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THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN BUDDHISM

**A Thesis
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Australian National University**

**by
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This thesis is the product of original research
carried out by myself in the Department of
South Asian and Buddhist Studies at the Australian
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26 February, 1982.

Ateli Sankar Prasad

To

My revered teacher, *Professor J.W. de Jong*

With deepest gratitude

PREFACE

The concept of time is perhaps the most difficult problem of human thinking. It has always been a perennial source of mystery and has often troubled the heads of those who try to understand it. It is really surprising that a concept with which we are so intimately mixed up in our daily life gives rise to a tremendous number of insurmountable intricacies from all sides as soon as we start analysing it critically. This is because time is not a single concept in itself. Firstly, it has different aspects, such as philosophical, psychological, literary, historical, anthropological, religious, cultural, mystical, mathematical, physical and biological. Secondly, it is related to many other concepts in some form or other, such as change, events, actions, causality, space, substance, matter, consciousness, motion, identity and difference, which in themselves are often vague. Thirdly, the concept of time raises a number of questions: What is the nature, status and direction of time? What is its origin and development? How can it be measured? Is there only one time or two, viz. eternal and phenomenal? Does time flow? What does its direction consist of? What are temporal orders, the past, present and future? Is a reversed direction of time possible? What are temporal priority, temporal posteriority, simultaneity, non-simultaneity, soonness, lateness, oldness, youngness, etc.? What is the duration of present? Is time finite or infinite? What is the relation between time, instants and interval? What is the difference between absolute time and clock time? What are timelessness, permanence, and temporality? What do mortal and immortal mean in respect of time? Is time linear, or cyclical, or spiral? Is time a cause or a cosmic power? And so on.

Even if we want to deal with time philosophically only, there are different approaches to it, namely, realistic, idealistic, relativistic, and negativistic. This shows how difficult it is to understand time in its entirety.

It is very disappointing that there is not even a single good work on time in Indian philosophy, though the original sources are replete with long as well as brief discussions on it. We find only a few scattered articles in journals and some brief accounts of it in a few books. Thus the study of time in India has always been neglected. There is certainly a small book of comparative study of Indian and Western concepts of space and time by K.K. Mandal (1968), but it is badly presented. The author gives the impression that he is not well-equipped with knowledge of the languages of the original sources, such as Sanskrit and Pali. He has failed to give a good philosophical account of these concepts.

In Indian tradition the discussion of time may be traced back to the *Atharvaveda* (3.52-53). Since then both Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts have dealt with this problem. But for my study I have been very selective in regard to the systems for two reasons: first, my primary aim is to discuss the treatment of time according to different schools of Buddhism in considerable detail. We can agree with Schayer (1938, p. 14) that

"As a matter of course, India is indebted for real progress in the critical analysis of the Time-problem ... to Buddhism. This progress was so essential that, if the history of the Indian Time philosophy is ever written, it will be in a large measure a history of Buddhist thought. Since sources are only partly opened, it is difficult to attempt an exhaustive exposition just now. But some facts can be ascertained."

I have also selected three non-Buddhist systems - Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Jainism - which, I consider, are the most important

schools of thought for our purpose. Secondly, limited time and resources, provided to me for writing a Ph.D. thesis, do not allow me to deal with all those texts and schools which speak of time in some or other way. However, I think, I have left a very important chapter to write, i.e. *Time and the Theory of Momentariness* throughout Buddhism ranging from Pali sources to Dignāga's school of logic and its subsequent developments. Although I am overwhelmed by the available materials, lack of time prevented me from doing this.

Throughout my thesis I have tried my best to maintain consistency in the presentation and to keep myself close to the original sources. It is not my aim to answer all those questions raised above regarding time, but rather to show what the Indian philosophical systems say of time and whether their interpretations of time are in line with their other metaphysical and epistemological postulations. I have often given my own observations where necessary and have made an attempt to analyse what they say about time. I have found in a number of cases that modern scholars have either misunderstood the original sources or relied on secondary writings while discussing this concept. Although to the best of my capacity I have advanced arguments in order to prove my thesis, yet there may be a substantial amount of scope to introduce fresh arguments and sharpen the present ones. One can pick holes in my arguments here and there, but I think it is not possible to reject what I have written in its entirety. I admit that in philosophy there is a difference of opinion even on a single topic and this is legitimate. In short, the present work is a humble attempt to give an idea of what the major philosophical systems of India think of time, but due to my own limitations and shortcomings I can claim of little originality in my presentation. To quote Jayanta:

kuto vā nūtanam vastu vayam utprekṣituṃ kṣamāḥ /
vacovinyāsavaicitramātram atra vicāryatām //

- *Nyāyamañjarī* (p.3.3-4)

"How can we discover a new fact (or truth in philosophy)?
Hence (as far as this ... [thesis] is concerned) one
should only consider our novelty in rephrasing (the older
truths propounded by the ancients in modern terminology)."

- Tr. Matilal, 1971, p. 7.

Now it is my duty to thank those who have helped me write this thesis. First of all, I owe my deepest gratitude to my revered teacher, Professor J.W. de Jong, whose name appears on the dedication page. It was he from whom I got the inspiration to work on this project during his visit to Banaras Hindu University in January, 1976. In the same year I first started my work under the supervision of the late Professor R.K. Tripathi of the Department of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University. But because of my severe financial difficulty I could not carry on my research until February, 1979. Again, it was Professor de Jong on whose kind and strong recommendation I was awarded an Australian National University Ph.D. Scholarship to work under his supervision on the present topic. Throughout my research he has been a constant source of inspiration and encouragement. He not only supervised my thesis with great interest, but also lent me lots of books which were not available in the University Library. I have also immensely benefited from his vast erudition and accuracy of presentation which have really set an example before me. It was an impossible task for me to maintain the standard he wanted.

My thanks are also due to Professor A.L. Basham, Dr. Baas J. Terwiel, Miss Linda Thompson, Mr. Rafäel Bar-Illán de la Plata and Mr. John Jorgensen for their help in writing the thesis. I wish to thank the libraries of Congress, Yale University, Harvard University, Oxford University, British Museum, India Office and Tokyo University for supplying me with

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Special thanks to Miss Betty Kat, the departmental secretary of South Asian and Buddhist Studies, for her elegant, prompt and careful typing. It is not possible to record all the help she has happily extended to me during my stay in Canberra.

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ABSTRACT

The present thesis is an attempt to expound the philosophical study of time in India. Its main purpose is to give a clear picture of the Buddhist notion of time as discussed in its different schools: the Pali tradition, Vaibhāṣikas (or the Sarvāstivādins), Sautrāntikas and the Mādhyamikas. It also deals with the three major non-Buddhist systems: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Jainism.

The first chapter deals with the substantive reality of time in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which is a realistic and pluralistic system. It accepts time (mahākāla) as an instrumental cause, eternal, absolute, independent, unique, infinite and all-pervading. According to this system, finite time (khaṇḍakāla), such as second, minute, hour, day, past, present or future, has no independent status, and is only an imposed property of eternal time (kālopādhi). In the second chapter, Sāṃkhya-Yoga gives a tremendous shock to absolute time of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Whereas Sāṃkhya identifies time with change, actions or events, Yoga ascribes reality to moment (kṣaṇa), but denies its aggregates as absolute time. In the third chapter, Jainism maintains that time is real and a substance, but it does not possess corporeality, though it has existence. It propounds the semi-realistic and atomistic theory of time. The fourth chapter makes an analysis of the concept of time in Pali Buddhism dispersed through a vast number of Pali texts. The fifth chapter deals with the important controversy on time between the Vaibhāṣikas (or the Sarvāstivādins) and the Sautrāntikas. The sixth and final chapter provides a Mādhyamika critique of time. It is to be noted that in the entire Buddhist tradition time has never been considered as a reality, though

we do find in it some interesting passages on the three time-epochs, the past, present and future, which are often taken as the modes of existence. But they too are in no sense real as such.

The first appendix gives some different lists of computations of time maintained by different texts. This is in addition to the lists given by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jainism. The second appendix is a new critical edition of the *Prasannapadā*, chapter XIX, which demonstrates the Mādhyamika critique of time.

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CHAPTER I

Time as a Substantive Reality in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika¹

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are the two currents of one philosophical system of realism, having mutual acceptance except minor differences in their philosophical postulations. They were systematised by Gautama (150 A.D. ?; 250-350 A.D. ?) and Kaṇāda (100 A.D.) mainly dealing with epistemology and metaphysics respectively. Umesh Mishra² presents a series of points of variations between these two schools. For our study we shall be treating them as one system irrespective of their independent developments. In the following passages the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika strives to explain some of the questions which trouble the heads of philosophers and drive us into quandaries and paradoxes as soon as we try to solve them.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a realistic and pluralistic system. It admits nine substances (dravya)³ - earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind - which constitute all kinds of material and immaterial things. Substance is defined by the Vaiśeṣikas as that which possesses qualities and action, and is an inherent cause (samavāyikāraṇa) of all composite things.⁴ Four of these substances - earth, water, fire and air - constitute the material world and, in their atomic form, are non-eternal. The remaining five substances are divided into two groups: first, ether, time and space are non-psychic, all-pervading (vibhu), normally imperceptible, one, infinite, eternal, and are common receptacles of all corporeal things. These substances have the characteristics of eternity, independence and ultimate particularity. Second, the two other substances - soul, which is also omnipresent, and mind, which is atomic - are psychic and have many individuals (anekatva).

The Characteristics of Time

- (1) Time is unique,⁵ i.e. one in number.
- (2) Time is inactive as it is different from those which possess activity.⁶
- (3) Time is all-pervasive (sarvagata), possesses extremely large dimension (paramamahatva), and is the substratum of all composite things (sarvasamyogisamānadeśatva).⁷ According to Śrīdhara (991 A.D.), all (sarva) in all-pervasive (sarvagata) denotes all composite material substances. Thus, all-pervasive means time has connection with all composite material substances. This does not mean that it moves everywhere, as it is said to be inactive. Paramamahatva shows that time possesses an unbounded, unlimited dimension. Sarvasamyogisamānadeśatva means time (together with ākāśa and dik) is the common receptacle or substratum of all composite material substances. It is, in real sense, not the substratum of all such substances, rather it is the substratum of all sorts of conjunctions. It is actually figuratively called the substratum of all conjuncts, or composite material substances. It is in this sense that it differs from all-pervasiveness (sarvagatatva).⁸
- (4) Time possesses the five qualities - number (saṁkhyā), dimension (parimāṇa), separateness (pṛthaktva), conjunction (samyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga).⁹
- (5) Time is the instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa) of all products.¹⁰ It is also said to be the cause of origination, duration and destruction, because the latter are understood only in relation to time,¹¹ such as in the expressions - 'this is the time of its origination', 'this is the time of its destruction'.¹² "Time is a cause", remarks Keith, "only in the loose sense of that term, which is affected in the school, namely as one of the many conditions which are necessary to the existence of a thing; it belongs to the category of general instrumental cause, as opposed

either to the specific instrumental cause (karaṇa) or the inherent or non-inherent causes."¹³

(6) Time is a substance and eternal.¹⁴

(7) Time is the ground of our usages of the past, present and future.¹⁵

(8) Time is the cause of our use of various temporal expressions,¹⁶ such as kṣaṇa,¹⁷ lava,¹⁸ nimeṣa,¹⁹ kāṣṭhā,²⁰ kalā,²¹ muhūrta,²² yāma,²³ day and night,²⁴ fortnight, month, year, season (ṛtu),²⁵ solstice (ayana),²⁶ yuga,²⁷ kalpa,²⁸ manvantara,²⁹ pralaya,³⁰ mahāpralaya.³¹

(9) Time is the cause of our notions (pratyaya) of temporal priority or oldness (paratva) and temporal posteriority or youngness (aparatva), simultaneity (yaugapadya) and non-simultaneity (ayaugapadya), and soonness (kṣipratva) and lateness (ciratva).³²

Proofs for the Existence of Time

As time does not possess any physical or psychological quality, it is not an object of direct perception. It is known only through inference on the basis of the notions of temporal priority and temporal posteriority, etc. It was Vācaspati³³ (980 A.D.) who first suggested the method of inference of time. He was followed by Udayana³⁴ (975-1050 A.D.), Padmanābha³⁵ (1578 A.D.) and others. Their arguments can be summarised as follows:

The notions of temporal priority and posteriority are based on the revolutions of the Sun³⁶ (sūryaparispanda). An object is called temporally prior (para), if it has a larger number of contacts with the revolutions of the Sun in its life, while that which has a smaller number of such contacts is called temporally posterior (apara). Now, the question is: How can an object come in contact with the solar revolutions? As the two are at a very large distance from each other, no direct contact (saṁyoga)

is possible. Other kinds of relations too, such as saṃyukta-samavāya, saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya, samavāya, are shown to be impossible. The only possibility left is an indirect relation through a connecting link. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that only a substance is capable of doing this, as contact is possible only among the substances (dravyasya dravyayor eva saṃyogaḥ). Further, none of the substances of earth, water, fire and air can be the connecting link, because they are limited in their dimension, and when they are connected with the object, they are not connected with the Sun. If it is suggested that the fire (tejas) inherent in the Sun acts as the connecting link, it is not tenable, because this fire would not be able to establish contacts with the objects which are lying under the earth in the dark. So, only an all-pervasive substance can serve our purpose, and this substance must be omnipresent in dimension and individual in character, so that it may be connected with all substances. Though ether and soul also are two all-pervading substances, they are not capable of being the connecting link. The connecting link should be such that it may be in relation to both the object and the revolutions of the Sun, and also has the capacity to relate them with each other. Neither ether nor soul possesses this capacity. If ether has this capacity, it would be possible for a particular stroke producing sound in one drum to be shifted to other drums and to produce sound in them also, because ether is a ubiquitous substance; but this is not the case. Thus, ether cannot connect the revolutions of the Sun with the object. Again, if the soul had this, it would create and transmit the attributes of one object to another arbitrarily, e.g. the fragrance of a flower would be perceived in the table, and the colour of one particular object found at any particular place might be transmitted to another place. Therefore, soul also cannot act as the connecting link.

The preceding absurdity shows that ether and soul lack the capacity to be a connecting link and a direct relation is impossible. The Vaiśeṣika, therefore, sets forth a special substance which will serve the end. And this substance is time which, through the relation of sva-samyukta-samyukta-samavāya (i.e. inherence of motion in a substratum which is in conjunction with something which is in conjunction with the individual in question (Bhaduri, 1975, p. 185, fn. 4), connects the object with the movements of the Sun.

Now one may raise an objection that if time is granted to possess the capacity of connecting the two substances, it is not free from the qualities of producing different attributes in other substances in the most confusing way like ether and soul, for time also is ubiquitous in character. Thus, time should also be restrained from being a connecting link. Keeping this difficulty in view, the Vaiśeṣika asserts that the existence of time as an indirect connecting link is proved by the reductio ad absurdum arguments against the two other possible substances - ether and soul. Further, in the present context the required capacity of time is posited by the same arguments which prove the existence of time itself as a substance. There is, therefore, no chance of mutual change of properties among the substances, if time is established as the medium of connecting the individual object and the solar revolutions.

In a similar way, the notions of simultaneity and non-simultaneity, soon and late too should be understood. When two or more actions (kriyā) are related to a particular solar revolution, they are called simultaneous. When they are related to different solar revolutions, they are termed as non-simultaneous. Soon and late signify a smaller and a larger number of solar movements respectively with which an action is connected.

Diverse Interpretations within the System

But all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars are not in agreement with Vācaspati and his followers regarding the method of inference of time. Śrīdhara (991 A.D.), in his *Nyāya-kandalī*, has a different approach to this problem. First, he out and out denies any possibility of establishing a relation between the notions of temporal priority (para, in the case of an old man), and temporal posteriority (apara, in the case of a young man), and the movements of the Sun. It would, therefore, be preposterous to accept an unrelated substance as a cause of these notions.³⁷ What he suggests is that time itself is the cause of the notions of temporal priority and temporal posteriority, simultaneity and non-simultaneity, soon and late, or these notions are the marks of the knowledge of time.³⁸ The reasoning behind this is that we observe no other cause for these notions with regard to their respective objects. It is undisputed that the notions of temporal priority and posteriority are found in substances. Again, substances themselves cannot be the cause of these notions, which actually are totally different from their respective substances. At the same time no effect can be produced without a cause. Hence, we deduce from this that time is the only cause of these notions.³⁹

Someone may say that to co-exist (sahabhāva) is simultaneity (yaugapadya), but not 'relating to one time' (ekakālikatva). This is not true, as Śrīdhara states, because without conceding time the word 'co-exist' has no meaning. The opponent may suggest that in an action the existence of different entities is called 'co-existence'. This also is not tenable. There is no contradiction among that which has not yet originated, that which continues to exist and that which has ceased to exist. Even if we find contradiction among the co-existing entities, the existence of time cannot be denied. Now the question arises: If time is one, why is there difference between these notions? This is, replies Śrīdhara, because of

the difference of conditions (sāmagrībheda). For instance, the awareness of the origination of one thing and the persistence of another by one and the same knowledge (jñāna) gives the notions of temporal priority and posteriority. And these notions arise from the co-operating cause (sahakārikāraṇa) time. Further, without admitting the existence of time the emergence of everything would be inexplicable. An ever-existing thing like ākāśa is uncaused and an ever-non-existing thing like a man's horn (naraviṣāṇa) also is uncaused, i.e. they are timelessly existent and non-existent respectively. As the Vaiśeṣika propounds the theory of asatkāryavāda, i.e. the effect is non-existent before its emergence, the only possibility where the causation may be applied is to the thing which is produced after having been previously non-existent (prāgasat). If time is not admitted, the word 'previous' (prāk) in 'previously non-existent' (prāgasat) would have no meaning, and then the production in general would be impossible like the ever-existing ākāśa or the absolutely non-existing man's horn.⁴⁰

Again, Śrīdhara maintains that change also gives knowledge of time. It is time which takes us inexorably from birth to death. Different states and successive changes in the phenomena indicate the passage of time. We also infer the existence of time through the different physical stages of an old man and a young one.⁴¹ At the same time, without admitting time, change would be unintelligible.

Śivāditya (12th century) and Candrakānta (19th century) explain away the independent reality of time and include it under ākāśa along with dik.⁴² Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1475-1550 A.D.) criticises the traditional list of nine substances and avouches that time and space are not individual substances; they are nothing but God (or Supreme Soul), because there is no proof that they are independent of God.⁴³ But Venīdatta (18th century) rejects this idea and sets forth that -

".... the notions which are formed due to Kāla are not possible to be explained by Īśvara; for Īśvara being one cannot explain the differences in notions as have been found above. We cannot hold that due to certain limitations present in Īśvara the differences in notions can be explained; for, if it be so, then let the differences of the all-pervading Jīvātman, namely, 'this is Caitra', 'this is Maitra', and so on, be also explained by the same limitations and do away with the plurality of the Jīvātman; for, with the help of the limitations a single conscious being can explain all the differences found in beings. Hence, the above mentioned prove the separate existence of Time - 'sa eṣa saṁvatsaraḥ'."⁴⁴

An interesting thing to note is that Raghunātha proposes eight new categories (padārtha), the first of which is moment (kṣaṇa), which is momentary in duration and a separate category, and is termed as an imposed property of time (kālopādhi).⁴⁵ But the question is: If there is no independent time, how is its kālopādhi possible? We do not get any satisfactory reply to this from him.

Further, Viśvanātha⁴⁶ (1654 A.D.), Dinakara⁴⁷ (mid-18th century) and Rāmarudra⁴⁸ (18th century) follow the traditional interpretation of time as a separate substance, and take moment (kṣaṇa) as its imposed property. They hold that the direct knowledge of moment is not possible; only an action (kriyā), which must last at least 4 such moments, gives the notion of it. According to the atomism of the system, an action is supposed to operate through 'disjunction' and 'conjunction', each of which occupies at least two such moments.⁴⁹

Vallabha (12th century) thinks that the traditional method of the inference of time by some Vaiśeṣika scholars is old and out of date (cirantana).⁵⁰ He, like Vātsyāyana⁵¹ (350-425 A.D.) advances another argument in order to prove the existence of time. He says, the notion of time can be observed from the notion of 'present' (vartamānapratyaya) or 'existence' of anything. His contention, we think, is that the general idea of presentness or existentness of entities gives the idea of time.⁵²

In other words, the particular notion of presentness itself, which is actually like the relation of inherence (samavāya), is time.⁵³

To quote B.K. Matilal:

"Primarily the Vaiśeṣika prefers a priori inference to an empirical inference based on observations. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika substances such as air, sky, space, time, self and mind are inferred on the basis of a priori principle. This inference can be described as follows: p is a quality and a quality by definition should reside in a substance. Thus, p resides in a substance, and since this substance is not identifiable with any of the known substances, such as, a, b, or c, by logic or elimination we infer the existence of a separate substance. This inference makes use of the a priori principle that a quality resides in a substance."⁵⁴

The Perceptibility and Imperceptibility of Time Discussed

There are two groups, one of which, including Kaṇāda⁵⁵ (100 A.D.), Praśastapāda (450-550 A.D.), Uddyotakara (550-625 A.D.), Śrīdhara (991 A.D.), etc., maintains that time cannot be an object of direct perception. The other group, whose main exponent is Jayanta (890 A.D.), professes the perceptibility of time. Perception (pratyakṣa) is defined by Gautama as a knowledge which arises from the contact of sense-organs (indriya, i.e. eye, nose, ear, tongue, skin and mind) with the objects (artha), and is in character undifferentiated (avyapadeśa), differentiated (vyavasāyātmaka) and free from errors (avyabhicāri).⁵⁶ Since time is formless and all-pervading, Kaṇāda and his followers argue, we suppose, its perceptibility is impossible. An eternal and ubiquitous thing cannot come within the range of sense-organs. But there is one exception, i.e. through Yogic intuition time can be perceived in its entirety.⁵⁷ This rejects D.M. Datta's remark that "The Naiyāyikas ... would grant neither the sensation of time nor any intuition of it".⁵⁸ Here he takes the Naiyāyikas as representing the combined system of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Jayanta, following the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, puts forth that time is perceived on the ground that in the notion of an event (kārya), time is observed as its qualification (viśeṣaṇa). The notions of succession, simultaneity, soon and late do not only refer to events,⁵⁹ but also to time. If time does not possess any colour, it does not matter. Karl H. Potter summarises the arguments of Jayanta. He writes:

"Jayanta's argument on this score is simply that since we perceive things in space we perceive space in addition to things, and likewise since we perceive things at times we perceive time in addition to the things. The answer of the other faction is, first, that space and time cannot be perceptible since they lack a necessary condition of perceptibility, and that secondly, what is perceived is not space or time but rather the things in relations (spatial and temporal) to one another. The condition of perceptibility which is said to be lacking in the case of space and time is possession of color."⁶⁰

Mahākāla and Khaṇḍakāla

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits two sorts of time: infinite, eternal, Great Time (mahākāla) and finite or empirical time (khaṇḍakāla, or kālo-pādhi). The former is an undivided whole and is conceived as the locus of the universe.⁶¹ It is a static continuum, not like an ever rolling stream. Everything is said to be related to it by temporal relation (kālika-sambandha).⁶² For instance, 'rain in this month' (asmin māse varṣaḥ).⁶³ Again, temporal relation is of two sorts: direct (sākṣāt) and indirect (paramparayā). The former is itself of two sorts, as Ingalls points out. He states:

"The first is the relation by which all entities, eternal and non-eternal, reside directly in universal time (mahākāla). ... The second is the relation by which all non-eternal entities reside directly in a portion of time. This is the relation between rain and this month. Now a portion of time is an imposed property (upādhi) on time, for time itself is eternal and formless."⁶⁴

Here it is to be noted that he does not quote any original source in his support. As we have seen above, time is all-pervasive in the sense that

it has contact only with composite material substances, which are non-eternal. This obviously excludes the eternal substances, such as space, soul and ether. Many modern scholars⁶⁵ also endorse our interpretation. Therefore, we tend to disagree with Ingalls in this regard.

Further, finite time, which is measured by the duration of an object, actions, movements of the Sun, contacts, disjunctions, and our watches, is regarded as the imposed property or division of great time (kālopādhi). It has only conventional and practical value. A man is called father, son, brother because of the difference of his various relations to others. In the same way, time, which is really unique, gives rise to the notions of temporally prior or posterior in its relation to different actions.⁶⁶ "In other words", remarks Matilal, "any kālopādhi may be looked upon as a time segment of the four-dimensional material world, exhaustive spatially and perpendicular to the time axis."⁶⁷

The Past, Present and Future Discussed

Annambhaṭṭa (1600 A.D.) maintains that time is the ground of our temporal expressions, such as the past, present, and future.⁶⁸ We speak of an event as past, present or future, which have their roots in time. These usages (vyavahāra) are nothing but conventional and sentential (vākyaprayogarūpa) as *Vākyavṛtti*⁶⁹ suggests, and time is considered as their instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa). Nīlakaṇṭha Śāstrī (1750-1840 A.D.) defines these terms as follows: The past is a counterpositive of present (vartamānadhvaṃsapratiyogi), which actually refers to the passage of time as the ground of our conventional usage. The future is the state which refers to the non-existence of present before it comes into existence. In all these cases time is common and should be taken as the cause. Hence,

it is not tenable to say that the past, present and future, which are the imposed properties of time, are based on the revolutions of the Sun.⁷⁰

Jayanta proposes a different approach to the problem of the three time-epochs. Time, as we have seen, is an undivided whole. Any attempt to divide it is not real and all the divisions of time must be considered as its imposed properties (upādhi).⁷¹ Now the question arises: What is that which gives rise to these upādhis? Jayanta's reply is that it is an action which gives the notions of the past, present and future. An action is a series of different moments of origination, duration and destruction in order to bring about a complete result. For example, the act of cooking rice. From putting the pot on the oven, when the action begins, to taking it down, when the action ends, is called one complete action which represents present time, such as 'he cooks'. The series of actions which has already produced an effect such as 'he cooked' represents past time. An action, which has not yet commenced, such as 'he will cook', refers to future time. It follows that our temporal expressions of the past, present and future refer to real time as their common ground.⁷² In other words, to quote A.B. Keith:

"The past of an individual is the time characterized by its destruction, the future that characterized by its precedent non-existence, the present is the time whose future existence is destroyed and whose own destruction is about to come."⁷³

Padmanābha Miśra (1578 A.D.), however, maintains that the past, present and future are essentially of the nature of time. They are not imposed properties of the latter.⁷⁴ If it is so, then every time-epoch will be called past, present and future in relation to its preceding and succeeding moments. It is present, if it has both preceding and succeeding moments. It is past, if it has only succeeding moments, and it is future, if it has only preceding moments. This is not possible without the flow of time from future to past through present. But in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika time is

admitted as static and inactive. Therefore, it is not possible for us to be in agreement with Padmanābha Miśra's contention. We have also seen that only an action can be supposed to be the basis in order to define the three time-epochs, as it has different preceding and succeeding moments referring to different points of time.

Further, direct perception, which arises from the contact of our sense-organs with the objects, gives knowledge of those objects which are related to present only. But through inference, holds Jayanta, we can have knowledge of all the three time-epochs. From the swollen river we can infer that there was rainfall referring to the past time. From the hovering of the clouds we can infer that there will be rainfall referring to the future time, and from the arising of the smoke in the mountain we can infer that there is fire there referring to the present time.⁷⁵ He rejects the Mīmāṃsaka's view that the Vedas alone give knowledge of past, present and future, subtle, concealed, and remote objects, which is not possible by other means. This is an absurd hypothesis, because we already have other means which provide us with knowledge of such objects. Apart from this the Yogic intuition also can reveal the nature of all kinds of objects related to the three time-epochs. Sometimes we too have knowledge of such objects.⁷⁶

Measurement of Time⁷⁷

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, measurement is possible only in the case of finite time, because "... Time in the sense of eternal time (mahākāla) seldom enters into our ordinary experiences. Our usual practice is to refer to the imposed divisions or calibrations (upādhi) of Time, and to connect an entity to one calibration or another. In order to refer to the imposed divisions, we generally mention other finite entities of

limited durations."⁷⁸ The standard for the measurement of finite time in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the daily solar revolutions (sūryapariṣpanda). Generally, the astronomical and astrological method of measuring time is accepted in this system.⁷⁹

According to Śrīdhara,⁸⁰ measurements of time are as follows:

15 nimeṣas	= 1 kāṣṭhā
30 kāṣṭhās	= 1 kalā
15 kalās	= 1 nādikā
30 kalās	= 1 muhūrta
or 2 nādikās	= 1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	= 1 ahorātra (dya & night, 24 hours)
15 ahorātras	= 1 pakṣa (fortnight)
2 pakṣas	= 1 māsa (month)
2 māsas	= 1 ṛtu (season)
6 ṛtus or 12 months	= 1 saṁvatsara (human year)
3 ṛtus	= 1 uttarāyaṇa (day of gods)
3 ṛtus	= 1 dakṣiṇāyana (night of gods)
or 1 human year	= 1 day and night of gods
360 days & nights of gods	= 1 year of gods
	= 360 human years
12,000 years of gods	= 4 Yugas = 360 x 12,000 human years
	= 4,320,000 human years
1,000 x 4 Yugas	= 1 day of Brahmā
	= 4,320,000 x 1,000 human years
	= 4,320,000,000 human years
1 day & night of Brahmā	= 8,640,000,000 human years

Thus, from the above computations $15 \times 30 \times 15 \times 2 \times 30$ nimeṣas = 24 hours, or 1 nimeṣa (which is defined as the time taken by a twinkling of the eye) = 1/5 second, which is the smallest unit of time, according to Śrīdhara. Here it is to be noted that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system a year is considered to consist of 360 days only, instead of 365.24219 days as in the Christian calendar.

Praśastapāda⁸¹ cites the names of the measurements of time differently, but he does not give their numerical values. These are: kṣaṇa, lava, nimeṣa, kāṣṭhā, kalā, muhūrta, yāma, ahorātra, ardhamaśa (fortnight), māsa, ṛtu, ayana, saṁvatsara, Yuga, kalpa and manvantara. Further, Udayana⁸² gives the following list:

2 kṣaṇas	=	1 lava
2 lavas	=	1 nimeṣa
18 nimeṣas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
30 kāṣṭhās	=	1 kalā
30 kalās	=	1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	=	1 ahorātra (day & night, 24 hours)
15 ahorātras	=	1 pakṣa (fortnight)
2 pakṣas	=	1 māsa (month)
2 māsas	=	1 ṛtu
3 ṛtus	=	1 ayana
2 ayanas	=	1 mānuṣa-varṣa (human year)
	=	1 day and night of gods


The rest are similar to Śrīdhara's list.

Thus, according to Udayana, $2 \times 2 \times 18 \times 30 \times 30 \times 30$ kṣaṇas = 24 hours, or 1 kṣaṇa = 1/25 second. "The Nyāya assumes", remarks B.N. Seal, "that the unit of physical change (or the time occupied by any single antecedent step in a causal series before the succeeding step is ushered in) is equal to one kṣaṇa."⁸³ Moreover, the preceding accounts show that there is not much unanimity among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars regarding the measurement of time.

Nature and Duration of Present Time

We find an interesting discussion regarding the present time in the *Nyāya-sūtra*⁸⁴ of Gautama and the commentary of Vātsyāyana (350-425 A.D.) thereon. The latter refers to an opponent⁸⁵ who denies the reality of present, but maintains that of past and future. To justify what he thinks,

the opponent cites an example



of a fruit (C) falling from the stalk (A). At any point (C) of its journey there are only two parts: (i) the space (AC) already traversed by it, the time connected with which is past time, and (ii) the space (CB) yet to be traversed by it, the time connected with which is future time. There is obviously no third part of the space with which we may connect present time. This shows that there is no present time.⁸⁶

The problem for the Naiyāyikas is that the opponent's hypothesis is illustrated by space, which is actually absurd. Therefore, Vātsyāyana urges that the three divisions of time can properly be manifested only by way of an action, say an action of 'falling' (kriyāvyaṅgya). When the action has ceased, the time associated with it is past time; when it has yet to happen, the time associated with it is future time; and lastly, when it is observed in operation in an object, the time associated with it is present time.⁸⁷ In case one does not observe the action while it is in progress, what could he conceive of as having ceased or as going to happen? The past time refers to the action having been ceased, and future time to the action which has yet to be. In both these times the object is devoid of action. When the object is actually falling down, it is said to be connected with the action, and this relation between the two gives rise to the conception of present time. If present time is denied, the other two (past and future) also, which are known only in relation to the former, cannot be established.⁸⁸ There are other reasons too to admit present time. If past and future are proved mutually, only

then can present be abrogated. But this is not so. Neither is future proved in relation to past, nor vice versa. Without admitting present it would be impossible to prove either past or future.⁸⁹

The opponent may suggest that just as short and long, high and low, light and darkness are relative concepts and mutually proved, in the same way, the past and future should be understood. This solution, states Vātsyāyana, does not fare any better, as no specific reason has been given for this. Without proper reasons mere illustrations will not suffice. There are counter-illustrations, such as form and touch, odour and taste, which are in no way proved mutually, and the same case is with past and future. Mutual dependence proves neither, because when one is absent, the other is also absent, and thus both cease to be.⁹⁰

Further, present time is not only denoted by an action of falling, but also by the existence of things, such as substance (dravya) exists, quality (guṇa) exists, action (karma) exists. The very existence of these things, which necessarily determine their presentness, proves the reality of present.⁹¹ This also indicates absolute time. In other words, the action of falling and the like give the notion of present in a limited sense only, whereas the existence of an action or movement in a substance stretches universally over the whole present,⁹² which is real, all-pervading time. Again, if present is not accepted, perception, which actually arises from the contact of sense-organs with the present objects only, would not be possible. That which is non-existent cannot come into contact with the senses, and there is nothing which is considered by the opponent as existing or real. Thus, on the acceptance of the opponent's thesis, the means of perception, the object of perception and the perceptual knowledge would be negated all together. And in the absence of perception there will be no inference and verbal testimony as well which are necessarily based on

the former. So, if all means of knowledge are spurned, there will be no knowledge of anything,⁹³ including past and future too which are known through Yogic intuition.⁹⁴

Vātsyāyana holds that the present time can be conceived of in two ways: (i) by the existence of an object, such as 'there is a substance', and (ii) by a series of actions, such as 'cooking' or 'cutting'. The latter is of two kinds: one is a series of different actions in order to produce a single result, e.g. 'cooking', which includes placing the pot on the oven, pouring the water into it, washing the rice and putting it in the pot, collecting the fuel and inserting it into the oven, kindling the fire, stirring with a ladle, pouring out the scum of boiled rice and finally, putting the pot down on the ground. The other is a series of repetitions of the same actions, e.g. 'cutting'. In this action a man repeatedly lifts up an axe and strikes it on a piece of wood. Both the series of actions - from placing the pot on the oven to putting it down on the ground, on the one hand, and from the beginning of cutting the wood to the end when it is cut into two pieces, on the other, indicate present time.⁹⁵ Now the future and past can be known in relation to these series of actions, which give the knowledge of present. A series of actions, which is intended but has not yet commenced, denotes future time, e.g. 'he will cook'. The cessation of the series followed by its result denotes past time, e.g. 'he cooked', and the series of actions, which is still in progress, causes the apprehension of present time, e.g. 'he cooks'. A complete series of actions refers to all the three time-epochs: (i) that which is ceased is said to be 'already done' (past time), (ii) that which is intended but yet 'to be done' (future time), and (iii) that which exists is said to be 'in progress', i.e. that which has commenced but has not yet ceased to be (present time).⁹⁶ Thus, Vātsyāyana shows that the

past and future are known only in relation to the present as its preceding and succeeding states respectively.

Now it is clear from the preceding discussions that present is conceived of in both ways: (i) as having been associated with the past and future, such as in the series of actions which denotes all the three time-epochs, and (ii) as having been dissociated from them, e.g. 'substance exists', which shows the perpetual existence of an object⁹⁷ referring to the absolute mode of present. Further, as we have seen above, the briefest action (denoting present) takes at least four moments of disjunctions and conjunctions. An instantaneous action is not possible at all. It follows that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the duration of present cannot be less than four moments. The span of an extended present can exceed more than four moments up to infinity. In other words, if present is not limited to four moments, it matters little to what measurable period we apply the term. The principle is the same whether we speak of a specious present or a present century or the present Yuga. An extended present is a period extending from now backward and forward, and in its extremely extended form it is the absolute mode of present, which is again a durational whole, a substantive, all-pervasive, infinite, eternal, and real time of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Śrīharṣa's Criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Notion of Time

Regarding the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion of time, Śrīharṣa (13th century), the great protagonist of Advaita Vedānta, seems to get hold of the wrong end of the stick. He tries his best to repudiate time as substantive reality in his outstanding treatise *Khāṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*.⁹⁸ His criticism of the reality of time clusters around the assumption that the temporal determinations, past, present and future, cannot be defined and they are unintelligible as well if we take them as separate entities. The Vaiśeṣika's

contention is that these determinations are based on external conditions, such as different solar revolutions, finite actions, or finite objects. But Śrīharṣa thinks that they are said to be connected with a particular solar motion and are thus existent simultaneously, which is an absurd position. These divisions of time, he continues, may be either real (svābhāvika) or conditional (aupādhika). Whichever alternative we take we find self-contradiction in it. In the first case, time is said to be an undivided whole, one which cannot possess real divisions. It means the same undivided time, which appears present, was future and will be past. But such cognition is not possible. If we say that it has tri-temporal characteristics, it cannot be unique. For, because of the difference of characteristics, there is difference among things. Even if we admit that the above divisions in a unique time are real, the adjustment of past and future would not be possible, because in that case there will always be a cognition of all the three time-determinations, which will lead to a great confusion. The Vaiśeṣika assertion is that past, present and future arise and are distinguishable by means of different external conditions, such as different solar revolutions. But to Śrīharṣa it is an unconvincing argument, as all the three times are said to be in relation to a particular solar motion. Thus, for example, a particular day, which is apprehended as present because of its relation to a particular solar movement, is also apprehended as past and future in relation to the same movement. That particular day is considered as present on the same day, as past on its succeeding days, and as future on its preceding days, and the particular solar revolution is common to all these three states. Hence, it is obvious that past, present and future as conditional divisions of one infinite time are also not tenable.

Again, the Vaiśeṣika may suggest that time when related to the actual action is present; when related to the pre-nonexistent action (prāgabhāvāvacchinna), it is past; and when related to the post-nonexistent or cessation of an action (pradhvaṁsāvacinna), it is future.⁹⁹ But this too does not fare better, because all the three time-epochs are said to be determined by action and so they appear to be present alike. The preceding definitions of time-segments are not appropriate, for there is no time-segment, which is determined by pre-nonexistence or post-nonexistence of an action, and not determined by any action.¹⁰⁰ Further, without making reference to previous and later, pre-nonexistence and post-nonexistence are incomprehensible. But previous is said to be past and later that of future. Thus, we see that the definitions of past and future, which the Vaiśeṣika proposes, wind up being circular, for the reasons given above. The Vaiśeṣika again defines present in a different way. It pronounces that the time determined by a particular action is called present in relation to that very action only, not in relation to another action.¹⁰¹ But this too, according to Śrīharṣa, does not succeed any better, because it is the same action, which determines the past and future as well alike. In this way Śrīharṣa tries to pick holes in the Vaiśeṣika arguments, which establish the time-reality. Though there is no attempt on behalf of the Vaiśeṣikas to meet the challenge of Śrīharṣa, still we can see how the holes could be blocked up again.

As we have seen, time in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is an undivided whole, infinite and absolute. The divisions of time as past, present, and future, or second, minute, hour, day, etc. measured by a watch, or an action, or a duration, or the existence of an object are empirical, not real. Actually, absolute time is not divided. The past, present and future, etc. are its imposed determinants (upādhis) for our practical

purposes. It means if there is no action or change, etc. in the phenomena, there would be no past, present and future. Still real time will continue to survive absolutely, and the imposed determinants do not really exist as such.

Notes

1. VS, 2.2.6-9, 5.2.21, 26, 7.1.25, 7.2.22, 8.1.2; NS, 1.1.5, 2.1.40-44, and NSBh thereon; PPBh, pp. 58.1.59-2, 65.4, 143.2-3, 155.2-156.4, 159.2-160.5, 397.2-398.5, 464.3-465.4; NK, pp. 58,13-16, 65.18-66.11, 123.3-124.7, 155.14-162.16, 397.13-399.21; *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp.359.1-373.8; *Padārthatattvanirūpana*, pp. 23.1-3, 72.31ff; *Nyāyavārtika*, pp. 253-256; *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā*, pp. 403-409; *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 348-358; *Kiraṇāvalī-bhāskara*, pp. 135-146; *Nyāyalīlāvati*, pp. 42-48, 279-293, 310-313; *Nyāyalīlāvati-kanthābharana*, pp. 284, 312; *Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 11.23; *Kārikāvalī*, kārikās 45b-46a, and *Nyāya-siddhāntamuktāvalī*, *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī* thereon; *Vaiśeṣikasūtro-paskāra*, pp. 160.8-166.3, 295.1-10, 326.5-6, 329.5-7, 434.8-435.4, 439.3-6, 450.7; *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, pp. 682.10-690.30; *Vākyapadīya*, 3.9.1-3, 6-8, 11, 13, 18-23, 31-37, 45, 47-48, 68-69, 75 and Helārāja's commentary thereon; *Kāla-siddhānta-Darśinī*, pp. 20-22, 107-109.

A.B. Keith (1968), pp. 232-235; Faddegon (1969), pp. 208-221; IP, II, pp. 142-144, 189; Umesh Mishra (1936), pp. 127-129, 175-187; Bhaduri (1975), pp. 183-213; H. Ui (1962), pp. 46, 51, 93, 104-105, 134-137, 190; Mandal (1968), pp. 83-100; Hiriyanna (1924), pp. 233-237; S.R. Das (1933), pp. 149-151; Athalye (1963), pp. 11.23-12.2, 129-132, 167-168; Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan (1971), p. 106; Schayer (1938), pp. 4-12; Gopinath Bhattacharya (1976), pp. 86-88; Ingalls (1951), pp. 30, 75, 78-79; Matilal (1968), pp. 43-44, 72-73; Potter (1977), pp. 91-93; J.V. Bhattacharya (1978), pp. 284-293; Stcherbatsky (1926), pp. 17-29; G.N. Jha (1916), pp. 112, 140-147, (1939A), pp. 167-172; D.M. Datta (1972), pp. 102-106; Dasgupta (1975), pp. 310-311.

2. 1936, pp. 37-50.
3. Cf. VS, 1.1.5; pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi.
4. Cf. ibid., 1.1.15: kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam.
5. Cf. PPBh, p. 143.2-3: ākāśakāladiśām ekaikatvād aparajātyabhāve pari-bhāṣikyās tisraḥ saṃjñā bhavanti, ākāśaḥ kālo dig iti.
6. Cf. VS, 5.2.21: dikkālāv ākāśaṃ ca kriyāvād vaidharṃyān niṣkriyāṇi.
7. Cf. PPBh, pp. 58.2-59.2: ākāśakāladiḡātmanām sarvagatatvam paramamahatvam sarvasaṃyogisamānadeśatvañ ca.
8. Cf. NK, pp. 58.13-59.16: sarvaśabdenātra prakṛtāpekṣayāntaroktāni mūrtadravyāṇi parāmrśyante. sarvagatatvam sarvair mūrtaiḥ saha saṃyoga ākāśādīnām, na tu sarvatra gamanam, teṣām niṣkriyatvāt. paramamahatvam iyattānavacchinnaparimāṇayogitvam. sarvasaṃyogisamānadeśatvam sarveṣām saṃyoginām mūrtadravyāṇām ākāśaḥ samāno deśa eka ādhāra ity arthaḥ. evaṃ digādiṣv api vyākhyeyam. yady apy ākāśādikaṃ sarveṣām saṃyoginām ādhāro na bhavati, ādhārabhāvenānavasthānāt, tathāpi sarvasaṃyogādhāratvāt sarvasaṃyoginām ādhāra ity ucyate, upacārāt. ata eva sarvagatatvam ity anenāpunaruktatā. tatra hi sarvaiḥ saha saṃyogo 'stīty uktam. iha tu sarveṣām ādhāra ity ucyate.

Here it is to be noted that in the above passage ākāśa, kāla and dik are described together, but we have taken only kāla for our purpose.

9. Cf. PPBh, p. 65.4: dikkālayoḥ pañcaguṇavatvam. Also see ibid., pp. 159.2-160.3.
10. Cf. ibid., p. 65.4: sarvotpattimatām nimittakāraṇatvañ ca. Also cf. VS, 2.2.8-9, 7.1.25, 7.2.22; NS, 2.1.23 and NSBh thereon; *Kārikāvalī*, 45b: janyānām janakaḥ kālo jagatām āśrayo mataḥ.
11. Cf. PPBh, p. 156.2-3: sarvakāryāṇāñ cotpattisthitivināśahetus tadvyapadeśāt.
12. Cf. NK, p. 159.10-11: tena kālenotpattyādīnām vyapadeśāt utpattikālo vināśakāla ityādivyapadeśāt kālasya tatra hetutvam ity arthaḥ.
13. Keith (1968), pp. 233-234.
14. Cf. VS, 2.2.7: dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte.
15. Cf. *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p.11.23: atītādivyavahārahetuḥ kālaḥ.
16. Cf. PPBh, p. 156.3-4: kṣaṇalavanimeṣakāṣṭhākālāmuhūrtayāmāhorātrār-dhamāsamāsartvayanasamvatsarayugakalpamanvantarapralayamahāpralaya-vyavahārahetuḥ.
17. "Kṣaṇa is that point of time during which a produced substance remains without an attribute, or a motion; or, that which marks the interval between the conjunction of the last thread and the production of the cloth, or between the produced motion and disjunction caused by it, or between the presence of the entire material for the production of an effect and the actual production of that effect" - Umesh Mishra (1936), p. 127, fn. 213. Also see *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 354-355.
18. It is equal to 2 kṣaṇas.
19. It is equal to 4 kṣaṇas or 2 lavas and is that length of time which is denoted by a single twinkling of an eye. Also see *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 355, and NK, p. 159.12-13: akṣipakṣmakarmopalakṣitakālo nimeṣaḥ.
20. It is equal to 18 nimeṣas or 72 kṣaṇas.
21. It is equal to 540 nimeṣas or 2,160 kṣaṇas.
22. It is equal to 30 kalās or 64,800 kṣaṇas.
23. It is a period of 3 hours.
24. They are equal to 24 hours or 30 muhūrtas or 8 yāmas.
25. It is equal to 6 months.
26. It means the Sun's road north and south of the equator, the half year, the equinoctical and solstitial points - Monier-Williams (1974), p.84, col. 2.
27. An age of the world, long mundane period of years (of which there are four, viz. 1. Kṛta or Satya, 2. Tretā, 3. Dvāpara, 4. Kali, of which the first three have already elapsed, while the Kali, which began at midnight between the 17th and 18th of February, 3102 B.C.

is that in which we live; the duration of each is said to be respectively 1,728,000; 1,296,000; 864,000 and 432,000 years of men, the descending numbers representing a similar physical and moral deterioration of men in each age; the four Yugas comprise an aggregate of 4,320,000 years and constitute a 'Great Yuga' or Mahā-Yuga - *ibid.*, p. 854, col. 1.

28. A fabulous period of time (a day of Brahmā or one thousand Yugas). With Buddhist the Kalpas are not of equal duration - *ibid.*, 262, col. 3.
29. It comprises 71 Mahā-Yugas - *ibid.*, p. 786, col. 3.
30. It means dissolution, reabsorption, destruction of the whole world at the end of a Kalpa - *ibid.*, p. 689, col. 3.
31. The total annihilation of the Universe at the end of a Kalpa - *ibid.*, p. 797, col. 3.
32. Cf. VS, 2.2.6: aparasminn aparam yugapat ciram kṣipram iti kāla-liṅgāni. Also see PPBh, p. 155.2-3; *Kārikāvalī*, 46a; NK, pp. 155.14ff. H. Ui (1962, pp. 134) suggests that here cause (kāraṇ) is more appropriate than mark (liṅga). Further, on liṅga, see Athalye (1963), pp. 281-289.
33. Cf. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā*, pp. 403ff.
34. Cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 349.5-358.7.
35. Cf. *Kiraṇāvalī-bhāskara*, pp. 135ff.
36. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika followed the primitive belief that the Sun revolves around the earth, which was supposed to be static.
37. Cf. NK, p. 156.17-19.
38. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 155.16-156.11.
39. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 156.12-16: teṣāṃ yugapadādipratyayānāṃ viṣayeṣu dravyādiṣu pūrvapratyayavilakṣaṇānāṃ dravyādipratyayavilakṣaṇānāṃ utpattāv anyasya nimittasyābhāvāt. etad uktaṃ bhavati - dravyādiṣu viṣayesu pūrvāparādipratyayā jāyante, na caiśāṃ dravyādayo nimittam tatpratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt, na ca nimittam antareṇa kāryasyotpattir asti, tasmād yad atra nimittam sa kāla iti.
40. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 157.2-158.2.
41. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 158.6: yuvasthavirayoḥ śarīrāvasthābhedenā tatkāraṇatayā kālasamyoge 'numite.
42. Umesh Mishra (1936), p. 187.
43. Cf. *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, p. 23.
44. Umesh Mishra (1936), p. 187.
45. Cf. *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, p. 72: kṣaṇaś ca kṣaṇiko 'tiriktah kālopādhiḥ. Cp. *Kārikāvalī*, 46b: kṣaṇādhiḥ syād upādhitah.

46. Cf. *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 148.4-5: kālas tv eko 'py upādhibhedāt kṣaṇādivyavahāraṇiṣayaḥ.
47. Cf. *Dinakarī*, p. 148.15ff.
48. Cf. *Rāmarudrī*, p. 148.33ff.
49. Cf. *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 149.1-3:
 (i) svajanyavibhāgaprāgabhāvāvachinnaṃ karma,
 (ii) pūrvasaṃyogāvachinnaṃ vibhāgaḥ,
 (iii) pūrvasaṃyogānāśāvachinnottarasāṃyogaprāgabhāvaḥ,
 (iv) uttarasaṃyogāvachinnaṃ karma.
 For details, see the two commentaries, *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī*, thereon.
50. Cf. *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, p. 293: eṣa tāvac cirantanāḥ panthāḥ.
51. Cf. NSBh on NS, 2.1.41.
52. Cf. *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, p. 310: evaṃ kālo 'pi sarvatrābhinnākāravartamānapratyayavedyaḥ.
53. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 312: tataḥ samavāyavad ekaṃ vartamānaṃ yadavacchedakaṃ sa kālaḥ.
54. Matilal (1977), pp. 58-59.
55. Cf. VS, 8.1.2: tatrātmā manaś cāpratyakṣe.
56. Cf. NS, 1.1.4: indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānaṃ avyapadeśam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam.
 For different interpretations, see Athalye (1963), pp. 211ff.
57. Cf. PPBh, pp. 464.3-465.4: asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ tu yogināṃ yuktānāṃ yogajadharmānugṛhītena manasā svātmāntarākāśadikkālaparamāṇuvāyumanassu tatsamavetaḥkarmasāmānyaviśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitatāṃ svarūpadarśanam utpadyate.
58. D.M. Datta (1972), p. 105.
59. Cf. *Nyāyamajjarī*, p. 361.7-10:
 pratyakṣagamyatām eva kecit kālasya manvate /
 viśeṣaṇatayā kāryapratyaye pratibhāsanāt //
 krameṇa, yugapat, kṣipram, cirāt kṛtam itīdrśaḥ /
 pratyayā nāvakalpante kāryamātrāvalambanāḥ //
60. Potter (1977), p. 92.
61. Cf. *Kārikāvalī*, 45b: janyānāṃ janakaḥ kālo jagatām āśrayo mataḥ.
62. For details see Ingalls (1951), pp. 78-79; Matilal (1968), pp. 43-44, 72-73.
63. Ingalls, *ibid.*, p. 78.
64. *Ibid.* Also see *Kārikāvalī*, 24a: anyatra nityadravyebhya āśritatvam ihocyate; and *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* thereupon.

65. See Keith (1968), pp. 233-234; Matilal (1968), pp. 43-44.
66. Cf. *Nyāyavārtika*, p. 253: yathaikasmin puruṣe anekasambandhabhedānuvidhāyiny abhinne pitā putro bhrāteti pratyāyā bhavanti tadvad ekaḥ kālaḥ kāryakāraṇaviśeṣāpekṣaḥ parāparādipratyayahetur iti.
67. Matilal (1968), p. 43.
68. Cf. *Tarkasaṅgraha*, p.11.23: atītādivyavahārahetuḥ kālaḥ.
69. This is a commentary by Meru Śāstrī on the *Tarkasaṅgraha*. See Athalye (1963), p. 129.
70. Cf. *Nīlakaṇṭha-prakāśikā*, p. 186.3-7: atītatvam ca vartamānadhvaṃsa-pratīyogitvam. vartamānatvam iha sabdaprayogādhikaraṇakālavṛttitvam. bhaviṣyatvam ca vartamānaprāgabhāvapratīyogitvam. atra sarvatra kālasya ḡhaṭakatayā atītādivyavahāre hetutvam tasyeti dhyeyam. na ca tādrśavyavahāraḥ sūryaparispanopādhiṃ ādāya sambhavatīti vācyam.
71. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 369.9-11: na tāttvikah kālasya bhedo vartamānādiḥ. kim tv asann apy asau vyavahārasiddhaye kenacid upādhiṃ kalpyate.
72. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 369.15-370.6. This should in no way be considered as an original approach by Jayanta to the problem of the three time-epochs. Such a view was first set forth by Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, 2.1.40-44, which we shall discuss later on.
73. Keith (1968), p. 233.
74. Cf. *Kiraṇāvalī-bhāskara*, p.144: te 'tītādayo bhāvā eva kālasvarūpā eva na tūpādhisvarūpā iti.
75. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 359.2-8. Also see NS, 1.1.5 and NSBh thereon.
76. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 359.9-13.
77. See NK, pp. 123.3-124.7; PPBh, p. 156.3-4; *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 313.14-23; G.N. Jha (1916), p. 112; D.M. Datta (1972), 104; B.N. Seal (1915), pp. 76-77, 148.
78. Matilal (1968), p. 43.
79. Cf. NK, p. 159.13: ...gaṇitaśāstrānusāreṇa pratyetyam. For the same statement, see *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 355.1-2.
80. Cf. NK, pp. 123.3-124.7.
81. Cf. PPBh, p. 156.3-4.
82. Cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 313.14-23.
83. B.N. Seal (1915), p. 147. Also see *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 354.4-5: utpannam dravyam yāvad aguṇam utpadyate, antyatatūsaṃyoge yāvan na paṭa utpanne karmaṇi yāvan na vibhāgaḥ tāvān kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ.

84. Cf. 2.1.40-44.
85. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan (1971, p. 106, fn. 1) and Radhakrishnan (IP, Vol. 2, p. 142) affirms that here the opponent is Nāgārjuna or the Mādhyamika school. But in the whole Mādhyamika system we do not come across such a view. As we know, the Mādhyamikas take everything as ultimately unreal, void (śūnya), and mutually dependent, including the past, present and future as well. G.N. Jha (1939A, p. 167) informs us that the *Bhāṣyacandra* also describes the opponent in this regard as the Buddhist. We agree with G.N. Jha (ibid.) and S. Bhaduri (1975, p. 206, fn. 45) that this view cannot be affiliated to any particular school or work.
86. Cf. NSBh, pp. 191.8-192.2: vṛntāt pracyutasya phalasya bhūmau pratyāsīdato yadūrdhvaṃ sa patito 'dhvā tatsamyuktaḥ kālaḥ patita-kālaḥ, yo 'dhastāt sa patitavyo 'dhvā, tatsamyuktaḥ kālaḥ patitavya-kālaḥ. nedānim tṛtīyo 'dhvā vidyate yatra patatīti vartamānaḥ kālo grhyeta, tasmād vartamānaḥ kālo na vidyate iti.
87. Cf. ibid., p. 192.4-6: nādhvavyaṅgyaḥ kālaḥ. kim tarhi ? kriyā-vyaṅgyaḥ patatīti. yadā patanakriyā vyuparatā bhavati sa kālaḥ patitakālaḥ. yadotpatsyate sa patitavyakālaḥ. yadā dravye vartamānā kriyā grhyate sa vartamānaḥ kālaḥ.
88. Cf. ibid., p. 192.6-10: yadi cāyaṃ dravye vartamānaṃ patanaṃ na grhṇāti kasyoparamam utpatsyamānatām vā pratipadyate. patitah kāla itī bhūtā kriyā. patitavyaḥ kāla itī cotpatsyamānā kriyā. ubhayaḥ kālayoḥ kriyāhīnaṃ dravyam, adhaḥ patatīti kriyāsambaddham, so 'yaṃ kriyādravyayoḥ sambandhaṃ grhṇātīti vartamānaḥ kālas tadāśrayau cetarau kālau tadābhāve na syātām itī. Also cf NS, 2.1.41.
89. Cf. ibid., p. 193.3-194.2: yady atītānāgatāv itaretarāpekṣau sidhyetām pratipadyemahi vartamānavilopam. nātītāpekṣā 'nāgata-siddhiḥ. nāpy anāgatāpekṣā 'tītasiddhiḥ. kayā yuktyā ? kena kalpenātītaḥ katham atītāpekṣā 'nāgatasiddhiḥ, kena ca kalepnā-nāgataḥ katham anāgatāpekṣāsīttasiddhir itī naitac chakyaṃ nirvaktum avyākaraṇīyam etad vartamānalopa itī.
90. Cf. ibid., p. 194.3-7: yac ca manyeta hrasvadīrghayoḥ sthalanimnayoś chāyātapayoś ca yathetaratarāpekṣayā siddhir evam atītānāgatayor itī, tan nopapadyate, viśeṣahetvabhāvāt. drṣṭāntavat pratidrṣṭānto 'pi prasajyate yathā rūpasparśau gandharasau netaretarāpekṣau sidhyataḥ, evam atītānāgatāv itī, netaretarāpekṣā kasyacit siddhir itī. yasmād ekābhāve 'nyatarābhāvād ubhayābhāvaḥ. Also cf. NS, 2.1.42.
91. Cf. ibid., p. 194.10-11: arthasadbhāvavyaṅgyaś cāyaṃ vartamānaḥ kālaḥ, vidyate dravyaṃ, vidyate guṇaḥ, vidyate karmeti. Also cf. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā*, p. 407.
92. Cf. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā*, ibid.: tayā vyaṅgyaḥ kālaḥ. etad uktaṃ bhavati patanādayaḥ kriyāḥ vartamāneṣv apayānty apayānti ca, astrikriyā tu sarvavartamānavyāpinī.
93. Cf. NSBh, p. 195.2-5: pratyakṣam indriyārthasannikarṣajam, na cāvidyamānam asadindriyeṇa sannikṛṣyate. na cāyaṃ vidyamānaṃ sat kiñcid anujānāti. pratyakṣanimittaṃ pratyakṣaviśayaḥ pratyakṣa-jñānaṃ sarvaṃ nopapadyate, pratyakṣānupapattau tatpūrvakatvād

- anumānāgamayor anupapattiḥ. sarvapramāṇavilope sarvagrahaṇam na bhavatīti. Also cf. NS, 2.1.43.
94. Cf. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā*, p. 407: na hi sarvaṃ pratyakṣam vartamānaviśayam atītānāgatayor api yogipratyakṣatvād iti bhāvaḥ.
95. Cf. NSBh, pp. 195.6-196.4: ubhayathā ca vartamānaḥ kālo grhyate kvacid arthasadbhāvavyaṅgyaḥ. yathā 'sti dravyam iti. kvacit kriyāsantānavyaṅgyaḥ. yathā pacati chinattīti. nānāvidhā caikārthā kriyā kriyāsantānaḥ kriyābhyāsaś ca. nānāvidhā caikārthā kriyā pacatīti sthālyadhiśrayaṇam udakāsecanaṃ taṇḍulāvapanam edho 'pasarpanam agnyabhiḥjvālanam darvighaṭṭanam maṇḍasrāvaṇam adho 'vatāraṇam iti. chinattīti kriyābhyāsa udyamyodyamya paraśum dārūni nipātayan chinattīty ucyate.
96. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 197.1-4: kriyāsantāno 'nārabdhaś cikīrṣito 'nāgataḥ kālaḥ pakṣyatīti. prayojanāvasānaḥ kriyāsantānoparamaḥ atītaḥ kālo 'pākṣid iti. ārabdhakriyāsantāno vartamānaḥ kālaḥ pacatīti. tatra yā uparatā sā kṛtatā. yā cikīrṣitā sā kartavyatā. yā vidyamānā sā kriyamānatā.
97. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 197.6-7: so 'yam ubhayathā vartamāno grhyate aparḥkto vyapavṛktaś ca atītānāgatābhyām, sthitivyāṅgyo vidyate dravyam iti.
98. See pp. 682.10-690.30 and Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary thereon.
99. Cf. *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, p. 684.6-7: kriyāvacchinnāḥ kālo vartamānaḥ tatprāgabhāvāvacchinno bhūtaḥ tatpradhvaṃsāvachchinno bhaviṣyann iti.
100. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 684.9-10: kriyānavacchinnasya tatprāgabhāva-pradhvaṃsābhāvāvacchedānupapatteḥ.
101. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 686.22-23: yat kriyāvacchinno yaḥ kālaḥ sa tat-kriyāpekṣayā vartamāno na tv anyāpekṣayā iti.

CHAPTER II


Time and Change in Sāṃkhya-Yoga¹

Sāṃkhya and Yoga are two aspects of one and the same system. Yoga accepts the Sāṃkhya theories with slight variations. But regarding the problem of time, there are clear-cut divergent interpretations. In Sāṃkhya the time-concept is not given much weight. Here we find only scattered references, and in order to gather a clear idea of the concept of time we have to draw inferences at many places from its expositions of other metaphysical categories. On the contrary, in Yoga we encounter an elaborate and explicit discussion on time.

The whole development of the Sāṃkhya conception of time may be broadly divided into two groups - preclassical and classical. The dividing line between the two is the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (350-400 A.D.), which is the first systematic text of the classical Sāṃkhya. The beginning of the preclassical "Sāṃkhya speculation cannot be precisely dated, as scattered elements of the doctrine may be traced back to the oldest parts of the *Veda* itself".² Aspects can be found in the *Vedas*, *Brahmaṇas*, earliest *Upaniṣads*, *Mahābhārata*, *Bhagavad-Gītā*, *Buddhacarita*, etc.,³ but during this period Sāṃkhya never emerged as a systematic philosophical system. On the other hand, the classical Sāṃkhya period embodies the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and its commentaries - the *Yuktiḍīpikā* (600 A.D., author unknown), *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* (700 A.D.), and *Tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra (980 A.D.). For our study of time we shall confine ourselves only to the classical Sāṃkhya literature and its later developments, comprising the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra* of Kapila (1400 A.D.) and the commentaries of Aniruddha (1500 A.D.) and Vijñānabhikṣu (1600 A.D.) thereon.

For the Yoga conception of time we shall be discussing with the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali (300-400 A.D.) and its commentarial literature, such as the *Yoga-bhāṣya* of Veda Vyāsa (500-600 A.D.), *Tattva-vaiśārādī* of Vācaspati Miśra (980 A.D.) and *Yoga-vārtika* of Vijñānabhikṣu (1600 A.D.).

Sāṅkhya-Yoga assumes two fundamental and independent realities - puruṣa and prakṛti. Puruṣa is self, pure spirit and consciousness, all-pervading but passive. Prakṛti is the root cause of matter. This is the fundamental substance out of which the whole world evolves. Unlike puruṣa, it is purely matter, but it is active in character. It is a string of three strands. The three guṇas - sattva (tendencies to manifestation),⁴ rajas (activity) and tamas (tendencies to non-manifestation and non-activity)⁵ - are the constituent parts of prakṛti. When prakṛti comes under the influence of puruṣa, evolution starts. The twenty-three constitutive elements (tattva) are derived from prakṛti, and these are effects. Since only puruṣa and prakṛti are infinite, these twenty-three evolutes are of limited magnitude. The following chart will show the gradual development of the whole process⁶ according to the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*:



From the preceding table it is clear that mahat, ahaṁkāra and the five tanmātras are both causes and effect, while the mind, five sense-organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin), five motor-organs (larynx, hand, foot, anus and parts of generation) and the five mahābhūtas are only effects, and not causes.⁷ Of these, mahat (literally 'great') or buddhi (intellect) is the first evolute of prakṛti. It is the basis of the intelligence of the individual. While the term 'mahat' brings out the cosmic aspect, buddhi which is used as a synonym for it refers to the psychological counterpart appertaining to each individual. In Sāṁkhya, stress is laid on the psychological aspect of mahat.⁸ According to the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*,⁹ mahat, ahaṁkāra and manas are called internal organs (antahkarana) and the ten sense and motor organs are termed external organs (bāhyendriya). Buddhi is the faculty of all the mental processes, reasoning, ascertainment, imagination, etc. In Sāṁkhya-Yoga, it is this buddhi which plays an important role in conceptualising the reality of time.

SĀMKHYA

In Sāṁkhya, there are two groups - one who believes in God and the other who denies his existence.¹⁰ Here Sāṁkhya is taken as the combined system of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. In the same vein, it is said that Kapil represents the latter group and Patañjali that of the former.¹¹

(i) Time not Different from Change

We must keep in mind that throughout the evolutionary process of prakṛti there is no such element as time. Regarding the existence of real time, the Sāṁkhya answer is an emphatic 'No'. It explicitly proclaims the unreality of time¹² in direct opposition to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulation of substantial and eternal time. The author of

the *Yuktidīpikā*, the oldest commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, boldly declares that there is no substance as time.¹³ It is nonsense to say that time is the creator of the world.¹⁴ As to the question of what is time, the Sāṃkhya reply is that in our daily life we are aware of events succeeding each other. We experience the passage of time by way of events and change of states. Out of the observations of these events man must have developed the concept of time. If there is no change, there is no time. Change is a necessary element for the notion of time. The origin of time may be said to lie with change. Sāṃkhya maintains the reality of change and identifies time with it. Time actually is nothing apart from change, events or actions.¹⁵ The latter themselves are time.¹⁶ However, time is not an entity which brings about change. It is only an abstract relation binding the events arising from the evolution of prakṛti, and hence it is unreal.¹⁷ This means that time is neither a material nor an efficient cause.

Gauḍapāda (700 A.D.), the author of the *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, rejects the notion of time as a cause of the universe. There are, he enunciates, only three categories in Sāṃkhya - manifest (vyakta), unmanifest (avyakta, or prakṛti) and pure-consciousness (puruṣa), and time comes under one of these, i.e. manifest. Since prakṛti is the cause of everything, it must also be the cause of time.¹⁸

(ii) The three Time-epochs in Sāṃkhya

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, time occupies an independent status as a substance, and the past, present and future are considered as its imposed properties (kālopādhi) based on finite durations, objects, events, or our watches. But Sāṃkhya regards time "as past, present and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution".¹⁹

Both Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra take a critical stand against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the reality of time while commenting on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 33. They speak of the three time-epochs, but not of time as such. Gaudapāda says that the three internal organs, buddhi, ahaṅkāra and manas, function in all the three time-epochs, past, present and future. The buddhi apprehends and forms an idea not only of a present object, such as a pitcher (ghaṭa), but also of the past (which is quiescent or sub-latent) and future ones (which is potential, or yet to be manifested). Likewise, the ahaṅkāra supplies consciousness of the objects, past, present and future; and the manas makes determination (saṅkalpa) in respect of all the three times.²⁰ Thus, the internal organs can have knowledge of all the three time-epochs. For example, if a river is swollen, the internal organs will infer that there has been rain (referring to the past); if there is smoke on a mountain, they will deduce from it on the basis of their past experiences that there is fire on the mountain (referring to the present); and lastly, there is an ancient belief in India that if in the hot weather the ants carry their eggs from one place to another, it indicates that there will be rain (referring to the future).²¹ But the external organs function only in the present (vartamāna); for instance, the eye only sees present forms, not past and future ones.²² In addition, Vācaspati maintains that the present also includes in itself the immediately preceding (atīta) and succeeding (anāgata) moments.²³ The reason behind this may be that an instantaneous present cannot be apprehended. Here he seems to be influenced by the great Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini²⁴ (500 B.C.) who maintained so. This means that the present comprises at least three moments, though it may take more than three. But the problem is, if we continue this process to

its logical extreme, we arrive at the absolute and infinite mode of present which is eternal and all-pervasive time of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. However, we may not take Vācaspati's above statement to lead to the notion of infinite time, because he explicitly criticises the Vaiśeṣika notion of unique time which does not possess any divisions in itself, such as the past, present and future. The latter are, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, actually the imposed properties of real time (kālopādhi),²⁵ based on the different sorts of conditions. Vācaspati suggests that origination (ārambha), duration (sthiti) and cessation (nirodha) of an action themselves can be taken as the ground of the notion of the past, present and future. Therefore, it is needless and superfluous to postulate time as a real and absolute substance apart from the twenty-five elements (tattva) of Sāṃkhya; instead, he says, these upādhis alone can serve our purpose. Dasgupta remarks:

"The Sāṃkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them unit of kāla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kāla as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi (buddhinirmāṇa) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perception."²⁷

(iii) Diverse Interpretations within the System

There is, however, a lack of unanimity regarding the exact import and characteristics of time in the later development of Sāṃkhya, particularly among the commentators. This diversity is found in the interpretation of the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* (II.12).²⁸ Here both time and space (kāla and dik) have been said to be the products of ether (ākāśa), though we do not encounter any such view in the rest of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga literature. The literal rendering of the aphorism is: "Space and time (arise) from ether, etc." Aniruddha in his commentary on the sūtra explains that

it is ether itself which, by different upādhis or external conditions, is called space and time. They are, therefore, included in ether.²⁹ Vedāntin Mahādeva³⁰ (end of 17th century) follows Aniruddha. But they do not furnish any further details. From this exposition it is not clear why space and time are included under ether and what their characteristics are. Aniruddha states that the word 'etc.' (ādi) in the sūtra is used by accident (sāmpāta). It follows that both these scholars fail to give any significant interpretation of the sūtra.

It is Vijñānabhikṣu who, in his *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, adds a quite different meaning to this sūtra, which definitely does not fit in with the traditional Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrines. His distinction between eternal and limited space and time is certainly a new arrival within the classical Sāṃkhya system. Obviously this implies that there is an independent and eternal time. Space and time, he asserts, which are eternal, are of the nature of ākāśa, and are like the particular guṇas or modifications of prakṛti. Therefore, space and time are proved to be all-pervasive (vibhu) in character.³¹ Further, space and time, which are limited or finite (khaṇḍadikkāla), are said to be produced from ākāśa, because of its conjunction with various upādhis or external conditions.³² Vijñānabhikṣu also explains the word 'ādi' used in the sūtra. By this, he says, we mean upādhis. Finite space and finite time are not the product of ākāśa in the real sense, but rather they are ākāśa itself particularised by various upādhis.³³ Radhakrishnan writes:

"We have no perception of infinite time or infinite space, and so they are said to be constructed by the understanding. From the limited objects of perception which stand to one another in the relation of antecedence and sequence, we construct an infinite time in order to represent the course of evolution."³⁴

But when we look into the classical Sāṃkhya system, we fail to find any consistency in Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation of the sūtra. There

is hardly anything in the sūtra which sustains this distinction between eternal and limited space-time.³⁵ Every student of Sāṃkhya-Yoga knows that it assumes only two fundamental independent realities, puruṣa and prakṛti. So how is it possible to grant an independent status to a third element, such as time ? That is why A.B. Keith is confronted with difficulty in maintaining any such distinction, keeping the Sāṃkhya doctrines in view. He says:

"In the empiric world both [space and time] appear as limited, and are explained in a quite inconsistent way by origination from the ether through its conditioning by the masses of corporeal nature, on the one hand, in the case of space, and by the movement of the heavenly bodies in the case of time."³⁶

Sen thinks:

"In any case, time, if it be not absolutely unreal, must also be in the ultimate analysis a particular product ... of three guṇas (elements or constituents). Perhaps this is the reason why Vijñānabhikṣu, besides identifying time with Ākāśa after the sūtra, also speaks of it as a particular guṇa or modification of Prakṛti (prakṛter guṇaviśeṣaḥ)."³⁷

Whatever may be the reason, Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation is evidently incompatible with the classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga tenets.

Moreover, there is another striking aphorism in the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* (I.12)³⁸ which admits eternal time: "(The bondage of the puruṣa cannot (be continued) by connection with time, because (time which is) all-pervading and eternal is related to all (puruṣas, released and unreleased)."³⁹ Here Aniruddha has taken the words, eternal (nitya) and all-pervading (vyāpin) as qualifying the puruṣa, whereas Vijñānabhikṣu has applied them to time.⁴⁰ But it is really surprising "to note that Vijñānabhikṣu himself in his *Yogasāra-saṅgraha* admits that the Sāṃkhya does not accept a separate entity as infinite time (Mahākāla) as the one, all-pervading reality or the basis of temporal determinations of moments, etc. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu goes to great length even to criticise the views of Sāṃkhya expressed in the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*."⁴¹

There is one more reference where the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*⁴² gives the analogy of eternal and infinite time (mahākāla), but here he certainly does not deny the existence of time, as he has done earlier.

To conclude the classical Sāṃkhya notion of time we can say that except Vijñānabhikṣu, in his *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, all the Sāṃkhya philosophers repudiate the existence of real time, though Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati maintain the three temporal determinations, the past, present and future. In the following lines we shall try to explain why Sāṃkhya-Yoga admits these temporal determinations.

YOGA

The conception of time in Yoga cannot be fully dealt with unless *the theories of causality, conservation of energy, change, succession* and other allied topics are discussed. Though Sāṃkhya and Yoga are not two wholly different systems, they show only few variations in their philosophical postulate, yet we find more explicit and elaborate exposition in the Yoga literature than in Sāṃkhya on the subject under examination.

(i) Causality, Conservation of Energy and Time

In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system, prakṛti alone, not puruṣa, is held to be the ground of all activities and evolution. It is constituted of the three guṇas - sattva, rajas and tamas. All activities belong to these guṇas. Causality is explained in the system as different modifications of guṇas. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrine of causality or satkāryavāda,⁴³ unlike that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist, means that cause and effect are not two different things. The effect is real and is always

existent. It subsists in a latent form in the cause, even beforehand. It is not entirely a new creation. It is the manifestation of what was latent.⁴⁴ The underlying substance remains the same in both the states, cause and effect. In Yoga this substance is called dharmin and its different modifications are termed dharmas. A substance (dharmin) is that which possesses characteristics or external aspects (dharma).⁴⁵ Further, the substance is said to be the same to its past (śānta), present (udita) and future (avyapadeśya) forms.⁴⁶ Of these, the past is that which has come to its quiescent state by finishing its functional activities.⁴⁷ The present is that which is in operation, i.e. in this form the substance is in its manifested or actualised form.⁴⁸ And the future is that which is not yet manifested (avyapadeśya); it is still latent in its material cause and has not yet commenced its functional activity.⁴⁹

The past, as we have seen, is a quiescent state. Now one may ask whether this quiescent past exists or is annihilated for ever. What happens to it ? The theory of satkāryavāda may also be called the theory of the conservation of energy, according to which nothing is destroyed but everything is transformed into different forms.⁵⁰ The same is the case with the past. When something finishes its activity, it is absorbed by its substance (dharmin) into a state of equilibrium. The future is not yet manifested. This means that both the past and future are in their unmanifested form. Only the present is manifested. A yogin is said to be vested with the power of recalling the past form of anything. He does not actually call it back but rather brings about its exact duplicate.

(ii) The Doctrine of Change and Time

Yoga maintains that with regard to the five gross elements and all the organs, change (pariṇāma) is held to be three-fold: (1) change of external aspect (dharma-pariṇāma), (2) change of time-variation (lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma), and (3) change of state (avasthā-pariṇāma).⁵¹ Change is defined in the system as the emergence of another external aspect (dharma) in a substance, which is permanent, on the disappearance of a previous aspect.⁵² Vācaspati remarks that here change of external aspect refers to all the three kinds of changes, stated above.⁵³ Of these, change of external aspect in a substance is the disappearance and appearance of the external forms, such as evolution (vyutthāna) and absorption (nirodha, lit. restriction, suppression).⁵⁴ In this mutation the substance remains intact, just as the substance of a lump of gold, even if it is turned into different kinds of ornaments, such as a ring, chain, bracelet, is constant throughout its various modifications. Change of time-variation is that by which a time-determination (kāla-bheda), such as the past, present or future, is characterised.⁵⁵ This change is from potential (future) to actual (present), and from actual to quiescent (past). It marks the three stages of a substance: the pre-manifested which is still in the womb of future awaiting to be manifested, the manifested which is present, and the post-manifested which after having finished its manifestation is now conserved in its quiescent state⁵⁶ (past, or the state of equilibrium). Lastly, change of state, or change due to duration or lapse of time, is described by the mutation of external aspect of the substance. In this change, the external aspect (dharma), which is in the manifested or actual (present) state, constantly undergoes change every moment. In this state, the force of restriction

(nirodhasaṁskāra) becomes more powerful, while the force of emergence (vyutthānasaṁskāra) becomes weaker.⁵⁷ To quote Dasgupta:

"When the changes that a thing undergoes are of so remarkable a nature as to affect the constitution of the body materially we call it new or old, or say that it has suffered growth or decay, and this aspect of the change is called avasthā-pariṇāma."⁵⁸

Thus, the mutation of substance from the point of view of the change of external aspect is called dharma-pariṇāma; from the point of view of temporal determinations - the past, present and future - it is called lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma; and from the point of view of the change in an external aspect in every succeeding moment in any of its particular stages in time, it is called avasthā-pariṇāma.

(iii) The Absolute Atomistic Theory of Time and the Succession of Moments

Yoga, like Sāṁkhya, admits that time is not an independent reality. But whereas the latter identifies time with change or action, the former nowhere explicitly does so. Rather Yoga accepts time in the form of discrete moments, which are considered real. The *Yoga-sūtra*⁵⁹ of Veda Vyāsa and its commentaries contain a full analysis of moments and their succession (krama).

The moment (kṣaṇa) is defined as the minimal duration of time, just as an atom⁶⁰ (paramāṇu) is the minimal part of matter (dravya). Alternatively, the moment is defined as the time taken by an atom in order to move from its previous point in the space to the next point.⁶¹ It is identical with the unit of change in the phenomenon. The perpetual flow of such discrete moments one after another gives the idea of succession or a series of moments. This succession of moments is devoid of reality, and the idea of the divisions of time, such as day and night, is merely a conceptual combination (buddhisamāhāra) of moments. Time

does not exist as an objective reality. Any attempt to ascribe reality to time is a work of understanding (buddhi), mere words. Only to common people, who do not have a critical mind, it appears as objectively real.⁶² Two or more moments cannot co-exist in order to form real time. Though the change of A to B and that of B to C are each real time as moments, but we cannot construct a series of A-B-C as real time.⁶³ We can also say that in Yoga time is included under vikalpa which is supposed to have no corresponding object.⁶⁴

Further, the moment in Yoga falls under the category of reality and is considered to be the basis of succession, and the succession in turn has its essence in the series of moments, which (series) is called time by the proponents of time. Again, two co-existing moments neither can co-exist nor can form a succession in order to establish absolute time, because it would be impossible. Succession is defined as the flow of moments in which one moment follows another. It follows that the present consists of only one moment. Its preceding (past) and succeeding (future) moments do not exist. Therefore, it is not tenable to maintain their combination to conceive real time.⁶⁵ The past and future moments can be understood in relation to change,⁶⁶ as we have explained above.

Notes

1. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, kārikā 33, and *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya*, *Tattvakaumudī* and *Mātharavṛtti* thereon; *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* also on kārikā 61; *Yuktidīpikā*, pp. 64.5ff, 73.30-74.7, 131.8-132.18; G.S. Musalagaonkar (1971), pp. 206-210; *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, I.12, II.12, and the commentaries of Aniruddha, Vedāntin Mahādeva and Vijñāna-bhikṣu thereon; *Yoga-sūtra*, III.13, 52 and *Yoga-bhāṣya*, *Tattva-vaiśārādī* and *Yoga-vārtika* thereon; *Kālasiddhānta-darśinī*, pp. 1-9; Garbe (1892), pp. 10, 96; Pulinbihari Chakravarti (1975), pp. 45, 94-99, 120, 200-208, 239-240, 254-264; B.M.P. Sinha (1976); I.H. Jhaveri (1955), pp. 417-419; Sen (1968), pp. 406-426; Mandal (1968), pp. 116-125; B.N. Seal (1915), pp. 18-21; Keith (1949), pp. 121-122; Satyavrat Sastri (1963), pp. 190-194; Schayer (1938), pp. 13-14; S.N. Dasgupta (1974), pp. 107, 109, 115ff, 214ff, 234-235, (1974A), pp. 43-47, (1975), p. 311.
2. Hulin (1978), p. 127.
3. See *ibid.*, pp. 127ff, 159.
4. IP, II, p. 266.
5. *Ibid.*
6. S.S.S. Sastri (1930, pp. xxxii-xxxv) gives four kinds of such tables according to (i) *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, (ii) *Saiva-siddhānta*, (iii) Paramārtha's version of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, and (iv) *Pratyayasarga*. Also see *Yuktidīpikā*, Appendix 2 and G.S. Musalagaonkar (1971), pp. 392-397.
7. Here it is to be noted that each evolute is finer than its succeeding one and grosser than its preceding one.
8. IP, II, pp. 266-267.
9. Kārikā 33;
antahkaraṇaṃ trividhaṃ daśadhā bāhyaṃ trayasya viśayākhyam /
sāmpratakālam bāhyaṃ trikālam ābhyantaram karaṇam //
10. *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 320.7: dvividhaṃ ca Sāṃkhyam - nirīśvaram seśvaram ca. Also see Johannes Bronkhorst (1981), pp. 309-320.
11. Cf. *Kālasiddhānta-darśinī*, p. 5: tatra Kapilaṃ matam nirīśvaram. Pātañjalaṃ matam seśvaram.
12. Cf. *Ratnaprabhā* on *Śārīrakabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara (2.2.1): Sāṃkhyaiḥ kālasyaṅaṅgikārāt (see Satyavrat Sastri, 1963, p. 191).
13. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 132.6: na kālo nāma kaścit padārtho 'sti. Also cf. *ibid.*, p. 73.31: na hi naḥ kālo nāma kaścid asti.
14. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 73.30: yad apy uktam kālāḥ jagad utpattir bhaviṣyatīti tad anupapannam.

15. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 73.31-32: kriyamānakriyāṇām evādityagatigodoha-ghaṭāstanitādīnām viśiṣṭāvadhīsarūpapratyayanimitatvam.
16. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 132.6: kriyāsu kālasamjñā.
17. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 74.6: kālas tu sambandhamātropakārī na vikriyāhetuḥ. tasmād asad etat.
18. Cf. *Gaudapāda-bhāṣya* on kārikā 61: vyaktāvyaktapurūṣāḥ trayāḥ padārthāḥ, tena kālo 'ntarbhūto 'sti. sa hi vyaktaḥ. sarva-kartrtvāt kālasyāpi pradhānam eva kāraṇam. Also see *Parāśara-smṛti* of Mādhavācārya, pp. 94.7-95.2: pradhānavāde pañca-vimśati-tattvebhyo bahir bhūtasya kālatattvasyābhāvāt pradhānam eva kālaśabdena vyavahṛiyatām.
19. Dasgupta (1975), Vol. I, p. 311. For a similar observation, see Guenther (1976), p. 218, fn. 32.
20. Cf. *Gaudapāda-bhāṣya* on kārikā 33: trikālam ābhyantaram kāraṇam. buddhyahamkāramāṅsi trikālaviśayāṇi buddhir vartamānam ghaṭam budhyate atītam anāgatam ceti. āhamkāro vartamāne 'bhimānam karoti atīte 'nāgate ca. tathā mano vartamāne saṅkalpam kurute atīte 'anāgate ca. evam trikālam ābhyantaram kāraṇam iti. Also see *Māṭharavṛtti* on the same kārikā.
21. Cf. *Tattvakaumudī* on kārikā 33: tadyathā - nadīpūrabhedād abhūd vṛṣṭiḥ; asti dhūmād agnir iha naganikuñje, asaty upaghātake pīplīkāṇḍasañcaraṇād bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭir iti, tadanurūpāś ca saṅkalpābhimānādhyavasāya bhavanti.
22. Cf. *Gaudapāda-bhāṣya* on kārikā 33: sāmpratākālam. śrotam vartamānam eva śabdam śṛṇoti nātītam na ca bhaviṣyantam, cakṣur api vartamānam rūpam paśyati nātītam nā 'nāgatam, tvag vartamānam sparśam, jihvā vartamānam rasam, nāsikā vartamānam gandham nātītanāgatam ceti evam karmendriyāṇi, vāg vartamānam śabdam uccārayati nātītam nā 'nāgatam ca, pāṇi vartamānam ghaṭam ādadate nātītam anāgatam ca, pāḍau vartamānam panthānam viharato nātītam nāpy anāgatam, pāyūpasthau ca vartamānāv utsargānandau kuruto nātītau nā 'nāgatau. evam bāhyam kāraṇam sāmpratākālam uktam. Also see *Māṭharavṛtti* on the same kārikā.
23. Cf. *Tattvakaumudī* on kārikā 33: vartamānasamīpam anāgatam atītam api vartamānam.
24. Cf. *Laghusiddhānta-kaumudī*, sūtra 767: vartamānasamīpye vartamānavad vā / 3.3.131 /.
25. Cf. *Tattvakaumudī* on kārikā 33: kālaś ca Vaiśeṣikābhīmata eko na anāgatādivyavahārabhedam pravartayitum arhati. tasmād ayam yair upādhibhedair anāgatādibhedam pratipadyate. Also cf. Musalagaonkar (1971), p. 209.10: svasya svabhedajana-katvābhāvāt.
26. Cf. *Tattvakaumudī*, *ibid.*: santu ta evopādhyāḥ, ye 'nāgatādivyavahārahetavaḥ, kṛtam atrāntargaḍunā kāleneti Sāṅkhyācāryāḥ, tasmān na kālarūpatattvāntarābhyupagama iti.

27. Dasgupta (1975), vol. I, p. 311. Also cp. *Siddhāntabindu*: dikkālau tu aprāmānikatvād noktau, ākāśasyaiva digvyavahārajana-katvasāmbhavāt, diśaḥ śrotam iti śruteś ca. kālas tu avidyā eva, tasyā eva sarvādhāratvāt. (quoted by Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, 1977, p. 105, fn. 1).
28. Dikkālāv ākāśādibhyaḥ.
29. tattadupādhibhedād ākāśam eva dikkālaśabdavācyam. tasmād ākāśe 'ntarbhūtau.
30. See Garbe (1892), p. 96; Satyavrat Sastri (1963), p. 193.
31. Cf. *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* on kārikā II.12: nityau yau dikkālau tāv ākāśaprakṛtibhūtau prakṛter guṇaviśeṣāv eva. ato dikkālayor vibhutvopapattih.
32. Cf. *ibid.*: yau tu khaṇḍadikkālau tau tu tattadupādhisamyogād ākāśād utpadyete ity arthaḥ.
33. Cf. *ibid.*: ādiśabdenopādhiprahaṇād iti. yady api tattadupādhi-viśiṣṭākāśam eva khaṇḍadikkālau tathāpi viśiṣṭasyātirikṭābhyupagamavādena.
34. IP, vol. II, p. 277.
35. Sen (1968), p. 414.
36. Keith (1949), pp. 121-122.
37. Sen (1968), p. 415.
38. na kālayogato vyāpino nityasya sarvasambandhāt.
In spite of Vācaspati's above protest "against the hypostatizing of a real Time, the Sāṅkhya, as a matter of fact, does not go beyond the problems and constructions of the 'Substantialists', Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsakas, etc. The distinction of eternal and created Time is retained in the form that the former becomes an attribute (guṇaviśeṣa) of the prakṛti, while the latter is reduced to ākāśa as the motion of the Sun and of the planets. The Sāṅkhyas also do not dismiss the conception of Time as the general cause." Schayer (1938), p. 13. "It is not denied", Schayer continues, "that Time (just as Space, karma, etc.) possesses param kāraṇatvaṃ sāmānyarūpeṇa; what is denied is only that it is a special cause, an asādhāraṇakāraṇa". - *Ibid.*, fn. 2. Further, he disagrees with Garbe (*Die Sāṅkhya Philosophie*, 1917, p. 168) and says: "A true estimate would rather be just the opposite, i.e. that the Classical Sāṅkhya manifested strikingly little interest in the Time-problem and that, apart from the negation of Time as a separate substance, it confined itself to copying the views of the rejected kālavāda." - *Ibid.*, p. 14.
39. Translation by Nandalal Sinha (1974), p. 31.
40. *Ibid.*

41. B.M.P. Sinha (1976), p. 86, fn. 2.
42. p. 96.21-22: sa ca mūrtipratyayābhyāṃ mahataḥ sthūlataḥ kasmāt ? avibhāgāt, vibhāganīṣpatteḥ kālādivat.
Also cp. ibid., p. 91.19: sa tu deśamahatvāt kālamahatvāc ca mahān.
43. Cf. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 9:
asadakaranād upādānagrahanāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt /
śaktasya śakyakaranāt, kāranabhāvāc ca sat kāryam //
44. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 27.5: sūkṣmānām mūrtilābhaḥ kāryam.
Also cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, *Tattvavaiśārādī* and *Yogavārtika* on *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.13.
45. Cf. ibid. on *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.14.
46. Cf. *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.14: śāntoditāvyapadeśyadharmānupātī dharmī.
47. Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 305.16: śāntā ye kṛtvā vyāpārānuparatāḥ.
48. Cf. ibid.: savyāpārā uditāḥ.
49. Cf. *Tattvavaiśārādī*, p. 293.5ff; *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 305.15ff.
50. Cp. *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* on the sūtra, I.91: satkāryavādinām hy atītādikam api svarūpato 'stīti. Also cp. *Yoga-sūtra*, 4.12, and its commentaries thereon.
51. Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 290.23-24: bhūtendriyeṣu dharmapariṇāmo lakṣaṇapariṇāmo 'vasthāpariṇāmaś coktaḥ.
52. Cf. ibid., p. 292.26-27: avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmani-vṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāmaḥ.
53. Cf. *Tattvavaiśārādī*, p. 297.7-8: dharmāśabdasya āśritatvena dharmalakṣaṇāvasthāvācakaḥ.
54. Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 290.25: vyutthānanirodhayor dharmayor abhibhavaprādurbhāvau dharmiṇi dharmapariṇāmaḥ.
Also cp. *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.9a.
In nirodha the change is not experienced, but it does not mean that there is no change. Since the guṇas are always active, the absence of change even for a moment is impossible.
55. Cf. *Tattvavaiśārādī*, p. 293.5: lakṣyate 'neneti lakṣaṇam kālabhedāḥ.
56. Cf. ibid., p. 293.5ff; *Yoga-sūtra*, 4.12, and its commentaries thereon.
57. Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 291.6-7: nirodhasaṃskārā balavanto bhavanti durbalā vyutthānasaṃskārā iti. eṣa dharmānām avasthāpariṇāmaḥ.
58. Dasgupta (1974), p. 117.

59. 3.52: kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ saṁyamād vivekajaṁ jñānam.
60. For a comparative study of atom according to Veda Vyāsa, Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu, see Dasgupta (1974A), p. 43.
61. Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 383.11-13: yathākarsaparyantaṁ dravyaṁ paramānur evaṁ paramākarsaparyantaḥ kālah kṣaṇaḥ. yāvataḥ vā samayena calitaḥ paramānuḥ pūrvadeśaṁ jahyād uttaradeśaṁ upasampadyeta sa kālah kṣaṇaḥ.
62. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 383.13-16: tatpravāhāvicchedas tu kramaḥ. kṣaṇatatkramayor nāsti vastusamāhāra iti buddhisamāhāro muhūrtāhorātrādayaḥ. sa khalv ayaṁ kālo vastuśūnyo buddhinirmānaḥ śabdajñānānupātī laukikānāṁ vyutthitadarśanānāṁ vastusvarūpa ivāvabhāṣate.
63. See K.C. Bhattacharya (1956), vol. I, p. 170.
64. Cf. *Yoga-sūtra* 1.9: śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ.
65. Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 383.17-21: kṣaṇas tu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī. kramaś ca kṣaṇānantaryātmā. taṁ kālavidaḥ kāla ity ācakṣate yoginaḥ. na ca dvau kṣaṇau saha bhavataḥ. kramaś ca na dvayoḥ sahabhavoḥ, asaṁbhavāt, pūrvasmād uttarasya bhāvino yadānantaryam kṣaṇasya sa kramaḥ. tasmād vartamāna evaikāḥ kṣaṇo na pūrvottarakṣaṇaḥ santīti. tasmān nāsti tatsamāhāraḥ.
66. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 383.21-22: ye tu bhūtabhāvinaḥ kṣaṇās te pariṇāmān-vitā vyākhyeyāḥ.

CHAPTER III

Semi-realistic and Atomistic Notion of Time in Jainism¹

Time as a Substance

Jainism, like Buddhism, is a heterodox system of Indian philosophy denying the authority of the *Vedas*. It is a realistic and pluralistic system which is divided into two sects: Śvetāmbara (white robed) and Digambara (sky-clad or nude). Though practices differ, the doctrinal differences between the two sections are comparatively trivial.² According to the Jaina cosmology, the whole universe consists of six substances (dravya) - soul (jīva), matter (pudgala),³ medium of motion (dharma),⁴ medium of rest (adharmā),⁵ space (ākāśa)⁶ and time (kāla).⁷ Some Jain scholars do not ascribe reality to time. They think that it is nothing but only a paryāya or mode of other substances.⁸

Further, the six substances are considered as ultimate reals. According to the Jaina metaphysical doctrine of manifoldness (anekāntavāda), there are not only many (aneka) reals, but each real has manifoldness or inherent complexity. The definition of substance depends on our standpoint (see IP, vol. I, p. 312). Sat (isness, beingness) is the characteristic of a substance.⁹ It means that it is the common characteristic of all substances. It possesses becoming (utpāda), disappearance (vyaya) and persistence (dhrauvya).¹⁰ These form the triple nature of a real. Substance again is defined as that which undergoes modifications¹¹ having its permanent substantiality unchanged. It persists through its own qualities (guṇa) and modifications (paryāya). Paryāya is subject to change, while guṇa is not so. For example, gold may exist in various forms, which are paryāyas and liable to change, but its qualities of malleability and yellowness do not change.

Substances are divided into two broad categories - Jīva and ajīva. Jīva is that which knows and perceives all objects, desires pleasure and dreads pain, acts beneficially or harmfully, and experiences the fruit of its actions.¹² Thus Jīva has consciousness, while ajīva does not have this characteristic, but it has structure, colour, taste, touch, smell and sound.¹³ "Jīva and ajīva", as Radhakrishnan observes, "do not correspond to I and not-I. It is an objective classification of things in the universe that underlies the distinction of jīva and ajīva. Animate beings are composed of soul and body, and their souls being distinct from matter are eternal."¹⁴ Ajīva is classified into two groups - that which has form (mūrta), and qualities, such as matter (pudgala), and the rest, such as dharma, adharma, ākāśa and time, are without form (amūrta).¹⁵ Again, of the six substances jīva, pudgala, dharma, adharma and ākāśa are said to be astikāya (corporeal). They are eternal, uncreated and of enormous magnitude.¹⁶ Astikāya means that which occupies space-points (pradeśa)¹⁷ and is thus called astikāya. These astikāyas have an essential nature, but they expose themselves through their various qualities and modes of existence. They are the constituent parts of all phenomena.¹⁸ They are called 'asti' because they exist, and they are called 'kāyas' as they have many pradeśas. Hence, they are said to be astikāyas.¹⁹ But time is not astikāya. It has existence, but is not corporeal, because it does not have pradeśas. Jīva, pudgala, dharma, adharma, and ākāśa have many pradeśas, because they consist of minute indivisible parts or atoms. These parts are not separate from each other, rather they are a conglomeration. The substances are said to occupy more than one pradeśas. But, on the contrary, time consists of such indivisible parts which are never mixed up. Therefore, every such part occupies a certain pradeśa. That is why time is said to have only one pradeśa, while other substances are of many pra-

deśas. Actually, kāya means that which has many pradeśas. Hence, this is the reason why time is not considered as an astikāya.²⁰

One may raise an objection that every indivisible part of time is said to occupy an independent pradeśa, so it possesses only one pradeśa. In the same way each particle of other substances occupies one pradeśa, thus each of these substances can be said to have only one pradeśa. The reply is that a particle of matter has the characteristic of being combined with other particles of matter, or aggregates (skandha), which have more than one pradeśas. Thus a particle of matter may be said to have many pradeśas. And as we have seen that that which has many pradeśas is called astikāya. But the time-particle does not have this characteristic of combining in the same way. That is why it is called an-astikāya (not astikāya).

Again, a substance is either active (sakriya) or passive (nişkriya). If it possesses causal activity, it is sakriya; and if there is no causal activity in it, it is nişkriya. According to this classification jīva and pudgala are sakriya, because they are found active under certain conditions. The rest - dharma, adharma, space and time - are not active.²¹ Pūjyapāda (6th century A.D.), the author of the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, also maintains that time is not active.²² Now the question arises: If these substances are not active, how does their appearance (utpāda), which is one of the three characteristics of a substance, become possible? And when appearance is not possible, disappearance (vyaya) must also be impossible. To this Pūjyapāda answers that it is not so. The appearance of the characteristics of origination (utpāda), etc. in these substances are admitted in a different way. In all the six substances there is a common attribute called aguru-laghu (individuality) "by means of which a substance never loses its own essential attributes and never requires the peculiar and essential attributes of any other substance."²³ And this attribute of individuality occurs at every instant. "It is due to this sort of change that we can

attribute rise (utpāda), decay (vyaya) and continuity (dhrauvya) to all the substances, and these alterations are called natural modifications (svabhāva paryāya)."²⁴

Time is said to be of twofold: Absolute time (paramārtha kāla, or dravya kāla, or niścaya kāla) and Relative time (vyavahāra kāla, or samaya).

Absolute Time

Time, according to Jainism, is the instrumental cause of all modifications in the rest of five substances. Birth, growth and decay of things are possible only because of this time. Jāinas are realists and they admit the reality of change; so they also recognise time as real. Time is known by inference from the modifications in the astikāyas, i.e., the other five substances.²⁶ The function of time is to assist these substances in their continued existence (vartanā), modification (pariṇāma), activity (kriyā), temporal priority (paratva) and temporal posteriority (aparatva).²⁷ Of these functions the first one, (continued existence, or vartanā) is caused by absolute time and the remaining three functions are caused by relative time.²⁸

The Concept of Continuity (vartanā)

The existence of real time (dravya kāla) is established by vartanā (continuity). Vartanā is the perception of the existence of a substance observed from modifications in it at every moment.²⁹ Each of the six substances has its different modes. The substancehood of a substance persists throughout its various modes - utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya. This continuity of the substancehood amidst different modifications in indivisible time period is called vartanā.³⁰ Vartanā, Akalaṅkadeva (720-780 A.D.) says, is known through inference like cooking.³¹ For instance, when we start cooking

rice, we find that after some time it is in cooked condition. During this period the rice undergoes modifications at every moment of time, but still the essence of rice continues to be the same, unchanged, and this continuity is *vartanā*.³² Analysing this continuity, we arrive at two conclusions - (i) incessant changes in a substance and (ii) persistence of the essence of a substance throughout these changes in its modes in an infinite time-period. The former gives the notion of relative time and the latter that of absolute time. Thus *vartanā* leads us to infer the existence of substantive time. Absolute time helps the changes, i.e. the perpetual changes of attribute at every moment, in the substances.³³ It is actually an instrumental cause only; just as "the stone under a potter's wheel assists in the movement of the wheel. The stone here does not impart motion to the wheel, but without this stone such a kind of motion would not have been possible."³⁴ Substances exist by themselves with their modes, and time conditions the changes in things. Being the condition of these changes does not oppose its characteristic of inactivity, as it is simply an accompanying cause.³⁵

Now we have to see as to what extent time is a substance, according to the Jaina philosophers. We have already described above that a substance possesses three characteristics - origination (*utpāda*), decay (*vyaya*) and continuity (*dhrauvya*).³⁶ It also possesses the qualities (*guṇa*) and capacity of modification (*paryāya*).³⁷ Continuity (*dhrauvya*) in time is part of the latter's own inherent nature and is self-caused. *Utpāda* and *vyaya* have external causes, but in case of time they are self-caused, because of the quality of individuality (*agurulaghu*)³⁸ in it. It has both ordinary (*sādhāraṇa*) and extraordinary (*asādhāraṇa*) qualities. Causality of continuity (*vartanāhetutva*) is an extraordinary quality, while unconsciousness (*acetanatva*), formlessness (*amūrtatva*), infinitesimality (*sukṣmatva*) and

individuality (agurulaghu), etc. are ordinary qualities of time.³⁹ Thus, we see that time is an independent substance.

The Atomistic Characteristic of Time

Unlike the Śvetāmbaras, the Digambaras maintain that absolute time consists of instants or extremely small points of time (kālāṇu).⁴⁰ These atoms have no colour, taste, smell or touch.⁴¹ They are discrete and never mixed up like a heap of jewels.⁴² Each particle of time occupies a separate space-point (lokākāśa). This is the unique characteristic of time, which distinguishes it from the other five substances. It has no extensive magnitude (kāyatva). This extensive magnitude is called horizontal extension (tiriyaka pracaya), but time has only vertical extension (urdha pracaya).

A. Chakravartinayanar writes:

"When the simple elements, say, the points are so arranged in a series where each term is an item also in another series we must have the two dimensional series which will correspond to surface or extension. Wherever there is such a Tiriyaka Pracaya we have Astikāya. But time or kāla has only Urdha Pracaya. The elements are in a forward direction. The series is mono-dimensional or linear order. Therefore kāla has no extension either directly or indirectly. Hence it is not an Astikāya. Though it is not an Astikāya, it is distinctly a real entity which accounts for changes in other things."⁴³

To Jainas, unlike the Vaiśeṣikas, time is not an all-pervasive, unique and whole substance, rather it is atomic. Prabhācandra (980-1065 A.D.)⁴⁴ rejects the Vaiśeṣika notion of one absolute time.⁴⁵

Relative Time

This form of time, i.e. time from the ordinary point of view, is measured by different changes.⁴⁶ Actually it is a paryāya (modification) of real time (dravya kāla). We can say that absolute time is the substantial cause (utpāda kāraṇa) of relative time. The latter consists of

short or long durations, such as hours, minutes, seconds. Further, it is of three kinds - the past, present and future. The number of the time-atoms in the past is equal to the number of the liberated souls multiplied by numerable winks (āvalis)⁴⁷. "The present is one instant. The future practical time is infinite times (the total of all) souls and all matter (substances)."⁴⁸ Umāsvāti (5th-6th century A.D.) says that time has an infinite number of samayas.⁴⁹ The samaya is the smallest unit of time. It is the time taken by an atom of matter in moving from one space-point to another.⁵⁰

Measurement of Time

Kirfel provides a comprehensive list of measurements of time according to the Śvetāmbara school as follows:⁵¹

The smallest unit of time is the samaya	
Infinite number of samayas =	1 Āvalikā (Āvaliā)
Numerous Āvalikās =	1 Ucchvāsa (Ussāsa) [or Niḥsvāsa] ⁵²
1 Ucchvāsa + 1 Niḥsvāsa =	1 Prāṇa (Pāna)
7 Prāṇas =	1 Stoka (Thova)
7 Stokas =	1 Lava
38.1/2 Lavas =	1 Nālikā (Nāliā)
77 Lavas = 2 Nālikās =	
539 Stokas = 3773 Prāṇas =	1 Muhūrta (Muhutta)
30 Muhūrtas =	1 Ahorātra (Ahoratta)
15 Ahorātras =	1 Pakṣa (Pakkha)
2 Pakṣas =	1 Māsa
2 Māsas =	1 Rtu (Uū)
3 Rtus =	1 Ayana (Ayaṇa)
2 Ayanas =	1 Saṁvatsara (Saṁvacchara)
5 Saṁvatsaras =	1 Yuga (Jua = 5 years)

20 Yugas	= 1 Varṣaśata (Vāśasaya = 100 years)
10 Varṣaśatas	= 1 Varṣasahasra (Vāśasahassa = 1000 years)
100 Varṣasahasras	= 1 Varṣaśatasahasra (Vasasayasahassa = 100 000 years)
84 Varṣaśatasahasras	= 1 Pūrvāṅga (Puvvaṅga = 8400000 years)
8400000 Pūrvāṅgas	= 1 Pūrva (Puvva = 8400000 ² years)
8400000 Pūrvas	= 1 Tuṭitāṅga (Tudīaṅga = 8400000 ³ years)
8400000 Tuṭitāṅgas	= 1 Tuṭita (Tudīa = 8400000 ⁴ years)
8400000 ² Tuṭitas	= 1 Aḍaḍa (= 8400000 ⁶ years)
8400000 ² Aḍaḍas	= 1 Avava (= 8400000 ⁸ years)
8400000 ² Avavas	= 1 Hūhuka (Hūhua = 8400000 ¹⁰ years)
8400000 ² Hūhukas	= 1 Utpala (Uppala = 8400000 ¹² years)
8400000 ² Utpalas	= 1 Padma (Pauma = 8400000 ¹⁴ years)
8400000 ² Padmas	= 1 Nalina (Naliṅa = 8400000 ¹⁶ years)
8400000 ² Nalinas	= 1 Arthanipūra (Atthiniūra = 8400000 ¹⁸ years)
8400000 ² Arthanipūras	= 1 Ayuta (Aua = 8400000 ²⁰ years)
8400000 ² Ayutas	= 1 Prayuta (Paua = 8400000 ²² years)
8400000 ² Prayutas	= 1 Nayuta (Naua = 8400000 ²⁴ years)
8400000 ² Nayutas	= 1 Cūlika (Cūlia = 8400000 ²⁶ years)
8400000 ² Cūlikas	= 1 Śīrṣaprahelika (Śīsapahelia = 8400000 ²⁸ years)

The *Trailokyadīpikā* and the *Trailokyasāra* give a different list of measurements of time, according to the Digambaras, which differs from Pūrvāṅga onwards:

1 Pūrvāṅga (Puvvaṅga)	= 8400000 years
1 Pūrva (Puvva)	= 8400000 ² = 7056 with 10 zeroes years
1 Parvāṅga (Pavvaṅga)	= 8400000 ² x 84 = 592704 with 10 zeroes years

1 Parva (Pavva)	= $8400000^3 \times 84 = 49787136$ with 15 zeroes years
1 Nayutāṅga (Naudaṅga)	= $8400000^3 \times 84^2 = 4182119424$ with 15 zeroes, etc. years
1 Nayuta (Nauda)	= $8400000^4 \times 84^2$ years
1 Kumudāṅga (Kumudaṅga)	= $8400000^4 \times 84^3$ "
1 Kumuda	= $8400000^5 \times 84^3$ "
1 Padmāṅga (Paumaṅga)	= $8400000^5 \times 84^4$ "
1 Padma (Pauma)	= $8400000^6 \times 84^4$ "
1 Nalināṅga (Naliṅga)	= $8400000^6 \times 84^5$ "
1 Nalina (Naliṅga)	= $8400000^7 \times 84^5$ "
1 Kamalāṅga (Kamalaṅga)	= $8400000^7 \times 84^6$ "
1 Kamala	= $8400000^8 \times 84^6$ "
1 Tudidāṅga (Tudiṅga)	= $8400000^8 \times 84^7$ "
1 Tudida (Tudia)	= $8400000^9 \times 84^7$ "
1 Aḍaḍāṅga (Aḍaḍaṅga)	= $8400000^9 \times 84^8$ "
1 Aḍaḍa	= $8400000^{10} \times 84^8$ "
1 Amamāṅga (Amamaṅga)	= $8400000^{10} \times 84^9$ "
1 Amama	= $8400000^{11} \times 84^9$ "
1 Hāhāhūhūṅga	= $8400000^{11} \times 84^{10}$ "
1 Hāhāhūhū	= $8400000^{12} \times 84^{10}$ "
1 Vidyullatāṅga (Vidulataṅga)	= $8400000^{12} \times 84^{11}$ "
1 Vidyullatā (Vidulata)	= $8400000^{13} \times 84^{11}$ "
1 Latāṅga (Lataṅga)	= $8400000^{13} \times 84^{12}$ "
1 Latā	= $8400000^{14} \times 84^{12}$ "
1 Mahālatāṅga (Mahālayaṅga)	= $8400000^{14} \times 84^{13}$ "
1 Mahālatā	= $8400000^{15} \times 84^{13}$ "
1 Śīrṣaparakampita (Śīsapakampia)	= $8400000^{15} \times 84^{14}$ "
1 Hastapraheli (Hatthapa- helia)	= $8400000^{16} \times 84^{14}$ "
1 Acalātmaka (Acalappa)	= $8400000^{16} \times 84^{15}$ "

The biggest unit of time in Jainism is the Mahākālpa, which consists of two aeons - Avasarpinī and Utsarpinī, the aeons of increase and decrease, or of unwinding and rewinding of the universe respectively. Each aeon consists of 413 452 630 308 203 177 749 512 192 x 10⁵⁰ (77 digits) solar years,⁵⁴ and each aeon has six ages.

Further, another immense period of time, according to the Jaina system, is the Vyavahārapalya. This is said to be the time taken when a circular receptacle of one yojana⁵⁵ diameter filled tightly with fine human hairs of the length which, in a normal adult would grow in seven days, is emptied by taking out one hair every hundred years.⁵⁶

Innumerable Vyavahārapalyas = 1 Uddhārapalya

Innumerable Uddhārapalyas = 1 Addhāpalya

10 x (crore x crore) of
Addhāpalyas or 10 x 10¹⁴
of Addhāpalyas = 1 Sāgar⁵⁷

The six ages of the Avasarpinī are:⁵⁸

(1) Sukhamāsukhamā	= 4 x (1 crore x 1 crore) of Sāgaras
	= 4 x 10 ¹⁴ of Sāgaras
(2) Sukhamā	= 3 x 10 ¹⁴ " "
(3) Sukhamāduḥkhamā	= 2 x 10 ¹⁴ " "
(4) Duḥkhamāsukhamā	= 1 x 10 ¹⁴ " " minus 42 000 years
(5) Duḥkhamā	= 21 000 years
(6) Duḥkhamāduḥkhamā	= 21 000 years
<hr/>	
Total	= 10 x 10 ¹⁴ Sāgaras or 1 Daśakoḍākoḍī Sāgar

To sum up we can say that the Jaina notion of time is atomistic as well as semi-realistic. It is atomistic in the sense that it consists of

an infinite number of atoms of time, and these atoms are never mixed up. There is no all-pervasive, single, independent and whole time. Secondly, time is a real, a substance, though it has no corporeality (kāyatva), while the other five substances have. Therefore, it is obvious that the standpoint of the Jainas regarding time is also semi-realistic.

Notes

1. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, 3.6,27,31; 5.39-40; *Tattvārthavārtika*, pp. 208.35-210.9, 221.29-222.17, 257,16ff, 476.21-484.8, 501.25-502.10; *Prameyakamalamārtanda*, pp. 564.6-568.11; *Pravacanasāra*, pp. 194.6-206.5; *Dravyasaṅgrāha*. pp. 59-68; *Dravyasaṅgrahavṛtti*, pp. 25.8-33.8; *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, pp. xxviii-xxix, kārikās 6,23-26, 107-109, 131; *Niyamasāra*, kārikās 9, 31-36; *Kālasiddhāntadarśinī*, pp. 101-105; H.S. Bhattacharya (1926), pp. 99-108, (1966), pp. 88-111; Mandal (1968), pp. 76-81; Padmarajiah (1947), pp. 111-115; G.R. Jain (1975), pp. 1-3, 51, 59, 77, 116-121, 172-177, 186-187, 198-200.
2. See Jacobi (1914), pp. 465ff.
3. Here pudgala means matter, which is quite different from the Buddhist notion of pudgala, which is personality.
4. The meaning of dharma in Jaina philosophy is completely different from what it means in other Indian philosophical systems. It is the auxiliary cause of motion. Cf. *Niyamasāra*, kārikā 30a: gamaṇanimittaṃ dhammam. It makes the motion of soul and matter possible. Actually, it does not cause motion in them, but helps them to move. Their movement without dharma would not be possible. So we can say that it is a medium of motion. Just as water is the necessary condition for the movement of fish. See *Tattvārtha-sāra* of Amṛtacandra Sūri, 3. 33-34. (Quoted by G.R. Jain, 1975, p. 15). Again, dharma is devoid of form, taste, touch, colour, smell, sound, activity, etc. and is said to be eternal. It pervades the whole universe (*Vardhamāna Purāna* of Sakalakīrti, 16.19, quoted by id., p. 15; also cf. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, kārikās 90-92, 94-96).
5. Adharma, like dharma, is regarded as all-pervasive, but it is the accompanying condition or cause of rest to soul and matter - cf. *Niyamasāra*, 30. It is also formless, inactive, eternal, etc. and has no taste, touch, colour, smell, sound, etc. It is an auxiliary cause of rest in case of soul and matter, just as the shade of a tree is for the traveller. Cf. *Vardhamāna Purāna*, 16.30 (Quoted by G.R. Jain, 1975, p. 25) - nityo 'mūrtaḥ kriyāhīnaś chāyeva pathikāṅginām.
6. "The term Ākāśa here means space not Ether as it is very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy" - *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, p. 99. It accommodates absolutely all the substances. Also cf. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, 5.18: ākāśasyāvagāhaḥ.
7. Cf. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, 5.39: kālaś ca.
8. See H.S. Bhattacharya (1966), p. 88.
9. Cf. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, 5.29: sad dravyalakṣaṇam.
10. Cf. ibid., 5.30: utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat. Here utpāda means the modification of a substance without alterations of its own essence, just as the lump of clay is transformed into a form of pitcher without any change in its substance. Vyaya is the disappearance of the previous form of a substance, just as after the formation

of a pitcher the lump of clay disappears. And dhrauvya is that characteristic of a substance which persists throughout its various modifications, just as in both the above states - as a lump of clay and as a pitcher-the substance remains the same.

Cf. *Tattvārthavārtika*, vol. II, pp. 494.32-495.5: svajātyaparityāgena bhāvāntarāvāptir utpādaḥmr̥tpindasya ghaṭaparyāyavat. tathā pūrvabhāvavigamo vyayanam vyayah yathā ghaṭotpattau piṇḍākṛteḥ. dhruveḥ sthairyakarmano dhruvatīti dhruvaḥ yathā piṇḍagha-tādyavasthāsu mr̥dādyanvayāt.

11. Cf. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5.2: paryāyair druyante dravanti vā tāni iti dravyāni. Here paryāya means mode of existence. See *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, p. xxxi.
12. Cf. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, kārikā 129.
13. Cf. *ibid.*, 133.
14. IP, vol. 1, pp.314-315.
15. Cf. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, kārikā 15b.
16. Cf. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, kārikā 4.
17. Pradeśa is that unit of space (ākāśa) which is occupied by an indivisible atom of matter (pudgala) and is capable of being occupied by any atom of any kind. In such a pradeśa of ākāśa one pradeśa of dharma, one pradeśa of adharma, one particle of time and a number of material atoms may be accommodated. Cf. *Tattvārtha-sāra*, 3.25-26 (Quoted in *Dravyasaṅgraha*, p. 70).
18. Cf. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, kārikā 15.
19. Cf. *ibid.*, kārikā 25.
20. Cf. Brahmadeva's commentary on *ibid.*, kārikās 24-25.
21. Cf. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, kārikā 98.
22. Cf. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5.7: kālasy āpi sakriyatvam iti cet, na.
23. Cf. *Gommaṭsāra-jīva-kāṇḍa*, kārikā 569; *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5.7.
24. Cf. Commentary on the *Gommaṭasāra-jīva-kāṇḍa*, kārikā 569.
25. Cf. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, kārikā 21.
26. Cf. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, p. 21.
27. Cf. *Tattvārthasiddhi*, 5.22.
28. Cf. commentary on *ibid.*
29. Cf. *Tattvārthavārtika*, vol. II, p. 477.3.
30. Akalaṅkadeva (720-780 A.D.) puts the same idea as follows: ekasminn avibhāgini samaye dharmādīni dravyāni ṣaḍ api svaparyāyair

ādimadanādimadbhir utpādavyayadhrauvyavikalpair vartanta iti kṛtvā tad viṣayā vartanā - ibid., p. 477.8-10.

31. Cf. ibid., p. 477.11: sā ānumānikī vyavahārikadarśanāt, pākavat.
32. Supra, fn. 30.
33. Cf. Brahmadeva's commentary on the *Dravyasaṅgraha*, kārikā 21: vartanālakṣaṇaś ca paramārthakāla.
34. Ibid., p. 60.
35. Cf. *Tattvārtha-sāra*, 3.83 (Quoted by H.S. Bhattacharya, 1966, p. 101).
36. Cf. *Pravacanasāra*, 2.50-52.
37. Cf. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5.39: 'Utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat' 'guṇa-paryāyavad dravyam' iti ca. Also see *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, 5.38.
38. Cf. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5.39.
39. Ibid.
40. Cf. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, kārikā 22 and Akalaṅka's commentary thereon; also cf. *Tattvārtha-sāra*, 3.44 and *Vardhamāna Purāṇa*, 16.35 (Quoted by G.R. Jain, 1975, p. 173).
41. Cf. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, 5.4.
42. Cf. *Tattvārtha-sāra*, 3.44; *Vardhamāna Purāṇa*, 16.35.
43. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, Introduction, p.xxviii-xxix. Also cf. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Hindi commentary, 5.39; and *Pravacanasāra*, 2.49.
44. According to M.K. Shastri (*Prameyakamala Mārtaṇḍa*, Introduction, p. 67).
45. Ibid., pp. 564-568.
46. Cf. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, kārikā 107.
47. One āvali is the twinkling of an eye. Cf. *Gommaṭasāra-jīva-kāṇḍa*, 578 and commentary thereupon:

"In every period of 6 months and 8 instants, 608 souls leave the primitive common, or Nitya Nigoda, condition; and the same number of souls enter the abode of liberation from 2 1/2 continents.

The number of Siddhas or liberated souls is infinite part of the total of all the souls (mundane and liberated). 6 months and 8 samayas being reduced to Āvalis and divided by 608 would be the numerable Āvali mentioned in the gāthā.

It would be noticed that numerable Āvalis in the Gāthā are constant. They do not vary. They represent the average time for one soul to attain liberation. The number of liberated souls increases every 6 months and 8 instants by 608. This explains the ever-increasing-length of past time by the constant number of Āvalis."

48. Ibid., kārikā 579 (Jaini's rendering).
49. Cf. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, 5.40.
50. Cf. *Gommaṭasāra-jīva-kāṇḍa*, 573.
51. See Kirfel (1967), pp. 337-339; also see Glasenapp (1964), pp. 154-155. Also cf. *Tattvārthavārtika*, 3.30; *Gommaṭasāra-jīva-kāṇḍa*, 574-576.
52. Cf. *Tattvārthavārtika*, 3.38.
53. It is according to the Digambara school, see Kirfel (1967), pp. 338-339.
54. The Brahma-kalpa of Hindus also consists of 77 digits, but the numbers are not the same. See G.R. Jain (1975), p. 176.
55. Yojana "is a particular measure of distance, sometimes regarded as equal to 4 or 5 English miles, but more correctly = 4 krośas or about 9 miles; according to some = 8 krośas" or 18 miles - Monier-Williams (1974), p. 858, column 1. Kirfel (1967, p. 337) also provides the measures of distance according to the Jaina system. According to the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, 3.9:

1 big Yojana	= 2000 krośas (kosas)
	= 4500 miles
1 small Yojana	= 4 krośas (kosas)
	= 9 miles

56. According to Kirfel (1967, p. 339) it is a Palyopama.
57. See *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, p. 83.
58. Also cf. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 3.27. Kirfel (1967, p. 339) gives the names of the 6 ages as follows:

1. Suṣamasuṣamā (susamasusamā)
2. Suṣamā (susamā)
3. Suṣamaduṣamā (susamadussamā)
4. Duṣamasuṣamā (dussamasusamā)
5. Duṣamā (dussamā)
6. Duṣamaduṣamā (dussamadussamā)

"We are now in the Duhkhamā or the 5th age (pañcamakāla); this began in about 523 B.C., i.e. 3 years 8 1/2 months after the liberation of Lord Mahāvīra and its total duration is 21,000 years" - *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, p. 89.

CHAPTER IV

The Concept of Time in Pali Buddhism.¹

In writing this chapter we have consulted as many Pali texts as possible including both canonical as well as non-canonical irrespective of their systematic order. It is really an arduous task to collate all the Pali texts in order to find the passages dealing with the concept of time. Only a few of them, which are actually vast in number, have been found useful for our purpose. These are: *Dīghanikāya*, *Majjhimanikāya*, *Samyuttanikāya*, *Aṅgutṭaranikāya*, *Dhammasaṅgani*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Paṭṭhāna*, *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Atthakathā*, *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, *Aṭṭhasālinī*, *Milindapaṇha*, etc. Of these only four, i.e. *Kathāvatthu*, *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Atthakathā*, *Aṭṭhasālinī* and *Milindapaṇha*, discuss the notion of time in considerable detail.

The Theravāda Rejection of the Theory of "everything exists".

In the *Kathāvatthu*² we come across a detailed analysis of the concept of time and its three temporal distinctions, the past, present and future. The Theravādins explicitly criticise the Sabbatthivādins (Skt. Sarvāstivādins), although without having a proper understanding of the latter's doctrines, which are discussed comprehensively in the next chapter.

The Sabbatthivādins propound the doctrine of "sabbam atthi" which means "everything exists". Prima facie it seems that the emphasis is laid upon the subject of this proposition "sabbam", but the context shows that the emphasis is really on the predicate "atthi" ('exists' or 'is').³ Now the question is: What does "everything" mean? This does not mean that the Sabbatthivādins believe in the continued existence of everything,⁴ the existence of soul (ātman) or any universal permanent cause like Brahman


of Vedic and Upaniṣadic tradition. Actually, "everything" means 75 dharmas, or 12 āyatanas, or 18 dhātus irrespective of their temporal status.⁵ The *Saṃyuttanikāya*⁶ defines "sabbam" (everything, all) as eye and form, ear and sound, nose and smell, tongue and taste, body and touch, mind and mental attitudes. At the same time it suggests that if someone rejecting this definition claims to teach another 'all', "it would be mere talk on his part, and when questioned he could not make good his boast, and further would come to an ill pass. Why so ? Because, brethren, it would be beyond his scope to do so."⁷ Buddhaghosa⁸ (1st half of 5th century) thinks that the doctrine of the Sabbatthivāda was propounded in some passages of the Sutta-piṭaka, such as: O monk, whatever is material form (rūpa), past, present or future ... Whatever is feeling (vedanā), past, present or future ... Whatever is perception (saññā), past, present or future ... Whatever is kammic formation (saṅkhāra), past, present or future ... Whatever is consciousness (viññāna), past, present or future ...,⁹ "'all phenomena, past, present, future', 'persist in that state, and therefore all go on existing'".¹⁰

If "everything exists", then the question arises¹¹ whether everything exists everywhere (sabbattha),¹² always (sabbadā),¹³ in every manner (sabbena sabbam),¹⁴ in everything (sabbesu),¹⁵ in separate or disjunct form (ayoga).¹⁶ If it is so, even the non-existent¹⁷ thing (yaṃ pi natthi) exists, which is an impossibility and an absurd idea. Further, if "everything" is taken in temporal sense, it can be implied that the three temporal distinctions, the past, present and future, exist independently.¹⁸ But according to the definition, the past is that which has ceased, gone away, changed, and the future is that which is not yet come, not yet born, so how can we say "the past exists", or "the future exists"?¹⁹ At the same time the present is that which has not ceased, not gone, not changed.²⁰ This means the present is that which exists. If the past and future also

exist, they have the characteristics of present, i.e. not ceased, not gone, not changed.²¹ Therefore, the past and future are present. This result can be deduced from the following categorical syllogism and can be illustrated valid according to the Venn diagram:²²

All Existents are Present All Past are Existents <hr style="width: 100%;"/>	
∴ All Past are Present	
Or, All M is P All S is M <hr style="width: 100%;"/>	where S = subject term P = predicate term M = middle term
∴ All S is P	
Or, $M \bar{P} = 0$ $S \bar{M} = 0$ <hr style="width: 100%;"/>	
∴ $S \bar{P} = 0$	

Now the above syllogism is valid if and only if the two premises imply or entail the conclusion. This is illustrated as follows in the Venn diagram:



We can apply some other methods also to criticise the Sabbatthivādins in this respect.

(1) (x) (Qx ⊃ Rx)	where, Px = x is past df
(x) (Px ⊃ ~ Rx)	Qx = x exists df
∴ (x) (Qx ⊃ ~ Px)	Rx = x is present df

Or, existence implies non-past.

Or, by transposition²⁴

$$(x) (\sim\sim Px \supset \sim Qx)$$

Or, equivalently

$$(x) (Px \supset \sim Qx)$$

i.e. past does not imply any existence.

Again,²⁵

$$(2) \quad (x) (Qx \supset \sim Px)$$

$$Qa$$

$$\therefore \sim Pa$$

and

$$(x) (Qx \supset \sim Px)$$

$$\sim \sim Pa$$

$$\therefore \sim Qa$$

This demonstrates that whenever there is existence, there is no past; and whenever there is past, there is no existence. In other words, both cannot go side by side. The same arguments can be placed against the proposition 'the future exists'. Thus, the Theravādins succeed in criticising the reality of the past and future.

Buddhaghosa remarks that in the expressions 'the past exists' and 'the future exists', the reference is made exclusively to the notion of time.²⁶ It follows that the Sabbatthivādins admit an independent reality of time as well as its three segments, the past, present and future, which are criticised by the Theravādins.

C.A.F. Rhys Davids²⁷ informs us that the Burmese translator supplies after 'sabbam' a term which is in the Pali version "dhamma-jātam" or "dhammassa jātam": the arising or happening of dhamma or anything which exists as a fact.²⁸ She raises an intelligent question²⁹ whether "sabbam" should be understood collectively, i.e. 'all', or distributively, i.e. 'everything'. "sabbesu sabbam atthi ti",³⁰ according to the context, should be taken in the latter sense, i.e. "all exists in everything". Here it is to be noted that the subject "sabbam" is taken collectively, while the predicate "sabbesu" distributively. Further, none of the dhammas, past, present or future, abandons its khandha-sabhāva.³¹ In other words, once they originate as a dhamma they always remain as a dhamma. This means the five aggregates (khandha), material as well as psychical, to wit, matter (rūpa),³² feeling

(vedanā), perception (saññā), kammic formation (saṅkhāra) and consciousness (viññāna), although they constitute the personal life and experience differently at different times, never give up their inherent characteristics. And thus, they keep on existing all the time. This shows that the Sabbatthivādins maintain the continued existence of the dhammas.

Time and the Aggregates (khandha)

Now the Theravādins connect the time-idea with the aggregates (khandha) and raise the question whether the past, present and future material forms (rūpa) exist.³³ If the reply is in the affirmative, the above arguments will apply against them also. It is the same with the four remaining aggregates: feeling, perception, kammic formation and consciousness. The expression "atītaṃ rūpaṃ atthī ti"³⁴ (Does the past material form exist?) is used in the distributive sense of everything taking each aggregate separately. But it can also be understood in the collective sense. In the preceding proposition the word 'rūpa'³⁵ actually means 'the material aggregate' (rūpakkhandha) which comprises 28 material qualities.³⁶ Taken distributively it refers to every individual of this aggregate as well as that of four others.

Now follows an interesting discussion on time. The Theravādins assert that in the expressions³⁷ 'paccuppannaṃ ti vā rūpaṃ' and 'rūpaṃ ti vā paccuppannaṃ' if the two terms 'paccuppannaṃ' and 'rūpaṃ' are understood as identical without making any distinction (appiyaṃ karitvā) between the two,³⁸ then the Sabbatthivāda statement "the present rūpa abandons its present state after it has ceased to be" leads one to believe that "the rūpa abandons its rūpabhāva (materiality)".³⁹ Under similar conditions, i.e. paccuppanna and rūpa are identical, if the Sabbatthivādins maintain otherwise that the present rūpa does not abandon its rūpabhāva after having been ceased,

In other words, if something is said to exist through different temporal stages of the past, present and future, its continued existence will show only its presentness (referring to present time). In that case, it would be impossible to make any distinction between the three time-epochs."

then it follows that the rūpa does not abandon its present state (paccuppanabhāva).⁴⁰ The Theravādins contend that when we say 'rūpa is present', it refers to one and the same thing essentially. When the rūpa ceases to be real, it abandons its present state; and when it abandons its present state, it ceases to be real. They ascribe reality neither to the past and future rūpas, nor to the past and future time-epochs themselves. The only real is present. In other words, the reality is confined only to the present state. Again, if it is maintained that the rūpa does not abandon its materiality (rūpabhāva), it becomes permanent (nicca), constant (dhuva), eternal (sassata) and unchangeable (aviparināmadhamma), which is not correct, i.e. not in line with the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. The rūpa is actually impermanent, unstable, non-eternal and evanescent. Therefore, it is untenable to say that the rūpa does not abandon its rūpabhāva.⁴¹ The same arguments apply to the reality of the three time-distinctions as such.⁴² But here Nibbāna is maintained as permanent and eternal.⁴³

The acceptance of transition from the future to the present and then to the past raises a further question whether something having been future becomes present, and again having been present becomes past.⁴⁴ Here the emphasis is laid on 'having been' and 'becomes'. Both these terms indicate the same state of being, i.e. presentness. It is only a repetition. This means the distinction of the future, present and past does not fare better, and these three terms are identical.

← In a further discussion the Sabbatthivādins again defend their theory that "the past exists, the future exists", and in their support they quote the same passage as above from the Nikāyas:⁴⁵ "Whatever, monk, is material form, past, future or present." It follows, avow the Sabbatthivādins, that the past exists, the future exists. This view is contradicted

effectively by the Theravādins by quoting other passages from the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*⁴⁶ though "without anything more than dialectical ingenuity".⁴⁷ The gist of these passages is: the rūpa, which has ceased and changed, is called 'has been' (i.e. past). In that state it is said neither 'exists' (i.e. present) nor 'will be' (i.e. future). Secondly, the rūpa which is not yet born is called 'will be' (i.e. future). In that state it is not called 'exists' (present) or 'has been' (past). Thirdly, the rūpa which has appeared is called 'exists' (present). In this state it is not reckoned as 'has been' (past) or 'will be' (future).⁴⁸ Therefore, the Sabbatthivāda assertion "the past exists, the future exists" is irrational.

The Sabbatthivādin's "...emphasis lies on the atthi, 'doth exist', of the solemn categorical declaration in the Sutta. The Theravādin, by completing the declaration, shows that the future, so far from existing, depends entirely, for its coming-to-exist at all, on the circumstances attending the occurrence of a certain pre-requisite, or antecedent condition. Before it exists, certain conditions must have come to pass. So the Comy.: the words 'there doth exist in the future re-becoming', etc., do not amount to a 'state of existing', but refer to certainty of result, given the consummation of the conditions".⁴⁹

Now the question is: What does the past consist of? According to Buddhaghosa, the opponent (the Sabbatthivādins)⁵⁰ sustains that both the past and future exist, because "the aggregates and other factors (of our experience) retain their state (as a sort of complex self)".⁵¹ The Sabbatthivādins think that the Theravādins also accept this doctrine. If it is so, then it follows that the past and future exist. But the fact is just adverse and the latter rather explain it away on the basis of *SN.iii.71*, as we have seen above. They are at least in agreement with their opponent that the past, present and future consists of aggregates.

The Sabbatthivāda point is that if 'the present consists of aggregates' proves that the present exists, then the same logic should apply to the future and past.⁵² The Theravādins urge that these three terms should not be mixed up. They are distinct from each other as set forth in *SN.iii.71*. Thus, the Theravādins, like the Sautrāntikas, affirm that only present can be said to exist.

The Theravāda criticism of the Sabbatthivāda doctrine of 'sabbam atthi' is in no way thorough and forceful, because nowhere do they make any reference to the notion of the *kāritra*,⁵³ i.e. activity or causal-efficiency, which should be considered as the most important concept invented by the Sarvāstivādins (or the Vaibhāṣikas) in establishing their theory of "traikālyavāda".

The Kassapikas Criticised

The Kassapikas,⁵⁴ who are considered as seceders from the Sabbatthivādins, tried to compromise with the Sabbatthivādins on the one hand and the Theravādins on the other. But the former looked upon their theory "as a kind of mutilated Sarvāstivāda which failed to recognise the existence of all the past."⁵⁵ And the latter criticised them in much the similar way as they criticised the Sabbatthivādins in the preceding passages.

According to the Kassapikas, some of the past and future exist, and some of them do not. We find a similar view put forward by Vasubandhu (320-350 A.D.) in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.⁵⁶ Here it is the Vibhajyavādins. We have seen above that the past by definition is that which has ceased, gone, changed. Now the Theravāda argument is that if some

of the past exists and some does not, it follows that some of it has ceased, gone, changed and some of it has not.⁵⁷ If the above definition of the past is taken into account, the Kassapika's theory leads to self-contradiction.

Further, the Theravādins⁵⁸ bifurcate the past: (1) that which has not yet produced its effect (avipāka), i.e. that which is still replete with potentialities, and (2) that which has already produced its effect (vipāka) and is now empty. Then, they apply the same arguments to them maintaining that each of these has two aspects: existence as well as non-existence. Thus, they interpret that some of the past, which is avipāka, exists and some of it does not. In the same way, some of the past, which is vipāka, exists and some of it does not. The Kassapikas deny this. They maintain only one past with two aspects: avipāka and vipāka. They make their position clear by saying: only that past which has not discharged its effect exists, whereas that past which has discharged its effect does not exist.⁵⁹ But the Theravādins do not accept any distinction between the two aspects of past. For them past is past and according to the definition, the past in general is that which is ceased, changed, gone. Likewise, all these arguments can be placed against "some of the future exists and some of it does not".⁶⁰

According to Vasumitra (100 A.D.),⁶¹ the Kassapikas hold the following doctrines:

- (1) If the passions (kleśa) (lit. dharma) were already destroyed and if it were already fully known (by an Arhant that they have been annihilated), then they would cease to exist in him (lit. there is none): (but in case they were) not destroyed and (this was) not fully known (then their substances would continue to) exist.
- (2) If the fruits of actions (karmaphala) have already ripened, then they cease to exist: (but if these fruits) have not ripened, they (continue to) exist.

- (3) The saṃskāras come into being through causes in the past, but not through causes in the future (lit. the saṃskāras derive their causes from the past: they do not derive their causes from the future).
- (4) All the saṃskāras perish at every moment.
- (5) The śaikṣa-dharmas are (still) accompanied by (lit. have) the vipākaphalas, etc.

Some Early Schools on the Reality of the three Time-epochs

The four later schools⁶² of the Mahāsaṅghikas, Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins and Kaukkuṭikas, and the earlier Mahīśāsakas⁶³ proclaim that the past and future do exist as a substance. It is interesting to note that the later Mahāsaṅghikas, unlike the earlier Mahāsaṅghikas and the earlier Mahīśāsakas, speak of the reality of the past and future.⁶⁴ Here the past and future are considered as independently real, hence we tend not to agree with Masuda⁶⁵ that this is the same view as that of the Sarvāstivādins.

We find at least one reference⁶⁶ in the Pali sources where the independent reality (parinipphana) of the three time-epochs is admitted by some unknown adherent. It might be the Andhakas⁶⁷ as S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids⁶⁸ suggest. This theory is not without any ground. We encounter a passage in the *Aṅguttaranikāya*⁶⁹ saying:

O monks, these are the three points of controversy. What are the three? Someone, o monk, may start talking of the past time-epoch, expressing: thus, it was in the past time-epoch. (Again) O monk, someone may start talking of the future time-epoch, expressing: thus, it will be in the future time-epoch. (Lastly) O monk, someone may start talking of the present time-epoch, expressing: thus, now it is in the present time-epoch.

The Theravādins⁷⁰ just set this passage aside. They argue if it is so, the time-epochs (addhā) would have to be accepted as the aggregate (rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra and viññāṇa) and thus in each time-epoch there

will be five aggregates. It follows that there will be fifteen aggregates in total taken all the three time-epochs together. And the same case would be with 18 dhātus, and 12 āyatanas. But this is not so. All this proves that the past, present and future are not independent realities. The Theravādins do admit the reality of present, but it is not an independent entity, rather a mode of existence or existent things, and the same case is with the two other time-epochs, the past and future.

To our knowledge there is only one passage⁷¹ in which the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins are said to maintain that time is eternal (nitya). It is like a reservoir in which the saṃskāras wander from one place to another. Here the saṃskāras are taken in the sense of the saṃskṛta-dharmas which are non-eternal (anitya).⁷² It must be noted that we do not find such doctrine elsewhere ascribing to the Dārṣṭāntika or the Vibhajyavādins.

The later Mahīśāsakas profess that the essence of the predispositions (anuśaya), 5 skandhas, 12 āyatanas and 18 dhātus are always present.⁷³ Bhavya⁷⁴ (490-570 A.D.) suggests that "The anuśayas are perpetually present" is one of the fundamental teachings of the Mahīśāsakas. But he does not mention whether they are earlier or later ones. We think that in the present context they are the earlier Mahīśāsakas. This doctrine leads us to believe that the present is eternal, though as a mode of existence. The reason behind this idea is that since the anuśayas, etc. give birth to all the dharmas, they must always be present. According to a Chinese text, *I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-'shu-chi*:⁷⁵

"... the constant existence of the skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus is said to have been postulated of the 'bījas (..or seeds)' and not of the current (samudācāra) skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus. This is undoubtedly an ingenuous interpretation, because otherwise the present proposition contradicts one of the other doctrines of the Mahīśāsakas, namely the doctrine of the perpetual destruction and recreation of the saṃskāras... This interpretation is subject, however, to a serious doubt. As it is well-known, the bīja theory, i.e. the theory of the

causation of the phenomena out of the bījas, plays an important role in the later Yogācāra literature, such as the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra*, etc."⁷⁶

But it is not certain whether the later Mahīśāsakas are influenced by the bīja theory. In this regard, a striking similarity can be observed with the Sarvāstivādins, who affirm the permanent reality of the essence of the dharmas. According to Vinītadeva⁷⁷ (8th century A.D.), the disciples of the Mahīśāsaka Sect (earlier or later not mentioned) insist that neither the future, nor the past, nor the present exists. The Vibhajyavādins,⁷⁸ he continues, bring out more or less the same view as follows:

- (1) That which is past and does not belong to the things, whose fruits (phala) has not yet ripened, does not exist.
- (2) The future fruit which has not yet ripened does not exist.
- (3) The present (pratyutpanna) which is not of the same class does not exist anymore, etc.

The significant point here is that they deny the existence of the present also in some or other sense.

The Temporal Relation between the Karma and its Retribution

In their later differentiated doctrines,⁷⁹ the Mahāsaṅghikas, Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins⁸⁰ and Kaukkuṭikas, maintained the simultaneous existence of the karma and its retribution. Masuda⁸¹ observes:

"Here the word 'karmas' signifies undoubtedly the potent legacies or bījas, to employ the technical term of the Vijñānavādins, of whose 'actions' good and bad, which originate in the three agencies, body, mouth and mind and not the actions themselves as this term is commonly understood. These potent traces or legacies of action are bound to bring their results (vipāka). The existence of sentient beings (and even the whole universe according to the later Vijñānavādins) owes its origin to these potent legacies of the past action.

The point of controversy in this proposition is the time-relation between the karmas and vipākas. The Sarvāstivādins and others insisted that the vipākas come into existence after the disappearance of the karmas, while the Mahāsaṅghikas believed in the simultaneous existence of the karmas and vipākas."

But logically the simultaneous existence of karma and its retribution seems to be impossible. Unless the karma is completed, its retribution cannot take place. It is possible that there is no gap even of one moment between the completion of the karma and the birth of the retribution, i.e. the latter is produced just in the next moment. André Bareau unconvincingly justifies the contention of the later Mahāsaṅghikas. He says: "As the past does not exist as a substance (dravya) and as the deed and its fruit (phala) are produced at different times, so, they argued, as long as the act is not completed, it exists in a perpetual present, and as the maturation of the fruit is likewise present, it exists at the same time as the act."⁸² He continues: "In the case of the act which has fructified, it is completed, it has entered into past, and can therefore no longer exist at the same time."⁸³ Let us analyse this interpretation. Bareau maintains that both the uncompleted act and the maturation of the fruit exist at the same time. The question is: How is the maturation of the fruit possible unless the act is completed? We think that when the act has fructified, the maturation of the fruit is complete. We do not observe any difference between the two acts of fructification and maturation, while Bareau does. Therefore, his assertion of the similarity between the later Mahāsaṅghikas and the Kassapikas also is not tenable. On the same topic the Prajñaptivādins postulate that the karma does not directly bear the fruit, rather it first develops into the cause (vipākahetu), which in turn becomes (pravartate) the fruit of vipāka (vipākaphala).⁸⁴ The author of the Chinese treatise, *I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-'shu-chi-fa-jen*, writes:

"The opinion of this school (i.e. the Prajñaptivādins) is that the karma-force develops gradually and receives the name of vipāka-hetu just at the time of fruition. The vipākaphala comes into being out of this vipāka-hetu (lit. whence). (But according to) the opinion of the Sarvāstivāda-school the word 'vipāka-hetu' is wide (in its denotation) and includes all the good and bad (actions), whereas the word 'vipāka-karma' is narrow (in its sense) and confined only to the caitasika of will (cetanā) and the actions which were already made known and those which were not yet made known (jñāpti and ajñāpti-karma)..."⁸⁵

The later Mahāsaṅghikas do admit the theory of the seed (bīja) and sprout (aṅkura) as Vasumitra informs us. Masuda's version of Vasumitra's treatise reads: "The seed develops into the sprout (aṅkura)",⁸⁶ and that of Bareau reads: "Les germes (bīja) eux-mêmes sont des pousses (aṅkura)",⁸⁷ i.e. the seeds themselves are sprouts.⁸⁸ This means the later Mahāsaṅghikas obviously have in their mind the theory of Satkāryavāda (i.e. the cause and effect are substantially identical) of the Sāṃkhya. The *I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-'shu-chi* endorses our thinking. It states that the later Mahāsaṅghikas "admit that rūpas (exist) for a long time without creation and destruction. Therefore, the substances of seeds change and become sprout; not that when the seeds are destroyed, the sprouts come into existence. Other schools (maintain that when) the seeds perish, there come into being sprouts".⁸⁹ And here we find a similarity between the later Mahāsaṅghikas and the Sarvāstivādins, though the earlier Mahāsaṅghikas reject this idea and "...maintained that substances do not exist in the past and future; they only exist in the present. Phenomena come into existence in accordance with the law of causation and are subject to the law of momentary change. In the past both the 'substances and the functions' of things have been already destroyed and in the future they are not yet brought into being. Phenomena exist therefore only in the present. This is well-known non-existence-theory as to the past and future of the Mahāsaṅghikas".⁹⁰ We have seen that the earlier Mahīśāsakas⁹¹ also propound the same theory.

One can trace out some interesting similarities and differences between the later Mahāsaṅghikas and the early Mahīśāsakas. Both admit that the material constituents (mahābhūta) of the sense-organs are subject to change, i.e. they are not real entities. But whereas according to the former, the citta and the caitasika dharmas are not subject to change, the latter denies it.⁹² The early Mahīśāsakas maintained the existence of the present only⁹³ against the theory of 'sabbam atthi'. Like the Sarvāstivādins⁹⁴ and the Kāśyapīyas,⁹⁵ but unlike the Vātsīputrīyas who hold that some saṃskāras exist for some time while others perish at every moment,⁹⁶ they pronounce that all the saṃskāras perish at every moment.⁹⁷ Regarding the duration of human life, they say, entrance into the womb is its beginning and death is its end, and during this life the material constituents of the sense-organs are subject to perpetual change.⁹⁸

But the preceding theory of the early Mahīśāsakas is not without inconsistencies, as Masuda remarks. He is puzzled by the use of two words, which are in opposition to each other, i.e. 'change' and 'perish'. If we elaborate his confusion, 'change' gives an idea of Satkāryavāda in which the underlying substance remains unaltered, only its form changes; and 'perish' denotes complete destruction of the substance. He elsewhere¹⁰⁰ states that the saṃskāra means the saṃskṛta-dharma, or 'the aggregated-thing'. If the saṃskāra is taken as an aggregated-thing which is perpetually changing, then it can also be accepted as a form of a substance. Again, a form (saṃskāra) may change incessantly without affecting the substance. It follows that the saṃskāra is not the substance per se. Therefore, whether the saṃskāra changes or perishes does not make any difference, and this solves Masuda's puzzle. This view is similar to that of the Sarvāstivādins and the Kāśyapīyas, but opposed to the Sautrāntikas.

The Andhakas Criticised

Buddhaghosa¹⁰¹ invents a new school, i.e. the Andhakas, which comprises the sub-schools of the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagiriya and Siddhatthikas. They seem to have been influenced by the Jaina theory of Syādvāda or Saptabhaṅgī which suggests seven different ways of judgements. A thing is existent from one standpoint and non-existent from another. It is said to exist in its own form (svarūpa), matter (svadṛavya), place (svakṣetra) and time (svakāla), but it is inexistent in its other form (pararūpa), matter (paradṛavya), place (parakṣetra) and time (parakāla).¹⁰² Thus, the Jainas tried to settle the opposite views, such as the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṃkhya and the asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Likewise, the Andhakas endeavour to compromise the two extreme views, 'sabbam atthi' and 'sabbam natthi'. They set forth that everything exists by way of its material form (rūpa) and other characteristics, i.e. the past, present and future, but there is no past by virtue of the future and present. In other words, past exists as past, not as future or present at the same time. In the same way, the future exists as future and present as present, but they do not exist as past simultaneously. Hence, everything exists in one way, but it does not exist in another way.¹⁰³ The Theravādins raise the similar objection as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja¹⁰⁴ did against the Jainas. They insist that the two states of existence (atthibhāva) and non-existence (natthibhāva) are not convertible, identical (ekatṭha), similar (sama), equal (samabhāga) and alike in origin (tadjjāta).¹⁰⁵ Thus, the same thing cannot have contradictory attributes co-existing in it.

However, the Andhakas believe that knowledge of the future, near or distant, is possible.¹⁰⁶ They think one can perceive the future through

extraordinary intuitive vision. In their support they quote a passage from the *Dīghanikāya*¹⁰⁷ in which it has been forecast that "... three dangers will hang over Pāṭaliputta, that of fire, that of water and that of dissension among friends". Further, they also maintain that one is in possession (samannāgata) of the past as well as of the future experience.¹⁰⁸ Their argument is that those who have attained insight into the eight stages of deliverance (aṭṭhavimokkhajhāyī),¹⁰⁹ those who can induce at will (nikāma-lābhī) the four states of mental absorption (jhāna),¹¹⁰ and those who can acquire nine gradual cessations¹¹¹ (anupubbavīhārasamāpatti), are constantly in possession of past and future experiences.¹¹² Buddhaghosa's objection¹¹³ is that the Andhakas are not making any distinction between the concept of actual possession (samannāgatapaññatti) and that of 'the acquisition of the state' (paṭilābhapaññatti), which is actually potential. The former is related to the present, while the latter is latent. The Theravādins¹¹⁴ urge that since, according to the definitions, the past is that which is departed, gone, changed, and the future is that which is yet to come, it is not possible to possess knowledge of the past or future.

The Sarvāstivādins maintain that the objects (ālambana) of the citta and caitasika dharmas really exist,¹¹⁵ and the Yogins possess consciousness of the past as well as of the future objects.¹¹⁶ But the Uttarāpathakas pronounce that consciousness of the past and future is without an object (anārammaṇa).¹¹⁷ The Theravādins argue that if there is consciousness of the past and future, how can it be without object. The statement 'There is consciousness of the past and future, but there is no object of such consciousness' is self-contradictory.¹¹⁸ According to Bhavya, the Pūrva-sthāviras, like the Sarvāstivādins and the later Mahīśāsakas, put forth that the past and future dharmas also exist.¹¹⁹ Bareau suggests that other Sthāviras reject this idea, and this theory cannot be attributed to the

primitive Sthaviras.¹²⁰ Further, we have seen that the Kassapikas and the Vibhajyavādins maintained that some of the past and future exist, and some of them do not. A group of the Vibhajyavādins went so far as to say, as Vinītadeva¹²¹ informs us, that the present (pratyutpanna) which is not of the same class does not exist anymore. This theory is absolutely obscure and we do not find any further detail of this anywhere. They also admit that the substance of time is permanent, while that of the Saṃskṛta-dharmas is impermanent and the latter function in the former.¹²²

Buddhaghosa Maintains Time as an Abstract Idea¹²³

Buddhaghosa in his *Aṭṭhasālinī* uses the term 'Samaya'¹²⁴ which denotes time (kāla) as well as many other related concepts. He quotes a verse in which time (samaya) and consciousness are said to be determined mutually, but first it is time which determines consciousness, and then vice versa.¹²⁵ This proposition raises the issue: What is the nature of consciousness per se in relation to time? For an answer one will have to see the Theravāda notion of twofold momentariness: (1) the momentariness of the material things, and (2) that of consciousness. The Sarvāstivādins accepted four moments, origination (jāti), duration (sthiti), decay (jarā) and destruction (anityatā),¹²⁶ in accordance with their theory of 'sarvam asti'. The Sautrāntikas reject duration and maintain that a dharma disappears immediately after, i.e. in the very next moment, it arises.¹²⁷ Thus, they accept only origination and destruction. The Theravādins put forth that matter lasts longer than consciousness. The briefest duration is called instant which equals one thought-unit. Matter lasts for 17 such instants,¹²⁸ while consciousness lasts only one, and that is the limitation of consciousness by time. In this vein, it is said that consciousness is determined by time. On the other hand, time is determined by consciousness means the duration of consciousness provides the measurement of time-unit, i.e. instant.

In the *Dhammasaṅgani* we often come across an indefinite locative 'when' (yasmin samaye...) which means a suitable time or an occasion,¹²⁹ but it certainly does not denote an absolute point of time. The *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*,¹³⁰ the commentary on the *Dīghanikāya*, gives nine meanings of samaya, such as, concurrence (samavāya), moment (khaṇa), time (kāla), group (samūha), condition (hetu), view (diṭṭhi), acquisition (paṭilābha), abandonment (pahāna) and penetration (paṭivedha). We also find these notions dispersed through different Pali texts.¹³¹ According to Buddhaghosa,¹³² of these nine only five, i.e. samavāya, khaṇa, kāla, samūha, and hetu, should be considered as signifying 'samaya' in 'yasmin samaye...'. These can be explained as follows:

(1) Concurrence (samavāya) of events. Actually this means the concurrence of the totality of causes and conditions (paccayasāmaggi)¹³³ which produce one common result.¹³⁴ It follows that in producing one common result many causes and conditions work altogether. This view is maintained in order to set aside the theories of one cause, such as Brahmā, Prajāpati, Viṣṇu, Puruṣa or Prakṛti.¹³⁵ Thus, Buddhaghosa professes that any single cause is not adequate for creation. This is supported by Buddha also, when he teaches: pleasure and pain are caused by neither oneself nor another. He avoids both extremes and teaches the middle path, i.e. the twelve-membered causal chain (paṭiccasamuppāda),¹³⁶ which represents more than one condition. Further, for the arising of visual consciousness, necessary conditions, such as, eye, object, light, must concur. "This meaning of samaya", remarks Nyanaponika, "relates the given moment of consciousness to the present, that is, to co-existing conditions".¹³⁷

(2) Moment (khaṇa) - This represents two Pali notions: (1) 'the ninth' (navama) moment, and (2) 'the four wheels' (catura cakkāni). The former should be taken as the ninth successional state, i.e. complete trance. The rest are the four Jhānas of rūpa-world consciousness and the four Jhānas

of arūpa-world consciousness.¹³⁸ The *Āṅguttaranikāya*¹³⁹ speaks of one (i.e. ninth) moment or occasion in the following way:

O monks, there is one moment (khaṇa), one occasion, suitable for living a holy life as a way to eliminate suffering. What one? Here (for example), o monks, (1) a Tathāgata is born in the world fully enlightened, accomplished in right behaviour and wisdom, faring well, knowing the universe, incomparable, as a guide of men who have to be restrained, as a teacher, enlightened among gods and men, blessed; (2) a dhamma which is tranquillizing, which leads to complete extinction of existence and perfect enlightenment, is taught by the Blessed One; and (3) an individual is reborn in the middle of the country, endowed with insight, faultless (anēla), skilled (anēlamūga), competent, capable of knowing good as well as bad speeches. This, o monks, is one moment, one occasion, suitable for living a holy life as a way to eliminate suffering (in other words, all this denotes one, i.e. ninth, moment or successional state).

'The four wheels' in the possession of which gods as well as men enjoy prosperity and greatness are:¹⁴⁰ (i) Living in a suitable place (paṭirūpa-desa-vāsa), (ii) dwelling in association with meritorious men (sappurisūpassaya), (iii) perfect application of mind (atta-sammā-panidhi),¹⁴¹ and (iv) meritorious deeds performed in the former life (pubbe-kata-puññatā). Buddhaghosa suggests that the four wheels "...should be classed as the one moment in the sense of occasion (or, conjuncture), for they form the occasion for the production of merit".¹⁴² Nyanaponika enunciates that khaṇa "...refers only to wholesome consciousness. It means: the right occasion for additional wholesome activity for which the present moment of wholesome consciousness is capable of being an inducement, a support and starting-point... This connotation of samaya refers only to the future."¹⁴³

(3) Time (kāla): Buddhaghosa defines time as an abstract idea based on this or that event or change.¹⁴⁴ This has a noticeable affinity with Sāṃkhya which also maintains that time is nothing apart from change, or events, or actions.¹⁴⁵ In the *Abhidhānappadīpikā-sūcī*¹⁴⁶ time is defined under three aspects:

- (a) Time is a concept by which the terms of life, etc. are counted or reckoned.
- (b) Time is that 'passing by' reckoned as 'so much has passed', etc.
- (c) Time is eventuation or happening, there being no such thing as time except from events.

C.A.F. Rhys Davids remarks that "The second aspect refers to the fact of change or impermanence; the third brings up the fact of perpetual becoming. From perpetual becoming we get our idea of abstract time (mahā-kāla), which is eternal, and lacks the common distinction of past, present, future, but which, to adopt M. Bergson's phraseology, 'looked at from the point of view of multiplicity, ... disintegrates into a powder of moments, none of which endures'..."¹⁴⁷

Buddhaghosa holds that time is merely a concept, as we have seen, derived from this or that phenomenal event, since it does not exist by its own nature.¹⁴⁸ The phenomena, which give an abstract idea of time, for example, are: temporal aspects of consciousness as well as matter, expressions, such as, 'the past', 'the future', time of seed germination, time of origination and decay, the revolutions of the sun and moon denoted by morning, evening, day, and night, the period which consists of day and night expressed by fortnight, month, etc. This shows that time is nothing but an abstract idea derived from these phenomena.¹⁴⁹

If time is taken as a reality, it is nothing more than an instant, a thought-unit, 1/16th (or sometimes 1/17th) of a unit of matter. The change of thought is so quick and short in duration that it is not at all possible to illustrate it.¹⁵⁰ Thus, the extreme brevity of duration of time is shown by the thought-unit. This concept can be compared to the 'moment' of Yoga.¹⁵¹

(4) Totality (samūha): This points to the totality (puñja) of the dhammas, such as, contact (phassa), and feeling (vedanā),¹⁵² which are considered as conditions in producing a common result. For example, eye, object, light and concentration of the mind are conditions for the arising of visual perception. In the *Paṭṭhāna*¹⁵³ 24 conditions (paccaya) are enumerated. But Aniruddha, in his *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*,¹⁵⁴ reduced them to only four: (i) object (ārammaṇa), (ii) support (upanissaya, especially sufficing condition or qualification for Arhantaship), (iii) kamma, and (iv) presence (atthi, this refers to pre-nascent or co-nascent phenomena on whose presence the arising of other phenomena is dependent). Thus, a multiplicity of conditions is admitted in order to reject the notion of one cause, such as God, Puruṣa and Prakṛti.¹⁵⁵

(5) Condition (hetu): This refers to the aforesaid conditions which show mutual dependence. This denies the theory of absolute free-will.¹⁵⁶ We agree with Nyanaponika that "This meaning of samaya relates to all three divisions of time. The future is likewise included, because every state of consciousness is not only conditioned, but is itself a condition for a subsequent state."¹⁵⁷

Some of Time Exists, Some does not, in the Milindapañha¹⁵⁸

Like other schools and sects of Buddhism, the *Milindapañha*, one of the non-canonical Pali texts, also maintains that time is not an absolute reality or a substance, though it discusses the problem of time (addhā) with great interest. Time as a whole or a single entity is not admitted, but when the King asks what time is, Nāgasena speaks of the three time-epochs, the past, present and future.¹⁵⁹ This is in accordance with the Nikāyas.¹⁶⁰ In this connection T.W. Rhys Davids informs us that "Buddha-ghosa distinguishes between the religious and philosophical denotation of

addhā (Suttanta-, Abhidhamma-pariyāya). In the former, 'the present' refers to one span of life; 'the past' is time prior to this span of life; 'the future' is time after decease from this life. In the latter, the present is any three-fold instant (nascent, static, cessant); past and future precede and follow that."¹⁶¹

Now the problem crops up whether time (addhā) really exists. Nāgasena enunciates that there is some time which exists and there is some which does not.¹⁶² This has been pronounced with reference to the kammic formations (saṅkhāra),¹⁶³ the second term in the twelve-membered paṭiccasamuppāda, not one of the five khandhas. There is no time for those kammic formations, which are past (atīta), gone (vigata), ceased (niruddha) and changed (vipariṇata). But there is time for those dhammas which are ripened (dhammavipāka),¹⁶⁴ or those vipāka-dhammas which still possess the potentialities of producing results (vipākadhammadhamma),¹⁶⁵ or those which help rise re-union (i.e. rebirth, paṭisandhi). Again, time exists for those beings (sattā) who will be reborn after death (kālaṅkata),¹⁶⁶ but those beings who will not be reborn when dead and those who have attained parinibbāna,¹⁶⁷ to them time does not exist.¹⁶⁸

In the preceding passage the term 'vipākadhammadhamma', according to Buddhaghosa,¹⁶⁹ is professed by the Andhakas who think that the kammic result itself inheres the potentialities of producing other results by way of reciprocity (aññamañña-paccaya), one of the 24 relational conditions stated above. But the Theravādins¹⁷⁰ reject this hypothesis, as this would lead to an infinite regress. But what Nāgasena wants to say is, we think, that this process does not continue infinitely, at a certain moment it is worn away and thus gradually comes to an end, then to those dhammas time also ceases to exist. Secondly, remarks I.B. Horner,¹⁷¹ "Nāgasena appears to be implying here that there is a possible re-linking or re-connection,

paṭisandhi, of beings, satta, though earlier he has said it is name-and-shape that re-connects. The triad of saṅkhāra, dhamma and satta is noteworthy for its unusualness." All this proves that time is nothing apart from saṅkhāras, etc. It should be considered as the mode of existence.

Ignorance is the Root of Time (addhā)

Further, ignorance (avijjā) is said to be the root of time.¹⁷² As we know, ignorance is the first term in paṭiccasamuppāda and saṅkhāra is conditioned by it in the series. So if ignorance is removed, there will be no saṅkhāra and thus in turn there will be no time. In this sense ignorance is the root of time. In the same way Nāgasena recites the remaining eleven links of paṭiccasamuppāda in order to demonstrate that it is impossible to show the beginning of time.¹⁷³ The *Samyuttanikāya*¹⁷⁴ discusses the problem of beginning (or the earliest point) in many respects with great detail and precision. To make King Milinda understand this concept Nāgasena brings forth a number of analogies¹⁷⁵ of seed-fruit-seed, egg-chicken-egg, circle (cakka), cycle of eye-form (or colour)-sight-touch-feeling-craving-kamma-eye (i.e. eye in rebirth, in future).¹⁷⁶

On the question whether or not the earliest point in any case can be shown, Nāgasena answers that in some respects this would be possible and in some not.¹⁷⁷ He continues, earlier than this (ignorance) there was absolutely no ignorance anywhere in any form. This earliest point (purimā koṭi) cannot be shown. It follows in line with the *Majjhimanikāya*¹⁷⁸ that something having been inexistent comes into existence (ahutvā sambhoti) and after having been ceases to be. In this sense, the earliest point can be shown.¹⁷⁹ Here T.W. Rhys Davids' remark is significant: "... the beginning of each link in the chain - the beginning of each individuality - can be traced, but not the beginning of each chain. Each life is a link in

a chain of lives, bound together by cause and effect, different, yet the same. There are an infinite number of such chains; and there is no reference in the discussion to any greater unity, or to any 'ultimate point' of all the chains."¹⁸⁰

The King thinks that if something having been inexistent (*ahutvā*) comes into existence and again having been existent ceases to be, this means having been cut off on both sides it is completely annihilated, i.e. it is non-existent before (i.e. in the past) and after (i.e. in the future) its existence. Now the question arises whether in this condition, i.e. having been cut off on both sides, it (ignorance) increases from its present existence onward (i.e. in the future). Nāgasena's reply is affirmative, and he gives an example of aggregates (*khandha*) which are seeds of all kinds of sufferings.¹⁸¹ If this is so, then Nāgasena's above statement that formerly there was no ignorance anywhere or in any way (*ito pubbe, Mahārāja, sabbena sabbam sabbathā sabbam avijjā nāhosi-* Mil., p.41.2-3) is inconsistent. It should rather be, as T.W. Rhys Davids rendered it, "Formerly, o King, everything in every form, everything in every mode, was ignorance. It is to us as if it were not", and in this sense the earliest point cannot be shown.

Besides, Nāgasena asserts that there are kammic formations (*saṅkhāra*) which are produced,¹⁸² but there are no *saṅkhāras* which are produced without a continued becoming (*abhavanta*),¹⁸³ for example, there was wood in the forest and clay in the earth, but it was only through the effort of men and women that a house was built.¹⁸⁴

H.V. Guenther¹⁸⁵ suggests that the above proposition '*ahutvā sambhoti*' (MN.iii, p.25.20-21) even if it has high authority is rejected by the author of the *Milindapañha*, when he says '*abhavantā jāyanti*'. Guenther overlooks the very fact that '*ahutvā sambhoti*' is also quoted by Nāgasena

himself. D.J. Kalupahana's contention is that "The words abhuvā and abhavā refer to a difference in time. While abhuvā refers to the past, abhavā refers to the present or even the future."¹⁸⁶

From the preceding discussions Walleser¹⁸⁷ deduces the conclusion that in the *Milindapañha* the transcendental meaning of subjective time (addhā), i.e. transcendental time, is not denied. We disagree with him, because were it so, it would be against the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. In addition, Nāgasena explicitly emphasizes that time (addhā) exists as far as the saṅkhāras or the dhammas exist. This establishes that time is not an independent substance or reality, it cannot be considered as transcendental either, even by implication, if at the same time we keep the fundamental teachings of Buddhism in view. It is true that these discussions give the idea of the past, present and future (the three time-epochs), but to add these segments up collectively in order to get transcendental time is, in our opinion, unwarranted.

Paṭiccasamuppāda: As Temporal Sequence

Paṭiccasamuppāda¹⁸⁸ (Skt. Pratītyasamutpāda) in early Buddhism (Theravāda as well as Sarvāstivāda) represents the three temporal states of a becoming, the past, present and future. This is the law of causality which is so universal that it applies to any object, sentient or insentient, at any time and at any place. This doctrine in Buddhism was actually directed against any theory of a single cause professed by other schools of thought. The twelve links of paṭiccasamuppāda are as follows:¹⁸⁹

- (1) avijjā (Skt. avidyā, ignorance)
- (2) saṅkhāra (Skt. saṃskāra, karmic formation)
- (3) viññāṇa (Skt. vijñāna, consciousness)
- (4) nāma-rūpa (Skt. nāma-rūpa, name and form)
- (5) saḍāyatana (Skt. ṣaḍāyatana, six sense organs)
- (6) phassa (Skt. sparśa, contact, sensation)
- (7) vedanā (Skt. vedanā, feeling)

- (8) tanhā (Skt. tṛṣṇā, craving)
- (9) upādāna (Skt. upādāna, clinging)
- (10) bhava (Skt. bhava, becoming)
- (11) jāti (Skt. jāti, rebirth)
- (12) jarā-maraṇa (Skt. jarā-maraṇa, old age and death).

A careful analysis of these links shows that they are stretching over all the three time-epochs, the past, present and future, and this is the origin of all kinds of suffering.¹⁹⁰ Generally, nos. 1-2 refer to the past time, 3-10 to the present and 11-12 to the future. Apart from this, several other supplementary methods of classifying these links have been suggested. One of them is:¹⁹¹

(A) Cause and Effect in Past and Present

(a) Past Cause

- 1. Ignorance
- 2. Kammic Formation

(b) Present Effect

- 3. Consciousness
- 4. Name and Form
- 5. Six Sense Organs
- 6. Contact or Sensation
- 7. Feeling

(B) Cause and Effect in the Present and Future

(a) Present Cause

- 8. Craving
- 9. Clinging
- 10. Becoming

(b) Future Effect

- 11. Rebirth
- 12. Old Age and Death

The commentarial sources, as McGovern¹⁹² remarks, draw up an amended chart of these links:

Past

- 1. Effect - (i) Birth and Old Age and Death or its equivalent;
(ii) Consciousness, Name and Form, Six Sense Organs, Contact, Sensation.
- 2. Cause - (i) Ignorance and Kammic Formation or its equivalent;
(ii) Craving, Clinging, and Becoming.

Present

1. Effect - (i) Consciousness, Name and Form, Six Sense Organs, Contact, Feeling, or its equivalent;
(ii) Rebirth, Old Age, and Death.
2. Cause - (i) Craving, Clinging, Becoming or its equivalent;
(ii) Ignorance, Kammic Formation, etc.

Future

1. Effect - (i) Rebirth, Old Age and Death or its equivalent;
(ii) Consciousness, Name and Form, Six Sense Organs, Contact, Feeling.
2. Cause - (i) Ignorance, Kammic Formation or its equivalent;
(ii) Craving, Clinging, and Becoming.

Notes

1. KV, pp. 112.24-147.10, 150.13-153.21, 187.10-191.4, 279.25-281.21, 316.6-317.10, 359.25-361.13, 365.15-367.13, 443.18-445.26; KA, pp. 43.13-51.27, 53.1-20, 57.7-26, 85.10-87.4, 118.14-20, 153.1-13; *Sumaṅgala-Vilāsinī*, i, pp. 31-33; PC, pp. 84-104, 108-110, 124-127, 182-183, 237-238, 242, 295-296, 363-364, 374-377, 392-394; As, pp. 48.2-51.28; Mil., pp. 39.7-42.6; *The Debate Commentary* (B.C. Law, 1969), pp. 52-62, 64, 69-70, 106-108, 145, 148-149, 188-189, 242; *The Expositor* (Pe Maung Tin, 1976), pp. 75-82; *Satyasiddhiśāstra* (N.A. Sastri, 1975), p. 86.1-10; Bareau (1957), pp. 353-364; Sasaki (1964), pp. 471-480; Walleser (1925), pp. 123-133; Keith (1923), pp. 163-165; Horner (1963), pp. 68-74; T.W. Rhys Davids (1975), pp. 77-83; Coomarswamy (1947), pp. 30-60; Nyanaponika (1965), pp. 104-126; Paul Mus (1939), pp. 3-36; Miyamoto (1959), pp. 3-18; McGovern (1923), pp. 163-176; Mandal (1968), pp. 67-69; Silburn (1955), pp. 165-251; Demiéville (1924), pp. 129ff. For the history of Pali literature, see Winternitz (1977), Geiger (1956), Law (1974).
2. Cf. KV.i.6-8, 10 and KA thereon. Also see, PC, pp. 84-110, 375-377, 392-394.
3. Cf. PC, p. 375.
4. CCB, p.4, fn. 1.
5. See the next chapter.
6. Cf. SN, iv, p.15.13-16: cakkhum ceva rūpā ca. sotañ ca saddā ca. ghānañ ca gandhā ca. jivhā rasā ca. kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca. mano ca dhammā ca. idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave sabbam. F.L. Woodward (1956, p.8, fn.1) informs us that according to the *Khuddakapāṭha* of the Sutta Piṭaka (ii.52), sabbam means the universe as existing in reality.
7. Cf. SN, iv, p.15.17-21.
8. Cf. KA, p. 43.13-16; Law (1969), pp. 52-53.
9. Cf. MN, iii, pp.16.32ff; also cf. SN, iii, pp. 47.10-48.4, PC, p. 95. S.Z. Aung (1972, p. 185, fn. 5) observes that the commentaries on the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* "explain that Nibbāna is undifferentiated into the eleven aspects - viz., past, present, future, distant, near, gross, subtle, high, low, internal, or external, characterizing phenomena".
10. Cf. Law (1969), pp. 52-53; PC, p. 85.
11. Cf. KV, pp. 112.25-113.10.
12. 'everywhere' means 'in the whole body'; cf. KA, p. 43.20-21: sabbatthā'ti sabbasmim̐ sarīre sabbam atthīti pucchati.
13. 'always' means 'in all times' (i.e. past, present, future) - cf. *ibid.*, p.43.21-22: sabbadā'ti sabbasmim̐ kāle sabbam atthīti pucchati.

14. 'in every manner' means 'in every respect'; cf. *ibid.*, p. 43.22-23: *sabbena sabban 'ti sabbenākārena sabbam atthīti pucchati.*
15. 'in everything' means 'everything in every dhamma'; cf. *ibid.*, p.43.23-24: *sabbesū 'ti sabbesu dhammesu sabbam atthīti pucchati.*
16. 'in separate form' means 'not in combined form'. A combination, according to Buddhaghosa, consists of many characteristics, not of one. Cf. *ibid.*, p.43.24-26: *ayogan 'ti ayuttam. nānāsabhāvānaṃ hi yoga hoti na ekasabhāvassa iti.*
17. If it is maintained that even non-existent things exist, then it would be a unique aggregate (*khandha*) apart from the five traditional ones, and this category would prove the existence of the horns in a hare, etc. Cf. *ibid.*, p.43.28-30: *yaṃ pi natthi taṃ pi atthi. yaṃ chaṭṭhakhandhādikaṃ sasavisāṇādikaṃ vā kiñci natthīti siddham. taṃ pi te atthīti pucchati.*
18. Cf. KV, pp. 113.14ff, and KA, p.44.10-12: *idāni atītam atthīti kālasaṃsandanaṃ hoti. tattha atītam atthīti ādikaṃ sudhikasāṃsandanaṃ.*
19. Cf. KV, pp. 113.15-23: *nanu atītam niruddhaṃ vigataṃ vipariṇataṃ atthaṅgataṃ abbatthaṅgataṃ ti ? āmantā. hañci atītam niruddhaṃ vigataṃ vipariṇataṃ atthaṅgataṃ abbatthaṅgataṃ, no ca vata re vattabbe- "atītam atthī" ti...nanu anāgataṃ ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ asaṅjātaṃ anibbattaṃ anabhinibbattaṃ apātubhūtaṃ ti ? āmantā. hañci anāgataṃ ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ asaṅjātaṃ anibbattaṃ anabhinibbattaṃ apātubhūtaṃ, no ca vata re vattabbe-"anāgataṃ atthī" ti.*
20. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 113.24-25: *paccuppannam atthi paccuppannam aniruddham avigataṃ avipariṇataṃ na atthaṅgataṃ na abbatthaṅgataṃ ti.*
21. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 113.26-114.4.
22. See, Copi (1972), pp.181ff.
23. See, *ibid.*, pp. 296, 316ff.
24. See, *ibid.*, p. 297.
25. See, *ibid.*, pp. 290, 316ff.
26. Cf. KA, p.44.10-12.
27. PC, p. 375.
28. "We use the term 'thing' not in the sense of substance, or having a substrate, but as anything which is exhausted, as to its being, by some or all of the known twenty-eight qualities of body or matter, and by the facts of mind" - *ibid.* Also see, *ibid.*, p. 14, fn.3; S.Z.Aung (1972), pp.271ff.
29. PC, p. 375.
30. Cf. KV, p. 113.6.
31. Cf. KA, p.43.15-16: *sabbe pi atītādibhedā dhammā khandhasabhāvānaṃ na vijahanti.*

32. For detail, see Y. Karunadasa (1967); S.Z. Aung (1972), pp. 154ff.
33. Cf. KV, p. 114.13-116.8; KA, p. 44.12-13: atītaṃ rūpaṃ atthīti ādikaṃ khandhavasena kālasaṃsandanam.
34. Cf. KV, p. 114.13.
35. 'rūpa' in its generic sense means 'matter' and in its specific sense, 'quality'. But in popular language, it means 'form' - S.Z. Aung (1972), p. 154, fn.1.
36. Cf. ibid., pp. 154-160.
37. KV, p. 116.9.
38. Ibid., p. 116.10ff.
39. Cf. ibid., p. 116.12-14: paccuppannaṃ rūpaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ paccuppanna-bhāvaṃ jahatī ti ? āmantā. rūpabhāvaṃ jahatī ti ? na hevaṃ vattabbe.
40. Cf. ibid., p. 116.18-19: paccuppannaṃ rūpaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ rūpabhāvaṃ na jahatī ti ? āmantā. paccuppannabhāvaṃ na jahatī ti ? na hevaṃ vattabbe.
41. Cf. ibid., p. 117.2-7: rūpaṃ rūpabhāvaṃ na jahatī ti ? āmantā. rūpaṃ niccam dhuvam sassatam avipariṇāmadhammaṃ ti ? na hevaṃ vattabbe. nanu rūpaṃ rūpabhāvaṃ na jahatī ti rūpaṃ aniccam adhuvam asassatam vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, nō ca vata re vattabbe - "rūpaṃ rūpabhāvaṃ na jahatī" ti.
42. Cf. ibid., p. 117.16ff; also see PC, pp. 90ff.
43. Cf. KV, p. 117.8ff.
44. Cf. ibid., pp. 121.7ff; KA, pp. 45.11ff; PC, p. 377.
45. Cf. MN, iii, pp. 16.32ff; also cf. SN, iii, pp. 47.10-48.4; KV, p. 135.1-6: nanu vuttaṃ Bhagavatā - "yaṃ kiñci, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā - ayaṃ vuccati rūpakkhando. yā kāci vedanā ... yā kāci saññā ... ye keci saṅkhārā ... yaṃ kiñci viññānaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā - ayaṃ vuccati viññānakkhandho" ti.
46. Cf. SN, pp. 71.19-72.34.
47. Keith (1923), p. 167.
48. Cf. KV, pp. 135.10-136.5. For further discussion on the same topic, see also KV, pp. 136.13ff; SN, iv. 52, ii. 101; AN, i. 197.
49. PC, p. 98, fn. 1.
50. Here Buddhaghosa does not identify the opponent with any particular school, but the context shows that it is the Sabbatthivādins. Also see ibid., p. 98, fn. 2.

51. B.C. Law (1969), p. 60. Also see, KA, p. 50.1-3.
52. Cf. KV, pp. 138.22ff.
53. Cf. AKB, v, pp. 808.5ff; TS, pp. 615.20ff; LVP (1937), pp. 87-134; AD, pp. 261.1ff.
54. Bareau (1955), pp. 201-203; The Kassapikas (Skt. Kāśyapīya) are also called Suvarṣaka, see Masuda (1925), p. 65, fn. 2; Bareau (1954), p. 237, (1955), p. 201; Demiéville (1932), p. 62; Silburn (1955), p. 245.
55. Bareau (1957), p. 358.
56. Cf. AKB, V, p. 805.10-11: ye tu kecid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalaṃ cātītaṃ karma, kiñcin nāsti yad dattaphalam atītam anāgataṃ ceti vibhajya vadanti, te Vibhajyavādināḥ. Also cp. Mil., p. 39.10ff. Also see, AD, p. 257, fn. 2.
57. Cf. KV, p. 143.15-18: atītam atthī ti ? ekaccam atthi, ekaccam natthī ti. ekaccam niruddham, ekaccam na niruddham; ekaccam vigatam, ekaccam avigatam; ekaccam atthaṅgataṃ, ekaccam na atthaṅgataṃ; ekaccam abbatthaṅgataṃ, ekaccam na abbatthaṅgataṃ ti ?
58. Cf. ibid., pp. 143.19-144.2.
59. Cf. ibid., p. 144.4-5: atītā avipakkavipākā dhammā- te atthi; atītā vipakkavipākā dhammā- te natthī ti.
60. Cf. ibid., pp. 145.28-146.14.
61. Masuda (1925), pp. 65-66. For stereotype criticism of the Sabbatthivādins and the Kassapikas by Harivarman, see his *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, pp. 69.8-75.5, 86.1-11. Also see Bareau (1954), pp. 264-265, (1955), pp. 201-203; Demiéville (1932), p. 62; Silburn (1955), pp. 245-246.
62. Masuda, ibid., p. 31.
63. Ibid., p. 59; Bareau (1954), p. 259.
64. Ibid., p. 62; Bareau (ibid.), p. 262.
65. Masuda, ibid., p. 62, fn.7; also see ibid., p. 39, fn. 1.
66. Cf. KV, XV.3.
67. See Bareau (1955), pp. 89-98.
68. PC, p. 295, fn.6; also see B.C. Law (1969), p. 188, fn. 3.
69. Cf. AN, i, p. 197.11-17: tīṇ' imāni bhikkhave kathāvatthūni. katamāni tīṇi ? atītaṃ vā bhikkhave addhānam ārabba kathaṃ katheyya- evam ahosi atītam addhānam ti- anāgataṃ vā bhikkhave addhānam ārabba kathaṃ katheyya- evaṃ bhavissati anāgataṃ addhānaṃ ti- etarahi vā bhikkhave paccuppannam addhānam ārabba kathaṃ katheyya- evam etarahi paccuppannaṃ ti.

70. Cf. KV, pp. 443.19-445.12.
71. LVP (1937), pp. 8-9.
72. Ibid. Also cp. Masuda (1925), p. 50, fn. 4.
73. Masuda, *ibid.*, p. 63; Bareau (1954), p. 263.
74. Bareau (1956), p. 181.
75. See Kyoto supplementary edition of the Chinese Tripiṭakas, 1905-1912, No. 942.
76. Masuda (1925), p. 63, fn. 4.
77. Bareau (1956), p. 197.
78. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 199.
79. See Masuda (1925), p. 33; Bareau (1954), p. 246.
80. See Bareau (1956), p. 195.
81. Masuda (1925), p. 33, fn.4. The question has been raised whether these later differentiated doctrines were found only in the Mahāsaṅghikas. Masuda (*ibid.*, p. 32, fn.3) informs us that according to the Chinese text, *Pu'-'chi-i-lun*, the Mahāsaṅghikas differed from those of the other three schools, i.e. the Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins and Kaukkūṭikas.
82. Bareau (1957), p. 360.
83. *Ibid.*
84. See Masuda (1925), p. 37.
85. *Ibid.*, fn. 3.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
87. Bareau (1954), p. 246.
88. Bareau (1957), p. 360.
89. Masuda (1925), p. 34, fn. 1.
90. *Ibid.*, p.31, fn. 1.
91. See *ibid.*, p. 59.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 61.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

96. Ibid., p. 54. According to the Chinese text, *I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-'shu-chi*, the things which continue for some time are the earth, life, etc., while the things which perish momentarily are the citta (mind), caitasika dharmas (mental states), etc. - ibid., fn.2.
97. Ibid., p. 62; see also pp. 50, fn. 4, 54, fn. 2.
98. Ibid., p. 61.
99. Ibid., pp. 54, fn. 2; 61, fn. 4.
100. See ibid., p. 50, fn. 4.
101. Cf. KA, p. 52.6-7: Andhakā nāma Pubbaseliyā Aparaseliyā Rājagiriya Siddhatthikā 'ti ime pacchā-uppannikāyā.
102. IP, I, p. 303. svarūpeṇa sattvāt, pararūpeṇa ca asattvāt-ibid., p. 304, fn. 1.
103. Cf. KA, p. 53.1-6: sabbe pi atītādibhedā dhammā rūpādivasena atthīti. atītam anāgatapaccuppannavasena anāgatapaccuppannāni vā atītādivasena natthi. tasmā sabbam ev' idam evam atthi evaṃ natthīti yesaṃ laddhi seyyathāpi etarahi vuttappabhedānam Andhakānam.
104. See Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the *Vedānta Sūtra*, ii.2.33 and Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the same, ii.2.31.
105. Cf. KV.i.10.
106. Cf. ibid., V. 8.
107. Cf. DN, ii, p. 88.1-2: Pātaliputtassa kho Ānanda tayo antarāyā bhavissanti, aggito vā udākato vā mithubhedā vā 'ti.
108. Cf. KV, IX.11; PC, IX.12; KA, IX.11.
109. For eight stages of deliverance, see DN, ii, pp. 111.33ff, iii, pp.261.34ff. Cf. *Dhammasaṅgani* (P.V. Bapat, 1940), pp. 71.1ff, 74.17ff.
110. For four states of Jhāna, see DN, iii. pp. 222.3ff, also see p.131.16ff; *Dhammasaṅgani*, pp. 71.16ff.
111. For the nine gradual cessations, see DN, iii, p.266.6ff; AN, iv, p. 409.7ff.
112. Cf. KV, p. 367.6-8: hañci atthi aṭṭhavimokkhajhāyī catunnaṃ jhānānaṃ nikāmalābhī navannaṃ anupubbavihārasamāpattīnaṃ lābhī, tena vata re vattabbe- "atītānāgatehi samannāgato" ti.
113. Cf. KA, pp. 120.28ff.
114. Cf. KV, IX.11; PC, IX.12.
115. Masuda (1925), p. 48.
116. Cf. TSP, p. 616.12ff.
117. Cf. KV, IX.6; PC, IX.6 and 7.

118. Ibid.
119. Bareau (1956), p. 177.
120. Ibid., fn. 6.
121. Bareau (1955), p. 180, (1956), p. 199.
122. Ibid., (1955), p. 176; LVP (1937), pp.8-9.
123. As, pp. 48.2-51.28; Pe Maung Tin (1976), pp. 75-82; Nyanaponika (1965), pp. 104-126; Sasaki (1964).
124. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* (Lamotte, 1966, pp. 73-79) also speaks of samaya, but it distinguishes kāla from samaya which is preferred by Buddha himself.
125. Cf. As, p.48.3: samaye niddisi cittaṃ cittena samayaṃ Muni.
126. Cf. AD, pp. 104.1ff; AK, ii.45c-d and AKB thereon.
127. Kalupahana (1975), p. 208, fns. 76, 77.
128. Conze (1962), p. 135.
129. Cf. As, p. 48.11-13: idāni 'yasmiṃ samaye' ti ādisu ayam anu-pubbapadavannaṇā. yasmiṃ ti aniyamato bhummaniddeso. samaye ti aniyamaniddiṭṭhaparidīpanam. ettāvatā aniyamato samayo niddiṭṭho hoti.
It is interesting to note that the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* (Lamotte, 1966, pp. 73-79) discusses a similar indefinite locative 'ekasmin samaye'.
130. Cf. pp. 31.22ff. Also see As, p. 48.14-15:
samavāye khaṇe kāle samūhe hetudiṭṭhisu /
paṭilābhe pahāne ca paṭivedhe ca dīssati //
131. Cf. DN, i, p. 205.19-20: app' eva nāma sve pi upasaṃkameyyāma kālaṇ ca samayaṇ ca upādāyāti. Here samaya shows concurrence (samavāya) of events.
AN, iv. p. 227.8-9: eko 'va bhikkhave khaṇo ca samayo ca brahmacariyavāsāya. Here samaya means moment (khaṇa). Also cf. SN, iv, p. 126.1ff.
Vinaya, iv. 117.27-28: ... uṇhasamaye pariḷāhasamaye ... Here samaya means season (kāla).
DN, ii, p. 254.6: mahāsamayo pavanasmim. Here samaya means group, assembly (samūha).
MN, i, p. 438.32-35: samayo pi kho te Bhaddāli appaṭividdho ahosi: Bhagavā kho Sāvattiyam viharati, Bhagavā pi maṃ jānissati: Bhaddāli nāma bhikkhu satthusāsane sikkhāya aparipūrakārī ti. ayam pi kho te Bhaddāli samayo appaṭividdho ahosi. Here samaya means condition (hetu).
Ibid., ii, pp. 22.27-23.1: tena kho pana samayena Uggāhamāno paribbājako Samaṇamaṇḍikāputto samayappavādake tindukācīre ekasālake Mallikāya ārāme paṭivasati. Here samaya means view (diṭṭhi).

SN, i, p. 89.23-24:

ditṭhe dhamme ca yo attho yo c'attho samparāyiko /
atthābhisamayādhiro paṇḍito ti pavuccatīti //

Here samaya means acquisition (paṭilābha).

A.N., iv, p. 8.15-16: sammāmānābhisamayā antam akāsi dukkhassā
ti. Here samaya means abandonment (pahāna).

Paṭisambhidāmagga, ii, p. 107: dukkhassa pīḷanaṭṭho saṅkhataṭṭho
santāpaṭṭho vipariṇāmatṭho abhisamayatṭho- See, As, p. 48.29-30.
Here samaya means penetration (paṭivedha).

Also see As, p. 48.16-30.

132. Cf. As, p. 48.32-33:

samavāyo khaṇo kālo samūho hetu yeva ca /
ete pañca pi viññeyyā samayā idha viññunā //

133. Ibid., p. 49.3: paccayasāmaggī samavāyo.

134. Ibid., p. 49.5-6: yā hi esā sādharāṇaphalanipphādakattena
saṅghitānaṃ paccayānaṃ sāmaggī, sā idha samavāyo ti jānitabbā.

135. Ibid., p. 50.8-12: tena ekakāraṇavādo paṭisedhito hoti. samavāyo
ca nāma sādharāṇaphalanipphādane aññamaññāpekkho hoti. tasmā
'eko kattā nāma natthī' ti imaṃ pi atthaṃ dīpeti. sabhāvena
hi kāraṇe sati kāraṇantarāpekkhā ayuttā' ti. evam ekassa kassaci
kāraṇassa abhāvādīpanena "sayam katam sukhadukkham" ti ādi
paṭisedhitam hoti.

Also see Pe Maung Tin (1976), p. 79, fn. 1.

136. Cf. SN, ii, pp. 1.15ff, 23.22ff.

137. Nyanaponika (1965), p. 105.

138. Cf. DN, iii, pp. 265.19-266.5.

139. AN, iv, p. 227.8-18: eko 'va bhikkhave khaṇo ca samayo ca brahma-
cariyavāsāya. katamo eko ? idha bhikkhave Tathāgato ca loke
uppanno hoti araham sammāsambuddho vijjācaranasampanno sugato
lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathi Satthā devamanussānam buddho
Bhagavā, dhammo ca desiyati opasamiko parinibbāyiko sambodhagāmī
sugatappavedito, ayañ ca puggalo majjhimesu janapadesu paccājāto
hoti, so ca hoti paññavā anelo anelamūgo paṭibalo subhāsita-
dubbhāsitassa attham aññātum. ayam bhikkhave eko 'va khaṇo ca
samayo ca brahmacariyavāsāyā ti.

Also cf. As, 49.6-8: "eko ca kho bhikkhave khaṇo ca samayo
ca brahmacariyavāsāyā" ti evam vutto pana navamo va eko khaṇo
ti veditabbo.

140. Cf. DN, iii, p. 276.5-7: cattāri cakkāni, paṭirūpa-desā-vāso,
sappurisūpassayo, attasammāpaṇidhi, pubbe ca kata-puññatā.

Also cf. AN, ii, p. 32.1ff.

141. Here we have taken 'atta' in the sense of 'mind'. See *The Book of
the Gradual Sayings*, ii, p. 35, fn. 3.

Pe Maung Tin (1976, p.77) renders 'atta-sammā-paṇidhi' as
'self-control'.

142. Tin, *ibid.*; cf. As, p. 49.11-12: tāni vā ekajjhaṃ katvā okāsaṭṭhena khaṇo ti veditabbāni. tāni hi kusaluppattiya okāsabhūtāni.
143. Nyanaponika (1965), pp. 105-106.
144. Cf. As, p. 49.14: taṃ tam upādāya paññato kālo vohāramattako. Also see, *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, p. 850.
145. Cf. kriyāsu kālasañjñā- *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 132.6.
146. See PC, p. 392.
147. *Ibid.*
148. Cf. As, p. 49.23-24: so panaesa sabhāvato avijjamānattā paññattimattako evā ti veditabbo.
149. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 49.16-23: 'cittakālo rūpakālo' ti ādinā nayena dhamme vā, 'atīto anāgato' ti ādinā nayena dhammavuttiṃ vā, 'bījakālo aṅkurakālo' ti ādinā nayena dhammapaṭipāṭiṃ vā, 'uppādakālo jarākālo' ti ādinā nayena dhammalakkhaṇaṃ vā, 'vedīyanakālo sañjānanakālo' ti ādinā nayena dhammakiccaṃ vā, 'nahānakālo pānakālo' ti ādinā nayena sattakiccaṃ vā, 'gamana-kālo ṭhānakālo' ti ādinā nayena iriyāpathaṃ vā, 'pubbaṅha-sāyaṅha-divā-rattī' ti ādinā nayena candimasuriyādīparivattanaṃ vā, 'aḍḍhamāso māso' ti ādinā nayena ahorattādisaṅkhātāṃ kālasañcayaṃ vā ti- evaṃ taṃ tam upādāya paññatto kālo nāma.
150. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 51.6-9: tattha hi so rūpajīvitindriyassa tāva parittako kālo vutto. yāva paccuppannaṃ rūpaṃ tiṭṭhati tāva soḷasacittāni uppajjitvā bhijjanti. iti tesāṃ kālaparittatāya upamā pi natthi. tenevāha- "yāvañ cidaṃ bhikkhave upamā pi na sukarā yāva lahuparivattaṃ cittaṃ" ti.
Also cf. AN, i, p.10.1-4; PC, p. 125; KV, ii.7.
151. See the chapter on Sāṃkhya-Yoga; also see *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.52 and the commentary thereon.
152. Cf. As, p. 49.25: yo panaesa phassavedanādīnaṃ dhammānaṃ puñjo so idha samūho ti vibhāvito.
153. See Narada (1969), pp. 1ff; also see Nyanatiloka (1938), pp.97ff.
154. See p. 847.
155. Cf. As, pp. 49.30-50.4: cakkhudvārādīsu hi uppajjamānānaṃ cakkhuvīññānādīnaṃ cakkhu-rūpa-āloka-manasikārādayo paccayā, mahāpakaraṇe ca "hetopaccayo ārammaṇaccayo" ti ādinā nayena catuvīsati paccayā vuttā. tesu ṭhapetvā vipākapaccayaṃ ca pacchājātapaccayaṃ ca, sesā kusaladhammānaṃ paccayā honti yeva. te sabbe pi idha hetū ti adhippetā. evaṃ assa iminā dvāravasena vā paccayavasena vā anekabhāvo veditabbo.
Also *ibid.*, p. 51.14-17: samūhasaṅkhāto pana samayo anekesaṃ pi sahuppattiṃ dīpeti. phassādīnaṃ hi dhammānaṃ puñjo samūho ti vutto. tasmiñ ca uppajjamānañ cittaṃ saha tehi dhammehi uppajjati ti anekesaṃ sahuppatti dīpitā. evaṃ dīpentena cānena ekasseva dhammassa uppatti paṭisedhitā hoti. ayaṃ samūhasaṅkhātēna samayena attho dīpito.

156. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 51.20-21: *evaṃ dīpentena cānena dhammānaṃ sa-vasavattitābhimāno paṭisedhito hoti.*
Also see Tin (1976), p. 81, fn. 3.
157. *Nyanaponika* (1965), p. 105.
158. *Milindapañha-Pāli*, pp. 39ff; Horner (1963), pp. 68ff; T.W. Rhys Davids (1975), pp. 77ff; Walleser (1925), pp. 123-133; Keith (1923), pp. 163-165; Demiéville (1924), pp. 129ff.
159. Cf. *Mil.*, p. 39.8-10: "... kim etam addhānaṃ nāmā" ti? "atīto, mahārāja, addhā, anāgato addhā, paccuppanno addhā" ti.
T.W. Rhys Davids (1975, p. 77, and I.B. Horner (1963, p. 68. render 'addhā' as 'time' and '(saṃsaric) time' respectively. Walleser (1925, p. 124) takes it as subjective (ideal) time.
160. Cf. *DN*, iii, p. 216.16-17: *tayo addhā. atīto addhā, anāgato addhā, paccuppanno addhā*; *AN*, i, p. 197.11-17; *SN*, i, p. 140.1-8.
161. *Dialogues of the Buddha* (T.W. Rhys Davids, 1977), Pt.3, p. 209, fn. 6.
162. Cf. *Mil.*, p. 39.10-11: *koci, mahārāja, addhā atthi, koci natthi ti.*
Cf. the above mentioned theories of the Kassapikas and the Vibhajjavādins.
163. One of the most complicated concepts in Buddhism. It has been rendered differently, such as, kammic formation, confection (constituent potentialities of being), activity, habitual tendency, effort, aspiration, accumulation, construction, kammic residue, condition, propensity, factor, thing, component thing, created thing, complex, constituent part, element of existence, trouble, creation, etc. See Johansson (1979), pp. 41-56; *Nyanatiloka* (1938), pp. 145-148.
164. See *PC*, pp. 205-209; *KV*, VII.7-9.
165. See *PC*, pp. 209-210; *KV*, VII.10; Horner (1963), p. 68, fn. 6; C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1963), pp. 252-253.
166. Horner (1963, p. 69, fn. 2) prefers the reading 'kālakata', which is in the present context unacceptable.
167. There is a distinction between *Nibbāna* and *Parinibbāna*. "To a man who had 'attained *Nirvāṇa*' there would still be time as long as he was in the enjoyment of it, that is as long as he continued in his present (and last) existence" - T.W. Rhys Davids (1975), p. 78, fn. 1.
168. Cf. *Mil.*, p. 39.12-16: "ye te, mahārāja, saṅkhārā atitā vigatā niruddhā vipariṇatā, so addhā natthi. ye dhammā vipākā, ye ca vipākadhammadhammā, ye ca aññatra paṭisandhiṃ denti, so addhā atthi. ye sattā kālaṅkatā aññatra uppannā, so ca addhā atthi. ye ca sattā parinibbūtā, so ca addhā natthi, parinibbutattā" ti.
169. Cf. *KA*, pp. 103.6-104.9.

170. Cf. KV, VII.10.
171. 1963, p. 69, fn.1.
172. Cf. Mil., p. 39.22-23: atītassa ca, mahārāja, addhānassa avijjā mūlam.
173. Cf. ibid., p. 39.23-28.
174. Cf. SN, ii, pp. 178.8-193.24.
175. Cf. Mil., p. 40.1-26.
176. "This is something of an innovation" - Horner (1963), p.71, fn. 2.
177. Cf. Mil., pp. 40.32-41.1: "kāci, mahārāja, paññāyati, kāci na paññāyati" ti.
178. Cf. MN, iii, p.25.20-21: ahutvā sambhonti, hutva paṭivedentīti. On this point Kalupahana (1975, pp. 153-154) criticises Guenther (1974, p.170). Also see AD, p. 268.5; AKB, p. 813.1ff; TSP, pp. 623.18ff, 631.23ff.
179. Cf. Mil., p.41.2-4: "ito pubbe, mahārāja, sabbena sabbam sabbathā sabbam avijjā nāhosī ti esā purimā koṭi na paññāyati, yam ahutvā sambhoti hutvā paṭivigacchati, esā purimā koṭi paññāyati" ti.
T.W. Rhys Davids (1975, p.81) seems to be wrong in translating the first sentence of this passage: "Formerly, O King, everything in every form, everything in every mode, was ignorance. It is to us as if it were not". Walleser (1925, p.127) follows him. On the other hand, Horner's translation (1963, p.71) (except the last sentence, i.e. "Can this earliest point be shown?" which should not be interrogative.) is correct, but not consistent, because in the following discussion Nāgasena gives an example of khandha (Mil. p.41.10) which means tree (literally, trunk of the tree) as well as aggregate. This shows that ignorance is there before the chain begins, but it seems to us, in the words of T.W. Rhys Davids, as if it were not. This means that in this respect the ignorance is not known to us.
180. T.W. Rhys Davids (1975), p. 81, fn. 2.
181. Cf. Mil., p. 41.5-11: "bhante Nāgasena, yam ahutvā sambhoti, hutvā paṭivigacchati, nanu tam ubhato chinnaṃ atthaṃ gacchati" ti.
"yadi, mahārāja, ubhato chinnaṃ atthaṃ gacchati, ubhato chinnaṃ sakkā vaddhetuṃ" ti? "āma, sā pi sakkā vaddhetuṃ" ti. "nāham, bhante, etaṃ pucchāmi, koṭito sakkā vaddhetuṃ" ti? "āma, sakkā vaddhetuṃ" ti. "opammaṃ karohī" ti. therō tassa rūkkhūpamaṃ akāsi- khandhā ca kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa bijāni' ti.
Cp. SN, ii, pp. 87.20ff.
182. Cf. Mil., p. 41.15: atthi saṅkhārā, ye jāyanti.
183. Cf. ibid., p. 41.30-31: "natthi, mahārāja, keci saṅkhārā, ye abhavantā jāyanti. bhavantā yeva kho, mahārāja, saṅkhārā jāyanti" ti.

184. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 42.2-4: "natthi kiñci, bhante, idha abhavantam jātam, bhavantam yeva jātam. imāni kho, bhante, dārūni vane ahesum, ayañ ca mattikā pathaviyam ahosi, itthīnam ca purisānañ ca tajjena vāyāmena evam idaṃ gehaṃ nibbattaṃ" ti.
185. Guenther (1974), p. 170, fn. 3.
186. Kalupahana (1975), p. 154.
187. Walleser (1925), pp. 125-126.
188. Johansson (1979) makes a detailed study of this concept on the basis of Pali sources. Also see McGovern (1923), pp. 163-180.
189. Cf. SN, ii, p. 1.15ff.
190. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 1.22-23: evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.
191. See McGovern (1923), p. 175. For the later interpretation of paṭiccasamuppāda by the Yogācārins, see *ibid.*, pp. 177-180.
192. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

CHAPTER V

The Controversy of Time between the Vaibhāsikas and the
Sautrāntikas¹

Introduction

There are two realistic and pluralistic schools of Hīnayāna - Vaibhāṣika (or Sarvāstivāda) and Theravāda. The former represents the Sanskrit Abhidharma and the latter that of Pali. This chapter deals with the Sarvāstivāda notion of time in the light of its controversy with the radical Sautrāntikas found in the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu² (320-350 A.D.) with the commentary of Yaśomitra (9th century A.D.), *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita (725-788 A.D.) with the *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla⁴ (740-795 A.D.), *Mahāvibhāṣā*⁵ (100 A.D.), *Nyāyānu-sāraśāstra*⁶ of Saṅghabhadra (280-350 A.D.?) and the *Abhidharmadīpa* with its *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*⁷ (4th-5th century A.D., author unknown).

The Sarvāstivāda literature⁸ is almost preserved in Chinese. Apart from the above mentioned and the following seven treatises, it has some other philosophical texts, such as the *Abhidharmahrdaya* of Dharmottara⁹ (200 A.D.) and *Saṃyukta-abhidharmahrdaya* of Dharmatrāta¹⁰ (100 A.D.).

The seven treatises are:

- (1) *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* of Kātyāyanīputra¹¹ (early 1st century A.D.)
- (2) *Prakaranapāda* of Sthavira Vasumitra¹² (100 A.D.)
- (3) *Vijñānakāya* of Sthavira Devaśarman¹³
- (4) *Dharmaskandha* of Śāriputra¹⁴
- (5) *Prajñaptiśāstra* of Maudgalyāyana¹⁵
- (6) *Dhātukāya* of Purṇa¹⁶ (100 A.D.)
- (7) *Saṅgītiparyāya* of Mahākausthila¹⁷.

The *Jñānaprasthāna* is the fundamental and the most important work of the Sarvāstivāda school. Other texts are considered secondary to it. It is also called *Aṣṭaśāstra* (Eight Books). Its monumental significance is attested to the fact that a great commentary, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*,¹⁸ has been written on it by Pārśva.¹⁹ It is actually a work of compilation by 500 Arhats beginning with Vasumitra²⁰ 400 years after the Mahāparinirvāṇa of Buddha. It contains 200 Chinese volumes or parts. According to J. Takakusu, "In Chinese we have ... two transmissions of the *Vibhāṣā*, Large (200 parts) and Small (14 parts). Whether one was an abridgement of the other we cannot tell for certain. But from several points of view we can imagine that the large one belongs to the Kaśmīra school and the smaller to the Gāndhāra school."²¹ Professor M. Hattori of Kyoto University suggested to me that it was now certain that the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and *Vibhāṣā* are different in many respects regarding their contents, and so it cannot be said that the latter is an abridgement of the former. Murti and Nakamura also take them as two different commentaries.²²

The Vaibhāṣika philosophy was exclusively based on this great commentary, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and hence the name Vaibhāṣika.²³ The Vaibhāṣikas are also called Sarvāstivādin, as they maintain that 'everything exists' (sarvam asti), and their doctrine is called Sarvāstivāda (sarva-asti-vāda = everything-exists-doctrine).²⁴ They admit that both mental as well as material elements exist in reality. Thus they are called realist. They are also pluralist, as they accept 75 elements of existence (dharma) - 72 conditioned (saṃskṛta) and 3 unconditioned (asaṃskṛta).²⁵ But this does not mean that "they believe in continued or immutable existence of everything"²⁶, the existence of Self (atman) or any other universal permanent cause like Brahman of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic tradition. Actually, 'everything exists' means 75 dharmas, or 12 āyatana, or

18 dhātus,²⁷ irrespective of their temporal status, the past, present, or future.²⁸ The *Saṃyukta Āgama*²⁹ says that "Everything exists means that the twelve āyatanas exist". Here Kalupahana makes a significant remark as follows:

"Stcherbatsky misunderstood the implications of the above text. The statement 'everything exists means the twelve āyatanas exist' did not mean that the twelve āyatanas, past, present, and future, exist, as the Sarvāstivādins would have interpreted. There is no reference to the past and the future, or, for that matter, to any conception of time. Early Buddhism does not deny present sense experience, or therefore, their causes, namely, the sense organs and sense objects. This idea is clearly expressed in the Sūtra that immediately follows the one Stcherbatsky quoted: "The visual organ and the visible object produce visual consciousness and contact. As a result of visual contact (yen ch'u) there arise feelings that are either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. This is what is meant by 'everything exists' Moreover, the Sarvāstivāda theory of 'everything exists' (sarvam asti) not only implies the real existence of the twelve āyatanas, but also the existence of an eternal substratum (dravya) or ultimate nature (svabhāva). This idea is denied by the very Sūtra quoted by Stcherbatsky The Sarvāstivāda theory may therefore be taken as a new development in the history of Buddhist thought resulting from the acceptance of the theory of momentariness."³⁰

The Sarvāstivāda accepts the objective reality of the dharmas on which is based the whole formation of phenomena. It maintains a distinction between a thing (substance) and its different states, which would fall in line with the common-sense notion of causation, according to which a thing undergoes modification through the three time-epochs, the past, present and future, yet its substance remains the same. It is possible that the Sarvāstivādins were influenced by their contemporary realists, such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā in this regard.

The Sarvāstivāda theory of traikālyavāda is a new arrival in the history of Buddhism. To quote Schayer, it "is an interesting and original attempt at replacing the hypostasis of a substantial time by another hypostasis, viz. that of real future and past elements of being. Each dharma exists through the three phases of the future, present and past."³¹

As we shall see later on, the past, present and future are not considered by the Sarvāstivādins as things-in-themselves, rather as different modes, states, positions or relations of dharmas. The Sautrāntikas vehemently criticise the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of traikālyavāda. The former denies the reality of the past and future dharmas, and maintains that the only one to be real is the present which is dynamic and possesses causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva). The Sautrāntikas, in their most radical statement, assert that the past and future time-epochs, ākāśa, Nirvāṇa and pudgala are mere names, assertions, empirical and of common usage.³² Instead of real past and future dharmas, and substantial time, they propound the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇavāda).³³ Further, the Vai-
bhāṣikas hold that the external objects are directly perceived. But the Sautrāntikas explain away such hypothesis and argue that since a past moment is unreal, the content of perception is also unreal from the objective point of view having no objective counterpart and "What is directly perceived is only our own idea which acquires the form of the object (sākāra-jñāna). Inasmuch as the diversity of the forms in our ideas could be caused by external objects, their existence is inferred from that diversity. In other words, the Vaibhāṣika's view may be called presentationist, and that of the Sautrāntika representationist."³⁴

The Sarvāstivādins (or the Vaibhāṣikas) admit 75 dharmas³⁵ in which there is no time. Still, one can find the ideas of both absolute as well as empirical time, though in disguise. The absolute existence of Nirvāṇa gives the idea of absolute time, and the saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas, jāti, sthiti, jarā, and anityatā³⁶ that of empirical time.

The existence of dharmas may be understood in connection with the origination, duration and destruction of anuśayas (seeds of kleśas or passions) in respect of past, present and future. "The elements of moral

defilement (kleśas) are always present in a life (saṃtāna), in a latent or patent condition. When latent, they have the form of 'residues' (anuśaya), they stick to the elements, pollute them, bring them into commotion and prevent their coming down to rest."³⁷ The anuśayas are of six kinds: attachment (rāga), pride (māna), repulsion (pratigha), wrong view (drṣṭi), doubt (vicikitsā) and ignorance (avidyā). The first three are svalakṣaṇa (a thing-in-itself, a thing in its specific form), because they arise with a particular object at a particular time, and the last three are sāmānyalakṣaṇa (a thing-in-general, or a thing in its generic form), because they arise with the empirical objects in general.³⁸

Man is attached to the objects of the past, present and future by his past and present rāga, pratigha and māna.³⁹ There are some passions, such as rāga, which exist only if the corresponding objects are present. On the other hand, there are other passions, such as drṣṭi, avidyā and vicikitsā, which are existent with all the objects of all times, the past, present and future.⁴⁰

The Vaibhāṣika Proofs for the Existence of the Past and Future Dharmas

Now the question arises whether the past and future really exist or not. If they are ever-existent, the saṃskāras (elementary forces) will be permanent and hence static, whereas they are active in the process of life. If they are not so, how is it possible for an individual to be attached to or detached from the objects of the past and future?⁴¹ But the Vaibhāṣikas do not admit the saṃskāras as eternal, because they possess saṃkr̥talakṣaṇas,⁴² i.e. origination, duration, decay and destruction. They boldly proclaim that the dharmas exist through the three time-epochs. The transition of the dharmas through different times shows that they are conditioned (saṃskṛta) and the continuance of their essence through the past, present and future determines their existence in all times. In this sense they

maintain that "all times", i.e. the past, present and future, exist in reality.⁴³ To support their hypothesis they quote some passages from the Āgamas. They place the following arguments which demonstrate the reality of the past and future elements:⁴⁴

(1) It is said by Buddha in the scriptures that an enlightened Śrāvaka keeps himself indifferent from the past and future rūpas (sense-objects), even though they do exist. The present rūpas are so apparent that they need no argument to be proved. If the past rūpa (form), O monks, had not existed, the learned Śrāvaka would not have been indifferent towards the past rūpa. Since there is a past rūpa, the learned Śrāvaka becomes indifferent to it.⁴⁵ The same is the case with the future rūpas. Thus the past and future rūpas exist.

(2) It is also said in the scriptures that consciousness arises from two factors - the material object and the sense organs, or the mind and the mental object. The sense organs can perceive only the present objects, while the mind can cognise past as well as future objects. Therefore, if there were no past and future objects, consciousness, which has them as corresponding objects, would not originate. Thus it is evident from the scriptures (Āgama) that there are past and future dharmas.⁴⁶

Stcherbatsky observes that "these first two reasons for admitting the existence of the past and the future are taken from Scripture, but there are others, too, which are founded on argument."⁴⁷

(3) If the past and future elements are not real, consciousness of the past and future propositions, such as, 'there was once a King Mahā-saṁmata' or 'there will be once a Cakravartin Śaṅkha', which refer to the past and future objects respectively, would be objectless (nirālam-bana). And then consciousness also would be absent, because of the lack of corresponding objects (ālambana). It is said: "Consciousness is cognizance of the corresponding objects". If there were no objects to be

cognised (jñeya), there would be no knowledge of anything by it (i.e. consciousness).⁴⁸ Hence, the past and future dharmas exist.

(4) If the past elements do not exist, the past Karma would give no retribution (vipāka), because the moment the retribution would arise, its cause (vipākahetu)⁴⁹ would be inexistent. And that which is non-existent is devoid of the potency of producing effects (kāryotpādanaśakti), as a non-existent thing completely lacks all the potencies.⁵⁰

(5) If the past and future elements do not exist in reality, the differentiated consciousness of the Yogins regarding the past and future objects, such as, 'once there was a King Māndhātā',⁵¹ 'there was once a King Brahmadata', or 'there will be once the Cakravartin Śaṅkha', 'there will be once the Tathāgata Maitreya', would not be possible, and there would be no clear distinction of the inexistent objects. Hence, the past as well as the future objects are not devoid of substantial reality.⁵²

Thus, the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that everything, the past, present and future dharmas exist, and the followers of this theory are called the Sarvāstivādins.⁵³ On the other hand, there are others called the Vibhajyavādins, who partly admit and partly deny this theory. According to them, only the present and past, which has not yet produced the result, exist. They admit, unlike the Sarvāstivādins, that the future and past, which has produced the fruit, are not existent.⁵⁴

Time and the Four Theories of Change in the Sarvāstivāda School⁵⁵

The Sarvāstivāda school has four great teachers, Dharmatrāta (100 A.D.), Ghoṣaka (150 A.D.), Vasumitra (100 A.D.) and Buddhadeva, who establish differently the existence of the past, present and future dharmas. "All these theories", writes St. Schayer, "which accept the reality of the three Times emphasise unanimously that a dharma, when

passing through the Time-epochs, does not change its essence and that it is only its empirical aspect, the bhāva in the terminology of Dharmatrāta, the avasthā in the terminology of Vasumitra, which undergoes transformation. But both these terms do not mean much as they are unfortunately not explained in details, but only modo indicio illustrated by dr̥ṣṭāntas which should not be taken literally."⁵⁶ Now let us explain these theories one by one.

(1) The theory of the change of modes (bhāvānyathātva) - Bhadanta Dharmatrāta professes the theory of change as the transformation of modes (bhāva).⁵⁷ Bhāva is defined by Kamalaśīla⁵⁸ as a special quality (guṇaviśeṣa)⁵⁹ from which arises the cognitive tendency (jñānapravṛtti) regarding the following terms: the past, present and future. Dharmatrāta sets forth that when a dharma passes through the three phases of time, viz. the past, present and future, only its modes change not its substance, just as gold is changed into different kinds of ornaments, such as, finger-rings, ear-rings, bracelets, armllets, chains, etc. In all these states only the mode of gold is changed, not its substance and colour (varṇa). Likewise, when milk is turned into curd, its taste, digestive capacity, etc. are changed, not its colour. In the same manner, when a dharma enters from future into present, it discards its future bhāva and attains its present bhāva, and by getting rid of its present bhāva, it attains its past bhāva, but the substance of the dharma remains the same,⁶⁰ because it never loses itself. Otherwise, it will result that the substance is one in the future, another in the present and still another in the past, which leads to absurdity.

(2) The theory of the change of characteristic (lakṣaṇānyathātva) - Bhadanta Ghoṣaka maintains that only the characteristics (lakṣaṇa)⁶¹ of a dharma are subject to change. When a dharma passes through different times, it submits to changes in its characteristics only; the past one

attains its past characteristic without being severed from its present and future characteristics; the present one attains its present characteristic without being severed from its past and future characteristics; and the future one retains its future characteristic without being deprived of its past and present characteristics. For example, when a man is in love with a woman, at the same time he is not free from the passions for other women.⁶² This leads to the conclusion that the past, present and future co-exist, but at a particular time the corresponding particular characteristic is predominant over the other two. The difference between the theories of Dharmatrāta and Ghosaka is that the latter maintains that in practice (vyavāhara) the past, present and future characteristics attain their activity (vṛtti) at their proper times.⁶³

(3) The theory of the change of condition (avasthānyathātva) - Bhadanta Vasumitra assumes the theory of the change of condition (avasthā)⁶⁴ in an element. He "states that objects exist at all the three times: past, present and future, and do not undergo any change either in their substance or in their form and quality, or in their characteristics as contended by Dharmatrāta and Ghosaka."⁶⁵ When a dharma appears at different times, its conditions change, not its essence, and it receives different designations in reference to its condition which it achieves, without any alteration in its substance. For example, when a small ball (gulikā) is thrown in the place of units, it means one; when thrown in place of hundreds and thousands, it is denominated hundred and thousand respectively and so on.⁶⁶ In this theory the condition is determined by its causal efficiency (kāritra). When a dharma is in the condition in which it has not yet attained its causal efficiency, or it has not yet produced any effect, it is called future; when it continues to be in its kāritra, it is present; and when

it has already ceased to be active, it is past, maintaining itself unchanged in its essence.⁶⁷

(4) The theory of the change of temporal relativity (anyathānya-thātva) - Bhadanta Buddhadeva propounds a theory of the change of relation (anyathā). He states that a dharma passing through different phases of time is designated differently as past, present and future in relation to its antecedent and subsequent moments without altering its essence. For example, a woman is called mother with reference to her children, and daughter with reference to her own mother.⁶⁸ Thus, a dharma is future with reference to its antecedent moments - past and present; it is present, when it has both its antecedent and subsequent moments, past and future respectively; and that which has only its subsequent moment, i.e. present or future, is past.⁶⁹ Thus, these are the four Sarvāstivāda theories of change⁷⁰ which also deal with the three time-epochs, the past, present and future.

A Critical Estimate of the Four Theories of Change

The preceding four theories of the Sarvāstivādins have received severe criticism from the Sautrāntikas. Actually, these theories seem to divert from the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. The Sarvāstivādins maintain that the elements are real and possess substance, and so it goes against the doctrine of non-substantiality (anātmavāda) and impermanence (anityatā), which they admit themselves. They also profess the theory of momentariness in their teachings. Like the Mahīśāsakas, Pūrvaśailas, Aparāśailas and Kāśyapīyas, but unlike the Theravādins, they establish that the mental as well as material elements are instantaneous.⁷¹ Vasubandhu provides an analysis of the controversy of momentary character of elements between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas (AKB,ii.45-46).⁷²

Vasubandhu criticises vehemently the above theories, because they are "not found in the genuine discourse of the Buddha, but it is an innovation of the *Vibhāṣā* (Exegetic) Literature of the Abhidharma School."⁷³ He attacks Dharmatrāta by saying that this theory is not different from the *pariṇāma*vāda (identity theory of cause and effect) of Sāṃkhya,⁷⁴ which maintains the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the permanent substance. The Sāṃkhya theory has been repudiated elsewhere by Kamalaśīla (*Prakṛtiparīkṣā*, TSP, chapter 1). The gist of his criticism is that the transformation of the substance is possible in two ways: first, by not discarding the previous *svabhāva* (essence) and secondly, by discarding the same. In the former, there arises a confusion (*saṃkara*) of three time-epochs, the past, present and future, and in the latter, there is a contradiction in the Sarvāstivāda doctrine that everything exists.⁷⁵

It seems that the theory of twofold dharmas, *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta*, brings the Sarvāstivādins very close to the Sāṃkhya. The former accept the momentary manifestation of all the *saṃskṛta* dharmas, while the latter that of *Prakṛti*. When all the manifestations come to an end, all the *saṃskāras* are extinct and only lifeless residue is left. This is in itself a reality without any activity, life or personality, which is similar to the eternal unmanifested matter (*Prakṛti*) of the Sāṃkhya.⁷⁶ But unlike the Sāṃkhya, the Sarvāstivādins, or the Buddhists in general never admit any eternal soul (*puruṣa*). Apart from similarities between these two systems, their differences too cannot be overlooked.⁷⁷ This requires a separate study which is not possible here. The similarities between the two induce Vasubandhu to criticise the theory of Dharmatrāta.

The second theory of Ghosaka is rejected on the same ground that it creates confusion or comingling (*saṃkara*), since all the characteristics

of the elements are said to co-exist. Again, Vasubandhu professedly denied any affinity (sāmya) between the illustration of a man, who is in love with a woman, and a dharma, which passes through the time-epochs. The man is said to be in love (rakta) when he is actually in process of love for something; and he is also said to be not deprived of love (avirakta) even if he is only in possession (samanvāgamamātreṇa)⁷⁸ of desire for something else. But in the case of a dharma, it is not correct to say that the attainment of temporal characteristics by it is with reference to either an actual activity or possession of activity."⁷⁹

The theory of Buddhadeva is set aside on the ground that in it each time includes in itself all the three time-epochs simultaneously. Take for example, the past time. In this state the preceding and succeeding moments are past and future respectively, and the middle one is present. This criticism is quite clear,⁸⁰ since in each time, all the three time-epochs are present. This shows that every moment is past, present and future in relation to some or other moment. So it is not at all admissible.

An Analysis of Vasumitra's Theory of Kāritra

It is curious to see that even if Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva are Sarvāstivādins, they are criticised by the Vaibhāṣikas.⁸¹ Only Vasumitra's view is accepted by them.⁸² According to Vasubandhu too, the third theory of Vasumitra in which the distinction of the time-epochs is established on the basis of Kāritra (causal efficiency) deserves some importance.⁸³ Here Edward Conze is apparently wrong to say that "Vasubandhu accepts Vasumitra's solution, which distinguishes the three periods of time with reference to a dharma's activity (kāritra)".⁸⁴

Actually, Vasubandhu does not accept Vasumitra's solution as true, rather he finds in it some similarity with the Sautrāntika theory of causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva), that is why he chooses it for discussion. Ultimately he criticises Vasumitra, which will be clear from the following discussions.

There is a long controversy between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas on Vasumitra's theory: When a dharma has not yet discharged its causal efficiency (kāritra), it is future; when it has attained its kāritra, it is present; and when its kāritra has ceased to be, it is past.⁸⁵ In all these states there is a permanent substance which remains unchanged. This conception of kāritra is one of the most significant and interesting contributions to discussion of the concept of time, especially in the controversy with the Sautrāntikas. One must keep in mind that there is no separate element of time as such in the list of dharmas given by the Sarvāstivādins. When we speak of the past, present and future dharmas, it means dharmas as past, present and future with reference to different stages of their causal efficiency. It is not that the Sarvāstivādins admit an absolute, all-pervasive time as a reservoir in which the dharmas are placed in their various states. It is rather surprising that D.J. Kalupahana, with whom John M. Koller⁸⁶ is in agreement, on the basis of Pali sources maintains that "... the Sarvāstivādins admit that not only everything past, present, and future exist, but that past, present and future themselves exist, that is, they are independently real they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time".⁸⁷ In this regard he does not quote any Sarvāstivāda text which supports this statement.

Here the Theravādins⁸⁸ misunderstood the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of "everything exists" and interpreted it as "the past, present and future

themselves exist independently". According to O. Rosenberg, says E.J. Thomas, "everything does not refer to all dharmas, in the sense of dharmas of every kind, but to the dharmas of all the three times".⁸⁹ Without giving any satisfactory evidence, E.J. Thomas further expresses his own opinion that "there were Sarvāstivādins who asserted the existence of past, present, and future as real things (dravyatā). This is the sense which is rejected by the *Kathāvattu*".⁹⁰ This observation of his is based on a single question asked in the *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* (p. 620.10) and its *Vyākhyā* (p. 620.25): "kālo nāma ka eṣa dharmah?" (What is the dharma which we call time?). This does not show that this was the theory of Sarvāstivādins. One gets the reply there instantly: "This is not an eternal substance (padārtha)".⁹¹ Yaśomitra in his *Vyākhyā* (p. 620.24) only mentions that there is a theory of eternal time as a substance.⁹² This may be the theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who admits an eternal and substantial time. It should also be noted that at other places too the Sarvāstivādins never assert that time is a substance. The *Vibhāṣā*, on the other hand, suggests that the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins maintain that "Time by its nature is eternal (nitya)".⁹³ It is also possible that it is this statement which we find in AKV (p. 620.24). But we are not sure that they really admitted such a notion. Thomas Watters also commits the same mistake when he asserts that Vasumitra "held that the Past, Present, and Future are all realities".⁹⁴

It is true that the Sarvāstivāda theory of everything exists is a new arrival in the history of Buddhist thoughts, but it is also true that, according to the Sarvāstivādins, nothing is outside the seventy-five dharmas, which constitute all sorts of material and immaterial things, and time is not an exception. Thus, it is absolutely unconvincing

to say that time has an independent ontological status apart from dharmas. We agree with D.J. Kalupahana⁹⁵ that the Sarvāstivādin's theory of "everything, past, present, and future, exists" is contradicted by the Nikāyas and the Āgamas,⁹⁶ that the former in this regard oversteps the limit of linguistic convention, and that the following statement of the Pāli version of the Nikāyas should be taken as a "warning for the Sarvāstivādins to avoid the mistake of maintaining that dharmas in their ultimate reality exist during the past, present, and future":⁹⁷

"There are these three linguistic conventions or usages of words or terms that are distinct - have been distinct in the past, are distinct at present, and will be distinct in the future - which [conventions] are not ignored by the recluses and brahmins who are wise. Which three? Whatever form (rūpa) there has been, which has ceased to be, which is past and has changed is called, reckoned, and termed 'has been' (ahosi); it is not reckoned as 'it exists' (atthi) nor as 'it will be' (bhavissati). [The same is repeated with regard to the other four aggregates.] ... Whatever form is not arisen, not come to be, is called, reckoned, or termed 'it will be' (bhavissati) and is not reckoned 'it exists' or 'it has been' ... Whatever form has been and has manifested itself is called, reckoned, or termed 'to exists' and is not reckoned 'it has been' or 'it will be'."⁹⁸

The selflessness of elements indicates that the Sarvāstivādins still maintain the basic teaching of Buddhism. But their doctrine of time made a distinct departure from the early or canonical Buddhism, which admits only two stages, origination and destruction,⁹⁹ or sometimes three, origination, decay and destruction.¹⁰⁰ The Vaibhāṣikas introduce an extra stage of duration (sthiti) which, they think, "was suppressed by the Buddha because of the danger which it involved to the doctrine of impermanence, but which is implicitly included in the last stage (sthityanyathātva)".¹⁰¹

The Sarvāstivādins explicitly rejected the theory that time is an eternal substance, and instead they posited the reality of dharmas as ever-lasting. When asked: What is the dharma which we call time

(kāla), they professedly reply that this is not an eternal entity (padārtha) as some believe. The word time is an expression (abhidhāna) by which are designated the saṃskāras in so far as the past, future and present are concerned.¹⁰² Further it is said that the saṃskṛta dharmas are epochs (adhvan), that is to say, they are past, present and future, because of their tri-temporal nature - 'traversed', 'being traversed' and 'yet to be traversed'.¹⁰³

The *Vibhāṣā*¹⁰⁴ maintains that there are three kinds of dharmas, the past, present and future. It claims to refute the erroneous doctrines and establishes the true one. According to one opinion, which is criticised by the *Vibhāṣā*, time (adhvan) is different from saṃskāras.¹⁰⁵ As the *Vibhāṣā* points out, the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins set forth that "time by its nature is eternal (nitya), the saṃskāras are non-eternal (anitya). The saṃskāras flow in time like the fruits in open baskets, going from this basket to another, or like several men leaving this house in order to enter that house. Likewise, the saṃskāras of the future enter into the present, of the present enter into the past".¹⁰⁶ But the author of the *Vibhāṣā* shows that time is not different from the nature of saṃskāras, time is the saṃskāras and the saṃskāras are time.¹⁰⁷ Saṃghabhadra establishes the difference of three time-epochs on the basis of kāritra (activity) and says: "The saṃskāras¹⁰⁸ which do not yet have activity are called 'future'; when they have activity, they are called 'present'; when their activity is destroyed, they are called 'past'. But there is no change in the substance (dravya)."¹⁰⁹

From the above analysis, now it is clear that the Vaibhāṣikas or the Sarvāstivādins do not maintain the ontological and independent status of time, as D.J. Kalupahana and J. Koller profess or as the Theravādins understood.

The preceding theory of the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins gives the notion of time, independent of the phenomena, like space and Nirvāṇa. As André Bareau suggests, Vasumitra's theory of the change of avasthā leads us to the same conception. He observes:

"The analogy he [Vasumitra] draws between things and counters, which take different names according to the boxes in which they are placed, is quite near to that of the fruit placed in a pot, and of the men in the house, chosen by the Vibhajyavādin and the Dārṣṭāntika. The only difference, but it is an essential one, is in the point of view of the thinkers. Vasumitra sees things only, and pays no attention to the space in which they are situated, whereas his opponents consider both, and draw between them the comparisons and the relations which force themselves on their minds."¹¹⁰

Here we find only analogy between the ways the illustrations (dṛṣṭānta) are given by the two sides, whereas they propound different theories from each other. Still it is to be noted that Vasumitra's analogy between the illustrations of a small ball (gulikā) and the numerical place (aṅka) on the one hand, and a dharma and its three stages, past, present and future based on its kāritra, on the other hand, are inappropriate or rather misleading. This analogy, not the theory itself, leads one to the notion that time is a receptacle in which dharmas are deposited in their different stages. The comparison of numerical place and the kāritra is completely incorrect. The former gives the idea of space, whereas the latter that of different temporal stages. It is clearly expressed that the word "adhvan" (time-epoch) not only includes in itself all the skandhas, i.e. rūpa skandha, etc., but also other elements, such as duḥkha-samudaya, anityatā, and anātma. This shows that time is nothing apart from saṃskāras, skandhas, duḥkha-samudaya, anityatā, anātma, and so on.¹¹¹ Hence time should not be conceived as an independent and all-pervasive entity.

Even if the Vaibhāṣikas deny again and again the independent reality of time and its three phases, the Sautrāntikas ask the question: If the

past and future exist as things, then they are present, and so how can they be described as past and future ?¹¹² This objection, in the opinion of André Bareau,¹¹³ is decisive, but we contend that both the Sautrāntikas and André Bareau misunderstood here the Vaibhāṣika position. It is really striking that Bareau in the same paper contradicts his own statement when he writes: "... the past, the present and the future were not considered by the Sarvāstivādins as things in themselves, but as modes of being, states, features, positions, reciprocal relations."¹¹⁴ The Sarvāstivādins do not admit the three time-epochs as possessing eternal substance or as reality in themselves; rather the dharmas, they pronounce, have the substantial reality throughout its different stages of transition. The Vaibhāṣikas have already said that it is the operation (kāritra) in its various stages, i.e. not yet developed, fully developed, and already settled, which determines the temporal status of the dharmas.¹¹⁵

The Kāritra Defined

Now the question arises: What is the meaning (abhipreta) of kāritra? The Vaibhāṣikas answer that kāritra means activity (vyāpāra), such as an act of seeing; it means the activities of five sense organs, by means of which the eye is seeing, the ear is hearing, the nose is smelling, the tongue is tasting, and the skin is experiencing; it is the activity by which consciousness (vijñāna) cognises the objects; and again, it is the activity by which the rūpa, etc. are made objects of the corresponding sense organs. The Sautrāntikas object that if it were so, the present (pratyutpanna) tatsabhāga¹¹⁶ eye¹¹⁷ would not possess actuality (vartamānatā) in the state of sleep, because it lacks the kāritra.¹¹⁸ In other words, even if the elements are obviously present, they do not perform their kāritra, i.e. they do not produce, for example, any sight.

The Vaibhāṣikas modify their definition of kāritra, according to which the kāritra means the potency of performing two kinds of functions: the potency of projecting (phaladāna) and of grasping (phalapratigraha) a result.¹¹⁹ Here it is important to notice that a particular dharma does not manifest itself by its own potency, rather its activity is determined by its preceding dharmas. Every preceding dharma forces its future succeeding dharmas to manifest their activity. This means that the real activity of a dharma is to determine the activity of subsequent dharmas. In this respect the Sarvāstivādins establish six kinds of causal relations¹²⁰ between the elements: (1) cause of existence (kāraṇa-hetu),¹²¹ (2) simultaneous cause (sahabhūhetu), (3) homogeneous cause (sabhāghetu), (4) associated cause (saṃprayuktakahetu), (5) universal cause (sarvatragahetu), and (6) cause of retribution (vipākahetu).¹²² Of these causes the first corresponds to the fruit of sovereign (adhipatiphala),¹²³ the second and fourth to the fruit of the activity of virile, or anthropomorphic result (puruṣakārāphala),¹²⁴ the third and fifth to the fruit of flow (niṣyandāphala),¹²⁵ and sixth to the fruit of retribution, or the fruit of maturity (vipākāphala).¹²⁶ Again, a dharma is (1) niṣyandāphala, since it is similar to its cause, (2) puruṣakārāphala, since it is born by the force of its cause, (3) adhipatiphala, since it is born on the ground of non-obstacle or its cause,¹²⁷ and (4) vipākāphala, since it is not born simultaneously, or immediately in the next moment.¹²⁸ The past and present dharmas can be sarvatraga and sabhāghetu (see AKP, ii, pp. 257 ff.). The dharmas of the past, present and future can be saṃprayukta, sahabhū and vipākā-hetu. Vipākāhetu gives its fruit when it is past, for the fruit is not simultaneous, though it may be immediately consecutive to its cause.¹²⁹ The conditioned dharmas of the three epochs are kāraṇahetu, and the unconditioned dharmas are beyond time.¹³⁰

Now one may ask: In which condition (i.e. past, present, or future) each of the causes happens, when it takes (gr̥hṇāti, ākṣipati) and gives (prayacchati, dadāti) its fruit ? A dharma takes a fruit when it becomes the seed.¹³¹ A dharma gives a fruit in the moment when it gives the force of origination to this fruit, that is to say, in the moment when the future fruit, which is turned towards the origination or is ready to be born (utpādābhimukha), is given by this dharma the force, which makes the former (the future fruit) enter into the condition of present.¹³² The five causes take their fruit only when they are present; they are past, when they have already taken their fruits; and future, when they are not yet active.¹³³

Now let us come back to the Vaibhāṣika definition of kāritra as "phaladānapratigraha". In this case, for example, the four saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas, jāti, sthiti, jarā and anityatā, co-existent with a particular element of the eye produce an anthropomorphic result (puruṣakārāphala) and the next succeeding element is the puruṣakārāphala, adhipatiphala (fruit of the sovereign) and niṣyandaphala (fruit of flow) in relation to its preceding element. Thus, because of producing (jananāt) all these fruits, the kāritra of the element is called "giving" (prayacchad), and because of being the cause (hetubhāvāvasthānād) of these fruits it is called "grasping" (gr̥hṇat), and is in this context "present".¹³⁴ The Sautrāntikas argue that if this is so, the past causes, such as sabhāgahetu, sarvatragahetu and vipākahetu too would be present, because it has already been conceded that they also produce a fruit.¹³⁵

But this objection, reply the Vaibhāṣikas, fares no better, because the kāritra is said to possess both the characteristics of phaladāna and phalagrahaṇa altogether.¹³⁶ The past sabhāga although "giving" is not "grasping".¹³⁷ The Sautrāntikas assert that if we accept this definition,

the past causes, such as sabhāgahetu, will be semi-present, because they have the characteristic of only giving the fruit, not grasping it.¹³⁸ Another problem is that if the three time-epochs are established according to the kāritra, an element having the characteristic of past also will be present, since it produces the fruit of the present moment. Thus, a comingling of the three time-epochs arises.

Samghabhadra's Reply to the Sautrāntikas

Keeping these difficulties in view, Samghabhadra¹³⁹ states that the Sautrāntikas advance their criticism, because they do not understand the nature of the dharma (dharmaśvabhāva) properly. Actually, the potency (śakti) of a dharma is of two kinds: activity (tso-yong, kāritra) and power (kong-neng, vṛtti, sāmāthyā, vyāpāra).¹⁴⁰ The power of projecting the fruit is called the activity of the dharma, not the actual bearing of the fruit.¹⁴¹ Even if kāritra is defined as phalākṣepa-sāmāthyā,¹⁴² the former does not possess the whole sāmāthyā. There is sāmāthyā which exists apart from the activity. That is why, for example, in obscurity or darkness, sāmāthyā (of the eye) of seeing the objects is obstructed by the darkness, but not so its kāritra. In other words, the darkness prevents the sāmāthyā of vision (darśanavyāpāra), hence the eye is not able to perceive the visibles. But its kāritra of projecting the fruit is not prevented by the darkness. The eye, therefore, even in such obscurity (āvaraṇa) projects its fruit, which is a new moment of the eye.¹⁴³ In the present state the kāritra is not absent, because it is the kāritra which establishes this state. The cessation of the kāritra of a dharma does not entail that the dharma is inexistent. As regards the fact of being the cause of the birth of a different dharma (i.e. bhāva, sing), that is not kāritra, rather only sāmāthyā, for it is only the present which projects the fruit; for the unconditioned

ones (asaṃskṛta dharmas), which are beyond time, do not project the fruit; for it is only projection of fruit which is called activity. Therefore, because of the inadequate knowledge of the Abhidharma doctrines, says Saṃghabhadra, the Sautrāntikas consider the sāmānyā as being the activity. The past cause, although it bears the fruit, is deprived of the activity. Now it is clear that the characteristics of the three time-epochs are not mingled.¹⁴⁴

However, the Sautrāntikas advance further severe criticism.¹⁴⁵ They raise the following questions: What is that which opposes the kāritra ? How is it past, present and future ? If it is not different from the dharma, the three epochs would disappear. If the dharmas exist in the past and future just in the same way as in the present, then why are they past and future, and not present ? If the proper nature (svabhāva,¹⁴⁶ tse-sing) or essence of the dharmas always exists, i.e. throughout the three time-epochs, it must produce the activity at all time. If their kāritra is not in the three time-epochs, what is that which has its kāritra in the form of obstacle (kiṃ vighnam kāritram) ?¹⁴⁷ What is that which sometimes activates the dharmas to perform and sometimes not to perform their kāritra ?¹⁴⁸ Saṃghabhadra puts this objection of the Sautrāntikas as follows: "Since the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the proper nature (t'i) of the dharma is unchanging, what force is that which induces the obstacle of all kinds, that the dharma does not always have the same state [bhāva] (sing-lei)?"¹⁴⁹

This objection, according to Saṃghabhadra is not justified. The identity of the characteristic of the proper nature (svabhāva) is not an argument which demonstrates the unity or identity of the bhāva. Indeed, one observes in the phenomena that the characteristic of the proper nature does not present any difference, rather the state (bhāva)

differs. He establishes the simultaneous existence of the dharmas which are essentially identical (i.e. not different with regard to the *sva-lakṣaṇa*), but differ with respect to the *bhāva* (yeou sing), such as *pr̥thivīdhātu* (terrestrial element), which is always in its essence solid, has diverse nature (sing), being internal (*ādhyātmikabhāva*), external; the sensation (*vedanā*) etc., which is always in its essence "experience", has diverse nature, being personal, of others, pleasant, or distressing.¹⁵⁰

Again, Saṃghabhadra formulates the objection of the Sautrāntikas differently as follows:

"In my [i.e. Sautrāntika] system the *saṃskāras* (or the conditioned dharmas), the conditions (*pratyaayas*), the concurrence of the conditions exist after inexistence [*abhūtvā bhavati*]. The conditions are of different kinds. Sometimes they concur, sometimes they do not. We understand that the dharmas are not born at all times. But you [i.e. Vaibhāṣikas] maintain that the *saṃskṛtas* and their conditions, of all times, always possess [their] proper nature (yeou-t'i, *sasvabhāva*), for you do not admit that the dharmas exist after inexistence. They must therefore always be present. [Now the question arises] what force is that which is able to oppose them?"¹⁵¹

This remark also, according to Saṃghabhadra, is not justified, because the problem has already been elucidated. We have said earlier that the characteristic of the *svabhāva* (t'i-siang) remains the same; only its *bhāva* (lei-sing) changes. Even though this notion is established by the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas make the following objection: You maintain that the *saṃskāras* and their conditions¹⁵² of all times perpetually possess their proper nature (*sasvabhāva*, yeou-t'i). What is that which makes the activity not to exist always, that they are not perpetually present in all times? The objection tumbles down when one understands the above exposed doctrine, i.e. the proper nature is constant, but the *bhāvas* (sing-lei) are different.¹⁵³

The Vaibhāṣikas further assert that the kāritra is activated when all the necessary conditions are present.¹⁵⁴ The Sautrāntikas reject this hypothesis, because the Vaibhāṣikas do admit that these conditions are always present and call the kāritra as past, present and future.¹⁵⁵

Is the Kāritra Different from its Dharma ?

Kamalaśīla places a series of arguments against the Vaibhāṣikas. He says that the Vaibhāṣikas must accept one of the two alternatives: that kāritra is either different or not different from its dharma. Since the characteristics of these two alternatives are mutually exclusive, the denial of one infers the affirmation of the other, and conversely, the affirmation of one leads to the denial of the other. And there is no third alternative which is acceptable.¹⁵⁶

(1) If the kāritra is different from the dharma, the latter would be without essence (niḥsvabhāva, i.e. unreal) in its antecedent and subsequent stages.¹⁵⁷ Schayer formulates this in the following syllogism:¹⁵⁸

- Probandum : dharmas existing in the present are unreal in their antecedent and subsequent states
- Reason : because they are causes (= hetutvād), or because they are contingent (= saṃskṛtatvād).
- Example : just as in the case with kāritra.

Contrary to this, if the dharmas are not unreal in their antecedent and subsequent states, then all the saṃskṛtas would be permanent, since the svabhāva of the dharmas are established in all times (= sarvadā), and this is the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of permanence. To support this argument Kamalaśīla quotes the *Pramāṇavārtika* (1. 206) that "According to learned men permanent is that whose svabhāva (essence) is never destroyed".¹⁵⁹

The Vaibhāṣikas urge that śakti¹⁶⁰ (= kāritra) is the svabhāva of permanent substance (nityasya śakti), or eternality is śakti (nityatā śakti). Consequently, in the Sautrāntika syllogism "there is no exclusion of the reasons: hetutva (being a cause) or saṃskṛtatva (being contingent), etc. from the class of negative instances (hetoḥ sādhyavipakṣeṇa virodhaḥ), i.e. in [the Sautrāntika] case from the class of permanent entities."¹⁶¹

Now, Kamalaśīla refers back to his criticism of the preceding objection in the *Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā* (TSP, chapter 8). Since, he says, it is accepted by all that everything which is conditioned (saṃskṛta) is also impermanent (anitya), the conditionedness (saṃskṛtatva) is not possible in permanence. This principle is self-evident. To admit the kāritra apart from skandhas, āyatanas, etc. is to go against the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. This is supported by the Scriptures too, where the Buddha professes that everything (sarvam) means five skandhas, twelve āyatanas, and eighteen dhātus. This shows that the kāritra has no separate category.¹⁶²

(2) Let us analyse the second alternative, namely, the dharma and its kāritra are not different (ananyad) from each other. If the kāritra is not different from the dharma, then the former would be just as the dharmasvarūpa, and being identical with the latter it would be existing in all times (= sārva-kālika). In this case, the distinction of the three time-epochs on the basis of the kāritra, which Vasumitra propounds above - i.e. "that which has achieved its kāritra is present; that which has exhausted its kāritra is past; and that which has not yet attained its kāritra is future" - would not be possible. This can be possible only when the two states of attaining (prāpti) and not attaining (aprāpti) of the kāritra are shown separately. But such distinction is impossible,

because there is a lack of the distinction of the states among the elements which always exist.¹⁶³ Thus, in this alternative, i.e. the kāritra is not different from the dharma, the latter just as the former lacks its past and future states, and possesses only its present state (= madhyamātraka), which is accepted by the Sautrāntikas against the Vaibhāṣika theory of sarvadā asti.¹⁶⁴

(3) If a third alternative is admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas that the kāritra is and is not identical with the dharma, then it leads to a mutual contradiction (paraspara viruddha). Because of the non-differentiation of the dharma from the kāritra, it results that the dharmas of rūpa, etc. do not exist always. But it is admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas that the dharmas exist permanently and the kāritra is non-permanent (as in the case of the past and future, kāritra does not exist). It follows that the dharma and kāritra are different from each other. Again, the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the kāritra is different from the dharma. These contradictory statements are termed by the Sautrāntikas as a caprice of God. This shows an arbitrary, impulsive and illogical notion, and change of mind. The Vaibhāṣikas are just like God who without thinking properly and rationally act arbitrarily.¹⁶⁵ But Saṃghabhadra rejects this objection.¹⁶⁶

The Kāritra of Kāritra Discussed

Besides, the Sautrāntikas apply a third prasaṅga argument against Vasumitra's theory of the three time-epochs established on the kāritra. Here Schayer's remark is significant. He says:

"This tacit supposition is necessary for deducing the prasaṅga formulated by the Sautrāntika. This very starting point is, however, erroneous. The Vaibhāṣikas do not teach that kāritra possesses the three Times; kāritra is momentary and the dharmasvabhāva only lasts through the three Times."¹⁶⁷

The argument Sautrāntikas advance is that if the Vaibhāṣikas concede that the kāritra is not different from the dharmas, this means that the former too exists like the latter throughout the three time-epochs. In other words, we can say that "the kāritra which has not yet attained its existence is a future kāritra; the kāritra which has just attained its existence is the present kāritra; the kāritra which has already ceased to be is a past kāritra."¹⁶⁸ But Kamalaśīla, who applies the third prasaṅga argument as follows, asserts that for the preceding thesis the Vaibhāṣikas have to admit the existence of a second kāritra of this kāritra, otherwise they cannot maintain that "the distinction of epochs are established on the basis of the kāritra" (adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ), because they violate this rule (vyabhicārāt).¹⁶⁹ Again, if the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the future, etc. (the three time-epochs) are established with reference to svarūpasattā (dravya, substance) of the kāritra, and not with reference to its kāritra (i.e. second kāritra), then they have to admit the bhāva too likewise. Therefore, what is the sense of introducing the theory of the kāritra?¹⁷⁰ And if to steer clear of the violation of the rule, they admit the kāritra of the kāritra, which itself is the kāritra of the dharma, then there arises an infinite regress.¹⁷¹

To the Sautrāntika argument, i.e. if the kāritra and the dharma are identical (ananya), the former too would be permanent (= sārva-kālika) like the latter, because there is no difference (= aviśeṣāt) between them, Saṃghabhadra replies that distinguishing qualities have been seen even if they are not different from the essence of the dharma, such as sapratighatva of the earth. Though the dharmas are not different from their substance, yet they are differentiated as sapratigha and apratigha, sanidarśana and anidarśana, and so they appear to be differentiated from

their essence by the distinguishing qualities. In the same way a dharma is determined by its kāritra.¹⁷² But this reply, says Kamalaśīla, is not helpful to the subject under consideration (prakṛtānupakāraka). In other words, this does not affect the criticism of the Sautrāntikas, whose argument is: on admitting the non-differentiation (abheda) of the kāritra from the substance (= dharma) no distinction is possible at all between the dharma and its kāritra, which are identified with each other. And therefrom no distinction of the three time-epochs is possible on the basis of the kāritra.¹⁷³ Moreover, he finds no point in the Vaibhāṣika argument which is acceptable to him. He says: "The dharmas of the earth, etc. are different, because they are differentiated by their mutually exclusive svalakṣaṇas".¹⁷⁴ That is why some of them are called sapratigha and some apratigha, such as the vedanā, etc. But it is evident that no apratigha can ever be sapratigha, because "there is no unique un-variably concomitant substance (= eko 'nugāmi padārthātmā) to which the sapratighatva of the earth, etc. could be attributed as a temporary, occasional quality (kāḍācitka dharma). Special qualities as sapratighatva, etc. express the whole being as such, i.e. as determined by the exclusion of all remaining homogeneous (sajātīya) as well as heterogeneous (vijātīya) qualities. Hence, although not differing from the svarūpa, they cannot be [in opposition to the kāritra], the principle of differentiation of the same [unchangeable substance]".¹⁷⁵

Now Saṅghabhadra¹⁷⁶ states that the kāritra is not different from the dharma, because it does not exist apart from the dharma; and at the same time it is also not simply the dharma, because even if the svabhāva of the dharma exists permanently, there may not be the kāritra always. It may sometimes be absent. Neither is there no difference between the kāritra and dharma, because the former is previously inexistent. The

kāritra is just like a series (saṃtānavat) of the dharmas. Actually, saṃtāna is not different from the dharma, because it does not exist independently of the latter; and it is also not simply the dharma, otherwise even a single dharma would be a saṃtāna. Moreover, it cannot be said that it does not exist, because its effects do exist.¹⁷⁷

But Kamalaśīla rejects Saṃghabhadra's hypothesis. He says, in the case of saṃtāna, its difference from the dharma is inexpressible (avācya), just like the pudgala, and is therefore niḥsvabhāva. In the same way, the kāritra too is niḥsvabhāva. But this argument shows the agnostic tendency of Kamalaśīla. If something is inexpressible, then how can we say that it is niḥsvabhāva? Now, he advances another prasaṅga: if a svabhāva exists in something, it must be either different or non-different from the dharma. But since such kāritra is a figment of imagination (kalpita), like the saṃtāna, it cannot produce any effect. Indeed, the saṃtāna, which is chimerical only, has no potency in generating any effect, because of its niḥsvabhāvatva, whereas the emergence of the effect is bound with the svabhāva. This proves that only the real elements of the niḥsvabhāva-saṃtāna are capable of activities (kriyākṣama), not the fabricated saṃtāna. From the above discussion we come to the conclusion that the kāritra exists as a prajñapti (empirical reality), and is inexistent absolutely (paramārthataḥ) in the antecedent and subsequent moments of its existence. Thus, the distinction of the time-epochs as the past, present and future is an abstract notion, not substantial.¹⁷⁸

But the kāritra as prajñapti too is not free from criticism. The Vaibhāṣikas see no difficulty, if the distinction of the epochs also is prajñapti like the kāritra.¹⁷⁹ The Sautrāntikas say that the kāritra of the dharmas is described by the Vaibhāṣikas as the potency of

projecting the effects (phalākṣepaśakti), and this potency is not different from the reality (= vastulakṣaṇa). Thus, it is not the object of speech (śabdagocara), and does not belong to the domain of words, because it is asādhāraṇa, and words cannot express a svalakṣaṇa. And thus, the power being the same as the reality (= vastu) and not different, how can it have a prajñapti existence ? Positively it cannot be so. Hence the distinction of the three time-epochs itself becomes tātṭvika.¹⁸⁰

Whether the Causal Efficiencies are Different or
the Same in their Past and Future States ?

Besides, one perceives the rūpa, such as fire, which possesses the causal efficiencies, like burning and cooking. Now the question arises: Are these causal efficiencies in their past and future states the same or different ? If they are the same, how are the mutually contradictory qualities, such as inactivity, by which the distinction of the future, present and past is established, co-existent in one undifferentiated entity, such as rūpa ? If amidst the imposition of contradictory qualities, the identity of a dharma is maintained, then all the differentiations would be vanished (utsannā), and the whole world would be turned into one identical thing. And the result of this identity would be co-emergence of everything.¹⁸¹

The Vaibhāṣikas clarify their position by saying that a dharma is not supposed to be completely undifferentiated while passing through the three time-epochs. It is differentiated by its different states, i.e. by leaving one state and grasping another.¹⁸² But here too Kamalaśīla applies the same prasaṅga: Are these states different or not from the bhāva ? The Vaibhāṣika answer is in the negative; otherwise, they say, their relation with the bhāva (= dharma) would be broken. Firstly,

because there would arise the inefficiency of the bhāva, and secondly, because the potency with regard to producing effects would be proved in both the presence and absence of those conditions.¹⁸³

But Kamalaśīla is not satisfied with this answer. He raises the questions and answers them himself in the following way: How is it maintained that the avasthās of the dharmas are not different from the dharmas themselves? He replies: it is not so, because the avasthās come into existence after having been inexistent, and are destroyed after having been existent. But the dharmas (= vastus) are not supposed in this manner, because according to the Vaibhāṣikas, they exist permanently. Therefore, how are the avasthās, which come into existence after having been inexistent and are destroyed after having been existent, identical with the permanent dharmas? It is, say the Sautrāntikas, never possible, because the avasthās and dharmas possess different characteristics (= bhinnayogakṣematvāt). For otherwise, by way of identity (= tādātmatvena) the avasthās would not be different from the dharma, and consequently they would exist always just as the svabhāva of the dharma (vastusvabhāvavat). Or else, the dharma not being different from the avasthās, it would come into existence after having been inexistent just as the svarūpa of the avasthās.¹⁸⁴

Even if it is maintained, asserts Kamalaśīla, that the avasthās are not different from the dharma, the imposition of contradictory qualities cannot be avoided. Now, the question arises whether the dharma (= vastu) in its middle state (i.e. the present) possesses causal efficiency by its own essence (svarūpeṇa) or differently. If the former, then the essence of the dharma exists even in the remaining states of the past and future. And so how can the essence of the causal efficiency be supposed to be latent in its future state, and quiescent

in its past state (= kriyākriyābhraṃsau). Secondly, if the dharma is active by means of something else, then again its own inactivity would result, and thus it is proved to be an avastu (= non-dharma).¹⁸⁵ Likewise, the theory that the rūpa, such as fire, also exists in the past and future states tumbles down. If we admit that a dharma is different in every state, then in this hypothesis there would be no comingling of mutually exclusive qualities, such as activity and inactivity, because of different dharmas in different states. But the dharmas, such as fire, whose causal efficiency is burning and cooking, would come into existence after having been inexistent and would be destroyed after having been existent. This leads to the contradiction with the thesis that the dharma exists permanently, because the dharma and its states lack their permanent association (anvayābhāvāt).¹⁸⁶

But the Vaibhāṣikas see no contradiction in the theory that a dharma, possessing causal efficiency, comes into existence after having been inexistent and ceases to exist after having been existent. They maintain that the causally inactive dharma (akāryayogyam vastu) also exists in the past and future states. It does not possess any causal efficiency in these two states, and so there is no contradiction in their theory of sadāstitva.¹⁸⁷ To this Śāntarakṣita replies that only those dharmas, which possess causal efficiency, exist, and actually nothing exists in the past and future states, because in these states no activity is possible.¹⁸⁸

But the Vaibhāṣikas profess that the past sabhāga hetu, etc. possess the activity, and hence it is wrong to say that there can be no causal efficiency in the dharmas, which are in their past and future states.¹⁸⁹ Śāntarakṣita applies further prasaṅga arguments to refute

the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas. He asserts that the past dharma, which has no causal efficiency, would be clearly like a present dharma, because being of occasional nature (kāḍācitka) it comes into existence after having been inexistent like other present dharmas.¹⁹⁰ Here the Sautrāntika prasaṅga is that whatever is produced by causes and conditions is called present, and that which is kāḍācitka is necessarily produced by causes and conditions. Therefore, something is uncaused only in two cases, either it is a permanent entity, or it is absolutely inexistent, because only in these two cases there is room for complete independence (anapekṣā). "Hence the third possibility", Schayer observes, "that of being sometimes existent and sometimes inexistent, is reserved to the entities which are causally determined = whose existence is limited by causal determinants."¹⁹¹ Therefore, whatever is kāḍācitka is necessarily produced by the causes and conditions, and that is necessarily present. In other words, 'being kāḍācitka' is invariably concomitant with 'being present'.¹⁹²

Again, Kamalaśīla says, if the past and future elements exist substantially (dravyataḥ), then all the saṃskāras or the saṃskṛta dharmas would be permanent (śāśvata). Therefore, in this case there would be no special quality (viśeṣa) which may distinguish the conditioned dharmas, such as rūpa, etc., from the unconditioned dharmas, such as pratisaṃkhyānirodha.¹⁹³ The Vaibhāṣikas respond that the conditionedness (saṃskṛtatva) of the rūpa is because of its association with the four saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas (i.e. jāti, jarā, sthiti, and anityatā), but the unconditioned dharmas, such as ākāśa, are not associated with them. This characteristic makes an essential difference (= vailakṣaṇya) between these two kinds of dharmas.¹⁹⁴ The Sautrāntikas reply that it is not correct, and to demonstrate the untenability of the Vaibhāṣika hypothesis,

they pick out the four saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas and analyse them one by one as follows.

An Examination of the Saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas by
the Sautrāntikas

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, jāti gives birth to things, sthiti stabilises them, jarā causes them decay and anityatā destroys them. These are the kāritra of the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas.¹⁹⁵ Now, Kamalaśīla starts analysing the first saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa, jāti. The jāti, as the Vaibhāṣikas profess, generates a special force¹⁹⁶ (viśeṣa) which stimulates the future conditioned dharmas to achieve their causal efficiency in order to produce their effects. It is, therefore, called the producer (= janikā) of the saṃskṛta dharmas, such as the rūpa. In this case, it is not a material cause, rather an instrumental cause. But the question arises whether this special potency (viśeṣa) is different from the saṃskṛta dharma itself or not? These are the only two alternatives (pakṣadvaya).¹⁹⁷

In the first alternative, i.e. the viśeṣa is not different from the dharma itself, the viśeṣa cannot be non-different (na avyতিরikta) from the conditioned dharmas (i.e. rūpa, etc.), because in that case it would already be a realised (niṣpanna) thing even before the jāti performs its kāritra, and then it would be incapable of producing any effect (aśakya-kriya), just as after it has performed its activity. And again, what is realised cannot be active, otherwise there would be an infinite regress.¹⁹⁸ The second alternative, i.e. the viśeṣa is different from the conditioned dharmas, too does not prove to be advantageous, because in that case there would be no relation between them. Again, because of this difference the relation of identity between them would be

impossible, and if they are not different, the preceding consequence (i.e. of the first alternative) would result. The relation of cause and effect too would be absent, because the viśeṣa originates from the jāti, not from the dharma. Other relations also, such as container (= adhāra) and contained (= adheya), are out of the question, because they too are included under the same category (antargatatvāt),¹⁹⁹ or as Schayer puts it: "because they are only special cases of causal dependence".²⁰⁰ On the acceptance of such a relation, the Sautrāntikas again apply the prasaṅga argument. Firstly, "The element is a tanmātrakāraṇa (= a basal, main cause). Then the viśeṣa, as produced exclusively by it, would always arise and jāti would be of no use."²⁰¹ Secondly, a dharma produces the viśeṣa with the help of jāti (jātim apekṣyā). But this is not correct, because the jāti is not an auxiliary cause. Otherwise, this would lead to an absurdity. Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that if there is any difference between the dharma and its viśeṣa, no relation can be established between them.²⁰² Again, in the case of difference the viśeṣa is inexistent before it comes into existence, and thus the theory of asatkāryavāda results.²⁰³ Likewise, if the decay is brought about by jāra, stabilisation by sthiti, and destruction by anityatā, then the same objections, which were applied against jāti, would be applied against these three too.²⁰⁴

Furthermore, it is said by the Vaibhāṣikas that the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas, jāti, etc. perform their kāritra due to their inherent potency (= samarthasvabhāva), and that the potency always exists. If it is so, says Kamalaśīla, it follows that the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas must always discharge their kāritra (= svakārya). The Vaibhāṣikas may reply that the preceding objection is irrelevant, because the functioning of the svakārya of the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas are based on the assistance of the causes and conditions,

or in other words, unless the auxiliary causes and conditions are present, there cannot be any svakārya. This doctrine is wrong, because they (causes and conditions) are already admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas as ever present. This leads to the conclusion that the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas execute their respective svakārya, i.e. origination, duration, decay and destruction, not only in their present state, but also in their past and future states. Consequently, the comingling of the three time-epochs in each state results.²⁰⁵

Momentariness of the Past and Future Dharmas Discussed

Śāntarākṣita proceeds with fresh prasaṅga arguments. He adduces that the past and future dharmas are either momentary (kṣaṇika) or non-momentary (na kṣaṇika). These are the only two alternatives. If we admit the first, the confusion of the three time-epochs would again arise.²⁰⁶ The moment which just originates is present, that which is destroyed after its origination is past, and that which has not yet come into its existence is future.²⁰⁷ Here, if the distinction of the three time-epochs is based on these three non-simultaneous temporal states, then Śāntarākṣita's objection seems to be ineffective, because in that case there is no comingling. But if the Vaibhāṣikas admit that the past and future elements too exist like the present ones, then his argument would be relevant. And consequently, the past and future elements too would be present, because the very existence shows their presentness.

If we admit the second alternative that the past and future elements are non-momentary, then there would be contradiction in the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism (kṛtānta = siddhānta), according to which all the saṃskāras are momentary.²⁰⁸ Moreover, there is also contradiction with

the logical or inferential knowledge (anumānavirodha). This contradiction is evident from the conclusion of the following syllogism:²⁰⁹

- Probandum : whatever is existing is momentary
(yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam).
- Example : just as the present elements (yathā vartamānam).
- Reason : the past and future elements exist
(santaś cātītānāgatā iti).
- Conclusion : hence, the past and future elements are
necessarily momentary (niyamāt kṣaṇabhāṅginah
prāptāḥ).

The Sautrāntika Hypothesis of Arthakriyākāritva
and Existence

The Sautrāntika hypothesis is that the causal efficiency or the efficiency of producing effects (arthakriyākāritva) is the inherent characteristic of the existing elements, because on logical ground the non-momentary elements eliminate any possibility of successive (krama) as well as simultaneous (yauḡapadya) causal efficiency. Therefore, if we deny the arthakriyākāritva, we also deny existence (sattā). "The predicate 'existence' (= sattā) is excluded from all the dharmas which are predicated by the negation of the sādhyā (= from all sādhyā-vipakṣa)".²¹⁰ And thus, the validity of the Sautrāntika syllogism is proved.

The Sautrāntikas advance further arguments which are completely based on their theory of the arthakriyākāritva. Since the Vaibhāṣikas do not set forth that only the arthakriyākāritva is existent, and existence is arthakriyākāritva, i.e. both these terms are synonyms or identical, and whatever does not possess arthakriyākāritva is not existent, the following syllogism against their theory appears to be preposterous. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the dharmas apart from their present state, in which they manifest their arthakriyākāritva,

exist in their past state, in which they become quiescent after having performed their causal efficiency, and in future state, in which they are latent still waiting to perform their activity.

Now, Kamalaśīla proceeds as follows. He says that the past and future elements may be said to be either capable of producing effects (arthakriyāsamartha) or not. These are the only two alternatives.²¹¹ If they are capable to do so, then they are present. Again, the following syllogism²¹² accelerates the Sautrāntika polemic against the Vaibhāsikas:

- Probandum : whatever is capable of producing effects is present, i.e. momentary (ye ye 'rthakriyā-samarthās te vartamānāḥ).
- Example : just as the present elements which are not under discussion here (yathā 'vivādāspadībhūtā vartamānāḥ).
- Reason : the past and future dharmas are capable of producing effects (= arthakriyāsamarthāś cātītādaya).
- Conclusion : therefore, the past and future dharmas are present, i.e. momentary (= svabhāvahetu-prasaṅgaḥ).

The preceding syllogism, says Kamalaśīla, is not indeterminate (na anaikāntika). It means that it is invariably concomitant, because it eliminates the presentness (vartamānatva = existence) of the past element, which has been destroyed, as well as the future element, which is not yet born, and consequently all their potencies would be absent, just like the sky flower, which exists nowhere.²¹³ The following syllogism freezes all the potencies out of the past and future elements:

- Probandum : those which are not present do not possess any potency (= ye vartamānā na bhavanti te kvacit samarthā api na bhavanti), or vice versa.
- Example : just as the sky flower (yathā vyomāmbhōruham).
- Reason : the past and future dharmas are not present (na bhavanti cātītādayo vartamānā).

Conclusion : therefore, invariably they do not possess any potency (= vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ), i.e. they are inexistent.

According to the Sautrāntikas, the three asaṃskṛta dharmas, ākāśa, pratisaṃkhyānirodha, and apratisaṃkhyānirodha, too are not an exception (= anekānta) to the preceding conclusion. They can also be the member of this syllogism, and their potencies can be dismissed likewise. Therefore, it cannot be said, claim the Sautrāntikas, that the syllogism is indeterminate.²¹⁴

Now, let us come to another argument, which the Sautrāntikas advance. If the dharmas exist substantially (dṛavyataḥ) even in its past and future states, their effects also must be eternal (nitya, i.e. existing throughout the past, present and future),²¹⁵ and consequently the striving for attaining the heaven and ultimate salvation would result in failure (viphalā).²¹⁶

The Sautrāntika Criticism of the Vaibhāṣika Arguments
for the Existence of the Past and Future Dharmas

From the preceding discussion it is evident that the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas, who maintain that all the saṃskṛta dharmas, such as rūpa, are existent in all the three time-epochs (adhvasaṃgrhīta), is without any solid ground (āśrayāsiddha).

Dharmakīrti has already said in his *Pramāṇa-vārtika* (3.191c) that "'Existence' as predicate [to be proved] (= bhāva-dharma) is not [possible], because [the dharmin] is not ascertained."²¹⁷ Moreover, even if the existence of the past and future dharmas is maintained, the arguments for this would be contradictory (viruddha), because the reality of the present is admitted (vartamānasiddhe) by everybody, and apart from this, if we admit the reality of the past and

future dharmas, then it would be just against the dharma-svarūpa or in the words of Schayer, against "the essence (svarūpa) of the probandum (dharma = sādhyā-dharma)".²¹⁸ Here, as we have seen in one of the above syllogisms, the probandum is: "those, which are not present, do not possess any potency, or whatever is capable of producing effects is present, i.e. momentary".

Now, the question arises: How can the past and future rūpas be proved existing throughout the three time-epochs ? Actually, says Kamalaśīla, it is never possible to make a distinction between the past and future, just as the horn of the hare (śaśaviṣāṇa), which has absolutely no existence (atyantāsad).²¹⁹ It means that the past and future dharmas too are absolutely inexistent, like the horn of the hare, and hence no argument would be fruitful regarding their existence. The Sautrāntika definitions of the past, future and present are given by Śāntarakṣita²²⁰ as follows:

The rūpa which is destroyed (vigata) after having been existent (bhūtvā) is called past; when a rūpa will arise after concurrence of total causes and conditions (= pratyayasākalya), it would be future. But if their existence is admitted, then their presentness (vartamānatva) would result, and as we know the existence or presentness is the characteristic of present only.

The Scriptural statement of the Buddha that the rūpa also exist in the past and future is said in the sense of a figurative attribution (= adhyāropya). It should not be taken in a literal or real sense (na bhāvataḥ).²²¹ Thereupon the Vaibhāṣikas are exasperated and ask: Who has said that the past and future dharmas exist in the same sense in which the present exists ? Rather they maintain that only the essence of the past and future dharmas exists permanently.²²² The Sautrāntikas

rightly argue that if they exist permanently, then how are they called past and future ? This inconsistency leads us to the conclusion that Buddha's statement, i.e. the past and future dharmas exist, must be understood otherwise. Actually, he intended to criticise "the Ājīvikas who denied moral responsibility for the past deeds" ... "the connexion between a past cause and a future result. In order to make it known that a former cause and a future result are something which happened formerly and will happen in future, he categorically declared: 'there is a past, there is a future'".²²³ Here the word 'is' (asti) is an accidental occurrence or a particle,²²⁴ "which may refer to something existent and to non-existent as well."²²⁵ For example, we say, there *is* absence of light before it is kindled, and there *is* absence of light after it is put out.²²⁶ In this sense the past and future dharmas exist, otherwise their existence cannot be proved.²²⁷ Now, if the Vaibhāṣikas maintain the existence of light in such conditions (i.e. in absence), then their doctrine may be compared to that of the Vaiśeṣikas who admit a separate category of absence (abhāva).

Regarding the Vaibhāṣika argument that consciousness arises from two factors: material object and sense-organs, or mind and mental object, Kamalaśīla responds that consciousness (vijñāna) is of two types - one is that which has its corresponding object (sālambana, objective), and the other which has no corresponding object (nirālambana, purely subjective). The Scriptural statement of Bhagavān Buddha, which the Vaibhāṣikas quote, about consciousness which arises depending on two factors cited above, means the first type (i.e. sālambana) and should be taken in an implied sense (= abhisamdhāya).²²⁸ Now the question arises: How is consciousness justified without having its corresponding object ? As a matter of fact, in this category there is

no corresponding object (naivālambanam asti),²²⁹ and only abstract notions, such as God, Prakṛti (Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya system), kāla, etc. are considered in it. It is also not that such notions possess any eternal Words as their objective correlates as propounded by Bhartṛhari.²³⁰ Moreover, the objective characteristic of such notions is eternity (nityatva), which being the totality of causes and conditions (sakalahetutva) is determined by these abstract notions (= buddhyā), is disconnected (= viyoga) from Word, name, or the viprayuktasamkāras. By the word 'ādi' in 'nityatvasakalahetutvādiḥ' means other causes and conditions, etc. (= nimittādeḥ), "which may be accepted" by the Vaibhāṣikas "as having potencies (svabhāva = sāmārthya) producing the mental reflex of an external object, etc. (arthapratibimbakādi)".²³¹

The Vaibhāṣikas protest that if consciousness may arise even without having any corresponding object, then how can it be called cognition (jñāna)? The very definition of consciousness as that which cognises (vijānātīti vijñānam), and its existence would be questioned, if the existence of the object to be cognised (vijñeya) is not admitted.²³² The Sautrāntikas reply that the Vaibhāṣika theory, according to which the correspondence of consciousness (= bodhānugama) with the object is not possible without an object to be cognised (= vina bodhyena), is not correct. Actually, this bodhānugati of consciousness is of immaterial nature (= ajaḍarūpatva).²³³ As Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have Vijñānavāda leanings, they admit that there is no external object to be manifested, and to its refutation they devote one entire section.²³⁴

As to the next Vaibhāṣika argument that the past dharma exists, because it has a real result, the Sautrāntikas never maintain that the result emerges directly from the past karmas.²³⁵ Then the question

arises: How is it produced ? This result, answers Vasubandhu, is produced from a particular state of the series of moments or events (= saṃtānaviśeṣāt). And this state originates from the previous act (= tatpūrvakāt).²³⁶ A detailed exposition of this topic is given by him in his AKB, chapter ix, where he refutes the Vātsīputriya's theory of ātmavāda.²³⁷

Now, the Vaibhāṣikas interrogate: How does the past karma give a moral retribution ? Śāntarākṣita does not maintain that the past moral cause (vipākahetu) gives any moral retribution (phala). The latter is a result of a series of momentary consciousness (vijñānaprabandha) which is influenced or perfumed (vāsita) by the former.²³⁸ Here vāsita means the series of momentary consciousness which, having been influenced by the past karma, becomes capable of producing moral retribution.²³⁹ But Bhagavān Buddha has taught, quote the Vaibhāṣikas, that karma, which is destroyed (kṣīṇa), annihilated (niruddha) and ripened (= viparinata), still exists.²⁴⁰ Therefore, they emphasise that "it could have some actual existence, i.e. some efficiency. Hence the words of Buddha imply an actual existence of the past"²⁴¹ elements. Kamalaśīla warns that this statement should not be taken literally, since Buddha has taught this in a metaphorical sense (upacāreṇa). For example, a piece of gold, etc. produced by a basic element²⁴² (mūladravya) actually forms a series of evanescent effects (phalaprabandha), which gives the impression of an everlasting substance (samabhāva), and though the basic element is already destroyed, yet it is called existing (= avinaṣṭa, not destroyed). Likewise, the past karma, though destroyed, is said to be existing.²⁴³ Here Vasubandhu rectifies that when Buddha said "the past karma exists", he meant that it had the potency of producing effect. This potency is generated into the series of momentary

elements, which (i.e. series) gives the illusory notion of one united whole, by the past karma which is already annihilated. Nevertheless, if it is maintain that the past karma exists in reality by its own nature (svena bhāvena vidyamānam), then it would not be called 'past'.²⁴⁴ In other words, it would then be present.

As to the question of what was the purpose of Buddha's above metaphorical teaching, Kamalaśīla replies that here Buddha's main aim was to refute the doctrine of annihilationism (ucchedadr̥ṣṭi) which establishes that there is no past karma which causes moral retribution. If he had said "there is no past karma" (nāsty atītaṃ karma), then the teaching that the past karma causes and influences indirectly a series of momentary existences, which (i.e. series) possesses the potency of producing results, would fail and the people to be addressed (vineya) would be trapped into the doctrine of annihilationism. That is why Bhagavān preached "the past karma exists".²⁴⁵ Otherwise, if the past elements exist in reality (= svarūpeṇa), Buddha's following teaching (deśanā) in the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra*²⁴⁶ would be not only meaningless but also adverse: "When the eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere, and when it is annihilated, it does not go anywhere to accumulate. Thus, the eye comes into existence after having been inexistent, and it disappears (pratigacchati) after having been existent."

The Vaibhāṣikas inveigh against their opponent that if the Sautrāntika theory, that an element comes into existence after having been inexistent, is admitted, then it would signify that the element comes into existence after having been inexistent in the present time-epoch.²⁴⁷ But Kamalaśīla proclaims that it is not admissible, because the time-epochs and the dharma (bhāva) are not two different things.²⁴⁸ It means,

comment the Vaibhāsikas, that the dharma having been inexistent in its essence comes into existence.²⁴⁹ Again, Kamalaśīla replies that it would only prove that the future dharmas, such as the future eye, do not exist.²⁵⁰

The Vaibhāsika²⁵¹ argument is that if the past and future dharmas are not really existing, then the present too would be inexistent, because the present is established (prajñāpyate) in relation to the past and future. And if the three time-epochs are lacking existence, then the conditioned dharmas also would be inexistent. If the conditioned dharmas are inexistent, then the asaṃskṛta dharmas too would be deprived of existence, because the latter is established only in relation to the former. And if the existence of both kinds of dharmas are denied, then salvation and the attainment of Nirvāṇa would be inexistent. Thus, on admitting this negation there would arise a great false notion (mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi).²⁵² Therefore, to steer clear of any such heretical notion we have to maintain the existence of the past and future dharmas.

The following Sautrāntika response, Schayer²⁵³ points out, seems to be an antistrophe of the preceding theory of the Mahāvibhāṣā. Kamalaśīla rejoins that if the saṃskṛta dharmas (= saṃskāras) exist permanently, then there would be an absence of causes and effects, which would lead to the unreality of the second āryasatya, i.e. the truth of the origin of suffering (duḥkhasamudayasatya) which in turn eliminates the reality of the third and fourth āryasatyas, i.e. the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodha) and the path leading to the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodhamārga) respectively. Therefore, if the four noble truths (satyacatuṣṭaya) are denied, then the thorough knowledge (parijñā), abandonment (prahāṇa), realisation (sākṣātkriyā) and accomplishment (bhāvanā) also would not be possible. And consequently, there would be

an absence of phalastha pudgalas (i.e. the individuals who are at the stage in which fruits or results are enjoyed) as well as pratipannaka pudgalas (i.e. the individuals striving for the attainment of salvation). Thus, the whole teaching (sakalam eva pravacanam) would be destroyed. That is why keeping these unavoidable fallacies in mind, says Kamalaśīla, it is necessary to maintain that the notion of the past dharmas, etc. does not have any corresponding objective counterpart.²⁵⁴

As to the last argument of the Vaibhāṣikas that without admitting the existence of the past and future dharmas, their Yogic perception would be impossible, Śāntarakṣita²⁵⁵ sets forth that the Yogins do not perceive the past and future elements as such, rather they are direct or indirect (sākṣāt or pāramparyeṇa) reflection of the present (vartamānasya rūpam). This reflection is of two types: (i) as an effect (kārya) in relation to the past causes, and (ii) as a cause (kāraṇa) in relation to the future effects. The Yogins harmonise (= anugacchanti) it with their imaginative and corresponding consciousness (= vikalpānugatātma-bhiḥ), which is purely phenomenal (śuddhalaukika), but in its essence (= tāttvika) it is without any objective correlate (aviṣaya). Thus, the teachings (deśanā) about the past and future dharmas are based on the past and future stream (saṁtati) of the above causes and effects.

Finally, the Vaibhāṣikas never admit their defeat even after this long discussion in which they are caught again and again in dilemmas created by the Sautrāntikas, and nevertheless they maintain that the past and future dharmas certainly exist, but regarding the permanent existence of the dharmas they confess "that this is something we do not succeed in explaining, their essence is deep (it is transcendental), since its existence cannot be established by rational method."²⁵⁶

Notes

1. AK, II.45-46, V.23-27, AKB and AKV thereon; ADV, pp. 252.1-281.9; TS and TSP, chapter 21: *Traikālyaparīkṣā*; AKP, II, pp. 293-298, V, pp. 48-66; BCAP, pp. 580.4-582.7; Schayer (1938); G.N. Jha (1939), pp. 861-886; Sasaki (1964), pp. 472-480; Arun Haldar (1966), pp. 51-63; P.M. Williams (1977), pp. 279-294; CCB, pp. 37-43, 76-91; Kalupahana (1966), pp. 94-105; McDermott (1974), pp. 193-200; Keith (1923), pp. 163-169; Mandal (1968), pp. 54-69; Bareau (1957), pp. 353-364; Takagi (1963), pp. 68-83; LVP (1925), pp. 343-376, (1932), pp. 1-9, (1937), pp. 7-158; Z. Ahmad (1978), pp. 9-37; Miyamoto (1959), pp. 3-18; *Kālasiddhāntadarśinī*, pp. 93-101; Kajiyama (1977).
2. On Vasubandhu, see Frauwallner (1951), pp. 69ff; AKP, Introduction, pp. xxiv-xxviii; Jaini (1958), pp. 48-53; Sukomal Chaudhuri (1976), pp. 21-33.
3. See AK, AKB, AKV and AKP.
4. See TS, TSP, Schayer (1938), G.N. Jha (1939), pp. 861-886.
5. See LVP (1937), pp. 7-25, and the fragments of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, translated by Schayer (1938). Takakusu (1975, p. 58) observes: "In Chinese we have two transmissions of the *Vibhāṣa*, Large (200 parts) and Small (14 parts). Whether one was an abridgement of the other we cannot tell for certain. But from several points of view we can imagine that the larger one belongs to the Kaśmīra School and the smaller to the Gāndhāra School." But Professor M. Hattori of Kyoto University informs me that it is now certain that the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and *Vibhāṣā* are different in many respects regarding their contents, and so it cannot be said that the latter is an abridgement of the former.
6. See LVP (1937), pp. 25-134. The *Nyāyānusāraśāstra* is a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa*. It is written in order to refute Vasubandhu's departure from the Sarvāstivāda doctrines. Saṅghabhadra's other work - the *Samayapradīpa*, is said to be an abridged edition of his *Nyāyānusāraśāstra*. See AKP, Introduction, p. xxii.
7. See AD and ADV. This work also, like the *Nyāyānusāraśāstra*, is written to refute Vasubandhu's leanings towards the Sautrāntikas in his AKB. Also see de Jong (1966), pp. 305-307; Sasaki (1962), pp. 373ff.
8. See Takakusu (1905), pp. 66-146, (1975), pp. 55-73; Masuda (1925), pp. 38-52; CCB; A.C. Banerjee (1957); Frauwallner (1963), pp. 20-36, (1964), pp. 59-99, (1971), pp. 69-121, (1972), pp. 95-152, (1973), pp. 97-121; Sukomal Chaudhuri (1976), Introduction; *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Vol. I, pp. 37ff, 64ff; AKP, Introduction, pp. v-lxvii; Lamotte (1958), pp. 202ff.
9. See Charles Willemen (1975). This text is also called the *Abhidharma-sāra* by LVP (AKP, Introduction, pp. lxiii-lxvii) and Lin Li-kouang

- (1949). See Willemen, *ibid.*, p. 179. Also see Frauwallner (1971), p. 71. It is to be noted that Dharmottara and Dharmaśrī are the same person. Dharmaśrī's Chinese name is Fa-shêng, and the Japanese call him Dharmasreṣṭhin. T. Kimura was the first man who called him Dharmaśrī. See again Willemen, *ibid.*, p. vi, also Nakamura (1980), p. 108.
10. Willemen (*ibid.*, pp. xv-xvi) on the basis of Lin Li-koung's (*ibid.*, pp. 324-354) investigation affirms that there are three Dharmatrāta-s: (1) Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, a Dārṣṭāntika, one of the four masters of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, the author of the *Ch'u Yao (Udāna) Ching*, (2) Dharmatrāta, the author of the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahrdaya* and the commentator of Vasubandhu's *Pañcavastuka*, and (3) Dharmatrāta, a dhyāna-master, whose name is linked with the *Ta-mo-lo Ch'an Ching*.
- Thus the preceding observation shows that it is first Dharmatrāta, i.e. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, not the author of the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahrdaya*, who is one of the four Sarvāstivāda teachers (Ghoṣaka, Dharmatrāta, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva) who are propounders of four kinds of theories in order to prove the doctrine of 'sarvam asti'.
- Also see AKP, Introduction, pp. xlvii-li; Pelliot (1930), pp. 267-273.
11. It contains eight books and was translated into Chinese by Hsüan-tsang. Two of its eight books have been reconstructed into Sanskrit by Santi Bhikṣu Sastri (1955). Also see LVP (1932A), pp. 323-327; AKP, Introduction, pp. xxix-xxxii. For the seven treatises and their authors, see Frauwallner (1964), pp. 70ff; N. Dutt (1978), pp. 143ff; LVP, *ibid.*
12. See AKP, *ibid.*, pp. xxxii-xxxiii; Frauwallner (1964), pp. 92ff.
13. See LVP (1925), pp. 343-376. It contains six chapters and deals with the pudgala, indriyas, cittas, kleśas, vijñānas, etc., according to Maudgalyāyana. The first two chapters contain the controversy of the past, present, future and the pudgalas. Also see AKP, Introduction, pp. xxxiii-xxxvi; Frauwallner (1964), pp. 88-92.
14. See AKP, *ibid.*, p. xxxvii; Frauwallner, *ibid.*, pp. 73-80. The Tibetan *Dharmaskandha* is an entirely different treatise from the Chinese one, see Takakusu (1905), p. 77, fn. 1.
15. LVP (1918, pp. 295-350) has translated into French its first two sections of the Tibetan version, namely, *Lokaprajñapti* and *Kāraṇaprajñapti*. Also see AKP, *ibid.*, pp. xxxvii-xli. On the *Prajñaptiśāstra*, see Paul Mus (1939A). The most recent work on this subject is by Eugène Denis (1977). For its review see de Jong (1980), pp. 70-73.

The *Prajñaptiśāstra* is the only one preserved in Tibetan. The Chinese version is not complete. The Tibetan version has three sections - *Lokaprajñapti*, *Kāraṇaprajñapti* and *Karmaprajñapti*. The *Abhidharmakośa*, chapter III, also contains a detailed exposition of *Lokaprajñapti*. "In the Chinese *Prajñaptiśāstra* itself (No. 1317), the title *Lokaprajñapti* is given, but its contents are missing, while the *Kāraṇaprajñapti* practically forms the whole text" - Takakusu (1905), p. 77, fn. 1.

16. McGovern (1925, p. 28) and Potter (1974, p. 3) think that its author was Vasumitra. Also see AKP, *ibid.*, pp. xli-xlii; Frauwallner (1964), pp. 80-88.
17. See Frauwallner, *ibid.*, pp. 71-73; AKP, *ibid.*, p. xlii.
18. Willemsen (1975, p. xix) informs us that there are three *Vibhāṣā*-s (commentaries) on the *Jñānaprasthāna* as follows:
- (i) The *Vibhāṣāśāstra* (by Shih-t'o-p'an-ni, T. 1547, attributed to Saṃghabhadra and most probably revised by Saṃghadeva in *Lo-yang*)
 - (ii) The *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra* (by the 500 Arhats, T.1546)
 - (iii) The *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* (by the 500 Arhats, T. 1545, tr. by Hsüan-tsang).
19. See Takakusu (1975), p. 58. Also see S. Lévi (1927), pp.114-116.
20. N. Dutt (1978, p. v) thinks that there were four scholars bearing the name of Vasumitra:
- (i) Vasumitra of Kaniṣka's Council and one of the authors of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*
 - (ii) Vasumitra of the Sautrāntika school
 - (iii) Vasumitra who appeared a thousand years after Buddha's parinirvāṇa, and
 - (iv) Vasumitra of the Sarvāstivāda school, from whom Hsüan-tsang learnt the Sarvāstivāda doctrines.
- Also see Masuda (1925); Bareau (1954), pp. 229-266, (1956), pp.167-200. R. Yamada, 'Vasumitra', *Vi Commemoration Volume*, pp. 529-550 (quoted by Potter, 1975, p. 2); AKP, Introduction, pp. xliii-xlv.
21. Takakusu (1975), p. 58. He calls Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra as the Neo-Vaibhāṣikas (*ibid.*, p. 60) and their period is called the Neo-Vibhāṣā period (McGovern, 1923, p. 29). Also see LVP (1937), p. 95, fn. 1.
22. CPB, p. 68. Nakamura (1980, p. 107, fn. 44) remarks: "The *Vibhāṣāśāstra*.... seems to have been an independent treatise which was composed prior to the older and newer versions of the *Abhidharma-vibhāṣāśāstra*."
23. Cf. AKV, p. 15.28-29: Vibhāṣayā divyanti caranti vā Vaibhāṣikāḥ, Vibhāṣām vā vidanti Vaibhāṣikāḥ.
24. Conze (1975A, p. 140) defines the Sarvāstivādins as "those who teach that also past and future events exist." Here neither does he give any textual reference to support this statement, nor does he define what he means by 'events'. We find the Sarvāstivādins often speaking of the past, present and future dharmas, but not the events.
25. For the Mādhyamika criticism of saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta dharmas, see MK, VII and MKV thereon; CPB, pp. 191ff; CŚ, IV and CŚV thereon.

26. CCB, p. 4, fn. 1.
27. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 5.
28. Cf. AKB, p. 805.9: ye hi sarvam astīti vadanti atītam anāgatam pratyutpannam ca, te Sarvāstivādāḥ.
29. See CCB, p. 5, fn. 3: "This passage cannot be traced in the Pali canon. Evidently the Theravādins suppressed it, because it did not agree with their particular tenet." On this point Kalupahana (1966, pp. 94ff) criticises Stcherbatsky and makes a comparative study of the *Saṃyukta Āgama* and the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*.
30. Kalupahana (1975), pp. 76-77.
31. Schayer (1938), p. 2.
32. Cf. MKV, p. 389.5-6; CSV, pp. 59.27-60.1: uktaṃ hi Bhagavatā - pañcemāni bhikṣavo nāmamātram pratijñāmātram vyavahāramātram samvṛtimātram. tad yathātīto 'dhvānāgato 'dhvākāśo nirvāṇaṃ pudgalaś cety ādi.
 Guṇaratna, in his commentary - *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* on *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri (p. 73), points out that the above passage is set forth by the Sautrāntikas. Also see CPB, p. 198.
33. See Stcherbatsky (1962), I, pp. 79-118; S. Mookerjee (1930), pp. 83-98, (1975), pp. 1-19.
34. D.N. Sastri (1976), p. 54. Also see A.K. Chatterjee (1975), pp. 16ff and the following stanza:
 artho jñānasamanvito matimatā Vaibhāṣikenocyate /
 pratyakṣo na hi vāhyavastuvistarāḥ Sautrāntikair āśritāḥ //
 - *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 75.2-3.
35. CCB, p. 95.
36. Cf. CCB, p. 39ff, where Stcherbatsky deals with different forces (saṃskāras), the forces of origination (utpāda), decay (jarā), maintenance (sthiti), destruction (anityatā). For the Sarvāstivāda theory of moment, see AK, ii, 46 and Bhāṣya and Vyākhyā thereupon. For the criticism of the saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas, see CPB, pp. 191ff.
37. CCB, p. 35.
38. Cf. AD, V, Kārikā 296 and its commentary thereon. Also cf. AKV, pp. 801.23-802.15: svalakṣaṇam - sukhavedanīyādi vastu, tatra rāgaḥ sukhavedanīyam eva vastvālambyotpadyata iti svalakṣaṇakleśa ity ucyate. tena sukhavedanīyena vastvālambyamānenonnatir bhavatīti māno 'pi svalakṣaṇakleśah. tathā dukkhavedanīyaṃ vastvālambya pratigha utpadyate itī pratigho 'pi svalakṣaṇakleśa ity ucyate. sāmānyakleśāś ca. drṣṭivicikitsādayaḥ. sāmānyāḥ sāmānyena vā kleśāḥ sāmānyakleśāḥ. ete hy aviśeṣeṇa sukhavedanīyā-dike vastuny utpadyante iti, atas tadālambya utpannāḥ kleśāḥ 'sāmānyakleśāḥ' ity ucyante.

39. AK, V. 23.
40. AK, V. 24d: śeṣais tu sarvaiḥ sarvatra saṃyuktaḥ. Also cf. CCB, p. 76.
41. Cf. AKB, p. 803.5-7: kiṃ punar idam atītānāgatam ucyate 'sti, atha na ? yady asti sarvakālāstitvāt, saṃskārāṇāṃ śāśvatatvaṃ prāpnoti; atha nāsti, kathaṃ tatra tena ca saṃyukto bhavati visāmyukto vā ?
42. Cf. ibid., p. 803.7-8: na saṃskārāṇāṃ śāśvatatvaṃ pratijñāyate Vaibhāṣikaiḥ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇayogāt.
43. Cf. AK, V. 25a: sarvakālāstitā.
44. Cf. ibid., 25a-b: uktatvāt, dvayāt, sadviṣayāt, phalāt. The *Vibhāṣā* also advances a series of arguments, see LVP (1937), pp. 9ff.
45. Cf. AKB, p. 804.4-7; ADV on kārikā 305. Also cf.: "atīte rādha rūpe anapekkho hohi, anāgatam rūpaṃ mā abhinandi, paccuppanassa rūpassa nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya cāgāya paṭinissaggāya paṭipajja" ti - quoted in the *Nettipakarana*, p. 30; MKV, p. 444.11-14; MN, III, pp. 188.1ff.
Cf. *Saṃyuktakāgama*, iii.14: "rūpaṃ anityam atītam anāgatam / kaḥ punar vādaḥ pratyutpannasya / evaṃdarśī śrutavān āryaśrāvako 'tīte rūpe 'napekṣo bhavati / anāgatam rūpaṃ nābhinandati / pratyutpannasya rūpasya nirvide virāgāya nirodhāya pratipanno bhavati / atītam ced bhikṣavo rūpaṃ nābhaviṣyan na śrutavān āryaśrāvako" - quoted in AKP, V, p. 51, fn. 1.
LVP (1925, pp. 343-376) has translated some parts of the *Vijñānakāya* of Devaśarman which deal with the existence of the past and future dharmas.
46. Cf. AKB, p. 804.9-11: "dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānasyotpādaḥ" ity uktam. dvayaṃ katamat ? caksū rūpāṇi yāvat manodharmā iti. asati vā 'tītānāgate tad ālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ dvayaṃ pratītya na syāt. evaṃ tāvad āgamato 'sty atītānāgatam; also cf. TSP, p. 616.6-9; SN, II, pp. 72.4ff; AK, III.32.
47. CCB, p. 78.
48. TSP, pp. 615.24-616.4. Also cf. AKB, pp. 804.9-805.2.
49. AK, II.54c-d.
50. TSP, p. 616.9-12: api ca - atītam karma phaladaṃ na syāt, yadi tan niḥsattvaṃ sattāsūnyaṃ bhavet; phalotpattikāle vipākahetor abhāvāt. na cāsataḥ kāryotpādanaśaktir asti; sarvasāmarthyavira-halakṣaṇatvād asattvasya. Also cf. AKB, p. 805.1-2.
51. Māndhānā and Māndhāno are two wrong readings, see TS, p. 616, fn. 2; also see AKP, iii, p. 28, fn. 6.
52. Cf. TSP, p. 616.12-15.

53. Cf. AKB, p. 805.9: ye he sarvam astīti vadanti atītam anāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ ca, te Sarvāstivādāḥ.

54. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 805.9-10: ye tu kecid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalam cātītam karma, kiñcin nāsti yad dattaphalam atītam anāgataṃ ceti vibhajya vadanti, te Vibhajyavādinaḥ.

LVP (AKP, V, p.52, fn. 1) quotes Paramārtha: "If a man says that everything exists, past, future, present, space, pratisamkhyānirodha (= Nirvāna), apratisamkhyānirodha, then one says that this man is of the Sarvāstivāda school. There are other men who say: 'The present dharmas exist; the past acts, if they have not given their fruit, exist; when they have given their fruit and the future dharmas, which are not fruit (of a past or present act) do not exist'. These men who say that the three epochs exist, but make these distinctions, one does not say that they are Sarvāstivādins, but that they are Vibhajyavādins."

Also *ibid.*, p. 23, fn. 1, where LVP quotes the *Vibhāṣā* 104.1: "Others say that, among the twelve misapprehensions (viparyāsa), eight are only abandoned by seeing the truths, and four, also by the meditation. These doctors are Vibhajyavādins."

On the Vibhajyavādins, *P'ou-kouang*, 20, 4: "They say that there is no categorical opinion which is completely correct (fēi tsin li), that (the past and future) partly exist, partly do not exist, and that it must distinguish: therefore one calls them "the school of those who speak after having distinguished (fēn piě choūo pōu), in Sanskrit Vibhajyavādins". According to the *Vijñaptimātravṛtti* (wēi chě chōu), iv. 35, 10: "Those whom one calls the Vibhajyavādins are now the Prajñaptivādins (choūo kiā pōu)". According to the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (tsōng luēn): "Two hundred years later a school called Prajñaptivādin emerged from the Mahāsaṅghika" (see Wassiliev, p. 251, and the note where one sees that, in the version of the *Samayabhedā*, one of the two Chinese translators reads here Vibhajyavādin). A commentary remarks thereupon: "According to these two explanations, the Vibhajyavādins only make a single school (with the Prajñaptivādins). But the *Vibhāṣā*, 25,5: "The Mahāsaṅghikas, etc. are called Vibhajyavādins." Also the *Arthadīpa* (? i tēng): "Either the Vibhajyavādins are certain masters of the Great Vehicle, or all the schools of the Small Vehicle are called Vibhajyavādins: these are not a particular school. Also, in the *Saṅgrahaśāstra* (? chě luēn), the Vibhajyavādins are strictly defined as being the Mahīśāsakas: in the *Vibhāṣā*, they are strictly defined as being the Sāmmitiyas."

55. Schayer (1938, p. 29, fn. 2) informs us that "the exposition of the four doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda, as given by Kamalaśīla, is a quite accurate reproduction of *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T. 1545, p. 396; *Abhidharmakośa* (tr. Poussin), V, pp. 52-56; *Nyāyānusāra*, T. 1562, p. 631."

Also see LVP (1937), pp. 22-25, 89ff.

It is to be noted that the Sarvāstivādins are also called Saṃkrāntivādins. "They teach that skandhas, etc. exist in three Time-epochs without changing and without abandoning their essence (= asaṃkīrṇasvabhāvāḥ, ajahatsvabhāvāḥ). This is denied by Sautrāntikas, the advocates of the doctrine - abhūtvā bhavati, who may be consequently designed as Asaṃkrāntivādins. The term

saṃkrānti, however, denotes also 'transmigration of the sukṣmacitta from one world to the other' and in this sense the Sarvāstivādins (= the Vaibhāsikas) are Asaṃkrāntivādins, the Sautrāntikas - saṃkrāntivādins." - Schayer (1938), p. 29, fn. 1.

Also cf. TS, kārikā 4 and TSP on kārikā 5; J. Masuda (1925), pp. 66, fn. 3; E. Lamotte (1936), p. 163. Also see Bareau (1955), pp. 155ff. On the four Sarvāstivāda teachers, see AKP, Introduction, pp. xlii-li.

56. Schayer (1938), p. 24.

57. bhāva is translated by different scholars differently:

existence CCB, p. 79; A.B. Keith (1923), p. 165.

state Bareau (1957), p. 356; Kalupahana (1975), p. 74.

manner of being (manière d'être) ... LVP (1937), pp. 22, 89.

becoming, being, state, condition, manner of being, nature, character, etc. Monier-Williams (1974), p. 754.

being Schayer (1938), p. 29.

mode, form, quality ... N. Dutt (1978), p. 155.

mode of existence G.N. Jha (1939), p. 862.

58. TSP p. 614.14: guṇaviśeṣaḥ, yato 'tītādyabhidhānājñānapravṛttiḥ.

59. Schayer (1938, p. 30, fn. 1) disagrees with E.H. Johnson (*Early Sāṃkhya*, 1937, p. 31) that "there is an old connection between bhāva - 'state of being' and the guṇa of the Sāṃkhya.....". Also see Stcherbatsky (1934), pp. 737-760; Harsh Narain (1961), pp. 45-51.

60. Cf. AKP, pp. 805.15-806.3: bhāvānyathiko BhadantaDharmatrātaḥ. sa kilāha - dharmasyādvasu pravartamānasya bhāvānyathātvaṃ bhavati, na dravyānyathātvaṃ. yathā suvarṇabhājanasya bhittvānyathā kriyamānasya saṃsthānānyathātvaṃ bhavati, na varṇānyathātvaṃ. yathā ca kṣīraṃ dadhitvena pariṇamad rasavīryavipākān parityajati, na varṇam. evaṃ dharmo 'py anāgatād adhvanāḥ pratyutpannam adhvānam āgacchann anāgatabhāvaṃ jahāti, na dravyabhāvaṃ. evaṃ pratyutpannād atītam adhvānaṃ gacchan pratyutpannabhāvaṃ jahāti, na dravyabhāvaṃ iti.

Also cf. TSP p. 614.7-12; LVP (1937), pp. 23, 90; CCB, p. 79; ADV, p. 259.10-16; *Yoga-bhāṣya*, iii, 13.

61. lakṣaṇa is rendered differently as follows:

characteristic ... AKP, V, p. 53; LVP (1937), pp. 23, 89; N. Dutt (1978), p. 155; Kalupahana (1975), p. 74; G.N. Jha (1939), p. 862; Monier-Williams (1974), p. 892.

aspect CCB, p. 79; A.B. Keith (1923), p. 165.

feature Bareau (1957), p. 356.

62. Cf. AKP, p. 806.4-6: lakṣaṇānyathiko BhadantaGhoṣakaḥ. sa kilāha - dharmo 'dhvasu pravartamāno 'tīto 'tītalakṣaṇayuktaḥ, anāgata-

pratyutpannābhyāṃ lakṣaṇābhyāṃ aviyuktaḥ. evaṃ pratyutpanno 'py atītānāgatābhyāṃ aviyuktaḥ. tad yathā - puruṣa ekasyāṃ striyāṃ raktaḥ, śeṣāsv avirakta iti.

Also cf. TSP, p. 614.15-17; ADV, pp. 259.17-260.2; LVP (1937), pp. 23, 91; *Yoga-bhāṣya*, on 3.13.

63. Cf. TSP, p. 614.18: asya hy atītādilakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahāra iti pūrvakād bhedaḥ.

Also see AKP, p. 53, fn. 1: "When a characteristic is active (labdhavṛtti), the dharma is equipped with this characteristic, but it is not deprived of other characteristics, for, in this hypothesis, a certain future dharma cannot exist ... like the present and past dharmas."

64. avasthā is translated by different scholars differently:

condition CCB, p. 79; AKP, p. 53; LVP (1937, pp. 23, 91) gives another word also for avasthā - 'état' or 'state'; Kalupahana (1975), p. 74.

condition, aspect, state G.N. Jha (1939), p. 862.

position Bureau (1957), p. 356.

65. *Abhidharmakośa* (Japanese edition), p. 167 (quoted by N. Dutt, 1978, p. 156).

66. Cf. AKB, p. 806.7-9: avasthā 'nyathiko BhadantaVasumitraḥ. sa kilāha - dharmo 'dhvasu pravartamāno 'vasthāṃ avasthāṃ prāpyanyo 'nyo nirdiśyate avasthāntarataḥ, na dravyāntarataḥ. yathaikā gulikā ekāṅge nikṣiptā ekam ity ucyate, śatāṅke śatam, sahasrāṅke sahasram iti.

Also cf. TSP, p. 614.19-25; ADV, p. 260.3-6; LVP (1937), pp. 23, 91; *Yoga-bhāṣya*, 3.13.

67. Cf. AKV, p. 806.23-25: yasyāṃ avasthāyāṃ yo dharmāḥ kāritraṃ na karoti tasyāṃ 'anāgataḥ' ucyate, yasyāṃ karoti tasyāṃ 'vartamānaḥ', yasyāṃ kṛtvā niruddhaḥ tasyāṃ 'atītaḥ'.

Also cf. TSP, p. 614.22-23; LVP, (1937), pp. 23-24; ADV, p. 261.4-7.

68. Cf. AKB, p. 807.1-3: anyathānyathiko BhadantaBuddhadevaḥ. sa kilāha-dharmo 'dhvasu pravartamānaḥ pūrvāparam apekṣyānyo 'nya ucyate avasthāntarataḥ, na dravyāntarataḥ. yathaikā strī mātā vocyate duhitā ceti.

Also cf. TSP, p. 615.3-6; ADV, p. 260.7-11; LVP (1937), pp. 23-24, 91-92; *Yoga-bhāṣya*, 3.13; P.M. Williams (1977), pp. 279-294.

69. LVP (AKP, p. 54, fn. 1) observes: "The two commentators of Hsüan-tsang differ. According to Fa-pao, the future is established in relation (apekṣya) to the past and present; the past, in relation to the present and future; the present, in relation to the past and future. This is the opinion of Saṅghabhadra. According to P'ou-kouang, the future, in relation to the anterior; the past, in relation to the posterior; the present, in relation to both: this is the system of the *Vibhāṣā*, 77, 2."

70. LVP (AKP, V, p. 54, fn. 2) writes: "..... The Ekavyavahārika school (i-choūo-pōu) says that the three epochs are only words, that their nature does not exist.
- The Lokottaravādins establish the epochs on the ground of the dharma: therefore, that which is mundane (laukika) exists relatively; that which is supra-mundane (lokottara) exists in reality.
- For the school of the Sūtras, for the school of the Mahāsaṅghikas (king-pōu; ta-tchōng-pōu), the past and future do not exist; the present exists."
71. J. Masuda (1925), p. 54, fn. 2; LVP (1937), pp. 137-140; L. Silburn (1955), pp. 227-274; Bareau (1950), pp. 1-11.
72. Also see CCB, pp. 39ff; Stcherbatsky (1962), I, pp. 79-118; Silburn, *ibid.*, pp. 254-262; Conze (1962), pp. 134-143; Keith (1923), pp. 181ff; LVP (1932), pp. 1-9, (1937), pp. 134-158; A.K. Chatterjee (1975), pp. 15ff; D.N. Sastri (1976), pp. 164ff, 187ff; for the criticism of momentary character of all entities, see *Syādvādamāñjarī* of Malliṣeṇa, chapter 18; Jain (1959), pp. 236-249. Also see TSP, *Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā*, chapter 8; Mimaki (1976) and its review by de Jong (1978A); Rita Gupta (1980), pp. 47-68.
73. Takakusu (1975), p. 65. Also see Stcherbatsky (1962), I, p.111; CCB, p. 90.
74. Cf. AKB, p. 807.5: sāmkyapakṣe nikṣeptavyah; TSP, p. 615.8; ADV, p. 259.14. A detailed analysis of the Sāmkyha doctrines is found in the *Prakṛtiparīkṣā* of TSP. P.S. Jaini (AD, Introduction, p. 89) informs us that Vasubandhu wrote a treatise specially to refute the Sāmkyha doctrines. Also see Liebenthal (1934).

Actually the first of the four doctrines is of the *Vibhāṣā* which is repeated in AKB, as LVP (1937, p. 92) thinks. This is not correct, because the *Vibhāṣā* rather criticises it, see LVP (1937), pp. 22-25, and Keith (1923), p. 165. LVP contradicts himself, see his AKP, V, p. 54, fn. 3, where he writes:

The *Vibhāṣā*, 77, 1, refutes the theory of the difference of bhāva: "Beyond the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of a dharma, what can well be its bhāva?" But a commentary says: The nature of a dharma in the three epochs is not transformed; there is only difference in the fact of activity (kāritra), of non-activity, etc. This is the bhāva of the dharma there. And this transformation (pariṇāma) is not like that of Sāmkyhas. The latter says that the nature of the dharmas is eternal and that it transforms itself into the twenty three tattvas. Whereas the nature of the conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharma is not eternal. It is on the basis of this modification, activity, non-activity, etc. that we speak of transformation. The theories established by Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva are also irreproachable. They do not present great difference with that of Vasumitra. Only Vasumitra gives a solid and simple explanation. The master of the Śāstra (Vasubandhu) too, in agreement with the *Vibhāṣā*, prefers it

Here it seems that the above mentioned commentary (the author of which is not given by La Vallée Poussin) opposes the statement of the *Vibhāṣā* and also contradicts itself. Firstly, it maintains that the nature of the dharma in the three epochs is not transformed. This shows that it is eternal and thus is in agreement at this

point with the Sāṃkhya. If the nature of the conditioned dharmas is not eternal, what kind of nature, if we take nature means *svabhāva* (dravya, substance), is that which is not transformed during the three epochs? Secondly, both the *Vibhāṣā* (LVP, 1937, p. 25) and the aforesaid commentary accept the theory of Vasumitra. And Vasumitra (AKB, p. 806.7-9; TSP, p. 614.19-23; ADV, p. 260.3-6; AKP, V, p. 54; LVP 1937, pp. 23, 91ff) admits that there is a change of states only, not of the substance or thing or dravya. Thirdly, Vasubandhu prefers the theory of Vasumitra not because he is in agreement with the *Vibhāṣā*, but because he finds some good points in it regarding the notion of *kāritra* to discuss with. Finally, as we will see, he rejects them all.

Saṃghabhadra in his '*Nyāyānusāraśāstra*' opposes Vasubandhu's charge against Dharmatrāta of being on the Sāṃkhya side: "This is not correct. As a matter of fact, the Bhadanta does not say that the essence (dravya) of conditioned dharma is eternal. In traversing the three epochs the dharma disappears, the dharma appears. He says only that, the dharma wandering through the epochs, although the dravyalakṣaṇa remains the same, the manner of existence (sing-lei) differs. This theory is partially similar to that of Vasumitra. How can one consider it as similar to that of the unbelieving Sāṃkhyas?" - LVP (1937), p. 92; also see Schayer (1938), p. 31, fn. 1.

Professor M. Hattori, on the basis of Akira Hirakawa's Japanese article, 'Usetsuna to Setsunametsu' (Kṣaṇika and Kṣaṇabhāṅga), published in *Kanakura commemoration volume*, Kyoto, Heirakuji Shoten, 1966, pp. 159-177, suggests to me that Hirakawa has mentioned in his above article a Chinese phrase: *san shih shih yu, fa t'i heng yu*, the literal translation of which is: "The three time-epochs really exist and the essence of a dharma is permanent". But Hirakawa does not agree with this phrase and interprets it as "It means that a dharma really exists in the three time-epochs". In respect of the essence of a dharma, he pronounces, there is no time-epoch, but in respect of its *kāritra* there are time-epochs. Hirakawa's observations are in accordance with the Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (Taishō edition). It is also to be noticed that the preceding Chinese phrase is not found in the Sanskrit *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*.

75. TSP, p. 615.9-11: *pūrvasvabhāvāparityāgena vā pariṇāmo bhavet, parityāgena vā ? yady aparityāgena, tadā 'dhvasaṅkaraprasaṅgaḥ. atha parityāgena, tadā sadā 'stitvavirodhaḥ.*
76. Cf. Stcherbatsky (1978), p. 32.
77. See CCB, p. 43ff. On the relation between Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, J.W. de Jong (1976, pp. 32-34) gives a number of valuable references with his own brief comments and analysis. Also see Stcherbatsky (1934), pp. 737-760; Harsh Narain (1961), pp. 45-56.
78. For *samanvāgama*, see May (1959), p. 111, fn. 279.

79. Cf. TSP, p. 615.12-15: *dvitīyasyāpi vādino 'yaṃ saṅkara eva; sarvasya sarvalakṣaṇayogāt. puruṣas tv arthāntarabhūtarāga-samudācārād rakta ucyate 'viraktaś ca samanvāgamamātreṇa, na tu dharmasya lakṣaṇasamudācāro lakṣaṇasamanvāgamo vā prāptilakṣaṇo 'sti, anyatvaprasaṅgāl lakṣaṇasya prāptivad iti na sāmyaṃ dr̥ṣṭāntasya Dārṣṭāntikena.*

Also cf. AKB, p. 807.5-7; ADV, p. 260.18-19; LVP (1937), pp. 24, 92; and *Yoga-bhāṣya*, 3.13.

For *prāpti* and *samanvāgama* see AK, II, 36b: *prāptir lābhaḥ samanvayaḥ (prāpti is acquisition and possession), and AKB thereupon.*

Cf. AKP, II, p. 179: *prāpti is of two kinds - "(1) acquisition (lābha, pratilambha) of that which has not been obtained (prāpta) and acquisition of that which has been lost; (2) possession (samanvāgama, samanvaya) of that which, having been obtained, has not been lost."*

Also cf. AKP, II, p. 179, fn. 1: *"..... The terms lābha and samanvāgama have not the same sense in the Abhidharma and the Kathāvatthu, ix.12. For the Theravādin, lābha signifies 'possession', for example, the Saints possess the power to realise at their will this or that meditation; samanvāgama means the actual realisation. Elsewhere (iv. 4) one distinguishes the paṭilābhasamannāgama and the samaṅgibhāvasamannāgama, potential possession (samanvāgama of the Abhidharma) and actual possession (saṃmukhibhāva of the Abhidharma)."*

On *prāpti* see Conze (1962), pp. 138ff.

80. Cf. TSP, p. 615.17-19: *caturthasyāpy ekasminn evādhvani trayo 'dhvānaḥ prāpnuvanti. tathā hi - atīte 'dhvani pūrvapaścimau kṣaṇāv atītānāgatau, madhyamaḥ kṣaṇaḥ pratyutpanna iti. eṣā dūṣaṇadig eṣāṃ spaṣṭā.*

Also cf. AKB, p. 807.7-9; ADV, p. 260.14-16; LVP (1937) pp. 24, 92.

81. Cf. LVP, *ibid.*; TSP, p. 615.8ff; ADV, p. 260.14ff; AKB, p. 807.5ff.

82. Cf. *ibid.*, also Keith (1923), p. 166.

83. Cf. AK, V. 26c-d: *tr̥tīyaḥ śobhanaḥ, adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ.*

84. Conze (1962), p. 136.

85. Cf. TS, *kārikā* 1791 and TSP thereon; AKB, p. 808.5-6: *yadā sa dharmāḥ kāritram na karoti tadā anāgataḥ. yadā karoti tadā pratyutpannaḥ. yadā kṛtvā niruddhas tadā atīta iti; AD, kārikā, 303 and ADV thereon.*

Also cf. AKV, p. 809.15-16: *uparatakāritram atītam, aprāpta-kāritram anāgatam, pratyutpannakāritram vartamānam iti.*

86. Koller (1974), pp. 204-205.

87. Kalupahana (1974), p. 187.

88. PC, p. 85.

89. E.J. Thomas (1951), pp. 164-165.
90. Ibid., p. 165.
91. AKP, IV, p. 62.
92. Cf. AKV, p. 620.24: "kālo nityaḥ padārtho 'sti" ity eke.
93. See LVP (1937), p. 8. But *Vibhāṣā*'s statement is contradicted by *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, *Kathāvatthu* and *Abhidharmadīpa-vṛtti* as follows:

- (1) AKB, p. 805.10-11: ye tu kecid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalaṃ cātītaṃ karma, kiñcin nāsti yad dattaphalam atītaṃ anāgataṃ cetī vibhajya vadanti, te Vibhajyavādinaḥ.

The same theory is found in the *Kathāvatthu*, i.8 (see PC, pp. 101-104), but it is referred to the Kassapikas (see *ibid.*, KA thereupon). This means that the Vibhajyavādins and the Kassapikas are the same, or at least both of them admitted the same theory regarding the conception of time.

Also see the *Milindapañha* (tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, 1975, I, pp. 77-78)), where this theory is not referred to any particular school.

At this point Bareau (1957, p. 359) seems to accept the *Vibhāṣā*'s above expression about the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins, or at least by-passes the preceding statement of AKB and the following one of ADV, p. 257.4-5:

- (2) vibhajyavādināṃ tu Dārṣṭāntikasya ca pradeśo vartamānādhvasamjñakāḥ.

94. Thomas Watters (1904), p. 274.
95. Kalupahana (1975), p. 77.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. See Keith (1923), p. 167, fn. 1.
100. Ibid., fn. 2.
101. Ibid., p. 167 and fn. 3. Also cf. AKP, II, pp. 224ff. See H.V. Guenther (1974), pp. 169ff.
102. Cf. AKP, IV, p. 62: "Quel est le dharma que nous appelons 'temps' (kāla) ? Ce n'est pas une substance (padārtha) éternelle, comme le croient quelques-uns. Le mot 'temps' est une expression par laquelle sont désignés les saṃskāras en tant que passés, futurs, actuels."

Also cf. AKV, p. 620.24-27: *kālo nityaḥ padārtho 'sti' ity eke. tad āśaṅkayā pṛcchati - kālo nāma ka eṣa dharmā ity. kāla ity asyābhidhānasyā kim abhidheyam ity arthaḥ. saṃskāraparidīpanādhi-vacanam etad iti. saṃskārāṇām atītānāgatapratyutpannānam abhidhyo-takam nāmeti.*

Also see LVP (1937), p. 9.

103. Cf. AKB, p. 26.4: *ta eva saṃskṛta gatagacchadgamīsyad bhāvād adhvānaḥ.* Also see AKP, I, p. 12:

"Les conditionnés sont les chemins - c'est-à-dire les époques, le passé, le présent et le futur - parce qu'ils ont pour nature d'être allés, d'aller, de devoir aller. De même, d'un chemin, on dit qu'il allait, qu'il va, qu'il ira à la ville."

104. LVP (1937), pp. 8ff.

105. Ibid., p. 8, fn. 2:

On ne traduirait pas mal: "autre chose que les choses" - *saṃskāra*, au sens étroit, un autre nom pour "acte" (deuxième terme du *Pratītyasamutpāda*); au sens large, que nous avons ici, presque synonyme de *saṃskṛta*, "produit par les conditions, conditionné"; le "conditionnant", *saṃskāra*, est toujours "conditionné". - De même *pratītyasamutpāda* = *pratītyasamutpanna*, Kośa, [AKP] III, p. 74.

106. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

107. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 9.

108. Here *saṃskāras* are not different from the *saṃskṛtas* or conditioned dharmas. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 93, fn. 1.

109. Ibid., p. 93.

110. Bareau (1957), p. 359.

111. Cf. TSP, p. 616.20-22: *adhvanā saṅgraho yesāṃ te 'dhvasaṅgrahā rūpādayaḥ. ādiśabdena vedanādiparigrahaḥ. tesāṃ bhāvo rūpādītvam. atrāpy ādiśabdena duḥkhasamudayānityānātmadītyvenopadiṣṭatvād iti grhyate.*

112. Cf. AKB, p. 808.7-8: *yady atītam api dravyato 'sty anāgatam iti kasmāt tad atītam ity ucyate, anāgatam iti vā ?*

113. Bareau (1957), p. 357.

114. Ibid., p. 356.

115. Cf. AKP, V, p. 55: "Nous l'avons dit. C'est l'opération, non faite, en train d'être faite, déjà faite, qui détermine l'époque du dharma."

Also cf. *ibid.*, fn. 2: "*Vibhāṣā*, 76. 11: "La sensation non encore éprouvée est futur; pendant qu'on l'éprouve, présente; éprouvée, passée"

116. See TSP, p. 617, fn. 1: tatsamānarūpaśyety arthaḥ.

For sabhāga and tatsabhāga, see AKB, I, 39; AKP, I, pp. 74-75, 81ff.

117. In other words "an actually given dharma of the homogeneous series forming the so-called eye" - Schayer (1938), p. 36.

118. Cf. TSP, p. 617.8-13: kiṃ punar atra kāritram abhipretam ? yadi darśanādilakṣaṇo vyāpāraḥ, yathā pañcānām cakṣurādinām darśanādīkam - yataś cakṣuḥ paśyati, śrotam śṛnoti, ghrāṇam jighrāti, jihvā svādayatītyādivijñānasyāpi vijñātṛtvam vijānātīti kṛtvā rūpādinām indriyagocaratvam. evaṃ sati pratyutpannasya tatsabhāgasya cakṣuḥ nidrādyavasthāyām kāritrābhāvād vartamānatā na syāt.

119. Cf. AKB, p. 808.9: phaladānapratigrahaḥ; also TSP, p. 617.14.

120. Cf. AK, II.49: kāraṇam sahabhūś caiva sabhāgaḥ saṃprayuktakaḥ / sarvatrago vipākākhyāḥ ṣaḍvidho hetur iṣyate //

Also cf. *Abhidharmahr̥daya* (Nanjio, 1288), ii, 11 - quoted in AKP, p. 245, fn. 1; CCB, p. 81, fn. 1; Yamakami Sōgen (1979), Appendix, pp. 309-315; W.M. McGovern (1923), pp. 192-199; *Jñānaprasthāna*, ed. by Shanti Bhikshu Sastri (1955), pp. 17-19; LVP (1913A), pp. 54-55; also *ibid.*, p. 55:

"The *Laṅkāvatāra* also has a theory of sixfold hetu: (1) bhaviṣyadhetu, (2) saṃbandhadhetu, (3) lakṣaṇadhetu, (4) kāraṇadhetu, (5) vyañjanadhetu, (6) upekṣādhetu."

121. *Saṃyutta*, iv, 87, etc. - quoted in AKP, II, p. 245, fn. 2(a).

122. See AKP, II, p. 245, fn. 2(f).

123. See *ibid.*, pp. 288, 290.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 289; Schayer (1938), p. 36.

125. See AKP, II, p. 288.

126. See *ibid.*, p. 290.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

128. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 290 and also fn. 1.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

130. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

131. *Ibid.*, p. 293, fn. 3: "tasya bījabhāvopagamanāt. The dharma always exists, be it future, present or past. We say that it takes or projects a fruit in the moment when, being present, it becomes the cause or seed of a fruit. The *Vyākhyā* observes that the comparison of the seed belongs to the theory of the Sautrāntikas. Also, "this text is missing in certain manuscripts" (kvacit pustake nāsty eṣa

pāṭhaḥ). Elsewhere the *Vyākhyā* explains: pratigrhṇantīty ākṣipanti hetubhāvenopatiṣṭhanta ity arthaḥ".

Also see P.S. Jaini (1959), pp. 236-249.

132. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 293.

133. Cf. *ibid.*

134. Cf. TSP, p. 617.14-17: atha phaladānagrahaṇalakṣaṇam kāritram, yathā - cakṣuṣā sahabhāva dharmā jātyādayaḥ puruṣakārāphalam, anantaroppannam cakṣur indriyaṃ puruṣakārāphalam adhipatiphalaṃ niṣyandaphalaṃ ca, état phalaṃ jananāt prayacchadd hetubhāvā-vasthānād grhṇac cakṣur vartamānam ucyaata iti.

135. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 617.17-18: evaṃ tarhy atītānām api sabhāgasarva-tragavipākahetūnām phaladānābhyupagamād vartamānatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

136. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 817.18: atha samastam eva phaladānagrahaṇalakṣaṇam kāritram iṣyate.

137. Schayer (1938), p. 36.

138. Cf. AKB, p. 808.10-11: atītānām api tarhi sabhāgahetvādīnām phaladānāt kāritraprasaṅgo 'rdhakāritrasya veti lakṣaṇasaṅkaraḥ.

Also cf. CCB, p. 82; AKP, V, p. 56; LVP (1937), p. 94; and TSP, p. 617.19: evaṃ atītasya sabhāgahetvāder ardhavartamānatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

139. Cf. Schayer (1938), p. 36, fn. 4; TSP, p. 617.19ff; LVP (1937), p. 94ff.

140. LVP (1937), p. 95, fn. 1) observes: "In [AK] kārikā, ii, 46a-b, vṛtti is translated as neng which the editor Kiokuga Saeki explains as kong-neng.

"The ancient Sarvāstivādins (the Vibhāṣā) do not distinguish tso-yong [= kāritra] and kong-neng [= vṛtti, sāmāthya, vyāpāra]. (But due to the lack of this distinction, one is not able to answer the objection: "The good action of the past gives a pleasant fruit of retribution; so it has kāritra, activity; therefore, according to the definition, it must be present", [*ibid.*, p. 93]). The neo-Sarvāstivādins, [such as] Saṅghabhadra, distinguish them: The conditioned ones, which are cause (hetu) and bring their "proper fruit", this is their kāritra; when they are condition (pratyaya) and assist another thing, this is their power (vṛtti, sāmāthya, vyāpāra): all the present ones are cause, all the present eyes bring the future eyes to the existence: all the present ones are not condition which assists another thing: for example, in the obscurity the potency of eye is damaged; it does not make the visual consciousness to be born Only the present has kāritra, the potency of grasping (or projecting) the fruit; the past cannot have that potency, the phaladāna-kong-neng, the potency of "giving" the fruit, of making another thing to be born."

141. Cf. TSP, p. 617.20: dharmāṇām kārītram ucyate phalākṣepaśaktiḥ na tu phalajanānam. Also cf. LVP (1937), p. 95.
142. Schayer (1938), p. 36, fn. 4.
143. Cf. *ibid.*, and LVP (1937), p. 95.
144. LVP (1937), pp. 95-96; also cf. TSP, p. 617.20-23.
145. AK, V, kārīkā 27:
 kiṃ vighnam tat katham nānyat, adhvāyogaḥ, tathā sataḥ /
 ajātanastatā kena gambhīrā khalu dharmatā //
146. For the Mādhyamika conception of svabhāva, see J.W. de Jong (1972), pp. 1-6. This paper is the English translation of the author's French article, *Le problème de l'absolu dans l'école Madhyamaka*, which was read at the 21st Congress of Orientalists in Paris on 27 July, 1948, and was published in the *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*.
- For the Vaibhāṣika notion of svabhāva and dravya, see La Vallée Poussin's observations (LVP, 1937, p. 96, fn. 5).
147. Cf. AK, V, 27a and AKV thereon; CCB, p. 82; LVP (1937), p. 96.
148. Cf. AKB, p. 809.3: yena kadācit kārītram karoti kadācin neti.
149. LVP (1937), p. 96.
150. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 51.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 97,
152. See *ibid.*, fn. 1: We have: tchou-hing (saṃskārāḥ), tse-t'i (sva-svabhāvāḥ), tchong-yuen (pratyayāḥ), i-ts'ie-che (sarvadā), hui (iṣṭāḥ), tch'ang (nityam), yeou-t'i (sasvabhāvāḥ)
153. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
154. Cf. AKB, p. 809.3: pratyayānām asāmagryam iti cet.
155. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 809.4: na; nityam astitvābhyupagamāt. yac ca tat kārītram atītānāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ cocyate.
156. Cf. TSP, pp. 617.24-618.11: tat kārītraṃ dharmād anyad vā syād, ananyad vā ? - iti tair abhyupagantavyam; anyānanyayor anyo 'nyaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt, ekaniṣedhasyāparavidhināntariyākatvāt. nānyā vastuno gatiḥ asti.
157. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 618.11-12: tatra yady anyat, tadā vartamānānām prāgūrdhvāvasthayoḥ niḥsvabhāvātā prāpnoti.
158. Schayer (1938), p. 39; also cf. TS, kārīkā 1794:
 anyatve vartamānānām prāgūrdhvaṃ vā 'svabhāvātā /
 hetutvasaṃskṛtatvādeḥ kārītrasyeva gamyatām //
 and TSP thereupon.

159. Cf. TSP, p. 618.13-16: anyathā yadi prāgūrdhvaṃ ca niḥsvabhāvatā na syāt, tadā sarvasya saṃskṛtasya nityatā prāpnoti; svabhāvasya sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt. na ca sadāsattvavyatirekeṇa nityatvalakṣanam asti. yad āha - "nityaṃ tam āhur vidvāṃso yah svabhāvo na naśyati" (*Pramāṇavārtika*, chapter 1, kārikā 206c-d) iti.
160. Here Schayer (1938, p. 40, line 5) reads 'nityasya śakti', while TSP reads 'nityatā śakti', p. 618.8.
161. Tr. Schayer (1938), p. 40; cf. TSP, p. 618.18-19: syād etat - yadi nāma nityatā śaktiḥ, hetutvasaṃskṛtatvādes tu hetoḥ katham sādhyavipakṣeṇa virodhaḥ ?

Schayer (1938, p. 40, fn. 1) points out that "the asaṃskṛtas do not possess any hetutva, but nevertheless they have a sui generis negative kāritra". The double logical and ontological meaning of the dharma, i.e. it is the bearer of its specific mark (svalakṣaṇa), which is at the same time its special function (svakriyā, vṛtti, kāritra, svabhāga), has been discussed by him in his "*Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā*" (Kracow, 1931, p. 2). Stcherbatsky (1934A, p. 35) criticises Schayer for not distinguishing between lakṣaṇa = svalakṣaṇa and lakṣaṇa = saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa, and for overlooking that ākāśa is not an asaṃskṛtadharmā. But Schayer does not accept these charges (1938, p. 21, fn. 2) and in his support quotes the *Vibhāṣā* (LVP, 1930, pp. 43, 50, 54), where it is said that the asaṃskṛtas possess some kāritra.

162. Cf. TSP, p. 618.19-23: pūrvam iti *Sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyām*. sarvasya ca saṃskṛtasyānityatvābhyupagamāt saṃskṛtatvaṃ nitye na sambhavatīti spaṣṭam evāvasīyate. kiṃ ca - skandhāyatanavyatiriktasya kāritrasyopavarṇane siddhāntavirodhaḥ. tathā hi Bhagavatoktam - "sarvaṃ sarvam iti brāhmaṇa yad uta pañcaskandhāḥ, dvādaśāyatanāni, aṣṭādaśa ca dhātavaḥ" iti.

Here we agree with Schayer (1938, p. 41, fn. 1) that "sarvam asti belongs to those canonical formulae, which are accepted by all schools, but the interpretation of which was by no means settled. In the sense of the Sūtra quoted in the text (*Samyutta Nikāya*, IV, 15), the Sautrāntikas too are 'Sarvāstivādins'. But Vaibhāṣikas take sarvam asti to mean sarvadā asti = trikāleṣv asti. Neither one explanation nor the other seem, however, to convey the original meaning which was probably the totality of the differentiated, mortal, world as opposed to the primeval unity of the undifferentiated absolute."

163. Cf. TSP, p. 619.10-14: athānanyat kāritram abhyupagamya, tadā dharmasvarūpavat tadavyatirekāt tad api sārvaśālikam prāpnoti. tataś ca kāritrāt pracyuto 'tītaḥ, tat prāpto vartamānaḥ, tad aprāpto 'nāgataḥ - iti kāritravaśād ayam adhvavibhāgo na syāt; yato 'sya kāritrasya yadi vibhāgena cyutiprāptyaprāptayaḥ syuḥ, tadā syād ayam adhvavibhāgaḥ, na ca tāni vibhāgena sambhavanti; sadāvasthitaikarūpasya vibhāgabhāvāt.

Also cf. AKB, p. 810. 5-9.

164. Cf. TSP, p. 619.16-18: kiṃ ca - kāritrād avyatiriktatvād dharmo 'api pūrvāparakoṭīśūnyasattāyogī prāpnoti kāritravat. pūrvāpara-

vyavacchinnaṃ = pūrvāparakoṭīśūnyam, madhyamātrakaṃ ca tat sattvaṃ ceti vighrahaḥ.

Also see LVP (1937), p. 101.

165. Cf. TSP, p. 619.19-23: kārītram ityādina parasparaviruddhābhyupaga-
modbhāvanenopahasati. evaṃ tarhi rūpādīdharmo na sadāstīti prasaktam,
kārītrād avyatiriktatvāt ? ity āha - sadā dharmāś ceti. evaṃ api
dharmād anyat kārītraṃ prasajyate. ity āha - dharmān nānyac ca
kārītram. devāḥ = Īśvarādayaḥ, te hi yuktāyuktam anālocya svā-
tantryeṇaiva vartante iti teṣāṃ yathāceṣṭitaṃ yuktinirapekṣaṃ
svātantryeṇa pravṛttih, tadvad etad iti yāvāt.

Also cf. AKB, p. 811.1-2:

svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaś ca neṣyate /
na ca svabhāvād bhāvo 'nyo vyaktam Īśvaraceṣṭitam //

Also see AKP, V, p. 58, fn. 1; LVP (1937), p. 110 and fn. 4;
CCB, p. 84; BCAP, p. 581.11-12.

166. See LVP (1937), pp. 110-111; Schayer (1938), p. 26.

167. Schayer (1938), p. 43, fn. 1.

168. Ibid., p. 43.

169. Cf. TSP, pp. 619.23-620.7: kiṃ ca - yadi kārītrasya kārītraṃ
antareṇānāgatāditvam iṣyate, na tarhi vaktavyam - 'adhvānaḥ
kārītreṇa vyavasthitāḥ' iti; vyabhicārāt.

170. Cf. ibid. p. 620.7-8: yathā kārītrasya svarūpasattāpeksayā
'nāgatāditvaṃ vyavasthāpyate, evaṃ bhāvānām apy anāgatāditvaṃ
bhaviṣyatīti kiṃ kārītrakalpanayā.

171. Cf. ibid. p. 620.9-10: atha mā bhūd vyabhicāradoṣa iti kārītrasyāpi
kārītraṃ abhyupagamyate. tadā tatrāpi vyatirekādicintayā tulyaḥ
paryanuyogaḥ, anavasthādoṣaś ca.

172. Here I have followed Schayer's quotation of the Tibetan reading
(1938, p. 44, fn. 1): 'tha mi dad = svarūpāvyatirikto. But TSP
(p. 620.12-13) reads: svarūpād vyatirikto ... which seems to be
inconsistent according to the context and contradicts its own
succeeding lines.

173. Cf. ibid. p. 620.15-18: tad etat prakṛtānupakāraḥ. tathā hi idam
atra prakṛtam - "padārthāt kārītrasyābhedo 'bhyupagamyamāne saty
ekasyaiva padārthasyātmabhūtakārītrasyāviśeṣāt tad vaśād ayam
adhvavibhāgo nāvakalpatē" iti.

174. Tr. Schayer (1938), p. 45. Also cf. TSP, p. 620.18: pṛthivyādayas
tu parasparam anyo 'nyalakṣaṇabhedāsaṅgabhinā iti.

Professor J.W. de Jong advised me that we could not say
whether the reading "bhedāsaṅgabhinā" is correct, and for this
one would have to check the Tibetan version. But since Schayer
(1938) has consulted the Tibetan translation too, here we rely on
his translation, though he has not given any specific reference
to this reading.

175. Tr. Schayer (1938), p. 45.
176. See LVP (1937), pp. 106-107.
177. Cf. TSP, p. 621.11-17: punaḥ sa evāḥ - "na kāritraṃ dharmād anyat, tadvyatirekeṇa svabhāvānupalabdheḥ. nāpi dharmamātram, svabhāvastitve 'pi kadācid abhāvāt. na ca na viśeṣaḥ, kārित्रस्या प्रागabhāvāt, saṃtānavat. tathā dharmanairantaryotpattiḥ saṃtāna ity ucyate, na cāsau dharmavyatiriktaḥ tad avibhāgena grhyamānatvāt. na ca dharmamātram, ekakṣaṇasyāpi saṃtānatvaprasaṅgāt. na ca nāsti, tat kāryasadbhāvāt" iti. āha ca -
- "saṃtatikāryaṃ ceṣṭaṃ na vidyate sāpi saṃtatiḥ kācit /
tadvad avagaccha yuktyā kārित्रेṇa 'dhvasamsiddhim" // iti
178. Cf. ibid. pp. 621.19-622.14: yathā saṃtānibhyas tattvānyatvenāvācyatvāt pudgalavat saṃtāno niḥsvabhāvaḥ, tadvat kārित्रam api niḥsvabhāvaṃ syāt. svabhāve hi sati tattvam anyatvam, tataś ca tat kārित्रam kalpitatvān na kvacit kārye saṃtativad upayujyeta. na hi kalpitasya saṃtānasya kvacit kārye 'sty upayogaḥ; tasya niḥsvabhāvāt. svabhāvapratibaddhatvāt kāryodayasya. tasmād vastv eva saṃtānaniḥsvabhāvaṃ arthakriyākṣamaṃ, na saṃtānaḥ kalpitaḥ. tataś ca kārित्रस्या प्राज्ञप्तिसत्त्वत् प्राग्वत् पाश्चात् अपि na paramārthataḥ sannidhānam astīti tad vaśād adhvatravyavasthānam api kalpitam eva syāt, na bhāvikaṃ.
179. Cf. TSP, p. 622.15-16: bhavatu kārित्रam प्राज्ञप्तिसत्, tat kṛtam cāpy adhvavyavasthānam प्राज्ञप्तिसत्, tataś ca ko doṣaḥ ?
180. Cf. ibid. p. 622.17-21: phalākṣepaśaktir hi dharmānām kārित्रam iti varṇitam. yā ca phalākṣepaśaktiḥ sā nānyā vastusvalakṣaṇāt, kiṃ tarhi ? tad eva. ata evāsau na śabdagocarā asādhāraṇatvāt svalakṣaṇe śabdāpravṛtteḥ. tataś ca śaktir eva vastu nānyad iti katham sā śaktiḥ प्राज्ञप्तिसत् भवेत्. naiva bhaved iti. tataś ca tadvaśād adhvavyavasthānam tāttvikam eveṣṭam bhavateti bhāvaḥ.
181. Cf. ibid., pp. 622.21-623.12: kiṃ ca - yad etad dāhapākādy arthakriyākāri vahnyādirūpam upalabhyate, kiṃ tad evātītānāgatāvastham ? āhosvid anyat ? yadi tad eva, katham ekasminn aviśiṣṭe 'smin rūpādike vastuny akriyādayaḥ parasparaviruddhā dharmā yujyante, yena yathākramam anāgatavartamānātītavyavasthā syāt. yadi hi viruddhadharmādhyāse 'py ekatvam syāt, utsannā tarhi bhedavyavasthā, tataś ca sarvam eva jagad ekam eva syāt, ekatve ca sahotpattyādiprasaṅgaḥ.
182. Cf. ibid., p. 623.12-13: athāpy avasthāparityāgaparigrahabhedena bhinnatvād dhvasu vastu na nirviśiṣṭam iti kalpyate.
183. Cf. ibid., p. 623.14-16: para āha - neti. bhidyante bhāvād iti saṃbandhaḥ. kasmāt ? bhāvasyākartrtvāptiḥ = akartrtvaprasaṅgāt. anvayavyatirekābhyām tāṣām evāvasthānām kāryaṃ prati sāmartyasiddheḥ.
184. Cf. ibid., p. 623.17-22: vastunaḥ sakāśād abhedam katham avasthāsv anumanyante = pratipadyante ? naiva; yasmād abhūtvā bhavanty avasthāḥ, bhūtvā ca vinaśyanti. na ca tathā vastv iṣṭam; sarvadā 'stivābhyupagamāt. tataś ca katham tā abhūtvā bhavantyo vinaśyantyaś ca tadātmikā yuktāḥ ? naiva; bhinnayogakṣematvāt. anyathā hi tadātmātvenāsām api sadāstitvaprasaṅgo vastusvabhāvavat, tato 'vyatirekādvastuno vā 'bhūtvābhāvādiprasaṅgo 'vasthāsvrūpavat.

185. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 623.23-624.11: bhavatu cāvasthābhedaparakaḥ, tathāpi viruddhadharmādhyāso na parihṛta eva. tathā hi - vastu madhyāvasthāyām kiṃ svarūpeṇa kārakam? ahoṣvit pararūpeṇa? yadi svarūpeṇa, tad eva svarūpam anyayor api daśayor atītānāgatāvasthāyor astīti katham asya kārakasvabhāvasya kriyākriyābhraṃsau syātām. atha pararūpeṇa, tadā 'syākartrtā punaḥ prāptety avastutvaprasaṅgaḥ.
186. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 624.11-15: evaṃ tāvat tad eva vahnyādirūpam atītānāgatāvasthāyām na yuktaṃ. athānyat, asmin pakṣe na bhavaty ekatra kriyākriyādiparasparaparāhatadharmasāṅkaryādidoṣaḥ, bhinnatvād vastunah. kiṃ tu yat tad dāhapākādikāryayogyam analādikaṃ vastu tad abhūtvā jāyate, bhūtvā ca vigacchatīti sadā 'stivābhyupagamavirodhaḥ syāt; anvayābhāvāt.
187. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 624.16-18: syād etat - yady api kāryayogyam abhūtvā jāyate, bhūtvā ca vigacchatīti; tathāpy atītānāgatāvasthāyām akāryayogyam vastu vidyata eva, tataś ca na sadā 'stivābhyupagamavirodhaḥ.
188. Cf. TS, kārikā 1820 and TSP thereon.
189. Cf. TSP, p. 624.20-21: athāpi syāt - atītasya sabhāgahetvādeḥ kāryayogyatvam iṣyata eva, tataś cāsiddham etat 'na tasmāt kāryasambhavaḥ'.
190. Cf. TS, kārikā 1821.
191. Schayer (1938), p. 53.
192. Cf. TSP, pp. 624.23-625.10: tathā hi - hetupratyaya-janito yo 'rthaḥ sa vartamāna ucyate, yaś ca kādācitkaḥ so 'vaśyam hetupratyayani-mittah; yasmād ahetukasya dve eva gatī - yad uta sadā sattvam, asattvam vā; anyānapekṣaṇāt. tasmād yaḥ kādācitkaḥ so 'vaśyam hetupratyayanirmītasattvaḥ, so 'vaśvam vartamāna eveti siddham. vartamānatvena kādācitkatvasya vyāptiḥ.
193. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 625.11-12: kiṃ ca - yadi atītānāgataṃ dravyato 'sti, tadā sarvasaṃskāraṇām śāśvatatvaprasaṅgaḥ. tataś ca pratisaṃkhyāni-rodhādibhyo rūpādīnām viśeṣi na prāpnoti.
194. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 625.13-14: atha rūpādeḥ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇayogāt saṃskṛtatvam, nākāśādīnām, tena bhavati pratisaṃkhyānirodhāder vaikalakṣaṇyaṃ rūpāder iti parair matam, tad etad asamyak.
195. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 625.14-17: tathā hi - jātiḥ, jarā, sthitiḥ, anityatā ca - iti catvāriṃāni saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni. tatra jātir janayati, sthitiḥ sthāpayati, jarā jarayati, anityatā vinaśayati - ity evaṃ janādir eṣāṃ vyāpāra iṣṭaḥ.
196. See Schayer (1938), p. 54, fn. 1.
197. Cf. TSP, p. 625.18-20: tatra jātis tāvat kaṃ viśeṣaṃ janayantī satyasya rūpāder janikā ity abhidhīyate - kiṃ tasmād rūpādeḥ param = vyatiriktaṃ, āhoṣvid aparam = avyatiriktaṃ viśeṣaṃ janayantīti pakṣadvayam.

198. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 625.20-22: tatra na tāvad avyatiriktaṃ; yasmād asau viśeṣo jātivyaṅpārāt prāg api niṣpannatvād aśakyakriyaḥ, niṣpatty-uttarakālavat. na hi niṣpannasya kriyā yuktā; anavasthāprasaṅgāt.
199. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 625.22-626.11: nāpi vyatirikto 'tiśayaḥ kriyate; vyatireke hy asya rūpāder ayam atiśaya itī sambandhāsiddheḥ. tathā hi - na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ; vyatirekābhyupagamāt. anabhyupagame vā pūrvoktadoṣaprasaṅgāt. nāpi tad utpattīlakṣaṇaḥ; jāter eva tadutpatteḥ. na cānyaḥ sambandho 'sti; ādhārādheyatvā-dīnām tadutpatty antargatatvāt.
200. Schayer (1938), p. 56.
201. Tr. Schayer, *ibid.*
202. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 626.12-15: jātim apekṣyotpādayatīti cet. na hy anu-pakāriṇyām jātāv apekṣā yuktā; atiprasaṅgāt tasmād vyatireke sati sambandho na siddhyati.
203. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 626.16: kiṃ ca - tasyātiśayasya pūrvam asattvād asatkāryam abhyupagatam bhavet.
204. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 626.16-19: evaṃ jarayānyathātve kriyamāṇe, sthityā 'vasthite, anityatayā ca nāṣe kriyamāṇe, eṣām anyathātvādīnām anyā 'nanyavikalpe sati ye doṣās te jātivaj jarādiṣv api vācyaḥ.
205. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 626.19-23: kiṃ ca - jātyādīnām svakāryārambhitvam yat tat samarthasvabhāvānīyamādiṣṭam. sa ca samarthaḥ svabhāvas teṣām sarvadā 'stīti sadaiva svakāryārambhitvaprasaṅgaḥ. na ca hetu-pratyayavaikalyam; teṣām api sadāvasthitatvāt. tataś cātītānā-gatāvasthayor jātyādibhir janānādisvakāryakāraṇād ekasminn evadhvaṅ aparimitādhvaprasaṅgaḥ.
206. Cf. TS, kārikā 1830.
207. Cf. *ibid.*, kārikā 1831.
208. Cf. TSP, p. 627.12-13: athākṣaṇikā itī pakṣaḥ, evaṃ sati kṛtānta-virodhaḥ. kṛtāntaḥ = siddhānta ucyate. tathā hi "kṣaṇikāḥ sarva-saṃskārāḥ" itī siddhāntaḥ.
209. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 627.14-16: kiṃ ca - na kevalam siddhāntavirodhaḥ, anumānavirodho 'pi pratijñāyāḥ. tathā hi - yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam, yathā vartamānam. santaś cātītānāgatā itī niyamāt kṣaṇabhaṅgināḥ prāptāḥ.
Also see TS, kārikās 391-394, and TSP thereon.
210. Tr. Schayer (1938), p. 58.
211. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 627.20-22: kiṃ ca - ime 'tītānāgatā arthakriyāsamarthā vā syuḥ, na vā samarthā itī pakṣau. yadi samarthāḥ, tadā sāmārthya-sadbhāve vartamānāḥ prāpnvanti, avivādāspadībhūtavartamānavat.
212. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 627.22-23: prayogaḥ - ye ye 'rthakriyāsamarthāḥ te vartamānāḥ, yathā 'vivādāspadībhūtā vartamānāḥ. arthakriyāsamarthāḥ cātītādaya itī svabhāvahetuprasaṅgaḥ.
Also see S. Mookerjee (1975), pp. 1-19.

213. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 628.11-12: na cāyam anaikāntikaḥ; yato vartamānatva-nivṛttau naṣṭājātānām sarvasāmarthyaviyogitvaṃ prasajyeta, ākāśam-bhoruhavat.
214. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 628.14-16: na cākāśapratisaṃkhyānirodhāpratisaṃkhyāni-rodhair asaṃskṛtair anekāntaḥ; teṣām api pakṣikaraṇāt. ato 'naikānti-katvakalpanāyā nātinibandhanam.
215. The same statement is found in AKB, p. 817.4; AKP, V. p. 63; and CCB, p. 89.
216. See Schayer (1938), p. 61, fn. 1, and LVP (1937), pp. 121ff. Also cf. TSP, p. 629.8-9: kiṃ ca - yasyātītānāgatam dravyato 'sti, tasya phalam api nityam astīti svargāpavargaprāptyartha yatno viphalāḥ syāt.
217. "nāsiddhe bhāvadharma 'sti". Tr. Schayer (1938), p. 63.
218. Schayer, *ibid.*; also cf. TSP, p. 629.23-24: athāpi siddhāḥ syuḥ, tathāpi vartamānatvasiddher dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhanād viruddhā hetavaḥ.
219. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 629.24-630.12: katham idānīm adhvasaṅgrhītatvam atītānāgatānām rūpādīnām nirdiṣṭam, na hi śaśaviṣāṇam atyantāsad atītam anāgatam vā vyavasthāpyate ?
220. Cf. TS, kārīkās 1843-1844.
221. Cf. *ibid.*, kārīkā 1845. Also see CCB, p. 84; AKP, V, p. 58; AKB, p. 811.4-5.
222. AKB, p. 811.5-6: kaś caivam āha - vartamānavat tad astīti ? atītānāgatātmanā. Also see CCB, p. 84; AKP, V, p. 58.
223. CCB, *ibid.*; also AKB, p. 811.8: asty atītam asty anāgatam.
224. AKB, p. 811.9: astiśabdasya nipātatvāt.
LVP (AKP, V, p. 58, fn. 3) observes: According to Hsüan-tsang: "The word 'is' applies to that which exists and to that which does not exist."
Also see BCAP, p. 581.17-18: "astiśabdasya nipātatvāt kāla-trayavṛttitvam". See Schayer's translation (1938, p. 73).
225. CCB, p. 84.
226. Cf. AKB, pp. 811.9-812.1: yathā 'sti dīpasya prāgabhāvo 'sti paścādabhāva iti vaktāro bhavanti.
227. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 812.1-2: evam atītānāgatam astīty uktam. anyathā hy atītānāgata eva na sidhyet.
228. Cf. TS, kārīkā 1846 and TSP, p. 630.16-18 thereupon: dvividhaṃ hi vijñānam - sālambanam, anālambanam ca. yat sālambanam tad abhi-saṃdhāya dvayāśrayavijñānadeśanā Bhagavataḥ.

229. TS, kārīkā 1847b.
230. See Schayer's remark (1938, p. 64, fn. 1).
231. Tr. Schayer, *ibid.*, p. 65; also cf. TSP on TS, kārīkā 1847.
232. Cf. TSP, pp. 630.25-631.8: yadi tarhi nirviṣayam api vijñānam asti, tat katham jñānam iti vyapadiśyate, tathā hi 'vijānātīti vijñānam' iti gīyate, asatī ca vijñeye kiṃ vijānataḥ vijñānam syāt ?
233. See TS, kārīkā 1999.
234. See TS, chapter 23 and TSP thereon. Also see TSP, p. 631.10-12 and Schayer (1938), p. 65, fn. 2.
235. Cf. AKB, p. 817.1-3: naiva hi Sautrāntikā atītāt karmaṇaḥ phalotpattim varṇayanti. kiṃ tarhi ? tatpūrvakāt saṃtānaviśeṣād ity ātmavādapratīṣedhe saṃpravedayīṣyāmaḥ
236. Cf. *ibid.* Also see CCB, p. 89 and AKP, V, p. 63.
237. See Stcherbatsky (1976). Also see AKP, IV, 85a, p. 185, and fn. 1; CCB, p. 202; TS, chapter 6; Schayer (1932).
238. Cf. TS, kārīkā 1849.
239. Cf. TSP, p. 631.13-14: vāsitam = paramparayā phalotpādanasamartham utpāditam. Also see BCAP, p. 473.10-11:
 yasminn eva hi saṃtāna āhitā karmavāsana /
 phalam tatraiva badhnāti karpāse raktatā yathā // iti.
- This kārīkā is also quoted in *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (p.106.29-30), but its source is not traced. Also see E.Lamotte (1936), pp.151-205.
240. Cf. TSP, p. 631.15: asti tat karma yat kṣīnam niruddham vipariṇatam. Also AKB, p. 812.3-4; CCB, p. 85; AKP, V, p. 59.
241. CCB, *ibid.*,
242. Schayer (1938, p. 67, fn. 1) observes: mūladravya = the basic element = the first element of a homogeneous series (pravāha).
243. Cf. TSP, p. 631.16-18: bhaktyeti upacāreṇa. yathā mūladravycoprasūtasya hiraṇyādeḥ phalaprabandhasya samabhāve vinaṣṭam api mūladravyam avinaṣṭam ity ucyate, tadvat karmāpi.
244. Cf. AKB, p. 812.5-6: tatra punas tadāhitam tasyām saṃtatau phaladānasamarthyam saṃdhāyoktam. anyathā hi svena bhāvena vidyamānam atītam na sidhyet. Also CCB, p. 85; AKP, V, p. 59.
245. Cf. TSP, p. 631.19-21.
246. *Saṃyuktāgama*, 13.22 (quoted in CCB, p. 85, fn. 1, and AKP, V, p. 59, fn. 3). This statement is found with slight variations in BCAP, p. 582.1-3, and also cf. in the same book, p. 474.15-18: iti hi bhikṣavaḥ asti karma, asti phalam. kārakas tu nopalabhyate ya imān

skandhān vijahāti. anyāṅś ca skandhān upādatte. anyatra dharmasāṅketāt. atrāyaṃ dharmasāṅketo yad asmin sati idaṃ bhavaty asyotpādād idaṃ utpadyate iti.

This passage also is taken from the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra*. Here LVP gives some other references too where the preceding passage is found (see AKP, *ibid.*).

Also cf. TSP, p. 631.23-24: "caḡsur utpadyamānaṃ na kutaścid āgacchati, niruddhyamānaṃ na kvacit sannicayaṃ gacchatīti hi caḡsur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca prativigacchati" iti; AKB, p.813.1-3; ADV, p. 263.1-2 and fn. 1.

247. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 632.9: vartamāne 'dhvany abhūtvā bhavatīti cet. Also see CCB, p. 85; AKB, p. 813.4; AKP, V, p. 60.
248. Cf. AKB, p. 813.4-5: na; adhvano bhāvād anarthāntaratvāt. Also see AK, I. 7c-d and AKB thereon; AKP, I, p. 12.
249. Cf. AKB, p. 813.5: atha svātmany abhūtvā bhavati.
250. Cf. TSP, p. 632.11: siddham - anāgataṃ caḡsur nāstīti. Also AKB, p. 813.5.
251. See LVP (1937), pp. 10-11 and Schayer (1938), p. 68, fn. 2.
252. For the exposition of mithyādr̥ṣṭi, see AKP, V, p. 18 and also fn. 1.
253. Schayer (1938), p. 68, fn. 2.
254. Cf. TSP, p. 632.11-15.
255. Cf. TS, kārikās 1852-1855 and TSP thereupon.
256. CCB, p. 91.

CHAPTER VI

The Mādhyamika Critique of Time¹

To understand the Mādhyamika critique of time it is essential to understand its examinations of pratītyasamutpāda, motion, permanence, the Vaibhāṣika notion of bhāva and its three phases, etc. We suggest that the Sautrāntika polemic against the Vaibhāṣikas might have led the Mādhyamikas in this regard, as the Sautrāntikas maintained that the past and future time-epochs, ākāśa, Nirvāṇa and pudgala are mere names, assertions, empirical and of common usage.²

The method³ of the Mādhyamika critique is its dialectic, which consists of a series of prasaṅga, i.e. reductio ad absurdum arguments. Its main function is to show the conflicting or rather self-contradictory characters in the opponent's thesis and to bring these fallacies home. The second point is that the Mādhyamika tries to prove that everything is relative and mutually dependent (pratītyasamutpanna),⁴ and whatever is relative is without svabhāva. J.W. de Jong remarks that "According to Nāgārjuna, a thing is real when it is endowed with svabhāva, a concept which is of great importance for the understanding of his thought. It is very difficult to know exactly what he wishes to express by this work every time, as it contains several notions."⁵ Further, he makes a significant observation that "for the Mādhyamikas the concept of svabhāva has only two meanings: (1) that of the 'own-being of each thing' (sva-lakṣaṇa or svo bhāva), which, incidentally, they consider unreal, and (2) that of the 'own-being of all things taken together' (prakṛti or svato bhāva)".⁶ But time in the Mādhyamika system does not come under either of these categories.

The basic instrument of the Mādhyamikas to criticise any *dr̥ṣṭi* (dogmatic view) concerning the reality of entities is their theory of *pratītyasamutpāda* (MK.1), which is in the Mādhyamika system "not the principle of temporal sequence, but of the essential dependence of things on each other, i.e. the unreality of separate elements (*naiḥsvabhāvya*, *dharma-nairātmya*). The entire Mādhyamika system is a re-interpretation of *Pratītyasamutpāda*. It is equated with *Śūnyatā* - the empirical validity of entities and their ultimate unreality."⁷ But the relativity of something does not prove its inexistence. In a celebrated *kārikā* Nāgārjuna avows that *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) = *Śūnyatā* (voidness) = *upādāya prajñapti* (metaphorical designation) = *madhyamā pratipad* (middle path).⁸ The Mādhyamika is a *prāsaṅgika*⁹ or a "vaitaṇḍika, a dialectician or free-lance debator",¹⁰ whose only objective is to criticise others, but not to propound any positive theory of his own.

The Mādhyamika admits twofold realities:¹¹ (1) *saṃvṛti* (phenomenon), and (2) *paramārtha* (absolute), but Murti wrongly interprets CŚ, IX.5 that "Space and time are, even from the empirical point of view unsubstantial things".¹² The word "time" (*kāla*) does not even occur in the above *kārikā*. It only says "*ākāśādīni*" which on the basis of the context and the commentary of Candrakīrti thereon, means *ākāśa*, *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* and *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*,¹³ which are the three unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) categories of the *Vaibhāṣikas*.

Time is neither the Material Cause of the World
nor Eternal

The *Kālavādins*¹⁴ (the proponents of time as cause) maintain that the existence of time is inferred by the fact that it is the cause of origination and destruction of the world. It also brings about all

kinds of modifications in things. In the same way, time is considered to be the negative cause. For example, even if the necessary causes and conditions, such as seed, water, air, soil and Sun, are present, the sprout does not always germinate if time acts against these causes and conditions.¹⁵ This leads to the conclusion that time is the cause of everything as well as eternal.¹⁶ But since, argues Candrakīrti (650 A.D.), time is an ever-lasting element and the germination of the seed is dependent on it, the sprout should always be in a state of production. Further, it is considered that although time is ever existent, there is sometimes a disappearance of activity in performing an action. Therefore, time suffers the fate of inexistence.¹⁷

Again, time, enunciate the Mādhyamikas, though existent, is completely incapable of engendering any activity like the seed, and production is not possible all the time. Even if there is production caused by time, it is variable, not in perpetuum, like that of seed. This shows that time too is variable, it means it is dependent on conditions, on the existence of which it would exist, and on the inexistence of which it would not exist. Hence, time too is impermanent like the sprout.¹⁸

Further, an inactive thing cannot possess causal characteristic (hetutva). The latter is actually not an independent substance. It is also not that it transforms itself into effect keeping its substratum, i.e. the inactive thing, unchanged. In other words, only an active thing can have the causal characteristic which is inherent in the former. In production of a fruit it cannot be said that the fruit is not of its own cause. What Candrakīrti wants to say is that cause and effect are identical (satkāryavāda, i.e. cause materially transforms itself into effect). And if there is production, it cannot be eternal like the sprout. Therefore, if there is no supposition of cause and effect

separately, neither of them can be proved as independent (svarūpeṇa).¹⁹ But they are not two different things. Further, a thing (bhāva) is called fruit after there has been a cause. For example, a sprout germinates only when a seed is existent, but not vice versa. It is not true to say that the state of fruit (phalatva) is not derived from a cause. Before the production of a sprout from a seed, there are only two alternatives: (1) hetubhūta, i.e. causal production, and (2) ahētubhūta, i.e. production at random or uncaused. In that case, the production of seed is not possible at random, like the production of fire. A fruit is produced only from a cause.²⁰ And without transformation of cause into effect, the latter is not possible, and without logical connection of cause and effect, there is no apprehension of an effect. Now, the seed, which is the root cause (mūlakāraṇa), perishes or transforms itself and then it becomes the cause of the sprout. It is not possible without changing the previous state. Likewise, if time is the cause of the world, it will have to change its previous state in giving rise to an effect, otherwise the production would be out of the question. And if it is so, time becomes impermanent like the seed.²¹ In the same vein Āryadeva says: that which undergoes transformation cannot be eternal.²²

Nowhere in the whole Indian philosophical tradition do we find that time is a material cause. Rather it is considered as an instrumental cause. So the analogy of time and seed, which is the material cause of the sprout, is inconsistent. Anyway, if time is ever considered by any opponent as the material cause, then Āryadeva's or Candrakīrti's criticism is successful. But here it seems that the thesis criticised by the Mādhyamikas is hypothetical or a result of misunderstanding the opponent's intention.

If it is assumed, says Candrakīrti, that on the production of an effect there is no change in time, then the effect, of which time is the cause, comes into existence after having been inexistent (abhūtvā jāyate), or it is produced at random. In other words, it arises itself without having been dependent on a cause or a condition. It is also not true that effect, which arises depending on causes and conditions, comes into existence after having been inexistent. There can be no production, if it has been absolutely inexistent in its previous state. That which is absolutely inexistent cannot be produced even if the necessary causes and conditions are at work, just like the horn of the hare.²³ That which is eternal arises spontaneously (nirhetuka). And so the assumption of any cause in this regard is without any purpose. What Candrakīrti intends to state is that the world is uncaused or self-caused. Therefore, there is no need to consider time as the cause of the world.²⁴

Now, the question is if a cause is eternal, how is its effect impermanent? In our daily life we observe that the impermanent seed gives rise to an impermanent sprout. It is really absurd to conceive that the effect, of which the eternal time is supposed to be the cause, is itself impermanent.²⁵

Time also Rejected as an Auxiliary Cause

It has been maintained that time exists, because it is an auxiliary cause (sahakārikāraṇa) in producing the fruits. That which does not exist cannot have the function of an auxiliary cause, like the daughter of a barren woman. Therefore, time exists, as it is an auxiliary cause. Even if all the causes and conditions, such as seed, soil, water, light, air, and sky are present, the sprout only emerges in the appropriate

season. This law applies to external as well as internal productions. Bhagavān has taught: "The karmas do not perish even after millions of years. Given all the causes and conditions as well as time, they (karmas) bear the fruits for men." Since all such productions are dependent on time, this proves that the latter exists and is an auxiliary cause in engendering the sprout.²⁶ Candrakīrti rejects any such theory saying that the function of time as an auxiliary cause can be accepted, if a sprout or a fruit is really produced. But this is not so.²⁷ Further, he rules out any possibility of causes and conditions.²⁸ He has also explained away the theory of karma and its retribution.²⁹

Again, it is set forth that time exists by its own nature, because it is the cause of origination and dissolution of things. In this phenomenon, the origination of seed and other things is dependent on a particular time. Dissolution and destruction are also dependent on a particular time. They do not always happen, even if all the causes and conditions are given. It follows that time does exist, as it is the cause of origination and dissolution of the world.³⁰ Candrakīrti replies that time can be admitted so, if there is anything like origination and dissolution. But there is nothing like these.³¹ He criticises these concepts in detail.³²

Āryadeva (170-270 A.D.) seems to aver that no effect arises by time, rather it is dependent on something else.³³ For example, in the case of origination of a sprout, to quote Murti "... a variable impermanent (kāḍācitkatva) factor alone can account for the production of the sprout sometimes only and not at other times."³⁴ But Murti does not clarify what the variable impermanent factor is.

No Means to the Knowledge of Time

It is argued that time is comprehended through kṣaṇa, pala, muhūrta, etc. It is inherent in all the three time-epochs, the past, present and future, and is different from bhāva (objects, things). Thus, it is eternal.³⁵ Candrakīrti attempts to tear this supposition too to pieces. He remarks that if time is something apart from an existent object and proved by knowledge, then it would be the cause of the origination and dissolution of the world. But it is never so, because then the question arises: How is time grasped, if it is different from bhāva ?³⁶ What Candrakīrti has in his mind is that knowledge of time is dependent on concrete existence.³⁷

Further, the Mādhyamikas accept four sources of knowledge (pramāṇas):³⁸ perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (śabda). But knowledge of time is absolutely out of the range of these pramāṇas in the Mādhyamika system. The opponent, as Candrakīrti quotes, accepts that time is proved by knowledge (jñānasiddha), but he does not give any detail of what particular source of knowledge is propounded in this regard by the former.

Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti on the three Time-epochs

Now, Candrakīrti begins to analyse the divisions of time, the past, present and future, which are determined by the special nature of time. They too, he says, are not capable of establishing themselves independently, because it is not possible to determine them by way of their abstract beingness (amūrtatvena svarūpena). If at all, their said existence may be established only by means of a particular jar. But

since the characteristics of the three time-epochs are different from phenomenal existence (bhāvabhinnā), they are subject to experience only like vedanā. They cannot be ascertained by sense-organs like the rūpa, śabda, and so on.³⁹

The opening lines of MKV on chapter XIX seem to be presenting the Vaibhāṣika notion of the three time-epochs⁴⁰ as follows: They are understood on the basis of a dharma (bhāva). That dharma whose bhāvasvabhāva (kāritra, in the Vaibhāṣika term) has ceased to be after having been originated is called past; if not yet ceased, it is called present; and if it has not yet been realised, it is future. But here Candrakīrti has failed to understand the Vaibhāṣikas correctly when he says: *te ca santi*,⁴¹ which means the past, present and future exist as such, and Mervyn Sprung's English translation⁴² too gives the same sense. Murti also offers a similar interpretation, though in a different context: "The same arguments may be urged, *mutatis mutandis*, with regard to the existence of the past or the present in the present and the future, etc."⁴³ He does not point out that the notion of these divisions of time in the Vaibhāṣika system is based on the activity (kāritra) of a dharma, though he has also not distinctly identified this theory with that of the Vaibhāṣikas.

If the above opponent is the Vaibhāṣikas, then we can say that sometimes the Mādhyamikas in their presentation of the opponent's thesis distort the facts, and sometimes they assume such hypothetical theories (as pūrvapakṣa) to criticise what would seem to be absurd for anybody, including even the Mādhyamika's opponents, to accept. For example, they present an opponent, whom I have not been able to identify with any of the Indian philosophical systems, who establishes the reality of the past,

present and future independently. If it is thought that he was Sarvāstī-
vādin or Vaibhāṣika, it is the result of one's rashness and incorrect
understanding of his system. On the other hand, if there is no real
opponent who admits the above theory, then the Mādhyamika criticism
fails to strike any goal. However, for the sake of the Mādhyamikas
let us suppose that there is an actual opponent who maintains the reality
of the three time-epochs separately. Then, the Mādhyamikas demonstrate
that the three time-epochs do not exist simultaneously, as it would be
impossible to distinguish them from each other. On the other hand, if
they exist, they exist in relation to each other, otherwise their
existence would be out of question. Time too cannot be understood with-
out such distinctions. This mutual dependence shows the unreality of
time.

Furthermore, if the three time-epochs exist in reality, then their
substratum (nibandhana), i.e. the changing things or the phenomenon
(bhāvasvabhāva), too would be real. The Mādhyamika contention is that
the changing thing (bhāva), which is the cause of the conception of the
three time-epochs, would be real, if the latter (kālatraya) themselves
are considered to be real. But it is not so,⁴⁴ and "as changing things
(bhāva) have been shown to be untenable,⁴⁵ the reality of Time too is
not established".⁴⁶ To put this argument in valid propositional form
(modus tollens):⁴⁷

$p \supset q$	where p = time-epochs exist
$\sim q$	q = changing thing exists
<hr style="width: 50%; margin: 0;"/>	\supset = sign of implication
$\therefore \sim p$	\sim = sign of negation
	\therefore = sign of therefore

Now, let us examine the Mādhyamika assertion that the past, present
and future are understood in relation to each other. If the present and

future are existent, they would either be in relation to the past, or not. If the first alternative is sustained, then both of them would necessarily be in the past. But nothing can be related to the thing which is non-existent (asattva), otherwise it would be just like a son born from a barren woman, or a flower from the jusminum-grandiflorum-creeper (mālatīlatā) in the sky, or oil squeezed from sand. It is also incorrect to say that they exist in mutual relation like light and darkness, because it would be a vitiated circle, or because it would be like an assertion identical with the point to be proved (sādhyasamatva).⁴⁸ Again, the Mādhyamika argument on the first alternative can be put in the following propositional form:⁴⁹

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 p \supset q & \text{where } p = \text{the present and future} \\
 & \text{exist} \\
 \sim q & q = \text{the past exists} \\
 \hline
 \therefore \sim p &
 \end{array}$$

If the present and future exist in the past, as they are in relation to the latter, both would be of the essence of the past, because they are included in the past. And then, the past too would be indistinguishable from the present and future as the three time-epochs are in the same state. It follows that the past too, together with the present and future, is inexistent. Again, the past is that which has passed the present state, and the future is that which has not yet attained the present state. Thus, if it is impossible to determine the present and future, then the past too would be unattainable.⁵⁰ If to avoid this predicament it is maintained that the present and future are not included in the past, then Nāgārjuna (150-250 A.D.) raises the question: What is that in relation to which there are present and future ?⁵¹

However, the proponents of time (kālavādins)⁵² affirm the reality of time and urge that in this regard there is no need of mutual dependence (apekṣā)⁵³. Nāgārjuna's reply is that neither the present nor the future can be proved without taking them in relation to the past, and then time too which is intelligible only through the three time-epochs would be unreal.⁵⁴ The same arguments, mutatis mutandis, can be advanced against the existence of the past and future in relation to the present, and the existence of the past and present in relation to the future.⁵⁵ Thus, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti have successfully demonstrated the unreality of the three divisions of time, which leads to the unreality of time itself as the knowledge of the latter is possible only through the former. This argument also can be put in the following propositional form:⁵⁶

$$\begin{array}{l}
 q \supset p \quad \text{where } p = \text{the reality of the three time-epochs} \\
 \quad \quad \quad q = \text{the reality of time} \\
 \quad \quad \quad \sim p \\
 \hline
 \therefore \sim q
 \end{array}$$

Prajñākaramati's Refutation of the Vaibhāṣika
Theory of Traikālyavāda

We find one Mādhyamika, Prajñākaramati⁵⁷ (early 10th century), who has rightly understood to some extent the Vaibhāṣika theory of traikālyavāda (i.e. the theory of three time-epochs). According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the bhāva (dharma, thing, phenomenon) certainly exists.⁵⁸ As we have seen in the previous chapter, they maintain the substantial reality of dharmas, which exist permanently. The three phases of time, the past, present and future, are the three phases of a dharma based on its activity (kāritra). The future time-phase of a dharma, a state in which it is in its latent form, is enforced by causes and conditions⁵⁹ to

achieve its present time-phase in which a dharma performs its kāritra. Thereon the last saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa, anityatā (cessation), executes its force owing to which a dharma attains its past time-phase in which it becomes quiescent. In this vein the Buddha has taught the three saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas, origination, duration and cessation.⁶⁰ In the similar sense pratītyasamutpāda too is taught.⁶¹ Here the Vaibhāṣikas took pratītyasamutpāda as the principle of temporal sequence. But the Mādhyamikas explain away such interpretation,⁶² and aver that pratītyasamutpāda is the principle "of the essential dependence of things on each other, i.e. the unreality of separate elements (naiḥsvabhāvyā, dharmanairātmyā). It is now equated with Śūnyatā- the empirical validity of entities, and their ultimate unreality."⁶³

Śāntideva⁶⁴ (695-743 A.D.) and Prajñākaramati are severely critical of the preceding theory of origination, duration and cessation. There is nothing, declares Prajñākaramati, which comes or originates from any space or time, nor does anything having been originated from somewhere go out of its present time-phase anywhere, nor does it endure by its own nature without any change (= ekasvabhāvena). On the contrary, if it is maintained that a dharma passes from its future time-epoch to present time-epoch, and again from present time-epoch to past time-epoch, then even a conditioned element would be permanent, as it is always existing, and it would not be impermanent. Thus, the problem arises: How to prove that a dharma is not permanent? But here it is to be noted that the Vaibhāṣikas do admit the permanence of the dharma.

The Kāritra and the three Time-epochs

Moreover, the Vaibhāṣika contention is that the differentiation of a dharma (dharmasya viśeṣaḥ) through the three time-epochs lies in the

fact that it is devoid of its kāritra in its preceding and succeeding states, i.e. the future and past respectively. In other words, when a dharma has not yet attained its kāritra and does not execute its activity, it is termed as future. When it is active, it is present. And when after having performed its action it is quiescent, it is past.⁶⁶ Prajñākaramati rejoins that such theory is not tenable. Now the question is whether a dharma always exists by its own nature without any change. If so, then why does kāritra not exist permanently as well?⁶⁷ The Vaibhāṣikas might reply that the origination and cessation of the kāritra are dependent on causes and conditions. This is also not correct, because dependence on causes and conditions is not applicable to that which exists permanently by its own nature. Again, if it is maintained that a thing exists even if it is devoid of any kāritra, then the reality of the latter, which is really inexistent like the horns of a horse, would result.⁶⁸

Further, Prajñākaramati raises an absurd question: How is the same kāritra called past, present and future?⁶⁹ Though he has plumbed the depths of his opponent's thesis, he has failed to understand it. Nowhere have the Vaibhāṣikas ever pronounced that the kāritra itself is called past, present and future. If it is so maintained, the kāritra too would be permanent, and then the dharma would always be active and there would only be a present time-epoch, and the past and future time-epochs would be out of question. Prajñākaramati continues: Is it so on account of the existence of a different kāritra, which works in the first kāritra, or does the first kāritra itself exist as past, present and future? In the former case, there would obviously be an infinite regress. In the latter, the same argument would apply to the dharma and there can be no denial of the fact that the same dharma is demonstrated as past, present and future

by its own nature irrespective of the *kāritra*.⁷⁰ Again, it is also not plausible to hold that the past and future dharmas exist substantially like the present one.

Now, the following questions arise. How are origination and cessation possible to the dharma which exists permanently by its own nature ? What does it lack in its previous state, in the absence of which it is called not yet realised, i.e. future ? What does it lack in its subsequent state, in the absence of which it is called destroyed, i.e. past ? If it is urged that the dharma exists in its antecedent and subsequent states also by its own nature, then it would be existing even in these states in the same way as it exists in its present state. It follows, therefore, that no distinction is possible between the three time-epochs, as the essential reality of the dharma is sustained, which eliminates the reality of the past, etc. All these things are termed by *Prajñākaramati* as the caprice of God.⁷¹ In the previous chapter we have seen that the *Sautrāntikas* too accuse the *Vaibhāṣikas* in a similar way.

From the preceding observations we can say that *Prajñākaramati* lacks a correct understanding of the *Vaibhāṣika* theory of the dharma and its different temporal phases. I do not think I can present this theory in a better way than the great *Stcherbatsky* has done. Though long, the passage is necessary for our proper understanding in the present context. He writes:⁷²

"...the *Sarvāstivādins* maintain that all elements exist on two different planes, the real essence of the element (*dharmasvabhāva*) and its momentary manifestation (*dharmalakṣaṇa*). The first exists always, in past, present, and future. It is not eternal (*nitya*) because eternality means absence of change, but it represents the potential appearances of the element into phenomenal existence, and its past appearances as well. This potentiality is existing for ever (*sarvadā asti*). Even in the

suppressed state of Nirvāṇa, when all life is extinct, these elements are supposed to represent some entity, although its manifestation-power has been suppressed for ever. The future potential elements are, indeed, divided in this school into two different sets, those that will appear (utpatti-dharma) and those that are suppressed and never will appear (anutpatti-dharma). Since the moment (kṣaṇa) is not something different from the element (dharma), time in general is not different from the elements taken collectively, as far as they have not lost their capacity of appearing in phenomenal life. In fact, "the times" is one of the synonyms used to designate collectively the elements appearing in ordinary life. But the term "time" (kāla), implying the reality of one time, is carefully avoided; it is replaced by the term "transition" (adhvan). When the Sarvāstivādin maintains that "everything exists", it means that all elements exist, and the emphasis which is put on the reality of elements refers to the conception that their past as well as their future transition represents something real. From this fundamental tenet the school derives its name. Since the conception of an element answers rather to our conception of a subtle force than for a substance, the reality, i.e. effectiveness, of the past is not so absurd as it otherwise would appear."

In the next section on "Impermanence in Sāṃkhya-Yoga"⁷³ the same author shows a great deal of similarity between the Sarvāstivādins (or the Vaibhāṣikas) and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

On the basis of the preceding analysis we can conclude that Prajñā-karamati's arguments against the traikālyavāda of the Vaibhāṣikas are valid in the light of his understanding of the latter's theory. The above passage by Stcherbatsky illustrates that the Vaibhāṣikas propound something different, though they too do not fare better as we find them against the fundamental teachings of Buddhism, such as 'everything is impermanent'.⁷⁴

The Theory of Karma, its Retribution and
the three Time-epochs

Further, the Sarvāstivādins quote scriptural evidence in their support which teaches that the past and future do exist. The Sūtra reads: the past

karma exists, the future retribution exists.⁷⁵ But Prajñākaramati asserts that the Sarvāstivādins took the Sūtra in its literal sense. Bhagavān taught so, he continues, in order to repudiate the heresy which denies the theory of cause and effect, i.e. karma and its retribution in moral life. Otherwise, the past is that which having been previously inexistent comes into existence, and again having been originated, is now destroyed. And the future is that which will come into existence when the necessary causes and conditions are given. In this sense it is said that cause and its effect exist. Here the word 'exists' (= asti) has been used as a nipāt (accidental occurrence or a particle), which can refer to all the three time-epochs.⁷⁶ This argument was first advanced in the same context by the Sautrāntikas,⁷⁷ who are supposed to have paved the way for the Mādhyamika as well as Vijñānavāda developments.

Now, Prajñākaramati quotes the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra*⁷⁸ in which Bhagavān has said: "O monks, when the eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere, and when it is annihilated, it does not go anywhere to accumulate. Thus, O monks, the eye comes into existence after having been inexistent, and it disappears after having been existent." Moreover, if the future eye had existed in reality, it would not have been said by the Buddha that it exists after having been inexistent. Therefore, there is no transition of time-epochs (adhva-samkrānti) from one state to another.

Refutation of the three Time-epochs by
Āryadeva and Candrakīrti

Āryadeva and Candrakīrti take the example of a jar (ghaṭa) to demonstrate the unreality of the past, present and future. Candrakīrti

suggests that to understand the future, we shall have to explain the future jar, and in the same way to understand the past and present, the past and present jars have to be explained respectively. But in the future no present time is realised. Then, the past is only past, and the present is that which has not yet ceased (aniruddha). These three time-epochs can be established only in relation to each other. If they are not mutually related, none of them exists.⁷⁹ We have noticed above that Nāgārjuna too offers the same argument. Further, it is evident that no present or past jar is found in the future jar, and because of the difference of characteristics a mutual relation is impossible. Thus, if in the future jar both the present and past jars are not existent, then both are not realised (anāgatau) in the future (anāgata), because of their unattainable characteristics (anāgatatvena) in this regard. Just as the future being not realised (anāgatatvena) in the present is future (unknown, anāgata), in the same way, both the past and present being not realised in the future are not known (anāgata). Again, if the opponent maintains that the future exists in the present being not yet realised (anāgatatvena), but not being unrealised in the future, then this too does not succeed any better. When the future is proved, both the past and present are proved. But if future is not established, then neither the past nor the present can be established.⁸⁰ On the other hand, if both the present and past are in the future, then all three will be future. When all three are future, then the past and present cannot be possible, and the future also cannot be defined as future. Therefore, the future time-epoch does not exist.⁸¹ And thus, the refutation of the future leads to the refutation of the past and present as well.

The opponent is not ready to accept that the future jar is absolutely inexistent. He holds that the nature of the future exists in the future

jar. Hence the future is separate by its own nature.

The past too is proved likewise. Thus, the future exists.⁸² Āryadeva avouches that if the nature of both the present and past are admitted in the future, then that which is future cannot itself become past or present.⁸³

Both Time and its Measurement are Impossible

Nevertheless, it might be emphasized that time is real, because its measurement is possible. Here, the point is that whatever is inexistent cannot be measured, just like the horns of a donkey, whereas time is measurable in terms of kṣaṇa, lava, muhūrta, day, night, fortnight, month, year, etc. This proves that since time is measureable, it also exists.⁸⁴

The crux of the problem is whether there is really any time as such. Candrakīrti enunciates that if there is something called time, then its measurement is possible. But there is nothing like that.⁸⁵ Again, he continues, if there is something called time, which is invariable (avasthita) and different from kṣaṇa, then it can be measured in terms of the latter. But there is nothing invariable and unchanging (kūṭastha) determined by kṣaṇa, etc. which is called time. At the same time, it follows that a variable (asthita) too cannot be understood as time.⁸⁶ Further, one might urge that there is an eternal time of an invariable nature which is manifested by kṣaṇa, etc.,⁸⁷ and in this vein it is contended by the kālavādins that: "Time engenders modifications in the creatures; time brings death to people; time is always awake and protects those who are asleep; time is inaccessible."⁸⁸ This characteristic itself is the invariable nature of time.⁸⁹ Candrakīrti rejects this theory too. There is no time, he insists, established in the above theory, which can be determined by manifesting itself in terms of kṣaṇa, etc. However, if

it is asked why time cannot be invariable, then the reply is because time cannot be understood apart from *kṣaṇa*, etc.⁹⁰

Time is neither Saṃskṛta nor Asaṃskṛta Dharma

Even if it is granted that there is an invariable time, the question arises whether this time is conditioned by nature (*saṃskṛtasvabhāva*)⁹¹ or unconditioned.⁹² Nāgārjuna⁹³ has devoted one full chapter for the examination of *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta* dharmas. He has also exhibited the impossibility of origination, duration and cessation, which are the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas*.⁹⁴ Therefore, conditioned things do not exist.⁹⁵ Bhāvaviveka (490-570 A.D.) in his *Karatalaratna*⁹⁶ avows that "The conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are unreal (*śūnya*) from the standpoint of ultimate truth (*tattvataḥ*), because they are produced through causes and conditions (*pratya-yodbhavāt*), like things created by magic (*māyāvat*)".⁹⁷ Nāgārjuna's argument is that if the *saṃskṛta* things are not established, how can the *asaṃskṛtas* be proved?⁹⁸

Bhāvaviveka maintains

that "The unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), such as Space, *Nirvāṇa*, etc. are non-existent from the standpoint of ultimate truth, because they are non-originating (*anutpāda*), like the sky-lotus (*khapuṣpavat*)".⁹⁹ This statement, according to J. May, represents one of the extreme points of *Mādhyamika* radicalism.¹⁰⁰

It follows that time is neither *saṃskṛta* nor *asaṃskṛta* by nature. Here it is important to note that the *Vaibhāṣikas* like any other system of Buddhism admit time neither as *saṃskṛta* nor as *asaṃskṛta*. In their list of 75 dharmas nowhere does time appear as a dharma. Since both the terms, *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta*, are used only in Buddhism, and no Buddhist

system accepts time in either of these terms, the Mādhyamika criticism in this regard is again pointless.

Both Time and its Substratum-Bhāva are Unreal

To refute the Mādhyamika criticism one might urge: it is true that there is nothing called eternal time, of an independent nature, apart from the rūpa, but nevertheless time is conceived of as designated by kṣaṇa, lava, muhūrta, as based on the saṃskāras and rūpa, and so on. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in sustaining the reality of time.¹⁰¹ But Candrakīrti puts this suggestion out of court. His assertion is that if time is said to be dependent on things (bhāva), and as things are unreal, time which is dependent on them is absolutely unreal.¹⁰² When there is no time, there are no divisions of time, such as kṣaṇa, lava and muhūrta in terms of which time is measured. Consequently, advocacy for the existence of time would not be possible on the ground of its measurements.¹⁰³ Thus, the series of becoming also becomes impossible in the three time-epochs. Now, the question arises: How can something, which does not exist in the three time-epochs, be a series of becoming?¹⁰⁴ Here, Nāgārjuna obviously applies deductive logic which is evident from the following syllogism:¹⁰⁵

$p \supset q$	where	
$\underline{\sim q}$		$p = \text{the existence of time}$
$\therefore \sim p$		$q = \text{the existence of bhāva, entities.}$

R.H. Robinson points out that in the kārikās, MK, XIX.1-3,6, "the topic is the polarity of discrete and continuous (identity and difference) with reference to time. The method is the same as before - dichotomy, and reduction to the paradox that two entities in a relation are neither identical nor different. As temporal succession is one of the components of

the concept of dependent co-arising, the problem of time belongs to the same class as those of identity, persistence, cause-and-effect, and own-being".¹⁰⁶ M. Siderits and J. O'Brien in their joint article make a significant remark: "Both Sāṃkhya and Abhidharma hold that time, unlike space, is not an ultimate constituent of reality. They appear to maintain, that our notion of temporal flow is derivative and secondary, a product of the occurrence of atomic occasions. This is the basis for Nāgārjuna's rejection of the Abhidharma theory in MMK, XIX.6. But the ultimate unreality of time does not detract from the significance of the kṣaṇa theory for our consideration."¹⁰⁷

We have already seen that the Sarvāstivādins or the Vaibhāṣikas do not admit the reality of time as such. From the same observations it is clear that the Mādhyamikas use such terminologies which give the impression that they tend to criticise the Sarvāstivādins (apart from the kālavādins), but their criticism is often the outcome of their misunderstanding the latter. Our observations show that both the Sarvāstivādins and the Mādhyamikas deny the reality of time, and we do not find any explicit reference where Nāgārjuna even seems to agree with the former in this regard. However, we can endorse S. Miyamoto's statement that "Nāgārjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (svabhāvavāda). He drew the conclusion of the non-existence of time from the Madhyamaka standpoint of non-substantiality (niḥsvabhāvavāda), which was a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self".¹⁰⁸

D.J. Kalupahana, on the basis of a non-Sarvāstivāda text, i.e. *Kathāvatthu*,¹⁰⁹ wrongly supports the accusations of the Theravādins that the Sarvāstivādins "upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time",¹¹⁰ "that not only everything past, present and future

exists, but that past, present and future themselves exist, that is, they are independently real".¹¹¹ In this regard, he has not quoted any reference in his support from the Sarvāstivāda sources. The result is that some other erroneous observations have appeared in his article, such as: "There is no doubt that it was the Sarvāstivāda conception of time which drew criticism from Nāgārjuna" in MK, XIX, "the Abhidharma scholasticism produced an absolutistic conception"¹¹³ of time. John M. Koller¹¹⁴ blindly approves Kalupahana's interpretation without taking any notice of the appropriate sources, and Stambaugh (1974, p. 132) too joins the same track.

Further, on the basis of a passage from the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra*, K.V. Ramanan also commits the same mistake. He incorrectly assumes that the Sarvāstivādins accepted time as a reality. In later statements he contradicts himself when he says: "The unit of time is the unit of function",¹¹⁵ and "time is synonymous with function".¹¹⁶

We suggest that the reality of time criticised by the Mādhyamika has been propounded by certain Kālavādins (proponents of absolute time), not Sarvāstivādins or Vaibhāṣikas.


A Critique of Motion¹¹⁷ also Leads to the Rejection of Time

The Mādhyamika examination of motion is very helpful in understanding its criticism of time. H. Cheng suggests that here the Mādhyamika seems "to criticise the Saṃmitīya¹¹⁸ and Vātsīputrīya. According to these early Buddhists, motion is possible since there is the mover or moving entity".¹¹⁹ Nāgārjuna's examination of motion also includes Space as well as substance-attribute relation apart from time. In this regard, it has to be kept in mind that his "...analysis gains some of its strength from the fact that

his Sanskrit terms are both spatial and temporal inextricably".¹²⁰ This has been demonstrated by his inexorable logic as follows.

Elsewhere the Mādhyamikas have shown the denial of origination¹²¹ which proves, *mutatis mutandis*, the characteristics (*viśeṣaṇa*) of *pratītyasamutpāda*, such as the denial of cessation.¹²² Further, they wish to prove that *pratītyasamutpāda* also demonstrates the denial of coming and going,¹²³ both of which are generally accepted as common-sense (*loka-prasiddha*). Now the question is what new arguments have been advanced by the Mādhyamikas in this regard.¹²⁴ Candrakīrti denies the very existence of motion (*gamana*). In case there is something called motion, the question arises whether it is necessarily related to the space of motion (*adhvajāta*, i.e. the space where motion takes place) already traversed (*gata*), or not yet traversed (*agata*), or being traversed (*gamamāna*).¹²⁵ All these hypotheses are preposterous.¹²⁶ The locus of motion cannot be determined. Nāgārjuna's claim is that motion is found neither in the space which has already been traversed, nor in that which has yet to be traversed, and there is no third possibility, such as being traversed, independent of the two.¹²⁷

What Nāgārjuna tries to say can be understood from the following diagram:¹²⁸




Suppose an object is moving along the path AB, and in its journey there is a point C. It is clear from this that motion is occurring neither in the part AC, which is already traversed, nor in the part CB, which is yet to be traversed. And apart from these two divisions, there is no third one where the motion is taking place. Here we notice that time, which is

subject to a trenchant criticism by Nāgārjuna, is certainly infinite, and such theory has been established by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Thus, the Mādhyamika shows that motion is impossible, but at the same time they "do not make a clear distinction between epistemological and ontological sense of impossibility".¹²⁹

Candrakīrti defines the terms related to motion: the space in which the activity of motion has ceased is called traversed (gata), and the space which is being traversed in the present state is said to have the actual motion (gamyate). But the opponent irrationally puts forth that the space, which has been traversed and where the activity of motion has ceased, is also called being traversed (gamyate), because it is associated with the present activity of motion. This kind of reflex is an impossibility and rather it glosses over the absurdity, since it is not rational to sustain that what has been traversed is 'being traversed'.¹³⁰ Likewise, that which has not yet been traversed (agata) cannot be called 'being traversed'. The space, which is not yet traversed and where the activity of motion has not yet taken place, is called future or 'not yet come' (anāgata); and when the motion is taking place, it is called present (vartamāna). Thus, it is not sensible to maintain that 'not yet traversed' also is 'being traversed', because the future and present are absolutely different from each other. Again, if the space is not yet traversed, how can it be called being traversed? And when the space is being traversed, how can it be said that it has not yet been traversed?¹³¹ A further point is that the space trodden by the mover is called traversed (past), and that which is not yet trodden is called future for him. Apart from these two there is no third space where we can observe any motion called 'being traversed'. Therefrom it follows that neither the actual movement (gamyamāna) is comprehended (gamyate), nor is 'being traversed'

conceived. Then, there is no actual motion (gamyamāna). Therefore, proclaims Candrakīrti, neither the motion is understood (āviśyate) through the activity of going, nor does it take place (gamyate). This leads to the conclusion that there is no motion (gamana) even in the actual movement.¹³²

One might urge that when a mover walks, the space covered by his foot is called where there is an actual movement. This too does not fare any better and is criticised by the Mādhyamikas, because the foot is an aggregate of atoms.¹³³ The space before (pūrva) the atom at the tip of the toe (i.e. in the backward direction) comes under the part which is already traversed, and the space after (uttara)¹³⁴ the atom located at the tip of the heel (i.e. in forward direction) falls within that which is not yet traversed. There is nothing like a foot apart from the atoms. Therefore, there is no space possessing an actual movement apart from what has been traversed and what has yet to be traversed.¹³⁵ "Even in the toes and in the parts of them such distinction can be made ad infinitum, without our alighting upon any part that is 'being traversed'."¹³⁶ It can be understood from the following diagram:



Suppose AB is the path along which the foot CD is moving towards B. The atom at the tip of the toe is D, in the backward direction (pūrva) of which, i.e. DC, there is the space already traversed for that particular atom D. Again, the atom at the tip of the heel is C, in the forward direction (uttara) of which, i.e. CD, there is the space which has yet to be traversed for that particular atom C.

To refute the opponent Nāgārjuna (e.g. MK, II.1)¹³⁷ takes time as a continuum and divides it into three segments: the past, present and future. But here he makes a dichotomy, which is his favourite instrument for criticising any hypothesis. He divides time mainly into two parts, as seen in diagram (1), the past (AC) and the future (CB). The dividing point C can be taken as present.¹³⁸ And then, he demonstrates that motion is impossible in any of these three phases of time. The present has evidently no duration, and being an infinitesimal point it is logically not possible for it to have any amount of space, which can be the basis of motion 'being traversed'. In other words, there is no durational present¹³⁹ and no space associated with it, which (space) may be called 'being traversed' (gamyate). The term 'gamyate' has two meanings: (1) 'is being traversed', and (2) 'is perceived or comprehended'. So the statement 'gamyamānaṃ na gamyate' (MK, II.1d) can also be interpreted as 'the actual movement cannot be perceived'.

Further, to establish motion the opponent might profess that wherever there is activity (ceṣṭā), there is motion, and the former is found in the actual movement. On the other hand, this activity is found neither in the accomplished, not in 'not yet accomplished' movements. So, there is motion only in the actual movement.¹⁴⁰ Candrakīrti clarifies the opponent's objection. Here, he says, the activity (ceṣṭā) means lifting up and advancing the foot forward. On the place where the mover performs such activity, there there is motion. And that activity is possible neither in the space already traversed (or in the past time-epoch), nor in that which has yet to be traversed (or in the future time-epoch). Rather there is motion only in that space where there is actual movement (or the space which is being traversed). Where motion is observed, there the actual movement is found, and that is driven by the activity of going

(gamikriyā). Therefore, only that space, where there is actual movement, is called 'being traversed'. Here also the verb 'gam' has two meanings: (1) to comprehend, and (2) to reach from one point to another in space.¹⁴¹

Candrakīrti pronounces that the opponent's expression of 'gamyamāna' is set forth because of its association with the activity of motion (gamikriyā), and in the case of the former we speak of 'being traversed'. But there is only one gamikriyā by way of which gamyamāna is designated, which again signifies the space of movement (adhvan).¹⁴² It is not tenable to suggest that 'being traversed' (gamyate) is in relation to the activity of actual movement. That is why Nāgārjuna (MK, II.3) raises the question: How can motion be ascribed to the actual movement? It is not possible, as it would be anomalous to maintain dual movements (divigama) in gamyamāna.¹⁴³ Candrakīrti defines gamyamāna as gamyate, and asserts that the dual movements show the movement traversed twice (divigata).¹⁴⁴ Since the actual movement (gamyamāna) is engendered by a single activity of motion, and since there is no other activity of motion, and since the expression 'being traversed' is anomalous without motion, the proposition 'the actual movement possesses motion' (gamyamānaṃ gamyate) does not make sense as a complete sentence does. Because of the absence of a second activity, there is only 'gamyamāna' and there is nothing like 'gamyate'.¹⁴⁵

If it is urged that 'being traversed' (gamyate), which is the predicate of 'gamyamānaṃ gamyate', is connected with the activity of motion, then in this case the actual movement (gamyamāna), which is the subject of the above proposition, will be devoid of activity.¹⁴⁶ It is not possible to ascribe a single motion to both gamyate and gamyamāna. Thus, the opponent's thesis 'gamyamānaṃ gamyate' turns to be self-stultified. To avoid this predicament if it is suggested that the activity or motion

is connected with both *gamyamāna* and *gamyate* (subject and predicate), then in the case of former, i.e. the actual movement inheres motion, two types of activities result: one by means of which there is actual movement, and the other which is inherent in the actual movement.¹⁴⁷ Again, on the acceptance of two movements or motions,¹⁴⁸ by necessity two movers have to be admitted, and in the absence of a mover the movement is not intelligible.¹⁴⁹ Further, if there is no movement, as has been demonstrated above, how can there be a mover?¹⁵⁰ Murti remarks that "We are here faced with an impasse. There is no space that is being traversed. The divisions in space are relative and unreal. Space considered in itself does not have these distinctions - *gata* (traversed), *agata* (not traversed), and *gamyamāna* (being traversed); there is no intrinsic property by which any space could be singled out and distinguished from others".¹⁵¹

To eliminate the substance-attribute relation, Nāgārjuna boldly declares that neither the mover moves, nor does the non-mover, and apart from these two there is no third one that moves.¹⁵² This follows that there is no movement whatsoever, and without movement the mover is unintelligible. Then, it is absurd to say that 'the mover moves'.¹⁵⁴ One might reply that the mover himself possesses the movement. Then, it results that the mover is by nature without any movement,¹⁵⁵ or we can say that the mover moves without movement as there is no other movement.¹⁵⁶ There are two alternatives: (1) either the mover is by nature without movement, or (2) he possesses an extraneous movement apart from the one which is inherent in him. The first alternative is evidently impossible. In the second, says Nāgārjuna, there are two movements, if the mover moves. Firstly, there is the movement because of which something is called mover. Secondly, there is the movement in association of which we say 'the mover moves'.¹⁵⁷ And then, two movers have perforce to be admitted.¹⁵⁸ He rules out any possibility of substance-

attribute relation between the mover and the movement, which are neither identical with nor different from each other.¹⁵⁹

Furthermore, MK, II.12-14 deal with reference to time as well as space. Now the question is whether there is any commencement of movement possible. The movement does not commence, avows Nāgārjuna, either in the space already traversed (past), or in the space yet to be traversed (future). It is also not possible in the space 'being traversed' (present),¹⁶⁰ because in the preceding analysis it has been shown impossible. Even if it is admitted that the movement commences in the space 'being traversed' (gamyamāna, i.e. present), the problem of two movements as well as two movers crops up.¹⁶¹ Therefore, nowhere either in the space or in time is the commencement of movement possible. Before the movement commences there is no division of time or space as present (being traversed), or past (already traversed); and it cannot take place in the future (or in the space yet to be traversed).¹⁶² If the movement has to be accepted, it must commence in one of these three divisions. But we have seen that in no case is it possible. And if there is no movement, the divisions of time or space themselves having been dependent on the former becomes unintelligible.¹⁶³ Again, if the divisions of time are not established, then time itself, which is known through its divisions, is not proved.

Finally, Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* demonstrates the impossibility of knowledge in the three time-epochs. On this topic we find an interesting debate between him and the Naiyāyikas.¹⁶⁴

To sum up we can say that the Mādhyamikas have successfully repudiated the notion of time.

Notes

1. MK and MKV, pp. 92-112, 382-389, 390.3-13, 410.3-7; CŚ and CŚV, pp. 38.1-45.25, 59.27-60.1, 102-135; BCAP, pp.579.19-582.7; *Sataśāstra*, pp. 58-59, 76-78; CPB, pp. 178-182, 198-200; M. Sprung (1979), pp. 76-90, 187-191; Lamotte (1966), pp. 73-79, (1970), pp. 1690-1696; Ramanan (1975), pp. 58-60, 83, 194-200; Robinson (1976), pp. 42, 52, 55, 150-153, 256, 261, (1956), pp. 296-297; Schayer (1938), pp. 71-73; May (1959), pp. 51-77, 122, fn. 320, 305-322; Vaidya (1923), pp. 78-79, 89-96, 135-136, 143-146; Hatani (1939), pp. 63-64; Inada (1970), pp. 43-50, 117-118, (1974), pp.173ff.; de Jong (1949), pp. 37-43, 57, 110-116, 129; Miyamoto (1959), pp. 8-9; Keith (1923), pp. 166, fn. 2, 238-239; Grenier (1970), pp. 67-75; Puligandla (1974), pp.167ff; Kaluṛahana (1974), pp. 187-188; Koller (1974), pp. 202, 204-206; Lancaster (1974), pp. 209-213; Kawano (1914), pp. 1-13; Y. Hara (1974), pp. 158-159; Y. Kanakura (1962), pp. 1-17; Miyasaka (1956), pp. 31-41; B.M.P. Sinha (1980), p. 57, also fns. 8 and 9; Mandal (1968), pp. 65-67; Stcherbatsky (1926), pp. 30ff; IP, Vol. 1, pp. 648-649; René Grousset, *Les philosophies indiennes*, Vol. 1, Paris, 1931, pp. 219-221 (quoted by May, 1959, p. 51, fn. 1); Cheng (1974), pp. 71-81, (1980), pp. 229-244; M. Siderits (1976), pp. 281-299; Panikkar (1966), pp. 125-128; Streng (1967), pp. 184-186, 205; Conze (1975), p. 62; *Kālasiddhānta-darśinī*, pp. 93-101; *Vākyapadīya*, 3.9.85-88.
2. Cf. MKV, p. 389.5-6; and CŚV, pp. 59.27-60.1: uktaṃ hi Bhagavatā - pañcemāni bhikṣavo nāmamātram pratijñāmātram vyavahāramātram saṃvṛtimātram. tad yathātīto 'dhvānāgato 'dhvākāśo nirvāṇaṃ pudgalaś cety ādi.
 Guṇaratna, in his commentary - *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* on *Śaddarśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri (p. 73), points out that the above passage is set forth by the Sautrāntikas.
 Also see CPB, p. 198.
3. See CPB, pp. 121-208; R.C. Pandey (1964), pp. 20ff, (1977), pp. 82ff, 89-113; Raju (1954), 694-713; Hatani (1939), pp. 53-71; S.S. Chakravarti (1980), pp. 303-306; Matilal (1971), pp. 146-167; Nayak (1979), pp. 481-482; Ichimura (1980), pp. 7-15; Cheng (1974), pp. 115-166; Robinson (1956), pp. 291-308.
4. See CPB, pp. 136-140; Cheng (1974), pp. 62-70; Harsh Narain (1963), pp. 323ff.
5. de Jong (1972), p. 2. In this article the author disagrees with his two predecessors - Stcherbatsky and Schayer, regarding this concept.
 Also see Fukuhara (1975), pp. 82-90; B. Bhattacharya (1979), pp. 335-344; Kesarcodi-Watson (1978), pp. 371-383; CPB, pp. 228ff, 325-328.
6. de Jong (1972), p. 3; also cf. Harsh Narain (1963), pp. 324ff.
7. CPB, pp. 7-8. Also see *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, kārikās 22ff; Matilal (1973), pp. 56-57. For the interpretation of śūnyata as absolute nihilism, see Harsh Narain (1963).

8. Cf. MK, XXIV.18:
 yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe /
 sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā // 18
 Also see May (1959), p. 237 and fn. 840; Matilal (1973), p. 56;
 May (1978), pp. 240-241; Nagao (1979), pp. 29-43; Wayman (1969),
 pp. 144ff. Harsh Narain (1963), p. 323.
9. Cf. MKV, p. 24.7: ācāryo bhūyasā prasaṅgāpattimukhenaiva parapakṣam
 nirākatori sma.
 Also see Stcherbatsky (1978), p. 109; CPB, p. 131, fn. 2.
10. CPB, p. 131; also see Nayak (1979), pp. 477, 480; Jhalakikar (1978),
 pp. 751, 809.
11. Cf. MK, XXIV.8:
 dve satye samupāśritya Buddhānām dharmadeśanā /
 lokasamvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ //
 Also see M. Sprung (1973); Wayman (1969), pp. 147-150; IP, Vol. 1,
 pp. 657-662.
12. CPB, p. 197.
13. Cf. CSV, p. 36.20-21: evam apratisamkhyānirodhapratisamkhyānirodhayor
 api vaktavyam.
 Also see *ibid.*, pp. 35.28-36.1-2: atha syād ākāśapratisamkhyānirodhā-
 pratisamkhyānirodhānām abhidharmaśāstraparipatḥhitānām akṛtakānām
 nityatvāstitvenābhyupagamād akṛtakasyāsattvapratipādanam abhyupetena
 bādhyata iti. etad api nāsti.
14. See Silburn (1955), pp. 137-142; Robinson (1976), p. 261, fn. 10;
 Schrader (1902), pp. 17-30; Lamotte (1966), pp. 76ff; Scheftelowitz
 (1929), pp. 1-31; Wesendonk (1931), pp. 53-67; Schayer (1938), pp.
 4-12; Panikkar (1974), pp. 161-162; Kalupahana (1974), p. 183;
 Mandal (1968), pp. 3-53; Bedekar (1961), pp. 17-28; Stcherbatsky
 (1926), pp. 14ff; Pannikar (1976), pp. 63-70; Coomarswamy (1947),
 pp. 8ff; Filliozat (1974), pp. 170ff; Herbert (1965), pp. 167-168;
 U.C. Bhattacharya (1934), pp. 305ff; S.R. Das (1933), pp. 149ff;
 Willman-Grabowska (1935), pp. 324-330; Bhaduri (1975), pp. 183-213;
 B.M. Barua (1970), pp. 8,11, 198-212, 403; Satyavrat Sastri (1963),
 pp. 149-204; *Atharvaveda*, XIX.53-54.
15. Cf. CSV, p. 38.2-5: kālavādī tu manyate. kālakṛtau jagatpravṛtṭyupa-
 samhārāv upalabhya kālasadbhāvo 'numīyate. tathā hi. satsv api
 bījādiṣu pratyayeṣu na sarvadāṅkurāder udaya upalabhyate. atha
 kadācid evopalabhyate. tad avasthānavirodhikālasannidhāne ca
 nivartate.
 Also see Ramanan (1975), pp. 195; Vaidya (1923), pp. 78, 135.
 Here time means season.
16. Also see *Śataśāstra*, p. 76.
17. Cf. CSV, p. 38.18-21: sa tathānumitaḥ kālo nāmāsti. tasya ca sato
 'pi kāraṇānupalambhān nityatvam iti. nanu caivam sati nityatvāt
 kālasya tadāyattodayānām aṅkurādīnām sadaivotpādaḥ prāpnoti. atha
 sato 'pi kadācit kāryakriyāsūparatavyāparatāsyeti kalpyeta. evam
 api saivāsyāsattvam āpādayiṣyati.

18. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 38.22-39.8: atha sato 'pi bījādivat kāryapravṛtti-yogyātmātiśayasamūkhībhāvān nāsti sarvadā kāryam iti. evam api bījādivad tadyogyātmātiśayaḥ sa kadācid eva bhavatīti na nityaḥ. so 'pi kutaḥ sarvadā neṣyate. atha pratyayāntarāyattasya tasyāsan-nidhāne sarvadā na bhavatīti. evam api pratyayasya bhāve bhāvād abhāve cābhāvād bhūtvā punar na bhavatīti nūnam.
 anyāyatto bhavaty eṣaḥ /
 tasya pravṛttir nivṛttiś ca yadāyattā tadāyattatvāt so 'nyāyatto bhavati. tasmād aṅkurādivat kāryatvaṃ nātikrāmatīti pratipādayan tena kāryaś ca jāyate //
 ity āha. kāryabhūtaś cāṅkurādivad anitya eva.
19. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 40.30-33: akriyasya hetutvaṃ na sambhavatītiḥa hetur nāma na kaścit padārthaḥ svetaro 'stīti phalārthodayasya hetutve na kathaṃ svasyaiva phalatvaṃ. phalatte cāṅkurādivad asya nityatvadrṣṭiḥ kuto bhavet. tasmād evam hetuphalavya-vasthābhāvād dvayam api svarūpeṇa na sidhyati.
20. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 41.1-5: atha phalaṃ nāma hetur bhūtvā bhāvaḥ. tathā hi bījasadbhāve 'ṅkuro bhavati. na tv aṅkurasadbhāve bījam. tasmān na hetoḥ phalatvaṃ iti. etad api na bhavati. yasmād yo bījākhyo bhāvas tasyāṅkurotpatteh prāk parikalpanāyām anyasya trtīyasya vikalpasyābhāvād hetubhūto vāhetubhūto vā kalpyeta. taṭra tāvad agnyādivad ahetubhūtād asyotpattir na yujyate. hetur eva ca phalaṃ jāyata iti pradarśyate.
21. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 42.22-25: bījam iti yan mūlakāraṇaṃ tat svayaṃ vikṛtiṃ gacchad aṅkurasya kāraṇaṃ bhavati na pūrvāvasthāyā aparityāge. tathā hi. yadi vicitram jagat kālakṛtaṃ syāt taṭcā kālo 'pi niyataṃ kāryotpādane pūrvām dūrasthām avasthām tyajan vikṛtāvasthaḥ kāryotpādānurūpo bhavet. tasmād bījavad anityaḥ.
22. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 42.23 and CŚ, IX.9c-d:
 vikṛtir jāyate yasya śāśvatam iti tan na hi.
23. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 44.18-22: jāte 'pi phale kālasyaāvīkārāt. tasmād yat phalaṃ kālāj jātaṃ tad abhūtvā jāyate. hetupratyayāv anapekṣamānaṃ svayaṃ evodbhavatīty arthaḥ. hetupratyayāyatta udbhave vā phalaṃ abhūtvodbhavatīti nedam yujyate. taṭra na sarvātmanābhūtvā bhāvo 'bhāvāt. yasya sarvātmanā bhāvo na sambhavati tat kharaviṣāṇavad hetupratyayābhyām janayitum na śakyate.
24. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 44.22-26: tasmādd hetudharmātīto nityo bhāvo yasya hetur iṣṭaḥ sa bhāvo 'bhūtvā jāyate. eṣa nirhetuko jāyate. svayaṃ evodbhavatīty arthaḥ. evaṃ cāsya kim nirarthayā hetuvakalpanayety ucyate-
 svayaṃ evodbhavas tasya kāraṇaṃ vinivartate //
 svayaṃ eva siddher asya jagato hetuḥ kāla iti niṣprayojanam.
25. Cf. CŚ, IX.11 and CŚV thereon:
 utpannaḥ śāśvatād bhāvāt katham aśāśvato bhavet /
 vailakṣaṇyaṃ dvayor hetuphalayor jātu nekṣyate // 11 //
 loke hy anityasyaiva bījasya phalaṃ aṅkuro nāmānityo jāyata iti prasiddham. kutaścīn nityāt kiñcid anityaṃ bhavatīti na bhavati cet tasya nityasya kālasya phalaṃ anityam iti tat kathaṃ sidhyet.

26. Cf. MKV, p. 390.3-12: atrāha. vidyate kālaḥ phalapravṛttau sahakārikāraṇabhāvāt. yo nāsti nāsau sahakārikāraṇabhāvena pratipadyate. vandhyātanayavat. tasmād asti kālaḥ sahakārikāraṇabhāvāt. iha bījāvanisalilajvalanapavanagaganābhidhānahetupratyayasāmagriṃ pratītyāyam aṅkura upajāyamānaḥ satyām api bījādipratyayasāmagryām ṛtuviśeṣāsannidhānān nopajāyate. yathā ca bāhyeṣv evam ādhyātmikeṣv api. yathoktaṃ Bhagavatā-
- na pranaśyanti karmāni kalpakotiśatair api /
sāmagriṃ prāpya kālam ca phalanti khalu dehinām // iti /
yasmāc caivam asti kālāpekṣā tasmād asty asau kālo nāma yo
'aṅkurādipravṛttau sahakārikāraṇaṃ bhavatīti.
- The above kārikā is also quoted on page 324.1-2 of MKV; also see de Jong (1949), pp. 43, 115-116.
27. Cf. MKV, p. 390.12-13: ucyate. syāt sahakārikāraṇatā kālasya yady aṅkurādiphalasya pravṛttir eva syāt. na tv asti.
- Also see de Jong, *ibid.*, pp. 43, 116.
28. See MK, chapter XX and MKV thereon; de Jong, *ibid.*, pp. 43-57, 115-129.
29. See MK, chapter XVII and MKV thereon; Lamotte (1936C), pp. 265-288; *cp. ibid.*, pp. 151-205, 207-263.
30. Cf. MKV, p. 410.3-6: atrāha. vidyata eva svabhāvataḥ kālaḥ sambhava-vibhavanimittatvāt. iha kañcit kālaviśeṣam apekṣyāṅkurotpattir bhāvānām utpādo bhavati. kañcit kālaviśeṣam apekṣya vibhavo vināśo bhavati. na sarvadā, vidyamānāyām api hetupratyayasāmagryām ity ato vidyata eva kālaḥ sambhavavibhavanimittatvāt.
- Also see de Jong (1949), pp. 57, 129.
31. Cf. MKV, p. 410.6-7: ucyate. syāt sambhavavibhavanimittatā kālasya yadi sambhavavibhavāv eva syātām. na tu staḥ.
- Also see de Jong, *ibid.*
32. Cf. MK, chapter XXI and MKV thereon: de Jong, *ibid.*, pp. 57-72, 129-143.
33. Cf. CSV, p. 103.19-20:
yasmin bhāve pravṛttiś ca nivṛttiś copalabhyate /
anyāyatto bhavaty eṣa kāryas tena ca jāyate // - CS, IX.7.
34. CPB, p. 198.
35. Cf. CSV, p. 103.14-16: sa ca kṣaṇapalamuhūrtādivyañjanīyo'tīto 'nāgataḥ pratyutpannaś ca kālātrayavyavasthitād bhāvād bhinnonitya iti
- Āryadeva in his *Śataśāstra* (p. 76) also presents the thesis of an opponent who maintains that time is eternal and known through inference, as follows:
- "There is a dharma which is time, because it has the characteristic of eternity ...
- There are some dharmas which, although they cannot be directly perceived, can be known through the anumāna sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa, such as time. Although when it is very subtle it cannot

be seen, yet through the seasons, flowers, fruits and so on we know that time exists. And then, seeing the effect we know the cause. And again, through (phrases like these), 'one moment', 'not one moment' and from the characteristics of distance and nearness, etc., we know that there is time. But it is not true that time is not existent. Therefore, it is eternal."

36. Cf. CŚV, p. 103.17-22: atrocitate. yadi kālo nāma bhāvād bhinnō jñānasiddho bhaved bhavet sa utpādabhaṅgahetuḥ. na tv evam asti. bhāvād bhinnatvena grahaṇaprasaṅgāt.

yasminjāyate // (CŚ, IX.7)
ity ādinā ...pratisiddhatvād api svalakṣaṇasiddhasya kālasya na pravṛttinivṛttihetutvam.

Also see MKV, p. 410.6-7. Here bhāva = existence, changing thing (according to Murti, CPB, pp. 139, 200); phenomena (according to Schayer, 1938, p. 71); thing, entity, French-chose (according to de Jong, 1949, p. 41).

Also see May (1959), pp. 15, 92, fn. 204.

37. Compare it with the Vaibhāṣika notion of bhāva and three time-epochs discussed in the previous chapter.

38. See CPB, pp. 250, also 149-153; May (1959), p. 116, fn. 294; R.C. Pandey (1977), pp. 28-49, 50-59; Siderits (1980), pp. 307-335, (1981), pp. 121-160; Cheng (1974), pp. 180-186; IP, Vol. 1, pp. 645-657.

On the same topic in other schools, see K.N. Jayatilleke (1963); S. Mookerjee (1975), pp. 273-440; D.N. Sastri (1951), pp. 122-129, (1976), pp. 419-487; Stcherbatsky (1962), pp. 59-78, 146-180, 204-443; Hattori (1968), (1972), pp. 169-180; Schmithausen (1972), pp. 153-163.

39. Cf. CŚV, p. 103.23-27: anyac ca. ye trayāḥ kālāḥ kālasya svabhāva-viśeṣeṇāvasthitās te 'py amūrtatvena svarūpeṇa nirṇetum aśakyatvān na śakyante svabhāvena vyavasthāpayitum. teṣāṃ ākhyātavyasya bhāvasya viśeṣo ghaṭādīdvārā śakyō vyavasthāpayitum. te tu bhāva-bhinnasvarūpā vedanādivad anubhavākārā na rūpaśabdādivad indriyādvārā paricchettavyāḥ.

40. Also see the previous chapter on the controversy of time between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.

41. Cf. MKV, p. 382.4-6: te ca bhāvāśrayāḥ. yasmād utpanno niruddho hi bhāvasvabhāvo 'tīta iti vyapadiśyate, utpanno 'niruddho hi vartamānaḥ. alabdhatmabhāvo 'nāgata iti. evaṃ bhāvasvabhāvanibandhanās trayāḥ kālā upadiṣṭās te ca santi.

42. M. Sprung (1979), p. 187.11-12.

43. CPB, p. 199. This passage, though in a different context, is quoted here to show that Murti also takes the three time-epochs as independently real to criticise them.

44. Cf. MKV, p. 382.6-8: tasmāt tannibandhano 'pi bhāvasvabhāvo 'stīti. ucyate. syāt kālatrayaprajñaptihetur bhāvasvabhāvo yadi kālatrayam eva bhavadabhimataṃ bhavet. na tv asti.

45. See MK, chapter XV and MKV thereon; M. Sprung (1979), pp. 152-164; Schayer (1932), pp. 55-80.
46. CPB, p. 200.
47. See I. Copi (1972), p. 274.
48. Cf. MKV, p. 382.12-16: iha tāvad yadi vartamānānāgatu syātām tāv apekṣyātītaṃ kālaṃ bhavetām anapekṣya vā. tatra yady atītam apekṣya sidhyete tathā niyatam atīte kāle bhaviṣyataḥ. yasmād yasya hi yatrāsattvaṃ tat tena nāpekṣyate. tadyathā vandhyā strī svatanayena gaganamālatīlatā svakusumena sikatā svatailena. avidyamānam apy andhakāraṃ pradīpena pradīpo 'py andhakāreṇa pratidvandvitvenāpekṣyata iti cet. naitad evam. asyāpi sādhyasamatvāt.
49. See supra fn. 47; also see Robinson (1956), p. 297.
50. Cf. MKV, pp. 382.16-383.2: tad atra yady atīte kāle vartamānānāgatau kālav iṣyete 'pekṣāsiddhyartham evam saty atīte kāle vidyamānatvād atītakālātmavat tayor apy atītatvaṃ syāt. tataś cātīto 'pi na syāt. yasmād vartamānāvasthātīkrānto hy atīto 'saṃprāpto 'nāgata iti syāt. yadā tu vartamānānāgatayor asaṃbhava eva. tadā kutaḥ kasyacid atītatvaṃ syād ity ato 'tīto 'pi na syāt.
51. Cf. MK, XIX.2:
 pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra punar yadi /
 pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca syātām katham apekṣya tam // 2 //
 Also see de Jong (1949), pp. 38, 111.
52. See supra fn. 14.
53. Cf. MKV, p. 383.8: athāpi syāt kālavādinām vidyata eva kālas tatra kim apekṣayā prayojanam iti.
54. Cf. MK, XIX.3:
 anapekṣya punaḥ siddhir nātītaṃ vidyate tayoḥ /
 pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate // 3 //
 Also see de Jong (1949), pp. 38, 111-112.
55. Cf. MK, XIX.4 and MKV thereon; also see de Jong, *ibid.*, pp. 39-40, 112-113; Āryadeva's *Śataśāstra*, pp. 76-78; Nāgārjuna's *Upāyahrdaya*, pp. 28-29. (see Tucci, 1929).
56. See supra fn. 47.
57. See BCAP, pp. 579.19-582.7. This passage is translated into English by Schayer (1938), pp. 71-73.
58. Cf. MKV, p. 259.2: vidyata eva bhāvānām svabhāvaḥ. Also see *ibid.*, pp. 250.3, 280.3.
 For the Mādhyamika criticism of bhāva, see MK, chapters XIII and XV, and MKV thereon; Schayer (1932), pp. 25-39, 55-80; G.C. Sprung in *Ānvīkṣikī*, Varanasi, vol. 4, nos. 3-4, pp. 201-214; M. Sprung (1979), pp. 144-164.

59. For the Mādhyamika criticism of causes and conditions, see MK, XX and MKV thereon; also see CPB, pp. 132-135, 166-178. Nāgārjuna has devoted several chapters in MK on the critique of causality in different forms, such as chapters 1, XV, XX and XXI.
60. For the Mādhyamika criticism of the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas, see MK, chapter VII and MKV thereon; May (1959), pp. 106-142; CS, XV and CSV thereon; CPB, pp. 177, 191-195; de Jong (1949), p. 4, fn. 14.
61. Cf. BCAP, pp. 579.19-580.3: nanu bhāvā nātyantāsambhavino bhavanti. api tu hetupratyayabalād anāgatād adhvano vartamānam adhvānam āgacchanti. vartamānāt punar anityatābalād atītam adhvānam gacchantīty evam utpādasthitivināśavyapadeśaḥ. pratītyasamutpādo 'pi yathāvad evaṃ saṃgacchate.
62. Cf. MK, 1 and MKV thereon; CPB, pp. 7, 136ff; A.K. Chatterjee (1975A), pp. 5-17; R.C. Pandey (1964), pp. 9ff; Nayak (1979), p. 483; Cheng (1974), pp. 62-70.
63. CPB, pp. 7-8.
64. Cf. BCA, IX.143a-b:
anyato nāpi cāyātaṃ na tiṣṭhati na gacchati /
65. Cf. BCAP, p. 580.5-10: anyato deśakālān nāyātam. nāgataṃ kiñcit. nāpy āgataṃ sad vartamānād adhvanaḥ kvacid gacchati. nāpi tenaika-svabhāvena kvacit tiṣṭhati. tathā hi yady anāgatād adhvano vartamānam āgacchet. vartamānād vātītam tadā saṃskṛtam api nityaṃ syāt. sarvadā vidyamānatvāt. nānityaṃ nāmāsti. sa dharmo na ca nityaḥ iti katham etat setsyati.
66. Cf. ibid., p. 580.11-14: atha pūrvāparakālayoḥ kāritraśūnyatayā dharmasyādhvasu viśeṣaḥ. tathā hi yadāsamprāptakāritraḥ. kṛtyaṃ na karoti. tadānāgato 'bhidhiyate. yadā karoti tadā pratyutpannaḥ. yadā tu kṛtyān nivṛttaḥ. tadātīta iti viśeṣaḥ.
67. Cf. ibid., pp. 580.14-16: etad api na kiñcit. tenaivātmanā tasyaiva tadāpi sadbhāvāt. kāritraṃ api katham na syāt. iti vaktavyam.
68. Cf. ibid., p. 580.16-18: pratyayāntarāpekṣāpi nityam avasthitarūpasya na sambhavati. kāritraśūnyasya ca vastutve aśvaviṣāṇādīnām api tattvaprasaṅgaḥ.
69. Cf. ibid., pp. 580.18-581.1: kāritraṃ vā katham atītam anāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ cocyate.
70. Cf. ibid., p. 581.1-3: kiṃ tad aparakāritrasadbhāvāt. svayam eva vā. pūrvatrānavasthānam. pāścātye ca dharmasyāpi svayam atītatvādivyavasthāyāṃ na kiñcit kṣūyate.
71. Cf. ibid., p. 581.3-12: yathā vartamānaṃ dravyato 'sti tathātītam anāgataṃ cāsti. tadā naivam. svabhāvena sato dharmasya katham anutpannavinaṣṭasvabhāvātā. kim asya pūrvam nāsīd yasyābhāvād ajāta ity ucyate. kim ca pāścān nāsti yasyābhāvād vinaṣṭa iti. tenaiva cātmanā pūrvāparakālayor avasthāne vartamānavād upalabdhyādiprasaṅgaḥ. tasmād abhūtvād abhavana dharmato na saṃgacchate

kathañcid apy adhvatreyaḥ. tattvābhy upagacchato nātītādisadbhāvaḥ.
tad ayam atra saṅgrahaślokaḥ-

svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāstī bhāvo nityaś ca neṣyate /

na ca svabhāvād bhavo 'nyo vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam // iti //

Also see TSP, p. 619; AKB, pp. 810.8-811.2; AKP, V, p. 58, fn. 1; LVP (1937), p. 110, fn. 4; CCB, p. 84.

72. CCB, pp. 41-42.

73. Ibid., pp. 43-47.

74. See IP, Vol. 1, p. 722 (notes on p. 625); also cp. Stcherbatsky (1962), vol. I, p. 111; Kalupahana (1975), p. 82; Nyanaponika (1965), p. 118.

75. Cf. BCAP, p. 581.13-14: yad apy ucyate. asty atītaṃ karma. asty anāgataṃ phalam iti sūtravacanāt. asty atītādibhāvaḥ.

76. Cf. ibid., p. 581.14-18: tad api hetuphalāpavāde taddrstipratīśedhārtham uktam Bhavavatā. asty atītam asty anāgataṃ iti. atītam tu yad abhūtapūrvam utpadya vinaṣṭam. anāgataṃ astiśabdasya nipātavāt. kālatrayavṛttitvam.
Also see AKB, p. 811.3-9.

77. Cf. AKB, p. 811.9 and AKV thereon.

78. Cf. BCAP, p. 581.18-582.3: ittham caitad evam yat *Paramārthaśūnyatāyām* uktam Bhagavatā. cakṣur bhikṣava utpadyamānam na kutaścid āgacchati. nirudhyamānam na kvacit sannicayam gacchati. iti hi bhikṣavaḥ cakṣur abhūtvā bhavati. bhūtvā ca prativigacchatīti.
Also see AKB, p. 813.1-3; TSP, p. 631.23-24; AKP, V, p. 59, fn. 2; CCB, p. 85, fn. 1; ADV, p. 263.1-2, and fn. 1.

79. Cf. CSV, p. 105.8-12: anāgataḥ kālaḥ upavyākhyātavya iti tadartham anāgato ghaṭa upanyastah. tathātītapratyutpannakālopavyākhyānārtham atītapratyutpannaghaṭopanyāsaḥ. tatrānāgate na pratyutpannam kālam prāptaḥ. atītas tataḥ evātītaḥ. pratyutpanno jāto 'niruddhaḥ.
te ca trayāḥ kālāḥ parasparāpekṣayaiva sthitāḥ. dvau dvāv anapekṣyaikaiko na bhavatīti.

80. Cf. ibid., p. 105.13-19: yaḥ so 'nāgato ghaṭo na tasmin vartamāno ghaṭo nāpy atītaḥ. lakṣanabhedād itaretarāsambhavāc ca. yadaivam anāgate ghaṭe vartamāno 'tītaś ca dvāv api na vidyete tadā vartamāno 'tītaś ca dvāv apy anāgatāv anāgatatvenānāgate. yathānāgato vartamāne 'nāgatatvenānāgatas tathā vartamāno 'tītaś ca dvāv apy anāgatāv anāgatatvenānāgate. yadi vartamāne 'nāgatatvenānāgato nānāgate 'nāgatatveneti. naitad evam. anāgatasiddhau vartamānasyātītasya ca dvayoḥ siddhiḥ. yadi tv anāgata eva nāsti tadā kuto 'tītaḥ pratyutpanno vā bhavet.

81. Cf. ibid., p. 105.22-24: yasmād ubhāv apy anāgatau tadā trayo 'py anāgatā eva. trayāṅgām anāgatatve cātītapratyutpannayor asambhavāt kuto 'nāgatatvenānāgaro vyavasthāpyate. tasmān nāsty anāgataḥ kālaḥ

As we know, there is another commentary by Dharmapāla on CSV, apart from CSV. This is found only in Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang. My friend, Mr. John Jorgensen, kindly supplied me with a free

translation of the opening lines of this commentary on chapter XI in order to make the sense clearer:

Kuang Pai-lun Pen by Āryadeva (T 30, pp. 182-187) - T 30, p.183b:

If a vase or the like is in the future (i.e. not yet come), then it does not exist in the past or present. If in the future past and present exist, then this future does not exist in the future.

Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun by Dharmapāla (T 30, pp. 187-250) - T 30, p. 203c:

If one says that something which has already ceased will not be born again and is without substance, this principle is not so. All created dharmas in both the times (chi) of before (future) and after (past) perform their function, and although they are non-existent, their substance (t'i, essence) eternally exists. The three time-epochs are not identical, because they have different characteristics. There is no necessity that they will not arise, have stability and lack cessation.

In order to reject this thesis, the following verse says:

If a vase or the like is in the future, then it does not exist in the past or present.

204a:

The Śāstra says: the rūpa, etc.; all the dharmas are in the future time-epoch (wei-lai shih). The two time-epochs, the past and present, are both empty. Only when they later meet with causes and conditions do these two forms (erh-hsiang) arise. How can you say "There is no necessity that they will not arise"? The future time-epoch (wei-lai shih) is not existent in the past or present. How can you say "They have stability and lack cessation"? If one grasps the past and present in the future, then this does not accord with the fundamental teachings of Buddha. Therefore, the following verse says:

If in the future, the past and present exist,
then this future does not exist.

The Śāstra says: if in the future, the past and present time-epochs exist, then the future disappears. It is maintained that a single dharma at one time has many characteristics (hsiang), and the latter differ from each other. This does not give a complete sense, because according to this principle each time-epoch has many characteristics which cannot be established.

82. Cf. CŚV, pp. 105.31-106.1: atha manyate. anāgato ghaṭaḥ sarvathā nāsty eveti na. anāgatasya svabhāvo 'nāgate ghaṭe vidyate. tasmād anāgatasya sadbhāvena pṛthag atītasyāpi siddhisadbhāve vidyate evānāgata iti.

83. Cf. CŚ, XI.2:

yady atītānāgatayoḥ svabhāvaḥ syād anāgate /
anāgataḥ svayaṃ yaḥ syād atītaḥ sa kathaṃ bhavet // 2 //

Also see Vaidya (1923), pp. 90, 143.

84. Cf. MKV, p. 385.11-13: atrāha. vidyata eva kālaḥ parimāṇavatvāt. iha yan nāsti na tasya parimāṇavatvaṃ vidyate tadyathā khara-
viṣānasya. asti ca kālasya parimāṇavatvaṃ kṣaṇalavamuhūrtadiva-
sarātryahorātrapakṣamāśasamvatsarādibhedena. tasmāt parimāṇavatvād
vidyata eva kāla iti.
85. Cf. ibid., p. 385.14: ucyate. yadi kālo nāma kaścit syāt syāt
tasya parimāṇavatvam. na tv asti.
86. Cf. ibid., p. 386.1-3: iha yadi kālo nāma kaścic avasthitaḥ kṣaṇādi-
vyatiriktaḥ syāt sa kṣaṇādibhiḥ parimāṇavatvād grhyeta. na tu
avasthitaḥ kṛtasthaḥ kaścit kālo nāmāsti yaḥ kṣaṇādibhir grhyeta.
tad evaṃ nāsthito grhyate kālo 'sthitatvān na grhyata ity arthaḥ.
87. Cf. ibid., p. 386.4: athāpi syān nitya evāvasthitasvabhāvaḥ kālo
nāmāsti kṣaṇādibhir abhivyaajyate.
88. Cf. ibid., p. 386.6-7:
kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ /
kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ // iti /
Also see *Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri, p. 16.13-14;
Lamotte (1949), p. 76, fn. 2; Kalupahana (1974), p. 183.
89. Cf. MKV, p. 386.8: yaś caivamlakṣaṇaḥ so 'vasthitasvabhāvo 'stīti.
90. Cf. ibid., p. 386.8-10: ucyate. evaṃ api sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate
yaḥ kṣaṇādibhir abhivyaajyamāno grhyeta. kasmāt punaḥ sthitaḥ kālo
nāstīti cet kṣaṇādivyatirekenāgrhyamānatvāt.
91. Here M. Sprung (1979), p. 190, wrongly translates saṃskṛta as
compound. Stcherbatsky rightly observes: "The translation of
saṃskṛta-dharma as 'compound' is a contradictio in adjecto.
A dharma is never compound, it is always simple. Wherever there
is composition there are several dharmas." - CCB, p. 40, fn. 1.
Also see May (1959), pp. 139, also 74, fn. 108, 106, fn. 255;
CPB, p. 96; Silburn (1955), p. 190.
92. Cf. MKV, p. 386.11: api cāyaṃ kālaḥ saṃskṛtasvabhāvaḥ sann astīti.
asaṃskṛtasvabhāvo vā.
93. MK, VII; also see CŚ, XV and CŚV thereon; CPB, pp. 96, 191-195,
352-354.
94. See supra fn. 60.
95. Cf. MK, VII.33a-b:
utpādashthitibhaṅgānām asiddher nāsti saṃskṛtam /
Also see CŚ, XV.9 and CŚV thereon; Vaidya (1923), pp. 117, 161;
May (1959), pp. 139, 369; LVP (1933), p. 21; supra fn. 58.
96. LVP (ibid., pp. 60-146) has translated this text into French.
Restored by N.A. Sastri from Chinese, see CPB, p. 96, fn. 5.
97. CPB, p. 96. Also see BCA, IX.143c-d and BCAP thereon.

98. Cf. MK, VII.33c-d:

sam̐skṛtasyāprasiddhau ca katham̐ setsyaty asam̐skṛtam //
Also see May (1959), p. 140, fns. 397, 398, p. 369; Vaidya (1923), pp. 117, 161; Robinson's remarks (1956, pp. 299-300) on the latter half of this kārīkā (MK, VII.33c-d) and similar others (XV.5, XXIII.10, XXIII.22, XXV.7 and XXVII.18) are noteworthy:

"It is necessary to reiterate here that epistemological questions are excluded from present consideration, and that the question is not how absences are cognized, but how the logical functor of negation is understood. A number of passages reveal that Nāgārjuna maintained a concept of negation which at first sight seems nonsensical.

.....
.....

These examples seem to maintain that the presence of the negation of any variable implies the presence of that variable. However, it is more likely that Nāgārjuna was thinking of a finite extension and its complement, and excluding null and universal terms from consideration. An entity (bhāva) is by definition conditioned, and neither universal (śāśvata) nor null (uccheda). It has a complement which is conditioned in the same way except for the property of being absent when the entity is present."

99. CPB, p. 96; also see supra fn. 2.

100. May (1959), p. 140, fn. 397. Here, in this context fn. 398 is very important and informative for further references.

101. Cf. MKV, p. 387.3-5: atrāha. satyam̐ nāsti nityaḥ kālo nāma kaścid rūpādivyatiriktaḥ svabhāvasiddhaḥ. kiṃ tarhi rūpādīn eva sa sam̐skārān upādāya prajñaptaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇādi-śabda-vācyo bhavati. tasmād adoṣa iti.

102. Cf. ibid., p. 387.7-8: yady evam̐ bhāvam̐ pratītya kālo bhavatīti bhavatā vyavasthāpyate. yadā khalu bhāvo nāsti. tadā niyatam̐ taddhetuko 'pi kālo nāstīti.

103. Cf. ibid., p. 387.13-14: kālābhāvāc ca na santi kṣaṇalavamuhūrtādayaḥ kālabhedās tatparimāṇabhūtā ity atah̐ kutaḥ parimāṇavatvena kālasiddhir bhaviṣyati.

104. Cf. MK, XXI.21:

evam̐ triṣv api kāleṣu na yuktā bhavasantatiḥ /
triṣu kāleṣu yā nāsti sā katham̐ bhavasantatiḥ // 21 //
Also see de Jong (1949), pp. 69, 140-141.

105. See supra fn. 47.

106. Robinson (1976), p. 42.

107. M. Siderits (1976), p. 299, fn. 11.

108. Miyamoto (1959), p. 9.

109. See PC, pp. 84ff, 95ff.
110. Kalupahana (1974), p. 187.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid., p. 188.
114. Koller (1974), pp. 204-205.
115. K.V. Ramanan (1975), p. 58.
116. Ibid., p. 59.
117. See MK, chapter II and MKV thereon; May (1959), pp. 51-77, 305-322; M. Sprung (1979), pp. 76-90; Inada (1970), pp. 43-50; Streng (1967), pp. 184-186; CPB, pp. 178-184; Silburn (1955), pp. 369-373; Stcherbatsky (1962), Vol. I, pp. 98-101; Ramanan (1975), pp. 185-187; René Grousset, *Les philosophies indiennes*, Paris, 1931, Vol. 1, pp. 219-221 (quoted by May, 1959, p. 51, fn.1); Siderits (1976), pp. 281-299; Cheng (1974), pp. 71-81, (1980), pp. 229-244; Robinson (1976), pp. 42ff; Panikkar (1966), pp. 125-128; IP, Vol. 1, pp. 648-649.
118. Sammitīya and Vātsīputrīya are the same. See N. Dutt (1939), pp. 90-100, (1978), pp. 181-208; Masuda (1925), pp. 53-57; André Bareau (1955), pp. 114-126; For the criticism of the Vātsīputrīya's doctrine of pudgalavāda, see AKB, chapter IX; AKP, IX, pp. 227-302; Stcherbatsky (1976); TS and TSP, chapter VI; Schayer (1932), pp. 68-93; *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* of Harivarman, see N.A. Sastri (1975), pp. 87-95, (1978), pp. 67-74.
119. Cheng (1980), p. 242, fn. 23; also see *ibid.*, p. 229, and Siderits (1976), p. 293.
120. M. Sprung (1979), p. 76, fn. 2.
121. Cf. MKV, pp. 11.13-14, 12.11-39.7; Stcherbatsky (1978), pp. 97-128.
122. Here we are referred back to MK, chapter 1, where Nāgārjuna maintains that "there is no hard and fast rule that everything must first appear and then disappear. The author ... intends to explain the principle of the Relativity which implies the denial of extinction and other characteristics" (Stcherbatsky, 1978, p. 97), and finally "it is established that there is no causality in the ultimate sense. The dependent origination (or Relativity) with its eight characteristics of no real origination, etc. is thus established" (*ibid.*, p. 128).
Also see May (1959), pp. 51, fn.4, 256, fns. 919, 920; Lamotte (1949), p. 326; LVP (1933), p. 11.
123. Cf. MKV, p. 11.13-14.

124. Cf. MKV, p. 92.3-5: *atrāha. yady apy utpādapratīṣedhāt pratītya-samutpādasyānirodhādiviśeṣaṇasiddhiḥ. tathāpy anāgamānirgamapratītyasamutpādasiddhaye lokaprasiddhagamānāgamakriyāpratīṣedhārtham kiñcid upapattiyantaram ucyatām iti.*
 May (1959), fn. 5, observes: The Tibetan version does not translate *loka*, and relates *prasiddha* to *upapattiyantaram*: "What new argument and evidence".
125. At least three triads are found in MK and MKV, (i) *gatāgatagamyamāna* (chapter 2), (ii) *utpādashthitibhaṅga* (chapter 7), and (iii) *atītā-nāgatapratyutpanna* (chapter 19). Also see May (1959), fns. 270, 551. Regarding the first triad May's remarks (*ibid.*, p. 51, fn. 7) are noteworthy:
- "1. The schema of the 'temporal analysis' in the present, past, and future, is applied to the critique of several categories, notably the *saṃskrtalakṣaṇa*...."
- For a general schema of refutation of 'triads', see MK, XIX.1-4 (de Jong, 1949, pp. 37-40) ...
- II. The interpretation of this first paragraph [of ch. 2] is critical. *gamyate* must be understood at the same time as passive as well as impersonal.
- (1) In the first interpretation, the subject *gatāgatagamyamānam* is understood as the direct-object (*karman*, MKV, ed. LVP, p. 96.8) of the driving activity (*gamikriyā*) expressed by the verb *gamyate*. It signifies literally: "that which has been gone", etc.; it opposes the agent of movement (*gantr*) and designates "the passage" (*adhvan*) through which this agent travels, within its three temporal aspects: accomplished journey, unaccomplished, and going to be accomplished. The driving activity objectifies itself in the passage, and the passage is "the support of objectification" (*ālambana*, fn. 603) of the driving activity. As a matter of fact, it is first of all this first interpretation which emerges from the commentary of Candrakīrti, who expounds *gatāgatagamyamānam* as *adhvan* (MKV, ed. LVP, pp. 92.9, 96.1) and gives a distinctly passive meaning to *gata*, etc. in such expressions as *deśo gato*, p. 93.5, *gate 'dhvajāte*, p. 92.5, *gate 'dhvani*, p. 94.2. This is also the interpretation of Murti [CPB] p. 178.
- (2) But the triad *gatāgatagamyamānam* is not rigorously opposed to the triad *gantr/agantr/ "naiva gantā nāgantā"*: the third terms do not correspond; moreover, the division *gata*- ... is of a temporal nature, whereas the division *gantr/...* is not. *gatāgatagamyamānam* represents the temporal splitting up of the movement (*gamana*): accomplished movement, unaccomplished, and yet to be accomplished, and then *gamyate* takes an impersonal sense: "There is movement". The grammatical relation between *gatāgatagamyamānam* and *gamyate* grows blurred in a kind of *anacoluthon*: "accomplished movement - there is no movement".
- (3) Certain passages of Candrakīrti's commentary and certain turns of the Tibetan version reveal properly the equivocal and ill-defined nature of the relation - *gataṃ (na) gamyate*: see fn. 23. In employing everywhere the particle *la*, the Tibetan translator solves this problem ingeniously, since this particle is appropriate in expressing the two restrained relations in the proposition *gataṃ (na) gamyate*: that of *karman* (*las su bya ba*) and that of *adhikaraṇa* (*gži*).
- (4) The complex meaning of *gamyate*, at the same time transitive and neuter, explains that the analysis of the movement can serve as

a model for the analysis of purely transitive actions, such as the vision (na dr̥ṣṭam dr̥śyate tāvad..., MKV, ed. LVP, p. 114.14, [May 1959] fn. 80), as well as the intransitive action (utpāda, MK, VII. 14, [May, ibid.] p. 120 and fns. 257, 311).

(5) One must not think of finding in the analysis of movement, which this chapter shows us, the division in the mover, movement and path. On the whole the analysis is based on the following categories:

- gantr- - agent (personal) of the movement or of the driving activity
gamikriyā - driving activity
- substantive: movement gamana → movement gatāgatagamyamānam under its three temporal aspects
- verbal : transitive gacchati / gamyate (in the passive sense)
 impersonal neuter gamyate

The object of the driving activity gatāgatagamyamānam → adhvan, passage (the movement, objective itself in the passage).

126. Cf. MKV, p. 92.5-6: ucyate. yadi gamanam nāma syān niyatam tad gate vādhvajāte parikalpyetāgate gamyamāne vā. sarvathā ca na yujyate.

127. Cf. MK, II.1:

gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ naiva gamyate /
gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate // 1 //

The second line of this kārikā is rather complicated. M. Sprung's translation (1979, p. 76) seems to be incorrect in the present context: "... nor in what, as something distinct from what has and has not been traversed, is just being traversed."

May and Murti translate it correctly. The former as: "Un mouvement actuel indépendant des deux autres est inintelligible" (1959, p. 52), the latter as "... there is no third division of space as the being traversed (gamyamāna)" (CPB, p. 178).

128. Siderits (1976, p. 289) also gives a similar diagram, but it is differently interpreted, rather mathematically.

129. Cheng (1980), p. 242, fn. 18.

130. Cf. MKV, p. 92.9-11: tatroparatagamikriyam adhvajātaṃ gatam ity ucyate āviśyamānaṃ vartamānagamikriyayā gamyata ity ucyate. yad-gatam uparatagamikriyam tadvartamānagamikriyāyogavācinā gamyata ity anena śabdenocyamānaṃ asamābaddham iti kṛtvā gataṃ tāvad gamyata iti na yujyate.

131. Cf. ibid., p. 93.1-3: agatam api na gamyate. agataṃ hy anupajāta-gamikriyam anāgatam ucyate. gamyata iti ca vartamānam. ato 'nā-gatavartamānāyor atyantabhedād agatam api gamyata iti na yujyate. yady agataṃ kathaṃ gamyate 'tha gamyate na tad agatam iti.

132. Cf. ibid., p. 93.6-9: iha hi gantā yaṃ deśam atikrāntaḥ sa tasya deśo gato yaṃ ca nātikrāntaḥ so 'syānāgataḥ. na ca gatāgatavyati-rekeṇa tṛtīyam aparam adhvajātaṃ paśyāmo gamyamānam nāma. yataś caivaṃ gamyamānam na gamyate. gamyata iti na prajñāyate. tasmān nāsti gamyamānam. ato na tad gamikriyayā āviśyate na gamyata iti nāsti gamyamāne 'pi gamanam.

For a similar argument, see MK, VII.14 and MKV thereon; May (1959), pp. 120-121, 313-314 where the impossibility of origination is shown by way of temporal analysis.

133. For the Mādhyamika examination of atoms, see CŚV, pp. 463-567; CPB, pp. 200-201; May (1959), p. 54, fn. 15; Ramanan (1975), pp. 214-215.
134. May (1959), p. 54, fn. 14, points out some vagueness from Sanskrit to Tibetan:
 pūrva ('anterior' in time) = rgyab ('posterior' in space)
 uttara ('posterior' in time) = mdun ('anterior' in space)
135. Cf. MKV, p. 93.9-13: atha syād gantur gacchato yaś caraṇākṛānto deśaḥ sa gamyamānaḥ syād iti. naivam. caraṇayor api paramānusām-ghātātāt. aṅgulyagrāvasthitasya paramānor yaḥ pūrvo deśaḥ sa tasya gate 'ntargataḥ. pārśnyavasthitasya caramaparamānor ya uttaro deśaḥ sa tasyāgate 'ntargataḥ. na ca paramānuvyatirekeṇa caraṇam asti tasmān nāsti gatāgatavyatirekeṇa gamyamānam.
136. CPB, p. 179.
137. Also see Tachikawa (1980), pp. 177-178.
138. The same dichotomy, for example, is found in MK, XXIII.17-18a-b. Tachikawa (ibid., pp. 167-168) explains these kārikās properly.
139. Or 'fat' temporal present is maintained by the Puḍgalavādins of Buddhism. See Yamaguchi, Susumu (tr.), *Gesshōzō Chūronshoku*, Tokyo, 1951, p. 146 (quoted by Siderits, 1976, p. 293).
140. Cf. MK, II.2:
 ceṣṭā yatra gatis tatra gamyamāne ca sā yataḥ /
 na gate nāgate ceṣṭā gamyamāne gatis tataḥ // 2 //
141. Cf. MKV, p. 94.1-4: tatra ceṣṭā caraṇotkṣepaparikṣepalakṣaṇā. yato vrajato gantur yatra deśe ceṣṭā gatis tatraiva deśe. sā ca ceṣṭā na gate 'dhvani sambhavati nāpy agate kiṃ tu gamyamāna eva. tātaś ca gamyamāne gatiḥ. yatra hi gatiḥ upalabhyate tad gamyamānam. tac ca gamikriyayā āviśyate. tasmād gamyamānam eva gamyata iti. eko 'tra gamir jñānārthaḥ, aparāś ca deśāntarasam-prāptyartha iti.
 The double meanings of "gam" embarrassed the Tibetan translators, see May (1959), p. 55, fn. 17.
 M. Sprung (1979), p. 78, fn. 1, remarks that "Candrakīrti might have added a third meaning, namely, 'to attain' or 'to achieve'. The entire chapter [MK.III] could be taken in either of these two alternate senses. The primary reference, however, is to motion in space and the chapter has been so translated".
142. The term "adhvan" has both spatial (the path) as well as temporal (epoch) meaning. See May (1959), p. 65, fn. 65. Further (ibid., p. 55, fn. 19), he points out:
 b. The hypothesis of the opponent - gamyamānam gamyate iti means the actual movement possesses movement. In order to give a complete sense ..., this proposition requires three conditions:

- (1) that the subject is the object (karman) of the action expressed by the predicate;
- (2) that the subject is 'endowed' with the driving activity' (gami-kriyāyukta);
- (3) that the predicate is 'endowed with the driving activity'.

143. Cf. MKV, p. 94.8-13: iha hi gamikriyāyogād eva gamyamānavyapadeśam icchati bhavān, tac ca gamyata iti bravīti. ekā cātra gamikriyā, tayā gamyamānavyapadeśo bhavatu kāmam adhvaṇaḥ. gamyata iti bhūyaḥ kriyāsaṁbandho gamyamānasya na yujyata iti gamyamānasya gamanaṁ katham nāmapapatsyate / kāraṇam āha- gamyamāne davigamanam yadā naivopapadyate // iti /

Here in MK, II.3c LVP (MKV) and Vaidya (1960) read "davigamanam" (dual movements), while May (1959, p. 56) on the basis of Paris manuscripts of *Prasannapadā* (preserved in Asiatic Society, Paris), which was also used by LVP, maintains "vigamanam", i.e. without inherent movement. Tibetan version reads "agamanam" (see MKV, ed. LVP, p. 94, fn. 2, and Vaidya, *ibid.*, p. 34, fn.1), which confirms Tucci's manuscripts of *Prasannapadā* (see de Jong, 1978, p. 36). Inada (1970, p. 44) reads "agamanam". Also see LVP, *ibid.*, p. 95.1 and Vaidya, *ibid.*, p. 34.15: vinā gamanena.

Inada (*ibid.*, pp. 44-45) informs us that "... Ryōtai Hatani and Hakuju Ui note in their respective Japanese translations that the *Akutobhayā* (Wu-wei-lun...), *Prajñāpradīpa* (Pan-jo-te'ng-lun...), *Ta-ch'eng-chung-kuan-shih-lun...* and Piṅgala's version as translated by Kumārajīva into Chinese (Chung-lun...), all refer to the latter reading (i.e. *agamanam*)."

de Jong (1978, p. 37) supports May's and Tibetan reading: *vigamanam*.

Siderits and O'Brien (1976, p. 290) maintain that "davigamanam" seems somewhat more likely, since it is supported by Candrakīrti's commentary. "However, both readings [*davigamanam* and *vigamanam*] yield an interpretation which is consistent with our assumption that in [MK] II.3 Nāgārjuna will seek to refute the case of motion in discontinuous time". Their mathematical interpretation of MK, II.3 (with the reading '*davigamanam*') supports Nāgārjuna:

"On this reading the argument is against the model of motion which assumes that both time and space are discontinuous; thus it parallels in function Zeno's Paradox of the Stadium. Suppose that time is constituted of indivisible minims of duration d , and space is constituted of indivisible minims of length s . Now suppose three adjacent minims of space, A, B, and C, and suppose that an object of length ls at time t_0 occupies A and at time t_1 occupies C, such that the interval t_0-t_1 is ld . Now since the object has been displaced two minims of space, that is, $2s$, this means that its displacement velocity is $v = 2s/d$. For the object to go from A to C, however, it is clearly necessary that it traverses B, and so the question naturally arises, When did the object occupy minim B? Since displacement A-B is ls , by our formula we conclude that the object occupies B at $t_0+l/2d$. This result is clearly impossible, however, since d is posited as an indivisible unit of time. And yet the notion that the object went from A to C without traversing B is unacceptable. In order

to reconcile theory with fact, we might posit an imaginary going whereby the object goes from A through B to C, alongside the orthodox interpretation whereby the object goes directly from A to C without traversing B. This model requires two separate goings, however, and that is clearly absurd. Thus we must conclude that there is no going of present-being-gone-to, since the requisite notion of an extended present leads to absurdity." (ibid.).

It is also interesting to note their interpretation of the same *kārikā* with May's reading, *vigamanam*:

"This may be taken as an argument against the model of motion which presupposes discontinuous time but a spatial continuum. Suppose that time is constituted of indivisible minims of duration *d*. Now suppose that a point is moving along a line *a-c* at such a rate that at t_0 the point is at *a*, and at $t_1 = t_0 + d$, the point is at *c*. Now by the same argument which we used on the first reading of II.3, for any point *b* lying between *a* and *c*, *b* is never passed by the moving point, since motion from *a* to *b* would involve a duration less than *d*, which is impossible. Thus what we must suppose is that for some definite duration *d*, the point rests at *a*, and for some definite duration *d*, the point rests at *c*. The whole point of the supposition at II.2 was to introduce the notion of activity, however. Now it seems that this supposition leads to a consequential non-going, which is not only counterintuitive but also clearly contrary to what the opponent sought when he presupposed an extended present. While the principles of cinematography afford a good heuristic model of a world in which time is discontinuous and space continuous, we do not recommend them to anyone interested in explaining present motion through a spatial continuum." (ibid.).

144. Cf. MKV, p. 94.14: *dvigataṃ gamaṇaṃ dvigamaṇam*. LVP (ibid., fn. 4) points out that this phrase is not translated in the Tibetan version. May follows Paris manuscript: *vigataṃ gamaṇaṃ vigamaṇam*, which confirms Tibetan version. See May (1959), pp. 56, fn. 22 and 307, fn. 11. Also see LVP (ibid.), p. 94, fn.4; Vaidya, ibid., p. 34, fn. 2.
145. Cf. MKV, p. 94.14-95.3: *gamyamānam iti gamyata ity arthaḥ. dvigataṃ gamaṇaṃ dvigamaṇam. ekasyā gamikriyāyā gamyamānam ity atropayuktatvād dvitīyāyā abhāvāc ca, gamyata ity ayaṃ vyapadeśo vinā gamanena yadā naivopapadyate, tadā gamyamānaṃ gamyata iti paripūrṇo vākyārtho nāstīty abhiprāyaḥ. gamyamānam ity etāvanmātram eva saṃbhavati dvitīyakriyābhāvāt, na tu gamyata iti.*
146. Cf. MKV, p. 95.4-5: *atha gamyata ity atraiva gamikriyāsaṃbandha iṣyate. evaṃ sati gamyamānavyapadeśe nāsti kriyāsaṃbandha iti.*
Also see MK. II.4 and MKV thereon.
147. Cf. MK, II.5:
*gamyamānasya gamane prasaktaṃ gamanadvayam /
yena tad gamyamānaṃ ca yac cātra gamaṇaṃ punah // 5 //*
Here *pāda d* is translated by May (1959, p. 58) as "l'autre contenu dans ce [movement actuel]", and Sprung (1979, p. 79) as "the other in which there is motion". But I prefer to follow May.

148. Throughout MK, chapter II movement (gamana) and motion (gati) are used as synonymous, and they can be interchanged. See May (1959), p. 57, fn. 26.
149. Cf. MK, II.6:
dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye /
gantāraṃ hi tiraskṛtya gamanam nopapadyate // 6 //
150. Cf. MK, II.7c-d:
gamane 'sati gantātha kuta eva bhaviṣyati /
151. CPB, p. 179.
152. Cf. MK, II.8:
gantā na gacchati tāvad agantā naiva gacchati /
anyo gantur agantuś ca kas tṛtīyo hi gacchati // 8 //
In the above two cases, according to Robinson (1956, pp. 295-296), the law of the excluded middle is invoked. Also see CPB, pp. 146-148.
153. Cf. MKV, p. 98.5: tasmān nāsti gamanam.
154. Cf. MK, II.9:
gantā tāvad gacchatīti katham evopapatsyate /
gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate // 9 //
155. Cf. MK, II.10:
pakṣo gantā gacchatīti yasya tasya prasajyate /
gamanena vinā gantā gantur gamanam icchataḥ // 10 //
156. Cf. MKV, p. 99.2: gamanena vinā gantā gacchatīti syāt, dvitīyagami-kiryābhāvāt.
157. Cf. MK, II.11:
gamane dve prasajyete gantā yady uta gacchati /
ganteti cocyate yena gantā san yac ca gacchati // 11 //
LVP (1933, p. 19) also translates this kārikā.
158. Cf. MKV, pp. 99.8-9: ato gantr̥dvayaprasaṅga iti.
159. Cf. MK, II.18-21.
A.B. Keith remarks (1923, p. 239): "Every conceivable relation yields to such dialectic; subject and object; actor and action; fire and fuel; existence and non-existence; extension or matter; sensation and perception; origination, duration, and disappearance; unity and plurality; whole and part; time; the aggregates; the six elements; the dispositions; the senses; as well as all the deepest doctrines of Buddhism, including misery, the Tathāgata, the noble truths, the chain of causation, bondage, and release itself, prove incapable of sustaining the searching examination or reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) which establishes that they neither exist of themselves, nor by others, nor by both, nor by neither."
160. Cf. MK, II.12:
gate nārabhyate gantum gatam nārabhyate 'gate /
nārabhyate gamyamāne gantum ārabhyate kuha // 12 //

161. Cf. MKV, p. 100.8: nāpi gamyamāne tad abhāvāt kriyādvayaprasaṅgāt
kartrdvayaprasaṅgāc ca.
162. Cf. MK, II.13:
na pūrvam gamanārambhād gamyamānam na vā gatam /
yatrārabhyeta gamanam agate gamanam kutaḥ // 13 //
163. Cf. MK, II.14:
gataḥ kim gamyamānam kim agataḥ kim vikalpyate /
adrśyamāna ārambhe gamanasyaiva sarvathā // 14 //
164. See *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, kārikās 20, 30-51, 69 with author's own
commentary; NS, II.I.8-13 and NSBh thereon; S. Mookerjee (1957),
pp. 21-31, 38-40; Siderits (1980), pp. 307-335; P.S. Sastri (1955),
pp. 199-201; CPB, pp. 149-153; *Śataśāstra*, pp. 58-59.

CONCLUSION

We may now conclude the results of our inquiry without repeating the arguments. Many of the questions raised in the Preface are answered in the preceding chapters. We have not examined all the related concepts separately. However, most of them are discussed at different places in the present thesis. Our primary aim has been to discuss time systemwise, i.e. according to major philosophical systems of India, not problemwise.

We have chosen both Buddhist and where relevant non-Buddhist systems for our study. We found that for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika everything is objectively real, and so time is taken here as a substantive reality. Time is thought to be non-psychic, all-pervading, unique, one, normally imperceptible, infinite, inactive, an instrumental cause of all products, a common receptacle of all corporeal things, ground of our usages of the past, present and future, and various temporal expressions, such as kṣaṇa, lava, nimeṣa and so on.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika gives some interesting proofs for the existence of time. Since time does not possess any physical or psychical quality, it is not an object of direct perception. It is known only through inference on the basis of the notions of temporal priority and temporal posteriority, and so on. However, we find diverse interpretations within the system in this regard. Time for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is an undivided whole, infinite and absolute. The divisions of time as past, present and future, or second, minute, hour, etc. measured by a watch, or an action, or the existence of an object are empirical, not real. They are imposed properties (kālopādhi) of absolute time.

In Sāṃkhya-Yoga time as such is denied. Sāṃkhya does not give much importance to the concept of time. We have seen that Sāṃkhya explicitly

proclaims the unreality of time in direct opposition to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulation of substantive and absolute time. Change is here taken as real and time is identified with it. But Yoga accepts time as discrete moments. We have dealt with the Yoga notion of time with regard to the theories of causality, conservation of energy, change and succession. It propounds the absolute atomistic theory of time, but denies any succession of moments representing as an absolute and infinite time.

Jainism is a heterodox system of Indian philosophy denying the authority of the Vedas. It admits time as a substance (dravya). Time in Jainism is considered to be an instrumental cause of every modification in other substances. But time from ordinary point of view is called relative time which is measured by different changes, and is nothing but a paryāya (modification) of absolute time (dravya kāla).

In Pali Buddhism, both canonical and non-canonical, we saw that there were only scattered references or brief discussions regarding time. In order to find a clear picture of the notion of time in Pali Buddhism, we drew implications at many places from its expositions of many other concepts. Time as such is absent from Pali sources.

In chapter V we witnessed a very interesting controversy on time between the dogmatic Vaibhāṣikas and the radical Sautrāntikas. The former maintains the continued existence of substance through past, present and future, and thus gives the impression of establishing an absolute time which was proved later on baseless. The Vaibhāṣikas do admit the three time-epochs, but nowhere do they even talk of absolute time as a substance. Vasumitra, one of the four Vaibhāṣika teachers, propounds the theory of kāritra (activity, causal efficiency), a term which is also adopted by the Sautrāntikas, but in a different sense. The former explains the three stages of kāritra, the past, present and

future, to prove the continued existence of substance, while the latter take it to demonstrate the momentary character of substance. The three time-epochs are understood by the Vaibhāṣikas only as modes of existence or entities.

Finally, the Mādhyamika dialectic exhibits the essencelessness (śūnyatā) of time like other entities. The method of the Mādhyamikas is their dialectic which consists of reductio ad absurdum arguments. It shows the conflicting or self-contradictory characters in each and every thesis of the opponent. Time as a cause is vehemently criticised by Nāgārjuna who also maintains the impossibility of any means to the knowledge of time.

The Mādhyamika critique of motion also leads to the rejection of time. Nāgārjuna shows that motion is found neither in the space which has already been traversed (referring to the past), nor in that which has yet to be traversed (referring to the future), and apart from these two states there is no third alternative, such as being traversed (referring to the present). He explains away movement, mover, space and time altogether. He argues that before movement commences there is no division of time or space as present (being traversed) and past (already traversed); and it is not possible for it to take place in the future (or in the space yet to be traversed). The movement itself is shown to be impossible, and thus the divisions of time or space themselves having been dependent on it becomes unintelligible. Likewise, if the divisions of time are not established, then time itself, which is known through its divisions, becomes devoid of reality.

To sum up we can say that in entire Buddhism we do not find time as an absolute reality, or a substance. We do find in it different temporal usages, such as the past, present and future, moment, and so on, but time as such is completely out of Buddhist terminology.

APPENDIX I

Measurements of Time

In addition to the lists of measurements of time given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jainism, the following texts provide their own computations of time.

(1) The *Sūrya-siddhānta*¹

60 prāṇas	=	1 pala
60 palas	=	1 ghaṭika
60 ghaṭikas	=	1 nakṣatra ahorātra (day and night, 24 hours)
30 nakṣatra ahorātra	=	1 nakṣatra māsa (month)
12 months	=	1 year (360 days and nights)
	=	1 day and night of gods
360 days and nights of gods	=	1 year of gods
	=	360 human years
12,000 years of gods	=	4 yugas
	=	4,320,000 human or solar years
	=	1 Great Yuga
71 Great Yugas	=	1 manvantara
	=	306,720,000 human years
1000 Great Yugas	=	1 Kalpa (a period which destroys the whole world)
	=	4,320,000,000 human years
	=	1 day of Brahmā
Or, 1 day and night of Brahmā	=	8,640,000,000 human years

(2) The *Amarakoṣa*²

18 nimeṣas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
30 kāṣṭhās	=	1 kalā
30 kalās	=	1 kṣaṇa
12 kṣaṇas	=	1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	=	1 ahorātra (a day and night, 24 hours)
15 ahorātras	=	1 pakṣa (fortnight)
2 pakṣas	=	1 māsa (month)
2 māsas	=	1 ṛtu
3 ṛtus	=	1 ayana
2 ayanas	=	1 vatsara (years)

(3) The *Manusmṛti*³

18 nimeṣas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
30 kāṣṭhās	=	1 kalā
30 kalās	=	1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	=	1 ahorātra
15 ahorātras	=	1 pakṣa
2 pakṣas	=	1 māsa
12 māsas	=	1 human year
	=	1 day and night of gods

Or, 1 year of gods = 360 human years

The rest is similar to that of the *Sūrya-siddhānta*.

(4) The *Purāṇas*

According to the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*⁴

15 nimeṣas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
30 kāṣṭhās	=	1 kalā
30 kalās	=	1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	=	1 ahorātra

The rest is similar to that of the *Sūrya-siddhānta*.

The commentator of the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* maintains that -

30 kalās	=	1 ghaṭika, or ghari
2 ghaṭikas	=	1 muhūrta

But this explanation, remarks Wilson, "is gratuitous and is at variance with more explicit passages elsewhere",⁵ e.g. according to the *Matsya Purāṇa*:

30 kalās	=	1 muhūrta
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Some other *Purāṇas*, such as *Kūrma*, *Mārkaṇḍeya*, *Matsya*, *Vāyu* and *Liṅga* exactly agree with the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. In the *Manu*, there is one change:

18 nimeṣas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
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The *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* follows the *Manu* in this respect, but in the rest agrees with the following list of the *Padma Purāṇa*:⁶

15 nimeṣas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
30 kāṣṭhās	=	1 kalā
30 kalās	=	1 kṣaṇa
12 kṣaṇas	=	1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	=	1 ahorātra

The *Bhāgavat*⁷ and *Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇas* give different accounts:

2 paramāṇus	=	1 aṇu
3 aṇus	=	1 trasareṇu

3 trasareṇus	=	1 truṭi
100 truṭis	=	1 vedha
3 vedhas	=	1 lava
3 lavas	=	1 nimeṣa
3 nimeṣas	=	1 kṣaṇa
5 kṣaṇas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
15 kāṣṭhās	=	1 laghu
15 laghus	=	1 nāḍikā
2 nāḍikās	=	1 muhūrta
6 or 7 nāḍikās	=	1 yāma or prahara
8 yāmas	=	1 ahorātra
15 ahorātras	=	1 pakṣa
2 pakṣas	=	1 māsa
2 māsas	=	1 ṛtu
6 māsas	=	1 ayana
2 ayanas or 12 months	=	1 vatsara
	=	1 ahorātra of gods

The rest is similar to that of the *Sūrya-siddhānta*.

As we have seen, a day and night of Brahmā is equal to 8,640,000,000 human years. Brahmā's life is said to be of 100 such years which is equal to 311,040,000,000,000 human years. It is interesting to note that according to the *Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa*, Brahmā's life is a nimeṣa of Kṛṣṇa; but the *Śaiva Purāṇa* says that it is a nimeṣa of Śiva.⁸

(5) Some Anonymous Computations of Time

Barnett⁹ gives three anonymous schemes which run as follows:

- (i) 10 gurvakṣaras = 1 prāṇa (breath)
(long syllables)

6 prāṇas	=	1 vinādī or pala
60 vinādīs	=	1 ghaṭika, or nādi, or daṇḍa
60 ghaṭikas	=	1 day and night
(ii) 1000 saṅkramas	=	1 truṭi
100 truṭis	=	1 tatpara
30 tatparas	=	1 nimeṣa
(iii) 60 kṣaṇas	=	1 lava
60 lavas	=	1 nimeṣa
60 nimeṣas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
60 kāṣṭhās	=	1 atipala
60 atipalas	=	1 vipala
60 vipalas	=	1 pala
60 palas	=	1 daṇḍa
60 daṇḍas	=	1 day and night
60 days & nights	=	1 ṛtu

(6) The *Arthaśāstra*¹⁰ of Kauṭilya

2 tuṭas	=	1 lava
2 lavas	=	1 nimeṣa
5 nimeṣas	=	1 kāṣṭhā
30 kāṣṭhās	=	1 kalā
40 kalās	=	1 nādikā
2 nādikās	=	1 muhūrta
15 muhūrtas	=	1 day and night

(7) The *Gaṇitasāra-saṅgraha*¹¹

7 ucchvāsas (breaths)	= 1 stoka
7 stokas	= 1 lava
38.1/2 lavas	= 1 ghaṭī
2 ghaṭīs	= 1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	= 1 day and night

(8) The *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*¹²

18 nimeṣas	= 1 kāṣṭhā
2 kāṣṭhās	= 1 lava
15 lavas	= 1 kalā
2 kalās	= 1 leśa
15 leśas	= 1 kṣaṇa
6 kṣaṇas	= 1 nāḍikā
2 nāḍikās	= 1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	= 1 day and night

(9) The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*¹³ of Vasubandhu

120 kṣaṇas	= 1 tatkṣaṇa
60 tatkṣaṇas	= 1 lava
30 lavas	= 1 muhūrta
30 muhūrtas	= 1 ahorātra
30 ahorātras	= 1 māsa
12 māsas	= 1 saṃvatsara

Notes

1. pp. 2ff.
2. pp. 59-61.
3. pp. 21ff.
4. Shree Ram Sharma (1967), pp.57.1ff; H.H. Wilson (1961), pp.19ff.
5. Wilson (1961), p.20, fn. 3.
6. Ibid.
7. P.N. Sinha (1950), pp. 49-54; G.V. Tagare (1976), pp. 278ff; Wilson, *ibid.*, p. 21.
8. Wilson, *ibid.*, p. 23, fn. 7.
9. Barnett (1913), p. 219.
10. pp. 223-224. Also see Kirfel (1967), p. 335; Barnett (1913), p. 219.
11. p. 5.
12. p. 40. Also see Kirfel (1967), p. 334.
13. AKB, p. 537.2ff; LVP (1932), pp. 1-9; Miyamoto (1959), p. 18, fn. 12; McGovern (1923), pp. 43ff.

APPENDIX II

A Critical Edition of the *Prasannapadā*. Chapter XIX,

Kālaparīksā

During 1903-1913 Louis de La Vallée Poussin published the *Mūla-madhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrti's commentary, the *Prasannapadā* (L),¹ furnishing copious notes and cross references. For this edition he used three manuscripts (mss) preserved in (1) Cambridge,² (2) Paris,³ and (3) Calcutta.⁴ But all these manuscripts, he points out in his preface, were mediocre copies of an original which itself he thought may not have been irreproachable. Therefore, because of the inaccuracies in these manuscripts he consulted its Tibetan version (T)⁵ and found it more reliable. Since then his edition has been considered a standard work and used as the basis by many scholars, such as Stcherbatsky,⁶ Schayer,⁷ Lamotte,⁸ de Jong,⁹ and May,¹⁰ for their translations of its different chapters in European languages. Recently M. Sprung¹¹ also based his English translation of the *Prasannapadā* on this edition.

A few years back G. Tucci discovered in Nepal an unknown manuscript of the *Prasannapadā* (R), a photocopy of which was lent to J.W. de Jong who found it presenting often better readings than Mss. First of all, it enabled him to edit fourteen verses missing in Mss, but found in T.¹² Further, he compared R with LVP's edition and T. He also received the microfiche cards of two other manuscripts of the *Prasannapadā*¹³ from the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, but he did not find better readings. So, he prepared text-critical remarks on the *Prasannapadā* (J) on the basis of the following materials:

- (1) LVP's edition,
- (2) The manuscript readings of the manuscripts from Cambridge, Paris, and Calcutta as indicated by LVP in his foot-notes.
- (3) The Tibetan translation (for chapters 18-22 and 2-4, 6-9, 11, 23, 24, 26 and 27 the Peking and Narthang Kanjurs edition, for other chapters the Japanese edition of the Peking Tanjur), and
- (4) G. Tucci's manuscript (R).

D.Seyfort Ruegg remarks that "All work on Nāgārjuna's great treatise will henceforth have to make use of this convenient new text of the MMK¹⁴ together with J.W. de Jong's invaluable notes on the *Prasannapadā*, and MMK."¹⁵ Keeping the importance of de Jong's text-critical notes in view and making use of it I feel it necessary at least to give a new edition of chapter XIX: *Kālaparīkṣā* (the examination of time), which is directly related to my present work. For this I have used the following materials:

- (1) J's text-critical notes (*Indo-Iranian Journal*, 20, 1980, pp. 230-231),
- (2) LVP's edition of the *Prasannapadā*, his foot-notes and Mss readings,
- (3) Vaidya (1960) and his foot-notes,¹⁶
- (4) T as found in the above three, and
- (5) R as given by J.

This chapter has been translated into European languages by the following scholars:

- (1) J.W. de Jong¹⁷
- (2) Kenneth K. Inada¹⁸ (kārikās only)
- (3) F.J. Streng¹⁹ (kārikās only)
- (4) M. Sprung²⁰.

The Sanskrit text runs as follows:

Kālaparīkṣā nāmaikonaviṃśatitamam prakaranam

atrāha - vidyata eva bhāvānām svabhāvaḥ kālatrayaprajñapti-
 hetutvāt.²¹ ihātītānāgatapratyutpannās trayah kālā Bhagavatopadiṣṭāḥ.
 te ca bhāvāśrayāḥ. yasmād utpanno niruddho hi bhāvasvabhāvo 'tīta iti
 vyapadiśyate, utpanno 'niruddho hi vartamānaḥ, alabdhātmaabhāvo 'nāgata
 iti. evaṃ bhāvasvabhāvanibandhanās trayah kālā upadiṣṭāḥ. te ca santi.
 tasmāt tannibandhano 'pi bhāvasvabhāvo 'stīti. ucyate. syāt kālatraya-
 prajñaptihetur bhāvasvabhāvaḥ, yadi kālatrayam eva bhavadabhimatam²²
 bhavet. na tv asti. yathā ca nāsti, tathā pratipādayann āha -

pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca yady atītam apekṣya hi /

pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca kāle 'tīte bhaviṣyataḥ // 1 //²³

iha tāvad yadi vartamānānāgatau syātām, tāv apekṣyātītam kālam
 bhavetām, anapekṣya vā ? tatra yady atītam apekṣya sidhyataḥ,²⁴ tathā
 niyatam atīte kāle bhaviṣyataḥ. yadmād yasya hi yatrāsattvam, na tat
 tenāpekṣyate.²⁵ tadyathā vandhyā strī svatanayena, gaganamālatīlatā
 svakusumena, sikatā svatailena. avidyamānam apy andhakāram pradīpena,
 pradīpo 'py andhakāreṇa²⁶ pratidvandvitvenāpekṣyata iti cet. naitad
 evam. asyāpi sādhyasamatvāt. tad atra yady atīte kāle vartamānānāgatau
 kālāv iṣyete, apekṣāsiddhyartham evam²⁷ saty atīte kāle vidyamānatvād
 atītakālātmavat taylor apy atītatvam syāt. tataś cātīto 'pi na syāt.
 yasmād vartamānavasthātikrānto hy atīto 'samprāpto 'nāgata iti syāt.
 yadā tu vartamānānāgatayor asambhava eva, tadā kutah kasyacid atītatvam
 syāt ? ity ato 'tīto 'pi na syāt // 1 //

atha yathoktadoṣaparijihīrṣayā -

pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra²⁸ punar yadi /

pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca syātām katham apekṣya tam // 2 //²⁹

tatrātīte³⁰ kāle yadi vartamānānāgatau kālau na sta iti pari-
kalpyate, evam api tatrāvidyamānatvād gaganendīvaravan nāsty apeksā
// 2 //

athāpi syāt - kālavādinām³¹ vidyata eva kālah, tatra kim apeksayā
prayojanam iti ? ucyate. evam api -

anapeksya punaḥ siddhir nātītam vidyate tayoh /

pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate // 3 //³²

pratyutpannānāgatayor asattvam, atītānapekṣatvāt,³³ kharaviṣānavat.
yataś caivam pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyata iti
vijñeyam // 3 //

yadā caivam atītam apeksya vā 'napeksya vā pratyutpannānāgatayor
nāsti siddhiḥ, evam pratyutpannāpeksayā vā 'napeksayā vātītānāgatayor
anāgatāpeksayā vā 'napeksayā vā pratyutpannātītayor asiddhāv iṣyamānā-
yām tenaiva³⁴ pratyutpannānāgatayor atītāpeksayā vā anapeksayā vā³⁵
asiddhikramena dūṣaṇasāmyam atidiśann³⁶ āha -

etenaivāvaśiṣṭau dvau kramena parivartakau /

uttamādhamamadhyādīn ekatvādīmś ca lakṣayeta // 4 //³⁷

katham kṛtvā ?

yady atīto 'nāgataś ca pratyutpannam apeksya hi /

kālo 'tīto 'nāgataś ca pratyutpanne bhaviṣyataḥ //

kālo 'tīto 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra punar yadi /

kālo 'tīto 'nāgataś ca syātām katham apeksya tam //

anapeksya punaḥ siddhir na jātam³⁸ vidyate tayoh /

tenātīto 'nāgataś ca kālo nāma na vidyate //

eṣa tāvad ekaḥ kālaparivartaḥ.

atīto vartamānaś ca yady ajātam apeksya hi /

atīto vartamānaś ca kāle 'jāte bhaviṣyataḥ //

atīto vartamānaś ca na stas tatra punar yadi /

atīto vartamānaś ca syātām katham apeksya tam //

anapekṣya punaḥ siddhir nājātaṃ vidyate tayoḥ /
 atīto vartamānaś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate //
 eṣa dvitīyaḥ kālāparivarta itī vyākhyānakārikā itī.³⁹ evaṃ dvau
 kālāparivartau boddhavyau //
 yataś caivaṃ vicāryamāṇaṃ kālātrayaṃ nāsti,⁴⁰ tasmāt kālo na
 vidyate, kālābhāvāc ca bhāvasadbhāvo 'pi nāstīti siddham //
 yathā caitat kālātrayaṃ vicāritam evam /
 uttamādhamamadhyādīn ekatvādiṃś⁴¹ ca lakṣayeta /
 uttamādhamamadhyamādīn⁴² ity ādiśabdena kuśalākuśalāvyaḥkṛtāni,
 utpādasthitibhaṅgāḥ, purvāntamadhyāntāparāntā,⁴³ kāmarūpārūpyadhātavaḥ,
 śaikṣāśaikṣaṇaivaśaikṣaṇāśaikṣādayo⁴⁴ yāvantaḥ padārthāḥ tripadārtha-
 sambandhavyavasthitāḥ,⁴⁵ te sarve gr̥hyante. ekatvādiṃś cety anenādi-
 śabdena dvitvabahutvayor grahaṇāt ta eta uttamādaya⁴⁶ ekatvādayaś ca
 kālātrayaḥ vyākhyānena vyākhyātā veditavyāḥ // 4 //

atrāha - vidyata eva kālaḥ parimāṇavatvāt. iha yan nāsti, na
 tasya parimāṇavatvaṃ vidyate tadyathā kharaviṣāṇasya. asti ca kālasya
 parimāṇavatvaṃ kṣaṇalavamuhūrtadivasarātryahorātrapakṣamāsasamvatsarādi-
 bhedena. tasmāt parimāṇavatvād vidyata eva kāla itī. ucyate. yadi kālo
 nāma kaścit syāt, syāt tasya parimāṇavatvaṃ. na tv asti. yasmāt -

nāsthito gr̥hyate kālaḥ sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate⁴⁷ /

yo gr̥hyetāgr̥hītaś ca kālaḥ prajñapyate katham // 5 //⁴⁸

iha yadi kālo nāma kaścid avasthitaḥ kṣaṇādivyatiriktaḥ syāt, sa
 kṣaṇādibhiḥ parimāṇavatvād gr̥hyeta. na tv avasthitaḥ kūṭasthaḥ kaścit
 kālo nāmāsti, yaḥ kṣaṇādibhir gr̥hyeta. tad evaṃ nāsthito⁴⁹ gr̥hyate
 kālaḥ, asthitaṭvān na gr̥hyata ity arthaḥ //

athāpi syāt - nitya evāvasthitasvabhāvaḥ kālo nāmāsti, sa kṣaṇādi-
 bhir⁵⁰ abhivyaajyate. tathā hi -

kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ /

kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ // itī //

yaś caivamlakṣaṇaḥ so 'vasthitasvabhāvo 'stīti. ucyate. evam api sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate yaḥ kṣaṇādibhir abhivyaajyamāno gr̥hyeta. kasmāt punaḥ sthitaḥ kālo nāstīti cet, kṣaṇādivyatirekenāgr̥hyamānatvāt.

api ca. ayaṃ kālaḥ saṃskṛtasvabhāvaḥ sann astīti parikapyetāsaṃskṛtasvabhāvo vā ?⁵¹ ubhayaṃ ca saṃskṛtaparīkṣāyāṃ pratiśiddham - utpādasthitibhaṅgānām asiddher⁵² nāsti saṃskṛtam / saṃskṛtasyāpy asiddhau ca katham setsyaty asaṃskṛtam //

- MK, VII.33

ity anena. tad evaṃ nāsti vyavasthitaḥ kālo yo gr̥hyeta. yaś cedānīm kālo na gr̥hyate 'sthitatvād⁵³ avidyamānasvarūpatvāt, so 'gr̥hyamānaḥ san katham kṣaṇādibhiḥ prajñapayituṃ bhāvataḥ⁵⁴ pāryata ity āha - agr̥hitaś ca kālaḥ prajñapyate katham iti. tasmān nāsty eva kālaḥ // 5 //

atrāha - satyaṃ nāsti nityaḥ kālo nāma kaścid rūpādivyatiriktaḥ svabhāvasiddhaḥ, kiṃ tarhi rūpādīn eva saṃskārān⁵⁵ upādāya prajñaptaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇādiśabdavācyo⁵⁶ bhavati, tasmād adoṣa iti. ucyate. evam api -

bhāvaṃ pratītya kālaś cet kālo bhāvād ṛte kutaḥ /

yady evaṃ bhāvaṃ pratītya kālo bhavatīti bhavatā⁵⁷ vyavasthāpyate, yadā khalu bhāvo⁵⁸ nāsti, tadā niyataṃ taddhetuko 'pi kālo nāstīti pratipādayann āha -

na ca kaścana bhāvo 'sti

iti pūrvam vistareṇa pratipāditatvād vakṣyamānapratiśedhāc ca. yadā caivaṃ na kaścid bhāvo 'sti bhāvataḥ, tadā -

kutaḥ kālo bhaviṣyati // 6 //⁵⁹

kālābhāvāc ca na santi kṣaṇalavamuhūrtādayaḥ⁶⁰ kālabhedās tatparimāṇabhūtāḥ, ity atah kutaḥ parimāṇavatvena kālasiddhir bhaviṣyati ? tasmān nāsty eva bhāvānām svabhāva iti //

uktaṃ hi Bhagavatā Āryahastikakṣyasūtre -⁶¹

yadi koci dharmāṇa bhavet svabhāvaḥ⁶²
 tatraiva⁶³ gaccheya jinaḥ⁶⁴ saśrāvako⁶⁵ /
 kūṭasthadharmāṇa siyā na nirvṛtī⁶⁶
 na niṣprapañco bhavi jātu paṇḍitaḥ // iti //⁶⁷

tathā -

buddhasahasraśatā ya atītā
 dharmasahasraśatāni bhaṇitvā /
 naiva ca dharmā⁶⁸ na cākṣara kṣīṇā
 nāsti samudbhavu tena akṣīṇā // iti /

- *Samādhirājasūtra*, 37.22

tathā⁶⁹ -

utpādakāle hi tathāgatasya
 Maitreyaṇāmā tv iha yo bhaviṣyati /
 bhaviṣyatīyaṃ kanakāvṛtā⁷⁰ mahī
 tasyā idānīm⁷¹ kuta āgamo 'sau⁷² // ⁷³
 ullāpanāḥ kāmagaṇā hi pañca
 vibhramāṇā mohana moṣadharmiṇaḥ /
 madhyāhṇakāle hi yathaiva grīṣme
 jalaṃ marīcyāṃ hi tathaiva kāmāḥ //
 ekena kalpena⁷⁴ bhaved dhi loko
 ākāśabhūto gaganasvabhāvo⁷⁵ /
 dāhaṃ vināśaṃ ca payānti meravaḥ⁷⁶
 kuta āgamaḥ kutra gatiś ca teṣāṃ // iti /

tad yathā -

pañcemāni bhikṣavaḥ saṃjñāmātraṃ pratijñāmātraṃ vyavahāra-
 mātraṃ saṃvṛtimātraṃ yad utātīto 'dhvā 'nāgato 'dhvā ākāśaṃ nirvāṇaṃ
 pudgalaś ceti //

// ity ĀcāryaCandrakīrtipādo-paracitāyāṃ Prasannapadāyāṃ
Madhyamakavṛttau kālaparīkṣā nāmaikonaviṃśatitamam prakaraṇam //

Notes

1. See MK, MKV.
2. C. Bendall, *Catalogue of the Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts in the University Library, Cambridge*, 1883, pp. 114-117, Add. 1483 (see de Jong, 1978, p. 25).
3. J. Filliozat, *Catalogue des manuscrits sanskrits et tibétains de la Société Asiatique, Journal Asiatique*, 1941-1942, pp. 12-13, No. 8 (see de Jong, *ibid.*)
4. R. Mitra, *The Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal*, Calcutta, 1882, pp. 169-172, B 2. (see de Jong, *ibid.*)
5. The Tibetan translation.
6. In English, chapters I and XXV, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*. See Stcherbatsky (1978).
7. In German, chapter X in *Feuer und Brennstoff. Ein Kapitel aus dem Mādhyamika-Śāstra des Nāgārjuna mit der Vṛtti des Candrakīrti*, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, Vol. 7, 1930, pp. 26-52; chapters V, XII-XVI in *Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā*, Krakow, 1931.
8. In French, chapter XVII, see Lamotte (1936 c).
9. In French, chapters XVIII-XXII, see de Jong (1949).
10. In French, chapters II-IV, VI-IX, XI, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXVII, see May (1959).
11. Chapters I-VI, VIII-X, XIII, XV, XVIII, XIX, XXII-XXV, see M. Sprung (1979).
12. See de Jong (1962).
13. *Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts*. A Title List of the Microfilm Collection of The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, 1975, p. 4, MBB-1 No. 62 *Prasannapadāmadhyamakavṛtti*, Nepālī paper 231 leaves; p. 15, MBB-II No. 117 *Prasannapadā nāma madhyamakavṛtti*, Nepālī paper 142 leaves (see de Jong, 1978, p.26)
14. de Jong (1977).
15. The review of de Jong (1977), *Indo-Iranian Journal* 22, 1980, p.249.
16. See his edition of *Madhyamakaśāstram of Nāgārjuna with Prasannapadā*, Darbhanga, 1960, pp. 163-167.
17. See de Jong (1949), pp. 37-43.
18. See Inada (1970), pp. 117-118.

19. See Streng (1967), p. 225.
20. See M. Sprung (1979), pp. 187-191.
21. R kālātrayaprajñaptihetutvāt; J suggests R; L and V kālātrayavi-
jñaptihetutvāt; cf. L (p. 382.7) and V (p. 163.5) kālātraya-
prajñaptihetur.
22. V bhavadabhimatam; R confirms V; L [bhava]dabhimatam.
23. T kārikā 1: see de Jong (1949), p. 111.
24. R sidhyatas; J suggests R; L and V sidhyete; T grub.
25. J suggests na tat tenāpekṣyate; L and V tat tena nāpekṣyate;
Mss yatattvenopekṣetaḥ; R na tattvenāpekṣyate.
26. L pradīpena pradīpo 'py andhakāreṇa; T sgron-ma'i rañ-gi ño-bo
(J translates pradīpasvabhāvena).
27. V apekṣāsiddhyartham; L 'pekṣāsiddhyartham; R 'pekṣyasiddhyartham.
28. L and V punar; Mss pūrva; R confirms L and V.
29. T kārikā 2: see de Jong (1949), p. 111.
30. L tatrātīte; Mss tatra ced atīte.
31. L and V kālāvādinām; T kālāvādinām darśane (see V, p. 163, fn. 2
and L, p. 383, fn. 4).
32. T kārikā 3: see de Jong (1949), pp. 111-112.
33. L and V atītānapekṣatvāt; Mss asyātītānapekṣatvāt (cf. L, p. 383,
fn. 6).
34. L and V iṣyamāṇāyām tenaiva; Mss ahiṣyamāṇāyā tanaiva.
35. V atītāpekṣayā vā anapekṣayā; L atītāpekṣalyā 'napekṣayā vJā.
36. V atidiśan; L a[ti]diśan.
37. T kārikā 4: see de Jong (1949), p. 112.
38. L and V siddhir na jātam; Mss siddhir nātītam; T confirms Mss
(see L, p. 384, fn. 3 and V, p. 164, fn. 1).
39. T omits iti vyākhyānakārikā iti (see L, p. 385, fn. 1 and V,
p. 164, fn. 2).
40. R vicāryamāṇam kālātrayam; L and V vicāraṇe kālātrayam; T rnam-par
dpyad-pa na / dus-gsum. T confirms R, cf. L, p. 404.7 vicāryamāṇa-
yos, T rnam-par dpyad-pa na; L, p. 410.11 vicāryamāṇau, T rnam-par
dpyad-pa na.
41. L and V ekatvādimś ca; Mss ekatvādimś cetyādi.

42. L uttamādhamamadhyamādīn; V uttamādhamamadhyamān (which is non-sense).
43. R pūrvāntamadyāntāparāntāḥ; L and V pūrvāntāparāntamadyāntāḥ; T sñon-gyi mtha'daṅ dbus-kyi mtha'daṅ / phyi-ma'i mtha'; T confirms R.
44. R -naivaśaikṣaṇāśaikṣādayo; J suggests R; L and V -naivaśaikṣa-naivāśaikṣādayo.
45. L and V tripadārthasambandhavyavasthitāḥ; Mss trihpādārthāḥ sambandhavyavasthitāḥ; T padārthās trisambandhena vyavasthitāḥ (see L, p. 385, fn. 3).
46. J suggests ta eta uttamādaya; L ta evottamādaya; V te eva uttamādayaḥ; R te eta uttamādaya; T mchog la sog-s-pa dag ... de-rnams ni.
47. L and V vidyate; Mss grhyate (see L, p. 385, fn. 4).
48. T kārikā 5: see de Jong (1949), 113.
49. L and V nāsthito; R confirms L and V; Mss nāstitā.
50. T de skad-cig la sog-s-pa dag-gis (J translates and suggests sa kṣaṇādibhir); Mss and R lakṣaṇādibhir; L and V kṣaṇādibhir.
51. R ... astītiparikalpyetāsamskr̥tasvabhāvo vā; L saṃskṛtasvabhāvaḥ sann astīti / asaṃskṛtasvabhāvo vā; T 'dus-byas-kyi ran-bzīn-du gyur-pa žig-gam / 'dus ma-byas-kyi raṅ-bzīn-du gyur-pa žig yod-par rtog-graṅ na.
52. J suggests asiddher, cf. L, p. 176.3; L and V asiddhau; R asiddhe.
53. L grhyate 'sthitatvād; Mss grhyetāsthitatyād; R grhyatāsthitatvād; J suggests L.
54. T omits bhāvataḥ (see L, p. 387, fn. 1 and V, p. 165, fn. 1).
55. R rūpādīn eva saṃskārān; L and V rūpādīn eva sa saṃskārān; T 'du-byed gzugs-la sog-s-pa dag. T confirms R.
56. L kṣaṇādiśabdavācyo; V kṣaṇādivācyo.
57. T omits bhavatā (see L, p. 387, fn. 2 and V, p. 165, fn. 2).
58. V bhāvo; L bhāv[ō].
59. T kārikā 6: see de Jong (1949), p. 114.
60. L and V kṣanalavamuhūrtādayaḥ; T kṣaṇādayaḥ (see L, p. 387, fn. 4 and V, p. 166, fn. 1).
61. L and V Āryahastikakṣyasūtre; Mss Āryahāstikoktasūtre (see L, p. 387, fn. 5).
62. L and V svabhāvaḥ; R svabhāva.

63. L and V tatraiva; R tantraiva.
64. L and V jinaḥ; R jinasya.
65. L and V saśrāvako; R śrāvako.
66. R 'kūṭasthadharmāna miyā na nirvṛtī; L and V kūṭasthadharmāna siyā na nirvṛtī; Mss dharmānamiyānanirvṛtī, dharmāsamayānanirvṛtī, dharmanam-iyānanirvṛtī (see L, p. 388, fn. 2).
67. V paṇḍitaḥ // iti /; L and R paṇḍita iti //.
68. L and V dharma; R dharmu.
69. V tathā; T confirms V (see V, p. 166, fn. 2 and L, p. 388, fn. 4); L tad yathā; R confirms L.
70. V kanakāvṛtā; L kanakās ṛtā; R kanakās ṛto.
71. V tasyā idānīm; L tasyāḥ tadānīm; R tasyāḥ tadānī.
72. L and V 'sau; R sau.
73. T closes the chapter here and omits from ullāpanāḥ onward up to the end of the chapter.
74. L and V kalpena; Mss kāsyena, kālpena; R kālena.
75. L and V gaganasvabhāvo; R gagaṇasvabhāvo.
76. V payānti bhe[ḥ]ravaḥ; L pa[ḥ]yanti[ḥ]meravaḥ; R yānti meravaḥ.

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