tragedy and realises the hidden religious sense of history.

Tischner's interpretation partly resembled Marxist hermeneutics. Siemek characterised the circular hermeneutic interpretation-criticism as 'an undivided act of "understanding", in which the demystification of meaning is, at the same time, a penetration of fetishised structures concealing the forms of objects'.\textsuperscript{17} Siemek sought to discover the truth (the Catholic 'good') behind false appearances by assuming certain values. Both Tischner and Siemek acknowledged the existence of a sense in and of history and believed that actions supported by critical interpretations would lead to the overcoming of evil. As in Catholicism Tischner had reduced the gap between the God-above and man, so Marxist hermeneutics reduced the distinction between the 'scientific' idea of communism and everyday social practice. Marxist and Catholic doctrines and institutions became historical, deprived of their 'absolute character'. Even though it was not openly accepted by all scholars, this kind of hermeneutic approach dominated Marxist thought. In Marxist and Catholic hermeneutics, history was understood as a process \textit{in statu nascendi} in which, as Tischner put it, revolution has always resulted from the recognition of new values.\textsuperscript{18} Revolution
did not, as had been claimed earlier, realised discovered laws of history. (Closely related to this concept was Kuczynski's philosophy of the heroic new world).  

Overall, in the 1970s, Catholic and Marxist thought had less distinct intellectuals parameters, although there was a significant difference in scope and orientation. In contrast to the Marxist search for universal ideas Tischner focussed on the particularity of the Polish situation. During discussion of the crisis of values at Castelgandolfo in August 1983, he considered the specific ethos and experience of Polish Catholicism in the history of a nation which had lost its independence but had never come to terms with this fact. He characterised this experience as denkende Hoffnung, a 'thoughtful hope' for the future, which prevented denationalisation and enslavement, writing that 'National enslavement goes deeper than enslavement of labour alone ... national enslavement has the deepest moral sense ... and it is often felt as enslavement of truth'. Here Tischner was reverting to the romanticism of Hoene-Wronski and Mickiewicz, who had seen the history of Poland in eschatological terms. He concluded: 'The conviction that service to the fatherland is, at the same time, a service to absolute values gives this service an extraordinary power. Those who do not serve are sinning'. 'Nation' was the value determining thoughts and actions. The popular romantic vision of the individual who serves both national values and the Christian brotherhood of nations were recalled in Tischner's writings. His attachment to national values was reinforced by the Solidarity movement. In 1981, in The Ethics of Solidarity, he conceived 'independence as the freedom of the individual and the freedom of the country; the independence of the workers is today equal to the independence of Poland'. While Kuczynski and other Marxists promoted the international movement and a
philosophy of international brotherhood, Tischner promoted a philosophy of national feelings and values.\textsuperscript{24}

Czeslaw Bartnik, another Catholic writer, represented a different approach. He saw the imposition of philosophical schemas on history as a great threat to the freedom of man. He wrote: 'Here exists a mystery, the desire to deprive others and sometimes even oneself of freedom in the name of an idea, a passion or so-called absolute truth'.\textsuperscript{25} On the other hand, he did not believe that society can cope without a plan for the future or that such a plan can be born out of a dialogue between individuals. He advocated the creation of professional plans for the future, writing that: 'The concrete modelling of the forms of history, the organisation of economic life and the direction of socio-political affairs ought to be placed in the hands of competent people (with) the proper professional qualities and authority ... All ortho-praxis (praxis fulfilling ideological directives), including historical ortho-praxis, must fulfil certain conditions: in the first place the personality of man both as an individual, and a collective being must be taken into account; secondly, the primacy of the realisation of the highest values of man must be acknowledged; finally, the condition of freedom may never be violated. Under these conditions it will be possible to discover and even create the true meaning of history'.\textsuperscript{26} Schaff immediately responded, trying to calm Bartnik's moral anxiety. According to Schaff, Marxists did not assign arbitrary meaning to history but simply recognised the values and needs of people. 'The point is', he wrote, 'to determine socially the essential goals of social development that would become the system of reference for the evaluation of historical events ... It can easily be seen that this frame of reference for speaking about "the meaning of
Bartnik and Schaff, unlike Tischner and Siemek, wanted to determine socially desirable values, realised in social practice and supervised by the Party. Bartnik did not seek to promote the open society, to abandon ideological directives completely, but wanted to reserve the right to ethical control of their application. Schaff offered a Marxist ideology which expressed the most basic social values. In this way, Schaff and Bartnik paved the way for cooperation between Catholicism as an ethical safeguard and Marxism as a leading political power, the basis for which was a mutual belief in the need for a social vanguard, ideologically equipped to impose and execute meaning in history.

It was a positivist approach, contrasting with the romanticism of Tischner and Siemek which again did not lead to a political reconciliation. The Church became the centre of opposition in a double sense; as an institution through which the opposition expressed its views and as a political centre moderating radical stances. In such a situation the officially sponsored dialogue was of little importance. Otherwise, it demonstrated a diffusion of Catholic ideas in Marxist theory and a certain displacement of Marxist ideology. In order to demonstrate this, some selected concepts of Marxism formed under the influence of Catholicism will be discussed, first, the concepts of Tadeusz Maria Jaroszewski, second, Tadeusz Pluzanski's ideas, then Janusz Kuczynski's vision of the heroic world, and finally Andrzej Nowicki's concept of culture.

Jaroszewski was an initiator of Marxist-Catholic dialogue. Since from 1971 to 1980 he was responsible for the policy of secularisation in the Central Committee of the PUWP and a leading figure in programming the study of Marxist philosophy. His
works on Catholic and existential philosophy brought him a State award in 1970, and a few years later he was appointed Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology in the Polish Academy of Science, a position he enjoyed until 1981, when his colleagues demanded his resignation. In the 1960s, when the Church, celebrating a thousand years of Polish Catholicism, enjoyed popular support and Gomulka, adopting an anti-reform position, was losing popularity, Jaroszewski believed that Marxism could eliminate religion by creating an alternative theory capable of answering religious needs. He acknowledged the gravity and importance of the problems religion dealt with, but wanted to limit, and finally destroy, the competence and authority of the Church.

In the 1960s, he insisted on the use of all available means of repression against the Church hierarchy, while promoting the view that the Party must gently persuade ordinary Catholics to a secular, socialist style of life. He wrote: 'The conversion of society to atheism is not the ultimate aim of Marxism, but it is its aim to educate people so that they can cope without God and religion'. In the time of the most tense relationship between the Church, Jaroszewski advocated the liquidation of all Catholic institutions, irrespective of their political positions. He disagreed with the thesis, popular among revisionists, of the spontaneous disappearance of religion and also rejected the concept of 'ideological indifference in a socialist state'. According to him, the vanguishment of clericalism was only possible if, Marxists widened their ideological front. He went on to argue that: 'We can sympathise and cooperate with the Catholic Left but we have simultaneously to intensify our efforts to destroy their ideology'.

When Gierek began to promote Marxist-Catholic dialogue in 1971,
Jaroszewski abandoned the idea of fighting the Church and saw the upgrading of Marxism as the most important issue. At the VIIth Congress of PUWP, in 1973, he stressed the propagation of 'greater philosophical reflectiveness throughout society', to remedy the declining interest in Marxist philosophy and the growing influence of Catholicism. At that time he was developing a new theory of secularisation, the emergence of which may be observed by comparing two books both published in 1965. In the first, addressed mainly to schools, Jaroszewski disparaged the positive aspects of religion. He accused the Church, in the language of the Stalinist ideologists, of being unpatriotic and anti-socialist and urged that the elimination of religion was a condition for the achievement of national unity. He assured his student readers that empirical studies had already confirmed the disappearance of religion in modern culture.

The conclusions of this propagandist book were in sharp contrast with the conclusions of his next book. In his *Personality and Property: The Ideal of Economic and Social Structure in the Neo-Thomist Approach* religion was discussed as an important social phenomenon, whose future disappearance was not easy to predict. In dealing with religion, Jaroszewski maintained that he was returning to the essential Marx, and his approach did indeed resemble Marx's original ideas, in the Seventh thesis on Feuerbach where the religious temperament itself was considered a social product. This was very different from the popularising scientific atheism of the Soviet Union, where religion was treated as conspiracy, not deserving of serious intellectual analysis. In this and his next book, *Personality and Community*, published five years later, not only was religion seriously discussed but also Marxism was reconstructed in the light of Catholic philosophy. The main purpose of these works was to answer the question: 'How can Marxist
humanism be realised in the contemporary world?"  Jaroszewski observed that there are problems and values at the heart of every form of humanism recognised independently of political and cultural divergences. These contradict non-humanist ideologies such as fascism or racism and their values. In the humanist tradition, Marxism had established a new advanced method of studying man in his social and economic relations. Moreover, Marxist humanism had also broken the passivity and illusoriness of bourgeois humanism by urging the working class to fight for the liberation of mankind. Jaroszewski saw alienation and world peace as the main problems of contemporary humanism. From a review of the most popular bourgeois theories of alienation he concluded that 'The distortion occurring in several contemporary Western theories of alienation arises because they study only the surface of the phenomenon, in culture or in psychology, without analysing it in the wider context of social change'. Marxists not only studied man as a social being interacting with others in a particular socio-economic order, but compelled the change of those social conditions which created alienation.

In his criticism of the bourgeois theory of self-knowledge, Jaroszewski followed Mounier's concept of personality. He argued that self-knowledge was a secondary factor in constituting personality. Self-knowledge was derived from the 'objective praxis of man', from man's struggle with the world of things. Human personality, on the other hand, was generally born and expressed in social relations, where man appeared as an acting being who consciously created his relation to nature and to other people and was responsible for his deeds. The way in which Jaroszewski discussed the Marxist theory of praxis diminished the divergence between the contemporary state of people's
consciousness and the consciousness which ought to be achieved by the revolutionary process. This discussion of Marxist humanism in personalist terms made it more acceptable to Catholics, but also obscured its characteristic historical and economic determinism and its direct connection with working-class consciousness. Marxism became a form of humanism and its function as an ideology legitimising the decisions and existence of the Party was effectively weakened. This weakening caused the gradual displacement of Marxist philosophy in Poland; Marxist philosophy had practically no important ideological function in the late 1970s. More specific references to Catholic personalism started to appear in Jaroszewski's writings in the early 1970s. To find these references it is necessary to start from his criticism of Catholic social doctrine. He argued against Catholic solidarism that in twentieth-century industry the division of complex industrial plants into small individual and craftlike units would not be possible. He saw as indefensible the Catholic appeal to moral conscience (which he called 'the myth of the third way') in a world of global production and centralised economics. A return to the personal, craftlike production of primitive societies could be nothing but a dream. At the same time, he supported the Marxist concept of a classless society as follows: 'It is impossible to verify Leo XIII's thesis that societies with no class differences could not exist or even be conceived. In primitive societies there are no class differences and ... scientific research has shown that such societies have existed for thousands of years'. This argument had a double effect, supporting the Marxist concept of a classless society just as strongly as it implicitly supported Catholic social doctrine. The existence of classless societies coincided with the existence of direct, personal
production and distribution of goods, Catholic and Marxist social doctrine appeared to share the same Utopian features in their plans to return to the past order.

In his next book, Jaroszewski modified the concept of communism and became less critical of Catholic moralism. In his publications of the late 1970s he argued that communism was not a prospect of a future classless society but a humanist idea, engendering values that stimulated critical attitudes and an ethos of social engagement. This idea was similar to the Utopian and moral vision of communism held by Wiez and was meant to contrast to the nihilistic, individualistic and abstract bias of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. The main purpose of the Marxist movement, as Jaroszewski put it, was 'the creation of a new, free and universal man ... the elimination of phenomena which are typical of bourgeois societies, such as rootlessness, estrangement, alienation and the isolation of individuals from one another'. Not the worker, exploited by capitalism, but man, alienated by the development of technology, by the mass media and by the degradation of the environment, was at the centre of his interest. Accordingly, he defined communism in Mounier's terms as 'a revindication of personality and authentic human community'. Jaroszewski claimed that Marx's theory 'translated into the language of modern culture', had the potential to excel any bourgeois theory of alienation. The main advantage of Marxism was its methodology. In spite of this stress, Jaroszewski himself did not use the Marxist methodology consistently; the method appeared unreliable in criticism of Catholicism. He criticised bourgeois philosophy on the ground that it simply reflected the distortions of life in capitalist society, while Catholicism was independent of the social order. He concluded his interpretation of existentialism thus:
'It is obvious that Sartre's visions are a generalisation of the real experience of bourgeois society ... The distortion of human existence in this concept reflects the distortion of human existence in bourgeois civilisation'. Jaroszewski did not apply the same methodology to his criticism of Leszek Kolakowski's penchant for existentialism. Kolakowski, he maintained, had supplemented Marxism with certain existentialist elements, thus aiming at 'anarchic voluntarism'. His interest in existentialism could be explained by 'the law of retortion', (or bending over backwards), that is he and other critics, in reaction to the Stalinist collective approach, had adopted an individualist philosophy. The presence of existentialism did not reflect the real experience of a socialist society but was only a reaction of intellectuals against ideological deviations. The development of Catholicism in a socialist state could not be accounted for in terms of Marxist relativism. Jaroszewski, Jozef Grudzien and other Party officials admitted that religion was 'above the social order'. They saw a broadly-based cooperation with Catholics in both social ideology and practice as inevitable in Poland. Jaroszewski believed that such cooperation, and particularly the acceptance of Marxist social practice, would reduce transcendentalism and harness the power of religion to practical and constructive purposes. He also claimed that Catholics had no option but to cooperate with Marxists. In the late 1970s he instanced as wrong and irresponsible the dialogue between KOR and Wiez, predicting that it would not be acceptable to the Church's hierarchy. With the aim of attracting Catholic intellectuals and winning them away from this 'anti-dialogue', Jaroszewski made significant doctrinal concessions increasingly incorporating personalist language into Marxist theory. For example, he was expressing his concept of social revolution in Mounier's terms when he wrote that 'The fundamental task of revolution
is to remove all obstacles which block the way to the comprehensive
development of the human personality, as well as to abolish the
antagonisms between the community and individuals and to liberate
individuals through the development of an authentic community of
persons'. People might experience this feeling of community
not only 'after but also during the formulative process of revolution'.
The terms 'community' and 'personality' supplanted the revolutionary
theory based on economic and class analysis. He followed further
in Mounier's steps and believed in 1979 that the development of science
and technology evoked a certain hope for the elimination of alienating
work. He wrote: 'The comprehensive development of human personality
is now no longer just a humanistic goal of socialism, but also a
necessary condition for the economics of growth'. Mounier also
believed in progress when he wrote that 'The more technique we contrive,
the more freedom of decision will be required by us'. In spite
of this personalist language and weakening Marxist doctrinal stance,
Jaroszewski was unable to attract many Catholics to his idea of dialogue.
In 1980 Tadeusz Slipko, of the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw,
summed his proposition up thus: 'I have attempted to prove on a wider
scale that the dialogue between humanisms ... represents a great and
noble cultural trend which is, however, fraught with difficulties in
every aspect of its existence. Neither is the contribution of morality
towards shaping the premises for the development of a constructive
dialogue between humanisms free from those difficulties. The encouraging
slogan "let us love each other" is not of much help in this case.
Before the conditions for a cordial exchange between humanisms can arise,
the idea of dialogue must be patiently liberated from accumulated
prejudices, false conceptions, dangerous claims and latent resentments.
But no difficulty, not even temporary failure, can block the way of that idea to the human mind'. For Catholics, Marxism was the ideology of the Party. Even partly liberated from this service, Marxism, burdened with previous sins, still could not be discussed on a purely intellectual level. Catholics demanded proper and wide discussion of ideology, not a humanism which could not be expected to bring any significant improvement of State-Church relations.

Tadeusz Pluzanski, of the Institute of Sociology and Philosophy in the Polish Academy of Science, made no attempt to analyse Marxist philosophy in the wide context of modern currents of thought. He focussed on the philosophy of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin which, for him, created the possibility of meaningful and effective dialogue between Catholics and Marxists. Pluzanski first published an introductory study of Teilhard's thought in 1963. His second book, four years later, was a fully developed study whose aim was 'an interpretation of the works of one of the most famous philosophical writers in the world, - the French Jesuit, paleontologist and philosopher, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, in a Marxist perspective'.

Pluzanski was fascinated by the totality and coherence of Teilhard's vision and even admired its religious bias, because religion was 'an essential element of contemporary society; although often straying into error where social ideology was concerned'. He saw Teilhard's philosophy as the highest achievement of evolutionism. 'It is possible', he wrote, 'by using the terminology of Hegel and Marx, to say that ... Spencer's thought is the thesis (positive, rational), Bergsonism is the negation (irrational, spiritual), whereas Teilhardism is the negation of negation ... which synthesises them "one step higher" in the cult of reason and cognition, the cult of the cosmos, man and spirit.' Teilhard's thought, summarising 'the whole achievement of the evolutionist tradition' did not
oppose Marx.\textsuperscript{58} It was an important and original achievement in Catholic thought, corresponding with Marxist spirituality.\textsuperscript{59} Pluzanski studied Teilhard's idea of global evolution in detail, accepting his vision that its final stage was full harmony between people and nature, that whole processes in the world tended to integration, unification and the creation of a superhumanity. But at the same time he discarded Teilhard's cerebralisation and deification of the cosmos, which resembled the Hegelian philosophy of absolute spirit and could produce an ideology of compromise.\textsuperscript{60} Still, this religious defect of Teilhard's vision did not discharge its revolutionary energy which was founded, as in Marx's thought, on the desire to achieve happiness for all humankind.\textsuperscript{61} He insisted that Marxists must find a way to influence the further development of Teilhard's theory. He wrote that 'The achievement of an essential convergence between Marxism and Teilhard's vision might be possible if the Teilhardian philosophy of praxis meant the transformation of the world by socialisation (in the Marxist sense) and "dynamic morality" meant revolutionary morality, including the disapproval of economic and social exploitation.\textsuperscript{62} Marxism would take from Teilhard his cosmology, his theory of evolution and his optimistic vision of the future, while Teilhard's followers would supplement their theory with Marxist social ideas. Teilhard's vision attracted Pluzanski just as it had attracted Roger Garaudy, who claimed that Marxists might learn from Christianity a faith 'which ensured that man never considered himself to be wholly defeated'.\textsuperscript{63} Pluzanski further propagated the study of Teilhard's thought when Gierek introduced ideological pragmatism which, in Taras's words, 'consisted of, first and foremost, selling society the leadership policy programme'.\textsuperscript{64} There was also a popular tendency not to eliminate non-Marxist ideologies but rather to embody them in new Marxist theory.
Schaff, for example, wrote that Marxism cannot absorb existentialism as part of itself but can and should surmount it by finding proper solutions to those problems which form its essential part. Pluzanski wanted to do the same with Teilhard's philosophy, but his endeavours were not answered by Catholics.

The Marxist fascination with Teilhard's ideas was not shared by Catholics, who studied his synthesis of theology, philosophy and science cautiously and in a more positivist manner. Kazimierz Klosak, a well known critic of Teilhard's philosophy, wrote a series of articles in which he hailed Teilhard as the 'Origen of our time'. He appreciated Teilhard's contribution to the popularisation of 'a purely natural vision of evolution against orthodox Catholic evolutionism', but was strongly critical of his conflation of very different scientific, philosophical and theological points of view. He argued for a clear distinction between the problem of evolution as seen from the phenomenal (scientific) and from the essential (metaphysical) points of view. As in the discussion with Marxists in the late 1940s, so here he opposed the introduction of theology into either scientific or metaphysical inquiry. Teilhard's philosophy was also criticised in a similar way in a set of articles published by Pax. Teresa Rylska and Boleslaw Gawecki attributed the lack of precision and clarity in Teilhard's philosophy to non-scientific, metaphorical language, proposing the introduction of cybernetics or detailed methodological studies, in order to make his philosophy more defined. Unlike Mounier, Maritain and other Catholic thinkers, Teilhard de Chardin did not have a great impact on Catholics. His thought was more readily accepted by Marxists than by Catholic intellectuals, this was also true in the West, where Marxists saw him as the herald of a new dialogue. Roger Garaudy
wrote: 'It is a fact that the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin opens the way for a fruitful dialogue ... from the very outset our dialogue with Pierre Teilhard has not been affected by the prejudices of a social conservatism or by signs of distrust of science or of the sheer joy of living'. In Poland in the 1970s Marxists were searching for ways of animating their theory, ready to venture into metaphysical speculation, while Catholics maintained the positivist approach to knowledge and discussed new ideas coming from the Western dialogue with suspicion. Pluzanski regretted this distrust of Teilhard's ideas by Polish Catholics: he continued undiscouraged with the study of Teilhard's philosophy and by the late 1970s Teilhard's concepts and language were increasingly influencing his own ideas.

In 1967, when Pluzanski published his book on Teilhard, the political situation in Poland was not favourable to open criticism of Marxist theory. The fear of revisionism was still in the air. Schaff's book, *Marxism and the Human Individual*, which was far from critical of Marxism, was strongly censured at the IVth Congress of PUWP in June 1964. As a precaution, Pluzanski did not discuss Marxism directly but in a roundabout way, through discussion of Leo Sedara Senghora, the President of Senegal. Senghora appreciated the Marxist theory of economic and social liberation but regretted its spiritual indigence and neglect of the personal and religious needs of man. 'Marx indeed', as Pluzanski observed, 'rejected the category of "man in general" ... he was talking about man determined by participation in a social class. He conducted precise analyses of the relationship between man and society and in further perspective sketched the relationship between man and humanity'. Senghora supplemented Marxism with Teilhard's vision of man and this combination, Pluzanski believed, could lead to the
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subsequent overwhelming of Marxist ideology by Catholicism.
In order to prevent this, Pluzanski advocated the consideration of religious problems and needs within Marxist theory. In 1975 he still believed that 'achieving an influence on the Teilhardist movement would be a significant success for Marxism', and that together the movements might help to overcome the crisis in contemporary culture, the lack of a Promethean spirit and nihilism. A year earlier, Pluzanski had disagreed with the view of Jean Lacroix, the leader of *Esprit*, that the contemporary crisis was directly connected with the atheism which had followed from the abandonment of the concept of wisdom in philosophy, but he admitted the exigency of belief or popular wisdom which might channel social energy. Marxism, he stressed, was one of the forces in history which had released and could express the consciousness of the working class but, through mistakes in organising the workers' movement in the post-revolutionary period, the Party had lost control and in consequence isolated itself and its ideology from the workers. The restoration of Marxist theory and practice to its proper position within the workers' movement was an urgent task. He looked askance at Catholic philosophy which, he observed, often coped better with social crises and reflected more accurately the actual state of the workers' consciousness than did Marxism. The events of the 1980s confirmed his observations. In a selection of articles written in 1980-81 and published immediately after martial law had been lifted, Pluzanski wrote: 'The cunning reason of history produced a situation in which socialism, which had developed in opposition to the Church and its doctrine ... in fact prepared the arena, on its own ground, for the expansion of Christian solidarist ideas. The Marxist failure to grasp the possibility of realising the solidarist model of society
in a socialist state and its similarly instrumental treatment of the working class ... left the way open to Catholic thinkers and activists who were prepared to deal with the new working class'.

The Marxists were superseded by the Catholics because they clung to an obsolete determinist model of Marxism. Pluzanski, like the revisionists, distinguished dogmatic institutional Marxism, which shared in the Party's fiasco, from a philosophical and methodological proposition. He wrote that Marxism remained popular only in so far as ... it stayed faithful to the classical principle of the compulsory association of the theory with changing social reality'.

In practice, this meant withdrawing from its position as educator and leader. Pluzanski demanded the same of Catholicism which, 'if it wanted to be Catholic in the etymological sense, must reject Catholic doctrine'. He was not alone in perceiving that Marxism must be more responsive to social needs and more philosophically orientated. Kuczynski, Jaroszewski and Schaff followed the same line. Like them, Pluzanski found inspiration in Hegel's dialectics. He assumed that the dialectical triad was only 'the probable triad', in which neither thesis nor antithesis created a unitary set. Thesis, antithesis and syntheses were sets of various elements, interacting with each other in an unpredictable way. In his approach to Hegelian dialectics Teilhard's influence was plain. Like Teilhard, who claimed that no linear metaphysical system advanced beyond ideology, Pluzanski wrote that a linear and determinist theory of the world produced an ideology which would 'suppress the reality and reduce it to a deceptively simplified model, whose only positive feature is support for the longed-for and optimistic vision of reality'. He also acknowledged that in dialectical Aufhebung the set of theses was not completely destroyed and that there were certain values which
constituted the identity of culture. Philosophy and religion, particularly Christianity, created such lasting fundamental cultural values. This again corresponded with Teilhard's concept of 'l'union différenciée' and with his opinion that 'when we turn towards the summit, the totality and the future, we cannot help engaging in religion'.\textsuperscript{82} In 1967 Pluzanski had accused Teilhard's theory of lacking a revolutionary spirit. By the 1980s he tried to transform Marxist theory into a complex theory of evolution in which neither Hegelian necessary syllogisms nor Marxist historical determinism had a place.\textsuperscript{83} He stripped Marxism of its substantive features as the scientific vision of future society, as social determinism and economic theory, and adopted Teilhard's concept of evolution towards unity, an evolution which is not and cannot be translated into the language of ideology. He came to believe that people would gradually acquire the same truth and the same aim.

His Marxism developed into a belief in a natural religion of humanity, in which Teilhard's religious vision was translated into the language of anthropology.

Janusz Kuczynski went even further towards the formulation of Marxist principles of humanity. His philosophy of a heroic world is possibly the best example of the changes which occurred in Marxist theory under the influence of the Marxist-Catholic dialogue, a process similar to that which Catholic philosophy underwent in the 1930s and 1940s, when Gilson, Maritain, Mounier, Teilhard and other Catholic writers developed their interest in social and political problems by considering the competitive Marxist ideas. In contrast to the scientific version of Marxism Catholic writers focussed on man searching for a third answer to set beside existential solitude and socialist collectivism.\textsuperscript{84} Like the Catholic writers of the 1930s-40s, Polish Marxists in the 1970s
were seeking an option, an idea by which the individual would be
reconciled with society and stimulated to creative activity.
Kuczynski, the editor-in-chief of Studia Filozoficzne and Dialectics and
Humanism, two of the most important philosophical periodicals in
Poland, has had a life-long commitment to the Christian-Marxist
dialogue. In the 1960s he already looked forward to the development
of intellectual competition with the Catholics, but it was not until
the 1970s that conditions were ripe for such a relationship. He
hoped, by a discussion of the principles of humanity, to reconcile
the extremes of the individualist and collectivist approaches to
philosophical anthropology. In his opinion certain phenomena of the
contemporary world, such as the existence of a global market, a growing
information network and greater mobility encouraged uniform behavioural
patterns. According to him humankind was in the process of integration
and unification. As he put it: 'First, history witnessed the birth
of nations and of the working class. Today it bears witness to the
birth of mankind'.

He criticised contemporary society as being still unable to provide man with proper living conditions. It was a random
assembly of isolated individuals who lacked a sense of community and
failed to see life in community 'as the supreme value, as the goal'.

Using the terminology of Catholic personalism, Kuczynski called this
assembly of individuals 'humankind in itself'. He contrasted this
with the 'humanity for itself' of the future, writing that 'Humanity
for itself means not only self-knowledge. It also means inner
differentiation and creative integration of the now universal subject,
which both differentiates and enriches as well as uniting its own
elements in community'. Humankind was, on his view, in an era of
transition, a transition which required the unification of human efforts
to create, as he often calls it, the New Universal Order. He saw intellectuals, especially of philosophers, whom he, like Gramsci, held not to represent any particular class, to be the driving force of this transformation, which again does not begin until every single recipient of the philosophical message shares in the creation of the realistically individual and socially collective existence of philosophy. In this sense he claimed, every man is a philosopher. He believed that the philosophical attitude to life would spread and that increasing numbers of people would accept the same values and act collectively for the betterment of life. Philosophy would develop simultaneously in two directions, vertically as philosophy itself advanced, soon to reach the global level, and horizontally, as part of the process of growing solidarity between peoples and nations, leading to the creation of superhumanity. But even this lofty vision did not save him from certain difficulties. Kuczynski used the term 'philosophical engineering' which, he suggested, was not opposed to the socialist concept of 'administrative propaganda'. But elsewhere he stressed that only man's free choice and self-motivation could form the basis of social action. He escaped from the apparent contradiction by means of dialectics, writing that: 'Before man begins to create he must himself be made a creator' and, again, that: 'Our philosophy can and should create man'. This is the most difficult part of Kuczynski's theory. How can philosophy create a new man without imposing norms on the individual? Kuczynski did not give an answer to this problem, but the ways in which he dealt with it demonstrated how close his theory came to religion. According to him, philosophy was an activity bestowing a new sense, a new value and a new perspective. He distinguished between sense and meaning, restricting the latter to 'the sphere of everyday pragmatic life, especially to the reflection of the surface of things and
phenomena as well as their utilitarian functions'. Sense he identified with the procedure of reflecting and shaping the essence and rules of the deep strata of reality and thus with the sphere of science and, above all, with philosophy'.

Sense and meaning, in another way, were the correlates of essence, which he defined as 'the inherent structure of objects together with the totality of their objective relations with the world, which make for the identity of object as species'. If the essence of an object was only reflected, the philosopher captured a meaning. On the other hand, when the philosopher attempted to shape or change the essence of an object then he created a new sense. The bestowing or revealing of a new sense was, for Kuczynski, a purely revolutionary activity. He conceived of revolution in a quite original way. It was neither a change of economic structure nor a moral revolution but an ontological revolution, changing the sense of being. This concept of revolution was based on, but not limited to, Marxism. In the journal *Dialectics and Humanism* he has written: 'Marxist philosophy changes the traditional concept of humanism. Engels's well-known words about the change in the forms of materialism as a result of great scientific discoveries apply also to the forms of humanism. Contemporary socialist humanism must not only take on a new form but also renew its content by setting itself new problems. It is a humanism of both synthesis and projection, description and norm, understanding and demand. This is why it has not only moral but also ontological dimensions. It is a world outlook and a means of activity, the humanising of the world of things, the safeguarding of natural goods and a simultaneous reform of nature according to the new aspirations of man'. Marxism was the humanism which could give birth to the 'New Universal Order' which would reach all
levels and all countries, bringing about a new thinking which will have the form of a conjunction. Thomas Langan, a Canadian theologian, has described this new Marxism as a theory of 'the heroic new world of mature, responsible individuals living in the perfect solidarity of a community of love from which naked power relationships have vanished, which recalls the human dimension in what Christian faith understands by the "Kingdom of God"'. Langan agrees with Kuczynski in his diagnosis of present social problems but questions his convictions and knowledge concerning the remedy. 'I take Kuczynski to mean that it is essential to his natural faith to hold that man pulls from his own substance, and no other source, the new sense. But, as Nietzsche saw so clearly, this view leads inevitably to the very thing Kuczynski wants to avoid: Will to power. If somehow I am the strong one who is able, I know not why, to bring out of my substance new sense, then it is necessarily my prerogative to impose it on the uncreative, I the sense-maker, have this responsibility'. Further, he stresses that Christians do not believe in the complete elimination of 'personal insecurity or selfishness' in man and cannot share Kuczynski's conviction about secular millenarianism. Albert Shalom, too, has accused Kuczynski of a secularisation of religious millenarianism which transforms Church doctrine into the presupposed absoluteness of politics. Kuczynski agrees with both critics that he has turned the valuable features of religion to the service of society, and admits that indeed the most difficult task is to avoid the possible coercion of man in social practice. He has attempted to formulate Marxist theory in such a way as to avoid a possible development into totalitarian ideology. No ideology, according to him, could possess a truth value, because truth implies the separation of subject and object, while the creation of a new
sense implies their fusion. He adds that 'As the historical and relational source of truth, sense constitutes today its theoretical consequence, while at the same time ... it affords a practical possibility of "transcending" the truth, the essence of object, as we encounter them now'.

Kuczynski tries to overcome the difficulty with 'doctrinal coercion of the individual', by assuming the prior value of creativity over truth; as he has written 'Truth is not enough ... we are in need of Creativity'. In contrast to Marxism, Kuczynski sees Catholicism as ambiguous in character. Its philosophy of history, in which creation and redemption have already happened, is not an open theory able to generate a progressive social attitude. On the other hand, Catholic morality, specifying the incompleteness and imperfectibility of man, is an open theory. Ontologically, he has claimed, Catholicism is unable to stimulate radical change in the world but Christian morality could be revolutionary, stirring man up to achieve improvement and completion. Further, he extended to declare that no religious vision could be ontologically open. Contrasting Marxism with the semi-religious philosophy of Hegel, he has written 'Marxism is not the realisation of an apriori generality of the spirit ... but deals with an empirico-historical whole which, factually, is barely created'. Kuczynski postulates the openness of the Marxist system but simultaneously claims that future actions are justified by the present state of affairs, which is 'the place of last judgement'. The future course of history is to be formed by actions which utilise existing possibilities. Therefore, as he has written in his article 'For a new Universal Order' Dialectics and Humanism, 'the degree of meaningfulness depends on the degree of realisation of the possibilities of the historical process'. In the next sentence, however,
he adds that 'Theoretically, we can at any point of time judge whether history was and whether it is meaningful, i.e., whether humanity utilised its historical possibilities up to a given moment and whether it utilises them at this moment'. On the one hand, Kuczynski is rejecting the idea of a predetermined secular-ideological meaning and advocating the creation of a new sense in history. On the other hand, he speaks of the 'utilisation' of existing possibilities and the evaluation of such utilisation. Thus, for the evaluation of every stage of history a universal purpose of history has to be accepted. Kolakowski is more consistent here in acknowledging the sense-giving function of religious transcendentality in culture and history, a function Kuczynski is reluctant to admit. Like many Marxists who encounter similar difficulties in finding a transcendental criterion, Kuczynski turns to hermeneutics. He considers Marxism a 'truly universal hermeneutics when interpreted in a comprehensive way. Then it not only explains facts and laws but also facilitates making predictions about the future'. In 1986 he admitted with dissatisfaction that 'Although it often seems that this ability to predict fails, the fault lies with those who do not see the problem clearly enough or try to exploit Marxism as a tool of empty ideological phraseology'. Kuczynski originally conceived of Marxism as a theory of creation, in contrast with hermeneutics merely exposing the existing sense. The difficulties with a defence of the thesis that Marxism is a non-coercive social ideology forced him back to hermeneutics. The circle of action-interpretation, interpretation-action, acknowledged by Kuczynski, made Marxism a movement toward a not fully describable future, a movement based more on belief and ethos than on a theory. It is a religion of humanity in which the most prominent trace of Marxism is this - that God
has been replaced by man and the Paradise by harmonious life within the world community.

Like Kuczynski, Andrzej Nowicki also tried to include certain religious phenomena in his philosophy of culture. Nowicki, of the University of Lublin, was the most radical critic of religion but also the most radical positivist and materialist. Culture, he argued, was emerging from the superstition of religious belief just as science was emerging from the naive observation and fear of nature of the past. Culture was a process of humanising the world through the creation of new objects and the transformation or completion of existing ones. It was a world of things on which man imprinted his name; *cultura est homo in rebus*. In this world of things religion had no place because it contradicted humanism, which could develop only by negating religion in the secularisation of its functions. In Nowicki's philosophy of culture, however man does not occupy a central or self-sufficient position. He has written: 'Man exists potentially and insufficiently in his internal world, realising himself only when he creates things ... also the being of things depends on this if the thing is perceived. Hence for a full existence man needs things, just as things need man for real existence'. Man is in necessary relationship with things. Nowicki has called this concept of culture a materialist humanism, which is accomplished in the production of 'something better than man himself'. He is convinced that this is a more advanced form of humanism than 'the false humanisms which set man over things'. The essence of this materialist humanism is rooted in the mediation of human relations by the world of things, on which man has imprinted the best of his features (*eksteriorizacja*), and which are rediscovered and
and assimilated in a process of perception (interriorizacja). The exchange of values through the world of things is subject to the scientific research of the cultural market. This subjection of culture to scientific research is directed against religion, in which spiritual values cannot be identified with their material foundations. One of the main aims of Nowicki's philosophy of culture has been to demonstrate that religion is a falsification of culture, preying on ignorance and the failure to recognise that spiritual values can only be anchored in things which exist in time and space. Present-day culture demonstrates the false utilisation of art by religion, as works of art which were originally created for religious purposes convey a great humanist meaning to the man of today. This, according to Nowicki, proves the deeply secular character of culture. He has encouraged stripping religious art of its false meaning, but sees this as permissible only if 'the transformation does not destroy the unique physical structure of the work'.

Nowicki uses this rule extensively, arguing that even artists known to be strongly attached to religion as a matter of fact have pictured only real human life. Religion simply constitutes a cover for the humanist message. His detestation and negation of religion has been so uncompromising that even Kuczynski persuaded him to moderate it.

Nowicki does not confine himself to the criticism of religion but has also created a secular substitute for it. The most important component of his theory is the idea of immortality, of which he writes: 'The belief in the existence of an alleged sphere beyond time and in absolute being ... which constitutes the foundation for the belief in the immortality of the soul has its source in the consolation sought in the hour of death. Those who hold power in society are interested in promoting this belief, ... which turns people's attention
away from real activities. Laymen conceive of time as a multi-dimensional space ... In a lay culture time is a human space which is filled through the development of historical science and by the perfecting of artistic and technical production, which record what otherwise would pass away'. Immortality is thus achieved by the registration of man's personality, works and actions in matter. The recognition that man's name, images and personality will continue to exist after death has eliminated the need for a deceitful religious consolation. He claims that such immortality is measurable by scientific method. Generally, believing in the indisputable value of scientific argument in criticising religion, he attempts to employ scientific methodology and terminology in his study of culture. This, he holds, helps to further reduce the presence of religion in culture. He claims that the artist, like the scientist, has discovered a problem, an empty place in culture which should be filled. Artists quoted from other artists, translated ideas, programmed the consumers of culture and so on. The heart of this scientific theory of culture which is to take the place of religion is the concept of incontrolology, which Nowicki invented in the late 1970s. Incontrolology, according to him, is 'a science about forms, effects and the programming of encounters between people and their works'. It studies the subjective (people) and the objective (their work) aspects of encounters in which a significant exchange of information has occurred. This new discipline measures the transformation of information during such encounters, treating material objects and human beings as concurrent. The outcome of incontrolology affirms the anti-humanism of religion. According to this theory, every object created by man has a name; 'no nameless work has ever existed'. Association with religion hides
the three most important attributes of human thought and creation: 

**spatiality**, i.e. their association with a particular environment, 

**temporality**, i.e. their existence in time; and **personality**, i.e. the attribute which ascribes every thought to a particular person.  

But it is otherwise, Nowicki claims, in politics. There religion is associated with the dominating ideology and reinforces the power of secular authority. This cooperation between religion and state authority is diminished at present, because religion has no important social function. Nowicki suggests that the presence of religion is only a reactivation of the 'paleontological form of thinking' and a 'wrong turning in human thought', the question remains of why this return has occurred. The process of maturation, as much as the process of removing religion from culture, is probably an ideal model for Nowicki, as he nowhere in his writing pays attention to the obviously growing interest in and political impact of religion in socialist Poland. He rather focusses on anti-religious thinkers of the past, regardless of the intellectual quality of their ideas. He believes that theology is in the process of disintegrating, that progressive Catholics must be tactically supported by Marxists. Elsewhere he claims that the conservative trend will win and therefore support is unnecessary.  

Nowicki's ideas often present an unreal picture of the Church and its philosophy and cause embarrassment to his colleagues. On the other hand, he inspires composers, painters, and writers to produce works which glorify secular culture. Vanini, Bruno and others owe their musical or literary portraits to his inspiration of composers as Boguslaw Schaffer. For his activities Nowicki has received the honorary citizenship of two Italian cities and membership of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in Naples. His contribution to the popularisation
of little-known atheists and Italian philosophy in Poland has been important, but his philosophy of culture is less successful and known only to a few scholars. He exemplifies the radical materialist position within Polish Marxism which is often identified with the Stalinist mode of philosophising. His position contradicts the humanist Marxism of Jaroszewski, Pluzanski and Kuczynski. Nevertheless, all of them share a desire to develop Marxist reflection in order to excel the religious questions. These interpretations have many romantic features, such as the desire for the integration of humankind, the search for values at once universal and individual, and heroism. This romantic Marxist reaction to the Stalinist enlightenment has been reinforced and strongly influenced by Catholicism. The symmetry of the intellectual process within Catholicism and Marxism is well illustrated by their reciprocal borrowing of ideas, concepts and even slogans. For example, Edward Schillebeeckx, a well-known liberal theologian, has deliberately used the slogan 'The Church with a Human Face' in the title of his new book on the ministry. The resemblance between the liberation of Marxism and that of Catholicism from institutional ties is evident. Moreover, Marxism is clearly evolving in the direction urged by the Catholics. A hitherto existing concern about the liberating role of the working class and the urge to abolish the bourgeois economic and social order has been transformed into a theory of human unity. The revolutionary reconstruction of society, to be realised through class conflict, has become a fight for unity, peace and the natural environment which is in complete harmony with the Catholic principle of love. In this way, the main theoretical obstacle to the acceptance of Marxism by Catholics has disappeared. Furthermore, Marxism shares in Catholic optimism, in the belief that the
progress of science, the computerisation and mechanisation of work, will restore man's control of production and give a significant amount of freedom. Marxists predict the appearance of a community which is clearly the secularised version of the community of God. In their view, the cruelty of recent wars and the exploration of space have already created a sense of community among the inhabitants of the earth and created a universal personal minimum standard. In short, the movement for the restructuring of the economic order has been replaced by attempts to rearrange social values, the class struggle has become a fight for humanity. This Marxism is a philosophical reflection, and today one will hardly find any remarks about Marxism as a strictly social doctrine. In the next chapter I discuss two outstanding attempts to overcome this convergence between liberal Catholicism and humanist Marxism, which further demonstrate the deep similarity of Catholic and Marxist ideas.
6. The Overcoming of Marxism by

Wojtyla and Kolakowski

In the 1970s Marxist scholars produced ideas quite remote from the scientific and even humanist versions of Marxism. They quitted, or rather were forced to quit, the position of party ideologists and became the spiritual leaders of a new humanism. Their idea of communism, defined in moral terms, closely resembled Catholic personalism. This belief in a harmonious, just social order distinguished them from liberals, democrats and other political groups and was the most characteristic feature of the new Marxism. Leszek Kolakowski and Karol Wojtyla criticised this concept of communism as a dangerous manifestation of myth. They witnessed the long and complicated search for accommodation between Catholicism and Marxism and each created a philosophy which arose from this necessary dialogue in the Polish situation. Before 1956 they were in opposite camps. From about the late 1960s their paths of thought started to converge and in the 1980s they advocated similar ideas. The parallels between Marxist and Catholic philosophers reveal the deeply granted correspondence between Marxist thought and Catholicism or, rather, religion in general. Discussion of Wojtyla's philosophy of man will be followed by discussion of Kolakowski's philosophy of myth in order to demonstrate how the Marxist liberation on earth relates to the Catholic idea of eternal liberation.

Wojtyla's philosophy originates in Thomism, to which he was introduced by Klosak during the war. He subsequently continued and developed his understanding of it as a student of Garrigou-Lagrange,
an orthodox Thomist in the Anglicanum in the late 1940s. The
phenomenology of Max Scheler, the subject of his Ph.D thesis
published after the Thaw of 1956, also had a strong impact. He
considered whether a Christian ethics could be founded on the
concept of emotional apriorism and concluded that Scheler had not
sufficiently considered the metaphysical individuality and
separateness of human beings. In his works he combines Thomist
metaphysics with Schelerian phenomenology, taking from the former
the ontology of man and from the latter a method of describing acts
in which man creates his own personality. Marxism, especially its
philosophy of work and alienation, has also had a great influence
on Wojtyla's reflections. He has not only used its terminology
but has partly adopted its solutions, translating them into the language
of Christian metaphysical dualism. In his main philosophical work
Acting Person Wojtyla studies the relationship between action as
interpreted by traditional ethics and action as an experience.¹
This problem is largely irrelevant to the subject of this thesis but his
discussion of alienation contributes significantly to Marxist-Catholic
dialogue.

Wojtyla believes that not cosmology but the philosophy of
man should be the main field of Marxist-Catholic dialogue and he
develops his theory of personal alienation against the background
of Marxist economic determinism. In Marx's writings the common idea
of alienation is, as David McLellan puts it, 'that man had forfeited
to someone or something what was essential to his nature—principally
to be in control of his own activities, to be the initiator of the
historical process'.² The followers of Marx strongly emphasised the
social causes of alienation, from which man may be liberated by the
destruction of capitalism. Wojtyla, in contrast, sees the fundamental source of alienation in the improper attitude of the individual to his fellow man and community. He writes: 'The view ... according to which the danger of the "dehumanisation" of our present-day civilisation lies chiefly in the system of things ... is prejudiced and misleading. Though this view cannot be entirely overlooked, it is equally impossible to accept it as the only correct interpretation of the illness of the present-day world ... it is man who creates the system of production, forms of technical civilisation, utopias of future progress ... Thus it is up to him to prevent forms of civilisation that would cause a dehumanising influence and ensuing alienation of the individual from developing. Consequently, alienation of human beings from their fellow men ... is the prime cause of any subsequent alienation resulting from the reference systems of the material arrangement of goods and their distribution in social life'.

Because the social mechanism of alienation depends on the distorted relationship between individuals, its study must be preceded by the study of man. Wojtyla assumes a radical Kantian position, according to which the autonomy of human freedom must not be violated by any ideology or for any reason. This emphasis leads him, as Don Cupitt observes, to approach religious and social problems from an anthropological point of view, the basis of which is the conviction that only man can limit his own freedom by an act of self-determination and only an act of free will can require it. Only a man, who has undertaken an action by his own decision, is and feels responsible for its result and is capable of creating his own personality in the social environment. He is not so capable if he is forced to perform an act. Wojtyla insists that this is the basic assumption
of any inquiries concerning man. Its omission he warns, leads to a technological approach to man which, in effect, produces a totalitarian ideology. He insists that every science of man is ethical because, directly or indirectly it deals with 'the reality of moral values'. Moreover, ethical problems reveal themselves fully in this 'abundant reality which is expanded by human morality' in such fields as science, technology and economics.

Wojtyla does not treat morality as a set of intentions, norms or the individual awareness of values but as a social situation in which values acquire a specific personal existence. Such a social situation is created by reciprocal subject-object relations. He explains it as follows: performing actions a man perceives himself as their subject whereas, when evaluating or judging their social effects, he is capable of perceiving himself as an object. In this sense the social relations in which man acquires an objectification of his values and self-knowledge are incorporated in his nature. This concept resembles Marx’s and Scheler’s philosophy of man, but with an important ontological reservation. In Wojtyla’s view, man is a sovereign individual being, by the very fact of his existence, a value in itself. Against the Marxist concept of man as a subject of history and social relations, he develops a concept of man acting consciously and realising values in a social environment.

Man acts according to rationally recognised values and, in doing so, identifies himself and is identified with them: 'Moral good is that by which man becomes and is good, moral evil is that by which ... man becomes and is evil'. Although values appear as personal they are not subjective, and exist independently of whether man does or does not realise or recognise them. Every appearance of values in the social
environment is personal in the sense that they acquire the 'strength of subjective conviction' ... because the person performing the action also fulfills himself in it, that is, acquires a personal feature'.

This emphasis on the individual realisation of values refutes Kochler's suggestion that Wojtyla is referring to the intersubjective human world (Lebenswelt) where experience of oneself, one's fellow men and values are mixed together. Wojtyla clearly distinguishes man from his social environment and does not accept Scheler's concept of man's full openness to the world (Weltoffenheit) but rather follows Roman Ingarden's concept of 'relative isolation' (wzgledna izolacja) according to which man is separated from his environment in a way similar to that in which his body is separated from his soul. The fact that, as Ingarden put it, man 'has to create the real condition of his existence and appearance ... by the transformation of certain things and the initiation of certain processes' denies the concept of man's full openness. This is one of the main differences between the Marxist concept of man as an assemblage of social relations and Wojtyla's concept of man as the being creating social relations.

One of Wojtyla's main theses is that the vitality and quality of social life depend on man. Any improvement of social life starts from and ends with the improvement of man himself, because only man is capable of recognising his own imperfection and proceeding with improvement. This happens because man recognises this imperfectibility. Wojtyla writes: 'Within the fulfilling of one's self, demanded as it were by the whole personalist structure of self-determination, there is a "moment of the absolute" (this surely made Kant speak of the absolute imperative); and the fulfilment of self in the act is accomplished
on the basis of the absoluteness of good. At the same time, the subject of that fulfilment keeps the full consciousness of his own non-absoluteness, or in other words, of the contingency, of the limitations, of the relativity of his being. Man recognises his imperfection by feelings of dissatisfaction with the values which have already been realised. This is a driving force to further actions and to the improvement of social and individual life. But by these persisting feelings of dissatisfaction man also learns about the relativity of his own being and acquires a conviction about the existence of the absolute.

According to Wojtyla every man is able to discriminate between good and evil thanks to his conscience, which not only recognises norms and judges actions but also requires the performance of values recognised as good and true values. A decision on realising values or not, on undertaking action or abstaining from it, must be consistent with one's conscience. Consciousness, which Wojtyla conceives of as a mirror reflecting the functioning of man, allows man to gain the experience that 'he is the one who is determined by himself and that his decisions make him become somebody'. Both Marxists and Catholics tended to understand consciousness in collective terms as the sense of class objective interest or the sense of common good respectively. From the position of the individual consciousness, which is a substance of any collective consciousness, Wojtyla criticises both Marxist class consciousness and the concept of the common good. In his opinion neither of these can be understood as a purpose democratically chosen or as a value imposed on the community by any agent 'representing' the good of the whole community. He stresses that 'It is impossible to define the common good without
simultaneously taking into account the subjective moment, that is the moment of acting in relation to the acting person'.\textsuperscript{19} This means that an ideology of the common good in the Catholic and Marxist sense cannot be properly formulated. Incorrect formulation of such an ideology leads to the destruction of authentic community ties, which are created by uninterrupted relationships between individuals.

Wojtyla distinguishes the community from society. Society is organised by an administrative body such as government, while a community is created by people sharing the same values. He does not believe in the possibility of full unification of administrative society and personalist community, but still considers that this ideal is the moving force of social reform, aiming at the liquidation of institutional and ideological obstacles to the development of authentic community life. He discerns long and small permanent and temporary communities. Humanity is the largest communities which, he claims, 'is not an abstraction or a generality, but possesses the specific gravity of the personal being in each man ... To participate in the humanity of another man means to continue in a living relation to the fact that he is precisely this man, and not merely to what, \textit{in abstracto}, makes him a man'.\textsuperscript{20} Against the spirit of abstraction he put the concretness of human existence. Humanity, in his view, is the community of 'we' where every man treats every other not as 'non-I' but as 'other-I'. Because of this way of participation humanity is the community of 'I's'.\textsuperscript{21} There is a difference between Wojtyla's and Kuczynski's visions of humanity. Kuczynski, who represents the \textit{milieu} of \textit{Dialectics and Humanism}, has tended to emphasise the phenomenon of the uniformity and integration of people around certain values. These values, recognised by a social elite, must subsequently be taught and so
multiplied. For Wojtyla the essence of humanity is embodied in the individual, in his approach to fellow man. Wojtyla has not developed a tendency to elitism, although he recognises the exemplary role of people embodying the highest values and contrasts his concept of an 'acting master' to the Marxist concept of 'knowledge the teacher'. Membership of a community does not alone determine the individual, since one can belong to a number of communities. Wojtyla distinguishes the strong and stable community of the family, the members of a nation and the citizens of a state, which he calls 'natural communities' reflecting the social nature of man. Other temporary communities may be communities of students, workers and so on fulfilling a plan or a specific task, which never absorbs them to the same degree as the 'natural communities' and does not require as strong a commitment.

Following the individual philosophy, Wojtyla insists that participation in any community should not be passive. He contrasts the active attitudes of solidarity and opposition to conformism. The attitude of solidarity, 'a constant readiness to accept and to realise one's share in the community', does not in his view contradict an attitude of opposition. He writes: 'We have experience of innumerable different types of opposition that have been continually expressed in the course of man's existing and acting "together with others", which show that those who in this way stand up in opposition do not intend thereby to cut themselves off from their community. On the contrary, they seek their own place and a constructive role within the community ... and a more effective share of the communal life'. An authentic community, in Wojtyla's opinion, is a community of dialogue between different personal realisations of values, a community in which the free
exchange of values is not confined by social institutions. Wojtyla's theory stresses the dynamism present at the individual level between freedom and self-determination and, at the level of community, in the constant dialogue between attitudes. In this context alienation appears as a block to this natural dynamism, the main effect of which is a non-authentic participation in community life. Wojtyla points out that 'Alienation denotes such a situation in a human being, a state in which he is not capable of experiencing another human being as the "other I"'.

This occurs in certain situations such as concentration camps, prisons, torture chambers and even in everyday life when it becomes difficult to maintain authentic interpersonal relations. Nevertheless, Wojtyla argues, even extremely difficult conditions are unable to break man completely. He gives as an example the Auschwitz concentration camp, where prisoners yet noticed the needs of others and sacrificed themselves for one another.

Inhuman conditions will never overwhelm man since he has the power to stand up for his own values. For this reason Wojtyla condemns conformism, which he calls 'a denial of participation'. He writes: 'Conformism consists primarily in an attitude of compliance or resignation, in a specific form of passivity that makes the man-person to be but the subject of what happens instead of being the actor or agent responsible for building his own attitudes and his own commitment in the community. Even when the servile attitude of conformism does not become an outright denial or limitation, it always indicates a weakness of personal transcendence, of self-determinations and choice'.

Conformism, as a denial of man's authentic attitude to others, is often reinforced by wrong social philosophies, such as individualism, totalitarianism and utilitarianism. He blames the development of
technological and materialist attitudes for these deviations of social thought. According to him the purely materialist or utilitarian approach to man cuts across his unique spiritual structure \(^{27}\) and causes man to be seen more in economic terms than as a sovereign moral subject. \(^{28}\) Instead of being the measure of all things man is compelled to adjust to economic and technological purposes. \(^{29}\) Like some Marxist thinkers he criticises the reduction of man to one dimension. \(^{30}\) But, he stresses, the most sinful of all is Marxist reduction of man to a subject of economic and social relations. The source of this reduction is in the Marxist attempt to translate the spiritual symbolism of the Bible into the language of social ideology. \(^{31}\) The consequence of this reduction is the 'ideology of liberation' which, focussing only on the earthly salvation, spreads hatred between people.

At the Synod of Bishops in 1974 he said: 'When one is talking about evangelisation in the contemporary world, the co-existence of many anti-gospels and anti-evangelisations must be recognised ... to them the Gospel of Jesus Christ must really appear as a "sign of contradiction" ... Economic and social liberation is crucial today ... and is included in evangelisation ... but this liberation cannot be separated from absolute liberation in God ... Therefore the vertical and horizontal dimensions of liberalisation should not be opposed to each other ... What unites them is love ... Has man, in the personal dimension, a better chance of development than through love?\(^{32}\) In order to spread love and to confront the anti-gospels the Church must integrate the principles of faith. Before Wojtyla was elected to the Papacy he had already developed his vision of the Church as promoting love and personal community. He sees as the remedy against alienation man's active engagement and realisation of personal values in community;
against the proliferation of anti-gospels he sets a strong Church with well-defined position. Surprisingly, perhaps, Leszek Kolakowski has reached very similar conclusions.

In the 1950s, when Kolakowski started his philosophical career, he had a reputation as a passionate critic of religion. At that time criticism of religion usually relied on contrasting the obscurity and anti-humanity of religious belief with the ideology of scientific socialism. Kolakowski, not quite following the general trend, developed a more analytic approach to religion, which focused on the internal contradiction between individual belief and the position of the Church. The Church, according to him, was only interested in 'the political struggle and not in the religious feelings of sentimental crazy aesthetes'. The Catholic philosophy which served the Church was politically oriented and had a well developed mechanism of self-protection which allowed it 'to put on foreign attire without losing its own identity'. Its development, from Augustine's view that man's self-reliance can only produce evil, through Aquinas's hierarchic order of beings to the personalism of the present, demonstrates a purely utilitarian aim to 'establish the dependence of man upon the Church and thus upon the most reactionary and obscurantist social forces'. Like most Marxists in the early 1950s, Kolakowski understood Catholic doctrine as a single and uniform system. For him the Church was an institution using belief in God to arrest progress and interrupt the imposition of a secular and humanist world view. The Church's ideological power lay in a fraudulent mediation between man's contingent world and his need for certitude, between real life and transcendentality, the signs of which were supposed to come only through the Church's teachings.
The Stalinist ideologists fought the Church when, at the same time, the Stalinist party developed semi-religious functions. Its dogmatism and assumption of religious functions became a subject of criticism in the late 1950s. After Stalin's death two positions may be recognised in the revisionist movement. Moderate critics held that, although Stalinism violated the humanist principles of Marxism, its actions were explained by the political and economic conditions of the cold war. Radical critics of Marxism, led by Kolakowski, demanded the revision of the whole of Marxist ideology and its liberation from Stalinist dogmatism. They believed in the positive value of Marxist philosophy and mainly attacked the party for its corruption. As Kolakowski writes 'Marx formulated a germinal project for a theory of cognition which, in the course of the development of the current of thought calling itself Marxist, was replaced by the radically different concepts of Engels and especially Lenin'. He urged a return to Marx's early ideas and the development of their humanist kernel. The new, humanist version was contrasted with the scientific ideology of Stalinism, which in place of Marx's seminal project set a codified system of ready-made answers and turned Marxist intellectuals into apologists for 'the facade of socialist life'. The Party attempted to establish a socialist order by indoctrination while, as Kolakowski stressed in 1955, 'socialism is the total sum of social values, whose implementation is incumbent on the individual as his moral duty'. For Stalinist ideologists the individual played no role in the great 'turmoil of history'; for revisionists he was a sovereign subject having moral responsibility for the implementation of the new social order, and one to whose opinions the Party should be responsive. The Stalinist Party claimed to represent class consciousness whereas Kolakowski stressed,
it had developed a normative, teleological and deductive concept of consciousness diverging from the actual state of people's consciousness. It violated the freedom of individuals, treating them as a force resisting the imposition of communism. In his writings after about 1953, Kolakowski attempted to prove that Stalinism preverted Marx's original ideas by creating a self-motivating and self-justifying ideology based on a philosophy of history and neglecting the basic principles of ethics.

Against the Stalinist scientific vision of history as the realm of objectivity and necessity, Kolakowski develops a vision of history as a set of individual facts organised by philosophical ideas. Only individual historical facts are the objects of direct study but, he writes, 'historical events are not signs from which we can decipher a message ... they become meaningful only when history is seen as a planned succession, which manifests itself in the changes of the human world but which does not itself belong to this world'.

History acquires meaning when facts are related to speculative, potential ideas incorporated in history such as Hegel's phenomenology of absolute spirit, Marx's idea of the class struggle or Husserl's eidos of humanity. Kolakowski admits that 'It is necessary to go beyond history in an act of philosophical faith if one wants to give history meaning; it is necessary to consider the world of possibilities which is pre-empirical (transcendental or transcendent) and is given body and made real by empirical history ... this faith can be creative but we must not delude ourselves that it is anything other than faith'.

It is a dualist vision of history, where sense is beyond actual existence and is never fully compatible with it. While not admitting the existence of God as the ultimate source of sense he refuses to accept the full understanding of empirical reality without prior acknowledgment of
transcendental sense. This scepticism about the scientific nature of historical laws brings his philosophy of history close to Catholic dualism, where a sense of history is beyond it and never fully compatible with actual time. Kolakowski emphasises that, while history may have many interpretations, they remain pure speculation until they stimulate action and are realised in social practice. Here there is a divergence from Catholicism, which justifies its philosophy of history by Biblical prophecy. The ideas imposed on history are, in Kolakowski's view, not fully optional because they depend on culture, are created within existing language and refer to existing discourse and practice. As products of culture they always have the status of provisional propositions which, if chosen and consciously affirmed, can form a Weltanschauung. Kolakowski describes two types of choice: the dogmatic, searching for absolute and objective solutions to human problems and the sceptical, distrusting such solutions. The strain between acceptance and dissatisfaction causes a circulation of ideas and nourishes culture. Intellectuals, Kolakowski argues, should not only produce these ideas but, more importantly, should supervise and adjust them in social practice. From the early 1950s he devoted several articles to the problem of the involvement of intellectuals in the Party's activities. While legitimising the Party's power and controlling its responsiveness to social needs, intellectuals must be free and unconstrained by other than moral obligations: this is an absolute requirement to immunise the Party against increasing dogmatism and to ensure the survival of Marxism.

In the mid-1950s Kolakowski hoped that Marxism would develop mechanisms, of self-defence allowing it to adapt to culture without changing its principles. In order to achieve this, Marxism should confine its
constitution simply to the principles of a progressive movement, allowing adaptation of its ideas to particular social situations. This line of thought finally led him to reject Marxism as incapable of having such mechanisms, and by its very nature generating a totalitarian ideology. In his attempt to save Marxism from dogmatism he called for 'the secularisation of thinking to combat pseudo-Marxist mythology, bigotry and religio-magical practices and rebuild respect for secular reason'. The New Left should reject rigid ideology and utopian visions of future society. The movement did not fulfil his expectations and in the early 1970s he rejected cooperation, writing in an open letter to Edward Thompson: 'I do think that this option was emptied not only by the experience of socialist states; it was emptied by the silly self-complacency and self-confidence of its adherents, by their inability to face both the limits of our efforts to change society and the incompatibility of demands and values which made up their creed; briefly, that the meaning of this option has to be revised entirely, from the very roots'. His description of himself as at once a conservative (the impossibility of changing society completely), a liberal (the state should regulate only the basic features of social life) and a socialist (the influence of the money market and economic inequality should be reduced) demonstrates Kolakowski's scepticism in relation to the value of determined social ideologies and the rejection of Marxism, the best part of which, as he claims, has already been assimilated into social philosophy.

The failure of Marxism to produce a non-dogmatic social ideology turns Kolakowski's attention to religion. The first signs of this shift from criticism of Marxism to an appreciation of religion appeared in Kolakowski's censure of Stalinist ideology. He was then already dissatisfied with
Lenin's passive epistemology, emphasising that perception is not a process mirroring objects but the organisation of the data according to socially and biologically important needs. Lenin's concept supported a vision of man as an object of natural or historical laws, with which Kolakowski disagreed. He further developed this criticism in an article in 1958 on Marx's concept of truth. He condemned the positivist and pragmatic approach to Marxism as an expression of 'the philosophy of alienated reason' and contrasted their category of usefulness to Marx's original concept of effectiveness. He wrote that 'The vision of the world presented in the Manuscripts arises from an effort to consider man's practical activities as a factor that defines his behaviour as a cognitive being ... The basic point of departure for all of Marx's epistemological thought is the conviction that the relations between man and his environment are relations between the species and the objects of its need; it also concerns cognitive contact with things'. He argued that the world is the whole, claiming with Bergson that it is partitioned only in our process of cognition guided by practical interest. We have a conviction about the existence of the world as the whole and, like Klosak, he claimed that we-have no accurate knowledge of its existence apart from that which we gain by experiencing the resistance of matter and from the feeling that an opposition not yet experienced always exists. Therefore perceived truth about the world is always historical, as 'it is unreasonable to hope that total "objectivity" can be introduced, once and for all'. In the 1950s Kolakowski supported his new Marxist praxis with a declaration of the need for a religious-type truth or vision of the whole world. The everyday struggle with matter, knowledge and, as appeared later, morality also, require a mythical, irrational vision
of the whole of the non-empirical truth. Its involvement in the practical-rational activity of man was the chief argument against scientific ideology. In the supplement to the second Polish edition of his article, published in 1967, Kolakowski identified his ideas with Antonio Gramsci's epistemology, which a few years later he developed into a theory of myth.

Kolakowski's theory of myth centres on the way in which myth is exposed and what sort of claims are attached to it. He suggests that all dogmatisms and ideologies are born of improper interpretation or utilisation of mythical beliefs in science, religion and art. In his book on the Reformation in the seventeenth century, he observes how the revolt against corruption in the Church was doomed to end in self-limitation and the creation of a new doctrine. He is sceptical of the possibility of freeing from dogmatism any social movement which seeks an ideological solution to problems. Any social doctrine takes its reference from an ideal situation but, in order to survive, it must refer to social reality. Revolt results when the ideology becomes incompatible with social reality. But as soon as a new ideology is created it is again vulnerable to a new heresy and a new revolt. Against this dialectic Kolakowski promotes an awareness of man's limited capacity to change his life and the world by means of revolution. This is not an ontological scepticism, denying the existence of absolute certainty, but an epistemological scepticism, claiming that there is no access to this reality. In this respect his book on the presence of myth, written in Poland and published overseas in 1972, is the most significant and a milestone on the way to accepting religion as the best possible expression of myth.

His philosophy of myth unites Catholic absolutism with Marxist historical
relativism. He assumes that knowledge originates in experience and practice but is more than these 'not only in the sense that it is not simply a description of them but also in that it relates every possible experiment to a further reality whose description cannot be logically connected with the description of the experiments'.

The same applies to ethics, art and any human activity in which the particular is always understood in relation to a whole. This need for a whole, a ground for accidentality, refers to the reality of myth which 'provides us with no information but demonstrates the world of values'. Man's practical-cognitive activity is conducted according to accepted values which are not part of an experience but transcend it, giving it a sense from outside. Their presence is necessary and natural because of 'the structure of human consciousness' and 'vital need of culture'. He insists that culture is unthinkable without this mythological reality because it alone has 'the power to cancel the indifference of the world' and create a horizon which can always be expanded but cannot be completely eliminated. This understanding of myth as a limitation of the human capacity 'to know', to possess ultimate knowledge of the world, accompanied by a conviction that the world exists independently and fully as a whole, is clearly comparable to the Catholic view. He is deeply sceptical about the reasonableness and effectiveness of any attempt to reach this mythological reality through secular philosophy. At the end of his book on Husserl's phenomenology he writes: 'Whatever enters the field of human communication is inevitably uncertain, always questionable, fragile, provisory, and mortal. Still, the search for certitude is unlikely to be given up, and we may doubt if it would be desirable to stop it. This search has little to do with the progress of science and technology. Its background
is religious rather than intellectual; it is ... a search for meaning. It is a desire to live in a world from which contingency is banned, where sense (and this means purpose) is given to everything'. 53

Such a search cannot be true or false 54 and has nothing to do with science. Marxism has broken in on the indefinable quality of myth by claiming that its vision of the world can be scientifically proved and that, through a social revolution leading to a rearrangement of the economic structure, the perfect social order can be created. But Marxists, in Kolakowski's view, did not realise that they simply imposed a philosophical idea on history and 'announced that the same idea emerged from their analysis of history'. 55 Every philosophy of history is part and parcel of political practice and helps to integrate people, providing they have faith in it. The 'semi-sacred' 56 character of the philosophy of history renders unnecessary any scientific proof other than the effectiveness of its performance in a particular social situation. This petitio principi of the Marxist philosophy of history has not been its only error. The general project of creating a perfect social order further manifests the mythological 'all or nothing' origin of their thinking, which combines different values in a single system. Such a dream of perfect unity, he writes, 'may come true only in the form of a caricature denying its original intention'. 57 Marxism committed the sin of literally translating the myth of harmony into the language of social ideology, with ironic effect. For these reasons, as he has written in Main Currents of Marxism, Marxism has been the greatest fantasy of our century and has led to dangerous social results.

In contrast to Marxism and other secular ideologies, religion is a permanent component of culture, performing two main functions: those
of bringing man, alienated by technology, back to nature and of providing moral certitude. It performs them in a manner completely different to secular ideologies. First, religion does not require to translate its symbols into a language of science, social ideology or whatever, beyond their own religious meaning. Like art, religion resists full decodification and does not need rational or scientific support. The secular ideologies are deprived of this immanent meaning and must be explained in other language. Therefore they become particular and verifiable in social practice. Religion defends itself from this because it is 'untranslatable into speech designed to grasp physical events; it has different norms of identification, different laws of causality, and different rules for interpreting the concatenation of phenomena'. Its language is the language of worship, resting on full conformity between feeling, attitude and behaviour; it cannot be accepted in part or instrumentally. Between religion and everyday life is a gap preventing close associations or literal understanding and making it possible to speak of its objects only by analogy. The second reason for the superiority of religion is that it maintains a judicious balance between condemnation of the world and joy in living, between punishment and reward, millenarianism and everyday life. Christianity does not promise the fulfilment of happiness on earth, but yet stimulates man's self-improvement by promising rewards after death. Using the concept of man in the abstract, equal before God and equally burdened with sin, religion does not evoke hate but creates the feeling of guilt which gives man a reference-point allowing the distinction between good and evil. It has not only the capacity to create non-coercive social ideas but can also protect society from easy ideological visions of reform. He writes: 'It is true that, in
order to make society more bearable, one needs to believe that it can be improved, but it is also true that there must be people who think about the price which is paid for every improvement. The sacred order creates the only system which allows us to consider this price and forces us to ask if it is not too high. In this way religion, in its pure philosophical status, became a pattern of mythological thinking. Marxist and other ideologies were only deformations of religion, harmful, as religion still could be, if translated into language of scientific ideology.

Neither Kolakowski nor Wojtyla focuses exclusively on a criticism of Marxism; they rather attempt to counter the type of thinking which led to its creation. Kolakowski admits that 'It is an ontological option to believe that the Eternal manifests its real presence by being throughout history a term of reference in human self-understanding. The contrary belief, that a plausible explanation of the worship of eternal reality may be given in anthropological terms, is an option as well. I have tried to explain why each of those options is self-supporting and why neither can be validated by the criteria of truth which the other employs'. Wojtyla concentrates on the anthropological perspective, discovering the sovereign ethical subject in action; Kolakowski, acknowledging the same ethical principle, is searching for the manifestation of sense-giving transcendentality. Although these perspectives do not support each other they are fully complementary. In this lies the deepest unity of Marxism and Christianity. During his Lent lectures in Rome in 1976, Wojtyla referred to Kolakowski's article 'Jesus Christ, Prophet and Reformer' published in 1965. This article was also discussed by György Lukács in Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, where he agreed with Kolakowski that Christ
had had a much greater influence on the revolutionary ethos than Marxists liked to admit. But he argued that Kolakowski had nevertheless over-estimated the dependence of Marxism on the Christian ethos and that Marx had developed motifs more often present in heresy than in the doctrine of the Church. Wojtyla has also turned his attention to this persistent symbolism of Christ and, referring to a survey conducted in 1975, he writes: 'Many correspondents admit quite frankly that for them Christ is not easy to accept ... the two thousand years that have gone by are an insuperable barrier'. He contrasts this view with Kolakowski's assertion that 'attempts to eradicate Jesus from our culture merely because "we do not believe in the God he believed in" are ridiculous and absurd', agreeing that Christ on the Cross symbolises the whole of human culture, a chosen sign where vertical and horizontal meet and which expresses the most profound interaction of the divine and human. Kolakowski's and Wojtyla's visions of the world are based on this interaction and both conceive of religion as a safeguard against secular ideologies or anti-gospels. Thus, the Church has a mission to oppose false religions and to carry 'the sign of contradiction' as Jesus had done 'who became a sign of contradiction for those to whom he had been sent'. It is the task of the Church, of the Holy See, of all pastors, to fight for mankind, often against men themselves. Today, when man is searching for secular, technological ways of resolving existential problems, Wojtyla promotes the acceptance and love of the whole truth of Christ, loving it the more as the world increasingly contradicts it.

Both Kolakowski and Wojtyla disagree with the radical, liberal attitude of the post-Vatican Church, which deprives it of its transcendental foundation. They promote activity and non-conformity on
the part of man but deny that religious prophecy can be reinterpreted in the language of social ideology. But social movements such as Marxism must be understood through Biblical prophecy. Wojtyla stresses that: 'It may sound a trifle strange, but I cannot understand either Sartre or Marx without having first read and pondered very deeply the first three chapters of Genesis'. He also admits that Marxism would help in understanding the Church's new situation in history and especially in learning about its functions. But Marxism, as Wojtyla and Kolakowski indicate, has committed the sin of literally translating Biblical prophesy, and so understands liberation only in economic terms. Liberation in history cannot be separated from liberation beyond history. Marxism has reduced the transcendental perspective, and in effect opposed man to man and promoted violence. Wojtyla calls it the classic Pelagian heresy, which leaves man in his 'hunger for the transcendental' stranded, a marginal factor in the march of civilisation.

Both men see mankind as bewildered and left hopeless, bereft of transcendental references, and insist on the need for a strong Church, to show the way ahead through life, and on the limitation of social ideologies to the pragmatic dimension. The Marxists of Poland criticised both thinkers, Kolakowski more than Wojtyla. Kolakowski was accused either of failure to understand the basic thesis of historical materialism or of developing positivist-liberal ideas, though no serious study of his philosophy has yet been attempted. Wojtyla's philosophy has been discussed much more cautiously and mainly seen as an attempt to integrate the Church in the face of growing liberal opposition. The influence of both men can be traced in the writings of young Marxists, of whom Siemek has admitted that 'There always remains a certain residuum of "ultimate questions" (letzter Dinge) where hermeneutics ceases to
speak and starts to listen ... Marxism does not know the sound of this inner "voice" of religious transcendence ... but this is audible and intersubjective and should be the subject of dialogue'.

Young Marxists are more interested than ever before in the transcendental dimension of their philosophy, the philosophy which Kolakowski and Wojtyla have rejected as incapable of being either a religion or a non-totalitarian social ideology but which remains the opium for man's religious needs.
Conclusion

The Catholic-Marxist dialogue, necessary in the Polish political and social situation, had two major effects. First, it significantly blurred doctrinal stances previously clearly defined. Marxism evolved into a religion of humanity while Catholicism came to provide a moral background for the political opposition. Second, the dialogue had impact on the mode of political life in Poland. A non-violent revolution took place and the Marxist regime often sought legitimization of its power through concessions to or reconciliation with the Church.

In the early post-war years both Catholics and Marxists wanted to preserve the purity of their doctrines. But the policies of Marxist regimes toward the Church caused Catholicism today to resume the role it played during the partition of Poland that of national representative and moral supporter of the opposition. In these functions, the position of the Church has to be distinguished from that of lay Catholics. The latter do not always represent the Church, although they cannot act in an absolutely free manner. The Hierarchy tests their actions by a simple criterion, i.e., whether they pay proper attention to the sovereignty of the Church in the socialist state. The Hierarchy does not usually allow itself to be dragged into either full opposition to or full cooperation with the Marxist regime, maintaining a balance between these two options. Such a balance was also maintained by the old Znak. Today its stability has been shaken by a younger generation seeking a wider say in Polish politics and the Polish economy. Unlike the clergy, Catholic activists, whose legal position within the Church still remains
unsettled, could not express their views by virtue of religious office; they needed to express their religious beliefs in political and secular language. This language appealed to a wide spectrum of the intelligentsia. It led to a rationalisation of religion which, preoccupied with social questions, has been transformed into a 'working morality', a philosophy of opposition as well as a component of political thought. In socialist Poland, religion, confronted with Marxism, has moved into the political-economic sphere, in spite of the apparent sentimentalism and folk-character of religious celebrations. This rationalisation has been most obvious in discussions of religion in a political context, where it is usually associated with Western civilisation, the moral code, the history of Poland, the self-knowledge of the intelligentsia, with being an integral part of the labour movement or with the foundation of political thought, often in such contradictory forms as liberalism and socialism. The rational arguments of Catholics contrasted with the more recent Marxist belief in a religion of humanity where will rather than reason was supposed to change the world.

In the German Ideology Marx denies that religion has a history of its own. It is supposed to be a product of class conflict, a false consciousness concealing true social and economic relations. In Poland, the efforts of lay Catholics to accommodate their ideas revealed and expressed a conflict, between the various strata of Polish society and those in political power, on a much larger scale than that of class conflict. Starting from miscellaneous interpretations of Catholic social doctrine, Catholic intellectuals often arrived at more critical, realistic and workable conclusions than the
Marxists, who created a kind of idealistic economic and social policy. During the entire period, the dialogue reflected a contradiction between Marxist rhetoric and social practice, as even Marxist scholars have to admit.

Some aspects of Marxist thought have penetrated Catholic thought. Not the provocative liberalism of Kisielewski (which was in any case strongly influenced by political realism) but the modified socialism of Mazowiecki, Kuron, Lipski and Cywinski has dominated underground political discussions. Liberalism that has usually been understood as a way out of the economic impasse rather than as an ideology of fierce economic competition, as an idea of individual freedom rather than as the abolition of state intervention. Most liberals claim that their philosophy is not contradictory to Catholicism and that Catholic morality is fundamental in their social order.¹ Their liberalism has more points in common with the Church's social doctrine than with the pure model of laissez-faire. A new version of socialism also refers to Catholicism. The Solidarity programme reads: 'In determining its activity, Solidarity turns to the values of Christian ethics, our national working-class tradition, and the democratic tradition of the labour world. John Paul II's encyclical on human labour is a fresh source of encouragement'.² In this programme Catholicism has been set against the regime and its ideology, against the exploitation of workers by 'state capitalism'. The recently established underground Polish Socialist Party (PPS), to which several prominent activists of Solidarity belong, has the following aims: 'We realise that the word "socialism", which has been hijacked by the communists, is not a popular one among the Polish people, as it is identified with the
authorities. We shall, through our work, struggle and creative thinking, return the proper meaning to this word and to the values associated with it ... we do not want to be associated with any definite philosophy, even though we admit that today we feel a greater affinity with the social teachings of the Catholic Church and most of all those of Pope John Paul II than with Marxism'. Catholicism has become a source of socialist thought but it must be emphasised that, as in the case of liberal thought, it is a Catholicism forged in the dialogue with Marxism. Jaruselski's regime, in spite of its apparent abandonment of ideological legitimisation, has reacted uneasily to the PPS, arresting its members and breaking up its meetings. As if in response to the creation of the PPS, the regime has created a new position called Secretary for Ideology whose incumbent is responsible for social and economic reforms. In this way the ideological confrontation has been transformed into a much wider discussion focussing on the meaning of certain ideas without clearly indicating an ideological stance.

The discussion of politics in Catholic periodicals, partly free or, where this was impossible, hidden in metaphorical historical language, has formulated alternative propositions and essentially helped to maintain a form of civil society. It has been a factor in preventing the development of a totalitarian form of government. The political ideas discussed by Catholics have had no direct influence on the existing policy of the Party but, mainly because of this, have prepared the ground for the appearance of an ideology of opposition. Today, political discourse is carried on in numerous official, semi-official or illegal periodicals. In these some elements of Catholic
thought can still be distinguished, but they are neither clearly distinct nor recognisable as separate ideologies. Catholic thought has no longer an independent existence, as it once did. It is involved in conservative, liberal or socialist thought, in more or less radical opposition, in political positivism as well as in romanticism. This dispersion reflects the popularity of Catholic ideas, of a pluralism energised by Catholicism and the disappearance of a clearly defined Catholic political and moral stance. In contrast to this dispersion Marxism as a scientific ideology has almost entirely disappeared. In the 1940s and 1950s Marxists attempted to control science, the economy, culture and the individual consciousness. Today Marxist scientific ideology, shaken by recurrent crises, has lost its legitimising functions and is hardly present in any form. In this sense, the appearance of Solidarity and the further development of political events has marked the end of the Catholic-Marxist dialogue, understood as the confrontation of two doctrines.

The main reasons for this disappearance can be traced back to the earlier Marxist-Catholic dialogue. In more than thirty years of dialogue, Marxism has appeared as less flexible, adaptable and stimulating than Catholicism. Catholicism, surviving the crisis caused by the war, occupation and the hostility of the Marxist state, has found a way out of the impasse much more quickly than Marxist 'scientific ideology', which has never fully acknowledged its mistakes. In the late 1950s the Party did not accept revisionist ideas, and in the 1970s criticism of scientific ideology was intended to rescue some elements of Marxism rather than to put right its mistakes by constructive criticism. Therefore the adoption of a humanist
rhetoric, in the Catholic view, was insufficient to clear the Marxist record and insufficient reason for establishing a dialogue, a decision also motivated by the history of the latter.

Throughout this period Catholics tried different ways of coming to terms with the various Marxist regimes. While Marxists were consolidating their power in the 1940s, Catholics adopted two positions. Znak and Pax claimed to represent political realism, which was also the main argument for the integration of communists with non-communist. There were certain parallels between Znak's ideas and Gomulka's national faction or between Pax's ideology and the orthodox Soviet faction. Both Catholic groups expected the Party to develop its policy along the lines they supported. But in the early post-war years Marxists were not interested in cooperation. To the disadvantage of Piasecki's political ambitions, the Party appreciated Pax's conformity with Marxist ideology, but only as a subversive activity against the Church. Although Pax enjoyed certain privileges, the Party never considered the group as a real or credible political partner. Marxists believed that religion could be eliminated by administrative and propagandist means and saw no need for accommodation with Catholicism. The oppression of the Church, the closure of the Znak periodicals and the implementation of Pax's ideology excluded any cooperation with the totalitarian Marxist regime. A hope for improvement in Marxist-Catholic relations came in 1956. The much milder ideological policy of the Gomulka regime created a chance for Znak. Through participation in Sejm, the group found a forum for the propagation of its neo-positivism, although neither Gomulka nor the revisionists expressed interest in dialogue. Catholicism was more tolerated by
Marxists, but still not recognised as an important social force. While Gomulka appealed to national feelings, Wyszynski announced the celebration of a thousand years of Christianity in Poland. The Great Novena highlighted the unity of Catholicism and Polish history and contrasted with Gomulka's policy in restoring a hard ideological line, limiting intellectual freedom and abandoning 'national' rhetoric. The image of the Church as a symbol of national self-identification grew as Gomulka's popularity declined. In this situation, Znak's neo-positivism soon became obsolete and its defence of the students in 1968 shifted the group's policy toward open opposition to the regime. In contrast to the earlier Znak, Wiez, stimulated by the thaw of 1956, had a much more radical programme, trying to seize the political and social initiative, incorporating many Marxist ideas and initially aiming at dialogue with the 'liberal' regime. The group insisted on full engagement in social and political affairs and on the reform of Catholicism and socialism according to its personalist philosophy. It inherited from Pax a belief in the close association of the Catholic and Marxist spirits and developed Znak's early concept of moral solidarity. Wiez promoted Catholicism as a social movement aiming at the liberation of man from unjust regimes which violated human rights, as a morality prompting social protest. In this transformation of Catholicism from Stomma's minimalism into a social ideology, the Marxist criticism of religion and revisionism were prominent factors.

The partition of this group again corresponded to the division of the revisionist movement into a group demanding radical reform fostered by moral criticism and one opting for limited reform. The Wiez moral philosophy was absorbed into 'democratic opposition' in
the early 1970s, whereas the adherents of limited reform maintained cooperation with the government and enjoyed the support of the Hierarchy in the 1980s. In the 1970s, when the younger generation of Znak and Wiez carried on a dialogue with the lay left, Marxist scholars attempted a serious discussion of Catholic ideas. They promoted a minimalist Marxism, insisting on fundamental principles and a fundamental ethos rather than on a coherent doctrine, they were open to discussion and ready to cooperate with Catholics at different levels. But by that time, Marxist philosophy had ceased to play an important ideological role and there was no reason for Catholics to become involved in the game of words. The Catholic groups had already fostered and been identified with an alternative culture created in opposition to the authorities. A certain ideological conversion occurred in Poland. At first Znak feared a possible development of Marxism which could bring an end to Western civilisation. Today Catholicism emerges from encounters with Marxism as a strengthened social force which Marxists have to treat seriously in order to survive.

Several ideas put forward by Catholics and Marxists were similar but did not legitimise permanent cooperation because of a certain apriorism in the Polish political situation. The Marxist regime, backed by the Soviet Union, demanded sole political power. Catholics, recognising the limited sovereignty of the Polish state, demanded a share in politics, based on pluralism within a socialist state. Therefore they insisted on their right to criticise and to social control of the Party's activities. This critical function, in which economic criticism was mixed with moral criticism, attracted the Polish intelligentsia. Not only the historical role of Catholicism
but also the Marxist policy toward the intelligentsia can be held responsible for its preferences. By the 1970s, the self-contained defensiveness of Marxist ideology did not leave much room for free intellectual activity. Discussions held in Catholic circles were often the only outlet for suppressed intellectual energy. Catholic periodicals, especially in the late 1960s, provided a forum for political discussions, which soon dominated religious problems. Today attempts are made to restore the 'religious spirit' in Catholic periodicals but it is doubtful if such attempts will succeed. The opposition still expects the political support of Catholic institutions, whose actions are censored according to political criteria and Catholicism is still a term of division between the authorities and society. Not only Catholics work for renewal. Marxists, too have attempted to cleanse their philosophy of the solutions imposed on it in the service of the Party, by returning to its origins in Hegelian thought.

This reflects the interaction which took place during the time of dialogue, i.e. a certain secularisation of religion and a development of religious interest among Marxists. Today Marxist and Catholic scholars together participate in meetings devoted to the spiritual problems of our age.

Catholic groups significantly contributed to the criticism of Marxist ideology and policy. Indeed they were well placed to provide a background for social criticism. In the early post-war period, Catholic intellectuals were prepared for a confrontation with Marxist ideology. Throughout this time, Catholics treated Marxism seriously, as a great threat not only to their religion but to the whole of Christian civilisation. By contrast, Marxist scholars tended to neglect religion, in spite of Marx's famous saying, in his
young Hegelian period, that the criticism of religion is the premise of all further criticism. They discussed Catholic philosophy and morality superficially, with little intellectual insight, believing in the superiority of their philosophy. During these critical battles Marxists often exhibited a lack of proper knowledge and study. For example, in the 1950s they unintentionally exposed the weakness of dialectical materialism, whereas Catholics gained some recognition for their modern approach to science. In the 1970s, the lack of a developed philosophy of religion, together with the post-Stalinist and post-revisionist impasse, made Marxism vulnerable to a diffusion of Catholic ideas. By this time, Catholic philosophy had already interpreted the main categories of Marxist thought. In the 1970s, Catholics and Marxists became more wary of each other's ideas, but whereas for Marxism this indicated the loss of its legitimising functions, for Catholicism it demonstrated an increase of its social critical functions. As Robert Ackermann has observed, although religion is not equivalent to or exhausted by social critique, a religion which 'cannot critique is already dead'. Its engagement in criticism proves the vitality of religion in Poland.

Furthermore, Catholicism has shown continuous development, unlike Marxism, which has been weakened by a succession of social crises. In the 1930s Catholicism was popular among the masses, enjoying the position of a state religion, but was also often criticised and disapproved of for its sentimentality and nationalism. Theoretically, Catholicism cannot properly supply the background to a nationalist philosophy. Yet Catholicism has done so in particular social situations, of which Spain is the best example. In Poland
Falanga and other nationalist groups attempted to harness religion to nationalist ideology in a blend of missionary Catholicism and nationalism, according to which Poland was more Christian and better prepared than other countries to realise the Catholic ethos in the world. Later, Piasecki added Marxism to his doctrine believing that once again, even more strongly than before, Poland could lead the nations to the deserved synthesis of the progressive ideologies, but he was alone in this attempt. After the war Polish Catholics, having undergone a significant metamorphosis, disapproved of nationalist power-philosophy. Even before the war, groups such as Odrodzenie had tried to change the national character of Polish Catholicism, but with little success. In the post-war Marxist state, critical Catholicism took the lead. Znak, Wiez, and even Pax, appealed more to the intellect than to national sentiment, producing wide-ranging and intellectually subtle ideas. The renewal of Catholicism paralleled the evolution of the Polish mentality, as the defeat of Poland and its subsequent occupation swept away nearly all the ideology of power politics and significantly diminished the nationalist rhetoric associated with pre-war Catholicism. In this context a sharp challenge to the pre-war image came naturally. The new model of Catholicism attracted the intelligentsia which, in spite of frequent insensitivity to religious practices, appreciated its role as a forum for the exchange of ideas. The discussion of history was one of the attractions. In Catholic periodicals historical studies occupied a prominent place, not only serving scientific interest but often being used for the propagation of actual political ideas presented in the symbolic language of history. Old controversies were made actual, old problems reappeared with a new intensity.
History became a code of communication among a wide spectrum of the intelligentsia. Marxists did not formulate a comparable language. They had broken with the Polish Marxist tradition after the war and throughout this time they censored certain historical facts. The brief return to the Polish road to socialism had no effect in establishing permanent communication. Attacks on the cultural and national heritage and only few or biased references to specifically Polish Marxism quickly disappointed the intelligentsia, which in the late 1950s increasingly sought new associations. The neglect of communication by the Party again strengthened the position of Catholicism as the ally of the intelligentsia. Moreover, Catholics had developed a moral philosophy which was flexible enough to provide a background to the formulation of different political ideas, as Marxism, formulated in more rigid, often out-of-date language, could not do. All these factors caused Catholicism to become not only a shelter for the intelligentsia but also an intellectual stimulant. No less important was the fact that its primary focus was on the social, economic and political problems of contemporary Poland. In the 1980s, the neo-romantic national philosophy of Tischner exemplified this phenomenon. On the other hand Marxists in the 1970s, and increasingly after the crisis of the 1980s, tended to discuss international problems, to create a philosophy 'changing the sense of the world,' also a kind of religious-romantic philosophy but contrasting with the national commitment of Catholics. This Catholic emphasis produced a cautious attitude to the post-Vatican reforms, which were more appreciated by Marxists than by Catholics. The latter saw them as interventions 'from above' into the difficult situation of the Church in a socialist state, whereas the former
expected the reforms to push Catholics toward cooperation and decrease the independence of the Church. Most of all the national commitment of Catholics had a moderating influence on internal affairs. Catholic groups respected the principle of realist politics and recognised limits which should not be transgressed for national raison d'être or raison d'état. Znak's political realism, Pax's philosophy of two world views, just like later, the religious morality of the democratic opposition and the Solidarity movement, exemplified this moderating influence. The strength of Polish Catholicism, its admixture with patriotism, has protected Poles against the development of more dangerous protests. So far it has kept the country within the limits of non-violent revolution.

This study shows that the thirty years of dialogue did not bring about cooperation. While each of the opposing philosophies made a significant impact on the other's doctrine, it was not discussed by the other directly or in depth. There was a dialogue without direct exchange of opinion and, perhaps because of this, at the same time a most significant and influential dialogue. For many years Marxists had avoided open discussion with Catholics. Today they see this as a great mistake because modified Catholicism, not Marxism, plays the most important role in society. In Poland Catholicism, to use Michael Walzer's terminology, fostered internal critique not only because it was well established in Polish culture but also because it did not legitimise any radical opposition to the Soviet-backed regime. Catholics sought for a definition of realist policy, i.e., a policy which would not jeopardise the existence of nation and state. The policy of forcing evolutionary change by increasing social pressure owes a great deal to the involvement of Catholics in politics. In contrast, Marxism remains an external
ideology, which has not only been unable to bring about the radical changes it predicted but also failed to develop existing potential, thus causing its own collapse and dividing the governing regime from society.
Preface


Chapter 1


2. Schaff wrote at that time that Polish Marxists like Abramowski whose theory was 'anti-Marxist', Brzozowski who was 'hostile to Marxism' or Kelles-Krauz 'an orthodox and eclectic not deserving any attention' cannot be taken by Marxists either as a model or as a part of Marxist tradition. Schaff, A.: Narodziny i rozwoj filozofii marksistowskiej. KiW, Warsaw, 1950, pp. 311, 334, 358.


5. ibid., pp. 109.

6. ibid., pp. 379-381.

7. ibid., p. 383.


13. ibid., pp. 110.
16. ibid., p. 195.
17. ibid., p. 197.
27. ibid., p. 25.
32. ibid., p. 51.
35. ibid., pp. 72-73.
36. ibid., p. 73.
39. ibid., p. 2.
41. Klosak (1948), p. 84.
42. ibid., pp. 83-85.
45. ibid., p. 128.
50. ibid., p. 6.
52. ibid., p. 10. In Anglo-Saxon philosophy, the term 'critical realism' was used for a similar position by G. Dawes Hicks and, not identically with Dawes Hicks or with each other by the American authors of Essays in Critical Realism, New York, 1920.
53. ibid., p. 11.
54. ibid., pp. 11-12.
55. ibid., p. 12.
70. ibid., p. 230.

Chapter 2


5. ibid., p. 283.


8. ibid., p. 74.

9. ibid., p. 98.


15. ibid., p. 405.


22. ibid., p. 241.

23. Especially because the international policy of *Znak* was a function of its political realism.


25. ibid., pp. 239-240.


29. 'Rozmowa o katolicyzmie w świecie i w Polsce', Znak (1959), no. 38.


36. Ibid., p. 452.


46. For example Zablocki, J., 'Liberalizm czyli krzywda społeczna'. Tygodnik Powszechny (1950), no. 34.

47. 'Rocznica' Tygodnik Powszechny (1957), no. 41, p. 1.

48. A good example is Stomma, S., 'Dwa nurty', Tygodnik Powszechny (1958), no. 12, where he expressed his doubt whether Germany had changed its claims.

49. Stomma, S., 'Pozytywizm od strony moralnej', Tygodnik Powszechny (1957), no. 15.


60. ibid., p. 57.

61. ibid., p. 46.

62. ibid., p. 100.

63. Interpellation by Znak group to the Sejm on March 11, 1968.


70. ibid., p. 134.
71. ibid., pp. 140, 171-172.
77. ibid., p. 103.
Today he writes: 'I want to have my private, own pulpit, to be a heretic in this epoch of great secularisation and great desecularisation'.


Michnik, A., Takie czasy...rzecz o kompromisie, Aneks, London 1985, pp. 117, 121, 140.


Chapter 3


9. ibid., p. 9.

10. ibid., p. 52.


19. ibid., p. 41.
20. ibid., p. 61.
26. ibid., p. 6.
29. ibid., p. 8.
30. ibid., p. 9.
35. ibid., p. 32.
36. ibid., pp. 75, 22.
38. ibid., p. 23.
40. ibid., p. 169.
45. ibid., p. 43.
49. ibid., p. 23.
50. ibid., p. 57.
51. ibid., p. 67.
52. ibid., p. 38.
55. ibid., pp. 343, 55.
58. 'Nie przepadam za magicznymi formulami-rozmowa z wicepremierem Zenonem Komanderem'. Przeglad Powszechny (1985), no. 35(179).
Chapter 4


2. Tygodnik Powszechny (1948), no. 25.


5. ibid., p. xviii.

6. ibid., p. 8.

7. ibid., p. 116.

21. ibdm, p. 159.
24. Radio Free Europe launched several attacks (Micewski (1978), p. 220). This reluctance persists even today. In the chronology of the Polish Church published by Wiez in 1984 (no. 7) the group is not mentioned at all.


31. ibdm, p. 216.


41. ibid., p. 105.


54. ibdm, p. 422.


Chapter 5


15. ibid., p. 658.


21. ibid., pp. 80-81.

22. ibid., p. 90.


24. ibid., p. 15.


26. ibid., p. 132.


29. ibid., pp. 74-76.


38. ibid., p. 338.

39. ibid., p. 353.


44. ibid., p. 194.


47. Groups as Argumenty, Czlowiek i Swiatopogląd.

48. In 1974 he wrote in Dialectics and Humanism : 'The stands of the Christian philosophers have been undergoing the process of differentiation against the background of the progressive social transformation occurring in our country. The Mounierist or Teilhardist interpretations of personalism are becoming to dominate, particularly among the younger generation of Christian philosophers, providing grounds for attempts at a philosophical justification of the commitment of Catholics to the ideas of socialist humanism. This opens the prospects for representatives of dialectical materialism not only for a basic Weltanschauung confrontation with representatives of the Christian philosophy, but also for dialogue and co-operation in many domains of social thought. This also opens the possibilities for Catholic intellectuals to take part in the polemics with the integrist-clerical interpretation of Christianity, and to participating, on the basis of Christian motivation, in the development of the socialist ethics and social philosophy'. Jaroszewski, T.M. : 'The Development of Philosophical Studies in Thirty Years of People's Poland'. Dialectics and Humanism (1974), no. 3, p. 7.


51. ibid., p. 131.


56. ibid., p. 236.

57. ibid., p. 113.

58. ibid., p. 234.

59. ibid., p. 123.

60. ibid., p. 243.

61. ibid., p. 85.

62. ibid., p. 250.


75. ibid., p. 62.
81. ibid., p. 155.
83. He writes: 'Socialism can be understood from a basis of Marxist assumptions, but it is also possible to develop socialism from the Church's social doctrine ... The unity of socialist attitudes which corresponds with the principles of our Constitution and simultaneously answers the needs of Poles ... can be based on a plurality of philosophical justifications' (p. 57). In spite of this pluralism, he insists that: 'Only historical materialism can provide philosophical justification for socialism' (p. 73), then a few pages later he is once more torn by doubts that 'we lack an authentic theory of socialist society and are now suffering the results of a long period of subordination of the social sciences to temporary political interest' (p. 138). Despite these doubts he is convinced that historical materialism 'was and still is the natural ground of the workers' consciousness' (p. 186). Pluzanski (1983).


91. ibid., p. 170.


97. ibid., p. 66.


104. ibid., p. 505.


107. ibid., pp. 326-327.

108. ibid., p. 9.

109. ibid., p. 330.
Chapter 6

18. ibid., p. 113.
19. ibid., p. 281.
21. ibid., p. 299.
23. ibid., p. 286.
25. ibid., p. 70.
27. ibid., p. 273.


37. Ibid., p. 135.


39. Ibid., p. 236.


41. Ibid., p. 183.

42. Ibid., p. 92.


46. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

47. Ibid., p. 83.


50. Ibid., p. 61.

51. Ibid., p. 104-105.
52. ibid., p. 82.


56. ibid., p. 145.


59. ibid., p. 163.


65. ibid., p. 106.

66. ibid., p. 87.


71. Wojtyla (1979), pp. 33, 133.


Conclusion


5. 'Obecnosc Marksa w kulturze filozoficznej XX wieku. Część I'. Studia Filozoficzne, (1985), no. 11-12, pp. 3-150.


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