USE OF THESES

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BERKELEY'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

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"he who is short-sighted will be
oblige[d] to draw the object nearer,
and may, perhaps, by a close and
narrow survey, discern that which
had escaped far better eyes"

- Introduction of the Principles
This thesis is my own work, and to the best of my knowledge all sources have been acknowledged.

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NOTES ON METHOD

Philosophy is not a discipline in which practitioners must operate with certain assumptions in order to be doing philosophy at all (unlike many other disciplines where if one turns one's attention to certain basic assumptions one is no longer doing anything within that discipline but rather something else - probably philosophy). In philosophy no alleged truths or principles are exempt from examination or challenge.

However, in any discipline it is normal for some investigators to cover various underlying questions about method, or principles of reasoning, while others leave these questions aside and deal with other matters, taking certain answers to such questions for granted. This sort of division of labour is usually desirable even when method or first principles of reasoning are a subject of genuine controversy. To spend one's time on the often difficult disputes about the first principles of a discipline, disputes about the methods or principles of reasoning which should be employed, is to not spend it on other matters.

As a general rule it is productive for many people on each side of each question of method to simply consider other questions, proceeding in accord with their own judgements on method. This builds up a body of literature on each side of the various questions, which shows what the various answers current amount to in practice, what their theoretical and practical consequences are; and the bodies of literature may well be valuable in their own right. (It can be
fatal to have most serious practitioners directing their
energies at basic questions which underly the discipline.)

So, it is not obligatory for each philosopher to
fully discuss his or her own manner of proceeding, so long as
the sorts of methods and reasoning employed are the subject of
investigation in the discipline. Nevertheless, since few
principles of method in philosophy are uncontroversial, or in
no need of some defence, it is desirable for an enquiry, even
an enquiry in the history of philosophy, to consider its own
method so far as is reasonable given its aims. But if a
systematic treatment of the questions of method incident to the
enquiry would take a considerable time and thus impede the
pursuit of the central aims of the enquiry then such a
treatment may legitimately be left aside.

Now, the theory and practice of reading texts is an
area of current philosophical interest, and any attempt at
developing a full and adequate treatment would require a very
substantial amount of time and energy. Since the task I wish
to attempt in this thesis is to uncover certain of Berkeley's
views and discuss their soundness I will leave such a treatment
aside. However, I do have certain beliefs about method which
to some degree condition the way I proceed. It is desirable
to set these out explicitly rather than leaving them tacit;
even though, for the reasons given, I will not attempt any
systematic justification of them.

Further, an author's own view of the matter with
which they deal, and of the basis on which they deal with it,
is often an invaluable aid in understanding a philosophical text. So, when producing a text oneself one should try to make clear what tasks are being undertaken and what preconceptions and methods one brings to them.

In accord with this point and the one preceding, I will set down as best I can the ends of my enquiry, and the pre-conceptions, beliefs, and methods which seem to me to inform it.

Reading texts is a craft not a science and is mainly learnt in practice not by mastering any theories of textual analysis. Texts are interpreted by hook or by crook with whatever evidence comes to hand: it is difficult to formulate any general rules.

The central aim of this thesis is to establish what Berkeley's major metaphysical arguments and conclusions are and to assess those arguments and conclusions. One thing I shall attempt is to uncover what he actually meant, what he believed, and what arguments he intended to advance. This approach pre-supposes that it is possible and legitimate to read a text in terms of what the author was intending to say; it pre-supposes that one can legitimately infer from the text to something distinct from the text, to wit, what the author actually believed, and meant to convey, when he or she was producing the text. This is not beyond dispute but is taken for granted throughout this thesis. (I do not wish to claim that one could not proceed to read a text without relying on it. If one considered only what was presented in the text without any pretensions to determining what the writer actually thought there would be no need for it.)
A great many historians of philosophy have set out to determine the beliefs and intentions of philosophers and others, and a great deal of the literature has that aim. What beliefs and intentions the philosopher had is, of course, an empirical question, and trying to find the answer is an empirical enquiry. Like other branches of empirical enquiry this kind of history of philosophy develops in practice rules of thumb, which are not justified a priori. Perhaps the most important of these is to take it that the author is sincere and is intending to say what he or she means, rather than, say, lying, or attempting to mislead the reader, or writing without any care as to whether what they say is true or in accord with what they believe. Indeed reliance on this is so wide-spread and deeply ingrained that it is often unconscious.

For instance, the usual practice is to simply present the plain words of a philosopher as direct evidence of what that philosopher thinks. Indeed a well known technique of "demonstrating" what belief a philosopher has on some question is to find a piece of text in which he or she expressly endorses that belief and to quote it. And the standard kind of objection to such a demonstration is to claim that the quotation is taken out of context, or that the quote does not mean what it appears to, or that in the quoted passage the writer is using words in a special sense, or that in other places the writer clearly expresses a contrary view, and so on. It is not the standard kind of objection to say, for instance, that for all we know the writer might be deliberately lying, and that for that reason the quote is not decisive. The possibility that the author is not writing in good faith is usually not even contemplated.
This is not to say that the presumption of good faith on the author's part might not be laid aside if there were evidence that it were mistaken (although one suspects there would be a natural tendency not to recognise such evidence). But if there is no evidence either way the presumption is simply taken for granted.

No doubt it is possible to have a go at ascertaining the beliefs of a writer from the text without supposing that the writer is trying to say what they believe, is writing in good faith. But the enormous difficulties of succeeding in this must be obvious. Of course if one reads a philosophical text only to ascertain what position is presented in the text (entirely prescinded from what position the producer of the text held), and what beliefs the writer may represent him or her self as having, then the presumption is not required. But we are launched on an enquiry not merely into what Berkeley said but into what he believed, what his opinions and intentions were.

Personally, I regard the presumption that the author wrote in good faith as reasonable, and as essential to the kind of enquiry foreshadowed. I do not see how we could proceed without it. It is essentially the same as the one we all habitually employ in everyday life in regard of those transient texts we all produce in talking to each other. Naturally it is only a rule of thumb and can be laid aside if and when there is reason to do so. Subject to this proviso I will operate with the presumption throughout the thesis.

However, it must be realised what a substantial presumption it is. As an assumption brought to nearly every
line of every major text it has enormous empirical content. It is an assumption that unless there is evidence to the contrary every assertion that the writer makes on every page is an attempt to state what the writer actually believes. To bring this pre-supposition to each text one tries to interpret is to make an enormous assumption.

Moreover, even where there is no evidence the pre-supposition should be set aside, it is obvious it can in fact be incorrect and lead into error. If it is brought to enough texts it seems likely that at least a few of them will not have been written entirely in good faith, while showing no sign of this: in which case importing the pre-supposition will lead the reader astray. But then any reading of the author's beliefs or intention will be subject to the possibility of error no matter what principles of interpretation are followed; it can hardly be otherwise with an empirical investigation.

There is a view that attempting to interpret philosophical texts which are not even roughly contemporary is futile since the texts arise from conceptual schemas, preconceptions, and world views different from our own and which we cannot understand. Presumably this view is based on a "reading" of various historical texts and con-texts which discerns these foreign "unreadable" conceptual schema, preconceptions and world views. But this is not the place to canvass the substantive issues. I believe that understanding a text written centuries ago cannot be ruled out prior to investigation, although the possibility that the import of the text is forever inaccessible to us given the context in which
it was produced should be taken seriously - there may be such contexts and texts. One should make the attempt at interpretation in hope - and only for reason, and after thorough investigation, conclude that the text cannot be read.

THE TEXTS
I. The Commentaries

Some writers on Berkeley rely heavily on the so-called Philosophical Commentaries, and treat the entries therein as if they were on an almost equal footing with passages in the texts prepared for publication. In practice some even seem prepared to take a straightforward statement of a certain position in the Commentaries as an expression of Berkeley's position when he came to write the Principles, unless there is an indication to the contrary. However it seems to me that all this is an error, and that the material in the Commentaries has only a very restricted use.

In an ordinary text prepared for publication one can take it that when the writer presents some statement in the ordinary indicative he or she means that statement. However this ordinary presumption cannot stand in the case of the Commentaries. Consider what they are. They are a set of notebooks in which diverse entries were written down. So far as we know they were never intended for publication and were Berkeley's notes to himself quite possibly made (and revised) from day to day. Such a series of notes to oneself can include statements which one never accepted and indeed have always opposed. For consider someone keeping a notebook as an aid to memory or to organise their thoughts, - they might well
write down a view with which they disagreed, and which they knew they would reject whenever they encountered it, but which they wished to remember. They might well jot down a point elaborating a view with which they were familiar and with which they disagreed in order to recall that extension of the view which they knew they rejected. They might even note down some formulation of a position which they rejected, but with which they often busied their mind and were out of all danger of forgetting, simply because that formulation seemed particularly apt, or clear, or revealing, and they wished to remember it.

Indeed the more clearly and strongly one was opposed to a view, the less need, the more pointless it would be, to set down a reminder of ones opposition in ones notes to oneself - especially if ones opposition was settled and longstanding. Further, the more one had a settled and clear doctrine on some point the less need to note ones opposition to some other doctrine on that point when recording some formulation of that other doctrine; ones opposition would go without saying. One would simply jot the formulation down. This is especially true where the notes to oneself in question are very brief and compressed setting out, in the main, single points in a line or two, as is the case with the Commentaries.

These considerations sufficiently show that when some entry in the Commentaries simply states some position that is no good reason to believe that the position is, or ever was, Berkeley's. The ordinary presumption that the occurrence of a piece of text which merely states a certain view implies that the author of the text held that view cannot rationally be
brought to a text like the Commentaries even on the assumption that the author was writing "in good faith", for it is not lack of good faith which the author is displaying in not jotting down what he or she already very well knows.

This does not imply that no use can be made of those entries in the Commentaries which are no more than a bald statement of a certain position. All it implies is that any use of them must not rely on the assumption that Berkeley at any stage believed what they say. Obviously any such use will be much more restricted than the use that can be made of a typical text, but there are such uses. What a person states can show things about their position even without any assumption that they mean what is said.

Naturally, there may be reasons apart from the ordinary presumption mentioned for taking it that certain specific entries express views which Berkeley at one stage had. Some of the entries are evidently not ones which he wrote down while simply neglecting to indicate that he did not accept what they say. These are entries where he specifically says that he holds a particular view, rather than just writing that view down - the entries state the writer holds the position which the entry sets forth. If one puts in the standard supposition that the writer is not deliberately mis-stating his or her position it follows that when Berkeley wrote each of these entries he held the view which it is an attempt to state.

But even in those cases where an entry seems to been intended to express a view of the author's there are grave problems.
In the first place Berkeley may have changed his mind after writing the entry. There is an enormous difference between the text of the Commentaries and the text of the Principles. Quite clearly there is a long way to go in terms of drafting and redrafting, and of extending, elaborating and re-working arguments, in moving from notebooks of the Commentaries' kind to a finished text like the Principles.

There is a great deal of detailed philosophical work to be done. Even if some of the entries seem to represent Berkeley's beliefs at the end of the Commentaries there is no reason to believe that his philosophical development froze at that point. It would be quite natural for his views to continue to be developed and elaborated during the extensive drafting and re-working required to produce a highly polished and crafted work like the Principles. These strictures tell particularly against those who think they can trace a development in the Commentaries to a final position on some point and take it that this is Berkeley's final position. Even if there is a development, and it is traceable, that is no reason to think that the final position in the Commentaries is the position from which the Principles was written.

If the final position on some question can be determined from the published texts then one may be able to recognise that some apparent development of his thought in the Commentaries ends up at the published position. But one can only recognise this on the basis of the published texts not on the basis of anything from the Commentaries, for in regard of any material from that source the question would always arise
whether it was material that Berkeley would have later discarded. That is to say, Berkeley's position in the Commentaries, and its development therein, is not independent evidence of what his mature position is.

In the second place, even if some entry in the Commentaries could be taken as an expression of the final position considerable problems would remain. When a person writes notes to themself they may well know what they "have in mind", they may well "know what they mean", in which event they may write notes which would not be fit to publish because the way they were put would invite misinterpretation by any reader other than the writer. Again, when one "knows what one means" one may write down remarks which while not actively tending to mislead any reader make their points very imprecisely, vaguely, or loosely. Again, upon just writing down a point in a note to oneself one may find that one has not said exactly what one meant but leave the note unaltered because one clearly appreciates what one means by it, and is in no danger of falling into misinterpretation; which is more than can be said for other readers.

Obviously nothing so far said means that one cannot recognise an entry in the Commentaries as stating some position of Berkeley's. But one can do so only on the basis of evidence from elsewhere that he held that position; and the warrant for ascribing that position to him is solely the evidence from elsewhere, the entry or entries expressing that position are not sound independent evidence.
No doubt many interpreters feel that they can see Berkeley's beliefs at work in the Commentaries. I do myself. But we are not entitled to rely on anything in them as direct evidence of what philosophical doctrines are being presented in the published works (although they may suggest an hypothesis to be checked against the other texts). Naturally, being of this opinion, I use the Commentaries rather sparingly in interpretation.

II. The texts prepared for publication

The primary texts on which my interpretation is based are to be found in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, 9 vols. Edinburgh, 1948-1957. In uncovering Berkeley's metaphysics I lean most heavily on A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (hereinafter called the Principles) and the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (which I will sometimes call the Dialogues or the Three Dialogues), as is the standard practice. These are the works in which Berkeley's system finds its fullest and most systemic expression. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe they do not provide a full and systematic exposition of the whole system.

The Principles was written as Part I of a proposed several part work, no other parts being published, and the Three Dialogues was written mainly as a re-statement of the
matter of the Principles 3. On the author's own assessment the Principles are intended primarily to refute scepticism about the existence or nature of the physical world and to demonstrate the existence of God and the "natural immortality of the soul" 4

(3) In the preface to the Dialogues Berkeley identifies certain pervasive philosophical difficulties and lays down three things which need to be done to secure the first principles of knowledge and science, and to prepare the mind for, and impel it toward, the study and practice of virtue. He records the proposed place of the Dialogues in this project in the following words:

"This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, published in the year 1710. But, before I proceed to publish the Second Part, I thought it requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain Principles laid down in the First, and to place them in a new light. Which is the business of the following Dialogues." (Pages 132-3, D.M. Armstrong (ed.) Berkeleys Philosophical Writings, Collier-MacMillan Ltd., London, 1969).

(4) These three objects of the Principles are stated in both the preface of the Principles and the preface of the Dialogues. The preface of the Principles begins,

"What I here make public has, a long and scrupulous enquiry seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known; particularly to those who are tainted with scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the Soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine" (ibid, p44), which is the full extent of that expression of the end of the work which is found in the preface. And the preface of the Dialogues reads in part,

"Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence arise scepticism and paradoxes. It is not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing: its true nature ... is still concealed. For ... we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason defective."(ibid p32)

He declares it is necessary to consider the source of these perplexities and, "if possible, to lay down such Principles as, by an easy solution of /the perplexities/, together with their own native evidence, may at once recommend themselves for genuine to the mind ... Which, with a plain demonstration of the Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, and the natural Immortality of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation, as well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice of virtue"; and continues "This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge ... But, before ... the Second Part, I thought it requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain principles laid down in the First ... Which is the business of the following Dialogues" (Ibid pp 132-3) (cont'd)
(Indeed while planning the Principles Berkeley at one stage resolved that "volition or will which is not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence at least in the First Book").

Of the three objects, refuting scepticism about the nature or existence of the physical world seems the most central. Berkeley's distinctive doctrine on the nature of the physical world is stated at greater length, and more repeatedly, than any other of his views. It is given pride of place in his exposition. Undoubtedly Berkeley sees that it is here he has his most direct and obvious conflict with the Lockean orthodoxy. Along with the concentration on the status of the physical world there is an extensive treatment of ideas, of which physical things are taken to be a mere species.

(4) These passages seem to me an express description of the objects of the Principles, and of the relation of the Dialogues to those objects.

As for the Dialogues alone, in the rest of its preface Berkeley proceeds to discuss its outcome in these terms,

"If the Principles which I here endeavour to propagate are ... true /"then"/ Atheism and Scepticism will be utterly destroyed, many intricate points made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced from paradoxes to common sense ... it has been my endeavour strictly to observe the most rigid laws of reasoning. And, to an impartial reader, I hope it will be manifest that the sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable expectation of immortality, do naturally arise from a close and methodical application of thought" (ibid pl33)

Moreover, the full title-page of the Dialogues reads-

"Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous/The Design of which is Plainly to Demonstrate/the Reality and Perfection of/Human Knowledge/The Incorporeal Nature of the/Soul/And the Immediate Providence of a/Deity/in Opposition to/Sceptics and Atheists/Also to Open a Method for Rendering the Sciences more Easy, Useful, and Compendious" (Armstrong op. cit. p130)
But Berkeley believes that the world as we know it is made up not just of ideas but also of spirits, two quite different kinds of thing: yet does not discuss spirits in as full a way as ideas. There are numerous points made about spirits and their properties but they tend to be made in passing, and when Berkeley turns his direct attention to spirits he tends to be brief. Thus although the remarks about spirit evidence a settled and rather complex account of spirit, this side of the system does not receive a full and systematic exposition in the Principles or the Dialogues.

Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence, when correctly gathered and marshalled, to show a great deal about Berkeley's doctrine of mind. It is possible to extract from the text a fairly full account of both spirits and ideas, an account of their nature, their origin, their relation to each other, and the way in which we know of them. It is possible to uncover a metaphysical system meant to encompass everything in the world as we know it.

III. Construing the text

There are a number of features of Berkeley's philosophical writing which it is as well to keep in mind. He reflects on his own undertaking, way of putting things, and use of terms, to a surprising extent. In the texts he repeatedly indicates what he means by his terms, or expands on the point of using those terms, or explains what he means by certain odd ways of speaking and odd kinds of statement, and notes the point of choosing to express himself in such a way. A lot of these remarks are in out of the way places in the texts but collectively they are of the first importance. They lay down what Berkeley intends by much of what he says.
He gives an indication of the sense of some term quite often. In some cases this "definition" of the term is fairly prominent, in others it is tucked away in passing remarks. In either case it seems to me that when a writer intimates that he or she is using a term with such and such a meaning they should be taken at their word unless there is strong evidence to the contrary. We shall take it for granted that where Berkeley indicates one of his terms should be taken in a certain sense the term should be read in that sense unless there is strong reason to do otherwise.

Some of Berkeley's reflection concerns what his doctrines actually amount to in terms of what one can say, and must say, about the world: and to what degree one is obliged to talk about the world in an expressly "Berkeleyean" style.

He is of the opinion that "the common use of language" could remain unaltered even if what is said in philosophical discourses is in accord with his principles. In general he thinks it allowable and even desirable in everyday speech to stick to the everyday descriptions of things even if one's understanding of what these things involve quite substantially changes.

In an illuminating example, he cites the Copernican theorist whose view of the structure of the heavens and the earth has changed radically from the pre-Copernican view but who does (and ought) continue to say in the ordinary way that the sun rises and sets although what he or she takes such
events to consist in differs greatly from the analysis of the pre-Copernican theorist. It is not that a Copernican should in all respects say just what a pre-Copernican theorist would say. Berkeley knows well that the Copernicans and pre-Copernicans have a substantive dispute about which astronomical descriptions of the heavens (and the earth) are true. It makes a great difference to one's discourse about astronomical questions whether one is a Copernican or not. But whichever way the dispute goes and whichever way of speaking prevails in technical astronomical discourse, it is appropriate to leave ordinary speech unaltered.

He intimates that analogous considerations apply to the practice of metaphysics, and that even if one adopts the Berkeleyean account of the nature of the world one should leave unaltered what one says in everyday non-philosophical talk about the world, even though adopting the Berkeleyean account evidently involves some major change in what one is prepared to say when discussing certain general "philosophical" questions.

The passage where these points are made warrants quoting at some length. Berkeley is stating an objection to his doctrine on the physical world (which doctrine has been fully set out before the passage), and then answering it, —

"We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? — I answer, he would so: in such things we ought to think with the learned and talk with the vulgar. They who to demonstration
are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system
do nevertheless say 'the sun rises', 'the sun sets',
or 'comes to the meridian', and if they affected a
contrary style it would without doubt appear very
ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here
said will make it manifest that the common use of
language would receive no manner of alteration or
disturbance from the admission of our tenets" 5

In the Dialogues Philonous in similar vein says
"In common talk, the objects of our senses are not
termed ideas, but things. Call them so still ... and
I shall never quarrel with you for a word" 6.

To a related point, Berkeley's account of the world
obviously changes what one can honestly say in discussion of
philosophical matters (it precludes, for instance, endorsement
of the representative theory of perception; and so on). No
doubt it involves saying things in "philosophical" discourse
which would not gain immediate acceptance amongst either
philosophers or non-philosophers.

Berkeley himself at many stages employs quite out of
the ordinary technical terms and ways of speaking. He
produces remarks which are very odd sounding indeed and which,
true or not, have no prospect of gliding insensibly into
mens' souls. However there are scattered remarks in which he
accepts the legitimacy of speaking in a much more ordinary
way than he customarily does - not just in non-philosophical
but in philosophical discourse - and expressly allows of
forsaking some of his most characteristic unusual ways of
speaking while retaining what are regarded as the
important substantive truths. It is explained that certain
technical terms and ways of speaking are used for certain
technical reasons but that one could talk otherwise without
error.
For instance in the Principles Berkeley writes,

"But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so - the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things; and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous...

I am not for disputing about the propriety but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas." 7

So, Berkeley is quite happy to allow people to stick to ordinary terms even in discussion of philosophical questions rather than adopt his own developed terminology, and indeed would be prepared to concede that these terms are "more proper or conformable" to custom than his terms, so long as those people concede certain substantive truths which can be largely stated without using the technical terms. The language of the way of ideas is not necessarily to be insisted on.

Illustrating the same point, Philonous is presented as having the same flexibility in respect of the characteristic doctrine that there is no matter, properly so-called. To quote,

"Hyl. ... what think you, therefore, of retaining the world Matter, and applying it to sensible things? This may be done without any change in your sentiments. Phil. ... retain the word Matter, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please ... I shall never quarrel with you for an expression" 8

It is not a part of the doctrine that people are wrong in their everyday statements about the world, or even that it would be preferable if they spoke differently. Berkeley too thinks that everyday speech is in order as it is. What
he objects to is what he takes to be an incorrect analysis of what kind of states of affairs our everyday statements about the things in the world assert to be the case, what they mean. He objects to the standard account of what it is to be a table or a chair or any of the other physical things we refer to in everyday speech. And he offers an alternative analysis of what our ordinary speech about the world amounts to, an analysis of what it is for a situation to be the kind of situation we talk about (whether physical or mental).

And even in discourses concerning philosophical matters he has no real objection to many of the established ways of talking about such matters, so long as those ways are not taken to embody or imply the orthodox analysis of the world; although he does think his own way of putting things has its own virtues.

Nevertheless, Berkeley employs his technical vocabulary and locutions carefully and consistently through most of the Principles and the Dialogues. The actual system we are presented with is almost entirely couched in such terms. It seems to me necessary to address the system as Berkeley stated it, at least in the first instance, in order to interpret the text and understand the doctrines.
PART II - Outline of the System

Preamble

Berkeley was forever writing. The volume of material he produced on philosophical subjects is considerable, as is the range of his philosophical interests. In this thesis I will focus on one thread only, albeit a rather substantial one, Berkeley's writings on the nature of the world, and on human knowledge of it. The thesis is written in the conviction that much of the available literature gives a quite unsatisfactory account of Berkeley's philosophical work. Many commentators misrepresent Berkeley's conclusions and arguments; in many cases their account of what Berkeley actually said is simply incompatible with the text. (This is particularly notable in regard of current accounts of Berkeley's metaphysics.) Where they turn to interpreting particular pieces of text their interpretation is often mistaken.

The first step in any work on Berkeley's philosophy is to establish what the relevant arguments and conclusions are: this is one of the main objects of this thesis. This undertaking requires an extensive and careful textual analysis; in the present state of the literature, and of Berkeleyan scholarship, no pertinent passage, or argument, can be taken as read, its meaning must be carefully elucidated. An attempt must be made at a textual analysis and interpretation, more or less from first principles.

Having established what the pertinent arguments; and conclusions are I will address myself to the question of the soundness of those arguments and the truth of those conclusions.
It is often charged that Berkeley's philosophical beliefs do not form a metaphysical system, that they do not constitute a consistent overall account of the world as a whole, whatever Berkeley's pretensions, and that the elements of his "system" are disparate and indeed sometimes incompatible fragments cobbled together with great ingenuity, rather than the natural parts of a coherent whole. It is my belief that this assessment is the exact reverse of the truth, that Berkeley's beliefs form an extremely systematic and coherent metaphysical system. I hope that in demonstrating the details and structure of Berkeley's beliefs about the world this thesis will conclusively show this to be the case. That is one of its purposes.

In Berkeley there is no gap between metaphysics and physics, rather there is a graduation from clearly metaphysical theories to clearly physical ones: Berkeley's natural philosophy is continuous with his metaphysics. In examining his account of the world I will focus on the more metaphysical and general elements of his system, leaving aside elements which are primarily a part of his detailed natural philosophy; but of course where this line of demarcation falls will be largely a matter of personal judgement.
CHAPTER I - The Concept of the Idea

In working to understand a philosopher it is always useful to place him or her in their philosophical context. It is always useful to consider the tradition they are in, if any; the ideas they accept from predecessors or contemporaries, and the elements original to them; the contemporary theories they accept, or ignore, or are reacting against. In Berkeley's case this is not only useful but essential.

On Berkeley's account of the world "ideas" are one of the main constituents of the world. More, he bases a great deal of his metaphysics on the character of these "ideas" and on the facts he alleges to be true of them. However no formal definition of them is given in the "Principles" and the only thing approaching a definition in the "Dialogues" is a discussion, rather late in the piece, on the propriety of the use of the word "idea" which is not of itself particularly illuminating. Nor is a formal definition of "idea" given in other of his writings. Moreover the sense of "idea" cannot be gathered from its use in the text alone, although Berkeley asserts a number of things about "ideas" which must be taken into account. Thus the first step in elucidating Berkeley's metaphysics must be to ascertain as precisely as possible the meaning he gives to the term "idea".

The term "idea" was part of the orthodox British philosophical lexicon of the day. And in his published works Berkeley initially just proceeds to talk about ideas without defining what ideas are; he just proceeds as though the sense of "idea" is more or less clear. It would seem that even if
Berkeley's term does not have precisely a sense generally current in his day it must have a clearly related one - one that is no more than a version of a then current sense: in our investigation of the exact sense in which Berkeley employs the term "idea" we must take text and context together.

The orthodox British philosophy of the time was deeply informed by Cartesian presumptions. Most pertinently it had adopted much of the Cartesian view of the "mental" at least in broad outline. To rehearse the Cartesian position - one is simply immediately given all one's conscious experience without possibility of error. What one is given includes all one's sensations, that is, what one perceives "as it were by the senses". ¹ It also includes all one's willing, imagining, doubting, understanding, asserting, and so on, and all one's "acts of understanding, will and imagination"². These are the "cogitationes"; and by definition they are the kind of thing one is immediately aware of in conscious experience, and the question of error does not arise. Further, the cogitationes are mental, as against being physical.

Amongst other things, those British philosophers who accepted this view of the "mental" wrote of ideas; and ideas were mental; they were found "in the mind"; they were, by definition, immediately given to a person who had them without possibility of error. This was so for philosophers in the Lockean tradition, perhaps the orthodox philosophical tradition of the day. More, the notion of the idea was one of the most central and important concepts in the Lockean conceptual schema. "Ideas" were not insignificant things, they were one of the building blocks of the universe, and the alleged character of
"ideas" provided some of the major premises and evidence on which the Lockean enterprise was built. Berkeley is annexing a widely employed term with the use of which he must have been familiar as a student.

Moreover in the introduction to the "Principles" he shows that he is talking of the same things as Locke in talking of ideas, at least in his own estimation. Preparatory to refuting a particular theory about abstract ideas he quotes Locke's exposition of it, an exposition in terms of ideas and general ideas, which exposition is directed mainly at establishing the character of ideas in humans as against brutes. Berkeley then conducts his discussion of the quoted views in the same terms as Locke employed in the quoted remarks: he simply proceeds to talk about these things which Locke has spoken of, disputing Locke's account of them, and simply referring to them as ideas as Locke does. He argues that in some respects they are somewhat different from what Locke would have them be. 3

In all this of course it is simply taken for granted that the entities which the two of them are referring to by the term "ideas" are one and the same. Berkeley is simply talking about those entities that Locke was talking about. Of course, he does rule out a certain alleged sort of idea, the "abstract idea", as absurd, the whole notion of it being incoherent and inconsistent; but this apart, ideas are what Locke has them to be.

Further, this part of the "Principles" evidences what Berkeley takes this Lockean sense of "idea" to be, for in order to set out the Lockean view he wishes to discuss and
in part contest he highlights a pair of quotations from Locke which, as selected, juxtaposed, and criticised, in Berkeley's text, quite unequivocably show what Berkeley takes the nature of ideas to be.

The quotations from Locke are set out in Berkeley's text as follows - (Armstrong, p.50)

"'The having of general ideas,' saith he, 'is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs.' And a little after: - 'Therefore, I think, we may suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man: and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.'

Essay on Human Understanding, B. II. ch. 11. 10 and 11.

Discussing these remarks Berkeley asserts that men have no ideas other than particular ideas, although some of these are in one sense general by being made to stand for a number of ideas indifferently. (In doing so he proceeds on the basis that he is dealing with the same things, that is ideas, as Locke. He simply uses the same terms.) He claims that men only have particular ideas, as Locke says the beasts do. But the two quotes which set up the position, one part of which Berkeley accepts and one part of which he rejects, specify unequivocably the nature of such ideas as have not been abstracted, the nature of what might be called "unabstracted ideas". They characterise
ideas which any mind might have prior to abstraction (ideas which might be employed by the mind in reasoning and thought in the absence of abstraction) as "particular ideas just as they receive them from the senses." Supposedly ideas which have not been "enlarged" by abstraction are such as we receive from the senses. So, leaving abstract ideas apart, ideas are sensations, or copies thereof, in the mind. Berkeley is not merely talking of the same entities as Locke, he is accepting one aspect of that account of what ideas are, made explicit in the quotations from Locke, the specification that unabstracted ideas are sensations, or copies thereof. As presented in Berkeley's text, the quotations from Locke are quite unambiguous on the matter. And, of course, Berkeley finds the whole notion of abstract ideas contradictory, for him ideas are unabstracted ideas.

We now see Berkeley's meaning. If the representative theory of perception were true, and applied to every physical thing and property, then we would all have in our minds sensory representations of situations in the external world. Berkeley calls those "mental" "things" which we would take as the "sensory representations" if we thought the representative

5 This notion of certain ideas being those "received from the senses" does not imply that such ideas are nothing other than sense impressions or sensations actually being perceived by sense. The Lockean notion is that one can receive an idea from the senses, and then have it on hand as part of one's stock of ideas. People thus develop a stock of ideas which are "just as they received them from the senses" (and which can then be combined and re-combined). The mind becomes furnished with ideas which are initially garnered by the senses but thereafter are at its beck and call.
theory correct, "ideas of sense"; and every idea is either an idea of sense or a copy of a possible idea of sense—produced, let us say, by the imagination or the recollection, or some other faculty. The term copy is here meant in the strictest sense. In the case of visual sensations only mental images, properly so called, count as copies; and likewise for all sensations. (It should be foreshadowed that on this definition of the term idea there might be "mental" things which are not ideas.)

We have now elucidated one aspect of the Berkeleyan notion of the idea. To turn to some other aspects of the idea—given the tradition in which he was educated Berkeley would know that in the Lockean schema the central feature of the idea is that it is given immediately in conscious experience, it is "before the mind". For any Lockean anything without this feature would necessarily not be an idea. Likewise, for any Lockean it would be necessarily the case that ideas were known without possibility of error. A thing without either of these features would not be thought an "idea", in the Lockean tradition.

Berkeley would not identify his use of the word with the Lockean one if he did not take it that he was talking of the same entities, thus it is highly probable that he takes it that the "ideas" he talks of are necessarily given in conscious experience, are necessarily "before the mind", and are known without the possibility of error. Again, he would know that readers would naturally take the term idea to denote a thing given immediately in conscious experience, and given without possibility of error, and would certainly read it with this connotation, so that it would be gratuitously misleading, and
court misinterpretation, to use the term in a contrary sense.

The presumption must be that Berkeley is not using the word in a contrary sense. In any case there are passages in the texts which fairly clearly show Berkeley's sense in the pertinent respects. He several times terms ideas the "immediate objects of the understanding", or "objects of thought", or "objects of human knowledge". To quote a revealing instance "My reason for using the word idea was, ... it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding". This suffices to show that for Berkeley, as well as for his orthodox contemporaries, the word "idea" refers to a thing given immediately in conscious experience.

Additionally, Berkeley holds that these immediate objects of the understanding are known without the possibility of error: he writes -

"so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas, divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in my compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding." (my italics)

So much for a sketch of the Berkeleyan "idea". We can now examine the basic metaphysics. Fortunately, Berkeley is a very systematic philosopher who believes that there are

10 Op. cit. pp 58-59. The same belief is evidenced elsewhere, for instance on page 70-71 op. cit. it is written, "All our ideas ... are visibly inactive ... to be satisfied of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas ... there is nothing in them but what is perceived" (my italics).
just several fundamental sorts of things making up the world as we know it, with just a few basic, and discoverable, relationships between them. In similar vein he believes that these basic ontological elements (things and relationships) are experienced or known of in just a couple of distinct ways.
CHAPTER II - The basic things in the world: Spirits and Ideas

According to Berkeley there are only three sorts of things of which humans have cognizance. These are ideas, spirits, and relations. ¹ Usually he ignores relations and says that people are only aware of ideas and spirits.²

Ideas and spirits are things of different and contrasting natures. They are known in very different ways. Berkeley writes

"After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects ... Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say 'they exist', 'they are known', or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures."³

Let us consider the nature of each of these two basic kinds of thing separately.

IDEAS

Berkeley uses the word "idea" in a way foreign to that modern usage in which the word is capable of denoting any mental item. It is necessary to have a clear view of what he meant by the term.

To reiterate - if the representative theory of perception were true, and applied to every sensible thing and property, then we would all have in our minds sensory representations of situations in the external world. The "mental" "things" which we would take as the "sensory representations" if we thought the representative theory correct are ideas of sense, and every idea is either an idea of sense or a copy of a possible idea of sense - produced, let us say, by the imagination or the recollection, or some
other faculty. The term copy is here meant in the strictest sense. In the case of visual sensations only mental images, properly so called, count as copies; and likewise for all sensations. Ideas are constitutive of sensations, and sensation-like awareness.

The esse of ideas (and of ideas only) is percipi; that is, the being of any idea is being perceived. 4 Further, All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive: there is nothing of power or agency included in them ... A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it; insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being. 5

According to Berkeley ideas can be distinguished into various sorts, on several different bases. The most important distinction of sort here is between ideas of sense and other ideas. In the "Principles" he deals with this distinction in sections 29 to 36 where he contrasts the ideas of sense with the ideas that human beings may excite or will in themselves (which he several times terms the chimeras formed by the imagination). 6

Firstly, he notes that the ideas perceived by sense have no dependence on one's will. Indeed it appears to be definitional of ideas of sense that they are those of our ideas which we perceive whether or not we will to (or will not to). As Berkeley says if you open your eyes in daylight you simply see what is before you, you are given a certain view of it, whether you want to or not. Secondly,
The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series.

Finally, as is inferred in a way I will describe later, ideas of sense are willed by the "Author of Nature"; that is, by God (who is One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good and Perfect).

In the "Dialogues" he repeats the contrast and also distinguishes between ideas of sense and the visions of a dream, saying of these visions that they are...

dim, irregular and confused. And, though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities.

Supposedly, God has created the world such that our ideas of sense are steady orderly and coherent; and are excited in a regular train or series, being connected and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives. And by virtue of this character they count as real things rather than as imaginary, illusory or chimerical; in that, for an idea perceived independent of the will of the perceiving creature, being steady, orderly and coherent and occurring as part of a regular train is what it is to be real.

In instance of this, section 33 of the Principles runs in part,

"The ideas of sense are allowed to have more reality in them than the ideas excited in the imagination, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind."
A little earlier in the section Berkeley avers that ideas excited in the imagination are less properly called real things than are the ideas of sense because they are less "regular, vivid, and constant" than the latter.

Again, in section 36 Berkeley states,

"Take here an abstract of what has been said — There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense ... These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former; — by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them ... In the sense here given of reality, it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term reality different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see."10

There are a number of other passages in the text which show that he believes the terms real and reality have a sense under which any idea of sense which is part of an orderly and coherent train of sensory experience which is of a piece with ones continuing experience of the world qualifies as a real being, and has an existence in rerum natura.

If God had chosen to create the world such that finite spirits had been affected with a mass of inchoate, irregular, incoherent ideas of sense that fell into no regular train or series then these ideas of sense would not have been real things. A mere collection of "wild" sense data would not count as a real world.

Having detailed the differences between ideas of sense and other ideas, Berkeley makes the very general observation that
... by whatever method you distinguish things (ideas of sense) from chimeras on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference, and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.12

Now, as is well known, Berkeley identified ideas of sense with physical things. However the physical things identified with ideas of sense are not supposed to be physical things in the ordinary sense, as is shown in section I of the "Principles". This is clearest in the "Dialogues" where Philonous says

"Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye. But ... men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connection in nature, either with respect to coexistence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing 13

and where, to the same point but with regard to one particular object, he says

"A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind because they are observed to attend each other.14

Thus to assert the existence of an ordinary physical object is to assert the existence of all the members of a set of ideas of sense. The ordinary physical things, which are real things in virtue of being part of that regular train of ideas of sense which is the course of nature, are in themselves small trains

12. My insertion. Philonous starts the remark from which this quote is taken by taking of ideas. He moves to talking of things via the words "But the ideas of sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear". He then talks of "these" contrasting them with chimeras and the visions of a dream - terming them "realities" immediately prior to the quote given. In this context the insertion merely clarifies the sense.
or collections of ideas which periodically occur together within the overall regular course of nature.

There is another quite independent way in which ideas are of different sorts. The ideas of sense which human beings have are associated with one or another of the five senses, and other ideas are merely copies of possible ideas of sense. Ideas, whether of sense or not, are associated with one sense or another. More, Berkeley suggests that although men have only five senses, and the five sorts of associated ideas, they might be endowed with, or other finite spirits may be endowed with, other senses, and, concomitantly, other associated sorts of ideas.¹⁵

So far we have noted distinctions of kind based on the properties of the ideas themselves but Berkeley also characterizes ideas as being of certain sorts solely on the basis of the role they play in the operations of the mind. Ideas which are of such a sort differ from ideas not of that sort only in respect of the use which the mind makes of them, and are in other respects not to be distinguished from the general run of ideas. But these matters will be most conveniently considered when we discuss the operations of the mind.

SPIRIT

So much for the nature of ideas, and of the basic sorts of ideas. The other fundamental sort of thing in the world is the spirit: and as for the nature of spiritual substances, souls, spirits, or minds -
A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being - as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will16

and

by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term 17

and

all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived: whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking.18

The very existence of a spirit "consists ... in perceiving ideas and thinking", and spirit is essentially active. Unlike idea, whose esse is percipi, the esse of spirits is percipere et agere; for one of them, to be is to perceive and to act. This implies that no spirit is distinct from its own acting, its being active. The occurrence of a spirit is the occurrence of a certain particular activeness. The acting and the actor are not distinct.

Berkeley manifests this point in Commentaries 788

"We see no variety or difference betwixt the Volitions ... 'Tis One Will One Act distinguished by the effects. This will, this Act is the Spirit, operative, Principle, Soul etc." 19

Apparently the spirit is an act. Again, in section 145 of the Principles he implies that it is an error to think that the mind can be prescinded from its acts and operations.20

In Commentaries 701 and 828 Berkeley writes that "the substance of Spirit" is "purus actus", and that "The Will is purus actus or rather pure spirit" - "purus actus" being best translated "pure act" - implying that there is no more to spirit than certain acts.21 And in 870 he says

"I must not give the Soul or Mind the Scholastic Name pure act, but rather pure spirit or active being"22
This is not a note on what the nature of spirit is, rather it is a note on what term he should use to characterize that nature. Henceforth he is to refer to this thing the substance of which is purus actus as "active being" or "pure spirit", eschewing any scholastic terminology. This casts a new light on Berkeley's repeated statements in the Principles that spirit is an "active being", and on his occasional references to "pure spirit".

Perhaps the most decisive passage is Commentaries 829 which implies that the mind is not to be distinguished from its acts. To quote

"Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble that may be made on the word it) to act, cause, will, operate."

So, according to Berkeley, there is no it which acts separate from the action or acting itself.

Some of the arguments preceding in which I have invoked certain of the Commentaries depend on those commentaries being in the respects invoked formulations of that doctrine that spirit is active, that its esse is agere, which is put forward in the published work, rather than formulations of some other position. I assume that if the commentaries in question were intended as formulations of a view which was not finally adopted then Berkeley would either have expressed his final view in a way that made it distinguishable from the one expressed in the Commentaries, or have explicitly disclaimed the position formulated in the Commentaries as distinct from, if perhaps related to, his considered position. This assumption is incorrect only if Berkeley several times formulated for himself,
on paper in his notebooks, a view (or views) close to the position eventually advanced but seen as distinct from it, and then expressed the view eventually advanced in such a way that it evidently could not be told from the other supposedly distinct view (or views), and made no mention of the fact that this other view was not his considered one. But this is unlikely: it seems to me that the assumption is quite warranted. And, of course, on the assumption, we must take it that the relevant aspects of Commentaries 701, 788, 828 and 829 are formulations of what was seen by Berkeley as the same view on the nature of spirit as that expressed in the published works, since the published formulations of the doctrine which we have considered leave it not distinguishable from the views which find expression in these commentaries, at least in the respects invoked. 24

24. In the case of a writer with clear expression and a considerable degree of internal consistency such as Berkeley I take it as a general maxim of textual interpretation that where the writer several times formulates a view or views which, as formulated, cannot be distinguished one from the other the reader should take it that the formulations are, as they appear, expressions of the same view. This principle has application both within the one text and across texts. It should be noted that the maxim does not depend on any assumption that any formulation in question is the expression of a view that the writer holds: the maxim touches on whether certain formulations are intended as expressions of the one position, irrespective of whether the writer supposes that position to be correct. Thus the maxim applies equally to published works and to materials of a more dubious status. Naturally the maxim can be set aside if there is reason to do so; it is a rule of thumb.

Both the maxims and the use made of it in my treatment of spirits are no more than in line with normal practice. Where several statements by a writer seem, on the face of the words, to be saying the same thing in different words it is customary to take it that they are expressions of the same point; and the possibility that they are in fact expressions of different points is not seriously considered unless there is reason to do so.
Commentaries 870, of course, is one of those which expressly states what the position of the writer is; it is a declaration by the writer that he himself must follow a certain course, that of not calling spirit by the scholastic name pure act but instead characterizing it as pure spirit or active being.

A spirit is distinct from ideas and cannot be composed of, or constituted by, ideas; nor can it be represented by, or resemble, an idea. One cannot have an idea of it. No mind is in any way constituted in any part by ideas.

As with ideas, there are a number of sorts of spirit which must be considered basic kinds of the things in the world. There are finite spirits as against infinite ones (God is the only one of these last). Within finite spirits there are human beings and other finite spirits, notably angels.
CHAPTER III - The Operations and Acts of Spirits

It is a little difficult to extract the full theory of the acts and operations of Spirit from the Principles for that is at no stage the focus of Berkeley's exposition. Indeed spirit was intended to be systematically dealt with, and Berkeley's full position set forth, in Part 2 of the Principles which was never readied for publication - although particular points are dealt with as they arise in the treatment of those questions to which the Principles is substantially addressed; and spirit is treated of sufficiently to set the other matters dealt with in some context. Much of the material on the acts and operations of spirit must be extracted from the nooks and crannies of the text.

A spirit's activity is its being. A spirit's acts and operations cannot be prescinded from the spirit itself. The operations of spirit are mentioned for the first time in published work in section 2 of the Principles where reference is made to spirit exercising various operations about ideas. Thereafter there are scattered mentions of the operations of spirit throughout the Principles and the Three Dialogues. Amongst the acts and operations of the mind that Berkeley mentions are reasoning about ideas, producing ideas, making and unmaking ideas, imagining and remembering ideas, and willing, loving, hating, thinking and knowing by reflex act.

There are several operations of the mind which I will consider in some depth in view of their interest and importance.
(a) **Thinking About Ideas**

Although it is not immediately obvious on the face of the text, Berkeley has a fairly detailed theory of how the mind conceives of, thinks about, ideas—including the ideas of sense. On this theory the mind thinks about ideas by summoning up ideas of its own and employing them in a way which will be detailed shortly. Any idea which is employed in this way is called by Berkeley an *idea of* something, and that idea is an idea of something solely in virtue of the use to which the mind puts it, not in virtue of any particular properties it has in itself.

Here I must pause to prevent confusion and say that I am still aware that all ideas are perceived by some mind or another, and that any idea which is perceived by some mind is simply present to that mind and that that mind is entirely conversant with it. What I am discussing here when I talk of thinking about or conceiving of ideas is not what is involved in an idea being present to the mind in being perceived, rather it is what is involved in the mind excogitating about ideas, having thoughts about them. On Berkeley's system as so far expounded there is not only room for supposing some process of conceiving of ideas which is distinct from mere perception of them, there is a need for it. If the only way a mind could think about an idea was by perceiving it, it would be impossible to think about any ideas except those which at the moment of thought one was perceiving. This would be an absurdity and sufficient in itself to refute Berkeley's system.
Again, if the only manner in which a mind could have a thought about an idea was by merely perceiving it then it would be impossible to think of an idea which one was in fact perceiving, in whatever circumstances one was in, as occurring at some other time, or in some other circumstances, or before some other mind; for none of these potential settings of the idea could be thought of merely in perceiving the idea before one's own mind. These consequences would be sufficient to refute Berkeley's system.

The theory of how ideas are conceived of has a considerable importance as a central part of Berkeley's theory of mind. It enables him to have a coherent view of how the mind is not only aware of but thinks about the world. Moreover, in my judgement, it plays a crucial role in his arguments that physical things are ideas, that their esse is percipi.

The evidence which shows that Berkeley has a theory, and what that theory is, is very scattered and needs a deal of ferreting out. To begin, there are those ideas which are ideas of some particular thing, and there are those ideas which are not ideas of some particular thing. The clearest expression of the distinction I can find is in section 41 of the Principles,

"if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or possibly can be ... without the mind, any more than its idea."\cite{11}

Addressing much the same distinction section 36 runs

"the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former\cite{12}
"Ideas of" in this use are, perhaps amongst other things, ideas we employ in conceiving of physical things in contradistinction to perceiving them. As Berkeley says "I find I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived."\(^13\) And for Berkeley physical things are just one sort of idea, the idea of sense; his ideas of are ideas which, perhaps amongst other things, we employ to conceive of what he takes to be one particular sort of idea.

When you think about, or conceive, any idea you represent it to yourself. In section 1 of the Principles it is said that on a survey of the objects of human knowledge one finds

"ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination - either ... or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways"\(^14\)

\(^{14}\) Armstrong op.cit. pp61. The full sentence from which the quote is extracted runs "It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination - either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways." On the face of the text the "aforesaid ways" referred to seem to be, firstly, perceiving the ideas which are imprinted on the senses and, secondly, perceiving "such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind". The objects of knowledge which would be perceived in this second way, that is on attending to the "passions and operations of the mind", would obviously include those ideas which the mind was actually operating about. So, in the quoted sentence the occurrence of an idea which represents an idea which the mind employs in its operations is contemplated. Here Berkeley treats the ideas employed in the operations of the mind as being susceptible of being "barely represented" by some idea.

When we consider the huge variety of mental processes which Berkeley considers to be operations of the mind, and the fact that any process which involves imagining, producing ideas, or willing involves an operation of the mind we can see that here Berkeley is contemplating most, if not all, of the ideas which are not ideas of sense being susceptible of being "barely represented" by some idea.
And in section 33 Berkeley writes

"The ideas imprinted on the Senses ... are real things: and those excited in the imagination ... are more properly termed ideas or images of things, which they copy and represent." 15

At this point we can see the difficulties that arise because the activity of conceiving of ideas is not the focus of Berkeley's exposition at any stage, so that we have to cull facts about it from passing remarks made in the course of addressing other questions. The passages so far invoked only contain what is pertinent to those questions. For this reason the majority of passages quoted deal with having ideas of ideas of sense, and only one contemplates having ideas of non-sensory ideas. Moreover, as can be seen, in the passages quoted Berkeley tends to remark on the existence of ideas of ideas, the existence of representations of ideas, without making it clear exactly what is involved in having an idea of some thing. However, and quite fortuitously, there is a remark which he makes in passing which illuminates the question. In section 140 of the Principles Berkeley writes,

"as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of others by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them, so we know other spirits by ...". 16

So, we conceive the ideas in the minds of other spirits by means of our own which we suppose to be resemblances of them. And in Berkeley's system the esse of ideas is percipi, all ideas one is not perceiving are in the minds of other spirits. Thus from Berkeley's point of view the quote is a description of how one conceives, thinks about, all ideas which one does not perceive, both those which are ideas of sense (physical things) and those which are not. The pertinence of this to the question of what is involved in having an idea of something is obvious.
We have already seen that conceiving of some idea can involve representing that idea to ourselves and that it does involve having an idea which is an idea of the first-mentioned idea, which idea of one in some way uses in representing the first-mentioned idea. We now see what is involved in an idea of ours being an idea of some thing, we see the way in which an idea is employed in being an idea of some thing. Having an idea of some thing in distinction to perceiving it involves supposing an idea of our own to be a resemblance of that thing in order to represent the thing to ourselves. One thinks of an idea, other than by perceiving it, by taking an idea of one's own and thinking of a "thing like that", where that is the idea of one's own. It is by this means that one conceives of those ideas which one does not perceive. This is the way one forms any thought about any idea one is not perceiving.

Moreover, Berkeley may well think that the method of conceiving of ideas described is the method employed to think about one's own ideas, at least in some respects. The quoted passage from section 140 is part of an express analogy between how we conceive of ideas in the mind of others and how we conceive of other minds, an analogy drawn for the purpose of making clear how we conceive of other spirits. In this context one would not expect Berkeley to mention how one thinks about one's own ideas, this being nothing to the point, even if he thought that in fact one thinks about some of the ideas not in other minds in the same manner as one does the ideas one does not perceive.
It seems likely that Berkeley supposes that one represents to oneself an idea which one did perceive at some time but no longer does by means of an idea of it. We may notice that in section 1 of the Principles Berkeley says of the ideas "formed by the help of memory and imagination" (my italics) that they may be ideas "barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways". Presumably the same applies to thinking about ideas which one is not perceiving but will or may perceive, and ideas which one might have perceived but did not.

As for the ideas which one is perceiving, the idea being perceived is present to the mind and in this minimal sense one might be said to think about it, but one may also have thoughts about it, one may excogitate about it. It is possible that Berkeley would say that when one has thoughts about it one does so by means of an idea of it. I do not believe we can decide whether Berkeley would say this on the evidence of the texts.

I am conscious that the direct expressions of Berkeley's doctrine on thinking about ideas, or of some part of it, which I have quoted, are rather few but in my view they are sufficient to establish the model of how ideas are conceived. More, there is a body of evidence of a more indirect kind which manifests Berkeley's model. There are arguments where Berkeley is obviously assuming the model, or some part of it.

Let us turn to section 137 of the Principles where it is written
'From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many and hetero-dox tenets ... That an idea, which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a Spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original'.

The first sentence quoted describes the opinion which is to be refuted, the opinion that spirits are known after the manner of an idea or sensation. In the second sentence, showing that no idea can be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself is advanced as showing that such an agent cannot be known after the manner of an idea. The movement of the argument is clear - the fact that no idea can be the image or likeness of a spirit is evidently intended to by itself refute the opinion referred to in the first sentence. This, of course, supposes that knowing some thing after the manner of an idea or sensation involves having an idea which is an image or likeness of that thing.

That the refutation of the opinion in question relies on the supposition that knowing some thing after the manner of an idea or sensation involves having an idea which is an image or likeness of that thing is further shown by what is then, in the third sentence, entertained as a rejoinder to the point made in the second sentence. The rejoinder is clearly a denial that an idea cannot be an image or likeness of a spirit; it is a suggestion that an idea may be able to resemble a Spirit in some respects, that an idea may be able to be the image of an agent subsisting by itself.
Clearly, the crux of the refutation of the opinion that Spirit is known after the manner of an idea or sensation is that supposedly it is not represented to us by an idea which is an image or likeness of it. More evidence to this point may be gathered by following through the overall argument against the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation. To quote again from the last quoted sentence -

"But perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a Spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original.

138. I answer, If it does not in these mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the ideas can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of these powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a Spirit."

What is assumed and presupposed throughout the argument is that to know a thing after the manner of an idea or sensation is to have an idea which is an image or likeness of it. Let us also note that it is supposed that if an idea cannot resemble, or be like, a spirit in any respect it cannot represent it and that in consequence there can be no idea of spirit.

There are other strands of argument which to some degree evidence Berkeley's doctrine. For instance, section 27 of the Principles in part runs -

"A spirit is one simple undivided active being ... Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vid. sec 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active Principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible."
The structure of the argument is evident. According to Berkeley there can be no idea of a soul or spirit because no ideas can "represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts". But this is to presume that having an idea of some thing must involve having an idea which represents that thing unto us by way of image or likeness. Further, the last sentence in the quote is obviously intended to be something to the point at issue. The sentence either elaborates on the point of the previous sentence or makes a different if related one (it is difficult to tell which), but in either event it presents the alleged fact that "to have an idea which shall be like that active Principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible" as a reason why there can be no ideas of a soul or spirit.

Overall I believe we may take it as established that in Berkeley's opinion the operation of the mind which constitutes conceiving of, thinking about, any idea is representing that idea to oneself by means of an idea of one's own summoning which one takes as a resemblance of the idea represented. One thinks about an idea which one is not perceiving in taking an idea of one's own and thinking of a that like this idea.

Let us apply this somewhat abstract formulation to a concrete case to make its import clear. Let us consider a particular idea of sense, say a particular horse (here for ease of exposition I leave aside the fact that in Berkeley's view any horse would be a set of ideas of sense). There is not only the idea which is that horse, there is the idea of that horse.
The idea which is the horse is an idea of sense: you either have it or not quite involuntarily. On the other hand when you think about that horse, or imagine it, you form an idea, and think of a that which is like this idea; by this means you represent to yourself the horse; and the idea which represents is an idea of the horse. And similarly with imagining, or thinking about, any idea, whether or not an idea of sense. (This is in accord with the principle that nothing can be like an idea but an idea).

Any idea, as well as being perceived by some mind or minds, may be conceived by means of an idea employed as an idea of it. What is conceived in this way is a that like the idea employed. An idea is an idea of X by virtue of being employed in the conceiving of X in the manner described. It is an idea of by virtue of that sort of act of the mind.

Berkeley has a sharp distinction between perceiving ideas and conceiving of them both in regard of ideas of sense and in regard of other ideas. While he is completely opposed to the representative theory of perception he holds in fact to a representative theory of conception.
(b) **Thinking about spirits**

No doubt one thinks about a spirit, in some minimal sense, in knowing one's own spirit by reflex act but one also needs to have thoughts **about** spirits. This is essential for Berkeley's system. If one could only think about a spirit by way of knowing it by reflex act then one could not think about spirits other than one's own. One could not think about other people and one could not think about God. Both these consequences are incompatible with what Berkeley would wish to maintain, and in any event would together refute the system.

Berkeley not only realises that we conceive of spirits which we are not directly experiencing, he has a view on how we do so. His theory of conception extends to the conceiving of spirits. And although there is less textual evidence than in the case of ideas we can uncover something of his view.

One act of mind which seems connected with conceiving of a spirit is having a notion of a spirit. But certain confusions have arisen from Berkeley's way of talking about notions and about the way we "know" spirits. He tends to use the word "knowing" (and cognate expressions) to cover both knowing that a certain thing or kind of thing is and knowing what a certain thing or kind of thing is (having a determinate conception of it). He speaks of knowing some property both when he is talking of knowing what that property is (what would count as it) and when he is talking of knowing that such a property is.

The distinction is between knowing what it is to be a certain thing or property, and knowing that such a thing or property exists, or is instantiated. Berkeley does not always mark this
distinction by any variation in locution; and most of the time he is talking about knowing that such a thing or property exists. Thus it is easy to take any reference to knowing some thing, or having knowledge of it, as a reference to knowing that the thing exists. When Berkeley identifies having a notion of a certain mind with having some "knowledge" of it, or implies that having a notion is involved in "knowing" a spirit, it is easy to assume that notions are meant to be involved in knowing that one's own mind or some other mind exists.

But this assumption is not supported by a close reading of the text. When we turn to the text we see that notions are not at all said to be involved in knowing one's own mind by acquaintance or knowing by inference that other spirits exist, and that the kind of knowing and knowledge involved is that where one knows what counts as "I", or God, or another finite mind (what it is to be "I" or God or another finite mind).

So far as I have been able to determine the word notion occurs 18 times in the Principles and 42 times in the Dialogues. There is no point to examining each case separately but some of them warrant our attention. The following passages reveal what a notion is,

"We have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating - inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words" (section 27 Principles)

"In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea or rather notion of spirit. That is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not deny or affirm anything of it." (section 140 Principles)

"I have some knowledge or notion of my own mind, and its acts about ideas; inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words". (section 142 Principles)
On the plain sense of these words a notion is very like a concept. To have a notion of spirit is to have a conception of what is denoted by the term spirit, it is to know the meaning of the term. And one needs the notion of spirit in order to affirm or deny anything of spirit.

The kind of knowing involved is evidently knowing what counts as "soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind such as willing, loving, hating" what counts as "my own mind, and its acts about ideas", what counts as "spirit".

In a few instances Berkeley appears to use the term notion to denote something like a belief, something which has a propositional character. For instance, in the Dialogues Hylas says "the notions ... upon review, appear still more clear and evident; and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my assent"; and Philonous says "I am content Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion". But in all remarks about a notion of spirit, or soul, or mind, or their operations, the term seems to have the sense of a conception of spirit, or soul, or mind, or of the operations of the mind.

The references to having a notion in the three specifications of what is involved in having a notion which I quoted earlier were inserted in the second edition of the Principles. One might interpret the insertions as a further attempt by Berkeley to settle questions about how spirits are known of, and how they are discovered, by setting out more explicitly the manner in which we are conversant with them. But this is not the most natural interpretation of the point of the insertions.
A reader not properly acquainted with the text can suppose difficulties quite distinct from the question of how spirit is to be known to exist. In particular such a reader, faced with repeated remarks that one cannot have an idea of spirit and that no idea can stand for or represent a spirit, may well suppose that on Berkeley's own principles a spirit cannot be conceived of: and a reader with some familiarity with other philosophies of the day might, on a first reading, conclude that a term which is supposed not to have a corresponding idea is an empty term, quite without meaning. Such errors would be quite natural.

Now, the quoted remark that

"we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating — inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words"  

(which first appeared in the second edition) follows immediately a remark that

"so far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto or represented by, any idea whatsoever".  

The second quoted passage that

"In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea or rather notion of spirit. That is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not deny or affirm anything of it".  

(in which the pertinent part, the words "or rather notion" were added in the second edition) follows immediately on section 139 which begins "But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms, soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant or have no meaning in them", and which then consists in a denial of that objection.
The third quoted passage

"I have some knowledge or notion of my own mind, and its acts about ideas; inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words"

(again added in the second edition) is in a section which starts

"After what has been said it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of idea"

and it is immediately preceded by

"We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action; although we may be said to have a notion of them" (also added in the second edition). 31

We can see that the three quoted passages about one's conception of spirit are sited precisely where the question of how one can conceive of spirit, how "spirit" can be other than an empty term given that it has no corresponding idea, is likely to be before the reader. The most natural interpretation of the purpose of the three quoted passages is that they are intended to make clearer that we conceive of spirit, or mind, or soul, despite there being no idea of them. The passages were inserted in the second edition not to make clearer how we come to know spirits exist, but to make it clearer how it is we can conceive them.

It seems probable that if a notion is required in order to know what a spirit is, and in order to affirm anything of a spirit, then it is required to think about a spirit at all. In any event the question of how one thinks of spirits is raised directly in the Dialogues and the answer is cast in terms of notions. Hylas questions whether God can be conceived on Philonous's principles, since there is no idea of him. Philonous replies that although he has no idea of God and other spirits he has notions of them, and can thereby conceive them.
Hylas begins thus,

"Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto or represent the nature of God?"

Phil. It cannot.

Hyl. Since therefore you have no idea of the mind of God, how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it ..." 32

Philonous responds,

"As to your first question: I own I have properly no idea, either of God or any other spirit ... my soul is (not) an idea, or like an idea. However, ... my soul may be said to furnish me with ... an image or likeness of God ... For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, ... in myself some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity ... I perceive him not by sense, yet I have a notion of him, or know him by reflection and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediatly apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas." 33

This extract is from one of the more confusing passages Berkeley wrote, but we can gather some things from it.

First, Berkeley takes it for granted that conceiving of God, representing him to oneself in thought, does involve having something "like unto the nature of God ", some "image or likeness" of him, before the mind. Hylas puts it that you need some likeness of God in the mind in order to think about him, and suggests that since one has no idea like God, he cannot be thought. The reply is that this consequence can be avoided because one has a likeness of God before the mind which is not an idea, and thus has a notion of him although not strictly speaking an idea of him.

Second, obtaining a notion of God involves taking ones own soul as the image or likeness of God, albeit an imperfect likeness. Indeed Berkeley indicates that one "mediately apprehends" other spirits and ideas "by the help of" ones own mind and ideas.
Clearly one does not mediately apprehend "other spirits" by the help of one\'s ideas; it remains, therefore, that one apprehends them mediately by the help of one\'s own mind. We should note that this mediate apprehension extends to spirits other than God since Berkeley is a monotheist.

A little after the lines last quoted Berkeley again touches on mediately apprehending a thing by means of using one\'s own mind, as a likeness of it. In reply to Hylas\'s question "if you can conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it". Philorous states,

"you neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act; neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately. All which makes the case of Matter widely different from that of the Deity".

We see that there is a mode of mediately apprehending a thing by its similitude to the self, as well as a mode in which a thing is apprehended by its similitude to an idea which you perceive. We know that the mode which involves the similitude of a thing to an idea before the mind is used to conceive ideas, and could not be used for spirits, since no idea can in any way be like a spirit. For the same reason no idea can be mediately apprehended by a similitude to one\'s own self. Representing the nature of a thing through its similitude to the mind is a mode of conception that can only be used in regard of spirits. And as we have seen Berkeley specifies that it is the mode of conception used in the case of God.

At least in respect of God having a notion involves using oneself as an image or likeness of the thing conceived. It involves representing to oneself a "that which in such and such respects is like this mind of mine". A thought about God has the form of a thought of "a that like this", where this is one\'s own mind.
It seems the same holds for any notion of a spirit, given section 140 which runs in part,

"as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose resemblances of them, so we know other spirits by means of our own soul: which in that sense is the image or idea of them." 35

So, we conceive of other spirits by means of our own soul which is the "image or idea" of them in that sense in which the ideas of our own by means of which we conceive the ideas perceived by other spirits, and which we suppose resemblances of those ideas, are images or ideas. Further the ordinary concept of being an image is of being in some respect a likeness of the thing represented. And we already know that our ideas of the ideas in the minds of other spirits are images or ideas in this ordinary sense, being likenesses of them. So, conceiving of any spirit or having a notion of it involves using one's own mind and its acts as an image or resemblance of the thing to be conceived. The mind expressly thinks of a "that which is like this" where the this is the mind itself or one of its acts - and this process is the very act of conceiving of a spirit. Any thought about a spirit has the form of a thought about a "that like this".

Presumably, as in the case of ideas, a thing only counts as the thing which the notion is of if the thing resembles in the pertinent respects the image which the mind is employing. But the thing represented does not have to be like its image in all respects. Indeed the thing can be defined as differing from the image in certain ways and as having qualities which the image does not possess. For instance, the notion of God is of a thing like me in certain respects but with greater powers and none of my imperfections. However, Berkeley makes it clear that the thing represented must resemble its image in certain respects or the image cannot function as a representation of it. (See sections 135-138, Principles)
There is an obvious analogy between the way in which we conceive of ideas and physical things and the way in which we conceive of spirits and their operations. In both cases the mind employs "images" of things in order to represent them to itself, and expressly thinks of resemblances of the images employed.

There is a fairly close analogy between ideas of and notions of. Just as an idea of X is employed in order to think and talk of X, so a notion of Y is employed in order to think and talk of Y. But the concept of a notion is not quite so clearly delineated as is the concept of an idea of. It is not clear whether the notion is just the thing which serves as an image or representation of the thing conceived (as an idea of is), or whether it is that representing thing plus the act of mind by virtue of which that representing thing serves as an image. Either interpretation, it seems to me, would fit the text. Perhaps Berkeley had not refined his concept in this respect, or perhaps the textual material is too meagre for his view to show through.

In any event, the act of having a notion of some spirit involves being immediately aware of an item which can serve as an image or likeness of the spirit, and using that item as an image or likeness; it involves both having the requisite item "before" the mind and taking the item to be an image or likeness of another spirit, just as having an idea of some thing involves having the representing idea before the mind, that is, perceiving it, and performing the act of treating it as an image or likeness of something else. In both cases, what is required to think about what is not directly experienced is not just the occurrence of the relevant "image" in the mind but the act of taking that thing as an image or picture of some other thing. It is only by virtue of that act of mind that the thing of which the mind is immediately apprized is a representation of anything at all.
CHAPTER IV - How the relation between the "idea of" some thing and that thing is characterized.

We have extracted from the text a doctrine on how ideas and spirits are conceived, and we have discerned elements of that doctrine in a number of places. It is important that we be able to recognise when that doctrine is being invoked or manifested in the text, and when it is not, so that we can correctly interpret Berkeley's words. This requires that we appreciate the various ways in which Berkeley puts the doctrine.

In this connection, there is a problem with how Berkeley puts his theory on the conception of ideas, and more specifically, a problem about how he is prepared to characterize the relation between the idea representing and the idea represented. Unfortunately, rather important questions of interpretation turn on the matter.

Given Berkeley's theories on the nature of physical reality the account of how we conceive of physical things implies an interesting relation between the ideas of the imagination employed to think about physical things, and those things themselves. The essential difference between an idea of sense and an idea of the imagination is that the idea of sense is not subject to the will of the finite perceiver and the idea of the imagination is. It is definitive of an idea of the imagination that it is subject to the will of the finite spirit which perceives it. It is definitive of an idea of sense that it is not. There are often other characteristic differences between ideas
of sense and ideas of the imagination, but this is contingent.

One could have what was otherwise the one idea both occurring in some mind subject to the will of God, and also occurring in some finite mind subject to its will. The difference would consist entirely in the causal and perceptual relation of the idea or ideas to various mind. Indeed, the one finite mind might be involved in each case, perhaps at different times, perceiving both the idea of sense, and the idea of the imagination, in question. And whose will an idea is subject to, and even which mind it is perceived by, looks to be what is sometimes called an external relation, given that minds and their acts are entirely distinct from ideas.

It might be natural to regard "two" ideas which happen to be the same except as to the will they are subject to, and even the mind they are perceived by, as the one idea occurring under different dispensations, even where the wills and minds concerned were those of God and a finite spirit. This, of course, is an adjustment of the criteria for what is to count as the same idea as another. It is a determination of what one will mean by saying that two ideas are the same idea. It delineates which situations are to be described as the occurrence of two different ideas, and which are to be described as the occurrence of the same thing in different circumstances and contexts. And it involves characterizing an idea which is produced by God and
imposed on a finite spirit as the same thing as an idea which is produced by a finite spirit but is, in itself, the same as the idea produced by God. In this case one would say that the same thing was occurring as an idea of sense, or as an idea of the imagination.

This version of the concept of being the same idea or thing might lead to descriptions of the world different from those resulting if one regarded the idea produced by God as ipso facto a different thing from the same idea produced by the finite mind; but the differences would be merely verbal and consequent simply on different definitions of one's terms. There would be two different ways of characterizing the same situation.

Now, Berkeley wants to keep the distinction between "real things" and "the chimeras of the imagination" fairly sharp. The deliberate and official doctrine is at least that any idea perceived by a finite spirit counts as an idea of sense when it is produced by God, and that any idea perceived by a finite spirit counts as an idea of the imagination when it occurs subject to the will of that spirit. (There are other differences between ideas of sense and of imagination, as a matter of fact.)

When he comes to discuss the distinction between a real thing and an idea of the imagination Berkeley often talks of the idea which is employed to represent a real thing as a quite different thing from the thing represented, rather than characterizing it as essentially the same thing occurring in a different context.
We have considered some of the passages involved. However, in some other published passages there seems a certain looseness and vagueness of expression: and Berkeley wanders into and out of talking of the ideas used to represent the things as the things themselves occurring in the finite mind, subject to its will; but in my view he never implies that the difference between being produced by God, and being subject to the will of the finite spirit, is of no consequence.

In this way he speaks of the things imagined as in some sense themselves "in the mind", although he quite appreciates that one is not perceiving them qua idea of sense. In doing so, he accords with a rather long tradition extending from medieval philosophy. Acquinas knew that there was an evident difference between a physical thing and the thought of it. But he did not want to say that this difference consisted in two different natures occurring, one in the physical realm and one in the mental. Rather he supposed that the same characteristics, the same nature, occur in each case but differ in the manner of their occurrence.

A certain nature or form occurring as the nature or form of a physical thing has "esse naturale"; and this very nature or form can occur in thought, in which event it is occurring with "esse intentionale". A thought is a thought of X by virtue of being an actual occurrence, with esse intentionale, of that form or nature which, with esse naturale, makes X to be what it is. This is how the mind
attains in thought to the nature of things themselves.¹

We need not fully understand this doctrine but should note that what makes a physical thing to be X, and what makes a thought to be a thought of X, is the one thing occurring in different manners. Naturally, this model was carried forward in the Thomist tradition, and had a wide influence in medieval and later philosophy.

The structural similarity between Acquinas's account and Berkeley's is evident. Ideas of sense (physical things) and ideas of physical things have the same defining properties qua idea, they have the same internal characteristics or nature, and differ essentially only in their relation to certain acts of certain spirits, which acts are entirely distinct and separate from the ideas themselves.

Certainly, on Berkeley's system, it would be fairly unexceptional to say that essentially the same natures were manifest in physical things as in ideas of them, one set of natures laid before us by God, and the other our own handiwork.

A man of Berkeley's learning in philosophy and theology would have been acquainted with the basic structure of Acquinas's system, and of the Thomist worldview. In occasionally speaking of physical things being present in the mind when thought on, in treating them as the thing conceived occurring under a different dispensation, Berkeley is in accord with a standard way that a rather similar set up to the one he outlines was

characterized in a tradition with which he was acquainted. He might well have found this way of talking of that sort of set-up fairly natural.

The Commentaries show that at one stage he was committed to the view that a thing existed whenever it was imagined or thought on, although in a different sense from that involved when it actually occurred in the world rather than in the imagination. In several entries he claims this in express contrast to what he takes to be the common opinion as to what the existence of things consists in.

To quote -

"472. You ask me whether the books are in the study now when no one is there to see them. I answer yes. You ask me are we not in the wrong for imagining things to exist when they are not actually perceived by the senses. I answer no. The existence of our ideas consists in being perceived, imagined, thought on. Whenever they are imagined or thought on they do exist. Whenever they are mentioned or discoursed of they are imagined and thought on therefore you can at no time ask me whether they exist or no, but by reason of that very question they must necessarily exist.

"473. But say you then a chinera does exist. I answer it doth in one sense, i.e., it is imagined. But it must be well noted that existence is vulgarly restrained to actual perception. And that I use the word Existence in a larger sense than ordinary."2

Clearly some of what is here said is contrary to the published doctrines, but a lot can be gleaned from it. Berkeley indicates that physical things exist when imagined in virtue of being ideas and thus subject to a general principle concerning ideas, to wit, "the existence of our ideas consists in being perceived, imagined, thought one."

The things exist when imagined or thought on in virtue of this characteristic of ideas.
But there seems little doubt that even at this stage of his philosophical thinking Berkeley would have held that any idea is necessarily immediately and actually before the mind. When he indicates that, through being an idea, a thing exists whenever imagined or thought on he must be supposing that it occurs immediately before a mind whenever imagined or thought on. Berkeley is evidently holding that when imagined or thought on the physical thing is existing in the mind qua idea.

But he obviously doesn't suppose that it is occurring qua idea of sense. The very case he deals with in 472 is that of things which are not "actually perceived by sense", and it is particularly such cases that the general principles he invokes are supposed to cover. So the physical thing is occurring in the mind as an idea which is not an idea of sense. This seems to imply that it is occurring as an idea framed by the mind itself, that is to say, as an idea of the imagination.

Besides, when he confronts the consequence that whatever physical thing is imagined but does not exist, at least as a physical thing, must be said to exist on the claims in 472 he says that it does exist in one sense in that "it is imagined", so he is supposing not only that when imagined or thought on its existence consists in occurring in the mind as an idea but that in so occurring it is imagined; that is, that it occurs as an idea of the imagination.

Berkeley correctly remarks that existence is "vulgarly restrained to actual perception", that is, to
existence qua idea of sense, but has made it clear that on his definitions of terms the occurrence of what is more or less the same idea as a physical thing, except for the fact that it is an idea of the imagination rather than an idea of sense, counts as an occurrence of the thing itself. Naturally there is still a clearly seen distinction between an idea of sense and an idea of the imagination, it is just not a distinction which necessarily involves being different things.

This is the full blown way of stating Berkeley's sort of account of the relation between physical things and ideas of them in accord with the way the relation is characterized by Acquinas. The account of what it is for some thing to be imagined or thought on implicit in 472 and 473 is recognizably at least a version of that we have extracted from the published work. The big difference is that Berkeley is decided on expressly characterizing the physical thing conceived and the thing before the mind in conception as more or less the same thing occurring in a different manner or sense.

As I have remarked there are traces of this way of putting things in the published texts although very prudently he never puts anything there in quite the way it is put here. Nevertheless it is obvious that he has not entirely ceased to find it a reasonable way of making his point. It is, of course, only an alternative way of describing the one model of the act of conception and of the relation between thought about the world and the world itself.
How the Relation Between the Idea of Something and that thing is Characterised in the Published Texts

It is important that we assess how Berkeley was prepared to state his doctrine in the published work, so that we can judge the permissible range of interpretation of the often cryptic or skimpy remarks which say or imply something about the act of conceiving ideas, especially since this aspect of the theory of conception is a central part of the system and underpins a major part of it.

The evidence we considered in coming to our first understanding of Berkeley's theory of the conception of ideas was in certain respects rather scanty. Some aspects of the theory were inferred from one or two fragments of text. Nevertheless the theory inferred was treated as that manifested in all those passages which talked about or relied on some feature of how ideas or physical things are conceived.

Now we may well ask whether these passages clearly manifest an account on which the idea of an idea or physical thing, and the idea or thing represented itself, are characterised as two different ideas, as against an account on which they may be accounted essentially the same idea occurring in different circumstances and settings. How much of the text bears on its face the formulation of the theory first ascribed to Berkeley rather than the formulation more recently contemplated?

There are not a great number of passages in which Berkeley mentions or implies something about how one thinks about ideas or physical things. Most which I know of were considered in our original analysis of his model of conception. Before we move to reconsider this material in detail we need to cover several points in general terms.
First, my own personal habit is to take it without reflection that when a person talks of an idea which they summon up to think of a thing, when they talk of an idea of that thing, they are referring to something distinct and different from the thing itself. So when reading some passage I tend to simply read distinct references, on the one hand to that in the mind in conceiving of some thing (or to the idea of that thing), and on the other to the thing conceived of, as references to distinct and different things. Only if I specifically ask myself whether the text is strictly incompatible with the expressions in question referring to the same thing can I suspend my instincts in this regard. This tendency to read in accord with ones preconceptions may occur in other readers. When it does it must be consciously set aside.

Second, when Berkeley says or implies that the idea representing the thing thought of is like, or resembles, or is an image of, the thing represented this should not be taken to carry the implication that the idea representing and that represented are distinct things. Even when the idea representing is the same thing as the thing represented it is true that the idea representing is like, resembles, and is employed as a likeness of, the thing represented. Likeness is a relation compatible with identity. It would be only good tactics to make the lesser claim when that is all that is required for the purposes of argument or illustration.

The textual material on Berkeley's views of conception, which we have already considered, falls into two sorts - that where Berkeley advances his theory (whatever it is) or some part of it, and that where he appears to assume the theory or some part thereof. Let us consider the material in which he states the theory, or some part of it, first.
Section 41 reads in part:

"if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or possibly can be ... without the mind, any more than its idea."38

That real fire is very different from the idea of fire would be insisted on either of the two ways of putting the basic doctrine. The question is, whether the difference mentioned here necessarily consists in being two quite different things or whether it might involve only a difference in setting and circumstance. And the text does not decide the question. The proposition that a certain idea which, occurring at the summons of the mind, is used as the idea of fire can be, when imposed by God, real fire seems compatible with the text.

Next comes a passage from section 36 of the Principles which must be read closely, indeed I will quote more lengthily than before, with the words previously quoted underlined.

"Take here an abstract of what has been said:- There are spiritual substances ... which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint weak and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense ... These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former; by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. ... it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by any other."39

Ideas of sense are real beings in that they are more affecting, orderly and distinct than ideas of the imagination and are not subject to the will of finite spirits. This draws a substantial contrast between ideas of the imagination and those which are real things.

Now, being orderly has to do with the relation between the ideas rather than the character of any particular idea, but being affecting and distinct certainly relates to the character of the individual idea. The question is, whether being more affecting
and distinct makes for being a different idea. I think the answer is that it is impossible to tell from Berkeley's writings. He is rather vague and loose about what counts as the same idea as another, and never much discusses the individuation of ideas.

As for the specific examples, a strong contrast is drawn between "the sun that I see by day and that which I imagine by night". Notice that on the grammar of this phrase the words "that which I imagine by night" refer to that sun which I imagine by night. Berkeley is explicitly talking of and contrasting a sun or suns, the I see by day and that which I imagine by night, which last is itself the idea of the real sun. It seems to me difficult to tell whether the difference between the sun seen and the sun imagined is definitely intended to consist in being different ideas or whether it might be no more than a great difference in the circumstance and setting of basically the same idea.

In either event, the idea of the imagination which represents the physical thing is treated as a certain physical thing a sun, which is occurring in the imagination rather than in rerum natura. Under Berkeley's criteria a sun existing in this manner does not count as a real thing; qua sun it does not have a real existence, that is exist as a "real being". On this line of approach the ideas which the mind uses to represent physical things to itself are treated as themselves physical things existing in a circumstance which makes them to be mere copies of real physical things rather than real physical things or ideas of sense.

In the case of "the objects of human knowledge ... are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory or imagination — either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways." 70
the matter is clearer.

It is compatible with this wording that the idea formed to represent some idea "originally perceived" in one of the aforesaid ways is in some sense the same idea as the idea represented.

Further, the characterisation of the ideas represented as those "originally perceived in the aforesaid ways" implies that those ideas sometimes occur later perceived in some other way. In regard of ideas originally perceived by being "actually imprinted on the senses" this suggests that an idea which later arises in the mind other than through the senses may be the same idea as that originally perceived by the senses.

To the same point, we have the ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination "compounding and dividing" those very ideas which were originally perceived in the "aforesaid ways". Again the implication is that the ideas originally perceived by way of being imprinted on the senses are being compounded and divided by memory and imagination. Here we may perhaps see some similarity to the Lockean account of the storehouse of ideas in which ideas first impressed on the mind by sense are laid by and used as building material with which the mind fashions new ideas. Which account regards the material laid by in the storehouse, and which is summoned up and worked with from time to time, as just that material originally garnered in sense perception.

Section 33 reads in part,

"The ideas imprinted on the senses are real things: and those excited in the imagination ... are more properly termed ideas or images of things which they copy and represent." (My italics) 41
Berkeley does not say that the one idea cannot be imprinted on the sense and also be excited in some imagination, but it would be natural to read the passage as delineating two categories of ideas such that no idea can fall within both. No doubt some of the naturalness arises from our pre-supposition that nothing can be both a real thing and an idea excited in the mind, but even allowing for this the passage seems to imply that, properly speaking, they are different things.

In section 140 Berkeley writes

"Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them, so we know other spirits by means of our own soul: which in that sense is the image or likeness of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another." 42

This is an extended comparison of the act of conceiving of an idea and the act of conceiving a spirit, a comparison in which an analogy is drawn both between the means employed to represent the thing to oneself in each case and between the relation between the image employed and the thing represented in each case.

As we conceive of ideas perceived by others by using ideas of our own as images of them, in like manner we conceive of other spirits by means of our own soul, "which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another". The soul is the image of other spirits in the sense involved in being used like those ideas of our own which we employ as resemblances of ideas in the mind of others: and the quoted words after the semi-colon are evidently intended to elaborate on just what is involved in being an image in this sense by continuing the comparison of the relation between one's own soul and the spirit it is employed to represent with the relation between the ideas employed as images and the things they represent.
And this is to present the relation between "blueness or heat perceived by me" and "those ideas" perceived by others as an illustrative case of the relation between the idea employed as the image of another idea and that other idea. But in this case there is a tacit identification of the idea which one uses as an image and that which it represents. The words "those ideas perceived by another" could be amended to "that blueness or heat perceived by another" without a change in sense.

Both the ideas perceived by another and the ideas which one uses to conceive those ideas are said to be a certain "blueness or heat". Clearly, these ideas of sense, and the images of them employed in conceiving them, are treated as the same idea albeit occurring in quite different circumstances.

When we turn to the passages where Berkeley assumes some theory of conception or part thereof, only in section 137 of the Principles is there any implication that the idea representing is distinct from the thing represented.

It is obvious that in the work prepared for publication Berkeley does not have a settled practice of saying or implying that the idea used to represent and the idea represented are to be accounted different ideas, nor does he have a settled practice of saying or implying that they are properly termed the same idea. There are only a few passages which definitely say or imply something either way: most are compatible with either way of putting the matter.
CHAPTER V - How We Know of the Basic Things

First, ideas. There are two distinct categories, one's own ideas and the ideas of others.

Consider the ideas which one happens to perceive. The very being of an idea is being perceived. An idea is that which is perceived. Ideas cannot be misperceived. I simply perceive those ideas which I perceive with no possibility of error.

The way that ideas which are perceived by others but not by oneself are known will be dealt with when I have dealt with how other minds are known.

Now let us consider spiritual substance. There are two categories, one's own spirit and other spirits. Consider one's own spirit. Berkeley says a considerable amount about knowledge of one's own spirit. Firstly, he holds that it is not subject to error. One page 193 of the "Dialogues" Philonous says

I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist.

On page 194 Philonous says "My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of." The distinction between immediate and mediate knowledge of is at least a distinction between inferential and non-inferential knowledge of. As to the way in which this non-inferential knowing of the

4. This requires justification: in the Three Dialogues, page 138 op. cit., Berkeley writes - "Phil. It seems then, that by sensible things you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense? Hyl. Right Phil. Doth it not follow from this that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing? Hyl. It doth." In response to this and similar arguments, Hylas says "in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately: for they make no inferences." The same sort of connotation of the word immediate is evidenced in section 145 of the Principles. (cont'd)
self occurs, Philonous says, "You neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by reflex act." 5 A page further on he says "the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflection." 6

So I am aware of myself by reflex act, that is, by reflection. What else does Berkeley say of this reflection, of this knowing of oneself? In section 89 of the "Principles" he writes "We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection." 7 Again, in "De Motu" he writes

By the help of sense we know the extended thing, solid, mobile, figured, and endowed with other qualities which meet the senses, but the sentient percipient, thinking thing we know by a certain internal consciousness. 8

Yet further, Hylas, caving in once again in the face of Philonous' dialectical brilliance, says,

I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations. 9

Finally, Philonous says,

How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else a thinking active principle that perceives, knows, wills and operates about ideas. 10

One's own mind is known, with certainty and immediately, through reflex act (reflection), inward feeling, or "a certain internal consciousness"; it is known through "a fair observation of what passes in my mind." In this knowing one is simply conscious of one's own being.

We now pass to knowledge of other spirits, which Berkeley treats of in sections 145 to 150 of the "Principles".

4. (cont'd)

"I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence the knowledge of other spirits is not immediate."
Here there is a radical distinction between that other spirit we call God and all other spirits.

Concerning those spirits other than God which are human beings, Berkeley writes,

I perceive ... several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them, and concur in their production. Hence the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my own ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomittant signs.11

So there are "some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them."12

Further,

It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but ... it be not inconsistent to suppose (them) ... there is a probability for them: ... we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves.13

On the subject of non-human finite spirits Berkeley's writings are rather skimpy. Most pertinent is a remark in a letter to Percival, to wit, "both reason and scripture assure us there are other spirits (as angels of different orders, etc.) besides man."14 Also relevant, from Alciphron, is we are led not only by revelation, but by common sense, observing and inferring from the analogy of visible things, to conclude there are innumerable orders of intelligent beings, (beings different from) man, ... whose place, this earthly globe, is but a point, 15 in respect of the whole system of God's creation.

Perhaps, amongst other things, suggesting this conclusion is
The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving around the central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend... Though the laboring mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immense. 

... this earth ... was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. 16

Certainly an Anglican bishop could feel that he knew of angels from scripture. As for reason, I take Berkeley to be saying that human beings inhabit what is but a fleck of dust in the context of the vast expanse of the creation and that common sense suggests that in other places in the universe (characterised as it is by endless variety) there are (perhaps on that crowd of other worlds in which the energy of an all-perfect Mind is displayed in endless forms) non-human finite minds.

As for God, "we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow creatures." 17 God is inferred from the nature of our ideas of sense as are other spirits, but the inference here is quite demonstrative. The works of nature, by far the greater part of the ideas and sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. So they must be produced by some other spirit. If one considers the character of the works of nature closely, one sees that this spirit is One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good and Perfect. 18

Berkeley is quite explicit about the similarity between the manners of knowing God and knowing human beings.
Two sections after the proof I have noted, he writes

It is plain we do not see ... that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do: but only such a certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. After the same manner we see God: all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity. 19, 20

So much for how other minds are known. As for the ideas of others, the inference to other human beings set forth above is, as quoted, an inference to "certain particular agents, like myself," "human agents," distinct finite agents like ourselves," and "that which lives, moves, perceives and thinks as we do." Presumably this inference can involve inferring some of the ideas, especially ideas of sense, of the people inferred.

To sum up what we know, there are two things known immediately, one's own spirit and the ideas which one perceives. Although both are known immediately they are known in different and quite distinct acts of the mind, perception in the case of the ideas, reflection in the case of the spirit.

One infers other minds and their ideas from what one sees in the world; that is, from the character of one's ideas of sense. One infers both to God and to those finite other minds which are human beings. The inference to God is demonstrative, yielding certainty, whereas the inference to other men yields only probability. The whole world cries out the existence of God, whereas only very circumscribed parts of it cry out (with less force) the existence of each particular human being.
So much for the basic sorts of things in the world, and the way we know of them. What of the basic discoverable relationships between the two fundamental sorts of entities, ideas and spirits?

The dependence of ideas on the mind

It has already been noted that ideas are what is perceived and spirit what perceives them, and that the esse of ideas is percipi. But in addition to simply stating that the esse of ideas is percipi, that their being is to be perceived, Berkeley speaks of the mind-dependence of ideas in other terms. He articulates two distinct but quite basic aspects: that an idea cannot subsist except in a spirit which is its support, that is, that spirit is the substance in which ideas inhere; and that an idea cannot exist unless produced (that is, willed) by a spirit.

Consider the question of subsistence, of spirit being the support of ideas. Berkeley writes,

"I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas."

So, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas is what is meant by affirming that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas.

And in section 7 of the Principles in the course of arguing that spirit is the only substance Berkeley says that for an idea "existing in" a thing consists in being perceived by it, so that any thing "wherein" ideas of sense exist must be a thing which is perceiving them. To quote,
"it is evident there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives ... for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing were a manifest contradiction; for to have an idea is all one as to perceive, that therefore wherein (the ideas perceived by sense) exist must perceive them".

Not only does affirming that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas mean affirming that spirit perceives ideas, but that ideas "exist in" such a substance, or in any substance or support, consists in no more than that they are perceived by it.

These points are put more elaborately — and keyed in with other ways in which Berkeley wants to talk of the mind dependence of ideas — in sections 90 and 91, of the Principles, which run in part

"Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist: this we do not deny; but we deny that they can subsist without the minds which perceive them ... It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things ... in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance or support wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and therefore cannot exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances, or spirits, which act, and think, and perceive them."

So, that ideas subsist in spirits, and that spirits are the support of ideas, means that no idea can exist except in that it is perceived by some spirit. We can see that the talk about spiritual substance is another way of expressing the doctrine that the esse of ideas is percipi.
Let us turn to spirit as the cause of ideas. In sections 26 and 27 Berkeley writes,

We perceive a continual succession of ideas; some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore, some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them ... the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit ... A spirit is one simple undivided active being - as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will.  

So every idea depends for its production on the will of some spirit.

There are two distinct dependencies of each idea, one a dependency on the will, the other a dependency on the understanding. A particular idea cannot exist unless it is perceived by some spirit, nor can it exist unless it is produced by some spirit.

The first dependency, that an idea must have a spirit as its cause, seems to involve the ordinary sort of dependence of any thing on being caused often invoked by philosophers of the time.

As for the other dependency it seems to me of the same character as that Descartes mentions when he writes,

whatever is found in the mind is merely one aspect or another of consciousness ... imagination sensation and will are inconceivable except in a conscious being.  

This Cartesian view of the nature of that immediately before the mind was prevalent in the orthodox British philosophy of the day - here Berkeley is no innovator.

As to how these relationships are known of - it is presented as a demonstrable truth that these relationships hold between ideas and spirits. Presumably anyone capable of rational thought can follow Berkeley's demonstrations (some parts of which have been quoted) and thus know of the relationships.
The relation between God, finite spirits, and ideas of sense

We have seen that when in section 145 of the Principles Berkeley starts to treat of how we become apprized of other human beings, he states that we infer them from certain "motions, changes, and combinations of ideas" that inform us that there are certain agents like ourselves which "accompany" those ideas and "concur in their production". This involves a rather odd characterisation of the relation between the ideas of sense which evidence the presence of human minds and those minds. What is it to concur in the production of the ideas of sense in question? Moreover, in section 146 Berkeley writes of certain ideas which convince us that finite spirits are "concerned in producing them".

What does Berkeley mean by talking of finite spirits which concur in the production of, or are concerned in producing, certain ideas of sense? What are we inferring to if we infer spirits with this relation to physical things (are we inferring to finite spirits which cause the ideas in question)? What role do these finite human spirits play viz-a-viz the physical world?

A nice question of interpretation arises here. At first glance Berkeley falls into inconsistencies in characterising and describing the relation between the finite human spirits and the physical world in sections 145 to 150. In other parts of the "Principles", and the "Dialogues", he is quite clear that all ideas of sense are entirely produced by and dependent on the volition of God, that they are as they are because, and only because, God wills them so. And even that physical object over which one has the closest voluntary control,
one's own body, is expressly treated as an ordinary set of ideas of sense. Yet in the course of the extended discussion of the relation between spirits and the physical world found in sections 145 to 150 of the Principles he terms those ideas of sense from which we infer other finite human spirits "ideas by them, excited in us", and he mentions a kind of idea of sense which he characterises as an "effect produced by /a man/". He also makes reference to certain physical changes as "produced by men." 9

These remarks not only appear inconsistent with Berkeley's general doctrine on the ideas of sense, they appear quite contrary to the clear account of the relation between a finite human spirit and the ideas of sense which is developed and repeatedly stated in the very sections in which the remarks occur. In section 147 of the Principles Berkeley writes

"There is not any one mark which denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For it is evident that, in affecting other persons, the will of man hath no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator." 10

He continues "He alone it is who 'upholding all things by the word of his power,' maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other." 11 and we have already seen that "that intercourse ... whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other" is the occurrence of those ideas of sense which each of us can see are ones in which finite spirits like ourselves have concurred. So it is because of God's volition that when I will a voluntary action, say the movement of my arm,
the ideas of sense vary in the way which constitutes a motion of my arm. Neither I nor any other finite spirit can cause an alteration in the ideas of sense, in the strict sense of the word cause. Rather, God has determined that when finite spirits have certain volitions, certain alterations in the ideas of sense will concomitantly occur.

We have material which, if taken in isolation, support the interpretation that Berkeley's view is that finite human spirits quite strictly speaking cause some ideas of sense, and we have material which equally supports the interpretation that, on Berkeley's view, only God is the cause of ideas of sense, and no finite spirits are in a strict sense the cause of any idea of sense. We must determine whether Berkeley consistently holds one of these two views but not the other, the appearance of contradiction being illusory, or whether he adheres to the one view in some places and to the other at other places, being inconsistent with himself. And, if he is inconsistent with himself in this way, we must see if either view has any claim to be regarded as the central or "official" view, the other being regarded as a lapse from this view into inconsistency. Let us begin to canvass the evidence of Berkeley's position on the matter.

In section 148 Berkeley reiterates the detailed account we have recently elucidated from section 147, writing

"When ... we see the color, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our minds; and these ... serve to mark out unto us ... finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see ... that which lives, moves, and thinks as we do: but only such a certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God: all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblages of ideas denotes
a particular human mind, withersoever we direct our view we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity; everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men."12 (my italics)

And he begins the next section

"It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident ... than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence."13 (my italics)

This is quite express.

Again, as we would expect, Berkeley's fundamental position is manifest in his treatment of God's responsibility, as the immediate author of all physical things, for those wrong actions which necessarily involve physical acts, such as crimes of physical violence. In the Dialogues he writes

"Hyl. You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making God the immediate author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacriledge, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

Phil. ... first ... the imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of ... Matter, you as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to nature."14

So, God is the immediate agent of all the physical motions in nature, including all the physical motions involved in "murder, sacriledge, adultery and the like heinous sins". Philonous's next words are

"I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action, or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a
criminal to death, is not thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an immediate cause of all such actions is not making him the Author of sin.

Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies ... thinking rational beings (have), in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills."\(^{15}\) (My italics)

Again, the same basic doctrine is unmistakable.

God is the immediate cause of "all such actions," all the physical actions involved in sinful acts (and any outward act is sinful if it involves a deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion), but He is not the only agent which "produces" such actions, other spirits having "limited powers" "in the production of motions" "under the direction" of their own wills, powers "ultimately derived" from God.

God wills that when human beings will certain outcomes, such as movements of their bodies, those outcomes will eventuate. He causes each such outcome to occur when the relevant volition occurs. The outcomes are thus under the direction of the finite spirits; and those spirits may be regarded as having limited powers to bring about certain changes in the world, which powers are indeed ultimately derived from God. By the grace of God human beings can "produce" certain physical changes, but they are never the immediate cause of those changes.

The charge Hylas brings is that God is being made author of all physical circumstances including the particular physical motions involved in sinful action (which are par excellence the sort of motions which would be the direct effect of human volitions if anything were) and, being the author,
carries the blame. Berkeley's response is to reaffirm that God is the direct cause of every physical occurrence but to deny that he is therefore guilty of sin, since in his wisdom, and as a part of the design of the Creation, he has delegated the decision on the actions in question to finite spirits, and thus sinful actions are determined by an inward deviation of the will of those spirits. It is a part of the internal arrangements of the creation that in the ordinary course of events (barring miracles and so on) there are certain invariable concomitances between the volitions of finite spirits and the ideas of sense. That finite spirits can "cause" certain sorts of alterations in the ideas of sense, certain alterations in the physical world, is a law of nature like other laws of nature. It involves certain particular invariable concomitances (invariable except in the case of miracles) established by fiat of God's will.

As in previous passages there is, in the midst of a clear expression of the view that God is, strictly speaking, the cause of all physical occurrences, a remark which, if taken strictly, implies that He is not the cause of all such occurrences, some of them being caused by finite spirits — as quoted Berkeley notes the possibility that God is not "the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies."

What are we to make of the remarks which seem to carry such an implication, how are we to take what Berkeley has actually said? As we have seen Berkeley quite expressly and deliberately advances the view that God is the true cause of all ideas of sense, and no finite spirit the true cause of any. Unless the remarks which appear to imply that some finite spirits are the
cause properly so called of some ideas of sense can be construed in some other way, Berkeley is inconsistent with himself. In this event, we might observe that where he directly addresses the question of the relation between God, finite spirits, and those changes in the ideas of sense which accompany the volitions of spirits he sticks to the view that God is the cause of all ideas of sense, and that consequently it has some claims to be regarded as the "official" view. But we can cut this line of thought short, for there are reasons to believe that the remarks are not to be taken as evidencing adherence to the doctrine that any finite spirit is in a strict sense the cause of any idea of sense.

Some of the remarks in question occur in the very sentences setting forth the heart of the doctrine that God causes all ideas of sense but in so doing arranges that certain ideas of sense will be in accord with certain volitions of finite spirits. But, apart from their setting, these remarks are just the standard sort of remark about which we are worried about. If Berkeley makes this sort of remark even when he is undoubtedly expressly advancing the other view such a remark does not definitively indicate that Berkeley at that point holds that finite spirits quite strictly speaking cause certain ideas of sense.

Moreover, this is one of those cases foreshadowed where Berkeley lays down how he is to be taken in speaking in a certain way, what he means by the kinds of remarks in question. In section 51 of the Principles he directly addresses the question of to what extent we should follow common usage and use language with seeming causal implications in describing the
regularities of nature, along with the question of how
passages in which one does speak in the common way are to be
read in order that one's intent may be grasped. He writes

"it will be demanded whether it does not seem absurd
to take away natural causes and ascribe everything
to the immediate operation of spirits? We must no
longer say upon these principles that fire heats or
water cools, but that a spirit heats, and so forth.
Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should
talk after this manner? — I answer, he would so: in
such things we ought to think with the learned, and
speak with the vulgar ... A little reflection on what
is here said will make it manifest that the common
use of language would receive no manner of
alteration or disturbance from the admission of our
tenets.

52. In the ordinary affairs of life ... phrases
may be retained ... how false soever they may be if
taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this
is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by
custom, language is suited to the received opinions,
which are not always the truest. Hence it is
impossible — even in the most rigid philosophic
reasonings — so far to alter the bent and genius of
the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for
cavillers to pretend difficulties and
inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader
will collect the sense from the scope and tenor
and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those
inaccurate modes of speech which use has made
inevitable."16(My italics)

So, Berkeley is of the opinion that when in the common
use of language one talks of the ordinary connections between
events in the course of nature, one should talk with the vulgar
and say things which if taken in a strict and speculative sense
imply that one particular thing in the course of nature causes
another, even when one does not intend them in that sense, and
even when one accepts the tenet that the real cause, the cause
in a strict and speculative sense, is something else. It needs
to be clearly seen that what is here advocated is, amongst
other things, a certain canon of expression in speech and
writing. And, on the view that God immediately causes all
physical things and arranges that there be a standing correspondence between the volitions of certain spirits and certain physical events, the connection between these volitions and the ideas of sense which accompany them falls naturally under this canon, for on the aforementioned view the connection consists only in an invariable concomitance, as with the other regularities of nature, and the rules describing the concomitance are laws of nature like the other laws of nature.

Further, phrases which are false "if taken in a strict and speculative sense" are unavoidable since "propriety (is) regulated by custom", and where in consequence one produces what could be taken as inconsistencies "a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connection of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable."

Here we have, amongst other things, another canon - a canon for reading texts in which keeping to the ordinary way of talking has produced the appearance of inconsistencies.

Let us apply this canon of Berkeley's to the passages which need to be understood. We may recall that Berkeley sometimes refers to the ideas of sense accompanying finite human spirits as produced by men, or as the effects of men. On considering the scope and tenor and especially the connection of the discourse in the passages which we have already examined - which tenor, scope, and connection have already been sufficiently elucidated - we see that when Berkeley in this way seems to imply in passing that finite spirits cause ideas of
sense he is speaking with the vulgar, as he himself expressly countenances, saying something which is in a "strict and speculative sense" false but which is not meant in that sense. We see that the remarks which in a strict sense imply that finite spirits cause ideas of sense are not intended by Berkeley in that sense; and that he does not mean to imply any such relation between finite spirits and the ideas of sense.

We might pause to note that Berkeley takes the line that he does in the belief that there can be a connection between things much closer than mere invariable concomitance, for which connection the term "causation" must, in strict usage, be reserved. He allows of "causation" in the sense of invariable concomitance, causation in a Humean sense, between human finite spirits and physical things.

This completes my survey of Berkeley's basic ontology. The survey has covered the nature of the kinds of entity, and of relationships between them, which are the basic constituents of the world on Berkeley's ontology. It has also covered the way in which these constituents are known, or known of, on Berkeley's epistemology. It may be seen that what I have surveyed forms a comprehensive schema into which any entity in the world as we know it will fit, Berkeley's philosophy being correct.
PART III - The Grounds of Berkeley's Philosophy

CHAPTER VII - The first principles of philosophy

It is a commonplace that a reader educated in one philosophical tradition and imbued with its pre-conceptions and world-view often has great difficulty understanding the writings of a philosopher with a different background. The truth of this is brought home to us when we confront the post-Cartesian philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries. A person with a modern philosophical education tends to be bemused when faced with the work of those of these philosophers who construct all-embracing metaphysical systems. It is not just that they are metaphysicians on a grand scale, an avocation that is currently unfashionable, their conclusions and arguments seem strange to the modern eye. Often they combine strenuous efforts at deductive rigour, at demonstrating all their conclusions to be true, and an evident concern to really prove decisively and beyond possibility of error that their conclusions are true, with a collection of premises which at first glance seem to be simply taken to be true. There are a lot of supposedly certain or evident truths at the bedrock of their systems.

The orthodox modern English-speaking traditions are not only bare of non-tautological yet certain truths which might serve as the premises in an absolutely decisive philosophical demonstration, we cannot see how such premises could ever be arrived at. The world does not seem to be the sort of place where non-tautological absolutely certain truths can be come by.
To find major philosopher after major philosopher supplied, if anything, with an overplus of non-tautological certain truths is perplexing. This perplexity is deepened by the fact that the major figures involved are very evidently genuises - people who in their intellectual and philosophical capacities tower over most of us like colossi. What are these enormously gifted philosophers doing?

Addressing this question in full generality is beyond the compass of this work but I will deal with it in regard of Berkeley, a philosopher who very evidently constructs an all-encompassing metaphysical system on the basis of truths which are supposed to be known to be true with certainty.

Western philosophers of the 17th and 18th century were very conscious of the need for, and difficulties in the road of, securing as absolutely certain the first principles of reasoning and knowledge. The medieval synthesis had come apart at the seams, and many leading philosophers were consciously part of the movement which disparaged the Schoolmen, and discounted their account of the grounds and first principles of knowledge and science. Some very powerful considerations had been invoked against the Schoolmen, considerations which appeared to raise difficulties for anyone who proposed to establish first principles of knowledge. It seemed difficult to keep some of the critique within bounds.

Having discarded the scholastic grounding of knowledge and reasoning philosophers faced the perennial
problems of securing first principles. Any supposed truth about the world can be accepted on its own account or it can be accepted because it seems to follow from some other supposed truth, and that latter supposed truth can itself be taken to be true because it follows from another supposed truth and so on, but not so on ad infinitum. Human beings are not capable of following out an infinite number of propositions: systems of human knowledge or belief must be finite.

Any chain of propositions each of which is accepted because it follows from a preceding one (or ones) must stand on a proposition (or propositions) which is not held to be true on such grounds. Further, given the supposed truths one accepts, some of them may follow from other of them, but some do not: what one accepts includes certain first propositions which do not follow from others amongst the propositions one accepts. These first propositions cannot be the conclusion of a sound argument in which the premises are truths one accepts.

One response to this kind of consideration is to say that a first proposition is evidently not held for good reason, that the believer has no decisive rational ground for adopting it rather than some contrary proposition. But from this it follows that no self-consistent system of belief has, in the ultimate analysis, any greater claim to be adopted than any other self-consistent system, that there is no decisive reason to accept one rather than another. So-called reasons to accept or reject purported truths are internal to such systems, and cannot decide between them. These sorry
conclusions are one of the ancient forms of scepticism.

In the concrete, the challenge is to whatever first principles or propositions one wants to adopt. The requirement is to provide a ground for the first propositions one wants to put forward. And the philosophers of the 17th and 18th century were very conscious of this. They knew that there were serious philosophical questions here, even if they thought they had an answer to them, and were aware that the various species of scepticism were waiting like hungry lions in the wings.

Now, while there may be general principles whose obverse is simply unthinkable this does not appear to be the case with a great many truths about the particular states of affairs which obtain in the world. Science in the ordinary sense of the word - that is, what used to be called natural philosophy - seems to recognise truths which are merely contingent, truths about the actual physical arrangements in the world.

There were strong motives for philosophers of the 17th and 18th century to accept that there were such contingent truths about the world. First, it was generally believed that God created the world by an unfettered exercise of his will and could have created it differently if he had so chosen, both in regard of the particular physical arrangements in the world and in regard of the regularities which obtain in the course of nature. Indeed, it was widely held that both the physical arrangements and the laws of nature remain subject to God's will; that is to say, that God is competent to produce miracles of any extent by mere
Thus, the world could have been created, and still could be altered, to be otherwise than it now is.

Second, people were generally believed to have "free will". The orthodox view was that this is one of the prerequisites of moral responsibility and religion. Supposedly, people can choose to do one thing or the other. In consequence, voluntary actions and all their infinite chains of consequences could have been otherwise.

Third, many philosophers felt they were part of that general movement which was issuing in the new science of the day. Many announced that they were providing metaphysical foundations for all knowledge, especially the knowledge being obtained in the sciences. Some thought they were clearing pernicious errors out of the path of Science. Some believed they were amongst other things articulating what the method of the new sciences was and should be. And the thrust of the new science was towards going out and discovering the design God had settled upon, and away from the investigation of necessary natural truths which could be ascertained a priori. The philosopher who wanted to be a part of this movement had an interest in believing that this basic approach was correct.

Not all major philosophers of the period were moved to accept that there were contingent truths about the world, but many were.

But, of course, the philosopher who accepts that there are genuinely contingent facts about the world which are potentially the subject of everyday or scientific knowledge has to solve the problem of grounding first propositions in a particularly acute form. Given that the
contingent truths could have been otherwise, and thus do not follow deductively from necessary truths, how are they or any first propositions from which they follow, to be grounded; how can one have knowledge, as against mere opinion, concerning them.

The source of the problem is that thought is free. Thought is not restricted to the actual, to the way things are, but extends to the possible, the way things might be. How then in reasoning can the mind come to accept a proposition which if true is only contingent without having made an arbitrary move as to the starting point? How can human reason be non-arbitrarily constrained to end in a proposition which describes how things are, although they could be otherwise? How can one move to a conclusion which does not follow from any necessary proposition or propositions, at any remove, without at the base premising an unestablished truth, for which no ground is given?

In order that the reasoning yield the conclusion without an arbitrarily located starting point, in the case of securing a particular proposition, the mode of reasoning employed must be such that it is so constrained that it inevitably issues in affirming the proposition, given that the world is such that the proposition is true. And the mode of reasoning must also be such that if the world were such that the proposition were false, then it would inevitably not issue in affirming that proposition; otherwise the reasoning is "invalid" in that its issuing in an affirmation of the proposition in question is compatible with the proposition being false, which would mean that coming to affirm a proposition through this mode of reasoning could not be regarded as establishing its truth.
The conclusions which the mode of reasoning is constrained to must vary with variations in the world. Which way the world is in respects determinative of the truth of a proposition under consideration must be determinative of the character of the reasoning in such a manner that the concrete process of reasoning unavoidably ends in accepting the proposition in case where it is true, and does not end in accepting it in any case where it is false. The world must come into play in the reasoning. The states of affairs which obtain in the world must determine the course of the reasoning in the requisite way.

These are the formal requirements for any kind of reasoning which can reliably secure a certain class of truths about the world without pre-supposing or premising any starting point. The question is whether there is any such mode of reasoning.

Quite clearly the forms of reasoning of which modern logic takes notice, forms which proceed from one proposition to another, will not serve. And if nothing more satisfactory can be found then there will be no answer to the challenge of the thorough-going sceptic. One may not adopt the sceptical position, but one will be unable to refute it, and establish ones first principles in its place, without begging the question.

The philosophers of the 17th, 18th, and 19th century shaped up to the challenge of securing first propositions, and the conclusions of science and everyday knowledge, in a variety of interesting ways which I cannot survey here. I will confine myself to the response of Berkeley which is of the traditional Cartesian kind.
On a common modern paradigm of an argument, an argument is composed of a conclusion and of various premises from which the conclusion purports to follow, and perhaps some intervening argumentation. On this standard model the only way a proposition can be advanced in the course of an argument is if it is either introduced as a premise or purportedly inferred from a premise or premises. But if one introduces propositions only by way of premise or inference therefrom then a contingent proposition can be established as an absolutely certain truth only if it is posited as an absolutely certain premise or follows from a premise (or premises) itself (or themselves) posited as an absolutely certain truth. Either requires positing at least one contingent proposition as an absolutely certain premise. (This is one source of our qualms. We feel that one can't establish certain and contingent truths, we can't see how anyone could manage the strict non-question-begging demonstration needed.)

However there is a form of argument different from the form of argument so far mentioned, and which may be able to escape these considerations. In this form a proposition can be advanced without being posited as a premise and without being inferred from one. More specifically, if in an argument one specifies a procedure whereby the reader may ascertain some fact needed in the argument, specifies that the reader should employ the procedure, and then appeals to the result of him or her doing so, this may serve to introduce the fact into the argument. The specified procedure for ascertaining the fact plays more or less the role of premise vis-a-vis the fact. But this analogy ought not be over-
emphasized; the procedure is not a proposition, the relation between procedure and fact ascertained is not that between premise and conclusion, and the place of the procedure in the argument is not the same as that of a premise.

At the most general this form of argument involves the specification of some basis for ascertaining some particular fact then an appeal to the reader to find that on that basis they are yielded the fact: and it is clear that a fact brought in in this way is neither an ordinary premise nor yet inferred from one.

Naturally an argument may be a mixture of this latter form of argument and that form mentioned earlier - facts being established by means of a basis for ascertaining them, and those facts then being used in the argument in the normal course of deductive reasoning.

It is my contention that Berkeley uses arguments of this form to furnish himself with supposedly absolutely certain truths. Indeed I will attempt to show that most of the truths on which his system depends are derived in this way.

Some of the supposedly fundamental truths on which the system depends are obviously Cartesian in origin. It is in the Meditations that Descartes most clearly sets down that reasoning about first principles on which his system is founded and by which the basic Cartesian truths are provided. He performs a manoeuvre, or constructs an argument, known as the cogito. Through the cogito he is given as certainly existing all the "contents" of his mind, all conscious experience. What is given is the whole
of the "mind". It includes sensations, that is, that which is perceived "as it were by the senses". It also includes willing, imagining, doubting, and all acts of "understanding, will and imagination". It is not appropriate to call the things given in the cogito ideas since Berkeley uses the term in a different sense. I will term them cogitationes.

The cogito rests on the procedure of attending to one's own thoughts, one's own consciousness. This procedure can be characterized in several ways, for example as taking into account one's own conscious experience or as taking cognizance of the contents of one's own mind.

What is essential is the taking into consideration of what one is given in conscious experience.

Allegedly on considering one's own thoughts one finds that one is simply given things of the sorts described. Moreover, it is supposedly also evident upon this consideration of one's own thoughts that the things one is being given are given without possibility of mistake, one is incorrigably apprized of them. More, on Descartes' own theories his own application of the procedure is inaccessible to others, taking place as it does in his own mind.

Assuring themselves of the basic principles is something that readers must do for themselves by employing the Cartesian procedure. It has long been recognised that the reader only secures the Cartesian first principles in the Cartesian manner if he or she uses the reflections of the Meditations as a model to guide their own thoughts and thus themselves apply the procedure described. This is the basis on which the basic truths are to be known to be true by each person, the sole method by which true certainty can be attained.
It hardly needs to be remarked that when basic principles are brought to an argument by this method we have an argument of the second kind: the Meditations being a mix of it and the more conventional deductive reasoning.

I have already noted the influence of Descartes on British philosophy up to Berkeley's day. Those in the orthodox tradition accepted much of the basic Cartesian model of the world. Amongst other things they accepted most of the Cartesian model of the mental, at least in rough outline. They believed that one did have a direct experience of certain things, an experience which could in no wise be illusory, and that one was thus cognisant of the nature of these items — that is to say, one thus knew truths about them. On this basis they became rather free in employing alleged truths about the "contents" of our minds and about our mental processes. The basic presumption underlying their approach was that such truths could be ascertained in the Cartesian way.

This is the context in which they introduced truths about ideas and the "mental" into their reasonings. Sometimes an explicit appeal to each reader's conscious experience was made to ground the presumed truths. Often this was not bothered with, being so conventionally the underpinning of such truths that it did not have to be mentioned. Nevertheless the orthodox view was that the ultimate warrant of these "truths" was each person's direct acquaintance with their conscious experience.

Berkeley is squarely in this tradition, accepting that what is before the mind is given without the possibility of error after the Cartesian manner. And some of the facts on which his whole system depends are supposed to be known in
this way. "Ideas" are certainly a part of what is conventionally called the "contents" of the mind, and Berkeley takes it as a philosophical truism that one is acquainted fully and without the possibility of error with those ideas which one perceives. When he describes the way in which this occurs, it is clearly very akin to the Cartesian way; to quote,

"so long as I confined my thoughts to my own ideas, divested of words, I do not see how I can be easily mistaken. The objects I consider I clearly and adequately know ... there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding."³ (my italics)

As for spirits - one's own spirit is known, quite immediately and without error, through "reflex act", "inward feeling", or "a certain internal consciousness"; it is known by "a fair observation of what passes in my mind". Again this is clearly the standard sort of basis for ascertaining certain facts which we have been contemplating.

Now, in ascertaining something of the character of Berkeley's grounds for certain central truths we have drawn a comparison between the Cartesian and Berkeleyean systems in regard of the way in which that before the mind is known. At this point, in view of the similarity uncovered, a question quite naturally arises as to the exact relation of the Cartesian cogito to its Berkeleyean equivalent, especially in regard of the relation of "ideas" and "spirit" to the cogitationes. This question ought to be resolved in order to elaborate Berkeley's relation to his predecessors and throw further light on the character of the Berkeleyean equivalent of the cogito. Let us, therefore, pause and consider the question directly.
Although Descartes gave quite detailed descriptions of some of the cogitationes he was given, his descriptions are obviously not meant to be exhaustively definitive of cogitationes. He does not attempt to describe everything he is given or might be given - it seems clear that there are many cogitationes, and possible cogitationes, which he does not deal with - rather he provides a procedure to enable the reader to find and correctly identify his, or her, own cogitationes. The first few Meditations are a set of traveling instructions which, if understood and faithfully followed, eventually bring the traveller within sight of herds of the elusive cogitatione.

As noted, the instructions are to attend to, to take into account, what one is given in conscious experience, and the things so given are cogitationes. By definition, any thing which is, or can be, found in conscious experience is a cogitatione. By definition, any "thing" which is, or can be, known in the Cartesian manner is a cogitatione.

Berkeley several times says that he is acquainted with the ideas which he perceives, in this manner. Typical is, "upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being affected with variety of sensations ["ideas"]." On Descartes terminology such "ideas" are ipso facto cogitationes.

It is clear that anything which is an idea is a cogitatione, or part thereof. However, as is obvious, not everything which is a cogitatione is an idea. But what relation holds between the cogitationes which are not ideas and spirit and its operations?
Some of the things which Berkeley cites as features of spirit are cited by Descartes as part of that conscious experience given in the cogito. As noted, Berkeley mentions reasoning about ideas, imagining, willing, and thinking while Descartes mentions, willing, imagining, understanding, asserting and denying. More, as noted, Descartes includes in that one is given all one's "acts of understanding, will and imagination". For Berkeley such acts are operations of spirits, and part of their esse.

Further, consider how our spirits are known. For Berkeley one's spirit and its features are not inferred to but are known immediately by reflection or inward feeling, by one simply being conscious of one's own being, or by "a fair observation of what passes in my mind". To the same point section 21 of De Motu runs

There are two supreme classes of thing, body and soul. By the help of sense we know the extended thing ... but the sentient, percipient, thinking thing we know by a certain internal consciousness."

What is involved in Berkeley's reflex act is a direct consciousness of one's own spirit. On Berkeley's theories one's spirit and its operations are a part or aspect of that which one is given in the Cartesian manner. As such they are to be numbered amongst the cogitationes.

We have described what is involved in knowing truths after the Cartesian manner. In thus coming to secure propositions about the "mental" as absolutely certain truths there is a move from the actual state of affairs one is given to the certainty of the proposition about that state of affairs. Supposedly, all that is required for the reasoner to come to the truth of propositions like "I am angry",
"I am thinking about a dog", and so on is to understand clearly what the proposition means, what it asserts to be the case. Given that, it is impossible to be in error, since one is directly and incorrigably acquainted with the way things are in the pertinent respects. One accepts the proposition when it is true, and does not accept it when it is false.

And in coming to accept the proposition when true, the mind does not start with any pre-supposition or premise, rather the way the world is (in terms of the mind's error-free acquaintance with itself and the things before it, and the occurrence of the state of affairs described by the proposition) comes into play and determines that the mind will come to the conclusion that the proposition is true beyond question. Given the nature of the mind and the occurrence of the state of affairs, the reasoning, simple as it is, inherently issues in the truth in question. The truth is secured without the reasoning starting from any arbitrary starting point. As Husserl says, our coming to knowledge in this way is presuppositionless.

Thus the proposed Cartesian manner of securing basic truths with which one then reasons deductively would meet the formal requirements laid out earlier. And while an opponent, sceptic or other, can lay before the mind for its consideration propositions contrary to any first propositions which are advanced, he or she cannot lay a contrary experience before the mind, the experience which the mind has remains an error-free experience of the way the world is not the ways it might be. It is an experience of the actual, and is constrained by the way things are.
There is one point which deserves expansion. The Cartesian procedure is taking into account what one is immediately given in experience, and the outcome of employing the procedure is to be constrained to realise that a proposition under consideration is beyond all question true. From the evidence before the mind it is supposed to be evident beyond all doubt or question that the proposition is true. This process is supposed to be one where the mind has present to it sufficient grounds to rationally conclude that a certain proposition is correct.

But if it were open to the mind to believe it quite possible that the experience in question is to some degree illusory or corrigible then the application of the procedure would not invariably issue in the mind adopting the appropriate conclusion, for if the mind thought it possible that the pertinent experience was delusory it would not be compelled to accept that the relevant proposition was evidently true. It is essential that the mind be in a position to be assured not just that the world appears to be as the proposition says, but that it is as it says.

Now, from what we have so far said, the mind could be able to come to know that the pertinent experience was veridical, non-illusory, in any way available to it and on that basis be constrained to recognise the truth of certain propositions about the experienced. But, of course, so that the mind can come to know that its experience is veridical, in a way which itself escapes the strictures of the sceptics, it must be able to attain this knowing without relying on an arbitrary premise or presupposition. And whatever such way of coming to know that its experience is veridical could be
employed by the mind, the mind could not be rationally compelled to accept that its experience is veridical if it were open to it to think it possible that this way of knowing could issue in falsehood; the mind would have to be so constrained that upon considering the question it could not hold that the way of knowing employed might yield falsehood.

In general, when the process of knowing some proposition to be true consists in having to recognise that the proposition is truly evident on the evidence before the mind without reliance on premise or presupposition, then, if it considers the question, it must be evident to the mind that the process itself is invariably truth yielding, that it never yields falsehood.

But we do not need to pursue these matters in general, for the Cartesian approach they are resolved in a particular way.

Descartes believes that in addition to whatever experience we may have of physical things and states of affairs we have an immediate and direct acquaintance with our own minds and their "contents", we have an immediate experiencing of them. And what is experienced, what we have an immediate acquaintance with, includes all the mind's experiences, and thus includes the mind's experiencing of its contents. The mind's experiencing of the things before it is one of the things immediately experienced.

Indeed, the whole train of the Meditations presupposes that this is so. When Descartes makes his retreat to the sphere of immediate experience, relying on nothing but his own thoughts, he takes it for granted that he has an
immediate acquaintance both with all his mind's experience, and with the character of that experience. When he has retreated to depending on nothing but the mental he supposes he still possesses an immediate acquaintance with all the mind's experience and experiencing in that it is present to him in consciousness. And he simply appeals to the mind's knowledge of the character of experiencing as itself something which the mind is directly acquainted with in experience in order to secure knowledge of the things he experiences at that crucial point in the second Meditation where he concludes that the mind cannot be mistaken about, or mis-perceive, anything which is a part of its immediate experience.

It is beside my purpose to trace through the places where Descartes manifests this aspect of his thought, but I will briefly consider Berkeley's views on the matter.

In discussing physical things Berkeley stresses repeatedly the need for things to be known of in a reliable way. He attacks "Matter", which is supposed to be inferred from what is given in experience, on the grounds that such a substance could be absent and yet the pertinent experiences present. To quote but one statement of the point,

"if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose - what no one can deny possible - an intelligence, without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of Corporeal Substances, represented by his ideas, and existing them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing?"
However, one's own mental things and processes, and our knowledge of them, are so described as to escape these rather severe strictures. With spirit and its acts and operations there is not the slightest suggestion that any such thing of one's own is known by inference from what is experienced, this mode of apprehension being reserved for other spirits. Rather, one's own spiritual processes are immediately given. This is how we come to know of them.

But, of course, experiencing oneself, and one's mental processes, is itself one of the central activities of the mind; it is the act of reflection, or reflexion, the reflex act, an activity which Berkeley takes it we know of; and this activity is treated on a level with the other activities of the mind, there is no suggestion that it is known other than immediately along with the other activities of the mind. And as we have seen this activity of experiencing one's own acts and operations involves "inward feeling" or "a certain internal consciousness", it consists in "a fair observation of what passes in my mind". In the activity one is simply conscious of one's own being, and is provided with an immediate knowledge of one's own mind. We may conclude that all one's acts and operations of mind are supposed to be immediately given in reflection.

Again, one's spirit is an acting, it consists in its acts and operations. And the acts and operations which it consists in include the act of reflection, the reflex act, which act is what provides one's knowledge of the mind. But since one has a full acquaintance with the being of the mind, one has a full acquaintance with its acts and operations through the reflex act. What the mind experiences through the reflex act includes the reflex act - the reflex act is self-reflexive.
And, like all of the mind's immediate experience, the experience of the mind's experiencing of itself provides one with a full acquaintance with the character of the things experienced. One knows them through and through.

To recapitulate, for Descartes the experiencing of one's own mind encompasses all of the mind's experiencing, including its experiencing of all its experiencing. Thus one is fully apprized of the nature of all of the minds experiencing including the fact that all the experiencing (including the experiencing of all the experiencing) is incorrigible, that nothing can be before the mind in immediate experience and be mis-apprehended. Similarly, for Berkeley the act of reflexion gives a full acquaintance with the acts and operations of the mind, their existence, nature, and character. It is through this translucence to itself that the mind knows that the reflex act (as well as other acts) gives a full, immediate, and certain knowledge. The act is self-reflexive, what is experienced includes the act of experiencing both one's own experiencing and the other things before the mind.

So, the evidence before the mind prevents it being open to the mind to suppose that taking immediate experience into account is susceptible of being falsehood yielding. It is not open to the mind to call into question the incorrigibility of the mind's acquaintance with a thing or process before the mind. Nor is it open to it to call into question the basis on which it is not open to it to call into question the incorrigibility of the mind's acquaintance with a thing or process before the mind. Nor is it open to it to call into question the basis on which it is not open to it to call
into question the basis on which it is not open to it to call into question the incorrigibility of the minds acquaintance with a thing or process before the mind. And so on ad infinitum. And all because of the one piece of evidence, the fully self-reflexive experiencing, an experiencing which in being an experiencing of the things and processes before the mind is also an experiencing of itself in its entirety.

And, of course, this structure is necessary in order to stop the mind a whoring after strange infinities. If one did not have self-reflexiveness, so that what provided the evidence of the soundness of any act, the full acquaintance with the being of that act, was always another act, then the mind could only be presented with completely full and decisive grounds for accepting the soundness of experience through an infinite chain of acts each illumining the preceding one, that is, the mind could only be constrained to accept the veridical character of its experience without arbitrary starting point through an infinite self-differentiation.

If one holds to the view that there is always a difference between the thing experienced in any act and that act of experiencing, then an infinite chain of acts becomes unavoidable if the mind is to establish truths after the Cartesian manner without just taking for granted some unestablished truth, and one may feel inclined to follow the unfortunate Hegel some way along his path to an infinitely articulated and infinitely internally self-differentiated Spirit. But this reflection on the consequences of taking another path is essentially an aside.

The path which Berkeley took allows of the mind securing certain truths without taking an arbitrary starting point, without premising or presupposing any truth, so long as the mind can have and does have the character he supposes.
It is through the self-translucence of the mind that Berkeley is to be immediately and unmistakeably apprized of the nature of the mind, including its acts and operations, and the nature of ideas.

Grounds for the truth of various propositions about ideas are presented to the mind. Given what is presented those propositions are evident to the mind. This is how one knows that the esse of ideas is percipi, and that nothing can be like an idea but an idea.

Likewise, the mind is presented with the nature and being of its acts and operations - it is presented with its own being. Consequently, the truth of certain principles about those acts and operations, and about itself as a whole, is evident to the mind. This is the manner in which one knows what the esse of spirit is, and that nothing inactive can be an image or representation of a spirit. It is how one knows of various aspects of the acts and operations of the mind.

Now, each person is supposed to be apprized of the relevant aspects of the mind, and of that before it, on looking into his or her own thoughts. Each person can thus know that certain propositions about ideas and spirits, about the acts and operations of the mind, are true. As with the Cartesian cogito this procedure has to be gone through by each person their own account to secure the requisite truths.

It is up to each person to assess whether the mind has the character required for securing absolutely certain truths, and whether on applying the appropriate procedures they are yielded the requisite first principles. It is up to each person to determine whether the argument is efficacious in their case.
We come now to that thesis for which Berkeley is most famous, the thesis that the esse of physical things is percipi, and, concomitantly, that physical things are ideas. He holds that every ordinary physical thing is either an idea of sense or a set of ideas of sense. As immediately strikes even the casual reader he purports to establish this in many places.

Before we proceed to look at the arguments in any detail it will be wise to note their logical type. I have discussed at some length that sort of argument which at least in part depends upon the employment of some procedure for ascertaining some fact or facts. Most of Berkeley's arguments that physical things are ideas of sense are of this type. Many of them turn on an appeal to the reader to find by reflecting on their own thoughts that some central part of the argument is warranted.

The fact which the procedure is designed to ascertain is part of the substance of the argument although it is neither simply taken to be true nor inferred from a premise or premises. What plays more or less the role of a premise viz-a-viz that fact is the specified procedure for ascertaining it, but the procedure plays the role only in being employed; indeed, strictly speaking, what plays the role of a premise is the act of employing it.

Berkeley sometimes advances arguments for the identity of physical things and ideas of sense which consist only in moves from premises to conclusion. But
when he does so some of his premises are such as to be bitterly contested by philosophical opponents. These controversial premises are themselves argued for but the arguments for them ultimately depend on the application of a specified procedure for ascertaining certain facts: and it is on the arguments for them that Berkeley's proofs stand or fall.

The profusion of argument for the esse of physical things being percipi makes a systematic treatment difficult, and my arrangement of the material must be somewhat arbitrary. In regard of the genuine arguments I will take the arguments found in the Principles (which are sometimes also found elsewhere) first; and then consider the arguments found elsewhere.

But before I proceed to the genuine arguments I will deal with what on a cursory reading can appear to be arguments in which Berkeley attempts to prove his thesis from the philosophical premises of his potential opponents but which in fact are not.

Let us consider first an argument which people sometimes attribute to him but which he does not in fact advance. This argument is sometimes thought to be stated in sections 14 and 15 of the Principles. Berkeley writes, "after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever". He then takes the well known arguments that apparent variation in the secondary qualities means that there can be no secondary quality "out there" in the world which our sensation is like and applies them mutatis
mutandis to the primary qualities. He concludes that

"In short, let anyone consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colors and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure and motion".1 (My italics)

However in the very next sentence he admits that those arguments which are thought to prove secondary properties to be in the mind prove nothing of the sort, so that though they may prove the same thing of primary qualities "with equal force" that is no force at all. To quote,

"Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or color in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or color of the object."2

He is quite clear that proof "after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind" is unsound: in his opinion "this method of arguing" does not show what its proponents have supposed it does.

The material in sections 14 and 15, which by some oversight a few people have supposed an argument for all qualities including the primary being "in the mind", bears on the status of the argument in section 10 of the Principles. Section 10 runs, in part,

"10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such-like secondary qualities do not; which they tell us are sensations, existing in the mind alone ... This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception."
Now, if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect, and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame the idea of a body extended and moving but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality, which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In sort, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.”

At first glance the argument seems quite simple and straightforward: take on the one hand a demonstrable truth that all secondary qualities are in the mind, which ones opponents must on their own premises admit, and on the other a procedure which shows that it is impossible that primary qualities occur separately from these secondary qualities, and the conclusion that they are all in the mind follows immediately - a simple and decisive proof if valid.

However, on a close reading, Berkeley does not say that the supposed truth that secondary qualities are in the mind is "an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception" what he says is that "they take it for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception". Now it could be that this difference in sense is irrelevant to his reasoning at this point and that it is a mere rhetorical device: it could be that Berkeley tacitly assumes that the supposed truth is an undoubted truth which they "who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances" can demonstrate beyond all exception. If
there were no further considerations this would probably be the natural interpretation. But while Berkeley evidently thinks it an undoubted truth that secondary qualities exist only in the mind, and thinks that he can demonstrate it beyond exception, he doesn't think that the opponents in question can. One of their problems is that they don't have a clear apprehension of the sort of considerations which make it an undoubted truth.

To recall Berkeley's own words in sections 14 and 15, proof "after the same manner" as the "modern philosophers" purport to demonstrate the mind dependence of secondary qualities is unsound - and again these unsound arguments of the modern philosophers viz-a-viz colors and tastes are "those arguments which are "thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind". The method of argument being disparaged is that of Berkeley's orthodox predecessors and contemporaries in their arguments from the apparent variation of our perceptions of secondary qualities, that method which is employed in those arguments which are "thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind". Now in section 10 those who are said to take it that the mind dependence of secondary qualities is an undoubted truth which they can demonstrate beyond all exception are "They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances". The question is are these people to be identified with the "modern philosophers" of whom Berkeley speaks in section 14 (and the arguments of whom he considers
And are the demonstrations by these people of the mind dependence of secondary qualities which Berkeley invokes in section 10 to be identified with those arguments he states to be unsound in section 15.

There are a number of reasons for supposing so. The "modern philosophers" would be a fairly apt description of those picked out by the descriptions in the first sentence of section 10 who are the people who are said to take it that the mind dependence of secondary qualities is an undoubted truth which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. And Berkeley asserts that proof "after the same manner" as that of the modern philosophers is unsound.

Again, as we have seen, Berkeley believed that the then currently accepted arguments for the mind dependence of colors and tastes were unsound, that the standard demonstrations of the time did not follow. And in section 9 the doctrine that the primary qualities but not the secondary qualities exist without the mind is ascribed to all those who make a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. But those who make a distinction between primary and secondary qualities are, or include, the members of most of the significant philosophical schools of Berkeley's day, they include those in the orthodox British and more narrowly Cartesian traditions. So Berkeley would place the members of most of the significant philosophical schools of his day amongst those who say that primary qualities exist without the mind in unthinking substances, and of whom he says in section 10 that they take the mind dependence of secondary qualities as a truth they can
demonstrate beyond exception. Since he believes that the then currently accepted arguments, the standard arguments, for the mind dependence of secondary qualities are unsound, Berkeley believes that the members of philosophical schools of his day cannot demonstrate this supposed truth beyond all exception. That is to say, "they who assert that ... the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances" cannot demonstrate the mind dependence of secondary qualities beyond all exception.

All this casts the argument in a new light. We see that there is a significance to Berkeley saying "This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception" rather than "This is an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception", the former expresses his opinion where the latter would not. What the believer in Matter (in the relevant sense of the term) is presented with is not a move from a supposition which must be admitted by any Materialist to the Berkeleyan position, for Berkeley is quite clear that the supposition is arrived at by his Materialist predecessors and contemporaries through error in argument, rather what they are presented with is a dilemma, an apparent demonstration that if he/she adheres to the very orthodox (if unsoundly proved) doctrine that secondary qualities are all "in the mind" then it follows that primary qualities are there too. They must either be an immaterialist or hold that none of the qualities either primary or secondary are mind dependent. If the Materialist takes the argument as in itself a refutation of the doctrine that primary qualities exist without the mind in unthinking substances they do so through philosophical error, or so Berkeley would suppose.
The Arguments of the Principles

In my opinion there are two major problems in trying to understand the arguments in the Principles that the esse of physical things is percipi.

First, it is not at all clear why Berkeley should take it that his arguments depend in a quite crucial way on the truth of his anti-abstractionist tenets, and why he brings those tenets in as explicit premises at one point. But it is evident that he believes that anti-abstractionism is a premise required in his overall argument for the esse of physical things being percipi, that anti-abstractionism is one of the grounds on which this conclusion is based. If we cannot see how the anti-abstractionism is supposed to be a ground for the conclusion then we do not understand the overall argument. We may understand parts of it but we do not understand the whole.

When we go to section 5 where the anti-abstractionism is expressly employed in the argument we find that one thing which supposedly ensures that one cannot conceive of any "sensible thing" distinct from the sensation of it is the impossibility of abstraction. It is implied that conceiving of "sensible things" occurring unperceived must involve abstracting ideas "so as to conceive sensible objects existing unperceived", and that it is impossible to conceive of unperceived sensible things because of the impossibility of abstracting ideas. Again, in section 6 it is said that
attributing to any part of "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the might frame of the world" an existence independent of a spirit involves "all the absurdity of abstraction".

Now, there are many arguments in the Principles in which the inconceivability of unperceived physical or "sensible" things is just asserted as self evident, or is said to be secured merely by some inspection of one's own mental processes. But we have seen that Berkeley thinks that the inconceivability of unperceived physical things depends on, amongst other things, the impossibility of abstraction. In this way the anti-abstractionist thesis underlies and supports the arguments just mentioned. If we do not see how the anti-abstractionist thesis is supposed to support the inconceivability of unperceived physical things we fail to follow one way in which Berkeley thought that the inconceivability of unperceived physical things, that point on which many of his major arguments turn, is secured.

Second, on any standard view there are difficulties making sense of the argument in section 22, 23 and 24 of the Principles. This argument is obviously meant as a major and decisive one, perhaps as the central argument in the Principles, and it is also given prominence in the Dialogues.

In the Principles, it is the crowning piece of the first 24 sections; which sections form a concentrated and systematic treatment of the nature of physical things and the doctrines prevalent about that nature, after which the
Principles turn for a while to other matters. The first eight sections mainly address the positive thesis on the nature of physical things, sections 9 to 21 mainly address alternative doctrines, criticising and refuting them, and commending the Berkeleyan analysis as the obvious and unavoidable alternative. Sections 22 to 24 are set off by spaces from the rest of the text, and are intended to provide a final knock-down argument.

At the beginning of section 22 Berkeley disparages his own prolixity on a matter that can be "demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two" in an "easy trial", and declares that he is willing to rest his whole case on this trial, and will give up the entire cause unless he thereby carries the day. He then puts the question to the test in the rest of sections 22, 23 and 24.

The argument is also given great prominence in the Dialogues, and plays a central role there.

Yet despite its obvious importance many readers have been unable to find the argument so much as intelligible - and not without reason. On an initial reading the apparent steps of the reasoning seem so unconnected one with another that it is difficult to understand how and in what way Berkeley could have imagined that each followed from those preceding.

However, it is obvious on reading any of his works that Berkeley generally speaking writes and thinks clearly and that he has quite acute logical powers. Thus it is worrying to suppose that he committed a series of rank fallacies in a proof on which he placed great weight and to which he gave considerable attention. It would be more satisfactory to have an interpretation on which this was not the case.
I have sketched two problems which it would be desirable to resolve. Possibly they cannot be resolved. Perhaps we cannot tell how anti-abstractionism is supposed to buttress the doctrine on the esse of physical things, and if Berkeley had anything in mind on this question it went to the grave with him. Again, it is possible that Berkeley has simply committed several rank and obvious fallacies in sections 22 and 23, for even a person of quite acute logical powers may do so on occasion even in an argument which they take care over. But we ought to seek for an interpretation on which the role of anti-abstractionism is clear and on which the argument in sections 22, 23 and 24 is something more than a string of obvious fallacies—and if any plausible interpretation does both these things, that is a considerable reason for thinking it correct.

II

One of the striking features of the Principles is the number of times Berkeley purports to establish that the esse of physical things is percipi. However like most readers I am uneasy at the arguments. Most of them rely upon the employment of some procedure for finding out, or checking up on, some central fact, and there is commonly an appeal for the reader to employ that procedure.

For instance, in the initial onslaught in sections 3 to 8 we are told that we can secure or check on various crucial facts if we "attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things", "merely open our eyes", "reflect and try to separate in our own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived", and "look never so little into our thoughts".
Unfortunately, like most people, I do not find that upon the employment of such procedures I ascertain the requisite facts. The consequent problems are considerable. It is not just that the arguments don't seem valid to me, in an important sense I do not understand what the arguments are.

This requires expansion. One famous kind of argument in which some fact is to be secured by the employment of some specified procedure is the Cartesian kind in which some fact is ascertained by going to some feature or aspect of the mind, or of that before it, which is such that on the basis of ones direct apprehension of it one can see that the fact in question is the case. Berkeley of course is using this Cartesian kind of argument in the first eight sections of the Principles. The problem for the interpreter of such arguments is as follows. The state of affairs which is to be taken into account to secure the fact is, as it were, already accessible to the reader. The procedure is to pay attention to, or notice the pertinence of, some particular state of affairs present to the mind, and to thus see that a certain truth is indeed true. So, one thing required of the procedure is that it draw ones attention to, be a gesture towards, some feature or aspect of the mind or of that before the mind. It must be, amongst other things, a pointing towards something which is, as it were, in ones field of view. More, the act of attending to ones mind is so simple that no difficulty can arise in it, and once you have had your attention drawn to something in or before the mind you know about that something more clearly and fully than mere
words could ever convey. Once enough has been said to distinguish the feature or aspect relied on from the other features or aspects of the mind, or of that before the mind, there is little point in describing it further, since, having had it picked out, one is fully acquainted with it in its entirety.

In consequence people in the Cartesian tradition tend to produce arguments in which some feature or aspect of the mind is to be attended to in order to simply evidence some truth but in which no detailed description is given of what sort of feature or aspect the reader is supposed to be attending to. In doing this they may tell the reader merely to attend to their own thoughts, or they may specify the circumstances in which the state of affairs to be attended to occurs, or they may describe it to some limited extent.

But when the interpreter is faced with such an argument and does not find that upon the application of the procedure they are given some aspect or feature of the mind which shows that the fact to be ascertained is so, it is often not clear what the writer was supposing would be picked out for our attention by the application of the procedure. And this is what happens in sections 3 to 8 of the Principles. We wonder what feature or aspect of the mind, or of that before the mind, was supposed to be there to come into play on the employment of the specified procedures. In each case it is not clear what presumed feature or aspect of the mind, or of that before it, from which the fact in question is meant to be evident. Berkeley intends to rely on.
Similarly, although in a number of other places in the Principles and the Dialogue he advances arguments for the esse of physical things being percipi which depend for some central fact on a procedure which draws the users attention to some feature or aspect of the mind which shows that this central fact is true, I do not find that these procedures yield me any features or aspects of the mind which show that the fact is the case. And generally speaking it is difficult to tell exactly what feature or aspect of the mind which was to show that the fact in question was the case, I was supposed to come across via the procedure. And unless we can determine what features or aspects were supposed to be encountered and prove decisive there is an important sense in which we will never understand how the argument was supposed to go.

In fact, as we shall see, more or less the same feature of the mind is being relied on in many instances where Berkeley appeals to that in or before the mind. More or less by chance it is possible to work out what this feature is and, consequently, how the various arguments involved are supposed to go. To work this out it is convenient to start with the argument in sections 22, 23 and 24 of the Principles. It needs to be read very closely, taking each part in context, so I will quote it at length.
"to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue: - If you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause...

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining, or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not show that you can conceive it possible that the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of; which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, itself. A little attention will discover to anyone the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.

24. It is very obvious upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction."
There is no doubt that the supposed truth that the notion of an unperceived physical thing is either a contradiction or completely empty is meant to be secured by each reader upon a survey of his or her own mind and its operations. The matter in section 23 on the details of the workings of the mind is to be confirmed by each reader upon an inspection of their own mental processes, and serves to guide that inspection by drawing attention to certain features of those processes.

In section 22 Berkeley asserts that an unperceived physical thing is a contradiction, and that one can see it is a contradiction upon trying to think of any particular physical thing existing unperceived. He lays down a challenge to the reader to conceive even one physical thing existing unperceived. The obvious counter-move is to meet the challenge directly and to try to conceive of a particular physical thing which is not being perceived. The first sentence of section 23 seems to set out that counter-move in a straightforward way. Berkeley picks on the example of "trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet" but nothing turns on which particular things are taken as an example, what is important is that one imagine them with "nobody by to perceive them". In the rest of the section Berkeley deals with this seeming counter-example and purports to re-demonstrate that one cannot conceive of an unperceived physical thing. In doing so he talks about things immediately perceived, and about the operations of the mind, invoking the sort of fact
which a Cartesian would suppose immediately given to the reader. The argument has the form of leading the reader through an examination of certain of their thought processes, and what is and is not involved in them and implied by them.

One strategy Berkeley employs is to elaborate his description of the act of mind described in the first sentence of section 23 in order to show that in fact it does not and cannot constitute conceiving of an unperceived physical thing. He also provides an analysis of what act of mind would constitute conceiving of an unperceived physical thing, as against the act described in the first sentence of section 23, and purports to show that such an act would involve a manifest repugnancy.

But at every point puzzles arise. Let us first examine his elaboration of what is involved in imagining "trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them". He writes,

"what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This ... only shews you have the power of imagining, or forming ideas in your mind".

When we go further down the argument we find another passage which seems to bear on what is involved in simply imagining physical things "and nobody by to perceive them". The passage runs,
"When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, itself."6

On a preliminary survey it is difficult to understand these passages. Obviously some definite view of what goes on in the mind when one conceives of some particular physical thing with nobody by to perceive it is at play here, but by themselves the passages are conspicuously uninformative as to what it is. However, we know Berkeley's general theory of how physical things are thought about (whether or not they are imagined with "nobody by to perceive them"). We know that they are represented to oneself by ideas of ones own summoning. In some respects the passages start to make a little sense when this is taken into consideration. On Berkeley's theory of conception conceiving of some physical thing does involve "framing in your mind certain ideas" in order to think of the thing and we are "all the while" "contemplating our own ideas" when we conceive of some physical thing. And given the theory the fact that one frames such ideas would show that "you have the power of imagining, or forming ideas in your mind".

But while the supposition that the descriptions in section 23 of what is involved in various acts of conceiving of physical things are evidencing Berkeley's general theory of how things are conceived, would make the passages more comprehensible in one way it would throw up new questions in another. In the passages quoted the ideas which one "frames" and "contemplates" in the course of conceiving of certain physical things are, by implication, identified with the things themselves. The ideas framed in
conceiving of the trees and books are ideas "which you call books and trees". In like manner, when the mind does its "utmost to conceive" of an unperceived physical thing it is "all the while only contemplating its own ideas". Nevertheless when it is "deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or without the mind" those bodies are "at the same time ... apprehended, or exist in", the mind itself.

However we have seen that Berkeley does sometimes speak in this fashion, taking the idea summoned up by the mind to be the same idea as that laid on finite minds by God in certain circumstances; although this is the most extended instance we have seen in the published work. We must remember he is clear that an idea exists as an idea of sense when it occurs not subject to the will of finite spirits and that an idea occurs as an idea of the imagination when it is subject to the will of the finite spirit which perceives it, so that even when the idea used to conceive an idea of sense is the same idea as the idea of sense itself, it is not thereby occurring qua idea of sense.

Now, where a fairly well articulated account of some matter is manifest at several places in a text, then unless there is evidence to the contrary we should take it the writer is being consistent, and holds to that account of the matter throughout the text. And when the writer touches on that matter we should take it that at that point he or she still accepts the account of it.

Accordingly, the appropriate procedure is to interpret what Berkeley says in section 23 on the supposition that the view of what goes on in the mind when one conceives
some particular physical thing, which is at play in that section, is in accord with the general theory of conception which Berkeley displays at other points.

Insofar as Berkeley's general theory of conception is evidencing itself in section 23, then the physical thing conceived, and the idea one summons to mind to represent the physical thing, are being treated as the same thing in quite different circumstances and settings.

I propose to read the text on the hypothesis that it is the general theory of conception at work in section 23. This will give us the opportunity to subject the hypothesis to a number of checks.

The first check on the hypothesis is to see how section 23 reads upon the supposition in question. We have noted that prior to explication the argument seems rankly fallacious. And, substance aside, there are a number of apparent peculiarities and incongruities of expression in it. The more the supposition we have accepted allows us to make sense of the argument in both substance and expression the greater the justification for accepting it.

Naturally the same sort of considerations apply to the equivalent argument in the Dialogues. There are peculiarities and anomalies of substance and expression analogous to those in sections 22, 23 and 24. The second test of the hypothesis requires us to consider this argument in the Dialogues, to construe the remarks in it about ideas
formed in the mind on conceiving of physical things in the same way as we construe equivalent remarks in section 23 (that is, in line with the supposition that we have accepted), and to see if we can make sense of the overall argument on that basis. The more the hypothesis allows us to make sense of this piece of argument the greater the warrant for it. (A subsidiary criterion here is that our interpretation of the whole of the argument in the Dialogues ought to leave it fundamentally the same as the one in the Principles. It would be perturbing if it did not, since, as we shall observe, the wording and movement of the argument in the Dialogues is so similar to that in sections 22, 23 and 24 it seems that essentially the same argument is being advanced in both places.)

Once we have come to an overall interpretation of the argument in sections 22, 23 and 24, and in the corresponding passages of the Dialogues, on the basis of the hypothesis we can submit that overall interpretation to several tests. (And since the hypothesis is an integral part of the overall interpretation it is tested at the same time.) First, if the overall interpretation of the argument shows how it is that Berkeley's anti-abstractionism underpins the arguments that unperceived physical things are inconceivable, or a contradiction, this is a reason for thinking it correct. Second, if the argument as interpreted fits in well with Berkeley's other arguments that the esse of physical things is perci, and with the rest of his system, that is a reason for thinking the interpretation correct.
Let us now proceed to examine the arguments in section 23 on the basis of the hypothesis that Berkeley is invoking his theory of conception. We will come to an interpretation of the overall argument and see how many of the peculiarities of argument and expression are made sense of on this approach.

Quite a number of writers have noted the strange way in which Berkeley seems to run together conceiving of an idea and perceiving that idea in the course of his reasoning in section 23; so that in the course of the "proof" therein the issue seems in the end to turn on the question of whether one can think of a thing which is unthought of, and indeed the "proof" seems to end up as a proof that one cannot conceive of a thing which is out of the mind in the sense of being unconceived. Some have said that Berkeley is simply relying on things which are conceived of being "in the mind", being "objects of thought" or "objects of experience", in the trivial sense of being what the mind thinks about. However it may be true that in some sense one cannot conceive of a thing which is unconceived but this of itself can be of little use to Berkeley in point of showing that a merely unperceived physical thing cannot be conceived of, let alone that it is a contradiction.

We can now deal with this matter quite easily, on coming to the text. Section 23 begins -

"But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may
so, there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shews you have the power of imagining, or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind."  

In this piece of text Berkeley describes an act of mind which can be performed, and then examines what is and is not involved in that act, and, concomittantly, what is and is not shown by it. The running together of conceiving of and perceiving a physical thing is present even at this initial stage of the argument. Speaking of what is involved in thinking of certain physical things Berkeley says "do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while". This conflation is bewildering on ones initial reading of the passage. Again, in Berkeley's own words, on merely conceiving of books and trees one has before ones own mind (one perceives) "certain ideas which you call books and trees". This proposition is inexplicable on a conventional rendering of the passage.

But on the interpretation, the hypothesis, that we have provisionally accepted we know in what sense and in what way Berkeley is here running together perceiving a physical thing and conceiving of it. In unpacking the act of mind at issue he is drawing attention to the supposed fact that in conceiving of physical things one is framing certain ideas, which of course one perceives, and one is supposing that they, the ideas one is framing and perceiving, exist "out there" in such and such circumstances. On this interpretation it is
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natural for him to speak as he does and characterise the
ideas perceived in the act of conception in question as
"certain ideas which you call books and trees", and to remark
that when one imagines trees or books one perceives or thinks
of them all the while.
Not only does reading the passage in this way allow
us to understand the identification of what is perceived in
conception with what is conceived, it accounts for a point
we have not yet considered.

Berkeley chooses to assert that

thinking of some physical things as occurring with "nobody
by to perceive them" is no more than framing the ideas or
representations of these things "and omitting to frame the
idea of any one who may perceive them".

But why would he

suggest that the act of conceiving of physical things
as occurring with nobody by to perceive them consists in part
in the act of omitting to frame the idea of any one who may
perceive them?
On our reading it is Berkeley's theory of
conception which is at play in the passage under
consideration.

The mental process being described is that

of conceiving a particular kind of physical situation.
On our account of Berkeley's theory of conception any
physical situation is thought on only by means of an idea
of it, an image of it:

conceiving of some physical scene

involves picturing it in a quite literal sense.

If one

thinks of a number of physical things as occurring in some
particular physical arrangement or physical circumstance


one employs an image of them as in such an arrangement or circumstance. That is part of what it is to think of such a physical situation. In particular in thinking of some physical things as existing with "nobody by to perceive them" one must employ an image, a mental picture, of the situation as being one in which there are no people, it must be an image of the things existing "in a solitary place" (which is the wording used in the equivalent argumentation in the Dialogues where Hylas conceives of a thing as existing "in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it"). The image must be one of a setting where no person is in a position, "is by", to perceive the physical things; they must be imagined as out of sight, out of hearing, and so on. It is an important feature of the ideas which are employed to think of the books and trees in the circumstances in question that they are images of books "in a closet" (presumably closed) and trees "in a park" (presumably deserted). We see why Berkeley might say that representing the situation to oneself consists in both framing the ideas which represent the things thought of and "omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them". And unless we invoke the model of conception it is not clear why he would say this.

Prior to analysis the next stage of the argument seems a little peculiar. To quote the pertinent text -
"This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of; which is a manifest repugnancy."}

So, what one is given in conceiving of physical things "and nobody by to perceive them" is "nothing to the purpose"; and the propositions after the colon in the first sentence seem to serve as the reason why it is nothing to the purpose. The movement of the argument seems to be that it is nothing to the purpose because what one is given shows that one has the power of imagination but does not show "that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind". Showing that "you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind" is taken as what would be "to the purpose"; and the purpose in question is to show that one can conceive of an unperceived physical thing.

Now, in the two sentences quoted, Berkeley does not actually say that "to conceive it possible that the objects of your thought may exist without the mind" is to "conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of". What he says is that in order to make it out that you can conceive it possible that they exist "without the mind" it is necessary to conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of. On this wording he does not necessarily identify conceiving of the objects of thought as existing without the mind (i.e. unperceived) with conceiving them to exist unconceived or unthought of, although clearly some intimate connection
between the two is being supposed.

Given the interpretation we have provisionally accepted we can work out what connection is being supposed and how the argument in the two sentences is supposed to work. The two sentences under discussion have the form of a reductio. It is said that in order to hold that an unperceived thing is conceivable you must conceive it as unconceived or unthought of, an obvious manifest repugnancy. The problem is, it is not clear how this follows.

We have taken it that in section 23 Berkeley's position is that conceiving of a physical thing occurring in certain circumstances is no more than taking a certain idea and supposing its occurrence in those circumstances independent of the will of finite spirits. But to think of a thing in this manner is to think of a thing which necessarily is perceived, for (on the most basic Cartesian premises) any idea is necessarily perceived and to conceive of any idea occurring in certain circumstances is to conceive of something which is necessarily perceived even in those circumstances. Any thing which is unperceived cannot be a thing represented to oneself in the manner described, for representing a thing to oneself in this manner is to have a thought about such and such an idea occurring imposed on finite spirits independent of their wills; that is to say, any thought framed in this manner is always the thought of an idea, albeit an idea which may be occurring in very special, important, or complicated circumstances. Thus to suppose a physical thing existing
unperceived one must suppose it not to be represented to
oneself in the manner in question, but (given Berkeley's
model of conception) this is to suppose it as "unconceived
or unthought of" since physical things are in fact conceived
"by way of idea". And this is just the manifest repugnancy,
not to say contradiction, which Berkeley says must arise if we
suppose an unperceived physical thing. Thus we see how Berkeley
holds that in order to conceive of an unperceived physical thing
one must conceive it as "existing unconceived or unthought
of", and we see what features of the mind are meant to make
this evident.

As to why he moves straight from a description of
what the operation of the mind is in conceiving of physical
things to what may seem to us the somewhat removed conclusion
that conceiving of an unperceived physical thing involves the
aforesaid manifest repugnancy, we must remember that in
regard of our knowledge of our minds and their operations
Berkeley is unswervingly Cartesian. He takes it for granted
that each of us is directly acquainted with all the workings
of our mind. Further, he takes the supposed fact that
percipi is part of the esse of the ideas which one uses to
think of physical things as an intuitively obvious truth
known to one on a mere contemplation of ones own mental
processes. Thus he takes it that when contemplating the
pertinent mental operation every person will find it an
intuitively obvious truth that an unperceived thing is not
an idea of any kind or in any circumstances; and that we must
suppose that such a thing is not conceived of or thought on in
the manner in which we know all physical things are conceived of; so that if an unperceived thing were a physical thing which we were thinking of it would have to be acknowledged to be unconceived or unthought of; which may well be called a manifest repugnancy. From Berkeley's point of view one merely has to turn the mind's attention to the operation of conceiving of a physical thing and the conclusion that the thing conceived must be perceived is self-evident. It is little wonder that he repeatedly says that the mind-dependence of physical things is one of the most evident of truths and one which, if looked at in the right light, may be secured with the littlest of pains.

The context in which the two sentences are placed is eminently suited for bringing the reader, in the manner suggested, to the conclusion that an unperceived physical thing is a contradiction. The sentences immediately before the two under present discussion explicitly discuss the act of conceiving of physical things, particularly those features of the act which guarantee that the esse of the thing conceived includes percipi - focussing the reader's attention on those features. Moreover, Berkeley keeps the reader's attention upon the act of mind in question even after the two sentences, for he proceeds to say more about what is involved in attempting to conceive of unperceived physical things, and what is involved is the mind being "deluded to think" it can do so - which serves to remind the reader of the pertinent phenomena. The remarks in question follow
hard on the last quoted sentence and are in the natural place for matter which supports and elaborates the conclusion that the manifest repugnancy noted arises on supposing an unperceived physical thing.

Let us take the argument we have just extracted from the first half of section 23 to the rest of the section. To quote the sentences immediately following the last quoted -

"When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said." 9

On the interpretation provisionally accepted this makes perfect sense. When we try to think about a physical thing we are "all the while only contemplating our own ideas" in the way indicated. Although the mind may believe it can conceive an unperceived physical thing the very things conceived are "at the same time ... apprehended by, or exist in, itself" in the sense described. And this last "fact" is presented as a reason why the mind cannot conceive an unperceived physical thing. (Berkeley is again presuming it self-evident that the things immediately given in experience cannot exist unexperienced). The argument is roughly the same as that we have extracted from the passage preceding.

Berkeley describes in passing what the mind is doing when it is deluded to think that it conceive an
unperceived physical thing, it is "taking no notice of itself". On our interpretation there is an obvious sense in which this is true. In supposing that an "object of thought" which it is perceiving can exist unperceived in the circumstances it specifies, the mind overlooks its own relation to this "object", for if it did not overlook it the mind would see that being perceived was essential to the thing which it was trying to think of as occurring unperceived as a physical thing.

On the basis of the interpretation, the hypothesis, accepted we have come to an overall interpretation of section 23 on which the argument in it is a coherent and interesting one rather than a series of obvious blunders, and on which we make sense of the apparent perversities of expression. This is a reason to accept both the overall interpretation of the argument and the hypothesis we have previously adopted, since that hypothesis is a major and integral part of the overall interpretation.

III

There is a piece of the Dialogues which on first glance seems to repeat the argument of sections 22, 23 and 24. The argument there is more compressed than in the Principles and is differently arranged. Never the less it is obvious that the analysis developed for the argument in the Principles will get some sort of a grip on it.
However it appears to me that the way the argument is put in the Dialogues does reinforce one particular sort of already mentioned temptation to misread the argument. In both the Principles and the Dialogues Berkeley runs together conceiving of some physical thing and perceiving it. One response already noted is to conclude that he does not distinguish them at all, and that the argument in question amounts merely to an attempt to prove that the notion of an unconceived thing involves a contradiction. Unfortunately, the temptation to jump to this conclusion is much stronger in the case of the text in the Dialogues than in the case of sections 22, 23 and 24, for it is easy to read the lines I am about to quote without full regard to their context. Hylas has claimed that he is actually conceiving a house and a tree existing "independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever". The dialogue proceeds,

"Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. The tree or the house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?
Hyl. How should it be otherwise?" 10

If one suspects that Berkeley is conflating conceiving of a physical thing and perceiving it, that he is taking it that in both cases the thing is an "object of experience" and is, in his own terms, "in the mind", then one might naturally take it that in the lines quoted he is proving, or trying to prove, that the house and tree
which Hylas claims to be able to think of as without the mind are "in the mind", are "objects of experience, and that consequently the lines quoted are the guts of the whole argument. The problem with this reading is that it is quite incompatible with the overall development of the argument. At no stage is the argumentation just quoted taken by either protagonist as a demonstration that unperceived physical things are impossible: and if we look at the overall argument it is clear that the quoted piece of text plays a different role. The overall argument runs -

"But ... I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

Hyl. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

Hyl. No, that were a contradiction.

Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?

Hyl. How should it be otherwise?

Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

Hyl. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it. - It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, me thought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them existing out of the minds of all spirits.

Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot
possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind?
Hyl. I do."11

Clearly the role the bit of dialogue previously quoted actually plays in the argument is to provide the premise that what one thinks of one conceives, thus allowing the principle that whatever is conceived is in the mind to come into play.

As in the Principles the argument proceeds by an examination of what is involved in the act of conceiving of physical things, in particular the act of conceiving of them as existing "in a solitary place" ("with nobody by to perceive them"). On considering his act of mind Hylas is led to agree that the things he is thinking of are ipso facto conceived by him and are consequently "in the mind". The conclusion that in consequence the physical things cannot be conceived as existing "independent and out of all minds" is immediately drawn by Philonous. Hylas concedes the point, and elaborates on what he is and is not given in the act of conceiving of a physical thing in a solitary place, and on why and in what way the act doesn't and couldn't amount to conceiving of an unperceived physical thing.

Let us consider the train of the argument. Having averred that he is actually conceiving of several physical things as occurring unperceived Hylas is led through a review of what is involved in the act of mind he is actually performing. He agrees that what he is thinking of is conceived by him. Philonous asks whether it is true that
what is conceived is in the mind. Hylas agrees that it is. Philonous immediately brings this "fact" as an objection to Hylas's claim that he is conceiving several physical things as unperceived. Hylas immediately concedes the claim is mistaken. Apparently when Hylas is contemplating the act of mind he is performing the supposed fact that "that which is conceived is in the mind" (whatever this amounts to) suffices to show that one cannot conceive a physical thing as unperceived. The question is, how is this meant to follow?

Berkeley, like anyone with a Cartesian view of these matters, is supposing that Hylas is directly and fully acquainted with the act of mind he is considering, since it is an act he is performing. On Berkeley's views Hylas comes to the conclusion that he cannot be conceiving an unperceived thing in the light of what he knows of the act of mind in question, as well as on the proposition that what is conceived is in the mind. And Hylas gives an indication that certain features of what he is directly acquainted with played a role in establishing that there are no unperceived physical things. Having been brought to concede that unperceived things cannot be conceived he pauses to reflect on how it was he previously held that he could and did conceive an unperceived physical thing. He expands on what he was supposing in initially believing that he could conceive the unperceived, details certain fact about the act of conceiving which he has previously overlooked, and indicates that it was through not considering these facts that he thought he could conceive an unperceived physical object. As Hylas states, "As I was
thinking of a tree in a solitary place ... me thought that was to conceive a tree existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see ... etc." Even leaving this remark aside it is obvious that what Hylas says about the features of the act of conception is meant to serve as a reason why the unperceived physical thing is inconceivable.

The features of the act of conception invoked are much the same as in sections 22, 23 and 24, but a close reading like that given section 23 is not required. It is said that in conceiving of physical things "all I can do is frame ideas in my own mind"; the mind does employ ideas of physical things "but that is all". The mind cannot think of a physical thing in any other manner strive as it may. And the relation between the idea of some physical thing and the thing itself seems to be that of being the same idea (or thing) although occurring in different circumstances and settings. (Indeed in order to have a thought of an idea of sense one must conceive that idea as occurring not subject to the will of any finite spirit otherwise one will not succeed in thinking of a "physical thing").

We may note that when addressing the question of whether one can conceive of physical things as unperceived Hylas says he can "conceive in his own thoughts" the "idea of a tree, of a house, or a mountain" but that this does not show that "I can conceive them /"the idea of a tree, house or mountain/ existing out of the minds of all Spirits":
and this last statement is the concluding remark in Hylas's extended discussion of his act of conception. Here it is implicit that showing that the idea of a physical thing, the idea framed to conceive it, could exist unperceived would be the same thing as showing that the thing itself could exist unperceived. (I am taking it that Berkeley is writing with precision, as he usually does; and that the word "them" stands for the words "the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain" for that is its strict grammatical function): It seems the idea employed to conceive of a physical thing is, by implication, the same thing as it. Again, as we have seen, it is said that when a physical thing is conceived the very thing conceived is "in the mind".

We see, in both sections 23 and in Hylas's description of conception in the Dialogues, what facts about the act of conception are invoked. On the facts invoked there is a quite literal sense in which upon considering the act he is performing Hylas must concede that "that which is conceived is in the mind", for in conceiving a physical thing the mind perceives an idea which is the same idea as the thing conceived. The mind is taking that idea and supposing that very idea occurs also as not subject to the will of finite spirits and so on. And on this literal sense of the proposition "that which is conceived is in the mind" it does immediately follow upon the most basic Cartesian view that the thing cannot exist unperceived, for since the thing taken and thought as occurring elsewhere is an idea it is evident upon mere inspection, to Hylas as to anyone else, that its esse includes percipi.
We see that Berkeley presents the features of the act of conception to which we have drawn attention as a reason why unperceived physical things cannot be conceived, and that these features are ones with which Hylas would be immediately acquainted and given which (if the Cartesian view is correct) it would be an intuitively obvious truth that one cannot conceive of a physical thing as unperceived. The argument is essentially the same as in sections 22, 23 and 24.

One minor difference is that an unperceived physical thing is not said to be a contradiction it is merely said to be unconceivable, although many writers of that time regarded a statement that something was inconceivable as tantamount to a claim that it was a contradiction. In any event given his treatment of the matter in the Principles there is little doubt Berkeley thinks that it quite immediately follows from the considerations canvassed that an unperceived physical thing is a contradiction. When we look to the use Philonous makes of the argument we see that in the end the charge he brings against the believer in unperceived physical things is that they advocate a view they are unable to think, they are "contending" for a state of affairs they cannot conceive of.

IV

It must be noted that the arguments we have extracted from section 23 and the corresponding part of the Dialogues do not depend in a crucial way upon the version of Berkeley's
theory of conception in which the idea representing and the thing represented are the same idea. Even on the other version the reasoning would be, for Berkeley, quite cogent. For if the relation between the idea representing and the thing represented were mere resemblance rather than identity it nevertheless follows immediately that the thing represented is also an idea, given the well-known likeness principle, the principle that no idea can be like or resemble anything but an idea. There is no doubt that Berkeley firmly adheres to the likeness principle: he invokes it whenever there is a question of an idea being like or resembling something which might not be an idea, and regards it as self-evident. Thus if the relation were mere resemblance rather than identity Berkeley would still take it as a necessary and obvious truth that the thing represented is an idea. All that would be consequent would be a slight rearrangement of the argument to put the likeness principle in, as a self-evident truth. The argument would then proceed as before.

As we shall see there is an instance where Berkeley does quite expressly put the likeness principle in order to show that whether the relation between the idea representing and that represented is identity or mere resemblance the notion of an unperceived physical thing is a contradiction. Further there are occasions when some elements of the model of conception uncovered are employed but one cannot tell whether the relation being supposed is that of mere resemblance or of identity. As we have seen it doesn't much matter from Berkeley's point of view as the likeness
principle is self-evident. The argument involved will stand equally well in either form. However from the reader's point of view it may matter which form is being intended since the possible objections to them differ in the obvious ways. If the likeness principle is incomprehensible or untrue one form of the argument is undercut but not necessarily the other. If the version of the theory of conception on which the idea representing and the thing represented are the same idea is unacceptable then the other form is undercut but not necessarily its alternative. Let us leave these questions until we deal with the arguments concerned.

V

Before we started work on section 23 I said that if an interpretation of the arguments could both make sense of section 23 and enable us to see how Berkeley's anti-abstractionism is supposed to underpin the inconceivability of an unperceived physical thing that would be a considerable reason to accept the interpretation as correct. We have seen that the overall interpretation of the argument in section 23, and in the corresponding part of the Dialogue, does make sense of the argument. Does it enable us to see how anti-
abstractionism is supposed to underlie the arguments for the impossibility of an unperceived physical thing? I believe that it does. There is an obvious way in which abstraction of the sort to which Berkeley objects so vehemently could enable a person to conceive of, to think about, an unperceived physical thing on Berkeley's theory of conception (in either version). If a person could form an abstract idea without the property of being necessarily or essentially perceived, if percipi could be abstracted out of the esse of an idea, then that abstract idea could be used to think of an unperceived physical thing without contradiction on either version of the theory of conception. If one had an idea whose esse did not include percipi one could take that idea and suppose it as also occurring in such and such circumstances, and so on, without any implication that the thing so conceived was being perceived, had percipi as part of its esse. Again, if one had an idea whose esse did not include percipi and took that idea and supposed that something like or resembling the idea perceived by the mind existed "out there" in such and such circumstances, then there would not be an implication that the thing supposed had an esse which includes percipi, since it could resemble the idea in the mind in every respect and yet not have an esse that was percipi.

Thus if the indicated sort of abstracted idea were possible the argument of section 23 would not follow, for even on Berkeley's model one could then conceive of an unperceived physical thing without contradiction. But if this sort of abstracted idea is ruled out then this possibility does not arise. In this way Berkeley's anti-abstractionism underlies the arguments for the esse of physical things being percipi.
Moreover this reading of the relation between anti-abstractionism and the arguments that physical things are mind dependent fits in with what Berkeley actually says about abstraction. He insists that anti-abstractionism is crucial and devotes the heart of his introduction to the Principles to it. When we look to the place where he explicitly brings it into play in argument for the mind dependence of physical things we find that the way Berkeley thinks that illicit abstraction engenders the notion of an unperceived physical thing is now discernable. To quote,

"It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that ... all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding ... If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived. Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and figures - in a word the things we see and feel ... is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided ... So far, I will not deny, I can abstract, if that may properly be called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation of perception of it." 12

In the first place, Berkeley says that the tenet at bottom depends on the doctrine of abstract ideas. He then specifies the kind of abstraction which could allow of conceiving of a physical thing as existing unperceived -
passing from the claim that the tenet depends on the doctrine of abstraction to his specification of exactly what kind of abstraction the tenet depends on by the words "For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than ..."
The kind of abstraction is that in which one distinguishes "the existence of sensible things from their being perceived". That Berkeley thinks this kind of abstraction is what would be needed to enable us to do what we can not otherwise do, that is, conceive of a physical thing as unperceived, is shown not merely by the way Berkeley passes to the specification of that abstraction but by the fact that the abstraction is described as that in which the existence of "sensible objects" is distinguished from their being perceived "so as to" conceive them existing unperceived.

On my reading an abstraction in which one separates in thought sensible things from their being perceived is just what is required to allow of conceiving an unperceived physical thing, and just what needs to be ruled out from Berkeley's viewpoint. (Indeed the rest of the quoted passage seems to be designed to rule out the kind of abstraction in which one distinguishes "the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived" and comes in the end to the conclusion that "it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it". The abstraction being ruled out here is, again, on my reading, the kind which would allow one to conceive an unperceived physical thing and which the overall anti-abstractionism is meant to rule out.)
In the second place, when we consider the overall argument of section 5 we find it concluded that "it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it". This is a conclusion about the mind, it is in fact a statement that a certain act of mind is impossible. And in the argument for it certain supposed limitations on abstraction are advanced as the reason why the act of conceiving of a sensible thing as unperceived cannot be performed. The alleged limitations are set forth in the following words,

"the things we see and feel ... is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided ... So far, I will not deny, I can abstract, if that may properly be called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or actually be perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception." 13

Let us remember that in terms of the lengthy discussion in the Introduction of the Principles abstraction is a mental operation in which the mind starts with the ideas it already has and then forms a new idea, the so-called abstract idea, which has only the properties abstracted from the ideas with which the mind starts. Abstraction just is forming what Berkeley calls "abstract ideas". Being unable to abstract "The existence of sensible things from their being perceived", being unable 'to separate, even in thought, ["the things we see and feel"] from perception", being unable to "divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each
other" physical things and the perception of them, is being unable to form a certain kind of idea, the idea whose esse does not include percipi. And this inability to form an idea whose esse is not percipi is presented as the reason why such "abstraction" as we are capable of does not suffice to allow of conceiving of a physical thing as unperceived. This reasoning is just what we would expect on the account I have given of the relation between anti-abstractionism and the inconceivability of unperceived physical things.

In the third place, given Berkeley's theory of conception and his overall theory of mind, what is said in the first three sentences implies that the anti-abstractionism underlies the inconceivability, and contradictoriness, of unperceived physical things in the way suggested. In thinking of some "sensible thing" there is an act of mind associated with some idea before the mind. The act is either that of taking the idea and supposing that it exists in such and such circumstances, or that of taking the idea and supposing that something like that idea exists in such and such circumstances. Now the occurrence or non-occurrence of a particular idea, or sort of idea, in the mind cannot affect the act of mind involved in conception except insofar as the act is precisely an act of doing something to or with that particular idea, or sort of idea, before the mind; in which case it is analytic that that act cannot occur unless the idea, or sort of idea, occurs in the mind. The whole weight of Berkeley's philosophy is against any idea affecting the acts of a mind except in this way; ideas are passive and cannot be a cause of anything and are moreover entirely distinct from the mind and its operations.
In addition to the act of mind involved in conception there is the idea the mind employs. Clearly the act can occur if that idea is present irrespective of what other ideas are or are not present, since, for the reasons already addressed, no other idea can by its absence or presence preclude the act being performed. Thus the only way some particular sort of idea can enable one to perform some particular kind of act of conception is if that kind of act is just taking an idea of that sort and supposing that it, or something like it, is occurring in such and such circumstances.

So, given his theory of mind and of conception, Berkeley's own words imply that the abstract ideas which would enable us to conceive of physical things existing unperceived (and which he strives to rule out through his anti-abstractionist arguments) would have to do so by way of being ideas which the mind takes as either the same idea as the thing conceived or a resemblance of it, in order to represent to itself the situation of a physical thing existing unperceived. This is the only way such abstract ideas could be used "so as to" conceive physical things existing unperceived. That is, that "abstraction" which Berkeley so vigorously opposes could enable the conceiving of unperceived physical things only by furnishing a kind of idea which could resemble an unperceived thing, or which could itself exist unperceived.

Of course this third analysis requires ascribing to Berkeley a higher degree of self consistency than it is customary to allow him. Those who are in the habit of supposing that his writings in metaphysics are not the exposition of any settled largely self consistent body of doctrine will draw back from the way I have taken Berkeley's
general theory of mind to the text of section 5. Needless to say I believe that the appropriate practise in interpretation is to ascribe to a writer the virtues of self consistency and of remembering what is written elsewhere in the text, unless there is reason to do otherwise. There is no reason to otherwise in this case. We should take it that Berkeley's views on the mind and its operations are a settled doctrine which he holds and is conscious of holding. And, of course, on this supposition my third point stands.

VI

At the beginning of our examination of the arguments of the Principles I set out to read section 23, and the equivalent passages in the Dialogues, on the hypothesis that Berkeley was not deviating from his general theory of conception and that his remarks should be construed in that context. Proceeding in this way has allowed us to make sense of a deal of important but obscure argumentation, both in the Principles and the Dialogues. It has also allowed us to develop an interpretation on which the role of anti-abstractionism in the argument is uncovered. In my judgement it is reasonable to accept the hypothesis as correct, and to adopt the interpretations which have been developed on that basis.
Let us briefly review the argument we have discerned in sections 22, 23 and 24 of the Principles, and in the corresponding part of the Dialogues, and consider its character and import. The argument is of that kind in which one is supposed to see that from what one is immediately apprized of after the Cartesian manner certain truths follow, truths upon which the ultimate conclusion of the argument in some part depends. (In this case, of course, the ultimate conclusion is that an unperceived physical thing involves a contradiction and is inconceivable.) In following the argument one is meant to ascertain certain facts by employing a certain procedure, the procedure of considering the immediately given realm of the "mental", the mind and its operations.

To set out in brief the features or aspects of the mind and its operations which one is supposed to encounter on using the procedure, and to rely on to secure certain truths: there is a particular mode of conception used in conceiving of ordinary physical things and situations. The mode of conception is that in which the mind employs an idea of its own summoning to represent the physical thing or situation to itself by way of taking it that the thing or situation in question just is the idea before it (or just is something which resembles that idea) occurring in such and such other circumstances. On this mode of conception, to think of a particular physical thing or situation just is to think of a particular idea one frames (or of a resemblance of that idea)
as occurring in certain other circumstances (at the very least as occurring not subject to the will of finite spirits). Naturally, the fact that this is how one thinks about physical things is knowable after the Cartesian manner.

For Berkeley anything thought of through this mode of conception is necessarily something whose esse is percipi. That the esse of ideas is percipi, and that nothing is like an idea but an idea, are, for Berkeley, evident truths. Thus when we are immediately acquainted with our act of conception, and so are immediately aware that what we are thinking of in thinking about any physical thing is something which is or is like an idea, we can quite immediately conclude that physical things must occur perceived.

But, of course, this conclusion does not ultimately rely on any facts about the act of conception as tacit premises, that is not the method of reasoning being employed here. Rather the conclusion depends on the act of conception being as purported so that the procedure of attending to one's own mind and its operations can secure appropriate facts. It is the actual occurrence of that act of conception which ensures that the part of the argument which consists in the application of a certain procedure for ascertaining various facts is efficacious, and actually secures those facts in the course of the reasoning.

In terms of the basic premises and procedures on which the argument rests the ultimate reliance on the nature of the act of conception is not a reliance on propositions
about that act, from which propositions, together perhaps with other premises, other propositions required in the argument follow deductively, rather the reliance is on the world being a certain way - specifically being a world in which the mode of conception used in conceiving of physical things is as Berkeley supposes - so that the procedure will work, so that it will be efficacious. It may be the case that descriptions of the act of conception in question are given in the course of the argument, but they are essentially middle steps in it in the sense that they are neither what one starts with in the reasoning nor a part of the conclusion. And like the middle steps in any argument they can be left out without impairing the validity of the arguments. In its reasoning the mind has before it the act of conception itself and might perhaps reason quite directly from that act to whatever follows without requiring to entertain any description of the act itself.

It needs to be noted that the argument allows of versions in which the argumentation is filled in to a greater or lesser degree. Any statements about what is involved in the act of conceiving of physical things can be left out without impairing the validity of the arguments. At its most austere the argument merely appeals to what the reader finds he or she means by speaking (or thinking) of a physical thing, or to supposedly intuitively obvious limits to what he or she can conceive. At its most elaborated the argument would describe the act of conception
in question in full. As I have said before Berkeley relies on the supposed fact that one is fully aware of one's own mental operations, and only needs them pointed to rather than fully described, and he does not give a systematic and full description of the act in question in the course of the argument. What features or aspects the act of conception is supposed to have to enable the procedure to work is most fully elaborated in sections 22, 23 and 24, and in the corresponding part of the Dialogues, and is less fully covered at other points where the argument appears.

For a Cartesian the alleged fact that any ideas, anything immediately before the mind, cannot exist unexperienced is a truth which can be known simply by contemplating one's own cogitations: everything about them including that they cannot exist unexperienced is evident on contemplating them. Berkeley seems a Cartesian in these matters, presumably he believes that the fact that the esse of any idea is percipi may be known after the Cartesian manner. Presumably upon a contemplation of one's own mind and mental processes one can know not only that it is true that physical things are or are like ideas, and that anything like an idea is an idea, but that the esse of ideas is percipi, that their very being is to be perceived.

It might be supposed that even if any particular physical thing can only be thought of as being or as being like an idea (and cannot be thought of as existing unperceived) some physical thing might in fact not be or be like an idea (and might occur unperceived) even on Berkeley's considerations, so that the argument would not follow even if we contemplated our own mental operations and, with Cartesian certainty, found them to be as Berkeley believes. This is not correct and misses the entire point. In
any particular case of thinking about a physical thing, what is meant by the mind in thinking of that thing is a thing which is or resembles such and such particular idea before the mind but which is occurring in such and such other circumstances (at the very least not subject to the will of finite spirits). The mind does not first think of a physical situation and then posit that the things in it are or are like an idea, rather in turning its thoughts to a particular physical situation the mind frames a thought of something which is or is like a certain idea before it: what would count as that physical situation is a situation in which something which is or is like the idea before the mind in the act of conception is occurring in the circumstances specified in the act of conception.

To take an analogy, if one thinks of a house and then posits that it is red-roofed it may be the case that the house is not red-roofed (given that a thing could count as that house without being red-roofed). This is true even if it is a psychological fact about one, or even about everyone, that they cannot but think of that house as red-roofed. But it cannot be true that that house is not a house for it is part of the definition of it that it is a house. Indeed if being red-roofed were part of the definition of being just that house it could not be true that it was not red-roofed. It would be analytic that that house was red-roofed (if it existed) although there might be no such house.

Likewise, given the truth of Berkeley's theory of conception, it is part of the definition of any particular physical situation that it is or is like some idea.
The very reference of any thought about a particular physical thing is to a that-which-is-or-is-like-the-idea-before-one. The concept of any particular physical thing has being, or being like, an idea built into it. It is analytic that the thing is, or is like, some idea.

I don't believe that on Berkeley's model of how the mind works it is analytic that the esse of physical things is percipi. It seems to me that for Berkeley it is not an analytic truth that the esse of ideas is percipi, although it is an absolutely certain truth. Thus, since the way that physical things are conceived only guarantees that their esse is percipi on the supposition that the esse of ideas is percipi (and given the Likeness Principle) the purported truth that the esse of physical things is percipi is presumably not analytic, although on Berkeley's view it is absolutely certain.

All this has rather obvious implications for the meaning of statements about particular physical things or situations. That the things involved cannot exist unperceived follows from the meaning of the statement (given the principles that the esse of ideas is percipi, and that
nothing can be like an idea but an idea). On Berkeley's arguments ascribing existence to any particular physical thing involves actually meaning that it is the same thing as, or like, an idea. This is, amongst other things, "what is meant by the terms exist when applied to sensible things", to use Berkeley's own words.

On Berkeley's view there are certain discoverable limits to what we mean by talking about, or thinking of, physical things; limits which are such that any talk of unperceived physical things is either empty or involves some kind of contradiction. That the esse of physical things is percipi is supposed to be a consequence of the limits on what we can mean by any particular discourse (or train of thought) about physical things.

The conclusion of the sort of argument we have been considering can be put in several ways. Berkeley himself does not always frame the conclusion in the same words. Sometimes he says that the supposition that there is an unperceived physical thing is a contradiction. Sometimes he says that an unperceived physical thing is inconceivable. It should be evident by now that this
inconceivability is meant to be more than a mere psychological fact. It is supposed to follow from the very meaning of thoughts and statements about physical things. Again, in section 24 Berkeley avers that the words "the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves or without the mind" "mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all". A few lines later he states that "It is on this I insist ... that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction". No doubt the point here is that the only way that you can pretend to talk of an unperceived physical thing without self-contradiction is if you don't actually refer to a physical thing as unperceived. If your words do not express any thought about an unperceived physical thing then you have avoided being embroiled in any direct contradiction, but only at the price of not meaning anything by your words. Your talk is either empty or self-contradictory.
CHAPTER IX - The initial onslaught

At the beginning of the main text of the Principles Berkeley moves into arguments that the physical world cannot exist unperceived, and purports to establish several times within the first 8 sections that the esse of physical things is percipi. Many of the arguments in this initial onslaught are of that form in which some fact is to be ascertained by the reader in some manner; that is, in which some procedure is to be employed. We are told we can ascertain various facts if we "attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things," "merely open our eyes," "reflect and try to separate in our thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived," and "look never so little into our thoughts." In many of these procedures the reader is supposed to notice or take into account the things, or parts or aspects of things, they are immediately given in experience and so see that the truth of some proposition is evident. The reader is supposed to directly encounter a feature or aspect of experience and to conclude that a certain proposition is true: he or she is to find a certain thing and so to find that a certain truth is true. This causes considerable difficulties.

To take an analogy, consider someone expounding with the aid of a large diagram. Perhaps they stride up and down before it with a large pointer in hand sometimes talking of the diagram, sometimes gesturing toward it, and sometimes indicating particular areas of it. Sometimes they will give some description of the feature of the diagram which they invoke to secure or illustrate some conclusion. They may say "As you can see from these lines here in the upper right hand corner, the heart is unusually near to the lungs". On the other hand
sometimes they may just say "It is evident from the diagram that ..." without describing what features of the diagram we are supposed to be taking into account - especially where what is evident is evident from some large-scale or prominent feature of the diagram. A person in a lecture hall can follow such an exposition without difficulty.

But consider the case where all you can see is the lecturer, the diagram not being visible from your position. You hear what he says but you are not presented with all he is trying to lay before his audience. You are not directly apprized of all the factors he means to place before the listener in support of his contentions although you may already know a lot about what is on the diagram or infer a fair amount about it from the passing characterizations given it and the respects in which it is relied on.

We are apt to find ourselves in an analogous position with many post-Cartesian philosophers, including the so-called British Empiricists. When it comes to certain kinds of premise they are likely to ground them by arguments which in part rely on you having certain things before you in your "mind", and which appeal to the character of those things. Sometimes these philosophers describe what sort of aspects or features of the mind they are making appeal to. And sometimes they do not; just saying, for instance, "It is evident if one looks never so little into ones own thoughts ... etc." - especially in those cases when they suppose that the feature or aspect from which the alleged fact is evident is a rather pervasive or obvious feature or aspect.

But, in this last case, insofar as the reader does not find that they have something immediately before them which
does make it evident that the fact is true, they don't know what kind of thing, from which the fact would supposedly be evident, was supposed to be before them. The reader is not presented with all the matter the writer is intending to place before them.

In Berkeley's initial onslaught there are specifications of procedures for ascertaining requisite facts which just direct ones attention to ones own thoughts, or some part thereof, without describing what one supposedly then encounters, except to say that some fact required in the argument is evident therefrom. Other specifications of procedures are accompanied by limited descriptions of what is to be encountered, descriptions which do not by themselves give a full picture of what you are meant to be moved by. In neither case are we told exactly what aspect or element of the experienced is to make the fact in question evident.

If the reader does find something given which makes the requisite fact evident then they appreciate at least one way in which the procedure works, and are apprized of at least one thing which is to be encountered on the employment of the procedure on which the requisite fact is evident. But insofar as readers are not given something from which they find the fact evident they are unable to tell, by way of finding that it makes the fact evident, which aspect or feature they were supposed to encounter and they cannot tell what feature or aspect Berkeley supposed they would encounter, and find the fact evident from, unless they already know what is supposedly to be encountered on employing the procedure in question, or are told it, or can infer it.
Unfortunately, I do not find that the procedures specified in sections 1 to 8 provide me with anything which makes the required facts evident. Most readers are in a similar position. So if we want to discover what thing from which the requisite facts are purportedly evident Berkeley means to have had laid before readers on their employment of the procedures, we must be told, or already know it, or infer it.

We are not sufficiently told what it is from which the required facts are to be evident, but luckily we know a fair bit about what Berkeley imagines is before us when we contemplate our own mental operations (we know, as it were, a lot of the diagram), and so we know something of what Berkeley thinks is placed before us upon the employment of some of the procedures specified. Further, we can grasp something about what is supposed to be before us, upon the employment of some of the procedures, by seeing what is said in passing about it, and the respects in which it is relied on.

Thus in order to grasp the full workings of the arguments in the initial onslaught we will need to bring into play our knowledge of Berkeley's theory of the mind, and of ideas, and consider carefully the indirect clues as to what we are supposed to be given in employing some of the procedures involved.

In sections 1 and 2 Berkeley lays the background for the arguments in the succeeding sections. There is no argument for his views in sections 1 and 2, but some of those views are asserted, implied or relied on therein. And I believe that the discussion in the following sections cannot be fully fathomed unless we understand how the scene is set there. Berkeley first lists categories into which all "objects of human knowledge" fall
"It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination - either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways."  

It is the "ideas actually imprinted on the senses" which constitute the world on Berkeley's system. And they are a kind of item very familiar to the traditions of Berkeley's time; they are the kind of item Descartes characterized as the things one is given "as it were by the senses".  

As we shall see the account of the world in the rest of sections 1 and 2 takes for granted the direct perception thesis that what one is immediately given "as it were by the senses" are pieces of the physical world, or, to put it another way, that it is pieces or aspects of the physical world itself which one is immediately given in sensory experience. 

Directly after the sentence quoted Berkeley continues

"By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance; and all of these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odors; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition."  

Each sentence contains descriptions which pick out the things one "perceives" by the sense or senses in question. These descriptions have the form of a series of descriptions which in regard of each sense pick out the item corresponding to the items picked out in regard of the other senses. This is the natural way to read them. This suggests that the things said to be "furnished"
by each sense are equivalent to the "ideas of light and colours" furnished by sight. And the ideas of light and colours are what is immediately furnished by sight, they are what is given in the visual experience.

Again, the sentences appear to be an elaboration on what certain "objects of human knowledge" consist in. Their arrangement relative to the first sentence of section 1 implies they are a continuation of the description of the objects of knowledge. The only kind of object of human knowledge allowed of in the first sentence which they might be describing are the ideas imprinted on the senses - and it would be natural for Berkeley to characterize those ideas in the terms quoted since he does believe that ordinary physical things and qualities are such ideas. Insofar as the sentences are meant to describe those things which are in fact the ideas actually imprinted on the senses then in characterizing them as "hard and soft", "heat and cold", "motion and resistance" and so on Berkeley is assuming that heat and cold, motion and resistance, and so on just are that which one is given immediately by the relevant sense, and he is just using the words "heat", "cold", "motion", "resistance", and so on for what one is immediately given in sensory experience.

This reading of the sentences as being intended to refer to that given immediately in sensory experience is confirmed by the progress of the rest of the section. It runs -

"And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of
ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things."4

The "these" referred to are evidently the "ideas of light and colour", the "hard and soft", "heat and cold", "motion and resistance", "odors", "tastes" "sounds", mentioned in the preceding sentences. Equally evidently the "these" are taken to be the things immediately given to sense. Berkeley lays down that a physical thing is a collection of "these", and almost immediately thereafter states that various physical things are "collections of ideas". Again, he gives an example of what a physical thing is in terms of an apple being a collection of a "a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence" which occur together; which fact about the apple is presented as equivalent to a stone, book, or tree being a certain "collection of ideas". Indeed, as we can see, having referred to "a certain colour, taste, smell, and consistence" which go together to make up the apple he immediately refers to "other collections of ideas" - and the force of the word "other" is obvious.

So, Berkeley is here pre-supposing a direct perception line on the relation between the immediately given in sense experience and the physical world. And he just uses the ordinary terms for the various physical properties and things to refer to the "things" immediately given in sensory experience.

No doubt this seems quite natural to Berkeley, since he believes it an evident truth that physical things are given immediately in sensory experience. But he is aware that some amongst his readers will object to the pre-supposition, and deny that physical things and qualities are ideas, on representative
realist grounds. Indeed he must have known that amongst his contemporaries with some training in philosophy this would be a standard response.

Naturally, Berkeley is ready to deal with the representative realist in due course, but in sections 1 and 2 he only sketches his starting point.

As commentators have noticed, Berkeley had to deal with two main kinds of reader. One kind without formal training in philosophy who will probably be "naive" direct realists and accept that the ideas given in sensory experience are parts or aspects of the physical world itself but who will probably not accept that those ideas cannot exist unperceived; and one kind with some training in the philosophy of Berkeley's day who will accept that the "ideas" given in sensory experience cannot exist unperceived but will believe that these ideas are distinct and separate from ordinary physical things and properties.

Berkeley himself is quite conscious of this. When at the end of the Dialogues Hylas asks Philonous to make clear in what ways the doctrine they now both hold is new, and in what way it simply incorporates previous opinions, albeit expressed in an unfamiliar way, Philonous says,

"My endeavours tend ... to unite ... that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: - the former being of the opinion, that those things they immediately perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things immediately perceived are ideas, which exist only in the mind. Which two notions put together, do, in effect, constitute the substance of what I advance."5

In the case of the "philosophers" Berkeley particularly needs to persuade them that the things given immediately as it were by the senses are the real things, rather than images of the
In the case of those uninstructed in philosophy he particularly needs to persuade them that the things immediately perceived can exist only in the mind.

Faced with this task he starts his exposition in a way that will be more acceptable to the uninstructed than to the "philosopher", as we have seen. He simply takes it that the immediately perceived things are the real physical things and writes accordingly in sections 1 and 2, leaving it to later to establish this aspect of his thought.

Correspondingly, section 3 opens with a statement of that doctrine which, for a person who accepts the initial direct perception view, needs to be proved. To quote that statement -

"That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the Senses, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them."\(^6\)

And direct perception pre-suppositions are carried into the argumentation which follows, either being assumed or taken to be obvious: - in section 4 Berkeley argues "For what are houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive but our own ideas or sensations"\(^7\), which takes a direct perception line for granted; in section 5 he says "Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures - in a word the things we see and feel - what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on sense?"\(^8\), again assuming a direct perception view of the relation between sensory experience and the physical world; and in section 7 he writes "the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas perceived by sense."\(^9\)
Nevertheless the direct perception line is not simply assumed throughout: the overall argument does not rely on a mere direct perception assumption. But before we can untangle the argument and determine the role of direct perception suppositions in it we must resolve an unavoidable exegetical question.

We have seen that Berkeley not only says and presumes that ordinary physical things and qualities are immediately given in sensory experience, he says and assumes that so-called "sensible things" and "sensible qualities" are in fact so perceived. What is Berkeley saying and assuming in saying and assuming this? What are the definitions of the terms "sensible thing" and "sensible quality"?

The answer to this last question determines not merely what is assumed in assuming that sensible things are directly given in sensory experience but what is meant by the various statements and arguments about "sensible" things and qualities: and some parts of the argument in each of sections 3 to 7 are couched in terms of the "sensible".

Sticking to the direct perception line on the relation between ordinary physical things and the immediately given, Berkeley adheres to the conclusion that the things immediately perceived are the sensible things; and that the sensible things are the ordinary physical things. Likewise, he says that the qualities immediately perceived are the sensible qualities; and that the sensible qualities are the ordinary physical qualities.

But what status are these "truths" supposed to have? If the definition of "sensible thing" (or quality) is that it is the kind of thing (or quality) which is immediately given in sensory experience, that it is the appearance or phenomenon, then it is true by definition that the things given as it were by the senses are sensible things, but the "truth" that sensible
things (or qualities) are the ordinary physical things (or qualities) is not true by definition, and expresses the substantive direct perception point. If the definition of "sensible thing" (or quality) is that it is the ordinary physical thing (or quality) then it is true by definition that sensible things are ordinary physical things but the supposed truth that sensible things are the things immediately given in sensory experience is not true by definition and expresses the substantive direct perception point. We cannot come to interpreting sections 3 to 8 until we have decided what the terms "sensible thing" and "sensible quality" mean.

It would be easy for us to read "sensible thing" as meaning "physical thing" without reflection, given the habits we bring to construing such terms. Many of us are rather familiar with the representative realist tradition, a tradition within which talk of a particular kind of "thing" or "quality" is typically about a physical thing or quality rather than some item in the mind. On the traditional representative realist view the "ideas of sense" are merely private elements of each person's mind, and a term such as "sensible things" would more naturally be used of the actual things representatively perceived by sense than of the elements of the mind serving as the representation. Since we are accustomed to this style of metaphysics we may tend to presume that a term like "sensible thing" means "physical thing". Again, Berkeley clearly thinks that sensible things and qualities are in fact ordinary physical things and qualities, he identifies the one with the other, and we may automatically take it that the sense of "sensible thing" is "physical thing".
But none of this will do. For an immaterialist it is just as natural to use the term "sensible thing" with the meaning of the immediately given in sense as it is to use it with the meaning of the ordinary physical thing. And we have seen that in sections 1 to 8 Berkeley is at some places operating with certain direct perception pre-suppositions, so passages which merely indicate an identification between physical things and sensible things suggest nothing one way or the other.

In point of fact, there is evidence that the definition of a sensible thing is that it is that kind of thing which is immediately given in sensory experience.

In the Three Dialogues Berkeley very consciously uses the term "sensible thing" to mean the kind of thing which is immediately before the mind when it has a sensory experience - as I shall show when we consider the argument of the Dialogues. He gives an express and lengthy definition of sensible thing in these terms at the beginning of the first dialogue, and in the ensuing disputation Philonous several times explicitly relies on this being the definition of the term (not merely a truth about it). Moreover in discussion Philonous several times characterizes those things which cannot be immediately before the mind in sensory experience as "insensible" things; this appellation is applied in particular to those "real" physical things which are alleged to be perceived by the mind only by way of being represented by ideas of sense in sensory experience. Faced with the representative realist's model of the ideas of sense as items before the mind which serve as pictures of those real things representatively perceived by sense, he characterizes these ideas of sense as "sensible" things and the things supposedly representatively perceived as "insensible" things.
There can be no doubt that in the Dialogues Berkeley uses the definition that sensible things are the kind of things which are immediately given in sensory experience, and that he does so deliberately and with, as it were, malice aforethought.

The correct rule of thumb to apply here is that when a philosopher uses the same term extensively in two distinct published expositions of what he expressly states to be the one doctrine that term should be taken to have the same sense in both texts unless there is strong evidence to the contrary.

Again, the second edition of the Principles and the third edition of the Dialogues were published in 1734 bound together in the one volume, presumably to be read together by the purchaser. At that time Berkeley was prepared to make, and did make, important alterations to the texts of both works. If he had changed the sense of the expression "sensible thing" from its sense in the Principles to a new one in the Dialogues it would have been necessary to sort this out when presenting the two texts side by side; and it would have been easy enough to do so. One simple expedient in regard of the Principles is to replace the words "sensible thing" with the words "physical thing" or some equivalent phrase. But he did not do so. He was prepared to let the use of the term stand unaltered in both texts, despite the express and prominent definition of the term at the beginning of the Dialogues, and its extensive use in the defined sense in the body of that work.
It seems to me quite unreasonable to suppose that in the Principles the term "sensible thing" is meant to have a sense different from that so evidently and deliberately given it in the Dialogues. The definition of sensible thing is that it is the kind of thing immediately given in sensory experience.

... 

We may now proceed to untangle the arguments of sections 3 to 8. Having previously said the "objects of human knowledge" are ideas of sense, those ideas perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, and ideas formed by memory and imagination, Berkeley claims it is evident to all that our "thoughts, passions, or ideas formed by the imagination" cannot exist separate from the mind. He then states -

"And to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the Senses however blended or combined together (that is, whatever object they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things." 11

This is straightforward enough, there are only two points needing comment. First, what we are being invited to attend to is not simply the meaning of "exist" as it were in itself, but rather what the term means "when applied to sensible things", that is to say, when it is used to form a proposition that a certain sensible thing or things exist.
Second, the sense of what is said turns on the sense of "sensible thing". On our interpretation one is being invited to attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to the things immediately perceived by sense; in order to find that such things can only occur perceived.

However in the next few sentences of the text Berkeley makes a transition to talking directly about what it means to say of ordinary physical things that they exist, to quote -

"The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things, without any relation to them being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible." 

The conclusion that for the various kinds of physical thing existence consists in being perceived is not presented as something which follows from the prior conclusion that sensible things cannot exist unperceived plus some supposition that physical things are sensible things. No doubt in believing that physical things are sensible things Berkeley believes that insofar as sensible things cannot exist unperceived the same is true of physical things, but this connection is not invoked in what is said.
Rather, as it is stated, the argument treats of physical things and sensible things in parallel. The move which was made in respect of sensible things is evidently meant to be effective in respect of physical things. There is again a substantive reliance on what it means to say of a table, an odour, a sound, and such-like, that it exists, a reliance on what the word exists means when applied to such things.

Berkeley presumes it is evident that to say a physical thing exists is to say it is perceived. He states, as obvious, that all he can understand by ascriptions of existence to tables, odours, sounds, and so on, (that is, by the word "exist" when applied to physical things) is that the thing in question was perceived. And he is obviously counting on the reader finding it evident that all he or she can understand by such an ascription (by such an application of the word "exist") is that the thing was perceived.

The form of the argument is not surprising. Berkeley was educated in a tradition in which a person who knew what a word meant could ascertain that meaning intuitively through introspection. So, when Berkeley believes that some aspect of what a term means in a certain use will enable the reader to attain "an intuitive knowledge" of some desired conclusion then a straightforward reliance on the reader finding what that term means is quite natural.

However, we may wonder why Berkeley thinks it obvious that what the word exists means when "applied" to
physical things is such that it is evident that a physical thing exists only when perceived. Many of us will want to deny that such a conclusion is true let alone evident.

Well, on Berkeley's theory of conception ascribing existence to any physical thing is just asserting the occurrence of a thing which is, or is like, a certain idea in the imagination. And since the esse of ideas is percipi, and nothing can be like an idea but an idea, it follows that when one asserts that some physical or sensible thing exists one is just asserting the existence of a thing which is perceived. Further, on Berkeley's system this will be established for each reader by the argument in section 3.13 The fact that in ascribing existence to a physical thing one is asserting the existence of a thing which is, or is like, the idea employed is accessible to the reader on employment of the procedure of considering the meaning of "exists" in certain applications. That nothing can be like an idea but an idea, and that the esse of ideas is percipi are obvious and evident truths. Thus on attending to what one means by the word exist when it is applied to physical things one would attain to "an intuitive knowledge" of the conclusion that physical things cannot exist otherwise than before a mind perceiving them.

The argument in section 3 is a version of that in sections 22, 23 and 24, although a lot less of the detailed workings are made explicit, and are rather to be

13. Unless the reader is blinded by pre-existing beliefs. See Armstrong op. cit. pp. 186
engendered in applying the procedure. In section 23 a contradiction was found in any belief or statement that there is an unperceived physical thing - on the basis that the concept of any physical thing is a concept of a that which is or is like a certain idea, and so forth. In section 3 precisely the same factors are relied on in the same way in showing that when the word exists is "applied" to physical or sensible things it follows that the thing only exists perceived, and that its existence unperceived is a repugnancy.

No doubt sections 22, 23 and 24 are cast in terms of the meaning of certain statements or beliefs about physical things, whereas section 3 seems cast more in terms of the meaning of the word exists, but this is a difference merely verbal. What the phrase "the term 'exists' when applied to physical things" marks out is a particular concrete use of the term exists, that use in which the term is actually put together with an expression referring to some physical thing (or things) to construct a meaningful ascription of existence to that thing (or things). So, in being invited to consider what is meant by the term exists when applied to physical things, we are being invited to consider what that term imports when it is actually a part of a statement that some physical thing exists, that is, we are being invited to consider an aspect of the meaning of such statements. And what we are supposed to appreciate about the meaning of the term in the use in question is what it implies (if the ascription is correct) about what is involved in one of the
physical things existing, what we are meant to appreciate is what is meant by the application of the term to physical things; that is to say, what it would be for the ascription to be true - which is just what we are supposed to appreciate in sections 22, 23 and 24. What we are supposed to see in section 3 is that to ascribe existence to a physical thing is to say that the thing is perceived, but this very fact about "exists" is equally a fact about the thing involved, it is a fact about what it is for a physical thing to exist, it is a fact about its very being. And of course it is just the fact which sections 22, 23 and 24 are intended to secure. Berkeley says in section 24 that the words "the absolute existence of sensible things in themselves, or without the mind ... mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all."¹⁴

The point made in section 3 can equally be put in terms of those words which denote physical things and properties. One could say that attending to the meaning of any such expression when attached to the verb exists would show that the things denoted cannot exist unperceived, and that an unperceived physical thing is a repugnancy. This makes a point about the statements section 3 refers to, those statements which are ascriptions of existence to a physical thing or things, and it is the same point, and made in the same way.

The view on what the term exists means in certain uses is not distinct from that doctrine about the nature of physical things found in both section 3 and sections 22-4; it is just the other side of the same coin.
Naturally, the efficacy of the argument in section 3 depends on the world being such that one does get an intuitive knowledge of the mind-dependence of physical and sensible things on attending to what ascriptions of existence to them mean. The argument will be efficacious if one has a complete and error-free acquaintance with the acts and operations of the mind, if the act of conception is as Berkeley supposes, and if the Likeness Principle and the principle that the esse of ideas is percipi are evident to the reader. Whether this is so will be considered in due course.

Unlike section 3, section 4 is not a distinct segment of the text set off by spaces from the surrounding sections. Rather, sections 4 to 8 are divided off together as one segment, and form one natural piece of argument. Within this, sections 4 and 5 jointly concern the tenet that

"houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding."15

Section 4 attempts to locate a contradiction in it, and section 5 discusses a doctrine from which the tenet is said to arise and upon which depend.

The reasoning of section 4 runs
"whoever shall find it in his heart to call / the tenet in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are / houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects/ but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive by sense besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?"

The intended force of this argument is clear. The reader is supposed to feel constrained to answer "Nothing!", "Nothing!", and "Yes!" to each of the rhetorical questions in turn, which lands him or her with the conclusion that it is repugnant that "houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects" could exist unperceived. Each rhetorical question advances a claim which supposedly the reader must accept upon seriously and scrupulously considering it.

The claims are

i) That "houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects" are just "the things we perceive by sense"

ii) That the things we perceive by sense are just our own ideas or sensations

iii) That it is plainly repugnant that any idea or sensation or combination thereof should exist unperceived.

Initially it is perhaps not entirely clear how the first two of these claims are to be construed. Does the word "perceive" in this context encompass only direct perception or would its signification extend to any indirect and representative perception which might occur? Whichever way this goes it is clear that in making the first two claims together Berkeley wants to aver that
Claim A. Physical things are the kind of things which are immediately and directly perceived from time to time, not items behind the veil of perception; that is, they are the kind of thing which is before the mind in sensory experience, rather than being different things.

Claim B. The kind of things which are immediately and directly perceived, which are from time to time before the mind in sensory experience, are "our own ideas or sensations".

Let us take Claim A first. The nature of the kind of thing which is immediately and directly perceived by sense, which is before the mind in sensory experience, is presumed to be known on standard Cartesian lines. The question is whether our ordinary words for physical things refer to that kind of thing, and whether our ordinary remarks about physical things are about that kind of thing.

Berkeley's answer is that it is evident that they do, and that they are. And, of course, if this is true then on his principles it ought to be fairly obvious to the unprejudiced intellect, since each person is able to ascertain what his or her terms mean.

Supposedly people go around in the world having sensations and perceptions of this and that, and sometimes talking of the physical things they are encountering. Knowing what ones talk means one can realise that this talk about physical things is at least in part about the kind of things before peoples minds in sensory experience, and further that there is no more to the reference of a term which denotes an ordinary physical thing than a reference to a thing or things which we may directly perceive by sense; that is, one can realise that all the physical world is directly perceivable rather than being
represented in sense perception by the things we perceive immediately. To use Berkeley's distinction, it is sensible, rather than insensible.

As for Claim B that the things we immediately perceive by sense from time to time are "our own ideas or sensations" this is a mere tautology. For Berkeley and for his contemporaries the things which are at any time before the mind "as from the senses" are by definition "ideas or sensations".  

17 It is clear that anything which is before the mind, directly experienced, is regarded as a "mental" item in this tradition. And if it is provided "as it were by the senses", it is accounted an "idea or sensation". The question concerns things which are not being experienced but which were, or could have been, experienced - would such things (if they could exist) be "mental" items properly so-called, "mental" items which were not being experienced, or are the criteria for what a mental item is such that such things would not properly so described.

Cartesians and the traditions which sprang from them have an answer to this implicit in their systems, an answer evidenced in one of their most characteristic doctrines. It is taken as fundamental but not merely "analytic" that any "mental" item cannot occur except "in" a mind, cannot occur unexperienced. This is strongly emphasised. But, of course, what the Cartesian or fellow traveller is ruling out is any situation where an item which is, or could be, an item given in immediate experience could occur unexperienced. What is said to be impossible is the occurrence of a feeling, a thought, a judgement, an idea, or a sensation unexperienced; and this is not a claim that such a thing would not properly be termed a feeling, a thought, and so on. If what is usually called a sensation or thought could occur unexperienced, this situation would be properly termed the occurrence of an unexperienced sensation or thought, and this situation is what is not possible.

The things which are, or could be, before the mind "as it were by the senses" are by definition "ideas or sensations".
Thus Berkeley is quite reasonable in simply asking rhetorically "what are houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?", and hoping for the readers concurrence, given that he believes that the claims he is advancing are actually true. Given his principles he can expect the concurrence of the unprejudiced reader who seriously considers the questions, although the reader blinded by pre-existing beliefs may avoid seeing the truth.

Moreover, we can discern the manner in which Berkeley would anticipate that any reader would come to see the truth of the first two claims. We can see the manner in which he would expect the two rhetorical questions to work on the reader.

Supposedly, all the acts and operations of the mind are transparent to the mind, and the mind can contemplate the act of referring and see what the intended object is, that is, what thing the mind is using the referring expression to refer to. On Berkeley's model, when the mind entertains a thought of a particular physical thing it is framing an idea of the imagination as an image and thinking of a that which is, or is like, this image. That is what every act of thinking about any physical thing consists in; the thought has the form of a thought about a that which is, or is like, this, where the this is a certain mental "picture". And this process is what the mind is given on turning its attention to its conception of any particular physical thing, to what for it counts as that physical thing.
Berkeley is relying on us appreciating that what would count as the mountain we are thinking of is a that which is, or is like, the image, the similitude, of it in the mind. And, of course, it is supposedly self-evident that nothing can be like an idea but an idea, so that it is immediately evident that the mountain itself is an idea (albeit perceived at the instance of God). And such an idea, like any idea, is the sort of thing which can from time to time be directly before a mind, it can stand in that relation to a mind. It is perceivable, it is sensible rather than insensible. (The doctrine that all ideas not only can be perceived, are perceivable, but must be perceived is not at play in the claims of the first two rhetorical questions, it is relied on in the case of the third).

As for the claim of the third rhetorical question, as we have seen Berkeley regards the claim that it is plainly repugnant that an idea or sensation which is or might be perceived by the mind from time to time could exist unperceived as a self-evident truth, of which an intuitive knowledge can easily enough be obtained. In this he followed the prevailing orthodoxy. No attempt to establish the principle that the esse of all ideas is percipi, other than by an appeal to its self-evidence, is obvious in the Principles.

We have now seen more fully what Berkeley would expect to happen when the reader contemplates the claims of the rhetorical questions, and the manner in which it is anticipated that the reader will find that "houses, mountains, rivers, and in a world all sensible objects" are just the kind of things we immediately perceive by sense, and that the things we immediately perceive by sense are our own ideas or
sensations, and that it is plainly repugnant that any idea or sensation or combination thereof should exist unperceived.

In advancing the argument of the three rhetorical questions Berkeley is relying on the reader having a complete knowledge of his or her own mind and its operations, on the act of conception being as he supposes, and on the self-evidence and truth of the Likeness Principle and the principle that the esse of all ideas is percipi. Whether that reliance is justified will be discussed in due course.

We have already considered section 5 in a previous discussion. Its line of argument fits in with the interpretation that in his arguments for the esse of the physical world being percipi Berkeley is relying on his model of conception in the various ways detailed.

Under our interpretation, framing the idea of an unperceived thing (that is, conceiving it) would require forming an idea which could serve to represent an unperceived thing. Now, if one could frame an idea abstracting its percipi from it, leaving an idea the very being of which did not encompass being perceived, then a thing could resemble that idea in any or every respect without being a thing which was perceived. Thus the idea could serve as a resemblance of a thing the esse of which did not include percipi; and the mind could think of a thing which is, or is like, that idea,
existing unperceived, without contradiction. If one could extract the percipi from the esse of an idea, one could by means of the resultant abstract idea conceive of an unperceived physical thing.

Section 5 considers the basis on which people believe that unperceived physical and sensible things are conceivable, and also considers what would be required to allow them to conceive an unperceived physical or sensible thing (to wit, a certain "strain of abstraction"), and argues that this strain of abstraction is impossible.

The abstraction objected to is that in which the mind removes being-perceived-ness from the esse of some idea, or forms an idea without being-perceived-ness in its esse. Berkeley discusses what can and cannot be done in framing ideas of things in the following terms:

"can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? ... is it possible to separate, even in thought, / the things we see and feel / from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of the rose without thinking of the rose itself. So far ... I can abstract." 18

At this point we need to keep in mind that for Berkeley abstraction is an act of the mind performed on the ideas before it in order to form new ideas. Thus his discussion of what kinds of "abstraction" are possible and what not, is a discussion of the ways in which it is possible to divide and alter the ideas before the mind.
We can see that at one point he delineates the kinds of abstraction which are possible in terms of the sorts of act of conception which require them. So, he indicates that he can perform that abstraction required in conceiving apart those things which have been perceived by sense together, and in imagining them apart. Again, he specifies that certain kinds of division of idea are possible by specifying the extent to which he can divide "in my thoughts" the things conceived. He clearly treats this as a specification of the extent to which he can perform the act of abstraction required.

Following the last quoted passage Berkeley invokes certain limits to the act of abstraction, which limits are presented as precluding that strain of abstraction which is required in distinguishing "the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived so as to conceive them existing unperceived"; that is, the limits are presented as precluding that strain of abstraction which would enable the conception of "sensible objects" existing unperceived. They are also presented as precluding the conception of "Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and figures - in a word the things we see and feel" as existing unperceived. These "things", indeed, are identified with the "sensible objects", yoked together with them, manoeuvred through the argument with them, and throughout treated as subject to the same reasoning.

To quote the statement of the limits and the rest of the section, -
"... I can abstract; if that may properly be called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it."19

And so ends the demonstration that the kind of abstraction required for conceiving an unperceived sensible or physical thing is not possible. Quite naturally it is also a demonstration that the act of conceiving of an unperceived physical or sensible thing, which would require the impossible act of abstraction, is impossible. As before, even when talking in large part in terms of what one may and may not conceive in one's thoughts Berkeley also intends to delineate the ways in which ideas can and cannot be abstracted; that is, separated into parts by the mind; he intends to delineate which strains of abstraction are possible.

The strain of abstraction which is not possible is that in which the mind separates "the existence of sensible objects" from "their being perceived"; it is the act required if one tries to "separate, even in thought, any of Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and figures - in a word the things we see and feel - ... sensations, notions, ideas or impressions on the sense/from perception"; it is the act required if one attempts to "conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it".
In abstraction one takes a particular idea or ideas and reduces it, or them, to a new idea. The limits to abstraction are limits to what you can actually do, rather than mere limits to what you think you can do, or realise you can do. They do not require a recognition of any fact; they are there even if a person thinks they are not, and their existence consists in the circumstance that whomever tries to perform an act of abstraction of the precluded kind, and however hard they try, it is impossible that they should succeed in performing it.

It appears that the limits which Berkeley locates are not mere psychological limits, as would be some person's inability to visualise a regular five-sided figure or the presumable inability of everyone to visualise a regular million-sided figure. The connection between any idea and being-perceived-ness is a necessary one, it is not possible that the one should occur without the other. The inability to perform the act of as it were pulling them apart is thus not some deficiency in potency, in strength of mind, which would be remedied if only we were sufficiently powerful. It is a concomittant of the necessary truth that the esse of ideas is percipi, and is presumably necessary in the same sense.

As for the attendant limit on conception, the limit on the kind of idea which the mind can frame and then employ as an image is a necessary limit. Thus insofar as the mode of conception which Berkeley believes is used to think of physical things is indeed the mode always employed
to think of physical things, one can necessarily only think of physical things qua occurrences or likenesses of ideas the esse of which is percipi.

Overall, Berkeley is clear that if one could perform the act of abstracting the "being perceived" out of the "existence" of an idea, one could form a mental image or picture of an unperceived physical thing, and so frame an idea of it, that is, think of it.

However, he believes that any "image" or re-presentation of a physical thing that the mind can produce always has an esse that is percipi. And thus the strain of abstraction required to conceive of an unperceived physical thing is impossible, and the act of conceiving of an unperceived physical thing is impossible.

Naturally, Berkeley merely asserts what he takes to be the facts about the act of abstraction, and the act of conceiving, for he shares the Cartesian assumption that every person is fully acquainted with their own mind. If one just lays the fact about certain acts of the mind before the reader, he or she will presumably be in a position to appreciate their truth.

We can see that the matter of section 5, and the insistence therein that the impossibility of abstract ideas underpins the inconceivability and repugnancy of unperceived physical and sensible things, fits in with the
account we are developing of what underpins Berkeley's doctrines on the physical world.

This reading is reinforced by section 6 which runs in part,

"Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known ...: it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived."
At section 7 Berkeley pauses to draw two corollaries of his position - that spirit is the only substance, and that there can be no unthinking substratum of physical and sensible qualities. In the Cartesian traditions there are two pertinent features of the notion of substance. First, a substance can exist by itself (needing nothing but God's will to sustain it) and can be conceived to so exist. Second, it is that to which certain properties must be ascribed. These properties cannot occur, and cannot be conceived to occur, except as attributes of that substance. The two features are part of the standard notion of substance in Berkeley's day.

For Descartes there are two substances in the created world. Extended substance, the essence of which is to be extended, and mental substance, the essence of which is to be conscious. Each can exist, and be conceived to exist, independently of other things (although dependent on God as first cause and sustainer), and each serves as that "substratum" in which certain properties and qualities are sited. All attributes, properties, and qualities are physical or mental. None are both. Properties etc. of the physical sort cannot exist and cannot be conceived to exist, except as attributes of an extended thing: they inhere in extended things. Properties etc. of the mental sort cannot exist, and cannot be conceived to exist, except as attributes of a mental thing: they inhere in mental things. Further, every thing and every property, quality or attribute which the mind is immediately aware of in experience is mental.
Locke, accepting much of the Cartesian tradition, has a similar view. There are two substances, mental and material, which can exist on their own account, apart perhaps from God's role as first cause. No property or quality of a physical sort can be conceived except as a modification or attribute of a material substance, no property or quality of a mental sort except as a modification or attribute of a mental substance. Naturally this account embodies Cartesian dualism, and all the insoluble difficulties of that dualism are attendant thereon, for mind is mind and matter is matter and never the twain shall meet. Any person's sensations or sense impressions are to be accounted mental items and, logically speaking, might exist even though any particular physical substance did not.

Berkeley's system has a quite different structure. Corporeal things are not independent of minds. They cannot exist excepting that they are perceived. The mind's sensory awareness of a physical thing, its sensations, are not distinct from, and independent of, the physical things themselves. There is only one kind of thing which, apart from its dependence on God qua first cause, can exist independent of other things, and that is a spirit. There are certain properties etc. which cannot occur except as attributes of spirit. And there are other things, qualities, and properties which while not modifications or attributes of spirit cannot exist apart from it.

Spirit qualifies as a substance on this basis. Of course, it is not a substance of an orthodox kind; it is entirely given in conscious experience and its esse is agere. On the other
hand, physical things cannot count as substances with certain properties inhering in them, that is, there is no extended substance, because extension and all other physical qualities and attributes cannot exist independent of a mind. Taking the mind as that thing without which physical attributes and qualities cannot be conceived, in that corporeal reality cannot occur unperceived, leaves spirit as the only substance around.

Thus the doctrine that "there is not any other Sub stance than Spirit" and that "there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of [color, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas of sense]" is just an aspect of the doctrine that the esse of physical things is percipi. So, as Berkeley says, the former doctrine is evident "from what has been said."

Moreover, "for the fuller proof of this point", he adduces another argument for his view on substance, relying in part on what has gone before but bringing into play a new consideration. He takes it for granted that "the sensible qualities are color, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas perceived by sense." This is an evident concomittant of the proposition that "houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects" are the things we perceive by sense and are nothing else than our own ideas and sensations, which proposition is supposed to have been secured in section 4.

He then discusses what might be termed the manner of inherence of the aforesaid sensible qualities, the "ideas perceived by sense", and concludes that the very inherence of such qualities consists in being perceived; that is, that
any thing "wherein" the quality inheres must be perceiving it, and so cannot be an unthinking substance or substratum (presumably because, by definition, no unthinking thing can be a perceiving thing; perceiving here being regarded as a species of thinking). To quote the argument -

"the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such-like, that is, the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction; for to have an idea is all one as to perceive: that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them. Hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas."23

In its context the suggestion that "to have an idea is all one as to perceive" is quite clearly meant as a specification of the manner in which the idea (the sensible quality) "exists in" that things "wherein" it exists. Let us recall that one says that some quality inheres in some substance when it is impossible that the quality should occur apart from that substance, and when it is inconceivable that it should occur without the substance. Berkeley's doctrine is that the only thing without which it is impossible that an idea of sense should exist is a thing perceiving the idea. It is possible to have an idea of sense and a mind perceiving it and nothing else. It is not possible to have an idea of sense and no mind perceiving it. Thus, for any substance, having an idea of sense inhering in it (that is to say, "existing in" it) consists in having the idea in the ordinary sense of that phrase; that is, it consists in perceiving the idea.
Whether this is indeed the only manner in which an idea inheres in, "exists in", another thing turns on whether the esse of every idea is percipi. If the esse of every idea is percipi then so long as it is perceived by something any idea of sense can exist without any further concomitant. And in this case, given that "the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas perceived by sense", the only thing which could count as a substance or substratum in regard of the ordinary physical properties, qualities and attributes, as well as the mental ones, is a perceiving thing. On the other hand, if it is not the case that the esse of all ideas is percipi then presumably it is not true that "for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction" and that "to have an idea is all one as to perceive", which consequence would undermine the argument.

Thus whether or not the relation between the physical property or quality and any substance it "exists in", "wherein it exists", and which "has the idea", can be nothing else than being perceived by the substance depends on the truth of the esse is percipi principle. It also depends on the proposition that the "the sensible qualities" are the ordinary qualities like color, figure, motion, smell, taste and such-like, and are "the ideas perceived by sense". That is to say it also depends on the truth of the direct perception line on physical properties and qualities, which is supposed to have been established by this stage. If both the things it depends on stand, then the argument stands.
It will be natural to consider whether the argument is sound when we come to consider the overall reasoning for those supposed truths on which it depends, and examine that package of argument in sections 1 to 8 of which it is an integral part.

At section 8 Berkeley turns to the theory which will probably be held by those with a grounding in philosophy, and which would engender repeated objections to section 1 to 7.

"But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances which things exist outside the mind in an unthinking substance."24

This reply to the preceding sections is not a rejection of the mind dependence of sensible things, rather it sets that aside as beside the point on the view that the real things which exist without the mind are not the ideas of sense, the sensible things, themselves. This view is part of the standard representative realist position. The representative realist believes that the ideas of sense (sensible things) are copies or resemblances of "external" things existing outside the mind (i.e. not directly perceived) and that ordinary physical things are such external things represented by the ideas of sense.

Of the claims in section 4 a representative realist would probably accept that the things given immediately in sensory experience are our own ideas and sensations, and that our ideas and sensations cannot exist unperceived, but would reject the claim that physical things are immediately given in sensory experience. In any event by section 8 it
is treated as established that if certain things are ideas then they cannot occur unperceived, for there is at explicit play in the argument an assumption that sensible things, ideas of sense, cannot exist unperceived. Berkeley says of the things "of which our ideas are the pictures or representations" that "if they are /perceivable/ then they are ideas and we have gained our point" - our point being that these things cannot exist unperceived or in an unthinking substratum.

Faced with the representative realist move Berkeley brings the Likeness Principle into play with great vigor. To quote,

"I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals, or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point: but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest."25

Now, it is not merely said that in point of fact no idea can resemble anything but an idea. It is said that a resemblance between an idea and non-idea is inconceivable, and suggested that there is no sense to asserting that an idea is like a non-idea.

And this Likeness Principle is presented as intuitively obvious. It is supposed to be warranted if we look never so little into our own thoughts: and in the last
sentence quoted there is a simple appeal "to anyone" on the question of whether, in regard of each of the sensible qualities, it makes any sense at all to assert that the quality is like something not given immediately in perception, something "insensible" (to use the term from the Dialogues).

As we have seen, in sections 1 to 7 Berkeley has been casting most of his arguments both in terms of "ideas of sense" or "sensible" things or qualities and in terms of "chairs", "mountains", and other words which in their ordinary use denote ordinary physical things, whatever the status of those ordinary physical things. Some of the arguments are so constructed that although they would fail in regard of establishing the nature of houses, tables, mountains, and so on in the event that these were not sensible things, nevertheless, all else going well, they would remain sound in regard of sensible things, and show that sensible things, at least, could not occur unperceived.

On the supposition that these arguments are decisive in regard of sensible things, the representative realist would concede the mind dependence of the sensible things but might draw back from the mind dependence of chairs, tables, etc.; and this is what he or she is preparing to do in the first sentence of section 8. And the conclusion of section 8 that the ideas of sense (sensible things) cannot be likenesses of "external" things buttresses the proposition that houses, rivers, mountains, etc. are sensible things against the assault that can be mounted on the basis of the representative realist model of the world.
The proposition so buttressed is required to underpin those reasonings which pre-suppose the direct perception assumption that physical things are sensible things. These reasonings are found in sections 4, 5, 6 and 7. One part of section 4, "what are _ houses, rivers, mountains, and in a word all sensible objects_7 but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?", clearly requires the assumption. Section 5 initially talks of sensible objects and then shifts between talking of "Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and figures" and talking of "sensations", "impressions on the sense" and "sensible things" as though these descriptions denote the same things. A small part of section 6 tacitly relies on the assumption in that the reader is asked to try to separate the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived in order to be convinced of the unintelligibility of supposing that any part of "the furniture of the earth or choir of heaven" exists independent of mind. Section 7 takes it for granted that "the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas perceived by sense." It is not surprising that the sections involved are grouped together with section 8 as one segment of the text set off from the rest of the text by spaces. However, section 3, which is not grouped with sections 4 to 8 but rather is set off as a distinct segment of the text, does not seem to require the proposition that physical things are sensible things as a premise, if anything that proposition is yielded in the course of the reasoning.
Section 3 is cast in terms both of sensible things, that is, "the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense", and of tables, smells, sounds, colour, figures and such-like ordinary physical things and qualities. And its reasoning is conducted in parallel, with the same arguments and considerations being brought to the case of sensible things and to the case of tables, smells, sounds, and so on, relying on exactly the same reasons for their esse being percipi in regard of each. A close attention to what the word exists means when applied to either sensible or physical things, that is to say a close attention to what statements that a sensible or physical thing exists mean, is supposed to make the reader find that any ascription of existence to a sensible or physical thing implies that the thing is perceived.

The argument does not turn on any assumption that the physical things are sensible things, this is not an explicit or implicit premise. Indeed, insofar as section 3 proves that the esse of things like tables, chairs, sounds, smells, and so on is percipi it amounts to a proof that those things are sensible things. A person persuaded by section 3 could thereupon no longer hold any representative theory of perception, on the contrary they would have to hold that tables, chairs, etc. were the kind of things which were given in sensory experience, they would have to hold a direct theory of perception. But if this is so, section 8 seems redundant.

To a related point, section 8 does not show that physical things are sensible things, although it does preclude any objection on representative realist lines.
What it purports to show is that there are no "external" things which are themselves not ideas, not being directly perceived, of which our ideas of sense are likenesses. This conclusion rules out the view that ordinary physical things are external non-ideas and that our ideas of sense are likenesses of those external things, but it does not indicate which part or parts of that view ought to be discarded.

Faced with a decisive proof that one's ideas of sense could not be likenesses of the supposed "insensible" external things the average representative realist would probably regard it as a proof that we are not in any way acquainted with the nature of ordinary physical things through sensory experience, retaining the view that ordinary physical things are external things (non-ideas) which are not directly perceived, and discarding the view that sensible things (ideas of sense) are in any wise likenesses of those physical things. That is to say, the representative realist would probably become a certain kind of sceptic in respect of our knowledge of the nature of physical things.

And Berkeley was quite conscious of this. Already the Lockean view is that as a matter of fact we can never be apprized of the real and inner constitution and nature of things because of the natural limitations of our faculties. In regard of this inner constitution we are already fobbed off by nature with mere "appearances" rather than "realities". And Berkeley is aware of this tendency in the thought of his day; it is one of his major targets.
The move from the Lockean position to the belief that if sensory representation of "external" things is impossible then we are not at all acquainted by sense with the nature of physical things, even by way of likeness, would be almost automatic for a person fixed and settled in the belief that physical things and qualities are external things. (Indeed the possibility of this move is one of the tendencies to scepticism which Berkeley objects to in the orthodoxies of his day.)

In the Three Dialogues Hylas, continuously defending the view that the real existence of the ordinary things in the world is distinct from their being perceived, is purportedly shown that sensible things (ideas of sense) cannot exist unperceived and assumes a representative realist position. He is then apparently shown that nothing resembling them can exist unperceived, on the ground that nothing sensible can be like anything insensible, which is the Likeness Principle. Also, his various defenses and accounts of material substance are refuted, and it is shown that if there are material substances or external things he has no means to know of either their existence or their nature. But, at the beginning of the third dialogue, he still holds to the presumption that any real ordinary "physical" things which may exist are external things, and thus declares for scepticism towards both the nature and existence of the ordinary constituents of the world. It is only then that Philonous starts to lead Hylas out of scepticism and into immaterialism by way of persuading him to abandon the principle that real things in the world have an existence which does not consist in being perceived, a principle which he has doggedly adhered to, and which in the
Principles is identified as the error from which the sceptical tendencies most centrally arise. 26

At the end of the Dialogues Philonous, tracing that course on which Hylas has been driven, first into scepticism via representative realism and then out of scepticism into immaterialism, says the principles they set out on led at first to scepticism and then, carried through thoroughly, led back to reason and common sense. And the proof that our ideas of sense cannot resemble external insensible things because of the Likeness Principle is the central step in moving Hylas out of being an unquestioned representative realist and towards scepticism.

So, on Berkeley's account, a mere proof that our ideas of sense could in no wise be likenesses, pictures, or resemblances, of "external" things existing outside the mind could simply tend to drive the representative realist to scepticism about our knowledge of the nature of physical things. He or she might well come to regard ideas of sense, sensible things, as phenomena and real physical things as noumena of unknown and unknowable natures.

It is section 3 (which contains a form of the argument set out most fully in sections 22, 23, and 24) which is to directly establish the positive doctrine and rule out the kind of scepticism described. The argument in section 3 is the crucial argument in the refutation of scepticism.

The argument of section 8 is not only redundant in regard of underpinning sections 4 to 7, it does not establish that ordinary physical things are ideas of sense,
all it purports to establish is that the ideas of sense are not likenesses of the physical things. While it rules out the representative theory of perception it does not establish a direct theory. Considered on its own it would not only allow the reader to stick to the doctrine that physical things are not sensible things, it might, on Berkeley's own treatment of the matter, move the representative realist towards a quite unnecessary and undesirable scepticism. We may well wonder why the argument is needed. But Berkeley would not wonder. He is of the opinion that when a person strongly holds a position in the belief that it is well-grounded and obvious then they are capable of not feeling the force of the most evident and decisive demonstration of a contrary position; they are capable of remaining unconvinced. And of course he is right. We are all familiar with the case where people are confronted with a simple and obviously sound proof and do not feel it decisive because they hold a contrary proposition which they imagine to be soundly established. This is especially so when the proof is contrary to some central element in an established paradigm. Usually a prevailing paradigm is not discarded merely because of clear and sound arguments for some proposition which happens to be incompatible with that paradigm, usually the prevailing paradigm has to be directly cast into doubt as well.

Thus, although the arguments of sections 1 to 7 are supposedly sound and decisive in their own right Berkeley is consistent in presenting the obdurate
representative realist as unpersuaded, as objecting to
the whole proceeding from his or her customary
pre-suppositions, and as replying in the way quoted on the
basis of the representative realist model of the world.
And the role of section 8 is to refute at one blow a
central and crucial element of this model of the world.
Section 8 simply overthrows the belief that the ideas of
sense are representations of external things.

Sections 1 to 7 are presented as having a full and
decisive force on their own account, and on Berkeley's system
they are indeed self-contained. Section 8 is not required to
underpin them but its refutation of any representative theory
of perception undercuts those beliefs which result in the
reader failing to appropriately struck by the force of the
arguments in 1 to 7. Its function is the overall train of
argument for immaterialism is therapeutic.

In consonance with this point, Berkeley attempts to
refute and question orthodox representative realism at great
length and in every aspect throughout the Principles and the
Dialogues, despite evidently realizing that there are
several alternatives to immaterialism besides representative
realism, including direct realism and, more significantly,
the various kinds of scepticism, because he knows he must
shake the faith which his orthodox readers have in
representative realism before they will seriously consider
immaterialism.

Of course, section 8 is important in its own right
as a refutation of representative realism, but its role in
establishing Berkeley's positive doctrines is to free the reader from his or her preconceptions. Quite naturally, section 8 is juxtaposed with those opening sections which most plainly rely on the principle that physical things are sensible things, sections 4, 5, 6 and 7, in order to undercut the representative realist presuppositions just as they come into play.
CHAPTER X - Assessing the arguments

The arguments with which we have been concerned contain both ordinary deduction from proposition to proposition and reliances on procedures which are to ground certain first principles required in the argument.

As we have seen there are at some places unstated assumptions, although there is usually an attempt to prove them elsewhere. For instance, in sections 4 to 7 certain assumptions that physical things are what is directly perceived are pre-supposed. These are just tacit premises and the relation between them and the premises they underpin is the relation which holds between two propositions one of which follows deductively from the other. Further, the reasoning from stated premises or first principles to other propositions is just ordinary deductive reasoning, which is valid or invalid, and sound or unsound, in the ordinary way. But, as we have also seen, certain parts of the reasoning consist in, or call for, the actual employment of specified procedures to produce certain first principles on the basis of which ordinary deductive reasoning can proceed.

We have noted that in invoking the procedures Berkeley is relying on certain states of affairs being the case. A state of affairs relied on in this connection is not a kind of tacit or disguised premise. It is not a proposition. What is relied on is not any proposition about the state of affairs but the state of affairs itself. If the reliance on the state of affairs is not warranted, that is, if the state
If affairs does not obtain, the result is not that the procedure is not true (what would it be for a procedure to be true?) rather the procedure is not efficacious, it does not yield the first principle upon being actually employed.

The relation between the proposition secured upon the application of the procedure and the state of affairs relied on is nothing like that between premise and conclusion, rather it is an empirical connection. The reliance is on the world being a certain way so that as a matter of fact a concrete act of employing a certain procedure will actually yield a certain proposition to the reasoner. This empirical connection is not improperly described as causal. There is an element of praxis integral to the very reasoning.

These facts have been evident or implicit in much of our treatment of what the arguments of sections 3 to 8 depend on. We have often spoken of a particular dependence in terms appropriate for a causal dependence. Let us now review what the arguments depend on in this way, and assess the efficacy of that part of the argument which consists in the actual application of a certain procedure.

There are four not unrelated states of affairs that Berkeley relies on. First, the reader having a full knowledge of their own mind. Second, the reader's act of conception being such that an idea is employed as a representation of the thing conceived in such a way that the thought of the thing is simply a thought concerning a that which is or is like the "image". Third, the Likeness Principle being self-evident. Fourth, the principle that the esse of ideas is percipi being self-evident.
Of course Berkeley believes that these states of affairs obtain in regard of all of his readers, and expects them all to be in a position to successfully carry out the argument. But in regard of each particular reader the argument only depends for its efficacy on the four states of affairs obtaining in regard of that reader. That reader must fully know the mind, their conception must inherently be of a that which is or is like this image, and the two principles in question must be self-evident to them. Given that, the argument will be efficacious in their case, irrespective of how the matter stands with other readers.

We need to note that what is relied on in regard of the two principles in question is not just their truth but the fact that upon contemplating them the mind will find them evident. What is relied on is their self-evidence. Supposedly a person applying the procedures will recognise that the principles are evident; and it is this state of affairs, this aspect of the way things are, which is to be operative in an actual application of the procedure.

As we have noted, sections 3 and 4 rely on all four states of affairs mentioned, and since it is in these sections that the overall conclusion that physical things are mind dependent is presented, the overall argument depends for its efficacy on all four states of affairs. Section 5 and presumably section 6 also rely on all four. Section 7 certainly does. Section 8, which merely refutes one alternative to the overall conclusion, relies on all but the nature of conception. Let us examine the four states of affairs one at a time.
Full knowledge of the acts and operations of the mind

Berkeley's doctrine that each of us has a full knowledge of the acts and operations of our own minds is just a version of the standard Cartesian view. The standard Cartesian view is, of course, rather worrying. Supposedly one is immediately given the mind, the whole mind, and nothing but the mind, in experience.

Further, one's experience of the mind is itself a part of one's thoughts, one's mind, and thus is itself part of what is given. One's consciousness of one's own mind, and each element and aspect of it, is a part or aspect of what one is conscious of. The mind experiences itself, and its own experiencing of itself. In Husserl's phrase the mind is "translucent to itself".

All this is definitely an odd doctrine. The question is whether it is correct. As we have seen Berkeley is not relying on the doctrine as a premise, rather he is relying on the world actually being as the doctrine states, and actually coming into play accordingly on application of the procedure for ascertaining that the esse of physical things is percipi.

The Cartesian approach is that the doctrine itself is known through our experience of the mind, our direct acquaintance with it. You are directly acquainted with your mind and consequently directly apprized of the fact that it has the character of being translucent to itself. In order to secure the basic propositions which state the doctrine one has to take into account the given, which is a thing or things not a proposition. And each person must secure the doctrine
in regard of their own mind in this way.

Again, a truth about the particular state of one's own mind, such as, say, that one has the idea of a house, is to be secured by taking into account, by taking into consideration, what one is given in thought, in experience. One moves from the actual thing to the proposition which describes it.

It is up to each person to ground truths about their mind by means of taking into consideration what they are acquainted with, and the only argument that can be mounted for such a truth which does not pre-suppose the truth of some other proposition is one which requires the reader or hearer to take into account what they are given in experience.

Now, on considering what I am acquainted with in experience I find that my mind is translucent to itself, that it is what Husserl aptly termed a "realm of certainty". Part of what I am given in being given the mind is being given the mind. What I experience includes my experiencing. The distinction between the knower and the known is not to be found. The distinction between subject and object is not present. I have a full knowledge of my mind, and any acts and operations it may be performing.

These remarks are all statements, they are propositions. But what I am given in the first instance is not mere propositions. I am given more than just some judgement about or belief in a realm of certainty, I am given the realm itself, which is a part of the world. On the basis of being given the realm I conclude that


realm exists. In regard of items in the realm of certainty, before my mind, (such as the idea of a house) I am given the item and on that basis, taking the item into account, conclude that the item is in the realm, is before my mind.

In these kinds of case there is a move from a thing in the world to a proposition, a move from the thing which is given to the proposition that the thing exists, or has such and such a nature, and so forth; which move might well be called reasoning since it is a cognitive act. We can see that the reasoning involved in coming to a truth in this way involves the reasoner doing something in order to ascertain the truth; in this case, a fairly straightforward thing, taking the given into account, taking it into consideration.

And any argument which requires such reasoning on the part of the reader or hearer involves the application of a procedure. The part of the argument which consists in the application of the procedure in order to ascertain some truth will not fail or succeed in the way that a piece of deductive reasoning will. Rather, in the case of each reader, an actual application of the procedure either will or will not yield the requisite truth to that reasoner.

It might be said that the way of grounding truths about ones mind outlined does not involve an act, since supposedly the "contents" of the mind are given irrespective of any act, one is conscious of ones thoughts whether or not one performs any particular kind of reasoning. But this line of thought is unsound. In order to secure certain truths one employs the argument specified and locates the given as the ground of those truths. The act involved is not
becoming aware of what one is conscious of, for that would indeed be no act at all, rather it is the act of taking what one is aware of into account in a certain way.

To illustrate, presumably everyone was conscious of their thoughts before Descartes, but he took them into calculation in a new way; he expressly used them as the immediate warrant of propositions about the mental, and explicitly presented those propositions as "following" from the given, in a new manner.

That the esse of all ideas is percipi

The principle that the esse of all ideas is percipi is a special case of a principle well known long before Berkeley. Many philosophers have held that the things directly before the mind, the things which the mind immediately experiences, cannot exist unexperienced. This was a prominent feature of Descartes system, although it was not original to him, and was accepted by the philosophers in the schools he engendered. It was accepted by Locke and informed the tradition he shaped.

In these traditions the mind-dependence of the immediately experienced is not treated as an analytic truth, a mere truth by definition, rather it is argued for. It is presented as a truth you secure upon looking into your own mind. Moreover it is taken not just that the things which happen, as a matter of fact, to be before the mind cannot occur unperceived, but that all the things which could occur before the mind cannot exist unexperienced. The principle
of the mind dependence of the "mental" is supposed to cover all possible objects of immediate experience - that is, all things which it is possible could exist immediately experienced - not just the ones which happen to occur. It is a mere restatement of this to say that nothing could exist unexperienced which could be immediately experienced. Concomitantly, the only things of which the mind can be immediately aware are things which cannot exist unperceived.

Of course this supposed truth is often advanced in a much more concrete way than this. It is asked whether it is possible for emotions, thoughts, feelings, ideas, mental images, sensations and so forth and so on to exist unexperienced. But the point is usually intended to be quite general. It is intended to cover anything which occurs before the mind, which is "in the mind", anything immediately experienced or given, not just the particular kinds of "mental" item mentioned; and it is intended to cover all the items which might occur immediately experienced.

The supposed truth about the things which could occur immediately experienced is, of course, equally a truth about the nature of the mind's experiencing. The experiencing can only have things which are mind-dependent within its ambit.

And, like many other alleged truths about the character of the mind and about any things immediately experienced by the mind, the supposed truth that the things immediately experienced cannot exist unexperienced, or that experiencing can only be of things which cannot exist
unexperienced, is meant to be secured by each person through a careful examination of his or her own experiencing, and the things experienced.

When I consider my own mind, its experiencing and what I experience, it is evident that nothing which is or could be before it could ever occur unexperienced. Thus in regard of possible objects of my experience I find the principle that nothing immediately experienced could exist unexperienced self-evident.

The Likeness Principle

We come now to the Likeness Principle or more accurately its alleged self-evidence. It might be thought that the principle is without determinate content, so that the question of its self-evidence does not arise. It is a trivial and obvious truth that given any assemblage of things the members of any possible subset of that assemblage are alike in some respect, if only in being members of that subset. More substantially, insofar as it is possible to pick out some subset of the assemblage in accord with certain criteria the members of the subset are alike in being susceptible to being grouped or sorted in that way on application of the criteria in question; and that they are so susceptible is a substantive fact about them.

To illustrate, any assemblage of objects which have spacial positions can be grouped into subsets in respect of falling within or without any one of an innumerably large set of definable geometric boundaries. Again, any assemblage
of objects which exist over time can be grouped into subsets in line with any differences which may obtain with regard to the span or spans of time over which each object exists.

In general, there are usually innumerable respects in which any two things, or the members of any two sets of things, are alike or unalike. Thus, to simply speak of one kind of thing being like another seems contentless, when there is no specification of in what respects the one kind is like the other. And the Likeness Principle seems contentless since it is not clear what it is for one thing to be like another.

But this cannot be right. I can know what I mean when I say that a certain shrub is like a certain wattle tree. And I can say what I mean. And although there will be respects in which the two are alike and certain respects in which they will be unalike it is obvious that not all of these will be pertinent. For instance, the fact that one once had a caterpillar on it and the other did not will be nothing to the point. Neither will the fact that the two are alike in that both once had an ant walk over them. Again, it can be true to say that a child is like its father, even when the two are definitely unalike in a number of respects; for instance, in respect of their height.

It is evident that in particular uses of the term in particular contexts, there can be a determinate sense to simply saying that some thing is like another. The notion of simple likeness often has a determinate sense. It has a definite and discoverable sense in the case of the Likeness Principle.
Indeed we have already seen fairly much what that sense is.

Quite clearly the likenesses in question are that which Berkeley supposes between the thing conceived and the idea of it, and that which he presumes the representative realist is supposing between our sense perceptions and the things they purportedly represent. These are the likenesses that count, for it is here that the Likeness Principle has its application.

Berkeley just takes it for granted that the sense of likeness involved is that in which an image is like the thing it represents, that the sense of likeness is that sense in which, in what is not at all accidentally called representational art, a painting is like the things represented.

This is evidenced in his philosophical diction. He often refers to the ideas which represent physical things in conception, or which are supposed to represent physical things in sense perception, as images. He sometimes characterises these ideas as pictures, and in the Dialogues the doctrine that the physical thing is "represented or painted forth" by the idea of sense is ascribed to the representative realist (First Dialogue, Armstrong op.cit.pp 169).

Given the kind of likeness in question, the Likeness Principle seems to me self-evident. When one conceives something by taking "this" (where the "this" is one of one's ideas) and directing one's thoughts to a "that like this", to a that of which "this" is properly speaking the picture, then anything of which one is thinking must be an idea. That is, it must be the kind of item that we encounter in experience.
The act of conception

Berkeley presumes that we conceive ideas and physical things by means of employing ideas of our own as images or resemblances of those ideas and things, so that every conception of a physical thing which we frame has the form of a thought concerning a "that like this", or the form of a thought concerning a "this, existing in such and such other circumstances", where "this" is the idea of our own which we employ. All I can say is that I certainly don't conceive of physical things in this manner. I am not a visualizer, and find it impossible to call an "image" to mind by effort of will, with the possible exception of aural "images". I do not employ ideas, in the Berkeleyan sense, in conceiving of physical situations, and, so far as I can see, what I conceive when conceiving of a physical object could, and I presume sometimes does, exist unperceived.

Overall, I am far from finding that my thought of a physical thing is inherently of a thing which can only exist if experienced. I do find it evident that nothing can be or be like a mental image, or the analogous item in respect of a sense other than the visual, (in the requisite sense of like) except something which is an idea in the sense of being the kind of thing which is immediately experienced, and that the kind of thing which is directly experienced cannot exist unexperienced, but this does not suffice to establish for me that physical things cannot exist unexperienced since it is not part of my concept of any physical thing that it is a thing which is or is like some mental image.
In this way the major argument of the Principles, the argument in sections 22, 23 and 24, and in section 3, fails to be decisive in regard of the things I think of when thinking of ordinary physical things.

However, I suspect that some strong visualizers may take the very suspect step of having, say, a visual image of a physical situation and as it were holding that image up in their heads and saying that "this", or something like "this", is there in the situation. If they do so they are conceiving the scene, or some parts or aspects of it, in line with Berkeley's model. In doing so they posit features of a very odd sort indeed as existing in the physical situation. The likeness principle and the fact that the esse of ideas is percipi, come into play and Berkeley's arguments show that the situation posited could not exist unperceived.

Consequently, if there are any people who mean by physical objects only things with these odd features, who require such features in anything they would be willing to call a physical thing, who make the possession of such features part of the definition of physical thing, then in regard of what they are referring to in talking of physical things Berkeley's proofs are sound. But these proofs are not efficacious in regard of what I (and, I believe, most people) refer to when I (or we) talk of tables, chairs, mountains, etc. When I talk of physical things I am not referring to objects which cannot exist unperceived.
In examining the arguments of sections 1 to 8 of the Principles we have already discussed how section 3, section 4, section 5, section 6, and section 7 all variously rely on the reader finding the Likeness Principle and the esse of ideas is percipi principle evident, and having a full knowledge of his or her own acts of mind, and conceiving of physical things in the manner described. In each case the reliance was on these states of affairs obtaining so that when the reader employs the procedure in question, even such a simple procedure as carefully considering a rhetorical question, this would result in him or her being yielded the requisite truth. But we can see that this breaks down insofar as physical things are not, or are not always, thought of in the manner presumed.

Section 8 depends on the Likeness Principle, the principle that the esse of ideas is percipi, and complete knowledge of the acts and operations of one's own mind; and in my view it is quite sound and succeeds in refuting representative realism.
CHAPTER XI - The minor arguments of the Principles

Apart from the extended treatments we have observed in sections 22, 23 and 24, and in sections 1 to 8 there appear to be small and even fragmentary versions of the arguments for the mind dependence of physical things in other parts of the Principles. Since they are all versions of the kind of argument we have extensively considered it will be sufficient, in the main, to set them out for inspection; along with a few comments which may prove useful.

The first argument we might consider is in section 9. On balance it seems to me that it is directed at establishing that the esse of certain physical properties is percipi, but this interpretation is not beyond dispute.

The section runs,

"Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these last they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind or unperceived; but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident, from what we have already shewn, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea; and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it."
Again Berkeley is speaking in parallel of "sensible qualities" and of colours, sounds, tastes, and figure, extension, solidity, and so on; taking it that the words for the ordinary "physical" qualities denote sensible qualities, and applying the reasoning on this basis.

There are two ways of reading the section. First, we can read the phrase "The ideas we have of these last" in the third sentence as a reference to the ideas which are "sensible" colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth (the sensations of colour, sound, taste, etc.), and the phrase "our ideas of the primary qualities" as a reference to the "sensible" figure, motion, rest, solidity, and so on (that is, the sensations of figure, motion, rest, solidity, etc.) On this line of interpretation, the section is aimed at the representative realism which holds that the sense impressions of "primary" qualities resemble real qualities out there in the world, but that sensations of secondary qualities do not. And the last sentence of the section, which has the appearance of an overall conclusion, has no more content than that there cannot be a "Matter" which has qualities that resemble any of the "sensations" which people have.

Second, we can take it that Berkeley is writing as he does in many other parts of the text, and that when he refers to "The ideas we have of these last", where these last are "all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth", he is indeed speaking, inter alia, about the ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, rather than the ideas which are these qualities - that is, we can take it that
he is speaking of the ideas which are employed by the mind as representations of these qualities. And, analogously, we can take it that the phrase "our ideas of the primary qualities" denotes the idea of extension, of figure, of motion, of solidity, and so on - that is, the ideas the mind employs to conceive of, to think about, these qualities - rather than those ideas which (on Berkeley's view) are the qualities in question.

This reading casts the argument in a quite different light from the first reading, and yet line by line the argument still follows and the section makes sense. On this reading, the third sentence states that the people who distinguish secondary from primary hold that our ideas of the secondary qualities are not resemblances of qualities existing other than in the mind, but that our ideas of primary qualities are resemblances, "patterns or images", of qualities existing outside the mind in a material substance.

Now, some at least of those who make a distinction between primary and secondary qualities "acknowledge" that what they call secondary qualities, the qualities they refer to in thought and speech as secondary, cannot occur in material substance and can be found only in the mind. Descartes, at least, says that to judge that there is anything in corporeal reality which is or is like what we refer to as secondary qualities is quite senseless, that the notion of a secondary quality or anything like it existing in the external world is incoherent. And the people
who make the primary/secondary distinction certainly do think that the primary qualities that we conceive of do exist as qualities in material substances.

Given Berkeley's model of conception, it would be natural to say of these people that they hold that the similitudes of secondary qualities which we employ in the mind to think of those qualities - that is, the ideas of secondary qualities - cannot resemble qualities existing outside the mind; and that the similitudes of primary qualities which we employ to think of them - that is, the ideas of the primary qualities - do indeed resemble qualities existing outside the mind "in an unthinking substance which they call matter". And this is what is said of them in the third sentence.

It would follow that what these people meant by matter was a substance with the primary qualities they conceive of, the resemblances of our ideas of the qualities, subsisting in them. The rejoinder which Berkeley advances to this line of thought would then be a version of the argument we have been examining, and it would properly issue in the conclusion "Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it".

On balance the second reading seems to me the more reasonable, although it is a somewhat speculative reading, since Berkeley so often elsewhere reserves the term "idea of" to refer to the idea used to represent a thing in conception, and talks of the ideas of sense which on his view constitute physical things as ideas which are those things.
Next let us note that part of section 17 which runs,

"when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?"  

This is not simply harking back to preceding arguments, it is an abbreviated form of the major argument we have been examining, it is a direct appeal to the reader to find it repugnant that "figure" and "motion" and also "other sensible qualities" could have an esse which is not percipi.

Section 45 again treats "sensible objects" and "trees" and "chairs" together, as being the same kind of thing, and as being subject to the same considerations. To quote,

"it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived: the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening
them it is again created - In answer
to all which, I refer the reader to what has
been said in section 3, 4, etc.; and desire
he will consider whether he means anything
by the actual existence of an idea distinct
from its being perceived. For my part, after
the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able
to discover that anything else is meant by
those words; and I once more entreat the
reader to sound his own thoughts, and not
suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If
he can conceive it possible either for his
ideas or their archetypes to exist without
being perceived, then I give up the cause.
But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is
unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of
he knows not what, and pretend to change on me
as an absurdity, the not assenting to those
propositions which at bottom have no meaning
in them."

The matter is not at all clear, but I am inclined
to believe that the procedure of considering what is meant
by the actual existence of a thing distinct from its being
perceived is meant to be undertaken in regard of the
"objects of sense", and the trees in the garden and the
chairs in the parlour; given that this procedure is brought
into play in answer to "all which", and in conjunction with
an appeal to sections 3 and 4 et al; and given that the
phraseology of Berkeley's invocation and employment of the
procedure closely echoes that of occasions where the
procedure is applied to trees, tables, rivers, mountains,
and so on.

The other piece of text which could concern
us here is

"But if you stick to the notion of an
unthinking substance or support of extension,
motion, and other sensible qualities then to
me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing; since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in, or be supported by, an unperceiving substance."4

The assertion that the existence of "extension, motion, and the other sensible qualities" in an unperceiving substance is a plain repugnancy, in an argument addressed to the reader, might be regarded as an implicit appeal to the reader to find that existence repugnant him or herself.
Philosophical dialogues sometimes need to be read in a different spirit from direct philosophical exposition. If an author wishes to construct dialogues in a conversational style in which discussion goes back and forth in a reasonably life-like manner, the protagonists cannot make long speeches at each other in the manner of small philosophical articles. For this reason, when there are a fair number of considerations which bear on an issue it is often necessary for an author to have his or her protagonists address only one or two considerations at a time. And when only one or two considerations on which the issue turns are to be addressed for the time being, the protagonists may be required to take for granted some position on the other pertinent considerations while those addressed are finished with.

Characteristically, Berkeley makes his protagonists take everything for granted but one or two points, come to a conclusion on the basis of those points and then move on to what they have been taking for granted. This method is perfectly legitimate if the matters taken for granted at any point are established at some other point. But it does issue in extended passages where the two protagonists, Hylas and Philonous, fiercely argue out some point, and one of them has some conclusion apparently demonstrated to him by the other, but both take for granted some point - perhaps even a highly controversial point - on which the argument depends. This occurs especially in the early stages of the Three Dialogues where certain matters are taken for granted which
have not been touched on up to that point. The person unused to reading dialogues then has a natural tendency to assume that the author simply begs the question. But of course this is an error if an attempt is made to establish the debatable matter elsewhere: even if the attempt fails the author is not guilty of simply begging the question.

In direct philosophical exposition it is the exception rather than the rule for the author to tacitly take for granted an important and controversial point in a crucial argument. In a work like the Dialogues the converse applies. The Dialogues thus require an unusually systemic reading. Berkeley was perhaps over-optimistic when he wrote in the preface "A treatise of this nature would require to be once read over coherently, in order to comprehend its design, the proofs, solution of difficulties, and the connexion and disposition of its parts. If it be thought to deserve a second reading, this, I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain"1 - especially in regard of contemporary philosophers, given the current rarity of the dialogue form and the decline in systemic philosophy.

It must be remembered that neither of the protagonists is the author, although clearly Philonous expresses views which Berkeley thinks substantially correct. But there is at least one place where Berkeley makes it plain that some of what Philonous has been saying has not been well put; and Philonous's manner of stating his doctrine, if not its substance, is significantly altered in the course of the Dialogues. Moreover, Philonous and Hylas are presented as pursuing a discussion over several days, so that their
position varies from page to page in respect of what has been said and what is yet to be said, but the author is laying before the reader the work as a whole.

Where, as in the Dialogues, many arguments rely on unstated or undiscussed premises which are to be secured elsewhere it is essential to appreciate "the connexion and disposition" of the parts of the text in order to understand the overall argument. And in my view the Dialogues contain a subtle and complex train of argument for Berkeley's positive doctrines as well as much argument against other alternatives. A lot of somewhat finicky work will be needed to extract and display this train of argument, in the course of which we will have to traverse some parts of the text several times.

As a preliminary we will consider the sense of the terms "sensible thing" and "sensible quality". We will then review the large scale structure of the argument for Berkeley's account of the nature of physical things, before proceeding to assess the detail of its parts.

The sense of "sensible thing", "sensible quality" etc.

Before I elucidate the structure of the Dialogues we must pause to establish the meaning of the terms "sensible thing", "sensible quality", "sensible object" and so on. There appears to be a careful and extended definition of the term sensible thing at the beginning of the discussion in the first dialogue.

To quote the first steps of the definitional process -
"Phil. What mean you by Sensible Things?
Hyl. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine I mean anything else?

Phil. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to be sensible which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?

Hyl. I do not sufficiently understand you". ²

What is to be settled is evidently the meaning of the term sensible, a definition is to be agreed on. Philonous's first question is plainly to this end, and Hylas's answer is the kind appropriate to such an enquiry: Hylas himself indicates that what is in question is what he means by the term.

In his second remark Philonous opens by saying that the object of his line of questioning is "clearly to apprehend" Hylas's "notions". He asks Hylas to bear with him while he asks a "farther question" to this end. And the farther question is a direct question about what it is to be a sensible thing, what counts as a sensible thing and what does not. Indeed the second part of the question is cast in terms of which kinds of things may "properly be said" to be "sensible" and which may not. Philonous is asking about Hylas's definition of sensible thing.

After the last-quoted lines there is a brief explanation of what it is to be perceived "mediately" or "not without the intervention of other /other things/" and then the process of definition resumes; and Hylas answers the question of what counts as a sensible thing in the following way -
"Phil. It seems then, that by sensible things you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense?  
Hyl. Right."³

This is express, and after a brief discussion of what this sense of the term amounts to Hylas and Philonous round off the process of agreeing on the sense of the term in the following words -

"Hyl. ... I tell you once for all, that by sensible things I mean those only which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately ...

Phil. This point then is agreed between us - That sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense."⁴

That part of the whole process which is most expressly a specification of what the term means ran -

"Phil. ... by sensible things you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense?  
Hyl. Right."⁵

This suggests that any thing which can be immediately perceived, anything perceivable, counts as a sensible thing. Admittedly a little later Hylas states "by sensible things I mean those only which are perceived by sense" and Philonous remarks "sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense". But this wording does not imply that all sensible things are immediately perceived, rather it is ambiguous in this regard. This manner of speaking can be used to pick out a certain kind of thing as that kind which is often to be found in a certain relation or situation but need not always occur in that relation or situation. For instance one can truly say that by trees one means the large growing things one finds in forests, without it being true by definition that all trees are in forests.
The way Berkeley presents the matter leaves it open for sensible things to be merely the things which are perceivable, to be the sort of thing which is perceived from time to time. And we may conclude that the scope of the term "sensible thing", under the definition given it in the process we have been considering, is not intended to be restricted to the thing actually being immediately perceived by sense but extends to things of the sort which might be perceived, that is, which are perceivable, since the first major question addressed after the preparatory work of defining "sensible thing" has been completed is whether the existence of sensible things and qualities consists in being perceived, and whether a sensible thing can exist unperceived. The question is plainly and squarely stated one third of a page after the end of the definitional process we have examined, and Hylas there avers that the existence of sensible things does not consist in being perceived.

We cannot reasonably suppose that Berkeley has set about defining the major term in question as the very first step in the discussion of the reality of sensible things (and had Philonous state that it is necessary that the notion of sensible thing be clearly apprehended at the beginning since "this may much shorten our inquiry"), and then ignored that definition within the page.

Again, the question of whether the existence of sensible things consists in being perceived raised immediately after the definition is pursued over twenty pages, and is the major focus of the first dialogue; indeed the conclusion
that the existence of sensible things does consist in being perceived, reached after extensive argument, is what drives Hylas from direct realism. Throughout this discussion it is taken that the immediately perceived thing is by definition the sensible thing, but it is not treated as a mere truth by definition that all sensible things are immediately perceived. Indeed direct appeals are made to the definition of the term sensible to ground the truth that the things which are in fact immediately perceived are sensible things, so that this truth can serve as a premise in an extended argument that things which are sensible things are always immediately perceived.

We have spoken so far mainly of sensible things. The natural interpretation is that the terms sensible quality, sensible object, and so on, have an analogous sense; that is, that they are by definition the kind of quality, object, and so on, which is immediately perceived. In the case of sensible qualities at least Berkeley's introduction of the term strongly suggests this -

"Phil. This point then is agreed between us - That sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside taste; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.

Hyl. We do not.

Phil. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or
combinations of sensible qualities?
Hyl. Nothing else. 6

There is a deal of evidence that Berkeley actually operates with the definition of sensible thing which we have outlined through the course of the first dialogue. The most striking is a little into the discussion on whether the existence of sensible things consists in being perceived. After Philonous has dealt with the "sensible qualities" of heat and cold and is starting on sweetness and bitterness, Hylas raises a general objection to what has been going on. To quote the ensuing exchanges -

"Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this time. ... I should have thus distinguished: - /−heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness/−, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the external objects. We must ... conclude ... only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say you to this?

Phil. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, the things we immediately perceive by our senses. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of, as distinct from these, ... /−do not/− at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this to your present purpose I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by the senses) do not exist without the mind.

Hyl. I see it is to no purpose to hold out so I give up the cause as to those mentioned qualities." 7
Nothing could be plainer than this. Philonous invokes a definition of the term sensible things which precludes the move Hylas is trying to make, and states that they have both been discoursing entirely about sensible things in the defined sense; and Hylas does not reject the point. On Berkeley's design, both protagonists are working with the definition laid down that sensible things are the things immediately perceived.

Moreover, Philonous asserts that Hylas himself has already defined sensible things to be "the things we immediately perceive by our senses", and Hylas does not demur. The only candidate for the passage in which Hylas has himself defined "sensible thing" is that definitional passage at the beginning of the Dialogues which we have already surveyed. This confirms the interpretation that Berkeley is there setting down the meaning of the term as it is to be used in the ensuing discussions.

We should note that in the passage under review Berkeley characterises the things which are not the sort of things which are immediately perceived as insensible.

The sense in which the term sensible is being used in the first dialogue is further attested by a passage which occurs in the course of the discussion of sensible sound a page or so on from the exchange last quoted. It runs, -

"Hyl. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air."
Phil. I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by the answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before."

This is a direct invocation of the answer he gave when Hylas was drawing a distinction between heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, immediately perceived by us, and some other kinds of quality, in the passage we have already considered at length, for the words "the answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before" can only be a reference to the answer then given, since that is the only preceding occasion on which such a distinction was applied in any connection. And as we have seen the answer then given was a direct appeal to the definition of sensible things there given. Berkeley is directly invoking that answer and that definition.

When we turn our attention to the point where Hylas endorses a representative realism we find another exhibition of the sense of "sensible thing". To quote in part Hylas's articulation of representative realism,

"Hyl. ... I think there are the two kinds of objects: - the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called ideas; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations ... ideas do not exist without the mind; but the later sort of objects do. ...

Hyl. /Those external objects/ are perceived by sense. ...

Hyl. ... For example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

Phil. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these are also perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas?
Hyl. That is my meaning.
Phil. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense.
Hyl. In the very same." 9

Now on this account there are two things perceived by sense, the "ideas", which are the only things directly perceived, and the "external objects", which are representatively perceived, and cannot be directly perceived. And these external things are termed "imperceptible" in contradistinction to the ideas.

On our reading of the definition of "sensible thing" we would expect that things directly perceived by sense would count as sensible things, and that the things which can be perceived by sense only "by the mediation of ideas", that is to say, representatively, would count as insensible. And a little further along the discussion of Hylas's new position we find that this is the case.

"Phil. ... Which are material objects in themselves - perceptible or imperceptible?
Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be perceived only by our ideas.
Phil. Ideas then are sensible and their archetypes or originals insensible?
Hyl. Right". 10

In its context, this displays the distinction between the sensible and the insensible as that between the sort of thing which is immediately perceived, and the sort of thing which is not immediately perceived.

There are other pieces of evidence which bear on the sense of the term sensible, but those we have considered
already have a sufficient force.

... 

Basically, the Three Dialogues is of that common form where one protagonist starts out with supposedly erroneous views and is by stages argued into supposedly correct views by the other protagonist. Hylas starts out with one position, that position is refuted by Philonous, Hylas comes to a somewhat different position, Philonous shows that it will not do either, and so on, until at the end Hylas is forced into what Berkeley believes is the correct doctrine.

Hylas is forever shifting his ground, but some shifts are more important than others. The most important are out of one overall metaphysical position and into another of a different kind. The text may be distinguished into stages within each of which Hylas is defending some particular general metaphysical stance. The transition from each stage to the next is one of the large scale features of the argument.

Luckily, the Dialogues is very well internally signposted. From time to time Philonous, or Hylas, states what is to be done in the next few pages, without demur from the other; and from time to time one of them reviews what has been done, outlining its structure. Moreover, when an important new move is made or stance taken it is usually well marked. There are two standard techniques here. First, one protagonist states clearly what he
takes the move or stance to be and asks the other whether he agrees, and the other expressly agrees. Second, the new matter is stated at length, often being put in several ways and repeated several times, with what appears to be deliberate redundancy so that the reader will find it difficult to mistake or overlook the point. This is especially the case when Hylas alters his position in an important way. Berkeley goes to great lengths to make the new position both prominent and clear.

It seems to me that Hylas passes through six distinct stages.
1. Naive Direct Realism.
   This is Hylas's initial position. Sensible things are ordinary physical things, and vice-versa, and they are real things. Their existence does not consist in being perceived, they can exist unperceived. (See pages 137 and 139 Armstrong op. cit.).
2. Representative Realism.
   Having apparently been shown that sensible things and qualities cannot exist unperceived, and that trees, mountains, rivers, etc., in the ordinary sense of these words, cannot exist unperceived (and are sensible things), Hylas turns to a representative realist position. Sensible things (ideas of sense) cannot exist unperceived but are pictures or likenesses of external things, which are themselves never directly but only representatively perceived. These external things can occur unperceived. (See particularly pages 166 to 169 Armstrong op. cit.)
3. Scepticism as to knowledge of a real world through the senses

This position is a little more complex, and could as well be called naive idealism. Having accepted that sensible things can neither be, nor be likenesses of, a thing which can exist unperceived, Hylas holds that the nature of real things is in no way conveyed to us by sensory experience, either directly or by way of representation. Concomittantly, he holds that the things we do know via the senses, directly or indirectly, are not real things but mere appearances. Things as we are apprized of them through sense experience, as we experience them, are not the real things, they are merely ideal.

In regard of sensible things Hylas believes they do not have a "real existence", that is, that they are not "real" things; but rather that they are mere illusion, or appearance. This is not to deny that they exist but to deny they are a part of a real world. Trees, mountains, rivers, and so on, in the ordinary sense of these words, are not real but mere appearance. (stage 3 is in op. cit., pages 173 to 174.

4. Non-direct Non-representative "Realism".

Still holding that the nature of real things is not conveyed to us by sense Hylas avers that there are real things which may be discovered by the intellect, rather than known through the senses. To quote the passage where Hylas takes up this stance,

"Hyl. I think I understand you very clearly ... But ... may there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirit and Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be Matter?"
Phil. How often must I inculcate the same thing? ... there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.

Hyl. You are in the right.

Phil. Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded on; and what this matter is, in your present sense of it."

Following these remarks Hylas proceeds to put up various accounts of "Matter" in various senses, in each of which "Matter" is inferred by reason not known by sense, and Philonous knocks them down. This takes up the rest of the second Dialogue. (Stage 4 is in Armstrong, pages 178 to 188)

5. Complete scepticism as to our knowledge of the real world.

Having apparently been shown that "Matter" - in any sense he can articulate - is impossible, and that in any event even if there were "Matter" no-one could have good reason to suppose so, Hylas moves to a complete scepticism as to our knowledge of the real world. Things as we know them are mere appearances, which have no relation to things as they are in themselves. And even if, per impossible, things as we know them showed forth real things as they are in themselves, there would be no way for us to know that this was the case. (Stage 5 is in Armstrong, pages 189 to 221)

6. Immaterialism

Hylas discards the view that real things in the world have an existence distinct from being perceived, and comes to accept that the sensible things, the things which are chairs, ships, hills, etc., and which are mind-dependent, are real things. He accepts that sensible things are real
ordinary physical things, and sensible qualities real
ordinary physical qualities. (Found in Armstrong, pages 222 to 222)

As in the Principles Berkeley sets before the
reader many arguments which are supposed refutations of
doctrines alternative to his own, but which do not
themselves establish his doctrine. I will only consider
arguments insofar as they are, or are an integral part of,
arguments for Berkeley's immaterialism.

Just after the beginning of the second dialogue
Hylas has been driven both from naive direct realism and
representative realism, and into the first stage of
scepticism, that concerning the possibility that the
nature of things is conveyed to one by sensory experience.

Thereafter both protagonists take it to be
established that the existence of sensible things and
qualities consists in being perceived and that ordinary
things like trees, tables, mountains, chairs, and so on,
cannot exist unperceived and are sensible things. This
is relied on by both protagonists in the ensuing
arguments, and is a major part of the full immaterialist
position.

What Hylas is not then prepared to accept is
that the trees, ships, and rivers, etc., which we speak
and think of in the ordinary way should be accounted real
things and properties: rather, having been apparently
shown that their existence consists in being perceived,
and that they are thus sensible, he is inclined to treat them as mere delusory appearances, in contradistinction to any real things there may be. (And, in the hope of securing some real things, he tries to hold fast to "Matter", which is not presented by the senses but discovered by reason.) He sticks to this treatment of these ordinary things which we speak of until he becomes an immaterialist at the end of the Dialogues.

The view he needs to adopt to have the full immaterialist position is that the things as we perceive them, and as we talk and think of them, are real and substantial, as real as anyone ever supposed, even though they are mind-dependent. (As Philonous says when asked to characterize the position both he and Hylas have come to at the end of the Dialogues.

"Phil. ... My endeavours tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:—the former being of opinion, that those things they immediately perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things immediately perceived are ideas, which exist only in the mind "[12])

Immaterialists do not believe that they have called the reality of the world and the things in it in question; indeed on their analysis of being a real thing the reality of the world is particularly secured by their principles, and nobody but themselves is a thoroughgoing realist. The immaterialist believes he or she has uncovered an important fact about real physical things, to wit, that they are the things immediately perceived and cannot exist unperceived. As Philonous says "I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things."[13]

But by the end of his first two stages, Hylas imagines that in regard of ordinary things in the world he must turn
things into mere ideas.

The 'error' into which Hylas has fallen is foreshadowed in the Principles in the first of the Objections. To quote -

"it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist exist only in the mind; that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy?" 14

Hylas has accepted a number of the "foregoing principles", and accepts that tables, mountains, and so on, cannot exist unperceived and are sensible things, but he has drawn the conclusion here displayed, that these things are not real but mere chimeras. As Philonous says at the end of the first dialogue "You are ..., by your principles, forced to deny the reality of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind." 15

So, after the first two stages all that remains to be established in order to secure the full positive doctrine is that the ordinary "physical" things, things such as lakes, flowers, houses, and so on, in the ordinary sense of these words, are real things rather than mere appearances. Anything not to this end in the last four stages is beside our point. In particular, anything which merely refutes some view Hylas advances, without thereby showing that the things denoted by the ordinary words for the ordinary things in the world are real things is beside our point.
Most notably, Hylas argues for a material substance or substratum which is not discovered by sense but by reason and which he regards as a candidate for being accounted a real being. Philonous purports to refute these arguments. No doubt these refutations would remove the temptation to say that these substances, rather than the things such as "trees", "mountains", and so on were the real things. In that sense the refutations would be therapeutic, and importantly so. But showing that one candidate for the title of real thing will not do, does not show that another will. Indeed this is just why the refutation of "intelligible" material substance does not cause Hylas to immediately embrace the sensible as the real but rather leaves him a more complete sceptic than before convinced that nothing furnished by either sense or reason is a real thing in the world. Thus the arguments involved in the refutations are not our concern.

The first two stages of the Dialogues are treated as having established that sensible things and qualities, and things like trees, mountains, tables, and so on, cannot exist unperceived. But it by no means follows that all, or even most, of the argumentation is to that end. Naive direct realism is expressly ruled out in the first dialogue, and in line with the approach we have noted before we would expect a number of arguments that preclude direct realism without pointing to some particular alternative. These arguments will not be our concern.
Again, at the beginning of the Dialogues Philonous promises to show that Hylas's principles lead to the denial of the "reality of sensible things". In this context one would expect Philonous to raise every difficulty Berkeley can think of including any which arise not from the belief that things such as rivers and tables have an existence distinct from their being perceived but from other elements of direct realism. Such difficulties, and arguments based on them, will not in themselves show that the existence of ordinary things consists in being perceived - although they will have an important therapeutic role - and will leave open a thorough-going scepticism.

Let us consider the structure of the first two stages. At the beginning of the first dialogue Philonous denies the existence of "what philosophers call material substance" (his italics). He intimates that if this opinion were shown to lead to anything sceptical he would renounce it, and asks Hylas "are you content to admit that opinion for true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism." Hylas says that he is, and implies that Philonous's denial of "material substance" will issue in scepticism about the reality of "sensible things".

The two then launch an investigation of "sensible things" (first defining the term as we have seen). They agree that "if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible" and that sensible things are simply sensible qualities or combinations thereof. They thus set out to decide on the nature of sensible things by deciding the nature of sensible qualities. Hylas adopts
the position that the existence of sensible things and qualities is distinct from their being perceived, and that they can exist unperceived.

The first sensible quality discussed is "sensible heat", that is, the idea of sense which we perceive when we feel heat; it is "the heat immediately perceived". Quite naturally, Philonous being an immaterialist and Hylas at this stage a direct realist, the two protagonists often refer simply to "heat"; using the ordinary word for the ordinary physical quality. But they are quite expressly examining heat qua the heat immediately perceived.

Hylas is eventually persuaded that the existence of sensible heat consists in being perceived. A parallel argument takes care of sensible cold.

The dialogue then runs,

"Hyl. ... there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external things.
Phil. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind than heat and cold?
Hyl. Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that is what I despair of seeing proved.
Phil. Let us examine them in order."

And they then proceed to examine all other sensible qualities in order, first considering the secondary sensible qualities and then the primary sensible qualities. In each case Hylas is eventually persuaded that the existence of the quality consists in being perceived. Various scruples and objections are dealt with along the way.
This completed, Philonous produces a new argument, and, setting aside all that has come before, he declares he is willing to let his whole case stand on it. It is the argument that it is inconceivable that any tree or house or such-like, should exist unperceived. Hylas accepts the argument and after a few minor scruples are dealt with discards his direct realism but moves to a representative realism.

As in the Principles Philonous brings the likeness principle into play, and forces Hylas to concede that the ideas of sense cannot be like things which are not perceivable, which are insensible.

At this point Philonous remarks,

"You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the reality of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind."21

Hylas does not fully concede the point, although he is unable to find any error in the preceding reasoning; and he makes one last half-hearted attempt to avoid the conclusion in the first two pages or so of the second dialogue, until at last we read -

"Phil. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic. Hyl. It is too plain to be denied."22
The first substantive argument for the mind-dependence of all sensible qualities which Philonous advances, that argument in which he goes through each sensible quality in turn, is presented as simply a proof that the immediately perceived quality cannot exist unperceived. Naturally it is conducted in large part using the ordinary words for the various ordinary physical qualities for at this stage both Hylas, a naive direct realist, and Philonous, an immaterialist, take it for granted that the quality immediately perceived is the ordinary physical quality. But the argument is expressly restricted to establishing the nature of the quality immediately perceived, the sensible quality, and the protagonists take it to apply to ordinary physical qualities only in that they presume ordinary physical qualities to be sensible.

The two protagonists expressly set out to deal with the sensible qualities, immediately after having defined the term sensible in the way we have seen, and Philonous starts the discussion of particular sensible qualities in the following context -

"Phil. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from being perceived.

Hyl. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.

Phil. Heat therefore, if it be a real being, must exist without the mind.

Hyl. It must."23
We must recall that at this stage Hylas is a direct realist and Philonous an immaterialist, and both believe that the word heat denotes sensible heat. In this context, the passage immediately above appears to be the beginning of an examination of what both protagonists take to be sensible heat, the heat immediately perceived.

Moreover, at the heart of the argument on "heat", after Hylas has initially conceded that a great "heat" is a pain, we read:

"Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

Phil. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one uniform simple sensation, or two distinct sensations?

Hyl. But one simple sensation.

Phil. Is not the heat immediately perceived?

Hyl. It it.

Phil. And the pain?

Hyl. True

Phil. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.

Hyl. It seems so."24

Now this reasoning quite evidently relies on the intense heat under consideration being intense sensible heat. But more importantly, is it reasonable to doubt that each reference to "the intense heat immediately perceived" in Philonous’s concluding remark is intended to refer to that intense heat which has been the subject of the preceding discussions. The conclusion of the argument
about "intense heat" is, as we can see, cast in terms of the "intense heat immediately perceived"; indeed it is explicitly framed as a conclusion about the intense heat immediately perceived - that this immediately perceived heat is identical with the pain. They have, in fact, been talking about the intense heat immediately perceived.

Again, having finished with "heat" and "cold" the exchange runs,

"Hyl. ... I am content to yield this point ... but there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external things.

Phil. But what ... if ... the case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities."25 (my italics)

Here Philonous characterizes the qualities they will be moving on to as other sensible qualities: he explicitly takes it that they have been considering the sensible qualities heat and cold.

But the most decisive passage is,

"Hyl. ... You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which I answered simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished: - those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains, but not as existing in the external objects. We must ... conclude ... only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar.

Phil. ... Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, the things we immediately perceive by our senses ... Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the mind?

Hyl. I see it is to no purpose to hold out"26 (second italics mine)
This is quite express. As Berkeley presents it, their discourse has been entirely proceeding about sensible heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, in the defined sense.

Hylas and Philonous then proceed to consider the other secondary and then the primary sensible qualities seratim. And on examination we would throughout find that the discussion is intended to cover only the "sensible", if I were to give the text a moderately close reading.

...  

Now, Berkeley presents Hylas as being moved from direct realism to a representative realism and from there to scepticisms. Each step involves an uncoupling of the ideas of sense from the real world. A person who takes the representative realist road no longer regards the tree immediately perceived, the tree "as it strikes the senses", as the tree proper. Rather what one is given in sensory experience is a picture, and the tree is the thing pictured. There are two distinct and indeed greatly unalike things which resemble each other in certain respects. One no longer has the one thing as it is, and as it appears.

Again, a comprehensive sceptic denies that the ideas of sense have anything at all to do with the way the world is. They are not real things, nor appearances of them, nor pictures of them; they have no fixed relation whatever to real things.
Berkeley knows that a person who follows the kind of path Hylas travels might take it that trees are quite distinct and different things from the pertinent ideas of sense, for this after all is one of the standard forms of representative realism; and might later take it that the ideas of sense have nothing whatever to do with any tables, chairs, rivers, houses, and so on, which there might be; for this is one of the standard forms of scepticism. But Berkeley is quite clear he wants to prove not simply that the ideas of sense are real things but that they are tables, and chairs, and rivers - real tables, real chairs, real rivers.

He knows that in thorough scepticism some are going to deny that the sensible thing has anything to do with any particular ordinary physical thing - quite irrespective of whether that sensible thing is a real thing or not. If a person has moved firmly to thorough scepticism, and is firmly of the view that there is no relation between sensible things and any other things, then being presented with a demonstration that the sensible things are real things will not move him or her from believing that these sensible things, even if real, have no relation to the ordinary things in the world - so long as the option of holding this has been left open.

For instance, consider a sensible tree, the tree as immediately perceived. There will be a tendency to come to believe that this is not an ordinary tree properly so-called. Consequently, even if people are at length persuaded that it is a real thing, they will not
necessarily think that this real thing is a tree in the ordinary sense of the word.

And, as we have noted, by the time the dialogues move into the stages where the remaining positive element to be established is that ideas of sense, sensible things, are real things in the world, it is taken to be established that trees and mountains - that is the ordinary things in the world which we talk and think of - are sensible things and that they cannot exist unperceived, that their esse is percipi.

Given that the argument in which Philonous goes through each sensible quality in turn is explicitly presented as simply a proof that the sensible things cannot exist unperceived, we should not suppose that Berkeley is depending on that argument to show that trees, mountains, etc., are sensible things the esse of which is percipi. We can see that the argument is not designed to show that the ordinary "physical" things we talk and think of are sensible things whose esse is percipi, although it doubtless has a therapeutic role in refuting direct realism.

Let us, therefore, look to the next argument, that which relies on it being inconceivable that certain things should exist unperceived. And when we do we find that the argument is so cast that it directly applies to ordinary physical qualities and things, as well perhaps as applying to sensible things. To quote -
"Phil. ... I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

Hyl. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen.

Hyl. No, that were a contradiction.

Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you.

Hyl. How should it be otherwise.

Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

Hyl. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what lead me into it - It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, me thought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them existing out of the minds of all Spirits.

Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind?

Hyl. I do."27

This argument is cast directly in the words for ordinary physical things and does not invoke any premise
that those things are sensible things, that is, that they are the sort of thing immediately perceived. One simply goes through the process of trying to conceive of an unperceived tree, house, or mountain, and on examining that process finds that all one can do in conceiving of such a thing is to conceive of a thing whose esse is percipi.

Unlike the preceding arguments which are calculated to show something about the quality immediately perceived, that it must be perceived, but which only apply to physical qualities on the supposition that those qualities are sensible qualities, this argument, as presented, directly applies to trees, mountains, chairs, and so on, and purports to show of them that they must be perceived (and concomittantly are sensible things). It only shows the same of all sensible things on the supposition that those things are all things like trees, mountains, etc. If a sensible thing was not an ordinary "physical" thing such as a tree, house, and so on, then it would not be subject to the argument as it is here framed.

As we can see, the argument is constructed in the course of Hylas and Philonous's attempt to determine whether sensible things can exist unperceived; but, as is natural given the protagonists positions at this point, it actually addresses trees, mountains, houses, and so on. Despite the preliminaries in which Hylas and Philonous declare they are on about "sensible" things, the actual argumentation covers the things denoted by our ordinary words for the ordinary things in the world.
The argument under review is the warrant, the only warrant, for two aspects of later exchanges. First, that in the sceptical stages of the Dialogues it is never considered that the trees and mountains which we think and speak of in non-philosophical thought and speech might be unknown or unknowable, or distinct from the things given immediately as it were by the senses. Second, that at important points it is taken for granted that the mountains, houses, chairs, that we speak and think of in the ordinary course of events are the immediately perceived things and cannot exist unperceived.

We have already considered Berkeley's arguments on the inconceivability of unperceived physical things, and that discussion covered the argument in question here. As we have seen, the argument depends for its efficacy on the act of conception being as Berkeley supposes, on having an error-free acquaintance with one's own mind, on the principle that the esse of ideas is percipi, and on the principle that nothing can be like an idea but an idea.

The character of the argument, particularly the fact that it is intended to apply to the things referred to by our ordinary terms for ordinary things in the world,
is further exhibited in a later passage. Just a few pages into the second dialogue, a little after the second stage of the Dialogues has been concluded, Philonous describes the advantages to religion which follow from the doctrines he espouses, and in the course of this rehearses the argument we have been contemplating.

He avers that since no sensible things can exist unperceived, but yet have an existence distinct from any finite spirit there must be an infinite omnipresent Spirit wherein they exist, and who contains and supports them. He then adds,

"that ... an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred from the bare existence of the sensible world is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion: That the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now ... baffle the most strenuous advocate for Atheism. ... the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown by this single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a Mind? Let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or a confused jumble of atoms; how anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist independent of a Mind, and he need go no further to be convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real existence?

Hyl. It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to religion in what you advance."28
Given our extensive treatment of similar arguments it is not necessary to comment much. Let us note that as here framed the argument is presented as applying directly to physical as well as sensible things. It applies to such things as a desert, a chaos, or a jumble of atoms. And we already know from our examination of the analogous arguments in the Principles that Berkeley does believe it is directly efficacious in the case of the things denoted by our ordinary words for "corporeal" objects such things as trees in a park, or books in a closet.

After the first two stages what remains to be done is to have Hylas come to consider the mind-dependent trees, houses, rivers, ships, etc., real and substantial things. Philonous suggests that Hylas gets into scepticism about the reality of sensible things, about the reality of the ordinary things we speak and think of, because he has incorrect criteria for what it is to be a real thing. For example of this,

"Phil. I deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the reality of sensible things consisted in an absolute existence out of the minds of spirits, or distinct from their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, you are obliged to deny sensible things any real existence; that is, according to your own definition you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined after that manner."
And he repeatedly says that Hylas's trouble is that Hylas will not concede that the sensible things, the mind-dependent things which we speak of in speaking of the ordinary corporeal things in the world, are real things, as he should.

Philonous aptly characterizes the dispute which remains between Hylas and himself in the following way,

"Phil. ... those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.

Hyl. Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses.

Phil. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things themselves. ... We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we differ - you will have them to be empty appearances, I real beings." 30

Now, we must recall that Berkeley thinks that we have access to the meanings of our terms. Presumably when one talks of some thing not being real, one knows what it is to be real, to be a real thing, and what it is to say of some thing that it is real, a real thing.

In the Principles Berkeley relies directly on this when he addresses the question of whether his doctrines imply that physical things only exist "in the mind", or qua appearance, rather than being real things in the world, when he addresses the question of whether on his account of their nature physical things are real rather than unreal or ideal. To quote,
"If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised ... Take here an abstract of what has been said: - There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves ... others they perceive by sense ... These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former; - by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them ... In the sense here given of reality, it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term reality different from what I do, I entreat them to look in their own thoughts and see."31

Further to the same conclusion, the question being faced is not what the nature of trees, mountains, etc., is - for that has been determined prior to this point - but whether things with that nature should be described as real things. That is to say, it is a question of whether things of such nature satisfy the criteria for being a real thing, whether they count as real things; it is a question of the definition of the term, the meaning of the term real thing.

And in the traditions from which Berkeley arises it is customary to believe that people can know the meanings of the terms they use by "introspection". Berkeley might naturally rely on the reader being able to know what he or she means by the terms "real" and "real thing", when he or she really reflects on the matter. And when we go to the text it is consonant with this interpretation.

Hylas is persuaded in the third dialogue of the reality of those sensible things which are denoted by the ordinary words for things in the world. Philonous's approach seems to be that what is essential is to clear out of the road errors and misconceptions which are likely to make a person believe that the things we speak of and think
of, and which are sensible things, are not real. He believes that once this is done Hylas will find himself compelled to acknowledge that trees, mountains, and so on, are real things.

And, apart from removing the impediments to seeing the obvious truth that the ordinary things which we denote by our ordinary words are real things, Philonous throughout the dialogue puts questions and appeals to Hylas on the matter; as though he hopes Hylas will see the merit of his views upon serious consideration. For instance near the beginning of the third dialogue Philonous says,

"Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?" 32

and a little later he remarks,

"But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?" 33

Moreover, at several points Philonous simply lays before Hylas what "real" supposedly means, what it is to be a real thing on his view. For instance, towards the end of the third dialogue he says

"can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an absolute external existence? ... objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable; - however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that constantcy and truth of things which secures all the
concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the irregular visions of the fancy."34

And again,

"Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or in any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being, but not on yours."35

And once the impediments have been cleared out of Hylas's way he just takes Philonous's points as obvious, and finds it evident that the trees, mountains, rivers, and so on, are real things, and that the notion of real is as has been propounded. He accepts Philonous's final summary of the position they both now hold - that its substance is that the things people "immediately perceive" are the real things, and that the things immediately perceived are ideas which cannot exist unperceived - and states

"Now ... a new light breaks upon my understanding. I am clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms."36

Personally, I do not find the final move to secure the reality of "sensible things" particularly convincing as an argument, although being myself opposed to indirect theories of perception I have a deal of sympathy with the conclusion. However, we do not need to linger on this move since, as we have seen, the overall argument for immaterialism breaks down considerably earlier when Berkeley attempts to show that ordinary physical things, trees, mountains, etc., cannot exist unperceived.
PART V - Concluding Remarks

Perhaps the major task of this thesis was to provide a survey of what Berkeley's conclusions and arguments are, and to assess those arguments and conclusions. That has been the burden of most of the preceding pages.

Naturally, it has only been possible to perform this task in a partial way. I have had to pass over many interesting and important aspects of the system - such as the nature of time, the nature of space, the full details of God's relation to his creation, the world as the "language of God", Berkeley's philosophies of science and mathematics, and many other significant matters.

However, in my judgement the basic structure of the system has been laid out and considered, as have the "arguments" for the central elements of that structure. Thus the main body of the work has been completed, but it will be useful to make some concluding remarks to draw the threads together.

How the mind can think on things which are quite separate and distinct from it, which are not immediately before it, is a traditional philosophical problem. It was an important question in medieval thought, and it was taken to be one of the questions philosophy should answer.

The nature of a thing, what the thing is, is apprehended by the mind when it has a thought which is a thought of that thing. But how can a "mental" item, a
thing wholly before the mind, present to the understanding the nature of a thing which is distinct and separate from the mind?

We have already seen that for Acquinas a physical thing is a certain nature occurring with esse naturale, and the thought of that thing is the same nature occurring with esse intentionale. And this is the way the mind can and does immediately apprehend the nature of each physical thing, what it is to be that physical thing.

For Acquinas the representation of the thing in the mind is quite literally a re-presentation of what the thing is, of its nature - the representation presents that nature again. Much the same is true for Berkeley.

We have seen that for Berkeley it would be fair enough to say that essentially the same kind of natures were manifest in ideas of sense and ideas of imagination; one set laid on us by God, the other our own contrivance. So, given his model of conception, for Berkeley the process of representing an idea or physical thing to oneself (which is the only way such a thing or idea can be conceived) is literally a re-presentation of the sort of nature thought on. And this process is what is required for that nature to become an object of thought, this is what is required for the thing to be an intelligible thing.

An idea of X serves as a representation of X in virtue of being a certain kind of re-presentation of X. On Berkeley's account of conception, the mind conceives the nature of a physical thing or idea only through having immediately presented to it the same sort of nature;
and the nature to be conceived is thought in that, and insofar as, it is the same as, or like, the nature immediately given to the mind.

On the side of ideas, there is a very close relation between the world and thought about it. The physical world that can be thought and spoken of, the intelligible physical world, consists in things and states of affairs which, in very central respects, have the same natures as our thoughts about them - thoughts of which we are immediately apprized, and the natures of which are fully presented to us.

On the side of spirits the matter is less clear. We have seen Berkeley's model of the conception of spirits under which we represent spirits to ourselves not by means of an idea or passive representation but by way of taking our own mind, or some active aspect of it, and considering a that which is like the thing taken.

Now, that which represents is entirely our own mind, or some aspect of it, and does not involve our ideas. It has an esse which is agere and is a resemblance of the thing represented. In this sense it is a re-presentation of the thing conceived. Again, there is a very close relation between the spirits and acts of spirits in the world, and our thoughts of them. The spirits and acts that are thought and spoken of can only have the same or similar natures as the thoughts of them.
One of my aims was to display the way in which Berkeley's thought is systemic. I believe this has largely been done in the detailed work of the preceding chapters. On my reading his metaphysics is a tightly integrated system.

This is most obvious on the side of ideas and physical things where there are limits to thought and discourse about these things in that the only manner of conception which can be used to think of them inherently comprehends only a certain kind of thing, with a certain kind of character. A thought about any idea, including any physical thing, consists in a thought about a that which is, or is like, such and such an idea.

Concomittantly, the reference of a thought about the physical world is to a that which is or is like such and such an idea, that thought denotes a thing or situation which is or is like such and such an idea. And since the meaning of human discourse is supposedly derivative on the meanings given to words by the users of the words, human discourse about ideas or physical things has this circumscribed reference, this denotation.

The position is analogous in the case of spirits. A thought about any spirit, or act of spirit, consists in a thought about a that which is like ones own spirit, or some act or aspect of it. A thought or statement about a spirit, or act, refers to a that which is like ones own spirit, or an act or aspect of it.
Just as there are only two kinds of thing directly experienced - one's own spirits and its act and operations, and one's own ideas - so there are only two kinds of thing conceived, each re-presented by one of the two kinds of thing directly experienced.

For Berkeley, the limits and character of the world we speak and think of are determined by the nature of perception and reflexion, and the nature of conception. Thought is not a neutral medium in which truths float but an active structured process - from the structure of which one can read off the character of thought and, concomittantly, the nature of the world thought on.

The overall strategy in Berkeleyean metaphysics is to go to the mind, and from the basic structure of thought read off the basic arrangement and character of the world as we know it. One finds limits to thought which are equally limits on the thinkable. (I am no Kantian scholar but there seem resemblances to Kant's overall approach.)

As we have seen this manoeuvre is used to secure the nature of the things which are conceivable, the relation between them, and how they may be known.

The account of the world which Berkeley came to on this basis would provide a ground for a sound knowledge of the world, well based sciences, a thoroughgoing religious conviction, and a recognition of the human being's place in the scheme of creation. In philosophy more narrowly construed, the account would resolve the major metaphysical quandaries of Berkeley's age.
Unfortunately, as we have noted, the account is not secured through the procedures set forth, and the above consequences do not flow.
COLLECTED FOOTNOTES

Note: The footnotes from each chapter are arranged here in order, except for those which are adjuncts to, or comments on, the text and which ought to be read in immediate conjunction with it. These latter footnotes are at the foot of the appropriate page.

Introductory Remarks

3. This footnote is at the foot of page 13.
4. This footnote is at the foot of pages 13 and 14.
5. Section 51, Principles, op. cit., page 81.
7. Section 38, Principles, op. cit., pages 75 and 76.
8. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 223.

Chapter I - The concept of the idea

2. Anscombe and Geach op. cit., pages 70 and 71, and page 183.
4. ibid
5. This footnote is at the foot of page 27.
7. Section 23, Principles, op. cit., page 70.
10. This footnote is at the foot of page 29.
Chapter II - The basic things in the world: Spirits and Ideas

2. See sections 86 and 89, Principles, op. cit., pages 96, 97 and 98.
4. See, for instance, sections 2 and 3, Principles, op. cit., page 62.
5. Section 25, Principles, op. cit., pages 70 and 71.
6. See sections 29 to 36, Principles, op. cit., pages 72 to 75.
7. Section 30, Principles, op. cit., page 72.
8. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 197.
10. Section 36, Principles, op. cit., page 75.
11. This footnote is at the foot of page 35.
15. See sections 77, 78, 81 and 136, Principles, op. cit., pages 92, 93, 94 and 119 respectively.
17. Section 138, Principles, op. cit., page 120.
18. Section 139, Principles, op. cit., page 120.
24. This footnote is at the foot of page 39.
25. Sections 8, 25, 137 and 138, Principles, op. cit., pages 64, 70 and 71, 119 and 119 to 120, respectively.
COLLECTED FOOTNOTES

Chapter III - The Operations and Acts of Spirit

1. Section 139, Principles, op. cit., page 120.
2. Section 27, Principles, op. cit., page 71.
5. ibid.
7. Section 27, Principles, op. cit., page 72.
8. ibid.
11. Section 41, Principles, op. cit., page 76.
14. This footnote is at the foot of page 44.
15. Section 33, Principles, op. cit., page 73.
16. Section 140, Principles, op. cit., page 120.
20. The word notion appears 18 times in the Principles - in sections 15 and 19 of the Introduction, and sections 17, 27, 68, 80, 89, 140, 142 and 143 of the main text. See Armstrong op. cit.
COLLECTED FOOTNOTES: Chapter III (cont'd)

23. Section 140, Principles, op. cit., page 120.
27. Section 27, Principles, op. cit., page 72.
28. ibid.
29. ibid.
30. Section 139, Principles, op. cit., page 120.
31. Section 142, Principles, op. cit., page 121.
33. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 193 and 194.
34. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 194.
35. Section 140, Principles, op. cit., page 120.

Chapter IV - How the relation between the "idea of" some thing and that thing is Characterized

1. This footnote is at the foot of page 65.
3. Section 41, Principles, op. cit., page 76.
5. Section 1, Principles, op. cit., page 61.
7. Section 140, Principles, op. cit., page 120.

Chapter V - How we Know the Basic Things

1. Evident from section 22, Introduction, Principles; and section 25, Principles; op. cit., pages 58 and 70.
COLLECTED FOOTNOTES: Chapter V (cont'd)

4. This footnote is at the foot of page 76
7. Section 89, Principles, op. cit., page 98.
8. Section 21, De Motu, op. cit., page 256.

Chapter VI - The basic relationships
2. Section 7, Principles, op. cit., page 63.
7. Section 146, Principles, op. cit., page 123.
8. See sections 34, 57, and 82, Principles, op. cit., pages 74, 83 to 84, and 94 respectively.
10. Section 147, Principles, op. cit., page 123.
11. ibid.
COLLECTED FOOTNOTES: Chapter VI (cont'd)

15. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 199.
16. Sections 51 and 52, Principles, op. cit., pages 81 and 82.

Chapter VII - The first principles of philosophy

2. Descartes Philosophical Writings, E. Anscombe and P. Geach (eds.), Nelson, 1964, pages 70 to 71 and 183.
5. Anscombe and Geach, op. cit., pages 70, 71 and 183.
7. Section 20, Principles, op. cit., pages 68 and 69.

Chapter VIII - The central puzzles

2. ibid.
4. Sections 22, 23 and 24, Principles, op. cit., pages 69 and 70.
5. Section 23, Principles, op. cit., page 70.
6. ibid.
7. ibid.
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
13. ibid.

Chapter IX - The initial onslaught
1. Section 1, Principles, Armstrong op. cit., page 61
4. ibid.
5. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 224 and 225.
7. Section 4, Principles, op. cit., page 62.
10. See first dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 166 to 170.
12. ibid.
13. This footnote is at the foot of page 196
16. ibid.
17. This footnote is at the foot of page 192
19. ibid.
22. ibid.
COLLECTED FOOTNOTES: Chapter IX (cont'd)

23. ibid.
24. Section 8, Principles, op. cit., page 64.
25. ibid.
26. Sections 86 to 89, Principles, op. cit., pages 96 to 98.
27. See, for instance, second dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 186.

Chapter XI - The minor arguments of the Principles
1. Section 9, Principles, Armstrong op. cit., page 64.

Chapter XII - The argument of the Dialogues
4. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 138 and 139.
6. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 138 and 139.
7. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 144.
COLLECTED FOOTNOTES: Chapter XII (cont'd)

17. ibid.
18. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 136 and 137.
19. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 139.
23. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 139.
24. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 140.
25. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 143.
27. First dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 163 and 164.
31. Section 36, Principles, op. cit., pages 74 and 75.
32. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., page 190.
33. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 220 and 221.
34. Third dialogue, Three Dialogues, op. cit., pages 220 and 221.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y


