USE OF THESES

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This thesis is the product of original research carried out by myself in the Department of South Asian and Buddhist Studies at the Australian National University, from 27 February, 1979 to 26 February, 1982.

[Signature]

Prasad
To

My revered teacher, Professor J.W. de Jong

With deepest gratitude
The concept of time is perhaps the most difficult problem of human thinking. It has always been a perennial source of mystery and has often troubled the heads of those who try to understand it. It is really surprising that a concept with which we are so intimately mixed up in our daily life gives rise to a tremendous number of insurmountable intricacies from all sides as soon as we start analysing it critically. This is because time is not a single concept in itself. Firstly, it has different aspects, such as philosophical, psychological, literary, historical, anthropological, religious, cultural, mystical, mathematical, physical and biological. Secondly, it is related to many other concepts in some form or other, such as change, events, actions, causality, space, substance, matter, consciousness, motion, identity and difference, which in themselves are often vague. Thirdly, the concept of time raises a number of questions: What is the nature, status and direction of time? What is its origin and development? How can it be measured? Is there only one time or two, viz. eternal and phenomenal? Does time flow? What does its direction consist of? What are temporal orders, the past, present and future? Is a reversed direction of time possible? What are temporal priority, temporal posteriority, simultaneity, non-simultaneity, soonness, lateness, oldness, youngness, etc.? What is the duration of present? Is time finite or infinite? What is the relation between time, instants and interval? What is the difference between absolute time and clock time? What are timelessness, permanence, and temporality? What do mortal and immortal mean in respect of time? Is time linear, or cyclical, or spiral? Is time a cause or a cosmic power? And so on.
Even if we want to deal with time philosophically only, there are different approaches to it, namely, realistic, idealistic, relativistic, and negativistic. This shows how difficult it is to understand time in its entirety.

It is very disappointing that there is not even a single good work on time in Indian philosophy, though the original sources are replete with long as well as brief discussions on it. We find only a few scattered articles in journals and some brief accounts of it in a few books. Thus the study of time in India has always been neglected. There is certainly a small book of comparative study of Indian and Western concepts of space and time by K.K. Mandal (1968), but it is badly presented. The author gives the impression that he is not well-equipped with knowledge of the languages of the original sources, such as Sanskrit and Pali. He has failed to give a good philosophical account of these concepts.

In Indian tradition the discussion of time may be traced back to the *Atharvaveda* (3.52-53). Since then both Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts have dealt with this problem. But for my study I have been very selective in regard to the systems for two reasons: first, my primary aim is to discuss the treatment of time according to different schools of Buddhism in considerable detail. We can agree with Schayer (1938, p. 14) that

"As a matter of course, India is indebted for real progress in the critical analysis of the Time-problem ... to Buddhism. This progress was so essential that, if the history of the Indian Time philosophy is ever written, it will be in a large measure a history of Buddhist thought. Since sources are only partly opened, it is difficult to attempt an exhaustive exposition just now. But some facts can be ascertained."

I have also selected three non-Buddhist systems - Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Jainism - which, I consider, are the most important
schools of thought for our purpose. Secondly, limited time and resources, provided to me for writing a Ph.D. thesis, do not allow me to deal with all those texts and schools which speak of time in some or other way. However, I think, I have left a very important chapter to write, i.e. *Time and the Theory of Momentariness* throughout Buddhism ranging from Pali sources to Dignāga's school of logic and its subsequent developments. Although I am overwhelmed by the available materials, lack of time prevented me from doing this.

Throughout my thesis I have tried my best to maintain consistency in the presentation and to keep myself close to the original sources. It is not my aim to answer all those questions raised above regarding time, but rather to show what the Indian philosophical systems say of time and whether their interpretations of time are in line with their other metaphysical and epistemological postulations. I have often given my own observations where necessary and have made an attempt to analyse what they say about time. I have found in a number of cases that modern scholars have either misunderstood the original sources or relied on secondary writings while discussing this concept. Although to the best of my capacity I have advanced arguments in order to prove my thesis, yet there may be a substantial amount of scope to introduce fresh arguments and sharpen the present ones. One can pick holes in my arguments here and there, but I think it is not possible to reject what I have written in its entirety. I admit that in philosophy there is a difference of opinion even on a single topic and this is legitimate. In short, the present work is a humble attempt to give an idea of what the major philosophical systems of India think of time, but due to my own limitations and shortcomings I can claim of little originality in my presentation. To quote Jayanta:
"How can we discover a new fact (or truth in philosophy)? Hence (as far as this ... [thesis] is concerned) one should only consider our novelty in rephrasing (the older truths propounded by the ancients in modern terminology)."


Now it is my duty to thank those who have helped me write this thesis. First of all, I owe my deepest gratitude to my revered teacher, Professor J.W. de Jong, whose name appears on the dedication page. It was he from whom I got the inspiration to work on this project during his visit to Banaras Hindu University in January, 1976. In the same year I first started my work under the supervision of the late Professor R.K. Tripathi of the Department of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University. But because of my severe financial difficulty I could not carry on my research until February, 1979. Again, it was Professor de Jong on whose kind and strong recommendation I was awarded an Australian National University Ph.D. Scholarship to work under his supervision on the present topic. Throughout my research he has been a constant source of inspiration and encouragement. He not only supervised my thesis with great interest, but also lent me lots of books which were not available in the University Library. I have also immensely benefited from his vast erudition and accuracy of presentation which have really set an example before me. It was an impossible task for me to maintain the standard he wanted.

My thanks are also due to Professor A.L. Basham, Dr. Baas J. Terwiel, Miss Linda Thompson, Mr. Rafael Bar-Illán de la Plata and Mr. John Jorgensen for their help in writing the thesis. I wish to thank the libraries of Congress, Yale University, Harvard University, Oxford University, British Museum, India Office and Tokyo University for supplying me with
photocopies of some important materials. It is a matter of great satisfaction that the Menzies Library of the Australian National University made available all those materials I required. Hence, I am grateful to the staff of the library.

Special thanks to Miss Betty Kat, the departmental secretary of South Asian and Buddhist Studies, for her elegant, prompt and careful typing. It is not possible to record all the help she has happily extended to me during my stay in Canberra.

Last but not least, I am deeply indebted to my wife, Meena, for her affection and encouragement. I would also like to express my thanks for her soothing company during all the moments of loneliness, happiness and occasional despair.
The present thesis is an attempt to expound the philosophical study of time in India. Its main purpose is to give a clear picture of the Buddhist notion of time as discussed in its different schools: the Pali tradition, Vaibhāṣikas (or the Sarvāstivādins), Sautrāntikas and the Mādhyamikas. It also deals with the three major non-Buddhist systems: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāmkhya-Yoga and Jainism.

The first chapter deals with the substantive reality of time in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which is a realistic and pluralistic system. It accepts time (mahākāla) as an instrumental cause, eternal, absolute, independent, unique, infinite and all-pervading. According to this system, finite time (khaṇḍakāla), such as second, minute, hour, day, past, present or future, has no independent status, and is only an imposed property of eternal time (kālopādhi). In the second chapter, Sāmkhya-Yoga gives a tremendous shock to absolute time of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Whereas Sāmkhya identifies time with change, actions or events, Yoga ascribes reality to moment (kṣaṇa), but denies its aggregates as absolute time. In the third chapter, Jainism maintains that time is real and a substance, but it does not possess corporeality, though it has existence. It propounds the semi-realistic and atomistic theory of time. The fourth chapter makes an analysis of the concept of time in Pali Buddhism dispersed through a vast number of Pali texts. The fifth chapter deals with the important controversy on time between the Vaibhāṣikas (or the Sarvāstivādins) and the Sautrāntikas. The sixth and final chapter provides a Mādhyamika critique of time. It is to be noted that in the entire Buddhist tradition time has never been considered as a reality, though
we do find in it some interesting passages on the three time-epochs, the past, present and future, which are often taken as the modes of existence. But they too are in no sense real as such.

The first appendix gives some different lists of computations of time maintained by different texts. This is in addition to the lists given by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jainism. The second appendix is a new critical edition of the Prasannapadā, chapter XIX, which demonstrates the Mādhyamika critique of time.
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CHAPTER I

Time as a Substantive Reality in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are the two currents of one philosophical system of realism, having mutual acceptance except minor differences in their philosophical postulations. They were systematised by Gautama (150 A.D.; 250-350 A.D. ?) and Kanḍa (100 A.D.) mainly dealing with epistemology and metaphysics respectively. Umesh Mishra presents a series of points of variations between these two schools. For our study we shall be treating them as one system irrespective of their independent developments. In the following passages the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika strives to explain some of the questions which trouble the heads of philosophers and drive us into quandaries and paradoxes as soon as we try to solve them.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a realistic and pluralistic system. It admits nine substances (dravya) - earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind - which constitute all kinds of material and immaterial things. Substance is defined by the Vaiśeṣikas as that which possesses qualities and action, and is an inherent cause (saṃavāyikāraṇa) of all composite things. Four of these substances - earth, water, fire and air - constitute the material world and, in their atomic form, are non-eternal. The remaining five substances are divided into two groups: first, ether, time and space are non-psychic, all-pervading (vibhu), normally imperceptible, one, infinite, eternal, and are common receptacles of all corporeal things. These substances have the characteristics of eternity, independence and ultimate particularity. Second, the two other substances - soul, which is also omnipresent, and mind, which is atomic - are psychic and have many individuals (anekatva).
The Characteristics of Time

(1) Time is unique, i.e. one in number.

(2) Time is inactive as it is different from those which possess activity.

(3) Time is all-pervasive (sarvagata), possesses extremely large dimension (paramamahatva), and is the substratum of all composite things (sarvasamyogisamānadeśatva). According to Śrīdhara (991 A.D.), all (sarva) in all-pervasive (sarvagata) denotes all composite material substances. Thus, all-pervasive means time has connection with all composite material substances. This does not mean that it moves everywhere, as it is said to be inactive. Paramamahatva shows that time possesses an unbounded, unlimited dimension. Sarvasamyogisamānadeśatva means time (together with ākāśa and dik) is the common receptacle or substratum of all composite material substances. It is, in real sense, not the substratum of all such substances, rather it is the substratum of all sorts of conjunctions. It is actually figuratively called the substratum of all conjuncts, or composite material substances. It is in this sense that it differs from all-pervasiveness (sarvagatyata).

(4) Time possesses the five qualities - number (saṃkhya), dimension (parimāṇa), separateness (prthaktva), conjunction (saṃyoga) and disjunction (vibhaga).

(5) Time is the instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa) of all products. It is also said to be the cause of origination, duration and destruction, because the latter are understood only in relation to time, such as in the expressions - 'this is the time of its origination', 'this is the time of its destruction'. "Time is a cause", remarks Keith, "only in the loose sense of that term, which is affected in the school, namely as one of the many conditions which are necessary to the existence of a thing; it belongs to the category of general instrumental cause, as opposed
either to the specific instrumental cause (karaṇa) or the inherent or non-inherent causes.\textsuperscript{13}

(6) Time is a substance and eternal.\textsuperscript{14}

(7) Time is the ground of our usages of the past, present and future.\textsuperscript{15}

(8) Time is the cause of our use of various temporal expressions,\textsuperscript{16} such as kṣaṇa,\textsuperscript{17} lava,\textsuperscript{18} nimeṣa,\textsuperscript{19} kāṣṭhā,\textsuperscript{20} kalā,\textsuperscript{21} mūḥṛta,\textsuperscript{22} yāma,\textsuperscript{23} day and night,\textsuperscript{24} fortnight, month, year, season (ṛtu),\textsuperscript{25} solstice (ayana),\textsuperscript{26} yuga,\textsuperscript{27} kalpa,\textsuperscript{28} manvantara,\textsuperscript{29} pralaya,\textsuperscript{30} mahāpralaya.\textsuperscript{31}

(9) Time is the cause of our notions (pratyaya) of temporal priority or oldness (paratva) and temporal posteriority or youngness (aparatva), simultaneity (yaugapadya) and non-simultaneity (ayaugapadya), and soonness (kṣipratva) and lateness (ciratva).\textsuperscript{32}

**Proofs for the Existence of Time**

As time does not possess any physical or psychical quality, it is not an object of direct perception. It is known only through inference on the basis of the notions of temporal priority and temporal posteriority, etc. It was Vācaspati\textsuperscript{33} (980 A.D.) who first suggested the method of inference of time. He was followed by Udayana\textsuperscript{34} (975-1050 A.D.), Padmanābha\textsuperscript{35} (1578 A.D.) and others. Their arguments can be summarised as follows:

The notions of temporal priority and posteriority are based on the revolutions of the Sun\textsuperscript{36} (sūryaparispanda). An object is called temporally prior (para), if it has a larger number of contacts with the revolutions of the Sun in its life, while that which has a smaller number of such contacts is called temporally posterior (apara). Now, the question is: How can an object come in contact with the solar revolutions? As the two are at a very large distance from each other, no direct contact (saṃyoga)
is possible. Other kinds of relations too, such as saṁyukta-samavāya, saṁyuktasamavetasamavāya, samavāya, are shown to be impossible. The only possibility left is an indirect relation through a connecting link. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that only a substance is capable of doing this, as contact is possible only among the substances (dravyasya dravyayor eva saṁyogah). Further, none of the substances of earth, water, fire and air can be the connecting link, because they are limited in their dimension, and when they are connected with the object, they are not connected with the Sun. If it is suggested that the fire (tejas) inherent in the Sun acts as the connecting link, it is not tenable, because this fire would not be able to establish contacts with the objects which are lying under the earth in the dark. So, only an all-pervasive substance can serve our purpose, and this substance must be omnipresent in dimension and individual in character, so that it may be connected with all substances. Though ether and soul also are two all-pervading substances, they are not capable of being the connecting link. The connecting link should be such that it may be in relation to both the object and the revolutions of the Sun, and also has the capacity to relate them with each other. Neither ether nor soul possesses this capacity. If ether has this capacity, it would be possible for a particular stroke producing sound in one drum to be shifted to other drums and to produce sound in them also, because ether is a ubiquitous substance; but this is not the case. Thus, ether cannot connect the revolutions of the Sun with the object. Again, if the soul had this, it would create and transmit the attributes of one object to another arbitrarily, e.g. the fragrance of a flower would be perceived in the table, and the colour of one particular object found at any particular place might be transmitted to another place. Therefore, soul also cannot act as the connecting link.
The preceding absurdity shows that ether and soul lack the capacity to be a connecting link and a direct relation is impossible. The Vaiśeṣika, therefore, sets forth a special substance which will serve the end. And this substance is time which, through the relation of sva-saṃyukta-saṃyukta-samavāya (i.e. inherence of motion in a substratum which is in conjunction with something which is in conjunction with the individual in question (Bhaduri, 1975, p. 185, fn. 4), connects the object with the movements of the Sun.

Now one may raise an objection that if time is granted to possess the capacity of connecting the two substances, it is not free from the qualities of producing different attributes in other substances in the most confusing way like ether and soul, for time also is ubiquitous in character. Thus, time should also be restrained from being a connecting link. Keeping this difficulty in view, the Vaiśeṣika asserts that the existence of time as an indirect connecting link is proved by the reductio ad absurdum arguments against the two other possible substances - ether and soul. Further, in the present context the required capacity of time is posited by the same arguments which prove the existence of time itself as a substance. There is, therefore, no chance of mutual change of properties among the substances, if time is established as the medium of connecting the individual object and the solar revolutions.

In a similar way, the notions of simultaneity and non-simultaneity, soon and late too should be understood. When two or more actions (kriyā) are related to a particular solar revolution, they are called simultaneous. When they are related to different solar revolutions, they are termed as non-simultaneous. Soon and late signify a smaller and a larger number of solar movements respectively with which an action is connected.
Diverse Interpretations within the System

But all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars are not in agreement with Vācaspati and his followers regarding the method of inference of time. Śrīdhara (991 A.D.), in his Nyāya-kandālī, has a different approach to this problem. First, he out and out denies any possibility of establishing a relation between the notions of temporal priority (para, in the case of an old man), and temporal posteriority (apara, in the case of a young man), and the movements of the Sun. It would, therefore, be preposterous to accept an unrelated substance as a cause of these notions. What he suggests is that time itself is the cause of the notions of temporal priority and temporal posteriority, simultaneity and non-simultaneity, soon and late, or these notions are the marks of the knowledge of time. The reasoning behind this is that we observe no other cause for these notions with regard to their respective objects. It is undisputed that the notions of temporal priority and posteriority are found in substances. Again, substances themselves cannot be the cause of these notions, which actually are totally different from their respective substances. At the same time no effect can be produced without a cause. Hence, we deduce from this that time is the only cause of these notions.

Someone may say that to co-exist (sahabhāva) is simultaneity (yaugapadya), but not 'relating to one time' (ekakālikatva). This is not true, as Śrīdhara states, because without conceding time the word 'co-exist' has no meaning. The opponent may suggest that in an action the existence of different entities is called 'co-existence'. This also is not tenable. There is no contradiction among that which has not yet originated, that which continues to exist and that which has ceased to exist. Even if we find contradiction among the co-existing entities, the existence of time cannot be denied. Now the question arises: If time is one, why is there difference between these notions? This is, replies Śrīdhara, because of
the difference of conditions (sāmagrībheda). For instance, the awareness of the origination of one thing and the persistence of another by one and the same knowledge (jñāna) gives the notions of temporal priority and posteriority. And these notions arise from the co-operating cause (sahakārikāraṇa) time. Further, without admitting the existence of time the emergence of everything would be inexplicable. An ever-existing thing like ākāśa is uncaused and an ever-non-existing thing like a man's horn (naraviśāna) also is uncaused, i.e. they are timelessly existent and non-existent respectively. As the Vaiśeṣika propounds the theory of asatkāryavāda, i.e. the effect is non-existent before its emergence, the only possibility where the causation may be applied is to the thing which is produced after having been previously non-existent (prāgasat). If time is not admitted, the word 'previous' (prāk) in 'previously non-existent' (prāgasat) would have no meaning, and then the production in general would be impossible like the ever-existing ākāśa or the absolutely non-existing man's horn.

Again, Śrīdhara maintains that change also gives knowledge of time. It is time which takes us inexorably from birth to death. Different states and successive changes in the phenomena indicate the passage of time. We also infer the existence of time through the different physical stages of an old man and a young one. At the same time, without admitting time, change would be unintelligible.

Śivāditya (12th century) and Candrakānta (19th century) explain away the independent reality of time and include it under ākāśa along with dik. Raghunātha Śiromāṇi (1475-1550 A.D.) criticises the traditional list of nine substances and avouches that time and space are not individual substances; they are nothing but God (or Supreme Soul), because there is no proof that they are independent of God. But Venidatta (18th century) rejects this idea and sets forth that -
"... the notions which are formed due to Kāla are not possible to be explained byĪsvara; forĪsvara being one cannot explain the differences in notions as have been found above. We cannot hold that due to certain limitations present inĪsvara the differences in notions can be explained; for, if it be so, then let the differences of the all-pervading Jīvātmans, namely, 'this is Caitra', 'this is Maitra', and so on, be also explained by the same limitations and do away with the plurality of the Jīvātmans; for, with the help of the limitations a single conscious being can explain all the differences found in beings. Hence, the above mentioned prove the separate existence of Time - 'sa esa samāvatsaraḥ'.'

An interesting thing to note is that Raghunātha proposes eight new categories (padārtha), the first of which is moment (kṣaṇa), which is momentary in duration and a separate category, and is termed as an imposed property of time (kālopādhi). But the question is: If there is no independent time, how is its kālopādhi possible? We do not get any satisfactory reply to this from him.

Further, Viśvanātha (1654 A.D.), Dinakara (mid-18th century) and Rāmarudra (18th century) follow the traditional interpretation of time as a separate substance, and take moment (kṣaṇa) as its imposed property. They hold that the direct knowledge of moment is not possible; only an action (kriyā), which must last at least 4 such moments, gives the notion of it. According to the atomism of the system, an action is supposed to operate through 'disjunction' and 'conjunction', each of which occupies at least two such moments.

Vallabha (12th century) thinks that the traditional method of the inference of time by some Vaiśeṣika scholars is old and out of date (cirantana). He, like Vātsyāyana (350-425 A.D.) advances another argument in order to prove the existence of time. He says, the notion of time can be observed from the notion of 'present' (vartamānapratyaya) or 'existence' of anything. His contention, we think, is that the general idea of presentness or existentness of entities gives the idea of time.
In other words, the particular notion of presentness itself, which is actually like the relation of inherence (samavāya), is time.

To quote B.K. Matilal:

"Primarily the Vaiśeṣika prefers a priori inference to an empirical inference based on observations. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika substances such as air, sky, space, time, self and mind are inferred on the basis of a priori principle. This inference can be described as follows: p is a quality and a quality by definition should reside in a substance. Thus, p resides in a substance, and since this substance is not identifiable with any of the known substances, such as, a, b, or c, by logic or elimination we infer the existence of a separate substance. This inference makes use of the a priori principle that a quality resides in a substance."

The Perceptibility and Imperceptibility of Time Discussed

There are two groups, one of which, including Kanāda (100 A.D.), Praśastapāda (450-550 A.D.), Uddyotakara (550-625 A.D.), Ārddhara (991 A.D.), etc., maintains that time cannot be an object of direct perception. The other group, whose main exponent is Jayanta (890 A.D.), professes the perceptibility of time. Perception (pratyakṣa) is defined by Gautama as a knowledge which arises from the contact of sense-organs (indriya, i.e. eye, nose, ear, tongue, skin and mind) with the objects (artha), and is in character undifferentiated (avyāpađeśa), differentiated (vyavaśyātmaka) and free from errors (avyabhicārī). Since time is formless and all-pervading, Kanāda and his followers argue, we suppose, its perceptibility is impossible. An eternal and ubiquitous thing cannot come within the range of sense-organs. But there is one exception, i.e. through Yogic intuition time can be perceived in its entirety. This rejects D.M. Datta's remark that "The Naiyāyikas ... would grant neither the sensation of time nor any intuition of it". Here he takes the Naiyāyikas as representing the combined system of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
Jayanta, following the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, puts forth that time is perceived on the ground that in the notion of an event (kārya), time is observed as its qualification (viśeṣaṇa). The notions of succession, simultaneity, soon and late do not only refer to events, but also to time. If time does not possess any colour, it does not matter. Karl H. Potter summarises the arguments of Jayanta. He writes:

"Jayanta's argument on this score is simply that since we perceive things in space we perceive space in addition to things, and likewise since we perceive things at times we perceive time in addition to the things. The answer of the other faction is, first, that space and time cannot be perceptible since they lack a necessary condition of perceptibility, and that secondly, what is perceived is not space or time but rather the things in relations (spatial and temporal) to one another. The condition of perceptibility which is said to be lacking in the case of space and time is possession of color."

Mahākāla and Khaṇḍakāla

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits two sorts of time: infinite, eternal, Great Time (mahākāla) and finite or empirical time (khaṇḍakāla, or kālopādhi). The former is an undivided whole and is conceived as the locus of the universe. It is a static continuum, not like an ever rolling stream. Everything is said to be related to it by temporal relation (kālika-sambandha). For instance, 'rain in this month' (asmin māše varṣaḥ). Again, temporal relation is of two sorts: direct (sākṣāt) and indirect (paramparayā). The former is itself of two sorts, as Ingalls points out. He states:

"The first is the relation by which all entities, eternal and non-eternal, reside directly in universal time (mahākāla). ... The second is the relation by which all non-eternal entities reside directly in a portion of time. This is the relation between rain and this month. Now a portion of time is an imposed property (upādhi) on time, for time itself is eternal and formless."
it has contact only with composite material substances, which are non-
 eternal. This obviously excludes the eternal substances, such as space, 
soul and ether. Many modern scholars also endorse our interpretation. 
Therefore, we tend to disagree with Ingalls in this regard.

Further, finite time, which is measured by the duration of an object, 
actions, movements of the Sun, contacts, disjunctions, and our watches, 
is regarded as the imposed property or division of great time (kālopādhi). 
It has only conventional and practical value. A man is called father, son, 
brother because of the difference of his various relations to others. In 
the same way, time, which is really unique, gives rise to the notions of 
temporally prior or posterior in its relation to different actions. "In other words", remarks Matilal, "any kālopādhi may be looked upon as 
a time segment of the four-dimensional material world, exhaustive spatially 
and perpendicular to the time axis." 

The Past, Present and Future Discussed

Annambhāṭṭa (1600 A.D.) maintains that time is the ground of our 
temporal expressions, such as the past, present, and future. We speak 
of an event as past, present or future, which have their roots in time. 
These usages (vyavahāra) are nothing but conventional and sentential 
(vākyaprayogarūpa) as Vākyavṛtti suggests, and time is considered as 
their instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa). Mīlakaṇṭha Śāstrī (1750-1840 
A.D.) defines these terms as follows: The past is a counterpositive of 
present (vartamānadhvamsapratiyogi), which actually refers to the passage 
of time as the ground of our conventional usage. The future is the state 
which refers to the non-existence of present before it comes into existence. 
In all these cases time is common and should be taken as the cause. Hence,
it is not tenable to say that the past, present and future, which are the imposed properties of time, are based on the revolutions of the Sun.\textsuperscript{70}

Jayanta proposes a different approach to the problem of the three time-epochs. Time, as we have seen, is an undivided whole. Any attempt to divide it is not real and all the divisions of time must be considered as its imposed properties (upādhi).\textsuperscript{71} Now the question arises: What is that which gives rise to these upādhis? Jayanta's reply is that it is an action which gives the notions of the past, present and future. An action is a series of different moments of origination, duration and destruction in order to bring about a complete result. For example, the act of cooking rice. From putting the pot on the oven, when the action begins, to taking it down, when the action ends, is called one complete action which represents present time, such as 'he cooks'. The series of actions which has already produced an effect such as 'he cooked' represents past time. An action, which has not yet commenced, such as 'he will cook', refers to future time. It follows that our temporal expressions of the past, present and future refer to real time as their common ground.\textsuperscript{72} In other words, to quote A.B. Keith:

"The past of an individual is the time characterized by its destruction, the future that characterized by its precedent non-existence, the present is the time whose future existence is destroyed and whose own destruction is about to come."\textsuperscript{73}

Padmanābha Miśra (1578 A.D.), however, maintains that the past, present and future are essentially of the nature of time. They are not imposed properties of the latter.\textsuperscript{74} If it is so, then every time-epoch will be called past, present and future in relation to its preceding and succeeding moments. It is present, if it has both preceding and succeeding moments. It is past, if it has only succeeding moments, and it is future, if it has only preceding moments. This is not possible without the flow of time from future to past through present. But in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika time is
admitted as static and inactive. Therefore, it is not possible for us to be in agreement with Padmanābha Miśra's contention. We have also seen that only an action can be supposed to be the basis in order to define the three time-epochs, as it has different preceding and succeeding moments referring to different points of time.

Further, direct perception, which arises from the contact of our sense-organs with the objects, gives knowledge of those objects which are related to present only. But through inference, holds Jayanta, we can have knowledge of all the three time-epochs. From the swollen river we can infer that there was rainfall referring to the past time. From the hovering of the clouds we can infer that there will be rainfall referring to the future time, and from the arising of the smoke in the mountain we can infer that there is fire there referring to the present time. He rejects the Mīmāṃsaka's view that the Vedas alone give knowledge of past, present and future, subtle, concealed, and remote objects, which is not possible by other means. This is an absurd hypothesis, because we already have other means which provide us with knowledge of such objects. Apart from this the Yogic intuition also can reveal the nature of all kinds of objects related to the three time-epochs. Sometimes we too have knowledge of such objects.

Measurement of Time

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, measurement is possible only in the case of finite time, because "... Time in the sense of eternal time (mahā-kāla) seldom enters into our ordinary experiences. Our usual practice is to refer to the imposed divisions or calibrations (upādhi) of Time, and to connect an entity to one calibration or another. In order to refer to the imposed divisions, we generally mention other finite entities of
limited durations.” The standard for the measurement of finite time in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the daily solar revolutions (sūryaparispanda). Generally, the astronomical and astrological method of measuring time is accepted in this system.

According to Śrīdhara, measurements of time are as follows:

- 15 nimeṣas = 1 kāśṭhā
- 30 kāśṭhās = 1 kalā
- 15 kalās = 1 nādiṃkā
- 30 kalās = 1 muhūrta
- or 2 nādiṃkās = 1 muhūrta
- 30 muhūrtas = 1 ahorātra (dya & night, 24 hours)
- 15 ahorātras = 1 pakṣa (fortnight)
- 2 pakṣas = 1 māsa (month)
- 2 māsas = 1 rtu (season)
- 6 rtu or 12 months = 1 saṁvatsara (human year)
- 3 rtu = 1 uttarāyaṇa (day of gods)
- 3 rtu = 1 daksināyaṇa (night of gods)
- or 1 human year = 1 day and night of gods

360 days & nights of gods = 1 year of gods = 360 human years
12,000 years of gods = 4 Yugas = 360 x 12,000 human years = 4,320,000 human years
1,000 x 4 Yugas = 1 day of Brahmā = 4,320,000 x 1,000 human years = 4,320,000,000 human years
1 day & night of Brahmā = 8,640,000,000 human years

Thus, from the above computations 15 x 30 x 15 x 2 x 30 nimeṣas = 24 hours, or 1 nimeṣa (which is defined as the time taken by a twinkling of the eye) = 1/5 second, which is the smallest unit of time, according to Śrīdhara. Here it is to be noted that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system a year is considered to consist of 360 days only, instead of 365.24219 days as in the Christian calendar.
Prāśastapāda cites the names of the measurements of time differently, but he does not give their numerical values. These are: kṣaṇa, lava, nimeṣa, kāṣṭhā, kalā, muhūrta, yāma, ahorātra, ardhamāsa (fortnight), māsa, ṛtu, ayana, saṁvatsara, Yuga, kalpa and manvantara. Further, Udayana gives the following list:

- 2 kṣaṇas = 1 lava
- 2 lavas = 1 nimeṣa
- 18 nimeṣas = 1 kāṣṭhā
- 30 kāṣṭhās = 1 kalā
- 30 kalās = 1 muhūrta
- 30 muhūrtas = 1 ahorātra (day & night, 24 hours)
- 15 ahorātras = 1 pakṣa (fortnight)
- 2 pakṣas = 1 māsa (month)
- 2 māsas = 1 ṛtu
- 3 ṛtus = 1 ayana
- 2 ayanas = 1 mānuṣa-varṣa (human year) = 1 day and night of gods

The rest are similar to Śrīdhara's list.

Thus, according to Udayana, 2 x 2 x 18 x 30 x 30 x 30 kṣaṇas = 24 hours, or 1 kṣaṇa = 1/25 second. "The Nyāya assumes", remarks B.N. Seal, "that the unit of physical change (or the time occupied by any single antecedent step in a causal series before the succeeding step is ushered in) is equal to one kṣaṇa." Moreover, the preceding accounts show that there is not much unanimity among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars regarding the measurement of time.

Nature and Duration of Present Time

We find an interesting discussion regarding the present time in the Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama and the commentary of Vātsyāyana (350-425 A.D.) thereon. The latter refers to an opponent who denies the reality of present, but maintains that of past and future. To justify what he thinks,
the opponent cites an example

of a fruit (C) falling from the stalk (A). At any point (C) of its journey there are only two parts: (i) the space (AC) already traversed by it, the time connected with which is past time, and (ii) the space (CB) yet to be traversed by it, the time connected with which is future time. There is obviously no third part of the space with which we may connect present time. This shows that there is no present time. 86

The problem for the Naiyāyikas is that the opponent's hypothesis is illustrated by space, which is actually absurd. Therefore, Vātsyāyana urges that the three divisions of time can properly be manifested only by way of an action, say an action of 'falling' (kriyāvyāṅga). When the action has ceased, the time associated with it is past time; when it has yet to happen, the time associated with it is future time; and lastly, when it is observed in operation in an object, the time associated with it is present time. 87 In case one does not observe the action while it is in progress, what could he conceive of as having ceased or as going to happen? The past time refers to the action having been ceased, and future time to the action which has yet to be. In both these times the object is devoid of action. When the object is actually falling down, it is said to be connected with the action, and this relation between the two gives rise to the conception of present time. If present time is denied, the other two (past and future) also, which are known only in relation to the former, cannot be established. 88 There are other reasons too to admit present time. If past and future are proved mutually, only
then can present be abrogated. But this is not so. Neither is future proved in relation to past, nor vice versa. Without admitting present it would be impossible to prove either past or future.  

The opponent may suggest that just as short and long, high and low, light and darkness are relative concepts and mutually proved, in the same way, the past and future should be understood. This solution, states Vātsyāyana, does not fare any better, as no specific reason has been given for this. Without proper reasons mere illustrations will not suffice. There are counter-illustrations, such as form and touch, odour and taste, which are in no way proved mutually, and the same case is with past and future. Mutual dependence proves neither, because when one is absent, the other is also absent, and thus both cease to be.

Further, present time is not only denoted by an action of falling, but also by the existence of things, such as substance (dravya) exists, quality (guna) exists, action (karma) exists. The very existence of these things, which necessarily determine their presentness, proves the reality of present. This also indicates absolute time. In other words, the action of falling and the like give the notion of present in a limited sense only, whereas the existence of an action or movement in a substance stretches universally over the whole present, which is real, all-pervading time. Again, if present is not accepted, perception, which actually arises from the contact of sense-organs with the present objects only, would not be possible. That which is non-existent cannot come into contact with the senses, and there is nothing which is considered by the opponent as existing or real. Thus, on the acceptance of the opponent's thesis, the means of perception, the object of perception and the perceptual knowledge would be negated all together. And in the absence of perception there will be no inference and verbal testimony as well which are necessarily based on
the former. So, if all means of knowledge are spurned, there will be no
knowledge of anything,\(^93\) including past and future too which are known
through Yogic Intuition.\(^94\)

Vātsyāyana holds that the present time can be conceived of in two
ways: (i) by the existence of an object, such as 'there is a substance',
and (ii) by a series of actions, such as 'cooking' or 'cutting'. The latter
is of two kinds: one is a series of different actions in order to produce
a single result, e.g. 'cooking', which includes placing the pot on the
oven, pouring the water into it, washing the rice and putting it in the
pot, collecting the fuel and inserting it into the oven, kindling the fire,
stirring with a ladle, pouring out the scum of boiled rice and finally,
putting the pot down on the ground. The other is a series of repetitions
of the same actions, e.g. 'cutting'. In this action a man repeatedly
lifts up an axe and strikes it on a piece of wood. Both the series of
actions - from placing the pot on the oven to putting it down on the
ground, on the one hand, and from the beginning of cutting the wood to
the end when it is cut into two pieces, on the other, indicate present
time.\(^95\) Now the future and past can be known in relation to these series
of actions, which give the knowledge of present. A series of actions,
which is intended but has not yet commenced, denotes future time, e.g.
'he will cook'. The cessation of the series followed by its result denotes
past time, e.g. 'he cooked', and the series of actions, which is still in
progress, causes the apprehension of present time, e.g. 'he cooks'. A com-
plete series of actions refers to all the three time-epochs: (i) that
which is ceased is said to be 'already done' (past time), (ii) that which
is intended but yet 'to be done' (future time), and (iii) that which
exists is said to be 'in progress', i.e. that which has commenced but has
not yet ceased to be (present time).\(^96\) Thus, Vātsyāyana shows that the
past and future are known only in relation to the present as its preceding and succeeding states respectively.

Now it is clear from the preceding discussions that present is conceived of in both ways: (i) as having been associated with the past and future, such as in the series of actions which denotes all the three time-epochs, and (ii) as having been dissociated from them, e.g. 'substance exists', which shows the perpetual existence of an object referring to the absolute mode of present. Further, as we have seen above, the briefest action (denoting present) takes at least four moments of disjunctions and conjunctions. An instantaneous action is not possible at all. It follows that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the duration of present cannot be less than four moments. The span of an extended present can exceed more than four moments up to infinity. In other words, if present is not limited to four moments, it matters little to what measurable period we apply the term. The principle is the same whether we speak of a specious present or a present century or the present Yuga. An extended present is a period extending from now backward and forward, and in its extremely extended form it is the absolute mode of present, which is again a durational whole, a substantive, all-pervasive, infinite, eternal, and real time of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Śrīharṣa's Criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Notion of Time

Regarding the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion of time, Śrīharṣa (13th century), the great protagonist of Advaita Vedānta, seems to get hold of the wrong end of the stick. He tries his best to repudiate time as substantive reality in his outstanding treatise Khandanakhandakhaṭṭāya. His criticism of the reality of time clusters around the assumption that the temporal determinations, past, present and future, cannot be defined and they are unintelligible as well if we take them as separate entities. The Vaiśeṣika's
contention is that these determinations are based on external conditions, such as different solar revolutions, finite actions, or finite objects. But Śrīharṣa thinks that they are said to be connected with a particular solar motion and are thus existent simultaneously, which is an absurd position. These divisions of time, he continues, may be either real (svā-bhāvika) or conditional (aupādhika). Whichever alternative we take we find self-contradiction in it. In the first case, time is said to be an undivided whole, one which cannot possess real divisions. It means the same undivided time, which appears present, was future and will be past. But such cognition is not possible. If we say that it has tri-temporal characteristics, it cannot be unique. For, because of the difference of characteristics, there is difference among things. Even if we admit that the above divisions in a unique time are real, the adjustment of past and future would not be possible, because in that case there will always be a cognition of all the three time-determinations, which will lead to a great confusion. The Vaiśeṣika assertion is that past, present and future arise and are distinguishable by means of different external conditions, such as different solar revolutions. But to Śrīharṣa it is an unconvincing argument, as all the three times are said to be in relation to a particular solar motion. Thus, for example, a particular day, which is apprehended as present because of its relation to a particular solar movement, is also apprehended as past and future in relation to the same movement. That particular day is considered as present on the same day, as past on its succeeding days, and as future on its preceding days, and the particular solar revolution is common to all these three states. Hence, it is obvious that past, present and future as conditional divisions of one infinite time are also not tenable.
Again, the Vaiśeṣika may suggest that time when related to the actual action is present; when related to the pre-nonexistent action (prāgabhāva-vacchinna), it is past; and when related to the post-nonexistent or cessation of an action (pradhvainavacchinna), it is future. But this too does not fare better, because all the three time-epochs are said to be determined by action and so they appear to be present alike. The preceding definitions of time-segments are not appropriate, for there is no time-segment, which is determined by pre-nonexistence or post-nonexistence of an action, and not determined by any action. Further, without making reference to previous and later, pre-nonexistence and post-nonexistence are incomprehensible. But previous is said to be past and later that of future. Thus, we see that the definitions of past and future, which the Vaiśeṣika proposes, wind up being circular, for the reasons given above. The Vaiśeṣika again defines present in a different way. It pronounces that the time determined by a particular action is called present in relation to that very action only, not in relation to another action. But this too, according to Śrīharṣa, does not succeed any better, because it is the same action, which determines the past and future as well alike. In this way Śrīharṣa tries to pick holes in the Vaiśeṣika arguments, which establish the time-reality. Though there is no attempt on behalf of the Vaiśeṣikas to meet the challenge of Śrīharṣa, still we can see how the holes could be blocked up again.

As we have seen, time in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is an undivided whole, infinite and absolute. The divisions of time as past, present, and future, or second, minute, hour, day, etc. measured by a watch, or an action, or a duration, or the existence of an object are empirical, not real. Actually, absolute time is not divided. The past, present and future, etc. are its imposed determinants (upādhis) for our practical
purposes. It means if there is no action or change, etc. in the phenomena, there would be no past, present and future. Still real time will continue to survive absolutely, and the imposed determinants do not really exist as such.
Notes

1. VS, 2.2.6-9, 5.2.21, 26, 7.1.25, 7.2.22, 8.1.2; NS, 1.1.5, 2.1.40-44, and NSBth thereon; PPBh, pp. 58.1.59-2, 65.4, 143.2-3, 155.2-156.4, 159.2-160.5, 397.2-398.5, 464.3-465.4; NK, pp. 58.13-16, 65.18-66.11, 123.3-124.7, 155.14-162.16, 397.13-399.21; Nyāyamārka, in Prakrit, pp. 359.1-373.8; Pādaññhatvatvantuḍpāna, pp. 23.1-3, 72.31ff; Nyāyavārttika, pp. 253-256; Nyāyavārttikātātparajarikā, pp. 403-409; Kīrtanaśat, pp. 348-350; Kīrtanaśat-bhāskara, pp. 135-146; Nyāyvātiśāt, pp. 42-48, 279-293, 310-313; Nyāyavātiśāt-kanthābhārana, pp. 284, 312; Tarkasamgraha, p. 11.23; Kārikāśat, kārikās 45b-46a, and Nyāya-siddhāntamuktaśāt, Dīnakārī and Kāmarudrī thereon; Vatīśekhasūtrasūtra-paśkāra, pp. 160.8-166.3, 295.1-10, 326.5-6, 329.5-7, 434.8-435.4, 439.3-6, 450.7; Khandamākhandākāhyāya, pp. 682.10-690.30; Vākyapādaśī, 3.9.1-3, 6-8, 11, 13, 18-23, 31-37, 45, 47-48, 68-69, 75 and Hele-rūga's commentary thereon; Kāla-siddhānta-Dārśinī, pp. 20-22, 107-109.


3. Cf. VS, 1.1.5; pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇī.

4. Cf. ibid., 1.1.15: kriyāgunaṇat samavāyikaraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam.

5. Cf. PPBh, p. 143.2-3: ākāśakāladīśāṃ ekaikatvād aparajātyabhāve pāri-bhāṣikyas tisraḥ saṁjñā bhavanti, ākāśaḥ kālo dig iti iti.


7. Cf. PPBh, pp. 58.2-59.2: ākāśakālaśādīgaṃtmanāṃ sarvagatatvam paramama-hatvaṃ sarvasaṁyogisamanādeśatvatvāṃ ca.

8. Cf. NK, pp. 58.13-59.16: sarvaśabdenātra prakṛtaṇaśaṁyāntaroktāni mūrtadravyāṇī parānṛṣyaṃ. sarvagatatvam sarvāt mūrtaiḥ saha saṁyogā ākāśadīnāṃ, na tu sarvatra gamaṇam, teṣām nisākriyatvā. paramamaḥatavat ityātyānacchinnāparimāṇapayogītvaṃ. sarvasaṁyogisamanādeśatvatvāṃ sarvegam saṁyogināṃ mūrtadravyāṇāṃ ākāśaḥ samāno deśa āhārā ity arthaḥ. evam digādiśv api vyākhyeyam. yady api ākāśadīkaṃ sarvegam saṁyogināṃ āhārā na bhavati, āhārabhedanavasthānāt, tathāpi sarva-saṁyogādhiśatvatvāṃ sarvasaṁyogināṃ āhārā ity ucyate, upacārāt. ata eva sarvagatatvam ity anenāpurnaruktāt. tatra hi sarvaiḥ saha saṁyogā 'stity uktaṃ. iha tu sarvegam āhārā ity ucyate.

Here it is to be noted that in the above passage ākāśa, kāla and dik are described together, but we have taken only kāla for our purpose.
9. Cf. FPBH, p. 65.4: dikkālayoh pañcaguṇāvatvam. Also see ibid., pp. 159.2-160.3.

10. Cf. ibid., p. 65.4: sarvotpattimatām nimmittakāraṇatvaṁ ca. Also cf. VS, 2.2.8-9; 7.1.25; 7.2.22; NS, 2.1.23 and NSP Bh thereon; Kārikāvalī, 45b: Janyānāṁ Janakaḥ kālo jagatāṁ āśrayo mātaḥ.


14. Cf. VS, 2.2.7: dravyatvanyatvate vāyūna vṛkhyate.


17. "Kṣaṇa is that point of time during which a produced substance remains without an attribute, or a motion; or, that which marks the interval between the conjunction of the last thread and the production of the cloth, or between the produced motion and disjunction caused by it, or between the presence of the entire material for the production of an effect and the actual production of that effect" - Umesh Mishra (1936), p. 127, fn. 213. Also see Kīrāṇāvalī, pp. 354-355.

18. It is equal to 2 kṣaṇas.

19. It is equal to 4 kṣaṇas or 2 lavas and is that length of time which is denoted by a single twinkling of an eye. Also see Kīrāṇāvalī, p. 355, and NK, p. 159.12-13: aksipakṣmakarmopalāṅitakālo nimeśaḥ.

20. It is equal to 18 nimesaḥ or 72 kṣaṇas.

21. It is equal to 540 nimesaḥ or 2,160 kṣaṇas.

22. It is equal to 30 kālaḥ or 64,800 kṣaṇas.

23. It is a period of 3 hours.

24. They are equal to 24 hours or 30 mūhūrtas or 8 yāmas.

25. It is equal to 6 months.

26. It means the Sun's road north and south of the equator, the half year, the equinoctical and solstitial points - Monier-Williams (1974), p.84, col. 2.

27. An age of the world, long mundane period of years (of which there are four, viz. 1. Kṛta or Satya, 2. Treta, 3. Dvāpara, 4. Kali, of which the first three have already elapsed, while the Kali, which began at midnight between the 17th and 18th of February, 3102 B.C.
is that in which we live; the duration of each is said to be respectively 1,728,000; 1,296,000; 864,000 and 432,000 years of men, the descending numbers representing a similar physical and moral deterioration of men in each age; the four Yugas comprise an aggregate of 4,320,000 years and constitute a 'Great Yuga' or Mahā-Yuga - ibid., p. 854, col. 1.

28. A fabulous period of time (a day of Brahma or one thousand Yugas). With Buddhist the Kalpas are not of equal duration - ibid., 262, col. 3.

29. It comprises 71 Mahā-Yugas - ibid., p. 786, col. 3.

30. It means dissolution, reabsorption, destruction of the whole world at the end of a Kalpa - ibid., p. 689, col. 3.

31. The total annihilation of the Universe at the end of a Kalpa - ibid., p. 797, col. 3.

32. Cf. VS, 2.2.6: aparasmīn apram yugapat ciraṃ kṣipram iti kāla-
liṅgāni. Also see PP Bh, p. 155.2-3; Kārikāvalī, 46a; NK, pp. 155.14ff. H. U. (1962, pp. 134) suggests that here cause (kāraṇa) is more appropriate than mark (liṅga). Further, on liṅga, see Athalye (1963), pp. 281-289.


34. Cf. Kīraṇāvalī, pp. 349.5-358.7.


36. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika followed the primitive belief that the Sun revolves around the earth, which was supposed to be static.


38. Cf. ibid., pp. 155.16-156.11.

39. Cf. ibid., p. 156.12-16: teṣaṃ yugapadādipratyayānāṃ viśayeṣu 
dravyādiṣu pūrvapratyayavilakṣaṇānāṃ dravyādiṣu pūrvapratyayavilakṣaṇānāṃ 
upattāv anyasya nimittasābhāvāt. ētad uktām bhavati - dravyādiṣu 
viśayeṣu pūrvāparādiṣu jāyante, na ca yathā pūrvāparādiṣu nimittaṃ 
tatpratyayavilakṣaṇātva, na ca nimittaṃ antāreṇa kāryasyotpattir 
asti, tasmād yad atra nimittaṃ sa kāla iti.

40. Cf. ibid., pp. 157.2-158.2.

41. Cf. ibid., p. 158.6: yuvasthavirayoḥ śaṅkavasthābhāṣeṇa tatkāraṇa-
tatyaḥ kālasāmyogo 'numite.


45. Cf. Padārthatattvaganirūpaya, p. 72: kṣaṇāc ca kṣaṇiko 'tiriktaḥ 


49. Cf. *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 149.1-3:
   (i) svajanyavibhiṣagrupāgabha-vavacchinnaṃ karma,
   (ii) pūrvasaṃyogāvacchinnavibhiṣaḥ,
   (iii) pūrvasaṃyogāvacchinnottarasaṃyogāpargabhāvah,
   (iv) uttarasaṃyogāvacchinnaṃ karma.

   For details, see the two commentaries, *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī*, thereon.


51. Cf. *NSBh* on *NS*, 2.1.41.


53. Cf. ibid., p. 312: tataḥ samavāyavad ekam vartamānam yadavacchedakaṃ sa kālaḥ.


   For different interpretations, see Athalye (1963), pp. 211ff.

57. Cf. *PPBh*, pp. 464.3-465.4: asmadviśiṣṭānām tu yogināḥ yuktānām yogajadhamānugṛhītena manasa śātvāṃtarākāśaṣadikākālāpajātamānuṣyāyu-

   manassu tatsamavetawoḥkarmasamānyavīśeṣu samavāye cāvītāthām, svarūpāparādhaṃ utpadyate.


59. Cf. *Nyāyamaṭijarī*, p. 361.7-10:

   pratyākṣaṃamyatām eva kecit kālasya manvate /
   viśeṣaṇatayaś kāryapratyaṃyate pratibhāsanāt //
   kramena, yugapat, kṣipram, cirat kṛtam itIdṛṣāḥ /
   pratyaṃyāś navakalpante kāryāmātrāvalambanāḥ //


62. For details see Ingalls (1951), pp. 78-79; Matilal (1968), pp. 43-44, 72-73.

63. Ingalls, ibid., p. 78.

64. Ibid. Also see *Kārikāvalī*, 24a: anyatra nityadravyabhya ṣrītavam ihocye; and *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* thereupon.
65. See Keith (1968), pp. 233-234; Matilal (1968), pp. 43-44.

66. Cf. Nyāyavārttika, p. 253: yathāikasmin puruṣe anekasambandhabhedānu-
vidhāiny abhinne pitā putro bhrāteti pratayā bhavanti tadvad ekaḥ
kālaḥ kāryakāraṇaviśeṣaṇeṇaḥ parāparādipratyayahetur iti.


68. Cf. Tarkasāṅgṛaha, p.11.23: atītādīvyavahārasthānaḥ kālaḥ.

69. This is a commentary by Meru Śastra on the Tarkasāṅgṛaha. See
Athalye (1963), p. 129.

70. Cf. Nīlakaṇṭha-prakāśikā, p. 186.3-7: atītātvaṃ ca vartāmānaprathavka-
pratiyogitvam. vartāmānatvam iha sadbaprayogādhiṣṭhakaraṇākālavyāṣṭītvaṃ.
bhaviṣyatvaṃ ca vartāmānapragāhāvapratiyogitvam. atra sarvatra
kālaṣya ātatakatatā ātītādīvyavahārē hetutvaṃ tasyeti dhīreyam.
na ca tādṛśāvayavahārāḥ sūryaparispandopādhiṃ ādāya sambhavatīti
vācym.

71. Cf. Nyāyamaṭhajā, p. 369.9-11: na tattvikaḥ kālaṣya bhedo vart-
māṇādhī. kim tv asanay asau vyavahārasiddhaye kenacid upādhiṃ
kalpyate.

72. Cf. ibid., pp. 369.15-370.6. This should in no way be considered as
an original approach by Jayanta to the problem of the three time-
epochs. Such a view was first set forth by Vatsyāyana in his
commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.40-44, which we shall discuss
later on.


74. Cf. Kīraṇāvali-bhāskara, p.144: te 'tītādayo bhāvā eva kālasvarūpā
eva na tūpādhisvarūpā iti.

75. Cf. Nyāyamaṭhajārj, p. 359.2-8. Also see NS, 1.1.5 and NSBh thereon.


77. See NK, pp. 123.3-124.7; PPBh, p. 156.3-4; Kīraṇāvali, p. 313.14-23;
G.N. Jha (1916), p. 112; D.M. Datta (1972), 104; B.N. Seal (1915),
pp. 76-77, 148.

78. Matilal (1968), p. 43.

79. Cf. NK, p. 159.13: ..ganitasastraṃsaṃsāraṇaṃ pratyetavyam. For the
same statement, see Kīraṇāvali, p. 355.1-2.

80. Cf. NK, pp. 123.3-124.7.

81. Cf. PPBh, p. 156.3-4.


83. B.N. Seal (1915), p. 147. Also see Kīraṇāvali, p. 354.4-5: utpannaṃ
dravyaṃ yāvad aguṇaṃ utpadyate, antyastantusāmyoge yāvan na pāta
utpanne karmaṇi yāvan na vibhāgaḥ tāvān kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ.
84. Cf. 2.1.40-44.

85. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan (1971, p. 106, fn. 1) and Radhakrishnan (IP, Vol. 2, p. 142) affirms that here the opponent is Nāgājuna or the Mādhyamika school. But in the whole Mādhyamika system we do not come across such a view. As we know, the Mādhyamikas take everything as ultimately unreal, void (śūnya), and mutually dependent, including the past, present and future as well. G.N. Jha (1939A, p. 167) informs us that the Bhāṣyaacandra also describes the opponent in this regard as the Buddhist. We agree with G.N. Jha (ibid.) and S. Bhaduri (1975, p. 206, fn. 45) that this view cannot be affiliated to any particular school or work.

86. Cf. NSBh, pp. 191.8-192.2: vṛntāt pracṛtyāsātasya phalasya bhūnau pratyāśidāto yadūdhavam sa patito 'dhvā tatsaṃhuyuktā kālāḥ patita-kālāḥ, yo 'dhañstāt sa patītavyo 'dhvā, tattsaṃhuyuktā kālāḥ patītavyakālāḥ. nedānīṃ trtīyo 'dhvā vidyate yatra patatīti vartamānāḥ kālo gṛhyeta, tasmād vartamānāḥ kālo ra vidyata iti.


88. Cf. ibid., p. 192.6-10: yadi cāyaṃ dravye vartamānaṃ patanāṃ na gṛṇāti kasyoparamam utpatyayamāntam vā pratipadyate. patitāḥ kāla iti bhūta kriyā. patītavyāḥ kāla iti cotpatsyayānā kriyā. ubhayaḥ kālaḥ kriyāḥ kālaḥ kṛṣṇāṃ dravyāṃ, adhāḥ patitīti kṛṣṇāṃbhuddham, sa 'yaṃ kriyādravyayāḥ sambhadam gṛṇatīti vartamānāḥ kālas tadāśrayau cetarau kālau tadāśrayaṃ sa syetām iti. Also cf NS, 2.1.41.

89. Cf. ibid., p. 193.3-194.2: yady atītāṅgatāv itaretarāpekeṣu sidhyetām pratipadyamānaḥ vartamānavilopam, nātītāpekeṣā 'nāgata-siddhiḥ, nāpy anāgatāpekeṣā 'titāsiddhiḥ, kavyā yuktya? kena kaḷpenātītāḥ katham atītāpekeṣā 'nāgatasiddhiḥ, kena ca kaḷpemānāgatāḥ katham anāgatapekeṣātitāsiddhir iti naitac chakyaṃ nirvaktum avyākaraṇyam etad vartamānalopa iti.

90. Cf. ibid., p. 194.3-7: yac ca manyaḥ hrasvārdhaghaṇyāḥ sthalanimnayoṣ chāyātapaṇyoṣ ca yathetetarāpekeṣayāḥ siddhir evam atītāṅgatayor iti, tan nopapadyate, viṣeṣahetvabhavāḥ. ċṛṣṇāntavat pratidṛṣṭānto 'pi prasājyate yathā rūpasarpāṇau gandharṣau netaretarāpekeṣau sidhyataḥ, evam atītāṅgatāv iti, netaretarāpekeṣā kasyacit siddhir iti. yasmād ekābhāve 'nyatārābhavāḥ ubhayaḥbhavāḥ. Also cf. NS, 2.1.42.


93. Cf. NSBh, p. 195.2-5: pratyakṣaṃ indriyārthasannikārṣam, na cāvidyayāmān asaṃdīriyēṃa sannikṛṣyate. na cāyaṃ vidyayāmāṃ sat kīciṣ cit anujāṇāti. pratyakṣānimittāṃ pratyakṣāvijayaḥ pratyakṣaṃ jñānaṃ sarvāṃ nopapadyate, pratyakṣānupapattau tatpūrvavakatvād
anumāñgamayor anupapattiḥ. sarvapramāṇavīlopa sarvagrahaṇaṃ na bhavatīti. Also cf. NS, 2.1.43.


95. Cf. NSBh, pp. 195.6-196.4: ubhayathā ca vartamānāḥ kālo grhyate kvacid arthaśadbhāvavayaṅgaḥ. yathā 'sti dravyam iti. kvacit kriyāsantānavaṅgaḥ. yathā pacati chinattīti. nānāvidhā caikārthā kriyā kriyāsantaṅaḥ kriyābhīṣyāsaḥ ca. nānāvidhā caikārthā kriyā pacatiḥ sthāyadihiṣrayaṇaṃ udakāsacanaṃ taṅguḷavāpanam edho 'pasarpanaṃ agnyabhījvālananam darvīghattaṃ an maṇḍasraṇaṃ adho'vatāraṇaṃ iti. chinattīti kriyābhīṣya udyanyodyamya paraśuṃ dāruṇi nipātayaṃ chinattīty ucyate.

96. Cf. ibid., p. 197.1-4: kriyāsantaṅo 'nārabdaśa cikīrṣito 'nāgataḥ kālaḥ pakṣyatīti. prayaṇaṇaśvasanaḥ kriyāsantaṅoparaṃ atītaḥ kālo 'pākṣid iti. ārabdhakriyāsantaṅo vartamānaḥ kālaḥ pacatiḥ. tatra yā uparataḥ sā kṛtata. yā cikīrṣita sā kartavyatā. yā vidyamānā sā kriyamānaṭa.

97. Cf. ibid., p. 197.6-7: so 'yam ubhayathā vartamāno grhyate apryayāvupakṣītaḥ ca atītanāgatābhīṣyām, sthitivyaṅgo vidyate dravyam iti.

98. See pp. 682.10-690.30 and Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary thereon.


100. Cf. ibid., p. 684.9-10: kriyānacchinnasya tatprāgabhāvapradhvaḥsābhāvavacchedanupapattaḥ.

CHAPTER II

Time and Change in Sāmkhya-Yoga

Sāmkhya and Yoga are two aspects of one and the same system. Yoga accepts the Sāmkhya theories with slight variations. But regarding the problem of time, there are clear-cut divergent interpretations. In Sāmkhya the time-concept is not given much weight. Here we find only scattered references, and in order to gather a clear idea of the concept of time we have to draw inferences at many places from its expositions of other metaphysical categories. On the contrary, in Yoga we encounter an elaborate and explicit discussion on time.

The whole development of the Sāmkhya conception of time may be broadly divided into two groups - preclassical and classical. The dividing line between the two is the Sāmkhya-kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa (350-400 A.D.), which is the first systematic text of the classical Sāmkhya. The beginning of the preclassical "Sāmkhya speculation cannot be precisely dated, as scattered elements of the doctrine may be traced back to the oldest parts of the Veda itself". Aspects can be found in the Vedas, Brahmanas, earliest Upaniṣads, Mahābhārata, Bhagavad-Gītā, Buddhacarita, etc., but during this period Sāmkhya never emerged as a systematic philosophical system. On the other hand, the classical Sāmkhya period embodies the Sāmkhya-kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa and its commentaries - the Yuktidīpikā (600 A.D., author unknown), Gaudapāda-bhāṣya (700 A.D.), and Tattva-kauśumā of Vācaspati Miśra (980 A.D.). For our study of time we shall confine ourselves only to the classical Sāmkhya literature and its later developments, comprising the Sāmkhya-pravacana-sūtra of Kapila (1400 A.D.) and the commentaries of Aniruddha (1500 A.D.) and Vijnānavihikṣu (1600 A.D.) thereon.
For the Yoga conception of time we shall be discussing with the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali (300-400 A.D.) and its commentarial literature, such as the Yoga-bhāṣya of Veda Vyāsa (500-600 A.D.), Tattva-vaiśāradī of Vācaspati Miśra (980 A.D.) and Yoga-vārtika of Vijnānabhikṣu (1600 A.D.).

Sāṅkhya-Yoga assumes two fundamental and independent realities - puruṣa and prakṛti. Puruṣa is self, pure spirit and consciousness, all-pervading but passive. Prakṛti is the root cause of matter. This is the fundamental substance out of which the whole world evolves. Unlike puruṣa, it is purely matter, but it is active in character. It is a string of three strands. The three guṇas - sattva (tendencies to manifestation), rajas (activity) and tamas (tendencies to non-manifestation and non-activity) - are the constituent parts of prakṛti. When prakṛti comes under the influence of puruṣa, evolution starts. The twenty-three constitutive elements (tattva) are derived from prakṛti, and these are effects. Since only puruṣa and prakṛti are infinite, these twenty-three evolutes are of limited magnitude. The following chart will show the gradual development of the whole process according to the Sāṅkhya-kārikā:

(1) Puruṣa

(2) Prakṛti

(3) Mahat or buddhi (intellect)

(4) Ahamkāra (ego)

(5) Manas (mind) (6-10) sense-organs (11-15) motor-organs (16-20) tannātrās [of sound, touch, smell, form and colour] (21-25) mahābhūtās [five gross elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth]
From the preceding table it is clear that mahat, ahamkāra and the five tanmātras are both causes and effect, while the mind, five sense-organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin), five motor-organs (larynx, hand, foot, anus and parts of generation) and the five mahābhūtas are only effects, and not causes. Of these, mahat (literally 'great') or buddhi (intellect) is the first evolute of prakṛti. It is the basis of the intelligence of the individual. While the term 'mahat' brings out the cosmic aspect, buddhi which is used as a synonym for it refers to the psychological counterpart appertaining to each individual. In Sāmkhya, stress is laid on the psychological aspect of mahat. According to the Sāmkhya-kārikā, mahat, ahamkāra and manas are called internal organs (antahkarana) and the ten sense and motor organs are termed external organs (bāhyendriya). Buddhi is the faculty of all the mental processes, reasoning, ascertainment, imagination, etc. In Sāmkhya-Yoga, it is this buddhi which plays an important role in conceptualising the reality of time.

In Sāmkhya, there are two groups – one who believes in God and the other who denies his existence. Here Sāmkhya is taken as the combined system of Sāmkhya-Yoga. In the same vein, it is said that Kapil represents the latter group and Patanjali that of the former.

1. **Time not Different from Change**

We must keep in mind that throughout the evolutionary process of prakṛti there is no such element as time. Regarding the existence of real time, the Sāmkhya answer is an emphatic 'No'. It explicitly proclaims the unreality of time in direct opposition to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulation of substantial and eternal time. The author of
the *Yuktidīpikā*, the oldest commentary on the *Sāmkhya-kārikā*, boldly declares that there is no substance as time. It is nonsense to say that time is the creator of the world. As to the question of what is time, the Sāmkhya reply is that in our daily life we are aware of events succeeding each other. We experience the passage of time by way of events and change of states. Out of the observations of these events man must have developed the concept of time. If there is no change, there is no time. Change is a necessary element for the notion of time. The origin of time may be said to lie with change. Sāmkhya maintains the reality of change and identifies time with it. Time actually is nothing apart from change, events or actions. The latter themselves are time. However, time is not an entity which brings about change. It is only an abstract relation binding the events arising from the evolution of prakṛti, and hence it is unreal. This means that time is neither a material nor an efficient cause.

Gauḍapāda (700 A.D.), the author of the *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* on the *Sāmkhya-kārikā*, rejects the notion of time as a cause of the universe. There are, he enunciates, only three categories in Sāmkhya - manifest (vyakta), unmanifest (avyakta, or prakṛti) and pure-consciousness (purusa), and time comes under one of these, i.e. manifest. Since prakṛti is the cause of everything, it must also be the cause of time.

(ii) The three Time-epochs in Sāmkhya

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, time occupies an independent status as a substance, and the past, present and future are considered as its imposed properties (kālopādhi) based on finite durations, objects, events, or our watches. But Sāmkhya regards time "as past, present and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution."
Both Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra take a critical stand against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the reality of time while commenting on the Śāṅkhyā-kārīka, 33. They speak of the three time-epochs, but not of time as such. Gaudapāda says that the three internal organs, buddhi, ahamkāra and manas, function in all the three time-epochs, past, present and future. The buddhi apprehends and forms an idea not only of a present object, such as a pitcher (ghaṭa), but also of the past (which is quiescent or sub-latent) and future ones (which is potential, or yet to be manifested). Likewise, the ahamkāra supplies consciousness of the objects, past, present and future; and the manas makes determination (sāmkalpa) in respect of all the three times. Thus, the internal organs can have knowledge of all the three time-epochs. For example, if a river is swollen, the internal organs will infer that there has been rain (referring to the past); if there is smoke on a mountain, they will deduce from it on the basis of their past experiences that there is fire on the mountain (referring to the present); and lastly, there is an ancient belief in India that if in the hot weather the ants carry their eggs from one place to another, it indicates that there will be rain (referring to the future). But the external organs function only in the present (vartamāna); for instance, the eye only sees present forms, not past and future ones. In addition, Vācaspati maintains that the present also includes in itself the immediately preceding (atīta) and succeeding (anāgata) moments. The reason behind this may be that an instantaneous present cannot be apprehended. Here he seems to be influenced by the great Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini (500 B.C.) who maintained so. This means that the present comprises at least three moments, though it may take more than three. But the problem is, if we continue this process to
its logical extreme, we arrive at the absolute and infinite mode of present which is eternal and all-pervasive time of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. However, we may not take Vācaspati's above statement to lead to the notion of infinite time, because he explicitly criticises the Vaiśeṣika notion of unique time which does not possess any divisions in itself, such as the past, present and future. The latter are, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, actually the imposed properties of real time (kālopaḍhi), based on the different sorts of conditions. Vācaspati suggests that origination (ārambha), duration (sthitī) and cessation (nirodha) of an action themselves can be taken as the ground of the notion of the past, present and future. Therefore, it is needless and superfluous to postulate time as a real and absolute substance apart from the twenty-five elements (tattva) of Sāṅkhya; instead, he says, these upādhis alone can serve our purpose. Dasgupta remarks:

"The Sāṅkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them unit of kāla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kāla as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi (buddhinīrmanā) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perception."  

(iii) Diverse Interpretations within the System

There is, however, a lack of unanimity regarding the exact import and characteristics of time in the later development of Sāṅkhya, particularly among the commentators. This diversity is found in the interpretation of the Sāṅkhya-sūtra (II.12). Here both time and space (kāla and dik) have been said to be the products of ether (ākāśa), though we do not encounter any such view in the rest of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga literature. The literal rendering of the aphorism is: "Space and time (arise) from ether, etc." Aniruddha in his commentary on the sūtra explains that
it is ether itself which, by different upādhis or external conditions, is called space and time. They are, therefore, included in ether. Vedāntin Mahādeva (end of 17th century) follows Aniruddha. But they do not furnish any further details. From this exposition it is not clear why space and time are included under ether and what their characteristics are. Aniruddha states that the word 'etc.' (ādi) in the sūtra is used by accident (saṃpūta). It follows that both these scholars fail to give any significant interpretation of the sūtra.

It is Vijnānabhikṣu who, in his Sāmkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, adds a quite different meaning to this sūtra, which definitely does not fit in with the traditional Sāmkhya-Yoga doctrines. His distinction between eternal and limited space and time is certainly a new arrival within the classical Sāmkhya system. Obviously this implies that there is an independent and eternal time. Space and time, he asserts, which are eternal, are of the nature of ākāśa, and are like the particular guṇas or modifications of prakṛti. Therefore, space and time are proved to be all-pervasive (vibhu) in character. Further, space and time, which are limited or finite (khaṇḍadīkkāla), are said to be produced from ākāśa, because of its conjunction with various upādhis or external conditions. Vijnānabhikṣu also explains the word 'ādi' used in the sūtra. By this, he says, we mean upādhis. Finite space and finite time are not the product of ākāśa in the real sense, but rather they are ākāśa itself particularised by various upādhis. Radhakrishnan writes:

"We have no perception of infinite time or infinite space, and so they are said to be constructed by the understanding. From the limited objects of perception which stand to one another in the relation of antecedence and sequence, we construct an infinite time in order to represent the course of evolution."

But when we look into the classical Sāmkhya system, we fail to find any consistency in Vijnānabhikṣu's interpretation of the sūtra. There
is hardly anything in the sūtra which sustains this distinction between eternal and limited space-time. Every student of Śāmkhya-Yoga knows that it assumes only two fundamental independent realities, puruṣa and prakṛti. So how is it possible to grant an independent status to a third element, such as time? That is why A.B. Keith is confronted with difficulty in maintaining any such distinction, keeping the Śāmkhya doctrines in view. He says:

"In the empiric world both [space and time] appear as limited, and are explained in a quite inconsistent way by origination from the ether through its conditioning by the masses of corporeal nature, on the one hand, in the case of space, and by the movement of the heavenly bodies in the case of time."36

Sen thinks:

"In any case, time, if it be not absolutely unreal, must also be in the ultimate analysis a particular product ... of three guṇas (elements or constituents). Perhaps this is the reason why Viśiṣṭa, besides identifying time with Ākāśa after the sūtra, also speaks of it as a particular guṇa or modification of Prakṛti (prakṛte guṇaviśeṣaḥ)."37

Whatever may be the reason, Viśiṣṭa's interpretation is evidently incompatible with the classical Śāmkhya-Yoga tenets.

Moreover, there is another striking aphorism in the Śāmkhya-sūtra (I.12)38 which admits eternal time: "(The bondage of the puruṣa can-) not (be continued) by connection with time, because (time which is) all-pervading and eternal is related to all (puruṣas, released and unreleased)."39 Here Aniruddha has taken the words, eternal (nitya) and all-pervading (vyāpin) as qualifying the puruṣa, whereas Viśiṣṭa has applied them to time.40 But it is really surprising "to note that Viśiṣṭa himself in his Yogasūra-saṃgraha admits that the Śāmkhya does not accept a separate entity as infinite time (Mahākāla) as the one, all-pervading reality or the basis of temporal determinations of moments, etc. Moreover, Viśiṣṭa goes to great length even to criticise the views of Śāmkhya expressed in the Śāmkhya-sūtra."41
There is one more reference where the author of the *Yuktidipika*\(^2\) gives the analogy of eternal and infinite time (mahākāla), but here he certainly does not deny the existence of time, as he has done earlier.

To conclude the classical Sāmkhya notion of time we can say that except Vijñānabhikṣu, in his *Samkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, all the Sāmkhya philosophers repudiate the existence of real time, though Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati maintain the three temporal determinations, the past, present and future. In the following lines we shall try to explain why Sāmkhya-Yoga admits these temporal determinations.

**YOGA**

The conception of time in Yoga cannot be fully dealt with unless the theories of causality, conservation of energy, change, succession and other allied topics are discussed. Though Sāmkhya and Yoga are not two wholly different systems, they show only few variations in their philosophical postulate, yet we find more explicit and elaborate exposition in the Yoga literature than in Sāmkhya on the subject under examination.

(i) **Causality, Conservation of Energy and Time**

In the Sāmkhya-Yoga system, prakṛti alone, not puruṣa, is held to be the ground of all activities and evolution. It is constituted of the three guṇas - sattva, rajas and tamas. All activities belong to these guṇas. Causality is explained in the system as different modifications of guṇas. The Sāmkhya-Yoga doctrine of causality or satkāryavāda,\(^3\) unlike that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist, means that cause and effect are not two different things. The effect is real and is always
existent. It subsists in a latent form in the cause, even beforehand. It is not entirely a new creation. It is the manifestation of what was latent. The underlying substance remains the same in both the states, cause and effect. In Yoga this substance is called dharmin and its different modifications are termed dharmas. A substance (dharmin) is that which possesses characteristics or external aspects (dharma).

Further, the substance is said to be the same to its past (sānta), present (udita) and future (avyapadeśya) forms. Of these, the past is that which has come to its quiescent state by finishing its functional activities. The present is that which is in operation, i.e. in this form the substance is in its manifested or actualised form. And the future is that which is not yet manifested (avyapadeśya); it is still latent in its material cause and has not yet commenced its functional activity.

The past, as we have seen, is a quiescent state. Now one may ask whether this quiescent past exists or is annihilated for ever. What happens to it? The theory of satkāryavāda may also be called the theory of the conservation of energy, according to which nothing is destroyed but everything is transformed into different forms. The same is the case with the past. When something finishes its activity, it is absorbed by its substance (dharmin) into a state of equilibrium. The future is not yet manifested. This means that both the past and future are in their unmanifested form. Only the present is manifested. A yogin is said to be vested with the power of recalling the past form of anything. He does not actually call it back but rather brings about its exact duplicate.
(ii) The Doctrine of Change and Time

Yoga maintains that with regard to the five gross elements and all the organs, change (parināma) is held to be three-fold: (1) change of external aspect (dharma-parināma), (2) change of time-variation (laksana-parināma), and (3) change of state (avasthā-parināma). Change is defined in the system as the emergence of another external aspect (dharma) in a substance, which is permanent, on the disappearance of a previous aspect. Vācaspati remarks that here change of external aspect refers to all the three kinds of changes, stated above. Of these, change of external aspect in a substance is the disappearance and appearance of the external forms, such as evolution (vyutthāna) and absorption (nirodha, lit. restriction, suppression). In this mutation the substance remains intact, just as the substance of a lump of gold, even if it is turned into different kinds of ornaments, such as a ring, chain, bracelet, is constant throughout its various modifications.

Change of time-variation is that by which a time-determination (kāla-bheda), such as the past, present or future, is characterised. This change is from potential (future) to actual (present), and from actual to quiescent (past). It marks the three stages of a substance: the pre-manifested which is still in the womb of future awaiting to be manifested, the manifested which is present, and the post-manifested which after having finished its manifestation is now conserved in its quiescent state (past, or the state of equilibrium). Lastly, change of state, or change due to duration or lapse of time, is described by the mutation of external aspect of the substance. In this change, the external aspect (dharma), which is in the manifested or actual (present) state, constantly undergoes change every moment. In this state, the force of restriction
(nirodhasaṃskāra) becomes more powerful, while the force of emergence (vyutthānasāṃskāra) becomes weaker. To quote Dasgupta:

"When the changes that a thing undergoes are of so remarkable a nature as to affect the constitution of the body materially we call it new or old, or say that it has suffered growth or decay, and this aspect of the change is called avasthā-parināma." Thus, the mutation of substance from the point of view of the change of external aspect is called dharma-parināma; from the point of view of temporal determinations - the past, present and future - it is called lakṣaṇa-parināma; and from the point of view of the change in an external aspect in every succeeding moment in any of its particular stages in time, it is called avasthā-parināma.

(iii) The Absolute Atomistic Theory of Time and the Succession of Moments

Yoga, like Sāṅkhya, admits that time is not an independent reality. But whereas the latter identifies time with change or action, the former nowhere explicitly does so. Rather Yoga accepts time in the form of discrete moments, which are considered real. The Yoga-sūtra of Veda Vyāsa and its commentaries contain a full analysis of moments and their succession (krama).

The moment (kṣaṇa) is defined as the minimal duration of time, just as an atom (paramāṇu) is the minimal part of matter (dravya). Alternatively, the moment is defined as the time taken by an atom in order to move from its previous point in the space to the next point. It is identical with the unit of change in the phenomenon. The perpetual flow of such discrete moments one after another gives the idea of succession or a series of moments. This succession of moments is devoid of reality, and the idea of the divisions of time, such as day and night, is merely a conceptual combination (buddhisamāhāra) of moments. Time
does not exist as an objective reality. Any attempt to ascribe reality to time is a work of understanding (buddhi), mere words. Only to common people, who do not have a critical mind, it appears as objectively real. Two or more moments cannot co-exist in order to form real time. Though the change of A to B and that of B to C are each real time as moments, but we cannot construct a series of A-B-C as real time. We can also say that in Yoga time is included under vikalpa which is supposed to have no corresponding object.

Further, the moment in Yoga falls under the category of reality and is considered to be the basis of succession, and the succession in turn has its essence in the series of moments, which (series) is called time by the proponents of time. Again, two co-existing moments neither can co-exist nor can form a succession in order to establish absolute time, because it would be impossible. Succession is defined as the flow of moments in which one moment follows another. It follows that the present consists of only one moment. Its preceding (past) and succeeding (future) moments do not exist. Therefore, it is not tenable to maintain their combination to conceive real time. The past and future moments can be understood in relation to change, as we have explained above.
Notes


3. See ibid., pp. 127ff, 159.

4. IP, II, p. 266.

5. Ibid.


7. Here it is to be noted that each evolute is finer than its succeeding one and grosser than its preceding one.


9. Kārikā 33;

    antahkaraṇaṃ trividham daśadhā bāhyam trayasya visayākhyam /
    sāmpratikālaṃ bāhyam trikālaṃ abhyantaram karaṇam //


13. Cf. Yuktiṇḍīpikā, p. 132.6: na kālo nāma kaścit padārtho 'sti. Also cf. ibid., p. 73.31: na hi nāh kālo nāma kaścid asti.

14. Cf. ibid., p. 73.30: yad apy uktaṃ kālaṃ jagad utpattir bhaviṣyatīti tad anupapannam.
15. Cf. ibid., pp. 73.31-32: kriyamāṇapriyānām evādityagatigodaha-
ghaṭāstaniṭādināṁ viśīṣṭāvadhiserūpapratyayamimittatvam.


17. Cf. ibid., p. 74.6: kālas tu sambhandamātropakārī na viśīṣṭāhethuḥ.
tasmād asad etat.

18. Cf. Gaudapāda-bhāṣya on kārikā 61: vyaktāvyaktapurūṣāḥ trayā
padārthāḥ, tena kālo 'ntarbhūto 'sti. sa hi vyaktāḥ. sarvakartṛtvāt kālasāyāpi pradhānāṃ eva kāraṇaṃ.
Also see Parāśāra-smṛti of Mādhavacārya, pp. 94.7-95.2: pradhānā-
vāde pañca-viśīṣṭi-tattvebhya bahir bhūtasya kālatatavyābhāvāt pradhānāṃ eva kālaśabdena vyavahṛiyatām.

19. Dasgupta (1975), Vol. I, p. 311. For a similar observation, see
Guenther (1976), p. 218, fn. 32.

buddhyānāṁkāramāṇāṁ trikālavisyāṇi buddhir vartamānāṃ ghāṭam
budhyate atītaṃ anāgatam ceti. āhākāra vartamāne 'bhimānāṃ kāroti
atīte 'nāgate ca. tāthā mano vartamāne saṁkalpaṃ kurute atīte
'ānagat ca. evam trikālam ēbhantaram karaṇam iti.
Also see Māṭhairavṛtti on the same kārikā.

21. Cf. Tattvakoamudī on kārikā 33: tadātatha - nadāpūrabhedād abhūd
vrṣṭīḥ; asti dhūmad āgnir īha naganikūfhe, asaty upagāhātaka
pīpiliśānasāricularaḥ bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭīr iti, tadanurūpās ca
saṁkalpābhīmānādhyavasāya bhavanti.

22. Cf. Gaudapāda-bhāṣya on kārikā 33: saṁpratakālāṃ. ērōtaṃ vartamānāṃ
eva śabdam śrōtiṃ nātītati na ca bhaviṣyatam, caṅkṣur api vartamānāṃ
rūpam paśyati nātītati nā 'nāgatam, tvag vartamānāṃ sparśām, jīvā
vartamānām rasam, nāśikā vartamānāṃ gandham nātītānāgatam ceti
evam karmendriyaḥ, vāg vartamānām śabdam uccāryati nātītām
nānāgatam ca, pāṇi vartamānāṃ ghāṭam aadade nātītām anāgatam
ca, pādau vartamānāṃ panthānāṃ viharato nātītām nāpy anāgatam,
pāyūpasthau ca vartamānāv utsargānandau kuruto nātītāu nā' nāgatau.
evam bāhyam karaṇam saṁpratakālāṃ uktam.
Also see Māṭhairavṛtti on the same kārikā.

23. Cf. Tattvakoamudī on kārikā 33: vartamānasāmāpam anāgatam atītam
api vartamānām.

24. Cf. Laghusiddhanta-kāmaudī, sūtra 767: vartamānasāmāpye vartamāna-
vaḍ vā / 3.3.131 /.

25. Cf. Tattvakoamudī on kārikā 33: kālaś ca Vaimeṣikābhīmata eko na
anāgataśdivyavāhārabhedam prevartayitum arheti. tasmād ayaṃ gair
ūpābhīhbedair anāgataśdivyabhedām pratipadyate.
Also cf. Musalagaonkar (1971), p. 209.10: svasya svabhādeja-
katvābhāvāt.

26. Cf. Tattvakoamudī, ibid.: santu ta evopādhyayah, ye 'nāgatāśdivyava-
hārahetavah, kṛtaṃ atrāntārgaṇunā kālenetā Sāmkhyācāryāḥ, tasman
na kālarūpapatattvāntarābhhyupagama iti.


29. tattadupādhībhedād ākāśam eva dīkkaḷāśabdarkavācyam. tasmād ākāśe 'ntarbhūtau.


32. Cf. ibid.: yau tu khaṇḍadīkkaḷau tau tu tattadupādhīsam yogyād ākaśād utpadyete ity ārthāḥ.

33. Cf. ibid.: ādiśabdenopādhīgraḥanaḥ idī. yady api tattadupādhī-viśiṣṭākāśam eva khaṇḍadīkkaḷau tathāpi viśiṣṭasyātiriktābhhyupagamvādaṇa.


38. na kālayogato vyāpino nityasya sarvasambandhāt.

In spite of Vacaspati's above protest "against the hypostatizing of a real Time, the Sāmkhya, as a matter of fact, does not go beyond the problems and constructions of the 'Substantialists', Valiṣesika, Mīmāṃsakas, etc. The distinction of eternal and created Time is retained in the form that the former becomes an attribute (guṇaviṣeṣa) of the prakṛti, while the latter is reduced to ākaśa as the motion of the Sun and of the planets. The Sāmkhyas also do not dismiss the conception of Time as the general cause." Schayer (1938), p. 13. "It is not denied", Schayer continues, "that Time (just as Space, karma, etc.) possesses param kāraṇatvam sāmānyarūpaṇa; what is denied is only that it is a special cause, an asādhaṇārayaṇa". - Ibid., fn. 2. Further, he disagrees with Garbe (Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, 1917, p. 168) and says: "A true estimate would rather be just the opposite, i.e. that the Classical Sāmkhya manifested strikingly little interest in the Time-problem and that, apart from the negation of Time as a separate substance, it confined itself to copying the views of the rejected kālavāda." - Ibid., p. 14.


40. Ibid.

42. p. 96.21-22: sa ca mūrtipratyayābhīyām mahataḥ sthūlataraḥ. kasmāt?
avibhāgāt, vibhāganipatteḥ kālādivat.
Also cp. ibid., p. 91.19: sa tu deśamahatvāt kālamahatvāc ca
mahān.

43. Cf. Sūkṣhya-kārikā, 9:
asadakaraṇād upādāna-grahaṇāt sarvasaṃbhavābhāvāt /
śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt, kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam //

44. Cf. Yuktidīpikā, p. 27.5: sūkṣmaṁ mūrtilābahāḥ kāryam.
Also cf. Yoga-bhāṣya, Tattvavaishāradī and Yogavārtika on
Yoga-sūtra, 3.13.


47. Cf. Yoga-bhāṣya, p. 305.16: sāntā ye kṛtvā vyāpārānuṣṭātāḥ.

48. Cf. ibid.: savyāpārā udātāḥ.

49. Cf. Tattvavaiśāradī, p. 293.5ff; Yoga-bhāṣya, p. 305.15ff.

50. Cp. Sūkṣhya-pravacana-bhāṣya on thy sūtra, 1.91: satkāryavādīnāṁ
hy atītādikam api svarūpato 'stīti. Also cp. Yoga-sūtra, 4.12,
and its commentaries thereon.

lakṣaṇaparipāṇāmo 'vasthāparipāṇāmas cokteḥ.

52. Cf. ibid., p. 292.26-27: avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvedharmani-
vṛttāu dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāmaḥ.

53. Cf. Tattvavaiśāradī, p. 297.7-8: dharmasabdasya āśīrvatvena
dharmalakṣaṇāvasthāvācakaḥ.

54. Cf. Yoga-bhāṣya, p. 290.25: vyutthānanirodhayor dharmayor abhi-
bhavapradurbhāvau dharmiṇi dharmaparipāṇāmaḥ.
Also cp. Yoga-sūtra, 3.9ā.
In nirodha the change is not experienced, but it does not
mean that there is no change. Since the guṇas are always active,
the absence of change even for a moment is impossible.

55. Cf. Tattvavaiśāradī, p. 293.5: lakṣyate 'neneti lakṣaṇaṁ
kālabhedaḥ.

56. Cf. ibid., p. 293.5ff; Yoga-sūtra, 4.12, and its commentaries
thereon.

57. Cf. Yoga-bhāṣya, p. 291.6-7: nirodhasaṅkāraḥ balavanto bhavanti
durbalā vyutthānasāṅkāra iti. esa dharmānāṁ avasthāparipāṇāmaḥ.

59. 3.52: kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ saṁyamād vivekajam jñānam.

60. For a comparative study of atom according to Veda Vyāsa, Vācaspāti and Vijnānabhikṣu, see Dasgupta (1974 a), p. 43.


64. Cf. Yoga-sūtra 1.9: śabdajñānānupāti vastuśūṇyo vikalpaḥ.


CHAPTER III

Semi-realistic and Atomistic Notion of Time in Jainism

Time as a Substance

Jainism, like Buddhism, is a heterodox system of Indian philosophy denying the authority of the Vedas. It is a realistic and pluralistic system which is divided into two sects: Śvetāmbara (white robed) and Digambara (sky-clad or nude). Though practices differ, the doctrinal differences between the two sections are comparatively trivial. According to the Jaina cosmology, the whole universe consists of six substances (dravya): soul (jīva), matter (pudgala), medium of motion (dharma), medium of rest (adharma), space (ākāsa) and time (kāla). Some Jain scholars do not ascribe reality to time. They think that it is nothing but only a paryāya or mode of other substances.

Further, the six substances are considered as ultimate reals. According to the Jaina metaphysical doctrine of manifoldness (anekāntavāda), there are not only many (aneka) reals, but each real has manifoldness or inherent complexity. The definition of substance depends on our standpoint (see IP, vol. I, p. 312). Sat (isness, beingness) is the characteristic of a substance. It means that it is the common characteristic of all substances. It possesses becoming (utpāda), disappearance (vyaya) and persistence (dhrauvya). These form the triple nature of a real. Substance again is defined as that which undergoes modifications having its permanent substantiality unchanged. It persists through its own qualities (guna) and modifications (paryāya). Paryāya is subject to change, while guna is not so. For example, gold may exist in various forms, which are paryāyas and liable to change, but its qualities of malleability and yellowness do not change.
Substances are divided into two broad categories – Jīva and ajīva. Jīva is that which knows and perceives all objects, desires pleasure and dreads pain, acts beneficially or harmfully, and experiences the fruit of its actions. Thus Jīva has consciousness, while ajīva does not have this characteristic, but it has structure, colour, taste, touch, smell and sound. "Jīva and ajīva", as Radhakrishnan observes, "do not correspond to I and not-I. It is an objective classification of things in the universe that underlies the distinction of jīva and ajīva. Animate beings are composed of soul and body, and their souls being distinct from matter are eternal." Ajīva is classified into two groups – that which has form (mūrta), and qualities, such as matter (pudgala), and the rest, such as dharma, adharma, ākāśa and time, are without form (amūrta). Again, of the six substances jīva, pudgala, dharma, adharma and ākāśa are said to be astikāya (corporeal). They are eternal, uncreated and of enormous magnitude. Astikāya means that which occupies space-points (pradeśa) and is thus called astikāya. These astikāyas have an essential nature, but they expose themselves through their various qualities and modes of existence. They are the constituent parts of all phenomena. They are called 'asti' because they exist, and they are called 'kāyas' as they have many pradeśas. Hence, they are said to be astikāyas. But time is not astikāya. It has existence, but is not corporeal, because it does not have pradeśas. Jīva, pudgala, dharma, adharma, and ākāśa have many pradeśas, because they consist of minute indivisible parts or atoms. These parts are not separate from each other, rather they are a conglomerate. The substances are said to occupy more than one pradeśa. But, on the contrary, time consists of such indivisible parts which are never mixed up. Therefore, every such part occupies a certain pradeśa. That is why time is said to have only one pradeśa, while other substances are of many pra-
deśas. Actually, kāya means that which has many pradeśas. Hence, this is the reason why time is not considered as an astikāya.20

One may raise an objection that every indivisible part of time is said to occupy an independent pradeśa, so it possesses only one pradeśa. In the same way each particle of other substances occupies one pradeśa, thus each of these substances can be said to have only one pradeśa. The reply is that a particle of matter has the characteristic of being combined with other particles of matter, or aggregates (skandha), which have more than one pradeśas. Thus a particle of matter may be said to have many pradeśas. And as we have seen that that which has many pradeśas is called astikāya. But the time-particle does not have this characteristic of combining in the same way. That is why it is called an-astikāya (not astikāya).

Again, a substance is either active (sakriya) or passive (niśkriya). If it possesses causal activity, it is sakriya; and if there is no causal activity in it, it is niśkriya. According to this classification jīva and pudgala are sakriya, because they are found active under certain conditions. The rest - dharma, adharma, space and time - are not active.21 Pūjayapāda (6th century A.D.), the author of the Sarvārtha-siddhi, also maintains that time is not active.22 Now the question arises: If these substances are not active, how does their appearance (utpāda), which is one of the three characteristics of a substance, become possible? And when appearance is not possible, disappearance (vyaya) must also be impossible. To this Pūjayapāda answers that it is not so. The appearance of the characteristics of origination (utpāda), etc. in these substances are admitted in a different way. In all the six substances there is a common attribute called aguru-laghu (individuality) "by means of which a substance never loses its own essential attributes and never requires the peculiar and essential attributes of any other substance."23 And this attribute of individuality occurs at every instant. "It is due to this sort of change that we can
attribute rise (utpāda), decay (vyaya) and continuity (āhrauvya) to all
the substances, and these alterations are called natural modifications
(svabhāva paryāya).”

Time is said to be of twofold: Absolute time (paramārtha kāla, or
dravya kāla, or niścaya kāla) and Relative time (vyavahāra kāla, or samaya).

Absolute Time

Time, according to Jainism, is the instrumental cause of all modifi-
cations in the rest of five substances. Birth, growth and decay of things
are possible only because of this time. Jainas are realists and they
admit the reality of change; so they also recognise time as real. Time is
known by inference from the modifications in the astikāyas, i.e., the other
five substances. The function of time is to assist these substances in
their continued existence (vartanā), modification (parināma), activity
(kriyā), temporal priority (paratva) and temporal posteriority (aparatva). Of
these functions the first one, (continued existence, or vartanā) is
caused by absolute time and the remaining three functions are caused by
relative time.

The Concept of Continuity (vartanā)

The existence of real time (dravya kāla) is established by vartanā
(continuity). Vartanā is the perception of the existence of a substance
observed from modifications in it at every moment. Each of the six sub-
stances has its different modes. The substancehood of a substance persists
throughout its various modes - utpāda, vyaya and āhrauvya. This continuity
of the substancehood amidst different modifications in indivisible time
period is called vartanā. Vartanā, Akalaṅkadeva (720-780 A.D.) says, is
known through inference like cooking. For instance, when we start cooking
rice, we find that after some time it is in cooked condition. During this period the rice undergoes modifications at every moment of time, but still the essence of rice continues to be the same, unchanged, and this continuity is vartanā.\(^{32}\) Analysing this continuity, we arrive at two conclusions - (i) incessant changes in a substance and (ii) persistence of the essence of a substance throughout these changes in its modes in an infinite time-period. The former gives the notion of relative time and the latter that of absolute time. Thus vartanā leads us to infer the existence of substantive time. Absolute time helps the changes, i.e. the perpetual changes of attribute at every moment, in the substances.\(^{33}\) It is actually an instrumental cause only; just as "the stone under a potter's wheel assists in the movement of the wheel. The stone here does not impart motion to the wheel, but without this stone such a kind of motion would not have been possible."\(^{34}\) Substances exist by themselves with their modes, and time conditions the changes in things. Being the condition of these changes does not oppose its characteristic of inactivity, as it is simply an accompanying cause.\(^{35}\)

Now we have to see as to what extent time is a substance, according to the Jaina philosophers. We have already described above that a substance possesses three characteristics - origination (utpāda), decay (vyaya) and continuity (dhrauvya).\(^{36}\) It also possesses the qualities (guṇa) and capacity of modification (paryāya).\(^{37}\) Continuity (dhrauvya) in time is part of the latter's own inherent nature and is self-caused. Utpāda and vyaya have external causes, but in case of time they are self-caused, because of the quality of individuality (agurulaghu)\(^{38}\) in it. It has both ordinary (sādhāraṇa) and extraordinary (asādhāraṇa) qualities. Causality of continuity (vartanāhetutva) is an extraordinary quality, while unconsciousness (acetanatva), formlessness (amūrtatva), infinitesimality (suksmatva) and
individuality (agurulaghu), etc. are ordinary qualities of time. Thus, we see that time is an independent substance.

**The Atomistic Characteristic of Time**

Unlike the Śvetāmbaras, the Digambaras maintain that absolute time consists of instants or extremely small points of time (kālāṇu). These atoms have no colour, taste, smell or touch. They are discrete and never mixed up like a heap of jewels. Each particle of time occupies a separate space-point (lokākāśa). This is the unique characteristic of time, which distinguishes it from the other five substances. It has no extensive magnitude (kāyatva). This extensive magnitude is called horizontal extension (tiryaka pracaya), but time has only vertical extension (urdha pracaya).

A. Chakravartinayanar writes:

"When the simple elements, say, the points are so arranged in a series where each term is an item also in another series we must have the two dimensional series which will correspond to surface or extension. Wherever there is such a Tiryaka Pracaya we have Astikāya. But time or kāla has only Urdha Pracaya. The elements are in a forward direction. The series is monodimensional or linear order. Therefore kāla has no extension either directly or indirectly. Hence it is not an Astikāya. Though it is not an Astikāya, it is distinctly a real entity which accounts for changes in other things."  

To Jainas, unlike the Vaiśeṣikas, time is not an all-pervasive, unique and whole substance, rather it is atomic. Prabhācandra (980-1065 A.D.) rejects the Vaiśeṣika notion of one absolute time.

**Relative Time**

This form of time, i.e. time from the ordinary point of view, is measured by different changes. Actually it is a paryāya (modification) of real time (dravya kāla). We can say that absolute time is the substantial cause (utpāda kāraṇa) of relative time. The latter consists of
short or long durations, such as hours, minutes, seconds. Further, it is of three kinds - the past, present and future. The number of the time-atoms in the past is equal to the number of the liberated souls multiplied by numerable winks (āvalis). "The present is one instant. The future practical time is infinite times (the total of all) souls and all matter (substances)." Umāsvāti (5th-6th century A.D.) says that time has an infinite number of samayas. The samaya is the smallest unit of time. It is the time taken by an atom of matter in moving from one space-point to another.

**Measurement of Time**

Kirfel provides a comprehensive list of measurements of time according to the Śvetāmbara school as follows:

The smallest unit of time is the samaya

- Infinite number of samayas = 1 Āvalikā (Āvaliā)
- Numerous Āvalikās = 1 Ucchvāsa (Ussāsa) or Niḥsvāsa
- 1 Ucchvāsa + 1 Niḥsvāsa = 1 Prāṇa (Pāna)
- 7 Prāṇas = 1 Stoka (Thova)
- 7 Stokas = 1 Lava
- 38.1/2 Lavas = 1 Nālikā (Nāliā)
- 77 Lavas = 2 Nālikās
- 539 Stokas = 3773 Prāṇas = 1 Muhūrta (Muhutta)
- 30 Muhūrtas = 1 Ahorātra (Ahoratta)
- 15 Ahorātras = 1 Pakṣa (Pakkha)
- 2 Pakṣas = 1 Māsa
- 2 Māsas = 1 Rtu (Uū)
- 3 Rtu = 1 Ayana (Ayaṇa)
- 2 Ayanas = 1 Saṃvatsara (Saṃvacchara)
- 5 Saṃvatsaras = 1 Yuga (Jua = 5 years)
20 Yugas = 1 Varşāgata (Vāsasaya = 100 years)
10 Varşāgatas = 1 Varşasahasra (Vāsahassa = 1000 years)
100 Varşasahasras = 1 Varşāgatasahasra (Vasayassahassa = 100,000 years)
84 Varşāgatasahasras = 1 Pūrvāṅga (Puvvaṅga = 8400000 years)
8400000 Pūrvāṅgas = 1 Pūrva (Puvva = 8400000² years)
8400000 Pūrvas = 1 Tuṭītāṅga (Tuḍiaṅga = 8400000³ years)
8400000 Tuṭītāṅgas = 1 Tuṭita (Tuḍia = 8400000⁴ years)
8400000² Tuṭitas = 1 Aḍaḍa (= 8400000⁶ years)
8400000² Aḍaḍas = 1 Āvava (= 8400000⁸ years)
8400000² Āvavas = 1 Hūhuka (Hūhua = 8400000¹⁰ years)
8400000² Hūhukas = 1 Utpala (Uppala = 8400000¹² years)
8400000² Utpalas = 1 Padma (Pauma = 8400000¹⁴ years)
8400000² Padmas = 1 Nalina (Naliṇa = 8400000¹⁶ years)
8400000² Nalinas = 1 Arthanipūra (Atthiniura = 8400000¹⁸ years)
8400000² Arthanipūras = 1 Ayuta (Aua = 8400000²⁰ years)
8400000² Ayutas = 1 Prayuta (Paua = 8400000²² years)
8400000² Prayutas = 1 Nayuta (Naua = 8400000²⁴ years)
8400000² Nayutas = 1 Cūlika (Cūlia = 8400000²⁶ years)
8400000² Cūlikas = 1 Śīrṣaprahelika (Ṣisapahelika = 8400000²⁸ years)

The Trailokyaḍīpikā and the Trailokyasāra give a different list of measurements of time, according to the Digambaras, which differs from Pūrvāṅga onwards:

1 Pūrvāṅga (Puvvaṅga) = 8400000 years
1 Pūrva (Puvva) = 8400000² = 7056 with 10 zeroes years
1 Parvāṅga (Pavvaṅga) = 8400000² x 84 = 592704 with 10 zeroes years
1 Parva (Pavva) = \(8400000^3 \times 84 = 49787136\) with 15 zeroes years

1 Nayutāṅga (Nauḍaṅga) = \(8400000^4 \times 84^2 = 4182119424\) with 15 zeroes, etc. years

1 Nayuta (Nauḍa) = \(8400000^4 \times 84^2\) years

1 Kumudāṅga (Kumudaṅga) = \(8400000^4 \times 84^3\) "

1 Kumuda = \(8400000^5 \times 84^3\) "

1 Padmāṅga (Paumaṅga) = \(8400000^5 \times 84^4\) "

1 Padma (Pauma) = \(8400000^6 \times 84^4\) "

1 Nalināṅga (Nalinaṅga) = \(8400000^6 \times 84^5\) "

1 Nalina (Nalina) = \(8400000^7 \times 84^5\) "

1 Kamalāṅga (Kamalaṅga) = \(8400000^7 \times 84^6\) "

1 Kamala = \(8400000^8 \times 84^6\) "

1 Tudidāṅga (Tudiaṅga) = \(8400000^8 \times 84^7\) "

1 Tudīda (Tudia) = \(8400000^9 \times 84^7\) "

1 Aḍaḍāṅga (Aḍadaṅga) = \(8400000^9 \times 84^8\) "

1 Aḍaḍa = \(8400000^{10} \times 84^8\) "

1 Amamāṅga (Amamaṅga) = \(8400000^{10} \times 84^9\) "

1 Amama = \(8400000^{11} \times 84^9\) "

1 Hāhāhūḥūaṅga = \(8400000^{11} \times 84^{10}\) "

1 Hāhāhūḥū = \(8400000^{12} \times 84^{10}\) "

1 Vidyullatāṅga (Vidulataṅga) = \(8400000^{12} \times 84^{11}\) "

1 Vidyullatā (Vidulatā) = \(8400000^{13} \times 84^{11}\) "

1 Latāṅga (Laṭaṅga) = \(8400000^{13} \times 84^{12}\) "

1 Latā = \(8400000^{14} \times 84^{12}\) "

1 Mahālatāṅga (Mahālayaṅga) = \(8400000^{14} \times 84^{13}\) "

1 Mahālatā = \(8400000^{15} \times 84^{13}\) "

1 Śīṛṣaṇakampita (Śisapakampia) = \(8400000^{15} \times 84^{14}\) "

1 Hastapraheli (Hatthapahelia) = \(8400000^{16} \times 84^{14}\) "

1 Acalātmaka (Acalappa) = \(8400000^{16} \times 84^{15}\) "
The biggest unit of time in Jainism is the Mahākalpa, which consists of two aeons - Avasarpinī and Utsarpinī, the aeons of increase and decrease, or of unwinding and rewinding of the universe respectively. Each aeon consists of $4.13 \times 10^{50}$ solar years, and each aeon has six ages.

Further, another immense period of time, according to the Jaina system, is the Vyavahārapalaya. This is said to be the time taken when a circular receptacle of one yojana diameter filled tightly with fine human hairs of the length which, in a normal adult would grow in seven days, is emptied by taking out one hair every hundred years.

Innumerable Vyavahārapalayas = 1 Uddhārapalaya
Innumerable Uddhārapalayas = 1 Addhāpalya
$10 \times (\text{crore} \times \text{crore})$ of Addhāpalyas or $10 \times 10^{14}$ Addhāpalyas = 1 Sāgar

The six ages of the Avasarpinī are:

1. Sukhamāsukhamā = $4 \times (1 \text{ crore} \times 1 \text{ crore})$ of Sāgaras = $4 \times 10^{14}$ of Sāgaras
2. Sukhamā = $3 \times 10^{14}$
3. Sukhamāduhkhamā = $2 \times 10^{14}$
4. Duḥkhamāsukhamā = $1 \times 10^{14}$ minus 42 000 years
5. Duḥkhāmā = 21 000 years
6. Duḥkhamāduhkhamā = 21 000 years

Total = $10 \times 10^{14}$ Sāgaras or 1 Daśakoḍakoḍi Sāgar

To sum up we can say that the Jaina notion of time is atomistic as well as semi-realistic. It is atomistic in the sense that it consists of
an infinite number of atoms of time, and these atoms are never mixed up.
There is no all-pervasive, single, independent and whole time. Secondly,
time is a real, a substance, though it has no corporeality (kāyatva),
while the other five substances have. Therefore, it is obvious that the
standpoint of the Jainas regarding time is also semi-realistic.
Notes


2. See Jacobi (1914), pp. 465ff.

3. Here pudgala means matter, which is quite different from the Buddhist notion of pudgala, which is personality.

4. The meaning of dharma in Jaina philosophy is completely different from what it means in other Indian philosophical systems. It is the auxiliary cause of motion. Cf. Niyamasūra, kārikā 30a: gamapaṇipimittam dhammam. It makes the motion of soul and matter possible. Actually, it does not cause motion in them, but helps them to move. Their movement without dharma would not be possible. So we can say that it is a medium of motion. Just as water is the necessary condition for the movement of fish. See Tattvārtha-sūra of Amṛtacandra Sūri, 3. 33-34. (Quoted by G.R. Jain, 1975, p. 15). Again, dharma is devoid of form, taste, touch, colour, smell, sound, activity, etc. and is said to be eternal. It pervades the whole universe (Vardhamāna Purāṇa of Sakaśiṃkirti, 16.19, quoted by id., p. 15; also cf. Pañcaśīśīsāyanāra, kārikās 90-92, 94-96).

5. Adharma, like dharma, is regarded as all-pervasive, but it is the accompanying condition or cause of rest to soul and matter - cf. Niyamasūra, 30. It is also formless, inactive, eternal, etc. and has no taste, touch, colour, smell, sound, etc. It is an auxiliary cause of rest in case of soul and matter, just as the shade of a tree is for the traveller. Cf. Vardhamāna Purāṇa, 16.30 (Quoted by G.R. Jain, 1975, p. 25) - nityo 'mūrtā kriyāhinaḥ chāyeva pathikāṅginām.

6. "The term Ākāśa here means space not Ether as it is very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy" - Pañcaśīśīsāyanāra, p. 99. It accommodates absolutely all the substances. Also cf. Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, 5.18: ākāsasyāvagāhaḥ.


10. Cf. ibid., 5.30: utpādaavayadhrauvya vyuktam sat. Here utpāda means the modification of a substance without alterations of its own essence, just as the lump of clay is transformed into a form of pitcher without any change in its substance. Vyaya is the disappearance of the previous form of a substance, just as after the formation
of a pitcher the lump of clay disappears. And dhruvyā is that characteristic of a substance which persists throughout its various modifications, just as in both the above states – as a lump of clay and as a pitcher—the substance remains the same.

Cf. Tattvārthavārttika, vol. II, pp. 494.32-495.5: svajātyaparītyaṃ bhāvāntaravāpyāṃ utpādaḥ ...... mṛtpindasya ghataparyāyaṃ vartmaḥ tathā pūrvabāvāpyaṃvyayaṃ...... yathā ghaṭotpatteḥ pīṇḍākṛteḥ dhruveḥ sthairyakarmano dhruvatītī dhruveḥ ...... yathā pīṇḍaḥ-tāḍyavasthāsu mṛdādyavasthātaḥ


13. Cf. ibid., 133.


15. Cf. Dravyasamgraha, kārikā 15b.


17. Pradeśa is that unit of space (ākāśa) which is occupied by an indivisible atom of matter (pudgala) and is capable of being occupied by any atom of any kind. In such a pradeśa of ākāśa one pradeśa of dharma, one pradeśa of adharma, one particle of time and a number of material atoms may be accommodated. Cf. Tattvārtha-sāra, 3.25-26 (Quoted in Dravyasamgraha, p. 70).


22. Cf. Sarvārthasiddhi, 5.7: kālaśy api sakriyatvam iti cet, na.

23. Cf. Gommaṭasāra-jīva-kāṇḍa, kārikā 569; Sarvārthasiddhi, 5.7.


27. Cf. Tattvārthasiddhi, 5.22.


30. Akalankadeva (720-780 A.D.) puts the same idea as follows: ekasmīn avibhāgīni samaye dharmadhīni dravyāni sañj api svaparyāyair
ādinānādinadbhir utpādavayadhrauvyavikalpair vartanta iti kṛtvā
tad viṣayā vartanā - ibid., p. 477.8-10.


32. Supra, fn. 30.

33. Cf. Brahmadeva’s commentary on the Dravyasaṁgraha, kārikā 21:
vartanālaksanāḥ ca paramārthakāla.

34. Ibid., p. 60.


37. Cf. Sarva-rthasaiddhi, 5.39: ’Utpādavayadhrauvayuktam sat’ ‘guna-
 paryāyayavad dvrayam’ iti ca. Also see Tattvārthadhiṣṭhīma-sūtra, 5.38.


39. Ibid.

40. Cf. Dravyasaṁgraha, kārikā 22 and Akalanka’s commentary thereon;
also cf. Tattvārtha-sāra, 3.44 and Vardhamāna Purāṇa, 16.35 (Quoted

41. Cf. Tattvārthadhiṣṭhīma-sūtra, 5.4.

42. Cf. Tattvārtha-sāra, 3.44; Vardhamāna Purāṇa, 16.35.

43. Pañcaastikāyasāra, Introduction, p.xxviii-xxix. Also cf. Sarvārthasaiddhi,
Hindi commentary, 5.39; and Pravacanasāra, 2.49.

44. According to M.K. Shastri (Prameyakamala Mārtanda, Introduction,
p. 67).

45. Ibid., pp. 564-568.


47. One āvali is the twinkling of an eye. Cf. Gommaṭasaara-jīva-kāṇḍa, 578
and commentary thereupon:

"In every period of 6 months and 8 instants, 608 souls leave the
primitive common, or Nitya Nigoda, condition; and the same number
of souls enter the abode of liberation from 2 1/2 continents.

The number of Siddhas or liberated souls is infinite part of the
total of all the souls (mundane and liberated). 6 months and 8
samayas being reduced to Āvalis and divided by 608 would be the
numerable Āvali mentioned in the gāthā.

It would be noticed that numerable Āvalis in the Gāthā are constant.
They do not vary. They represent the average time for one soul to
attain liberation. The number of liberated souls increases every
6 months and 8 instants by 608. This explains the ever-increasing-
length of past time by the constant number of Āvalis.”
48. Ibid., kārikā 579 (Jaini's rendering).


52. Cf. Tattvārthavārttika, 3.38.

53. It is according to the Digambara school, see Kirfel (1967), pp. 338-339.

54. The Brahma-kalpa of Hindus also consists of 77 digits, but the numbers are not the same. See G.R. Jain (1975), p. 176.

55. Yojana "is a particular measure of distance, sometimes regarded as equal to 4 or 5 English miles, but more correctly = 4 krośas or about 9 miles; according to some = 8 krośas" or 18 miles - Monier-Williams (1974), p. 858, column 1. Kirfel (1967, p. 337) also provides the measures of distance according to the Jaina system. According to the Tattvārthādhitāgama-sūtra, 3.9:

\[
\begin{align*}
1 \text{ big Yojana} & = 2000 \text{ krośas (kosas)} \\
& = 4500 \text{ miles} \\
1 \text{ small Yojana} & = 4 \text{ krośas (kosas)} \\
& = 9 \text{ miles}
\end{align*}
\]

56. According to Kirfel (1967, p. 339) it is a Palyopama.

57. See Tattvārthādhitāgama-sūtra, p. 83.

58. Also cf. Sarvārthasiddhā, 3.27. Kirfel (1967, p. 339) gives the names of the 6 ages as follows:

1. Suśamasuṣuṣamā (susamasususamā)
2. Suṣamā (susamā)
3. Suṣamaduṣuṣamā (susamadususamā)
4. Duḥṣamasuṣuṣamā (dususamasusamā)
5. Duḥṣamā (dussamā)
6. Duḥṣamaduṣuṣamā (dususamadussamā)

"We are now in the Duḥkhama or the 5th age (pañcamakāla); this began in about 523 B.C., i.e. 3 years 8 1/2 months after the liberation of Lord Mahāvīra and its total duration is 21,000 years" - Tattvārthādhitāgama-sūtra, p. 89.
CHAPTER IV

The Concept of Time in Pali Buddhism.

In writing this chapter we have consulted as many Pali texts as possible including both canonical as well as non-canonical irrespective of their systematic order. It is really an arduous task to collate all the Pali texts in order to find the passages dealing with the concept of time. Only a few of them, which are actually vast in number, have been found useful for our purpose. These are: Dīghanikāya, Majjhimanikāya, Saṁyuttanikāya, Aṅguttaranikāya, Dhammasaggaṇī, Kathāvatthu, Paṭṭhāna, Kathāvatthupakaraṇa-Āṭṭhakathā, Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, Āṭṭhasālīnī, Milindapaṇha, etc. Of these only four, i.e. Kathāvatthu, Kathāvatthupakaraṇa-Āṭṭhakathā, Āṭṭhasālīnī and Milindapaṇha, discuss the notion of time in considerable detail.

The Theravāda Rejection of the Theory of "everything exists".

In the Kathāvatthu we come across a detailed analysis of the concept of time and its three temporal distinctions, the past, present and future. The Theravādins explicitly criticise the Sabbatthivādins (Skt. Sarvāstivādins), although without having a proper understanding of the latter's doctrines, which are discussed comprehensively in the next chapter.

The Sabbatthivādins propound the doctrine of "sabbam atthi" which means "everything exists". Prima facie it seems that the emphasis is laid upon the subject of this proposition "sabbam", but the context shows that the emphasis is really on the predicate "atthi" ('exists' or 'is'). Now the question is: What does "everything" mean? This does not mean that the Sabbatthivādins believe in the continued existence of everything, the existence of soul (ātman) or any universal permanent cause like Brahman
of Vedic and Upaniṣadic tradition. Actually, "everything" means 75 dharmas, or 12 āyatanas, or 18 dhātus irrespective of their temporal status. The Saṁyuttanikāya defines "sabbam" (everything, all) as eye and form, ear and sound, nose and smell, tongue and taste, body and touch, mind and mental attitudes. At the same time it suggests that if someone rejecting this definition claims to teach another 'all', "it would be mere talk on his part, and when questioned he could not make good his boast, and further would come to an ill pass. Why so? Because, brethren, it would be beyond his scope to do so." Buddhaghosa (1st half of 5th century) thinks that the doctrine of the Sabbatthivāda was propounded in some passages of the Sutta-piṭaka, such as: O monk, whatever is material form (rūpa), past, present or future ... Whatever is feeling (vedanā), past, present or future ... Whatever is perception (saññā), past, present or future ... Whatever is kammic formation (saṁkhāra), past, present or future ... Whatever is consciousness (vinnanā), past, present or future ..., 'all phenomena, past, present, future', 'persist in that state, and therefore all go on existing'.

If "everything exists", then the question arises whether everything exists everywhere (sabbattha), always (sabbāda), in every manner (sabbena sabbam), in everything (sabbesa), in separate or disjunct form (ayoga). If it is so, even the non-existent thing (yam pi natthi) exists, which is an impossibility and an absurd idea. Further, if "everything" is taken in temporal sense, it can be implied that the three temporal distinctions, the past, present and future, exist independently. But according to the definition, the past is that which has ceased, gone away, changed, and the future is that which is not yet come, not yet born, so how can we say "the past exists", or "the future exists"? At the same time the present is that which has not ceased, not gone, not changed. This means the present is that which exists. If the past and future also
exist, they have the characteristics of present, i.e. not ceased, not gone, not changed. Therefore, the past and future are present. This result can be deduced from the following categorical syllogism and can be illustrated valid according to the Venn diagram:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{All Existents are Present}\\
&\text{All Past are Existents}\\
\therefore &\text{All Past are Present}
\end{align*}
\]

Or, \(\text{All M is P}\)
\(\text{All S is M}\)
\(\therefore \text{All S is P}\)

Or, \(\text{M} \cap \text{P} = 0\)
\(\text{S} \cap \text{M} = 0\)
\(\therefore \text{S} \cap \text{P} = 0\)

Now the above syllogism is valid if and only if the two premises imply or entail the conclusion. This is illustrated as follows in the Venn diagram:

We can apply some other methods also to criticise the Sabbatthivādins in this respect.

1. \((x) \ (Qx \supset Rx)\)
   \(\therefore (x) \ (Qx \supset \neg Px)\)

Or, existence implies non-past.

Or, by transposition 
\((x) \ (\neg Px \supset \neg Qx)\)
Or, equivalently

\[(x) \ (Px \supset -Qx)\]

i.e. past does not imply any existence.

Again, \(^25\)

\[(2) \ (x) \ (Qx \supset -Px)\]

\[\neg Pa\]

\[\therefore \ \neg Pa\]

\[\therefore \ \neg Pa\]

\[\therefore \ \neg Pa\]

This demonstrates that whenever there is existence, there is no past; and whenever there is past, there is no existence. In other words, both cannot go side by side. The same arguments can be placed against the proposition 'the future exists'. Thus, the Theravādins succeed in criticising the reality of the past and future.

Buddhaghosa remarks that in the expressions 'the past exists' and 'the future exists', the reference is made exclusively to the notion of time. \(^26\) It follows that the Sabbatthivādins admit an independent reality of time as well as its three segments, the past, present and future, which are criticised by the Theravādins.

C.A.F. Rhys Davids \(^27\) informs us that the Burmese translator supplies after 'sabbam' a term which is in the Pali version "dhamma-jātam" or "dhammassa jātam": the arising or happening of dhamma or anything which exists as a fact. \(^28\) She raises an intelligent question \(^29\) whether "sabbam" should be understood collectively, i.e. 'all', or distributively, i.e. 'everything'. "sabbesu sabbam atthi ti", \(^30\) according to the context, should be taken in the latter sense, i.e. "all exists in everything". Here it is to be noted that the subject "sabbam" is taken collectively, while the predicate "sabbesu" distributively. Further, none of the dhammas, past, present or future, abandons its khandha-sabhāva. \(^31\) In other words, once they originate as a dhamma they always remain as a dhamma. This means the five aggregates (khandha), material as well as psychical, to wit, matter (rūpa), \(^32\) feeling
(vedanā), perception (saññā), kammic formation (sañkhāra) and consciousness (viññāna), although they constitute the personal life and experience differently at different times, never give up their inherent characteristics. And thus, they keep on existing all the time. This shows that the Sabbatthivādins maintain the continued existence of the dhammas.

**Time and the Aggregates (khandha)**

Now the Theravādins connect the time-idea with the aggregates (khandha) and raise the question whether the past, present and future material forms (rūpa) exist. If the reply is in the affirmative, the above arguments will apply against them also. It is the same with the four remaining aggregates: feeling, perception, kammic formation and consciousness.

The expression "atītam rūpam atthi ti" (Does the past material form exist?) is used in the distributive sense of everything taking each aggregate separately. But it can also be understood in the collective sense. In the preceding proposition the word 'rūpa' actually means 'the material aggregate' (rupakkhandha) which comprises 28 material qualities. Taken distributively it refers to every individual of this aggregate as well as that of four others.

Now follows an interesting discussion on time. The Theravādins assert that in the expressions 'paccuppannam ti vā rūpam' and 'rūpam ti vā paccuppannam' if the two terms 'paccuppannam' and 'rūpam' are understood as identical without making any distinction (appiyam karitva) between the two, then the Sabbatthivāda statement "the present rūpa abandons its present state after it has ceased to be" leads one to believe that "the rūpa abandons its rūpabhāva (materiality)". Under similar conditions, i.e. paccuppanna and rūpa are identical, if the Sabbatthivādins maintain otherwise that the present rūpa does not abandon its rūpabhāva after having been ceased,
In other words, if something is said to exist through different temporal stages of the past, present and future, its continued existence will show only its presentness (referring to present time). In that case, it would be impossible to make any distinction between the three time-epochs."
then it follows that the rūpa does not abandon its present state (paccuppapanabhāva). The Theravādins contend that when we say 'rūpa is present', it refers to one and the same thing essentially. When the rūpa ceases to be real, it abandons its present state; and when it abandons its present state, it ceases to be real. They ascribe reality neither to the past and future rūpas, nor to the past and future time-epochs themselves. The only real is present. In other words, the reality is confined only to the present state. Again, if it is maintained that the rūpa does not abandon its materiality (rūpabhāva), it becomes permanent (nicca), constant (dhuva), eternal (sassata) and unchangeable (avipariṇāmadhamma), which is not correct, i.e. not in line with the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. The rūpa is actually impermanent, unstable, non-eternal and evanescent. Therefore, it is untenable to say that the rūpa does not abandon its rūpabhāva. The same arguments apply to the reality of the three time-distinctions as such. But here Nibbāna is maintained as permanent and eternal.

The acceptance of transition from the future to the present and then to the past raises a further question whether something having been future becomes present, and again having been present becomes past. Here the emphasis is laid on 'having been' and 'becomes'. Both these terms indicate the same state of being, i.e. presentness. It is only a repetition. This means the distinction of the future, present and past does not fare better, and these three terms are identical.

In a further discussion the Sabbatthivādins again defend their theory that "the past exists, the future exists", and in their support they quote the same passage as above from the Nikāyas: "Whatever, monk, is material form, past, future or present." It follows, avow the Sabbatthivādins, that the past exists, the future exists. This view is contradicted
effectively by the Theravādins by quoting other passages from the *Sahyutta-nikāya* \(^46\) though "without anything more than dialectical ingenuity".\(^47\) The gist of these passages is: the rūpa, which has ceased and changed, is called 'has been' (i.e. past). In that state it is said neither 'exists' (i.e. present) nor 'will be' (i.e. future). Secondly, the rūpa which is not yet born is called 'will be' (i.e. future). In that state it is not called 'exists' (present) or 'has been' (past). Thirdly, the rūpa which has appeared is called 'exists' (present). In this state it is not reckoned as 'has been' (past) or 'will be' (future).\(^48\) Therefore, the Sabbatthivāda assertion "the past exists, the future exists" is irrational.

The Sabbatthivādin's "...emphasis lies on the atthi, 'doth exist', of the solemn categorical declaration in the Sutta. The Theravādin, by completing the declaration, shows that the future, so far from existing, depends entirely, for its coming-to-exist at all, on the circumstances attending the occurrence of a certain pre-requisite, or antecedent condition. Before it exists, certain conditions must have come to pass. So the Comy.: the words 'there doth exist in the future re-becoming', etc., do not amount to a 'state of existing', but refer to certainty of result, given the consummation of the conditions".\(^49\)

Now the question is: What does the past consist of? According to Buddhaghosa, the opponent (the Sabbatthivādins)\(^50\) sustains that both the past and future exist, because "the aggregates and other factors (of our experience) retain their state (as a sort of complex self)".\(^51\) The Sabbatthivādins think that the Theravādins also accept this doctrine. If it is so, then it follows that the past and future exist. But the fact is just adverse and the latter rather explain it away on the basis of *SN.iii.71*, as we have seen above. They are at least in agreement with their opponent that the past, present and future consists of aggregates.
The Sabbatthivāda point is that if 'the present consists of aggregates' proves that the present exists, then the same logic should apply to the future and past. The Theravādins urge that these three terms should not be mixed up. They are distinct from each other as set forth in SN.iii.71. Thus, the Theravādins, like the Sautrāntikas, affirm that only present can be said to exist.

The Theravāda criticism of the Sabbatthivāda doctrine of 'sabbam atthi' is in no way thorough and forceful, because nowhere do they make any reference to the notion of the kāritra, i.e. activity or causal-efficiency, which should be considered as the most important concept invented by the Sarvāstivādins (or the Vaibhāṣikas) in establishing their theory of "traikālyavāda".

The Kassapikas Criticised

The Kassapikas, who are considered as seceders from the Sabbatthivādins, tried to compromise with the Sabbatthivādins on the one hand and the Theravādins on the other. But the former looked upon their theory "as a kind of mutilated Sarvāstivāda which failed to recognise the existence of all the past." And the latter criticised them in much the similar way as they criticised the Sabbatthivādins in the preceding passages.

According to the Kassapikas, some of the past and future exist, and some of them do not. We find a similar view put forward by Vasubandhu (320-350 A.D.) in his Abhidharmakośabhasya. Here it is the Vibhajyavādins. We have seen above that the past by definition is that which has ceased, gone, changed. Now the Theravāda argument is that if some
of the past exists and some does not, it follows that some of it has ceased, gone, changed and some of it has not.\textsuperscript{57} If the above definition of the past is taken into account, the Kassapika's theory leads to self-contradiction.

Further, the Theravādins\textsuperscript{58} bifurcate the past: (1) that which has not yet produced its effect (avipāka), i.e. that which is still replete with potentialities, and (2) that which has already produced its effect (vipāka) and is now empty. Then, they apply the same arguments to them maintaining that each of these has two aspects: existence as well as non-existence. Thus, they interpret that some of the past, which is avipāka, exists and some of it does not. In the same way, some of the past, which is vipāka, exists and some of it does not. The Kassapikas deny this. They maintain only one past with two aspects: avipāka and vipāka. They make their position clear by saying: only that past which has not discharged its effect exists, whereas that past which has discharged its effect does not exist.\textsuperscript{59} But the Theravādins do not accept any distinction between the two aspects of past. For them past is past and according to the definition, the past in general is that which is ceased, changed, gone. Likewise, all these arguments can be placed against "some of the future exists and some of it does not".\textsuperscript{60}

According to Vasumitra (100 A.D.),\textsuperscript{61} the Kassapikas hold the following doctrines:

(1) If the passions (kleśa) (lit. dharma) were already destroyed and if it were already fully known (by an Arhant that they have been annihilated), then they would cease to exist in him (lit. there is none): (but in case they were) not destroyed and (this was) not fully known (then their substances would continue to) exist.

(2) If the fruits of actions (karmaphala) have already ripened, then they cease to exist: (but if these fruits) have not ripened, they (continue to) exist.
(3) The saṃskāras come into being through causes in the past, but not through causes in the future (lit. the saṃskāras derive their causes from the past: they do not derive their causes from the future).

(4) All the saṃskāras perish at every moment.

(5) The śaikṣa-dharmas are (still) accompanied by (lit. have) the vipākaphalas, etc.

Some Early Schools on the Reality of the three Time-epochs

The four later schools of the Mahāsaṅghikas, Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins and Kaukkutīkās, and the earlier Mahīśāsakas proclaim that the past and future do exist as a substance. It is interesting to note that the later Mahāsaṅghikas, unlike the earlier Mahāsaṅghikas and the earlier Mahīśāsakas, speak of the reality of the past and future. Here the past and future are considered as independently real, hence we tend not to agree with Masuda that this is the same view as that of the Sarvāstivādins.

We find at least one reference in the Pali sources where the independent reality (parinipphana) of the three time-epochs is admitted by some unknown adherent. It might be the Andhakas as S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids suggest. This theory is not without any ground. We encounter a passage in the Aṅguttaranikāya saying:

O monks, these are the three points of controversy. What are the three? Someone, o monk, may start talking of the past time-epoch, expressing: thus, it was in the past time-epoch. (Again) O monk, someone may start talking of the future time-epoch, expressing: thus, it will be in the future time-epoch. (Lastly) O monk, someone may start talking of the present time-epoch, expressing: thus, now it is in the present time-epoch.

The Theravādins just set this passage aside. They argue if it is so, the time-epochs (addhā) would have to be accepted as the aggregate (rūpa, vedanā, saññā, sañkhāra and viññāṇa) and thus in each time-epoch there
will be five aggregates. It follows that there will be fifteen aggregates in total taken all the three time-epochs together. And the same case would be with 18 dhātus, and 12 āyatanas. But this is not so. All this proves that the past, present and future are not independent realities. The Theravādins do admit the reality of present, but it is not an independent entity, rather a mode of existence or existent things, and the same case is with the two other time-epochs, the past and future.

To our knowledge there is only one passage\(^7\) in which the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins are said to maintain that time is eternal (nitya). It is like a reservoir in which the saṃskāras wander from one place to another. Here the saṃskāras are taken in the sense of the saṃskṛta-dharmas which are non-eternal (anitya).\(^7\) It must be noted that we do not find such doctrine elsewhere ascribing to the Dārṣṭāntika or the Vibhajyavādins.

The later Mahāsāsakas profess that the essence of the predispositions (anuśaya), 5 skandhas, 12 āyatanas and 18 dhātus are always present.\(^7\) Bhavya\(^7\) (490–570 A.D.) suggests that "The anuśayas are perpetually present" is one of the fundamental teachings of the Mahāsāsakas. But he does not mention whether they are earlier or later ones. We think that in the present context they are the earlier Mahāsāsakas. This doctrine leads us to believe that the present is eternal, though as a mode of existence. The reason behind this idea is that since the anuśayas, etc. give birth to all the dharmas, they must always be present. According to a Chinese text, I-pu'tsung-lun-lun-'shu-chi:\(^7\)

"... the constant existence of the skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus is said to have been postulated of the 'bījas (..or seeds)' and not of the current (samudācāra) skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus. This is undoubtedly an ingenious interpretation, because otherwise the present proposition contradicts one of the other doctrines of the Mahāsāsakas, namely the doctrine of the perpetual destruction and recreation of the saṃskāras... This interpretation is subject, however, to a serious doubt. As it is well-known, the bīja theory, i.e. the theory of the
causation of the phenomena out of the bijas, plays an important role in the later Yogacāra literature, such as the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, etc.\textsuperscript{76}

But it is not certain whether the later Mahīśāsakas are influenced by the bija theory. In this regard, a striking similarity can be observed with the Sarvāstivādins, who affirm the permanent reality of the essence of the dharmas. According to Vinitadeva\textsuperscript{77} (8th century A.D.), the disciples of the Mahīśāsaka Sect (earlier or later not mentioned) insist that neither the future, nor the past, nor the present exists. The Vibhajyavādins,\textsuperscript{78} he continues, bring out more or less the same view as follows:

(1) That which is past and does not belong to the things, whose fruits (phala) has not yet ripened, does not exist.

(2) The future fruit which has not yet ripened does not exist.

(3) The present (pratyutpanna) which is not of the same class does not exist anymore, etc.

The significant point here is that they deny the existence of the present also in some or other sense.

The Temporal Relation between the Karma and its Retribution

In their later differentiated doctrines,\textsuperscript{79} the Mahāsaṅghikas, Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins\textsuperscript{80} and Kaukkuṭikas, maintained the simultaneous existence of the karma and its retribution. Masuda\textsuperscript{81} observes:

"Here the word 'karmas' signifies undoubtedly the potent legacies or bijas, to employ the technical term of the Vijñānavādins, of whose 'actions' good and bad, which originate in the three agencies, body, mouth and mind and not the actions themselves as this term is commonly understood. These potent traces or legacies of action are bound to bring their results (vipāka). The existence of sentient beings (and even the whole universe according to the later Vijñānavādins) owes its origin to these potent legacies of the past action."
The point of controversy in this proposition is the time-relation between the karmas and vipākas. The Sarvāstivādins and others insisted that the vipākas come into existence after the disappearance of the karmas, while the Mahāsaṅghikas believed in the simultaneous existence of the markas and vipākas."

But logically the simultaneous existence of karma and its retribution seems to be impossible. Unless the karma is completed, its retribution cannot take place. It is possible that there is no gap even of one moment between the completion of the karma and the birth of the retribution, i.e. the latter is produced just in the next moment. André Bareau unconvincingly justifies the contention of the later Mahāsaṅghikas. He says: "As the past does not exist as a substance (dravya) and as the deed and its fruit (phala) are produced at different times, so, they argued, as long as the act is not completed, it exists in a perpetual present, and as the maturation of the fruit is likewise present, it exists at the same time as the act." He continues: "In the case of the act which has fructified, it is completed, it has entered into past, and can therefore no longer exist at the same time." Let us analyse this interpretation. Bareau maintains that both the uncompleted act and the maturation of the fruit exist at the same time. The question is: How is the maturation of the fruit possible unless the act is completed? We think that when the act has fructified, the maturation of the fruit is complete. We do not observe any difference between the two acts of fructification and maturation, while Bareau does. Therefore, his assertion of the similarity between the later Mahāsaṅghikas and the Kassapikas also is not tenable. On the same topic the Prajñāptivādins postulate that the karma does not directly bear the fruit, rather it first develops into the cause (vipākahetu), which in turn becomes (pravartate) the fruit of vipāka (vipākaphala). The author of the Chinese treatise, I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-′shu-chi-fa-jen, writes:
"The opinion of this school (i.e. the Prajñāptivādins) is that the karma-force develops gradually and receives the name of vipāka-hetu just at the time of fruition. The vipākapālaka comes into being out of this vipāka-hetu (lit. whence). (But according to) the opinion of the Sarvāstivāda-school the word 'vipāka-hetu' is wide (in its denotation) and includes all the good and bad (actions), whereas the word 'vipāka-karma' is narrow (in its sense) and confined only to the caitasika of will (cetana) and the actions which were already made known and those which were not yet made known (jnāpti and ajnāpti-karma)..."85

The later Mahāsāṅghikas do admit the theory of the seed (bīja) and sprout (aṅkura) as Vasumitra informs us. Masuda's version of Vasumitra's treatise reads: "The seed develops into the sprout (aṅkura)";86 and that of Bareau reads: "Les germes (bīja) eux-mêmes sont des pousses (aṅkura)";87 i.e. the seeds themselves are sprouts.88 This means the later Mahāsāṅghikas obviously have in their mind the theory of Satkāryavāda (i.e. the cause and effect are substantially identical) of the Sāṅkhya. The I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-'shu-chi endorses our thinking. It states that the later Mahāsāṅghikas "admit that rūpas (exist) for a long time without creation and destruction. Therefore, the substances of seeds change and become sprout; not that when the seeds are destroyed, the sprouts come into existence. Other schools (maintain that when) the seeds perish, there come into being sprouts".89

And here we find a similarity between the later Mahāsāṅghikas and the Sarvāstivādins, though the earlier Mahāsāṅghikas reject this idea and "...maintained that substances do not exist in the past and future; they only exist in the present. Phenomena come into existence in accordance with the law of causation and are subject to the law of momentary change. In the past both the 'substances and the functions' of things have been already destroyed and in the future they are not yet brought into being. Phenomena exist therefore only in the present. This is well-known non-existence-theory as to the past and future of the Mahāsāṅghikas".90 We have seen that the earlier Mahīśāsakas91 also propound the same theory.
One can trace out some interesting similarities and differences between the later Mahāsāṅghikas and the early Mahīśāsakas. Both admit that the material constituents (mahābhūta) of the sense-organs are subject to change, i.e. they are not real entities. But whereas according to the former, the citta and the caitasika dharmas are not subject to change, the latter denies it. The early Mahīśāsakas maintained the existence of the present only against the theory of 'sabbam atthi'. Like the Sarvāstivādins and the Kāśyapīyas, but unlike the Vātsīputrīyas who hold that some saṃskāras exist for some time while others perish at every moment, they pronounce that all the saṃskāras perish at every moment. Regarding the duration of human life, they say, entrance into the womb is its beginning and death is its end, and during this life the material constituents of the sense-organs are subject to perpetual change.

But the preceding theory of the early Mahīśāsakas is not without inconsistencies, as Masuda remarks. He is puzzled by the use of two words, which are in opposition to each other, i.e. 'change' and 'perish'. If we elaborate his confusion, 'change' gives an idea of Satkārayavāda in which the underlying substance remains unaltered, only its form changes; and 'perish' denotes complete destruction of the substance. He elsewhere states that the saṃskāra means the saṃskṛta-dharma, or 'the aggregated-thing'. If the saṃskāra is taken as an aggregated-thing which is perpetually changing, then it can also be accepted as a form of a substance. Again, a form (saṃskāra) may change incessantly without affecting the substance. It follows that the saṃskāra is not the substance per se. Therefore, whether the saṃskāra changes or perishes does not make any difference, and this solves Masuda's puzzle. This view is similar to that of the Sarvāstivādins and the Kāśyapīyas, but opposed to the Sautrāntikas.
The Andhakas Criticised

Buddhaghosa invents a new school, i.e. the Andhakas, which comprises the sub-schools of the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagiriyas and Siddhatthikas. They seem to have been influenced by the Jaina theory of Syādvāda or Saptabhaṅgī which suggests seven different ways of judgements. A thing is existent from one standpoint and non-existent from another. It is said to exist in its own form (svarūpa), matter (svadravya), place (svaksetra) and time (svakāla), but it is inexistent in its other form (pararūpa), matter (paradravya), place (paraksetra) and time (parakāla). Thus, the Jainas tried to settle the opposite views, such as the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṃkhya and the asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Likewise, the Andhakas endeavour to compromise the two extreme views, 'sabbam atthi' and 'sabbam natthi'. They set forth that everything exists by way of its material form (rūpa) and other characteristics, i.e. the past, present and future, but there is no past by virtue of the future and present. In other words, past exists as past, not as future or present at the same time. In the same way, the future exists as future and present as present, but they do not exist as past simultaneously. Hence, everything exists in one way, but it does not exist in another way. The Theravādins raise the similar objection as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja did against the Jainas. They insist that the two states of existence (atthibhāva) and non-existence (natthibhāva) are not convertible, identical (ekattha), similar (sama), equal (samabhāga) and alike in origin (tajjāta). Thus, the same thing cannot have contradictory attributes co-existing in it.

However, the Andhakas believe that knowledge of the future, near or distant, is possible. They think one can perceive the future through
extraordinary intuitive vision. In their support they quote a passage from the *Dīghanikāya* in which it has been forecast that "... three dangers will hang over Pātaliputta, that of fire, that of water and that of dissension among friends". Further, they also maintain that one is in possession (samannāgata) of the past as well as of the future experience. Their argument is that those who have attained insight into the eight stages of deliverance (āṭṭhavimokkhajhāyī), those who can induce at will (nikāmalābhī) the four states of mental absorption (jhāna), and those who can acquire nine gradual cessations (anupubbavāsamāpatti), are constantly in possession of past and future experiences. Buddhaghosa's objection is that the Andhakas are not making any distinction between the concept of actual possession (samannāgatapāṭṭhānā) and that of 'the acquisition of the state' (patilabhappāṭṭhānā), which is actually potential. The former is related to the present, while the latter is latent. The Theravādins urge that since, according to the definitions, the past is that which is departed, gone, changed, and the future is that which is yet to come, it is not possible to possess knowledge of the past or future.

The Sarvāstivādins maintain that the objects (ālambana) of the citta and caitasika dharmas really exist, and the Yogins possess consciousness of the past as well as of the future objects. But the Uttarāpathakas pronounce that consciousness of the past and future is without an object (anārammaṇa). The Theravādins argue that if there is consciousness of the past and future, how can it be without object. The statement 'There is consciousness of the past and future, but there is no object of such consciousness' is self-contradictory. According to Bhavya, the Pūrva-sthaviras, like the Sarvāstivādins and the later Mahīśāsakas, put forth that the past and future dharmas also exist. Bareau suggests that other Sthaviras reject this idea, and this theory cannot be attributed to the
primitive Sthaviras. Further, we have seen that the Kassapikas and the Vibhajyavādins maintained that some of the past and future exist, and some of them do not. A group of the Vibhajyavādins went so far as to say, as Vinītadeva informs us, that the present (pratyutpanna) which is not of the same class does not exist anymore. This theory is absolutely obscure and we do not find any further detail of this anywhere. They also admit that the substance of time is permanent, while that of the Samskrta-dharmas is impermanent and the latter function in the former.

Buddhaghosa Maintains Time as an Abstract Idea

Buddhaghosa in his *Atthasālinī* uses the term 'Samaya' which denotes time (kāla) as well as many other related concepts. He quotes a verse in which time (samaya) and consciousness are said to be determined mutually, but first it is time which determines consciousness, and then vice versa. This proposition raises the issue: What is the nature of consciousness perse in relation to time? For an answer one will have to see the Theravāda notion of twofold momentariness: (1) the momentariness of the material things, and (2) that of consciousness. The Sarvāstivādins accepted four moments, origination (jātī), duration (sthiti), decay (jara) and destruction (anityatā), in accordance with their theory of 'sarvam asti'. The Sautrāntikas reject duration and maintain that a dharma disappears immediately after, i.e. in the very next moment, it arises. Thus, they accept only origination and destruction. The Theravādins put forth that matter lasts longer than consciousness. The briefest duration is called instant which equals one thought-unit. Matter lasts for 17 such instants, while consciousness lasts only one, and that is the limitation of consciousness by time. In this vein, it is said that consciousness is determined by time. On the other hand, time is determined by consciousness means the duration of consciousness provides the measurement of time-unit, i.e. instant.
In the Dharmasahāgni we often come across an indefinite locative 'when' (yasmin samaye...) which means a suitable time or an occasion, but it certainly does not denote an absolute point of time. The Sumahgalavilāsinī, the commentary on the Dīghanikāya, gives nine meanings of samaya, such as, concurrence (samavāya), moment (khaṇa), time (kāla), group (samūha), condition (hetu), view (diṭṭhi), acquisition (paṭilābha), abandonment (pahāna) and penetration (paṭivedha). We also find these notions dispersed through different Pali texts. According to Buddhaghosa, of these nine only five, i.e. samavāya, khaṇa, kāla, samūha, and hetu, should be considered as signifying 'samaya' in 'yasmin samaye...'. These can be explained as follows:

(1) Concurrence (samavāya) of events. Actually this means the concurrence of the totality of causes and conditions (paccayasamaggi) which produce one common result. It follows that in producing one common result many causes and conditions work altogether. This view is maintained in order to set aside the theories of one cause, such as Brahmā, Prajāpati, Viśnu, Purusa or Prakṛti. Thus, Buddhaghosa professes that any single cause is not adequate for creation. This is supported by Buddha also, when he teaches: pleasure and pain are caused by neither oneself nor another. He avoids both extremes and teaches the middle path, i.e. the twelve-membered causal chain (paṭiccasamuppāda), which represents more than one condition. Further, for the arising of visual consciousness, necessary conditions, such as, eye, object, light, must concur. "This meaning of samaya", remarks Nyanaponika, "relates the given moment of consciousness to the present, that is, to co-existing conditions".

(2) Moment (khaṇa) - This represents two Pali notions: (1) 'the ninth' (navama) moment, and (2) 'the four wheels' (catura cakkāni). The former should be taken as the ninth successional state, i.e. complete trance. The rest are the four Jhānas of rūpa-world consciousness and the four Jhānas
of arūpa-world consciousness. The Anguttaranikāya speaks of one (i.e. ninth) moment or occasion in the following way:

O monks, there is one moment (khāṇa), one occasion, suitable for living a holy life as a way to eliminate suffering. What one? Here (for example), o monks, (1) a Tathāgata is born in the world fully enlightened, accomplished in right behaviour and wisdom, faring well, knowing the universe, incomparable, as a guide of men who have to be restrained, as a teacher, enlightened among gods and men, blessed; (2) a dhamma which is tranquillizing, which leads to complete extinction of existence and perfect enlightenment, is taught by the Blessed One; and (3) an individual is reborn in the middle of the country, endowed with insight, faultless (aneḷa), skilled (aneḷamūga), competent, capable of knowing good as well as bad speeches. This, o monks, is one moment, one occasion, suitable for living a holy life as a way to eliminate suffering (in other words, all this denotes one, i.e. ninth, moment or successional state).

'The four wheels' in the possession of which gods as well as men enjoy prosperity and greatness are: (i) Living in a suitable place (paṭirūpa-desa-vāsa), (ii) dwelling in association with meritorious men (sappurisūpassaya), (iii) perfect application of mind (atta-samma-panidhi), and (iv) meritorious deeds performed in the former life (pubbe-kata-puṇñatā). Buddhaghosa suggests that the four wheels "...should be classed as the one moment in the sense of occasion (or, conjuncture), for they form the occasion for the production of merit". Nyanaponika enunciates that khāṇa "...refers only to wholesome consciousness. It means: the right occasion for additional wholesome activity for which the present moment of wholesome consciousness is capable of being an inducement, a support and starting-point... This connotation of samaya refers only to the future."

(3) Time (kāla): Buddhaghosa defines time as an abstract idea based on this or that event or change. This has a noticeable affinity with Sāṃkhya which also maintains that time is nothing apart from change, or events, or actions. In the Abhidhānappaticā-sūtra time is defined under three aspects:
(a) Time is a concept by which the terms of life, etc. are counted or reckoned.

(b) Time is that 'passing by' reckoned as 'so much has passed', etc.

(c) Time is eventuation or happening, there being no such thing as time except from events.

C.A.F. Rhys Davids remarks that "The second aspect refers to the fact of change or impermanence; the third brings up the fact of perpetual becoming. From perpetual becoming we get our idea of abstract time (mahā-kāla), which is eternal, and lacks the common distinction of past, present, future, but which, to adopt M. Bergson's phraseology, 'looked at from the point of view of multiplicity, ... disintegrates into a powder of moments, none of which endures'..." 

Buddaghosa holds that time is merely a concept, as we have seen, derived from this or that phenomenal event, since it does not exist by its own nature. The phenomena, which give an abstract idea of time, for example, are: temporal aspects of consciousness as well as matter, expressions, such as, 'the past', 'the future', time of seed germination, time of origination and decay, the revolutions of the sun and moon denoted by morning, evening, day, and night, the period which consists of day and night expressed by fortnight, month, etc. This shows that time is nothing but an abstract idea derived from these phenomena.

If time is taken as a reality, it is nothing more than an instant, a thought-unit, 1/16th (or sometimes 1/17th) of a unit of matter. The change of thought is so quick and short in duration that it is not at all possible to illustrate it. Thus, the extreme brevity of duration of time is shown by the thought-unit. This concept can be compared to the 'moment' of Yoga.
(4) **Totality (samūha):** This points to the totality (puñja) of the dharmas, such as, contact (phassa), and feeling (vedanā), which are considered as conditions in producing a common result. For example, eye, object, light and concentration of the mind are conditions for the arising of visual perception. In the *Paṭṭhāna* 24 conditions (paccaya) are enumerated. But Aniruddha, in his *Abhidhammattha-sahgaha*, reduced them to only four: (i) object (ārammaṇa), (ii) support (upanissaya, especially sufficing condition or qualification for Arhatship), (iii) kamma, and (iv) presence (atthi, this refers to pre-nascent or co-nascent phenomena on whose presence the arising of other phenomena is dependent). Thus, a multiplicity of conditions is admitted in order to reject the notion of one cause, such as God, Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

(5) **Condition (hetu):** This refers to the aforesaid conditions which show mutual dependence. This denies the theory of absolute free-will. We agree with Nyanaponika that "This meaning of samaya relates to all three divisions of time. The future is likewise included, because every state of consciousness is not only conditioned, but is itself a condition for a subsequent state."

Some of Time Exists, Some does not, in the *Milindapañha*. Like other schools and sects of Buddhism, the *Milindapañha*, one of the non-canonical Pali texts, also maintains that time is not an absolute reality or a substance, though it discusses the problem of time (addhā) with great interest. Time as a whole or a single entity is not admitted, but when the King asks what time is, Nāgasena speaks of the three time-epochs, the past, present and future. This is in accordance with the Nikāyas. In this connection T.W. Rhys Davids informs us that "Buddha-ghosa distinguishes between the religious and philosophical denotation of
addhā (Suttanta-, Abhidhamma-pariyāya). In the former, 'the present' refers to one span of life; 'the past' is time prior to this span of life; 'the future' is time after decease from this life. In the latter, the present is any three-fold instant (nascent, static, cessant); past and future precede and follow that."  

Now the problem crops up whether time (addhā) really exists. Nāgasena enunciates that there is some time which exists and there is some which does not. This has been pronounced with reference to the kammic formations (saṅkhāra), the second term in the twelve-membered paṭiccasamuppāda, not one of the five khandhas. There is no time for those kammic formations, which are past (atīta), gone (vigata), ceased (niruddha) and changed (vipariṇata). But there is time for those dhammas which are ripened (dhammavipāka), or those vipāka-dhammas which still possess the potentialities of producing results (vipākadhammadhamma), or those which help rise re-union (i.e. rebirth, paṭisandhi). Again, time exists for those beings (sattā) who will be reborn after death (kālaṅkata), but those beings who will not be reborn when dead and those who have attained parinibbāna, to them time does not exist.

In the preceding passage the term 'vipākadhammadhamma', according to Buddhaghosa, is professed by the Andhakas who think that the kammic result itself inheres the potentialities of producing other results by way of reciprocity (aṅkāmañña-paccaya), one of the 24 relational conditions stated above. But the Theravādins reject this hypothesis, as this would lead to an infinite regress. But what Nāgasena wants to say is, we think, that this process does not continue infinitely, at a certain moment it is worn away and thus gradually comes to an end, then to those dhammas time also ceases to exist. Secondly, remarks I.B. Horner, "Nāgasena appears to be implying here that there is a possible re-linking or re-connection,
patisandhi, of beings, sattā, though earlier he has said it is name-and-shape that re-connects. The triad of saṅkhāra, dhamma and sattā is noteworthy for its unusualness." All this proves that time is nothing apart from saṅkhāras, etc. It should be considered as the mode of existence.

Ignorance is the Root of Time (addhā)

Further, ignorance (avijjā) is said to be the root of time.172 As we know, ignorance is the first term in paṭiccasamuppāda and saṅkhāra is conditioned by it in the series. So if ignorance is removed, there will be no saṅkhāra and thus in turn there will be no time. In this sense ignorance is the root of time. In the same way Nāgasena recites the remaining eleven links of paṭiccasamuppāda in order to demonstrate that it is impossible to show the beginning of time.173 The Saṁyuttanikāya174 discusses the problem of beginning (or the earliest point) in many respects with great detail and precision. To make King Milinda understand this concept Nāgasena brings forth a number of analogies175 of seed-fruit-seed, egg-chicken-egg, circle (cakka), cycle of eye-form (or colour)-sight-touch-feeling-craving-kamma-eye (i.e. eye in rebirth, in future).

On the question whether or not the earliest point in any case can be shown, Nāgasena answers that in some respects this would be possible and in some not.177 He continues, earlier than this (ignorance) there was absolutely no ignorance anywhere in any form. This earliest point (purimā koṭi) cannot be shown. It follows in line with the Majjhimanikāya178 that something having been inexistential comes into existence (ahutvā sambhoti) and after having been ceases to be. In this sense, the earliest point can be shown.179 Here T.W. Rhys Davids' remark is significant: "... the beginning of each link in the chain - the beginning of each individuality - can be traced, but not the beginning of each chain. Each life is a link in
a chain of lives, bound together by cause and effect, different, yet the same. There are an infinite number of such chains; and there is no reference in the discussion to any greater unity, or to any 'ultimate point' of all the chains."\(^{180}\)

The King thinks that if something having been inexistent (ahutvā) comes into existence and again having been existent ceases to be, this means having been cut off on both sides it is completely annihilated, i.e. it is non-existent before (i.e. in the past) and after (i.e. in the future) its existence. Now the question arises whether in this condition, i.e. having been cut off on both sides, it (ignorance) increases from its present existence onward (i.e. in the future). Nāgasena's reply is affirmative, and he gives an example of aggregates (khandha) which are seeds of all kinds of sufferings.\(^{181}\) If this is so, then Nāgasena's above statement that formerly there was no ignorance anywhere or in any way (ito pubbe, Mahārāja, sabbena sabbam sabbathā sabbam avijjā nāhosi- Mil., p.41.2-3) is inconsistent. It should rather be, as T.W. Rhys Davids rendered it, "Formerly, o King, everything in every form, everything in every mode, was ignorance. It is to us as if it were not", and in this sense the earliest point cannot be shown.

Besides, Nāgasena asserts that there are kammic formations (saṅkhāra) which are produced,\(^{182}\) but there are no saṅkhāras which are produced without a continued becoming (abhavanta),\(^{183}\) for example, there was wood in the forest and clay in the earth, but it was only through the effort of men and women that a house was built.\(^{184}\)

H.V. Guenther\(^{185}\) suggests that the above proposition 'ahutvā sambhoti' (MN.iii, p.25.20-21) even if it has high authority is rejected by the author of the Milindapañha, when he says 'abhavanta jāyanti'. Guenther overlooks the very fact that 'ahutvā sambhoti' is also quoted by Nāgasena
himself. D.J. Kalupahana's contention is that "The words abhutvā and abhavantā refer to a difference in time. While abhutvā refers to the past, abhavantā refers to the present or even the future."\(^{186}\)

From the preceding discussions Walleser\(^ {187}\) deduces the conclusion that in the *Milindapaṇha* the transcendental meaning of subjective time (addhā), i.e. transcendental time, is not denied. We disagree with him, because were it so, it would be against the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. In addition, Nāgasena explicitly emphasizes that time (addhā) exists as far as the saṅkhāras or the dhammas exist. This establishes that time is not an independent substance or reality, it cannot be considered as transcendental either, even by implication, if at the same time we keep the fundamental teachings of Buddhism in view. It is true that these discussions give the idea of the past, present and future (the three time-epochs), but to add these segments up collectively in order to get transcendental time is, in our opinion, unwarranted.

**Paṭiccasamuppāda: As Temporal Sequence**

Paṭiccasamuppāda\(^ {188}\) (Skt. Pratītyasamutpāda) in early Buddhism (Theravāda as well as Sarvāstivāda) represents the three temporal states of a becoming, the past, present and future. This is the law of causality which is so universal that it applies to any object, sentient or insentient, at any time and at any place. This doctrine in Buddhism was actually directed against any theory of a single cause professed by other schools of thought. The twelve links of paṭiccasamuppāda are as follows:\(^ {189}\)

1. avijjā (Skt. avidyā, ignorance)
2. saṅkhāra (Skt. saṃskāra, karmic formation)
3. viññāna (Skt. vijnāna, consciousness)
4. nāma-rūpa (Skt. nāma-rūpa, name and form)
5. saḷāyatanā (Skt. saḍāyatana, six sense organs)
6. phassa (Skt. sparśa, contact, sensation)
7. vedanā (Skt. vedanā, feeling)
(8) tanhā (Skt. trṣṇā, craving)
(9) upādāna (Skt. upādāna, clinging)
(10) bhava (Skt. bhava, becoming)
(11) jāti (Skt. jāti, rebirth)
(12) jara-marāṇa (Skt. jara-marāṇa, old age and death).

A careful analysis of these links shows that they are stretching over all the three time-epochs, the past, present and future, and this is the origin of all kinds of suffering. Generally, nos. 1-2 refer to the past time, 3-10 to the present and 11-12 to the future. Apart from this, several other supplementary methods of classifying these links have been suggested. One of them is:

(A) Cause and Effect in Past and Present

(a) Past Cause

1. Ignorance
2. Kammic Formation

(b) Present Effect

3. Consciousness
4. Name and Form
5. Six Sense Organs
6. Contact or Sensation
7. Feeling

(B) Cause and Effect in the Present and Future

(a) Present Cause

8. Craving
9. Clinging
10. Becoming

(b) Future Effect

11. Rebirth
12. Old Age and Death

The commentarial sources, as McGovern remarks, draw up an amended chart of these links:

Past

1. Effect - (i) Birth and Old Age and Death or its equivalent;
   (ii) Consciousness, Name and Form, Six Sense Organs, Contact, Sensation.
2. Cause - (i) Ignorance and Kammic Formation or its equivalent;
   (ii) Craving, Clinging, and Becoming.
Present

1. Effect - (i) Consciousness, Name and Form, Six Sense Organs, Contact, Feeling, or its equivalent; 
   (ii) Rebirth, Old Age, and Death.
2. Cause - (i) Craving, Clinging, Becoming or its equivalent; 
   (ii) Ignorance, Kammic Formation, etc.

Future

1. Effect - (i) Rebirth, Old Age and Death or its equivalent; 
   (ii) Consciousness, Name and Form, Six Sense Organs, Contact, Feeling.
2. Cause - (i) Ignorance, Kammic Formation or its equivalent; 
   (ii) Craving, Clinging, and Becoming.
Notes


2. Cf. KV.i.6-8, 10 and KA thereon. Also see, PC, pp. 84-110, 375-377, 392-394.


4. CCB, p.4, fn. 1.

5. See the next chapter.

6. Cf. SN, iv, p.15.13-16: cakkhūṃ ceva rūpā ca. sotañ ca saddā ca. ghāmañī ca gandhā ca. jīvāḥ rasā ca. kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca. mano ca dhammā ca. idāṃ vuccati bhikkhave sabbam. F.L. Woodward (1956, p.8, fn.1) informs us that according to the Khuddakapāṭha of the Sutta Piṭaka (ii.52), sabbam means the universe as existing in reality.


9. Cf. MN, iii, pp.16.32ff; also cf. SN, iii, pp. 47.10-48.4, PC, p. 95. S.Z. Aung (1972, p. 185, fn. 5) observes that the commentaries on the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha "explain that Nibbāna is undifferentiated into the eleven aspects - viz., past, present, future, distant, near, gross, subtle, high, low, internal, or external, characterizing phenomena".


12. 'everywhere' means 'in the whole body'; cf. KA, p. 43.20-21: sabbattha' ti sabbasmiṃ sarīre sabbam atthiti pucchati.

13. 'always' means 'in all times' (i.e. past, present, future) - cf. ibid., p.43.21-22: sabbadā' ti sabbasmiṃ kāle sabbam atthiti pucchati.
14. 'in every manner' means 'in every respect'; cf. ibid., p. 43.22-23: sabbena sabbana'ti sabbenākārāna sabbam aththi pucchati.

15. 'in everything' means 'everything in every dhamma'; cf. ibid., p.43.23-24: sabbesa'ti sabbesu dhammesu sabbam aththi pucchati.

16. 'in separate form' means 'not in combined form'. A combination, according to Buddhaghosa, consists of many characteristics, not of one. Cf. ibid., p.43.24-26: ayogana'ti ayuttam. nānasabhāvānaṁ hi yoga hoti na ekasabhāvāsa iti.

17. If it is maintained that even non-existent things exist, then it would be a unique aggregate (khandha) apart from the five traditional ones, and this category would prove the existence of the horns in a hare, etc. Cf. ibid., p.43.28-30: yam pi natthi tam pi atthi. yam chaṭṭhakhandhādikāṁ sasavisāgamādikāṁ vā kīvci natthi siddham. tam pi te aththi pucchati.

18. Cf. KV, pp. 113.14ff, and KA, p.44.10-12: idāni atitām aththi kālasamāsandanaṁ hoti. tattha atitām aththi ādikāṁ sudhikasamsandanaṁ.


20. Cf. ibid., p.113.24-25: paccuppannam aththi paccuppannam aniruddham avigataṁ aviparinatataṁ na atthaṅgataṁ na abhaththaṅgataṁ ti.


22. See, Copi (1972), pp.181ff.

23. See, ibid., pp. 296, 316ff.


26. Cf. KA, p.44.10-12.

27. PC, p. 375.

28. "We use the term 'thing' not in the sense of substance, or having a substrate, but as anything which is exhausted, as to its being, by some or all of the known twenty-eight qualities of body or matter, and by the facts of mind" - ibid. Also see, ibid., p. 14, fn.3; S.Z.Aung (1972), pp.271ff.

29. PC, p. 375.

30. Cf. KV, p. 113.6.

31. Cf. KA, p.43.15-16: sabbe pi atīdibhedā dhammā khandhasabhāvam na vijahanti.
32. For detail, see Y. Karunadasa (1967); S.Z. Aung (1972), pp. 154ff.
35. 'rūpa' in its generic sense means 'matter' and in its specific sense, 'quality'. But in popular language, it means 'form' - S.Z. Aung (1972), p. 154, fn.1.
37. KV, p. 116.9.
38. Ibid., p. 116.10ff.
42. Cf. ibid., p. 117.16ff; also see PC, pp. 90ff.
43. Cf. KV, p. 117.8ff.
44. Cf. ibid., pp.121.7ff; KA, pp.45.11ff; PC, p. 377.
45. Cf. MN, iii, pp. 16.32ff; also cf. SN, iii, pp. 47.10-48.4; KV, p. 135.1-6: nanu vuttaṃ Bhagavata - "yaṃ kīci, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ atītāntāgata paccuppannaṃ aṭṭhatanam vā bahiddhā vā olāriṃ vā sukhumā vā ānaṃ vā paṃṭṭaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā- ayaṃ vuccati rūpakkhandho. yā kāci vedanā ... yā kāci saññā ... ye keci sañkhāra ... yaṃ kīci viññāṇam aṭṭhitāntāgata paccuppannaṃ aṭṭhatanam vā bahiddhā vā olāriṃ vā sukhumā vā ānaṃ vā paṃṭṭaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā - ayaṃ vuccati viññāṇakkhandho" ti.
46. Cf. SN, pp. 71.19-72.34.
48. Cf. KV, pp. 135.10-136.5. For further discussion on the same topic, see also KV, pp. 136.13ff; SN, iv. 52, ii. 101; AN, i. 197.
49. PC, p. 98, fn. 1.
50. Here Buddhaghosa does not identify the opponent with any particular school, but the context shows that it is the Sabbatthivādins. Also see ibid., p. 98, fn. 2.


53. Cf. AKB, v, pp. 808.5ff; TS, pp. 615.20ff; LVP (1937), pp. 87-134; AD, pp. 261.1ff.


57. Cf. KV, p. 143.15-18: atītāṃ atthī ti? ekaccāṃ atthī, ekaccāṃ nātthī ti. ekaccāṃ niruddham, ekaccāṃ na niruddham; ekaccāṃ vīgatāṃ, ekaccāṃ avīgatāṃ; ekaccāṃ atthaṅgatāṃ, ekaccāṃ na atthaṅgatāṃ; ekaccāṃ abbhaṭṭhaṅgatāṃ, ekaccāṃ na abbhaṭṭhaṅgatāṃ ti?

58. Cf. ibid., pp. 143.19-144.2.

59. Cf. ibid., p. 144.4-5: atītā avipakkavipākā dhammā- te atthi; atītā vipakkavipākā dhammā- te nātthi ti.

60. Cf. ibid., pp. 145.28-146.14.


62. Masuda, ibid., p. 31.

63. Ibid., p. 59; Bareau (1954), p. 259.

64. Ibid., p. 62; Bareau (ibid.), p. 262.

65. Masuda, ibid., p. 62, fn.7; also see ibid., p. 39, fn. 1.


67. See Bareau (1955), pp. 89-98.

68. PC, p. 295, fn.6; also see B.C. Law (1969), p. 188, fn. 3.

69. Cf. AN, i, p. 197.11-17: tīṇ' imāni bhikkhave kathāvatthūni. katamāni tīṇi? atītaṃ va bhikkhave addhānam ārabba kathām katheyya- evam ahosi atītāṃ addhānam ti- anāgatāṃ va bhikkhave addhānam ārabba kathāṃ katheyya- evam bhavissati anāgatāṃ addhānam ti- etarāhi vā bhikkhave paccuppannam addhānam ārabba kathāṃ katheyya- evam etarāhi paccuppannam ti.

71. LVP (1937), pp. 8-9.

72. Ibid. Also cp. Masuda (1925), p. 50, fn. 4.

73. Masuda, ibid., p. 63; Bareau (1954), p. 263.


75. See Kyoto supplementary edition of the Chinese Tripitakas, 1905-1912, No. 942.


78. Cf. ibid., p. 199.


81. Masuda (1925), p. 33, fn. 4. The question has been raised whether these later differentiated doctrines were found only in the Mahāsaṅghikas. Masuda (ibid., p. 32, fn. 3) informs us that according to the Chinese text, Pu'-'chi-i-lun, the Mahāsaṅghikas differed from those of the other three schools, i.e. the Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins and Kaukkutikas.


83. Ibid.

84. See Masuda (1925), p. 37.

85. Ibid., fn. 3.

86. Ibid., p. 34.


89. Masuda (1925), p. 34, fn. 1.

90. Ibid., p. 31, fn. 1.

91. See ibid., p. 59.

92. Ibid., pp. 34, 61.

93. Ibid., p. 59.

94. Ibid., p. 50.

95. Ibid., p. 65.
96. Ibid., p. 54. According to the Chinese text, *I-pu’-tsung-lun-lun-shu-chi*, the things which continue for some time are the earth, life, etc., while the things which perish momentarily are the citta (mind), caitasika dharmas (mental states), etc. — ibid., fn. 2.

97. Ibid., p. 62; see also pp. 50, fn. 4, 54, fn. 2.

98. Ibid., p. 61.

99. Ibid., pp. 54, fn. 2; 61, fn. 4.

100. See ibid., p. 50, fn. 4.

101. Cf. KA, p. 52.6-7: Andhakā nāma Pubbaseliyā Aparaseliyā Rājakīryā Siddhatthikā ‘ti ime pacchā-uppannanikāyā.


103. Cf. KA, p. 53.1-6: sabbe pi atīdhibbā hīmala rūpādivasena atthīti. atītām anāgatapaccuppannasena anāgatapaccuppamāṇī vā atītādivasena natthi. tasmā sabbā ev’ idam evam atthī evam natthīti yesam laddhi seyyathāpi etarahi vuttapabbhādānam Andhakānām.

104. See Saṅkara's Bhāṣya on the *Vedānta Sūtra*, ii.2.33 and Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the same, ii.2.31.

105. Cf. KV.i.1.10.

106. Cf. ibid., V. 8.


108. Cf. KV, IX.11; PC, IX.12; KA, IX.11.


110. For four states of Jhāna, see DN, iii. pp. 222.3ff, also see p.131.16ff; *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, pp. 71.16ff.

111. For the nine gradual cessations, see DN, iii, p.266.6ff; AN, iv, p. 409.7ff.

112. Cf. KV, p. 367.6-8: hañci atthi atṭhavimokkhandhāya catunnam jhānānam nikāmālābhi navannam anupubbavihare sāmādhī niṁsam lābhi, tena vata re vattabbe- "atītānāgatehi samannāgato" ti.

113. Cf. KA, pp. 120.28ff.

114. Cf. KV, IX.11; PC, IX.12.


117. Cf. KV, IX.6; PC, IX.6 and 7.
118. Ibid.


120. Ibid., fn. 6.


123. As, pp. 48.2-51.28; Pe Maung Tin (1976), pp. 75-82; Nyanaponika (1965), pp. 104-126; Sasaki (1964).

124. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā (Lamotte, 1966, pp. 73-79) also speaks of samaya, but it distinguishes kāla from samaya which is preferred by Buddha himself.

125. Cf. As, p. 48.3: samaye niddisi cittaṃ cittena samayaṃ Muni.

126. Cf. AD, pp. 104.lff; AK, ii.45c-d and AKB thereon.


It is interesting to note that the Mahāprajñāpāramitā (Lamotte, 1966, pp. 73-79) discusses a similar indefinite locative 'ekasmin samaye'.

130. Cf. pp. 31.22ff. Also see As, p. 48.14-15:

samavāye khoṇe kāle samūhe hetudīṭṭhisu /
paṭilābhe pahāne ca paṭivedhe ca dissati //

131. Cf. DN, i, p. 205.19-20: app' eva nāma sve pi upasaṅkameyyāma kālaf ca samayaf ca upādāyāti. Here samaya shows concurrence (samavāya) of events.


Vinaya, iv. 117.27-28: ... unhasamaye pariḷāhasamaye ... Here samaya means season (kāla).

DN, ii, p. 254.6: mahāsamayo pavanasmim. Here samaya means group, assembly (samūha).


Ibid., ii, pp. 22.27-23.1: tena kho pana samayena Uggāhamāno paribbājako Samanuṃdikāputto samayappāvādake tindukācīre ekasālake Mallikāya ārāme paṭivasati. Here samaya means view (diṭṭhi).


Also see As, p. 48.16-30.

132. Cf. As, p. 48.32-33:

samavāyo kho kālo samūho hetu yeva ca / ete paṭica pī viññeyyā samayā idha viññunā //

133. Ibid., p. 49.3: paccayasamagga samavāyo.

134. Ibid., p. 49.5-6: yā hi esā sādhāraṇaphalanipphādakattena saṅkhāritam paccayānaṃ samagga, sā idha samavāyo ti jānitabbā.

135. Ibid., p. 50.8-12: tena eka kāraṇavādo paṭisedhito hoti. samavāyo ca nāma sādhāraṇaphalanipphādānaṃ abhisamayāpekkho hoti. tasmā 'eko kattā nāma satthi' ti imam pī atthaṃ dīpethi. sabhāvena hi kāraṇe satim kāraṇantarapekkhā ayutta ti. evam ekassa kassaci kāraṇassa abhāvadippānena "sayaṃ katuṃ sukhadukkhham" ti adī paṭisedhitam hoti.

Also see Pe Maung Tin (1976), p. 79, fn. 1.


138. Cf. DN, iii, pp. 265.19-266.5.

139. AN, iv, p. 227.8-18: eko 'va bhikkhave kho ca samayo ca brahmacariyavāsāya. katamo eko? idha bhikkhave Tathāgato ca loke uppanno hoti arahāṃ sammagambuddho viyācarapāsampanno sugato lokakāri anuttaro purisadhammasatthi Satthā devamanussānaṃ buddho Bhagavān, dhammo ca desiyati. patimākaṃ sambojanikānti sugatappavedito, ayaṃ ca puggalo majjhimesu jānapadesu paccājato hoti, so ca hoti paṭīmāvā anelo anelamūgo paṭibalo subhasita-dubhāsiṇṇassa attham ahaṃ yā atthāṃ. ayaṃ bhikkhave eko 'va kho ca samayo ca brahmacariyavāsāya ti.

Also cf. As, 49.6-8: "ekam ca kho bhikkhave kho ca samayo ca brahmacariyavāsāya" ti evam vutto pana navamo va eko kho ti vedītabbo.

140. Cf. DN, iii, p. 276.5-7: cattāri cakkāni, paṭirūpa-desa-vāso, sappurisapassayo, attassanāpanidhi, pubbe ca kata-puññati.

Also cf. AN, ii, p. 32.1ff.

141. Here we have taken 'atta' in the sense of 'mind'. See The Book of the Gradual Sayings, ii, p. 35, fn. 3.

Pe Maung Tin (1976, p.77) renders 'atta-samā-paṇidhi' as 'self-control'.
142. Tin, ibid.; cf. As, p. 49.11-12: tāni vā ekajjhām katvā okāsatthena khaṇo ti veditabbhāni. tāni hi kusaluppattiya okāsabhūtāni.


144. Cf. As, p. 49.14: tathā tam upādāya paññato kālo vohāramattako. Also see, Abhidhammatthasāhasaṅga, p. 850.


146. See PC, p. 392.

147. Ibid.


150. Cf. ibid., p. 51.6-9: tattha hi so rūpajīvitindriyassā tāva parittako kālo vutto. yāva paccuppanṇam rūpaṃ tiṭṭhati tāva sajasacittāni upajjītāṃ bhijjanti. iti tesaṃ kālaparittatāya upamā pi nattthi. tenevāha- "yāvāni cidaṃ bhikkhave upamā pi na sukāra yāva lahuparivattam cittaṃ" ti. Also cf. AN, i, p.10.1-4; PC, p. 125; KV, ii.7.

151. See the chapter on Saṃkhya-Yoga; also see Yoga-sūtra, 3.52 and the commentary thereon.

152. Cf. As, p. 49.25: yo panesa phassavedanādīnaṃ dhammaṇaṃ puñjo so idha samūho ti vibhāvito.

153. See Narada (1969), pp. 1ff; also see Nyanatiloka (1938), pp.97ff.

154. See p. 847.

155. Cf. As, pp. 49.30-50.4: cakkhuvādādīnaṃ cakkhu-vādāloka-manasiḥkāraṇāy vassā, mahāpakkaraṇaṃ ca "hetopaccayo ārammaṇaṃpaccayo" ti ādinā nayena cattuvisati paccayā vuttā. tesaṃ ṭhāpetvā vippakapaccayaṃ ca pacchajātāpaccayaṃ ca, sesā kusaladhammaṇaṃ paccayaṃ honti yeva. te sabbe pi idha hetū ti adhippetā. evam assa iminā dvāravasena vā paccaya vasena vā anekabhāvo veditabbo.

Also ibid., p. 51.14-17: samūhasaṅkhāto pana samayo anekesaṃ pi sahupattim dīpito. phassādīnaṃ hi dhammaṇaṃ puñjo samūho ti vutto. tasmā ca uppajjamānañi cittān saha tehi dhammehi uppajjatī ti anekesaṃ sahupattino dīpītā. evam dīpentena cānena ekasceva dhammassa uppatti patisesidhītā hoti. ayaṃ samūhasaṅkhātāna samayena attho dīpītā.
Also see Tin (1976), p. 81, fn. 3.


160. Cf. DN, iii, p. 216.16-17: tayo addhā. atīto addhā, anāgato addhā, paccuppanno addhā; AN, i, p. 197.11-17; SN, i, p. 140.1-8.


Cf. the above mentioned theories of the Kassapikas and the Vibhajyavadins.

163. One of the most complicated concepts in Buddhism. It has been rendered differently, such as, kammic formation, confection (constituent potentialities of being), activity, habitual tendency, effort, aspiration, accumulation, construction, kammic residue, condition, propensity, factor, thing, component thing, created thing, complex, constituent part, element of existence, trouble, creation, etc. See Johansson (1979), pp. 41-56; Nyanatiloka (1938), pp. 145-148.

164. See PC, pp. 205-209; KV, VII.7-9.


166. Horner (1963, p. 69, fn. 2) prefers the reading 'kālakata', which is in the present context unacceptable.

167. There is a distinction between Nibbāna and Parinibbāna. "To a man who had 'attained Nirvāṇa' there would still be time as long as he was in the enjoyment of it, that is as long as he continued in his present (and last) existence" - T.W. Rhys Davids (1975), p. 78, fn. 1.


169. Cf. KA, pp. 103.6-104.9.

171. 1963, p. 69, fn.1.


176. "This is something of an innovation" - Horner (1963), p.71, fn. 2.


179. Cf. Mil., p.41.2-4: "ito pubbe, mahārāja, sabbena sabbam sabbathā sabbam avijjā nāhosi ti esā purimā koṭi na paññāyati, yam ahutvā sambhoti huvā paṭīvīgacchati, esā purimā koṭi paññāyati" ti.

T.W. Rhys Davids (1975, p.81) seems to be wrong in translating the first sentence of this passage: "Formerly, O King, everything in every form, everything in every mode, was ignorance. It is to us as if it were not". Walleser (1925, p.127) follows him. On the other hand, Horner's translation (1963, p.71) (except the last sentence, i.e. "Can this earliest point be shown?" which should not be interrogative.) is correct, but not consistent, because in the following discussion Nāgasena gives an example of khandha (Mil. p.41.10) which means tree (literally, trunk of the tree) as well as aggregate. This shows that ignorance is there before the chain begins, but it seems to us, in the words of T.W. Rhys Davids, as if it were not. This means that in this respect the ignorance is not known to us.


Cp. SN, ii, pp. 87.20ff.


183. Cf. ibid., p. 41.30-31: "natthi, mahārāja, keci saṅkhārā, ye abhavantā jāyanti. bhavantā yeva kho, mahārāja, saṅkhārā jāyanti" ti.
184. Cf. ibid., p. 42.2-4: "natthi kiñci, bhante, idha abhavantaṁ jātam, bhavantaṁ yeva jātam. imāni kho, bhante, dārūni vane ahesum, ayaṁ ca mattikā paṭhaviyam ahosi, itthinam ca purisānaṁ ca tajjena vāyāmena evam 'idaṁ gehaṁ nibbatatāṁ" ti.


188. Johansson (1979) makes a detailed study of this concept on the basis of Pali sources. Also see McGovern (1923), pp. 163-180.


191. See McGovern (1923), p. 175. For the later interpretation of paṭiccasamuppāda by the Yogācārins, see ibid., pp. 177-180.

192. Ibid., p. 176.
CHAPTER V

The Controversy of Time between the Vaibhaṣikas and the Sautrāntikas

Introduction

There are two realistic and pluralistic schools of Hinayāna - Vaibhaṣika (or Sarvāstivāda) and Theravāda. The former represents the Sanskrit Abhidharma and the latter that of Pali. This chapter deals with the Sarvāstivāda notion of time in the light of its controversy with the radical Sautrāntikas found in the Abhidharmakōṣa and its bhāṣya of Vasubandhu (320-350 A.D.) with the commentary of Yaśomitra (9th century A.D.), Tattvasāgraha of Śāntarakṣita (725-788 A.D.) with the Pafjika of Kamalaśīla (740-795 A.D.), Mahāvibhaṣa (100 A.D.), Nyāyānuśāraśāstra of Saṇghabhadra (280-350 A.D.) and the Abhidharmadīpa with its Vibhaṣāprabhāvṛtti (4th-5th century A.D., author unknown).

The Sarvāstivāda literature is almost preserved in Chinese. Apart from the above mentioned and the following seven treatises, it has some other philosophical texts, such as the Abhidharmahrdaya of Dharmaottara (200 A.D.) and Saṅyukta-abhidharmahrdaya of Dharmatrāta (100 A.D.).

The seven treatises are:

1. Jñānapraṇavānāśāstra of Kātyāyana śruti (early 1st century A.D.)
2. Prakarānapāda of Sthavira Vasumitra (100 A.D.)
3. Vijñānakāya of Sthavira Devaśarman (13
4. Dharmaśānakāya of Sāruputra (14
5. Prajñaptiśāstra of Maudgalyāyana (15
6. Dhatukāya of Purṇa (100 A.D.)
7. Saṅgītīparyāya of Mahākausthila (17
The Jñānapraṇasthāna is the fundamental and the most important work of the Sarvāstivāda school. Other texts are considered secondary to it. It is also called Āṣṭagrantha (Eight Books). Its monumental significance is attested to the fact that a great commentary, the Mahāvibhāṣā, has been written on it by Pārśva. It is actually a work of compilation by 500 Arhats beginning with Vasumitra 400 years after the Mahāparinirvāṇa of Buddha. It contains 200 Chinese volumes or parts. According to J. Takakusu, "In Chinese we have ... two transmissions of the Vībhāṣā, Large (200 parts) and Small (14 parts). Whether one was an abridgement of the other we cannot tell for certain. But from several points of view we can imagine that the large one belongs to the Kaśmīra school and the smaller to the Gāndhāra school." Professor M. Hattori of Kyoto University suggested to me that it was now certain that the Mahāvibhāṣā and Vībhāṣā are different in many respects regarding their contents, and so it cannot be said that the latter is an abridgement of the former. Murti and Nakamura also take them as two different commentaries.

The Vaibhāṣikā philosophy was exclusively based on this great commentary, the Mahāvibhāṣā, and hence the name Vaibhāṣikā. The Vaibhāṣikas are also called Sarvāstivādin, as they maintain that 'everything exists' (sarvam asti), and their doctrine is called Sarvāstivāda (sarva-asti-vāda = everything-exists-doctrine). They admit that both mental as well as material elements exist in reality. Thus they are called realist. They are also pluralist, as they accept 75 elements of existence (dharma) - 72 conditioned (saṃskṛta) and 3 unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). But this does not mean that "they believe in continued or immutable existence of everything", the existence of Self (atman) or any other universal permanent cause like Brahman of the Vedic and Upaniṣadadic tradition. Actually, 'everything exists' means 75 dharmas, or 12 āyatanas, or
dhatus, irrespective of their temporal status, the past, present, or future.28 The *Samyukta Āgama*29 says that "Everything exists means that the twelve Āyatanas exist". Here Kalupahana makes a significant remark as follows:

"Stcherbatsky misunderstood the implications of the above text. The statement 'everything exists means the twelve Āyatanas exist' did not mean that the twelve Āyatanas, past, present, and future, exist, as the Sarvāstivādins would have interpreted. There is no reference to the past and the future, or, for that matter, to any conception of time. Early Buddhism does not deny present sense experience, or therefore, their causes, namely, the sense organs and sense objects. This idea is clearly expressed in the Sūtra that immediately follows the one Stcherbatsky quoted: "The visual organ and the visible object produce visual consciousness and contact. As a result of visual contact (yen ch'u) there arise feelings that are either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. This is what is meant by 'everything exists' ..... Moreover, the Sarvāstivāda theory of 'everything exists' (sarvam asti) not only implies the real existence of the twelve Āyatanas, but also the existence of an eternal substratum (dravya) or ultimate nature (svabhāva). This idea is denied by the very Sūtra quoted by Stcherbatsky ..... The Sarvāstivāda theory may therefore be taken as a new development in the history of Buddhist thought resulting from the acceptance of the theory of momentariness."30

The Sarvāstivāda accepts the objective reality of the dharmas on which is based the whole formation of phenomena. It maintains a distinction between a thing (substance) and its different states, which would fall in line with the common-sense notion of causation, according to which a thing undergoes modification through the three time-epochs, the past, present and future, yet its substance remains the same. It is possible that the Sarvāstivādins were influenced by their contemporary realists, such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṁsā in this regard.

The Sarvāstivāda theory of traikālyavāda is a new arrival in the history of Buddhism. To quote Schayer, it "is an interesting and original attempt at replacing the hypostasis of a substantial time by another hypostasis, viz. that of real future and past elements of being. Each dharma exists through the three phases of the future, present and past."31
As we shall see later on, the past, present and future are not considered by the Sarvāstivādins as things-in-themselves, rather as different modes, states, positions or relations of dharmas. The Sautrāntikas vehemently criticise the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of traikālyavāda. The former denies the reality of the past and future dharmas, and maintains that the only one to be real is the present which is dynamic and possesses causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva). The Sautrāntikas, in their most radical statement, assert that the past and future time-epochs, ākāśa, Nirvāṇa and pudgala are mere names, assertions, empirical and of common usage. Instead of real past and future dharmas, and substantial time, they propound the theory of momentariness (ksanavāda). Further, the Vaibhāṣikas hold that the external objects are directly perceived. But the Sautrāntikas explain away such hypothesis and argue that since a past moment is unreal, the content of perception is also unreal from the objective point of view having no objective counterpart and "What is directly perceived is only our own idea which acquires the form of the object (sākāra-jñāna). Inasmuch as the diversity of the forms in our ideas could be caused by external objects, their existence is inferred from that diversity. In other words, the Vaibhāṣika's view may be called presentationist, and that of the Sautrāntika representationist."

The Sarvāstivādins (or the Vaibhāṣikas) admit 75 dharmas in which there is no time. Still, one can find the ideas of both absolute as well as empirical time, though in disguise. The absolute existence of Nirvāṇa gives the idea of absolute time, and the saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas, jāti, sthitī, jara, and anītyā that of empirical time.

The existence of dharmas may be understood in connection with the origination, duration and destruction of anusayas (seeds of klesas or passions) in respect of past, present and future. "The elements of moral
defilement (kleśas) are always present in a life (saṁtāna), in a latent or patent condition. When latent, they have the form of 'residues' (anuśaya), they stick to the elements, pollute them, bring them into commotion and prevent their coming down to rest." The anuśayas are of six kinds: attachment (rāga), pride (māna), repulsion (pratigha), wrong view (drṣṭi), doubt (vicikitsā) and ignorance (avidyā). The first three are svalakṣaṇa (a thing-in-itself, a thing in its specific form), because they arise with a particular object at a particular time, and the last three are sāmānyalakṣaṇa (a thing-in-general, or a thing in its generic form), because they arise with the empirical objects in general.

Man is attached to the objects of the past, present and future by his past and present rāga, pratigha and māna. There are some passions, such as rāga, which exist only if the corresponding objects are present. On the other hand, there are other passions, such as drṣṭi, avidyā and vicikitsā, which are existent with all the objects of all times, the past, present and future.

The Vaibhāṣikas do not admit the saṁskāras as eternal, because they possess saṁkṛta-lakṣaṇas, i.e. origination, duration, decay and destruction. They boldly proclaim that the dharmas exist through the three time-epochs. The transition of the dharmas through different times shows that they are conditioned (saṁkṛta) and the continuance of their essence through the past, present and future determines their existence in all times. In this sense they
maintain that "all times", i.e. the past, present and future, exist in reality. To support their hypothesis they quote some passages from the Agamas. They place the following arguments which demonstrate the reality of the past and future elements:

(1) It is said by Buddha in the scriptures that an enlightened Śrāvaka keeps himself indifferent from the past and future rūpas (sense-objects), even though they do exist. The present rūpas are so apparent that they need no argument to be proved. If the past rūpa (form), O monks, had not existed, the learned Śrāvaka would not have been indifferent towards the past rūpa. Since there is a past rūpa, the learned Śrāvaka becomes indifferent to it. The same is the case with the future rūpas. Thus the past and future rūpas exist.

(2) It is also said in the scriptures that consciousness arises from two factors - the material object and the sense organs, or the mind and the mental object. The sense organs can perceive only the present objects, while the mind can cognise past as well as future objects. Therefore, if there were no past and future objects, consciousness, which has them as corresponding objects, would not originate. Thus it is evident from the scriptures (Agama) that there are past and future dharmas.

Stcherbatsky observes that "these first two reasons for admitting the existence of the past and the future are taken from Scripture, but there are others, too, which are founded on argument."

(3) If the past and future elements are not real, consciousness of the past and future propositions, such as, 'there was once a King Mahāsaṃmata' or 'there will be once a Cakravartin Saṅkha', which refer to the past and future objects respectively, would be objectless (nirālambana). And then consciousness also would be absent, because of the lack of corresponding objects (ālambana). It is said: "Consciousness is cognizance of the corresponding objects". If there were no objects to be
cognised (jñeya), there would be no knowledge of anything by it (i.e. consciousness). Hence, the past and future dharmas exist.

(4) If the past elements do not exist, the past Karma would give no retribution (vipāka), because the moment the retribution would arise, its cause (vipākahetu) would be inexistent. And that which is non-existent is devoid of the potency of producing effects (kāryotpādanā-śakti), as a non-existent thing completely lacks all the potencies.

(5) If the past and future elements do not exist in reality, the differentiated consciousness of the Yogins regarding the past and future objects, such as, 'once there was a King Māndhātā', 'there was once a King Brahmadatta', or 'there will be once the Cakravartin Śaṅkha', 'there will be once the Tathāgata Maitreya', would not be possible, and there would be no clear distinction of the inexistent objects. Hence, the past as well as the future objects are not devoid of substantial reality.

Thus, the Vaibhaṣikas maintain that everything, the past, present and future dharmas exist, and the followers of this theory are called the Sarvāstivādins. On the other hand, there are others called the Vibhajyavādins, who partly admit and partly deny this theory. According to them, only the present and past, which has not yet produced the result, exist. They admit, unlike the Sarvāstivādins, that the future and past, which has produced the fruit, are not existent.

Time and the Four Theories of Change in the Sarvāstivāda School

The Sarvāstivāda school has four great teachers, Dharmatrāta (100 A.D.), Ghoṣaka (150 A.D.), Vasumitra (100 A.D.) and Buddhadeva, who establish differently the existence of the past, present and future dharmas. "All these theories", writes St. Schayer, "which accept the reality of the three Times emphasise unanimously that a dharma, when
passing through the Time-epochs, does not change its essence and that it is only its empirical aspect, the bhāva in the terminology of Dharmatrāta, the avasthā in the terminology of Vasumitra, which undergoes transformation. But both these terms do not mean much as they are unfortunately not explained in details, but only modo indicō illustrated by drṣṭāntas which should not be taken literally." Now let us explain these theories one by one.

(1) The theory of the change of modes (bhāvānyathātva) - Bhadanta Dharmatrāta professes the theory of change as the transformation of modes (bhāva). Bhāva is defined by Kamalaśīla as a special quality (guṇaviśeṣa) from which arises the cognitive tendency (jñānapraṇavṛtti) regarding the following terms: the past, present and future. Dharmatrāta sets forth that when a dharma passes through the three phases of time, viz. the past, present and future, only its modes change not its substance, just as gold is changed into different kinds of ornaments, such as, finger-rings, ear-rings, bracelets, armlets, chains, etc. In all these states only the mode of gold is changed, not its substance and colour (varṇa). Likewise, when milk is turned into curd, its taste, digestive capacity, etc. are changed, not its colour. In the same manner, when a dharma enters from future into present, it discards its future bhāva and attains its present bhāva, and by getting rid of its present bhāva, it attains its past bhāva, but the substance of the dharma remains the same, because it never loses itself. Otherwise, it will result that the substance is one in the future, another in the present and still another in the past, which leads to absurdity.

(2) The theory of the change of characteristic (lakṣaṇānyathātva) - Bhadanta Ghoṣaka maintains that only the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of a dharma are subject to change. When a dharma passes through different times, it submits to changes in its characteristics only; the past one
attains its past characteristic without being severed from its present
and future characteristics; the present one attains its present characteristic without being severed from its past and future characteristics; and the future one retains its future characteristic without being deprived of its past and present characteristics. For example, when a man is in love with a woman, at the same time he is not free from the passions for other women. This leads to the conclusion that the past, present and future co-exist, but at a particular time the corresponding particular characteristic is predominant over the other two. The difference between the theories of Dharmatrāta and Ghosaka is that the latter maintains that in practice (vyavāhara) the past, present and future characteristics attain their activity (vṛtta) at their proper times.

(3) The theory of the change of condition (avasthānyathātva) - Bhadanta Vasumitra assumes the theory of the change of condition (avasthā) in an element. He "states that objects exist at all the three times: past, present and future, and do not undergo any change either in their substance or in their form and quality, or in their characteristics as contended by Dharmatrāta and Ghosaka." When a dharma appears at different times, its conditions change, not its essence, and it receives different designations in reference to its condition which it achieves, without any alteration in its substance. For example, when a small ball (gulikā) is thrown in the place of units, it means one; when thrown in place of hundreds and thousands, it is denominated hundred and thousand respectively and so on. In this theory the condition is determined by its causal efficiency (kāritra). When a dharma is in the condition in which it has not yet attained its causal efficiency, or it has not yet produced any effect, it is called future; when it continues to be in its kāritra, it is present; and when
it has already ceased to be active, it is past, maintaining itself unchanged in its essence.\(^6\)

(4) The theory of the change of temporal relativity (anyathānayatva) - Bhadanta Buddhadeva propounds a theory of the change of relation (anyathā). He states that a dharma passing through different phases of time is designated differently as past, present and future in relation to its antecedent and subsequent moments without altering its essence. For example, a woman is called mother with reference to her children, and daughter with reference to her own mother.\(^6\) Thus, a dharma is future with reference to its antecedent moments - past and present; it is present, when it has both its antecedent and subsequent moments, past and future respectively; and that which has only its subsequent moment, i.e. present or future, is past.\(^6\) Thus, these are the four Sarvāstivāda theories of change\(^7\) which also deal with the three time-epochs, the past, present and future.

A Critical Estimate of the Four Theories of Change

The preceding four theories of the Sarvāstivādins have received severe criticism from the Sautrāntikas. Actually, these theories seem to divert from the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. The Sarvāstivādins maintain that the elements are real and possess substance, and so it goes against the doctrine of non-substantiality (anatmavāda) and impermanence (anityatā), which they admit themselves. They also profess the theory of momentariness in their teachings. Like the Mahāsāskas, Purvavāsikas, Aparāsātrikas and Kāśyapīyas, but unlike the Theravādins, they establish that the mental as well as material elements are instantaneous.\(^7\) Vasubandhu provides an analysis of the controversy of momentary character of elements between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas (AKB,ii.45-46).\(^8\)
Vasubandhu criticises vehemently the above theories, because they are "not found in the genuine discourse of the Buddha, but it is an innovation of the Vibhāṣā (Exegetic) Literature of the Abhidharma School." He attacks Dharmatrāta by saying that this theory is not different from the parināmavāda (identity theory of cause and effect) of Sāṁkhya, which maintains the transformation (parināma) of the permanent substance. The Sāṁkhya theory has been repudiated elsewhere by Kamalasila (Prakṛtiparīkṣā, TSP, chapter 1). The gist of his criticism is that the transformation of the substance is possible in two ways: first, by not discarding the previous svabhāva (essence) and secondly, by discarding the same. In the former, there arises a confusion (saṁkara) of three time-epochs, the past, present and future, and in the latter, there is a contradiction in the Sarvāstivāda doctrine that everything exists.

It seems that the theory of twofold dharmas, saṁskṛta and asaṁskṛta, brings the Sarvāstivādins very close to the Sāṁkhya. The former accept the momentary manifestation of all the saṁskṛta dharmas, while the latter that of Prakṛti. When all the manifestations come to an end, all the saṁskāras are extinct and only lifeless residue is left. This is in itself a reality without any activity, life or personality, which is similar to the eternal unmanifested matter (Prakṛti) of the Sāṁkhya. But unlike the Sāṁkhya, the Sarvāstivādins, or the Buddhists in general never admit any eternal soul (puruṣa). Apart from similarities between these two systems, their differences too cannot be overlooked. This requires a separate study which is not possible here. The similarities between the two induce Vasubandhu to criticise the theory of Dharmatrāta.

The second theory of Ghosaka is rejected on the same ground that it creates confusion or comingling (saṁkara), since all the characteristics
of the elements are said to co-exist. Again, Vasubandhu professedly
denied any affinity (sāmya) between the illustration of a man, who is
in love with a woman, and a dharma, which passes through the time-epochs.
The man is said to be in love (rakta) when he is actually in process
of love for something; and he is also said to be not deprived of love
(avirakta) even if he is only in possession (samanvāgamamātreṇa)\(^78\) of
desire for something else. But in the case of a dharma, it is not correct to say that the attainment of temporal characteristics
by it is with reference to either an actual activity or possession of
activity."\(^79\)

The theory of Buddhadeva is set aside on the ground that in it each
time includes in itself all the three time-epochs simultaneously. Take
for example, the past time. In this state the preceding and succeeding
moments are past and future respectively, and the middle one is present.
This criticism is quite clear,\(^80\) since in each time, all the three time-
epochs are present. This shows that every moment is past, present and
future in relation to some or other moment. So it is not at all admissible.

**An Analysis of Vasumitra’s Theory of Kārita**

It is curious to see that even if Dharmatrāta, Guṇaśaka and Buddhadeva are Sarvāstivādins, they are criticised by the Vaibhāṣikas.\(^81\) Only Vasumitra’s view is accepted by them.\(^82\) According to Vasubandhu too, the third theory of Vasumitra in which the distinction of the time-epochs is established on the basis of Kārita (causal efficiency) deserves some importance.\(^83\) Here Edward Conze is apparently wrong to say that "Vasubandhu accepts Vasumitra’s solution, which distinguishes the three periods of time with reference to a dharma’s activity (kārita)".\(^84\)
Actually, Vasubandhu does not accept Vasumitra's solution as true, rather he finds in it some similarity with the Sautrāntika theory of causal efficiency (arthakriyākārītva), that is why he chooses it for discussion. Ultimately he criticises Vasumitra, which will be clear from the following discussions.

There is a long controversy between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas on Vasumitra's theory: When a dharma has not yet discharged its causal efficiency (kārītra), it is future; when it has attained its kārītra, it is present; and when its kārītra has ceased to be, it is past. In all these states there is a permanent substance which remains unchanged. This conception of kārītra is one of the most significant and interesting contributions to discussion of the concept of time, especially in the controversy with the Sautrāntikas. One must keep in mind that there is no separate element of time as such in the list of dharmas given by the Sarvāstivādins. When we speak of the past, present and future dharmas, it means dharmas as past, present and future with reference to different stages of their causal efficiency. It is not that the Sarvāstivādins admit an absolute, all-pervasive time as a reservoir in which the dharmas are placed in their various states. It is rather surprising that D.J. Kalupahana, with whom John M. Koller is in agreement, on the basis of Pali sources maintains that "... the Sarvāstivādins admit that not only everything past, present, and future exist, but that past, present and future themselves exist, that is, they are independently real .... they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time". In this regard he does not quote any Sarvāstivāda text which supports this statement.

Here the Theravādins misunderstood the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of "everything exists" and interpreted it as "the past, present and future
themselves exist independently". According to O. Rosenberg, says E.J. Thomas, "everything does not refer to all dhammas, in the sense of dhammas of every kind, but to the dhammas of all the three times".\textsuperscript{89} Without giving any satisfactory evidence, E.J. Thomas further expresses his own opinion that "there were Sarvāstivādins who asserted the existence of past, present, and future as real things (dravyatā). This is the sense which is rejected by the Kathāvatthu".\textsuperscript{90} This observation of his is based on a single question asked in the Abhidharma-kosā-bhāṣya (p. 620.10) and its Vyākhyā (p. 620.25): "kālo nāma ka eṣa dharmaḥ ?" (What is the dharma which we call time ?). This does not show that this was the theory of Sarvāstivādins. One gets the reply there instantly: "This is not an eternal substance (padartha)".\textsuperscript{91} Yaśomitra in his Vyākhyā (p. 620.24) only mentions that there is a theory of eternal time as a substance.\textsuperscript{92} This may be the theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who admits an eternal and substantial time. It should also be noted that at other places too the Sarvāstivādins never assert that time is a substance. The Vibhāgā, on the other hand, suggests that the Dārśāntikaś and the Vibhajyavādins maintain that "Time by its nature is eternal (nitya)".\textsuperscript{93} It is also possible that it is this statement which we find in AKV (p. 620.24). But we are not sure that they really admitted such a notion. Thomas Watters also commits the same mistake when he asserts that Vasumitra "held that the Past, Present, and Future are all realities".\textsuperscript{94} It is true that the Sarvāstivāda theory of everything exists is a new arrival in the history of Buddhist thoughts, but it is also true that, according to the Sarvāstivādins, nothing is outside the seventy-five dhammas, which constitute all sorts of material and immaterial things, and time is not an exception. Thus, it is absolutely unconvincing
to say that time has an independent ontological status apart from dharmas. We agree with D.J. Kalupahana\textsuperscript{95} that the Sarvāstivādin's theory of "everything, past, present, and future, exists" is contradicted by the Nikāyas and the Āgamas,\textsuperscript{96} that the former in this regard oversteps the limit of linguistic convention, and that the following statement of the Pāli version of the Nikāyas should be taken as a "warning for the Sarvāstivādins to avoid the mistake of maintaining that dharmas in their ultimate reality exist during the past, present, and future":\textsuperscript{97}

"There are these three linguistic conventions or usages of words or terms that are distinct - have been distinct in the past, are distinct at present, and will be distinct in the future - which [conventions] are not ignored by the recluse and brahmin who are wise. Which three? Whatever form (rūpa) there has been, which has ceased to be, which is past and has changed is called, reckoned, and termed 'has been' (ahosi); it is not reckoned as 'it exists' (atthi) nor as 'it will be' (bhavissati). \[The same is repeated with regard to the other four aggregates.\] ... Whatever form is not arisen, not come to be, is called, reckoned, or termed 'it will be' (bhavissati) and is not reckoned 'it exists' or 'it has been' ... Whatever form has been and has manifested itself is called, reckoned, or termed 'to exists' and is not reckoned 'it has been' or 'it will be'."\textsuperscript{98}

The selflessness of elements indicates that the Sarvāstivādins still maintain the basic teaching of Buddhism. But their doctrine of time made a distinct departure from the early or canonical Buddhism, which admits only two stages, origination and destruction,\textsuperscript{99} or sometimes three, origination, decay and destruction.\textsuperscript{100} The Vaibhāṣikas introduce an extra stage of duration (sthiti) which, they think, "was suppressed by the Buddha because of the danger which it involved to the doctrine of impermanence, but which is implicitly included in the last stage (sthityanyathātva)".\textsuperscript{101}

The Sarvāstivādins explicitly rejected the theory that time is an eternal substance, and instead they posited the reality of dharmas as ever-lasting. When asked: What is the dharma which we call time
they professedly reply that this is not an eternal entity by which are designated the samskaras in so far as the past, future and present are concerned. Further it is said that the samskrta dharmanas are epochs (adhvan), that is to say, they are past, present and future, because of their tri-temporal nature - 'traversed', 'being traversed' and 'yet to be traversed'.

The Vibhasa maintains that there are three kinds of dharmanas, the past, present and future. It claims to refute the erroneous doctrines and establishes the true one. According to one opinion, which is criticised by the Vibhasa, time (adhvan) is different from samskaras. As the Vibhasa points out, the Darstantikas and the Vibhajyavadinins set forth that "time by its nature is eternal (nitya), the samskaras are non- eternal (anitya). The samskaras flow in time like the fruits in open baskets, going from this basket to another, or like several men leaving this house in order to enter that house. Likewise, the samskaras of the future enter into the present, of the present enter into the past". But the author of the Vibhasa shows that time is not different from the nature of samskaras, time is the samskaras and the samskaras are time. Saenglishadra establishes the difference of three time-epochs on the basis of kārita (activity) and says: "The samskaras which do not yet have activity are called 'future'; when they have activity, they are called 'present'; when their activity is destroyed, they are called 'past'. But there is no change in the substance (dravya)."

From the above analysis, now it is clear that the Vaibhasikas or the Sarvastivadinins do not maintain the ontological and independent status of time, as D.J. Kalupahana and J. Koller profess or as the Theravadinins understood.
The preceding theory of the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins gives the notion of time, independent of the phenomena, like space and Nirvāṇa. As André Bareau suggests, Vasumitra's theory of the change of avasthā leads us to the same conception. He observes:

"The analogy he [Vasumitra] draws between things and counters, which take different names according to the boxes in which they are placed, is quite near to that of the fruit placed in a pot, and of the men in the house, chosen by the Vibhajyavādin and the Dārṣṭāntika. The only difference, but it is an essential one, is in the point of view of the thinkers. Vasumitra sees things only, and pays no attention to the space in which they are situated, whereas his opponents consider both, and draw between them the comparisons and the relations which force themselves on their minds."

Here we find only analogy between the ways the illustrations (dṛṣṭānta) are given by the two sides, whereas they propound different theories from each other. Still it is to be noted that Vasumitra's analogy between the illustrations of a small ball (gulikā) and the numerical place (aṅka) on the one hand, and a dharma and its three stages, past, present and future based on its kārita, on the other hand, are inappropriate or rather misleading. This analogy, not the theory itself, leads one to the notion that time is a receptacle in which dharmas are deposited in their different stages. The comparison of numerical place and the kārita is completely incorrect. The former gives the idea of space, whereas the latter that of different temporal stages. It is clearly expressed that the word "adhvan" (time-epoch) not only includes in itself all the skandhas, i.e. rūpa skandha, etc., but also other elements, such as duḥkha-samudaya, anityatā, and anātma. This shows that time is nothing apart from saṃskāras, skandhas, duḥkha-samudaya, anityatā, anātma, and so on. Hence time should not be conceived as an independent and all-pervasive entity.

Even if the Vaibhāṣikas deny again and again the independent reality of time and its three phases, the Sautrāntikas ask the question: If the
past and future exist as things, then they are present, and so how can they be described as past and future?\textsuperscript{112} This objection, in the opinion of André Bareau,\textsuperscript{113} is decisive, but we contend that both the Sautrāntikas and André Bareau misunderstood here the Vaibhāṣīka position. It is really striking that Bareau in the same paper contradicts his own statement when he writes: "... the past, the present and the future were not considered by the Sarvāstivādins as things in themselves, but as modes of being, states, features, positions, reciprocal relations."\textsuperscript{114} The Sarvāstivādins do not admit the three time-epochs as possessing eternal substance or as reality in themselves; rather the dharmas, they pronounce, have the substantial reality throughout its different stages of transition. The Vaibhāṣīkas have already said that it is the operation (kāritra) in its various stages, i.e. not yet developed, fully developed, and already settled, which determines the temporal status of the dharmas.\textsuperscript{115}

The Kāritra Defined

Now the question arises: What is the meaning (abhipreta) of kāritra? The Vaibhāṣīkas answer that kāritra means activity (vyāpāra), such as an act of seeing; it means the activities of five sense organs, by means of which the eye is seeing, the ear is hearing, the nose is smelling, the tongue is tasting, and the skin is experiencing; it is the activity by which consciousness (vijñāna) cognises the objects; and again, it is the activity by which the rūpa, etc. are made objects of the corresponding sense organs. The Sautrāntikas object that if it were so, the present (pratyutpanna) tattvāndagā\textsuperscript{116} eye\textsuperscript{117} would not possess actuality (vartamanatā) in the state of sleep, because it lacks the kāritra.\textsuperscript{118} In other words, even if the elements are obviously present, they do not perform their kāritra, i.e. they do not produce, for example, any sight.
The Vaibhāṣikas modify their definition of kārtira, according to which the kāritra means the potency of performing two kinds of functions: the potency of projecting (phaladāna) and of grasping (phalapratigraha) a result. Here it is important to notice that a particular dharma does not manifest itself by its own potency, rather its activity is determined by its preceding dharmas. Every preceding dharma forces its future succeeding dharmas to manifest their activity. This means that the real activity of a dharma is to determine the activity of subsequent dharmas. In this respect the Sarvāstivādins establish six kinds of causal relations between the elements: (1) cause of existence (kāraṇā-hetu), (2) simultaneous cause (sahabhūhetu), (3) homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu), (4) associated cause (saṃprayuktahetu), (5) universal cause (sarvatragahetu), and (6) cause of retribution (vipākahetu).

Of these causes the first corresponds to the fruit of sovereign (adhipatiphala), the second and fourth to the fruit of the activity of virile, or anthropomorphic result (puruṣakāraphala), the third and fifth to the fruit of flow (niṣyandaphala), and sixth to the fruit of retribution, or the fruit of maturity (vipākaphala). Again, a dharma is (1) niṣyandaphala, since it is similar to its cause, (2) puruṣakāraphala, since it is born by the force of its cause, (3) adhipatiphala, since it is born on the ground of non-obstacle or its cause, and (4) vipākaphala, since it is not born simultaneously, or immediately in the next moment. The past and present dharmas can be sarvatraga and sabhāgahetu (see AKP, ii, pp. 257 ff.). The dharmas of the past, present and future can be saṃprayukta, sahabhū and vipākahetu. Vipākahetu gives its fruit when it is past, for the fruit is not simultaneous, though it may be immediately consecutive to its cause. The conditioned dharmas of the three epochs are kāraṇahetu, and the unconditioned dharmas are beyond time.
Now one may ask: In which condition (i.e. past, present, or future) each of the causes happens, when it takes (grhṇati, ākṣipati) and gives (prayacchati, dadāti) its fruit? A dharma takes a fruit when it becomes the seed. A dharma gives a fruit in the moment when it gives the force of origination to this fruit, that is to say, in the moment when the future fruit, which is turned towards the origination or is ready to be born (utpādābhimukha), is given by this dharma the force, which makes the former (the future fruit) enter into the condition of present. The five causes take their fruit only when they are present; they are past, when they have already taken their fruits; and future, when they are not yet active.

Now let us come back to the Vaibhāṣīka definition of kārita as "phaladānapratigraha". In this case, for example, the four saṃskṛta- lakṣaṇas, jāti, sthiti, jarā and anityatā, co-existent with a particular element of the eye produce an anthropomorphic result (puruṣakārāphala) and the next succeeding element is the puruṣakārāphala, adhipatiphala (fruit of the sovereign) and niṣyandaphala (fruit of flow) in relation to its preceding element. Thus, because of producing (jananat) all these fruits, the kārita of the element is called "giving" (prayacchad), and because of being the cause (hetubhavavasthānād) of these fruits it is called "grasping" (grhṇat), and is in this context "present".

The Sautrāntikas argue that if this is so, the past causes, such as sabhāgahetu, sarvatragahetu and vipākahetu too would be present, because it has already been conceded that they also produce a fruit.

But this objection, reply the Vaibhāṣīkas, fares no better, because the kārita is said to possess both the characteristics of phaladāna and phalagrahaṇa altogether. The past sabhāga although "giving" is not "grasping". The Sautrāntikas assert that if we accept this definition,
the past causes, such as sabhāgahetu, will be semi-present, because they have the characteristic of only giving the fruit, not grasping it. Another problem is that if the three time-epochs are established according to the kāritra, an element having the characteristic of past also will be present, since it produces the fruit of the present moment. Thus, a comingling of the three time-epochs arises.

**Samghabhadra's Reply to the Sautrāntikas**

Keeping these difficulties in view, Samghabhadra states that the Sautrāntikas advance their criticism, because they do not understand the nature of the dharma (dharmasvabhāva) properly. Actually, the potency (śakti) of a dharma is of two kinds: activity (tso-yong, kāritra) and power (kong-neng, vṛtti, sāmarthya, vyāpāra). The power of projecting the fruit is called the activity of the dharma, not the actual bearing of the fruit. Even if kāritra is defined as phalākṣepa-sāmarthya, the former does not possess the whole sāmarthya. There is sāmarthya which exists apart from the activity. That is why, for example, in obscurity or darkness, sāmarthya (of the eye) of seeing the objects is obstructed by the darkness, but not so its kāritra. In other words, the darkness prevents the sāmarthya of vision (darsanavyāpāra), hence the eye is not able to perceive the visibles. But its kāritra of projecting the fruit is not prevented by the darkness. The eye, therefore, even in such obscurity (āvaraṇa) projects its fruit, which is a new moment of the eye. In the present state the kāritra is not absent, because it is the kāritra which establishes this state. The cessation of the kāritra of a dharma does not entail that the dharma is inexistent. As regards the fact of being the cause of the birth of a different dharma (i.e. bhāva, sing), that is not kāritra, rather only sāmarthya, for it is only the present which projects the fruit; for the unconditioned
ones (asaṃskṛta dharmas), which are beyond time, do not project the fruit; for it is only projection of fruit which is called activity. Therefore, because of the inadequate knowledge of the Abhidharma doctrines, says Saṃghabhadra, the Sautrāntikas consider the sāmartha as being the activity. The past cause, although it bears the fruit, is deprived of the activity. Now it is clear that the characteristics of the three time-epochs are not mingled.\textsuperscript{144}

However, the Sautrāntikas advance further severe criticism.\textsuperscript{145} They raise the following questions: What is that which opposes the kārītra? How is it past, present and future? If it is not different from the dharma, the three epochs would disappear. If the dharmas exist in the past and future just in the same way as in the present, then why are they past and future, and not present? If the proper nature (svabhāva,\textsuperscript{146} tse-sing) or essence of the dharmas always exists, i.e. throughout the three time-epochs, it must produce the activity at all time. If their kārītra is not in the three time-epochs, what is that which has its kārītra in the form of obstacle (kim vighnaṃ kārītram)?\textsuperscript{147} What is that which sometimes activates the dharmas to perform and sometimes not to perform their kārītra?\textsuperscript{148} Saṃghabhadra puts this objection of the Sautrāntikas as follows: "Since the characteristic (laksana) of the proper nature (t'i) of the dharma is unchanging, what force is that which induces the obstacle of all kinds, that the dharma does not always have the same state [bhāva] (sing-lei)?"\textsuperscript{149}

This objection, according to Saṃghabhadra is not justified. The identity of the characteristic of the proper nature (svabhāva) is not an argument which demonstrates the unity or identity of the bhāva. Indeed, one observes in the phenomena that the characteristic of the proper nature does not present any difference, rather the state (bhāva)
differs. He establishes the simultaneous existence of the dharmas which are essentially identical (i.e. not different with regard to the svālakṣaṇa), but differ with respect to the bhāva (yeou sing), such as pṛthivīdhātu (terrestrial element), which is always in its essence solid, has diverse nature (sing), being internal (ādhyātmikabhāva), external; the sensation (vedanā) etc., which is always in its essence "experience", has diverse nature, being personal, of others, pleasant, or distressing. 150

Again, Saṃghabhadra formulates the objection of the Sautrāntikas differently as follows:

"In my [i.e. Sautrāntika] system the saṃskāras (or the conditioned dharmas), the conditions (pratyayas), the concurrence of the conditions exist after inexistence [abhūtvā bhavatil]. The conditions are of different kinds. Sometimes they concur, sometimes they do not. We understand that the dharmas are not born at all times. But you [i.e. Vaibhāṣikas] maintain that the saṃskṛtas and their conditions, of all times, always possess [their] proper nature (yeou-t'i, sasvabhāva), for you do not admit that the dharmas exist after inexistence. They must therefore always be present. [Now the question arises] what force is that which is able to oppose them?"151

This remark also, according to Saṃghabhadra, is not justified, because the problem has already been elucidated. We have said earlier that the characteristic of the svabhāva (t'i-siang) remains the same; only its bhāva (lei-sing) changes. Even though this notion is established by the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas make the following objection:

You maintain that the saṃskāras and their conditions152 of all times perpetually possess their proper nature (sasvabhāva, yeou-t'i). What is that which makes the activity not to exist always, that they are not perpetually present in all times? The objection tumbles down when one understands the above exposed doctrine, i.e. the proper nature is constant, but the bhāvas (sing-lei) are different.153
The Vaibhāṣikas further assert that the kārita is activated when all the necessary conditions are present. The Sautrāntikas reject this hypothesis, because the Vaibhāṣikas do admit that these conditions are always present and call the kārita as past, present and future.

Is the Kārita Different from its Dharma?

Kamalaśīla places a series of arguments against the Vaibhāṣikas. He says that the Vaibhāṣikas must accept one of the two alternatives: that kārita is either different or not different from its dharma. Since the characteristics of these two alternatives are mutually exclusive, the denial of one infers the affirmation of the other, and conversely, the affirmation of one leads to the denial of the other. And there is no third alternative which is acceptable.

(1) If the kārita is different from the dharma, the latter would be without essence (niḥsvabhāva, i.e. unreal) in its antecedent and subsequent stages. Schayer formulates this in the following syllogism:

Probandum : dharmas existing in the present are unreal in their antecedent and subsequent states
Reason : because they are causes (= hetutvād), or because they are contingent (= saṃskṛtatvād).
Example : just as in the case with kārita.

Contrary to this, if the dharmas are not unreal in their antecedent and subsequent states, then all the saṃskṛtas would be permanent, since the svabhāva of the dharmas are established in all times (= sarvadā), and this is the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of permanence. To support this argument Kamalaśīla quotes the Pramāṇavārtika (1. 206) that "According to learned men permanent is that whose svabhāva (essence) is never destroyed".
The Vaibhāśikas urge that śakti\textsuperscript{160} (= kārita) is the svabhāva of permanent substance (nityasya śakti), or eternity is śakti (nityatā śakti). Consequently, in the Sautrāntika syllogism "there is no exclusion of the reasons: hetutva (being a cause) or saṃskṛtatva (being contingent), etc. from the class of negative instances (hetoh sādhyavipakṣena virodhaḥ), i.e. in [the Sautrāntika] case from the class of permanent entities."\textsuperscript{161}

Now, Kamalaśīla refers back to his criticism of the preceding objection in the Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā (TSP, chapter 8). Since, he says, it is accepted by all that everything which is conditioned (saṃskṛta) is also impermanent (anītya), the conditionedness (saṃskṛtatva) is not possible in permanence. This principle is self-evident. To admit the kārita apart from skandhas, āyatanas, etc. is to go against the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. This is supported by the Scriptures too, where the Buddha professes that everything (sarvam) means five skandhas, twelve āyatanas, and eighteen dhātus. This shows that the kārita has no separate category.\textsuperscript{162}

(2) Let us analyse the second alternative, namely, the dharma and its kārita are not different (ananyad) from each other. If the kārita is not different from the dharma, then the former would be just as the dharmaśvarūpa, and being identical with the latter it would be existing in all times (= sārvakālika). In this case, the distinction of the three time-epochs on the basis of the kārita, which Vasumitra propounds above - i.e. "that which has achieved its kārita is present; that which has exhausted its kārita is past; and that which has not yet attained its kārita is future" - would not be possible. This can be possible only when the two states of attaining (prāpti) and not attaining (aprāpti) of the kārita are shown separately. But such distinction is impossible,
because there is a lack of the distinction of the states among the elements which always exist.\textsuperscript{163} Thus, in this alternative, i.e. the kārita is not different from the dharma, the latter just as the former lacks its past and future states, and possesses only its present state (= madhyamātraka), which is accepted by the Sautrāntikas against the Vaibhāṣika theory of sarvadā asti.\textsuperscript{164}

(3) If a third alternative is admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas that the kārita is and is not identical with the dharma, then it leads to a mutual contradiction (paraspara viruddha). Because of the non-differentiation of the dharma from the kārita, it results that the dharmas of rūpa, etc. do not exist always. But it is admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas that the dharmas exist permanently and the kārita is non-permanent (as in the case of the past and future, kārita does not exist). It follows that the dharma and kārita are different from each other. Again, the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the kārita is different from the dharma. These contradictory statements are termed by the Sautrāntikas as a caprice of God. This shows an arbitrary, impulsive and illogical notion, and change of mind. The Vaibhāṣikas are just like God who without thinking properly and rationally act arbitrarily.\textsuperscript{165} But Saṃghabhadra rejects this objection.\textsuperscript{166}

The Kārita of Kārita Discussed

Besides, the Sautrāntikas apply a third prāsaṅga argument against Vasumitra's theory of the three time-epochs established on the kārita. Here Schayer's remark is significant. He says:

"This tacit supposition is necessary for deducing the prāsaṅga formulated by the Sautrāntika. This very starting point is, however, erroneous. The Vaibhāṣikas do not teach that kārita possesses the three Times; kārita is momentary and the dharma-svabhāva only lasts through the three Times."\textsuperscript{167}
The argument Sautrāntikas advance is that if the Vaibhāṣikas concede that the kārita is not different from the dharmas, this means that the former too exists like the latter throughout the three time-epochs. In other words, we can say that "the kārita which has not yet attained its existence is a future kārita; the kārita which has just attained its existence is the present kārita; the kārita which has already ceased to be is a past kārita." But Kamalaśīla, who applies the third prasaṅga argument as follows, asserts that for the preceding thesis the Vaibhāṣikas have to admit the existence of a second kārita of this kārita, otherwise they cannot maintain that "the distinction of epochs are established on the basis of the kārita" (adhvānāḥ kāritreṇā vyavasthitāḥ), because they violate this rule (vyabhicārāt). Again, if the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the future, etc. (the three time-epochs) are established with reference to svarūpasattā (dravya, substance) of the kārita, and not with reference to its kārita (i.e. second kārita), then they have to admit the bhāva too likewise. Therefore, what is the sense of introducing the theory of the kārita? And if to steer clear of the violation of the rule, they admit the kārita of the kārita, which itself is the kārita of the dharma, then there arises an infinite regress.

To the Sautrāntika argument, i.e. if the kārita and the dharma are identical (ananya), the former too would be permanent (= sārvakālika) like the latter, because there is no difference (= avisesāt) between them. Saṅghabhadra replies that distinguishing qualities have been seen even if they are not different from the essence of the dharma, such as sapratighatva of the earth. Though the dharmas are not different from their substance, yet they are differentiated as sapratigha and apratigha, sanidarsana and anidarsana, and so they appear to be differentiated from
their essence by the distinguishing qualities. In the same way a dharma is determined by its kārita. But this reply, says Kamalaśīla, is not helpful to the subject under consideration (prakṛtānupakāraka). In other words, this does not affect the criticism of the Sautrāntikas, whose argument is: on admitting the non-differentiation (abheda) of the kārita from the substance (= dharma) no distinction is possible at all between the dharma and its kārita, which are identified with each other. And therefrom no distinction of the three time-epochs is possible on the basis of the kārita. Moreover, he finds no point in the Vaibhāṣika argument which is acceptable to him. He says: "The dharmas of the earth, etc. are different, because they are differentiated by their mutually exclusive svalakṣaṇas". That is why some of them are called sapratīgha and some apratīgha, such as the vedanā, etc. But it is evident that no apratīgha can ever be sapratīgha, because "there is no unique unvariably concomitant substance (= eko 'nugāmi padārthātmā) to which the sapratīghatva of the earth, etc. could be attributed as a temporary, occasional quality (kādācitka dharma). Special qualities as sapratīghatva, etc. express the whole being as such, i.e. as determined by the exclusion of all remaining homogeneous (sajātiya) as well as heterogeneous (vijātiya) qualities. Hence, although not differing from the svarūpa, they cannot be [in opposition to the kārita], the principle of differentiation of the same [unchangeable substance].

Now Saṁghabhadra states that the kārita is not different from the dharma, because it does not exist apart from the dharma; and at the same time it is also not simply the dharma, because even if the svabhāva of the dharma exists permanently, there may not be the kārita always. It may sometimes be absent. Neither is there no difference between the kārita and dharma, because the former is previously inexistent. The
kāritra is just like a series (saṃtānāvat) of the dharmas. Actually, saṃtāna is not different from the dharma, because it does not exist independently of the latter; and it is also not simply the dharma, otherwise even a single dharma would be a saṃtāna. Moreover, it cannot be said that it does not exist, because its effects do exist. 177

But Kamalaśīla rejects Saṃghabhadra’s hypothesis. He says, in the case of saṃtāna, its difference from the dharma is inexpressible (avācyya), just like the pudgala, and is therefore niḥsvabhāva. In the same way, the kāritra too is niḥsvabhāva. But this argument shows the agnostic tendency of Kamalaśīla. If something is inexpressible, then how can we say that it is niḥsvabhāva? Now, he advances another prasaṅga: if a svabhāva exists in something, it must be either different or non-different from the dharma. But since such kāritra is a figment of imagination (kalpita), like the saṃtāna, it cannot produce any effect. Indeed, the saṃtāna, which is chimerical only, has no potency in generating any effect, because of its niḥsvabhāvatva, whereas the emergence of the effect is bound with the svabhāva. This proves that only the real elements of the niḥsvabhāva-saṃtāna are capable of activities (kriyākṣama), not the fabricated saṃtāna. From the above discussion we come to the conclusion that the kāritra exists as a prajñāpti (empirical reality), and is inexistent absolutely (paramārthataḥ) in the antecedent and subsequent moments of its existence. Thus, the distinction of the time-epochs as the past, present and future is an abstract notion, not substantial. 178

But the kāritra as prajñāpti too is not free from criticism. The Vaibhāṣikas see no difficulty, if the distinction of the epochs also is prajñāpti like the kāritra. 179 The Sautrāntikas say that the kāritra of the dharmas is described by the Vaibhāṣikas as the potency of
projecting the effects (phalākṣepaṇakti), and this potency is not
different from the reality (= vastulakṣaṇa). Thus, it is not the
object of speech (śabdagocara), and does not belong to the domain of
words, because it is asādhāraṇa, and words cannot express a svālakṣaṇa.
And thus, the power being the same as the reality (= vastu) and not
different, how can it have a prajñāpti existence? Positively it cannot
be so. Hence the distinction of the three time-epochs itself becomes
tattvika. ¹⁸⁰

Whether the Causal Efficiencies are Different or
the Same in their Past and Future States?

Besides, one perceives the rūpa, such as fire, which possesses the
causal efficiencies, like burning and cooking. Now the question arises:
Are these causal efficiencies in their past and future states the same
or different? If they are the same, how are the mutually contradictory
qualities, such as inactivity, by which the distinction of the future,
present and past is established, co-existent in one undifferentiated
entity, such as rūpa? If amidst the imposition of contradictory
qualities, the identity of a dharma is maintained, then all the
differentiations would be vanished (utsanna), and the whole world would
be turned into one identical thing. And the result of this identity
would be co-emergence of everything. ¹⁸¹

The Vaibhāṣikas clarify their position by saying that a dharma is
not supposed to be completely undifferentiated while passing through the
three time-epochs. It is differentiated by its different states, i.e.
by leaving one state and grasping another. ¹⁸² But here too Kamalāśīla
applies the same prasaṅga: Are these states different or not from the
bhāva? The Vaibhāṣika answer is in the negative; otherwise, they say,
their relation with the bhāva (= dharma) would be broken. Firstly,
because there would arise the inefficiency of the bhāva, and secondly, because the potency with regard to producing effects would be proved in both the presence and absence of those conditions.  

But Kamalaśīla is not satisfied with this answer. He raises the questions and answers them himself in the following way: How is it maintained that the avasthās of the dharmas are not different from the dharmas themselves? He replies: it is not so, because the avasthās come into existence after having been inexistent, and are destroyed after having been existent. But the dharmas (= vastus) are not supposed in this manner, because according to the Vaibhāṣikas, they exist permanently. Therefore, how are the avasthās, which come into existence after having been inexistent and are destroyed after having been existent, identical with the permanent dharmas? It is, say the Sautrāntikas, never possible, because the avasthās and dharmas possess different characteristics (= bhinnayogakṣematvāt). For otherwise, by way of identity (= tādātmatvāna) the avasthās would not be different from the dharma, and consequently they would exist always just as the svabhāva of the dharma (vastusvabhāvavat). Or else, the dharma not being different from the avasthās, it would come into existence after having been inexistent just as the svarūpa of the avasthās.

Even if it is maintained, asserts Kamalaśīla, that the avasthās are not different from the dharma, the imposition of contradictory qualities cannot be avoided. Now, the question arises whether the dharma (= vastu) in its middle state (i.e. the present) possesses causal efficiency by its own essence (svarūpeṇa) or differently. If the former, then the essence of the dharma exists even in the remaining states of the past and future. And so how can the essence of the causal efficiency be supposed to be latent in its future state, and quiescent
in its past state (= kriyākriyābhramāmsau). Secondly, if the dharma is active by means of something else, then again its own inactivity would result, and thus it is proved to be an avastu (= non-dharma). Likewise, the theory that the rūpa, such as fire, also exists in the past and future states tumbles down. If we admit that a dharma is different in every state, then in this hypothesis there would be no comingling of mutually exclusive qualities, such as activity and inactivity, because of different dharmas in different states. But the dharmas, such as fire, whose causal efficiency is burning and cooking, would come into existence after having been inexistent and would be destroyed after having been existent. This leads to the contradiction with the thesis that the dharma exists permanently, because the dharma and its states lack their permanent association (anvayābhāvāt).185

But the Vaibhāṣikas see no contradiction in the theory that a dharma, possessing causal efficiency, comes into existence after having been inexistent and ceases to exist after having been existent. They maintain that the causally inactive dharma (akāryayogyam vastu) also exists in the past and future states. It does not possess any causal efficiency in these two states, and so there is no contradiction in their theory of sadāstitva.186 To this Śāntaraksita replies that only those dharmas, which possess causal efficiency, exist, and actually nothing exists in the past and future states, because in these states no activity is possible.187

But the Vaibhāṣikas profess that the past sabhāga hetu, etc. possess the activity, and hence it is wrong to say that there can be no causal efficiency in the dharmas, which are in their past and future states.188 Śāntaraksita applies further prāsaṅga arguments to refute
the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas. He asserts that the past dharma, which
has no causal efficiency, would be clearly like a present dharma, because
being of occasional nature (kādačitka) it comes into existence after
having been inexistent like other present dharmas. Here the Sautrānti-
tika prasanga is that whatever is produced by causes and conditions is
called present, and that which is kādačitka is necessarily produced by
causes and conditions. Therefore, something is uncaused only in two
cases, either it is a permanent entity, or it is absolutely inexistent,
because only in these two cases there is room for complete independence
(anapekṣa). "Hence the third possibility", Schayer observes, "that of
being sometimes existent and sometimes inexistent, is reserved to the
entities which are causally determined = whose existence is limited by
causal determinants." Therefore, whatever is kādačitka is necessarily
produced by the causes and conditions, and that is necessarily present.
In other words, 'being kādačitka' is invariably concomitant with 'being
present'.

Again, Kamalaśīla says, if the past and future elements exist
substantially (dravyataḥ), then all the saṃskāras or the saṃskṛta dharmas
would be permanent (saśvata). Therefore, in this case there would be no
special quality (viśeṣa) which may distinguish the conditioned dharmas,
such as rūpa, etc., from the unconditioned dharmas, such as pratisam-
khyaṇirdhā. The Vaibhāṣikas respond that the conditionedness (saṃ-
skṛtātva) of the rūpa is because of its association with the four saṃ-
skṛtalaksana-s (i.e. jāti, jara, sthiti, and anityatā), but the uncondi-
tioned dharmas, such as ākāśa, are not associated with them. This
characteristic makes an essential difference (= vailaksanya) between
these two kinds of dharmas. The Sautrāntikas reply that it is not
correct, and to demonstrate the untenability of the Vaibhāṣika hypothesis,
they pick out the four saṃskṛtalaksanaṇas and analyse them one by one as follows.

An Examination of the Samskṛtalaksanaṇas by the Sautrāntikas

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, jāti gives birth to things, sthiti stabilises them, jarā causes them decay and anityatā destroys them. These are the kāritra of the saṃskṛtalaksanaṇas. Now, Kamalaśīla starts analysing the first saṃskṛtalaksanaṇa, jāti. The jāti, as the Vaibhāṣikas profess, generates a special force (vīseṣa) which stimulates the future conditioned dharmas to achieve their causal efficiency in order to produce their effects. It is, therefore, called the producer (= janīka) of the saṃskṛta dharmas, such as the rūpa. In this case, it is not a material cause, rather an instrumental cause. But the question arises whether this special potency (vīseṣa) is different from the saṃskṛta dharma itself or not? These are the only two alternatives (pakṣadvaya).

In the first alternative, i.e. the vīseṣa is not different from the dharma itself, the vīseṣa cannot be non-different (na avyatirikta) from the conditioned dharmas (i.e. rūpa, etc.), because in that case it would already be a realised (niṣpanna) thing even before the jāti performs its kārita, and then it would be incapable of producing any effect (aśakya-kriya), just as after it has performed its activity. And again, what is realised cannot be active, otherwise there would be an infinite regress. The second alternative, i.e. the vīseṣa is different from the conditioned dharmas, too does not prove to be advantageous, because in that case there would be no relation between them. Again, because of this difference the relation of identity between them would be
impossible, and if they are not different, the preceding consequence (i.e. of the first alternative) would result. The relation of cause and effect too would be absent, because the viśeṣa originates from the jāti, not from the dharma. Other relations also, such as container (= adhāra) and contained (= adheya), are out of the question, because they too are included under the same category (antargatetvāt),¹⁹⁹ or as Schayer puts it: "because they are only special cases of causal dependence".²⁰⁰ On the acceptance of such a relation, the Sautrāntikas again apply the prasaṅga argument. Firstly, "The element is a tamātrakāraṇa (= a basal, main cause). Then the viśeṣa, as produced exclusively by it, would always arise and jāti would be of no use."²⁰¹ Secondly, a dharma produces the viśeṣa with the help of jāti (jātim apekṣyā). But this is not correct, because the jāti is not an auxiliary cause. Otherwise, this would lead to an absurdity. Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that if there is any difference between the dharma and its viśeṣa, no relation can be established between them.²⁰² Again, in the case of difference the viśeṣa is inexistent before it comes into existence, and thus the theory of asatkāryavāda results.²⁰³ Likewise, if the decay is brought about by jāra, stabilisation by sthiti, and destruction by anityatā, then the same objections, which were applied against jāti, would be applied against these three too.²⁰⁴

Furthermore, it is said by the Vaibhāṣikas that the saṃskṛtalaksanās, jāti, etc. perform their kārītra due to their inherent potency (= samarthasvabhāva), and that the potency always exists. If it is so, says Kamalaśīla, it follows that the saṃskṛtalaksanās must always discharge their kārītra (= svakārya). The Vaibhāṣikas may reply that the preceding objection is irrelevant, because the functioning of the svakārya of the saṃskṛtalaksanās are based on the assistance of the causes and conditions,
or in other words, unless the auxiliary causes and conditions are present, there cannot be any svakārya. This doctrine is wrong, because they (causes and conditions) are already admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas as ever present. This leads to the conclusion that the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas execute their respective svakārya, i.e. origination, duration, decay and destruction, not only in their present state, but also in their past and future states. Consequently, the comingling of the three time-epochs in each state results.205

Momentariness of the Past and Future Dharmas Discussed

Śāntarakṣita proceeds with fresh prasāṅga arguments. He adduces that the past and future dharmas are either momentary (kṣaṇika) or non-momentary (na kṣaṇika). These are the only two alternatives. If we admit the first, the confusion of the three time-epochs would again arise.206 The moment which just originates is present, that which is destroyed after its origination is past, and that which has not yet come into its existence is future.207 Here, if the distinction of the three time-epochs is based on these three non-simultaneous temporal states, then Śāntarakṣita’s objection seems to be ineffective, because in that case there is no comingling. But if the Vaibhāṣikas admit that the past and future elements too exist like the present ones, then his argument would be relevant. And consequently, the past and future elements too would be present, because the very existence shows their presentness.

If we admit the second alternative that the past and future elements are non-momentary, then there would be contradiction in the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism (kṛtānta = siddhānta), according to which all the saṃskāras are momentary.208 Moreover, there is also contradiction with
the logical or inferential knowledge (anumānavirodha). This contra-
diction is evident from the conclusion of the following syllogism:

**Probandum:** whatever is existing is momentary (yat sat tat sarvam kṣaṇikam).

**Example:** just as the present elements (yathā vartamānām).

**Reason:** the past and future elements exist (santaś cātātānāgata iti).

**Conclusion:** hence, the past and future elements are necessarily momentary (niyamāt kṣaṇabhaṅgīnaḥ prāptāḥ).

**The Sautrāntika Hypothesis of Arthakriyākāritva and Existence**

The Sautrāntika hypothesis is that the causal efficiency or the efficiency of producing effects (arthakriyākāritva) is the inherent characteristic of the existing elements, because on logical ground the non-momentary elements eliminate any possibility of successive (krama) as well as simultaneous (yaugapadya) causal efficiency. Therefore, if we deny the arthakriyākāritva, we also deny existence (sattā). "The predicate 'existence' (= sattā) is excluded from all the dharmins which are predicated by the negation of the sādhya (= from all sādhya-vipakṣa)". And thus, the validity of the Sautrāntika syllogism is proved.

The Sautrāntikas advance further arguments which are completely based on their theory of the arthakriyākāritva. Since the Vaibhāṣikas do not set forth that only the arthakriyākāritva is existent, and existence is arthakriyākāritva, i.e. both these terms are synonyms or identical, and whatever does not possess arthakriyākāritva is not existent, the following syllogism against their theory appears to be preposterous. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the dharms apart from their present state, in which they manifest their arthakriyākāritva,
exist in their past state, in which they become quiescent after having performed their causal efficiency, and in future state, in which they are latent still waiting to perform their activity.

Now, Kamalasīla proceeds as follows. He says that the past and future elements may be said to be either capable of producing effects (arthakriyāsamartha) or not. These are the only two alternatives. If they are capable to do so, then they are present. Again, the following syllogism accelerates the Sautrāntika polemic against the Vaibhāṣikas:

**Probandum**: whatever is capable of producing effects is present, i.e. momentary (ye ye 'rthakriyā- samarthās te vartamānāḥ).

**Example**: just as the present elements which are not under discussion here (yathā 'vivādaspadībhūtā vartamānāḥ).

**Reason**: the past and future dharmas are capable of producing effects (= arthakriyāsamarthās catītādaya).

**Conclusion**: therefore, the past and future dharmas are present, i.e. momentary (= svabhāvahetu-prasaṅgāḥ).

The preceding syllogism, says Kamalasīla, is not indeterminate (na anaikāntika). It means that it is invariably concomitant, because it eliminates the presentness (vartamānata = existence) of the past element, which has been destroyed, as well as the future element, which is not yet born, and consequently all their potencies would be absent, just like the sky flower, which exists nowhere. The following syllogism freezes all the potencies out of the past and future elements:

**Probandum**: those which are not present do not possess any potency (= ye vartamānā na bhavanti te kvacit samarthā api na bhavanti), or vice versa.

**Example**: just as the sky flower (yathā vyomāmbhoruham).

**Reason**: the past and future dharmas are not present (na bhavanti catītādayo vartamānā).
Conclusion: therefore, invariably they do not possess any potency (= vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ), i.e. they are inexistent.

According to the Sautrāntikas, the three asaṃskṛta dharmas, ākāśa, pratisaṃkhyānirodha, and apratisaṃkhyānirodha, too are not an exception (= anekānta) to the preceding conclusion. They can also be the member of this syllogism, and their potencies can be dismissed likewise. Therefore, it cannot be said, claim the Sautrāntikas, that the syllogism is indeterminate.

Now, let us come to another argument, which the Sautrāntikas advance. If the dharmas exist substantially (dravyataḥ) even in its past and future states, their effects also must be eternal (nitya, i.e. existing throughout the past, present and future), and consequently the striving for attaining the heaven and ultimate salvation would result in failure (vīphala).

The Sautrāntika Criticism of the Vaibhāsika Arguments for the Existence of the Past and Future Dharmas

From the preceding discussion it is evident that the theory of the Vaibhāsikas, who maintain that all the saṃskṛta dharmas, such as rūpa, are existent in all the three time-epochs (adhvasamgrhīta), is without any solid ground (āśrayāsiddha).

Dharmakīrti has already said in his Pramāṇa-vārtika (3.191c) that "'Existence' as predicate [to be proved] (= bhāvadharma) is not [possible], because [the dharmin] is not ascertained." Moreover, even if the existence of the past and future dharmas is maintained, the arguments for this would be contradictory (viruddha), because the reality of the present is admitted (vartamānasiddhe) by everybody, and apart from this, if we admit the reality of the past and
future dharmas, then it would be just against the dharma-svarūpa or in
the words of Schayer, against "the essence (svarūpa) of the probandum
(dharma = sādhyas-dharma)". Here, as we have seen in one of the above
syllogisms, the probandum is: "those, which are not present, do not
possess any potency, or whatever is capable of producing effects is
present, i.e. momentary".

Now, the question arises: How can the past and future rūpas be
proved existing throughout the three time-epochs? Actually, says
Kamalāśīla, it is never possible to make a distinction between the past
and future, just as the horn of the hare (śaśavisāṇa), which has abso-
lutely no existence (atyanāsad). It means that the past and future
dharmas too are absolutely inexistent, like the horn of the hare, and
hence no argument would be fruitful regarding their existence. The
Sautrāntika definitions of the past, future and present are given by
Śaṅtaraksita as follows:

The rūpa which is destroyed (vigata) after having been existent
(bhūtvā) is called past; when a rūpa will arise after concurrence of
total causes and conditions (= pratyayasākalya), it would be future.
But if their existence is admitted, then their presentness (vartamānatva)
would result, and as we know the existence or presentness is the
characteristic of present only.

The Scriptural statement of the Buddha that the rūpa also exist
in the past and future is said in the sense of a figurative attribution
(= adhyāropya). It should not be taken in a literal or real sense (na
bhāvatah). Thereupon the Vaibhāśikas are exasperated and ask: Who
has said that the past and future dharmas exist in the same sense in
which the present exists? Rather they maintain that only the essence
of the past and future dharmas exists permanently. The Sautrāntikas
rightly argue that if they exist permanently, then how are they called past and future? This inconsistency leads us to the conclusion that Buddha's statement, i.e. the past and future dharmas exist, must be understood otherwise. Actually, he intended to criticise "the Ajīvikas who denied moral responsibility for the past deeds" ... "the connexion between a past cause and a future result. In order to make it known that a former cause and a future result are something which happened formerly and will happen in future, he categorically declared: 'there is a past, there is a future'\textsuperscript{223}. Here the word 'is' (asti) is an accidental occurrence or a particle, \textsuperscript{224} "which may refer to something existent and to non-existent as well."\textsuperscript{225} For example, we say, there is absence of light before it is kindled, and there is absence of light after it is put out.\textsuperscript{226} In this sense the past and future dharmas exist, otherwise their existence cannot be proved.\textsuperscript{227} Now, if the Vaibhāṣikas maintain the existence of light in such conditions (i.e. in absence), then their doctrine may be compared to that of the Vaiśeṣikas who admit a separate category of absence (abhāva).

Regarding the Vaibhāṣika argument that consciousness arises from two factors: material object and sense-organs, or mind and mental object, Kamalaśīla responds that consciousness (vijñāna) is of two types - one is that which has its corresponding object (sālambana, objective), and the other which has no corresponding object (nirālambana, purely subjective). The Scriptural statement of Bhagavān Buddha, which the Vaibhāṣikas quote, about consciousness which arises depending on two factors cited above, means the first type (i.e. sālambana) and should be taken in an implied sense (= abhiṣamdhāya).\textsuperscript{228} Now the question arises: How is consciousness justified without having its corresponding object? As a matter of fact, in this category there is
no corresponding object (naivālambanam asti), and only abstract notions, such as God, Prakṛti (Pradhāna of the Sākhya system), kāla, etc. are considered in it. It is also not that such notions possess any eternal Words as their objective correlates as propounded by Bhaṭṭṛhari. Moreover, the objective characteristic of such notions is eternity (nityatva), which being the totality of causes and conditions (sakalahetutva) is determined by these abstract notions (= buddhyā), is disconnected (= viyoga) from Word, name, or the viprayuktaśaṃskāras. By the word 'ādi' in 'nityatvasakalahetuvādiḥ' means other causes and conditions, etc. (= nimittādeḥ), "which may be accepted" by the Vaibhāṣikas "as having potencies (svabhāva = sāmarthya) producing the mental reflex of an external object, etc. (arthapratibimbakādi)".

The Vaibhāṣikas protest that if consciousness may arise even without having any corresponding object, then how can it be called cognition (jñāna)? The very definition of consciousness as that which cognises (vijñātīti vijñānam), and its existence would be questioned, if the existence of the object to be cognised (vijnaya) is not admitted. The Sautrāntikas reply that the Vaibhāṣika theory, according to which the correspondence of consciousness (= bodhānugama) with the object is not possible without an object to be cognised (= vina bodhyena), is not correct. Actually, this bodhānugati of consciousness is of immaterial nature (= ajaḍaṛūpatva). As Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have Viṣṇu-nāvāda leanings, they admit that there is no external object to be manifested, and to its refutation they devote one entire section.

As to the next Vaibhāṣika argument that the past dharma exists, because it has a real result, the Sautrāntikas never maintain that the result emerges directly from the past karmas. Then the question
arises: How is it produced? This result, answers Vasubandhu, is produced from a particular state of the series of moments or events (= saṁtānaviśeṣāt). And this state originates from the previous act (= tātpūrvavāt).\textsuperscript{236} A detailed exposition of this topic is given by him in his AKB, chapter ix, where he refutes the Vātsiputriya's theory of ātmavāda.\textsuperscript{237}

Now, the Vaibhāṣikas interrogate: How does the past karma give a moral retribution? Śāntarakṣita does not maintain that the past moral cause (vipākahetu) gives any moral retribution (phala). The latter is a result of a series of momentary consciousness (vijñānaprabandha) which is influenced or perfumed (vāsita) by the former.\textsuperscript{238} Here vāsita means the series of momentary consciousness which, having been influenced by the past karma, becomes capable of producing moral retribution.\textsuperscript{239} But Bhagavān Buddha has taught, quote the Vaibhāṣikas, that karma, which is destroyed (kṣīṇa), annihilated (niruddha) and ripened (= viparinata), still exists.\textsuperscript{240} Therefore, they emphasise that "it could have some actual existence, i.e. some efficiency. Hence the words of Buddha imply an actual existence of the past"\textsuperscript{241} elements. Kamalasila warns that this statement should not be taken literally, since Buddha has taught this in a metaphorical sense (upacāreṇa). For example, a piece of gold, etc. produced by a basic element\textsuperscript{242} (mūladṛavya) actually forms a series of evanescent effects (phalaprabandha), which gives the impression of an everlasting substance (samabhāva), and though the basic element is already destroyed, yet it is called existing (= avināṣṭa, not destroyed). Likewise, the past karma, though destroyed, is said to be existing.\textsuperscript{243} Here Vasubandhu rectifies that when Buddha said "the past karma exists", he meant that it had the potency of producing effect. This potency is generated into the series of momentary
elements, which (i.e. series) gives the illusory notion of one united whole, by the past karma which is already annihilated. Nevertheless, if it is maintain that the past karma exists in reality by its own nature (svena bhāvena vidyamānam), then it would not be called 'past'. In other words, it would then be present.

As to the question of what was the purpose of Buddha's above metaphorical teaching, Kamalaśīla replies that here Buddha's main aim was to refute the doctrine of annihilationism (ucchedadṛśti) which establishes that there is no past karma which causes moral retribution. If he had said "there is no past karma" (nāsty atītam karma), then the teaching that the past karma causes and influences indirectly a series of momentary existences, which (i.e. series) possesses the potency of producing results, would fail and the people to be addressed (vineya) would be trapped into the doctrine of annihilationism. That is why Bhagavān preached "the past karma exists". Otherwise, if the past elements exist in reality (= svarūpeṇa), Buddha's following teaching (desanā) in the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra would be not only meaningless but also adverse: "When the eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere, and when it is annihilated, it does not go anywhere to accumulate. Thus, the eye comes into existence after having been inexistent, and it disappears (pratigacchati) after having been existent."

The Vaibhāṣikas inveigh against their opponent that if the Sautrāntika theory, that an element comes into existence after having been inexistent, is admitted, then it would signify that the element comes into existence after having been inexistent in the present time-epoch. But Kamalaśīla proclaims that it is not admissible, because the time-epochs and the dharma (bhāva) are not two different things. It means,
comment the Vaibhāṣikas, that the dharma having been inexistent in its essence comes into existence.\footnote{249} Again, Kamalaśīla replies that it would only prove that the future dharmas, such as the future eye, do not exist.\footnote{250}

The Vaibhāṣika\footnote{251} argument is that if the past and future dharmas are not really existing, then the present too would be inexistent, because the present is established (prajñāpyate) in relation to the past and future. And if the three time-epochs are lacking existence, then the conditioned dharmas also would be inexistent. If the conditioned dharmas are inexistent, then the asamskrta dharmas too would be deprived of existence, because the latter is established only in relation to the former. And if the existence of both kinds of dharmas are denied, then salvation and the attainment of Nirvāṇa would be inexistent. Thus, on admitting this negation there would arise a great false notion (mithyā-dṛṣṭi).\footnote{252} Therefore, to steer clear of any such heretical notion we have to maintain the existence of the past and future dharmas.

The following Sautrāntika response, Schayer\footnote{253} points out, seems to be an antistrophe of the preceding theory of the Mahāvibhāṣā. Kamalaśīla rejoins that if the saṃskṛta dharmas (= saṃskāras) exist permanently, then there would be an absence of causes and effects, which would lead to the unreality of the second āryasatyas, i.e. the truth of the origin of suffering (duhkhasamudayasatyā) which in turn eliminates the reality of the third and fourth āryasatyas, i.e. the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodhasatyā) and the path leading to the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodhamārgasya) respectively. Therefore, if the four noble truths (satyacatuṣṭaya) are denied, then the thorough knowledge (prajñā), abandonment (prahāna), realisation (sākṣātākṣaṇa) and accomplishment (bhāvanā) also would not be possible. And consequently, there would be
an absence of phalastha pudgalas (i.e. the individuals who are at the stage in which fruits or results are enjoyed) as well as pratipannaka pudgalas (i.e. the individuals striving for the attainment of salvation). Thus, the whole teaching (sakalam eva pravacanam) would be destroyed. That is why keeping these unavoidable fallacies in mind, says Kamalasila, it is necessary to maintain that the notion of the past dharmas, etc. does not have any corresponding objective counterpart.

As to the last argument of the Vaibhāṣikas that without admitting the existence of the past and future dharmas, their Yogic perception would be impossible, Śāntarakṣita sets forth that the Yogins do not perceive the past and future elements as such, rather they are direct or indirect (sākṣāt or pāramparyeṣa) reflection of the present (vartamanasya rūpam). This reflection is of two types: (i) as an effect (kārya) in relation to the past causes, and (ii) as a cause (kāraṇa) in relation to the future effects. The Yogins harmonise (= anugacchanti) it with their imaginative and corresponding consciousness (= vikalpānugatātmatābhiḥ), which is purely phenomenal (suddhalaukika), but in its essence (= tāttvika) it is without any objective correlate (aviṣaya). Thus, the teachings (deśanā) about the past and future dharmas are based on the past and future stream (saṃtatī) of the above causes and effects.

Finally, the Vaibhāṣikas never admit their defeat even after this long discussion in which they are caught again and again in dilemmas created by the Sautrāntikas, and nevertheless they maintain that the past and future dharmas certainly exist, but regarding the permanent existence of the dharmas they confess "that this is something we do not succeed in explaining, their essence is deep (it is transcendental), since its existence cannot be established by rational method."
Notes


3. See AK, AKB, AKV and AKP.


5. See LVP (1937), pp. 7-25, and the fragments of the Mahāvibhaṣa, translated by Schayer (1938). Takakusu (1975, p. 58) observes: "In Chinese we have .... two transmissions of the Vībhāṣa, Large (200 parts) and Small (14 parts). Whether one was an abridgement of the other we cannot tell for certain. But from several points of view we can imagine that the larger one belongs to the Kanśīra School and the smaller to the Gāndhāra School." But Professor M. Hattori of Kyoto University informs me that it is now certain that the Mahāvibhaṣa and Vībhāṣa are different in many respects regarding their contents, and so it cannot be said that the latter is an abridgement of the former.

6. See LVP (1937), pp. 25-134. The Nyāyānusāraśāstra is a commentary on the Abhidharmakośa. It is written in order to refute Vasubandhu's departure from the Sarvāstivāda doctrines. Sañghabhadra's other work - the Saññayapradīpā, is said to be an abridged edition of his Nyāyānusārāśāstra. See AKP, Introduction, p. xxii.

7. See AD and ADV. This work also, like the Nyāyānusāraśāstra, is written to refute Vasubandhu's leanings towards the Sautrāntikas in his AKB. Also see de Jong (1966), pp. 305-307; Sasaki (1962), pp. 373ff.


9. See Charles Willemen (1975). This text is also called the Abhidharmasāra by LVP (AKP, Introduction, pp. lxiii-lxvii) and Lin Li-kouang.
10. Willemen (ibid., pp. xv-xvi) on the basis of Lin Li-koung's (ibid., pp. 324-354) investigation affirms that there are three Dharma-trāta-s: (1) Bhadanta Dharma-trāta, a Dārṣṭāntika, one of the four masters of the Mahāvibhāga, the author of the Ch'ū Yao (Udana) Ching, (2) Dharma-trāta, the author of the Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya and the commentator of Vasubandhu's Pañcavastūkā, and (3) Dharma-trāta, a dhyāna-master, whose name is linked with the Ta-mo-lo Ch' an Ching.

Thus the preceding observation shows that it is first Dharma-trāta, i.e. Bhadanta Dharma-trāta, not the author of the Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya who is one of the four Sarvāstivāda teachers (Ghoṣaka, Dharma-trāta, Vasumitra and Buddhadēva) who are propounders of four kinds of theories in order to prove the doctrine of 'sarvam asti'.

Also see AKP, Introduction, pp. xlvi-li; Pelliot (1930), pp. 267-273.

11. It contains eight books and was translated into Chinese by Hsūn-čang. Two of its eight books have been reconstructed into Sanskrit by Santi Bhikṣu Sastri (1955). Also see LVP (1932A), pp. 323-327; AKP, Introduction, pp. xxix-xxxvi. For the seven treatises and their authors, see Frauwallner (1964), pp. 70ff; N. Dutt (1978), pp. 143ff; LVP, ibid.


13. See LVP (1925), pp. 343-376. It contains six chapters and deals with the pudgala, indriyas, cittas, kleśas, vijñānas, etc., according to Maudgalyāyana. The first two chapters contain the controversy of the past, present, future and the pudgalas. Also see AKP, Introduction, pp. xxxiii-xxxvi; Frauwallner (1964), pp. 88-92.

14. See AKP, ibid., p. xxxvii; Frauwallner, ibid., pp. 73-80. The Tibetan Dharmaskandha is an entirely different treatise from the Chinese one, see Takakusu (1905), p. 77, fn. 1.

15. LVP (1918, pp. 295-350) has translated into French its first two sections of the Tibetan version, namely, Lokaprajñāpti and Kāraṇaprajñāpti. Also see AKP, ibid., pp. xxxvii-xl. On the Prajñāptiśāstra, see Paul Mus (1939A). The most recent work on this subject is by Eugène Denis (1977). For its review see de Jong (1980), pp. 70-73.

The Prajñāptiśāstra is the only one preserved in Tibetan. The Chinese version is not complete. The Tibetan version has three sections - Lokaprajñāpti, Kāraṇaprajñāpti and Kārmaprajñāpti. The Abhidharmakośa, chapter III, also contains a detailed exposition of Lokaprajñāpti. "In the Chinese Prajñāptiśāstra itself (No. 1317), the title Lokaprajñāpti is given, but its contents are missing, while the Kāraṇaprajñāpti practically forms the whole text" - Takakusu (1905), p. 77, fn. 1.
16. McGovern (1925, p. 28) and Potter (1974, p. 3) think that its author was Vasumitra. Also see AKP, ibid., pp. xli-xlili; Frauwallner (1964), pp. 80-88.

17. See Frauwallner, ibid., pp. 71-73; AKP, ibid., p. xlii.

18. Willemen (1975, p. xix) informs us that there are three Vibhāṣā-s (commentaries) on the dhānāprasthāna as follows:

(i) The Vibhāṣāśāstra (by Shih-t'o-p'an-ni, T. 1547, attributed to Saṃghabhadra and most probably revised by Saṃghadeva in Lo-yang)

(ii) The Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra (by the 500 Arhats, T.1546)

(iii) The Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra (by the 500 Arhats, T. 1545, tr. by Hsūn-tsang).


20. N. Dutt (1978, p. v) thinks that there were four scholars bearing the name of Vasumitra:

(i) Vasumitra of Kaniska's Council and one of the authors of the Mahāvibhāṣā

(ii) Vasumitra of the Sautrāntika school

(iii) Vasumitra who appeared a thousand years after Buddha's parinirvāṇa, and

(iv) Vasumitra of the Sarvāstivāda school, from whom Hsūn-tsang learnt the Sarvāstivāda doctrines.


21. Takakusu (1975), p. 58. He calls Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra as the Neo-Vaibhāṣikas (ibid., p. 60) and their period is called the Neo-Vibhāṣā period (McGovern, 1923, p. 29). Also see LVP (1937), p. 95, fn. 1.

22. CPB, p. 68. Nakamura (1980, p. 107, fn. 44) remarks: "The Vibhāṣā-śāstra... seems to have been an independent treatise which was composed prior to the older and newer versions of the Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra.


24. Conze (1975A, p. 140) defines the Sarvāstivādins as "those who teach that also past and future events exist." Here neither does he give any textual reference to support this statement, nor does he define what he means by 'events'. We find the Sarvāstivādins often speaking of the past, present and future dharmas, but not the events.

25. For the Mādhyamika criticism of saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta dharmas, see MK, VII and MKV thereon; CPB, pp. 191ff; CS, IV and CSV thereon.
26. CCB, p. 4, fn. 1.
27. Cf. ibid., p. 5.
29. See CCB, p. 5, fn. 3: "This passage .... cannot be traced in the Pali canon. Evidently the Theravādins suppressed it, because it did not agree with their particular tenet." On this point Kalupahana (1966, pp. 94ff) criticises Stcherbatsky and makes a comparative study of the Sāṃyukta Āgama and the Sāṃyutta Nikāya.
32. Cf. MKV, p. 389.5-6; ČSV, pp. 59.27-60.1: uktaḥ hi Bhagavatā - pañceśāmi bhikṣavo nāmamātraṁ pratijñāmātraṁ vyasvāhāramātraṁ saṃvṛtimātraṁ. tad yathātīto 'dhwānāgato 'dhwākāśo nirvāṇaṁ pudgalaś cety ādi.
Gūpareṇa, in his commentary - Tarkarahasyadīpiṇā on Sāddarśanasmucocaya of Haribhadrasūri (p. 73), points out that the above passage is set forth by the Sautrāntikas. Also see CPB, p. 198.
34. D.N. Sastri (1976), p. 54. Also see A.K. Chatterjee (1975), pp. l6ff and the following stanza:

artho jñānasaṃvānto matimatā Vaibhāṣikeṇocayate /
pratyakṣo na hi vāhyavastuvistarāḥ Sautrāntikair āśritaḥ //
- Sāddarśanasmucocaya, p. 75.2-3.
35. CCB, p. 95.
36. Cf. CCB, p. 39ff, where Stcherbatsky deals with different forces (saṃskāras), the forces of origination (utpāda), decay (jaraḥ), maintenance (sthiti), destruction (anītātā). For the Sarvāstivāda theory of moment, see AK, ii, 46 and Bhāṣya and Vyākhya thereupon. For the criticism of the saṃskṛta-lākṣaṇas, see CPB, pp. 191ff.
37. CCB, p. 35.
38. Cf. AD, V, Kārikā 296 and its commentary thereon. Also cf. AKV, pp. 801.23-802.15: svalaṅkaṣaṇaṁ - sukhavedanīyādī vastu, tatra rāgāḥ sukhavedanīyaṁ eva vastvālamhyotpadyata iti svalaṅkaṣaṅkaśa ity ucyate. tena sukhavedanīyaḥ vastvālambyasamānennatir bhavatīti māna 'pi svalaṅkaṣaṅkaśaḥ. tatha duḥkhavedanīyaṁ vastvālambya pratigha utpadyate iti pratigho 'pi svalaṅkaṣaṅkaśa ity ucyate. sāmānyakleśāḥ ca. dṛṣṭīvicikitsādayāḥ. sāmānyāḥ sāmānyena vā klesāḥ sāmānyakleśāḥ. ete hy aviśeṣeṇa sukhavedanīyādike vastūny utpadyante iti, atas tadālambya utpannāḥ klesāḥ 'sāmānyakleśāḥ' ity ucyante.
39. AK, V. 23.

40. AK, V. 24a: sesaiś tu sarvaiḥ sarvatra saṃyuktāḥ. Also cf. CCB, p. 76.

41. Cf. AKB, p. 803.5-7: kiṃ punar idam atītānāgatam ucyate 'asti, atha na ? yady asti sarvakalāstītvā, saṃskārāṇāṃ saśvatavāṃ prāṇotpātaḥ; atha nāsti, kathām tatra tena ca saṃyukto bhavati visamyaṃkto vā ?

42. Cf. ibid., p. 803.7-8: na saṃskārāṇāṃ saśvatavāṃ pratiṣṇāyate Vaibhāṣikaiḥ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇayogāt.

43. Cf. AK, V. 25a: sarvakalāstītī.

44. Cf. ibid., 25a-b: uktatvāt, dvayaḥ, sadviṣayāt, phalāt. The Vibhaṣaṇī also advances a series of arguments, see LVP (1937), pp. 9ff.

45. Cf. AKB, p. 804.4-7; ADV on kārikā 305. Also cf.: "atīte rādhā rūpe anapekṣho hohi, anāgataṃ rūpaṃ mā abhinandā, paccuppannassa rūpassa nibbidāya virāgyā nirodhyā cāgāya paṭinissaggāya paṭipajja" ti – quoted in the Nettipakarana, p. 30; MKV, p. 444.11-14; MN, III, pp. 188.1ff.


LVP (1925, pp. 343-376) has translated some parts of the Vījnānakāya of Devasarman which deal with the existence of the past and future dharmas.

46. Cf. AKB, p. 804.9-11: "dvayaḥ pratītya vījnānasotapādaḥ" ity uktam. dvayaḥ katam? caksu rūpāḥ yāvat manodharma iti. asati vā 'tītānāgate tad ālambanaṃ vījaṇanāṃ dvayaḥ pratītya na syāt. evam tāvad āgamaṃ 'sty atītānāgataṃ; also cf. TSP, p. 616.6-9; SN, II, pp. 72.4ff; AK, III.32.

47. CCB, p. 78.

48. TSP, pp. 615.24-616.4. Also cf. AKB, pp. 804.9-805.2.

49. AK, II.54c-d.

50. TSP, p. 616.9-12: api ca - atītaṃ karma phaladaṃ na syāt, yadi tan niḥsattvaṃ sattāśūnyam bhavet; phalotpattikāle vipākahetor abhāvāt. na cāsataḥ kāryotpādanaśaktir asti; sarvasaṃarthavārahalakṣaṇatvād asattvasya. Also cf. AKB, p. 805.1-2.

51. Māndhānī and Māndhāno are two wrong readings, see TS, p. 616, fn. 2; also see AKP, iii, p. 28, fn. 6.

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53. Cf. AKB, p. 805.9: ye he sarvam asti iti vadanti atitam anāgataṃ
pratyutpannam ca, te Sarvāstivādaṁ.

54. Cf. ibid., p. 805.9-10: ye tu kecīd asti yat pratyutpannam adatta-
phalam cāti ti karma, kiñcina nāsti yad dattaphalam atitam anāgataṃ
ce ti vibhajeya vadanti, te Vibhajeyyavādīnaḥ.

LVP (AKP, V, p. 52, fn. 1) quotes Paramārtha: "If a man says
that everything exists, past, future, present, space, pratissan-
khyanirrodoḥ (= Nīrāga), apratissākhyānirodoḥ, then one says that
this man is of the Sarvāstivāda school. There are other men who
say: 'The present dharmas exist; the past acts, if they have not
given their fruit, exist; when they have given their fruit and
the future dharmas, which are not fruit (of a past or present act)
do not exist'. These men who say that the three epochs exist,
but make these distinctions, one does not say that they are
Sarvāstivādins, but that they are Vibhajeyvādins."

Also ibid., p. 23, fn. 1, where LVP quotes the Vibhāṣa. 84.1:
"Others say that, among the twelve misapprehensions (vipāryāsa),
eight are only abandoned by seeing the truths, and four, also by
the meditation. These doctors are Vibhajeyvādins."

On the Vibhajeyvādins, P'ou-kouang, 20, 4: "They say that
there is no categorical opinion which is completely correct (rēi
tsin li), that (the past and future) partly exist, partly do not
exist, and that it must distinguish: therefore one calls them
"the school of those who speak after having distinguished (rēn piē
cho'i pōu), in Sanskrit Vibhajeyvādīnaḥ". According to the
Vijñaptimātravṛtti (wēi chē chōu), iv. 35, 10: "Those whom one
calls the Vibhajeyvādins are now the Prajñaptivādins (cho'i kia pōu)".
According to the Samayabhedoparacacakra (tsōng lüên): "Two
hundred years later a school called Prajñaptivādin emerged from the
Mahāsāṅghika" (see Wassiliev, p. 251, and the note where one sees
that, in the version of the Samayabheda, one of the two Chinese
translators reads here Vibhajeyvādīna). A commentary remarks there-
upon: "According to these two explanations, the Vibhajeyvādīn only
make a single school (with the Prajñaptivādins). But the Vibhāṣa,
25,5: "The Mahāsāṅghikas, etc. are called Vibhajeyvādīn." Also
the Arthadāta (wēi tēng): "Either the Vibhajeyvādins are certain
masters of the Great Vehicle, or all the schools of the Small
Vehicle are called Vibhajeyvādins: these are not a particular
school. Also, in the Saṃgharaśāstra (wēi lēn), the Vibhajeyvādins
are strictly defined as being the Mahīśāsakas: in the Vibhāṣa, they
are strictly defined as being the Sāmmitīyas."

55. Schayer (1938, p. 29, fn. 2) informs us that "the exposition of the
four doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda, as given by Kāmalāśīla, is a
quite accurate reproduction of Mahāvibhāṣa, T. 1545, p. 396;
Abhidharmaṇakosā (tr. Poussin), V, pp. 52-56; Nyāyānusāra, T. 1562,
p. 631."

Also see LVP (1937), pp. 22-25, 89ff.

It is to be noted that the Sarvāstivādins are also called
Saṃkrāntivādīnāḥ. "They teach that skandhas, etc. exist in three
time-epochs without changing and without abandoning their essence
(= asamkīrṇasvabhāvāḥ, ajahatsvabhāvāḥ). This is denied by
Sautrāntikas, the advocates of the doctrine – abhūtva bhavati,
who may be consequently designed as Asamkṛāntivādīnāḥ. The term
saṃkrānti, however, denotes also 'transmigration of the sukṣmacitta from one world to the other' and in this sense the Sarvāstivādins (= the Vaibhāṣikas) are Aṣaṃkrāntivādins, the Sautrāntikas - saṃkrāntivādins." - Schayer (1938), p. 29, fn. 1.

Also cf. TS, kārikā 4 and TSP on kārikā 5; J. Masuda (1925), pp. 66, fn. 3; E. Lamotte (1936), p. 163. Also see Bāreu (1955), pp. 155ff. On the four Sarvāstivāda teachers, see AKP, Introduction, pp. xlii-li.


57. bhāva is translated by different scholars differently:

manner of being (manière d'être) ... LVP (1937), pp. 22, 89.
becoming, being, state, condition, manner of being, nature, character, etc. .... Monier-Williams (1974), p. 754.
being ............... Schayer (1938), p. 29.
mode, form, quality ... N. Dutt (1978), p. 155.
mode of existence ..... G.N. Jha (1939), p. 862.


59. Schayer (1938, p. 30, fn. 1) disagrees with E.H. Johnson (Early Sāmkhya, 1937, p. 31) that "there is an old connection between bhāva - 'state of being' and the guṇa of the Sāmkhya.....". Also see Stcherbatsky (1934), pp. 737-760; Harsh Narain (1961), pp. 45-51.

60. Cf. AKB, pp. 805.15-806.3: bhāvanyathiko BhadantaDharmatrātaḥ. sa kilāhā - dharmasyādhvasu pravartamānasya bhāvanyathātvam bhavati, na dravyānathātvam. yathā suvarṣapāhājanasya bhittvān-yathā kriyamānasya saṃsthānānāthātvam bhavati, na varṇānathātvam. yathā ca κ्ष्रा दादित्वेना परिप्रम सरवियाभिपक्कम परिप्रम्यात, na varṇaṃ. evam dharmo 'py anāgatad adhvanam pratyutpannam adhvānām āgačchān anāgataabhāvam jahāti, na dravyabhāvam. evam pratyutpānām āgačchān pratyutpannabhāvam jahāti, na dravyabhāvam iti.

Also cf. TSF p. 614.7-12; LVP (1937), pp. 23, 90; CCB, p. 79; ADV, p. 259.10-16; Yoga-bhāṣya, iii, 13.

61. laksāṇa is rendered differently as follows:


62. Cf. AKB, p. 806.4-6: laksāṇānyathiko BhadantaGhoṣakaḥ. sa kilāhā - dharmo 'dhvasu pravartamāno 'tītā 'tītalaksāṇa-yuktāt, anāgata-
pratyutpānabhyam laksanābhyaḥ aviyuktāḥ. evaṃ pratyutpanno 'py
aftānāgatābhyaṃ aviyuktāḥ. tad yathā - puruṣa ekasyaṃ strīyāṃ
raktāḥ, śeṣasya avirakta iti.
Also cf. TSP, p. 614.15-17; ADV, pp. 259.17-260.2; LVP (1937),
pp. 23, 91; Yoga-bhāṣya, on 3.13.

63. Cf. TSP, p. 614.18: asya hy atitādilaksanavṛttiḥbhāṣekṣo vyavahāra
iti pūrvakāḥ bhedah.
Also see AKP, p. 53, fn. 1: "When a characteristic is active
(lahdhavṛtti), the dharma is equipped with this characteristic,
but it is not deprived of other characteristics, for, in this hypo­
thesis, a certain future dharma cannot exist ... like the present
and past dharmas".

avasthā is translated by different scholars differently:

condition .... CCB, p. 79; AKP, p. 53; LVP (1937 , pp. 23, 91)
gives another word also for avasthā - 'état' or
condition, aspect, state .... G.N. Jha (1939), p. 862.

p. 156).

66. Cf. AKB, p. 806.7-9: avasthā 'nyathiko BhadantaVasumitraḥ. sa
kīlāḥ - dharma 'dhausu pravartamāno 'vasthām avasthāṃ prāpyanyo
'nayo nirdīṣyate avasthāntaraṅṭeh, na dravyāntaraṅṭeh. yathāikā
gulikā ekāṅge nikṣiptā ekān ity ucayate, śatāṅke śatam, sahasrāṅke
saḥsrasam iti.
23, 91; Yoga-bhāṣya, 3.13.

67. Cf. AKV, p. 806.23-25: yasyāṃ avasthāyāṃ yo dharmāḥ kāritraṃ na
karoti tasyāṃ tātā rogataḥ ucayate, yasyāṃ karoti tasyāṃ 'vartamānah',
yasyāṃ kṛtvā niruddhāḥ tasyāṃ 'atitāh'.
261.4-7.

68. Cf. AKB, p. 807.1-3: anyathānyathiko BhadantaBuddhadevaḥ. sa kīlāha-
dharmā 'dhausu pravartamānah pūrvvāparam apekṣyāno 'nya ucyate
avasthāntaraṅṭeh, na dravyāntaraṅṭeh. yathāikā strī mātā vocyate
duhiṭā cetī.
Also cf. TSP, p. 615.3-6; ADV, p. 260.7-11; LVP (1937), pp.
23-24, 91-92; Yoga-bhāṣya, 3.13; P.M. Williams (1977), pp. 279-
294.

69. LVP (AKP, p. 54, fn. 1) observes: "The two commentators of Hsuan-
tsang differ. According to Pa-pao, the future is established in
relation (apekṣya) to the past and present; the past, in relation
to the present and future; the present, in relation to the past
and future. This is the opinion of Saṃghabhadra. According to
P'ou-kouang, the future, in relation to the anterior; the past,
in relation to the posterior; the present, in relation to both:
this is the system of the Vibhāṣa, 77, 2."
70. LVP (AKP, V, p. 54, fn. 2) writes: "..... The Ekavyavahārika school (i-chouo-pōu) says that the three epochs are only words, that their nature does not exist.

The Lokottaravādins establish the epochs on the ground of the dharma: therefore, that which is mundane (laukika) exists relatively; that which is supra-mundane (lokottara) exists in reality.

For the school of the Sūtras, for the school of the Mahāsaṅghikas (king-pōu; ta-tchong-pōu), the past and future do not exist; the present exists."


74. Cf. AKB, p. 807.5: sāṅkhya-pakse nikṣeptavyah; TSP, p. 615.8; ADV, p. 259.14. A detailed analysis of the Sāṅkhya doctrines is found in the Prakṛtiparītikā of TSP. P.S. Jaini (AD, Introduction, p. 89) informs us that Vasubandhu wrote a treatise specially to refute the Sāṅkhya doctrines. Also see Liebenthal (1934).

Actually the first of the four doctrines is of the Vibhāṣa which is repeated in AKB, as LVP (1937, p. 92) thinks. This is not correct, because the Vibhāṣa rather criticises it, see LVP (1937), pp. 22-25, and Keith (1923), p. 165. LVP contradicts himself, see his AKP, V, p. 54, fn. 3, where he writes:

The Vibhāṣa, 77, 1, refutes the theory of the difference of bhāva: "Beyond the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of a dharma, what can well be its bhāva ?" But a commentary says: The nature of a dharma in the three epochs is not transformed; there is only difference in the fact of activity (kārita), of non-activity, etc. This is the bhāva of the dharma there. And this transformation (paripāma) is not like that of Sāṅkhya. The latter says that the nature of the dharmas is eternal and that it transforms itself into the twenty three tattvas. Whereas the nature of the conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharma is not eternal. It is on the basis of this modification, activity, non-activity, etc. that we speak of transformation. The theories established by Ghosaka and Buddhadeva are also irreproachable. They do not present great difference with that of Vasumitra. Only Vasumitra gives a solid and simple explanation. The master of the Sastra (Vasu-bandhu) too, in agreement with the Vibhāṣa, prefers it ....

Here it seems that the above mentioned commentary (the author of which is not given by La Vallée Poussin) opposes the statement of the Vibhāṣa and also contradicts itself. Firstly, it maintains that the nature of the dharma in the three epochs is not transformed. .... This shows that it is eternal and thus is in agreement at this
point with the Sāṃkhya. If the nature of the conditioned dharmas is not eternal, what kind of nature, if we take nature means sva-bhāva (dravya, substance), is that which is not transformed during the three epochs? Secondly, both the Vibhaṅga (LVP, 1937, p. 25) and the aforesaid commentary accept the theory of Vasumitra. And Vasumitra (AKB, p. 806.7-9; TSP, p. 614.19-23; ADV, p. 260.3-6; AKP, V, p. 54; LVP 1937, pp. 23, 91ff) admits that there is a change of states only, not of the substance or thing or dravya. Thirdly, Vasubandhu prefers the theory of Vasumitra not because he is in agreement with the Vibhaṅga, but because he finds some good points in it regarding the notion of kārita to discuss with. Finally, as we will see, he rejects them all.

Saṅghabhadra in his 'Nyāyānusārābāstra' opposes Vasubandhu's charge against Dharmatrata of being on the Sāṃkhya side: "This is not correct. As a matter of fact, the Bhadanta does not say that the essence (dravya) of conditioned dharma is eternal. In traversing the three epochs the dharma disappears, the dharma appears. He says only that, the dharma wandering through the epochs, although the dravyalakaṇa remains the same, the manner of existence (sing-lei) differs. This theory is partially similar to that of Vasumitra. How can one consider it as similar to that of the unbelieving Sāṃkhyas?" - LVP (1937), p. 92; also see Schayer (1938), p. 31, fn. 1.

Professor H. Hattori, on the basis of Akira Hirakawa's Japanese article, 'Usetsuna to Setsunametsu' (Kṣanika and Kṣanabhaṅga), published in Kanakura commemoration volume, Kyoto, Ḍerākū Shoten, 1966, pp. 159-171, suggests to me that Hirakawa has mentioned in his above article a Chinese phrase: san shih shih yu, fa t'i heng yu, the literal translation of which is: "The three time-epochs really exist and the essence of a dharma is permanent". But Hirakawa does not agree with this phrase and interprets it as "It means that a dharma really exists in the three time-epochs". In respect of the essence of a dharma, he pronounces, there is no time-epoch, but in respect of its kārita there are time-epochs. Hirakawa's observations are in accordance with the Chinese translation of the Abhidharmakośa-bhaṣya (Taishō edition). It is also to be noticed that the preceding Chinese phrase is not found in the Sanskrit Abhidharmakośa-bhaṣya.

75. TSP, p. 615.9-11: pūrvasvabhāva-parityāgena va pariṇāmo bhavet, parityāgena va? yady aparirtyāgena, tadā 'dhvasaṅkāra-prasaṅgaḥ, attha parityāgena, tadā sadā 'stitvavirodhaḥ.


77. See CCB, p. 43ff. On the relation between Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, J.W. de Jong (1976, pp. 32-34) gives a number of valuable references with his own brief comments and analysis. Also see Stcherbatsky (1934), pp. 737-760; Harsh Narain (1961), pp. 45-56.

78. For samanvāgama, see May (1959), p. 111, fn. 279.
79. Cf. TSP, p. 615.12-15: dytjtasyāpi vādino 'yam saṅkara eva; sarvasya sarvalokaṁyogābh. puruṣas tv arthaṁ sarbāḥsarvaṁ-
sarvamātmāṁ rakte ucayate 'viraktaḥ ca saṁvaṁāmaṁātreṇa, na tu
dharmasya lokaṁsarvaṁātmā sarvaṁāmāvaṁ āvaṁ prāptilaṁkār
stri, anyatvaprasaṅgāl lokaṁyogaṁ prāptivād iti na saṁyam
dṛṣṭāntasya dṛṣṭāntikena.
Also cf. AKB, p. 807.5-7; ADV, p. 260.18-19; LVP (1937), pp.
24, 92; and Yoga-bhasya, 3.13.
For prāpti and saṁvāgaṁ see AK, II, 36b: prāpti labhaṁ
saṁvāgaṁ (prāpti is acquisition and possession), and AKB there-
upon.
Cf. AKP, II, p. 179: prāpti is of two kinds - "(1) acquisition
(labha, pratilambha) of that which has not been obtained (prāpta)
and acquisition of that which has been lost; (2) possession
(saṁvāgaṁ, saṁvāya) of that which, having been obtained,
has not been lost."
Also cf. AKP, II, p. 179, fn. 1: "..... The terms labha and
saṁvāgaṁ have not the same sense in the Abhidharma and the
Kathāvatthu, ix.12. For the Theravādī, labha signifies 'possession',
for example, the Saints possess the power to realise at their will
this or that meditation; saṁvāgaṁ means the actual realisation.
Elsewhere (iv. 4) one distinguishes the pratīlabhaṁsaṁvāgaṁ and
the saṁmukhibhāvasaṁvāgaṁ, potential possession (saṁvāgaṁ of
the Abhidharma) and actual possession (saṁmukhibhāva of the Abhi-
dharma)."
On prāpti see Conze (1962), pp. 138ff.
80. Cf. TSP, p. 615.17-19: caturthasyāpy ekasminn evādhanī trayo
'dhvānaḥ prāptavānti. tathā hi - atite 'dhvānaṁ pūrvavaścīmau
kṣaṇāt atītaṁ kṣaṇaṁ pratyutpanna iti. esa
dūṣanāpya esām spaśṭā.
Also cf. AKB, p. 807.7-9; ADV, p. 260.14-16; LVP (1937) pp. 24,
92.
81. Cf. LVP, ibid.; TSP, p. 615.8ff; ADV, p. 260.14ff; AKB, p. 807.5ff.
82. Cf. ibid., also Keith (1923), p. 166.
83. Cf. AK, V. 26c-d: trītyaḥ śobhanaḥ, aḍhvaṁaḥ kāritaṁ vyavasthitāḥ.
85. Cf. TS, kārikā 1791 and TSP thereon; AKB, p. 808.5-6: yadā sa
dharmāḥ kāritaṁ na karoti taddā anāgataṁ. yadā karoti taddā pratyut-
pannaḥ. yadā kṛtvā niruddhas taddā atīta iti; AD, kārikā, 303 and
ADV thereon.
Also cf. AKV, p. 809.15-16: uparatakāritaṁ atitam, sprāpta-
kāritaṁ anāgataṁ, pratyutpannaṁkāritaṁ vartāmanāṁ iti.
88. PC, p. 85.
89. E.J. Thomas (1951), pp. 164-165.

90. Ibid., p. 165.

91. AKP, IV, p. 62.


93. See LVP (1937), p. 8. But Vibhāṣā's statement is contradicted by Abhidharmakośa-bhasya, Kathāvatthu and Abhidharmadīpa-vṛtti as follows:

(1) AKB, p. 805.10-11: ye tu kecid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalam cātītaṃ karma, kīcchīn nāsti yad dattaphalam atītam anāgataṃ ceti vibhajya vaddanti, te Vibhajyavādinaḥ.

The same theory is found in the Kathāvatthu, i.8 (see PC, pp. 101-104), but it is referred to the Kassapikas (see ibid., KA thereupon). This means that the Vibhajyavādins and the Kassapikas are the same, or at least both of them admitted the same theory regarding the conception of time.

Also see the Milindapañha (tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, 1975, I, pp. 77-78), where this theory is not referred to any particular school.

At this point Bareau (1957, p. 359) seems to accept the Vibhāṣā's above expression about the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins, or at least by-passes the preceding statement of AKB and the following one of ADV, p. 257.4-5:

(2) vibhajyavādinās tu Dārṣṭāntikasya ca pradeśo vartamānādhaṃvā- saṃāññakah.


96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.


100. Ibid., fn. 2.


102. Cf. AKP, IV, p. 62: "Quel est le dharma que nous appelons 'temps' (kāla) ? Ce n'est pas une substance (padārtha) éternelle, comme le croient quelques-uns. Le mot 'temps' est une expression par laquelle sont désignés les saṃskāras en tant que passés, futurs, actuels."
Also cf. AKV, p. 620.24-27: kālo nityaḥ padārtho 'sti' ity eke. tad āśāṅkayaḥ prcchati - kālo nāma ka eṣa dharma iti. kāla ity asyāṃhīdānasya kim abhiddhayam ity arthaḥ. saṃskārāparidipanādhivacanam etad iti. saṃskārāṇāṃ atītāṅgatapratyutpānānāṃ abhidyo-takam nāmeti.

Also see LVP (1937), p. 9.

103. Cf. AKB, p. 26.4: ta eva saṃskṛta gatagacchadgамиyad bhāvād adhvāṇaḥ. Also see AKP, I, p. 12:

"Les conditionnés sont les chemins - c'est-à-dire les époques, le passé, le présent et le futur - parce qu'ils ont pour nature d'être allés ...., d'aller, de devoir aller. De même, d'un chemin, on dit qu'il allait, qu'il va, qu'il ira à la ville."

104. LVP (1937), pp. 8ff.

105. Ibid., p. 8, fn. 2:

On ne traduirait pas mal: "autre chose que les choses" - saṃskāra, au sens étroit, un autre nom pour "acte" (deuxième terme du Pratītyasamutpāda); au sens large, que nous avons ici, presque synonyme de saṃskṛta, "produit par les conditions, conditionné"; le "conditionnant", saṃskāra, est toujours "conditionné". - De même pratītyasamutpāda = pratītyasamutpanna, Kośa, [AKP] III, p. 74.

106. Ibid., pp. 8-9.


108. Here saṃskāras are not different from the saṃskṛtas or conditioned dharmas. Cf. ibid., p. 93, fn. 1.

109. Ibid., p. 93.


111. Cf. TSP, p. 616.20-22: adhvānaḥ saṅgraho yesām te 'dhvasaṅghrahā rūpādayaḥ. ādiśabdena vedanādiparigrahā, tesām bhāvo rūpāditvam. astūpy ādiśabdena duḥkhasamudayānityānātmāditvopadiṣṭatvād iti gṛhyate.

112. Cf. AKB, p. 808.7-8: yady atītam api dravyaḥ 'sty anāgatām iti kasmāt tad atītam ity ucyate, anāgatam iti vā?


114. Ibid., p. 356.


Also cf. ibid., fn. 2: "Vibhāṣā, 76.11: "La sensation non encore éprouvée est futur; pendant qu'on l'éprouve, présente; éprouvée, passée ....."

For sabhāga and tatsabhāga, see AKB, I, 39; AKP, I, pp.
74-75, 81ff.

117. In other words "an actually given dharma of the homogeneous series forming the so-called eye" - Schayer (1938), p. 36.

darśanādilakṣaṇo vyāpāraḥ, yathā pañcānāṁ caksūrādīnṛm darśanādi-
kam - yataś cakṣuṇaḥ pasyati, śrotāṁ śṛṇoti, ghrāṇaṁ jighṛati,
jiḥva śvādayatītyādīvijñānasyāpi vijñāṭṛtvam vijñāṇātītī kṛtvā
rūpādīnāṁ indriyagocaratvam. evaṁ sati pratyutpattasya tatsabhā-
gasya cakṣuo nirdāvavasthāyāṁ kāritrābhāvād varṣamānātā na syāt.


120. Cf. AK, II, 49: kāranaṁ sahabhūṣ caiva sabhāgarah savamprayuktakah / sarvatrago vipākākhyāḥ śaḍvidho hetur iṣyate //
Also cf. Abhidharmaharṇḍaya (Nanjio, 1288), ii, 11 - quoted in AKP, p. 245, fn. 1; CCB, p. 81, fn. 1; Yamakami Sogen (1979), Appendix,
54-55; also ibid., p. 55:
"The Lohkāvatāra ..... also has a theory of sixfold hetu:
(1) bhavisyadhhetu, (2) saṁbandhahetu, (3) laksanahetu, (4) kāraṇa-
hetu, (5) vyañjanaḥhetu, (6) upeksāḥhetu."

121. Sāhyutta, iv, 87, etc. - quoted in AKP, II, p. 245, fn. 2(a).

122. See AKP, II, p. 245, fn. 2(f).

123. See ibid., pp. 288, 290.

124. Ibid., p. 298; Schayer (1938), p. 36.

125. See AKP, II, p. 288.

126. See ibid., p. 290.

127. Ibid., p. 289.

128. Cf. ibid., p. 290 and also fn. 1.

129. Ibid., p. 297.

130. Ibid., p. 275.

131. Ibid., p. 293, fn. 3: "tasya bījabhāvopagamanāt. The dharma always
exists, be it future, present or past. We say that it takes or
projects a fruit in the moment when, being present, it becomes
the cause or seed of a fruit. The Vyākhyā observes that the comparison
of the seed belongs to the theory of the Sautrāntikas. Also, "this
text is missing in certain manuscripts" (kvacit pustake nāsti eṣa
Elsewhere the Vyākhya explains: pratigr̄hantity āksipanti hetubhāvenopatiṣṭhanta ity arthaḥ".

Also see P.S. Jaini (1959), pp. 236-249.

132. Cf. ibid., p. 293.

133. Cf. ibid.

134. Cf. TSP, p. 617.14-17: atha phaladānagrahaṇalakṣaṇam kārītram, yathā - cakṣuṣā sahabhāva dharmā jātyādayaḥ puruṣakārṇaphalam, anantarotpānāṁ cakṣur indriyaṁ puruṣakārṇaphalam adhipatiṇḍhām nīsyandaphalāṁ ca, etat phalāṁ janaṇāt prayacchadd hetubhāva-vasthānād gr̄hiṇac cakṣur vartamanāṁ ucyata iti.


136. Cf. ibid., p. 817.18: atha samastam eva phaladānagrahaṇalakṣaṇaṁ kārītram iy Ļate.

137. Schayer (1938), p. 36.


Also cf. CCB, p. 82; AKP, V, p. 56: LVP (1937), p. 94; and TSP, p. 617.19: evam atītasya sabhāghetvatār dhravartamanatvaprasaṅgaḥ.


140. LVP (1937), p. 95, fn. 1) observes: "In [AK] kārikā, ii, 46a-b, vṛtti is translated as neng which the editor Kiokuga Saeki explains as kong-neng.

"The ancient Sarvāstivādins (the Vibhāṣa) do not distinguish tso-yong (= kārita) and kong-neng (= vṛtti, sāmarthya, vyāpāra). (But due to the lack of this distinction, one is not able to answer the objection: "The good action of the past gives a pleasant fruit of retribution; so it has kārita, activity; therefore, according to the definition, it must be present", .... [ibid., p. 93]). The neo-Sarvāstivādins, [such as] Saṅghabhadra, distinguish them: The conditioned ones, which are cause (hetu) and bring their "proper fruit", this is their kārita; when they are condition (pratavya) and assist another thing, this is their power (vṛtti, sāmarthya, vyāpāra): all the present ones are cause, all the present eyes bring the future eyes to the existence: all the present ones are not condition which assists another thing: for example, in the obscurity the potency of eye is damaged; it does not make the visual consciousness to be born .... Only the present has kārita, the potency of grasping (or projecting) the fruit; the past cannot have that potency, the phaladāna-kong-neng, the potency of "giving" the fruit, of making another thing to be born."


143. Cf. ibid., and LVP (1937), p. 95.

144. LVP (1937), pp. 95-96; also cf. TSP, p. 617.20-23.

145. AK, V, kārikā 27:

kim vighnāṇat tat kathaṁ nānyat, adhvāyogāḥ, tathā sataḥ / ajātanaśṭatā kena gambhīra khalu dharmatā //

146. For the Mādhyamika conception of svabhāva, see J.W. de Jong (1972), pp. 1-6. This paper is the English translation of the author’s French article, Le problème de l’absolu dans l’école Mādhyamaka, which was read at the 21st Congress of Orientalists in Paris on 27 July, 1948, and was published in the Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger.

For the Vaibhāśika notion of svabhāva and dravya, see La Vallée Poussin’s observations (LVP, 1937, p. 96, fn. 5).

147. Cf. AK, V, 27a and AKV thereon; CCB, p. 82; LVP (1937), p. 96.


149. LVP (1937), p. 96.

150. Cf. ibid., p. 51.

151. Ibid., p. 97.

152. See ibid., fn. 1: We have: tchou-hing (sāṃskārāḥ), tse-t’ī (sva-svabhāvāḥ), tchong-yuen (pratyāyāḥ), i-ts’ie-che (sasvādāḥ), hiu (iṣṭāḥ), tch’ang (nityām), yeou-t’ī (sasvabhāvāḥ) …

153. Ibid., p. 97.

154. Cf. AKB, p. 809.3: pratyāyānāṁ asāṃagryam iti cet.

155. Cf. ibid., p. 809.4: na; nityām astitvābhuyupagamāt. yac ca tat kāritram atītānāgataṁ prayutpānāṁ cocyate.


157. Cf. ibid., p. 618.11-12: tatra yady anyat, tada vartamānānāṁ prāgūrdhvavasthayaḥ niḥsvabhāvātā pṛapnoti.

158. Schayer (1938), p. 39; also cf. TS, kārikā 1794:

anyatve vartamānānāṁ prāgūrdhva vāsvabhāvānāṁ / hetutvasaṃskṛtatvādeḥ kāritrasyevā gamyatām //

and TSP thereupon.
159. Cf. TSP, p. 618.13-16: anyathā yadi prāgūrdhvaṁ ca niḥsvabhāvatā na syāt, tādā sarvasya saṃskṛtasya nityatā prāpatīti; saṃbhāvasya sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt, na ca saḍāśattavayatiśreṇa nityatva- lakṣaṇam asti. yad aha - "nityam tam āhur vidvāhō yah svabhāvo na niṣyatā" (Pramāṇavārtika, chapter 1, kārikā 206c-d) iti.

160. Here Schayer (1938, p. 40, line 5) reads 'nityasya sakti', while TSP reads 'nityatā sakti', p. 618.8.


Schayer (1938, p. 40, fn. 1) points out that "the saṃskṛtas do not possess any hetutva, but nevertheless they have a sui generis negative kārita". The double logical and ontological meaning of the dharma, i.e. it is the bearer of its specific mark (svalakṣaṇa), which is at the same time its special function (svakriyā, vṛtti, kārita, svabhāga), has been discussed by him in his "Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapada" (Krakow, 1931, p. 2). Scherbatsky (1931A, p. 35) criticises Schayer for not distinguishing between lakṣaṇa = svalakṣaṇa and lakṣaṇa = saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa, and for overlooking that śākṣa is not an asamskṛtadharma. But Schayer does not accept these charges (1938, p. 21, fn. 2) and in his support quotes the Vībhāṣā (LVP, 1930, pp. 43, 50, 54), where it is said that the asamskṛtas possess some kārita.

162. Cf. TSP, p. 618.19-23: pūrvaṃ iti Sthitabhavaparikṣayāṃ. sarvasya ca saṃskṛtasya nityatvādiḥpyagamāt saṃskṛtavām nitye na saṃbhavatīti spṛṣṭam evaṇasyate. kiṃ ca - skandhāyaṇanavyatīrtikāsa kāritaṃ-pavaraṇānāṃ śiddhāntavirodhāḥ. tathā hi Bhagavatoktām - "sarvaṃ sarvam iti brāhmaṇa yad uta paścāskandhāḥ, dvādaśāyatanānāṃ, aṣṭādaśa ca dīhātavaḥ" iti.

Here we agree with Schayer (1938, p. 41, fn. 1) that "sarvam asti belongs to those canonical formulae, which are accepted by all schools, but the interpretation of which was by no means settled. In the sense of the Sūtra quoted in the text (Saṃyutta Nikāya, IV, 15), the Sautrāntikas too are 'Sarvāṣṭvādins'. But Vaibhāgikas take sarvam asti to mean sarvadā asti = trikāleśv asti. Neither one explanation nor the other seem, however, to convey the original meaning which was probably the totality of the differentiated, mortal, world as opposed to the primeval unity of the undifferentiated absolute."

163. Cf. TSP, p. 619.10-14: aṭhānanyat kāritaṃ abhyupagamaye, tādā dhammasvarūpavat tadavatītrekaḥ tād api sārvakālikaṃ prāpnoti. tataḥ ca kāritaḥ prayuto 'titāḥ, tat prāpto vartamānāḥ, tat aprāpto 'nāgataḥ - iti kāritaṃvaśād ayaṃ adhvaḥbhāgo na syāt; yato 'syā sarvām yādī vibhāgāna cyutipṛṣṭavyapratyayā syah, tādā syād ayaṃ adhvaḥbhāgo, na ca tāni vibhāgana saṁbhavanti; sadāvasthitākaraṇāṃ vibhāgābhāvāt.

Also cf. AKB, p. 810. 5-9.

164. Cf. TSP, p. 619.16-18: kiṃ ca - kāritaḥ avyatīrtikatvād dharmo 'api pūrvaparatoṣṭaṇayaḥ api prāpnoti kāritaṃvad. pūrvapara-
vyavacchinnam = pūrṇa-parakotisunyam, madhyamātrakaṃ ca tat sattvam ceti vigrahāḥ.

Also see LVP (1937), p. 101.

165. Cf. TSP, p. 619.19-23: kāritram ityādina parasparavinuddhābhupagamodhāvanopahasati. evam terhi rūpādharma na sadāstīti prasaktam, kāritrād avyatirikatvatāḥ ity āha = sadā dharmas ceti. evam api dharmād anyat kāritrām prasājyate. ity āha = dharmān nānyac ca kāritram. deśāḥ = Īśvarādayāḥ, te hi yuktāyuktaḥ anāloca vātantaṇyenaiva vartante iti teṣām yathācetitām yuktinirapekṣaṃ svātantaṇyena pravṛttīḥ, tadvad etad iti yāvāt.

Also cf. AKB, p. 811.1-2:
svabhāvah sarvatā cāsti bhāvo nityaḥ ca nesyaḥ / na ca svabhāvād bhāvo 'nyo vyaktaṃ Īśvaraceśṭitam //

Also see AKP, V, p. 58, fn. 1; LVP (1937), p. 110 and fn. 4; CCB, p. 84; BCAP, p. 581.11-12.


168. Ibid., p. 43.

169. Cf. TSP, pp. 619.23-620.7: kim ca - yadi kāritrasya kāritram antareaṇānagatādītvaṃ īṣyate, na terhi vaktavyam - 'adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ' iti; vyabhicārāt.

170. Cf. ibid. p. 620.7-8: yathā kāritrasya svarūpasattāpeksayā 'nāgatādītvaṃ vyavasthāpya, evam bhāvānām apy anāgatādītvaṃ bhaviṣyatiti kim kāritrakalpanayā.

171. Cf. ibid. p. 620.9-10: atha mā bhūd vyabhicārādosa iti kāritrasyaśī kāritram abhyupagamyate. tādā tatrāpi vyatirekādīcitaya tulyāḥ paryanyogaḥ, anāvasthādosaḥ ca.

172. Here I have followed Schayer's quotation of the Tibetan reading (1938, p. 44, fn. 1): 'tha mi dad = svarūpāvyātirikto. But TSP (p. 620.12-13) reads: svarūpād vyātirikto ... which seems to be inconsistent according to the context and contradicts its own succeeding lines.


Professor J.W. de Jong advised me that we could not say whether the reading "bhedāsaṅgabhinā" is correct, and for this one would have to check the Tibetan version. But since Schayer (1938) has consulted the Tibetan translation too, here we rely on his translation, though he has not given any specific reference to this reading.

177. Cf. TSP, p. 621.11-17: punaḥ sa evāḥ - "na kāritaṁ dharmād anyat, taddvyatireṇa svabhāvāṇupalabdhēḥ. nāpi dharammātram, svabhāvāstītive 'pi kadācid abhāvāt. na ca na viśeṣaḥ, kāritaṁyā prāgabhāvāt, saṁtāna vat. tathā dharmamairantyotpattiḥ saṁtāna ity ucyate, na caṣa dharmavayāriktaś tad avibhāgaṇa śṛṣṭyamāṇatvāt. na ca dharmamātram, ekākṣapasyāpi saṁtānatiṣṇavṛtpratipadaḥ. na ca nāstī, tat kārya- saṁbhāvāt" iti. āha ca -

"saṁtātikāryaṁ ceṣṭaṁ na vidyate säpi saṁtatiḥ kācit / tadvād avagaccha yūktyā kāritaṁ 'dhvasaṁsiddhīm" // iti


179. Cf. TSP, p. 622.15-16: bhavatu kāritaṁ prajñāspitatisat, tat kṛtaṁ cāpy adhavyavasthānām prajñāspitatisat, tataś ca ko doṣāḥ?


186. Cf. ibid., p. 624.11-15: evam tāvat tad eva vahnyādīrūpam atītānā- gatāvasthāyām na yuktam. athāṃyat, asmin pakṣe na bhavaty etkara kriyākriyādiparasparaaparāhataharmābhāṣyasaṅkāryādidoṣoḥ, bhinnatvād vastunāḥ. kim tu yat tad dāhāpākādkāryayogam analādikām vastu tad abhūtvā jāyate, bhūtvā ca vigacchatāti sadā 'stītvābhhyupa- gamavirođahāḥ syāt; anyavābhāvāt.

187. Cf. ibid., p. 624.16-18: syād etat - yady api kāryayogam abhūtvā jāyate, bhūtvā ca vigacchatāti; tathāpy atītānāgatāvasthāyām akāryayogam vastu vidyata eva, tataś ca na sadā 'stītvābhhyupa- gamavirođahāḥ.

188. Cf. TS, kārikā 1820 and TSP thereon.

189. Cf. TS, p. 624.20-21: athāpi syāt - atītasya sābhāgahetvādeḥ kāryayogatvām iṣyata eva, tataś ca sāttvadham etat 'na tasmāt kārya- sābhāvahāṃ'.

190. Cf. TS, kārikā 1821.


192. Cf. TSP, pp. 624.23-625.10: tathā hi - heṭupratyayajanito yo 'rthah sa vartamāna ucyate, yaś ca kāḍācitikāḥ so 'vaśyaṃ heṭupratyayani- mittāḥ; yasmād ahetukasya dve eva gati - yad uta sadā sannya, asattaṃ vā; anyānapekṣaṇāt. tasmād yaḥ kāḍācitikāḥ so 'vaśyaṃ heṭupratyayaniṁītaṃ vahyāt, so 'vaśvaṃ vartamāna eveti siddham. vartamānatvena kāḍācitkātvasya vyāptīḥ.

193. Cf. ibid., p. 625.11-12: kim ca - yadi atītānāgatam dravyato 'sti, tada sarvasamskārāṇāṃ sāśvatvatvavaprasaṅgaḥ. tataś ca pratisaṃkhyāni- rodhādibhyo rūpāṇāṃ viśeṣaḥ na prāpnoti.

194. Cf. ibid., p. 625.13-14: atha rūpādeḥ saṃskṛtalaksanayogat saṃ- skṛtavam, nākaśādīnāṃ, tena bhavati pratisaṃkhyānirodhāder vaila- kṣanyāṃ rūpāder iti param iti parair matam, tad etad asamyak.

195. Cf. ibid., p. 625.14-17: tathā hi - jātīḥ, jaraḥ, sthitiḥ, anityatā ca - iti catvāriṁśāḥ saṃskṛtalaksanāṇī. tatra jātī jayanti, sthitiḥ aṭhayati, jaraḥ jayati, anityatā vināśayati - ity evam jananādir esāṃ vyāpāra iṣṭāḥ.


197. Cf. TSP, p. 625.18-20: tatra jātīḥ tāvat kaṃ viśeṣam jayantaṁ satyasāṃ rūpāder janikā ity abhīdhyaṭe - kim tasmād rūpādeḥ param = vyatiriktaṁ, ahosvīd aparām = ayyatiriktaṁ viśeṣam jayantaṁ iti pakṣadvayaṃ.
198. Cf. ibid., p. 625.20-22: tatra na tāvad avatiriktaṃ; yasmād asau viśeṣo jātīvyāpārāt prāga' api nīgpannatvād aśākyakriyāḥ, nīsgpattuttaracālava. na hi nīgpannasya kriyā yuktā; anavasthāprasānaṅgāt.

199. Cf. ibid., pp. 625.22-626.11: nāpi vyatirikto 'tisayah kriyat; vyatireke hy asya rūpādṛṣṭaḥ aśaya iti saṃbandhāḥsiddheḥ, tathā hi - na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ saṃbandhaḥ; vyatirekābhupagamāt, anabhyupagame va pūrṇavatadosapraśaṅgāt. nāpi tad utpattilakṣaṇaḥ; jāter eva tadutpatteḥ. na cānyāḥ saṃbandho 'stī; ādhaṛādheyaṃtva- dīnām tadutpatty antaragatavatā.

201. Tr. Schayer, ibid.

203. Cf. ibid, p. 626.16: kim ca - tasyātiśayasya pūrvam asattvād asatāryam abhyupagataṁ bhavet.

204. Cf. ibid., p. 626.16-19: evam járayānyathātve kriyamaṇe, sthityā 'vasthite, anityatayā ca nāše kriyamaṇe, eṣām anayathātvādīnām anyā 'nanya vikalpe satī ye doṣas te jātīvaj ārādiṣy api vācyāḥ.

205. Cf. ibid., p. 626.19-23: kim ca - jātyādīnām svakāraṃbhvaḥ titva yāt samarthaśvabhāvaniyamādiṣ. sa ca samarthaḥ svabhāvas teṣām sarvadā 'stītu sadaiva svakāraṃbhvaḥsyaḥ sa heta-pratyayavaikalpe; teṣām api sadāvasthitavat. tataḥ cātiṭānāgatāvasthayor jātyādībhir jananādīsvakārya-kāraṇād ekasmin evadhvam aparimitādvaprasaṅgāḥ.

206. Cf. TS, kārikā 1830.

207. Cf. ibid., kārikā 1831.


Also see TS, kārikās 391-394, and TSP thereon.


211. Cf. ibid., p. 627.20-22: kim ca - ime 'tītānāgata arthakriyāsamaṃsthā vā cuḥ, na vā samarthaḥ iti pakṣau. yadi samarthaḥ, taḥ āsamartaḥ-vadbhāve vartamānaḥ prāpnuvanti, avivādaṃśpadibhūtvavartamānavat.

212. Cf. ibid., p. 627.22-23: prayogāḥ - ye ye 'arthakriyāsamerthaḥ te vartamāṇaḥ, yathā 'vivādaṃśpadibhūtvā vartamāṇāḥ. arthakriyāsamerthaḥ ātītādāyā iti svabhāvahetupraśaṅgāḥ.

Also see S. Mookerjee (1975), pp. 1-19.
213. Cf. ibid., p. 628.11-12: na cāyam anākāṃṭikaḥ; yato vartāmānātvanirṛttā naśṭaḥjātānāṃ sarvasāmartyaivyāyogītvāṃ prasajyeta, ākāśam-bhoruḥavat.


215. The same statement is found in AKB, p. 817.4; AKP, V, p. 63; and CCB, p. 89.


219. Cf. ibid., pp. 629.24-630.12: kathām idānīm adhvasaṃghṛṅiḍatvam ātītānāgatānām rūpādīnām nirṛśītām, na hi sāṃvīśaḥgām anyantāsād ātītam anāgatam vā vyavasthāpyate?

220. Cf. TS, kārikās 1843-1844.

221. Cf. ibid., kārikā 1845. Also see CCB, p. 84; AKP, V, p. 58; AKB, p. 811.4-5.

222. AKB, p. 811.5-6: kaś caivaṃ āha - vartāmānāvat tad astīti? ...... ātītānāgataḥatmanā. Also see CCB, p. 84; AKP, V, p. 58.

223. CCB, ibid.; also AKB, p. 811.8: asty ātītam asty anāgatam.

224. AKB, p. 811.9: astiśabdasya nipātatvāt.

LVP (AKP, V, p. 58, fn. 3) observes: According to Hsūan-tsangs: "The word 'is' applies to that which exists and to that which does not exist."

Also see BCAP, p. 581.17-18: "astīśabdasya nipātatvāt kālarātrayavṛttitvām". See Schayer's translation (1938, p. 73).

225. CCB, p. 84.

226. Cf. AKB, pp. 811.9-812.1: yathā 'stī dīpasya prāgabhāvo 'stī paścādabhāva iti vaktāro bhavanti.


228. Cf. TS, kārikās 1846 and TSP, p. 630.16-18 thereupon: dvividham hi vijñānām - sālambanām, anālambanām ca. yat sālambanām tad abhi-saṃdhāya dvayāśraya vijñānadeśanā Bhagavataḥ.
229. TS, kārikā 1847b.

230. See Schayer's remark (1938, p. 64, fn. 1).

231. Tr. Schayer, ibid., p. 65; also cf. TSP on TS, kārikā 1847.

232. Cf. TSP, pp. 630.25-631.8: yadi tarhi nirvīṣayam api vijñānam asti, tat kathāṃ jñānam iti vyapādiṣyate, tathā hi 'vijñānātīti vijñānam' iti gīyate, asati ca vijñāye kim vijñānataḥ vijñānanaḥ syāt?


234. See TS, chapter 23 and TSP thereon. Also see TSP, p. 631.10-12 and Schayer (1938), p. 65, fn. 2.


236. Cf. ibid. Also see CCB, p. 89 and AKP, V, p. 63.

237. See Stcherbatsky (1976). Also see AKP, IV, 85a, p. 185, and fn. 1; CCB, p. 202; TS, chapter 6; Schayer (1932).

238. Cf. TS, kārikā 1849.

239. Cf. TSP, p. 631.13-14: vāsitam = paramparayā phalotpādanasaṃratham upādītam. Also see SCAP, p. 473.10-11:
yasmīn eva hi saṃtāna āhitā karmavāsanā / phalaṃ tatraiva badhnāti karpāse raktatā yathā // iti.

This kārikā is also quoted in Sarvaḍarśanasaṅgraḥa (p.106.29-30), but its source is not traced. Also see E.Lamotte (1936), pp.151-205.


241. CCB, ibid.,

242. Schayer (1938, p. 67, fn. 1) observes: mūladravya = the basic element = the first element of a homogeneous series (pravāha).


244. Cf. AKB, p. 812.5-6: tatra punas tadāhītaṃ tasyāṃ saṃtatau phala-dānasaṁarthyaṃ saṃdhāyoktam. anyathā hi svena bhāvena vidyumannam atītaṃ na sidhiyet. Also CCB, p. 85; AKP, V, p. 59.


246. Safnyuktagama, 13.22 (quoted in CCB, p. 85, fn. 1, and AKP, V, p. 59, fn. 3). This statement is found with slight variations in SCAP, p. 582.1-3, and also cf. in the same book, p. 474.15-18: iti hi bhikṣavah āsti karma, āsti phalaṃ. kārakas tu nopalabhyste ya imān
skandhān vijahāti. anyānā ca skandhān upādattē. anyatra dharma-
sahketāt. atrayam dharmasaṅketo yad asmin satī idam bhavaty
asyotpādaḥ idam utpadyate iti.

This passage also is taken from the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra. Here LVP gives some other references too where the preceding passage is found (see AKP, ibid.).

Also cf. TSP, p. 631.23-24: "cakṣur utpadyamānaṁ na kutaścid
āgacchati, niruddhyamānaṁ na kvacit sānnicayām gacchāti iti hi
cakṣur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca pratīvigacchāti" iti; AKB, p.813.1-3;
ADV, p. 263.1-2 and fn. 1.

247. Cf. ibid., p. 632.9: vartamāne 'dhvany abhūtvā bhavatīti cet.
Also see CCB, p. 85; AKB, p. 813.4; AKP, V, p. 60.

248. Cf. AKB, p. 813.4-5: na; adhvano bhāvād anarthāntaratvāt.
Also see AK, I. 7c-d and AKB thereon; AKP, I, p. 12.

249. Cf. AKB, p. 813.5: atha svātmanī abhūtvā bhavatī.

Also AKB, p. 813.5.


252. For the exposition of mithyādṛṣṭi, see AKP, V, p. 18 and also fn. 1.


255. Cf. TS, kārikās 1852-1855 and TSP thereupon.

256. CCB, p. 91.
To understand the Madhyamika critique of time it is essential to understand its examinations of pratītyasamutpāda, motion, permanence, the Vaibhāṣika notion of bhāva and its three phases, etc. We suggest that the Sautrāntika polemic against the Vaibhāṣikas might have led the Madhyamikas in this regard, as the Sautrāntikas maintained that the past and future time-epochs, ākāśa, Nirvāṇa and pudgala are mere names, assertions, empirical and of common usage.

The method of the Madhyamika critique is its dialectic, which consists of a series of prāsaṅga, i.e. reductio ad absurdum arguments. Its main function is to show the conflicting or rather self-contradictory characters in the opponent's thesis and to bring these fallacies home. The second point is that the Madhyamika tries to prove that everything is relative and mutually dependent (pratītyasamutpāna), and whatever is relative is without svabhāva. J.W. de Jong remarks that "According to Nāgārjuna, a thing is real when it is endowed with svabhāva, a concept which is of great importance for the understanding of his thought. It is very difficult to know exactly what he wishes to express by this work every time, as it contains several notions." Further, he makes a significant observation that "for the Madhyamikas the concept of svabhāva has only two meanings: (1) that of the 'own-being of each thing' (sva-lakṣaṇa or svo bhāva), which, incidentally, they consider unreal, and (2) that of the 'own-being of all things taken together' (prakṛti or svato bhāva)'". But time in the Madhyamika system does not come under either of these categories.
The basic instrument of the Mādhyamikas to criticise any drṣṭi (dogmatic view) concerning the reality of entities is their theory of pratītyasamutpāda (MK.1), which is in the Mādhyamika system "not the principle of temporal sequence, but of the essential dependence of things on each other, i.e. the unreality of separate elements (naiḥsvabhāvya, dharma-nairātmya). The entire Mādhyamika system is a re-interpretation of Pratītyasamutpāda. It is ..... equated with Śūnyatā - the empirical validity of entities and their ultimate unreality." But the relativity of something does not prove its inexistence. In a celebrated kārikā Nāgārjuna avows that pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) = Śūnyatā (voidness) = upādāya prajñāpti (metaphorical designation) = madhyamā pratipad (middle path). The Mādhyamika is a prāsaṅgika or a "vaitanḍika, a dialectician or free-lance debator", whose only objective is to criticise others, but not to propound any positive theory of his own.

The Mādhyamika admits twofold realities: (1) saṃvṛti (phenomenon), and (2) paramārtha (absolute), but Murti wrongly interprets CS, IX.5 that "Space and time are, even from the empirical point of view unsubstantial things". The word "time" (kāla) does not even occur in the above kārikā. It only says "ākāśādīni" which on the basis of the context and the commentary of Candrakīrti thereon, means ākāśa, apratisākhyānirodha and pratisākhyānirodha, which are the three unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) categories of the Vaibhāṣikas.

Time is neither the Material Cause of the World nor Eternal

The Kālavādins (the proponents of time as cause) maintain that the existence of time is inferred by the fact that it is the cause of origination and destruction of the world. It also brings about all
kinds of modifications in things. In the same way, time is considered
to be the negative cause. For example, even if the necessary causes and
conditions, such as seed, water, air, soil and Sun, are present, the
sprout does not always germinate if time acts against these causes and
conditions.\footnote{15} This leads to the conclusion that time is the cause of
everything as well as eternal.\footnote{16} But since, argues Candrakīrti (650 A.D.),
time is an ever-lasting element and the germination of the seed is
dependent on it, the sprout should always be in a state of production.
Further, it is considered that although time is ever existent, there
is sometimes a disappearance of activity in performing an action. Therefore,
time suffers the fate of inexistence.\footnote{17}

Again, time, enunciate the Mādhyamikas, though existent, is completely
incapable of engendering any activity like the seed, and production is not
possible all the time. Even if there is production caused by time, it is
variable, not in perpetuum, like that of seed. This shows that time too
is variable, it means it is dependent on conditions, on the existence of
which it would exist, and on the inexistence of which it would not exist.
Hence, time too is impermanent like the sprout.\footnote{18}

Further, an inactive thing cannot possess causal characteristic
(hetutva). The latter is actually not an independent substance. It is
also not that it transforms itself into effect keeping its substratum,
i.e. the inactive thing, unchanged. In other words, only an active
thing can have the causal characteristic which is inherent in the former.
In production of a fruit it cannot be said that the fruit is not of its
own cause. What Candrakīrti wants to say is that cause and effect are
identical (satkāryavāda, i.e. cause materially transforms itself into
effect). And if there is production, it cannot be eternal like the
sprout. Therefore, if there is no supposition of cause and effect
separately, neither of them can be proved as independent (svārūpena). But they are not two different things. Further, a thing (bhāva) is called fruit after there has been a cause. For example, a sprout germinates only when a seed is existent, but not vice versa. It is not true to say that the state of fruit (phalatva) is not derived from a cause. Before the production of a sprout from a seed, there are only two alternatives: (1) hetuḥūta, i.e. causal production, and (2) ahetuḥūta, i.e. production at random or uncaused. In that case, the production of seed is not possible at random, like the production of fire. A fruit is produced only from a cause. And without transformation of cause into effect, the latter is not possible, and without logical connection of cause and effect, there is no apprehension of an effect. Now, the seed, which is the root cause (mūlakāraṇa), perishes or transforms itself and then it becomes the cause of the sprout. It is not possible without changing the previous state. Likewise, if time is the cause of the world, it will have to change its previous state in giving rise to an effect, otherwise the production would be out of the question. And if it is so, time becomes impermanent like the seed. In the same vein Āryadeva says: that which undergoes transformation cannot be eternal.
If it is assumed, says Candrakīrti, that on the production of an effect there is no change in time, then the effect, of which time is the cause, comes into existence after having been inexistent (abhūtvā jāyate), or it is produced at random. In other words, it arises itself without having been dependent on a cause or a condition. It is also not true that effect, which arises depending on causes and conditions, comes into existence after having been inexistent. There can be no production, if it has been absolutely inexistent in its previous state. That which is absolutely inexistent cannot be produced even if the necessary causes and conditions are at work, just like the horn of the hare.\textsuperscript{23} That which is eternal arises spontaneously (nirhetuka). And so the assumption of any cause in this regard is without any purpose. What Candrakīrti intends to state is that the world is uncaused or self-caused. Therefore, there is no need to consider time as the cause of the world.\textsuperscript{24}

Now, the question is if a cause is eternal, how is its effect impermanent? In our daily life we observe that the impermanent seed gives rise to an impermanent sprout. It is really absurd to conceive that the effect, of which the eternal time is supposed to be the cause, is itself impermanent.\textsuperscript{25}

**Time also Rejected as an Auxiliary Cause**

It has been maintained that time exists, because it is an auxiliary cause (sahakārikāraṇa) in producing the fruits. That which does not exist cannot have the function of an auxiliary cause, like the daughter of a barren woman. Therefore, time exists, as it is an auxiliary cause. Even if all the causes and conditions, such as seed, soil, water, light, air, and sky are present, the sprout only emerges in the appropriate
season. This law applies to external as well as internal productions. Bhagavān has taught: "The karmas do not perish even after millions of years. Given all the causes and conditions as well as time, they (karmas) bear the fruits for men." Since all such productions are dependent on time, this proves that the latter exists and is an auxiliary cause in engendering the sprout. Candrakīrti rejects any such theory saying that the function of time as an auxiliary cause can be accepted, if a sprout or a fruit is really produced. But this is not so. Further, he rules out any possibility of causes and conditions. He has also explained away the theory of karma and its retribution.

Again, it is set forth that time exists by its own nature, because it is the cause of origination and dissolution of things. In this phenomenon, the origination of seed and other things is dependent on a particular time. Dissolution and destruction are also dependent on a particular time. They do not always happen, even if all the causes and conditions are given. It follows that time does exist, as it is the cause of origination and dissolution of the world. Candrakīrti replies that time can be admitted so, if there is anything like origination and dissolution. But there is nothing like these. He criticises these concepts in detail.

Āryadeva (170-270 A.D.) seems to aver that no effect arises by time, rather it is dependent on something else. For example, in the case of origination of a sprout, to quote Murti "... a variable impermanent (kādācitkatva) factor alone can account for the production of the sprout sometimes only and not at other times." But Murti does not clarify what the variable impermanent factor is.
No Means to the Knowledge of Time

It is argued that time is comprehended through kṣaṇa, pala, muḥūrta, etc. It is inherent in all the three time-epochs, the past, present and future, and is different from bhāva (objects, things). Thus, it is eternal.35 Candrakīrti attempts to tear this supposition too to pieces. He remarks that if time is something apart from an existent object and proved by knowledge, then it would be the cause of the origination and dissolution of the world. But it is never so, because then the question arises: How is time grasped, if it is different from bhāva?36 What Candrakīrti has in his mind is that knowledge of time is dependent on concrete existence.37

Further, the Mādhyamikas accept four sources of knowledge (prāmanas):38 perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (sabda). But knowledge of time is absolutely out of the range of these pramāṇas in the Mādhyamika system. The opponent, as Candrakīrti quotes, accepts that time is proved by knowledge (jñānasiddha), but he does not give any detail of what particular source of knowledge is propounded in this regard by the former.

Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti on the three Time-epochs

Now, Candrakīrti begins to analyse the divisions of time, the past, present and future, which are determined by the special nature of time. They too, he says, are not capable of establishing themselves independently, because it is not possible to determine them by way of their abstract beingness (amūrtatvena svarūpena). If at all, their said existence may be established only by means of a particular jar. But
since the characteristics of the three time-epochs are different from phenomenal existence (bhāvabhinnā), they are subject to experience only like vedanā. They cannot be ascertained by sense-organs like the rūpa, śabda, and so on. 39

The opening lines of MKV on chapter XIX seem to be presenting the Vaibhāṣika notion of the three time-epochs 40 as follows: They are understood on the basis of a dharma (bhāva). That dharma whose bhavasvabhāva (kārita, in the Vaibhāṣika term) has ceased to be after having been originated is called past; if not yet ceased, it is called present; and if it has not yet been realised, it is future. But here Candrakīrti has failed to understand the Vaibhāṣikas correctly when he says: te ca santi, 41 which means the past, present and future exist as such, and Mervyn Spruģ's English translation 42 too gives the same sense. Murti also offers a similar interpretation, though in a different context: "The same arguments may be urged, mutatis mutandis, with regard to the existence of the past or the present in the present and the future, etc." 43 He does not point out that the notion of these divisions of time in the Vaibhāṣika system is based on the activity (kārita) of a dharma, though he has also not distinctly identified this theory with that of the Vaibhāṣikas.

If the above opponent is the Vaibhāṣikas, then we can say that sometimes the Madhyamikas in their presentation of the opponent's thesis distort the facts, and sometimes they assume such hypothetical theories (as pūrvapakṣa) to criticise what would seem to be absurd for anybody, including even the Madhyamika's opponents, to accept. For example, they present an opponent, whom I have not been able to identify with any of the Indian philosophical systems, who establishes the reality of the past,
present and future independently. If it is thought that he was Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāsika, it is the result of one's rashness and incorrect understanding of his system. On the other hand, if there is no real opponent who admits the above theory, then the Mādhyamika criticism fails to strike any goal. However, for the sake of the Mādhyamikas let us suppose that there is an actual opponent who maintains the reality of the three time-epochs separately. Then, the Mādhyamikas demonstrate that the three time-epochs do not exist simultaneously, as it would be impossible to distinguish them from each other. On the other hand, if they exist, they exist in relation to each other, otherwise their existence would be out of question. Time too cannot be understood without such distinctions. This mutual dependence shows the unreality of time.

Furthermore, if the three time-epochs exist in reality, then their substratum (nibandhana), i.e. the changing things or the phenomenon (bhāvasvabhāva), too would be real. The Mādhyamika contention is that the changing thing (bhāva), which is the cause of the conception of the three time-epochs, would be real, if the latter (kālatraya) themselves are considered to be real. But it is not so, and "as changing things (bhāva) have been shown to be untenable, the reality of Time too is not established". To put this argument in valid propositional form (modus tollens):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{p} & \rightarrow \text{q} \\
\neg \text{q} & \rightarrow \neg \text{p}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( p \) = time-epochs exist
\( q \) = changing thing exists
\( \rightarrow \) = sign of implication
\( \neg \) = sign of negation
\( \therefore \) = sign of therefore

Now, let us examine the Mādhyamika assertion that the past, present and future are understood in relation to each other. If the present and
future are existent, they would either be in relation to the past, or not. If the first alternative is sustained, then both of them would necessarily be in the past. But nothing can be related to the thing which is non-existent (asattva), otherwise it would be just like a son born from a barren woman, or a flower from the jussminum-grandiflorum-creeper (mālatīlatā) in the sky, or oil squeezed from sand. It is also incorrect to say that they exist in mutual relation like light and darkness, because it would be a vitiated circle, or because it would be like an assertion identical with the point to be proved (sādhyasamatva).\footnote{48} Again, the Mādhyamika argument on the first alternative can be put in the following propositional form:\footnote{49}

\[ p \supset q \]
\[ \sim q \]
\[ \therefore \sim p \]

If the present and future exist in the past, as they are in relation to the latter, both would be of the essence of the past, because they are included in the past. And then, the past too would be indistinguishable from the present and future as the three time-epochs are in the same state. It follows that the past too, together with the present and future, is inexistent. Again, the past is that which has passed the present state, and the future is that which has not yet attained the present state. Thus, if it is impossible to determine the present and future, then the past too would be unattainable.\footnote{50} If to avoid this predicament it is maintained that the present and future are not included in the past, then Nāgārjuna (150-250 A.D.) raises the question: What is that in relation to which there are present and future?\footnote{51}
However, the proponents of time (kālavādīna) affirm the reality of time and urge that in this regard there is no need of mutual dependence (apekṣā). Nagarjuna's reply is that neither the present nor the future can be proved without taking them in relation to the past, and then time too which is intelligible only through the three time-epochs would be unreal. The same arguments, mutatis mutandis, can be advanced against the existence of the past and future in relation to the present, and the existence of the past and present in relation to the future. Thus, Nagarjuna and Candrakīrti have successfully demonstrated the unreality of the three divisions of time, which leads to the unreality of time itself as the knowledge of the latter is possible only through the former. This argument also can be put in the following propositional form:

\[ q \supset p \]

where \( p \) = the reality of the three time-epochs
\( q \) = the reality of time

\[ ~ p \]

\[ . . . . \sim q \]

Prajñākaramati's Refutation of the Vaibhāṣika Theory of Traikālyavāda

We find one Mādhyamika, Prajñākaramati (early 10th century), who has rightly understood to some extent the Vaibhāṣika theory of traikālyavāda (i.e. the theory of three time-epochs). According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the bhāva (dharma, thing, phenomenon) certainly exists. As we have seen in the previous chapter, they maintain the substantial reality of dharmas, which exist permanently. The three phases of time, the past, present and future, are the three phases of a dharma based on its activity (kāritra). The future time-phase of a dharma, a state in which it is in its latent form, is enforced by causes and conditions to
achieve its present time-phase in which a dharma performs its kārītra. Thereon the last saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa, anityātā (cessation), executes its force owing to which a dharma attains its past time-phase in which it becomes quiescent. In this vein the Buddha has taught the three saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas, origination, duration and cessation. In the similar sense pratītyasamutpāda too is taught. Here the Vaibhāṣikas took pratītyasamutpāda as the principle of temporal sequence. But the Mādhyamikas explain away such interpretation, and aver that pratītyasamutpāda is the principle "of the essential dependence of things on each other, i.e. the unreality of separate elements (naiḥsvabhāvyā, dharmanairatmya). It is now equated with Śūnyatā— the empirical validity of entities, and their ultimate unreality." 

Śāntideva⁶⁴ (695-743 A.D.) and Prajñākaramati are severely critical of the preceding theory of origination, duration and cessation. There is nothing, declares Prajñākaramati, which comes or originates from any space or time, nor does anything having been originated from somewhere go out of its present time-phase anywhere, nor does it endure by its own nature without any change (= ekasvabhāvena). On the contrary, if it is maintained that a dharma passes from its future time-epoch to present time-epoch, and again from present time-epoch to past time-epoch, then even a conditioned element would be permanent, as it is always existing, and it would not be impermanent. Thus, the problem arises: How to prove that a dharma is not permanent? But here it is to be noted that the Vaibhāṣikas do admit the permanence of the dharma.

The Kārītra and the three Time-epochs

Moreover, the Vaibhāṣika contention is that the differentiation of a dharma (dharmsya viśeṣaḥ) through the three time-epochs lies in the
fact that it is devoid of its kārītra in its preceding and succeeding states, i.e. the future and past respectively. In other words, when a dharma has not yet attained its kārītra and does not execute its activity, it is termed as future. When it is active, it is present. And when after having performed its action it is quiescent, it is past. Prajñā-karamati rejoins that such theory is not tenable. Now the question is whether a dharma always exists by its own nature without any change. If so, then why does kārītra not exist permanently as well? The Vaibhāṣikas might reply that the origination and cessation of the kārītra are dependent on causes and conditions. This is also not correct, because dependence on causes and conditions is not applicable to that which exists permanently by its own nature. Again, if it is maintained that a thing exists even if it is devoid of any kārītra, then the reality of the latter, which is really inexistent like the horns of a horse, would result.

Further, Prajñākaramatī raises an absurd question: How is the same kārītra called past, present and future? Though he has plumbed the depths of his opponent's thesis, he has failed to understand it. Nowhere have the Vaibhāṣikas ever pronounced that the kārītra itself is called past, present and future. If it is so maintained, the kārītra too would be permanent, and then the dharma would always be active and there would only be a present time-epoch, and the past and future time-epochs would be out of question. Prajñākaramatī continues: Is it so on account of the existence of a different kārītra, which works in the first kārītra, or does the first kārītra itself exist as past, present and future? In the former case, there would obviously be an infinite regress. In the latter, the same argument would apply to the dharma and there can be no denial of the fact that the same dharma is demonstrated as past, present and future.
by its own nature irrespective of the kārita. 70 Again, it is also not plausible to hold that the past and future dharmas exist substantially like the present one.

Now, the following questions arise. How are origination and cessation possible to the dharma which exists permanently by its own nature? What does it lack in its previous state, in the absence of which it is called not yet realised, i.e. future? What does it lack in its subsequent state, in the absence of which it is called destroyed, i.e. past? If it is urged that the dharma exists in its antecedent and subsequent states also by its own nature, then it would be existing even in these states in the same way as it exists in its present state. It follows, therefore, that no distinction is possible between the three time-epochs, as the essential reality of the dharma is sustained, which eliminates the reality of the past, etc. All these things are termed by Prajñākaramati as the caprice of God. 71 In the previous chapter we have seen that the Sautrāntikas too accuse the Vaibhāṣikas in a similar way.

From the preceding observations we can say that Prajñākaramati lacks a correct understanding of the Vaibhāṣika theory of the dharma and its different temporal phases. I do not think I can present this theory in a better way than the great Stcherbatsky has done. Though long, the passage is necessary for our proper understanding in the present context. He writes: 72

"...the Sarvāstivādins maintain that all elements exist on two different planes, the real essence of the element (dharma-svabhāva) and its momentary manifestation (dharma-lakṣaṇa). The first exists always, in past, present, and future. It is not eternal (nitya) because eternality means absence of change, but it represents the potential appearances of the element into phenomenal existence, and its past appearances as well. This potentiality is existing for ever (sarvadā asti). Even in the
suppressed state of Nirvāṇa, when all life is extinct, these elements are supposed to represent some entity, although its manifestation-power has been suppressed for ever. The future potential elements are, indeed, divided in this school into two different sets, those that will appear (utpatti-dharma) and those that are suppressed and never will appear (anutpatti-dharma). Since the moment (kṣaṇa) is not something different from the element (dharma), time in general is not different from the elements taken collectively, as far as they have not lost their capacity of appearing in phenomenal life. In fact, "the times" is one of the synonyms used to designate collectively the elements appearing in ordinary life. But the term "time" (kāla), implying the reality of one time, is carefully avoided; it is replaced by the term "transition" (adhvan). When the Sarvāstivādin maintains that "everything exists", it means that all elements exist, and the emphasis which is put on the reality of elements refers to the conception that their past as well as their future transition represents something real. From this fundamental tenet the school derives its name. Since the conception of an element answers rather to our conception of a subtle force than for a substance, the reality, i.e. effectiveness, of the past is not so absurd as it otherwise would appear."

In the next section on "Impermanence in Sāmkhya-Yoga" the same author shows a great deal of similarity between the Sarvāstivādins (or the Vaibhāṣikas) and the Sāmkhya-Yoga.

On the basis of the preceding analysis we can conclude that Prajñā-karamati's arguments against the traikālyavāda of the Vaibhāṣikas are valid in the light of his understanding of the latter's theory. The above passage by Stcherbatsky illustrates that the Vaibhāṣikas propound something different, though they too do not fare better as we find them against the fundamental teachings of Buddhism, such as 'everything is impermanent'.

The Theory of Karma, its Retribution and the three Time-epochs

Further, the Sarvāstivādins quote scriptural evidence in their support which teaches that the past and future do exist. The Sūtra reads: the past
karma exists, the future retribution exists. But Prajñākaramati asserts that the Sarvāstivādins took the Sūtra in its literal sense. Bhagavān taught so, he continues, in order to repudiate the heresy which denies the theory of cause and effect, i.e. karma and its retribution in moral life. Otherwise, the past is that which having been previously inexistent comes into existence, and again having been originated, is now destroyed. And the future is that which will come into existence when the necessary causes and conditions are given. In this sense it is said that cause and its effect exist. Here the word 'exists' (= asti) has been used as a nipāt (accidental occurrence or a particle), which can refer to all the three time-epochs. This argument was first advanced in the same context by the Sautrāntikas, who are supposed to have paved the way for the Mādhyamika as well as Vijñānavāda developments.

Now, Prajñākaramati quotes the Paramārthaśāntyatasūtra in which Bhagavān has said: "O monks, when the eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere, and when it is annihilated, it does not go anywhere to accumulate. Thus, O monks, the eye comes into existence after having been inexistent, and it disappears after having been existent." Moreover, if the future eye had existed in reality, it would not have been said by the Buddha that it exists after having been inexistent. Therefore, there is no transition of time-epochs (adhva-saṃkrānti) from one state to another.

Refutation of the three Time-epochs by Āryadeva and Candrakīrti

Āryadeva and Candrakīrti take the example of a jar (ghaṭa) to demonstrate the unreality of the past, present and future. Candrakīrti
suggests that to understand the future, we shall have to explain the future jar, and in the same way to understand the past and present, the past and present jars have to be explained respectively. But in the future no present time is realised. Then, the past is only past, and the present is that which has not yet ceased (aniruddha). These three time-epochs can be established only in relation to each other. If they are not mutually related, none of them exists.\(^79\) We have noticed above that Nāgārjuna too offers the same argument. Further, it is evident that no present or past jar is found in the future jar, and because of the difference of characteristics a mutual relation is impossible. Thus, if in the future jar both the present and past jars are not existent, then both are not realised (anāgatau) in the future (anāgata), because of their unattainable characteristics (anāgatatvena) in this regard. Just as the future being not realised (anāgatatvena) in the present is future (unknown, anāgata), in the same way, both the past and present being not realised in the future are not known (anāgata). Again, if the opponent maintains that the future exists in the present being not yet realised (anāgatatvena), but not being unrealised in the future, then this too does not succeed any better. When the future is proved, both the past and present are proved. But if future is not established, then neither the past nor the present can be established.\(^80\) On the other hand, if both the present and past are in the future, then all three will be future. When all three are future, then the past and present cannot be possible, and the future also cannot be defined as future. Therefore, the future time-epoch does not exist.\(^81\) And thus, the refutation of the future leads to the refutation of the past and present as well.

The opponent is not ready to accept that the future jar is absolutely inexistent. He holds that the nature of the future exists in the future.
jar. Hence the future is separate by its own nature. The past too is proved likewise. Thus, the future exists.\textsuperscript{82} Āryadeva avouches that if the nature of both the present and past are admitted in the future, then that which is future cannot itself become past or present.\textsuperscript{83}

Both Time and its Measurement are Impossible

Nevertheless, it might be emphasized that time is real, because its measurement is possible. Here, the point is that whatever is inexistent cannot be measured, just like the horns of a donkey, whereas time is measurable in terms of kṣaṇa, lava, múhūrta, day, night, fortnight, month, year, etc. This proves that since time is measurable, it also exists.\textsuperscript{84}

The crux of the problem is whether there is really any time as such. Candrakīrti enunciates that if there is something called time, then its measurement is possible. But there is nothing like that.\textsuperscript{85} Again, he continues, if there is something called time, which is invariable (avasthita) and different from kṣaṇa, then it can be measured in terms of the latter. But there is nothing invariable and unchanging (kūṭastha) determined by kṣaṇa, etc. which is called time. At the same time, it follows that a variable (asthita) too cannot be understood as time.\textsuperscript{86}

Further, one might urge that there is an eternal time of an invariable nature which is manifested by kṣaṇa, etc.,\textsuperscript{87} and in this vein it is contended by the kālavādins that: "Time engenders modifications in the creatures; time brings death to people; time is always awake and protects those who are asleep; time is inaccessible."\textsuperscript{88} This characteristic itself is the invariable nature of time.\textsuperscript{89} Candrakīrti rejects this theory too. There is no time, he insists, established in the above theory, which can be determined by manifesting itself in terms of kṣaṇa, etc. However, if
it is asked why time cannot be invariable, then the reply is because time cannot be understood apart from kṣaṇa, etc. 90

Time is neither Saṃskṛta nor Asaṃskṛta Dharma

Even if it is granted that there is an invariable time, the question arises whether this time is conditioned by nature (saṃskṛtasvabhāva) 91 or unconditioned. 92 Nāgārjuna 93 has devoted one full chapter for the examination of saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta dharmas. He has also exhibited the impossibility of origination, duration and cessation, which are the saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas. 94 Therefore, conditioned things do not exist. 95 Bhāvaviveka (490–570 A.D.) in his Karatalaratna 96 avows that "The conditioned things (saṃskṛta) are unreal (śūnya) from the standpoint of ultimate truth (tattvataḥ), because they are produced through causes and conditions (pratyayodbhavat), like things created by magic (māyāvat)." 97 Nāgārjuna's argument is that if the saṃskṛta things are not established, how can the asaṃskṛtas be proved? 98

Bhāvaviveka maintains that "The unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), such as Space, Nirvāṇa, etc. are non-existent from the standpoint of ultimate truth, because they are non-originating (anutpāda), like the sky-lotus (khapuspavat)." 99 This statement, according to J. May, represents one of the extreme points of Madhyamika radicalism. 100

It follows that time is neither saṃskṛta nor asaṃskṛta by nature.

Here it is important to note that the Vaibhāṣikas like any other system of Buddhism admit time neither as saṃskṛta nor as asaṃskṛta. In their list of 75 dharmas nowhere does time appear as a dharma. Since both the terms, saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta, are used only in Buddhism, and no Buddhist
system accepts time in either of these terms, the Madhyamika criticism in this regard is again pointless.

**Both Time and its Substratum-Bhāva are Unreal**

To refute the Madhyamika criticism one might urge: it is true that there is nothing called eternal time, of an independent nature, apart from the rūpa, but nevertheless time is conceived of as designated by kṣaṇa, lava, muhūrta, as based on the saṃskāras and rūpa, and so on. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in sustaining the reality of time.¹⁰¹ But Candrakīrti puts this suggestion out of court. His assertion is that if time is said to be dependent on things (bhāva), and as things are unreal, time which is dependent on them is absolutely unreal.¹⁰² When there is no time, there are no divisions of time, such as kṣaṇa, lava and muhūrta in terms of which time is measured. Consequently, advocacy for the existence of time would not be possible on the ground of its measurements.¹⁰³ Thus, the series of becoming also becomes impossible in the three time-epochs. Now, the question arises: How can something, which does not exist in the three time-epochs, be a series of becoming?¹⁰⁴ Here, Nāgārjuna obviously applies deductive logic which is evident from the following syllogism:¹⁰⁵

\[ p \supset q \]

\[ \sim q \]

\[ \therefore \sim p \]

where

- \( p \) = the existence of time
- \( q \) = the existence of bhāva, entities.

R.H. Robinson points out that in the kārikās, MK, XIX.1-3,6, "the topic is the polarity of discrete and continuous (identity and difference) with reference to time. The method is the same as before - dichotomy, and reduction to the paradox that two entities in a relation are neither identical nor different. As temporal succession is one of the components of
the concept of dependent co-arising, the problem of time belongs to the same class as those of identity, persistence, cause-and-effect, and own-being". M. Siderits and J. O'Brien in their joint article make a significant remark: "Both Sāṃkhya and Abhidharma hold that time, unlike space, is not an ultimate constituent of reality. They appear to maintain ...., that our notion of temporal flow is derivative and secondary, a product of the occurrence of atomic occasions. This is the basis for Nāgārjuna's rejection of the Abhidharma theory in MMK, XIX.6. But the ultimate unreality of time does not detract from the significance of the kṣaṇa theory for our consideration."107

We have already seen that the Sarvāstivādins or the Vaibhāṣikas do not admit the reality of time as such. From the same observations it is clear that the Madhyamikas use such terminologies which give the impression that they tend to criticise the Sarvāstivādins (apart from the kālavādins), but their criticism is often the outcome of their misunderstanding the latter. Our observations show that both the Sarvāstivādins and the Madhyamikas deny the reality of time, and we do not find any explicit reference where Nāgārjuna even seems to agree with the former in this regard. However, we can endorse S. Miyamoto's statement that "Nāgārjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (svabhāvavāda). He drew the conclusion of the non-existence of time from the Madhyamaka standpoint of non-substantiality (nīḥsvabhāvavāda), which was a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self".108

D.J. Kalupahana, on the basis of a non-Sarvāstivāda text, i.e. Kathāvatthu, wrongly supports the accusations of the Theravādins that the Sarvāstivādins "upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time", "that not only everything past, present and future
exists, but that past, present and future themselves exist, that is, they are independently real". In this regard, he has not quoted any reference in his support from the Sarvāstivāda sources. The result is that some other erroneous observations have appeared in his article, such as: "There is no doubt that it was the Sarvāstivāda conception of time which drew criticism from Nāgārjuna" in MK, XIX, "the Abhidharma scholasticism produced an absolutistic conception" of time. John M. Koller blindly approves Kalupahana's interpretation without taking any notice of the appropriate sources, and Stambaugh (1974, p. 132) too joins the same track.

Further, on the basis of a passage from the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, K.V. Ramanan also commits the same mistake. He incorrectly assumes that the Sarvāstivādins accepted time as a reality. In later statements he contradicts himself when he says: "The unit of time is the unit of function", and "time is synonymous with function".

We suggest that the reality of time criticised by the Madhyamika has been propounded by certain Kālavādins (proponents of absolute time), not Sarvāstivādins or Vaibhāsikas.

A Critique of Motion also Leads to the Rejection of Time

The Madhyamika examination of motion is very helpful in understanding its criticism of time. H. Cheng suggests that here the Madhyamika seems "to criticise the Saṁmitīya and Vātsiputriya. According to these early Buddhists, motion is possible since there is the mover or moving entity". Nāgārjuna's examination of motion also includes Space as well as substance-attribute relation apart from time. In this regard, it has to be kept in mind that his "...analysis gains some of its strength from the fact that
his Sanskrit terms are both spatial and temporal inextricably".\textsuperscript{120} This has been demonstrated by his inexorable logic as follows.

Elsewhere the Mādhyamikas have shown the denial of origination\textsuperscript{121} which proves, mutatis mutandis, the characteristics (viśeṣaṇa) of pratītyasamutpāda, such as the denial of cessation.\textsuperscript{122} Further, they wish to prove that pratītyasamutpāda also demonstrates the denial of coming and going,\textsuperscript{123} both of which are generally accepted as common-sense (loka-prasiddha). Now the question is what new arguments have been advanced by the Mādhyamikas in this regard.\textsuperscript{124} Candrakīrti denies the very existence of motion (gamana). In case there is something called motion, the question arises whether it is necessarily related to the space of motion (adhvajāta, i.e. the space where motion takes place) already traversed (gata), or not yet traversed (agata), or being traversed (gam-yamāna).\textsuperscript{125} All these hypotheses are preposterous.\textsuperscript{126} The locus of motion cannot be determined. Nāgārjuna's claim is that motion is found neither in the space which has already been traversed, nor in that which has yet to be traversed, and there is no third possibility, such as being traversed, independent of the two.\textsuperscript{127}

What Nāgārjuna tries to say can be understood from the following diagram:\textsuperscript{128}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
    \node (A) at (0,0) {A};
    \node (C) at (1,0) {C};
    \node (B) at (2,0) {B};
    \draw[->] (A) -- (B);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Suppose an object is moving along the path AB, and in its journey there is a point C. It is clear from this that motion is occurring neither in the part AC, which is already traversed, nor in the part CB, which is yet to be traversed. And apart from these two divisions, there is no third one where the motion is taking place. Here we notice that time, which is
subject to a trenchant criticism by Nāgārjuna, is certainly infinite, and such theory has been established by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Thus, the Madhyamika shows that motion is impossible, but at the same time they "do not make a clear distinction between epistomological and ontological sense of impossibility". 129

Candrakīrti defines the terms related to motion: the space in which the activity of motion has ceased is called traversed (gata), and the space which is being traversed in the present state is said to have the actual motion (gamyate). But the opponent irrationally puts forth that the space, which has been traversed and where the activity of motion has ceased, is also called being traversed (gamyate), because it is associated with the present activity of motion. This kind of reflex is an impossibility and rather it glosses over the absurdity, since it is not rational to sustain that what has been traversed is 'being traversed'. 130 Likewise, that which has not yet been traversed (agata) cannot be called 'being traversed'. The space, which is not yet traversed and where the activity of motion has not yet taken place, is called future or 'not yet come' (anāgata); and when the motion is taking place, it is called present (vartamāna). Thus, it is not sensible to maintain that 'not yet traversed' also is 'being traversed', because the future and present are absolutely different from each other. Again, if the space is not yet traversed, how can it be called being traversed? And when the space is being traversed, how can it be said that it has not yet been traversed? 131 A further point is that the space trodden by the mover is called traversed (past), and that which is not yet trodden is called future for him. Apart from these two there is no third space where we can observe any motion called 'being traversed'. Therefrom it follows that neither the actual movement (gamyamāna) is comprehended (gamyate), nor is 'being traversed'
conceived. Then, there is no actual motion (gamyāna). Therefore, proclaims Candrakīrti, neither the motion is understood (āviṣyate) through the activity of going, nor does it take place (gamyate). This leads to the conclusion that there is no motion (gamana) even in the actual movement. 132

One might urge that when a mover walks, the space covered by his foot is called where there is an actual movement. This too does not fare any better and is criticised by the Mādhyamikas, because the foot is an aggregate of atoms. 133 The space before (purva) the atom at the tip of the toe (i.e. in the backward direction) comes under the part which is already traversed, and the space after (uttara) 134 the atom located at the tip of the heel (i.e. in forward direction) falls within that which is not yet traversed. There is nothing like a foot apart from the atoms. Therefore, there is no space possessing an actual movement apart from what has been traversed and what has yet to be traversed. 135 "Even in the toes and in the parts of them such distinction can be made ad infinitum, without our alighting upon any part that is 'being traversed'." 136

It can be understood from the following diagram:

Suppose AB is the path along which the foot CD is moving towards B. The atom at the tip of the toe is D, in the backward direction (purva) of which, i.e. DC, there is the space already traversed for that particular atom D. Again, the atom at the tip of the heel is C, in the forward direction (uttara) of which, i.e. CD, there is the space which has yet to be traversed for that particular atom C.
To refute the opponent Nāgārjuna (e.g. MK, II.1) takes time as a continuum and divides it into three segments: the past, present and future. But here he makes a dichotomy, which is his favourite instrument for criticising any hypothesis. He divides time mainly into two parts, as seen in diagram (1), the past (AC) and the future (CB). The dividing point C can be taken as present. And then, he demonstrates that motion is impossible in any of these three phases of time. The present has evidently no duration, and being an infinitesimal point it is logically not possible for it to have any amount of space, which can be the basis of motion 'being traversed'. In other words, there is no durational present and no space associated with it, which (space) may be called 'being traversed' (gamyate). The term 'gamyate' has two meanings: (1) 'is being traversed', and (2) 'is perceived or comprehended'. So the statement 'gamyamānām na gamyate' (MK, II.1d) can also be interpreted as 'the actual movement cannot be perceived'.

Further, to establish motion the opponent might profess that wherever there is activity (cestā), there is motion, and the former is found in the actual movement. On the other hand, this activity is found neither in the accomplished, not in 'not yet accomplished' movements. So, there is motion only in the actual movement. Candrakīrti clarifies the opponent's objection. Here, he says, the activity (cestā) means lifting up and advancing the foot forward. On the place where the mover performs such activity, there there is motion. And that activity is possible neither in the space already traversed (or in the past time-epoch), nor in that which has yet to be traversed (or in the future time-epoch). Rather there is motion only in that space where there is actual movement (or the space which is being traversed). Where motion is observed, there the actual movement is found, and that is driven by the activity of going
(gamikriyā). Therefore, only that space, where there is actual movement, is called 'being traversed'. Here also the verb 'gam' has two meanings: (1) to comprehend, and (2) to reach from one point to another in space.  

Candrakīrti pronounces that the opponent's expression of 'gamyamāna' is set forth because of its association with the activity of motion (gamikriyā), and in the case of the former we speak of 'being traversed'. But there is only one gamikriyā by way of which gamyamāna is designated, which again signifies the space of movement (adhvan). It is not tenable to suggest that 'being traversed' (gamyate) is in relation to the activity of actual movement. That is why Nāgārjuna (MK, II.3) raises the question: How can motion be ascribed to the actual movement? It is not possible, as it would be anomalous to maintain dual movements (dvīgamana) in gamyamāna. Candrakīrti defines gamyamāna as gamyate, and asserts that the dual movements show the movement traversed twice (dvīgata). Since the actual movement (gamyamāna) is engendered by a single activity of motion, and since there is no other activity of motion, and since the expression 'being traversed' is anomalous without motion, the proposition 'the actual movement possesses motion' (gamyamānam gamyate) does not make sense as a complete sentence does. Because of the absence of a second activity, there is only 'gamyamāna' and there is nothing like 'gamyate'.

If it is urged that 'being traversed' (gamyate), which is the predicate of 'gamyamānam gamyate', is connected with the activity of motion, then in this case the actual movement (gamyamānam), which is the subject of the above proposition, will be devoid of activity. It is not possible to ascribe a single motion to both gamyate and gamyamāna. Thus, the opponent's thesis 'gamyamānam gamyate' turns to be self-stultified. To avoid this predicament if it is suggested that the activity or motion
is connected with both ganyamāna and ganyate (subject and predicate), then in the case of former, i.e. the actual movement inheres motion, two types of activities result: one by means of which there is actual movement, and the other which is inherent in the actual movement.\(^{147}\) Again, on the acceptance of two movements or motions,\(^{148}\) by necessity two movers have to be admitted, and in the absence of a mover the movement is not intelligible.\(^{149}\) Further, if there is no movement, as has been demonstrated above, how can there be a mover?\(^{150}\) Murti remarks that "We are here faced with an impasse. There is no space that is being traversed. The divisions in space are relative and unreal. Space considered in itself does not have these distinctions - gata (traversed), agata (not traversed), and ganyamāna (being traversed); there is no intrinsic property by which any space could be singled out and distinguished from others".\(^{151}\)

To eliminate the substance-attribute relation, Nagarjuna boldly declares that neither the mover moves, nor does the non-mover, and apart from these two there is no third one that moves.\(^{152}\) This follows that there is no movement whatsoever, and without movement the mover is unintelligible. Then, it is absurd to say that 'the mover moves'.\(^{153}\) One might reply that the mover himself possesses the movement. Then, it results that the mover is by nature without any movement,\(^{154}\) or we can say that the mover moves without movement as there is no other movement.\(^{155}\) There are two alternatives: (1) either the mover is by nature without movement, or (2) he possesses an extraneous movement apart from the one which is inherent in him. The first alternative is evidently impossible. In the second, says Nagarjuna, there are two movements, if the mover moves. Firstly, there is the movement because of which something is called mover. Secondly, there is the movement in association of which we say 'the mover moves'.\(^{156}\) And then, two movers have perforce to be admitted.\(^{157}\) He rules out any possibility of substance-
attribute relation between the mover and the movement, which are neither identical with nor different from each other.159

Furthermore, MK, II.12-14 deal with reference to time as well as space. Now the question is whether there is any commencement of movement possible. The movement does not commence, avows Nāgārjuna, either in the space already traversed (past), or in the space yet to be traversed (future). It is also not possible in the space 'being traversed' (present),160 because in the preceding analysis it has been shown impossible. Even if it is admitted that the movement commences in the space 'being traversed' (gamyamāna, i.e. present), the problem of two movements as well as two movers crops up.161 Therefore, nowhere either in the space or in time is the commencement of movement possible. Before the movement commences there is no division of time or space as present (being traversed), or past (already traversed); and it cannot take place in the future (or in the space yet to be traversed).162 If the movement has to be accepted, it must commence in one of these three divisions. But we have seen that in no case is it possible. And if there is no movement, the divisions of time or space themselves having been dependent on the former becomes unintelligible.163 Again, if the divisions of time are not established, then time itself, which is known through its divisions, is not proved.

Finally, Nāgārjuna in his Vigrahavyāvartanī demonstrates the impossibility of knowledge in the three time-epochs. On this topic we find an interesting debate between him and the Naiyāyikas.164

To sum up we can say that the Mādhyamikas have successfully repudiated the notion of time.

2. Cf. MKV, p. 389.5-6; and ČSV, pp. 59.27-60.1: uktaḥ hi Bhagavatā - pañca mānī bhikṣavo nāmāmātrām pratijñāhīnāmātrām vyavahāramātrām sam-vṛtti mātrān. tad yathātiito 'dhvāna-gato 'dhvāksa nirvāṇam pudgalas cetā adī.

Gunaratna, in his commentary - Tarkarahasyadipikā on Saḍdarśana-saṁcaya of Haribhadrasūri (p. 73), points out that the above passage is set forth by the Sautrāntikas.

Also see CPB, p. 198.


5. de Jong (1972), p. 2. In this article the author disagrees with his two predecessors - Stcherbatsky and Schayer, regarding this concept.


7. CPB, pp. 7-8. Also see Vigraha vyavartanī, kārikās 22ff; Matilal (1973), pp. 56-57. For the interpretation of śūnyata as absolute nihilism, see Harsh Narain (1963).
8. Cf. MK, XXIV.18:

yah pratityasamutpada tu sunya tam pracaksmaha
sa prajmapit upadaya pratipat saiva madhyama

Also see May (1959), p. 237 and fn. 840; Matilal (1973), p. 56;

9. Cf. MKV, p. 24.7: acaryo bhuyasa prasaangapattimukhenaiva parapaksam
nirakakori sma.

Also see Stcherbatsky (1978), p. 109; CPB, p. 131, fn. 2.

10. CPB, p. 131; also see Nayak (1979), pp. 477, 480; Jhalakikar (1978),
p. 751, 809.

11. Cf. MK, XXIV.8:

dve satya samupdityatra Buddha-nama dharmadeeana
lokasaamvritisatyam ca satyam ca paramartha-taha

Also see M. Sprung (1973); Wayman (1969), pp. 147-150; IP, Vol. 1,
p. 657-662.

12. CPB, p. 197.

13. Cf. CSV, p. 36.20-21: evam apratisamkhyanirodhapratisasamkhyanirodhaya
api vaktavam.

Also see ibid., pp. 35.28-36.1-2: atha syaid aksaprasanasamkhyanirodha-
pratisamkhyanirodha-nam abhiddharmaastra-paripatihitam akrtakam
nityatvastivtenabhupagamad akrtakasyaivasattvapratipadanam abhyupetena
badhyata iti. etad api nasti.

Schrader (1902), pp. 17-30; Lamotte (1966), pp. 76ff; Scheftelowitz
Mandal (1968), pp. 3-53; Bedekar (1961), pp. 17-28; Stcherbatsky
(1926), pp. 14ff; Panikkar (1976), pp. 63-70; Coomarswamy (1947),
U.C. Bhattacharya (1934), pp. 305ff; S.R. Das (1933), pp. 119ff;
B.M. Barua (1970), pp. 8,11, 198-212, 403; Satyavrat Sastri (1963),
p. 149-204; Atthavaveda, XIX.53-54.

15. Cf. CSV, p. 38.2-5: kalavati tu manyate. kalakrtau jagatpravrttyupas-
ansaharav upalabhya kalasaadbhavo 'numiyate. tatha hi. satsv api
bijadi su prayaya su sarvadakfurader udaya upalabhyate. atha
kadacit evopalabhya. tad svasthamavirodhi kalasadannidhane ca
nivartate. Also see Ramanan (1975), pp. 195; Vaidya (1923), pp. 78, 135.
Here time means season.

16. Also see Satabastra, p. 76.

17. Cf. CSV, p. 38.18-21: sa tathanumita kalo namasti. tasya ca sato
'pi karagamupalambhman nityatvam iti. nanu caiva sati nityatvat
kala yada datta todayanam aksuradina sadaiva pratidadh prapanoti.
Atha sato 'pi kadacit karyakriyayuparatavyaparatasyeti kalpyeta. evam
api saivasattvam apadayishyati.
18. Cf. ibid., pp. 38.22-39.8: atha sato 'pi bijādīvat kāryapravṛtti-
yogyātāmātītasyassūnahabhāvān nāstī sarvādā kāryam iti. evam āpi
bijādīvad tad yogyātāmātītāy sa kaḍācid eva bhavatīti na nityāḥ.
so 'pi kutaḥ sarvādā nesyaṭe. atha pratayaṁatāryātasya tasyaśaṇ-
nidhāne sarvādā na bhavatīti. evam āpi pratayaṣaṣya bhāve bhāvād
abhāve cābhāvād bhūtvā punar na bhavatīti nūnām.

anyāyatā bhavatī eṣā ṣ/tasya pravṛttīr nivṛttīś ca yadāyaṭtā tadāyattatvāt so 'nyāyatā
bhavatī. tasmād anukūrādīvat kāryatvaṁ nātikrāmatīti pratipādayan
tena kāryaḥ ca jāyate //
ity āha. kāryabhūtaṁ cānkūrādivad anitya eva.

19. Cf. ibid., p. 40.30-33: akiṛśaṣya hetuṭvaṁ na saṃbhavatītiḥa
hetur nāma na kaṣcit padārthaḥ svetaro 'stīti phalārthodayasya
hetute na kathāṁ svasyaiva phalatvaṁ. phalatve cānkūrādivad
asya nityatvadṛṣṭīḥ kuto bhavet. tasmād evam heṭuṭhalavya-
vaṣṭhābhāvād dvayaṁ āpi svarūpaṇaḥ na sīṇhyatī.

20. Cf. ibid., p. 41.1-5: atha phalaṁ nāma hetur bhūtvā bhāvaḥ. tathā
hi bijāsadbhāve 'ākuro bhavatī. na tv anukūrasadbhāve bijām. tasmān
na hetuḥ phalatvaṁ iti. etad āpi na bhavatī. yasmād yo bijākhyo
bhāvas tasyāṅkūroṭpatteḥ prāk parikalpāṇāṁ anyāṣya tṛṭīyasya
vikāpasyabhāvād heṭubhūtō vāheṭubhūtō kālpyeta. tātṛtā tāvād
agnīādivad anheṭubhūtād asyotpattir na yujyate. hetur eva ca phalaṁ
jāyata iti pradaṛśyate.

21. Cf. ibid., p.42.22-25: bijam iti yan mūlakāraṇaṁ tat svayaṁ
vikṛtiṁ gacchad anukūraṣya kāraṇaṁ bhavati na pūrvaṣṭhāyā
aparītyage. tathā hi. yadi vicītram jagat kālakṛtaṁ syat tācā
kālo 'pi nīyatāṁ kāryotpādane pūrvaṁ dūrasaṭṭhāṁ asvasthaṁ tyajaran
vikṛtāvasthaḥ kāryotpādānūpū bhaṇet. tasmād bijhavad anityaḥ.

22. Cf. ibid., p. 42.23 and CS, IX.9c-d: vikṛtī jāyate yasya śāśvataṁ iti tan na hi.

23. Cf. ibid., p.44.18-22: jāte 'pi phale kālasvāvikārāt. tasmād yat
phalaṁ kālāj jātāṁ tad abhūtvā jāyate. heṭuprataya-yāv anapekṣaṁaṇāṁ
svayaṁ evoddhavatīty arthāḥ. heṭuprataya-yāvata udbhāve vapi phalaṁ
abhūtvodbhavatīti nedam yujyate. tatra na sarvātmabhūtvā bhāvo
'bhāvāt. yasya sarvātmamanā bhāvo na saṃbhavatīt kharaviṣṇavad
heṭuprataya-yābyāṁ janayitum na śakyate.

24. Cf. ibid., p. 44.22-26: tasmād heṭudharmatīto nityo bhāvo yasya
hetur istāḥ sa bhāvo 'bhūtvā jāyate. eṣa nirhētuko jāyate. svayaṁ
evoddhavatīty arthāḥ. evaṁ cāsya kim nīrarthayaḥ heṭuvakalpanayety
ucyate-

svayaṁ evoddhavas tasya kāraṇaṁ vinivartate //
svayaṁ eva siddher asya jagato hetuḥ kāla iti niṣprayaṁanah.

25. Cf. CS, IX.11 and CSV thereon:

utpaṁṇāṁ śāśvataṁ bhāvāt kathamaṁ āśāśvataḥ bhavet /
vaiśaktāyaṁ dvayaḥ heṭupralayor jātu nekṣyate // 11 //
loke hy anityasayai bījaṁ phalaṁ āṅkurośrībhūtī
dhāya iti praśiddham. kutācīn nityāṁ kīcīcīd anityaṁ bhavatīti
na bhavati cet tasya nityasya kālasya phalamaṁ anityaṁ iti tat
katham sidhyet.

The above kārikā is also quoted on page 324.1-2 of MKV; also see de Jong (1949), pp. 115-116.


Also see de Jong, ibid., pp. 115-116.

28. See MK, chapter XX and MKV thereon; de Jong, ibid., pp. 43-57, 115-129.

29. See MK, chapter XVII and MKV thereon; Lamotte (1936c), pp. 265-288; cp. ibid., pp. 151-205, 207-263.


Also see de Jong (1949), pp. 57, 129.

31. Cf. MKV, p. 410.6-7: ucyate. syāt saṃbhavavibhavanimittatā kālasya yadi saṃbhavavibhavāv eva syātām. na tu stāḥ.

Also see de Jong, ibid.

32. Cf. MK, chapter XXI and MKV thereon; de Jong, ibid., pp. 57-72, 129-143.


34. CPB, p. 198.

35. Cf. ČSV, p. 103.14-16: sa ca kṣaṇapalamahūrtādīvyasālījanīyoṭīto 'nāgataḥ pratuyutpannaḥ ca kālaśāyavyavasthitād bhāvāḥ bhinnon nitya iti Ṭārāyadeva in his Śataśāstra (p. 76) also presents the thesis of an opponent who maintains that time is eternal and known through inference, as follows:

"There is a dharma which is time, because it has the characteristic of eternity ... There are some dharmas which, although they cannot be directly perceived, can be known through the anumāna sāmānyata-dṛṣṭa, such as time. Although when it is very subtle it cannot
be seen, yet through the seasons, flowers, fruits and so on we know that time exists. And then, seeing the effect we know the cause. And again, through (phrases like these), 'one moment', 'not one moment' and from the characteristics of distance and nearness, etc., we know that there is time. But it is not true that time is not existent. Therefore, it is eternal."


...jasmin .................jēyate // (CS, IX.7)

īty ādīnā ...pratiṣiddhātvād api svalaṣaṇasiddhāsa kālasya na pravṛttinivṛttinīhetūtvam.

Also see MKV, p. 410.6-7. Here bhāva = existence, changing thing (according to Murti, CPB, pp. 139, 200); phenomena (according to Schayer, 1938, p. 71); thing, entity, French-chose (according to de Jong, 1949, p. 41).

Also see May (1959), pp. 15, 92, fn. 204.

37. Compare it with the Vaibhāṣika notion of bhāva and three time-epochs discussed in the previous chapter.


40. Also see the previous chapter on the controversy of time between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.

41. Cf. MKV, p. 382.4-6: te ca bhāvāśrayāḥ. yasmād utpanno niruddho hi bhāvasvabhāvo 'tītā iti vyapādiṣyate. utpanno 'niruddho hi varta-mānaḥ. abalabhātmabhāvo 'nāgata iti. evam bhāvasvabhāvanibandhanās trayāḥ kālā upadiṣṭāḥ te ca santi.


43. CPB, p. 199. This passage, though in a different context, is quoted here to show that Murti also takes the three time-epochs as independently real to criticise them.

44. Cf. MKV, p. 382.6-8: tasmat tannibandhano 'pi bhāvasvabhāvo 'stītī. ucyate. syāt kālatarayaprajāpīthetur bhāvasvabhāvo yadi kālatarayam eva bhavadabhīmaṇaḥ bhavet. na tv asti.
45. See MK, chapter XV and MKV thereon; M. Sprung (1979), pp. 152-164; Schayer (1932), pp. 55-80.

46. CPB, p. 200.

47. See I. Copi (1972), p. 274.

48. Cf. MKV, p. 382.12-16: iha tāvad yadi vartamānānāgatu syātām tāv apekṣāyātītaṃ kālaṃ bhavetām anapekṣā yā. tatra yady aṭītām apekṣāya sidhīyete tathā niyataṃ aṭīte kāle bhāvīṣyataḥ. yasmād yasya hi yatrahattvam tat tena nāpekṣyate. tadyathā vandhya stri svatanayena gaganamālatexīrā śvakuṣumāṇaṃ sikata śvataillena. avidyamānāṃ apy andhakāraṃ pradjāpena prādīpo 'py andhakāreṇa prātīdvandvitvānāpekṣyata iti cet. naitad evam. asyāpi sādhyaśamatvāt.

49. See supra fn. 47; also see Robinson (1956), p. 297.

50. Cf. MKV, pp. 382.16-383.2: tad atra yady aṭīte kāle vartamānānāgatau kālāv iṣyete 'pekṣāsiddhyartham evam saty aṭīte kāle vidyāmanātvād aṭītakālātmavat tayor apy aṭītatvam syāt. tataḥ cātīto 'pi na syāt. yasmād vartamānāvasthātikrānto hy aṭīto 'saṃprāpto 'nāgata iti syāt. yadā tu vartamānānāgatayor asamāhava eva. tadā kutaḥ kasyācād aṭītatvam syād ity ato 'tīto 'pi na syāt.

51. Cf. MK, XIX.2:
   pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra punar yadi /
   pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca syātāṃ kathā apekṣāya tam // 2 //
   Also see de Jong (1949), pp. 38,111.

52. See supra fn. 14.

53. Cf. MKV, p. 383.8: athāpi syāt kālavādināṃ vidyāta eva kālas tatra kim apekṣāyaḥ prāyojanam iti.

54. Cf. MK, XIX.3:
   anapekṣāya punaḥ siddhir nātiṣṭaṃ vidyāte tayoḥ /
   pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmaṭ kālo na vidyāte // 3 //
   Also see de Jong (1949), pp. 38, 111-112.

55. Cf. MK, XIX.4 and MKV thereon; also see de Jong, ibid., pp. 39-40, 112-113; Āryadeva's Sataśāstra, pp. 76-78; Nāgārjuna's Uपयाह्र्यदया, pp. 28-29. (see Tucci, 1929).

56. See supra fn. 47.

57. See BCAP, pp. 579.19-582.7. This passage is translated into English by Schayer (1938), pp. 71-73.

58. Cf. MKV, p. 259.2: vidyāta eva bhāvānāṃ svabhāvaḥ. Also see ibid., pp. 250.3, 280.3.
59. For the Madhyamika criticism of causes and conditions, see MK, XX and MKV thereon; also see CPB, pp. 132-135, 166-178. Nāgārjuna has devoted several chapters in MK on the critique of causality in different forms, such as chapters 1, XV, XX and XXI.

60. For the Madhyamika criticism of the saṃskṛtalaksanas, see MK, chapter VII and MKV thereon; May (1959), pp. 106-142; C6, XV and CSV thereon; CPB, pp. 177, 191-195; de Jong (1949), p. 4, fn. 14.


63. CPB, pp. 7-8.

64. Cf. BCA, IX.143a-b: anyato nāpi cāyātaṁ na tiṣṭhati na gacchati /

65. Cf. BCAP, p. 580.5-10: anyato deśakālān nāyātām. nāgataṁ kīcicīt. nāpy āgataṁ sad vartamānād adhvānam kvacīd gacchati. nāpi tenalka- svabhāvena kvacīt tiṣṭhati. tathā hi yady anāgataṁ adhvan vartamānām āgacchet. vartamānād vāti tam tādā saṃskṛtām api nityām svāt. sarvādā vidyāmanātvaṁ. nānityām nāmāsti. sa dharmo na ca nityah iti katham etat setṣyati.

66. Cf. ibid., p. 580.11-14: atha pūrvāparakālayoḥ kāritraśūnyatyādharmasyādvahusu viśeṣāḥ. tathā hi yadāsaṃkṛtakāritraḥ. kṛtyaṁ na karoṭi. tadānāgato 'bhidhiyate. yadā karoṭi tadā pratyutpannaḥ. yadā tu kṛtyaṁ nivṛttataḥ. tadātiṇa iti viśeṣāḥ.


68. Cf. ibid., p. 580.16-18: pratyayantarāpeksaśāpi nityām avasthitarūpasya na saṃbhavati. kāritraśūnyasya ca 'vastutve avasthitamātisvabhavatām api tatvaprasāntaḥ.


70. Cf. ibid., p. 581.1-3: kim tad aparākāritrasadbhāvāt. svayam eva vā. pūrvatṛnavasthaḥ. pāścātye ca dharmasyāpi svayam atītam aśvavasthāyaṁ na kīcicīt kṣūyate.

71. Cf. ibid., p. 581.3-12: yathā vartamānaṁ dravyaṁ 'sti tathāti tam anāgataṁ cāsti. tada naivam. svabhāvena satō dharmasya katham anutpannavināśtasvabhāvāt. kim asya pūrvam nāśāḥ yasyābhāvād ajōta ity ucyate. kim ca pāścān nāśi yasyābhāvād vilāsaḥ iti. tenāvii cātmanā pūrvāparakālayor avasthāne vartanānavad upalabhyādi prasaṅgaḥ. tasmād abhūtvād abhavana dharmato na saṃgacchate
kathañcid apy adhvatrayayogah. tattvābhy upagacchato nātītādisadbhāvah. 
tad ayan atra saṁgrahaślokaḥ- 
svabhāvāḥ sarvādhā cāstī bhāvo nityaś ca negyate / 
na ca svabhāvād bhavo 'nyo vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam // iti // 
Also see TSP, p. 619; AKB, pp. 810.8-811.2; AKP, V, p. 58, fn. 1; LVP 
(1937), p. 110, fn. 4; CCB, p. 84.

72. CCB, pp. 41-42.
73. Ibid., pp. 43-47.
74. See IP, Vol. 1, p. 722 (notes on p. 625); also cp. Stcherbatsky 
(1962), vol. I, p. 111; Kalupahana (1975), p. 82; Nyanaponika (1965), 
p. 118.
75. Cf. BCAP, p. 581.13-14: yad apy ucyate. asty atītaṃ karma. asty 
anāgatam phalam iti sutravacanāt. asty atītaḥ dibhāvah.
76. Cf. ibid., p. 581.14-18: tad api hetuphalāpavāde taddṛṣṭiprati- 
śedhārtho uktam Bhavavatā. asty atītaṃ asty anāgatam iti. atītaṃ 
tu yad abhūtapūrvam utpadya vinaṣṭam. anāgatam astiśabdasya nipātātva- 
kāłatrayavrīttīvam.
Also see AKB, p. 811.3-9.
77. Cf. AKB, p. 811.9 and AKV thereon.
78. Cf. BCAP, p. 581.18-582.3: itthātma caitad evam yat Paramārthaśūnyatāyam 
uktam Bhagavatā. caksur bhīkṣava utpadyamānaṃ na kutaścid āgačchati. 
nirudhyānāmaṃ na kvačist sannicayam gacchati. iti hi bhīkṣavāḥ caksur 
abhūtva bhavati. bhūtvā ca pratīvagacchati iti.
Also see AKB, p. 813.1-3; TSP, p. 631.23-24; AKP, V, p. 59, fn. 2; 
CCB, p. 85, fn. 1; ADV, p. 263.1-2, and fn. 1.
79. Cf. ČSV, p. 105.8-12: anāgatāṃ kālāḥ upasyākhyātavya iti tadartham 
anāgato ghaṭo upanyastāḥ. tathātītaṃpratyutpannakālopyākhyānārtham 
atītāpratyutpannaghaṭopanyāsāḥ. tatrāṇāgata na pratyutpannam kālāṃ 
prāptaḥ, atītāṃ pravātītāḥ. pratyutpanno jato 'niruddhāḥ, 
te ca trayañ kālāḥ parasparāpākeśaiva sreṣṭhāḥ. dvau dvāv 
anapekṣyakaikā ko na bhavatīti.
80. Cf. ibid., p. 105.13-19: yaḥ so 'nāgato ghaṭo na tasmin vartāmāno 
ghato nāpy atītaḥ. laksapabhedād itaretarāsaṁbhava ca. yadaivam 
anāgata ghaṭe vartāmāno 'tītaś ca dvāv api na vidiyete tadā vartāmāno 
'tītaś ca dvāv api anāgataś anāgatavatvenānāgata. yathānāgato vartāmāne 
'nāgatavatvenānāgata tathā vartāmāno 'tītaś ca dvāv api anāgataś 
anāgatavatvenānāgata. yadi vartāmāne 'nāgatavatvenānāgata nānāgata 
ināgatovetneti. naitād evam. anāgatasiddhau vartāmnasyātītasya 
ca dvayoḥ siddhiḥ. yadi tv anāgata eva nāsti tadā kuto 'tītaś 
pratyutpanno vā bhavet.
81. Cf. ibid., p. 105.22-24: yasmat ubhāv api anāgatā eva. trayoṣām anāgatāvye 
cātītāpratyutpannayor asambhāvāt kuto 'nāgatavatvenānāgara vyavasthāpyate. tasmān nāsti anāgataḥ kālāḥ 
As we know, there is another commentary by Dharmapāla on ČS, 
apart from ČSV. This is found only in Chinese translation by Ḥsuan-
tsang. My friend, Mr. John Jorgensen, kindly supplied me with a free
translation of the opening lines of this commentary on chapter XI
in order to make the sense clearer:

Kuang Pai-lun Pen by Kryadeva (T 30, pp. 182-187) - T 30, p.183b:
If a vase or the like is in the future (i.e. not yet come),
then it does not exist in the past or present. If in the
future past and present exist, then this future does not
exist in the future.

Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun by Dharmapāla (T 30, pp. 187-250) -
T 30, p. 203c:
If one says that something which has already ceased will
not be born again and is without substance, this principle
is not so. All created dharmas in both the times (chi) of
before (future) and after (past) perform their function,
and although they are non-existent, their substance (t'i,
essence) eternally exists. The three time-epochs are not
identical, because they have different characteristics.
There is no necessity that they will not arise, have
stability and lack cessation.

In order to reject this thesis, the following verse says:
If a vase or the like is in the future, then it does not
exist in the past or present.

The Śāstra says: the rūpa, etc.; all the dharmas are in the
future time-epoch (wei-lai shih). The two time-epochs, the
past and present, are both empty. Only when they later meet
with causes and conditions do these two forms (erh-hsiang)
arise. How can you say "There is no necessity that they will
not arise"? The future time-epoch (wei-lai shih) is not
existent in the past or present. How can you say "They have
stability and lack cessation"? If one grasps the past and
present in the future, then this does not accord with the
fundamental teachings of Buddha. Therefore, the following
verse says:
If in the future, the past and present exist,
then this future does not exist.

The Śāstra says: if in the future, the past and present
time-epochs exist, then the future disappears. It is main-
tained that a single dharma at one time has many character-
istics (hsiang), and the latter differ from each other.
This does not give a complete sense, because according
to this principle each time-epoch has many characteristics
which cannot be established.

82. Cf. CSV, pp. 105.31-106.1: atha manyate. anāgato ghaṭaḥ sarvathā
nāsti eveti na. anāgatasya svabhāvo 'nāgate ghaṭe vidyate. tasmād
anāgatasya sādhāvena pṛthag atītasyāpi siddhisadbhāve vidyata
evānāgata itī.

83. Cf. CS, XI.2:
yady atītanāgatayo'ḥ svabhāvāḥ syād anāgata /
anāgataḥ svayaṁ yaḥ syād atītāḥ sa kathaṁ bhavet // 2 //
Also see Vaidya (1923), pp. 90, 143.
īha yan nāsti na taśya parimāṇavatvam vidyate tadyathā kharaviṣāṇasya. asti ca kālasya parimāṇavatvam kṣaṇalavamuhūrtadiva-
sarātryahorāturakṣamāsamsaṃvatsarādibhedena: tasmāt parimāṇavatvād 
vidyata eva kāla iti.

85. Cf. ibid., p. 385.14: ucyate. yadi kālo nāma kaścit syat syāt 
tasya parimāṇavatvam. na tv asti.

86. Cf. ibid., p. 386.1-3: iha yadi kālo nāma kaścid avasthitā kṣaṇādi-
vatiriktaḥ syāt sa kṣaṇādibhiḥ parimāṇavatvād grhyeta. na tu 
avasthitā kūṭasthāḥ kaścit kālo nāmātī yah kṣaṇādibhir grhyeta. 
tad evaṁ nāsthito grhyate kālo 'sthitatvān na grhyata ity arthaḥ.

87. Cf. ibid., p. 386.4: athāpi syān nitya eva-vasthitasvabhāvāḥ kālo 
nāmātī kṣaṇādibhir abhivyajyate.

88. Cf. ibid., p. 386.6-7: 
kālaḥ pacatibhūtāni kālaḥ saṁharate praśāḥ / 
kālaḥ suptēgu jāgaṁi kālo hi duratikramāḥ // iti / 
Also see Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya of Haribhadrasūri, p. 16.13-14;

89. Cf. MKV, p. 386.8: yaś caivaṁ lakṣaṇaḥ so 'vasthitasvabhāvo 'stīti.

90. Cf. ibid., p. 386.8-10: ucyate. evam api sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate 
yah kṣaṇādibhir abhivyajyamāno grhyeta. kasmāt punaḥ sthitaḥ kālo 
nāstīti cet kṣaṇādīvastiriktenāpāḥyamāṇatvāt.

91. Here M. Sprung (1979), p. 190, wrongly translates saṁskṛta as 
compound. Stcherbatsky rightly observes: "The translation of 
saṁskṛta-dharma as 'compound' is a contradictio in adjecto. 
A dharma is never compound, it is always simple. Wherever there 
is composition there are several dharmas." - CCB, p. 40, fn. 1. 
Also see May (1959), pp. 139, also 74, fn. 108, 106, fn. 255; 
CPB, p. 96; Silburn (1955), p. 190.

92. Cf. MKV, p. 386.11: api caivaṁ kālaḥ saṁskṛtasvabhāvāḥ sann astīti. 
asaṁskṛtasvabhāvo vā.

93. MK, VII; also see CS, XV and CSV thereon; CPB, pp. 96, 191-195, 
352-354.

94. See supra fn. 60.

95. Cf. MK, VII.33a-b: 
upādasthitibhaṅgānāṁ asīddher nāsti saṁskṛtam / 
Also see CS, XV.9 and CSV thereon; Vaidya (1923), pp. 117, 161; 
May (1959), pp. 139, 369; LVP (1933), p. 21; supra fn. 58.

96. LVP (ibid., pp. 60-146) has translated this text into French. 
Restored by N.A. Sastri from Chinese, see CPB, p. 96, fn. 5.

97. CPB, p. 96. Also see BCA, IX.143c-d and BCAP thereon.
Cf. MK, VII.33c-d:

sāṃskṛtasya pprasiddhau ca katham setsyaty asaṃskṛtam //

Also see May (1959), p. 140, fn. 397, 398, p. 369; Vaidya (1923), pp. 117, 161; Robinson's remarks (1956, pp. 299-300) on the latter half of this kārikā (MK, VII.33c-d) and similar others (XV.5, XXII.10, XXIII.22, XXV.7 and XXVII.18) are noteworthy:

"It is necessary to reiterate here that epistemological questions are excluded from present consideration, and that the question is not how absences are cognized, but how the logical functor of negation is understood. A number of passages reveal that Nāgārjuna maintained a concept of negation which at first sight seems nonsensical.

These examples seem to maintain that the presence of the negation of any variable implies the presence of that variable. However, it is more likely that Nāgārjuna was thinking of a finite extension and its complement, and excluding null and universal terms from consideration. An entity (bhāva) is by definition conditioned, and neither universal (śāvata) nor null (uccheda). It has a complement which is conditioned in the same way except for the property of being absent when the entity is present."

98. CPB, p. 96; also see supra fn. 2.

100. May (1959), p. 140, fn. 397. Here, in this context fn. 398 is very important and informative for further references.


102. Cf. ibid., p. 387.7-8: yady evam bhāvam pratītya kālo bhavatīti bhavatā vyavasthāpyate. yadā khalu bhāvo nāsti. tada niyataṁ taddhetuko 'pi kālo nāstīti.

103. Cf. ibid., p. 387.13-14: kālabhāvac ca na santi kṣaṇalavamuhūrtādayaḥ kālabhedās tatparimāṇabhūtā ity atāḥ kutaḥ parimāṇavatvena kālasiddhir bhaviṣyatī.

104. Cf. MK, XXI.21:

evaḥ triṣv api kāleṣu na yuktā bhavasantatiḥ /

Also see de Jong (1949), pp. 69, 140-141.

105. See supra fn. 47.


109. See PC, pp. 84ff, 95ff.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid., p. 188.
116. Ibid., p. 59.
118. Sāṅkhya and Vātsippyutṛya are the same. See N. Dutt (1939), pp. 90-100, (1978), pp. 181-208; Masuda (1925), pp. 53-57; André Bareau (1955), pp. 114-126; For the criticism of the Vātsippyutṛya's doctrine of pudgalavāda, see AKB, chapter IX; AKP, IX, pp. 227-302; Stcherbatsky (1976); TS and TSP, chapter VI; Schayer (1932), pp. 68-93; Satyasiddhīsastra of Harivarman, see N.A. Sastri (1975), pp. 87-95, (1978), pp. 67-74.
122. Here we are referred back to MK, chapter 1, where Nāgārjuna maintains that "there is no hard and fast rule that everything must first appear and then disappear. The author ... intends to explain the principle of the Relativity which implies the denial of extinction and other characteristics" (Stcherbatsky, 1978, p. 97), and finally "it is established that there is no causality in the ultimate sense. The dependent origination (or Relativity) with its eight characteristics of no real origination, etc. is thus established" (ibid., p. 128).
   Also see May (1959), pp. 51, fn.4, 256, fns. 919, 920; Lamotte (1949), p. 326; LVF (1933), p. 11.
124. Cf. MKV, p. 92.3-5: atrāha, yady apy utpādapratisedhāt pratītyasamutpādaśāyinīrodhādiviśegaṇasiddhiḥ. tathāpy anāgaṃniṃgamapratītyasamutpādasiddhaye lokaprasiddhāganāganākmakriyāspratisedhārtham kīciṣā upapattiyantaram ucyatām iti.

May (1959), fn. 5, observes: The Tibetan version does not translate loka, and relates prasiddha to upapattiyantaram: "What new argument and evidence".

May (1959), fn. 5, observes: The Tibetan version does not translate loka, and relates prasiddha to upapattiyantaram: "What new argument and evidence".

125. At least three triads are found in MK and MKV, (i) gatāgatagamyamāna (chapter 2), (ii) utpādasthitibhanga (chapter 7), and (iii) atitānāgatapratyutpanna (chapter 19). Also see May (1959), fns. 270, 551. Regarding the first triad May's remarks (ibid., p. 51, fn. 7) are noteworthy:

"1. The schema of the 'temporal analysis' in the present, past, and future, is applied to the critique of several categories, notably the saṃskṛtalaksana...."

For a general schema of refutation of 'triads', see MK, XIX.1-4 (de Jong, 1949, pp. 37-40) ...

II. The interpretation of this first paragraph [of ch. 2] is critical. gamyate must be understood at the same time as passive as well as impersonal.

(1) In the first interpretation, the subject gatāgatagamyamānam is understood as the direct-object (karman, MKV, ed. LVP, p. 96.8) of the driving activity (gamikriyā) expressed by the verb gamyate. It signifies literally: "that which has been gone", etc.; it opposes the agent of movement (gantr) and designates "the passage" (adhvan) through which this agent travels, within its three temporal aspects: accomplished journey, unaccomplished, and going to be accomplished. The driving activity objectifies itself in the passage, and the passage is "the support of objectification" (ālambana, fn. 603) of the driving activity. As a matter of fact, it is first of all this first interpretation which emerges from the commentary of Candrakirti, who expounds gatāgatagamyamānam as adhvan (MKV, ed. LVP, pp. 92.9, 96.1) and gives a distinctly passive meaning to gata, etc. in such expressions as deṣo gato, p. 93.5, gate 'dhvajate, p. 92.5, gate 'dhvani, p. 94.2. This is also the interpretation of Murti [CPB] p. 178.

(2) But the triad gatāgatagamyamānam is not rigorously opposed to the triad gantr/agantr/ "naiva ganta nāganta": the third terms do not correspond; moreover, the division gata-... is of a temporal nature, whereas the division gantr/... is not. gatāgatagamyamānam represents the temporal splitting up of the movement (gamana): accomplished movement, unaccomplished, and yet to be accomplished, and then gamyate takes an impersonal sense: "There is movement". The grammatical relation between gatāgatagamyamānam and gamyate grows blurred in a kind of anacoluthon: "accomplished movement - there is no movement".

(3) Certain passages of Candrakirti's commentary and certain turns of the Tibetan version reveal properly the equivocal and ill-defined nature of the relation - gataṃ (na) gamyate: see fn. 23. In employing everywhere the particle la, the Tibetan translator solves this problem ingeniously, since this particle is appropriate in expressing the two restrained relations in the proposition gataṃ (na) gamyate: that of karman (las su bya ba) and that of adhikaraṇa (gzi).

(4) The complex meaning of gamyate, at the same time transitive and neuter, explains that the analysis of the movement can serve as
a model for the analysis of purely transitive actions, such as the vision (na drṣṭaṁ ṛṣyate tāvad..., MKV, ed. LVP, p. 144.14, [May 1959] fn. 80), as well as the intransitive action (utpāda, MK, VII. 14, [May, ibid.] p. 120 and fns. 257, 311).

(5) One must not think of finding in the analysis of movement, which this chapter shows us, the division in the mover, movement and path. On the whole the analysis is based on the following categories:

- **gantr-** - agent (personal) of the movement or of the driving activity
- **gamikriyā** - driving activity
- **substantive:** movement gamana → movement gatāgatagamyamānam under its three temporal aspects
- **verbal:** transitive gacchati / gamyate (in the passive sense)

Impersonal neuter gamyate

The object of the driving activity gatāgatagamyamānam → adhvan, passage (the movement, objective itself in the passage).

126. Cf. MKV, p. 92.5-6: ucyate. yadi gamanam nāma syān niyataṁ tad gate vādhvajāte parikalpyetāgate gamyamāne vā. sarvathā ca na yujyate.

127. Cf. MK, II.1:

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128. Siderits (1976, p. 289) also gives a similar diagram, but it is differently interpreted, rather mathematically.


130. Cf. MKV, p. 92.9-11: tatoparatagamikriyam adhvajātaṁ gatam ity ucyate āvīśyangānaṁ vartamānagamikriyaya gamyata ity ucyate. yad-gatam uparatagamikriyam vartamānagamikriyāyogavācinā gamyata ity anena sābdenocyamānaṁ asaṁbaddham iti kṛtvā gatam tāvad gamyata iti na yujyate.

131. Cf. ibid., p. 93.1-3: agatam api na gamyate. agatam hy anupajāta-gamikriyam anāgatam ucyate. gamyata iti ca vartamānam. ato 'nā-gatavartamānyor atyantabhedaṁ agatam api gamyata iti na yujyate. yady agatam kathaṁ gamyate 'tha gamyata na tad agatam iti.

132. Cf. ibid., p. 93.6-9: iha hi gantā yam deśam atikrāntaṁ sa tasya deśo gato yam ca nātikrāntaṁ so 'syānāgataṁ. na ca gatāgatavyati-rekena ūtriyaṁ aparam adhvajātaṁ paśyāmo gamyamānam nāma. yataś calvam gamyamānam na gamyate. gamyata iti na prajñāyate. tasmān nāsti gamyamānam. ato na tad gamikriyāṁ āvīṣyate na gamyata iti nāsti gamyamāne 'pi gumananam.
For a similar argument, see MK, VII.14 and MKV thereon; May (1959), pp. 120-121,313-314 where the impossibility of origination is shown by way of temporal analysis.

133. For the Mādhyamika examination of atoms, see CŚV, pp. 463-467; CPB, pp. 200-201; May (1959), p. 54, fn. 15; Ramanan (1975), pp. 214-215.

134. May (1959), p. 54, fn. 14, points out some vagueness from Sanskrit to Tibetan:

pūrva ('anterior' in time) = rgyab ('posterior' in space)  
uttara ('posterior' in time) = mdun ('anterior' in space)

135. Cf. MKV, p. 93.9-13: atha syād gantur gacchato yaś caranākhrānto deśaḥ sa gamyāmānaḥ syād iti. naivam. caragayor api paramānusām-ghatatvāt. angulyāvasthitasya paramānṛyaḥ pūrvo deśaḥ sa tasya gate 'ntargataḥ. pārśnyavasthitasya caramāṃparamānṛyaḥ yaḥ uttaro deśaḥ sa tasyāgate 'ntargataḥ. na ca paramānvyatirekena cara ṇam asti tasmān nāsti gatāgatavyatirekena gamyāmānam.

136. CPB, p. 179.

137. Also see Tachikawa (1980), pp. 177-178.

138. The same dichotomy, for example, is found in MK, XXIII.17-18a-b. Tachikawa (ibid., pp. 167-168) explains these kārikās properly.

139. Or 'fat' temporal present is maintained by the Puigalavādins of Buddhism. See Yamaguchi, Susumu (tr.), Gesshozd Churonshoku, Tokyo, 1951, p. 146 (quoted by Siderits, 1976, p. 293).

140. Cf. MK, II.2:  

cyātā yatra gatis tatra gamyāmāne ca sā yataḥ /  
na gate nāgata cyātā gamyāmāne gatis tataḥ / 2 //

141. Cf. MKV, p. 94.1-4: tatra cyātā caraṇotkṣepaparikalaksanā. yato vrajaḥ gantur yatra deśe cyātā gatis tatraiva deśe. sā ca cyātā na gate 'dhvani saṃbhavati nāpy agate kim tu gamyamāna eva. tataḥ ca gamyamāne gatiḥ. yatra hi gatir upalabhya tad gamyāmānam. tac ca gamikriyāyā āvīṣyate. tasmād gamyāmānam eva gamyata iti. eko 'tra gamir jñānārthaḥ, aparās ca deśāntaraśaṃ- ṭyarthā iti.

The double meanings of "gam" embarrassed the Tibetan translators, see May (1959), p. 55, fn. 17.

M. Sprung (1979), p. 78, fn. 1, remarks that "Candrakīrti might have added a third meaning, namely, 'to attain' or 'to achieve'. The entire chapter [MK.II] could be taken in either of these two alternate senses. The primary reference, however, is to motion in space and the chapter has been so translated".

142. The term "adhvaṇ" has both spatial (the path) as well as temporal (epoch) meaning. See May (1959), p. 65, fn. 65. Further (ibid., p. 55, fn. 19), he points out:

b. The hypothesis of the opponent - gamyāmānam gamyate iti means the actual movement possesses movement. In order to give a complete sense ..., this proposition requires three conditions:
(1) that the subject is the object (karman) of the action expressed by the predicate;
(2) that the subject is 'endowed' with the driving activity' (gami-kriyayukta);
(3) that the predicate is 'endowed with the driving activity'.

143. Cf. MKV, p. 94.8-13: iha hi gamikriyayogad eva gamyamanavyapadeśam ichati bhavān, tac ca gamyata iti bravīti. ekā cātra gamikriyā, tāyā gamyamanavyapadeśo bhavatu kāmam adhvaṇaḥ. gamyata iti bhūyaḥ kriyāsahbandho gamyamānasya na yuṣyata iti gamyamānasya gamanam katham nāmopapatsyate / kāraṇam śāh-
gamyamāne dvigamanam yadā naivopapadyate // iti //

Here in MK, II.3c LVP (MKV) and Vaidya (1960) read "dvigamanam" (dual movements), while May (1959, p. 56) on the basis of Paris manuscripts of Praśannapadā (preserved in Asiatic Society, Paris), which was also used by LVP, maintains "vigamanam", i.e. without inherent movement. "Tibetan version reads "agamanam" (see MKV, ed. LVP, p. 94, fn. 2, and Vaidya, ibid., p. 34, fn.1), which confirms Tucci's manuscripts of Praśannapadā (see de Jong, 1978, p. 36). Inada (1970, p. 44) reads "agamanam". Also see LVP, ibid., p. 95.1 and Vaidya, ibid., p. 34.15: vinā gamanena.

Inada (ibid., pp. 44-45) informs us that "... Ryōtai Hatani and Hakujū Uj note in their respective Japanese translations that the Akyokōha (Wu-wei-lun...), Prajñāpradīpa (Pan-jo-te'ng-lun...), Ta-oh'eng-chung-kuin-shih-lun...and Piṅgala's version as translated by Kumārajīva into Chinese (Chung-lun...), all refer to the latter reading (i.e. agamanam)."


Siderits and O'Brien (1976, p. 290) maintain that "dvigamanam" seems somewhat more likely, since it is supported by Candrakirti's commentary. "However, both readings [dvigamanam and vigamanam] yield an interpretation which is consistent with our assumption that in [MK] II.3 Nāgārjuna will seek to refute the case of motion in discontinuous time". Their mathematical interpretation of MK,II.3 (with the reading 'dvigamanam') supports Nāgārjuna:

"On this reading the argument is against the model of motion which assumes that both time and space are discontinuous; thus it parallels in function Zeno's Paradox of the Stadium. Suppose that time is constituted of indivisible minims of duration d, and space is constituted of indivisible minims of length s. Now suppose three adjacent minims of space, A, B, and C, and suppose that an object of length ls at time t₀ occupies A and at time t₁ occupies C, such that the interval t₀-t₁ is ld. Now since the object has been displaced two minims of space, that is, 2s, this means that its displacement velocity is \( v = 2s/d \). For the object to go from A to C, however, it is clearly necessary that it traverses B, and so the question naturally arises, When did the object occupy minim B? Since displacement A-B is ls, by our formula we conclude that the object occupies B at \( t₀+1/2d \). This result is clearly impossible, however, since d is posited as an indivisible unit of time. And yet the notion that the object went from A to C without traversing B is unacceptable. In order
to reconcile theory with fact, we might posit an imaginary going whereby the object goes from A through B to C, alongside the orthodox interpretation whereby the object goes directly from A to C without traversing B. This model requires two separate goings, however, and that is clearly absurd. Thus we must conclude that there is no going of present-being-gone-to, since the requisite notion of an extended present leads to absurdity." (ibid.).

It is also interesting to note their interpretation of the same kārikā with May's reading, vigamanam:

"This may be taken as an argument against the model of motion which presupposes discontinuous time but a spatial continuum. Suppose that time is constituted of indivisible minims of duration d. Now suppose that a point is moving along a line a-c at such a rate that at t₀ the point is at a, and at t₁ = t₀+ld, the point is at c. Now by the same argument which we used on the first reading of II.3, for any point b lying between a and c, b is never passed by the moving point, since motion from a to b would involve a duration less than d, which is impossible. Thus what we must suppose is that for some definite duration d, the point rests at a, and for some definite duration d, the point rests at c. The whole point of the supposition at II.2 was to introduce the notion of activity, however. Now it seems that this supposition leads to a consequential non-going, which is not only counterintuitive but also clearly contrary to what the opponent sought when he presupposed an extended present. While the principles of cinematography afford a good heuristic model of a world in which time is discontinuous and space continuous, we do not recommend them to anyone interested in explaining present motion through a spatial continuum." (ibid.).

144. Cf. MKV, p. 94.14: dvīgataṃ gamanaṃ dvigamanam. LVP (ibid., fn. 4) points out that this phrase is not translated in the Tibetan version. May follows Paris manuscript: vigataṃ gamanaṃ vigamanam, which confirms Tibetan version. See May (1959), pp. 56, fn. 22 and 307, fn. 11. Also see LVP (ibid.), p. 94, fn. 4; Vaidya, ibid., p. 34, fn. 2.

145. Cf. MKV, p. 94.14-95.3: gamyamāṇam iti gamyata ity arthaḥ. dvīgataṃ gamanaṃ dvigamanam. ekasyā gamkriyāyā gamyamāṇam ity atropayuktaviśād dvitīyāyā abhāvāc ca, gamyata ity ayaṃ vyapadeśo vinā gamanena yudā naivopapadyate, tadā gamyamāṇam gamyata iti pariṣpūrṇo vākyaṛtho nāstītī abhiprāyaḥ. gamyamāṇam ity etāvamātraṃ eva saṁbhavati dvitīyakriyābhāvāt, na tu gamyata iti.

146. Cf. MKV, p. 95.4-5: atha gamyata ity atraiva gamikriyāsandha iyate. evam satī gamyamānayapadeśe nāstī kriyāsandha iti. Also see MK. II.4 and MKV thereon.

147. Cf. MK, II.5:

\[\text{gamyamāṇasya gamane prasaktam gamanadvayam / yena tad gamyamāṇam ca yac cātra gamanaṃ punāḥ // 5 //}

Here pada d is translated by May (1959, p. 58) as "l'autre contenu dans ce [movement actuel]", and Sprung (1979, p. 79) as "the other in which there is motion". But I prefer to follow May.
Throughout MK, chapter II movement (gamana) and motion (gati) are used as synonymous, and they can be interchanged. See May (1959), p. 57, fn. 26.

Cf. MK, II.6: dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye / gantāraṃ hi tirsakṛtya gamanaṃ nopapadyate // 6 //

Cf. MK, II.7c-d: gamane 'sati gantātha kuta eva bhaviṣyati /

Cf. MK, II.8: gantā na gacchati tāvad agantā naiva gacchati / anyo gantur agantuś ca kas tṛṣṭyo hi gacchati // 8 //

In the above two cases, according to Robinson (1956, pp. 295-296), the law of the excluded middle is invoked. Also see CPB, pp. 146-148.

Cf. MKV, p. 98.5: tasmān nāsti gamanam.

Cf. MK, II.9: gantā tāvad gacchāti katham evopapatsyate / gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate // 9 //

Cf. MK, II.10: pakṣo gantā gacchāti yasya tasya prasajyate / gamanena vinā gantā gantur gamanam icchataḥ // 10 //


Cf. MKV, pp. 99.8-9': ato gantṛdvayaprastāṅga iti.

A.B. Keith remarks (1923, p. 239): "Every conceivable relation yields to such dialectic; subject and object; actor and action; fire and fuel; existence and non-existence; extension or matter; sensation and perception; origination, duration, and disappearance; unity and plurality; whole and part; time; the aggregates; the six elements; the dispositions; the senses; as well as all the deepest doctrines of Buddhism, including misery, the Tathāgata, the noble truths, the chain of causation, bondage, and release itself, prove incapable of sustaining the searching examination or reductio ad absurdum (prasāṅga) which establishes that they neither exist of themselves, nor by others, nor by both, nor by neither."

Cf. MK, II.12: gate nārabhyate gantum nārabhyate 'gate / nārabhyate ganyamāne gantum ārabhyate kuha // 12 //
161. Cf. MKV, p. 100.8: nāpi gamyāmāne tad abhāvāt kriyādvyayaprasāṅgāt kartrdvayaprasāṅgāc ca.

162. Cf. MK, II.13:
na pūrvām gamanārṇābhād gamyamānām na vā gataṃ / yatrārābhyeta gamanam agate gamanām kutah // 13 //

163. Cf. MK, II.14:
gataṃ kim gamyamānām kim agataṃ kim vikalpyate / adṛṣṭyāmāna āraṇbhē gamanasyai v sarvathā // 14 //

CONCLUSION

We may now conclude the results of our inquiry without repeating the arguments. Many of the questions raised in the Preface are answered in the preceding chapters. We have not examined all the related concepts separately. However, most of them are discussed at different places in the present thesis. Our primary aim has been to discuss time systemwise, i.e. according to major philosophical systems of India, not problemwise.

We have chosen both Buddhist and where relevant non-Buddhist systems for our study. We found that for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika everything is objectively real, and so time is taken here as a substantive reality. Time is thought to be non-psychic, all-pervading, unique, one, normally imperceptible, infinite, inactive, an instrumental cause of all products, a common receptacle of all corporeal things, ground of our usages of the past, present and future, and various temporal expressions, such as kṣaṇa, lava, nimeṣa and so on.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika gives some interesting proofs for the existence of time. Since time does not possess any physical or psychical quality, it is not an object of direct perception. It is known only through inference on the basis of the notions of temporal priority and temporal posteriority, and so on. However, we find diverse interpretations within the system in this regard. Time for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is an undivided whole, infinite and absolute. The divisions of time as past, present and future, or second, minute, hour, etc. measured by a watch, or an action, or the existence of an object are empirical, not real. They are imposed properties (kālopādhi) of absolute time.

In Sāṁkhya-Yoga time as such is denied. Sāṁkhya does not give much importance to the concept of time. We have seen that Sāṁkhya explicitly
proclaims the unreality of time in direct opposition to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulation of substantive and absolute time. Change is here taken as real and time is identified with it. But Yoga accepts time as discrete moments. We have dealt with the Yoga notion of time with regard to the theories of causality, conservation of energy, change and succession. It propounds the absolute atomistic theory of time, but denies any succession of moments representing as an absolute and infinite time.

Jainism is a heterodox system of Indian philosophy denying the authority of the Vedas. It admits time as a substance (dravya). Time in Jainism is considered to be an instrumental cause of every modification in other substances. But time from ordinary point of view is called relative time which is measured by different changes, and is nothing but a paryāya (modification) of absolute time (dravya kāla).

In Pali Buddhism, both canonical and non-canonical, we saw that there were only scattered references or brief discussions regarding time. In order to find a clear picture of the notion of time in Pali Buddhism, we drew implications at many places from its expositions of many other concepts. Time as such is absent from Pali sources.

In chapter V we witnessed a very interesting controversy on time between the dogmatic Vaibhāṣikas and the radical Sautrāntikas. The former maintains the continued existence of substance through past, present and future, and thus gives the impression of establishing an absolute time which was proved later on baseless. The Vaibhāṣikas do admit the three time-epochs, but nowhere do they even talk of absolute time as a substance. Vasumitra, one of the four Vaibhāṣika teachers, propounds the theory of kāritra (activity, causal efficiency), a term which is also adopted by the Sautrāntikas, but in a different sense. The former explains the three stages of kāritra, the past, present and
future, to prove the continued existence of substance, while the latter take it to demonstrate the momentary character of substance. The three time-epochs are understood by the Vaibhāṣikas only as modes of existence or entities.

Finally, the Mādhyamika dialectic exhibits the essencelessness (śūnyatā) of time like other entities. The method of the Mādhyamikas is their dialectic which consists of reductio ad absurdum arguments. It shows the conflicting or self-contradictory characters in each and every thesis of the opponent. Time as a cause is vehemently criticised by Nāgārjuna who also maintains the impossibility of any means to the knowledge of time.

The Mādhyamika critique of motion also leads to the rejection of time. Nāgārjuna shows that motion is found neither in the space which has already been traversed (referring to the past), nor in that which has yet to be traversed (referring to the future), and apart from these two states there is no third alternative, such as being traversed (referring to the present). He explains away movement, mover, space and time altogether. He argues that before movement commences there is no division of time or space as present (being traversed) and past (already traversed); and it is not possible for it to take place in the future (or in the space yet to be traversed). The movement itself is shown to be impossible, and thus the divisions of time or space themselves having been dependent on it becomes unintelligible. Likewise, if the divisions of time are not established, then time itself, which is known through its divisions, becomes devoid of reality.

To sum up we can say that in entire Buddhism we do not find time as an absolute reality, or a substance. We do find in it different temporal usages, such as the past, present and future, moment, and so on, but time as such is completely out of Buddhist terminology.
APPENDIX I

Measurements of Time

In addition to the lists of measurements of time given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jainism, the following texts provide their own computations of time.

(1) The Sūrya-siddhānta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60 prāṇas</td>
<td>1 pala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 palas</td>
<td>1 ghaṭika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 ghaṭikas</td>
<td>1 nakṣatra ahorātra (day and night, 24 hours)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 nakṣatra ahorātra</td>
<td>1 nakṣatra māsa (month)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>1 year (360 days and nights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360 days and nights of gods</td>
<td>1 year of gods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360 human years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000 years of gods</td>
<td>4 yugas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,320,000 human or solar years</td>
<td>1 Great Yuga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 Great Yugas</td>
<td>1 manvantara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>306,720,000 human years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 Great Yugas</td>
<td>1 Kalpa (a period which destroys the whole world)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,320,000,000 human years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or, 1 day and night of Brahmā</td>
<td>8,640,000,000 human years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) The *Amarakoṣa*²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Unit</th>
<th>Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 nimeṣas</td>
<td>1 kāṣṭhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 kāṣṭhās</td>
<td>1 kalā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 kalās</td>
<td>1 kṣaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 kṣaṇas</td>
<td>1 muhūrtā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 muhūrtas</td>
<td>1 ahorātra (a day and night, 24 hours)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 ahorātras</td>
<td>1 pakṣa (fortnight)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 pakṣas</td>
<td>1 māsa (month)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 māsas</td>
<td>1 ṛtu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 ṛtus</td>
<td>1 ayana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ayanas</td>
<td>1 vatsara (years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The *Manuṣmṛti*³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Unit</th>
<th>Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 nimeṣas</td>
<td>1 kāṣṭhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 kāṣṭhās</td>
<td>1 kalā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 kalās</td>
<td>1 muhūrtā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 muhūrtas</td>
<td>1 ahorātra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 ahorātras</td>
<td>1 pakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 pakṣas</td>
<td>1 māsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 māsas</td>
<td>1 human year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= 1 day and night of gods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or, 1 year of gods</td>
<td>= 360 human years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rest is similar to that of the *Sūrya-siddhānta*. 
(4) The Purāṇas

According to the Viṣṇu Purāṇa:

15 nimeṣas = 1 kāṭhā
30 kāṭhās = 1 kalā
30 kalās = 1 muhūrtas = 1 ahorātra

The rest is similar to that of the Sūrya-siddhānta.

The commentator of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa maintains that:

30 kalās = 1 ghaṭīka, or ghari
2 ghaṭīkas = 1 muhūrtas

But this explanation, remarks Wilson, "is gratuitous and is at variance with more explicit passages elsewhere," e.g. according to the Matsya Purāṇa:

30 kalās = 1 muhūrtas

Some other Purāṇas, such as Kurma, Markandeya, Matsya, Vāyu and Līlāga exactly agree with the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. In the Manu, there is one change:

18 nimeṣas = 1 kāṭhā

The Bhavisya Purāṇa follows the Manu in this respect, but in the rest agrees with the following list of the Padma Purāṇa:

15 nimeṣas = 1 kāṭhā
30 kāṭhās = 1 kalā
30 kalās = 1 kṣaṇa
12 kṣaṇas = 1 muhūrtas = 1 ahorātra

The Bhāgavat7 and Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇas give different accounts:

2 paramāṇus = 1 anu
3 anus = 1 trasareṇu
The rest is similar to that of the *Sūrya-stādhānta*.

As we have seen, a day and night of Brahmā is equal to 8,640,000,000 human years. Brahmā's life is said to be of 100 such years which is equal to 311,040,000,000,000 human years. It is interesting to note that according to the *Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa*, Brahmā's life is a nimeṣa of Kṛṣṇa; but the Śaiva Purāṇa says that it is a nimeṣa of Śiva.

(5) Some Anonymous Computations of Time

Barnett gives three anonymous schemes which run as follows:

(i) 10 gurvākṣaras = 1 prāṇa (breath) (long syllables)
| 6 prāṇas       | = 1 vināḍī or pala |
| 60 vināḍīs     | = 1 ghaṭīka, or nādi, or daṇḍa |
| 60 ghaṭikas     | = 1 day and night |

(ii) 1000 saṁkramas  = 1 truti
100 trutiśs       = 1 tatpara
30 tatparas        = 1 nimesa

(iii) 60 kṣaṇas      = 1 lava
60 lavas           = 1 nimesa
60 nimeśas         = 1 kāṣṭhā
60 kāṣṭhās         = 1 atipala
60 atipalas        = 1 vipala
60 vipalas         = 1 pala
60 palas           = 1 daṇḍa
60 daṇḍas          = 1 day and night
60 days & nights    = 1 ītu

(6) The *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya

| 2 tuṭas   | = 1 lava |
| 2 lavas   | = 1 nimeśa |
| 5 nimeśas | = 1 kāṣṭhā |
| 30 kāṣṭhās | = 1 kalā |
| 40 kalūs  | = 1 nādiṇī |
| 2 nādiṇās | = 1 muhūrta |
| 15 muhūrtas | = 1 day and night |
(7) The *Gaṇitasāra-samgraha*

7 ucchvāsas (breaths) = 1 stoka
7 stokas = 1 lava
38.1/2 lavas = 1 ghaṭī
2 ghaṭīs = 1 muhūrtta
30 muhūrtas = 1 day and night

(8) The *Abhidhanacintāmaṇi*

18 nimesas = 1 kāṣṭhā
2 kāṣṭhās = 1 lava
15 lavas = 1 kalā
2 kalās = 1 leśa
15 leśas = 1 kṣaṇa
6 kṣaṇas = 1 nāḍīkā
2 nāḍīkās = 1 muhūrtta
30 muhūrtas = 1 day and night

(9) The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu

120 kṣaṇas = 1 tatkṣaṇa
60 tatkṣaṇas = 1 lava
30 lavas = 1 muhūrtta
30 muhūrtas = 1 ahorātra
30 ahorātras = 1 māsa
12 māsas = 1 saṃvatsara
Notes

1. pp. 2ff.
3. pp. 21ff.
6. Ibid.
8. Wilson, ibid., p. 23, fn. 7.
11. p. 5.
13. AKB, p. 537.2ff; LVP (1932), pp. 1-9; Miyamoto (1959), p. 18, fn. 12; McGovern (1923), pp. 43ff.
During 1903–1913 Louis de La Vallée Poussin published the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrti’s commentary, the Prasannapadā (L), furnishing copious notes and cross references. For this edition he used three manuscripts (mss) preserved in (1) Cambridge, (2) Paris, and (3) Calcutta. But all these manuscripts, he points out in his preface, were mediocre copies of an original which itself he thought may not have been impeccable. Therefore, because of the inaccuracies in these manuscripts he consulted its Tibetan version (T) and found it more reliable. Since then his edition has been considered a standard work and used as the basis by many scholars, such as Stcherbatsky, Schayer, Lamotte, de Jong, and May, for their translations of its different chapters in European languages. Recently M. Sprung also based his English translation of the Prasannapadā on this edition.

A few years back G. Tucci discovered in Nepal an unknown manuscript of the Prasannapadā (R), a photocopy of which was lent to J.W. de Jong who found it presenting often better readings than Mss. First of all, it enabled him to edit fourteen verses missing in Mss, but found in T. Further, he compared R with LVP’s edition and T. He also received the microfiche cards of two other manuscripts of the Prasannapadā from the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, but he did not find better readings. So, he prepared text-critical remarks on the Prasannapadā (J) on the basis of the following materials:
(1) LVP's edition,

(2) The manuscript readings of the manuscripts from Cambridge, Paris, and Calcutta as indicated by LVP in his foot-notes.

(3) The Tibetan translation (for chapters 18-22 and 2-½, 6-9, 11, 23, 24, 26 and 27 the Peking and Narthang Kanjurs edition, for other chapters the Japanese edition of the Peking Tanjur), and

(4) G. Tucci's manuscript (R).

D. Seyfort Ruegg remarks that "All work on Nagarjuna's great treatise will henceforth have to make use of this convenient new text of the MMK together with J.W. de Jong's invaluable notes on the Prasannapada, and MMK." Keeping the importance of de Jong's text-critical notes in view and making use of it I feel it necessary at least to give a new edition of chapter XIX: Kalapārīkṣā (the examination of time), which is directly related to my present work. For this I have used the following materials:


(2) LVP's edition of the Prasannapada, his foot-notes and Mss readings,

(3) Vaidya (1960) and his foot-notes,

(4) T as found in the above three, and

(5) R as given by J.

This chapter has been translated into European languages by the following scholars:

(1) J.W. de Jong

(2) Kenneth K. Inada (kārikās only)

(3) F.J. Streng (kārikās only)

(4) M. Sprung.

The Sanskrit text runs as follows:
atrāha - vidyata eva bhāvānāṁ svabhāvahā kālatrayaprajñāaptihhetutvāt. 21 ihātipitānāgatapratyutpānaṁ trayaḥ kālā Bhagavatopadīṣṭāh. te ca bhāvāśrayāḥ. yasmād utpanno niruddho hi bhāvasvabhāvo 'tītā iti vyapadīṣyate, utpanno 'niruddho hi vartamānaḥ, alahātmabhāvo 'nāgata iti. evam bhāvasvabhāvanibhandhanāṁ trayaḥ kālā upadīṣṭāḥ. te ca santi. tasmāt tannibhandhano 'pi bhāvasvabhāvo 'stīti. ucyate. syāt kālatrayaprajñāaptihetur bhāvasvabhāvah, yadi kālatrayam eva bhavadabhimataṁ 22 bhavet. na tv asti. yathā ca nāsti, tathā pratipādayann āha -
pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca yady atītam apekṣya hi /
pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca kāle 'tīte bhavisyataḥ // 1 //

iha tāvad yadi vartamānānāgatau syātām, tāv apekṣātītām kālam bhavetām, anapekṣya vā? tatra yady atītam apekṣya sidhyataḥ, 24 tathā nityam atīte kāle bhavisyataḥ. yadmād yasya hi yatrāsattvam, na tat tenāpekṣyate. 25 tadyathā vandhyā strov svatanayena, gaganamālatilatā svakusumena, sikātā svatalena. avidyānam apy anahkāraṁ pradīpena, pradīpo 'py anahkārenā 26 pratidvandvitvenāpekṣyata iti cet. naitad evam. asyāpi sādhyanasamtvāt. tad atra yady atīte kāle varthamānānāgatau kālāv iṣyete, apekṣāsiddhyartham evam 27 saty atīte kāle vidyāmnatvād atītakālātmavat tayor apy atītatvaṁ syāt. tataś cātīto 'pi na syāt. yasmād varthamānāvasthātikṛānta hy atīto 'samprāpto 'nāgata iti syāt. yadā tu varthamānānāgatayor asambhava eva, tādā kutsāḥ kasyacid atītatvaṁ syāt? ity ato 'tīto 'pi na syāt // 1 //

atha yathoktadoṣaparijihīṣayā -
pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra puṇar yadi /
pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca syātāṁ katham apekṣya tam // 2 //
tatréśā "30 kāle yadi vartamānānāgatau kāla u na sta iti pari-
kalpyate, evam api tatrāvidyāmānatvād gaganendīvāravarān nāsty apekṣā
// 2 //</n

athāpi syāt - kālavādinām'31 vidyāta eva kālah, tatra kim apeksayā
prayojanam iti ? ucyate. evam api -
anapekṣya punah siddhir nātītam vidyate tayoḥ /
pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate // 3 //</n
pratyutpannānāgatayor asattvam, atītānapekṣatvāt,33 kharaviśānavat.
yataś caivam pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyata iti
vijñeyam // 3 //</n
yadā caivam atītam apekṣya vā 'napekṣya vā pratyutpannānāgatayor
nāsti siddhiḥ, evam pratyutpannāpekṣayā vā 'napekṣayā vātītānāgatayor
anāgatapekṣayā vā 'napekṣayā vā pratyutpannātītayor asiddhā īśyamānā-
yām tenāiva34 pratyutpannānāgatayor atītāpekṣayā vā anapekṣayā vā35
asiddhikrameṇa duṣānasāmyam atidīsann36 āha -
etenāivaśāṣṭau dvau krameṇa parivartakau /
uttamādhamamadhyādīn ekatvādīmā ca laksayeta // 4 //</n
kathāṃ kṛtvā ?
yady atīto 'nāgataś ca pratyutpannam apekṣya hi /
kālo 'tīto 'nāgataś ca pratyutpanne bhaviṣyataḥ //</n
kālo 'tīto 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra punar yadi /
kālo 'tīto 'nāgataś ca syātām katham apekṣya tam //</n
anapekṣya punah siddhir na jātām38 vidyate tayoḥ /
tenātīto 'nāgataś ca kālo nāma na vidyate //</n
eṣa tāvad ekaḥ kālaparivartaḥ.
atīto vartamānāḥ ca yady ajātam apekṣya hi /
atīto vartamānāḥ ca kāle 'jāte bhaviṣyataḥ //</n
atīto vartamānāḥ ca na stas tatra punar yadi /
atīto vartamānāḥ ca syātām katham apekṣya tam //</n
anapekṣya punaḥ siddhir nājātaṃ vidyate tayoḥ /
atīto vartamāṇaś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate //
eṣa dvitiyāḥ kālaparivarta iti vyākhyaṇakārikā iti. 39 evam dvau
kālaparivartau boddhaḥvyau //
yataś caivaṃ vicāryaṃaṇaṃ kālatrayaṃ nāsti, 40 tasmāt kālo na
vidyate, kālābhavāc ca bhāvasadbhāvo 'pi nāstīti siddham //
yathā ca itat kālatrayaṃ vicāritam evam /
uttamaḥdhamamadhyādīn ekatvādīmś 41 ca lakṣayeta /
uttamaḥdhamamadhyādīn 42 ity adiṣabadena kuśalākuśalāvyākṛtāni,
uptādasthitibhaṅgāḥ, purvāntamadhyāṅtāparāntā, 43 kāmarūpārūpyadhatavaḥ,
śaikṣaśaikṣaṅgaivaśaikṣaṅgaśaikṣaṅgo 44 yāvantaḥ padārthās tripadārthasaṃbandhavyāvasthitāḥ, 45 te sarve grhyante. ekatvādīmś cety anenaṁdi-
śabdena dvitvabhatvavayagrahaṇāt ta etat uttamaḍayaḥ 46 ekatvādayaś ca
kālatrayavyākhyaṇena vyākhyaṇā veditavyāḥ // 4 //

strāha - vidyata eva kālaḥ parimāṇavitvat. iha yan nāsti, na
tasya parimāṇavitvaṃ vidyate tadyathā kharaviśārasya. asti ca kālasya
parimāṇavitvaṃ kṣaṇalavamuhūrtadivāsaratvahorahorapakṣasamāsasaṁvatsarādi-
ḥedena. tasmāt parimāṇavitvād vidyata eva kāla iti. ucyate. yadi kālo
nāma kaścit syāt, syāt tasya parimāṇavitvaṃ. na tv asti. yasmāt -
nāsthito grhyate kālaḥ sthitāḥ kālo na vidyate 47 /
yo grhyetāgrhitaś ca kālaḥ prajātypate katham // 5 // 48

ihā yadi kālo nāma kaścid avasthitah kṣaṇādivyatiriktaḥ syāt, sa
kṣaṇādibhiḥ parimāṇavitvād grhyeta. na tv avasthitah kūṭasthaḥ kaścit
kālo nāmādi, yaḥ kṣaṇādibhir grhyeta. tad evam nāsthito 49 grhyate
kālaḥ, asthitatvān na grhyeta ity arthaḥ //

athāpi syāt - nitya evāvasthitasvabhāvaḥ kālo nāmādi, sa kṣaṇādi-
bhir 50abhivyajyate. tathā hi -

kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṁharate prajāḥ /
kālaḥ suptēṣu jāgāti kālaḥ hi durastikramaḥ // iti //
yaś caivaṁlakṣaṇaḥ so 'vasthitasvabhāvo 'stīti. ucyate. evam api
sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate yaḥ kṣaṇādibhir abhivyajyamāṇo gṛhyeta. kasmāt
punaḥ sthitaḥ kālo nāstīti cet, kṣaṇādīśvakṣaṇaṁ gṛhyamāṇatvāt.

api ca. ayaṁ kālaḥ sāṁskṛtasvabhāvaḥ sann astīti parikapyetāsaṁ-
skṛtasvabhāvo vā ?

ubhayāṁ ca sāṁskṛtarākṣayāṁ pratisiddham -
uptādasthitibhaṅgānāṁ asiddher

nāstī sāṁskṛtam /
sāṁskṛtasyāpy asiddhau ca kathāṁ sṛṣṭy at ama sāṁskṛtαm //

- MK, VII.33

ity anena. tad evaṁ nāstī uvasthitāḥ kālo yo gṛhyeta. yaś
cedadīṁ kālo na gṛhyate 'sthitavādavidyamāṇasvarūpavāt, so
'svabhāvo san kathāṁ kṣaṇādībhīḥ prajñapayitum bhāvataḥ pāryata

ity āha - agrihitaś ca kālaḥ prajñapya kathāṁ iti. tasmāṁ nāsty eva
kālaḥ // 5 //

atraḥa - satyam nāstī nityaḥ kālo nāma kaścid rūpādīśvatāriktaḥ
svabhāvasiddhaḥ, kim tarhi rūpādīn eva saṁskāraṁ upādāya prajñaptāh
kālaḥ kṣaṇādiśabdāvacyo bhāvati, tasmād adoha iti. ucyate. evam api -
bhāvaṁ pratiita kālaś cet kālo bhāvad rte kutah /

yady evaṁ bhāvaṁ pratiita kālo bhavatitā bhavatā vyavasthāpyate,
yaddā khalu bhāvo nāstī, tadā niyamaṁ taddhetuко 'pi kālo nāstīti
pratipādayann āha -

na ca kaścana bhāvo 'sti

iti pūrvaṁ vistareṇa pratipādītavād vakṣyamāṇapratisēdhāc ca.
yaddā caivaṁ na kaścid bhāvo 'sti bhāvataḥ, tadā -
kutah kālo bhavisyati // 6 //

kālābhāvāca ca na santi kṣaṇālavaṅmahūrtādayaḥ kālabhedāṁ tatparimā-
ṣabdāh, ity atāḥ kutaḥ prāmāṇavatvena kālasiddhir bhavisyati ?
tasmāṁ nāstī eva bhāvānāṁ svabhāva iti //

uktam hi Bhagavata Āryahastikākṣyasūtra -
yadi koci dharmāṇa bhavet svabhāvaḥ
tatraiva gaccheyā jīnaḥ saśravaka
kūtaś tad dharmāṇa siyā na nirvṛti
na nisprapañca bhavi jātu pañditaḥ // iti //
tathā -
buddhasahasraśatā ya atītā
dharmahasraśatāni bhaṅitvā /
naiva ca dharma na cākṣara kṣiṇā
nāsti samudbhavu tena akṣiṇā // iti /

- Samādhīrajasūtra, 37.22

tathā毒素 -

utpādakāle hi tathāgataśya
Maitreyanāma tv iha yo bhaviṣyatī /
bhaviṣyatīyaṃ kanakāvṛtā mahī
tasyā idāññā kuta āgamo 'sau // 73
ullāpanāḥ kāmaguniḥ hi paśca
vibhūmānaḥ mohana moṣadharmāṇaḥ /
madhyāhnaṅkāle hi yathaiva griṣme
jalām marīcyāṃ hi tathaiva kāmāḥ //
ekena kalpanā bhaved dhi loko
ākāśabhūto gaganasvabhāvo /
dāhan vināśam ca payānti meravāḥ
kuta āgamaḥ kutra gatiḥ ca tesiṁ // iti /
tad yathā -

pañceṃāṇi bhikṣavaḥ samjñāmatraṃ pratijñāmatraṃ vyavahāra-
matraṃ samvṛtimatraṃ yaḥ utātito 'dhvā 'nāgato 'dhvā ākāśam nirvāṇam
pudgalas ceti //
// ity AcaryaCandrakirtipadaracitayam Prasannapadayam

Madhyamakavittau kalapariksha namakonasvinshatitaman prakaranam //
Notes

1. See MK, MKV.


5. The Tibetan translation.


8. In French, chapter XVII, see Lamotte (1936 c).

9. In French, chapters XVIII-XXII, see de Jong (1949).

10. In French, chapters II-IV, VI-IX, XI, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXVII, see May (1959).


21. R kālatrayaprajñānāptihetutvāt; J suggests R; L and V kālatrayavijñānāptihetutvāt; cf. L (p. 382.7) and V (p. 163.5) kālatrayaprajñānāptihetutvāt.

22. V bhavadabhimataṃ; R confirms V; L bhavadabhimataṃ.


24. R sidhyatas; J suggests R; L and V sidhyete; T grub.

25. J suggests na tat tenāpeksyate; L and V tat tena nāpeksyate; Mss yatattvenopeksētaḥ; R na tattvenāpeksyate.

26. L pradīpena pradīpo 'py andhākāreṇa; T sgron-ma'i raṇ-gi ūo-bo (J translates pradīpasvabhāvena).

27. V apekṣāsiddhyartham; L 'pekṣāsiddhyartham; R 'pekṣyasiddhyartham.

28. L and V punar; Mss pūrva; R confirms L and V.


30. L tatrātīte; Mss tatra ced atīte.

31. L and V kālavādināṁ; T kālavādināṁ darśane (see V, p. 163, fn. 2 and L, p. 383, fn. 4).


33. L and V atītānapeksatvāt; Mss asyātītānapeksatvāt (cf. L, p. 383, fn. 6).

34. L and V āsiyamāṇāyāḥ tenaiva; Mss ahiśyamāṇāyāḥ tanaiva.

35. V atītāpeksayā vā anapeksayā; L atītāpeksaḥyā 'napeksayā vjā.

36. V atidiśan; L altidiśan.


38. L and V siddhir na jātaṃ; Mss siddhir nātitaṃ; T confirms Mss (see L, p. 384, fn. 3 and V, p. 164, fn. 1).

39. T omits iti vyākhyānakaśikā iti (see L, p. 385, fn. 1 and V, p. 164, fn. 2).


41. L and V ekatvādiṃś ca; Mss ekatvādiṃś cetyādi.
42. L uttamādhnamamadhyamādīn; V uttamādhnamamadhyamān (which is nonsense).

43. R pūrvāntamadhyāntāparāntāḥ; L and V pūrvāntāparāntamadhyāntāḥ; T sfhon-gyi mtha'daḥ dbus-kyi mtha'daḥ / phyi-ma'i mtha'; T confirms R.

44. R -naivasaikṣaṇaikṣādayo; J suggests R; L and V -naivasaikṣa-naivāsaikṣādayo.

45. L and V tripadārthasaṃbandhavyavasthitāḥ; Mss trihpādārthāḥ saṃbandhavyavasthitāḥ; T padārthāḥ trisāṃbandhena vyavasthitāḥ (see L, p. 385, fn. 3).

46. J suggests ta eta uttamādaya; L ta evottamādaya; V te eva uttamādayaḥ; R te eva uttamādayaḥ; T mchog la sogs-pa dag ... de-rnams ni.

47. L and V vidyate; Mss grhyate (see L, p. 385, fn. 4).


49. L and V nāsthitā; R confirms L and V; Mss nāstitā.

50. T de skad-cig la sogs-pa dag-gis (J translates and suggests sa kṣaṇādibhir); Mss and R lakṣaṇādibhir; L and V kṣaṇādibhir.


52. J suggests asiddher, cf. L, p. 176.3; L and V asiddhau; R asiddhe.

53. L grhyate 'sthitatvād; Mss grhyetāsthitatyād; R grhyatāsthitatvād; J suggests L.

54. T omits bhāvataḥ (see L, p. 387, fn. 1 and V, p. 165, fn. 1).

55. R ṛupādīn eva saṃskārāṃ; L and V ṛūpādīn eva sa saṃskārāṃ; T 'du-byed gzugs-la sogs-pa dag. T confirms R.

56. L kṣaṇādīsabdavacyo; V kṣaṇādīdivacyo.

57. T omits bhavata (see L, p. 387, fn. 2 and V, p. 165, fn. 2).

58. V bhāvo; L bhāv(o).


60. L and V kṣaṇālavamuhūrtādayaḥ; T kṣaṇādayaḥ (see L, p. 387, fn. 4 and V, p. 166, fn. 1).

61. L and V Āryahastikaksyasūtre; Mss Āryahāstikoktasūtre (see L, p. 387, fn. 5).

62. L and V svabhāvah; R svabhāva.
63. L and V tatraiva; R tantraiva.
64. L and V jinah; R jinasya.
65. L and V saśrāvako; R śrēvako.
66. R 'kūṭasthadharmāṇa miyā ṇa nirvṛtfī; L and V kūṭasthadharmāṇa siyā na nirvṛtfī; Mss dharmāṇmiyāṇanirvṛtfī, dharmāsamyāṇanirvṛtfī, dharmāṇmi-iyāṇanirvṛtfī (see L, p. 388, fn. 2).
67. V paṇḍitaḥ // iti //; L and R paṇḍita iti //.
68. L and V dharma; R dharmu.
69. V tathā; T confirms V (see V, p. 166, fn. 2 and L, p. 388, fn. 4); L tad yathā; R confirms L.
70. V kanakāvṛṭā; L kanakās trtā; R kanakās trto.
71. V tasyā idānīṁ; L tasyāḥ tadānīṁ; R tasyāḥ tadānī.
72. L and V 'sau; R sau.
73. T closes the chapter here and omits from ullāpanaḥ onward up to the end of the chapter.
74. L and V kalpena; Mss kāsyena, kālpena; R kālena.
75. L and V gaganaṃsvabhāvo; R gaganaṃsvabhāvo.
76. V payānti bheṣbhi?jravaḥ; L pa[yanti]meravaḥ; R yānti meravaḥ.
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