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PROTESTANTS AND THE FORMATION OF KOREAN SELF-RECONSTRUCTION NATIONALISM 1896-1937

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A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Canberra November 1984
Except where acknowledged otherwise, this thesis is based entirely on original research done by myself.

KENNETH M. WELLS
ABSTRACT

The concept of the nation-state is one of the most powerful political and emotional concepts of modern times. While Korea's Protestants were among the first to introduce the concept to Korea, they consistently urged that it be based, not on political confrontation between races, but on reconstruction of the national character founded on individual reform.

The weakening of the traditional Confucian, aristocratic social and political structure by the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars coupled with energetic Protestant mission activity among the lower and higher classes of rural and urban Korea, facilitated the rise of Christianity as a strong rival in defining the nature and goals of society and nation. Korean Protestant nationalists attributed Korea's weakness to ethical and spiritual decay and proposed as a solution an ethical nationalism of stewardship, civic morality, Christian education and self-reliance. Their campaign was initially political and placed them in the arena of international rivalry over Korean territory which was decided in Japan's favour by her defeat of Russia in 1905.

The Japanese Government-General, installed in 1910, recognised that the Protestant Church and its schools were the strongest focus of resistance to its colonial policy of assimilation and proceeded to incarcerate Protestant leaders and bring the schools under direct control through legislation. Despite persecution and the exile of numbers of its leaders, Protestant Church growth continued. Through the symbols of its faith, the political structure of its churches and
its identification with the reconstructive "remnant" of Ancient Israel, the Protestant community in Korea and in exile developed up to 1918 an image of itself as the cradle of the new, democratic Korea of the future.

This image became weakened after the 1919 March First Movement when the prestige of the West and liberal-democracy diminished and socialist movements introduced a new socio-political formula. Self-reconstruction ideals continued to be promoted by some Protestants as the source of a new national civilisation without which no genuine Korean state could emerge or survive. This nonpolitical nationalism involved considerable tension *via-à-via* competing streams of nationalism and among its own practitioners, but amidst Japanese pre-emptive action and charges of compromise and naivety, self-reconstruction nationalists advocated a third way between resistance and resignation. In its economic form, self-reconstruction ideology enjoyed support from nonrevolutionary socialists.

The movement was crushed in 1937 with the onset of the second Sino-Japanese War. Its vision of the nation as a spiritual, cultural community sustained many Koreans during the years of colonial subjection and continues to inspire a following among Koreans today.
In the course of the years devoted to the production of this thesis I have met numerous kind people who have generously encouraged, advised or actively supported my labours. There are many whose comments have sparked an insight or prompted a train of thought which then became part of the thesis. I have become increasingly aware of my fortune in being able to pursue my research within such a supportive environment.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor Wang Gungwu for his supervision of my research and writing, for the benefit of his scholarly experience and for his constant encouragement throughout my time in Seoul and Canberra. I wish to thank Professor Crawcour and Dr. Andrew Fraser for their assistance with Japanese sources and translations, and Dr. John Fitzgerald and Theresa Munford for sparing the time to teach me Chinese. I have benefitted considerably also from the comments and constructive criticisms of my colleagues in the Far Eastern History Department, most especially Dr. Esta Ungar and Terry Narramore. I wish to thank Susan Watson for typing this thesis under considerable pressure. Nona Bennett performed an excellent task in proof-reading the lion's share of the thesis. Any errors, typing or textual, are of course solely my responsibility.

Among those who assisted me in Korea I wish to thank Dr. H.G. Underwood, who arranged my acceptance at Yônsei University, Professors Lee Chong-yôn and Park Yong-shin for supervising my research, Professors Min Kyông-bae and Yi Man-yöl and Dr. Yi Hyôn-jong for leading me to source materials, and Professor Kim Jun-yël (now
President of Koryŏ University) for arranging access to the holdings of the Asiatic Research Centre Library at Koryŏ University.

In the final stages of writing in particular, much study becomes a weariness of the flesh to all one's household. To my wife, Young-Oak, I cannot adequately express in words my deep gratitude and respect for the manner in which she has patiently borne the main burden of care for our four young children, in addition to checking my Korean translations and reading over the text. I thank Natalya, too, for allowing my absence on weekends to "finish Daddy's book".
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<td>CMSS</td>
<td>Chōsen mondai shiryō sōsho</td>
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<td>CTS</td>
<td>Chōsen tōchi shiryō</td>
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<tr>
<td>GGPAB</td>
<td>Government General Police Affairs Bureau</td>
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<td>GSC</td>
<td>Gendaishi shiryō: Chōsen</td>
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<td>NKH</td>
<td>Naimushō Keihokyoku hen: Shakai undō no jōkyō</td>
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<td>USPM</td>
<td>United States Presbyterian Mission Archives</td>
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<td>Kim Ül-han, Yun Ch'i-ho Chŏn</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On 6 December 1945 Baron Yun Ch'i-ho, former president of the first "modern" nationalist organisation in Korea, the Independence Club of 1896-1899, died at his home in Kaesŏng at the age of eighty. Among the mourners at his funeral was another veteran of the Independence Club, Syngman Rhee, to whom Yun had written two months earlier a letter Rhee had ignored, on the future course of the Korean nation.1 During the next eighteen months a number of national figures in the south fell victim to assassins: Song Chin-u, Kim Ku, Chang Tŏk-su and Yŏ Un-hyŏng. In the north the Soviet Command confined and presumably executed one of the most prestigious nationalists in the land, Cho Man-sik, together with colleagues such as Kim Hyŏn-sŏk.

All these men were Protestants and all in varying degrees had been associated with "self-reconstruction" nationalism, a movement pioneered by Yun Ch'i-ho and refined by An Ch'ang-ho, another Protestant who had died in a prison hospital in 1938. The deaths of these men did not exactly mark the end of their thought or labours, for others stood up where they were struck down and strove to keep the tradition alive. The occurrence after the liberation of precisely those things Yun and

An had warned about - the fateful reliance on other powers, internal division and an undemocratic society - inclined some to regard them as prophetic interpreters of the nation's character, failings and needs. Nor did their deaths weaken the link between Christianity and Korean nationalism, a link which has survived rather strongly in the south - some might say to the detriment of both church and state. But in that they facilitated the rise in the south of Syngman Rhee's rather different form of "Christian" nationalism and encouraged a mass exodus from the north of its large Protestant population, these deaths signalled a turning away from their spiritual critique and vision by the new rulers of the divided nation.

In politics, their decline attended a pre-occupation with the "glorious" struggles of the Korean patriots in exile which naturally encouraged political leaders in north and south to subsume the idea of nation entirely under the concept of the state. Nationalism was made official: it was defined as the process whereby each regime came to power; and through their respective definitions they claimed

2. After the resignation of President Syngman Rhee in 1960, the Hungsadan, the organisation founded by An Ch'ang-ho in 1913 to embody and propagate his self-reconstruction ideals, regrouped in the expectation that the persecutions it suffered under Rhee's regime would cease. But in 1961 the Hungsadan was ordered to disband and its jubilee celebrations were held in America in May 1963. Six months later the ban was lifted in Korea and the organisation re-formed under Chu Yo-han, a principal leader during the Japanese occupation. After President Park Chung-Hee's assassination, the Han'guk Ilbo began printing articles on self-reconstruction ideas, and even included one on Yun Ch'i-ho. Whilst in Korea in 1980-1981, I met a number of Korean scholars who believed the values expressed in the Independence Club's newspaper, the Tongnip Shinmun, were what Korea needed today.
legitimacy. The official perspectives have heavily influenced historical writings on Korean nationalism in the two Koreas (and to some extent elsewhere), so that the self-reconstruction movement which distinguished nation as a cultural community from the political state has scarcely been examined let alone understood. A brief examination of the historiography of Korean nationalism will illuminate the problem.

Historiography of Korean Nationalism

Where nationalism is viewed as the struggle to wrest political control of the Korean peninsula from the Japanese, Korean historians are anxious to refute the Japanese "colonial" view of Korean national and political behaviour. It is the constant complaint of Korean scholars that Western scholars view Korea, ancient and modern, through Japanese eyes. This practice they trace back at least to 1905 when George Kennan, impressed by the Japanese victory over Russia, influenced President Roosevelt to Korea's disadvantage. In 1926 Alleyne Ireland published The New Korea in which, relying exclusively and naively on the English-language versions of the Government-General Annual Reports, he argued that Japanese colonial rule was highly beneficial for Korea. Even Sidney and Beatrice Webb praised the efficiency of the Japanese state in whose hands they believed Korea could be redeemed.

4. N.R. Bennett, "The Webbs in Asia", a paper delivered at the Fifth New Zealand International Conference on Asian Studies, Hamilton, University of Waikato, 25-28 August 1983. (Cited with permission.)
The publication in 1960 of Hilary Conroy's *Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910* stimulated earnest debate on the "colonial" approach. Although Conroy's book is a masterly piece of history, it was challenged by Korean scholars such as Lee Soon-won and Doo Soo Suh of Washington University for giving Japan the benefit of considerable doubt concerning the process which led to her annexation of Korea. Conroy had already admitted that his findings were based on "Japanese sources which, of course, reflect Japanese views ... and Chinese, Russian and Korean sources but little", and in 1962 gave more credence to the Korean viewpoint. What then is the "colonial" view of Korean history?

One Korean scholar has suggested that the colonial view was not merely that conditions in Korea in 1910 justified Japan's annexation. It went far beyond this by making Korea's "subjection-worthiness" axiomatic, a hermeneutic for interpreting the whole course of Korean history. The main thrust of this view has been analysed by Lee Ki-baik.


in his *Han'guksa Shillon* (韓國史新論), in which he elaborates on the following five ingredients: (1) the peninsular theory, whereby it is argued that as a peninsula, Korea is militarily and culturally heteronomous, and therefore its history is not self-determined; (2) toadyism, i.e. the idea that Korea's history is simply one of toeing the line of whatever power is strongest at a particular time; (3) factionalism, which is considered an innate, permanent characteristic of Koreans; (4) the idea that Korean culture lacks initiative and originality; from which follows (5) the stagnation theory, that there has been no internal development of Korean society. These beliefs supposedly guided the compilers of the Government-General's official publication: *The History of Chōsen* (朝鮮史).

The colonial perspective was hardly questioned in Japan until the 1960s. The following decade Korean nationalism itself attracted sympathetic discussion by Japanese scholars who contributed to the Tokyo journal *Kan*, such as Abe Hiroshi, Ōhata Tokushiro and Inoue Hideo. Although Mr. Inoue complained in 1979 that the Japanese academic world was still far from discarding the colonial view,

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8. Lee Ki-baik, *Han'guksa Shillon*, Seoul, Ilchogak, 1967. Korean and Sino-Korean works cited in footnotes will be romanised according to the McCune-Reischauer system. Except where an author's personal preference is known, the authors' names will be romanised likewise. The Korean and/or Sino-Korean and a translation of each work cited are provided in the Bibliography. For works in Japanese, I follow accepted practice and give only the romanised form (Hepburn) in notes and Bibliography.


the most recent publications of the Korean History Research Society (Chōsen Shi Kenkyūkai) evince greater willingness to credit Korean history with some creativity and distinction.  

Shortly after the annexation Koreans began responding to the colonial view with a nationalistic view of their history. The first important representative of this response was the nationalist Pak Ón-sik, whose first work, Han’guk T’ongsa (韓國痛史) written in about 1915, was followed by two further volumes in 1921: Han’guk Tongnip Undong chi Hyŏlsa (韓國獨立運動之血史: 2 volumes). In the first work Pak anticipated what is today a popular refutation of the colonial viewpoint, namely, that the Japanese occupation disrupted and held back the healthy development of Korean nationalism towards an enlightened, progressive, democratic state. His later volumes deal more with the question of "Korean-ness": the "traditional preference" for the scholar in Korean culture is opposed to the alleged predilection of the Japanese for the warrior. A deliberate counter to Japanese chauvinism, the tables are turned and Korea is recast as a morally superior civilisation temporarily overrun by a barbarous race hopelessly trusting in crude violence. These views could not be printed inside Korea, and so Pak wrote:

11. See especially Chōsen Shi kenkyūkai rombunshū, No.19, March 1982, Tokushū: Chōsen no shakai to shisō; and ibid, No.20, March 1983, Tokushū: shokuminji shita minshū no seikatsu to tatakai.

and published them in North China, where Kim Pyöng-cho and Shin Ch'ae-ho also composed nationalistic writings.  

This nationalistic perspective did not hold good for all Korean nationalists for there was an earlier tradition, the sedo theory of the late Chosôn era, which had appeared among Reform Party members in the 1880s and was adopted by some Protestant nationalists in the 1890s. *Sedo ch'öng'i* (世道政治) is a term which gained currency in the 1890s and survives today as short-hand for the thesis that the history of the late Chosôn era was determined by the domination of politics by royal in-law clan oligarchies. The earliest and most heavily cited history espousing the sedo theory is the *Kínse Chosôn Chönggam* (近世朝鮮政體) which was published in Chinese in Tokyo in 1886. The Preface was signed by Yi Su-jông, a Reform Party member who was the first higher class Korean to embrace Protestantism and who began a Korean translation of the Bible in Japan in the early 1890s. The idea that court intrigue encouraged corruption throughout the land, stifled the wisdom of enlightened men and prevented solution of national problems, quickly became the dominant interpretation of the late Chosôn dynasty and its decline.


14. The Reform Party was not organised as a modern political party, but was a vocal pressure group or faction which called for Western-style (or Meiji-style) reforms between 1880 and 1899. Thereafter, reformists joined "enlightenment" or "self-strengthening" movements or went abroad. The Chosôn dynasty lasted from 1392 to 1910.

It is easy to see how the *sedo* theory could be used to support the colonial viewpoint, and indeed two of its leading Korean exponents, Yi Nŭng-hwa and Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, served on the Government-General's Chōsen History Compilation Committee (Chösenshi henshŭkai). Both Yi and Ch'oe were Christians, the latter an ardent associate of Yun Ch'i-ho and An Ch'ang-ho from the early twentieth century. Yun Ch'i-ho himself was probably the first to introduce *sedo* ideas to Europeans, in 1898, through the Methodist mission, and his diary contains frequent allusion to the negative effects of *sedo* politics.\(^{16}\) In reality Yun did not support the colonial perspective: he limited the operation of *sedo* politics to the previous one hundred years only, and like all other Korean proponents of the theory drew no conclusions therefrom about innate failings of the Korean people. Since modern scholars such as Lee Ki-baik still apply the *sedo* thesis to nineteenth-century Korea,\(^{17}\) it is important to distinguish it sharply from the colonial interpretation.

The *sedo* thesis did however warn its advocates against a nationalistic viewpoint which credited Korean history with innate virtue and superiority. For Yun Ch'i-ho, An Ch'ang-ho and other self-reconstruction nationalists *sedo* politics was one among other

\(^{16}\) Yun Ch'i-ho, "Popular Movements in Korea", *The Korean Repository*, December 1898, pp.465-469. (For some reason Mr. Quinones gives as the reference to Yun's article the *Korean Review* of May 1898. This journal, the successor of the *Korean Repository*, did not begin until 1900.)

\(^{17}\) See C.K. Quinones, *op cit*, p.512.
symptoms of the national decay which had invited foreign invasion. While it did not justify Japan, Korea's weakness was the occasion for the annexation, and any nationalistic view which ignored the fact was considered highly suspect. This moral view of the cause of Korea's loss of independence appealed to many Protestants, but by the 1920s nationalists who claimed Japan was the sole cause of Korea's weakness criticised it for vitiating the anti-Japanese independence movement. After the liberation several opponents of the nationalistic view of history were numbered among those charged with collaboration with the Japanese and included Ch'oe Nam-sŏn and a principal apologist of reconstruction ideals, Lee Kwang-su. Yun Ch'i-ho, some publications claim, committed suicide out of despair over charges of collaboration. 18

The charge of collaboration was not linked to the seodo thesis itself, which remained acceptable as a specific description of court politics in the nineteenth century, but to the refusal (or failure) to oppose Japanese rule as the foremost enemy of the nation. The assumption of power in the south by Syngman Rhee at the expense of the self-reconstruction leaders favoured the appearance of eulogistic writings on the nationalist movement abroad and on heroic, often violent acts of anti-Japanese resistance. 19 The discredited nationalists


19. Kim Ku who had moved away from self-reconstruction ideals soon after the annexation and had organised assassination and sabotage squads against the Japanese while in exile in Shanghai, was included among the heroes.
were largely ignored. Dissatisfaction with the narrowness and anti-Japanese focus of these nationalistic histories surfaced in the 1970s with the writings of Lee Kwang-rin, Lee Ki-baik, Shin Yong-ha and others; recently, Yun Ch'i-ho and self-reconstruction ideals have received sympathetic treatment in some quarters. But such sympathy is rare, and in Western scholarship also, interest in the self-reconstruction stream of Korean nationalism has only recently surfaced.

Defining Nationalism in Korea

Since the publication of Lee Chong-sik's general political history of Korean nationalism in 1963, few names have been added to the list of scholarly publications on Korean nationalism in English. Almost all


such scholarship has been the work of political scientists and as yet only one monograph by an historian has been published on the subject. Consequently, Korean nationalism has been viewed according to political-science frameworks and evaluated with reference to models of transition, development or progression from "traditional" to "modern" or "simple" to "ideological" nationalism.

The great virtue of these political-science approaches is their rejection of the tendency, in South Korea especially, to define nationalism as anti-Japanism. The purpose of models is, as Robert Simmons expresses it, to "get a handle" on reality, that is, to discover general or universal patterns of political behaviour. Nationalism must in this case prove its kinship with the concerns of nation-state politics throughout the modern world. Simple anti-Japanism not only fails to demonstrate any such kinship but also contradicts itself, for in portraying nationalism as merely the response to Japan, it supports the colonial view that Korean history is determined from outside. Suh Dae-sook has successfully criticised this as not being nationalism at all, but traditional patriotism.


The modular or social-science approach does create its own problems however. Each model assumes its own definition of nationalism, and the various Korean independence movements are expected to justify their claim to nationalism accordingly. Chen I-te perceives a transition from xenophobic patriotism (i.e. "traditional" nationalism) to "modern" nationalism, and attributes this to the influence of Japan's colonialism.\(^{27}\) One would expect then that xenophobia had diminished in importance by 1945 and certainly afterwards, and that patriotism and nationalism had also become distinct concepts marking the transition. This is not evident. The Korean terms aegukju\(\bar{i}\) (愛國主義: patriotism) and aeguk ch\(\bar{i}\)sa (愛國志士: patriot) denote virtue of the highest order right through and beyond the colonial period, and groups supporting the Shanghai Provisional Government after 1919 called themselves patriotic societies. With regard to xenophobic nationalism it must be recognised that the Korean term for nationalism was and still is minjokju\(\bar{i}\) (民族主義), which means "the principle of race".\(^{28}\) Kuksju\(\bar{i}\) (國粹主義) appears in a nationalist journal in 1925 as a term of approval,\(^{29}\) but later refers critically to


\(^{28}\) "Minjok", which is used in "racial prejudice", "ethnicity" etc. in Korea, defines nation as race, and Koreans generally resist any suggestion that it might be otherwise.

\(^{29}\) In Kaeby\(\bar{\mathring{\text{\text{"}}}},{ one Py\(\text{"\text{"}}}\) Yong-no referred to Shin Ch'ae-ho as the "star of kuksu\(\bar{\text{"}}}ju\(\bar{\text{"}}\)\(\text{"}}\). Shin in fact had used the term kuksu poj\(\text{"}}\) (國粹保全) in 1908. For both references, see Tanjae Shin Ch'ae-ho Ch\(\text{"}})njip, Supplementary Volume, pp.116 and 397.
ultranationalistic ideas. The more literal equivalent of nationalism, 
kukkajuui (國家主義), is rare throughout and never seems to have 
been applied to any person (i.e. there is no 國家主義者). Even 
the supposed "collaborator" Lee Kwang-su wrote in 1933 that "race 
is fate", an absolute claiming loyalty from all who belong, the 
only genuine grounds of a nation to which the only possible passport 
of entry was birth into its race. 30

If like Ernest Gellner one delivers judgment from on high and 
pronounces that because certain global socio-economic developments 
sufficiently explain the phenomenon of nationalism the "ideological 
or doctrinal history of nationalism is largely irrelevant to the 
understanding of it", 31 then one may conclude that semantic evidence 
cannot challenge Mr. Chen's thesis. One might go further and say that 
Lee Kwang-su simply expressed the kernel of nationalistic sentiment, 
described by Lord Acton as the idea "that nations would not be 
governed by foreigners" and by Mr. Gellner as sentiment "most acutely 
offended by ethnic divergence between rulers and ruled". 32 But then 
Mr. Chen should perhaps revise his own terminology which implies that 
xenophobic sentiment is incongruous with the development of a modern 
nation-state.

The problems of models of nationalism do not end here. Since 
Mr. Gellner the philosopher believes the "precise doctrines" of

30. Lee Kwang-su, "Chosŏn minjok ron", Lee Kwang-su Chŏnjip, 
1983, p.130.
32. ibid, p.134.
nationalism are "hardly worth analysing", he adopts a rather cavalier attitude towards the historical documents of each case. But even where the historical research is thorough, it is evident that large parts of a people's experience can be excluded from consideration or misunderstood through adherence to a model of the political dynamics of nationalism. Mr. Suh's evaluation of the March First Movement of 1919 illustrates the problem:

This is perhaps the largest mass movement of the Korean people, but it was only great in the number of casualties, for it did not achieve anything substantial in relation to the magnitude of the disaster. Nor was it influenced by the October Revolution, but rather, if the uprising may be attributed to anything, it was Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination which inspired not the politicians but the religious leaders ... who led the people to a political disaster.34

Suh Dae-sook quite legitimately excludes the March First Movement from an explicitly ideological, political-revolutionary form of nationalism. (Nor does it belong to self-reconstruction nationalism.) But it is a little too strong to suggest that its only greatness was its failure. It is one thing to adopt a model to examine some specific aspect of nationalism, quite another to conclude that anything which slips through its net is small fry not worthy of notice.

The antithesis forced between politicians and religious leaders in Mr. Suh's critique is baffling. Which Koreans in 1919 were "politicians"? Apart from petty officials and two provincial governors who supported the

33. ibid, p.124.

Government-General, the majority of persons inside Korea qualifying for the title were religious leaders. The Japanese had recognised that religious leaders were *de facto* political leaders since 1905. In 1928 they observed that nationalism was still dominated by various religious bodies, and a police survey in 1936 revealed that whereas public officials were the least involved, nearly fifty per cent of religious leaders questioned indicated they were actively seeking independence.

By contrast, historians find it impossible to pass by the positive importance of the March First Movement. Frank Baldwin considers it "a milestone in the growth of Korean nationalism", and claims that its example "continues to sustain and uplift Koreans struggling to build a viable country ...." Marius Jansen also acknowledges the movement as "the first great demonstration of nonviolent resistance in the twentieth century". At the time it drew praise from the leaders of

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the Chinese May Fourth Movement as an example to emulate and preceded Gandhi's nonviolent, civil disobedience campaigns in India by one month.

What the March First Movement does illustrate in full relief are the predicament of all political endeavour - nationalist and other - inside Korea during the Japanese occupation and a degree of religious, particularly Christian, involvement that is unusual in East Asian nationalisms. Though by no means the only ones, these two factors played a definite part in determining the nature of some streams in Korean nationalism. The political or social scientist must of course seek universal patterns. The task of historians is to unearth the particular, to grasp what it is that gives each "case" of nationalism its distinctive character.

Nation, State and Religion: Concepts in Tension

Contemporary events or developments in the life of groups or people appear at times to stimulate deep reflection on their identity. Where the situation is insecure, threatening or in some other way critical the people may generate among themselves a heightened awareness of "history",


40. Of course by calling any movement a case of nationalism, an historian is assuming it falls into a general category, and some schools of history such as the French "Annalists" specialise in seeking grand patterns in history. But there is a difference between looking for a pattern and applying a model methodologically. My own intention in this thesis is not to address the question "What is self-reconstruction nationalism?" - as if there were an archetype to measure up against - but to describe and interpret a particular Korean movement which I find appropriate to term "self-reconstruction nationalism".
or in the terms of at least one philosophical tradition they reflect on the problem of their own existence in terms of their place in time and space. Unless this self-examination is to become sterile, there must ensue from it a concrete attempt to define the nature of the group which at the same time authenticates its role and value. This has doubtless spawned all sorts of programmes based on various interpretations of history as a force with direction or on convictions about historical "mission" and so on. It has also inspired inquiries into the meaning of history of considerable influence, such as Augustine's monumental *City of God* in which he searched for an understanding of human life that both made sense of the impending collapse of the Roman system and defined the cosmic role of the community of belief to which he belonged.

In the case of Augustine, the community concerned had the advantage of strong identity as a growing Christian church. But as an expanding community it set no limits to its boundaries geographically, racially or in time, for it had cosmic ambitions. In this respect the contrast with the narrow exclusiveness of modern nationalism could hardly be more complete, yet in Korea this latter phenomenon also arose in part out of reflections on group identity at a critical juncture in her history. The lively connexion between a universalist religion like Christianity with the particularistic concept of a nation-state is indicative of the growth of national consciousness in modern times, but is not self-explanatory.

41. I mean existentialism. Nicholai Berdyaev's *Meaning of History*, Cleveland, Meridian, 1962, is the most explicit in the tradition.
Some Christian thinkers have strongly condemned the identification of nation and state. The Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, for instance, branded nationalism as a plague and the "myth of the National State ... the so-called principle of nationalities ... that each national group must set itself up as a separate State" as the demon of modern history. He accused the "systematic identification of ... Nation and State" and nation and race of betraying universal human priorities. The nation had become "an earthly divinity whose absolute selfishness is sacred". Nationalism, the commitment to the particularistic ties of blood, tribe or clan, was the antithesis of Christianity.

The catastrophe of World War I prompted some Protestants also to censure the identification of churches with nation-states, if not the concept of nation-state itself. The Swiss theologian Karl Barth was a prominent leader in this movement from the 1930s and the German Barmen Declaration of 1934 became its definitive document. The creation at this time of the Confessing Church in opposition to the German National Church and the cooperation between Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Bishop Bell of Chichester were attempts to retrieve and reaffirm the universality of the Christian faith. That this should have been necessary and encountered such resistance reveals the extent of Protestant servitude to nationalistic impulses and demands. In the

43. ibid, p.2.
44. ibid, p.7.
late nineteenth century when its missionaries entered Korea, Protestantism in general was happy with the nation-state formula, even if within this context the Presbyterians and Methodists insisted strongly on the separation of church and state.

This dominance of the nation-state concept over universalistic systems has been attributed by Benedict Anderson in his recent work, *Imagined Communities*, to the decline of religious cosmologies and the rise of secularism. This has influenced the perception of political groupings as numerous autonomous, thoroughly introspective peoples (nations).\(^45\) In order to make sense of all the complex and discrete historical forces out of which nationalism has emerged, Mr. Anderson identifies two broad categories: the technological-economic developments and the anthropological-psychological changes which were perhaps attendant features of the former.

The former category is what enables a person to imagine membership of a community of "citizens" horizontally linked within specified geographical boundaries. The linchpin in this process is the "revolutionary vernacularising thrust of capitalism", the capitalistic concern with reaching the largest market possible: in a word, "print-capitalism".\(^46\) The latter category refers to the erosion of religious cosmologies but also, in Mr. Anderson's view, to the "religious"

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46. *ibid*, pp.41-47.
nature of nationalism. Nationalist imaginings are akin to religious imaginings and thus succeed where ideologies like Marxism and liberalism fail. By a "secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning", they fill the "gaping emotional vacuum" attending the decline of religious modes of thought. This explains why nationalism, which has inspired no great thinkers, should be such a stumbling-block to Marxism; and why it is that as Carlton Hayes pointed out, Christianity suffers the anomaly of "state" churches.

Much of this is helpful, but it does not completely fit the phenomenon of Protestant nationalism in Korea. It may be that Mr. Anderson has passed too quickly over the nature of specifically religious nationalism, of nationalist movements which grow out of or are influenced directly by religious traditions. Such movements are, after all, not uncommon in Asia. "An understanding of the religious environment within which the politics of Asian states operate," a scholar has claimed, "is essential to a comprehension of the role of nationalism in these politics." In Korea Protestant Christianity, a new religion, inspired and helped fashion self-reconstruction

47. ibid, pp.18-19.
48. ibid, pp.11-13.
nationalism, and while a secular concept of time accompanied the "new learning" which entered the land with Christian missions, it did not exclude the religious conception of contemporaneity with historical experiences of different eras. The identification with ancient Israel by the Protestant community up to 1919 at least, is surely partly why Christian nationalism flourished in Korea.

Among people who already possess ethnic or cultural identity, the presence of religion rather than its absence may strengthen nationalist sentiment. As Juan A. Rivera has noted of the Aglipayan or Philippine Independent Church this century, its strength lies in its appeal to nationalism. It is a Filipino movement... It is a truly indigenous church and therefore it can appeal more than any other entity to the nationalistic sensibilities of the people. Forming the Philippine Independent Church signifies more than adherence to religious tenets; it means, above all things, a most patriotic act.... Patriotism per se is a religious act.52

51. By "secular" concept of time Mr. Anderson means the idea of events going on at the same time, side by side, which enables large numbers of people to envisage each other reading the same newspaper, facing the same problems, etc., at the same time, even though the people never meet. The "religious" concept of time, of contemporaneity, he takes from Auerbach's Mimesis: two or more events which are neither causally nor temporally linked (the sacrifice of Isaac and of Christ), are linked vertically to divine providence. (Anderson, p.30.) This encourages people to seek identity with "types" across time rather than horizontally with classes, peoples, etc. But I think that in Korea, Christianity actually introduced this "religious" conception, and that it added meaning to nationalism. The Protestants identified the Koreans as a people with the ancient Israelites, and claimed God's relation to both was identical.

52. von der Mehden, op cit, p.143. The apparently synonymous usage of nationalism and patriotism in this quotation may be quite justified. Baldwin does the same in his study on Korean nationalism (op cit, p. 5). I purposely questioned a number of Korean students in Seoul on this point, and discovered an almost uniform failure to distinguish the terms.
This example suggests that religious nationalism is more than an alliance of two interests, and arises where membership of a religion becomes a nationalistic act. This may seem obvious enough, but in view of the inherently self-limiting nature of nationalism one might expect this symbiotic relationship of religion and nationalism to involve tremendous tension. For insofar as a salvation-religion becomes an expression of nationalism it loses its integrity and, conversely, to the extent such a religion permeates its fabric it relativises the particularism and objectives of nationalism. Logically, this tension can be resolved only by religion becoming particularistic, by religion consenting to dance to the nationalist tune. If Mr. Anderson concludes that it is false to claim that "Marxists as such are not nationalists", of Korea it could almost be said, "Protestants as such were nationalists."

This does not mean religious nationalism is a fraud or that the religious component is simply dropped once the nation-state is firmly established. For as already noted, the connexion is not merely an alliance: religion may define the nature of a nationalist movement and the imprint it makes on a national society through the movement is historically very important. Islamic nationalism and the intimate relationship between Polish Catholicism and Polish national identity.


54. See for example M. Pomian-Srzednicki, Religious Change in Contemporary Poland: Secularisation and Politics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, where the author argues that Polish nationalism survives precisely because Polish society has successfully resisted secularisation. There are Poles who resent this Catholicism-Poland identity, for example Czeslaw Milosz. See his essay, "The Importance of Simone Weil", in his Emperor of the Earth, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981.
are cases where the social vitality of religion is such that nationalism becomes resistance to secularisation.

Religions wield a power through their symbolism that supposedly "scientific" ideologies are hard-put to match. In his book *Pasyon and Revolution*, Reynaldo Ileto has examined the highly articulate symbolism that expressed common aspirations and inspired devotion to political movements among the revolutionary and nationalistic religious communities in the Philippines. Religions have a power through their symbolism that supposedly "scientific" ideologies are hard-put to match. In his book *Pasyon and Revolution*, Reynaldo Ileto has examined the highly articulate symbolism that expressed common aspirations and inspired devotion to political movements among the revolutionary and nationalistic religious communities in the Philippines. 55 Religious symbolism thus enhances the ability to imagine national or political communities. Max Weber's findings in this respect are a corrective to the rather cynical attitude towards religious functions in society and politics of such diverse writers as Gibbon, Machiavelli, Durkheim and Spinoza. 56 Of particular pertinence to Protestantism in Korea is Robert Bellah's thesis of the movement from compact to "differentiated religious symbolism" which universalist, salvation-religions tend to inspire. 57 The introduction to Korea of a differentiated monotheism was bound to have some socio-political effect.


and Korean Protestant scholars claim that it was this new faith which provided Koreans with the ability to distinguish themselves from their society and thereby initiate modernisation as a nation-state.58

Despite this acceptance of the nation-state as a natural, legitimate entity, tension did arise at times in Korea between Christianity and nationalism. But this tension was mostly generated by conflicting definitions of nationalism and disagreements over the priority of political action and the source and nature of change. Tension arose among the Protestants also over the proper relationship between the church and the state. But it was out of these very tensions that there emerged, albeit unevenly, the Protestant version of self-reconstruction nationalism.

The Thesis

The pervading presence of religion in Korean nationalism first caught my attention when I was engaged in research on Korean independence movements for my master's thesis. It was not just that so many nationalists adhered to a religion but that they maintained there was a link between their beliefs and their nationalism. That Ch'ŏndogyo should be so linked did not surprise me for it seemed an obviously nationalistic religion, of the type that is prone to chiliastic

imaginings and movements. It was founded around 1860 and its importance during the crisis of the late Chosón dynasty and during the Japanese occupation has been examined by Mr. B.B. Weems. But the importance the Protestant Church quickly came to possess in fashioning nationalism, far surpassing its numerical importance, did appear unusual for East Asia. Yet there is no work in English on the subject comparable to Weems' on Ch'ŏndogyo, or to Eugene Boardman's study of Christian influences on the Taiping Rebellion.

Initially I intended treating only the 1920s and 1930s with special reference to Cho Man-sik, a Presbyterian nationalist in P'yŏngyang, and movements associated with him. My advisers in Seoul soon convinced me that there was insufficient source material to support the topic, at least given the time at my disposal. The deeper I delved into the subject the stronger became my understanding that the pre-annexation period was extremely important to the later period, and required more detailed and careful treatment than could be contained in an introduction. It is reasonable to speculate that had Protestantism arisen only after the annexation in 1910 it would have borne a different relationship with nationalism. Before annexation it had room to develop a perspective on life and the

59. B.B. Weems, *op cit.*


61. See Notes on Sources.
character and objectives of the nation free from pressure to justify itself as an anti-Japanese force. Moreover given the unfamiliarity in the West with the Christian/nationalist connexion in Korea, a presentation of the Protestant role over its four most important decades rather than a local case over a shorter time-span seemed a more worthwhile contribution.

The subject still required narrowing down to a specific movement. From the foundation of the Independence Club in April 1896 to the Japanese invasion of China in July 1937, Protestants were involved in all phases and streams of the nationalist movement in Korea and abroad. Syngman Rhee, leader of the American-based democrats, President of the Shanghai Provisional Government and later of South Korea; Yi Tong-hwi, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, guerilla leader and a founder of the Korean communist movement; Yun Ch'i-ho, politician, educationalist, President of the Independence Club and Korean Self-strengthening Society and proponent of civic morality; An Ch'ang-ho, leader of the "gradualist" movement; ten of the eleven committee members responsible for the Tokyo Students' Declaration of Independence of 8 February 1919; sixteen of the thirty-three signatories to the March First Declaration of 1919; Yi Sung-hun, pioneer of modern education; Ch'oe Hyŏn-bae, a leader in the Han'gŭl movement; Kim Kyu-sik and Yŏ Un-hyŏng, proponents of socialism; Cho Man-sik, champion of economic nationalism and Head of the Interim Government in North Korea from August 1945 to January 1946 - all counted themselves Protestants. Even Kim Ku, organiser of assassination and sabotage squads, claimed to be a Protestant.

The distribution of Protestants among such a wide range of approaches, of which some were mutually antagonistic, is evidence of the general acceptance by Protestants of the inherent rightness of
the nation-state principle. It also makes the task of interpreting the nature of the Protestant impact on Korean nationalism unmanageable in a thesis and could even suggest that the real impact was the other way round. Fortunately, the writings of a number of Korean nationalists indicated that Protestants did directly influence through their explicit beliefs the formation of one stream of nationalism: self-reconstruction or "ethical" nationalism.

In the late nineteenth century a self-strengthening movement arose among members of the Reform Party. This initially meant strengthening the army and economy through modernisation after the manner of Meiji Japan, which was supposed to have adapted Western learning to its own needs. In the 1890s Sŏ Chae-p'il and Yun Ch'i-ho developed an ethico-spiritual critique of Korean society, beliefs and politics, on the basis of their recently acquired Protestant faith. Korea's material weaknesses were regarded as symptoms of moral and spiritual decline, and self-strengthening was reinterpreted as the religious and ethical renewal of the individual and society. This required in addition to Christian faith modern education, training in public virtues, unity among all classes of Koreans and long-term commitment to all fields of national reconstruction.

Under the Japanese occupation this view was developed into a self-reconstruction theory which was supported by some Buddhists and Ch'ŏndogyo adherents as well as Protestants. The basic outline of the theory can be stated in simple terms. Korea's colonial fate was a result of the lack of the material requisites of a modern state. This material lack was itself a result of a lack of moral fortitude and spiritual integrity which was manifested in egotistical factionalism, absence of public ethics, chronic inability to unite in times of crisis and sheer lack of will to persevere with practical action in place of
sporadic bursts of unrealistic enthusiasm. Japan was certainly a problem, but also the consequence of a deeper and more pressing problem: the Korean's lack of the attributes of nationhood. If Japan left tomorrow, she or another power would be back again the day after. Hence any independence which bypassed self-reconstruction spiritually, morally and culturally would depend constantly on outside support and protection. Self-reconstruction involved reform of the individual character through moral, mental and physical training, pursued within the supportive structures of model communities. These pilot communities were to be the future form of Korea in embryo: as they matured they would render foreign rule unnecessary, and ultimately impossible.

Protestants naturally took an ethical view of nationalist action. The value of any action was its relation to eternal truth. History acquired meaning insofar as it was oriented towards the "Kingdom of God", just as individual life had to be directed towards the perfection promised to it through the resurrection. Conversely, all action contrary to truth or holiness or unrelated to eternity was eternally insignificant. The solution of those Protestants aware of the tension between nationalistic ends and transcendental claims was ethical nationalism: a nationalism which by its nature was aligning the people with the values of the "Kingdom of God". Self-reconstruction of the individual and the national society was therefore far more than a nationalistic strategy: it was a spiritual task universally applicable to all humanity and any nation whether independent or not.

There were elements of idealism in the Korean Protestant self-reconstruction ideology which recall the ideas of the Russian religious intelligentsia of the mid-nineteenth century up to the present day. Dostoevsky and Solov'ev believed that national society was a spiritual creation. In 1880 Dostoevsky wrote that "at the basis of social life,
citizenship, nationalism lies the idea of personal self-perfection, which 'comprises everything, all aspiration, all yearnings', and from it issue all civil ideals', and that "the moral issue always preceded the genesis of the nationality itself, for it is the former which created the latter". This theme also appeared in the writings of Nicholai Berdyaev and S. Bulgakov and continues to engage Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and Igor Shafarevich today. It is difficult to conceive of a more apt summary of the thought of Yun Ch'i-ho and An Ch'ang-ho than Dostoevsky's statement above.

Nicholai Berdyaev considered the nation-state formula was a harmony of the traditionally opposed streams of nominalism and realism (or idealism). The universal, he wrote, "exists in the particular and concrete, and not the reverse", and implied that the nation-state was an example of Hegel's idea of the concrete universal. Not surprisingly, he found foreign occupation "profoundly degrading", as indeed it must be in a world of nation-states. Under a Japanese regime which insisted on the

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64. Nicholai Berdyaev, *Dream and Reality*, London, Geoffrey Bles, 1950, p.89. In most other respects, Berdyaev disagreed with Hegel. His idea that a spiritual revolution was the only genuine, and the most radical, revolution, was shared by Yun Ch'i-ho and An Ch'ang-ho, though there is no evidence that they took it from him.

65. *ibid*, p.316.
cultural assimilation of its colonial subjects, Korean Protestants felt this degradation acutely and reflected all the more deeply on the spiritual and ethical sources of nationhood.

The inflexible opposition of the Japanese Government-General to any political movement among the Koreans encouraged self-reconstruction Protestants to separate "nation" from "state" conceptually in order to emphasise the priority of cultural reconstruction over political action. This separation of the two concepts was not a denial of the nation-state formula. It was meant to establish national culture as the only valid basis of the state and also to insist on the meaningfulness of ethical nationalism even or especially where political nationalism was blocked. In the 1920s this became the basis of the call to reconstruct the nation as a "Christian" civilisation.

Reconstruction nationalists were not the only ones to call for a "New Culture". The Korean leftist journal, Shin Saenghwal (新生活), demanded it in the early 1920s. During the same decade the Marxist-oriented Ch'un Pao (群報) in China also dedicated itself to the dissemination of "New Culture". Shin munhwa (新文化) was a term widely used in East Asia at that time. But where the political left argued that differences in culture were caused by differences in environment, the Korean self-reconstruction nationalists argued that the health of a culture depended on its spiritual roots. Revitalising culture was a moral and religious enterprise.

The New Testament has no word for "culture", which suggests that the concept was considered irrelevant to spirituality. While this does not mean that spirituality is irrelevant to culture, it strongly implies that culture and civilisation are not ends in themselves and is utterly hostile to adoption of the faith for its cultural potential. Protestants
in the West have tended not to value culture or civilisation highly. The Reformation view (to simplify matters) is that faith so transcends and surpasses the meaning, function and potential of culture that "it makes civilisation, as such, questionable". Wherever culture (or civilisation) presumed to compete with faith as a solution to the human position and needs, it had to be rejected. The idea that Christ stands above cultures judging them all is a powerful current in Reformation theology. But many Protestants have sought to mitigate the tension between civilisation and faith. Even Soren Kierkegaard, who developed the Lutheran doctrine of salvation by divine grace alone into his principle of the "absolute qualitative distinction" between God and humankind, combined aesthetics, ethics and religion as structurally dependent components of human civilisation. Paul Tillich rejected hostility towards culture, affirming civilisation in its ideal form as the interrelationship of love, power and justice.

Catholics also hold differing views on culture. John Henry Newman found culture to be irrelevant to spirituality. Enlightenment and refinement of mind by education was "absolutely distinct" from "cultivation of virtue", making "not the Christian ... but the


67. Needless to say it is not the only current in this diverse field. See H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, London, Faber and Faber, 1952.


gentleman", for "knowledge is one thing, virtue another".\textsuperscript{70} T.S. Eliot, an Anglo-Catholic, disagreed: while religion and civilisation must be distinguished, there was an intimate and necessary relationship between them.\textsuperscript{71} Yet his denial of the possibility that a people can deliberately construct a civilisation sets him apart from the Korean Protestants. Perhaps their closest ally in the West is Karl Mannheim, who founded the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.\textsuperscript{72} The Korean Protestant leaders did not bother with the question whether civilisation belonged to "nature" or to "grace". They recognised that the separation of knowledge and virtue was possible, but regarded it as an aberration and for that reason defined the civilised person precisely as the spiritually refined. Their iconoclasm was directed against specific "idols" in Korean culture, not against a high view of civilisation. The Korean Protestant leaders had no argument with the very positive Chinese concept of civilisation (mumnyǒng: 文明) which Wang Gungwu has elucidated in a recent essay.\textsuperscript{73} They were not after all Western Protestants,

\textsuperscript{70} ibid, p.110.

\textsuperscript{71} T.S. Eliot, \textit{Notes towards the Definition of Culture}, London, Faber and Faber, 1962, chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{72} Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) believed in the possibility of planning a culture and also that culture was transmitted and even created by cultural élites (not the same as class élites). Lee Kwang-su adopted this view. See Karl Mannheim, \textit{Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: studies in modern social structure}, Second Edition, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951.

The exaltation of cultural reconstruction over political action did expose self-reconstruction nationalists to charges of compromise, opportunism and even collaboration in the 1920s and 1930s by both the nationalist left and right who premised all national development on the immediate expulsion of Japan. The question of collaboration can be approached on three levels: (a) the nature of the accusation; (b) what those so accused believed they were doing; and (c) what the historian perceives they did. The failure of most modern Korean historians to assess critically the accusation of collaboration is largely responsible for the thinness of our knowledge of this stream of nationalism. The whole question requires more subtle treatment than it has so far enjoyed.

The mention of subtlety may be negatively interpreted as an elaborate means of missing the point. But I feel little need to apologise for any subtlety here, for the self-reconstruction nationalists certainly saw no substance in the accusations and their approach clearly made good sense to considerable numbers of Koreans. One decries rather the lack of subtlety among the "political" nationalists whose own movements were less stable and no more successful. The desire to accuse others of betraying the cause is a sad feature of nationalist movements, and the victims are often those most concerned with the actual lives of their compatriots. The case of Simone Weil, the French philosopher and political activist, illustrates this general feature. According to her brother, Simone Weil

74. For the purposes of this thesis, I have given more importance to the Protestant rejection or reinterpretation of Confucian concepts than to the Confucian influence on the Koreans' understanding of Protestantism. But the question of a Confucian imprint on their cultural ideals is discussed in chapter seven below.
... had very few illusions. She had discussions with the Gaullists in America and what she disliked most of all was their total intolerance towards anyone who was what they described as a 'collaborator' in France: many of those so-called collaborators were perfectly honest and decent people who were doing their best under difficult circumstances. In fact, my sister mentions in a letter ... that the Gaullists were calling her a Pétainist, and conversely.75

A more pertinent criticism of the self-reconstruction ideal may be that it was naive. The philosophy of change which self-reconstruction nationalists held, that improvement of individual morality, knowledge and expertise would inevitably transform society and finally secure independent statehood, neglected the possibility of autonomous social "laws" and appeared unmindful of the fact that even in democratic nations which are free of foreign rule, social change demands considerable struggle. The notion that the militarily powerful Japanese Empire would withdraw from the strategic Korean peninsula in recognition of its inhabitants' having acquired the attributes of nationhood seemed absurd. But then any self-assertion by Koreans, including political action, was on this view hopeless.

Again, the whole question requires closer examination. The debate between the Protestants and the radical left over the issue of feasibility suggests that the former were not so naive and that the idea that there were hard and fast divisions between socialists and non-socialists on this point needs modification. There were "ethical" socialists involved in Cho Man-sik's programme of economic reconstruction and in An Ch'ang-ho's gradualist organisations, and prolonged debate

within self-reconstruction circles over the means of change and the relation between their ideals and independence. On the historical level, Koreans appear to have adopted Christianity and socialism for the same reason - their perceived opposition to Japan's imperialism - and many embraced both. Christianity offered hope of freedom from the degradation suffered at the hands of a non-Christian, non-Western power but insisted also on overcoming the evil within Korean society. Socialism, appealing to the Leninist doctrine of imperialism, promised the liberation of the oppressed colonial "class" but also insisted on attending to the class-struggle within that "class".

Under the prohibitive conditions imposed by Japan inside Korea, the self-reconstruction nationalists were unable to transpose their beliefs satisfactorily into action. This thesis therefore resembles in places an intellectual history. The need to reassess judgments of the role and nature of the movement at various points adds to the discursive tone of the study. Yet there is a story to tell and it is hoped the narrative is not overshadowed by discussion. The thesis is divided into three phases in accordance with the major stages in the movement's development, and each phase carries its conclusions over into the next. As the concluding section of chapter eight ends the story, there is no separate conclusion.

Phase One deals with the emergence of Protestantism as a rival for the social and political allegiance of the nation up to 1910. The Protestants' critique of neo-Confucianism and Korean social and political mores is examined, together with the work of Yun Ch'i-ho in pioneering ethical nationalism and promoting the concept of civic morality. The penetration of both the higher urban classes through the Independence Club and educational activities and the lower rural classes
through village evangelism and the 1907 Great Revival prepared the religion for a vital role in nationalism after the annexation.

Phase Two concerns the "Dark Ages" of the Korean nation under virtual martial law from 1910 to 1918. During this period Japan regarded Christianity as the principal obstacle to its assimilation policy and attempted to diminish its influence through religious and education laws and imprisonment of its leaders. The Conspiracy Case of 1911-1913 in which Yun Ch'i-ho was implicated is the most sensational of the Japanese moves to contain Christianity. Although Protestant church growth was relatively slow during this harsh period, the Protestants gained prestige as the centre of resistance and as a community came to regard themselves as the cradle of the future Korea. An Ch'ang-ho and other Protestants who had fled abroad described the church as the centre of Korean national reconstruction, and the identification of the Korean race with ancient Israel took hold of the Protestant imagination in Korea, America, Japan, North China and Manchuria.

Phase Three commences with a brief account of the effects of the March First Movement of 1919. Though not a part of self-reconstruction nationalism, this movement influenced its direction. The ineffectiveness of political demands and action demonstrated by the movement encouraged self-reconstruction nationalists to promote education and culturalism as the surest path to independence. After initial success, this approach suffered reverses with the entrance of political-revolutionary ideologies and the escalation of anti-Japanese fervour and demands for outright political resistance among the nationalist right. The self-reconstruction ideals were maintained principally through the Korean branch of An Ch'ang-ho's Hûngsadan, while the
practical side of the movement was embodied in the economic self-reliance programmes inspired by Cho Man-sik. An important shift occurred in the movement in the late 1920s from an individualist to a more collectivist form of liberalism.

In 1937 the Government-General ordered all national organisations to disband, began arresting self-reconstruction nationalists among others and in 1938 forced the major Protestant denominations to accept Japanese supervision. The experiment ended. In the end, no movement succeeded in its aims. The significance of the self-reconstruction movement lay in its refusal to define nationalism in terms of the "enemy" and its provision of a positive alternative. The extent to which it thus gave meaning to the everyday existence of the politically powerless Koreans on the peninsula is a subject for future social histories of the period.
Phases One: Protestant Growth and the Ethics of Nationhood up to 1910

Chapter Two

The Protestant Penetration of Korean Society

Traditional Religious Background

Korea has with some justification been described as a nation of fine religious and philosophical achievements. The Tripitaka Koreana, the Buddhist canon of over 6000 volumes compiled from the eleventh century, and the creative development of neo-Confucian principles by Yi T'oe-gye (Yi Hwang) in the sixteenth century together constitute a considerable spiritual and intellectual achievement.¹ Even today religious fervour among South Koreans and the virtual deification of Kim Il-sung and the attendant doctrines of his "sacred family" in the North reveal a continuing religious perception of reality. The existence of religious interpretations of the domestic and international

crises facing the Chosŏn dynasty in the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries and the religious rivalry over Korea's character are not exceptional.

In the eighteenth century deteriorating rural conditions revealed strain in the feudal structure and were accompanied by increasing peasant unrest. There also arose a group of scholars who promoted *silhak* (실학), empirical study, in opposition to what they believed was the excessive metaphysical speculation of the official neo-Confucian orthodoxy, which they branded incapable of attending to the critical practical problems of the nation. The most renowned *silhak* proponent, Chŏng Yak-yong ("Tasan": 1762-1836), was a Catholic and the *Namin* faction with which he was associated "came to believe in the Catholic view of the world" by the nineteenth century. Tasan and the *Namin* faction attempted to synthesise the new Catholic doctrines and science with pristine Confucianism and apply them to feudal economic and political structures. But such scholars failed to muster enough support to win tolerance at the court, and early in the nineteenth century the orthodox *Noron* (Elders') faction was able to suppress *silhak*, proscribe Catholicism, and adopt the inflexible position

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2. This rural situation and its effects are dealt with in detail in Kim Yong-sŏp, Han'guk Kǔndae Nongŏpsa Yŏn'gu, Seoul, Ilchogak, 1979.


which disabled it before the onslaught of the later nineteenth-century foreign and domestic upheavals.

After the major peasant insurrection foreseen by Tasan erupted in 1862, silhak thought appeared poised to fulfil itself as certain young noblemen who were open-minded on Western ideas formed a reformist lobby. But their adoption of silhak principles was somewhat selective, though they claimed silhak inspiration, and the genuine presence of these principles in the reformists' political and economic programmes has been questioned. When their coup d'état of December 1884 failed, many reformists with religious interests turned to Christianity. Confucianism in any form rapidly lost prestige after Japan routed China in 1895 and its demise was sealed a decade later by the imposition of the Japanese Protectorate over Korea.

In the nineteenth century Buddhism, too, was suffering from serious loss of morale. Buddhism had been dominant in the fourth century A.D. and had enjoyed periods of brilliance in the eleventh and fifteenth centuries. But as neo-Confucian orthodoxy became threatened from within and without, it clamped down the more heavily on "voluntary" religion. Given the opportunity and conditions to develop an integrated, nation-wide organisation, Buddhism

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5. The reformist Pak Yong-hyo claimed the Reform Party members took their line from Pak Kyu-su, a silhak scholar. See Lee Kwang-su, "Pak Yong-hyo ssi rül mannan iagi", Tongkwang, No. 19, March 1931, pp.13-16.


7. By "voluntary" religion is meant religion professed not because of birth or nationality or official patronage, but by conscious decision. The term is used in C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970.
could have posed a challenge to the existing political order, especially during times of unrest. The Korean ruling elite therefore denied it the opportunity, while the weakness of Buddhism in Ch'ing China deprived it of outside support. Buddhism was pushed into a position divorced from the major social and political institutions, moving an early Christian missionary to observe that "Buddha's sun seems to be setting over Korea."⁸ Added to this political disadvantage was loss of respect for it among the populace caused by allegations of sexual immorality and financial misconduct among monks and nuns.⁹

In addition to the Confucian and Buddhist traditions there was Korea's own indigenous, "classical" religion: Shamanism, connected

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9. Such allegations and rumours seem rife at the close of the nineteenth century. Typical is a note in The Independent, a nationalist newspaper, 1.8.1896:

Rumour has it that several hundred priests (Buddhists) from around Seoul have come south, bringing in their kits old fashioned suits of soldier's uniform, which upon occasion they don and proceed to rob and extort money. Rumour has it that an edict has gone forth from Chun Ju to arrest all Seoul priests on sight. A week ago three were in jail at Oku.

(Dates are given in the following order: day, month, year.) The Japanese, too, found Buddhism in poor condition, so much so that their plan to propagate Japanese Buddhism among Koreans seemed tactically wrong at this time: Kankoku genji ni otte no chihō jinshin jōkyō, 1.11.1909: "(13) Kanmin no ippan shukyo nakanzuku Nihonjin sonota gaikokujin no keiei shukyō ni taisuru kanjō." (From Residency-General documents held in Yōnsei University Library, hereafter: YUL.)
with the cult of Tan'gun, mythical founder of Korea and ancestor of the Korean race. Regardless of any other religious profession, the people believed that in all natural, material and animate phenomena such as thunderstorms, rivers, rocks, beasts and humans dwelt conscious, individual spirits; that the spirits were separable from these phenomena; and, by extension, that human spirits continued to exist after physical death or destruction. Since any spirit could affect life and fate for good or ill, the Shaman, usually a female, was entrusted with placating or winning over spirits on behalf of nation, village or individual client. Animistic ritual and belief mixed with popular Taoism rather than spirit-travel as such characterised Korean Shamanism, which also involved ancestor worship, geomancy, auguries, astrology, fortune-telling and the hidden meanings and fates contained in Chinese characters.

While this all-pervasive nature of Korean classical religion may render it imprecise in meaning, it has also enabled some to attribute confidently to it all that is "native" to Korea and to Korean thought and personality. But however broadly the spirit of this classical religion may be defined, it is clearly its "spirits", its belief in spirit realms and forces, which constituted its own interpretation of life's vicissitudes and gave the people a sense of numenous reality outside and beyond the material order of the Confucian state. Yet it

would be false to conclude that there was any division of powers -
spiritual and temporal - based on a dichotomy of religious and
secular or state functions. The Korean state admitted no independent
social institution, and Korean classical religion was absorbed and
diffused among neo-Confucian institutions with a view to its
reinforcing the state. Thus ancestor worship was absorbed under
filial piety and sanctioned the king's rule; and thus the king
officiated at the altar of Tan'gun and sealed his mandate. When
the neo-Confucian institutions declined Shamanism remained, but it
proved vulnerable to Christianity.

The bankruptcy of Korean neo-Confucianism and the weakness of
Buddhism facilitated the rise of a revolutionary but decidedly
conservative new religion called Tonghak (Eastern Learning). Launched
by Ch'oe Che-u in the 1860s, Tonghak was a syncretic religion which
nevertheless strongly repudiated its sources and claimed to be the
champion of agrarian reform, the enemy of corruption and the only true
protector of Eastern culture. As a chiliastic movement it resembled
the Chinese Taip'ing movement, but was more xenophobic and harboured

11. In this respect, Korean classical religion was related to and
used by the neo-Confucian rulers in a similar way to Chinese
classical religion and cults under the Ch'ing. See C.K. Yang,
*op cit*, p.181. The Altar, still standing, was erected on Kanghwa
Island at the mouth of the Han River, 25 miles from Seoul.
Tradition accords its establishment to Tan'gun sometime after
2265 B.C. There is also the Tan'gun Shrine in P'yöngyang which
was considered the spiritual focus of ancestor worship. See
Charles Clark, pp.139-140. King Sejo (reign: 1455-1468)
explicitly used the Tan'gun tradition to claim a direct Mandate
of Heaven for Korean rulers, and in the eighteenth century
official historians claimed Tan'gun's mantle for the Yi Dynasty,
to bolster its legitimacy. See Sohn Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon and
Hong Yi-sup, *The History of Korea*, Seoul, Korean National Commission
bitter hatred of the Catholics. Tonghak was involved in the 1862 peasant rebellion and although Ch'oe Che-u was executed after it was quelled, the religion flourished among the distressed peasantry and dissident yangban (aristocracy). Two severe droughts in 1876-1877 and 1888-1889 disposed the peasantry to attempt a major, concerted rebellion in the 1890s directed against the corruption and reliance on China prevailing under Queen Min. When the Tonghak Rebellion reached formidable proportions in May 1894, the queen persuaded young King Kojong to petition China for troops, and so helped precipitate the Sino-Japanese War.

The Tonghak Rebellion was crushed in the course of the war, but the religion survived as a reformist, patriotic cult dedicated to national independence. Renamed Ch'ŏndogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way) in 1905, the cult established schools, managed an anti-Japanese newspaper and claimed a membership of some 300,000 by 1910.\textsuperscript{12} Under the banner of "Poguk Anmin" - Protect the Nation, Secure the Wellbeing of the People - Ch'ŏndogyo "gave a needed hope and unity of purpose to a large element of Koreans who had no dynamic religion and whose condition of life appeared hopeless."\textsuperscript{13} After 1910 Ch'ŏndogyo became alongside Christianity a major religious force in Korean nationalism.

\textsuperscript{12} B.B. Weems, Reform, Rebellion and the Heavenly Way, pp.67 and 75; also Han Woo-keun, p.458.

The Entry of Protestantism, 1884-1895

The process whereby Christianity, under unlikely and even hostile conditions, entered Korea and thrived among the populace until Korea became the exception in East Asia, has teased a number of minds.¹⁴ The puzzle can be approached from a psychological and an historical standpoint. Seemingly, the former asks why Christianity appealed while the latter asks how it took root over time. However, a strict distinction is difficult to maintain in practice, for unless one dogmatically asserts that the function of a religion sufficiently explains its cause, the internal dynamics of religion must be admitted as an historical factor also. The early missionaries noted that there were aspects of the Korean religious and philosophical traditions which eased the way to accepting Christianity, and attributed this to Providence. A scholar has recently judged that it "was an unequivocal advantage for the Christian religion to be rather easily linked with old Korean conceptions",¹⁵ and so one suspects there was some psychological "preparation" for Christian growth in Korea.

The most popular religious explanation of the Korean reception of the new faith is the existence of a current of monotheism in Korean classical religion, related to the Tan'gun cult. There is a tradition of

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a divine being known as Bwanin or as Hanunim, the "Heavenly One". "Many of the Christians in Korea," commented an early missionary, "first had their interest in the Christian Gospel aroused through their knowledge of Tangoon and his God, and they have recognised that He is one and the same as the God of their Bible." Some Korean nationalists later took pains to emphasise this monotheistic current to explain the naturalness of Koreans embracing Christianity. Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, nationalist historian, published a finely argued exposition of Korea's Hanunim, the God who was the actual sun, the patron of Tan'gun and creator of all existing things. Ch'oe claimed this monotheism was an unbroken tradition reaching into Korea's deepest past and embedded in the Korean psyche as the locus of all ideals. Another Korean construed the Korean tradition of Ch'ŏnbu Samin (天符三印) - the three deities of the past, present and future - as identical to the Christian Trinity.

Insofar as this monotheistic current was largely inoperative and submerged under polytheism and pantheism when Protestantism arrived, too much weight should not be laid on it as an explanation of Christian success. For all practical purposes, the Korean religious tradition involved "apathy about the supreme being" and a "concentration

18. Il T'ae, "Tan'gun shinhwa", kaeb'yŏk, No.1, June 1920, pp.61-63.
of intellectual and emotional energies on the figures of the lesser spirits." Other aspects of classical religion may have been more important factors. The Christian affirmation of the operation of spiritual powers brought it much closer to the common religious sensibility than Confucianism ever had been: to turn to an apparently greater source of spiritual power was not a desertion of basic perceptions. Moreover some Korean intellectuals felt that the weakness of positive moral components in contemporary Korean religion allowed fear of spirits to dominate Shamanism. Christian ethical teachings may have made good the lack and brought relief. But in terms of national structures, social organisation and political values, there remains the important question how an imported, heterodox belief made any headway against a hostile Confucian orthodoxy.

The Korean political climate in the 1880s was unfavourable to Christianity. The very insecurity of neo-Confucian orthodoxy had only intensified official persecution of heterodoxy. The court not only suppressed the indigenous movements - Silhak and Tonghak - but had also periodically subjected Catholicism to bloody purges since its establishment in 1784, culminating in the Taewŏngun's nation-wide massacre of native and foreign Catholics alike in 1866. Thus the


chances of Protestantism gaining a legal foothold were slim, and Protestant missions only won tolerance when the Korean court had little real choice, and even then their presence during the first decade of 1884 to 1895 was insecure.

In order to appreciate better the Protestant challenge to the late Chosŏn dynasty it is important to grasp that the Korean rulers had not been simply wilful or irrational in suppressing Catholicism. One is accustomed in pluralist societies to a secular/sacred dichotomy whereby the parliament or equivalent body is the political organ only of the state, while religion is respected as the domain of the various churches. But the neo-Confucian state on the contrary subscribed to a view familiar to the Western mind in Aristotle: the state was the highest bond of society, of which all other societal relationships were but dependent parts. The Chosŏn state claimed to be the sole authority in ordering, maintaining and enforcing the Korean social system, indeed the ideal pattern to which all social, economic and ethical systems should conform. To deny this priority was an act of treason: to follow ethical systems or gods independent of the state was an act of conspiracy against the visible "god" - the state and its king. Hence Korean classical religion was expected to sanctify the state, and had Tertullian been present to hear King Sejo's sacrificial ode at the Temple of Heaven endowing Tan'gun with the title of "Son of Heaven", he would doubtless have complained as he did of Rome, that the gods were only admitted if they served the interests of the state. Quite apart from its teaching and origin, Christianity was therefore subversive simply because it was an independent presence that could not be absorbed as an aspect of the public works of the state. Since its contemporary connexion with Western learning and politics
made it further indigestible, acceptance required a weakness in the state or some change in the nature of the state. Change did occur, but grudgingly for it was the weakness of the state that permitted it.

On the advice of neo-Confucian scholars, King T'aejo (reign: 1392-1398) had made ethical transformation and penal institutions complementary pillars of government. This position was reaffirmed in the eighteenth century. Amidst the frequent crises of the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries the Chosön monarchy began to fall back on religious sanctions of its rule. The readiness with which King Kojong (reign: 1864-1907) turned to classical tutelary deities disturbed some literati, but it reveals that even Korea's rulers found naturalistic Confucian monism lacking. Korean neo-Confucianism may actually have exposed the Chosön state to the religious concept that it was responsible to an authority beyond humanity. To the chagrin of the rulers, Christianity arrived with a clear, unashamedly transcendental theory of normative law which was


22. I suspect that in Korea the idea of the Mandate of Heaven was less free of religious implications than in China, and that the Chosön ethico-political system rested to quite a degree on religious sanction. Also, Weber's thesis that popular religion under a Confucian regime is reduced to official ritual and becomes equated with mere social convention does not fit Korea very well. (Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, chapter 6.) In Chosön Korea social convention cannot be described as "mere" either from the rulers' or the subjects' point of view.
fully congruous with its own doctrine of ethical transformation. Here was a "voluntary" religion that could challenge neo-Confucianism on its own grounds. But if this explains something of Korean neo-Confucian vulnerability, it also begs the question why Christianity replaced neo-Confucianism to such a degree in Korea, when it failed in China where a similar orthodoxy was also in disarray. It is necessary to widen the scope of historical analysis and slant the question differently: how rather than why Christianity succeeded.

Official opposition to Christianity in any form remained explicit up to 1884 at least, and was encouraged by Japan and China. In 1860, Japan intimated to Korea that whereas she had agreed to open trade relations with Western powers, she "regarded the continued proscription of Christianity as essential". The Ch'ing were less forthright, although in his draft for the Korean-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1882, Viceroy Li Hung-chang stipulated the exclusion of Christian missionary work on the peninsula. Most Korean officials needed little such encouragement. The isolationists led by the influential scholar Ch'oe Ik-hyon deeply mistrusted anything Western, and in 1876 had memorialised the throne to the effect that opening the country "would amount to a total destruction of traditional


values and national identity." Even the "moderate" reformers under Kim Yun-sik, separating techniques from values in Western civilisation, wished to insert an anti-Christian clause in the 1882 treaty. In the end, the clause was not inserted, but neither was the Taewongun's anti-foreign edict of 1866 annulled.

Yet since it opened diplomatic relations between Korea and the United States of America, the 1882 treaty did break some ice. Prior to the treaty, suspicions about Christianity had been diminished a little by a book written in China in the 1840s' called Haeguk Toji (海國圖志) in Korean, in which the European Reformation was explained. This was followed by a booklet titled Choson Ch'aengmyak (朝鮮策略), from which many learned Koreans adopted a generous view of Protestantism. Under such influences the "radical" reformists began to regard Western beliefs as the source of Western science and institutions. The Buddhist Kim Ok-kyun accordingly befriended Robert S. Maclay of the Methodist Mission in Japan, and in July 1884 obtained King Kojong's permission for Maclay to open educational and


27. Lee Kwang-rin, "Kaikaha no Kaishinkyo kan", in Kan, Vol.7, No.11-12, November-December 1978, pp.10-12. Reformists can be divided into two main groups, the "moderates" who rejected all Western thought, admitting its material skills only, and the "radicals" who thought this dichotomy was contradictory and impossible. It will be noticed that the "isolationists", the strict neo-Confucians, agreed with the radical reformists that the moderates' dichotomy was false, and thus concluded that the West in its entirety was poison.

28. It was principally through the silhak scholar Pak Kyu-su and the reformist Yu Kil-jun that this work became widely known among educated Koreans. See Kim Yong-jak, Kammatsu nashyonarizumu no kenkyu, Tokyo, Tokyo University Press, 1975, pp.76-78.

29. Park, pp.35-36.
medical facilities in Seoul. In September the same year a medical missionary from Ohio, Dr. Horace Allen, who to use his own expression "sneaked in by a ruse", noted that the king had assured Maclay that "no objection would be made to the introduction of Protestant Christianity into his kingdom". After a fortuitous incident - his successful treatment of Prince Min Yŏng-ik who may otherwise have died of injuries sustained during the radical reformists' abortive coup d'état in December 1884 - Dr. Allen was welcomed at the court and soon became the king's trusted advisor. Allen used his new-found prestige to facilitate medical and educational work by "unofficial" missionaries. As Secretary of the United States' Legation, 1890-1897, he attempted to introduce Christianity to the Korean nation via its ruling stratum.

Christianity was nevertheless still illegal, its position anomalous and precarious. The virile, anti-foreign wijŏng chŏksa (衛正斥邪) movement was still robust in the 1880s, and at least in respect to its hostility towards Christianity it conjoined Tonghak rebel and neo-Confucian scholar-official. While Tonghak leaders called for a purification of the nation from foreign contamination and placed threatening placards against missionary dwellings, neo-Confucianists

30. Park, p.38; Lee Kwang-rin, op cit, p.29.
31. That is, as physician to the American legation. Dr. Allen's career in its many aspects is presented in detail in F.H. Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. The quotation is from ibid, p.1.
32. Quoted in Park, p.39.
33. Harrington, chapter 3. Also Paik, p.86. In 1897 Dr. Allen became Minister Resident and Consul-General; and from 1901-1905 was Envoy Extraordinaire and Minister Plenipotentiary. He was decorated by Kojong on three occasions.
34. Park, p.27. Lensen, p.123.
like Ch'oe Ik-hyon and the disciples of the deceased Yi Hang-no branded Protestantism a religion of beasts and a cover for spies. Naturally enough, Dr. Allen chose to tread softly and slowly and discouraged missionaries from testing their reception outside the capital. On his own terms this caution paid off: "By 1890 the anti-foreign law had by common consent become a dead letter and was superseded by a general goodwill."  

At first the missionaries, especially the Methodists who favoured opening doors through education and medicine, fell in line with Dr. Allen's strategy. "The present social and political condition of Korea," remarked the Rev. Henry Appenzeller in 1886, "is such that it is the unanimous judgment of all the missionaries here not to attempt open evangelistic work." But in fact evangelistic enterprise was already under way by less cautious Presbyterians. Even before Dr. Allen's arrival six Koreans from the north-west border town of Ŭiju had been baptised by two Scottish missionaries based in Manchuria, and portions of the Bible in vernacular Korean script had been circulated in Korea by merchants. In July 1886 the Presbyterian missionary


36. Paik, p.163. On his return from the United States as Royal Envoy, Prince Min Yong-ik reported to King Kojong that "America remains supremely powerful without honouring the military". (Italics added.): Hahm Pyong-choon, "Korean perception of America" (posthumous article), in *Sahakji*, No. 17, November 1983, p.30. Both America and Japan were strong, but the former was so in the "correct" way. This was an important factor in the gradual acceptance of the West even among members of the Korean establishment and in the lapse of anti-foreign edicts.

Dr. H.G. Underwood secretly baptised a Korean in Seoul, while the following year he travelled north to baptise twenty more. Dr. Underwood baptised a further thirty-three Koreans in April 1889, by which time Mr. Appenzeller had begun similar forays with similar results. The Presbyterian missions had as their explicit primary objective the conversion of the working classes before the aristocracy.

Though by 1890 the Korean Government tended to wink at such activities, this practice of taking Christianity to the countryside direct to the villager certainly marked a departure from Dr. Allen's position. The historical importance as well as the difficulties involved in this departure are hinted at in the diary of Australia's first missionary to Korea, the Rev. J. Henry Davis. Henry Davis arrived in Korea in October 1889, spent a few months learning the language and then set off alone southwards. He travelled on foot and on horseback from village to village, carrying books and quinine. Davis noted the Koreans' eagerness for the books, whose contents he was constantly asked to explain, and found them "a very studious lot". He was also harassed by officials and after only six months in the land, fell ill and died. The cumulative effect of this style of evangelism was to enable Protestantism to take root among the rural commoners and merchant


41. ibid, 19 and 22 March 1890.
class before noticeable interest arose in urban centres and among the higher classes. The few nobles who were converted before 1895 were of high calibre, but were mostly reached abroad. Nevertheless, their day was soon to come, and Dr. Allen's strategy and the grass-roots emphasis of the Presbyterian missions worked together historically to produce in Korea a Christian growth and socio-political influence unparallelled in East Asia.

Growth and Social Involvement, 1895-1905

The decade 1895 to 1905 has been described as being "like a chapter from the Acts of the Apostles" because of the extraordinary expansion of Protestantism among Koreans, from 528 to at least 12,500 full, baptised members. The same period spans the final loss of Korean independence to Japan in all but name - from the Sino-Japanese to the Russo-Japanese wars. Whereas both the political and religious aspects of the period have understandably attracted scholarly attention,

42. Quoted in Paik, p.263.

43. C.C. Vinton, "Statistics of the Protestant Churches in Korea", in The Korean Repository, Vol.2, October 1895, p.383. If non-baptised members are added, the figure for 1895 is 1095. For the 1905 figure see Shearer, pp.51-52, 167, 176, and Appendix; Yi Man-yŏl, pp.67 and 106. It is surprising that despite the work done on this period of Protestant growth in Korea, no book seems to give a systematic presentation of overall figures. Since non-baptised membership was normally greater than full membership, the total number of adherents of Methodist and Protestant denominations in 1905 was probably over 28,000.

little attempt has been made, in English, to inquire into their connexion. The two aspects are in fact interrelated and the process whereby Christianity became established as a new force in Korean social and national life throws some light on this link.

The political disarray of China involved in its defeat by Japan in 1895 had far-reaching effects in Korea. It marked the end of Korea's semi-vassalage to the Middle Kingdom, and together with the social and economic deterioration in Korea, hastened the demise of neo-Confucian legitimacy. Since the Tonghak movement, too, was a casualty of the war, Christianity at this juncture offered a new ideology and symbolism around which to rally and by which to interpret the nation's position. Though Russia loomed large as a competitor from 1897 to 1899, China's elimination enhanced Japan's overall power on the peninsula. Since Japan's success was attributed to its adoption of Western learning, the number of Koreans who sought in Western civilisation a basis for independence sharply increased. Whilst the Protestant missions carried the faith to the remotest villages, influential yangban and politicians, especially from the ranks of the Reform Party, began to promote Christianity as the path to national salvation.

Missionaries had established schools before 1895, but now Christianity began seriously to supplant Confucianism in education, its traditional pride and domain. The idea that Western religion and education were separable lost ground, and the new education was regarded as the key to enlightenment, progress and national strength. Editorials of the Tongnip Shinmun, under the direction of the Christianity triumvirate, 45

Shamanism has not been forgotten here, but it had no organisational or institutional strength of its own. It is generally said that Shamanism has considerably influenced the Korean interpretation of Christianity: see Yu Tong-sik, Han'gu k Chonggyo wa Kidokkyo, Seoul, Taehan Kidokkyo sohoe, 1983, pp.34-38.
Sŏ Chae-p'il, Yun Ch'i-ho and Namgung Ōk, maintained in concert with explicitly Christian newspapers that the connexion between Christianity, modern education and national revival was intrinsic. Together with this invasion of an entrenched Confucian reserve, missionaries and Korean Christians assaulted specific social practices and mores associated in Korea with Confucianism: ancestor-worship and filial piety, funeral rites, forced and child marriages, non-remarriage of widows and the merely functional view of women in general. They also accused it of agnosticism, materialism and obsession with officialdom and office-seeking. In churches, the view that people were morally bound till death to the social "caste" they were born into was consciously combatted by gathering the whole range of society under one roof, by ignoring social distinctions in the conduct of services, and by objecting to legal discriminations based on class and sex.

Confucian scholar-officials rose to their defense without delay.

In 1896, the politician Shin Ki-son published a book, *Yuhak Kyŏngsi* (儒學經緯), which was both an apology for Confucianism and a counter-attack on Western religion. The attack was somewhat crude,

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46. This view was put forcefully by Sŏ Chae-p'il in editorials of *The Independent*: 7.4.1896; 16.5.1896; 6.8.1896; 10.9.1896; 14.11.1896. The role of the newspaper will be dealt with in some detail in chapter 3.


48. Park, pp.98-100, 129.
however, consisting essentially in the proposition that because Christianity was a religion of "barbarians", it was not worthy of consideration. Christians immediately printed vindications of the missionaries and their faith. The Tongnip Shinmun praised the sacrificial altruism of the missionaries, their honesty and support of sufferers from injustice, their tireless work in establishing hospitals and schools and their service in printing works in han'gul so that all Koreans might benefit. With pointed emphasis, the newspaper noted that all this was done for no official or political reward whatsoever, and that such selflessness could be found nowhere in Korea except within the Church of Christ. A subsequent editorial on the meaning of Christmas indicated the honour given womanhood through Mary and claimed that the Western nations flourished because they were not above abiding by a religion that was not their own but had come from the East.

Shin Ki-sŏn, a high-ranking official ( ) who was appointed Minister of Education in June 1896, represented a conservative backlash against the Kabo Reforms of 1894-1895. Once in power, he presumed to dismantle the educational reforms introduced by Education Minister Yi Wan-yong in 1895 and Acting Minister Yun Ch'i-ho early in 1896. Shin overstepped himself, however, for the reforms bore the status of

51. ibid, 24.12.1897.
imperially sanctioned law.⁵² In the furore which followed, incited by articles in the *Tongnip Shinmun* and protests by the Independence Club, Shin lost his portfolio and the laws stood.⁵³ After the fall of the Club and Yun Ch'i-ho's internal exile in 1899, Shin Ki-son once more became Minister of Education.⁵⁴ But his Confucian cause was all but lost, the Kwangmu Reforms notwithstanding, for many leading scholars and officials had turned to Christianity by 1904. These included Kim Chŏng-sik, former Chief of Seoul Police, Yi Sang-jae, Hong Chae-ki, Syngman Rhee, An Kuk-sŏn, Yu Kil-jun and his brother Yu Sŏng-jun, Han Sŏk-jun and three scholars who became Korea's first ordained Christian ministers: Ch'oe Pyŏng-hŏn, Kil Sŏn-ju and Kim Pyŏng-cho. Worst of all for Confucianism was the conversion in this period of Yi Wŏn-kŭng, then considered to be Korea's greatest living Confucian scholar.⁵⁵

Encouraged, the Christian missions pressed on with Christian-based education. In Seoul, the Methodists and Presbyterians expanded their outreach through the Pae Chae Boys' and Ehwa Women's Colleges, a girls'

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⁵². *Government Gazette (Kwanbo)* No.36: 12.5.1895; No.117: 22.7.1895; No.121: 24.7.1895; No.135: 12.8.1895; No.138: 15.8.1895. (These dates are by lunar calendar; the following are solar.) No.257: 25.2.1896; No.287: 31.3.1896.


boarding school and the Intermediate School for Boys. The link between faith and learning posited in these schools is illustrated by the curriculum outline in a mission report on the Intermediate School, which in 1904 recorded a one hundred per cent rise in enrolments over the previous year:

The subjects taught were, History - English, Korean and Ecclesiastical; Science - Astronomy, Natural History, Geography, Physics and Chemistry; Mathematics - Elementary and Advanced Arithmetic, and Algebra; Bible Courses on the Life of Christ, Gospel of St. John and Old Testament Theology, besides shorter courses in lectures on Romans and Ephesians, the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' Creed and the Ten Commandments.56

In P'yŏngyang the Presbyterians found the possibilities almost unlimited. By 1904 they operated forty-six boys' primary and four girls' primary schools, an Advanced School for girls and women, a teachers' training class and a Theological Academy which was training Korea's first ministers. In addition to these the churches themselves held "training classes" to educate their congregations, old, young, male and female. In 1903-1904 over 5,400 Koreans are claimed to have attended these sessions, which emphasised Christian ethics and beliefs, mutual understanding and acceptance among all members, and leadership qualities.57 In the Sŏnch'ŏn circuit alone, in North P'yŏngan Province, twenty-one primary schools and fifty-seven church groups operated in like fashion.58 The existence by 1905 of at least 120


57. ibid, Pyeng Yang Station Report. (Underwood Collection.)

58. ibid, Syen Chyun Station Report. (Underwood Collection.)
Protestant schools cannot have failed to undermine neo-Confucianism and supports the conclusion of the Korean sociologist, Park Yong-shin, that there emerged from the churches, schools and hospitals "a pattern of thought based on ... values, ideals, and beliefs which was not only unprecedented, but inconsistent with the established Yi social value system."  

1906-1910: The Protectorate, the Great Revival and the Alleged Anti-Nationalism of the Church

Between 1906 and 1910, the odds in the Confucian/Christian controversy swung decisively in favour of the latter. The Japanese Residency-General noted in 1909 that in all provinces save South Hamgyo'ng and North and South Ch'ungch'ŏng, the Christian churches were replacing the traditional yangban-centred institutions as national foci, especially in conjunction with their campaign for social equality through the samın p'yŏngdŏng (四民平等) movement. Shin Ki-sŏn's view of Christianity was overthrown: the tables were turned, and now it was Confucianism that had to justify itself. The journals of the newly-formed educational and "learned" societies joined newspapers such

59. Park, p.225.
60. ibid, p.97.
61. Kankoku genji ni oite chiho jinshin jokyo, 1.11.1909: "(2), Jinmin no kakkaiyû o tsujite sono minshin o shihai suru seiryoku chûshin no idō." (YUL.)
as the Hwangsong Shinmun in echoing the earlier contention of the Tongnip Shinmun that Confucianism was the villain behind Korea's humiliations. Koreans abroad added their condemnation of the "useless and empty" theories and ceremonies of the Confucian scholars. Henceforth Western education was to lead the long-overdue cultural and intellectual reformation. By 1910, only about ten religious-based schools were not under Christian management. The Presbyterians and Methodists ran 805 schools, while Anglican and Catholic schools numbered at least eighteen. "The fact must not be overlooked," warned the worried Japanese officials, "that schools in


63. e.g., Kongnip Shinbo, 29.11.1907. Editorial.

Korea are being established under the missionaries ... [These schools] are the foundation of the present new education system."^5

The Japanese Residency-General was under threat. "In a day, that which centuries of misrule on the part of her own rulers had failed to do, the Japanese occupation accomplished: patriotism was born in Korea.... All saw in the Church the only hope for their country."^66

This overstatement by the Presbyterian William Blair in 1910, which stemmed less from exultation than trepidation over the inherent dangers for the church in this situation, is a reflection of the spectacular burst of growth at the time. The roll of baptised Presbyterians reached 46,934 in 1911, whilst the Southern Methodists who were considered to be working in an unresponsive area, recorded an increase between 1905 and 1911 of 700 per cent. At the close of 1910 the total number of Protestant adherents is estimated at more than 200,000 in the population of about thirteen million.67 While this growth still centred on country rather than city and among the lower classes, interest in Christianity continued to increase among the scholars and some politicians through the proliferation of schools and clubs.68

65. Keimu Geppo No.1, 25.7.1910, "Kankoku tōchū kempeitai shireibu de kaisaishita kakudō kempeichō (keimubuchō) kaigi sekijō ni okeru hyōgakubu jikan enzetsu." (YUL).

66. William Blair and Bruce Hunt, The Korean Pentecost, Edinburgh, Banner of Truth Trust, 1977, p.63. Part 1 of this book is an edited version of Blair's earlier work of the same title, printed in 1910 by the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

67. Paik, p.423; Shearer, pp.48, 60, 167, 176; Lee Man-yŏl, pp.67 and 110-111.

68. Kankoku genjī ni oite no ohihō jinselin jōkyō, 1.11.1909: "(14) Kamnin no Yasokyo ni taisuru kanjō oyobi nyūkō no dōki narabi sakari." The Japanese doubted that Christianity would really capture the higher classes, however.
The Russo-Japanese War was a factor in the early stages of this growth. According to mission reports the missionaries "gained tremendous prestige" from the fact that in the war-torn countryside they alone seemed able to offer the Koreans protection. The leader of the Japanese nationalistic Kokuryūkai, Uchida Ryōhei, whom Prince Itō had invited to Korea to report on the situation, admitted this fact: "At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, contrary to the [pro-Japanese] Ilchinhoe ... the followers of the Western Religion were taken seriously by the Japanese Army," so that the church was felt to be a considerable force by the people. The church leaders profited by "nursing their flocks, in contrast to the severities of army behaviour, like the Madonna her child." If this held good during the war, it lacks force as a full explanation of Christian growth following the war. For after Britain and America "hastened to recognise Japan's control," recalled William Blair, "a violent, anti-foreign, especially anti-American storm swept over the land." In 1907 another missionary, the Rev. C.E. Sharp, perceived a definite political factor behind the continuing growth. Upon hearing a Christian provincial governor state


70. Uchida Ryōhei, Ryūki kaigen himegoto: "Heijō no chōsa", 15.4.1907, in Chōsen tochi shiryō, (10 vols), Tokyo, Kankoku shiryō kenkyūsho, 1970, Vol.4, pp.120-121. (Hereafter: CTS.)

71. Blair, pp.64-65.
at a Sunday evening service that, "We are placed in a position where there is no alternative path to take other than believing in the Christian God," Sharp concluded that God was using the political situation for a spiritual awakening.  

The Japanese were unappreciative of the divine strategy. Japan's victory over the pro-Ch'ing forces in Korea had expedited the rise of a new centre of resistance with considerable morale. Japanese police complained that "wherever a dispute arises between Japanese and Koreans, missionaries take up the case of the Koreans" and make representations to the authorities. Christian schools showed "evil tendencies", mixing "impurities", that is politics, in their education. As for the churches, the police asserted, Koreans joined them in order to resist the Japanese administration, and missionaries allured adherents by claiming that only through Christianity could Korea avoid annexation.

Uchida Ryohei had already made the equation and his countrymen believed it: Christianity and anti-Japanese sentiment were one.

72. Yi Man-yol, pp.107-108. Sharp had earlier observed how during the war the calmness of Christians in contrast to non-Christians had attracted membership: Annual Report of the Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. for 1903-1904: Report for Seoul Station. (Underwood Collection.)

73. Keimu Geppo No.1, 27.7.1910: "Kankoku tochû kempeitai shireibu de kaisaishita kakudô kempeichô (keimubuchô) kaigi sekijo no okeru kyogakubu jikan enzetsu." (YUL)

74. Kankoku genji ni oite no chihô jinshin jôkyô, 1.11.1909: "(14): Kanmin no Yasokyô ni taisuru kanjô oyobi nyûkyô no doki narabi sakari." (YUL)

75. Itô Hirobumi, Resident-General of Korea, has adopted a more generous view of Christianity than this, though it is difficult to know when he was being simply diplomatic. Itô laid the foundation stone of the first Y.M.C.A. building in 1907, along with the Korean Crown Prince. (Paik, p.409). But he seems initially to have thought that Christianity would weaken Korean opposition to Japan, and by requesting missionaries to use their moral prestige to keep Koreans in line, he put them in a difficult position. (Paik, pp.414-415).
If the widespread turning to Christianity up to 1910 was in part politically motivated, the political context was, of course, largely the creation of Japan herself. Japanese political conduct had pushed Christians into opposition, and the very fact that Christianity served as spokesperson of the natural interest indicates the degree to which the new religion had penetrated national life by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. But this was not the whole story. The Japanese were pre-occupied with the activities of politically conscious higher-class Christians, but they were on the periphery of the rapid growth of membership among the rural and lower classes and of what was then the central religious experience and landmark of Korean Christianity: the Great Revival of 1907.

This revival, a nation-wide movement, was "great" not so much in its numerical effect - it occurred not prior to but in the midst of rapid growth - as in the profound effect it had on the nature and tone of Korean Christianity. "The great awakening marks the spiritual rebirth of the Korean Church. The religious experience of the people gave to the Christian Church in Korea a character which is its own." Dr. Paik Lak-Geoon, who penned these words in the mid-1920s, attributes the revival to the sense of failure and frustration at Japan's occupation, a desire for a higher level of spirituality whetted by reports from other lands, and the "definite attempt of the missionaries" to bring it about. This opinion is corroborated by missionary writings

76. Paik, p.374.
77. ibid, p.370.
and reports and by later church historians. By all accounts the revival was an intensely emotional movement, but there issued from it practical results. Dr. Paik identified some of these as: indigenisation of Christianity; mutual understanding between missionaries and Koreans at a crucial moment; increased awareness of the ethical implications of Christianity and the need for Biblical study; and energetic evangelistic campaigns that ensured continued rapid growth through 1908.

Since none of the above results are overtly political or social, the revival was regarded by some Christians, possibly including An Ch'ang-ho, as irrelevant to Korea's burning problems. Debate still continues in Korea over whether the revival was not actually an anti-nationalist campaign among the churches under missionary direction. Given the political factors at play in the growth of the churches before 1907, the revival appears, by contrast, to mark a turning away from national and political issues to personal spiritual concerns. There has been a tendency to regard this as a, perhaps temporary, shift away from a "social Gospel" to an otherworldly pietism, but before any

78. e.g. Blair, chapter 9; Annual Report of the Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. for 1907; Min Kyōng-bae, Han'guk Minjok Kyohoe Hyǒngsǒng Saron, Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1974, pp.38-49; Shearer, pp.34 and 53.


80. Both Min Kyōng-bae and Yi Man-yŏl suggest this, Min more strongly than Yi. A problem in Min's work is that "pietism" is used to label rather than describe. Sometimes it seems to mean simply anti-intellectualism, as if pietism did not have a strong intellectual tradition in Christianity. Kierkegaard was a "pietist".
The Great Revival did affect the nature of subsequent Christian involvement in nationalism. Its legacy is visible even in the reaction against it, and the attitudes of various Christian nationalists towards it highlight the tension inherent in the very term "Christian nationalism". This tension involved ideological or rather theological disputes which were not new to Christianity but which were new to Korea. At stake were the relationship of the church and the believer to the world, eschatology and millenialism, and the transcendent final cause of the faith. The tension was in part, too, a reflection of the composition of the church, which was mainly lower-class and not as intellectually aware as some active high-class members desired.

The Protestant missionaries in Korea espoused as a guideline to church/state relations the doctrine of the separation of the church and the state. Far from implying simply submission of the churches to state authorities, this doctrine, which stems from the European Reformation, was originally designed to keep the churches free from government interference - free, in fact, from the imperial Roman and Confucian view that religion may exist only insofar as it serves state interests and ends. The church was to reciprocate by not usurping genuine state functions, but it reserved to itself a "prophetic" right to speak out on issues of national moral and spiritual welfare. This arrangement is not straightforward in practice, and is especially problematic during a period of social and political upheaval such as Korea was undergoing in 1907.

Criticism that the revival withdrew the church from its national responsibilities had some basis in fact. Though no mission body as such pontificated on the subject, certain individuals did seek to
interpret St. Paul's instructions on Christian/state relations in Romans, chapter 13, as a condemnation of Korean political resistance to the Residency-General. This position was held in an extreme form by persons such as the "Japanese agent" Bishop M.C. Harris (Methodist), who even accused other missionaries of being anti-Japanese. But the view that in opposing the Japanese the Koreans were opposing authorities emplaced by God involved obvious absurdities, for it logically implied that whoever managed to force Korea into submission would have divine approval. If the Righteous Armies succeeded in throwing the Japanese out then they would be divinely sanctioned, and so on.

The extremism of Bishop Harris, who was biased towards Japan, was not typical of Korea's early missionaries. The church/state doctrine did recognise a distinction between the role of government (which was to restrain evil and promote good) and the people who filled government posts and who might act contrary to its purposes. The missionary Homer Hulbert, for example, toured the United States while on furlough in November 1907 with the purpose of revealing that under protestations of developing Korea for independence, Japan was pursuing terrorist politics which harmed the nation.

81. In Romans, chapter 13, verses 1-4, Paul describes the function of governments as being to encourage right living and to discourage wrongdoing, and states that since God empowers the authorities to this effect, disobedience to the government amounts to resisting God.

82. Park, pp.413-417; Min Kyông-bae, p.43. It is clear enough that many missionaries who had witnessed the corruption of the Korean administration and its obstruction of reform, had considered Japanese rule could hardly be worse. But this attitude began to change once the Residency-General was installed. See Yi Man-yŏl, pp.113-118.


84. Kognnip Shinbo, 22.11.1907 and 15.11.1907.
In the face of pressure to raise the banner of resistance over the church, most missionaries and Korean church leaders supported the separation of church and state to prevent the churches from becoming political organs. It was in the context of suggestions that the church should officially join forces with the Righteous Armies that Pastor Kil Sŏn-ju strove, with great success, to convince Korean Christians that the church as such had no mandate in that direction. Missionaries in northern Korea had met to discuss the situation, and William Blair was convinced that if the Korean church declared itself officially against the Japanese, the people would adopt Christianity "in a day", and so establish "another Roman Church". Korean Christians could organise and plan politically if they felt they should, but not under cover of the church. This position was explicit in mission reports of the time:

The marked success of the Y.M.C.A. caused attempts to be made to use it politically, and, these failing, many young men of the churches began to band themselves together under a similar name within the churches, and under the sheltering folds of both church and society met nightly to discuss and denounce the actions of their government and of the Japanese. In time these were all suppressed, not because of any lack of sympathy on the part of the missionaries for all who were being wronged, but to prevent the Church becoming a political organ.

85. Blair, p.63. See also Yi Man-yŏl, p.103.

86. Annual Report of the Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. for 1906, pp.9-10. (Underwood Collection.)
There is no doubt that the particularly inward nature of the revival was viewed with relief by the missionaries. There was unanimous agreement among the Presbyterians that its most salutary effect was the heightened consciousness of the need to repent of personal evil and a deeper appreciation of the concept of holiness. It was easy enough to repent of one's ancestors' sins and far too easy to condemn the sins of a hated invader, but difficult to repent of one's own evil and to forgive others. It is only when this is accomplished that one reaches the heart of the matter, for, in Christian terms, it is the heart that is the matter. The missionaries' concern was not simply over a technical relationship between church and state, but also over the possibility of the essence of Christian spirituality - personal repentance - being submerged under a comparatively easier and certainly more popular political denunciation of Japan.

The question still remains whether such views and the nature of the revival itself did not in practice encourage an anti-nationalist movement within the churches. Certainly it did mean opposing politicisation of the churches in the sense discussed above. Undeniably some missionaries had little sympathy with Korean nationalism while the caution of others suggested politics was suspect. Yet the missionaries were in a difficult position. They were frequently charged by the Japanese with encouraging or even deliberately inciting anti-Japanese sentiment. When the Korean Cabinet Minister, Son Pyŏng-jun, accompanied Resident-General Prince Itō to Japan in February 1909, he was reported as claiming that Christianity was the greatest problem in Korea, that the Taehan Hyŏphoe's organisation and "obstructionist" activities were the work of Christians, and that the missionaries were inciting "ignorant people" to commit acts

of subversion. When Son publicly accused the missionaries of secret collusion with the former Korean Emperor and of political plots involving Pak Yong-hyo, the missionaries felt obliged to gather in the Seoul Y.M.C.A. to discuss means of refuting him.\(^8^8\)

In a sense very important to the survival and vitality of Christianity in Korea the Revival was not an anti-national movement. It had a particularly Korean flavour about it, and as their own experience, impressed upon the Koreans that the faith belonged to their race and nation. No longer could Christianity be described as a "Western" religion. The Presbyterian missions in particular had encouraged this indigenisation through implementing what was called the "Nevius Method" of self-support, self-propagation and self-government of the Korean churches by Korean Christians.\(^8^9\) Sometime around 1904, Dr. H.H. Underwood had observed to the Korean Elder of Seoul's Chông Dong Presbyterian church that the idea that Christianity was foreign would continue

... just as long as you allow foreign money to be used in carrying it forward. When you build and own your own churches, send out your own evangelists, and support your own schools, then both you and others will feel and realise it is not a foreign affair, but your own.\(^9^0\)

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90. Lillias H. Underwood, *Fifteen Years Among the Topknots*, N.Y., American Tract Society, 1904, p.133. The Seoul Chông Dong Church was perhaps the first to be built by Korean capital and labour, and was constructed by scholars, *yangban* and commoners working side by side.
In 1907, the year of the Great Revival, the Presbyterian Church in Korea became fully self-governing, and the structural and economic strength and confidence of this and other denominations was of major importance after the Japanese annexation of 1910.

The Revival raised an issue quite other than theological for some Christian nationalists. If on observing the revival meetings An Ch'ang-ho really did exclaim, as hearsay has it, "How shall we ever wake up this foolish race!" - then he was referring not to any doctrine but to the "Korean" approach to religion. He was objecting to the very indigenisation of Christianity the revival denotes; to what appeared to be a reversion to those traditional modes of behaviour and thought which An's writings clearly show he hoped Christianity would abolish. This impression is strengthened by later criticism by An's disciple Lee Kwang-su, that the Christianity of this period left a legacy of anti-intellectualism. This criticism doubtless conceals a class problem. It also poses a real question for both theologians and historians. Did the "indigenisation" of Christianity threaten its role in transforming society by so absorbing the faith into a traditional framework that it lost its cutting edge as a distinct alternative?

91. Chu Yo-han (compiler) An Tosan Chŏnjip, Seoul, Samjungdang, 1963, p.28. Chu is careful to make only tentative remarks about An's attitude to the Great Revival, pointing out that only rumours and no real evidence exists. Min Kyŏng-bae, op cit, p.48, quotes the rumour as solid fact.

92. See below, chapter seven.

There is another aspect to this problem, namely, the influence of the prevailing pre-millennialism of the Korean church and missionaries. Pre-millennialism is the belief that the thousand-year period of peace and righteousness suggested in the Revelation of St. John will be ushered in by Christ at his Second Coming to end the course of human history as hitherto experienced. Opposed to this is a post-millennial view which places Christ's return at the end of a millennium of christianisation of the world without any special divine intervention. Distinct from both is amillennialism which denies the millenium has literal meaning.

Pre-millennialists tend to hold a rather sombre view of history. The millennium is to be imposed by a supernatural event cutting short the evolution of demonic forces in history. Thus Christ's sombre rhetorical question, "When the Son of Man returns, will he find faith on earth?" is to be treated with all its negative force. Faith will be found only within an embattled church standing in antithesis to the world. On this view, the "Kingdom of God" is eschatological, not "among you" in any concrete way, but placed after the end of history. Their land ravished by two wars, their emperor forcibly dethroned, their nation rapidly falling under foreign domination, the Koreans' willing assent to a pre-millennialist interpretation is not surprising. Amidst earthly chaos, the believers could travel their earthly pilgrimage in faithfulness to God expecting either a resurrection to eternal life after death, or Christ's coming to destroy the evil age before their death.

Despite the foregoing construction, an historian is still faced with the seeming paradox of pre-millennialist missionaries and their Korean congregations establishing, as the Japanese complained, the framework of a whole new educational system, founding hospitals and
imparting political and social ideas which in Korea were considered nothing less than revolutionary. Part of this paradox can be dispelled by pointing out that it was the higher-class converts, who were definitely not pre-millennialist in their approach, who grasped the socio-political implications of their faith. Further, the socio-political concern nurtured in mission schools which were founded to facilitate outreach may be an instance of sociological laws working independently of original intentions. Yet the outworking of these "laws" was certainly in line with the intentions of the Christian activists, and this returns the discussion to the question whether the somewhat "other-worldly" nature of the revival weakened interest in nationalism among ordinary Korean Christians.

In theory the church could be national without being nationalistic, but this misses the thrust of the accusation that in a time of national crisis affecting all Koreans, Christians were discouraged from being involved. Korean Christians abroad expressed anxiety at the revival's emphasis on life after death, and an evangelist in San Francisco, Yang Ju-sam, printed a "warning" to Korean Christians in a nationalist newspaper not to forget that Christianity was expected to rescue Korea from Japan just as the Israelites were delivered from the Egyptians. Judging from a Presbyterian mission report of 1904, it does not seem

94. L.-G. Paik Interview; Yun Diary, 8.3.1891.

95. Yang Ju-sam, "Kyŏnggo A Han'guk Yesukyohoe Hyŏngje Chamae", in Kongnip Shinbo, 26.2.1908. In 1931 Yang became the first Moderator of the United Methodist Church of Korea.
that even the conservative missionaries would have disagreed with Mr. Yang in principle. But in 1907, there was a real question of *modus operandi*, and again, it is necessary to recall that the context of the debate was the "temptation" for the church as a body to join the military resistance of the Righteous Armies. This was thought to be suicidal in the circumstances, giving the Japanese every justification for the eradication of Christianity from Korea they so desired. Such scruples were not a feature only of pre-millennialists or "other-worldly" Christians. The influential Methodist intellectual and nationalist politician Yun Ch' i-ho, had reflected on the problem as early as the 1890s. Then an exile and university student in America, Yun reasoned against official church participation in politics:

Is it right for a pastor to be engaged in politics? I answer: It is lawful but not expedient. For:

1. The business and duty of a pastor are distinct from those of a politician. The latter seeks to promote the external welfare of the Society; the former seeks to elevate the morals and enlighten the conscience of the people.

2. (....)

3. Besides, when a man gives his thoughts to two different lines of business, that one is sure to get the upper hand which comes nearest to his immediate, visible, tangible and temporal interest, though the other is of more importance in future .... So, when a pastor is engaged in preaching and politics at the same time it is ten to one that the more exciting part of his double duty will engross his thoughts and time to the utter or partial neglect of the other part.... Should he, from personal conviction or taste or circumstances, enter into politics, let him resign the spiritual charge....

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97. *Yun Diary, 7.12.1890.*
Yun saw a fundamental spiritual rationale for his church/state, or secular/sacred division: "The interest of the Kingdom of Christ can not, and must not, be identified with the interest of a party." Yun became convinced that Christianity was essentially inward or as he put it, "God in the heart; this is religion." It would be a misunderstanding to construe this position, which was widespread among Korean Christians, as a doctrine of the irrelevance or evil of the material world. It concerned rather a belief that inner renewal was essential to outward revival. Spiritual change was to work on the whole fabric of national life like "leaven in the lump", while societal change without this inner transformation could never achieve genuine liberation. Christianity was not a political programme, not because it was less than such, but because it was so much more.

Here at least, the amillennialists and pre-millennialists agreed. The Presbyterian Kil Sŏn-ju, ordained in 1907, was a fundamentalist Christian and was credited by the missionaries as being the major force persuading Koreans not to join the guerilla warfare. His personal history warns one off drawing easy conclusions on the basis of alleged beliefs. Converted to Christianity in 1897, Kil Sŏn-ju immediately teamed up with An Ch'ang-ho in P'yŏngyang to establish the Manmin Kongdong Hoe, or Assembly of All People, which was a creation of


the Independence Club. 101 Did he change his mind by 1907? It would be
truer to say he changed his occupation, from political activist to
ordained minister. The Independence Club, Sŏ Chae-p'ii1, Yun Ch'i-ho
and An Ch'ang-ho, had not seen any hope in armed resistance, and Kil in
1907 remained sceptical. Kil based his objections on the same spiritual
perspective of Korea's problems which the "politicians" professed. He
also related ethics to national problems:

Christianity must always fight against evil, and must always
overcome it. Any who shrink from this fight with evil or
who suffer defeat cannot but become failures and in the end
will fail to cleanse themselves of evil and must live in the
midst of it. Therefore the unlawful interference in and
shackling of our nation by Japan must be eliminated, and in
this, Christians must stand in the vanguard. 102

In 1919 Kil Sŏn-ju became one of the famed "Thirty-Three" who launched
the nation-wide March First Movement for independence, and in the 1920s
was among the first to work among the labouring classes amidst the
rising interest in socialism. 103

Thus pre-millenialism and the accompanying emphasis on personal
salvation and life after death did not deprive the early Korean
Christians of a social philosophy. The revival clearly influenced the
type of social philosophy that was adopted. It clarified and perhaps
polarised two possible positions on the "Kingdom of God", namely:
either to identify it with an almost entirely immanent, secular community

101. Ch'oe Chi-ung, "Minjung undong ūi puhŭngsa: Kil Sŏn-ju", Han'guk
102. Quoted in ibid, pp.166-167.
103. ibid, p.167.
that was thought to be emerging from the changes in Korean society; or to place it wholly after death or after Christ's return. The revival involved a position closer to the second pole and this tended to discourage investment in systems or structures founded on human resources. At the least, it encouraged the view that national problems were analogous to or a consequence of individual spiritual weaknesses, and that therefore elevating personal character would solve other, material problems. Society could improve only insofar as significant numbers of people in society improved; society was as, but no more redeemable than individuals, and the final salvation of both had to await the resurrection and/or the Second Coming.

Where did the missionaries stand? Spencer Palmer has judged that "Indifference to the social application of Christian theology" was a "feature of the Korea mission programme", and that this was due to the fundamentalism and pre-millennialism of the early missionaries.\textsuperscript{104} Two points can be made in reply. First, regardless of their beliefs, had the missionaries gone to Korea with the surely arrogant purpose of making or encouraging a direct assault on the nation's social and political structure, their stay in Korea would have been very short.\textsuperscript{105} Second, as has already been noted, they were openly critical of time-honoured Korean social institutions such as ancestor-worship,
child-marriage and aristocratic privilege. Although social indifference might seem a logical outcome of pre-millenialism and fundamentalism, historical evidence often contradicts this conclusion. The Korean case is no exception.

In support of the second point, one may cite the missionary training programme of the Australian (Victorian) Presbyterians whose conservative and fundamentalist position is clear from a perusal of their mission archives. Australian candidates for the Korean mission field in the 1900s attended a series of lectures on the subject of the social effects of missions. The lectures addressed the question

106. The examples of Dwight C. Moody and Lord Shaftesbury, famous pre-millennialists, show that a "negative" view of history does not mean its holders do not work for social change. Among Christians the integrity of the Gospel must be demonstrated even if the "world" must deteriorate. See Ernest R. Sandeen, The Roots of Fundamentalism. British and American Millenarianism, 1800-1930, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970, especially pp.146, 177-178, 184-185. Sandeen's book suggests that looking for a pre-millennialist social philosophy is a red herring: more decisive is the distinction between "futurists" and "historicists", and apocalyptic and nonapocalyptic theology. See ibid, pp.3-5, 36-39 and 81-83. William L. Lamont's study, Richard Baxter and the Millennium, London, Croom Helm, 1979, supports Sandeen's observations. Mr. Lamont finds that most conclusions drawn about people's world-views and socio-political beliefs on the basis of their type of millennialism are fallacious. See especially pp.55-56, 61-64.

107. "Collection of manuscripts on 'Modern Missions'", Archives of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria: Korea Mission. These are four handwritten lectures and are undated. Internal evidence and the fact that Australia did not send missionaries to Korea in any numbers until the 1900s indicates that they were probably delivered in the first decade of the twentieth century. The Australian position is supported by writings of American missionaries in Korea. The expected and claimed social impact of Christianity comes out very clearly in the following works: Annie L.A. Baird, Daybreak in Korea, N.Y., Fleming H. Revell Co., 1909, and James S. Gale, Korea in Transition, N.Y., People's Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1909.
"Christian Missions touch and transform individual lives. Do they also reach and influence society as a whole?" - on the premise that the "social results are a later and more indirect product than the spiritual." This did not mean backing off from the social sphere ("Christianity being sociological in scope, Christian Missions must be so considered."). but it implied that the individual was the basic unit: "[Missions] deal with the individual and through him reach society." Social legislation "may compel outward observance, but it cannot change the heart and disposition." Hence social reform concerned first "a change in the spirit of Asiatic Empires, rather than their material civilisation", for "Christianity is not the bloom but the root", the "pressure" behind reform. By implication the first and only task of the missionary was evangelism: without a significant number of committed Christians, there could be no Christian reform and talk of a Christian society would be meaningless.

Social and political reform was strongly desired and expected, and Christianity was seen as the motivating force. "Christianity," the lectures continued, "has a reconstructive function in the Mission Fields. Christian Missions have already produced social results which are manifest and society in the non-Christian world at the present time is conscious of a new and powerful factor which is working positive and revolutionary changes in the direction of a higher civilisation."

An anonymous Korean Christian leader's words are cited with approval:

The only hope of the country is in the Churches.... The Churches are raising up bands of men who know how to combine for a common object, who are quickened intellectually and who are full of character, courage and hope. To convert and educate the common people is the only hope of Korea.
This expectation of positive social change through missionary work was shared by Methodist missionaries in Korea, who as early as February 1898 had written on the "part played by Christianity in the social progress of the world."\textsuperscript{108}

Clearly, the propositions that Korea's missionaries were uninterested in the social application of their faith and that this stemmed from theological conservatism and pre-millennialism are unsatisfactory. The real issues were the methodology of change, the priority of spiritual regeneration and the strict separation of church and state. The missionaries saw their involvement as indirect and left direct action to the Koreans, discouraging such only when the means seemed unchristian or where the separation principle was violated. There was general agreement on these points among Korean nationalists also. Yang Ju-sam warned that if Christians wanted to interfere in secular affairs, "then they must do so in accordance with the Lord Jesus' command to follow righteousness and humanitarian [principles]", and judged that the guerilla approach was mistaken.\textsuperscript{109}

Yun Ch'i-ho, amillennialist and non-fundamentalist, essentially agreed with the American Presbyterian Mission view that "the true problem is one not touched by politics, but one that pertains to the moral and spiritual, for only as the Koreans measure up to true Christian ideals will there be salvation for their country nationally."\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{108} "Christian Missions and Social Progress" (anon.), \textit{The Korean Repository}, February 1898, pp.64-69.

\textsuperscript{109} Yang Ju-sam, \textit{op cit.}

\textsuperscript{110} See note 96. The phrase "not touched by politics" would have been qualified by Yun.
This kind of diagnosis was integral to An Ch'ang-ho's approach and appears in the newspaper he founded in San Francisco in 1907, the Kongnip Shinbo. "Christ told the Jews," ran one article, "that since they were full of evil deeds and devoid of goodness, God took their rights from them and handed them over to others, and this surely applies to Korea today." National revival depended on enlightenment of the people and socio-political change on thought-reform. The combination of utilitarianism and Protestant evangelicalism was quite acceptable in the West at that time, and J.S. Mill's doctrine that social laws could be reduced to laws of human nature was appealed to by the Koreans also. The Korean Youth Association in San Francisco held debates on the theme, while their pastors taught that good personal ethics meant a good national society.

There were disagreements among Koreans over whether personal renewal led automatically to national renewal and over the meaning of the separation of church and state. An article in the Kongnip Shinbo

111. Kongnip Shinbo, 25.10.1907.
112. *ibid*, 5.2.1908 and 9.9.1908.
114. *ibid*, 29.9.1907; 1, 8, and 22.11.1907.
116. It is not clear how often this claim was made. Going only on reported excerpts of sermons, it is difficult to make any judgment. For example Pastor Lee Tōk's second reported sermon urges active, planned application to national problems whereas the first sermon seems to suggest national renewal is automatic.
maintained that in the modern world religion and politics were independent and separate pursuits, and that as citizens all people were responsible for organising public or national affairs. Another article accused the Christians in Korea of naivety for failing to grasp the implications of this separation. Even should Koreans master the Bible they would remain just as hopeless in statecraft as before and ignorant of education, law, fiscal matters and government organisation. The West, it argued, pursued morality through religion, but acquired expertise in domestic and foreign affairs through independent study, in fact basing politics and law on Roman and Greek antecedents and thought. This opinion diverges from the belief of Yun Ch'i-ho and the earlier radical reformists that Western institutions derived from the values of its religion and would decay if separated from them. It seems to have escaped the proponents of this form of secular/sacred dichotomy that they were advocating a process whereby public life would become totally secularised and religion relegated to what people may do in their private lives. This may not have been the intention, but there is something more than a little ironical in the spectacle of the "enlightened" Korean Christians abroad, who decried the revival's failure to apply Christianity to society, actually advocating an arrangement which really does withdraw faith from national affairs.

The church/state principle was put to severe test in 1907-1908, after Japan had forced the Korean Emperor Kojong to abdicate. From August 1907, guerilla forces engaged the Japanese troops and police

117. *ibid*, 22.7.1908: "Kukka sasang pyŏnch'ŏn idong ron."
118. *ibid*, 10.6.1908: Han'guk Yesukyoin ūi ryugyŏnul kaehyŏn hara."
under the commanders Yi In-yōng, Hō Wi and Yi Kang-nyǒn. They scored initial successes before Japanese reinforcements were despatched to suppress the resistance mercilessly. The atrocities perpetrated against innocent villagers turned "hundreds of quiet families into rebels". Outrage filled the Korean Christians and but for the influence of Kil Sŏn-ju, it was claimed, they might easily have risen in armed insurrection. The delicate position of the churches is illustrated by the case of the evangelist, Ch'oe Sang-ryun.

Ch'oe Sang-ryun was one of twenty influential Christians selected by the Korean Minister of Justice early in 1908 to carry a Royal Proclamation to guerilla leaders ordering them to lay down their arms and return to their occupations. Korean Christians had kept aloof from the Righteous Armies and Sŏ Chae-p'il had criticised the anti-Japanese guerillas in 1896 for harming the real interests of the "great mass of country people", by despoiling their livelihood. The guerillas were at that stage anti-foreign and anti-Christian. But in 1907 Yun Ch'i-ho still faulted them. Although he confessed that the "wanton and deliberate cruelty of the Japanese policy has alienated me - all true Koreans - from Japan", Yun thought the Righteous Armies were futilely adding to the sufferings of the people: "The people are

119. Sohn, Kim and Hong (eds), op cit, p.236.
tormented between the devil and the deep - between the anti-Japanese 'patriotic' guerillas who levy supplies from villages and the 'angelic' Japanese who burn up the villages turning thousands of harmless people into the mountains - there to starve and freeze and die, because they are compelled to give food to the guerillas." Reports in 1908 confirmed that in many areas "people can neither sit down nor stand up", for if they are found with a "self-defence corps" membership card they are executed by the guerillas, and if found without one they are shot by the Japanese soldiers as covert guerilla supporters. 

Though the Christians had agreed not to join armed resistance, opinion was divided over the propriety of Christian churchmen attempting to dissuade the guerillas on behalf of a government which was under the thumb of Prince Itō Hirobumi. Did this not transgress the church/state principle? Again, criticism was sharpest from Koreans furthest removed from the struggle. In the U.S.A., one Chang Ki'sh'an attacked Christian ministers for becoming the tools of the enemy, and suggested they should rather encourage the guerillas not to rest till freedom was restored. The evangelist Yang Ju-sam expressed a more balanced view:

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123. *ibid*, Yun to Dr. Candler, 13.10.1907.
125. There were exceptions, like Kim Ku.
When I first heard that our Government had chosen a number of well-known members of the Christian Church and had sent them out ... to deliver the Government order to insubordinate and rebellious guerillas to disperse, I thought, here is an opportunity for the Christian religion, the basis of all peace, to show itself to be the vehicle of peace, quieten the people and bring to pass a further flourishing of the Way in our land. But immediately upon thinking again, [I realised that] should this mission really be undertaken, it would bring harm and disrepute to Christianity, the religion which is prospering so and which is our nation's means of salvation, our people's sole hope - and finally bring terrible calamity upon our nation.127

Yang fully agreed that Christians should be actively seeking to alleviate the intense suffering caused by the self-defeating policy of the Righteous Armies, but "to stop water flowing, one must block its source", and since the government had stung the people into rebellion, Christians should first confront it with its errors. Yang was fearful lest the people misunderstand the Christians' motives and turn on them like the Chinese Boxers.128

Yang's fears were not unfounded. Dr. Gale of the Methodist Yŏndong Church in Seoul received an anonymous letter from a guerilla early in 1908, which explained that the reason Christians had till now been treated with respect was that they were seen to be behaving honourably. But if the Royal Messengers were not recalled, their own and other Christians' lives could no longer be guaranteed.129 Some years earlier, Tonghak forces had regrouped and threatened to kill all

128. *ibid*, loc.cit.
129. *ibid*, 18.3.1908.
Christians; only the Russo-Japanese War was thought to have prevented
them. Dr. Gale took the warning seriously and consulted with the
American Consul before negotiating with Itō for the recall of the
Christian messengers.

Ch'oe Sang-ryun had, in fact, initially refused the government
commission. Instead he wrote a lengthy letter to the cabinet urging
each member to resign, go without escort to the guerilla strongholds
and apologise in person, and the Righteous Armies would disperse.
It is some measure of the dilemma facing Christians and the pressures
bearing on them, that within a month or so Ch'oe changed his mind and
entered a guerilla base in Hwanghae Province as a Royal Messenger,
sometime in February 1908. Ch'oe met with no more success there
than he had with the cabinet, and his meeting with the guerilla leader,
Min Kūng-ho, was a fiasco. The whole project was soon abandoned
and the resistance continued, but with enormous losses. Between
August 1907 and June 1911 the Japanese recorded 2,852 attacks involving
141,815 insurgents, of whom 17,697 were killed and 3,706 wounded.
By 1913 guerilla resistance virtually ceased.

130. Annual Report of the Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Church
(Underwood Collection.)

131. Kongnip shinbo, 18.3.1908. It seems the recall was not immediate,
but a process of phasing the operation out.

132. ibid, 19.2.1908. The newspaper mistakenly calls Ch'oe Sang-ryun
"Sō Sang-yun," confusing him with one of Korea's first Protestants
of that name.

133. ibid, 8.4.1908.

134. Minjok Undong Ch'ongsŏ, 10 vols, Seoul, Minjok munwha hyŏphoe,

135. Government-General of Chōsen: "Chōsen no hogo narabi ni heigō", Chapter 1, Section 8, (CTS, vol.1.3).
Elite-Commoner Interdependence in Korean Protestantism

Protestantism began in Korea in 1884 as an insecure, "foreign" religion whose future existence depended on its not drawing attention to itself. By 1910 its adherents numbered well over 200,000 Koreans, predominantly rural and lower-class, but including politicians, accomplished scholars and many of the land's most influential nationalists. At first considered a potential political liability, by 1907 Christianity's possible withdrawal from nationalism was viewed with dismay.

The dramatic rise of Christianity, and with it Western influences, coincided with a traumatic political collapse. The phenomenal growth of Christianity between 1895 and 1910 can be - and usually is - accounted for by the weakening of the traditional neo-Confucian, yangban-dominated social and political structure by the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars and the imposition of the Japanese Protectorate in 1905. This enabled Christianity to become a major contender in defining the nature and goals of society and nation. Thus an important cause of interest in Christianity was the relief it seemed to offer in the midst of political humiliation and social dislocation.

Not all Koreans who turned to Christianity were politically motivated as such. The Great Revival of 1907 revealed the essentially religious nature of the movement, in that from it there emerged an emphasis on personal repentance, on the vertical relationship with God and on the final cause of faith: conformity to the nature of Christ through resurrection to immortality. Among Presbyterians, who comprised the majority, rote knowledge of the Westminster Confession's
catechism was compulsory for all prospective members. In reply to the question on the meaning and destiny of human existence, the Shorter Catechism states: "The Chief end of man, is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever." A tension arose between this emphasis and the tendency to value the faith more for its perceived nationalist potential.

In 1907-1908 especially, fears were expressed by Christian nationalists that the revival emphases were drawing the sting from the churches' socio-political challenge. Such fears may have had temporary validity. Yet once the theoretical and theological arguments over the implications of pre-millennialism and fundamentalism are dealt with, it appears that as a matter of historical fact the fears were a little alarmist. The revival had positive effects also on Christian involvement in Korean society. It served the crucial function of making the religion "Korean", besides providing the numbers and structure without which the Christian nationalists' talk of applying Christian notions to national life would have survived only as an idea.

Certainly the most positive result of the Great Revival in terms of Christian nationalism was the link thus forged between the common, rural Korean and the urban "élites". The rapid growth from 1895 was a result of purely religious as well as social and political factors.

136. Lee Kun Sam, op cit, p.164. Lee comments that Korean converts were given six months' catechetical training before being allowed baptism. The Bible was emphasised as the "Word of God which would manifest itself in the transformation of an individual's life wherever it entered the human heart."

The revival, which mainly affected the labourers, merchants and peasants among whom the religion had first taken root and spread, forced the intellectuals and political figures to take the lower classes into account as an essential source of vitality and support. Conversely, the politically conscious leaders infused national consciousness among the common people through Christian institutions. The bane of many liberal-democratic movements in Asian countries is the tendency of the élites, who are the first to imbibe the new ideas, to be cut off from the people by those very ideas. In Korea the association of the new ideas with a new religion greatly mitigated this tendency. Dr. Allen's policy of reaching the nobility, the Methodist approach through education and the Presbyterian concentration on the countryside and implementation of a "democratic" church administration, engendered mutual respect and solidarity among Protestants on the eve of invasion by a "non-Christian", non-Western nation.
CHAPTER THREE

FAITH, EDUCATION AND ETHICAL NATIONALISM, 1896-1910

"The greatest issue for the dying is how they should be living." - Yun Ch'i-ho.¹

It was characteristic of members of the Reform Party (改革堂) who travelled to Europe or America in the late nineteenth century to return impressed by "Western" social values and conduct.² Since they perceived a connexion between Protestantism and Western learning and civilisation, adoption of Christianity also became characteristic of the radical reformists for whom the "[new] concept of God made impossible a recognition of ultimate value in the existing social structures."³ By 1910, reformists who had converted to Protestantism

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1. Yun Ch'i-ho, "Kumiin ūi Chosōningwan e taehayŏ", in Taep'yo Han'guk sup'il munhak ohonjip, 2 vols, Seoul, Ulsŏ munhwa sa, 1975, Vol.1, p.117.

2. The famous remark by Prince Min Yŏng-ik on his return from his mission to America in 1884 shows that Western civilisation dazzled even conservative leaders and caused some cultural ambivalence: "I was born in the dark, I went out into the light, and now I have returned into the dark again; I cannot yet see my way clearly but I hope to soon." Quoted in Hahm Pyong-choon, "Korean Perception of America" (posthumous article), Sahakji, No.17, November 1983, p.30.

3. Park Yong-Shin, p.102.

This turning to Christianity coincided with rethinking by the radical reformists on means and ends in the wake of their defeat during the Kapshin Coup of December 1884, an attempt to wrest control of Korean politics from Ch'ing domination. The Kapshin Coup marks a watershed in the history of the Korean reform movement for its failure underlined the need of any such movement to become a broad-based national movement. The coup had been in the style of a traditional palace revolution. Thereafter a different strategy was called for, one of enlightening the people, informing them of Korea's condition and wooing their support for thorough reform. With this object Sŏ Chae-p'il founded the Independence Club (獨立協会) in 1896, and with Yun Ch'i-ho and Namgung Ŭk began disseminating the "new thought" through Korea's first vernacular newspaper, the Tongnip Shinmun (통립 신문). High on the Protestant reformists' agenda stood the inculcation of a new civic ethic among the populace, and in this Yun Ch'i-ho played the leading role.

4. The Kapshin Coup, led by Kim Ok-kyun, Sŏ Kwang-bŏm, Hong Yong-sik, Pak Yong-hyo and Sŏ Chae-p'il on 4 December 1884, lasted barely four days before Ch'ing forces suppressed it. It is one of the most well-known events in modern Korean history. There is one history of the coup in English: Harold F. Cook, Korea's 1884 Incident, Seoul, Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, Monograph Series No. 4, 1972.
The Young Reformer, 1881-1887

Eldest son of Yun Ung-yŏl of the Haep'yŏng Yun clan, and connected through his paternal grandmother to the powerful Andong Kim clan, Yun Ch'i-ho was born in South Ch'ungch'ŏng Province on 23 January 1865. Little more than a year earlier Korea's King Ch'ŏljong had died without heir, leaving a court preoccupied with succession problems and clan strife to face the "challenge of the West". Yun's father, who in 1858 had begun an accomplished military career which brought the family up to Seoul, was one of the first members of the Reform Party and advocated strengthening Korea's position through military reform. On his return from an official visit to Japan in May 1880, Yun Ung-yŏl was appointed by King Kojong to train and command new troops after the manner of Meiji Japan. This placed the Yun family in the centre of a bitter, often violent struggle over the optimum course for the nation, staged amidst the tripartite rivalry for pre-eminence in Korea among Japan, China and Russia. Naturally

5. The Haep'yŏng Yun clan is relatively old and prestigious. It reaches back into at least the early 12th century (middle Koryŏ) when an ancestor, as personal aide to the monarch, occupied a position equivalent to prime minister. See Ch'oe Tŏk-kyo and Yi Sŭng-u (eds), Han'guk sŏngse'i taegwan, Seoul, Ch'angjo sa, 1973, p.453; and Ohn sŏnseong yugo pyŏngnyŏnbo, Haep'yŏng Yun ssi Taejong chung, Seoul, Sŏngil munhwa sa, 1974. Yun Ch'i-ho's nephew Yun Po-sŏn succeeded Syngman Rhee as second President of the Republic of Korea.


7. Other Western powers, especially France, England and America were involved, but for comparatively limited stakes. Diplomatic sources agree that American policy in Korea was weak and that Japan was the only nation with a consistent position and object. See Lensen, chapter 4, and William F. Sands, Undiplomatic Memories, Seoul, Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, Reprint Series, 1975, pp.78, 118-120.
enough, Yun Ch'i-ho followed his father's footsteps into the initially pro-Japanese Reform Party.\textsuperscript{8}

In April 1881 Yun Ch'i-ho was sent to Japan by the Korean court as a member of a study group which included Yu Kil-jun, prominent reformer of later years and author of the influential\

Sŏyu kyŏnmun (西遊見聞). While Yu studied under the famed liberal, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Yun came under the supervision of one Nakamura Masatada, a specialist in Western studies. His observation from Japan of Asian politics hardened a dislike of China that possibly began with his father's return from Japan in 1880 and which was confirmed by news of his exile to Wŏnsan on the north-east coast of Korea following the Military Riot (Imo Kunran) of June 1882.\textsuperscript{9} By 1883, Yun was speaking of "Korea's slavery" to China.\textsuperscript{10}

In May 1883, at the age of eighteen, Yun was recalled to Korea after only five months' study of English to serve as interpreter to the first American Minister in Korea, Lucius Foote.\textsuperscript{11} In this capacity he became involved in Foreign Office affairs and was frequently summoned to the throne to advise King Kojong and Queen Min. Since the former Regent, the Taewŏngun (Yi Ha-ung), had been kidnapped and taken to China the previous year, the power of the pro-Ch'ing queen was

\textsuperscript{8} A more detailed discussion of Yun's pre-conversion activities is given in Kenneth M. Wells, "Yun Ch'i-ho and the Quest for National Integrity", Korea Journal, Vol.22, No.1, January 1982, pp.42-59.

\textsuperscript{9} YCH, pp.45-46 and 38.

\textsuperscript{10} Yun Diary, 2 November 1883.

\textsuperscript{11} YCH, p.47.
ascendant. The Chinese, represented by Li Hung-chang and Yuan Shih-k'ai, were therefore confident of their pre-eminent influence over Korean foreign policy. "I am the King of Corea," Li informed the American Minister to Peking, "whenever I think the interests of China require me to assert the prerogative." Yun was aware of this, for among his papers there is his English translation of a document in which Li Hung-chang in 1883 disapproved of independent trading agreements with foreign powers, and warned King Kojong not to allow "any precipitate discussion with [foreign] plenipotentiaries, which shall nullify the purport of your former notice that Chosun is a dependency of China." In collusion with the powerful Min clan, China had installed herself in the court as the foremost obstacle to the Reform Party's intention of implementing Meiji-style reforms.

12. A competent and wily politician, the Taewongun, Yi Ha-ung, was the father of King Kojong who as a child had been chosen from obscurity by Princess Cho (mother of Honjong who had preceded Ch'oljong) to succeed heirless King Ch'oljong, in the hope of bolstering her own Cho clan. Yi Ha-ung surprised the Korean political world by skilfully rising to the top. But following the 1882 Military Riot the pro-Ch'ing Queen Min, wife of Kojong, co-operated with the Ch'ing to have the Regent kidnapped and taken to China. The Taewongun returned to Korea during the 1894 Tonghak Rebellion, but was forced to retire in 1895 by the Japanese.


15. Queen Min belonged to the Yŏhŭng Min clan, the same clan as King Kojong's mother. This clan had been connected with the royal line since King T'aegjong (1400-1418).
Although Yun decried this Chinese influence, it is clear that by 1884 he believed the greater fault lay with Korea's internal weakness and disorganisation. "If we but strengthen ourselves," he advised the king, "there will be no real reason to fear anyone." Arguing that Korea's integrity in foreign relations was dependent on attaining internal strength and orderliness, he urged the king to initiate reform of government and administrative structures. Yun at this time considered that tightening up the government machinery would solve structural problems in both central and local administration. His remedy was to keep civil and military affairs strictly separate and to regulate departmental business in such a way that instead of interfering with other departments, officials would devote their whole careers to the business of their respective offices.

When, towards the end of 1884, Yun learned of Kim Ok-kyun's intention to take advantage of China's troubles in Indo-China to grasp power in Korea, he queried the wisdom of this type of solution. Yun's father especially disapproved of the plot and considered that its reliance on Japanese troops without Korean support was bound to end in failure. To Yun Ch'i-ho, the Kapshin Coup was a tragedy. It placed all associated with the reform movement under suspicion, strengthened China's hand and caused a reaction among the people and officials who accused the reformists of intending to make Korea a Japanese vassal. While Kim

16. Yun Diary, 5 April 1884.
17. See Wells, op cit, p.44.
18. Yun Diary, 18 January 1884.
19. ibid, 6 December 1884.
20. ibid, 7, 14, 15, 20 December 1884; 14 February 1885. For the official Japanese response, which was displeasure at the involvement by Japanese liberals, see Hilary Conroy, p.134.
Ok-kyun and others fled to Japan and Sŏ Chae-p'il to America, Yun chose exile in Shanghai where he entered Dr. Young J. Allen's Anglo-Chinese Southern Methodist Mission School on 27 January 1885. Two years later Yun adopted Christianity.

Christian Conversion and the Beginnings of Nationalist Theology: 1887-1893

From the beginning of 1886, Yun underwent a spiritual crisis which led to his baptism as a Southern Methodist in Shanghai on 3 April 1887; the decision came after intensive reading, discussion and thought, and Yun regarded it very seriously. The circumstances of his conversion were important for two reasons. First, there is no indication that political considerations played any direct part. In fact, Yun later feared that his new faith would be a political liability. Secondly, he regarded Christianity primarily as an inward, personal enlightenment producing in time a transformed life. This inseparability of religion from ethics, the concept of renewal commencing from within and working outwards, and his apolitical adoption of Christianity came to have a deep influence on Yun's nationalist thought; and also made him an enigma to many Koreans who later embraced Christianity as a politically useful proposition.

Yet neither was Yun blind to the implications of his new beliefs, which he began to relate to history and society after entering Vanderbilt University in America in November 1888. He keenly observed American

21. Yun Diary, 3 April 1887.
22. Ibid., 16 April 1889.
social, political and religious beliefs and practice and, like An Ch'ang-ho, Syngman Rhee and Sŏ Chae-p''il, attributed American civilisation to Christianity. This identification of civilisation with religion was not, in the 1880s, unreasonable. It not only had for Yun logical appeal, but it was standard dogma in Korea where Confucianism and civilisation were almost synonymous. Disenchanted with society and culture in Korea, Yun naturally concluded that Confucianism was at fault. Conversely, he concluded that if Christianity were the truth, then it would restore Korean strength and dignity:

The rise and decline of a nation depends on the wisdom and nature of its people. Our people have for several hundred years been slaves of others, possessing no wisdom or manly character and, suffering for 500 years the oppression of an incomparably bad government, high and low, official and commoner, all seek miserably to preserve their lives through bondage to others. How then, given the present state of our country, can we hope for independence, and even were that attained, how will we be able to defend ourselves against subsequent evils and preserve our land? Thus the pressing need at present is to increase knowledge and experience, teach morality and perseverance and cultivate patriotism .... There is no other instrument able to educate and renew the people outside the Church of Christ.24

But would Christianity be able to save Korea? Here Yun hit a serious snag in the shape of Social Darwinism. In fact, a great deal of his mental energy from mid-1889 on seems to have been expended on a struggle to reconcile his avowed belief in "the inexorable law of the

24. Yun Diary, 30 March 1889.
survival of the fittest" with his Christian belief in a moral imperative and God's providential ordering of history.

Yun employed three key Christian concepts to analyse international behaviour and the Korean dilemma: the personal origin of evil; judgment in history (providence); and the concept of stewardship. On reading Macaulay's *History*, Vol.1, Yun was dismayed by the enormity of the crimes of one nation against another, but concluded: "These international sins have their root and source in individual hearts. These sins look more grievous than individual sins simply because they are greater in bulk." Yet if history proceeds according to the law of might and "international sins" are the prime mover in international affairs, then what is the meaning of Providence? What is the point of talking about "inalienable rights"?

Yun took issue with Carlyle:

> In Carlyle's *Await the Issue*, he says, "One strong thing I find here below: the just thing and the true thing." There is as much truth in this statement as in the "inalienable right of man" which men talk about now-a-day. That is, those who have might have inalienable right and justice and success, but those who have no might have nothing but wrong, injustice, and failure. This is proved by the dealings of a stronger nation or race with a weaker nation or race. Therefore, one strong thing I find here below: might nothing more."

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25. *ibid*, 14 October 1892. Although Yun mentioned reading Gibbon, Macaulay and Carlyle, his diary does not record his having read Spencer. Given his advanced proficiency in Chinese, Japanese and English, it is likely Yun read evolutionary theories of history and nations. In Shanghai, Yun may have read a Chinese translation of T. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays*, which Lee Kwang-rin says came into Korea after 1905. (Lee Kwang-rin, "Kaikaha no Kaishinkyō kan", *Kan*, Vol.7, No.11-12, November-December 1978, p.31.)


27. *ibid*, 6 May 1890.
Yun modified this judgment later:

We cannot say "might is right" in the overthrow of one nation or race by another unless the conquered is better in morals, religion, and intelligence, therefore more right than the conqueror .... But we find the stronger has been almost always better or less corrupted in morals, religion and politics than the weaker .... Thus what seems to be a triumph of might over right is but a triumph of comparative - I do not say absolute - right over comparative wrong.28

From the idea of the survival of the fittest Yun concluded that no right, even the right of a people to its nation, was "inalienable"; while from the concepts of the personal origin of evil and of Providence, he concluded that a people was morally accountable for protecting its nation's integrity. Invasion was as much the fault of the nation invaded as of the invader, for "misgovernment has its own punishment as any other crime",29 and "no sin is greater in a nation than weakness".30 Thus true fitness was derived from spiritual health and responsibility, while falling prey to social and national evolutionary processes was the logical outcome - or even judgment - of spiritual stagnation. Or, in Christian terminology, land, freedom and independence were gifts of God and their retention depended on their proper stewardship.

Stewardship in Christianity may be traceable to the Creation stories in Genesis, where God handed the earth and all its life and

28. ibid, 20 October 1892.
29. ibid, 24 September 1893.
30. ibid, 6 May 1891.
resources over to the care of humankind. However, the idea that
government and citizens are jointly responsible for developing both
material and spiritual resources for the mutual benefit of all is
contained in a number of religious systems besides Christianity, and
certainly Confucianism. But Yun believed Confucianism had been
discredited precisely on this point: Korea had great potential - the
people were well-endowed with good physique, intelligence and memory,
the climate was salubrious and there were abundant natural resources -
yet her rulers and subjects neglected it. 31 Confucian precepts were
powerless to rectify the Korean situation because they were flawed
throughout by a ruinous pre-occupation with filial piety. Moreover,
in its detail the Protestant version of stewardship owned a social
emphasis that was new to nineteenth-century Korea and which Yun
considered crucial, viz. civic morality.

"Civic morality", a term usually associated with English and
American Protestantism, refers to those moral qualities which
Protestants believe should accrue to the individual citizen. 32
Individual morality is seen to be the basis of social, even national,
health and vitality. Therefore one may understand the personalistic
and religious social philosophy implied in the concept of civic
morality as being logically opposed to those philosophies which take
social structure or class as their starting point. When expressing

31. ibid, 11 October and 14 December 1899.

32. A belief held not only by Protestants of course, nor by all
Protestants. But in America and Great Britain at that time the
Protestant link appears to have been strong. Many people go
back to the Englishman Richard Baxter as the greatest exponent
of this sort of approach. In this thesis, however, I am not
concerned with applying or testing the ideas of Weber or Tawney,
which would require a separate study.
himself in English Yun Ch'i-ho did not use the exact term "civic morality", but he often referred to "public virtue", "public responsibility" and "public spirit", and it becomes clear after studying his nationalist thought that the content of these terms corresponds with the concept of "civic morality" as defined above. It was on the strength of this concept that Yun, shortly before leaving America in October 1893 to return as a teacher to his former school in Shanghai, stated his conviction: "Christianity is the salvation and hope of Korea."  

Critique of Confucianism

As a yangban educated in the Chinese Classics, it was natural that Yun Ch'i-ho should approach and explain his new beliefs in practical ethical terms. This involved a critique of Confucianism which the Shanghai environment evidently stimulated. On his return to Seoul at the close of 1894 Yun became deeply involved in religious and political movements and did not return to his critique until he was internally exiled to Wonsan in March 1899. For the sake of clarity, I shall treat the Shanghai period of 1893-1894 and the Wonsan/Chinnamp'o period of 1899-1903 together, before returning to Yun's activities in Seoul from 1895 to 1899.

Yun Ch'i-ho firmly believed in the universality and objective existence of moral laws: "Great and fundamental principles of morality are few and simple. The first great man who chanced to express them in

33. Yun Diary, 19 February 1893. Similar sentiment is recorded on 8 April and 19 December 1893.
neat and telling forms had, of course, as much right to give his name to them as Livingstone had to name his lakes and mountains.\textsuperscript{34}

Therefore although he shared the Reform Party's view that the Chosŏn dynasty's Neo-Confucian ethical system had become static and formalistic, he criticised Confucianism not for any alleged ethical poverty, but for the particular construction and emphasis it placed on filial piety. In Yun's view, although this duty was wholesome in itself it had lost all proportion by being raised to an ethical absolute, as the touchstone of moral orthodoxy. The greatest casualty was public morality: at the centre of Confucianism lay a distortion subverting civic morality.

In Shanghai, Yun concluded that filial piety, while "covering a host of sins", freed one from concern for the millions without food, home, education or spiritual understanding, permitted idle speculation on questions of infinity/non-infinity in a "perpetual war ... in regard to the priority of \textsuperscript{34} ri [ri] \textsuperscript{35} or \textsuperscript{35} ki [ki]", and encouraged "the doctrine of the inferiority of women, of absolute submission to kings" and of "everlasting 'go-backism'". It appears that the ethical distortion went very deep, not only justifying political and social oppression, but also supporting an ethical elitism (for only the privileged had the leisure and means to practise sufficiently the demands of filial piety) which relieved one from mundane responsibilities.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{ibid}, 20 October 1896.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{ibid}, 17 December 1893. "Ri" is principle and "ki" is essence, or "life-force". There were three schools of thought on this: 理先氣後 ；氣先理後 ； and 理氣消疫. Yun's criticism is of course sweeping and could hardly apply to the silhak school, but whereas neo-Confucianists pronounced silhak anathema, reformists admired it. See chapter two, p.39.
In contrast, Protestant morality signified to Yun a transition from outward legality to inward self-determination through a conscience informed transcendentally by God. Whereas Confucian ethics ended in moral élitism, Protestant ethics were a sort of "everyman's" morality: it planted moral activity firmly in the ground of ordinary human existence.

Later, as Magistrate of Wŏnsan in South Hamgyŏng Province in 1902, Yun cited a contemporary case of political irresponsibility as an example of how filial piety, undergirding the ethic," 不仁不義 [purin purūi] (one must not be uncharitable and unjust), may entirely subvert all public virtue." On 25 March 1902, the Governor of Hamhung City, Kim Chong-han, had, through cruel extortions, caused a major insurrection. In his defence, Kim pleaded that his salary was too low, and that if he failed to support parents and relatives, "he is necessarily a bad man, no matter if he is honest in the discharge of his official duties". Another case which impressed itself on Yun was in 1901, when eight of the thirteen provinces suffered severe famine, and whole villages disappeared through death or migration. Yet in face of such calamities, the Government Gazette mentioned only ceremonies and appointments of imperial grave-keepers as items of national importance. Given this official unconcern for the welfare of the people, this bad stewardship, Yun queried whether one could accuse

36. ibid, 11 April 1902.
God of injustice if Korea fell to others.\textsuperscript{37}

But it was not only among the ruling body that Protestant ethics were needed, for those ruled also gave Yun little comfort. On 1 April 1902 a fire broke out in Wonsan, but Yun experienced great difficulty in persuading even a few to work the pump the Japanese fire-brigade had brought. Four houses burned down, and Yun confided to his diary:

Altruism has always been condemned by Confucianists; hence public spirit is almost an unknown quality in Korea or China ... where the gross materialism of Confucius has reduced the whole range of human duty within the four walls of one's house ....\textsuperscript{38}

Bertrand Russell has pointed out that Confucianism laid down no ethical instructions that contradicted people's natural inclinations, and saw this as a point in its favour. Yun Ch'i-ho believed this was precisely its failing. Filial piety, interpreted as the "duty within the four walls of one's house", was the greatest enemy in Korea of "public spirit". The whole business of morality was to turn attention away from natural inclinations to the needs of society and nation which transcended exclusively familial interests.

There was more than an ethical problem for Yun in Confucianism. There was a vital lack in the system as a whole. Though he conceded the beauty of Mencian ethical maxims, he argued that they were "powerless and therefore useless"; they lacked the wherewithal to enable

\textsuperscript{37} Here is evidence that the idea that the Korean situation invited foreign control pre-dates the Japanese "colonial" interpretation (see Introduction, p.8). But the idea of moral desert is not the same as the Japanese view. Providence meant to Yun God's ability to pursue moral ends through the seemingly amoral processes of history. Korea's fault was not Japan's justification, but of Korea's fault Yun was certain: \textit{ibid}, 7 May and 14 September 1902.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{ibid}, 6 April 1902.
people to practise them. This was a lack, quite simply, of spiritual power - a religious rather than ethical disqualification. Yun required this spiritual power because as a Protestant he believed, contra Mencius, that humans tended naturally towards evil in action if not in sentiment, and that therefore fine ethical philosophy directed only to the intellect was quite inadequate. In 1890 Yun had already concluded that Koreans, Chinese and Japanese did not need "positive philosophy or altogether knowable religion", which they had in Confucianism. Rather, they wanted "a living moral or rather spiritual power to enable us to do what we know to be true."^40

Thus, Yun Ch'i-ho drew a different conclusion from Mo Tzu even though their premise - the inclination of the unaided human will towards evil - was similar. Both believed power was necessary to bring about an ethical society; but whereas Mo Tzu appealed to a coercive outside force - the government - Yun appealed to a spiritual power that would take root within individuals. There was no misanthropic pessimism in

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39. ibid, 12 December 1893. Yun does not cite any maxims.

40. ibid, 18 May 1890.

41. Hsün Tzu is, of course, the philosopher who explicitly claims humans to be basically evil. But Mo Tzu implies as much when he teaches that humans in their original, ungoverned state turned necessarily to hate, injury and chaos:

In ancient times ... each man believed that his own views were correct and disapproved of those of others, so that people spent their time condemning one another. Within the family fathers and sons, older and younger brothers grew to hate each other ... while throughout the world people resorted to water, fire and poison in an effort to do each other injury .... The world was chaotic as though it were inhabited by birds and beasts alone. To anyone who examined the cause, it was obvious that this chaos came about because of the absence of rulers and leaders. (Quoted in Vitaly A. Rubin, Individual and State in Ancient China: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophers, New York, Columbia University Press, 1976, p.40.)
in Yun's position here: he believed in the capacity of humans to change, then work voluntarily towards the highest common good. So against a background of centuries of sophisticated philosophical attention to the principles of Confucius, Mencius and Chu Hsi, Yun perceived that Christianity's strength in Korea would lie not in argument but in action, in a demonstration of its moral power to transform individual and national life.

Yun's experience as Magistrate of Wonsan (March 1899 - July 1900; September 1901 - July 1903) and of Chinnamp'o (July 1900 - August 1901) was a personal vindication of his contention that a practical application of Protestant social and political ethics would restore Korea's integrity. By all accounts he won unprecedented popularity for his honesty and justice in public affairs. In Wonsan, the people on one occasion feted him with banquets, music and dancing, while in Chinnamp'o, his popularity was such that when his transfer back to Wonsan was announced, the people petitioned Seoul for its rescission, held demonstrations and for ten days prevented his departure.

42. On Buddhism, Yun said very little, which was probably due to the low repute of Buddhism at that time.

43. Yun Diary, 17 December 1893.

44. These dates are a simplification. In 1903, after Yun's reputation as an outstanding administrator was established, the Central Government shifted him around several district magistracies where conditions were troublesome, especially Ch'ŏnan, Pusan, Hamhŭng and Muan. (Government Gazette: 9 and 23 November, 11 August, 17 and 24 December 1903; 19 February 1904.) A fuller discussion of Yun's activities as Magistrate is given in Wells, op cit, pp.50-52.

45. Yun Diary, 14 December 1900; 25, 26 July 1901; YCH, pp.194-195.
But for all his personal success in local administration, Yun was aware that Korea was steadily falling under Japanese and Russian control. If he had proved some points, his rule was nevertheless decidedly paternalistic; and if the people had applauded his rule, their loyalty was to his person rather than to a concept of civic responsibility. This was confirmation of the lesson Yun had drawn earlier from his political involvement, to which I now return, that it was too early for democracy: first, Christianity must replace Confucianism to generate public spirit at individual and national levels.

The Independence Club and the Tongnip Shinmun 1896-1899

Towards the end of the Sino-Japanese War a new, pro-reform government headed by Kim Hong-jip was formed under pressure from the victorious Japanese, and proceeded to enact what became known as the Kabo Reforms. Since Kim Hong-jip had accompanied Yun's father, Yun Ung-yol, to Japan in 1880, reformists who had fled after the abortive Kapshin Coup found it safe to return. Yun himself returned to Seoul from Shanghai at the close of 1894 to seek a post in the Ministry of Education.

By any standards 1895-1896 was a tumultous period politically, and Yun found little opportunity in government to apply his ideas. Becoming Vice-Minister of Education on 11 June 1895, he was re-appointed as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in July, after the exile once again

46. Sohn Pow-key (ed.), *The History of Korea*, part v, chapter 3, gives details on these reforms.
of the then Home Minister Pak Yong-hyo on false charges of treason levelled by supporters of Queen Min. Yun became very suspicious of the Japanese Minister Inouye's intentions, which he believed were "to manage Corean affairs ... until Japan may feel strong enough to defy [Russia]." However Inouye's replacement in August by Count Miura Gorō proved more sinister: before dawn on 8 October, Queen Min was murdered in the palace with the complicity of Japanese troops under Miura and a Captain Sugimura, whereupon the king became Japan's virtual prisoner. On 28 November Yun Ung-yŏl attempted to smuggle King Kojong out of the palace with his son's knowledge and support, but failed. While his father managed to flee to Chefoo in China, Yun Ch'i-ho was subsequently dismissed from the Foreign Office under Japanese pressure. Then, on 11 February 1896, the king was successfully escorted to a haven inside the Russian Legation, whereupon Kim Hong-jip and others of the pro-Japanese Cabinet were assassinated. Yun emerged from hiding, received a Royal Pardon and was appointed Acting Minister of Education the next day, but on 1 April he departed

47. *Government Gazette*, 20 May 1895, 20 intercalary May 1895 (lunar); *Yun Diary*, 7 July 1895. (I have retained lunar dating in footnotes for convenience in looking the references up, but have always converted dates to the solar calendar in the text. From 1896 the *Government Gazette* changes to the solar calendar.)

48. *Yun Diary*, 5 August 1895.


from Seoul with Prince Min Yŏng-hwan on the first Korean Mission to Russia. 51

Despite the circumstances of his brief stay in office Yun succeeded in having two primary schools established and initiated a move to recall two-thirds of the Korean students in Tokyo to help set up modern education in Korea. 52 During his term as Acting Minister of Education from 12 February to 31 March 1896, Yun framed and had passed three education laws, one of which provided for the implementation of universal primary education. 53 As Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs he also initiated the practice of publishing reports on foreign events in the Government Gazette. 54 But implementation of the education reforms and the Kabo Reforms in general was frustrated by government instability and conservative opposition.

Equally as problematic as conservatism in Yun's view was the disastrous philosophy of change which lay behind the vicissitudes of 1895-1896. Despite the lesson of the Kapshin Coup, the philosophy prevailed that "by one blow, they could rid Korea of all known and

51. Government Gazette, 12 February ( 鳥外) and 3 April 1896.
52. Yun Diary, 31 March 1896.
54. These reports were titled "Webo" (外報) and while Yun was Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, a series was run on the situation in India under British rule, a subject in which Yun had for some time taken a close interest. See Government Gazette, 20 August - 11 October 1895 (lunar), passim.
unknown evils", whereas they had thereby progressively endangered
the existence of the nation. On his return from Russia in January
1897, Yun sought no political post but instead joined the Independence
Club, the reform lobby which Sŏ Chae-p'il revitalised on his return
from exile in America in April 1896.

Yun Ch'i-ho at first called the Independence Club a "farce", a
"conglomeration of indigestible elements", but soon became an
enthusiast, speaking with Sŏ at Christian meetings to solicit support.
Under club auspices he organised a debating society which evolved into
the Assembly of All Peoples (Manmin Kongdong Hoe), and initiated what
became a club tradition of memorialising the throne on national
affairs. He was elected Vice-President of the Club in February, and
President in May 1898.

The organ of the Independence Club was a newspaper, the Tongnip
Shinmun, initially issued thrice weekly. As the first Korean news-
paper to be printed entirely in the native Korean phonetic script
(Han'gul) it was designed to reach the widest possible readership,
inform the public of domestic and foreign events and problems,
introduce the new learning of the West, and instil the concepts of
civil rights, self-reliance and democracy. The tone was Christian,

55. Yun Diary, 26 February 1896.
56. ibid, 25 July 1897.
57. ibid, 8, 15, 29 August 1897.
58. Shin Yong-ha, Tongnip Hyŏphoe Yŏn'gu, Seoul, Ilchogak, 1976,
p.97.
with several leading articles on the harmful socio-economic effects of Shamanism. Early in 1898 Yun took over management of the paper from Sŏ Chae-p'il, at which point circulation had risen from an initial 300 to 1,500 copies. Under Yun's management issues were increased to six per week, while circulation doubled to 3,000 by the end of 1898.

On accepting management of the paper, Yun emphasised the role of the *Tongnip Shinmun* in making people aware of their civil rights and of the need for action and perseverance to attain them. Koreans...

... were not horses and oxen set to work like beasts of burden to carry baggage for monarch or yangban, nor could they simply gather up inalienable rights and prosperity by chance off the streets. Rather, these things were acquired only after a long period of effort, study and struggle .... If they desired to enjoy such rights and prosperity, they must work, strive, indeed fight for them.

A study of the *Tongnip Shinmun* from April 1896 to its final issue at the end of 1899 certainly bears out Yun's summary. Throughout publication, its editorials preached that religion, education and democracy, and hard work, co-operation and honesty, were the only path to self-reliance. A link was posited between God, patriotism and industry on the one hand, and unity, prosperity and strength on the other, while

59. *Tongnip Shinmun* (hereafter *Tongnip*), 7 May and 1 December 1896; 7 January 1897; 25 July 1899.

60. Shin Yong-ha, pp.34-37.

61. *YCH*, p.79.

62. *Tongnip*, 30 April, 4 July, 12 September and 8 December 1896; 5 June and 27 July 1897; 9 April 1898; 18 January and 18 February 1899.
the West was held up as verification. Korea had great potential, but hard work was required to realise it. In short, the Tongnip Shinmun was the vehicle of an intense campaign for the modernisation of the total life of Korea along Western lines. Western education was therefore advocated as an alternative to armed revolt and continual government reshuffling.

In the editorials of the Tongnip Shinmun Yun's values were for the first time openly publicised among the Korean people. For example, Korea's troubles were characterised as "the accumulated result of the ways of thinking and studying in Korea over the last several hundred years". Her weakness was the result of "worshipping empty theories", while Eastern learning in general was caricatured as "a high fence, within which one may look about, but outside of which one is not permitted to see a single thing", thus effectively stifling all innovation. The strength of the West, on the other hand, was

63. *ibid*, 14 June and 19 September 1898; 9 January, 11 March, 8 August and 18 September 1899.

64. Both Yun and his Christian colleague Namgung Ok, an editor of the Tongnip Shinmun, later set up their own schools. Namgung was arrested by the Japanese at his school in Kangwŏn Province in the "Rose of Sharon" incident of November 1933. See Kim Se-han, *Hansŏ Namgung Ok Sŏnsaeng u'i Saengae*, Seoul, Donga, 1960, p.233.

65. Tongnip, 19 March 1898.

66. *ibid*, 14 June and 19 September 1898.

67. *ibid*, 9 September 1899.
attributed to its dynamic tradition of studying factual reality over a long period, and of applying the conclusions to the promotion of the people's welfare. The Western value system behind this tradition was said to be based on Christian concepts; Western civilisation was wont to "make use of the Creator's beautiful soil for the good of His people the world over." Since civilisation was "the outcome of sound education", it was argued that it was necessary to pursue it through three channels: church, school and press.

The Tongnip Shinmun discussed such major themes as the nature and necessity of unity, modern economic and political theory and the meaning and value of normative law, frequently pointing to the level of "public spirit" in Europe and America. The Choson K'irisutoin Hoebo, a Christian periodical to which Yun also contributed, added its

68. See n.66.

69. The Independent, 14 November 1896. The Independent was the English-language organ of the Independence Club, but its contents do not parallel those of the Tongnip Shinmun.

70. ibid, 6 August 1896.

71. Tongnip, 16 September 1897; 9 January and 1 March 1899.

72. e.g. ibid, 11 April 1896; 9 March, 20 April, 5 June and 15 July 1897; 11 January and 15 December 1898; 18 January, 29 May, 16 June and 5 September 1899.

73. e.g. ibid, 14 May, 11, 30 June and 8 December 1896; 7 January, 23 February and 27 May 1897; 11 January, 11 March, 9, 19 April and 16, 18-21 November 1898; 5 April and 8 August 1899.

74. e.g. ibid, 16 April, 14 July and 25, 29 August 1896; 18 March, 27 April and 11 December 1897; 19 February, 15, 22 August, 7 September and 30 November 1898; 10 January, 10 April and 12, 14 August 1899.

75. e.g. ibid, 14 April, 4 July and 12 September 1896; 6 March, 25 May and 1, 5 June 1897; 11 January, 7 May, 14 June, 15 July and 19 September 1898; 6 February, 12, 31 May and 6 October 1899.
support to the campaign for civic morality, especially in its call for a new style of education. Warning that bringing up offspring in the knowledge only of their own comforts and desires invites egotism, arrogance and laziness, it argued that children, too, are gifts from God and that parents are stewards charged with educating the young in the widest possible manner.  

The Independence Club debates were much more overtly political. As speeches became pointed in their references to the king's "slavery" to Russia, Yun proposed in February 1898 that the Club memorialise the throne to the effect that, "it is the misadministration of internal affairs and not the presence of foreign gunboats that threatens the safety of the Kingdom." Passed by a vote of fifty to four against, the memorial caused a sensation. As memorial followed memorial, Yun remarked that "the waves of democracy are faintly beating on the rocky shores of Korean politics." But by the end of the year the Club became politically isolated and as Yun's formerly cordial relationship with Emperor Kojong suffered mounting strain he began expecting assassination or arrest daily.  

While absent on the Korean Mission to Russia Yun had been appointed a Privy Councillor and he retained the position after joining the Independence Club. In July 1898 he tendered his resignation.

76. e.g. Choson K'irisuting Hoebo, 2, 24 February, 19 May and 24 November 1897.
77. Yun Diary, 13 February 1898.
78. ibid, 27 February 1898.
79. ibid, 10, 11, 13 November 1898.
80. Government Gazette, 14 April 1896.
in connexion with certain memorials which criticised the throne, but the Emperor rejected it. In October, after repeated memorials on behalf of the Independence Club, Yun was censured by Kojong but his integrity was so prized that he was appointed Vice-President of the Privy Council shortly afterwards. On 30 October an extraordinary event took place. Several cabinet members and important officials joined the Independence Club and Assembly of All People in gathering before the palace to demand rectification of government shortcomings and reform. This gathering, known as the Kwanmin Kongdonghoe (官民共同會), presented the famous Six Articles, a demand for constitutional politics.

Yun Ch'i-ho later recalled the action of the politicians and officials as a most cynical act motivated by fear of "public opinion", a ploy to put the Assembly of All People off guard and await the chance "to send down a thunderbolt of oppression". The Independence Club had already lost favour with the foreign legations by opposing moves by Russia, Japan and America to gain special influence in the

81. ibid, 8, 12, 13 July 1898.
82. ibid, 10, 11, 12 (篤外), 13, 24 (篤外) October 1898.
83. A summary in English of these Articles is given in Han Woo-keun, p.443.
84. Yun Ch'i-ho, "Tongnip hyŏphoe ŭi hwaldong", Tongkwang, No.26, October 1931, pp.35-36.
court; now the court itself turned hostile. During the night of 4 November, the eve of the day when it was promised to introduce political reform, the arrest of Independence Club members began. Syngman Rhee, Yi Sang-jae, Namgung Ok and fourteen others were taken, but Yun escaped through an exit in his back fence specially prepared for the occasion. From hiding, Yun submitted his resignation from the Privy Council once more, but after popular pressure persuaded the authorities to release the arrested persons, Yun was granted a special imperial pardon and on 22-23 November he was reappointed Vice-President of the Privy Council and appointed Mayor of Seoul. But the political experiment was over.

On 21 November a confrontation occurred between Independence Club members and the strong, conservative "Pedlars' Guild" led by the

85. The manoeuvring of the legations was so blatant that the late Alexander Lensen fittingly titled his two-volume diplomatic history of the period, *Balance of Intrigue*. The American diplomat William Sands observed that legation intriguing was open and shameless (*op cit*, chapters 3, 5 and 8) and the same theme pervades Harrington, *op cit*, parts 2 and 3. Yun Ch'i-ho described the conduct of the American Consul-General Greathouse, who replaced the Korean royal bodyguard with mercenaries, as "unconscionable". (Yun Ch'i-ho, *loc cit.*). The Independence Club succeeded in having the mercenaries removed. The Club was anti-Ch'ing from its inception. With Russia, it maintained good relations until 1898 when it successfully opposed employment of Russian military and financial advisors. Yun claimed Russia had been guilty of bad faith and accused Japan of "juggernaut" behaviour. (*Yun Diary*, 12 December 1905.)

86. Yun Ch'i-ho, *loc cit.*

assassin of Kim Ok-kyun, Hong Chong-u, which left several people dead and injured. At the same time, forged posters were posted on public buildings claiming that it was time to depose the monarch, establish a republic and elect a president. Kojong fell for this deception and finally withdrew his protection from Yun. In January 1899 the Club was forcibly dissolved and prominent leaders were imprisoned. Yun departed for Wonsan in March, and nine months later the Tongnip Shinmun was discontinued.

The suppression of the Independence Club came as no surprise to Yun, who since May 1898 had suspected that the experiment would fail. The primary cause in his view was not conservative opposition so much as the continuing "lack of public spirit among the common people", without which democracy was not feasible. Even the euphoric meetings of the Assembly of All Peoples later that year did not impress: Yun was surprised rather by the "abominable indifference of the general public". Even among Club members, Yun lamented, perhaps as many as nine-tenths were themselves corrupt. He therefore had opposed the demands of the "radicals" like Syngman Rhee for direct confrontation with the conservatives, for without popular support the only winners would be Japan or Russia. Before democracy must first appear public

88. Yun's biographer claims that the bills called for Yun to be the first president (YCH, pp.82-83). But Yun's diary says nothing of this and the only quotation of the bill I have come across, in Kim Se-han, pp.95-96, mentions no names, only the idea.

89. Yun Diary, 1, 2 May 1898.

90. ibid, 6 November 1898.

91. ibid, 27 December 1898.
concern and conscience; and before that, the "blood of the race has to be changed by a new education, a new government and a new religion."  

It is difficult to assess the importance of the Independence Club during its hectic three years' activity. It was the first organised front pressing the court and government to adopt Western political forms and philosophy and created the first "opposition" newspaper in Korean history. Although the Club prompted only limited reform, such as the enactment of regulations governing concessions to foreign firms and provision for the election of some members of the Privy Council, its legacy became clear in the twentieth century when former Club members became stars of the nationalist movement. Moreover its most active leaders - Yun Ch'i-ho, Sŏ Chae-p'il and Namgung Ŭk in Seoul and An Ch'ang-ho and Kil Sŏn-ju in P'yŏngyang - were Protestants, while others such as Yi Sang-jae and Syngman Rhee who reached prominence in later movements embraced Christianity by 1904. The Independence Club enjoyed greater influence as a legacy than as an institution.

92. *ibid*, 1 February 1899.


94. For example, eight of the 1919 Shanghai Provisional Government Cabinet were Club members. (F.A. McKenzie, *Korea's Fight for Freedom*, Seoul, Yonsei University Reprints, 1969, pp.73-74.)
Civic Responsibility and Capitalism

There was, however, one important area in which the ethical and individualist approach represented by Yun Ch'i-ho was influential among reformists as a whole in the 1890s, and this was the area of change. Yun's belief that lasting change would derive only from a change in the will of individuals has been described already, but in a speech marking the proclamation in November 1897 that Korea was henceforth an empire ruled by an emperor, Yun felt confident enough to ascribe this view to the Imperial Decree itself. Noting that a proclamation on its own could achieve nothing at all, Yun interpreted it thus:

The point of the Imperial Rescript in urging us to amend our ways and pursue new ones, is not that we must willy-nilly change our occupations - scholar, farmer, artisan or merchant - in order to become true citizens. Rather, it means that if we once and for all cast from us all those customs and habits of old that have inured us to indolence and duplicity, and instead work conscientiously to fulfil our respective duties in whatever office or business we may be engaged, then not only will our nation naturally become prosperous and strong, but we will also indeed become Taehan citizens worthy of the name.\(^\text{95}\)

This appeal to the will and conscience of each citizen appeared frequently in the Tongnip Shinmun, especially in discussion of economics, where it was maintained that a change in moral outlook and attitude would necessarily bring about changes in the structure of economy and society. Further, it was claimed that the essence of

\(^{95}\) Cho'sŏn K'ŭrisŭtoin Hoebo, 24 November 1897. Emphasis added.
Western capitalism was "public spirit". No-one in Korea with money thought how it could be used for others, but used it for his own pleasures or died and left it to the next generation to misuse. By contrast, in the West it was considered that "money is not just for the use of one person, but is rather a convenient means of exchanging goods among the peoples of the world." Therefore, it was argued, money was made to serve the people by being put into industries which manufactured useful goods. England exported goods the world over, America supplied the world with food, but Korea, with fertile soil and an ideal climate had not even developed its agricultural industry, let alone deep-sea fishing. Those Westerners who found they had a surplus used it for the good of the community by establishing schools, hospitals, libraries and the like. Citing institutions established in Shanghai by foreigners at their own expense, one editorial went so far as to say that this was an indication of the universal reach of Western ethics. It is important to grasp both this highly optimistic view of "Protestant" economics and the nonviolent approach to change held by the management of Tongnip Shinmun when examining the reform proposals of the 1890s.

96. Tongnip, 5 June 1897.
97. ibid, 25 July 1896; 27 May and 1 June 1897.
98. ibid, 6 February 1899.
The two principal reformists involved in rural reform during the Kabo Reforms of 1895-1896 were the "moderate" reformer Kim Yun-sik and Yun's erstwhile colleague, Yu Kil-jun. Both were influenced by earlier shilhak scholars' idealistic schemes of equal land distribution. Yet both also rejected this idealism in favour of infusing the existing landlord/tenant structure with capitalist functions, modern agricultural techniques and a secure landownership system which would protect the right of individuals to own land. Kim Yun-sik opposed tampering with the rural structure directly by recourse to sweeping, man-made legal proclamations, on the grounds that since the existing system had not arisen that way it would certainly not genuinely or safely change that way. Justice had to be secured through tax-reform and domestic peace through respect of ownership rights established by a thorough land survey.

Yu Kil-jun's position was similar. In 1891 he had argued in his Chije-ui (地制義) that the traditional ownership system, improved and secured by issuing land deeds after a fair survey, could serve best the modernisation of agricultural economics. With Pak Yong-hyo and the Tongnip Shinmun Yu pointed out that development of commercial companies, which they considered basic to the West's strength, could only occur with the co-operation of those already

100. ibid, pp.313-315.
101. ibid, p.319.
possessing capital. Thus a sudden equal distribution of land would remove the only rural component - the landlord class - that could provide the wanted capital. In Korea, the Hyangyak, or Local Gentry Associations, were the obvious places to start. In this rural development, the co-operation of the peasants would be vital, and out of this it was expected that better landownership relations would evolve. 102

These proposals of Kim and Yu clearly put a lot of faith in the willingness of the landlords and monied classes to free their capital for investment in agricultural enterprises, and having done so, to increase wages as returns increased. The Korean economic historian, Kim Yong-sŏp, comments that with Kim and Yu "the traditional landlord system was rationalised according to Western European economic and political thought." 103 It would be truer to say that it was rationalised according to their romantic conception of Western economic and political thought. Yu Kil-jun, who at this time was edging towards Christianity, believed that competition was the source of prosperity, strength and happiness and that competition itself was a natural and wholesome outcome of the "pursuit of knowledge and cultivation of virtue". 104

The contrast between the Korean practice of confining the use of money to one's own home and the capitalist dependence on putting one's

102. ibid, p.333.
103. ibid, p.319.
capital to use in the wider society, led Yun Ch'i-ho, Sŏ Chae-p'il and other reformists besides Yu Kil-jun to regard capitalism as unselfish in spirit. Just as Western individualism signified to them a system of respect for the person and possessions of others, i.e., of civil rights, so capitalism was viewed as an application to economics of public spirit. This required no immediate structural change but would effect gradual improvements in a stable manner. The only alternative seen in those troubled times was a violent revolution such as the 1894 Tonghak Rebellion which, as Yun had predicted five years earlier, served as an excuse for foreign powers to "Polandise" the Korean peninsula.

Education and the Model Settlement, 1905-1910

On his return to Seoul late in February 1904 Yun Ch'i-ho learned that "Polandisation" of his country was in full play. The final attempt to reform Korea along traditional lines - the Kwangmu Reforms had been frustrated by intensified Russo-Japanese rivalry and

105. Yun Diary, 14 December 1889.

106. The Kwangmu Reforms which preceded the Russo-Japanese War are examined in Kim Yong-sŏp, part II, section 3 and part III.

107. From 1860, when Count Muraviev-Amurski established Vladivostok, and the cession of the Chinese Ussuri territories to Russia gave her a 12-mile frontier with Korea, Japan had viewed Russia with suspicion. In 1891, Crown Prince Nicholas stated the necessity of an ice-free port in south-eastern Korea; and when in 1896 the Liaotung Peninsula became a Russian lease, the railway was extended through it. Against this background, Japan evolved its "Man-Kan kōkan" policy of exchanging influence in Manchuria for special rights in Korea. This policy was, however, precariously balanced on finely-drawn distinctions which broke down and ended in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. See W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, 2nd ed. New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, pp.168-169; C.A. Fisher, "The Role of Korea in the Far East", Geographical Journal, 120, 1954, pp.285ff., Takeuchi Tatsuji, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1935, p.132; and Conroy, p.328.
hampered by its own conservatism. The Russo-Japanese War had commenced, and the deployment of a large Japanese force in Seoul warned Yun that "the life of Korea as an independent country is suspended by a thread." In March Yun was appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post which entailed negotiations with the Japanese over the succeeding twenty months of a nature which Yun found humiliating. At strategic moments the Minister of Foreign Affairs Yi Ha-yŏng fell conveniently ill, forcing Yun, as Acting Minister, to sign "agreements" with Japan which gave her increasing control of Korean affairs.

Yun was in no doubt over his own position. It was "morally wrong" to "hand over the whole country with eyes open, for dirty bribes, to Japan" and he refused to accede to the "Nagamori Concession", a scheme of the Japanese Minister G. Hayashi to have Korea's "wastelands" transferred to Japanese management. It was, he perceived, "annexation minus the name". Hayashi told Yun, "We expect much of you and ask you and your friends to co-operate with us," and became disgruntled over Yun's obstinacy. Yun had already observed growing coldness towards himself among Japanese officials and remarked, "Their coolness to me implies that I cannot be used for selling this country to them. That

108. Yun Diary, 4 May 1904.


110. Yun Diary, 8 June 1904.

111. ibid, 13 August 1904.
much is to my credit." After Russia conceded final defeat in October 1905, Prince Ito Hirobumi entered the palace with a force of gendarmes and on 17 November compelled the Cabinet to sign a Protectorate Treaty which made him Resident General. Thereupon Yun resigned from the Government and to the displeasure of Japan flatly refused the Foreign Affairs portfolio which was pressed upon him repeatedly in the following weeks.

The instalment of the Residency-General in Seoul added urgency to Yun's conviction that new learning based on a new religion was Korea's only hope. Earlier, in July and August 1904, former Independence Club leaders had been released from imprisonment and in the reunion that followed Yun discovered that a large number had become Protestants: Sygman Rhee, Yi Sang-jae, Hong Chae-ki, Kim Chŏng-sik (former Chief of Seoul Police) and Yi Wŏn-gŭng among others. As news of the activities of An Ch'ang-ho, Yi Sŭng-hun, An T'ae-guk, Yang Ki-t'ak and Ch'oe Nam-sŏn reached him, Yun understood he was now one among numerous influential people who believed that spiritual training to foster civic virtues was the proper means of gaining and maintaining independence. In a letter to Mr. Durham Stevens, an American employed by the Japanese in the Finance Department, Yun explained that while he had no sympathy with the puppet Government he had no intention of joining

112. *ibid*, 6 June 1904.
114. *Yun Diary*, 31 July and 9 August 1904.
the Righteous Armies either: "I believe that Koreans must take the situation that is imposed on them and make the most of it. I can help my country better in a private capacity than I may in the Cabinet as now planned." 115

By "private capacity" Yun Ch'i-ho referred to educational work, specifically Christian-based education. As early as 1893 he had conceived a plan of establishing an industrial school in Korea, for which he had entrusted $200 to Dr. Candler, then President of the Methodist Emory College. 116 Back in Korea, Yun wrote to Dr. Candler on the subject:

[If] we desire to have a school of any sort at all, it must be an industrial school where the Corean youth may learn through saving truth that work is no disgrace; that Corea's future depends on work; that Christianity is a working religion. 117

Yun strongly emphasised that it was "one of the obligations of Christianity" to teach the virtue of hard work, and believed that a Christian industrial college would "not only encourage self-reliance but also give the means of self-reliance." 118

From early 1906 Yun began preparations for the school with financial support from his father. 119 In October he opened the

115. This letter is in Yun Diary, 12 December 1905.
117. Letters, Yun to Dr. Candler, 22 October 1895.
118. Ibid, Yun to Dr. Candler, 23 January 1896.
119. Paik, p.393.
Han-Yŏng Sŏwŏn (Anglo-Korean College) at Songdo (now Kaesŏng) to the north of Seoul, in conjunction with the Southern Methodist Mission. As Principal, his fame attracted students from all over Korea. Commencing with fourteen students, the roll increased to 225 within two years and by 1910 reached 329 students, 54 of whom were high-school pupils. The industrial side of the curriculum at first concentrated on the fruit and vegetable industries, later expanding to include carpentry, pastoral farming and the textile industry. In time the college provided Songdo with a modern carpentry business, a textile plant called Songgojik, a dairy farm operated by Yun's eldest son Yŏng-sŏn, and a vineyard and apple orchard.

Concurrently, a number of other institutions arose which shared Yun's basic objectives. The return of An Ch'ang-ho from America in February 1907 heralded a flurry of activity within the new Protestant community. In the north Yi Sŏng-hun founded the famous Christian Osan College, while An himself established Taesŏng College. Uchida Ryōhei termed P'yŏngyang the "hotbed" of Christianity and estimated that at least one half of its population were Christians: "In P'yŏngyang there are the Minhoe (民會), the self-strengthening society and youth associations. There are also the Sŏu Hakhoe (西友學會) and public consultation centres for merchants. Everything is run by Christians in collusion with the officials."

120. ibid, p.395.
121. YCH, pp.115-118.
122. Uchida Ryōhei, Ryūki kaigen himegoto: "Heijō no chōsa", 15 April 1907. (CTS, Vol.4, pp.120 and 122.)
An Ch'ang-ho embarked on speech tours to persuade Koreans that independence depended on self-strengthening, not on foreign nations:

"If we believe in Christianity then we have no real enemy under Heaven .... The nation's independence is up to you citizens, not the protection of foreign peoples. God alone can be called our Protector."\textsuperscript{123}

From 1907 to 1908 educational and industrial institutions and societies sprang up under Christian leadership in several parts of the nation. Yi Tong-hwi, though harassed by police, founded and headed the Poch'ang School in Kanghwa district on the mid-west coast; Yi Sang-jae became principal of Kosŏng School in Seoul; Namgung Ŭk founded a monthly educational journal, the Kyoyuk Wolbo for the use of Koreans unable to attend schools; and Yi Tong-hwi and Kim Tong-wan helped establish industrial centres in Seoul and Kaesŏng (Songdo).

The return of Yu Kil-jun from exile in Japan in September 1907 stimulated considerable interest in industry, education and local self-government ideas in the mid-western provinces around Seoul. Just before he was forced to abdicate, Emperor Kojong granted Yu official pardon and offered him a government post. Yu declined and reportedly stated his intention to "work in the capacity of an ordinary citizen, serving the needs of education."\textsuperscript{124} From November 1907 Yu devoted himself to "national", that is primary, education. Enlightenment through learning

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{ibid}, pp.121 and 122.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Kongnip Shinbo}, 13 September and 22 November 1907.
and cultivation of morality, Yu proposed, were the twin pillars of true civilisation. Primary education would enable Koreans to understand the rights and responsibilities that make humans human and fulfil human ideals.\textsuperscript{125} Up to 1910 Yu founded or participated in a number of industrial and economic projects, as well as inspiring self-governing, elected, citizens' councils together with Namgung Œk.\textsuperscript{126} Still an idealist and now a firmly Christian idealist, Yu Kil-jun was by 1908 advocating "pure" socialism.\textsuperscript{127}

A negative byproduct of this activity was development within the Protestant community of the traditional regional rivalry between the north-west and mid-west provinces, represented by the sŏbuk p'a (西北派) and kiho p'a (畿湖派) respectively. To the former belonged An Ch'ang-ho, Yi Sŏng-hun and Cho Man-sik, to the latter Syngman Rhee, Yi Sang-jae, Yun Ch'i-ho and Yu Kil-jun. Both An and Yun were cognisant of this development and deliberately worked to minimise its effects. Yun Ch'i-ho became Principal of An's Taesŏng College and An encouraged "southern" participation in the leadership of organisations he inspired, particularly the Shinminhoe (新民会) and Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe (青年學友會). The Shinminhoe was designed

\begin{itemize}

\item \textsuperscript{126} Kongnip Shinbo, 3 June and 21 October 1908; 13 January 1909.

\item \textsuperscript{127} Kongnip Shinbo, 16 December 1908. Upon annexation, the Japanese included Yu in their list of high decorations in the hope of gaining his support, but Yu refused to accept the award. He died something of a mystic in 1914. His brother Sŏng-jun and son Œk-kyŏm became leaders in self-reconstruction nationalism, the latter as a protégé of Yun Ch'i-ho and a Y.M.C.A. leader.
\end{itemize}
To promote national unity, spiritual and moral growth through education, and commerce and industry through Korean capital and expertise. But Yun was more deeply involved in the Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakukoe, whose founding president he became in August 1909.128

The manifesto of the Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe, which may have been composed by Yun Ch'i-ho, expressed something of the new citizen he envisaged:

To any desirous of reform of corrupt old customs and willing to cultivate true public virtues we declare that this cannot be achieved by academic ability or by fine speech and writing alone. Such will be attained by forming a grand spiritual organization of young men united in mental power; by mutually exchanging and practising knowledge; by formulating forward-looking policies, despising danger and backwardness; by stemming the angry tide of convention regardless of pain; and by making your youthful renewal in pursuit of the path of happiness before you the pivotal point of our [national] revival.129

128. Yun was also President of the Self-Strengthening Society ( 自強會 ) from July 1906. The membership of this Society was a very mixed bag, not a particularly "Christian" organisation. I have briefly treated Yun's relation to the Society in Ken M. Wells, "Civic Morality in the Nationalist Thought of Yun Ch'i-ho, 1881-1911", in Papers on Far Eastern History, No.28, September 1983, pp.143-144.


129. Quoted in Sonyŏn, Vol.2, No.8, September 1909, pp.14-16. The compilers of the collected works of Shin Ch'ae-ho (Shin Ch'ae-ho Chŏnjip, 4 volumes) have attributed the Manifesto to Shin (Vol.3, p.110). I have checked their source, which is given as Taehan Maeil Shinbo, 7 August 1909, but there is no mention of the Manifesto in that newspaper of that date. In Sonyŏn, loc cit, the manifesto is published under Yun's name, while Cho Yong-man, Song Min-ho and Pak Pyŏng-ch'ae, Ilje ha ŭi Munhwawa Undongsa, Seoul, Minjung sŏgwăn, 1973, p.29, put Yun's name at the head of a list that includes Ch'oe Nam-sŏn. No mention is made of Shin Ch'ae-ho.
It is a measure of the social changes occurring in the early twentieth century that Yun and his colleagues saw the main hope in Korean youth (i.e. the 20-35 year range). In a way, the Ch'ongnyon Hakukoe and the Y.M.C.A. were the new Independence Club, while the former's virtual mouthpiece, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn's Sonyŏn, was heir to the Tongnip Shinmun. The Sonyŏn, which carried some of Yun's articles, concentrated specifically on the link between civic morality and national independence. In its issues between 1907 and 1910, civic courage was opposed to materialistic, greedy bravado;\textsuperscript{130} Garibaldi was cited for his patriotism, courage, single-mindedness, perseverance, and rejection of ease and falsehood; the citizen's responsibility for the national territory, the need for co-operation and the rejection of toadyism were urged;\textsuperscript{131} and pointed biographies on great leaders like Abraham Lincoln abounded.\textsuperscript{132} In December 1908, the Sonyŏn carried an article titled "Amerik'anun irihayŏ tongnip hayasso" (How America gained Independence), in which, under eighteen points, was described in some detail the anatomy of civic virtue.\textsuperscript{133} Unyielding tenacity and a self-reliant spirit were heavily emphasised, and the eighteenth point concluded with an affirmation of Yun's belief that the Protestant spirit was the antithesis of selfishness: "In short, reckoning that the word 'I' was non-existent, and forgetting the 'private', they did not flinch

\textsuperscript{130} Sonyŏn, Vol.2, No.9, 1 October 1909, pp.5ff.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{ibid}, Vol.2, No.10, 1 November 1909, pp.69ff.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{ibid}, Vol.1, No.2, 1 December 1908, pp.72-75.
from shedding their own blood for public freedom and the widest happiness of all."

While the proliferation of these organisations and publications was greatly encouraging to him, Yun was also conscious of the rather diffused nature of the campaign. A concrete embodiment of the new principles was necessary.

By April 1907, in view of the support accorded his convictions and the generous donation of funds to his school even by non-Christians in Songdo, Yun Ch'í-ho judged that the time was right to establish his life's "dream" - a "model Christian settlement". This he described in a letter to Dr. Candler:

To do this one must have (1) a missionary centre, (2) a good educational plant, (3) a reasonably large tract of land for the accommodation of at least a hundred or more cottages with good streets, etc., (4) money to initiate these elements of a settlement. Of course we have no means of making such a plan an accomplished fact. Yet around our mission there will grow up a village as soon as the school is set on a firm basis of usefulness. 134

The project was important to Yun as a step towards firmly grounding Christian values in Korean society as a visible alternative to the methods of the "patriotic" guerillas. "We shall," he wrote, "present to our non-Christian population of the whole country a model settlement" with "a hospital, a school, a missionary settlement, and cheap and beautifully located sites and farms to begin with." 135

134. Letters, Yun to Dr. Candler, 16 April 1907.
even appealed to Dr. Candler to find people willing to invest up to $20,000 in the scheme, adding, "All the members of the Mission approve the plan."\footnote{ibid, 3 June 1907.}

However time was against Yun and like-minded Koreans. As annexation appeared imminent a number of leading Christians fled the wrath to come. In October 1909 a Catholic, An Chung-gun, assassinated Prince Ito in Harbin. As the Residency-General began trailing An Ch'ang-ho with detectives and attempted to entrap him with spies in order to link him with the assassination,\footnote{Resident-General to Japanese Premier and Foreign Minister, 20 January 1910: 1909 nen An Jū-kon ni kansuru shorui (3), Section 2, item 3. (YUL).} Christian activists began fearing for their safety in earnest. Yun Ch'i-ho was shocked to discover on his return from Y.M.C.A. deputation work in England and America in early 1910 that An Ch'ang-ho had departed, and seriously considered leaving himself.\footnote{YCH, pp.116-117.} He chose to remain and continued expanding the school and mission compound in accordance with his ideals, but on 29 August 1910 Korea was formally annexed to the Japanese Empire. Yun's dream of a pilot community practising civic ethics still awaited fulfilment.
Conclusion

William Sands believed that the Independence Club members would have carried off a real revolution but for the Russo-Japanese rivalry that developed into war in 1904; even after the war, he considered them still capable of precipitating a revolution. Would an alliance with Japan have brought success? Apart from the fact that opposition to foreign reliance was a major item on the radical reformists' platform, there is no evidence that Japan would have been a trustworthy ally. Especially after 1905, there is every justification for Marius Jansen's judgment that the "likelihood of substantial Japanese support for liberal and republican forces in Asia was very slight."

An alliance with the conservatives might have borne fruit but for the insurmountable mutual distrust. Without a working compromise with the conservatives the reformists could not realistically expect to pilot the nation in the stormy conditions then prevailing. There seems to have been an unresolved tension in Yun and An's position between the admitted long-term nature of their approach and the also admitted urgency of Korea's position. Was not Korea's mortal danger such that

138. Sands, p.156.

139. Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954, p.105. In 1907 Prime Minister Yi Wan-yong reportedly suggested to Prince Itō that the former leaders of the Independence Club were useful men who could well be employed by the Government as district officials. Itō evidently agreed. (Kongnip Shinbo, 13 September 1907.) But An Ch'ang-ho's interview with Itō in 1908 made it clear that the Japanese had no intention of co-operating with nationalists, only of directing and controlling them. (See Arthur Gardner's dissertation, pp.113-114.) When Yi Si-yōng, Governor of South P'ýongan Province, began working closely with An and other nationalists, he was simply dismissed. (Ni-Kan gaikō shiryō shūsetsu [8 vols], Tokyo, Gannandō shoten, 1964, Vol.1.8 pp.54-55.)
the immediate necessity of defending it had a right to override the question of just what it was that was being defended? Yun's diary does indicate a continual battle to reconcile factions from 1884 to 1905.140 Thereafter Yun was more concerned as a private citizen to work towards building a new nation conforming to his concept of stewardship, than to attempt to maintain the superficial independence of a system which he believed was totally wrong and anachronistic. In his thought, means and ends were inseparable: the end Yun desired for his nation was simply the continuation of the religious and ethical means he prescribed for attaining the new Korea. In this unity of thought, Yun refused to distinguish independent statehood from the quality of life of the people. As the journal Sonyøn had pointed out, the American people had become independent before England bowed out, and the latter was the consequence of the former.141 In Yun's thought it had to be that way round: foreigners would always interfere in Korea unless the people first developed the spirit of independence.

The essence of Yun Ch'i-ho's ethical nationalism is seen in his response to the actual loss of any real independence in November 1905. The situation being beyond his control, rather than uselessly beating against closed doors, Yun pursued his ideals through the open

140. Yun once confided to Yu Kil-jun, "I cannot be a partisan: I look at both sides of a question too much." Yun Diary, 16 January 1896.

avenues of education and religious societies. However bad the situation, in his view it was still raw material for the free in spirit to use in improving their character and quality of life. If perfection was pursued in society, sooner or later that society would be renewed. Yun considered his present activities were more meaningful than desired future conditions despite (or because of) the wretchedness of the present. This is not, as George Bernard Shaw wittily characterised it, a view of the world as a "moral gymnasium" designed for strengthening moral muscle. It is comparable rather to the belief of Dostoevsky and Berdyaev in the spiritual structure of reality,\(^{142}\) and to a Chinese tradition of change which Lin Yu-sheng states as the need to establish an intellectual and cultural foundation for sociopolitical change.\(^{143}\) The essential difference between the Chinese and Korean "cultural-intellectualist" movements is that the content of the latter was heavily influenced by Christianity.

It was suggested earlier that the Independence Club was stronger as a legacy than as an institution. There is a question how deeply this legacy could have penetrated Korean society. The ideology of the Tongnip Shinmun was certainly an import of high level Western liberalism expressed through reasonably high level journalism by some of the finest minds in Korea. It informs one about ideas circulated

\(^{142}\) See above, chapter one, pp.28-30.

\(^{143}\) Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, pp.37-41. Another difference may be that the "self-strengthening" movement in Korea moved to advocacy of the priority of cultural-intellectual modernisation much more quickly.
among élites - educated rather than economic élites. But in this instance the medium was at least partly the message: the Tongnip Shinmun was printed in pure vernacular script; it was meant for a wide readership and this in itself was an intimation of democratic ideals. Moreover it is vital to take fully into account the identification, as discussed in the previous chapter, of these ideals with the new Protestant faith and the sense of comity thereby established between upper and lower social levels.

It was actually the Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe, which Lee Kwang-su described as the "flying army" of the Shinminhoe, that most influenced the character of self-reconstruction nationalism after the annexation. Through this organisation the "Four Principles" of living - Truth, Ability, Loyalty and Courage - and the "Three Categories" of education - moral, mental and physical - were expounded for the first time. Most important, it was founded as a result of much reflection by An Ch'ang-ho on the limitations of the Independence Club and Self-Strengthening Society. These had been hampered and distracted by their political involvement. The Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe was therefore strictly nonpolitical and dedicated to the reformation of Korean individual and social character. By focusing on more universal human issues and aspirations, it was welcomed by many under the Japanese occupation as a meaningful and feasible approach to solving national problems.

144. See Ch'oe Nam-son, "Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe ŭi chuji", Sonyŏn, Vol.3, No.4, April 1910, pp.61-65.
The period 1910-1919 inside Korea may be described as a "dark ages" not only with regard to the fate of Christian and nationalist activities, but also with regard to the paucity of materials. The annexation terminated both the Chosŏn dynasty and the energetic enlightenment campaign of the previous five years, and few Korean documents have survived from the decade of military rule that followed. The religious policies adopted by Governors-General Terauchi Masatake (1910-1916) and Hasegawa Yoshimichi (1916-1919) were essentially hostile to an independent Christianity. Mission energies became consumed in a struggle to retain a role in education and the Christian leadership which had not already fled abroad came under threat.

Moreover Korea became diplomatically isolated upon annexation, as Western powers accepted Japan's reasoning that Korea was hopelessly weak and a threat to East Asian peace. "To be sure," President Roosevelt recalled, "by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent. But Korea itself was helpless to enforce the treaty, and it was out of the question to suppose that any other nation, with no interests of its own at stake, would do for the Koreans
what they were so utterly unable to do for themselves."¹ Not until
the Pacific War was the annexation, which Syngman Rhee bitterly pointed
out had had the "full sanction and approval of the civilised nations",²
reinterpreted by the United States as treachery and intrigue.

Despite unofficial contact with the West through the mission boards,
Korean Christians probably suffered more than any other group during the
first decade of full Japanese rule. The antipathy of the Government-
General towards Christianity is recognised in general terms, but the
nature of the conflict and the crucial influence upon it of the
assimilation policy are subjects begging analysis.³ An incident of
such proportions as the 1911-1913 Conspiracy Case suggests a real issue
and so classifying it as an example of the early Government-General's
hystoria⁴ is insufficient. Up till 1919 the Protestants organised no
political movement and threw out no overt challenge to the authorities,

1. Quoted in Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind The Myth,

2. Syngman Rhee, Japan Inside Out: The Challenge of Today, New York,

3. There is no published study of the early period in English. There
   is a doctoral dissertation on Japanese policy towards the various
   religions in Korea from 1910 to 1945 (Kang Wi-jo, "The Japanese
   Government and Religions in Korea, 1910-1945", Chicago University),
   which gives brief general coverage. Lee Kun-sam, op cit, has a
   section on Christian/Shinto confrontation in the later period, and
   another doctoral dissertation provides information on Presbyterian
   resistance in the 1930s and 1940s: Kim Eui Hwan, "The Korean
   Church under Japanese Occupation with Special Reference to the
   Resistance Movement within Presbyterianism", Temple University,
   1966.

4. Lee Chong-sik, pp. 92-93. Mr. Lee cannot of course be expected to
   analyse the Conspiracy Case in his general study of nationalism,
   but his treatment of it leaves an impression that Japanese hysteria
   was the major element in it.
yet they found themselves locked in a struggle with the Japanese for the "soul" of the nation and for their own survival.

The Policy and Practice of Assimilation

Japan's colonial theory in Korea cannot be treated here in detail, but its central motif of assimilation requires some description. Conceiving of Korea as a dagger pointed towards her heart, a natural highway leading China and Russia to herself, Japan had pleaded defensive and strategic justification for the annexation. Especially after An Chung-gün's assassination of Ito Hirobumi in October 1909, both the public and the political parties had pressured the Saionji Cabinet for a "decisive policy" and the "Promulgation of the Treaty of Annexation ... was universally proclaimed as a great achievement." Behind this acclamation lay Japan's belief by this stage that she was the "Light of Asia", destined to lead the East into strength and prosperity. For this idealistic purpose, as well as to secure more mundane objectives, the assimilative policy appeared most suitable.


7. See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, pp.41-44.
The choice was an unhappy one. At the end of the first decade of Japan's administration, a foreign observer was struck by the "rare spectacle of one civilised race ruling another civilised race", but was seemingly insensible of the implications. More closely involved with the Koreans, F.A. McKenzie had earlier more astutely perceived a tragic paradox: "The old, effete administration was cleared away, sound currency maintained, railways were greatly extended, roads improved, afforestation pushed forward on a great scale, agriculture developed, sanitation improved and fresh industries begun .... [Yet] this period... ranks among the greatest failures of history."\(^8\)\(^9\) Behind this paradox was the refusal of Korea, a nation possessing the intellectual, religious and cultural heritage of a proud civilisation, to surrender her identity to Japan in accord with the demands of assimilation.

The main assumptions of the assimilative policy appeared in the summary prepared by Governor-General Terauchi for the Annual Report of the Administration of Chōsen of 1910-1911. Citing the close geographical and cultural affinities of Korea and Japan, he asserted, "It is a natural and inevitable course of things that two peoples whose ... interests are identical, and who are bound together with brotherly feelings, should amalgamate and form one body."\(^10\) Not all Japanese

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10. Dong Wonmo, p.25.
favoured assimilation on these or any grounds, and later Dr. Suehiro Shigeru of Kyōto Imperial University identified the policy as the root of all Japan's failures in Korea. Few Koreans indeed desired to acknowledge any ethnic bond, and since they had been the means of Chinese culture reaching Japan, particularly T'ang Buddhism and fourteenth-century neo-Confucianism, they were embittered by Japanese condescension. For protestations of brotherly affection notwithstanding, the racial contempt for Koreans evident from the 1890s became firmly institutionalised in the Government-General administration after 1910 in the political apparatus, in education and in legal and economic systems.

The immediate problem of applying political rights to Koreans had been circumvented quite simply. Professor Tomazu maintained that Japan had no such obligation on the grounds that "when our constitution was written, it did not anticipate the annexation of Korea." Whilst adopting this recourse to political differentiation, Premier Katsura nevertheless announced in December 1910 that Korea was not a shokuminji (colony) but a gaiji (outer territory), of which Japan was the naiji (inner, or home territory). This arrangement gave Korea a contradictory

11. *ibid*, p.263.

12. cf. R.H. Mitchell, *op cit*, p.91: "If a distinction is made between assimilation as an official policy and assimilation as an informal social process, it is easy to see that there was a direct conflict between the formal and the informal, and that Japanese society sabotaged Japan's own assimilation policy."

political status, which in turn produced an administrative anomaly: whilst Korea was theoretically an integral member of the Japanese empire, administratively she was organised as a separate entity. Some sort of political modus vivendi had to be devised, which took the form of separation of the Government-General from the Diet and gave almost unlimited power to the Governor-General within Korea. He exercised direct authority over the Secretariat, five Bureaus and seventeen Affiliated Offices of the Government-General and literally ruled the land by decree. Despite eight revisions between 1910 and 1919, no changes were made to mellow this authoritarian rule.\(^{14}\)

Since the administration at local level also was highly centralised, the political apparatus, if effective as a means of strict control, was inimical to meaningful Korean participation and therefore to Korean political assimilation as well. There being no representative body for Koreans, bureaucratic recruitment was the only door to political involvement. Since the function of the bureaucracy was to implement Japanese rule, such employment bore the stigma of collaboration, and all "patriotic" Koreans such as the former Governor of South P'yŏngan, Yi Si-yŏng, had been removed by 1910. Between 1910 and 1913, 43.9% of Korean Senior Officials, including 90% of the highest, chokunin rank, and 24.7% of Korean Junior Officials were dismissed.\(^{15}\)

The aims, practice and results of Japan's economic management of Korea have occasioned some polemical disputation, especially when

\(^{14}\) Wells, \textit{op cit}, pp.48-49.

\(^{15}\) Dong, pp.221-222.
approached from the various theoretical positions of the present. But the Koreans felt and doubtless were exploited, for in terms of Japan's avowed strategic interest in Korea, commercial factors ranked high.\(^\text{16}\)

In accord with his centralism, Governor-General Terauchi adopted the *kaihatsu saku*, or exploitation policy, whereby Korea became fiscally independent of Japan, in preference to the *imin saku* which would have closely linked the two economies. This ensured for the Government-General unchallengeable dominance of the economy, especially through its monopolies in forestry, mining, tobacco and railways. It was not until after Manchukuo had been established in the 1930s that the administration implemented rapid industrialisation through its North Korea Development Plan (*Hokusen kaitaku keikaku*). In the earlier stages the most visible economic measure of the Koreans' loss of nationhood was the Japanese acquisition of their land.

Japan had begun acquiring real estate in Korea well before the annexation. Even prior to the Protectorate, an observer noticed "certain extraordinary and incredibly usurious real estate mortgage operations [by Japanese], which seemed to have the definite purpose of acquiring all the land possible by foreclosure."\(^\text{17}\) From 1908 the pseudo-private Oriental Development Company (*Toyo takushoku kaisha*) began obtaining land and by 1910 Japanese holdings amounted to three per-cent of arable land.\(^\text{18}\) In 1912, the Japanese Minhō (民法) was applied to

\(^{16}\) Article III of the Nichi-Rosen Protocol had secured Japan special commercial and industrial interests in Korea. See Lensen, Vol.2, chapter 25, passim.

\(^{17}\) Sands, p.78.

Korea as the Chōsen minji rei (朝鮮民主令) with the aim of establishing a private ownership system. The land-ownership surveys that followed were based on self-assessment with no concession made to the confused Korean farmers to whom the idea was so new.\textsuperscript{19} The surveys facilitated "legal" confiscation of land on technical grounds. The Japanese Christian, Professor Yoshino Sakuzō, reported in the Tokyo Chūō kōron after a tour in Korea in 1916: "Without consideration and mercilessly [the Japanese] have resorted to laws for the expropriation of land, the Koreans concerned being compelled to part with their family property for nothing."\textsuperscript{20} The Oriental Development Company's holdings alone increased considerably between 1910 and 1920, from approximately 11,000 to 77,000 hectares.\textsuperscript{21} Through its Chōsen Industrial Bank the Oriental Development Co. quickly ensured the Japanese settlers and administration domination of Korea's economy.\textsuperscript{22}

Only in education did the Koreans retain some measure of control. This is significant, for political means of assimilation having been avoided, education was elected the most suitable alternative on the advice of Dr. Mizuno Rentarō, later Director-General of Political Affairs.

\textsuperscript{19} Ch'oe Ho-jin, Han'guk Kyŏngje Sa, revised edition, Seoul, Pakyŏng Sa, 1981, p.219.

\textsuperscript{20} Quoted in Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, New York, Fleming H. Revell, 1921, pp.110-111.

\textsuperscript{21} Ch'oe Ho-jin, pp.220-221.

\textsuperscript{22} See Hori Kazuo, "Shokuminji sangyō kinyū to kezai kōzō", in Chōsen kenkyūkai rombunshū, No.20, March 1983, especially pp.156-163.
Mizuno urged that education, as the principle tool of assimilation, be introduced benevolently and with sufficiently encouraging incentives.\textsuperscript{23} While Dr. Mizuno's principle was adopted, his recommendations on its implementation were not. Instead, Terauchi and Yamagata Isaburō (Prince Yamagata Aritomo's adopted son) erected a separate, unequal school system to that of the Japanese in Korea and Japan, justifying their actions on Korean intellectual and racial inferiority. "Assimilation" meant not to advance the Koreans' knowledge or expertise on a level with Japanese, but "to cultivate such character as befitting the imperial subject through moral development and dissemination of the national [i.e. Japanese] language."\textsuperscript{24} Towards Confucian schooling Government-General policy was conciliatory, even supportive,\textsuperscript{25} and overall the authorities experienced very few problems with the Korean Confucian tradition. Relations with Christian-based schools were, by contrast, plagued by prolonged conflicts, and the Japanese perceived in the continuation of these schools a major threat to their assimilative designs.

The Government-General's Christian Containment Policy

The annexation on 29 August 1910 did not greatly surprise the Koreans. Attitudes towards the possibility had ranged from absolute opposition to willing assent. Yi Yong-gu, president of the pro-Japanese

\textsuperscript{23} Dong Wonmo, "Assimilation and Social Mobilization in Korea", in Nahm (ed.), p.155.

\textsuperscript{24} Han Kyo Kim, "An Overview", in Nahm (ed.), p.50.

Ilchinhoe, petitioned the Resident-General and Prime Minister Yi Wanyong for annexation on 4 December 1909. Yun Hyo-jong responded immediately by calling for the expulsion of the Ilchinhoe from Korea, although the Japanese claimed his Taehan Hyoophoe (大韓協會) was not on the whole completely opposed to the idea so much as the timing.\(^{26}\)

Of all sections, the Japanese observed, the Christians opposed the annexation "the most vehemently". Though missionaries were generally discreet or even restrained anti-annexation campaigns in the schools, the authorities detected considerable activities "behind the scenes" in such bodies as the Y.M.C.A. In the P'yongan provinces and in Sŏnch'ŏn particularly, anti-Japanese and anti-annexation speeches and activities were openly staged in Christian schools.\(^{27}\)

Yet the Christians were not politically well-positioned at the close of 1910. By 1912 the Protestants Yŏ Un-hyŏng, Yi Tong-hwi, Kim Kyu-sik and Syngman Rhee joined in exile those who had fled earlier. Contrasted with a military regime which during this period enforced its will through a law-force of approximately one policeman to 400 persons,\(^{28}\) the Christian community was certainly at a disadvantage. But not all its activists had fled. Yi Sŭng-hun, who interpreted the annexation in terms of God's Providence under which Christians should develop the

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27. ibid, Vol.8, p.319.

spiritual requisites of independence, concluded that his responsibilities lay inside Korea.²⁹ Namgung Ōk and Shin Hŭng-u likewise chose to work through schools in Korea, one joining the teaching staff of the Methodist Paehwa Women's College and the other becoming principal of the famous Pai Chai College.³⁰ Kim Ku, An T'ae-guk, Yang Ki-t'ak, Ok Kwan-bin and Sŏnu Hyŏk stayed in Korea, and the church itself continued to thrive under the leadership of such as Rev. Yang Chŏn-paek and Rev. Kil Sŏn-ju and his two sons Chin-hyŏng and Chin-kyŏng. Yun Ch'i-ho himself was regarded as the foremost Christian nationalist alive, and the people looked to Christians as bearers of national revival.

The Government-General was of much the same opinion: the churches were hotbeds of nationalism and their schools the front line. Japanese censors became paranoiac about references in sermons or publications to the "devil", the "Kingdom of Heaven", and even to "spring", claiming these were seditious. Even an injunction to "love one's enemies" brought reproof, while the hymn Onward Christian Soldiers was classified under "dangerous thoughts".³¹ Doubtless the Christians were not wholly innocent. William Sands believed that the "worst thing Koreans ever did for themselves was to assassinate [Ito] and kill Durham White Stevens ...."³² Prince Ito's assassination by the Catholic An Chung-gŭn had been followed two months later by an attempt on the life

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of the pro-Japanese Prime Minister Yi Wan-yong, by the Protestant
Yi Chae-myōng. The case of Durham Stevens, Japan’s assistant in the
Korean finance department who had been assassinated on his return to
San Francisco in March 1908, had already cast sufficient suspicion
on the Christians. Not only were his assassins Christians, but Shin
Hōng-u, then studying in America, published a long article praising
the action in the Kongnip Shinbo, a newspaper available in Korea at
that time. The Englishman E.T. Bethel, manager of the Taehan Maeil
Shirnun which was edited by the Protestant Yang Ki-t’ak, was deported
from Korea for publishing articles sympathetic to the assassination.

The assassinations infuriated Japanese residents and officials in
Korea. Their fury was mixed with some fear as an idea spread among
some Koreans of them all rising up on a set day, attacking the Japanese
individually and slaying them all. Again, the Taehan Maeil Shirnun was
involved, although Christians such as Kim Ku and Chŏng Han-gyŏng (Henry
Chung) thought the scheme completely crazy. But the damage was done
and soon after annexation the Government-General set about bringing
Christianity under the same complete control it was imposing on other
aspects of Korean life. Terauchi Masatake planned to have Korean
churches reorganise as branches of the Japan Congregational Church
(Kyōdān kyōkai) and to enlist the aid of the missionaries in drawing
the sting from the Korean Christian community. Neither ploy enjoyed
much success.

33. Kongnip Shinbo, 29 April 1908.
34. Ni-Kan gaikō shiryō, Vol.8, pp.60ff.
35. Kim Ku, "Paekbŏm iljji", in Song Kŏn-ho (compiler), Kim Ku Seoul,
Han’gil sa, 1980, pp.121-122. Kim Ku says that it was An Chung-gŭn’s
younger brother An Myŏng-gŭn’s idea, and that he dissuaded him.
Henry Chung, pp.196-197, refers to the same idea and to the Christian
opposition to it, but seems to suggest it was mooted in 1918 or 1919.
The Japan Congregational Church had resolved to send missionaries to Korea in October 1903: in July 1904 a church was established in Seoul, and another in P'yōngyang in October 1907. At this stage its missionary outreach was aimed at Japanese residents, so the two churches were in fact Japanese churches. In 1910 the church publicly endorsed the assimilation policy and, blaming foreign missionaries in Korea for the Korean Christians' anti-Japanese stance, advocated evangelism by Japanese Christians only as the path to harmony between Japan and Korea. Not all Christian denominations in Japan supported assimilation, but all agreed with the Congregational Church's praise of the annexation. The famous Japanese public figure Uchimura Kanzō stood alone as the only influential Japanese Christian to oppose annexation in 1910.

Terauchi Masatake was quick to grasp his opportunity. Letters and other documents of Japanese Christians concerned mention the Governor-General's political and financial support of the Japan Congregational Church, and he personally encouraged influential and wealthy Japanese to add their assistance in order to counteract the evils of "Western Christianity". As Ōkuma Shigenobu, Shibusawa Eiichi and Zaibatsu firms - Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Furukawa - donated funds, the Congregational Church enticed already established Korean congregations to affiliate with their superbly well-financed denomination. In this way, together with only minor success in evangelism, the denomination grew to 150

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churches for Koreans by 1919, with a membership of 14,387. Terauchi's successor, Hasegawa Yoshimichi, continued the policy more openly. In his review of the first decade of Japanese rule in Korea, Hasegawa mentioned the administration's constant concern over the Korean Christians' "dependence" on foreign missionaries, whom he accused of pursuing the politically harmful tactic of advocating "freedom and pro-Americanism" as a means of evangelism. "Should Christianity establish rapport with the mind of the Korean people," he continued, referring to Christian involvement in the March First Movement, "it is necessary that at the very least the reins of the church be grasped by Japanese or by Koreans [rather than foreigners.]" This is the view of the administration as well." Hasegawa then revealed that the Japan Congregational Church had been given aid by the Government-General over the years, but lamented that its enterprise among Koreans had brought only meagre returns.

In terms of the aim of assimilating Korean Christianity, attracting little more than 14,000 of the 350,000 Korean Christians over a period of ten years was no doubt disappointing. Yet among those transferring to the Japanese denomination were some important leaders. After an altercation with an American missionary, Yi Wŏn-k'ŭng's Seoul Myodong Church became independent and then in late 1916 affiliated itself with the Congregational Church. The former Chief of Seoul Police

38. ibid, pp.413-414; 429.


40. Shinhan Minbo, 9 November 1916.
Kim Chŏng-sik, who had been serving as president of the Korean Y.M.C.A. in Tokyo, also joined the Japanese denomination on his return to Korea at the end of 1916. At this point the denomination experienced sudden growth from roughly six to eleven thousand members. However Kim Chŏng-sik remained a firm friend of Uchimuru Kanzō, whose writings reveal that Kim at least was fundamentally opposed to the motives of the Congregational Church's missionary enterprise in Korea.

Government-General promotion of the Japan Congregational Church was only one side of the coin of its strategy to contain Christianity. On the reverse side were legal and other disinclinations placed on the practice and propagation of the faith by non-Japanese denominations. In August 1915 the Government-General published its Ordinance 83, "Regulations on Religious Propagation in Chōsen", to take effect as of October that year. Although this ordinance differed little from the religious laws in Japan, Western missionaries were distressed at the powers it gave the authorities to control church personnel and by its requirements to inform the administration in detail on every aspect of church and mission life. From Japan, Dr. Speer advised missionaries

42. Matsuo, p.413.
in Korea not to be "alarmed in the slightest degree", but their fears were grounded in the experience of the church over the preceding five years under less troublesome laws. From 1911 reports emerged from Christian strongholds such as Sŏnch'ŏn that "services, Sundays and weekdays, were regularly attended by police ... and our schools were under very close scrutiny almost daily." Even more pertinent was the fact that shortly before the new laws were devised the Korean Christian community had undergone a serious assault on its leadership, known as the "105 Incident", or "Conspiracy Case".

The Conspiracy Case, 1911-1913

An Ch'ang-ho had fled to Korea, Yun Ch'i-ho had elected to stay, and both choices were fateful in their own way. The former suffered the frustrations of diaspora life, and the latter the psychological and physical assault of hostile authorities together with misunderstanding from some Koreans. Yet as far as Korean nationalism and Christianity were concerned, An Ch'ang-ho lurked in the shadows while Yun Ch'i-ho stood, willy-nilly, on centre-stage. This focus had begun to sharpen from November 1910 when Kim Ku and a number of others, mostly Christians connected with Yangsan School in Anak, Hwanghae Province, were sentenced to imprisonment for alleged involvement in a subversive plan attributed by police to An Chung-gŭn's brother An Myŏng-gŭn.

45. Dr. Speer to Dr. Brown. Date illegible. (USPM 762.)
46. Annual Report of the Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the USA: Syen Chyun Station, 1911-1912, p.3. (Underwood Collection.)
Since no such connexion was proven the incident was regarded by some as the beginning of a Japanese plan to crush Christianity. The scale of Japanese operations was only understood at the close of 1911 as arrests began of large numbers of influential, mainly Christian leaders.

The Government-General struck first in Sŏnch'ŏn, a provincial centre in North P'yŏngan where over half the 8000 inhabitants were Christians. Arrests began in late September 1911 and before long over 80 persons including five pastors and pupils and faculty of the Christian Boys' Academy were incarcerated to await trial on a charge not yet revealed. When accusations of an aborted plot to assassinate Governor-General Terauchi at Sŏnch'ŏn railway station on 28 December 1910 finally emerged, they were met with disbelief among Koreans and foreigners alike. In March 1912 the Japanese prosecution "data" claimed the following:

At Syen Chun [Sŏnch'ŏn], the conspirators proceeded ... to the station again and ranged themselves on the platform with the Japanese and Koreans who came there to welcome the Governor-General. The train arrived about noon, and every one of the would-be assassins watched intently for the opportunity, having ready his revolver or short sword under his long cloak. The Governor-General descended from his train and saluting the welcomers passed within three or four steps of the conspirators. Owing, however, to the strict vigilance of the police officers and others, they could not accomplish their nefarious object.49


Identical attempts on Count Terauchi's life at other railway stations were alleged explaining the arrest of Christians in Pyongyang, Seoul and other centres where Christians were influential. Up to 157 persons were remanded for trial, of whom 22 were non-Christians. On 9 February 1912 Yun Ch'i-ho (then in Songdo, north of Seoul) was charged with having master-minded the whole conspiracy. The first trial commenced on 18 June 1912 at the Seoul District Court, before which 123 persons were arraigned and 105 convicted on the basis of stereotyped "confessions" exacted by torture. Three men died from this torture, and the Australian, Dr. G.E. Morrison, expressed the common belief of Koreans and foreigners that "no shadow of doubt exists in the mind of any reasonable man that these men were tortured." Although careful not to accuse the Government-General openly of persecution of Christians, missionaries' reports and letters show that they solidly supported the view of the Korean Christian and non-Christian population that the conspiracy was a Japanese one against the life of the Korean church. It was claimed that Japanese residents and even the police said as much.

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51. "Statement on the Conspiracy Case", by 12 missionaries under Dr. Moffett, 1912. (USPM 762.)


Two factors robbed the Government-General of full satisfaction. First, the trial itself exposed the improbability of the charges and it became evident that in their zeal the police and prosecution had lost any sense of proportion. In July a missionary from Taegu wrote to the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in the U.S.A. that it had become "so evident that the authorities have overreached themselves and made a travesty ... of the whole affair, that we are much comforted." Secondly, the accused themselves made a fool of the interrogation methods by implicating foreigners. On 11 July 1912 confessions read in open court implicated nineteen missionaries including Drs. Underwood and McCune, the pre-millennialist, fundamentalist Dr. Moffett and Mr. Blair, and, absurdly, Bishop Harris himself. Astonishment and glee at the folly of the prosecution has obscured the question whether this was not actually a brilliant move by the tortured defendants. The door was thrown wide to justified foreign protest, and buffeted by international outrage, the Government-General was obliged to re-open the trial. The initial judgment of 28 September 1912 had declared 105 persons guilty of treason, of whom six, including Yun, Yang Ki-t'ak and Yi Sŭng-hun were sentenced to ten years in jail, 18 for seven years, 39 for six and 42 for five years. Other important Christians sentenced included An T'ae-guk, Rev. Yang Chŏn-paek, Sŏnu Hyŏk, Ch'a Ri-sok, Rev. Kim Tong-wŏn, Yang Jun-myŏng, Sŏnu Hun, Im Ch'i-jŏng, Ok Kwan-bin and Rev. Kil Sŏn-ju's son, Chin-hyŏng. The incongruity between the

54. Author (illegible: Edison?) to Brown, July 1912. (USPM 762.)
55. Rev. R. Speer to the Board, 12 July 1912. (USPM 762.)
charge and the sentences suggested that even the judges viewed the case simply as an expedient for removing influential Christians from public life. Two eminent attourneys from Tokyo, Messers Ogawa and Ozawa, unequivocally denounced the trial as itself a criminal proceedings and charged that there was "evidence from the records in this case that the Administration was oppressing men on account of their beliefs...."57 Later, a Japanese official was reported to admit in a public address: "We did not believe from the first that there was anything in the conspiracy case."58

Early in 1913 the defendants jointly lodged an appeal against their convictions. During the two retrials which followed, Yun Ch'i-ho and An T'ae-guk especially produced solid alibis and successfully refuted the testimony against them. All this the magistrate accepted. But in his final verdict he concluded, in effect, that there was insufficient reason to abandon the overall charge that the six "ringleaders" were involved in plotting mischief against Count Terauchi.59 The sentences of Yun, Yang, Yi, Im and An were reduced to six years and that of Ok Kwan-bin to five years, while the remaining 99 were acquitted.

In October 1914 Bishop Harris learned that the Japanese Premier Ōkuma Shigenobu, had advised Terauchi to adopt a friendlier attitude towards the Christian missions in Korea.60 Accordingly, the six

57. Brown, p.19; Taegu District Court Records, 1-3 July 1913. (USPM 762.)
58. Mrs. Sharrocks to Brown, 6 November 1914. (USPM 762.)
60. Mrs. Sharrocks to Brown, 6 November 1914. (USPM 762.)
Christians were released under a special amnesty on 13 February 1915. Terauchi still insisted on the conspiracy's reality, attributing it to "misunderstandings concerning the purport of the annexation", and called attention to the pacification of the people in recent years. The Japanese press in Seoul immediately published unlikely "interviews" with Yun and Yang Ki-t'ak in which the two allegedly said how greatly they had benefitted from their time in prison (Yun had come close to death), how tremendously grateful they were for the unmerited amnesty, and how fully they now understood the grandeur of Japan's history and its beneficence towards Korea.

If the Conspiracy Case was irrational in its prosecution its cause was not fictitious nor was the Government-General's objective, on its own terms, illogical. The Christian community, though not a strongly organised force politically, was yet the most troublesome single focus of national identity. Above all it was unassimilable, which of itself amounted to political heterodoxy. The potential scarcely hidden within Korean Christian institutions to challenge the authorities seriously should its growth continue unchecked was lost on neither Korean nor Japanese. Count Terauchi reportedly stated in a speech delivered in Tokyo on 17 December 1913 that, "The Christian Church is the most powerful force in Chōsen. Therefore our Government-General must keep especial watch on the Christians there."

61. Telegram: Governor-General to Minister of Internal Affairs, 15 February 1915; and Terauchi to Foreign Minister Kato, Top Secret, 16 February 1915. (CTS, Vol.5.)

62. The Seoul Press articles are given, undated, in USPM classification 883.

63. Shinhan Minbo, 26 February 1914.
common perception of the situation thus: "To the Japanese, the most troublesome element is the Christians. To the Koreans, the most hopeful thing is the expansion of the Christian Church."64

But why should Yun Ch'i-ho, a cautious man who had counselled against open political resistance to the annexation,65 have been singled out as he was? The Koreans did not find this at all puzzling. "Needless to say," Yi Kwang-su commented a decade later, "Mr. Yun's withdrawal from officialdom was the primary reason he was seized in the Governor-General assassination conspiracy case."66 In his own detailed report of the case in 1912, the Rev. J. Jardine also opined that Yun's constant refusal to join the government during the Residency-General was taken very ill by the Japanese who had hoped thus to legitimise their presence.67

It was the reason for Yun's withdrawal that was considered subversive. To Durham Stevens, Yun had written that it was a protest against the shamefully anti-patriotic act of signing the Protectorate treaty.68 The full import of his "retirement" had been impressed on the Japanese by Yun's involvement with An Ch'ang-ho, Yi Sŏng-hun, An T'ae-guk and others in the Shinminhoe and the Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe. At the retrial in Taegu in July 1913 the prosecution began with Yun's presidency of the Shinminhoe, a body organised, it claimed, to instil patriotism and anti-Japanese thought in the people's minds in preparation for the overthrow of the "empire", and linked the "plot" directly to

64. Cho Tŭk-rin, "Han'guk hyŏnshi chyŏnghwang", ibid, 16 September 1915. cf. ibid, 7 January 1915.
67. "Statement of the Case", p.4. (USPM 762.)
68. Yun Diary, 29 November 1905.
this background.  

That the Shinminhoe, like the Myŏnhakhoe (勉學會) which was linked to the Anak Incident, was founded and led by Protestants, was food enough for thought; but Christian leadership of the major schools was no less irritating to the authorities. As Yun Chi-ho's Methodist Han-Yŏng College in Songdo and Yi Sŏng-hun's Osan College in Chŏngju attracted large numbers of spirited students, the Japanese were alerted to the fact that in education, where they hoped to create "loyal subjects", a completely contrary movement was being nurtured. It mattered little that Yun and the missionaries cautioned against political resistance and pleaded neutrality when they presided over a whole educational and religious enterprise that inspired of its nature "evil" tendencies. The Conspiracy Case was more than vengeance for Itō's assassination or spite against influential Koreans snubbing officialdom: it was a clear signal of Japan's determination to eliminate any independent element which might thwart its claim to be total arbiter of the nation.

The Education Controversy

Residency-General documents suggest that the Japanese had the closure of all religious and possibly private schooling in view from 1909 at least. As the first step, the Residency-General had

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70. Kim Ku and Lee Kwang-su were involved in the Myŏnhakhoe, later named the Haeso kyoyuk ch'onghoe. See Han'guk Hyŏndae Sa, Vol.4, pp.76-79.

71. Keirrru geppo No.1, 25 July 1910, "Kankoku tōchū kempeitai shireibu de kaisashita kakudō kaigi sekijō ni okeru hyōgakubu jikan enzetsu". (YUL.)
instituted measures to remove any publication considered harmful to its interests. Among the first to be banned were Yun Ch'i-ho's *Usun Sori*, a book otherwise known as *Sohwa* (笑話), a collection of stories with patriotic overtones and civic morals. According to one Korean report the police burned 3,700 volumes in May-June 1909. In August 1909 guidelines for textbook censorship were devised, and finally, on annexation, all Korean newspapers, magazines and journals were banned and replaced by official, pro-Japanese publications.

The corollary of this onslaught was an active campaign to suppress the Korean language, discredit Korea's history and cultural heritage and assert Japan's historical and moral rights over Korea. Japanese teachers taught Korean pupils that Korea was originally Japanese territory, that their rightful emperor resided in Tokyo and that there was no such entity as "Korea". The prosecution of this campaign was crude and invited reaction. Dr. William Griffis, an Orientalist, concluded in 1919 that the Japanese histories of Korea were a "collection of nursery tales". In retaliation, some Koreans,

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75. Henry Chung, p.137. See also letters printed in *Shinhan Minbo*, 13 May 1915 and 13 April 1916.
especially those abroad, began producing their own platonic "noble lies" extolling the glories of Korea's past and charging Japan with having interrupted the natural unfolding of the country as one of the lights of the modern world.\textsuperscript{76}

Korean Protestants who subscribed to the \textit{sedo} theory of Chosôn history favoured a different kind of response. An Ch'ang-ho had not bothered to differ with Itô over the diagnosis of Korea's ills; but he insisted on Koreans being left to administer their own cure. After all, was it not the Christians' aim to reconstruct national life? The Government-General readily perceived it was, but there lay the nub of the problem. The Protestant nationalist version of reconstruction pointed away from assimilation to the Japanese empire towards a self-reliant, independent nation-state. The Christian educational enterprise had to go.

Noting that there was greater energy behind the establishment of private schooling than public, that Koreans were rejecting study of Japanese as the "language of the \textit{Waenom} [pygmies]" and instead were entering Christian schools, and that pupils in public schools tended to club together with Christian school pupils and imbibe their thought, the Residency-General had issued an Imperial Rescript on Private Education in August 1908 to monitor their activities and curricula.\textsuperscript{77} Missionaries initially objected to the power this rescript gave the Minister of Education to close down schools not complying with its

\textsuperscript{76.} See above, chapter one, p.6.

\textsuperscript{77.} Government-General of Chōsen, Chōsen no hogo oyobi heigō, chapter 1, section 8: "Tai Kan shisei yōkō". (\textit{Ni-Kan gaikō shiryō}, Vol.8, pp.165-170.)
regulations, but agreed to abide by it after Residency-General assurances that rights to religious instruction were not being denied. 78

After the annexation Count Terauchi was open in his aim of eliminating religious schools, and the Conspiracy Case was itself a body-blow to Christian schools. The Sŏnch'ŏn Boys' Academy was forced to close in October 1911, while other Christian schools suffered serious shortages of staff because of the arrests. The Governor-General noted with satisfaction that by May 1914 mission schools had decreased from approximately 795 to 473. 79 Yet the schools exhibited certain resilience. Eighteen students gathered in about April 1912 to reopen the Sŏnch'ŏn Academy, after which students began to flock back. Reportedly, 186 students attended the academic year of September 1912 to June 1913, and among the 32 to graduate that year were twelve who had been arrested and later released. 80 Further, some of the drop in the numbers attending mission schools was accounted for by the accelerating process of missions handing schools over to Korean management. In Seoul, where Presbyterians and Methodists combined for higher education, primary education was put "entirely under the supervision and control of the Korean Church", 81 while the Australian

78. ibid, loc cit.

79. Instruction No.16 of the Government-General of Chŏsen, to local Authorities: 24 March 1915 (USPM 762.)

80. Shinhan Minbo, 1 August 1913.

Presbyterian Mission in the southern provinces pursued a like policy. In the midst of the Conspiracy Case, in 1913, the five Presbyterian schools in P'yŏngyang - Sungdŏk Primary, Sungyŏn Primary, Sungshil Middle, Sùngŭi Girls' Middle and Sungshil College - boasted 1220 pupils and together were considered the most influential educational enterprise in the land.

As the effects of the Conspiracy Case began to wane, the Government-General passed new education laws explicitly prohibiting religious instruction in schools and aimed at phasing out any language but Japanese in the classroom. These laws were issued on 24 March 1915 as "Revisions in Regulations for Private Schools" and "Regulations for Examinations of Teachers of Private Schools", and were accompanied by Terauchi's "Instruction No. 16". The pertinent articles of the first law were Article VI, 2, prohibiting addition of any subject to the curriculum of a private school not found in approved official courses, and Article X, 2, which required the teachers to speak Japanese and know Chinese. Article VI of the second law required examination of teachers in Japanese but exempted, in the supplementary rules, a Japanese candidate from examination in both Korean and Chinese languages. On the position of religion, Terauchi's "Instruction" was explicit:

82. Presbyterian Church of Victoria. "Extracts from the Records, 1909-1913": March 1910; January 1911; September 1911. (Archives of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria: Korea Mission.)

83. Shinhan Minbo, 7 November 1913; Annual Report - Pyeng Yang Station, 1914, p.36.

84. Seoul Press, 26 March 1915. See also note 79.
In the educational administration of the Empire the principle is ... to keep education independent of religion; and at the time when the Chosen Educational Ordinance [1911] was put into force, I declared that no Government or public schools nor any private schools whose curriculum is fixed by laws or ordinances should be allowed to give religious education or conduct any religious ceremonies .... In [private] schools no religious teaching is permitted to be included in their curricula nor religious ceremonies can be allowed to be performed [sic]. (....)

While ... private schools gradually decrease in number yet as a whole they are exerting no small influence on the young people. Should the educational methods adopted and pursued in these schools go contrary to the general principle of the State, consequence thereof would be most grievous from the point of view of national welfare.

For the transition to teaching in Japanese and the full adjustment of courses, Count Terauchi announced a "period of grace" of five and ten years respectively for schools already established. Undoubtedly this was equally a period of grace for the Government-General. In 1914 Terauchi had noted that the forthcoming reforms could not be implemented at once since that would mean closing mission schools straight away, and "there being a dearth in the Government and public schools able to take their place their closure will leave a great gap in the educational work of Chosen." 85

The claim made by Mr. M. Komatsu, Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau in Korea, that Japan was following accepted Western custom in separating religion completely from education, 86 drew a lengthy and

85. "Results of 3 Years' Administration of Chosen since Annexation", Government-General, January 1914. U.S. Records of the Department of State relating to internal affairs of Korea [Chosen], Doc. 895.00/557. (Microfilm.)

86. Published in Seoul Press, 2 April 1915.
closely-argued reply from the Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in the United States, Dr. Arthur Brown. The point of private education, he argued, lay in giving parents the option of having their children taught, in addition to the national syllabus, a system of morality or religious belief in a methodical manner and at their own expense. Should this option be closed off, one aspect of religious freedom would be violated, parents would have no reason to pay to send children to private schools and mission boards no justification in receiving funds in support of the schools. In short, mission and church involvement in education would have to cease. 87 This of course was what the authorities had in mind, but not instantly, and in any case the Chairman of the Senate of the Educational Federation of Christian Missions in Korea, the Rev. J. Adams of Taegu, reminded them of assurances given earlier that there would be "no interference with the full freedom of religious instruction in the Christian schools." 88 Not all missionaries were so anxious and Dr. Speer in Tokyo predictably advised Dr. Brown to think nothing of it. 89 But when Mr. Komatsu finally responded to Dr. Brown in November 1915, it was clarified that the source of the new laws had been irritation over the frustration by Christian schools of the intention of effecting assimilation through a directed education system. 90

87. Brown to Komatsu, 16 June 1915 (USPM 762.)
88. Adams to Guthrie, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 17 August 1915. (USPM 762.)
89. Underwood to Brown, 24 July, 13 December 1915; Speer to Brown, 20 September (USPM 762.)
90. Komatsu to Brown, 4 November 1915 (USPM 762.)
The Presbyterians and the Methodists differed in their responses. The former, who valued education more for the opening it gave to religious instruction, resolved not to register under the new regulations, whereas Bishop Harris influenced the latter to comply. 91 The Japanese press reported Shin Hŭng-u as expressing satisfaction after questioning the competent authorities that the regulations would not curtail the religious influence of this school: 92 in February 1916 the Northern Methodist Pai Chai College became the first mission school to register under the new laws, as Pai Chai Higher Normal School. When the Southern Methodist Han-Yŏng College at Songdo followed suit the Japanese press eagerly rushed to the conclusion that Yun Ch'i-ho, who had resumed headship of the College after his release, was therefore "decidedly in favour of the proposal." 93 But this case appeared rather to vindicate the pessimists.

The registration of the Han-Yŏng College had occurred under some duress. In mid-November 1916 three teachers, a former teacher and two clerks at the College were arrested on charges of having unlawfully printed and distributed a volume of seditious songs in August 1914 and a further volume in September 1915. It transpired that one Yi Kyŏng-jung

91. The Presbyterians were far from unanimous and discussion continued amongst them throughout this period: Rev. H.E. Blair to Brown, 25.3.1916; Adams to Brown 28.11.1917; Reiner to Brown, 11.7.1917; Brown to Adams, 32.1.1918. A report of the Methodist decision is in R.W. Noble, "Report concerning Pai Chai Schools made before the Federal Council," 1916 (USPM 762.)

92. Japan Advertiser, 1 August 1915. It is obvious that Shin had reservations, since in the same article he is quoted as saying that schools in Japan had suffered somewhat under similar laws there.

93. Seoul Press, 1 September 1917.
of Songdo, formerly a teacher at the well-known Myŏngdong Presbyterian School in Manchuria near Chü-tzu-chiêh, had heard of a plan by teachers at the Han-Yŏng College to compile the song book and had provided much of the contents. Among the songs were one paying tribute to An Chung-gûn, another calling for "heroes of an independent nation" and Yun Ch'ı-ho's Aegukka (National Anthem). Both volumes had the same forward which contained the following passage:

The rise and decline, success and ruin of a nation lies in the spirit of its citizens. Songs are a most effective way of inspiring the [true] spirit in citizens. For this reason, in the nations of Europe and America they cultivate the spirit of the citizenry through the wonderfully graceful and elegant lyrics and tunes of their great poets and musicians.

The secret publication of these two volumes confirmed the police in their suspicions that the school was still "brimful with seditious thought". After a thorough search of the school compound they discovered further publications "injurious to public peace" such as the banned T'aeguk Hakbo and Taehan Hakbo, and a proscribed history text, Ch'odŏng Pon'guk Yŏksa, which was being used in classes. Finally, after it was revealed that the song books had been distributed also among pupils of the nearby Southern Methodist Hosudŏn Girls' School, police indicted twenty-two staff and students of the two institutions.


95. **GGPAB**, Keikô Kihatsu, No. 527, 13 November 1916: "Fuonsha hakken shobun no ken."

The provincial Governor summoned Mr. Wasson, head of the Southern Methodist Mission in Songdo, demanded he explain why he had not registered the school and warned that if Mr. Wasson was indisposed to conform after being assured that the teachers would be licensed it would be interpreted as reluctance to work in harmony with the Government-General. 97 After the school complied, Mr. Wasson was informed he was granted only one year's grace to build separate premises for purely religious instruction, while the school's curriculum had to change "instantly". 98 In Dr. Adam's view, the only advantage the school gained by registering was licensed teachers: as a school, it was "rigidly secularized, both in and out of school hours." 99 Similar cases followed and many schools' applications for licensing teachers were refused, so that in the end even the formerly sanguine Dr. H.H. Underwood wrote: "An administration which looked with grave suspicion on all private education and frankly looked forward to its rapid elimination was not inclined to make it easier for these schools to readjust themselves to the new conditions .... Many elementary schools were forced to close and all schools felt that their existence was precarious." 100 During the controversy official Japanese comment on the quality of Christian faith and education in Korea

97. Shinhan Minbo, 5 April 1917; Adams to Brown 9 January 1917. (USPM 762.)

98. Wasson to Adams, 2 January 1917 (USPM 762.)

99. Adams to Brown, 9 January 1917 (USPM 762.)

100. H.H. Underwood, op cit, p.162.
became increasingly sarcastic, and by 1918 the Presbyterians who had not registered feared certain closure. But for the "conciliatory" policy introduced by Baron Saitō Makoto after the March 1919 uprising, Protestant schools may well have closed before the ten years' grace expired.

Christian higher education especially was feared lest it develop into a shadow government, or as Shin Hŭng-u put it, a "Mombushō within a Mombushō". Not only was it impossible to assimilate through education a people whose interest in schooling was animated by considerations foreign to the Japanese interest, but it was perceived also that Protestantism was naturally hostile to political control of its beliefs and aims. Whereas the Government-General permitted only a social "virtue" which overruled individual conscience in subservience to the empire, the Protestant civic morality as developed in Korea was founded on the doctrine of individual responsibility to God. The educational laws of 1915 claiming to separate religion from education were designed to establish as orthodoxy a state ethic which made serving the cause of the Japanese empire the highest possible duty of subjects. This, of course, was the meaning of the phrase, "loyal and good subjects of the Empire".

101. Addresses by Mr. Sekiya, 9 June 1916, in Seoul Press, 21 June 1916; and Mr. Usami, 3 September, in Seoul Press, 7 September 1917.

102. Brown to Adams, 23 January 1918, Reiner to Brown, 9 February 1918, Brown to Avison, 26 June 1918, John F. Genso to Brown, 10 July 1918 (USPM 762); Campbell and Allen, Korea's Awakening, p.28.

103. Japan Advertiser, 1 August 1915.

104. Imperial Rescript on Education, 1911. This was repeated often, and especially insisted on by Hasegawa when retiring from office in June 1919. (GSC, Vol.1, p.485.)
To the missionaries, the confrontation was essentially over the issues of religious freedom and the role of the state in national life. The separation of the church and the state did not mean to them separation of the church from education. The intensity of the confrontation was caused by the unresolvable opposition between two claims on the Korean mind: that of a transcendental, somewhat individualist ethic and that of an administration bent on directing all human endeavour towards one temporal end. Theologically, the issue was whether the Japanese imperial system was not actually demanding that its subjects render to itself what belonged to God.

The theological formulation is, in this case, more apt. From 1 April 1915 the Government-General instructed Christian schools to observe strictly and with appropriate ceremonies the days on which the Japanese Emperor offered imperial sacrifices. A compulsory textbook on Ethics and Morals was issued to Christian schools. The section on ancestor-worship concluded: "It will not do at all for anyone to neglect the sacrifices to his ancestors." When Christian pupils and staff were ordered to bow to the portrait of the Emperor they objected that it was idolatrous, "since, to a good Japanese, he is a divine being". The missionaries naturally accused the authorities of "a remarkable inconsistency".

On their own terms the Japanese were not so inconsistent, for they abode by a different definition of the issue. Like the former Korean


106. Campbell and Allen, Korea's Awakening, p.28.

neo-Confucian monarchy, the authorities wished to link filial piety, albeit with a Shintō focus, with loyalty to the state. The Japanese in Korea regarded religion as subordinate to politics; the missionaries insisted the two were distinct and that morality was a function of religion. Though Korean Christians generally went along with the latter, to them the confrontation had another dimension: the survival of national identity.

Christianity was not the only religion to suffer Government-General attention. From 1913 at least, the authorities began attempting to bring Ch'ŏndogyo under the official wing by setting up a new body, and Koreans claimed threats were being made against the Ch'ŏndogyo leader Son Pyŏng-hŭi. The authorities aimed at merging Korean with Japanese Buddhism by dividing the religion's administration into new districts under Japanese monks charged with establishing temple schools, publishing Buddhist literature and propagating the doctrines. Korean observers noted that the whole system was focused on reverence for the Emperor. But like Confucianism, Korean Buddhism at this stage was not regarded as a threat by the Japanese. Even in 1919 Governor-General Hasegawa observed that the religion was still depressed and had "no dealings with society whatsoever". The harshness of the Government-General's dealings with Christianity may be attributed to the religion's Western connexions, its unassimilable character and its record of social and political vitality.

108. Shinhan Minbo, 10 October 1913.

109. ibid, 6 August 1914. See also the sections on Ch'ŏndogyo and Buddhism in Kang Wi-jo's doctoral dissertation, chapters 6 and 8.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PROTESTANT VISION OF THE NEW KOREA

By 1910 it was abundantly clear that the survival of Korea's national identity was problematic and that the Protestant community was forced most to reflect upon it. The exodus of Christians that had begun before 1910 increased, and such large numbers emigrated north to Manchuria and Siberia that even as far south as Pusan missionaries reported cases of almost entire congregations emigrating.\(^1\) Dispossession of land was a major inducement to emigrate, but in some mission reports emigration was blamed directly on the wave of persecution against Christians.\(^2\)

Though their ranks were depleted the Protestants were still the most "progressive" force in Korea in terms of education, political philosophy and self-reliance. Unable to express their ideals explicitly, Protestant nationalists articulated their values and vision of a free Korea through the language and symbols of their faith. In this respect

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1. Shearer, p.60.

2. Annual Report, 1913, p.6 (Underwood Collection); Campbell and Allen, Korea's Awakening, p.28. A Japanese report linked Christian emigration to Siberia, Manchuria, Shanghai, Peking, Hawaii and South America with political circumstances: Chōsen shireibu chōsei, 1 June 1924: "Futei Senjin ni kansuru kisoteki kenkyū", chapter 2, part 1, pp.4-5. (CMSS, Vol.6.)
their experience reveals kinship with some forms of Filipino religious nationalism. "What really made the movement 'subversive'," Mr. Ileto comments on a movement led by Ruperto Rios early this century," is that Rios' followers had an image of the future that shaped their activities."\(^3\) The Korean church, too, communicated an image of the future, and the Presbyterian and Methodist denominations not only survived but even increased their core membership from 62,000 baptised members in 1911 to 87,000 in 1919.\(^4\) But persecution draws differing responses from among the oppressed, and from 1910 the self-reconstruction approach had to be defended against gathering pressure to define nationalism primarily in terms of anti-Japanism.

The Question of Means

The Protestant community in Korea was not monochrome. Quite apart from the exile centres in China, Manchuria, Siberia, Hawaii and the American continent, there were many shades of emphasis between the positions adopted inside Korea by such as Kim Ku on the one hand and Yun Ch'i-ho on the other. The pre-annexation groupings - Shinminhoe, Y.M.C.A., Self-Strengthening Society, etc. - still maintained some cohesion and tended to identify with an organisation in exile. Variation also arose out of the identification of movements and emphases

\(^3\) Reynaldo Ileto, \textit{Pasyon and Revolution}, p.233.

\(^4\) Shearer, pp.60 and 167. Baptised members normally comprised one third of the number of adherents. During this period the proportion of non-baptised members diminished a little because of the persecutions.
with the different "nationalistic" Christian schools: Yangsan School in Anak (Kim Ku), Taesong College in P'yŏngyang (An Ch'ang-ho and Yun Chi'i-ho), Osan College in Ch'ŏngju (Yi Sŏng-hun and Cho Man-sik), Hanyŏng College in Kaesŏng (Yun Chi'i-ho), Pai Ch'ai Colleges in Seoul (Shin Hŭng-u and Namgung Ŭk) and mission schools in P'yŏngyang, Sŏnch'ŏn, Seoul, Taegu and Masan. There remained also parochial loyalties to the kiho p'a and sŏbuk p'a.  

Initially, the Protestant nationalists were more united by what they held in common than divided by their differing emphases. Generation of civic ethics and recovery of national rights were major aims common to all. Kim Ku himself had up to 1910 striven to instil "national spirit" through education, complaining that most adults "did not even know what a nation was." But his attention was drawn to training in military science abroad after 1910 when positive action inside Korea became further restricted. Shortly after annexation Kim Ku, Yi Sŏng-hun, An T'ae-guk, Chu Ch'ın-su and Yang Ki-t'ak were "elected" representatives of Hwanghae, North P'yŏngan, South P'yŏngan, Kangwŏn and Kyŏnggi provinces respectively, with the initial task of arranging emigration of youth to Manchuria to train as troops. All these "representatives" were arrested in the Anak and Conspiracy Case incidents, and subsequently Kim Ku and Yi Tong-hwi escaped across the Yalu River.

5. The Shinminhoe group identified with An Ch'ang-ho in exile and the Y.M.C.A. mainly with Syngman Rhee. This is also a regional division, though Yun Ch'i-ho was not strongly identified with either exile group.


7. ibid, pp.196-197.
Christians advocating military means of recovering national rights claimed their position differed from that of the Righteous Armies. Kim Ku characterised the traditional guerillas as bearers of "old thought" in contrast to the "new thought" of his own group. His point was that recovery of national rights required not a defensive reaction but creation of a new order in which soldiers also would be trained scientifically in "real capability" before rushing into combat. One of the secret aims of the Shinminhoe had been organisation of modern armed forces, and so the participation of the educator Yi Sung-hun in Kim Ku's schemes immediately after the annexation indicates that a comprehensive view of the means of national revival was still current.

The arrests did not extinguish interest in military preparations. In March 1915 police discovered that Sō Kyōng-sun, a graduate of Yangsan School in Anak and the Presbyterian Sungshil College in P'yōngyang and for a time a teacher at the Christian Poshin School in Songjin, North Hamgyōng Province, had forged links with Yi Si-yōng's Military Academy in Manchuria, Kim Kyu-sik in Shanghai and patriots in San Francisco. In the same month a larger movement was broken up, involving students and graduates of Taesōng College, Sungshil College and Jesus Kakkūm School in P'yōngyang, whose network of contacts included Yi Si-yōng's Academy, Pak Yong-man's Nebraska Military College, and Korean émigré communities in Chinese and Russian territories.

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8. *ibid*, p.179.
Early in 1917 a branch of the Korean National Association (Taehan Kungminhoe), formed by An Ch'ang-ho, Syngman Rhee and other overseas dissidents, had been established inside Korea. Members were recruited from among students from all provinces attending the P'yŏngyang Presbyterian Seminary and Sungshil College. The Korea branch formed two bodies in June 1917 called the Korea Independence Corps and the "Suicide Squad" (決死隊), and with its links with Pak Yong-man, emphasised military means to realising a "Korea for Koreans". More than half of the twenty-five arrested in February 1918 were connected with the P'yŏngyang Seminary, Sungshil College and the Presbyterian Yŏnhŭi Special School in Seoul.  

The number of Protestants inside Korea involved directly or indirectly in military preparations accounts for only a small percentage of the thousands who passed through Christian schools as students or staff during the period. The Japanese documents mention no participation among church congregations. Indeed Kim Ku's thought reflects no specific Christian inspiration and his position was "Christian" mainly by association. His writings betray an interest in Christianity that derived solely from ulterior motives: God was nothing if he was not a supporter of Korean nationalism. Some divergence between his and An Ch'ang-ho's approaches was inevitable for An deliberately related his reconstruction programme to Christian


13. See Kim Ku, "Na ùi sowŏn", in Song Kŏn-ho (Compiler), Kim Ku, pp.9-18. Here Kim makes the most explicit appeal imaginable to the god of nationalism.
doctrines, and in later years they were hardly in the same stream. If Yun Ch'ì-ho's views are placed against Kim's the divergence becomes a chasm. Among the Protestant churches and many of their nationalist leaders inside Korea - Cho Man-sik, Yi Sang-jae, Shin Hùng-u and Namgung Ōk—the approach of An Ch'ang-ho and Yun Ch'i-ho was still accepted as the authentic Christian one.

The Reconstructive Community inside Korea

In direct contrast to the centralising activities of the Residency-General and later the Government-General, the missions had encouraged through the Nevius Method and their implicit political views, administrative autonomy and local self-support among the churches. The emphasis on personal liberty, respect for impartiality in legal cases, resistance to unlawful seizure of property and illegal taxation, especially in north-western provinces, had contributed to the development of what Yi Man-yöl terms "autonomy-consciousness". The 1907-1908 Great Revival, far from being over in 1910, was just then beginning to show its more long-term fruits, and the evangelistic "Million Movement" of 1910 was pursued in the expectation that a time of severe trial for the nation was imminent. In the circumstances, evangelism amounted to recruiting members for an organisation opposed to the Japanese colonial philosophy of assimilation. In this light Mr. Yi observes that the extent to which missionaries "directly and indirectly inspired in the Koreans the spirit of independence ... is incalculable."

14. Yi Man-yöl, Hanmal Kidokkyo wa Minjok Undong, pp.81-86.
By intensifying the awareness of national loss, the annexation influenced many Koreans to regard the Christian church in a special way. According to Mr. G. Lak-geoon Paik, at that time one of the rising generation of Christian youth, loss of nationhood encouraged many to depend on the Protestant church and look to it as the substitute for the state. This involved an important transfer of loyalties. The highest value in Korean life had been a filial piety whose apogee was loyalty to the monarch. This orientation had already been relativised by the late nineteenth-century Christian reformers, and with the loss of both emperor and nationhood the people were compelled to search among themselves for identity. Mr. Paik perceives this as a transfer of loyalties to the people, whereby the idea of a nation-state replaced the monarchy and serving the state meant serving "the people". Since many of the most active leaders were Christians, Christianity was regarded as "for the people", and the Christians who had fled abroad were expected to return in due course to take up leadership of a new Korea.

This development influenced the Christian community to strengthen its internal solidarity, a movement further encouraged by Government-General harassment and persecution. The gulf between the highly educated Christians and the rural and lower-class lay adherents narrowed even further as they joined in the common purpose of promoting principles

18. ibid. Hugh Cynn, op cit, p.138, makes the same point.
of democracy and self-reliance through the spiritual enrichment of "the people".

If because of the discontinuity of Korean state life the Protestant church became a repository of national ideals and aspirations, it does not necessarily follow that these were themselves "Christian". But at this stage the focus was on ideals of societal relationships which were considered to be Christian and of universal application. Korean Christian intellectuals were convinced that there was an integral connexion between their beliefs and democratic values. Referring to the self-government of the Korean churches, Chŏng Han-kyŏng (Henry Chung) declared without qualification that "Christianity from time immemorial has sown the seed of democracy". Shin Hŭng-u (Hugh Cynn) believed that Christianity implicitly inspired democratic sentiment in Korea. He noted a distinct relationship between the rise in the number of Christians and interest in democratic thought, citing the influence of hospitals and churches in breaking down class and sex segregation and the egalitarian ideas disseminated through the schools. Shin observed further that the schools served as important links between Christian and non-Christian communities as the organs through which Christianity introduced a universalistic ethic to the people at large and thereby turned the eyes of the Hermit People toward new social and political values.

What were these "new" values? Some have been raised already: civic ethics, stewardship, and service of one's fellow-citizen in lieu


20. Hugh Cynn, p.129.

21. *ibid*, pp.139-142. Yŏ Un-hyŏng claimed this role for Christianity also: *GGPAB*, Kōkei No.684, 15 January 1920: Kokugai jōhō, "Dokuritsu seigansho teishutsu ni kansuru ken."
of absolute obedience to the monarch. Since after 1910 it was no longer possible to voice "dangerous thoughts" explicitly, the values had to be implicit in the teaching and theological principles of the Protestant churches and schools. Here, two broad areas emerge: the structure of the church as a community and the emphasis on individual conscience.

The pattern of social relationships within the church communities served as the "plausibility structure" of their values and beliefs. According to a rare study of sermon contents, it was taught that all believers, regardless of social background, education or possessions, held the same system of values, among which was the principle that all members equally were responsible for making decisions on issues held in common. This principle had particular appeal in a Confucian society. Yim Louise, a pioneer in women's rights and education, recalled that experience of the application of this principle marked a turning point in her life. As a high-school pupil in 1915, Yim was introduced to Rev. Kim In-jun of Chŏnju: "He spoke to me as an equal. It was the first time I had been addressed like this by any Korean man." Inspired, Yim started prayer-meetings among Korean women and founded "cell-groups" in which women began deliberating on their role in national and social affairs.


The inviolability of the individual conscience is expressed in the distinctive Protestant doctrine of the "Priesthood of all believers" and is implicit in the main Presbyterian textbook for members at the time, the *Westminster Confession of Faith*. This doctrine was basic to the voluntary composition of the community and permitted freedom in all major decisions such as choice of marriage partner, vocation and even subordinate articles of faith. It encouraged acceptance of limited social pluralism, which was obviously opposed to Japanese colonial policy, and was regarded as the basis of democratic sentiment. Equally important, the doctrine helped Koreans to imagine each other's existence as simultaneously a horizontal, temporal community and a transcendental communion of faith. For their horizontal relationship was grounded in the belief that each individual believer was vertically linked to God.

Mr. G. Paik recalls two further fundamental tenets which were believed by the Protestant community to be essential to genuine social and political reform: monotheism and the image of God in humanity. God was not only one and supreme, he was moral; God not only created humans, he formed them in his own likeness. These principles were the basis of the Korean Christians' concern for human rights and belief in inherent human dignity, the basis, they were certain, of democracy. The Christianity, democracy and strength of the West were not accidentally but organically joined in history, and

therefore the Christian community was regarded as the cradle of the
democratic Korea of the future.

Doubtless the distinction between the supernatural and the mundane
in monotheism, which distinguishes God from the world of creation,
was very radical in the Korean setting as it had been for Uchimura
Kanzō in Japan. 27 Doubtless too, the conception of the one God's
omnipotence being inextricably bound up in his "holiness" was all
the more conducive to reflection on the nature of society when humanity
was thought to possess at least the remnants of God's image. 28 Yet it
would be forcing a neat conclusion for the sake of logical nicety to
claim that the Korean church was onto the absolute transcendence of
the Puritans' or Kierkegaard's concept of God. The Korean Christian
philosopher Mr. Han T'ae-dong identifies the failure of Korean
Christianity to appreciate fully the distinction between God and
created humanity as its basic flaw. 29 The same view may have lain
behind Yun Ch'i-ho's complaint in 1945 that Koreans were still not
ready for democracy, 30 though both cases reflect the lingering
differences between the intellectuals and the semi-literate adherents.
For though few Korean Christians may have attained what Weber described

28. In Protestant theology there are various traditions on the meaning
of the "Fall" - Lutheran, Reformed, Anglican, Wesleyan, Brethren,
nonconformist and so on. Most, including Reformed and Wesleyan,
subscribe to the concept of a remnant of God's image surviving
the Fall, the Methodists more positively than the Presbyterians.
See Gerrit C. Berkouwer, Man: the Image of God, Michigan, Eerdmans,
1969.
29. Han T'ae-dong, Interview, Seoul, 10 June 1980.
30. Yun Ch'i-ho, "An Old Man's Ruminations (I)", 15 October 1945,
Letters.
as the "inner isolation of the individual", the church community knew what it meant to respect the individual conscience and drew their egalitarian ideals from it. For this reason many joined the church in 1910-1911, although some left during the gruelling Conspiracy Case. 31

The Christian schools, which were mostly boarding schools, were at least as important as the churches in providing the "plausibility structures" of Protestant ideals and more important as vehicles of self-reconstruction thought. Though Taesōng College was closed down during the Conspiracy Case, Yi Sung-hun's Osan College in Chǒngju remained open and resisted pressures to register under the new education laws after 1915. While Yi was in jail the school was run by Lee Kwang-su and Cho Man-sik who had returned from studying Law at Meiji University in 1913. The following national figures taught or studied at Osan College during this period: Sŏ Ch'un, Kim To-t'ae, Kim Chi-hwan, Chu Ki-ch'ŏl, Han Kyǒng-jik, Ham Sŏk-hŏn and of course, Cho, Lee and Yi Sung-hun. Han Kyǒng-jik claims Cho had a decisive influence on pupils, who left the school deeply imbued with the values of autonomy and mental, moral and physical training. 32 Like the Songdo compound before Yun Ch'i-ho's arrest, Osan College was promoted as a pilot scheme for national reconstruction and was founded on the principles of the former Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe.


The Han-Yŏng College "Songbook Incident", which the Government-General had used to persuade the school to register under the new education laws, was not an isolated affair. In December 1916 Japanese detectives discovered that teachers were disseminating "seditious" songs and teaching from banned textbooks as far afield as Onch'ŏn School in the Köngsŏng district of North Hamgyŏng Province. Among the textbooks confiscated were works by Chang To-bin who was then considering a contract to teach at Osan College. Songbooks identical or similar to the Han-Yŏng editions were next discovered in schools in Kangwŏn, North Kyŏngsang and South Hamgyŏng Provinces. Early in 1918 police raided the home of a teacher at the Presbyterian Kwangson School in Hwanghae Province and seized a number of essays which his students had written on the responsibility of citizens to prevent Japan from realising her aim of "extinguishing" the Korean race within fifty years. By 1919 there had spread among private Christian schools a network of resistance to assimilation.

One of the few sources of information in Korean on the Protestant community from 1910 to 1918 is the Shinhan Minbo which was published in San Francisco in America. Because Koreans in America were inclined to regard their compatriots inside Korea with condescension, removed as
they were from the harshly limiting political environment there, even these reports are often less than illuminating. Nevertheless it was universally accepted that the progress of the church was vital to the future of the nation, and letters and reports from Korea were sometimes printed in detail.

Early letters smuggled out of Korea painted a desperate picture of the inexorable advance of the Japanese shadow over all aspects of life. One received in June 1913 described the intensification of Christian persecution accompanying the Conspiracy Case and pleaded with Koreans abroad to stay there and seek some way of restoring independence, for all paths inside Korea were blocked. But a later letter printed in August 1913 claimed that patriotic sentiment was growing daily and merely asked Koreans in America to concentrate on achieving unity. By October the same year, as many relatives of believers suffering persecution began to join the church also, the tone became positive, and the church was portrayed as the "foundation on which our race will obtain unbounded blessings and joy". "The religious spirit of the people is steadily progressing," reads another report; "their courage is being strengthened, their civic spirit is developing ... ." In the end, it was said, the Conspiracy Case only added prestige to the church and harmed the reputation of Japan.

37. *ibid*, 15 August 1913.
38. *ibid*, 3 October 1913.
40. *ibid*, 8 August 1913. This was before the education controversy. Observations of church morale by Koreans in Japan after 1916 were less positive. See below, p.201.
In March-April 1914 there occurred a "revival" among Christians in P'yŏngyang which prompted renewed efforts to spread Christianity in Korea and whose effects began to surface in 1915. A report published in September 1915 suggests that the church had regained its confidence after the failure of Japanese efforts to crush its influence:

Compared to several years ago, our people have progressed remarkably .... If the Church of Christ becomes fully established there will be no need ever again to call into question of the Koreans' level [of enlightenment] .... In terms of the world of spirit, our people are definitely alive, not dead. They possess an independent, no longer a slavish, character.

The P'yŏngyang revival stimulated considerable interest in the Christian Bible throughout Korea. The Korean Bible Society reported that in 1917 it "had an average of more than 150 Korean colporteurs at work throughout the year, and they sold 660,000 books - most of them Gospels." The colporteurs were more than travelling salesmen. In an unobtrusive but evidently effective way they formed a team of evangelists who penetrated regions otherwise beyond the reach of the churches. The Rev. F.G. Vesey of the Bible Society recorded that the colporteur's travels take him:

41. Shearer, p.62; Shinhan Minbo, 7 May 1914.

42. Cho Tŭk-rin, "Han'guk hyŏnshi chŏnghwang", Shinhan Minbo, 16 September 1915.

... along the high road to big towns and country seats, or over the mountain passes and rough hill-paths to villages and hamlets scattered here and there. He visits the markets, meets the crowds gathered to barter and sell ... and he goes from house to house in sparsely populated places, speaking heart to heart with the lonely farmer ...." 44

The Bible was full of political implications to Protestant nationalists, and the colporteurers became involved in activities of which Rev. Vesey was unaware. "To me the Bible and the whole Christian religion pointed the road to freedom from the Japanese and to a better life with peace for all mankind," wrote Yim Louise. "God never meant slavery to be the destiny of man." 45 In Ch'ŏnan, South Ch'ungch'ŏng Province, Yim came across a colporteur who carried leaflets from Christians in Seoul concerning the creation of an underground network early in 1918. She informed him of her own and nine other cell-groups in southern areas and so became linked up with the secret network. 46 It was this network, serviced by colporteurers, which enabled the Protestant churches to distribute copies of the Declaration of Independence and prepare for the March First Movement with such speed and total secrecy that the Japanese initially refused to believe that the operation was carried out without substantial missionary involvement.

44. ibid.

45. Yim Louise, op cit, pp.93 and 100.

46. ibid, pp.100-101. Yim also acknowledges the work of colporteurers in distributing educational material throughout the peninsula: p.85.
The rising tide of confidence also encouraged some ministers to focus in their sermons on the actions of Moses and Nehemiah in leading and rebuilding the Jewish nation. But the authorities had not relaxed in their efforts to contain the faith. The exhausting education controversy was fully under way, and the increased boldness of the churches provoked even stricter scrutiny and obstruction of their activities from 1916. The Protestants had to adopt great caution lest they fell for "Japanese provocations" and filled the "waiting prisons". Yet it was understood that the authorities recognised the strength of purpose of the church, and the people were cautiously jubilant that the Government-General had failed in its designs against it.

The Reconstructive Community in Exile

The tendency to regard the church as a substitute for the lost state was even stronger among the émigré Protestant communities than in Korea. The political focus also was understandably more obvious. In north America and Hawaii the Korean National Association was founded and largely directed by Christian nationalists, while An Ch'ang-ho founded the Hŭngsadan (not to be confused with Yu Kil-jun's earlier organisation of the same name) in 1913 with the object of developing a

47. "Koguk ch'in'gu haru chŏnyŏk niyagi", part 6, in Shinhan Minbo, 22 June 1916.

specific community embodying self-reconstruction ideals. In Japan the Korean churches and Y.M.C.A. were led by persons of proven "patriotic" credentials such as Cho Man-sik, Kim Chŏng-sik and the Rev. Chu Kong-sam. Yŏ Un-hyang and Yi Tong-hwi requested the churches in Korea to send out pastors to form church communities as a means of preserving the Koreans' sense of national identity. Significantly, it was Christian ministers rather than leaders of nationalist societies who were requested: the church was the nationalist society.

Among the exile communities where the choices were not so limited, differences over means were pronounced and in part geographically determined. On Korea's northern borders where life was difficult and the number of exiles large (about one million by 1917), proximity to the homeland encouraged preparations for direct, military action. In the United States of America where Koreans were comparatively few, well-fed and distant from Korea, the gradualist approach of advancing knowledge and expertise in commerce, industry, modern political systems and theology was more popular. By the same token, the territories which nationalists chose for exile usually reflected their nationalist allegiances.

Self-reconstruction nationalism was therefore strongest in the United States of America. Chŏng Yŏ-sang, an officer of the San Francisco Korean National Association, informed friends on his return to Korea in November 1915 that the movement in America was centered on the churches and attributed the greater political success of the Association in America than elsewhere to the predominance of "followers of Yun Ch'i-ho". 49

49. GGPAB, Keikō kishu No.23727-1, 20 November 1915: "Yōchūi Senjin no kikan." (GSC, Vol.1, p.5.)
Lee Kwan-yong, leader of a large nationalist organisation linked with Koreans in Peking, Nanking, Shanghai and San Francisco, told interrogators in August 1918 that whilst a pupil of Taesŏng College from 1906 to 1910 he had "frequently attended lectures by Yun Ch'i-ho, principal, and An Ch'ang-ho, a teacher, on the protection and preservation of the Fatherland and the establishment of national rights." After annexation Lee studied at Sungshil College before travelling to San Francisco to discuss independence strategy with An Ch'ang-ho. He then journeyed to China in December 1914 to make contact with Shin Ch'ae-ho and Yi Tong-hwi and propose a scheme to achieve ideological unity on the basis of An's long-term approach of cultivating "real power" (實力), "sound character" (健全人格) and "unity" (統一). Unity was not achieved, and re-creation of national character remained largely the concern of Koreans in America and of groups loyal to An Ch'ang-ho elsewhere.

The American community saw in their freedom opportunity to realise in miniature the ideal pattern of society for the future Korean nation. In a speech delivered at the main Korean church in San Francisco in May 1913 An Ch'ang-ho berated those who failed to appreciate that the reason patriots inside Korea were achieving rather little was that the police, gendarmes and troops were spread everywhere "like a great spider's web". Their proper response was not to despise their suffering brethren but to act on the knowledge that the fate of the National

Association was the fate of Korea, for with its decisive advantages over émigré communities elsewhere it was the source of Korea's "motive power". 51

An Ch'ang-ho believed this "motive power" depended on "stepping intrepidly through the gate of righteousness; and the way through this gate of righteousness is belief in Jesus Christ, shouldering the Cross, and treading the path of moral uprightness." 52 This meant discarding the wrongs and weaknesses that had left Korea defenseless before foreign predation and reconstructing as the first stage a new spiritual and moral framework. The Shinhan Minbo supported this view in editorials and articles. Thoughts bear fruit, "so one obtains 'paradise' when noble thoughts are cherished and suffers ruin when contemptible thoughts are harboured. This is a truth revealed by the Holy Spirit and is the true teaching of the sages." 53 Since Koreans had had a habit of "bowing the knee to China in the morning and the head to Russia in the evening", the annexation was hardly exceptional. The blame could not be laid at the feet of monarch or government or "country-sellers" alone: the tragedy lay on the conscience of all "twenty million Koreans". They had no courage or perseverance, and primarily it was the "callous unconcern of the people that opened [the door] to Terauchi Masatake's militaristic policy". 54


52. An Ch'ang-ho, "Illyu üi haengbok", 7 August 1914, in ibid, 13 August 1914.

53. ibid, 26 March 1914. Editorial.

54. Kang Yong-so, "Happyông üi wönin", ibid, 10 September 1914. cf. letter in ibid, 13 May 1915.
The new moral framework was self-reliance founded on civic responsibility. From 16 September 1915 the *Shinhān Minbo* printed its aims on the top of the front page, of which one read: "To strive unceasingly to quicken the public's sense of civic duty."

So important was this principle, that an editorial on the subject in April 1917 concluded that: "The resurrection of the twenty million Koreans lies solely in this civic morality." So important was this principle, that an editorial on the subject in April 1917 concluded that: "The resurrection of the twenty million Koreans lies solely in this civic morality." The belief that the nation was first and foremost a matter of morality was spelt out in April and May 1916 by Kil Ch'ŏn-u as the "Theory of National Reform" (民族改良論):

The basic purpose, as is well known, of those enterprising people presently engaged in projects committed to the fields of religion, education, politics or industry, is simply to inform the people's minds, improve their physiques and thereby create useful persons. Hence the most pressing and important problem in our present social policy is reform of the people .... It is impossible to establish a sacred national structure and a virtuous society without reforming the citizens in whom resides that nation's and that society's energy ....

Bearing an important relation with social planning, 'reform of the people' - that is, reforming the faults of the citizens, the components of society - involves studying ways to reform humanity in all its aspects: biological, anthropological, sociological, psychological, hygienic and educational.

The influence of utilitarian ethical philosophy via American evangelicalism on this "Theory of National Reform" is evident in its reference to social planning and its holistic approach to reform. J.S. Mill had argued the consensus of all social phenomena:

56. *ibid*, 6 April 1916.
"There is no social phenomenon which is not more or less influenced by every other part of the condition of the same society, and therefore by every cause which is influencing any other of the ... social phenomena." Once the laws or causes of social phenomena are understood, it becomes possible to "surround any given society with the greatest possible number of circumstances of which the tendencies are beneficial, and to remove or counteract ... those of which the tendencies are injurious". The Koreans adapted this to their own religious viewpoint. Human nature was conceived of as a composite of evil characteristics inherited from Adam and Eve - sickness of body and mind, criminal instincts, etc. - and good properties presumably granted when humankind was created. Reform of the people therefore required attention to both aspects, "to destroy this hereditary evil and so to pursue reforms that [people] will follow their good [inclinations]."

An Ch'ang-ho identified lack of national unity as the most serious consequence of the process of enfeeblement of the people's spirit under the Chosŏn dynasty, alongside fatal neglect through

57. This and the previous quotation are taken from J.S. Mill, *A System of Logic*, Book VI, chapter 9, §2. Mill did, however, state there were different kinds of causes; and he insisted that individual phenomena and their causes "must be studied apart." - *ibid*, Book VI, chapter 9, §3. Kil Ch'ŏn-u's article seems to follow Mill here, but there was a tendency among some of the Christians to think that all causes were spiritual. See above, p.83.

self-indulgence of the practical foundations of viable statehood. Other peoples had long recognised that unity was inseparable from survival, but Koreans failed to realise this and "so we lost what is a people's grandest organisation - the nation". Since then various bodies had sprung up but had disappeared of themselves or through persecution. The only body remaining as a united national group was the Korean National Association, but even this was threatened by the old evils of parochialism and individualism which were causing diffusion of its energies and influence.59 As President of the National Association, An toured Hawaii in August-September 1915 to convince compatriots of the absolute necessity of a united national movement, at a time when a serious rift was developing there between Syngman Rhee and Pak Yong-man.

Quick solutions were a threat to unity, and An Ch'ang-ho insisted on a "national evolutionary process", on "taking justice and humanity as our standard and rising one rung at a time".60 Like a recent English historian, An seems to have believed that democracy derives not from events like the French Revolution so much as from "a slow growth of reasonableness" among citizens. "Gradualism" was not just a tactic or temporary phase, it was to be understood as a realistic perception of the dynamics of life itself, attunement with which was essential to generating genuine and lasting strength and quality. So although An called for unity, he warned against a type of "union-ism" (共同主義) which ignored its true roots - the sound formation of

59. ibid, 8 July 1915.
60. An Ch'ang-ho, "Uri kungmin ūi chinhwa ūi shunshō" (Los Angeles), ibid, 22 January 1916.
individual members\textsuperscript{61} - and reminded National Association members that without such training their children would resemble cattle more than well-endowed, responsible citizens.\textsuperscript{62}

In a stirring speech delivered to the Los Angeles branch of the National Association in June 1916, An Ch'ang-ho gave vivid expression to the Korean Protestant community's self-consciousness as the new and future Korea. Pointing out that Koreans like himself who had left Korea before annexation still retained passports as Koreans, An commented:

> On the face of it, this is because there was no opportunity ... to obtain travel documents from the Japanese Government, but viewed from another angle, it signifies that [the Americans] ... look upon us as the image of Korea. This then is our task: to bear upon our backs the shapeless form of Korea and to increase the overall strength and influence of the National Association so it can act as spokesperson and advocate for this as yet unformed nation till it realises the object of restoring its physical form.\textsuperscript{63}

Another group of nationalists who developed self-reconstruction ideology and who were well-placed to influence movements in Korea was the Christian student community in Japan. The students were not exiles as such but formed an important part of the Korean diaspora. Cho Man-sik had left Korea in June 1908 for study in Tokyo where he was joined by other Christians including Chŏn Yong-t'aek, Paek Nam-hun, No Chŏng-il and Kim Sŏng-su. By 1915 there were

\textsuperscript{61} ibid, 22 June 1916. (The English historian is Sir Herbert Butterfield.)

\textsuperscript{62} An Ch'ang-ho, speech delivered in Los Angeles in June 1916, ibid, 15 June 1916.

\textsuperscript{63} ibid, 15 June 1916.
approximately 480 mainly private Korean students in Tokyo, and in 1916 the Hakuhoe (學友會), formed in 1912, encompassed seven branches: five in Tokyo and one each in Kyoto and Osaka. Cho Man-sik returned to Korea in 1913, but by then several more influential Korean Protestants had joined the Tokyo students. Under Lee Kwang-su, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, Song Chin-u, Song Kye-baek, Paek Kwan-su, Chang Tŏk-su and others, the Hakuhoe espoused liberal democracy and became the main organ of Korean nationalism in Japan.

The nation responsible for their colonial status became, when host, almost a haven for Korean students. From 1915 there arose amongst Japanese students, professors, journalists and some politicians what has been termed the "mass awakening": a movement for Japan's reconstruction along liberal democratic lines. Pre-eminent among the leaders of this awakening was Professor Yoshino Sakuzō of Tokyo University who was well-known as a Christian and a contributor to the Chūō Koron. Korean students were greatly inspired by Yoshino's speeches and his book on democracy (1916) in which he advocated a fully representative parliament directed to the common welfare of all.

The Koreans found another ally in the student law society in Tokyo, the Shinjinkai, which under Professor Minobe Tatsukichi openly favoured Korean independence by 1918.

While the Koreans drew theoretical support from the independent Japanese scholars who formed the Reimeikai, it was the Japanese students' impassioned energy that was reflected in the fervent speeches and debates of the Hakuhoe. Even so, the Koreans' speeches were much more strongly marked by the influence of Christianity than those of the Japanese students. Alongside appeals to democracy, Korea's independence was closely linked to the fortunes of Christianity in Korea. Chôn Yong-t'aek argued that the religious history of Korea could be stated generally in terms of Buddhism and Confucianism and their decline. When Christianity, a global religion, was introduced to Korea it took hold rapidly and there was new hope for the nation. But the present (1917) outlook was dismal because of the major setback the church had received through the Conspiracy Case and similar acts of oppression. The Rev. Kim Nok-jun also lamented the weakened state of the Korean church but added:

Even though at first sight the church back in Korea seems weak it actually possesses considerable latent power, and as for adherents, their number amounts to as many as 200,000 people. At any rate, the progress of Christianity in Korea is the most noteworthy item.

Sō Ch'un, later a teacher at Osan College, actively supported the view that Korea's future lay in the propagation of Christianity among the people. The Korean Y.M.C.A. in Tokyo held welcome receptions for students as they arrived in Japan, in which the students were

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68. Chôn Yong-t'aek, "Chosen Kitokkyo no koko oyobi genjō", Kanda Y.M.C.A., 30 October 1917. This and the following speeches are published in GSC, Vol.2, pp.1-18.


70. Sō Ch'un "Chosen to Yaso Kyōkai", Tokyo Y.M.C.A., 29 December 1917.
urged to emulate the Christian church's "clear aims" and "dedication to final objectives". The "common aim" recommended to students was "to build a new Korea".

Between 1915 and October 1918 the Christian students generally argued the need to cultivate self-reliance, real strength and ability and civic responsibility, while Lee Kwang-su especially, in his writings, promoted a gradual, cultural self-reconstruction programme which was almost identical to that of An Ch'ang-ho. But as Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of national self-determination reached them in late 1918, their speeches became suddenly militant and called for immediate independence. Sŏ Ch'un warned that reliance on the allies alone was mistaken and urged Koreans to seek independence through their own strength. In January 1919 he and nine other Protestant students formed the committee that organised the February Eighth Tokyo Students' Declaration of Independence, the forerunner of the March First Movement in Korea.

71. Tokyo Y.M.C.A. Welcome speeches, 26 September and 26 October 1918.

72. e.g. Song Kye-baek, speech at Kanda Y.M.C.A., 17 November 1917; Yi Pyŏng-hwa, "Seimei to Keizai", Tokyo Y.M.C.A., 3 April 1916; Song Chiu-u, "Genjō no daiza to seinen no tokushoku", Tokyo Y.M.C.A., 9 April 1915.

73. See below, p.235.

74. Sŏ Ch'un, "Kamisama no shintai nansho o ronjite seibutsu tetsugaku ni oyobu", Hakuhoe oratorical meeting, Tokyo Y.M.C.A., 22 November 1918.
Conclusion: Religious Visions and Imagined Communities

If the promotion of civic morality and a programme of thorough human reconstruction premised on the belief that life was fundamentally moral and spiritual were Christian contributions, the annexation of August 1910 added an ineluctable item to the nationalist agenda which Christianity clearly did not supply. For "recovery of national rights" could not be separated conceptually or materially from the expulsion (or exit) of Japan. The Protestants' adoption in Korea and America especially of gradual reconstruction was an attempt to cope with the tension between "Christian" and "nationalistic" objectives. Inculcating the spirit of Christianity in the people was a Christian, "cosmic" objective, and the expectation that this would right wrongs, bring peace and create a free community was the "Good News" of Christianity. In this way the Protestants could offer a course which, while transcending the expulsion of Japan as an immediate objective, could include it nevertheless as a consequence inherently bound up with the Korean people's active adherence to their faith.

The presentation of this solution was, however, open to other interpretation, and it needed only a small over-emphasis on the consequences to turn the tension into a contradiction. In a discussion of the benefits of Christianity in Korea in 1917, for example, Lee Kwang-su dealt solely with elements of a supposedly "new civilisation" that looks very much like Western civilisation. Doubtless Lee was limiting himself to identifying certain desirable developments which he believed flourished within a Christian atmosphere; but the impression
is given that Korea's strength is the chief value. Lee also composed the Tokyo Student's Declaration of Independence, Appeal and Resolution of 8 February 1917. The resolution concluded with a threat of an "eternal, bloody war" between Korea and Japan. Since Lee's position in the early 1920's differs quite dramatically from the above line and his later writings reveal serious thought on the appropriate modus operandi of a Christian movement for change, it is possible Lee's expression in the Resolution was only tactical. But he was disappointed with Yun Ch'i-ho after the latter's release in 1915 because he had expected Yun to be more politically and openly opposed to Japan.

75. Lee Kwang-su, "Yasokyo üi Chos'on e chun ünhye", July 1917, in Lee Kwang-su Chonjip (11 vols), Seoul, Ushin sa, 1979, Vol.10, pp.17-19. Lee praised Christianity as a light-bearer, the source of the silhak scholar Tasan's enlightenment and the inspirer of high morality, democratic values and respect for women. But certain tendencies disturbed him, and these he outlined in December 1917. Lee's discussion of the "faults" of Korean Christianity concerned the survival of traditional religious habits which he called "superstitions", and in the main indicate that he expected Christianity to serve the interests of liberal democracy and high culture: "Kumil Chos'on Yaso Kyohoe üi Kyoljjŏm", in ibid, Vol.10, pp.20-24. Hereafter: Lee Kwang-su Works.


77. Lee Kwang-su, "Kūrisŭto üi hyŏngmyŏng sasang", Ch'ŏngnyŏn, Vol.11, No.1, January 1931. Lee's position is discussed in some detail below in chapters 6 and 7.

It is worth noting that the same tension pervaded Japanese Christianity from the Meiji era on. A passage in Uchimura Kanzō's published *Diary* reveals that he perceived a contradiction between faith and utilitarianism:

The new faith was accepted more for utilitarian purposes, such as a happy home, free government, etc., than for its intrinsic spiritual worth. "To make my country as strong as Europe or America," was the prime aim of my life, and I welcomed Christianity, as I thought it a great engine for carrying out this design. And how many do still accept it for its socio-political reasons! But now the love of country was to be sacrificed for the love of heaven, that the former might be restored to me in its truest and highest significance.79

Yun Ch'i-ho essentially agreed with Uchimura's perspective. On his release from Taegu prison in 1915 Yun delivered a speech at the Seoul Central Y.M.C.A. which was attended by an overflow crowd. In the course of the speech, which treated subjects such as the importance of methodical reading habits, Yun declared: "Rash, imprudent behaviour can yield no gain. It is strength alone that will save Korea, and strength derives from the youth cultivating themselves morally and mentally; and again after that, from perseverance in education and industry."80

Yun's speech was received with disappointment by many activists abroad but not, significantly, by An Ch'ang-ho.81 There was some


80. This quotation of Yun's speech is from Lee Kwang-su, *op cit*, p.9.

awareness of the need to respect the tension between faith and nationalism among Koreans in America. Kim Hyŏn-gu, a student at Cornell University, affirmed that the expansion of Christianity in Korea was "our only hope and joy". But where Lee Kwang-su was concerned the faith would lose its political impact through diversion into "superstitious" activities, Kim was anxious lest it be distracted from its true spiritual purpose by short-term political schemes or by confusing it with Western learning. Kim spoke critically of anti-intellectualism and failure to apply Christian beliefs in the present but he perceived the greatest danger to Christian progress lay in using it for mundane success: "If one borrows the name of 'believer' in order to do some work outside religion, not only is such a contrivance fraudulent but its object cannot thus be attained. The only result will be harm to oneself, society or race." Like Uchimura, Kim urged belief in Christianity for its own sake and warned against using it to cover one's motives with an appearance of spirituality.\(^{82}\)

Some Koreans were eager to reduce the tension altogether, however. Uchimura's sacrifice of love of country to love of heaven had no point to those Koreans in America who took it for granted that, "one who loves his country is one whom God loves".\(^{83}\) Their nation was, as Mr. Anderson expresses it, conceived of as "inherently limited and sovereign" as a matter of course and was to be kept that way. The Koreans' "duty, glory and reasonable service", went one obvious

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82. Kim Hyŏn-gu, "Uri nara Yesukyo paldal e taehan kippŭm gwa kŏkjŏng", Shinhan Minbo, 7 January 1915.

83. ibid, 18 July 1913.
Biblical paraphrase, was "to keep intact this land until we return to God .... If we wish to love our country and tend the land of promise God has granted to us, then we must first be baptised in the blood of fervent patriotism and drink of the waters of patriotic zeal."84

The latter position was rather extreme, and the most popular justification of Christian nationalism was the symbolic identification of the Korean race with ancient Israel and the Protestant church as the remnant community that would bring about restoration. This identification also provided the conceptual link between the Protestant community and the nation-state. In 1908 the Methodist Yang Ju-sam had already expressed the idea: "It is Christianity that will save Korea's twenty millions from their sins and restore freedom to our citizens; and it is Christianity that will rescue our Taehan race from the hands of the enemy just as the children of Israel were delivered from Egypt."85 The idea gained added appeal after the annexation. An editorial in the Shinhan Minbo in September 1913 linked patriotic statements from the Old Testament during the Babylonian exile with the release of the Israelite remnant to rebuild Jerusalem.86

A series of studies on Nehemiah's nation-building activities appeared in the same newspaper in April-May 1916. Another contributor claimed Koreans were a holy race like the Jews and would be led to their own

84. ibid, 18 July 1913.


86. Shinhan Minbo, 5 September 1913. Editorial.
Canaan if they turned from their culpable past neglect of stewardship of their nation's abundant natural and human resources.  

The belief was not limited to Koreans in America. In a letter to National Association members in America, Yi Tong-hwi mentioned his delight in finding thousands of Koreans in China, Manchuria and Siberia who were revering God and putting their whole beings into education and other beneficial enterprises, never letting go of their hope of freeing Korea. Yi commented: "Beloved brothers, we are a nation sacrificed to God like Israel of old. Wherever we may go, we must make this [self-sacrifice] our proper service [to God]."  

Across in Tokyo, a Korean student observed in a speech at the Korean Y.M.C.A. that: "The situation in the Korean peninsular is truly wretched, bearing close resemblance to that of the Israelites of Judea; and there is no way to save her except through Christianity."  

Just how literally this identification of modern Korea with ancient Israel was taken is difficult to discover. The parallel was certainly taken very seriously, along with the inference that God would deliver Korea from Japan. Among the persecuted Protestants inside Korea the symbolism had considerable potency. Events in Jewish history became favourite themes for drama in Christian schools. Yim Louise recalls the sense of contemporaneity with ancient Israel she experienced while playing the part of Queen Esther:

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87. *ibid*, 29 April 1914. Letter to the Editor.


As I walked on the stage and looked out at the audience of girls and parents, I was transformed. The words I had rehearsed so carefully took on new meaning. They seemed to fit the present as well as the past. When I pleaded with King Ahasuerus to save the Hebrews, the words became a plea for Korea. And the meaning of my lines ... was clearly understood by the audience.  

The identification was a symbol of the Protestants’ determination to resist assimilation, which they equated with annihilation, and to work out their own future. The intensified police surveillance and harassment provoked by references to Ezra, Nehemiah and Esther in sermons suggests that both sides were well aware of what was happening.

During the P'yŏngyang revival in 1915, a Korean observed that church members had "discovered" that to enter Heaven one had to walk the thorny paths of this degenerate world and first overcome its evils and find Jerusalem here. The result of this refocusing on earth, he continued, was an influx of people to dawn prayer meetings. These meetings became the concrete symbols of the Korean Protestant community’s objectives on earth. As groups of Koreans prayed side by side they expressed their solidarity. Vertically related to their God, they were horizontally bound together. The transcendent and the immanent were thus related, and the state was to be reconstructed according to their image of a future nation that embodied the transcendental ideals of a Christian civilisation.

90. Yim Louise, pp.55-56.
91. "Koguk ch'ingu ūi haru chŏnyŏk niyagi", part 6, Shinhan Minbo, 22 June 1916.
The termination of World War I, the political principles that governed the negotiations at Versailles, the Tokyo Students' February Eighth Movement and the Korean March First Movement heralded a new era in Protestant self-reconstruction nationalism in Korea. The obvious, tenacious leadership and participation of the Protestant community in the March First Movement had so reinforced its claim to be the restorative "remnant" that one writer has remarked that, "especially when infused with the zeal of Wilsonianism, Christianity seemed to many Koreans to be the wave of the future".  


2. Chosen shireibu chosei, 1 June 1924: "Futei Senjin ni kansuru kisoteki kenkyū", chapter 6, part 1, p.41. (*CMSS*, Vol.6.)
When Henry Chung announced that the March First Movement had opened the Pandora's Box of Korean nationalism, he asserted a broader truth than he realised. There was released in fact a multitude of disparate groups and ideas which settled down by 1923 into several opposed movements. The failure of the liberal-democratic Western nations to support Korean independence at Versailles and the 1921-1922 Washington Conferences and the rise of socialism among Koreans produced a definite ambivalence among Protestants concerning the identification of Christianity with liberal democracy and, by association, with Western culture. As Protestants abroad and in Korea gave allegiance to vastly different programmes the identification with ancient Israel, which depended on unity, began to break down.

Finding themselves in competition not with non-Christian groups but with organisations whose leadership included influential Protestants, self-reconstruction nationalists were anxious to substantiate the Christian origin of their ideals. An Ch'ang-ho, Lee Kwang-su, Song Chin-u and Chang Tōk-su remained committed to liberal democracy but conceded that many specific political options were ethically neutral.

3. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p.301.

4. Curiously, the Korean Christians did not adopt an apocalyptic version of identification with Israel, which would have given it more strength. The focus was on Nehemiah's nation-building activities rather than the visions of Daniel, even though God was supposed to deliver Korea from Japan. The book of Daniel may have posed a problem for Koreans. Daniel became the ruler of the Jews on behalf of King Nebuchadnezzar, which in Korean terms meant, for example, Yun Ch'i-ho taking power on behalf of the Japanese Emperor. The identification with Israel seems to have been present among the lay Protestants throughout 1919-1937, but revived strongly from 1938 during the confrontation over obeisance before "national" Shintō shrines. See the latter section of Lee Kun-sam, op cit.
The Christian responsibility of all was, therefore, to admit that the options were relative - relative to each other but also relative to the task of creating a Christian civilisation in Korea. In such a civilisation social and political debate would be pursued in a climate of mutual respect and the outcome determined in accordance with a central principle of civic morality: the public verdict.

If this suggests adoption of pluralism, it was a pluralism that was considered able to thrive only within unity based on essential social and political values. That these values were to be "spiritual" was axiomatic to the Protestant self-reconstruction nationalists. The pure or absolute pluralism as examined, for example, by Isaiah Berlin⁵ was never contemplated. The denial of exclusive rights to ideologies followed logically on subscription to the absolute value of self-reconstruction as a Christian civilisation. In order to pursue this ideal it was necessary to distinguish "nation" from "state", not only because the latter was Japanese but also because christianisation of the nation was thought to take logical precedence over reorganisation of the state. This scheme was proposed in the context of severe disunity among nationalists and as such became more clearly defined after 1922 when the Protestants found themselves divided in the wake of the March First Movement.

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The Aftermath of the March First Movement

The conspiratorial alliance between the two most influential religions in Korea - Ch'ŏndogyo and Christianity - gave the March First Movement unusual unity, financial backing, the benefit of experience of operating under inimical regimes, foreign contacts and human resources from all classes, men and women. Unlike the Tokyo movement which was limited to students and suppressed immediately, the March First Movement involved within two months up to two million people. Yet it has been suggested that the March First Movement was singularly lacking in any long-term policy or "thesis" and that the Tokyo movement stands in a closer relationship ideologically to the post-1919 movements than its successor. The Christian involvement poses a parallel problem: whereas one can recognise in the Tokyo Christian students' debates many of the arguments of earlier and later

6. The March First Movement was a unique, and as later attempts confirmed, an unrepeatable event. It was not a part of self-reconstruction nationalism and is sufficiently well known not to describe it here. But there is one point to clear up here regarding Christian involvement. I believe Mr. Matsuo is correct in discounting Yamabe Kentarō's depreciation of this involvement. Yamabe considers it "an unfounded popular theory to say that clergymen and influential persons in the Churches led the March First Movement, since the number of clergymen arrested was only 242 compared with the total of 19,529." (Quoted in Matsuo, Part 2, p.584. Lee Chong-sik gives a figure of 244 out of 19,525: pp.115-117.) How many people are required to lead a mass movement? At least 3,428 of the arrested were positively identified as Christians by police and comprised the largest religious group, followed by Ch'ŏndogyo at 2,283. Of the 471 females arrested 309 were Christians. "Official" church involvement was of course contrary to the separation of church and state. Examination of the daily police reports supports the view that without the Christian student action of 5 March, the movement could well have lost momentum at a crucial point. See Kenneth M. Wells, "Korean Independence Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1919-1937. A Study in Nationalism", master's thesis, University of Canterbury, 1979, pp.103-105.

Christian nationalists, one cannot place the "Christian" input to the March movement in this way.

That 16 of the 33 signatories to the March First Declaration of Independence, known as the "Thirty-Three", were Christian (15 were Ch'ŏndogyo and 2 were Buddhist) and included influential figures like Yi Sŭng-hun and the Rev. Kil Sŏn-ju, may be regarded as contingent on the church's experience during the "Dark Ages". But a well-defined "Protestant" position such as existed even as far back as the late 1890s is difficult to find. It would be extraordinary for such a position to have suddenly evaporated, and the nature of the March First Movement itself may account for the omission. Ch'ŏndogyo and Christianity were serious rivals in Korea, their collusion having been achieved through intermediaries, and so both sides forebore taking any line that might upset an alliance which had, in fact, nearly shipwrecked on the eve of the movement during a stormy debate over student involvement. The movement had been planned only one month in advance under the inimical conditions of a police state, to take advantage of the crowds expected to gather in Seoul for the Emperor Kojong's funeral. The movement was designed to demonstrate to the Versailles Conference participants the Korean will for self-determination, for which was demanded above all else an expression of firm national solidarity. It was therefore contrary to its objectives to identify the movement as a "Protestant" or a "Ch'ŏndogyo" cause. If the Buddhist, Han Yong-un, was able to issue an independent statement on the Declaration without

endangering unity, this was probably because Buddhism was not then a
strong contender for nationalist leadership. 9

The haste and circumstances of the planning of the movement did
leave unclear what was to follow on its euphoric rise and unexpectedly
harsh suppression. From Shanghai, nationalists sent an agent to Seoul
to ascertain the mind of the imprisoned leaders only to be instructed
to do as they deemed best. They assumed that some form of democracy
was best, and so the Korean Provisional Government was established as,
if not the brainchild of the "Thirty-three" themselves, the most direct
offspring of their movement. The assumption of democracy was in line
with the political orientation prevailing among the nationalists,
especially Christians, at the time. "Christianity in Korea has been
recognised as the national religion, from which we have learned the
meaning of democracy and the value of liberty," wrote Vasilli
Andreivich Mun, in the Declaration of the Korean National Council of
March 1919 in Nikolsk-Ussurisk. 10  Democracy was explicitly stated in
the Hānsŏng or Seoul draft of the Provisional Government to be the
guiding principle of "Taehan Min'guk" - the Republic of Korea. Even
before the Shanghai or Seoul drafts were publicised, nationalists in
Siberia and North America had composed representative constitutions.

9. Han Yong-un issued a separate statement on the Declaration of
Independence which also appeared in March 1919, a piece of some
5000 words titled "Chosŏn Tongnip ūi Sŏ": Han Yong-un Chŏnjip

10. This document, dated 15 March 1919, is in the United States Records
of the Department of State relating to internal affairs of Korea
(Chosen) 1910-1929, Doc. No. 895.00/606, Microfilm Reel 2.
The unanimous selection of all groups of the Methodist Syngman Rhee to the position of chief executive underscores the widespread commitment to democracy, since Rhee was considered the foremost interpreter of democracy to the Korean people through his "political bible" written in prison from 1899 to 1904. The rejection of Confucian political dogma was so decisive that the Crown Prince Yi dismissed the monarchy and its traditions in his sensational attempt to smuggle himself out of Korea to join the Provisional Government as "simply one Korean among others". 11

Despite this agreement on ends, dissension over means reduced the Provisional Government within three years to a faction-ridden, ineffective institution; after 1922 it could hardly be maintained that there was agreement even on ends. Already by May 1919, the Government was hovering between three strategic courses: diplomatic activity in Europe and the United States; direct, military action against Japan; and a "gradualist" policy of training Koreans at home and abroad in the qualities and means of independence. 12 Lee Kwang-su, now in Shanghai, described the period up to the merger of the Hansŏng and Shanghai constitutions as a "political war", 13 and aggravated by distance the differences among government members and supporting groups were never resolved. An attempt to synthesise the three courses early in 1920 failed, and the alternatives


12. An account of these factions can be found in Lee Chŏng-sik, pp.129-136.

hardened into distinct factions, each led by influential Christians: Syngman Rhee, Yi Tong-hwi and An Ch'ang-ho.

Yi Tong-hwi, a well-known Protestant educator who fled to Khabarovsk in 1912 to escape arrest in the Conspiracy Case, was heavily involved in recruiting and training guerillas in Kirin Province when elected first Premier of the Provisional Government. Syngman Rhee, President, elected to stay in America to direct diplomatic activities with other leading Christians such as Henry Chung and Min Ch'an-ho. Organisation of the government fell to the Acting Premier An Ch'ang-ho, who attempted to reconcile the main factions. His influence waned with Yi Tong-hwi's arrival in September 1919, and by late 1920 the ideal of unity suffered a fateful blow amidst the furore which broke out over Rhee's alleged proposal of a League of Nations mandate over Korea as a step towards independence. Yi vigorously opposed the idea and Rhee was summoned by his cabinet to Shanghai where, on Rhee's arrival in January 1921, Shin Ch'ae-ho especially took him to task for his "treachery". Rhee's proverbial charisma failed him and there ensued a spate of resignations up to May, including Yi, An, Shin and Kim Kyu-sik; all but Shin were Protestants.

The impotence of the Provisional Government by 1921 was blamed variously on parochialism and leadership rivalries, on lack of funds and by Shin Hŭng-u (Hugh Cynn), on the "lack of the sense of compromise".  

15. ibid, pp.152 and 169; Yi Kang-hun, Taehan Min'guk Imshi Chŏngbu Sa, Seoul, Sŏmun mun'go, 1975, p.119.
There was little ground for compromise. The mandate controversy impinged on the question of means. Rhee had earlier held up military preparations against Japan to ridicule, while Henry Chung claimed that the "saner element of the Korean people saw from the beginning the hopelessness of their cause on the field of military combat with Japan." The "direct action" and "diplomatist" factions had little except mutual antagonism in common; only An could mediate and even he fell out with both Yi and Rhee. But even with the mandate issue, it is difficult to account for the inability of Yi, An and Rhee to recognise each other's contribution without considering the problem of leadership, of the historical antagonism between northern and southern provinces. The very notion of a nation-state implies the necessity of force, while no real government would ignore foreign policy or neglect domestic welfare.

The first real ideological complication to occur was the rise of revolutionary socialist thought from 1922. The watershed in both the fortunes of the government and the move towards socialism was the


17. Where a nation is conceived of as a self-limiting, sovereign state (Anderson) or a congruence of cultural nation with political state (Gellner), its integrity obviously must be defended by force should internal and external threats of a military nature arise (Weber). Rhee believed only the U.S. forces were strong enough to expel Japan, whereas Yi wanted Koreans to do it.
refusal of the "democratic" nations to admit consideration of Korea's case in the Washington (Pacific) Conferences of 1921 to 1922. "After the Pacific Conference," a Japanese report noted, "the reputation of the Provisional Government plummeted." The abrupt turn to Moscow by the sorely disillusioned Protestant Kim Kyu-sik, chief campaigner at Versailles, is the most dramatic indicator of this change. But in May 1920, Yi Tong-hwi had already established the Koryŏ Communist Party, and was joined by Yŏ Un-hyŏng who was well-known inside Korea as a former evangelist. Yŏ translated the Communist Manifesto for distribution among Koreans in Manchuria and with Kim Kyu-sik he found a sympathetic reception at the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in 1922. These early Korean socialists were not committed to communism in any exclusivist or strict ideological sense and certainly did not share Lenin's zest for whittling down

18. GGPAB, Kōkei No.1581, 23 May 1922: "Kokumin daihyōkai no keika ni kansuru ken." (CDU, part 3, chapter 1, pp.178-180.)


21. Yŏ, Kim and Yi Tong-hwi were all Protestants and remained so, and as such did not accept the atheistic materialism of the Bolshevik communists. Their followers were evidently not interested at this stage in socialist theory in any rigorous form, but in the idea it might hasten Korean independence. See Choson Shireibu Chosei, 1 June 1924: "Futei Senjin ni kansuru kisoteki kenkyū", chapter 2, part 4, p.7. (CMSS, Vol.6.)
the faithful to a core group of revolutionaries: unity was still a desideratum.

When tendering their resignations on 12 May 1921, both An Ch'ang-ho and Yŏ Un-hyŏng claimed they did so in the interests of restoring unity. Yŏ submitted that the "crisis" in Korean nationalism was caused as much by internal strife as by Japan's suppression. He contrasted the petty vendettas and mutual recriminations rife among the exiles with the pure sacrificial support inside Korea of the Provisional Government and pleaded for a firm, concerted effort. With Yŏ, Shin Ch'ae-ho, Kim Kyu-sik and others, An organised the National Delegates' Conference (Kungmin Taep'yohoe) to promote unity.

An's prescription for this unity shows his adherence to the pre-1919 views of the Protestant community, and contributed to the maintenance of self-reconstruction "orthodoxy" inside Korea during this post-1919 phase. The Provisional Government, An lectured in Shanghai, had been created by the public will but immediately began to operate on systems of personal and group loyalties, appeals to emotion over reason and on currying favours and sowing suspicions in an underhand way - in fact exactly as Yun Ch'i-ho and colleagues had described the sedo politics of the Chosŏn dynasty. Furthermore, the conflict over whether to look to Moscow, the United Kingdom, America or China for support revealed to An the old dependence psychology. The National Delegates' Conference aimed to ensure that

22. Yŏ Un-hyŏng, speech delivered to Delegates' Conference, 12 May 1921, recorded in Tongnip Shinmun, 14 May 1921.

23. ibid, 31 May 1921.

24. ibid, loc cit.
the government returned to the processes of public opinion (公論).
Since it was known by Koreans in Russia, America, China and even in Cheju Island, the Provisional Government already existed as the highest potential organ of national unity. If the principle of submitting all decisions to public opinion were followed, clashes between Rhee, Yi, Wŏn Se-hun and himself would be largely neutralised.25

The promise of the Delegates' Conference was not fulfilled. As a constitutional body courting world recognition, the Provisional Government was perhaps bound to follow the fate of the diplomatists after the Washington Conference rebuff, but the Delegates' Conference hastened this demise by persistently attacking Rhee and finally, in 1925, "impeached" him.26 For the Korean Christian diaspora, this feuding created sharp divisions within their own ranks, and although churches abroad remained strongly nationalistic it is impossible after 1922 to speak of a Protestant consensus abroad.

The relative isolation of nationalists inside Korea did not prevent the development of divisions parallel to those abroad. As high spirits gave way to bitterness at the brutality of Japanese suppression of the March First Movement and to disappointment at the unconcern of the Western powers, reactions within Korea differed along much the same lines as those abroad. But the context of their decisions was naturally quite different. The March First Movement caused the Japanese Government to review its colonial behaviour, introduce limited reforms and pursue the so-called "cultural" or "conciliation" policy.

25. ibid, 21 and 31 May 1921.
Reform and Resistance, 1919-1921

When Baron Saitō Makoto, the new Governor-General, disembarked at Pusan in September 1919 bearing promises of a conciliatory policy, his landing was greeted by a pointed merchants' strike; in Seoul, he was welcomed by an attempt on his life. After a tour of the provinces Saitō reported to Foreign Minister Uchida on 16 September that "the public feelings of Koreans in general are much worse than expected and ... in spite of the reforms in government organisation there is no sign of relaxation of their feelings." Remembering the bloody suppression of the March uprising, Korean nationalists were unimpressed by superficial structural reorganisation of government agencies.

The assimilative policy and the organisation of the Government-General had been reviewed in the Japanese Diet, and proposals ranged from calls to repeal the whole policy to the military faction's advocacy of an even stronger hand. Master of compromise that he was, Premier Hara Kei guided opinion towards a tempered application of assimilation and assented to having Baron Saitō, a retired military man who emphasised cultural assimilation through education and gradualism in politics, succeed General Hasegawa as Governor-General. Yet Hara continued to cling to Terauchi's illusions, pursuing the "new" policy of Ni-Sen yūwa (harmony of Japan and Korea) on the


assumption that "the two peoples are closely related to each other in race, in manners and customs and in sentiments". It is doubtful the Premier could have prevailed over the militarists had Saitō's proposed reforms not been so innocuous from the Japanese point of view, and indeed in the process of annexing Manchuria, the military administration was revived and Saitō's "cultural policy" was terminated as a barely tolerated interregnum.

Saitō's reforms were, as a modern Japanese publication notes, "extremely narrow in scope and did not satisfy the Korean people". In the central administration, the Education Department was upgraded to an independent Bureau, the gendarmerie was abolished, and the Police Bureau was transferred from the Governor-General's direct control to the Government-General proper as a civilian bureau. In local administration, a limited franchise was granted to Koreans to elect members of new advisory councils in the provinces and prefectures from November 1920. As the elective system was considered "quite new" to Koreans, however, elections were restricted to specially selected villages. Moreover since the governors reserved the right to appoint provincial advisory council members, elected candidates remained few. Henry Chung dubbed the advisory councils as an "espionage system" and expressed the general scepticism of nationalists: "The only reforms that have been introduced are the changing of the name of the 'military' administration to that of 'civil', and the

29. Dong Wonmo, p.268.
31. Dong Wonmo, pp.155-156.
32. Ireland, The New Korea, pp.115ff.
'gendarme' to 'police'.' Even genuine reforms would be beside the point, for the demand was for complete independence.\textsuperscript{33}

Up to 1920 at least the Protestants, who had born considerable material and human loss during the uprising, were determined to keep the issue of independence alive and visible to the world. The Presbyterians and Methodists in particular continued to agitate and to be arrested, and a number of Catholic resistance groups appeared also. There is even evidence of the Presbyterian and Methodist Assemblies contemplating official patronage of the cause.\textsuperscript{34} The churches did officially organise funds for the relief of the families of those in prison, and among the Methodists Yun Ch'i-ho was a major

\textsuperscript{33} Henry Chung, pp.275 and 284.

\textsuperscript{34} See, e.g. the following GGPAB documents:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Kōkei No.34959, 9 December 1919: "Keijō ni okeru fuon jōkyō tsuibō."
  \item Kōkei No.36043, 23 December 1919: "Futei Senjin kenkyō no ken."
  \item Kōkei No.36611, 26 December 1919: "Fuon bunshō hakken ni kansuru ken."
  \item Kōkei No. 983, 22 January 1920: "Himitsu kessha kokuminkaien boshūsha oyobi fuon bunshō seifūsha kenkyō ni kansuru ken."
  \item Kōkei No.2917, 6 February 1920: "Kitoku shinkōkai soshiki keikaku ni kansuru ken."
\end{itemize}

The Christians were committed to the concept and support of the Provisional Government, especially as the Rev. Kim Pyōng-cho, one of the "Thirty-three", had escaped to Shanghai to assist in its organisation.

In P'yŏngyang, Presbyterians associated with the P'yŏngyang Theological Seminary reorganised the Korean National Association in August 1919 with the intention of incorporating all Presbyterians as a step towards developing it into the official, unified representative organ of the whole nation on the peninsula. In September it won recognition from the Provisional Government and commenced preparations for extending its domain throughout the land. The Constitution and Manifesto of the Taehan Kungminhoe invoked the values of the self-reconstruction tradition. Article Two of Chapter One in the Constitution equated reflection on and obedience to the common law of God with joint deliberation on administrative affairs by both citizen and official; Article Three of Chapter Four granted voting rights to all members aged 25 and over for regional representatives who were to possess "patriotism, religious faith and general knowledge". The Manifesto reinterpreted traditional wisdom in terms of civic rights and duties and the utilitarian concern for national efficiency and social happiness:

35. At the Annual Meeting of the Southern Methodist Church in Korea held at Wŏnsan, 3-6 September 1919, the Rev. Kim Yŏng-hak of Kangwŏn Province called for a collection of funds for the families of the more than ten Southern Methodist ministers jailed since March. Yun Ch'i-ho was the highest contributor. GCPAB, Kökei No.28470, 6 October 1919: Chiho minjo ihō, "Nankanriha Yasokyo nenkai nite sojō hannin no kazoku ni taisuru gienkin boshū no ketsugi." Presbyterians in P'yŏngyang collected 1,200 Yen and built a new house for the family of Rev. Kil Sŏn-ju, who was in prison together with his two sons, Chin-Kyŏng and Chin-hyŏng. ibid, "Sŏjō hannin ni taisuru Yasokyoto no dōjō." (GSC, Vol.1, pp.536-537.)
The Ancient Texts say that the People are the foundation of the State. This saying is indeed the great maxim and reference of political economy of every age. Whichever the nation, the people preceded the birth of its government, and so the people do not exist for the government but the government for the people .... [Real] citizens must not lose the rights pertaining to citizens. They should bear the nation on their own backs and themselves choose and commission state officials, small and great. In co-operation and harmony, the officials and the people should deliberate on all national affairs, daily increase the strength of the state and preserve forever the happiness of the People ....

Concurrently, several other groups with similar aims and links with the Provisional Government were formed among Protestants in P'yŏngyang and Seoul, including the Patriotic Women's Society, the Independence Youth Corps and the Youth Diplomatic Corps. But by the end of the year their leaders had been arrested and imprisoned together with members of the National Association.  

The earliest surviving record after 1918 of a specifically Christian perspective on the foundations of civilisation is a police report of a speech delivered by the Rev. Kim P'il-su. Before an estimated crowd of 1500 gathered at Seoul Central Y.M.C.A. on 14 November 1919, he spoke on "oneness" (合- ). National welfare rested, Rev. Kim suggested, on the principle enunciated by Christ

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37. Taegu District Court, Records of the Trial of the Youth Diplomatic Corps and the Patriotic Women's Society, 29 June 1920 (CTS, Vol.5, p.739ff); GGPAB Kōkei 34497, 5 December 1919: "Daikan minkoku aikoku fujinkai kenkyo noken"; GGPAB Kōkei 1536, 22 January 1920: "Daikan aikoku fujinkai ni kansuru ken." (CDU, part 2, chapter 3, pp.221-224; 265-266.)
that a house divided against itself cannot stand. This principle flowed through village, district, province and nation to encompass finally the whole world. The irreligious, ignorant and unprincipled denied that righteousness, as Mencius also had taught, gave strength and unity to a nation and instead resorted to military means as in the Three Kingdom Period in Ancient Korea and in Germany today. But the world-wide breakdown of barriers to unity had already ensued in Korea in the (pre-1919, pre-annexation) move away from distinctions between yangban and commoner, and Koreans awaited only democracy to achieve full oneness. The true inspiration of democracy was Christ: Korea's welfare depended on Christian youth "making the Lord Christ the goal of our unity ...." 38

This line was not immediately popular among the greater part of Korean Christian youth. The general bitterness observed by Baron Saitō in September 1919 continued to express itself throughout 1920 in the form of secret youth societies dedicated to agitation, funding and training guerilla units and support of the Government in Shanghai. But by early 1921 their strategy had been so shattered by a number of factors that the Rev. Kim's approach and self-reconstruction ideology came once more into vogue. First, the arrest and imprisonment of prominent Protestant leaders like Kim Maria and An Chae-hong from the end of 1919 demolished hopes that Saitō might grant some leeway to Korean political movements. On the contrary, he bluntly accused the "small minority" behind the March uprising of irresponsibility and folly, and branded any still recalcitrant

38. GGPAB Kökei No.32779, 19 November 1919: Keijō minjō ihō, "Kitokkyō seinenkai kōen no jōkyō." (GSC, Vol.1, p.582.)
"not only parasites of the Korean people but ... great criminals disturbing the peace in the Orient. Unless and until they are suppressed with merciless rigour, it will be impossible to ensure the continued prosperity of the people in Korea." Though the leaders of the Patriotic Women's Society were "not exactly criminals", their "blind" dedication to national rights was "greatly harmful", especially when it had spread on such a large scale, and they were accordingly put in jail for three years. Independence agitation became impractical.

Second, the disappointments at Versailles and Washington and the discord within the Provisional Government together with continual Japanese interception of funds, considerably dampened the spirit of sacrificial donations to the cause so lauded by An Ch'ang-ho and Yō Un-hyŏng in Shanghai. Third, the intense "mopping up" operations by Japanese troops of Korean guerillas in Hunch'un, Manchuria, from October 1920 rendered a military solution even more remote. Missionaries in Chientao accused Colonel Misumachi on this occasion of attempting to wipe out Korean Christians and of burning their homes, schools and villages. The Colonel replied that some innocents may have been shot because it was impossible to separate insurgents from


41. Chōsen kindai shiryō (11), Bansai sōjō jiken (Sanichi undō) (3): Eibun shiryō, Tokyo, Gannandō shoten, 1964, pp.70-74.
the genuinely innocent, and that the churches and their schools had to be destroyed because they were "sinks of iniquity".\footnote{ibid, p.53.} The Japanese were worried about the influence of Christianity on Koreans in Manchuria, particularly with Yi Tong-hwi's fame involved, and after the operations they issued a twenty-eight page report in which the religion was equated with anti-Japanese activity.\footnote{Chōsen gunsan bōbu, Chōtokuhō No.10, 22 March 1922: "Manshū ni okeru senkyōshi no senseiryoku." (YUL.)} From 1921, the Japanese kept close watch on the Korean Christians in Manchuria, especially in the almost wholly Christian villages such as New Korea Town (新韓村) in P'u-yen.\footnote{ibid, No.9, 9 February 1924, "Tōbu tōshi sen hōmen yori mitaru Roshi Sen no jōkyō." (YUL.)} From inside Korea, support of military activities across the northern borders became extremely difficult.

In January 1920 Governor-General Saitō did, however, issue publishing permits to three newspapers, two being pro-Japanese and one, the \\textit{Donga Daily} (東亞日報), going to the nationalists. The latter was founded by a group of respected national leaders, most of whom were Protestants. Kim Sŏng-su, Principal of Seoul Central Middle School and founder of the Kyŏngsŏng Textile Company, provided the bulk of the funds; Pak Yŏng-hyo, veteran of the 1884 Kapshin Coup and reformer in the 1890s, was made manager; Chang Tŏk-su, an organiser of the February Eighth Movement, became chief editor; and Yang Ki-t'ak, former editor of the \\textit{Taehan Maeil Shinbo} and a victim in the Conspiracy Case, was editorial supervisor. On 1 April the \\textit{Donga Daily} put out its
first issue. Chang Tök-su composed its editorial, written in dramatic style, in which he announced the "resurrection" of the "Rose of Sharon of East Asia", almost at the same time as his fellow Protestant Shin Hŭng-u, then in America, published his *Rebirth of Korea*. The "progress of liberty" was now the journey on which the nation was to embark, and the *Donga Daily* pledged itself to three major tasks:

1. To serve as the organ of the people's voice;
2. to champion democracy;
3. to espouse culturalism.  

Culturalism meant commitment to constructing a "new" culture, and the newspaper carried articles over the following months excoriating the Confucianists for their toadyism and insisting on the need to eradicate "superstition". At the same time editorials attacked the pro-Japanese newspapers, the *Shisa News* (時事新聞) and the *Chosŏn Daily* (朝鮮日報), so that the latter were unable to attract sufficient readers. Six months before the Hunch'un Incident encouraged a change of tactics inside Korea, influential Christian nationalists had already opted to play Saitō's cultural game against him.

Culture and Education, 1921-1925

The shift to culturalism was dominated by Chang Tök-su in its early stages. From June 1920 Chang began gathering together the numerous youth

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societies that had mushroomed since 1919. In December he succeeded in forming a federation of no fewer than 113 such groups as the Korean Youth Federation (Chōson Ch'ŏngnyŏn Yŏnhaphoe), which he placed under the umbrella of the Seoul Central Y.M.C.A. Chang argued that without training in unity the nationalist movement would have no effect and campaigned for a return to the task of "cultivating real strength and ability". With another rising youth leader, Kim Myŏng-sik, Chang organised the Seoul Youth Association in January 1920 to spearhead the movement. The Japanese described the progress of Chang’s movement as "extraordinary", and noted that affiliated youth groups had "sprung up everywhere throughout all regions and served as the main stream of the nationalist movement". As the movement expanded, "self-cultivation societies" (Suyanghoe) proliferated. To the slogan "real strength" was added the cry for "cultural development" or "cultural politics", while through a system of "circuit lectures" students carried self-strengthening programmes and the message of unity to the rural districts.


48. Chosen Shireibu Chōsei, 1 June 1924, "Futei Senjin ni kansuru kisotekki kenkyū", chapter six, part 3, p.44. (CMSS, Vol.6.)

49. See note 47.

50. CMSS, Vol.6, p.53.
The conviction Christians brought to their campaign for the ethical and religious renewal of Korean civilisation was strengthened by reflections on the ineffectiveness of political agitation. On 20 April 1921 plans laid since December 1920 by one Hong Pyŏng-dŏk came to fruition in the establishment of the Christian Youth Federation (Yasokyo Ch'ŏngnyŏn Yŏnhaphoe), which represented church youth groups from Shinŭiju in the north to Mokp'o and Kimhae in the far south. Article Two of Chapter One of its Constitution stated: "The object of this Federation is, fully to promote and put into practice the three areas of education - moral, mental and physical -, to advance the Church and to spread the Good News." Upon election of the Federation's officers Shin Hŭng-u, now General-Secretary of the Central Y.M.C.A., addressed the delegates:

For about a decade, we Koreans had lived our lives in silence, but stimulated by the culture brought in from abroad over recent years we launched an uprising. Yet nothing was gained as a result, and in the end there was incurred only harm and loss for the Korean people.

In future, we must put a stop to this blind activity and exert ourselves fully on behalf of our nation and society. The young are stronger in body than the old. They excel also in thoroughness of mind, in the vigour of their pursuit of learning and in courageousness of spirit. Even so, you young men are apt to lose heart and do not relish sound, persevering work, and so it is my hope that you will put short-term [considerations] behind you and grasp hold of the long-term [view], lend your strength to this Federation and through it strive to construct Heaven in Korea.

51. GGFAB Kökei No. 13004, 7 May 1921: "Yasokyŏ seinen rengōkai ni kansuru ken." (CDU, part 2, chapter 3, pp.584-587.)
52. ibid, loc cit.
The most indefatigable proponent of nonpolitical, cultural nationalism was the influential but rather controversial Lee Kwang-su, who had returned to Korea in March 1921 determined to spread the reconstruction ideology of An Ch'ang-ho throughout the land. Lee immediately threw himself into the cultural movement with his former colleagues from Tokyo student days - Kim Sŏng-su, Chang Tŏk-su, Hong Myŏng-hŭi, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn and Song Chin-u - and began contributing articles to the *Donga Daily* and to *Kaebŏk*.

Lee Kwang-su was, and still is, counted among the prominent Christians of his day, but his eclecticism and obvious attraction to Buddhist spirituality upset any facile religious labeling. As a teacher at the Christian Osan College up to 1913 Lee drew criticism from some for teaching Tolstoyism rather than Christianity, and dissatisfaction over the "purity" of his Christian faith continues today. Lee himself spoke reverently of the Presbyterian founder of Osan College Yi Sŏng-hun as his mentor and claimed that Yi's example turned practically the whole population of Chŏngju to Christianity. He attributed to Yi his own dedication to the self-reconstruction principle that inner strength was the well-spring of social and national progress. It is evident that by 1917 at least,

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54. Lee Kwang-su, *op cit*, p.236.
Lee believed that civilisation depended on the quality of a people's religion and regarded Christianity as the source of the highest civilisation.\textsuperscript{55} One of Korea's greatest writers, he wove Christian themes into his novels and more than any other, openly premised much of his nationalist argumentation on Christian doctrines and the sayings of Christ. Most pertinent of all, Lee became the greatest apologist and communicator of the nationalist thought of An Ch'ang-ho to Koreans on the peninsula.

Though Lee Kwang-su wrote on several facets of nationalism his actual influence lay in promoting the concept of the cultural roots of a nation or the definition of "nation" as "culture". The kernel of this concept had appeared already in an article, "Our Ideology", which Lee had contributed to the Tokyo Korean student journal, \textit{Hak Chi Kwang}, in December 1917. Lee based his argument here on the axiom that the political and cultural histories of a nation, though usually related, are in fact sometimes, and conceptually always, distinct. Far from being subordinate, its cultural history determined a nation's worth, and in this sense "Korean history" did not exist: Koreans could not claim any part in world-cultural history. Belonging to Chinese culture was not any comfort:

That we have soaked ourselves in tens of thousands of readings of the Chinese Classics over the past 500 years does not ascribe any value to the existence of the Korean race and neither does the appellation "Little China" [小中華] or the assertion that we have

\textsuperscript{55} See above, chapter five, pp.203-204.
perfected the philosophy of the Chu Hsi school .... There is one, and only one, way of acquiring any value for the existence of the Korean race, and that is to create a new culture which it can call its own.  

"Production of a new culture", which depended on realising the spiritual potential within oneself and the race, was a matter of urgency, Lee claimed. It would restore a sense of worth and avert the psychological and spiritual disintegration threatened by the disappointment of so many hopes at and since the annexation. The "new national ideal" was for Korea to attain a proud position in the history of civilisations.

It is striking how closely Lee's ideas in 1917 already resembled those of An Ch'ang-ho. Even "gradualism" was stated in Lee's "ideology": the new culture and new nation would not appear in one or two decades but after one or two centuries of consistent effort. Gradualism was evidently a logical feature of self-reconstruction, which by its nature opposed rapid change. Yun Ch'i-ho had earlier placed Korea's national maturity a century in the future, while An Ch'ang-ho doubted national integrity would be restored within his life-time. In Shanghai Lee had joined An Ch'ang-ho in June 1919, became vice-president of the Hûngsadan and advanced


57. *ibid, loc cit.*
gradualism through the new *Tongnip Shinmun.* Lee soon became convinced, though An unaccountably objected, that he must return to Korea where the application of the doctrine had the most point. Similarly to Solzhenitsyn today, Lee recognised that the influence of exiles on events in their home-country was severely limited, and began to look upon the "emptying" of Korea by its national leaders as a great mistake.

Lee Kwang-su began his campaign in Korea with a long message to Korea's teenagers, serialised in *Kaebyŏk* from November 1921 to March 1922. Lee argued that Korea's plight was the penalty for long bankruptcy in her economy, morality and learning, and devoted by far the most space to an account of Korea's ethical ruin. The young were urged to join together in a common commitment to rectify these failures through thorough self-improvement. But his major piece, "Discourse on National Reconstruction", appeared in *Kaebyŏk* in May 1922. On November 11, 1921, the very day the Pacific Conference was convened, Lee had penned his introduction. The contents, he acknowledged with a nod towards An Ch'ang-ho, had been worked out by Koreans abroad but coincided with his own beliefs and had now become


the purpose of his life. "Reconstruction", Lee continued, had become
the watchword of the present, replacing other slogans such as "reform"
and even "revolution". For it signified something more fundamental
and profound and encompassed the world-wide move from imperialism to
democracy, competition to co-operation and male chauvinism to equality
of the sexes. For the Koreans it was a summons to reconstruct the
national character, economy, environment, religion, morality, in
short, Korean civilisation in its totality.⁶²

In this "Discourse", Lee introduced the most controversial aspect
of the creed: its relegation of politics to a position subordinate to
moral reconstruction and education. The great failing of the
Independence Club and all similar societies and associations that formed
up to 1910, he claimed, was that too few members understood that the
nation's collapse was caused by moral and spiritual sickness. Even
the educational societies neglected the fact that positive knowledge
required an ethical foundation. Only the Ch'ōngnyŏn Hakuhoe (under
Yun Ch'i-ho's leadership) understood the weaknesses of the preceding
organisations, and determined not to have any political colouring
but to establish genuine reconstruction ideals within an ethical
framework.

Since it was not moral ignorance but moral powerlessness that led
Korea to ruin, the need was for new wineskins, that is, the national
character had to be renewed. Just as Jesus and his disciples began a
far-reaching work of reconstruction, Lee argued, so Korea's revival

could begin from a few people with a will to act together. Korea's hope lay within; its independence would be realised through its own efforts, not as a gift posted from abroad. The process could take a century and more, but it was essential that it was kept entirely free from any political connexion and focused on individual and cultural reconstruction lest it be interrupted by government interference. Reconstruction was an "eternal, all-embracing cultural movement", the duty of every citizen and the life of the nation.  

Cultural reconstruction, a self-civilising enterprise, required serious attention to education, and as the demand for schooling among Koreans rapidly increased from 1921 the cultural doctrine appeared poised to win the allegiance of the whole nation. The Japanese observed that increasing numbers of Korean students were going to Japan in obedience to the "cultural" line that they must "first establish firm foundations of national self-reliance and lay plans for adequate cultural development and real strength in readiness for a future opportunity."  

In Korea, Chang Tōk-su successfully promoted schooling funded and staffed by Koreans in his home province of Hwanghae, while Song Chin-u and Kim Sŏng-su strengthened and upgraded the Seoul Central Middle and High Schools. In Chŏngju, Cho Man-sik was back at the helm of Osan College after ten months' imprisonment for his part in organising March First activities in P'yŏngyang, while mission schools in the major centres experienced an

63. *ibid*, *loc. cit.*
64. See note 47.
extraordinary influx of pupils from 1921. Perhaps the truest indication of how widespread and intense this commitment to the "new" education was, is the records of the hitherto unexamined Australian Presbyterian Mission concerning the traditionally less responsive southernmost districts. "All schools are overcrowded," reported Dr. William Taylor from Chinju in 1922. "There is a perfect craze for education all over the peninsula." In Pusan, another Australian, Miss Withers, perceived the nationalistic impulse behind the surge of interest:

Throughout the whole country there is a tremendous thirst for learning and the people are beginning to realise that their present position is a good deal due to the lack of education in the past .... Our schools are overcrowded. Last Spring in Fusanchin [Pusan district] over 100 were turned away, and in Chinju, Masampo and throughout the whole country large numbers had to be refused admission.

The educational movement undeniably made good mileage out of the slight liberalisation of schooling and the permission for Christian schools to include religious instruction in their curricula granted under Governor-General Saitō. But the Government-General was anxious to supply the increased demand itself and between 1920 and 1925 erected four times as many government schools as had appeared from 1905 to 1919. Public primary and secondary schools doubled during 1920 to 1925 also, but private schooling grew more markedly than any and in

65. The Presbyterian, 11 October 1922. (Archives of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria: Korea Mission.)

66. ibid., loc. cit.

secondary schools attracted an enrolment on average three times higher than public schools. The Japanese fear of a "mombusho within a mombusho" was revived late in 1922 by the emergence of a movement to establish a Korean university.

The appearance in November 1922 of the Preparatory Committee to establish a People's University is normally referred to as just one expression of Korean nationalism in the 1920s. It was, in fact, the first action of many of the "Thirty-Three" immediately after their release from prison and had it been successful it would have been the crowning achievement of the cultural movement. Yet the Committee has received brief analysis, from the standpoint of its critics, only very recently in two works: in a short piece in Korean and in an unpublished dissertation in English. Within this culturalist phase of Korean self-reconstruction nationalism, however, the Committee to Establish a People's University and especially its Manifesto demonstrate the currency and influence of the definition of nation as culture distinct from the political state.

The idea of a Korean university was not new. After a movement to repay Korea's national debt had been frustrated by the Japanese shortly before the annexation, the Protestants Yun Ch'i-ho, Namgung Ok, Yang Ki-t'ak and No Paek-rin had discussed using money collected for

68. Dong Wonmo, "Assimilation and Social Mobilisation in Korea", in Nahm (ed.) p.158; Eugene C. Kim, in ibid, p.140.

the national debt to establish a university. With six million hwan at hand they had petitioned Terauchi, but were refused permission to begin. In 1920 Yun and others approached Baron Saitō, but with no more fortune. But on the release of the "Thirty-Three" and in view of the enthusiasm over education, the time was judged right to recruit support. By March 1923, 1,170 persons from throughout Korea had joined the 47 founders, and on 29 March 462 delegates gathered at the Seoul Central Y.M.C.A. to discuss promotion of the university and to compose the Manifesto.

The Manifesto, an elegantly phrased composition, opened with a rhetorical question, "How shall we work out our destiny?" - and proceeded to exalt education as the true foundation of other, secondary enterprises such as industry, diplomacy and politics. Confident of their position, the Committee included in the Manifesto a glowing account of the value of tertiary education to the nation as a whole. Universities had a "tremendous connexion with the evolution of humankind", ensuring "cultural progress" and raising the quality of life of nations. The universities which were founded in Italy, France, Germany and England in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were the cradle of Europe and America's grand civilisation, the source of its religious renewal and political revolutions. There was nothing important that Korea needed in the modern era which did not require or attend university education.

70. Kim Se-han, pp.170-171.
71. Minjok Undong Ch'ongsŏ, Vol.6, p.244.
72. The Manifesto is printed in ibid, pp.244-246.
This appraisal of the role of education and civilisation had also been expressed by articles in *Kaebyŏk* since June 1920. "What a man knows, that he is," quoted one contributor. "Therefore education is our life, the life of the nation and society, the life of the whole universe .... Where there is education, there is life, well-being, civilisation, happiness and victory." In proportion to the population schools were too few, and there was still no university, he lamented. The Australian missionaries also shared something of the culturalists' vision. Observing that the "young people are thinking deeply of their future service of their country", they concurred with the view that the "coming new nation is in the hands of the present students".

The significance of this viewpoint is that it defied the central principle of political nationalism that the prior congruence of "nation" and "state" is the necessary condition of the development of national culture. In its context the "coming new nation" did not mean a politically independent state but referred to the character and ethos of the civilisation which would be moulded by the generation of youth then imbibing the new education and culture. The nationalists argued that the nation preceded the state (for the people preceded the government) and that the origin of the nation was not political but moral. The Koreans had not developed a true nation and so necessarily failed to produce a stable political form. Cultural reconstruction was both a means of undermining Japanese rule and a moral imperative whose

73. Pak Tal-sŏng, "Shigūp'i haegyŏl hal Chosŏn ŭi tae munje", *Kaebyŏk*, No.1, 25 June 1920, pp.23-29. *Kaebyŏk* was funded mainly by the Ch'ŏndogyo church.


75. The context was the question of "saving Korea for God", that is, turning the people to Christianity; not, initially, of saving Korea from the Japanese. - *ibid.*
validity could not be cancelled by the issue of who ruled. Thus a form of nonpolitical nationalism was advanced which immediately drew both enthusiastic support and bitter opposition.

**Culturalism Under Attack: 1923-1925**

Despite detailed work on a comprehensive curriculum, the venture to establish a Korean university ground to a halt by 1925. The immediate causes of its failure are clear enough: failure to attract sufficient funds and Government-General counteraction. At first, contributions came thick and fast, but with this the limits of indulgence had been reached, and the authorities began to obstruct the project in various ways.\(^{76}\) In 1922, Dr. Mizuno announced that the Government-General was about to open a university in Seoul, and it was suggested two universities were unnecessary at that stage.\(^{77}\) Potential contributors to the Korean venture were discouraged by this pre-emptive action, but when Keijō Imperial University opened in 1927, entry for Koreans was restricted to one third of the total enrolment, and Korean lecturers were excluded except for instruction in Chinese and Korean Literature and occasionally Mathematics.\(^{78}\)

There were other aspects to the failure of this most ambitious project of cultural nationalism which concerned the growing disillusionment with liberalism and misgivings over the political philosophy of the

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78. Dong Wonmo, p.410.
culturalists. In 1922 Kim Myŏng-sik had seceded from Chang Tŏk-su's youth association to publish a moderate leftist journal, *Shin Saenghwal*, with Pak Hi-do, a Y.M.C.A. leader and a member of the "Thirty-Three" who had just been released from jail. As the Leninist doctrine of imperialism gained currency many of the younger generation especially turned with high hopes to Marxism, the "science" of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist revolution. While the *Shin Saenghwal* attacked *Kaebyŏk* and *Donga Daily* culturalism, the more radical left dismissed the university movement as an élitist hobby.\(^79\) Cultural reconstruction nationalism also faced hostility from the nationalist right. The fact that Lee had been allowed to re-enter Korea in 1921 a free man had given rise to rumours of a dishonourable understanding between him and the Japanese. When he urged Koreans in an article in July 1921 to reject political plots and instead form a key class of intellectuals to spearhead the cultural revival,\(^80\) the counsel against resistance appeared suspicious.

This opposition was not of itself the reason for the failure of the university scheme, which would probably have succeeded but for Japanese intervention, but it seriously weakened self-reconstruction nationalism in its culturalist form. The ascendency of socialism by 1924 not only ended the numerical dominance of culturalism but also put it at a psychological disadvantage. Socialism offered sharp definitions and a clear-cut programme; culturalism seemed vague, ambiguous and even insipid. Socialism was on the rise and held

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79. See Robinson, pp.234-236, 243-246 and 270ff.

promise; culturalism had been tried and found wanting. Further, by
attracting numbers of important Protestants - Pak Hi-do, Kim Myöng-sik,
Kim Ch'ŏl-su, Han Wi-gŏn and Hong Myŏng-hŭi, as well as Yi Tong-hwi,
Kim Kyu-sik and Yŏ Un-hyŏng abroad - socialism deprived culturalism
of a consensus of support among the very group which most inspired it.
Within half a decade confidence in the Protestant community's self-
identity had become shaken as division arose among its leaders over
the true shape of the New Korea.

It is important not to exaggerate the division. Socialism had
not been adopted by church congregations and was at this stage even
more a creed of the educated élite than culturalism. No section of
society could claim greater involvement in primary education, rural
and urban, than the Protestants, and Japanese documents plainly state
that the idea of deliverance through education struck a responsive
chord among "ordinary" Koreans who remained enthusiastic about
education up to 1930 at least. 81 The presence of Christians among
the socialist and communist movements actually mitigated the effects
of the division. Yi Tong-hwi maintained positive relations with Song
Chin-u, manager of the Donga Daily, 82 while Han Wi-gŏn was
influenced by colleagues in the Y.M.C.A. to facilitate mediation
between Song Chin-u and communist critics in Tokyo. 83

81. Naimushō Keihōkyoku, Gemmitsu: Shōwa gonen ni okeru shakai undō
no jōkyō: "2 Minzokushugi undō no jōkyō." (CDU, part 3, chapter
6, p.573.)

82. L.-G. George Paik, Interview.

83. GGPAB, Tōkyō shutchoen, May 1924: "Zaikyō Chōsenjin jōkyō."
Lee Kwang-su claimed he was simply following the precedent of the Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe. In February 1922 he and his fiancée Pak Hyŏn-hwan had formed a Hūngsadan branch in Seoul with about ten other nationalists, including the Protestant Kim Yun-gyŏng who had returned from study in Japan. The branch was given the innocuous title, Suyang Tongmaenghoe, the Self-Improvement League. In July 1922 a similar body took shape in P'yŏngyang among graduates of An Ch'ang-ho's Taesŏng College: Cho Myŏng-sik, Kim Sŏng-ŏp and the Presbyterian Elder and colleague of Cho Man-sik, Kim Tong-wŏn. Then in 1923 Cho Man-sik, Kim Sŏng-su, An Chae-hong, Song Chin-u and the Ch'ŏndogyo leader Ch'oe Rin met to discuss a unified, nonpolitical body to promote self-reconstruction. It was decided to commence with the serialisation of Lee Kwang-su's "National Statecraft" theses in the Donga Daily from 2-6 January 1924.

In the opening section, Lee openly rejected the "socialistic" idea of determinism of the individual will in history, classing it along with Hegel's historicism as "superstitious and arbitrary". He next rejected the notion that Koreans could properly be involved only in political movements which made Japan's expulsion their immediate or even primary aim. This narrow opinion only robbed Koreans of the few openings for political action which existed.

84. Government-General Justice Bureau, 1938: "Chosen dokuritsu shisō undō no hensen." (CDU, part 2, chapter 3.) There are discrepancies between the dates given in this document and those that appear in the Jubilee history of the Hūngsadan (Hūngsadan Oship Junyon Sa, Seoul, Hūngsadan oship junyon sa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 1963, p.40), but I have followed the dates in the earlier document. The differences are not great.

85. Donga Daily, 2 January 1924: editorial.

86. ibid, 3 January 1924.
Finally, Lee asserted that education was the most urgent and formidable task of all, the means whereby Korea's fourteen million farmers, with whom Korea's destiny lay, would be equipped for the task of constructing the new civilisation.87

In view of the negative reaction to these articles by right and left, it was decided unwise to attempt to organise the intended national body for the time being.88 In March 1924 Lee Kwang-su travelled to Peking to consult with An Ch'ang-ho on future strategy. On his return he published his "Üigi Ron" (義氣論), in which he described civic ethics and set Christian doctrines against materialistic concepts of history and methodologies of class struggle.

The composition of society was spiritual: "A person's most precious possession is public spirit .... If there be such things as high and low classes, then they can be divided only with reference to public spirit." St. Paul's cry, "Ah, I am a wretched being!" evinced that the line separating good and evil ran not between classes or nations but through the heart of every individual, where the primary and decisive battle had to be fought. Christ's expression on the Cross, "It is finished", was his final song of victory over the evil in human nature. His command to all who follow was, accordingly, "Be perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect." The process of history was therefore quite other than economically determined:

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87. ibid, 5, 6 January 1924.

We believe in evolution in history. We believe that humanity has been steadily evolving from ancient times in a good direction, and that it is the blood of the many righteous, or public-spirited people who have fought from of old, that is the force driving human history in this direction.

Sodom, Lee recalled, would have been saved if it had possessed only ten righteous men. With one thousand such, what tremendous good Korea could achieve:

Do not mourn our lack of political freedom. Mourn not our state of economic insolvency. Neither mourn should some fearsome disease strike us down. Not that these are not grievous things; but they are nothing compared with the lack among us of righteous people.

Public spirit was altruistic action towards neighbour, district, nation and all humankind. Lee proposed a programme not simply to deliver Korea but also Japan and the rest of the world from the forces of enslavement - all of which derived from within. On this view, he argued, "making myself, as one person, perfect, is the greatest of works on behalf of humanity."89

Christians and the Nation-State

In his writings, Lee Kwang-su reflected the difficulties faced by nationalists within Korea after it had become clear that neither Japan nor the democratic West were sympathetic with their demands for

89. Lee Kwang-su, "Ui gi Ron", Lee Kwang-su Works, Vol.10, pp.250-253. (This was published in Chosŏn Mundan, No.3, December 1924.)
political independence. He spoke for those who, possibly influenced by An Ch'ang-ho, perceived in the new socialist wave the old reliance on outside influence and power; and also for those who concurred with the Rev. Kim P'il-su's and Shin Hŭng-u's dissatisfaction with heroic but counterproductive political agitation. That Lee should draw criticism from both socialist and strict nationalists was natural, but his position vis-à-vis the latter was ironical, since, for all his commitment to the anti-toadyist, self-reliance tradition, Lee was labelled by them a compromiser with Japanese power.

By the end of 1923 the sudden burst of enthusiasm for education had given way to renewed attention on political independence. When it had become least feasible the demand for the upper ceiling - immediate, unconditional independence - was pressed most strongly, and the merest hint of a political armistice with Japan was interpreted as compromise or even collaboration. The culturalist separation of nation as culture from nation as a sovereign political entity clashed with this either/or mentality and threatened the sacred cow of political nationalism, which had no time for subtlety.

The appeal to the Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hakuhoe approach of An Ch'ang-ho and Yun Ch'i-ho was therefore a deliberate rejection of pressure to define nationalism as political resistance to Japan. Yun Ch'i-ho's position during this period was wholly consistent with the self-reconstruction movement's philosophy of change. Yun, Pak Yŏng-hyo and former "patriotic" politicians such as Han Kyu-sŏl had been approached in January or February 1919 about joining the March First organisation. All had some reason to decline, and Yun gave an ambiguous, evasive reply, saying he would just follow on behind. 90 Yun's refusal to join the March First

90. Han'guk Hyŏndaesa, Vol.4, p.227.
Movement has been interpreted as the shame-faced reluctance of a fifty-four year old man of letters, still frail after his former imprisonment, to court arrest, torture and incarceration again. This is a wholly speculative and unnecessary psychological explanation of a decision that was entirely consistent with Yun's nationalist position since before the annexation.

Yun's objection to the March First Movement was that to succeed it required the strength Korea lacked. As early as 1893 Yun had learned the "absurdity" of appealing to American conscience against its self-interest, and in 1919 he foresaw that the hope placed in the Paris Conference was misguided. Even if Korea was granted independence, she could not maintain it alone and would have to rely almost wholly on Japan to uphold it. Yun predicted nothing but harm to Korea, and his opinions clearly influenced Shin Hŭng-u and the Christian Youth Federation. In joining the movement to establish a Korean university, Yun reaffirmed his commitment to the Ch'ŏngnyŏn Hahuhoe belief that cultivation of the attributes of nationhood must precede independent statehood.

It was suggested earlier that Yun was an enigma to Koreans who adopted Christianity as a politically useful proposition, since his own conversion followed a personal search for truth and the spiritual power to follow the ethical demands of his conscience. In his diary, Yun had early confessed to a growing admiration for St. Paul's unwavering commitment to his mission amidst political resistance by Israel to Rome:


92. Yun Diary, 12 June 1893.

93. Seoul Press, 8 March 1919. Interview with Yun Ch'i-ho.
I admire the character of St. Paul more and more. In his lifetime Judia went through all the national agonies of vassalage and dissolution. It must have been an exciting time for a high-spirited Jew. Yet Paul stuck to what he saw to be the true mission for which he was elected.94

Yun realised that had Paul offered his faith to the cause of Jewish zealotism, Christianity would not have become a world religion but at best a successful Jewish heresy or sect. He laid his finger on the crucial factor whereby Christianity became universalistic and burst free from racial, national and political boundaries. This may have been the most specific and critically Christian aspect of Yun's rejection of a nationalism premised on racial confrontation and a Christianity identified with anti-Japanese political ideology. In the final analysis, strict nationalists could not approve Yun's "authentic" Christianity, just as Yun likewise could not approve their definition of nationalism.

Protestants who joined the socialist movement were inclined to regard "nonpolitical" nationalism as a tacit acceptance of imperial power. At best, the culturalist apologetics of Lee Kwang-su seemed to suggest naively that the economic and political machinery of the Japanese empire would be overcome by a combination of learning and Christian character. This was not strictly true. Lee had deliberately separated the concepts of nation and state and proposed the prior creation of a strong ethical nation. Further, behind the adoption of nonpolitical nationalism lay the practical observation

94. Yun Diary, 4 August 1894.
that under the conditions political resistance was counterproductive and divisive. Cultural self-reconstruction was defended as realistic in a double sense: it offered a programme that was at once the antidote to the nation's "real" problem and the only feasible course for the vast majority of Koreans on the peninsula.

There was of course an important disagreement here over the cause of Korea's subjection to Japan. The socialists and communists of this period perceived a necessary connexion between capitalism and imperialism and concluded that Korea was a victim of impersonal historical forces. Self-reconstruction ideology was based on the view that, even if imperialism worked according to its own distinct laws, it was Korea's own "sin" of national decay that had allowed these laws to operate on her own territory. According to the original Protestant critique of Korean society the designation of Japan by both the left and right as the principal enemy of the people was regressive. Hence self-reconstructionism was not simply a tactic, and Lee's summons of the nation to righteousness and advocacy of the spiritual sources of change indicate that by 1924 he was in essential agreement with Yun Ch'i-ho.95

The interest in nonpolitical nationalism among Protestants was strengthened by the realisation that unlike communism, anarchism,

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95. The socialists did have a theory of Korean social "sickness" also. But in their terms, it was a sickness of structure which Korea shared with Japan. For the Protestant self-reconstruction nationalists it was a sickness of spirit - individual and social - which differed from any "sickness" Japan might have had: if Japan had suffered the same ailment she could not have conquered Korea. I have not discussed the "Confucian" nature of Korean culturalism here, but see below, chapter 7, pp.293-299.
capitalism and other "isms" vying for support at the time, Christianity was not itself a political ideology or prescription for state organisation. This fact had been pressed home by the move from liberalism to socialism by influential Protestants; the Russian Revolution had drawn praise initially even from Henry Chung.  

It had to be recognised that the Christian sources did not impose any specific political programme on believers. The inescapable implication of this discovery was that if nationalism were defined politically then there could be no "Christian" nationalism.

Yun, Lee and like-minded Protestants therefore rejected the political definition of nationalism. The exaltation of any political doctrine and of nationalism itself as an absolute and the identification of Christianity with any one political movement could only rob Protestants of their prophetic mission of renewing the Korean people as a Christian nation. After 1925, when the ranks of socialist and "pure" nationalist movements were reduced by imprisonment and desertion, self-reconstruction nationalists reorganised and sought once more to create a community that would pioneer the spiritual revolution of the Korean nation.

96. Shinhan Minbo, 29 March 1917. Henry Chung thought it was a "great event", an indication of the rising tide of democracy. The newspaper soon became critical: in its 17 May 1917 issue, it accused Russia of going from one extreme to another.
CHAPTER SEVEN

NATIONAL REPENTANCE, CIVILISATION AND SPIRITUAL REVOLUTION, 1926-1937

Background to the Period

The appearance of socialist and even communist organisations in Korea by 1923 alarmed the Government-General. In 1923 Pak Hi-do and Kim Myōng-sik were sentenced to six months' imprisonment for calling for political revolution and their journal, Shin Saenghwai, was banned indefinitely.¹ In April 1925 the three main communist factions in Korea secretly formed the First Korean Communist Party in Seoul. But a thoughtless flag-waving incident in Shinŭiju, North P'yŏngan, exposed the party to the police who arrested thirty prominent members in November. This incident provoked a factional struggle which seriously threatened the communist movement, especially after the Second Communist Party was crushed in mid-1926 and its ranks were decimated by arrest.²

Meanwhile, the noncommunist nationalists suffered reverses of their own. In September 1924 the struggling pro-Japanese Chosŏn Daily was bought up by Yi Sang-hyŏp and the Protestants Yi Sang-jae, An Chae-hong and Paek Kwan-su and was soon regarded as the organ of the nationalist left.³ For a time Chosŏn Daily articles criticised the Donga Daily's

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2. See Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement, pp.82-84.
nonresistance stance. However the Chosŏn Daily staff suffered also from the exposure of the Shinŭiju Incident of November 1925, whereupon Yi Sang-hyŏp accepted responsibility and resigned. In 1925 also, staff of the Donga Daily, Kaebŏk and Ch'oe Nam-sŏn's Shidae Ilbo suffered fines and imprisonment. The management of the Chosŏn and Donga dailies thereupon sought solidarity in the struggle to counteract the Government-General's attempts to stifle nationalist thought. In December 1925 Song Chin-u and An Chae-hong met for discussions in the Seoul Central Y.M.C.A., and a Reporters' Support League was founded to protect press freedom and human rights.4

The Chosŏn and Donga newspapers remained at odds over the political issue despite this thaw in relations. When the weakened communist groups approached the nationalists concerning the formation of a united front, the Chosŏn Daily management concurred enthusiastically. In February 1927 the united front was organised as the Shinganhoe, and Yi Sang-jae was elected its first president. The presence of the political disagreement was marked by the absence, initially, of any members of the Donga Daily management among Shinganhoe members and the vital role of Chosŏn Daily staff in the organisation of the front. Protestant nationalists in general cannot be so easily divided with respect to the political issue. Cho Pyŏng-ok, a member of An Ch'ang-ho's Hŏngsadan, was an officer of the Shinganhoe, while the fact that the Cho Man-sik, one of the sturdiest protagonists of self-reconstruction ideology and nonresistance, chaired the P'yŏngyang branch of the Shinganhoe alerts

4. Donga Daily, 12, 17, 19 and 20 November 1925.
one to the complexity of the nationalist landscape in this period and to the existence of more than one polarity, more than one axis, in the nationalist debate.

General Protestant support of the Shinganhoe, which soon attracted a membership of some 30,000, was crucial if the church was to remain a force in Korean nationalism. Self-reconstruction nationalists were not opposed to political activity within legal limits (since political training was desirable), and the Shinganhoe had been formed with Japanese permission and existed on Government-General sufferance. There was therefore a gap between image and reality in the Chosŏn Daily's description of the Shinganhoe as a noncompromising political organisation that rejected all "opportunism" outright. As soon as it stepped beyond the bounds of legality by its clandestine sponsorship of the 1929 Kwangju Student Uprising into a nationwide movement, its leaders and several hundred members found themselves behind bars. The Japanese refusal to grant permission to reorganise after its dissolution in May 1931 underlined its former dependence on official favour. The breakdown of the experiment was blamed by its president for 1930-1931, the Christian lawyer Kim Pyŏng-no, on excessive and self-defeating politics.

5. The relationship of Protestants and the self-reconstruction movement to the Shinganhoe is an important subject for research, which I hope one day to carry out. On the Shinganhoe, see Suh Dae-sook, chapters 4 and 5 and Lee Chong-sik, pp.250-260.

6. Chosŏn Daily, 20 January 1927, Editorial, and "Hwekshikich'ok hwehap i dwel shinganhoe ch'angnip chunbi" (p2). Also ibid, 14 February 1927: "Shinganhoe ch'angnip ch'onghoe."
In the midst of these political vicissitudes, two major Protestant organisations maintained the self-reconstruction movement: the Suyang Tonguhoe, which was the Korean branch of An Ch'ang-ho's Hŭngsadan, and the Hŭngŏp Kurakbu, the Korean arm of Syngman Rhee's Tongjihoe. But it was the former which strove more actively to keep the torch burning and which is therefore the focus of this chapter.

National Repentance and Social Change

The rapprochement between the Donga and Chosŏn dailies and the setback suffered by revolutionary socialism encouraged the Seoul Suyang Tongmaenghoe and the P'yŏngyang Tongu Kurakbu to amalgamate in January 1926 as the Suyang Tonguhoe. Chu Yo-han, son of the Rev. Chu Kong-sam (who led the Korean Presbyterians in Tokyo) and a former leader in the Far Eastern Bureau of the Hŭngsadan, founded the Tongkwang Company in Seoul and began publishing a monthly journal, the Tongkwang, from May 1926. As the journal of the Suyang Tonguhoe, the first issue launched into the promotion of the "Three Categories of Education" and of reform of the individual, development of the arts, unity, and public virtue.

The leading article, presumably written by Chu Yo-han, concerned ethical self-reconstruction. "Above all else," it opened, "we must

7. The Hŭngŏp Kurakbu was strong in the Seoul Y.M.C.A. and some churches, and was led by Methodists such as Shin Hŭng-u. It was associated also with the mid-western Kiho p'a. But it had no journal and there is not much information on it. A Japanese report on the organisation is: Sotokufu hōmukyoku, 1938: "Chōsen dokuritsu shisō undō no hensen." (CDU, part 2, chapter 3, pp.338-345.)

8. Kim Ch'ang-se, "Minjokchŏk yukch' e kaejo undong" (pp.3-7); Sanong, "Hapdong gwa Pulli" (pp.14-18); Lee Kwang-su, "Yesul p'yŏngga ūi p'yŏjun" (pp.38-40), as well as the articles cited in notes 9 and 10 below.
recognise that morally we have greater flaws than other peoples. By 'moral failure', we by no means refer to a lack of fidelity or filial piety or any other moral item. Rather, we refer to a fundamental lack in the foundations of our morality itself." Korean morality needed to redirect itself towards honesty, conscientiousness, good faith, perseverance, unselfishness and the priority of public over private and family concerns and to grasp the underlying spirit of all ethics: love, forgiveness and encouragement towards all. Training in such was the "essential ingredient of national revival", the "greatest duty of every individual member of our Korean race". As Koreans committed to self-reconstruction "increase one by one, two by two, so our race's shrivelled roots will send forth new, sharply-pointed shoots".9

The exposition of the Suyang Tonguhoe's philosophy of social change was tackled in the same issue under the pseudonym, Changbaek Sanin. "Magical" ideas of instantaneous change were opposed with the argument that all true change follows the same principle of "graduality" (gradation). "Revolution" was therefore not a sudden event created by fiat, but the "consummation of a gradual process of factor piling on factor". Koreans were supplied with ten areas of need for improvement in personal and social life, with the concluding advice: "Before plotting any revolution, accomplish a revolution within yourself."10

10. Changbaek Sanin, "Kaein ilgang saenghwai ŭi hyŏkshin i minjok palhung ŭi kŭnbon", in ibid, pp.29-33. This is a common expression of "liberalism" and comparable to the position held by Chinese liberals such as Hu Shih.
The stage was set for the entry of An Ch'ang-ho's polished doctrine of national reconstruction, and from 1926 to 1931 the Tongkwong editors published as much of An's writings as censors permitted, under the pseudonyms Sanong and Som'me. An wrote with the style of a religious prophet so that once more the Korean race was subjected to a hard-hitting analysis of its moral and spiritual dissipation. Again, Koreans were summoned to create a new civilisation founded on the practical ethics of Protestantism as An understood them. Ethical nationalism commencing from "reconstruction of individual character" (人格改造) was a national duty, and An harshly criticised the tendency still prevailing even after the "vanished dream" of support from Versailles and the League of Nations to cast about for aid among the strong nations. "How on earth will this produce the qualifications of independence," he asked, "and how dare we pretend that what we are doing is an 'independence movement' ....? To believe only in another's strength and to live in reliance on another's strength is slavery."\(^\text{11}\)

The principle of national repentance as the grounds of civilisation had been presented by An Ch'ang-ho in an important speech titled "Reconstruction". Culture, or civilisation, appears in this speech as an idealist concept, almost a final cause drawing and directing human endeavour everywhere to itself; and its ethical make-up is supposedly Protestant.\(^\text{12}\) The "supreme hope and end" of humankind is univer-

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12. See the discussion on the sources of An's concept of civilisation below, p.298.
sal happiness (幸福), a happiness whose mother is civilisation (文明). Civilisation in turn is the offspring of effort put into reconstruction (改造). Though Christianity did not first introduce "reconstruction" to humanity, for it is the "sum of all teachings of Confucius, Buddha, Socrates and Tolstoy", the ethical teachings of Christ have given it its sharpest profile.

What was the very first word John, who came just before Jesus, cried out to the people? 'Repent!' After that, what was the first thing of all Jesus cried out in a loud voice? Again, 'Repent!' This 'repentance' is exactly what I mean by reconstruction.13

An expresses doubt whether Koreans have really grasped this deepest sense of reconstruction or repentance. Civilisation is "beauty and light" set in antithesis to "darkness and filth". In this sense, there is urgent need to renovate everything in and about Korea: education, religion, agriculture, commerce, public works, customs, food, clothing, cities, villages and even rivers and mountains. Fully-forested hills and clear-running streams are necessary for housing, farming and the environment; barren hills and polluted rivers cause erosion, floods and impoverishment materially and spiritually. All modes of existence are interrelated. The whole cultural edifice, and therefore the whole task of reconstruction, rests upon individuals reforming themselves. "A reconstructive animal is my definition of a human .... Any who claims to be unable to undertake the work of reconstruction is not a human, or only a dead human."14

14. ibid.
Although An subscribed to the psychological theory - often employed by Christian apologists - that people could transform their characters by a process of deliberate repetition of good actions until the will gladly and voluntarily falls in line, he was sensible of the indispensable spiritual quality that Christianity teaches must inspire the process: "Christian love". Where Yun Ch'i-ho and Lee Kwang-su defined this partly in terms of altruism, An likened it to self-denying philanthropy, and all praised it as the slayer of egotism. In a sermon delivered to the Korean Protestants in Shanghai, probably in 1919, An spoke on the theme of Christ entering the world as light shining in darkness, bearing the "life that was the life of men", found in the first chapter of John's Gospel. The self-sacrificing love expressed in God's sending his only son to die for men by the hand of men, An preached, was the essential ingredient of happiness. Since happiness was at once the offspring of civilisation and the fruit of Christian love, the nation An envisaged was a "Christian civilisation". An's position may be expressed as a syllogism:

A. Christian love is the essence of happiness.
B. Happiness is the product of true civilisation.
C. Therefore Christian love is the foundation of true civilisation.

In that God demanded this love of all people, An continued, obedience at this point became the entrance of God into human souls, and this was the meaning of Christ's words that those who followed his commands would

be in him and he in them. Hence, while in an immediate sense human survival and happiness depended on material support, as soon as the question of the knowledge necessary for the acquisition and proper use of materials was raised, it became evident that such knowledge had to be sought in a spirit of selfless love: a loveless knowledge would become a curse.16

Through An's works, readers of Tongkwang were subjected to relentless exposure of the evils of their society and a call to repent. Among other failures, An charged Koreans generally with irresponsibility towards their society, allowing it to be ruled by others, destructive envy of any who achieve good or become leaders, vainglory, unreliability, mendacity and chronic disunity.17 The remedy was to work at the apposite virtues: stewardship, mutual encouragement and trust, singlemindedness, hard work, honesty and co-operation. The work of repentance had to begin with the individual, whence evil derived, and was a task not to be despised or overlooked. It affected society like yeast in dough and denying its importance meant "deceiving the world and deceiving ourselves".18 Repentance was the source of genuine social transformation.

16. An Ch'ang-ho, "Sarang".

17. An Ch'ang-ho, "Tongp'o ege kohanūn kūl", 1924, Peking; "Tongjidūl kke chunūn kūl" 1926?: Collected Works. The contents of these pieces appeared in instalments in Tongkwang in May, June, August, October, November and December 1926 and in January and February 1927.

18. An Ch'ang-ho,"Tongjidūl kke chunūn kūl".
An's description of the happy society recalled the enthusiasm of the earlier Protestant reformers for the civic ethics they witnessed in Europe and America. Societies could be reduced to two basic types, the pitiless or cruel and the warmhearted or humane, and the two represented opposite poles. Korean social relationships were cold and hard as stone in family, school and the administration at every level: "The suffering of the Taehan race, devoid of all good will, is truly worse than Hell. Taehan society is a field of thorns. There is no joy in it." Not only so, it was among the worst societies in the world. "Having lived without ever a taste of a warmhearted society, we have the strength to endure an inhumane society. But let people who have lived in some other, humane society suddenly enter a cruel society like ours and they feel they are mortally done for." 19 This society was then contrasted with Western societies whose greatness stemmed from harmony and good will. Drawing on his observations of American family and social life, An described a society where marriages were founded on genuine affection, children and women were treated with dignity, promises were kept, individual freedom respected and where in all public life from local administration to standing in queues, citizens acted with mutual consideration. 20

The object of the Hũngsadan, or the Suyang Tonguhoe in Korea, was to become a model community of individuals united in reforming themselves


20. An Ch'ang-ho, op cit, and "Tongjdõl kke junũn kũl".
and their relationships along these lines. In 1922 Lee Kwang-su had already noted the necessity of a new, supportive environment within which individuals could put reconstruction principles into practice.21 An Ch'ang-ho had in mind the construction of a model village (and an attempt was made in Chen Chiang on the Yangtze in 1929) as a pilot model for all Korea. The community was intended to attract membership from the common people and so become the instrument of national renewal. It was no accident that An fashioned the Hûngsadan after the Protestant Church, requiring candidates for full membership to be sponsored by two members and to undergo training for up to six months in its principles before being admitted after a strict "catechism" test.22 The church still bore the future Korea within it, and truth, goodness and love were to be its pillars.

Such a society required unity. Just as the Rev. Kim P'il-su had warned that a nation divided against itself could not stand, An Ch'ang-ho likewise argued that a divided society would suffer a "fundamental death", and appealed to the motto of the American independence movement: "United we stand; divided we fall."23 Whilst organising the Shanghai Provisioned Government, An had insisted that "unity is the absolute",24 and later advanced St. Paul's comparison of communal

23. An Ch'ang-ho, "Tongp'o ege kohanûn kdîl".
unity with the functioning of a human body. How then did this absolute of unity fit in with respect for individual liberty and conscience?

An Ch'ang-ho's answer falls into two parts. First, he argued that room for free expression of opinion could in any case be found only where there existed unity on essential areas of human conduct and social ethics. This essential unity was spiritual and would create the atmosphere within which human liberty could breathe and social and political pluralism thrive. The second part of the argument, based on the first, concerned the process of public opinion. As each member of society, after consulting reason and conscience, advanced his own views a body of public opinion formed from which issued the public verdict, the nation's "will, cry and command". In short, spiritual unity was the source of national unity, not directly, but via the public opinion it enlivened.

The common will had to be pursued through a concrete organisation, which in sovereign states was ideally the government headed by a chief executive. Koreans had to create their own national guardian and executor of the common will, but this touched a raw nerve: the issue of leadership. Realising that amongst Korea's youth a contradiction

25. An Ch'ang-ho, "Sarang".


was sensed between egalitarian ideals and submission to a leader. An sought to dispel this "misunderstanding" with the analogy of an orchestra, the beauty of whose musical harmony depended on each skilled player following the conductor. At times, when active in the organisation of the Provisional Government, An carried his principles of unity and leadership almost to the point of advocating a species of state-absolutism. "Obedience is the ultimate and greatest condition of unity," he proclaimed .... "Disobedience towards the government's orders by any individual citizen is treachery." He dismissed any "individual liberty" that conflicted with the interests of national unity as "self-centered and egotistical". But these more extreme doctrines were hammered out in the heat of the "political war" during the first six months of the Provisional Government and disappeared after 1921, never reaching the Korean readership of the Tongkwang. There was some ambiguity here, characteristic of utilitarian social thought, over which was, as Benjamin Schwartz expresses it, the "ultimate beneficiary" of individual labour and perfection - the individual or social (or national) unit.

28. An Ch'ang-ho, "Tongp'o ege kohanūn kūl".

29. An Ch'ang-ho, "Yuk tae saōp", Tongnip Shinmun, 8 October 1920. (This newspaper must not be confused with the Independence Club paper of the same name.)

30. Sanong (ie. An Ch'ang-ho), "Onul ūi Chosón haksaeng", Tongkwang, No.8, December 1926, p.3.

An was obviously interested in creating a "good" society in material and ethical senses, and his analogy of an orchestra recalls L.T. Hobhouse's view that a man is properly free "when he is controlled by principles and rules which all society must obey". But an important qualification must be made. An would not have been happy with Hobhouse's statement that freedom is "not so much a right of the individual as a necessity of society". His exhortations were based on the belief that Korean society was rotten because traditional social thinking had not respected the rightful freedom and sanctity of the individual. A society which violated individual freedom was crooked by definition, since it dealt carelessly with rights and dignity given by God. An was a methodological individualist and in the late 1920s refused to move with his colleagues towards a collectivist form of liberalism.

The determining feature of An's individualism was the ethico-spiritual theory of the origin of human liberty which he shared with other Protestant self-reconstruction nationalists. An was therefore opposed to the "immoral" idea of utilising egotistical drives to create a well-ordered society. (Rousseau, surprisingly, hardly inspires any comment in the nationalist literature.) From the outset Western "Protestant" individualism was valued by Korean reformers as the


33. *ibid*, p.123.

antithesis of the selfishness they detected in Korea's family-centred society, and even capitalism had been envisaged, not as a motive to personal gain or as enlightened self-interest, but as service to others. The Korean Protestants' concept of liberty had no place for an untrammeled freedom, for true freedom was constrained by self-denying love. The individualism An described in Tongkwang articles was therefore consciousness of individual responsibility and involved sacrifice, compassion, fidelity to conscience and reason, respect for others and commitment to social welfare.  

The first important intimation of the later move towards collectivist liberalism appeared in articles contributed to Tongkwang from August 1926 by Kim Yun-gyŏng, who gave the subjects of liberty and national culture an Hegelian twist. Soon after Kim's return to Korea in 1922 an Hegelian Society was formed, and for a moment it appeared that certain lines in An's thought would be transformed into an all-embracing doctrine of the state as the highest manifestation of national spirit, the supreme representative of the Absolute Ego. But Kim Yun-gyŏng stopped short of portraying the state as the father of culture, which would have reversed the self-reconstruction tradition on the relationship between nation and state besides playing dangerously into Japanese hands. Instead he concentrated on the individual and society, national unity and universal civilisation or cosmic consciousness. Much of Kim's argument dealing with philosophical categories

35. An Ch'ang-ho, op cit, pp.2-5; An Ch'ang-ho, "Tongjidŭl kke chunŭn kŭl", Collected Works.

36. Kim Yun-gyŏng serialised his treatise in Tongkwang, Nos. 4-13, August 1926 - May 1927. Thereafter, a teacher at the Methodist Paehwa College, Kim devoted himself to the standardisation and popularisation of the vernacular script, Hangŭl.
is abstruse and probably had minimal impact on Korean nationalism. But Kim also gave strong and clear support for ethical nationalism, rivalled perhaps only by Lee Kwang-su as a transmitter of Hŭngsadan ideals.

Kim Yun-gyōng implicitly repudiated the former Protestant nationalist subscription to a social-Darwinist definition of social and national life as survival of the fittest and heralded the adoption of an organic concept of society as mutual aid. Since all "concepts are reflections of the world outside the ego", Kim argued, the essence of the self embraced social factors. All reality was thus interrelated and social misery was the result of disunity caused by individuals attempting to live without reference to society. Social conflict was a disease, not the source of evolutionary progress in history; whereas national unity produced a healthy civilisation, the grounds of all liberty. Kim opined that Hegel's teaching that the moral quality of an individual increases according to the extent one favours the absolute over the relative ego "contains a profound truth", for the relative world was akin to Hell. Those who realise the absolute ego within themselves, that is, those who identify with and live for society, have found their true self and true freedom.37

Although Kim portrayed society as a moral structure in his articles, it is clear from his terminology that he adhered to a view of the individual as a cell whose only possible fulfilment was in its belonging to the social organism. In this he appealed to the British idealist

philosopher T.H. Green. By thus suggesting that the individual was not an ontologically independent member of society Kim proposed a different solution to social relationships from An Ch'ang-ho's vision of a "humane" society (有情社会). Kim's "society" consisted of humans related to each other by virtue of their ultimately indistinguishable identity with the Absolute Ego of the social organism, and the scheme was monistic. An's vision was of a "society" of distinct, indivisible, self-contained individuals united by the only power capable of relating such independent beings, namely, spiritual love. An rejoiced in the distinct identity of individual persons wherein lay their inviolability and opportunity to "deny" themselves, and his unambiguous monotheism makes his position more authentically Protestant. But although the Hegelian terminology was later dropped, Kim's viewpoint soon dominated, and An in later years was among the minority in this respect. But on the practical level Kim Yun-gyŏng enthusiastically advanced the "Four Great Principles" of Truth, Ability, Loyalty and Courage and his support of An's broad, positive definition of nationalism made them allies.

Like An Ch'ang-ho, who attributed to the belief in racial grounds of unity the "ruin of mankind", Kim Yun-gyŏng struck out against the "narrow militarist" view of nationalism that defined itself in terms of an enemy. Although for the present "the nation is the greatest manifestation of united, common consciousness", Kim yearned for the realisation of the Stoic and Christian ideal of a higher consciousness

38. Kim Yun-gyŏng, "In'gyŏk gwa tan'gyŏl", Tongkwang, No.6, October 1926, p.6.
embracing all humanity. This ideal, he complained, was frequently misunderstood by "narrow" nationalists as anti-nationalism, but "just as family life is not inconsistent with national life ... so the common, united life of all humanity is not a contradiction of national life and neither is national life inconsistent with the common life of all mankind." The health of one nation contributed to the health of the whole world, and this rather than racial hatred had to inspire Korean nationalism. 41

The influence of this position inside Korea is certain but difficult to quantify. The Japanese authorities noted that Hungsadan ideas had already made considerable inroads among the "rising, progressive youth" in the P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces by the end of 1920. 42 Until it was banned in February 1933, the Tongkwang attracted supportive articles on ethical nationalism, personal reconstruction and national unity from numbers of influential Protestant leaders who were not all members of the Suyang Tonguhoe. By 1927 contributors included the Protestants Kim Ch'ang-t'ok, Kim Chi-hwan, Kim Ch'ang-se, Yi Il, Yi Yun-je, Yun Ch'i-ho, Yi Sang-jae, Yi Sung-hun, Chŏn Yŏng-t'aek, Sŏ Chae-p'il, Mun Il-p'yŏng and the Osan College director Myong I-hang, and also Christian socialists such as Yi Sun-t'aek, Pak Hi-do and Kim Yŏng-je. The support of Cho Man-sik, fast emerging as the most influential Protestant and nationalist in Korea, was well-known, while the basic concurrence of Ch'ŏndogyo and Buddhist leaders such as Yi Chong-rin and Han Yong-un further extended

41. Kim Yun-gyŏng, " Ing'yŏk ūi hangnichŏk haeŭi", Tongkwang, No.4, August 1926, pp.6-10.

42. GGPAB Kôkei 37234, 24 November 1920: Kokugai jôhô, "Shanhai futei Senjin no soshiko seru kakushu dantai." (CDU part 3, chapter 2, pp.418-420.)
the movement's influence. The Christian church itself had been growing steadily since 1920 as prominent Christians such as Rev. O Hwa-yōng, a Methodist member of the "Thirty-Three", attracted large crowds to the evangelistic meetings he commenced on release from prison late in 1922. By 1935 the Christian population approached half a million out of a population of twenty million and was the only religion in Korea besides Shintoism recording growth.

The Suyang Tonguhoe leaders judged they had growing support, and in January 1927 the Tongkwang carried an announcement, under its prospectus, of the creation of the Tongkwang Support Group. The purpose was to expand its membership to "many tens of thousands", and to secure an economic base. Ordinary members were to pay 3 hwan per annum, while donations of 50 hwan or more entitled donors to life membership. Coming only one month before the creation of the Shinganhoe, the announcement of the Tongkwang Support Group coincided with renewed interest in political movements, however, and once more the self-reconstruction movement was obliged to defend its nonpolitical form.

43. The concurrence of the Ch'ŏndogyo and Buddhist nationalist leadership was clearer in relation to economic movements, and is mentioned in chapter 8. Yun Ch'i-ho and Lee Chong-rin worked well together, establishing the Yŏnnonghoe ( ) in the early 1930's: Kim Kyu-hwan, Ilje ŭi Ŭllon-Sŏnjŏn Chŏngch'ae k, Seoul, Iu Publishing Co., 1978, p.258.

44. Donga Daily, 12 December 1922.


46. Tongkwang, No.9, January 1927, p.39.
The self-reconstruction ideology was susceptible to manipulation by the Japanese, especially with regard to its political nonresistance principle. The Japanese Seoul Press, for example, presented Yun Ch'i-ho's argument against the practicality of the March First Movement as counsel to the weak to submit to the strong and to forget about independence. In November 1920 Mr. Maruyama, Head of the Government-General Police Affairs Bureau, had delivered a speech in support of the then pro-Japanese Chosôn Daily, in which he acknowledged that the belief that steady, peaceful progress in Korean culture would achieve Korean independence would, if left alone, become a serious problem to the administration. It was therefore necessary to devise a way of harmonising cultural movements with Government-General objectives: "We must instil in the Koreans an awareness of the need to subscribe to a higher idea than subservience to a feverish search for the Fatherland." The increase in the number of industrial labourers from 55,000 in 1920 to 102,000 in 1930 made the Japanese anxious that the educated nationalists favour nonresistance tactics, lest they join forces with the labourers.

Opponents of the nonresistance principle were quick to notice this vulnerability and accused its apologists of lulling national consciousness to sleep on behalf of the Japanese. The most sensational attack

47. Seoul Press, 8 March 1919.
49. ibid, p.174.
was contained in a short story, *The Great Battle of the Dragons*, written in 1926 in Peking by Shin Ch'ae-ho, who influenced the rise of anarchism in Korea. Since Shin had been a foundation member of the Ch'önghyon Hakuhoe in 1907 and was formerly impressed with Christianity, his attack, which amounted to a bitter repudiation of Christ's teachings, was all the more important.

In Shin's allegory there are two dragons, one named Miri and the other simply Dragon. Miri represents passive subservience, found in traditional Eastern philosophy and in Christianity, while Dragon personifies the revolutionary, anarchic spirit flowing from the West. Miri arrives on the scene in 1868 (the year of the Meiji Restoration) and by soft talk about security and survival, seduces the people to accept colonial rule. Suddenly, Christ appears in a village church and begins spreading the "fraud and trickery" by which he had already deceived the West. Christ, an evil sorcerer, bewitched people's minds: "By lies, 'Blessed are they that suffer, blessed are the poverty-stricken,' he deceived those who had lost their nation and the unpropertied masses into thinking they were holy, thus making them forget their real enemy and dream of a sham heaven, and so granting every convenience to the power HOLDERS and rulers ...."51 Then Dragon slays Christ on behalf of the people who rise up and demolish all structures of society and administration and religion, proclaiming "all things on earth to be the common possession of all".52


51. Shin Ch'ae-ho, "Yong gwa Yong ūi tae kyŏkjŏn", in *ibid*, Supplementary Volume, p.283.

52. *ibid*, p.286.
The people thereupon "named the whole globe the Kingdom of Earth and announced the total severance of all intercourse with heaven".\(^{53}\) As for the diehards still looking for God, they are mocked as "faithful slaves".\(^{54}\)

By the mid-1920s Shin Ch'ae-ho was no more a friend to political nationalism than the likes of Yun Ch'i-ho and Lee Kwang-su, for he desired to free the nation - and all nations - not by installing a Korean government in place of the Japanese regime, but by destroying all governments, all "states", without exception.\(^{55}\) Christianity in Korea was a double obstacle to freedom, for it not only prevented resistance to the real enemy of state power but also taught that the people's "real" enemy was the evil that was within them - a "superstition". In a back-handed way Shin acknowledged, as had Mr. Maruyama, that Christianity and the self-cultivation movement were a force in Korean society to be reckoned with. But combined with similar criticism from the right and left wings of the nationalist movement, Shin's charge that the self-reconstruction movement was an effectual prop to the

\(^{53}\) ibid, p.286.

\(^{54}\) ibid, p.296.

\(^{55}\) Many modern Korean nationalists wish to use Shin Ch'ae-ho as a "true" nationalist. In 1925, one Pyôn Yong-no praised Shin as an "ultra-nationalist" (國族主義者), in Xæbyŏk: (Tanjae Shin Ch'ae-ho chŏnjip, Supplementary Volume, p.597f.) But I agree with Professor Lee Ki-baik's judgment that by the mid-1920s Shin can hardly be used for nationalist purposes, (Lee Ki-baik, "Nationalism in Tanjae'e Historical Study", pp.4-10). A thorough study of Shin's position in Korean nationalism especially in the 1920s has recently appeared, written by a Korean closely involved in Hungsadan movements since the liberation: Shin Il-ch'ŏl Shin Ch'ae-ho ùi Yŏksa Saseong Yŏn'gu, Seoul, Koryŏ University Press, 1981, chapters 4-7 especially.
Japanese regime fuelled debate within the Suyang Tonguhoe over the ever latent problem of its political philosophy.

At two meetings in the second half of 1926 Cho Pyŏng-ok, a Presbyterian who had earned a doctorate in economics at Columbia University, strongly urged that the Suyang Tonguhoe change into a political organisation. Cho had been active in the Hŭngsadan in the U.S.A. and his views reflected a move there for more radical and direct action led by Kwak Im-t'ae. Simultaneously, Chu Yo-sŏp led a group in the Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai in urging the adoption of socialism. His brother in Korea, Chu Yo-han, thereupon claimed that the emphasis on self-cultivation was a great hindrance to attracting youth and suggested it was time to wind up the "cultivation of real ability" line and commence political training for direct revolutionary manoeuvres.

The Hŭngsadan had a bad year overall in 1926. The Far Eastern Bureau almost split, while conflicts between Sŏnu Hyŏk and Ch'a Ri-sŏk held back any progress in Nanking where the Hŭngsadan's Tongmyŏng Institute was on the verge of collapse. In Manchuria, the Hŭngsadan leader, the Rev. Kim Pyŏng-cho (one of the "Thirty-Three"), was afflicted by a temporary ban imposed on his church school in Hsing-ching and on farming rights, while the unsettled political

56. Hŭngsadan Oship Jumyŏn Sa, p.69.


58. An Ch'ang-ho, letter to Han Sŏng-gon and Chang Ri-do, 2 August 1927: Collected Works; Shōwa jūnen ni okeru shakai undō no jōkyō: "Minzokushugi undō". (NKH, Vol.7.)

59. An Ch'ang-ho, op cit.
climate in China and the 1925 Mitsuya Agreement signed by Chang Tso-lin for China severely limited Korean nationalist activities from Nanking to Manchuria. An Ch'ang-ho therefore observed the theoretical disunity of the Hûngsadan with dismay and called Chu Yo-han to Nanking in September 1926 for discussions.

An Ch'ang-ho shared with Chu his unease lest the Hûngsadan become a politically partisan body. As individuals, members would naturally hold their respective political views, but should the Hûngsadan nail its colours to any single political mast there was a serious danger of it disintegrating in the wake of changes in the direction of the ideological wind: its fate must not be linked to the fortunes of any political faction. The Hûngsadan had a distinct, indispensible role in the independence struggle, An insisted, but allowed that when a broad revolutionary party was formed it could positively aid the revolution as one section of the larger movement. Chu consented to this and returned to Korea. 60 In 1927 An toured the branches in North China and Manchuria and then wrote to the American Headquarters on the issue: "I have already said this time and again," he chided, "but placed as we are in a revolutionary era we shall inevitably have to engage in some revolutionary movement. But for this there will need to be a special revolutionary organ distinct from the self-cultivation organs." Plans were under way, An revealed, to form a single, large independence party on this understanding. 61

60. Chôsen Sôtokufu hômukyoku, 1938, loc cit.
61. An Ch'ang-ho, op cit.
In Korea, the response to the Tongkwang Support Group advertisement was evidently encouraging, according to information Chu Yo-han published on the spread of self-cultivation groups up to July 1927. But his leading articles reveal a change of emphasis from individuals to social structures. Whilst affirming that "Koreans fighting for the construction of a new destiny must first possess sound personalities", Chu also argued that the social environment determined individual character to a considerable degree. This had not been particularly denied by self-reconstruction theorists and was partly why pilot communities were planned, but Chu charged the self-cultivation movement with forgetting the social dimension.

People's lifestyles have been socialised to the extent that it is now recognised that since the individual cannot depart from society, it is not a matter of an individual's society but of a society's individual. Leaders of cultivation movements must therefore never forget that any individual reconstruction that does not involve social reconstruction is totally ineffective ....

Since it is difficult for individuals in an unhealthy society to become healthy themselves, it is only after society is made healthy that individuals can be made genuinely healthy. To build a sound society is the fundamental antidote forwarded by the cultivation movements; so the essence of our movement then, is to prepare sound combat units for the construction of this healthy society.

Our path is in this direction alone. From makeshift personal reconstruction to social reconstruction!62

Social reconstruction meant neither Shin Ch'ae-ho's demolition of its formal structures nor the Marxist programme of social power passing to the proletariat. It was still a matter of philanthropy.

Chu issued a call to all citizens already equipped — specialists, skilled workers, scientists, businessmen, ministers and teachers — to band together and create the new social environment. Alongside the Marxist doctrine,

The free development of each will be the condition of the free development of all,

the self-reconstructionists proposed,

The sound development of individuals will result in the sound development of society.

In form, the two appear close enough yet in substance there was a vital difference. In the former, development supposed a material base; in the latter, an ethical base. Chu Yo-han was determined to show that his movement’s ethics were not the accomplices of the ruling powers that critics claimed. In July 1927, he called for resistance:

We must discard the morality of obedience and adopt the morality of resistance. Obeying one’s parents is ‘filial piety’: well, we shall have to throw filial piety out. And if obedience to the king be called loyalty, we shall have to throw out loyalty also. If obedience to seniority, to power-holders, to the rich be called morality, then we cannot but do away with morality.

This is a time for resistance. Today is the time to rise up under the banner of revolt....

The only obedience wanted, Chu concluded, was to Truth and Goodness.

It is remarkable that the Japanese censors allowed this to be printed.

63. Chu Yo-han, "Nalgún todŏk ŭi sae yongch'ŏ", Tongkwang No.15, July 1927, p.3.
The compulsory ethical instruction introduced to schools in 1915 included exhortations to practise filial piety and to celebrate festivals and ceremonies honouring the Japanese Emperor. "Obedience to the king" was a meaningless expression in Korea unless it referred to the Japanese Emperor.

Chu's call for resistance and moral radicalism was an attempt to imbue the self-reconstruction movement with manliness, to restore the cutting edge which the reconstruction movement with its Protestant values had formerly displayed, to sound out once more a prophetic note to Koreans enfeebled by decayed values. It was also a challenge to colonial power, which also would be swept away before an ethical fervour implacable towards all obstacles in the path of Truth and Goodness. It was designed to defuse doubts over the relevance of self-reconstruction "moralism" and to present it instead as the centre of uncompromising resistance to the very values and philosophy - of both Koreans and Japanese - which were keeping Korea enslaved. This was the Korean "satyagraha", the force of truth that no power or evil could extinguish.

But Chu's articles appeared more "radical" to many Koreans because the ethical focus had shifted from the individual or human nature to the social system. Chu was not referring to the function of a model community as a "plausibility structure" but was advancing the theory that the social milieu was responsible for the privations of humanity. This not only vitiated the Christian doctrine of original sin but also implied a methodological collectivism. Chu did not conclude, as one might have expected, that initiating change at the level of social structure was really political intervention, but as editor of
the Tongkwang he represented the general rise of a collectivist liberalism in Korea in the late 1920's.

The Tongkwang's articles paid off. Whereas the Hongsadan branches abroad remained relatively weak, in 1928 the Suyang Tonguhoe grew in strength and numbered among its supporters members of political organisations and some socialists, albeit "ethical" socialists. Thereafter, the focus of Hongsadan ideology and activity remained in Korea. This was a personal vindication for Lee Kwang-su and a triumph for the belief that Korea rather than the diaspora was the true arena of nationalism. In 1929 the three major Suyang Tonguhoe branches in Seoul, P'yongyang and Sŏnch'ŏn reorganised with renewed confidence that their movement was directly related to the struggle for independence.

A Christian Definition of Revolution

The 1929 reorganisation reflected the desire to sharpen the movement and to move away from individualist liberalism. The Suyang Tonguhoe was renamed simply the Tonguhoe, thus dropping "self-cultivation" from the title; the words "Chŏson new culture movement" in the Constitution were changed to "new Chŏson construction movement"; and an article was inserted describing the body as one detachment of the whole revolutionary forces. The Central Committee of the Tonguhoe set about consciously focusing the movement on independence and in February 1931 agreed upon a Four-Year

64. See below, Chapter 8, p.
65. Chŏsen Sotokufu homukyoku, 1938, loc cit.
Plan. In year one, discipline and active service, such as participation in "circuit lectures", and reform of life-styles were to be emphasised. In year two, the youth were to be organised as Young Pioneers, trained daily in ideology and physical fitness and sent out on periodic recruitment drives and campaigns to abolish illiteracy and so on. Year three was reserved for promotion among women and securing financial support, while year four was for consolidation of the above areas, special attention to enlightenment of the masses, and preparation of all members for action. It was agreed also that articles advocating some form of home-rule or political accommodation and any critical of socialism would be barred from future Tongkwang issues. 66

The Four Year Plan was not a great success. The Great Depression weakened the movement's economic base, and the Japanese operations in Manchuria from 1931 were accompanied in Korea by the termination of Saitō's "cultural" politics, the implementation of rapid industrialisation in northern Korea and renewed suppression of nationalist and communist movements. "Circuit lectures" were banned, and the February 1933 issue of Tongkwang, its fortieth issue, proved to be the last. The communists, too, failed in three attempts to reorganise a party inside Korea between 1929 and 1932. 67 In response, some on the political right turned to terrorism, while the communist movement centred once more on Koreans in exile. The self-reconstruction nationalists, however, began to return to their former conviction that revolutionary struggle was

66. ibid, loc cit.
67. See Suh Dae-sook, op cit, chapter 5 and pp.190-192.
primarily ethical in character. At the same time, they began to oppose Marxist-Leninists whose divisive tactics they came to abhor.

An Ch'ang-ho became more convinced by 1931, after the Far Eastern Bureau failed to establish the Ideal Village, that "the ruin of our Fatherland is not due solely to Japan's imperialist invasion, but is a result of the lack of national character in its citizens themselves". In February, Tongkwang published his "Plea to the Youth concerning Perfection of Character and Training in Unity". An denied the two tasks were irrelevant or inapt: "The fundamental cause of all our failures is the feebleness of our national unity. This was the cause, too, of our initial collapse." In May, when the Japanese took advantage of in-fighting between the radical left and moderates in the Shinganhoe to prohibit national organisations, a second letter from An was published. Surely the cause of Korea's tragedy was now abundantly clear: "If we act together we shall survive; if not, we shall perish - that is our situation!" All else was secondary, and all else secondary could be achieved only after unity had been achieved.

Ironically, in April 1932 An Ch'ang-ho was seized by Japanese police in Shanghai during a raid on Koreans in retaliation against

68. Shōwa jūnen ni okeru shakai undo no jōkyō, loc cit. (NKH, Vol.7.)
70. Sanong, "Hŏnshinchŏk chŏngshin ūi paeyang", Tongkwang, No.21, May 1931, p.42.
terrorist activities directed by Kim Ku. An was brought to Korea, and although no connexion was established with the terrorist Aeguk Dan in Shanghai he was sentenced to penal servitude in Taegu prison, where he remained till January 1936. Four months after his arrest, Chu Yo-Han composed a leading article for Tongkwang which revealed renewed commitment to An's position on the nature of the Hünsadan movement:

There are many who consider the Tonguhoehoe to be a political organisation. This is fundamentally in error. All criticism which ensues from this mistaken view must necessarily miss the mark .... Though one part of our national power, it would be a departure from the facts to identify it as a force of 'nationalism' where that signifies certain fixed essential political features. (Emphasis added.)

Whilst some might mock it as an "Everlasting Retirement Centre", Chu was convinced the Tonguhoehoe creed was vital to Korea's future, for two reasons.

First, the record of Korean social life over the last 300 or even 40 years shows that there is historical value in 'establishing trust', 'promising the spirit of unity', 'unity in quality before quantity' and so on ....

Second, under the present circumstances in Korea, there is cultural-historical significance of major importance in the Tonguhoehoe enterprise .... Depending on one's point of view, one may regard this [movement] as the root and trunk of all other movements.

The reason the Tonguhoehoe insisted on rejecting political colourings was not, Chu ensured his readers, because politics was downgraded but stemmed rather from a recognition of the importance of politics as a distinct field of action in its own right. Moreover was it not self-evident that in Korea an overt, legal body such as the Tonguhoehoe could not become politically active? Reiterating the Tonguhoehoe objection to "narrow" views of nationalism, Chu concluded:
The political inclinations of a Tonguhoe member will be decided at that point when he or she participated in some political activity .... And that activity will be pursued not through the Tonguhoe but through a separate, political body .... To judge and criticise a programme professing to be just one part as though it were the whole is, whether intentionally or not, a kind of demagoguery.71

Likewise, it was demagoguery for a particular political option to claim exclusive rights over the nation, and so the Tonguhoe finally expressed open opposition to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of revolution. The self-reconstruction emphasis on social reconciliation was of course a "political" viewpoint that was antagonistic to any class-conflict theory. In January 1931 Lee Kwang-su urged awareness of the Tonguhoe's distinct philosophy of change. He attacked the Korean communists in Manchuria for bringing terrible suffering upon innocent Koreans, women and children, through their methods and opposed the violence of their spirit with Christ's command not to hate but to love one's foes.72 In the Y.M.C.A. journal, Ch'ongnyŏn (青年), Lee drew a sharp distinction between the Christian and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary methods. Concerned that the term "revolution" was used by many to mean only a violent class confrontation, Lee predicted that before long the "Christian" definition of revolution would be accepted as the genuine one. Lee presented the differences between the two forms of revolution as four major contrasts:

71. Chu Yo-han, "Tonguhoe nŭn muŏshin'ga?" Tongkwang, No.36, August 1932, pp.36-37.

1. Christianity prescribes prayer for those who hate you and love towards enemies. Marxist-Leninism demands hatred of the 'bourgeoisie'.

2. Christian revolution is founded upon meeting class power and antagonism with love and upon suffering oneself to be killed. Marxist-Leninist revolution means violent destruction of the opposing class.

3. Christianity binds its army to a cross, Marxist-Leninism to guns.

4. The eyes of Christian revolutionaries are filled with tears of love and forgiveness, those of Marxist-Leninists with fires of hatred and vengeance.73

Far from being original, the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution was faithful to the dismal pattern of revolution throughout human history, a pattern that never brought the promised benefits. Lee cited Gandhi as one pursuing the example of Christ, yet even he had not attained the full Christian attitude which went beyond nonviolent resistance to positive prayer for one's enemy. But how and what was Christ trying to revolutionise? Not bourgeois or proletarian society nor any other society based on violence, strife and evil, but rather, "He purposes to root out, exterminate and commit wholly to the flames all thoughts, desires and habits of malice, belligerence and violence residing in the heart of humankind." Since this demanded unyielding determination it implied a far from peaceful revolution. But whereas Marxist-Leninists filled rivers with the blood of their victims, Christians had to fill them with their own blood. Since the day Christ

shed his own blood at Golgotha, innumerable martyrs had offered theirs to save all the humanitarian thought now existing in the world. The martyrdom was not over: not until all the prisons were filled with Christians would the systems based on hatred and violence disappear the world over.74

Lee Kwang-su's reverence for Tolstoy was known in Korea since 1912 at least, and his novels, such as Chaesaeng (再生: regeneration, or resurrection), reflect Tolstoy's influence. In 1932, aged forty years, Lee wrote the novel Hŭk (Mother Earth), which was published in serial form in the Donga Daily. The hero of the novel was a peasant youth named Hŏ Sung, who left for university training and later "returned to the land" to live among and enlighten the rural people.75 By another author, Hŏ Sung might have been portrayed as a fiery Leninist revolutionary, but Lee's character embodied the ideals of the self-sacrificing "friend of the people", a mystical lover of the land and its inhabitants.

Lee Kwang-su's writings on "Christian" revolution were part of a conscious return by Protestant leaders of the self-reconstruction movement to the spiritual roots of their ideology, prompted by the failure of the Shinganhoe to maintain unity.

During the final year and one half of the Shinganhoe movement there occurred an unexpected rapprochement between Protestants such as

74. ibid.
Yun Ch'i-ho and Pak Hi-do and a renewed commitment to nonpolitical ideals. Between 1931 and 1933 a number of groups had formed under the leadership especially of Yun Ch'i-ho, An Chae-hong, Lee Kwang-su and Cho Man-sik, all aimed at the ever-elusive ideal of a unified, dependable national organisation. The attempts were mostly frustrated by the old rivalries between the radical left and the culturalists and between Christianity and Ch'ŏndogyo, and the only groups to get off the ground were those organised by or in conjunction with Yun Ch'i-ho, being the least "political" organisations of them all. But a united, successful stand against the political-revolutionary tone of Shin Hŭng-u's Positive Faith Corps from 1933 to 1935 by the Tonguhoe, Hŭngŏp Kurakbu and other Christian organisations enlivened hopes for Christian nationalist unity.

On New Year's Day 1936, Cho Man-sik wrote an article for the Shin Donga, the cultural journal of the Donga Daily Company, on the "Reorganisation of a Central Institution". The confused state of Korean society was a result of having no aim and no clear idea of means. "In the social life of our people there is a degree of disorganisation unequalled in any other society under Heaven," Cho charged. After outlining a comprehensive programme of urban and rural reform in industry, education, culture and social welfare, Cho proposed the formation of a central organ to co-ordinate all these activities in city and countryside.

76. GGPAB, 1939, "Saikin ni okeru Chōsen chian jōkyō" (CDU, part 2, chapter 3, p.345.)

77. A Japanese report claims Shin's Positive Faith Corps was modelled on the Hitler Youth movement, on Hitler's idea of creating a "positive Christianity". (CDU, part 2, chapter 3, p.343.) However in 1934 Shin lamented that "in these days of dictatorships and Fascisms, liberalism seems to have suffered a setback", and claimed that Christian thought was the "soul of liberalism". (Hugh Cynn, "Laymen and the Church", in Within the Gate, Northern Methodist Mission in Korea, 1934, p.119. Archives of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria: Korea Mission.)
He insisted that all such activity be based on "reform of life-style".\(^78\)

In another article published the same month in *Samch'öllì*, a journal contributed to by numbers of Protestants including Chu Yo-han and An Chae-hong, Cho reaffirmed that repentance was the only true beginning and foundation of worthwhile social change and called upon youth to sacrifice their talents, possessions and energy to the reconstruction of the nation.\(^79\) Cho here deliberately forwarded an ethical basis to revolution and denied that present action found justification only in immediate, visible historical results. In the same issue of *Samch'öllì* Yun Ch'i-ho added his own summons to "throw away all factionalism and adopt a common, united position".\(^80\)

In January 1936 also, An Ch'ang-ho was released from jail. At a gathering of nationalists on the 13th at the home of the Ch'öndogyo youth leader Yi Chong-rin, An launched into a defence of self-reconstruction principles.

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80. Yun Ch'i-ho, "Ilch'i tan'gyöl hagirül", in *ibid*, loc cit.
And what sort of social revolution is achieved by good-for-nothing characters? It all goes back to revolution of the personality .... Without revolution in character, even if one does abolish an evil social system, it will be followed by another bad system .... If the soil is bad, no matter how good the seed, it is still bad. 81

An then sought out Cho Man-sik, Paek Kwan-su, Lee Kwang-su, Kim Sŏng-su, Kim Pyŏng-no and other Protestant colleagues, to discuss action on Cho's proposals. 82

Since An was associated with the Tonguhoe and Yun Ch'i-ho and An Chae-hong with the Hŭngŏp Kurakbu, Cho Man-sik, formally affiliated to neither, was the ideal focus of Protestant unity. In February he again wrote on the formation of a central co-ordinating body 83 and followed this up with a speech at the Sŏnch'ŏn Y.M.C.A. which was reported in Ch'ongnyŏn in April. In the latter, Cho stressed that proclamation of the Gospel was not just one among other conditions of rural amelioration and so on, but was the alpha and omega of national revival: "in a word, it encompasses everything." Cho urged whole-hearted support for the "one district, one church" movement, which he hoped would give great impetus to the task of Christianising the social life of the nation. He appealed for large-scale evangelisation and for Korea's 300,000 Protestants to take the lead in uniting the people in

81. Discussion with Yi Chong-rin, 13 January 1936, recorded by a monk, Ch'ŏn An: Collected Works. Ch'un Wŏn is Lee Kwang-su's pen name.
social holiness. Through faith in Christ, Cho concluded, the masses would obtain a firm grasp on the essentials of life and become firmly united in common allegiance to the "ideal Great Man".84

Cho Man-sik observed a serious decline in the idealism which had inspired Koreans a decade earlier and which was replaced either by hedonism or cynical despair. An ideal, he believed, was "that which a people within the limits of its knowledge considers to be supreme." The ideal for which Koreans should strive was contained in Christ's words to the Jews and to all peoples at all times: "Seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these other things will be given to you as well." This was the meaning of Christ's ideal of "saving his people from their sins", and to pursue it, he gathered young men around him and trained them to live lives directed in all aspects towards that ideal.85

Cho acknowledged that, standing in the way of ideals, there were various material and circumstantial problems which had to be taken seriously. But he expressed confidence that the human spirit could surmount obstacles if individuals, through prayer, were empowered by God. Cho took issue with the Marxist doctrine of change:

According to the Marxist view where the material life controls the mental or spiritual life, there is, they say, some possibility of changing [people's ideals]. But in fact, people change their ideals very easily for any reason: the propertied due to their property, the


unpropertied due to their lack of property, the
learned because of their learning and the ignorant
because of their ignorance. 86

True, stable ideals, Cho believed, were spiritually inspired and
maintained and influenced change in social relations. Therefore
of all legacies Christian faith was the greatest that the present
generation could pass on to future generations. 87 The church had
to be made the centre of Korean national life, and unite the nation
around the ideal of "seeking first our people in righteousness". 88
This call to righteousness was supported also by a number of
independent Christians including the disciples of Uchimura Kanzō,
Kim Kyo-shin and Ham Sŏk-hŏn, a graduate of Osan College. 89

As a leading exponent of the ethical self-reconstruction ideology
by 1937 and the most widely respected and least tainted with parochial­
ism of the Protestant nationalists, Cho Man-sik revived the belief
of the Protestant church in its role as the reconstructive community.
However in mid-1937, as the Japanese invaded China, the Government-
General began placing such material obstacles in the path of Cho's
ideals that the movement, in an organisational sense, had to be abandoned.

86. *ibid*, *loc. cit.*


89. On Kim Kyo-shin, see Kim Chŏng-hwan, "Kin Kyŏ-shin no minzoku
seishinsateki isan", *Kari*, Vol.8, No.2, February 1979, and Min
Kyŏng-bae, "Kin Kyo-shin no mukyōkaishugi to Chŏsenteki kirisutokyō", *ibid*.
Ham Sŏk-hŏn's position is discussed in the concluding section
of Park Yong-shin's dissertation.
Social Transformation and Civilisation: Protestant or Confucian?  

Interpretation and evaluation of Asian nationalist movements which propose the priority of ideas or the need to establish an intellectual and cultural foundation for sociopolitical change, are complex assignments. The literature and debate on the "culturalist" movements in China from the late Ch'ing period reveal the subtleties of the subject and the possibility for widely divergent judgments.  

There is no comparable literature on the Korean experience to guide debate, yet the substantial involvement and influence of religious systems emerges as an inescapable, possibly unique factor in the development of Korean "cultural-intellectual" nationalism. It is also a complicating factor, for it adds to the tensions the "cultural" nationalists experienced in relation to the "political" nationalists on the one hand and the colonial rulers on the other. It complicates also the question of the principal sources of the Korean self-reconstruction or "cultural-intellectualist" tradition.  

Recently, in a rare discussion of the Korean case, Mr. Robinson has remarked of the "cultural nationalist" conception of social change issuing from cultural transformation that, "this idea was due, no doubt,  

90. As a subject in itself, this of course requires much greater space than can be afforded it here. I hope to be able to explore it in more detail in the future.  

to the continuing influence of Confucian thought ...." In the light of the Protestant Koreans' conscious redefinition of cultural transformation there would seem to be room for considerable doubt. Following Joseph Levensen, one might say that they simply used different terms to express the same ideals. This solution is not as easy as it might seem. For example, one might judge that the Korean leftist statement, "The common man, the masses, are the backbone of society", is no doubt a Confucian hangover, an expression of the maxim "The people are the foundation of the state" in modern terminology. But surely the important point is the introduction of a Marxist concept of the "people" which was not perceived in Confucianism. Likewise, the Korean Protestants' introduction to the task of social transformation of ethical and theological concepts which they had not detected in Confucianism, might suggest that they used the same (traditional) terms to express different ideals.

It is important to recognise that in reflecting on the source, means and ends of social change the Koreans were grappling with issues that are universal and that therefore the various alternatives open to humankind are not each the exclusive preserve of a particular tradition. Some traditions confirm each other. The idea of moral and cultural

93. ibid, p.257.
transformation and the emphasis on education are present in different senses in many cultures. The Koreans were subject to diverse influences. Lee Kwang-su's novel Hūk was inspired by the pre-bolshevick religious thinkers of Russia and their Vekhi movement. Lee used their principle of sobornost, a national-spiritual community which envisaged the solidarity of the intelligentsia with the people, the peasantry, or the narod. In July 1931 Song Ch'in-u established a Narod Movement sponsored by the Donga Daily, which continued until suppressed in 1935, because the Russian tradition presupposed a spiritual dynamic of change. The beliefs of Yun and An resemble also the American Christian social philosopher Henry George, whose writings influenced both Tolstoy and that doyen of English socialism, William Morris. Social reform, wrote George,

... is not to be secured by noise and shouting; by complaints and denunciation; by the formation of parties, or the making of revolutions; but by the awakening of thought and the progress of ideas. Until there be correct thought, there cannot be right action .... Power is always in the hands of the masses of men. What oppresses the masses is their own ignorance, their own short-sighted selfishness.

The great work of the present for [all] who would improve social conditions, is the work of education - the propagation of ideas.95

94. Kwak Pok-san, "Minjung kyemong üi son'gakjök chisŏng - Song Chin-u", in Han'guk Inmul Taegye, Vol.9, pp.105-114.

With regard to the ethical emphasis of Korean Protestants the problem is intricate, for comparison must be made not only with Confucianism but also with the amorphous assumptions of Western liberalism. An Ch'ang-ho placed great emphasis on moral training and likened moral citizens to skilled musicians. Herein lay the charge against him of moral elitism. Was this the moral elitism of Confucianism or a reflection of what has been termed the "élitist assumptions" of liberalism? For in China's case the liberal Yen Fu's linkage of democracy to the intellectual and moral quality of the people has been interpreted as a feature of Western liberalism's position on freedom and democracy.

The Korean Protestants actually made it reasonably clear what they valued in "Christian" ethics and how they regarded Confucianism. Yun Ch'i-ho held that morality was objective and universal and therefore approved of Confucian and Mencian ethics where they reflected this universalism. The question whether ethics were Confucian or Christian was a red herring: the real issue was the ethical focus of each system. Here, Yun and An rejected the "distortion" of the Confucian ethical obsession with filial piety and wished to replace it with the Christian focus on love, meaning altruism, philanthropy and self-sacrifice. Further, Confucianism was "empty" in a two-fold


97. See Schwartz, pp.72-73 and 84-87, especially his discussion of Yen Fu's philosophy of change: the "'change of heart' in an entirely new direction - a thorough transvaluation of values" (p.85) and the need for new, non-traditional education (p.87).
sense. First, it described ethics but could point people to no source of spiritual power that would enable them to practise them. Secondly, its morality was élitist, impracticable by the common people in many respects. 98

The charge of moral élitism was therefore ironic, for the self-reconstruction nationalists claimed they were introducing the Protestant "everyman's" ethic to everyday life. This reflects, perhaps, the Protestant designation of all believers as saints and priests which demands high ethical standards of the rank and file and insists, as it were, that they all join the moral élite. In Korea, such ethical demands were considered appropriate for members of the churches, but for An to demand the same of a national organisation was not. Yet to An and his colleagues, the church was the image of the new Korea.

It might be argued that the insistence that a "learned" person also be a "righteous" person is a Confucian influence, since Western philosophy, and the Christian John Newman, allowed that moral inferiority and intellectual excellence could coexist in one person. 99 This is a

98. Readers are referred here to Yun Ch'i-ho's views, discussed above, chapter 3, pp.103-105.

99. On Newman, see above, chapter 1, p.31. In a fascinating and provocative study of this sort of problem, Stanley Rosen points out that post-renaissance philosophy in the West is characterised by the detachment of "reason" from its "traditional affiliation" with the "good". He also argues that Christianity has allowed the "good" to lie outside the purview of rational investigation. Stanley Rosen, *Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1969, especially pp.xiv-xv and 140-197.
valid point, but needs to be qualified. The Protestants defined the "learned" and "righteous" differently from the Chosŏn neo-Confucian tradition: education was to be universal and pursued within the spiritual environment of the church, and in this context An spoke of the curse of a "loveless knowledge". Kim Ch'ang-se, a Tonguhoe member and a medical doctor, proposed the formula, "Know scientifically, act religiously", and claimed that it was in the West that knowledge and faith were regarded as two wheels on the same cart. 100 Though normally generous to other religious systems, An denounced the Chosŏn dynasty's cultural legacy for corrupting the people's religious outlook. "Korea is an ancient nation of 4000 years' standing," he noted. Unfortunately, contact with Western civilisation has come late, but Korea's [new] civilisation is one founded on Christianity and nationalism. 101

The self-reconstruction emphasis on creating "civilisation" suggests Confucian or traditional influence. An Ch'ang-ho's definition of civilisation as "beauty and light" reflects the traditional understanding of munmyŏng (wen-ming in Chinese) as brightness and literacy and moral authority. 102 An asserted that the task of cultural and national transformation was universal to humankind. 103 But just as Yun Ch'i-ho had reinterpreted the universal

100. Kim Ch'ang-se, "Kwahak gwa chonggyo", Tongkwang, No.12, April 1927, pp.53-61.

101. Interview with Western journalists in Shanghai, dated 9 September 1919. Collected Works.


103. See above, p.260.
responsibility of governments and peoples to manage their nation wisely in terms of the Christian principle of "stewardship", so An grounded the transformation of society and culture on "repentance". The iconoclastic flavour of his summons of the nation to radical repentance hardly seems to have been relativised by the traditional ideal of civilisation. Change was no longer pendular but teleological. Christianity did not simply replace Confucianism as the civilising agency; it constituted a new ideal of civilisation.

The traditional, positive evaluation of culture shared by self-reconstructionists did, however, have at least one clear influence, in that it inhibited the debate over the tension between faith and culture that has occupied Western Christianity. Yun Ch’i-ho is something of an exception, for his clearly transcendent ethical focus caused constant tension in his own relation to nationalist issues. Generally, the equation of human progress with cultural development, which was made by the Tonguhoe member Yi Kang-yŏl in 1927, was taken for granted. If ethics were universal and Christianity enabled their practice then "Christian" civilisation was the ultimate ideal of the nation. It was necessary therefore to demonstrate the practicality of the ideal by applying it to a practical area of existence: economics. Culturalism was only a part of the self-reconstruction programme, and it was in the economic field that its position in the nationalist landscape of the 1920s and 1930s emerged most clearly.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION: THE IDEAL ON TRIAL

Economic reconstruction shared equal place with education and political training on the 1907 Shinminhoe platform. It absorbed much of the attention of Yu Kil-jun and Namgung Ok before the annexation, and industrial education surrendered priority only to religious instruction in Yun Ch'i-ho's Songdo Yan-Hong College. Both Yi Sŏng-hun and Cho Man-sik had first celebrated their discovery of the new learning and religion by embarking on commercial enterprises, and trade, industry and economic mobility became characteristic of the Protestant communities in the north-western provinces in particular. 1 In his "Principles of Statecraft" Lee Kwang-su had likewise emphasised economic and cultural self-reconstruction equally.

The most tangible and immediate reminders of the Koreans' colonial status were of course their exclusion from the economic direction of their society and their consequent general poverty. Faithful to their doctrine of the spiritual and moral causes of Korea's subjection, Protestant self-reconstruction nationalists reminded their compatriots

that it was the absence of a sound economic national base which first invited foreign economic predations. Self-reliance or self-sufficiency became the watchword of their economic programmes, and the Korean Products Promotion Society (Chosŏn Mulsan Changnyŏhoe) inaugurated in 1922 by Cho Man-sik was the largest and most explicit embodiment of their principles. As such, the Society engendered considerable debate among nationalists and socialists of all shades. Before the movement is examined, a brief description of the economic context will be given.

Economic Background

The Oriental Development Company's land holdings increased dramatically between 1920 and 1931 as the following table illustrates.

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<th>Year</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931 (Approx.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td>85,500</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Japanese holdings in 1930 accounted for 60% of arable land, while Korean landlords were required by law to have Japanese managers.

2. Ch'oe Ho-jin: Han'guk Kyŏngje Sa, pp.220-221.
Considering that during the period under examination the Japanese in Korea represented only 3% of the total population (of 17-19 million: about 80% being rural) and these mostly officials, bureaucrats, patrolmen and soldiers, it is clear a small number of Japanese directly controlled the larger part of Korean agriculture and supervised the remainder.

Until the operation of the Yen Bloc economy of the 1930s priority was given to agricultural industry. The most intensive agricultural development occurred during the 1920s when the Rice Production Expansion Plan was implemented in Korea following the 1918 and 1920 Rice Riots in Japan. This plan was consciously designed to achieve imperial self-sufficiency in rice and to solve the problem of rising rice prices after World War I.\(^5\) Hence although rice output in Korea almost doubled between 1910 and 1938, export of rice to Japan in the same period increased twenty-fold, accounting for 40% of Korea's annual yield; Korean rice consumption declined by almost one half, replaced mainly by millet imported from Manchuria.\(^6\) The Japanese had noted in 1913 that Korean farmers even in the capital province of Kyŏnggi often subsisted on "the roots of grasses and the tender bark of trees"\(^7\), and Governor-General Ugaki observed the same situation in the 1930s.\(^8\) As agricultural development progressed the proportion of Korean farmers tilling their own soil declined and tenancy increased. Between 1922

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and 1933 tenancy increased from 40.6% to 55.2% of rural households. But excluded from land or labour opportunities, Korean farmers were obliged to emigrate in large numbers from the 1920s to Manchuria, Mongolia, North China, Hawaii and Japan. Nearly 140,000 Koreans emigrated to Manchuria from 1920 to 1929, while the number of Korean labourers in Japan (mainly Osaka) rose from less than 30,000 in 1920 to over 230,000 in 1933.

Non-agricultural industry showed a steady quantitative increase from before the annexation with the construction of railways and development of mining. Zaibatsu firms - Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Nagoya - established themselves in Korea in the mid-1920's to augment beer, paper, flour, cement, magnesium, nitrogen, tungsten and hydro-electric industries, as well as to develop the existing textile, iron and coal industries. On the heels of the Great Depression the Government-General implemented rapid industrialisation through its North Korea Exploitation Plan and so social dislocation derived from structural change in industry became a feature of the later 1930s.

9. Ch'oe Ho-jin, p.223.
10. ibid, p.224.
11. Shōwa hachinen ni okeru shakai undō no jōkyō: "Zairyū Chōsenjin no undō."(NKH, Vol.5.)
The overriding economic grievance and concern of Korean nationalists in the 1920s was the Japanese strangle-hold on enterprise - rural and urban. The Government-General gave financial assistance only to large businesses and offered loans to Koreans at a rate one-third higher than to Japanese. The only large-scale Korean enterprises which succeeded without openly pledging loyalty to Japan were the Kyŏngsang Textile Company (Seoul), the Kyŏngnam Bank (Pusan), the Honam Bank (S.W. Korea), and the Paeksan Trading Company (Pusan): even the latter two were forced to dissolve or merge with Japanese enterprises in 1941 and 1927 respectively. (Small and medium enterprises fared a little better in Seoul and P'yŏngyang, as will be noted below.) Grievances were exacerbated at employment level by a discriminatory wage system which left Korean workers at least 40% poorer than their Japanese counterparts in Korea.

Korea's economic dependence on Japan is evinced by the fact that by 1931, 95.1% of Korean exports - grain, cotton, silk and minerals - went to Japan whilst 80% of her imports came from Japan to absorb Zaibatsu surplus production. In short, the Korean economy was a colonial economy: its determining features were controlled by and for the Japanese while Koreans supplied relatively under-paid services and labour. Without political powers the Koreans could do little about

inequities or the export of food and raw materials to Japan. But one avenue did appear to be open in Cho Man-sik's view: Koreans could refuse to spend the wealth that remained to them on imported daily necessities and instead patronise such goods as Koreans produced or were able to produce.

The Korean Products Promotion Society: Formation and Activities

The Korean Products Promotion Society was born in P'yŏngyang amidst a widespread growth of numerous smaller movements promoting frugality, purposeful work and ethical life-styles, such as temperance societies and savings clubs, mostly initiated by Protestant Christians. The idea was not entirely new to the region. A "Love Korean Products" movement had arisen in P'yŏngyang in 1909, urging Koreans to patronise Korean products in order to promote a national economy based on native industry. Indeed, the north-western provinces (North and South P'yŏngyang and Hwanghae) were commercially and industrially far more active and more socially mobile than the conservative, yangban-dominated southern areas. Cho Man-sik was a Presbyterian Elder, General-Secretary of the P'yŏngyang Y.M.C.A., an organiser of the nation-wide March First Movement of 1919 and principal of the Christian Osan College in Chŏngju, South P'yŏngan Province. He was a graduate in Law of Meiji University, the son of a medium owner-cultivator in a relatively poor and strongly Christian village in Kangsŏ-gun near P'yŏngyang. In July 1922 Cho


recruited support from colleagues and Christian youth, proclaimed the formation of the Products Promotion Society and established its headquarters in the P'yŏngyang Y.M.C.A. The Society was immediately supported by sixteen businesses in and around P'yŏngyang.  

Although the Korean Products Promotion Society was generated by the P'yŏngyang Christian nationalists, Cho intended it to be a national movement supported by all social groups and religious organisations. Cho described its purpose in simple terms implying that it was a commonsense response to a threat all Koreans suffered in common:

The present indigence among Koreans is due to mindless contempt of and failure to cherish their own goods. So without realising it, Koreans are suffering under foreign economic invasion. Beginning with trivial daily merchandise, Japan's capitalistic economic invasion has now ravished our very centre. The way to block this invasion is to increase production of native foods and to develop and raise products to a high level of excellence. These goods must constantly be patronised in order to promote further production.

Cho re-tailored the traditional male costume a little to simplify it for an active working life, shod himself in native straw sandals and shaved his head. He dwelt in P'yŏngyang city in a two-room bungalow which an acquaintance described as being "like a peasant's for frugality". As all types of people from regional personalities to


failed examinees and distressed labourers made their pilgrimage to visit Cho, he became something of a symbol of the "new Korea". In his blending of traditional commoner's values with the practical elements of the Western religious and scientific outlook, Cho Man-sik was able to communicate directly to the people the essence of self-reconstruction ideas which in their "culturalist" form had been couched in rather theoretical terms. In particular, Cho's practice of influencing the nation through personal moral example rather than political or social authority gained him respect, even from critics, and earned him the title "Gandhi of Korea".

Cho was not disappointed in his expectation of the national appeal of his movement. Within months, an enthusiastic lobby had formed in Seoul. In mid-December 1922, fifty Seoul students under Yŏm T'ae-jin organised a Self-Support Association (自助會). After presenting statistical evidence of the serious trade imbalance caused by importing daily necessities, the Association published a three-point programme:

1. Koreans must unite in using only Korean goods and in rejecting imported goods;
2. Koreans must immediately begin to manufacture necessities with their own hands;
3. Koreans must unite in refusing to sell or mortgage land and strive rather to purchase it.

To this end, the businessmen planned to form "large, English guild-style industrial co-operatives to produce and supply goods Koreans eat, wear

23. ibid, loc cit.
and use, and to make these the organs of production and consumption for the whole of Korea." This development stimulated debate in the nationalist newspapers, especially the Donga Daily, while lecture tours organised in the provinces to propagate the idea attracted reported crowds of five to six thousand.

Chang Tŏk-su's Korean Youth Association spearheaded the movement in Seoul from November 1922. An article commemorating the Youth Association's second anniversary, which appeared in the Donga Daily on 1 December, stressed the urgent need to support a Korean-based economy. Three weeks later the Association published an appeal for a "national contract", a "sacred covenant" of the Korean people to practise the principles of "self-support and self-sufficiency" (自作自給).

The Government-General reacted quickly. Lecture tours were disrupted and one campaigner was arrested in the north-western border town of Ŭiju. Forewarned, supporters in Seoul decided to establish branches in Seoul and other districts in order to present the Japanese with a fait accompli. This strategy succeeded.

On 9 January 1923 ten or more people met in Seoul and formed a preparatory committee. On 20 January 160 persons met at Hyŏpsŏng

27. Cho Ki-jun, p.505.
College, elected twenty directors and resolved on a three-point interim policy statement:

1. Men and women are to wear Korean cotton clothing;
2. Use native food and drink (excepting sugar, salt, fruit and cool beverages);
3. Use other native products as far as possible.²⁹

Thus the Korean Products Promotion Society became established in Seoul. From there, the Japanese later conceded, the movement "mushroomed".³⁰

Early in February the socialist Presbyterian Yi Kap-sŏng and the Methodist minister O Hwa-yŏng lectured before about 2,000 people at the Seoul Ch'ŏndogyo (Heavenly Way Religion) Hall with two others on the importance of Koreans developing respect for Korean products.³¹

Within a week a concerted membership drive added 400 financial members to the Society, bringing the Seoul branch total to 817.³² Yet a week later regional branches had been established in all the larger provincial cities besides P'yŏngyang, in addition to some smaller towns: Pusan, Taegŏn, Masan, Hamhŭng, Kwangju, Miryang, Taegu, Yangsan, Tongnae, Anju, Yŏngdong, Yŏnghŭng and Kŭmje.³³ Despite immediate Government-General opposition, the movement had become nation-wide and continued to spread to the smallest rural villages from February to October 1923.³⁴ Support came from the youth groups, the Christian,

³⁰. See note 18.
³³. *ibid*, 5, 8, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21 and 23 February 1923.
Ch'ŏndogyo and Buddhist groups, women's clubs, businessmen and industrialists, while in P'yŏngyang the unusual national unity of the Society was illustrated by its support by the P'yŏngyang Labour League. Support also came from an unexpected quarter. In Miryang (South Kyŏngsang), the Kisaeng or "entertainment" girls adopted the slogan "Korea for Koreans" and made a pact to wear only simple, native Korean clothing. In Masan (South Kyŏngsang), forty Kisaeng girls formed a league declaring that since they too were Koreans, indeed Koreans forced into their present occupation by poverty, they were well aware of the need to live frugally and use native goods and clothing only.

Encouraged by this initial response the Seoul, P'yŏngyang and several provincial branches prepared to use the approaching Lunar New Year holiday (i.e. February 16) for highly visible rallies and parades. But at 1 p.m. on 13 February the Seoul directors were summoned to the Central Police Station and threatened with dire consequences should the arrangements go ahead, on the basis of laws regulating assembly and public peace. Alternative arrangements were promptly made. A "social" gathering took place at the Ch'ŏndogyo Hall at 2 p.m. on the Lunar New Year's Day, attended by several thousands all in plain Korean costume. The eight provinces were represented by special flags depicting their district products.

35. Donga Daily, 13 February 1923.
36. ibid, 5 and 14 February 1923.
37. ibid, 15 February 1923.
manifestos were distributed and Kim Pyong-hui of the Chosön Daily and the manager of the Donga Daily, Song Chin-u, gave short speeches. From 7 p.m. lectures were given at the Central Y.M.C.A. and Youth Association buildings by noted nationalist figures and religious leaders on the theme: "The Self-Support Movement will be accomplished by the united strength of our twenty million people."  

In P'yongyang the streets had hosted pre-New Year rallies of up to seven thousand people. The police complained that such gatherings were too large and ordered Kim Sŏng-öp, Chairman of the P'yongyang branch, to limit the New Year's Day parades to two separate corps of fifty marchers each. The parades took place as instructed, but reportedly 10,000 people representing over sixty groups gathered afterwards in the P'yongyang Christian College grounds to hear the Rev. Kim Tong-wŏn speak on the subject of self-sufficiency.  

Rallies were held also by several other district branches, in Sŏngch'ŏn, South P'yŏngan, Suan in Hwanghae, Talsŏng and Yangsan in South Kyŏngsang, and Sunch'ŏn in South Cholla. In Kunsan (North Chŏlla) and Pusan large parades were led by the Kisaeng girls. 

In the midst of this resounding success a Seoul director, Na Kyŏng-sŏk, a bright student fresh from studies in Tokyo, proposed immediate action on two fronts: formation of consumers' co-operatives and propagation of the movement's theoretical basis.  

The Seoul Board of Directors met on 22 February and commissioned Na, Yi Sun-t'aek, an economist trained in Japan, and the Youth Association and Y.M.C.A.

38. ibid, 16 and 18 February 1923.
39. ibid, 16, 17 and 18 February 1923.
40. ibid, 16 February 1923.
41. ibid, 22 February 1923.
leader Kim Ch'ŏl-su, to examine the co-operative movements of a variety of countries. They reported a month later that in Korea's situation it would be advisable initially to establish co-operatives from above and steadily encourage mass-participation till the movement became spontaneous. An estimated 5,000 Yen would be required to initiate the scheme, for which a tax on members was proposed. At this stage, insufficient financial support was pledged. In June 1924 the Seoul branch directors perceived that education was the first priority and accordingly decided to supply villagers with information demonstrating the art and desirability of consumers' co-operatives.

In accord with Na Kyŏng-sŏk's second proposal, the Seoul branch did succeed despite considerable Government-General opposition in producing a journal, Sanŏp Kye (Industrial World). The first issue appeared in November 1923, and with some lapses and several changes in name the journal continued until forced to terminate late in 1932 by Japanese pressure and the strain of the Great Depression. In January 1925 Kim Ch'ŏl-su announced that the journal would henceforth turn from theory and principles and concentrate on practical issues. Possibly on account of the developing depression, the whole movement turned from "enlightenment" of the public to encouragement of specific industries in late 1929, and the journal, renamed Chosŏn Mulsan Changmyŏhoe Hoebo, attracted wider readership by carrying articles on

42. Cho Ki-jun, p.513.
45. ibid, loc cit, Cho Ki-jun, pp.516-517.
46. Donga Daily, 1 January 1925.
the practical operation of national industries.\footnote{Cho Ki-jun, p.523.}

Reports on the Society continued to appear almost every week until late 1924 when enthusiasm flagged. Lecture rallies held in the Ch’ŏndogyo and Y.M.C.A. buildings in Seoul and at P’yŏngyang Christian College on lunar New Year’s Day 1924 (5 February), attended by several thousands,\footnote{Donga Daily, 3, 5, 7 and 8 February 1924.} appeared to be the last big event the Society could muster in face of rising Japanese intolerance. One disappointed contributor to the nationalist journal \textit{Kaebyŏk} judged that the movement had lost momentum by the end of 1923. Indignantly, he demanded to know how it was that "this fervent movement which so shook the whole country has become so desolate within six or seven months?"\footnote{Quoted in Chin Tŏk-kyu, "1920 nyŏndae kungnae minjok undong e kwanhan koch'al", in Song Kŏn-ho and Kang Man-kil (eds.), \textit{Han’guk Minjokjui Ron}, Seoul, Ch’angjak gwa pip’yong sa, 1982, p.148.} This judgement was certainly too hasty of a movement whose very nature and aims made appraisal reasonable only on its long-term performance. Indeed, the wording and tone of this criticism fulfilled precisely the apprehensions expressed by the Seoul directors in February 1923. The Chairman, Yu Sŏng-jun, explained that the movement could not maintain its present feverish energy nor could it accomplish its aims in just a few years.\footnote{Donga Daily, 18 February 1923.} The Ch’ŏndogyo youth leader Yi Chong-rin further stressed the need for perseverance,\footnote{ibid, 20 February 1923.} while Kim Ch’ŏl-su
expressed the hope that Koreans had by now overcome their tendency to latch euphorically onto a new thing but desert the cause when the initial noise died down. 52 Despite these pleas and warnings, support did slump. Japanese harassment of the movement was probably the most important external factor, but the rise of the radical left in 1923 caused internal debates and defections, a subject which will be treated below.

In 1925 the Seoul directors attempted a revival of the former support. Kim Ch'ŏl-su severely criticised the "inexcusable" Korean habit of following emotional surges in disregard of practical steps towards a goal and estimated that only one tenth of the 2000 members in each province were at all conscientious. 53 In July the Board of Directors drew up a plan for revival:

1. Visit each of the 3000 [Seoul?] members, clearly outline the situation, and form a support group of consenting members.

2. Should the number of supportive members reach 100 or more, announce a revival meeting and entrust arrangement to members elected for the purpose.

3. Encourage non-members who are in accord with our objectives to join the Society. 54

Although one hundred and twenty members indicated active support, only thirty-seven attended the meeting convened on 3 October 1925 at Tongdŏk

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52. *ibid*, 21 February 1923.
53. *ibid*, 1 January 1925.
Girls' School in Seoul. Nevertheless, a promotional campaign followed which enabled the Society to clear its debts and to operate once more from its own premises.  

The Society struggled on for another two years without great support. At the Seoul Annual General Meeting of April 1927 the Board of Directors was requested to submit after one month's investigations and deliberations its opinions on the causes of failure and their proposals to remedy this. Accordingly, they despatched a questionnaire to three hundred leading members throughout the nation. The reasons given included suppression by the Japanese; threats against members and supporters; the critical stance of a section of the Youth Association; factionalism; resignation due to destitution among the common people; and the refusal by merchants importing goods to co-operate.

In April the next year, the Seoul branch finally received permission to hold a bazaar at the Central Y.M.C.A., designed to rectify the unawareness of what Koreans produced from one province or district to another. The Choson Daily published an extensive list of items of native produce prior to the bazaar and called for a nationwide response to the ideas and spirit it symbolised. The newspaper warned that Koreans were fast losing even nominal participation in the economy and urged all to promote "the maximum growth possible under

the various actual political and economic conditions now prevailing".58
All this was apparently too subversive, for the Government-General censored the editorial comment.

The bazaar marks an upswing in the Society's fortunes. The Seoul Annual General Meeting in April 1929 adopted a six-part programme which essentially concerned practical measures towards founding industries through commercial and industrial leagues or guilds. A newly-elected director, the architect Ch'ŏng Se-gwŏn, acquired new premises for the Society as well as arranging free printing of the journal.59 Another, very successful bazaar was held in the Seoul Y.M.C.A. in April 1930, attended by unprecedented numbers and presided over by Yun Ch'i-ho.60

The P'yŏngyang branch was no less vigorous at this point and had enjoyed greater freedom from its inception. It held New Year parades most years: a successful parade in 192861 was followed in 1930 by an enthusiastic march of six hundred persons led by Cho Man-sik. Again, the Y.M.C.A. served as centre of operations.62

This new lease of life at the onset of the Great Depression raises questions that will be left aside in this thesis.63 Renewed or intensified

58. Chosŏn Daily, 6 April 1928.
61. Donga Daily, 6 January 1928.
63. For example, the question of what economic factors (depression effects on Japan, China and Korea and on trade; effect of dropping silver or gold standards) may have prompted new interest in the Society. It should be noted that the depression hit China and Japan a little later than the West and was probably not a factor in Korea until late 1930.
interest in economic problems, especially in co-operatives and tenancy reforms, featured in the newspapers and other journals such as Tongkwang throughout the depression years.\textsuperscript{64} The Government-General's industrialisation programme involved even tighter control over the economy, so that this heightened economic consciousness was deprived of any outlet. The Society did influence or establish a few small and medium native industries in P'yöngyang, Seoul and some other provincial centres, while co-operatives began to be established more or less independently in some numbers from the late 1920s, peaking at thirty-eight major co-operatives formed in 1931 alone.\textsuperscript{65} In short, the Society's activities enjoyed relative success in its limited ventures (bazaars and parades), but its accomplishments diminished dramatically in proportion to the scale of its practical industrial ambitions, i.e. wherever it conflicted with Japanese interests or required sizable capital outlay. Yet despite the modesty of these economic results the Product Promotion Society was an important focus and expression of nationalism inside Korea.

Self-Sufficiency and National Survival

The explicit rationale for this economic nationalism was self-support, self-sufficiency, self-reliance (자주자체 : hereafter I shall

\textsuperscript{64} e.g. Han Sŏng-in, "Hyŏpdong chohap iran muŏshin'ga?", serialised in Tongkwang from July 1932 to February 1933, consisted of an historical overview of co-operatives, their economic, political, social and international aspects, strengths and pitfalls and rules of development.

\textsuperscript{65} Of the 97 major co-operatives (mainly consumer) formed between 1920 and 1932, 83 were established in the final four years, 1929-1932. From a survey in Tongkwang, No.33, May 1932, pp.170-171.
italicise "self-sufficiency" whenever it occurs as a translation of these four characters). This principle was almost an article of faith among Protestant nationalists, for it was regarded as the authentic expression of "stewardship" as propounded by Yun Ch'i-ho and Sŏ Chae-p'il in the 1890s. The principle had by the 1920s gained support among other religious groups also. The leading Buddhist nationalist and reformer Han Yong-un clearly subscribed to it, as did a prominent Buddhist member of the Korean Products Promotion Society, Kim T'ae-hyŏp. The Ch'ŏndogyo youth leader Yi Chong-rin was an active Society member also. In economic terms, then, stewardship meant self-sufficiency or at least preparations for such - not, in the foreseeable future, the overthrow of Japanese imperialism or the destruction of capitalism.

Cho Man-sik laid the blame for the "Japanese capitalistic invasion" squarely on Korean ignorance born of thoughtlessness concerning the basic conditions of their economic survival. In December 1922 the Korean Youth Association adopted Cho's theme in an article titled, "My life by my means". Morality, instincts and the like, the article stated, referred to the universal concern of people to preserve their welfare. But Koreans blindly allowed themselves to

66. Han Yong-un, "Yŏngjŏk pinp'ip ŭro kot'ong", in Donga Daily, 9 January 1923.

67. Kim T'ae-hyŏp, "Chahwal ŭi chŏngshin", Changsan, Vol.2, No.3, March 1931, pp.8-12. (Changsan is the successor to Journal, renamed so in 1931.)

68. Donga Daily, 26 December 1922.
be "buffeted by wind and wave", living "lives without foundation". It lamented the plunder of Korean land and commerce by foreigners and, taking the bull by the horns, most emphatically declared that economic activity was "the most direct and most vital" means of ensuring Korea's survival: politics could come later. Early in January 1923 a member of the nationalist Minuhoe (民友會), Sŏl T'ae-hŭi, wrote a bold article for the Donga Daily on Korea's slavery. Not even the masters of their own food and clothing, he complained, Koreans were reduced to playing games with "movements for the right to political participation". Yet what was urgently needed was concerted action to reverse the process of borrowing money in order to eat and relinquishing land in order to live: without this all else was soap bubbles. In one aphorism, Sŏl encapsulated the mood of the mounting economic nationalism: "At present we live off others' labour and goods; before long we shall be living off their rubbish tips."

The Manifesto of the Korean Products Promotion Society spelled these ideas out for the general public:

If there is nothing for us to eat and nowhere secure for us to dwell, then our very livelihood will be destroyed. Then what rights, freedom or happiness can we expect and what hope may we have for any truly human development? The first condition of life is food-clothing-shelter, which is, to put it another way, our industrial base. If through the destruction of this industrial base nothing remains to our name, it is only to be expected that we should become utterly impoverished and fail to enjoy a livelihood fit for human beings ....

69. Donga Daily, 12 January 1923.
Food, clothing and shelter - i.e. the industrial question - is the most urgent problem facing us .... Simply take a hard look at the clothes we wear, the food we eat and all the goods we use. Are any of these wrought with our own hands or produced by our own efforts? (...) Can we possibly sell our houses, land and even our own bodies for things other hands supply, and still lay claim to our rivers and mountains and manage our households as before? If the destruction of one's industrial base incontestably involves the destruction of one's livelihood ... the present economic situation of the Korean people will certainly consign us all to the dark pit of ruin ....

In order to promote Korean products we must make it our aim to buy and use goods made by Koreans, and also unite to manufacture and supply those goods we need. Unless we come to our senses and exert ourselves in this way, how can we expect to maintain our livelihood and develop our society?70

The "Three Policies of Action" under Article 2 of the Seoul by-laws confirm the programme of mental and moral enlightenment suggested by this Manifesto: (1) promotion of industry through cultivating industrial knowledge; (2) promotion of love and use of Korean products; and (3) economic guidance through investigating the people's life-styles and circumstances with a view to training them in reform of their economic customs.71 Although the Annual General Meeting held in April 1929 resolved to focus its activities more on practical issues, the Society by no means dropped theoretical discussions from its journal, and the contents differed in no important

respects from its initial statements. Self-sufficiency remained the guiding principle. A society member, Yi Kūng-no, published an explanation of the concept in February 1930. Since Korea was not some Robinson Crusoe cut off from the international market, he argued, self-sufficiency was clearly a relative concept only. It was not an ideology of "primitive" economics or a refusal to be involved in the modern world. But nor was it a temporary expedient. It had to become the permanent rationale of Korean economic activity, unless Koreans were to face dire want forever. Self-sufficiency implied constant development of skills and technology: it was profoundly practical. Yi then turned to the moral theme. The former self-sufficiency of the home unit had vanished to be replaced by a short-sighted, suicidal opting for present convenience. It is easier, at first, to let others produce goods and simply buy them - but after that, the deluge: no land, no nation. Self-sufficiency meant being responsible for one's own and the nation's economy.  

Articles continued to drum out this theme up to 1932, attacking the "underlying hedonism" of Koreans, their fatalism, short-sightedness, and contempt of movements that require stamina and perseverance or that are not "political".  

Sŏl T'ae-hŭi commented that the Great Depression

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72. Yi Kūng-no, "Chajak Chagūp ūi ponūi", in *ibid*, Vol.1, No.2, February 1930, pp.12-14. It is interesting that Yi later became an official in the DPRK, since his description of "self-sufficiency" here is similar to the North Korean *juch'e* principle. Interesting, too, that *juch'e* economics should be branded "primitive" by a North Korean critic of Kim Il-sung: Lim Un (pseud.), *The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea*, Tokyo, Jiyusha, 1982, pp.286-290.

underlined the urgency of self-sufficiency by demonstrating that industrially undeveloped people are left utterly resourceless in such cases. With some sarcasm he asked whether Koreans imagined that four or five hundred horse-power engines were necessary to produce any of Korea's daily requirements (excepting transport and electricity).  

The spiritual theme also remained. The Buddhist Kim T'ae-hyŏp asserted that Koreans could choose between self-extinction and self-survival ultimately only on the basis of spiritual health: "If we lack the inner resources of self-sufficiency, no additional factor introduced from outside will be of any use."  

This theoretical position of the Korean Products Promotion Society placed it firmly in the tradition of self-reconstruction nationalism. It enjoyed much wider support than the university scheme and seemed to suggest that when applied to practical issues, the validity of self-reconstruction principles was accepted. The Tonguhoe and Hŭngŏp Kurakbu officially backed the economic movement which also attracted united support from the Donga and Chosŏn dailies. Although its active membership was not very great after 1924, not all or even a majority of supporters could be expected to be financial members, and membership of 16,000 in 1925 (following Kim Ch'ŏl-su's estimates)  

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75. Kim T'ae-hyŏp, op cit.

76. See note 53. Kim was reported as saying there was an average of 2000 members in each of the eight provinces - obviously not a precise figure.
was not inconsiderable for a subsection of the wider self-reconstruction movement. Its representation can be clarified somewhat by examining the leadership as a social group.

Details on Cho Man-sik have already been given. Of the twenty directors elected by the Seoul Society in 1923 the following details have been found. Paek Kwan-su, Kim Ch'ŏl-su, Yi Kap-sŏng, Pak Tong-wŏn, Chŏng No-sik and Yi Sun t'aeak were prominent Christian leaders, all but the last having been involved in the organisation of the February Eighth or March First Movements. Kim Ch'ŏl-su, a close associate of Yi Tong-hwi, was among the first Koreans to turn to communism (in 1919 or 1920) and was a leader of the leftist faction of the Seoul Youth Association from 1922. In 1930 Kim attempted to establish a Communist Party in Seoul, but was arrested. Yi Sun t'aeak studied economics in Japan and in 1923 lectured at the Presbyterian Yonhŭi Special College. He was a critic of capitalism, publishing a series of ten or more articles on its contradictions in the Donga Daily during January 1923. 0 Hyŏn-ju was a Christian prominent in the Seoul Women's Club, while Im Kyŏng-ho and Yi Chong-rin were Ch'ŏndogyo adherents, the latter a youth leader.

Sŏl T'ae-hŭi, critic, journalist and educationalist, had been involved in the "enlightenment" movement as a member of the Sŏbuk Hakhoe (1907-1910) and the Taehan Hyŏphoe (1908-1909) and had also been involved in the March First Movement. Yi Tŭk-nyŏn, Kim Tong-hyŏk and Yi Si-wan likewise belonged to the enlightenment tradition. Kim Yun-su was a Seoul businessman and Kim Tŏk-ch'ang had established the

77. Unless acknowledged otherwise, these details are gleaned from nationalist journals such as Tongkwang and the Society's Journal; the Han'guk Inmyŏng Taesajŏn Seoul, Shin'gu Munhwa Sa, 1980; Cho Ki-jun, pp.506-507; and Chin Tŏk-kyu, op cit, p.147.

78. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement, p.120.

79. See, for example, Sol T'ae-hui, "Hŏnbŏp sŏ-ŏn", in Taehan Hyŏphoe Hoebŏ, No.3, 25 June 1908, pp.28-31.
first Korean spinning and weaving plant. The theorist Na Kyöng-sök had studied Marxism in Japan and was known as an "ethical socialist".

The Chairman of the Board of Directors in the early years was Yu Song-jun, brother of the famous politician and liberal reformer of the late nineteenth century, Yu Kil-jun. Arrested for his involvement in the Independence Club, Yu Song-jun had emerged from prison in 1904 a committed Christian and together with Yun Ch'ì-ho, Yi Sang-jae, Syngman Rhee and others, established the Korean Y.M.C.A. Yu served as Chief of the Educational Bureau and held other posts in the Ministry of Education during the Protectorate and became Councillor of North Ch'ungch'òng Province under the Government-General in October 1910. But Yu soon withdrew from officialdom and became increasingly nationalistic. His nephew Yu Ok-kyöm was an accomplished lawyer, protégé of Yun Ch'i-ho, Y.M.C.A. leader, and a conservative Christian nationalist. Yu Song-jun was thus a member of an illustrious and well-known aristocratic family.


81. Kongnip shirman, 5 July 1907.

82. The Seoul Press, 7 October 1910.

These brief biographical details suggest that the Society was managed by a well-educated group of proven nationalists with some influential connexions and a good representation of youth and religious, especially Protestant, groups. If the Self-Support Society mentioned earlier be reckoned among its supporters, then this together with the two businessmen on the Board of Directors in Seoul and the sixteen business establishments supporting the P'yŏngyang branch indicates definite commercial representation. The nature of its leadership drew criticism in its day from revolutionary socialist groups and has prompted some historians today to portray the movement as non-popular, irrelevant to and rejected by the masses. The reality seems to have been rather more subtle, and an examination of the debate between the Society and its contemporary critics reveals its complexity and produces some surprises.

The Ideological Debate

The ideological debate began shortly after the Korean Products Promotion Society was established in Seoul and was opened by a member of the Seoul-Shanghai communist faction, Chu Chong-gŏn, whose articles criticising the Society were published in the
Donga Daily from 6 to 23 April 1923. The main thrust was that the venture was impossible: native industry could not develop under colonial rule without political power. Even if some commercial development took place it would be plundered by Korean capitalists, which meant exploitation in the end by foreign (Japanese) capitalists. Chu was further unimpressed by the assurances of his former fellow-student in Tokyo, Na Kyŏng-sŏk, that the masses would win out in the long run. If the process began wrongly, i.e. in reliance on bourgeois and capitalist activity, then there was no guarantee the proletariat's sufferings would be rewarded later.

Other critics attacked the class composition of the Society leadership. The split in the Youth Association involved this very issue. As a "product of the leadership class" the Society was judged incapable of tapping "the central strength of the Korean people". One Yi Sŏng t'ae wrote an article in the leftist journal, Shin Saenghwal, imputing corrupt motives to the Society's organisers: they were after all the intelligentsia and so their activities were simply a plot to maintain their leadership and support bourgeois society. There was

84. Donga Daily, 13 March 1923. Chu became a founding member of the First Korean Communist Party in Seoul in 1925 and was arrested in November the same year.
85. Quoted in Robinson, doctoral dissertation, pp.243-244.
86. ibid, p.245.
more to this than flinging mud, for it was feared that any success of the Society could only weaken the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat. Nevertheless the attack on motives was unconvincing, since its authors among the Youth Association were objectively in the same "leadership class" of intelligentsia they impugned. Hence in their response, Society members were concerned more with Chu Chong-gôn's treatment of the issue on its own merits.

Cho Man-sik's biographer claims he treated the criticisms with disdain. This is surprising for Cho viewed Marx with respect. No recorded response has been discovered by myself apart from some comments he made in 1937 of a more general nature. It is possible that the criticisms had little point in northern Korea where social conditions differed in important ways from the south and where Christianity was strong and radical socialism weak. L.-G. Paik, who knew him well, recalls that Cho was a practitioner rather than a theorist and that among Society members there was tacit agreement on the validity of its aims and methods. Whatever the case, in Seoul two Society members immediately leaped to the defense: Na Kyŏng-sŏk and Yun Yong-nam. From their defense based on Marxist analysis we learn something of the complexity of the nationalist movement following the March First Movement.

88. Tongkwang, No.29, January 1932, p.58.
90. L.-G. George Paik, Interview.
In a long article of some 10,000 words, Yun Yong-nam took the critics to task for vague use of terminology: capitalist, proletariat, bourgeois and so on. He pointed out that Korean society differed clearly from the social situation such words had been coined to describe. In Korea they were mere words and one could not inspire genuine class-consciousness by opposing phantoms. Since the critics (Chu) argued that there was no true capitalist class among Koreans, they ought to have concluded that there existed no real proletariat, i.e., a class defined in contrast and opposition to capitalists.

Or if the proletariat was taken (erroneously) to mean the impoverished, then almost all Koreans belonged - or very soon would. Yun proceeded with possibly a "heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" argument:

To be really consistent, one should say that apart from a minority group of workers (the proletariat?) all Koreans are "idlers" (petty bourgeois and above?). Surely then, any means of wiping out the idlers would be welcomed by that minority group of workers who pour out their blood and sweat? It is not certain whether these idlers, after displaying all-round improvement in efficiency, will change into a [true] propertied or unpropertied class. Yet if they become unpropertied, that is well; and if propertied, that should cause no harm .... For to the degree they may become a propertied class, they will become material of a substance worth contending against.

Not surprisingly, Yun feared he might be accused of twisting the Marxist argument. He pleaded serious-mindedness and argued that though some maintained that proletarian ends must be pursued by

91. "Chamyŏl inga, tosaeng inga?", Donga Daily, 26 April 1923.
proletarian means, according to Marxist method the desired end could not be attained without travelling through each stage of the journey. He challenged his opponents to do some real research into the Korean situation, to pay heed to the material context of thought and harness theory to reality. Consciousness had to be practical, and the Society was able to produce this for it would "more or less clarify the distinctions between the propertied and productive classes". The reality was that 60% of land and at least 80% of wealth was in Japanese hands. Since statistics indicated that this trend was accelerating as Korea's overall wealth increased, it is here that action could be taken. In effect, Yun appeared to be stating that the classic Marxist prediction that economic misery of the proletariat must increase as the capitalist economy advanced was being fulfilled in Korea between Koreans and Japanese, and that this was the origin of the Society. (To have been so specific would have invited certain censorship of the article, but it requires only a little imagination to glean the intended import.)

Na Kyŏng-sŏk, who seems to have been active in the Y.M.C.A. whilst in Tokyo, published his reply under the name Kong-min (公民) in four articles printed in the *Donga Daily*. He opened his argument by

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92. This does seem to conform with Marx's own words: "When a society has discovered the natural law that determines its own movement ... even then it can neither overleap the natural phases of its evolution, nor shuffle them out of the world by a stroke of the pen." Quoted in K.R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (2 vols), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, Vol.2. p.86.

countering Chu Chong-gon's charge that the Society's aims were impossible. The Society, he maintained, was "a movement generated by the undeniable actual problems in Korea" whose urgency Chu had failed to grasp. The movement did exist, and the fact that Koreans had rallied to resist approaching economic extinction could not be irrelevant to the question of the possibility of success. Despite the obvious severe limitations imposed by political powerlessness, doing nothing was not an adequate response. Na implied that this economic movement was not just one but the only alternative and an incontestable duty.

Na Kyŏng-sŏk admitted that the movement could be construed as an alliance imposed by a bourgeoisie threatened with ruin on a proletariat lacking clear class-consciousness. But like Yun Yŏng-nam he believed that the Korean bourgeoisie had perforce become proletarian in effect. Endowed with relatively good intellectual training, they could be the heralds of a real proletarian movement even if as a bourgeois swan-song. The unpropertied class was always the most vulnerable, but it was a non sequitur to conclude that the Korean Products Society was therefore harmful to proletarian interests. For one thing, Korea had to progress from manual, cottage and non-diversified rural industries to merchandised industry to survive, and this was not in violation of any socialist principle. For another, the Society was not simply a boycott movement but aimed to awaken consciousness of economic facts and issues. The practice of selling one's labour to industry was one of the real defects of the basic social structure but was a problem as yet remote from the common people's present plight: corpses cannot unite. If the critics would only take
the formulae of historical materialism seriously they would realise that the suffering of the proletariat and the intense development of the productive forces were expressly stated to be necessary phases. Proletarian consciousness could not develop in solo: that would not be dialectical.

Finally, Na accused Chu of confounding social and political revolutions. Russia experienced a political but not a social revolution because the conditions of the latter did not exist. Therefore Russia had to impose state capitalism to generate the missing necessary productive power. All three of Trotsky's requisites of a successful social revolution were also lacking in Korea, where a growth in consciousness accompanying increased productive power was a necessity. Na failed to see how a movement to use and produce native goods would threaten this growth rather than promote it. The greatest threat to the proletariat lay in proposing political confrontations when it was in no position to carry them through.

To summarise, Yun and Na argued that political, not economic action was impossible in Korea's circumstances; that, in any case, political change did not equal or guarantee socio-economic

94. This would seem to be a great misunderstanding of Marxist dialectics. Neither Marx nor Lenin believed that revolutionary potential increased in proportion to the poverty of a class. But Mao Tse-tung may have, and this idea was evidently around in these early days of Marxism in Korea. See Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, (3 vols), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978, Vol.3, p.499.

95. Namely: 1. real material capacity for class-struggle among the proletariat; 2. the morale and determination necessary to persevere in the struggle; and 3. an internationally favourable situation. The absence of this final condition was blamed for the failure of 1919, and Na believed no improvement was in sight.
transformation; that since Koreans had lost virtually any semblance of an economic base, the Society was a direct and most relevant response to Korean realities; and that rather than undermining the consciousness of an as yet hardly existent proletariat, the movement was the only hope of any such consciousness appearing at all. Thus the primary tasks were to encourage people to use native goods where practical and to transform the "idlers", those with capital and skills, into producers.

Evaluation of the Debate

The defense of the Society given by Na Kyŏng-sŏk and Yun Yŏng-nam could make it difficult to identify the precise ideology of the movement. What does one make of an organisation that was not officially socialist yet defended itself with Marxist analysis, and not anti-socialist yet to all intents encouraged capitalistic economic relationships? The arguments of Na and Yun do suggest the following solution of this anomaly. It is erroneous to imagine that true capitalistic, bourgeois and proletarian classes existed in Korea in the 1920's. It is likewise erroneous to conceive of capitalism and socialism as two distinct alternatives leading in opposite directions: they are both part of the same process and the capitalist phase must, according to Marxism, precede socialism. This is the point of Na's assertion that Soviet Russia was compelled to institute state capitalism rather than immediately implementing socialism. Both Na and Yun appear to have seen in Marx justification for a period of industrial capitalism in much the same way as Russian Social-Democrat leaders like Peter Struve. Like Sun Yat-sen,
they were trying to make capitalism create socialism. However, three other more practical factors fashioned the Korean Products Promotion Society: the demand for unity, anti-nihilism, and religious beliefs.

It was noted earlier that Cho Man-sik intended the Society to be a truly national movement supported by all classes and persuasions. Unity had been the one grand positive achievement of the 1919 March First Movement which nationalist leaders were anxious to maintain. An Ch'ang-ho ranked the struggle for unity among the highest and most urgent tasks of the nationalist movement while reserving the strongest condemnation for the chronic lack of this quality among Koreans. From the mid-20's this theme was propounded in *Tongkwang* articles emphasising "firm solidarity". The Products Promotion

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97. There is of course the very important factor of the Japanese economic superstructure, but treatment of this is beyond the purpose of this study. Nationalists did consider this factor, of course, when planning their movements, e.g. *Tongkwang*, No.31, March 1932, pp.57-61.

98. Such articles are too numerous to cite them all, but include Kim Ch'ang-se, "Yŏngguk ŭi saram gwa mal" (*Tongkwang*, No.2, June 1926); Yi Sun-t'aek, "Sekaji mugi" (No.8, December 1926); Changbaek Sanin, "Kaein ŭi saenghwal ŭi kaehyŏki minjok chŏk palhŭng ŭi kŭnbon ida" (No.1, May 1926); Kim Yun-gyŏng, "Ingŏk ŭi hangni chŏk haeŭi", (No.4, August 1926); Kim Yun-gyŏng, "Mu.shil.yŏk.haeng.shinŭi.yŏnggi" (No.10, February 1927); and Kim Kyŏng-sŏk, "Minjok kaejoron tokhugam" (No.29, January 1932).
Society shared the self-reconstruction belief that conflict in Korea's present condition between ideologies, classes or anything else was a recipe for extinction. Hence Na Kyŏng-sŏk declared that the only "ism" of the movement was "death-escapism".\(^99\)

Though Na and Yun professed a type of socialism they attacked the radical left for the strong current of nihilism they perceived in it. Much of their counter-attack can only be understood in the light of the popular nihilism which began to emerge as one reaction to the failure of the March First Movement and the continuing intransigence of the Government-General. Shin Ch'ae-ho in Peking took up the principle that "without destruction there can be no construction",\(^100\) a clear disagreement with the gradualist reconstruction movement in Korea. Against a background of despair expressed in Korean drama, novels, poetry and songs,\(^101\) a small, short-lived Nihilist Party (Hŏmu Tang) was formed in southern Korea in January 1926.\(^102\)

Within the leftist movement this nihilism took on a more serious ideological and practical form. Nihilism, or "destruction" was

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101. See essays by D.P. Mesler and Chanbok Chee in Nahm (ed.), and by Seok Choong Song, Andrew Nahm and Oh Kon Cho in Kim and Mortimore (eds).

posited as a negative phase in revolutionary tactics, a necessary programme of sabotage of the existing order. This possibly accounts for the lack (initially) of involvement by the radical left in co-operative movements in favour of supporting rural tenants' disputes. Yun attacked this position as muddled thinking. If anything was impossible in colonial Korea it was this "destruction". Revolution had to be carried out from a position of genuine strength and by some real means: for the desperately vulnerable Koreans, economic nihilism meant self-annihilation and destruction meant destruction full stop. Na also took Chu Chong-gōn to task for offering no alternative other than economic nihilism: "To say 'it cannot be done' is to command a race without means of future livelihood to sit and wait for death."Ironically, the radical left was accused of being a negative force, of being reactionary in Metternich's sense of the term.

The attack on nihilism had strong ethical inspiration, and here the religious background of the movement is evident and throws light on the problem of the Society's relationship to socialist ideology. The reasons for the strength of religion, particularly Protestant Christianity, in Korean nationalism are doubtless complex. But the historical cause of interest in Christianity was similar to the cause of interest in socialism/communism: both were viewed as rallying points.

103. Donga Daily, 26 April 1923.

104. ibid, 26 April 1923. Needless to say, the radical left did not consider themselves to be advocates of such a position, but the charge that they were preaching both despair and escapism was a major part in the Society's counter-attack.
for opposition to Japan and as sources of a new Korea. Christians had been excited by Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination because it seemed to own legal and moral grounds. Now socialism seemed to have scientific grounds - and moral grounds too, for socialism was a response to oppression. Thus Christians were naturally attracted to socialism after the disappointments of 1919-1921. Indeed, some South Korean Buddhists today blame Christianity for opening Korea to communism.105

This affinity between causes of interest in Christianity and socialism explains one aspect of the particularly Korean flavour of economic nationalism between 1922 and 1932. Cho Man-sik himself illustrates the blend. Among politicians, thinkers, scientists and novelists, Cho wrote that he most admired Bismarck, Marx, Darwin and Hugo.106 Here we have the synthesis: Bismarck, the nationalist unifier; Marx, the anti-imperialist and preacher of economic dignity; Darwin, the (unwitting?) source of a social-Darwinist concept of struggle for survival; and finally Hugo, the believer in its application to social issues of Christian compassion as the most powerful influence for beneficial change. This may appear to be a confusion of contradictory positions,107 but if one steps from the realm of

105. I am indebted to my colleague John Jorgensen for this information which he learned in conversation with Korean Buddhists while carrying out research on Buddhism recently in Seoul.


107. One must allow for the fact that in citing these persons Cho was answering a *Tongkwang* questionnaire and was given no space to explain what he meant. It is clear from his 1937 comments on Marxism quoted on page 291 that Cho did not agree with historical materialism or economic determinism. Probably, it was Marx's vision of a just society that appealed to Cho (and other Korean Christians) rather than his political programme, and this reminds one that Marx did not of course invent socialism, and did not ever claim to have done so.
theory into the Korean historical arena of the 1920s it is not difficult to see that it was the moral factor which made working sense of the synthesis.

But the affinity must not be pushed too far, for there were real differences which prevented most Christians from becoming genuine Marxist socialists (or communists) and which suggested a Christian/communist antithesis. Koreans who were Christian and socialist held Christianity to be "true" in a way socialism was not. A distinction was made between Marxist analysis and Marxist philosophy (which was interpreted as rigid economic determinism and monistic materialism involving propositions of necessary historical laws). Na Kyōng-sŏk possibly spoke of these "laws" with tongue in cheek when challenging his critics to take their communist creed seriously; he called himself after all an ethical socialist. As a movement, the Society rejected a political-revolutionary approach.

The very moralism which turned Christians to socialism as a specific position they could well adopt was at the same time a hindrance to their accepting the Marxist metaphysic. As discussed above, their moral viewpoint extended to the origins of Korea's present plight, which they attributed to moral and spiritual decay. Given such a divergence between this religious and the communist explanations of the causes of Korea's problems, some incompatibility between their respective solutions to the problems was inevitable. The issue between these solutions was a sensitive moral one. Korean radical socialists seemed to believe that anything which may improve the workers' lot had to be opposed as a delaying factor in the liberation
of the oppressed; the worse the lot of workers the better, as far as
the promised inevitable revolution was concerned. But for the
Christians (and Buddhists and Ch'ŏndongyo adherents) who favoured
reconciliation over confrontation and who believed in the possibility
of radical change through positive spiritual renewal, such an idea
appeared shockingly immoral.

For all their moralism, the nonsocialist religious nationalists
hardly took into account the fact that the commonest motivation of
industry was possibly greed - or would become so, once things
improved. Like Yu Kil-jun earlier, Cho and his colleagues relied on
Christianity to inject altruism into Korean social and economic
relations. On their own showing, this was not entirely unwarranted.
Cho Man-sik often worked without any remuneration, living in humble
circumstances; Yun Ch'i-ho supported numerous young Koreans in
higher, "useful" education and his Songdo dairyfarm and textile plant
were local boons; Cho's wealthy colleague O Yun-sŏn funded national
and public enterprises, as did Kim Sŏng-su; the merchant Yi Sŏng-hun
had put his money into founding Osan College; and under Cho's influence
a library, community hall and an orphanage were constructed in
P'yŏngyang partly through the fruits of the commercial initiative of
two widows. The possibility of using private capital for the
public good seemed vindicated. Nevertheless, these were individual
instances which could not guarantee identical behaviour in a whole

108. See note 94.

economic system. Could issues of justice realistically wait upon the final, elusive ideal of Christian love? There was some point to the radical left's concern that the Society's proposals, if they succeeded, would not be in the interests of the majority of Koreans.

Some Christian nationalists did indeed consider communism might prevent or abolish the ravages of economic individualism. From 1929 Yi Sun-t'aek joined his fellow-teacher at the Presbyterian Yŏnhūi Special School, Paek Nam-un, in a campaign to "turn the campus red" and opposed the school's Hùngŏp Kurakbu faction led by Yu Ōk-kyŏm. But others came to fear that it would abolish freedom also and deemed social contradictions preferable to social tyrannies. This anxiety about communism was expressed by Han Kyŏng jik, Cho Man-sik's "star pupil", and founder of a Christian socialist party in 1945 in Shinŭiju, North P'yŏngan Province. Han believed that Christianity itself was unequivocally on the side of the worker and quite able to pursue its aims through any political programme such as socialism. The Christian/communist clash was unfortunate, being

110. cf. Henry George, op cit, p.74: "The command, 'Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn', precedes the entrancing vision of universal peace .... That which is above justice must be based on justice, and include justice, and be reached through justice." An anonymous contributor to Tongkwang did give thought to the operation of greed: "So long as God does not remove the lust for possession the realisation of pristine Christianity's communal idea through the spirit of Christian love alone is impossible." ("Sahoe kaejo ŏi chesasang", Tongkwang, No.22, June 1931, p.73.) However in Protestant thought, if "love" is elusive, "justice" must be equally elusive, for "justice" without "love" is a perversion or caricature of itself.

partly the blame of corruption in the Eastern Orthodox Church and
the enormous mistake it made in identifying itself with the
government, and partly the fault of the unreasonable root-and-branch
approach to religion of communism and its merciless persecution of
the churches. But Han recognised a definite metaphysical obstacle
to Christian/communist reconciliation in the latter's materialistic
social philosophy. It was a pity, he opined, that socialism was
coming to mean communism for the latter was destructive of human
freedom:

I do not know whether it is possible for all
to eat equally, free from every care. But in times
past people who without any choice simply worked
as ordered and ate only what they were given were
called 'slaves'; it seems that only in a communist
society are they called citizens. We are told also
that there are no classes in communist societies.
The Devil there aren't! Maybe the noun has changed,
but classes clearly continue to exist. They are the
ruling and the ruled classes or the Communist Party
Members and the citizens.  

The distrust of thorough-going communism by Christian nationalists
grew out of experience as much as theoretical differences. A Government-
General police report of 1928 reveals that once they began to gain
support, Korean communists attacked religion harshly as they thought
they were supposed to do. This needs some interpretation. In that
they wanted not clarification but rejection of tradition, the Christians

112. Han Kyông-jik, "Kidokkyo wa Kongsanjui", in Han Kyông-jik Moksa
Sŏllgyojet (12 vols), Tae Han Yesu Changnohoe ch'onghoe kyoyuk

113. GGPAB, Kei kō hi, No. 8036, 27 October 1928: "Himitsu kessha
Choson kyōsantō narabi Kōrai seinenkai jiken kensha no ken." (GSC,
Vol.5, p.94.)
had been the first modern revolutionary force in Korea. Yet what characterised the Christian nationalists from early on was the idea, held as a self-evident axiom, that genuine social reform could not realistically precede reform of the inner self. However as mentioned earlier, the political failure of both the March First Movement and the Washington Conference campaign was taken by many to signify the failure also of the former underlying axiom. The materialist approach of Marxism owed its appeal to its confronting a more or less established nationalist orthodoxy with something that once again was iconoclastic. For their part the radical communists did not regard their ideology as an extension of former principles: one had to convert to it or be rejected by it. Yet in opposing religion the communists found themselves taking on nationalism itself and were directed, too late, to tone down their attacks.\textsuperscript{114}

The communist attack on religion in Korea was a strategic blunder. The religion, if it can be called such, which had been behind the Korean government and supported the \textit{status quo} was Confucianism, and this had lost its authority among Koreans as early as 1905. In the colonial context, Christianity was valued by many nationalist for being antipathetic to Japanese rule, and Ch'\text{\~o}ndogyo shared a similar image. Moreover Ch'\text{\~o}ndogyo claimed that its membership was 99\% rural,\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} ibid, loc cit.

\textsuperscript{115} Kim Il-tae, "Ch'\text{\~o}ndogyo nongmin undong \text{"ii iron gwa shilje"}, \textit{Tongkwang}, No.20, April 1931, p.41.
while Protestantism had begun as a village movement penetrating the remotest areas of the land. The Protestant Church was also strong in the cities, especially in the north. In 1930 it was estimated that 10% of P'yŏngyang attended Presbyterian Churches alone, while in Sŏnch'ŏn to the west fully half of its 13,000-strong population was reckoned to be in churches on Sundays.\textsuperscript{116} The communist attack on popular religions which also visibly inspired much of the nationalist leadership could not have greatly impressed the ordinary Korean.

Conclusion: Self-Reconstruction or Passive Collaboration?

From 1932 the Korean Products Promotion Society suffered strict containment by the Government-General. The architect Chŏng Se-gwŏn was forcibly prevented from funding the Society, members were threatened with reprisals and the journal had to cease publication.\textsuperscript{117} The Society itself continued to operate up to 1937 when it was ordered to dissolve. At the same time, its supporting organisations were destroyed by the police and the core of the self-reconstruction nationalist leadership was arrested.

Upon the discovery of subversive documents in May calling upon Christians to "deliver the people", the Japanese moved against Y.M.C.A. and Tonguhoe personnel. After "earnest" interrogation of Chu Yo-han and others the police arrested fifty-five Tonguhoe members in Seoul in

\textsuperscript{116} Shearer, p.142.

\textsuperscript{117} Cho Ki-jun, p.524.
August and a further ninety-three from Sŏnch'ŏn and P'yŏngyang in November. In March 1938 thirty-three more were arrested in Anak, and therewith 181 leaders from the four traditional centres of Christian resistance were arraigned for trial. The majority were lawyers, doctors, teachers, Christian ministers and "propertied" people who held positions of leadership in their respective regions. "Above all," the police reported, "the Christian ministers concerned have secured a firm foothold within the Northern Presbyterian denomination which embraces over 200,000 members throughout Korea."

In P'yŏngyang and Sŏnch'ŏn, "all the real power of Christianity is involved in the Tonguhoe." Those influenced by the movement, the Japanese estimated to be in the order of tens of thousands.  

In March 1938, in his sixtieth year, An Ch'ang-ho died under guard, of tuberculosis. Within months of his death, Yun Ch'i-ho, Yu Ők-kyŏm, Shin Hŭng-ŭ, Chang Tŏk-su and other members of the Hŭngŏp Kurakbu were arrested, and several staff of Christian schools were forced to resign. At this point the Japanese Government advised the Governor-General to seek a political solution, and the Tonguhoe and Kurakbu members were freed on condition of good behaviour. This

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118. Sotokufu hōmukyoku, 1938: "Chŏsen dokuritsu shisō undō no hensen." (CDU, part 2, chapter 3, pp.334-338.)
120. Tongnip Undongsa Charyojip, Vol.12, pp.1365-1433. Lee Kwang-su, Chu Yo-han, Kim Yun-gyŏng and others were initially sentenced to three to five years' imprisonment. Yun Ch'i-ho, Shin Hŭng-ŭ, and Yu Ŭk-kyŏm had not been brought to trial before the Japanese Government ordered a political solution.
condition placed on their activities during World War II, has been regarded by critics as evidence that the political nonresistance philosophy of the self-reconstruction movement - cultural and economic - was in fact passive collaboration with Japanese power.\footnote{121}

In terms of immediate historical results it is evident that in its cultural and economic ventures the self-reconstruction movement succeeded but little. A Korean scholar has put this down to popular rejection of the movement as both elitist and compromising, but on hardly adequate grounds.\footnote{122} The elitist charge has been discussed in the previous chapter. The movement's fate cannot be

\footnote{121. e.g. Kim Kyu-hwan, pp.257-258.}

\footnote{122. Chin Tök-kyu, \textit{op cit.} Defining true nationalism as popular movements, Mr. Chin in effect concludes that if a movement fails it is because it is not supported by the people. This is obviously questionable in itself. Mr. Chin then puts the decline in enthusiasm after 1924 down to the Society's faulty ideology, i.e., it was not "populist". According to this reasoning one would have to conclude from the lack of success of any movement in the 1920s and 1930s that none at all was supported by the people, \textit{ergo}, that there was no nationalism. Mr. Chin cites (p.148) in support of his position a Government-General Police Affairs Bureau summary of reports for 1933-1938, dealing with the Japanese divide-and-rule policy against nationalism then. Such reports do refer back to earlier periods and while they note a decline in nationalist movements in the mid-1920's, the decline is \textit{relative} to socialist movements. Since socialists were still nationalistic, a rise in socialism did not mean nationalist sentiment was discarded. The Japanese paranoia about the "red threat" in the 1920's must be allowed for: socialists and labour leagues were lumped under statistics on communism and some statistics are quite indiscriminate. Japanese reports also note a decline in radicalism by 1929 and the resurgence of "pure" nationalism: Shakai undō no jokyō, "Minzokushugi undō no jōkyō", 1931, 1935 and 1937. (CDU, part 3, chapter 6.)}
explained adequately in terms of the compromise versus noncompromise debate of the period, as the Korean communists themselves were well aware.  

The "noncompromise" newspaper, the Chōson Daily, was fully behind the Products Promotion Society whose ablest theoreticians included socialists. The popularity of Cho Man-sik, the "Gandhi" of Korea, in 1945 has recently been described by a North Korean communist as "sensational". For compared with concurrent movements in Korea, his movement emerges as the most durable of any clearly-defined organisation with specific aims.

The cause of the self-reconstruction movement's woes was not lack of popular support but the Japanese reaction to its growing popularity. The combined influence of the Tonguhoe and Hūngōp Kurakbu on the Korean population startled the Government-General. The authorities

123. Cho Man-sik was affiliated with the "non-compromise" side. When the Shinganhoe was launched, Cho became Head of the P'yōngyang branch. Moreover the first national President was the Christian nationalist Yi Sang-jae, who was a leader of the movement to establish a Korean university in 1924 which Mr. Chin places on the "non-popular" side. Founding members of the Shinganhoe included the following founding members of the Korean Products Promotion Society: Yi Sun-t'ae k, Yi Chong-rin, Pak Tong-wan and Myōng Che-se, Yu Sŏng-jun's nephew Yu Ŭk-kyŏm, and the communist leader Han Wi-gŏn. (Donga Daily, 20 January 1927). Han Wi-gŏn was a reporter of the Donga Daily, while Cho Man-sik was at one time manager of the Chosŏn Daily. The two newspapers were supposedly "compromise" and "non-compromise" organs in the 1920s. That the communists were aware of the lack of clear definition of the factions is evident from the Korean communist "theses" of March 1928. See "Chŏngch'i Rongang", in Ko Jun-sŏk (compiler), Ch'osŏn Kakumei te-se, Tokyo, Tsuge shobō, 1979, pp.81-88.

124. Lim Ŭn, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea, p.133.
not only removed their members from schools but also moved rapidly to bring the Protestant denominations under direct supervision. In 1939 they noted with relief and a sense of triumph that at last the "stubborn" Presbyterians, the strongest single group in the land, had submitted to pressure to renounce their "dependence" on European and American Christianity and conform to "Japan-style Christianity".\footnote{GGPAB, 1939: "Saikin ni okeru Chōsen chian jōkyō." \footnote{(CDU, part 2, chapter 3, pp.346-347.)}}

In an international climate where the nation-state formula was universal and in Korea's case where Japan, on her own behalf, applied that formula with a vengeance, the self-reconstruction nonresistance nationalists certainly faced a serious dilemma. For not only Korean but also Japanese nationalism was involved. The problem with Japanese nationalism was not that it was narrow but that it was not narrow enough. Had it been content simply to impose its political authority over the colonial possessions, there would have been no real barrier to Korean self-reconstruction, and the Korean "nation" could have survived in a similar way to the Chinese "nation", and indeed their own "nation", under Mongolian and Manchu rule. But the assimilation policy could not tolerate a "nation" of Koreans that did not coincide with the Japanese "state" of Chōsen. The Koreans had to concede the logic of Japan's position, for it was also the logic of their own argument that once Korea became a real nation a Japanese state would become unviable. The Japanese recognised the peril of allowing a distinct national culture and economy to remain or develop within its imperial boundaries in the modern world. The more successful
the self-reconstruction movement became the more certain it was that Japan would crush it.

While the Japanese imprisoned the self-reconstructionists for subversion, the "pure" nationalists and the radical left accused them of collaboration. The weakness of this criticism was that the political nationalists of right and left were given far less room to manoeuvre than the "culturalists". To claim that this proved the nonresistance movement was collaborationist is inconclusive, since it implies that the least feasible approach was the most genuine. The self-reconstruction movement had its martyrs too, and more important, was replete with nationalist symbols. The charge of collaboration was, overall, more polemical than descriptive.

The debate over the powerlessness of individuals against socio-political structures was more complex and involved some irreconcilable views of social change. The anarchists, represented by Shin Ch'ae-ho, urged the utter dissolution of formal social structures while the Marxists hoped to grasp the necessary political power to transform totally those structures. The Protestants themselves experienced differences over the methodology of change by the late 1920s. But whichever took priority the source of improvement in both society and individuals was held to be spiritual. In An Ch'ang-ho's view, individuals who blamed sociopolitical structures for their unhappy condition and refused to take responsibility for their own lives were actually accomplices in their own enslavement. The environment was a limiting not a determining factor.
It was this belief that ethico-spiritual health and vitality was the "root and trunk" of all other national enterprises that induced its advocates to relegate politics to a secondary position in the struggle for national integrity. Amidst the confusion of the myriad competing "isms" all claiming to be the authentic voice of Korea's future, national self-reconstruction ideology possessed a certain charm for many Koreans and especially Protestants. It appealed as a prophetic vision carrying with it its own commendation and was received by devotees as a self-evident truth.\textsuperscript{126} An's system was indeed a very unified one: his doctrine that reality was everywhere concentric and that change therefore commenced at the centre of perception, that is, in the human spirit, working outwards till all else was transformed, was philosophically attractive and emotionally appealing to nationalists who rejected civil violence and yearned for unity.

By dissociating themselves from direct political activism and anti-Japanese sentiment, self-reconstruction nationalists paradoxically expanded the definition of nationalism to encompass broad areas of life, from personal life-style and household economy to social relations and cultural change. This was not what the political activists, and patriots abroad, called nationalism. But a nation-state cannot be

\textsuperscript{126} e.g. Kim Kyŏng-sŏk, "Minjok kaejoron tok'ugam", \textit{Tongkwang}, No.29, January 1932, pp.106-107. Kim wrote that now at last there had appeared "over our heads the first bright glimmer of dawn, a clear compass before our feet". Lee Kwang-su he likened to "a prophet sounding the fire alarm to a dying race".
built and preserved by narrow nationalist sentiment, and the neglect of social and economic reform after 1945 by the Rhee Government reflected its preoccupation with heroes of resistance and the politics of the diaspora. On the peninsula, large numbers of politically powerless Koreans caught from self-reconstruction ideals a vision, not only of a new Korea, but also of their participation in its construction.
GLOSSARY OF KOREAN NAMES AND TERMS

Aeguk Dan
An Chae-hong
An Ch'ang-ho
An Chung-gun
An Kuk-sun
An Myōng-gun
An T'ae-guk
Ch'a Ri-sŏk
Chajakhoe
Chang Tŏk-su
Changbaek Sanin
Cho Kwang
Cho Man-sik
Cho Myōng-sik
Ch'oe Hyŏn-bae
Ch'oe Ik-hyŏn
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Chung, Henry: see Chŏng Han-ŭng

Cynn, Hugh: see Shin Hŭng-u
Donga Daily

Hakuhoe
Ham T'ae-yŏng
Han Kyŏng-jik
Han Wi-gŏn
Han Yong-un
Hansŏng
Han-Yŏng Sŏwŏn
Hong Myŏng-hŭi
Hŭngsadan
Hyŏn Sang-yun

Ilchinhoe
Im Ch'i-jŏng
Imo Kunran

Kabo Reforms

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Rhee Syngman: see Yi Sŭng-man

Samoh'ŏlli
Sedo chŏngch'i
Shidae Ilbo
Shin Ch'ae-ho
Shin Donga
Shin Hŭng-u
Shin Ki-sŏn
Shin Saenghwal
Shinganhoe
Shinminhoe
Silhak
Sŏ Chae-p'il
Sŏ Ch'un
Sŏ Kwang-bŏm
Sŏbuk p'a
Sŏl T'ae-hŭi
Song Chin-u

三千里
世道政治
時代日報
申采浩
新東亞
申興雨
申箕吾
新生活
新幹會
新民會
實學
徐載弼
徐椿
徐光範
西北派
薛泰熙
宋鎮禹
No Paek-rin
Noron
O Hwa-yong
O Hyon-ju
O Yun-soon
Ok Kwan-bin
Osan College
Paik Kwan-su
Paik Nam-hun
Paik Nam-un
Pak Hi-do
Pak Hyon-hwan
Pak Tong-wan
Pak Un-sik
Pak Yong-hyo
Pak Yong-man
Poguk Anmin
Song Kye-baek
Sŏnu Hyŏk
Sonyŏn
Suyang Tongmaenghoe
Suyang Tonguhoe
Taehan Chaganghoe
Taehan Hyŏphoe
Taehan Kungminhoe
Taesŏng College
Taewŏngun
Tan'gun
Tonghak
Tongjihoe
Tongkwang
Tongnip Hyŏphoe
Tongu Kurakbu
Tonguhoe
Yi Wan-yong
Yi Wŏn-gŭng
Yi Yong-gu
Yi Yun-jae
Yŏ Un-hyŏng
Yu Kil-jun
Yu Ŭk-kyŏm
Yu Sŏng-jun
Yun Ch'i-ho
Yun Hyo-jŏng
Yun Yŏng-nam
NOTES ON SOURCES

There is no single body of primary source material on the Protestant nationalist movements in Korea. I was advised by Professor Kang Man-gil, then of Koryŏ University, and the Director of the National History Compilation Committee, Dr. Yi Hyŏn-jong, that insufficient source materials had survived on Protestant movements in the 1920s and 1930s to support a whole thesis. I am inclined now to be more optimistic, though such a study of this period would take considerable time and may have to wait upon access to the relevant materials in P'yŏngyang and the regional centres in North Korea where Protestantism was strong.

The story of Korean Protestant self-reconstruction nationalism from 1896 to 1937 has therefore had to be pieced together from information scattered throughout the writings of nationalists and their journals and newspapers; and throughout the collections of Japanese official documents.

Research on the first phase (1896-1910) was facilitated by the preservation, in good order, of the Tongnip Shinmun and the works of Yu Kil-jun and Yun Ch'i-ho. The Tongnip Shinmun (1896-1899) was a very partisan newspaper whose editorials campaigned consistently for the adoption of "Western" religion, learning and socio-political values and systems. Since the paper was managed and edited by the Christian triumvirate of Yun Ch'i-ho, Sŏ Chae-p'il and Namgung Ők, its contents reflect the nationalist thought of early Protestant
reformers. The *Diary* of Yun Ch'i-ho is without doubt a most valuable source on the early Protestant perception of society, international politics, Japanese intentions and Korea's decline. Published in six volumes, the *Diary* covers the period January 1883 to July 1906: it is written in classical Chinese from January 1883 to October 1887, in Korean from then till December 1889 and thereafter in fluent English. Unfortunately, the remainder of the diary up to 1945 has not been released for publication. I endeavoured to obtain permission to read the unpublished portion through the offices of Professors H.G. Underwood, L.-G. Paik and Lee Kwang-rin, but without success.

I have relied for official documentation on this first phase mainly on the *Government Gazette* (Kwanbo: Chinese text) and Residency-General documents contained in the *Chōsen tōchi shirō* (10 vols) and *Mī Kan gaikō shirō* (8 vols) collections. In this connexion I have an explanation to make. During the process of packing and transporting my notes, books and research materials from Seoul to Canberra, a few master cards in my bibliography were lost. Fortunately, I succeeded in tracking down all missing titles except one title of a collection of Residency-General documents housed in the Yonsei University Library. From memory, these were documents released by the Government-General. I have indicated these documents in the footnotes with the abbreviation YUL (Yonsei University Library). References to these are few and occur almost exclusively in chapter two.

Nationalist newspapers and other writings were banned throughout the second phase, 1910-1918. The police reports and Japanese Ministry
of Internal Affairs reports contained in the *Gendaishi shiryō* volumes, the trial records of the Conspiracy Case in the *Chōsen dokuritsu undō* compilation, the mission reports in the Underwood and Moffett collections, the correspondence, reports and miscellaneous papers of the Presbyterian Church of the United States and the *Shinhan Minbo* (San Francisco) comprise the bulk of my primary source materials for this period.

The principal Korean sources for the third phase (1919-1937) are the collected works of Lee Kwang-su and An Ch'ang-ho and the newspapers and journals: *Donga* and *Chosŏn dailies*, *Kaeb'yŏk*, *Ch'ŏngnyŏn*, *Samhe'ŏlli*, *Shin Donga* and *Tongkwang*. The *Tongkwang* journal is a valuable and virtually unmined source on both culturalism in general and Protestant influences in particular. The journals of the Korean Products Promotion Society, *Changsan* and *Chosŏn Mulsan Changnyŏhoe Hoebo*, which are important sources for the final chapter, have to my knowledge been cited in only one other study to date, namely Cho Ki-jun's economic history: *Han'guk Chabonjui Sŏngnip Saron* (1973).

The Japanese sources for the third phase are the documents contained in the following compilations: *Chōsen dokuritsu undō*, *Chōsen tōchi shiryō*, *Gendaishi shiryō*: *Chōsen*, *Chōsen mondai shiryō sōsho* and the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs compilation, *Shakai undō no jōkyō*. There is a definite bias in these compilations towards socialist and communist movements. Even though volumes six and eight of *Chōsen mondai shiryō sōsho* are supposedly reserved for the nationalist movement, a considerable portion deals with communist
activities. Volume eight, which contains excerpts from the Government-General High Court Shisō ihō bulletins in the 1930's frustratingly leaves out reports on the Tonguhoe and Christian movements which are shown on the Shisō ihō lists of contents.

Finally, I have not cited the National History Compilation Committee’s multi-volume collection on Korean nationalism, Han’guk Tongnip Undongsa Charyo, because the relevant volumes consist of translations of Japanese documents which I had access to in the original language.
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